Makaranda
(Madhukar Anant Mehendale Festschrift)

Editors:
M. A. Dhaky
J. B. Shah

Sharadaben Chimamhrai
Educational Research Centre
Ahmedabad.- INDIA.
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Sharadaben Chimanbhai Educational Research Centre
'Darshan' Opp. Ranakpur Society
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Foreword

In the publication programme contemplated by this Centre, one category involves publishing felicitation volumes for renowned scholars in the field of Jainology as well as Indology in general. We are happy to publish this second volume in that series for Prof. (Dr.) M. A. Mehendale, the distinguished and world famous scholar whose contributions to the fields of Sanskrit, Prakrit, and Avestan studies are outstanding and whose association with the institutions having great reputation like the Deccan College and the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, both located in Pune, is decades old. We hope and believe that the scholars in the fields in which he has been for many years working will welcome this publication.

Sharadaben Chimanbhai
Educational Research Centre
1st of September, 1999

Ajay Chimanbhai
Trustee
Editors' Preface

In mid-May 1997, we for the first time met Prof. Mehendale at the world-renowned Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute in Pune where he has been working for the past several years after retiring from the Deccan College. We, of course, were aware of his researches in the fields of Sanskrit, Prakrit, and Avesta—an academic preoccupation in which he has been continually engaged, indeed for over half a century. We, moreover, were familiar with some of his more famous works. To meet him face to face, however, was for us a rare event and indeed was an experience as profound as was delightful. As we look back, in him we were meeting an academic of great stature, the surprising part was that we found him not only an humble yet dignified, and also a pleasantly communicative scholar, but also serene, soft-spoken, and forthright as well as fearless, a rare combination of several desirable facets of disposition for any scholar possessing outstanding merits and distinction. In the course of our conversation, an idea flashed in our minds. Then, just on an impulse, we proposed to allow us to produce a festschrift for him. After a few contemplative moments, and for certain to our delight, Prof. Mehendale agreed, the result being this Volume which we have pleasure in placing before the scholarly community. The papers, we feel, are well-written and needed only small editorial modifications and adjustments according to a few details of the style-sheet this Centre has adopted. However, we must clarify that we have
largely allowed the author's own style for formal conventions in writing since we noticed that the scholars specializing in different disciplines followed their own particular style-sheet; and changes, indeed too many needed for effecting homogeneity in total style-conventions we adopt were, therefore, uncalled for and would end up in confusion even after putting in laborious efforts for long months at our end.

We express our special thanks to the erudite authors for their learned contributions as also for their ready response to our request. They all, as we here do, hold Prof. Mehendale in high esteem and most of them for many years know him as well as his admirable work in the fields in which he is a specialist and has been untiringly active. (Prof. Mehendale's biographical sketch will appear in the volume of his collected papers compiled and edited by Dr. S. A. Laddu, Pune, which is currently in press.)

At the Centre's end, we must specially thank the Computer Operator Shri Akhilesh Mishra for his flawless laser printing and to Shri Naranbhai Patel for his diligently and perceptively done proof-reading.

M. A. Dhaky
J. B. Shah
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Kampa-pronunciation in

स्थानां न ये ४ रास: RV 10.78.4

P. D. Navathe

Kampa; which means tremor, is a peculiar kind of pronunciation which frequently occurs in the traditional recitation of the *Rgveda (RV)*. According to a rule in the *Rgveda-Prātiṣākhya*¹, it takes place when an independent, circumflex (i.e., svarita of four kinds, namely jātya, abhinīhita, kṣaipra and Prašliṣṭa) is followed by an acute or another independent circumflex.

The same conditions for the occurrence of kampa are laid down in a kārikā cited by Bhattōji Dīksita in the *Praudha Manoramā (PrMan)* on his *Siddhānta Kaumīdi (SK)* on the sūtra तस्स्यादित उदात्तमर्गहस्त्स्वम् । Aṣṭādhyāyī 1. 2. 32. This kārikā, which is ascribed to Sākalya², further states that, having uttered the first half of the independent circumflex with an acute accent the remaining half, which is grave, should be uttered with a tremor.

The *Upalekhasūtra*³, a school manual, states that when the said circumflex is on a short vowel the kampa is said to be short and when it is on a long vowel it is said to be long.

According to the tradition of the *Rgveda*, if the preceding independent circumflex is on a short vowel, the figure ⁵ is placed after it, e.g., युक्तोष्ण ⁵ स्मादेद्रेष्टस् RV 2.6. 4⁵; श्रव्य ⁵ स ब्राह्म RV 2. 10. 1⁴ etc., and the figure ⁶ if it is on a long vowel, e.g., प्रोणो विन्ध्य ⁶ यो. RV 2. 4. 2⁵ तत्त्व व जूँपुष्पण: RV 2. 10. 5⁴ etc. As may be noticed, these figures have vertical accent marks above and horizontal accent marks below them⁴. In the former case, the pronunciation of the syllable is known as ekakampa and in the latter as trikampa. This pronunciation is a sort of analysis of the independent circumflex into its component parts.
However, it is difficult to determine the probable time when this practice of marking the kampa with figures $\frac{1}{2}$ and $\frac{3}{2}$ could have started. The Rgveda-Prātiśākhya and Sākalya, who prescribe the kampa, are completely silent about this distinction. So, for want of adequate evidence, we may surmise that the practice is as old as, or might be still older than, the beginning of the manuscript tradition of the Rgveda.

In the light of the aforementioned rules and practice regarding the kampa-phenomenon in the Rgveda let us examine the kampa in the passage र्यानां न ये $\frac{1}{2}$ ग: RV 1c. 78. 4, the subject of the present discussion. In the standard edition of the Rgveda the line is read as given here. The padapātha of the line: र्यानाम् $\frac{1}{2}$ ग: shows that, in the Samhitā, the abhinihita circumflex ग which is the result of the combination of the acute ग- with the following grave ग-, is followed by the acute ग. As the said circumflex is on a long vowel, according to the normal practice, the figure $\frac{1}{2}$ was expected to be placed after it. However, we find the figure $\frac{3}{2}$ instead. So, this is to be recorded as an irregular instance which deviates from the norm of marking the kampa. I have checked all the occurrences of kampa in the Mandalas 2 to 6. No other instance of violation of the norm was noticed in this portion.

The case of kampa in र्यानां न ये $\frac{1}{2}$ ग: is comparable with that in the parallel passage इद्रामी युतामिर्मी $\frac{1}{2}$ भि स्तोमा अनुप्सत RV 6. 60. 7. The Padapātha: इद्रामी इति | युतामिर्मी | इमेव | अभि | स्तोमा: अनुप्सत | shows that the situation in both ये and मत्तियम् is exactly identical. However, in the latter case the kampa is regularly marked by the figure $\frac{3}{2}$.

Regarding the accentuation of the line र्यानां न ये $\frac{1}{2}$ ग: a curious view is expressed by the Svarāṅkuśa Śikṣā. Thus it observes:

यज्ञभिनिहितात्यथाबाहुस्वतो दश्यते यदि ।
तत्र स्वार न कुर्वायत र्यानां नेति दर्शनम् ॥१६॥

"If an acute is found to precede the abhinihita circumflex then in that case one should not pronounce the independent circumflex (Svāra) as may be noticed in the sequence र्यानां न ."

According to Bloomfield's Vedic Concordance (p. 818a), the said sequence occurs only at RV 10. 78. 4a where the abhinihita ग is preceded by the acute
Kampa-pronunciation in स्वतः namely RV 10.78.4

न. So, if my understanding is correct, according to the Śīkṣā there is no pronunciation of the independent circumflex in the passage स्वतः न ये ५ उः. Consequently, there is no Kampa.

In the context of the independent circumflex, due to the peculiar position of which the Kampa-pronunciation takes place, we come across an interesting discussion in the grammatical tradition of the SK. Attention is to be particularly drawn here to the exposition of the sūtra तत्त्वादिति उद्दातमधवर्धस्वम्। Aṣṭ 1-2-32 given in the said commentary. The discussion is important for us as the Rgvedic passage, which is the topic of the present article, is cited there as an example.

In the preceding sūtra समाहारः स्वतः: Aṣṭ 1. 2. 31 the circumflex accent was defined as a combination of the acute and the grave accents. The aim of the present sūtra is to clarify the nature of this combination. This is done by stating the sequence of the components of the combination in the course of pronunciation and their proportion to each other in the combination.

The sūtra is explained as follows: "The word हृत्व in the sūtra is technically unnecessary. The first half of the circumflex is to be understood as acute. Consequently, the latter half is grave. It is distinctly heard when it is followed by an acute or another circumflex".

To illustrate this point are cited the following three examples:

1. क्षोर्कोष्ठ: RV 5. 61. 2⁴, 2. स्वतः न ये ५ उः: RV 10. 78. 4⁴ and 3. शतचक्षुः ये उः: RV 10. 144. 4⁴. It is evident that, in this context, by circumflex, an independent circumflex is intended.

In the first two examples the independent circumflex is followed by an acute. The Tattvabodhini, a sub-commentary of the SK observes that in the first example the said circumflex is on a short vowel and in the second on a long one⁹; in the third example the independent circumflex is followed by another independent circumflex¹⁰).

According to the Bālamnoramā on the SK the circumflex in the last example is a Kampasvarita¹¹). However, this designation is not appropriate as the kampa-pronunciation occurs in all the three cases and not in this one alone.
As the subject of kampa does not come within the scope of the present sūtra, it is not treated in the SK and the PrMan. However, in the PrMan, the authority of Śākalya is invoked, as is already mentioned12, to state that kampa-pronunciation takes place in the three examples thus cited.

It is to be noted that, in the printed editions of the SK the figures , , and , with the accent-marks given below and above them, are placed respectively after the circumflex in the first second and third example.

The purpose behind the use of these figures is not quite clear. It may be noticed that in the SK as also in the PrMan, nowhere is there any mention of these figures. Similarly, neither of the two sub-commentaries of the SK throws any light on this point.

The Kaumudi-Mahotsāha, an old Marathi exposition of the SK, explains that the figures , , and indicate that the preceding circumflex is respectively short, long, and prolated.

Thus, according to this explanation, the circumflex is to be classified under three categories and the figures correspond to the respective category under which it is classified, they have nothing to do with the kampa-pronunciation observed in the Vedic tradition.

It is evident that the figure in the second example is not in conformity with the traditional system of the RV. That the figures and show agreement with the tradition is a matter of mere coincidence.

The explanation given in the Kaumudi-Mahotsaha can hardly be regarded as convincing for want of supporting evidence being available in the SK and the PrMan.

Annotations :-

1. जात्योधिनिहिंसक्ष्येव क्षेत्रः प्रकोप्य एव च।
   एते स्वयम् प्रकाम्पये यद्यच्चस्वरतीतिदयता: || 3.38
   Mangal Deva Shastri considers this kārikā as `spurious', probably because it is not commented upon by Uvaṭa.

2. श्राक्त्योधिप्याम्
Kampa-pronunciation in र्वाताः न ये ॐ: RV 10.78.4

अप्रकृतत्वं यः स्वातः स्वतिलोकदात्तपूर्वस्तः।
उदारायम्यम्याथ शेषं निःवित्तनं कोम्यतमृ॥

विभा-स्वतितो द्विया प्रकृतोऽप्रकृत्तकाः।
तत्र प्रकृत्या स्वभावेनोदातायायेनाथाचर्चितं संगतिः विना जातो यः स
प्रकृतः, तद्वियोप्रकृतेऽर्ऴ इति बोध्यम्। प्रो. म. - उदाराय उदाराय कृत्वा।
The source of the kārikā is not known.

3. हुस्वे हुस्वे बिजनीयात दीर्घे दीर्घे तथैव च।
स्वतित्यानुप्रोष्येन कर्म्य कुर्बिते शास्त्रिवृत्॥२॥

Macedonell : Vedic Grammar 84 b, p. 78.

5. There seems to be no unanimity among the Vaidikas regarding the practice of pronouncing the ekakampa or trikampa. In this connection I heard from the Late Shri Vinayakabhaṭṭa Ghaiṣas, a reputed Rgvedin from Pune, that the Vaidikas from the southern Maharashtra everywhere follow the practice of pronouncing ekakampa irrespective of the short or long quality of the preceding independent circumflex. This information requires verification.


8. हुस्वाद्यम्यम्याथ। स्वतित्यादितोऽस्मिन्युदातं बोध्यम्।
उत्तरार्घ्ये तु परिशाप्यादनादात्तमस्तः।
तस्य चोदातस्वतितपत्तिच्छः।
ब्रवण स्वायत्तः।
अयत्र टूट्तात्त्वित: प्रश्नाश्चे प्रतिज्ञा।
क्ष्य ॐ बोध्य:।
'र्वाताः न ये ॐ:।','घत्ताकं
यो ॐ ब्रह्म。' इत्यादिकमुदातादात्तः।
सिद्धान्तकौमुदी with तत्वभोधिनी, Nirṇayasāgara edition,
Bombay, Śaka 1830 (= A.D. 1908)

9. स्वतित्यादित: उदारायम्।
हुस्वाद्यम्यम्याथ।
दीर्घाधयादितस्योदातास्मिन्युदातं बोध्यम्।
र्वाताः न ये ॐ इति।
ये ॐ अर्थ:।
इति पद्ययाम्यि विद्यायात्त्वित:॥
The relevance of the figure ॐ placed after ये is inexplicable.

10. स्वतित्यादित: उदारायम्।

11. 'घत्ताकं यो' इत्यकायः कर्म्यस्वतित:।
स ू तु ॐ इत्वकायांतकस्वतितिपकः।

12. See annotation 2 above.
Emendation to the text of the Maitrāyaṇī Samhitā

T. N. Dharmadhikari

The Maitrāyaṇī Samhitā (MS) has practically lost its oral tradition and is now found in few manuscripts only. Fortunately, the text of this Samhitā was critically edited and brought out by Schroeder in Leipzig in 1881-1886 and later by Satavalekar in Aundha (Maharashtra) in 1942.

Since the MS has been retained only in manuscript tradition, many (mis-)readings have crept in its text. Schroeder appears to have rectified some of them. Some other scholars have tried to suggest few conjectural emendations to the text of the MS. Martin Mittwede (1986) has collected such emendations in his text-critische Bemerkungen zur Maitrāyaṇī Samhitā. I have to examine one emendation, along with the proper rationale behind it. In the printed text of the MS 3. 2. 8 (Satavalekar), we come across a line reading (यदेता उपशीत्यनेऽस्य) अनतिदाहय युक्तित्रम् (इति, हेवाचें य एता उपधाता इत्यज्ञादी भवति यस्येता उपशीत्यनेऽस्य)।

In this line, the word अनतिदाहय is accented twice, i.e. it shows two udāṭta accents, which is against the Pāṇinian rule, namely ‘anudāttam padam ekavarjam’ (Pāṇini 6. 1. 158) Second, the word यद्द (in युक्तित्रम्) is marked as anudāṭta, which is also against the above-cited Pāṇinian rule. It may be noted that the word यद्द is always udāṭta. The double udāṭta accent in अनतिदाहय and the anudāṭta mark of यद्द give us a clue to conclude that the passage is corrupt and needs emendation.

Schroeder has tried to correct this passage, who reads it as अनतिदाहय युक्तित्रम् (Vol II, p 28). Thus following the rules of accents, he has removed the second udāṭta of अनतिदाहय and has marked यद्द with udāṭta. However, he has neither given the support of manuscripts to this effect, nor has he recorded any other readings here.
Further, Keith, while translating the Taittiriya Samhitā (TS) 5. 2. 10, (p. 415), f. n. 1, notes that the text of MS should obviously be corrected to read ādad for yād which is non-sense'. He has suggested the correction, obviously on the basis of the TS 5. 2. 10 which reads अनतिदाहायेयायिददानम् etc. In fact, the Kāṭhaka Samhitā X. 9 also reads अनतिदाहायेयायिददानम् and supports this emendation. It may be noted here that, though the emendation is correct, it is based only on collateral literature, which cannot always be regarded as decisive, since such literature also show variant readings. Therefore this emendation needs further investigation into the original manuscripts of the MS.

The manuscripts of the MS kept in the custody of Vaidika Samśodhana Maṇḍala, Ādarsha Sanskrit Shodha Samsthā, (V. S. M) Pune, show the readings as follows :-

Manuscript No. 4554 and 2337 अनतिदाहायेयायिददानम्. Manuscript No. 2738 अनतिदाहायेयायिददानम्. A Manuscript from private collection (Saṁvat 1665) reads the text as अनतिदाहायेयायिददानम् etc. Even though these manuscripts do not give the correct readings here, they furnish some further clues for emending the text, namely they have recorded या in अनतिदाहायेयायिददानम् as long. This word may, therefore, be split into अनतिदाहाय अयत् हत् अत्रम्. The second udātta of अनतिदाहाय (Satavalekar's edn.) can now be shifted to अ of अयत्. Since यद् is replaced by अयत् the discrepancy of its (i. e of यद्) being anudātta is also removed.

The pada-pātha (manuscript No. 14096 V. S. M.), though not very reliable and dependable, splits the text as अनतिदाहायेयायिददानम् अयत् हत् अत्रम्, and retains the tradition of अयत् instead of यद्, suggesting that the pada-pātha-kāra has long या in अनतिदाहायेयायिददानम् in his tradition.

Since the meaning of the word अयत् cannot be satisfactorily interpreted in this context, it may be read as अदत् (from यद to eat), not only on the basis of the collateral literature of TS and KS, but also on the following arthavāda-namely अयत् भवति. Thus the word यद् (Satavalekar) or यद् (Schroeder) be first read as अदत् on the basis of manuscripts and then अयत् be emended and read as अदत्. The help derived from manuscripts accounts for अ in अदत्.
Bhaṭṭa Bhāskara and Sāyaṇa derive अदित् from वद vide. Their commentaries on TS 5-2-10-Sāyaṇa-अत्रमदित् अत्रमति' and Bhatta Bhāskara - 'अदित् अद्यादेवात्रम्'।

The meaning of the entire line would be - 'These (apasyā) bricks are placed, it is to avoid excessive burning. The earth said—one who places these bricks verily eats food. He becomes consumer of food for whom these bricks are placed.'
On some Similes in the Jaiminīya Brāhmaṇa

Madhavi Kolhatkar

The similes play a very important role in literature. They are used primarily as a means to convey the intended meaning with clarity and ease through a known illustration and then also as a poetic embellishment. They are used as an aid for the better understanding of something unknown with the description of the already known.

The Brāhmaṇa literature is also not an exception to this known fact. Similes are used profusely in them. They are more of an explanatory or illustrative nature rather than that of decorative. They are generally very simple, yet appealing. The similes in the Aitareya and the Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa have been studied before and discussed in details, but such is not the case regarding the similes in the Jaiminīya Brāhmaṇa (= JaimiBr.)

Compared to other Brāhmaṇas, it can be seen that JaimiBr. exuberantly employs this poetic device, the simile. There are not less than 45 similes only in the first part of it which describes the ritual of the Agnihotra and the Agniṣṭoma. They are used mainly to explain the ritual procedure. They are mostly simple, easy and appealing, and can be characterised as explanatory. They provide the illustrations from the every day life and hence are, on the whole, very easy to understand. Bodewitz’s translation of the JaimiBr. is of much help in comprehending those. (In some cases, however, one cannot totally agree to his translation or emendation.) The aim of this paper is to discuss two such similes.

i) The simile at JaimiBr. 1. 250 reads; yathā vittaṁ pravāham kṣipram pravahet evam evai ‘nam etā devatās svargāya lokāya pravahanti / “Just as a river may quickly transport goods, even so these deities transport him with a view to heaven.” (Bodewitz, 1990, P. 139).
There are certain difficulties in accepting this translation. The word *pravāham* is taken here as having neuter gender and the subject of the clause. Besides this grammatical difficulty, there is one more difficulty and that is; this meaning is not in accordance with the context.

The context is as follows—"When the Trivṛt Stoma covers the Gāyatṛī, what does she procreate on account of this?" One should say: "The sacrifice with seven naves and the idā as its end. "The Gāyatṛī becomes pregnant. She procreates the Puronuvākya (invitation). The Puronuvākya the yājya Yājya the Vaṣaṭ—call, the Vaṣaṭ—call the libations, the libations the Dakṣinās, the Dakṣinās heaven....and the Dakṣinās make him go to heaven." (Bodewitz, 1990, P. 139) And then the same idea is further explained through the above simile.

Thus, from the context it is clear that, because of the union of the Trivṛt stoma with the Gāyatṛī metre, certain sacrificial elements are acquired successively and finally the Dakṣinās. It is the Dakṣinās, thus gained, which lead the sacrificer to heaven. Accordingly, the simile can be translated: "As the gained or accumulated (water? wave? force?) carries the flow further with speed, similarly the deities carry the sacrificer to heaven (with speed)." The idea behind this seems to be somewhat like a relay-race. As the accumulated waters, i.e. the waves or the force which is accumulated due to the waves carry the waters further with speed, the Dakṣinās thus gained by gradual succession lead the sacrificer to heaven. The next sentence clearly expresses this idea: *trivṛd evai 'namā stoma gāyatryai prayacchati gāyatṛī puronuvākyāyai puronuvākyā yājyāyai yājya vaṣaṭkārāya vaṣaṭkārā ahutibhya ahutayo dakṣinābhya dakṣinās svargam lokaṁ gamayanti* | "The Trivṛt stoma gives him to the Gāyatṛī metre, the Gāyatṛī metre gives him to the Puronuvākya invitation, the Puronuvākyā invitation to the Yājya, the Yājya to the Vaṣaṭ-call, the Vaṣaṭ-call to the libations, the libations to the Dakṣinās, and the Dakṣinās make him go to heaven." (Bodewitz, 1990, p. 139).

There might perhaps be some suggestion in this passage. It is obvious that since the sacrificer has already started the performance of the sacrifice, he is going to get the fruit of it sooner or later. But the same course of action will be expedited and the deities will carry him quickly to heaven if he will
satisfy the priests by giving sufficient or rather abundant Dakṣinās.

ii) The second simile is at JaimiBr. 1. 281. It reads—

\[ \text{tad ha smāheyapīs saumāpas sa vādyā yajeta sa vānyāṁ yājayed yo yathā mahatī tīrthe sikate gā asambādhamānās santarpayed evaṁ sarvā devatā anusavanāṁ chandaśv āksaram āksaram anusambādhamānāṁ santrapyaṁtir vidyād iti.} \]

Bodewitz (1990, p. 159) has translated it—“As to this also Īyapi Saumāpa said: “He may sacrifice now or act as a priest for someone else, who would find all the deities satiating themselves on account of the fact that he had satisfied them each according to his own Pressing and to every syllable in the (corresponding) metres and (consequently) not pressed together just as one may satisfy cattle in a large ford without sandbanks (i. e.) not pressed together.”

In the notes Bodewitz (1990, p. 300) has stated, “For sikate read ‘sikate (as suggested by Caland in his transcript). The absence of sandbanks creates room for the cows in the water.” The word sikate is difficult to explain grammatically as an adjective of tīrthe. But a river cannot be without sandbanks. The word aisikate would suggest then that the river is so full of water that the sandbanks are not seen. It is used, perhaps to emphasise the vastness of the ford.

Bodewitz has suggested one more emendation. regarding that he has noted (1990, p. 300). “The crit. ed. and Caland’s transcript read āksaram āksaram anusambādhamānāh. Evidently anus belongs to the preceding nouns as a postposition. On account of the comparison a negation before sanbādhamānāh is required here. The gods are asambādhamānāh, since everyone has his own place (i. a. syllable) for his satisfaction. Therefore, I read āksaram āksaram anus asambādhamānāh.”

For better understanding of this paragraph, it is necessary to take into consideration the previous one. It reads - yo vai devānāṁ grhāṅ veda grhī bhavatī vindate grhāṅ / chandāṇisi vāva devānāṁ grhāṅ / aṣṭāksarā gāyatṛī aṣṭau vasavāḥ / gāyatṛyaiva vasavo grhīṇāḥ / ekādaśāksarā triṣṭub ekādaśa rudrāḥ / triṣṭubhaiva rudrā grhīṇāḥ / dvādaśāksarā jagati dvādaśa ādityāḥ / jagatītvaśityā grhīṇāḥ /... sa ya evam etāṁ devānāṁ grhāṅ veda grhī bhavatī vindate grhāṅ / yo vai devānāṁ tṛiptī veda tṛipyatyaśtanā tṛipyat yāśya prajā |
Bodewitz (1990, p. 159) has translated it—“He who knows the houses of the gods, obtains a house. The metres forsooth are the houses of the gods. The Gāyatrī has eight syllables; there are eight Vasus. Through the Gāyatrī the Vasus possess a house. The Triśṭubh has eleven syllables; there are eleven Rudras. Through the Triśṭubh the Rudras possess a house. The Jagatī has twelve syllables; there are twelve Ādityas. Through the Jagatī the Ādityas possess a house...He who thus knows these houses of gods, obtains a house. He who knows the satisfaction of the gods, becomes satisfied himself and his offspring becomes satisfied.”

From this passage, it becomes clear that each syllable of a particular metre is a house for each god of a particular group and he should get that particular syllable as his own house. Then only the deities will be satisfied.

When the deities come to the sacrifice, they rush or swarm for their own house. They are in hurry to get their own house. They are _aṅkṣaram aṅkṣaram anu sambāḍhamānāḥ_. But at that time, it is the priest _yo vidyāt..._ who should know or who should see to it that when the stotras are chanted at the time of the Soma-pressing, they should be chanted in such a way that each and every syllable is uttered distinctly so as to enable the deities to occupy their own syllable, i.e. the house and they become satisfied.”

Now, if we interpret this simile in the light of this passage, the meaning can be understood without changing _anu sambāṇḍhamānāḥ_ to _anu asambāṇḍhamānāḥ_. Thus the simile can be translated—“Regarding this, Iyapi Saumāpa has said—He, who would know that all the deities who are rushing or swarming for their respective syllable are satisfied in their own (Soma) pressing (by getting it), just as one satisfies the cattle at a spacious ford without the sandbanks (being seen), without being pressed together, should sacrifice today or act as a priest for someone else.”

The same idea is further elaborately explained using the word _anusamāṇḍhamānāḥ_ three more times—_aṅśaṅkṣarā gāyatrī aṣṭau vasavah vasūnāṁ gāyatram prātassavanam / tat te prātassavane chandassv aṅkṣaram aṅkṣaram anusamāṇḍhamāṇās santrpyanti / “The Gāyatrī has eight syllables. There are eight Vasus. The morning pressing is connected with Gāyatrī and belongs to the Vasus. Therefore they, rushing for their own syllable at the_
time of morning pressing, satisfy themselves (by getting it.)"

In the same way the eleven Rudras and the twelve Ādityas also satisfy themselves.

Thus this passage can be translated satisfactorily without emending the word *anu samādhānamāḥ* as *anv asambādhamānāḥ*.

It should be mentioned here that the English translation of the Adhyāya done by Bodewitz is very illuminating and of considerable help in understanding the subject. He has been quite successful in translating the first part of the difficult text like the JaimiBr. which deals with the complicated subject like that of arranging the Stotras, and the Sāmans and has no commentary on it. With due appreciation for his invaluable contribution to the field of Vedic Sanskrit, an attempt has been made in this paper to put forth some suggestions before the scholars, for their consideration.
Bibliography:


How to Kill a Sacrificial Victim*

Hanns-Peter Schmidt

In the description of the animal sacrifice in the Śatapātha-Brāhmaṇa 3.8.1.15 we find a statement about three ways of killing a victim:

“Then, having come back (from the place of slaughter), they (the priests) sit down turning towards the Āhavanīya (thinking): ‘let us not be eyewitnesses to (the ‘victim’s) being made consent (to its death)’. They do not strike it with a hammer [or cudgel] (kūṭena prāghnantī), for that is the way (to slay an animal) for man (mānuṣam), nor behind the ear, for that is the way for the Fathers (pitrdevatyām). They either suffocate it by closing its mouth or they make a noose (for strangling it). Therefore he (the Adhvaryu) does not say: ‘slay it, kill it!’, for that is the way for man, but: ‘make it consent! It has passed on’, for that is the way for the gods (devatrā). For when he says: ‘it has passed on’, then it passes on to the gods; therefore he says: ‘it has passed on’.

Eggeling translated kūṭena by ‘on the frontal bone’, but grammatically this is incorrect, and, as Oldenberg has shown, the word kūṭa means ‘hammer’, to which one might prefer ‘cudgel’.

For mānuṣam, Eggeling has ‘for that is human manner’, for pitrdevatyām ‘after the manner of the Father’, and for devatrā ‘after the manner of the gods’.

The translation of pitrdevatyām is incorrect since the word means ‘having the Pitrās as deities’, and thus can only refer to the worship of the fathers. Generally the victims for the fathers are killed the same way as those for the gods, but according to Kātyāyana Śrautasūtra 25.7.34 at the funeral the
anustarini cow or goat is killed by striking it behind the ears, which is the custom with the Mādhyandinas. In the Baudhāyana Pitṛmedhasūtra 1.4 the statement tām anyatraiva śastrād ghnanti “they slay her otherwise than with a sword”² does not allow any conclusion as to the manner of killing Baudhāyana followed, but indicates that killing by sword, namely decapitation, was practised by some people.

mānuśam probably refers to the profane killing for human consumption, but, given sacred character of the Vedic texts, we know little of how animals were killed outside the sacrifice.

Eggeling’s rendering of devatrā also is misleading because not the manner in which the gods sacrifice is meant, but rather how men sacrifice for the gods.

Decapitation probably was the ancient way of immolation. In the Aśvamedha-sūkta Rgveda 1.162.9, it is said: “what of the horse’s flesh the fly has eaten, or what sticks to the post, to the axe, what to the hands of the slaughterer, what to the nails — all that of you shall be with the gods.” This passage speaks for itself and does not require any comment. J. C. Heesterman³ quotes this passage and adds: “Possibly the peculiar way in which the animal is bound to the stake points in the same direction: the cord is fastened to the right foot, goes round the left side of the neck and is then wound round the right horn and finally fastened to the stake. Thus room is left for the slaughterer’s knife.” For ‘knife’ we should substitute ‘axe’ because a knife is hardly the proper tool for decapitation. Heesterman also refers to the Taittirīya-Samhitā 6.3.6.3 where an opposition between sacred and profane slaughter seems to be alluded to: “He winds (the rope) transversely, for they fasten a (beast) for killing in front; (verily it serves) for distinction.” ² (aksṇayā pārī harati, vādhyāṁ hi prātyāṅcam pratimuṅcánti, vyāvṛttyai) According to Sāyana, standing in front of the animal is the profane way of binding it to the pole, ‘transversely’ is the sacred way of doing it⁴. If this interpretation is correct and reflects traditional knowledge, it would follow that also profane slaughter was originally done by decapitation, although Sāyana was hardly aware of this since he only knew suffocation as the method of killing in Vedic sacrifice.
Decapitation is still today the prevalent method of killing a victim in Hindu ritual, but also letting the animal slowly bleed to death has been reported⁵. I have no information about how profane killing is done among Hindus.

In the standard Vedic ritual as represented by the Brāhmaṇas and the Śrautasūtras, the decapitation has been replaced by suffocation and strangling, but there is one expectation: the skulls of man, horse, bull, ram and goat, which must be placed in the middle of the first of the five brick layers of the fire altar, are taken from victims who are “released” (ud-sṛj) from the place of sacrifice and beheaded outside. The fact that their bodies are thrown into water to mix with the clay to be used for the bricks shows that they were not victims in the sense of the animal sacrifice since no offering of parts of them is made. The greatest problem for the authors of the ritual texts was the human victim because at their time human sacrifice had become practically obsolete. The many ways in which one tried to get out of the difficulties have been discussed by Heestermañ⁶. In the standard animal sacrifice, the head, except for the tongue, is not used at all. The reasons given for this are the following: When the gods first seized an animal for sacrifice, Tvaśṭṛ spat on its head, thus claiming it as his own; the spittle became the brain and the marrow of the spinal column, and therefore they are not to be eaten. The Asuras used the head, the shoulders, the neck (backbone) and the hind-thighs. These parts were accordingly not to be used in the sacrifice for the Devas. Since Tvaśṭṛ spat on the neck, one should not use it⁷. Tvaśṭṛ is an ambiguous character, standing between the Devas and the Asuras. In another text it is Viśvarūpa, Tvaśṭṛ’s Asuric son who spits (or vomits) on the animal from above; for that reason one does not cut portions of the animal from above; by anointing it from above one makes it fit for sacrifice, pure (medhya)⁸. We do not know whether the Asuras were thought to kill the victim by decapitation. It is, however, clear that in Rgvedic times decapitation was not considered Asuric, but we do not know whether the head of the animal was used in the sacrifice. In the standard ritual it is discarded, but there seems to be one exception: in the domestic Śūlagava the tail, the skin, the head and the feet are thrown into the fire⁹. Among these pieces the tail belongs to those of which a portion is offered in the
Paśubandha. Here, however, we may have a case of a burnt offering which is not a gift to the deity, but rather a sacrifice as abandonment and destruction of property. 

Replacing decapitation by suffocation or strangulation may have several reasons. One is most probably that, by the time of the Brāhmaṇas, blood was considered inauspicious and its spilling on the place of sacrifice polluting. The blood is dedicated to the Rākṣasas who are to stay in the deepest depth and be joined by the sacrificer's enemies. Only on two occasions is it made ritual use of: once in the Aśvamedha, where cooked blood is offered to Agni Śvīṣṭakṛt = Rudra; here the Devas, identifying themselves with the Agnayah Śvīṣṭakṛtaḥ, take the blood for themselves in order to defeat the Asuras — the reasoning for which may well be that by incorporating the ambiguous Rudra his possibly destructive interference is neutralized. The other occasion is the Śūlagava, dedicated to Rudra, where the blood is offered to the snakes or to Rudra and his cohorts.

The fact that non-Aryan people used decapitation and offered the head and the blood to the deity, as practised until to-day in the sacrifice to Kāli, may have contributed to the change.

It has been suggested that one of the reasons for preferring suffocation was the desire to preserve the animal whole. This can be supported by the sacrificer's wife's sprinkling the eyes, ears, nostrils and mouth of the immolated animal in order to quicken it. The openings of the head are the seats of the vital airs (prāṇa) and thus the head is one of the most important parts of the body, second only to the omentum which is identified as the chief part (agra). In one instance the pollution of the animal caused by Viśvarūpa is remedied by anointing it and thus making it pure again (see above n. 8), but this did not apply to the head. However, the parts not fit for sacrifice, including the head, are placed on the Vedi together with the cooked part and reinvigorated with the vital breaths prāṇa and apāna so that the animal is restored in the beyond.

In the Vedic texts there is, to my knowledge, no explicit reference to the victim's being preserved whole. But that the idea was current in antiquity is attested by the Greek author Strabo (first century B.C.) who states
(Geography 15.1.54), probably on the basis of Megasthenes (visited India ca. B.C. 300-290), that the Indians do not cut the throat of the victim but strangle it so that it is not mutilated but given to the god complete.

II

The passage with which this note begins mentions killing a victim by hitting it on the head with a hammer or cudgel, for which I cannot find any evidence in Indian sources. Since it is unlikely that the author of the Brāhmaṇa invented this method without having either seen or heard of it, we should look beyond India. And indeed neighbouring Iran furnishes some evidence.

The ancient Zoroastrian scriptures, the Avesta, do mention animal sacrifices, but not the method of killing. The earliest attestation is found in the Geography (15.3.15) of Strabo:

“But in Cappadocia—for there the tribe of the Magi is large; they are also called fire-kindlers; and there are many sanctuaries of the Persian gods—they do not even sacrifice with a knife, but they beat (the animal to death) with a piece of wood as with a cudgel.”

In the preceding sections (13-14), Strabo refers to the animal sacrifices of the Persians, but is not explicit about the method of killing. He mentions that in the sacrifice for water they go to a lake, river or spring, dig a trench and immolate the victim over it, taking care that the water is not polluted with blood. Since no cudgel is mentioned, one might think that Strabo assumed that the method was cutting the throat, as it was the Greek one.

In the middle Persian text Draxt ī Asūrig, ‘the Babylonian tree’, which goes back to a Parthian predecessor, a date-palm and a goat engage in a verbal contest, each of them extolling its uses, particularly for man, and its superiority. In verse 15 the date-palm says: “They make clubs of me which break your neck.”

The Armenian Bishop Eznik of Kolb (fifth century A.D.) mentions that the Magi first club the animal and then kill it by cutting its throat. The verb used for ‘to club’ is yazel, borrowed from Iranian yaz ‘to sacrifice.’ Eznik remarks that thus the Magi unknowingly kill the victim twice.
The Bishop of Halvan, Mār Barhad Bešebbâ (sixth century A.D.), has a similar version: According to Zardušt, one should not cut the throat of the victim before beating it on the neck with a cudgel till it is without life so that it does not feel the pain.

In the middle Persian encyclopedic text Dēnkard (tenth century A.D.) we have the most detailed Zoroastrian testimony about the matter:

"The reason for striking cattle with a log before (applying) the knife, together with the other things which are to be done in that matter, apart from the ritual efficacy of cleansing the body from a number of demons, especially the portions of excrement and bad taste, and (apart from) preventing the unjust and ill-considered slaughter of cattle, is first pity for the beast and on this account the lessening of its fear and pain when the knife is applied to it, and the prevention of the slaughter of cattle in an ill-considered manner, impulsively and at any time when one’s desire is urgent."

In Islamic times clubbing the animal was still practised as appears from a hostile and probably distorting source, ‘Abd al-Jabār:

‘They have among their laws other revolting things, such as eating carrion. This is done by tying the bull tightly, and making it ascend a mountain. Then they say to it: ‘We have commanded you and have warned you, but you did not do (what you were commanded to do). Then they beat it until it is dead, and eat it. This is what they call yazdān-kušt, which means ‘killed by God’, and there are other foolish things which they do."

The same author has another version of the same, in which the animal is not beaten to death: The Magi make a cow ascend an elevated place, fetter her feet and make her roll down, saying: “Descend!” and “Don’t descend!” When she has fallen and is dead, they eat her saying: “It is God who has killed her!"

The Muslim author has probably taken this cruelty to animals which may have occurred among uncivilized folk for standard behaviour. It is unlikely that this was ever an accepted Zoroastrian practice.

The charge that the Zoroastrians eat carrion is also voiced by Abu Sa'id
Nashwān al-Himyarī:

"The characteristics of Persians: Then we stop in Persia; there, we find unmatched intellects and unmatched wisdoms. Their political administration is odd; their king is a mobed and he arranges the affairs; he has knowledge of the future. In spite of these, they sleep with their mothers; they eat al-maytah (non-ritually killed animal, carrion) and they perform ablution with (bull's) urine; water is acceptable for them and they honour fire."

Here the method of slaughter is not mentioned, and we cannot tell whether the author refers to ritual killing which did not comply with Muslim practice or to profane killing. Actually it is not known whether there was any profane slaughter among Zoroastrians; the present day Irani Zoroastrians allow only ritual killing in sacrifice. The accusation of eating carrion is obviously based on the assumption that the animal was killed, either by clubbing (or strangulation, see below) before being bled.

It is clear from the foregoing passages that the Zoroastrians generally killed the sacrificial victim by first hitting it with a club and then cut its throat. Ph. Gignoux writes that "we do not know how the Mazdeans were supposed to slaughter cattle ritually." This is a surprising statement in view of the evidence adduced above, some of which is even quoted by Gignoux. But Gignoux draws attention to other sources which show that there was another method in use in Sasanian times. The Acts of the Persian Martyrs claim that the Zoroastrians drank blood in their worship and tried to make the martyrs drink blood. In the Passion of Akepsimas, Joseph and Aitalaha the martyrs are ordered "to drink blood and prostrate themselves before the Sun", but the Christians refuse. Later the magus orders to bring pure meat of an animal not strangled or immolated to the idols. In spite of this concession and the promise of absolution the saints refuse because nothing pure can come from impure hands. Instead of clubbing, strangling before cutting the throat was accordingly practiced by some Magi.

Strangling is mentioned by al-Ṭabarī in the history of al-Afshīn, a local Iranian prince from Transoxania, who, though converted to Islam, followed some unorthodox practices. In one instance he is accused by a Mobad:

"This man used to eat the flesh of strangled beasts, and he urged me to
eat it also, alleging that it was more tender than meat that had been [ritually] slaughtered. He used to kill a black ewe each Wednesday; he would sever it through the middle with a sword, walk between the two halves, and eat its flesh\textsuperscript{31}.

It is odd that a Mobad should bring up such an accusation if strangling was an acceptable practice among Zoroastrians. Possibly, it was a minority practice not approved by the entire clergy. But since the same Mobad later converts to Islam, it may well be that he wanted to ingratiate himself with the Muslim masters. The accusation contributed to al-Afšin's arrest and final execution in 226 A.H. (A.D. 841) though the main, probably trumped-up, charge was that he was involved in a conspiracy of the followers of the rebel Bābak whom he himself had defeated three years earlier as general in the service of the caliph.

The Pahlavi commentary of the Nīrangistān, a ritual handbook of the Sasanian or early Islamic period, does not mention the method of killing the sacrificial victim explicitly, but it appears that hitting with a club is not involved, and that the knife to cut the throat is applied after the animal has been excited by a serrated, comb-like knife in order to keep it alert at the moment of death so that its soul goes consciously to heaven\textsuperscript{32}.

In a 16th century Persian Rivāyat, the following rules for the slaughter of cattle are given:

"[A Herbad] should recite the Kshnuman [proportional] of Bahman Amshaspand [who is the protector of cattle] and recite one Yatha [the Ahuna vairya prayer]...up to Shyaotthenanām and then he may draw over it [the animal] a pure and sharp knife. He should not so manipulate (the knife awkwardly) but he should fix his eyes on it and should retain his breath, so that the gospend may have less pain\textsuperscript{33}.

Boyce deplores "that the old humane manner of first stunning the beast has been abandoned for the Muslim manner of slaughter\textsuperscript{34}." Gignoux (see above n.27) argues that this practice is influenced by the Islamic one since the passage begins with bismillah. The borrowing of a formula does, however, not prove that another item in the same passage must be borrowed, too. If Boyce and Gignoux are right, the Nīrangistān passage might also show Islamic
influence. If my interpretation of Strabo 15.3.13 (see the beginning of section II) is correct, it is however possible that cutting the throat without previous clubbing was one of the ways practised since ancient times.

The practice of the Irani Zoroastrians has been described by Mary Boyce:

"The first day of the [Mihragān] festival was one of bright winter sunshine, and the animal was led out of its stall into the courtyard, which had been carefully swept according to the established ritual. It was offered water to drink, and a sweetmeat, which it readily accepted. Water was splashed upon the ground around it; and then it was cast on its back. Jamshid [the chief sacrificer] knelt beside it, spoke the appropriate Avestan words [as in the above Rivāyat], kissed its left cheek in contrition, and then swiftly cut its throat. Zoroastrians, unlike Muslims, consume the blood of the sacrifice. This is therefore caught in a bowl. When it had ceased to flow, the sacrificer cut off the tip of the tongue, and since the priest was not present, this was wrapped in some of the head and sent to him to be consecrated in the name of the yazad Hōm, the ancient Haoma, to whom a part of all animal sacrifices must be devoted."

The blood is used to prepare a sort of fried black pudding. But it is regarded as ritually impure and accordingly it is not consecrated. Soup is made of the head, but it also is ritually unclean, as are the forelegs. This is quite similar to the Vedic attitude towards blood and the head, with the exception that both can be used for ordinary purposes. Of the inwards of the animal heart, lungs, liver, kidneys, and omentum are ritually used. All these are among the eighteen parts of the victim which are suitable as sacrificial food in the Vedic animal sacrifice. In the Vedic ritual omentum gets special treatment, and such treatment was not completely unknown in Iran since Strabo (15.3.13) reports that—though in general the Persians do not leave any portion of the meat for the gods since they think that the god needs only the soul of the victim—some put a small piece of the omentum on the fire. In spite of the fact that the head is not made use of ritually, the tongue is used in both, Iran and India. Some of the agreements pointed out may well reflect Indo-Iranian heritage.
Annotations :

* The title of this note echoes that of an article and then a whole book by Calvert Watkins, *How to Kill a Dragon. Aspects of Indo-European Poetics*, New York - Oxford 1995, which tells us much about poetic formulas, but nothing about the "how"


2. śastrād is Caland’s emendation for śastrā (see his note on Āpastamba Śrautasūtra 31.2.8).


7. Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa 3.8.3.11, 29.

8. Taittirīya Saṃhitā 6.3.7.4.

9. Āśvalāyana Gṛhyasūtra 4.8.25.


11. Taittirīya Saṃhitā 1.3.9 h-k.

12. Taittirīya-Brāhmaṇa 3.9.11.3-4. Āpastamba Śrautasūtra 20.19.10; 20-21-15. Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa 13.3.4.2ff.

13. Āśvalāyana Gṛhyasūtra 4.8.27.


16. Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa 3.8.2.4-5.
17. Taittirīya Samhitā 6.3.9.5.
18. Taittirīya Samhitā 1.3.10.d-e, Maitrāyaniya Samhitā 3.10.4, Āpastamba Śrautasūtra 7.25.6-7.
27. M. Boyce. A Persian Stronghold of Zoroastrianism. Oxford 1977, 162f. When nowadays buying meat for ordinary use from Muslim butchers they argue that the sin of killing is the butcher’s (ibid., 98). This argument reminds us of the Buddhist and Jaina monks or ascetics who lived on begged food, including meat, the condition being that the animal was not especially killed and prepared for them; see L. Alsdorf, Beiträge zur Geschichte von Vegetarismus und Rinderverehrung in Indien, Wiesbaden 1962, 5ff.
31. The History of al-Ṭabarī. Vol. XXXIII, transl. and annot. by C. E. Bosworth,
Albany 1991, 188. I owe this reference to Siamak Adhami.


34. M. Boyce, “Ātaš-zôhr and Āb-zôhr,” *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* 1966, 100-118:109. Most of the evidence shows that the animal was not merely stunned but rather killed by the club.


37. Āpastamba Śrautasūtra 7.22.6.


Vārāha Śrautasūtra
A Further Textual Study
C. G. Kashikar

The first critical edition of the Vārāha Śrautasūtra (VārŚS)—a junior Sūtra-text belonging to the Maitrāyaṇī recension of the Krṣṇa Yajurveda—was published by W. Caland and Raghu Vira (Lahore 1933). In spite of the efforts made by the learned editors to present a critically edited correct text, the edition left much to be desired by reason of the very defective and scanty manuscript-material. I could procure two manuscripts of the text, not used by the editors—one (B) from the Maharaja Sayajirao University Oriental Institute, Baroda and another (N) from a private collection from Nandurbar, Dist. Dhulia (Maharashta). Even though both the manuscripts are much corrupt and belong to one and the same group, I could improve the text considerably in my edition (Pune, 1987). In the absence of a sufficient number of reliable manuscripts, I had very often to resort to major and minor conjectures.

Incidentally, I came across an old manuscript of Maitrāyaṇīya Sūtra-texts. [I thank my friend Radhe Shyam Shastri for bringing this manuscript to my notice.] The manuscript (Acc. no. - 2800) is in possession of Vaidika Samśodham Maṇḍala, Pune. It was procured from Bhadgaon, Dist. Jalgaon (Maharashta), a centre of Māṇava-Maitrāyaṇīya activities. The manuscript is written in Devanāgarī script on country paper, is worn out, and has withered borders. It is written in prṣṭhamāṭrā style. The hand-writing is uniform throughout. Folios (except two) are numbered, but the opening and closing folios are missing. The opening folio is numbered 115 and the last one is 237; inbetween, too, several folios are missing. The available portions deal with parts of the Vārāha Śrautasūtra, several Vārāha Pariśiṣṭas, and the Pravargya forming part of the Māṇava Śrautasūtra. In all 15 folios present
the scattered portions of the VārśŚŚ. As the external and internal evidence shows, the manuscript is much older than the two Vārāha manuscripts B and N. So far only two manuscripts recording the Vārāha tradition were known to be existing. The present manuscript, even though supplying a partial text, is the third one. It must therefore be regarded as a veritable source for the preservation of the Vārāha Śūtra-text.

In consideration of the similarity of corrupt readings, the present manuscript, which I designate as Bh., belongs to the same group as that of Band N. There must have been a common source of the three manuscripts. Whether Bh. was the source of B and N, it is difficult to say. In spite of the common corrupt readings, Bh exhibits certain independent readings which are undoubtedly worthy of attention. There are certain orthographical peculiarities of Bh. Where there is a conjunction of dental nasals, the scribe writes, as many other scribes have done, a single dental nasal with a dot on the preceding syllable, e. g. III. 4. 2. 8 मुख्तव्यन्ति. The scribe writes guttural Kh in place of sibilant ś e. g. sukhadā for suṣadā (III. 3. 3. 12). He also turns the other way round, e. g. premiṣa for preṅkha (III. 2. 5. 55). When there is an occasion to change the genitive plural suffix dental ṇāṁ into cerebral ṇāṁ, he retains the dental, e. g. meṣānāṁ for meṣānāṁ (III. 4. 4. 23); also accusative plural triḥāyānān for triḥāyānān (III. 4. 3. 18). When there is a conclusion of a Khaṇḍa he sometimes writes Khaṇḍa, but sometimes changes as Khaṇḍaka (III. 3. 3; 4. 1. 4).

The 15 folios (115-117, 119-128 and two without numbers) give the following portions of the text : III. 2. 2. 37 to III. 2. 3. 11; III. 2. 5. 42 to III. 2. 6. 4; III 2. 8. 34 to III. 3. 1. 54, III. 3. 2. 27 to III. 4. 4. 28.

I record below the preferable readings of Bh where the present text is defective. At a few places, I have recorded the variant from Bh even though it is also corrupt. I hope the portions of Mānava Śrautasūtra and Vārāha Pariśīśtas as found in Bh will be exploited for the purpose of checking and improving, if possible, corresponding portions available in printed or manuscript form.

**Mahāvrata**

III 2. 5. 46. तत: प्राचीनस्माहिले. This is the quarter D of the verse beginning
with न तै गातो मादीस्य. Bh reads तैः प्रस्त: सचानाहि Vaitānasūtra 34. 9 reads तैः प्रस्त: संजागहि. The third verse in the same sūtra reads the first line as यदा राष्टो वदते ग्राम्यमतिसाक्षरजन्य. Bh reads साक्षरजन्य. All this is corrupt.

III. 2. 5. 47-पोलो मार्जलीयं यथार्थं गच्छति। Bh (folio not numbered, A8) reads निनयीति in place of यथार्थं गच्छति. MānŚŚ VII. 2. 7. 10 has निनयीति प्रतिवीति। ApŚŚ XXI. 5 reads उदकुम्भानुपनीयं यथार्थं गच्छति. In the Mahāvrata sacrifice, there is an interesting rite in which, according to VārŚŚ. III. 2. 5. 46-47 four or six or eight maid-servants walk around the Mārjāliya mound four times while each of the four verses is being recited four times, and strike their feet on the ground saying, “This is honey, this is honey.” Having gone around the Mārjāliya mound each time, they pour down water from their pitchers and at last they depart. Here the verbal form ninayanti (they pour down water) is essential in compassion with the relevant passages from the MānŚŚ and ĀpŚŚ. The words यथार्थं गच्छति are also necessary.

III. 2. 5. 49-दक्षिणात्: संजागतमार्गवधा: कृत्रिया सङ्केत-कवचनं: संद्वद्धा विच्छयति। The word संजागतमार्गवधा: is corrupt. Here Bh. (folio not numbered A9) reads संजागतमार्गवधा: which also is corrupt. There is no parallel construction in the MānŚŚ and the ĀpŚŚ, hence I am not able to reconstruct the word.

III. 2. 5. 62-प्राहान् समवनीयं सर्वं भक्ष्याति महस्ते भक्ष्यायम सङ्केते भक्ष्यायम स्तोमं सभक्ष्यायमस्य मोहस्ते भक्ष्यायम प्रजां मे भक्ष्यायम प्रतिश्रव भक्ष्यायम इति। Instead of प्रजां मे भक्ष्यायम प्रतिश्रव भक्ष्यायम Bh (folio not numbered B7-9) reads प्रजां मे भक्ष्यायम प्रतिश्रव भक्ष्यायम इति which seems to be correct. The formulas are not registered in Bloomfield’s Vedic Concordance.

Śautrāmaṇi

III. 2. 8. 48-द्वेषा देवहेडनम् इति तितियंतिवृत्तमेयम्यज्ञाहूति जुहोति J Bh (115 A10) reads भेष्यम्यज्ञाहूति जुहोति. MānŚŚ V. 2. 19. 35 reads यद्वेषा देवहेडनमितिप्रभृतिभि: याक समिष्ठयुज्यस्तिस्य आहुत्यंति। MS. III. II covers the mantras to be employed in the Kaukili Śautrāmaṇi. In MS. III. II. 10 the mantras beginning with यद्वेषा etc. concern the Avabhrtha. The fourth and the fifth verses respectively are धामो धामो and यदू प्राथमेष्या। VārŚŚ. III. 2. 8. 40 reads धामो धामोऽध्यायः। यदू प्राथमेष्या। This implies that the first three verses beginning with यद्वेषा are to be employed in offering oblations. The MānŚŚ therefore rightly says तितियंतिवृत्तमेयम्यज्ञाहूति। The Bh-reading भेष्यम्यज्ञाहूति जुहोति, therefore, requires to be emended as भेष्यम्यज्ञाहूति जुहोति.
It is not expedient to offer a single oblation with three verses. ApS'S XIX. 10. 4 reads यद्वा देवहेंद्रनिमित्तस्य पश्चायुक्तं हुहेंद्रस्यस्मात: T Br. II. 6. 6 provides mantras for the Avabhṛtha in the Kaukli Sautrāmanī. Āpastamba rightly prescribes five oblations with five verses, and in the next sūtra, he asks the sacrificer to follow the Avabhṛtha with the subsequent verse. In all rituals the mantra-collection and the prescriptions go concurrently.

Rājasūya

III. 3. 2. 29—रुद्रमेणोपयु पालासामक्षस्थमी द्रुमबं नैयाग्राध्यं मिति पार्श्वेन तेषु राजसूयय इत्यपयो व्याप्तति. Bh (१९ A४) reads स्वाहा राजसूयय: instead of mere राजसूयय: MS II. 6. 8 and MānS'S IX. i. 33 read स्वाहा राजसूयय:.

III. 3. 2. 34—अघ्यक्षमुदंक्स्यायति Bh (१९A४) reads अघ्यस्यायति Instead of स्यायति.

III. 3. 3. 1—असाविच देवं गौर्जीकमन्यो
नामोकारस्य जनमभुवोष।
बोधायति ल्या हर्षस्य यौक्तयि—
बोधा न: स्तोममधसी पदेदु ॥

इति निःशुभा ब्रह्मायेति. Bh (१२० A६) reads यहदेशेतीशा निःशुभा etc. This requires to be emended as यहदेशेतीशा निःशुभा. The verse is addressed to Indra. Therefore the addition of ऐदेशा is right. cf. MānS'S. IX. 2. 3. 28; RV. VII. 21. 1.

III. 3. 3. 17—सह साराधिना रथमादायति (Bh १२० B 5) reads सह साराधिना रथवाहन रथमादायति. Rathavāhana needs to be corrected as rathavāhana. cf. MS. IV.4.

6 सह साराधिना रथवाहने रथमादायति; MānS'S. IX. १. ४. ११—सह साराधिना रथवाहने रथमादायति, cf. also Vār'SS III. 3. 4. 37, 39.

III. 3. 3. 18—आहितदासमोहिता।१८॥ ब्रह्मास्त्वं ब्रह्मासिः etc. After the 18th sūtra, Bh (१२० B5) leaves a lacuna indicated by four horizontal lines and then writes ब्रह्मास्त्वं etc. B and N do not show this lacuna. Looking at the parallel procedure in MānS'S. IX. 1. 4. 9 do not think that anything is missing here.

III. 3. 3. 21—एष वज्र इति ब्रह्मा फलवं रचेभे प्रयच्छितं। रजा प्रतिष्ठिताय प्रतिष्ठित: सेनान्ये सेनानी संघर्षत्संघर्षीता संघर्षीता सूताय सूचि ग्रामग्ने ग्रामगणीशावापाया. Bh (१२० B7) reads एष वज्र इति वज्ञावस्य: ब्रह्मा etc.
The occasion is to prepare a gambling platform for the royal sacrificer. The Brahman passes on the wooden sword to the King who in his turn hands it over to the heir-apparent. The turn goes on further and ultimately the wooden sword is received by the dice-player. In all there are seven passings. Each one passes it on to the next reciting the formula एस वजजस्ते में सच्चि. In the height of this series of actions the correct reading in Bh can be conjectured. The word वज्जा may be emended as स सम and next two blank spaces may have been intended for यज्ञ.: Thus one may read एस वज्जा इति सत्समि ज्ञाति: पर्यायवृत्तमा स्थाय: ज्ञाति: प्रवचनाति etc. cf. MS. II. 6. 6; IV. 4. 6; Mānś. IX. 1. 4. 19; ApŚ’s XVIII. 18. 14. The word paryāya has been frequently used in the VārŚŚ.

III. 3. 31—ऋचो गाथाध तोता शंसति हिरण्यकृच आसीन: || Bh (१२९ A४) reads ऋचछ गाथाध.

III. 3. 36–३८—अधिषेष्यों गाहिष्ठे जुहोति ||३६॥ प्रतिहिष्यस्य वर्य स्थाय पत्रयो र्वीणामिति [वाचच्चति] ||३७॥ माहेद्रिष्ण परिष्ठा] समानामावव्यथा। ||३८॥ This is the emended text. Caland and Raghuníra edition and B and N read अधिषेष्यों गाहिष्ठे जुहोति प्रतिहिष्य स्थाय पत्रयो र्वीणामिति गजिल्या. Bh (१२९ A ७–१०) reads अधिषेष्यों गाहिष्ठे हुत्वा प्रजापते न त्वदिवसाविनि प्रतिहिष्यस्य नामादिशति द्विपिलुभुषणाः पुत्रे इति प्रतिहिष्यस्य वर्य स्थाय पत्रयो र्वीणामिति जगिल्या समानामावव्यथा।

In comparison with parallel construction in MānŚ’s IX. 1. 4. 27-29, the Bh-reading seems to have filled the gap, “the Adhvaryu offers the remnants of the sprinkling waters on the Garhapatya with the verse praṇāpate na tvad.” Here he mentions the name of the heir-apparent. N. N. If the heir-apparent is a child of two fathers (by birth as well as by adoption), he should say, “N. N. son of N. N.” He should then murmur the verse, “May we be lords of wealth....” The subsequent procedure up to the Avabhṛthā is similar.

IV. 3. 4. 36—सायं पूर्वः: प्रयुज उत्तरणि हवीणि Bh. (122 A8) adds घट्ट उत्तरणि. This is the correct reading. In the Daśapeya sacrifice forming part of the Raśastya, there are six prior praṇuj offerings to be offered in the evening, and six latter praṇuj offerings to be offered next morning of VārŚŚ. III. 3. 4. 38. भव्यस्य च: प्रतिन: Hence the Bh-reading is correct. cf. MS. IV. ४. ९ : यदेहत: प्रयुज उपलैि सायमन: प्रतिन: ढौ च ऋतू अहस्य रुद्रश्च ते एव प्रयुज: पद्य: ढौ च ऋतव ऋश्वरे प्रयुज: प्रायश्चित्ता उमयीदिन्य: ग्राहस मास: संवत्स: संवतस्समेव वृहस्ते: cf. ĀpŚ’s XVIII. 22. 5-7.
Aṣvamedha

III. 4. 1. 17—शतेः: सह प्रोक्ष्तिः पुरस्ताद्धीर्घुदेशिक्षणो ब्रह्मा पदाव्रोत्त्रतर उद्दागता। अभिषेक्याणां राजपुत्राणां शतेः: सहाध्यूप राजा ब्रह्मा सूत्रप्रामणीयां होता क्षत्रसंगमीतृतृतुराहिता। Bh reads प्रोक्ष्तिः (९२३ B1) instead of प्रोक्ष्तिः and later शतेः (123 B2) instead of शतेः. The plural प्रोक्ष्तिः is correct in consideration of the plural शतेः: and the mention of four priests beginning with the Adhvaryu. Later the instrumental singular शतेः as recorded in Bh is also correct. The total number of princes participating in the sprinkling of the horse in company with the four chief priests is four hundred. There are four chief priests and each of them is to be accompanied by a hundred princes. Therefore, the first occurrence of sata is in plural and the second occurrence is in singular. cf. MānS'S. IX. 2. 1. 32.

III. 4. 1. 35—संस्थितासु परिप्रेक्ष्याचें। Bh (124 A4) has परिप्रेक्ष्य instead of परिप्रेक्ष्य. cf. ApS’S. XX. 6. 7.

III. 4. 1. 57—पौद्दारवाचे। Bh (124 A10) reads पौद्दारवाचे: which is preferable MānS’S. IX. 2. 2. 22 has pautudāravau. cf. also naitudārava.

III. 4. 2. 9—एते स्त्रेः स्मरणार्थां मात्राभ्यो नाट्राभ्य उपक्रमेतात्स्मेदक्ष्य। The ending portion is corrupt. Bh ends this sūtra with स्मरणार्थां which is equally obscure.

III. 4. 2. 14—अवृद्धाय स्वाहा। Bh (125 B3) reads न्याृद्धाय स्वाहा which is correct : cf. TS. VII. 2. 20. 1; TBr. III. 8. 16. 3; KS (As'va) II. 10.

III. 4. 3. 1—व्यक्त्यक्ष्याय मोहात्सु स्वाम्य प्रतिमुच्छ। etc. Bh (126 A3) reads प्रतिमुच्छ which is found also in MānS’S. IX. 2. 3. 7. However the ĀpS’S. which has much influenced the VārSS. reads प्रतिमुच्छ.

III. 4. 3. 3—उद्दागतासप्रस्थवर्णः। etc. Bh (126 A5) reads उद्दागतासप्रस्थवर्णः. Also in the next sūtra Bh reads अवर्णः.

III. 4. 3. 21—Between the 21st and 22nd sūtras Bh reads : स्रोता प्रतीयायो पुरस्ताद्धीर्घुदेशिक्षणां उद्दागतासप्रस्थवर्णाहिता। Both the 21st sūtra and the additional matter as reproduced above end with उपयोगिता. Hence it is obvious that B and N missed the subsequent portion through haplography. The Bh-portion is corrupt. MS. III. 14. 1-21 records lists of forest-animals to be procured in connection with the Aṣvamedha. In these lists one comes across the words त्वस्य उज्ज्वल at the end of Ms. III. 14. 10. Besides these, there
is nothing in these lists which would correspond with a part of the Bh-portion. MānŚŚ's IX. 2. 4. 3-4 refers the forest-animals recorded in Ms. MānŚŚ's IX. 2. 4. 4 mentions, among others, नाड़ीशु (= नाड़ीशु) प्रतिपिपशकान् which approximates the ending part of the Bh portion. Even though the Bh-portion could not be deciphered completely, it is clear that the VārŚŚ read some portion between the 21st and the 22nd sūtras. ĀpŚŚ's. XX. 14. 5. ff. does not render any help in this respect.

III. 4. 4. 1—पृष्ठार्थम् त्वा भुवनस्य नामिम्. Bh (127 B1) reads पृष्ठार्थम् च भुवनस्य नामिम्. The cited portion is the part B of the verse beginning with पृष्ठार्थम् त्वा भभमते पृथिव्या: which is traced to TS. VII. 4. 18. 2; VS XIII. 61. The variant reading as found in Bh is from RV. I. 164. 34.

III. 4. 4. 26—तत्स्थ पञ्चमानो लोहितं श्रयति. The word पञ्चमानो, even though a correct grammatical form is obscure in the present context. Bh (128 B7) reads पञ्चमानो which is equally obscure.
Vedisms in Daivarāta’s Chandodarśana

G. U. Thite

Daivarāta, a modern ṛṣi, to whom 448 mantras are claimed to have been revealed, was born on 4th Jan. 1892. He belonged to Gokarna. A collection of hymns revealed to him called “Chandodarśana” is published by Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Mumbai, 1968. This text consists of 8 chapters called Anuvākas. There are in all 50 hymns composed in Vedic metres, namely Gāyatrī, Anuṣṭubh, Triṣṭubh, and Jagatī. The text consists of Saṃhitā-pāṭha as well as Pada-pāṭha, both with the accentuation marks. The text is followed by the ‘Chandodarśanasarvāngakramanikāṣūtram’ which is an index to the text. There is also a commentary in Sanskrit by Gaṇapati Muni. The commentator who happened to be Daivarāta’s teacher has written a preface to his commentary in which he justifies the possibility of there being new ṛṣis. For, he says that even in the Rgveda there are references to new and ancient ṛṣis. The commentator-teacher of Daivarāta claims that Daivarāta was a great Yogi and seer and that he even without being properly trained in Sanskrit or Veda saw these Vedic Mantras in 1917 during the 15 days of the month of Kaṛṭṭika. Daivarāta in his transcendental meditation recited these mantras and the teacher wrote them down. The teacher had to omit many a half-verse or quarter-verse because they were not sufficiently audible. In this paper it is intended to study the Vedisms in these Mantras.

In the Rgveda when an independent Svarīta immediately precedes an Udātta, the phenomenon of Kampa occurs. In that case the independent Svarīta is accompanied by the sign of the numeral 1 if the vowel is short and 2 if the vowel is long. The figures are marked with both Svarīta and Anudātta. In the Chandodorśana, there are several occasions of both these types of Kampa. Thus for example in I. 4. 2 agnirayāṁ viśvavijjātavedāḥ sva1r visvānyeva bhūtāni jātāni Veda. For similar Kampas see I. 4. 7, I. 5. 9, I. 5.
10, I. 8. 2, II. 7. 1, III. 4. 4, IV. 2. 6, IV. 4. 5, IV. 4. 11, V. 1. 6, V. 1. 8, V. 2. 3, V. 3. 8, VI. 2. 5, VI. 4. 7, VII. 2. 1-4, VII. 3. 1, VII. 4. 1-2, VIII. 4. 8, VIII. 5. 4. In all these cases there is the figure.

In the following example there is a Kampa with the figure 3-hrdavyo^ntaramṛtaḥ, I. 4. 4. For similar Kampa see I. 8. 2, III. 1. 6, IV. 3. 1, V. 1. 3, VI. 4. 15, VIII. 1. 9, VIII. 4. 7.

In the Rgveda the refrains like sa janāsa indraḥ (II. 12) or kuvit somasyāpāmiti (X. 119) are famous. As in the Rgveda, in the Chandodārśana also there are some refrains or some lines which are stylistically repeated. Indeed there is rather too much repetition and use of refrain. These are the oft repeated refrains.


2. sendro marutvān rājatiḥa sa madhyamaḥ : I.6. 1-5.

3. vāyuḥ sahasendravāntsa madhyamaḥ : I. 7. 1-5.


5. vāg vidā pratimā brahmaṇaḥ sā parā : II. 2. 2-7.

6. vāg vidā mātā viśvasya brahmaṇo yoniḥ : II. 4. 1-10.


8. sendrameva tami vrīne śaṁ gamadhyai : IV. 2. 2-9.


13. tā āpo devyaḥ svamīṁ mā punantu : VII. 2. 1-10.

15. samāpo mātaro mṛṣayata mahyam : VII. 3. 8, VII. 4. 7.

16. vatsasya me jīvanāya : VIII. 1. 2-6.

17. tapasopavasan prapadye : VIII. 3. 1-3, 5, cp. 4, 6, 7.

18. tavagniṣomau mṛlayatāṁ svamī viśvam; VIII. 4. 1-6, 8. It is significant to note in this context that in all these repetitions the Pada-pātha does not use the device called galita (dropped) as is normally done in the Pada-pātha of the Rgveda. Thus here the Pada-pātha also repeats all the words.

Use of the consonant l or lh is a peculiarity of the Rgveda. This use is limited only to such cases as ḍ or ḍh occurring in between two vowels only. In, Chandodarśana, too, we notice the same peculiarity. Thus the form mṛlayatam occurs as a part of the refrain tavagniṣomau mṛlayatāṁ svamī viśvam which occurs eight times in the Chandodarśana (VIII. 4. 1-8). Similarly the sound lh occurs in the word samūlhah (I. 8. 2; IV. 1. 2) and in the word abhyūlhah (V. 1. 6).

In some Vedic words we find the sound r for which in the later language we get the sound l in them (see e. g. śithira / śithīla). The word aram offers a similar case. In later Sanskrit we get the word alam while the Veda prefers aram. In the Chandodarśana also we find the use of aram. Thus we see for example I. 7. 5 : yo na drē'ram. In IV. 5. 6 however in one and the same verse alam as well as aram is used thus : yam prānaīḥ svaritum prāṇabhṛto nālam (b) and yam manasā mantuṁ na maniśino'ram. (c). The same two lines are also found in VI. 1. 6. For the use of the word aram see also VI. 1. 7 (b&c).

In the Chandodarśana IV. 2. 2-9 we everywhere read sendraṁ taṁ vṛṇe saṁ gamadhayi. Here the double sandhi of saḥ indram is noteworthy. It is quite similar to the Rgvedic double sandhi in sedagnin (RV VII. 1. 14), sedagniryo vanuṣyataḥ (RV VII. 1. 15), semaṁ naḥ kāmamāprṇa (RV I. 16. 9).

As in the Veda in the Chandodarśana the Upasargas and verbal forms are at times separated from each other. Thus for example VIII. 2. 5 we read indro balena samo'sminnādadhātu punaḥ prāṇān. Here after the prefix sam there is a word asmin. The prefix sam is to be connected with ā dadhātu. It
however seems that the Vedic peculiarity about prefixes is very rare in the Chandodarśana. In the Veda prefixes can even come after the verbal forms. This peculiarity is not noticed in the Chandodarśana.

Some of the peculiarities of nominal declensions in the Vedic language are also seen in the Chandodarśana. Thus for example the nominative plural forms brāhmaṇāsah and amṛtāsah occur in III. 1. 6. The nominative plural of the neuter gender words drop ni or ni. Thus see e. g. tri for triṇi in III. 5. 3; VI. 2. 6. The instrumental singular form cītī is found in II. 3. 4, 7; II. 8. 1; II. 10. 1, 8; VI. 3. 2; VI. 4. 14. The form suciṭī is a similar one (VI. 1. 2). The instrumental plural forms with bhis are also noteworthy. See e. g. viśvebhīh, VI. 3. 4; tebhīh, VIII. 5. 3. The locative singular forms without i of the words ending in an also are peculiar to Veda. Thus see the form atman (II. 10. 8; III. 2. 3; VI. 3. 9; VIII. 5. 1).

In Rgveda VIII. 60. 5, in connection with Agni and in Rgveda IX. 62. 30, in connection with Soma, the word rtaḥ (right) is used in Masculine Nominative Singular. In Chandodarśana I. 4. 8 the word rta is used in Masculine Nominative Singular as an adjective of Agni (cp. also I. 5. 10). It is however used as an Active Past Participle of the root r in the sense of “gone”. Similarly in Chandodarśana III. 4. 5 this word is used in connection with Brahmaṇaspati.

The word darśata (worthy to be seen) occurs many times in the Rgveda (see I. 36. 9; I. 38. 13; I. 102. 2 etc.) Similarly the word visvadarśata is also frequently used (see I. 25. 18; I. 44. 10; I. 50. 4 etc.). In the Chandodarśana also both these words are used. Thus see the word darśata in I. 2. 7; I. 7. 5; IV. 1. 8; IV. 2. 10; V. 2. 10; V. 4. 8; VI. 1. 8; VI. 3. 16; VI. 4. 16 and the word visvadarśata in I. 6. 5. We also get the word adarśata (“invisible”) in I. 7. 5.

The word viśvathā is used thrice in the Rgveda (I. 141. 9; II. 24. 11; V. 44. 1). In Chandodarśana it is used very frequently I. 4. 13; I. 5. 3; II. 2. 4; II. 4. 4; II. 6. 8; II. 10. 8; II. 12. 10; III. 2. 1; III. 2. 4-5; III. 3. 7-8; IV. 2. 1; IV. 3. 1; IV. 4. 4; IV. 6. 9; V. 2. 1; V. 2. 9; V. 3. 5; V. 4. 3; V. 6. 5; VI. 2. 9; VI. 3. 1; VI. 3. 5; VI. 3. 10; VIII. 4. 1.

Infinitive forms also constitute another peculiarity of the Vedic language. In the Chandodarśana also we find Vedic infinitives: See for example the
form \textit{drśe} (I. 7. 5; IV. 1. 6; VII. 4. 6). Another Vedic infinitive form is \textit{gamādhya} (II. 4. 6; IV. 1. 5; IV. 2. 9; IV. 3. 1-11; IV. 4. 1-11). The form \textit{jivase} is found in IV. 1. 7; VII. 4. 6. In Chandodarśana II. 12. 8 Aorist Imperative Second Person Singular of the root \textit{kṛ} viz. \textit{kṛdhi} is used. Subjunctive forms like \textit{bhavāti} (III. 1. 8) and \textit{codayāsi} (ii. 2. 6) are found in the Chandodarśana. A form from a denominative root viz. \textit{duvasya} ("do you serve" from \textit{duvas} "service") (III. 1. 4) is also typically Vedic. Gerundive form \textit{kartvam} (III. 1. 5) is also a Vedic peculiarity. Use of the Perfect form \textit{cakartha} in III. 6. 1 is a reminiscent of the Vedic language.

Stylistic use of the particle \textit{u} is a peculiarity of the Vedic language. This particle is used very frequently in the Rgveda. For e. g. I. 24. 8; I. 26. 5 etc. In the Pada-pāṭha, however, this particle is invariably nasalized, lengthened and followed by \textit{iti} (ū \textit{iti}). This peculiarity is noticed in the Chandodarśana in exactly the same manner in its Samhitā-pāṭha and Pada-pāṭha. See I. 2. 5; III. 1. 8' and VII. 1. 7.

In the Vedic language the emphatic particle \textit{it} ("only") is very commonly used (see e. g. RV I. 1. 4). In the Chandodarśana, too, this indeclinable is used in a similar manner. Thus see VI. 2. 5 : \textit{yo mimāyā tridhed bhuvanam vāgbhiḥ}.

There are some typically Vedic words used in the Chandodarśana. Thus in I. 4. 1 the word \textit{pūrūsa} is used (cf. also VIII. 4. 8-9). The word \textit{pratnathā} ("in the ancient manner") is used in I. 5. 4. Some other expressions like \textit{mithuyā} ("mutually") (VIII. 4. 1); \textit{varūtha} ("protection") (III. 1. 4); \textit{svadhaya} ("at will") (V. 4. 1); \textit{apraketaḥ} ("without a mark") (I. 4. 4); \textit{vedīsad} ("sitting upon the altar") (I. 4. 6); \textit{paṇca jaṇāḥ} ("five tribes") (VI. 4. 13); \textit{durgrbhītaḥ} ("wrongly taken") (VII. 2. 7); \textit{visvavedāḥ} ("knower of all") (V. 4. 5); \textit{satpatih} ("lord of existing things") (VI. 1. 4); \textit{sahasvān} ("powerful") (I. 5. 5). In Chandodarśana II. 7. 7 the word \textit{ravaṭha} is used in the sense of "sound". For the use of this word in the Rgveda : see I. 100. 13; IX. 80. 1.

Many phrases used in the Chandodarśana remind us of the same or similar phrases used in the Vedic literature. Thus in Chandodarśana I. 3. 2 we read \textit{savitā satyadharmā} which is comparable to \textit{savitā satyadharmā} in RV X. 34. 8; X. 139. 3. In Chandodarśana I. 8. 1-4 Rudra is described to be
marutāṁ pitā (cp. RV. II. 33. 1 ā te pitar marutāṁ sumnametu). For the word brahmacodani (CD II. 2. 6) compare RV VI. 53. 8. CD I. 5. 5 agnirayaṁ sunitī supaṭhāsmān susumnaḥ satye nayatu praṇetā is similar to RV I. 189. 1 (agne naya su pathā rāye asmān). The phrase sutarmā nauḥ in CD II. 5. 7 is comparable to RV VIII. 42. 3 sutarmāṇaṁ adhi nāvam ruhema (cp. also AB I. 13 : yajñio vai sutarmā nauḥ). The stylistic expressions devānāṁ devatamaḥ, maghonāṁ maghavattamaḥ, rathinam rathitamaḥ (CD all IV. 3. 3); rasānāṁ rasatamaḥ (CD IV. 3. 6); priyānāṁ priyatamaḥ (CD IV. 3. 7); hitānāṁ hitatamaḥ (CD IV. 3. 8); gurūnāṁ gurutamaḥ (CD IV. 4. 4); ṛṣīnāṁ ṛṣītamaḥ (CD V. 3. 3; VI. 4. 6) are very much in tune with the Rgvedic phrases gaṅānāṁ gaṅapatiṁ (II. 23. 1); tavastamaḥ tavasāṁ (II. 33. 3); bhiṣaktamaṁ bhiṣajāṁ (II. 33. 4). When we read (about Vaisvānara) in Cd V. 1. 7 ayaṁ visveṣu bhuvanesvaḥdhiṣitaḥ we remember adhiṣṭiyanti bhuvanāṁ viṣvā (RV I. 154. 2). The phrase savitresitaḥ (CD VII. 1. 1) reminds us of the phrase anvasya ketamiṣitaṁ savitrā (RV II. 38. 5).

Use of the pronominal particles īm and sim is a peculiarity of the Rgvedic language. In the Chandodarśana also, these particles are frequently used. Thus for īm see II. 5. 2-4; IV. 2. 2-7; IV. 6. 2-5; VI. 2. 2-5; VII. 2. 1-10; VII. 3. 7; VII. 4. 1. For the use of sim see IV. 6. 1; VI. 2. 1.

There are some extremely queer constructions in the Chandodarśana which can neither be called Vedic nor classical. Thus for example in VI. 3. 9 we read ya ātmānamevānvajuhvata bhūyah. Here yaḥ is singular and ajuhvata is a plural form. In IV. 4. 1-11c everywhere we read indrasyaiva rṇī bhavāneyanṛnoṇyāt. Here the form anyāt is quite strange. We expect either the form anyasmat or just as the Genitive form is used of the word indra so also the Genitive form anyasya should have been used. In I. 6. 1 and I. 7. 1 the word ātmānvi is used in the sense of “possessing the self”. This possessive form is irregular.

In Chandodarśanā I. 4. 6 Agni is described as vedīsad yo havir devebhya nayati. Here we expect an Accusative form rather than a Dative form of the word deva. In III. 2. 2 and in III. 6. 4 there is an expression dampatiṭiva. Here the word dampati is a Pragrhya. Still there is a euphonic combination (sandhi) between dampati and iva. Indeed we have to describe these
phenomena as ārṣa (belonging to ṛṣis).

From the above given details of the vedisms in the Chandodarśana one can safely conclude that the Chandodarśana has all the appearance of a Ṛgvedic Maṇḍala. In the introduction to this book R. R. Divakar has quoted the views of Mahmahopadhyaya Datto Vaman Potdar, (Acharya) Vinoba Bhave, (Lokanayak) M. S. Aney (President, Vaidik Saṃśodhana Mandal), Dr. Sontakke (Secretary, Vaidik Saṃśodhana Mandal) and Dr. Hans Peter (Schmidt ?) a German Vedic scholar, who have accepted the Vedic character of the Chandodarśana. (There are, however, no reasons given.) I accept their view but with some reservations. There are numerous negative points which also should be taken into consideration. From the point of view of mythology, the Chandodarśana has nothing to either add or to agree with the extant Ṛgveda. There are numerous references to Indra but no reference either to Vṛtra or to any other demon. Among the most typical Vedic gods, Varuṇa or Āśvins find no place here. Last but not the least Soma and soma-sacrificial ritual are conspicuously absent. The overall tenor of the Chandodarśana is rather that of the philosophical Upaniṣads like Śvetāsvatara or Mūndaka than that of the archaic Ṛgvedic hymns of the second Maṇḍala for example. Thus in my estimate Chandodarśana is Vedic but not sufficiently archaic.

These limitations, however, are not mentioned here in order to diminish the importance of the Vedic nature of the Chandodarśana. They can be treated as the part of the personality of the modern ṛṣi Daivarāta. I only hope that the future history will not only accept the Chandodarśana as Veda but will also associate it with some new ritual. The future generations are likely to learn this text by heart in its Samhitā-pāṭha, Pada-pāṭha and even with the other Vikṛtis like Krama, Jaṭā and Ghana etc. The future Mimāṃsakas, too, will try to establish the apauruṣeyatva of this text and its authoritativeness.
The Justification of Kṛṣṇa’s Annihilation of His Own Clan

S. J. Noel Sheth

It is with a great sense of joy and gratitude that I write this essay in honour of Prof. M. A. Mehendale, who taught me Yāska’s Nīrūkta. In the context of this etymological work, it may be incidentally remarked that the latter part of my article¹ is replete with examples of etymologies employed by commentators for the purpose of exegesis.

We will analyse the justification of Kṛṣṇa’s destruction of his own clan, the Yādavas,² given by the Mahābhārata (Mbh) and its commentator Nīlakanṭha, by the Viṣṇu Purāṇa (ViP) and its commentator Śrīdhara, by the Bhāgavata Purāṇa (Bhp) and especially by the following 15 commentators on the Bhāgavata: Bhagavadprasadā (BP), Giridharalāla (GD), Gaṅgāsahāya (GS), Jīva Gosvāmin (JG)-the reference is to one of his three commentaries, called Krama-sandarbha(Ks), Madhva(MD), Puruṣottama, Rādhāramaṇadāsa (RR), Sudarśanasūrīn, Śukadeva (SD), Śrīdhara Śvāmin (SS), Vallabha (VB), Viśvanātha Cakravartin (VC), Vamśīdhara (VD), Vijayadhvaja (VJ), and Vīrārāghava (VR).³

The episode occurs in the “Mausala Parvan” (Book 16) of the Mbh, in 5.37.1-5.38.11 of the ViP, and in 11.1; 11.6; 11.30; and 11.31 of the BhP⁴. The bare outline of the story is as follows: Due to their impudent tomfoolery, some of the Yādava youths are cursed by brahmins that an iron pestle or club produced from Sāmba, one of the youths, will destroy the Yādava clan⁵. The pestle is ground to powder and thrown into the sea, but the powdered iron grows into reeds on the shores of the ocean. Later, noticing evil omens, Kṛṣṇa urges the Yādavas to leave Dvārakā and go to Prabhāsa. There the Yādavas get drunk and begin to kill one another. When they run out of
weapons, they resort to the reeds on the shore which, due to the powdered iron, turn into iron clubs in their hands. Kṛṣṇa too joins in the fray and strikes dead several of them with those iron clubs. After the destruction of the Yādavas,6 first Balarāma, and then Kṛṣṇa, leaves this world, the latter doing so after being shot by an arrow by a hunter named Jarā ("Old Age"). Then the ocean submerges the city of Dvārakā. After Kṛṣṇa’s departure, the evil Kali Yuga is ushered in. It should be noted that, in the Harivaṁśa (97.31-36), Nārada foretells that Kṛṣṇa will return to his own celestial region and that the ocean will inundate the cities of Bhogavatī and Dvārakā, but the actual events are not narrated in the Harivaṁśa7.

1. The Problem and the Justification in the Mahābhārata and its Commentator Nīlakaṇṭha

In his Introduction to the Critical Edition of the “Mausala Parvan” of the Mbh, Belvarka asks “why Kṛṣṇa did not prevent the misconduct of the Yādavas, overrule the curse of the sages...Kṛṣṇa had done similar wholesome and righteous acts in the Kaurava-Pāṇḍava warfare. He not only did not prevent the evil, but even participated personally in the Mausala fight.....How are we to explain such happenings and such conduct in the ease of the reputed promulgator of the Bhagavadgītā teaching ?”8

In the Mbh, although at first Kṛṣṇa’s father Vasudeva points to Arjuna’s two disciples, Pradyumna and Yuyudhāna [Sātyaki], as the primary cause of the annihilation of the Vṛṣṇis or Yādavas, he does not want to censure them, because he thinks that the real cause is the curse of the Brahmans. (16.7.5-8). Their imprecation is often alluded to as the reason for the destruction (16.1.9; 2.16; 4.38; 5.3; 5.5; 8.30; 9.8; 9.25) It should be noted that the Mbh also mentions another curse, that of Gāndhārī on Kṛṣṇa; she cursed him that he will kill his own relatives and he himself will meet an ignominious death because, according to her, he was willfully indifferent to the destruction of the Kauravas (11.25.36-42).

It is also maintained that the Yādavas are impelled by destiny (16.2.5; 2.13; 9.26), and that the inundation of Dvārakā was also due to fate (16.8.41). Similarly, it is said that they are controlled by Time (Kāla) (16.2.2; 4.29; 4.42; 9.10, 33). Moreover, the Yādavas, including Balarāma, acted
under the influence of liquor (16.4.14-15; 4.31; 4.40).

All this, at first sight, can be construed as an explanation as to why the Yādavas were annihilated. But, on the other hand, Vyāsa declares in the text that Kṛṣṇa is able to counteract the curse and destiny, since he is able even to alter the course of the three worlds; yet, even so, he chooses to be indifferent (16.9.24-33). Even Kṛṣṇa's own father Vasudeva⁹ laments that Kṛṣṇa, the lord of the universe, is indifferent to this calamity (anāya) (16.7.9-11).¹⁰ He does not want to change fate (Kṛtānta) (16.2.14) It is true that he wants to prevent Yuyudhāna from killing more people (16.428) but when, impelled by fate, all the Bhojas and Andhakas surrounded the son of Sini, i.e., Yuyudhāna, then Kṛṣṇa, knowing the opposition of Time (Kāla) does not get angry [and does not interfere] (16.4.29-30). Commenting on 16.9.33, Nīlakanṭha indicates that Time (Kāla), mentioned in this verse, is none other than the Lord Kṛṣṇa himself (on 16.9.33 = 16.8.33 in the vulgate). Not only does he not prevent the tragedy, but, becoming angry, he even kills with the iron club [nearly] all the Yādavas, practically leaving no survivors (16.4.34-35; 42-26). Similarly, after Gāndhāra has pronounced her curse, he tells her that she is thereby helping him to bring about what he has already determined to accomplish. The Yādavas will bring about their mutual slaughter. (11.25.44-45).¹¹ When the time for Gāndhāra's curse taking effect draws near (16.3.19), Kṛṣṇa desires to make her words come true (16.3.21).

While there are attenuating circumstances in the passages cited above, the MBh does not give clear and unambiguous justification of Kṛṣṇa's destruction of his own relatives. Perhaps it could be pointed out that the MBh implicitly indicates that the Yādavas reap their just deserts because they commit sins and do not repent; they hate Brahmans, the ancestors (Pitr) and the deities, and disrespect their preceptors (guru). Only Balarāma and Kṛṣṇa do not behave like this (16.3.8-9). Nīlakanṭha asserts that the Yādavas perish because they are totally attached to wealth (artha) and sensuality (kāma) (Introduction to Māusalaparvan.) Let us now move on the VI P.

II. The Problem and the Justification in the Viṣṇu Purāṇa and Its Commentator Śridhara²².

Under the pretext (vyāja) of the curse of the Brahmans, Kṛṣṇa destroys
the Yādava clan (5.37.3, 5), and he who knows the highest truth does not want to counteract what destiny had predetermined (5.37.14). Krṣṇa declares that he has begun the extermination of the Yādavas (5.37.21), and that he will leave this world and go to heaven only after he has annihilated them (5.37.22-23,34). The Yādava youth act as they do because they are drawn by the force of the impending event (5.37.7), namely the destruction of the Yādavas (Śrīdhara namely on 5.37.7). When the text states that the Yādavas are overpowered by fate (5.37.39), Śrīdhara says it means that they are deluded by Krṣṇa (on 5.37.39). The commentator also asserts that, when the text mentions that the sages who pronounce the curse are endowed with divine knowledge (5.37.9), it implies that they are aware of Krṣṇa’s intention (on 5.37.9). Even the portents are created by Krṣṇa himself (on 5.37.28). He approves of the Kukkurās and Andhakas (both belonging to the Yādava clan) drinking the liquor (5.37.37), which incites them to lose their senses and fight with each other. And while Vyāsa tells Arjuna that all beings are subject to Time (Kāla) (5.38.54 ff), he also adds that Krṣṇa is the one who takes the form of Time (Kālarūpin) (5.38.39). According to Śrīdhara, the Yādavas, who are the aṁśas of ādhisthārika deities, would have obtained salvation if they died in Dvārakā. However, Krṣṇa does not want this. Hence he cajoles them to go to Prabhāsa, where they will attain only the temporary heaven (Svarloka) (on 5.37.29).

It is true that, as in the Mbh, in the ViP, too, Krṣṇa tries to stop them, but when they continue to fight with each other, mistakenly thinking that he is actually coming to the help of each one of them (5.37.43), then Krṣṇa gets angry with them and kills [almost all of] them, without remainder (5.37.44-45). Śrīdhara adds that the Yādava youth report the whole matter to king Ugrasena i.e., not to Krṣṇa (on 5.37.10), and Ugrasena himself does not inform Krṣṇa: which suggests that the Yādavas are opposed to Krṣṇa (on 5.37.11). Furthermore, since the text refers to the Yādavas as killers (ātattāyin) (5.37.45), it means that they are intent on svavadha (on 5.37.45). This can mean either that they want to kill Krṣṇa himself, thus justifying his slaying them, or that they desire to destroy themselves [under the force of Krṣṇa’s deluding power], so that Krṣṇa is merely carrying out their wish.
However, a clear justification is given by the ViP when Krśṇa refers to the Yādavas as a very great burden to the earth (5.37.26), adding that even a youth of the Yādavas is no less than Jarāsandha and others who were a heavy load on the earth (5.37.25); and he declares that the earth's burden will not be removed until the Yādavas are obliterated (5.37.22). So the ViP gives an unambiguous reason why the Yādavas should be destroyed. In the Mbh the grounds are not so strong, for, although it mentions the wickedness of the Yādavas, it does not state that they are a burden to the earth; in other words, their punishment need not have been so drastic as a complete annihilation. Whereas in the ViP the burden of the earth cannot be removed until they are extirpated. Hence, the ViP advances beyond the Mbh in justifying Krśṇa.

III. The Problem and the Justifications in the Bhāgavata Purāṇa and its Commentaries

The text states that the annihilation of the Yādavas is due to the curse of the Brahmins (11.6.26, 31, 34; 11.30.2, 24), and the commentators, explicitly or implicitly, mention the curse, when explaining these verses. Some of them refer to it even at other places (e.g., GD, SS on 11.1.1; BP, GD, GS, VR on 11.30.20) and even attribute Krśṇa's being shot by and arrow to it (GS, SS, VD on 11.30, 38). The curse cannot be averted (VR on 11.6.36; BP on 11.6.37) because of the difference between the divine, earthly and embodied souls (RR on 11.6.34). The idea would seem to be that Krśṇa is only seeing to it that the imprecation of the Brahmins is fulfilled, and it was pronounced precisely because of the misbehaviour of some of the Yādavas.

However, the text also mentions that Krśṇa does not annul the curse, even though he is capable of doing so (11.6.42); on the contrary, he approves of it (11.1.24), and several commentators repeat this explicitly (e.g., BP, GD, GS, SS, VD, VR) or almost explicitly (VB, RR, SD, Sudarśanasūrin). He uses the curse of the Brahmins as a pretext (11.1.5) and the commentators explicitly (BP, GD, GS, JG (Ks), RR, SD, VB, VC, VD, VR on 11.1.5; see also SD on 11.1.1) or implicitly repeat what the verse says. In fact, VC and VD add that even though Krśṇa suggests to the Yādavas that they move to Prabhāsa, ostensibly to remain alive and thus avoid the effect of the
imprecation (11.6.35), his inner intention is not to counteract the curse (VC, VD on 11.6.42). Indeed the real cause of their destruction is Kṛṣṇa’s wish. Kṛṣṇa himself sets the stage for the Brahmins’ imprecation (VC on 11.1.11). The various events in this whole episode take place through Kṛṣṇa’s will. E.g., it is he who internally urges the brahmins to proceed to Piṇḍāraka (BP, GS, GD, VB, VJ, VR. Sudarśanasūrin on 11.1.11); the Yādava youths, too, go there (GD on 11.1.13); they insult the brahmins (VD on 11.1.13); the brahmins get angry (JG(Ks), RR, VD on 11.1.16) and imprecate upon them (VD on 11.1.16); the juvenile Yādavas are afflicted by the curse (VD on 11.1.14); the punishment appears to be disproportionate to their fault (VB on 11.1.16), nor do the Brahmins regret this (Puruṣottama on 11.1.18); the frightened Yādava boys report the whole matter to the king, but not to Kṛṣṇa, who could have counteracted the curse (RR, VD on 11.1.19); and the king himself had the pestle powdered, etc., but did not ask Kṛṣṇa’s advice (GD on 11.1.21)—all this takes place because of Kṛṣṇa’s will. Moreover, when Kṛṣṇa suggests that they leave Dvārakā and go to the sacred place Prabhāsa in order to neutralize the curse (11.6.35-38; see GS on 11.6.37, VR on 11.1.1), it is actually a trick (vyāja) (JG (Ks), RR, VD on 11.6.35-36), for it is not proper that even the semblance of inauspiciousness befalls the auspicious city of Dvārakā (JG (Ks), RR, VD on 11.6.35; RR, VD, on 11.30.6), since death is something inauspicious. So, while it is maintained that Kṛṣṇa is the master of the situation and can, if he so wishes, counteract the curse, he is shown to be hardhearted, lacking in compassion towards his own relatives, nay, even taking an active part in their extirpation (11.30.23). Many commentators concede that it would not be proper for Kṛṣṇa to destroy his own clan. Hence, they explain that, instead of killing the Yādavas himself, he induces an internal feud among them (11.1.4), [so that they would kill one another] (BP, GD, GS, SS on 11.1.3; SD, VC on 11.1.4).

In fact, the Yādavas are behaving thus precisely because they are deluded by Kṛṣṇa’s māyā (11.30.13, 17, 24; the text may also be suggesting this in 11.30.19, 22, 49). Some of the commentators add that this is the main cause (GS, JG (Ks), SS on 11.30.13). Indeed the club episode and other such incidents are even created through Kṛṣṇa’s māyā (JG (Ks), VD on 11.30.49). Even when the text says that the Yādavas lose their sense of
judgement and drink liquor due to fate (11.30.12; see also GS, SS on 11.30.12), the commentators point out that this fate is another name for the wish of the Lord (JG (Ks), RR, VD, VJ, VR on 11.30.12).

Thus, the BhP, too, places the problem before us. However, it goes further than the ViP in attempting to exonerate Kṛṣṇa. And the commentators, who come much later, go still further than the BhP. Let us now discuss the justifications offered by the BhP and its commentators.

1. The Yādavas are wicked and a burden to the earth

While both the ViP (5.37.21-22) and the BhP (11.1.3) mention that the Yādavas have become a burden to the earth, it is only the latter (11.1.3-4; 11.6.29-30; 11.30.24) that gives reasons why they are a burden to the earth, thus demonstrating that Kṛṣṇa is not annihilating them merely out of whim: the Yādavas have become proud due to their strength, bravery and wealth, so that once Kṛṣṇa leaves the earth, no one will be able to restrain them from overrunning and destroying the world. They were intoxicated and blinded with liquor (11.30.13, 17) and angry due to jealousy (11.30.24). The commentators heartily endorse the text's criticism of the Yādavas. So these faults, which make them an unbearable burden to the earth, indicate that they deserve to be wiped out from the face of the earth.

Although Kṛṣṇa restrains them from killing one another, the Yādavas attack Kṛṣṇa and Balarāma (11.30.21), and so it is all right for Kṛṣṇa to retaliate. It should be observed that, both in the Mbh and in the ViP, Kṛṣṇa tries to stop them but the Yādavas do not attack Kṛṣṇa himself in these two texts. In the BhP, however, they do so, thus making them more culpable and justifying Kṛṣṇa's reaction all the more.

2. Kṛṣṇa destroys the Yādavas as an act of grace to prevent them from sinning

Contrary to the above reason, some of the commentators, basing themselves on the question of King Parīksita in 11.1.8, portray the Yādavas as religious people, pious and generous and at the service of the aged, so that it could be said that it would indeed be a blessing if they were to spread all over the earth (JG(Ks), VD on 11.6.30). The burden of the earth is not
due to too many individuals (vyaktibāhulya) since the load could well be from the eternal mountains, etc. which have excessive weight; nor is the burden due to irreligiousness (adharma) on the part of the Yādavas, for the text declares them to be “pious, generous and always at the service of the aged” and “with their minds on Kṛṣṇa” (11.1.8). Hence the idea that the earth would be crushed by the innumerable Yādavas becoming agitated due to their separation (viraha) from Kṛṣṇa [if he were to leave the visible world without taking them along with him], is poetically fancied to be a burden to the earth (RR, VD on 11.30.25; see also JG (Ks), RR, VD on 11.1.3). The Yādava race is said to be a burden, even though it is supremely religious (parama-dhārmika) (VC on 11.1.3). If those who are [relatively] indifferent to Kṛṣṇa cross the darkness [of saṃsāra and avidyā, merely by listening to] his glory sung in beautiful stanzas [as mentioned in 11.1.7], all the more, surely, will this be the case with the Yādavas (JG (Ks), VD on 11.1.5; RR on 11.1.7); hence, it is established that the question of the burden of the earth has to be laid at other peoples’ [and not at the Yādavas’] doors (JG (Ks), VD on 11.1.6).

Nevertheless, Kṛṣṇa decides to remove them so that they may not become sinful, for when the Kali Yuga arrives, the minds of even the good go astray. In fact, by accompanying Kṛṣṇa, who is about to leave the earth, the goal of their human life (Puruṣārtha) would be fulfilled all the more. Hence, it is with the idea of conferring grace on them that Kṛṣṇa destroys the Yādavas. If he were not to protect them in this way, Kṛṣṇa would be guilty of a fault (MD, VD, VJ on 11.6.30). If they were separated from Kṛṣṇa, who is about to depart from the world, they would lose their sense of discernment between right and wrong, and thus indulge in mad behaviour (JG (Ks), RR, VD on 11.6.30); they would become proud and destroy the world (VD on 11.6.30), or they would become sorrowful and thus become unbearable to the earth (JG (Ks) on 11.30.25). So Kṛṣṇa is also doing a favour to the earth by preventing the Yādavas from becoming a burden to the earth in the future. However, at present they are not weighing her down. If anything, the Yādavas are a sort of sweet burden to the earth. VC explains that, even though the earth does not consider the burden of Kṛṣṇa’s religious relatives to be really a load, yet, as her Lord, he must lessen her burden just
as the lover lightens the weight of the excessive ornaments from his very young beloved; or just as the weight of a desirable thing is easy to carry but, when one has too much of it, it is not so easy to bear; or just as a greedy merchant finds it difficult to lift the weight of a heap of gold that he has suddenly obtained, so also it is difficult for the earth to bear the burden of the Yādavas (VC on 11.6.30). Therefore, the Yādavas are removed because they are too much of a good thing!

SD adds two more reasons. The Yādavas are destroyed because otherwise, seeing their supremacy on earth, the asuras, being filled with hatred, would return again and thus become a renewed burden to the earth. Since there is this apprehension of the return of the asuras, the Yādava clan is destroyed. Secondly, since they have completed their work (kṛtakārya) on earth, the Yādavas are withdrawn. (SD on 11.1.3).

3. This annihilation is actually the removal of the deities who have entered Kṛṣṇa’s attendants.

On the one hand, some commentators assert that the Yādavas are actually parts (aṁśa) of deities, who are not eligible for immediate salvation (sadyomokṣa). If they were to die in Dvārakā, they would attain salvation, hence Kṛṣṇa leads them to Prabhāsa, which will bring them the fruit of prosperity (GS, SS on 11.6.35), i.e., the temporary heaven (svarga), health etc. (VD on 11.6.35), but not salvation. On the other hand, some others claim that the Yādavas should be distinguished from the deities who have entered them (e.g., RR on 11.1.1, VD on 11.1.10). According to this latter view, Kṛṣṇa desires that his Dvārakā should always retain its brilliance, characterized by his eternal retinue (parikara), viz., the Yādavas. Hence through his yogic power he expels from his attendants (such as Pradyumna, Samba, etc.) the deities (such as Kandarpa and Kārtikeya), who had entered unseen into his attendants and, taking these deities to Prabhāsa, involves them through his māyā in the battle of the clubs, thus sending them to their temporary heaven (VC, VD on 11.6.35 and on 11.30.5; see also GS, RR on 11.6.35, and VD on 11.1.10). Incidentally, VC and VD remark that, even though Kṛṣṇa talks about going to Prabhāsa, he actually intends to remain always in Dvārakā in his complete form, together with his attendants (on
11.6.35). This is a reference to the belief of Bengal Vaiṣṇavism that Kṛṣṇa is always present on earth. We shall now deal with this doctrine.

4. The extermination of the Yādavas is actually their transition from the prakaṭa-lilā to the aprakaṭa-lilā.

In order to make this point clear, it may be helpful to refer briefly to the understanding of prakaṭa-lilā and aprakaṭa-lilā in Bengal Vaiṣṇavism. This school believes that Kṛṣṇa is eternally present and playing his lilās (sports) not only in his heavenly Vaikuṇṭha but also on earth, viz., in Mathurā, Vṛndāvana and Dvārakā. His lilā on earth, however, is not always visible to empirical beings. It becomes manifest in the Dvāpara Yuga, when it is called prakaṭa-lilā (manifest sport), but at other times it generally remains concealed, and hence it is called aprakaṭa-lilā (unmanifest sport). The one and the same lilā appears in these two forms due to the limitations of the empirical beings. In the aprakaṭa-lilā there is no beginning, middle and end, while in the prakaṭa-lilā there is a beginning, middle and end, as well as a mixture of empirical and non-empirical elements. Although both the lilās are eternal, or rather aspects of the one eternal lilā, yet, since there is no beginning, middle and end in the aprakaṭa-lilā, it may be referred to as the nitya-lilā (eternal sport). In the prakaṭa-lilā there is the appearance of the birth, growth and death of Kṛṣṇa, while in the aprakaṭa-lilā he is eternally present as a youth and there is neither birth nor death. The abode (dhāman or loka) or Kṛṣṇa is also simultaneously present in Vaikuṇṭha as well as on earth. There are three kinds of prakāśas or appearance of Kṛṣṇa’s abode: (i) aprakaṭa-prakāśa (unmanifest appearance), in which the abode remains hidden from empirical beings, (ii) prāpaṇcika-prakāśa (empirical appearance), in which the abode becomes visible to empirical beings; and (iii) prakaṭa-prakāśa (manifest appearance), which takes place when, in the prāpaṇcika-prakāśa, Kṛṣṇa becomes manifest together with his attendants (parikara). Hence it is only in the prakaṭa-lilā of Kṛṣṇa that the prakaṭa-prakāśa of his abode takes place. Let us now proceed to the explanations of the commentators.

VC and VD quote a whole string of scriptural passages to prove that Kṛṣṇa’s bodies (vigraha), names, abodes, qualities (guna), sports (lilā) and
attendants are all eternal (VC, VD on 11.30.5). Their contention is that ordinary people, and even others, will be deceived by māya and think that Kṛṣṇa is destroying the Yādavas and that he himself abandons his body, but actually the Yādavas and Kṛṣṇa are only becoming invisible in the prakāṭa-lilā and entering into the aprakāta-lilā. This is how they explain it: It is only after Kṛṣṇa's lilās are over, i.e. when his prakāṭa-lilā ceases, that the age of Kali will have authority on earth. Kṛṣṇa has already destroyed those who were opposed to him [namely demons, wicked kings, etc. who were a burden to the earth (see., e.g., 11.1.1-3.)]; those who are for him will have their bhakti doubled, and those who are very much for him will have their love multiplied a hundredfold; and even those who are indifferent to him will become devotees. Hence dharma will in fact increase and, as a result, Kali's power cannot become manifest. [So in order to usher in the Kali Yuga], Kṛṣṇa decides to bring about the restriction of dharma in the following manner. He decides to reign in Dvārakā together with his attendants, namely the Yādavas, but, becoming hidden to the empirical (prāpañcika) world, he will first expel the deities who have entered his attendants and establish those deities in their heaven, and then enter Vaikuṇṭha together with his retinue (i.e., he will enter into his aprakāṭa-lilā]. Now, due to the defect of māya, the ordinary people mistakenly think that all the Yādavas go to Prabhāsa where, under the influence of the curse of the Brahmins, they become intoxicated and, being killed by one another, they give up their bodies. Similarly, the people erroneously think that Kṛṣṇa, too, together with Balarāma, abandons his human body and ascends to his abode. In fact, others will publicly proclaim that just as the Kuru race was wiped out, so also Kṛṣṇa falls in Prabhāsa together with his own clan. Due to such despicable proclamations, dharma will suddenly be left with only one leg, and then not only the ordinary people, but also Kṛṣṇa's añśas like Arjuna and others, will look upon Kṛṣṇa's exit (niryāṇa) lilā as an ordinary and calamitous (duravasthāmayī) one. Sages like Vaiśampāyana, Parāśara and others have described in their Samhitās that, in order to establish the power of Kali, even Kṛṣṇa's devotee Śaṅkara, who will be born in the Kali Yuga, will write his commentary on the Vedānta in a false light so that the other commentators, whose intellects are deprived of sense, will come to the wrong conclusion that the body of Kṛṣṇa is illusory (VC, VD on 11.30.5). So these
commentators claim that, even though not only the ordinary people, but also others like Arjuna, think that the Yadavas are annihilated, the real situation is that it is a mere transition from the prakāta-līlā to the aprakāta-
līlā.

When Kṛṣṇa decides that he will return to his abode in peace (11.1.4), he means that he will return to the nitya-līlā, to his eternal abode of Dvārakā. It is not proper for Kṛṣṇa to become invisible while leaving the Yadavas behind. In fact, when the text (11.1.4) asserts that the Yadavas cannot be overcome by others, it also implies that they cannot be destroyed by themselves nor by Kṛṣṇa himself, since the same verse (11.1.4) mentions that they are always under his protection. Hence their being “overcome” (paribhava) really refers to their being made to turn away from the [prakāta] prakāśa (JG(Ks), VD on 11.1.4). Kṛṣṇa’s withdrawing the Yadavas (11.1.5) signifies his making them invisible (RR on 11.1.5), or making them enter into his abode (JG(Ks) on 11.1.5). Similarly, when 11.1.10 states that Kṛṣṇa wants to withdraw the Yadavas, what is meant is that he desires to make them go to his own abode, whose prakāśa is beyond the empirical (prapañca)(JG (Ks), VD on 11.1.10). Kṛṣṇa still has things left to be done (11.1.10): These include his making himself as well as his eternal attendants [the Yadavas] become invisible to the eyes of people who are in the empirical world (prapañcika) (VD on 11.1.10). RR points out that when Kṛṣṇa tells the Yadavas that they should all immediately leave Dvārakā (11.30.5), what he means is that they should not stay on in Dvārakā characterized by the prakāśa-prakāśa [i.e., where Krisna’s abode as well as Kṛṣṇa and his attendants are visible to empirical beings], but continue to stay on in the aprakāṭa-prakāśa [i.e., in which they are all invisible to empirical beings] (RR on 11.30.5). When Kṛṣṇa tells the Yadavas that the worship of Brahmans is the best way to get rid of evil and secure auspiciousness (11.30.9), he does so in the context of obtaining the (aprakāṭa-) prakāśa which is beyond the empirical (JG (Ks) on 11.30.9). SS, commenting on 11.30.9, says that, according to Kṛṣṇa, the Yadavas’ worship of Brahmans, etc. would lead to the highest benefit in heaven (devaloka). By this Kṛṣṇa secretly means to say that this worship will be the cause of welfare in his own divine world, namely in the aprakāṭa-prakāśa (VD, RR on 11.30.9). The description of
the Yādavas drinking liquor, slaying each other with weapons and the erakā grass—which becomes hard like iron—, as well as Kṛṣṇa's participating in the killing, and Balarāma's leaving the world (11.30.12-26), all this is not the true state of affairs. The real purpose is not to kill all the Yādavas, but in order that Kṛṣṇa and Yādavas become invisible [and thus enter into the aprakaṭa-lilā] (VC, VS on 11.30.12). Since 11.30.13 states that Yādavas are deluded by Kṛṣṇa's māyā, it is clear that all this [destruction] is caused by his māyā. Thus the passages in the Purāṇas which give the opposite meaning [namely that the destruction really takes place] should be construed as corroborating the fact that it is all brought about by his māyā (JG(Ks), VS on 11.30.12).

When 11.30.25 mentions that the Yādavas were destroyed (naṣṭeṣu), it refers to their becoming invisible to the people who are in the empirical world (prapañca) (RR, VS, on 11.30.25). Similarly, when 11.30.26 states that Balarāma united his soul with the Self and left the human world, it means that he united his soul, namely the prakāśa in the prakaṭa-lilā, to the Self, namely the prakāśa in the aprakaṭa-lilā; in other words, he considered both the prakāsas as non-different from each other. His leaving the human world means that he became invisible to it. (RR, VS, on 11.30.26). The same idea is expressed more briefly by JG, when he explains that Balarāma joined his soul manifest (prakāśamāna) in the prakaṭa-lilā to the Self manifest in the aprakaṭa-lilā, and thought of them as non-different from each other (JG(Ks) on 11.30.26). Again, Balarāma's passing away (niryāna), mentioned in 11.30.27, is said to refer to his entrance into the aprakaṭa abode (RR on 11.30.27), or his return to Mahā Vaikuṇṭha in his own form (svarūpa) and his going to Pātāla in his svāmśa form (VS on 11.30.27). So also the condition (daśā) of Kṛṣṇa after being shot by the hunter, does not refer to his impending death, but to his body becoming invisible (VS on 11.30.46), to his future entry into the aprakaṭa-lilā (VC, VS [who quotes VC] on 11.30.46), following in the footsteps of the Yādavas (JG(Ks), VS on 11.30.46).

GS gives an interesting argument to show that the killing of the Yādavas could not have taken place. According to 3.4.2, the battle of the Yādavas took place in the evening. It is after this that the hunter is said to have
arrived. Now this could not have been so because the animals would not have come out at that time due to their being frightened by the battle involving crores of Yādavas; and it is impossible for the hunter not to have known the time beneficial for hunting. Hence it means that the hunter arrived in a solitary place, after the deities [the Yādavas] became invisible. Therefore the annihilation of the Yādavas has to be false (GS on 11.30.28). GS adds that, even though the destruction of the Yādavas is untrue, Kṛṣṇa makes people believe in it in order to produce dispassion or indifference to the world (vairāgya) in them (GS on 11.30.28). *26*

Just as the Yādavas enter into the aprakaṭa-līlā, so also does the city of Dvārakā. The impending inundation of Dvārakā by the sea (11.30.4, 11.31.23) is with the intention of making Dvārakā enter into the aprakaṭa-līlā (VC and VD [who quotes VC] on 11.30.46). 11.30.47 mentions only the flooding [and not the destruction] of Dvārakā, so that the Yādavas would abandon it [to enter into the aprakaṭa-līlā] (VD on 11.30.47). Verses 11.31.23-24 speak of the submersion of Dvārakā, except for Kṛṣṇa’s palace or temple (ālayam) where, he is always present. However, these verses are uttered by Śuка to console king Paśupita, who is sad because he imagines that Kṛṣṇa’s Dvārakā-līlā is not eternal. The statement that Dvārakā was abandoned (tyaktām) by Kṛṣṇa in v.23 is only from the popular point of view. In fact, the Dvārakā-līlā is eternal, and the verse actually says that Dvārakā is not forsaken (atyaktām, taking the negative a from the long ā-ending of the preceding word, hariṇā) since in v. 24 it is said that Kṛṣṇa is always present there (tatra). *27* The flooding is not of Dvārakā, which has been made by Viśvakarman; rather, it is the inundation of the surrounding land; i.e., Kṛṣṇa caused Dvārakā to be surrounded by water so as to act like a moat around it. The words mahārāja śrīmadbhagavadālayam (in a11.31.23) can be construed as an attribute of the city of Dvārakā *28*: the city of Dvārakā (dvārakāpuram) which is in the form of Kṛṣṇa’s eternal abode (ālayam = śrīkṛṣṇanītyadhamārūpam) which is characterized by the great kings, namely the Yādavas (mahārāja = mahāntaḥ rājāno yādavalakṣanā yatra tathābhūtam tadālayam). *29* When the text says that the inundation did not include (varjayitvā) Kṛṣṇa’s palace (v.23), and that Kṛṣṇa is always present there (v.24), it means that Kṛṣṇa was present also to those [Yādavas] who
belong to his palace, or it means that ‘Kṛṣṇa’s palace’ refers [not just to the palace in the narrow sense, but] to the palace situated in the beautiful ambience of the houses of the Yādavas. 11.31.24 mentions the benefits gained by people remembering (smṛti) Kṛṣṇa’s abode in Dvārakā: this remembrance is mentioned because it cannot be actually seen now (JG (Ks), RR, VD on 11.31.23-24). Hence, that Dvārakā is experienced otherwise [i.e., as if destroyed] is due only to the imitation of what is mundane, popular or secular (laukikatva); whereas, in reality, it is characterized by the eternally established supra-mundane (alaukika) prakāśa (JG (Ks), VD on 11.1.1.) The 11th skandha of the Bhāgavata really describes Kṛṣṇa’s ascension (āroha) into the aprākata-prakāśa of Dvārakā (RR, VD on 11.1.1.) Dvārakā is eternal because it is the meeting point of all that is divine and superdivine (VD on 11.31.23). VC briefly states that the view that the Yādavas, Krisna’s palace, etc. are not eternal is rejected in vv. 23-24, since it is asserted that the Lord’s palace is an exception (v. 23) and Kṛṣṇa is present there eternally (v.24) (VC on 11.31.23.24). Hence, Kṛṣṇa cannot abandon Dvārakā (VC on 11.1.7).

Therefore, the so-called destruction of the Yādavas is actually their transition from the prakaṭa-līlā to the aprakaṭa-līlā. In keeping with this understanding, a number of verses are ingeniously interpreted to yield a meaning different from the obvious meaning that strikes one at first sight. We shall now take up examples of these different interpretations.

The plain meaning of verse 11.30.12 is: Then in that place, the Yādavas, whose judgement was destroyed by fate (diśṭavibriṣamīśitadvhhīyhaḥ), drank the highly intoxicating, sweet drink called Maireyaka, by whose juices the intellect is deluded. RR reinterprets this verse to show that the Yādavas move from the empirical (prapaṁca) to the nitya-līlā, in the following manner. The intellect (dhiyaḥ) of the Yādavas was deprived by time (diśṭa = kāla, one of the meaning given by the lexicographer Viśva) which was under the influence of prakata-līlā. i.e., their intellect was deprived of the experience of the nitya-līlā. They drank the honey (madhu) in the form of the maireyaka. The word maireyaka consists of mā + irā + ka. Mā means the nitya-līlā, which is brought about by irā, i.e., by Sarasvati, a deity who is fond of nitya-līlā, i.e. it pervades the devotees. In other words, irā stands for the Śruti or
Scripture (e.g., “What was, may be, and will be becoming”, which produces the nītya-līlā. Ka is a suffix which does not convey any meaning of its own, i.e., it does not add anything to the original meaning of the base [maireya] to which it is appended (svārthe ka). Hence maireyaka means ‘that which gives the understanding of the nītya-līlā, since it makes one forget the empirical (prapañca). By the tasting (dravaiḥ = āsvādanaiḥ) of this maireyaka’s eternality (nityatva) the Yādava’s intellect (mati) in the form of separation (viyoga) was destroyed, i.e., the eternal union (sanyoga) shone forth (RR on 11.30.12).

11.30.13 speaks of a clash (saṅgharṣaḥ) among the Yādavas, who were deluded by Kṛṣṇa’s māyā(kṛṣṇamāyāvimūḍhānām) and whose hearts were proud (drptacetāsām). This is given a symbolic meaning: The conflict is actually between the prakāṭa-līlā and the nītya-līlā. In this struggle the prakāṭa-līlā, consisting of separation (viyoga), was defeated by the nītya-līlā. The Yādavas are those to whom (yebhaḥ) Kṛṣṇa’s māyā, namely his desire indicating separation, was hidden (vimūḍāḥ = tirohitāḥ), and their hearts are proud due to their union (sanyoga) with the nītya-līlā (RR, VD, on 11.30.13).

The ordinary meaning of 11.30.14 is: Agitated by anger (krodhasamrabdhaḥ) those killers (ātatāyinaḥ), fought with one another (yuyudhuḥ) on the sea-shore (velāyām) with bows (dhanurbhiḥ), swords (asibhiḥ), spears (bhallaḥi), maces (gadābhīḥ), iron clubs and lances (tomararṣṭibhiḥ) Now RR and VD propose a deeper, spiritual meaning: This verse (and also the following verse) enumerates the order of the spiritual means (sādhanā) for the adepts (sādhakas) to see the entrance to the nītya-līlā. They are agitated by anger in order to destroy the pain of separation (viyoga) at the time (velāyām) of their going to the abode of aprakāṭa-prakāśa. They become killers in order to destroy the pain of separation; they fight against avidyā, etc. which are the cause of the cycle of rebirth. The spiritual means they use are bows, namely the praṇava; swords, namely indifference to hope or hopelessness, spears, namely each one’s purity, etc. The word gadā (mace) is explained thus: Gadā = ga+dā. Ga is a dance characterized by song (ga=gītopalakṣita nṛtya) and dā=diyante, ‘are given’; i.e., “with maces” (gadābhīḥ) means ‘with the clapping of hands, which are given in
dance, they fight with sins', since the Padma Purāṇa says that, by the clapping of hands while dancing in front of the Lord, the sins in one's person fly away like so many birds. Similarly, tomaraśṭibhiḥ (with clubs and lances) is interpreted differently to mean 'the destruction of ignorance': Tomara=tau+mara. Tau=tauti, i.e. it goes to cover the svarūpa-jiñāna (knowledge of the essence); mara=mārayati, causes to die. So tomara is that which causes the svarūpa-jiñāna to die, i.e., tomara means ignorance Rṣayah=riṣanti=nāsawayanti, 'they destroy'. So the Yādavas fight with six kinds of prapattis, which destroy ignorance (RR, VD on 11.30.14).

Verse 11.30.15 says that, having accosted (sametya) each other with their chariots, elephants, etc. (rathakuṇjarādibhiḥ), as well as with donkeys, camels, bulls...and men (kharosṭrgobhiḥ....nariḥ), all of which carried flying banners (patatapatākaiḥ), the Yādavas killed (nyahan) each other with arrows (saraḥ). However, going beyond this mundane meaning, RR and VD interpret the verse in a spiritual sense: The Yādavas mutually tasted (sametya=āsvādyatvena sametya=āsvādyā) the Vaiśṇava sāstras like the Bhāgavata, which are comparable to the storehouse (kuṇjarā=koṣa) of the components (ratha=avayava) of bhakti.34 From these sāstras blessings (patāka=saubhāgya) in the form of Kṛṣṇa's grace flow out (patantyaḥ=nisarantyaḥ). Thus fortified by these sāstras, the Yādavas encountered (sametya) men (nara) who were like donkeys, camels, etc. They made these men listen to the Bhāgavata etc.—and this (making to listen) was made to flow like water (śara=jala).35 By these means, the Yādavas killed (nyahan) these men's dependence on sensual objects, which (dependence) had a nature similar to that of donkeys, camels etc. In other words, the Yādavas destroyed the karman and avidyā characteristic of the Kali age, and through this victory over Kali, saved these men. The commentators justify the peculiar meanings they have given to some of the words in this verse by quoting the dictionaries of Hemacandra, Medini and Viśva (RR, VD, on 11.30.15) Similarly, verse 11.30.16, which outwardly mentions duels between various couples, such as Pradyumna and Sāmba, is interpreted differently to mean: Each of these couples, namely Pradyumna and Sāmba, Akrūra and Bhoja, etc. came together in twos (samīyatuh) in order to discuss with each other the highest truth (paramārtha) with regard
to the battle (yudhi) with saṁsāra and with the separation (viyoga) [from the prakaṭa-līlā] (RR, VD, on 11.30.16).

The statement in 11.30.17, namely that, deluded by Kṛṣṇa, the Yādavas attacked (āsādyā) each other and struck or killed (jaghnūḥ) one another, is reinterpreted in the following way: The Yādavas are deluded (vimohitāḥ) by Kṛṣṇa, i.e., they are made to forget the separation from the prakaṭa-līlā by their coming in contact with the light of the nitya-(i.e. aprakaṭa-)līlā. That is, being blinded by the intoxication of exhilaration (madāndhakārītāḥ) generated by their experiencing the happiness of the nitya-līlā they met (āsādyā=miśīvā) each other, and came to know (jaghnūḥ=jñātavantah) the secret of the nitya-līlā. The verb jaghnūḥ, which is derived from the verbal root han, does not mean ‘they killed’, but ‘they came to know’ because, since the root han also means ‘to go’, it can mean ‘to know’ (RR, VD on 11.30.17). In 11.30.18 forgetting (visṛjya) their friendship (sauhrdām), they fought (ayudhyan) with one another. This is interpreted differently: Having abandoned (visṛjya) the empirical world (prapañca) they experienced their mutual friendship in the state of nitya-līlā (RR, VD on 11.30.18). They as it were waged war (ayudhyan=yuddham iva) in order to destroy the enemy in the form of the separation from the prakaṭa-līlā, and thus be connected with the aprakaṭa-līlā. The fighting among relatives in 11.30.19 is given the following new meaning: Being mūdhāḥ (v. 19), i.e., devoid of the contact with the separation from the prakaṭa-līlā, the relatives (jñātayaḥ) recognized (ahan=jñātavanaḥ) their relatives (jñātin) as the eternal attendants of Kṛṣṇa in other words, they thus obtained inspiration. In connection with this unconventional meaning given to the root han, RR and VD remark that the claim that the root han does not mean ‘to go’ because it is not used in this sense, is a mere rash statement or temerity on the part of those who are confined to the narrow well of poetry and not immersed in the vast ocean of the Scriptures. The Mahābhāṣya of Patañjali can be adduced in support of this remark (RR, VD on 11.30.19).

11.30.20. mentions that when their arrows were depleted, their bows broken, and their weapons exhausted, the Yādavas took hold of (jahruḥ) the erakā grass in their clenched fists (mūṣṭibhiḥ) in order to use this grass as weapons. However, RR and VD bring to light the hidden and deeper
import of this verse: Once one has reached the goal (sādhya), namely the eternal world of nitya-līlā, the means (sādhana) to the goal come to an end, just as in the maxim ‘when Indra, the god of rain, is present, there is no need of implements to dig a well’. After the arrows in the form of the ‘discernment of objects’ were reduced, i.e., abandoned (kṣiyamāṇesu=tyjyamāṇesu), the bows in the form of the ‘reflections on the meaning of Om’ were broken, and the weapons, namely the spiritual means (sādhana) in the form of the ‘four kinds of asceticism’ were neglected (kṣiyamāṇesu=upeksyamāṇesu), the Yādavas grasped or recognized the ‘erakās” by stealing away, i.e., by deception (muṣṭibhiḥ=moṣanaiḥ=vañcanaiḥ), i.e., by becoming invisible from the empirical world (prapañca). Eraka is composed of a+īra+ka, and thus means the happiness (ka=sukha) of Era. And Era (a+īra) means one who goes (īra), i.e., knows, from all sides (a=sarvatah); in other words, Era refers to the omniscient one, the Lord. Hence, erakāh are those to whom (yābhyaḥ) the omniscient Lord (Era) is their happiness (ka): these are the residents in the nitya-līlā. Thus, when it is said that the Yādavas grasped (jahruḥ=jaghruḥ), i.e. recognized, these residents (erakāḥ), it means that the Yādavas experienced the aprakaṭa-prakāśa (RR, VD on 11.30.20).

The ordinary meaning of 11.30.21-22 is: The erakā grass held (dhrtāḥ) in the fists (muṣṭiṇā) of the Yādavas became (abhavan) iron bars (parighāḥ) hard like adamant (vajrakalpāh). (With these they struck (jaghruḥ) their enemies. Being prevented by Kṛṣṇa and being deluded (mohitāḥ) by him, they considered Kṛṣṇa and Balarāma as opposed to them, and so, deciding to kill (hantum) them, they attacked them. However, RR and VD interpret these verses in the context of the Yādavas entering the nitya-līlā: Those erakāḥ, who were residing [in nitya-līlā], who were vajrakalpāḥ, i.e., shining (kalpa=kalpante=prakāśante) with spiritual diamonds (vajra) who were always abiding (dhrtāḥ41=avasthitāḥ) [in nitya-līlā] due to the deception (muṣṭinā=vañcanena), namely the hiding of the prapañca, and who were parighāḥ, i.e. surrounded (pari=paritah) by bells (gḥāḥ=ghanṭāḥ, according to Medinī), met (abhavan = prāpuḥ) the Yadus.42 Hating (divisāḥ) the prakāṭa-līlā which was consisting of separation, the Yādavas, being prevented by Kṛṣṇa, i.e. being prevented as it were from experiencing the nitya-līlā through
the guise of the prakāta-līlā and being mohitāḥ, i.e., becoming devoid of the close connection with separation through the joy of experiencing the nitya-
līlā, with loving anger considered Kṛṣṇa as an enemy as it were, due to his causing them to suffer separation, and so they came to know (jaghnuh, jñātavantah the root han signifies ‘to know’ since it means ‘to go’43) Kṛṣṇa and Balarāma as united with the nitya-līlā. Since they already held in their hands the weapons of dispassion, etc.,44 the Yādavas became eager (āpannāḥ=udyuktāḥ) to kill (hantum) the prakāta-prakāśa that was replete with the sorrow of separation, i.e., they became eager to disappear from the prakāta-līlā (RR, VD on 11.30.21-22).

11.30.23 reports that after (atha) being attacked, Kṛṣṇa and Balarāma, angrily moving about (carantau) and exerting (udyamya) themselves in the battle, retaliated by hitting back (jaghnatuh) at the Yādavas with the erakā grass that had become like iron clubs (parigha) in their fists (muṣṭi). RR and VD, however, look at this verse from a different perspective: Afterwards (atha) i.e., after the Yādavas had reached nitya-līlā, Kṛṣṇa and Balarāma, intending to remove their own pain of separation, became angry and began to exert (udyamya), i.e., in order to cross beyond the empirical (prapañca) world they began to make the effort of meditation etc. They began moving about (carantau) in the battle (yudhi), i.e., they began moving about in order to wage war as it were, and becoming destroyers (parighau=ghātakau) of deception (muṣṭi=vañcanā)45, they came to know (jaghnatuḥ=jñātavantu)46 the erakās, namely those who were residing in the nitya-līlā. In other words, they made the two prakāśtās into the prakāśa, thus making it an object of inspiration (RR, VD on 11.30.23):

The obvious meaning of verse 11.30.24 is: The anger accompanied by rivalry (spardhā) of the Yādavas, who were affected (upasṛṣṭa) by the curse of the Brāhmīns and whose souls were covered by the māyā of Kṛṣṇa, led them to their destruction (kṣaya), just as fire generated from bamboo sticks destroys a forest (vanam). RR and VD give the verse a more sophisticated meaning: The curse of the Brahmins was broken (upasṛṣṭa=rūgna) or destroyed (upasṛṣṭa=upaplavam prāpitaḥ=nāśitaḥ) by the Yādavas: both these meanings of upasṛṣṭa are given by Medini. The soul of the Yādavas covered even Kṛṣṇa’s māyā in the form of his desire showing separation: in
other words, their nature was eternally united with him [in the nitya-lilā]. Their anger (krodha) accompanied by competition (spardhā) led them to kṣaya, i.e., to the place which is characterized by the eternal prakāśa. Just as a fire born of the friction of bamboo sticks drives away the avana ('non-forest')⁴⁷, namely human beings—who, being different from the natural produce of the forest, are intruders in the forest⁴⁸—and makes these humans reach their own residence, similarly the anger of the Yādavas drove them—who were foreign to what occurs in the empirical world (prapañca)—to their eternal abode [nitya-lilā] (RR, VD, on 11.30.24). This interpretation is briefly, but essentially, mentioned by the earlier commentator JG, who writes that the real meaning of kṣaya is the eternal abode of the Yādavas. Similarly, he gives the same explanation of the simile of the bamboo fire and the avana, as later given by VD and RR (JG (Ks) on 11.30.24).

The death (nidhanam) of Kṛṣṇa's relatives (11.30.46) is interpreted to mean not 'death', but nitarām dhanam, the acquisition of the great wealth of the aprakaṭa-lilā (JG(Ks), RR, VD on 11.30.46). 11.31.12 asserts that Kṛṣṇa, who had restored his teacher Sāndīpāni's son and worked other wonders, could surely protect his own person (svāvane) [from dying at the hands of the hunter]. Some of the commentators take the sva either to refer to Kṛṣṇa's own attendants, namely the Yādavas, or to include them in addition to Kṛṣṇa himself. Since Kṛṣṇa is surely capable of protecting his own (sva), namely the Yādavas, interpreting their case otherwise would not be in accordance with the true lilā of Kṛṣṇa; rather their going to their abode together with their bodies [i.e., without being killed] is very appropriate (JG (KS), VD on 11.31.12) RR points out that it is very appropriate in the cases of both Kṛṣṇa and of the Yādavas (RR on 11.31.12). VC derives a somewhat different conclusion, which, nevertheless emphasizes the same idea, namely that the Yādavas are not really destroyed by Kṛṣṇa. He says that, even though Kṛṣṇa, together with his attendants [the Yādavas], is visible to the empirical world (prapañca) he can [at the same time] also shine, i.e., be manifest, [together with them, in the aprakaṭa-lilā] (VC on 11.31.12; also cited by VD on 11.31.12).

The reference to the wives of Balarāma and Vāsudeva embracing the [dead] body of their respective husbands in 11.31.20 should not be taken
literally. The wives of Balarāma embraced Balarāma himself, and not his body, for, according to a Brahmatarka saying, in the case of the Deity there is no difference between the body (deha) and the Embodied (dehin) \(^{49}\) ‘Vasudeva’ means the śuddha-sattva or pure matter; in other words, since Vasudeva is the very essence of the hlādinī, saṁvit and svarūpa śaktis, \(^{50}\) he cannot be an individual self (jīva), and so there cannot be a distinction between the body and the embodied for him either (RR on 11.31.19; VD on 11.31.20\(^{51}\)). In other words, Balarāma and Vasudeva did not die, but entered into the aprakāta-līlā. SD reasons that Balarāma’s wives could not have embraced his body, because it is said (in 11.31.18) that Devakī, Rohiṇī and Vasudeva were unable to see Kṛṣṇa and Rāma, \(^{52}\) and also because both Kṛṣṇa and Balarāma are eternal vigrahās. Therefore, in reality, his wives embraced Balarāma’s ‘body’ made up of [the outline of] his clothes or they embraced a mental image of his body (SD on 11.31.20). VD points out that Kṛṣṇa’s wives, Rukmini and others, are said to be tadātmikāḥ (11.31.20), i.e., their minds are given to him (tadarpitacittāḥ) : in other words, they meditated on him since his replica (body) had become invisible (VD on 11.31.20; so also GD on 11.31.20\(^{53}\)). When it is said that Arjuna made the funeral arrangements (sāmparāyika) for the Yādavas (11.31.22), the real meaning is that he arranged for the chanting of the names of God (nāma-kirtana) and other such actions by Vaśīṇavas, which are appropriate for the uttarkāla (the interval from one full moon to another : samparāya=uttarakāla, according to Medinī), which in turn helps in obtaining the eternal abode of aprakāta-līlā (RR, VD on 11.31.22). Although 11.31.25 appears to refer to those who have survived the killing (hataśeśān) [thereby implying that many of the Yādavas were in fact annihilated], in reality the reference is to the Yādavas, who are known to have survived (hata=jñāta\(^{54}\)) [thus indicating that none of the Yādavas were destroyed] (RR, VD on 11.31.25). In 11.31.26 it is reported that the grandfathers, after hearing of the killing of their friends (suhrdvadha) [the Yādavas], took to the Great Path (mahāpatha) [the other world]. But the real meaning is that they heard about their friends [the Yādavas] having reached vadha or the place of nitya-līlā, for vadha is that which gives (dha=dadhati) consolation (va=sātvana, according to Medinī). Then, being eager to reach that same place, they went to the Great Path, namely the place conducive to meditate on the nitya-līlā (RR, VD on
Such then are the numerous examples of ingenious interpretations which demonstrate the way in which some of these commentators proceed in showing that Kṛṣṇa does not really destroy the Yādavas, but only makes them enter into the aprakāṭalīlā.

In conclusion, we can see how the commentators go even beyond the BhP in justifying Kṛṣṇa. These commentators are much later than the BhP. They range from SS, who is said to be born around 1325 CE, to GS, whose birth is claimed to be in Saṅvat 1892 [1835 CE]55 Not coming from a folk background, they have a more sophisticated understanding of what it means to be divine. Further, although the commentators do not mention it, they may have been aware of adverse criticism from Christians and Muslims, and possibly even from other Hindu sects. Hence the changed sociocultural conditions and the further development in the understanding regarding Kṛṣṇa's divinity impelled the commentators to go beyond even the Bhāgavata in their efforts to remove any blemish that they felt tarnished Kṛṣṇa's divine portrait.

Annotations:

1. Originally presented at the 10th World Sanskrit Conference, Bangalore, 1997, this article has been both revised and enlarged, including as it also does much new material.

2. For justifications of Kṛṣṇa in other matters, see my:


4. There are a few passing references to this episode elsewhere in the BhP, e.g., 3.3.14-15, 24; 3.4.1-2, 23, 29.

5. In the Mbh it is stated that, after uttering the curse, the sages went to Kṛṣṇa (16.2.12). The commentator Nilakantha suggests that they went to him to ask him to permit or pardon (ksantavya) it (on 16.2.12=16.1.23 in the Vulgate ed.)

6. Actually not all the Yādavas are destroyed. There are some survivors, e.g., Dāruka (Vhp 5.37.48) and Vajra, who is later crowned king (Vhp 5.37.57). Similarly, Bhp 11.31.25 mentions not only Vajra, but also women, children and elders. Some commentators assert that, although women survived, no Yādava male—other than Vajra—escaped the destruction (GD on 11.31.25 [=23], BP on 11.31.25 [=24]; GD, VR on 11.31.25). See also BhP 3.4.28-31, where reference is made to Uddhava being spared.
7. See my book, Divinity of Kṛṣṇa, pp. 70-73

8. See p. xxxiv.


10. Nīlakaṇṭha reads anayāt, instead of anayam (Critical text, 16.7.11) : Kṛṣṇa is indifferent, he says, because the Yādava boys are guilty. However, in an alternative explanation, he identifies Kṛṣṇa’s indifference with the calamity (on 16.7.11=on 16.6.13 in the vulgate text.)


12. For some other past publications, I have also referred to the commentary of Ratnagarbha, called Vaiṣṇavākutacandrika, Bombay Śaka 1824. This time, however, in spite of searching in several libraries, I have not been successful in tracing the book. However, in connection with our topic, I do not expect Ratnagarbha’s gloss to differ much from that of Śrīdhara.

13. Śrīdhara clarifies that Kṛṣṇa does so under the guise of the Brahmins’ curse (on 5.37.21).

14. Śrīdhara points out that this means they do not heed Kṛṣṇa’s words. (on 5.37.43; in my text, his comment is wrongly assigned to v.42).

15. Wrongly printed as his comment on v. 44.

16. In my printed text, BP’s gloss is on the same verse, but his comment is numbered as 11.1.25.

17. GD on 11.1.1; GD, JG (Ks), RR, VD on 11.1.10; BP, SD, SS, VB, VR on 11.1.10-11; GS, VJ, Sudarśanasūrin on 11.1.11; VB on 11.1.18; GS on 11.30.1.

18. However, in 11.30.24 Kṛṣṇa himself kills some of the Yādavas, although he does so only when attacked by them (11.30.23).


20. For more details, see O.B.L. Kapoor, The Philosophy and Religion of Śrī Caitanya : The Philosophical Background of the Hare Kṛṣṇa Movement : Munshiram


22. In his introduction to XI.30. SS mentions that Kṛṣṇa destroys his own clan. Commenting on this, RR points out that Kṛṣṇa makes his race invisible under the pretence of destruction (RR on 11.30.1).

23. See Bhp 1.7.24-25

24. This is the highest abode, also called Goloka: See De, Vaiṣṇava Faith and Movement, pp. 333-334.


26. See also SS on 11.1.1., where he explains that the episode is meant to generate dispassion as well as the ephemeral character of the pleasure of sense objects. Of course, not belonging to Bengal Vaiṣṇavism, he does not subscribe to the view that the Yādavas merely become invisible in the aprakāta-līlā, and are not really destroyed. BP and GD on 11.1.1. also mention dispassion.

27. That is, Kṛṣṇa is not only present always in his palace or temple, but there, namely in Dvārakā.

28. This interpretation is not mentioned by RR.

29. In other words, Dvārakā is the central abode not only of Kṛṣṇa but also of the Yādavas.

30. That is, not only is Kṛṣṇa's palace not wrecked, but so too the Yādavas as well as their dwellings are not destroyed.

31. Since it has become invisible in the aprakāta-līlā. That is, it is a remembrance not of something that has been demolished, but of something that continues to exist, albeit invisibly.

32. In order to keep a better track of the reinterpretations by the commentators, it is recommended that the reader looks at the original text of each reinterpreted verse of the BhP. Space does not permit me to reproduce each verse in this article.

33. Prakāta-līlā the Yādavas the experience of time (kāla) or temporality, as opposed to the eternality of the nitya-līlā or aprakāta-līlā.

34. According to VD and RR (on 11.30.15), the components of bhakti, in this
context, are such forms of bhakti is listening (sravana) to, and chanting kirtana) the names and deeds of God.

35. Through this metaphor of water the verse suggests the producing of love (preman) by these sastras) (VD, RR on 11.30.15).

36. This word is not in the verse. Often words which are not in the text are supplied by the commentators. In particular they frequently supply the words prakata- and aprakaata-(or nitya-)lila.

37. Lit, ‘came to know’ (janatavantah), which glosses jaghnuh, supplied from the previous verse.

38. Here, as well as in a few other places (e.g., in VD’s commentary on v. 11.30.20), there appear some printing mistakes in the volume I am using.

39. And therefore does not mean ‘to know’, as explained in the commentary on 11.30.17, above.

40. Their entering into the aprakaata-lila by disappearing from the prakaatalila is a sort of deception, since ordinary people may not realize that they still continue to be present, albeit invisibly.

41. VD (on 11.30.21) mentions the v. 1. bhrtah which my edition has chosen as the preferred reading, but adds that the word comes to mean the same thing as dhrtah.

42. This word is to be supplied, according to RR and VD.

43. See the commentary of RR and VD on 11.30.17 and 19 above.

44. Mentioned in RR and VD’s interpretation of 11.30.20.

45 See above, RR, VD on 11.30.20.

46. See above, RR, VD on 11.30.17.

47. VD and RR read avanam instead of vanam, supplying the negative a from the previous word, yathah, in the text: vainavav'gniiryathavvanam.

48. Human beings do not belong to the natural setting of the forest: they generally do not live in forests.


50. On these saktis, see ibid. pp. 276-284.

51. RR’s reference is to v. 19, and not to v. 20, because RR takes the half verse
(rāmapatnyāśca.....) as part of v. 19, while VD takes the same half verse as part of v. 20.

52. That, is, according to SD, they did not see the bodies of Kṛṣṇa and Balarāma.

53. However, unlike VD, he holds that the wives of Balarāma embraced his (dead) body.

54. See above, RR, VD on 11.30.17, where the root han is claimed to mean 'to know'.

55. See Vāsudeva Kṛṣṇa Caturvedi, Śrīmadbhāgavat ke tikākār (Mathurā : Rajyashri Prakashan, 1977), pp. 66 and 159.
A note on Śabara’s India

Shripad Bhat

In the development of Indian philosophy, through the ages, the Pūrvamīmāṃsā system plays an important role. The object of the Mīmāṃsā seems to have been ‘Vedārthavicāra’ or the investigation into the interpretation of the Vedas. In order to understand the Vedas, Jaimini sūtras serve as an important tool of interpretation. The sūtras of Jaimini were interpreted by some Bhāsyakāras, such as Bodhāyana, Bhavadāsa Upavarṣa, and so on. Among them Śabara became very popular, whose work is known as Śabarabhāṣya, which, in fact, formed the basis and starting point for all later Mīmāṃsā works.

In this work of Śabara, along with Dharmamīmāṃsā, we find a number of geographical, social and cultural references which were subjected to a critical analysis as being reliable sources of Dharma. Besides Vedic texts, Smṛti and Sadācāra also got importance as the sources of Dharma. Śabara asserts the significance of the influence of Smṛti texts, popular customs, rights of women etc. which are closely related and have become familiar in the life of ordinary people. He shows that there was a unity of language and culture from the Himālayas to Capecomorin.

An effort has been made in the present work to being into limelight the geographical, social, and cultural facts as reflected in the Śabarabhāṣya.

Date of Śabara—To fix the date of Śabara, a number of attempts have already been made. A. B. Keith concludes that 400 A. D. is the earliest date of Śabara\(^1\). According to P. V. Kane, the date of Śabara is not earlier than 100 A. D. and not later than 500 A. D\(^2\). G. N. Jha assigns him as a senior contemporary of the great ‘Vikramādi’ the founder of the ‘saṁvat’ era and therefore believed as having lived in 57 B. C\(^3\). He quotes a verse which
speaks of Śabara as the father of Vikramāditya⁴. Besides, Śabara refers to the Aśmaka country more than once. Siddheshwar Shastri Citrav opines that whole Aśmaka country might become under the Sātavāhana dynasty⁵. Sātavāhana flourished in I cent. B. C⁶. Therefore, taking into consideration of the period of Sātavāhana and the Aśmaka country one may conclude that the period of Śabara belongs to I cent. B. C.

**Geographical aspects**—Śabara knows a wide geographical horizon. The extant of country known to him is indicated by several landmarks mentioned in the Bhāṣya. For example—

1) On J. S. 7. 1. 7 Śabara refers to the colour of cloth. Such as, ‘colour is spoken of in connection with a cloth; yet it does not subserve the purpose of cloth but of the man or woman⁷. This kind of fashion, according to Maṇḍana Miśra refers to the people of north-east or Kashmir⁸.

2) On J. S. 7. 1. 8 the author of the Bhāṣya clearly refers to Punjab, when he says, "When it is said that a Punjabi [Vāhika] has come as guest so prepare for him a barley-meal, this same barley-meal is prepared for any and every Punjabi⁹."

3) On J. S. 2. 3. 2 Śabara gives an example that ‘One should eat sāṣṭika grain with milk; if he eats Śāli, he should mix curd with it¹⁰. Maṇḍana Miśra says that this type of tradition is in practice in Mithilā¹¹. A. S. Agarwal says that it was best suited to grow in Punjab, since it does there with little water. It is a core rice, the grains of which agglutinate when boiled¹².

4) On J. S. 1. 3. 9 while discussing the Vedic sentence, ‘Therefore cows run after Varāha’, Śabara says that ‘Varāha’ the word denotes Hog, as it is Hog that cows run after¹³. This type of tradition is seen at a festival held along with the Dipāvali. Maṇḍana Miśra says that this shows the close relation of Śabara with Mithilā¹⁴.

5) On J. S. 1. 3. 20 the author of the Bhāṣya speaks of the Māthura resident of or born at or migrated from Mathurā¹⁵.

6) On J. S. 2. 3. 3 the author says ‘such usage would not be contrary to the usages of the Āndhra’s¹⁶. On this Kumārila comments that Bhāṣya refers to the usage of the Dravid who have been spoken of as Āndhra¹⁷.
7) On J. S. 1. 1. 13 Šabara refers to Pātaliputra (Patna) and Srughna (Hastināvatī) more than once.

8) Šabara more than one place refers to the whole of India from the Himālaya to Kanyākumari, For example—

i) On J. S. 10. 2. 51 Šabara says that from the Himālaya down the Kumāri (Capecomorin) the term ‘parvan’ is known as denoting a point of time as also a group18.

ii) At another place while discussing the meaning of ‘caru’ Pūrvapakṣin refers to the use of the word as a pot. The term ‘caru’ is generally known from the Himālayas to Capecomorin as standing for a pot. As a matter of fact, all over the country the ‘caru’ is found to be used in the sense of a pot. The most reasonable course is to accept what is well recognised19. Siddhāntin’s answer is that it is more reasonable to take the word as cooked rice. Further he adds that the term ‘caru’ is recognised as denoting cooked rice from the Himālayas down to Capecomorin20.

9) On J. S. 1. 3. 18 Šabara speaks of the southerners as dark skinned, large-bodied and red-eyed21.

Social and cultural facts—Šabara is well acquainted with a number of social and cultural aspects which are subjected to a critical analysis of the sources of Dharma and their reliability.

i) Education—P. V. Kane opines that the Mīmāṁsāsūtra does not state how much of the Veda has to be studied before one enters on understanding the meaning of it22. However J. S. 3. 8. 18 says that one who knows the Veda has adhikāra for performing the sacrifices23. In this connection Šabara raises a question how much of the Veda must a man know in order to be entitled to perform a Vedic sacrifice and replies that he must memorize as much as would enable him to carry to its completion the Vedic sacrifice undertaken by him24. However, it should be noted that, one should study the Veda but he must also understand its meaning. The first sūtra of Jaimini mentions that ‘Now, therefore, comes to the enquiries into Dharma’. The word ‘atha’ in the sūtra denotes reading the Vedas according to the prescribed text, according to the rules and injunctions prescribed for its study. Such
knowledge is a general requisite as the Mīmāṁsā involves various kinds of discussion about the Vedic texts. After the study of the Vedas, a student may either return from the teacher’s house and enter married life or may continue to remain in the teacher’s house carrying on investigation into the meaning of the Vedic texts.

ii) Respect to the teachers—Śabara gives great respect to the teachers. He emphasizes that the teacher should be followed and saluted. Further he asserts that, if one follows his teacher, the teacher becomes pleased and teaches him with care and also being satisfied with the pupil, explains to him the reasonings that go to solve the various difficulties.

iii) Hospitality—Śabara shows great respect to hospitality. He emphasizes that what is done for the guest must be regarded as prompted by the guest, because in the honouring of the guests, what is enjoined is that the guests should be pleased. The injunction being that the guest is to be treated in such a manner as to please him. Gifts should be offered to him or he should be fed. Whatever else he wants should be done. He should not be forced to do what he does not wish to do.

iv) Medicine—It is interesting to point out that Śabara suggests medicine for certain diseases. For example, in every case of eye-disease, mudga rice is eaten; and in every case of stomach disease, milk is drunk.

v) Killing of foetus—Śabara says that killing of foetus before its concept is known leads to sin, since it has been referred to as the sin of foetus murder. A foetus murder is the worst of sinners because it makes benefit in both worlds. Foetus means sacrifice. One who destroys sacrifice, he is called a murderer of foetus.

vi) Use of oil in meals—At many places Śabara refers to the use of oil in meals. He says that oil has capacity to lubricate the food. For example:

On J. S. 10. 3. 16 the author says giving with an example that Yajñadatta should be fed with oil. Oil is mentioned as of use in feeding and it is to be used only in the place of clarified butter, the purpose of which alone can be served by oil, the capacity to lubricate the food being common to oil and clarified butter.
2) On J. S. 7. 1. 5 he says regarding the results of using oil, such as it would be like drinking of oils just as when oil or clarified butter is drunk, though this drinking is ephemeral yet it brings about at another time. Such results as improvement of intelligence, memory strength and so forth.

vii) Authority of popular customs—There are certain duties which are not laid down in the Vedas but are established by the customs, such as, “Teacher should be followed; Tank should be dug; Drinking booths should be set up”. Śabara asserts that drinking booths and tanks are philanthropic works, conducive to the benefit of people and not conducive to the Dharma. He shows the Vedic authority which indicates the digging of the water reservoirs. Further, he adds that the teacher should be followed and saluted; elders should be welcomed by rising from the seat and should be respected. He emphasizes that these customs should be repeated whenever the occasion presents itself.

There are some texts which say that the Holāka and the like should be practised by the Easterners only. The Āhninaibuka and the like should be practised by the southerners only. The Udvṛṣabhayājña and the like should be practised by Northerners only. Here, Pūrvapakṣa tries to restrict them to the particular places, i.e. East, South, and North where the said customs are found. The answer for this question made by Siddhāntin is that the customs like those mentioned should be a duty for all, because all injunction has that character and injunctive word that cannot denote either the class (universal) or the individual (particular). Hence there is no authority for restricting its application to any other particular person. It could be found that a person who has gone out of the southern country and is residing either in the East or in the North still continue to perform Āhnīnaibuka. In fact when a person migrates to another country, he does not follow its customs. Hence it can be concluded that there can be no restriction in the authority of popular customs.

viii) Marriage is not a deed of sale and purchase.

On J. S. 6. 1. 10 Pūrvapakṣin says that women can possess no property on account of sale and purchase, because women are bought and sold. They are sold by their father and bought by their husband. And since they are sold
by their father, they have no rights over the father’s property and since they have been bought by their husband, they have no right over the husband’s property.\textsuperscript{37}

However, Śabara states in Siddhāntapakṣa that, as for the sale that is spoken of in regard to the wife, it is a purely religious function and not really a sale. A thing is said to be sold when its price is a fluctuating factor—sometimes more or sometimes less. In the case of marriage, however, the so-called price is a fixed item, whether beautiful or ugly. Consequently, the case of wife is not one of sale or purchase.\textsuperscript{38}

ix) Rights of women—While discussing the rights of women to perform a sacrifice, pūrvapakṣin says that a woman cannot perform a sacrifice as she has not the property of her own and what she earns that belongs to her husband. He relies on the text of Manu, ‘The wife, the slave, and the son are all devoid of property; whatever they can earn is the property of him to whom they themselves belong. However, the Siddhāntin points out that the famous Vedic text ‘svargakāmo yajeta’ applies equally to all men and all women because both have a desire for ‘svarga’. This is established by Śabara as the correct one and this allows woman the right to perform a sacrifice.

As a matter of fact, the woman is actually connected with property. Śabara emphasizes that in matters relating duty [religious acts], property and pleasure, the wife should not be ignored. Further he adds that religious acts should be performed jointly. Performance should be defective whether the man or woman did not participate in it and the performer cannot associate with any woman he likes, because the texts say that the performer should associate with only that woman who is his wife.\textsuperscript{39}

Earth is a property of all men—Regarding the land on J. S. 6. 7. 3, Śabara states that the land should not be given away, because people are found to be owners of lands, not of the entire globe. In fact the ‘Lordship of the earth’ given to him by reason that he is being engaged in the protecting of corns and other produces. He receives a share out of it, which he alone possesses not the earth and there is nothing peculiar in regard to his ownership over such supporting and preserving etc. of living beings as are done by persons inhabiting the earth.\textsuperscript{40}
Within the limited scope of this paper only a few references have been shown regarding the geographical, social and cultural aspects found in the Bhāṣya. It may be a good contribution, if one studies the Bhāṣya with the help of contemporary literature and evaluate the Bhāṣya on these above said aspects.

Annotations:

1. D. V., Garge Citations in Śābarabhāṣya, p. 23.
2. Ibid.
4. ब्राह्मण्यामभवेदत्रहित्रो ज्योतिषिदादायः
   राजा भवेदविक्षमरूपः क्षत्रिौजायमभूतः।
   वैश्याया हरितंदेवयोविक्षिणिजातिः कृत्तिः
   शूरायामभवतिः श्रेयस्वराधिईस्वरायत्वः।।
7. वाससिः गणः, भूरते, वासे राखयतीति, वाससि च क्रियये न चास्चैं तदर्थः, स्वर्यः पुरुषार्थः वा भवति।
9. यथा वाहिकोत्तिथिमयातः यवाभिस्मै प्रक्रियतात्तमितुतः यो यो वाहीकस्तस्तस्तस्त सत्य यवान्त्र क्रियये।
10. पद्मसा शालिकं भूरीत, यदि शालि भूरीत तत्र दृढ़ उपसिद्धे।
12. V. S. Agarwal, India as known to Pañinī, p. 206.
13. तस्माद वयस्य गाणोनुसारवाचि [श. रा. ४. ४. ३. ११] इति शुकरे वयस्य दर्शयति।।सूकरे हि गाणोनुसारवाचि।
15. यतो हस्तये – मधुरययुपीपस्थतो माथुर इति। मधुरयय वसन, मधुरयय निर्गतिः।
16. जतंपदपिपिलमुक्तर्थिणि रोजेत्यावं वदन्तीयुक्तम्।
18. उभयत्र हि पर्वशब्दो लोकप्रसिद्धः काले समुदये च आ हिमवतः। आ च कुमारीभें।
19. प्रसिद्ध स्थालयं च चर शब्दः । आ च हिमवतः आ च कुमारीभवः । प्रसिद्धस्य ग्रहणं न्यायम् । S. B. on 10. 1. 35.

20. आदने च चर शब्दः । आ च हिमवतः आ च कुमारीभवः । S. B. on 10. 1. 32.

21. येःपि यशाम् बुधहो लोहिताश्वः । ये दाशिणायणः इति समाख्यताः ।


23. जाते च वचनं न हृदित्त्रथः पवित्रोऽसि ।

24. न हृदित्त्रथः पवित्रोऽसि । योह्विद्विद्वात्सावः कर्मं समाध्यावाः । किंतु पुनःविद्तेन विद्वाननिक्रियते । यावत् विद्तेन शास्त्रों भवति यथों क्रमानुसारित किंतु यथास्थिनन्तरमिति । तत्त्वस्य वेदस्य सर्वं स तेन क्रमानु भवति अधिकृताः ।

25. गुरुस्पनत्वः । १. ३. ७० ।

26. गुरुस्पनमाजीतो गुरुस्पन्नायपशिष्ये, प्रश्नप्राप्तिभेदिनश्च न्यायान्तः परिशुद्धे वश्यतीति ।

27. आत्मदेवोपतिधिष्टः स्वाध्या । आत्मेऽहैं परतितिविद्येते । अतिथिः परीचितिः । यथा प्रोत्साहनं तथा कर्त्तvigमिति । द्वारान् भोजनं वा कार्यंनिति । यथातिथियों रेष्टे तत्काल्यं, यद्यर्थे न रेष्टे न तद्विद्वारितगत्वगति । १. १. १००.

28. यथा वा अश्त्रयामे युद्धाद्भूतो भोजकः, उदारयामे पायं, पायमृत्वमिति । सर्वं च मुद्दामीन्नो भुज्यते, उदारयामे पायं, पायं पौयते । ७. १. ८.

29. अविनाशे गम्येः हते भूषणयान्तवादो भवति । तस्माददिव्यजतन्तरं गर्भप्राथों हलेन भूषणां भवतिति । भूषणाः पापपुक्ततम् । यथास्थित्वो भोजस्य भवति । यथातिथियों रेष्टे तत्काल्यं, यद्यर्थे न रेष्टे न तद्विद्वारितगत्वगति । ६. १. ७.

30. देवदत्तः यहदासेनेन्तरे भोजने तैलमुखकायकं भूषणां स्त्री प्राकृतस्त्री कार्याभिमिनिवत्वायुं शक्तिति, तस्य कार्यं विनिगुण्ये यथस्य । सामाय्यः हस्तु सेनकायं पूर्वेनेति ।

31. यथा तैलपानं चुतपानं वा भोजस्य तितीयस्य सति कालान्तरे मेधास्वाति बलपुष्पावर्तीन फलानि करेऽति ।

32. गुरुस्पनत्वः । तद्गद्यनिधित्वम्, प्रव्र व्यापिशितिवा । १. ३. १.

33. प्राप्राप्ताग्नि च परोपकार, न धर्माय इत्यवमायते । १. ३. २.

34. Ibid.,

35. गुरुस्पनित्वं भिडित्वित्वाय, वृद्धवाय: । प्राप्राप्तेऽयेऽ । सामन्तवर्षनेति । ६. २. ३०.


37. ऋषिविक्रमसंयुक्तत हि रहितः । पिता विक्रोतीयने । भर्त्रो त्रिक्रोतीयने । रश्मीक्रोतीयः पिरुणानाभिनीतिः ।

38. यथा क्रयः । युद्धाद्भूतो धर्ममात्र तु ततः । नातो क्रयों इति । क्रयों हि उच्चतीचयण्यपशो भवति । च निष्ठैं रिवंदे दामम् । शायरतिश्च शोभनमायथपञ्च च क्रय्यां प्रति । तस्मादक्रियोऽयमिति ।

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Makaranda
39. Vide 6. 1. 6-16.

40. न भूमिदं इति। क्षेत्राणामिनिषिताः दृश्यन्ते, न कृत्तत्त्वृ पृथिवीगोलकस्य।...........यदसि पृथिविः सम्भृताः
ब्रीमानाः स्थिष्यन्ते, सन्तिविन्यस्य कर्षणशिष्यः भागस्येषे न भूमे॥, सन्तिविन्यस्ये ये मनुष्यस्तेस्वयूँ सर्वप्राणिः
धारणचक्रवर्त्तमाणाः स्ननशिष्यते तत्तशिष्यं प्रति न कश्चिद् विशेषः।

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विचित्र हि सूक्तस्य कृति: पाणिने:

बा. बा. भागवत

भगवता पाणिनिना संस्कृतभाषाया: सूत्रपं व्याकरण्यान प्राय: सार्धिनिसहस्र-संवर्तसर्वोऽपूर्व व्याचिक। तदेववाच्यथिति नाम नाम प्रधितम्। तत्स्य च सूत्रपञ्चमात्व सर्वत्रन्तस्तवत्त्र तन्नेन निबद्धत्वाच्च सुत्रान् ज्ञातुः व्याख्यान् नितरामपरिहारं वर्तते। तन्नेन व्याख्यानं नाम नाम प्रधितं किस्मत्रप्रविष्टं निःखासां।

पद्येऽद: पदार्थकृतिः विग्रहो वाक्योपजना। आक्षेपोधः समाधानं व्याख्यानं पद्यविधं मतम्। इति परिभाषितं वर्तति।

यद्रायच्छ व्याख्याननलक्षणे पदिविधत्वः संगृहीतः, तथापि पाणिनिसूत्रपञ्चमा तत्तुलक्षणम् भालेनैव प्राणम्। उदाहरणप्रत्युदाहरणादीनमयस्यसंग्रहाद्वैतम्। यत् उदाहरणम् नाम सूत्रस्य फलरुपं साध्यम्, प्रत्युदाहरणम् नाम सूत्रस्यपदानं समस्तकम्।

एतहं सर्वाङ्गपूर्णं व्याख्यानं भगवता पाणिनिना स्वयमेव स्वशिष्येभ्यः। पाणिन्य स्वादित्ययुमातुः शक्यते। यद्रायतात्त्वस्थौ स्वषेष व्याख्यानमथि न कवापुपनलयते, तथापि इत्यन्तात्त्वः व्याख्यानं बहुः सूत्राणि मूकानि अर्थात् निर्धारणं स्थः, अतः इत्यदिः स्वोपाय व्याख्यानं केवल मुखपर्यंताय समाजिकवृत्तिः संताने बहुः संवख्यातकनि वेदवतृ प्रवाहचक्रात्र व्याख्यातां संस्कृतितले शोधितः।

‘आक्षेपादेकां’ १. ४. १ इतिसुविवरणे महाभाष्यकारः। वर्तत इति केन्द्र शिष्यः। भगवता एवमध्यापित इति।

यद्राय प्रभाषयमपि पाणिनिसूत्रवृत्तान्यमेव, तथापि न तत् सर्वाङ्गपरिपूर्णम्, नापि अश्वायुः। समेतं सूत्राणि व्याख्यानम्। यतः अश्वायुः चार्यमानान्य सूत्रानमेक्षं शिष्यः यहां व्याख्यातानि।

सांप्रत्मुपलोक्षे नैवेद्य अश्वायुः व्याख्याते नैवेद्ये समसंवर्तसारं तके यहांस्याद्यित्यायां द्वारां विवर्त्यां लिखिता काशिकावृतिरः प्राणीतया सर्वाङ्गपरिपूर्णाः सर्वेऽ दूर्युप उपलब्धते। अश्वायुः-सूत्रकालमयाः काशिकावृतिकारः यथावतः प्रायः सहस्रं संवर्तसारामतीतम्। तेनैवानि व्याख्यानानि बहुर्विद्यां वधिकारानि स्मृतिवपमधुना।
नैकमप्‌पुलप्‌भत्ये इत्यहो महदोभयं पाणिनिपरम्यायः।

कदाचित्‌स्यादेद्यःप्रस्तुतम्‌, अधुना प्रस्तुतमम्‌स्यायः।

उच्चैस्ततं वा वपट्टकः। १. २. ३५ इतिमूल्या‌र्थानावसे काशिकायां बष्ट्रश्चेदनात्र वीणस्‌ शरदो लक्ष्यते, वीणस्तः शयथायुद्देष्यं स्वरविवीर्णम्‌, ताहि वपट्ट प्राप्तमेव कुन्तो न कुङ्कम्‌? कविचारार्थम्‌, 'विचित्रा हि सूत्रस्य कृति: पाणिने:' इति लिखिति चृतिकारः।

स्वं रूपं शब्दयश्चाब्दसंसा १. १. ६८ इति व्यवस्था सूत्रकोणां पाणिनिना स्वयमेव प्रतिज्ञाता। तामनुसूत्य सूत्रे निर्दिष्टः: शब्दः तानेव शब्दानु उदिश्य प्रयुज्यते, न तत्समानार्थः पर्यायानु, विशेषानु वा। अस्यं स्वतन्त्रव्यवस्थायां सूत्रेष्व निर्दिष्टः: 'वपट्र' शब्दः समानार्थ वीणस्तः शरद लक्ष्यणां बोधितिः, तस्य लक्षितस्य वीणस्तः शयथायुद्देष्यं स्वरविवीर्णमुच्चेतस्यां सूत्रमिदं विद्यतिः। इति स्वयमभयुपतस्य तत्स्य वर्तमानः परित्यागः: कुङ्कतः? इत्यन्येगे काशिकाकारः समाध्ये 'वचिचारार्थम्‌, विचित्रा हि सूत्रस्य कृति: पाणिने:' इति।

'मने वृष्णपचनमनहूवीर्य ुदाता।' ३.३.३६ इत्यतें सूत्रे वदे वृष्णु इत्यादिभ्यं धातुभः: किन्तु प्रत्ययं तत्स्रोदतस्वरं च विद्यति। प्रत्ययविवाहेतुसूत्रेन सत्वं 'परः' इग्योऽधिकार्ये वर्ते। तदनुसूत्य सत्वं प्रकृतिवाचकस्य पश्चिमार्थिः: प्रयुज्यते। यथा 'दातः' 'प्रतिपदिकानु' 'गुप्तिज्ञकिदाम्‌' इत्यादि, परस्त्र सूत्रे प्रकृते: प्रयवम्‌ विभावः: प्रयुक्ता तद्यं स्वयमभयुपेता भुजानुसूत्यान व्यवस्थायह: परित्यागः: कुङ्कतः? काशिकाकारः समाध्ये। 'वचिचारार्थम्‌' इति।

एमेववातप्रस्तुताशः बहुदू सूत्रेन सूक्तकात् कृतं स्वतन्त्रविनयममुनयूछ्य इदेवेव वैविचारार्थभुवात्वर्यति। 'उद्वोधनम्‌' ४. १. १५३, 'प्राचार्यवृहत्तन्तनिः पिन्य बहुदू' ४. १. १६०, 'उत्तमाकायाचः च' ५. ४. ९० 'ईदजानोध्व च' ७. २. ७८ एते दू सूत्रेन काशिकावृत्तिदेश्या।

नैकबावर्मेव समाधातु: काशिकाकारस्य कोविभ्रायः संभाव्येत् विचित्र-शब्दस्यायः: वकुरभ्रायं संदर्भ चाँदुवर्त्यं भिधते 'विचित्र हि परमेशानस्य सामार्थ्यम्‌। अत्र करुतमकरुतमन्यथाकरुतमलाभ्या: इत्यथ: प्रतीते स च परमेशानस्यायः: विशेषगुणवत्तां स्तौति। परं 'हातविरितिस्तातं हि विचित्रो विपाकः' शिशुपालवधे ११. ६४ इत्यतः अन्यार्थावल्लक्ष्यापि न स्तुति: पर्यवस्यति, किंतु उच्चद्वितीयस्यादेव दोषवर्ज्ये प्रतीते।

पाणिनिमुनौ दृष्टि सुरूपाः: प्राचीना अभ्यासका स्तावित् एवमाधिन्यायं यत-हंद काशिकाकुर्यं नैकबावर्मावृत्र समाधानं भावत: पाणिने: विशेषगुणवत्तामेव स्तौति। परमेशानस्य विचारात्नाया यथा करुतमकरुतमन्यथाकरुतम विलक्षणं सामार्थ्यवाच्यमृतमु, एवमेव
विचित्र हि सूक्ष्म कृति: पाणिने: ।

व्याकरणसूत्रचनाया सूक्तकतुः भगवतः पाणिने: । अतः ते प्राचीनः टीकाकारः कवचन कवचन पर्यन्तुणागमुद्वयति, परं सर्वत्रनस्त्रत्तनस्य मुनेनििश्च्युनागमानिवर्ति समाधाय पर्यन्तुणागमूले एव कुष्ठागामत्वाति । महाभाष्यकारादिभिन्नस्त्रत्त्रविप्रेशेन बहव्व उद्वाचितः पर्यन्तुणागः सूत्रदोषा एव एवमेवपावपत्मणीया इत्येव श्रद्धेते श्रद्धावतः पाणिनीयः ।

अधुना अपना विमर्शसूति: प्रस्तुते-महाभाष्यं तथेऽव काशिकायं अन्तरं यानि नैकाक्षेत्रध्याया व्याख्यानानि ऐश्विनीसादिशास्त्रसंवेदं साहित्यं तत्त्वं भविष्यविविधं लिखितानि, तेषु काशिकायायसन्तद्वारेश्च: सर्वेश्च: वैदिकविभाग्यं विभाग्यं । महाभाष्यदीनो व्याख्यानानि पाणिनमुनी पाणिनीयपरंपरायं विशिष्टं वैदिकपरंपरायं नितं श्रद्धेते । ते सर्वपि व्याख्याचारः ‘भगवानु मात्रानि’ इत्येव संवेदति । प्रथमदृश्यां महाभाष्यकारेणप्रथमतया बहुत्र नितं प्रस्तुतं महाभाष्यचरणपरंपरं श्रृवथिवचनमिव व्याख्या प्रमाणितं नित्यमुस्मरसाति । काशिकाकारः स्वयं व्याख्यापणं नेषां देवं वन्दते, नापि सूत्रकारं स्वरूपति । किंतु सर्वथा तद्भवानमवस्त्रवोद्योगः । साक्षात्कावस्त्रवोद्योगस्थित ‘वृत्त भाष्ये तथा धातुनाम-पानावादिदु’ इत्यादि ।

यद्यपि काशिकाकारः पाणिनमुनी सिद्धांताचारणांमहाने मात्रावधानं विभाग्यं यथा ‘आकुमारंश: पाणि:’ (१. ४. ८९, २. १. १३), तथायथायादारभावः, अन्यं: च श्रद्धालितयः । श्रद्धालितये केवलं गुणपक्षपणिती भक्तिरक्षा देवताया, ऋषिः, मुनेनििर्यय: वा केवलं गुणाने भक्तिः, गुणाने गायति, गृहस्तिः वा न दोषं दोषसमुदायमपि । आदारभावेआदारावस्य गुणानिणं दोषाद्वादरतिवर्त्यां जानिवयं, लब्धेऽवसे च दोषानिणं स्मरं ब्रह्माण्वुर्चनेवदति । यत आदारभावेमध्यमयं, जद्वीरत तत्वाविवेचनानि निर्यां जानिवयं, या श्रद्धालितये आवृत्ता भविति, निदाति, अन्धात्मुपायति वा । अतः मध्यमस्थः काशिकाकारः आदारभावं ददानोदिः नैकाक्षेत्राचारणं वैचित्रार्थमु: इति समाधानेनेववेत् सूचितयति सूत्रकार्यस्य विचित्रकृति: स्वयमभूपमत्यं तन्त्रस्य नैकाक्षेत्रं परियागाद्वायस्यां संभ्रमकारणेवात् एव न सोभना, नापि कथापि सोदृशं शक्यं कार्यां वा ।

यतः

मनागतप्रभुविया वा कामं कामयु व: कामी ।

क्रियासाधीनं निस्त्रत्तत्रं कामेत कः ।

अतः एतानि तन्नौखणनां-कामं तानि सर्वत्रनस्त्रत्तनस्य मुनेन्वेवनाम-दोषा एव ।
An Earlier Reference to ‘Ṣālāturīya (Pāṇini)’

M. A. Dhaky

For some years past, George Cardona has emerged as one of the few front-ranking authorities on Pāṇini and Pāṇinian literature. A few years ago, in his famous work—Pāṇini: His Work and its Traditions, Vol. 1, “Background and Introduction”—, he had succinctly dwelt upon the historical facts relating to that greatest of all Sanskrit grammarians. Observed Cardona: “1. The available evidence does not allow one to determine Pāṇini’s dates with absolute precision. Nevertheless, the evidence also precludes placing Pāṇini at a time later than the early fourth century B. C. : 500 B. C. is reasonable date to accept. According to a tradition which there is no cogent reason to doubt, Pāṇini was native to Śalātura, in the northwest of the subcontinent. Thus, in his Gaṇaratnamahodadhi (GRM 1.2 : शालातुरीयशकटाङ्कज्ञचन्द्र-गोमिदिवसभूतिलिब्धमान-भोजयुक्त : मेघाविन : प्रवर्तीयकचरुक्तिप्रैतिनिषिपतिपद्वितया जयति।) Vardhamāna uses śalāturīya in speaking of Pāṇini, and in his commentary on the passage in question he explains (शालातुरीय नाम ग्रामः सोप्यानीस्वास्त्त्वित शालातुरीयस्थत्रभवान्, पाणिनिः) that this term refers to the respected Pāṇini (tatrabhavāṇ pāṇinīḥ), whose ancestral place was the village Śalātura. See A 4. 3. 90, 94 (344, 345).” Now, the date of the Jaina Śvetāmbara author whom Cardona quoted, namely Vardhamāna Sūri (of an unknown gaccha), is S. 1197 / A. D. 1141. There are, however, a couple of other references (and in one case at least definitely an earlier one) to the ‘Śalāturīya’ cognomen of Pāṇini. The first is the lexicon Trikāṇḍaśeṣa—a later supplementum to the Amarakośa (c. 6th cent. A. D.)—referred to by Viśvanātha Sāstrī in his preface to the Laghusiddhāntakaumudi (reprints, Delhi 1983, 1988). And some years ago, as I was going through Cardona’s learned Introduction, I recalled a reference to ‘Śalāturīya’ by another, but earlier, Śvetāmbara Jaina writer, namely Siddhasena gaṇī, that figures in his commentary on the Sabhāṣya-Tattvārthādhi-gama-sūtra of Umāsvāti (c. A. D. 350). In his commentary on
the bhāṣya of the Sūtra 5-24, Siddhasena records the opinion of the followers of ‘Śālātūriya’ that dhvani (suggestive notion) and sphoṭa (connotative implication) are different from each other: tadvān dhvanir-eva ca śabdaḥ-śrotagrahanah, na sphoṭaḥ Śālātūriya matānusāri-vaiyākarāṇa-nikāya parikalpitah..... Since Siddhasena gaṇi lived between c. A. D. 690-770', and the mean date for his commentary arguably seems c. A.D. 760-65, we now have an unambiguous reference to Śālātūriya which is at least 375 years anterior to the one encountered in the Gaṇaratnamahodadhi. Predictably, Siddhasena gaṇi must have had before him an earlier written or oral tradition which so reported: hence this fact lends a very firm support to, and positively stipulates Cardona's palpably well-considered assertion.

Annotations:

3. See Mohanlal Dalichand Deshai, Jaina Sāhitya-no Saṃśkṛpta Itihāsa, (Gujarāti), Mumbai 1933, p. 254.
4. Laghusiddhāntakaumudī (of Varadarāja), “Bhūmikā”, p. 3. The editor, in his preface, however, does not quote the original verse/passage from the Trikāṇḍāśeṣa, but quotes there from Vardhamāna Sūri cited also by Cardona. (Also see the 'Introduction' to the selfsame work, edited in this case by Pt. Nārāyaṇadatta Tripāṭhi, 23rd edition, Gorakhapur S. 1993 / A.ʿD. 1937, p. 2, for the identification of Śalātur.)
5. Umāsvāti was a pre-Śvetāmbara pontiff who belonged, according to his own colophon, to the Ucchārīnāgara-śākhā of the main northern Nirgrantha stream. He was neither Yāpanīya nor Digambara as I elsewhere have discussed. Siddhasena gaṇi, the commentator, plausibly lived in the ancient Pāṭalā and Moḍherā tract, located within northeastern Gujarat.
Vivakṣā in Kāśikāvṛtti: Jayāditya and Vāmana

Anna Radicchi

The discussion regarding the authorship of the various parts of the Kāśikāvṛtti by Jayāditya and Vāmana respectively has been going on for more than a century.

From the time when the Kāśikā began to be published in The Pandit (March 1874, Vol. VIII) by Bālaśāstrī, the task of reliably giving the name of the vṛttikāra at the end of each pāda had to be faced. However, the manuscript tradition was contradictory. In the Report¹ R. G. Bhandarkar concluded that the first five adhyāyas of the Kāśikā should be attributed to Jayāditya and the last three to Vāmana. This was contrary to the attribution of the first four adhyāyas to Jayāditya and the last four to Vāmana, believed to be valid, based as it was on the evidence of the Kashmirian manuscripts collected by G. Bühler in 1875-76².

Haridīkṣita had stated yet another division in the Šabdaratna to Bhaṭṭojīdīkṣita’s Praudhamanoramā under 5. 4. 42: the vṛtti of the I, II, V and VI adhyāyas is by Jayāditya, while the vṛtti of the other adhyāyas is by Vāmana. Bālaśāstrī also took the latter division into consideration at the end of his edition of the Kāśikā³; in this edition he had however practically assigned the first four adhyāyas and the fifth up to the end of the third pāda to Jayāditya, the rest to Vāmana, occasionally mentioning the name of the vṛttikāra at the end of the pādas. Although the theory presented in their introductions may differ, this division has in fact remained in the three editions most frequently consulted today: Prāchya Bhāratī’s 1965-1967 edition, the one from Osmania University, and finally the most recent one edited by J. Sh. L. Tripathi and S. Malaviya⁴.

When S. Ch. Chakravarti published the Bhāśāvṛtti in 1918⁵, one could
see that Puruṣottamadeva, who was writing in the XII century, frequently mentions Jayāditya in the first five adhyāyas as the author of the Kāśikāvṛtti, from the VI adhyāya onwards Jayāditya is no longer named, but a Vāманavṛtti is referred to. Another important edition we owe to S. Ch. Chakravarti, that of the Nyāsa or Kāśikāvivaraṇapañjakā, marked a turning-point in these studies. Vol. I already contained sūtra 1. 1. 5 under which the Nyāsakāra Jinendra pointed out Jayāditya and Vāmana’s respective contrasting opinions and mentioned the text of a vṛtti by Jayāditya on 7. 2. 11. “Did Jayāditya write a complete commentary on the Kāśikā?”, wondered Chakravarti. The reference in the Nyāsa to a vṛtti by Jayāditya on the seventh adhyāya certainly contrasted with all previous attributions of parts of the vṛtti to the two authors.

The Nyāsa, carefully-studied with the support of the Padamañjari, proved in fact to be the most important source for discovering and listing the internal contradictions in the Kāśikāvṛtti.

Initially, the research concentrated on linking contradictions to differences of opinions between the two authors, Jayāditya and Vāmana. Dineshchandra Bhattacharya’s work belongs to and emerges during this first period. In 1922, in “Pāninian Studies in Bengal”, he expressed his opinion, based on examination of references in the Nyāsa, that Jayāditya had himself completed his vṛtti and Jinendra had at least partial access to its lost portions. Vāmana’s vṛtti thus seemed to assume the role of a revised enlarged edition of Jayāditya. What then led Vāmana to revise only the last three chapters remained unexplained.

Bhattacharya came back to the double authorship of the Kāśikāvṛtti in 1946, in the Introduction to his edition of Puruṣottamadeva’s Paribhāṣāvṛtti. There he presented some ‘interesting facts’ gathered from a careful analysis of the respective works of Jayāditya and Vāmana (i.e. the first five adhyāyas and the last three adhyāyas of the Kāśikāvṛtti), which seemed to demonstrate that Jayāditya and Vāmana were separated by ‘some length of time’. This should lead, in his opinion, to the abandonment of the current view that Jayāditya and Vāmana were contemporaries or that Vāmana ‘came soon after Jayāditya’, as stated by S. K. Belvalkar in his Systems of Sanskrit Grammar. Bhattacharya counted 42 references to previous writers (under expressions
such as ‘kecit’, etc.) in Jayāditya’s larger portion (I-V) as opposed to 103 references in Vāmana’s smaller portion (VI-VIII). He then noted that in the section of the Vedic accent (VI. 2), all the illustrations under the sūtras of the II and the III adhyāyas commented on by Jayāditya were collected, but others were also added. Finally, the ‘polemical discussions’ in which Vāmana indulges, practically nonexistent in Jayāditya. It seems, however, that rather than ‘polemical discussions’, it is a matter of a clear tendency on Vāmana’s part to go into the intricacies of the rules and grammatical technique, also constantly referring, in many passages cited by Bhattacharya, to the paribhāṣās, the rules of interpretation. The increase in reference to the other authors, as well as an increase in the number of examples certainly accounted for a period of time between Jayāditya and Vāmana longer than what scholars had generally been ready to concede. “Vāmana could never be supposed to have revised the last three chapters of Jayāditya’s vr̥tti before 700 A. D. and probably did so about 750 A. D.”, according to Bhattacharya, who placed Jayāditya in 650 A. D. However, it seems that—indeed Vāmana’s attention to the interpretation of the rules and interpretative technique also indicates—perhaps more than anything else, a later time in respect to Jayāditya, near the Middle Ages.

In the 60’s, Yutaka Ojihara began systematic research on facts of ‘incoherence interne chez la Kāśikā’. Would a complete collection of these facts, Ojihara wondered, have served, if not to revise, at least to verify the standard opinion on the division of the extant text of the Kāśikā between Jayāditya and Vāmana? Ojihara’s research was not completed and did not solve the problem of the division of the parts of the text of the Kāśikāvr̥tti as we know it today between Jayāditya and Vāmana. Judging from the state of research, Ojihara believed that each of them had independently commented, in his own time, on all of Pāṇini’s grammar.

Ojihara’s articles initiated the final stage in the history of these studies. By now the most important references from the Nyāsa and the Padamañjarī, as well as from native commentators, have all been taken, and confidence has been lost that we may be able to learn more about the original work by Jayāditya and Vāmana. The II volume of the latest edition of the Kāśikā with Nyāsa and Padamañjarī edited by J. Sh. L. Tripathi and S. Malaviya, has
reprinted the Introduction to the Kāśikāvivaraṇapāñjikā by Srish Chandra Chakravarti, dated 1925. On the one hand this rightly indicates the importance of the publishing of the Nyāsa, in Chakravarti’s excellent edition, as a contribution to this field of studies; on the other hand, it implies that in 1986 it was believed that nothing of significance had been contributed to the subject following the 1925 study.

Shortly afterwards, in 1988, Narayana Miśra reconsidered, in “Varttamaṇakāśikāvṛttigata-jayādityavāmanāṁśa-vibhājana-vivecanam”¹⁰, the evidence from native commentators already examined by Chakravarti and drew his first conclusion: the vṛttis by Jayāditya and Vāmana originally must have been extended to the entire Aṣṭādhyāyī and the evidence now allows us to affirm that the Kāśikā we know contains Vāmana’s vṛtti only from 6.2 to the end of the Aṣṭādhyāyī. Then, however, Narayana Miśra also considered the Nyāsa under pratyāhārasūtra 4 and under 7.4.71 (and also the Padamaṇjarī under 7.4.71 and 8.2.18) and reached the final conclusion that although the attribution of the Kāśikāvṛtti to the double authorship of Jayāditya and Vāmana is based on tradition, commentaries like the Nyāsa do not in any case allow the definitive ascription of the parts of the vṛtti to Vāmana or Jayāditya respectively. Nor do we find greater clarity or authority in more recent native commentators. We must be satisfied with considering the Kāśikā as the work of the two authors. After more than a century of research, this is a meagre result indeed.

Taking a different path in the same period, another scholar became even more sceptical regarding the possibility of now determining the real author of the Kāśikāvṛtti. J. Bronkhorst, on two occasions,¹¹ dealt with the controversial passage of the Chinese pilgrim I-ching who mentions, in the context of Indian grammatical studies, a work he calls the vṛtti-sūtra that he attributes to Jayāditya who, he says, had died thirty years earlier. Both the term vṛtti-sūtra, which in fact is used in the Mahābhāṣya in the sense of sūtra tout court, and the mere mention of Jayāditya, whom tradition names along with Vāmana as the author of the Kāśikāvṛtti, have been discussed since the first appearance of the translation from I-ching by Takakusu, who considered vṛtti-sūtra = Kāśikāvṛtti.
Bronkhorst lastly adopted and elaborated J. Brough’s idea\(^{12}\) (originally perceived by H. Oldenberg) that the *vṛtti-sūtra* cited by I-ching, who attributes its authorship to Jayāditya, must actually be understood as the body of *vārttikas* that the *curnī*, that is the *bhāṣya*, comments on, I-ching’s *vṛtti-sūtra* and *curnī* together making up the present Mahābhāṣya.

A few years earlier\(^{13}\), Bronkhorst had explained that Jayāditya’s name must have emerged from confusion between *vārttikakāras*, because the Kāśikā, as well as the Mahābhāṣya, includes a collection of *vārttikas*. Bronkhorst initially spoke of two authors for the Kāśikā, the *vārttikakāra* Jayāditya and Vāmana, and believed that I-ching was indicating the Kāśikā when using the term *vṛtti-sūtra*. But in the end he has fully rejected tradition: “The opinion that the Kāśikā had two authors, Jayāditya and Vāmana, is almost certainly wrong and probably due to Jinendrabuddhi’s Nyāsa\(^{14}\).”

Here we would like to go back to the arguments set forth by D. Bhattachārya as early as 1946, when the inconsistencies which cannot be explained by assigning them to the respective opinions of Jayāditya and Vāmana had not yet been sufficiently taken into consideration. However, the important annotations from the Nyāsa, the Padamañjarī, and the Bhāṣāvṛtti as well as those from more recent commentators had already been collected, and attention had focused on manuscript tradition. In 1946, that name mentioned by I-ching, Jayāditya, was still generally considered as the name of the author of the Kāśikā, the only inexplicably strange thing being that he had been regarded as the sole author, while tradition named two. On the basis of this knowledge and with the self-confidence of one who feels history has not completely left him in the dark, D. Bhattachārya had attempted to grasp the distinctive features of that part of the *vṛtti* attributed to Vāmana (VI-VIII *adhyāyas*) as opposed to that attributed to Jayāditya.

It is from this point of view that we wish to determine whether there was an evolution in the idea of *vivakṣā* between the first and the second part of the Kāśikāvṛtti\(^{15}\). From a review of the occurrences of *vivakṣā* terminology in the two parts of the Kāśikāvṛtti traditionally attributed to Jayāditya and Vāmana respectively (*adhyāyas* I-V; *adhyāyas* VI-VIII), it becomes evident that the second part moves decisively towards the medieval idea of *vivakṣā*.
and towards the function the *vivakṣā* will have in the grammatical technique of the Middle Ages. Thus the fact that the second part of the *Kāśikā* is later than the first remains demonstrated, just as the existence of different authors is demonstrated.

Philology can make its voice heard where history does not shed sufficient light and where textual comparisons are not convincing.

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We may attempt to group all the occurrences of the term *vivakṣā* and related terminology in the first five *adhyāyas* of the *Kāśikāvṛtti* under seven headings\(^{16}\). They will naturally not be watertight compartments but broadly overlapping areas. The complete list of the occurrences grouped under the seven headings is found in the Appendix at the end of this article.

Now follows a definition of the headings with selected examples for each of them.

Let us establish the first heading, 1) in the most general way possible, as ‘the desire to express or utter something.’ It is indeed difficult to find, in a grammatical context, something that one wants to express or ‘utter which does not at the same time have a grammatical connotation. The most satisfactory example seems to be found in that ‘desire to faithfully reproduce a sound’ in the *vr̥tti* under 1. 1. 16, which is, freely translated, the sense of *anukāryānukaraṇayorbhedasyāvivakṣitavāt*.

After all, even ‘the desire to express a meaning not provided for by a *sūtra*’ is inseparably linked to the other face of the coin, that of ‘the desire to express a meaning provided for by a *sūtra*’, with the consequent application of the same. We would therefore also place the examples for ‘the desire to express meanings not provided for by the rules’ under the second heading.

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2) ‘The desire to express a meaning provided for or not provided for by the rules’, a meaning, it should be noted, which can be analysed according to grammatical categories, concepts, and terminology. Here are included the paraphrases of the text of the *sūtras*, which more fully explain the meaning provided for, that is the one wanted or not wanted to be expressed, and the
elucidations given in the debates on examples and counter-examples. Thus the \textit{vṛtti} explains under 1. 4. 42 what the \textit{sādhakatam karaṇam} of the \textit{sūtra} is, paraphrasing it with \textit{kriyāśiddhau yatprakṛṣṭopakārakam vivaksitam}, ‘what one wants to express as the pre-eminent means for carrying out the action’; under 1. 4. 54 it describes the \textit{svatantraḥ kartā as kriyāśiddhau svātantryena vivaksyate}, ‘what one wants to express as independent in the carrying out of the action.’

In these expressions, individual judgement and taste seem to be emerging. It is in the eye of the individual that in the course of an action something seems to assume the prominent role of a means, \textit{karaṇa}, like the sickle used to cut grass or the axe used to cut wood, and one wants to coherently express the carrying out of the action. It is once again the individual who bestows independence of action on a person and now expresses himself with \textit{devadattah pacati}, ‘Devadatta cooks’, and then gives the pot the role of Devadatta because he sees it as the agent and therefore expressed himself with \textit{sthāli pacati}, ‘the pot cooks.’

It is however certain that what the speaker wants to express according to his own individual feeling must then be expressed grammatically to be correct and understandable. The means must be expressed with the instrumental and the agent, however singled out, becomes the grammatical subject.

\textit{Sūtra} 4. 3. 163, \textit{phale luk}, prescribes that, when dealing with the fruit, affixes indicating ‘product or part’ undergo \textit{luk} and are thus elided. The \textit{vṛtti} glosses \textit{phale} of the \textit{sūtra} with \textit{phale ...vivakṣite}, ‘when one wants to express the fruit,’ and gives as the first example \textit{āmalakam} (the fruit of the Emblic Myrobalan), in which the affix \textit{mayat} prescribed by 4. 3. 144 is dropped. \textit{Phale vivakṣite} of the \textit{vṛtti} is the same as \textit{phale’bhidhaye}, which in fact substitutes it under 4. 3. 166: here the individuality contained in the desire to express oneself in one’s own way is lost and is replaced by the meaning of ‘what the speakers have to express’, and want to express, to communicate correctly, according to rules.

In the \textit{vṛtti} to the section under \textit{tasyāpatyam} (4. 1. 92), the expressions of the \textit{sūtras}, \textit{gotre} (4. 1. 93), \textit{yūni} (4. 1. 94), are amplified and explained
with gotrāpatye vivakṣite, yūnyapatye vivakṣite, that is 'when one wants to express a gotra descendant,' 'when one wants to express a yuvan descendant.' Under 4. 1. 98 instead of vivakṣite we find vācye, gotrasamīṇāke' patye vācye, which is in fact synonymous. In these contexts, vivakṣā is nothing more than the desire to communicate, using, according to grammatical rules, the various affixes on the basis of their range of usage. The speaker's intention can be deduced from the form used.

4. 1. 161 regulates formations deriving from manu-, like mānuṣah, manusyaḥ, which indicates species, jāti, not descend, apatya. However, one may want to express apatya, apatyavivakṣāyām : mānavi prajā, 'Manu's progeny', adopting the affix an which is used for apatya, clearly shows the speaker's intention, that of expressing descent.

The yañ affix is prescribed by 4. 1. 105 for formations indicating gotra descendants, with the gargādis. However, we find jāmadagnyah, the name of Paraśurāma, 'Jamadagni's son,' and pārāśaryah, the name of Vyāsa, 'Parāśara's son': here the affix has not been used for gotra descent as prescribed by the 4. 3. 166 sūtra. A gotra form has been superimposed, says the Kāśikā. When, however, one wants to express direct descent, anantarāpatyavivakṣāyām, this superimposition may not take place, and the affix prescribed for descent is used, with the resulting forms jāmadagnah and pārāśarahaḥ, and we understand that direct descent is being expressed.

There are numerous examples under this second heading: We might say that 'the meaning the speaker wants to communicate, which is or is not identified with the meaning codified by the rules' is the signification occupying the foremost place among all usages of vivakṣā and related terminology observed in the first five adhyāyas of the Kāśikāvṛtti.

Forms like kartrāḥpireṅkāryāṅphalavivakṣā, used repeatedly in the vṛtti under 1. 3. 80 foll., meaning 'the desire to express that the fruits of the action are directed towards the agent,' are listed under this heading as well (see Appendix), as the concept of wanting to convey a meaning provided for by the rules overlaps and prevails over the concept of wanting to express oneself according to the dictates of the rules. This is also present, since the kartrāḥpireṅkāryāṅphalavivakṣā involves a use of the ātmanepada on the
basis of what 1. 3. 72 prescribes, according to a fundamental analysis of functions assigned to verbal diathesis. Analogously, with tenses and moods, which ‘want’ to follow the rules, and so on.

More simply, one could say that vivakṣā sometimes takes on the meaning of ‘the desire to correctly apply the rules’; however, this leads to the specific cases under the third heading.

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3) ‘The desire to express oneself by following the dictates of the rules’, where the grammatical means rather than the meanings are directly involved; ‘the desire to express oneself using specific grammatical means’, as for example a prayaya, with the consequent iter of the prakriyā.

We arrive at grammatically abstract expressions like ‘the desire to express a prayaya’; see under 4. 1. 90 and 91 prāgdiśvyatīye jādau prayaye vivakṣite; under 4. 4. 109 yakārāda prayaye vivakṣite, under 5. 4. 57 dāci vivakṣite; finally under 2. 4. 35 and 3. 1. 31 ārdhadhātukavivakṣāyām. The vṛtti under 2. 4. 35 warns: it is a visayasaptami: ārdhadhātukavivakṣāyām means ārdhadhātukavivāye, thus explicitly under 3. 1. 31, that is ‘in the range of usage of the ārdhadhātukas’ or rather ‘when an ārdhadhātuka has to be used.’

Elsewhere the vivakṣā of prayaya is explained as ‘the prayaya that one has in mind and wants to express’; clearly stated under 4. 1. 90: prāgdiśvyatīye jādau prayaye vivakṣite buddhisthe.

The prakriyā is in any case put to work both in the objective range of application of the rules and in the subjective choice of them. The vṛtti under 2. 4. 35 says that when an ārdhadhātuka affix has to be used, first one effects the substitutions and then uses the various affixes as required. Thus the form hanyāt, ‘let him kill’, in the liṅ sārvadhātuka; but in the ārdhadhātuka liṅ, the so-called Benedictive, first one must substitute vadḥ for han as prescribed by 2. 4. 42 and then the required affix is added and the correct third person is produced: vadhyāt, ‘may he kill’.

In the same way, the vṛtti explains under 4. 1. 90 that when one wants to add a prayaya of the prāgdiśvyatīya type beginning with a vowel, prayaya which one has in mind, elision of the yuvan affix takes place before it is
added. The example is phañtāhṛtāḥ, 'disciples of the yuvan descendant of Phañtāhṛti'. To form phañtāhṛtāḥ, the prāgdivyatīya ajādi affix which one has in mind is an of 4. 2. 112; before this can be added, the yuvan affix must be dropped, as it would otherwise produce the form phañtāhṛtāḥ, 'a descendant of phañtāhṛtiḥ.' Once the affix is dropped, an can be directly added to phañtāhṛtiḥ, producing phañtāhṛtāḥ as per 4. 2. 112, with the desired meaning of 'tasya chātrāḥ'.

The reverse of the process, which moves from the vivakṣā through the iter of the prakriyā to the form itself, is also practicable. One may start, for instance, with the dāśarathāya form in the expression pradīyatām dāśarathāya maithili, 'let Sītā be given to Daśaratha's son', to conclude that the form does not follow 4. 1. 95, which regulates formations regarding descent (tasyāpatyam, 4. 1. 92) for bases in -a, because according to 4. 1. 95 Daśaratha's descent should have been called dāśarathīḥ. Thus it means there was no intent to use a specific affix for descent, but an affix generically indicating tasyedam was chosen, according to sūtra 4. 3. 120 in the section beginning with śeṣe in 4. 2. 92. The form, says the Kāśikā, will result from śeṣavivakṣā śeṣavivakṣayā bhaviṣyati. In conclusion, observing the usage one can go back to the vivakṣā, what the speaker wants to express. It is clear that we are dealing with a speaker, or rather speakers, who want to express themselves in a grammatically correct way.

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4) The vivakṣā as determining usage, which is then recorded by the rules.

Let us consider as an instance 4. 4. 83, vidhyatadhānuṣā, which prescribes the use of the yat affix with the meaning of 'that pierces', provided that the piercing instrument is not a bow.

The affix is added to the base indicating the object to be pierced, for example pādyā, 'that pierces the foot', said of pebbles which pierce the feet, pādyāḥ śarkaraḥ, or of thorns that pierce the thighs, ūravyāḥ kaṇṭakāḥ. For these forms, the sūtra excludes the bow as the piercing instrument; here the spoken language provides confirmation, as we do not find formations in -ya meaning 'to pierce' when the piercing instrument is the bow. One would not
understand the desired meaning, says the Kāśikā under the sūtra: na vivakṣitoḥ rthah pratiyate.

The vṛtti under 2. 2. 36 speaks of višeṇa and višeṇya, i.e. of the qualifier and the qualified, alternating according to vivakṣā. The example is kṛtakatāḥ, ‘who made the mat’, in which the first member, niṣṭhā, is the qualifier; but the vigraha may also be kate krtam anena, ‘made by him on the mat’, and here kṛta, niṣṭhā, is qualified by kate (see Nyāsa under the sūtra).

In other contexts the Mahābhāṣya had considered višeṇa and višeṇya alternating according to what one wants to express as fundamental (prādhānyena vivakṣitāḥ, under 2. 1. 57, Vol. I. 399); the genus, sāmāṇyam, is gauḥ and the particular, višeṇa, is kṛṣna only if this is what one wants to express, the bhāṣya says once again under 1. 1. 67 (Vol. I, p. 172). But roles can be reversed. How? The reply is: vivakṣātāḥ, ‘on the basis of vivakṣā.’

Although višeṇa and višeṇya may alternate on the basis of vivakṣā, the grammatical concepts the two terms convey remain firm: without them it is impossible to analyse compounds or to explain the concord which is the foundation of syntax. Analogously with svātantrya. The ‘agent as possessing svātantrya’ was already codified by Pāṇini in 1. 4. 54, and remained acquired knowledge. But identification of the agent possessing svātantrya depended on one’s subjective viewpoint and pointing or not pointing it out depended on vivakṣā. When one says that ‘a door looks towards’, abhinirkrāmati dvāram, the vṛtti under 4. 3. 86 comments, one wants to express the door as the agent possessing svātantrya, svātantryena vivakṣyate.17

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5) The desire to express oneself = usage, to be observed to integrate or limit, specify or render the rules more flexible.

The Mahābhāṣya already pointed out the iti, which often appears in the text of the sūtras especially in the section on taddhita affixes, as an indicator that in these cases usage must be observed; this allows us to go back to the desire to express oneself, vivakṣā; it is indeed the vivakṣā which finally determines the range and limits of application of these sūtras. The formula itikaraṇas tataścedvivakṣā, ‘there is an iti in the sūtra and vivakṣā derives
from it', is already bhāṣyan. The Kāśikā uses it and often also uses its shorter equivalent, itikaraṇo vivakṣārthāḥ.

Under 4. 4. 125, which contains iti in the sūtra, in place of itikaraṇo vivakṣārthāḥ we read itikaraṇo niyamārthāḥ : niyama means the limit of application of the sūtra depending on the speaker's desire to express himself, as shown by usage. 'Itikaraṇa indicates there are limits on usage', itikaraṇādviṣayaniyamāḥ, we read under 5. 2. 94 before the traditional sloka enumerating the meanings in which we find the affix matup employed. The vṛtti considers this itikaraṇa repeated by anuvṛtti, with its effect of evoking the vivakṣā, under 5. 2. 95 and the following sūtras regulating the use of the matvarthīya affixes.

Under 2. 2. 27 governing the formation of compounds like keśākeśi, 'by the hair,' and daṇḍādanḍi, 'stick against stick', it is said that the iti in the sūtra makes one go back to, i. e. it makes one understand what people want to express (laukikamartham); the seizing, fighting, reciprocity, the struggle : all contribute to the meaning of the compound and all derive from iti. Here one is talking about the laukikī vivakṣā; the Mahābhāṣya had already named it, contrasting it with a prayoktrī vivakṣā, an 'individual vivakṣā', which the Kāśikā does not mention.

On the one hand, itikaraṇa is restrictive, that is it specifies usages by referring back to spoken language; on the other hand, it leaves room for further additions. For example, iti in 5. 2. 93 indicates that the list of meanings of indriya given in the sūtra can be enlarged in case different etymologies occur.

Elsewhere, iti allows further clarifications to be added to the wording of the sūtra, for instance, 5. 2. 45 names only ' (numerals) ending in daśa in the sense of "this is surplus in it"; examples are ekādaśam śatam, 'hundred + eleven', ekādaśam sahasram, 'thousand + eleven'. The sūtra does not say that the surplus must be of the same nature as that to which it is added : 11 kārṣāpana added to 100 others = ekādaśam kārṣāpanaśatam, '111 kārṣāpana'; nor does the sūtra explain that it is to be applied only to the numbers one hundred and one thousand. A traditional sloka focused attention on these details. But, the vṛtti concludes, it has been said that itikaraṇa is 'vivakṣārtha',
and thus permits all these particularities.

The *vṛtti* under 5. 1. 16, which regulates formations like *prākāriya* said of bricks ‘sufficient to erect a wall’ or *prāsādiya* said of land ‘sufficient to construct a building on’, also goes back to the *iti* of the *sūtra* which ‘it has been said is “vivakṣārtha” when it poses the question : why is *prāsādo devadattasya syāt* not integrated into *prāsādiya*? Theoretically, the *sūtra* would allow integration because what one wants to express, by forms which the *sūtra* regulates, is only possibility, *yogatāmātra*; however, integration of the analytical expression *prāsādo devadattasya syāt* is not found in usage. Here the Kāśikā reëchoes Patañjali’s *bhāsyā* under the *sūtra*.

There is one more passage from the Kāśikā which should be cited under this heading. It is under 4. 2. 21 which the Kāśikā reads *sāsminpaurnamāsīti samjñāyām*. The *sūtra* must have originally read *sasminpaurnamasīti*; the proposāl to add the term *samjñā* is discussed in the *bhāsyā*, which rejects it. *Samjñā* limited the application of the *sūtra* to terms in use, actually only appellations of a month, a half-month or a year. But, Patañjali concludes, there is *itikarana* and that is sufficient, because the presence of *iti* in the *sūtra* refers to *vivakṣā*, and this accounts for the real range of the *sūtra* application. The Kāśikā, which accepts the reading *samjñāyām*, must then justify the redundancy and embarks on explanations. The Kāśikā says that the use of *iti* and *samjñā* in the *sūtra*, both having the same purpose; that of seeing that usage is observed, must aim at the indirect teaching (*jñāpaka*) that *iti* is synonymous with *samjñā*. The expressions of usage (*yattatra tatrocylate*) are ‘*itikarana*’, they depend on people’s desire to express themselves, and grammar must take them into consideration.

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6) ‘What a rule requires, or does not require.’

This meaning is clear in *akārasya vivakṣitavāt* under 3. 2. 61 : ‘because the *sūtra* requires the form with an indicatory a (of the three *dhātus* : *vida jñāne, vida sattāyām, vida vicārane*), thus excluding *vidā* listed in the *dhātupāṭhas* with the meaning of *lābha*, with an indicatory *l*.

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7) 'What a formulation intends, or does not intend.'

An important example is found under 4. 1. 92 (tasyāpatyam). The vṛtti says that the genitive, tasya of the sūtra, concerns the base upagu- in the expression upagorapatyam, and is restricted to the meaning of 'descent.' In place of upagorapatyam we may use aupaevah, 'the offspring of Upagu', deriving from the base upagu- with the affix an as per 4. 1. 83. The wording of the sūtra indicates nothing else, neither gender nor number. lingavacanādikamanyatsaravamavivakṣitam; the fact that tasya is masculine does not mean that the affixes whose use is regulated by 4. 1. 92 are added only to masculine bases nor does the singular form of apatyam restrict descent to a single individual.

A vārttika in the Mahābhāṣya under 4. 1. 92 already advised that gender and number in the indication of the meaning of a taddhita are not meant to teach anything because they do not in fact attempt to communicate gender and number. taddhitārthanirdese lingavacanamapramāṇam tasyāvivakṣitatvāt. The words of a text must obligatorially have gender and number, Patañjali reacts in his comment under the vārttika. The vārttika developed a following; we also find it in the form of paribhāsa in the Cāndravyākaraṇa: sūtre lingavacanamapramāṇamavivakṣitatvāt.

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To analyse the difference between the Kāśikāvṛtti to the last three adhyāyas of the Aṣṭādhyāyi and the Kāśikāvṛtti to the first five adhyāyas as regards the use of vivakṣā terminology, it seems useful to review once again the meanings under the seven above-given headings for the first five adhyāyas and see if they are also found in the last three adhyāyas and what developments they eventually undergo there.

1) 'The desire to express or utter something' is present. One example of several: auttarādharyam...vivakṣitam, 'the desire to express the state of one thing being over the other,' under 8. 1. 7.

2) 'The desire to express a meaning provided for, or not provided for, by the rules;' for example, dravamūrtisparsāvivakṣāyām under 6. 1. 26, which repeats the wording of 6. 1. 24, or also samipyevivakṣite under 8. 1. 7. In
these cases, vivakṣā terminology is used to express ‘the desired meaning’, which is then that of the sūtra. However, we also find, even more frequently, expressions with abhidheya, gamyamāna and also vartamāna which substitute vivakṣita in constructions of absolute locatives or substitute -vivakṣāyām in compounds: see nagare’ bhidheye under 6. 1. 155, eteṣvartheṣu gamyamāneṣu under 6. 1. 139, guṇakārtsnye vartamānam under 6. 2. 93, etc. Vācin is often used in the sixth adhyāya, kratvācini samāse under 6. 2. 97, etc., where the fourth would use vācyā. In the long second pāda of the sixth adhyāya, vivakṣita does not appear even once in the sense of ‘wanted to be expressed according to the rules’; in its place we find synonyms which lack, however, that sense of individual will to express oneself which is present in vivakṣā terminology.

3) ‘The desire to express oneself by following the dictates of the rules’; ‘the desire to express oneself using specific grammatical means’, as for example a prayāya.

Here we will consider that ‘not wanting to express the feminine’, which actually represents ‘the desire to express oneself not using specific grammatical means’, that occurs repeatedly in the vṛtti to the series of sūtras, beginning from 6. 3. 34, regulating the substitution of the masculine for the feminine. 6. 3. 34 governs forms like darśanīyabhāryaḥ, ‘who has a beautiful wife,’ with the masculine substituting the feminine in the first member of the compound. The formulation of the sūtra excludes the priyādis from the application of the rule, but an instance like drdhabhaktih, ‘of firm faith’, with bhakti included in the list of the priyādis as its second member does not respect the exclusion of the sūtra, with its masculine in the first member. How can this be justified? The vivakṣā provides the answer: it was chosen not to use the feminine gender in the first member: strīpurvapadasyāvivakṣitatvāt. This teaching is found in the Mahābhāṣya where a vārttīka under 6. 3. 42 which prescribed masculine with the kukkutyādis in compounds with the anadadis (kukkutyā anaṃ kukkutāṇḍam, ‘a hen’s egg’) was followed by another: na va strīpurvapadāvivakṣitatvāt. ‘Perhaps’, this second vārttīka said, ‘it is more correct to maintain that one did not want to use the feminine in the first member.’ The Kāśikā, repeating the vārttīka, added under the sūtra: the first pāda means jāti in general, not
gender.

The \textit{vṛtti} under 6. 3. 45 as well, which legitimates the alternating of forms with short ī like śreyasitārā and forms with long ī like śreyasītārā, turns to the \textit{strīvāsāvivāṣitātwa} for instances like śreyastārā. One could formulate a rule to legitimate the masculine, but ‘not wanting to express the feminine’ accounts for the \textit{prakriyā} better: one did not want to use the feminine before adding the comparative affix, which is then applied to śreyas, with the resulting śreyastārā.

In this way, one proceeds further. The Vedic \textit{nīśāptam rakṣah} and \textit{nīśāptā arātayāh}, with the cerebralization of nīs before the verb tap prescribed by 8. 3. 100 (numbering from the Kāśikā), a cerebralization which according to the sūtra itself should not have occurred because there is a sense of repetition, can be considered Vedic irregularities. However, the \textit{vivākṣā} can also provide an explanation: the sense of repetition is there but one does not want to express it. Not wanting to express something provided for by the sūtra exempts one from applying the rule. Here we have a meaning of \textit{vivākṣā} not found in the Kāśikāvṛtti to the first five \textit{adhyāyas}.

A remark of the \textit{vṛtti} under 7. 4. 57 is also worth being noted. The sūtra establishes the \textit{guna} option for forms like \textit{mokṣate}, as an alternative to \textit{mumukṣate}. The sūtra speaks of \textit{muc akarmaka}, intransitive \textit{muc}. In the examples then given by the \textit{vṛtti}, \textit{mokṣate vatsāh svayameva}, \textit{mumukṣate vatsaḥ svayameva}, ‘the boy wants to free himself’, the reflexive is used. The \textit{vṛtti} explains that \textit{muc} is intransitive in the reflexive; therefore the sūtra that speaks of the intransitive \textit{muc} regularly applies. Then it adds a further consideration: \textit{karmaviśeṣasyāvivāṣitatvādveda}, ‘or, it may be maintained that one does not want to express the kind of action (but only action and that is all)’. It is the same as saying that the restriction of the sūtra, \textit{akarmaka}, is overcome if there is no desire to take into account, and consequently express, the type of \textit{karman}. This is more than the \textit{vivākṣā} that guides the iter of the \textit{prakriyā} and determines the form; it is the \textit{vivākṣā} that legitimates forms which according to the rules should be considered irregular. In the final analysis, the \textit{vivākṣā} acts as a substitute for the rules.

In the \textit{vṛtti} to the last three \textit{adhyāyas} we do not find 4) the \textit{vivākṣā} as determining usage, which is then recorded by the rules or 5) the desire to
express oneself = usage, to be observed to integrate or limit, specify or render the rules more flexible.

Without observing the *prayoga*, which meant highlighting tendencies developing in the spoken language, the *vivakṣā* remained only a device for justifying forms which would otherwise be considered aberrant according to the rules. The device lies at the beginning of a path it will continue to travel during succeeding centuries; the Kāśikāvṛtti takes this path only in the last three *adyāyas*.

As regards the observation of usage to integrate, limit, specify or render the rules more flexible, an important role in the *vṛtti* to the first five *adyāyas* was played by the *iti* of the *sūtras*, which acted as an indicator of the need in these cases to resort to *vivakṣā*. The indication of the *iti* of the *sūtras* as *vivakṣārtha* completely disappears from the *vṛtti* to the last three *adyāyas*. It is true that the Mahābhāṣyan *itikaraṇas tataścedvivakṣā* appeared in and was limited to the context of the *taddhita* affixes. However the Kāśikāvṛtti had also commented on it as *itikaraṇaśceha vivakṣārthaḥ* under 2. 2. 27 on compounds, nor does the use of *iti* in the *sūtras* disappear in these last three *adyāyas*; however, it is noted here and there without mentioning the *vivakṣā*. See, under 7. 2. 34, *itikaraṇam pradarśanārtham* : *iti* in this *sūtra* comes to an end of a long list of Vedic forms, and here *iti*, says the Kāśikā, means that we are dealing with examples that do not exclude others. Along with *amiti* listed in the *sūtra* we find *abhyamiti* in the Vedic expression *ravimabhyamiti varuṇāḥ*. Regarding another *iti*, in *sūtra* 7. 4. 65, again coming to an end of a list of Vedic forms, it is said that it is meant to include other forms of the same type : *itikaraṇamevamprakā-ṛṇāmanyesamapyaupāśāmgraḥārtham*.

*Itikaraṇah pradarśanārthah* was already present in the *vṛtti* under 3. 1. 41 and *itikaraṇah prakārārthah* under 5. 2. 93 (note the masculine instead of the neuter); thus the interpretation of *iti* as *pradarśanārtha* and *prakārārtha* is not an innovation of the *vṛtti* to the last three *adyāyas*. However, it is certain that here it is used to the exclusion of any other mention of *iti* as *vivakṣārtha*.

Vedic forms, we have said, and this is not a negligible detail. *Bhāṣā* was the language in use, but Vedic was the sacred language which did not permit
innovation or free expression. It is no wonder that the prayoga is not taken into consideration in a Vedic context.

6) 'What a rule requires or does not require.' Avivaksite karmani under 6. 1. 207, in which avivaksita is rather 'what a rule does not require', may be taken here as an example: it excludes asita in the passive sense.

7) 'What a formulation intends, or does not intend' is amply represented. For example, under 6. 1. 36 it is said of sratah that 'it does not intend to express the plural'; under 6. 1. 143 it is said of kustumburuni that 'it does not intend to express the neuter'; the endings with which the kartakaujapadis in 6. 2. 37 are given 'do not want to express number', while for saitikaksapaicaleya h 'the plural is not prescribed' because saitikaksapaicaleyau in the dual is also found; the genitive angasya in 6. 4. 1, which acts as adhikara until the end of the VII adhyaya, can also be considered a pure theme, without its use wanting to signify an ending'; finally, under 8. 2. 46, regarding the formulation of another sutra, 1. 3. 19, using jeh as an inflected form of the dhatu ji, it is said that the sutra merely uses the form ji and 'does not intend to express the meaning of the dhatu ji.'

We have listed here all the examples of heading 7) occurring in the vrtti to the last three adhyayas. They are statistically numerous compared to the total number of occurrences of vivaksa terminology, much more numerous than in the first five adhyayas.

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In conclusion, in the last three adhyayas of the Astadhyayi commented on in the Kasilavrtti, anything referring to the prayoga, that is 4) and 5), disappears from the context of the vivaksa.

2) is modified, because the meaning to be expressed, as the rules prescribe it, is more often given as abhidheya, gamyama, etc. than as vivaksita or vivaksa: it becomes the objective meaning prescribed by the rules rather than the individual choice of the meaning to be expressed, according to rules.

3) undergoes substantial evolution in the direction of a 'device to justify otherwise irregular forms.'
6) is present, but it is principally 7) which expands due to the above-stated attention paid to the objective meaning, the positive aspect of which is a more profound analysis of the formulation and interpretation of the rules.

Annotations:


3. The Pandit, N. S. III (1879), see Upasamhāra, p. 20.

4. See Appendix for bibliography.

5. Savitārāya-smṛtisāmrakṣaṇa-granthamālā 1, The Varendra Research Society, Rajshahi.


255 fol.


14. WZKS 34 (1990), above quoted, p. 142.


16. This experiment was presented for discussion at one of the sections of the 35th ICANAS, held in Budapest in July 1997. We still hold to the general lines of that presentation, here revised and corrected.

17. Regarding the desire to express the independence of the agent, cp. svātantryena ... kartā vivakṣitah in the Mahābhāṣya under 3.1.87, Vol. II, p. 67; and also imāṇindriyaṇi kadācitsvātantryena vivakṣitāni under 1.2.59, Vol. I, p. 230 and passim.

APPENDIX

Occurrences of vivakṣā terminology in Kāśikāvṛtti I-V *

1) : ‘The desire to express or utter something’

1.1.16 : (anukāryānukaraṇayorbhedasya) avivakṣitatvāt

2.1.19 : abhedavivakṣā

2.4.6 : niyatadravyavivakṣāyām

3.3.99 : (vācyatvena) vivakṣitah

3.4.21 : (śaktiśaktitormorbhedasya) avivakṣitatvāt

*) The following editions have been used:

Here are included the paraphrases of the text of the sūtras, which more fully explain the meaning, and the elucidations given in the debates on examples and counter-examples.
1.4.42 : (yatprakṛṣṭopakārakam) vivakṣitam
1.4.54 : (svātantryena) vivakṣaye
2.3.16 : āsirvivakṣāyām
2.3.67 : kartrīvivakṣāyām
2.3.53 : kartrabhīpīyakriyāphalavivakṣāyām
3.2.56 : (prakṛter) avivakṣāyām
3.3.131 : viprakarṣavivakṣāyām
3.3.143 : bhūtavivakṣāyām
   bhaviṣyadvivakṣāyām
3.3.145 : bhūtavivakṣāyām
3.4.71 : (ādikarmaṇi...) vivakṣite
4.1.90 : (tasya chaṭṭrā iti) vivakṣite (ṛthe buddhisthe)
4.1.93 : (tasmin) vivakṣite (bhedaṇa pratyapatyam)
   (gotrāpate) vivakṣite
4.1.94 : (yunyapate) vivakṣite
4.1.105 : anantarāpatyavivakṣāyām
4.1.161 : apatyavivakṣāyām
4.3.50 : (phale rṇatvena) vivakṣite
4.3.74 : (mukhyam yadapādānam) vivakṣitam
4.3.163 : (phale...) vivakṣite
4.3.164 : (phale...) vivakṣite
5.1.12 : (prakṛterananyārthatve) vivakṣite
   (prakṛtyantarānivṛttiratra) vivakṣitā (na tādārthyaṁ)
   vivakṣitaḥ (prakṛtivikārabhāvo labhyate)
5.1.14 : (carmatyapi prakṛtitvena) vivakṣite
5.1.16 : (prakṛtivikārabhāvastādarthyam ceha na) vivakṣitam...
   (yogyatāmatram)
5.2.41 : (aparicchedakatvena) vivakṣyate
5.4.47 : (kṣeṣasya...) avivakṣāyām
5.4.50 : (nātra prakṛtir) vivakṣitā

3) : ‘The desire to express oneself by following the dictates of the rules’, ‘the desire to express oneself using specific grammatical means’, as for example a prayāya.

2.3.33 : (dharmaṁatram karanañatayā) vivakṣyate (na dravyam)

2.3.52 : (karmanī kārake śesatvena) vivakṣite

2.3.53 : (karmanī kārake śesatvena) vivakṣite

2.3.54 : (karmanī kārake śesatvena) vivakṣite

2.3.55 : (karmanī kārake śesatvena) vivakṣite

2.4.35 : ārdhādhatukāvivakṣāyām

3.1.31 : ārdhādhatukāvivakṣāyām

4.1.90 : (prāgdivyatiye’ jādau prayaya) vivakṣite (buddhisthe)

4.1.91 : (prāgdivyatiye’ jādau prayaya) vivakṣite

4.1.95 : śesavivakṣayā

4.4.109 : (yakārādau prayaya) vivakṣite

5.4.57 : (daici) vivakṣite

4) : Vivakṣā as determining usage, which is then recorded by the rules

2.2.36 : (viśeṣanaviśeṣyabhāvasya) vivakṣānibandhatvāt

4.1.19 : tasyedamvivakṣāyām

4.3.86 : (svātantryena) vivakṣyate

4.4.83 : vivakṣito (rthah)

5) : The desire to express oneself = usage, to be observed to integrate or limit, specify or render the rules more flexible. It is made known by ‘iti’ in the wording of the sūtras.

2.2.27 : (itiśarthaḥ...) vivakṣārthah

4.2.21 : (itiśaratatataśced) vivakṣā

(itiśaratatataśced) vivakṣā

4.2.55 : (itiśaraṇo) vivakṣārthah
(itikaraṇastataśced) vivakṣā

4.2.57 : (itikaraṇastataśced) vivakṣā
4.2.58 : (itikaraṇo) vivakṣārthaḥ
4.2.67 : (itikaraṇo) vivakṣārthaḥ
   (itikaraṇastataśced) vivakṣā
4.4.125 : (itikaraṇastataśced) vivakṣā
5.1.16 : (itikaraṇo) vivakṣārthaḥ
   (itikaraṇastataśced) vivakṣā
   (itikaraṇo) vivakṣārthaḥ (ityuktam)
5.2.45 : (itikaraṇastataśced) vivakṣā
   (itikaraṇo) vivakṣārthaḥ (ityuktam)
5.2.77 : (itikaraṇo) vivakṣārthaḥ
5.2.94 : (itikaraṇo) vivakṣārthaḥ
   (itikaraṇastataśced) vivakṣā
5.2.95 : (itikaraṇo) vivakṣārtho (nuvartate)
5.2.107 : (itikaraṇo) vivakṣārthaḥ
5.4.10 : (itikaraṇo) vivakṣārthaḥ
6) : 'What a rule requires, or does not require'
3.2.61 : (akārasya) vivakṣitavat
7) : 'What a formulation intends, or does not intend'
4.1.92 : (liṅgavacanādikamanyatsarvam) avivakṣitam
4.3.120 : (prakṛtipratyārthayoh sāṣṭhyarthamātram tatsambandhi- mātram ca)
4.4.2 : (samkhyākālayor) avivakṣā
5.1.47 : (adhikaraṇatvena) vivakṣitavat
5.1.131 : (ayamartho) vivakṣitaḥ
5.2.47 : (ekatvam) vivakṣitam
   (ādhikyamātram) vivakṣitam
Occurrences of vivakṣa terminology in Kāśikārṇti VI-VII

1) "The desire to express or utter something"
9.1.7: (auttarādharyameva) vivakṣitam
9.2.13: (udakasattāsambandhasāmānyam) [vivakṣyate]

2) "The desire to express a meaning provided for, or not provided for, by the rules"
9.1.26: dravamūrttisparsāvivakṣāyām
6.1.144: (na ... sātayaprabancho) vivakṣitah
6.3.42: (pūrvapadartho'tra jātiḥ sāmānyena) vivakṣitah
9.1.7: (sāmipy)e) vivakṣite
(na sāmipyam) [vivakṣitam]
9.1.12: (purvaprathamayor) arthātiśayavivakṣāyām (it is a vārttika)
9.2.13: (dadhātyartho na) vivakṣyate
9.2.59: bhidikriyāvivakṣāyām

3) "The desire to express oneself by following the dictates of the rules, 'the desire to express oneself using specific grammatical means', as for example a pratyaya"
6.3.34: (strīpurvapadasya) avivakṣitavāt
6.3.42: (na va'strīpurvapadasya) vivakṣitavāt (vārttika: nava'strīpurvapad-avivakṣitavāt)
6.3.45: (strītasya) avivakṣitavāt

6) "What a rule requires, or does not require"
6.1.207: avivakṣite (karmani)
7) "What a formulation intends, or does not intend"
6.1.36: (bahuvacanasya) avivakṣitavāt
6.1.143: (napurūṃsaṅkaliṅgam) avivakṣitam
6.2.37: vacanavivakṣārthah
(bahuvacanam) avivakṣitam

6.4.1: avivakṣitatvibhaktyartham
8.2.46 : (dhātuvāmanukāryagatāṁ sadapy) avivakṣitatvāt
further more

7.4.57 : (karmaviśeṣasya) avivakṣitatvāt

8.3.100 : (sadapāsevamāṁ na) vivakṣyate
Meaning of the Accusative in Desiderative

V. P. Bhatta

Introduction

Sanskrit, perhaps, is the only language which has a large number of finite non-periphrastic desideratives (sannantas). For instance consider, 'He wishes or desires to do' (cikīṛṣati), and 'He wishes or desires to eat' (bubhukṣate). These desideratives are found to be used with the accusatives such as 'cooking' (pākam) in 'He desires to do cooking', (pākam cikīṛṣati) and 'rice' (odanam) in 'He desires to eat rice' (odanam bubhukṣate) etc. When the desideratives are used, the agent (speaker) generally wishes to accomplish an object, and therefore, wishes to accomplish the actions as well. Consider for instance 'pākam cikīṛṣati' and 'odanam bubhukṣate' once again. Here the person wishes to accomplish the cooking and the rice; and therefore, wishes to accomplish the action of doing and the action of eating respectively. Recognising this fact, Pāṇini has assigned the desiderative affix (san) optionally in the sense of the wishing (desiring) after a simple root expressing the (accomplishment of the) action, i. e. the object wished for, and having the same agent as the wisher thereof (p. iii. 1. 7). Thus the desiderative 'cikīṛṣati' in 'pākam cikīṛṣati' can denote the desire to accomplish the action of doing which has the same agent as that of the desire and functions as the object of desire.

A point to be noted here is that Sanskrit allows desiderative constructions such as 'cikīṛṣati' only optionally; and hence periphrastic phrases such as 'kartum icchati' can be freely used to express the same sense of desire as the finite desiderative form 'cikīṛṣati' in 'pākam cikīṛṣati' etc.

Also, it should be noted that Sanskrit restricts the desiderative affixes to the roots which are intended to express the objects of accomplishment; for instance the desiderative affix (san) is used after 'gam' in 'gantum icchati'
= jīgamīṣati as the root ‘gam’ is intended to express only the action of going, the object of accomplishment; whereas the same desiderative (san) is not used after ‘gam’ in ‘gāmanena icchati grāmam’ as the root ‘gam’ is not intended there to express the object of accomplishment. Cit is intended to express the instrument of accomplishing the village.

By far the single most important criterion for the desiderative usage is that the subject (agent) of the verb ‘to wish’ should also be the subject (agent) of the verb denoting the action, the object of accomplishment (samanakartṛka). For instance, consider ‘odanam bubhuksate’. Here the subject of the verb ‘to wish’ is also the subject of the verb ‘to eat’ expressing the action of eating (the rice), the object of accomplishment. Thus, the desideratives ‘bubhuksate’ etc. are not found in ‘Yajñadatta wishes that Devadatta should eat’ (Devadattasya bhojanam icchati yajñadattah) where the subject of the verb ‘to wish’ is different from the subject of the verb ‘to eat’. Also, while the desideratives are found to be mostly used in the sense of desire or wish (icchāyām), the same desideratives are not found used in any other sense such as knowing; thus, ‘kartum jānāti’ is not ‘cikīrṣati’. However, they are found to be used, as an exception, in the sense of doubt or fear of an imminent danger (śankāyām). Thus, when one doubts or fears that the bank is in an imminent danger of breaching down, the desiderative usage ‘śaṅke patiṣyat kūlam = kūlam pipatiṣati’ is found. Lastly but not lastly, desideratives are stems or bases from which primary and secondary derivatives can be formed, and thus ‘nididhyāsitavyah’ is explained.

Problem:

However, epistemologists differed as to whether the accusative-meanings (such as the cooking and the rice) function as the objects of the root-meanings or that of the desire; and also whether the root-meanings, such as the action of doing etc., function as the objects of desire or not. Consequently, different epistemologists have analysed the meanings of the accusative and that of the roots differently. Also, they have analysed the relationships between the accusative-objects and the root-meanings and the relationships between the root-meanings and the desire differently.
Meaning of the Accusative in Desiderative

Grammarians’ theory

Influenced by Pāṇini (p. iii. i. 7), Kātyāyana (Vār, 10, on p. iii. 1. 7) analyses the desideratives such as ‘He desires the doing’ ‘cikṛṣati’ with an infinitive as ‘He desires to do’ (kartum icchati); and holds that the root-meaning such as the action of doing functions as the object of the desire. Also, he opines that the desiderative such as ‘devadattaḥ bubhksate’ is to be understood as ‘Devadatta desires to eat rice by himself’ (devadattaḥ svataḥ bhoktum icchati); and therefore, the root-meaning such as the eating has the same agent as that of the desire (the desiderative is not used when Yajñadatta desires that Devadatta should eat (devadattasya bhojanam icchati). Thus Vārtikakāra suggests a direct relationship between the root meaning such as the action, and the desire.

Now, the grammarians such as Nageśa (Laghumaṇjuṣā, p. 1075) perceive that, when the root-meaning such as the doing is the object (karman) of desire and has the same agent as that of the desire (samānakartṛka), the same becomes the qualifier (viṣeṣaṇa) with respect to the desire, the chief qualificand (pradhāna); and therefore, the same root-meaning, i.e. the action, can be related to the desire through the relations of both the objecthood (karmatva) and the state of having the same agents (samāna kartṛkatva). Further, they perceive that when the root-meaning, i.e. the action qualifies the desire, the latter (desire) becomes the qualificand of the former (action), and the relations will be both the community of locus (sāmānādhikaranya) and the state of having the reference described by the objectness of the root-meaning (viṣayatānirūpita viṣayitva). For instance, consider the usage ‘He desires to make the pot’ (ghaṭam cikṛṣati). Here the desiderative expresses the desire which is qualified by the root-meaning, i.e. the action of doing (making), through the community of locus and the state of having a reference to the objectness described by the objectness of the doing itself. Now, in such cases, the accusative expresses the objecthood to be related to the root-meaning, i.e. the action, directly through describing and to the desire indirectly through the action; and also in such cases the ākhyāta expresses the substratumness; therefore, the cognition produced is that one has the desire qualified by the root-meaning, i.e. the action of doing describing the objecthood resident in the pot.
Accusative-meaning, too, is the object of desire.

It should be observed here that, while the root-meanings such as the action of doing are the objects of desire (icchākarman), the accusative-meanings such as the cooking, too, can function as the objects of desire indirectly through the actions, as they are the objects that one ultimately wishes for. Consider, for instance, ‘pākam cikīrsati’ and ‘grāmam jīgamisati’. Here the cooking and the village, the accusative-meanings, which are the objects of doing and going respectively, function as the objects of desire indirectly through the actions of doing and going, as they are the objects that the agents wish for. Thus, recognizing this crucial linguistic factor, Patañjali (Mahābhāṣya on p. vii. i. 7) has suggested that, while the root-meaning such as the going has one object, namely the village, the desire has two objects, namely the village and the action of going (gamer grāmah karma iṣes tūbhe karmāṇī).

Logician’s Theory

Logicians, especially Gaṅgeśa (Tattvacintāmaṇi, IV) etc. were greatly influenced by Patañjali’s statement that accusative-meanings, too, can function as the objects of desire and so desire has two objects (iṣes tūbhe karmāṇī), and also they were greatly influenced by the semantic fact that in producing the effects such as the cooking, the root-meanings such as the doing function as the means of accomplishment while being accomplished in themselves. Thus, they have analysed the accusative desiderative usages such as ‘He desires to do cooking’ (pākam cikīrsati) as ‘He desires to accomplish the cooking by means of the doing’ (pākam krtyā sādhayati); and have held that the desideratives express the desire that has the root-meaning, i.e. the action, as the qualifier and the accusative-meaning, i.e. the cooking, as the qualificand (object). Also thus, they have held that while the accusatives after ‘pāka’ etc. express the objecthood of the form of qualificandness (viśeṣyatārūpakaramatva) relating to the desire through the describing, the instrumental expresses the instrumentality of the form of the qualificierness of the action that can be related to the desire through the relation of describing the accomplishedness of oneself (svasadhyatvaparakāritā). Thus, one cognizes that one has the desire that has the action as the qualifier and
the cooking as the qualificand from ‘pākam cikirṣati’ etc.

Saundaḍas Theory

However, the problem with such a theory of Gaṅgeśa is that it directly contradicts the grammatical convention that the desiderative suffix is applied after the root expressing the (accomplishment of the) object wished for; and hence the root-meaning, i.e. the action functions as the object of desire. Further, it contradicts the grammatical convention that the kāraka-case-meanings are to be related to the root-meanings such as the actions; and therefore, the objecthood expressed by the accusative ‘pākam’ etc. needs to be related to the root-meaning such as the action of doing in ‘pākam cikirṣati’ etc. Also, suppose such a grammatical convention is not adhered to, then the problem would be that the incorrect accusative usages such as ‘He desires to stay the home’ (grham tiṣṭhāsatī) instead of the correct locative usage ‘He desires to stay at home’ (grhe tiṣṭhāsatī) could be contingent. This is possible on the ground that the desire to stay (as opposed to the staying) can have the home as its object; and hence the objecthood of the home expressed by the accusative (grham) can be related to the desire through describing.

Thus Saundaḍa (Nyāyakośa) proposes that the accusative in ‘pākam cikirṣati’ etc. must be admitted to express the objecthood of the form of objectness of cooking (viṣayatva); and the same can be related to the root-meaning such as the action of doing; and thus the convention that kāraka-case-meanings are to be related to the root-meaning such as the action, gets adhered to. Also, he proposes that the root-meaning such as the action of doing can be held to function as the object of the form of being the object of desire and the same can be related to the desire through the objecthood and the state of having the same agent as that of the desire. Thus one cognizes in such cases that one has the desire that describes the objecthood of the action which in turn describes the objecthood of the cooking.

Now, the advantage of this proposal is that the incorrect accusative usage ‘grham tiṣṭhāsatī’ can be avoided. Since the staying cannot be said to describe the objecthood of the home—it can only describe the locushood of the home—the same objecthood cannot be related to the staying; and thus the accusative usage expressing the objecthood of the home becomes avoided.
Gadādhara’s theory

Gadādhara (Vyutpattivāda, II (ii. 17) was also convinced of the fact that the desiderative cannot express the desire having the root-meaning (such as the action) as the qualifier and the accusative-meaning as the qualificand; and therefore, the accusative-meaning such as the qualificandness of the cooking cannot be related to the desire through describing. Thus, he proposes that the desiderative must be admitted to express the desire having the root-meaning (the action) as the qualificand (kṛtivīṣeyakecchā) such as ‘Let there be the action accomplishing the cooking’ (pāka kṛtir bhavatu). Now, since in such a theory, the accusative is admitted to express only the objecthood of the cooking relating to the action (kṛtikarmatva) and not the objecthood of the cooking relating to the desire (icchākarmatva), the incorrect accusative usage such as ‘grham tiṣṭhāsati’, wherein the home can appear as the object of desire, is avoided.

A point to be noted here is that, in the case of desideratives, the affix must be admitted to be expressing the desire as having the root-meaning as the qualificand (dhātvartvāvīṣeyaka), (it cannot be admitted to be expressing the desire as having the root-meaning as the qualifier dhātvartha’prakāraka) to facilitate the usage ‘odanam bubhukṣate’ wherein the eating of the rice is the qualificand. Also, it cannot be argued that in such a case as ‘odanam bubhukṣate’, only a desire wherein the eating is the qualifier and the rice is the qualificand through the objectness, is understood; for, the same usage ‘odanam bubhukṣate’ is made even when the desire such as ‘odanabhojam bhavatu’, wherein the eating of the rice is cognised to be the qualificand. Further, it should be noted that while the cognitions produced in the active usages such as ‘pākam cikīṣati’ and ‘odanam bubhukṣate’ etc., are that one has the desire referring to the action of doing having the cooking as the object’ (pākādikarmakrtyādi viṣayecchāśrayah) and that ‘one has the desire referring to the eating having the rice as the object’ (odanakarmakabhojana viṣayecchāśrayah), the cognitions produced in the passive usages such as ‘pākah cikīṣyate’ and ‘odano bubhukṣyate’ are that ‘the cooking is the object of the action of doing, the object of desire’ (icchāviṣayābhūta kṛt viṣayah pākah) and that ‘the rice is the object of eating, the object of desire’ (icchāviṣayābhūta bhāvānāviṣayah odanah).
Conclusion:

While desideratives are a common features of all languages for expressing speaker's desire, non-periphrastic finite desideratives are the peculiarities of only Sanskrit. Now, since the primary condition for the desiderative usage is that the speaker must necessarily wish for the accomplishment of an object, the accusatives express the objects wished for in the desiderative usages as in ‘pākam cicīrṣati’ etc. (excepting that nominative expresses recipient of disadvantages) (when the san is used in the sense of fear) as in ‘svā mumūrṣati’ etc.

Also, since the speaker wishes to accomplish an object by accomplishing an action first, the desiderative roots express the actions functioning as the objects of desire. Also, since the speaker wishes to accomplish the object by accomplishing the action by himself, the action and the desire have the same person (speaker) as the agent (samānakartka).

Grammarians, especially Nageśa and others perceived that when the root-meaning such as the action is the object of desire and has the same agent as that of the desire, the same becomes a qualifier qualifying the desire, the qualificand, through the objected (karmatva) and the state of having the same agent (samānakartkatva).

However, the real point of difference among the epistemologists is regarding the function and the relation of the accusative-meanings. Following the Mahābhāṣya statement and general linguistic theory, Gaṇgeśa has proposed that the accusative meanings such as the cooking are the objects and hence the qualificands of desire; whereas the root-meanings such as the action of doing are the means and hence the qualifiers of the desire. However, since such a theory contradicts the general grammatical convention that kāraka-meanings are related to the actions, and also since such a theory cannot avoid the incorrect accusative usages such as ‘grham tiṣṭhāsati’, Saundada and Gadādhara have proposed the theory that the accusatives must be admitted to be expressive of the objecthood relating to the root-meanings (actions) and the same root-meanings are the objects and hence the qualificands of desire. Now, as regards the Mahābhāṣya statement: Patañjali does not deny that accusative-meanings are the objects of the root-
meanings; rather he merely states that when the root-meanings are the objects of desire, even the accusative-meanings, which are the objects of root-meanings, become the objects of desire indirectly. And this view is supported by the linguistic fact that the accusatives associated with the roots such as ‘jnā’ and ‘is’ referring to some objects as in ghaṭam ‘jānātī’ and ‘sukham icchati’ etc., refer to the objectness (viṣayatva) or the chief-qualificandness (mukhyaviśeṣyatva); and hence the accusatives, associated with the desideratives referring to some objects, too, can refer to the objecthood, described by the root-meanings (actions), which can be considered as the chief qualificandness described by the desire.

**Select references**


Joshi S. D. and


Semantic Randomness and the Comparative Method

Henry M. Hoenigswald

1. The prototypical phonological innovations are *mergers*, since by Polivanov's Law, phonemes can merge spontaneously but will split only in conjunction with a merger. In the prehistory of Sanskrit an Indo-European *e* has merged with *o* into a. The merger can be inferred from such facts as that (1) Skt. a will in some words be found to correspond to one Greek vowel (viz. e), while in other words Skt. a will correspond to another Gk. vowel (viz. a). Contrariwise, (2) Gk. h-, word-initially before a vowel, corresponds to a Skt. y- in some words (Gk. hepar, Skt. yakṣt 'liver') but to a Skt. s- in others (Gk. hepta, Skt. sapta 'seven'). In the first case (1) it is Sanskrit that has innovated by eliminating a contrast; in the second case (2) it is Greek (phonetic properties are not at issue; only identities and differences). The languages, we say in such cases, are related.

2. Two related languages may be related in a special way: they may be *ancestor* (or older stage) and *descendant* (or later stage). When (3) one language has all the mergers while the other has none, the second is the ancestor of the first. To the extent that it is true that Sanskrit has only retentions but no innovations when matched against the modern Indo-Aryan languages, Sanskrit is their ancestor. In most—perhaps all—known histories, perfectly pure ancestor languages are not on record, but a collection of all the retentions may always be constructed. The result is known as a *reconstruction*. The process leading to a reconstruction as we have just described it is the *comparative method* (which is not 'comparison' in the ordinary sense but rather a technique to tell phonological innovation from retention).

3. Thus, the German *Traum* 'dream' (with tr-) corresponds to
English *dream* (with *dr*-) , but Ger. *treu* 'faithful' (with the same Ger. *tr*-) corresponds to E. *true* (with *tr*-) ; here German has innovated. On the other hand, Ger. *Schwalbe* 'swallow (the bird)' has *-lb* - while *schwelgen* 'indulge' has *-lg*-. Since both appear in E. in identical shape as *swallow* , English is the innovator here. The two languages continue one common parent language (*'West Germanic'*) which had two different initial consonants in 'true' and in 'dream', and two different internal clusters in the name of the bird and in 'devour, indulge'. Latin and Italian, however, exhibit (practically) *only* instances in which differences in Latin are matched by identities in Italian (e.g. Lat. *crēdit* '[s] he believes' but *uidet* '[s] he sees', with *ē* and *ī*, respectively, against Italian *crede*, rhyming with *vede*); (practically) *never* the other way round. Consequently we regard Latin as the ancestor of Italian².

4. This summary not only omits considerable additional detail; it is also flawed. Take the following case : German *scheinen* 'appear' matches English *shine* but Ger. *Schaum* 'froth' matches E. *scum*. Where German has one and the same *sch*- in both words, English shows a contrast between *sh*- and *sc*- . On the surface the lineup is the same as it is for G. *Traum* and *treu* as against E. *dream* and *true*. Our conclusion from that state of affairs was that German had undergone a sound-change where English had not (see section 3). But this cannot be the case here. Certain *particular* recurrences—we shall call them 'doubles'*—give away the true story. Here is an example : Ger. *Schiff* corresponds to E. *ship* but also to E. *skip* - in *skipper*. The obvious fact that the two are semantically related (almost to the point of synonymy in this instance) shows that we are dealing here with only one earlier morpheme but, as it were, with two channels of transmission. From our extraneous knowledge of the historical setting, we designate the one carrying the *sh* - words as the channel of true descent and the one carrying the *sc* - words as loanwords from another Germanic language such as Dutch or Scandinavian³. To be sure, evidence of this kind is rare; we are not always lucky enough to have any of it.

5. We must now amend our earlier pronouncement. The rule covering *true* and *dream* and their German cognates should be this : if one phoneme (in a given environment) of a language A corresponds to one phoneme of a related language B in one set of words and to another phoneme in another
set of words of randomly different meaning, A is the innovator in that particular respect.

6. In spite of its tenuous character and its precarious standing, this proviso is of uncanny importance. An accident of history has allowed us to lift the veil just a little from a fundamental relationship between the two layers of double articulation, narrow phonological and wide-ranging morphemic structure which will never cease to obsess us. Distinguishing what is distinct is fine, but absolute Manichaean dichotomy is not, and when all is said and done, language is an integral whole.

Annotations:

1. There are others.

2. Something very much like this was in effect said long ago, though it was since forgotten. See Morpurgo Davies 1998 : 169.

"Dialect borrowing is only half the story. There is another body of material to be taken care of before sound-changes can be formulated: analogic formations that look like sound-changes but aren't. These may in theory and under the same lucky circumstances be recognized in the same way as dialect loans, provided there is an added finding that the discrepancy between the doublets they create recurs also in alternants in paradigms (most of them originally created by sound-changes). The requirement of preliminary winnowing-out of non-sound-changes is, in other words, not always just a pious wish." See Hoenigswald 1983.

REFERENCES


The Aurasa Son

Ludo Rocher

“In modern times the courts generally recognize only two kinds of sons, namely *aurasa* and *dattaka*, the other kinds of sons being held to be obsolete.” In fact, the claim that most of the various kinds of sons recognized by the ancient *rśis* had become obsolete is not restricted to “modern times.” It goes back far into the past. According to a verse attributed to Brhaspati, “present-day” people were no longer able to distinguish between the different kinds of sons introduced by the Seers:

\[
\text{anekadā kṛtāḥ putrā rśibhiś-ca purātanaḥ; } \\
\text{na śakyantedhunā kartumā saktahīnair-idantanaḥ. (26.69)}
\]

Yet, the *dharmaśāstras*—including Brhaspati’s—, the commentators, and the modern treatises on Hindu law prior to 1955/56 went on to list and, in many cases, define and discuss 12 different kinds of sons².

Even though the lists of 12 kinds of sons differ in detail³, there are some features which most of them share:

(1) The different kinds of sons are always listed in descending order of importance. Says Nārada:

\[
pūrvah pūrvah smṛtah śreṣṭho jaghanyo yo ya uttarah (13. 47 cd/45cd⁴).
\]

And so does Viṣṇu:

\[
eteṣāṁ pūrvah pūrvah śreyān (15. 28)
\]

(2) Whereas all other sons appear at different places in the several lists, the *aurasa* son invariably occupies the first place. Some texts underscore this position explicitly. Vasiṣṭha’s definition (17. 13; see below) does not include the term *aurasa⁵*, but is followed by *prathamaḥ*. Viṣṇu’s definition
(15. 2; see below) ends: *aurasaḥ prathamaḥ*. And the second half of the śloka in which Manu defines the *aurasa* son (9. 166; see below) reads:

\[\text{tam aurasasāṃ vijāniyāt putraṃ prathamakalpitam (or -kalpakam).}\]

Being *prathama* “first” in a descending line implies that the *aurasa* is also *mukhya* “most important.” Vijñāneśvara introduces Yājñavalkya’s list of sons (2. 128) as follows:

\[\text{adhunā mukhyagaunaputrāṇām dāyagrahaṃ avasthāṃ darṣayisyāṃs tesāṃ svarūpaṃ tāvad āha.}\]

Similarly, Nandapaṇḍita introduces Viṣṇu’s definition of *aurasa* (15. 2): *tatra mukhyam lakṣayati*; and he comments: *prathamo mukhya ity-arthaḥ*. More important in the context of this article is the fact that Nandapaṇḍita subsequently introduces his discussion of the order eleven kinds of sons thus: *atha gaunān lakṣayati*. In other words, the *aurasa* is the single *mukhya* “primary” son; all others are *gaunā* “secondary” sons.

The idea that the *aurasa* son is different from all other kinds of sons is also expressed in another way. According to Manu:

\[\text{kṣetrajādīn sutān etān ekādaśa yathoditān}

\[\text{putrapratinidhīn āhuḥ kriyālopaṅ maniśināḥ | (9. 180)}\]

Whatever the often discussed meaning of *kriyālopaṅ*, it is clear that any one of the other sons is only a *pratinidhi* “substitute” for the *aurasa*. The fact that, and the reason why, substitute sons are allowed only when a father does not have an *aurasa* son appears in a verse attributed to Atri (Dharmakośa, p. 1352):

\[\text{aputreṇaiva kartavyaḥ putrapratinidhiḥ sadā |}

\[\text{piṇḍodakriyāhetor yasmāt tasmāt prayatnataḥ.}^{10}\]

At this point it is necessary to digress for a moment and look at the peculiar position of one of the “substitutes,” the *putrikāputra* “the son of an appointed daughter.” In the lists of sons the *putrikāputra* occupies the second place with Baudhāyana, Yājñavalkya, Brhaspati, and Kauṭilya; the third place with Vasiṣṭha, Śaṅkha-Likhita, Nārada, Viṣṇu, and Yama; the fifth place with Hārīta and Devala; the tenth place with Gautama.
Manu's position is ambivalent. The *putrikāputra* is not mentioned in the list of sons. On the other hand, on two occasions the son's son and the daughter's son (whom most commentators interpret as the son of a *putrikā*) are said to be equal:

\[pautradauhitrayor loke na viśeṣo 'sti dharmaṭaḥ (9. 133ab);\]
\[pautradauhitrayor loke viśeṣo nopaṇapadyate (9. 139ab).\]

Yājñvalkya goes farther, and clearly equates the *putrikāputra* with the *aurasa*:

\[auraso dharmapatiṇijas tattsamaḥ putrikāsutaḥ, (2. 128cd)\]

And so does Kauṭilya:

\[tena tulyaḥ putrikāputraḥ. (3. 7. 5)\]

When Bṛhaspati illustrates what it means to be a *pratinidhi* type of son, he excludes from that category not only the *aurasa* but the *putrikāputra* as well:

\[ājyaṁ vinā yathā tailaṁ sadbhiḥ pratinidhīkṛtam | (26. 78)\]
\[tathaikādaśa putrās tu paṭrikaurasayor vinā. ||\]

What this means is that the rules regarding the *aurasa* son that will be discussed in the remaining pages of this article in the opinion of many also apply to the *putrikāputra*.

The *aurasa* being different from the superior to all other kinds of sons entails that he is entitled to special privileges. Most important are those related to inheritance. Without going into details which are beyond the scope of this study, I will just mention that, according to a number of sources, the *aurasa* alone inherits the paternal property to the exclusion of any other son. According to Manu:

\[eka evaurasaḥ putraḥ pitryasya vasunāḥ prabhuh |\]
\[śeṣānām—ānṛśaṁśyārtham pradadyāt tu prajāvānam || (9. 163)\]

Similarly Bṛhaspati, although again ranking the *putrikāputra* with the *aurasa*:
eka evaurasah pitrye dhane svami prakirtitaḥ |
tattulyaḥ putrikaputro bhartavyās tv apare smṛtāḥ || (26. 70)

Nārada lays down the order in which different kinds of sons inherit as follows:

kramād dhy-ete prapadyeran mrte pitari taddhanam |
yāyaso yāyaso'bhāve jaghanyas-tad avāpnuyāt || (13. 49/46)

Yājñavalkya more generally concludes his discussion of the different kinds of sons as follows:

piṇḍado'nāharaś-caiśāṁ pūrvābhāve parah parah || (2. 132cd)

In view of these and other privileges accorded to the aurasa son, it is important to define exactly which kind of son qualifies as an aurasa. I will now examine the various definitions of the term aurasa in the smṛtis, and the several ways in which the commentators have tried to reconcile the differences.

A number of smṛtis provide remarkably similar definitions for the term aurasa:

(1) Vasiṣṭha:

svayam-utpāditaḥ svakṣetre saṁskṛtāyām (17. 13);

(2) Viṣṇu:

svakṣetre saṁskṛtāyām utpāditaḥ svayam (15. 2);

(3) Manu:

svakṣetre saṁskṛtāyām tu svayam-utpādayed dhi yam (9. 166ab);

(4) Devala:

saṁskṛtāyām tu bhāryāyāṁ svayam-utpādito hi yah (Dharmakośa, p. 1350);

(5) Hārīta :17

sādhvyāṁ svayam-utpāditaḥ (Dharmakośa, p. 1265);

(6) Kauṭilya:

svayamjātaḥ kṛtakriyāyām (3. 7. 4).
All these definitions basically require only two qualifications for a son to be *aurasa*: (1) he must have been sired by his father, and (2) his mother must be his father’s duly wedded wife. Yet, there are other restrictions.

**First restriction**

Except for Kauṭilya, who uses the term *jātah*, all other texts quoted so far include either *utpādayet* or *utpādītah* “sire, be sired.” As a result, some commentators require that the mother must be the father’s duly wedded wife, not only at the time of their son’s birth, but also at the time of his conception. E.g., Kullūkabhaṭṭa (on Manu 9. 166):

\[svabhāryāyāṁ ... kṛtavivāhasamśkarāyāṁ yam svayam-utpādayet\]

That means that, according to Kullūka, a son born after the wedding of his father and his mother, but conceived prior to it, is not *aurasa*.

**Second restriction**

According to some commentators, for a son to be *aurasa* he must not only have been conceived after the wedding of his parents; his mother must also be a virgin at that time. Kullūka’s sentence which I quoted earlier in a truncated form reads:

\[svabhāryāyāṁ kanyāvasthāyāṁ-eva kṛtavivāhasamśkarāyāṁ yam svayam-utpādayet\]

**Third restriction**

At least one *dharmasūtra* explicitly requires that the mother of an *aurasa* son be of the same *varṇa* as his father’s. Baudhāyana’s definition of *aurasa*, although close to the definitions cited above, adds one important word:

\[savarnāyāṁ saṃskṛtyāṁ svayam-utpāditam aurason putram vidyāt\]

(2. 2. 3. 14)

A number of commentators interpret the term *savarnāyāṁ* literally. For instance, Kullūka (on Manu 9. 166) quotes the Baudhāyana text to restrict Manu’s definition of the *aurasa* son:

... *iti* Baudhāyanavacanāt sajātiyāyāṁ-eva svayam-utpādita auraso jñeyah | Among the commentaries that accepted the requirement that the
mother of an *aurasa* son be of the same *varṇa* as his father's is Vijñāneśvara's *Mitākṣara*, which was to become very influential in Anglo-Indian law. While commenting on Yājñavalkya's requirement that the *aurasa* son be *dharma*patnija (2.128a; see above), Vijñāneśvara says:

\[ \text{savarṇā dharma}vivāhoḍhā dharma}patnī; tasyām jāta aurasaḥ putro mukhyah}^{22} \]

Other commentators adopted a more liberal interpretation. Even Vijñāneśvara's own commentator, Bālambhaṭṭa, argues that the term *dharma* in *dharma*patnija, though preventing sons of *pratiloma* marriages to be *aurasa*, does not exclude sons of *anuloma* marriages, including sons of brahmans, kṣatriyas, and vaiśyas by duly wedded sūdrā wives (pp. 538-39)\(^{23}\).

Similarly, Mitramiśra, who most often supports the views of the *Mitākṣara*, in this case criticizes Vijñāneśvara for being inconsistent by excluding the sons of *anuloma* marriages, whom he elsewhere in the *Mitākṣara* declares to be *aurasa*:

\[ \text{“savarṇā dharma}vivāhoḍhā dharma}pati; tasyām jāta aurasaḥ putra” iti Mitākṣara. vastutas tu nedam evam boddhavyām, (1) anulomajānām mūrdhāvasiktādīnām auraseṣv antarbhāvād iti svavacanavirdhadī—na hi te savarṇāyām-uppannāḥ; (2) brāhmaṇādiṣu yesaṁ yena dharma}vivāhas-taduḥhotpannānām aurasa}prasānge teṣu satsv—apy—anyaśām dāyagraha}naprasānga}c-ca (Vyavahārāprakāśa p. 467). \]

At the same time Mitramiśra proposes an interesting way of reconciling the *sṛtis* that require the wife to be savarṇā with those that do not:

\[ \text{utkarṣābhiprayām savarṇābhiprayām}. \]

The idea that a son born to a woman of the same *varṇa* as his father's is a superior (*utkṛṣṭa, prakṛṣṭa*) type of *aurasa* son, but that a son born to a mother of a lower *varṇa* is *aurasa* as well, is formulated even more clearly by Nandapandita (on Viṣṇu 15. 2):

\[ \text{yat tu “savarṇāyām samśkr̥tāyām svayam-uppāditam aurasa}m putram jāniyād” iti Baudhāyanīyam savarṇātvaviśeṣa}nām tad—auraseṣu prakṛṣṭau rasa}prasātrapratipādanāya nānyeśāḥ nirākaraṇāyeti mantavyam}^{25} \]
As one might expect, even among those who accepted the fact that the son born to a duly wedded wife of a lower varṇa qualifies as aurasa, the question arose whether this extended meaning also applies to the case in which the husband was a twice-born and the wife a südrā. The commentators disagree.

Rāmacandra (on Manu 9. 166), without explicitly excluding the son of a südrā, does so indirectly by referring to the aurasa as a dvija:

\[svakṣetre saṁskṛtāyāṁ-udhāyāṁ svayam-upādayed dvijaṁ tam aurasanit putram... vijāniyāt\]

In its comment on the term savarnā at Āpastamba 2. 2. 3. 14, the Pārijāta (as quoted in the Vyavahāraprakāśa, p. 468) is willing to extend the meaning of the term to include any dvija female married to any dvija male—it is not clear whether or not both anuloma and pratiloma marriages are included, but for the son of a südrā his father to be aurasa

\[savarnātra dvijasya dvijā südrāsya südrā na tu brāhmaṇasya brāhmaṇī kṣatriyasya kṣatriyā vaiśyasya vaiśyā. anyathā brāhmaṇādipariṇīta-kṣatriyādiputranāṁ dvādaśa-vidhaptaraṁtvāṁ na syāt\]

In the passage from the Mitākṣara where Vijñāneśvara includes sons of anuloma marriages among the aurasas, and, therefore, allows them to claim the entire inheritance prior to any other kind of sons, he immediately follows up by declaring that sons born of a südrā wife, though aurasa, do not enjoy that privilege:

\[sūdrāputras tv auraso'pi kṛtsnam bhāgam-anyābhāve'pi na labhate\]

Aparārka agrees, and adds a reason why this is so:

\[dharmanāt-sabdāna südrā vyāvartate, tasyāḥ sahadharmacāritvābhāvat.\]

Bālambhaṭṭa, on the contrary, in the passage quoted earlier, holds that patnītvāṁ mukhyam-avivakṣitam-iti südrāpi tādṛśi dvijānāṁ (p. 538).

Nandapaṇḍita (on Viṣṇu 15. 2) deals with this problem at length. He first mentions an objection to the effect that the son of a südrā cannot qualify
as an aurasa, because the šaudra is listed among the “substitutes” for the aurasa (putrapratidhitvena tasya gaṇanam) at Manu 9. 160.²⁷ Nandapaṇḍita retorts that the šaudra who is made a substitute (pratiniḥdhiṇiṇī) by Manu is not a son born to a duly wedded śūdrā woman, but to a śūdrā who is not his father’s wife. And he concludes that nothing prevents the son born to a male dvija by his duly wedded śūdrā wife from being aurasa:

tasmād uḍhāyām śūdrāyām utpannasyaurasatve na kiṃcid bādhakam |

This brief survey of the various definitions of the term aurasa in the smṛtis and of some of the ways in which the commentators have tried to reconcile the differences clearly shows that the concept of an aurasa son in Hindu legal literature is far more varied and complex than the English “legitimate son,” the term which is most often used to translate it.

Annotations:

1. P. V. Kane: History of Dharmaśāstra, vol. 3, p. 657. Kane refers to Nagindas v. Bachoo (1916) 43 I. A. 56, 57, and adds: “But two more kinds of sons have been recognized in modern times in certain provinces only, namely the kṛtrima in Mithilā (modern Tirhut) and the putrikāputra among the Nambudri brāhmaṇas of Malabar.” For details, see Ibid., pp. 659 and 660.

2. In only very few smṛtis is the number of sons different from 12: Baudhāyana (2. 2. 3. 31-33) and Brhaspati (26. 70-74) list 13, Devala (Dharmakośa, vol. 1, p. 1373; all references to the Dharmakośa are to vol. 1: Vyavahāarakāṇḍa) 15. The view that these were merely apparent deviations from the number 12 is clearly expressed by Nandapaṇḍita (on Viṣṇu 15. 2): yat tu Brhaspatinā “putrās trayodāsa proktā Manunā ye 'nupūrvaśa” (26. 77ab) iti trayodāsatvam, Devalena ca “putrākhya daśa pañca ca” iti pañcadasaṭatvam-uktam, tad avāntarīyabhedam-ādāya nātyantabhedeneti na virodah, teṣāṁ apy atrāntarbhāvāt |


4. The first verse number refers to Jolly’s Nāradasmṛti edition (1885), the second to Lariviere’s (1989).

5. The term aurasa does occur elsewhere in the text, in connection with the share of an adopted son in case an aurasa is born after the adoption: tasmiṁs (=
The Aurasa Son
dattake) cet pratigrhita aurasaḥ putra utpādyate caturbhāgabhāgi syād dattakah (Vasiṣṭha 15. 9).

6. Baudhāyana (2. 2. 3. 33) quotes the opinion of Aupajanghani to the effect that the aurasa is the one and only true son: teṣāṁ prathama evety-Aupajāṅghaniḥ, on which Govindarāja comments: Aupajāṅghaniḥ-ācāryo manyate-sma aurasa eva putro na putrikāputrādaya iti.


8. Eg., Vyavahāraprakāśa, p. 480 : kriyālopaḥ pariṇayādikriyālopaḥ ity arthah. kriyālopaḥ iti pratinidhitve hetuḥ | Smṛticandrikāyām tu “aurasābhāve tatkārīkaśrāddhādilopaḥ bibhyato maniśina rṣaya ekādaśa putranidhin kartavyatvenāhur” iti vyākhyātam |

9. Immediately after the list of 12 kinds of sons Manu (9. 161) exhibits the following simile : 

   yādṛśaṁ phalam-āpnoti kuplavaṁ saṁtarāṇ jalam |
   tādṛśaṁ phalam-āpnoti kuputraṁ saṁtaraiṁs tamaḥ ||

   Whether or not the term kuputra was originally meant to refer to “bad” sons generally, as opposed to “good” sons, the commentators agree that kuputra here refers to any son who is not an aurasa. E.g. Kullūka : kuputraṁ kṣetrajādibhiḥ |

10. Cf. a verse attributed, among others, to Yama (Dharmakośa, p. 1352) :

   aputreṇa sutah kāryo yādṛk tādṛk prayatnataḥ |
   piṇḍodakakriyāhetor-nāmasaṅkīrtanāya ca ||

   Jolly’s interpretation of the existence of other sons than the aurasa : “originally an economic motive was perhaps a more important factor in it—to get for the family as many powerful workers as possible” (Law and Custom, p. 156), was dismissed by Kane (op. cit., pp. 648-49) and Mayne (op. cit., p. 114). Kane and Mayne refer to the fact that only in the absence of an aurasa son substitute sons could be recurred to. Both also agree that the lists of 12 different kinds of sons were due to “the systematizing habit of Sanskrit writers” (Mayne), or to “the ancient writers’ great penchant for divisions and sub-divisions based upon very slight differences of circumstances” (Kane).
11. Vasiṣṭha (17. 15) lists the putrika rather than the putrikāputra: tṛtiyāḥ putrika vijñāyate.

12. In the enumeration of sons attributed to Devala (Nandapāṇḍita on Viṣṇu 15. 27; cf. Dharmakośa, p. 1373: smṛtyantaram) putrikāputra occupies the fifth place, putrikā the second.

13. For an interpretation of this unusual and extreme position at Gautama 28. 33, see, e.g., the Mitākṣarā (on Yājñavalkya 2. 132): Gautamiye tu pautrikeyasya daśamatvena pāṭho vijñāyaviṣayāḥ.

14. Hence Brhaspati’s statement (26. 77) that Manu recognizes 13 kinds of sons:

putrāṃ trayodaśa proktā Manunā ye’nupūrvvaśaḥ |
saṁtānākāraṇāṃ teśām aurasah putrika tathā ||

Cf. also Mayne (op. cit., p. 107): “Manu mentions the aurasa and the appointed daughter’s son as of equal status and then mentions the aurasa and the eleven secondary sons, altogether, thirteen sons.”

15. The Mitākṣarā comments: tatsamaḥ putrikāpuraḥ tatsama aurasasamāḥ putrikāyāḥ sutah putrikāsutah, but also adds an alternative interpretation based on Vasiṣṭha 17. 15 (cf. note 11): athavā putrikaiva sutah. so’py-aurasasama eva pitravayavānāṁ alpatvān mātravayavānāṁ bāhulyatvāc-ca.

16. I must mention in passing that some commentators offer etymological explanations for the term aurasa. For instance, the Mitākṣarā (on Yājñavalkya 2. 128) says that aurasa means uraso jātaḥ; cf. Aparārka (on the same verse): urasi bhāvaḥ. Hence the translation of aurasa as “son of the body.” According to Rāghavānanda (on Manu 9. 166), svayam-udvāhitāyām urahsaṁśleṣaṇājātattvād aurah; kṣetraje tadabhāvo Nāradokto “gātrair gātrāṇy asaṁsprśann” (12. 82d/81d) ity ādinā |

17. As far as we know from the fragments collected by Jolly (Munich, 1889), Hārīta does not use the term aurasa.

18. Nevertheless, in Pedda Amamni v. Zamindar of Marungapuri (1874) 1 I. A. 282, 293, the Privy Council decided that the fact that a son was conceived prior to the wedding of his parents does not prevent him from being a “legitimate” son. “That would be a most inconvenient doctrine. If it is the law that law must be administered. Their Lordships, however, do not think that it is the Hindu Law. They are of opinion, that the Hindu Law is the same in that respect as the
English law." This decision drew strong criticism from Gooroodass Banerjee: "with every respect due to the decision of the highest tribunal for India, I may be permitted to say that the doctrine of procreation in lawful wedlock is necessary to constitute legitimacy, is not only supported by the language of the texts cited above, but is also in accordance with the general spirit of the Hindu law, by which the nuptial rites are primarily meant only for girls [note: Manu 8. 226]; while the necessity of marrying girls before puberty, reduces the practical inconvenience of the doctrine within the narrowest possible limits." (Marriage and Stridhana, 3rd ed., 1913, p. 166).

19. Although Kullūka does not say so explicitly, he may have been influenced here by several smṛti texts which require that a bride be ananyapūrvā "not having belonged to another man." Cf. Yājñavalkya 1. 52 ananyapūrvikā, Āpastamba 2. 6. 13. 1 apūrvā, etc.

20. One might be tempted to read the same requirement into Āpastamba 2. 6. 13. 1-4, were it not that Āpastamba's is the only text that is brief and vague on the subject of sons, to the extent of not mentioning any of the 12 kinds of sons by name. Yet, Āpastamba distinguishes between two types of sons: (1) sons begotten on a woman who is savarṇā, apūrvā, and sāstravihitā, and (2) sons by a woman who is pūrvavatī, by one who is asaṁskṛtā, and sons begotten varṇāntare maithune. The privileges of the first type of sons (teṣāṁ karmabhīh sambandhāḥ, dāyenāvatītaramaś-ca) have been differently interpreted. In the second case there is doṣa on the part of the father (or the parents?), and, more important, the son (tatrāpi doṣavān putra eva). Based on Pañini 5. 3. 14, according to which the suffix -tra in tatra can have other meanings than that of the locative, Haradatta interprets the latter sentence as follows: tābhyaṁ-ubhābhāyam-api putra evātītasyena doṣavān. This seems to indicate that for Āpastamba and, even more so for his commentator Haradatta, the son of an asavarṇa marriage did not qualify as an aurasa.

21. Similarly, Sarvajñanārāyaṇa (on the same verse): svakṣetre svasavarṇaṁkṣetre.

22. The term dharmavivāhodhā may imply that, in Viṣṇuṇeśvara's opinion, the parents' wedding must have been one of the "higher," not one of the "lower" types of wedding. Cf. Viśvarūpa's Balakṛṣṇa (on the same verse): savarṇā brāhmādīvivāhasaṁskṛtā dharmapatiṇī.
23. References to the Bālambhaṭṭī are according to the Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series (work 41) edition.

24. This is a reference to a passage in the Mitākṣara (on Yājñavalkya 2. 132cd) where Vijñānesvara includes sons of anuloma marriages among the aurasas and, hence, makes them inherit prior to all other kinds of sons: anulomajānāṃ mūrdhāvasiktādīnāṃ aurāsēv antarbhāvāt teṣām-apy-abhāve kṣetrajādīnāṃ dāyaharatvam boddhavyam |


26. Note that a number of smṛti texts list the son of a sūdrā wife separately, invariably at or near the end of their lists.

Sāra, A-sāra, Sam-sāra

Minoru Hara

These three words do not appear in consecutive order with prefixes a- and sam- as indicated above in the title, but appear usually in the order asāre saṁśāre sāra. The phrase is apparently intended to show the poetical device of alliteration (anuprāsa).

The phrase without the last word sāra, that is asāra saṁśāra, means “the current of transmigration (saṁśāra), destitute of solid essence (a-sāra),” and thus is imbued with a pessimistic tinge, peculiar to the Hindu religion of asceticism and renunciation. A few examples suffice to illustrate this:

(0-1) asāro ‘yaṁ saṁśāraḥ/giri-nadī-vegopamaṁ yauvanam/ trṇāginisamam jīvitam/abhra-cchāyā-sadṛśā bhogāḥ/svapna-sadṛśaḥ putramitra-bhṛtya-kalatra-varga-sambandhaḥ ||

(PPT. Book 1, tale 4, p. 23, lines 18-21).

“Essenceless is this world of transmigration. Youth is comparable to a rapid current in a mountain. Life is equal to fire on grass. Enjoyments are like clouds. Association with son, friends, servants and wife is like a dream.”

(0-2) aho asāro ‘yaṁ saṁśāraḥ/kṣaṇa-bhaṅgurāḥ prānāḥ/svapnasadṛśāḥ priya-samāgamah/indrajālavat kuṭumba-parigrahah/tad dharmāṁ muktvāṁ ē gatir nāsti ||

(PPT. Book 3, tale 3, p.190, lines 6-8).

“Oh, essenceless indeed is this world of transmigration. Life is instantly breaking. Meeting with dear persons is like a dream. A family is like a magic. Thus, there is no way other than (practising) meritorious acts.”

(0-3) bhogās tuṅgatarāṅgabhaṅga-cupalāḥ prānāḥ kṣaṇa-dhvaṁsinoḥ stokāny eva dināṁ yauvana-sukham prītiḥ priyeṣv asthirā tat saṁśāram
asāram eva nikhilaṁ buddhāv buddhā bodhane lokānugraha-peśalena manasaṁ yatnaḥ samādhiyatām ||

(IS. 4634)

“Enjoyments are unsteady like the breaking of billows. Life perishes in a moment. The happiness of youth lasts only a few days and love with one’s beloved is unstable. Oh, wise men, having realized the whole world of transmigration as essenceless, an effort should be made for enlightenment with your mind skilled at helping people.”¹

With the addition to this of the word sāra (essence), the phrase is endowed with a positive value, meaning “something solid or essential (sāra) in this ephemeral world of human existence.” An oft-quoted passage of the Pañcatantra reads,

Ananta-pāram kila śabda-śāstrāṁ
svalpaṁ tathāyur bahavaś ca vighnāḥ |
sāraṁ tato grāhyam apāsya phalgu
hamśair yathā kṣīram ivāmbu-madyāt ||

(IS. 243)

“Verbal science is shoreless(ly extended), life is short and beset with many obstacles. Thus, one should grasp the essential, leaving the essenceless, as geese extract the milk out of water (mixed).”²

But, the content of the word sāra here varies in accordance with the nature of the contexts in which it occurs. It is, then, an interesting task to collect the passages which contain the phrase and investigate their contexts, analysing what is meant by the word sāra in each and every context. This analysis will show what is considered by the ancient Indians to be the most valuable thing in human life, and eventually reveal some aspects of the Hindu view of life in general.

Though material will be multiplied in the course of further extensive reading in Sanskrit texts, here is presented the result of modest gleanings from classical Sanskrit literature which may encourage more competent scholars to further comprehensive and systematic studies in the future.
I

(1) *asāre saṁsāre*...

In addition to the three passages quoted above, we have the following examples.

(1-1) The essencelessness of the world of transmigration is often compared to the interior of a plantain tree (kadalī):

\[\text{Asāraḥ saṁsāraḥ sārāsa-kadalī-sāra-sadṛśo}^3\]
\[
\text{lasad-vidyul-lekhā-cakita-capalam jīvatam idāṁ |} \\
\text{Yad etat tāruṇyāṁ naga-gata-nadī-vega-sadṛśam} \\
\text{āho dhārṣṭyāṁ puṁsāṁ tad api viṣayāṁ dhāvati manāḥ | |} \\
\text{(MSS. 3734)}
\]

"Essenceless is the world of transmigration as a juicy stem of a plantain tree. Human life is shaky and unsteady like a momentary lightning flash. Youthfulness is similar to the rapids of a mountain-stream. Oh, men's impudence, that their mind still runs after (the enjoyment of) sense-objects."

(1-2) An expression *asāra ghora-saṁsāra* is found in an address to Viṣṇu by Garuḍa:

\[
\text{Bhagavan devadeveśa śaraṇā-gata-vatsala |} \\
\text{*asāre* ghora-saṁsare sarva-duḥkhā-malimase | |} \\
\text{(Pretakalpa 16.2)}
\]

"O Lord, the master god among gods, compassionate to those who seek refuge in this essenceless, terrible world of transmigration, stained by all sorts of suffering."

(1-3) In this ephemeral world, meeting ends in separation.

\[
\text{Asāre bata saṁsāre karma-tantraḥ śarīriṇāṁ |} \\
\text{jāyante priya-saṁyogā viyoge hṛdaya-chidāḥ | |} \\
\text{(MSS. 3743)}
\]

"In this essenceless world of transmigration, the thread of karma is interwoven through human beings. Union with one's beloved becomes heart-rending at separation."
(1-4) We have a verse tinged with a pessimistic and deploring tone.

Asāre sāṁsāre viśama-viṣa-pāke nrpa-sukhe
kṛtāntenācānte prakṛti-capale jīvita-bale |
Ohruvāpāye kāye viṣaya-mṛgarṣṇāhata-hṛdāh
kṣara-prāṇaiḥ prāṇān ahaha parīmuṣṇanti kudhiyāh ||

(MSS. 3744)

“In this essenceless world of transmigration, where even the happiness of kings eventually develops into vehement poison, where life-power, fickle by nature, is sucked away by death, and where the body is subject to sure annihilation, fools, whose mind are carried away by the mirage of (the enjoyment of) sense-objects, hurt their life by flowing breaths.”

(1-5) It is, then, a vain effort to look for happiness in this world. It simply ends in delusion:

Asāre khalu sāṁsāre sukha-bhrāntiḥ ĺaririnām |
lālā-pāṇam ivāṅguṣṭhe bālānām stanyā-vibhramah ||

(MSS. 3742)

“In this essenceless world of transmigration, people conceive a delusion of happiness, as babies falsely consider the playful sucking on their thumbs as sucking their mother’s breasts.”

(1-6) An Epic passage, then, recommends a wise man to abandon it:

Janma-mṛtyu-jarā-vyādhi-vedanābhir upadrutam |
asāram imam avantam sāṁsāram tyajataḥ sukham ||

(MBh. 12.9.33=Hitopadeśa 4.87)

“By abandoning this essenceless and unpleasant world of transmigration, which is beset by the anguish of birth, death, old age, and illness, one becomes happy.”

(1-7) Thus, a certain idea came into the mind of a wealthy merchant Dhanana one day, which led him to renunciation:

evam sakala-sampadām āśrayasya tasya cetasi sarva-vastusv anitya-buddhir utpannāḥ: kim iti, sāṁsāro ‘yam asāraḥ: sarvam api vastu-jāṇam anityam
(Vikramacarita Southern Recension of 7, p.78. lines 16-18)

"Though he was thus endowed with all good fortune, there arose in his heart a consciousness of the transiency of all goods: 'How now! unprofitable is this round of existence, and the whole mass of objects of wealth is transient.'"

(Edgerton)\textsuperscript{8-9}

(1-8) One should always think of \textit{asāratā} of \textit{samsāra}:

\begin{verbatim}
Kāharniśam anucintyā samsārasāratā na tu pramadā |
Kā preyaśi vidheyā karunā dākṣīnyam atha maitrī ||
\end{verbatim}

(IS. 1717)

"What should be thought of day and night? Essencelessness (asāratā) of the world of transmigration (samsāra), but not women.

What should be taken to be the dearest? Compassion, skilfulness and friendliness."

\textbf{II}

(2) \textit{asāra} (niḥsāra) and \textit{sāra}.

(2-1) \textit{asāra} and \textit{sāra}.

Prior to considering \textit{asāre samsāre sāra}, it is convenient to examine passages where the two words, \textit{asāra} and \textit{sāra}, are contrasted.

(2-1-1) The best known example is found in the Pāli Dhammapada.

\begin{verbatim}
Asāre sāra-matino\textsuperscript{10} sāre cāsāra-dassino |
te sāraṁ nādhigacchanti micchā-saṅkappa-gocarā ||\textsuperscript{11}
Sārān ca sārato āṅtvā asārān ca asārato |
te sāram adhigacchanti sammā-saṅkappa-gocarā ||
\end{verbatim}

(Dhammapada 12)

"Holding the essential in the unessential, and seeing in the essential the unessential, they fail to reach the essential, their judgement being subject to error.

Knowing the essential as the essential and the unessential as the unessential, they reach the essential, their judgement being subject to right."\textsuperscript{12}
(2-1-2) Two things are contrasted as asāra and sāra. One is recommended to take sāra out of asāra. In the Pāli “Kaṇha-jātaka” we read,

Asārassa dhanassa dānam sāro, bahu-roga-sādhāraṇa-bhāvena asārassa kāyassa sīlavantesu abhivādanādi-kammaṃ sāro. aniccatābhībhūtassa asārassa jīvatassa aniccādīvasena vipassanā-yogo sāro. tasmā asārehi bhoghei sāra-gahaṇattham dānam dassāmi | (Kaṇhajātaka 440, J. 4. 7. 23-27)

"Charity is the essence of essenceless wealth. Such actions as respectful greeting to the virtuous, and other things are the essence of body, essenceless because of its being the receptacle of various diseases. The essence of life, essenceless because of its being subject to transitoriness, is one’s application to insight by means of transitory(-ness) and others (dukkha and anattā ?). Thus, I practise charity in order to get the essence from essenceless enjoyment."

(2-1-3) We have a Sanskrit verse in a similar tone:

Dānam vittād ṛtaṁ vācaḥ kīrti-dharmau tathāyuyṣaḥ |
paropakaraṇam kāyād asārāt sāram āhare | |
(IS.2750)

"Man should take from the essenceless the essence; from wealth charity, from speech the truth, from life fame and merit, from the body altruism.”

Here the sāra-s are the act of giving (dāna), truth (ṛta), fame (kīrti) and religious merit (dharma) and altruism (paropakarana), while the asāra-s are wealth (vitta), speech (vāc), life (āyus) and body (kāya).

(2-2) niḥsāra and sāra :

(2-2-1) The contrast of wealth and charity is further emphasized:

Dhanasya niḥsāra-laghoḥ sa sāro  
yad diyate loka-hitonmukhena |  
nidhānatāṁ yāti hi diyamānam  
adīyamānam nidhanaika-niṣṭham ||
(JM. 2. 50)

"Wealth is a contemptible thing, because it is pithless, yet it has one
virtue, that it can be given away by him who aims at the welfare of the creature; for if given away, it becomes a treasure, otherwise its ultimate object is only death.”

(Spieijer)

(2-2-2) The human world (mānuṣya) is styled as essenceless (niḥsāra). A man, who seeks after the essence there, is deluded:

Mānuṣye kadalī-stambha-niḥsāre sāra-mārgaṇam |
yah karoṭi sa saṁmūḍho jala-budbuda-saṁnībhe ||

(YS. 3. 8=IS. 4823)

“He, who seeks after the essence in the essenceless world of human beings, comparable to the stem of the Kadali tree and to foam in water, is a fool.”

(3) Sāra and saṁsāra

(3-1) In the Kuṭṭanīmata, the courtesan Mālatī is called saṁsāra-sāra, the essence of the world of transmigration:

Śithilayatu kusama-cāpaṁ kṣipatu śarān vāṇadhau manojanmā saṁsāra-sāra-bhūtā vicarati bhuvī mālatī yāvat ||

(Kuṭṭanimata 121)

“Let the god of love unstring his flower-bow and place his arrows in his quiver, as long as Mālatī, the essence of the world of transmigration, roams over the earth.”

IV

(4) asāre saṁsāre sāra

Despite its essencelessness, there exists something essential, what is indicated here by the word “essence” (sāra) is nothing but the most valuable object in human life. Below, we shall investigate this.

(4-1-1) The first sounds economico-practical:

Asāre khalu saṁsāre sāran ā śvaśura-mandīram |
Haro Himālaye āsete Viṣṇuḥ ā sete mahodadhau ||

(IS. 776=MSS. 3739-40)
"The essence of the essenceless world of transmigration is the house of one's father-in-law. Śiva reposes in the Himālaya and Viṣṇu in the Ocean."

(4-1-2) The second sounds erotic, sāra being "woman." In his reflections, king Vikramāditya says:

tan mahat kaṣṭam kṛtvāpi saṁsāra-sāra-bhūtaṁ stri-sukham eva bhoktavyam, uktam ca

Asāre khalu saṁsāre sāram sāraṅga-locanā
tad-arthaṁ dhanam icchanti tat-tyāge tu dhanena kim | 16
asāra-bhūte saṁsāre sāra-bhūtā nitambini
iti saṁcintya vai śambhur ardhāṅge kāminīṁ dadhau || 17

tad Vikramārko rājātra samāgataḥ: tam ekaṁ agrahāram yācayitvā
cām cana kanyāṁ vivahya saṁsāra-sukham anubhaviṣyāmi ||

(Vikramarācita 6 Story Southern Recension) (p. 74, lines 5-12)

"Therefore even at the expense of great trouble one should certainly enjoy the pleasure of (the love of) women, a happiness which is the cream of this round of existence. And it is said:

'In this unprofitable round of existence, the best thing of all is a gazelloe-eyed woman. For her sake men seek after wealth, and without her what is the use of wealth? In this unprofitable round of existence, the best thing of all is a fair hipped woman. It was with this thought in mind, I ween, that Śambhu took his beloved upon his lap.' 18

Now King Vikramārka has come hither. So I will beg of him a donation of land, marry some girl, and engage in worldly pleasure..."

(Edgerton)

(4-1-3) Gamblers consider gambling as sāra. A gambler addresses king Vikrama as follows,

Tasmād asāre saṁsāre sāram dyūta-sukham, yato 'syayayapraśthanāṁ
yogino 'pi kurvanti (Vikramarācita Jainistic Recension of 27, 4 prose, p. 200)

"Therefore in this unprofitable round of existence, the cream of all is
the joy of the play, so that even ascetics cherish the desire to become absorbed in it.”

(Edgerton)

(4-1-4) The plighted word is called the sāra :

\[ Sāṁsāre śāratāśāre vācā sāra-samuccayā | \]
\[ vācā vicalitā yasya sukṛtam tena hāritam || \]

(Vikramacarita Brief Recension of 24, p. 183, lines 20-21)

“In this wholly unprofitable round of existence (a plighted) word is the only thing of importance. Whosoever breaks his word loses his acquired merit.”

(Edgerton)

(4-1-5) Renunciation is recommended. He who seeks vainly after sāra in sāṁsāra is betrayed and resorts to detachment (vairāgya), renouncing the world :

\[ Sāṁsāram eva niḥsāram dṛṣṭvā sāra-didṛkṣayā | \]
\[ pravrajanty akṛtodvāhāḥ param vairāgyam āsritāḥ || \]

(Nāradaparivrājaka Upaniṣad 3. 0. Schrader ed., p. 139, lines 2-3)

“Seeing that sāṁsāra is truly without substance, people are imbued with intense detachment and, desirous of seeing the substance, renounce while they are still unmarried.” (Olivelle)

(4-2) Though the following passages do not contain the word sāra as such, what is meant there has a similar purport.

(4-2-1) Corresponding to (4-1-2) above, which praises the enjoyment of women, we have a verse in the Mālatīmādhava, where the hero condemns a murderer of Mālatī, considering his beloved as if sāra. We notice that in the case of Bhavabhūti the tone is much more serious than Vikramāditya!

\[ Aśāramī sāṁsāramī parimūṣita-ratnam tribhuvanam | \]
\[ nirālokam lokam maraṇa-śaraṇam bāndhava-janam || \]
\[ adarpaṁ kandarpaṁ jana-nayana-nirmāṇam aphalam jagaj jīrṇāryaṁ \]
\[ kathāṁ asi vidhātum vyavasitaḥ || \]

(Mālatīmādhava 5. 30)
“How did you decide to make this world of transmigration deprived of essence, the three-worlds of a jewel, the shining world of light, her kinsfolk of hope to live, the god Kāma of pride, the creation of human eyes of fruit, and to make the world like a weathered forest?”

(4-2-2) Corresponding to (4-1-5) above, we have a verse in the Prabodhacandraodaya, which praises detachment (vairāgya):

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Asāre sanśāre} & \text{ virāsa-parināme tu viduṣāṁ} | \\
viyogo vairāgyam draḍḥayati vitanvaṁ śama-sukham | |
\end{align*}
\]

(Prabodhacandraodaya 5.28cd)

“On the contrary, in this essenceless world of transmigration which develops eventually into tastelessness, separation strengthens detachment in the case of the wise, manifesting the happiness of tranquillity.”

(4-2-3) Friendship is also considered as the sāra of sanśāra. The hardship of living in this world is rewarded by one’s association with good people, especially a person who knows the right thing (ucita-jña).

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{citresu pathiṣu caratām kvacid ucita jñāḥ sa ko’pi sarśhatate yena śamam} & \\
\text{sanśāratām sanśāra-paraśrāmāḥ saphalaḥ} | |
\end{align*}
\]

(Vikramacarita, Jainistic Recension of 20 verse 8, p. 158)

“Sometimes by chance those who wander on random paths meet with some man who knows what is truly fitting; and if they wander through life with him, the toil of their existence becomes fruitful.”

(Edgerton)\(^{19}\)

(4-2-4) The following verse sounds cultural, sāra being the elegant taste of “poetical composition (kāvya-karaṇa).”\(^{20}\)

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Asāre sanśāre} & \text{ sumati-śaṇe kāvya-karaṇe} \\
yatheṣṭam ceṣṭante kati na kavayaḥ sva-sva-rucayaḥ | \\
pāraṁ dugdha-snigdham madhura-racanam yas tu vacanam \\
prasūte brūte vā bhavati viralaḥ ko ‘pi sāralah | |
\end{align*}
\]

(MSS. 3745=Vikramacarita p. 235 verse 14)

“There are many poets, each brilliant in his own way, who busily themselves at their own pleasure with the art of poetry, which is the refuge
of the wise in this unprofitable round of existence. But it's rare to find some genuine poet, who can produce or speak milk-sweet words, exquisite in composition.”

(Edgerton)

(4-2-5) Some also sound philosophical and altruistic:

Samsāre kim sāram bahuṣo’pi vicintyamānam idam eva |
manuṣeṣu drṣṭa-tattvam sva-para-hitāyodyatam janma ||

(IS. 6639)

“What is the essence of the world of transmigration? Thinking of this problem again and again, then (he finds) only this. Once born among human beings, (one should) see the truth and make an effort for the good of himself and others.”

(4-2-6) Similarly, genuine judgement (sattvikī buddhi) is called the valuable object which is hard to find in this essenceless world of transmigration. In the reflections of king Vikramāditya it is said:

Asāre khalu samsāre vartamānasya dehināḥ |
tattvataḥ sattvikī buddhir jāyate durlabhā yadā ||

(Vikramacarita 30th story, Metrical Recension p. 213, lines 11-12)

“When genuinely pure consciousness, so hard to obtain, is produced in a mortal who dwells in the truely unprofitable round of existence…”

(Edgerton)

V

(5) Occasionally, two things are called sāra in asāra-samsāra.

(5-1) Wealth (vibhava) and a son (tanaya) are called sāra-s.

Samsāre ’smin dvayam sāram vibhavas tanayo’pi ca |
tenaikaikena hīnasya janmino janma niśphalam ||

(IS. 6640)

“In this world of transmigration, the following two are its essence: wealth and a son. If destitute of one of them, one’s birth is fruitless.”

(5-2) Worldly success (śrī) and women (stṛ) are enumerated, with the
intention of showing the poetical skill of alliteration.

rājan, asāre samsāre sāra-dvayam aham manye, śrīḥ strī ca
(Vikramacarita 30th story Jainistic recension, p. 216, lines 12-13)

"O, king, in this essenceless world of transmigration, I think the following
two are its essence; success and women."

(5-3) The essential two are expressed in a different way, philosophical
insight (tattva-jñāna) and women:

Samsāre’sminn asāreparināti-tarale dve gati pāṇḍitānām
tattvajñānāmrtāmbhahpla-valulita-dhiyām yātu kālāḥ kadācit no cet
mugdhānānānām stanajagahanaghanābhoga-sambhoginīnānām
sthulopasthasthalīṣu sthagita-karatatalasparśalodyāmānām ||

(IS. 6642)

"In this essenceless world of transmigration, transient after all, two
(things) are the resort of the wise. Time should pass for those wise ones,
whose minds are shaken on the raft on the water of ambrosia styled as
knowledge of truth."

Otherwise one should enjoy women." (too erotic to translate)

(5-4) Four things are considered as sāra in a more religious context.

Asāre khalu samsāre sāram etac catuṣṭayaṁ
Kāśyāṁ vāsaḥ satāṁ saṅgo Gaṅgāmbhaḥ Śaṁbhū-sevanāṁ ||

(IS.778)

"The essence of the essenceless world of transmigration is the four
things: residence in Kāśī, association with the good, the water of the Ganges
and the serving of Śiva."

VI

The contrast of sāra and asāra is not limited to the world of
transmigration (samsāra), but is further extended to the body (sarīra), which
is also ephemeral. The wise man seeks to find something contributive (sāra)
by means of this unprofitable (asāra) body. This construction is met
particularly frequently in the context of self-sacrifice for the sake of others.
(6-1) A Brahmin boy decided to offer himself in order to save the life of the king, persuading his parents as follows:

Tad etenätyasārena sukṛtaṁ yad upārjyate |
tad eva sāram saṁsāre kṛta-buddhibhir ucyate ||
(KSS. 94. 107)

“So wise men say that the only solid and permanent thing in a fleeting universe is that merit (sukṛta) which is acquired by means of this very frail and perishable body.” (Tawney and Penzer)

(6-2) In Buddhist texts which relate the self-sacrifice of the Bodhisattva, we often meet passages of a similar purport. In the story of Jīmūtavāhana who decided to sacrifice his life to save Śaṅkhacūḍa, we read:

Ity uktvā sa mahāsattvo hṛdi cakre manoratham |
apy asārena dehena sāram atrāpnuyām aham ||
(KSS. 90. 111)

“When the noble-hearted one had said this, he formed this wish in his heart: May I obtain the one essential object in this world by the sacrifice of my unsubstantial body.” ²⁴

(6-3) In the story of the great monkey, who tried to save a man with no regard for his own body, the monkey addresses the man as follows:

Ehi prṣṭham mamāruhya sulagno 'stu bhavān mayi yāvad abhyuddharāmi tvām svadehāt sāram eva ca | (11)

Asārasya šarīrasya sāro hy eṣa mataḥ satām |
yat paresāṁ hitārthesu sādhanī-kriyate budhairḥ ||
(JM. 24. 12)

“Come, climb upon my back and cling fast to me, while I bring out both thee and the usefulness of my body.

For the pious pronounce this to be the usefulness of the body, otherwise a worthless thing, that it may be employed by the wise as an instrument for benefitting our neighbour.” (Spejer)

The Mahāyāna Buddhist texts which speak of the great deeds of the Bodhisattva are full of these stories. ²⁵
VII

To sum up the result of our investigation.

Though the contexts we have dealt with above are not always uniform, some being comical and others rather serious, we may classify them in several categories:

(1) Some are economic and practical, the sāra being the house of the father-in-law (śvaśuṇa-mandira), and a son (tanaya).

(2) Some are secular: sāra being wealth (vīhbava) and success (śṛī).

(3) Some are hedonistic and erotic, sāra being gambling and women (śṛī).

(4) Some are philosophical, sāra being philosophical insight (tattva-jñāna and sāttviki buddhi).

(5) Some are moral, sāra being to keep one’s promised words.

(6) Some are cultural, sāra being poetical composition (kāvya-karana).

(7) Some are religious, sāra being detachment (vairāgya) and serving gods.

(8) Some are social, sāra being association with good men (satāṁ saṅga).

(9) Some are altruistic, sāra being serving others (para-hita, paropakarana).

We notice here that those items which we have picked out of the examples mostly correspond to the Hindu ideals of human life puruṣārtha (trivarga, or caturvarga), that is, dharma, artha, kāma and mokṣa. Furthermore, this idea of finding sāra in asāra saṁsāra is akin to that of janma-sāphalya (fruitfulness, or the significance of birth as a human being).26

Annotations:
1. Cf. asāro saṁsāro bhaṅgurarāṁ sarīraṁ, sāray’abbha-vibbhamaṁ jīviyaṁ taḍi-vilasiyāṅgāri jovaṇaṁ, kimpāga-phalovamā bhogā... (Jacobi p. 14, lines 21ff.) janma-maraṇa-roga-soga-pauro asāro saṁsāro (Jacobi p. 35, lines 34ff.)
Though not directly construed with each other, the following passages are
worthy of attention:

aho aniccayā saṁsārassa, asārayā sarīrassa (Jacobi p. 27, lines 21)

jao asārā pariṇāma-dāruṇa saṁsāra-paribhamaṇa-heū kāmabhogā (Jacobi p. 3, line 38-p. 4, line 1)

For kāma as asāra, Cf. also Saundarananda 15. 11 (asārān...kāmān)

2. Cf. IS. 245 (yat sāra-bhūtam tad upāsanīyam)

3. For kadali-sāra, Cf. also Mahommagga-jātaka (546) 91 (yathā kadalino sāram anvesam). Cf. also (546) 92 (simbalino sāram) and note 8 below.

4. In the following passage, saṁsāra is replaced by mānuśya (human world) and asāra by niḥsāra:

mānuṣye kadali-stambha-niḥsāre sāra-mārgaṇaṁ  ||
yāḥ karoti sa sammūḍho jala-budbuda-saṁnibhe  ||

(IS. 4823)

5. Cf. saṁsāre 'sminn asāre kunḍati-bhavana-dvāra-sevā-kalaṅka-vyāsaṅgadhvastadhairyam kathām amaladhiyo mānasam saṁvidadhyuḥ  |

(IS. 664lab)


7. Cf. MBh. 12. 177. 45 (asāram iva mānuṣyam...)

8. Cf. also

Asāra-saṁsāra-vivartaneṣu mā yāta toṣaṁ prāsabham bravimi  |
sarvatra daisyās samatām upeta samatvam ārādhanaṁ acyutasya  ||

(Viṣṇu Purāṇa 1. 17. 90)

buddhāv niḥsāratāṁ saṁsārasya (Kādambari p.315, line 9)

lty evam smaratas tasya babhūva niyatātmanah  |
kadali-garbha-niḥsārah saṁsāra iti niścayaḥ  ||

(Buddhacarita 14. 6)

For the expression kadali-garbha-niḥsāra (essenceless as the pith of a plantain
tree), Cf. MBh. 12. 287. 16c (martya-loke) and kadali-stambha-niḥsāra, Cf. IS. 4832. Cf. also note 2 above.

For the expression saṁsāre 'sāra-sāgare, Cf.
Indrajālam aham manye saṁsāre 'sāra-sāgare |
kartā ko 'tra mahābāho sarvaṁ vada mama prabho ||
(Garuḍa Purāṇa Uttarakaṇḍa 22. 4)

9. In the following passages, the word saṁsāra is replaced by loka, jagat, etc.

niḥsāram paśyato lokaṁ toya-budbuda-durbalam |
(Saundarāṇanda 15.63ab)

Yataś ca lokaṁ saṁajanma-niṣṭharṁ |
paśyāmi niḥsāraṁ asac ca sarvam ||
(Saundarāṇanda 18. 17ab)

asāram avsantam aniṣcitam jagaj jagaty anitye balam avyavasthitam
(Saundarāṇanda 9. 16cd)

Paumaraha-rāyā vi muṇiūṇa asārattam jīva-loyassa
(Jacobi p.46, line 30)

10. The first part of the verse is quoted in Mahāyāna-sūtrālaṃkāra (ed., by S. Levi vi p.82) with a hidden, and enigmatic meaning (abhisāṁdhi)

Asāre sāra-matayo viparyāse ca sushhitāḥ |
kleśana ca susāṅkliṣṭā labhante bodhim uttāmām ||

Here, asāra is used in the sense of samādhī and sāra in the sense of visāraś cetasaḥ=vikṣepa. Cf. also E. Lamotte. La Somme du Grand Vehicule d’Asanga (Mahāyāna-saṁgraha) II (Louvain 1973) p.132. I owe this reference to M. Hattori.

11. Cf. also asāre sāra-yogaññū matim na tv-eva vindati |
sārabho va giri-duggasmim antarā yeva sidati ||
(Haṁsa-Jātaka 502.24)

12. Cf. Udānavarga 29.3-4,

Asāre sāra-matayah sāre cāsāra-saṁjñīnaṁ |
te sāram naḍhigacchanti mithyā-saṁkalpa-gocarāḥ ||
sāram tu sārato jñātvā hy asāram cāpy asārataḥ |
te sāram adhigacchanti saṁyak-saṁkalpa-gocarāḥ ||

13. There are two verses which recommend charity:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{dhānasya niḥśāra-laghoḥ sa sāro} \\
yad diyate loka-hitonmukhena \\
\text{nidhānatām yāti hi diyamānam} \\
adīyamānaṁ nidhanaika-niśṭham \\
\end{align*}
\]
(JM. 2. 50)

\[
\begin{align*}
evāṁ ca ye dravyam avāpya loke \\
mitreṣu dharme ca niyojayanti \\
avāpta-sārāṇi dhanāni teṣāṁ \\
bhraṣṭāni nānte janayanti tāpam \\
\end{align*}
\]
(Buddhacarita 11. 5)

14. Cf. also its variant in

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Dānam arthād ṛtam vācaḥ kīrti-dharmau ca cetasaḥ} \\
deḥāt paropakāritvam asārāt sāram uddharet \\
\end{align*}
\]
(Cāṇakya-rāja-nīti-śāstra 8.25)

15. Though in a different context, the contrast of sāra and asāra is found in the following passage.

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Tad etad avagamyāham asārām sāram uttamaṁ} \\
niśāmaya mahābhāga pranipatya bravīmi \\
\end{align*}
\]
(Viṣṇu Purāṇa 1. 19. 42)

\[
\begin{align*}
varam alpa-balām sāram na bahvi muṇḍa-maṇḍali \\
kuryād asāra-bhaṅgo hi sāra-bhaṅgam api sphuṭam \\
\end{align*}
\]
(IS. 5966)


17. Cf. MSS. 3737

18. Cf. also,

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{rājā sansārodāra-sāra-sukha-mayaḥ samājani} \\
\text{(Jainistic Recension, 1, prose p. 77, line 11)} \\
\text{tan mayā labdhāṁ sansāra-sukham maugdhyena muktam} \\
\text{(Jainistic Recension, 2, prose p. 77, line 1)} \\
\end{align*}
\]

19. Cf. also,
Sarīṣāra-viso-vrksasya dve phale amṛtopame |
kāvyāṁṛta-rasāsvāda ālapah sajjanaḥ saha ||
(IS. 6636)

Sarīṣāra-śrānta-cittānāṁ tisro viśrānti-bhūmayaḥ |
apatyam ca kalatram ca sādhu-saṁgatīr eva ca ||
(IS. 6637)

Snigdhair mugdhair vidagdhaśe ca yad āryais saha saṁgatīḥ
etad evāyusah sāraṁ nisarga-kṣaṇa-bhaṅginaḥ ||
(Cānakyā-rāja-nīti-śāstra 7.67)

20. Cf. also, kāvyāṁṛta-rasāsvāda of IS.6636 as quoted in the note 19 above.

21. Cf. also,

Anityatāvyanusṛtāṁ karma-cchidrasasaraṁśayāṁ ||
ätta-sāram karisyāmi kathāṁ nemāṁ sārasvatīm ||
(Mātṛceta Satapaṁcāśatakā 6)

Poetical composition is called “the epitome of existence” by Jayadeva who uses the word bhava-sāra in place of sarīṣāra-sāra.

Śri-jayadeva-kaver idam uditam udāram
śrīnu sukhadam śubhadam bhava-sāraṁ ||
kesava dhṛta-daśa-vidha-rūpa
jaya jagad-iṣa hare ||
(Gitagovinda 1.15)

22. Three things are also enumerated in a similar context.

Sarīṣāra-śrānta-cittānāṁ tisro viśrānti-bhūmayaḥ |
apatyam ca kalatram ca sādhu-saṁgatīr eva ca ||
(IS. 6637)

23. The body is often styled as asāra. For example,

Saṁucchrayaṁ tadvaṁ asāram udvahan
balaṁ vyavasyed viṣayārtham udyataḥ (10cd)
śaṁraṁ āmād api mṛn-mayaṁ ghaṭād
idāṁ tu niḥsāratamaṁ mataṁ mama ||
(Saundarānanda 9. 11ab)
24. Cf. also,

Tad enam ekam ārtam ced dehenakānta-nāśinā |
  rakṣāmi nāmunā nāgāṃ tan me dhig janma nispalam ||
  (KSS. 90. 130)


  aham ātta-sārah kālam kariṣyāmi......(SS. p. 20, line 2)
  asāraḥc-ccharīrāt sāradānābhīprāyya... (SS. p. 23, line 13)
  asārāt kāyāt sāram ādātu-kāmo... (SS. p. 26 line 2) (BB text)

  avahastena dānam dadāti asārāt kāyāt sāra-saṁgrahārtham |
  (Divyāvadāna p. 482, lines 6-7)

  bhavanād iva pradīptān nimajjamānād ivāpsu ratna-nidheḥ kāyād vidhāna-
  nidhanād ye sāram nādhigacchanti te sāram apaśyantah sārāsāreṣv
  akvidāprajñāḥ te maraṇa-

  makara-vadana-praveśa-samaye viṣidanti |
  (Divyāvadāna p. 384, lines 4-7) (BB text)

26. I had an occasion to collect and discuss the passages of janma-sāphalya in
  Japanese in 1972 (Ancient Indian Concept of Destiny pp. 25-78)
Abbreviations and Texts used in this article are as follows:

BB : Bibliotheca Biddhica
HOS : Harvard Oriental Series (Cambridge, Mass.)
IS : Indische Spruche, by O. Böhtlingk 1-3 (St. Petersburg 1870-3)
J : The Jātaka, ed., by V. Fausbl (PTS. text)
JM : Jātakamālā, ed., by H. Kern (HOS 1, third ed. 1943)
KSS : Kathāsaritsāgara of Somadevabhaṭṭa (NSP. 1930)
MSS : Mahāsubhāṣītasāṅgraha by L. Sternbach (Hoshiarpur 1974-)
MBh : The Mahābhārata (Poona Critical Edition)
NSP : The Nirṇaya Sagar Press (Bombay)
PPT : The Pañcatantra of Pūrṇabhadra, ed., by J. Hertel (HOS 11,1908)
SS : The śikṣāsaṃuccaya
YS : Yājñavalkya-smṛti (NSP. 1949)
Jacobi : Ausgewählte Erzählungen im Māhārāṣṭrī (Leipzig 1886).
Buddhacarita : Text ed. by E. H. Johnston (Lahore 1936)
Kādambarī : NSP. 1921.
Kuṭṭāṇīmata : Bibliotheca Indica 266 (Calcutta 1944)
Nāradaparivrājaka


Prabodhacandrodaya : NSP. 1935.

Pretakalpa : The Garuḍa Purāṇa (Sāroddhāra) Sacred Books of Hindu 9 (Allahabad 1911)

Saundarananda : Text ed., by E. H. Johnston (Oxford 1929)

Vikramacarita : Text ed., by F. Edgerton (HOS 27 1926)

Viṣṇu Purāṇa : Text ed., by the Gitapress, Gorakhpur (date not given).
Ānandavardhana’s Contribution to Research Methodology

C. Panduranga Bhatta

The aim of research is to advance over the knowledge already possessed in a subject. The ancient Indian teacher was expected to make his student superior to himself in the acquisition of the stock of knowledge. This is proven by the ancient Indian saying ‘śisyāt parābhavamīchet’ (A teacher should invite defeat at the hands of his students). By preparing students superior to what he himself was, the teacher in Ancient India was expected to effect the progress of his branch of knowledge. Ancient Indian thinkers encouraged the dissemination of knowledge, as is evident in the following verse;

अपूर्वः कोषष्ठि कोषोष्ठि विद्वानो तव भारति।
व्ययतो वृद्धिमात्रात् क्षयमात्रात् संचय्यात्।

It may be said that the contribution of knowledge may be either by discovering new truths as such or by revising and correcting the existing knowledge of truths and thereby presenting the known truths in a new light.

The history of Sanskrit poetics bears ample evidence of how each successive thinker has taken off from the point at which some previous thinker has left the state of knowledge, either by adding to it or by revising it. The search for the ultimate reality in the field of the Sanskrit poetics led to the emergence of various concepts. Each concept regard one or the other aspect as the soul of poetry. This process of evolution over the centuries marks clear advancement in formulating norms of evaluation of the poetic composition, from gross to more subtle aspects. Ānandavardhana was a great poet of both Sanskrit and Prakrit and he had the first hand knowledge of the poetic process. He was well versed in the tenets of Vedānta, Tarka, Mīmāṃsā,
Vyākaraṇa, and Buddhism. He demonstrated the inadequacy of the ancient principles of criticism for a proper estimate of literature.

Ānandavardhana’s dhvani-theory marks a clear advancement in the evolution of the concept of poetry. He investigates into the inner spirit which he finds in the suggestive power of word (vyañjanā) and suggestion (dhvani). All theories of Alāñkāra, Guṇa etc., formulated by rhetoricians of the past are confined to an elucidation of the beauty of the vācyā element alone. Thus real philosophy of poetry, which is concerned with the soul, begins at the point where the early theories end. This paper attempts to analyse the research methods adopted by Ānandavardhana in his Dhvanyāloka.

(a) Introduction

The introduction given by Ānanda explains in detail the nature and importance of the problem proposed to be discussed. The introduction given by him is:

काव्यस्यात्मा ध्वनितिः बुध्येऽः समामातूर्वः-
स्तत्स्याभावं जगद्योरे भान्ति महुतमयं।
केचिद्वां रिथतमविशये तत्त्वमुच्यसंदीयं
तेन बृहम्: सहद्यमण: प्रोत्तये तत्त्वरूपमहूः।

The earlier poeticians believed that the field of poetry had been exhaustively explained by the well-known categories of Alāñkāra etc. and there was no scope left for propounding any original theory like Dhvani afresh, the philosophers denied the validity of the theory of Dhvani on logical grounds, and laymen simply asserted that Dhvani was a thing beyond their comprehension. The whole of the Dhvanyāloka, containing as it does the definition, classification and illustration of dhvani, as also the clear lines of demarcation between dhvani and other concepts, presents a long and sound response to the charge of poeticians and others that dhvani was a superfluous and meaningless concept. This is made clear in the introduction. In his introduction Ānanda also states that the ‘dhvani’ is the quintessence of the poetry of all master poets and is the most beautiful in itself, though undetected and left unexplained by all the writers on poetry in the past. But it is widely instanced in great works like the Rāmāyana and the Mahābhārata: तत्त्व हि
ध्वने: स्वस्यं सकलस्यकविकायोपिनिषद्भूतभूतसत्तत्त्वसीमीथिरपि चरतकायायलक्षणविधाविनाम्
Only the experience of a tasteful reader can decide whether something is genuine poetry or not and not the pronouncements of theorists. The connoisseur of poetic art plays an important rôle in Ānandavardhana’s scheme of poetry. He was the first to assign such an important rôle to the poetic reader (Sahāradaya or Sāmājika). Ānanda mentions all these points in his introduction and hence we can say that the introduction found in his work sets the trend for the rest of the work and it stimulates reader’s interest besides helping the reader to have the whole work in perspective.

(b) Chapter Division and Headings

The chapters in the Dhvanyāloka represents stages in the arguments of the work, each stage resting on a distinct class of data. Ānanda has maintained some measure of uniformity in the size of the chapters. The Dhvanyāloka contains four chapters called Udyotas (Flashes). The first chapter deals with all the objections, assumed as well as real, that may possibly be brought against the validity of the theory of Dhvani. The charges made by the followers of different schools of Philosophy, Grammar and ancient poetries, are all shown here as baseless. After this Ānanda gives a definition of Dhvani and a clear explanation of the various terms involved in the definition. He also gives a brief indication of the major varieties of Dhvani, their relative importance and their relation to the other concepts. In the second chapter he proceeds to enumerate the sub-divisions of Dhvani, and to bring out the peculiarity of each of them with the aid of striking examples. He also precisely defines the province of each of the several concepts like Guṇa, Rīti and Alaṅkāra. The third chapter deals with various fundamental factors related to the the process of composition. Very interesting research relating to the theme, style, characters and propriety are all found here. He also discusses here the various degrees of excellence in poetry. In this chapter Ānanda gives for the first time detailed rules on the following:

(1) The relation of phonetic patterns of diction (Saṅghaṭanā) to the psychological theme of rasas.

(2) The canon of propriety which decides the success or failure of a
(3) Deterrents of rasa.

(4) Opposition and harmony between rasa.

In the fourth chapter he explains how the province of poetry is never completely exhausted even when the subject of poem happens to be one and the same thing for a number of poets. In this chapter he also makes interesting comments about the predominant sentiments of the Rāmāyaṇa and the Mahābhārata.

This division of the Dhvanyāloka into four chapters is more arbitrary than logical. Instead of any exclusive consideration of the different aspects of Dhvani in the different chapters, we find all the topics running into each other in every chapter. On this K. Krishnamoorthi observes; “Ānanda’s treatment of all the various topics in the Dhvanyāloka may be said to be conditioned by his attitude towards Rasa. If, amidst all the mass of Ānanda’s scattered speculations, we are still able to recognise a running thread, it is entirely due to his steady and systematic appraisal of Rasa as the highest goal in poetry.4

The plan adopted by Ānanda in his treatment of Dhvani is very well brought out by Abhinavagupta in his Locana : उक्तव्यति नीतिः ‘यत्रार्थः शब्दो च इति’ सामान्यलक्षणं प्रतिपादित्तम्। वक्तमण्या तु नीतिः विशेषलक्षणं भविष्यति ‘अर्थांतरे सक्रमितम्’ इत्यदि । तत्र प्रथमोद्वारे च्यते: सामान्यलक्षणः कार्यीकारणं क्रृतम् । द्वितीयोद्वारे कार्यीकारणोऽवान्तविभागं विशेषलक्षणं च विद्वदद्वाद्युक्तेन मूलविभागं सूचितवादेष्ट।

The whole of the first chapter is concerned with a general exposition (Sāmānya laksana) of Dhvani. The general definition itself is contained in the Kārikā "‘यत्रार्थः शब्दो च तमार्थपुरस्वार्जीकृतत्वायेऽ” etc.6

While all the preceding Kārikās lead up to it, the succeeding ones follow from it. But the specific treatment (विशेषलक्षण) of the types of Dhvani in poetry is to be found only in the following chapters, from the point of view of Vyaṅgya in the second chapter and from the point of view of vyaṇjaka in the third chapter.

The procedure adopted in the Dhvanyāloka is as follows; first the author states the theory in nut-shell, then examines it in all its implications, and
finally sums up the main results of his investigation in a memorable verse. The bare essence of the theory is given in about 120 kārikās. Ānanda avoids all details and debates in the kārikā portions reserving them all for his prose vṛtti or gloss. The vṛtti is a supplement of the kārikā. It supplies illustrations and offers explanations, it adds new material and answers objections, both actual and anticipated. The remarkable observations made in the vṛtti portion are summed up in the form of memorable verses called parikara-ślokas. Thus the method adopted by Ānanda for presenting the results of his investigation is very sound and novel.

(c) Relevance of Research to Contemporary Society

Ānanda built a new structure of poetic theory on the foundation of the thought of his predecessors namely Bharata, Bhāmaha, Udbhaṭa and Vāmana. For the first time in the history of Indian poetics he asked basic questions relating to aesthetics and semantics and answered them systematically like a philosopher.

Ānanda was both a poet-critic and philosopher of the first rank, a fact which is evidenced by one of his verses cited in the vṛtti on Dhvanyāloka, III.44

या व्यापारस्विति रसानू सतितुं काचित्कवीनां नवा हस्तिं धारितमयितात्थविषयोमेषा च वैपित्तिति ।
ते दै अयवलम्ब्य विश्रमिनिं निर्वर्णिणयनो वचों
श्रात्ता नैव च लघुभधिश्चण त्वद्विंतित्वम् सुखम् ॥

Ānanda defines poetry as combination of word and sense that imparts aesthetic pleasure to the refined reader; सहदयोद्याहारिद शक्तांभमयचेत अध्यक्षत्वम्। His Dhvani-theory makes a clear advancement in the evolution of the concept of poetry. He investigates into the inner spirit which he finds in the suggestive power of word (Vyañjanā) and suggestion (Dhvani). He recognised powers of word namely (i) Abhidhā that gives literal sense, (ii) Lakṣāṇā that gives secondary sense. He thought that these two were not adequate to give the complete meaning of poetry and hence he has accepted the meaning of poetry and hence he has accepted the third power of word called Vyañjanā which gives deeper sense.
For the first time in Indian literary criticism Ānanda propounded the fundamental principle of aesthetic judgement namely "चार्त्वार्तविनिबन्धना हि वाच्यायुक्तव्यः: प्राधान्यविच्छेदः." In all poetry, there will be two elements: the plainly stated and the suggested. The literary critic's judgment is involved in deciding which is relatively more prominent. The criterion for such judgment is provided only by his aesthetic impression of the two. That which strikes him as more beautiful will decide his characterizing it as Dhvanikāvya or Guṇībhūta-vyaṅgya. In spite of so much discussion of the nature of poetry by language philosophers, theoreticians, and rhetoricians, there is very little of practical criticism in Sanskrit poetics. Such applied criticism is available to some extent for the first time in the work of Ānanda.

According to Ānanda, it is not consistent with propriety to describe love in its vulgar form, in the case of divine characters. Though Ānanda criticises this in his Dhvanyāloka he is moderate in his remarks on this literary flaw. According to him, this poetic blemish does not become patent in Kālidāsa as it is submerged by the artistic beauty of the description; महाकवीनामयुपत्कृतमयुतंदेवताविषयभ्रदब्धसंभोगः निबन्धनात्याचिच्छिन्यं शक्तिलिङ्गः कुमारसंभवे देवीसमयोगवर्णनम्।

Thus the adverse criticism raised by Ānanda against Kālidāsa paves the way for a glowing tribute to his extraordinary genius. This appears revolutionary in the light of the dogmatic approach of other poeticians who, following the traditional method, ignore or decry such tendencies in the literature of the period.

Ānanda says that, in the Mahābhārata, Mokṣa is depicted as the foremost of human values and Śānta as the predominant sentiment. At the end of the war, Yudhīṣṭhīra was in the dejected mood, and, being unable to derive any pleasure in victory, hankered after quietude and final emancipation. The self-realization on the part of Yudhīṣṭhīra, the vibhāva of Śāntarasa in the epic, is testified by the following verse. He says, fie on the usages of Kṣatriya, fie on might and valour, fie on wrath, since through these such a calamity has overtaken us;

धिगस्तु क्षत्रात्मारां धिगस्तु बलमृष्णम्।
धिगस्तवर्ष चेनमायायं गमिता बयम्।
Thus the *Mahābhārata* clearly shows that human nature ultimately pines for tranquility and peace. It further emphasizes the futility of war or violence as a means of attaining artha, kāma, and dharma. The *Mahābhārata* offers us an alternative method, which is self-realization through the control of human desire. To a world, which is seeking desperately for an alternative to war and violence, the poem seems to offer a solution. Again it is Ānandavardhana who gave this remarkable interpretation of the epic poem for the first time. All these issues investigated by Ānandavardhana were not only relevant to his own contemporary society but they will remain relevant for ever.

(d) Citations and References

In discussing different problems regarding the Dhvani theory, Ānanda cites about 150 passages. Of these many verses are from the works of eminent poets like Kālidāsa, Amaruṇa, Bāṇa, Mayūra, Śrīharṣa, Dharmakīrti, Bhaṭṭanārāyaṇa, and others. In his efforts to propound his own theory of poetry by probing into its form and structure, he has drawn upon the evidence of his own experience as a poet; अस्माधिरायपम्बेल्षु काव्यप्रबन्धेशु यथायं दर्शितमेव।

It may be pointed out here that Ānanda had no false modesty and did not refrain from citing a few of his own verses, too, as illustrations.

Again, Ānanda for the first time gives us, in Indian poetics examples of literacy analysis. Unlike his predecessors he cites a large number of illuminating examples from the best writers in Sanskrit literature and discusses with insight the reasons for their appeal to a man of taste. It may be observed here that citations made in the *Dhvanyāloka* serve the definite purpose and they are not cited for the sake of filling space or for displaying author’s erudition. Some citations themselves form the subject of discussion and others lend support to author’s own argument.

(e) Style

Ānanda avoids making tall claims about the importance of his findings and slighting the work of other researchers in the same area. At one place Ānanda says that he has nothing but respect for the work of the ancients; and that he will utilize the same wholeheartedly;
Ananda has avoided strong language while criticizing others and this is instanced in the following:

अस्फुटसपुरितं काव्यतत्त्वमेतत्तत्त्वोदितम् ।
अश्ववनुविज्ञानकर्तुर्तीतिः सम्प्रवर्तिताः।

Those who were unable to explain properly this essential principle of poetry as they had only a glimmer of it, have brought into vogue the theory of styles.

At one place Pūrvapakṣin says that he cannot understand the reason why persons should close their eyes under the self-assumed illusion of being ‘perceptive critics’ and dance about with joy saying that they have discovered dhvani therein; ध्वनिनिर्देशितं यदेवदलोकसाधनाधिकार्यानमेकुलकलालोचनेनृत्ये तत्र हेतु न विचः।

For this Ananda says that the enthusiasm of persons imbued in their minds with the value of suggestion is quite proper. None need display jealousy to show somehow that they are all men of deranged minds; न च तेषु कथसिद्धीध्वना कलुकमशेषेशुपुष्पध्वनिकल्याध्विष्राग्नीयम्।

At another place Pūrvapakṣin asks ‘will quality of forcefulness ever arise from words without the texture of long compounds?’ औरेजस: पुनः
कथमनवितसखनुकंशदाश्रयत्वम् न हासमासं सख्नता कदाचित्रोजस आश्रयतां न विचः।

For this Ananda very politely replies: ‘if your mind is possessed by the ghost of blind faith in convention, we cannot say anything. Otherwise, we will ask you why it should not be so? उच्चवते यदै न प्रसिद्धमात्रागहुतितं चेतिसद्यापि
न न बूम: । औरेजस: । कथमसामस्या सख्नता नाश्रयः।

Ananda avoids labouring the obvious and supplying the elementary information on the subject. He says:

दिद्रान्तर तूच्छते तेष व्युष्टानाम सङ्केतसाम् ।
सुद्रिष्णादितात्लोका सर्वस्वेश भविष्यति।
Refined critics can be educated even by a mere indication of the direction. With their enlightened minds they will guess aright everywhere. Ānanda contented himself with indicating the broad types of Dhvani-varieties. He says that innumerable varieties of Dhvani were possible;

एवं ध्वने: प्रमेदा: प्रभेदपदार्थ केवल शब्दयन्ते ।
संख्यातु दिस्माते वेतानिद्वद्वप्रमणात:।¹⁹ ॥

It may be pointed out here that Abhinavagupta gives 9940 varieties whereas Mammata’s figure is 10455. But when we see the preponderance of minute classification and subtle hairsplitting arguments in the Dhvanyāloka we may feel that Ānanda has wasted his energy on matters insignificant in respect of literary criticism. But we must not forget that Ānanda is an ancient writer living in an age when the whole atmosphere was permeated with a love for philosophical argument and logical subtlety.

Ānanda refrains from illustrating the blemishes seen in the works of great poets. He feels that a loud exposure of the defects of great men who have the bright light of a thousand good sayings about them would amount to a censure of the critic himself; सूक्ष्मसहस्राण्यितात्मनान् महात्मनं दोषोद्योगणात्मनं
एव दूषणं भवतीति न विभवज्य दशितम्।²⁰ ॥

Ānanda’s foremost aim was to establish the existence of the pratīyamāna sense. About the function which was required to convey that sense, opinions might differ—he himself has acknowledged this and on his part he thought vyañjana or suggestion as the most logical and convenient way of revealing that sense: वाचकत्वमणावृति व्यतिरिक्तो व्यञ्जकत्वलक्षण: शब्दव्यापारो उस्ति-
इत्यस्माभिरपुण्यगतम्। तत्त्व चेतनिन्य न काचित्त्व श्रवति:। तद्वद् व्यञ्जकत्वं लिङ्क्वमठस्तु अन्यद्वा
प्रसिद्द शब्दप्रकारलक्षणान्यं शब्द व्यापारविषयतच तत्त्वार्थिः-इति नात्येववायोविवादः।²¹ ॥

On the whole, the style of Ānanda is very similar to the style adopted in the research works of modern days.

Conclusion

The conclusion of Ānanda recalls to the reader the claim made in the introduction and then, on the basis of the whole argument of the work, it reiterates in summary form the findings and this restatement highlights the soul of the argument in his work. Ānanda in his conclusion says that the
theory of principal suggestion has been propounded thus for in all its bearings with the view to clearing up conflicting opinions; एवं ध्वनि संप्रदायिक विप्रतिपत्तिनिरसार्थ स्तुत्यात तद्व्युष्यादेन प्रयोजनानात्सप्तयते ॥

He also explains the other practical uses to which such a theory might be put. According to him, endless of creative imagination in poets will be another outcome of the theory of principal and subordinated suggestion.

He says in his conclusion that he has shown in poetry the presence of dhvani or suggestion so that it may prove a source of enjoyment to sublime souls even like magnificent wish-fulfilling tree;

काव्यायत्र सौंत्राय विषम्कर्यन्ति ध्वनि निविन्दित:  ॥
सोदयो कल्यातीत मानानां भोग्योकतु भव्यात्मनाम् ॥

He further says that the true nature of the essence of good poetry was but dimly discerned and remained asleep as it were, all along, even in the minds of men with mature intelligence. It has now been set forth at length in order that it might wake-up once again in refined critics.

सवाज्ञात्वत्तत्ववलय विशालिम्
कल्प मनस्तु, वरिष्ठं विद्यामति ॥
तद्व्याख्यातो अहिंलो यदास्ति
राजन्दर्वर्धन इति प्रतिपादितानि: ॥

Like a true research work, instead of stopping the controversy about literary theories once and for all time, the Dhvanyāloka gave a fresh impetus for discussions with a greater zest. Later poetsicians of repute like Mammaṭa, Viśvanātha, Vidyānātha, Vidyādharā and Jagannātha simply accepted the Dhvani-theory as the last word in Indian poetics. Even independent writers, who differed from Ånanda, found it impossible to ignore him. In fact, Kuntaka, Mahimabhaṭṭa, Rājaśekhara and Bhoja have all restated as it were the essentials of the new theory itself by adopting different terminologies. Ånanda is recognized as the greatest authority in the field of Sanskrit poetics by Jagannāthapāṇḍita. He noted: ध्वनिकृतां आलंकारिकस्मयोग्यस्थापकम् ॥

Ånanda’s Dhvanyāloka sums up and explains all the previous speculations on the subject. It makes the end of the old school of criticism and heralds the birth of a modern school, modern in style, in theory, and in approach.
Annotations:

1. Subhāṣitaratnabhāṇḍāgāra, p. 29.
2. Dhvanyāloka, I.1.
3. Ibid., before I.2.
5. See Locana on Dhvanyāloka I. 19.
7. Ibid., p. 22.
8. Ibid., p. 124.
9. Ibid., p.-274: शान्तो रसो स्सान्तर्तः, योज्यलक्षणः पुरुषार्थः पुरुषार्थान्तर्तः।
10. Mahābhārata, "Śānti", 7.5.
13. Ibid., III. 46.
15. Ibid., p. 28.
16. Ibid., p. 122.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid., II. 14.
19. Ibid., III. 45.
20. Ibid., p. 70.
21. Ibid., III.
22. Ibid., IV Udyota beginning.
23. Ibid., after IV. 18.
24. Ibid.,
Ecological Awareness in Indian Tradition

(Specially as Reflected in Sanskrit literature)

Leela Arjunwadkar

Ecology is a relatively new science that concerns itself with the inter-relationship of organisms and their environments. Paradoxically enough, it owes its existence to the amazing progress man has made in certain branches of science during the last 50 years. The span and stride of this progress is so great that it is threatening the very survival of man. And hence an awareness for ecological balance gained momentum all over the world. So ecological awareness, per se, is of very recent origin. ‘Put an end to the destructive progress and use of science. Love and nurture, not loot and plunder, nature’—is the motto of this new branch of science.

In this ambit I have tried to see the relation between man and Nature as it existed in Indian tradition. My conclusions would be—the ancient Indian attitude as reflected in Sanskrit literature (which is the most important source of information in this context) has never been anthropocentric and relationship between man and nature has always been that of love, harmony, and peaceful inter-dependence.

In the end, however, I have posed some questions that are very pertinent to the present situation.

Nature means ‘the external world in its entirety, the creative and controlling force in the universe.’ In that sense man is also a part, and a very important one, of nature. But we list him apart because he is intellectually the most gifted and developed species in nature. So much so, that he is able to pose serious threats even to nature. The present situation is so grave that man and nature could very well be a dichotomical division.
Moreover, it is not unlikely that we Indians have started taking the attitude of man and nature as something different from each other since Western influences have started gathering around us. During the last 200 years in general and last 50 in particular, our life and attitudes have changed enormously. Our thinking patterns, attitudes, lifestyles have become more and more West-oriented—more specially with the thrust of industrialization, urbanization, and population explosion.

The Greek and Roman cultures were born and brought up within the ramparted cities of Athens and Rome. Indian culture, on the other hand, was born and nurtured on the lap of Mother Nature. And hence, nature always had an inseparable and vibrant share in the Indian ethos, though affluent citylife was not unknown. We have vivid descriptions of big cities humming with various activities, crowded with people from all directions and resounding with tenfold sounds. Even today several rites and austerities are centered around trees and creepers, birds and mountains and rivers. A *tulsi* plant is a must in every Indian home. Pilgrimages to holy places that are mostly situated in natural surroundings hold an attraction for an Indian. Anchorite life has always fascinated Indian mind. In fact scriptures ordain it as the third stage in the life of every Hindu.

The thought that there is a very intimate relationship between nature and man appeared in English literature as late as Wordsworth and Coleridge in the first generation and Keats, Shelley and Byron in the second. It is these poets that ushered in the era of Romanticism and in it there was a profound shift in sensibility. These poets had an altogether new intuition for the primal power of the wild landscape, the spiritual correspondence between man and nature. They displayed an immense sense of the Infinite and the Transcendental.

Prior to that, Greek thought held its sway. Europe, following the Greek thought, had always felt a great attraction for tragedy in literature, where the hero is always in conflict with his surroundings. A culture that fights with its environment creates tragedies, while a culture that has a harmonious relationship with its environment has a liking for comedies, or rather happy endings in a drama. Following this pattern of thought a new branch of literary
studies, known as 'literary ecology' has come into being. Though pastorals had been in vogue since Greek times, tragedy had always held the place of honour. In his constant battle against nature, his confirmed adversary whom man has always wanted to conquer and subjugate, the only saving grace for man in his moral height. This is the great quality of a tragic hero. To a Westerner, man is most blatantly the measure of all things and nature exists only for him.

In Indian thought, on the other hand, this is not entirely and blatantly so. Since Vedic times, it has been believed that the world is a cosmos, and an ordered whole, governed by the principle of Rta. Then the metaphysical concept of Brahman linked up all things in this world as products of one and the same principle. Again the principles of rebirth and retribution (Karmavipāka) have resulted in the innate belief in the continuum of existence and linkage in all species,—whether birds or animals or reptiles or insects or human beings or also gods. And so, by definition as well as in belief, Indian mind has not been totally anthropocentric. This awareness for existence may not have been cultivated on a conscious plane, but it has percolated down the centuries in the Indian mind as a vague nimbus of collective conscience. It got expressed through religious terms, through the concepts of Dharma and A-dharma, through the terms of merit and sin. Fear and attraction and awe for nature also must have got intermixed. Today in the twentieth century these beliefs seem to be tenuous and have mostly taken the form of dead tradition.

Ancient Indian tradition has always cherished, respected and adored nature. Perhaps this is the characteristic of several ancient peoples like the Chinese, Japanese, the Red Indians, Eskimos. I remember to have read the letter written around 1880 by a Red Indian chieftain to the President of the United States regarding how the white man is recklessly plundering nature, denuding forests and killing wildlife just for the sake of his own pleasure and luxury, which is seriously and adversely affecting their own right to live. They themselves had been using nature-resources, no doubt, but very frugally and without in any way disturbing its cycle. That is the best way to love and respect Nature and live in harmony with it.
Indian mind has always believed in a harmonious relationship with nature. (It is because of this attitude, among other things, that Sanskrit literature does not have any tragedy.) ‘If by felling trees, slaughtering animals a person goes to heaven, which is the pathway to hell?’ asks one poet and registers his objection to sacrifice. Man may be different from other species because of his brain faculties and abilities, but he is as much an integral part of Nature as are other things and creatures. I remember a poem—a modern one—in which the sun gets uneasy because the tiny grass flower has not bloomed. The sweet little flower answers—‘I will open up and smile provided you promise to shine.’ Just imagine a puny thing laying down a condition for the sun! Man has no right to thwart and destroy this harmony and balance in Nature, through his unbridled grabbing of nature’s resources. Manu, the well-known ancient Indian law-maker, asks hermitage-dwellers not to till the land around their penance-grove. They are supposed to be of very simple habits so far as food and other things are concerned.

In this context the philosophical stand of Masanobu Fukuoka regarding man-nature relationship is worth noting. He has a lot to say on nature remaining undisturbed, unlooted and enriched. It is for this end, we find in Sanskrit literature, that man has sought peace and bliss from nature. For that end he has also sought to make a discreet distinction between need and greed, to lessen at least, if not to minimize, his wants and live a simple life with only a few wants. In this connection I am reminded of Galbraith’s famous remark—‘We have to give up the mania of changing our car every six months.’ Another thoughtful American friend had said—‘I am not so much afraid of the human over-population in the underdeveloped countries, as I am of the unbridled consumerism of the affluent countries.’

In classical Sanskrit literature we have very happy pictures of the penance-groves, the entrancing beauties of thick forests that are uncontaminated by the hum and noise, hustle and bustle of urban life. We have contrasting pictures of the penance-grove culture and urban culture. The former is full of love, cherished memories, goodwill for everyone. No one is an orphan there. Lofty trees shower loving presents and cuckoos sing benedictions. Urban culture, on the other hand, is like a house engulfed in flames, full of a maddening crescendo of noises, unconcerned people and,
above all, bereft of memory, steadfast love and full of fickle passions.

One poet wonders, like the Duke in Shakespeare’s *As You Like It*, why people seek to wallow in the dirt of city life and go on begging and bowing before vile people when all good things are waiting for them in the forest glades. Nature is to them a living and loving character, a symbol of intense and deep love.

In fact nature was the chief raw material of the Indian poet, who usually treated it in relation to man and rarely described it for its own sake. The phenomena of seasons, day and night, birds and beasts and flowers are employed to frame human emotions or are personified as counterparts of the human subjects of the poet. There are umpteen literary conventions or symbols to this effect. Throughout this literature a deep love of nature is implicit, especially in Kālidāsa, who for this reason among others, has a higher reputation in the West than any other ancient Indian poet. In Indian thought a sharp line is not drawn between the worlds of man and nature. The Universe is an ordered *Whole* of which man is a part. Imbued with the spirit that is transcendent and immanent, the same life-giving essence that is in man, circulated in every part of it. The propelling force, therefore, in Kālidāsa’s poetry is to see nature, not as a setting for man and a backdrop to the human drama, but to perceive it as possessing a life of its own and as related to the human world in many complex ways.

This is very true. To Kālidāsa, not only the seasons, but all nature in all its aspects and moods, was a living being. To him it became a vivid and sentient replica of the human world—expecting and giving love in abundance, displaying intense emotions and attachments. This might be the cause why Lord Śiva in his eight-fold form (*Aṣṭamūrti*) appealed to him. That form embraces the whole universe. In the absence of this attitude he could not have written several of his beautiful pieces. In fact the ever-changing charms of the seasons, as also the beauty of rivers, ocean, mountains, sunrise and sunset have become a must for Sanskrit epic poetry. Stray verses also display a rich love of nature, though they frame it in the span of only four lines.

It must be mentioned, however, that attitudes change from poet to poet and writer to writer and nature has been viewed by different poets and
writers from diverse points of view—pragmatic, realistic, idealistic.

Kauṭilya, not a poet but a third century B. C. theoretician, took an entirely pragmatic view of nature when he wrote on the science of statecraft. From that point of view he recommends how sites should be selected for the capital, for the royal palace, how particular plants and trees as also birds and animals be kept to protect the king from fire, poison and snakes. He tells us about how the king should use rivers, mountains, forests, lakes, trees to fix up boundaries. How, further, he should use barren land and develop special sanctuaries for elephants and deer. He has sharply decried addiction to hunting. But that is because it spoils the king, not because of any ecological awareness. In such details, we find, Kauṭilya is utilizing every detail and contour of nature for the benefit of the king.

I have heard of a manuscript on the science of animals and birds (Mṛgapaśīśāstra), a remarkable text of the 14th century. A king, who was fond of hunting, felt one day that if such unrestricted hunting continued all the beasts and birds would get destroyed. So he asked a Jain Pandit in his court to write down their descriptions, habits, habitats etc. This is a remarkable piece of awareness for nature. The fear of that king came into reality during the one hundred and fifty years of British rule, when because of too much hunting tigers, cheetahs etc. actually became endangered or extinct species.

Nature descriptions in the Rāmāyana are generally realistic or photographic. But there, too, the mental frame of the person concerned is not entirely absent. Kālidāsa's nature pictures emerge as if from the brush of a painter, but still nature is a living reality for him. He expresses human emotions in terms of nature, and natural phenomena in terms of human emotions.

Even in stray verses we have ideas and figures of speech that prove how macrocosm and microcosm merge into each other. In fact most of the imagery of Sanskrit poets, be they epic poets, dramatists or poets composing stray verses, is inspired and shaped by nature. If sun, moon, stars, sky, clouds, mountains, rivers, ocean, birds, animals, flowers—especially lotus,—fruits, trees etc. were to be left out, what would the poets do? Several figures of speech in Sanskrit literature mostly derived their material from nature.
Literary conventions like the longings (dohadas) of different trees also show how the hero with his erotic longings is symbolized in those trees.

Along with this we must take into account one particularly striking facet of man-nature relationship in Sanskrit literature and Indian ethos. If the king does not behave properly, in keeping with Dharma, the cycle of nature stands obstructed. The King’s sinful ways make his subjects suffer. An irresponsible king’s sins visit upon his subjects. That means nature responds to or is affected by the good and evil of the humans, especially of the ones in high office.

I have often wondered whether this is just a conventional belief or just a laudatory statement or if there is any grain of metaphysical or mystical truth in it. If we ponder over what Fukuoka has to say regarding man-nature relationship, if we try to fathom the depths of the Upaniṣadic statements like ‘Thou art That’, and if we read what great souls have to say about their mysterious mystical experiences, I think, this attitude towards nature, gives an altogether new perception and insight to us. We begin to realize that the emotional life of all things and species in nature is the same. That even the trees and plants are sentient was proved by J. C. Bose in the last century. That is why we find all types of characters in Sanskrit Literature—human beings, gods and goddesses, rivers, demons, trees, serpents, celestial nymphs etc., and that their share in the same emotional life is the umbilical cord that binds all to Mother Nature.

Amazing corroboration for this point comes from modern physicists like Fritjof Capra and David Bohm. Capra tells us that mystics in the East have through intuition grasped the fundamental unity of all things in the universe. David Bohm, while discussing the cosmic dimension speaks of the healing touch of nature. Quite a few books dealing with the living touch of jungle life breathe of the same spirit. The thrilling account of a young girl who traversed the great Australian desert from the east to the west coast in the company of only four camels and two dogs describes the remarkable insight she got into space and time during that journey.

The same is the attitude of Sanskrit writers towards nature. It shows a harmonious part-whole relationship with nature. To a certain extent at least
it has percolated down to the present times as an inherited faith. I had to get a tree in my garden felled. The man whom I had hired for the purpose came with all the materials of worship. He worshipped the tree, broke a coconut, begged the tree to forgive him—for the sin of killing a living being, though for the sake of his livelihood. I was sincerely moved by this act of his and got indirectly a confirmation of the correctness of the picture of man-nature relationship in my mind.

It can be said a bit derogatorily that this is just symbolic, an ideistically conceived point of view, and that also may be tinged with fear, merit- and-sin consideration, *Dharma-Adharma* concept. That may be so. But what is significant is that it has seeped down to the lowest strata of Indian society as is evinced by the above experience of mine.

But recently an agro-economist, who is also a Sanskritist, has completely shattered this picture to pieces. With his crassly pragmatic approach and ruthless logic he has pointed out that unless we want to have 'planned poverty', especially for the people in hilly and backward areas, we have got to take up more and more developmental projects. A harmonious and ideal relationship between man and nature was possible in olden days because there was no population explosion, and social fabric was essentially based on inequality and accepted as such. With the menacing problem of population growth and the aim of our development as a nation, we have to accept the fact of, as also the hazards of spiralling industrialization. May be, because of this, our moon and constellations will be contained in neon-signs and we will have to be content with indoor plants and pet animals etc. If ecological imbalance and environmental problems is the price we have to pay, we will have to pay it and seek newer solutions. But now the wheel cannot be turned back.

This shattering stance has completely undone me and quite a few vexing questions are tormenting me:

1. Is my analysis of the old Indian ethos correct or is it mere escapism or idealism?

2. Was the old harmonious relationship possible only because there was no population problem and inequality was the accepted norm of the social structure?
3. Did the theory of retribution (*Karmavipāka*) gain a very strong foothold in India because it was the only panacea for this structure?

4. Is it, as the great philosopher J. Krishnamurti asked—'is the mind in India being caught and carried away by the materialistic wave? The wave is threatening the Western World, expressing itself through technology, materialism, nationalism. The Western mind is moving in the direction of the outer and it dominates the world. So is India losing something that was there?'

5. What is in store for us? Mutation or metamorphosis? Or is complete destruction waiting to pounce on us—the *homo sapiens*?

To sum up:

Science has been more a problem-monger than a problem-solver. It has created and complicated more problems, than it has solved. So we cannot hope to find any solution for the present crisis in the progress of science. We have to seek solution elsewhere.

Religion in the traditional sense also will bring no solution as with all its dogma and ritual it has become outdated. So what is essential is a truly religious feeling, an inculcation of ethical values that make a clearcut distinction between need and greed as also deep feeling of reverence, love, sanctity and responsibility towards Nature. Ancient man had a close and live relationship with nature, which he kept alive through his myths, rites etc. Now in a complex society like ours every man, every scientist has to find out and reinterpret his own relationship with nature. To rediscover this is to have a true ecological awareness. For that, education at the individual level is the only solution, though it is a very slow meandering process. But it is as essential as it is difficult. In this great struggle of ours, no sacrifice is too great, no effort too small.
Reference Literature


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Vyāsa’s Leftovers: Food Imagery in Indian Literature

Vidyut Aklujkar

I have a feeling that, in representing South and Southeast Asia on this panel on Food, I may have bitten off more than I can chew. But I am going to follow a practice of my childhood of finishing everything on my plate, once I have been served. A Marathi proverb prescribes that one should chew every bite thirty-two times. Hence, I am going to deal with my meal in all possible ways, even if in brief morsels, so as to savour all the rasas, or tastes that can be savoured.

[Since the South and Southeast Asian section is habitually placed at the tail end of the plenary session panel, after the appetizers, main course and deserts have been served, my topic today is entitled, Leftovers, or to be exact, Vyāsa’s Leftovers: Food in Literature. I shall interpret literature to denote mainly Indian literature, in Sanskrit and in vernaculars, from Vedic to contemporary times.]

The paper is divided into two sections. In the first, I shall take note of the most valuable conceptual and theoretical contributions of South Asia to the study of food, and in the second, I shall discuss the treatment of leftover food in life and literature. The latter excursion will allow me to discuss topics such as purity and pollution, clannish acceptance and rejection, Bhakti, or worship and its ritual practices, and finally, originality and plagiarism in literature.

Since ancient times, food has been studied in India from all possible angles, such as the Dharma-śāstra or religious lawbooks, politics, philosophy, including logic, ethics, and metaphysics, mythology, medicine, social studies, poetics and the science of literary criticism, to name a few. Although several
original contributions can be traced in each of these disciplines, the two or three most well-known deserve mention here. One is the Rasa theory of Indian science of dramaturgy and poetics. Rasa can be translated as juice, essence, sap, flavour or enjoyment. Rasa theory, first elaborated by Bharata\(^1\) uses the culinary model/motif to explain literary enjoyment. Just as different tastes of food combine to produce flavour in food, similarly different emotions expressed by the actors and actresses generate the aesthetic enjoyment in the audience\(^2\). Just as food is classified as sweet, sour, salty, bitter, hot and astringent, literature is classified with reference to the dominant moods: love, humour, pathos, valour, danger, disgust and terror. The rasa theory has had many eminent exponents since and it remains a standard theory of literary criticism even in contemporary India.

The second most important current of thought is the one which upholds purity of food to be of central importance in purifying one's body and mind, thus leading on to the ultimate goal of human life, salvation. The earliest expression of this is in the Chāndogya Upaniṣad VII. 26. 23. This line of thought links food with Karma and rebirth, thus generating several corollaries in ethics, religion and mythology. One such corollary is the supposition that a person should always give out portions of his cooked food to Gods, guests, beasts etc, and only after the sacrifice should himself eat. Those that cook for themselves are said to be the sin-eaters\(^4\). The triangle of food, Karma and rebirth is pivotal to the later development of Indian religions such as Hinduism, Buddhism and Jainism which stress non-violence as a virtue and prescribe vegetarianism as a morally superior diet.

Indians acknowledge the all-pervasiveness of food early on by equating food with the all-pervasive principle, Brahman. The Upaniṣads have declared food to be the highest ultimate principle, 'annam brahmeti vyajanāt.' The central concept regarding food in general in ancient Indian literature is that you are what you eat, and therefore, all actions of eating, conscious or unconscious, are to be taken seriously, and each one is supposed to have its consequences, if not here and now, then in the next birth, or even several births later\(^6\). This conviction of dietary accountability gets translated in the Dharmaśāstra\(^7\), into elaborate injunctions and taboos regarding food preparation, serving and consumption, whereas in the epics and the purāṇas,
it generates innumerable myths and stories of rewards of pious actions such as guest-feeding, and gift of food, and stories of gory consequences to wrong food-consumption or food-theft\textsuperscript{8}. Such an attitude is crystallized in a celebrated definition of meat with reference to the reciprocity of dinner and diner. Manu, the most influential lawgiver [circa 1st c. A.D.], declares that the animal whose meat I am eating here and now will eat me later. That is why meat is called “me + eat” by the wise thinkers\textsuperscript{9}.

In most literature, food remains a central metaphor spanning the poles of life and death and encompassing everything in between. It is obvious that food is associated with life, since experience tells us that eating of food sustains life. This fact leads to the belief that food actually generates life, annād bhavanti bhūtāni, to quote the Bhagavad Gītā 3.14. The idea is found in many texts such as the Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa\textsuperscript{10}, the Taittirīya Upaniṣad\textsuperscript{11} etc. Later on in the epics and purāṇas, this idea of the life-giving potency of food is stretched to the point of literally positing certain foods as producing progeny. Many variations on the theme are found, where oral consumption of actual semen or of rice, ghee, mango etc. leads to the birth of a baby, eating multiple portions of a dish leads to multiple births, as in the case of the twin princes in the Rāmāyana, and eating of half portions leads to incomplete births as in the case of Jarāsandha, or the king who was put together by the Demoness Jarā, when he was born in two halves from his twin mothers’ eating half a mango each. The transformation of food into progeny is a theme exploited innumerable times in the epic and purānic literature\textsuperscript{12}. On the other hand, progeny may be viewed as food, either by human or divine diners, albeit in very rare instances. Myths centering upon cannibalism, ritual or real explore the darker side of the food/progeny complex\textsuperscript{13}. In the eleventh canto of the Bhagavad Gītā, when Lord Krṣṇa manifests his cosmic form to the warrior Arjuna, he appears as Kāla or Time which devours the entire universe. This cosmic vision of the Almighty manifests his multiple molars, chewing and pulverizing the multitudes of beings that enter the hungry hole. The triple world becomes a divine morsel and all people simply become sesame seeds on top. Food thus comes to be connected with death, in more ways than one. From the point of view of dietary commonsense, if a person has indigestion, then food is detrimental
to his health and excess of food in extreme cases may lead to death. On the
other hand, food is like medicine to starving people. Perhaps it is with similar
outlook that the Taittiriya Brāhmaṇa II.8.8.3 declares that food is said to be
both death and the medicine that averts death. A carnivorous diet connects
food at once with life and death. The epic Mahābhārata illustrates a chain of
successive victims and diners, such as a hunter killing an eagle, which is
swooping on a snake, which is about to devour a frog which is finishing off
a fly. Whether food is connected with life or death depends only on one’s
point of view. As a contemporary poet Shel Silverstein has noted in his poem,
“Thanksgiving dinner’s sad and thankless. Christmas dinner’s dark and blue,
When you stop and try to see it, from the turkey’s point of view.” As we
noted earlier, the turkey’s point of view is taken quite seriously in Indian
literature and the awareness of the possibility of role reversal between the
diner and his dinner permeates several myths and informs many lawbooks.

Perhaps thanks to this built-in bipolarity, any concept of food exhibits
ambivalent associations. This can be seen by examining the concept of leftover
food as it is treated in Indian literature. Leftover food is a complex concept
loaded with contradictory associations. In what follows, I shall attempt to
show how it vacillates between opposites such as purity and pollution,
generosity and miserliness, sacrality and profanity, desirability and disgust,
acceptance in and rejection from a community, and plagiarism and originality
in literature.

The Sanskrit word for leftover food is ‘ucchīṣṭa,’ which is explained as
‘bhaktāvaśeṣa’ which means food left over in a person’s dish, or food that
has once been in his mouth, or touched by his lips, tongue or saliva, and
then left over, rejected or abandoned. Since purity of food is of central
importance in the ancient Indian literature the topic of ucchīṣṭa becomes
equally important. The Bhagavad Gītā classifies the ucchīṣṭa along with
food that is stale by standing overnight, food which is devoid of flavour, and
stinking. The lawbooks consider leftover food even if it is not stale, polluted
and hence unfit to be consumed by anyone. Texts like the Grāhastha ratnākara
explain the rationale by saying, “The evil deeds of men resort to their food.
Whoever eats the food of another partakes of that man’s sin.” The
Dharmaśāstras or religious lawbooks allow only babies and children upto
five years old to accept their parents’ leftovers, but after that, no one can. Until the thread ceremony, a boy may dine from his mother’s plate, but after that, he may not, since he then assumes his own personhood, and as an adult must observe the basic rules of hygiene and purity. Partaking of anyone’s leftovers is forbidden, whereas partaking of a lower-class person’s leftovers is particularly associated with dire consequences. The Viṣṇu Śmrītī dictates that if one partakes of the leftovers of a Śūdra, one should atone for it by throwing it up and later observe fast for seven nights in order to purify one’s self.

Rules regarding purity and pollution that centre around the concept of leftover food are so strong that their observance is essential to an individual’s acceptance in a community and their disregard, even inadvertent failure to observe them leads to the errant members’ eviction from within a community. Eating someone else’s leftover food is believed to be equivalent to sharing his sins. That is why it is dangerous, and such a behaviour gives rise to shame and disgust. These are not only old beliefs expressed in ancient texts, they are very much alive even today in most orthodox circles in India. So strong were these beliefs that in the early days of the Portugese régime in Goa, entire towns of Hindus were converted to Christianity because they happened to drink water from a well into which a piece of bread was thrown or even believed to be thrown by Christian missionaries. The villagers believed that they had eaten someone’s leftover bread, and thereby were somehow ‘changed’ or ‘defiled’ and thereby they lost their own religious identity and were thus tricked into accepting the other’s religious identity. This is an instance of what some scholars have called gastro-politics.

Of course, to all restrictions regarding leftover food there were exceptions, both within the orthodox tradition and within the subsequent reforms. Since ancient times, these exceptions were also practiced along with strong prohibitions. Thus we find injunctions such as : A person should always leave something on his plate, and whatever remains is to be given to his wife, servant or slave.” For a wife to be dining from her husband’s plate eating his leftovers was supposed to be a sign of her loyalty. Even until now, such a behaviour was praised as exhibiting proper conjugal relationship. Needless to say that the opposite, that is, eating of the wife’s leftovers by the
husband, was rarely if ever publically practiced, and hardly ever confessed, let alone praised.

To the general attitude of aversion towards eating anyone's leftovers, some other powerful exceptions have also been recorded. As early as in the Chāndogya Upaniṣad²¹, we find the story of Uṣastī Cākrāyaṇa which shows that in a dire calamity, to save one's life, one may eat even the remnants of another's food²². Considerations such as sustaining life may force one to eat leftovers, but on the other hand, we find that strong motives such as love or worship may lead a person to willingly accept leftovers from the beloved, the Guru, or God.

This brings me to discuss the turnabout that the concept of leftover food makes under the sweeping influence of the doctrine of Bhakti or intense personal worship. Not only does it lose its negative associations with pollution, danger, and disgust but it assumes the connotations of highest purity, honour and bliss. The common practice of devotees is as follows: Food is prepared afresh daily and before serving anyone else, is arranged neatly in a dish and offered to God as one would to an honoured guest. It is believed that God blesses it, some believe that God actually samples it, and then, after the ritual offering is completed, the same food is offered as prasāda, or blessed leftovers from God to all the assembled devotees. This ritual of worship transforms the profanity of defiled leftover food-consumption into the sacrality of sharing the divine feast. In some sects of worship or Bhakti, or in Sikhism where the Guru or spiritual teacher is equivalent to the Almighty, eating the leftovers of one's own Guru is taken to be the utmost token of the disciple's loyalty. Thus with the advent of Bhakti, or intimate personal worship of God, we find the concept of leftover food assuming interestingly significant and positive associations.

It may seem that in the disciple's partaking of the teacher's leftovers there is a lopsided power politics as in the gender relations, where we noted how a wife is blessed when she eats the husband's leftovers but not vice versa. However, all such neat preconceived notions topple when we study the phenomenon of Bhakti. The concept of leftover food performs a double somersault as it were, and manages to land on all fours, without breaking
any limbs. It is not only honourable for a devotee or a disciple to share the leftovers of his God or Guru, but we find stories in the Bhakti tradition where even God loves to share leftovers from his devotees. I have discussed these at length earlier in my paper “Sharing the Divine Feast”\(^\text{23}\), so here I shall mention a few examples just to explain the turnabout of the purity-pollution notions.

The earliest example of reciprocal love or reward of worship in this manner is noted by Sāyaṇa\(^\text{24}\) in explaining Rgveda 8.91, where Apālā, a woman suffering from white leprosy chews the leaves of the soma plant to extract juice from them and offers it with love to Indra. Indra drinks the juice with pleasure, and sets up a paradigm of God’s behaviour towards his devotees. Later Bhakti literature abounds in such instances where just like the devotee that partakes of God’s leftover food, God also enjoys the leftovers of his devotees\(^\text{25}\). The earlier injunctions of observing purity of food are deliberately flaunted by the reformist strategies of the devotees of God, since they want to break the earlier barriers that separate humankind into rigid castes and they aspire to share the divine love among all, regardless of gender or status.

We saw how the notions of purity and pollution undergo a radical change when coloured with Bhakti. The connected notions of clannish acceptance and rejection that we saw earlier expressed in orthodox Hinduism are also turned upside-down when we are dealing with leftovers in the context of Bhakti. Eating of leftovers of “the other” was enough for an orthodox Hindu to be polluted and therefore, rejected from within his caste, and in extreme cases, from his religious identity. Under the discourse of Bhakti, ideally this is reversed, and it is precisely the eating of leftover food, of the God or of the devotees, that becomes desirable, and is denied to all but the fortunate few. I shall mention only one such instance. Bhakta poet Sant Ekanātha (1533-1599) was a brahmin by birth, and a well-read pandit by profession. He practised and preached the message of equality regardless of caste or creed. In his poems, he describes the pastoral life of Lord Kṛṣṇa in great detail, dwelling at length on the favourite games of Kṛṣṇa and his friends. He describes the communal meals of Kṛṣṇa and his friends on the banks of Yamunā\(^\text{26}\). Ekanātha’s Kṛṣṇa comes from an affluent home, so he brings from
home rich food for his midday meal, but his humble cowherd friends bring
dried pieces of roties and whatever else they find tied somehow in their
napkins. Ekanātha's Kṛṣṇa never eats alone. He makes everyone open his
shidori, the bag-lunch, and makes each one put his meal together in a big
pile. He adds his own meal to the pile as well. Then the friends feed each
other, and share the mixture of all tastes. The superb flavour, the divine
‘rasa’ that this feast produces can only be imagined. Sometimes the cowherds
engage in mock quarrels as to who should take the first morsel. Sometimes
they accuse Kṛṣṇa of being mischievous and gobbling up their food. Kṛṣṇa
often must break up their friendly quarrels by sharing his food with them.
The gods in heaven are envious of the joy of the innocent cowherds and they
want to share it too. So the gods assume the forms of the fish in the river
Yamunā and wait in the hope of sharing the crumbs, ucchiṣṭa, when the
cowherds come to wash their hands in the river. But God Kṛṣṇa plays a
mischief again. He scares his cowherd friends away from the river by telling
them about a ghost in the river. So they resume their play by simply wiping
their hands on their bottoms. The cunning gods are thus deprived of sharing
their leftovers, their ucchiṣṭa which is freely available to those who are Kṛṣṇa’s
friendly devotees. Ekanātha believes that he was blessed enough to partake
the sacred leftovers from that common meal of Kṛṣṇa’s cowherds.

Now that we have travelled through centuries of Indian literature tracing
the aroma of leftovers, it is time to turn to Vyāsa and his leftovers. Vyāsa is
traditionally believed to be the visionary author of the great Indian epic, the
Mahābhārata. While praising the wealth of his insights, breadth of his topics
and depth of his characters, it is said in Sanskrit, “vyāsocchiṣṭam jagat
sarvam” : “This entire world is Vyāsa’s leftovers.” This can be interpreted in
more than one sense. In one sense, it means that all later literature is like
crumbs of Vyāsa’s plate. What is praise for Vyāsa may sound like deprecation
for other poets. Since Vyāsa has already tasted it, it follows that the others
are only savouring his stale leftovers, or using Vyāsa’s stolen goods. If this is
so, then is there any room for freshness or originality in literature anymore?
Are all later poets plagiarizers? Interpreted thus, the metaphor of leftovers
again helps us, since garnishing leftovers is a real test of any good cook’s
creativity. Any cook worthy of her salt will take the challenge and surprise
her diners. Originality in this context simply gets redefined. Judging by the astounding volume and quality of reinterpretations of the themes, characters and messages of the Mahābhārata, ranging from Bhāsa and Bhaṭṭanārāyaṇa to Peter Brook and Shashi Tharoor, Vyāsa’s praise seems to have deterred no new poet or novelist of South Asia.

In another sense, the adage means, that there is nothing new under the sun, that Vyāsa has anticipated it all in the Mahābhārata. As his disciple Vaiśampāyana proclaims, “that which is elsewhere is already here, and what is not here is found nowhere.” When one seriously begins to study the Mahābhārata, [I say, begins to study, since no one has yet finished studying the Mahābhārata,] one finds the above praise to be not an exaggeration, but simply a modest description of the great epic. To take an example, in addition to all the topics that I have discussed so far in connection with the leftover food, the Mahābhārata presents us with stories that give quite different connotations to the concept of leftover food. I am going to consider only two stories here before I conclude. In each of these there is a bird or a beast eating leftover food, and each in turn, links these birds and beasts with humans and their morality. Furthermore, each story takes the otherwise eulogized heroes of the epic such as Bhīṣma and Yudhiṣṭhira, and shows them in a less flattering light. One of these mentions a curious female bird called Bhūṅga śakuni, perhaps meaning the land-indicator bird, who lives on the other side of Mt. Himavat, and subsists by eating only leftover food. This bird eats not just any leftover food, but she carves out the particles of flesh stuck between a lion’s teeth, and eats only those bits while chanting constantly, “Don’t be foolhardy.” King Śiśupāla of Cedi insults the grand old celibate Bhīṣma of the Kuru clan by equating his life with that of the Bhūṅga bird. In calling Bhīṣma these names, Śiśupāla doubly insults Bhīṣma. He implies that Bhīṣma’s speech contradicts his own actions just as the silly bird’s foolhardy action contradicts her own instruction. And secondly, Śiśupāla suggests that just as the bird stays alive only thanks to the lion’s indulgence and mercy, Bhīṣma owes his life to the mercy and indulgence of Duryodhana, the present Kaurava king. The leftover-eating Bhūṅga bird mentioned, to my knowledge, only in the Mahābhārata, stands as a solitary example of someone who combines vanity and stupidity with a dangerously marginal
existence.

The second story is about a mongoose and the Pāṇḍava prince Yudhiṣṭhira\textsuperscript{31}. It frames the concepts of gift of food in the context of hunger, not only of the diners, but also of the donors. It makes us re-examine the normal connotations of miserliness and generosity associated with small and large gifts, in particular, gifts of food, with reference to leftover food. Needless to say that the gift of food is always praised in Indian literature as the most precious gift of all\textsuperscript{32}. We also saw that on the whole, leftover food was associated with defilement and pollution in the mainstream, and hence was forbidden as a gift\textsuperscript{33}. The Mahābhārata narrates several stories of gifts of all kinds, and it often praises the eldest Pāṇḍava, Yudhiṣṭhira as a great donor, a kindhearted and generous king. However, in the Āśvamedhika parvan, the following tale is told. Yudhiṣṭhira has just finished performing the great sacrifice, Āsvamedha. He has given away untold wealth. Brahmins have received gold, gems, and money, the guest kings have received elephants, horses, jewels and women. There are streams of honey, wine and other intoxicants everywhere. There are tanks of ghee, and mountains of food being given away. Heavenly flowers are falling upon Yudhiṣṭhira's head and people are returning to their own countries singing praises of the great king. At that point a mongoose whose body is half golden comes out of a hole and makes a thunderous noise. The mongoose then declares in a human voice that this royal sacrifice cannot hold a candle to the one made by that poor brahnin living in this Kurukṣetra earlier. They all are shocked to hear that and ask it to enlighten them further. The mongoose tells the king a story of the poor old Brahmin and his family. They had not had anything to eat for days together, because there was a famine. Finally, they come by some grains and with great effort prepare a meal. They are about to sit down to eat when a guest comes to the door, and the brahmin gives up his own share of food to satisfy the guest's hunger. When that is not enough, the brahmin's wife, then his son and then the daughter-in-law also give up their own portions of food to the guest. He eats, is satisfied, and praises the family, which remains starving. The guest declares, "Hunger gnaws at wisdom, hunger clouds morality. Hunger engulfs knowledge, and drives away courage. The one who can conquer hunger indeed wins the kingdom of heaven." With these words the guest leaves, and a
heavenly chariot descends to take the blessed family to heaven. The mongoose says that he was drawn by the smell of food to that place of sacrifice by the Brahmin family, and he rolled in the leftover food and water spilled on the ground. Lo and behold, half his body which came into contact with those leftovers became golden. The other half, untouched by that food, remained dark. The mongoose says to King Yudhiṣṭhira, “Since then I have visited several sacred places in the hope of making my remaining body golden. I had no such luck again. I had come in great expectations to your sacrifice but even here, it did not turn golden. That is why I said earlier, that this sacrifice is not as great as the sacrifice made by that starving Brahmin and his family.” The humbled King remains speechless.

Annotations:
1. Nāṭya Śāstra 6.32-33 यथा बहुद्वयुक्तवृत्तिजनेवार्वहिमुखतम्। आस्वादयन्ति भुजाना भर्क्ष भक्षादितो जन:।
2. को दश्तन्। अग्रह.... यथा हि नाना व्यक्तिनीष्ठित्व्यश्यायाधवसावनिष्ठित: तथा नानाभावोपङ्गादाय सरसनिष्ठितः
3. आहारशुद्द्दुर सत्यशुद्द: सत्यशुद्धृ धुता स्मृति:। स्मृतिलम्पे सर्वग्रामीवों विप्रमोक्ष:। हृदेयग्य ७.२६.२
4. यज्ञशिलाशः सन्तो मुच्यन्ते सर्वकिल्ल्वैः। भुजाते ते लघुः पाप:। ये पचन्यात्मकारणाद्।। भगवदगीता
5. Taittirīyā Upaniṣād 3.2.1-3.
9. मां स भक्षयितामकुः यस्तो मांसमहाद्याचार्यम्। एतानांसत्य मांसलघु प्रवदन्ति मन्निष्ठितं।। मनु ५.५३
10. अनाहात: प्रजनं प्रजानाम्। तैत्तिरीय ब्राह्मण, अनाहात: प्रजा: प्रजायन्ते।। तैत्तिरियोपनिष। २२
11. अनाहात: भभवित। भूतानि जातान्यक्षेत्रे चर्यन्ते।। अद्वेदति च भूतानि त्रस्मादश्च तदुच्चर्ये।। तैत्तिरियोपनिष। २२
12. O"Flaherty 1980;
13. Aklujkar 1996; Shulman 1993 etc.
14. अत्र प्राणन्तपथामाहुः। अत्र मृत्युः तमु जीवाद्युमाहुः।।
15. By extension, ‘ucchīṣṭa’ is also applied to a person who has not washed his hands and mouth after eating. Thus, Manu declares that one who is an uccхиṣṭa
should not go anywhere. *na cocchiṣṭah kvacidvrajat*. Manusmṛti 2.56. This also is later connected with Tantra divinities such as the ucchiṣṭa Gaṇeṣa and ucchiṣṭa cāṇḍālī. I shall not deal with these in this paper. For more on these topics, see Chitrav Śāstri’s Bhāratiya Sanskrīti Kośa.

16. यात्राम् गतसं पूर्ति पर्यूपितं च यतः। उच्चिष्टमपि चाचेष्यं भोजनं तामसप्रियम्।। भगवद्गीता १७.१०


18. शूद्रोच्छिष्टवाणे च वर्मनं कुलवा सतरघनुमप्वसेत्। विषुवसूतिः। This quotation is taken from Bhāratiya Sanskrīti Kośa. p. 596.


22. The learned brahmin Uṣasti declines from accepting water from the person whose leftover food he accepts, since taking any more than is absolutely necessary would be still accepting ‘ucchiṣṭa’ or defiled food. This shows that even in dire circumstances, a man must use his own discretion and decline from indulging in acceptance of ucchiṣṭa. For more on the subject of a particular ascetic practice of eating remnants of leftover meat, and on the word vighasāśin : see Wezlar, 1978.


29. धर्मं चाचस्य च कामे च मोक्षे च महतर्भम। यद्हादिहि तदन्त्य यज्ञहासितः न तत्क्वचित्।। महाभारत. आदिपर्व ५६.३३

30. MBh Sabha Parva, sarga 42. 19-23.

31. MBh Āśvamedhika parvan adhyaśya 91-96. nakulopākhyaṇam.

32. अक्लमान्यं दानं न भूतं न भविष्यति। पुष्यं वास्तयमायूः बलपुष्पिविवर्धनम्।। हलायुधकोशः।

33. नोच्चिष्टं कर्मचिन्हादाट्वं ननुसृति २.५६
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The Resurrection of Cārvāka

Krishna S. Arjunwadkar

THE INTELLECTUAL

"The intellectual should constantly disturb, should bear witness to the misery of the world, should be provocative by being independent, should rebel against all hidden and open pressures and manipulations, should be the chief doubter of systems...and for this reason, an intellectual cannot fit into any role that might be assigned to him...and essentially doesn't belong anywhere : he stands out as an irritant wherever he is."


(Abr. : DPC stands for Debi Prasad Chattopadhyaya. p stands for page numbers from Lokāyata. For consistency, I have used diacritical marks irrespective of their use or otherwise in the original works.)

Prologue :

Literature on Cārvāka

Since Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya (DPC) published his Lokāyata : A Study in Ancient Indian Materialism (People's Publishing House, 1959), interest in Cārvāka alias Lokāyata seems to have been revived at least in Maharashtra. With the solitary exception of Sadashiv Athavale's work. Cārvāka : Itihāsa va Tattvajñāna (Vāi 1958), all recent studies are post-Lokāyata. Among them may be listed

(1) Cārvāka-darśana (1982, 1987),
(2) Āstika-śiromaṇī Cārvāka (1992), and
(3) Vaidika Paramparā viruddha Cārvāka (Jan.-Mr. 1994 issue of the
Navabhārata magazine)—all the three by A. H. Salunkhe; and


(5) Cārvākavāda va Advaitvāda (Pradeep Gokhale, 1989).

Of these, No. 1 is a doctoral thesis, later revised and enlarged into No. 2. No. 3 is a detailed refutation (221 pages in Royal size) of the review of No. 1 by Shriiniwas Dikshit published in the Navabhārata, Nov.-Dec. 1992. This game of polemic exchanges was going on in the Navabhārata even at the time I was writing this article; and I, too, have made my own contribution to it as noted below. No. 4 is a collection of papers read at a seminar on Cārvāka in Pune in 1975. All these four books, along with the one by Athavale, are in Marathi. In a Marathi article entitled ‘Cārvākāce Punarujjivan’ (1 and 2), I have discussed points arising from the Marathi books, particularly those by Salunkhe. (The Navabhārata, April and May, 1998). The present article is, therefore, focused on DPC’s Lokāyata, with occasional references to other works. In writing this article, my intention is not so much as to review Lokāyata in detail as to discuss inherent weaknesses in DPC’s methodology and arguments.

Lokāyata: an outline

DPC’s Lokāyata, extending over about 700 pages and eight chapters, is divided into four ‘books’: I. The Problem and the Method (ch. 1-2); II. The Social Background (ch. 3-4); III. Materialism (ch. 5-7); IV. Idealism (ch. 8). He has discussed the nature of the contents of the book, chapter by chapter, in his ‘Introduction’. DPC’s span of ancient Indian materialism covers a wide range of cults, concepts, practices and philosophical schools spreading over a long period beginning with the Vedic times and reaching as far as our own, and detecting materialistic core even in apparently orthodox traditions. The tradition of materialism is traced by DPC to the Asuras (identified by some with Assyrians) of Vedic times who are associated with Deha-vāda, the view that the material body itself is the soul, and is shown by him, through his interpretative skills, to cover the cults of the so-called orthodox deities like Gaṇapati and Gaurī, Tantric cults and even the Sāṃkhya-Yoga schools of philosophy and sections of Buddhism. He devotes the last two chapters to the discussion of the contrasting idealistic outlook, also having its roots in
the oldest stratum of the Vedas and found in some crucial concepts in Buddhism. In this study DPC has drawn inspiration from the writing of George Thompson upon which, he confesses, he has depended throughout his study. (Intro. p.xix). My criticism, therefore, applies in its essence as much to his guide as to DPC himself.

Views DPC approves not

DPC starts with the unreliability of Mādhava's account of Cārvāka as presented in his Sarva-darśana-saṃgraha, a Sanskrit work assigned to the 13th c. A.D. (p. 4), despite the fact that it is 'clear and coherent' (p. 9), and quotes views of authors like Tucci, Garbe and Dasgupta who believe, on the basis of stray references in old works, that authentic works on Cārvāka school are lost. A certain Brhaspati Sūtra posing to be an authentic work by Brhaspati, the mythical originator of the Cārvāka school, published by F. W. Thomas (1921) is brushed aside by Tucci as unauthentic but consisting of authentic passages from older sources (p. 8). This is followed by different views regarding the origin and development of the Cārvāka school. These vary between two extremes: (i) the Lokāyata, as a branch of ancient Indian philosophy, never existed at all (p. 11, Rhys Davids p. 18); (ii) it was imported into India from Sumerian civilization (p. 13). This latter view is held by Dasgupta on the basis of the similarity between the burial custom of the Sumerians and that attributed to Asuras, who believed that the soul is not different from the body, in the Chāndogya Upaniṣad (p. 14). DPC does not agree with Dasgupta, obviously because the former is interested in finding roots of materialism in ancient India. In between the two extremes stands the view that (iii) Lokāyatas survive in India even today as one can judge from the practices of the Kāpālikas and such other sects making sex a part of religious ritual (p. 16).

Fact and fiction : Characteristics

What is it that DPC is out to prove or establish? Is it his Marxist stand that, like all civilizations, Indian civilization, too, must have started at the lowest rung of the ladder, the primitive conditions, namely the primary needs of the man—food, clothing and shelter? Perhaps not. This is too obvious a reality to need any evidence or argumentation, in line with the one that any
grown up man opens his account of growth from the womb of his mother. DPC is out to prove that these primitive conditions are reflected in the ancient Indian literature. In other words, it is his imaginative way of interpretation of the said literature based on certain presumptions/observations (such as importance of woman in primitive societies as the source of production, woman as the centre of an agricultural society and so on) that make his quasi-theoretical views unacceptable. If scientific exposition of a fact (which needs undeniable proof leading to inevitable conclusions) and writing classed as fiction (in which imagination plays the decisive role) based on only a broad framework of the fact are considered to be the two extremes of literature, DPC’s writing has the appearance of the former but in fact tends towards the latter. This is perhaps owing to the influence of the western tenets of hermeneutics which can work on possibilities lacking support to translate them into certainties. This may, incidentally, open up doors to a comparative study of hermeneutics—Western and ancient Indian, i.e., Mīmāṃsā.

Materialism, magic and ritual

Materialism is defined as ‘belief that only matter is real or important’ characterised by “rejection of spiritual values etc.’ (OED) Materialism being this, how can it be reconciled with magic which is defined as the ‘art of influencing events by occult control of nature or spirits’ (OED)? For, what is ‘occult’? It is something ‘involving the supernatural, mystical,...’ All this terminology militates against the very foundation of materialism which denies anything and everything beyond matter. And DPC talks of magic as a characteristic of materialism of primitive man and illustrates it by citing the description of dogs chanting for food occurring in a principal Upaniṣad, and enlists even some deities like Gaṅapatī, Gaurī and the whole gamut of Tantric practices as part of ancient Indian materialism. It is like avowed enemies being made to join hands for diametrically opposite goals. If this is said to be justified on the ground that it is meant for material, this-worldly gains, any religious prayer can have an equal claim to materialism, for being meant for material gains! With this approach, DPC can enrol almost the whole of Vedic and later religious literature as representing ancient Indian materialistic tradition, leaving out very little of it as really religious; for the Vedic seers and common people pray gods for progeny, horses, wealth, conquest of the
enemies and what not—everything material. Under these circumstances, I fail to understand why DPC had to rely on a solitary and rare example of the chanting dogs. Apparently it is confusion, may be deliberate, or ‘judicial blindness’ as Marx remarks. It is amusing to see this latter criticism, flung by DPC on non-Marxists, devolve on the champion of Marxism himself.

**Totemism**

Whenever DPC finds references to animals and plants in ancient Sanskrit literature, he thinks of totemism. Now, totemism is understood as taking animals as emblems of families. The chanting dogs, names of humans after birds and animals are, he thinks, indicators of totemism; and lots of these are found in ancient Indian society. Conceding his view as a possibility, how can he explain the fact that various physical postures in the Yoga tradition are named after animals and birds? Is Yoga also materialistic in essence and a characteristic of the primitive society? The primitive society which can develop such a complicated system as Yoga must be far advanced than many developed and civilized ones! I am aware that, in DPC’s view, Yoga has its origin in the magic of the primitive man; but, as shown earlier, magic and materialism do not go together. Even if they are supposed to go together, the outlook and the approach of these two, on the one hand, and those of Yoga, on the other, are diametrically opposite—the former recognising no goal beyond worldly gains, and the latter advising control of mind through discarding everything worldly for spiritual sublimation.

Talking of the chanting dogs in the Chāndogya Upaniṣad (I.12.4) out of which he has made his major capital, DPC has blamed Radhakrishnan for tampering with the contents of the original passage by making the dogs go around, each following dog holding the tail of the preceding one. Had he consulted the Śaṅkarabhāṣya on the passage, he would have found it to be Radhakrishnan’s source. It is Śaṅkara who, considering that the dogs are meant to imitate the style of the brahmins going around in a particular ritual (associated with the baliṣpadamāna song) in a Soma sacrifice, each holding on to the one ahead of him (cf. Śrutakoṣa by Dandekar and Kashikar, English version, Vol. II, Pt. II, p. 454), makes the dogs hold tails, in a bid to complete the comparison. So, the blame, if any, lies at the door of Śaṅkara. But the
context given above will make it clear that Śaṅkara has introduced the said detail on the basis of his perfect knowledge of the sacrificial tradition and his sense of responsibility as a commentator. He in fact deserves to be praised for that.

As to human beings being named after animals etc., men are even today named after birds and plants / flowers even among culturally and educationally advanced sections of human society. The suffix ‘Simha’ (meaning a lion) is added to men’s names for centuries in many an Indian community like the Sikhs. Jawaharlal Nehru was never found in public functions without a rose in his button hole. None but DPC would think that it was a totem or its survival. In ancient Indian literature, we find some kṣatriya families tracing their origins to the Sun and the Moon (this belief perpetuated through historical times even to this day), and display them on the banners of their chariots etc. There is no reason why it should be kept outside the span of totemism. In fact, even poetry with innumerable comparisons from the world of animals and plants cannot escape the claim of totemism and primitive character. The logical conclusion is: we are all a primitive society and shall so remain to the end! This position, incidentally, so perfectly tallies with that of Śaṅkara who maintains that, in matters fundamental, all human beings behave like animals, following their instincts—paśvādibhiś cāviśeṣāt. (Brahmasūtrabhāṣya, introduction). The only difference would be: while a Marxist will stop at instincts, Śaṅkara goes deeper to trace the behaviour to a primordial cause, namely mistaking the identity of the Self as that of the non-Self.

What about the monkeys in the Rāmāyaṇa? Humans with monkey totems, actual monkeys or primates humanized for poetic effect aimed at an element of miracle? And what again about the animal characters in Aesop’s fables and the Pañcatantra of Viṣṇuśarman? If DPC cannot see them, is it a case of ‘judicial blindness’ as Marx observes? This literary tradition of representing human beings by animals for artistic purposes comes as close as the too well known ‘Animal Farm’ of our own times criticizing Communist way of thinking.
Varieties in names

Many are the varieties in which names are given to persons and families. Of these, to give only some a preferential treatment as indicating a primitive practice, particularly when their style is seen persisting even in a contemporary society, is to ignore the resourcefulness of man in giving names and his reluctance to change them, may be for practical considerations, once they are established. This view presumes that words denoting animals and plants make their appearance in a language or attract its speakers earlier than any other words. Those who hold such a view should explain why we do not find words denoting food, clothing and shelter which are so basic to the primitive society, in the list of words used as given names in a sizeable proportion. By floating his theory of totemism as reflected in given names, DPC is unwittingly encroaching upon the domain of linguistics and risking postulates that cannot be defended on linguistic grounds. The purpose of names is to distinguish one thing from another; and this is achieved in a variety of ways reflecting man's resourcefulness. Even words expressing physical defects are found to be in vogue as family names. The point to be made is: considering the vast variety of styles in naming animals and humans, it fails to convince a discrete reader to separate a group of words as reflecting totemism.

The word totem is explained as a natural object (esp. animal) adopted among North American Indians as emblem of family or clan (OED). These emblems have found an expression there in huge wooden carved memorials that can still be verified. In extending the same tendency to primitive Indian society, DPC has relied solely on linguistic evidence without a support from archaeological findings. How far can a linguistic evidence be relied upon in the face of the fact that, as shown elsewhere in this article, names of families and individuals in India are drawn from a variety of fields, and the proportion of the so called 'totemic' family names to other varieties thereof is trivial.

While interpreting Indian given names in his own way, is DPC aware that English given names normally do not mean or signify anything else? For instance, 'John' means just the name of a person and nothing else. English, therefore, does not leave any scope for the sort of deliberations DPC has
made in connection with Sanskrit names (that they suggest a primitive, totemic society). Does it mean that the English society managed to escape a stage of development which other societies could not? If it does, DPC owes an explanation why; as such a position militates against Marx's observation that every society begins from the lowest stage of development.

**Totemism and linguistics**

Treating use of words denoting animals, birds and plants as names of humans to be indicative of totemism, and hence of primitive society, DPC is presuming that the class of words he separates was the earliest to come into existence in Sanskrit (or, for that matter, in any language) before the rest as also before the practice of giving names to human beings; and also that they have retained their meanings through the ages. Is it possible to map on definite lines the development of a language and take it as the basis for a theory? All such attempts are no more than flights of imagination. This is not in keeping with the reality. Language continually changes with time in vocabulary and grammatical structure. Old words die, new words arise; the surviving old words, too, change their meaning. To summon language to give witness in defence of a theory is, therefore, a journey in the dark leading to nowhere.

**Uniform scheme of social development**

Another fallacy in DPC's argument is that everywhere in the world human society has a uniform scheme of development. This makes him think that if totemism is found to be a stage somewhere, it must be so everywhere. Human societies on the whole develop not in isolation but through an interaction with other societies. This has happened with ancient societies separated even by seas. Human beings can see what others do and follow suit if it is to their advantage. This is how India, after the stagnation of centuries, came to develop the ability to understand and produce the latest in technology developed by other societies. Evidence has been brought to light to show that ancient societies, with their crude technology, could establish contacts with distant continents. Like individuals, societies, too, differ in their ability to develop; it is, likewise, not a rare phenomenon that one can skip a stage in which another pulls on for ages. It is, therefore, idle,
to presume a single formula of development and try to fit it on the history of the human society everywhere in the world. It is primitive logic, if logic it could be named.

**Endogamy and exogamy**

DPC traces the practices of endogamy and exogamy still in vogue in India and associated with the gotra system, to those among ancient tribes. A rational approach to these practices would reveal that there are several factors responsible for them such as the proportion of males to females in a social group, relation of one group to another, development of means of communications with far-off groups, practical needs and instincts and so on, numerous instances of which can be drawn from history and mythology. The complex system of smaller castes and sub-castes owes its origin to the violation, rather than observation, of the practice of endogamy and exogamy. The Greek princes and their protégés settled in India after Alexander's invasion were presumably married to Indian women and were absorbed in Indian society in the course of time. History records that the daughter of Alexander's officer was married to Chandragupta. The surest counter force challenging these practices may be found in the development of the institution of prostitutes, a universal phenomenon not taken notice of by the learned author. It is, therefore, illogical to think, as DPC does, that these practices governed ancient tribes on a large scale and continued to prevail over the gotra groups even in the contemporary society. Human physiology being the same everywhere, man's intelligence must have discovered long ago the futility and irrationality of the practices under discussion. This is all the more true when seen in comparison to animal species that have, out of natural instincts, developed cross breeding without the intervention of man.

**The miraculous in Sanskrit literature**

DPC's approach to ancient Sk literature as a means of social history is based on certain presumptions. How is he going to defend his approach against those who regard it as a symbolic-cum-poetic representation of astronomical facts? For example, Hanumān in the Rāmāyaṇa is interpreted by some as a comet on the basis of the tradition associated with his exploit of jumping at the Sun soon after his birth. Similar explanations have been
offered of other characters in the celebrated epic. This point leads us to the
general question how far can we rely on theories of the nature of possibilities
based on interpretations of ancient literature as means of reconstructing
ancient history, and prefer one to another? For, all talk of possibility is
inherently tied with the claims of other credible possibilities and even
impossibility. This naturally lends them an utterly subjective character, and
no scientific discussion can afford to allow a subjective element to colour an
evidence. Viewed from this angle, one can reasonably maintain that all
attempts at culling information of definite, specific facts from ancient
literature, not produced as history, which are based on interpretations, are
open to challenge and doubt as to their acceptability as proven conclusions.

Ancient literature as a source of history

Again, if ancient literature is viewed as a source of social history, what
prevents its use as a source of the history of technology? There are magical
formulas for every imaginable purpose in the Atharvaveda. We find
innumerable references to extra-sensory perception and supernatural powers
arising from penance and illustrated by curses and boons. There are references
in the Rāmāyaṇa to aerial carriers (vimāṇas) used by gods and gāndharvas.
Vālmiki employs a huge aerial carrier, Puspaka (said to be in the service of
Kubera before Rāvana robbed him of it), spacious enough to accommodate
an entire army (even Jumbo Jets of our own times of technological
advancement cannot hope to perform this feat), to fetch Rāma and his army
to Ayodhyā after the conquest of Rāvana. Rāma’s army of monkeys is credited
with building of a stone bridge across the sea to reach Laṅkā to wage a war
against Rāvana. Equally challenging is the episode of the touch of Rāma’s
foot restoring Ahalyā to her human form from the state of a stone she was
reduced to as a result of her husband’s curse. The great Mahābhārata (really
great!) speaks of an artificial nourishment of Gāndhāri’s foetus, cut into a
hundred pieces, finally producing a hundred sons called Kauravas. (Some
scholars see in this episode an evidence of the practice of ‘cloning’ being
known in those times!) Savitri is said to have restored her dead husband to
death after negotiations with the god of death. Kṛṣna, when in danger of being
attacked by Duryodhana’s guards in an open court where he was pleading
for Pāṇḍavas, is said to have assumed myriad forms to confuse them. Hiṃmbā,
Bhima's consort from a demonic family, could change her appearance at will. And so could Śūrpaṅkhā of the Rāmāyaṇa fame. Such examples can be multiplied to any extent. There are innumerable references to weapons having unlimited destructive power when used along with magic chants, such as Brahmāstra. One can infer from this (and some actually do) that a highly developed technology existed in those times. DPC is using such methods to find evidence in ancient literature of a primitive society as are capable of supplying evidence that, like a boomerang, would recoil on him and prove to the contrary that the society reflected in it was technically far advanced than the present-day society boasting of its achievements.

*Prakṛti in Sāṃkhya* : Building castles in the air

Coming to the concept and term *Prakṛti* in Sāṃkhya which DPC regards as an indicator of the importance of woman in primitive societies and relates it to the worship of woman in Tantrism, what are we to say about the occurrence of the same term in Pāṇinian grammar? Is it also a heritage of a primitive society? Surely, DPC is confounding grammatical gender with sex. With his peculiar view regarding feminine words in technical works, he may also like to bring even Vedānta under the roof of materialism on the basis of important feminine words like Avidyā, Māyā etc. Is he aware that Sanskrit language has words meaning a wife in all the three genders (bhāryā f., dāra m., kalatra n.)? Even if the grammatical gender is supposed to be related to sex, it would be a gross mistake to take as a basis for building up social theory the metalanguage in scientific works which is exclusively decided by definitions. Building up a theory on the basis of a feminine word, DPC rounds up Vaiśeṣika atomism with materialism despite the fact that the Vaiśeṣika word for an atom is paramāṇu, a masculine word. Are Vaiśeṣikas also related to Tantrism, male-oriented in this case?

If DPC's theory is extended to other areas of life, we will have to conclude that feminine words denoting parts of body (such as nāśikā, jihvā, yoni, kaṭi, jaighā...) imply a female-dominated society. Its corollary would be that heart (hṛdaya), being neuter, was the last part of the body to be identified. On the basis of this hypothesis, we can assume that the parts in feminine gender were the earliest to be identified. DPC owes special thanks to Sanskrit
language for its arbitrary scheme of genders of nouns providing an unthought-of source for his research. The only question he has to answer is whether this theory is applicable to societies speaking languages which lack this characteristic. English, for example, has the use of masculine and feminine genders limited only to words denoting men and women, all the rest being generally treated as having the neuter gender. English shares this feature with many other languages with minor variations. In the light of DPC's theory that female domination indicates an agricultural society, would it be reasonable to conclude that speakers of these languages skipped some stages of development? The basic weakness of DPC's theory is that he bases his social theory on linguistic facts which vary from language to language and, hence, are unreliable as a scientific evidence; and, even in doing so, he takes this evidence to areas of study in which meanings of words are controlled not by convention, but by definition.

**Woman as a link between Tantrism and Sāṃkhya**

This brings us to a seminal question: is Tantrism necessarily centred round woman as the creative force as DPC maintains? Tantrism in India has both male as well as female deities as its objects of worship, of which only the female element attracts DPC's attention. What about the Tantric traditions highlighting male as the creative force, as, for example, the Śiva sect is, with 'phallus' (liṅga) as the symbol of its deity? Is it (male-oriented Tantrism) reflected in any philosophical system as, for instance, the female-oriented Tantrism is, according to DPC, in the Sāṃkhya system? Perhaps, DPC would like to associate Vaiśeṣikas with male Tantrism, as they regard paramāṇu, atom, masculine in gender, as the ultimate cause of the world (a perfect symbolic description of phallus), and are traditionally associated with the Śiva sect. In this way, any philosophical system, or, for that matter, any discourse in Sk tradition, necessarily using masculine and feminine words which abound in Sanskrit, can be associated with Tantrism, male or female, or both; and all Sanskrit literature can be brought under a single banner of Tantrism. This will show again that DPC is illogically mixing up philosophical systems with linguistic traits and social history, blissfully unaware of the logical conclusions that inevitably follow his presumptions. He is putting together unrelated areas to justify his favourite theory.
To show how irrelevant DPC is, I am tempted to cite the tradition of Sanskrit grammar known as Harināmāṁśita. This tradition explains Sanskrit grammar by using terms resembling, but different from, the grammatical terms in vogue. For example, vibhakti in Pāṇinian grammar is Viṣṇubhakti in it. Does it establish any natural relation between grammar and the devotional sect? As the author of the Harināmāṁśita grammar himself declares, his purpose is only to promote merit of the student by inducing him to utter God-related words while he studies grammar. Tantra and the Sāṁkhya system, too, do not have any natural relation; imagination of such a relation may, if at all, promote the merit of a Marxist if he cares to study Sāṁkhya.

Obsessed with the element of woman as a link between anything and Tantra, DPC discovers succour from an unexpected direction. In a story related to the Sāṁkhya tradition occurring in the Mahābhārata, the name Kapila is found as Kapilā being the name of the wife of Āsuri, a celebrated authority of the system and traditionally the teacher of Pañcaśīkha, another authority. What is unusual in this story is that this Kapilā is said to have breast-fed Pañcaśīkha, which DPC interprets to mean that she tutored him in the system, and raises the question whether the originator of the Sāṁkhya system was a male or a female. (p. 364) DPC would be happy if the second alternative prevails; for it would smoothen his way to establish Lokāyata-Sāṁkhya-Tantra axis. But I have discussed elsewhere in this article the hazards of seeing history in ancient stories interpreted at will. In a story of a similar nature occurring in the Padmapurāṇa (Uttara-khaṇḍa) in praise of the greatness of the Bhāgavata Purāṇa, the sage Gokarna is said to have been born of a cow and, consequently, having cow-like ears which gave him his name. How is DPC going to interpret it? I wonder how a useful reference in the Brahmasūtra of Bādarāyaṇa escaped the notice of DPC. He would have found the sūtra I.1.3, śāstrayonītvāt, involving the word yoni, to be an evidence for aligning with Tantra even Vedānta, presumably in its older version as in the case of Sāṁkhya.

This habit of sky-rocketing on the basis of solitary words usual with DPC's style is the most disqualifying factor in his research. Speaking of the name Kapila/ā cited above, does he know that as an adjective it simply means tawney-coloured and may have (but not necessarily) the colour of the eyes
of the person concerned as the reason why it was selected as his / her name. In other words, there may be several Kapilas / Kapilās, including even the present-day cricketer. Even a tawney-coloured cow is named Kapilā, even today. This would take the wind out of his novel suggestions of identifying Kapilavastu of the Buddha as the native place of the originator of the Sāṃkhya system, and Kapila, the son of Prahlāda, an asura, with Kapila the Sāṃkhya. DPC may note that there is also a place named Kapilatīrtha in Kolhapur in Maharashtra; it may help him to extend the area of influence of Kapila and materialism. Some years ago, Vātsāyana, a contemporary celebrity from India, is said to have visited Indian Embassy abroad, where, in a reception in his honour, he was introduced as the author of the famous ancient Sanskrit work on erotics, the Kāmasūtra! We need not laugh at the embassy people for their ignorance.

**Primitive society in the Rgveda?**

While referring to Vedic passages making a reference to Gaṇapati, is DPC aware that there is a whole sūkta in the Rgveda devoted to thoughts on gambling presented in a poetic way as the monologue of a gambler. It strikes the repenting note of a gambler who has lost all his possession in a bait. There are likewise references in Vedic literature to theft, excessive drinking of liquor as well as womanisation. Now, even by Marxist standards, gambling etc. cannot be regarded as a natural development in a primitive society; it is necessarily an evil, an economically developed society breeds. The very fact that some seer thought of using language effectively for this purpose reflects an advanced stage of a language and literature that no primitive society can be reasonably associated with. And that is not all. Besides compositions displaying considerable poetic quality, Vedic literature proves its strength of handling topics of philosophical significance with supreme confidence. Can these be explained on the presumption of a primitive society? Modern surveys reveal that backward social groups use a language with a poor vocabulary of a few hundred words and coarse grammatical structure putting severe limitations to their ability to think. In the light of these findings revealing essential relationship between language and social development, would it be reasonable to maintain that the Vedic society with a highly developed language and literature was little more than a primitive society? Reference
may be made to another Rgvedic sūkta which portrays Indra jabbering under the effect of excessive drinking. Apart from the very unique, highly literary idea of composing such a hymn, it may be legitimately asked if such an event and its expression is possible in a primitive society.

Marxist Utopia and exploitation

DPC positions materialism against idealism, and, following in the footsteps of Marx and his followers, talks of the Utopia that the primitive human society was, and criticises surplus production as the root cause of exploitation. With Utopia as an ideal of human relations, it would be idle to speak of materialism and idealism as opposing outlooks. Secondly, all talk of Utopia is founded on the wrong presumption that it is possible to manage a society in isolation. The stark reality is that, given the possibility of inter-communication, no intelligent society can think of going its own way except at the cost of being severed from the rest of the world and, by implication, from better means of livelihood and openings for development.

Tantra and Tantrism

DPC relates Sāṁkhya to Lokāyata through Tantrism on the slender basis of the Sāṁkhya being referred to as a Tantra by Śaṅkara. This effort is as funny as one to relate grāmasinha (dog) to simha (lion) or gehesūra (coward) to sūra (brave)! And he thinks that the etymology of the word Tantra supports his conclusions!! Judicious thinkers do not rely on etymologies of words when they are interested in a serious dialogue, knowing that, whatever the etymology, words denote the conventional meaning. And as to Śaṅkara, he uses the term Tantra as much to refer to Sāṁkhya as to Vaiśeṣika. (Vide Brahmaśūtra-bhāṣya 2-2-17) Leaving Śaṅkara aside, how would DPC account for the use of the term Tantra in such words as śalyatantra, prasūttitantra, pañcatantra, kātantra, and above all, svatantra and paratantra? As with the word Tantra, DPC has fumbled with the pronominal feminine form kāṁcana in the passage ‘na kāṁcana pariharet’ (‘one should never abstain from any woman’—DPC’s translation) in the Chāndogya II.13.2, which he understands to mean any woman (p. 66), not aware that it can, and, in the context, legitimately does, refer to one’s wife. These instances show the weaknesses of a researcher who has no access to the first sources; and DPC admits that
he knows no Sanskrit and has to rely on translations of Sanskrit works. The other alternative conclusion is that he purposely avoids evidence that would damage his theory. It is for him to choose between the charges of being uncritical and dishonest.

Sāṁkhyā, Yoga and Vedānta

DPC's basic presumption is that the original Sāṁkhyā is materialistic and akin to Lokāyata. So he owes an explanation of the non-materialistic elements in Sāṁkhyā. How does he meet with this problem? With reference to the oldest extant work on Sāṁkhyā, Īśvarakṛṣṇa's Sāṁkhya-kārikā, he observes: 'The author of the Kārikā wanted to graft upon the Sāṁkhyā system certain elements of idealistic thought, evidently borrowed from the Vedāntic circle.' This, he thinks, 'resulted in internal inconsistency in his work.' (p. 371) Weigh this view with Īśvarakṛṣṇa's own statement at the end of his work that he has presented the tenets of the system as reaching him through an unbroken tradition starting from Kapila, but in an abridged form (kārikā 69). Who should we consider is more reliable? And what is the basis on which to discredit Īśvarakṛṣṇa as unreliable? If Īśvarakṛṣṇa's inconsistencies, as DPC views them, make him unreliable, what evidence is there to prove that the original system itself did not have them? DPC is obviously influenced by Garbe who thinks that all appeal to śruti in the Sāṁkhya texts lying before us are subsequent additions. (p. 380).

Īśvarakṛṣṇa, in kārikā 2, enumerates reasons why Vedic ritual is unacceptable as a means of permanent and final liberation from suffering. DPC reads in it Sāṁkhyā objection to the validity of the Vedas. (p. 378) The same view is shared even by Vedānta, to be found expressed in the Upanisads too. (Vide Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad I. 7.) What is materialistic in it? This view denies the efficacy of the Vedic ritual, not of knowledge. This, when read with a later reference to scriptures as a means of knowledge, led DPC to find an inconsistency / contradiction in the Kārikā which he attributes to the author's 'compromise', concluding therefrom the character of the earlier Sāṁkhyā as materialistic (p. 380). What Sāṁkhyā is emphasizing in the kārikā under discussion is the inability of the Vedic ritual to produce permanent results, leading to a search for other means for a permanent
solution to the problem of getting rid of suffering. This implies his acceptance of the Vedic ritual as a restricted means of the objective and not a total disapproval.

DPC thinks that ‘as contrasted with Prakṛti, Puruṣa in the Sāṃkhya was secondary or a-pradhāna, udāśina.’ (p 383) How did such a principle creep into the system? ‘The whole thing was surreptitiously borrowed by some later exponent of Sāṃkhya (DPC means Īśvarakṛṣṇa) from the circle of philosophers who were really the followers of the Vedas.’ (p. 384) Further, ‘the place of the Puruṣas... is utterly unimportant and even redundant or superfluous.’ (p. 385) This is all confusion. Space is inactive in the process of creation. Is it unimportant? Puruṣa is a class, a principle. A scientist has nothing to do with activity or otherwise of his subject. He just observes. What is the place of the myriad stars above us in our daily life, except, of course, those taken note of by astrologers? Are they, too, redundant or superfluous? What use are winter days to us to deserve notice in our calendars? They must be superfluous. Wonderful logic! What does DPC think about the substance called a ‘catalytic agent’ in scientific terminology? Utterly useless, as it stays inactive and unaffected in electrolysis. Is not the scientist obliged to say so? The duty of a scientist is to observe and present his conclusions on the support of evidence, not by choice or at will. Sāṃkhya view of Prakṛti and Puruṣa is thus the result of scientific thinking, not prompted by Īśvarakṛṣṇa’s likes or dislikes. Such views create doubt about the very bona fides of DPC as a researcher. He has turned science into trade. This shows how a Marxist is in his subconscience dominated by trade unions!

Turning to Bādarāyaṇa and his Brahmasūtras (BS), DPC observes that, of the total 555 sūtras, 60 sūtras are devoted to refuting the Sāṃkhya, considered to be the ‘pradhāna-malla’, the chief opponent, as Śaṅkara deems him; but there is not a single sūtra to refute Lokāyata; for ‘to the author of the text, the refutation of the Sāṃkhya was all that was needed to refute the materialistic standpoint.’ (p. 374) This is absolutely wrong. BS 3-3-53 and 54 are sūtras exclusively dealing with and refuting the Lokāyata view with cogent arguments. As elsewhere, DPC is hiding this information from his readers only to damage his own credibility. Earlier on he has quoted only a part of Śaṅkara’s evaluation of Sāṃkhya. So does he tamper with Kauṭīlya
by quoting from his work an isolated reference to Lokāyata. No honest researcher would degrade himself into playing such tricks.

It is on the authority of Śaṅkara that DPC equates Sāmkhya with Tantra and further with Lokāyata, setting aside Śaṅkara’s evaluation of Sāmkhya as a system closest to the Vedic philosophy (vaidikasya darśanasya pratyāsannatvāt)—a compliment DPC omits while citing a passage in Brahmasūtra-bhāṣya (2-1-12) in which Śaṅkara praises the Sāmkhya, ‘however grudgingly’ (p. 364). This is another example of DPC playing tricks with evidence. (The other one being that of the term ‘Tantra’). He omits this portion because it is damaging to his theory of aligning Sāmkhya with Lokāyata. And if there is some evidence he is not free to omit, he chooses to abuse it as ‘highly deceptive’ (p. 364). To those who do not wish to lend themselves to DPC’s ways of misleading, a remark from an authority on Vedānta may show the facts in their true perspective : If Sāmkhya and Yoga give up their insistence on the following three points, there would be no difference between them and Vedānta—(i) that Puruṣas Selves/Souls) are many; (ii) that the world is real; and (iii) that the Universal principle and the Self are different. (Pañcadasī of Vidyāranya, VI. 228) But this valuation may be dubbed by DPC as based on an adulterated version of Sāmkhya resulting from Īśvarakṛṣṇa’s tampering of the original Sāmkhya in order to graft it on the Vedānta. (p 371)

Primitive conditions : Symptom of retarded society

What is objectionable in DPC’s argument is that he takes a static view of a thought, denying possibilities of further development thereof, and, like a true Marxist, views the primitive conditions as ideal, Utopian. (Yes, the Marxists, too, like idealists, have their own Utopia consistent with materialism.) This is the reason why he treats as adulteration the features of a system historically later to emerge. But thoughts, like those who create them, are never static, despite their champions’ claims to their static nature. The child develops with years its intellectual and psychological, no less than its physical, faculties; and what is natural at one stage is not so at the next. If a full grown man continues to take interest in toys fit for a child, instead of human ‘toys’, it is perhaps a case of retarded growth and a matter of worry
to be concerned. This is true of a society too. If after generation after
generations, it is not out of its primitive stage, it is a symptom of its retarded
condition. Given enough intellectual capital of its members and favourable
surroundings, a society is bound to change, however slowly, in the direction
of what is called civilisation. All effort to stall this process would be as futile
as one to stall the development of an individual. The development of thought
as the heritage of a society proceeds on similar lines from grosser to subtler,
from outer to inner, from surficial to fundamental, from force to psychological
approach, from object to subject. All talk of going back to primitive conditions
is as ridiculous as that of turning a grown up man into a child again.

Epilogue:

Motivated research

The common characteristic of all the books on Cārvāka listed at the
opening of this article is that they are, on the whole, the outcome of a
motivated research. An attempt is apparent in these books to raise Cārvāka
in status and thus compensate for his despised position for centuries, and
thereby providing an ancient basis for some modern movements / outlooks
of their authors’ liking. Thus DPC is interested in establishing roots of
materialism, styled also as Marxism, in ancient Indian thought, while
Salunkhe sees in Cārvāka an ancient champion of anti-Brahmanism and / or
anti-Vedism. Both have based their conclusions on imaginative interpretations
of material from mythical and poetic works which have no place in scientific
discussions, along with philosophical and other treatises which are admissible
as reliable sources,—all in Sanskrit. What distinguishes DPC from others in
his decent language characteristic of serious research and his anxiety to
support his views by quoting from a wide range of literature. He claims no
first hand knowledge of Sanskrit sources, and, as such, he has to rely on
English translations thereof. Salunkhe is a Sanskritist and writes with a
missionary /adolescent zeal that knows no bounds in reaching conclusions
and attacking an adversary.

Imaginative school of research

DPC’s claims made in behalf of Cārvāka, shared by others listed at the
beginning of this article, show that a distinct school of research—the
imaginative school—is spreading, like an epidemic, with unprecedented speed, in humanity subjects. This conclusion is supported by DPC himself when he says that his is a 'systematic effort to study ancient Indian philosophy from the materialistic point of view' and that 'it has to be highly argumentative'; for, he argues, 'What we are actually left with are merely a few fragmentary survivals of Lokāyata...of those who wanted only to refute and ridicule it.' He, therefore, believes that 'Lokāyata thus remains to be reconstructed from the essentially hostile references to it.' (Preface to Lokāyata, pp. xiii and xv.) This explains why imagination plays the key-role in the writings of those who are for the resurrection of Cārvāka. We do not find this type of research / scientific discourse in ancient Indian tradition; it is a gift from the West—a boon to motivated research which inevitably leads to predetermined conclusions. The magic touch of the hand of Midas changed everything into the coveted precious metal; DPC's Marxist touch changes everything into materialism. What worries a discrete mind on seeing such a huge intellectual expenditure over anything but substantial is : in what way is human thought benefitted or furthered by such ventures founded basically on imagination?

This, ultimately, leads us to a more serious question : does imagination which can at best indicate possibilities have a respectable place in a scientific discussion which requires its conclusions to be based on certainty ? The difference between a possibility and a probability may be a point in a practical approach; for science, these two are no more than aspects of the same phenomenon. Unless a possibility is converted into a certainty by an unchallengeable proof, no guess can hope to be raised to the status of a scientific one. Till this stage is reached, all theories stand on the same level; and priorities are a matter of subjective views. This should not and must not prevent one from making and presenting enquiries at the sight of possibilities. What is to be noted is that an enquiry may start, but not end, with mere possibilities.

This discussion may not be construed to mean a denial of the existence of sects in India centred around woman and sex and all that goes with a licentious way of life as part of religious practices. They were, are, and will be there under one pretext or the other, even justifiably, as long as human
The Resurrection of Cārvāka

society is what it is. What is objected to is the unrestricted use of imagination in drawing biased conclusions based on data, at times partially presented, interpreted with prejudice by ignoring the context, going under the name of scientific research.

**Forces: Natural and Cultural**

All culture has developed as a counter-balancing psychological human invention to make social life possible and progressive against the natural forces of self-interest, greed, vices, immunity to the interests of fellow creatures, appropriation of others' assets by brutal force, and thus protect interests of humanity in exclusion of other forms of life. It would be worthwhile to see how culture achieves this end with its multi-pronged approach. It all starts with generating group interests to curb individual interests. This means creating a group ego side by side with the individual ego which is instinctive. An individual can be persuaded to surrender or delimit some of his interests when he is convinced that individual interests are best protected by the protection of the group interests. This is the beginning of the process we call reasoning which is corroborated particularly when groups are attacked by foreign groups. Success or failure in such events must have led people to form larger groups with increased power of group action which eventually developed into states. The so called primitive democracies form part of this process of boosting group strength.

With the evolution and growth of groups came the need to form rules as an objective machinery to resolve internal conflicts which, considering the human nature as it is, were bound to arise. In the wake of the rules came a machinery to enforce them in case individuals, as a matter of instinct, tended to violate them. This is the beginning of what we now call law and administration. The 'communistic' rules which the primitive societies formed and followed were the precursors of the 'values' in more developed cultures. Even religion played its role in containing the human instincts. If values in any form cannot exist without faith, which is after all a cultivated view, why a faith in the unseen be labeled as 'out of bounds'. The concept of the State is thus a natural development of the organisation of human society and in no way something that ruined the primitive tribal democracies. Tribal
democracies died because they could not survive in changed circumstances. Even tribal groups on their way to becoming states fight with each other for material or imaginary, even flimsy, reasons that hurt their group ego as illustrated by the war between Kosala and Magadha on the score of dowry unpaid. DPC assigns the responsibility of this war to the emergence of states, presuming that tribal groups never fight each other. Even today fights are not uncommon among the urban as well as rural groups. Nothing but prejudice can explain persistence in the view that social evils are the result only of civilization including religion. Cases after cases of corruption against political leaders today are enough to falsify this claim. Human nature is instinctively prone to go to any extent for personal gains.

All roads lead to faith

How to counter this nature has been a matter of worry for cultured minds for ages. No way has been found out of this situation except education in a wider sense in various forms. Education is the cultivation of social qualities which is based on the distinction between good and bad which is a matter of faith. Once this is realised, it carries little weight to argue about the foundation of faith, this-worldly or other-worldly. Whatever the foundation, it is the result that matters for a practical man. That is the reason why the author of Arthaśāstra, an expounder of stark politics, advises the rulers to see that the established social order based on religious faith is scrupulously maintained. But prejudiced research finds in his work a reference to the study of Lokāyata in exclusion of what he states elsewhere. It is not 'judicial blindness', to quote Marx's words?
Valahassajataka and Telapattajataka

Siegfried Lienhard

The legend of the merchant Simhala as it appears in the later Sanskrit versions contained in the Mahavastu, the Divyavadana, the Karanadvyaha, the Gunakaranadvyaha as well as in the Newari recensions looks back on a long development. While its beginnings cannot be exactly localized in time, there is no doubt whatsoever that many persons worked on the narrative over a period of centuries and, attuned to new aims with the passages of time, often changed, supplemented and elaborated on it. Standing at the beginning of the development, it seems, is the Valahassajataka, ‘The Reincarnation Story of (the flying steed) Valaha’, which was composed not in Sanskrit but in Pali, the language of Theravada Buddhism. What is remarkable is that in this early version, contained in the Jakata collection of the Pali recension of the Buddhist canon, we do not yet meet the merchant Simhala, the later hero of the Simhalavadana.

The high point of the relatively short Pali version is the episode of the white and — according to this text — crow-headed steed Valaha, who, as in the later versions, saves five hundred shipwrecked merchants. In this account, too, the witches’ city, here called Sirisavatthu, is located on Sri Lanka. Whenever merchants suffer shipwreck on the island, the witches regale them, pitiable and stranded that they are, with drinks and savory dishes. They allege that their husbands are merchants, whom, however, they are forced to assume to be dead, as they have undertaken a voyage by ship but have not yet returned, although three years have passed. In the Pali version, too, the witches deceive their newly arrived guests, whom they lead to their city Sirisavatthu. The men soon succumb to the alluring women’s charms. However, this deception is not long-lived: Whenever persons turn up shipwrecked off the island’s shores, those who had before them are put in
chains and thrown in prison. And so it happened when, one day, a large caravan with five hundred shipwrecked merchants went ashore on Sri Lanka. The witches again sported in games of love with the merchants, who were easily lured into their nets. The eldest witch chose the eldest merchant as her friend. After the latter had fallen into a deep sleep, she went to the witches' prison in order to slay the men held captive there and to eat their flesh. When she returned and they both again embraced, the merchant noticed that her body emitted a coldness, and immediately suspected that the friendly being must in reality be a dangerous witch who ate human flesh. The next day, when he revealed the truth to his men, only two hundred fifty believed his words of warning, and thus only half of the trading company fled. Now, the Bodhisattva, i.e. the future Buddha, had been born at this time in the form of a white-coloured horse, and it was on Sri Lanka, as it happened, that he was sojourning, eating grass. When he compassionately called out three times to see whether anybody was there who wanted to return home, the fleeing men made themselves known immediately. At the horse's invitation some climbed on his back, while others clasped his tail, and still others held their place with folded hands. The Bodhisattva saved them all, but the witches ate the two hundred and fifty merchants who remained behind.

As we see, in this Jātaka the horse Valāha, or Valāhassa, is identified with the Venerable One, whereas in the version of the legend contained in the Guṇakāraṇḍavyūha and in the Newārī version, the rescuing horse is taken to be a manifestation of Avalokiteśvara. As for the plot, the episodes of the first part of the later versions differ only slightly from the events recounted in the Valāhassajātaka. Substantial differences can be seen, in the main, only in those particular elements which lead gradually, after the pairs have been formed, to the flight of the merchants. Whereas in the later versions it is the caravan leader who leaves his bed at night and, having come to the witches' prison, recognizes the extreme threat of the situation, in the Pāli narrative, the eldest witch having stolen off for a short time, it is the renewed embrace which triggers the eldest merchant's plan to flee. Those who carry the action forward in the version in Pāli are again the five hundred tradešmen and witches as well as, in the last part, the Buddha, reborn as a miraculous
horse. Only the head witch and the eldest merchant, moreover, stand out as individuals clearly identifiable as such, though the role of the latter in the Nepalese tradition and in the versions of the Kāraṇḍa- and Gaṇakāraṇḍavyūha is no longer anonymous, but has crystallized into the figure of Simhala, the young, handsome and pious son from a rich merchant’s house. It is worth noting that the pretext of being widowed merchants’ wives, and as such objects of pity, is obviously meant to excuse the lust of the Ceylonese witches, but this psychologically quite subtle nuance, which figures only in the Pāli version, was no longer held to be so important in the later period⁴.

The narrative of the Valāhassajātaka extends up only to the rescue of the eldest merchant and—according to this version—also half of his followers. A story which presumably represents the pattern used for the fable’s continuation spun out in the other versions is recounted, surprisingly in another reincarnation story in Pāli, the Telapattajātaka⁵, whose hero, however, appears not as a seafaring merchant but as the Bodhisattva, i.e. the future Buddha, in his former existence as one of the hundred sons of King Brahmadatta of Benares. It has been prophesied to the young prince that he would never ascend his father’s throne, but rather would be crowned king of Takṣaśilā⁶ in the far-off land of Gandhāra. The prophecies, however, would only be fulfilled if the prince was able to defy the dangers lying in wait for all sojourners on the road to Gandhāra: in a large forest live witches⁷ who, able to infatuate men with their charms, continuously invite weary travellers for a refreshing drink. Once they have seduced their guests, they murder them and devour their barely cold corpses.

The prince fares forth. He is accompanied by five men of the court who, in spite of his warning, want to go along at all costs. The first of them is a savorer of beauty, the second a music enthusiast, the third a connoisseur of select aromas, the fourth a gourmet and the fifth a lover of great comforts. When they reach the witches’ villages together with the prince, all five fall victim in turn to the witches’ seductive arts. Only the king’s son remains steadfast. But when he moves on, one of the witches follows him. She tells the people living in the forest that she is the prince’s spouse, and though the prince denies this, the forest dwellers give her a ready ear. She even produces a son later and, child in arm, follows in the tracks of the prince. When the
two arrive in Takṣaśilā, the witch makes her small son disappear and waits, radiating in the sheen of her beauty, in front of the house where the king’s son has found lodging. It so happens that the king of Takṣaśilā just then comes past. He is blinded by the witch’s charms and learns that the beautiful lady is the wife of a prince who has just come to Takṣaśilā. The king now has the stranger to his city summoned but, like the people in the forest, does not believe the prince’s words. He invites the beautiful woman into his palace, passes an evening in her company and finally, exhausted from the joys of love, falls into sleep. The witch immediately fetches her companions. While she eats the king up, her female comrades exterminate the remaining being in and around the palace. Since bones are lying in front of the palace the next day and the palace gate remains closed, the subjects come together and elect as their king the prince who had remained steadfast in spite of all temptations.

It is interesting to note that individual elements of the fable just depicted are also met with in the account of the colonization of Sri Lanka, as rendered in two important chronicles of Ceylon composed in Pāli, the Mahāvarṇaśa⁶ and, in shorter format, the Dīpavarṇaśa⁹. As these two works based on the historical tradition of old commentaries (aṭṭhakathā) report, the daughter of a king once coupled with a lion in India, and out of this unusual bond came both a son, Sīhabāhu (Skt. Simhabāhu)¹⁰, who later became king of Lāla, this native land, and Sīvalī, a daughter. From the marriage of these two siblings sprang at last Vijaya, a surely prince and the eldest of a total of 32 brothers, whom Sīhabāhu presently banned, placing him, together with seven hundred families, on an ocean-going ship with distant destination. After many adventures, Vijaya and his men reached the island of Sri Lanka, at the time populated only by snakes and various kinds of demonic beings, above all rākṣasas and yaksas. Near the yaksā-city Sirisavatthu, Vijaya meets a dangerous yakṣīṇī, a threat to his people, who later, after the two have dined together, turns herself into a beautiful 16-year-old girl. At her command Vijaya destroys numerous yaksas and afterwards takes up residence in the city he himself has founded, Tambapaṇṇi (Tāmrapaṇṇi), together with his yaksā wife and his men, who call themselves—after Sīhabāhu—Sīhalas (Skt. Simhala). Two children come out of this marriage, but hostile yaksas kill his
Valāhassajātaka and Telapattajātaka

spouse, and Vijaya, crowned king and ruling the whole of Ceylon, weds a second time. There is a magnificent wedding feast, and his bride and future queen is now no longer a yakṣinī but a real princess from South India.

As we see, the yakṣa-city here, as in the Valāhassajātaka, again bears the name Sirīsavatthu, and the witch is a yakṣinī who, at the suitable moment, takes on the appearance of a young and captivating girl.

Annotations:

* This article has originally been published in German and forms part of S. Lienhard, *Die Abenteuer des Kaufmanns Simhala. Eine nepālische Bilderrolle aus der Sammlung des Museums für Indische Kunst Berlin*, Berlin 1985 (S. 16 - 20). The English translation presented here is by Philip Pierce, Nepal Research Centre, Kathmandu.


2. The term applies in Pāli is yakhinī (Skt. yakṣinī) and not rāksasī (as in the Sanskrit texts).

3. The nounvalāhassa, ‘cloud horse’, as in the designation of a mythical steed is documented also in the *Samyuttanikāya* (III, 145). Instead of valāhassa, the formsvalāhaka or, in Sanskrit and Newāri texts, bālāha(ka) also occurs. It is worth noting that a horse of the breed of Valāhassarāja, ‘king of the cloud horses’, is numbered among the seven precious objects (sattaratana) belonging to the throne of a universal monarch, namely the sovereign’s wheel (cakka), state elephant (hatthi), state steed(assa, valāhaka), wish-granting jewel (mani), consort (ittthi), treasurer (gahapati) and field marshal or king’s advisor (parināyaka or senāpati). Thus in the “Mahāsudassanasuttanta”, *Dīghanikāya* II, p. 174 (PTS) the assaratanai, e. e. ‘the jewel horse’; is not only designated valāhaka, but also, exactly like the steed Valāha in the Valāhassajātaka, as sabbaseto kākasiso muñjakeso iddhimā veṭhāsamgamo, i. e. as ‘completely white, crow-headed, having a mane like muñja- grass, possessing supernatural powers
(and) flying through the sky. As H. von Stietencron 1972, p. 8f. has shown, the cloud horse is closely connected with the folk cult of yakṣas. Yakṣas and yakṣīs have as their mount (vāhana) a water or cloud horse, a normal horse or an animal half horse and half fish. Horses with magical powers also occur elsewhere in Indian literature. The steed Indrāyudha in Bāna’s Sanskrit novel Kādambari, for example, a present given by king Tārāpiḍa to his son, Candrāpiḍa, is a magical wonder horse, as is a horse named Manojava in Subandhu’s story Vāsavadattā.

4. Both the Kāraṇḍavyūha and the Gunakāraṇḍavyūha provide the reader only with the information that the witches are without husbands (Guṇak.: asvāmika), whereas the Newāri tradition represents the beautiful ladies not as widows at all but as young girls still unlearned in the ways of love.


6. Pāli Takkasilā.

7. The term used in the Pāli text is yakkhini (Skt. yakṣinī). Whereas most versions have the adventures of the hero transpiring in Ceylon, in that of the Telapattajātaka the witches’ mischief runs its course in or near Gandhāra in the extreme northwest of ancient India. The folk tradition of Nepal, in contrast, shifts the scene of action to Tibet.


10. I. e. ‘lion-armed’. In the Newāri tradition the hero of the Simha(la) legend is often called Simhalasārthabāha. This name, however, is hardly understood any longer by the youngest generations in its meaning ‘Simhala, the caravan leader’, but usually—in its entirety—taken as the personal name for the short form Simhala, appearing in Newāri usage often in the slightly corrupted form Simhalasārthabāhu.
Abbreviations


Notes on Avestic Asha ‘Truth’

Helmut Humbach

As is well-known, numerous phrases found in the Avesta have parallels in the Rgveda, both the Iranian and the Indian branch of the Aryan languages and literatures having inherited them from the Proto-Aryan period. Thus OAv. Y33, 5 erezūš pādo corresponds with RV1, 41, 5 ḯūnā pathā ‘straight path’, and YAv. Y10, 4 zam pereḏbēm corresponds with RV1, 67, 5 ksām prthīvim 'broad or spacious earth'.

A few of these phrases, Gaḍic as well as Young Avestic, show the term aša-/ṛta - ‘truth’ as one of their two members:

Y 31, 22 ašem hapti = RV5, 68, 4 ṛtam sapantā ‘observe / hold truth’;

Y 49, 9 aša.yuxta-(stem yuxt-) = RV10, 61, 10 ṛtayuktī - ‘yoking together with truth’.

Y 10, 4 ašahe xā = RV2, 28, 5 Khām ṛtasya ‘source of truth’;

Yt.10, 86 ašahe....paṇtam=RV5, 45, 8 ṛtasya pathā ‘path of truth’.

In the unspoken view of most scholars of Indo-Iranian, such correspondences justify the assumption that the meaning of Av. aša-exactly agrees with that of Ved. ṛta-, both of them continuing the meaning of their joint Proto-Aryan predecessor without any change. Yet this view seems to me too superficial, at least as far as the Avesta is concerned. The phrases just quoted are nothing but a sort of petrefacts from which only limited information can be drawn regarding the meaning of aša- in the entirety of its Avestic occurrences. As a matter of fact, there can be no doubt that the position of aša- in its semantic field and environment has undergone some notable changes in the Gāḍās of Zarathushtra, and some more in the Younger Avesta.
Whereas Vedic ṛṭa- always is non-personified, Gāoṭic aša- is a divine entity which can manifest itself as a cosmical power or divine quality (non-personified), and as a divine person (personified). In a phrase such as ašāt hacā ‘in accordance with truth’ personification is clearly ruled out whereas it is evident in the vocative case, e.g. in Y28, 5 aša kat vṛka darūsāṇī ‘O truth, shall I see you’. A typical Gāoṭic problem is just that due to the indistinctness of some transmitted forms of endings (ašā=voc. or instr. sg. or nom. acc. pl.), and even more due to the mystical ambiguity of the Gāoṭās it is difficult, if not impossible, to decide for non-personified or personified in the majority of the occurrences of aša-.

In the case of non-personification there is also ambiguity regarding non-materiality and materiality. In the passages in which Ahura Mazdā is said to be offered aša- by humans and in those in which humans are said to be granted aša- by Ahura Mazdā, materiality of aša- is as possible as immateriality. Most typical of this ambiguity are the passages in which aša- is the grammatical object of the root dā ‘to place, offer, grant’ in the meaning ‘to acquire, accept, obtain’ of its medial forms:

Y 34, 1 ašem....taibiiō dānhā ‘you (Ahura Mazdā) obtain truth’, i.e. ‘you obtain the truth offered to you at the actual ceremony’, in which not only the piety of the worshippers but also their ritual offering (myazd) are referred to;

Y 46, 15 ašdm xšmaibiiā daduiiē ‘you (human persons) will obtain truth’, i.e. ‘you will be granted bliss in this and / or the afterworld’ or ‘you will obtain material welfare’.

The reference to material welfare is unequivocal in the phrase astuuvat ašdm ‘corporeal truth’ found in Y 43, 16 in which Zarathushtra alludes to the Fraškōkōrōti, the renovation of the world at the end of time, and, at the same time, to the sacrificial fee to be paid in pieces of cattle etc. he is entitled to expect (cf. particularly Y44, 18-19 and 46, 19).

In the Gāoṭās, the inherited concept of aša - ‘truth’ has proliferated the concept of a group of divine entities, led by Ahura Mazdā and called Ahuras as attested in the phrase mazdāscā ahurānḥō ‘the Ahuras and (Ahura) Mazdā’ Y 30, 9 and 31, 4. Whereas the number of these Ahuras is as open in the
Gāthās as is the number of the Young Avestic Yazatas, that of the Young Avestic Amēṣa Spōṇtas is limited. Their canonical number is one-plus-six (= Ahura Mazdā plus six), and it is just Yt 13, 83 (=19, 16) in which we find the number one-plus-seven (= Ahura Mazdā plus seven) : yōi hapta hamō. mananjō yōi hapta hamō. vacanhō yōi hapta hamō. šiiao ṣānāhō...yaēsam asti hamō. ptācā fraśāstaca yodaspa ahuro mazdā ‘the seven (Amēṣa Spōṇtas) who are of the same manner of thinking....speaking.....acting.....whose father and master is the same, Ahura Mazdā, the creator.’

The picture reflected in the mystic poetry of the Gāthās does not necessarily agree with what Zarathushtra taught in prose all the major part of the Gāthā text was unintelligible to his adherents. The only Gāthic passage that could have some chance of being close to the prophet’s actual teachings regarding the Ahuras (> Ameṣa Spōṇtas) is Y 47, 1. In this stanza, the series maniiū - manah -, vacah-, šiiao ᵃṇā - 'spirit, thought, word, action' (cf. Y 30, 3 maniiū....manahicā vacahicā šiiao ᵃṇāi ‘both spirits, both thoughts, both words, both actions’) is artistically intercrossed with the series ahura- mazdā, spēṇta- maniiū-, aša-, vohu- manah-, xša ṣra-, ārmaiti-, hauruuaṭāt-, amōdōṭatāt- ‘Ahura Mazdā, holy spirit, truth, good thought, power/rule, right-mindedness, integrity/nectar (=liquid offering), immortality/ambrosia (=solid offering), thus describing Ahura Mazdā as being accompanied by seven divine entities (one-plus-seven) :

Y 47, 1. Spōṇta mainiiū vahištacā mananha
with holy spirit and best thought
hacā aṣat šiiao ᵃṇācā vacanhacā
with action and word in accordance with truth
ahmāi dan hauruuaṭā ameretatā
they shall offer Him nectar and ambrosia
mazdā xša ṣra akārmaiti ahuros

The Lord is Wise through power and right-mindedness.

There is an evident similarity between this Old Avestic Y 47, 1 which suggests the number one-plus-seven, and the Young Avestic Yt 13, 83 which expressly mentions this number. On the basis of this similarity one could hypothesize that Y 47, 1 reflects the real teaching of Zarathushtra but it is
equally possible that the number one-plus-seven of Yt 13, 83 is derived by priestly speculation from the Gāthā stanza.

The original precedence of aša- ‘truth’ over the other Ahuras is not perspicuous in Y 47, 1 formetrical reasons but it is ascertained by historical plausibility, by the overwhelming number of its occurrences in the Gāthās, and by Y 37, 1-5(Haptanhāiti), which has the one-plus-six series ahura mazdā, aša vahišta, vohu manah, vohu xša vṛa, vanhidaēnā, vanhifseratū, vanhī ārmatti. Yet a notable rearrangement must have happened in the canonical series of the Younger Avesta in which aša-, having ceded his precedence to Vohu Manah, was shifted to the second place. This rearrangement is also mirrored in the report of Plutarch de Iside et Osiride 47 according to whom Oromazes created six divinities, namely first Good Will (eunoia), second Truthfulness (alētheia), third Good Order (eunomia), fourth Sound Judgement (sophia), fifth Wealth (plūtos), sixth Producer of the pleasantness rewarding for good works (tōn epi tois kalois hēdeōn dēmiūrgos). The rearrangement is based on a speculative theological interpretation of Y 43, 7. 9. 11. 13. 15 spōnt dām at ṣbā mazdā mānhī ahurā hiat mā vohū pairī jasat mananhā as a recount by Zarathushtra on his legendary meeting with Vohu Manah, who came to guide him to the first audience granted him by Ahura Mazda. (Actually, the prophet describes himself as meditating in front of the holy fire).

The canonical number one-plus-six of the YAv. Amōsa Špēntas with the inversion of the precedence is found in Y 57, 24 ahurō mazdā ašāuua...vohu manō...aš dām vahīst dām...xša vṛ dām vairīm...xša vṛ dām vairīm...spēntā ārmaitiš...hauruuvatās...amōrētatas. The same can be detected in the Haft Amesaspand Yast (Yt 2, 1-3) and the two Sīrōzas (S1, 1-7, 2, 1-7). The Sīrōza occurrences particularly suggest that the development of the one-plus-six pattern is closely connected with the introduction of the Mazdayasnian calendar, which is customarily attributed to the period of the Younger Avesta.

The Pahlavi translation of the Gāthās tries to make a difference between the non-personified Ahurian concept ahlāyīh ‘truthfulness (often glossed by frārōnīh ‘honestly’) and the personified Ahura ašwahīšt, a differentiation which is appropriate in principle but which suffers very much from the translator’s
incompetence in matters of Avesta grammar. In his Sanskrit version of the Pahlavi Neriosangh simply renders așwahiśt by așawahiśta-. More notable is his rendering of ahlāyīh ‘truthfulness’ by the expected dharma- or, alternatively, by the unexpected punya- ‘religious merit’.

Also surprising is Neriosangh’s rendering of Phl. ahlaw ‘truthful’ by punyātman- ‘whose soul has religious merit, of meritorious soul’ or muktātman- ‘of emancipated soul’, and of Phl. druwand ‘deceitful’ by durgatimant - ‘unfortunate, distressful’. On this occasion he breaks the stereotype of the Pahlavi translation, obviously describing așa- as a condition that is enjoyed by pious people in both this world and the afterworld.

Av. așauwan- ‘truthful’ describes the condition of a pious person in this world in V 5, 61 juuascit nōit buuat așauua, mōascit nōit baxšait <e> vahištahe anhōuš = PhlT. ziwandag nē bawēd ahlaw [kū bē nē wisārēd ā-š] murd nē baxšēnd ān i pahlom axwān) ‘when living he cannot become truthful [i.e. he cannot expiate his soul], when he has died they will not allot to him the best existence’. In contrast, Old Persian rtāwān- is said of a person in the afterworld in Xerxes Ph 47-48 šiyyāta ahanīy jīva utā mṛta rtāvā ahanīy ‘happy may I be when living, and when dead may I be truthful (=blessed)’, and ibidem 54-56 hauv utā jīva šiyyāta bavatīy utā mṛta rtāwā bavatīy ‘he becomes happy while living, and becomes truthful (=blessed) when dead’.

A parallel of the Old Persian interpretation of the term is obvious in Mēnōy i Xrad 44, 34, which says of the inhabitants of Erān Wēz ka mīrēnd ahlaw hēnd ‘when they die they are truthful (=blessed)’ which in Neriosangh’s Sanskrit reads yadi (*yadā) mriyante muktā bhavanti ‘when they die they become emancipated’.
Avestan Eschatology

N. M. Kansara

The sacred literature produced by the efforts of the prophet Zarathushtra and his disciples, as well as the language of this literature, are generally designated 'Avesta' or Zend-Avesta. The word 'Avesta' however, does not occur in this earliest Iranian texts, but is found first in the Pahlavi, a language which came into existence in Iran after the extinction of the Avestan tongue as a vernacular. It designates the original Zoroastrian texts as Avastak, Avistak, or Avastak u Žand. The Pahlavi word 'Zand' has for its original Avestan 'Azainti' which means explanation. Hence, the expression 'Avastak u Zand' is generally taken to represent the original Avestan texts, together with the commentary upon them, in Pahlávi. 'Zand' refers to the short commentaries, rather explanatory glosses in the Avestan language itself upon the difficult Avestan texts, and found interspersed in the extant Avestan texts. At a later period the expression Zend-Avesta became more popular among the Zoroastrians of Persia and India, both as the name of the Zoroastrian scripture and their language. The ancient Iranians and the Vedic Indians, in their pre-historic home, spoke two dialects of one original language. As a result, there is a close affinity between Avesta, the sacred language of Ancient Iran, and Vedic Sanskrit, the sacred tongue of Ancient India. The resemblance is so great that, with careful observance of certain phonetic laws, the whole lines and stanzas may be converted, word for word, from the one language into the other. Apart from certain distinctive idioms, the grammar and syntax of both languages are closely similar. Avesta is the sister language of Vedic Sanskrit1. Thus, 'Zand' would immediately remind us about 'Chandas' the name by which Pāṇini refers to the Vedic Sanskrit in his Aṣṭādhyāyī². The Gāthās, being the oldest part of the Avesta, embody the veritable words of Zarathushtra, and are akin to the verses of the Vedic bards. They contain the
teachings of the Prophet, summed up in metrical stanzas which he composed as a nucleus of his discourses.

Among the nations of antiquity there seems to have been none else, except the Vedic ones, that had a more clearly developed system of eschatology, a firmer conviction of the immortality of the soul, and a surer belief in a resurrection and a future life, than had the ancient Iranians as can be judged from their sacred literature. Through all the writings of Zoroastrianism runs a stain of hope that the good will be rewarded hereafter and the wicked punished; that right will triumph and evil will be vanquished; that the dead shall arise and live again; and that the world will be restored to perfection so that joy and happiness may reign supreme. In the Gāthās themselves, the pious expectation of a new order of things is the motif upon which Zarathushtra rings continual changes.

The Avesta and the Pahlavi texts often refer to a new era and the rejuvenation as frasokereti and fraskart, respectively. In this way the millennium is really the preparation of all mankind for eternity and perfection of the world, a blessed consummation in which man should have a share. At the great crisis or final change of the world there will be a decisive division and separation of the evil from the good, and a complete establishment of Ahura’s sovereignty, ‘the Good Kingdom’. This dogma of a ‘new heaven and a new earth’ is found both in the Gāthās and in the Younger Avesta. It is decidedly a millennial doctrine which is closely associated with the belief in the coming of a saviour (Saosyant) and the resurrection of the dead.

In Gāthā Ushtavaiti, Zarathushtra declares his message of immortality saying: ‘All those who will give hearing for Meunto this one (the prophet) will come unto Salvation and Immortality through the works of the Good Spirit.’ Zarathushtra’s pre-eminent concern with the bearing of eschatology was on conduct, as can easily be seen from a study of the Gāthās. Faith and works form the foundation of the doctrine of salvation in the religion of Ancient Iran. A belief in the freedom of the will, in the acknowledgment of man’s ability to choose the right or to choose the wrong, and in his consequent responsibility to his Creator, lies at the basis of the moral and ethical system.
of the Zoroastrian religion, which above all emphasizes the existence of the two warring principles of Good and Evil, Light and Darkness. To guide man to the choice of right, and thus to assure his gaining the eternal salvation, was the very purpose of Zarathushtra's mission upon earth\textsuperscript{11}.

According to Zoroastrianism, death means the cessation of physical life, caused by the separation of the soul from the body\textsuperscript{12}. According to the Iranian Bundahishn, the five constituents of human personality, which are body (\textit{tan}), life or vitality (\textit{jān}), soul (\textit{ruvān}), form (\textit{ēvēnak}), and Fravashi (\textit{frōhar}), are separated at death; the body returns to the earth, the life to the wind, the form to the sun, and the soul is joined to the Fravashi, so that the soul cannot be destroyed\textsuperscript{13}. As to the fate of the soul (\textit{urvan} or \textit{ruvān}) immediately after death, the Gāthās do not provide us with a clear picture. The later Avesta, however, contains several passages explicitly describing how the soul of the righteous or of the wicked is believed to hover near its earthly tenement, in confidence or in fear, for three days and three nights before it passes to the individual judgment. The Pahlavi and the Parsi-Persian texts not only paraphrase the Avestan material with elaboration of detail but also contribute some new ideas concerning the state of the soul during this period of suspense\textsuperscript{14}. According to the description in the Hadhokht Nask, when a righteous man passes away, his soul takes his seat near the head, chanting the sacred hymns and proclaiming the happiness which Ahura Mazda will accord to the blest. On the first night his soul experiences as much joy as all that which he experienced as a living being. On the second night and the third one, it continues. Thus during the first, second, and third nights after death the soul of the pious sings in exultation the Song of Salvation, beginning with the verse: \textit{usta ahmai yahmai usta kahmaicit}. The Avestan texts do not state explicitly what other experiences befall the soul of the pious during these three nights, but we may infer from the developments in the Pahlavi literature\textsuperscript{15} that the demon Vizaresha, who awaits the soul at the Chinvat Bridge\textsuperscript{16}, makes a fruitless attack on it beforehand and struggles in vain to capture it. In the attempt the other 'wicked malicious demons' may be thought to join, namely those who 'cut the thread' of life\textsuperscript{17}, and especially Asto-vidhātu and the evil Vayu, who would naturally seek to ill the soul as they do the body\textsuperscript{18}. Probably for that reason the angel Sraosha is
invoked in the Avesta to protect in both lives against the onslaughts of Aēshma, which the evil-minded Aēshma, together with the demon-created Vidhati, launches\textsuperscript{19}. Contrary to the spirit of the Avesta, the Pahlavi writers picture the newly departed soul as more or less helpless, and they indulge in elaborate descriptions of how it must rely upon the righteous Srōsh for protection from evil influences, and the surviving relatives are expected to properly propitiate him, so that he will afford his guardianship to the soul\textsuperscript{20}. In accordance with the Zoroastrian fondness for symmetry, the experience of the soul of the wicked, as it lingers in anguish near the body, is the exact opposite in every detail to that of the righteous soul. The description given in the Hadhokht Nask informs us that during the first, second, and third nights after death the soul of the wicked cries aloud the Wail of Woe, the Gāthā of lamentation, which begins with the verse: *kam namōi zam kuora namoi ayenī*. The cause of these lamentations of the soul is obviously the fact that, besides the mental anguish suffered on account of a life spent in sin, there is the prospect of the impending doom at the Chinvat Bridge\textsuperscript{21}. The concept of the Daēnā, or Conscience, and the rôle it plays in determining man’s destiny hereafter, is one of the fundamental doctrines of Zarathushtra and forms a keynote of his eschatological teachings in the Gāthōs. Man is endowed with free will. Though helped by the teachings of the Prophet, which are the revelation of the good laws of Mazdāh, it is left entirely to man to make a free choice between the Two Principles, the warring kingdoms of Good and Evil\textsuperscript{22}. It is the wise who choose aright, and who, by their good thoughts, words, and deeds, acquire merit in this life and felicity in the life hereafter. The foolish, on the other hand, do not choose rightly, but, yielding to the temptation of evil thoughts, words, and deeds, bring misery upon themselves in the present world and damnation in the next\textsuperscript{23}. Therefore, the Daēnā of the wicked destroys the verity of the Right Way for him, and his soul will suffer anguish at the Judgment of the Chinvat Bridge, having strayed from the Path of Asha through his own deeds and tongue\textsuperscript{24}. Wholly in the spirit of the Gāthōs is the beautiful conception of the later scriptural writings, according to which the Conscience comes to greet
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the soul at the dawn of the fourth day after death, either in the form of a lovely maiden, or in the shape of a hideous hag. The maiden appears amid a breath of balmy wind, fragrant with scents and perfumes; the hag arrives amid the chill of a foul blast heavy with sickening stench. According to the account given in the Dātastān i Mēnūk i Khrat, the soul of the righteous commences its journey to the great beyond with the help of the powers of Good, but not without facing opposition and impediments thrown in its way by the powers of Evil. The latter are ever eager to drag it to hell, without making any distinction whether it be a righteous or a wicked soul, and without waiting for the trial which it must undergo at the Judgment Seat before its destiny is determined. The Denkart informs that if a person becomes a follower of the Principle of Evil by doing deeds that help sinfulness, the Daēnā appears in the guise of a courtesan, who drags him to hell. The Shkand-vimanik Vichār also furnishes the converse picture to that of the lovely damsel, namely the ghastly form of the courtesan, who is a tormentor and comes to meet the wicked soul with the store of its sin. However, the Iranian Bundahishn supplements its account of the hideous Hag, in contrast with the Maiden, by logically adding a lean cow and a barren garden to offset the figure of the milch-cow and the flourishing vineyard seen by the soul of the righteous. No sooner has the wicked breathed the stench of a foul wind than he beholds these frightful apparitions. They are the grim messengers of the coming retribution; and the soul, filled with anguish, questions each of them in turn as to its significance, and learns in answer that each typifies the individual Conscience (dēn), evil in thought, word, and deed, as the result of a life of sin in this world.

The soul now stands at the Individual Judgment in the presence of one or more heavenly assessors before whom the life-account is rendered. The good and evil deeds are weighed in the balance; and the final decision is made according to the turn of the scales, which are counterpoised with perfect justice. Next comes the crossing of the Chinvat Bridge, the Bridge of Judgment, over which the righteous and the wicked alike must pass—the one to felicity, the other to damnation. This doctrine of an individual judgment at the Bridge is clearly discernible throughout the Zoroastrian scriptures, from the Gāthās to the latest Persian religious writings. This doctrine of a
spiritual accounting of man's life record, the weighing of merits and demerits, forms an integral part of Zarathushtra's message. All the daily actions of man are entered, so to speak, as items (dāora) of debit and credit in the record for the hereafter; and only by increasing the credit side of the account can the debits be counterbalanced. When the account is brought to a final reckoning (henkeratā), if there be any excess of good deeds, as in the case of the righteous, these souls find their final destiny in the Abode of Good Thought or House of Song. But if, owing to bad deeds, the claims (išudō) cannot be satisfied, the result is reversed, as in the case of the wicked, who are destined to become veritable inmates of the House of the Lie. All meritorious deeds are regarded as stored up in the treasure-house of Heaven, where they are entrusted to the divine protection of Mazdāh. There is no doubt that this takes place at the Individual Judgment, and before the twofold award is meted out to the souls, with a possible intermediate state. We are not in a position, however, to determine with precision the time when the Individual Judgment takes place. It is a matter of little concern to the Prophet whether the Judgment takes place immediately after death or on the dawn of the fourth day after death. That the fate of each man is determined in strict accordance with the kind of life he has led on earth, or 'the first life', is the thing that is of moment.

Another important observation to be made in this connection is that Zarathushtra's teachings of a strict reckoning of man's actions leave no room for a real remission of sins, whereas later Zoroastrianism admits repentance, expiation, and remission. 'The laws of the first life', cannot be turned aside or altered by any sacrifices or offering; and it is in accordance with these laws that man shall be judged, both here and hereafter. Yet, in spite of this, we may infer that Zarathushtra's sense of justice allowed that strenuous effort in performing good deeds would ultimately create a surplus of merit to outweigh the accumulation of past evil.

As to the place where the Individual Judgment is held, there are several passages in the Gāthās which either expressly, or by mere suggestion, point to the well-known Chinvat Bridge as the scene of reckoning and balancing where the souls of both pious and the wicked will stand in judgment. It is at the bridge, moreover, that the first separation of the pious from the wicked
shall take place\textsuperscript{39}.

There are numerous passages in the Gāthās where Ahura Mazdāh is invoked by Zarathushtra as the Ruler over the twofold awards\textsuperscript{40}, who at the time of the Final Dispensation will divide the wise from the unwise\textsuperscript{41}. He is the supreme arbiter, and His decision is final\textsuperscript{42}. At the time of the Resurrection it is Zarathushtra who will be the Judge (ratav), Mazdāh being the Overlord (ahū); and Zarathushtra expressly declares himself to be the ratav appointed by Ahura\textsuperscript{43}. Thuš the Gāthās contain, at least in substance, those essential elements that are elaborated in the Later Avesta and in the Pahlavi books. And, the doctrine of the Individual Judgment is one of the cardinal teachings of Zarathushtra concerning the life hereafter\textsuperscript{44}.

There is also in Zoroastrianism the doctrine of an intermediate stage, the tenet of Hamistakān, oe 'Equilibrium'. Zarathushtra recognized the possibility that the good and evil deeds of an individual might balance exactly when weighed in the scales at the heavenly tribunal; and a special place and condition are assigned to such a soul until its ultimate fate shall have been determined at the Universal Judgment. Zarathushtra's keen vision and logical mind caught glimpses of this General Judgment at the end of all things. This optimistic hope of the dawn of a new and better eon is the note that rings again and again in the Gāthās. The Prophet's graphic presentation of these events may well have stirred the imagination of his hearers and inspired his followers to carry on the task of furthering the Wished-for-Kingdom (\textit{xsaOra vairya}) and to look forward to the day when good shall finally triumph over evil, and the world shall be restored to perfection (\textit{frašokeretī}). The accounts given in the Later Avestan and Pahlavi books are essentially the same as those found in the Gāthās, except that the picturesque side is more fully developed\textsuperscript{45}.

\textbf{Annotations:}


2. Pāṇini - 'Aṣṭādhyāyī', 1. 2. 61; 1. 4. 81; 3. 1. 84; 4. 3. 71; 5. 2. 89; 6. 4. 5; 7. 1. 96; 8. 1. 35, etc.

1963, pp. 143ff.

4. Ibid., p. 149.

5. Avesta, Part 1: Yasna (Ys) and Visparat (Vsp), edited in Devanāgari script by Ervad M. F. Kanga and N. S. Sontakke, Vaidika Saṁśodhana Mandala, Poona 1962; Ys. 62. 3; Yasht (Yt) 13. 58; Vendīdād (Vd) 18. 51; Artāk Virāz Nāmak (AVN) 64. 13; 87. 9.

6. Ys. 30. 2; 51. 6; 43. 5.

7. Ys. 31. 19; 47. 6.

8. Ys. 51. 1; 41. 2; 48. 8; 32. 6.


10. Ys. 45. 5.


15. Ibid., pp. 12-13; 15-16.


17. Vd. 19. 28.

18. Vd. 5. 8-9.


21. Ibid., p. 22.

22. Ys. 30. 2-3; 31. 11-12.

23. Ys. 30. 3.

24. Ys. 51. 13; Parvy, ZDFL, pp. 29-31.


29. Pavry, ZDFL, pp. 43-44.

30. Ibid., p. 49.


33. Ys. 32. 15; 46. 10; 15-17; 50. 4; 51. 15.

34. Ys. 49. 11; 46. 11; 31. 20.

35. Ys. 49. 10.


37. Ys. 33. 1.

38. Pavry, ZDFL, pp. 53-54.


40. Ys. 51. 1.

41. Ys. 31. 19; 47. 6 (Vidātay)

42. Ys. 51. 14; 32. 6.

43. Ys. 33. 1

44. Pavry, ZDFL, p. 59.

45. Ibid., p. 113.
Manuscript Collection in the Asiatic Society of Bombay

B. V. Shetti

The Asiatic Society of Bombay came into existence, as the Literary Society of Bombay on the 26th of November 1804, at the meeting held in the building which at present houses the Haffkines Institute, but which was then the Government House. At the suggestion of Sir John Malcolm, on the 27th of February 1828, Society's name was changed as Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland, but it was not till the 27th of January of 1930, that the new name appears in the minutes of the Bombay Society. The Society moved into the Town Hall in September 1930. After Independence of India, the Society's name was changed as The Asiatic Society of Bombay.

The Asiatic Society of Bombay has a collection of about 3,500 manuscripts, some of which are very rare. 17 manuscripts are illustrated. In 1826, the Government of Bombay gave to the Asiatic Library a rich collection of the very valuable collection of manuscripts, which had been bequeathed to the Court of Directors of the East India Company by Dr. Taylor. Some Gujarati MSS. procured in Gujarat were presented by Colonel Miles. The holdings were further enriched by the presentation of several Oriental MSS. in 1834 by Mr. Borradaile. Further, a part of the Pandit Bhagawanlal Indraji collection came by way of presentation to the Society. Thereafter, the most notable addition to the Library was a donation of Sanskrit MSS. belonging to Dr. Bhau Daji Lad: This was presented to the Society at the public meeting held in Bombay to perpetuate the memory of the departed scholar, and is known as the “Bhau Daji Memorial.” A noteworthy presentation some years ago has been a collection of Sanskrit MSS. of the late Mr. Shankar Pandurang
Pandit by his daughter, Mrs. Kshamabai Row. Further additions were made by D. P. Podar and others.

In 1919, a Sub-Committee had been appointed to prepare for a list of manuscripts in the Society's possession and to recommend steps necessary for their careful preservation. A catalogue of these collections which had been a desideratum all these years was at long last completed in 1931, albeit in parts—the Sanskrit, Jaina and Vernacular sections in four volumes by Prof. H. D. Velankar after an assiduous labour of ten years, and the Arabic, Persian, and Urdu sections by Mr. A A A Fysee rendering a service of love. Velankar's catalogue includes 2093 MSS. and Fysee's work includes 28 MSS. Velankar's catalogue which became out of stock is now being reprinted. At present the Society has 356 MSS. which are yet to be studied and catalogued.

In recent years not much effort has been made to collect manuscripts. Through the media, an appeal can be made to the public to donate manuscripts in their possession for study and preservation for posterity.

In 1820, Mountstuart Elphistone, Governor of Bombay, and President of the Society, presented a number of books in foreign languages, which included, amongst others, the Dante Manuscript, one the most precious possessions of the Society, The Dante Ms. is a quaternion, 12½” × 8½” of great beauty and excellence. It has wide margins and is in single columns. The calligraphy is large, attractive and clear. The title of the cantos are done in beautiful red and gold. The initial letter of each canto is blue, embellished by scrolls and beautifully illuminated, while each terzina begins with a simple ornament alternating in gorgeous blue and red. The inside of the leather binding has an inscription in Italian which says: "Magnificent book in parchment of the Divina Commedia of Dante Aleghieri, which equals in preservation and beauty those existing in the leading libraries of Europe, especially those in the Ambrosian Library of Milan, with which it has been compared. The form of the characters shows that the date is near the middle of the fourteenth century, that is thirty years after the death of Dante, which took place in A. D. 1321 at the age of fifty-six. The miniatures at the head of each canto allude to the contents of each canto and indicate the style of the art of the fourteenth century in a way that renders the book highly precious."
The MS. was rebound in calf, when on a visit to the Library in 1906. His Excellency the Governor of Bombay remarked that it was in a dilapidated condition needing repairs. Offers for the purchase have been received in the past, including one from the Italian Government under Mussolini. But the Management rejected these offers and the manuscript remains one of the proudest possessions of the Society.

Also, one more very prized collections of the library is an illustrated manuscript of *Shāhnāmāh* of Firdausi. *Shāhnāmāh* is an epic accounting the history of the early kings of Persia and other episodes, such as the fight between the hero Rustom and his son Suhrab, and from these epochs down to the reign of Yazdagir who reigned in A. H. 411/A. D. 1020, with whom the epic ends. The manuscript is profusely illustrated, every chapter beginning with a painting. The colophon of the manuscript mentions that it was prepared in A. H. 900/A. D. 1495 at Shirāz, which was a famous school of painting in Iran. The paintings are mainly illustrations of war scenes or of the feats of the heroes. The warriors and the heroes are seen fighting the enemies either on foot or on saddled horses, wearing heavy armours, inside the fort or outside in an open landscape. Paintings are colourful, being in various shades of red, pink, mauve, green, and also the prominent gold. The calligraphy of this very beautiful manuscript is of very high quality.

The discovery of the dated illustrated manuscript of The ‘Āranyaka Parva’ has been an event of major importance for the history of Indian miniature painting. It affords a reasonable basis for ascribing approximate dates to a number of well known illustrated manuscripts, as also for determining their provenance. The Society got this manuscript along with other manuscripts of Dr. Bhau Daji Lad collection in 1882. It is apparent from the colophon folio that the manuscript originally had 362 folios but at present only 230 folios are extant. It is dated Saṁvat 1573/A. D. 1516. This manuscript was copied at Yoginīpura, under the rule of Sikandar Lodi for Bhanudas Chaudhari. *Almost all the folios of the Ms. are ornamented with beautiful old pictures indicative of the story written on them,* The ‘Āraṇyaka Parva’ of the *Mahābhārata* deals with the events during the 12 years of exile of the Pāṇḍavas after Yudhiṣṭhira’s defeat at the game of dice.

The Jaina tradition has patronised painting illustrating the episodes
from the life of Tirthaṅkaras a great deal, mainly as visual aid to the devotees. The illustrations were also done to acquire religious merit by the pious Jainas. The Society has four such illustrated MSS. of the Kalpasūtra, one of the important religious texts of the Jainas. They are painted in the western Indian style of painting of the 15th century and later. They are in order dated A. D. 1415, 1625, 18th century, and A. D. 1826.

Palm-leaf illustrated MSS. painted during Pāla kings in Bihar and Bengal became very popular. They usually illustrated Tāntric Buddhist deities. But the invasion of Bakhtyar Khalji in A. D. 1200 put an end to this art. However, this art later spread to Nepal and Tibet. In this art there is influence of paintings from Ajanta and Ellorā. There are six palm-leaf illustrated folios from the Buddhist MS. Aṣṭasahasrikā Prajñāpāramitā of c. A. D. 1200 in the Asiatic Library.

All the MSS. in the Society's collection are now micro-filmed. Scholars can now refer to these MSS. with the help of the micro-film reader provided at the Society's premises. They can also get photostat copies of folios at nominal fixed rates.

**LIST OF RARE MANUSCRIPTS**

**Brahmanical**:

Gaṅaratnamahodadhi, Saṅvat 1480 (B. D. 63)
Sūryasiddhānta of Caṇḍeśvara, Saṅvat 1452, Sāke 1318 (B. D. 282).
Sūryasiddhānta of king Madanpāla, Saṅvat 1459 (B. D. 282).
Athravavedasārṇhitā of Paippaladaśākha, Saṅvat 1925 (B. D. 246).
Bhāgavatapurāṇa of Yogeśvara, Saṅvat 1573 (B. D. 231).
Āraṇyakaparva of Mahābhārata, Saṅvat 1573 (B. D. 245).
Paṁcadaṇḍatpatrachatraprabandha, Saṅvat 1499.
Vikramacaritra, Saṅvat 1492, Sake 1357.

**Jaina**:

Kalpasūtra, Saṅvat 1472 (B. D. 63/4).
Ṣaḍāvaśyakasūtra, Saṅvat 1455 (B. D. 202).
Saḍāvaśyakasūtra, Saṁvat 1525 (B. D. 141).
Gautamapricchā of Śrītilaka, Saṁvat 1480 (B. D. 234).
Saṁgrahaṇīratna of Śrītilaka, Saṁvat 1480 (B. D. 234).
Vāsupūjyacaritra, Saṁvat 1440 (B. D. 184).

BUDDHIST:

Santasahasrikā Prajñāpāramitā, Govindaṇḍala. A. D. 1200; No. 210 (B. I.)

ARABIC:

Tib-u ('Ahli') l-kisa, A. D. 1591-1681 (zz-c-9).
Al-Jauharal al-munira fi jumal in min as-sirat, A. D. 1654 (zz-c-50).

PERSIAN:

Shahnama of Firdausi, Dated 1495 (zz-a-l).
Shahnama of Firdausi, A. D. 1843.
Kershaspnama A. H. 625/A. D. 1227.
Ain-i-Akbari by Abu'l-Fazl (zz-b-2).
Mahabharat by Faizi, 18th century (zz-b-2)
Nal-u-Daman by Faizi, A. D. 1594-95 5EX-d-68).

URDU: Naqliyyat-i-Hindi 5z-b-31).
Qissa-i-Rustam Ali

EUROPEAN: Dante Alighieri Divina Commedia Dated c. 1350

LIST OF ILLUSTRATED MANUSCRIPTS:

1. BD26/3 1818 Yogaśāstra of Hemacandra and other stories - Saṁ. 1550, l III.
2. BD26/6 1674 Saṅgrahaṇīratna of Śrīcandra - l III.
3. BD26/9 1969 Śilaratha Citra - 19 ILL.
4. BD61/1 1639 Pravacana sāroddhāra of Nemicandra - 1 ILL.
5. BD63/4 1429 Kalpasūtra of Bhadrabāhu Saṁ. 1472= A. D. 1415 - 21 ILL.
6. BD72/6 1970 Śilārāsa of Vijayadeva Sūri - Saṁ - 1799 - 1 ILL.
7. BD91/2A 2065 Bhagavadgītā Samaślokī of Vāmana Paṇḍita - 1 ILL.
8. BD91/5 382 Narapatijayacaryā - Charts & diagrams.
9. BD94/2 380 Narapatijayacaryā 13 ILL.
10. BD107/22 2041 Rāmavinnoda of Rāma Kaviśvara 1 ILL - Painted Wood covers.
11. BD156/2 1592 Kṣetrasamāsa, Ratnaśekhara - 11 ILL.
12. BD205/1 1438 Kalpasūtra - C -1625 A. D. Patan 31 ILL.
13. BD205/4 1593 Kṣetrasamāsa of Ratnaśekhara - Illustrated with Diagrams.
14. BD245 966 Āranyakaparva Dt. 1516.
15. BD310/1 383 Narapatijayacharyā - 3 ILL + Diagrams.
16. BD310/5 1464 Jñātādhamakathāsūtra - 1 ILL.
17. BI148 1428 Kalpasūtra of Bhadrabāhu, 18 Century - 3II
18. BI194 Karanḍavyuha - 1 ILL.
19. BI206 Avalokiteśvara Stotra - 1 ILL & 2 painted wood covers.
20. BI208 Gaṇḍavyuhamahārṇava - 1 ILL.
22. DP 35 2322 Šilpaśāstra of Viśvakarmā - 2 ILL.
23. DP 41 2344 Līlāvatī Dt. Śāke 1625 - 1 ILL.
24. Forbes Manual 12 143693 Mahābhārata in Persian - 17 Illustrations
   (Mahābhārata by Faizee - Z. Z. B. 2 18th Century
25. ZZ. E-24 142564 Kalpasūtra. Saṁ 1833 = A. D. 1826 - Bombay)
26. ZZ. A. 1 140714 Šāhānāmāh
27. Forbes Memorial 15 Album of Painting by P. Dajieebhoy - 48 ILL.
Concept of Śiṣṭācāra

Hukam Chand Patyal

0.0. An attempt is made in this paper to discuss the concept of Śiṣṭācāra ('practice or conduct of the Śiṣṭas' ['learned or virtuous persons']). The word Śiṣṭa (< śas- (substituted by Śiṣ-, vide P. 6. 4. 34; 8. 3. 60; also see Vāyu P. i. 59. 33; Matsya P. 145. 34)¹. The earliest occurrence of the word Śiṣṭa adj. 'taught, instructed' is met with in AV. 2. 29. 4; 5. 26. 4 etc. also cf Sat Br. 13. 1. 6. 1 wherein Śiṣṭāh praśāh means 'clever children'.

0.1. In ancient India, law was closely connected with religion. According to the Dharma-texts, the whole body of dharma (sacred law) can be divided into three parts - namely ācāra 'rules of conduct or established practices'; vyavahāra 'rules of government and judicature or jurisprudence'; and prāyaścitta 'atonement or penance and expiation' (see especially the division of Manu Sm. and Yājña Sm.).

1.0. The main contents of the Dharma - and Smṛti - texts are concerned with the duties of men in different stages of life, namely studenthood, householdership, renunciation, asceticism; they are also concerned with dietary regulations; and also with the rights and duties and functions of kings. These texts also deal with socio-religious matters, such as purificatory rites, funeral ceremonies, modes of hospitality; daily observances etc. They are also concerned with juridical matters.

1.1. The term ācāra—religious custom, established usage—is transcendent law, and that should be very carefully observed by a twice-born person (Manu Sm. 1. 108). The term dharma is the most comprehensive and important term in the whole range of Sanskrit literature. It embraces sacred law and duty, justice, religious merit etc. Many Dharma-texts enumerate three sources (mūlas) of dharma, namely the Veda, Tradition,
'Good Custom or Practice of the śīṣṭās' (Gaut DS. 1(1). 1-2; Vāsi DS. 1. 4-7 (cf. Āpa DS. 1(1). 1. 2). Manu Sm. 2. 6. and Yājñā Sm. 1. 7 add one more source, namely self-satisfaction or inner contentment (ātmatusṭi). Manu Sm. 2. 12 also enumerates these four sources of dharma (on the term dharma), see Patyal 1997 : 157-65). As a matter of fact, every rule of dharma must find its foundation in the Veda. "But in reality, it seems that when a Hindu affirms that dharma rests entirely upon the Veda, the word Veda does not mean in that connection the Vedic texts, but rather the totality of knowledge, the sum of all understanding of all religious and moral truths, whether revealed or not." (Lingat 1973 : 8; cf. HDS. I. 4).

1.2. Dharma is not 'visible' to an ordinary man. That rule is of great significance and importance for which there is 'no visible purpose' (adrṣṭārtha), than a rule for which there is 'visible purpose' (drṣṭārtha). The king should be impartial to both friends and foes (Yājñā Sm. 2. 1-2). He should be the supporter and protector of dharma (Yājñā Sm. 2. 21). The semidivine nature of the king was vested with temporal power, and the enforcement of law was primarily his responsibility (Manu Sm. 7. 4-5).

2.0. The śīṣṭācāra is the very touchstone for judging whether an act is in consonance with what the scriptures require us to do. The sadācārādharma and śīṣṭācārādharma are even above Śruti and Smṛti. If Śruti and Smṛti both fail to elucidate a ticklish problem, then the community may look for guidance and model in the actions of the people 'who practise what is right or proper' (sadācāra), or who generally 'act according to the (Vedic) instruction' (śīṣṭācāra).

2.1. The earliest reference to the śīṣṭas appears to be found in Tai U. I. II (though the word śīṣṭa itself is not used in this text). If there is any doubt regarding any deeds, regarding conduct, one should behave in such matters, as the Brāhmaṇaṇas (who are) competent to judge, devoted (to noble deeds), not led by others, not harsh, lovers of virtues. In sum, the noble behaviour of the so-called Brāhmaṇaṇas is the secret doctrine of the Veda, this is the teaching.

2.2. The śīṣṭas are variously defined in the Dharma-texts and also in Mahā
Bhā. and the Purāṇas. Baudh DS. (1. 1. 5-6) clearly says 'śiṣṭas are those who are free from envy and pride, who keep only as much corn as is measured in kumbhī, who are free from greed and hypocrisy, arrogance, covetousness, delusion and anger. Those are śiṣṭas who have studied the Veda according to the prescribed methods, together with appendages (i.e., Itihāsa and Purāṇa), who know how to draw inferences from that and, who tend to make people realize the teaching of the Veda
t. Vāsi DS. (1. 6) defines śiṣṭa as one whose mind is free from desires. In Mahā Bhā. (3. 198. 55 ff.) it is said that department of the strict (śiṣṭācāra) is difficult to acquire. In the same epic (3. 198. 57 f.) the following are mentioned as the means of acquiring śiṣṭācāra 'Sacrifice, gifts, austerities, the Vedas, and truthfulness my good Brahmin, are five purifying means for those whose department is informed, and they are always effective. After controlling lust and anger, arrogance, greed and insincerity the strict or virtues (śiṣṭas) are contended with the law and are applauded by the śiṣṭas'. Matsya P. (145. 39) mentions eight characteristics of the śiṣṭas, namely gifts, truthfulness, asceticism, learning, sacrifice, worship, self-restraint, and want of greed. Mahā Bhā. (13. 30. 20-23) defines and praises the śiṣṭas. The śiṣṭas are those who are engaged in carrying out the duties of the aggregate of three (namely dharma, artha and kāma), who are engaged in righteous conduct or behaviour, who are conversant with Brahman, who are possessed of the knowledge of the Vedas; who are free from lust and follow righteous behaviour, who subsist on water and air alone, who partake of the remnants of food offered to the deities and guests, who observe diverse kinds of vows. They are worthy of worship who have no spouses (observe celibacy), who have spouses and maintain domestic fire, who are refuge of the Vedas and also of all creatures in the universe.

2.3. In Tantr Vā. 1. 3. 7 (see p. 128 ff.) authoritativeness of the sadācāra (the custom and usages of the śiṣṭas) is discussed. śiṣṭas are those who perform the religious acts expressly enjoined by the Veda. The sadācāra is what is practised by the śiṣṭas and śiṣṭas are those who practise sadācāra. These practices followed by the śiṣṭas constitute a part of dharma, and thereby dharma leads to heaven.
These practises become authoritative with the observance of the śiṣṭas (HDS. III. 82, 843-4).

3.0. Resumé

From the foregoing discussion we are led to the following considerations argumenti causa:

1) The śiṣṭas are those who possess all virtues, knowledge of the Vedas and other śāstras.

2) The conduct of the śiṣṭas (śiṣṭācāra) is even above Śruti and Smṛti.

3) The śiṣṭas are the refuge of the Vedas and also of all creatures in the universe. The religious practices become authoritative because of observance of the śiṣṭas. The śiṣṭācāra is the very touchstone for knowing whether an act is in consonance with what the scriptures require us to do.*

Annotations:

1. It appears that Vāyu P. 1. 59. 33 and Matsya P. 145. 34 derive śiṣṭa from śis - to remain'. Hence śiṣṭācāra by these Purāṇas is understood to be the conduct of life for those who remained (i.e. survived) after the Manvantara. This Puranic etymology does not appear to be convincing. The correct etymology is sas - (sís - to teach') + -ṭa-.

2. Śiṣṭāḥ khalu vigatamatsarā nirahāṁkārāḥ kumbhidhānyā alolupā dambhadarpalebhahamoha-krodhavivarjitāḥ / dharmenādhigato yeṣāṁ vedas saparibrñhanaḥ / śiṣṭas tad anumānajñāḥ śrutipratyaksahetava iti //

Baudh DS. 1. 1. 5-6. Baudh DS. 1. 1. 6 is found in Manu Sm. 12. 109 and Vāsi DS. 6. 43 (with some variants). Cf. Mahā Bh. iii. 174. 10 (on vi. 3. 109) which also gives more or less the same type of description of the śiṣṭas as is found in Baudha DS.

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HDS = Kane, P.V.


पचसागारगृहित ‘प्रभाषप्रकाश’

जितेन्द्र शास

कार्य परिषद

प्रस्तुत गृहितां स्थापिता पं. पचसागारगृहित मान्यता गृहित छ. तेसी समाधू प्रभापुर
प्रतिभाक, प्रभापुर आचार्य धीरविजय सुरिना अध्याय छ. तेसी प्रस्तुत गृहितां अते
प्रशस्ति स्वाभाविक गृहितां स्वीकृत छू. ते —

भद्रकातकोटिकोट श्री ६ धीरविजयसुरिना सिंहवर विजयराजचे महोपाध्याय श्री
धर्मसागरगृहित श्री पदानुसारगृहित ।

अर्थात् तेसी आचार्य धीरविजयसुरिना शिष्य महोपाध्याय धर्मसागरना शिष्य
छ. आ गृहित तेसी ज्ञाते तत्स्वते तेनौ उद्वेष्यात आता वच्चू न च रंगमुद्य परित नयनः अनमी
अन्त्य गृहितां तेनौ रंगमुद्य संयमत १६२३ (ऎक्सी १५६३) दशायर्यो छ. आ उपर्यायी अले
अनुमानिक शास्त्रे आ श्रींगय पत्ते ज वर्णांतृ आन्त्याचाय समयां वर्णांतृ करे.
तेमना ज्ञान विजय विशेष भावती ज्ञाती नवी परित धीरविजयसुरिना अक शिष्य श्री
शुभविजये अक्षांसिन्धू वृत्त तर्कगृहित उपर अक अवलोकन रंगमुद्य करे. ते अवलोकन पं.
पचसागारगृहितेस रंगमुद्यात उद्वेष्य आत थाय छ. आ उपर्यायी अले मानी शास्त्रे आ
प्रस्तुत पचसागारगृहित संस्कृत भाषाना अने रसमाखलना वीरा अन्त्यांतृ करे. तेमने
शास्त्र अने ईतिहासिक विषय अक तो रंगमुद्य. साधे साधे दर्शनवेत्रा अंग की पत्ता
वत्ता छ. तेसना अंगोंती थांब नीते प्रभापुर चे.

१. वरोपात दीका सहीत नयनात अथा नयनः अवत
२. शिवमलना (सं. १५३४, शूकिलिवृतिका)
३. पर्यावरकी (सं. १५४५)
४. देवदुरुधवार (सं. १५४८, धीरविजय सुरिना अवस्थनातृ)
५. महरश्यामकरामातंत्र (सं. १५५६)
६. दुलितप्रकाश (वरोपात-दीका सहीत)
७. प्रभाषप्रकाश (वरोपात-दीका सहीत)
8. તિવકંબરીવૃતી
8. યશોપર્શરિત

આમ તેમને સંસ્કૃત ભાષામાં સારી અંગી કૃતિઓ રચી છે અને તેમની મોટાભાગની બધી જ પકાશિત પણ થતી છે.

પ્રત્યે પરિણય :

આ ગ્રંભિની મૂળ પત ભાગીવાલ દરેર્થક ભારતીય સંસ્કૃત વિધાનમાંથી કસ્તમત સંભાળવી પ્રાપ્ત થયેલ છે. તેનો ક્રમક નષ્ટર-૩૨દ છે. કાગળ ઉપર લાગેલ આ કસ્તમતની સાધન ૧૯ x ૨૮ સેમીની છે. કુલ ૧૨ પાણા છે. દરેક પાણાની આગળ પાણ સુંદર સુક્ષમ અક્ષર અને પ્રતિમા બિસ્મિના લાગુણ કર્યુ છે. દરેક પૃષ્ઠ ઉપર ૧૩ પક્ષિમી છે અને દરેક પલ્કિમી આશારે મોટી અક્ષરો છે. પ્રતના અતે વેનન સંવત દશાવો નથી પરંતુ આ કસ્તમતના અક્ષર અને મરોગણ આશ આશારે આશ ૧૭મા સેફાની કસ્તમત દોબાનું અનુમાની શક્ય.

દર્શન-વિજ્ઞાન શિધ્યાઓ :

છે. પદાત્મક માથાં લાગુ હોવેલ છાતા વક્ષય અને વૈવેધિક શિશ્રુતી શાસની છે. મતના સ્વધપન દર્શાવતી કૃત્ય નયમકાશ છે. યુક્તિઓ સ્વધાપ સાધુ કરતી યુક્તિપ્રકાશ છે, અને પ્રમાણના લખાતને દર્શાવતી કૃત્યુનુ નામ પ્રમાણપ્રકાશ છે. આ કૃતિઓ સંસ્કૃત ભાષામાં પદધાર માટે કસ્તમત છે. પ્રથમને કાળમાં તેમ જ સમયકાલમાં જેન પદધારે દર્શાવી સોહના કતાં તે સ્વધપની આ કૃતિઓ મૂકે તો તીર્થકરાના સહાયના ઉપર લાગેલ તો છે, પરંતુ તેમાં વધારુ તથા અત્યાહા છે. આ દર્શનના તીર્થકરની દેશના-સ્વધાપ તમના તાલુકાના ડેનસ્વધપ મૂકી તેમની સુખ કરી છે. અને સોહન કૃત્ય સુખ ઉપર તેમને સાધ સાધ ભાષામાં સંસ્કૃતમાં ટીકા રાખી છે, કે ઉદ્ધાપ થાપ છે.

અસ્તિત્વ કૃતિઓ દર્શનશાસનના પ્રમાણ આયા પ્રમાણના વધાર અંગાર કાર્યો આવી છે. ભારતીય દર્શન પદધારણમાં પ્રમાણને દ્વારમાં જ મુકાત સાદ આપાવામાં આવયુ છે. પરંતુ પ્રમાણના વધાર શોં શોં પ્રમાણના ભાઈ પરંતુ કસ્તમતના માટે કસ્તમતના માટે કસ્તમતના સંબંધ છે. યુક્તિઓ સાધાર પ્રમાણ તરીકે સ્વચ્છ છે, મખ્યા રીતે પ્રાણની, જેનો સાહેબ પ્રમાણ તરીકે સ્વચ્છ છે. આધી નયાયિક સંમત કૃતિ જન સંમત પ્રેમપક્ષપ્રે સય્યાપણ કાર્યો આવ્યો છે અને તેમાં રક્સલા દુઃખ દાખલી, અંટે તેના પકાશન કરી, જેને સંમત જાણન પ્રમાણ તરીકે સય્યાપણ કિયો કાર્યો આવેલ છે.
स्वोपज्ञातिरिणात:

प्रमाणप्रकाशः

|| अथ प्रमाणप्रकाशभूतः ||

सारस्वत्यः पद्मेरुः नमस्कृत्व पुनःपुरेः
श्री प्रमाणप्रकाशः वृत्ति कुरेऽ यथामलयम् ॥१॥

इह स्वःपर्यंतरितजनन् समर्थः प्रमाणः लक्षणः व्युत्पादनः प्रमाणप्रकाशः चित्तःः
प्रकृतशास्त्रः विद्वानसमावेश्यामेव लिङ्गकाविनिमौदितेऽस्वरूपस्वरूपवूति
कर्त्त्ववत्क्रमः प्रवृत्तिउपाधिकारः

स्वतः श्रीवाणः यस्य पदः प्रमाणप्रकाशमाविःकुरुते मां मतम् ॥

उपासकः त्य प्रतिध्यानः सुखितरः ज्ञानात्मकः शास्त्रज्ञातेष्वयम् ॥२॥

व्याख्या

इह व्याख्यातः येषां व्याख्यातः प्रतिभाप्रवत्ततः येषां व्याख्यातः प्रतिभाप्रयत्ततः वर्गः
लक्षणान्तः सङ्ख्यान्तः

अथ स्वःमयः सिद्धः ज्ञातः प्रमाणः व्यवस्थानः परपरिकल्पितः संकिक्रमः प्रमाणः

अथ स्वःमयः सिद्धः ज्ञातः प्रमाणः व्यवस्थानः परपरिकल्पितः संकिक्रमः प्रमाणः

व्याख्या

अद्वैतानिकः गीताध्यात्मकः ज्ञानात्मकः सङ्कारः प्रतिभाप्रवत्ततः वर्गः

प्रमाणः हेमेश्वरः संकिक्रमः पोते स्किप्तेष्वत्वाविष्णुः

व्याख्या

अधोस्वरूपः गीताध्यात्मकः गीताध्यात्मकः प्रतिभाप्रवत्ततः प्रमाणः सङ्किक्रमः प्रमाणः

तथान्वय्यतिरिक्तः विशालः प्रतिभाप्रवत्ततः वर्गः सङ्किक्रमः प्रमाणः सङ्किक्रमः प्रमाणः

व्याख्या

अत्यंतः विशालः प्रतिभाप्रवत्ततः वर्गः सङ्किक्रमः प्रमाणः सङ्किक्रमः प्रमाणः

व्याख्या

अत्यंतः विशालः प्रतिभाप्रवत्ततः वर्गः सङ्किक्रमः प्रमाणः सङ्किक्रमः प्रमाणः

व्याख्या

अत्यंतः विशालः प्रतिभाप्रवत्ततः वर्गः सङ्किक्रमः प्रमाणः सङ्किक्रमः प्रमाणः

व्याख्या

अत्यंतः विशालः प्रतिभाप्रवत्ततः वर्गः सङ्किक्रमः प्रमाणः सङ्किक्रमः प्रमाणः
न च तत्र योगताया अभावात्मक-व्यातिके व्यविचार इति वाच्यम्। तद्वर्तेऽभस्यायाम्
(सू)त्रे एव विकल्पप्रातीर्मायाणात्मलः। तदेदतद्वन्त-व्यातिके व्यविचारस्य सत्तिकृतवाणे
त्योपद्वितमपि न द्यायार् योग: एते भवतो चैतिमेधौ हितोपदेशादानेन परमकारणः
ध्यन्यत इति हितीयः-काव्यः।

अथ सत्तिकृतानि व्यविचारस्य न को दोषः। प्रामाण्य हेमन इत्यादि।

तत्तद्दत्तव-विनाशयायिनः प्रामाण्य हेमन: खलु द्यायान्।
चिकित्सण धूर्ताः च योगः-भावा भाविककुक्त्युक्त-पद्धांकः।

अथ तत्र छिद्रपञ्चोपदस्यात व्यविचार-स्नातू विनाशयायिनो विनयः। प्रामाण्य हेमन:
क्षत्रः। प्रामाण्यस्य-स्वरूपस्य खलिच्यत निस्तक्षत स्रवणयात्राय धूर्तः। स्वव्याहितमः। च योगः
योगभावो योगता तत्ततः योगिको योगभावसदवभेदायतृक्तस्तूर्येऽकं तत्र
छिद्रपञ्चात्मक चिकित्सण तत्र योगताभाववाच्छः। सत्तिकृतस्य गगने विण्डमानस्यापि तद्वयक
प्रमितलकाल्पनि न व्यविचारतिमातित तृतीयः-काव्यः।

अथ योगे न द्वाहानावम्बिचार छिद्रपञ्चात्मक तत्तक्यात-कृतः भगवास्वयम्।

लगन्त्यानै-विवलय-युद्धगतेश्वरमिषां किल पुष्करं तत्र।
तथाहि भो का वद योगतति नूने भवोपत्सु सहकारि-सन्निधि:।

अहो स्वायत्तं एतेश्वरं अनन्तमे वाल्यामेण योग्यताविकल्प-युद्धगतेश्वरमिष्टं भवति
भगमो। तथाहि तत्र विवलयार् सुत्करात्वा एव स्वर्य सुत्करनुबन्धति। भो योग वद ब्रह्म।
तत्र छिद्रपञ्चात्मका का योगतति स्याहारिना पूष्टे प्राह योगः। सहकारि सत्तिकृतयः।
अयोगश्च यस्थ दण्डादिक-सकलकारण-समवाहने कि द्वयादि-कारणवं गुणमेषकिल नॉपितादेखः
गदधस्य व्यव्याप्रि सत्तिकृतदिवसकल-कारणसय-वाहने-द्वयादधिसहकारकारणवेगुणमेष
न तद्वयकमोत्तमादनि इति सहकारि-सत्तिकृतयः। नृत्यादी नृत्यादी चैदितित
चतुर्थकाल्म:।

अथ तद्वयकमोकार-सहकारकारण-विकल्पनानान्।

स्थायत फिं भो सहकारकारणः। द्वयं गुणो वत योग कर्म।

d्वयं हि चेद्यायथ को विशेषस्त्रृ सत्तिकृतपृव्येः शङ्करादि।

अहोशद्विलिङ्गवन्द्या विद्यानेषुपि सत्तिकृतः प्रमाणपति सहकारकारण-सत्तिकृत-योगता-प्रतियोगिकाभावायात्रायः कालः। तत्र प्रमोिवय सहकारि-कारण फिं द्वयं गुण: कर्म वा
स्याहृ द्वयमो व्याययापि चैतिकन्यकस्तूरित्य चैद्वयापि। अथ भव: यदि यापि द्वयः
सहकारकारण स्याहृ। तथादिव्याप्रि द्वयं-सहकारकारण सहकृतलाशित्येषेन
सत्तिकृतादृ गगनविषय-प्रमोिपडः केन निवार्यः। वयस्मात्कारणात् घटसत्तिकृतविदित। घट
अधान्यापि द्रव्यस्य सहकृरकारणां तिस्कृतवर्तानां

अव्यापि चेदद्वयमहो ततः किं मनस्तथालोक इहेदमबकमकः
एतत्रस्थायि च तत्र सत्तिधिर्यतयद्विहयत एव यस्मात्

व्याख्या - चेदद्वययविप्रदेव गणन-सत्कृयेण तत्रभोज्ये द्वाकृयेण सहकृरकारण स्वादित बृहे
मनस्तथे सति तत्सहकृरकः किं मनो वालोको वा अंबकमिति चौक्षुय सहहकृर स्यात्
नैत्यक्षरयमिति संगते। यत्सर्वदानसमाधियो घटसत्कृयेकश्च आसातियत न च
मनस सह तदन्त्य चौः। सत्कृयेन भावेन आत्मा मनस सह संयुक्ते मन इत्यद्यमेवादि
प्रकृयायत्वतमावेन वीशमाननापि सत्कृयेन न गणविषयक प्रतिवादा इति वाच्यम्। मनसः
शरीरपरिमाणकऽऽि्नेद्रयसत्कृष्क्ष्वात्। प्रयोगो यथा-मनो मध्यमपरिमाणाधिकारण
पृथ्वियादिपार्श्वादिपार्श्ववृक्षपरिमाणाधिकारण पृथ्वियादिपार्श्ववृक्षपरिमाणाधिकारण ज्ञाति केवल सति अवधातः न चैवें न सैंसू यथा
यथा घट इति घट इति घटत्वस्यापि मध्यम परिमाणाधिकारणेव सिद्धे आत्मकेः परिमाणब्युः
सिद्धयति हि प्रयोगः। मनोदेह परिमाणस्य मध्यमपरिमाणाधिकारणात्। आत्मवृत्त सर्वमोऽहि
मध्यमपरिमाणाधिकारणात्। सिद्धेन द्विष्कृतिददिर्वाच्यम्। आत्मोदेह वियभयमन्त्रस्य विशेषत्वद्यूत्स्यालथे: यथा त्रेयोपथ्यस्य गुणाः च त्रैवः यथा
यथा घटः। न च पशुभूतिवत्वमार्धासिद्धोऽयं हेतुरिति वाच्यम्। जले चैव गगने चन्द्रोपलम्बादुः। इत्यादि
नुमात्वाएकङ्कात्करण पशुभूतिवत्वमार्धासिद्धोऽयं हेतुरिति वाच्याय वश्यमानान्त्या न च पुष्पादिनामः।
तत्रदेशशरीरादिभुगणोपलवयायायाय चादवा-ध्यानरास्थित्यकालावेत्येकः पुष्पादिनु यभीत्वमार्धाय
हेतुरिति चावाय तत्र पुष्पाभक्षकपारणानुसार परप्रत्य-स्थवाचारपर्यायायायाय योगविश्व-भाषामुलनमेतुातैः केवलं गाढःपुच्छयते। न जातु गुणां गुणनमतिरियो भवति इति प्रमेय-काममल-मार्त्तिरवर्तानात्। तस्मात् यथविभावितैह(तै)रिति। ननु तदंत्यः शास्त्रादिविवैध्यान्तोऽनौतः प善िरिति चेतृ न नाय तत्रदिगुणः
किन्तृ तददशालादेवक्षे तस्य तत्रदेशगमनैः सत्तुपलवतः। ततो ध्यानदिशानन्दश्च प्रभेन देहे
एव सुखप्रभेन पलवयायायायायायासिर्वदाः आत्माः। काय-प्रमाणव इति न चतुरोऽदेी-गुणकत्रिय-चन्द्रवातिभोगतमानो यभीत्वमार्धाय-निवाकाकादष्ठये येहातिकरिते जस्तान्तर्विस्तृतस्य हेतुरिति वाच्यम्।
अहृतणामाने देहादवहि: सतविशेषात: तथाति नादोऽ
देहनाडुः: सभवति आत्माधारणणुत्तमातुः सुखादिर्वाश्च हस्त्वचाहं भवहि: सभवति भएहि: नादोऽ
देहादवहि: सतव अनुमेय कनक-रासादीय तु अहृत्तततसामथर्मणे देहस्तृवात्मानो
भोगसुभवताः तस्माद्। देहानामहुमाने मालमिति। किं चायमाल्याभोगाभयं
सर्वत्मकाणकब्यवायायायात्। एक्यं देशे वा चेतु सत्वत्मा तर्ख(तं) स्मत्यश्चाज्ज्वी। अथ चेतु

एकदेशानवासभन्त्रति ताहि सावभव-प्रसादः एकदेशे नैवाधाकृत्त्वतं च पदेन तत्मात्र व्याप्त पक्षः। नवामातः काय-प्रमाणेऽ बालराशीरसरिपामाततस्तय युगीरसरिपामाणिर्गीरकः। कथं स्यातु इति चेतु न तस्य कुण्डलीपुष्प सर्द्धानावश्येन संप्रभवत। यथा हि द्विस्त-प्रमाणोत्पि सर्फः कुण्डलीभूतः वित्सर्वादि प्रमाणः। समीक्ष्यते तथायमापि तत्तद्धपरिमाणानापि बालाक्ष्यकः ततावतु परिमणान्तेपः।

इत्यातः काय-प्रमाणते न कठिनोप-लेशोपि। न चातनः काय-प्रमाणते हस्तल्पाटकः कः खाण्डान्यथा इति वाच्यम्।

आत्मोपि खण्ड स्यामकुमः कष्टाक्षरोपयथा छल्ले वानवषेपिः के कोप्लाभः स्यातु इत्यात्मनो मध्यमपरिमाणाधिकरणात् देह-प्रमाणाभिति मनसा सहनिद्वृत्य संव्याह-त्वेनाविष्टः क्रस्यस्य मनोनवयालोकवद्रयापि सातिष्यतः तदानि गणन-विविधया-प्रमोत्लावसिंहस्यनावनाविष्ट्यापि सहकारिकारणम्।

यस्मात्कर्तारानि घटनादेश घटनदी दशिकं च तत्र निषिद्ध विकल्पेदवेश्छन् सहकारिकारणं पिन्त्यति।

स्निकारणं प्रमोत्लावने द्वियस्यापिः द्वियस्य च सहकारिकारणं निषिद्ध गुणस्यापि विकल्पे मेवेश्न सहकारिकारणं निषिद्धयति।

गुणस्य अंि मातुगः प्रमेयातोश्वातं तत्र सहकारिकारणम्।

प्रमेयानं स्यातु घटादिवदः व्योमनोपि संख्यादि गुणाविनिविधतवादृः।

अहोक्षितर उषणगुणोऽपि प्रमेयानं सहकारिकारणं स्यातु प्रमातुगतो वा स्यातु इति विकल्प गुणविकल्पं दृष्ययति। न दशिको भवेत दुः यत्मातं गुणाविनिविधतवात् सन्ततिकारणं तत्रत्वोत्सरसंसरः स्यातु अयमस्तु स्यातु इति गुणवेश्चन घटविषयकप्रमोत्लावित्तरैस्य।

अथ घटादी विद्यमानस्य गणे च विद्यमानस्य गुणविशेषस्य सन्ततिकारणं प्रमोत्लावे सहकारी कारणं च स्वादिकारांकापोदायः।

द्वियाहोत्पादक रूपः तत्र भावस्य तत्र प्रतिवन्धक्वलित।

न सन्ततिकारणोपि विहायस्। प्रमानं नवाच: कर्तुमेहिते चेतु न।

नन्द द्वियाेहस्य द्वियविषयक प्रमाणः उपाधिकर रूपवचि स्त्राचतुः तत्र नातीतिती कथै सन्ततिकारणोपि तप्रतिमिति। स्यातु। सन्ततिकारणोपि तप्रतिमो जनयित्वायं रूपवाच्यावस्य तत्र प्रतिवन्धक्वलित। सन्ततिकारणोपि विहायसो गगनस्य प्रमानं कर्तुमेहितेन इति चेतेत्यमकारणा।

इत्यमेव आप्याधिके शंकिते स्याद्वाघः।

वस्त्रितु तात्त्वविकारि शास्त्रायं हि भावेन्द्रयमेव कारणम्।

किलातिशेषि-स्त्राव-प्रमाणा: प्रमाणामावशिष्क-भावलालाधवात्।
अहो योग ! यदि रूपवत्वादर्शस्य तत्र प्रतिवेद्यकलेन सातिरक्षणयो न व्योम-विषयक-प्रमाणन्यकलिंगमति तथ्यं बृहुः !

तत्पर्यस्तु प्रतिवेद्यकलेः: प्रतिवेद्यप्रतियोक्ति क्रममं: तद्योगोलकं तदन्योगाभावाः-प्रतियोगीकं भावेदेशमेव स्वप्नप्रामाया इति सं ज्ञानं तदन्योगायं: परस्य: प्रमापृष्ठिण्ठितस्वयं अतिशायिकारणं तदेव प्रमाणम्। आवश्यक-भाव-लाघवादिति आवश्यकत्व विशिष्ट लाघवात्।

आवश्यकत्वाभावाभावाभ्यं:। भावाभावाभ्यं: योगा हि सातिरक्षणार्थः व्योमविषयक प्रमोद्यते प्रत्यक्ष-प्रमोद्यति-प्रयोजक-प्रतिवेद्यकाभावाभ्यं-रूपवत्वादर्शः संग्रहते। तत्र स्वाधीनरस्तादिवद्धतिः बृहुः। सातिरक्षणार्थः यदि प्रत्यक्ष-प्रमिती जन्यत्वयात् मात्राभावाभ्यं: क्रियाभावाभ्यं: कारणस्य नास्तु प्रामाण्याः किस्मत्यदा सातिरक्षण प्रतिवেद्यकाभावस्य ज्ञातमको भावेदेशमेवेति नवमकाव्यस्य।

अथ प्रमेययुग्मस्त्वप्रत्यक्ष-प्रमतिः सहकारिकारणतं निशेष्यति प्रमातृगस्यापि

गुणस्य सहकारिकारणतं निशेष्यति-\[\text{अहंभुवन्यस्य पूर्वमस्य प्रमातृगस्यापि हि सातिरक्षणम्।}\
\[\text{अस्तित्वेनुक्षेत्रिकप्रतिवेद्यतं तत्संकलको जन्यत्र तथो।}\

अहो योग ! यदि अहंभुवन्यस्य पूर्वमस्य प्रमातृगस्यापि हि सातिरक्षणम्। अस्तित्वेनुक्षेत्रिकप्रतिवेद्यतं तत्संकलको जन्यत्र तथो। [१०१]

अहो योग ! यदि अहंभुवन्यस्य पूर्वमस्य प्रमातृगस्यापि हि सातिरक्षणम्। अस्तित्वेनुक्षेत्रिकप्रतिवेद्यतं तत्संकलको जन्यत्र तथो। [१०१]

अथ प्रमेयप्रमातृगः गुणस्य सहकारिकारणतं निशेष्यति कर्मणोऽधिपै सहकारिकारणतं निशेष्यतिः।

कर्मणं नं तत्र सहकारिकारणं व्योमोऽधिपं या नवन्योऽधिपं या।

व्योमोऽधिपं तथ्य सदाप्रक्रियाक्षेत्रिकप्रतिवेद्यस्य तदेन सः स्वात्। [१०१]

अहो योग ! कर्मणं नं व्योमोऽधिपं नवन्योऽधिपं सहकारिकारणं स्वात्।

इत्यत्र विकल्पं दूषयति व्योमोऽधिपं इति व्योमतस्तम्य कर्मणं। समुपत्तां असिद्धि।

व्योमको निक्रिययुग्मायुग्मकारणस्य स्वात्तमसमयत्वत। नेत्रिकप्रतिमयेति तथ्य व्योम। प्रमा स्वात् समुपत्तां तेजस्वितोऽकारशास्त्रस्य।
अथ द्रव्यगुणकर्मणां तत्र सहकारिकाणाते निषिद्धे सत्कर्मवाहेने व्यभिचार-छिद्रपिधाणाय योग्येतु सोयताभावस्य यहंक न्यासं तद्युपरे योभूतुगुणो भगवतसं दर्शयति।

इत्युपरे विकल्पमुद्दरे सत्योत संयस्तकुदुक्ति यहंक।
भक्ता त्यात तद्विभचारस्माधीत: कृतं तत्पर्योपकारी॥१२॥

सुगम्य द्वादशं कायमः।

इत्यं योगमयसंसिद्धप्रमाणलक्षणं निलोच्च पर्मोपकारिणा भगवता यत्त्रमाणलक्षणं

न्यागादि तस्य रक्षा-रीमणी दर्शयन् भगवतसुति स्वल्पणें वत्योद्धं कायमाह॥

स्वामिष्निजात्र-व्यवसायिस्यम्यः ज्ञान-प्रभाणोत्तमवहारम्॥

चिन्तेष्य य: स्वरह्ये त्यार्थपितम् शलायेः स एव प्रकटं महेन्द्रम्॥१३॥

अहो स्वामिष्निज शाश्वेन ज्ञान अनु शाश्वेन ग्रहादिद्वियत्योवर्यम्यवत्यस्वः निधियं केवलमस्ते यत्सम्यास्य तत्जन्ते तद्वतं रक्षारीयुवियस्य न्यायेऽत: स्व हुदं पुपान् किरिविशिष्टं त्यार्थपितं भगवत्तप्रीत्वेष्य मुद्दाण्यलरीकृतं स कोट्त्व इत्याह स एवेत्वथ-योगाक्षेत्त्वत्व एवकारः। स एव निखिलसुगुणस्य शलायो यत्रेऽवं ततं: किरिविधाय महेन्द्रम पूज्यामः: एततं भगवद्वचः श्रद्धावताः हि पूज्यतं दर्शयत्विदित चतुर्दशाक्यायः।

अथ प्रभाणप्रमाणस्य एकत्रेष्य प्रविष्यस्य-भेदरूप स्वियं दर्शयति।

एकोपि यः स्वस्सन्तैनेन युमात्मकोऽथ हि पाण्डितानि।

न्यासाखलकारीयेन मनुष्येदेव दुह्यत्वोऽलेख इत्यं स्फुरद्गुणः॥१४॥

एकोपि एकसङ्केतकोपि यो हारः स्वस्म(त) दन्तै भेदुपुमस्य इति प्रत्यवेयित्व कथा भेदुपुमेन व्य-सर्वकृत इत्यथः। स च पाण्डितानि हि न्यास धर्मायरसि भ्राजेतेऽतं यथा मनुष्येदेव दुह्यत्वोऽलेके कोऽलेख: शोभते। इतः प्रामः स्फुरद्गुणां लक्षणों द्वारकलक्षणं गुणों वेद्यात्केतिष्य संस्कृत्याः।

व्यस्तार्थस्य स्याख्यादिमते किल प्रमाण द्विविधं स्पष्टार्थप्रेतदात्। तत्र स्पष्टं नामस्य-कारणं, मलविशेष-विशेष-कारणं विशृष्टिविशेष एव तत्र स्पष्टं पर्मपि द्विप्रकारं सावितदीने कुँवर्यं चेति।

तत्र सार्वदीने कपूर द्विप्रकारं इन्द्रियप्रक्षेपं अनीन्द्रयः प्रक्षेपं चेति तन्त्रदिश्यार्थादेः धार्मिकवर्षभवेन्द्रं तत्तदित्वप्रक्षेपं, सुवादे: समरणादि ज्ञानस्य यत्र स्वपुरुष वेदेन तदान्नदित्वप्रक्षेपं, अनिन्द्रयः क्षयोपयोगविशेषायस्य कसः भद्रवत्रवेदिः -विशेषके एव मनो यथा प्रतिपद्यतमें। इत्यदिनदिनदित्वप्रक्षेपभेदविषयं सावितदीने कपूरप्रक्षेपं मुख्यं तु प्रत्यक्षमें। अतीतिदेशेन तद्पि द्विविधं विकल्पं सकलं च। तत्र विकल्पं द्वेशव अवधिं श्रीभुभु- सुकूलः। तु केतुलेष्णेत तु मुख्यं प्रक्षेपं।
प्रतिभास-विषयकः पोषक्मसः। तदपि द्विविधं अनुमानं आगमक्षेत्रति अनुमानमपि दृष्टा गौणं मुखं चेति तत्र गौणं त्रिशा स्मर्य प्रायंभिज्ञानं तत्कर्षेत्रति। मुखं तु तदतत्रिरं धूमादिना वहन्याद्युपायनमिति। दत्तयुपाय दृष्टा स्वार्थं परार्थश्चेति। योग्यता विशेषात्तक्रः-निरीक्षणाधिवर्णानां साध्यज्ञानां स्वार्थं तत्र साध्यं इत्यमविदितसमिद्धिमिति तत्र वायुभ्राधिेन्त्राय विषयेूकोृतमित्रं यथा शब्दः कर्मशःस्वतितः। स्वयंहिदना न सर्वशेषति अवांशितं तु प्रत्ययाद्युपायानुस्मारित्वं यथा शब्दः नित्यः श्रवणालित्वं प्रत्ययः बाधितं न तथे। असिद्धपदं तु विपर्यायानां साध्यव्यवस्थापनाय प्रतिभाषेश्चय नि असिद्धं भवितं तेन साध्यस्म प्रतिपाद स्वरूपत्तेनाधिवर्णात्तर-स्वरूपकालात् वादितस्तु प्रतिपादकलेन विजातार्थस्वरूपकलेन न तथे। साध्यज्ञानं च हेतुविज्ञानपूर्वकमे हेतुशः साध्यविज्ञानाध्यायविद्यमानस्तेन्त्रा। केवलेश्चरूपं पापण्यं हेतुतर्कणं वदति तत्र हेतुवाचारस्तिथिपि च-प्रकृतं सम्प्रवाच। प्रक्षेत्रेति न पर्यन्त्त एकशाःनाध्यायवत्ता उपयुक्त फलविदित्याः हेतुवाचारस्तिथिपि आमत्वग्रहि प्रत्यक्षानातृपीति-वाच्यप्रवचनेश्चय त्रिशा, पंचरूपसंभवात्।

पक्षधर्मसं प्रत्यक्षणम् उदेष्ट्ति सकलकृत्तिकोदयमित्रर्थ सकारलिकणस्कृतत्वाद्युपायमि उदेष्ट्ति साध्यकृत्तिकोदयलक्षण हेतुतर्वृत्तेनेपि। अनुमितेज्जार्यान्तत्ति पक्षधर्मस्यस्मागकल्कं इत्यदि तैैैैैैैैैैैैैैैैैैैै। किंतू साध्यविज्ञानानमिति एव हेतुतर्कणं तत्व वाचारस्तिथिपि समान न तु साध्यविज्ञानानित्यस्तः हेतुतुर्व उक्तवात भवता साध्यविज्ञानावो वाचारस्तिथिपिं भवति तच्चारणपि इत्र प्रमेयवादिभिः इत्यदि केवलाविद्यनि अविद्याभावनित्यकम् साध्याभावप्रसिद्धतेनाध्यायप्रिय्येति चेतू। न। अभिधेयाविद्याभावस्य समाविद्यावच्छेदते घटे एव प्रसिद्धतात्।

न चैव प्रमेयव्यवस्थापनेतरु सचे अभिधेयाव्यवस्थापाययस्ते घटे एव व्यविचारात्ि व्यायम्। समाविद्यावच्छेदनं प्रमेयस्य लक्षण-साधनस्यापि तत्रातूतात् साधनाः-वच्छेदकाविच्छेदा-प्रतियोगिकाः बावविद्यात् व्यविचारात्ि तत्त्वचिन्तामणिः-सूत्राचारीचेतेषती।

न च समविद्यात्त्वस्य प्रतियोगितया सह व्यविचारतात्त्व सवच्छेदकालयमिति वाच्यं समानाधिकरणस्यस्वातत्त्वात् इति शृङ्गाम्बेदे वच्छेदयं शृणुनिग्रहितप्रतियोगितया सह वैद्यकर्मिच् योग्को र्णायात्त्व-वच्छेदकालयात्। उत्तरं च तत्त्वचिन्तामणिमाृत्तिः प्रतियोगितात्त्ववच्छेदकालयात् प्रतिविद्यानामभावप्रत्यक्षे कारणम्। न तत्र प्रतियोगितात्त्ववच्छेदकालयात् प्रतिविद्यामृत्तित्वमसभ तनं गौरविद्यव न च समाविद्यावच्छेदा-प्रमेयस्य-लक्षण-प्रतियोगिकाविद्या प्रसिद्धतात् न नाभूवो घटे वाच्यं इति व्यायम्। आहार्यज्ञान विशयवत दशाः तस्य प्रसिद्धतातू। न चानाहार्यज्ञानविश्वासस्य तत्रातूतात् अन्योक्ष्यां नीमतं इत्या नास्त्यत्वं कर्ति। तमसस्वम्बनेत्रभाव रूपातेन उक्तकलनीतिकालसंभवात् तस्मादत्त्वात् तस्मात् त्वया आहार्यज्ञानविश्वासस्य दशाः उक्तकलनीतिकालसंभवात् च व्यवस्थायं तथास्माभिरिष्पि समविद्यावच्छेदा-

न च किल्याकडून होणारे पर्यावरणाच्या मानवीय विकासातील प्रभाव अनुमानांना दर्शात. व्यक्तीही सामाजिक, राजकारणी आणि धार्मिक निर्मितींमध्ये स्थायीता होते. पर्यावरणाच्या प्रभावाने सामाजिक तथा धार्मिक निर्मितींमध्ये स्थायीता होते. या प्रकारे पर्यावरणाचे प्रभाव अनुमानांमध्ये स्थायीता होते.
महात्मायिशेष सिद्धिरित अस्मदादाह्यवैगुण्य विकल्पस्तु न समभवते संशयानिवऽते: कि तस्या हथ्यत्षदर्शस्थिरितं बाध्यायादित यथा-समदादाह्य बौद्धगृहादिति न द्वितीयविकल्पंपि तस्यागहमिशिरितं सिद्धि कि च यदादिकायिं श्रीरिकत्तकल्लददशावितः। कथातं तद्न हथ्यत्षदर्शमभेषण भू-भूभूसदीनार्थश्रीरिकर्त्ता कल्पयितं शयं: तस्मात् सरसार्थशार्लक्षण-पक्षस्वेति पार्य त्वालं हेवियत्स्यवसंद्धिः जस्मिन्वितानांनेत्रस्पिति न चैमात्ये ना सम्बंधायति। कीठिकाशानिष्ठादैतेपि शास्त्रमुद्धिं एकरूपवयोपलभातथा प्रकृति उपि संभवायात्। कि च यथा आपकत्तृ तिष्कारोण भू-भूप्राग्यमोक्ष: कर्ता करते तथा कि न घटपददीनामपि कुंभकार कुंविदादि कर्तृतिनकारण स एव कर्ता करते। अथ तेनां प्रयत्नसिद्ध प्रयत्न सकारोंकं कथमयादं तथ्यात च अधिविधायसाध्ये श्रीमूर्तिर्भी महेश्वरस्यस्यामं कर्तप्रत्य इति तस्मादेआत्म-भवत्माहेशिनिरुक्तं कर्तप्रत्य व्यावेश तस्मादुप्रद्वंद्व कर्तुलामावता तस्य सार्वोपि नार्थमिति नित्यालोकानामहत्या हेवियत: खलु नित्य्यवेकस्वभव: सनं भूवननि सृजितो अपस्वभावो वा प्राथमिकस्लोद्देस्व कदाचिन्द्र-ग्रंथिमाणादौपप्ते। तदुपप्ते च एक स्वभावत्व व्याहेतः तथा च संकृत्त ज्ञानार्थ अपर्यावसानानुपि एक्ष्यापि कार्यस्य न सृजितो अपर-स्वभावते तु तस्या नित्यानेव स्वभाववेदें स्वभाववतोद्धि भेदात इति प्रयःम्यकमल-मार्तवंद्वचनात्।

क्रियेक्षरो वेनेव स्वभावेन जगति सृजितो तान संहेतु स्वभावावतेन वा। तेनैव चेतु सृजित संहार्योपमाल्पप्रस्तुत्ं एकस्वभावविशेषात। जगदुस्जर्जस्वभावविभिन्न स्वभावेन चेतु संहेतु ताहि स्वभाव भेदातु कुतस्य सार्ववत्य सिद्धकि नार्थ नार्थफळो तस्य सार्ववत्य सिद्धकि ताहि सिद्धार्थिणः। स्वाधीन च विश्व विधाते ततू कि सुखित दुःखितादेशकाश्यं घटित अनन्तादेशःसुवर्णबेदवेह नीर्मिती अथ बौद्धवानिर्प्रेसित एव तथा करोनीतात् चेतु ताहि अद्वैताध्य जगदिन्येन किमनेनार्थङ्गुण्डीतः। कि च जन्मात्मवेयुक्ति चेतु सृजित ताहि तु न तो सृजिती समस्त्यं तथा च कथात्म जगद्वितिकर्त्तो-तपस्तिमपदार्थकर्तृत्वं तथा च श्रमाधार्मिकपक्तवेदें स्वात-स्वाभावावता तस्य सार्ववत्य तस्मादिद्रिणायदश्र बहवानु सर्वेछ आत्मवाहिनिर्विश्र यात्तपदार्थ प्रतिप्रतिवादगम इत्यादम प्रयायतः तत्स्संस्थिभूर्व्यवस्त्रविज्ञानात्मक एक एव हरे युम्भां द्विसिद्धको भाविति भाव: एताकारण तार्थेबयावतेन विपयीनदशर्योः कब्जेवैव गान्त्ये परिःते तस्य मौदे दर्शयातः।

योगो हृदि स्त्रे जिन सत्तिकर्षथनूसारं निदायकति मूढः।
हितवा तमप्रयुक्त इवेशुकार्णे बुध्मुलजालं वदने स्वाभिषे। ॥९५॥

तपः स्व-पर-स्वत्सलिन्त्ध्यप्रणामहार्य हितवा त्यक्तवा योगः। स्वाहि सत्तिकर्षथपथंस्यारं निदायकति न्यस्यात् अर्थ भावः। ज्ञानात्मकलेन स्वप्रकारापर्युपुख्प्रेक्षितवाभवेना जाड्यवत्यः चस्तुनि प्रामाण्यमनात्त्व्य स्वप्रकाशास्मृति सत्तिकर्षथे स मूढः।
प्रामाण्यमझृतकलेकृतति इति तत्त द्ययत्तमाह। इव यथा। उद्ध: इशुकाण्ड त्यक्तवा बुब्बुन्तनजालं बुब्बुतवर्दं स्वयमुखे निद्धाति। अत्र चोट्टराधानीये गींग: स च बुब्बुतस्थानीय सत्रिकर्ष्य प्रामाण्यं इशुकाण्डस्थानीय ज्ञानप्रामाण्यं हिच्चा आदत इति न च सत्रिकर्ष्य प्रमाकरण चेतने प्रामाण्यं स्वादित्त वाच्यं। प्रमाकरणव्ये घटदायविशेषेण तस्याये प्रामाण्यप्रसंगात्तथाहि कि नाम करणतं व्यायामकारणतं चेतोऽहि व्यासंतजयन्ति सति तत्तवजनकं चेदु व्याप्तवल्तं ताहि। घटदायविशेषेण तस्याये तस्याये तत्त घटजन्यं चेतोऽहि वाच्यं प्रमाकरणकलेन घटदायविशेषेण तस्याये सति तत्तवजनकं चेतोऽहि वाच्यं प्रमाकरणकलेन घटदायविशेषेण तस्याये सति तत्तवजनकं चेदु व्याप्तवल्तं ताहि। घटदायविशेषेण तस्याये तस्याये तस्याये तत्त घटजन्यं चेतोऽहि वाच्यं प्रमाकरणकलेन घटदायविशेषेण तस्याये सति तत्तवजनकं चेदु व्याप्तवल्तं ताहि। घटदायविशेषेण तस्याये तस्याये तस्याये तत्त घटजन्यं चेतोऽहि वाच्यं प्रमाकरणकलेन घटदायविशेषेण तस्याये सति तत्तवजनकं चेदु व्याप्तवल्तं ताहि। घटदायविशेषेण तस्याये तस्याये तस्याये तत्त घटजन्यं चेतोऽहि वाच्यं प्रमाकरणकलेन घटदायविशेषेण तस्याये सति तत्तवजनकं चेदु व्याप्तवल्तं ताहि। घटदायविशेषेण तस्याये तस्याये तस्याये तत्त घटजन्यं चेतोऽहि वाच्यं प्रमाकरणकलेन घटदायविशेषेण तस्याये सति तत्तवजनकं चेदु व्याप्तवल्तं ताहि।

अथ योगगोपालाचारिद्र प्रकाश: प्रामाण्यारससारणये सत्रिकर्ष्य कथन्त्रितप्रामाण्ये यवस्यथाय सत्तुष्टादृश्यारि परिहितद्व यद्यन्ति भगवता तदाह।

अनौति तीर्थदिख्य सत्रिकर्ष्य हारस्वायनं प्रतिवंदि पाणिना। तथाहि बिज्ञान बिधायकसांभोपचारांतस्य यदि प्रमाणं।

अहो स्वामित्वस्यायनं वक्ष्यमाण: प्रकाशप्रतिवंदिदिवसयोऽपि सारणतेन कृत्वा सत्रिकर्ष्य हारस्वायनस्य प्रामाण्यं निरस्तिस्मित्य:। तथाय तत्तवबंस्त्रवधारादाह तथावहिः। अहो योगगोपालाचारिद्र अहो योगगोपालाचारिद्र पारिते सत्रिकर्ष्य बिज्ञानविधायकसां उच्चारतो घृतमापुरुषत्वादि यथा धृते आयु: कारणानायुपचायो धृते तथा स्व-परं यवस्यथाय-ज्ञान-लक्षणप्रामाण्य-ज्ञान-लक्षणप्रामाण्य-ज्ञान-लक्षणप्रामाण्य करण्ते प्रमाणोपचाराः तथि प्रामाण्यं स्वरे ताहि श्रुयु प्रतिवंदी विचारितो योगसारण:।

अथ तमेव प्रतिवंदीमाह।

आत्मादिकं तत्त्वविशेषतस्तु तत्त्वकारणां तत्त्वोपचारस्तु:। प्रामाणत्वेत्वि विश्वोऽधिकारस्वलङ्किनो तत्तु तथेति वाच्यं।

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अहो योग ! यदि सतिकर्ष्य स्मारकारणवेच्या प्रामाण्यमेंकोस्च तत्त
आत्मादिकमिपं अविषेकां स्मारकारणवेच्या सर्वापेक्षा प्रामाण्यमें अविषेकं सूत्रं एव
दशरथी तत्कारणस्नानं इति प्रामाण्याज्ञ तदव सतिकर्ष्य हि ज्ञातमो रुपचारस्या
विशेषादिति ।

अथ योग विकल्पतत्त्वाभावाण्यव्यवस्थापक-शाकानिर्देशमाह प्रामाण्यीति । न च
चर्चिता केवल दस्तु अठै इत्यादित खटातमानि तददित प्रामाण्य नेति न स्वात् कुळः
प्रामाण्यमें दिक्त प्रमाणार्थत्वमें यतोत्तरे तदविश्वासी तपस्यणं विश्वेदयादिति
भावप्रकाशालिबद्धान्विति अयमधर्मः । प्रामाण्यमयोविशेषेण किल प्रमाणं न तत्र तविश्वासीणो तस्येकं
स्यां न हि स एव सत्तेकं प्रतिविशेष्टि वत् यथा शक्येत । तत्सत्तु सतिकर्ष्य दश्यानन्दाच्ये
प्रामाण्यवेच्या घटवदातमः प्रामाण्य-प्रसंग-प्रतिबद्ध-दीर्घं अस्यं दैवति बाजंमिति सतदसा-
काय्यायः ।

अथ प्रामाण्यस्य प्रसंगविशेषादित्ये दूषणाविवे कृृत्वा ।

यदि प्रमेयवत्-विशेषिनी-मानता स्मारकारणमें किल चो प्रामाण्यम् ॥
वंध्यासुतंतेवष तथा च तस्यास्तं प्रसंगक्ष्य तथातत्त्वोपि ॥१९८॥

अहो योग प्रामाण्यस्य प्रसंगः सह विशेषिते व कम् य य य प्रामाण्यम् न तत्र
प्रसंगमिति समस्ते तथा च प्रामाण्यस्य प्रसंगमें वंध्यास्तनयन्त्रस्वतमान्ये । तत्त्वमयः ।
यदि प्रमेयवत् विशेषिनी-मानता-प्रामाण्यं स्मार्थः प्रामाण्यस्य प्रसंगमें स्यान् न तत्र तत्
स्यां न हि चं इत्यादित वंध्यास्तनयन्त्र समस्तः तथा च प्रामाण्यस्य प्रसंगः स्यान् न हि चं
वंध्यास्तनयन्त्र नोन विशेषित निन्दादेव । तथा प्रामाण्यमि अप्रमेयवते नास्तिक्ये निन्दां
स्यादिति भावायः । किं च सन्तु भावस्यापि प्रामाण्यमि प्रामाण्यस्य भावस्यापि प्रसंगः
प्रामाण्यानन्दाच्ये कथं सर्वज्ञस्य सर्वार्थं स्यादिति सर्वोपेक्षः किं च यथा प्रामाण्यः प्रसंगः
सह विशेषिते तथा प्रामाण्यमें कथं सर्वोपेक्षः निन्दादेव । तथा च तस्यास्तं तददस्तां प्रसंगः
इति न प्रामाण्यः प्रमेयवत्-विशेषितेन तत्त्वमिति सतिकर्षणं ज्ञातरणाच्ये विशेषेण घटवदातमः प्रामाण्य-प्रसंग-प्रतिबद्धाराचारादिपि
सतिकर्षणं प्रामाण्यमिति अयदशकायः ॥

अथ प्रमेयवत् प्रमाणतः विशेषिते प्रामाण्यानां महेश्वरस्यापि सर्वज्ञं न सिद्धेऽदिति
दर्शवदात ॥

कि चाप्रमेयात्मक सन्तु भावन कथं तत्वेश्वः ॥

सर्वार्थविद्वते प्रतिबद्ध-पाणि विद्वाने च योग हृदिस्थानः ॥१९९॥

सुकस्मादेव किं च सतिकर्षणं प्रामाण्यं वकः सर्वज्ञान: प्रसंगः तत्त्वमि च चाश्चर्षः
साक्षात्प्रमाणादिभिः सम्बन्धो नास्तिक्ये सर्वार्थिदस्वदास्तः च योगिच्छेतोपि ॥
साक्षात्यप्रमाणभं: सम्मन्यावाहत् कथय तस्य सार्वज्ञं, न च तद्वर्षशुषो योगज-धर्मानुग्रहात\n\nतत्संबन्ध यथादेवति वाच्यं, कोशायं योगोदिनिर्वाणं योगज-धर्मानुग्रह: स्वविषये प्रवृत्तमानस्य\nचक्षुपदेशदितवाणाधान सहकारिमात्र वा। नाद्य युक्तिमानु पक्षः परमालावदी प्रवृत्तमानस्य\nचक्षुपदेशदित्वाणाधान अथ योगिनि नवत्रसंपादनावैक्तितैं चेताहि स्ववेव तत्र प्रवृत्तमानस्य चक्षुः:\nको योगजमुखानुग्रहः कर्तव्यः कै चायोग्यावदियोऽति। सिद्धे हि योगजमुखानुग्रहे तत्र\nप्रवृत्तस्वतः प्रवृत्तौ च सत्त्वम् स्वविषये प्रवृत्तमानातिशिशाप-पर्याप्त योगजमुखानुग्रहः: सिद्धे ते न\nद्वितीय पक्षेऽपि घटदितमा विषयातिवेद्यमेहः प्रसंगः तथा चैतकेवतः करणः योगजमुखानुग्रहोऽति\nसल्या युगापूर्वायान्यैकातीतिर्द्विकायस्य-विषयक-जाननकं स्वाधित्य योगजमुखानुग्रहस्यासंबन्धम्\nचक्षुः सातिकर्षण्य परमाणुविषयकानोनाध्रेण सर्वज्ञाविप्रसंस्कृत चक्षुः-सातिकर्षण: प्रमाणः स्वतः\nइति।

अथ परस्परिकल्पित सातिकर्षणां प्रमाणं निस्सद्य स्वमत सिद्धप्रमाणालक्षणं यवस्थापनः\nप्रमाणस्य-हन्त-माहात्म्यं वर्णायति।

स्वमित्रज्ञानवसायिः सम्यक् ज्ञान प्रामाणोत्तम-रहस्यम्।
यो न्यायमित स्वे हृदये स नूतन स्वातं सम्पदामास्यदमिगं-विप्रतिकर्षणः। ॥२०॥

अहो स्वमित्र तत्पार्थं सम्यक्यं व्यवसायिः ज्ञान-लक्षणं-प्रमाणारूपं य: पुमान स्वे हृदि न्यायस्य तथायति स अख्लक: स: सम्बदामास्य स्मार्थितार्थं, व्यासर्थस्य सम्यक्यं स्व: परर्माणवाजनं प्रमाणं स्मार्थितं देशाभिधि। नवतिथ्वायत्वाक्षरसंभवादिद्वैपरोऽविवारकायाश्च वातावरणदपानीति। पदाति सर्थकाणी स: प्रकृते चैतकेवतः पदैः कृतित्वायत्वाद्रुपिनिवारयते इति चेतत् शून्य प्रकृते हि न दर्शन-प्रतिष्ठानिकायन-अभावयतु हाय स्मार्थितं किंतु जायते सामग्र: \nविशेषाव्यवस्थात: पदाति अनेनेति ज्ञान-दर्शन-साधारण तथा च ज्ञानमितुके दर्शनेवति-\nव्यासार्थविशेषेति व्यासार्थयतुके विशेषेष्य गौणे भावे व्यासार्थ दामास्याहात्क्षेत्रपि युक्ततया दृष्टवधानि विशेषत्वमहिं निष्क्रियोतित्व व्यवसायिः न चैतादं दर्शनं सम्भवति। ये हि दृष्टवधानि धर्मण जाने युक्ततया भावते हि दर्शने गौणदेवने भावते ये हि जाने गौणयति दृष्टवधानि भावते च दर्शने युक्ततयावभावते इति दर्शनस्य व्यवसायित्वाभावनं\nतद्वायसायिः निषेधं कथायति। व्यवसायिः चेतुः संशोधने भाव: अर्थ संशोधनाः सातिकर्षणेवत:। वासिः संशोधनाः \nनिषेधकल्पनेन व्यवसायित्वाहं इति तत्तस्थाय विषयं स्मार्थितं। सम्मृ व्यवसायिः ज्ञानमितुके \nजानात्वतादि कल्पित-नानुस्यायान्वितात्विशेषेत् परेति अथ सम्मृक च-व्यवसायिः जाने \nप्रमाणमितुके अप्रमाणे युक्तकर्षणपदातिः जाने निषेधयत्वायतियतुः स्वेति। ननु घटादि ज्ञानस्य\nमनो ग्राहावेदनेवपित स्वाकारायनवयस्य-वेदवेदने कथमाणार्थयति चेतृ तस्य मनोग्रहावेदे \nघटाद्रायेन न स्वतः तस्य श्च-स्तृ एव व्यवाततार्क: कै च घटादि मनोजोन्याववसायायायुं \nमनोजोन्यानु व्यवसायस्वप्पज्ञानाहास्यदप्प्ज्ञानामीत्वनस्य-प्रसंग इति सकलज्ञानस्य\nश्च पर-व्यवसायिच्छेऽयौग कल्पिते पर व्यवसायिन्यप्रमाणे जानेनिषेधिः-निषेधं स्वेति पदं
तत: सिद्ध सम्पक स्य-पर-व्यवसायिज्ञान न माणणमिति। ततःविविधज्ञानवस्त्रण माणणरूपहारस्य
कङ्गे स्थापकः पुमानः सम्पदा स्यद्रमिदि भावाद्।

अथोपसंहारः

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