

Jīva and Ajīva

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Jain philosophers talk of Jīva and Ajīva. Is it a division, a category distinction or an abstraction? Do Jīva and Ajīva exclude each other? Or are they abstractions from experience, and so just the concepts and not existents?

Before we proceed further it may be pointed out that it was the custom in ancient India to give a list of concepts but the list was not necessarily exclusive and several concepts mentioned in the list were over-lapping. The Vaiśeṣikas mention nine Dravyas—the Mahābhūtas, the space and time and Manas and Ātman. It is difficult to assume that space and time and the Bhūtas exist independently of one another and that they are not overlapping. It is difficult to imagine Pṛthivī, Āp, Tejas, Vāyu or Ākāśa without spatial or temporal dimension. I understand that when the Vaiśeṣikas gave this list they treated Pṛthivī, Āp etc., as also their forms, space and time as belonging to one list of investigations. The Jains similarly could give a list of what is traditionally known as Jain padārthas (Jainas called them Dravyas) and amongst them could be Jīva and Ajīva.

If we look at experience at a macroscopic level it will be clear that the world consists of Jīva or the animate and things different from Jīva or the inanimate. This is the case of a division of the world on a certain principle, fundamentum divisonis. Such division would not suggest that the life or Jīva has no spatiotemporal aspects, nor would it suggest that it has no material aspects. It would, e. g., be possible to imagine two kinds of matter one having life and the other without life. This is what is, for example, said in the Caraka-Saṁhitā. But on such a division, the living and the non-living things or substances will both have some common properties which are spatio-temporal. For, whether something is living or non-living, it would primarily be material and located in space and would be just real, one that can be experienced.

Sometimes, however, we may classify our experience into Life and otherwise and such a classification would easily be ambiguous; for, one could mean by it either the classification of real things or we could mean by it a classification of concepts, a case of mere abstraction. It is further possible that we might confuse between the division of things and classification of concepts and in that case we might be doing what is known as abstraction but thinking that we are dividing (or classifying) the things in the world. In this case the confusion would arise due to the fact that we would be treating concepts and things on par, the images of things and concepts succeeding each other in such a quick succession that one is mistaken for the other.

When Descartes, e. g., thought of extention and consciousness as substances he was, as Spinoza later suggested, talking of attributes or was merely abstracting, i. e., distinguishing extentional and consciousness aspects of experience, but was thinking that he was dividing (or classifying) the substances, into two. But dividing substance having extension into living and non-living substances is quite different from classifying the concepts of extension and consciousness (without extension) and then thinking that consciousness without extension was one kind of substance and extension was another kind of substance. In experience we do come across the living beings and nonliving things. But however minute a living being may be our experience always tells us that it is always determined by extension. That we are not able to see the extension of it by our naked eyes, does not prove that there is no extension determining these substances. One has to admit that the language *Aṇoh Aṇiyān* etc. is the language of extension or space. The problem which arises here is that how there can be a Saṁyoga-external contact between something that is extensional and something that is extensionless. People of various schools including Jainism must have noticed this difficulty and that is why the concept of *Liṅga-Deha* or *Kāraṇa-Deha* must have been introduced. It goes without saying that *Deha* suggests that although consciousness was different from body, it still had extension. But if this is admitted it is a tacit admission of the fact that the division *Jīva* and *Ajīva* was a division of matter, i. e., existence having extension, into non-living and living, and from this it would follow that Jain philosophers were primarily concerned with dividing or classifying the world into extentional but conscious and extentional but nonconscious world, and not into extentional and nonextentional world. My contention is that in a physical analysis or division it is never possible to divide the world into something that is extensional and nonextensional. When we try to talk of extensional and non-extensional and also identify extensional with nonconscious or *Ajīva* and nonextentional with conscious or *Jīva* we are, as a matter of fact, abstracting, conceptualizing, logicizing and only mistaking a logical analysis for a physical division.

Of course a problem would arise here : When we are talking of a Living being, we know that it is determined by birth and death. In a state after death consciousness or livingness disappears and it makes us think that it has gone away. We forget that 'has gone away' is a metaphor and if it is not used in a metaphorical way it would only belong to the language of space. But we simultaneously hold the belief that (a) it belongs to the language of space and (b) it does not belong to the language of space. We simply overlook that to hold two such beliefs together is a contradiction. But holding such beliefs becomes possible because they are held in two separate chambers of consciousness without any communication between them. Of course, one will have to explain the phenomenon of exit or vanishing of life. But saying that life is a separate substance and it goes away at the time of death is not offering a real explanation of the phenomenon. Space and a thing in space cannot be separated

from each other. From this if someone suggests that they are two things and they only come together by some external contact, it would be incorrect. Similarly if there is green leaf and if later on it dries up, it would be incorrect to say that green itself has gone somewhere else. When a revolving wheel stops it does not mean that the movement is taking rest somewhere. Vanishing is not equivalent to going somewhere else just as existing together of space and a thing in space is not equivalent to external contact or Saṃyoga. A better explanation would be to say that (1) space and a thing in space are one phenomenon, (2) greenness and vanishing of greenness of leaf is another kind of phenomenon (3) revolution of wheel and stopping of its movement is a third kind of phenomenon and death of a living being is a fourth kind of phenomenon. One need not explain the one in terms of the other. But unconsciously one commits this mistake and fluctuates between the process of dividing (or classifying) and conceptualising. Perhaps a better explanation of Jain category would be possible if we understand Jīva and Ajīva as a division of existants, say matter, on the principle that one is animistic and the other is not. One has to remember that the process of dividing, enumerating, counting or sometimes even classifying things is of one kind and categorising of things is of another. You cannot divide, enumerate etc., unless things exist in their own right. Of course conceptually you can even give concepts the status of a thing and then count (as you do when you count categories). But primarily this process belongs to things which exist in their own right. On the other hand when you distinguish different qualities or characteristics, you are not separating the independent things, you are abstracting them, and such abstractions are neither in space nor in time, they are not existing, nor living, they are just concepts.

A problem, of course, would arise about the relationship of such concepts to reality. Concepts in logic does not require a bearer of substratum but if they are to be real then they can be real only in relation to some substratum which is real, i.e., these concepts should be such that they must be capable of having a form which is a form of existence, a form of life. This form of life or existence makes it possible for us to think that the concept has an existential relevance. Take, e.g., the case of sweetness. In order for sweetness to have significance in life it will have to go with some thing and to talk of a thing we will have to talk of space, time and substance. Space, time and substance, so to say provide a medium for the concept of sweetness to be real. The process by which we concretise a concept is the process in which we supply medium for the concept to exist. And this according to me is the Jain concept of Astikāya—a body for its existence, a form of existence. This form of existence will naturally vary accordingly as the concept in its concretized form is dynamic or not and accordingly the Astikāya concept also will be modified into Dharmāstikāya and Adharmāstikāya etc. But the point that I am making is that when a Jain philosopher tries to conceptualize and abstract, he rather talks of Dharma and Adharma, both of them being characteristics (Adharma is also a characteristic) and when he talks of concrete things, he talks of Jīva and Ajīva. One can easily see the distinction between Jīva and Ajīva on the one hand and

Dharma and Adharma on the other.*

In the light of what has been said above, let me now try to understand the theory of Jīva and Ajīva as understood traditionally by the Jain thinkers. In doing this, it will be my object to remove the contradictions or inconsistencies in the theory and present the theory in a consistent form. Thereby I might be able to show that the theory of Jīva and Ajīva is, in fact, concerned with a division of certain matter which is divided on the basis of animate and inanimate only.

First, Jain philosophers think that both Jīva and Ajīva are Dravyas.* Of course Dravya is that which has got certain characteristics. But they think that all Dravyas are spatial in character. Even time is spatial in character for them. Space seems to be the common characteristic of all Dravyas or things. They use the word Pradeśa to denote spatiality of a thing. They also think that since there are two kinds of objects, Jīva and Ajīva, Jīva and Ajīva would be a division of the universe. They bring in an important notion here. The notion of Ākāśa. They divide Ākāśa into Loka-Ākāśa and Aloka-Ākāśa. Loka-Ākāśa is the space wherein the things exist and activity takes place. But the Loka-Ākāśa is encircled by a limiting line (may be imaginary) beyond which there cannot be any activity nor can there be any existence of things. It is on this line of demarcation that Jain philosophers imagine that there are Siddhaśīlās and think of them as abode of freed souls. The freed souls simply cannot go beyond this line because as soon as they are free their activity comes to an end. Beyond this line there is only empty space. It is empty space not because there is nothing in it but because there cannot be anything in it. All things of different kinds therefore exist only in Loka-Ākāśa. It may be remembered that the empty space in Loka-Ākāśa is different in kind from the empty space in Aloka-Ākāśa.

There is however, a difficulty which may be pointed out here. Everything which exists is Astikāya. However, Kāla is not an Astikāya though it exists in Lok-Ākāśa only. How to conceive of Kāla as not Astikāya and still in space is in fact a problem. Therefore, I think, it is necessary to think that the term Astikāya does not simply indicate a thing but it means as Jain philosophers rightly assert, a medium introduced like Kant's schemata to make up for the relation between concepts and things. But if we think this way, Jīva and Jīvāstikāya would be two notions and not one. Jīva would be the concept of Jīva and Jīvāstikāya would be an actual Jīva having extension. This will not only be true of Jīva, but of all Dravyas. In ordinary language we do use the word Jīva in these two senses. This would also explain why Kāla is not Astikāya, for the concept of time does not require any other medium in order to be significant.

* At a later stage, however, he must have made a distinction between Jīva (as a concept) and Jīva (as Astikāya). Similarly he must have made a distinction between Dharma and Dharmāstikāya etc.

* I am aware that the Jains use the word Dravya where a Vaiśeṣika would use Padārtha.

Time itself is such a medium, It is not bound to space in the manner material things are bound to space. Thus only those concepts which require spatiality, in order for them to be significant, and have a form of existence would alone be Astikāya. Astikāya would also thus mean the body or medium of a concept which makes the concepts exist and cease to be merely a concept. I feel that at some stage Jain philosophers must have confused between the concept of Jīva and the actual Jīva. It need not be added that the concept of Jīva is a logical notion whereas Jīva is an empirical existence.

Let me now understand how the Jain philosophers think of Jīva which is a Dravya and so which exists its own right. And here comes a very significant notion of the Jains. First they think that the Jīvas are Anantas-infinite. They also think that Jīvas are Asaṅkhyā-Pradeśas. Pradeśa here means space and by the statement Jīvas are Asaṅkhyā-Pradeśas—what is meant is that different Jīvas can have different spatial dimensions. What is admitted here is that the existent Jīvas are spatial in character. Again, if there is a living child then the Jīva of that child has the same extension as the extension of the body. If the child grows the Jīva also grows for there is no part of the living body which is unconscious. The Jīva is regarded as life-coat for the body. It is a cap or a gown which covers every part of the body and is coextensive with it. This Jīva is not ordinarily separable from the body. When it becomes Mukta then like the left-skin of the serpent and the serpent which can be separated, the Jīva and the body are separated. The Jīva in the context of the living body is continuously growing but a Mukta Jīva would not occupy that part of the body where there are empty spaces or hollowness. Thus in the case of a Mukta Jīva there may not be a one-to-one correspondence between the extension of Jīva and the body, and the extension of the Mukta Jīva may be smaller than his body.

The most important and common-sense element in the whole theory of Jains is this that they agree that consciousness of Jīva cannot exist without space. But this is possible only if Jīva and body are inseparable. But inconsistently with this belief they also believe that at the time of Mukti the Jīva and body can be separated. It is like taking out a cap of a fountain-pen and keeping it away from the fountain pen. In the case of fountain-pen both the fountainpen and its cap are material. But can there be a spatial form which exists and has no material characterization? It is almost like thinking that there is a form of fragrance as a quality without any material bearer. It is like the Cheshire cat in Alice in the wonderland, which goes away leaving its grin behind. Can there be spatial layer of consciousness without a material body? To think of such layer is in fact to think that consciousness is also material though different from the material body which is non-living. It is holding two belief-systems together in two different chambers. Jain philosophers were toeing the common-sense so long as they were thinking that the Jīvas had pradeśas. But to think of the Jīvas along with pradeśas without body, i.e., Deha, is to mystify and liquidate the common sense. It is the mistake of not distinguishing between vanishing of the phenomenon and separation

of the two independent phenomena. This paradox can be dissolved only if we regard that there are living spatial phenomena and non-living spatial phenomena such that both of them have some material substratum. While interpreting Jain theory it is the common sense, which we have to depend upon. The commonsense tells us that matter is to be divided into living and non-living and is not to be abstracted into matter and not-matter. But in such a case it is redundant to say that there are two bodies one living and the other non-living and that the living body is super-imposed on the non-living one. Spatiality, it is insisted, is a property both of living and non-living. In the process of abstraction spatiality would also be abstracted. Perhaps for this reason people talked of Kārmika Deha. Unless Karma has spatiality and material properties it could not be attached to Jīva at all. But this common sense stand of the Jains is given up when they bring in the Mukta Jīva, and like other systems of Indian philosophy add to confusion and become more or less like traditional Sāṅkhya or traditional Advaita.

लेखसार

जीव और अजीव

डा० एस० एस० बालिगे, पुना विश्वविद्यालय

जैन दार्शनिकोंने जीव और अजीव तत्त्वोंकी चर्चा की है। क्या यह चर्चा पदार्थोंके वर्गीकरणसे सम्बन्धित है अथवा यह मात्र एक धारणा है। वर्गीकरणके लिए पदार्थका अस्तित्व-विस्तार आवश्यक है जबकि धारणाके लिए यह अनिवार्य नहीं है। जब स्थूल जगत्को जीव-अजीवके रूपमें वर्गीकृत करते हैं, तब सामान्य दृष्टिसे आकाश-कालके गुण स्वतः समाहित हो जाते हैं। ऐसा प्रतीत होता है कि जैनोंके लिए जीव और जीवास्तिकाय दोनोंका भिन्न अर्थ है। जैनोंमें शरीर और जीवका जो सम्बन्ध बताया है, वह तर्कसंगत नहीं बैठता। इनके सम्बन्धके लिए कर्मका आश्रय लिया गया है। यह भी विस्तारवाला है। जीवास्तिकाय भी विस्तारवान् है। यहाँ तक तो बात बनती है, लेकिन जब मुक्त जीवकी बात आती है, तब स्थिति भिन्न होती है। यहाँ इनके सिद्धान्तोंमें भी सांख्य और अद्वैतके समान भ्रान्ति अधिक उत्पन्न होती है। फलतः जैनोंके जीव-अजीव विषयक पक्षके सही रूप पर गंभीर विचार और निर्णय आवश्यक है।

एक शोधदिशा

जापानमें प्रचलित येन मत और जैनधर्म

पं० जगन्मोहन लाल शास्त्री, कटनी

‘दिनमान’ के १-१०-७७ के अंकमें ‘धर्म-दर्शन’ खंडमें प्रकाशित ‘आत्मानुकूल पथ’ नामक शीर्षक में बताया गया है कि जीन कारपेंतियरने अपने एक भाषणमें येन मतको बौद्ध धर्मकी एक शाखा बताया है। परंतु, यह कुछ बातोंमें बौद्ध धर्मसे बिल्कुल भिन्न है।

येन मत पूर्णतः आत्मानुभूति पर आधारित है। इसमें गुरुके उपदेश तथा प्रवचनको कोई स्थान नहीं है। इसे सभी अपना सकते हैं। यह एक प्रकारका स्व-अनुशासन है। इस मतमें सभी धर्मोंके मिश्रणकी अभूतपूर्व संभावनायें हैं। योग-विज्ञान तथा अनुशासनका इतना सुन्दर समन्वय अन्यत्र देखनेको नहीं मिलता। यह मत इतना व्यापक है कि यह रूढ़िवादी अर्थोंमें बौद्ध धर्मकी श्रेणीमें नहीं आता। यह मुख्यतः ध्यानमूलक धर्म है। इसमें ध्यानके केन्द्रीकरणको एक निश्चित बिन्दु तक पहुँचानेकी आवश्यकता है।

यह मनोविज्ञानसे जुड़ा हुआ है और रहस्यमय है। यह धर्म और समाजमें सन्तुलन लाता है। यह मत उपनिषद् धर्मके अधिक समीप लगता है।

डा० कारपेंतियरने अनेक प्राचीन धर्म ग्रन्थोंके आधार पर यह भी प्रमाणित किया है कि बौद्ध धर्म पर ही येनमतकी छाप पड़ी है। उदाहरणार्थ, योगमें चित्तवृत्ति निरोध, आत्मानुभूति, समय और धार्मिक क्रियायें येनमतकी ही विशेषतायें हैं, बौद्ध धर्मकी नहीं।

मुझे पन्द्रह वर्ष पूर्व येनमतके विषयमें जानकारी प्राप्त हुई थी। मैंने अनेक विदेशगन्ताओंसे इसके विषयमें विशेष जानकारी चाही थी, पर उनका विश्वास था कि जापानमें तो बौद्ध धर्म ही है, येन-जैसा कोई पृथक् धर्म नहीं है। अपने शोधकोंके प्रमादसे मैं इस विषय पर विस्तृत विचार नहीं कर पाया। लेकिन डा० कारपेंतियरके विवरणसे इस विषयमें जो तथ्य सामने आते हैं। वे मेरी दृष्टिसे निम्न हैं :

येनमत जैनधर्मकी शाखा सम्भावित है क्योंकि इसमें वर्णित स्वानुभूति ही सम्यग् दर्शन है और स्व-अनुशासन ही निश्चय चारित्र्य है। इन दोनोंका संबंध आत्माश्रयी है, बाह्यस्रोती नहीं। इसमें अनेक धर्मोंके मिश्रणकी संभावनायें इसके अनेकान्तवादी दृष्टिकोणको व्यक्त करती हैं। इसका ध्यान जैनधर्ममें मोक्ष या निर्वाण या आत्मानुभूतिका साधन बताया गया है। जैनधर्म भी आत्माको शुद्ध, बुद्ध मानता है और निर्वाणको ईश्वर कृपा पर निर्भर नहीं मानता। येनके समान ही जैनधर्म भी दरबारी धर्म नहीं रहा। यह बौद्धधर्मसे पूर्ववर्ती भ० पार्श्वनाथके समयमें भी प्रचलित था। इसमें वीतरागता और आत्मानुभूतिको उच्च स्थान प्राप्त है। जैनधर्ममें संयम पर भी बल दिया गया है।

इस प्रकार येन और जैनधर्ममें न केवल नाम-साम्य है, अपितु उसके सिद्धान्त भी समान हैं। क्या ऐसा माना जा सकता है कि सहस्रों वर्ष पूर्व जब बौद्ध चिन्तक एशियाई देशोंमें धर्म प्रचार हेतु गये थे, तब जैन चिन्तक भी गये हों? उस समय जहाँ जैनधर्मका अधिक प्रभाव पड़ा हो, वे आज भी 'येन' कहलाते हों? यह विचार मात्र भावनात्मक नहीं हो सकता, इस विषयमें शोधकों को विचार करना चाहिये।

जैनधर्मानुयायी वाणिज्यिक रहे हैं और आज भी उनका इसी ओर झुकाव है। इसलिये उनसे इस प्रकारकी खोजकी क्या आशा की जावे? इनकी अनेक संस्थाओंको तो अपने देशमें ही अपने धर्म और समाज पर वात्सल्य नहीं है, फिर विदेशोंकी तो बात ही क्या? क्या सराक जाति संबंधी शोधसे हमारी समाज या संस्थायें प्रभावित हुई हैं? संस्कृतज्ञ विद्वानोंको भी पारस्परिक शास्त्रार्थमें ही विश्वास है। मैं इस लेख द्वारा समाजके प्रबुद्ध वर्ग तथा धार्मिक वर्गका ध्यान इस प्रकारकी शोधोंकी ओर आकर्षित करना चाहता हूँ। उन्हें आजकी आवश्यकताको समझने तथा अनुदार वृत्तिको छोड़नेका आग्रह करना चाहता हूँ। इसके बिना धर्मकी उन्नति, प्रभावना, प्रचार-प्रसार व कालान्तर स्थायित्व-कुछ भी नहीं हो सकता।

मेरे ध्यानमें हमारे प्रमादके अनेक उदाहरण हैं। एक बार एक प्रभावी राजनीतिक नेताने भूतपूर्व सिन्ध प्रान्तमें जैनधर्म और उसके तीर्थंकरोंके विषयमें एक लेख लिखा था। वह बड़ा ही रोचक एवं ऐतिहासिक विषय था। लेकिन उसपर भी हमारा ध्यान नहीं गया। यही नहीं, कभी-कभी तो हम शोधकोंको हतोत्साह भी करते हैं। एक बार इलाहाबादके सुप्रसिद्ध अजैन विद्वान्ने हुकुमचन्द्र अभिनन्दन ग्रन्थके लिए एक जैन इतिहाससे सम्बन्धित गवेषणापूर्ण लेख भेजा था। वह लेख प्रकाशित तो नहीं ही किया गया, उसे लौटाया भी नहीं गया। इसीलिये एक बार जब मैंने उन्हें महावीर जयन्ती पर कटनी आमन्त्रित किया, तो उन्होंने नकारात्मक उत्तर देते हुए लिखा, "मुझे जैनोसे जुगुप्सा हो गई है।"