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On the eve of the 2500th Anniversary of Lord Mahāvīra

JAINISM IN BUDDHIST LITERATURE

By

Bhagchandra Jain Bhaskar

M. A., Sāhityāchārya, Ph. D. (Ceylon)

Head of the Department of Pāli and Prākṛit
Nagpur University

Foreword By

Prof. Hira Lal Jain, D. Litt.

Formerly Professor of Sanskrit, Pāli and Prākṛit Department,
Jabalpur University



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
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To
My uncle, a great social worker,
Who Made me What I am.



LATE SHRI SHAH DEEPCHAND
JAIN NAHAR
Katara, Sagar. M P.

FOREWORD

[By Dr. H. L. Jain, Formerly, Director, Institute of Post-Graduate Studies and Research in Prākṛit, Jainology and Ahimsā Vaishali, Bihar, and Professor and Head of Sanskrit, Pāli and Prākṛit Department, University of Jabalpur, India.]

Jainism and Buddhism alike held Non-violence as a supreme virtue and laid emphasis on celibacy and renunciation. They likewise condemned animal sacrifices, preached kindness to all creatures, big or small, and strove, not for worldly prosperity and happiness, but for absolute release from the cycle of birth and death through the goal of Salvation, Mokṣa or Nirvāṇa. Both the Prophets, Mahāvira and Buddha, were Kṣatriya princes of Eastern India, and both renounced their kingdom for a life of asceticism, attained perfect knowledge through meditation and preached to the people the way to peace. Their career was spent for the most part in the province of Bihar where they were both born and died. Jina, Buddha and Śramaṇa were their interchangeable titles, and many proper names such as Siddhārtha, Gautama and Kāśyapa were common in their hierarchies.

These and many other common features misled the earlier Western historians, such as Elphinston to propound the view that Jainism was no more than an offshoot or school of Buddhism which had very wide ramifications in Asia and a much greater circle of followers in ancient India itself. This opinion, however, underwent a radical change, when scholars like Jacobi and Hoernle studied the Jaina and Buddhist systems more closely and analysed dispassionately the facts revealed by the ancient texts of the two systems

of thought. It was then established beyond dispute that Jainism was not only independent of Buddhism, but it was older of the two in its origin and development, and it was preached more than two centuries earlier than Mahāvira by Pārśva whose followers had continued to maintain their identity and religious propaganda all through the period, so that the parents of Mahāvira, and probably of Buddha also, belonged to that faith. The name of Buddha's father Śuddhodana is in itself a testimony that he was a pure vegetarian, a rice consumer, implying there by that *Ahimsā* was his creed.

Opinion is also unanimous that the two Prophets were contemporary. But, for how long, who was senior of the two and who attained *Nirvāṇa* earlier, are disputed questions. Among various calculations and theories about Buddha's *Nirvāṇa*, the two deserve particular attention. One is the reference in Ceylonese Chronicles, according to which Buddha achieved salvation in 544 B. C. The second evidence is provided by the Chinese dotted Records which go to prove that the event took place in 487 B. C. This evidence is also in accord with an earlier Sinhalese tradition. As against this, there is only one stable tradition about Mahāvira's *Nirvāṇa* that it took place 470 years before Vikrama and 605 years before Śaka i. e. 527 B. C. There is plenty of literary and epigraphic evidence to support this, and what is claimed to militate against this has been again and again proved to be based on an error or preconceived notions. There are frequent references in the Pāli literature of the Buddhists themselves that Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta i. e. Mahāvira was one of those six *Tīrthaṅkaras* or teachers who were senior to Buddha and were sufficiently famous and popular to be consulted by the contemporary monarch Ajātaśatru on matters of religion and philosophy, before Buddha could be thought of for the purpose. Not only this, but it has also been clearly stated that when the news of Mahāvira's *Nirvāṇa* reached the ears of Buddha, the latter thought it fit to

summon all his followers together and warned them against any schismatic tendencies after his death, as was allegedly happening in the case of Mahāvira's Nirvāṇa. To ignore these facts as erroneous, because they run counter to one's own fanciful theories and calculations, is not rational and logical.

Doubts and debates apart, there is no denying the fact that Mahāvira and Buddha had a contemporaneity of more than two decades, preaching in the same localities and finding some of their followers changing allegiance from one to the other teacher even more than once. This, taken into account with the fact that they both belonged to an earlier phase of the Śramaṇa ideology, would naturally lead us to expect a large amount of similarity in the teachings of the two systems and numerous references to one another in their literature. This is more so in the Buddhist works than in the Jaina, presumably because the younger were more envious of their seniors than vice versa. On the other hand, it is also a fact that the known Jaina canonical works assumed their present shape much later than their Buddhist counter-parts. Hence, whatever historical, philosophical or religious references to Jainism are found therein, they are of great importance, not only for both the systems of thought but for the cultural history of India as a whole.

This is what has been thoroughly studied by the author of the present book, Dr. Bhagchandra Jain. He is by birth and faith a Jaina and a Buddhist scholar by choice. He has not only dived deep into Buddhist literature, but also stayed long and travelled widely in Ceylon, collecting sifting, selecting and classifying his data. The book "Jainism in Buddhist Literature" was originally submitted as a thesis for a Doctor Degree, and its acceptance for the same in a Ceylon University was a strong evidence of the fact that it withstood well the scrutiny of a team of specialists. Still Dr. Bhagchandra did not think it fit to project his thesis into publicity imme-

diately after receiving his Doctorate. He allowed it, as well as himself, to ripen with age and experience, while he engaged himself in teaching Pāli and Prākṛit at the University of Nagpur. He has put his finger, not only on all the direct references to Mahāvira and his teachings, but also on all those ideas and practices which appeared to have a common basis. The wealth of information stored in this book, the scholarly marshalling of well authenticated facts, penetrating judgement, systematic exposition and balanced conclusions make the book indispensable for all lovers of Indian culture as well as for those who wish to undertake any kind of study or research work in the field.

I congratulate the author and bestow my best blessings on the young scholar from whom I have reason to expect further contributions to our knowledge on a subject which, in its own way, is of deep interest and supreme importance in the domain of Oriental Classical Studies.

Balaghat, M. P.

Hira Lal Jain

1-3-1972.

PREFACE

Nearly a hundred years ago, Weber, on the basis of some superficial similarities, came to the conclusion that Jainism was an off-shoot of Buddhism. In 1884 Jacobi corrected this view and with a thorough investigation into the historical and traditional records of the two religions, established the fact that Jainism was an earlier and independent religion of India. Although over eighty years have passed since Jacobi's researches, the much-needed comparative study of Jainism and Buddhism has not been undertaken seriously. There have been passing references to their contemporaneity and doctrinal dissimilarities as well as the role they played together as a revolutionary opposition to Vedic Brāhmaṇa. The reason for the long delay in attempting a deeper study can easily be understood. The Buddhist literary and Philosophical works are in Pāli and Sanskrit while the Jaina records are in Prākṛit and Sanskrit. Neither in India nor in Ceylon do we find many scholars who had the opportunity of acquiring competence in all the three languages. Apart from the linguistic equipment, there is the more difficult problem of understanding fully the religious, philosophical, ethical, and epistemological nuances of both religions. An adherent of Jainism or Buddhism knows his religion only; but for comparative studies, a thorough grasp of both is *sine qua non*.

My early studies gave me an opportunity to acquire an adequate knowledge of Sanskrit, Pāli, Prākṛit, Philosophy and Ancient Indian History and culture and Archaeology. While studying for my M. A. in Pāli I went through many Buddhistic texts. But these, in themselves, could not have given me the requisite qualification to handle a subject like Jainism in Buddhist literature.

When I was awarded the Commonwealth Scholarship for study in Ceylon and admitted to Vidyodaya University of Ceylon, I felt that I could undertake a comparative study between Jainism and Buddhism more successfully. I was provided with the most suitable environment and facilities for

this work. As a Jain I was conversant with my own religion and Vidyodaya, being a revered seat of Buddhist learning, the venerable scholar-monks who guided me in my researches knew all about Buddhism. This, indeed, is a very rare opportunity for one who wants to study Buddhism. That is why I did not mind giving up half-way the work, I was doing at Benares Hindu University as a University Grant Commission Scholar, on the Saddhamapundarika.

This thesis represents only the beginning of a series of comparative studies which should be undertaken in the field of Buddhism and Jainism. My attempt is to trace the references to Jainism in Buddhist literature and to evaluate the information contained therein. It has been my intention to find out the degree of accuracy and completeness with which the Buddhist literature has recorded various dogmas and teachings of Jainism.

The method adopted by me has been to examine the data in the Tipiṭaka, the Pāli Non-Canonical literature and Sanskrit philosophical works in that order. I have utilized the original texts in Pāli and Sanskrit as far as possible. Where similarities or original Jaina versions of any doctrinal point were observed, the Jaina works in Ardhamāgadhī and Śauraseni Prakṛits and Sanskrit were used.

One observation has to be made at this stage on the scope of the research I had undertaken. Contrary to the general belief, the data on Jainism available in Buddhist Literature are very meagre. Though contemporaneous, the Buddhist records have only made scanty references to both Jainism and its Tirthaṅkara or Tirthaṅkaras. These references are distributed all over the voluminous literature and the search for them has been a very arduous task whose magnitude and difficulty may not be very clear to an ordinary reader of these chapters.

My indebtedness to previous authors and translations of the Pāli, Prakṛit, and Sanskrit literature has been duly acknowledged in the references and the bibliography.

Acknowledgements

At the end it is my pleasant duty to acknowledge the help that I have received from various quarters. It is with gratitude that I record my sincere appreciation of all the assistance I received from the Government of India which selected me for this scholarship, and the Government of Ceylon and the authorities of the Vidyodaya University of Ceylon who very kindly awarded the scholarship to me and made all arrangements for not only studies but also a very happy sojourn in this beautiful Island.

I am very grateful to my teacher and guide Ven. Balangoda Ananda Maitreya, D. Litt., Professor of Theravāda Buddhism and Dean of the Faculty of Buddhism, Vidyodaya University of Ceylon, who supervised my studies and ven. late Dr. Palannoruwe Wimaladhamma Nayaka Thero, D. Litt., then Vice Chancellor, the Vidyodaya University of Ceylon who too, gave me much encouragement and very valuable suggestions.

I am highly grateful to Dr. Hira Lal Jain, Formerly Director, Institute of Post-Graduate Studies and Research in Prākṛit, Jainology and Ahimsā, Vaishali, Bihar, and Professor and Head of Sanskrit, Pāli and Prākṛit Department, University of Jabalpur, India who encouraged me from time to time and blessed this work with his valuable *Foreword*.

I am gratefully recollect the valuable help received from Dr. Ananda W. P. Guruge, formerly Professor of Sanskrit, Vidyodaya University of Ceylon and the Senior Assistant Secretary in the Ministry of Education, Government of Ceylon and at present UNESCO Expert and Professor of Educational Planning, who inspite of his busy official schedule extended all the possible help in completing my work. He went critically through the thesis before it was submitted to the University. In fact, it was to a great extent due to him that my stay in Ceylon became comfortable and purposeful.

I am also indebted to Dr. A. N. Upadhye, Professor and Head of the Department of Jainology and Prakrit, Mysore University, who helped me in every possible way in the completion of the work. He responded to my letters and queries without delay from Kolhapur while I was in Ceylon.

I am also grateful to my brother Dr. Ajaya Mitra Shastri, Reader in Ancient Indian History, culture and Archaeology, Nagpur University, who willingly went through the entire manuscript critically and made a number of valuable suggestions for better presentation. He has always been a source of encouragement to my studies.

I shall fail in my duty if I do not express my gratitude to my teacher Dr. N. H. Samtani, Department of Sanskrit and Pāli, Benaras Hindu University, Varanasi who suggested me to apply for the Commonwealth Scholarship for which I was fortunately selected. I am further indebted to him for the willing help he extended to me in various ways.

I would also like to express my gratitude to late Dr. Vashudeva Sharana Agrawala, Professor and Head of the Department of Art and Architecture, College of Indology, B. H. U., Dr. V. V. Gokhale, formerly Professor and Head of the Department of Buddhist Studies, Delhi University, Late Dr. Kamata Prasad, Jain Hon. Director, the World Jaina Mission, Aliganja (Etah), U. P., Ven. Bhadanta Ananda Kausalyayana, my teacher late Prof. B. Anomadassi, Lecturer in Pāli, B. H. U., my elder brother Sati Dulichand Nahar Katara, Saugor, Dr. Darbari Lal Kothiya, Reader, Sanskrit Mahāvidyālaya, B. H. U., Pt. Parmananda Shastri, Dr. U. C. Jha, Ranchi University, Pt. Kalaish Chandra Shastri, and Dr. Gokul Chandra Jain who, whenever consulted, were ready to help me with very useful suggestions and advice.

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I must here express my gratefulness to Mr. K. P. G. Wijayasurendra, then Deputy Registrar (Examination), Vidyodaya University of Ceylon.

Mr. H. Gunasekera, then Registrar of the Vidyodaya University of Ceylon, Mr. E. H. Disanayake, then Deputy Registrar (Administration) and Mr. P. Abeseker, then Assistant Registrar (Administration) who helped me in many ways.

I will be failing in my duty if I fail to express my gratitude to the Librarians of the Vidyodaya University of Ceylon, Vidyānkara University of Ceylon, Archaeological Department and the Public Library, Colombo, Ganesha Jain Sanskrit Mahavidyalaya Library, Sagar, Pārśvanātha Vidyāshrama Library, Varanasi, Svādvāda Mahāvidyālaya Library Varanasi, and Librarians of Benares Hindu University and Nagpur University who went out of their way to assist me in getting the books and journals I needed for my work.

Last but not the least, my grateful thanks go to my uncle, Shah Deep Chandra Jain Nahar and my brother, Duli Chandra Jain Nahar, Katara, Sagar, M. P. for the encouragement they gave me in my studies and the security they provided for my mother and wife during my sojourn in Ceylon. Without their kindness and generosity I could never have had the education which enabled me to undertake this work. To my mother Smt. Tulsadevi Jain and my wife, Smt. Pushpa lata Jain M. A. I am extremely grateful for the many sacrifices they have made to help me achieve my ambition of bringing about a better understanding of the mutual dependence of Jainism and Buddhism and of the timely role these two great religions of India can play in bringing about peace and well-being to humanity.

I am also grateful to Shri Prof. Sudhakar Pandeya, M. P. and the authorities of the Nāgarī Prachārīṇī Sabhā, Varanasi and Shri Sharad Kumar Sadhak for the help in the printing of the book. I am also thankful to my friend Shri Prof. B. V. Mohril who prepared the index of the work.

ABREVIATIONS

A	Aṅguttara Nikāya.
AA.	Aṅguttara Nikāya Aṭṭhakathā, i. e. Manorathapūraṇi.
AP.	Apadāna.
APT.	Anekānta Praveśa Tīkā.
AS.	Amitagati Śrāvaka-cāra.
ASI.	Archaeological Survey of India.
BU.	Buddhavaṃsa.
ChāUP.	Chāndogyopaniṣada.
D.	Dīgha Nikāya.
DA.	Dīgha Nikāya Aṭṭhakathā, i. e. Sumanāḡala Vilāsinī.
DHA.	Dhammapada Aṭṭhakathā.
DHP.	Dhammapada.
DPPN.	Dictionary of Pāli Proper Names.
DS.	Dravya Saṅgraha.
DSV.	Dravya Saṅgraha Vrtti.
EC.	Epigraphia Carnatika.
EI.	Epigraphia Indica.
ERE.	Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics.
HBT.	Hetu Bindu Tīkā.
HBTA.	Hetu Bindu Tīkāloka.
IA.	Indian Antiquary.
IHQ.	Indian Historical Quarterly.
J.	Jātaka.
JA.	Jaina Antiquary.
JBORS.	Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society.
JPTS	Journal of the Pāli Text Society.
JRAS.	Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society.
LT.	Laghiyastraya.
M.	Majjhima Nikāya.
MA.	Majjhima Nikāya Aṭṭhakathā, i. e. Papañcasūdanī.

MHV.	Mahāvamsa.
MK.	Mādhyamika Kārikā.
NKC.	Nyāya Kumuda Candra.
NM.	Nyāya Mañjarī.
NS.	Niyamasāra.
NV.	Nyāya Vinīścaya.
NVV.	Nyāya Vinīścaya Vivaraṇa.
PK.	Pañcāstikāyasāra.
PKM.	Prameya Kamala Mārtanḍa.
PM.	Pramāṇa Mīmāṃsā.
PMU.	Parikṣāmukha.
PSU.	Puruṣārtha Siddhyupāya
PTS.	Pāli Text Society.
PV.	Pramāṇa Vārtika.
PVA.	Pramāṇa Vārtikālankāra.
PVST.	Pramāṇa Vārtika Svavṛtti Tīkā.
S.	Saṃyutta Nikāya.
SA.	Saṃyutta Nikāya Aṭṭhakathā, i. e. Sāratthappakāsinī.
SBE.	Sacred Books of the East.
SBJ.	Sacred Books of the Jainas.
SN.	Sutta Nipāta.
SNA.	Sutta Nipāta Aṭṭhakathā, i. e. Paramattha Jotikā.
SS.	Sarvārtha Siddhi.
STP.	Sanmatī Tarka Prakaraṇa.
Sūkṛ.	Sūtrakṛtāṅga.
TS.	Tattva Saṅgraha.
TSP.	Tattva Saṅgraha Pañjikā.
TSū.	Tattvārtha Sūtra.
TSūBh.	Tattvārtha Sūtra Bhāṣya.
TV.	Tattvārtha Vārtika.
V.	Vinaya Piṭaka. Zeitschrift Deutschen Morganland Ischen- Gesellschaft.

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Antiquity of Śramaṇa System

Sixth Century B.C.

The Brāhmaṇas were dominant in society during the period of the Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta and the Buddha. Their ritualism was represented by the priest who "vigorously claimed that the welfare and, indeed, the very existence of the world, including even the gods, depended upon the maintenance of their systems of sacrifice, which grew to immense size and complexity."¹ Their "rites and ceremonies multiplied and absorbed man's mind to a degree unparalleled in the history of the world and literature occupied itself with the description or discussion of the dreary ceremonial."²

Vedic System

The Brāhmanical religious system had its beginning in early Vedic literature. The term Brāhmaṇa is derived from the root *br̥h* to grow, expand, evolve, develop, swell the spirit or soul.³ The priests, who were the custodians of such prayers, assumed a very high degree of spiritual supremacy in Vedic society and were considered to be the very progeny of Prajāpati, the creator – God (*Brāhmaṇo viprasya Prajāpateroṇa apatymiti Brāhmaṇo*). For the sole purpose of preserving spiritual leadership the Brāhmaṇas evolved a system of very elaborate sacrifices. These sacrifices were considered to be eternal and even the creation of the world was believed to be the result of a sacrifice. The rites were performed both to gain worldly enjoyment and to injure one's enemies.

Later Vedic literature

In later Vedic literature the value of the actual sacrifices was transferred to their symbolic representation and to meditation on them.⁴ Later on, Upaniṣadic thinkers observed that the nature of soul could be described only in negative terms; the *ātman* was said to be neither this nor that (*neti neti*), and was regarded as free from sin, old age, death, ⁵grief, hunger, and thirst. Its desires were true. Its cognitions were true. A man who knows such *ātman* gets all his desires and all worlds.⁶

The soul or Brahman pervaded all objects of the universe. The universe has come out of Brahman.

Thus "we find the simple faith and devotion of the Vedic hymns, on the one hand, being supplanted by the growth of a complex system of sacrificial rites, and on the other, bending their course towards a monotheistic or philosophic knowledge of the ultimate reality of the universe."⁶

The social outlook and the goal of life of the Vedic system were based on the caste system. The so-called Śūdras, the lower community, were considered ineligible to perform spiritual rites.⁷

Śramaṇa System

There prevailed, at that time, another stream of cultural current which was quite independent of the Brāhmaṇical or Vedic current and, probably older than it.

The word *Śramaṇa* is derived from "Śram" to exert effort, labour, or to perform austerity, but is mixed in meaning with *Śam* a wanderer, recluse⁸. One who performs acts of mortification or austerity is called Śramaṇa (*Śramayati tapasyaṭīti Śramaṇah*⁹).

The Śramaṇa cultural system was based on equality. According to it, a being is himself responsible for his own deeds. Salvation, therefore, can be obtained by anybody. The cycle of rebirth to which every individual was subjected was viewed as the cause and substratum of misery. The goal of every person was to evolve a way to escape from the cycle of rebirth. Each school of Śramaṇas preached its own way of salvation. But they all agreed in one respect, namely, in discounting ritual as a means of emancipation and establishing a path of moral, mental and spiritual development as the only means of escaping from the misery of *saṃsāra*.

Thus the Vedic cultural system differs from Śramaṇa cultural system in three respects; viz. (a) attitude to society, (b) goal of life, and (c) outlook towards living creatures. Consequently, both these cults were so opposed to each other that Pāṇini and Patañjali referred to them as having *Śaiva-virodha* and *Govyāghravat-virodha*.

Independent origin of the Śramaṇa cultural system

There are two principal theories in regard to the origin of the Śramaṇa cult : according to one (i) It is more or less a protest against the orthodox Vedic cult, and, according to the other (ii) It is of an independent origion. The first theory, though supported by Winternitz, Rhys David, E. Leunman etc., is no longer accepted by the majority of Jain scholars.¹²

From the survey of various theories about the origin of the Śramaṇa cultural system Deo came to the conclusion that each of them stresses a particular aspect, such as, (i) Kṣatriya protest, (ii) Organised sophistic wanderers, (iii) The qualities of the Brahmacārīn, (iv) Copy of the Brāhmaṇical rules for sanyāsa, and (v) The existence of Māgadhan religion in the eastern part of India. All these factors, he says, "helped the formation of the great wandering community of the Śramaṇas. But Deo places greater emphasis on the Kṣatriya protest against the Brāhmaṇical sacrifices. He says "The Śramaṇas did reveal anti-Brāhmaṇical feelings as they were dissatisfied with the degenerated Brāhmin priesthood¹³."

But this conclusion is not altogether correct, since we find very strong evidence, both literary and archeological, which proves, beyond doubt, that the Śramaṇa cultural system as practised by the Jainas or the so-called *Vrātyas*¹⁴ of Vedic literature, existed prior to Brāhmaṇism. The great antiquity of the Śramaṇa religious system has received less attention from scholars due to the fact that in historical times the Brāhmaṇa cult appeared to be more influential and widespread. The emergence of the Śramaṇa cultural system at this time was only a revival of an ancient religious system. This gaining of influence had been made possible through protests against the ritualism of the Brāhmaṇas. That is why some scholars assumed the origin of Śramaṇa cultural system to be a result of the protest against the Brāhmaṇical sacrifices.

Classification of Śramaṇas

The Śramaṇas (Śamaṇa in Pāli) are classified in various ways. The *Sutta Nipāta* refers to four kinds, viz. the *Maggaḥīnas*,

Maggadesakas or *Maggadesins*, *Maggajīvinas*, and the *Maggadāsins*¹⁶. Disputes arose among them¹⁶ and a number of philosophical schools had already arisen by the time of the Buddha. These schools are generally designated as *Diṭṭhi*¹⁷. The sixty-two wrong views (*Micchādiṭṭhi*) referred to by the Buddha in the *Brahmajālasutta* represent the teachings of such schools.

In the same work, *Śramaṇas* are called disputations (*vāda-sīla*¹⁸), and are classified under three headings, viz. *Tiṭṭhiyas*, *Ājivikas*, and the *Nigaṇṭhas*. These were recognised as rivals of Buddhism. The Tamil tradition also observed the same classification, viz. *Aṇuvādins* (*Pakudha Keccāyana's* sect), *Ājivikas*, and the *Jainas*¹⁹.

The *Thūṇāṅga*²⁰, a Śvetāmbara Jain canonical work, gives as many as five divisions of the *Samaṇa* class, viz. *Nigaṇṭha*, *Sakka*, *Tāvasa*, *Geruya*, and *Ājīva*. Here *Sakka* means the Buddhist, and *Ājīva* means the *Ājīvika*, the followers of *Makkhali Gosālaka*. No accounts are found regarding the *Geruya* who wore red clothes and *Tāvasa* who were *Jaṭādhārī* and lived in forest²¹. The *Ājīvakas* are no more. Only the *Nigaṇṭhas* and the Buddhists have survived the vicissitudes of history.

Common features of the *Śramaṇas*

The *Dictionary of Chinese Buddhist Terms* defines *Śramaṇa* as follows : "Ascetics of all kinds: the *Samanai* or *Samanaoi* or *Germanai* of the Greeks, perhaps identical also with the *Tungusian Samaṇa* or *Śramaṇa*." Further it presents the common features of *Śramaṇa* : "He must keep well the truth, guard well every uprising (of desires), be uncontaminated by outward attractions, be merciful to all and impure to none, be not allotted to joy nor harrowed by distress, and able to bear whatever may come."

The Buddha also says that to be *Acelaka* (naked) is not the only characteristic of a real *Samaṇa*. According to him, the real *Śramaṇa* is he who has got rid of covetousness, ignorance, and mastered the four *Bhāvanās*, viz. *Friendliness*, *Compassion*, *Sympathetic joy* and *equanimity*²². At another place he says : "The real *Samaṇa* is he who has acquired a

perfectly purified conduct in speech, thought and mode of living, by controlling the sense organs, moderation in eating, being intent on vigilance, being possessed of mindfulness, and clear consciousness, remote lodging in forests to get rid of doubt, getting rid of the five hindrances and being aloof from pleasures of the senses he enters on the four meditations one by one²³."

All these references indicate clearly that the Śramaṇa is characterised in Buddhist literature, as an ordinary monk belonging to any sect except perhaps the Brāhmaṇas. Aiya-swami Shastri²⁴ collected some common features of such religious communities from Tamil literature which are as follows:—

- (i) They challenged the authority of the Vedas.
- (ii) They admitted into their church all members of the community irrespective of their social rank and religious career (Varṇa and Āśrama).
- (iii) They observed a set of ethical principles.
- (iv) They practised a detached life with a view to liberating themselves from worldly life etc.
- (v) They could take to a life of renunciation (pravrajyā) on reaching majority.

Likewise Deo²⁵ refers to some of the features of monastic conduct which were common to all these communities. They are as follows :—

- (i) The members of such groups gave up worldly life, and severing all contact with the society, they wandered as homeless persons.
- (ii) Being least dependent on society, they maintained themselves by begging food.
- (iii) Having no home, they led a wandering life, staying, however, at one place in the rainy season in order to avoid injury to living beings.
- (iv) Lastly, they seemed to acknowledge no cast barriers, and hence consisted of various elements of the society.

The *Samavāyāṅga* refers to the ten types of conduct which should be followed by the Samaṇas. They are as follows : *kṣānti*, *mukhi*, *ārjava*, *mārdava*, *lāghava*, *satya*, *saṁyama*, *tapa*, *tyāga* and

brahmacariyavāsa. At another place, some other types of conduct has been mentioned, viz. *Upadhi, śruta, bhaktipāna, aṅga-lipragraha, dāna, nimantrana, abhyutthāna, kṛtikarma, vaijṣṇavṛtya, samavaśaraṇa-sammilāṇa, samnisadyā, and kathāprabandha*.

In the *Aṅguttara Nikāya*²⁸ the Buddha mentions three pursuits for a Bhikku : (i) training in the higher morality, (ii) higher thought, and (iii) higher insight. He then says that a monk must follow these pursuits with keenness ; otherwise his presence in the order will be like that of an ass in a herd of cattle.

Ascetics in Buddhist literature

In Buddhist literature all ascetics or wandering sects are referred to by the name *Samaṇa*. Sometimes they are also designaed *Tīthiya, Paribbājaka, Acela, Muṇḍasāvaka, Tedaṇḍika, Māgaṇḍika, Aviruddhaka, Jaṭilaka, Gotamaka, Magga-desin, Maggadūsin*. The sixty-two wrong views (*Micchāditthi*) of the *Brahmajāla Sutta*²⁹ and three hundred and sixty-three views of the *Sutrakṛtāṅga* refer to a great number of such sects. Some of these may be vedic, while others were teachings of moral sects of the *Samaṇas*.

The *Lalitavistara*³¹ mentions a list of ascetics which includes the *Carakas, Paribrajakas, Vṛddha-śrāvakas, Gautamas*, and *Nirgranthas*. A similar list is given in the *Saddharmapūṇḍarīka*³² where it is stated that *Bodhisattva* does not associate himself with them.

Importance of the Samanas

Of all these numerous communities of ascetics the *Śramaṇas* always figure prominently in Jaina and Buddhist literatures. Upadhye says : "All intellectual activities in ancient India were not confined only to *Brāhmaṇas* : there was not only *Brāhmaṇical* literature, but there was also the *Paribbājaka, Śramaṇa*, or ascetic literature. These two representatives of intellectual and spiritual life in ancient India are well recognised by the phrase *Śramaṇa-Brāhmaṇā* in Buddhist sacred texts, by reference to *Śramaṇa Brāhmaṇa* in Buddhist inscriptions, and further by Megasthenes' distinction between *Brahmanai and Samanai*³³".

Samaṇas in Jain and Buddhist literature

The *Samaṇas* in Jain and Buddhist literature are represented as "worker" (from *Śram*, to strive) in spiritual life who attain salvation through their own efforts. They are accorded high honour both within their circles and without. The *Mahāvagga* refers to *Samaṇa* who is honoured by the bhikkhus. Pāli literature mentions usually, besides the Buddha, the well-known six *Samaṇas*, the so-called heretical teachers of outstanding position in the community.

Sometimes the term *Samaṇa* is used in Pāli literature, as an adjective showing respect towards the designated teacher. The Buddha himself is called *Mahāsamaṇa*, and his followers *Sākyaputtiya Samaṇas*³⁴. So the followers of the Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta are designated the *Samaṇa Nigaṇṭha* or, to be exact, the *Nigaṇṭhanāma Samaṇajātika*³⁵.

Samaṇa-Brāhmaṇa in Jain and Buddhist literature

Buddhist literature, specially the Pāli Canon, uses a compound designation "*Samaṇa-Brāhmaṇa*" to denote a religious sect that is opposed to the caste superiority of the Brāhmaṇa community and its ritualism. Likewise, the Jain literature also mentions *Śamaṇa-Mahānāh*³⁶ and *Mahānā-Samaṇā*³⁷.

T. W. Rhys Davids rightly says that *Samaṇa* connotes both asceticism and inward peace. He is of the view that "*Samaṇa-Brāhmaṇa* should therefore mean, a man of any birth who by his saintliness, by his renunciation of the world, and by his reputation as a religious thinker, had acquired a position of a quasi-Brāhmaṇa and was looked up to by the people with as much respect as they looked up to a Brāhmaṇa by birth³⁸. Jain literature also gives the same connotation to this term³⁹."

Sometimes the term *Samaṇa-Brāhmaṇa* is also used in Pāli literature for the followers of the Brāhmaṇa community. The *Brahmajālasutta* and some other suttas refer to them as *keci Sa-maṇa Brāhmaṇā*. And in some places it is used for any follower of any sect as mentioned in the course of the sixty-two wrong views (*micchādiṭṭhi*). Thus the term *Samaṇa-Brāhmaṇa* is

used, in Buddhist literature, in a very loose sense⁴⁰. I, therefore, examined the views attributed to Samāṇa-Brāhmaṇa and found that the teachings of Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta are also represented among them.

The origin of *Samāṇa-Brāhmaṇa* is unknown, but we can trace it from the works of Pāṇini (prior to Buddha⁴¹) and Patañjali (second century B. C.) which mention a perpetual enmity (*śāśvata-virodha*) between a snake and mongoose (*ahinakulaval*) to illustrate the compound formation of Samāṇa-Brāhmaṇa.⁴² The edicts of Aśoka also mention them; but the term is *Brāhmaṇa-Samāṇa*, and not *Samāṇa-Brāhmaṇa*⁴³.

The reason of this variation in Aśokan edicts, according to Sukumara Dutta, is that "The legends were composed by those who themselves belonged to the Samāṇa class and wished to give it precedence, while the Brāhmaṇa is put first in the edict because the Brāhmaṇical society was perhaps demographically more extensive in Aśoka's empire. The accomplishments of this élite, the Samāṇa-Brāhmaṇa, are described from the Buddhist point of view in the scripture"⁴⁴.

Another reason for the relative positions of the two component parts of the compounds *Samāṇa-Brāhmaṇa* and *Brāhmaṇa-Samāṇa* may be adduced by reference to the antiquity of the Samāṇa cultural system and the subsequent growth in importance of the Brāhmaṇa cultural system. The earlier appellation *Samāṇa-Brāhmaṇa* gives precedence to Samāṇas most probably because Samāṇa cultural system was the more ancient system. The change in precedence in the term *Brāhmaṇa-Samāṇa* might have been due to the waxing influence of the Brāhmaṇa religious system which resulted in relegating the Samāṇas to a less important position in the religious life of India.

The Heretical Teachers

The leaders of Śramaṇism were referred to in Buddhist literature as "Heretical Teachers". These contemporary teachers "were doubtless, like the Buddha himself, inspired by the wave of dissatisfaction with the system of orthodox Brāhmaṇism." Six such teachers are mentioned in the Pāli Canon:—

- (i) Pūraṇa Kassapa. (ii) Makkhali Gosāla.
 (iii) Ajita Kesakambali. (iv) Pakudha Kaccāyana.
 (v) Sañjaya Belaṭṭhiputta, and (vi) Nigaṇṭha Nātiputta.

In the *Sāmaññaphala Sutta* each of these teachers is highly commended as a leader of an order (*gaṇino gaṇacariyo*). Each has been described as being well-known (*ñāta*), famous (*yassa-sino*), the founder of a sect (*tiṭṭhakarā*), respected as a saint by many people (*sādhusammata bahu-janassa*), a homeless wanderer of long standing (*cirapabbajitā*), and advanced in years (*vayonupatta*⁴⁶). Barua⁴⁷ thinks of them as philosophers or theologians in the modern sense. But in the sixth century B. C. there were controversial theories which are said to have been propagated in various ways by the Ācāryas who belonged to the Brāhmaṇa as well as the Śramaṇa religious system.

The *Sāmaññaphala Sutta* deals with the doctrines of these heretical teachers in detail. It may be noted here that these doctrines are "to be treated very cautiously; for it is evident that the authors had but a limited knowledge of the teachings of the heretics, and what knowledge they had warped by "odium theologicum."⁴⁸

As king Ajātasattu expressed his desires to know something about spiritual matters, his six ministers, the followers of the six heretical teachers one, after another, suggested that the king should meet their Ācāryas and clear his doubts. Ajātasattu then paid a visit to them and questioned them thus : "The fruits of various worldly trades and professions are obvious. But is it possible to show that any appreciable benefit can be derived from asceticism (*Sanditṭhikarā Sāmaññaphalaṃ*) in this very life ?" The answers given by them could not satisfy Ajātasattu. It was then suggested to him that he should ask the Buddha to answer the question. Hence, the Buddha is said to have solved his problem in a authoritative way.

Pāli Canon refers to the teachings of Pūraṇa Kassapa and others in several Suttas. Although all such passages are stereotyped, they seem to give a fairly comprehensive summary of atleast the impressions which their teachings had made on the Buddhists. While we have no sufficient sources from which

their accuracy can be verified, except, of course, in the case of Nigantha Nātaputta, we are fortunate that the meagre references in the Pāli Canon are the only means by which we know about the existence of two of the six teachers⁴⁹.

(i) Pūraṇa Kassapa

This teacher upheld the view that there is neither merit nor demerit in any sort of action. He says, "He who performs an act or caused an act to be performed.. (karato kho kārayato pana atimāpayato), he who destroys life, the thief, the house-breaker, the plunderer..the highway robber, the adulterer and the liar, commits no sin. Even if with a razor-sharp discus a man reduces all life on earth to a single heap of flesh, he commits no sin. If he comes down to the south bank of the Ganges, slaying, maiming, torturing, and causing others to be slain, maimed, or tortured, he commits no sin, neither does sin approach him Likewise if a man goes down the north bank of the Ganges, giving alms, and sacrificing and causing alms to be given and sacrifices to be performed, he acquires no merit, neither does merit approach him. From liberality, self-control, abstinence, and honesty is derived neither merit nor the approach of merit⁵⁰."

This doctrine is based on Akiriyāvāda, the theory of non-action, according to which the soul does not act and the body alone acts. According to Barua it is *Adhiccasaṃuppannikavāda* (i. e things happen fortuitiously without any cause or condition⁵¹). Jain Commentator Śīlāṅka considers the doctrine of Pūraṇa Kassapa as similar to the one which obtained in the Sāṅkhya system⁵². But Nalinaksa Dutt observes that "it would be wide of the mark if we say Kassapa's teaching is the same as that of Sāṅkhya, though it holds that Puruṣa is only an onlooker, an inactive agent, the functioning factor being the Prakṛti⁵³". As a matter of fact, Kassapa's teaching is so peculiar that we cannot find any similarity to the six Indian philosophies

In the *Samyutta Nikāya*⁵⁴ and *Aṅguttara Nikāya*⁵⁵ he is mentioned as an *Ahetuvādin*, which appellation is applied to-

Makkhali Gosāla in the *Samaññaphala Sutta*. He is also reported to have claimed omniscience⁵⁶.

Buddhaghosa gives some biographical data on Pūraṇa Kassapa. He says that Kassapa came to be known by his name from the fact that his birth completed (*Pāṇā*) one hundred slaves in a certain household. Owing to this fact he was never found fault with, even when he failed to do his work satisfactorily. In spite of this, he was dissatisfied and fled from his master's house. He then had his clothes stolen and went about naked⁵⁷.

The *Dhammapāda Commentary* gives another account. It says that when the heretical teachers were unable to prevent the Buddha's miraculous power, they ran away. While fleeing Pūraṇa Kassapa came across one of his followers carrying a vessel and a rope. Pūraṇa took them and on the river near Sāvattī he tied the vessel round his neck. He threw himself into the river and committed suicide⁵⁸.

(ii) Makkhali Gosāla

Originally Makkhali Gosāla was a follower of Jainism of the Pārśvanātha tradition. As he was not appointed a Gaṇadhara in Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta's order, he left the Jain Saṅgha and founded another sect called Ājīvika⁵⁹. He too was a naked ascetic.

He was prophet of *Niyativāda* (fatalism), according to which "There is neither cause nor basis for the sins of living beings ; they become sinful without cause or basis Neither is their cause or basis for the purity of living beings ; they become pure without cause or basis. There is no deed performed either by oneself or by others which can affect one's future births, no human action, no strength, no courage, no human endurance or human prowess can affect one's destiny in this life. All beings, all that have breath, all that are born, all that have life, are without power, strength, or virtue, but are developed by destiny, chance and nature, and experience joy and sorrow in the six levels for existence. Salvation, in his opinion, can be attained only by death and existence which

are unalterably fixed (*niyata*). Suffering and happiness, therefore, do not depend on any cause or effect."

The *Majjhima Nikāya*⁶¹ calls this ahetukadiṭṭhi or akiriya-diṭṭhi, while the *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* (1.127) *Darśanasāra*⁶² and *Gomattasāra Jivakāṇḍa*⁶³ of Jainas designate it as *ajñānavāda*.

The Buddha considered Makkhali as the most dangerous of the heretical teachers. He says : "I know not of any other single person fraught with such loss of many folk, such discomfort, such sorrow to devas and men, as Makkhali, the infatuate"⁶⁴. "Buddha also considered his view as the meanest one as would appear from the following comment:

"Just as the hair blanket is reckoned the meanest of all woven garments even so, of all the teachings of recluses, that of Makkhali is the meanest"⁶⁵.

In the *Dīgha Nikāya Commentary*⁶⁶, Buddhaghosa shows how he was called Makkhālī Gosālā. He says that he was once employed as a servant. One day while carrying an oil pot along a muddy road, he slipped and fell through carelessness, although warned thus by his master : *Makkhali* (stumble not). Hence he is named *Makkhali*. He was called Gosālā because he was born in a cow-shed. Pāṇini⁶⁷ describes him as *Maskarin* (one who carries a bamboo staff). *Uvāsaga Dasāo* calls him *Makkhaliputta*⁶⁸.

(iii) Ajita Kesakambali

Ajitakesa Kambali was a materialist who denied the existence of good or bad deeds. According to him, "There is no merit in almsgiving, sacrifice or offering ; no result or ripening of good or evil deeds. There is no passing from this world⁶⁹ to the next. No benefit accrues from the service of mother or father. There is no afterlife, and there are no ascetics or Brāhmaṇas who have reached perfection on the right path, and who, having known and experienced this world and the world beyond, publish (their knowledge). Man is formed of the four elements ; when he dies earth returns to the aggregate of earth, water to water, fire to fire, and air to air, while the senses vanish into space. Four men with the bier take up the corpse; they gossip (about the dead man) as far as the burning gro-

und⁷⁰ (where) his bones turn the colour of a dove's wing, and his sacrifices end in ashes. They are fools who preach almsgiving, and those who maintain the existence (of immaterial categories) speak vain and nonsense. When the body dies both the fool and the sage alike are cut off from life and perish. They do not survive after death⁷¹.

Ajita's philosophy can be compared with the philosophy of *Cārvāka*. In the *Brahmajāla Sutta* it is classified as *Ucchedavāda* (the doctrine of annihilation after death) or *Tam Jivam tam sariram* (the doctrine of identity of the soul and body). In the *Mahābodhi Jātaka*, it is said, that Ajita was born, in a previous birth, as one of the five heretical councillors to the king of Vārāṇasī. Then, too, he preached the doctrine of *Ucchedavāda*. He was called Kesakambali because he wore a blanket of human hair, which is described as being the most miserable garment. It was cold in cold weather, and hot in the hot, foul smelling and uncouth⁷².

(iv) Pakudha Kaccāyana

According to Pakudha Kaccāyana, the seven elementary categories are neither made nor ordered, neither caused nor constructed; they are barren, as firm as mountains, as stable as pillars. They neither move nor develop; they do not injure one another, and one has no effect on the joy and sorrow of another. What are the seven? Earth, Water, Fire, Air, joy and Sorrow, with life as the seventh...No man slays or causes to slay, hears or causes to hear, knows or causes to know. Even if a man cleaves another's head with a sharp sword, he does not take life, for the sword-cut merely passes through the seven elements⁷³.

In the *Brahmajāla Sutta* this theory is classified as both *Akiriyavāda* and *Sassatavāda*. According to Pakudha, good or bad deeds do not affect the elements which are eternal. Like *Ucchedavāda*, this teaching is also criticised in Buddhist literature.

Buddhaghosa says that Pakudha Kaccāyana avoided the use of cold water, using always hot water. When hot water was not available, he did not wash. If he crossed a stream he

would consider it as a sin, and would make expiation by constructing a mound of earth⁷⁴.

(v) **Saṇjaya Belaṭṭhiputta**

Saṇjaya Belaṭṭhiputta was the preacher of *Ajñavāda* or Agnosticism. He says that if "you asked me, "Is there another world ?" and if I believed that there was, I should tell you so. But that is not what I say. I do not say that is so ; nor do I say that it is not so⁷⁵."

It is said that the Elders Sāriputta and Moggallāna were disciples of Saṇjaya before they were converted to Buddhism⁷⁶. Moggallāna and Saṇjaya are mentioned as Jaina Munis in Jaina literature⁷⁷.

The Jaina doctrine of *Syādvāda* is said to have been influenced by the teachings of Saṇjaya. According to Malalaseker, "It is probable that Saṇjaya suspended his judgements only with regard to those questions, the answers to which must always remain a matter of speculation. It may be that he wished to impress on his followers the fact that the final answer to these questions lay beyond the domain of speculation, and that he wished to divert their attention from fruitless inquiry and direct it towards the preservation of mental equanimity⁷⁸". But as a matter of fact Saṇjaya's teachings are based on indeterminate characters, while the *Syādvāda* has a definite answer. That is why the Jaina philosophers criticised Saṇjaya's theory⁷⁹. We can, however, say that whether Saṇjaya was a Jaina muni or not, his teachings seem to be influenced to some extent by the Jaina doctrines. The *sūtrakṛatāṅga* does not mention his name in this context. Saṇjaya's view is criticised in Pāli literature as an *Amaravikkhepavāḍa* a theory of ecl-wrigglers⁸⁰).
(vi) **Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta :**

In the *Sāmaññaphala Sutta*, Nigaṇṭha Nāta-Putta is introduced as the teacher of *Cātuyamasāvāra*. "A Nigaṇṭha is surrounded by the barrier of four-fold restraint. How is he surrounded ?...He practises restraint with regard to water, he avoids all sin, by avoiding sin his sins are washed away, and he is filled with the sense of all sins avoided⁸¹...So surrounded

by the barrier of fourfold restraint his mind is perfected, controlled, and firm⁸⁵.

As pointed out by Jacobi this reference to the teaching of Nātaputta is very obscure⁸⁵. *Cātuyāmasaṃvara* as mentioned in the *Sāmaññaphala Sutta*⁸⁴ consists of the four characteristics of the Jainas. The real *Cātuyāmasaṃvara* belonging to the Pārśvanātha tradition, is found else-where in the Pāli Canon itself.

In response to the Buddha's question Asibandhakaputta Gāmaṇi said that the Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta preached thus to his followers or Sāvakas : a slayer of living creature (*pāṇaṃ atipateṭi*), a stealer of a thing (not given to him) (*adinnam ādiyati*), a subject of sensual passion wrongly (*kāmesu micchā carati*), and one who tells a lie (*musā bhaṇati*) are all condemned.⁸⁵

Here are mentioned the four causes of sin. In the *Aṅguttara Nikāya* the five ways of falling into sin, according to Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta, are outlined. They are : destruction of animates (*pāṇātipateṭi hoti*) taking what is not given (*adinnādāyī hoti*), passionate enjoyment of evil (*abrahmacārī hoti*), speaking a lie (*musāvādī hoti*), and living on liquor and drink (*surāmera-yamajjappamādatthāyī hoti*).⁸⁶

Both these references are neither correctly recorded nor in order. The *Nikāyas* appear to have confused between the Vratas of Pārśvanātha and Mahāvīra. The *Parigraha* (attachment to the mundane affairs), a fourth cause of sins according to the Pārśvanātha tradition, included the passionate enjoyment, was not mentioned in the *Nikāyas*, while the *Abrahmacarya*, separated from *Parigraha* by Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta, is mentioned there.

Non-violence is the fundamental principle of the Jainas which is recorded in the Pāli Canon. The Nigaṇṭhas do not use cold water as living being exist therein.⁸⁷ They take a vow not to go beyond a limited area, so that the possibility of destroying life while moving about is reduced to a minimum.⁸⁸

The *Kayadaṇḍa* (Physical deeds) is more blamable than *Manodaṇḍa* (mental deeds) in their opinion.⁸⁹ Intention (*bhava* or *manodaṇḍa*) is the main source of violence, and if the injury is caused by the body intentionally (*bhavana*), it will be considered more blamable. Meat-eating is completely prohibited in Jainism. It is said that while *Sīha Senāpati* served meat to Buddha and his followers, the Nigaṇṭhas had protested and criticised such activities.⁹⁰

Nakedness or nudity (*acelakatva* or *Digambaratva*) with a mind controlled and restrained from all sorts of attachment and the practice of severe austerities with right knowledge are the main sources of omniscience and salvation.⁹¹ Pāli literature too records the Jaina claim to the omniscience of Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta.⁹² The Pāli Canon is also familiar with the rudiments of *Syādvāda* and *Navatattvas*. Buddhist philosophical literature which developed later establishes and refutes the more advanced Jaina doctrines about epistemology and logic.

The foregoing is a brief description of the leaders of Śrāmaṇism as recorded in Pāli literature. From this somewhat scanty data it is clear that their teachings can be grouped under two main headings :—

- (i) *Ājīvikism* as taught by Pūraṇa Kassapa, Makkhali Gosāla, and Pakudha Kaccāyana and
- (ii) *Jainism* as taught by Pārśvanātha and Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta.

The doctrine of Sañjaya Belaṭṭhiputta does not fall into either of the above categories. But as Nalinaksa Dutt has shown, Sañjaya's teachings are "only a stepping stone to that of Buddha."⁹³ We shall now take into consideration the inter-relationship among the three prominent religious systems : Jainism, Ājīvikism, and Buddhism.

Jainism and Ājīvikism :

Makkhali Gosāla, the founder of the Ājīvika sect, was a follower of Jainism, before he founded his separate school.⁹⁴ It is, therefore, not unnatural for his teachings to be influenced

by Jainism. Ājīvikas and Jainas share a set of common monastic rules. Both were normally naked and both followed the same method of eating.⁹⁵ That is the reason why the Pāli literature could not make a clear distinction between the *Nigaṇṭhas* and the *Ājīvikas*. The *Sutta Nipāta*⁹⁶ distinguishes the Ājīvikas from other sects, whereas the *Majjhima Nikāya*⁹⁷ includes all the heretical teachers in the general category of *Ājīvikas*.

Buddhaghosa in his *Dhammapada Commentary*⁹⁸ describes an ascetic who knocks at the doors of all the sects including the *Ājīvikas* and the *Nigaṇṭhas*. But the same work refers indiscriminately to *Nagga-samana*, *Ājīvika* and *Acela*⁹⁹. Similarly the *Divyāvadāna*¹⁰⁰, in the story of Aśoka, seems to use the term *Ājīvika* and *Nigaṇṭha* (*Nirgrantha*) synonymously.

Chinese and Japanese Buddhist literature classes the *Ashibikas*, (i. e. *Ājīvikas*) with the *Nikendabaras* or *Nirgranthas* as practising severe penance. "They both hold that the penalty for a sinful life must sooner or later be paid so that the life to come may be free for enjoyment. Thus their practices were ascetic. Fasting, silence, immovability and burning themselves up to the neck were their expressions of penance."¹⁰¹

Hoernle identifies the *Ashibikas* with the *Digambara* Jainas. In support of his theory, he refers to *Halāyudha*¹⁰² which "enumerates a large number of names of the two divisions, the *Śvetāmbaras* and *Digambaras*...The latter are also known as the *Ājīva*, which is only a shorter form of *Ājīvika*...It is evident now, from what has been said, that the terms *Nigaṇṭha* and *Ājīvika* denote the two jaina orders which are known to us as *Śvetāmbaras* and *Digambaras*."¹⁰³

Hoernle's further suggestion is that the term *Nirgrantha* implied only a *Śvetāmbara* Jaina. This conclusion is not supported by any evidence. The verse quoted by Hoernle does not contain exactly synonymous words. It mentions the names of various schools. Basham remarks in this connection that the evidence of both *Halāyudha* and *Yādava*, including the *Nirgrantha* in the same category as the *Nagaṇṭha*,

should be adequate to disprove the theory. The term was obviously used for a Jaina of any type¹⁰⁴.

"*Nigantha*" or "*Nirgrantha*" was always used with reference to Digambaras in the earlier works. Its application to *Śvetāmbaras* was a later development subsequent to their breaking away from the original school of Jainism in the early centuries B. C.

Śīlāṅka, the commentator of the *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*, says : "They are the *Ājivikas* who follow the doctrine of Gosāla, or Botikas (i. e, Digambaras.¹⁰⁵). On the basis of this reference Hoernle rightly concluded that the later *Ājivikas* merged with the Digambara Jainas. He says "Śīlāṅka states that the reference is to the *Ājivikas* or Digambaras. Seeing that, in his comment on another passage of the same work, he identifies the *Ājivikas* with the *Terāsiyas* (Sanskrit-*Trairāsiikas*). It follows that in Śīlāṅka's view the followers of Gosāla, the *Ājivikas*, the *Terāsiikas*, and the Digambaras were the same class of religious mendicants. "¹⁰⁶

Basham, too, appears to support this view when he says that the *Ājivika* survived in Madras, Mysore and Andhra until the 14th century A. D., and that the original atheism of Makhalī Gosāla merged with that of the Digambara Jainas.¹⁰⁷

But, as a matter of fact, Śīlāṅka could not make a clear statement that the *Ājivikas* and Digambaras were the same. It seems that on the basis of nakedness, Halāyudha, Śīlāṅka etc. referred to the words which have the same meaning.¹⁰⁸

Jainism and Buddhism

As both Jainism and Buddhism were taught within the same geographical area during the same historical period, a high degree of mutual ideological influence was inevitable. The wandering of the Buddha for six years in search of enlightenment also would have brought him into contact with Jainistic dogmas.

Some ideas are found to be common to both Jainism and Buddhism. Buddhism is based on the Four Noble Truths

(*Cattāri ariyasaccāni*), viz. the Truth of suffering (*Dukkhasacca*), the Truth of the Arising of suffering (*Dukkha-samudayasacca*), the Truth of the Annihilation of Suffering (*Dukkhanirodhasacca*) and the Truth of the Path leading to the Annihilation of Suffering (*Dukkha-nirodhagāmaṇi-paṭipadā-ariyasacca*). Jainism, too, teaches substantially the same doctrines. During the twelve meditations (*Dvādaśūpprekṣā*) a Nigaṇṭha thinks of the nature of the world and soul. In this way he tries to abstain from attachment to anything so that he could attain the state of *Vītarāgātva* (freedom from all desires). *Avidyā* (ignorance), as in Buddhism, is the root cause of Karmic bondage, and release is possible through Right Vision (*Samyagdarśana*), Right Knowledge (*Samyagjñāna*), and Right Conduct (*Samyagcūritra*¹⁰⁹).

Buddhism extols the four meditations (*Bhāvanā*), viz. *Mettā* (Friendship) *Karuṇā* (Compassion), *Muditā* (delight), and *Upekkhā* (indifference¹¹⁰). The Jain Scripture declares that these should be meditated upon by everybody (*Maitri-pramoda-kāruṇyamādhyasthāni ca satvaguṇādhi-kakṛīṣyamānavinayeṣu*). They are realizable through concentration (*yogak-khamāṇṇṇiḥṇāṇṇṇi ajjhāgamaṇi*), and are free from ageing (*ajaraṇṇi*). Salvation can be attained with the cessation of the chain of causation. Nibbāṇa, in Jainism, is a condition of the pure soul, free from all bondage of karmas, peaceful, enlightened and eternal¹¹¹. Both religions believe that every being experiences fruits of his good and bad deeds in the present or future life and rebirth continues till the attainment of salvation.

Non-violence (*Ahiṃsā*) is also a common feature of both Jainism and Buddhism. Buddhism, like Jainism, stipulates that its adherents should abstain from all forms of violence (*Himsā*). But Jainism appears more strict in this respect. The eating of flesh, which is not altogether forbidden in Buddhism, is completely forbidden in Jainism. In other words, Non-violence is the foundation of Jaina religion and philosophy. *Syādvāda* and *Nayasūda*, the spirit of reconciliation, is an integral part of its theme.

Both Jainism and Buddhism hold that the Universe came into being without the intervention of the creator-God. Worshipping of the images of their sages is a common feature in both religions.

As regards the dissimilarities between them, they are so fundamental that any positive influence of Jainism on Buddhism or vice-versa is difficult to establish. Buddhism does not believe in soul, whereas Jainism regards it as an essential part of human personality and its purity is essential for the attainment of salvation. According to Buddhism, a thing which comes into being perishes in the next moment. All the psychological factors like feeling, cognition, names and concepts are discrete and momentary. The first moment is regarded as the material cause (*upādāna*) and the second the effect (*upādeya*). The combined stream of *Upādāna* and *Upādeya* give rise to the false notion of a permanent self.

On the other hand, Jainism, in spite of admitting the obvious psycho-physical changes, adheres to the belief that both *jīva* (soul) and *ajīva* (matter) are eternal. It maintains that only the modes (*Paryāyas*) of a substance are subject to change while the substance with its essential quality (*guṇa*) is unchanging and abiding. The Buddhist theory of flux has been, therefore, criticised bitterly by the Jaina philosophers.

These two religions resort to a common terminology. For instance, the word *nigaṇṭha* is used for Jainism in both scriptures. Buddhism also regard "*sabbaganthapahīna*"¹¹² as the nature of *Nibbāna*. *Pudgala* is used only in these two religions but with different meanings. In Jainism it means an inanimate thing, while Buddhism gives it the sense of *Ātma* or *Jīva*. Likewise, *Arhat*, *Buddha*, *Āsava*, *saṃvara*, *Sammādiṭṭhi* (*saṃyagdarśi* or *Samyagjñāna*) *Micchādiṭṭhi*, *Tisarāṇa*, *Noraka*. etc. are common to both the religious systems.

According to the Pāli Canon, the Buddha himself had a more favourable impression of *Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta* and Jainism than of any other contemporary teacher or teaching.¹¹³ though he condemned the Nigaṇthas at a number of places. Apart from

the fact that they arose from the same social milieu, the emphasis they both laid on ethical principles and on the empirical testing of truth seems to have made them mutually respectful to each other.

Conclusion

The foregoing discussion has brought us to the conclusion that the Śramaṇa cultural system led by the Jainas existed perhaps prior to Brāhmaṇa cult and that most of the leaders of different sects of that time were influenced by the Jaina dogmas. Jacobi came to the following conclusion on the inter-relationship of these religious teachers :

“The preceding four *Tīrthaṅkaras* (Makkhali Gosāla, Pūraṇa Kassapa and others) appear to have adopted some or other doctrines or practices of the Jaina system, probably from the Jainas themselves... Here it appears that Jaina ideas and practices must have been current at the time of Mahāvira and independently of him. This combined with other arguments, leads us to the opinion that the Nirgranthas (Jainas) were really in existence long before Mahāvira, who was the reformer of the already existing sect.”¹¹⁵

2. JAINISM AND ITS LITERATURE

Jainism is a religion based on sound scientific reasoning. It stresses the perfection of knowledge, and teaches as its fundamental doctrine, the ethical evolution of man. It illuminates the path of liberation and persuades its adherents to seek real happiness in the immortal soul. Mental purity, not the external appearance, is the source of constant tranquillity and emancipation in Jaina opinion. Non-violence is primary principle of the Jaina religion and philosophy.

Origin of Jainism

According to Jaina belief, Jainism is both eternal and universal. It is open not only to human beings of all castes and classes, but even to animals, devas, and souls in hells. According to the Jaina tradition, twenty-four *Tīrthaṅkaras* appear in every kalpa.¹ *Rṣabhadeva* is said to be the first

Tirthaṅkara of the present era. He is believed to have taught seventy-two arts (*Bhavattarim kalāo*) to men and sixty-four to women. The beginnings of human civilization, thousands of aeons ago, are associated with him².

Antiquity of Jainism

Jainism is believed to be a pre-Vedic religion. Jainas are referred to in early Vedic literature by the name of *Vrātyas*³. They are identified as the members of Śramaṇa cultural system which is led by Jainas. The *Rgveda*⁴, the oldest scripture of the Hindus refers to Ṛṣabha, perhaps Ṛṣabhadeva, frequently. Besides, the Hindu Purāṇas⁵ contain accounts of his life and these tally with Jaina accounts. As regards archaeological and epigraphical evidence, the *Kāyotsarga* (dedication of body) Yoga pose of sitting and standing images engraved on the seals of Mohanjodro, Harappa and Lothal are identified by some scholars as *Ṛṣabha* images⁶. The *Hathi-gumpha* inscription of king Khāravela refers to an image of Jaina which was taken away to Magadha by king Nanda.⁷ Similar evidence is found with regard to other Tirthaṅkaras who, too, had been historical personages of immense reputation in philosophical and religious circles⁷.

The modern scholars appear to agree with the view that Jainism is the oldest of Non-Aryan group. For instance, Dr. Zimmer says: "There is truth in the Jaina idea, their religion goes back to remote antiquity, the antiquity in question being that of the Pre-Āryan, so-called Dravidian period, which has recently been dramatically disillusioned by the discovery of a series of great Late Stone Age cities in the Indus valley dating from the third and even perhaps fourth millennium B. C."⁸

Antiquity of Jainism and Buddhist literature

There was a time when European Scholars regarded Jainism as a religion of medieval advent or an off-shoot of Buddhism⁹. Jacobi was the first to establish in 1884 the antiquity of Jainism as an independent and pre-Buddhistic religion on the basis of the data available from the Pāli Canon. He regarded Pārśvanātha as a historical person and the founder of Jainism.

But he also remarked : ' But there is nothing to prove that Pārśva was the founder of Jainism. Jaina tradition is unanimous in making Ṛṣabha, the first Tirthaṅkara (its founder)..... They may be something historical in the tradition which makes him the first Tirthaṅkara¹⁰'

The Pāli Canon refers to *Nigantha Nālaputta* as an elder heretical teacher and is also familiar with some characteristics of Pārśvanātha tradition. Besides, Buddhist literature mentions Ṛṣabhadeva, Padma, Canda, Puṣpadanta, Vimāla, Dharma and Ariṣṭanemi, the Jaina Tirthaṅkaras.

Ṛṣabhadeva is called one of the Jaina Tirthaṅkaras in Chinese Buddhist literature¹¹ The *Mañjuśrīmūlakaḥ*¹² refers to him as *Ṛṣabha-nirgranthaṭṭhin*, and the *Dharmottara-pradīpa*¹³ mentions him along with the name of *Vardhamāna* or *Mahāvīra*. It may be noted here that the names and numbers of Buddhas Paccekabuddhas, and Bodhisattvas in Buddhism appear to have been influenced by those of the Jaina Tirthaṅkaras. For instance, *Ajita*, the name of the second Tirthaṅkara, has been given to the Paccekabuddha who lived ninety-one kappas¹⁴ ago. The *Vepulla-pavvata* in the time of Kassapa Buddha appears to have been named after *Supassa* (Pāli) or *Supārśva*, the seventh Tirthaṅkara of Jains. The people of Rājagaha were called Suppiya or the follower of Supassa at that time¹⁵. *Padma* or *Paduma*, the sixth Tirthaṅkara, is the name of the eighth of the twenty-four Buddhas¹⁶. It is also the name of a Pacceka-Buddha to whom Anupama Thera offered some akuli flowers¹⁷. Paduma is also referred to by the name of Cakkavatti of eight kappas ago¹⁸. Canda, the eighth Tirthaṅkara, is the name of a chief lay supporter of Sikhi Buddha.¹⁹ *Pupphavati* is the name of Benaras in the *Jātaka*.²⁰ It would have been named after Puṣpadanta, the ninth Tirthaṅkara of Jains. Vimāla, a Paccekabuddha, has been named after the thirteenth Tirthaṅkara²¹. A king who lived sixty-one kappas ago, has also been called Vimāla²². Likewise, Dhamma is the name of the fifteenth Tirthaṅkara of Jains. A Bodhisattva who, was born as Dēva-putta in a Kāmāvacara Deva-world has also been.

referred to by this name²⁸. In the *Milinda Pañha*,²⁴ he is called a Yakkha²⁵ *Ariṣṭanemi* or *Nemi* the twenty-second Tirthaṅkara of Jainas, is also referred to in Pāli literature. The *Dhammikasutta* of the *Aṅguttara Nikāya*²⁶ speaks of Aranemi as one of the six Tirthaṅkaras (Sathāre tithaṅkare). The *Majjhima Nikāya*²⁷ refers to *Ariṣṭha* as one of the twenty-four Pratyekabuddhas who inhabited the Sigiri mountain. The *Dīgha Nikāya*²⁸ draws our attention to the name of ' *Dīḍḍhanemi* ' as a Cakkavatti. In the same work there is a reference to king *Ariṣṭhanemi* who is called a Yakkha²⁹. All these past references probably are to the Ariṣṭhanemi of Jaina Tirthaṅkara. As we shall see later, Jainism had been a prominent religion in Ceylon before Buddhism was brought there. It is therefore not unnatural if we find some places named after the Jaina Tirthaṅkaras. For instance, *Ariṣṭhapavvata* is a mountain which is identified with modern *Riṣigala* near Habarane in the North Central Province³⁰. *Pāṇḍuābhaya* lived there for seven years, awaiting an opportunity to make war on his uncles and it was near this place that ultimately defeated them.³¹

Pārśvanātha, the twenty-third Tirthaṅkara of the Jainas, who flourished 250 years earlier than Mahāvīra or Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta at Benaras, was born to King *Aśvasena* and queen *Vāma*. He is said to have attained Nirvāṇa (Salvation) on the Sammeda Śikhara which is called today the Pārśvanātha Hill.³¹ The *Jātakas* mention the names of Kings of Vārāṇasī-Brahmadatta, Uggasena, Dhanañjaya, Mahāsīlava, Saṃyama, Vissasena, and Udayabhadda.³² Pārśvanātha belongs to the *Ugravamsa* which may have been named after Uggasena and Vissasena may be recognised as his father.³³ *Brahmadatta* is also said to have been a Jaina king who devoted his whole life for Jainism. *Vappa* (*Manorathapūraṇī*), the Buddha's uncle, was a follower of Pārśvanātha tradition.

In Pāli literature various doctrines of Jainas have been acknowledged. They belong to Pārśvanātha or Ariṣṭanemi, if not to earlier Tirthaṅkaras. *Pārśvanātha* was known as *Parisajjānīya* or the distinguished man according to the *Aṅguttara Nikāya* (P. 290)

The *Dharmottara-pradīpa* (P.286) also refers to both Pārśvanātha and Ariṣṭanemi. The *Cālyāmasaṃvara*, which is attributed to the Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta in the *Sāmaññaphala Sutta*, is in reality a teaching of Pārśvanātha. Some Nigaṇṭhas mentioned in Pāli literature are apparently followers of Pārśvanātha. For instance, Vappa³⁴, Upāli³⁵, Abhaya³⁶, Aggivessāyana saccaka³⁷, Dīgha Tapassī³⁸, Asibandhakaputta Gāmini³⁹, Deva Ninka⁴⁰, Upatikkha⁴¹, Siha⁴², are lay followers while Saccā, Lolā, Avavādikā, Paṭacārā⁴³ etc. are lay women followers of the *Pārśvanātha* tradition. They had later on become the followers of the Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta⁴⁴. Jacobi, therefore, says that 'Pārśva was a historical person is now admitted by all as very probable.

Mahāvīra or the *Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta* of Pāli literature was born in Kuṇḍagrāma⁴⁵ (Koṭiggāma) of the *Mahāvagga*, a suburb of Vaiśālī⁴⁶, and an important seat of the Jñātri Kṣatriyas. He was the son of Siddhārtha and Trisālā, who belonged to the clan of Jñātri or *Naha*⁴⁷. He renounced worldly enjoyment at the age of thirty without getting married⁴⁸ and became a Nigaṇṭha ascetic. He then underwent a course of severe bodily mortification for the next twelve years and attained omniscience.

The Pāli Canon does not mention anything of the early life of Mahāvīra, but refers to the period of his mission as a religious teacher. He was called *Nigaṇṭha* in the sense that he is free from all bonds, and was called *Nātaputta* because Nāta or Nāya was the name of his clan.⁴⁹ As Gotama is generally referred to as the *Buddha*, *Jina* came to be used as the popular name of Ṛṣabha and other Tirthaṅkaras, and their adherents began to be called 'Jainas'. The Pāli Nikāyas mention *Nigaṇṭhā* in place of Jinas (*Aṃhākaṃ ganthānakilesa paṭibujjhānakilesa natthi, kilesaganthirakittā mayam ti evam vāditāya Laddhanāmasena Nigaṇṭho*⁵⁰). The term 'Nigaṇṭha' for a Jain came to be used perhaps along with the origin of Jainism itself.

Teachings of Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta have been already mentioned in the course of our discussion on the six heretical teachers. It is remarkable here that both Jainism and Buddh-

ism arose and grew up in the same province of India. The leaders of both sects were sometimes living in the same city, but they never met perhaps personally⁵¹. Their followers, however, used to indulge in discussions, conversations and debates.

The date of Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta

The date of *Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta*, like the date of the Buddha has been a subject of much controversy among the scholars⁵². The Pāli Canon has two main references which give an idea of the age and death of Nātaputta. Ajātasattu is reported to have spoken of Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta to the Buddha in *Samaññaphala Sutta* as "One who has long been recluse, old and well-stricken in years (*cirapabbjito, ādthagato, vayoṇupatto*)⁵³. Another reference recorded is that when the Buddha was at the Ambavana of the Sākyas, Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta had just died at pāvā (*ekaṃ samayaṃ bhagavā sakkesu viharati vedhāñña nāma sākyā tesāṃ āmbavane pāsāde. tena kho pana samayena Nigaṇṭho Nātaputto Pāvāyaṃ ādahunā Kalaṅkāto hoti.*)⁵⁴ Ānanda is supposed to have conveyed this news to the Buddha in a very pleasant mood.

The Chief landmark in Jaina chronology is the year of Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta's death, which is generally placed somewhere between 468 and 482 or 527 and 546 B. C. Jacobi is perhaps the first savant who tried to determine the date of Mahāvira. In the introduction to the *Ācārāṅgasūtra*, showing the differences between the Buddha and Mahāvira, he says : Mahāvira died in Pāvā, avowedly before the former (Buddha)⁵⁵. Hence, in the introduction to the *Kalpasūtra*⁵⁶ he suggests that his death might have taken place round about 468-467 B. C. This opinion was based on Hemachandra's *Parīkṣitaparvan*⁵⁷ which tells us that Chandragupta, the Sandrokottos of the Greeks, ascended throne 155 years after the death of Mahāvira. The Chandragupta's ascension, according to Jacobi, took place in 313 B. C. Therefore the death of Mahāvira must have occurred in 468 B. C. (313 + 155 = 468 B. C.) Charpentier⁵⁸ also supported his view. If Hemachandra's chronology is accepted,

the tradition of the Pāli Canon has to be rejected. Both, Jacobi and Charpentier were of the view that the statement in the Pāli Canon to the effect that Mahāvira died when the Buddha was at Pāvā was spurious. But this gives rise to a further problem in view of the fact that the death of the Buddha is now widely accepted as having occurred in 543 B. C. Therefore this question needs further investigation as the interval between the death of Buddha and Mahāvira could not have been as long as 75 years. Basham, too, is inclined to accept Jacobi's view. But he based his arguments on the *Bhagavati Sūtra* and a less favoured theory about the date of the Buddha's Parinirvāṇa in 483 B. C. He says ; "If we accept 483 B. C. as the date of the Buddha's nirvāṇa, on the basis of Mahāvamsa synchronism, the accession of Ajātasattu must have occurred in the year 481-480 B. C. The first campaign, soon after which the death of Gosāla occurred, must have taken place at some time between the date of Ajātasattu's accession and the year preceding the Buddha's death." He then suggests that 'the first campaign occurred in 484 B. C., and the death of Gosāla in that year, or in 484 B. C. On the strength of the *Bhagavati* statement that Mahāvira survived Gosāla for sixteen and a half years, this date would place Mahāvira's death in 468-467 B. C.⁵⁹'

As regards the reference to the Nigaṇṭha Nātapuṭṭa in Pāli scripture he suggests that "the Pāli record may not in fact refer to the death of Mahāvira at Pāvā, but to that of Gosāla at Sāvattī, which *Bhagavati Sūtra* also mentions as having been accompanied by quarrelling and confusion. At a later date, when the chief rival of Buddhism was no longer Ajīvism but Jainism, the name may have been altered to add to the significance of the account⁶⁰. The explanation of Basham that the Pāli Canon recorded the death of Gosāla and not that of Mahāvira appears to be farfetched.

Majumdar and Raychaudhuri are of the view that Mahāvira's death should have taken place in 478 B. C. In support of this theory they suggest that Mahāvira died about sixteen

years after the accession of Ajātaśatru, and the commencement of his war with his hostile neighbours. This would place the Nirvāṇa of the Jain teacher after the Buddha's death, as according to the Ceylonese chronicles, the Buddha's died eight years after the enthronement of Ajātaśatru. This is supported by the Hemachandra's account that places the Chandragupta's accession a hundred and fifteen years after the Nirvāṇa of Mahāvira. We know that Chandragupta's enthronement took place in 323 B. C. ($323 + 155 = 478^{61}$ B. C.).

Another attempt to date the death of Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta has been made by Hoernle. According to him, 483 B. C. is 'practically certain' date of Buddha's parinirvāṇa. Bimbisāra was murdered by his son Ajātaśatru eight years before the nirvāṇa, or in 490 B. C. Hoernle believes that for some years before this Ajātaśatru was *de facto* ruler, and the war took place not in the year of his legal, but of his *de facto* accession, which could not have been long before the murder of Bimbisāra. He accepts the *Bhagvatī* tradition of the sixteen years interval between the death of Mahāvira and Gosāla. He therefore suggests 484 B. C. for the death of Māhāvira and 500 B. C. for that of Gosāla, and for the war and *de facto* accession of Ajātaśatru⁶². The theory of Hoernle is more comprehensive, as he tries to establish the chronology of all events connected with the issue. In the aforesaid Pāli record, Chunda expressed the hope that on the death of the Buddha a similar question would not arise in his order. This fact indicates that Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta's death was thought of as having taken place at a time when the Buddha himself was very old, when the Buddhist monks were concerned about the future of the order after the death of its leader. Hoernle's theory which places Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta's death two years prior to that of the Buddha tallies with the statement of Chunda in the Pāli Canon.

The orthodox Jaina tradition which dates the death of Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta in 527 B. C. is not unanimously accepted by the scholars. The main problem with regard to this traditional date is that its accuracy depends on the correct calculation of

the commencement of the Vikrama Era. According to one view, Vikrama was born 470 years after the death of Mahāvira while his accession and death took place 483 and 568 years respectively after Mahāvira's death⁶³. Another view holds that the Vikrama Era began 410 years after Mahāvira's death.⁶⁴ According to these data, the date of Mahāvira's death mainly depends on the event in Vikrama's life which marked the commencement of the Vikrama Era. If the Vikrama Era commenced with Vikrama's birth, the date of Mahāvira's death is 527 B. C. (i.e. $57 + 470 = 527$ B. C.⁶⁵). If it began with Vikrama's accession, the date has to be 545 B. C. ($57 + 488 = 545$ B. C.)⁶⁶. If the Vikrama Era began with Vikrama's death, Mahāvira's death has to be dated as 622 B. C. ($470 + 80 + 72 = 622$ B. C.⁶⁷). If we accept the tradition, which gives the interval as 60 years, the date of Mahāvira's death will be 467 B. C. ($527 - 60 = 467$ B. C.)⁶⁸. Thus the dates of Mahāvira's death will be 527 B. C., 545 B. C., 622 B. C. or 467 B. C. This makes the entire problem rather confusing and intricate.

Jacobi refers to the traditional date of the death of Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta as follows. "The reduction of the Jain's Canon or the Siddhānta took place, according to unanimously accepted tradition, at the Council of Valabhi, under the presidency of Devardhi. The date of this event (980 or 993 A. V.), corresponding to 454 or 467 A. D., is incorporated in the Kalpa-sūtra⁶⁹. Here the view of Hemachandra's *Parīṣiṣṭaparavan* appears to be wrong as compared to the *Tiṭthogālī Paṇṇaya* which is an ancient and more reliable book. It is stated that the date of Chandragupta Maurya's accession falls 215 years after the death of Mahāvira. Moreover, on the same day, Pālaka began to rule in Ujjaini. He ruled over the country for sixty years. Afterwards Nanda's dominion is listed for 155 years. Then commences the enthronement of Chandragupta Maurya⁷⁰. But these sixty years have been omitted in the chronology of the *Parīṣiṣṭaparavan* of Hemachandra. Puranachandra and Krishnachandra Ghosa write "Hemachandra must have omitted, by oversight, the period of 60 years of king Pālaka after Mahāvira⁷¹. Hemachandra himself appears to have accepted 527 B. C. as the

date of Mahāvira's death. He says that Kumārapāla of Chālukya was born 1669 years after the Nirvāṇa of Mahāvira⁷². It is now certain that Calukya Kumārapāla was born in 1142 A. D.⁷³ Accordingly, the date of Mahāvira's death falls in 527 B. C. He has also made an attempt to prove 527 B. C. Muni Nagaraj has also made an attempt to prove 527 B. C. as the most likely date of Mahāvira's (Nātaputta's) parinirvāṇa⁷⁴.

Muni Kalyanavijaya,⁷⁵ Kailash Chandra Shastri⁷⁶, and Shantilala Shah⁷⁷, accept this date but reject the evidence of Pāli Tripiṭka. Vijayendra Suri⁷⁸ agrees with them as far as this date is concerned, but thinks like Basham, that the death of Gosālaka, and not of Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta, is recorded in Pāli Tripiṭka. The date of the Buddha's death is accepted by them as 544 B. C. But other references made in Pāli Nikāyas are ignored by them.

On the other hand K. P. Jayasaval⁷⁹, Radhakumuda Mokerji⁸⁰ and Kamata Prasada⁸¹ favour the view that Mahāvira's Nirvāṇa took place in 545 B. C. (i. e. 57 + 488 = 545 B. C.) Their main argument is that the Vikrama era commenced from the accession which took place 488 years after Mahāvira's death.

But their views are not correct as the evidence to prove 527 B. C. as the date of Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta's parinirvāṇa are rather more substantial and reliable. J. K. Mukhtar proved successfully this view⁸². The *Jambusūmicariu* and other *granthas* also support the same opinion. The Pāli records also protest its genuineness. Without going into prolonged discussion, we may now conclude that 527 B. C. seems to be more dependable as the date of Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta's death.

The Place of Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta's death

According to the Pāli Canon, which has already been referred to in the earlier section, the Buddha was informed while he was at a *Sāmagāma* among the Śākyas, that Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta had died at Pāvā. In the *Vividhatīrtha-kalpa*, Pāvā is called Apāpapuri, perhaps on account of its religious importance. In the course of his peregrinations Mahāvira came from

Jr̥mbhaka to the forest of Mahāvār̥sa. Eleven Gaṇadharas, Gautama and the rest, were initiated here. Vardhamāna (Mahāvīra) went on a fast for two days. then preached his last teachings and attained Nirvāṇa⁸³.

But there has been some controversy with regard to the location of Pāvā. The traditional *Pāvā*, is near Rājagaha (Bihar) and is now called *Pavāpurī*. Jacobi⁸⁴ thinks that Mahāvīra's Nirvāṇa took place at this Pavāpurī, while Mahapandita Rahula Sankrityanais⁸⁵ of the opinion that Pāvā is the modern Papaura village twelve miles away from Kūsinārā or Kasiya, situated on the little Gaṇḍaka river, to the east of the district of Gorakhpur. Nathuram Premi⁸⁶ agrees with Rahul Sankrityana. It is most probable that Pāvā was included in the territory of the Mallas since a Santhāgāra was built by them in Pāvā. It is also said that at this place the Buddha ate his last meal at the house of Cunda, and as a result he had an attack of dysentery. He then left the place and proceeded to Kūsinārā where he ultimately attained Parinirvāṇa⁸⁷.

The Mallas, a republican tribe of the same type as the Licchavis, were divided at that time into two groups. One having their capital at Pāvā and the other at *Kūsinārā*. The *Kolpasūtra* says that on the eve of Niganṭha Nātaputta's death nine Mallas and nine Licchavis, the chiefs of their respective tribes, were among those who went on *Proṣadhōpavāsa* to mark the passing away of the great Jina. It is further stated that they ordered illuminations on the day of the new moon saying, "Since the light of intelligence is gone, let us make an illumination of material matter⁸⁸. Since Mahāvīra's nirvāṇa occurred early in the morning, the Jāinas worship Mahāvīra at that time and illuminate the earthen pots. The whole day is now called Dipāvālī. This evidence confirms our view that Pāvā, the place of Niganṭha Nātaputta's parinirvāṇa, is no other than *Papaurā* on the Gorakhpura district.

Schism in the Jaina Order

Signs of schism in the Jaina order might have appeared at the death of Niganṭha Nātaputta as stated in Pālī Nikāyas-

The *Sāmagāma Sutta* describes the state of the Jaina order after the Nirvāṇa of Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta. Ānanda conveys the message of Cunda to the Buddha with elation. He says :—

“Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta had just died at Pāvā. At his death the Nigaṇṭhas became disunited into two parts which took to mutual strife and conflict, quarrelling and wounding each other with wordy weapons (*tassa kālaṅkiriya bhinnā Nigaṇṭhā dvedhikajātā bhaddājanajātā kalahajātā vivādāpaṇṇā aññamaññaṃ mukhasattihi vitudantā viharanti*), thou does not understand this doctrine and discipline; but I do understand it. How should thou understand it ? Thou art in the wrong, I am in the right. I am speaking to the point; thou art not. Thou sayest last what should be said first and what ought to come last. What thou hast so long excogitated is quite upset. The challenge is taken up; thou art proved to be wrong. Begone to get rid of thy opinion, or disentangle thyself if thou canst. Truly, the Nigaṇṭhas, followers of Nātaputta, were out methinks to kill”⁸⁹.

The Buddha gives the reasons of this disunity among the Nigaṇṭhas, “Their teacher was not supremely enlightened and a doctrine badly set-forth, badly imparted, ineffectual to guide, not conducive to peace⁹⁰.” The Commentaries state that Nātaputta realising on his death-bed the folly and futility of his teaching, wished his followers to accept the Buddha’s teachings. In order to bring this about, he taught his doctrine in two different ways to two different pupils, just before his death. To the one he said that his teaching was Nihilism (*Uccheda*), and to the other that it was Eternalism (*Sassata*). As a result they quarrelled violently among themselves, and the order broke up⁹¹.

What we are concerned with is not so much the reasons mentioned above for disunity, as the existence of disunity itself. The rift took place actually in the Jaina order after the Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta’s parinibbāṇa, though it might not had been to the extent described⁹². No evidence has yet been discovered to indicate that the final schism took place immediately after his death.. Therefore the passage quoted should

be examined from two angles. Either it is said in hyperbolic language or it is a later addition. The first is more likely as a rival order will naturally exaggerate any differences or disunity in the opponent's group. But the germs of schism could not have been altogether absent. However, judging from the fact that Jainism, like Buddhism, continued to be favoured by Kuṇiya or Ajātasattu, Aśoka, Ceṭaka, Seniya, pradyota, Udayana etc⁹³, it can be concluded that the culmination of these schismatic tendencies did not take place until the famine of Magadha which lasted for 12 years during the period of Chandragupta Maurya.

Later on, the Jaina order divided itself into two divisions, viz. the Digambaras who accepted the complete nakedness as the essential requirement to attain salvation, and the Śvetāmbaras who did not recognize this theory *in toto*. The first is the original sect. All the Tīrthaṅkaras including Pārśvanātha and Mahāvīra were Digambaras. All along in Pāli literature Mahāvīra is called Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta and his followers Nigaṇṭhas. The reason for this is that they claimed to be free from all bonds (*amhākaṃ gaṇṭhānakilesa paḷibujjānakilesa natthi, kil-esagaṇṭhirahitaṃ mayāṃ ti evaṃ vādītāya laddhaṇāmasena Nigaṇṭho*)⁹⁴. The rift, which began immediately after the demise of Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta, finally took shape in the second or third century B. C., when the Digambara and Śvetāmbara came to be differentiated. The *Dhammapadaṭṭhakathā*⁹⁵ refers to and criticizes both the Digambara and Śvetāmbara sects⁹⁶.

Philosophical Literature of Jainas

A proper evaluation of Jainism as found in Buddhist literature necessitates some familiarity with Jaina literature. The Jaina contribution to Indian philosophical and religious knowledge is so profound that only a bare outline of the Jaina literature can be attempted here.

We are concerned here with the Jaina philosophical literature which can be divided into four schools⁹⁷ :

- (i) Canonical School (upto sixth century A.D.)
- (ii) Anekānta School (from third century A.D. to eighth century A.D.).
- (iii) Pramāṇa School (from 8th A.D. to 17th A.D.), and
- (iv) Navya-nyāya School (from 17th A.D.).

The Canonical School

Both the Digambara and Śvetāmbara sects of Jainas accept unanimously that Mahāvīra or the Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta is the main source of their scriptures, which are said to have been collected by his disciple called Indrabhūti or Gautama⁹⁸. He died at Rājagṛha at the age of ninety-two, 12 years after Mahāvīra's nirvāṇa. Afterwards, according to the Digambaras, the successors of these teachers could not gain proficiency in all the Aṅgas. As time passed on gradually they decreased and were completely lost 683 years after Mahāvīra's nirvāṇa⁹⁹.

But the Śvetāmbara tradition claims to have preserved the *Aṅgas* and *Upāṅgas*. It appears to me that upto certain time Canonical literature would have been preserved by both sects through the recitation method, but to prove its own antiquity as the original sect, the Śvetāmbara tradition added some elements like the dialogues between Keśin and Gautam or Jāmālī episode, and eliminated some portions of the original literature. Seeing this the Digambara tradition would have completely denied their validity and announced it to have been lost.

The Śvetāmbara Canonical Literature

The Śvetāmbaras preserved a wide and profound Canonical literature, though mixed up with some elements. It consists of the following texts¹⁰⁰ :

The twelve Aṅgas : (i) Ayāraṅga, (ii) Sūyagaḍaṅga, (iii) Thāpāṅga, (iv) Samavāyāṅga, (v) Viyāhapaṇṇatti or Bhagavati, (iv) Nāyādhammakahāo, (vii) Uvāsagadasāo, (iii) Antagadadasāo, (ix) Aṇuttarovavāiyadasāo, (x) Paṇhāvāgaraṇaīm, (xi) Vivāgasuya, and (xii) Diṭṭhivāya.

The twelve Upāṅgas : (i) Ovavāiya, (ii) Rāyapaseṇijja, (iii) Jivābhigama, (iv) Paṇṇavaṇṇā, (v) Suriyapaṇṇatti, (vi) Jambuddīvapaṇṇatti, (vii) Candapaṇṇatti, (viii) Niryāvalio, (ix) Kappāvaḍaṃsiāo, (x) Pupphiāo, (xi) Pupphacūliāo, (xii) Vaṇhidasāo.

The Ten Paiṇṇas : (i) Causaraṇa, (ii) Āurapaccakkhāṇa, (iii) Bhattapariṇṇaya, (iv) Saṃthāraga, (v) Taṇḍulaveyāliya, (vi) Candāvijjhaya, (vii) Devindatthava, (viii) Gaṇivijjā, (ix) Mahāpaccakkhāṇa (x) Viratthava.

The Six Cheyasuttas : (i) Nisīha, (ii) Mahāṇisīha, (iii) Vavahāra, (iv) Āyāradasāo or Dasāsuyakkhandha, (v) Kappa or Bṛhatkalpa (vi) Pañcakappa, or Jiyakappa.

The four Mūlasūttas : (i) Uttarājjhaya, or Uttarājjhayāṇa, (ii) Āvassaya, (iii) Dasaveyāliya, (iv) Piṇḍaniṇijjuttī.

The two Cūlikā suttas : (i) Nandi, (ii) Aṇuyogadāra.

Development of Āgama Literature

Śrutakevalī Bhadrabāhu predicted during the reign of Chandragupta Maurya that there would be a terrible famine in Magadha for twelve years. To ensure the purity of Jaina asceticism, the Saṅgha decided to leave Magadha. A group of monks under the leadership of Viśākhāchārya went to South India. But Sthūlabhadra remained in Magadha with some monks. After the famine was over, Viśākhāchārya with his disciples came back to Magadha and found that the pupils of Sthūlabhadra had developed an attachment to clothes.¹⁰¹

Viśākhāchārya tried to convince them for observing Digambaratva but he could not succeed in his achievement as the Sthūlabhadra and his followers were not ready to live without clothes. Hence the schism was started in the Jaina Saṅgha. On the other hand, Bhadrabāhu, the teacher of Viśākhāchārya, with his prominent pupil Chandragupta Maurya (Muni Prabhācandra)¹⁰² left Magadha and went to South India. According to Digambar tradition, he observed there Samādhi-maraṇa on the Kalvpra mountain (Śramaṇa Velagola Inscriptions, of Śaka sam. 522).¹⁰³

After some time, according to the Śvetāmbara tradition, there were held four Councils in Pāṭāliputra, Mathurā and Valabhī where the Ācāryas tried to gather the Āgamas to the best of their ability. The present form of the Śvetāmbara Jaina Canon is said to be the result of the Second Valabhī Council held under the presidency of Devardhigaṇin Kṣamāśramaṇa in the beginning of the sixth century A. D. (980 or 993 years after Mahāvīra attained nirvāṇa.

This indicates clearly that the Śvetāmbara Āgama was not the product of one period. It developed gradually during the course of several generations. It is not, therefore, unnatural if certain things have been changed¹⁰⁴. However, a good portion of very important and valuable material compiled in ancient times remains intact. Winternitz rightly says, "The works of the Siddhānta cannot have originated during one period. The canon which Devardhi compiled, and which has come down to us, is the final result of a literary activity that must have begun as soon as the organisation of the order and the monastic life were firmly established. This was in probability the case not long after the death of Mahāvīra. The earliest portions of the Canon may, therefore, quite possibly belong to the period of the first disciples of Mahāvīra himself, or at the latest to the second century after Mahāvīra's death—the period of the Maurya Chandragupta, in which tradition places the Council of Pāṭliputra—whilst the latest portions should probably be dated nearer to the time of Devardhi"¹⁰⁵. In support of this statement other evidences are collected by Deo.¹⁰⁶

Resemblance to Pāli literature

The Śvetāmbara Jaina Canon which is the result of several centuries appears to have a close resemblance to Pāli scripture which was compiled in the first or second century after the Buddha's demise. In other words, the Jaina Canon has been influenced by Pāli literature. The language and style are good enough evidences in this connection. For instance, a stanza of the *Uttarādhyana* (9.44), viz.

Māse māse tu jo bālo kusaggenam tu bhuñjāe

Na so sukkha adhammasa kalam agghai solasiṃ.

has a very close resemblance to the stanza of the *Dhammapada* (70), viz.

Māse māse kusaggena bālo bhuñjetha bhojanam.

Na so saṅkhatadhammanam kalam agghati solasiṃ.

The stanzas of the *Dhammapada* (103, 405, 409) can be compared with the stanzas of the *Uttarādhyana* 9.34; 25.22; 25.24. Some other stanzas like 49, 66, 362 are similar to the stanzas 1.2, 4.1, 10. 12, of the *Dasavaikalika*. In the same way Puṇḍarika Addhyana of the *Sūtrākṛtāṅga* and the *Saddharma-Puṇḍarika*, *Vipākasūtra* and *Avadanastaka*, and *Karmasataka*, *Thāṇḍāṅga* and *Aṅguttara*, *Uttarādhyana* and *Dhammapada* and *Jātaka Pāṭimokkha* and *Nisītha* are very closely related to each others in subject matter. The Śvetāmbara Āgamas are called *Gaṇīpitaka*¹⁰⁷ as the Buddhist scripture are called the *Tīpitaka*¹⁰⁸ Thus the Śvetā- mbara Āgamas are undoubtedly influenced by the Buddhist scripture.¹⁰⁹

The mixture of prose and verse, fantastic descriptions of the hells, preaching with the help of legends, parables, tales, dialogues and ballads, are the main characteristics of both Pāli and Jain Scriptures. But in comparison with Pāli literature, Jain literature is presented in a rather uninteresting style. Winternitz has pointed out that "with rare exceptions, the sacred books of the Jainas are written in a dry-as-dust, matter of fact, didactic tone, and as far as we know them hitherto, are seldom instilled with that general human interest which so many Buddhist texts possess. Hence, important as they are for the specialist, they cannot claim the interest of the general reader to anything approaching so great an extent."¹¹⁰

The language of the Canonical literature is a Prākṛt called Ardhamāgadhī. The verses, like the Buddhist Canon, present more archaic forms. But the Commentaries (*Nijjuttī*, *Bhāsā*, *Ṭīkā*, and *Ṭīkā*) are in both Prākṛt (*Jaina Mahāraṣṭrī*) and Sanskrit.

Digambara Canonical Literature

The Digambaras believe that the Cannon as preached by Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta is no longer available as it was lost during the famine. But they have preserved in their earlist works, written by the ancient Āchāryas, detailed accounts of the structure and the contents of their Cannon. According to such accounts the Digambara Canonical literature is divided into two groups : the *Āṅgapraviṣṭa* and the *Āṅgabāhya* :—

(A) The *Āṅgapraviṣṭa* :

The *Āṅgapraviṣṭa* is of twelve kinds which are similar to the twelve Āṅgas of the Śvetāmbaras with the exception that the last Āṅga "*Draṣṭipravāda*" is divided into five parts : (i) Five Parikarma ; (a) Candraprajñāpti, (b) Sūryaprajñāpti, (c) Jambūdvīpaprajñāpti, (d) Dvīpaprajñāpti and (e) Vyākhyā Prajñāpti. (2) *Sūtra* (3) four, *Anuyogas* (a) Prathamānuyoga, (b) Karaṇānuyoga, (c) Dravyānuyoga and (d) Caranānuyoga, (4) *Pūroḍgalas* are fourteen : (a) Utapādapūrva, (b) Agrāyaṇī, (c) Viryānuvāda, (d) Astināstipravāda, (e) Jñānapravāda, (f) Śītipravāda, (g) Ātmapravāda, (h) Karma pravāda, (i) Prtyākhyāna (j) Vidyanuvāda, (k) Kalyāṇavāda, (l) Prāṇavāda (m) Kriyāvāda and (n) Trilokavindusāra. (5) Five *Cālikas* : (a) Jalagatā, (b) Sthalagatā, (c) Māyāgatā, (d) Rūpagatā, and (e) Ākāśagatā.

(B) The *Āṅgabāhya Śruta*.

The *Āṅgabāhya Śruta* is divided into fourteen Prakīrṇakas : (1) Sāmāyika, (2) Saṁstava, (3) Vandana (4) Pratikramaṇa (5) Vinaya (6) Kṛtikarma (7) Daśavaikalika (8) Uttarādhyayana (9) Kalpavyavahāra (10) Kalpākalpa, (11) Mahākalpa (12) Puṇḍarika. (13) Mahāpuṇḍarika, and (14) Niṣiddhika.¹¹¹

The fact that the Digambara and the Śvetāmbara traditions agree on fundamental features of the structure of the Jaina Canon establishes beyond doubt :

(a) that a Jaina Canon had been compiled, arranged and recognized before the schism, and

(b) that the traditional divisions were remembered even after the Digambaras rejected the Śvetāmbara Canon as a later innovation.

Āchārya Paramparā

The Digambara tradition maintains that its Canon was lost gradually as the Āchāryas who knew one or several Aṅgas passed away without ensuring that their pupils had mastered the Aṅgas. An Āchārya-paramparā of such pupils, after the death of Mahāvīra, is referred to by Yatiṛṣabha, according to which Gautamasvāmī, Sudharmāsvāmī and Jambūsvāmī were Kevalins (having perfect knowledge of Canon) for 62 years, Nandi, Nandimitra, Aparājita, Govardhana and Bhadrabāhu were Śrutakevalins for 100 years, Viśākhā, Proṣṭhila, Kṣatriya, Jaya, Nāga, Siddhārtha, Dhṛtisena, Vijaya, Buddhila, Gaṅga-deva and Sudharama were knowers of eleven Aṅgas and ten Pūrvas for 183 years, Nakṣatra, Jayapāla, Pāṇḍu, Dhruvasena and Kansa were knowers of eleven Aṅgas for 220 years, and Subhadra, Yaśobhadra, Yaśobāhu and Loha were knowers of Ācārāṅga for 118 years. Thus within the period of 683 years after the death of Mahāvīra all these Ācāryas are said to have been perfect in the respective Canon.¹¹²

Afterwards, according to the *Dhavalā* and *Jayadhavalā*, Dharasenāchārya was knower of partly the Aṅgas and Pūrvas. But the *Nandīsaṅgha Prākṛta Paṭṭavālī* does not lend support to this view. According to this, the Āchārya-paramparā (from Gautama to Lohācārya) is enumerated within 565 years. Then Arbhadvalī, Māghanandi, Dharasena, Bhūtavalī and Puṣpadanta are said to have known one Aṅga, and their period was for 28, 21, 19, 30 and 20 years. On the basis of this calculation Bhūtavalī and Puṣpadanta come under the period of 683 years. This view is supported by *Bṛhaṭṭippaṇikā*¹¹³ which mentioned *Jonipāhuḍa* written by Dharasenācārya 600 hundred years after the death of Mahāvīra.

(ii) Anekānta School

Fortunately, Puṣpadanta and Bhūtavalī wrote a joint work named *Ṣaṭkhaṇḍagama* of which Puṣpadanta wrote the earlier portion and Bhūtavalī the latter and Guṇadharācārya wrote

Kasāyapāhuḍa on the basis of the third *Peṇadosaprabhṛta* (*Vastu-adhikāra*) of *Jñānapravāda-pūrva* in the first century B. C. The rudiments of Jaina philosophy are found in these works which form the basis of all later works on Digambara Jainism by such Ācāryas as Kundakunda, Umāsvāti, Samantabhadra. The Canon considered as lost by Digambaras is preserved by Śvetāmbara tradition, as has already been stated, However in the absence of the original Canon, the Digambaras recognize the works of Puṣpadanta, Bhūtavli, Guṇadharācārya, Kundakunda, Svāmi Kārtikeya, Umāsvāti, Vaṭṭakera and Śivārya as Canonical works.

Ācārya Sumati is mentioned in the Buddhist philosophical literature. Śāntarakṣita refers to him in the course of Pratyakṣa and Parokṣa Parikṣā in the *Tattvasaṅgraha*.¹¹⁴ We do not know about his definite literary contribution¹¹⁵ but the above references are a testimony to his recognition as a Jaina logician. As regards his date, he is mentioned in the copper-plate inscription of Karkasuvarṇavarṣa¹¹⁶ as the pupil of Mallavādi, an Ācārya of the Mūlasaṅgha-sena-āmnāya. The same inscription refers to Aparājita as a pupil of Sumati. This inscription belongs to Śaka saṁvat 743. Mallavādi referred to Diñnāga (5th century A. D.) without mentioning Dharmakīrti's name in his *Nayacakra*. He, therefore, flourished after Diñnāga and before Dharmakīrti (7th century A. D.). Bhaṭṭācārya concludes his date as being near about 720 A. D.¹¹⁷

Pātrakeśari also is mentioned in the *Tattvasaṅgraha*. Śāntarakṣita quotes the famous Kārikā¹¹⁸ composed by Pātrasvāmin, who was also called Pātrakeśari¹¹⁹. He is also referred to by several other writers¹²⁰ as the author of the *Trilakṣaṇakadathanā* which was written in order to refute Diñnāga's theory or *Trilakṣaṇahetu*. It may be noted here that Pātrasvāmin is not the name of Vidyānanda as Pathak¹²¹ and Vidyābhūṣaṇa¹²² suggest, but he is undoubtedly a separate person.¹²³ *Śrāmṇavelagolā Praśasti*¹²⁴ mentions his name and some other inscriptions¹²⁵ refer to him after Sumati. Pātrasvāmin must have, therefore, lived after Diñnāga and before Śāntarakṣita. He, therefore appears to have belonged to the last part of the

6th century A. D. and earlier part of the 7th century A.D.¹²⁶ Śrīdatta¹²⁷ (prior to Pūjyapāda) also established the *Anyathānu-papatti* as one of the forms of Hetu in the *Jalpanirnaya*.

The period of Anekānta is marked by the establishment of the *Syādvāda* conception with greater emphasis. The *Sapta-bhaṅgi* of Ācārya Kundakunda is developed by Samantabhadra, Siddhasena, Sumati, Pātrekeśari and Śrīdatta. A complete discussion of all the doctrines of Jainism is the characteristic of this age. This was a prolific age in other religious traditions too. For instance, the Vedic philosophers produced the *Nyaya-bhāṣya*, *Yogabhāṣya*, *Śūrarabhāṣya* etc. while Buddhist logicians such as Nāgārjuna and Dinnāga were already advancing their theories in refutation of Vedic and other contemporary philosophical system.

(iii) Pramāṇa School.

One of the most revolutionary theories of this period was the concept of *pratyakṣa* as indicated knowledge. While the older Āgamic tradition accepted *Pratyakṣa* to be direct cognition, these new theoreticians rejected this view on the ground that there would be no direct cognition when the sense organs were relied upon for empirical experience. The cognition through sense organs was therefore held to be *Indriya Pratyakṣa* while only realization through mental perception could be considered *iṅdriya Pratyakṣa*. Other Pramāṇas were included in the category of *Parokṣa Pramāṇa* (indirect knowledge). Jinabhadra Kṣamāśramaṇa (6th century A. D.) divided first the Pramāṇas systematically into two types, *Sāmyavahārika Pratyakṣa* (Empirical Perception), and *pāramārthika Pratyakṣa* (Transcendental Perception).¹²⁸ It may be noted here that the word *Sāmyavahāra* originally belongs to the *Vijñānavādī* Buddhists.

Conducting logical discussion to establish one's own views is another main feature of this period. The Nālandā Buddhist university had attained fame in this direction in the time of Dhāmapāla. His pupil Dharmakīrti and others were engaged in philosophical debates with parties that were opposed to

them. The Jaina philosophy, which is much closer then other religions to the Buddhist philosophy, also came in for a certain amount of criticism. Their main objections were raised against the dual characteristic of reality according to the *Anekāntavāda* conception, which was the result of endeavours to unite all the one-sided views. The *Pramāṇavārtika* of Dharmakīrti and its Commentaries *Pramāṇavārtikaṭīkā* of Devendramati, *Pramāṇavārtikālāṅkāra* of Prajñākaragupta *Pramāṇavārtika savarṭtiṭīkā* of Kaṇvakagomin, *Tattvasaṅgraha* of Śāntarakṣita, *Hetubinduṭīkā* of Arcaṭa and other works of Buddhist philosophers had been already written to refute the Vedic views of Kumāṛila, Iśvarasena and Maṇḍanamiśra, and the Jaina views of Umāsvāmi, Samantabhadra and Siddhasena. At this critical moment Ācārya Akalaṅka and Haribhadra entered the field of controversy against the opponents of Jainism.

Mahendra Kumara established the view that the age of Haribhadra lies from 720 A. D. to 810 A. D. and that Akalaṅka flourished in 720-780 A. D. Both these great philosophers defended Jainism and in due course formulated a Jaina philosophical ideology on the basis of Syādvāda and Non-violence¹²⁹.

Here the personality of Akalaṅka, who is mentioned only once in Buddhist literature, (DHP. p. 246) is very significant. His literary contribution is profound and extensive. All his works *Tattvārthavārtika*, *Aṭṭaśālī*, *Laghiyastrayasavarṭti*, *Nyāyaviniścaya Savarṭti* *Siddhiviniścaya*, *Pramāṇasaṅgraha*, etc. "Stand as eloquent testimony to his penetrating mind and show a remarkable advancement in Jaina logic. He had a chivalrous disposition to help the people misled by the Buddhists. In his writings he was very satirical and caustic about Buddhists, particularly about Dharmakīrti, in retorting the euphemistic criticism of Syādvāda by Dharmakīrti."¹³⁰ Haribhadra and his works such as *Sāstravārtāsamuccaya*, *Anekāntajayapatākā* and *Anekāntāvādapraveśa*, also bear the same characteristics. The later Jaina philosophers developed the Jain philosophy of both these Ācāryas, Akalaṅka and Haribhadra on their own ways.

Thus the *pramāṇa* school saw the establishment of several new philosophical theories and doctrines. The theory of *Syādvāda* and *Pramāṇas* was further developed by Akalaṅka and his followers, and they defended *Syādvāda* which was bitterly criticised by rival philosophers, using the principles of *Syādvāda* itself for the purpose.

The foregoing is a brief outline of Jaina philosophical literature. It is to be remembered here that Jaina literature was of later origin than Vedic and Buddhist literature. Jain literature came to be written while the Vedic and Buddhist philosophers were engaged in debates. Therefore it was naturally influenced by them. The Jain philosophers came into contact with many Buddhist philosophers. That is the reason why the major part of Jaina literature is devoted to the refutation of Buddhist doctrines.

Spread of Jainism

Pāli literature refers generally to northern provinces of India where Buddhism originated and developed. Some facts relating to Jainism, which are found scattered in Buddhist literature, throw light on the expansion of Jainism during the time of the Buddha. It may be noted here that Jainism had already been established as a religion in various provinces of India before the Buddha began his mission. But Pāli literature records only the discussions the Buddha had with certain Jaina followers he met, and not the Jaina doctrines *in toto*.

Magadha was a center of missionary activities of all heretical teachers.¹⁸¹ The Buddha also selected this province for the propagation of his teachings. *Rājagaha* and *Nālandā* were the main places where the Buddha had to face the Nigaṇṭhas as strong rivals. Bimbīśāra was supposed to have been in favour of both the religions. The Buddha came across the Jain ascetics at Kālasilā on the side of Isigili mountain in *Rājagaha*. They were practising severe act of self-mortification with the idea of eradicating the past Kammas and attaining salvation. The Buddha could not convince them against their views.¹⁸²

But he was able to convert *Upāli Gahapati*,¹³³ *Abhayarājakumāra*,¹³⁴ and *Asibandhakaputta Gāmini*,¹³⁵ the lay devotees of the Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta. *Dīghatāpassī*, a Jain monk, is reported not to have changed his religion, though he was convinced by Buddha. (M. i, 371), *Nigrodha* is said to be a follower of Ājīvikism who practised asceticism including *Cātuyāmasamvara* of Jainism. He appears to have been a follower of Jainism and a supporter of Ājīvikism. Whatever that be, he also could not be converted to Buddhism.¹³⁶ The above incidents happened in Rājagaha and Nālandā. Most of the discourses given here by the Buddha were mainly to refute the teachings. This shows that Jainism in Magadha was on a firm footing, since the Buddha could not win over a number of followers of the Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta.

Kosala was ruled over by Pasenadi during the Buddha's time. He respected all the six Tīthiyas.¹³⁷ Buddha spent twenty-one Vassas in Kosala. In addition, he visited this place several times. Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta also had a good number of followers here. Sāvattī and Sāketa were the main places where the Buddha came into contact with the Jainas.

In *Sāvattī* there was a very rich Setṭhi named *Migāra* who was a staunch follower of Jainism. His son's wife Visākha was perhaps a follower of Buddhism. She is said to have persuaded her father-in-law, Migāra, and other members of the family to be converted to Buddhism.¹³⁸ Another Setṭhi named Kālaka, the son-in-law, of Anāthapiṇḍaka, living in Sāketa is also described as having given up the faith of Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta and embracing the religion of the Buddha.¹³⁹

The Śākyaas were politically an independent entity. *Kapilavattī* was the birth-place of the Buddha, but the Śākyaas, were not strongly in favour of his doctrines. On the other hand, Jainism was very popular here since the Buddha's parents and their people were followers of Pārśvanātha tradition. But the Buddha and his followers tried to convert the people from their faith. *Mahānāma*, perhaps a relative of the Buddha, was an adherent of Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta's religion. The Buddha

pointing out the uselessness of severe mortification made an attempt to convert him¹⁴⁰ and ultimately he succeeded in doing so. Hence both the *Cūḷa-Dūkkhaṇḍa Sutta* and *Sekha Sutta* were preached to Mahānāma.

Devadaha was an important town in the eyes of the Jain mission. Here also the Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta's view, the theory of Kamma, is reported to have been refuted by the Buddha¹⁴¹. But no follower of Jainism, except *Vappa Śākya*¹⁴², the Buddha's uncle who was converted by Moggallāna, is mentioned in the Nikāyas as having given up Jainism. The fact that the Buddha laid down special rules for the entry of Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta's followers to the Saṅgha, however, seems to indicate that a number of Nirgranthas were converted to Buddhism.

The *Licchavi*s had a republican form of government, and *Vaisālī* was their capital. Since Pārśvanātha's time it had been a centre of Jainism.¹⁴³ Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta and his Nāta clan were very closely related to the Licchavis. He was very much influential in his home town, Vesālī. In the course of missionary activities Jainism came into contact with Buddhists of Vesālī. Saccaka¹⁴⁴, a highly respected follower of Jainism was defeated by the Buddha in a religious disputation, *Sallaka*'s parents also were followers of Jainism.¹⁴⁵ On the other hand, *Abhaya* and *Paṇḍita Kumāra*¹⁴⁶ were not satisfied with the answers given by their opponents.¹⁴⁷ *Sīha*, a general of the Licchavis, was of course, impressed by the Buddha's discourse and he became his follower. In spite of active opposition of the Nigaṇṭhas, the Buddha continued his work of conversion of the Licchavis to the newly established religion.

The *Mallas*, like Licchavis, were republican tribe. They were divided into two groups, the Mallas of Pāvā, and the Mallas of Kusinārā, They were followers of both Jainism and Buddhism. The Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta's nirvāṇa took place in Pāvā¹⁴⁸ and the Mallas and Licchavis as a mark of honour, illuminated the place with earthen pots. This indicates that the Mallas were well disposed towards the Jainas.

The Jainas carried on their missionary work in *Varāṇasī*, *Mithilā*, *Simhabhūmi*, *Kausāmbī*, *Avantī* etc. but Pāli literature makes no reference to Jain activities in these centres. Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta wandered about in Bihar and some part of Bengal and Uttar Pradesh in the course of his missionary activities which commenced immediately after the attainment of Kevaljñāna. He got much help from his maternal uncle Ceṭaka, king of Vesālī and his son-in laws Udayana, Dadhivāhana Sātanika, Caṇḍa Pradyota, Nandivardhana and Bimbisāra.

After Mahāvira

After Mahāvira's parinirbāṇa, Jainism was patronized by Śaisunāges, Nandas, Khārvela, Mauryas, Sātavāhanas, Guptas, Paramāras, Chandelas and others. Some of them were followers of Jainism while others provided all possible facilities to develop its literary and cultural activities. The Southern part of India was also a great centre of Jainism. Bhadrabāhu and Viśākhācārya with their disciples migrated to the South and propagated Jainism a lot. Āndhra Sātavāhanas, Pallavas Pāṇdyas, Colas, Cālukyas, Raṣṭrakūṭas, etc. were main dynasties which rendered sufficient royal patronage and benefits to Jainism and its followers through the spirit of religious toleration existed in this region. The Jainas were given magnificent grants for their spiritual purpose. Numerous Jain temples and sculptures were erected by kings and many facilities were provided for literary services through out India. As a result the Jain Ācāryas wrote their ample works in Sanskrit, Prākṛit, Tamil, Telugu, Kannada, Apabhraṁśa and modern Indian languages.

Jainism in Ceylon

Jainism crossed India from south in about the eighth century B. C. if not earlier, and became one of the important religions of Ceylon, which was known in those days by the name of *Laṅka Ratnadvīpa* or *Siṃhala*.¹⁴⁹

The *Mahāvamsa*, the best-known and most authoritative Ceylonese Chronicle in Pāli verse, refers to the existence of Jainism in Ceylon even before the arrival of Buddhism. It is said there that Vijaya and his followers had to face the opposition of Yakkhiṇis in their attempt to establish their kingdom in Laṅkā. After the passing away of Vijaya, Paṇḍuvāsudeva, and Abhaya Paṇḍukābhaya captured the whole Island with the help of a Yakkhaṇi named Cetiya who lived in the Dhūma-rakkha mountain near Tumbarāṇyana. Paṇḍukābhaya then settled his helpers, Yakkhas and Yakkhiṇis in various sides of the city of Anurādhāpura, a capital of Laṅkā. He is also said to have handed over some cities to his relatives. He then made the appointment of hundreds of Caṇḍālas to work in the city and erected a cemetery for them. Eastward of that cemetery Paṇḍukābhaya built a house for the Nigaṇṭha *Jotiya*. In the same reign there dwelt another Nigaṇṭh named *Giri* and many other ascetics of various heretical sects. At the same place there was also built a chapel for the Nigaṇṭha *Kumbhaṇḍaka*. Towards the west from thence and eastward of the street of the huntsmen there lived about five families of heretical beliefs (*nūnāpasaṇḍikā*¹⁵⁰).

The five hundred families of heretical beliefs and the construction of Vihāras to the Nigaṇṭhas on behalf of the king of Laṅkā, Paṇḍukābhaya, indicate clearly that Jainism was a living religion in Ceylon during his reign. Paṇḍukābhaya's period, deduced on the basis of the date of Buddha's death as 544 B. C., is supposed to be 438-368 B. C. Jainism had apparently been introduced to Ceylon before Paṇḍukābhaya. It could have been even before the arrival of Vijaya. One may wonder whether a name like *Ariṭṭha* (i. e. that of Devānaṁpiya Tissa's minister) had any connection with the Jaina Tirthaṅkara of that name.¹⁵¹

Jainism continued to exist even after the establishment of Buddhism in the Island. Its existence during the first century B. C. is recorded in the *Mahāvamsa*. It is said that after a battle with the Tamils, king Vaṭṭhaḡāmini Abhaya who was

defeated fled out of the city. A Nigaṇṭha named *Giri* saw him and cried out loudly "The great black *Siṃhala* is running away" (*paḷayati mahākāla Siṃhala ti bhusaṃ ravi*). When the great king heard this he thought "If my wish be fulfilled I will build a *Vihāra* here" (*sidhe mama manorathe viḥāraṃ kāressaṃ*)¹⁵² Hence, after a few years when he drove away the *Damila Daṭṭhika* from *Anurādhāpura* and regained his throne, he destroyed the *Jaina* monastery and built *Abhaya-giri Vihāra* in that place.¹⁵³

According to the *Mahāvamsa Tīkā*, this monastery was the scene of a tragedy in the time of *Khallāṭanāga*, predecessor of *Vaṭṭagāmini*. This king, when he discovered a plot against his life by his nephew, went to *Giri's* monastery and ended his life by burning himself. At the spot, where this event occurred, *Khallāṭanāga's* kinsman built a *Cetiya* called the *Kurundavāsokā Vihāra*,¹⁵⁴

Jaina tradition takes the history of *Jainism* in *Ceylon* to *Anera* anterior to that reflected by the *Ceylon Chronicles*. According to *Jaina* records, the *Yakṣas* and *Rākṣasas* who inhabited *Ceylon* prior to its *Aryanization* by *Vijaya* were not only human beings with a well-developed civilization but also *Jainas* by faith¹⁵⁵. The *Vividhaṭṭhakaḷpa* mentions that at *Trikūṭagiri* in *Kiṣkindhā* of *Laṅkā* there was magnificent *Jain* temple which was dedicated by *Rāvaṇa*, for the attainment of supernatural powers (*Kiṣkindhīyīm Laṅkāyāḥ paṭalaṅkāyām Tri-kūṭagrīrau Śrīśāntinūthah*). To fulfil a desire of *Mandodari*, the principal queen, *Rāvaṇa* is said to have erected a *Jaina* statue out of jewels and this, it is said, was thrown into the sea when he was defeated by *Rāmachandra*. *Śaṅkara*, a king of *Kalyaṇanagara* of *Kannāḍa*, came to know about this statue and he recovered it from the bottom of sea with the help of *Padmāvatidevi*, a prominent Goddess of *Jainas*¹⁵⁶.

It is said that the statue of *Pārśvanātha* which is worshipped even now at *Śrīpura* *Antarikṣa* (*India*) was brought by *Māli* and *Sumāli Vidyādhara* from *Laṅkā*.¹⁵⁷ Another statue of *Pārśvanātha* found in the caves of *Terapura* is also said to

be from Laṅkā.¹⁵⁸ The *Karakaṇḍucariu* describes how Amita-vega, a Jaina king of Malaya, used to visit Laṅkādvīpa as an intimate friend of Rāvaṇa who built a Jaina temple in malaya.¹⁵⁹ This Malaya can be identified with Malaya, the name of the central hill country of Ceylon.

These references seem to point out that Jainism existed in Ceylon even before the birth of the Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta. Vibhiṣaṇa, the younger brother of Rāvaṇa, who was a follower of Jainism according to Jain tradition and literature, is referred to as the tutelary Yakṣa of Ceylon (*Vibhiṣaṇastāmraparaṇi-yarū*) in the *Mahāmāyūrī*, a magical text of Northern Buddhists, which was translated into Chinese in the fourth century A. D. Vibhiṣaṇa is still worshipped at Kelaniya and is supposed to be one of the four guardian deities of the Island.

Although the supremacy which Buddhism achieved in Ceylon could have led to the suppression of Jainism and incidents similar to the destruction of Giri's monastery by Vaṭṭa-Gāmiṇī Abhaya could have occurred at different times, Jainism did not disappear from Ceylon till at least after the eighth century. About the tenth century A. D.¹⁶⁰ Muni Yaśaḥkīrti was requested by the then king of Ceylon to improve the state of Jainism in the Island.¹⁶¹ This shows that Jainism not only was in existence at that time in Ceylon, but it also enjoyed the patronage of Sinhala kings of Ceylon.

As regards the Jaina monuments in Ceylon, the view of S. Parnavitana, an authoritative scholar on Ceylon Archaeology, are relevant :

"No remains of any Jaina monuments have ever been found in Ceylon. The earliest Stūpas and Vihāras of Jainism did not differ from those of Buddhism so much so, that without the evidence of inscriptions or of iconography it would be extremely difficult to differentiate between the two. Jain iconography had not yet developed in the times that we are dealing with. In the period during which this religion was prevalent in Ceylon, there were no monuments built of durable materials. Moreover, when Jainism disappeared, their places-

of worship must have been appropriated by the Buddhists as it happened with regard to the monastery of Giri, and any traces of the earlier faith would certainly have been obliterated in this way. Some of the earliest unidentified stūpas of small dimensions may, however, be Jaina in origination."¹⁶²

These meagre bits of evidence prove that Jainism existed in Ceylon from at least eighth century B. C. If any credit is given to the legends of Rāvaṇa, the upper limit may be extended by a few more centuries. If the historicity of these legends is established it would be interesting to find that early Jainism which preceded Pārśvanātha had also founded a foothold in Ceylon.

BUDDHISM AND ITS LITERATURE

The Buddha and Buddhism

Buddhism is a part of purification based on the *Majjhima paṭiḍḍā* (Middle path) which avoids the two extremes *Kāmesu kāma sukhallakanyoga* (the attitude of sensual indulgence) and *Attakulamathānuyoga* (asceticism and self-mortification). This doctrine was enunciated by the historical personality of Gautama, the Buddha in the sixth century B. C.¹

Source of Buddhism

There is no consensus of opinion among scholars regarding the source of Buddhism, because Buddhism has been influenced by all the philosophical schools prevalent at that time. As Oldenberg says : "Hundreds of years before Buddha's time, movements were in progress in Indian thought, which prepared the way for Buddhism."²

The Buddha, before gaining enlightenment, went to Ālāra Kālāma and Uddaka under whom he followed their religious observances. Ālāra Kālāma is supposed to be the Ācārya of Sāṅkhya philosophy. But Keith, while pointing out several similarities between Sāṅkhya and Buddhism, says that "the proof of Sāṅkhya influence is obviously indirect and not in itself complete."³ Oldenberg also thinks in a somewhat similar way.⁴

On the other hand, Jacobi is of opinion that Buddhism has been derived from a corresponding theory of the forerunners of Jainism.⁵ Pande also accepts this view though not very emphatically.⁶ This view can be supported by reference to Pāli literature itself. After being dissatisfied with the teachings of Ālāra Kālāma and Uddaka Rāmaputta, the Buddha went at last to mount Gayā-Uruvelā. Following the others, he himself occupied a spot beside the Nairāñjarā river and with full purpose of heart he set himself the task of enduring self-mortification, restraining every bodily passion, and giving up thought about substance. With purity of heart, he observed the rules of fasting which no worldly man can bear. Silent and still, lost in thoughtful meditation, he spent six years.⁷ He himself says that he experimented with the four types of religious practices of severe penance (*tapā*), selfmortification (*lukha*), avoidance (*jegucchā*), and seclusion (*pavivittā*).⁸ Here *avoidance* appears to be a reference to Jainism for it is said "I used to walk up and down conscientiously extending my compassion even to a drop of water, praying that even the dangerous bacteria in it may not come to harm."⁹ "Such practices are mentioned at another place in the *Majjhima Nikāya*.¹⁰ We shall compare them later with Jain practices in the chapter on Ethics. These may bear testimony to the Jain view that the Buddha was a Jain muni at a certain stage of his ascetic life.

Ācārya Devasena (8th century) says that the Buddha was a great learned disciple of the saint Pihitāsraṇa who ordained him as muni Buddhakīrti in the Saṅgha of Pārśva-nātha, the twenty-third Tirthaṅkara of the present era. But after a time the Buddha started taking flesh and dead fish as food and putting on a red cloth, he preached his own Dhamma, saying that there was no harm in taking such food.

Siripāsaṇāhatitthe sarayūtīre palāsaṇayaraṭṭho.

Pihiyā sabassa sismo mahasudo buddhakittimurṇo.

Timi pūraṇāsaṇehim ahigayapvajjāoparihaṭṭo.

Rattam varaṇṇ dharittā pavatṭhiyam teṇa eyantaṇ.

Māmsassa natthi Jīvo jahā phale dahiya-duddhasakkarāe.
 Tamhā taṃ vāṃchittā taṃ bhakkhanto na pāviṭṭho.
 Majjaṃ na vajjanijjaṃ davadavvaṃ jahājalaṃ taḥā edaṃ.¹¹
 Idi'loe ghositta pavatthiyaṃ sabbasāvajjaṃ.

There is, however, no direct admission of this fact in any of the Buddhist texts, although the Buddha's own account of his six years of penance leaves little doubt as to the possibility of his being influenced by the doctrines of Jainism. It is also possible that the Buddha's attitude to meat-eating as well as to other forms of ultra-strict restrictions on human conduct (as seen also from his controversy with Devadatta in respect of the five rules, Pañcavattbu) was the reason for the establishment of a new religion where self-mortification is denounced as vulgar and futile.

Buddhist Literature

Buddhist literature is rich and varied and is found in several ancient and modern languages such as Pāli, Prākṛit, Sanskrit, Tibetan, Chinese, Nepalese, Japanese, Sinhala, Burmese, Thai, Combodian, Uigur, Sogdian, Kuchanese and other languages of Central Asia. But for this survey our attention will be confined only to the Buddhist literature in Pāli and Sanskrit.

Buddhist literature can be classified as follows :—(i) Pāli literature consisting of (a) Canonical, (b) Extra Canonical, and (c) Non-Canonical works. The last is further divided into (a) Aṭṭhakathās, (b) Tikās, (c) Tippanīs, (d) Saṅgahas, and (e) Pakaraṇas. (2) Sanskrit literature consisting of (a) Hinayāna, and () Mahāyāna works.

Pāli literature

The Pāli Canon, which represents the Theravāda Buddhism, is popularly known as Tipiṭaka, the three baskets;¹² the three *Piṭakas* (Baskets-or) parts, are the Vinaya Piṭaka, Sutta Piṭaka and the Abhidhamma Piṭaka. Like most other literary works of Ancient India, the *Tipiṭaka* too grew gradually over a period of several centuries. The three Councils stand out as landmarks in the process of its growth and development. It is generally

accepted by scholars today that the *Tripiṭaka*, as we have it, including *Kathavatthu*, the last work to be attached to it by the Chairman of the Council himself, was accomplished shortly after the Third Council. During the Third Council it was decided to propagate Buddhism abroad. Mahinda, a pupil of Tissa and a son (according to another tradition, the younger brother) of Aśoka, was appointed to introduce Buddhism into Ceylon. In Ceylon, the Canon was preserved through oral tradition until it was reduced to writing in 84 B. C. during the reign of king Valagamba.¹³

The *Vinaya Piṭaka* is the head of the Canon and is considered earlier than the *Sutta Piṭaka* ¹⁴ It deals with rules and regulations to be observed by the members of the Buddhist order in their daily life. The *Vinaya* comprises three main parts : (i) *Suttavibhaṅga*, consisting of (a) *Mahāvibhaṅga*, and (b) *Bhikkhuvibhaṅga*. (ii) *Khandaka*, consisting of (a) *Mahāvagga*, and (b) *Cullavagga*. (iii) *Parivāra* or *Parivārapāṭha*,

The *Pātimokkha* is the main part of the *Vinaya Piṭaka*. It is said that the life of a good monk "is restrained by the restraints of the *Pātimokkha*". (*pātimokkhasaṃvāsaṃvuto*).¹⁵ It contains 227 rules out of which 152 were probably original while the remainder may have been added at the time of the compilation of the *Vinaya Piṭaka*. The *Suttavibhaṅga* is a commentary on the *Pātimokkha*. It deals with *Pārājikadhamma*, *Saṅghādisesadhamma*, *Aniyatadhamma*, *Pācittiyadhamma*, *Paṭidesanīyadhamma* and *Sekhiyadhamma*. The *Khandhaka* is the supplement of the *Suttavibhaṅga*. It contains the special rules for admission into the order, the Buddhist ceremonies such as *Uposatha*, modes of eating, begging, dwelling etc. The *Parivāra* is of later origin. It consists of nineteen sections.

The Buddhist monachism as an institution was influenced by the Jaina monastic rules and regulations. For instance, *Vassāvāsa*, *Uposatha*, *Pavāraṇā* and rules for admission to the order, are very similar to the rules of Jaina monachism. One may, therefore, expect many references to Jainism in the

Tipiṭaka. But the direct references to Jain monachism are very few in the *Vinaya Piṭaka*.

The Sutta Piṭaka is the chief source of our knowledge of the Dhamma; it is, therefore, called Dhamma. It is divided into five Nikāyas, viz. *Dīgha*, *Majjhima*, *Saṃyutta*, *Aṅguttara* and the *Khuddaka*. The first four are mainly in prose and contain discourses, attributed to the Buddha and his disciples. The remaining Nikāya is a miscellaneous collection of smaller works, most of which are in verse. The *Dīgha Nikāya* contains the longest thirty-four Suttas arranged into three parts (*Vaggas*), viz. *Sīlakkhandha* (1-13), *Mahāvagga* (14-23) and *Pāṭikavagga* (24-34). In several Suttas of *Dīgha Nikāya* there are references to Jainism and particularly to Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta. The most significant among them are the *Brahmajāla*. (1) *Sāmaññaphala*, (2) *Kassapasihanāda* (8), *Mahāparinibbāna* (16), *Pāṭikasutta* (54) *Pāsādikasutta* (21), *Āṭānāṭiya* (32), and *Saṅgīti Sutta*, which provide invaluable data on the life and thoughts of Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta. The *Majjhima Nikāya* is a collection of 152 discourses. The *Cūlasihanāda* (11), *Cūlasaccaka*, (35) *Mahāsaccaka* (86) *Upāli*, (56) *Kukkuravattika*, (55) *Abhayarājakumāra*, (58) *Dighanakha*, (71) *Sandaka*, (76) *Cūlasakuladāyī*, (79) *Devadaha* and (101) *Sāmagāma* (104) contain references to Syādvāda and other Jain conceptions, and are, therefore, helpful in assessing in greater detail the Buddhist attitude to Jainism. The *Saṃyutta Nikāya* and *Aṅguttara Nikāya* consist of various types of Suttas. They are older as well as later, shorter as well as longer. The *Saṃyutta* (grouped together) *Nikāya* is of 56 *Saṃvuttas* and at least 2,990 Suttas with the division of five *Vaggas*, viz. the *Sagāthavagga* (1-11), *Nidānavagga* (12-22), *Khandhavagga* (23-34), *Saḍāyatanavagga* (35-45) and *Mahāvagga* (45-56). *Saṅkha-dhammasutta*, *Acelakassapasutta*, *Acelasutta*, *Sattajatilasutta* and *Nānātitthiyasutta* refer to Jain ethics and philosophy. The *Aṅguttara Nikāya* is very similar to the *Thāṇāṅga* of the Jains. It deals mainly with the religious topics under the numbers from one to eleven. The number of the Suttas in the

Nikāya is about 2308 which are divided into Vaggas containing as a rule 10 Suttas each. Atthāṅgikasutta, Ānanda-vagga, Tikanipāta, Tapodhamma-sutta, Vappa-sutta and Lokāyatika-sutta provide some very useful data for the understanding of several ancient Jain concepts. The *Khuddaka Nikāya* is a collection of short pieces which are both diverse and unsystematic both in content and arrangement. There is no unanimity about the pieces which belong to this Nikāya. According to the Ceylonese tradition it consists of (1) *Khuddaka-pāṭha*, (a collection composed of only 9 short Suttas), (2) *Dhammapada* (a collection of 423 memorial verses), (3) *Udāna* (a collection of solemn sayings of the Buddha), (4) *Itivuttaka* ("Thus-has-been-said" closely resembles the Udāna), (5) *Suttanipāta*, a very archaic in character consisting of four Vaggas. (6) *Vimānavatthu*, (7) *Petavatthu*, (8) *Theragāthā*, (9) *Therīgāthā*, (10) *Jātaka* (11) *Niddesa Mahāniddesa* and *Culla-Niddesa*, (12) *Paṭisambhida-magga*, (13) *Apadāna*, (14) *Buddhavaṃsa*, and (15) the *Cariyāpīṭaka*. Among these Udāna (*Sattajaṭilasutta*), *Suttanipāta* (*Dhammikasutta*), *Therāpadāna*, (*Abhayattherāpadāna*), *Jātaka* (*Mahābodhi*) and the *Dhammapada* have preserved some valuable references to Jainism, though somewhat late.

The *Abhidhamma Piṭaka* is a later development. It is an attempt at scholastic analysis of the Buddhist psychology and philosophy. It does not deal with systematic philosophy. It is merely a supplement to the Dhamma.¹⁶ *Abhidhamma* is highly honoured particularly in Burma. It comprises the following books : (1) *Dhammasaṅgāṇi* (2) *Vibhaṅga*, (3) *Kathāvatthu*, (4) *Puggalapāṇī*, (5) *Dhātukathā*, (6) *Yamaka* and (7) the *Paṭṭhāna*. The *Abhidhamma* of the Sarvāstivādins was entirely different. There is no reference to Jainism in this Piṭaka.

The *Paritta* or *Mahāparitta* is a collection of canonical texts which is used for magical purposes. Such *Paritta* ceremonies are still in vogue in Ceylon and are believed to avert evil and bring about well-being and happiness.

There is another classification of the Buddhist scriptures into nine aṅgas¹⁷ : (1) Sutta, (2) Geyya (mixed prose and verse), (3) Gāthā (verse), (4) Udāna (ecstatic utterances), (5) Veyyākaraṇa (explanation) (6) Itivuttaka (sayings beginning with the phrase "Thus-said-the-Buddha") (7) Jātaka (stories of former births of the Buddha), (8) Abbhutadhamma (stories of wonders), and (9) Vedalla (questions and answers)¹⁸.

Besides the Canonical literature, there are some other works which were highly honoured and regarded as Extra-Canonical books, such as the *Nettipakaraṇa*, *Peṭakopadesa* and the *Milindapañha*. The first two works are regarded as canonical in Burma. There are no references to Jainism in these two works. The third one the *Milindapañha* (P. 259), of course, refers to the Jain theory that water contains small insects and therefore should be used after getting it filtered and heated.

The *Tripiṭaka* consists of speeches, conversations, songs, sayings, narratives and monastic rules and regulations. The most of the Canon is placed in the mouth of the Buddha himself. But it is difficult to pick out with a certainty the actual words of the Buddha as there are in the *Tripiṭaka* contradictions, repetitions, interpolations which are characteristics of ancient religious works.

Rhys Davids¹⁹ has given a chronological table of Buddhist literature from the Buddha's time to the time of Aśoka, which is as follows :—

(i) The simple statements of Buddhist doctrine now found, in identical words, in paragraphs or verses recurring in all the books.

(ii) Episodes found, in identical words, in two or more of the existing books.

(iii) The Sīlas, the Pārāyaṇa, the Octades, the Pātimokkha.

(iv) The Dīgha, Majjhima, Aṅguttara, and Saṃyutta Nikāyas.

(v) The Suttanipāṭa, the Thera and Therī Gāthās, the Udānas, and the Khuddakapāṭha.

(vi) The Suttavibhaṅga and the Khandhakas.

(vii) The Jātakas and the Dhammapada.

(viii) The Niddesa, the Itivuttaka, and the Patisambhidāmagga.

(ix) The Peta and Vimāna-Vatthus, the Apadānas, the Cariyā Pitaka, and the Buddha-Varṇsa.

(x) The Abhidhamma books, the last of which is the Kathāvatthu, and the earliest probably the Puggalapaññatti.

Law reviews this chronological table and concludes that it "is too catechetical, too cut and dried and too general to be accepted in spite of its suggestiveness as a sure guide to the determination of the chronology of the Pāli Canonical texts."²⁰ In his concluding chapter he presents his conclusions on the chronology of the Pāli Canonical literature as follows²¹ :—

(i) The simple statements of Buddhist doctrine now found in the identical words in paragraphs or verses recurring in all the books.

(ii) Episodes found in identical words in two or more of the existing books

(iii) The Sīlas, the Pārāyana group of sixteen poems without the prologue, the Aṭṭhaka group of four or sixteen poems, the Sikkhāpadas.

(iv) Dīgha, Vols. II and III, the Thera-Therīgāthā, the collection of 500 Jātakas, Suttavibhaṅga, Patisambhidāmagga, Puggalapaññatti and the Vibhaṅga.

(v) The Mahāvagga and the Cullavagga, the Pātimokkha completing 227 rules, the Vimānavatthu and Peravaṭthu, the Dhammapada and the Kathāvatthu.

(vi) The Cullaniddesa, the Mahāniddesa, the Udāna, the Itivuttaka, the Suttanipāta, the Dhātukathā, the Yamaka and the Paṭṭhāna.

(vii) The Buddhavaṁsa, the Cariyāpitaka and the Apadāna.

(viii) The Parivārapāṭha.

(ix) The Khuddakapāṭha.

On the whole we can say that the present Pāli Canonical literature must have been compiled up to the third century

B. C. In other words the Third Council is the lower limit for this purpose, though some very minor changes could have been made up to the final writing during the reign king *Vatṭagāmaṇi* of Ceylon (1st century B. C.). Law draws the conclusion that the lower limit is the last quarter of the first century B.C.. His conjecture is based on the *Milindapañha* (about the first century A. D.) which refers to the fact that when it was compiled, the division of the canon into three pitakas and five nikāyas was well established.²² He further says : "The Sinhalese commentaries, the *Mahā-aṭṭhakathā*, the *Mahāpaccariya*, the *Mahā-kurṇḍiya*, the *Andhaka* and the rest pre-supposed by the commentaries of Buddhadatta, Buddhaghosa, and Dhammapāla, point to the same fact, namely, that the Canon become finally closed sometime before the beginning of the Christian era. Thus we can safely fix the last quarter of the first century B. C. , as the lower limit²³.

As a matter of fact, it is doubtful whether the Canon compiled in the Third Council was indeed the same which has come down to us in the Pāli Tipitaka. For no one can deny that between the third century B. C. and the first century B. C. when then the writing down took place; the Tripiṭaka might have undergone many changes, especially much addition. Thus the *Pāli Tripiṭaka* as it now exists is not exactly identical with the Pāli Tipitaka compiled in the Third Council; but the later accretions, interpolations and amendments do not appear to be so numerous and significant as to make the present Canon less valuable as an authentic record of the life and teachings of the Buddha.

(b) Non-Canonical literature :

Non- Canonical literature, as we have already stated, can be divided into four categories : (1) *Atthakathās*, (ii) *Ṭīkāś*, (iii) *Tippanis*, and (iv) *Pakaraṇas*. Out of these Non-Canonical works only a few like the *Atthakathās* of Buddhaghosa were found to be useful for my study. Some of the references to Jainism in Commentaries throw much light on the attitude of the later Buddhist monks to Nigaṇtha Nātaputta and some

of the impressions recorded by them do not coincide with the actual conditions as known to us from more authentic sources.

For instance, in the commentaries on²⁴ *Dīghanikāya* and *Majjhimanikāya*,²⁵ Buddhaghosa in the course of explaining the reference to the death of Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta states that Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta enjoined upon his followers in his last hours to accept the Buddha's teachings as he had realised the folly and futility of his doctrines. Further Buddhaghosa misunderstood the principle of *Syādvāda* and complained that Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta taught his followers in two contradictory ways : to one he was supposed to have said that his doctrine was nihilism (*uccedavāda*) and to the other that it was eternalism (*sassatavāda*). As a result, Buddhaghosa says, they quarrelled violently among themselves, and the order of Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta was divided into two. This reference certainly indicates the time around the fifth century when religious disputations were creating mutual misunderstanding and certain dogmas were being explained according to their own whims and fancies in order to influence the masses. Such instances are also found in Jaina literature.

Sanskrit Buddhist literature :

While Pāli had been the language of Theravāda Buddhists only Sanskrit had been a medium which was utilized by both the Hinayāna and the Mahāyāna Buddhists. The *Vaibhāṣika* and the *Sautrāntika* schools belong to the Hinayāna Buddhists and the *Mādhyamika* or *Śūnyavāda* and the *Yogācāra* or *Vijñānavāda* schools are of Mahāyāna Buddhists. The vast literature of these schools is available in different languages. We find there some valuable references to Jain philosophy in the works of Nāgārjuna, Āryadeva, Dharmakīrti, Vasubandhu, Arcata, Śāntarakṣita, Prajñākara-gupta, Jetāri etc. who refuted the *Syādvāda* and other Jaina concepts which are dealt with in the present thesis in respective chapters. A large amount of work on Buddhist philosophy is lost and existed only in Tibetan or Chinese translation which could not be used here.

Chapter-II

JAINA PHILOSOPHY

The Six Dravyas

The term *dravya* or *padārtha* (substance) in Jainism denotes any existence which possesses the significant factor of persistence despite its numerous qualities and modifications. The Jaina theory of reality does not leave room for both an absolute permanent reality of Parmenides and an eternal flux of Heraclitus¹. It accepts only the dynamic reality which has the three fundamental characteristics, viz. *Utpāda* (origin), *vyaya* (destruction), and *dhrauvya* (Permanence).²

Dravya is also the substratum of *guṇas* (qualities) and *pariyāyas* (modes)³. There is neither quality without substance nor substance without quality⁴. *Dravya* is one as a class, and is the inherent essence of all things manifesting diverse forms,⁵ In its reality it can neither be created nor destroyed; it has only permanent substantiality. But through its modes it secures the triple nature in character⁶. *Dravya* is of six kinds, namely, *jīva* (soul), *pudgala* (matter), *dharma* (principle of motion), *adharma* (principle of rest), *Ākāśa* (space) and *Kāla*(time). The first five types of dravyas are called *astikāyas* (those which exist and have different pradeśas or areas like a body) and the last is named *anastikāya*⁷.

According to another classification it is of three kinds, viz. *sakriya* (active) *niṣkriya* (inactive), and *sakriyaaniṣkriya* (active-inactive). The *sakriya dravyas*, which have the capacity of moving from place to place, are *pudgala* and *jīva*. The *niṣkriya dravya* is against the nature of *sakriya dravya*. It has neither direct nor indirect functional power. Space comes under this classification. *Kāla* is also included in the category of *Niṣkriya dravyas*, though it accounts for changes in other things. *Sakriya niṣkriya dravyas* are those realities which move about without themselves undergoing changes or motion. These have merely *avagāhana* (place). The *dharma* and *adharma dravya*

come under this classification. *Jīva*, *dharma*, and *adharma* have innumerable areas or *pradeśas*. *ākāśa* has infinite *pradeśas*, and *pudgāla* is of numerable *pradeśas*. *Kāla* has one *pradeśa*⁸. These six *dravyas* maintain their identical nature without losing their respective qualities, though they are mutually interpenetrating and accommodate one another and mix up to occupy the same space.⁹ *Ākāśa*, *Kāla*, *Jīva*, *dharma* and *adharma* are formless or *āmūrtā* *dravyas*. They do not possess the sense qualities of contact, taste, smell, sound and colour. *Pudgāla* (matter) alone is *mūrtā*. All the *dravyas*, except *Jīva*, are *acetana* (devoid of consciousness)¹⁰

In another classification, the *dravyas* or *Tattvas* are divided into seven categories, viz. *Jīva* (soul), *ajīva* (nonsoul), *āśrava* (inflow of karmic matter into the soul), *bandha* (bondage of soul by karmic matter), *saṁvara* (stoppage of the inflow of karmic matter), *nirjarā* (shedding of karmic matter), and *mokṣa* (liberation of soul from karmic matter). The seven *tattvas* are so arranged here as to provide an epitome of the Jaina doctrine of salvation. The first two, *jīva* and *ajīva* comprise the entire universe. The plight of the *Jīva* in *samsāra* is on account of the karmic matter which flows into it. *Sanvara* and *nirjarā* are two states in the process of liberation wherein the inflow of karmic matter is first stopped and all karmic matter is subsequently shed. The *jīva* thus becomes completely free of karmic matter and attains *mokṣa*. These seven *tattvas* are *eternal* and "sat".¹¹

(i) *Jīva* (soul)

The Jaina theory of soul, though fundamentally similar to the concept of soul in other philosophical schools, is still different from them in certain respects. Soul is eternal, uncreated and beginningless. There is no controversy on this point. The controversial point is its nature. The *Saṁhitās* of the *R̥gveda*¹² and *Atharvaveda*¹³ state about the nature of the soul that when a man dies, it goes to the world of his forefathers and stays with ceaseless perfect life. The *Satapatha Brāhmaṇa*¹⁴ points out that it is enjoyer of good or evil deeds. The *Upaniṣads* are against

its plural form¹⁵. According to the *Kāthopanīṣad*¹⁶, it is eternal and distinct from body. *Āvidyā* is the cause of wandering into births¹⁷. Further, Gaudapāda says that it is one and is neither born nor created. *Māyā* (illusion) is the cause of appearance of births. Śaṅkara follows Gaudapāda's view, says : "It is due to *māyā*, pure and simple, that the Great Self (*Ātman*) appears as the threefold states (viz. walking, dreaming and dreamless sleep) even as a rope appears as a snake and the like."¹⁸

Both the Sāṅkhya and the Yoga systems are practically one.¹⁹ *Sāṅkhya* presents the doctrines while the Yoga prescribes certain practices for the sake of their spiritual development'. The soul in these philosophies is accepted in the form of *puruṣa*, but it is said to be absolutely non-active or unattached to *prakṛti* or matter and *Puruṣa* is unaffected by the vicissitudes of the *Prakṛti*²⁰.

According to the *Nyāya* and the *Vaiśeṣika* philosophy, the soul itself is responsible for its deeds. It is eternal and possesses the non-eternal qualities such as consciousness, desire etc. *Jñāna* (knowledge) is distinct from soul and it obtains the capacity of knowing by association with itself. That means *Jñāna* is devoid of knowing power by nature²¹.

The Buddha, on the other hand, declined to answer the nature of soul as he felt that it is not indispensable for the removal of suffering. The entire universe in his view is a bundle of Khandhas, viz. *rūpa* (body), *vedanā* (feeling), *saññā* (perception), *saṅkhāra* (aggregates), and *viññāṇa* (consciousness). All things including even soul are analysed into the elements that can be perceived in them. All things are devoid of soul, just as a chariot is nothing but a congregation of wheel, frame, etc. "I" or "Mine" should not be attached with mundane affairs if one wants to attain salvation. Hence this view is named *anattā* in Buddhism²².

Jainism considers soul as the central figure. Its perfect knowledge (*Bhedajñāna* or *Ātmañāna*) is essential to destroy

karmas and attain salvation.²² The nature of soul in Jainism is to be understood from the standpoint of non-absolutism (*anekāntavāda*). From the real standpoint (*nīścayanaya*), soul is absolutely pure possessing the nature of knowledge and vision (*ahameko khalu siddho dūṛisaṇamiyo sadrūpi*)²⁴. It is regarded to be without smell, without sound, not an object of *anumāna* (inference), without any definite bodily shape, imperceptible and intangible and is characterised by consciousness²⁵. Ācārya Nemicaṇḍra points out that the soul is characterised by *upayoga* (consciousness), is formless (*amultī*), is an agent (*kattā*), has the same extent as its own body (*sadehaparimāṇo*), is the enjoyer of the fruits of karma (*bhoṭṭā*), exists in world (*saṁsārattho*), is *siddha* (*siddho*) and has the characteristic upward motion (*viṣṣaso dḍhaga*) :

Jīvo upaogamao amultī kattā sadehaparimāṇo.

*Bhoṭṭā saṁsārattho siddho so viṣṣaso dḍhaga*²⁶.

Thus we have seen that the nature of soul in Jainism is dual in character. According to the realistic standpoint, it remains the same under all states, while according to the practical standpoint, it is transformed into modes and thus becomes different in number, place, form, etc.

(ii) Pudgala (matter)

Things perceived or enjoyed by the senses, bodies, mind, karma, and the other material objects are called *Pudgala* (matter)²⁷. They can be touched tasted, smelt, and have colour. *Śabda* (sound produced by various means), *bāṇḍha* (union caused by man or otherwise), *saukṣmya* (fineness), *sthaulya* (grossness), *saṁstihāna* (figure), *bheda* (division), *tama*s (darkness), *chāyā* (shade) and *ālāpa* (sun-shine) are the forms of *Pudgala*. It has two prominent forms, namely atoms (*aṇu*) and molecule (*skandhas*)²⁸. They unite together to construct reality.

The nature of the universe in Jainism is based on the nature of reality which possesses triple characteristics, *utpāda*, *vyaya* and *dhrauvya*. The things that exist cannot be destroyed and the things that do not exist cannot be

originated from a realistic standpoint, but they get transformed into their own attributes and modes from a practical point of view.²⁰ This system of realities results in the universe being infinite as well as eternal in character. The entire universe, according to Jainism, is a compendium of the six *Dravyas* which are a permutation and combination of atoms. The atom in Jainology is the smallest unitary part of *pudgala*. It is characterised by its internal cohesion (*sneha*) and indivisible unity. A molecule (*aṇu*), a combination of atoms, results in an aggregate of matter (*skandha*)²⁰ *Aṇu* is an indivisible entity and cannot be perceived by ordinary men.

Pudgāla dravya is always transformed into *skandha* and *paramāṇu*. The *upādāna kārana* (substantive cause) and the *nimitta kārana* (external cause) are responsible for these modifications. For instance, in the manufacturing of a pot, clay is the substantive cause and the potter, stick, water, etc. are external causes. Each and every entity runs through these two causes and gets its similar modes.

Thus the universe in Jaina philosophy is undivided, uncreated, eternal, self-existent, and infinite from realistic standpoint; while from a practical standpoint of its inter-related parts it is transitory, phenomenal, evanescent, and finite. This theory rejects all the other theories based on the absolute standpoint such as *Kālavāda*, *Svabhāvavāda*, *Niyativāda*, *Yadṛcchāvāda*, *Puruṣavāda*, *Īśvaravāda*, *Bhūtavāda*, etc.

The doctrine of *karman* seems to have developed against these doctrines of creation. According to Jainism, the vibrations (*voga*) and the passions (*kaṣāyas*) of soul attract karmic matter and transform it into karmic body. Soul is pure in its intrinsic nature. The relation of *karmas* is a cause that makes its cycling into births. This is the nature of bondage. Soul, which is *amūrta* (spiritual), is affected by *karmas* which are *mūrta* (material). This concrete association of the spiritual and the material leads to the existence of universe, which is beginningless. The material *karman* (*dravyākarma*) is a *āvaraṇa* (cover) which brings about the *bhāvākarma* (its spiritual

counterpart) that is called *doṣa* like privation and perversion. This is the mutual relation as cause and effect of both these karmas.

Karmas are classified into eight main types, viz. (1) *Jñānāvaraṇa* (knowledge-obscuring), (2) *Darśanāvaraṇa* (vision-obscuring), (3) *Vedanīya* (feeling-producing), (4) *Mohanīya* (deluding), (5) *Āyu* (longevity determining), (6) *Nāma* (body-making), (7) *Gotra* (status determining, and (8), *Antarāya* (obstructive).

These karmas are sub-divided into one hundred and forty eight which may be seen in detail in the *Gomattasāra Karma-kāṇḍa* etc.

The inflow of karmic matter into the soul is called *Āsrava* and the bondage of the soul by karmic matter is called *Bandha* in Jainism. Both are related mutually to each other as cause and effect. *Āsrava* is the antecedent and anterior cause of bondage. The stoppage of inflow of karmic matters into the soul is called *Sanivara* and the shedding of karmic matters by the soul is called *Nirjara*. Evil thoughts and miseries lead to a suffering in the world as well as in hell. The happiness of heaven is also insignificant when we compare it to the happiness of salvation.³¹

Thus the *Sanivara* and *Nirjara* lead to the destruction of the karmas and reveal the purity of self, which is called *Mokṣa*. Umāsvāmi says that *Mokṣa* is a state of freedom from all karmic matter owing to the destruction of the cause of bondage and to the shedding of the karmas³². Pūjyapāda in the *Sarvārthasiddhi* defines *mokṣa* "as the state of the highest condition of purification, unthinkable inherent attitude of knowledge and unobstructed bliss, of a soul which becomes totally free from the defect of karmic dirt and is liberated from the body³³.

(3-4) Dharma and Adharma :

Dharma and *adharma* dravyas convey special meanings in Jainism. *Dharma* is accepted as a kind of Ether which

helps us in motion. *Pudgala* and *Jīva* move with the help of *dharma* as fish move with the help of water. *Adharma* is the exact opposite of *dharma*. It assists *pudgalas* and *jīvas* in staying as ashadow assists travellers to rest³⁴.

(5) **Ākāśa Dravya :**

Ākāśa in Jainism provides a place for all substances to exist. It is said to be *ananta-pradeśī* (possessing infinite pradeśas), *amūrtika* (having a non-physical factor), and *niṣkriya* (inactive), and *sāvayavi* (having parts). It is of two kinds, *lokākāśa* and *alokākāśa*. The former is co-extensive with the dravyas, whereas the latter is devoid of this characteristic. *Loka* consists of three divisions, *Urdhvaloka* (upper world), *Madhyaloka* (middle world), and *Adholoka* (lower world). They are the abodes of celestial beings, men and other creatures, and the inmates of hell. Beyond this *Lokākāśa* which is said to be eternal, infinite, formless, without activity and perceptible only by the omniscient³⁵.

(6) **Kāla Dravya :**

Kāla in Jainism is divided into two categories, *Vyavahāra-kāla* and *Pāramārthikakāla*. The former helps to change substances into their modes and the latter is understood from continuity. Time is not an appearance but a reality since we experience it in the form of hours, minutes etc.³⁶

The Six Dravyas in Buddhist Literature :

The references to six dravyas of Jainism are found in the Pali Canon as well as in later Sanskrit Buddhist literature. They are however, not referred to in a systematic order.

(1) **The Jaina Conception of Soul (Jīva).**

In the course of a conversation with Sākya Mahānāma, the Buddha speaks of Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta's doctrine as follows :

"If there is an evil deed that was formerly done by you, get rid of its consequences by severe austerity. To keep away from evildeeds in the future, one should exercise for the control of body (*kāyena saṁvuta*), control of speech (*vācāya*

saṁvuta), and control of thought (*manasāsāṁvuta*). Thus by burning up, by making an end of former deeds, by the non-doing of new deeds, there is no transmission of modes in the future for him. From there being no transmission in future is the destruction of deeds (*āyatim anavassavo*), from the destruction of deeds is the destruction of ill, from the destruction of ill is the destruction of feeling, from the destruction of feeling all ill become worn away." The Buddha says further, "That is approved by us; it is pleasing to us : therefore we are delighted⁸⁷."

This is a comprehensive introduction to the seven states or *Tattvas* of the Jains. The thoughts of *Nigaṇṭha Nātaputtā* represented in this passage are as follows :

- (i) The existence of Soul.
- (ii) Sukha or Duḥkha is due to previous karmas done.
- (iii) By ascetic practices with right knowledge one could get rid of the effects of karmic matter.
- (iv) On the complete stoppage of karmic matter, Dukkhas would be arrested, and without dukkha there would be no *Vedanā* (feeling), and the absence of *Vedanā* leads to the end of dukkhas and this is called mokṣa. Here the first point represents *Jīva* and *aṣṭa*, the second represents the *āśrava* and the *bandha*, and the third point stands for *saṁvara* and *nirjarā*, and the last corresponds to *Mokṣa*.

The *Brahmajālasutta* in the *Dīghanikāya* refers to the sixty-two contemporary philosophical views which fall into two categories namely *Pubbānānudittī* indicating the ultimate beginningless of things concerned with the ultimate past on eighteen grounds, and the *aparānānudittī* concerned with the future on forty-four grounds. All the current views of that time have been classified into these two groups, as the Buddha himself says that there is no other conception beyond them (*natthi ito bahiddha*)⁸⁸

According to *Pubbānānudittī*, the views about the beginning of things in eighteen ways are as follows⁸⁹ :

(i) Some (*sasatavādīs*) hold in four ways that the soul (*attā*) and the universe (*loka*) are eternal.

(ii) Some (*Ekaccasasatavādīs*) hold in four ways that the soul and universe are in some respects eternal and in some not.

(iii) Some (*antānantāvādīs*) hold that the universe is finite or infinite or finite and infinite, or neither finite nor infinite.

(iv) Some (*amarāvikkhepavādīs*) wriggle like eels in four ways and refuse a clear answer.

(v) Some (*adhiccasamuppannavādīs*) assert in two ways that the soul and the universe have arisen without a cause.

In the context of showing the *aparantānuditthi*⁴⁰ (views about the future), the Buddha mentions them in forty-four ways :

(i) Some (*Uddhamāghātanikā saññīvādīs*) hold in sixteen ways that the soul is conscious after death.

(ii) Some (*Uddhamāghātanikā asaññīvādīs*) hold in eight ways that it is unconscious after death.

(ii) Some (*Uddhamāghātanikā nevasaññi-nāsaññīvādīs*) hold in eight ways that it is neither conscious nor unconscious after death.

(iv) Some (*Ucchedavādīs*) hold in seven ways the annihilation of the soul.

(v) Some (*ditthadhammanibbānavādīs*) hold that *nibbāna* consists in the enjoyment of this life in five ways, either in the pleasures of sense or in one of the four trances.

Out of these conceptions, the theories of *Uddhamāghātanikā saññīvādā* should be mentioned here, according to which the soul is conscious and eternal. The Buddha says : "There are brethren, recluses and Brāhmaṇas who maintain in sixteen ways, that the soul after death is conscious and it is not a subject to decay. "The sixteen ways are as follows⁴¹ :

(i) Soul has form (*rup' attā hoti arogo paraṃ maraṇā saññi*).

(ii) Soul is formless (*arupi attā hoti arogo paraṃ maraṇā*).

(iii) Soul has and has not form (*rupi ca arupi attā hoti*).

(iv) neither has nor has not form (*nevaṇṇapi nāṇṇapi attā hoti*).

(v) is finite (*antavā attā hoti*).

(vi) is infinite (*anantavā attā hoti*).

(vii) is both (*antavā ca anantavā ca attā hoti*).

(viii) is neither (*nevantavā nānantavā ca attā hoti*).

(ix) has one mode of consciousness (*ekattasaññi attā hoti*).

(x) has various modes of consciousness (*nānāttasaññi attā hoti*).

(xi) has limited consciousness (*parittasaññi attā hoti*).

(xii) has infinite consciousness (*appamānasaññi attā hoti*),

(xiii) is altogether happy (*ekāntasukkhi attā hoti*).

(xiv) is altogether miserable (*ekāntadukkhi attā hoti*).

(xv) is both (*sukhadukkhi attā hoti*).

(xvi) is neither (*adukkhamasukkhi attā hoti*).

A list of sixteen theories regarding the nature of soul is also referred to in the *Udāna*⁴². The topics listed there are said to be debated by many *Samaṇas* and *Brahmaṇas*, and they are the same type of conception of the soul as we find in the section of *Uddhamāghātaniḱā saññivādā*. The same points are also treated somewhat differently in the list of undetermined questions⁴³. There are several other places also in Pāli literature where such questions had been discussed⁴⁴.

Out of these views mentioned above, the thoughts of *Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta* can be detected. As we have already seen, Buddhaghosa thought that Jainism was a combination of eternalism and nihilism. If this is due to an early Buddhist tradition, the Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta's views might have been recorded in Pāli Literature under these two sections. The *sassatavāda* indicates the eternality of soul which should have been mentioned from the realistic standpoint and *Ucchedavāda* points out the non-eternality of soul which should have been explained from practical standpoint. That means soul is eternal and having consciousness according to *niścayanaya*, and it is non-eternal and is a subject to change in its modifications from the viewpoint of *vyavahāranaya*. It is also pointed out

that soul is extended over all parts of body which is very similar to the view of Jainas. Jainism is also of view that soul is formless and is possessed of consciousness⁴⁵. Buddhaghosa also referred to this view of Jainas⁴⁶.

Poṭṭhapāda⁴⁷ describes the theories of *attā* (soul) as follows :

(i) *Attā* has a form and is composed of the four elements enjoying food. This is the theory of material soul (*Olārikaṇṇo, ahaṃ bhante, attānaṃ pacceṃ rūpīṃ cātumahābhūtiṇaṃ kabalīkārahārahakkhaṃ ti*)

(ii) *Attā* is made of mind (*manomaya*) comprising all parts and not devoid of sense-organs (*manomayaṇṇo kho ahaṃ bhante, attānaṃ pacceṃ sabbaṇṇapaṇṇaṇṇi ahiṇṇindriyaṇṇi ti*).

(iii) *Attā* is formless and with consciousness (*arūpīṃ kho ahaṃ, bhante, attānaṃ pacceṃ saññāmayāṇṇi ti*).

(iv) Consciousness is different from *Attā* (*aññā vā saññā aññā vā attā ti*).

Out of these theories, Guruge is of view that the first theory probably belongs to the Jainas, for Jainism flourished in the same region where the Buddha was active⁴⁸. As a matter of fact, this theory belongs to the Cārvāka philosophy according to which soul, like body, is a congregation of the four elements⁴⁹. No such view is accepted by Jaina philosophy. The third view can be, of course, recognised as the Jaina theory of soul, for soul in Jainism is accepted, as we have already seen, formless and conscious.

Vasubandhu mentions that according to the Jainas, the soul is eternal by nature, and it makes extension according to the body⁵⁰.

The *Catuhśataka* also pointed out that according to some philosophers the soul is spread over the entire body. It shrinks and extends according to the dimensions of the body of man or animal. Therefore, a bee, bird, elephant, etc. have their souls in proportion to their bodies⁵¹. This view mentioned in the

Caluḥṣataka is definitely related to the Jaina theory of soul. Umāsvāti says that by the contraction and expansion of the *pradeśas*, the soul expands according to the body, as the light from a lamp gets expansion and contraction according to the room. That is the reason why a soul can occupy the space represented by an ant or an elephant⁵².

Acārya Śāntarakṣita in his *Tattvasaṅgraha* wrote a separate chapter entitled *Ātma Parīkṣā* or the examination of Soul. He there refuted most of the relevant theories. In this context he established the theory of soul according to the Jainas and then refuted it on the basis of the doctrine of momentariness of Buddhism.

The theory of soul, according to the Jainas, as he described, has been established through *Dravyārthikanaya* (substance-point of view) and *Paryāyārthikanaya* (successive factors point of view). He says : the soul has the characteristic of consciousness only (*cillakṣaṇa evātra*). In the form of substance, it remains the same under all states (*anugatātmaka* or comprehensive) by nature, while in the form of successive factors, being distinct with each state, it is exclusive in its nature (*vyavṛtyātmaka*). This two-fold character of soul is cognised by direct perception, and does not stand in need of being proved by other evidence. Thus consciousness which continues to exist through all states, even though these states are diverse, is a form of pleasure and rest, from the substance standpoint, while the successive factors consist of the diverse states which appear one after the other ; and all these are distinctly perceived⁵³.

Śāntarakṣita further explains the above view of Jainas stating on behalf of them that if the substance were absolutely different from the successive factors, then no difference in it would be possible; because on the ground of their non-difference regarding place, time and nature, the two are held to be one. As a matter of fact, however, the two are different as regards number and other factors. For instance, the difference regarding number is that the substance is one, while the successive

factors are many. By nature, one is comprehensive, while the other is distributive. In number, a jar, for example, is one, while its colour and the rest are many. In this way, their functions, etc. are also different. Thus substance is not absolutely different from the successive factors. Therefore, soul and its modes are also not absolutely different. Having the characteristic of consciousness, it is eternal and constant from the view of substance, while from the view of successive factors it changes in its modes such as pleasure, pain, etc.⁵⁴.

The Jainas try to convince the opponents by presenting the example of *Narasimha*. They say that, like *Narasimha*, there is no self-contradiction in the dual characteristic of soul. For, the soul is impartiate (*nirbhāga*); therefore it exists in the joint dual form, and hence is not perceived separately⁵⁵.

The theory of soul in Jainism, as referred to by Śāntarakṣita, is also referred to by Arcaṭa in his *Hetubindutīkā*⁵⁶. The arguments submitted to refute the theory also are similar. The main defect, according to them, in this theory, is the self-contradiction, which is not accepted by the Jainas. Śāntarakṣita urged that one entity cannot have two forms. He puts forward two points in support of his view. He says if there is an unmodified substance in connection with successive factors, there is no difference in it, and in that case, it is not liable to be modified⁵⁷. Oneness between substance and its modes will involve the substance to be distributed like the forms of successive factors or the successive factors themselves would be mixed into the substance. Hence there would be no difference between them and the theory will be disproved⁵⁸. As regards *Narasimha*, he says, it is an aggregate of many atoms, that is why it seems dual in nature (*anekāṇusamūhātma sa tathaiiva pratiyate*)⁵⁹. Thus Śāntarakṣita, as well as Arcaṭa⁶⁰, refutes the theory on the ground that one cannot have two forms. Otherwise the eternality and the dual nature would be both untrue and unreliable.

As a matter of fact, the dual characteristic of soul is based on the standpoint of non-absolutism which is ignored by the

Buddhist philosophers. The view of Jainas against these objections will be discussed in the chapter on *Syadvada*. Moreover, we can point out here that there is no self-contradiction in the dual characteristic of soul provided we conceive the problem through Non-absolutistic standpoint.

(2) Ajiva or Pudgala (matter) : Nature of Karmas

The mundane soul attract the karmas and then they stand towards each other in relationship of phenomenal conjunction. This relation, according to Jainism, is beginningless and continues till one attains salvation. Soul and Karmas can be dissociated as they are two separate entities.

Pāli Literature contains some valuable references to the Jaina doctrine of Karma. *Triyoga* is the most significant aspect of Jaina ethics in that it explains the origin of karmas and their attachment to the soul through the three means of word, deed, and thought. This is also called the *tridaṇḍa Karma*⁶¹. The Buddha also recognises the *tridaṇḍa Karma* but in a somewhat different way. It is well known how the Buddha generally gave new meanings to old philosophical and ethical terms and taught new doctrines based on them. The famous *triyoga* or *tridaṇḍa* doctrine was originally a Jaina dogma. The Buddha himself has ascribed it to Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta before refuting it. He asks a Nigaṇṭha named Dighatapassi in Nālandā ashore many kinds of wrong doings bring about evil effects according to the teaching of Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta? Dighatapassi replied that the *Kāyadaṇḍa* is most heinous⁶²,

Here, *daṇḍa* means *duccarita* or wrong behaviour in body, speech and thought, which brings misery and distress to the mundane soul. The Buddha recognised *kāyakamma*, *Vacikamma* and *Manokamma* in place of *kāyadaṇḍa*, *vacidaṇḍa* and *manodaṇḍa*. The dispute between the Buddha and the Jainas on the use of *Kamma* and *Daṇḍa* is apparently due to the distinct connotation the term *Karma* has to each system. To the Buddhist it signifies volitional action while to the Jaina it is the endproduct of action which clings on to the soul in a material form. Both *Daṇḍa* and *Kamma* have the same meaning in

Jainism. The use of the word *Daṇḍa* in the sense of *Kamma* can be seen in the *Thāpāṇḍa* (3. 126).

The more important difference of opinion between the Buddha and Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta relates to the relative ethical significance of deed, word and thought. Which is the most heinous of all : deed, word or thought ? The Buddha says that the most heinous is thought (*manodaṇḍa*) while Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta is said to have held deed (*kāyadaṇḍa*) to be the worst.

The reference in *Upāli Sutta* of the *Majjhima Nikāya* to this dispute gives the impression that the Nigaṇṭhas did not realise the importance of the mind or *Manodaṇḍa*. It is really not so and it needs further clarification. Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta did not, at any stage, envisage bodily action which is devoid of intention and volition. Involuntary acts-such as mistakes and accidents do not fall within the purview of *Kāyadaṇḍa*. Only such action as is preceded by thought is *Kāyadaṇḍa* and the true significance of Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta's attitude to three-fold action can be conveyed when *kāyadaṇḍa* is translated and understood not as mere bodily action but as "thought converted into action."

Ācārya Kundakunda condemned asceticism, if it is unaccompanied by intention (*bhāva*). The guilt or otherwise of an action depends on the nature and intensity of thought and intention. If one is ever thinking of causing harm to another, he is guilty of malicious thought even though he does not actually cause any injury, while another, who, with no intention of causing any injury, becomes unconsciously the instrument of injury, should not be morally held responsible for that act. For instance, a burglar who fails in robbing after attempting to do so, is to be punished as a felon; and a surgeon, even though his patient may die during an operation skillfully performed with all attention, is not held responsible for such a death⁶³. But if any wrong is intentionally committed, he is, of course, more responsible and blamable for such "wrong" than he who merely harbours malicious thought but does not actually cause any injury :

Avidhāyāpi hi himsā himsāphalabbhājanam bhavatyekam.

Kṛtvā 'pyaparo himsā himsāphalabbhājanam na syāt⁶⁴.

Thus in Jainism the Kāyadaṇḍa is worse than either *Mano-daṇḍa* or *Vacīdaṇḍa*. The Buddha indicated the same idea but defined its characteristics in a different manner. This is one area where the two do not really disagree. Jainism, like Buddhism, is a religion that gives importance to intention before an ethical judgement is made of any action.

Another reference in this connection is found in the *Anguttara Nikāya* where *Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta* is designated *kriyāvādī* (activist), while the Buddha is said to be both *kriyāvādī* and *akriyāvādī*. An episode relates how Sīha, the General of Licchavis, asked for permission to meet the Buddha, and how Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta did not allow him to do so saying that the Buddha taught the *akriyāvāda*. However, Sīha decided to meet the Buddha and varified at once whether he is *akriyāvādī*. In response to this question the Buddha said that he is both *Kriyāvādī* and *akriyāvādī*. He is *akriyāvādī* in the sense that he taught beings how to abstain from evil actions, and he is *kriyāvādī* in the sense that he taught them how to perform good deeds. The Buddha's reply is as follows :—

"There is a way in which one might say of me that the ascetic Gotama holds the principle of non-action, teaches the doctrine of non-action, and by this leads his disciples; and there is a way in which one might rightly say of me that the ascetic Gotama holds the principle of action ? I proclaim the non-doing of various kinds of wicked and evil things. And how might one say of me that the ascetic Gotama holds the principle of action ? I proclaim the doing of good conduct of body, speech, and thought. I proclaim the doing of various kinds of goods things⁶⁵."

The question arises here as to why *Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta* criticised the Buddha as an *Akriyāvādī* ? and why the Buddha gave an answer like this ? The *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* includes Buddhists among the *Akriyāvādīns*, since they do not accept the exis-

tence of soul and hence deny karman as well⁶⁶. Further it describes the types of *Akriyāvāda* as follows⁶⁷.

(i) On the dissolution of the five elements, i. e. earth, water, fire, wind, air, living beings cease to exist. On the dissolution of body the individual ceases to be. Everybody has an individual soul. The soul exists as long as the body exists.

(ii) When a man acts or causes another to act, it is not his soul, which acts or causes to act (*SūKṛ.* i.1.1.33.).

(iii) There are five elements and the soul is a sixth substance. These six substances are imperishable.

(iv) Pleasure, pain, and final beatitude are not caused by the souls themselves, but the individual souls experience them.

(v) The world has been created or is governed by the gods. It is produced from chaos. (*SūKṛ.* 1.1.3.5.8).

(vi) The world is boundless and eternal.

All these views are reduced to four main types that correspond to those associated in the *Pāli Nikāyas* with four leading thinkers of the time, e. g. atheism like that of Ajita, eternalism like that of Kātyāyana, absolutism like that of Kāśyapa and fatalism like that of Gosāla.

The types of *Kriyāvāda* that do not come up to the standard of Jainism are the following :

(i) The soul of a man who is pure will become free from bad karma on reaching beatitude but in that state it will again become defiled through pleasant excitement or hatred.

(ii) If a man with the intention of killing a body hurts a gourd mistaking it for a baby, he will be guilty of murder. If a man with the intention of roasting a gourd roasts a baby, mistaking him for a gourd, he will not be guilty of murder.

But this definition of *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* is also not altogether an adequate summary of the doctrine of *Kriyāvāda* and *Akriyāvāda*. In another place the same work presents the characteristics in a better way. It says : the *Kriyāvāda* teaches that the soul exists, acts, and is affected by acts, and this held by

the Jainas in common with the Vaiśeṣikas and Nyāya schools. The *Akriyāvāda* means a doctrine, according to which the soul does not act or is not effected by acts. It is held, according to the Jaina view, by the Buddhists in common with the Vedānta, Sāṅkhya and Yoga schools⁶⁸. It is, therefore, in the light of the negation of a soul by the Buddha that Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta called him an *Akriyāvādin*.

Śīlaṅka appears to hold that the Buddhists fall into the *akriyāvāda* category, for they denied the existence of a soul. But, as a matter of fact, the mere denial of the existence of a soul does not mean that Buddhism should be included into *akriyāvāda*. The Buddha believes fully in moral responsibilities and the ethical consequences of both good and bad acts, words, and thoughts. He fully accepted the doctrine of karma which governs the cycles of rebirth. Apparently the Jainas were not fully aware of these facts of Buddhist ethics. But it is somewhat surprising as the contemporary philosophers should have known that the Buddha himself criticised bitterly the teachings of Makkhali Gosāla, a contemporary nihilist, on the ground of *akriyāvāda*.

Another reference to the karma doctrine of Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta is found in the *Majjhima Nikāya*. According to that the inflow of karmas can be stopped by performing severe penance with right knowledge⁶⁹. The familiarity with the karma theory of Jainas can also be traced in the Mahābodhi Jātaka⁷⁰. It is said there that once the Bodhisattva was born in the family of a Brāhmaṇa. When he came of age, he renounced the world and became a mendicant and lived at the Himālayas. During the rainy season he came down and going on his begging rounds he gradually approached Benaras. There he took up his abode in the royal park, and on the following day he got his meal from the king. Afterwards, the king had a hut of leaves built for him and used to come to pay his respect to the mendicant daily thrice a day. And so twelve years:

Now the king had five counsellors who advised him on temporal and spiritual matters. One of them denied the existence of cause (karma). Another believed everything was the act of a Supreme Being. A third professed the doctrine of previous actions. A fourth believed in annihilation at death. A fifth held the Kṣatriya doctrine. He who denied the cause taught the people that existence in this world was purified by re-birth. He who believed in the action of Supreme Being taught that the world was created by him. He who believed in the consequences of previous acts taught that sorrow or joy that befalls man here is the result of some previous action. The believer in annihilation taught no one passed hence to another world, but that this world is annihilated. He who professed the kṣatriya creed taught that one's own interest is to be desired even as the cost of killing one's parents. These men were appointed to sit in judgement in the king's court and being greedy of bribes they dispossessed the rightful owner of property.

Out of these, the third counsellor seems to have represented the thoughts of Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta who preached that all things happened in life are due to the previous karmas. Such previous karmic matter, though present, begin to operate only when they become mature and then they produce corresponding psychic states through which they bind the self⁷¹.

The Bodhisattva of the *Mahābodhi Jātaka* criticised this theory along with other theories belonging to the five counsellors of the king. It is said there that while he accepted the offer of the king to be judge of his court, he became very popular within a short period. The five counsellors got angry with him and tried to convince the king that the Bodhisattva was seeking sovereignty. Hence the king diminished the honours paid to him and made plans to slay him. The Bodhisattva came to know all these things and went again towards the Himālaya.

The five counsellors in order to prevent him from coming again in the city publicised that the Bodhisattva with

the help of queen wanted to slay the king. As a result, the queen was put to death. Hence the sons became enemies of the king. In the meantime the Bodhisattva came to know this conspiracy and came to the city to save the life of the king. He entered a frontier village and after eating the flesh of a monkey given to him by the inhabitants he begged for its skin which he had dried in his hermit's hut. He went then to the city of Benares and had himself seated in the park on the monkey's skin. The King with his counsellors came to see him. without any response the Bodhisattva began to rub the monkey's skin. The king asked why he was doing so? The Bodhisattva replied that the monkey was very useful to me but I ate its flesh. The counsellors thought that this man is guilty of taking the life of a monkey. The Bodhisattva, addressing one by one, denied their charge and criticised their theories.

The third counsellor's theory which is supposed to have represented Jainism is criticised as follows :

From former action still both bliss and woe again :
 This monkey pays his debt, to wit, his former sin :
 Each acts a debt discharged, where then does guilt come in?
 If such the creed thou holdst and this be doctrine true,
 Then was my action right when I that monkey slew.
 Couldst thou but only see him sinful is thy creed.
 Thou wouldst no longer then with reason blame my deed⁷².

The Majjhima Nikāya⁷³ also supports the Jaina theory of Karmas. According to the Jaina Āgamas, Soul enjoys all sorts of fruits of Karmas done⁷⁴. As regards the criticism of this theory made by the Buddha, it does not provide any substantial argument. Moreover the *Mahābodhi Jataka* is a later development of the Jātaka literature. Śīlāṅka refers to only 500 Jataka stories belonging to the Jātakas⁵⁷, which shows its nature of development.

In the *Anguttara Nikāya*⁷⁶ the same idea is found in traditional doctrines of inaction (*tiṇimāṇi bhikkhave tiṭṭhayanāṇi yaṇi paṇḍitehi samānuyuñjīyamānāni akiriyaṇa Saṇṭhahanti*). They are as follows :—

(i) There are certain recluses and the Brāhmaṇas who hold the view that "whatever happiness or misery or neutral feeling is experienced, all that is due to some previous action (*yaṃ kiṃ cāyaṃ purisa-puggalo paṭisaṃvedeti sukkhaṃ vā dukkhaṃ vā adukkhamasukkaṃ vā sabbam taṃ pubbekataheṭṭi*)

(ii) all the pleasure and misery are due to a Supreme Deity (*issaranimmāṇaheṭṭi*).

(iii) Others teach that all such pleasure and misery are uncaused and unconditioned (*ahetu appaccayā*).

Out of these three theories the first is undoubtedly related to the doctrine of Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta. Criticising this view, the Buddha pointed out that owing to previous actions, men will become murderers, stealers, unchaste, liars, etc. For those who fall back on past deeds as the essential cause of present action, there is neither desire to do, nor effort to do, nor would they consider it to do this deed or abstain from that deed. The necessity for action or inaction not being found to exist in truth, the term Samana cannot reasonably be applied to yourselves, since you live in a state of bewildering with faculties unwarded⁷⁷.

Here the argument raised by the Buddha against the first theory is that if all is due to the previous karmas, then it is not essential to make effort to abstain from them. This conception might have been known to Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta when he accused the Buddha as an *Akriyāvādī* (Non-actionist.) Ācārya Kundakunda⁷⁸ is of opinion that all the previously bound karmic matters operate only when they become mature. The Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta prescribed severe penance with perfect knowledge to destroy the karmas. The Buddha himself, as we have already seen, expresses his satisfaction with regard to the theory⁷⁹.

The *Aṅguttara Nikāya*⁸⁰ describes the six breeds (*chaḷābhijjā*) as the different categories of beings, as declared by Pūrṇa Kassapa. They are,

(i) black breed (*kaṇhābhijjā paṇṇattā*) category includes the mutton-butchers, hunters jailers etc.

(ii) blue breed (*nīlābhijāti paññāta*) includes the monks who live as though with a thorn in the side, and all others who profess the deed and doing so (*bhikkhu kaṇṭakavattika ye vā pana aññepi keci kammaṇḍaṁ kiriyavāda*).

(iii) the third is the red breed (*lohitaabhijāti paññāta*), the category to which Nigaṇṭhas belong;

(iv) the fourth is yellow breed (*haliddābhijāti*) which includes the white-robed householders and followers of the Ājīvikas;

(v) the fifth is the white breed (*sukkābhijāti*), which includes the Ājīvikas.

(vi) the last is the purest white (*paramasukkābhijāti*) in which Pūraṇa kassapa is included.

The Buddha hears of this division from Ānanda to whom later on he declares the six breeds according to his own conception. These six divisions are mainly divided into two divisions, black and white. This division is based on the good and bad karmas of man. The Jainas also have about the same division into six categories, but they are not mentioned in Pāli literature. The Jainas have the particular word *Leśyā* for such division.

The *Leśyas* are different stages of soul influenced by different karmas and activities of mind. They are classified into six main types, viz. *kṛṣṇa* (black), *nīla* (blue), *kāpota* (grey), *pīta* (yellow), *pādma* (pink) and *śukla*⁸¹ (white). These are nothing but the states of beings based on their activities of mind. The *kṛṣṇa* is the worst *leśyā* of the first three and the *pīta* is the least pure of the latter three *leśyas*. According to another division, these six divisions are classified into two divisions, *dravyaleśyā* and *bhāvaleśyā*. This is similar to the classification made by the Buddha and the *Yogaśāstra*.⁸² Since the conception of *leśyās* is not mentioned in the Pāli Canon, we can say that it may have originated later in Jainology as an imitation of Śramaṇa traditions.

The *Aṅguttara Nikāya*⁶³ describes three kinds of 'yoga' (*manasa, vacana and kāya*) which cause the inflow of the karmic matter into the soul due to ignorance (*avijjā*). It is said there that at Kapilavatthu, Vappa⁶⁴, a follower of Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta went to visit Moggallāyana. Moggallāyana asked Vappa "There is some one here, Vappa, restrained in body, speech and thought owing to the waning of ignorance and the arising of knowledge (*kāyena, samī uto, vācāya samivuto, monasā samivuto avijjārirūpā vijjupphādā*). He then asked Vappa whether he perceives any cause owing to which the *āsava*s causing pain would flow upon the man at some future time. (*passasi-no tvam, vappa, tam thānam yato nidānam purisaṃ dukkhavedaniya āsava assaveyyum abhisamparāyam* 'ti). Vappa then replied "Sir, I do see such reason. There may be in this case a certain evil deed whose fruit has not yet ripened, owing to the *āsava*s causing pain might flow in upon that man at some future time (*passamaham bhante, tam thānam idhassa bhante pubbe-papakammam katham avipakkavipakam tato nidānam purisaṃ dukkhavedaniya āsava assaveyyum abhisamparāyam*). At this juncture, the Buddha came there and having a conversation he asked Vappa "As to these *āsava*s which come about as a result of bodily activities, in the case of one who sustains from bodily activities that causes vexation and distress, it follows that those *āsava*s causing pain do not exist in him. He does not do fresh deeds, as to his former deed; he wears it out of constant contact with it, by a wearing out that is plain to see, not just for a time, one that asks for inspection that leads onward a wearing out that can be understood by the intelligent each for himself. The same is repeated in the context of *vacīsamārambhāpaccaya* and *manosamārambhāpaccaya*. The Buddha repeated thrice this question. Upāli answered it in the words "that cannot be". Further, the Buddha explained his views. He said : "Vappa, by the monk, whose heart is perfectly released, six constant abiding-states (*sātata-vihārā*) are attained. He, seeing an object with the eye, is neither elated nor depressed, but rests indifferent, mindful

and comprehending. Hearing a sound with the ear.....smelling a scent with the nose.....tasting a savour with the tonguewith body contacting tangibles.....with mind cognizing mental states, he is neither elated nor depressed, but rests indifferent, mindful and comprehending. When he feels a feeling limited by body, he knows that he so feels. He knows : when body breaks up, after life is used up, all my experiences in this world will lose their lure and grow cold. Suppose, Vappa, that shadow is cast by a stump. Then comes a man with axe and basket and cuts down that stump by the root. So doing he digs all round it. Having done so he pulls up the roots, even the rootlets and root-fibres. He chops that stump into logs and having done so chops the log into chips. The chips he dries in wind and sun, then burns them with fire, then makes an ash-heap. The ash-heap he winnows in a strong wind or lets the ash be carried away by a swift flowing river. Verily, Vappa, that shadow cast because of the stump, made not to become again, of a nature not to arise again in future time. Just in the same way, Vappa, by a monk, whose heart is the released, six constant abiding-places are won. He, seeing an object with the eye.....with mind cognizing mental states, is neither elated nor depressed, but abides indifferent, mindful and comprehending. When he feels a feeling limited by body.....limited by life, he knows that he so feels. He knows : "When body breaks up, after life is used up, all my experiences in this world will lose their lure and grow old."⁸⁵

There is no substantial argument, in fact, in this criticism by the Buddha. Yoga attracts the karmic matter towards the soul and connects the same with it. The soul is obscured by such karmic matter since time immemorial. That is the reason why it experiences fruits, good or bad. The destruction of Karmas, according to Jainism, depends on the restraint of mind, word, any body. By severe penance one can destroy all the past deeds and prevent the flow of new karmas.⁸⁶

The *Aṅguttara Nikāya*⁸⁷ refers to the five ways of falling into sin, according to Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta. They are destru-

ction of animates (*pāpātipāta*), taking what is not given* (*adinnādāyi*...), passion enjoyment of evil (*abrahmacārī*.....), speaking a lie (*musavādi*.....), and living on liquor and drink. (*surāmerayamajjapamādatthāyi*.....). The *Dīgha Nikāya*⁸⁸ mentions the *Cātuyāmasmvara* of Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta. These are the references to the *Pāñcānvratas* of Jainas which will be dealt with in the next chapter.

The Buddha at another place in the *Anguttara Nikāya*⁸⁹ says to Visākhā that the Nigaṇṭhas took a vow not to go beyond the East, West, North or the South. This vow saves them from violence at least in the prescribed limitation. The *Proṣadhopavāsa* also is said to be a way to destroy the karmas.⁹⁰

Some other ways to make a purified soul also are recorded in Pāli literature. One becomes completely naked with no desire or attachment towards anything in the last stage of asceticism. In this *acelakatva* he should follow a lot of rules and regulations which have been mentioned in the Pāli Canon as well as in the Jaina Āgama. These will be discussed in the chapter on Ethics.

Mokṣa Tattva

The well-known reference of the *Majjhima Nikāya* to the severe penance of Jainas indicates the state of mokṣa according to Jaina philosophy. The Buddha says that...by severe penance all the sufferings will be destroyed (*sabbam dukkhamniñjñam bhavissati*). This means the freedom from all karmic matter is Mokṣa or Salvation according to Jainism.⁹¹ Kundakunda says : that if the causal condition of karmas disappears through the control of senses and thought, then the springs of karmas get blocked. When the springs of karmas thus get blocked the *dravya* karmas get repulsed. When the *dravya* karmas completely disappear, the person becomes all-knowing and all-perceiving and attains the state of infinite bliss which transcends the sense feeling and which is untouched by the sorrows of life :

Hedumbbhāve piyamā jāyadi nāpissa āsavaṇirodho.
Āsavabhāveṇa viṇā jāyadi kammaṣsa du pirodho.

‘‘*Kammasābhāṣeṇa va savvaṇhū savveloya dassi ya.*
Pavadi indiyarahidaṃ avvaṇaṃ suhamaṇantaṃ.”⁹²
 Nature of Universe

The common topics, which are said to have been debated by the *Samaṇas Brāhmaṇas* and *Pariabājakas*, are referred to in Pāli literature. The Jaina conception of the nature of Universe also appears to be recorded in the *Brahmajāla Sutta*. The four different propositions maintained by contemporary teachers in this connection are as follows⁹³ :

- (i) This world is finite and circumscribed (*antavā ayam loko pariyaṇto*)
- (ii) It is infinite and without limit (*anantavā ca ayam loko aparīyaṇto*).
- (iii) It is both finite and infinite (*antavā ca ayam loko aparīyaṇto*).
- (iv) It is neither finite nor infinite (*nevaṇyam loko antavā na panananto*).

The third theory appears to be the view of Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta. Buddhaghosa does not clarify this view. He suggests only that the limited and unlimited character of the world depends on the limited or unlimited view taken by the contemplator in his mental perception or vision,⁹⁴. Perhaps he missed here the philosophical aspect of the proposition. If we apply the standpoint of non-absolutism, its inner meaning can be easily grasped. However, we can point out that from the standpoint of substance (*dravya*) and place (*kṣetra*), the world is limited and from the standpoint of *kāla* and *dhāva* it is unlimited.

Records of theories held at the time have been repeated several times in Pāli literature. But they do not add anything substantial to what has been mentioned before. The later Buddhist philosophical literature provides us with more data in this respect. It indicates a development of the concept under discussion.

Śāntarakṣita refers to a view of Ācārya Sūri, a Jaina philosopher, in the course of refuting the doctrine of the "thing by itself" (*svabhāvanāda*), which throws light on the Jaina conception of the nature of the Universe. But to understand that reference it would be best to know first the context on which it is based. It provides a common ground to the Buddhist and Jaina Logicians, as they are not in favour of *Svabhāvanāda*. According to this doctrine, as shown in the *Tattasāṅgraha* and other books, things originate neither from themselves nor from any other things. They are not dependent on causes. To prove this theory the holder of this view queries, 'Who makes the diversity in the lotus and its filament? By whom have the variegated wings of the peacock and such things been created? Such arguments can be raised about other things too. For instance, the sharpness and other properties of a thorn or any other thing must be regarded as uncaused, since they are around us due to the influence of nature.'⁹⁵

Against this view, Śāntarakṣita argues that if you do not postulate any cause, your view cannot be accepted, as nothing can be proved without adequate evidence. He then supports his arguments with those of Ācārya Sūri. He says that Ācārya Sūri, a Jaina philosopher, also upholds the same objection in the theory of "thing by itself", as he says, "One who declares that there is no cause would demolish his own conclusion, if he adduced any reasons in support of his assertion; on the other hand, if he were also to adduce reasons what could be gained by mere assertion?".⁹⁶

Here the view of Sūri referred to by Śāntarakṣita appears to be in conformity with Jainism. The theory of *Svabhāvanāda* is accurate as far as the opposition to the theory that a God controls the universe is concerned, but if it carries the meaning of *ahetukavāda*, it cannot be admitted by the Jaina philosophy. According to this theory, the world possesses innumerable causes which have innumerable effects by nature, but its development requires some other material also. For instance, the clay can produce the jar, but it also depends on

the apparatus, as stick, wheel, potter, etc. Lotus comes out of mud, which is a cause of its fragrance and beauty. Therefore, the view that only nature (*svabhāva*) is responsible for the origination of things, is inadmissible to the Jainism. The *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* also criticises the view of *Svabhāvavāda* :

Kaḥ kaṇṭakānāṃ prakaroti taikṣṇyaṃ,

Vicitrabhāvaṃ mṛgapakṣiṇāṃ ca.

Svabhāvataḥ sarvavidāṃ pravṛttaṃ,

Na kāmācāroṣti kutah prayatnaḥ.⁹⁷

Another reference to the Jaina conception of the nature of the Universe is recorded by Śāntarakṣita in his examination of the external world. Kamalaśīla, the well-known commentator of Śāntarakṣita, explains the view saying that the universe accordingly is non-perception of external world. They describe its nature as resembling of things (*pratibimbādīśannibham*). In support of this assertion they say that the entire universe comprising the threefold phenomena (subjective or immaterial, objective or material, and imaginary or fictitious) is mere "ideation". This ideation through the diversity of the "chain of causation" is endless and impure, for they have not realised the truth; but it is pure for those whose karmas have been got rid of. Kamalaśīla further delineates the nature of the universe according to Buddhism saying that the universe is in perpetual flux and affects all living things. This idea of the entire universe is based on two points—(1) there can be no apprehender of the external world, being non-existent, and (2) every cognition is devoid of both "apprehender" and "apprehended", because it is cognition.

The main ground for establishing this principle is that the perception of a thing depends on one's mentality. The diversity of imaginations is responsible for the diversity of realities. For instance, as stated by Ācārya Ārvadeve in his philosophical work *Catuhśataka*, "the corpse of a woman is considered in various forms. The sage considers it as the cause of wandering into the world, a libidinous man thinks about her beauty to fulfil his sexual desires, a cock, on the

other hand, perceives it for the purpose of eating. Therefore, the world is nothing but only the fiction of imagination. If it is not so, reality should be perceived or thought in one form by the whole universe without any sort of *sanketa* or *samskara*.

In this context Śāntarakṣita refers to the view of Sumati and then refutes it from the Buddhist point of view. Ācārya Sumati⁹⁸ argues accordingly that "all things have two aspects the Universal and the Particular. Consequently the universe is a combination of atoms which exist in two forms, viz. the common and uncommon. Of these the common form is apprehended by the senses, and the form of the atoms which is uncommon is held to be amenable to mystic perception." That means the compendium of atoms, the so called *Skandha* is the universe, which we perceive, and the atoms, which are so subtle that they cannot be perceived by us, are perceived by the omniscient.

Thus the external world in the view of J inism is not imagination, but a multitude of atoms. It cannot be ignored, as perception of an entity which represents the external world is based on knowledge of feeling. Since an entity has different names, it can be fictitious but its existence cannot be ignored. The entity is *paramārtha sat* like knowledge or *vijñāna*. Knowledge can be dependent on the entity, but the entity cannot be dependent on knowledge. The innumerable thing in the world cannot be seen by the ordinary man, but it does not mean that they are not in existence.⁹⁹

Śāntarakṣita does not agree with these views. He remarks that they are the confounded assumptions of some dull-witted persons (*durmatayah*). He argues that the two different forms of a thing must be different from each other. It cannot, therefore, be right to say that a single thing has two forms. The second and the most touching argument is raised to the effect that as the particular form of an entity is not entirely different from the universal form, there would be a possibility of the former being apprehended by the senses; and in that case there could

not be the clear cut distinction that "The common form is amenable to sense cognition and the uncommon form is amenable to mystic cognition."¹⁰⁰

The above objections are met by the Jain philosophers. They say that from the point of view of *dravyārthikanaya*, reality is the same but from the *parvārthikanaya* standpoint its modes are different from each other. On the basis of the conception of non-absolutism, there is no room for self-contradiction.¹⁰⁰

The Nature of word

Śāntarakṣita in the *Tattvasaṅgraha* refers to a view of the Mīmāṃsakas regarding the nature of the word with the idea of establishing his own theory. The mīmāṃsakas hold the view that the word is eternal. Hence there is no author of the Veda. Therefore it is authoritative, reliable, and of divine origin (*apauruṣeva*). In this way, they set forth the several views that have been held by various philosophers regarding the exact nature of word. Among them the Jainas are said to have held the view that the word is atomic in character (*śabdgaḥ Digambaras*)¹⁰². In the following *kārikā* two types of words are mentioned, viz Universal (*Sāmānya*) and particular (*Vileṣa*) which are the main features of the Jain conception of reality.

While the establishing of his own view, Śāntarakṣita criticised the Mīmāṃsakas' conception, but he did not refute the Jain conception separately. He proved the falsity of the common types of words, while criticising the view of the Mīmāṃsakas. He set up a theory that the *Veda* is not an authoritative and reliable source. Hence word is universal in character and non-eternal in form.

As regards the divine origin of the *Veda* (*apauruṣeyavāda*) both Jainism and Buddhism are travellers of one and the same path. The arguments against the Mīmāṃsakas' view are adduced by both parties in a similar way, though they are based on their own fundamental principles, and therefore, they differ in some places.

The Buddhists say that words are not representative of their meanings, because they are used even for denoting the past and future realities. If they were having an inseparable connection, their usage would be restricted and no meaning would come out of them. They, therefore, think that the word signifies only the imaginary universalised reality.¹⁰³

On the other hand, the Jainas postulate a theory that words are of two kinds, universal and particular. If words were not valid to show the existence of the external world, they would be meaningless and therefore useless and knowledge would be impossible.¹⁰⁴ Kundakunda says that there are four different kinds of material objects, viz. *Skandhas*, *skandhaśeṣas*, *skandhapradeśas*, and *Paramāṇus*. *Skandhas* are the aggregates of atoms. The next two are the differences in molecular constitution. The last one is a primary atom which constitutes the other three classes.¹⁰⁵ The atom cannot be divided (*paramāṇū ceva aviḥhāgi*).¹⁰⁶ Sound is generated by *skandhas* when they strike against one another. The sound produced by *skandhas* may be natural (*svabhāvika*) or artificial (*prāyogika*).¹⁰⁷ Thunder of cloud and the roar of the sea are natural sound while the artificial sound is purposeful which is divided into two types, *bhāṣātma* (language) and *abhāṣātma* (non-language). The language sound again may be *akṣarātma* (articulate) and *anākṣarātma* (inarticulate). The *akṣarātma* sound is made up of alphabetical sounds while the *anākṣarātma* is the language of animals. *Anākṣarātma* sounds are of four kinds, viz. (i) *tata* sound produced by musical instruments covered by leather, (ii) *vilata* sound produced by *viṇā*, etc, (iii) *ghana* produced by metallic instruments like *tāla*, etc, and (iv) *śausira* produced by wind-instruments.¹⁰⁸ These sounds can be heard and recognized as they are *pauḍagalika*.

(3, 4, 6) Dharma, Adharma, and Kāla Dravyas

There are no references to *dharma*, *adharma*, and *Kāla Dravyas* in Pāli literature. The *Darmastikāya* is almost similar to the *paṭiccasamuppāda* (dependent origination) of the

Buddhists, but the *adharmastikāya* is quite unknown to them; the *kāla dravya* is recognized in Buddhism in the form of *prajñaptimātra* in the *Aṭṭhasālini*.¹⁰⁹

(5) Akāśa Dravya

A reference is made to the Jaina conception of *ākāśa* in the *Tattvasaṅgraha* by the Mīmāṃsaks. Śāntarakṣita raised a question against the Mīmāṃsakas' view regarding the eternity of works like *ghaṭa* (jar). They say that if the auditory organ is *ākāśa*, several objections could be brought against this theory. For instance, being all-Pervasive there would be equality of contact with all sounds and all organs. How then could the answer be provided on the basis of the auditory organ ? The Mīmāṃsakas try to reply that *ākāśa* cannot be regarded as being without parts, and therefore it is the auditory organ. They support their view of the Jainas and the Sāṅkhyas both of whom have accordingly the idea of the auditory organ consisting of parts (*jainairārhatāḥ Sāṅkhyaiśca niravayavasya vyomah niśiddhātvaṭ* ¹¹⁰).

Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla refute this view. They urge that if the divisible *ākāśa* is held to be eternal, then all the objections that have been urged against the view "the indivisible *ākāśa* is eternal" would become applicable.¹¹¹ The defects pointed out by Śāntarakṣita in this theory are as follows. If *ākāśa* is eternal and consists of parts, words should remain in the form "this is the same. Another argument, in support of this idea, is presented by him in the form that what is eternal does not stand in need of the help of anything. Hence, the cognitions that would proceed from the eternal source, should all appear simultaneously. Therefore, he concludes that *ākāśa* is neither eternal nor consists of parts. ¹¹² In the *Abhidharma-kośa* *ākāśa* (1. 5) is enumerated in the *asamskṛta dharmas* and described as "without covering" (*tatrākāśamanāvṛttiḥ*).¹¹³ According to Buddhaghosa, *ākāśa* is infinite.¹¹⁴

The Jainas are of view that *ākāśa* is eternal and consists of parts (*sūvayava*) and having infinite parts or *pradeśas* it-

provides to *jīva* and *ajīva*. The etymology of *ākāśa* itself indicates that it allows space to other substance to enter into or penetrate itself.¹¹⁵ This entering or penetration is expressed by the word *avagāha*.¹¹⁶ Different places occupy different locations of *ākāśa*. Its manifoldness connotes, as in the case of matter itself, its possession of parts.¹¹⁷

Conclusion

This brief account of the Jaina philosophy as found in Buddhist literature shows us that :—

(i) the six *dravyas* and the seven *Tattvas* of Jainism were known to early Pāli literature and further refuted in Sanskrit Buddhist philosophical literature.

(ii) Among the sixty two contemporary Philosophies depicted in the *Brahmajālasutta* and some other places in the Pāli Canon. The Jaina view is described as both *Ucchedāvāda* and *sassatāvāda*.

(iii) According to the Jaina philosophy, the soul is formless and consists of consciousness.

(iv) Mundane soul attracts karmas and then both stand towards each other in a relationship of phenomenal conjunction. This relation is beginningless and continues till one attains salvation.

(v) *Kāyadaṇḍa* is more heinous than *Manodaṇḍa*, if a wrong deed is committed intentionally. That means intention is the main source of evil or virtuous acts. Soul will have to enjoy the fruits of karmas done. All is, therefore, a result of previous karmas.

(vi) The destruction of karmas depends on *triyaoga* and severe penance with right understanding.

(vii) Universe is not a creation of any god, but it is a combination of atoms.

(viii) Word is atomic in character, and

(ix) *Ākāśa* (space) is eternal and consists of parts.

These data also indicate that, inspite of minor errors, the knowledge of Jaina Philosophy which Buddhist scholars possessed was of a very high order.

CHAPTER III

JAINA ETHICS

The Duties of jaina House-holders

Emancipation through the removal of karmic matter from the soul is attainable only through righteous living according to ethical discipline. One should abstain from the five faults (*pañcapāpa*) viz, injury (*hiṃsā*), falsehood (*asatya*), stealing (*steḥa*), unchastity (*abrahma*) and wordly attachment (*parigraha*)¹. These vows are of two kinds: Partial vows (*Aṇuvratas*) or limited abstention from the five aforesaid faults and Full vows (*Mahāvratas*) or total abstention from five faults. The former is prescribed for house-holders and the latter for ascetics. Five kinds of training (*bhāvanā*) have been prescribed for each of these vows for the sake of securing stability in them².

The above-mentioned five *vratas* have been unanimously accepted by the Ācāryas, on the basis of *Pratimas* or *Vratas* or *Pakṣa*, *Caryā* and *Sādhana*. The difference of opinion is only with regard to the *Guṇavratas*, *Śikṣāvratas*, *Mūlaguṇas* and *Pratimas*. The great Ācārya Kundakunda described householder's duties on the basis of *Pratimas*. He simply presented the names of *Guṇavratās* e. g. *dik parimāṇa*, *anarthadanaśauvarjāna* and *bhogopabhogaparimāṇa* and *Śikṣāvratas* e. g. *sūmāyika proṣadha*, *atithi-pūja* and *sallekhanā*. Svāmi Kārtikeya followed his line but placed *deśavakāśika* in place of *sallekhanā*-Vasunandī included *sallekhanā* in *Śikṣāvratās*. These Ācāryas described neither *Aṣṭamūla guṇas* nor *āticāras* of *Vratas*.

Ācārya Umāsvāmi and Samantabhadra are prominent figures among those who described the house-holders duties on the basis of twelve *vratas*. Umāsvāmi divided *Vratā* into two e. g. *Agārī* who follows *aṇuvratas* and *Anagārī* who follows *Mahāvratas*. He took pains to describe the *āticāras* of each *vratā* but did not refer to *Aṣṭamūlaguṇas* and *pratimas*. He might have followed the tradition of *Upāśakadeśasūtra*. Umāsvāmi could not recognize the names of *vratas* given by Kundakunda. He changed them into *Digvrata*, *deśavrata* and *anartha-*

daṇḍavratā in *Guṇavratas* and *sāmāyika*, *prosadhopavāsa*, *upabhogaparibhogaparimāṇa* and *atithisamivibhāga* in *Śikṣāvratas*. *Deśavakāśika* has been included into *guṇavratas* and *bhogopabhogaparimāṇa* into *Śikṣāvratas*. Samanatabhadra borrowed his views from kundakunda, Kārtikeya and Umāsvāmi and put them in a reviewed ways. He regarded *deśavakāśikā* as a part of *śikṣāvratas* and placed *Vaiyāvratya* in place of *sallekhanā*. He is perhaps the first Ācārya who presented *Mūlaguṇas* in the *Ratnakaraṇḍakatrivakacāra*.

Jinasena represents those Ācāryas who described the householder's duties on the basis of *pakṣa*, *caryā* and *sādhanā* in the *Ādiṭṭhāna*. Later Ācāryas followed either of these three traditions. The Pāli literature does not mention any of these controversial names of *vratas*. We can therefore come to the conclusion that at the time of Pārśvanātha or Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta no such tradition was in force.

The five faults are the causes of recurrent births and therefore they are personified as "*Dukkha*" (pain) itself. For the sake of removing such *dukkha*, one should meditate upon the benevolence (*maitrī*) for all living beings, delight in looking at better qualified beings (*pramoda*), compassion (*kāruṇya*) for the afflicted, and indifference to both praise and blame (*mādhyastha avinayaśeṣa*).³

The duties of a Jaina House-holder as reflected in Pāli Litt.

Pāli Literature contains only scanty and scrappy bits of information on the duties of a Jaina House-holder. But they are invaluable as the gradual development of the vows could be traced with the help of such information.

The *Samaññaphala Sutta* of the *Dighanikāya* refers to the *Cātuyāmasaṃvara* as a part of the doctrine of Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta. This is not an accurate record, for *Cātuyāmasaṃvara* is of Pārśvanātha, and not in the doctrine of Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta. We shall discuss this matter later on. The four vows of Pārśvanātha were revised by Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta who found it necessary to specify *Brahmacarya* as a separate vow in view of the laxity

he observed among the followers of Pārśvanātha. Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta, thus, established a discipline based on five vows as opposed to that of Pārśvanātha⁴. The Buddhist circles were apparently unaware of this innovation by Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta.

Asibandhakaputta Gāmiṇi, a Jaina house-holder, goes to see the Buddha at Nālandā. In response to a question of the Buddha he says : Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta teaches a doctrine to his laymen (*Sāvaka*) according to which a slayer of living creature (*pañāṇāṃ alī paṭeti*), one who steals (*adinnam ādiyati*), one who indulges in sensual pleasures wrongly (*kāmasu micchā carati*, and one who tells a lie (*musā bhaṇati*), would go to the purgatory (*so āpāyiko nerayiko*). In short his destiny depends on the life he leads.⁵

The above reference deals with the vows of house-holders who are said to be followers of Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta, but the vows recorded are four and not five in number. Another remarkable point is that "*Kuṣīla*" which was separated from *parigraha* in the form of *Kāmesumicchācarati* in Pālī is referred to individually here. This shows that the Buddhists were aware of the reformation made by Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta in the Pārśvanātha's religion, but the fact that *Kuṣīla* was not substituted in place of *Parigraha* but in addition to it was apparently not understood.

A reference to five vows of Jainism is found in the *Aṅguttara Nikāya*,⁶ this mentions the five ways of falling into sin as taught by Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta. The five ways are :

- (i) destruction of living beings (*pañātipāṭi hoti*).
- (ii) taking what is not given (*adinnādāyī hoti*).
- (iii) passionate enjoyment of evil (*abrahmacārī hoti*).
- (iv) speaking lies (*musāvādī hoti*).
- (v) taking liquor and intoxicants (*surāmerayamajjapamādaṭṭhāyī hoti*).

This, again, is only partially accurate. The first four kinds of sins are referred to correctly, though not in the Jaina order. As to the fifth, it is "*Parigraha*" which should have been mentioned. According to Jaina ethics, "*Surāmeraya-*

majjappamadaṭṭhāna'' is an aspect of *Himsā* and not a separate category. This list omits *Parigraha* altogether.

These references lead us to two observations : (i) According to the Pārśvanātha tradition, there were four vows, and (ii) Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta formulated five vows dividing the last into two *Akusīla* and *Aparigraha*. The defects in these references are : (i) they do not follow the traditional Jaina order of precedence, and (ii) the *Parigraha*, which is placed as the last way of falling into sin, is ignored in *Pālī* Literature. The compilers of the *Pālī Tipiṭaka* either were not well acquainted with the reformation of Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta or they did not consider it very important.

The omission of *Parigraha* in all the references in the *Pālī* Canon is significant. *Parigraha* is the most important Jaina contribution to Indian Ethics. It was altogether a new concept when it was first included in Pārśvanātha's doctrine. It embraced all aspects of indiscipline and abstinence from it and was recognized as the removal of the very root of all immorality. It was founded on the role which desire and craving played in human affairs. But the moral significance of Pārśvanātha tradition was not adequately understood by the Buddha or his followers, for, if they did, they would have observed how the vow relating to Pārśvanātha agreed with the Second Noble Truth of Buddhism as a diagnosis of suffering.

The *Nikāyas* also recorded the Jaina notion with regard to *Himsā*, its causes, and their remedies. The *Majjhima Nikāya* says that Nigaṇṭhas uphold three ways of committing *Himsā* viz, (i) by activity (*kṛta*), (ii) by commission (*kārita*) and (iii) by approval of the deed (*anumodana*). To get a violence committed or to approve a violence committed is about the same as to commit violence by one's self, for one is involved in the activity directly or indirectly and shares it. Therefore, one who refrains from *Himsā* will not utter even a word which is likely to give pain to another, will not commit any act which may cause injury to another, will not harbour any thoughts prejudicial to another, will not make anybody else

utter words likely to cause pain to another, nor entertain feelings of ill will towards another, and will not encourage others to cause pain by word, deed, or thought to another.⁷

In another place, the *Majjhima Nikāya*⁸ states that in *Nalanda*, Dīghatapassī informed the Buddha that the Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta did not lay down *Kamma Kamma*, but his teaching was based on *Danḍa danḍa*⁹. Wrong doings, according to him, as we have already mentioned, are of three kinds, viz. *Kāyadanḍa* (wrong of body), *Vacīdanḍa* (wrong of speech), and *Manodanḍa* (wrong of mind). Further he says that *Kāyadanḍa* is more heinous in the opinion of Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta than either of the other two. This is supported by Nātaputta himself. He appreciates the statement of Dīghatapassī and says that he has answered Gotama in a very proper way (*sādhu sādhu tapasī*). For how can an insignificant wrong of mind overshadow an important wrong of body, since a wrong deed of body is the more blamable? (*kim hi sobhati chabo manodanḍo imassa evaṃ olārikassa kāyadanḍassa upanidhāya. atha kho kāyadanḍo vā mahāsāvajjataro pāpassa.....*). Upālī goes then to discuss the matter with the Buddha. The Buddha asked him "If Nigaṇṭha, who although suffers from sickness, refuses cold water and takes only hot water, passes away, what result does Nātaputta lay down for him?" Upālī answers that he will be born among the Manosatta Devas. He also says that according to Nātaputta, the blame is less; Because before he passed away, he was devoted to mind. The Buddha says: "House-holder, take care of how you explain. Your earlier statement does not tally with your latter, nor your latter with your earlier" (*manasā karohi, Gahapati...na kho te sandhiyati purimena vā pacchumam, pacchimena vā purimam*), and then asks Upālī: "While going out or returning, Four-fold restrained Nigaṇṭh Nātaputta brings many small creatures to destruction. What result, house-holder, does Nātaputta lay down for him? Nātaputta lays down that being unintentional, there is no great blame. "But if he does in-

tend it, it is of great blame. And this intention is included in that of wrong of mind," (*taṃ kiṃ maññasi, Gahapati, idhassa Nigaṇṭho..... so abhikkhamanto paṭikkhamanto bahu khuddake pana saṅghaṭaṃ apadeti, imassa pana, Gahapati, Nigaṇṭho Nātaputto kaṃ Vipākaṃ paññāpeti 'ti ? 'asañcetanikaṃ bhante, Nigaṇṭho Nātaputto no māhāsāvajjaṃ.. manodaṇḍasmin, bhante.'*) The Buddha urges then, "If a man comes here with a drawn sword and says that in a moment I will take all the living creatures in this Nālandā into one heap of flesh, one mass of flesh, what do you think about this ? Is that man able in one moment, one second, to make all the living creatures in this Nālandā into one heap of flesh ? (*aharaṃ yāvatikā imassa Nālandāya paṇa te ekena khaṇena ekena muhuttena ekaṃ māṃsakhalam ekaṃ māṃsapuñjaṃ karissāmi ti.. so puriso kaluṃ ?..*). Upālī replies : "Even ten men, revered Sir, even twenty, thirty, forty men, even fifty men are not able in one moment, one second, to make all the living creatures in this Nālandā into one heap of flesh, one mass of flesh. How then can one insignificant man shine out at this stage ?" The Buddha again points out the self-contradiction in the statement of Upālī.¹⁰

In fact, attachment and intention are very important in Jainism. They are regarded as the main sources of *Himsā*. If one, who observes the rules of conduct conscientiously, walks along, carefully looking ahead, end intent on avoiding injury to the crawling creatures, were to injure an insect by trampling it under foot by chance, he would not be responsible for *Himsā*. And if one acts carelessly or intentionally, he would be responsible for that whether a living being is killed or not. For, under the influence of passions, the person first injures the self through the self whether there is subsequently an injury caused to another being or not :

Yuktācaraṇasya sato rāgādyāveśamantareṇā' pi
Na hi bhavati jātu himsā prāṇavyaparopauḍeva,
Vyutthānāvasthāyāṃ rāgādināṃ vaśapravṛttāyāṃ
Mryantāṃ Jīvo mā vā dhāvatyagre dhruvaṃ himsā.
Yasmātsakaṣāyaḥ san hantyaṭmā prathamamātmanātma-
nāṃ

*Paścājjāyeta nā vā himsā prāpyantarāṇaṃ tu.*¹¹

Both, non-abstinence from *Himsa*, and indulgence in *Himsa*, constitute *Himsa*; and thus whenever there is careless activity of mind, body or speech, there is always injury to living being. Mere possession of a sword would not make one guilty of *Himsa*. Even then such possession can be the cause of some injury to somebody. Therefore, to prevent all possibility of *Himsa*, one should not entertain even the desire for the possession of such objects as are likely to cause injury.¹²

Thus all these references indicate that intention is the main source of injury in Jainism and if injury is caused by body intentionally, it will be considered more blamable. If killing of living beings is made an offence even when it is without intention, no one on earth can be an *Ahimsaka*, for the entire world is full of vitalities of all types which a man may kill in large number without knowing them at all :

Viṣvaggiṇvacito loke kva caran ko' pyamokṣyat.

*Bhāvankasādhanaṃ bandhamokṣaṃ cennābhaviṣyatām.*¹³

As regards the eating of flesh, the *Vinaya Piṭaka* has a good record of the Jain point of view. It is said there that Siha, a General of the Licchavis and a follower of Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta, had served meat to the Buddha. Knowing this Nigaṇṭhas, waving their arms, were murmuring from road to road in *Vaisālī* : Today a fat beast killed by Siha Senāpati has been served into a meal for the Buddha. The Buddha made use of this meat, knowing that it was killed on purpose for him."¹⁴ This incident took place immediately after Siha was converted to Buddhism. The Nigaṇṭhas, therefore, might have tried to blame both, the Buddha and Siha. Whatever that may be, this reference indicates clearly that the Jains were completely against the eating of flesh. The followers of the Buddha appear to have been influenced by this idea of the Jains. *Jivaka* visits the Buddha and asks if it is true that animals are slain expressly for the Buddha's use. The Buddha replies that he forbids the

eating of meat only when there is evidence of one's eyes or ears as grounds for suspicion that the animal has been slain for one's expressed use. Anyone who slays an animal for the use of a monk and gives it to him, commits a great evil. Jivaka is pleased with the reply and declares himself a follower of the Buddha.¹⁵

Likewise, Devadatta asked the Buddha for the imposition of the following five rules on all the members of the Saṅgha.¹⁶

- (i) that monks should dwell all their lives in the forest.
- (ii) that they should accept no invitations to meals, but live entirely on alms obtained by begging.
- (iii) that they should wear only robes made of discarded rags and accept no robes from the laity.
- (iv) that they should dwell at the foot of a tree and not under a roof, and
- (v) that they should abstain completely from fish and flesh.

But the Buddha thought that such rules should not be laid down for the Saṅgha as a whole. He left them for monks to observe purely on a voluntary basis.

Amṛtacandra, a Jaina Ācārya argues against the eating of flesh that it cannot be procured without causing destruction of life. One who uses flesh, therefore, commits *Himsā*, unavoidably. Even if the flesh be that of a buffalo, ox, etc., which has died of itself, *Himsā* is caused by the crushing of creatures spontaneously born. He who eats or touches a raw or a cooked piece of flesh, certainly kills spontaneously-born creatures constantly gathering together.¹⁷ In conclusion he says that those who wish to avoid *Himsā*, should first of all take care to renounce wine, flesh, honey and the two *udumbaras* (gular and fig) and fruits of *Pippala*, *Pakara* and *Banyan* which are the birth places of small mobile beings.¹⁸

Guṇavratas or Multiplicative Vows

The early Scriptures seem to have been familiar with the *Guṇavratas*. In the *Āṅguttara Nikāya* the Buddha is said to

have discussed the *Upasatha* ceremony while he was near *Sāvatthi* at *Visākha*'s house. *Visākha*, the *Migāra*'s mother, was perhaps, not perfectly converted from Jainism to Buddhism at that time. One day she, having observed the *Upasatha*, came to meet the Buddha at noon. Then the Buddha described to her three types of *Upasatha*. It is to be noted here that the *Upasatha* is the tenth vow in Jainism.

(i) Digvrata

The Buddha says to *Visākha* : "There is a sect of naked ascetics (*Nigaṇṭho nāma Samaṇajātikā*), who exhort a disciple thus : "Now my good fellow, you must lay aside injury (*Danḍam nikkhīpāhi*) to beings that exist in the East beyond the yojana from here, likewise to those in the West, North, and the South beyond a yojana from here. Thus they exhort them to kindness and compassion towards some creatures only¹⁹." This is a correct description of the *Digvrata* which is a life long vow to limit ones mundane activities in all directions from well-known objects,²⁰ But in subsequent lines the Buddha is reported to have criticised the doctrine saying : In this way they enjoin cruelty by making them not spare other living beings (*ekaccānaṃ paṇānaṃ nānuddayāya nānukampāya samādapenti*). This criticism is made only for the sake of criticism. For, he who confines his activities within a limited sphere, follows a complete vow of *Ahiṃsā* as regards what is beyond those limits, because of total absence of non-restraint there²¹. He, therefore, tries to follow the vow of *Mahāvratā*"²².

Thus, this is undoubtedly an unfair attack on the Jainas. Jacobi says in this respect : "we cannot expect one sect to give a fair and honest exposition of the tenets of their opponents : it is but natural that they should put them in such a form as to make the objections they want to raise against them all the better applicable. In the *Jaina Āgamas*²³ also we find misrepresentation of Buddhist ideas"²⁴.

Another reference to this vow is found in the *Dīgha Nikāya*. It is mentioned there that the Buddha met at *Vesālī* a certain

ascetic named Kaṇḍara-Masuka, who maintained seven life-long vows in order to gain fame and honour. The seven vows are : As long as I live I will be naked, and will not put on a garment (*yāvejjivam acelaḥ aṣṣaṇṇaṃ na vattham paṇḍeḥeyyaṃ*), as long as I live, I will observe the vow of chastity (*yāvajjivam brahmacāriṃ āssaṃ na methunam dhammaṃ paṭiseveyyam*), so long as I live, I will maintain myself by spirituous drink and flesh, eating no rice-broth or gruel (*yāvajjivam surāmāṃseneva yāpeyyam na odana-kummāsaṃ bhuñjeyyem*), I will never go beyond the Udena shrine in Vesālī in the East (*puratthimena Vesālīṃ Udenam nāma cetiyam taṃ nātikkameyyam*); I will never go beyond the Gotamaka shrine in Vesālī in the South (*dakkhiṇena Vesālīṃ Gotamakam nāma cetiyaṃ taṃ nātikkameyyam*); I will never go beyond the Sattamba shrine in Vesālī in the West (*Pacchimena*); and I will never go beyond the Bahuputta shrine in Vesālī in the North (*Uttarena...* 25

Here all the vows, except the third (i.e. the one referring to spirits and meat), represent the Jaina vows. It is quite possible that this vow which is inconsistent with the spirit of the other six vows, is either a mistake or an interpolation. The first two are common vows of most ascetics of that time, while the last four are vows of a Jainistic type, and they represent the *Digvrata*. No other sect adhered to these last four vows. As regards the *Ājivikas*, I would prefer to quote the words of Basham, an accepted authority on Ājivikism. He says : ‘The ascetic Kaṇḍara-masuka is regularly referred to as acela, but nowhere as Ājivika, and we have no evidence that any of his vows, with the exception of the first, were taken by the organized Ājivika community.²⁶’ Now, we can say that kaṇḍara-masuka must be either an ascetic fallen from the Jaina asceticism, or his vows have been mixed up. For they cannot be accepted completely, neither by Jainas, nor by *Ājivikas*, since both religions prohibited meat-eating completely.

(ii-iii) Deśavrata and Anarthadaṇḍavrata

Deśavrata means one should take a vow for a certain time not to proceed beyond a certain village, market place etc. No

clear reference to this vow is yet found in Pāli literature, as it is not much different from *Digvrata*.

In the *Anarthadaṇḍavarata*, one should never think of hunting, victory, defeat, battle, adultery, theft, etc, because they only lead to sin.²⁷ With regard to this vow nothing is mentioned separately, but we can trace its nature from other references. *Dighatapaṣṣi* describes to the Buddha the three ways of falling into sin according to the Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta, viz. the *Kāyadaṇḍa*, *vacidaṇḍa*, and the *manodaṇḍa*²⁸. This indicates that to resist the *kāya*, *vacana*, and *mana* from doing wrong deeds is the aim of *Anarthadaṇḍavarata*.

The śikṣāvratas or Disciplinary Vows

(i) Sāmāyika :

There are several illuminating references to the *Śikṣāvratas* in the Pāli Canon. It is *Sāmāyika* or Contemplation of the self that the *Mjjhima Nikāya*²⁹ refers to when the Buddha says to Mahānāma that he had seen Nigaṇṭhas on the Vulture peak, standing erect, refraining from sitting, experiencing pain...etc. This is an allusion to the *Kāyotsarga* of the Jaina ascetics, but we can have an idea of the nature of *Sāmāyika* prescribed for Jaina laymen since it is the pre-stage of *Kāyotsarga*. As this reference indicates, *Sāmāyika* should be performed by sitting or standing at a tranquil place.

(ii) Proṣādhopavāsa

The *Aṅguttara Nikāya* presents a picture of a *Proṣādha*. While the Buddha was staying near *Sāvatthi*, he criticises the opponents' *Upoṣāthas* and preaches the nature of Buddhist *Upoṣātha* to Viśākhā. He says : "There are three kinds of *Upoṣāthas*, the *Gopālak Upoṣātha*, *Nigaṇṭha Upoṣātha*, and the *Āryana Upoṣātha*.

In explaining what the *Gopālak Upoṣātha* is, the Buddha said, "Suppose, Viśākhā, the herdsman at evening restores the kin to their owners. Then he thus thinks : the kine grazed today at such and such a spot, and drank at such a spot. Tomorrow they will graze at such and such a spot. Likewise,

the holder of *Gopāḷaka Upoṣatha* thinks thus : tomorrow I shall eat such and such food, both hard and soft. And he spends the day engrossed in that covetous desire. This sort of *Upoṣatha*, therefore, is not fruitful. It is not very brilliant. It is not very brilliant. It is not of great radiance.³⁰

He then describes the *Nigaṇṭha Upṣatha* : "There is a sect of naked ascetics, the so called *Nigaṇṭhanāma Samāṇajīvika*. Then again on the Sabbath day they exhort the disciple thus : "I have no part in anything, anywhere, and herein for me there is no attachment to anything." The Buddha then makes a remark on this sort of *Upoṣatha*. He says : "Yet for all that, his parents know him for their son and he knows them for his children and wife. Yet for all that his slaves and workmen know him for their master and he in turn knows them for his slaves and workmen. Thus at a time when one and all should be exhorted to keep the sabbath, it is in falsehood that they exhort them. This, I declare, is as bad as telling lies. Further the Buddha criticises that as soon as that night has passed he resumes the use of his belongings, which had not been given back to him really. This I declare as bad as stealing. This *Upoṣatha* of the *Nigaṇṭhas*, therefore, is not of great fruit or profit. It is not very brilliant. It is not great radiance." Thereafter, the Buddha points out his own attitude towards the *Upoṣatha*. He says that both these sorts of *Upoṣatha* are not fruitful. The *Upoṣatha*, which he exhorts, is perfectly right, is named *Ārya Upoṣatha*. It brings the purification of a soiled mind by a proper process. For this purpose the *Ārya* disciple calls to mind the Tathāgata thus : The Exalted One, the *Arhanta*, is a fully Enlightened One, perfect in knowledge, and in practice, a benevolent person, a world-knower, Unsurpassed, Charioteer of Beings to be tamed, Teacher of Devas and mankind, a Buddha is the Exalted One. As he thus bethinks him of the Tathāgata, his mind is calm; delight arises, the soil of the mind is abandoned. It is just like cleaning the head when it is dirty. Thus this sort of *Upoṣatha* is more fruitful.³²

Here, the second *Upoṣatha* belongs to the Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta and the third to the Buddha. But what about *Gopālka Upoṣatha* ? Whom does it belong ? I think that it should belong to either *Brāhmaṇas* or *Ājīvikas*, or it may be a part and parcel of the Nigaṇṭhas' *Upoṣatha*. As regards the Brāhmaṇa tradition, *Upoṣatha* is observed with sacrifices and complete fasting³³, and the *Ājīvikas* are no-where mentioned as observers of any sort of *Upoṣatha*. Now, if we go through Jaina literature, we will find that there was a tradition of having *Upoṣatha* both with and without meals. For, selfmortification is said to have been performed according to one's capability. The *Upoṣatha* is observed to carry on contemplation in a better way : and that can be fulfilled by a lay devotee with or without meals, though without meals is preferred :—

Sa proṣadhopavāso yaccatuṣparvyāṃ, yathāgamaṃ.
 Sāmyasaṃskāradārḍyāya caturbhuktyujhanaṃ sadā.
 Upaviśakṣamaiḥ kāryo' nupavāsastadakṣamaiḥ.
 Ācāmlanirvikṛtyādi śaktyā hi śreyase tapaḥ³⁴

Another point is that the Nigaṇṭha *Upoṣatha* is said to be performed by observing *Digvrata*, the sixth vow of a Jaina lay devotee, and abandoning all attachment during that period. Here the Buddha is reported to have blamed the Jainas, accusing them of violence, since they have compassion towards beings existing only within a certain limited sphere, not to others. But as already pointed out, according to Jainism, a layman is to observe the partial vows (*anuvratas*), according to which, he is not to go beyond a certain limit. How then is there any possibility of violence ?

Another criticism of the Buddha compares *Nigaṇṭha Upoṣatha* to lying and stealing. He says that during the period of *Upoṣatha* a Jaina layman becomes unclothed and thinks that nobody is his and he is of nobody's, and gets rid of worldly attachment for a limited time. After performing his *Upoṣatha* he accepts his belongings and knows the parents as parents and so forth. We know, the vow was taken for a limited

time, not on a permanent basis. It should be remembered here that this is the partial vow (*aṇuvrata*) prescribed for the lay-men to practice a monk's life. Further a question of lyeing or stealing does not arise here.

Arguments, which were prevalent in those days are recorded in the *Bhagavati Śataka*.³⁵ Gaṇadhara named Gautama (not the Buddha) asked Mahāvira a question about some Ājivikas, the followers of Gośālaka, who had doubt about the *Jama Upoṣatha*. They asked them : 'Suppose a Jaina layman observes Upoṣatha and proceeds to meditation abandoning all his properties including the wives and suppose someone during his absence appropriates his properties and his wives, does that layman become guilty of taking other people's things on his return if he takes his properties and wives from the person who had appropriated them ? Māhāvira answered the above question saying that layman uses his own things, and not of others. For the belongings were abandoned for only of limited period, not for all time.

This reference makes it very clear that the impressions which the Buddha and the Ājivikas had of *Nigaṇṭha Upoṣatha* were alike. If Gośālaka of the *Aṅguttara Nikāya* is the Gośālaka of the *Bhagavati Śataka*, we can say that the *Gośālaka Upoṣatha* might have belonged to the Ājivika sect. Because the founder of Ājivikism, Makkhali Gośāla, was formerly a follower of Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta. Several of its doctrines were, therefore, influenced by the doctrines of Jainas. Whatever that may be, one thing is certain, that is, all sects and schools of *Samaṇa* Cult had the *Upoṣatha*, though in varying forms, as a common religious institution.

With regard to removing all clothes during the *Samāyika* or *Upoṣatha*, Jacobi says, "The description, however, does not quite agree with the *posaha* rules of the Jainas." He depends on the definition of *Posaha* according to the *Tattvārthasārādīpikā* as given by Bhandarakar. He says : "Posaha, i.e., to observe a fast or eat once only on the two holy days, one must give up bathing, unguents, ornaments, company of women, odours.

incense, lights, etc. and assume renunciation as an ornament. Though the *Posaha* observances of the present Jains are apparently more severe than those of the Buddhists, still they fall short of the above description of the Nigaṇṭha rules : for a Jain layman does not, to my knowledge, take off his clothes during the *posaha* days, though he discards all ornaments and every kind of luxury; nor must he pronounce any formula of renunciation similar to that which the monks utter on entering the order. Therefore, unless the Buddhist account contains some mistake or is a gross mis-statement, it would appear that the Jainas have abated somewhat their rigidity with regard to the duties of a layman.³⁶

Jacobi's findings are based on the findings of Bhandarakar or on the *Tattvārthasārādīpikā* and are supported by his observation that the Jain laymen do not take off clothes during the *Sāmāyika*, and therefore, he thinks that the Jainas have somewhat relaxed the rigidity with regard to the duties of a layman. But, it appears, Jacobi had no opportunity to collect the references from Jain literature, we have already pointed out from the *Bhagawati Śataka* that the Jain laymen who wish to be initiated to the vows of monkhood take off their clothes at the time of *Samāyika*. The *Sāgaradharmamṛta*³⁷, which is only concerned with the duties of the Jain laymen, also clearly refers to the fact that during the *Upoṣatha* days senior observers of *Sāmāyika* removed their clothes during the *Sāmāyika* period. It is a personal observation of mine that even now the senior members who are on the verge of becoming muni (Digambara monk) renounce their clothes at night during the performance of *Sāmāyika*. It should, therefore, be clear that the Jain laymen still observe the rigid duties which are referred to in *Pāli* literature.

The afore-mentioned reference to Nigaṇṭha-Upoṣatha in the *Aṅguttara Nikāya* points out the duties coming under *Bhogopabhogaparimāṇavrata*, the eleventh vow of lay devotees, which enjoins that one should limit the enjoyment of consumable and non-consumable things. When this vow is observed,

there is no scope for *Himsā* or violence. Because of the control of speech, mind and body, there is no room for telling a lie or stealing or for other kinds of *himsā*. Further because of abstinence from all sexual intercourse and attachment to worldly affairs, there is no *Abrahmacarya* and *Parigraha*.

The twelfth obligation of a Jaina layman is perhaps the most widely practised. It is due to the munificence of the laity which practised *atithisaṃvibhāgavrata* that Jaina monks, could, despite the numerous vicissitudes of time, preserve the Jaina tradition. In the *Pāli* records we have references to the generosity of such Jaina laymen as Upālī who gave alms and requisites not only to Jaina monks but also to other religious persons of the time. It is also this vow which has made Jainism one of the best-endowed religions of India with a very impressive group of temples of exquisite artistic excellence.

The Stages of Ethical Evolution of a Jaina House-holder

The stages of ethical evolution of a Jaina house-holder are called the *Pratimās* and are eleven in number. Ten of them (i.e. excepting *Ratribhuktityāga*) are referred to indirectly in the *Pāli* Canon. Their main characteristics have been discussed in the course of our discussion on the Twelve Partial Vows (*dvādaśāṇuvratas*). The *Aṅguttara Nikāya*³⁸ gives us a list of ascetics who were prevalent at that time, and it refers to Nigaṇṭhā, Muṇḍāsāvaka, Jaṭṭakā, Paribbājaka, Māgandikā, Tedaṇḍikā, Aruddhakā, Gotamakā, and Devadhammikā. The Nigaṇṭhas are undoubtedly the followers of Nigaṇṭha Nātiputta who performed very severe penances. The same *Nikāya*³⁹ enumerates six *Abhiṇāsis* and in that account the Nigaṇṭhas are said to have worn one yellow stained cloth (*kāṣāyavāstra*). This may be a reference to *Elaka* or *Kṣullaka* (i.e. the vow of wearing small loin cloth with or without a cloth to cover the upper body⁴⁰).

Buddhaghosa in his Commentary on the *Dhammapāda* says that more assiduous Nigaṇṭhas cover their water-pots so that no soul and sand should enter it.

Commoner ascetic practices are also mentioned in the *Nikāyas*⁴¹. Out of them, *Nabhihatam* (refusing to accept the food especially prepared for them), is related to the eleventh stage of Jaina House-holder called *Uddiṣṭatyāga-Pratimā*.

From these indirect references we come to the conclusion that at that time no such name was given to the *vratis*. However, it shows that there were some types of categories of *vratis*.

Jaina Monachism

After completing the practice of *Aṇuvratas* and *Pratimās*, a house-holder seeks permission from his relatives to renounce completely mundane affairs and become a Jaina monk. Then after worshipping *pañca Parameṣṭhins* (*Ārhanṭa*, *Siddha*, *Ācārya Upādhyāya*, and *Sādhu*) he requests the Gaṇin to admit him into his Order. Being accepted by the Gaṇin, he pulls out his hair and becomes a completely naked ascetic according to the *Digambara* tradition.

There were at first no caste restrictions to be a Jaina monk, but later on *Brāhmaṇa*, *Kṣatriya*, and *vaiśyas* are said to have been preferred.⁴² Robbers, sick persons, slaves, blinds, debtors, etc. are not to be admitted into the Order.⁴³

The new monk makes gradual progress in monkhood and attains the position of *Sthavira*, *Upādhyāya*, *Ācārya*, *Gaṇadhara*, and *pravartaka*.⁴⁴ There are three Monastic Units which are recognized by the Jainas :—

(i) *Gaṇa* consists of at least three monks and maximum a thousand.⁴⁵ It is a unit made up of many *kulas* (*parasparasāpekṣānekakulasamudāyāḥ*).⁴⁶

(ii) *Kula* forms the *Gaṇa* (*gaṇaḥ kulāsamudāyāḥ*).⁴⁷

(iii) *Gacchā* consists of seven monks (*saptapuruṣako gacchāḥ*).⁴⁸

It is under a particular *Ācārya* (*Guruparivārah*).⁴⁹ The entire Order consists of monks, nuns, laymen, and women, and is called *Sangha*. If one breaks any rules or regulations, he should observe *Prāyaścittas* like *Ālocanā*, *Pratikramāṇa*.

Ubhaya, Viveka, Vyutsarga, Tapa, Cheda, Parihāra, and Upas-thūpanā ⁵⁰ During the rainy season a Jaina ascetic should stop his touring and abstain from walking on green grass or water. One should move about only during the day taking proper care not to tread on any living creature (*sāmyak irīyā samiti*).⁵¹

Complete nakedness (*jahṛjñya*) is one of the essentials of Jaina (*Digambara*) monk-hood.⁵² He should have 27 qualities *Prāṇīlpatāvurmaṇa etc.*⁵³ Among the requisites he is permitted to have a broom made of peacock feathers and a water-pot made of wood for using after answering calls of nature. He sleeps either on the bare ground or on a plank of wood. He never uses blankets and the like, even during the cold season. He is not supposed even to touch money.

A Jaina ascetic takes his meal and water once a day between about 9 A. M. and 18 Noon. He eats out of his own palms in a standing position. The concept behind this rule is to abstain from all botherations and mundane affairs. The food should be pure in nine ways (*navakoṭi-parisuddham*)⁴⁵ The faults pertaining to the improper begging of food are generally grouped into four, viz. *Udgama* (preparation of food), *Utpādana* (the ways of adopting food), *Eṣaṇā* (the method of accepting food), and *Paribhoga* (way of eating food, its quantity, etc).⁵⁵ The main purpose of eating is to gain physical strength adequate for the purpose of Performing religious duties.

The fundamentals of moral discipline consist of the twenty-eight *Mūlaguṇas*, the *Uttaraguṇas*, five-fold *Ācāras*, the twelve *Anuprekṣās* or reflections, the twelve-fold penance or *Tapas*, ten kinds of *Vaiyāvṛtya*, and the twentytwo kinds of *Parīṣaha*. They are as follows :

The twenty-eight Mūlaguṇas :

(1) *Pañca Mahāvratas* : total abstention from five great sins, i.e. *Himsā* (violence), *Asatya* (telling a lie), *Steṇa* (theft), *Abrahma* (sexual intercourse), and *Parigraha* (worldly attachment).

(2) *Pañca Samitis* : five religious observances, viz. (i) *Iriyā* or walking with proper care looking 3½ yards ahead, (ii) *Bhāṣā* or speaking with proper care, (iii) *Eṣaṇī*, or taking only pure food which was not specially prepared for him, (iv) *Āānani-kṣepaṇa* or proper care in lifting and laving, and (v) *pratiṣṭhā-paṇū* or proper care in excreting.

(3) *ṣaḍīvaśyakas* : five daily duties, viz. (i) *Sāmāyika* or equanimity of soul, (ii) *Vandanā* or saluting of *Tīrthaṅkaraś* images in the temples. (iii) *Stuti*, praising the qualities of holy beings. (iv) *Pratikramana* or repentance of faults, (v) *Svādhy-āya* or reading the scriptures, and (vi) *Kūyotsarga* or giving up attachment to the body and practising contemplation of the self.

(4) *pañcendriyanirodha* or restraint of five senses.

(5) *Pañcācūra* : five kinds of *ācūras*, viz. *Darśanācūra* or to induce strong and steady faith, (ii) *Jñānācūra* or to increase knowledge, (iii) *Cāritrācūra* or to improve one's daily life, (iv) *Tapācūra*, and (v) *Vīryācūra*, to increase the power of one's inner self.

(6) *Triguṇtis* : the three-fold restraint of mind, body and speech.

Besides, a monk is said to have seven other duties, viz. (i) *Keśaluṅcana* or pulling the hair with one's own hands, (ii) *Acelakatva*, or Nakedness, (iii) *Asnānātva*, or not to bathe, (iv) *Bhṛṣayanatva*, or sleeping on the ground, (v) *Ekabhukti* or taking only a little food once a day, (vi) *Adantadhūvanatva*, or not applying a brush to the teeth, and (vii) Taking food in a standing posture, and only in the hollow of the folded hands.

A monk, as we have already referred to in the last chapter, is supposed to meditate on the twelve *Anuprekṣās* or *Bhūvanās* (reflections) and observe the austerities (*tapas* and *Parīśahas*).

References to Jaina Monachism in Pāli Literature

Pāli, as well as Buddhist Sanskrit, literature refers to Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta as the head and teacher of a very large Order (*saṅghī ceva gaṇī ca gaṇācariyo ca*), well known (*ātā*), famous (*yasassī*), the founder of a sect (*tīlhaṅgarā*).⁵⁷

Here *San̄ghī*, *Gaṇī*, and *Gaṇācariyo* indicate the stages of gradual development in Jaina hierarchy. The *Sādhu* or *Nigaṇṭha* is mentioned as the ordinary category of monks. Such monks (*seha* or *antevāsīn*) are of four types in Jaina literature, and their main duties are to practise the monastic conduct and study. *Ācārya* is superior to *Upādhyāya* and is supposed to be head of a small group of monks. The *Āvaśyakavīryakī* mentions the qualities of a *Ācārya* viz. that he should possess the five-fold conduct (*ācāra*) knowledge (*jñāna*), faith (*darśana*), good behaviour (*cūritra*), penance (*tapa*), and fortitude (*virya*). *Gaṇī*, a head of a *gaṇa*, is separated from *Ācārya*, but his duties are not much different. He is said to be equipped with eightfold *gaṇīsāmpadā*, viz. *Ācāra*, *Śruta*, *Śarīra*, *Vacana*, *Mati*, *Prayoga*, and *San̄graha*.⁵⁸ *Gaṇadhara* is a chief disciple of *Tīrthaṅkar*. The *Tīrthaṅkara* karma is obtained by meditation of *Darśanaviśuddhi* (purity or right belief), *Vinayasampannatā* (reverence for means of liberation and for those who follows them), *Śīlavrateṣvanatitūra* (faultless observance of the five vows, and faultless subdual of the passions), *Abhīkṣṇajñānopayoga* (ceaseless pursuit of right knowledge), *San̄vega* (perpetual apprehension of mundane miseries), *Śaktitastyūga* (giving up according to one's capacity) *Sādhusamādhī* (protecting and reassuring the saints or removing their troubles), *Vaiyāvṛtṭyākaraṇa* (serving the meritorious), *Arhadbhakti* (devotion to arhats or omniscients), *Ācāryabhakti* (devotion to *Ācāryas*), *Bahuvṛtabhakti* (devotion to *Upādhyāya*), *Pravacanabhakti* (devotion to scripture), *Avāśyakaparihāni* (not neglecting one's duties), *Mārgaprabhūvanā* (propagation of the path of liberation), and *Pravacanavatsalatva* (tender affection for one's brothers on the path of liberation).⁵⁹

Church Units

The monks were grouped in various Units under their respective Heads. The whole congregation of monks, nuns, laymen, and lay-women is called *San̄gh*. *Gaṇa*, *Kula*, and *Gaccha* were the main Units. *Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta* is

said to be a head and a teacher of such *Sanḡha* and *Gaṇa* (*Sanḡhi' ceva gaṇi' ca gaṇācariyo ca*).⁶⁰ The *gaṇa* was the largest unit made up of many *kulas* (*paraṣparaśanākakulasa-mudāyah*).⁶¹ The maximum number of the members of a *Gaṇa* is said to be a thousand (*utkrīṣṭaḥ puruṣaṣāḥ pramāṇaṁ sahaśrbyāpṭharkṭvaṁ*).⁶² It was headed by *Gaṇadhara* or *Tīrthaṅkara*.⁶³

Vassāvāsa or stay in rainy season

During the rainy season a Jaina ascetic is supposed to stop his touring. The rule was so popular that the people criticise the Buddhist monks for not adhering to it at the beginning, "How can these recluses, *Sākyaputtiyas*, walk on tour during the cold weather and hot weather and rain trampling down the crops and grasses, injuring life that is one-facultied and bringing many small creatures to destruction? Shall it be that these members of other sects, whose rules are badly kept, cling to and prepare a rains-residence, shall it be that birds having made their nests in the tree-tops, cling to a proper rains-residence, which these recluses trample on walking?"⁶⁴ Then the Buddha prescribed the rules pertaining to the observance of indoor residence in the rainy season.

Here the word *aññatitthiyā* refers to the heretical teachers. We are not aware of this rule in their doctrines, except in those of *Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta*. The *Mūlācāra* mentions that a Jaina monk should stop touring in the rainy season and abstain from causing injury to vegetable beings which grow profusely during this time.

Taṇarukkhaḥaridachedaṇatayapattapavālakandamūlāim.
Phalapupphabiyaghādaṁ ṇa karenti muṇi ṇa kārenti.
Puḍhaviya samārambhaṁ jalapavaṇaggitasāṇamārambhaṁ.
*Ṇa karenti ṇā karenti ya kārentaṁ ṇāṇumodanti.*⁶⁵

The *vassāvāsa* in Jainism⁶⁶ as well as Buddhism⁶⁷ commences on the full-moon day of a *Āṣāḍha* and ends on the full-moon day of *Kārtika*. The *Tkhaṇṇāga* permits the monks to go to another place under certain circumstances.⁶⁸

Requisites

A Jaina monk has no attachment to the world. Nakedness or *acelakatva* is considered one of the essential of monkhood (*lingakappa*).⁶⁹ Pāli literature refers to Jaina ascetics as Nigaṇṭhas, for they claimed to be free from all bonds (*aṇḍhākaṃ gaṇṭhānakilesa paḷibujjhankilesa natthi*, *Kilesaganthirahitaāyāni ti evaṃ vūditāya laddhnūmavasena Nigaṇṭho*).⁷⁰

Cloth and other requisities are considered *parigraha* (possession) which is an obstacle to the attainment of salvation. Ācārya Kundakunda says : "If (you were to say) it is (found) stated in certain texts that monk [accepts a piece of clothing and possesses a pot, (we are to ask) how can he (with these) be independent and without activities involving preliminary sins ? If he accepts a piece of clothing, gourd-bowl or anything else, necessarily there is involved harm to living beings, and there is disturbance in mind."⁷¹ Somadeva also puts forth the same view.⁷² According to *Digambaras*, no body can attain complete emancipation from karmas without being naked.

The Buddha was completely against nakedness (*Acelakatva*). He criticised this rule along with others on several occasions. In Pāli literature the word *Acela* is used quite loosely and referred to any naked ascetic rather than a member of any single organised religious sect.⁷³ In the *Vinaya*⁷⁴ both *Acelaka* and *Ājīvika* are used synonymously. In the *Majjhima Nīkāya*, the Buddha is said to have followed the *Acelakatva* before he had attained Buddhahood. But in the *Dhammapadaṭṭhakathā*, a person with an unsettled mind is compared to one who starts as an *Acelaka*, Nigaṇṭha and Tāpasa.⁷⁵

In the same work an incident is referred to where the Nigaṇṭhas wearing a piece of cloth are considered better than those who are completely unclothed (*Acelakas*). The reason given for wearing a garment was the prevention of dust and dirt falling into their alms-dishes. For even dust and

comprise beings endowed with life⁷⁶. This reference appears to the *Śvetāmbara* sect of Jains which apparently had come into existence at the time of Buddhaghosa.

The same work mentions another incident which happened during the marriage of Visākhā, a lay-woman who was a follower of Buddhism. It is said there that her father-in-law Migāra, follower of Jainism, escorted the naked ascetics (perhaps Jains) into his house for a meal, and called Visākhā to pay homage to them. As she entered the hall where the naked ascetics were eating and looked at them, she said "Men like these are totally bereft of a sense of modesty and fear of mortal sin and have no right to the title of *Arhant*. Why did my father-in-law send for me⁷⁷?"

Another story⁷⁸ gives a dialogue between Sirigutta and Garhadinna, the followers of Buddha and the Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta. Garhadinna says to Sirigutta that the Nigaṇṭhas (Jaina monks) are omniscient. They know the past, present and the future. Afterwards Sirigutta, a follower of the Buddha, tries to test this boast of the naked ascetics. He prepared a ditch to be dug between two houses. On invitation, when the Nigaṇṭhas came, they fell into the pit and their bodies were covered with mud etc. Then it is said that he had them beaten with sticks and brought humiliation upon them. In the end it was proved that Buddhist monks were omniscient for they could avoid the pit which was secretly dug for them too. One factor is important here, that is, the Jaina monks who figure in this story are only ordinary monks and Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta is not connected with the incident at all.

All these references to *Acelakas* and Nigaṇṭhas indicate that the Buddha and his followers were not only opposed to nakedness, but they also ridiculed it. On the other hand, it is clear that Acelakatva or nakedness was one of the essentials of Jaina monkhood.

Ascetic Practices

Some ascetic practices which were prevalent at that time

among *Samaṇas* and *Brāhmaṇas* are referred to by the name of *Acela Kassapa*⁷⁹. The same practices are said to have been practised by the Buddha himself before he attained enlightenment⁸⁰. The *Ājīvikas* are also said to have followed them⁸¹. These practices are as follows :

- (1) He goes naked (*acelako hoti*).
- (2) He is of loose habits (performing his bodily functions, and eating food in a standing posture, not crouching down, or sitting down, as well-bred people do (*muttācāro*).
- (3) He licks his hands clean (after eating, instead of washing them, as others do)-(*hatthāpalekhano*).
- (4) When on his rounds for alms, if politely requested to stop nearer, or to wait a moment, he passes solidly on (*na ehi bhaddantiko na tiṭṭha bhaddantiko*).
- (5) He refuses to accept food brought to him (*nābhihatam*)
- (6) He refuses to accept food if prepared especially for him (*na uddissakatam*).
- (7) He refuses to accept any invitation (*na nimantānam sādiyati*).
- (8) He will not accept food straight from the mouth of a pot or pan (*so na kumbhīmūkhā paṭiggaṇhāti. na kalopimukkhū paṭiggaṇhāti*).
- (9) He will not accept food placed within the threshold (*na elakamuntaram*).
- (10) Nor among the sticks (*na daṇḍamantaram*).
- (11) Nor among the pestles (*na musalamantaram*).
- (12) Nor when two persons are eating (*na dvinnam bhuñjamānam*).
- (13) Nor from a pregnant woman (*na gabbhāniyā*).
- (14) Nor from one giving suck (*na pāyamaṇāyā*).
- (15) Nor from one in intercourse with a man (*na puri-santaragatāyā*)
- (16) He will not accept food collected (*na saṅkattisu*).
- (17) Nor accept food where a dog is standing (*na yattha su upaṭṭhito hoti*).

(18) Nor where flies are swarming (*na yattha makkhikā saṇḍasaṇḍacārini*).

(19) Nor accept fish, nor meat, nor drink, nor intoxicants, nor gruel (*na maccham, na thusodkam pīvati*).

(20) He is one-houser accepting one mouthful or a two-houser accepting two-mouthfuls or a seven-houser accepting seven mouthfuls (*so ekāgāriko vā hoti ekāloṇṇiko vā hoti dvāloṇṇiko, sattāgāriko vā hoti sattāloṇṇiko*).

(21) He keeps himself going on alms given by only one or only two, or so on, up to seven (*ekissāpi dattiyā yāpeti, dvīhi pi dattīhi yāpeti, sattāhi pi dattīhi yāpeti*).

(22) He takes food only once a day, or once every two days, or so on upto only seven days. Thus does he dwell observing the practice of taking food according to rule, at regular intervals, upto even half a month. (*ekūhikam pi āhāraṃ āhāreti, dvīhikam pi āhāraṃ āhāreti, sattīhikam pi āhāraṃ āhāreti, itī ecarūpam addhamāsikam pi pariyāyabhottabhañjanūnuyogamanuyutto viharati*).

Out of these practices, several are reminiscent of the eight faults pertaining to food, which are mentioned in the *Mūlācāra* viz. *Udgama*; *Utpādana*, *Eśaṇā*, *Saṃyojana*, *Aṅgāra*, *Dhūma* and *Kāraṇa*.³² These are identical with the rules prescribed for Jain monks. Jacobi also accepts that "many are quite clear, and bear a close resemblance to well known Jain usages."³³

The *Udgama*doṣa³⁴ are of sixteen kinds. viz. *Adhaḥkarma*, *Auddesika*, *Adhyadhi*, *Pūtimisra*, *Sthāpita*, *Bali*, *Prāviṣkarama*, *Kṛita*, *Prāmṛṣya*, *Abhighāta*, *Udbhinna*, *Malāroha*, *Accheddya* and *Aniśīṣṭa*. Among these faults some are referred to in the above reference. They are as follows :

Nābhikataṇṇu (5) is the *abhighāta* doṣa of the *Mūlācāra*, according to which a Jain monk should not accept the food brought from other places³⁵ :

Na uddissakataṃ (6) is *Auddesika* Doṣa of the *Mūlācāra* which means : whatever is prepared specially for any saint or Śramaṇa or Nirgrantha, should not be accepted by a Jain

monk.⁸⁶ The reason behind this rule is that the lay-devotees of Jainism should always take pure food and be prepared to offer faultless food to a monk at any time.⁸⁷ *Na kumbhī mukhā paṭigganḥāti, na kalopimukhā paṭigganḥāti, na elakamantaram, na daṇḍamantaram, na musalamantaram* (8-11) are the *Sthāpita* and *Misra doṣas* pertaining to food in Jaina asceticism.⁸⁸ According to these rules, the utensils and things cooked therein should not be mixed :

Pāsaṇḍehi ya saddham sāgarehiṇ ya jadaṇḍamuddisiyaṇ.
Dādumidi saṃjadāṇaṇ Siddham missaṇ viyāṇāhi.
Pāgādu bhāyaṇāo aṇṇamhi ya bhāyaṇamhi pakkhaviya,
Saghare vā paraghare vā ṇihidaṇ ṭhavidam viyāṇāhi⁸⁹

saṅkattiṣu (16) is the *Prāduṣkara (saṅkramaṇa)* and *Rṇadoṣa* of the *Mūlacāra*. According to them, the food for Jaina monks should neither be collected nor be borrowed from any other places.⁹⁰ This indicates that a donation should be made according to one's capacity.⁹¹ So *ekāgāriko va. dvāgāriko vā. satlagāriko vā hoti* (20) are identical with the *Āciṇṇa doṣa*. A *muni* should not go begging beyond seven houses. He is supposed to have returned in case he could not get alms⁹². *Na dvinnam bhuñjamānānaṇ*, (12) *Na gabbhinīyā*⁹³, (13) *Na pūyamānāya*⁹⁴ (14) *Na puri santarāgatāya* (15) are identical with the *Dāyaka Doṣas*, according to which a woman who is eating (*ghasattī*), is pregnant (*gabbhinī*) or is nursing a baby (*pūyamānaṇ dārāyaṇ*) is not eligible to offer alms to a monk.⁹⁵ *Na ehi bhadanṭiko, Na tiṭṭha bhadanṭiko* (4) *Na uddissakataṇ* (6) are related to *Uddiṣṭa-tyāga*, according to which a Jaina monk does not accept any invitation. (*uddiṣṭam piṇḍamaṇyujjhed*).

Mode of eating

We have already seen that a Jaina monk (Digambara) does not possess anything except a water-pot and a broom. He therefore eats food in the hollow of his palms in a standing position.⁹⁶ The *hatthāpalekhano* (3) indicates the same mode of eating of Jaina saints in an ironical way. *The Mutṭacāro* (2) also perhaps hints the same. Somadeva points out here that

although no body attains salvation by observing this mode of eating but it gives an impression that an ascetic takes an oath that he should take his meals till he could keep food in the hollow of his palms in standing position.⁹⁷

Quantity of food

A Jaina monk is supposed to fill half his belly with food, one fourth with water, and one fourth with wind. The maximum quantity of food to be taken ordinarily is 32 morsels (kavala).⁹⁸ the '*Ekūlopiko, dvūlopiko, sattūlopiko* indicate further restrictions on the quantity of food consumed by a monk.

The Circumstances under which Food could not be taken

A long list of circumstances under which food could not be taken is given in the *Mūlācūra*. If a crow touches the food or if some one vomits or if the monk happens to see blood or flesh or somebody crying or if living beings like flies fall into his food, no food should be accepted under such circumstances. *Na yattha su upatthito hoti* (17), *Na yattha makkhikā saṇḍasaṇḍacārini* (18). *Na macchaṃ, na māmsaṃ, na suraṃ, na merayaṃ, na thusodakam pīvati* (19) point out further circumstances.

Fasting

The reference "*Ekāhikam pi āhāraṃ āhāreti, dvihikam pi āhāraṃ āhāreti, sattihikam pi āhāraṃ āhāreti, iti evarūpaṃ adḍhamāsikam pi pariyāyabhāttabhōjanānuyogamanuyutto viharati*," (22) shows that fasting was prevalent in the Acelaka sect, especially in Jainism. According to Jaina ethical standpoint, one should fast according to *dravya* (substance), *kṣetra* (place), *kāla* (time), and *bhāva* (mental state). Various methods fasting are mentioned in Jaina literature and monks used to fast even for months.⁹⁹

Thus the above mentioned references to Acelaka's practices in Pāli literature are related in many respects to the practices of Jaina monachism.

Supernatural Powers

Supernatural powers of Jaina monks are referred to in Jaina literature.¹⁰⁰ But they were prohibited to show them in public for such purposes as obtaining food.¹⁰¹ Later on, certain occasions the Jaina monks were allowed to make use of such powers.¹⁰² Acārya Samantabhadra¹⁰³ and Siddhasena Divākara¹⁰⁴ are famous for displaying such supernatural powers.

The *Vinaya Piṭaka*¹⁰⁵ mentions that the six heretical teachers including Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta approached a great merchant of Rājagaha to get a bowl. But all of them failed and Piṇḍola Bharadvāja, a follower of the Buddha, fetched it down. Likewise, the *Dīgha Nikāya* refers to an incident where a Nigaṇṭha failed in manifesting the supernatural powers which he claimed. How far these references are correct, we cannot say. But the Jaina literature, does not preserve any record of such incidents which could tally with these references in Pāli literature

Daily routine

As regards the routine of a Jaina monk, he is supposed to spend more time in study and meditation. He gets up early in the morning and pays his homage to the *Pañcaparameṣṭhins* during *Sāmāyika* or *Kāyotsarga*. Besides begging and preaching he engages himself in the performance of duties without transgressions. His duties are to observe the *Pañcamahāvratas*, *pañcasamutis*, *Ṣaḍvaśyākas* *Pañcendriyas* *Dvādaśanupre-kṣas*, twenty two *Parīśahas*, *Pañcācāras*, and *Triguṇtis*. References to them as found in the Pāli literature are as follows :

Pañcamahāvratas

The *Sāmaññaphala Sutta* of the *Dīgha Nikāya* mentions the *Cātuyāmasaṃvara* of the Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta. We have already discussed this matter to some extent in the section on the duties of laymen. The *Yama* means *Mahāvṛta* or perfect vow. And *Cātuyāmasaṃvara* means four restraints attained by Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta. These four Restraints are as follows according to the *Sāmaññaphala Sutta* :

- (i) *Sabbavāriyārīto* or restrained as regards all water.
- (ii) *Sabbavāriyuto* or restrained as regards all evil.
- (iii) *Sabbavāridhuto* or all evil washing away.
- (iv) *Sabbavāriphuṭo* or he is filled with a sense of all sins avoided.

This is undoubtedly a very faint picture of Nigaṇṭha Nāta-putta's doctrine. Buddhaghosa's *Sumaṅgalavilāsini* also does not help much in this respect. Jacobi remarks : "This is certainly, neither an accurate nor an exhaustive description of the Jaina creed, though it contains nothing alien from it and successfully imitates the language of the Jaina Sūtras." He further says that "The Buddhists, I suppose, have made a mistake in ascribing to Nātaputta Mahāvira's doctrine which properly belonged to his predecessor Pārśva. This is a significant mistake; for the Buddhists could not have used the above term as descriptive of the Nigaṇṭhas creed unless they had heard it from followers of Pārśva, and they would not have used it if the reforms of Mahāvira had already been generally adopted by the Nigaṇṭhas at the time of the Buddha."¹⁰⁸

There are several versions of the *Sāmaññaphala Sutta* different from each other. For instance, the Tibetan *Dulva*, retains Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta's authentic teaching of wiping and karma by penance, while in one of its Chinese versions dated 412-13 A.D. Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta claims omniscience, and in another Chinese version dated 381-395 A.D., he is mentioned to hold the view of karma.¹⁰⁹ Basham thinks that *Sāmaññaphala Sutta* shows a completeness and consistency lacking in the rest, and perhaps represents the original source of the other references"¹¹⁰ This, however, does not seem to be quite correct. As a matter of fact, the *Cālyāmasamvara* followed by Pārśvanāthā tradition comprised : (i) *Sarvaprāṇātipātaveramaṇa*, (ii) *Sarvamaṇṣavāddāveramaṇa*, (iii) *Sarvādātādānaveramaṇa*, and (iv) *Sarvabhiddhādānaveramaṇa*. Here the *Maithuna* (sexual intercourse) and *Parigraha* (worldly attachment) were included in the last vow, that is *Sarvabhiddhādānaveramaṇa*.

In course of time its real meaning was forgotten and the followers of Pārśvanātha tradition or *Pasāvaccijja* considered the *Sarvabhidhādānavaramaṇa* (Parigraha) as concerned only, with wealth, and not sexual desires. As a result, they did not consider the *Strisambhoga* to be a fault if it is done for getting a son.¹¹³ This is the reason why one was advised not to have contact with them.¹¹⁴

Observing this slackened conduct, Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta separated the last into two vow viz *Brahmacarya* (celibacy) and *Aparigraha* (non-attachment to the worldly enjoyment), and made it into five. Since then the Jainas are called the followers of five great vows (*Pañcamahāvratas*).¹¹⁵ It seems, as we have already seen that the Pāli Canon was also familiar with *Pañcamahāvratas*.

Pañcasamitis

The *Majjhima Nikāya*¹¹¹ describes the kind of language which should be used by a Jaina monk. It is said there that "Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta sent Abhayarājakumāra to the Buddha to ask a question whether he (the Buddha) utters a speech that is disliked by others, or disagreeable to them. If he speaks so, what is the difference between him and a common man." This indicates that according to Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta no monk should speak harshly.¹¹⁷

Ṣaḍvīśyakas

Among the *Ṣaḍvīśyakas*, only the *Kāyotsarga* (kāṇṭagga) is referred to in Pāli literature. In the *Majjhima Nikāya*¹¹⁸ the Buddha told Mahānāma that while he was staying at Rājagaha, he had seen a number of Nigaṇṭhas on the Isigili Kālasilā standing erect, refraining from sitting, and experiencing acute, painful, sharp and bitter sensations.

This reference indicates the *Kāyotsarga* or *Sāmāyika* as prescribed for the Jaina monks. It should be performed without movement of or attachment to the body (*sthitavyāsīnasya sarvāṅgacalanarahitasya subhadyānasya vṛttiḥ Kāyotsargaḥ*).¹¹⁹

Loca or Keśaluñcana

One should pull out his hair of head and beard in five handfuls with intervals of two, three or four months following a *ūpavasa* and *Pratikramana*.¹²⁰ Before the attainment of Buddhahood, Prince siddhārtha had himself observed this rule. He says, "I was one who plucked out the hairs of head and beard intent on the practice of doing so (*kesamassulocako hoti, kesamassulocanānuyogamañuyutto*)."¹²¹

Acelakatva

Acelakatva (nakedness) with non-attachment to anything is essential to attain salvation.¹²² According to the Majjhima Nikāya¹²³, the Buddha, too, followed this rule before attaining Buddhahood.

Triguptis

Trigupti is the essence of a monk's creed to which he should thoroughly adhere to destroy karmas.¹²⁴ The Nigaṇṭhas, who were engaged in severe penance on Gijjhakūṭa-pabbata at Rājagaha said to the Buddha that according to Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta, the past deeds could be destroyed by preserving the proper control over the mind, body, and speech (*yam pañeṭha etarahi kāyena samvutā; vācāya samvutā, manasā samvuta tañ āyatim pāpassā kammaṣa akaraṇam.....*). As its corollary it is said that the *kāyadaṇḍa*, *vācīdaṇḍa* and *mano-daṇḍa* are said to be the causes of sins.¹²⁵

Meditation¹²⁶ (*dhyāna*) and concentration (*saṁādhi*) are fundamental obligations of a Jaina monk. Meditation is of four kinds, namely *Ārtadhyāna* (painful concentration) *Raudra dhyāna* (wicked concentration), *Dharmadhyāna* (righteous concentration) and *Śukladhyāna* (pure concentration). The first two are the causes of bondage to the karmas, while the last two lead to salvation.¹²⁷ The severe penance observed by the Nigaṇṭhas at Rājagaha was to attain the last two *dhyānas*, for which the self-realization was essential. The regular study, the right conduct, right attitude, and non-attachment, are the factors which pave the way to *Dharma*-

āhyāna.¹²⁸ The *Śukladhyāna* contributes to the steadiness of the mind which ultimately results in the attainment of omniscience.

Thus the reference to Jaina ethics as found in Pāli literature are, though meagre and sometimes defective, very important. From our survey of these references, we may conclude that :

(i) *Cātuyāmasamvara* was followed by the Pārśvanātha tradition, and not Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta tradition, and the Buddha and his followers were not perfectly aware of this difference in the two traditions.

(ii) Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta separated the last vow of *Cātuyāmasamvara* into two *Brahmacarya* and *Parigraha*, which was known to the Pāli Canon,

(iii) The *Gupavratas* and *Śikṣāvratas* were so popular among both the monks and the laity that their nature and implications were well known to Buddhist circles.

(iv) *Acelakatva* and other severe forms of penance were put into practice in Jaina community during that period, and Jainism had already acquired a fame for the severity of its vows and observences.

CHAPTER IV

JAINA EPISTEMOLOGY

1—Pratyakṣa Pramāṇa (Direct Knowledge)

Logical discussions

Epistemology evolved as a result of logical discussions. Such discussions and debates as the sceptics and sophists engaged in, in ancient Greece, were prevalent in Ancient India. They aimed at defending their own theories while refuting those of their opponents.

The *Sutta Nipāta*, which is supposed to be one of the earliest parts of the Pāli Scripture, states that such debates took place among the Śramaṇas¹ and Brāhmaṇas². Sometimes the *Tīthiyas* (including Ājīvikas and Nigaṇṭhas)³, the so called *Vādasīlas* (habituate in the debate), have also been associated with these debates.⁴

All these debates are named *takki*⁵ or *takkikā*.⁶ In Pāli literature the ten possible ways of claiming knowledge have been criticised by the Buddha in addressing Kālāma.⁷ One of them is called "*takka-hetu*" which has been explained in the Commentary as "*takka-gahena*" (adhering to reason)⁸. This takki-hetu appears to be closely related to *prāmaṇa* or epistemological or logical ground, which is perhaps used first by Umāśvāmi, a Jaina Acārya of about the 1st century A. D.⁹ The word *hetu* is also referred to in this sense in the *Bhagwati Sūtra* (336) and the *Thāṇāṅgasūtra* (309-10).

Such discussions were held for the sake of gaining triumph in arguments or to defend religions. The debaters used the *vāda*, *jalpa* and *vitandā* forms which are the classifications of *kathā* or discussion in the Nyāya tradition. Pāli literature also makes similar references to this classification. The *Sutta Nipāta* mentions the *vāda*¹², *kathā*¹³ and *vitandā*.¹⁴ Buddha-ghose associates this *vitandāsattva* with the Brāhmaṇas, while

the *Saddanīti* refers to the *Titthiyas*. It shows the *vitandā* was utilized at that time by all schools of thought, since the term *Titthiya* was applied to both the *samaṇas* and the *Brāhmaṇas*.

The discussion through which knowledge is gained about doctrines is called the *Vada*; that which is only for gaining victory over the opponents is *Jalpa*; the debate where the quibbles (*chala*) analogues (*jāti*) and respondent's failures (*nigrahasthūna*) are utilized to vanquish the opponent is called *vitandā* in Nyāya system and was used to defend their own views by right or wrong means.¹⁵

The Buddhist tradition also could not escape being influenced by this practice. The old logical compendia like the *Upāyahrdaya*, *Tarkaśāstra*, etc. appear to have allowed the use of quibbles analogues etc. for the specific purpose of protecting the Buddhist order, but Dharmakīrti, realising that it was not in keeping with the high standards of truth and non-violence, completely denied their usage in the *Vādanyāya*. Hence, Dharmakīrti refers the qualities of the debater who speaks more or less than necessary. Therefore he accepts only the two *Nigrahasthānas*, *Asādhanaṅga* and *Adoṣodbhāvana* for-*vādi* as well as *prativādi*.¹⁶

The Jainas, on the other hand, lay more stress on truth and non-violence. They think of the *Vitandā* as *Vitandābhāsa*.¹⁷ Akalaṅka rejects even the *Asādhanaṅga* and *Adoṣodbhāvana* in view of the fact that they are themselves the subjects of discussion. He then says : a defendant should himself indicate the real defects in the established theory of a disputant and then set up his own theory.¹⁸ Thus he should consider each item from the point of view of truth and non-violence.

The above fact is supported by Pāli literature which contains references to the logical discussions of that period. Some adherents of Jainism had also participated in such discussions. Saccaka, Abhaya and Asibandhakaputta Gāmīṇi are the main characters who took an active part in them.

Saccaka is described in the *Nikāyas* as one who indulged in debate, a learned, controversialist, who was highly esteemed by the common people.¹⁹ He is said to have debated with all the six teachers, including even Māhāvira (Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta), although Saccaka was a staunch follower of Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta. This may imply that he was a follower of the Pārśvanātha tradition. But as Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta became a Tīrthaṅkara of Jainism, Saccaka would have examined him through discussions and then accepted his religion, which was nothing but the reformation of the Pārśvanātha tradition. Saccaka boasts about his dialectical skill in magniloquent language and speaks to the Licchavis at Vaiśālī : "To-day there will be a conversation between me and recluse Gautama. If Gautama takes up his stand against me, even as a powerful man, having taken hold of the fleece of a long fleeced ram, might tug it towards him." Further it has been mentioned there that the Buddha had asked a question which could not be replied by Saccaka. And the result was that he became a follower of the Buddha.²⁰

Another reference is recorded in the *Abhayarājakumāra Sutta* of the *Majjhima Nikāya*²¹ to the effect that Abhayarājakumāra was sent by Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta to ask a question from the Buddha about his speech, as to whether the Tathāgata utters unpleasant words and is unkind to others.

The statement that "Abhaya was sent by Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta" is not supported by Jaina literature. Whatever its reason, the fact is evident that the Jainas participated actively in discussions and tried to indicate the defects of others religious utterance made about the future of Devadatta. Abhaya then went to inquire as to how far he was correct in his view. He does not appear to have questioned merely with the idea of imputing faults to his opponent's theory. This seems to be the first and most fundamental principle of Jaina conception of logical discussions of that period. The propositional question put by Abhaya Rājakumāra to the Buddha is as follows :

(i) Would the Buddha make statements which are displeasing and unpleasant to others ? (*bhūseyya nu kho.....Tathāgato tanivācamyā sū vācā paresam appiyā amanāpā*).

(ii) If so, how is he different from the ordinary individual who also makes statements which are displeasing and unpleasant to others ? (*atha kiñcarahi..... puthujjanena nākarāṇam, puthujjano pi hi tam vācam bhūseyya, yā sū vācā paresam appiyā amanāpā*).

(iii) The Buddha would not make statements which are displeasing and unpleasant to others (*na Tathāgato tam vācāṇ bhāsati yā sū vācā paresam appiyā*) :

(iv) Then why has he pronounced about Devadatta that he is doomed to hellthat he is incorrigible (*atha kiñcarahi.....Devadatto byākato : āpayiko Devadatto ryākato ; āpayiko Devadatto atekicco Devadatto*) ?

Here Abhaya tried to show that the Buddha made a self-contradictory statement. Likewise, Asibandhakaputta Gāmaṇi²² a follower of Nigantha Nātaputta made the following remarks about the Buddha as he understood him .

(i) The Buddha in various ways speaks showing compassion to people (*Bhagavā anekapariyāyena kulānam anuddayaṃ vānneti*).

(ii) The Buddha during a famine... ..goes about with a large number of disciples and behaves in a way detrimental to the interest of people (*Bhagavā dubbhikkhemahatā bhikkusaṅghena saddhīm carikaṃ carati, uchedāya Bhagavā kulānam paṭipanno*).

The questions asked by Abhaya Rājakumāra and Asibandhakaputta Gāmaṇi are based on such type of framed questions : If he questioned thus and he answers thus, we shall join issue (*vādam*) with him thus."²³ They are called "dupadāṃ *peñham* or "*ubhayatokoṭikam pañham*" (dilemmas)²⁴ As a matter of fact, these are the conditional questions, which would have been thought out or taught before embarking on a dispute

The Jaina attitude to these debates and discussions was that they were meant only to investigate the real defects in opponents theories. There were not allowed to gain a victory through evil means, like quibbling, analogues, power and so on. That is why *Vitaṇḍā* is considered *Vitaṇḍābhāsa* in Jainism.²⁵ The Buddha himself appreciates the attitude of such Paṇḍitas and agrees with them on other matters.²⁶ He called them *Vinñu* or intelligent persons who are supposed to be hypothetical rational critics.²⁷ They used to make an impartial and intelligent assessment of the relative worth of conflicting theories.²⁸ On the basis of the above view the later Jaina philosophers established the definition and means of debates. Akalaṅka is perhaps the first to point out clearly such definitions. He says that if one is capable of establishing his own view (*pakṣa*) through right devices, it is *Jaya* (victory) for him and *Parājaya* (defeat) for the other.²⁹

The Buddhist philosophical literature which developed later, has not mentioned any discussions and refutations of Jaina conception in this connection. This may be due to the fact that both philosophies had similar rules and regulations regarding such debates, except for a few differences (especially in the case of *Nigrahasthānas*).

Evolution of Epistemology

Epistemology and Logic are mainly concerned with the validity of knowledge and have been subjects of controversy among philosophers from time immemorial.

The Buddha classified such thinkers into three groups in a Sutta of the *Majjhima Nikāya*. It is said there that a Brāhmaṇa student went to ask the Buddha "in which category he stands". The Buddha replied "there are some recluses and Brāhmaṇas who profess their doctrines after finding a final and ultimate insight (*ditṭhadhammābhiniñāvasonapāramippattā*) into this life. "where does the venerable Gotama stand among them ?" The Buddha replied "I say that there is a distinction among those who profess their doctrines after finding a final

and ultimate insight in this life. There are some recluses and Brāhmaṇas who are traditionalists (*anussāvika*), who profess their doctrines after finding a final and ultimate insight in this life, such as the Brāhmaṇas of the three Vedas (*tevijja*). There are also some recluses and Brāhmaṇas who profess their doctrines after finding a final and ultimate insight in this life on mere faith alone (*kevalaṃ saddhā mātṭakena*) such as the reasoners (*takkī*) and metaphysicians (*vimāṃsī*, lit. speculators). There are some other recluses and Brāhmaṇas who profess their dogmas after finding a final and ultimate insight in this life by assimilating a higher knowledge (*ditṭhadhammābhinnāvosaṇapāramippattā*) personally (*samaṃ Yeva*) of a doctrine (*dhammaṃ*) among doctrines not traditionally heard of before. Now I am one of those who profess the basis of their doctrines after finding a final and ultimate insight in this life by gaining a higher knowledge personally of a doctrine among doctrines not traditionally heard of before"³⁰.

This reference seeks to classify the pre-Buddhist and contemporary thinkers into three groups : (i) the Traditionalists (*anussāvika*), who obtained knowledge on the basis of their scripture and interpreted it according to them. The Brāhmaṇas or the followers of the Vedas are enumerated in this group. (ii) The Rationalists or Reasoners (*takkī*) who gained knowledge through reasons. Sceptics, and Materialists come under this group, and (iii) Experientialists, who attained higher knowledge on the basis of personal experience (*Samaṃ Yeva*). Jains, Buddhists, and Ājīvikas would fall into this category.

Like the Buddha, Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta is said to have professed his doctrines after finding a final and ultimate insight by gaining a higher knowledge personally, not traditionally heard of before. That is why he emphasised more on knowledge rather than belief (*Saddhāya kho Gahapati jñānaṃ yeva paṇitatarāṃ*).³¹ It is reported that he claimed to have perfect knowledge (*sabbāñña*) and vision (*sabbadassābhi*). This insight can be obtained after attaining Right Vision.

(*Samyagdarśana*), Right-Knowledge (*Samyagjñāna*), and Right Conduct (*Samyagcāritra*).³² Right view in the seven principles (*Jīva* or soul, *Ajīva* or matter, *Āśrava* or inflow of karmas, *Bandha* or bondage of karmas, *Samvara* or checking of karmas, *Nirjara* or shedding of karmas, and *Mokṣa* or complete liberation from karmas) is the *Samyagdarśana*, which is the basis of Right knowledge (*Samyagjñāna*). Purification of the attitude is regarded as the *sine qua non* of the purification of knowledge and conduct. While *Darśanamoha* (delusion of vision) destroys, immediately after Right Vision and Right Knowledge emerge. Then through Right Conduct one can attain the Perfect knowledge, the so-called *Kevalajñāna* or *Sarvajñatva* in Jainism.³³

Knowledge and Vision (*Jñāna and Darśana*)

In Jainism, knowledge and vision or *jñāna* and *darśana* or omniscience are the result of penance (*tapa*) and contemplation (*dhyāna*).³³ That is why Nātaputta is called *Jñānavādīn* in the *Aṅguttara Nikāya* (*aharū anantena ñānena anantaṃ lokam jñanāṃ passam viharāmi*).³⁴

According to Jain literature, *Jñāna* or *cetana* (consciousness) also called *Upayoga*, is the main characteristic of soul in Jainology.³⁵ This *upayoga* is of two kinds, viz. *sākāra* (determinate) and *anākāra* (indeterminate). The former is called *jñāna*, while the latter is *darśana*. *Sākāra upayoga* consists of five classes of knowledge, viz. *Matijñāna* (sensitive knowledge), *Śrutajñāna* (scriptural knowledge), *Avadhi jñāna* (visual knowledge), *Manahpariyaya jñāna* (mental knowledge) and *Kevalajñāna* (perfect knowledge). *Anākāra upayoga* is divided into four classes, viz. *Cakṣudarśanāvarāṇa* (non-obscuring), *Acakṣudarśanāvarāṇa* (non-ocular-obscuring), *Avadhidarśanāvarāṇa* (visual-obscuring), and the *Kevaladarśanāvarāṇa* (perfect-conation-obscuring). Consciousness develops into the two forms, knowledge and vision (*jñānākāra* and *Jñeyākāra*).³⁶ We can say that *jñāna* is determinate knowledge (*sākāra jñāna*) and *darśana* is indeterminate knowledge (*anākāra jñāna*). This is the distinction between *jñāna* and

darśana. According to the *Prajñāpanā Sūtra* also both *upayoga* and *paśyatta* can be *sākāra* as well as *anākāra*.

Ācārya Kundakunda mentions the view of his predecessors that vision reveals the self (*ditṭhiṃ appapayāsaya*). Hence, he considers the problem from the empirical as well as the transcendental standpoint³⁷ and concludes that the soul and its knowledge and vision are identical and hence each can reveal the self as well as non-self.

Virasena considers reality as a complex of universal-cum-particular and says in his commentary called *Dhavalā* on the *ṣatkhaṇḍāgama* of Puṣpadanta that *jñāna* comprehends external meaning of the nature of reality, while *darśana* is the comprehension of the true form of that nature.³⁸ That means *jñāna* reveals the external reality while *darśana* intuits its internal characteristics. Siddhasena Divākara defines vision (*darśana*) as an apprehension of *sāmānya* and knowledge (*jñāna*) as an apprehension of *viśeṣa jam sāmāṇyaggaḥaṇam dāmsaṇameyam viśesiyaṁ jñānaṁ*.⁴⁰ By this time the delination of *darśana* had been developed to mean the apprehension of *sāmānya* of an entity.

It is clear that vision or *darśana* was originally considered to be the revealer of self (*ātma-prākāśaka*). That is the reason why *matijñāna*, *śrutajñāna* and the *avadhijñāna*, which reveal external nature of reality, can be wrong if they are viewed from the wrong angle, whereas *cakṣudarśana*, *acakṣudarśana* and *avadhidarśana*, which come prior to them, are not so. If *Viśeṣa* (particular) had been considered as having a meaning of general observation of an entity, the *Samśaya* (doubt), *viparaya* (perversion), and the *anadhyavaśāya* (indecision) would have existed in its perception made earlier, and *darśana* would have been divided, like *jñāna*, into *darśana-adarśana* etc. This defect would not arise if we define vision as a revealer of self. For, it always exists prior to, as well as at the time of knowledge.⁴¹

This idea was expressed in logical terms by Pūjyapāda

Devanandi in his *Sarvārtha Siddhi*.⁴² No endeavours had been made upto that time to consider *darśana* as a valid standard of knowledge (*pramāṇa*). Whether it should be regarded as *pramāṇa* or not was the main problem for the logicians. Abhayadeva Sūri, a commentator on the *Sammatī Tarka*, expressed his view that *Darśana*, like *Jñāna*, could be *pramāṇa* (valid)⁴³ while Māṇikyanandi and Vālideva Sūri⁴⁵ considered it as a *Pramāṇābhāsa* (falsely valid). It may be that Nivikalpaka *darśana* of Buddhism and not *Darśana* of Jainism was in their minds when *darśana* was declared a *pramāṇābhāsa*.

Pāli literature makes reference to the fact that Nātaputta possessed "infinite knowledge and vision". The Jaina Āgamas⁴⁶ confirm the ancient view and say *jāṇadī paṣṣadī* and "*Jāṇamāṇe pāsamāṇe*". This indicates that the activities of both, knowledge and vision in an object can take place together and reveal its knowledge and vision simultaneously.

In the later period, some of the Śvetāmbara Ācāryas tried to explain this original ideology in a different way. They said that *Jñāna* and *darśana* were conscious activities, and the two conscious activities could not occur simultaneously. But there is a controversy among them with regard to the case of one who is omniscient (Kevalin). Some stick to the Āgamas, while others do not and assert either that a Kevalin's *Jñāna* and *darśana* are simultaneous or that they are mutually identical and have no separate identity. Siddhasena Divākara and Jinabhadra are the exponents of these views.⁴⁷

On the other hand, the Digambara Ācāryas unanimously hold that the *jñāna* and *darśana* of a kevalin occur simultaneously. Kundakunda, a great Digambara Ācārya states that *jñāna* and *darśana* of a kevalin occur simultaneously even as the light and heat of the sun occur simultaneously.⁴⁸ Umāsvāmī⁴⁹ and his follower Pūjyapāda Akalaṅka⁵¹, Vidyānanda⁵² etc. also support this view.

Later, for the first time in the Jaina logical tradition it is analysed that knowledge and vision of an entity reveal its

*knowledge and vision simultaneously. A further explanation is given that an entity has two forms, viz. Universal and Particular. The former is the subject of vision and the latter of knowledge. Here knowledge and vision become separate. That is why perhaps Abhayadeva Sūri accepted both as valid.

Another point may be noted here. The etymology of *Pramāṇa* (*pramīyate yena tatpramāṇāt*) points out that *jñāna* is the more important cause of right knowledge (*pramāṇa*) since it is an attribute of soul *Sannikarṣa* (contact of an organ of senses with its effect) and sense-organs cannot be *pramāṇa*.⁵³ Akalaṅka made a great contribution towards the development of the definition of *pramāṇa*. He maintains non-discrepancy (*avisamvādin*) as a test of *pramāṇa* which adds one more characteristic, namely, that of *anadhigatārīhagrāhi* (knowledge which is not cognised).⁵⁴ Akalaṅka, therefore, recognised only the validity of knowledge which is determinative (*nirṇayātma*), non-discrepancy (*avisamvādin*) and useful in *sāmūhaya-vahāra* (empirical stand-point). In this way, the *saṁkalpaka-jñāna* (conceptual knowledge), not the *nirvikalpaka-jñāna* (non-conceptual knowledge), is considered as perception. The concept that *nirvikalpaka-jñāna* could be regarded as perception is successfully refuted by Śāntarakṣit in the *Tattvasaṅgraha*.
Classification of Knowledge

Jainism classifies Knowledge in two ways : (i) Canonical (*Āgamika*), and (ii) Philosophical *Dārśanika*. The five kinds of knowledge such as *mati*, *śruta*, *avadhi*, *manāḥparyāya* and *kevalajñāna* are based on the former, while *pratyakṣa* (direct knowledge) and *parokṣa* (indirect knowledge) are developments of the latter. The *Pratyakṣa* is defined as knowledge obtained by self without the assistance of an external instrument.⁵⁵

It is only to the Jains that “*aṁśa*” means “Soul.”⁵⁶ Thus *Pratyakṣa* in Jain *Āgamika* tradition does not mean empirical perception, i.e. Knowledge obtained through sense organs. According to this definition the *Avadhijñāna* (visual knowledge), *Manāḥparyāya-jñāna* (intuition of mental knowledge)

and *Kevaljñāna* (pure and perfect knowledge) are comprised *Pratyakṣa*, and *Matijñāna* (sensuous knowledge) and *Śruti-jñāna* (scriptural Knowledge) in *Parokṣa*.⁵⁷

The Jaina definition of *pratyakṣa* was quite different from those of other philosophical systems. According to the latter, *pratyakṣa* is aknowledge gained through sense organs. It created a serious difficulty for Jaina philosophers. The rivals began to question their standpoint. Having examined the arguments, the later Jaina philosophers accepted *pratyakṣa* as the knowledge produced by the sense-organs also. Jinabhadra and Akalaṅka designated it as *sāmvyāvahārika pratyakṣa* (empirical perception), while the real *pratyakṣa* of āgamika tradition was called *pāramārthika pratyakṣa* (transcendental perception).⁵⁸ *Indriyapratyakṣa* and *mānasapratyakṣa* accepted by the Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas are included in the first category. Thus *matijñāna*, which was put under *parokṣa* in the Āgamika tradition, came under the category of *pratyakṣa* in philosophical tradition. Likewise *smṛti*, *sañjñā*, *Cinta* and *abhinibodha*, which were synonymous with *mati* in the Āgamic tradition⁵⁹ are synonymous with *smaraṇa*, *pratyabhijñāna*, *tarka*, and *anumāna* in the philosophical tradition. Therefore *parokṣa pramāṇa*, are five including *śruti* (āgama).

Pratyakṣa Pramāṇa or (direct knowledge)

As we have already observed *Pratyakṣa* in Jainism is accepted as self-cognition. Umāsvāmi⁶⁰ presented this definition in the *Tattvārthasūtra*. Samantabhadra.⁶¹ defined it as knowledge which is of self-revealing character. Siddhasena Divākara in his *Pramāṇa Mīmāṃsā* added to it one more characteristic, namely, “*Bādhavarjit*” (admitting of no contradiction).

Akalaṅka developed the theory further by adding *avisamvādi* (non-discrepancy) and *andhigatārthagrāhi* (knowledge of object which is not yet cognised) as characteristics of the validity of knowledge.⁶² This definition could remove several inner contradictions of the earlier definitions.

There are four sub-divisions of *matijñāna*, viz. *avagraha*

(perception), *ikā* (speculation), *avāya* (perceptual judgement) and *dhāraṇā* (retention)⁶⁸.

They are dependent of their pre-knowledge, but they emerge from sense-organs and acknowledge the modes of a particular object. It is, therefore, considered *Sāṃvyaṅavahārika pratyakṣa*.⁶⁴

Except Cārvaka, all other systems⁶⁵ have classified *Janya-pratyakṣa* (generated perception) as (1) *Laukika* (Empirical) and (2) *Alaukika* (transcendental). The nature of these perceptions is the same as the nature of *Sāṃvyaṅavahārika* and *Pārmāthika Pratyakṣa* of Jainas. *Yogi-pratyakṣa* or *Yogi-jñāna* of the Sāṅkhya-Yogas,⁶⁶ *Nyāya-vaiśeṣikas*⁶⁷, and the Buddhists⁶⁸, *Āmajñāna* of the Mimāṃsakas⁶⁹, are synonymous with Transcendental perception (*Pārmāthika* or *Alaukika Pratyakṣa* which is the special competence of the soul *viśiṣṭātma śakti*). According to Śāntarakṣita in the *Taitvasaṅgraha*, the Jainas⁷⁰ called this knowledge name *Yagi-pratyakṣa* or *Yogaja-pratyakṣa*.

The philosophers are not agreed on the question whether transcendental perception is determinate (*Savikalpaka*) or indeterminate (*nirvikalpaka*) or both determinate and indeterminate (*ubhaya*). The Buddhist tradition⁷¹ regards it as being only indeterminate, (*Kalpanāpoḍhaṃ*), while the Nyāya Vaiśeṣikas and Mimāṃsakas⁷² are of the view that it can be either determinate or indeterminate.

The Jainas, on the other hand, like the Sāṅkhyas, think that determinate (*savikalpaka*) is the only real perception⁷³. Śāntarakṣita⁷⁴ refuted this idea. He referred to the view of Sumati who considered the *Akṣaja pratyakṣa* (sensory perception) as *Sāṃvyaṅavahārika pratyakṣa* and *Yogi-pratyakṣa* (intuitive perception) as *Pārmāthika pratyakṣa*. He also added that according to the Jainas the determinate perception (*savikalpaka pratyakṣa*) is the real perception.⁷⁵

Savikalpaka pratyakṣa or determinate perception

Knowledge (*jñāna*) and vision. (*Darśana*), the two main

characteristics of the soul which we had already discussed, are also called *Darśanopayoga* (indeterminate cognition) and *Jñanopayoga* (determinate cognition).⁷⁶ The former is called the *Nirvikalpaka* while the latter is called *Savikalpaka*.⁷⁷

The Āgamika tradition accepts both *Savikalpaka* and *Nirvikalpaka* as valid due to spiritual considerations. According to the real standpoint in this tradition, a man obtains Right knowledge, is right in his cognition and a man who holds a wrong view (*mithyādr̥ṣṭi*), is wrong in his cognition, while from a practical standpoint both views are right. Therefore in the Āgamika tradition, both *Savikalpaka* and *Nirvikalpaka* are valid from relative stand-points. Ācārya Umāsvāmi divided cognitions into right and wrong ones. The *Avadhidarśana*, and *Kevaldarśana* are indeterminate transcendental perception, while *Avadhijñāna*, *Manahparyaya-jñāna* and *Kevalajñāna* are determinate (transcendental perception).⁷⁸

However, in the logical tradition the validity of *pramāṇa* has been changed. To refute the opponents views, specially those of the Buddhists, the Jaina Ācāryas used in their respective definitions of *pramāṇa* some words like *nirṇaya* (determination) or *jñāna* with a view to indicate that *darśana* or determinate cognition, which stands for cognition of the general (*sāmānya-upayoga*) falls outside the purview of these definitions.⁷⁹

It may be noted here that the Buddhist philosophy accepts only the *nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa* or indeterminate perception as valid knowledge. As regards the definition of perception there are two Buddhist traditions, one is headed by Dinnāga who does not accept non-illusory (*abhānta*) nature of perception, and the other headed by Dharmakīrti who does so. Sāntrakṣita and his followers support the latter stating that Sense-perception is free from conceptual contents and hence not erroneous.⁸⁰ We see a thing first; then realise its name. Thus the determinate knowledge (*savikalpaka jñāna*) depends on indeterminate knowledge (*nirvikalpaka jñāna*)

and, therefore, only indeterminate knowledge is perception.⁸²

In connection with establishing his own view Śāntarak-
ṣita refuted the view of Ācārya Sumati. According to Sumati,
both *nirvikalpaka* and *savikalpaka pratyakṣa* should be recogni-
sed as valid as the first reflects the general form of a thing
or, in other words, its existence as an indefinite thing, while
the second (*savikalpaka*) reflects the special characteristic
of an entity thus perceived.⁸²

This theory appears to be in conformity with the Jaina
Āgamika tradition, but not with the Logical point of view.
Abhayadeva, the commentator of the *Sammatitarka* also took
up the same position⁸³. As we have already seen, the process
of general perception commencing from *avagraha* (mere app-
rehension) and ending with *Dhāraṇā* (retention) passes from
the indeterminate (*nirvikalpaka*) state of knowledge to deter-
minate (*savikalpaka*).⁸⁴

Kamalaśīla has explained the view of Sumati that a thing
is amenable to non-conceptual perception in the form of mere
observation, or purely subjective ideation.⁸⁵ But the Jaina
philosophy does not accept it. Jainism asserts that a thing is
perceived by *Darśan* or cognition, not by *Ālocana* or observa-
tion.⁸⁶ The *viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya* criticises the view, viz “*kei
dīhaloyana pubbaamoggaham venti*” which means a thing can be
apprehended by a purely subjective ideation. In his *commenta-
tery* Hemacandra Maladharideva referred to a *kārikā* by Kumā-
rila “*asti ālocanā jñānam prathamam nirvikalpakam*” It is possi-
ble that the commentator thought this view was that of Kumā-
rila and it is also probable that Kamalaśīla misunderstood the
view of Sumati.

Kumārila, a Mīmāṃsaka philosopher, asserted two kinds
of sense-perception. According to him, non-conceptual percep-
tion is purely subjective ideation as apprehending the “spec-
ific individuality of the particular (*ālocanā jñānam nirvikal-
pakam vyaktisvalakṣaṇam*), and the conceptual perception
(*savikalpaka pratyakṣa*) is the apprehension of the universal
(*sāmānyaviśayaṃ tu savikalpakam*).⁸⁷

Ācārya Sumati does not agree with this definition. He questions : is the thing before the eyes of the observer apprehended purely by itself, as characterised by its own form which is impossible anywhere else ? or is it not so apprehended ? If Kumārila answers : there is non-apprehension of the thing in a form distinguished from other things, then Sumati states that in this position either there would be apprehension of the thing itself only, or there would be no perception of the thing at all. He illustrated his theory by reference to the perception of a Jar. The Jar should be either apprehended without having the form of others or it should not be apprehended. There could be no escape from these alternatives⁸⁹.

Kumārila's view is based on the definition of perception given in the *Jaiminiyasūtra*⁹⁰ It is refuted by all non-Mīmāṃsaka philosophers, Vedic⁹¹ as well as Buddhist⁹² and Sumati appears to be the first Jaina Ācārya to join them in refuting this view.

Having criticised the view of Kumārila, Sumati proceeds to criticise the view of Buddhist Ācāryas, especially, that of Śāntarakṣita. As we have seen, Śāntarakṣita, a follower of Dharmakīrti, defines perception as knowledge free from conceptual contents and not erroneous⁹³ He tries to prove his theory by means of inference and establishes that the *nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa* (indeterminate perception) is the only real perception. Śāntarakṣita further clarifies his own view by citing examples. He says : in case a thing has no particular form, it cannot be accepted as a particular thing. For instance, the white house owing to different characteristics cannot be mistaken for a cow. It is the same case with the perception.⁹⁴

Here in this definition the *kalpana* is the main figure which has been defined in various ways by Buddhist Philosophers. Śāntarakṣita defined it as *visiṣṭaviśayaśābodhakā* (knowledge of qualified object). Sumati is said to be against this view. He

argues that a thing cannot be qualified without having a connection-with the qualifications, as in the case of a stick (*daṇḍa*) and the stick-holder (*daṇḍin*). Hence the cognition which apprehends the qualifications (*viśeṣatā*) is conceptual (*savikalpaka*).⁹⁵ He again draws our attention to this defect of self-contradiction in this theory pointing out that if there is always the apprehension of the things as distinguished from homogeneous (*sajātīya*) and heterogeneous (*vijātīya*) things, then the apprehension would become determinate (*savikalpaka*) for it can be conveyed "this is different". Otherwise how does it apprehend the difference between things.⁹⁶

Sumati pointed out another defect in the Buddhist theory. He asserts that there is no particular (*viśeṣa*) without a touch of the universal (*Sāmānya*). It cannot be argued in his opinion that the universal or "being" is not touched at all by the sense-perception at the time of apprehension, because in this position the particular would be devoid of existence and thus it could become characterless; and as such could not be apprehended by sense-perception, because it would be devoid of "being" and become like the sky-flower (*ākāśa-kusuma*).⁹⁷ Thus Sumati is of the view that the particular is perceived with the character of the universal.

All Jaina logicians have tried to refute the Buddhist theory of sense-perception following in the footsteps of Sumati. Akalaṅka is the main figure to raise the question in this respect. Adding the adjectives *anadhigatārthagrāhin*, *arisaṁvādin*, and *viśada* to the existing definition of perception⁹⁸ he established that the *Nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa* gets transformed into the *savikalpaka* is the *pramāna*.⁹⁹ Later on most of the Jaina logicians such as Ācārya prabhācandra,¹⁰⁰ Anantavīrya,¹⁰¹ Vādrāja, Vidyānanda,¹⁰² imitated him and elaborated his ideas to refute the opponent's views.¹⁰³

Refutation of the Jaina conception of *savikalpaka*

Pratyakṣa by Śāntrakṣita

The Jaina conception of *Savikalpaka Pratyakṣa* has been

refuted by the Buddhist philosophers. Śāntarakṣita, even having defined perception as lucid knowledge without reflection (*kalpanā*) criticised the view of Sumati on the ground that an entity does not have any particular qualities by which it can be differentiated at the moment of apprehension. He thus sought to assert that there is no particular thing at all. But the particular characteristic of a thing is implicit in his classification of the universal (*Sāmānya*) into two types, viz. (i) distinguished by qualifications, and (ii) not distinguished by qualifications. The first is *Nirvikalpaka*, and next is *Śavikalpaka pratyakṣa* (conceptual-perception). The former is the real *pratyakṣa* while the latter is practical.

On this basis, Śāntarakṣita presents two arguments to refute Sumati's theory. The first is that an entity does not possess any characters by which it can be differentiated. We see a thing first and then realise it as a pot or any particular thing. When the thing is apprehended, the negation of all other things comes forth naturally. Hence, the non-conceptual perception (*nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa*) in the specific form of colour, shape, etc. appears and then there follows the conceptual content (*vikalpātmaka jñāna*) associated with the words *it is different*.¹⁰³

Here the words do not lead to cognition. The reason behind this is that the specific individuality (*svalakṣaṇa-vastutva*) itself is independent of the words. The perception generated by them also should be deprived of the words. The words do not have any relation with the meaning. In the absence of words a thing exists, and in the absence of a thing we use the words, which are dependent on gestures and intentions. There is, therefore, no possibility of words in the *Nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa*. The second argument which Śāntarakṣita puts forth is that in particular thing there should be no other characteristics except that of the "Particular".¹⁰⁴

Thus, whatever cognition appears with regard to the "specific individuality" of things it beyond the range of

words and is hence non-conceptual perception. In his opinion, the lucidity and determination in the *savikalpaka pratyakṣa* is not its own characteristic, but it really comes from *nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa*. After a moment of *nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa*, the *savikalpaka pratyakṣa* is generated and the ascertainment and lucidity of a thing which comes from *nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa* appears to be of *savikalpaka pratyakṣa*. In this manner *savikalpaka pratyakṣa* also determinates a thing and is called perception from a practical viewpoint (*vyavahāra*), but the real perception is only the non-conceptual (*nirvikalpaka*) perception.

In the above criticism Śāntarakṣita's main arguments are that the *nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa* is the real *pratyakṣa* and a thing cannot be both universal and particular. Both these arguments are met by the later Jaina Ācāryas. They say that the *nirvikalpaka jñāna* of the Buddhists is the formless perception which is not capable of determinating the nature of a thing. Therefore, it is determinate (*Sākāra*) and lucid (*viśada*), and could be accepted as a *pramāṇa*.

It appears that to refute the validity of the Veda, the Buddhist philosophers denied the real relation between the words and their meanings. All sorts of knowledge generated in connection with words which are not supported by the *nirvikalpaka*, are declared to be invalid. As a matter of fact Buddhism also accepts *Savikalpaka Pratyakṣa*. In the *Vibhaṅga*,¹⁰⁵ Knowledge (*jñāna*) is divided into two types Cognitive (*Savitakka*) and Non-cognitive (*Avitakka*). Both these types are similar to *Savikalpaka* and *Nirvikalpaka Pratyakṣa*.

The object of perception

We have mentioned earlier that the *pratyakṣa* is of two kinds, viz. *Sāṃvyaḥvāhārika* (knowledge obtained through the senses and mind) and *Pārmārthika pratyakṣa* (knowledge obtained by the soul itself, without the help of the senses and the mind). The object of perception is related to both types of perception.

The validity of *Pramāṇa* in Jain philosophy is based on the nature of things. It asserts that a reality is a multitude of atoms and possesses a characteristic of being substance-cum-mode (*dravyaparyāyātmakam*). The permanence-in-change is its common nature. Out of six substances the *jīva*, *dharma*, *adharma*, *ākāśa*, and *Kāla* are said to be perceived only by the omniscient who has the *pārmāthik pratyakṣa* while the mundane souls perceive the objects of inference, not of sense-generated perception. The rest *pudgala dravya* is a subject to be perceived by mundane souls through sense-generated perception (*indriyajanya pratyakṣa*).

Jainism is absolutely realistic in nature. Each atom or reality, in its conception is quite indestructible and independent and always changes into different modes. This system is both natural and eternal. The whole universe continues in this way. There is no need to postulate a creator-god to explain the origin and evolution of the universe.

In connection with the examination of the external world, *Sāntarakṣita* refers to the view of *Sumati*. He says the atoms have two qualities, General (*Sāmānya*) and Particular (*Viśeṣa*.) The objects perceived by sense-organs possess the general character. These objects are conglomerations of atoms which appear as an entity with a shape and size. The true quality of atoms is known only by the emancipated one who attained the *pāramāthika Pratyakṣa* or *Yogi pratyakṣa*.¹⁰⁶

This conception is made more clear in the *Syādvadamañjari*. It is said that atoms which are co-related generate *paryāyas*. They have infinite and continuous changes which depend on the types of contact or relation with others. For instance, when the atoms of the soil come into contact with each other, they become compact and with their becoming compact produce a pot. This process does not come about due to external pressure but is the result of an internal connection with each other. Therefore Jain philosophy does not assert the extra *avayavi dravyas*.

As regards the existence of atoms, we have both, *Pratyakṣa* and *Anumāna*. We see the atoms in the form of a pot (*ghaṭa*). The atoms, that cannot be perceived by ordinary men due to their minuteness, are perceived by the Yogins. By inference also the Jainas try to prove the existence of atoms. The body itself is a mass of atoms wherein they get combined by such forces as time and cause the gross body¹⁰⁷.

This conception of object of perception has been a subject of criticism, especially with the Buddhist logicians. The *Vijñānavāda*, an extreme form of idealism which is propounded by the Sautrāntika and Yogācāra schools, asserts that there is no causal (*yadākaranaṁ jñānam*) world of external (reality. In its opinion reality is only the *Vijñāna* (idea).

Thus the *Vijñānavāda* denies the external world by denying the atoms. It says that the heap of atoms or a single body cannot be said to be in the external world. Both the *Pratyakṣa* and *Anumāna* are unable to prove their existence because ordinary mortals have never seen atoms even in a dream. As regards the *Pratyakṣa* of Yogī, it demands great faith. The *Anumāna* also is not helpful in this respect; Because for want of *pratyakṣa* of atoms now can we get at the *hetu* (reason) and the *sādhya* (to be proved). Nor does the external world consist of bodies. When the atom itself could not be proved, how can we hope to prove a body which consists of many atoms. It is thus nothing but only a superstition caused by a hypothesis of *vāsanā* due to *avidyā* or ignorance.¹⁰⁸

Ācārya Śāntarakṣita also denies the existence of atoms. He refutes the view of Sumati stating that one object cannot have two qualities. Otherwise the object also will be considered as two. Another argument is raised that if the two qualities are not different from each other, why do you say that the special quality of the atoms is perceived by the emancipated only ?¹⁰⁹ By denying the existence of two qualities in one object, Śāntarakṣita tries to refute the view of Sumati.

The above criticism is based on the *Vijñānavāda*, which asserts that there is no existence of the external world. We see it only on account of the hypothesis of *vāsanā*. This criticism is answered by Jaina philosophers in latter works. Hemachandra tries to reply that the existence of the world cannot be refused, since knowledge is the action (*kriyā*) in which the object is supposed to be directed. Without the external object there can be no perception. Therefore, Jainism admits the existence of both, the atoms and the body (*avayavī*).

As regards the criticism that the atoms of the body would be conflicting with one another, Jaina philosophy admits this fact, but it tries to solve this problem through *Anekāntavāda*. As Hemachandra says, 'criticism' of atoms, therefore, cannot affect those who believe in *Syādvāda*,¹¹⁰ according to which a body is one and yet manifold.

Pāramārthika Pratyakṣa (Transcendental Perception)

The Pāramārthika Pratyakṣa is the outcome of the destruction of *Jñānavarāṇakarma* (knowledge obscuring karma). It springs forth from the purified soul itself without the assistance of sense-organs or any other external internal instruments. That is the reason why it is called the perfect lucid perception (*viśada pratyakṣa*). It is of two kinds : *Sakala pratyakṣa* (complete direct knowledge), and *Vikala pratyakṣa* (incomplete direct knowledge). *Kevalajñāna* (perfect knowledge or omniscience) comes under the former, and the *Avadhijñāna* (visual knowledge), *Manahparyāyajñāna* (mental knowledge) under the latter.

Avadhijñāna, as its name indicates, is limited by *dravya* (substance), *Kṣetra* (place) *Kāla* (time) and *bhāva* (emotion). It is of three kinds—*deśavadhi* (partial visual knowledge), *paramāvadhi* (high visual knowledge), and *sarvāvadhi* (full visual knowledge). Viewed from another aspect it is divided into *Bhāvapratyaya* (birth-born visual knowledge) and *guṇapratyaya* (acquired by merit). The former is possessed by those in heaven and hell by birth,¹¹¹ while the latter can be

secured by human beings as well as five-sensed sub-human beings after destruction-cum-subsidence of the relevant kârmic veil (*Kṛtyopaśama-nimitta*).¹¹² Only the forms having shapes (*rūpin*) can be known by *avadhijñāna*.¹¹³ The formless, such as soul (*jīva*), *dharma* (principle of motion), *adharma* (principle of rest), *ākāśa* (space), and *Kāla* (time) are not within its scope of perception. It can penetrate infinite number of cycles, both past and future.

Manahparyāya jñāna reveals the thoughts of human beings. It is of two kinds, viz. *ṛjumati* (simple direct or mental knowledge) and *vipulamati* (complex direct or mental knowledge). Umāsvāmi distinguishes them on the ground that the latter is purer and everlasting, while the former has less purity and infallibility.¹¹⁴ Pūjyapāda,¹¹⁵ and Akalanka¹¹⁶ support his view. But Jinabhadra is of somewhat different view viz. that *manahparyāya jñāna* knows the states of mind directly by intuition, but the external objects thought of by the mind can only be inferred.¹¹⁷ Later Ācāryas followed both these views.

Umāsvāmi makes a distinction between *avadhi* and *manahparyaya*. He says that (i) the former is less pure than the latter, (ii) the former can extend to the whole universe, while the latter is limited to the centre of the middle world. (iii) The first can be secured by all beings possessed of mind; while the other only by saints having supernatural powers, and (iv) the subject matter of the first is gross, while that of the latter is very subtle. But Siddhasena Divākara does not recognise any distinction between *avadhi* and *manahparyaya*, since "subhuman organisms possessed of two or more sense-organs are also found to strive by means of attraction and repulsion, and thus are possessed of minds and as such it will be proper to extend the scope of *manahparyaya* to the minds or the objects of the minds of them as well, or otherwise it will be improper to postulate *manahparyaya* as a separate category of knowledge.¹¹⁸ It can however, be considered a specific type of *Avadhijñāna*.

Kevalajñāna is perfect knowledge of all substance and their modifications. It is generated after complete destruction of the veil of the *Mohaniya karma* (deluding) which is the most powerful in the Kārmic matter. Hence the soul comes to perceive all things past, present and future. When a person achieves perfect knowledge, he is called Omniscient.

According to Jainism, no one can be a teacher (Tirthaṅkara) without being omniscient. This perfect knowledge can be obtained by the purified soul which has consciousness (*cetanā* or *upayoga*) as its sole characteristic.¹¹⁹ The term *Upayoga* is used to denote the *darśana* and *jñāna* which are the main features of the soul. *Darśana* is perception and *jñāna* is knowledge.¹²⁰ Soul, its knowledge, and its intuition all these are identical and hence each can reveal the self as well as non-self.¹²¹ *Akalaṅka* is of the view that when the soul cognises the object, it is called *Jñāna*; and when the soul perceives itself, it is called *Darśana*.¹²²

It is apparent now that at the destruction of *Jñānāvaraṇā*, *Darśanāvaraṇā*; *Mohaniya*, and *Antarāya*, the soul obtains inner illumination and becomes omniscient.

According to Jaina philosophy, each and every entity is somehow related to all other entities in the universe. Such relations are called modes or *paryāyas* of the entity. If one knows an entity completely, these modes will also be known completely. That is why it is said that one who knows one, knows all, and one who knows all, knows one. In the *Pravacanasāra*, Kunda-Kunda says: One who does not know simultaneously the realities of past, present and future, and the three worlds, cannot know even a single object with its infinite modifications, if one does not know all objects, how will he be able to know one? For instance, if one is inclined to have a knowledge of *ghaṭa*, he should have knowledge of its intrinsic nature as well as *ghaṭa* itself, since knowledge reveals all the objects. As the soul has infinite capacity to know all the objects, when one attains such power, he has to know all the objects.¹²⁴ severe penance with Right vision, Right knowledge,

and Right conduct is required to attain such purified stage of soul.

The early Pāli Canon as well as the latter Buddhist philosophical literature criticised the view of Jainas that their Tirthaṅkaras were omniscient. In the *Majjhima Nikāya* the Buddha says to Sandka Paribbrājaka that "Some teacher, all-knowing" (*sabbāññī*), all seeing (*sabbadassāvī*) claims all-embracing knowledge and vision (*aparisesaṃ ñānadassanam*), Saying whether I am walking or standing still or sleep or awake, knowledge and vision are constantly and perpetually (*satatam samitam*) before me". Further the Buddha says, "he enters an empty place, and he does not receive alms and a dog bites him, and he encounters a fierce elephant, and he encounters a fierce horse, and he encounters a fierce bullock, and he asks a woman and man their name and clan, and he asks the name of a village or market town and the way". So if any one asks him why he need question in this manner if he is omniscient, then he replies this: "I had to enter an empty place, therefore I entered"¹²⁵

At another place the Buddha says to Mahānāma that he had seen the Nigaṇṭhas performing severe penance at Rājagaha on the Isigili kālāsīlā. He then asked them "why do you people do so? They replied that the Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta was omniscient and he had said that by severe penance all past deeds would be destroyed and the new deeds would be prevented. In this way, they would attain salvation. Then the Buddha asked them "Do all of you know the past and the future of yourselves and your deeds. He went on to say "You do not know whether you did an evil deed like this or that You do not know the getting rid of unskilled states of mind, the uprising of skilled states." Getting the reply "no" from them the Buddha remarked "these beings, revered Nigaṇṭhas, do those who are born again among men in the world, and are wrathful (*luddha*), blood handed (*lohitapāṇīno*), dealing in cruelty (*kurūbrakammāntā*) do these go forth among the Nagaṇṭhas."¹²⁶ Likewise Udāyi Paribbrājaka says to Gotama

“the all-knowing omniscient (Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta), on being asked a question by me concerning the past, shelved the question by asking another, answered off the point and evinced temper and ill-will and sulkiness, (*purimāni, bhante, divasāni purimatarāni, sabhūṇu sabbadassāvi.....so mayaṃ pubban-
taṃ ārabha paṭhamāṃ puṭṭho samāno aññenāññāṃ paṭicari, bahir-
ddhū kathaṃ apanamesi, kopāro ca dosaro ca appaccayam ca
pātvākāsi*).¹²⁷

The *Dhammapada Atthakathā* presents a very interesting story regarding the dialogues that took place between Sirigutta and Garahadinna, the followers of the Buddha and the Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta respectively. Garahadinna, a follower of the Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta said to Sirigutta that the Nigaṇṭhas are omniscient; they know the past, present and future. Afterwards, Sirigutta, a follower of the Buddha decided to try the boastful claim of the naked ascetics (*Nigaṇṭhas*). He got a ditch dug between two houses and had it covered. Nigaṇṭhas were then invited to alms. When the Nigaṇṭhas came, they fell into the pit and their bodies were covered with mud and filth. Then it is said that he had beaten them with sticks and brought humiliation upon them. After a similar trial he proved that Buddhist monks were omniscient.¹²⁸ It may be noted here that all the Nigaṇṭhas are not said to be omniscient, but only a very few who could attain the perfect knowledge after performing the required duties. This story, however, refers to the Jaina tradition that its Tīrthaṅkaras and some prominent monks were omniscient.¹²⁹

Likewise, later Buddhist philosophical literature also referred critically to the Jaina conception of omniscience or *Keva-lajñāna*. Dharmakīrti, in the course of establishing the “*Dharmajñatva*” in the Buddha, points out the superfluity of Jaina view of omniscience and says that the *anuṣṭhānaga-lajñāna* (a knowledge that has a bearing on life or practice) is more important, than having a knowledge of the number of bacteria (*kiṭṭasaṅkhyā*), which is of no use at all for hu-

man beings. The real *tattvadrastū* (knower of scripture) in the opinion of Dharmakīrti is one who knows what is to be abandoned and what is to be accepted and not everything. It is immaterial whether one knows everything or not, but what matters is whether he knows the essential thing, that is, what he ought to know. If the mere range of knowledge was valuable in itself, without its bearing on life, why not worship vultures who soar in to the atmosphere and thereby get a long range of sight.¹³⁰ Thus he asserts the view that a absolute purity in life and not unlimited knowledge is the essential characteristic of a Teacher.

Prajñākaragupta, the commentator of Dharmakīrti also supports Dharmakīrti's view, but he goes one step further and establishes the omniscience of the Buddha. He also says that it can be attained by any spiritual aspirant, who masters the art of subduing passions.¹³¹

Thus it is only for the sake of argument that this conception of omniscience had been recorded in the Pāli Canon as well as in later Buddhist philosophical literature, since no Jain view regarding this problem is correctly and completely mentioned. It was therefore not possible to give an accurate picture of the Jain theory of omniscience. This much, however, we can say that the conception of omniscience in Jain Tirthaṅkaras is not a new one. It might belong to Pārśvanātha or the period prior to that tradition, since the Nigaṇṭhas, whom the Buddha saw performing severe penance on Rājagṛha at Rājagṛha would be the followers of Pārśvanātha or an earlier tradition.

The whole Jain literature seeks to establish the fact that Jain Tirthaṅkaras are omniscient, while denying the omniscience of any other. The *Bhagavati Sūtra* (9.32) says that the Nirgranthas who belonged to the Pārśvanātha tradition did not accept the Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta as a prophet or head of a Jain sect unless it was proved that he was all-knowing and all-seeing.¹³²

Later *cāryas* such as Kundakunda, Samantabhadra, Akalaṅka, Vidyānanda try to establish omniscience on the basis of inference. We have already mentioned Kundakunda argument in this connection. Then Samantabhadra says that there are three kinds of entities, viz. the subtle (*sūkṣma*), proximate (*antarīta*), and remote (*dūravartī*). They must be perceived simultaneously by somebody, since all objects are to be perceived. Hence there must be some one omniscient.¹³⁴

Vīrasena presents another argument in support of omniscience. He says that *Kevalajñāna* (omniscience) is innate in the soul. Due to destruction-cum-subsidence of karmas, it functions as *matijñāna*. The self-cognised *matī* implies the fractional kevala jñāna, just as the observation of a part of a mountain leads us to the perception of the mountain itself.¹³⁵

The Jaina philosophers did not emphasise *Dharma jñātva* like Dharmakīrti or early Buddhist tradition, but they endeavoured to point out that a person is omniscient when he is both *Dharma jñā* as well as *Sarvajñā*, because *Dharma jñātva* depends on *sarvajñātva*.

Akalaṅka presents another argument which is also referred to by Dharmottara, a Buddhist philosopher in the *Dharmottara-prādīpa*.¹³⁶ His argument is that if we deny supersensorial knowledge, how can astrological divinations be made? Hence, it must be accepted that there is a faculty of super-sensorial knowledge which is nothing but *Kevalajñāna* or omniscience.¹³⁷

After the destruction of the evil of karmic bondage one can attain the inherent capacity of his own soul, and perceive all things.¹³⁸ The very progressive gradation of knowledge implies the highest magnitude of knowledge attained by man. If one has no capacity to know or perceive all things at once he will not be able to do so even by means of the Veda.¹³⁹ Hence we have to accept that one can become omniscient. Impossibility of omniscience cannot be established unless one has knowledge of persons of all times. Consequently, one who rejects omniscience for all times must himself be omni-

scient.¹⁴⁰ Presenting the positive arguments in this way, Akalaṅka relies on the negative arguments that there is no contradictory *pramāṇa*¹⁴¹ to reject the established omniscience and therefore it is certain. He then substantiates this argument by examining the various so-called contradictory *pramāṇas*.¹⁴³

Dharmakīrti and his commentator, Prajñākargupta, think that the Jaina conception of omniscience cannot be accepted for want of *Sādhaka-bādhakapramāṇa*¹⁴⁵ (assisting and contradicting evidence). Akalaṅka replies this criticism by saying that one cannot establish the non-existence of omniscience without being omniscient. He further says that there is no *bādhaka pramāṇa* to refute omniscience in Jainism, and the absence of *bādhaka pramāṇa* is itself a *sādhakapramāṇa*.¹⁴⁵

As regards *Anuṣṭhānagatājñāna* urged by Dharmakīrti, Vādirāja, a commentator of Akalaṅka, questions "By which *pramāṇas* does the Buddha perceive the *Anuṣṭheyagatāvastu* ? Neither can *Pratyakṣa Prāmāṇa* be helpful in this respect, otherwise what will be the use of *Anuṣṭhāna* ? Nor will the *Anumāna* (inference) *pramāṇa* will solve our problem, because it depends on the *pratyakṣa*. Thus the *Anuṣṭheyagata Jñāna* in itself has no importance.¹⁴³

So far as *Kiṭasaṅkhyā-parijñāna* and its *puruṣārthopayoga* are concerned, he says that it is essential to include *Kiṭasaṅkhyā-parijñāna* as an integral part of omniscience, as *caturāryasatya* implies the *Duḥkhasatya* of creatures living around. If the Buddha has not grasped the *Caturāryavedanatva*, how could he preach to his disciples convincingly ? He then remarks that if the *Kiṭasaṅkhyā-parijñāna* serves no useful purpose, what then is the use of *Bhikṣu-saṅkhyā-parijñāna* in Buddhism.¹⁴⁶ ?

Thus the Jains established the theory of omniscience, whereas the Buddhist refuted it in Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta. According to Jainism its adherents could aspire to be omniscient. But it was only Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta who attained this

spiritual height at that time. However, the masses considered all Niganthas to be omniscient, because some of them gained various powers of insight. The Buddha, apparently under the impression that this was the actual claim of Jainism, criticised it. The later Buddhist philosophers also followed him. Later, on the imitation of Jainism, the Buddha is also made an omniscient in Buddhist Literature.¹⁴⁷

2. Parokṣa Pramāṇa (Indirect Knowledge)

Non-distinct (*aviśada*) knowledge is *parokṣa*, and it unlike *pratyakṣa*, dependent on others. It is of five kinds, namely, *smarana*, *pratyābhijñāna*, *tarka*, *anumāna* and *āgama*. Out of these *pramāṇas* in Jaina logic, only the *anumāna* *pramāṇa* has been discussed in Buddhist philosophical literature. Yet it is helpful to get a brief picture of other *pramāṇas* also, since the Jaina and the Buddhist philosophers vary in their attitudes to other *pramāṇas* on account of the different stand-points they had adopted.

Smṛti pramāṇa

Smṛti is the remembrance of a thing perceived or known before and it is a source of knowledge of a particular thing in association with earlier experiences. Therefore, it is regarded on *Pramāṇa* by Jaina logicians. But the Vedic philosophers are not ready to accept it as an independent *pramāṇa* on the ground that it depends on the validity of earlier experience (*grahitagrāhitva*).¹⁴⁸ The Buddhists joined hands with the Vedic philosophers like Kumārila.¹⁴⁹ and rejected the validity of *smṛti*.¹⁵⁰ Their main argument, like that of the Mīmāṃsakas or the Vaiśeṣikas, is that the validity of *smṛti* is conditioned by previous experience and it is wholly dependent on experience.¹⁵¹ As a matter of fact, the question of memory being treated as a *pramāṇa* does not arise in a system like Buddhism where all knowledge-involving-thought (*vikalpa jñānamūtra*) is considered no *pramāṇa*.¹⁵²

On the other hand the Jaina logicians unanimously accept the validity of *smṛti pramāṇa*. Their main argument is that

the *Saṁskāras* recall for any particular purpose the things experienced in the past. The memory of such things is a source of knowledge gained through senses. Therefore *smṛti* is declared to be a *Pramāṇa*, since it is true of facts *saṁvādin* just as perception. The validity of *pramāṇa* cannot be ascertained merely by relation to its dependence or independence of experience. If this argument is accepted even *pramāṇa* will cease to be a *pramāṇa*, for inference also depends on knowledge already acquired through direct empirical perception.¹³⁵

While examining *smṛti pramāṇa*, we may also discuss *Dhārāvāhika pramāṇa* (continuous cognition). The *Dhārāvāhika pramāṇa* is accepted as a *pramāṇa* by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas¹⁵⁴ and the Mīmāṃsakas.¹⁵⁵ In Buddhist tradition only Aracata accepts it.¹⁵⁶ He says that only the Yogin's *dhārāvāhika jñāna* is *pramāṇa*, because it involves awareness of *Sūkṣmakālakalā* (minute divisions of time), while ordinary man's continuous cognition is not a *pramāṇa*, because it does not involve such awareness.

The Jain logicians have two traditions regarding *dhārāvāhika Pramāṇa*. According to the Digambara tradition,¹⁵⁷ it is valid provided it produces a *viśiṣṭa pramāṇa* (a knowledge of special objects), while the Śvetāmbara tradition accepts the *dhārāvāhika jñāna* as a *pramāṇa* without any conditions¹⁵⁸ **Pratyabhijñāna**

Pratyabhijñāna (recognition) is the result of perception and recollection. Its nature is of *tadevedam* (that is definitely this), *tatsādṛaśam* (it is similar), *tadvilakṣaṇam* (it is somewhat dissimilar), and *tatpratīyogī* (it is different from that), which are *avisamvādin* (non-discrepant) and therefore are *pramāṇas* themselves.¹⁵⁹

Kumārila¹⁶⁰ as well as Javanta¹⁶¹ includes *pratyabhijñāna* in *pratyakṣa*. But the Buddhists do not accept it as a separate *pramāṇa*. In support of their theory, they advocate the idea that *pratyabhijñāna* is nothing, but only a combination or recollection or remembrance and perception. Further they urge that a thing is momentary (*kṣaṇika*) if it dismisses the

permanence of entities that are correlated with *pratyabhijñāna*.¹⁶²

The Jainas, on the other hand, uphold the view that because the *pratyabhijñāna* presupposes an entity in its antecedent and subsequent model condition, it should be recognised as a separate *pramāṇa*, like *smṛti*.¹⁶³

Tarka pramāṇa

Tarka or inductive reasoning is an essential feature to have the concomitance of an entity¹⁶⁴ which is the instrument of inference. *Pratyakṣa*, *smaraṇa* and *pratyabhijñāna* are associative reasons to originate *tarka*. It decides the inseparable connection (*avinābhāva sambandha*) among the objects known through inference and *āgama*. *Akalaṅka* is the first to fix the definition and subject of *tarka* in Jaina philosophy,

Mīmāṃsikas do not accept *Tarka* as a separate *pramāṇa*. The word *Uhā* used by them¹⁶⁵ in the sense of reasoning is synonymous with the *Īhā* of *matijñāna* of Jainas.¹⁶⁶ The Buddhist, also deny its validity on the ground that *tarka* can only help one to know further an object which is already known through perception.¹⁶⁷

Akalaṅka recognised *tarka* as a *pramāṇa*, since concomitance cannot be known without *tarka*.¹⁶⁸ If we do not accept the validity of *tarka*, we will not be able to accept either, as they both (inference and *tarka*) depend on the same basis for their validity as *pramāṇas*.¹⁶⁹

Āgama Pramāṇa :

The words of an *Āpta* are called *āgama*. *Āpta* means a person of superior intellect and character, who is non-discrepant (*avisaihvādīn*) in his respective subjects.¹⁷⁰ The Jainas believe that their prophets were *Āptas* and therefore they accepted *āgamas* as an independent *pramāṇa*. The Jainas did not restrict the definition of *Āpta* to the field of spiritual experiences and attainments. An *Āpta* may, according to Jaina logicians, be any authority on the subject even if it is only a secular subject.

The Vaiśeṣikas and the Buddhists include āgama in inference. But as a matter of fact, it should not be considered as a part of *anumāna*, since, unlike *anumāna*, it arises without having perceived signs and their concomitance. It may be noted here that the Jainas as well as the Buddhists rejected the claim of the Vedic philosophers that the Vedas are *apauruṣeya* (not of human authorship but of devine origin).¹⁷¹

Thus *smṛti*, *pratyabhijñāna*, *tarka*, *anumāna* and *āgama* are accepted as separate *pramāṇas* in Jaina philosophy and included into *parokṣa pramāṇa*. That means, according to Jainas, there are two *pramāṇas*, viz. *pratyakṣa* and *parokṣa*, while the Buddhists assert the reality of *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna*.¹⁷²

Anumāna Pramāṇa

Anumāna means a cognition which takes place after some other cognition, specially perception (*anu vyāptir nirṇayasya pascadbhavi mānaṃ*).¹⁷³ The Vedic thinkers may have been the first to attempt a definition of *anumāna* and their definition influenced both the Jainas and the Buddhists, although there was no unanimity among them as regard the exact nature of this *pramāṇa*.

Diṇṇāga (5th A.D.) a great Buddhist philosopher, is among the earliest to oppose the Vedic tradition. He offered a new definition which was latter adopted by his disciples. This Buddhist definition influenced the Jaina logicians like Siddhasenadivākara (5th A. D.), Akalaṅka (8th A.D.), and Vidyānanda (9th A. D.)

In the Jaina tradition Ācārya Akalaṅka presents a comprehensive definition of *anumāna* as follows :—

Cognition of *Sādhya* (what is to be proved) or major term produced by the *Sādhana* (the instruments to prove the *sādhya*) is called *Anumana* which follows *liṅga-grahana* (apprehension of the predicate of proposition) and *vyāpti-smāraṇa* (remembrance of invariable concomitance). He emphasises that because it is *avisamvadin* (non-discrepant) in its own subject and remo-

ves the defects arising due to doubt (*saṁśaya*), perversion (*viparyaya*) and indecision (*anadhyavasāya*), it should be recognised as a *pramāṇa*.¹⁷⁴

Vyāpti (invariable concomitance) is the main feature of *anumāna*. *Avinābhāva anyathānumāpānnatva*, *vipakṣavyāvṛtti*, and *niyatasādhacarya* are well-known characteristics, of *vyāpti*. *Sahabhāvanīyama* (having co-relation) and *kramabhāva-nīyama* (having successive relation) are the main factors of *Vyāpti*.¹⁷⁵ *Sahabhāva-nīyama* is understood as a character of the probandum (*vyāpākadharmā*) like *rūpa* (form) and *rasa* (taste) and *kramabhāva-nīyama* is understood as a character of the probandum (*vyāpākadharmā*). This definition indicates that *anumāna* is not restricted only to the *tādātmya* (identical nature) and *tādutpatti* (identical cause of origination) but it can also be applied to those things which do not possess of the *tādātmya* and *tādutpatti* relation. For instance, we can make an inference about the taste of something looking at its form, which has no *tādātmya* relation. Likewise, the rise of *Sāketa* can be inferred by looking at the rise of *kṛttikā*.¹⁷⁶

Sādhya and *sādhana* are also two of the other main features of *anumāna*. A thing which is to be perceived is called *sādhya* and a thing which is related positively with *Sādhya*, is called *sādhana*.¹⁷⁷

Anumāna is of two kinds, viz. *Svārthānumāna* (inference by one's own self) and *Parārthānumāna* (inference by others). The former is valid knowledge which arises in one's own mind from determinate *sādhana*, while the latter is a result of reasons standing in relation to invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*) with *sādhya*.

The organs or *Svārthānumāna* are said to be three in number, viz. *dharma*, *sādhya*, and *sādhana*. *Pakṣa* (minor term) and *hetu* middle term are also prescribed as its organs. Here, *sādhya* and *sādhana* are included in *pakṣa*. The remaining one is *dharmī* which is to be proved by *pramāṇas* (*prasiddha*).¹⁷⁸

As regards the types of Hetu, the *Vaiśeṣika sūtra* (9.2.1) refers to five kinds such as *kārya*, *kāraṇa*, *saṃyogi*, *samavāi* and *virodhi*. The Buddhists accept only three hetus, viz. *svabhāva*, *kārya*, and *anuplabdhi*. The Jainas, on the basis of definition of *avinūbhāva*, recognise *svabhāva*, *vyāpaka*, *kārya*, *kāraṇa*, *purvacara*, *uttaracara* and *Sahacara*. Upalabdhirūpa and anupalabdhirūpa are also said to be the types of hetu.

Regarding the organs of *pārvathānumāna*, there is no unanimity among the philosophers. The Naiyāyikas have laid down five organs, viz. *pratijñā* (proposition), *hetu* (reason), *udāharaṇa* (example), *upanaya* (application) and *nigamana* (conclusion).¹⁷⁰ The propositions, according to them, would be as follows :

- (i) There is a fire on the mountain (*pratijñā*).
- (ii) Since there is smoke (*hetu*),
- (iii) Wherever there is smoke, there is fire (*udāharaṇa*).
- (iv) There is smoke on the mountain (*upanaya*), and
- (v) Therefore there is a fire on the mountain (*nigamana*).

The Sāṅkhyas¹⁸⁰ and the Mīmāṃsikas¹⁸¹ do not accept the last organs, viz. *Upanaya* and *Nigamana*.

In the field of Buddhist Logic, Acārya Dignāga appears to have accepted three organs such as, *Pakṣa*, *Hetu*, and *Drṣṭānta*,¹⁸² while Dharmakīrti includes *Pakṣa* in *Nigrahasthāna*, and divides *Hetu* into three types.¹⁸³ According to him, the three Hetus are, (i) *Pakṣādharmatva* (its presence of the reason in the subjects totally), (ii) *Sapakṣasatva* (its presence in similar instances, although not in their totality) (iii) *Vipakṣavyāvṛttatva* (its absence in dissimilar instances in their totality). These reasons are also called the *Ayogavyavaccheda*, (impossibility of absence), (ii) *Anyayogavyavaccheda*, (impossibility of otherness in similars, but not in the totality of the similars), (iii) *Atyantayogavyavaccheda* (impossibility of others completely), i. e. absence of totality of the dissimilar instances) : For instance,

- (i) whatever is sat, is kṣaṇika (*Pakṣadharmatva*).
- (ii) the pot is sat, therefore it is kṣaṇika (*sapakṣasatva*).
- (iii) because all entities are sat (*vipakṣavyāvṛtattva*).

Thus, here the *Pakṣa* and *Nigamana* are denied and *Dṛṣṭānta* and *Upanaya* are indirectly accepted. Hetu is the main feature according to the Buddhist view (*viduṣṭmivācya hetu-
revā hi kevalaṃ*).¹⁸⁴

On the other hand, the Jainas accept only two organs, *Pratijñā* (proposition) and *Hetu* (middle term-reason). They urge in support of this theory that without accepting the *pratijñā* or *pakṣa* what is the use of the *hetu*, and for what would it be utilized.¹⁸⁵ Hence, they say that *Udāharaṇa* is necessary and deny that *Upanaya* and *Nigamana* are conclusive factors.¹⁸⁶ For instance :

- (i) there is a fire on the mountain (*pakṣa*).
- (ii) since there is smoke (*hetu*).

The above view of the Jainas is recorded in Buddhist literature. Both Dharmakīrti and Śāntaraksita criticised this theory. Dharmakīrti examines the Jain propositions with the following example :

- (i) trees are sentient beings—cetanās taravah (*pratijñā*).
- (ii) because they sleep (*hetu*).

He then refutes this theory stating that this instance is fallacious, since sleep which is manifested by closing of the leaves at night is found only in some trees, not in their totality.¹⁸⁷ The same thing is explained in the *Darmottara-prā-
dīpa* by Dharmottarara.

Śāntaraksita referred to a view of Pātrakeśari with regard to the conception of types of *hetu*. He puts a number of examples to establish his own view showing that there are only two organs, *Pratijñā* and *hetu*. For instance :

1. (a) the hare-marked (*śaśa-lāñchana*) is the Moon (*pakṣa* or *pratijñā*).
- (b) because it is spoken of as the Moon (*hetu*). Likewise :

2. (a) the pain of mine has been caused by the falling insect (*pakṣa*).
 (b) because its appearance was felt on the touch of the falling insect. (*hetu*).
3. (a) the soul, jar and other things are somehow essentially non-existent (*pratijñā*).
 (b) because they are somehow inapprehensible in any way, like the horns of the hare (*hetu*).

In the last case, there is no Corroborative Instance of dissimilarity. *The jar and other things* include the entire group of Positive Entities and they have been mentioned in the Proposition as essentially non-existent. And the negative entity has been put forth as the Instance. Apart from the *Positive* and the *Negative*, there is no third category wherein it could be pointed out that the exclusion of the Probandum implies the exclusion of the Probans. Therefore, according to Pātrasvāmin, there are only two organs of *hetu*, wherein other organs can easily be merged. This is the shortest and most well-defined way of making inference.

As a matter of fact, the Janias are of the view that the number of steps in a proposition cannot be fixed as it depends entirely on the level of competence of the hearer.¹⁹¹ Māṇikyānandi recognizes *pratijñā* and *hetu* as the minimum essential steps, but he concedes that other steps may also be required in dealing with certain types of hearers.¹⁹² Hemacandra¹⁹³ is also of the same view. Vādideva's view, however, is somewhat different. He accepts, like the Buddhists, one step for the particular type of hearers and two, three, four, and five for other general hearers.¹⁹⁴ But Pātrasvāmin's view is more important in this respect as he does not go beyond the two steps of *Pratijñā* and *Hetu*.

Śāntarakṣita, following in the foot-steps of Dharmakīrti criticises the theory of Pātrasvāmin. He says that *being spoken of as the moon* is present also in things where the Probandum (*sa pakṣa*) is known to be present. It is also

sometimes present in the Man (who is spoken of as the moon) or in Camphor, Silver and such other things which are also called *moon*.¹⁹⁶ Likewise, in the second instance Śāntarakṣita points out as a defect that there is no distinction between the probans (the pain of mine has been caused by the falling insect), since the proban is a part of the Proposition itself. The same fact is asserted in different words in the Probans.¹⁹⁶ Similarly, he indicates defects in other examples¹⁹⁷ put forward by Pātrasvāmin and tries to prove the two steps of *Pratijñā* and *Hetu* to be inadequate and incomplete.

This criticism is based on the conception that Jainas recognize only *hetu* Dharmakīrti includes *Pakṣa* in *Nigrahasthāna* and then divides *hetu* in three categories, viz. *Pakṣadharmatva*, *Sapakṣasatva*, and *Vipakṣavyūrtti*. These are called *Trairūpyahetu*. Both, *Draṣṭānta* and *Upanaya* are included in the *Hetu* of the Buddhists. But pātrasvāmin does not accept this view on the ground that the *Trirūpa* can also be found in *Hetvābhāsa* (fallacious middle term). Further he asserts *Pakṣa* and *Hetu* as steps of *hetu*. Since he establishes *Anyathānupapatti* as the definition of *hetu*, how could he include the *Pakṣa* or *Pratijñā* into other organs as Dharmakīrti did ? It was essential to him as well as other Jaina Ācāryas, therefore, to recognise *Pratijñā* as a separate organ of *Hetu*.¹⁹⁸

As regards the aspects of the nature of a probans, the Buddhists, like the Vaiśeṣikas¹⁹⁹ and Sāṅkhyas,²⁰⁰ assert that there are three aspects of a probans, viz. *pakṣasatva* (presence in the subject), *sapakṣasatva* (presence in a homologues), and *Vipakṣasatva* (absence from heterologues). The Naiyāyikas accept, in addition to the above three, two more aspects of the nature of probans viz. *abādhitavisatva* (absence of a counter-balancing probans), and *asatpratipakṣatva*.²⁰¹ Both, the Buddhists and the Jainas criticise the view of the Naiyāyikas.²⁰² The Buddhists include the *abādhitaviśayatva* in *pakṣa* and show the superfluity of *asatpratipakṣatva*. The three aspects of the

Buddhists are also called the *Sādhanaṅga*, wherein the *asiḍḍha*, *viruddha* and the *anaiḥāntika* are all included.

On the other hand, the Jaina tradition admits that only the *anyathānupapannatva*, also called *avinābhāva*, or *vyāpti*, or *vīpakṣavyāvṛtti*, is the essential characteristic of a probans (*hetu*).

Pakṣadharmastadansena vyāpto 'pyeti hetutām.

Anyathānupapannatvaṁ na cettarkena lakṣyate.²⁰³

Jainas, however, are not so strict upon this view, and allow any number of aspects in particular places, even though these aspects are actually details. Pātra svāmin is the first to establish this view in Jaina tradition. The earliest mention of his position is found in *Tattvasaṅgraha* of Śāntarakṣita, where his view is mentioned and then refuted. The gist of Pātrasvāmin's theory is that *anyathānupapannatva* is only one feature of *hetu* since it is the shortest way of making an inference. It has capacity to absorb and assimilate all other aspects of probans.

This conception of Jainas is criticised by the Buddhist logicians, Dharmottara, a commentator of Dharmakīrti, says that according to *Anvikṣas*, the inference proceeds from one-feature *hetu* (*ekalakṣaṇajamanamānam*)²⁰⁴ which is called *ekasūpya* or *anyathānupapannatva*. It indicates that *anyathānupapannatva* should not exist apart from the probans.

Śāntarakṣita, the distinguished commentator of Dharmakīrti, has also refuted this view. He quotes a well-known *kārikā*²⁰⁵ of Pātrakeśarin which, though not extant, is mentioned in the works of other writers. He is first mentioned in the *Tattvasaṅgraha* and the *Pramāṇavārtika Svavṛttitīkā* by the name of Pātrasvāmin. Ācārya Anantavīrya says that this *kārikā* belongs traditionally to Pātrakeśari who wrote a philosophical treatise named *Trilakṣaṇakadārtthanam*²⁰⁶ The *Śravaṇavelagolā inscription* also supports this view of Anantavīrya.²⁰⁷

Śāntarakṣita and his commentator explain the view of Pātrasvāmin with regard to the various aspects of probans. They say that according to Pātrasvāmin, the probans is valid only when it is found to be otherwise impossible and not when it has the three features (*anyathānupapannatva eva śobhano hetunā punastrilakṣaṇaḥ*). This view is elaborated as follows : Pātrasvāmin justifies that *anyathānupapannatva* is the principal characteristic of a probans. Through presumption (*arīh-āpatyā*) the same characteristic implies three features, viz. *Pakṣadharmatva*, *Sapakṣasattva*, and *Vipakṣavyāvṛttatva*, but the *Vipakṣavyāvṛtti* or *anyathānupapatti* can imply all other features which do not serve any useful purpose. As a matter of fact, the relation of invariable con-comitance (*avinābhāva*), which is, the heart of hetu, is not present in the three-featured reasons (*trairūpya-hetu*), but found in the one featured (*ekarūpya-hetu*).²⁰⁸

Śāntarakṣita then quotes a renowned kārīkā of Pātrasvāmin from the *Trīlakṣaṇakadarthana* as follows :—

anyathānupannattvaṃ yasya tasyaiva hetutā.
 dīṣṭāntau dvāvapi stāṃ vā ma vā tau hi na kārāṇaṃ
 nānyathānupapannattvaṃ yatra tatra trayeṇa kiṃ.
 anyathānupapannattvaṃ yatra tatra trayeṇa kiṃ.

It means *anyathānupapannatva* is the only probans. There may be three corroborative instances, but really they cannot be depended upon. If the *anyathānupapannatva* is not there, what is the use of three features ? and if the *anyathānupapannatva* is there, what is the use of the three features (*trairūpya*) ? He illustrates this point saying that the man who has three sons is called *ekaputraka* on account of having one good son (*Suputratvāt*). Similarly in the case of the three featured probans only feature would be useful in making inferences.

Pātrasvāmin has tried to prove that there can be no *anyathānupapannatva* hetu in the three-featured probans. For instance, "one must be dark (*pakṣasatva*), because one is the son of so and so (*sapakṣasatva*), whose other sons are found to be dark (*vipakṣasatvavyāvṛtti*)". This example contains

the three-featured probans, Even then it cannot lead to any valid and definite knowledge and conclusion. For there is no *avinābhāva-sambandha* (relation of invaribale con-comitance) between his son and his darkness. The climate and eating of vegetables by his mother during the pregnancy is real cause. Therefore, the *Trairūpyā* is not a correct theory.

Sa śyāmastasya putratvāddraṣṭā śyāmā yathetare.

Iti trilakṣaṇo heturna niscityai dravartate.²⁰⁹

Pātrasvāmin again pointed out that the one-featured probans has the requisite capacity of leading to valid knowledge. It has no external corroborative instances, either of similarity or of dissimilarity, either in the form of statment or in the form of actual things, because all things have been included under the subject or *pakṣa* (minor term) *Positive and Negative entities* (*bhāvābhāvātmaakaera sarvapadārthasya pakṣī-kriativāt*), and there is nothing apart from these. As regards the character of "being present in the Minor term", this is the *anyathānūpapañnatva hetu* and noting apart from the latter. Hence the probans here is *one-featured*.²¹⁰

But the Buddhist philosophers do not accept this view and they try to criticise it. For instance, Śāntrākṣita questions whether Pātrasvāmin's definition of *hetu* refers to the general position or to a particular subject on which knowledge is sought or to a particular instance. If the first alternative is accepted, then, what would be indicated, would be the existence of the probans in the object where the probandum is present; and it would not accomplish what is sought to be accomplished.²¹¹

If Pātrasvāmin's definition of the Probans is that *Anyathānūpapañnatva hetu* is found in the Minor term (*dharma*) only, the same means of cognition, which has made the Probans known, would make know Probandum (*sādhya*), also. Both these depend on each other. If the Probandum does not become known, the Probans also cannot become known. Thus the probans would be useless, and the Probandum would

be known by other means. There would be the incongruity of "mutual interdependence" (*anyonyāśrayadoṣa*), if the definite cognition of the Probandum followed from the Probans. Hence, the cognition of one would be dependent upon the cognition of the other.²¹²

Regarding the third alternative, Śāntaraṣita says that if the probans were known as existent in the Corroborative Instance, that would not bring about the cognition of the probandum in the Minor term, since its invariable concomitance will not have been definitely cognised all over.²¹³ He then refutes the instances²¹⁴ put forward by Pātrasvāmin in the course of his arguments.

For instance, in regard to the first instance concerning Śyāmaputra, he says that "One is dark, because he is the son of so and so" is not the natural reason (*svabhāvāhetu*), as "being product" (*kṛtakatvam*) has a character of non-eternality. The *Śyāmatva*, in his opinion, is the aggregate of five ingredients (*pañcopādānaskandha*). Nor is the probans based on the effect (*kāryahetu*), as there is no causal relation between his son and darkness. Nor is it of the nature of the non-perception (*anupalabdhi*) is the probans cannot prove the negation of complexions other than darkness.²¹⁵

Further Śāntaraṣita criticises the theory of Pātrasvāmin on the grounds of other inferences and concludes that the one-featured probans is really an important theory (*klībāsten-aiśalākṣaṇaḥ*). He then tries to prove that three-featured probans has no such defects.

This refutation of the theory of one-featured probans is based on the *asiddha*, *viruddha* and *anākūntika* defects (*hetvābhāsas*). However, the Jaina philosophers like Prabhācandra and Anantavīrya say that these defects are really not on the side of the one-featured *hetu* of Jainas, but on the side of the three-featured *hetu* of they Buddhists, because it can be applied to even *Hetvābhāsas*. They finally conclude that the one-featured *hetu* is the shortest and the simplest route to make an inference regarding anything.²¹⁶

But as a matter of fact, the three-featured probans are more convenient for the middle-term (*hetu*). For, even without knowing the words *homologue* and *hetologue* everybody can easily understand the major and the middle term.

With regard to the importance of this reference we are in a position to say that the earliest mention of Jainā conception of *anythānuṣaṅganatva* as an aspect of a probans has been made by Ācārya Dharmakīrti. Afterwards, Śāntara-kṣita referred to it and proceeded to examine it critically. There he mentioned Pātrasvāmin as the holder of this view. For the sake of Jainā philosophical history, this reference to Pātrasvāmin and his view is very important.

Pramāṇasamplavavāda

Pramāṇasamplava is an application of more than one pramāṇa to one object (*prameya*).²¹⁷ Jainas are appropriately called *Prāgmāṇasamplavavādīn*²¹⁸ in the *Hetubindu Tīkā*. This is because the theory of relativity of knowledge (*anekāntavāda*) is the basis of Jainā philosophy. It means that an entity is not in perpetual flux, but it is relatively eternal and having universal and particular characters (*sāmānyaviśeṣāt-maka*).

A thing consists of infinite attributes which cannot be apprehended by one by merely superficial knowledge. Other Pramāṇas, therefore, have clear scope to know the unapprehended elements of a particular thing. In the definition of pramāṇa Ācārya Aklaṅka added a word *anadhigatārthagrahī* which itself indicates that *pramāṇasamplava* can be accepted provided there is *upayoga-viśeṣa* to determine the definite or indefinite part of an entity.²¹⁹ The Naiyāyikas have on such term in their definitions of pramāṇa. But they accept the *pramāṇasamplava* in each case.

But on the other hand, Buddhist philosophy does not recognise the validity of *pramāṇasamplava*. According to its theory, an object is in perpetual flux : it cannot last for more than a moment. One object cannot have two validi-

ties, simultaneously. On this ground the Buddhist logicians criticise the Jaina and other systems. These criticisms will be analysed in the next chapter where, Anekāntavāda of Jainism will be discussed.

Conclusion

From this brief survey of the epistemological and logical concepts of Jainas as recorded in the Buddhist philosophical literature; we have seen that

(i) Among the ancient thinkers, the Jainas were classified as a group of philosophers who attained higher knowledge on the basis of personal experience.

(ii) Knowledge and vision were two characters of self. of these, vision (*darsana*) was originally considered to be the revealer of self (*ātmaprakāśaka*). This idea was developed in logical form and *darsana*, like *Jñāna*, was considered to be valid knowledge.

(iii) Knowledge (*jñāna*) was classified as Canonical or Āgamic, and Philosophical or *Dārśanic*. The five kinds of knowledge, namely, *mati*, *śruti*, *avadhi*, *manahparyaya*, and *kevalajñāna* were based on the former, while *Pratyakṣa* and *Parokṣa* are developments of the latter. *Pratyakṣa* was divided into *sāṃvyaḥvāhārika* and *pūramārthika*, while *parokṣa* into *smṛti*, *tarka*, *pratyabhijñā*, *anumāna*, and *ūgama*. Unlike Buddhism, *pūramārthika pratyakṣa* was *savikalpaka* (determinate). Sum-mati's theory was referred to in the *Tattvasaṅgraha* in this connection.

(iv) Pure self could attain omniscience. Hence Jaina Tīrthaṅkaras achieved this stage of complete purification and became omniscient.

(v) The ideology of omniscience was gradually developed in Buddhism as a result of Jaina influence.

(vi) *Pratijñā* and *hetu* were the only organs of *Parārthānumāna*. Pātrakeśari's view was referred to by Śāntarakṣita in the *Tattvasaṅgraha* in this connection,

It was also mentioned there that *anyathānopapatti* was the essential characteristic of Hetu, and

(vii) Apart from the knowledge of each other's epistemological theories, the Jainas and the Buddhists, through centuries mutual criticism, contributed substantially towards the enrichment of philosophical speculation in India and added to the sum total of human experience in its quest for the Truth.

Chapter-V

The Theory of Anekāntavāda

1. The Nature of Reality (*Anekāntavāda*)

Anekāntavāda is the heart of Jaina philosophy. Reality possesses infinite characters which cannot be perceived or known at once by an ordinary man. Different people think about different aspects of the same reality and therefore their partial findings are contradictory to one other. Hence, they indulge in debates claiming that each of them was completely true. The Jaina philosophers thought over this conflict and tried to reveal the whole truth by establishing the theory of non-absolutist standpoint (*anekāntavāda*) with its two wings, *Nayavāda* and *Syādvāda*.

There are two mutually distinct and fundamental standpoints from which all things can be considered. They are universalization and particularization. Universalization starts with the observation on a synthetic basis of similarities, and gradually reaches the level where distinction exists and finally concludes that any object of consciousness is in reality an element. On the other hand, Particularization is based on observation of dissimilarities which finally leads one to the conclusion that the universe is but a conglomeration of completely dissimilar existences.

These two standpoints have given rise to several other conceptions in Indian Philosophy. They can be classified into five principal categories¹ as follows :

- (i) the conception of identity.
- (ii) the conception of difference.
- (iii) the conception of subordinating difference to identity.
- (iv) the conception of subordinating identity to difference and
- (v) the conception of identity-in-difference.

(i) The conception of identity

The conception of identity means that all things are permanent, homogenous and universal as in Vedānta. Here the Brahman is considered to transform itself into the universe and to re-absorb the universe into itself. It is called the *Brahmādvaitavāda* or *ekatvavāda*, *vikāravāda* or *Brahmapariṇāmavāda*, which realized *brahman* as the basic reality. Later on, Śaṅkara established a theory called *vivartavāda* which means that an effect is a false or apparent transformation. According to this, the *brahman* is the sole reality and universe is intrinsically unreal (*mithyā*).

(ii) The conception of difference

The Buddhist philosophy represents this view. It asserts that everything is impermanent, soulless and a cause of pain (*sabbam aniccaṃ, sabbam anattaṃ, sabbam dukkhaṃ*). The conception of *anattā* or *nairātmya* establishes *asatkāryavāda*. Reality is momentary and flexible since it transforms into modes in a moment. The imagination (*kalpanā*) is the cause of the co-relation of modes which leads to casual efficiency (*arthakriyā*). The Śūnyavāda, Kṣāṇikavāda etc. are co-related with this doctrine.

(iii) The conception of subordinating difference to identity

The Sāṅkhya upholds the view of subordinating difference which means that the nature of reality is a plurality of the statically permanent (*kūṭasthanītya*) and the dynamically constant (*pariṇāmanītya*). The *Puruṣa* (self) is *kūṭasthanītya*, while the *Prakṛti* is *pariṇāmanītya*. Owing to different combinations of three *guṇas* (*sat, rajas, and tamas*), *Prakṛti* is transformed into modes, while the *Puruṣa* remains unchanged. The causes and effects are not entirely identical, but different in certain respects. Its fundamental principal *Satkāryavāda*, that affirms the pre-existence of the effect in the cause, is based on the non-distinction (*abhedavāda*), which is considered to be different from the *ārambhavāda* of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika.

(iv) **The conception of subordinating identity to difference**

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas hold the view that the *Vīśeṣa* (the particular) is the prominent feature that distinguishes the elements, and the *samavāya* (intimate relation) is the cause of relation between two inseparable (*ayutāsiddha*) substances and their modifications.

(v) **The conception of identity-cum-difference**

Conflicting views and heated arguments about the nature of reality confused the minds of the people to such a degree that it became essential to reconsider this burning philosophical question in a conciliatory spirit. This important step was taken by the Jainas and the result was the theory of *Anekāntavāda*, which postulates a theory of manifold methods of analysis (*Nayavāda*) and synthesis (*Syādvāda*).

According to Jaina Philosophy, as we have already seen, an entity consists of infinite characteristic which cannot be perceived all at once. Therefore one who perceives a thing partially, must be regarded as knowing one aspect of truth as his position permits him to grasp. Even though he is not in a possession of the entire truth, the aspect he has come to know cannot be altogether disregarded or ignored. The question arises as to how the whole truth of reality could be known. According to Jaina standpoint, all the theories contain a certain degree of genuineness and hence should be accepted from a certain point of view; but the nature of reality in its entirety can be perceived only by means of the theory of manifoldness (*anekāntavāda*). The Jaina philosophers synthesize all the opponents views under this theory.

The nature of reality, according to this theory, is permanent-in change. It possesses three common characters, viz. *utpāda* (origination) *vyaya* (destruction) and *dhrauvya* (permanence through birth and decay), It also possesses the attributes (*guṇas*) called *anvayī*, which co-exist with substance (*dravya*) and modifications (*pariyāyas*) called *vyatirekī*, which

succed each other. Productivity and destructivity constitute the dynamic aspect of an entity and permanence is its enduring factor. This view is a blended form of the completely static view held by the Vedāntins and the completely dynamic view held by the Buddhists.²

Jaina literature³ mentions three different views with regard to the relation of *guṇa* and *paryāya* with a substance (*dravya*). viz. the *bhedavāda*, *abhedavāda* and the *bhedābhedavāda*. The *bhedavāda* represents the view that the attributes and the modifications are a combination with the substance which gives birth to the triple characters (*dravya*, *guṇa* and *paryāya*) of an entity.⁴ Both, *guṇa* and *paryāya* are two distinctive elements in this view. The former is called *sahabhavi* or intrinsic, while the latter *kramabhavi* or extrinsic⁵. This ideology was promulgated by Kundakund, and supported by Umāsvāmi, Samantabhadra and Pūjyapāda.

According to *abhedavāda*, the *guṇas* and the *paryāyas* are synonymous (*tulyārthau*) signifying the conception of change inherent in which are both external and internal modifications of all realities without creating any contradictory position.⁶ Siddhasena Divākara is the chief supporter of this view and he is supported by Siddhasenagaṇi, Haribhadra and Hemachandra.

The third view *bhedābhedavāda* held by Akalaṅkadeva has been accepted by all his commentators and followers such as Prabhāchandra, Vādirājajisūri and Anantavīrya. This view appears in a more developed and harmonized form and clarifies further the relation between *guṇa* and *paryāya*. While commenting on the *Sūtra Guṇaparyayavaddravyam* of the *Tattvārthasūtra*, Akalaṅka suggests that *guṇas* are themselves a distinct category from, as well as identical with, *paryāyas*⁷. It means *guṇas* always exist with realities and their modifications which follow one after another. Prabhāchandra⁸ in the *Nyāyakumudacandra* gives a more critical and comprehensive explanation.

All these three views are not fundamentally different from one another, since they unanimously accept the common factors, utpāda, vyaya, and dhrauvya simultaneity (*sahabhāvitva*) and modifications with successivity (*kramabhāvitva*). The Buddhist philosophers are familiar with the first and the last view, but they do not make any distinction between them.

Anekāntavāda in Buddhist literature

The rudiments of the theory of *anekāntavāda* can be gleaned from early Pāli literature. The *Brahmajāla Sutta* pointed out the sixty-two Wrong views (*Micchadittṭhis*) according to the Buddhistic standpoint. Out of them, the *Ucchedavāda* (nihilism) and *Sassatavāda* (Eternalisms), Buddhaghosa says, were taught by Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta to two of his pupils, just before his death⁹.

This account of Buddhaghosa cannot be accepted as true since he had quite understandably misunderstood the teachings of Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta. Buddhaghosa had not been fully conversant with all aspects of *anekāntavāda* and he had thought that Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta had taught contradictory doctrines. This is quite understandable because the theory of permanence in-change which forms the basis of the *Anekāntavāda* is completely at variance with the Buddhist theory which accepts only change. Due to this difficulty thoughts of Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta are considered in Pāli literature under the headings *Sassatavāda* and *Ucchedavāda*.

Rudiments of *Anekāntavāda* are traceable in the Buddhist approach to questions : Pāli literature¹⁰ describes how he answered a question in four ways. The four ways are :

- (i) *Ekaṃsa-vyākaraṇīya* (answerable categorically),
- (ii) *Paṭipucchāvākaraṇīya* (answerable by putting another question),
- (iii) *Tthāpaṇīya* (question that should be set aside).
- (iv) *Vibhajjavākaraṇīya* (answerable analytically).

The Buddha, who adopted these techniques in answering numerous metaphysical and ethical questions put to him by various disciples and disputants, himself claims to be a *Vibhajjvādin*.¹¹ The *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* of the Jainas requires the Jaina monk to explain a problem with the help of *Vibhajjavāda*.¹² It shows that the Jainas as well as the Buddhists followed the analytical method of explanation. It is possible that the earliest division of the above questions was divided into *ekamāsavyākaraṇīya-pañha*, and (2) *anekamāsavyākaraṇīya-pañha* corresponding to the Jaina classification of two kinds of statements (*ekamāsika dhamma* and *anekamāsika dhamma*). Later, the latter class would have been sub-divided into the (i) *vibhajja-vyākaraṇīya* and the (ii) *thāpāya*. *Paṭipucchā-vyākaraṇīya* is a sub-class of *vibhajja-vyākaraṇīya*.¹³

A point to be noted here is that the Buddha used the word *anekamāsa* in his preachings. For instance, in reply to a question asked by Poṭṭhapāda, the Buddha says "I have taught and laid down doctrines of which it is possible to make categorical assertions and I have taught and laid down doctrines of which it is not possible to make categorical assertions" *ekamāsikā pi.....mayā dhammā desitā paññattā*¹⁴, *anekamāsikā pi.....mayā dhammā desitā paññattā*). Here *anekamāsikā*, like *Vibhajjavāda*, is similar to *Anekāntavāda* of Jainas. The etymology and meaning are also similar. But the difference between these two theories is that the Jainism accepts all statements to possess some relative (*anekāntika*) truth, while the Buddhism does not accept that all non-categorical statements (*anekamāsika*) can be true or false from one standpoint or another. *Anekāntavāda*, unlike *anekamāsikavāda*, conceives of the possibility of knowing reality from one or more standpoints. Paṇḍita Durvekamiśra, in the *Hetubinduṭīkāloka*, summarized this concept as follows : *Syācchabdo 'nekāntavacano nityatosti tena syādvādo anekāntvādo yadvā syādakṣaṇīkaḥ syādkṣaṇīka ityādi.....*)¹⁵ A developed form of this doctrine is referred to in a later Sanskrit Buddhist philosophical literature. As we have already seen, this theory continued develop still further up to the time of Kundakunda.

After Kundakunda, Samantabhadra tries to explain it further with the help of examples. This is referred to by Karṇakagomin in the *Pramāṇavārtika Svavṛttiṭīkā*¹⁶ and Durvekamiśra in the *Hetubinduṭīkāloka*. According to Samantabhadra, the triple characters abide with a substance at one and the same time. They are not mutually independent. *Utpāda* can never exist without *vyaya* and *dhrauvya*. The other two characters too are mutually dependent. Samantabhadra uses an example to clarify this view. If a jar made of gold is turned into a crown it will please a man who has an attachment to the crown, but it will displease a man who dislikes the crown, while the third man who is neutral about the crown but is interested in the gold, will have no objection to it at all. Here origination, destruction, and permanence abide in one reality. Another example is presented to make this controversial point clearer. He says: he who takes a vow to live on milk, does not take curd, he who takes a vow to live on curd, does not take milk; and he who takes a vow to live on food other than supplied by a cow, takes neither milk nor curd. Thus Samantabhadra concludes that *utpāda*, *vyaya*, and *dhrauvya* may exist in a relative sense.¹⁷ Kundakunda has also given such example in this connection.¹⁸

The etymology of the word *dravya* itself indicates that a thing is permanent-in-change taking a new form simultaneously with the disappearance of the previous form.¹⁹ This view was also accepted by Durvekamiśra according to *Kṛdanta* section.²⁰ Śāntarakṣita²¹ and Arcaṭa²² have also recorded this conception in their respective works.

Trayātmakavāda and Arthakriyāvāda, in Buddhist Literature

The *arthakriyākāritva* (causal efficiency) is the essence of the doctrines of Bhedavāda, Abhedavāda, and Bhedābheda-vāda. The *Saṅkīrṇavāda* of Sāṅkhyas, *Asaṅkīrṇavāda* of Naiyāyikas and Buddhists and *Sadasaṅkīrṇavāda* of Jains are well-known to us in this respect. Here we are concerned only with the views of the Buddhists and Jains.

The Buddhists assert that the "Particular is the only real element of an entity characterised as *sva-lakṣaṇa* (thing-in-itself). It is supposed to be momentary and a congregation of atoms. A thing accordingly is born and immediately afterwards it is destroyed²³. The substance is *nirhetuka* (devoid of causes) in the sense that it originates without the assistance of cause other than its own cause of origination. Each moment produces another moment destroying itself and thus it presents a sort of continuously of existence. Thus it manages to maintain a cause and effect (*kāryakāraṇabhāva*) relationship.

According to Buddhism, Momentariness (*kṣaṇabhāṅguratā*) and causal efficiency (*kārya-kāraṇabhāva*) are inseparable. It treated momentariness, efficiency, causality and reality as synonyms, and hence argued that an entity is momentary because it was efficient and it was efficient because it was momentary. On the basis of this idea, the Buddhists criticise causal efficiency in a permanent thing. They say that entities come into Being either simultaneously (*yuga-pādēna*) or successively (*kramēna*). But in a permanent thing, both these ways cannot be effective, since they are not able to originate it immediately due to the non-proximity of a cause. In the first alternation, the substance should originate all the possible effects in the very first moment of its existence, As regards the type of causal efficiency that takes place simultaneously, a permanent thing cannot have any effects, because it can be neither perceived nor inferred. As Śāntarakṣita says, after having brought about all the effects simultaneously, the nature of a thing comprising its capacity for effective action, disappears, and therefore the momentary character of a thing is an essential factor for causal efficiency. Furthermore they point out that auxiliaries (*sahakāri*) must follow the things with which they are connected. These auxiliaries, as a matter of fact, cannot abide with permanent things, because the peculiar condition produced in a thing by auxiliaries would neither be similar

nor dissimilar. If they make any difference, the efficiency of the permanent thing in producing the cause is compromised and becomes dependent upon other things in order to be efficient. If, on the contrary, they are not able to make any difference, the arguments for inoperative and ineffective (*akiñcitkara*) elements in a thing have no meaning. The Buddhists, therefore, conclude that causal efficiency is the essence of the simple and unique moments each of which is totally different from the others.²⁴

On the other hand, the Jainas believe that a substance is dynamic (*pariṇāmi*) in character. It means a thing is eternal from the real standpoint (*niscayanayena*) and momentary from a practical viewpoint (*vyavahāranayena*). Causal efficiency, according to them, is possible neither in a thing which is of the static nature (*kūṭasthanīya*) nor in a thing which is incongruous with the doctrine of momentariness (*kṣaṇikavāda*), but it is possible only in a thing which is permanent-in-change. To make a clarification of this view, they say that efficiency takes place either successively or simultaneously. Both these alternations cannot be effective in the momentary existence, since the spatial as temporal extension which requires the notion of *before* and *after* for efficiency are absent from the momentary thing of the Buddhists. *Santāna* (continuous series) is also not effective in this respect, since it is not momentary in the opinion of the Buddhists.²⁵

This view of the Jainas is recorded by Durvekamiśra in the *Hetubinduṭīkāloka*. The writer of the *Vādanyāya* called *Syādvādakeśari* who is supposed to be the same as Akalaṅka-deva, is said to have defeated the opponents and established the Jaina Nyāya. According to *Syādvādakeśari*, Durvekamiśra says, every entity is *anaikāntika* (having infinite characters), which is the basis of *arthakriyā* (casual efficiency). Kulabhūṣaṇa, a commentator on the *Vādanyāya*, explains this view that the *anyathānupapatti* is the main character of reality, and *arthakriyā* is possible only in that character.²⁶ He, then,

on the basis of the above view, tries to point out defects in the theory of absolute momentariness and absolute eternalism stating that causal efficiency is possible in either of these theories of reality. Clarifying his own position, Kulabhūṣaṇa asks whether momentary character has causal efficiency during its own existence or in another. If the first alternative is accepted, the entire universe would exist only for a moment. The effect produced by a certain cause during its own existence would be a cause of others, despite being caused itself and this series will never end. The argument "Cause makes an effect during its own existence and an effect comes into being during the existence of others" is not favoured since an effect is supposed to be originated during the existence of its own cause and not of another". Otherwise, an effect cannot take place and there will be the defect of "*Samanantarapīḍa-virodha*"²⁶, according to which the effects would emerge in the distant future. The next moment is also not powerful to generate the thing, since it is not a creator. Otherwise what would be the difference between *sat* and *asat*, and *kṣaṇika* and *akṣaṇika*. We could conclude therefore, that *ārlhakriyā* is possible only in permanent-in-change character.²⁸

Afterwards, Durvekamiśra tries to criticise the view of Syādvādaśāri not by advancing arguments but by merely hurling insults. As a matter of fact, whenever the Buddhist philosophers came across people whose views were different to theirs, especially when they could not refute their theories, they resorted to the practice of ridiculing them by means of ironical speech. It is in this manner that the arguments of the Jainas against the theory of *kṣaṇikavāda* came to be dismissed by Paṇḍit Durvekamiśra with cursory remarks that a wise-man should disregard the above objections raised by the above *Anhrikas* or *Digambaras* (*yadi nāmānhrikoktirūpekṣaṇīya prekṣāvātām*)²⁹. He then tries to show that only the momentary character has a capacity of casual efficiency.

śāntaraksita also refers to view which seems to belong to the Jaina tradition, but it is attributed to Bhadanta Yoga-

Yogasena, who is claimed by certain scholars to be a Buddhist philosopher. For instance, Bhattacharya says in his introduction to the *Tattvasaṅgraha* that "nothing definite is known about Yogasena; he is not mentioned in the Nanjio's catalogue of the Chinese Tripiṭaka nor in any of the Tibetan catalogues". He then tries to prove that Yogasena was a Buddhist philosopher on account of his appellation *Bhadanta* saying "But the word *Bhadanta* is always used in the *Tattvasaṅgraha* to denote a Buddhist, or more preferably a Hīnayāna Buddhist. Our authors have not made a confusion in this respect anywhere in this book, and on this ground we can take Yogasena to be a Buddhist."³⁰

But Śāntarakṣita has not indicated anywhere that the word *Bhadanta* should be limited only to the Buddhist Ācāryas. It has been widely used in Jaina literature as a term of respect to elder Bhikkhus. It is, therefore, not impossible that Yogasena was a follower of Jainism or was influenced by its conceptions, as his views against *Kṣaṇikavāda* represent the Jaina standpoint.³¹ Further Śāntarakṣita did not mention anywhere explicitly the criticism made by Jainas against the *Kṣaṇikavāda*. Moreover, it is unlikely that in such a comprehensive work he should forget to mention the refutation of the Buddhist theory of momentariness by the Jainas, when the Jainas were their greatest opponents.

Some schools of thought opposing the doctrine of momentariness (*Kṣaṇābhāṅgavāda*) were rising even within Buddhist system. For instance, Śāntarakṣita refers to the view of *Vātsīputrīyas* who classified things under two headings momentary and non-momentary.³² The conception of soul, according to them, has also been refuted by Śāntarakṣita. Stcherbatsky mentions the *Vātsīputrīyas* who admitted the existence of a certain unity between the elements of a living personality. In all probability they have been influenced by the Jaina views as their arguments are very similar to the Jaina arguments raised against the view of *Kṣaṇikavāda* and *anātmavāda*.

There are, however, two important points of difference between the Buddhist and the Jaina in the meaning they attach to *dravyavāda* in their common denunciation of the view which connects this notion of *arthakriyākāritva* with *dravyavāda*. First, the Buddhist is against *dravyavāda*. Secondly, the Buddhist's attack actually turns out, whatever his profession may be, to be on the hypothesis of the static (*kaṣṭhanīya*) *dravya* whereas the Jaina's attack is also on the same hypothesis but only as a contrast to his own theory of the dynamic (*pariṇāmi*) *dravya*.⁸⁴ We have already discussed the Jaina's view against *ekāntadravyavāda*.

Dual character of an entity

Some systems of thought accept only the Universal (*Sāmānya*) character of reality. Advaitavādins and the Sāṅkhyas are the typical representatives of this view. Some other schools led by the Buddhists recognise only Particular (*Viśeṣa*) character of reality. The third school of thought belongs to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, who treat Universal and Particular (*Sāmānya* and *Viśeṣa*) as absolutely distinctive entities.

Śāntarakṣita first establishes the Jainistic view on the nature of reality. He says that according to Jainism, an entity has infinite characteristics which are divided into two categories, viz. Universal and Particular. Just as different colours can exist in a lustrous gem without conflicting with each other, so the universal and particular elements could abide in a reality.⁸⁵

We find two kinds of existence in an entity, viz. existence of own nature (*Svarūpāstiva*) and existence of the similar nature of others (*Śādrasīyūstiva*). The former tries to separate the similar (*sa-jātiya*) and dissimilar (*vi-jātiya*) substances and indicates their independence. This is called Vertical Universal (*ūrdhvatāsāmūnya*), which represents unity (*anugatapratyaya*) in plurality of different conditions (*vyāvṛtāpratyaya*) of the same individual. In other words, the permanent character of an entity is called *ūrdhvatāsāmūnya*.⁸⁶

Śāddīyāstitva, the so-called *Tiryaksāmānya* (horizontal), represents unity in the plurality of different individuals of the same class.³⁷ The word *cow* is used to denote a particular cow and it also refers to others of the same class, because of similarity.³⁸ Likewise, *Viśeṣa* is also of two kinds, *Paryāya* and *Vyatireka*. The former distinguishes the two modes of same entity, while the latter makes a distinction between the two separate entities.

Thus each and every reality is universalized-cum-particularized (*sāmānya-viśeṣātma*) along with substance with modes (*dravyaparyāyātma*). Here *dravya* represents the universal character and *paryāya* represents the particular character of a thing. The adjective *Sāmānya-viśeṣātma* indicates the apprehension of *Tiryaksāmānyātma* and *Vyatirekasāmānyātma*, while *Dravyaparyāyātma* points out the *ūrdhvatāsāmānyātma* and *Paryāyaviśeṣātma* character of a reality. Though the quality of *sāmānyaviśeṣātma* is included in the *dravyaparyāyātma*, its separate use indicates that no entity is beyond the limitation of *dravyaparyāyātmakatva* of *utpādayadhravyātma*. While *Sāmānyaviśeṣātma* indicates the character of reality, the *dravyaparyāyātma* shows its dynamic nature. Thus in Jainism an entity is of a dual nature. Both these types of *sāmānya* have been dealt with by Śāntarakṣita, Kaṇakagomin and Arcaṭa. They take the traditional example of a jar (*ghaṭa*) made of gold which can be changed into several modes, while preserving gold as a permanent substance.³⁹

Another example has been given by Buddhist philosophers on behalf of Jainas. They say that the identical-in-difference (*bhedābheda*) between the substance and the modes is accepted by the *Anhrikas* as the nature of reality.⁴⁰ When a substance is spoken of as one, it is with reference to space, time and nature; when it is spoken of as different, it is with reference to number, character, name and function. For instance, when we speak of a jar and its colour and its other attributes, there is difference of number, and name; there is also also a

difference of nature, inasmuch as an inclusiveness or comprehensiveness is the nature of the substance of the jar, while exclusiveness or distributiveness is the nature of successive factors in the form of colour and so forth. There is also a difference of function; inasmuch as the purposes served by the two are different. Thus the substance is not totally undifferentiated, as it does become differentiated in the form of the successive factors.⁴¹

Kamalaśīla explains the Jaina view as to why it stresses on the universal-cum-particular character. He says, as the Jainas assert : "If the above doctrine is to be denied, all things would have to be recognized as one. If a certain thing spoken of, for instance, as a jar was not different from other things, such as cloth, then there would be no difference between the jar and sky-flower (i. e. sky-flower is a thing that does not exist at all-hence an absurdity (*ākāśa-kusuma*)). Likewise a thing that is always differentiated from all other things, can have no other state save that of the sky-flower. Consequently, the general character in shape of universal entity, has to be admitted."⁴²

Kamalaśīla further explains the Jaina conception of the particular characters of an entity. He says that if the same entity, jar, was devoid of dissimilarity, then the jar could not be regarded as anything different from the cloth etc. in the form of *this is jar, that is cloth*, but in fact it does differ from other things. Therefore the particular character is always present in reality.⁴³

As the Buddhist do not admit the universal character of an entity, the Jainas endeavour to convince them that the universal character is merged in the particular character of an entity. They set forth the argument that if any entity is not similar to other things, it ceases to be entity. For, that which is excluded from an entity, could have no position, but non-existence, as in the case of a sky-flower.⁴⁴

In support of the aforesaid view, another argument is presented, on behalf of the Jainas, that is, if an entity were not

similar to or different from every other entity, how then is it possible that the common idea of "being an entity" is found to appear only in connection with the jar and such things, and not in connection with the crow's teeth. It is so because the said restriction is due to a certain capacity in their natures. Though, according to Jainism, all things in the form of entities are not different from one another, their capacity may be regarded as the required "commonality. This is also called the *Niyatavṛtti*. Without accepting this limitation anything could be transformed into any-thing else.

Later the Jainas dealt with the difference among things. They say that if a jar were entirely devoid of dissimilarity to those other things, then there being no difference between them, the jar could not be anything different from those things. This would involve a self-contradiction. When one is ready to accept some sort of difference among things, he has also to accept dissimilarity as a particular character.⁴⁶

Thus according to the Jainas' view, like the gleaming Sapphire, every entity, while being one, has several aspects. Of these, some are apprehended by inclusive notions, and others by exclusive notions. Those that are apprehended by inclusive, and hence spoken of as *Common*, while others, which are apprehended by exclusive notions, are exclusive and hence said to be *Particular*. The inclusive notion appears in the non-distinctive form of "This is an Entity", while the exclusive appears in the distinctive form "this is jar, not cloth".

Vastvekātmakamevedamanekākāramiṣyate.

Te cānuvṛttivyāvṛttibuddhigrāhyatayā sthitāḥ.

Ādyā ete'nuvṛttatvātsāmānyamiti kīrtitāḥ.

Viśeṣāstvabhīdhiyante vyāvṛttatvāttato 'pare.⁴⁷

Nature of relation of an entity

The nature of an entity is also a controversial point among the philosophers. For instance, the Naiyāyikas, the extreme realists, think that relation is a real entity. According to them, it connects the two entities into a relational unity through conjunctive relation (*samavāya sambandha*). Conju-

nction is a subject of quite separate, while the other relates with inseparable realities. *Samavāya* is said to be eternal, (*nitya*), one (*eka*) and all-pervasive (*sarvavyāpaka*).⁴⁸

The Vedāntins and the Buddhists, the idealists, are against the view of the Naiyāyikas. The Buddhists assert the subjective view of relations. A relation, according to Dharma-kīrti, is a conceptual fiction (*sambandhaḥ kalpanākṛtaḥ*), like universal, and hence it is unreal. He also rejects the two possible ways of entertaining a relation in universal. They are dependence (*paratantrya sambandha*) and interpenetration (*rūpaśleṣa sambandha*).⁵⁰

On the other hand, the Jainas, on the basis of non-absolute standpoint, try to remove the extreme externalism of the Naiyāyikas and the extreme illusionism or idealism of Buddhism and Advaitism. They maintain that a relation is a deliverance of the direct and objective experience. Relation is not merely an inferable but also an indubitably perceptual fact. Without recognising relation, no object can be concrete and useful and atoms would be existing unconnected.⁵¹

As regards the rejection of two possible ways of relation, the Jainas say that they should not be rejected. For, *paratantrya-sambandha* is not mere dependence, as the Buddhists ascribe, but it unifies the relata⁵². *Rūpaśleṣa* is also untenable for purpose.⁵³ The two points are here to be noted : the first is that according to Jainism, the relata never lose their individuality. They make internal changes having consistent internal relation with the external changes happening to them. In adopting this attitude the Jainas avoid the two extremes of the Naiyāyikas' externalism and the Vedāntins internalism. Another point is that the Jainas consider relation to be a combination of the relata in it as something unique or *sui generis* (*jātyantara*). It is a character or trait in which the natures of relata have not totally disappeared but are converted into a new form. For instance, *nara-simha* is a combination of the units of *nara* (man) and *simha* (lion).

They are neither absolutely independent nor absolutely dependent, but are identity-in-difference. Hence the Jainas are of the view that relation is the structure of reality which is identity-in-difference.⁵⁴

2. The Theory of Nayavāda

Nayavāda or the theory of partial truth is an integral part of the conception of *Anekāntavāda*, Which is essential to conceive the sole nature of reality (*vastu nayati prāpayati samvedanākoṭimārohati*). It provides for the acceptance of different viewpoints on the basis that each reveals a partial truth about an object. Naya investigates analytically a particular standpoint of the problem⁵⁵. But if the problem is treated as the complete truth, it is not *Naya*, but *Durnaya* or *Nayābhāsa* or *Kunaya*. For instance, *it is is Naya*, and *it is and is only is durnaya*, while "it is relatively (*syāt*)" is an example of *Syādvāda*⁵⁶.

Nayas can be as many as there are ways of speaking about a thing. This infinite number of *nayas* has been reduced to seven, viz. *Naigama* (figurative), (ii) *Saṅgrha* (general or common), (iii) *Vyavahāre* (distributive), (iv) *Ṛjusastra* (the actual condition at a particular instant for a long time), (v) *Śabda* (descriptive), (vi) *Samabhirūḍha* (specific), and (vii) *evambhūta* (active). The first four *nayas* are *Śabdanayas* and the rest are the *Artha Nayas*, for thoughts and words are the only means by which the mind can approach reality. These seven *Nayas* have been also divided into two categories, *Dravyārthika* or *Sāmānya* (noumenal or intellectual intuition relating to the substance), and *Paryāyārthika* or *Viśeṣa* (phenomenal view relating to the modifications of substances). The first three *nayas* are connected with the former division and the rest with the latter. In the scriptural language these are named the *Niścayanaya* (real standpoint) and the *Vyavahāranaya* (practical standpoint). The *Tattvārthavartika* (133) mentions the *Drvyāstika* and the *Paryāyastika* in place of *drvyārthika* and *paryāyārthika*.

As regards *nayābhāsa*, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika systems are called in *Naigamābhāsa*, as they hold the absolute distinction in the characters of a thing. The Sāṅkhya and the Advaita schools are enumerated under the *Saṅgrahābhāsa*, the Cārvaka under the *Vyavhārynayābhāsa*, the Buddhist conception of *Kṣaṇābhāṅgavāda* in the *Rjusūtranayābhāsa*, the *Samabhirūḍhanayābhāsa* and so on.

The theory of *Naya* in Buddhist literature

Pāli literature indicates some of the characteristics of *Nayavāda*. The Buddha mentions ten possible ways of claiming knowledge in the course of addressing the Kālāmas. The ten (i) anussavena, (ii) paramparāya, (iii) itikirāya, (iv) piṭa-kasaṁpadāya (v) bhavyarūpatāya (vi) samaṇo na guru, (vii) takkihetu, (viii) nayahetu, (ix) ākāraparivitakkena, and (x) diṭṭhinijjhānakkhantiya⁵⁸ Out of these, the eighth way, viz. *Nayahetu* is more important for our study. Here *Naya* is a method of statement which leads a meaning to a particular judgement⁵⁹ The Jātaka says that the wise man draws a particular standpoint.⁶⁰ In about the same meaning. *Naya* is used in Jaina philosophy, as we have already seen. This *Nayahetu* of Buddhism appears to indicate the Jaina influence of *Naya*, and it would have been made a part of its own in the form of two types of Saccas, viz. *Sammūṭtisacca* and the *Paramatthasacca*,⁶¹ which are used in about the same sense as *Paryāyārthikanaya* and *Dravyārthikanaya* or *Vyavahāranaya* and *Niscayanaya*. The words *Sunaya* and *Dunnaya* are also found in Buddhism used in identical way.⁶²

The *Suttanipāta* indicates that the *Sammūṭtisacca* was accepted as a common theory of Recluses and the Brāhmaṇas,⁶³ and the *Paramatthasacca* was treated as the highest goal⁶⁴ These two Saccas are characterised as *Nītattha* (having a direct meaning) and *Neyyattha* (having an indirect meaning).⁶⁵ The Commentary on the *Anguttara Nikāya* says that there is no third truth (*tatiyaṁ n'upalabbhīti*). *Sammūṭti* (conventional statement) is true because of convention and

Paramattha is true because of indicating the true characteristics of realities :

Duве saccāni akkhāsi Sambuddho vadataṃ varo.

Sammutiṃ paramatthaṇca tatiyaṃ n' ūpalabbhati.

Paramatthavacanāṃ saccāṃ dhammānaṃ tathalakkhaṇaṃ⁶⁸

On the other hand, it is also said that there is only one truth, not second (*ekaṃ hi saccāṃ na dutiyamatthi*).⁶⁷ This contradictory statement appears to give the impression that even in Buddhism the nature of things is considered through some sort of relativistic standpoint which is similar to the theory of *Nayavāda* of Jainism,

Buddhism was aware of the conception of the *Nayavāda* of Jainism, since the *Aṅguttara Nikāya* refers to the several *Paccekasaccas* (individual truths) of the several Recluses and Brāhmaṇas. If it is so, the conception of *Paccekasacca* (Partial truth) of Buddhism is definitely influenced by the *Nayavāda* of Jainism. There is no doubt that Jainism founded this theory earlier than Buddhism.

3. The Theory of Syādvāda

We have observed in our discussion on *Nayavāda* that it is not an absolute means of knowing the nature of reality. The further examination of truth is attempted by the theory of Conditional Dialectic or *Syādvāda*. The *Nayavāda* is analytical in character, while the *Syādvāda* is a synthetical in method. The latter investigates the various standpoints of the truth made possible by *nāya* and integrates them into a constant and comprehensive synthesis. Dasgupta describes the relation between these two methods as follows : "There is no universal or absolute position or negation, and all judgements are valid only conditionally. The relation of the *nāya* doctrine with the *syādvāda* doctrine is, therefore, this, that for any judgement according to any and every *nāya* there are as many alternatives as are indicated by *Syādvāda*.⁶⁹"

The prefix *Syāt* in the *Syādvāda* represents the existence of those characters which, though not perceived at the mom-

ent, are present in reality (*nirdeśyamānadharmavyatirikṣā* 'śeṣadharmāntarasarīsūcakena Syāt yukto vādo'bhīpretadharmavacanāni Syādvādaḥ). Syādvāda reveals the certainty regarding any problem and not merely the possibility or probability. It is a unique contribution of Jainism to Indian Philosophy. Syādvādin is a popular appellation given by later philosophers to Jains. Dharmakīrti, Araṇya and Śāntarakṣita used this term for the Jains in their respective works.

Syāt is generally rendered into English as "may be" or "perhaps" which is far from appropriate. As a matter of fact, there is no appropriate word for Syāt in English, but we can translate it with the term *relatively* which is closer and more suitable to convey the significance of the theory. The Concise Oxford Dictionary gives the meaning of *relatively* as "having mutual relations, corresponding in some way, related to each other".⁷⁰ H.G.A.⁷¹ Van Zeyst writes : "When a function indicates some definite relationship in which the object stands to some other object, the term must be described as "relative". There is a word *Kathañcut* in Sanskrit literature which is used as a substitute for Syāt by Jaina as well as non-Jaina philosophers. These connotations tally with the inner meaning of Syāt.

Further Syādvāda makes an effort to respect other doctrines by warning us against allowing the use of *eva* or *only* to proceed beyond its prescribed limits and penetrates the truth patiently and non-violently. The uniqueness of Syādvāda as the most peaceful and non-violent means of arriving at the Truth through argumentation is emphasised by Tatiya in his assessment of Syādvāda in Jain Philosophy : "It is the attitude of tolerance and justice that was responsible for the origin of the doctrine of non-absolutism (*anekāntavāda*). Out of universal tolerance and peace-loving nature was born cautiousness of speech. Out of cautiousness of speech was born the habit of explaining a problem with the help of *Siyavāya* (*syādvāda*) or *Vibhajjavāya*. This habit again developed into a non-absolutistic attitude towards reality."⁷²

It would be helpful to remember that the nature of reality is determined in Jainism by referring to the *dravya* (matter), *Kṣetra* (place), *kāla* (time) and *bhāva* (state). This is the positive factor. The negative factor is that of referring to the negative counterpart (*niṣēdha-pratimukha*) or a particular object such as the absence of *ghaṭatva* (jariness) in cloth and, vice versa. This negative factor constitutes the full-fledged, nature of the Jar as the positive one.

According to the conception of *Syādvāda*, both identity and difference must exist in reality. But opponents categorically deny this claim on the ground that a dual character can never exist in an entity. The critics of *Syādvāda* object to it on the basis that *Syādvāda* gives rise to the following erroneous results⁷³ : (i) *Virodha* or self-contradiction, like hot and cold, (ii) *Vaiyadhikarāṇya* or absence of a common abode, (iii) *Anavasthā* or *regressus ad infinitum*, (iv) *Saṅkara* or confusion, (v) *Vyatikara* or exchange of natures, (vi) *Samśaya* or doubt, (vii) *Apratipatti* or non-apprehension, and (viii) *Uvayadoṣa* or fallacies on both sides. Out of these defects *Virodhadoṣa* is considered by them to be the most glaring. The Jainas do not accept that there is any self-contradiction in *Syādvāda*. They put forth three possible forms in which *virodha* can occur :

(i) *Vadhyaghātakabhāva* or destructive opposition, like mon-goose (*nakula*) and the serpent (*ahi*).

(ii) *Sahānavasthānabhāva* or the non-congruent opposition, like *śyāma* and *ṇīta* in a ripe mango.

(iii) *Pratibadhyapratibandhakabhāva* or the obstructive opposition, like the "moonstone" which protects the sun's rays. And they maintain that these forms of *virodhas* cannot effect their theories of reality. They also say that an entity is *ananta-dharmatmaka* (having innumerable characters) which cannot be perceived at once by ordinary men until and unless, we conceive the problem through negative and positive aspects (*bhāvābhāvātmaśakti*), identity-in-difference (*bhedā-bhedena*) eternity-in-non-eternity (*nityānityātmaśakti*),

universal-cum-particular elements (*sāmīnyaviśeṣātmakena*), or substance-in-modes (*dravyaparyāyātmakena*). Each and everything is related to the four-fold nature of itself (*svadrayacatuṣṭaya*) and is not related to the fourfold nature of the other-than-itself (*paraḍrayacatuṣṭaya*). For instance, the jar is the jar in itself, but it is not the jar in relation to others, as cloth, fruit, etc. No one can deny this dual characteristic of a thing, otherwise its negative aspects or non-existing characteristics would disappear and their modes would commingle.⁷⁴

According to the Jainas, the non-existences (*abhāvas*) are of four kinds, viz. *Prāgabdhāva*, *Pradhvaṃsābhāva*, *Itaretarābhāva* and *Anyonyābhāva*.

(i) *Prāgabdhāva* means the non-existence of an effect in the cause.⁷⁵ The substance is eternal which can neither be newly created nor completely destroyed.⁷⁶ The effect accordingly does not exist before its own existence, which is a result of causes. The substance in itself is an effect and the modes are the causes. That means the pre-modes are the *prāgabdhāva* of post-modes. The clay or the curd is the *Prāgabdhāva* of jar (*ghaṭa*) and butter (*ghṛta*). If this previous negation were not there, the product clay or curd would always exist in their effects jar or butter.

(ii) *Pradhvaṃsābhāva* means the non-existence of an effect after destruction.⁷⁷ *Prāgabdhāva* is the *upādāna* (material cause) and *Pradhvaṃsābhāva* is the *Nimitta* (determining cause). The first destroys then the other originates. If this negation were not in an entity, milk would still be there in curd.

(iii) *Itaretarābhāva* or *Anyonyābhāva* means mutual non-existence. Each entity exists in its nature which cannot be transferred to others. The cow cannot possess the form of the horse.⁷⁸ If this mutual negation were not in entities, the horse would become every other thing.

(iv) *Atyantābhāva* means the absolute non-existence of an entity. As for instance, the sky-flower (*ākāśa-kusumī*)

or *Śata-viṣāṇa* (horns to the hares), which have no existence at all.⁷⁹

On the basis of above exposition, the Jainas endeavour to answer the objections raised by opponents through the different aspects of the nature of reality. They are dealt with below :

The Identity-in-difference (*bhedābhedātmaka*)

The identity-in-difference is the main figure which guards the Jaina standpoint against the attacks of opponents. The exposition of this central idea has been a necessary talk to the Jaina Acāryas. They postulate a theory that a substance is neither absolutely different than other things, nor absolutely alike. Otherwise how could the quality (*guṇa*) and qualified (*guṇī*) be distinguished ?

An entity is characterised by birth (*utpāda*), death (*vyaya*) and permanence (*dhrauvya*). All entities are included in this definition *Sat* or substance is *abheda* and *guṇas* are *bheda*. Apart from *guṇas* or *paryāyas*, there is no existence. Therefore, reality is called the identity-in-difference.

Eternal-cum-non-eternal aspects (*nityānītātmaka*)

In the same way the substance can be neither absolutely eternal nor absolutely non-eternal, but it is eternal-cum-non-eternal. If we do not accept this, causal efficiency (*arthakriyā*) would not be possible with an entity and all the transaction would fail due to the static or perpetual fluxive character of thing. Pre-existence would be 'dis-connected with the post-existence. How then could the doer and enjoyer be recognized ?

Likewise, reality is universalized-cum-particularised, one-cum-innumerable, etc. from real and practical standpoints. There is no self-contradiction in this recognition, since the nature of reality is conceived relatively.

Saptabhaṅgī or a theory of Sevenfold predication

Saptabhaṅgī or the theory of sevenfold predication is a method of cognition to apprehend the correct nature of reality-

through a sevenfold relativist dialectic method. It is treated as complementary to the Syādvāda doctrine. Akalaṅka thinks of it as a way which considers the modes of a thing in a positive (*vidhimukhenā*) and negative (*niṣedhamukhenā*) manner without incompatibility in a certain context. The sevenfold predications are as follows :

- (i) *syādaṣṭi* or relatively it is.
- (ii) *syānnāṣṭi* or relatively it is not.
- (iii) *syādaṣṭi nāṣṭi* or relatively it is and is not.
- (iv) *syādaṣṭyavaktavya* or relatively it is inexpressible.
- (v) *syādaṣṭyavaktavya* or relatively it is and is inexpressible.
- (vi) *syānnāṣṭyavaktavya* or relatively it is not and is inexpressible.
- (vii) *syādaṣṭināṣṭyavaktavya* or it is, is not, and is inexpressible.

Here the radical modes of predication are only three in number—*syādaṣṭi*, *spṛāyānnāṣṭi*, and *syādaṣṭyavaktavya* which construct other predications by combining themselves. The first two modes represent the affirmative or being (*asti-va*), and the negative or non-being (*nāstīva*) characters of an entity. The third is a combination of both being and non-being. The fourth is inexpressible in its predicate. The remaining three modes are the combined forms of the first, second, and the third. The first two and the fourth predications are consequently the assertions of simple judgements, and the remaining four of complex judgements. According to the mathematical formula, the three fundamental predications make seven modes and not more than that.

The first mode represents the existence of the jar (*ghaṭa*) and the non-existence of cloth (*paṭa*) in the jar. The second predication shows the negative aspect of jar that it does not exist as cloth or anything else. There is no contradiction here, since the predication asserts the relative and determinate abstraction. The third mode offers a successive presentation (*kramārpaṇa*) of negative and positive aspects of an entity, while the fourth one offers a simultaneous presenta-

tion (*sahārpaṇa*) of the two concepts. According to Jain conception, one word represents one meaning. The relation between a word and its meaning is described by Jainas as *Vācyavācakanīyama*. The characters of *being* and *non-being* in the jar cannot be expressed at once (*yugapāt*). Therefore this predication is designated as inexpressible (*avaktavya*). The remaining are the combined modes derived from bringing together the first, second and the third with the fourth one, which express the complex judgements.

Each of these modes contains one alternative truth while altogether contain the complete truth. Observing the importance of this method Padmarajiah says : "The whole method, therefore, may be said to be one which helps a patient inquiring mind in its adventure of mapping out the winding paths running into the faintly known or unknown regions of reality and bringing them within the bounds of human knowledge."⁸⁰

Syādvāda conception in Buddhist literature

The rudiments of the Syādvāda conception are found in Vedic and Buddhist literature. It appears to have originally belonged to the Jainas, if we accept Jainism as pre-Vedic religion, and all the subsequent thinkers adopted it as a common approach to the nature of reality. That is the reason why various forms of *Syādvāda* are found in the different philosophical schools.

Vedic literature records negative and positive attitudes towards problems. The *Rgveda* which is supposed to be of the earliest period, preserves the rudiments of this doctrine in the *Nāsadīya Sūkta*. It manifests the spiritual experience, of the great sage, who describes the nature of the universe as :

Nāsadāsīno sadāsīt tadānīm nāsīdrajo no vyomāparo yat.
Kimābaribah kuha kasya śarmannambhaḥ kimāsīdgahanam
gabhīram. Na mṛtyurāsīdamṛtaṁ na tarhi na rātryā ahna
āsīt praketaḥ Ānīdavātaṁ svadhayā tadekaṁ tasmāddhān-
yanna paraḥ kiṁ canāsa.

"There was not the non-existent nor the existent ; there not the air nor the heaven which is beyond. What did it

contain ? Where ? In whose protection ? Was there water, unfathomable, profound ? There was not the becom of night, nor of day. That one breathed, windness by its own power. Other than that there was not anything beyond".⁸¹ This indicates inexpressibility (*anirvacanīyatva*) about the nature of the universe.

The Upaniṣadic period presents this speculation in a more concrete form by taking positive steps. The *Chāndogyopaniṣad*⁸² represents the idea that Being (*sat*) is the ultimate source of existence, while some *Upaniṣads* uphold the view that Non-being is the source of Being (*asad vā idam agra āsit. tato vai sat ajāyato*).⁸³ On the other hand, some Upaniṣads assert that it is both, Being and Non-being (*sadāśadavareṇyaṁ*),⁸⁴ and some later Upaniṣads maintain that Non-being cannot be expressed by using a particular name and form (*asad avyākṛta nāmārūpam*).⁸⁵

Thus the concept or *Syādvāda* found in Vedic literature commences from polytheism and goes on to monotheism and is later replaced by monism. This indicates that the theory was not rigid. The later developed Vedic philosophical systems were also influenced by this idea and they conceived the problems from different standpoints with the exception of that of complete relativism.

The Naiyāyikas,⁸⁶ though they used the word *anekānta*,⁸⁷ could not support the *Anekāntavāda* entirely and they accepted the atoms, soul, etc. as having absolute unchangeable characters. The Vedānta philosophical attitude also runs on the same lines. Even considering a thing through empirical (*vyāvahārika*) and real (*pāramārthika*) standpoints, it asserts that all standpoints are inferior to the standpoint of *Brahman*.⁸⁸

The *Syādvāda* conception is found in a more developed form in Buddhist literature. The *Brahmajālasutta* refers to sixty-two Wrong-views (*micchaditṭhis*) of which four belong to the Sceptics. They are known as *Amarāvikkhepikā* (who

being questioned resort to verbal jugglery and eelwriggling) on four grounds⁹⁰ The Commentary of the *Dīghanikāya* presents its two alternative explanations. According to first, *Amarāvikkhepikā* are those who are confused by their endless beliefs and words. The second explanation gives meaning that like a fish named amarā, the theory of *Amarāvikkhepikā* runs hither and thither without arriving at a definite conclusion.⁹⁰

The first of these schools is defined thus : "Herein a certain recluse or brāhmin does not understand, as it really is, that this is good (*kusalaṃ*) or this is evil (*akusalaṃ*). It occurs to him : I do not understand what is good or evil as it really is. Not understanding what is good or evil, as it really is, if I were to assert that this is good and this is evil, that will be due to my likes, desires, aversions or resentments. If it were due to my likes, desires, aversions, or resentments, it would be wrong. And if I were wrong, it would cause me worry (*vighāto*) and worry would be a moral danger to me (*antarāyo*). Thus, through fear of lying (*musāvāda-bhayā*), and the abhorrence of being lying, he does not assert anything to be good or evil and on questions being put to him on this or that matter he resorts to verbal jugglery and eel-wriggling, saying : I do not say so, I do not say this, I do not say otherwise, I do not say no, I deny the denials (I do not say, "no no").⁹¹

According to this school, it is impossible to achieve knowledge which is a hinderance to heaven or salvation (*Sagga-ssa c'eva maggassa ca antarāyo*).⁹² The second and the third school of sceptics do not assert anything to be good or evil through fear of involvement (*upadānabhayā*) and a fear of interrogation in debate (*anuyogabhayā*).

The fourth school of Sceptics followed the philosophy of Sañjaya Belaṭṭhiputta who fails to give a definite answer to any metaphysical question put to him. His fourfold scheme or the five-fold formula of denial is based on the negative aspects which are as follows :⁹³

- (i) *evam pi me no* (I do not say so).
- (ii) *tathāpi me no* (I do not say thus).
- (iii) *aññathāpi me no* (I do not say otherwise).
- (iv) *no ti pi me no* (I do not say no).
- (v) *no no ti pi me no* (I do not deny it).

This formula is applied with regard to the answering of several questions as :⁹⁴

- (i) *atthi paro loko* (there is another world).
- (ii) *natthi paro loko* (there is not another world).
- (iii) *atthi ca natthi ca paro loko* (there is and is not another world).
- (iv) *Natthi na natthi paro loko* (there neither is nor is not another world).

The commentary offers two explanations of the meaning of this formula. According to the first explanation, proposition (1) is an indefinite rejection or denial (*aniyamitavikkhepo*). Proposition (2) is the denial of a specific proposition, e. g. the eternalism (*sassatavāda*) when asked whether the world and the soul are eternal. Proposition (3) is the denial of a variant of (3) e. g. the rejection of the semi-eternal theory (*ekaccasassatāṃ*), which is said to be somewhat different from (*aññathā*). Proposition (4) is the denial of the contrary of (2), e. g. the denial of the nihilist theory (*ucchedavādaṃ*) when asked whether a being (*tathāgato*) does not exist after death. Proposition (5) is the rejection of the dialectician's view (*takkivādaṃ*) of a double denial, e. g. denying the position if asked whether a being neither exists nor does not exist after death.

According to the second explanation, Proposition (1) is the denial of an assertion e. g. if asked whether this is good, he denies it. Proposition (2) is the denial of a simple negation, e. g. if asked whether this is not good, he denies it. Proposition (3) is a denial that what you are stating is different from both (1) and (2) e. g. if asked whether his position is different from both (1) and (2) (*ubhaya aññathā*) he denies it. Propo-

sition (4) is a denial that you are stating a point of view different from the above e. g. if asked whether his thesis (*ladāhi*) is different from the three earlier points of view (*tivādhena pi na hoti*), he denies it. Proposition (5) is a denial of the denials, e. g. if asked whether his thesis is to deny everything (*no no te ladāhi ti*) he denies it. Thus he does not take his stand (*na tiṭṭhati*) on any of the logical alternatives (*ekasmin pi pakke*).

Both these explanations show that the fifth proposition of Sañjaya's philosophy is the rejection of denial. Therefore only four propositions of the theory remain. They can be compared with the first four predications of the *Syādvāda* theory of Jainas :

- (i) *Syādaṣṭi* (relatively it is).
- (ii) *Syānnāṣṭi* (relatively it is not).
- (iii) *Syādaṣṭi nāṣṭi* (relatively it is and is not).
- (iv) *Syādavaktavya* (relatively it is inexpressible).

Observing this similarity, several scholars like Keith⁹⁶ are ready to give the credit to Sañjaya for initiating this four-fold predication to solve the logical problems. On the other hand, some savants like Jacobi think that in opposition to the Agnosticism of sañjaya, Mahāvīrā has established *Syādvāda*. Miyamoto asserts in his article "The Logic of Reality as the Common Ground for the development of the Middle Way" that Sañjaya's system is quite close to the Buddhist standpoint of the indescribable or inexpressible."⁹⁷

These views are not quite correct. As a matter of fact, the credit should not go only to Sañjaya for the adoption of the four-fold scheme, since there were other schools of sceptics who also accepted a similar scheme. Śīlaṅka referred to four groups of such schools *Kriyāvādins*, *Akriyāvādins*, *Ajñānavādins*, and *Vaiṇeyikas*. These are further sub-divided into 363 schools based on purely the nine categories (*nava padārthas*) of Jainism.⁹⁸ These schools were mainly concerned with four questions. They are as follows :

(i) Who knows whether there is an arising of psychological states ? (*Sati bhāvotpattiḥ ko vetthi*) ?

(ii) Who knows whether there is no arising of psychological states ? (*Asati bhāvotpattiḥ ko vetthi*) ?

(iii) Who knows whether there is and there is no arising of psychological states ? (*Sadasati bhāvotpattiḥ ko vetthi*) ?

(iv) Who knows whether the arising of psychological states is inexpressible ? (*Avaktavyo bhāvotpattiḥ ko vetthi*) ?

These questions are similar to first four *Syādvāda* predications. The main difference between the Predications of Sceptics and Jainas was that the former doubts or denies the logical problems altogether whereas the latter asserts that they are true to a certain extent,

Makkhali Gāsāla and Syādvāda

Makkhal Gosāla, the founder of the Ājīvika sect and an earlier companion of Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta, has contributed to the development of the *Syādvāda* conception. He considered problems through the three-fold standpoints, called *Trirāśis*,⁹⁹ a short version of *Sapta-bhaṅgi*.

On the basis of the *Nandīśūtra* commentary, Basham observes : "The Ājīvika heretics founded by Gosāla are likewise called *Trairāśikas*, since they declare everything to be of triple character, viz. : living, not living, and both living and not living : world, not world, and both world and not world; real, unreal, and both real and unreal, in considering standpoints (*naya*) regarding the nature of substance, of mode, or of both. Thus since they maintain three heaps (*rāśi*) or categories they are called *Trairāśikas*". Further he says "the Ājīvikas thus seem to have accepted the basic principles of Jaina epistemology, without going to the over-refined extreme of *Saptabhaṅgi*, as in the orthodox Jaina *Syādvāda* and *nayavāda*."¹⁰⁰

This reference indicates that the Ājīvikas were aware of the *Saptabhaṅgi* of the Jaina logic and they reduced them to three. Dr. Jayatilaka remarks on this reference : "But jud-

ged by the fact that the three-fold scheme of predication is simpler than the four-fold scheme of the Sceptics and Buddhists and the corresponding seven-fold scheme of the Jainas, it would appear to be earlier than both the Buddhist and the Jain schemes, with which the Ājīvikas could not have been acquainted when they evolved theirs." Further he says, "In fact, it can be shown that in the earliest Buddhist and Jaina texts the very doctrine of the *Trairūśikas*, which seems to have necessitated the three-fold scheme, is mentioned, thus making it highly probable that it was atleast earlier than the Jain scheme". He accounts for this view by saying that "while the earliest stratum of the Pāli Nikāyas knows of the four-fold scheme, one of the earliest Books of the Jain Canon, the *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*, which makes an independent reference to this *Trairūśika* doctrine, does not mention the seven-fold scheme, although it is aware of the basic principles of Syādvāda.¹⁰¹

Here Jayatilleke tries to prove that that three-fold scheme appears to be earlier than the Jaina scheme. He gives a reason in support of his view that the *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* does not mention the Seven-fold scheme. I too hold the three-fold scheme had come into existence earlier than the four-fold scheme. Dīghanakha pīrāṇaka, who seems to be a follower of the Pārśvanātha tradition, also maintains, as we have already found, this scheme.

As regards the absence of the reference in the *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*, it should be remembered that it is not totally unaware of the basic principles of Syādvāda, as Jayatilleke himself accepts. It is said that "the wise man should not joke or explain without conditional propositions."¹⁰² He should "expound the analytical theory (*vibhajjavāyama ca vyāgrejja*) and use the two kinds of speech, living among virtuous men, impartial and wise.¹⁰³ Further it does not deal with the Jaina philosophy. It is a concise compilation of the Jaina doctrines as well as others of that time. It was, therefore, not essential to deal with Syādvāda in detail. Kundakunda, who flourished in the first

century B. C. or in the beginning of the Christian era, described to the Saptabhaṅgī, himself in the *Pāṇcastikāyasāra*. He says that "Dravya can be described by the seven-fold predication : (1) *siya atthi* or *syādasti*, (ii) *siya natthi*, or *syānnāsti*, (iii) *siya uhayaṃ* or *syādestināsti*, (iv) *siya-avvattavva* or *syādvavaklavva* (v) *siya atthi-avvatavva* or *syādestyavaktavya*, (vi) *siya natthi avvattavva* or *syānnāstyavaktavya*, and (vii) *siya atthi natthi avvattavva* or *Syādestināstyavaktavya* :

Siya atthi natthi uhayaṃ avvattavvaṃ puno ya tattidayarṇ.
Davvaṃ khu satta bhaṅgaṃ ādesavasena sambhavadi.¹⁰⁴

This means that the Syādvāda and its predications were well known at the time of the Buddha, and upto the time of Kundakunda they were developed still further.

This Buddha and Syādvāda

During the Buddha's time there were certain philosophical points which became the subjects of violent debate. Having realised the futility of such debates the Buddha became an analyst, like the Jainas.¹⁰⁵ In the *Dīghanikāya* the Buddha is reported to have said that he had taught and laid down his doctrines with categorical (*ekaṃsikkū*) and non-categorical (*anekāmsikkā*) assertions.¹⁰⁶ The theory of Four-Noble-Truths is an example of the former, and the theory of *Avyākatas* is of the latter.

Here the term *ekaṃsikkū* and *anekāmsikkā* are very similar to *ekāntavāda* and *anekāntavāda*. The former is concerned with the non-Jaina philosophies and the latter with the Jaina philosophy. The difference between the Buddha's and Nigaṇṭha Nāputta's standpoints is that according to the former's conception the non-categorical assertions are not true or false, from some standpoint or another, unless we analyse them; while the latter upholds the view that all the statements are relatively (*syāt*) correct, i. e. they contain some aspect of the truth. The theory of *Avyākata* does not consist of any such quality.

The Buddha adopted the four-fold scheme to answer the logical questions of that time as outlined below :

- (i) *atthi* (it is).
- (ii) *natthi* (it is not).
- (iii) *atthi ca natthi ca* (it is and it is not), and
- (iv) *n'ev'atthi na ca natthi* (it neither is, nor is not).

This four-fold scheme has been used in several places of the Pāli Canon. For instance :

- (i) *Channam phassāyatananam asesaviraganirodhā atth' aññam, kinci ti ?* (is there anything else after complete detachment from and cessation of the six spheres of experience ?).
- (ii) *Channam...natth' aññam kinci ti ?*
- (iii) *Channam...atthi ca n'atthi c' aññam kinci ti ?*
- (iv) *Channam n'ev'atthi na n'atth' aññam kinci ti ?*

Miyamoto observes that the seven-fold scheme of the jainas is equivalent to the four-fold scheme of Buddhists in the following manner :

- | | | |
|--------------------------------|---|-----|
| (i) Syādasti | = | 1 |
| (ii) Syānnāsti | = | 11 |
| (iii) Syādastināsti | = | 111 |
| (iv) Syādavaktavya | | |
| (v) Syādastyavaktavya | | |
| (iv) Syānnāstyavaktavya | = | IV |
| (vii) Syādastināstyavaktavya | | |

But this observation is not perfectly right, since the Jainas pondered over the problems more profoundly than the Buddhists. It would be more appropriate if we think of the first four propositions of the Buddhists; But there are differences between the Jaina and the Buddhist schemes. According to the Jaina scheme, all the seven propositions could be true from relative standpoints, while in the Buddhist scheme only one proposition could be true. the propositions are not considered logical alternatives in Jainism as considered in Buddhism.

It is more probable that the Buddha's *Catuṣkoṭi* formula has been influenced by the four-fold formula of Sañjaya,

although there are also traces of the influence of the seven-fold formula of the Jains. Such formulas, it must be remembered, were commonly accepted at that time by teachers with different attitudes.

Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta and Syādvāda in Pāli Literature

The Pāli Canon considers *Anekāntavāda* or *Syādvāda* a combination of both *Uccedavāda* and *Sassatavāda*. As we have already mentioned, Buddhaghosa was of the opinion that Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta presented his views in contradictory ways.¹⁰⁸ We have seen how this was due to the fact that Buddhaghosa could not understand the real nature of *Syādvāda*.

We know that Jaina Philosophy considers problems neither by absolute eternalism nor absolute nihilism, but eternalism-cum-nihilism. Apart from the confusion regarding *Sassatavāda* and *Uccedavāda*, there are no explicit references to *Syādvāda* in the pāli Canon. The absence of direct references does not mean that the *Syādvāda* conception was not a part and parcel of the doctrines of the Nātaputta at that time. This conclusion is further strengthened by the fact that Buddhist books appear to be aware of some characteristics of *Syādvāda*, which might have belonged to the tradition of Pārśvanātha.

In the course of a discussion, the Buddha says to Saccaka, who was a follower of the Pārśvanātha tradition and converted later to the Nātaputta's religion, that his former statement is not keeping with the latter, nor the latter with the former (*na kho te sandhiyati purimena vā pacchimanā pacchimeṇa vā purimā*).¹⁰⁹ Here attention is drawn to self-contradictions in Saccaka's statements. This might have been an early instance of adducing self-contradiction (*svātmavirodha*) as an argument against *Syādvāda*. This has been an oft-repeated criticism against *Syādvāda* by opponents of different times.

Likewise in the course of a conversation held between Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta and Citta Gahapati, the latter blames the former for his self-Contradictory conception. He says; If your former statement is true, your latter statement is false, an d

if your latter statement is true, your primer statement is false.
(*sace purīmaṃ saccam, pacchimaṃ te micchā, sace pacchimaṃ
saccam purīmaṃ te micchā*).¹¹⁰

Another reference found in Pāli literature helps us to understand the position of Syādvāda. The *Dīghanakha* of the *Majjhima Nikāya* mentions the three kinds of theories upheld by Dīghanakha Paribbājaka. They are as follows :¹¹¹

- (i) *Sabbam me khamati* (I agree with all (views)),
- (ii) *Sabbam me na khamati* (I agree with no (views)).
- (iii) *Ekkaccaṃ me khamati, ekaccaṃ me na khamati* (I agree with some (views) and disagree with other (views)).

The Buddha criticises Dīghanakha's views in various ways, and expresses his own views towards the problem. Dīghanakha's views are similar to the predications of Syādvāda, and represent its first three *bhaṅgīs* as follows :

- (i) *Sabbam me khamati* = Syādasti,
- (ii) *Sabbam me na khamati* = Syānnāsti.
- (iii) *Ekkaccaṃ me khamati; ekaccaṃ me na khamati* = Syādestināsti..

Now the problem is to consider to which school of thought Dīghanakha belonged. According to the commentary on the *Majjhima Nikāya*, he is said to be a holder of the view of *Ucchedavāda*,¹¹² which is a part of Syādvāda school in the opinion of Buddhaghosa. He might have belonged to Sañjaya's of Paribbājakas who were followers of Parśvanātha tradition converted later to Nātaputta's religion before he joined the Buddha's order.¹¹³ Dīghanakha was a nephew or Sañjaya. It seems, therefore, that he was a follower of Jainism. This inference may be confirmed if Dīghanakha can be identified with Dīghatapassī of the *Upālisutta* of *Majjhima Nikāya*, who was a follower of Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta.

In the above propositions of Saccaka, Citta Gahapati and Dīghanakha Paribbājaka, we can trace the first four predications (including *Syādavaktavya*) of Syādvāda conception of Jainism.

It is not impossible that the term *Syāt* had been used by Jainas in the beginning of each predication justly correctly

the others' views on the basis of non-absolutism. The word *Syāt* (*Siya* in Pali), which indicates the definite standpoint towards the problems, is also used in the *Cūla Rahulovāda-sutta* of the *Mājjhima Nikāya*, where the two types of the *Tejodhātu* are pointed out in definite way.¹¹⁴ It seems that the word *Syāt* originally belonged to the Jainas and was later used by the Buddhists in a particular sense. The defect of self-contradiction in *Syādvāda* conception of the Jainas is a criticism levelled against it by the Buddhists. It happened so, only because of ignorance of the meaning of *Syāt*. As a matter of fact, the Jainas had concentrated their attention on the controversial points in different theories of then philosophers and had tried to examine their views from different stand-points. By this method the Jainas could figure out the real nature of reality and consider the problem in a non-violent way.

The refutation of *Syādvāda* in Buddhist literature

The Buddhist Ācāryas at different times criticised the *Syādvāda* conception of the Jainas on the grounds of self-contradiction, commingling, doubt, etc. The main arguments of the foremost Buddhist logicians were as follows :

Nāgārjuna and *Syādvāda*

Ācārya Kundakunda and Umāsvāti were among the earliest who established clearly the theory of the triple character (production, destruction, and permanence) of reality in Jainism. Nāgārjuna (about 150-250 A. D.), the propounder of *Śūnyavāda* made the charge that the theory of triple character is itself a self-contradictory formula, as it cannot be associated with reality, since such a thesis is faulty on account of *anavasthādoṣa* (regressus ad infinitum).¹¹⁵

Dharmakīrti and *Syādvāda*

In the *Prāmāṇya-Vārtika* (*svavṛtti*) Dharmakīrti remarks that the *Anekāntavāda* is mere non-sensical talk (*pralāpa-mātra*). He says in the course of refuting the *Bhedābheda* theory that the *Digambaras* (Jainas-*Anhrikas*), who present

their doctrines in a fantastic way, could be refuted in the same way as the Sāṅkhya philosophy, which thinks of the nature of reality as absolute difference (*atyantābheda*). He then mentions that the Jainas hold a view : "All is one, and all is not one (*sarvaṃ sarvātmakaṃ na sarvaṃ sarvātmakaṃ*).¹¹⁶

Dharmakīrti tries to clarify his remark by presenting a traditional example of the Jainas. The Jainas explain their theory of the nature of reality with the illustration of a golden jar (*svaṃśaḥṣa*), where gold is considered the general, and not the particular, character. Here Dharmakīrti points out why the Jainas do not recognize the jar or pot itself as a general character, since *Dravyatva* is in all of them according to Jainism.

Dharmakīrti is of the view that the Jaina theory of dual character, viz. universal and particular, is so formulated that the character of particularity is relegated to the background and made less significant. He explains this with reference to the famous example of camel and curd. If the particularity which distinguishes camel from curd or vice versa is not an important factor, he says one may as well eat a camel when he wants to eat curd. He tries by this argument to demolish the Jaina theory as he understood that curd is not only curd by itself (*Svarūpeṇa*) but also camel in a relative sense (*pararūpeṇa*). According to Dharmakīrti, there cannot be a universal character between camel and curd and even if such a character exists, their mutual difference or particularity is all that matters for both identification and use.¹¹⁷

Against the Jaina conception of the universal character of a thing, he says : if all realities are *sat* (being or isness), there would be no difference between knowledge and word (*dhi* and *dhvani*) that imparts a knowledge, which is quite impossible. Therefore Śyādvāda conception in Dharmakīrti's opinion is defective.¹¹⁸

Prajñākaragupta and Śyādvāda :

Prajñākaragupta (660-720 A. D.), the well known commentator and a pupil of Dharmakīrti, also refutes the Jain theory

of reality. His criticism is very similar to the criticism of Nāgārjuna. Prjñākara says : origination, destruction, and permanence cannot exist together. If is destroyed how can it be a reality; if it is permanent, how can there be destruction, and if it is permanent, it should always be in mind. He then argues that the reality cannot be realised as both eternal and non-eternal. It should be accpeted as either eternal or non-eternal.¹¹⁹ Here Prajñākara pointed out that the triple character of a thing is a self-contradictory theory.

Arcaṭa and Syādvāda :

Samantabhadra's view mentioned in the "*dravyaparyāya-yorāikyam*" and "*saṃjñāsamukhyāviśeṣaśca*" has not been refuted by Dharmakīrti. Whatever may be its reason, it is criticised by his commentator Arcaṭa (about the seventh century A. D.) who followed the arugments of Nāgārjuna.¹²⁰ He says : origination and destruction cannot exist together in one dharmi, since they are contradictory in character. The argument "they take place relatively" would not solve the question, because in the course of origination and destruction, permanence would not be there, and likewise in the presence of a permanent character the other two would be absent. Therefore, a triple-charactered nature of reality as the Jainas assert, is not possible according to Arcaṭa's way of thinking.¹²¹

An another place he tries to refute the *Bhedābheda* { identity-in-difference } conception which means the substance and its modes cannot be separated from a realistic stendpoint, but they are different in name, number, nature, place, etc. from a practical viewpoint. It appears as if he does not see much difference between *ubhayavāda* of Vaiśeṣikas and *bhedābheda* of Jainas. That is the reason why he conceives the substance as being completely different from its modes.

He refutes the view first in prose under the heading "*Anhr-ikādisammatasya dravyaparyāyāḥ bhedābhedāpakṣasyanirāsaḥ*" and then the same arguments are repeated in fourty-five stanzas, The gist of them is as follows :

The difference between substance and its modes by the name, number, etc. and unity of them into one by place, time, and nature, is not possible as the nature of reality, since an entity cannot assume more than one character.¹²²

He further points out that *saṃjñā* is the cause of an intimation (*saṃketa*) which depends on desires. How then can one differentiate it by name, since it is also one, not two ? Words are fictitious, the difference therefore, would be imaginative. *Sanṅkhyābheda* also is not possible as there is a difference between *vācya* (to be spoken) and *vācaka* (speaker), which is also *kalpita* (imaginative).

Further he points out that without the destruction of a substance there would be no destruction of its modes. Hence, they can be identified neither as *bheda* nor as *abheda*. If the modes are different from the substance, words would not be connected with them. If they are accepted as non-different, their natures would be one. How then could the *Lakṣāṇabheda* be applied ? *Kāryabheda* is also not possible as there is no difference in nature.¹²⁴

The theory "substance and its modes are not different (*abheda*) in place, time, nature" is also defective in Prajñā-kara's views. He says : "position, the form, smell, juice, touch etc. are different in modifications. If the nature stays with substance and modes in the form of destruction and otherwise, the substance would be two as *ghaṭa* and *paṭa*, not one which removes *abhedatva* with them. Further he says, if the *bhedābheda* is accepted, the *bheda* (difference) would be fictitious due to not leaving the *abheda* (identity), and hence *abheda* would be proved as false in character. Here Arcaṭa thinks in terms of *ubhayavāda* that if the substance and mode are completely different, all the evils of both the "identity-view and difference-view" will lay upon this conception.¹²⁴

Arcaṭa refers to the Jaina's view that they analyse reality through *sui-generis* (*Jātyantarā*) which exposes the combination of identity and difference, although it makes a distinction

between the particular and general character of reality. For instance, *Narasimha* is a combination of man and lion, which is not self-contradictory because of the theory of *sui-generis*.

Opposing this theory, Arcaṭa points out thāt *Narasimha* is a compendium of atoms which cannot be transformed into *narasimha*. Due to a combination of the forms which is called *śabalarūpa*, a place of existence of diverse naturas. How then could a unity in nature be proved? Arcaṭa finally remarks that this is the philosophy of block-heads (*darśanakṛto'yaṁ viprāyaso madhamatinām*):

This criticism is based on the understanding that the nature of reality is completely in two different forms. This is the view of Vaiśeṣikas, not Jainas. This criticism made by Āraṇyakas is answered by the later Jaina philosophers such as Vādirājasūri, Anantavīrya, Prabhācandra.

Śāntarākṣita and Syādvāda

Śāntarākṣita examined the Syādvāda doctrine of the Jainas in a separate chapter of his *Tattvasaṅgraha*. The main defects, according to him, are as follows :

If the oneness between substance and modes is real (*agaṇa*), then the substance also should be destructive like the form of the successive factors or those successive factors themselves should be comprehensive (*anugatātma*) in their character, like the substance. Therefore it should be admitted that either there is absolute destruction of all characters or it consists of the elements of permanence, exclusiveness and inclusiveness, which can-not exist in any single thing.¹²⁶

Hence he turns to the universal and the-particular character of an entity. He says : there would be a comingling (*sāṅkhyā*) and a confusion (*Sandeha*) in the dual nature of reality, the result of which would not be helpful to decide which is general and which is particular (*parasparasvabhāvatve syātsāmānyaviśeṣayoh. sūāṅkhyatattvato nedarā dvairūpyamupapadyate*).¹²⁷

If the general and the particular are regarded as non-different from one and the same thing, how could there be

any difference in the nature of these two characters? And being non-different why should it not be regarded as one? ¹²⁸

The diversity of properties (*dharmabheda*) also cannot be accepted there, since the diversity or plurality cannot be one. As regards the potencies (*śaktīnām*), their diversity is merely a creation of the speakers' desire to speak. As it is crystal clear that both, affirmation and denial, cannot exist in one thing, we have to regard the self-contradiction between unity and plurality. Hence, he observes that any diversity of properties of a single entity can only be a creation of fancy (*kalpita*). ¹²⁹

In diversity (stage of an entity which is excluded from several like and unlike things to this and that) even a single thing may be assumed to have numberless diverse forms; but in reality no single thing can reasonably have two forms.

Śāntarakṣita further gives a traditional example of *Narasimha*. He says: such entities as *narasimha* and others which have been described as possessing dual characters are also not real but conceptual (*kalpita*). These arguments of Śāntarakṣita resemble those of Arcaṭa. ¹²⁹

Thus he arrives at the conclusion that dual character of a thing is figment of mere imagination.

Karṇakagomin and Syādvāda

Karṇakagomin in the *Prāmāṇavārtikasvavṛttiṭīkā* refers to the Digambaras' theory of relativity, according to which they accept the mutual negation (*anyonyābhāva*) to distinguish the realities, so that they should not be confused. He then starts to criticise the view that the distinction among things, cannot be identified by mutual negation, which is possible in entities produced by non-different causes. If they originate from different causes, how does *anyonyābhāva* come into existence? ¹³⁰

Further he tried to show the defects in the Jaina's theory of universal-cum-particular character of *ūrdhvatāsāmānyātmaka* and *tīryaksāmānyātmaka vastu*. He then rejects the theory saying that there should be either *abheda* or *atyantābheda*.

Both characters cannot co-exist in the same substance. Hence the *ūrdhvatūśhmānya* could be destroyed because things are not permanent.

As regards *tiryaksūmānya*, that is also defective in character in his opinion. He says : if the universality were in the substance, the *ghaṭa* (pot) and *paṭa* (linen) or *dadhi* (curd) and *uṣṭra* (camel) would be identical. Hence a shape or a water-pot should be found in cloth and a curdeater should consume a camel.¹⁸¹ Therefore *Syādvāda* doctrine is false (*mithyāvāda*) in his opinion.

Thus Karṇakagomin makes his refutation following Dharmakīrti's arguments, and tries to prove that the dual characteristic of an entity is not possible as it invites serious defects in the theory.

Jitāri and Syādvāda

Jitāri, another Buddhist logician wrote a complete book *Anekāntavādanirāsa* to refute the *Anekāntavāda*. Padmaraja summarizes its arguments as follows :—

When the *Anekāntavādin* maintains that *dravya* and *paryāya* are identical, owing to the identity of their nature, it means that he affirms nothing short of their total identity (*ekarūpa-taiva*) Difference, based on (the secondary consideration) number etc. (*saṅkhyādi*), will then be fictitious (*Kalpanāmā-trakalpītaḥ syūt*). For, a real difference (*pāramārthikobhedah*) between the two cannot proceed from the identity of their nature (*na hi yayohḥ svabhāvabhedahḥ tayohḥ anyathā pāramār-thiko bhedahḥ sambhavati*).¹⁸²

Or conversely, when the *anekāntavādin* pleads that *dravya* and *paryāya* are different, it means that he affirms their unqualified difference. Identity will then be fictitious. For real identity (*svabhāvabhedah*) cannot proceed from the difference which is their basic and total nature. The truth about the whole position, according to Jitāri, is that one cannot have identity as well as difference by the same nature (*na ca tenaiva svabhāvena bhedaścābhedaśca*).

Padmarajah then says : "the entire argument, from the Buddhist side, may be said to have been grounded on the basic truth of the fundamental Buddhist dictum : "It cannot be right to affirm and deny a thing at once, affirmation and denial being mutually contradictory,"¹⁸³

Likewise the same arguments are found in the *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhiṭīkā* According to that, both the affirmative and negative aspects cannot exist in one thing.¹⁸⁴

Evaluation

To sum up, in very ancient days there was a three-fold or four-fold common predication to satisfy the burning philosophical questions of 'mind. Pāli. as well as Jain Prākṛt literature, mention them as Scepticism or agnosticism. The *Anekāntavāda* (non-absolutistic standpoint) which strives to incorporate the truth of all systems, has two main organs that of *Nayavāda* (the doctrine of standpoints), and *Syādvāda* (the dialectic of conditional predication). The whole theory is more renowned by the name of *Syādvāda* and its apprehenders are called *Syādvādinah* or Jainas.

The nature of reality is the main problem of philosophy. On the basis of *Syādvāda* the Jainas established the dual character of reality. In the medieval period of logic the non-Jaina philosophers, especially the Buddhists, such as Nāgārjuna, Dharmakīrti, Prajñākara, Arcaṭa, Śāntarakṣita and Jitāri attacked the theory and blamed the Jainas for several defects and ultimately called their theory *Mithyāvāda* and *Jālmakalpita*.

The Jaina philosophers tried their best to explain the theories which these critics held to be defective. Akalaṅka (720-780 A. D.), who can be hailed as the propounder of the Jaina logic, answered the opponent's arguments. The entire Jaina tradition appears to have more or less followed him in their endeavours to refute the objection brought against Jaina conceptions.

The main arguments of the Buddhists to reject the *Syādvāda* doctrine, as we have already mentioned, is that the two

characters cannot exist together in one reality. Otherwise there would be a self-contradiction of affirmative and negative characters. Other defects to be mentioned are confusion and commingling that follow self-contradiction.

As a matter of fact, the Buddhist philosophers misunderstood the theory of Syādvāda, since they treated the dual characteristic of the nature of reality as absolutely different from each other. This theory originally belonged to the vaiśeṣikas, and not the Jainas. The theory of the Vaiśeṣikas, called *Ubhayavāda* is criticised by the Jainas themselves, who observed in it the defects of self-contradiction, commingling, doubt, etc. The Buddhist philosophers have found the very same defects in the Jainas' theory of Syādvāda.

The foremost argument against this doctrine is the violation of the Law of Contradiction, which means that "be" and "not be" cannot exist together. But the Jainas do not accept this formula *in toto*. They say that the validity of the Law of Thoughts should be considered by the testimony of experience (*saṃvedanā*) and not by pre-conception. Experience certifies that the dual character of entities exists in respect of its own individuality and does not exist apart from and outside this nature (*sarvamasti svarūpeṇa pararūpeṇa nāstī ca*), as we have already seen. In relativistic standpoint both, being and non-being, can exist together. Everything is real only in relation to and distinction from every other thing. The Law of Contradiction is denied absolutely in this respect. The point is only that the absolute distinction is not a correct view of things, according to Jainism.

As regards the triple character (origination, destruction, and permanence) of reality, the Jainas support it through *anyathānupapannatvāhetu* as explained before. The Buddhists themselves are of the view that a thing perishes immediately after its origination, and this continuity never ends. The continuity of moments or similar moments (*sajātīyakṣaṇas*) is considered the material cause (*upādāna kārana*). This is

in fact nothing but only *dhrauvya* or a permanent feature of the Jāinas and the *Sanīāna* (continuity) of the Buddhists. Without accepting *dhrauvya* or *sanīāna*, memory (*smṛti*), recognition (*pratyabhijñāna*), bondage-salvation (*bandha-mokṣa*), etc. would disappear from field of experience. Therefore, the permanent element is essential for the circulation into the modes.

The permanent element possesses the character of identity in-difference (*bhedābbhedavāda*). Identity is used in the sense that the substance and its modes cannot be separated from a realistic standpoint, and difference in the sense that they are different in name, number, etc. from a practical viewpoint.¹³⁵ In other words, the modes are not absolutely different from substance, as in that case, the modes would not belong to the substance. With past reflections the substance is transformed into present modes and proves itself as a cause of future modes that are necessary for the understanding of the permanent character of an entity. To understand the difference between *guṇas* and *paryāyas*, the terms *saṅkhyā*, *lakṣaṇa*, etc. are used. From a realistic standpoint there is no such difference which could indicate the separation between them. After refuting the objections of Arcaṭa, Vādirāja comments that the latter is not capable of finding defects in the Syādvāda by his powerful voice.¹³⁶

To preserve the unity of terms in relation to different characters, the Jāinas assert an element which is called *Jātyantara* (*sui generis* or *unique*). They maintain that a reality is a synthesis of identity-in-difference and each synthesis is *Jātyantara*.¹³⁷ This is illustrated by the instance of *Narasimha* which is criticised by the Buddhist philosophers. Prabhācandra says in response to the Buddhist criticism about *narasimha* that it is neither *nara* nor *siṃha*, but because of their similarities they are called *Narasimha*. While having mutual separation they exist non-differently in relation to substance and like waves in water they emerge and sink in each other.¹³⁸ Thus

there is no self-contradiction in dual characters of an entity in relative sense, as the Jāinas assert.

Dharmakīrti urged with regard to the universal-cum-particular character of reality that this theory compelled one to recognize the curd and camel as one entity. In connection with the fallacious middle term (*hetvābhāsa*) Akalaṅka points out that the Buddhist philosophers discover defects to censure the Jāinas on the basis of invalid arguments (*Mithyūjāti*).¹³⁹ For instance, Dharmakīrti ignores the formula *sarvobhāvastadatatsvābhāvaḥ* and tries to establish equality between curd and camel. Hence he questions why one who intends to eat curd, does not go to eat a camel in place of curd, since according to Jainism, both have the universal character.¹⁴⁰

Akalaṅka tries to disarm critics like Dharmakīrti by pointing out the definition of *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa*. Vādirāja, a commentator of Akalaṅka, explains that the similar transformation of a thing into its modes (*sadrāśaparīṇāmo hi sāmānyam*) is called *Sāmānya*.¹⁴¹ According to this definition, the modes of curd and camel are not similar, they are really completely different, as well as similar. How is it then possible that these elements are mixed ?

Another argument used for the refutation of the Buddhist standpoint is that the identity is only among the modes of curd, as hard, harder, hardest, etc., but they have never any sort of relation with the modes of camel. Hence, they can never be mixed with each other. Vādirāja refers to a traditional fiction that Dharmakīrti proved himself as a *Vīḍuṣaḥ* (jester), because he did not possess a good knowledge of the opponents theory.¹⁴²

Akalaṅka again criticises the view of Dharmakīrti saying that if the argument that "the atoms of curd and camel may have been mixed sometimes before and the atoms of curd have still the capacity to be transferred into the modes of camel" is to be raised, it would not be advisable. For the past and the future modes of an entity are different, and all transactions and

transformations run according to present modes. The curd is for the purpose of eating, while the camel is for riding. The words for them are also completely different from each other. The word "curd" can be applied only to curd, not camel. It is the same case with the word "camel" too.

Akalaṅka further points out if in relation to past modes, the unity between curd and camel is derived, then *Sugata* was *mṛga* (deer) in his previous birth and the same *Mṛga* became *Sugata*. Why then should *Sugata* only worshipped and *Mṛga* be considered edible ?¹⁴³

1. *Sugato'pi mṛgo jāto mṛgo'pi Sugataḥ smṛtaḥ.*
Tathāpi Sugato vandyo mṛgaḥ khādyo yathesyate.
Tathā Vastubalādeva bhedābhedāvyavasthiteḥ.
Codito dadhī khādeti kimuṣṭramabbhidhāvati.

Thus he tries to prove that as the transformations of *sugata* and *Mṛga* are quite different, and their being worshipped and eaten are related to their modes, all substances have the capacity to be transformed only to their possible modes, not to others. Therefore the identity between the modes of curd and camel cannot lead to the truth. Their transformations do not have the *Tādātmyasambandha* and *Niyata-sambandha*.

In fact, Akalaṅka and other Jaina Ācāryas tried to meet the arguments of the Buddhist philosophers in forceful words. The innumerable examples of scathing attacks against Buddhists can be seen in Akalaṅka's and other Jaina Ācāryas' works. The caustic remarks such as *jāḍyāhetavaḥ*, *ahnīkalakṣaṇam*, *paśūlakṣaṇam*, etc. made by Dharmakīrti himself on opponents' views are criticised by Akalaṅka in the *Pramāṇa-saṅgraha*.¹⁴⁵

Thus the Jaina Ācāryas do not accept any self-contradiction in the *Syādvāda* conception. Likewise, the other defects such as confusion, commingling, etc. which are based on the self-contradiction, are also proved as "*mithyādoṣāropana*". And, according to them, the criticism made by the Buddhists or others is not effective in this context. As a matter of fact, in their opinion, *Syādvāda* has no defects provided it is clearly understood.

Conclusion

From these comments we may conclude that :—

- (i) The rudiments of *syādvāda* conception of Jainas can be gleaned from early Pāli literature.
 - ¶ (ii) *Syādvāda* conception originally belonged to Jainas and all the subsequent thinkers adopted it in a somewhat different way as a common approach to conceive the nature of reality.
 - ¶ (iii) *Syādvāda* is neither *Ucchedavāda* nor *Sassatavāda* as Buddhaghosa understands, but is permanence-in-change. According to this theory, the triple characters, viz, origination, destruction and permanence, can abide with a substance at one and the same time.
 - ¶ (iv) *Arthakriyā* (causal efficiency) is the essence of *Syādvāda* conception. According to the Jainas, the *arthakriyā* is possible in only the dynamic (*pariṇāmi*) substance.
 - (v) The nature of reality is universal-cum-particular; and the nature of relation of an entity is deliverance of the direct and objective experience.
 - ¶ (vi) There is neither self-contradiction nor any other defect which the *Buddhist Ācāryas* tried to point out.
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NOTES

CHAPTER I

Antiquity of Śramaṇa System

1. Upadhye, A. N. *Mahāvīra and his Philosophy*, Lord Mahāvīra and his Teachings, Bombay, 1961.
2. Eliot, Sir Charles, *Hinduism and Buddhism*, Vol. I. p. 53.
3. Williams, S. M., *Sanskrit-English Dictionary* (s. v. *Brāhmaṇa*), p. 741.
4. See the *Upaniṣad* and *Vedāṅga* literature.
5. *Chauṣ*. Viii. 7. 1.
6. Dasgupta, S. N., *A History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I. p. 22.
7. *Ṛgveda*, 10. 90. 12.
8. *A*. i. 167; *D*. iii. 16; *S*. i. 45; *Dhp*. 164.
9. *Sanskrit. English Dictionary* (Williams), s. v. *Śramaṇa*, p. 1097.
10. Samacariyā samaṇo ti vuccati, *Dhp*. 388. Cf. Samitā pāpattā Samaṇā, *DhA*. iii. 84.
11. *Mahābhāṣya*, 2. 4. 9.
12. Jetly, *Historical Position of Jainism, Ahimsā and Jainism*, Bombay, 1959-60.
13. Deo, S. V., *History of Jaina monachism*, p. 56; also see R. Garbe, *Philosophy of Ancient India*, p. 12. : *Jainism*, Mrs. N. R. Guseva. P. 4-18.
14. Vrātya āsīdiyamāna eva sa Prajāpatim samaisyat..... *Atharavāveda*, 15. 1-4; The Pāli literature (*Theragāthā*) also refers Vrātyas. Confer; Ananda Guruge, *Vidyodaya Lipi*, Colombo, 1962, p, 71, where arguments are adduced to prove that Vrātyas of an Eastern Indian were the survivals of Indus Valley Civilization.

15. Caturō samaṇā pañcamatthi te te avikaromi Sākhaputtho. Maggajino maggadesiko ca, magge jīvati yo ca maggaḍḍisin, Sn. 83-4.
16. Yama assa vādāṃ parihānamāhu, apahataṃ pañhavimānśkesū. Paridevati saccati hīnavādo, upaccagomam'ti anutthunanti. Sn. 827; Ete vivādā samaṇesu jātā, Sn. 828.
17. 54, 151, 786 etc.
18. Ye kec'ime titthiya vādasilā, ājivikā vā yadi vā Nigaṇṭhā. Paññāya taṃ nātitaranti sabbe, t̥hito vajantaṃ viya siḡhagāmīṃ. Sn. 381.
19. Shastry, N. Aiyasvami, Śramaṇas or non-Brahmanical Sects, The Cultural Heritage of India, Vol. I. p. 389 ff.
20. p. 949, 342 b. 21. *ibid.* p. 949.
22. Cf. yato, kho, Kassapa, bhikkhu averaṃ avyapajjaṃ mettacittaṃ bhāveti, āsavānaṃ khayā anāsavaṃ cetovimuttiṃ pañnavimuttiṃ diṭṭheva dhamme sayāṃ sacchikatvā upasampajja viharati, ayaṃ vuccati, Kassapa, bhikkhu, Samaṇo ti, D i. 170.
23. Hirottappaṃ, parisuddho kāyasamācāro.....M. i. 271; D. i. 170.
24. Op. Cit. Vol. I. p. 386 ff. 25. Op. Cit. p. 45.
26. Samvāyāṅga, 10. 1. 27. *ibid.* 12. 2.
28. v. i, Pārājika. A. i. 229
29. The sixty two Micchādittis as mentioned in the Brāhmaṇasutta are as follows in chief eight heads: viz. Sassatavādin, Ekaccassatavādikā, Antānantikā, Amarāvikkhepiḱā, Adhiccasamuppannikā, Uddhamaghātin, Ucchedavādin and the Diṭṭhadhammavādin.
30. The Sūtrakṛtāṅgu refers to 363 views under four main sects, viz. Kriyāvāda, Akriyāvāda, Ajñānavāda and Vinayavāda, I. 1 12 ff.
31. Lalitavistara, ed. Lefmann, Vol. I p. 380 ; Mahāvastu,
32. Saddharma Puṇḍarika, (Kern), pp. 275-6.
33. Brahatkathakośa, intro. p. 13.
34. See the Buddhist literature; Sn., Selasutta.

35. *A.* 276. 36. *Uṭṭa.* Chap. xxv;
37. *Uvāsaga.* pp. 108.
38. *Dialogues of Buddha*, II, intro., p. 165,
39. *Op. Cit.*
40. *Cf.* *D.* i. 5; ii. 150; *A.* i. 110, 173 sq ; *Iti.* 64 ; *Sn.* 189 : *V.* ii. 295.
41. Upadhyaya, B. D., *Sanskrit Sahitya kṛ Itihāsa*, p. 148.
42. *Mahābhāṣya.* 2. 4 9.
43. Kalasi Rock. Edict, III; Girinara Rock Edict, IV, VIII, etc.
44. *Buddhist Monks and Monasteries of India*, p. 49; *The Buddha and Five Year After Centuries*, p. 3.
45. *History and Doctrines of the Ājīvikas*, p. 10.
46. *D.* i. 49.
47. *Pre-Buddhist Indian Philosophy*, pp. 275.
48. *History and Doctrines of Ājīvikas.* p. 10.
49. Pūraṇa Kassapa, Makkhali Gosala, and Sañjaya Belatthiputta are referred to in Jaina Literature.
50. Kārato kho kārayato... . panam atimāpayato...natthi puññassa āgamo. *D.* i. 52.
51. *Pre-Buddhist Philosophy*, p. 279.
52. *Sūkr.* I 1 12. 15. v. p. 209.
53. *Early Monastic Buddhism*, Vol. 1. p. 35.
54. *S.* iii. 69; *V.* 126. 55. *A.* iii. 383; also see *J.* v. 227.
56. *A.* iv. 428. 57. *DA.* i. 142.
58. *DhA*; *Cf.* *Divyāvadāna, Prātihāryasūtra*, pp. 100.
59. *Bhāvasaṅgraha*, 175-179.
60. *D.* i. 53. 61. *M.* i. 513; *Milindapañha*, 4-5.
62. *Darsanasūtra*, 176. 63. *I.* *Cf.* *Sūkr.* 2. 1. 345.
64. *A.* i. 33. 65. *A.* i. 289.
66. *DA.* i. 166 f. 67. *Mahābhāṣya*, 5. 1. 154.
68. *Sūtra*, 216.
69. N'tthi ayaṃ loko ti paraloke t̥hitassa pi ayaṃ loko n'atthi, n'atthi paraloke ti idha loko t̥hitassa pi paraloko n'atthi. Sabbe tattha tattha'eva ucchijanti ti dasseti. *Sum.* i. p. 165.

70. *Op. Cit.* P. 166.
Also see *Uttarādhyayana* (SBB), p. 62.
Modgalāyana was also a name of Jaina clan; Sūkṛ 7-8
71. N'atthi.....dinnam, n'atthi yiṭṭham, n'atthi hutam,
.....ucchiṇṇanti vinassanti, na hontiparam maraṇā.
(Digha, I, p. 55. A remarkable parallel to this
passage is to be found in the *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* (II, i. 9 Fol.
375 FF. i. SBE. XIV. II. i. 15-17; *History and doctrines of Ājīvikas*—Basham. PP, 15-16.
72. *DA.* i. 144., *MA.* i. 422-3.
73. Satt' ime.....kāyā akatā akata-vidhā animmitā anim-
mātā vañjhā kūṭaṭṭhā esika-ṭṭhāyi-ṭṭhītā. Te na
iñjanti na vipariṇāmantī na aññam-aññam vyābā-
dhenti n' ālam aññaaññassa sukhāya vā dukkhāya
va sukkha-dukkhāya vā. Katame sattā? Paṭhavi-
kāyo āpo-kāyo tejokāyo vāyokāyo sukhe dukhe jīve-
sattme.....Tattha n'tthi hantā vā ghātetā vā sotā vā
Sāveta vā viññātā vā viññāpetā vā. Yo pi tiṇhena
satthena sīsam chindati na koci kiñci jīvītā voropeti,
sattaññam yeva kāyānam antarena sattha-vivaram
anupatati. *D.* i. 56. Compare with the *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*
1. 1. 10, fol. 280 ff. SBE. XIV, i. 20-4. *History and doctrines of Ājīvikas*, p. 16.
74. *DA.* i. 144.
75. "Atthi paro loko?" ti iti ce tam pucchasi, "atthi paro
loko" ti iti ce me assa, "atthi paro loko" ti te maṃ
vyākareyyāṃ. Evaṃ pi me no. Tathā 'ti pi me no.
Aññathā ti pi me no. No ti pi me no. No no ti pi me
no....*D.* i. 58.
76. *V.* i. 42, 391.
77. Ruṣṭaḥ Śrīviranāthasya tapasvī Maudgalāyanaḥ.
Sīśyaḥ Śrīpārśvanāthasya vidadhe Buddhadarśanaṃ.
Suddhodanasutam Buddhāṃ paramātmānambrabīṭ.
AS. 6. 78. *DPPN*, p. 1000.
79. Tarhyastīti na bhaṇāmi, nāstīti ca na bhaṇāmi, yadapi
ce bhaṇāmi, tadapi na bhaṇāmi darśanamastviti
kaścit, so 'pi pāpiyān.....*Aṭṭasahasī*, p. 129.

80. *Dīghanikāya, Brahmajālasutta.*
81. Sabbavāriyutto ti sabbena pāpavāraṇena yutto. Sabbavāridhuto ti sabbena pāpavāraṇena dhutapāpo. Sabbavāriphuṭṭho ti sabbena pāpavāraṇena phuṭṭho..... Catatto ti koṭippattacitto. *Sum. Vil. i. p. 168.*
82. Nigaṇṭho cātuyāmasaṇhvarasaṃvuto hoti. Kathāñca... Nigaṇṭhā sabbavārivārito ca hoti, sabbavāridhuto ca, sabbaphuṭṭho ca. evaṃ kho, Mahārāja, Nigaṇṭho..... Ayaṃ vuccati, Mahārāja, Nigaṇṭho gatatto ca yatatto ca ṭhitatto ca ti. *D. i. 37.*
83. *Jaina Sūtras*, pt 11. *SBE.* xiv. intro. pp. xx xxi.
85. *D. i. 58.* 84. *S. iv. 317-8.*
86. *A. iii, 276-7.*
87. *Milinda Pañha*, 59 FF. *Sum. Vil. i. 168.*
88. *A. ii. 199.* 89. *M. i. 374. F.*
90. *V. i. 233. F.; A. iv. 179 F.* See also the *Telovāda Jātaka.* 91. *M. ii, 31, A. i. 220. F.*
92. *M. ii, 31; A. iii, 74.*
93. *Early Monastic Buddhism*, Vol. I p. 40.
94. *Encyclopaedia of Buddhism* (s. v. *Ājīvika*), p. 330.
95. *M. i. 238*
96. Ye keci 'ime titthiya vādasilā Ājivikā vā yadivā Nigaṇṭhā. Paññāya taṃ nātitaranti sabbe ṭhito vajantaṃ viya sīghagāmin. 321.
97. *Sandakasutta.* 98. *DHA. i. 309.*
99. *ibid.* pp. 390. 100. p. 427.
101. *Sugiura, Hindu Logic as preserved in China and Japan, Philadelphia*, 1900, p. also see *ERE. i. p. 269.*
102. *Abhidhāna Ratnamālā*, ii. 189 ; Vaijayanti, Ed., Oppert. p. 202, v. 16.
103. *ERE. i. pp. 266-7.*
104. *History and Doctrines of Ājivikas*, p. 184. See, *Jaina Sahitya ka Itihāsa : Pūrvapīṭhikā*, pp. 463 for refutation of the theory of Hoernle.
105. Te Gosālakamatānusārinā Ājivikādayaḥ (sic) Boṭikā vā. *SūKṛ. Com. i. 3. 3. 14, fol. 92. Eke ye*

parasparopakārahitam darśanamāyantarṃ jayaśśata-
kakalpaḥ, te ca Gosālakamatānusārinā Ājivikā
Digambarā vā, *ibid.*, 3. 3. 8. v. p. 91.

106. *ERE*: i. p. 262.
107. *Encyclopaedia of Buddhism*, pp. 332 f.
108. Varahamihira in his *Bṛhajjūtaka* (15. 1.) also refers to the Ājivikas. For a full discussion of this reference see Ajaya Mitra Shastri, *Varahamihira's reference to the Ājivikas*, *J. O. I.* Vol. xii, p. 44-50.
109. Samyagdarśana-jñānacāritrāṇi mokṣamārgaḥ, *Tsū.* 1. 1; Cf. *Majjhima Nikāya*, *Sammādiṭṭhi Sutta*.
110. *Majjhima Nikāya*, *Māhamālunhika Sutta*.
111. Bandhahetvabhāvanirjarābhyaṃ kṛtsnakarmavipramokṣo mokṣaḥ, *Tsū.* 10. 2; *SS.* p. 1.
112. Gataddhino visokassa, vippamuttassa sabbadhi. Sabbagaṇṭhappahinassa, pariāho na vijjati. *DhP.* 90.
113. *M.* i. 03; ii. 214 ff.
114. The Buddha condemned the *Nigaṇṭhas* as unworthy in ten respects : they were without faiths, unrighteous, without fear and shame, they chose wicked men as friends, extolled themselves and disparaged others, were greedy of present gain, obstinate, untrustworthy, sinful in their thoughts and held wrong views., *A.* v. 156.
115. *IA.* IX. 162; quoted by Kamata Prasada, *Bhagawāna Mahāvira*, p. 263 fn. 4.

2. Jainism And Its Literature

1. There are two great cycles (kalpas) *Utsarpanī* (Evolution) and *Apasarpanī* (Involution). Each of these is divided into six periods; (i) *Sukhamā sukhāmā* or the period of great happiness. (ii) *Sukhamā* or the period of happiness. (iii) *Sukhamā duḥkhamā* or the age of happiness and some misery, (iv) *Duḥkhamā sukhāmā* or the age of misery and some happiness, (v) *Duḥkhamā* or the age of misery. The present era is the fifth one

which is to last twenty-one thousand years. Two thousand and five hundred years have already passed.

The present Kalpa is *Utsarpani*, in which twenty-four Jain Tirthankara appeared : (1) Rṣabhadeva (2) Ajitanātha (3) Sāmbhavanātha (4) Abhinandanātha (5) Sumatinātha (6) Padmanātha (7) Sūparśvanātha (8) Candaprabha (9) Puṣpadanta (10) Śitalanātha (11) Śreyāṅśanātha (12) Vāsupūjya (13) Vimalanātha (14) Ārahanātha (15) Mallinātha (16) Munisuvratanaātha (17) Naminātha (18) Neminātha (19) Pārśvanātha, and (20) Māhāvira (Vardhamāna) or *Nigantha Nāta-putta* of Pāli literature.

2. *Kalpasūtra*, SBE., xxii., pp. 281-285 : *Harivaṃśa-Purāṇa*, 8. 15. *Mahāpurāṇa* of Puṣpadanta, Sandhis 1-3.
3. *Atharvaveda*, Chapt. xv.; They may be purified with the vrātyastoma method and treated as follower of Vaidic religion. (*Kātyāyana* and *Āpastambha Śrautasūtra*). Munayo vātaraśaṇaḥ piśaṅga vasate malā (*Rgveda*, 10. 136, 2-3), Keśyagnim keśi viśam (*ibid.* 10. 136. 1), and Kakardave Kraśabho yukta āsīd (*ibid.* 10. 102.6) etc. are the references to prove the antiquity of Jainism.
4. *Rgveda*, 10. 102. 6.
5. *Viṣṇu Purāṇa* (ed. Wilson), 2. 1. p. 163; *Bhāgavat Purāṇa*, 5. 3. 6.; *Markaṇḍeya Purāṇa*, 50; *Kurma Purāṇa* 41; *Agni.* 10; etc.
6. Jain, K. P., *JA.* Vol. 1. No. ii., 1935, p. 19. Also see *Modern Review*, August, 1932—*Sindh Five Thousand Years Ago*. Ramchandran, T. N., *Hadappa and Jainism*, *Anekānta*, October, 1972. pp. 159.
7. *JBORS.* iii. 465.
8. *The Philosophy of India*, p. 60.
9. Weber, (*Indische Studien*, xvi. 210; *Jaina Itihāsa Series*, No. 1. p. 6; *Jainism in North India*, introduction.) adduces four points of coincidence. which, according to his opinion, prove that Jainism, has branched off from Buddhism, (*Indische Alterthumskunde*,

iv. p. 763). This theory has been refuted by Jacobi. See Jain Sūtras, I. intro. xxi.

10. *IA.*, Vol. ix, p. 163.
 11. *The Dictionary of Chinese Buddhist terms*, p. 184.
 12. *Mañjuśrīmūlakalpa*, 45. 27, ed. Ganapati Shastri, Trivendram, 1920; *Buddhist Sanskrit Dictionary*, (s. v. *Nirgrantha*); *Mahāvastu*, vol. i. p-369.
 13. p. 286. 14. *ThegA.*, i. 68.
 15. *S.*, ii. 192. 16. *J.*, i. 36.
 17. *ThegA.*, i. 335; *Ap.*, i. 287; see also, iii. 70, and *PVA.*, 75.
 18. *Ap.*, i. 50. 19. *Bu.*, xxi. 122.
 20. *J.*, vi. 133 ff. 21. *M.* iii. 70; *Ap.*, i. 107.
 22. *Ap.*, i. 205; *ThegA.* i. 115.
 23. *Dhammajātaka*. 24. p. 212.
 25. *DPPN.*, S. V. Dhamma.
 26. *A.*, iii. 373.
 27. *Isigilisutta*.
 28. *Dialogues of the Buddha*, iii p. 60.
 29. Paccesanti pakā-senti tatolā tattalā tatotlā. Ojasi tejasi tatojasi sūro rājā Ariṭṭh Nemi. *D.*, iii. 291.
 30. *Mhv.*, trans. 72. n. 3.
 31. *Mhv.*, x. 63-72.
 32. *A.*, i. 290; ii. 11, quoted by J. C. Jain, in the *Life in Ancient India*, p. 19; also see *Kalpasūtra* 6.149; Schurbring, *Die Lehre Der Jainas*, p. 24.
- Jacobi, *SBE.*, xiv. pp. intro., xiv-xxi; Dasagupta, *History of Indian Philosophy*. I. p. 173.
33. p. 236. 34. *A.*, ii. 196 ff.
 35. *M.*, i. 371 ff. 36. *ibid.*, 392 ff.
 37. *ibid.*, 237 ff.; *MA.*, i. 450.
 38. *ibid.*, 371. ff. 39. *S.*, iv. 312 ff.
 40. *Ninkha* (*Nika*) is a Deva who visits the Buddha in the company of several other Devas and utters a verse in praise of Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta :
Jegucchi tapako bhikkhu Cātuyāma susaṁvuto.
Niṭṭhaṁ sutam ca ācikkham na hi nūna kubbisī siyā.

41. *Mahāvagga* 42. S. i. 65. f.
43. J. iii., 1. 44. M. i. 371 ff.
45. *Jaya Dhavalā*, Vol. i. p. 78.
46. *Tiloyapaṇṇatti*, 4. 550.
47. *Ācārāṅga*, 2. 3. 402.; *Kalpasūtra*, 110.
48. According to the Śvetāmbara tradition, however, Mahāvira was married. But the tradition is now challenged by the result of researches done by Shri Parmananda Shastri, See, *Anekānta*, kirāṇa 9, March, 1955, p. 233.
49. *SnA* ii., 432; *Tiloya Paṇṇatti*, 4.550.
50. *MA.*, 423; Cf. *MV.*, 1.113.5; *Mahāvvyutpatti*, 3550; *Sp.*, 276;3; *Divyā.*, 143.12; *AS.*, i. 231.5; *LV.*, 380.12; *Bodhisatvabhūmi*, 246.6; Cf. *Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary*, p. 300. The *Dharmottārapradīpa* and the *Tattvasaṅgraha* refer to Nigaṇṭha Nātapuṭṭha as Vardhamāna, 3.11.
51. See in detail my article "*Bhagavāna Mahāvīra aura Mahātmī Buddhake vyaktigata samparka*", published in *Jaina Mīlana*, Vol. 1. 1968.
53. *D.* i. 57.
54. *D.*, iii. 119 (*Pāsādikā Sutta*); *M.*, ii. 244 (*Sāmagāma Sutta*); Here the Buddha is referred to have seated at Sāmagāma among the Śākyas; *D.*, iii. 209 f. Here he is said to have seated at Pāvā.
55. *SBE.*, Vol. xxii, intro., p. xxvii. 1884.
56. *SBE.*, Vol. xxii, intro., p. xxxvii. 1894.
57. *Evam ca Mahāvīramukte varṣasate gate.*
Pañcāśadadhike Candragupto bhavenṇṛp h 8,339.
58. *IA.*, 1914, pp. 118; also see the *Cambridge History of India*, Vol. i. pp. 139-140. Charpentier here thinks that the Vikrama era commences 410 years after the Mahāvīra's death, 527-60-467. B. C.).
59. *History and Doctrines of the Ājīvikas*, p. 74.
60. *ibid.*, 75.

61. *An Advanced History of India*, pp. 85-8. Jacobi also seems to have supported this view later on, see his article *Jainism*, in *ERE.*, 7. pp. 465.
62. *Uvāsagadasāo*, ii. p. 111, n; *History of the Ājivikas*. p. 76.
63. Vikkamarajjarambhā parao sirivīranibbu bhaṇiyā. Sunnam muniveyajutto vikkamakālau Janakāle. *Vicūrasīreṇi*.
64. *IA.*, Vol. 43.
65. Cunningham, A. *Book of Indian Eras*, p. 49.
66. Sattari cadusadjutto tiṇkālā Vikkamo havai jammo. Aṭhavarasa bālalilā soḍasavīsehi bhammie dese. *Nandisaṅgha's second Prākṛita Paṭṭabali*. This verse is also found in the *Vikrama Prabandha*: see, *JSB*. kirāṇa, 4, p. 75.
67. *Subhāṣitaratnasandoha* of Amitagati.
68. *IA.*, 1914, pp. 118.
69. *Ācāraṅgasūtra*, *SBE.*, Vol. xxii., intro., p. xxxvii.
70. Jaṁ rayañiṁ siddhigao arahā tittthaṅkaro Mahāvīro.
Taṁ rayañimavantie abhisitto pālao rāyā.
Pālagaraṇṇo saṭṭho paṇa paṇasayaṁ viyāṇi ṇandi-
ṇaṁ.
Muriyāṇaṁ saṭṭhisayaṁ tīsā puṇa pūsamittāṇaṁ.
—*Tittthagālī Paiṇṇāyā*, 620-621.
71. *Epitom of Jainism*, Appendix A, p. iv.
72. *Trisaṭṭasālakāpuriṣacaritra*, 10. 12. 45.
73. *An Advanced History of India*, p. 202.
74. *Mahāvīra aura Buddhakī Samasāmayakatā*, *Anekānta*, 16. 1-4. *Āgama aura Tripitaka; Eka Anuśilana*, pp. 47.
75. *Vīr-Nirvāṇa Samvat aura Jainā Kāla Gaṇana*, 1930.
76. *Jaina Sahitya kī Itihāsa (Purva-piṭhika)*, p. 336-7.
77. *Chronical Problems*, Bonn, Germany, 1934; *Jaina Bha-ratiyā*, Varṣa 10, aṅka, 1. p. 5-21.
78. *Tirthaṅkara Mahāvīra*, Bombay, 1963, Vol. 11. p. 319-324.

79. *JBORS* 1, 203.
80. *Hindu Sabhyatā* (Hindu Civilization), pp. 216.
81. *Bhagawāna Mahāvīra aura Mahātmā Buddha*, pp. 100.
82. Prasasti Khandya, padya, 1.
83. Law, B. C; *Some Jaina Canonical Sūtras*, p. 178.
84. *Bharatiya Vidyā*, Varāṇasī, 3, aṅka, 1.
85. *Darśana Digdarśana*, p. 444, fn. 3.
86. *Jain Sāhitya aura Itihāsa*, pp, 424.
87. Majjhima Nikāya
88. *Kalpasūtra*, 128.
89. *M.* ii, 243 F.; *D.* iii, 117, 210.
90. *Dialogues of the Buddha*, iii. p. 112.
91. *DA*, iii, 906; *MA*. 11, 851; 851; *DPPN.*, S. V. *Nigāṇṭha*.
92. *Āvūśyaku mūl.*, bhā., v. 127.
93. Jain, Jyoti Prasad, *Bhāratiya Itihāsa : Eka Dṛaṣṭi*, Khaṇḍa I.
94. *MA*. i, 423.
95. *DPPN*. Pt. II. p. 64.
96. For detailed discussion please see my article "*Schism in Jaina Order*".
97. Jain, M. K., *Jaina Darśana*, p. 14.
98. It is to be mentioned here that the Digambaras relate their scriptures to Gautama Gaṇadhara, the first and direct disciple of Mahāvīra, while the Śvetāmbaras relate to Sudharma Svāmi, the successor of Gautama Gaṇadhara.
99. *Tiloya Paṇṇatti*, 4. 1476-90.
100. See *Jaina Sāhitya kā Brāhad Itihāsa*, Vol. 1-5
101. *History of Jaina Monachism*.
102. *Jaina Śilālekha Saṅgraha*, Vol. 1. p. 1.
103. The Svetambara tradition believes in his coming back to Magadha and then going to Nepal for Mahā-praṇadhyaṇa, *Parīṣṭuparvan*.
104. *Samacarīṣataka* of Samayasundarigani, Cf. Doshi, Vachar Das, *Jaina Sāhityamām Vikāra thavāthi thayeli hani*, 1. ;

105. Winternitz, M. A.; *History of Indian Literature*, Vol. ii. p. 434-5.
106. *History of Jaina Monachism*, p. 22. *op. cit.*, p. 22.
107. Sūkr. v. 136. p. 253.
108. *Milinda Pañha*, p. 19. (Bombay edition); *DhA.* Vol. i. p. 129.
109. Eliot, Sir Charles, *Hinduism and Buddhism*, Vol. i. p. 117; *A History of Jaina Philosophy*, Vol. i. p. 170.
110. Winternitz, M. A., *History of Indian Literature*, Vol. ii. p. 426.
111. *Sarvārthasiddhi*, I. 20.
112. *Tiloyapaṇṇāṭṭi*, 4. 1476-90. Also see the *Harivaṃśa-parāṇa*, *Dhavalā*, *Jayadhavalā*, *Ādipurāṇa*, and *Śrūtāvatārā*; *Jayadhavalā*; Vol. i. intro. p. 47-50.
118. *Dhavalā*, Vol. i. intro., p. 23-30.
11. *Syādvāda-parīkṣā*.
115. iraja referred to Sanmati in the *Parivānāthacarita* as a Commentator on the Sanmati which would be the Sammati Prakaraṇa of Siddhasena. Another contribution made by him is referred to in the *Mallisena-prāśasti* of *Sravaṇavelagolā*. There is mentioned his work "*Sumatisaptaka*" which is not available.
116. *EL.*, Vol. xxi. intro. p. 45.
117. *TS.* intro. p. 92.
118. Nānyathānupapannatvaṃ yatra tatra trayeṇa kiṃ.
Anyathānupapannatvaṃ yatra tatra trayeṇa kiṃ.
ibid. 1369.
119. *NVVI.* Vol. ii. p. 234.
120. *SVT.* p. 371; *TSV.* p. 205; *Pramāṇa-parīkṣā*, p. 72;
JTV. p. 135; *SKT.* p. 225.
121. "Dharmakīrti ke Trilakṣaṇa-hetupara Pātrakeśarikā
Ākramaṇa", *Bharatiya Prachina Vidyā*, 12. pp. 71-80.
122. *History of Indian Logic*, p. 187.
123. Shastri, K. C., Svāmī Patrakeśarī aura vidyānanda,
Anekānta, Varsa I. p. 67.; *NKC.* I. intro. p. 76

124. *ibid.* p. 75. 125. EC. Vol. viii, No. 39.
 126. SVT. Vol. i. intro. p. 36. 127. *Jaina Darśana*, p. 23.
 128. VBH. 95. 129. SVT. Vol. i. intro. pp. 53-62.
 130. *ibid.* p. 69-70. 131. D. i. 47 f., M. ii. 2 f.
 132. M. i. 31. 380.; A. i. 220 f.
 133. *ibid.* 371 ff.
 134. *ibid.* 392 ff. 135. S. iv. 312 ff.
 136. Dutt, N. *Early Monastic Buddhism*, Vol. i, p. 145.
 137. S. i. 68; M. i. 205; 400, 426.
 138. DPPN. (s. v. Migara). DhA. i. 387 ff.; AA. i. 220;
 MA. i. 471.
 139. A. ii. 25; AA. ii. 482 f.
 140. M. i. 91 ff.
 141. M. ii. 214 ff; M. ii. 31; A. i. 220; M. 92 B.
 142. A. ii. 196 ff.
 143. *Jaina Sutras*, Vol. xxii. p. 194.
 144. M. i. 234; MA. i. 450. 145. MA. i. 450.
 146. A. i. 220-ff. 147. V. 233. f; A. iv. 179 f.
 148. M. ii. 243. ff; D. iii. 117, 210. See *Early Monastic Buddhism*, p. Vol. I. pp. 145 ff.
 149. Mahāvamsa, 10. 53-99 (tram).
 150. Mahāvamsa, pp. 67.
 151. *ibid.* 10. 65. 152. *ibid.* xxxiii. 43-44.
 153. *ibid.* xxxiii. 79. 154. Mahāvamsaṭṭhā, p. 444.
 155. See, *Harivaṃśapurāṇa*; *Pauma Cariu*, etc.
 156. *Vividhātīrthakalpa*, pp. 93.
 157. *ibid.* p. 102.
 158. *Brahmakathākośa of Harīṣeṇa*, p. 200.
 159. *Karakaṇṭhu cariu*, pp. 44-69.
 160. Mahamāyūri, ed. by Sylvian Levi, JA. 1915, pp. 40;
 cf. *The Society of the Rāmāyaṇa*, p. 68.
 161. *Jaina Śīlalekha Saṅgraha*, p. 133
 162. *Pre-Buddhist Religious Beliefs*, JRAS. (Ceylon).
 Vol. xxxi, No. 82, 1929, p. 325.
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C. Buddhism And Its Literature

1. See my article *Historicity of the Buddha* published in the *Mahabodhi Journal*.
2. *Buddha*, Trans. by Hoey, p. 6.
3. *Buddhist Philosophy*, pp. 142-3.
4. *Die Lehre der Upanishaden und die Anfänge des Buddhism*, p. 296.
5. Referred by T. W. Rhys Davids in his book *Origin and Growth of Religion*, p. 27.
6. *Studies in the Origin of Buddhism*, p. 547.
7. Beal, *Life of Buddha*, SBE. Vol. xix. p. 141; *Buddhist Studies*, pt. II; p. 118
8. M. ii. 77.
9. So.....sato va abbikkamami sato patikkamami, yava udabindumhi me dayā paccupaṭṭhiṭā hoti, ma 'ham khuddaka pane visamagate sanghatam apadesan ti, M. i. 78. Also see *Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge*, p. 465.
10. M. i. 238.
11. *Darśanasūtra*, 6-9.
12. According to Buhler, *Pitaka* is a basket, in which manuscripts were preserved (*Indian Studies*, iii, 2nd Ed., Strassburg, 1898, p. 86 ff), Rhys Davids, (SBE Vol. 35, p. 28) and Trenckner (JPTS. 1908, p. 119 f.) think that *Piṭaka* does not mean "receptacle" but rather "tradition". See also Winternitz's *Indian Literature*, Vol. i. p. 8. fn. 1.
13. *Mahāvamsa*,
14. Kern : *Manual of Indian Buddhism*, p. 2. In the opinion of Franke, the *Mahavagga* and *Cullavagga* of the *Vinaya Piṭaka* would be later than the *Dighanikāya* (JPTS. 1908, pp. 8ff, 58 ff. See *Indian Literature*, p. 21 fn. 3.
15. D. ii. 42. cf. *DHP*. 185.
16. Rhys Davids, *Buddhism* (American Lectures), p. 62.

17. *M. i*, 133; *Milindapañha*, 345 etc. According to records of Mahāyāna Buddhism, there are twelve Angas, *Manual of Indian Buddhism*, p. 7.
18. Childers, *Dictionary of Pali Language*, under these words.
19. *Buddhist India*, pp. 121-2.
20. *A History of Pali Literature*, Vol. i. p. 1.
21. *ibid.*, p. 42.
22. *Milindapañha*, (Trenckner Ed.), pp. 13, 190, 21 13; *A History of Pali Literature*, p. 12.
23. *A History of Pali Literature*, p. 12.
24. *DA*. iii. 117, 220 25. *MA*. ii. 243.

CHAPTER II

Jaina Philosophy

1. Ghosal, S. C., *Pañcāstikāya*, intro. p. xxix.
2. Utpādavyayadbrauṇayuktam sat, *TSū*. 5. 30.
3. *PK*. 10. 4. *ibid.* 13.
5. *ibid.* 8. 6. *ibid.* 10-11.
7. *DS*. 23. 8. *ibid.* 25.
9. *PK*. 7. 10. *ibid.* 104.
11. *DS*. 24-48.
12. ix. 113. 9. 11; x. 14. 3-10; *A History of Indian Literature*, p. 2.
13. xviii. 2. 27.
14. vi. 2. 2. 27; 6. 3. 1; xi. 7. 2. 23; *A History of India Logic*, p. 2-3.
15. *BUṣ*. iv. 4. 19; cf. *KUṣ*. ii. 4. 10-11.
16. 1. 1. 20; 1. 2. 18-19; 1. 2. 22; *History of Indian Literature*, p. 3.
17. *Āgamaśāstra*, 111.
18. *Sāṅkhya Bhāṣya*, *Brahmasūtra*, 11.1.9.; *Studies in Jaina Philosophy*, p. 125.
19. *Studies in Jaina Philosophy*, p. 125-8.

20. *Sāṅkhya Kārikā*, 62.
21. *Nyāyasūtrabhāṣya* and *Vratti*, l. 1. 10; *Pratīkṣāpāda-*
bhāṣya, p. 643-44. *studies in Jain Philosophy*.
22. *Mūlinadapañha*, pt. 1. 23. *TSū.* l. 4; 1. 2.
24. *Samayasāra*, 38. 25. *ibid.* 49.
26. *DS.* 2. 27. *TSū.* 5. 23.
28. *ibid.* 5. 24-25. 29. *PK.* 15.
30. *ibid.* 77. 31. *TSū.* 6.2.
32. *ibid.* 10. 2. 33. *SS.* p. 1.
34. *PK.* 90-96. 35. *DS.*, 19-20.
36. *PK.*, 107-108., *DS.* 21.
37. Atthi kho vo Nigaṇṭhā, pubbe pāpakammaṃ kataṃ
taṃ imāya kaṭukāya dukkarakārikāya nijjirettha; yaṃ
panettha etarahi kāyena saṃvutā, vācāya saṃvutā,
manasā saṃvutā, taṃ āyatinaṃ pāpāssa kammaṣṣa
akaraṇaṃ; iti purāṇaṃ kammāṇaṃ tapasā vyantīb-
hāvā, navāṇaṃ kammāṇaṃ akaraṇā, āyatinaṃ anavas-
savā kammakkhayā, kammakkhayā dukkhakkhayo,
dukkhakkhayā vedanākkhayo, vedanākkhayā sabbaṃ
dukkhaṃ nijjīṇaṃ bhavissati 'ti. Taṃ ca paṇamhā-
kaṃ ruccati ceva khamati ca. tena cammaṃ attamaṇā'
ti. *M.* i. 93; cf. *M.* ii. 31; *N.* ii. 214 FF; also see *A.* i. 220.
38. *D.* i. 31-39. 39. *ibid.* i. 32.
40. *ibid.* i. 31-39. 41. *ibid.* i. 32.
42. *Udāna*, p. 67. 43. *D.* i. 187; *M.* i. 431;
44. Cf. *D.* i. 195; *S.* ii. 60. *Dharma Saṅgraha*, 137.
45. *DS.* 2.
46. Arūpa-samāpatti-nimittaṃ pana atta ti samāpatti-
saññāñ c' assa saññā gahetvā vā Nigaṇṭho-ādayo pañ-
ñāpeti, viya takkamattena eva vā, arūpā attā saññā
ti nam, *Sumaṅgala Vīlāsini*. p. 110.
47. *D.* i. 186-7.; iii. 137.
48. The Place of Buddhism in Indian Thought, *Journal*
of Viśvavidyalaya University of Ceylon, Vol. i. No. 1., p. 25.
49. Bhāskarabhāṣya; *Bauddhadarśana tāthā anyā Bhāratīya-*
darśana, p. 824; Cf. *Sandakhasutta* of *Majjhimanikāya*.

50. *Vijñaptimatratāsiddhi*, p. 7.
51. *Catuhśataka*, 10-10.
52. *TSa*, 5. 16; *DS*. 10.
53. digambarāsta eva prāhūḥ. cillakṣaṇa evātmā sa ca dravyarūpeṇa sarvāvasthāsvabhinnatvāt anugamātma-
kaḥ, paryāyarūpeṇa tu pratyavasthaṁ bhinnatvāt
vyāvṛtyātmakaḥ etacca pratyakṣataḥ eva siddhamā-
tmano dvairūpyamiti na pramāṇāntarataḥ prasādh-
yaṁ. tathāhi *TSP*, p. 118, Kā. 311.
54. *TS*, 313-315. 55. *ibid.* 325.
56. *HBT*. p. 98-104. 57. *TS*. 312.
58. *ibid.* 316-18. 59. 327.
60. Dravyaparyāyarūpatvāt dvairūpyaṁ vastunaḥ khalu.
Tayorekā tmakatve'pi bhedaḥ sañjnādibhedataḥ.
Indriyajñānanirbhāsi vasturūpaṁ hi gocaraḥ.
Śabdānāṁ naiva, tat kena sañjnābhedād vibhinnatā.
61. Tao danda pannattā, tam jahā-manadande, vayad-
ande, kāyadande., *Samavāyāṅga*, 3.1.
62. seyyathidaṁ-kāyadaṇḍaṁ, vacidaṇḍaṁ, manodaṇḍa-
ṁ ti. imesaṁ kho, āvuso Gotamo, tiṇṇaṁ daṇḍā-
naṁ evaṁ paṭivibhattānaṁ evaṁ paṭivisiṭṭhānaṁ
kāyadaṇḍaṁ Nigaṇṭho Nātaputto mahāsāvajjatarāṁ
paññāpeti pāpassa kammaṣsa kiriyāya pāpassa kam-
maṣsa pavattiyā, no tathā vacidaṇḍaṁ, no tathā
manodaṇḍaṁ 'ti., *M.*, i. 372. FF.
63. Bhāvā rahino sijjhai jai vi tavaṁ carai koikoḍio.
Jammaṁ tarai bahuso lambiya hattho galiyayaṭṭho.
64. *PSU.*, 51.
65. ahaṁ hi sīha, akiriyaṁ vadāmi kāyaduccaritassa va-
cīduccaritassa manoduccaritassa; anekavihītānaṁ pā-
pakamānaṁ akusalānaṁ dhammānaṁ akiriyaṁ vad-
āmi.....kusalānaṁ dhammānaṁ kiriyaṁ vadāmi. *A.*,
iv. 182 f. tran. by Thomas. *The Life of the Buddha*,
p. 207.
66. Lavayasaṅkīnaḥ Lokāyatikaḥ Śākyādayasca. Teṣāṁ
ātmaiva nāsti kūṣastatkriyā tajjānīto va karmavan-

- dha iti.....asthitānāṃ kūṭaḥ iti Akriyāvāditvaṃ.
12. 4. v. p. 218.
67. Law, B. C., *Some Jaina Canonical Sūtras*, p. 189.
68. *SBE.*, xiv. p. xxv. quoted in the *Heart of Jainism*, p. 90. Jacobi is also of such opinion, *SBE.*, Xiv., P. 316, Fn. 3. Attāṇa jo jāṇāti jo ya logaṃ gaim ca jo jāmai ṇagaim ca. Jo sāsayaṃ jāṇa asāsayaṃ ca jā-tiṃ ca maraṇaṃ ca jaṇovavāyaṃ. Aho'vi sattaṇa viut-ṭhaṇāṃ ca jo āsavaṃ jāṇati saṃvaram ca. Dukka-haṃ ca jo jāṇati nijjaraṃ ca so bhāsiumarihai kiriyā-vādaṃ. *SūKṛ.* l. 12. 20-21. *kriyāvāda* is of 180 types and *Akriyāvada* 84, *ibid.*, l. ll. 119-121.
69. *M.* i. 93; ii. 31; 214 f.; *A.* i. 220.
70. *Jātaka Stories*, v. pp. 116. Compare to the story of four councillors in the *Uttarapurāṇa* of Guṇabhadra where the Karma has been accepted as a main cause for having birth in a high or low class. 46. 112-118.
71. Savve puṇṇanibaddhā du paccayā santi sammadiṭṭha-ssa. Uvaogappāogaṃ bandhante kammabhāveṇa. *Samayasāra*, 173.
72. *Jātaka Stories*, V. p. 118.; *Jātaka* (Nagari), Vol. ii. v. 145-7. p. 53.
73. *M.* ii. 31, 214 f; *M.* i. 93; Cf. *A.* i. 220.
74. *DS.* 9. 75. *SKr.* l. 12. 5. v. p. 215.
76. *A.* i. 174.
77. Tena āyasmanto pāṇātipātino bhavissanti pubbeka-tāhetu, adinnādāyino musāvādino abrahmacārino...pisuṇ-avācā...pubbekataṃ kho pana, bhikkhave, sārato pac-chāgacchataṃ na hoti chando vā vāyāmoīdaṃ vā kar-ṇiyaṃ idaṃ ca akaraṇiyaṃ ti. iti karaṇīyākaraṇīye kho pana saccato tṭhetato anupalabbhiyamāṇe muṭṭh-assatīnaṃ anārakhānaṃ vihartāṃ na hoti paccattaṃ. sahadhammiko samaṇavādo.....*ibid.*, i. 174 f.
78. *Samayasāra*, 173.
79. *M.* ii. 214.
80. *A.* iii. 383 f. cp. *DA.* i. 162.; *S.* iii. 210.; *D.* iii. 250 F.

81. *SS.* 2. 6. 82. 4. 7. 83. *A.* iii., 196 f.
84. *AA.*, ii. 559 says he was the Buddha's uncle (*cūlapitā*) and a Sākyan *rājā*. *DPPN.*, S. V. *Vappa*.
85. *Gradual Sayings*, Pt. ii., P. 207.
86. (*Kāyena saṁhūtā; vācāya saṁhūtā, manasā saṁhūtā taṁ āyatim papassa kammassa akarapaṇaṁ iti purāṇaṁ kammānaṁ tapasā vyantibhāvā.....*).
87. *A.* iii. 276-7. 82. *D.* i. 57.
89. *M.* ii., 214. 90. *A.* , iii. 276-7.
91. *M.* i. 93. 92. *PK.* 157-8.
93. *D.* i. 23 FF. 94. *Sumaṅgala Vā.*, i. 115.
95. *Ts.*, 112-2. 26. *TsP.*, P. 66.
97. *SūKr.*, 1. 2. 12. *Vṛatti*.
98. Tulyaṁ rūpaṁ yadā grāhyamatulyaṁ naiva grāhyate... Aṇūnāṁ dvya-rūpatve tadā kiṁ nopapādyate. Tatsā-mānyaviśeṣātmarūpatvātsarvavastunaḥ. Tulyātulyas-varūpatvādvirūpa aṇavaḥ smṛtaḥ. Samānaṁ tatra yadrūpaṁ tadakṣajñānagocaraṁ. Ekākārmatojñāna-maṇuṣvevopapadyate. Asmānaṁ tu yadrūpaṁ yogipra-tyakṣmisyate. Iti durmatayaḥ kecit kalpayanti samā-kulaṁ—*TS.* 1980--83.
99. *NKC.*, p. 134; *NVV.*, pt. I. p. 344; *SVT.*, pt. pt 1. p. 158; *PKM.*, yt. i. p. 25.
100. Dve hi rūpe kathaṁ nāma yukte ekasya vastunaḥ. Dve tadā vastuni prāpte aparāspara-rūpataḥ. Paraspārātmatāyāmtu tadvairūpyaṁ viruddhate.
101. See, chapter, v. of the book.
102. *TS.*, 2310.
103. *PV.*, 3. 296-7.
104. *NKC.*, p. 565; *LT.*, 26-29; 64-65.
105. *PK.*, 80.
106. *ibid.*, 81. 107. *ibide.*, 86.
108. *Io.* 5. 24. 109. *Atṭhsalīnī*, 1, 3. 16.
110. *TSP*, p. 605, 2133-84. Cf. *PK.*, 97 ff; *DS.*, 19 ff.
111. *TS.*, 2567. 112. *ibid.* 2548.
113. *Abhidharmakosa*, 1.5.

114. *Aṭṭhasālini* 160; *Dialogues of the Buddha*, pt. i. p. 36. fn. 2. akasante' smin dravyāṇi śvayaṃ vā kāśata ityākāśam. Jivādini dravyāṇi svaiḥ paryāyairavyatirekeṇa yasminnākāśante. prakāśante tadakaśam svayaṃ cātmiyaparyāyamaryādaya ākāśata ityākāśam. Avakāśādānādvā. 22. athavā itareṣaṃ dravyāṇaṃ avakāśādānādakāśamiti prśodarādiṣu nipātitaḥ śabdah. Kundakunda defines ākāśa :—
Savveṣiṃ Jivaṇaṃ sesāṇaṃ tahāya puggalānam ca. Jaṃ dedi vivaramakhilaṃ taṃ loe havadi āyāsaṃ.
115. *Iv.*, 5. 1., 21-22.
116. Ākāśasyavagāhaḥ, *TSū.* V. 18. ākāśasya.....sāvaya vatvaṃ ghaṭādir ivopapannaṃ sāvayavamākāśaṃ himavat-vindhyāvaruddhavibhinnadeśattvāt,
117. *TBV.*, p. 641; *Jaina Theory of Reality and Knowledge*, p. 277. *CF. PKM.*, p. 563; *NKC.*, 245.

CHAPTER III

Jaina Ethics

1. Himsā' nṛtāsteṣṭābrahmaparigrahebhya viratirvratam, *TSū.*, 7. 1.
2. *ibid.*; 7. 4-8.
3. Maṭṭīpromodakāruṇyamādhysthāni ca sattvaguṇādhikakliṣyamāna' vinayeṣu, *TSū.*, 7. 11.
4. *Thaṇḍaṅga*, 4.1 (*ṭīka*). Udaḥpedalaputta (*Sūtrakṛtāṅga*, 7th Addhyana), Kālāsavesiyaputta (*Vyāḥapāṇṇati*, 1st sataka), ect. are referred to in the Jaina Āgamas who renounced Cāturyāmaddharma of Pārśva-nātha and accepted the Pañcamahāvratas of Mahāvīra.
5. Asibandhakaputto Gāmaṇi Nigaṇṭha-sāvako yena Bhagavā tena upasaṅkami....., taṃ ca bhagavā uvāca—Ko nu kho Gāmaṇi Nigaṇṭho-Nātaputto sāvakānaṃ dhammaṃ deseti ti ? (Gāmaṇi uvāca)—evaṃ kho

bbante Nigaṇṭho Nātaputto sāvakanāṃ dhammaṃ deseti—yo koci paṇaṃ atipāṭeti sabbo so āpayiko nerayiko, yo koci adinnaṃ ādiyati sabbo so āpayiko nepayiko, yo koci kāmesu micchā carati sabbo so āpayiko nerayiko, yo koci musā bhaṇati sabbo so āpayiko nerayiko. yaṃ bahulaṃ yaṃ bahulaṃ viharati tena tenniyati, 'ti.—S., iv. 317.

6. Pañcahi bhikkhave, dhammehi samannāgato Nigaṇṭho .. devadhammiko yathābhattaṃ nikkhatte evaṃ niraye. katamehi pañcamehi ? paṇātipāṭi hoti, adinnādāyī hoti, abrahmacārī hoti, musāvādī hoti, surāmerayamajjapamādaṭṭhāyī hoti. A. iii. 276-7.
7. Kṛtakāritānumatairvākkāyamanobhirivāte. Autsargiki nivṛttirvicitrarūpāpavādikī tveṣā. PSU. 76.
8. ime kho āvuso Gotama, tiṇṇaṃ daṇḍānaṃ evaṃ paṭivibhattānaṃ evaṃ paṭivisiṭṭhānaṃ kāyadaṇḍaṃ Nigaṇṭho Nātaputto mahāsāvjjataraṃ paññāpeti pāpassa kammaṃ kiriyāya pāpassa kammaṃ pavattiyā, no tathā vacidaṇḍaṃ, no tathā manodaṇḍaṃ ti. M. i. 372.
9. The *daṇḍa* is synonymous with "*duccarita*" which means wrong behaviour in body, speech, and thought, and which afflicts injures and brings to trouble and distress. *SnA.* 63. *ND.* ii. 293, quoted by Horner in the *Middle Length Sayings*, ii. p. fn. 3.
10. taṃ kiṃ maññasi gahapati, idhassa Nigaṇṭho abādhiko duhito bālahagilāno sītodakaṇṇaṃ alabhamāno kalaṅkarēyya. imassa pana, gahapati, Nigaṇṭho Nātaputto kaṭhūpapattiṃ paññāpetti 'ti asaṅcetanikaṃ, bhante, Nigaṇṭho Nātaputto no mahāsāvajjaṃ paññāpeti....., M. i. 377.
11. PSU. 45-47.
12. Hirāsāyāṃaviramaṇaṃ himsopariṇāmanamapi bhavati himsā.

Tasmāt pramattayoge prāṇavyaparopāṇaṁ nityaṁ.
 Sūksmāpi na khalu hiṁsā paravastunibandhanāṁ bha-
 vati pumsaḥ.
 Hiṁsāyatanānivṛttiḥ pariṇāmaśuddhaye tadapi
 kāryā; *PSU.*, 48-49.

13. *Pahūḍa.*

14. tena kho pana samayena sambahulaṁ Nigaṇṭhā Vesā-
 liyaṁ rathikāya rathikaṁ...baha paggayha kandanti—
 ajja Sīhena Senāpatinā thūlaṁ pasuṁ badhitva Sam-
 aṇassa Gotamassa bhattaṁ kataṁ, taṁ Samaṇo Got-
 amo jānaṁ uddissa kataṁ māṇsaṁ paribhuñjati paṭi-
 cakammaṁ' ti. *Mahāvagga* (Vinaya Piṭaka),
 237.

15. *M.*, i, 368 f: *DPPN.*, s. v. Jivaka Sutta.

16. *DPPN.*, s. v. Devadatta.

17. Na vinā prāṇivighātānmāṁsasyotpattirisyate yasmāt,
 Māṁsaṁ bhajatastasmātprasaratyanivāritā hiṁsā.
 Yadapi kila bhavati māṁsaṁ svayameva mṛtasya
 mahiṣāvṛṣabhlādeḥ.
 Tatrāpi bhavati hiṁsā tadāśritanigodanirmathanāt.
 Āmāsvapi pakvāḥvapi vipacyamānasu māṁsapesiṣu.
 Sātatyenotpādastajjātīnāṁ nigodānām.
 Āmāṁ vā pakvāṁ vā khādati yaḥ sprśati vā piṣita-
 pesiṁ.
 Sa nihanti satatatanicitaṁ piṇḍaṁ bahujiṇakoṭṭinām.
PSu. 65-68.

18. Mādyāṁ māṁsaṁ kṣaudraṁ pañcodumbaraphalāni
 yatnena.
 Hiṁsāvyuparatikāmairmuktavyāni prathamameva. 61.
 Yonirudumbarayugmaṁ plakṣanyagrodhaḥpalapha-
 lāni.
 Trasajivānaṁ tasmāttesaṁ tadbhākṣane hiṁsā.

ibid. 72.

19. Ātthi, Visākhā, Nigaṇṭhā nāma Samaṇajītikā.
 Te sāvakaṁ evaṁ samādapenti— ehi tvaṁ ambho pur-
 iso, ye puratthimāya disāya pana paraṁ yojanasataṁ

tesu daṇḍam nikkhipāhi, ye pacchimāya, ye uttarāya.....ye dakkhiṇāya.....'ti. Iti ekaccānaṃ paṇānaṃ anuddayāya anukampāya samādapenti. .

—A., i. 206.

20. Digprācyādiḥ tatra prasiddhairabhiññānairavadhiṃ kṛtvā niyamānaṃ digvratīḥ, SS., p. 176. : also see TV., p. 547.
21. PSU., 138.
22. SD., 5 3-4.
23. *Jaina Sūtras, Uttarādhyayana*, p. 414, v. 26. ff.
24. *Jaina Sūtras*, Pt. 11. SBE, Vol. 45., intro. xviii.
25. D. iii. 9. F.
26. Basham, A. C. *History and doctrines of the Ājīvikas*, p. 104.
27. SU., 141. also see, SD., 5. 12.
28. M. i. 372 FF.
29. *Cūladukkhanda Sutta*,
30. A. i, 206. 31. A. i. 207. 32. ibid.
33. *Kātyāyana Śrautasūtra*, 4. 15. 35.
34. SD., 5. 34-35. cf. *Bhagavati Śataka*, 12. 1.
35. *Bhagavati Śataka*, 8.5.
36. *Jain Sūtras*, SBE., Vol. 45., intro. P. xviii.
37. S. D., 7.7.

In a Commentary on the *Ratnakaraṇḍaśrūvakācūra*, Ācārya Prabhācandra also referred to this rule :—see, *Bhāgwanā Mahāvīra aura Mahātmā Buddha* p. 207.

38. A., iii. 277.
39. Nigaṇṭhā ekasātakā ti vadati, *Lohitābhijūta nāma*, *ibid.*, iii. 383 f. cf. *Sumaṅgala Vitāsini*. i. 162.
40. *Lāṭi Saṃhitā*, 55. 41. D. i. 166. cf. M. i. 77.
42. *Pravacanasāra*, 3. 15. According to A. N. Upadhye, this is the interpolated verse.
43. *Thāṇḍaga*, p. 164. Cf. *Mahāvagga* (N. H. Bhagavata's ed). pp. 108-109.
44. *Mulacūra*, 4. 155.

45. *ibid.*, 10.92. 46. *Brhatakalpakathūbhāṣya*, 2780.
47. *ibid.* 492-93. 48. *Mūlācāra*, comm. Val.i p. 133;
49. *Pāiyasadda Mahanṇava*, p. 358 :
50. *Tsa.*, 9.22. 51. *Mūlācāra*, 5. 107-109.
52. *ibid.* 10. 17-18. 53. *Samavāyavāga*, 27-1.
54. See, *Mūlācāra* and *Anāgārādharmamṛta*.
55. *ibid.*, *Piṇḍabuddhyadhikāra*.
56. Pañcaya mahavvayāṇaṃ samidio pañca jīṇavaruddiṭṭhā.
Pañceviṇḍiyarohā chappi ya āvāsayaṃ loco.
Accelakamaṇḥāṇaṃ khidisaṇaṃamadantaghaṃsaṇaṃ
ceva.
Ṭhidibhoyaṇeyabhattaṃ mūlaguṇā aṭṭhavisā du.
—*Mūlācāra*, 1. 2-3.
57. *D. i.* 49.
58. *Dasvaṅkalika*, cū., 2.9 : Deo, S. V; *History of Jaina Monachism.*, p. 145. f.
59. *Tsa.* 6. 24. 60. *D. i.* 49.
61. *Brhatakalpakathūbhāṣya*, vṛtti on 2780, Vol. iii.
62. *ibid.* Vṛtti, on 1443, Vol. ii.
63. Piyadhammo daḍḍhadhammo saṃviggō'vajjabhīru par-
isuddho.
Saṅgahaṇuggakusalo sadadaṃ sārakkhaṇajutto.
Gambhīro duddhariso midavādī appakoduhallo ya.
Ciraṇavvaido ghibidaṭṭho ajjāṇaṇaṇaḍḍharo hodi.
—*Mūlācāra*, 4.183-4.
64. Tena kho pana samayena chabbaggiya bhikkhu vass-
aṇaṃ uppgantvā antarāvassanaṃ cārikaṇaṃ caranti. man-
ussā tatheva njjhāyanti khipyanti vipacenti—"kathaṇaṃ
hi nāma samaṇā sākyaputtīyā hemantaṇaṃ pi gimhaṇaṃ
pi vassaṇaṃ cārikaṇaṃ carissanti, haritāni tiṇāni samma-
ddantā, ekindriyaṇaṃ j vaṇaṃ vihetṭhantā, bahu khuddake
pāṇe aṇṇāhetāṇaṃ āpādentā. Ime hi nāma aññstitt-
hiyā durakkāṭṭadhammā vassāvāsaṇaṃ alliyissanti
saṅkasaṇiseanti... V, i. 137 F.
65. *Mūlācāra*, 3. 35-36.
66. *ibid.*, 10. 18.

67. V., i. 138. 68. p. 308 b.
69. Accellakam loco vosatṭasariradā ya paḍilīhānam
Eso hu liṅgakappo caduvvidho hodi ṇayabbo.
—*Mūlācāra*, 10-17
70. MA., i. 423; DPPN., sv. Nigaṇṭha; *Dictionary of Chinese Buddhist Terms*, p. 428
71. *Pravacanasāra*, 3. 3-5, 21; Jain, C. R., *Sanyāsadharmā*, pp. 45-46; Deo, s v; *History of Jaina monachism* p. 341.
72. Vikāre viduṣāṃ dueṣo navikārānuvartane.
Tannagratīve pi sagotthe no Nāma-dueṣa-kalmaṣaḥ.
—*upāsakādhyāyana*., 131. p. 35.
73. *Encyclopaedia of Buddhism*, p. 175. Also see Barua, B. M.; *A History of Pre-Buddhist Indian Philosophy*, p. 297. Basham. A. C.; *History and Doctrines of the Ājīvikas*, pp. 96, 107.
74. V. v. 19-21, 39-40.
75. *DhPA.*, Vol. I. pt. II., 309. 76. *ibid.* iii. 489.
77. *DhPA.*, Vol. I. pt. II, pp. 400; *Buddhist Legend*, Vol. 29. p. 70 ff.
78. *Buddhist Legend*, Vol. 29. pp. 74.
79. D. i. 166. 80. M. i. 77.
81. *ibid.* i. 138.
82. Uggama uppādaṇa esaṇam ca samjōjanam pamā-
ṇam ca.
Ingālādhūna kāraṇa aṭṭhavihā piṇḍasuddhi du.
Mūlācāra, 6.2.
83. Jacobi, *uttarādhyāyana*, intro. p. xxxi.
84. *Vṛahatkalābhāṣya*. Vol. I. 532 ff.; *Jīṭkalāpa*, 35., *Bhāṣya*, 1087-1719.
85. Desatti ya savvatti ya duvinam puṇa abhihaḍam
viyāṇāhi.
Āciṇṇamaṇāciṇṇam desāvihadam have duviham.
—*Mūlācāra*. 6. 19.
86. *Pinḍaniryukti*, 219-242.
87. Jāvadiyam uddeso pasandotti ya have samuddeso.
Samaṇotti ya ādeso niggaṇṭhotti ya have samādeso.

- Mūlācāra*, 6. 7.; *Ācārāṅga*, 11 1.6.8 (p. 104), *Dasavaśi*. 5.1.55.
88. Cf. *Pinḍaniryukti*, 271-77; 279-84.
89. *Mūlācāra*, 6. 10. 11, also see, *Dsv.*, 5. i. 31.
90. Cf. *Pinḍaniryukti*, 285-91; 303-15.
91. *Mūlācāra*, 6. 15, 17. 92. *ibid.* 6. 20.
93. *Dasvaśi*. 5. 40-41. 94. *ibid.* 5. 42-3.
95. *Mūlācāra*, 6.50, 52; also see, *Dasavaikālika*, 5. i. 43. 5-46.
96. Āsaṇaṃ jaḍi vā paṇaṃ khajjaṃ bhojaṃ ca liṇṇa peḍḍhaṃ vā. Paḍilehūṇaṃ suḍḍhaṃ bluṇṇaṃ pāṇipattesu. *Mūlācāra*, 9. 54; 1. 34.
97. *Uṇṇasakādhyaṇa*, 133 4. p. 35.
98. Addhamasāṇassa savvīṃ jaṇassa udarassa tadyamu-dayeṇa. Vāṇaṃ sūpcaṇaṇaṭṭhaṃ cauttamavasesaye bhikkhū. —*Mūlācāra*, 6. 72; also see, *ibid.* 5. 153.
99. See, for detail, *History of Jaina Monachism*, p. 196. f.
100. *Āvaśyaka Nirukti*, 766 ff. *Pinḍa Nirukti*, 427.
101. See, Deo, s. v. *History of Jaina Monicism*, p. 298, *Pinḍa*. N1. 494-99.
102. *Nisīha Cūṇi*, 4. p. 375. *Bṛhat Kalpakathū Bhāṣya*, Vol. III. 2681.
103. *JA.*, Vol. 13. No. 2. p. 2.
104. *ibid.*, Vol. 12-13, No. 2, p. 2, 68. Such magical practices can also be seen in the Āgamas. See, *History of Jaina Monachism*, p. 420.
105. *Book of Discipline*, Vol. 5. p. 151.
106. *D.* i. p. 57; *M.*, i. 377.
107. *Yogasāstra*, 2.30
108. *Jaina Sūtras*, introduction.
109. Rockhill, *the life of the Buddha*, p. 99 f. *History and Doctrines of the Ājīvikas*, Basham, A. C.; p. 21. f.
110. *History and Doctrines of the Ājīvikas*, p. 23.
111. Bahirdha-maithunaṃ parigrahaviśeṣaḥ ādānaṃ ca parigrahaḥ tayordvandvaikatvamathavā ādiyat ityā-dinaṃ parigrāhyaṃ vastutacca dharmopakaraṇamapi

bhavatityat āha, bahistāt dharmopakaraṇād bahirya-
diti, iha ca maithunaṁ parigrahe 'ntarbhavati,
Thāṇḍīga, 4. 1. Tikā.

¶ 112. *Abhayarajakumārasutta*.

¶ 113. Dharmārthaṁ putrakāmasya svadāresvadhikātinaḥ.
Ṛtukāle vidhānena doṣastatra na vidyate. *Sūkr*.
3. 4. 9-13, V. p. 98. At the same place, it is said-
Sadanuṣṭhānāt pārśve tiṣṭhantīti pārśvasthāḥ (Pāsa-
ttā), svayūthya vā pārśvasthāvasannākuśīlādayaḥ
stripariṣahaparājītāḥ. te vadanti—
Priyādarśanamevāstu, kimanyairdarśanāntaraiḥ.
Prāpyate yena nirvāṇam, sarāgeṇāpi cetasā.

—*ibid.*, 3. 4. 9. V. p. 98;

114. *Sūkr*, V. 102, p. 177; 102. Nir. vṛtti.

115. Pañcamahavvayā paṇṇattā-tam jahā-savvāo pāṇā-
tipāta sayvāo veramaṇaṁ, savvāo musāvāyao
veramaṇaṁ, savvāo adinnādāṇāo veramaṇaṁ, savvāo
mehupāo veramaṇaṁ, savvāo pariggahāo veramaṇaṁ,
Samavāyāṅga, 5. 2.

116. *Abhayarajakumārasutta*.

117. Cf. Pesuṇṇahāsakakkasaparanindāppappasamsavi-
kahādī.

Vajjita saparahīyaṁ bhāsāsamidi have kahaṇaṁ.

—*Mūlacāra*, 1. 12.

118. Ekamidāhaṁ, Mahanāmā, samayaṁ Rājāgahe vihi-
raṁ Gajjhakūte pabbate. Tena kho pana samayena
sambahulā Niganthā Isigulī .. āsanapaṭikkhūtā, opak-
kamikā, dukkhā tibbā kharā kaṭukā vedanā veda-
yanti.....*M.*, i. 93; cf. *M.*, ii, 31, 214 f.

119. *Mūlacāra*, comm. pt. I. p. 491.

120. Vyatīyacaṭṭakamāse loco ukkassamajjhimaḥaṇṇo.
Sapaḍikkamaṇe divase uvavāse, va. 1 āy. v. 10.

Mūlacāra, i. 20.

121. *M.*, i. 77. 122. *Mūlacāra*, i. 36. 123. *M.*, i. 77.

124. Maṇavacakāyapautti bhikkhū sāvajjakajjasamjuttā.
Khippaṁ nīvārayanto tihaṁ du gutto havadi eso.

—*Mūlacāra*, 5. 134

125. M., i. 372 f.
126. See for the place and nature of Meditation in Jainism, *Studies in Jaina Philosophy* by Tatiya. p. 261 f.
127. TS., 9. 28: Pare mokṣahetuḥ, *ibid.*, 9. 29.
128. Dhyāna Śataka, 30-34.

CHAPTER IV

Jaina Epistemology

1. Pratyakṣa Pramāṇa (Direct Knowledge)

1. Ete vivādā samaṇesu jātā, Sn. 4. 8. 63.
2. Ye kecime Brāhmaṇā vādasilā, *ibid.*, 2. 14. 162.
3. Ye kecime Tittthiṇa vādasilā, Ājivikā vā yadi vā Nigaṇṭhā, *ibid.*, 2. 14. 161.
4. *ibid.* 2. 14. 162. 5. D. i. 16.
6. na takkikā sujjhanti, Udāna, 6. 10. 23. 7. A. i. 189.
8. A. 1. 11. 305. 9. Tatparokṣaṃ, TSū. 1. 10.
10. Bhagavatisūtra, 336;
11. Thāṇāṅgasūtrā, 309-310; *History of Indian Logic*, p. 162. *Caraka Saṃhitā*, 3. 8. 6. 25.
12. Sn. 4. 8. 59, 60. 62; 411. 94. 13. *ibid.* 4. 8. 60-1.
14. *ibid.* ii. 76. 15. *Nyāya Sūtra*, 4. 2. 50-9
16. *Vādanyāya*, p. 1. 17. NV. 2. 384.
18. *Aṣṭasatī Aṣṭasaḥsri*, p 87.
19. Bhāsappavāḍako, paṇḍitavādo, sādhu samma to bahi-
janassa, M. i. 227.
20. *ibid.* 23. 4. f. 21. *ibid.* 312.
22. S. iv. 323 ff 23. *ibid* i. 176; ii. 122.
24. M. i. 393; S. iv. 32 } 25. NV. 2. 384.
26. D. i. 162 27. D. i. 163 ff.
28. M. i. 403 ff. 29. SV. 5, 2; TSV. 380.
30. M., 11. 211; Jayatilleke. R. N. *Early Buddhist theory
of Knowledge*, p. 171

31. Nigaṇṭho, ābuso, Nātaputto sabbaññū sabbadassāvī
aparisesaṃ jñānadassanaṃ paṭijānāti, carato...sami-
taṃ jñānadassanaṃ paccupaṭṭhitaṃ, *M.*, i. 92-3'
A., i. 220-221.
32. Samyagdarsāna jñānacāritrāṇi mokṣamārgaḥ,
TSu, 1. 1
33. *TSū*, 1. 4. 34. *A.* IV. 429.
35. Cillakṣaṇa evātmā, *TSP.* P. 118, Jivo upayogamao...
DS. 2; *T V.* 2. 8.
36. *TV.* 1. 6. Cf. *Dhaḥalā Tikkā*, P. 149. 37. *Niyamasūra*,
60, 161-9.
38. *Dhaḥalā*, 1. 1. 4; *ST.* P. 2. 1. 39. 1. 1. 4.
40. *STP.* 2. 1. 41. *S V T.* intro. (Hindi), p. 40.
42. *SS.* 1. 15. 43. *S T P T.* p. 458.
44. *PMu.* 6. 1. 45. *Pramāṇanaya Tatvāloka*,
6. 25.
46. Samaṃ jāṇadi passadi viharaditti, Prakṛti Anuyoga;
Janamane evaṃ ca naṃ viharai, *Ācārāṅga Sūtra*.
47. *STP.* 11; *VBH.* 3089-3135, *Studies in Jaina Philo-*
sophy, p. 75 ff.
48. *NS.* 159; 49. *TSū.* 2. 9;
50. *SS.* 2. 9. 52. *Aṣṭaṣa*, 101.
52. *Aṣṭasahasrī*. 53. *LT.* 1. 3, *SVT.* 1. 3, see intro. p. 97.
54. *Pramānamavisamvādi jñānāmanadhi...Aṣṭasati-Aṣṭa*
sahasrī, p. 175.
55. Jaṃ pardo Viññāṇaṃ taṃ tu parokkhati bhaṇḍidama-
tthesu. Jaṃ kevaḷaṇṇādaṃ havadī hu jiveṇa
paccakkhaṃ. *PS.*, 58
56. akṣṇoti vyāpṇoti jñānātīyakṣa ātmā, *SS.*, P. 59;
PMu., 6. 1
57. Ādye-parokṣaṃ, *TSu*, 1. 11; Pratyakṣamanyat.
ibid., 1. 11
58. *LT.* 4; *ViBh.* 95. 59. 1. 13.
60. Pratyakasamanyat, 1. 12. 61. *NA.* 1.
62. *Aṣṭasati Aṣṭasahasrī*, p. 175; *Pramāṇa Mīmāṃsā*.
63. *TSū* 1. 15. 64. *Pravacanasāra*, 23-4;

65. *VSu.* 3. 18. *NSu.* 1. 1. 4; *SK.* 5. *SSu.* 1. 89: *Yogabhāṣya*, 1. 7, *JSū.* 1. 1. 4; *Caraṇasamhita*, 11. 20; See, *An Advanced Studies in Indian Logic and Metaphysics*.
66. *YSu.* 3. 54; *SK.* 64. 67. *Vsu.* 9. 1; 13-15.
68. *N. B.* 1. 11, 69. *Tantravārtika*, p. 240.
70. *TS.* 1983. 71. *PSg.* 1.3; *NP.* p. 7; *NB.* 14.
72. *SV.* 1. 39. 73. *PKM.* 1. 3.
74. *TS.* 1983. 75. *ibid.*
76. *TSū.* 2. 9. 77. *Aṣṭaśatī Aṣṭasaḥśrī*, p. 275.
78. Ādye parokṣaṇṇ, Pratyakṣamanyat, *TSū.* 1. 11. 12.
79. Pratyakṣaṇṇ viśadaṇṇ jñānaṇṇ mukyaṣaṇṇvyavahārataḥ. Parokṣaṇṇ śeṣavijñānaṇṇ pramāṇe iti saṅgrahaḥ.
80. *TS.* 1214; *PSg.* p. 8.
81. *TSP.* p. 394; *NKC.* p. 46. *NVV.* p. 13.
82. *TSP.* p. 379, kā. 1265. 83. *ST.* p. 457.
84. *TSū.* 1. 15; *LT.* 6 85. *TSP.* p. 379.
86. Viśayaviśayisannipātasamanantaramādyāṇṇ grahaṇa-mavagrahaḥ, *TV.* 1. 15. 1.
87. *TSP.* p. 379. 88-89. *ibid.* p. 389.
90. 1. 1. 4.
91. *NA.* p. 43; *Tātparyavṛttiṭīkā*, p. 145; *NM.* p. 100.
92. *PSg.* 1. 37. 93. *TS.* 1224.
94. *ibid.* 1270. 95. *TS.* 1274-6.
96. Bhedo vaiśiṣṭamukṭaṇṇ hi na viśeṣaṇṇasaṅgatiḥ. Bhinnamityapi tadvācā nānuviddhaṇṇ pratiyate, *ibid.*, 1272.
97. *ibid.* 1269. 98. *Aṣṭaśatī Aṣṭasaḥśrī*, p. 175.
99. *NV.* 1. 158; Also see, *SV.* 1. 4; *TSV.* p. 185; *LT.* 1. 3.
100. *PKM.* p. 8; *NKC.* p. 47.
101. *SVT.* p. 13.
102. *Aṣṭasaḥśrī*, p. 75. 103. *TS.* 1273.
104. Viśeātmaṇṇtīrekeṇa nāparaṇṇ bhedalakṣaṇaṇṇ. Tadrūpasparsaṇṇe teṣu grahaṇaṇṇ kathamucyate. Tadrūpasparsaṇṇe cāpi bhedāntaravibheditaḥ. Grahita iti vijñānaṇṇ prāptameṣu vikalpakāḥ. *TS.* 1280-1.

105. *Vibhaṅga*. 323
106. TS. 1981-83.
107. SM. P. 111-2.; notes. p. 196.
108. *idid.* notes. p. 195.
109. Dve hi rūpaṃ kathaṃ nāma yukte ekasya vastunaḥ.
Adve tadā vaśtuni prāpte aparaspararūpataḥ.
Parasparātmatāyāṃ tu ta dyairūpyaṃ viruddhyate.
Viśeṣaścopalabhyeta cakṣurādibhirindriyaiḥ. TS.
1984-5.
110. Na cāmūnyārthadūṣaṇāni syādvādādināṃ vidyate.,
SM., p. 111.
111. TSū. 1. 29; STśSū 71. 112. TSū. 22.
113. TSū. 1. 27. 114. NSū. 16.
115. TSū 1. 25. 116. SS. 1. 24.
117. TV. 1. 23. 118. ViBH. 814.
119. Niścayadvātrīṃśikā, 17, quoted from Jñānavindupra-
kraṇa by Tatiya in *Studies in Jaina Philosophy*, p. 69,
fn. 3. bhāvā jīvadaya jīvagunā cedanā ya uvaogo.
PKS. 16.
120. Upaoge khalu duviho nāṇena ya dansṇena samjutto.
PKS. 40; DŚ. 4
121. Appāṇaṃ viṇu nāṇaṃ nāṇaṃ viṇu appago e saṇḍoho.
Tamhū sapaṇapayāsaṃ nāṇaṃ tahā daṇḍasaṇaṃ hodi.
NS. 170.
122. Bāhyābhyantarehetudvayasannidhāneyathāsambhava-
mupala bduhscaitanyānuvidhāyī pariṇamaḥ. TV. 2.B.
123. Je egaṃ jāṇai te sabhaṃ Jāṇai, je sebhāṃ jāṇai te
egaṃ, jāṇai, *pravacānasūtra*. Also sse, ASū. 1. 3. 4 :
ViBh. 320.
124. Jaṃ takkāliyamidaraṃ Jāṇadi Jugavaṃ samantado-
sabbhaṃ... PS. 1. 47-9.
125. idha, sandhaka, okacco sattha sabbaññū cabbadaesāvī
aparisosāṃ ṇanadassanaṃ paṭijānāti—carato ca me-
tiṭṭhato ca suttassa ca jāgrassa ca setataṃ samitaṃ
ṇānadassanaṃ paccup aṭṭhitaṃ ti, so ahuāññampi,
agāraṃ pi pavisati, piṇḍaṃ pi na labhati, kukkuro pi

dasati, caṇḍena pi hatthinā samāgacchati, caṇḍena pi
assena samāgacchati, caṇḍena pi gceṇa samāgacchati,
itthiyā pi purissa pi nāmaṃ pi gottam pi pucchati,
gāmassa pi nigamassa pi nāmaṃ pi maggaṃ pi
pucchati. 'm. i. 529

126. (ekamihāham mahānāma samayam rājagahe viharāmi
gijhakūte pabbate. tena kho pana samayena
Nigaṇṭhā.. katukā vedanā vedayanti...Nigaṇṭho
Nātaputto sabbaññū sabbadassāvī.. kim pana tumhe.
no lidam. ev. m sante āvuso Nigaṇṭhā, ye loke luddā
lohitapāṇino kumārakammantā manussesu paccājātā
te Nigaṇṭhesu pabbajanti 'ti).
127. M. ii. 31; M. Sayings. ii. p. 228, l. 250.
128. *Buddhist Legend* (*Dhammapadattakāthā*), Vol. 29. p.
74 ff.
129. M. ii. 31, 214 ff; M. i. 92f; A. i. 220; A. iii. 74; S. iv.
398.
130. tasmādanuṣṭheyagataṃ jñānamasyavicīryatam.
kītasāṅkhyāparijñāne tasya na kvopayujyate. heyo-
padeyatattvasya sābhyupāyasya vedakaḥ yaḥ
pramāṇamasāviṣṭe na tu sarvasya vedakaḥ. dūram
pasyatu vā mā vā tattvamiṇṭmtu pasya tu. pramāṇm
duradursi Cedehi grdhrārupasmahe. 2. 31-33.
131. (tato'sya vitarāgātve sarvairahajñānasambhavaḥ.
samahitasya sakalam cakāstīti viniścitam. sarveṣām
vitarāgāṇāmetat kasmānna vidyate. rāgādikaṇayamātre
hi tairyatnasya pravartanāt. punaḥ kālāntare teṣām
sarvajñaguṇarāgiṇām. alpayatnena sarvajñatvasiddhi-
ravāritā.—
132. *Bhāgavati sūtra*, 9.32. 133. Ps. l. 47-49
134. sūkṣmantaritatadūrārthaḥ pratyakṣaḥ kasyacidyatathā.
Anumeyatvato' gnyādiriti sarvajñasamsthitih. AM. 5.
135. *Jayadhavalā ṭīkā*.
136. *Dharmottara Pradīpa*, p. 245, 248.
137. yadi suksme vyavahito va Vastuni Buddhiratyanta-
parokṣe na syātkatharṇ tarhi jyotirjñānavisamvādaḥ ?

jyotirjñanamapi hi sarvajñapravartitameva, etasmā-
davisamvāda.....

Aklāṅkenāpi :—

Dino jyotirjñānātsarvajatvasiddhiḥ Taduktam.

Dhiratyantaparokṣerthe na cetpuṁsaṁ kutaḥ punaḥ.

Jyotirjñānavisaṁvādaḥ srutatvāccetsādhanañtaram.

—SVT. p. 526;

quoted by Dharmottara in the *Dharmottara Pradīpa*,
p. 245, 248 : compare-NV. 414; Śāstravārtāsamuccaya,
2. 3.

138. Jñāna syātīśayāt sidhyedvibhutam parimāṇvāt.
139. *ibid.* 8. 3. 140. *ibid.* 8. 10-14.
141. *ibid.* 8 12-18. 142. SV. 8 6
143. PVA. 4. 91. 144. *ibid.* 8. 6-7.
145. NV. 37-40. 146. NVV. 50-52.
147. See my article "The Conception of Omniscience in
Buddhism" appeared in VSMP 1968. Also see the
Appendix. III.
148. *Tattvavaiśaradī*, 1. 11. 149. *Anu.* 160.
150. PVM. 2. 5. 151. SV. 3. 2.
152. TS. 1298. 153. PVM. 2. 5.
154. *Tātparyavṛttiṭīkā*, p. 21. ; *Kandali*, p. 61; NM. 22, etc.
155. *Prakaraṇa Pañjikā*, p. 42-3; *Vṛhati Pa.* p. 103; Śāstra-
dīpikā, p. 124.
156. *Hetubinduṭīkā*. 157. TSV. 1. 10. 78; PKM. p. 16.
158. PM. p. 4-5. 159. PMu. 3. 5.; *Pramāṇapari-*
kṣā, p. 60.
160. SV. 227.
161. *Nyāya Vārtika Tātparya Ṭīkā*, d. 139.
162. PV. 3. 502-7. 163. LT. 10. 19. 21.
164. PM. 3. 11; SVT. intro.
165. *Śābarabhāṣya*, 9. 1. 1.
176. TS_{Bh}. 1. 15. 167. PV. p. 7.
168. LT. 11. 169. SV. 3. 8. 9; Lt. 12.
170. Aṣṭaśati Aṣṭasahasrī, p. 236.
171. NKC. pp. 724.

172. See in detail for this subject "*The Advanced Studies in Indian Logic and Metaphysics*" and SVT. introduction, etc.
173. NVV. pt. II. p. 1. 174. NV. 170.
175. Sahakramabhāvaniyamo 'vinābhāvaḥ, PM. 3. 16.
176. SV. 6. 16. 177. NV. 21.
178. PM. 3. 22. 179. Nyāyasūtra, I. I. 32.
180. SK. (Māthuravṛtti), p. 5.
181. Prakaraṇa Pañjikā, p. 83-5.
182. Nyāya Praveśa, pp. 1. 183. Vādanyāya, p. 61.
184. PV. 128. 185. Sv. 6. 17;
186. PMū. 33-40.
187. Cetanāstaravaḥ iti sādhye sarvatvagapaharaṇe maraṇam prativādyasiddham vijñānenadvatīyayurnirodhakṣaṇasya maraṇasyenenābhyupagamāt, tasya ca taru-svasarṁbhavāt; NB., 59.
188. Digambarāstu sādhyena vyāptamavyāptam vā maraṇam..... p. 190-1.
189. Candratvenāpadiṣṭannācandraḥ śaśalāñchanah.
Iti dvilakṣaṇo heturayaṁ cāpara ucyaṭe. etc. TS., 1372-1379.
190. TSP. 1375. 191. *Advanced Studies in Indian Logic and Metaphysics*, p. 86.
192. PMu. 3. 37-40. 193. *Pramāṇa Mīmāṃsā*.
194. RVS. p. 548. 195. TS. 1395.
196. *ibid.* 1397. 197. *ibid.* 1398-1429.
198. Nyāyāvatāra Vārtika Vṛtti, Prastāvanā, p. 76-8.
199. *Prāśastapādabhāṣya*, p. 200, *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*, p. 203.
200. SK (Mātharavṛtti), 5. 201. NP. 1; NB. 2-5; HB. P. 4; PS. 1362.
202. *Tatparyatīkā*, I. I. 5; NM. p. 110. 203. SV. 6. 2..
204. *Dharmottar-prādīpa*, p. 35
205. Pātrasvāmimatamāśaṅkate : —
Anyathā' nupapannatve nānudraṣṭā ścahetutā.
Nāsati tryaṁśakasyāpi tasmātklībāstrilakṣaṇaḥ.
Anyā thānupapannatvaṁ yasyāsau heturisyate.
Ekalakṣaṇakaḥ so rthasheturlakṣaṇako na vā.

206. Tena tadviṣayatrīlakṣaṇakaderthanam uttarabhāṣyam-
yataḥ kṛtam, *SVT.* p. 371.
207. Mahimā sā Pātrakeśarīguroḥ param bhavati yasya
bhaktyāśīt. Padmāvatisahāyā trīlakṣaṇakadarthanam
kartum.
- *Jaina Sūālekha Saṅgrah*, Pra. Le. 54.
208. *TS.* 1364-5. 209. *ibid.* 1370.
210. *TSP.* p. 406, Kā. 1371. 211. *TS.* 1380-1.
212. *ibid.* 1386-8. 213. *ibid.* 1389.
214. *ibid.* 1395-1429. 215. *ibid.* 1416.
216. *NKC.* p. 440; *SVT.* 6. 16. 217. *HBT.* p. 290.
218. *HBT.* p. 37. 219. *Aṣṭasahasrī*, p. 3.

CHAPTER V

Anekāntavāda

1. The Theory Of Anekāntavāda

1. This classification excludes the less important conceptions such as *hetuvāda*, *ahetuvāda*, *bhāva-vāda*, *abhāva-vāda*, *daitavāda* *puruṣārthavāda*, and so on. See in detail, *Darśana aurā cintana* and *Jaina theory of reality and knowledge*.
2. Utpādavyayadhravyayuktam sat, *Tsū* 5. 30, Guṇapara-
rayayavaddravyam, *Tsū*, 5. 38.

Kumārīlabhaṭṭa also maintains the nature of reality to be of three-fold character. His view is almost identical with that of Jaina philosophy (see *Śloka-vārtikā Kūrikā*, 21-22. But the difference between the views of Kumārīla and Jainas is that the former adheres to a "middle position" (*mādhyasthātā*) between the two extremes of the *bheda* (*anya*) and the *abheda* (*ananya*), each of which (*ekāntikam*) is characterised as fallacious (*mṛṣā*), while the latter recognizes them to a certain extent as right and not.

- fallacious. Whitehead (PrR. p. 318), Frauwallner and Kant (*The Philosophy of Kant Explained*, by John Watson, Glasgow, 1908, p. 199) are also of about the same view. Hegel, (Hegel's *science of Logic*, tr. by W. H. Johnson and L. G. Struthers, 1929, London, Vol. 1 p 195), Bradley (*Principles of Logic*, by F. H. Bradley, Oxford, 1940, Vol. 11. p. 487), Bosanquet (*The essentials of Logic*, by B. Bosanquet, London, 1903, p 134) too are of the close views to the Jaina view of reality. See in detail, Jaina theories of reality and knowledge, pp. 131.
3. See, *Jaina Theories of Reality and Knowledge*, pp. 258.
 4. Atho khalu dāvvaṃaḍāvvaṃāṇi guṇappagāṇi bhaṇidāṇi. PS., 119.
 5. *Pravacanasāra*, Jayasena's commentary, p. 121.
 6. STP. 2. 9-14; TV. pt. I, ¶. 428. 7. TV. 5. 37, 2-4.
 8. NKC. ¶. 363.
 9. Āvuso tvaṃ mama iccayena Sassataṃ ti, gaṇhapesi. Evam dve pi me cka laddhike akatvā bahu-nānā-nihāraṇa uggāṇhapesvā kālāṃ akāsi. Te tassa sarira-kiccaṃ katvā sannipatitā aññahi aññaṃ pucchimsu-
"kas' āvuso ācāryo sāraṃ ācikkhi?" ti "Sassataṃ"
u. Aparo taṃ paṭibāhetvā "Mahyaṃ sāraṃ ācikkhi
ti" āha. Fvaṃ sabbe : Mahyaṃ sāraṃ ācikkhi,.....
DA, u. 906-7. MA., u. 831.
 10. A., u. 46; *Millinda Pañha*, iv. 2. 5. Also see, A., i. 197.
 11. M., ii. 46.
 12. Vibhajjavāyaṃ ca vyāḡarejee, *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*, 1. 14. 22.
 13. *Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge*, p. 292.
 14. D i. 191. 15. HBT. p. 284.
 16. ITS. ¶. 333; HBT. p. 369.
 17. na sāmānvatmanodeti na vyetiviyaktamanvayāt.....
-AM., 59-61. quoted in PVST., by Karpakagomin,
p. 333; Durvekamiśra quotes one more kārikā in the
Hetubinduṭṭhikaloka p. 371.

Na nāśena vinā śoko notpādena vinā dhṛtiḥ.
Sthityā viṇā na mādhyasthyaṁ tasmāt vastur
trayātmakam.

18. *pravacanasūtra*, 17-18.
19. *Lt.*, 30; *PM.*, p. 24.
20. *Dravyaśabdena dravati paryāyena gacchati* ti p. 337.
21. *Tattvasaṅgrah*, *Ātmaparīkṣā*.
22. *HBT*. p: 28.
23. *Prameyasarṇamālā*, p. 4, also see, the VIIth chapter of the *Tattvasaṅgrah*).
24. See, *TS.*, 350-516. Also see, *HBT*, p. 213. The *Syādvāda-Maṇjarī* (p. 19) refers to a stanza in this respect : Yo yatraiva sa tatraiva yo yadaiva tadaiva saḥ. Na deśakālayorvyāptirbhāvanāmiha vidyate.
25. Pūrvaṁ naśvaracchaktātākāryaṁ kinnāvinaśvarāt.
Kāryotpattiviruddhyeta na vai kāraṇasattatayā.
Yad yadā kāryamutpitsu tattadottpādanātmakam.
Kāraṇaṁ kāryabhedenā na bhinnam kṣaṇikaṁ yathā.
—*SV.*, 3 11-12. Also see, *NKC.*, p. 379. etc. *Jaina Theories and reality of knowledge*.
26. *HBT*. p. 373 4
27. Tanna tāvadakṣaṇiko bhāvaḥ kāryam kartum śaknoti,
tasya kramayaugapadyābhyāmarthakriyāvirodhāt nāpi
kṣaṇiko bhāvaḥ kāryam prabhavati. tathāhi kṣaṇiko
bhāvaḥ svasattakāle kāryakāraṇasvabhāve' thānyadā.
yadi prathamavikalpastadā tadaiva kuryāt. svasatt-
ākṣane ca kāryakṛtau sarvaṁ jagadekalakṣaṇavartī
prāpnoti. tathāhi kāraṇam svasattākṣaṇa eva yat
kāryamakṛta tadapyanyasya kāraṇamiti tadapi tadaiva
svakāryam kuryāt ... *ibid.* p. 374.
28. Tarhi kāryamapi te daivotpādyeta'nyadā tatkālaṁ,
parihṛtya kāryotpattiviruddhyeta ... *ibid.*
29. *ibid.* p. 374.
30. *IS.*, intro. p. 1.
31. *Uttarādhyayana*, 20-15; 23. 28; 26. 9; 28. 16; 28. 19.
Bhagavatsūtra, 73. 209; *Daśvaikalikasūtra*, 4. etc.
32. *TS.* 352.
33. *ibid.* 336-349.

34. *Jaina Theory of Reality of Knowledge*. p. 173.
35. Nanvanekātmakan̄ vastu yathā mecakratnavat.
Prakṛtyaiva sadādīnām ko virodhastathā sati.
—TS., 1709.
36. Tāsu tāsu hyavasthāsu sa evāyaṁ nara iti anuvṛtti-
pratyayahetor naratvajāterūrdhvatāsāmānyasabdābh-
ilapyastāsu cāvasthāsu.....*HBT.A.* p. 343. CF. Parā-
paravivartavyāpī dravyaṁ ūrdhvatā mṛdiva sthāsā-
disu, PM. 4.5 ekasmin dravye kramabhāvinaḥ
pariṇāmaiḥ paryayaḥ ātmani harṣaviśādivat, PM. 4. 8.
HBT.A., p. 343; PM., 4.5.
37. Tiryaksāmānyavyāvṛttipratyayaheto
HBT.A., p. 343. Cf.
Sadrasūpariṇāmastiryak khaṇḍamuṇḍādiṣu gotvavat.
PM., 4. 4.
38. PM., 4. 9.
39. PVST. p. 333; *HBT.A.* p. 369. etc.
40. *HBT.* p. 98.
41. Deśakālasvabhāvānāmabhedādekatoctate.....
Sāṅkhyālakṣaṇasamjñārthabhedāt bhedāstu varṇyate.
Rūpādayo ghaṭaścetai saṅkhyāsamjñā vibheditā.
Kāryānuvṛttivyāvṛtti lakṣanārthavibheditā.
Dravyaparyāyayorevaṁ naikāntenā 'viśeṣavat.
dravyaṁ paryāyarūpeṇa viśeṣaṁ yāti cet svayaṁ.
—TS., 313-315; also see, *HBT.*, pp. 98.
42. kiñcidvivakṣitaṁ vastughaṭādi,.....
yadi ghaṭādirbhāvaḥ paṭādina bhāvāntareṇatulyaḥ
syāt-tato yadi vyāvṛttaḥ syāt, tadā khapuṣpāna tasya
viśeṣaḥ syāt, sarvathā vastvantarādvvyāvṛttavāt, na
ca vastvantarādvvyāvṛttasyānyagatiḥ sambhavati, kha-
puṣpatām muktivā. tasmāttasya vastunaḥ khapuṣpat-
ulyatvamabhyupagacchata bhāvāntaratulyatvaṁ va-
stutvaṁ nāma sāmānyamabhyupagantavyamiti sidd-
ham sāmānyātmakan̄
—TSP., p. 487.
43. TSP. P. 487.
44. TS. 1712-13.
45. *ibid.* 1714-16.
46. *ibid.* 1718-19.
47. *ibid.* 1720-21.
48. *Tārakabhāṣā*, pt. T. p. 5

49. PV., 3. 237.
50. Pārtantrayaṃ hi sambandhaḥ siddhe kā paratantratā.
Tasmāt sarvasya bhāvasy sambandho nāsti tattvataḥ.
—quoted in TV., p. 146, NKC. 305.
51. Rūpaśleṣo hi sambandhaḥ dvitve sa ca kathaṃ bhavet.
Tasmāt prakṛtibhinnānāṃ sambandho nāsti tattvataḥ.
—quoted in the TSV., p. 148. cf. NKC., p. 306; PKM.,
p. 149.
52. *Jaina Theories of Reality and Knowledge*. p. 232. f.
53. Dravyakṣetrakālabhāvakṛta hi pratyāsattiḥ ekatva-
pariṇatisvabhāva pārtantryapariṇāma sambandho'
rthānāmabhipreto Jainaiḥ . rūpaśleṣo hi. NKC.,
p. 307.
54. NKC., p. 369. *Jaina Theories of reality and knowledge*,
p. 283.

2. The Theory of Nayavāda

55. Nayo jñātirabhiparāyah, LT., 55. Anirākṛtapratipakṣo
vastvaṃśagrāhi jñāturabhiprāyo nayah. PKM. p. 676.
56. Sadeva sat svāt saditi tridhārtho,
mīyet durnitinayapiamānaiḥ, SM., 28.
57. See. TV. 1. 33; *Epitom of Jainism*.
58. A. ii. 191-3.
59. Nayena neti, S. ii. 58; anayena nayati dummedho,
J. iv. 241.
59. Nayaṃ nayati medhāvī, J. iv. 241.
61. Dve satye samupāsṛitya buddhānaṃ dharmadeśanā.
Lokasaṃvṛtisatyam ca satyam paramārthataḥ.
—MK Ārya. 8.
62. A. iii. 178; *Netti*. 21. J. iv. 241.
63. Ns., 897, 904, 911. cf. *Milinda Pañha*, 160.
64. Sn. 68, 219.
65. Dve'me Tathāgatam Abbhācikkhanti Katamam dve ?
Yo ca Neyyattham suttantam nītattho suttanto ti
dipeti; yo ca nītattham suttantam nevyattho sutt-
anto ti dipeti, A., i. 60.
66. AA., i. 95; Cf. *Kathavatthu*, *Aṭṭhakatha*, 34.

67. Sn 884. 68. A. ii. 41; v. 29.
3. The Theory of Syādvāda
69. A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. I. p. 141.
70. SV. p. 1027.
71. Encyclopaedia of Buddhism, Fascicule : A-Aca-P., p. 142.
72. Studies in Jaina Philosophy, p. 22.
73. PKM. 526.
74. Sarvamasti svarūpeṇa pararūpeṇa nāsti ca.
Anyathā sarvasattvaṃ syāt svarūpasyāpyasambhavaḥ.
—SM., 14.
75. Vastvasaṅkarasiddhiśca tatprāmāṇyaṃ samāśritā.
Kṣīradadhyādi yannāsti prāgabdhavaḥ sa ucyate
NKC., p. 467.
76. PKS., 9.
77. Nāstitā payaso dadhai pradhvamsābhāvalakṣaṇaṃ,
—NKC., p. 467.
78. Gavi yo'svādyabhāvastu so' nyonyābhāva ucyate.
NKC., Vol. II. p. 467.
79. *ibid.*, Vol. II. p. 467; *Jaina theories of Reality and knowledge*, p. 350.
80. *Jaina Theories of Reality and Knowledge*, p. 363.
81. *R̥gveda*, x. 129, Tr. Macdonell, *A Vedic Reader for Students*. p. 207-8.
82. *Vī.*, 2. 1-8.
83. *Tup.* 2. 7; Also see the *CHU* p. 3. 19. 1.
84. *MUp.* 2. 2. 1. 85. *ChUp.* 3. 19. 1.
86. *Sāṅkhyaparavacanabhāṣya*, p. 3
87. *Nyāyabhāṣya*, 2. 1. 18.
88. *Vedāntasāra*, p. 25.
89. Santi...eke samaṇabrāhmaṇā amarāvikkhepikā, tattha tattha paṇḍaṃ puṭṭhā samaṇa vācāvikkhepaṃ āpajjanti amarāvikkhepaṃ catūhi vatthūni, *D.*, 1. 24.
90. *DA.* 1. 115.
91. Idha...ekacco samaṇo vā brāhmaṇo vā idam kusalam ti yathābhūtaṃ nappajānāti, idam akusalam ti yathā-

bhūtaṃ nappajānāti. Tassa evaṃ hoti. Ahaṃ kho idaṃ kusalaṃ ti yathābhūtaṃ nappajānāmi, idaṃ akusalaṃ ti yathābhūtaṃ nappajānāmi. Ahañ c' eva kho pana idaṃ ti yathābhūtaṃ appajānāto, idaṃ kusalaṃ ti yathābhūtaṃ appajānato idaṃ. kusalaṃ ti va vyākareyyaṃ, idaṃ, akusalaṃ ti va vyākareyyaṃ, tattha me assa chando vā rāgo vā doso vā paṭigho vā taṃ mam' assa musā. Yaṃ mam' assa musā so mam' assa vighāto. Yo mam' assa vighāto so mam' assa antarāyo ti. Iti so musāvādabhaya musāvādaparijegucchā n' ev idaṃ kusalaṃ ti vyākaroṭi na pana idaṃ akusalaṃ ti vyākaroṭi, tattha tattha pañhaṃ puṭṭho samaṇo vācā vikkhepaṃ āpajjati amarāvikkhepaṃ : Evañ ti pi me no. Tathā ti pi me no. Aññathā ti pi me no. No ti pi me no. No no ti pi me no ti. D., i. 24-5.

92. DA., i. 155.

93. idha, bhikkhave, ekacco samaṇo vā brāhmaṇo vā mando hoti momūho. So mandattā momūhattā tattha tattha pañhaṃ puṭṭho samaṇo vācāvikkhepaṃ āpajjati amarāvikkhepaṃ—Atthi paro loko ti...evañ ti pi me no, ti. tathā ti pi me no, aññathā ti pi me no, no no ti pi me no ti. Natthi paro loko ti pe...atthi ca natthi ca paro loko pi. nevatthi na natthi paro loko pi; atthi sattā opapātikā pi, natthi sattā opapātikā, nevatthi na natthi sattā opapātikā; atthi sukaṭadukkhaṭānaṃ kammānaṃ phalaṃ vipāko, natthi... vipāko, atthi ca natthi...vipāko, nevatthi na natthi... vipāko. Hoti tathāgato paraṃ maraṇā, na hoti... maraṇaṃ, *neva hoti na na hoti...maraṇā*. D. 1. 27.

94. D., i 58-59.

95. DA., i. 115; see, Jaytilleke, *Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge*, p. 136.

96. Keith writes—he (sañjaya) seems as an agnostic to have been the first to formulate the four possibilities.

of existence, non-existence, both and neither..." *Buddhist Philosophy*, p. 303 : Raju, P. T. also supports this view stating "the principle seems to have been first used by Sañjaya"—an article "*The Principle of Four-Cornered Negation in Indian Philosophy*."

97. *Buddhism and Culture*, ed. Susuma Yamaguchi, Kyoto, 1960 p. 71.
98. Asiyasayaṃ Kriyānaṃ Akriyavāṇa hoi culasie. Annaniya sattatthi veniyana ca vattisa. *Sūkr.* Vo. I. fol. 212.
99. *Ibid.* 1. 3. 11-34; *Vṛtti.* p. 45-6; Vavisam suttaim tikanaiyaim terasia sutta parivadie, *Samavāyāṅga* 22. 4.
100. Tathā te eva Gośāla-pravarttitā Ājivakīḥ pāsaṇḍinas Trairāsikā ucyante, yatas te sarvaṃ vastu tryātmakaṃ icchanti tad yathā jīvo jivājīvās ca loko' loko lokā-lokāś'ca, sadasat sadasat. Naya-cintāyāṃ drvyāstikaṃ paryāyāstikaṃ ubhayāstikaṃ ca, Tatas tribhī rāsibhis caranti iti Trairāsikāḥ. *Nandī comm.*, fol. 113, quoted by Weber Verzeichniss, ii, p. 685. Cf. *Samavāya comm.*, fol. 129. *History and doctrines of the Ājivikas.* p. 275.
101. *Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge*, p. 156.
102. Na yā vi panne parihāsakujjā, na yā' siyāvāya viyā-garejja, *Sūkr.* 1. 14. 19.
103. Sañkejja yā' saṃkitabhāva bhikkhū, vibhajjavāyaṃ ca viyāgarejja, bhāsādukaṃ dhammaṃ-samuṭṭhitehiṃ vyāgarejja samayā supanne. *ibid.* 1. 14. 22.
104. *PK.* 14.
105. Vibhajjavāyaṃ ca viyāgrāejja, *sūkr.* 1. 14. 22.
106. Ekaṃsika pi...mayā dhammā desitā paññattā, anekaṃsika pi desitā, paññattā, *D. i.* 191. ; Cf. vibhajja-vādo...ahaṃ...nāhaṃ ..ekaṃsavādo, *M. ii.* 197.

- ¶ 07. "The Logic of Relatively as the Common Ground for the Development of the Middle Way", *Buddhism and Culture*, ed. Susuma Yamāguchi, Kyoto, 1960, p. 80.
- ¶ 08. *MA.* ii. 831; *DA.* iii. 906. 109. *M.* i. 232.
- ¶ 10. *S.* iv. 298-9. 111. *M.* i. 498 ff.
- ¶ 12. *MA.* iii. 204. 113. *DPPN.*, sv.
Dīghanakha.
- ¶ 14. Katamo ca Rāhulo tejodhātu ? tejodhātu siyā ajjhattikā siyāvahirā, *M.*, *Cūlarāhulovūdasutta*; Also see the *Bodhirājakumārasutta* of the same Nikāya, p. 330 (Nāgarī edition).
- ¶ 15. Utpādādyastrayo vyastā nālaṃ lakṣaṇakarmaṇi. Saṃskṛtasya samastasyu rekatra kathamekadā. Utpādasthitibhaṅgamanyat saṃskṛtalakṣaṇam. Asticedanvastaiva nāsti cette na saṃskṛtaḥ. *Mk.* 45-6.
- ¶ 16. Etenaiva yadāhrikāḥ kimapyasīlamākulaṃ. Pralāpanti pratikṣiptaṃ tadapyekānta sambhavāt. Digambarāṇaṃ idaṃ ca kimapyayuktaṃ asīlamaheyopādeya. maparinīṣṭhānāt ākule "syāduṣtro dadhi na syāditi" yairuktaṃ te' pi etenaiva prakṣiptaḥ. bhābenaiva ekāntabhedāt. *PV.* 1. 183.
- ¶ 17. Sarvasyobhaya rūpatve tadviśeṣanirākṛteḥ. Codito dadhi khādeti Kimuṣṭraṃ nābhidhāvati. Athāstyā-tisayaḥ kaścit yena bhedenā vartate. Sa eva dadhyonyatra nāstītyanubhayaṃ paraṃ. *ibid.* 1. 184-5.
- ¶ 18. Sarvātmatve ca sarveṣāṃ bhinnau syātāṃ na dhidhvaniḥ. Bhedasamhāravādasya tadabhāvādasambhavaḥ. *ibid.*, 1. 185-6
- ¶ 19. Athotpādavyayadhrauvyayuktaṃ yattatsadiṣyate. Eṣāmeva na satvaṃ syāt etadbhāvādhiyogataḥ. etc., *PVA.*, p. 142.
Yadā vyavastādasatvaṃ kathaṃ tasya pratiyate. Pūrvam pratites atvaṃ syāt tadā tasya vyayaḥ kathaṃ.

Dhrauveye'pi yadi nāsmiṇ dhiḥ katham sātvaṃ
 |ratīyate
 Pratīterevasarvasya tasmātsatīvaṃ kuto' nyathā-
 Tasmānnityānityasya vastunaḥ sambhavaḥ qvacit.
 Anityam nityamathāvastu ekāntena yuktimat-
 PVA, p. 142.

120. HBT., p. 233.

121. "Utpādavyayadhrauvya yuktaṁ sat" ityetaḍapyayau-
 ktaṁ, dhra uveṇotpādavyayayorvirodhāt, ekasmiṇ
 dharmiṇyayogāt. kathañcit utpādavyayau kathañcit,
 dhrauvymiti cet. yathotpadau na tathā dhrauvy-
 ayaṁ, yathā ca dhrauvyaṁ na tathotpadaḥvyayayāviti
 naikaṁ vastu yathoktalakṣaṇaṁ svāt. *ibid.* p. 146.

122. Drvyaparyāyarūpatvāt dvairūpyaṁ vastunaḥ kila.
 Tayorekātmakatvépi bhedaḥ. samjñādibhedaḥ *ibid.*,
 p. 104.

123. *ibid.* v. 4-5.

124. *ibid.* v. 7-12, p. 105.

125. *ibid.*, v. 20 & 25. p. 106.

126. TSP. p. 421.

127. TS. 1722

128. *ibid.* 1723.

129. *ibid.* 1720-30

130. cf. *ibid.* 1733 35.

131. yo'pi Digambaro manyate—Sarvātmakameyedaṁ
 syādanyāpohāvyatikrme tasmād bheda evānyathā na
 syādanyābhāvo bhāvanāṁ yadi na bhābediti, sopya-
 nena nirastaḥ. abhāvena bhāvśbhedasya kartuma-
 śakyatvāt. nāpyabhinnānāṁ hetuto niṣpannānāmany-
 onyābhāvaḥ sambhavati. bhinnāścennispannāḥ
 kathamanyonyābhāvaḥ sambhavati? *PVST.* p. 109.

132. tena yo'pi Digambaro manyate...sopyatra nirākṛta
 eva drastavyaḥ. tadvāti sāmānyaviśeṣavati vastunya-
 bhyupagamyamāne atyantapabhedābhedaḥ syātām...
 atha sāmānyaviśeṣayoḥ kathañcidabbedā iṣyate.....
 mithyāvāda eva syādvādaḥ. —*PVST.*, p. 332-42.

133. *Jaina Theories of Reality and Knowledge*, p. 22-23.

134. Sadbhūtā dharmāḥ sattādidharmāḥ samānā
 bhinnāścāpi yathā Nirgranthādīnāṁ. Tanmatam na

'samanjasaṃ. kasmāt ? no bhinnābhinnāmete'pi
pūrvavat bhinnābhinnayordoṣābhāvāt.....ubhayore-
kasmīn asiddhatvāt.....bhīdnnābhinnakalpenā na
sadbhūtaṃ nyayāsiddhaṃ satyābhāsaṃ grahitam. 2. 2.

435. Guṇaved dravyamutpadavyadhrauvādayo guṇaḥ.
Dudrāva dravati droṣatyekānekaṃ svaparyāyaṃ.
Bhedajñānāt pratiyet prādurbhāvatyayau yadi.
Abhedajñānataḥ siddhā sthītiramśena kenacit. *NV.*,
117-8.
436. Arcāṭaṇṭaka tadasmāduparaṃ, dustarkapakṣabala-
calanāt. Syādvādācalavidalanacuñcurnā tavāsti
nayacañcuḥ. —*NVV.*, 1087.
437. *AJP.* Vol. I. p. 72.
438. Na naraḥsīmharūpatvā na sīmho naraḥrūpataḥ.
Sadbhāvijñānakayāṇāṃ bhedāt jātyantaraṃ hi tat
Nanaro nararyeveti na sīmhaḥ sīmha eva hi.
Samānādhikaraṇyena naraḥsīmhaḥ prakīrtitaḥ.
Dravāt svasmādashinnāśca vyāvṛttaśca parasparaṃ.
Unmajjanti nimajjanti jalakallolavat jale.
—*NKC*, p. 369 ; also see *APT.*, p. 15.
439. Bhūtadoṣasyodbhāvayitumaśakyatvena asaddūṣaṇeno-
dbhāvanam sa jātiḥ, *NVV.*, Vol. II. p. 233.
440. Tatra mithyottarāṃ jātiḥ yathā' nekāntavidvijaṃ.
Dadhyuṣṭrāderabhedātvāprasāṅgāḍekacodanam. *NV.*,
2. 203
441. *NVV.*, Vol. II. p. 233.
442. Pūrvapakṣamavijñāya dūṣako' pi vidūṣakaḥ iti
prasiddhaḥ. *NVV.*, Vol. II, p. 233
At another place Dharmakīrti is called 'Kathamunmūṭto'
NVV., p. 17 Kutsitmāsaṃsamānaḥ ayaṃ prasiddho
Dharmakīrti kenāpi Dignāgādina vañcītaḥ (*SVT.*,
p. 365 etc.)
443. *NV.*, 2. 204-5. Like-wise at another place Akalaṅka,

commenting on the Buddhist Ācāryas, especially
Dharmakīrti, says :

Dadhyādau na pravarteta Bauddha tadbhuktaye.
Janaḥ, Adrasyaṁ saugatiṁ tatra tanuḥ

Dadhyādike tathā bhukte na bhūktaṁ kañcikaḍḍikaṁ.
Ityāsau vetu no veti na bhuktā saugati tanuḥ.

—*Siddhiviniścayaśavrtti*, 6, 37.

144. Sthūletarākārayorāpyevamanyonyabhede satyapi
dravyeṇaikenā tādātmyopapatteravaya vino Jainābhi-
matasya suvyavasthatvāt, *NVV Pt. ii. p. 172* &
Sadraśātmānaḥ santo niyatarttayaḥ, *ibid pt. ii. p. 52*.
145. *PSg. p. 115-6*.
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APPENDICES

- 1. The Date of Buddha.**
- 2 Buddhist Councils.**
- 3. The Conceptions of Omniscience-
in Buddhism.**

APPENDIX 1

The Date of Buddha

The chief landmark of Buddhist chronology is the year and date of the Buddha's parinibbāna which is said to lie according to two main traditions, somewhere between 487-477 B. C. and 543-544 B. C.

Charpentier¹, Max Muller², and General A Cunningham³ asserted 477-478 B. C. as the date of the Buddha's demise. According to them, the year of Chandragupta's accession was 315 B. C. and it is now proved to be an erroneous premise.

Oldenberge⁴ favours 481 B. C. while V. A. Smith prefers 486 B. C. Smith depends on the so called "*Cantonese Dotted Record*". It is said that Bhikṣu Saṅghabhadra sent news of the Buddha's parinibbāna to China. Since then an arrangement of reckoning the Buddha's death by marking a dot each year had been made in Canton, and this dotted record continued upto the year 489 A. D. All the dots were counted in 489 A. D., and their total number reached 975, which suggests 486 B. C. as the year of Buddha's death. It is not easy to recognize the *dotted record* as being trust worthy unless other strong evidence supports it.

Rychaudhuri⁵ accepts 486 B. C., while Kern⁶ places it in 488 B. C. On the other hand, Muni Nugaraj⁷ mentions 502 B. C. as the year of the Buddha's parinibbāna. But all these conceptions do not carry weight as they do not take into account all the evidences.

Another date 483 B. C., which seems more reliable, is supported by several non-traditionalists or reformed traditionalist scholars. Sylvain Levi⁸ pointed out from the Chinese accounts that 483 B. C. was reckoned as the Buddha's demise up to the 4th century in Ceylon, while E. R. Ayrton⁹, the late Archaeological Commissioner of Ceylon, and Wickrema-

singhe¹⁰ try to prove the acceptability of this date from the beginning of the 4th century up to the 11th century. Geiger also warmly accepts this view.

John M. Seneviratne established his theory that "The era reckoned from 483 B. C. remained not only up to the 11th century but up to the end of the 15th century, when the new tradition that the Buddha died in 544 B. C.—came in and soon ousted the old, are creating no little confusion, not so much during the transitionary stage as in our own time."¹¹

The scholars, who accept 483 B. C. as the date of the Buddha, urge that 218 years after Buddha's death, Asoka's consecration took place. They quote the *Dīpavamsa*¹², and *Mahāvamsa*¹⁴ in support of their theory. As regards Asoka's consecration, they say that his predecessors Bindusāra and Candragupta ruled for 28 and 24 years, according to the Ceylonese chronology.¹⁵ And Asoka was consecrated four years after he had already reigned over the country.¹⁶ This means Candragupta would have ascended the throne 162 years ($218 - 4 = 214 - 28 + 24 = 162$) after the Buddha's nibbāna.

Fortunately they could say with almost certainty that Chandragupta's accession took place in 321 B. C., since Alexander the Great died at Babylon in the same year and this fact has been amply recorded¹⁷. From this they conclude that the Buddha's death would have taken place in 483 B. C. ($321 + 162 = 483$).

Hoernle, on the otherhand, accepts 482 B. C. as the "Practically certain" date of the Buddha's parinibbāna. He supports his view by the evidence that Bimbisāra was murdered by his son eight years before the Buddha's nibbāna.¹⁸ Though there is no great difference between the dates, 483 B. C. appears the more dependable one.

As regards the traditional date of Buddha, it is yet to be ascertained, since the tradition itself is not accepted with unanimity. According to the Buddhist Chronicles of Ceylon and Burma, the Nibbāna took place in 544-543 B. C., while

the Northern Indian traditions place it at a very early date. Cunningham¹⁹ refers to some of them. In the time of Hiuen Tsaang, A. D. 630-645, the Buddhist schools held widely different opinions, varying from 900 and 1000 years up to 1200, 1300 and even 1500 years prior to that date²⁰, which would place the Nibbāna of the Buddha either in 250, or 350, or 550, or 650 and 850 B. C. The same extravagant antiquity was also asserted in the time of Fa-Hian, who places the Nibbāna during the reign of Ping-Wang, Emperar of China, in B. C. 770-719²¹. A similar antiquity was still claimed as late as the Twelfth Century A. D., during the reign of Asoka Balla Deva. Two of his inscriptions are dated in the years 51 and 74 of the Lakṣmaṇa Sena era, or in A. D. 1159 and 1180. A third inscription, which is dated in the year 1813 after the Nibbāna of Buddha shows that at that time, Nibbāna was believed to have occurred between about 656 to 633 B. C.

But all the traditional views, except the traditions of Ceylon and Burma, do not have sufficiently strong evidences in their support. According to the *Mahāvamsa*, Parākramabāhu I was crowned when 1696 years had elapsed since the Buddha's death, that is, in the year 1697 A. B. The Ceylonese era falls this year 1153 A. D.²² This is supported by an independant source, viz. a South Indian Inscription at the Temple of Tiruvalisvara in Arpakkama. According to the *Cūlavamsa*, 56.16 foll., the predecessors of Parākramabāhu, from Parākrama Pāṇḍu onwards, reigned 107 years. Thus the accession of the last-named prince falls at 1590 A. D. Moreover, this date is confirmed by the South Indian *Maṇimangalam* inscription, which is dated the same year²³. All this shows that for the second half of the twelfth century the existence of the Ceylon era, reckoned from 544; is established with certainty.²⁴

In support of this view, we can now put forward another evidence. An inscription has been recently discovered near Amurādhāpura in Ceylon which delineates the various kinds of donations made by king Upatissa I, the elder brother and

predecessor of the king, for the benefit of the Bodi-shrine. S. Paranavitana, on the basis of this earliest inscription so far found in which a date is given in the Buddhist era reckoning from the Parinirvāṇa of Buddha along with the regnal year of the king reigning at the time, has been able to say that the Buddhist era reckoned from 544 B. C. was prevalent in the reign of king Upatissa I (368-410). A. D.²⁵

It is to be noted here that some scholars think of 483 B. C. as the Ceylonese traditional era of the Buddha's Nirvāṇa. M. De. Z. Wickremasinghe, however, tried to establish the view that till the 11th Century A. D. the tradition of counting the Buddhist era from 483 B. C. was prevalent both in India as well as in Ceylon. He suggested that the mistake might have occurred in regard to the length of reigns assigned to the several kings who preceded the great Vijaya Bāhu I. His reason for suggesting it is that it was a century of foreign domination for about 86 or 96 years, the Cholians over-ran the Island, carrying destruction every-where. If a mistake did really occur in this chronology, it is most probable that it was due to such difficult circumstances.²⁶

Senaviratne²⁷ too has attempted to prove that the death of Buddha took place in the year 483 B. C., on the strength of the conclusion arrived at by Fleet and accepted by Geiger and Wikramasinghe. He says that the correctness of Fleet's date is beyond question. According to him, the above date continued till the time of Parākramabāhu VI when it was corrupted by the addition of 93 years; and a few centuries still later a Buddhist monk at Kandy dropped out of this 93, when the era assumed its present date.

But these views are refuted by other eminent scholars. E. Hultzsch²⁸ pointed out that the above view, that of reckoning the era from 483 B. C. is based on an erroneous translation by Wijesinghe of passage in the *Cūlavamsa* (Chapter, 53.v. 44), H. W. Codrington²⁹ remarked on the paper of Senaviratne that the Kalyāṇi inscription indicated that the "Sakarāja" era as that used in Burma and dating from

A. D. 638, according to a Burmese inscription, is dated śaka-rāja 657 at Bodhigayā." " This date ", he says " however, shows that the Buddhist era, as used in Burma in the fifteenth century was 544 B. C''. E. M. Abhesinghe,³⁰ on the basis of Jaina literature, criticising the view of Seneviratne, says that " We know that Buddha was countemporaneous with Bimbisāra, and if with the Jainas, we identify Swāmi Gautama or Gautama Indrabhūti with Lord Buddha, the first disciple of the Jaina Tirthaṅkara Mahāvira, we can approximately fix, from both these sources, the date of the great demise at 544 B. C.'"³¹

In connection with Abhesinghe's conclusion I would like to make a few comments. His suggestion, in support of 544 B. C. being date of the Buddha's demise, that Gautama Indrubhūti and Gautama the Buddha are identical, is incorrect. They were different personalities. One was the Gaṇadhara or Explainer of Mahāvira's preachings, while the other was the founder of Buddhism. One died at Guṇāvā in Rājagṛaha at the age of ninety two, 12 years after the attainment of salvation by Mahāvira, while the other died at Kusinārā at the age of eighty and attained nibbāna.

In the light of the aforesaid evidences we can now conclude that the most probable date of the birth of Buddha therefore, is 624-623 B. C. We make this deduction as he is supposed to have lived for 80 years, as he himself says in the *Mahāparinibbūnasutta* of the *Dīghanikāya* before his death that he was of 80 years of age (aṭṭhitaro me vayo vattati). Thus the date of the Buddha's parinirvāṇa may be decided at 544 B. C. (624-623 B. C. - 80 = 544-543 B. C.).

APPENDIX 11

Buddhist Councils

The Buddha's parinibbāna was a critical moment for the Dhamma and its followers. How the Buddha's teaching could be preserved for the future, was a problem for his prominent disciples. Some disciples, like Subhadda¹, felt that, with the death of the Buddha, they could interpret the Dhamma according to their own wishes. This attitude was viewed with alarm by the more loyal and erudite disciples who immediately thought of summoning a council where the word of the Buddha could be established and where steps could be taken for its preservation and propagation. The task assigned to this Council was to decide the Dhamma and Vinaya of the Buddha².

Arrangements were made for this to be held at Rājagaha, near the Saptapaṇi cave under the presidency of Mahākassapa commencing from the second month of the Vassāva season, i. e. in the fourth month after the Buddha's death³. Five hundred Arhat bhikkhus participated in it. Ānanda⁴, who was yet a śaikṣa, attained arhathood (*asaiṣa*) just on the eve of the Council, and he played a prominent part in the establishment of the texts of the Sutta Piṭaka.

The decisions at this Council were not altogether unanimous. For instance, Gavāṃpati, a senior arhat of the time, abstained from approving or disapproving the decisions of the Council, while Pūraṇa denounced the Council's decisions and urged the incorporation of the seven Vinaya rules⁵. Whatever that may be, the accounts of Gavāṃpati and Pūraṇa indicate the germs of schism in the order even at that early date. R. C. Majumdar says "This was a danger signal for the 'Church.'"⁶

The sources of the First Council are (i) The *Cullavagga*, XI, of the *Pāli Vinaya*, (ii) The *Dīpaṃsa*, (iii) The *Mahāvamsa*, (iv) Buddhaghosa's introduction to the *Sumaṅgalavilāsinī*, (v) *Mahābodhivamsa*, (vi) *Mahāvastu*, (v) *Māñjuśrīmūlakalpa*, (vi) The Tibetan sources :—Bu-ston's Chos. Bbyung (History of Buddhism), translated into English by Obermiller, and Taranatha's History of Buddhism, (vii) Chinese sources but derived from the Sanskrit sources : The Vinaya of Mahīśāsakas, Dharmaguptas, Mahāsaṅghikas, Sarvāstivādins, Kāśyapa saṃgītisūtra (Kai-ye-kie-king), Aśokāvadāna (A-yu-wang-king), Mahāprajñāpāramitāsāstra, Parinirvāṇa-sūtra, and Hiuen Tsang's Record of western countries.

As regards the authenticity of the First Council, the Russian savant I. P. Minayeff⁷ appears to be the first to investigate and establish the historicity of the event in 1887. Oldenberg refuted his opinion in 1898 and said that the First Council was nothing but pure fiction. His argument is that Subhadda's account is referred to in the *Cullavagga* and *Mahāparinibbānasutta* (*Dīgha*. 2. 3) but the latter is silent about the Council. This silence, according to him, "is as valuable as the most direct testimony : it shows that the author of the *Mahāparinibbānasutta* did not know anything of the First Council. "He then concludes" that it is not a fact, "but pure invention, and moreover an invention of no very ancient date."⁸

Rockhill reviewed Oldenberg's view in 1884 on the basis of Tibetan sources and remarked that "the authenticity of the council of Rājagaha has been doubted on insufficient grounds". But T. W. Rhys Davids seems to have upheld Oldenberg's view. He says "The conclusion drawn by Oldenberg is at least the easiest and readiest way of explaining the very real discrepancy that he has pointed out¹⁰. R. O. Franke declares emphatically against the First Council that "the two accounts in the *Cullavagga* xi, xii, are but air-

bubbles."¹¹ Among later scholars, Sukumar Dutta expresses his view thus—"The account of the First Council is only a legend of this invented character, seizing, as a peg to hang on, the Subhadda story in the *Mahāparinibbāna* narrative¹².

But all these views are one-sided and based on merely the absence of any reference to it in the *Mahāparinibbānasutta*. As a matter of fact, the *Mahāparinibbānasutta* is concerned with the account of the Buddha's parinibbāna and not the history of the Order. The *Vinaya*, of course, is related to the history of the Buddhist order and therefore an account of the First Council has a legitimate place in it. Likewise the *Dīpavaṃsa* mentions the First Council, but not Subhadda's account. Tibetan Dulva also does the same

Finot¹³ pointed out that chapters XI and XII of the *Cullavagga*, which contain an account of the two councils, have such an abrupt beginning unlike the other chapters of the *Cullavagga* that they could not have been originally a part of this work. He further points out that the *Mahāparinibbānasutta* also differs from the other Suttas of the *Dīghanikāya* in the nature of its contents, being more historical in character, and that the *Mahāparinibbānasutta* and the two chapters (XI, XII) of *Cullavagga* are so similar in nature that they must have been originally parts of one and the same work. In support of this contention of his, he refers to a work entitled *Samyuktavastu* (Nanjio 1121), the *Vinaya* of the *Mūla-Sarvāstivādins*, which contains the account of both parinibbāna and the Councils, and concludes therefrom that the Theravādins too had a work corresponding to the *Samyukta-vastu*, and that it was dismembered at a later date by the ancient editors of Nikāyas and *Vinaya*¹⁴.

Obermiller¹⁵, Poussin¹⁶, Prazyluski¹⁷ also support the authenticity of the First Council. Jacobi urged that it was not essential for the *Mahāparinibbānasutta* to go out of its way to describe the Council. He then remarked that mere *argumentum ex silentio* cannot be accepted against the historicity of the First council.¹⁸

Assessing the different views of scholars regarding the authenticity of the First Buddhist Council of Rājagaha, we find that no reliable evidence is available to reject its validity. The Gavāṃpati and Pūraṇa accounts contain the parts of the Buddha's teaching which they accepted. We cannot therefore think of it as a pure invention. Thus all accounts favour the acceptance of the First Council as a historical event.

As regards its contribution to the evolution of the Pāli Canon, it is, however, difficult to accept the traditional conception, which asserts that the whole Dhamma and Vinaya were recited in the First Council. The *Sumaṅgalavilāsinī*¹⁹ further adds that not only *Dhamma* and *Vinaya*, but also the *Abhidhamma* was finalised in this very Council. How was it possible to compile the whole of the *Sutta* and *Vinaya* along with the *Abhidhamma* within about two months?

Poussin is inclined to think that the Council could not but be regarded as an enlarged *Pāṭimokkha* assembly.²⁰

Minayeff asserts that the accounts of the Council contain two clearly distinguishable parts, of which the one that speaks of the compilation of the Canon must belong to a period posterior to the rise of the sects.²¹ Nalinaksa Dutt is of opinion that the Council was summoned to decide the less important rules of discipline (*khuddakānukhuddakāni sikkhāpadāni*) which were sanctioned by the Buddha himself.²²

The *Dīpaṃsa* presents a more probable account : "The Bhikkhus composed the collection of Dhamma and Vinaya, by asking the Thera called Ānanda regarding the Dhamma. There Mahākassapa and the great teacher Anurudha, Thera Upālī, of powerful memory, and learned Ānanda, as well as many other distinguished disciples who had been praised by the Buddha....made this council." Here the Dhamma and Vinaya mean selected groups of the original Suttas and doctrines, not the whole present *Pāli Tipiṭaka*.

(b) The Second Council

Hundred years after the death of the Buddha (vassasata-parinibbute Bhagavati), the Second Council was held in

Vesālī to recite again the Dhamma and the Vinaya. Seven hundred monks participated in this council. It is also therefore called Saptasatikā.

The accounts of the Second Council

The accounts of this council state that Yasa Thera was shocked when he came to know about the relaxing of monastic rules and the acceptance by some monks of the ten heretical practices (*dasa vatthūni*)²³. But as Yasa Thera opposed them, he was excommunicated (*paṭisūraṇīyakamma*). Yasa then went in search of monks who would agree with his views. He further tried to bring the dispute to a peaceful end. For this purpose a Council was summoned at Vesālī in *Valikārāma* under the presidency of Thera Revata. All these ten points were considered unlawful according to tradition. This council lasted eight months during which the Dhamma and Vinaya were discussed. The heretical monks then arranged a separate council called Mahāsaṃgīti making a different redaction of the Canonical literature.²⁴

Main Sources

The main sources of the second council are : (i) the *cullavagga* of the *Vinaya-piṭaka*, (ii) *Dīpavamsa*, (iii) *Mahāvamsa*, (iv) *Samantāpāsādikā*, (v) Hiuen Tsang's Record of Western countries (vi) Tibetan Dulva, Tārānātha's *Geschichtes Buddhismus in Indien*, übersetzt von Schifener, and other Chinese sources such as Fa-hian and Hiuen-Tsang's records. These sources differ in some respects, but the *Cullavagga*'s record is the oldest one and the others appear to be based on it.

Historicity of the Council.

The historicity of this council is now accepted unanimously by the scholars. Kern raised an objection saying "We could not discover in these accounts anything but dogmatic fictions for which didactic mythical stories of older times have furnished the materials"²⁵. But in another work he altered his conception stating "The council on Vinaya in Vaisālī has an

historical base."²⁶ Oldenberg, who denied the First Council, accepted the Second Council. He says : "It is an account, which with all its pedantic snatching after trifles, bears the stamp of being in the highest degree trustworthy."²⁷

It should be noted here that the debatable points were settled after discussions, most probably on the basis of some authoritative works. But Majumdar is of the view that the present Vinaya could not have been compiled before the Second Council was held, or otherwise the dispute over the monastic rules could not have arisen among the monks at that stage.

We are inclined to accept the traditional view that both the Dhamma and the Vinaya were recited at the Vesālī Council. The Dhamma comprises the Nikāyas which are the earliest and most reliable sources of the Buddhist doctrines. Whether any finality was reached regarding the structure and contents of the Piṭakas or not, we may not be able to decide due to the lack of necessary evidence available to us. But it is most unlikely that a Council summoned to settle a dispute in monastic Order, which was threatening the unity of the Buddhist Order, was concluded without a review of the body of doctrines preserved by the monks.

The Third Council

Up to the time of Aśoka Buddhism became very popular and easier to follow than the original teachings of Buddha. It is said that the heretics in monk's robes used to live in Buddhist monasteries and preach their own dhamma in the name of Buddhism. Under such circumstances the monastic rules were slackened and the Uposatha and the Pavāraṇā could not be held for about seven years. The Great king Aśoka somehow came to know of this corruption among the Buddhist monks and then sent a religious officer to conduct *Uposatha* and *Pavāraṇā* ceremony. He found that some bhikkhus failed to carry out the king's order. He then cut throats of several monks. Aśoka was much disturbed by this Moggali-putta, Tissa, however, came into contact with Asoka and a solution was found.

This was the background for the third council held in Pāṭaliputra under the presidency of Moggaliputta Tissa. It is referred to in the *Dīpavamsī*, *Mahāvamsa* and *Samantapāsādikā*. It is recorded in the Tibetan *Dulva* and some Chinese sources too. But the *Cullavagga* does not give an account of the third Council. Asoka's inscriptions also make no reference to it.

Historicity of the Council

Some scholars like Minayeff, Keith, Franke, etc. deny its historicity. Their main argument is that it is not mentioned in the *Cullavagga*, one of the earliest scriptures and in the Asoka's inscriptions. Keith, for example, says : "It is incredible that it ever took place without receiving some mention in the numerous records of Asoka."²⁸ In the Buddhist Philosophy he says : "the only verdict of scientific history must be that the council was a figment of the pious or fraudulent imaginings of a sect, which desired to secure for its texts, and especially for the new *Abhidhamma*, a connection with the greatest Buddhist sovereigns, and that the northern tradition does well to ignore the Council entirely."²⁹ He even thinks of Tissa in a "Suspicious aspect."³⁰

As regards the absence of any record in Asoka's inscriptions, it can be said that Asoka would have preferred to attach the name of Moggaliputta Tissa to this council since it was the result of his invaluable efforts. Asoka was only the supporter and provider of the purpose.

Actually some of his edicts indicate that this Council did take place. In one of his edicts, for example, King Asoka decrees that heretical monks and nuns shall be excommunicated.³¹ G. C. Pande rightly suggests that Asoka might not have been "as intimately connected with the Council as the Pāli tradition would have us believe."³²

It was only the *Vibhajjavādins* or the *Theravādins* who attended this Council. A rift in the Buddhist order took place after the Second Council and by the time of Asoka it was divided into eighteen sects³³, which were refuted by *Vibhajjavādins* in this great Council

Thus on the basis of above literary as well as inscripational evidences, we cannot deny the historicity of the Third Council held in Pāṭaliputra under the presidency of Moggaliputta Tissa.

Other Councils

Other Councils also were summoned for various purposes at different times. The Fourth Council was held under the auspices of Kaniṣka in about 100 A. D. According to the *Mahāvamsa* and *Other Ceylonese* traditions, three Councils were held in Ceylon. The *First* was held during the reign of King *Devānapiya Tissa* (247-207 B. C.) under the presidency of the Venerable Ariṭṭha Thera. The *Second* Council was held during the time of King Vattagamini Abhaya (about 101-77 B. C.) under the presidency of Mahāthera Rakkhita and the Canon was reduced to writing. It was held at the Aluvihara in the village of Matale in Ceylon. The *Third* Council was conducted in 1865 at Ratnapura in Ceylon under the presidency of the Venerable Hikkaduve Siri Sumangala. Two Councils have been held in Thailand (Siam). Some Councils were summoned in Burma too. The so-called *Fifth* Council held in Mandalay is very important, as the text of the Canon fixed at this Council was engraved on marble slabs which for the last so many years had proved to be the most reliable record of the Buddhist Canon. The *Sixth* Buddhist Council was inaugurated in May 1954 in Rangoon with the collaboration of the various countries of the Buddhist world.

APPENDIX III

The Concept of Omniscience In Buddhism

The Buddha is said to have declaimed omniscience in the sense of knowing everything at once and all the time as claimed by Nātaputta¹, though he never denied the possessing of supernatural power. The Buddha himself said that he had a three-fold knowledge (*tisso vijjā*). He has remarked that "those who say that the Recluse Gotama is omniscient and all-seeing and professes to have an infinite knowledge and insight, which is constantly and at all times present to him, when he walks or stands, sleeps or keeps away—are not reporting him properly and misrepresent him as claiming what is false and untrue." On being asked how he could be reported correctly in this matter, he replied "in proclaiming that the Recluse Gotama has a three-fold knowledge" (*tisso vijjā*)². It is said therefore that whatever is well-spoken is the word of the Buddha (*yam kiñci subhāsītūṃ, tam tassa bhagawato vacanarū*).³

The very familiar *Abhiññā* in Buddhist literature has an "older and wider meaning of special supernatureal power of a perception and knowledge to be acquired by training in life and thought."⁴ "It has been interpreted as the following six powers called *Chalābhiññā* attained by the Buddha⁵ :

- (i) *Iddhividhā* (psychokinesis).
- (ii) *Dibbasotadhātu* (clairaudience).
- (iii) *Cetopariyāñña* (telepathic knowledge).
- (iv) *Pubbenivāsānussatiñña* (retrocognitive knowledge).
- (v) *Dibbakkhu* (clairvoyance) also known as *cutupa-pātāñña* (*D. i, 82*) or knowledge of decease and survival of beings, and

(vi) *Āsavakkhayañāna* (knowledge of the destruction of defiling impulses).

All these six powers have a close relation with the five knowledge of Jainism. The first two are similar to *Matijñāna* and *Śrutajñāna*. The fourth and the fifth correspond to *Avadhijñāna*, the third to *Manahparyaya jñāna*, and the last to *Kevalajñāna* of the Jains.

On the basis of possessing the *Pubbenivāsānussatiñāna* and *Dibbacakkhu*, the Buddha claimed to see and know the decess and survival of beings and their karmas.⁶ Anuruddha, who is said to have attained the *dibbasotadhātu*, is believed to have the power of "seeing a thousand worlds."⁷ All the characters of these two *abhiññās* resemble the *avadhijñāna* of Jainism.

Manahparyaya jñāna corresponds to *Cetopariyāñāna* in Buddhism. The general and particular characters of another's mind can be known through this jñāna. The *Āṅguttara Nikāya* gives four ways by which another's thoughts can be known viz. (i) by observing external signs (*nimittena*), (ii) by getting information from others or from an intermediate source, (iii) by listening to the vibration (*vipphārasaddam*) of the thoughts (*vitakka*) of another as he thinks and reflects (*vitakkūyato vicārayato*), and (iv) by comprehending with his mind the mind of another and observing how the mental dispositions are placed in the mind of a particular individual (*manosañkhāra paṇihita imassa antara*) on the part of one who has attained the state of concentration free from cognitive and reflective thought (*avitakkaṃ avicāraṃ samādhim*). Here the third and the fourth seem to be identical with *rjumatī* and *vipulamati* of *manahparyaya jñāna*.⁸

The sixth *abhiññā* *Āsavakkhayañāna* is a knowledge acquired for the destruction of defiling impulses. *Āmajñāna*⁹ (*attanivā jñeeyyātha*) is essential for destroying the impulses and then for the attainment of salvation¹⁰. The Buddha is also called the *ñānavādī* in the *Nikāyas*¹¹. The power of knowing and Perceiving everything (*jānāti passata*) is a distinguishing

characteristic of the Buddha¹². This knowing and perceiving is connected with the Four Noble Truths (*ariyasaccāni avecca passali*¹³). After being eliminated the five impediments (*pañcānivarāṇepahāya*¹⁴) the Buddha is said to have known and perceived the Four Noble Truths with the last three *abhiññās*. He knows "this is the truth of suffering, this is the cause of suffering, this is the cessation of suffering, and this is the path leading to the cessation of defiling of impulses"¹⁵

The Buddha is one who has knowledge and insight into all realities (*sabbesu dhammesu ca ñānadassi*),¹⁶ which can be comprehended by mental concentration (*samādhi*). Through this insight the Buddha could know that Sunakkhatta would die after seven days, and that of epilepsy and on dying he would be reborn as one of the Kalakanjas, the very lowest of the Asura groups¹⁷. Once when the bhikkhus were conversing in his absence, he was able to say that they had been discussing¹⁸. In the *Kevaddha Sutta* he is said to have claimed to answer a question which even Brahma was ignorant of¹⁹.

All these references indicate that because of some short of insight the Buddha could know and perceive things. He is said to have a three-fold knowledge (*tisso-vijjā*),²⁰ six intellectual powers (*cha imāni.....Tathāgatabalāni*),²¹ ten intellectual powers (*dasa balāni*)²² and so forth. He is therefore considered sometimes an omniscient. Keith refers to a passage from the *Aṅguttara-nikāya*²³ where the Buddha is compared to a granary, whence men every good word, and points out the same view.²⁴

These are the negative references to the Buddha's omniscience. They have been the stepping stones to establish omniscience positively in the Buddha in later Pāli as well as Buddhist philosophical literature. The *Paṭisambhida-magga* says in this respect that the Tathāgata's omniscience consists in knowing everything conditioned and unconditioned, and also knowing everything in the past, present and future.

Further it tries to prove omniscience in the Buddha, and says that 'he knows everything that has seen heard, sensed, thought, attained, sought and searched by the minds of those who inhabit the entire world of gods and men.'²⁵ "Likewise, the Kathāvatthu describes the two epithets "*sabbāññu*" (omniscient) and "*sabbadassāvī*" (all-seeing) as occurring in a list of eight epithets of the Buddha.²⁶" As a matter of fact, the Buddha never claimed himself to be omniscient. His discipline explained his supernatural power or threefold knowledge as omniscience and supplemented some references to establish it in the Buddha at the compilation of the *Tripiṭaka*, especially the Abhidhamma. This happened so because of *saddhā* or faith and *bhaddi* or devotion in the Buddha.

The Pāli Canon refers to *saddhā* as synonymous with *bhaddi* (devotion), *pema* (affection) and *pasāda* (propitiousness) or *appreciation*²⁷. The *Milindapañha*²⁸ and the *Aṭṭhaśālinī*²⁹ show that the *saddhā* has two characters, appreciation (*samupasādanālakkaṇa*) and endeavour (*samupakkhandanālakkaṇa*). Datta observes that "*saddhā* carries two distinct meanings (1) one is faith (*pasāda*) producing *pīṭi* (pleasure), and (2) the other is self confidence proving *vīrya* (energy)³⁰. Likewise, Jainism *śraddhā*³¹, *bhakti*³², *anurāgā*³³, *sevā*³⁴, and *vinaya*³⁵ are said to be indential words.

The conception of *Dammaññā* (knowledge of *ariyasaccāni*) in the Buddha was gradually developed in Buddhist philosophical literature. Dharmakīrti supports this view that the Buddha was a *Dharmajña* as well as *Mārgajña* in the sense that he was knower of *Caturāryasatyā*, but he did not deny the omniscience of the Buddha. He said that spiritual knowledge should be recognised as an essential element of a Teacher.³⁶

Prajñākaragupta, a disciple of Dharmakīrti further observes that omniscience is possible, if one has destroyed all worldly attachments. This requires great effort.³⁷

Śāntarakṣita emphasises sarvajñatva more than *Dharmajñatva*. He says that an omniscient being can know everything that he intends to know, since he has already destroyed all the obstructions of knowledge³⁸. He then refutes the view of Kumārila, and establishes complete omniscience in the Buddha. The later Buddhist Philosophers followed Śāntarakṣita's view.

In the sixth century B. C. omniscience was considered one of the essential characteristics of a Teacher or Prophets. The Buddha criticised this view and said that no one can know and perceive everything at once. But his disciples were anxious to give their teacher a position of greater recognition, and gradually went on to establish the theory of the perfect omniscience of the Buddha on the basis of the superhuman powers. There is no doubt that this was done with a view to stand the Buddha in the line of other Prophets,

NOTES

APPENDIX 1

The Date of Buddha

1. *IA.*, 1914, pp. 126.
2. *Introduction to the Dhammapāda*, *SBE.*, pp. xliii-xlvii.
3. *Book of Indian Eras*, p. 34.
4. *Vinaya Piṭaka*, *SBE.*, Vol. xlii p. 28
5. *Political History of India*, p. 227.
6. *Kern, Buddhism*, 11. p. 63.
7. *Āgama and Tripiṭake : Eka Anuśīlana*, P. 114.
8. *Journal Asiatique*, 1900, pp. 316; Eng. trans. by J. M. Seneviratne, *JRAS* (Ceylon Branch), Vol. xxiv., No. 68, pp. 82-102.
9. "Date of the Buddha's of Ceylon from a Chinese Source", *JRAS*, 1911, pp. 1142-1144.
10. *Epigraphia Zeylanica*, Vol. 1. pp. 79-80, 122-124, 155-157.
11. *Mahāvamsa*, intro. pp. xxii.
12. *JRAS.* (Ceylon Branch), 1914, Vol. xxxiii, No. 67, p. 143.
13. Dve satāni ca vassāni aṭṭhārasa vassāni ca.
Sambuddhe parinibhūte abhisitṭho piyadassano. *Dīp.*, vi. 1.
14. Jinanibbānato paccā purā tassābhisekato.
Satthārasaṃ vassasatadvayaṃ evenṃ vijāniyaṃ.
Mahā Vamsa, v. 21.
15. *Dīp.*, v. 106; *Mahā*, v. 16-18.
16. *Dīp.*, vi. 21-22; *Mahā*, v. 22.
17. Smith, V.-A; *The Early History of India*, pp. 38-9.
Roychaudhuri accepts 323 B. C.
18. *ERE.*, 1. pp. 260-261.
19. *Book of Indian Eras*, pp. 34-5.
20. Ulien's *Hwen Thsang*, 11.335.
21. *Record of Buddhist Kingdoms*, translated by Giles, C. vii.

22. *Epigraphia Zeylanica*, Vol. 1. p. 155 & p. 123; See also *Galvihara Inscription of Polonnaruwa*, 11. 1-4 (Ed. Muller, *Ancient Inscription of Ceylon*, pp. 87. 120).
23. Hultzsch, *South Indian Inscription iii.* no. 27, p. 53; *Epigr. Zeyl.* pp. 80, 155.
24. Geiger, *Mahāvamsa*, intro. p. xxix.
25. *University of Ceylon Review*, Vol. xviii. Nos. 3 & 4, pp. 131.
26. *Epigraphia Zeylanica*. Vol. 1. pp. 79-80, 122-124, 155-57.
27. *The date of Buddha's death and Ceylon chronology*, JRAS. Vol. xxiii. No. 67, 1914, pp. 143.
28. *Ibid.*, P. 253.
29. *Contribution to Sinhalese chronology*, JRAS. 1913, p. 517-531.
30. JRAS., (Ceylon Branch), Vol. xxiii. No. 67, 1914.
31. *IA.*, Vol. xi. 1882, p. 246 (for the particulars about Indrabhūti Gaṇadhara).

APPENDIX 11

Buddhist Councils

1. Alam āvuso, ma socittha, ma paridevittha, Samuttā mayam tena mahāsamaṇena, upaddutā ca homa, idaṃ vo kappati idaṃ vo na kappati. idāni pana mayam yaṃ icchissāma taṃ taṃ karissāṃ. yaṃ na icchissāṃ taṃ na karissāṃ. *Dīghanikāya*, Mahāparinibbāna-Sutta ; *Vinaya Piṭaka*, Culla, Pañcasatika Khandhaka.
2. Pure adhamo dīppati, dhammo paṭibhāhiyati. avinayo dīppati. 3. *Mahāvamsa*, ii.2.2
4. There is no unanimity regarding to inclusion of Ānanda in the First Council. See, *Le Concile de Ragaha*, p. 225.
5. Prof. La Vallee Poussin has traced some of these rules in the *Mahāvagga* (vl. 17-19-20). Pūraṇa says "The dhamma and the Vinaya have been well sung by the Theras. Nevertheless, even in such manner

as it has been heard by me from the mouth of the Blessed One, in that manner will I bear it in memory." *Vinaya Piṭaka*, iii.341-Culla, XL. i. i., quoted by S. Dutta in *The Buddha and Five After Centuries*, p. 103.

6. *Buddhistic Studies*, p. 44.
7. *Recherches sur le Bouddhisme*, 1887, translated from Russian into French by R. H. Assier de Pompignan, 1824.
8. *Buddhistische Studien*, ZDMG, 1898, pp. 613 ; Introduction to the *Vinaya-piṭaka*, Vol. 1.xxv-xxix.
9. *The life of the Buddha*, p. vii.
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11. *J. P. T. S.*, 1908, pp. 1-80.
12. *The Buddha and Five After Centuries*, p. 102.
13. *IHQ.*, Viii. pp. 241-6.
14. *Early Monastic Buddhism*. N. Dutta, Vol. 1. p. 337.
12. *IHQ.*, VIII. pp. 781-4.
16. *Le Museon*, VI. pp. 213-323, tr. into English in the *Indian Antiquary*, 1908 ; See also *ERE.*, sv. Councils.
17. *Le conseil de Rajagrha*, by Jean Przyluski.
18. *Z.DMG.*, Vol. xxxiv ; 1880, pp. 184 ff.
19. Tata anantaram-dhammasaṅgaṇi-vibhaṅgañca, kathāvatthuñca Puggalaṃ, Dhātu-yamaka-paṭṭhāṇaṃ, abhidhammāti vaccati. Evaṃ samvaṇṇitaṃ sukhama-yānagocaraṃ, taṃ saṃgāyitva idaṃ abhidhammapīṭakaṃ nāmaṭi vatvā pāñca-arhantasatāni sājjhā-yamakansu. Sumaṅgalavilāsini, Nidānakathā.
20. 2 Cf. *Early Monastic Buddhism*, Vol. 1. p. 339.
21. *Recherches Sur le Bouddhisme*, pp. 35-36.
22. *Early Monastic Buddhism*, Vol. 1. p. 339.
23. *Mahāvamsa*, 5.

The Tibetan and Chinese accounts give a quite different reason. They relate this dissension with Mahādeva's doṣas, which are as follows :

(i) An Arhat may commit a sin by uncounscious-

temptation. (ii) One may be an Arhat and not know it. (iii) An Arhat may have doubts on matters of doctrine. (iv) One cannot attain Arhatship without a teacher., and (v) The noble ways may begin by a shout, that is one meditating seriously on religion may make such an exclamation as how sad ! How sad ! and by so doing attain progress towards perfection—the path is attained by an exclamation of astonishment.—2500 years of Buddhism, p. 98.

24. *Dīpavamsa*, 5.30 foll. names it Mahāsaṃgīti, while the *Mahāvamsa*, 5. 3-4, calls it Mahāsāṅghika.
25. *Historic du Bouddhisme Dans*, 1. Indc : *Buddhistic Studies*, p. 26.
26. *Manual of Buddhism*, p. 109.
27. Introduction to the *Vinaya-piṭaka*, p. xxix.
28. *Buddhist Philosophy in India and Ceylon*, Vol. 11. pp. 265 6.
29. *Buddhist Philosophy*, p. 19. 30. *Ibid*.
31. Hultzsch, E., *Inscriptions of Ashoka*, ; *Corpus Inscriptionum Indicarum*, Vol. 1. Oxford, 1925, pp. xliii. ff; p 160. No. 5.
32. *Studies in the Origin of Buddhism*, p. 8.
33. The Vajjiputtakas established the Mahā-Sāṅghika sect in the Second Council. It was divided later on into five sects and become six, Viz. Mahāsāṅghika, Ekabhojārika, Gokulaka, Paññattivādi, Bāhulika, and Cetiyavādi.

APPENDIX III

The Concept of Omniscience In Buddhism

1. *M.* i. 529; ii. 31; *Buddhist Legend (Dhammapadam-kathā)*, Vol. 29. p. 74 ff.
2. *M.* i 482.
3. *A.* iv. 164.
4. *PTS.* Dictionary.
5. *D.* i. 83.

6. So dibbene cakkhunā visuddhena atikkantamānusakena satte passati cavamāne upapajjamāne hīne paṇīte suvanne dubbanne sugate duggate yathā-kammupage. *D.* i 82. 7. *M.* i. 213.
8. *A.* i. 170-171; *Early Buddhist theory of Knowledge* p. 440.
9. *A.* ii. 191. 10. *M.* i. 167.
11. *D.* iii. 12; *A.* i. 340. 12. *M.* i. 111.
13. *Sn.* 229. 14. *M.* i. 347.
15. So imaṃ dukkhaṃ dukkhaṃ ti yathābhūtaṃ pajānāti, ayaṃ dukkhasamudayo ti.....ayaṃ āsavaṇirodhagāmi-niṇṇipadā ti, *D.* i. 84. 16. *Sn.* 478.
17. *Dialogues of the Buddha*, iii, p. 12.
18. *ibid.* ii. p. 4. 19. *D.* i. 223.
20. Unlimited retrocognition, unlimited clairvoyance, and knowledge of the destruction of the inflowing impulses, *M.* i, 482.
21. In addition to the three—fold knowledge : (i) the Buddha knows, as it really is, what is possible as possible and what is impossible as impossible, (ii) the Buddha knows as it really is the effects according to their conditions and causes, of the performance of karma in the past, present and future, and (iii) the Buddha knows, as it really is, the corruption, perfection and arising from contemplative states of release, concentration and attainment, *A.* iii. 417.
22. In addition to the six *abhiññās* the following four added : (i) The Tathāgata knows, as it really is, the mode of a life leading to all states, (ii) the Tathāgata knows, as it really is, the world with its various and diverse elements, (iii) the Tathāgata knows, as it really is, the various predilections of beings, and (iv) the Tathāgata knows, as it really is what goes on in the senses and faculties of other beings and individuals, *M.* i. 71. *Vibhaṅga*, 335-44. *Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge*.

23. A. iv. 173 ff.; Smith, Aśoka, p. 154.
24. *Buddhist Philosophy*, p. 33.
25. Sabbam saṅkhatam asaṅkhatam anavassam jānāti
ti.....atītam.....pacuppannam sabbam jānāti ti,
Paṭisambhidāmagga, 131.
26. Kathāvatthu, 228. 27. A. iii. 165.
28. *Milindapañha*, 34. 29. *Aṭṭhasālīnī*, 304.
30. Dutta, N., *Place of Faith in Buddhism*, IHO. Vol. 16,
p. 639.
31. *Pāe-sadda-mahaṇṇava* Vol. in. p. 796; *Prakṛita*
Vyākaraṇa of Hemachandra. d. Pishel, Bombay, 1900,
p. 159. Belief in the seven categories (saptatattvas)
as ascertained in Jainism is called *Right Belief*
(*Samyag-darśana*) which paves a way to attain
salvation.
32. *Sarvārthasiddhi* ; 6.24.
33. *Yāśastilaka and Indian Culture*, p. 262, N. 3.
34. *Pāe-saddamahaṇṇava*, Vol. iii. p. 796.
35. *Abhidhānarājendraśāstrī* Vol. X.
36. Heyopādeyatattvasya sabhyupāyasya vedakah.
Yah pramāṇamasīviṣṭo na tu sarvasya vedakah.
Brahm pasyatu vā na vā tattvamiṣṭam tu paśyatu.
Pramāṇam dūrdarśī, cedeha gradhrānupasmahe.
Pv. 2.32-33.
37. Tato vitarāgatve sarvārtha jñānasambhaḥ punaḥ
kālantare tesām sarvajña-gunarāgiṇām, alpayatnena
sarvajñatvasiddhiravartta...PVA. p. 329.
38. Ydyadicchti boddhum va tattvavetti niyogataḥ.
Śaktireyam vidhā-hyasya prahṇavarāṇo hyaso.
TS. 3628.
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11	5	is birth	his birth
11	15	on the of river	on the bank of river.
26	6	Nignth	Nigaṇṭha
38	1	anonical	Canonical
38	26	cannon	Canon
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