JAYARĀSI’S CRITICISM OF VERBAL TESTIMONY

J. M. Shukla

Jayarāsi bhaṭṭa’s Tattvopaplavasīṁha is a unique work written in the beginning of the eighth century A. D. The author belonged to the Lokāyata tradition about which we possess only second hand knowledge from scattered references in different compendia of philosophical views. Very few independent works of this system have been discovered or studied by scholars.

The work under reference was edited by Sukhalal Sanghvi and R.C. Parikh and published in the Gaekwad’s Oriental Series Vol. 87, in 1940.

Jayarāsi bhaṭṭa apparently was Brahmin as can be inferred from the abuses he showered on the Buddhists and the Jainas.¹ His wrath cooled down a bit when he took up for criticism the views of the Brahmanic philosophers, although for the Naiyāyikas he was always happy to dart a couple of special arrows!

The tendency for using strong language against the views of the opponents prominently surfaced when the Buddhists wanted to establish the validity of their doctrines against those of the Mīmāṁsakas on the one hand and of the Naiyāyikas on the other. Although the independent contribution of the Mīmāṁsakas to epistemology is not very outstanding before Kumārila (c. A. D. 550-600), the Buddhists considered them as their major rivals, because, the Mīmāṁsakas, as the Buddhist thought, had biased people’s mind with the dogma of the eternality as well as non-human (divine) origin of the Vedas. Therefore Dharmakīrti² (c. A. D. 625-675) and the Buddhist writers coming after him express strong sentiments against their rivals. On the opposite side, writers like Kumārila, Jayanta bhaṭṭa (c. A. D. 750-800) and Vācaspati Miśra (9th cent. A. D.) use brilliant repartee and biting sarcasm.³ This situation provokes attempt to understand the general trend of refutation of others’ views in ancient Indian philosophical tradition.

The earliest tradition summarily refers to the views of the previous writers. It faithfully presents the views of the objector and after brief references to such views offers its own interpretation and explanations which positively contribute to the discussion at hand. We meet with this tendency in the Śatapatha-brāhmaṇa (c. B. C. 800 or later), in the Pūrva- and the Uttara-mīmāṁsā sūtras (c. B. C. 200), in the Mahābhāṣya of Patañjali (c. B. C. 150) and in the Vākyapadīya of Bhārtṛhari (c. A. D. 400-450).

The next tradition takes up one by one the arguments of the rival systems and offers logical refutation. We here have the illustrations of the works of the Mahāyāna Buddhist philosopher Nagārjuna (c. 2nd cent. A. D.), Mīmāṁsaka Bhaṭṭa Prabhākara (c. A. D. 600) and Śaṅkarācārya (c. A. D. 780-812).
J. M. Shukla

The third tradition takes up the opponent’s arguments, lends them a subtle twist, interprets them in its own way and ultimately refutes them. The illustrations are of the works of Dignāga (A. D. 400-450), Kumārila, Dharmakīrti and Śántarakṣita (A. D. 750).

The fourth tradition diligently collects the basic arguments of other philosophical systems, and tries to refute them by different devices of refutation. Jayarāśi represents this class of dialectics.

Jayarāśi adopted the method of setting forth at the outset all possible alternatives with respect to a problem or the implications of a definition and then demonstrating the absurdities inherent in each one of them. He has at his command all the known tools of dispute (kathā) in the form of discussion (vāda), disputation (jalpa), and wrangling (vītanā). He neither asserts nor denies anything. He merely presents a point, explores its alternatives and taking them one by one, refutes them. His method is to examine the tenets forwarded by other thinkers and show that they are self-contradictory, meaningless and untrue. For him: “all principles being upset, all the propositions will be charming so long as they are not investigated into.” He boasts that he has gone beyond the arguments that would be conceived by Bṛhaspati, the early master of his own system of philosophy, whom he understands as no other than the preceptor of the Gods! In the text body he quotes from Bṛhaspati.

As can be seen from the first page of his work, he has traversed beyond the professed views of the Cārvākas. The Cārvākas accept the validity of perception as a means of knowledge. They also accept four primary elements, namely earth, water, light and air. But Jayarāśi, or the particular Cārvāka school to which he belonged, did not accept any means of knowledge or any element. He summarily dismisses them and would talk about them as acceptable only in the worldly usage. The elements do not have any ultimate existence or validity.

Jayarāśi quotes Bhartṛhari, Kumārila, Dharmakīrti and Śántarakṣita. Digambara Jaina writers later than Jayarāśi, like Anantavīrya in his Aṭṭasahassī and Tattvārtha-ālokavārttika extensively quote him.

At the end of the Tattvopapavasimha he criticises verbal testimony (ābda-pramāṇa). He divides his criticism into five sub-sections:

1. Words cannot express meaning because there exists nothing like a relation between the two. Therefore the words of a common man, or those of a trusted person (āpta) or the words and sentences found in ancient works have no validity.

2. Words cannot be accepted as a means of valid knowledge simply because they are spoken or written by a trustworthy or an infallible person (āpta).

3. The argument that the vedas are not composed by any human agency and are eternal cannot be accepted as valid.
4. Words and sentences cannot be accepted as a valid means of knowledge since they naturally fulfill the desire of a speaker to express meanings.

5. Meanings cannot be obtained only from grammatically correct words.

Let us try to understand Jayarāśi's criticism in these sub-sections one by one.

Some persons declare: “the word go (cow) is valid because it expresses a correct meaning, Jayarāśi says this is not correct because there is no relation between the word ‘go’ (cow) and the meaning, ‘the animal cow’ (go). There is nothing like a relation between words and their meanings.

The objector, however, will like to point out that there is a relation between a word and its meaning. The relation may be of the nature of identity (tādātmya), or of the nature of causality (tadulpatti), or of the nature of a convention (sāmayika), or is natural (svabhāvika).

Jayarāśi has referred to four kinds of relations: First is ‘identity’ which is accepted by the Mīmāṃsakas and the grammarians; the second ‘causality’, accepted by the grammarians; third, ‘naturalness’ accepted by Mīmāṃsakas and the grammarians; and fourth, the relation called ‘convention’ (sāmaya) which is accepted by the Naiyāyikas.

The ‘eternal’ relation is called nitya or autpātika, or tādātmya-rūpa, or yogyatā-rūpa. The Mīmāṃsakas and the grammarians who accept this kind of relation also call it the relation between the expressed and the expressor (vācyavācaka-bhāva-rūpa). The grammarians were the first to emphasize a natural relation between a word and its meaning, which they called eternal (nitya) or evident (siddha). The Mīmāṃsakas meticulously followed them. It has become the bedrock of their interpretative superstructure, because, on the basis of this relation they explain the eternality and the infallibility of the Vedas.

The Buddhists do not accept any relation between words and their meanings. For them neither words nor their meanings are real; how, then, can the relation between the two be taken as real? For the Vaiśeṣikas and the Naiyāyikas neither the sanjyoga nor the samavāya can be a relation between the words and their meanings. Vātsyāyana is reluctant to call the understanding of a word in the form ‘this is expressed by this’ and ‘this is the expressor of this’ as a relation. At least, he would be pleased to designate it as convention (sāmaya).

Jayarāśi says that the relation called identity (tādātmya) cannot be accepted, because, words like go (cow), hasti (elephant) and their meanings are not alike in form. The relation causality (kārya-kārama-bhāva) also is not possible, because, even when meanings have vanished and hence no longer are present, words are still known to exist.
Convention (samaya) based on the usage of the elders cannot be accepted as a relation because there are many individual words which denote the same meaning. A single word which brings about the cognition of the meaning and which is at the same time not different from other words cannot be conceived. The word which helped the convention which arose long ago is not always present at the time of the understanding of its meaning. The convention of a word which brings about the cognition of the meaning cannot be known as it was not present when the convention arose.

There cannot be a natural relation between words and meanings, because we cannot cognise the relation either by perception or inference. Similarly, the relation cannot be based on implication (arthāpatti) because implication is based on perception and other means of knowledge and in the absence of perception, one cannot arrive at implication. Second, implication itself is not different from inference and the grammarians do not accept inferential relation between words and their meanings.

Here, in the absence of a relation between a word and its meaning, words no longer express any meaning. When words do not bring about the cognition of meaning, how can a sentence composed of words express any meaning? When sentences cannot express any meaning, how can Vedic statements be understood as having any meaning at all?

If the objector were to say that meaning can still be comprehended from a sentence, although the words constituting the sentence may not have their meanings wellknown, Jayarāsi would say that, in such a case, all those who recite the Vedas will be able to understand the meaning of the Vedas! This is not possible because a meaningful sentence is contrary to a meaningless sentence. One cannot make statements like “stones swim” (Śabara-bhāṣya on the Mīmāṃśa-sūtra 1.1.5) or “Prajāpati, having made a decoction of sixty-four letters drank them.”

The validity of the verbal cognition based on the utterance of an authentic person is refuted in the second subsection.

There are some thinkers who accept words of authoritative persons as the means of valid knowledge. The authorities are those who intrinsically possess ‘Dharma’, or moral behaviour. Whatever is said by them is non-contradictory. It is said that one who has driven away demerits will not tell a lie because there is no reason for it.

All this, says Jayarāsi, is ‘unvalid’. The behaviour of an authentic person is largely indirect and hence what is related by him cannot be grasped. At the same time there is no inference which would recognize a non-attached person, for inference has already been declared as unproven.
Jayārāsi’s Criticism of Verbal Testimony

Well, let the persons thought to be ‘authority’ make statements. How do they become valid? Do they so become by their mere existence or by their being capable of generating right knowledge? The former cannot be accepted because that which does not bring about any activity cannot be related to something valid. And, if the capability to generate right knowledge were considered to prove the validity of the statements of an authentic person, is it understood as bringing about right knowledge on its own or with the help of some auxiliary cause? The former position cannot be accepted because it alone cannot bring about any cognition and there will not be any order and simultaneity.

If, on the other hand, the statement of an authoritative person were to generate right knowledge only when helped by some auxiliary cause, one can say that the auxiliary cause may be erroneous, with the result that, inspite of himself being an authoritative person, his statements may generate a contrary knowledge. Let us take an example. A person having seen a boy with a new blanket says, ‘this boy has a new (nava) blanket’. The hearer on account of his perturbed mind understands the boy as having nine blankets. In the opposite sense, the deceitful speaker may have wished to convey by his utterance that the boy has nine blankets; while the hearer, on account of his righteous behaviour, understands him as having a new blanket. Similarly, the authentic statements may, on account of sinful behaviour of a person, be understood differently than what they really signify. There may be other reasons like being possessed by evil spirits, mental derangement, or a confused mind which bring about erroneous understanding of the statements of authoritative persons. Hence neither the utterance nor the hearing of the statements by an authentic person should be considered valid.

In the third sub-section Jayārāsi offers his refutation of the doctrines of those who accept the authoritativeness of the vedas.

Those who follow the views of fools opine as follows: The vedas are authoritative in a different way, that is because not composed by any human agency. Human beings, with their minds inverted by infatuation etcetera, bring about something inverted and therefore cannot be the authors of the Vedas. It is argued that Veda is eternal, because, like sky etcetera, one cannot remember its producer. The defects related to him and influenced by him are no longer found in his absence. When there are no defects clinging to the Vedas, how can one doubt the validity of the authoritativeness of the Vedas. It is said that the presence or absence of faults is related to human beings. As regards the Vedas, there should not be any doubt because there is no composer of the Vedas.11 It is also said that “like the understanding brought about by a correct premise, a statement of a trustworthy person, or sense perception, the understanding produced by Vedic precepts is authentic because it is brought about by faultlessness means.”12
Moreover, the knowledge brought about by Vedic precepts is never doubtful because it is not produced in the form of a question like "why indeed." It is also not erroneous because it is not contradicted in other places, nor is it contradicted at other times. Therefore the 'Knowledge' from Vedic precepts is not incorrect.

The above is the objector's point of view. Jayarāśi now starts point by point refuting the arguments put forward by the Mīmāṃsaka opponent.

The Veda cannot be eternal just because its creator is not found. In the cases of wells and public shelters, for example, their builders are not remembered. How could, then, they be deemed as non-eternal? If one were to argue that on account of the uncertainty regarding place and time, the builder is not remembered. Jayarāśi says that the argument will suffer from the ground of defeat called wrong person (hetvantaram) because the arguer desires a specific mention when no such mention has given the particular meaning.\textsuperscript{13}

Even if a mention regarding the absence of the non-availability of a particular place and time with regard to the builder or the author of a well or the Vedas were made, the fact of non-remembrance of the builder or the author will not be excluded from the argument proving the contrary. Again, this reason is unproven because the followers of Kaṇāda do remember the author of the Vedas. At the same time many people in the world declare that Brahmā is the composer of the Vedas.

Jayarāśi continues: Do you consider the absence of remembrance of the author on the part of all people as the reason in favour of the authenticity of the Vedas, or on the part of a few people. If the former, than it is untenable because the presently available portion of the Veda cannot be ascertained. If the latter, then the reason (hetu) is inconclusive because quite a few people do not remember the work of living persons. From this it also becomes evident that when some persons do not remember the authors of the Veda, others do remember them.

Jayarāśi likes to repeat that the Vedas are unauthentic, not because they are composed by human beings but because there may have crept errors and unacceptable elements on account of the faults on the part of the human authors. Like human beings who are sure to commit errors, the sense-organs also may commit errors in their working and hence all knowledge produced by them should be deemed unauthentic. Hence nothing under the sun should be considered as authentic.

There is a possibility of some 11 persons concealing their authorship of the Vedas and accordingly declaring that (a singular) 'he' has not composed the Vedas. Hence the argument that the Vedas are authentic because no human being has composed them cannot be considered proven.

For the sake of assumption, however, let the Vedas be considered as not composed by any human agency. How does it prove its authenticity. If authenticity is based on excluding the errors, because the composer human agency is also
excluded, you, the opponent, argues Jayarāśi, will bring forward the argument of authenticity based on natural merits related to the Vedas, when human faults and errors are eliminated. In that case, avers Jayarāśi, along with natural merits, natural demerits also will have to be included, which ultimately will declare Vedas as unauthentic.

Besides, who will remove the misconceptions generated in the minds of the hearers of the Vedas? On hearing the recital of the Vedas, a wrong meaning is likely to be comprehended by the hearers, which will lead to a faulty performance of every day actions and which in its turn will generate erroneous knowledge, let alone the authenticity of the Vedic injunctions.

The argument that the knowledge comprehended by Vedic precepts is authentic because it is not proven contrary even at a different place and different time, also cannot stand; because, remembrance, although not contradicted, cannot be considered authentic.

It is argued that the objects Known with the Knowledge brought by Vedic precepts are truly existent and hence they are real, but the cognition of the keśonāduka (a woolly mass seen by pressing the eye with the finger) can never have any reality. Jayarāśi says that the poor dear objector arguing his case desires to instruct others after taking poison himself. The later comprehension of the Vedic precept is useless for its understanding because the understanding has ceased to exist at that time and at the time of comprehension, the object has been non-existent.

The small fourth sub-section refutes in a very summary way the authenticity of 'words' because they fulfill the desire of a speaker. The Mimāṃsaka says that the words are uttered on account of the desire to speak (vivakṣā) on the part of a speaker. Jayarāśi says that there is no causal relation between words and the desire of a speaker. He relies for his argument on his rejection of the causal relation as he has already pointed out in the case of the Buddhists. He has also rejected causal relation (hetu-phala-bhāva) with regard to the inference of the Buddhist and the Naiyāyikas and the perception of the Buddhists and the Sāṃkhyaśa.15

In the fifth sub-section Jayarāśi criticises the view of the grammarians who declare that meanings are obtained only from correct words.

Other thinkers, namely the grammarians, declare that meaning is obtained from correct words. Correctness of words which are called lakṣya is ascertained by their being consistent with rules of grammar (lakṣana).

Jayarāśi asks: "What do you understand by words (lakṣya) to explain which the great sage (Pāṇini) composed a mass of rules. Do the syllables like 'g' etcetera constitute words, or do we understand by words something abstract called sphoṭa
which is different from letters? If the former, are the letters eternal and do they constitute words or are they produced? If eternal syllables (or letters) were to be called words, will they be comprehended as isolated or grouped? If they were understood as isolated, then only a single syllable \( g \) or \( o \) will give the meaning of the word \( \text{go} \) (cow). In that case, the specific order in pronouncing letters will be fruitless. Besides, a single letter cannot be inflected because only a complete word which is in the form of a group of letters can have terminations.

Well, let us understand a word as a group of syllables (saṁghāta), says the objector, because the letters \( g \), \( o \) and \( \text{visarga} \), which constitute the word \( \text{go} \), when taken together, are called a group (saṁghāta).

Jayarāsi does not agree with this proposition. Syllables, says he, have an inherent difference. In what, he questions, will one syllable be different from another letter? A syllable may be different from a non-syllable but how can it be different from another syllable? Is the difference based on the shape (ākāra) of a letter, or is it based on its nature of being a non-letter (avarṇātmakatā)? If shape were emphasised in considering difference, then other letters will not be called letters as for example \( nīra \) (water) is not \( tīra \) (a bank) and \( tīra \) is not \( nīra \). If the nature of being a non-letter (avarṇātmakatā) is considered for difference, then there will be a single letter (or syllable) in the whole world and it will not bring about a meaning like ‘the animal called a cow’ (go’rthaścakatvam) from the word \( \text{go} \), for the word \( \text{go} \) (cow), a single syllable cannot become capable of being Inflected.\(^1\)

There is also no proof which establishes the eternality of letters (or syllables) because perception and other means of knowledge have already been established as invalid.

If the letters were understood as many and different because the single syllable \( g \) is uttered slowly once, and loudly at other times and thus a loudly uttered \( g \) is different from a slowly uttered one, then the letter \( g \) will be understood as different from other syllables elsewhere.

The objector rejects this by saying that the loudly uttered \( g \) syllable and the slowly uttered \( g \) syllable are really not different. Their difference is based on their being manifested differently; the syllable (or letter) \( g \) is never understood as different from another \( g \) letter. Jayarāsi replies that it is not correct to say that the manifestations are different. If it were so, the division of \( g, o \), and the \( \text{visarga} \) for the word \( \text{go} \) (cow) will have to be understood as based on the differences of manifestations and hence the letter remains a single entity. The result will be that from a single letter which becomes incapable of inflection, the meaning\(^2\); ‘the animal cow’ will not be obtained.

And also, Jayarāsi continues, if objects which are understood as different are accepted as being non-different, there will not be any variety (brought about by difference) in this world, and in a world without any difference, no ordering
of the measurer and the measured will be possible. In an unchangeable and static world there will be no possibility for the rise and development of knowledge.

The objector then comes forward with a qualification that the last syllable accompanied by the memory of the earlier syllables which had been already uttered and which then disappeared, can be understood as a word. Jayarāśi rejects this proposition, saying that the last syllable, too, once uttered, has disappeared at the time of its remembrance and therefore it will not be capable of providing any sense.

Jayarāśi once again offers the earlier argument. Even if case terminations were applied to a single syllable, the inflected single syllable will generate meaning and other syllables will not serve any purpose for bringing about meaning.

If one were to state that the already uttered syllables are remembered after the last syllable is pronounced, or that the last syllable is understood after the remembrance of the earlier syllables, in both the cases, there is no existence of a word (which is understood as a group of letters) and the meaning derived would be something unrelated to a word.

Syllables, moreover, cannot be understood as ‘produced’ (kārya). Something which already exists can be felt (and understood). That which is felt exists before it is known; its understanding comes later. What is the nature of that which is felt? Is it something produced recently and does it then become the object of cognition? Or has it been produced long before? Or is it something not produced at all?

We cannot conceive of any cause for it. We also cannot think of effort etcetera being responsible, for the effect etcetera are neither existent nor capable of activity. All this becomes unthinkable; for there is nothing like a causal relation. One cannot conceive of the cause being understood first or the effect being apprehended first. Some times both the cause and the effect are simultaneously apprehended. We cannot thus become certain about the causal relation. In the absence of such a certainty the non-eternal syllables cannot be understood as a word.

Jayarāśi very cleverly refutes all the concepts related with words and their eternity. He dismisses as unproven the difference among syllables, their grouping, the last syllable becoming capable of generating sense, their eternity, their capacity to produce anything, their nature of being a mere existence and, above all, the causal relation between words and syllables.

The grammarian comes forward with the famous concept of sphota, the ‘word essence’ responsible for bringing about verbal cognition. The grammarian says that sphota or a flash of meaning arises from the syllables which constitute a word, the syllables manifesting the sphota. It is said that the letters either singly or as an aggregate bring about meaning. The meaning is already present, hence the
meaning in the form of the sphiota should be understood. It is also said that the sphiota is different from the syllables.

Jayarāśi tried to refute the sphiotavādin’s point of view as follows: The grammarian says that something meaningful in the form of a word that is sphiota can be understood, because, there is no possibility of meaning otherwise than from sphiota. Jayarāśi replies that the validity of the argument about meaning obtained from implication (arthāpatti) has already been refuted.18

Meaning is not something tied down to a word and therefore already known before. We also cannot say that perception will help us in understanding sphiota. We have already thrown it away as a valid means of knowledge. Besides, an unchangeable concept like a word in the form of sphiota cannot be conceived as being capable of bringing about right knowledge. Hence, concludes Jayarāśi, there is nothing like a word (either in the form of syllables or sphiota).19

This is Jayarāśi’s refutation of the objector’s view of sphiota. We may say that a couple of arguments offered by Jayarāśi is feasible, confused, and stated wrongly and at random. One might have expected a very accurate account of the objector’s point of view taken from the Vākyapadīya of Bhattṛhari whom Jayarāśi quotes at the end of the work, or the refutation of sphiota from such great minds like Kumārila and Dharmakīrti. Was he afraid of Maṇḍana Miśra who was ready with a brilliant defence of sphiota in his Sphiotasiddhi? Nothing of the kind: Jayarāśi, the indisputable wrangler (vaitāṇḍika), had in mind the Mīmāṃsakas, the Buddhists, and the Naiyāyikas as major opponents. Grammar was not his forte, nor grammarians his important adversaries. The reference to sphiota is only incidental. Jayarāśi’s arguments about syllables words, their relation, the expressiveness of the so-called corrupt words and the nature of the pronouncements of an authoritative person are arrows directed against the Mīmāṃsaka more prominently than against the grammarian. At the end of the fifth sub-section Jayarāśi takes up the topic regarding the expressiveness of the so-called corrupt words.

There are rules in the form of the sītiras regarding the correctness or otherwise of words in the current usage. Words are both correct and corrupt, say the Mīmāṃsakas and the grammarians. The correct words are determined by rules of grammar.20

The so-called corrupt words like gāvī, goni, goputtalikā, all meaning a cow, are considered apabhramśa, or corrupt words. This is not correct. Even in the absence of rules testifying their correctness, they should be understood as correct words. What will happen when someone utters a corrupt word? Does the mouth of the speaker become deformed? Do such words not convey any meaning? Do they convey a changed meaning? Do the meanings of the corrupt words become incapable of bringing about a particular and intended action or does their utterance result in some disaster? For these alternatives Jayarāśi has taken help of the first section (āhnikā) of Patañjali’s Mahābhāṣya and the introductory discussion in the early part of the Saṃbara-bhāṣya.
Jayarāśi next answers the above questions one by one. We find hundreds of people uttering the so-called corrupt words. Their mouths are not deformed.

A word like gāvī (cow) does express meaning because there are many cognizers of the meaning of the word cow when gāvī is uttered. It also should not be said that, when a hearer hears the word gāvī, he is mentally reminded of the word cow, the so-called correct word. The uneducated and backward persons have never known the word go and therefore at the time of the utterance of the word gāvī they are not reminded of the word go.

There is also no change of meaning when a corrupt word is pronounced. We never experience that the correct meaning ‘cowness’ is contradicted by the word gāvī when the latter is uttered.

Nor does a corrupt word become incapable of bringing about a particular result, because, when the word gāvī is uttered, there is no difficulty in milking a cow or leading it to a pasture or in its giving birth to a calf. The expressiveness of a corrupt word can never be derecognised.

Bhartṛhari has said that the corrupt word, according to some, is expressive only through the inference (of its correct form). Even if its expressiveness were equal to that of the corrupt form, the Śāstra makes a restriction with regard to usage, keeping merit and demerit in view.21

Jayarāśi says this is not correct, because, there is no restriction on the expressiveness of a corrupt word. There are no specific rules about the use of correct or corrupt words. Even well-versed scholars are found using corrupt words.

On this point Jayarāśi is in good company, for Patañjali, too, has stated that only at the time of ritual, corrupt words are not pronounced, because it results in demerit and restrictions against the use of such utterances are specifically given by Vedic injunctions. He also says that corrupt as well as correct words express the same meaning.22

References

1. TPS,
   (a) for the Buddhists, p. 29, l. 26; 32, 4; 39, 17, 23; 42, 22; 53. 9.
   (b) for the Jainas p. 79, l. 15.

2(a) तस्मेव तवसीदृष्टि प्रजापक्षित कथं वृत्तादिति सविस्मयानुसारं नक्षेत: । तस्मारेत् यनुबाक्षिबिति नववेद्याङ्गान्तुभुवनं विनिर्माणेकं तमः । p. 80, Pramāṇavārttika, Svārthānumānavṛtti (Mālvaṇīā, Benares).

   (b) वेदप्रामाण्यं कस्यचित्तं वादः स्नानं धर्मेऽभ्यां जातिवादवावेः ।
   सन्तायाप्रमो पापप्रमायं चैति वेदप्रामाण्यं पापं विनिर्माणं जावेः।
   ibid, p. 118.

   (c) तदेतुस्मत्तत्त्त्तकथं उपमाजसंवर्गानिभव । Vādanyāya, p. 103.
3. The criticism of grammar and grammarians: p. 67, 68.

(a) सूत्रवाचिकार्येय प्रयत्नये चायप्राप्तन्तम्।
   अवश्याय: कथं चायप्राप्तस्वत्र: संबंधं:। II Tantravārttika, p. 260.

(b) जतो विगानगार्थ स्वाध्यायाहूँ भव्याः नानुलारासात्त॥
   खिफ्तालाच यवस्याः शाब्दानां नानुलारासात्त॥ ibid, p. 274.

(c) कृत्यं सूत्रं दिनं माणं कय्यत्रं कोषदेवं:।
   अवश्यान प्रदायवं जननकरणसंतम॥ Nyāyamaṇjarī, p. 386.

(d) तदेव यवस्यते न्यायमोहमापारिशीलनविकलानां वाहुतरा प्रलया उत्तेष्योः।
   Nyāyavārttikatātparyatikā, p. 715.

4. तदेवमुप्ज्युष्टेऽब तस्मेवं अविवाहितत्वम्॥ सवं यवहारं परिपुष्टं इति। TPS. p. 125.

5. TPS. p. 45, 48.

6. पुण्यवादिनिः तत्वानि लोके प्रसिद्धिः। तत्त्वं विवाहितमाणि न यवविष्यते कि पुनर्निर्माणैत।
   TPS. p. 1.

7 TPS. introduction VI ff.

8. वृत्तं निरंगकं सत्तं पदादि परिकल्पतम॥
   अवस्तुतम वृत्तं संकल्पस्याच वस्तुन॥
   Pramāṇavārttika, Svārtha-nāmanā, verse 941 b, 242 a.

9. ननु सवं शब्दस्यादित संबंधं: कणिकित। Nyāyamaṇjarī, p. 220.

10 (a) साधाय: शब्दार्थसंबंधप्रत्यय:। Vaiśeṣikasūtra, 7.2-10.
   (b) समयं तमवावियम। Vātsyāyanabhaṣya on Nyāyasūtra, 2.1.55.
   (c) तहुरसंस्थ सड़केत एव। इत्यादि स्वामाविकेन संबंधेन।
   Tātparyatikā, on Nyāyasūtrabhaṣya 2.1.55.

11. Tatvasamgraha, verse no. 2895.

12. नोदनान्तिता बुद्धि: प्रमाणं दोषविजिते।
   कारणीयमानस्वार्कार्यमः। TPS. p. 116; Śloka-vārttika, Sūtra 2. v. 184.

13. एवं तदमं अविवाहितामिहितेः विवेकोपितो हेक्नत्तरं नाम निप्रस्थायनम्।
   TPS., p. 116, l. 23, 24.

14. सूत्रवाचिकार्येयचक्रवेद्यप्रमाणमातू। TPS. p. 118, l. 18.

15. TPS. p. 84. 19; 87, 6; 71, 4: 63, 14; 71, 4.

16. तत्त्वादेव एवं वणिक्षम जगति संबंधं। तस्य गोर्गवाचकवं न यवदे सुप्रविशक्ष्यन। TPS. p. 121, l. 1, 2.

17. This is verbatim of the earlier argument, p. 121, l. 1.

18. अर्थप्रतिपादव्यत्नानुचरता पदार्थवायने। तत् अर्थपिते: प्रामाण्यमेव नास्ति।
   TPS. p. 123, l. 20,21.

Here Jayarāśi takes a jump from अर्थप्रतिपादति to अर्थपिते by verbal quibble (वाक चाला).
19. न च नित्यम् विज्ञानाचार्यान्त्रिक्याकरणामार्थमस्ति। T.P.S., p. 123, l. 25. This is a repetition of p. 121, l. 16.

20. Discussion regarding the nature of corrupt words stopped after the seventh century A.D. when different forms of Prakrits became the spoken dialects. The discussion in later Buddhist and Jaina works and in Nāgasa is merely academic.

21. अपश्रव्योजनमेव वाचक: केष्मिन्दिष्टे।
वाचकत्वादिक्षोपयो नियम: पुष्यपाप्यो: ॥
TPS. p. 125; Vākyapādiya III. 3.30.

22. समानार्थार्थमात्र शब्देन नापशब्देन च वर्णनियम: क्रियते। Mahābhāṣya, I. p. 8, l. 21
(Keilhorn)