# Makaranda

(Madhukar Anant Mehendale Festschrift)

Editors :
M. A. Dhaky
J. B. Shah

Sharadaben Chimanbhai
Educational Research Centre
Ahmedabad.- INDIA.

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

**Sharadaben Chimanbhai Educational Research Centre**

'Darshan' *Opp.* Ranakpur Society

Shahibaug **Ahmedabad**-380 004 (Gujarat State) INDIA

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Prof. M. A. Mehendale

# Foreword

In the publication programme contemplated by this Centre, one category involves publishing felicitation volumes for renowned scholars in the field of Jainology as well as Indology in general. We are happy to publish this second volume in that series for Prof. (Dr.) M. A. Mehendale, the distinguished and world famous scholar whose contributions to the fields of Sanskrit, Prakrit, and Avestan studies are outstanding and whose association with the institutions having great reputation like the Deccan College and the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, both located in Pune, is decades old. We hope and believe that the scholars in the fields in which he has been for many years working will welcome this publication.

Sharadaben Chimanbhai
Educational Research Centre
1st of September, 1999

**Ajay Chimanbhai**
Trustee

# Editors' Preface

In mid-May 1997, we for the first time met Prof. Mehendale at the world- renowned Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute in Pune where he has been working for the past several years after retiring from the Deccan College. We, of course, were aware of his researches in the fields of Sanskrit, Prakrit, and Avesta—an academic preöccupation in which he has been continually engaged, indeed for over half a century. We, moreover, were familiar with some of his more famous works. To meet him face to face, however, was for us a rare event and indeed was an experience as profound as was delightful. As we look back, in him we were meeting an academic of great stature, the surprising part was that we found him not only an humble yet dignified, and also a pleasantly communicative scholar, but also serene, soft-spoken, and forthright as well as fearless, a rare combination of several desirable facets of disposition for any scholar possessing outstanding merits and distinction. In the course of our conversation, an idea flashed in our minds. Then, just on an impulse, we proposed to allow us to produce a festschrift for him. After a few contemplative moments, and for certain to our delight, Prof. Mehendale agreed, the result being this Volume which we have pleasure in placing before the scholarly community. The papers, we feel, are well-written and needed only small editorial modifications and adjustments according to a few details of the style-sheet this Centre has adopted. However, we must clarify that we have

largely allowed the author's own style for formal conventions in writing since we noticed that the scholars specializing in different disciplines followed their own particular style-sheet; and changes, indeed too many needed for effecting homogeneity in total style-conventions we adopt were, therefore, uncalled for and would end up in confusion even after putting in laborious efforts for long months at our end.

We express our special thanks to the erudite authors for their learned contributions as also for their ready response to our request. They all, as we here do, hold Prof. Mehendale in high esteem and most of them for many years know him as well as his admirable work in the fields in which he is a specialist and has been untiringly active. (Prof. Mehendale's biographical sketch will appear in the volume of his collected papers compiled and edited by Dr. S. A. Laddu, Pune, which is currently in press.)

At the Centre's end, we must specially thank the Computer Operator Shri Akhilesh Mishra for his flawless laser printing and to Shri Naranbhai Patel for his diligently and perceptively done proof-reading.

**M. A. Dhaky**

**J. B. Shah**

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# Kampa-pronunciation in स्थानां न ये १रा: *RV* 10.78.4[a]

**P. D. Navathe**

Kampa, which means tremor, is a peculiar kind of pronunciation which frequently occurs in the traditional recitation of the *Ṛgveda (RV)*. According to a rule in the *Ṛgveda-Prātiśākhya*[1], it takes place when an independent, circumflex (i. e., *svarita* of four kinds, namely *jātya, abhinihita, kṣaipra* and *Praśliṣṭa*) is followed by an acute or another independent circumflex.

The same conditions for the occurrence of kampa are laid down in a kārikā cited by Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita in the *Prauḍha Manoramā (PrMan)* on his *Siddhānta Kaumidī (SK)* on the sūtra तस्यादित उदात्तमर्धह्रस्वम् । *Aṣṭādhyāyī* 1. 2. 32. This kārikā, which is ascribed to Śākalya[2], further states that, having uttered the first half of the independent circumflex with an acute accent the remaining half, which is grave, should be uttered with a tremor.

The *Upalekhasūtra*[3], a school manual, states that when the said circumflex is on a short vowel the kampa is said to be short and when it is on a long vowel it is said to be long.

According to the tradition of the *Ṛgveda,* if the preceding independent circumflex is on a short vowel, the figure ¹१ is placed after it, e. g., युयोध्य ¹१ स्मद् द्वेषांसि *RV* 2.6. 4[c]; श्रवस्य ¹१ स वाजी *RV* 2. 10. 1[d] etc., and the figure ¹३ if it is on a long vowel, e. g., भृगवो विक्ष्वा ¹३यो. *RV* 2. 4. 2[b] तन्वा ¹३ जुर्भुराण: *RV* 2. 10. 5[d] etc. As may be noticed, these figures have vertical accent marks above and horizontal accent marks below them[4]. In the former case, the pronunciation of the syllable is known as *ekakampa* and in the latter as *trikampa*. This pronunciation is a sort of analysis of the independent circumflex into its component parts.

However, it is difficult to determine the probable time when this practice of marking the kampa with figures ꣡१ and ꣡३ could have started. The *Ṛgveda-Prātiśākhya* and Sākalya, who prescribe the kampa, are completely silent about this distinction[5]. So, for want of adequate evidence, we may surmise that the practice is as old as, or might be still older than, the beginning of the manuscript tradition of the *Ṛgveda*.

In the light of the aforementioned rules and practice regarding the kampa-phenomenon in the *Ṛgveda* let us examine the kampa in the passage रथा꣡नां न ये ꣡१ रा: *RV* 1c. 78. 4[a], the subject of the present discussion. In the standard edition of the *Ṛgveda*[6] the line is read as given here. The padapāṭha of the line : रथा꣡नाम् । न । ये । अ꣣रा: । shows that, in the Saṁhitā, the abhinihita circumflex यै which is the result of the combination of the acute ये- with the following grave अ꣣-, is followed by the acute रा:. As the said circumflex is on a long vowel, according to the normal practice, the figure ꣡३ was expected to be placed after it. However, we find the figure ꣡१ instead. So, this is to be recorded as an irregular instance which deviates from the norm of marking the kampa. I have checked all the occurrences of kampa in the Maṇḍalas 2 to 6. No other instance of violation of the norm was noticed in this portion.

The case of kampa in रथा꣡नां न ये ꣡१ रा: is comparable with that in the parallel passage इन्द्रा꣡ग्नी युवामि꣡मे ꣡३ भि स्तोमा꣡ अनूषत *RV* 6. 60. 7[ab]. The Padapāṭha : इन्द्रा꣡ग्नी इति꣡ । यु꣣वाम् । इ꣡मे । अ꣣भि । स्तोमा꣡: । अनूषत । shows that the situation in both ये꣡१रा: and -मे꣡३भि is exactly identical. However, in the latter case the kampa is regularly marked by the figure ꣡३.

Regarding the accentuation of the line रथा꣡नां न ये ꣡१ रा: a curious view is expressed by the *Svarāṅkuśa Śikṣā*[7]. Thus it observes :

यत्राभिनिहितात्पूर्वोह्युदात्तो दृश्यते यदि ।
तत्र स्वारं न कुर्वीत रथानां नेति दर्शनम् ॥१६॥

"If an acute is found to precede the abhinihita circumflex then in that case one should not pronounce the independent circumflex (*Svāra*) as may be noticed in the sequence रथानां न ".

According to Bloomfield's *Vedic Concordance* (p. 818a), the said sequence occurs only at *RV* 10. 78. 4a where the abhinihita ये is preceded by the acute

न. So, if my understanding is correct, according to the Śikṣā there is no pronunciation of the independent circumflex in the passage रथा॑नां न ये ᳚१ रा:. Consequently, there is no Kampa.

In the context of the independent circumflex, due to the peculiar position of which the Kampa-pronunciation takes place, we come across an interesting discussion in the grammatical tradition of the *SK*. Attention is to be particularly drawn here to the exposition of the sūtra तस्यादित उदात्तमर्धह्रस्वम्। *Aṣṭ* 1-2-32 given in the said commentary. The discussion is important for us as the Ṛgvedic passage, which is the topic of the present article, is cited there as an example.

In the preceding sūtra समाहार: स्वरित: Aṣṭ 1. 2. 31 the circumflex accent was defined as a combination of the acute and the grave accents. The aim of the present sūtra is to clarify the nature of this combination. This is done by stating the sequence of the components of the combination in the cource of pronunciation and their proportion to each other in the combination.

The sūtra is explained as follows : "The word ह्रस्व in the sūtra is technically unnecessary. The first half of the circumflex is to be understood as acute. Consequently, the latter half is grave. It is distinctly heard when it is followed by an acute or another circumflex[8])".

To illustrate this point are cited the following three examples :

1. क्व ᳚१वोऽश्वा: *RV* 5. 61. 2[a], 2. रथा॑नां न ये ᳚२ रा: *RV* 10. 78. 4[a] and 3. श॒तच॑क्रं यो ᳚३ह्य: *RV* 10. 144. 4[c]. It is evident that, in this context, by circumflex, an independent circumflex is intended.

In the first two examples the independent circumflex is followed by an acute. The *Tattvabodhinī*, a sub-commentary of the *SK* observes that in the first example the said circumflex is on a short vowel and in the second on a long one[9]); in the third example the independent circumflex is followed by another independent circumflex[10]).

According to the *Bālamnoramā* on the *SK* the circumflex in the last example is a *Kampasvarita*[11]). However, this designation is not appropriate as the kampa-pronunciation occurs in all the three cases and not in this one alone.

As the subject of kampa does not come within the scope of the present sūtra, it is not treated in the SK and the *PrMan*. However, in the *PrMan,* the authority of Śākalya is invoked, as is already mentioned[12], to state that kampa-pronunciation takes place in the three examples thus cited.

It is to be noted that, in the printed editions of the *SK* the figures १, २ and ३, with the accent-marks given below and above them, are placed respectively after the circumflex in the first second and third example.

The purpose behind the use of these figures is not quite clear. It may be noticed that in the *SK* as also in the *PrMan,* nowhere is there any mention of these figures. Similarly, neither of the two sub-commentaries of the *SK* throws any light on this point.

The *Kaumudī-Mahotsāha,* an old Marathi exposition of the *SK,* explains that the figures १, २, and ३ bearing the accent-marks indicate that the preceding circumflex is respectively short, long, and prolated.

Thus, according to this explanation, the circumflex is to be classified under three categories and the figures correspond to the respective category under which it is classified, they have nothing to do with the kampa-pronunciation observed in the Vedic tradition.

It is evident that the figure २ in the second example is not in conformity with the traditional system of the *RV*. That the figures १ and ३ show agreement with the tradition is a matter of mere coincidence.

The explanation given in the *Kaumudī-Mahotsāha* can hardly be regarded as convincing for want of supporting evidence being available in the *SK* and the *PrMan*.

**Annotations :-**

1. जात्योऽभिनिहितश्चैव क्षैत्रः प्रश्लिष्ट एव च ।
   एते स्वराः प्रकम्पन्ते यत्रोच्चस्वरितोदयाः ॥ ३.३८

   Mangal Deva Shastri considers this kārikā as `spurious', probably because it is not commented upon by Uvaṭa.

2. शाकल्योऽप्याह -

अप्राकृतस्तु यः स्वारः स्वरितोदात्तपूर्वगः ।
उदादायार्धमस्याथ शेषं निघ्नन्ति कम्पितम् ॥

विभा-स्वरितो द्विधा प्राकृतोऽप्राकृतश्च । तत्र प्रकृत्या स्वभावेनोदात्तयोर्यथाकथंचित् संगतिं विना जातो यः स प्राकृतः, तद्भिन्नोऽप्राकृत इति बोध्यम् । प्रौ॰ म॰ - उदादाय उदात्तं कृत्वा । The source of the kārikā is not known.

3. ह्रस्वे ह्रस्वं विजानीयाद् दीर्घे दीर्घं तथैव च ।
स्वरितस्यानुसारेण कम्पं कुर्वीत शास्त्रवित् ॥२२॥

4. *Cf.* Whitney : *Sanskrit Grammar* 87d, p. 30.

Macdonell : *Vedic Grammar* 84 b, p. 78.

5. There seems to be no unanimity among the Vaidikas regarding the practice of pronouncing the *ekakampa* or *trikampa.* In this connection I heard from the Late Shri Vinayakabhaṭṭa Ghaisas, a reputed Ṛgvedin from Pune, that the Vaidikas from the southern Maharashtra everywhere follow the practice of pronouncing *ekakampa* irrespective of the short or long quality of the preceding independent circumflex. This information requires verification.

6. *Ṛgveda* ed. by Max Müller, Oxford, 1872. *Ṛgveda Saṁhitā* ed. by the Vaidika Saṁśodhana Maṇḍala, Pune 1972.

7. Included in the *Śikṣāsaṁgraha,* Varanasi 1989, p. 134.

8. ह्रस्वग्रहणमतन्त्रम् । स्वरितस्यादितोऽर्धमुदात्तं बोध्यम् । उत्तरार्धं तु परिशेषादनुदात्तम् । तस्य चोदात्तस्वरितपरत्वे श्रवणं स्पष्टम् । अन्यत्र तूदात्तश्रुतिः प्रातिशाख्ये प्रसिद्धा । 'क्व १ वोऽश्वाः' । 'रथानां न ये २ राः' । 'शतचक्रं यो ३ ह्यः' इत्यादिष्वनुदात्तश्रुतिः । सिद्धान्तकौमुदी with तत्त्वबोधिनी, Nirṇayasāgara edition, Bombay, Śaka 1830 (=A. D. 1908)

9. क्वेति ।....उदात्तपरत्वे ह्रस्वस्वरितस्योदाहरणमुक्त्वा दीर्घस्वरितस्योदाहरणमाह-रथानां न य इति । ये ३ अरा इति पदद्वयमपि फिट्स्वरेणान्तोदात्तम् । The relevance of the figure ३ placed after ये is inexplicable.

10. स्वरितपरत्वे उदाहरणमाह-शतचक्रमिति ।

11. 'शतचक्रं यो' इत्योकारः कम्पस्वरितः । स तु 'ह्य' इत्यकारात्मकस्वरितपरकः ।

12. *See* annotation 2 above.

# Emendation to the text of the Maitrāyaṇī Saṁhitā

**T. N. Dharmadhikari**

The Maitrāyaṇī Saṁhitā (MS) has practically lost its oral tradition and is now found in few manuscripts only. Fortunately, the text of this Saṁhitā was critically edited and brought out by Schroeder in Leipzig in 1881-1886 and later by Satavalekar in Aundha (Maharashtra) in 1942.

Since the MS has been retained only in manuscript tradition, many (mis-)readings have crept in its text. Schroeder appears to have rectified some of them. Some other scholars have tried to suggest few conjectural emendations to the text of the MS. Martin Mittwede (1986) has collected such emendations in his text-critische Bemerkungen zür Maitrāyaṇī Saṁhitā. I have to examine one emendation, along with the proper rationale behind it. In the printed text of the MS 3. 2. 8 (Satavalekar), we come across a line reading (यदेता उपधीयन्तेऽस्या) अनतिदाहाय यद्दित्रम् (इति, होवाचेयं य एता उपदधाता इत्यत्रादो भवति यस्यैता उपधीयन्ते)।

In this line, the word अनतिदाहाय is accented twice, i. e. it shows two udātta accents, which is against the Pāṇinian rule, namely 'anudāttam padam ekavarjam' (Pāṇini 6. 1. 158) Second, the word यद् (in यद्दित्रम्) is marked as anudātta, which is also against the above-cited Pāṇinian rule. It may be noted that the word यद् is always udātta. The double udātta accent in अनतिदाहाय and the anudātta mark of यद् give us a clue to conclude that the passage is corrupt and needs emendation.

Schroeder has tried to correct this passage, who reads it as अनतिदाहाय यद्दित्रम् (Vol II, p 28). Thus following the rules of accents, he has removed the second udātta of अनतिदाहाय and has marked यद् with udātta. However, he has neither given the support of manuscripts to this effect, nor has he recorded any other readings here.

Further, Keith, while translating the Taittirīya Saṁhitā (TS) 5. 2. 10, (p. 415), f. n. 1), notes that the text of MS should obviously be corrected to read àdad for yàd which is non-sense'. He has suggested the correction, obviously on the basis of the TS 5. 2. 10 which reads अनतिदाहायोवाच ह्येमददित्। etc. In fact, the Kaṭhaka Saṁhitā X. 9 also reads अनतिदाहायोवाच ह्येमददित् and supports this emendation. It may be noted here that, though the emendation is correct, it is based only on collateral literature, which cannot always be regarded as decisive, since such literature also show variant readings. Therefore this emendation needs further investigation into the original manuscripts of the MS.

The manuscripts of the MS kept in the custody of Vaidika Saṁśodhana Maṇḍala, Ādarsha Sanskrit Shodha Saṁsthā, (V. S. M) Pune, show the readings as follows :-

Manuscript No. 4554 and 2337 अनतिदाहाय्यायदिदन्नम्। Manuscript No. 2738 अनातिदाहाय्यायदिदन्नम्। A Manuscript from private collection (Saṁvat 1665) reads the text as अनातिदाहाय्यायदिदन्नम् etc. Even though these manuscripts do not give the correct readings here, they furnish some further clues for emending the text, namely they have recorded या in अनतिदाहायायदिदन्नम् as long. This word may, therefore, be split into अनतिदाहाय अयत् इत् अन्नम्। The second udātta of अनतिदाहाय (Satavalekar's edn.) can now be shifted to अ of अयत्. Since यद् is replaced by अयत् the descrepancy of its (i. e of यद्) being anudātta is also removed.

The pada-pāṭha (manuscript No. 14096 V. S. M.), though not very reliable and dependable, splits the text as अनतिदाहायेत्यनतिदाहाय। अयत्। इत्। अन्नम्।, and retains the tradition of अयत् instead of यत्, suggesting that the pada-pāṭha-kāra has long या in अनतिदाहायायदिदन्नम् in his tradition.

Since the meaning of the word अयत् cannot be satisfactorily interpreted in this context, it may be read as अदत् (from √ad to eat), not only on the basis of the collateral literature of TS and KS, but also on the following arthavāda-namely अन्नादो भवति। Thus the word यद् (Satavalekar) or यद् (Schroeder) be first read as अयत् on the basis of manuscripts and then अयत् be emended and read as अदत्। The help derived from manuscripts accounts for अ in अदत्।

Bhaṭṭa Bhāskara and Sāyaṇa derive अदत् from √ad vide. Their commentaries on TS 5-2-10-Sāyaṇa-अन्नमदित् अन्नमत्ति' and Bhatta Bhāskara - 'अददित् अद्यादेवान्नम्।

The meaning of the entire line would be -`These (apasyā) bricks are placed, it is to avoid excessive burning. The earth said—one who places these bricks verily eats food. He becomes consumer of food for whom these bricks are placed.'

# On some Similes in the Jaiminīya Brāhmaṇa

**Madhavi Kolhatkar**

The similes play a very important role in literature. They are used primarily as a means to convey the intended meaning with clarity and ease through a known illustration and then also as a poetic embellishment. They are used as an aid for the better understanding of something unknown with the description of the already known.

The Brāhmaṇa literature is also not an exception to this known fact. Similes are used profusely in them. They are more of an explanatory or illustrative nature rather than that of decorative. They are generally very simple, yet appealing. The similes in the Aitareya and the Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa have been studied before and discussed in details, but such is not the case regarding the similes in the Jaiminīya Brāhmaṇa (= JaimiBr.)

Compared to other Brāhmaṇas, it can be seen that JaimiBr. exuberantly employs this poetic device, the simile. There are not less than 45 similes only in the first part of it which describes the ritual of the Agnihotra and the Agniṣṭoma. They are used mainly to explain the ritual procedure. They are mostly simple, easy and appealing, and can be characterised as explanatory. They provide the illustrations from the every day life and hence are, on the whole, very easy to understand. Bodewitz's translation of the JaimiBr. is of much help in comprehending those. (In some cases, however, one cannot totally agree to his translation or emendation.) The aim of this paper is to discuss two such similes.

i) The simile at JaimiBr. 1. 250 reads; *yathā vittaṁ pravāhaṁ kṣipraṁ pravahet evaṁ evai 'nam etā devatās svargāya lokāya pravahanti* / "Just as a river may quickly transport goods, even so these deities transport him with a view to heaven." (Bodewitz, 1990, P. 139).

There are certain difficulties in accepting this translation. The word *pravāham* is taken here as having neuter gender and the subject of the clause. Besides this grammatical difficulty, there is one more difficulty and that is; this meaning is not in accordance with the context.

The context is as follows—"When the Trivṛt Stoma covers the Gāyatrī, what does she procreate on account of this ?" One should say : "The sacrifice with seven naves and the iḍā as its end. "The Gāyatrī becomes pregnant. She procreates the Puronuvākya (invitation). The Puronuvākya the yājyā Yājyā the Vaṣaṭ—call, the Vaṣaṭ—call the libations, the libations the Daksiṇās, the Daksiṇās heaven....and the Dakṣiṇās make him go to heaven." (Bodewitz, 1990, P. 139) And then the same idea is further explained through the above simile.

Thus, from the context it is clear that, because of the union of the Trivṛt stoma with the Gāyatrī metre, certain sacrificial elements are acquired successively and finally the Dakṣiṇās. It is the Dakṣiṇās, thus gained, which lead the sacrificer to heaven. Accordingly, the simile can be translated : "As the gained or accumulated (water ? wave ? force ?) carries the flow further with speed, similarly the deities carry the sacrificer to heaven (with speed)." The idea behind this seems to be somewhat like a relay-race. As the accumulated waters, i. e. the waves or the force which is accumulated due to the waves carry the waters further with speed, the Dakṣiṇās thus gained by gradual succession lead the sacrificer to heaven. The next sentence clearly expresses this idea : *trivṛd evai 'naṁ stomo gāyatryai prayacchati gāyatrī puronuvākyāyai puronuvākyā yājyāyai yājya vaṣaṭkārāya vaṣaṭkāra āhutibhya āhutayo dakṣiṇābhya dakṣiṇās svargaṁ lokaṁ gamayanti* | "The Trivṛt stoma gives him to the Gāyatrī metre, the Gāyatrī metre gives him to the Puronuvākya invitation, the Puronuvākyā invitation to the Yājya, the Yājya to the Vaṣaṭ-call, the Vaṣaṭ-call to the libations, the libations to the Dakṣiṇās, and the Dakṣiṇās make him go to heaven." (Bodewitz, 1990, p. 139).

There might perhaps be some suggestion in this passage. It is obvious that since the sacrificer has already started the performance of the sacrifice, he is going to get the fruit of it sooner or later. But the same course of action will be expedited and the deities will carry him quickly to heaven if he will

satisfy the priests by giving sufficient or rather abundant Daksiṇās.

ii) The second simile is at JaimiBr. 1. 281. It reads—*tad ha smāheyapis saumāpas sa vādya yajeta sa vānyaṁ yājayed yo yathā mahatī tīrthe sikate gā asambādhamānās santarpayed evaṁ sarvā devatā anusavanaṁ chandaṣsv akṣaram akṣaram anusambādhamānās santṛpyantir vidyād iti.*

Bodewitz (1990, p. 159) has translated it—"As to this also Iyapi Saumāpa said: "He may sacrifice now or act as a priest for someone else, who would find all the deities satiating themselves on account of the fact that he had satisfied them each according to his own Pressing and to every syllable in the (corresponding) metres and (consequently) not pressed together just as one may satisfy cattle in a large ford without sandbanks (i. e.) not pressed together."

In the notes Bodewitz (1990, p. 300) has stated, "For *sikate* read *'sikate* (as suggested by Caland in his transcript). The absence of sandbanks creates room for the cows in the water." The word *sikate* is difficult to explain grammatically as an adjective of *tīrthe*. But a river cannot be without sandbanks. The word *asikate* would suggest then that the river is so full of water that the sandbanks are not seen. It is used, perhaps to emphasise the vastness of the ford.

Bodewitz has suggested one more emendation. regarding that he has noted (1990, p. 300). "The crit. ed. and Caland's transcript read *akṣaram akṣaram anusambādhamānāḥ*. Evidently *anu* belongs to the preceding nouns as a postposition. On account of the comparison a negation before *saṁbādhamānāḥ* is required here. The gods are *asaṁbādhamānāḥ*, since everyone has his own place (i. a. syllable) for his satisfaction. Therefore, I read *akṣaram akṣaram anv asaṁbādhamānāḥ."*

For better understanding of this paragraph, it is necessary to take into consideration the previous one. It reads - *yo vai devānāṁ gṛhān veda gṛhī bhavati vindate gṛhān / chandāṁsi vāva devānāṁ gṛhāḥ / aṣṭākṣarā gāyatrī aṣṭau vasavaḥ / gāyatryaiva vasavo gṛhiṇaḥ / ekādaśākṣarā triṣṭub ekādaśa rudrāḥ / triṣṭubhaiva rudrā gṛhiṇaḥ / dvādaśākṣarā jagatī dvādaśa ādityāḥ / jagatyaivādityā gṛhiṇaḥ /...sa ya evam etān devānāṁ gṛhān veda gṛhī bhavati vindate gṛhān / yo vai devānām tṛptīr veda tṛpyatyātmanā tṛpyaty 'asya prajā |*

Bodewitz (1990, p. 159) has translated it—"He who knows the houses of the gods, obtains a house. The metres forsooth are the houses of the gods. The Gāyatrī has eight syllables; there are eight Vasus. Through the Gāyatrī the Vasus possess a house. The Triṣṭubh has eleven syllables; there are eleven Rudras. Through the Triṣṭubh the Rudras possess a house. The Jagatī has twelve syllables; there are twelve Ādityas. Through the Jagatī the Ādityas possess a house...He who thus knows these houses of gods, obtains a house. He who knows the satisfaction of the gods, becomes satisfied himself and his offspring becomes satisfied."

From this passage, it becomes clear that each syllable of a particular metre is a house for each god of a particular group and he should get that particular syllable as his own house. Then only the deities will be satisfied.

When the deities come to the sacrifice, they rush or swarm for their own house. They are in hurry to get their own house. They are *akṣaram akṣaram anu sambādhamānāḥ*. But at that time, it is the priest *yo vidyāt...*" who should know or who should see to it that when the stotras are chanted at the time of the Soma-pressing, they should be chanted in such a way that each and every syllable is uttered distinctly so as to enable the deities to occupy their own syllable, i. e. the house and they become satisfied."

Now, if we interpret this simile in the light of this passage, the meaning can be understood without changing *anu sambāndhamānāḥ* to *anu asambādhamānāḥ*. Thus the simile can be translated—"Regarding this, Iyapi Saumāpa has said—He, who would know that all the deities who are rushing or swarming for their respective syllable are satisfied in their own (Soma) pressing (by getting it), just as one satisfies the cattle at a spacious ford without the sandbanks (being seen), without being pressed together, should sacrifice today or act as a priest for someone else."

The same idea is further elaborately explained using the word *anusaṁbādhamānāḥ* three more times—*aṣṭākṣarā gāyatry aṣṭau vasavah vasūnāṁ gāyatram prātassavanaṁ / tat te prātassavane chandassv akṣaram akṣaram anusaṁbādhamānās santṛpyanti /* "The Gāyatrī has eight syllables. There are eight Vasus. The morning pressing is connected with Gāyatrī and belongs to the Vasus. Therefore they, rushing for their own syllable at the

time of morning pressing, satisfy themselves (by getting it.)"

In the same way the eleven Rudras and the twelve Ādityas also satisfy themselves.

Thus this passage can be translated satisfactorily without emending the word *anu saṁbādḥamānāḥ as anv asambādhamānāḥ.*

It should be mentioned here that the English translation of the Adhyāya done by Bodewitz is very illuminating and of considerable help in understanding the subject. He has been quite successful in translating the first part of the difficult text like the JaimiBr. which deals with the complicated subject like that of arranging the Stotras, and the Sāmans and has no commentary on it. With due appreciation for his invaluable contribution to the field of Vedic Sanskrit, an attempt has been made in this paper to put forth some suggestions before the scholars, for their consideration.

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# How to Kill a Sacrificial Victim*

**Hanns-Peter Schmidt**

In the description of the animal sacrifice in the Śatapatha-Brāhmaṇa 3.8.1.15 we find a statement about three ways of killing a victim :

"Then, having come back (from the place of slaughter), they (the priests) sit down turning towards the Āhavanīya (thinking) : 'let us not be eyewitnesses to (the victim's) being made consent (to its death)'. They do not strike it with a hammer [or cudgel] (*kū́ṭena prághnanti*), for that is the way (to slay an animal) for man (*mā́nuṣam*), nor behind the ear, for that is the way for the Fathers (*pitṛdevatyàm*). They either suffocate it by closing its mouth or they make a noose (for strangling it). Therefore he (the Adhvaryu) does not say : 'slay it, kill it !', for that is the way for man, but : 'make it consent ! It has passed on', for that is the way for the gods (*devatrā́*). For when he says : 'it has passed on', then it passes on to the gods; therefore he says : 'it has passed on'."

Eggeling translated *kū́ṭena* by 'on the frontal bone', but grammatically this is incorrect, and, as Oldenberg has shown, the word *kùṭa* means 'hammer'[1], to which one might prefer 'cudgel'.

For *mā́nuṣam,* Eggeling has 'for that is human manner', for *pitṛdevatyàm* 'after the manner of the Father', and for *devatrā́* 'after the manner of the gods'.

The translation of *pitṛdevatyàm* is incorrect since the word means 'having the Pitṛs as deities', and thus can only refer to the worship of the fathers. Generally the victims for the fathers are killed the same way as those for the gods, but according to Kātyāyana Śrautasūtra 25.7.34 at the funeral the

*anustariṇī* cow or goat is killed by striking it behind the ears, which is the custom with the Mādhyandinas. In the Baudhāyana Pitṛmedhasūtra 1.4 the statement *tām anyatraiva śastrād ghnanti* "they slay her otherwise than with a sword"[2] does not allow any conclusion as to the manner of killing Baudhāyana followed, but indicates that killing by sword, namely decapitation, was practised by some people.

*mānuṣam* probably refers to the profane killing for human consumption, but, given sacred character of the Vedic texts, we know little of how animals were killed outside the sacrifice.

Eggeling's rendering of *devatrā* also is misleading because not the manner in which the gods sacrifice is meant, but rather how men sacrifice for the gods.

Decapitation probably was the ancient way of immolation. In the Aśvamedha-sūkta Ṛgveda 1.162.9, it is said : "what of the horse's flesh the fly has eaten, or what sticks to the post, to the axe, what to the hands of the slaughterer, what to the nails — all that of you shall be with the gods." This passage speaks for itself and does not require any comment. J. C. Heesterman[3] quotes this passage and adds : "Possibly the peculiar way in which the animal is bound to the stake points in the same direction : the cord is fastened to the right foot, goes round the left side of the neck and is then wound round the right horn and finally fastened to the stake. Thus room is left for the slaughterer's knife." For 'knife' we should substitute 'axe' because a knife is hardly the proper tool for decapitation. Heesterman also refers to the Taittirīya-Saṁhitā 6.3.6.3 where an opposition between sacred and profane slaughter seems to be alluded to : "He winds (the rope) transversely, for they fasten a (beast) for killing in front; (verily it serves) for distinction," (*akṣṇayā́ pári harati, vádhyaṁ hi prátyañcam pratimuñcánti, vyā́vṛttyai*) According to Sāyaṇa, standing in front of the animal is the profane way of binding it to the pole, 'transversely' is the sacred way of doing it[4]. If this interpretation is correct and reflects traditional knowledge, it would follow that also profane slaughter was originally done by decapitation, although Sāyaṇa was hardly aware of this since he only knew suffocation as the method of killing in Vedic sacrifice.

Decapitation is still today the prevalent method of killing a victim in Hindu ritual, but also letting the animal slowly bleed to death has been reported[5]. I have no information about how profane killing is done among Hindus.

In the standard Vedic ritual as represented by the Brāhmaṇas and the Śrautasūtras, the decapitation has been replaced by suffocation and strangling, but there is one expectation : the skulls of man, horse, bull, ram and goat, which must be placed in the middle of the first of the five brick layers of the fire altar, are taken from victims who are "released" (*ud-sṛj*) from the place of sacrifice and beheaded outside. The fact that their bodies are thrown into water to mix with the clay to be used for the bricks shows that they were not victims in the sense of the animal sacrifice since no offering of parts of them is made. The greatest problem for the authors of the ritual texts was the human victim because at their time human sacrifice had become practically obsolete. The many ways in which one tried to get out of the difficulties have been discussed by Heesterman[6]. In the standard animal sacrifice, the head, except for the tongue, is not used at all. The reasons given for this are the following : When the gods first seized an animal for sacrifice, Tvaṣṭṛ spat on its head, thus claiming it as his own; the spittle became the brain and the marrow of the spinal column, and therefore they are not to be eaten. The Asuras used the head, the shoulders, the neck (backbone) and the hind-thighs. These parts were accordingly not to be used in the sacrifice for the Devas. Since Tvaṣṭṛ spat on the neck, one should not use it[7]. Tvaṣṭṛ is an ambiguous character, standing between the Devas and the Asuras. In another text it is Viśvarūpa, Tvaṣṭṛ's Asuric son who spits (or vomits) on the animal from above; for that reason one does not cut portions of the animal from above; by anointing it from above one makes it fit for sacrifice, pure (*medhya*)[8]. We do not know whether the Asuras were thought to kill the victim by decapitation. It is, however, clear that in Ṛgvedic times decapitation was not considered Asuric, but we do not know whether the head of the animal was used in the sacrifice. In the standard ritual it is discarded, but there seems to be one exception : in the domestic Śūlagava the tail, the skin, the head and the feet are thrown into the fire[9]. Among these pieces the tail belongs to those of which a portion is offered in the

Paśubandha. Here, however, we may have a case of a burnt offering which is not a gift to the deity, but rather a sacrifice as abandonment and destruction of property[10].

Replacing decapitation by suffocation or strangulation may have several reasons. One is most probably that, by the time of the Brāhmaṇas, blood was considered inauspicious and its spilling on the place of sacrifice polluting. The blood is dedicated to the Rākṣasas who are to stay in the deepest depth and be joined by the sacrificer's enemies[11]. Only on two occasions is it made ritual use of : once in the Aśvamedha[12], where cooked blood is offered to Agni Sviṣṭakṛt = Rudra; here the Devas, identifying themselves with the Agnayaḥ Sviṣṭakṛtaḥ, take the blood for themselves in order to defeat the Asuras — the reasoning for which may well be that by incorporating the ambiguous Rudra his possibly destructive interference is neutralized. The other occasion is the Śūlagava, dedicated to Rudra, where the blood is offered to the snakes[13] or to Rudra and his cohorts[14].

The fact that non-Aryan people used decapitation and offered the head and the blood to the deity, as practised until to-day in the sacrifice to Kālī, may have contributed to the change.

It has been suggested that one of the reasons for preferring suffocation was the desire to preserve the animal whole[15]. This can be supported by the sacrificer's wife's sprinkling the eyes, ears, nostrils and mouth of the immolated animal in order to quicken it. The openings of the head are the seats of the vital airs (*prāṇa*)[16] and thus the head is one of the most important parts of the body, second only to the omentum which is identified as the chief part (*agra*)[17]. In one instance the pollution of the animal caused by Viśvarūpa is remedied by anointing it and thus making it pure again (*see* above n. 8), but this did not apply to the head. However, the parts not fit for sacrifice, including the head, are placed on the Vedi together with the cooked part and reinvigorated with the vital breaths *prāṇa* and *apāna* so that the animal is restored in the beyond[18].

In the Vedic texts there is, to my knowledge, no explicit reference to the victim's being preserved whole. But that the idea was current in antiquity is attested by the Greek author Strabo (first century B.C.) who states

(Geography 15.1.54), probably on the basis of Megasthenes (visited India *ca.* B.C. 300-290), that the Indians do not cut the throat of the victim but strangle it so that it is not mutilated but given to the god complete.

II

The passage with which this note begins mentions killing a victim by hitting it on the head with a hammer or cudgel, for which I cannot find any evidence in Indian sources. Since it is unlikely that the author of the Brāhmaṇa invented this method without having either seen or heard of it, we should look beyond India. And indeed neighbouring Iran furnishes some evidence.

The ancient Zoroastrian scriptures, the Avesta, do mention animal sacrifices, but not the method of killing. The earliest attestation is found in the Geography (15.3.15) of Strabo :

"But in Cappadocia—for there the tribe of the Magi is large; they are also called fire-kindlers; and there are many sanctuaries of the Persian gods —they do not even sacrifice with a knife, but they beat (the animal to death) with a piece of wood as with a cudgel[19]."

In the preceding sections (13-14), Strabo refers to the animal sacrifices of the Persians, but is not explicit about the method of killing. He mentions that in the sacrifice for water they go to a lake, river or spring, dig a trench and immolate the victim over it, taking care that the water is not polluted with blood. Since no cudgel is mentioned, one might think that Strabo assumed that the method was cutting the throat, as it was the Greek one.

In the middle Persian text *Draxt ī Asūrīg,* 'the Babylonian tree', which goes back to a Parthian predecessor, a date-palm and a goat engage in a verbal contest, each of them extolling its uses, particularly for man, and its superiority. In verse 15 the date-palm says : "They make clubs of me which break your neck[20]."

The Armenian Bishop Eznik of Kolb (fifth century A.D.) mentions that the Magi first club the animal and then kill it by cutting its throat. The verb used for 'to club' is *yazel,* borrowed from Iranian *yaz* 'to sacrifice[21].' Eznik remarks that thus the Magi unknowingly kill the victim twice.

The Bishop of Halvan, Mâr Barhad Bešebbâ (sixth century A.D.), has a similar version : According to Zardušt, one should not cut the throat of the victim before beating it on the neck with a cudgel till it is without life so that it does not feel the pain[22].

In the middle Persian encyclopedic text Dēnkard (tenth century A.D.) we have the most detailed Zoroastrian testimony about the matter :

"The reason for striking cattle with a log before (applying) the knife, together with the other things which are to be done in that matter, apart from the ritual efficacy of cleansing the body from a number of demons, especially the portions of excrement and bad taste, and (apart from) preventing the unjust and ill-considered slaughter of cattle, is first pity for the beast and on this account the lessening of its fear and pain when the knife is applied to it, and the prevention of the slaughter of cattle in an ill-considered manner, impulsively and at any time when one's desire is urgent[23]."

In Islamic times clubbing the animal was still practised as appears from a hostile and probably distorting source, 'Abd al-Jabār :

'They have among their laws other revolting things, such as eating carrion. This is done by tying the bull tightly, and making it ascend a mountain. Then they say to it : 'We have commanded you and have warned you, but you did not do (what you were commanded to do)'. Then they beat it until it is dead, and eat it. This is what they call *yazdān-kušt*, which means 'killed by God', and there are other foolish things which they do[24]."

The same author has another version of the same, in which the animal is not beaten to death : The Magi make a cow ascend an elevated place, fetter her feet and make her roll down, saying : "Descend !" and "Don't descend !" When she has fallen and is dead, they eat her saying : "It is God who has killed her[25] !"

The Muslim author has probably taken this cruelty to animals which may have occurred among uncivilized folk for standard behaviour. It is unlikely that this was ever an accepted Zoroastrian practice.

The charge that the Zoroastrians eat carrion is also voiced by Abu Sa'id

Nashwān al-Himyarī :

"The characteristics of Persians : Then we stop in Persia; there, we find unmatched intellects and unmatched wisdoms. Their political administration is odd; their king is a mobed and he arranges the affairs; he has knowledge of the future. In spite of these, they sleep with their mothers; they eat *al-maytah* (non-ritually killed animal, carrion) and they perform ablution with (bull's) urine; water is acceptable for them and they honour fire[26]."

Here the method of slaughter is not mentioned, and we cannot tell whether the author refers to ritual killing which did not comply with Muslim practice or to profane killing. Actually it is not known whether there was any profane slaughter among Zoroastrians; the present day Irani Zoroastrians allow only ritual killing in sacrifice[27]. The accusation of eating carrion is obviously based on the assumption that the animal was killed, either by clubbing (or strangulation, see below) before being bled.

It is clear from the foregoing passages that the Zoroastrians generally killed the sacrificial victim by first hitting it with a club and then cut its throat. Ph. Gignoux writes that "we do not know how the Mazdeans were supposed to slaughter cattle ritually[28]." This is a surprising statement in view of the evidence adduced above, some of which is even quoted by Gignoux. But Gignoux draws attention to other sources which show that there was another method in use in Sasanian times. The Acts of the Persian Martyrs claim that the Zoroastrians drank blood in their worship and tried to make the martyrs drink blood[29]. In the *Passion of Akepsimas, Joseph and Aitalaha* the martyrs are ordered "to drink blood and prostrate themselves before the Sun", but the Christians refuse. Later the magus orders to bring pure meat of an animal not strangled or immolated to the idols. In spite of this concession and the promise of absolution the saints refuse because nothing pure can come from impure hands[30]. Instead of clubbing, strangling before cutting the throat was accordingly practiced by some Magi.

Strangling is mentioned by al-Ṭabarī in the history of al-Afshīn, a local Iranian prince from Transoxania, who, though converted to Islam, followed some unorthodox practices. In one instance he is accused by a Mobad :

"This man used to eat the flesh of strangled beasts, and he urged me to

eat it also, alleging that it was more tender than meat that had been [ritually] slaughtered. He used to kill a black ewe each Wednesday; he would sever it through the middle with a sword, walk between the two halves, and eat its flesh[31]."

It is odd that a Mobad should bring up such an accusation if strangling was an acceptable practice among Zoroastrians. Possibly, it was a minority practice not approved by the entire clergy. But since the same Mobad later converts to Islam, it may well be that he wanted to ingratiate himself with the Muslim masters. The accusation contributed to al-Afshīn's arrest and final execution in 226 A.H. (A.D. 841) though the main, probably trumped-up, charge was that he was involved in a conspiracy of the followers of the rebel Bābak whom he himself had defeated three years earlier as general in the service of the caliph.

The Pahlavi commentary of the Nīrangistān, a ritual handbook of the Sasanian or early Islamic period, does not mention the method of killing the sacrificial victim explicitly, but it appears that hitting with a club is not involved, and that the knife to cut the throat is applied after the animal has been excited by a serrated, comb-like knife in order to keep it alert at the moment of death so that its soul goes consciously to heaven[32].

In a 16th century Persian Rivāyat, the following rules for the slaughter of cattle are given :

"[A Herbad] should recite the Kshnuman [proportional]of Bahman Amshaspand [who is the protector of cattle] and recite one Yatha [the Ahuna vairya prayer]....up to Shyaothenanām and then he may draw over it [the animal] a pure and sharp knife. He should not so manipulate (the knife awkwardly) but he should fix his eyes on it and should retain his breath, so that the *gospend* may have less pain[33]."

Boyce deplores "that the old humane manner of first stunning the beast has been abandoned for the Muslim manner of slaughter[34]." Gignoux (see above n.27) argues that this practice is influenced by the Islamic one since the passage begins with *bismillah*. The borrowing of a formula does, however, not prove that another item in the same passage must be borrowed, too. If Boyce and Gignoux are right, the Nīrangistān passage might also show Islamic

influence. If my interpretation of Strabo 15.3.13 (*see* the beginning of section II) is correct, it is however possible that cutting the throat without previous clubbing was one of the ways practised since ancient times.

The practice of the Irani Zoroastrians has been described by Mary Boyce:

"The first day of the [Mihragān] festival was one of bright winter sunshine, and the animal was led out of its stall into the courtyard, which had been carefully swept according to the established ritual. It was offered water to drink, and a sweetmeat, which it readily accepted. Water was splashed upon the ground around it; and then it was cast on its back. Jamshid [the chief sacrificer] knelt beside it, spoke the appropriate Avestan words [as in the above Rivāyat], kissed its left cheek in contrition, and then swiftly cut its throat. Zoroastrians, unlike Muslims, consume the blood of the sacrifice. This is therefore caught in a bowl. When it had ceased to flow, the sacrificer cut off the tip of the tongue, and since the priest was not present, this was wrapped in some of the head and sent to him to be consecrated in the name of the *yazad* Hōm, the ancient Haoma, to whom a part of all animal sacrifices must be devoted[35]."

The blood is used to prepare a sort of fried black pudding. But it is regarded as ritually impure and accordingly it is not consecrated. Soup is made of the head, but it also is ritually unclean, as are the forelegs[36]. This is quite similar to the Vedic attitude towards blood and the head, with the exception that both can be used for ordinary purposes. Of the inwards of the animal heart, lungs, liver, kidneys, and omentum are ritually used. All these are among the eighteen parts of the victim which are suitable as sacrificial food in the Vedic animal sacrifice[37]. In the Vedic ritual omentum gets special treatment[38], and such treatment was not completely unknown in Iran since Strabo (15.3.13) reports that—though in general the Persians do not leave any portion of the meat for the gods since they think that the god needs only the soul of the victim—some put a small piece of the omentum on the fire[39]. In spite of the fact that the head is not made use of ritually, the tongue is used in both, Iran and India. Some of the agreements pointed out may well reflect Indo-Iranian heritage.

**Annotations :**

* The title of this note echoes that of an article and then a whole book by Calvert Watkins, *How to Kill a Dragon. Aspects of Indo-European Poetics*, New York - Oxford 1995, which tells us much about poetic formulas, but nothing about the "how"

1. H. Oldenberg, *Ṛgveda. Textkritische und exegetische Noten. Siebentes bis zehntes Buch*, Berlin 1912, 319. *Cf.* M. Mayrhofer, *Etymologisches Wörterbuch des Altindoarischen*, Heidelberg 1986-96, s.v., with further literature, and especially H. W. Bodewitz, *Jaiminīya Brāhmaṇa* I, 1-65, Leiden 1973, 147f.
2. *śastrād* is Caland's emendation for *śastrā* (*see* his note on Āpastamba Śrautasūtra 31.2.8).
3. "Vrātya and Sacrifice", *Indo-Iranian Journal* 6.1962.1-37 : 18f.
4. *See* A.B. Keith (transl.) *The Veda of the Black Yajus School entitled Taittirīya Sanhita*, Cambridge, Mass. 1914, 521 with fn. 3.
5. M. Witzel, "The Case of the Shattered Head," *Studien zur Indologie und Iranistik* 13/14.1987. 363-416 : 391.
6. "The Case of the Severed Head," *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasisens* 11.1967.22-43:3Off. Reprinted in *The Inner Conflict of Tradition*, Chicago 1985, 45-58:5Off. *Cf.*, also for the following, *The Broken World of Sacrifice*, Chicago 1993, 72ff.
7. *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* 3.8.3.11, 29.
8. *Taittirīya Saṁhitā* 6.3.7.4.
9. *Āśvalāyana Gṛhyasūtra* 4.8.25.
10. On this problem in general *cf.* Heesterman, *The Broken World of Sacrifice*, 9ff.
11. Taittirīya Saṁhitā 1.3.9 h-k.
12. Taittirīya-Brāhmaṇa 3.9.11.3-4. Āpastamba Śrautasūtra 20.19.10; 20-21-15. Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa 13.3.4.2ff.
13. Āśvalāyana Gṛhyasūtra 4.8.27.
14. Pāraskara Gṛhyasūtra 3.8.11.
15. Heesterman, *The Broken World of Sacrifice*, 73.
16. Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa 3.8.2.4-5.

17. Taittirīya Saṁhitā 6.3.9.5.

18. Taittirīya Saṁhitā 1.3.10.d-e, Maitrāyanīya Saṁhitā 3.10.4, Āpastamba Śrautasūtra 7.25.6-7.

19. The translation follows A. de Jong, *Traditions of Magi. Zoroastrianism in Greek & Latin Literature*, Leiden - New York—Köln 1997, 144.

20. M. Nawwābī (ed.), *Manẓūmah-i Draxt Āsūrīg*. Tehran 1346. Ch. J. Brunner, "The Fable of the Babylonian Tree. Part II : Translation," *Journal of Near Eastern Studies* 39.1980.291-302.

21. E. Benveniste, "Sur la terminologie iranienne du sacrifice," *Journal asiatique* 252.1964.45-58:52/

22. Quoted after R. C. Zaehner, *Zurvan. A Zoroastrian Dilemma*, Oxford 1955, 439f.

23. Dh. M. Madan (ed.) *The Complete Text of the Pahlavi Dinkard*, Bombay 1911, 466 line 12ff. Translation by R. C. Zaehner, *Zurvan*, 52 note A.

24. Quoted for S. Shaked, "Islamic reports concerning Zoroastrianism," *Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam* 17.1994.43-84:76.

25. G. Monnot, *Penseurs musulmans et religions iraniennes. 'Abd al-Jabbār et ses devenciers*, Paris 1974, 268.

26. *Al-Hūr al-'ayn*, ed. Kamāl Mustafā. Cairo 1948, 228. I owe the knowledge of this passage and its translation to Siamak Adhami.

27. M. Boyce, *A Persian Stronghold of Zoroastrianism*. Oxford 1977, 162f. When nowadays buying meat for ordinary use from Muslim butchers they argue that the sin of killing is the butcher's (*ibid.*, 98). This argument reminds us of the Buddhist and Jaina monks or ascetics who lived on begged food, including meat, the condition being that the animal was not especially killed and prepared for them; *see* L. Alsdorf, *Beiträge zur Geschichte von Vegetarismus und Rinderverehrung in Indien*, Wiesbaden 1962, 5ff.

28. Ph. Gignoux, "Dietary laws in pre-Islamic and post-Islamic Iran," *Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam* 17.1994.16-42:21f.

29. P. Bedjan (ed.), *Acta martyrum et sanctorum*, Paris 1890-1897. II 302-3.

30. H. Delehaye, *Bibliotheca Historiae Graecae* 15-16, II 513.

31. *The History of al-Ṭabarī*. Vol. XXXIII, transl. and annot. by C. E. Bosworth,

Albany 1991, 188. I owe this reference to Siamak Adhami.

32. *Nīrangistân : a Photozincographed Facsimile of a MS, belonging to .... Hoshangjee Jamaspjee,* ed. D. P. Sanjana, Bombay 1894, fol. 129 recto. *Erbadistān and Nirangistān : Facsimile Edition of the Manuscript TD, Ed.* F. M. Kotwal, J. W. Boyd, Cambridge, Mass. 1980, fol. 87 verso. *Aêrpatastân and Nīrangastân*, trnsl. S. J. Bulsara, Bombay 1915, 324f. *Cf.* M. Boyce, *A History of Zoroastrianism* I, Leiden 1975, 149 n. 12.

33. M. R. Unvala, *Dârâb Hormazyâr's Rivâyat*, Bombay 1922, I, 261. B. N. Dhabhar (trnsl.), *The Persian Rivâyats of Hormazyâr Framarz*, Bombay 1932, 261.

34. M. Boyce, *"Ātaš-zōhr and Āb-zōhr," Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* 1966, 100-118:109. Most of the evidence shows that the animal was not merely stunned but rather killed by the club.

35. M. Boyce, "Mihragān among the Irani Zoroastrians," *Mithraic Studies, Ed.* J. R. Hinnells, Manchester 1975, I, 106-118:111.

36. Boyce, *ibid.*, 115.

37. Āpastamba Śrautasūtra 7.22.6.

38. *Ibid.,* 7.19-21.

39. On the significance of the omentum, *cf.* R. B. Onians, *The Origins of European Thought*, Cambridge 1954, 188 n.2, 271, 280 with n.1, 282, 484, 511f.

# Vārāha Śrautasūtra

## A Further Textual Study

C. G. Kashikar

The first critical edition of the Vārāha Śrautasūtra (VārŚS)—a junior Sūtra-text belonging to the Maitrāyaṇī recension of the Kṛṣṇa Yajurveda—was published by W. Caland and Raghu Vīra (Lahore 1933). In spite of the efforts made by the learned editors to present a critically edited correct text, the edition left much to be desired by reason of the very defective and scanty manuscript-material. I could procure two manuscripts of the text, not used by the editors—one (B) from the Maharaja Sayajirao University Oriental Institute, Baroda and another (N) from a private collection from Nandurbar, Dist. Dhulia (Maharashtra). Even though both the manuscripts are much currupt and belong to one and the same group, I could improve the text considerably in my edition (Pune, 1987). In the absence of a sufficient number of reliable manuscripts, I had very often to resort to major and minor conjectures.

Incidentally, I came across an old manuscript of Maitrāyaṇīya Sūtra-texts. [I thank my friend Radhe Shyam Shastri for bringing this manuscript to my notice.] The manuscript (Acc. no. - 2800) is in possession of Vaidika Saṁśodham Maṇḍala, Pune. It was procured from Bhadgaon, Dist. Jalgaon (Maharashtra), a centre of Mānava-Maitrāyaṇīya activities. The manuscript is written in Devanāgarī script on country paper, is worn out, and has withered borders. It is written in pṛṣṭhamātrā style. The hand-writing is uniform throughout. Folios (except two) are numbered, but the opening and closing folios are missing. The opening folio is numbered 115 and the last one is 237; inbetween, too, several folios are missing. The available portions deal with parts of the Vārāha Śrautasūtra, several Vārāha Pariśiṣṭas, and the Pravargya forming part of the Mānava Śrautasūtra. In all 15 folios present

the scattered portions of the VārŚS. As the external and internal evidence shows, the manuscript is much older than the two Vārāha manuscripts B and N. So far only two manuscripts recording the Vārāha tradition were known to be existing. The present manuscript, even though supplying a partial text, is the third one. It must therefore be regarded as a veritable source for the preservation of the Vārāha Sūtra-text.

In consideration of the similarity of corrupt readings, the present manuscript, which I designate as **Bh.**, belongs to the same group as that of Band N. There must have been a common source of the three manuscripts. Whether Bh. was the source of B and N, it is difficult to say. In spite of the common corrupt readings, **Bh** exhibits certain independent readings which are undoubtedly worthy of attention. There are certain orthographical peculiarities of Bh. Where there is a conjunction of dental nasals, the scribe writes, as many other scribes have done, a single dental nasal with a dot on the preceding syllable, e. g. III. 4. 2. 8 मुखैरंनानि. The scribe writes guttural Kh in place of sibilant *ṣ* e. g. *sukhadā* for *suṣadā* (III. 3. 3. 12). He also turns the other way round, e. g. *preṁṣa* for *preṅkha* (III. 2. 5. 55). When there is an occasion to change the genitive plural suffix dental °*nām* into cerebral °*ṇām,* he retains the dental, e. g. *meṣānām* for *meṣāṇāṁ* (III. 4. 4. 23); also accusative plural *trihāyanān* for *trihāyaṇān* (III. 4. 3. 18). When there is a conclusion of a *Khaṇḍa* he sometimes writes *Khaṇḍa*, but sometimes changes as *Khaṇḍaka* (III. 3. 3; 4. 1. 4).

The 15 folios (115-117, 119-128 and two without numbers) give the following portions of the text : III. 2. 2. 37 to III. 2. 3. 11; III. 2. 5. 42 to III. 2. 6. 4; III 2. 8. 34 to III. 3. 1. 54, III. 3. 2. 27 to III. 4. 4. 28.

I record below the preferable readings of **Bh** where the present text is defective. At a few places, I have recorded the variant from **Bh** even though it is also corrupt. I hope the portions of Mānava Śrautasūtra and Vārāha Pariśiṣṭas as found in **Bh** will be exploited for the purpose of checking and improving, if possible, corresponding portions available in printed or manuscript form.

## Mahāvrata

III 2. 5. 46. ता: प्राचीश्चोज्जगाहिरे. This is the quarter D of the verse beginning

with न वै गावो मागीरस्य. **Bh** reads ता: प्राची: सचगाहिरे Vaitānasūtra 34. 9 reads ता: प्राच्य: संजगाइरे. The third verse in the same sūtra reads the first line as यदा राघटी वदतो ग्राम्यमतिरसाकसैजनस्य. **Bh** reads साकंसौजनस्य. All this is corrupt.

III. 2. 5. 47-परीत्य मार्जालीयं यथार्थं गच्छन्ति । **Bh** (folio not numbered, A8) reads निनयंति in place of यथार्थं गच्छन्ति. MānS'S VII. 2. 7. 10 has निनीय प्रतिपरियन्ति ApS'S XXI 20. 5 reads उदकुम्भानुपनिनीय यथार्थं गच्छन्ति. In the Mahāvrata sacrifice, there is an interesting rite in which, according to VārŚS. III. 2. 5. 46-47 four or six or eight maid-servants walk around the Mārjālīya mound four times while each of the four verses is being recited four times, and strike their feet on the ground saying, "This is honey, this is honey." Having gone around the Mārjālīya mound each time, they pour down water from their pitchers and at last they depart. Here the verbal form *ninayanti* (they pour down water) is essential in compassion with the relevant passages from the MānS'S and ĀpS'S. The words यथार्थं गच्छन्ति are also necessary.

III. 2. 5. 49-दक्षिणत: संजातप्रभावधा: क्षत्रिया रथेषु क्वचिन: संनद्धा विध्यन्ति. The word संजातप्रपावधा: is corrupt. Here **Bh.** (folio not numbered A9) reads संजायात्यावधा: which also is corrupt. There is no parallel construction in the MānS'S and the ĀpS'S, hence I am not able to reconstruct the word.

III. २. ५. ६२-ग्रहान् समवनीय सर्वे भक्षयन्ति महस्ते भक्षयामि यशस्ते भक्षयामि स्तोमं ते भक्षयाम्यन्नाद्यं ते भक्षयामि प्रजां मे भक्षयामि प्रतिष्ठां भक्षयामि इति ॥ Instead of प्रजां मे भक्षयामि प्रतिपणं भक्षयामि **Bh** (folio not numbered B7-9) reads प्रजां ते भक्षयामि प्रतिष्ठां ते भक्षयामि इति which seems to be correct. The formulas are not registered in Bloomfield's Vedic Concordance.

## Śautrāmaṇī

III. 2. 8. 48-यद्देवा देवहेडनम् इति तिसृभिरवभृथमेष्यन्नाहुति जुहोति J **Bh** (115 A10) reads °मेष्यन्नाहुती जुहोति. MānS'S V. २. ११. ३५ reads यद्येवा देवहेडनमितिप्रभृतिभि: प्राक् समिष्टयजुर्भ्यस्तिस्र आहुतीर्जुहोति । MS. III. II covers the mantras to be employed in the Kaukilī Śautrāmaṇi. In MS. III. II. 10 the mantras beginning with यद्देवा etc. concern the Avabhṛtha. The fourth and the fifth verses respectively are धाम्नो धाम्नो and यद् ग्रामे. VārŚS. III. २. ८. ४० reads धाम्नोधाम्न: ॥ यद् ग्रामे इति मार्जयते । This implies that the first three verses beginning with यद्देवा are to be employed in offering oblations. The MānS'S therefore rightly says तिस्र आहुतीर्जुहोति. The Bh-reading °मेष्यन्नाहुती जुहोति, therefore, requires to be emended as °मेष्यन्नाहुतीजुहोति.

It is not expedient to offer a single oblation with three verses. ApS'S XIX. 10. 4 reads यद्देवा देवहेडनमित्यवभृथे पञ्चाहुतीर्जुहोतीत्याश्मरथ्यः T Br. II. 6. 6 provides mantras for the Avabhṛtha in the Kaukilī Sautrāmaṇī. Āpastamba rightly prescribes five oblations with five verses, and in the next sūtra, he asks the sacrificer to follow the Avabhṛtha with the subsequent verse. In all rituals the mantra-collection and the prescriptions go concurrently.

**Rājasūya**

III. ३. २. २९—रुक्मेणोत्पूय पालाशमाश्वत्थमौदुम्बरं नैयग्रोधमिति पात्राणि तेषु राजसूया इत्यपो व्यानयति. **Bh** (११९ A४) reads स्वाहा राजसूयाः instead of mere राजसूयाः MS II. 6. 8 and MānS'S IX. i. ३३ read स्वाहा राजसूयाः.

III. 3. 2. 34—अभ्यक्तमुदकं स्पर्शयति **Bh** (११९A८) reads अवस्पर्शयति Instead of स्पर्शयति.

III. 3. 3. १—असावि देवं गोऋजीकमन्धो
न्यस्मिन्निन्द्रो जनुषेमुवोच ।
बोधामसि त्वा हर्यश्व यज्ञै-
र्बोधा नः स्तोममन्धसो पदेषु ॥

इति त्रिष्टुभा ब्रह्मान्वेति । **Bh** (१२० A५) reads °पदेष्वेतींध्रा त्रिष्टुभा etc. This requires to be emended as °पदेष्वित्यैन्द्र्यमिष्टुभा. The verse is addressed to Indra. Therefore the addition of ऐन्द्र्या is right. *cf.* MānS'S. IX. 2. 3. 28; ṚV. VII. 21. 1.

III. 3. 3. 17—सह सारथिना रथमादधाति (*Bh* 120 B 5) reads सह सारथिना रथवाहन रथमादधाति. *Rathavāhana* needs to be corrected as *rathavāhana*. *cf.* MS. IV.4.

6 सह सारथिना रथवाहने रथमादधाति; MānS'S. IX. १. ४. ११-सह सारथिना रथवाहने रथमादधाति, *cf.* also VārŚS III. 3. 4. 37, 39.

III. 3. 3. 18—आहितादवरोहिता ॥७८॥ ब्रह्मांस्त्वं ब्रह्मासि etc. After the 18th sūtra, **Bh** (120 B5) leaves a lacuna indicated by four horizontal lines and then writes ब्रह्माँस्त्वं etc. B and N do not show this lacuna. Looking at the parallel procedure in MānS'S. IX. 1. 4. 9 do not think that anything is missing here.

III. 3. 3. 21—एष वज्र इति ब्रह्मा स्फयँ राज्ञे प्रयच्छति । राजा प्रतिहिताय प्रतिहितः सेनान्ये सेनानी संग्रहीत्रे संग्रहीता सूताय सूतो ग्रामण्ये ग्रामणीरक्षावापाय. **Bh** (१२० B7) reads एष वज्र इति वक्षा....पर्यायैः ब्रह्मा etc.

The *occasion is to prepare a gambling platform for the royal sacrificer.* The Brahman passes on the wooden sword to the King who in his turn hands it over to the heir-apparent. The turn goes on further and ultimately the wooden sword is received by the dice-player. In all there are seven passings. Each one passes it on to the next reciting the formula एष वज्रस्तेन मे रध्य. In the height of this series of actions the correct reading in **Bh** can be conjectured. The word वसा may be emended as सप्त and next two blank spaces may have been intended for यजुषः. Thus one may read एष वज्र इति सप्तभिर्यजुषः पर्यायैर्ब्रह्मा स्फ्यं राज्ञे प्रयच्छति etc. *cf.* MS. II. 6. 6; IV. 4. 6; MānS'S. IX. 1. 4. 19; ApS'S XVIII. 18. 14. The word *paryāya* has been frequently used in the VārŚS.

III. 3. 3. 31—ऋचो गाथाश्च होता शंसति हिरण्यकूर्च आसीनः ॥ **Bh** (१२१ A४) reads ऋचश्च गाथाश्च.

III. ३. ३. ३६-३८—अभिषेकशेषं गार्हपत्ये जुहोति ॥३६॥ प्रतिहितस्य वयं स्याम पत्रयो रवीणामिति [वाचचति] ॥३७॥ माहेन्द्रेण परित्वा] समानमावभृथात् ॥३८॥ This is the emended text. Caland and Raghu Vīra edition and B and N read अभिषेकशेषं गार्हपत्ये जुहोतीति प्रतिहितस्य वर्यं स्याम पतयो रयीणामिति जपित्वा. **Bh** (१२१ A ७-१०) reads अभिषेकशेषं गार्हपत्ये हुत्वा प्रजापते न त्वदित्यसाविति प्रतिहितस्य नामादिशति द्विपितुरमुष्यासौ पुत्र इति प्रतिहितस्य वयं स्याम पतयो रयीणामिति जपित्वा समानमावभृथात् ॥

In comparison with parallel construction in MānS'S. IX. 1. 4. 27-29, the **Bh**-reading seems to have filled the gap, "the Adhvaryu offers the remnants of the sprinkling waters on the Gārhāpatya with the verse *prajāpate na tvad.*" Here he mentions the name of the heir-apparent. N. N. If the heir-apparent is a child of two fathers (by birth as well as by adoption), he should say, "N. N. son of N. N." He should then murmur the verse, "May we be lords of wealth...." The subsequent procedure upto the Avabhṛtha is similar."

IV. 3. 4. 36—सायं पूर्वाः प्रयुज उत्तराणि हवींषि **Bh.** (122 A8) adds षट् after उत्तराणि. This is the correct reading. In the Daśapeya sacrifice forming part of the Rājasūya, there are six prior *prayuj* offerings to be offered in the evening, and six latter *prayuj* offerings to be offered next morning of VārŚS. III. 3. 4. 38. षडुत्तराणि प्रातः. Hence the **Bh**-reading is correct. *cf.* MS. IV. ४. ९ : यदेताः प्रयुज उपैति सायमन्याः प्रातरन्याः द्वौ वा ऋतू अहश्च रात्रिश्च ता एव प्रयुङ्क्ते षडन्याः षड् वा ऋतव ऋतूनेव प्रयुङ्क्ते ता उभयीद्वदिश द्वादश मासाः संवत्सरः संवत्सरमेव वृङ्क्ते. *cf.* ĀpS'S. XVIII. 22. 5-7.

## Aśvamedha

III. 4. 1. 17—शतैः सह प्रोक्षति पुरस्तादध्वर्युर्दक्षिणतो ब्रह्मा पश्चाद्धोतोत्तरत उद्गाता। अभिषेक्याणां राजपुत्राणां शतैः सहाध्वर्यू राज्ञां ब्रह्मा सूतग्रामणीनां होता क्षत्तृसंगृहीतृणामुद्गाता। **Bh** reads प्रोक्षति (१२३ B1) instead of प्रोक्षति and later शतेन (123 B2) instead of शतैः. The plural प्रोक्षन्ति is correct in consideration of the plural शतैः and the mention of four priests beginning with the Adhvaryu. Later the instrumental singular शतेन as recorded in **Bh** is also correct. The total number of princes participating in the sprinkling of the horse in company with the four chief priests is four hundred. There are four chief priests and each of them is to be accompanied by a hundred princes. Therefore, the first occurrence of *śata* is in plural and the second occurrence is in singular. *cf.* MānS'S. IX. 2. 1. 32.

III. 4. 1. 35—संस्थितासु परिप्लवमाचष्टे। **Bh** (124 A4) has परिप्लव instead of परिपल्व *cf.* ApS'S. XX. 6. 7.

III. 4. 1. 57—नैतुदारवोऽग्निष्ठ एकविंशत्यरत्निः पौतुद्रवावभितः। **Bh** (124 A10) reads पौतुदारवावभितः which is preferable MānS'S, IX. 2. 2. 22 has pautudāravau. *cf.* also *naitudārava.*

III. 4. 2. 9—एतेन धर्मेणारभ्य माष्ट्राभ्यो नाष्ट्राभ्य उपक्रमेतानवस्थेदश्चः The ending portion is corrupt. **Bh** ends this sūtra with °स्थेदस्वो which is equally obscure.

III. 4. 2. 14—अर्बुदाय स्वाहा॥ **Bh** (125 B3) reads न्यर्बुदाय स्वाहा which is correct : *cf.* TS. VII. 2. 20. 1; TBr. III. 8. 16. 3; KS (As'va) II. 10.

III. 4. 3. 1—इत्यश्वस्य ग्रीवासु रुक्मं प्रतिमुच्य etc. **Bh** (126 A3) reads प्रतिमुंचति which is found also in MānS'S. IX. 2. 3. 7. However the ĀpS'S. which has much influenced the VārŚS. reads प्रतिमुच्य.

III. 4. 3. 3—उद्गातारमपरुणद्धि etc. **Bh** (126 A5) reads उद्गातारमवरुणद्धि. Also in the next sūtra **Bh** reads अवरुन्धन्ति.

III. 4. 3. 21—Between the 21st and 22nd sūtras **Bh** reads : त्रींस्त्रीनवहूय अष्टे प्रतीयाष्ट्र उष्ट्रनित्युष्ट्रानुष्ट्रो घृणेत्योष्ट्रकान् सकृनीनावीषपुरुतिमंसकानुपाकरोति। Both the 21st sūtra and the additional matter as reproduced above end with उपाकरोति. Hence it is obvious that B and N missed the subsequent portion through haplography. The **Bh**-portion is corrupt. MS. III. 14. 1-21 records lists of forest-animals to be procured in connection with the Aśvamedha. In these lists one comes across the words त्वष्ट्रा उष्ट्रान् at the end of Ms. III. 14. 10. Besides these, there

is nothing in these lists which would correspond with a part of the **Bh**-portion. MānS'S IX. 2. 4. 3-4 refers the forest-animals recorded in Ms. MānS'S IX. 2. 4. 4 mentions, among others, नाड्निषु (=नाडीषु) प्लुषिमशकान् which approximates the ending part of the **Bh** portion. Even though the *Bh*-portion could not be deciphered completely, it is clear that the VārŚS read some portion between the 21st and the 22nd sūtras. ĀpS'S. XX. 14. 5. ff. does not render any help in this respect.

III. 4. 4. 1—पृच्छामि त्वा भुवनस्य नाभिम्. **Bh** (127 B1) reads पृच्छामि यत्र भुवनस्य नाभिः. The cited portion is the part B of the verse beginning with पृच्छामि त्वा परमन्तं पृथिव्याः which is traced to TS. VII. 4. 18. 2; VS XIII. 61. The variant reading as found in **Bh** is from ṚV. I. 164. 34.

III. 4. 4. 26—तस्य पवमानो लोहितं श्रपयति. The word पवमानो, even though a correct grammatical form is obscure in the present context. **Bh** (128 B7) reads पावनो which is equally obscure.

# Vedisms in Daivarāta's Chandodarśana

G. U. Thite

Daivarāta, a modern ṛṣi, to whom 448 mantras are claimed to have been revealed, was born on 4th Jan. 1892. He belonged to Gokarṇa. A collection of hymns revealed to him called "Chandodarśana" is published by Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Mumbai, 1968. This text consists of 8 chapters called Anuvākas. There are in all 50 hymns composed in Vedic metres, namely Gāyatrī, Anuṣṭubh, Triṣṭubh, and Jagatī. The text consists of Saṁhitā-pāṭha as well as Pada-pāṭha, both with the accentuation marks. The text is followed by the 'Chandodarśanasarvānukramaṇikāsūtram' which is an index to the text. There is also a commentary in Sanskrit by Gaṇapati Muni. The commentator who happened to be Daivarāta's teacher has written a preface to his commentary in which he justifies the possibility of there being new ṛṣis. For, he says that even in the Ṛgveda there are references to new and ancient ṛṣis. The commentator-teacher of Daivarāta claims that Daivarāta was a great Yogi and seer and that he even without being properly trained in Sanskrit or Veda saw these Vedic Mantras in 1917 during the 15 days of the month of Kārttika. Daivarāta in his transcendental meditation recited these mantras and the teacher wrote them down. The teacher had to omit many a half-verse or quarter-verse because they were not sufficiently audible. In this paper it is intended to study the Vedisms in these Mantras.

In the Ṛgveda when an independent Svarita immediately precedes an Udātta, the phenomenon of Kampa occurs. In that case the independent Svarita is accompanied by the sign of the numeral $\underline{1}$ if the vowel is short and $\underline{3}$ if the vowel is long. The figures are marked with both Svarita and Anudātta. In the Chandodarśana, there are several occasions of both these types of Kampa. Thus for example in I. 4. 2 *agnirayaṁ viśvavijjātavedāḥ sva$\underline{1}$r visvānyeva bhūtāni jātāni Veda*. For similar Kampas see I. 4. 7, I. 5. 9, I. 5.

10, I. 8. 2, II. 7. 1, III. 4. 4, IV. 2. 6, IV. 4. 5, IV. 4. 11, V. 1. 6, V. 1. 8, V. 2. 3, V. 3. 8, VI. 2. 5, VI. 4. 7, VII. 2. 1-4, VII. 3. 1, VII. 4. 1-2, VIII. 4. 8, VIII. 5. 4. In all these cases there is the figure.

In the following example there is a Kampa with the figure 3 - *hrdayyo3ntaramṛtaḥ,* I. 4. 4. For similar Kampa see I. 8. 2, III. 1. 6, IV. 3. 1, V. 1. 3, VI. 4. 15, VIII. 1. 9, VIII. 4. 7.

In the Ṛgveda the refrains like *sa janāsa indraḥ* (II. 12) or *kuvit somasyāpāmiti* (X. 119) are famous. As in the Ṛgveda, in the Chandodarśana also there are some refrains or some lines which are stylistically repeated. Indeed there is rather too much repetition and use of refrain. These are the oft repeated refrains.

1. *jyotir viśvasya darśayat* : I. 1. 3, I. 2. 7, I. 3. 4, I. 5. 10, I. 6. 5, I. 7. 5, I. 8. 5, IV. 3. 12, IV. 4. 12, IV. 5. 8, IV. 5. 10, V. 2. 10, V. 3. 14, VI. 1. 8, VI. 2. 10, VI. 3. 16, VI. 4. 16, VII. 2. 11, VII. 3. 8, VII. 4. 7, VIII. 1. 10.

2. *sendro marutvān rājatīha sa madhyamaḥ* : I.6. 1-5.

3. *vāyuḥ sahasendravāntsa madhyamaḥ* : I. 7. 1-5.

4. *marutaṁ sa pitā rudraḥ sa madhyamaḥ* : I. 8. 1-5.

5. *vāg vidā pratimā brahmaṇaḥ sā parā* : II. 2. 2-7.

6. *vāg vidā mātā viśvasya brahmaṇo yoniḥ* : II. 4. 1-10.

7. *samena taṁ puruṣaṁ prapadye rasena* : III. 5. 1-7.

8. *sendrameva taṁ vṛṇe śaṁ gamadhyai* : IV. 2. 2-9.

9. *indrasyaiva ṛṇī bhavānyanṛṇo'nyād indrameva taṁ vṛṇe saṁ gamadhyai* : IV. 4. 1-11.

10. *sa satyoyam amṛto viśvavedāḥ* : IV. 5. 1-7, IV. 6. 1-9, V. 2. 1-9, V. 3. 1-13.

11. *tapasā dhībhiḥ puruṣaṁ taṁ prapadye* : VI. 1. 1-7, VI. 3. 1-15, VI. 4. 1-15.

12. *parasmā puruṣaḥ sa pūrṇaḥ paramaḥ* : VI. 2. 1-9.

13. *tā āpo devyaḥ svamīṁ mā punantu* : VII. 2. 1-10.

14. *apo devīḥ śaraṇaṁ prati prapadye* : VII. 4. 1-6.

15. *samāpo mātaro mṛṭayata mahyam* : VII. 3. 8, VII. 4. 7.

16. *vatsaśya me jīvanāya* : VIII. 1. 2-6.

17. *tapasopavasan prapadye* : VIII. 3. 1-3, 5, cp. 4, 6, 7.

18. *tavagnīṣomau mṛlayatām svaṁ viśvam;* VIII. 4. 1-6, 8. It is significant to note in this context that in all these repetitions the Pada-pāṭha does not use the device called *galita* (dropped) as is normally done in the Pada-pāṭha of the Ṛgveda. Thus here the Pada-pāṭha also repeats all the words.

Use of the consonant *ḷ* or *ḷh* is a peculiarity of the Ṛgveda. This use is limited only to such cases as *ḍ* or *ḍh* occurring in between two vowels only. In, Chandodarśana, too, we notice the same peculiarity. Thus the form *mṛḷayatam* occurs as a part of the refrain *tavagnīṣomau mṛḷayataṁ svaṁ viśvam* which occurs eight times in the Chandodarśana (VIII. 4. 1-8). Similarly the sound *ḷh* occurs in the word *samūḷhaḥ* (I. 8. 2; IV. 1. 2) and in the word *abhyūḷhaḥ* (V. 1. 6).

In some Vedic words we find the sound *r* for which in the later language we get the sound *l* in them (see e. g. *śithira / śithila*). The word *aram* offers a similar case. In later Sanskrit we get the word *alam* while the Veda prefers *aram*. In the Chandodarśana also we find the use of *aram*. Thus we see for example I. 7. 5 : yo na *dṛśe'ram*. In IV. 5. 6 however in one and the same verse *alam* as well as *aram* is used thus : *yaṁ prānaiḥ svarituṁ prāṇabhṛto nālam* (b) and *yaṁ manasā mantuṁ na manīṣiṇo'ram*. (c). The same two lines are also found in VI. 1. 6. For the use of the word *aram* see also VI. 1. 7 (b&c).

In the Chandodarśana IV. 2. 2-9 we everywhere read *sendraṁ taṁ vṛṇe saṁ gamadhayi.* Here the double sandhi of *saḥ indram* is noteworthy. It is quite similar to the Ṛgvedic double sandhi in *sedagnīn* (ṚV VII. 1. 14), *sedagniryo vanuṣyataḥ* (RV VII. 1. 15), *semaṁ naḥ kāmamāpṛṇa* (RV I. 16. 9).

As in the Veda in the Chandodarśana the Upasargas and verbal forms are at times separated from each other. Thus for example VIII. 2. 5 we read *indro balena samo'sminnādadhātu punaḥ prāṇān*. Here after the prefix *sam* there is a word *asmin.* The prefix *sam* is to be connected with *ā dadhātu*. It

however seems that the Vedic peculiarity about prefixes is very rare in the Chandodarśana. In the Veda prefixes can even come after the verbal forms. This peculiarity is not noticed in the Chandodarśana.

Some of the peculiarities of nominal declensions in the Vedic language are also seen in the Chandodarśana. Thus for example the nominative plural forms *brāhmaṇāsaḥ* and *amṛtāsaḥ* occur in III. 1. 6. The nominative plural of the neuter gender words drop *ni* or *ṇi*. Thus see e. g. *trī* for *trīṇi* in III. 5. 3; VI. 2. 6. The instrumental singular form *cittī* is found in II. 3. 4, 7; II. 8. 1; II. 10. 1, 8; VI. 3. 2; VI. 4. 14. The form *sucittī* is a similar one (VI. 1. 2). The instrumental plural forms with *bhis* are also noteworthy. See e. g. *viśvebhiḥ*, VI. 3. 4; *tebhiḥ*, VIII. 5. 3. The locative singular forms without *i* of the words ending in *an* also are peculiar to Veda. Thus see the form *atman* (II. 10. 8; III. 2. 3; VI. 3. 9; VIII. 5. 1).

In Ṛgveda VIII. 60. 5, in connection with Agni and in Ṛgveda IX. 62. 30, in connection with Soma, the word *ṛtaḥ* (right) is used in Masculine Nominative Singular. In Chandodarśana I. 4. 8 the word *ṛta* is used in Masculine Nominative Singular as an adjective of Agni (cp. also I. 5. 10). It is however used as an Active Past Participle of the root *ṛ* in the sense of "gone". Similarly in Chandodarśana III. 4. 5 this word is used in connection with Brahmaṇaspati.

The word *darśata* (worthy to be seen) occurs many times in the Ṛgveda (see I. 36. 9; I. 38. 13; I. 102. 2 etc. ) Similarly the word *visvadarśata* is also frequently used (see I. 25. 18; I. 44. 10; I. 50. 4 etc. ). In the Chandodarśana also both these words are used. Thus see the word *darśata* in I. 2. 7; I. 7. 5; IV. 1. 8; IV. 2. 10; V. 2. 10; V. 4. 8; VI. 1. 8; VI. 3. 16; VI. 4. 16 and the word *visvadarśata* in I. 6. 5. We also get the word *adarśata* ("invisible") in I. 7. 5.

The word *viśvathā* is used thrice in the Ṛgveda (I. 141. 9; II. 24. 11; V. 44. 1). In Chandodarśana it is used very frequently I. 4. 13; I. 5. 3; II. 2. 4; II. 4. 4; II. 6. 8; II. 10. 8; II. 12. 10; III. 2. 1; III. 2. 4-5; III. 3. 7-8; IV. 2. 1; IV. 3. 1; IV. 4. 4; IV. 6. 9; V. 2. 1; V. 2. 9; V. 3. 5; V. 4. 3; V. 6. 5; VI. 2. 9; VI. 3. 1; VI. 3. 5; VI. 3. 10; VIII. 4. 1.

Infinitive forms also constitute another peculiarity of the Vedic language. In the Chandodarśana also we find Vedic infinitives : *See* for example the

form *dṛśe* (I. 7. 5; IV. 1. 6; VII. 4. 6). Another Vedic infinitive form is *gamadhyai* (II. 4. 6; IV. 1. 5; IV. 2. 9; IV. 3. 1-11; IV. 4. 1-11). The form *jīvase* is found in IV. 1. 7; VII. 4. 6. In Chandodarśana II. 12. 8 Aorist Imperative Second Person Singular of the root *kṛ* viz. *kṛdhi* is used. Subjunctive forms like *bhavāti* (III. 1. 8) and *codayāsi* (ii. 2. 6) are found in the Chandodarśana. A form from a denominative root viz. *duvasya* ("do you serve" from *duvas* "service") (III. 1. 4) is also typically Vedic. Gerundive form *kartvam* (III. 1. 5) is also a Vedic peculiarity. Use of the Perfect form *cakartha* in III. 6. 1 is a reminiscent of the Vedic language.

Stylistic use of the particle *u* is a peculiarity of the Vedic language. This particle is used very frequently in the Ṛgveda. For e. g. I. 24. 8; I. 26. 5 etc. In the Pada-pāṭha, however, this particle is invariably nasalized, lengthened and followed by *iti* (*ū̃ iti*). This peculiarity is noticed in the Chandodarśana in exactly the same manner in its *Samhitā-pāṭha* and *Pada-pāṭha*. See I. 2. 5; III. 1. 8 and VII. 1. 7.

In the Vedic language the emphatic particle *it* ("only") is very commonly used (see e. g. ṚV I. 1. 4). In the Chandodarśana, too, this indeclinable is used in a similar manner. Thus see VI. 2. 5 : *yo mimāya tridhed bhuvanaṁ vāgbhiḥ.*

There are some typically Vedic words used in the Chandodarśana. Thus in I. 4. 1 the word *pūruṣa* is used (*cf.* also VIII. 4. 8-9). The word *pratnathā* ("in the ancient manner") is used in I. 5. 4. Some other expressions like *mithuyā* ("mutually") (VIII. 4. 1); *varūtha* ("protection") (III. 1. 4); *svadhayā* ("at will") (V. 4. 1); *apraketaḥ* ("without a mark") (I. 4. 4); *vediṣad* ("sitting upon the altar") (I. 4. 6); *pañca janāḥ* ("five tribes") (VI. 4. 13); *durgṛbhītaḥ* ("wrongly taken") (VII. 2. 7); *viśvavedāḥ* ("knower of all") (V. 4. 5); *satpatiḥ* ("lord of existing things") (VI. 1. 4); *sahasvān* ("powerful") (I. 5. 5). In Chandodarśana II. 7. 7 the word *ravatha* is used in the sense of "sound". For the use of this word in the Ṛgveda : *see* I. 100. 13; IX. 80. 1.

Many phrases used in the Chandodarśana remind us of the same or similar phrases used in the Vedic literature. Thus in Chandodarśana I. 3. 2 we read *savitā satyadharmā* which is comparable to *savitā satyadharmā* in ṚV X. 34. 8; X. 139. 3. In Chandodarśana I. 8. 1-4 Rudra is described to be

*marutāṁ pitā* (cp. RV. II. 33. 1 *ā te pitar marutāṁ sumnametu*). For the word *brahmacodanī* (CD II. 2. 6) compare ṚV VI. 53. 8. CD I. 5. 5 *agnirayaṁ sunītī supaṭhāsmān suṣumṇaiḥ satye nayatu praṇetā* is similar to ṚV I. 189. 1 (*agne naya su pathā rāye asmān*). The phrase *sutarmā nauḥ* in CD II. 5. 7 is comparable to ṚV VIII. 42. 3 *sutarmāṇaṁ adhi nāvam ruhema* (cp. also AB I. 13 : *yajño vai sutarmā nauḥ).* The stylistic expressions *devānāṁ devatamaḥ, maghonāṁ maghavattamaḥ, rathinam rathitamaḥ* (CD all IV. 3. 3); *rasānāṁ rasatamaḥ* (CD IV. 3. 6); *priyāṇāṁ priyatamaḥ* (CD IV. 3. 7); *hitānāṁ hitatamaḥ* (CD IV. 3. 8); *gurūṇāṁ gurutamaḥ* (CD IV. 4. 4); *ṛṣiṇāṁ ṛṣitamaḥ* (CD V. 3. 3; VI. 4. 6) are very much in tune with the Ṛgvedic phrases *gaṇānāṁ gaṇapatiṁ* (II. 23. 1); *tavastamaḥ tavasāṁ* (II. 33. 3); *bhiṣaktamaṁ bhiṣajāṁ* (II. 33. 4). When we read (about Vaisvānara) in Cd V. 1. 7 *ayaṁ viśveṣu bhuvaneṣvadhikṣitaḥ* we remember *adhikṣiyanti bhuvanāni viśvā* (RV I. 154. 2). The phrase *savitreṣitaḥ* (CD VII. 1. 1) reminds us of the phrase *anvasya ketamiṣitaṁ savitrā* (ṚV II. 38. 5).

Use of the pronominal particles *īm* and *sīm* is a peculiarity of the Ṛgvedic language. In the Chandodarśana also, these particles are frequently used. Thus for *īm* see II. 5. 2-4; IV. 2. 2-7; IV. 6. 2-5; VI. 2. 2-5; VII. 2. 1-10; VII. 3. 7; VII. 4. 1. For the use of *sīm* see IV. 6. 1; VI. 2. 1.

There are some extremely queer constructions in the Chandodarśana which can neither be called Vedic nor classical. Thus for example in VI. 3. 9 we read *ya ātmānamevānvajuhvata bhūyaḥ*. Here *yaḥ* is singular and *ajuhvata* is a plural form. In IV. 4. 1-11c everywhere we read *indrasyaiva ṛṇī bhavānyanṛno'nyāt*. Here the form *anyāt* is quite strange. We expect either the form *anyasmat* or just as the Genitive form is used of the word *indra* so also the Genitive form *anyasya* should have been used. In I. 6. 1 and I. 7. 1 the word *ātmanvī* is used in the sense of "possessing the self". This possessive form is irregular.

In Chandodarśana I. 4. 6 Agni is described as *vediṣad yo havir devebhyo nayati*. Here we expect an Accusative form rather than a Dative form of the word *deva*. In III. 2. 2 and in III. 6. 4 there is an expression *dampativaiva*. Here the word *dampatī* is a Pragṛhya. Still there is a euphonic combination (sandhi) between *dampatī* and *iva*. Indeed we have to describe these

phenomena as *ārṣa* (belonging to ṛṣis).

From the above given details of the vedisms in the Chandodarśana one can safely conclude that the Chandodarśana has all the appearance of a Ṛgvedic Maṇḍala. In the introduction to this book R. R. Divakar has quoted the views of Mahamahopadhyaya Datto Vaman Potdar, (Acharya) Vinoba Bhave, (Lokanayak) M. S. Aney (President, Vaidik Saṁśodhana Mandal), Dr. Sontakke (Secretary, Vaidik Saṁśodhana Mandal) and Dr. Hans Peter (Schmidt ?) a German Vedic scholar, who have accepted the Vedic character of the Chandodarśana. (There are, however, no reasons given. ) I accept their view but with some reservations. There are numerous negative points which also should be taken into consideration. From the point of view of mythology, the Chandodarśana has nothing to either add or to agree with the extant Ṛgveda. There are numerous references to Indra but no reference either to Vṛtra or to any other demon. Among the most typical Vedic gods, Varuṇa or Aśvins find no place here. Last but not the least Soma and soma-sacrificial ritual are conspicuously absent. The overall tenor of the Chandodarśana is rather that of the philosophical Upaniṣads like Śvetāsvatara or Muṇḍaka than that of the archaic Ṛgvedic hymns of the second Maṇḍala for example. Thus in my estimate Chandodarśana is Vedic but not sufficiently archaic.

These limitations, however, are not mentioned here in order to diminish the importance of the Vedic nature of the Chandodarśana. They can be treated as the part of the personality of the modern ṛṣi Daivarāta. I only hope that the future history will not only accept the Chandodarśana as Veda but will also associate it with some new ritual. The future generations are likely to learn this text by heart in its Samhitā-pāṭha, Pada-pāṭha and even with the other Vikṛtis like Krama, Jaṭā and Ghana etc. The future Mimāṁsakas, too, will try to establish the *apauruṣeyatva* of this text and its authoritativeness.

# The Justification of Kṛṣṇa's Annihilation of His Own Clan

**S. J. Noel Sheth**

It is with a great sense of joy and gratitude that I write this essay in honour of Prof. M. A. Mehendale, who taught me Yāska's *Nirukta.* In the context of this etymological work, it may be incidentally remarked that the latter part of my article[1] is replete with examples of etymologies employed by commentators for the purpose of exegesis.

We will analyse the justification of Kṛṣṇa's destruction of his own clan, the Yādavas,[2] given by the *Mahābhārata* (Mbh) and its commentator Nīlakaṇṭha, by the *Viṣṇu Purāṇa* (ViP) and its commentator Śrīdhara, by the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* (Bhp) and especially by the following 15 commentators on the *Bhāgavata* : Bhagavatprasāda (BP), Giridharalāla (GD), Gaṅgāsahāya (GS), Jīva Gosvāmin (JG)-the reference is to one of his three commentaries, called *Krama-sandarbha* (Ks), Madhva (MD), Puruṣottama, Rādhāramaṇadāsa (RR), Sudarśanasūrin, Śukadeva (SD), Śrīdhara Svāmin (SS), Vallabha (VB), Viśvanātha Cakravartin (VC), Vaṁśīdhara (VD), Vijayadhvaja (VJ), and Vīrarāghava (VR).[3]

The episode occurs in the "Mausala Parvan" (Book 16) of the Mbh, in 5.37.1-5.38.11 of the ViP, and in 11.1; 11.6; 11.30; and 11.31 of the BhP[4]. The bare outline of the story is as follows : Due to their impudent tomfoolery, some of the Yādava youths are cursed by brahmins that an iron pestle or club produced from Sāmba, one of the youths, will destroy the Yādava clan[5]. The pestle is ground to powder and thrown into the sea, but the powdered iron grows into reeds on the shores of the ocean. Later, noticing evil omens, Kṛṣṇa urges the Yādavas to leave Dvārakā and go to Prabhāsa. There the Yādavas get drunk and begin to kill one another. When they run out of

weapons, they resort to the reeds on the shore which, due to the powdered iron, turn into iron clubs in their hands. Kṛṣṇa too joins in the fray and strikes dead several of them with those iron clubs. After the destruction of the Yādavas,[6] first Balarāma, and then Kṛṣṇa, leaves this world, the latter doing so after being shot by an arrow by a hunter named Jarā ("Old Age"). Then the ocean submerges the city of Dvārakā. After Kṛṣṇa's departure, the evil Kali Yuga is ushered in. It should be noted that, in the *Harivaṁśa* (97.31-36), Nārada foretells that Kṛṣṇa will return to his own celestial region and that the ocean will inundate the cities of Bhogavatī and Dvārakā, but the actual events are not narrated in the *Harivaṁśa*[7].

## 1. The Problem and the Justification in the *Mahābhārata* and its Commentator Nīlakaṇṭha

In his Introduction to the Critical Edition of the "Mausala Parvan" of the Mbh, Belvalkar asks "why Kṛṣṇa did not prevent the misconduct of the Yādavas, overrule the curse of the sages...Kṛṣṇa had done similar wholesome and righteous acts in the Kaurava-Pāṇḍava warfare. He not only did not prevent the evil, but even participated personally in the Mausala fight.....How are we to explain such happenings and such conduct in the case of the reputed promulgator of the *Bhagavadgītā* teaching ?"[8]

In the Mbh, although at first Kṛṣṇa's father Vasudeva points to Arjuna's two disciples, Pradyumna and Yuyudhāna [Sātyaki], as the primary cause of the annihilation of the Vṛṣṇis or Yādavas, he does not want to censure them, because he thinks that the real cause is the curse of the Brahmins. (16.7.5-8). Their imprecation is often alluded to as the reason for the destruction (16.1.9; 2.16; 4.38; 5.3; 5.5; 8.30; 9.8; 9.25) It should be noted that the Mbh also mentions another curse, that of Gāndhārī on Kṛṣṇa; she cursed him that he will kill his own relatives and he himself will meet an ignominious death because, according to her, he was willfully indifferent to the destruction of the Kauravas (11.25.36-42).

It is also maintained that the Yādavas are impelled by destiny (16.2.5; 2.13; 9.26), and that the inundation of Dvārakā was also due to fate (16.8.41). Similarly, it is said that they are controlled by Time (*Kāla*) (16.2.2; 4.29; 4.42; 9.10, 33). Moreover, the Yādavas, including Balarāma, acted

under the influence of liquor (16.4.14-15; 4.31; 4.40).

All this, at first sight, can be construed as an explanation as to why the Yādavas were annihilated. But, on the other hand, Vyāsa declares in the text that Kṛṣṇa is able to counteract the curse and destiny, since he is able even to alter the course of the three worlds; yet, even so, he chooses to be indifferent (16.9.24-33). Even Kṛṣṇa's own father Vasudeva[9] laments that Kṛṣṇa, the lord of the universe, is indifferent to this calamity *(anaya)* (16.7.9-11).[10] He does not want to change fate *(Kṛtānta)* (16.2.14) It is true that he wants to prevent Yuyudhāna from killing more people (16.428) but when, impelled by fate, all the Bhojas and Andhakas surrounded the son of Sini, i.e., Yuyudhāna, then Kṛṣṇa, knowing the opposition of Time (*Kāla*) does not get angry [and does not interfere] (16.4.29-30). Commenting on 16.9.33, Nīlakaṇṭha indicates that Time (*Kāla*), mentioned in this verse, is none other than the Lord Kṛṣṇa himself (on 16.9.33 = 16.8.33 in the vulgate). Not only does he not prevent the tragedy, but, becoming angry, he even kills with the iron club [nearly] all the Yādavas, practically leaving no survivors (16.4.34-35; 42-26). Similarly, after Gāndhārī has pronounced her curse, he tells her that she is thereby helping him to bring about what he has already determined to accomplish. The Yādavas will bring about their mutual slaughter. (11.25.44-45).[11] When the time for Gāndhārī's curse taking effect draws near (16.3.19), Kṛṣṇa desires to make her words come true (16.3.21).

While there are attenuating circumstances in the passages cited above, the Mbh does not give clear and unambiguous justification of Kṛṣṇa's destruction of his own relatives. Perhaps it could be pointed out that the Mbh implicitly indicates that the Yādavas reap their just deserts because they commit sins and do not repent; they hate Brahmins, the ancestors (*Pitṛ*) and the deities, and disrespect their preceptors (*guru*). Only Balarāma and Kṛṣṇa do not behave like this (16.3.8-9). Nīlakaṇṭha asserts that the Yādavas perish because they are totally attached to wealth (*artha*) and sensuality (*kāma*) (Introduction to *Mausalaparvan.*) Let us now move on the ViP.

## II. The Problem and the Justification in the *Viṣṇu Purāṇa* and Its Commentator Śrīdhara[12].

Under the pretext (*vyāja*) of the curse of the Brahmins, Kṛṣṇa destroys

the Yādava clan (5.37.3, 5), and he who knows the highest truth does not want to counteract what destiny had predetermined (5.37.14). Kṛṣṇa declares that he has begun the extermination of the Yādavas (5.37.21),[13] and that he will leave this world and go to heaven only after he has annihilated them (5.37.22-23,34). The Yādava youth act as they do because they are drawn by the force of the impending event (5.37.7), namely the destruction of the Yādavas (Śrīdhara namely on 5.37.7). When the text states that the Yādavas are overpowered by fate (5.37.39), Śrīdhara says it means that they are deluded by Kṛṣṇa (on 5.37.39). The commentator also asserts that, when the text mentions that the sages who pronounce the curse are endowed with divine knowledge (5.37.9), it implies that they are aware of Kṛṣṇa's intention (on 5.37.9). Even the portents are created by Kṛṣṇa himself (on 5.37.28). He approves of the Kukkuras and Andhakas (both belonging to the Yādava clan) drinking the liquor (5.37.37), which incites them to lose their senses and fight with each other. And while Vyāsa tells Arjuna that all beings are subject to Time (*Kāla*) (5.38.54 ff), he also adds that Kṛṣṇa is the one who takes the form of Time (*Kālarūpin*) (5.38.39). According to Śrīdhara, the Yādavas, who are the *aṁśas* of *ādhikārika* deities, would have obtained salvation if they died in Dvārakā. However, Kṛṣṇa does not want this. Hence he cajoles them to go to Prabhāsa, where they will attain only the temporary heaven (*Svarloka)* (on 5.37.29).

It is true that, as in the Mbh, in the ViP, too, Kṛṣṇa tries to stop them, but when they continue to fight with each other,[14] mistakenly thinking that he is actually coming to the help of each one of them (5.37.43), then Kṛṣṇa gets angry with them and kills [almost all of] them, without remainder (5.37.44-45). Śrīdhara adds that the Yādava youth report the whole matter to king Ugrasena i.e., not to Kṛṣṇa (on 5.37.10), and Ugrasena himself does not inform Kṛṣṇa : which suggests that the Yādavas are opposed to Kṛṣṇa (on 5.37.11). Furthermore, since the text refers to the Yādavas as killers (*ātatāyin*) (5.37.45), it means that they are intent on *svavadha* (on 5.37.45[15]). This can mean either that they want to kill Kṛṣṇa himself, thus justifying his slaying them, or that they desire to destroy themselves [under the force of Kṛṣṇa's deluding power), so that Kṛṣṇa is merely carrying out their wish.

However, a clear justification is given by the ViP when Kṛṣṇa refers to the Yādavas as a very great burden to the earth (5.37.26), adding that even a youth of the Yādavas is no less than Jarāsandha and others who were a heavy load on the earth (5.37.25); and he declares that the earth's burden will not be removed until the Yādavas are obliterated (5.37.22). So the ViP gives an unambiguous reason why the Yādavas should be destroyed. In the Mbh the grounds are not so strong, for, although it mentions the wickedness of the Yādavas, it does not state that they are a burden to the earth; in other words, their punishment need not have been so drastic as a complete annihilation. Whereas in the ViP the burden of the earth cannot be removed until they are extirpated. Hence, the ViP advances beyond the Mbh in justifying Kṛṣṇa.

## III. The Problem and the Justifications in the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* and its Commentaries

The text states that the annihilation of the Yādavas is due to the curse of the Brahmins (11.6.26, 31, 34; 11.30.2, 24), and the commentators, explicitly or implicitly, mention the curse, when explaining these verses. Some of them refer to it even at other places (e.g., GD, SS on 11.1.1; BP, GD, GS, VR on 11.30.20) and even attribute Kṛṣṇa's being shot by and arrow to it (GS, SS, VD on 11.30, 38). The curse cannot be averted (VR on 11.6.36; BP on 11.6.37) because of the difference between the divine, earthly and embodied souls (RR on 11.6.34). The idea would seem to be that Kṛṣṇa is only seeing to it that the imprecation of the Brahmins is fulfiled, and it was pronounced precisely because of the misbehaviour of some of the Yādavas.

However, the text also mentions that Kṛṣṇa does not annul the curse, even though he is capable of doing so (11.6.42); on the contrary, he approves of it (11.1.24), and several commentators repeat this explicitly (e.g., BP,[16] GD, GS, SS, VD, VR) or almost explicitly (VB, RR, SD, Sudarśanasūrin). He uses the curse of the Brahmins as a pretext (11.1.5) and the commentators explicitly (BP, GD, GS, JG (Ks), RR, SD, VB, VC, VD, VR on 11.1.5; *see* also SD on 11.1.1) or implicitly repeat what the verse says. In fact, VC and VD add that even though Kṛṣṇa suggests to the Yādavas that they move to Prabhāsa, ostensibly to remain alive and thus avoid the effect of the

imprecation (11.6.35), his inner intention is not to counteract the curse (VC, VD on 11.6.42). Indeed the real cause of their destruction is Kṛṣṇa's wish.[17] Kṛṣṇa himself sets the stage for the Brahmins' imprecation (VC on 11.1.11). The various events in this whole episode take place through Kṛṣṇa's will. E.g., it is he who internally urges the brahmins to proceed to Piṇḍāraka (BP. GS. GD. VB. VJ. VR. Sudarśanasūrin on 11.1.11); the Yādava youths, too, go there (GD on 11.1.13); they insult the brahmins (VB on 11.1.13); the brahmins get angry (JG(Ks), RR, VD on 11.1.16) and imprecate upon them (VB on 11.1.16); the juvenile Yādavas are afflicted by the curse (VD on 11.1.14); the punishment appears to be disproportionate to their fault (VB on 11.1.16), nor do the Brahmins regret this (Puruṣottama on 11.1.18); the frightened Yādava boys report the whole matter to the king, but not to Kṛṣṇa, who could have counteracted the curse (RR, VD on 11.1.19); and the king himself had the pestle powdered, etc., but did not ask Kṛṣṇa's advice (GD on 11.1.21)—all this takes place because of Kṛṣṇa's will. Moreover, when Kṛṣṇa suggests that they leave Dvārakā and go to the sacred place Prabhāsa in order to neutralize the curse (11.6.35-38; see GS on 11.6.37, VR on 11.1.1), it is actually a trick (*vyāja*) (JG (Ks), RR, VD on 11.6.35-36), for it is not proper that even the semblance of inauspiciousness befalls the auspicious city of Dvārakā (JG (Ks), RR, VD on 11.6.35; RR, VD, on 11.30.6), since death is something inauspicious. So, while it is maintained that Kṛṣṇa is the master of the situation and can, if he so wishes, counteract the curse, he is shown to be hardhearted, lacking in compassion towards his own relatives, nay, even taking an active part in their extirpation (11.30.23). Many commentators concede that it would not be proper for Kṛṣṇa to destroy his own clan. Hence, they explain that, instead of killing the Yādavas himself,[18] he induces an internal feud among them (11.1.4), [so that they would kill one another] (BP, GD, GS, SS on 11.1.3; SD, VC on 11.1.4).

In fact, the Yādavas are behaving thus precisely because they are deluded by Kṛṣṇa's *māyā* (11.30.13, 17, 24; the text may also be suggesting this in 11.30.19, 22, 49). Some of the commentators add that this is the main cause (GS, JG (Ks), SS on 11.30.13). Indeed the club episode and other such incidents are even created through Kṛṣṇa's *māyā* (JG (Ks), VD on 11.30.49). Even when the text says that the Yādavas lose their sense of

judgement and drink liquor due to fate (11.30.12; see also GS, SS on 11.30.12), the commentators point out that this fate is another name for the wish of the Lord (JG (Ks), RR, VD, VJ, VR on 11.30.12).

Thus, the BhP, too, places the problem before us. However, it goes further than the ViP in attempting to exonerate Kṛṣṇa. And the commentators, who come much later, go still further than the BhP. Let us now discuss the justifications offered by the BhP and its commentators.

### 1. *The Yādavas are wicked and a burden to the earth*

While both the ViP (5.37.21-22) and the BhP (11.1.3) mention that the Yādavas have become a burden to the earth, it is only the latter (11.1.3-4; 11.6.29-30; 11.30.24) that gives reasons why they are a burden to the earth, thus demonstrating that Kṛṣṇa is not annihilating them merely out of whim : the Yādavas have become proud due to their strength, bravery and wealth, so that once Kṛṣṇa leaves the earth, no one will be able to restrain them from overrunning and destroying the world. They were intoxicated and blinded with liquor (11.30.13, 17) and angry due to jealousy (11.30.24). The commentators heartily endorse the text's criticism of the Yādavas. So these faults, which make them an unbearable burden to the earth, indicate that they deserve to be wiped out from the face of the earth.

Although Kṛṣṇa restrains them from killing one another, the Yādavas attack Kṛṣṇa and Balarāma (11.30.21), and so it is all right for Kṛṣṇa to retaliate. It should be observed that, both in the Mbh and in the ViP, Kṛṣṇa tries to stop them but the Yādavas do not attack Kṛṣṇa himself in these two texts. In the BhP, however, they do so, thus making them more culpable and justifying Kṛṣṇa's reaction all the more.

### 2. *Kṛṣṇa destroys the Yādavas as an act of grace to prevent them from sinning*

Contrary to the above reason, some of the commentators, basing themselves on the question of King Parīkṣita in 11.1.8, portray the Yādavas as religious people, pious and generous and at the service of the aged, so that it could be said that it would indeed be a blessing if they were to spread all over the earth (JG(Ks), VD on 11.6.30). The burden of the earth is not

due to too many individuals (*vyaktibāhulya*) since the load could well be from the eternal mountains, etc. which have excessive weight; nor is the burden due to irreligiousness (*adharma*) on the part of the Yādavas, for the text declares them to be "pious, generous and always at the service of the aged" and "with their minds on Kṛṣṇa" (11.1.8). Hence the idea that the earth would be crushed by the innumerable Yādavas becoming agitated due to their separation (*viraha*) from Kṛṣṇa [if he were to leave the visible world without taking them along with him], is poetically fancied to be a burden to the earth (RR, VD on 11.30.25; see also JG (Ks), RR, VD on 11.1.3). The Yādava race is said to be a burden, even though it is supremely religious (*parama-dhārmika*) (VC on 11.1.3). If those who are [relatively] indifferent to Kṛṣṇa cross the darkness [of *saṁsāra* and *avidyā,* merely by listening to] his glory sung in beautiful stanzas [as mentioned in 11.1.7], all the more, surely, will this be the case with the Yādavas (JG (Ks), VD on 11.1.5; RR on 11.1.7); hence, it is established that the question of the burden of the earth has to be laid at other peoples' [and not at the Yādavas'] doors (JG (Ks), VD on 11.1.6).

Nevertheless, Kṛṣṇa decides to remove them so that they may not become sinful, for when the Kali Yuga arrives, the minds of even the good go astray. In fact, by accompanying Kṛṣṇa, who is about to leave the earth, the goal of their human life (*Puruṣārtha*) would be fulfilled all the more. Hence, it is with the idea of conferring grace on them that Kṛṣṇa destroys the Yādavas. If he were not to protect them in this way, Kṛṣṇa would be guilty of a fault (MD, VD, VJ on 11.6.30). If they were separated from Kṛṣṇa, who is about to depart from the world, they would lose their sense of discernment between right and wrong, and thus indulge in mad behaviour (JG (Ks), RR, VD on 11.6.30); they would become proud and destroy the world (VD on 11.6.30), or they would become sorrowful and thus become unbearable to the earth (JG (Ks) on 11.30.25). So Kṛṣṇa is also doing a favour to the earth by preventing the Yādavas from becoming a burden to the earth in the future. However, at present they are not weighing her down. If anything, the Yādavas are a sort of sweet burden to the earth. VC explains that, even though the earth does not consider the burden of Kṛṣṇa's religious relatives to be really a load, yet, as her Lord, he must lessen her burden just

as the lover lightens the weight of the excessive ornaments from his very young beloved; or just as the weight of a desirable thing is easy to carry but, when one has too much of it, it is not so easy to bear; or just as a greedy merchant finds it difficult to lift the weight of a heap of gold that he has suddenly obtained, so also it is difficult for the earth to bear the burden of the Yādavas (VC on 11.6.30). Therefore, the Yādavas are removed because they are too much of a good thing !

SD adds two more reasons. The Yādavas are destroyed because otherwise, seeing their supremacy on earth, the *asuras*, being filled with hatred, would return again and thus become a renewed burden to the earth. Since there is this apprehension of the return of the *asuras*, the Yādava clan is destroyed. Secondly, since they have completed their work (*kṛtakārya*) on earth, the Yādavas are withdrawn. (SD on 11.1.3).

***3. This annihilation is actually the removal of the deities who have entered Kṛṣṇa's attendants.***

On the one hand, some commentators assert that the Yādavas are actually parts (*aṁśa*) of deities, who are not eligible for immediate salvation (*sadyomokṣa*). If they were to die in Dvārakā, they would attain salvation, hence Kṛṣṇa leads them to Prabhāsa, which will bring them the fruit of prosperity (GS, SS on 11.6.35), i. e., the temporary heaven (*svarga*), health etc. (VD on 11.6.35), but not salvation. On the other hand, some others claim that the Yādavas should be distinguished from the deities who have entered them (e.g., RR on 11.1.1, VD on 11.1.10). According to this latter view, Kṛṣṇa desires that his Dvārakā should always retain its brilliance, characterized by his eternal retinue (*parikara),* viz., the Yādavas. Hence through his yogic power he expels from his attendants (such as Pradyumna, Sāmba, etc.) the deities (such as Kandarpa and Kārtikeya), who had entered unseen into his attendants and, taking these deities to Prabhāsa, involves them through his *māyā* in the battle of the clubs, thus sending them to their temporary heaven (VC, VD on 11.6.35 and on 11.30.5; see also GS, RR on 11.6.35, and VD on 11.1.10). Incidentally, VC and VD remark that, even though Kṛṣṇa talks about going to Prabhāsa, he actually intends to remain always in Dvārakā in his complete form, together with his attendants (on

11.6.35). This is a reference to the belief of Bengal Vaiṣṇavism that Kṛṣṇa is always present on earth. We shall now deal with this doctrine.

**4. *The extermination of the Yādavas is actually their transition from the prakaṭa-līlā to the aprakaṭa-līlā.***

In order to make this point clear, it may be helpful to refer briefly to the understanding of *prakaṭa-līlā* and *aprakaṭa-līlā* in Bengal Vaiṣnavism. This school believes that Kṛṣṇa is eternally present and playing his *līlās* (sports) not only in his heavenly Vaikuṇṭha but also on earth, viz., in Mathurā, Vṛndāvana and Dvārakā. His *līlā* on earth, however, is not always visible to empirical beings. It becomes manifest in the Dvāpara Yuga, when it is called *prakaṭa-līlā* (manifest sport), but at other times it generally remains concealed, and hence it is called *aprakaṭa-līlā* (unmanifest sport). The one and the sama *līlā* appears in these two forms due to the limitations of the empirical beings. In the *aprakaṭa-līlā* there is no beginning, middle and end, while in the *prakaṭa-līlā* there is a beginning, middle and end, as well as a mixture of empirical and non-empirical elements[19]. Although both the *līlās* are eternal, or rather aspects of the one eternal *līlā*, yet, since there is no beginning, middle and end in the *aprakaṭa-līlā,* it may be referred to as the *nitya-līlā* (eternal sport). In the *prakaṭa-līlā* there is the appearance of the birth, growth and death of Kṛṣṇa, while in the *aprakaṭa-līlā* he is eternally present as a youth and there is neither birth nor death[20]. The abode (*dhāman* or *loka)* or Kṛṣṇa is also simultaneously present in Vaikuṇṭha as well as on earth. There are three kinds of *prakāśas* or appearance of Kṛṣṇa's abode : (i) *aprakaṭa-prakāśa* (unmanifest appearance), in which the abode remains hidden from empirical beings, (ii) *prāpañcika-prakāśa* (empirical appearance), in which the abode becomes visible to empirical beings; and (iii) *prakaṭa-prakāśa* (manifest appearance), which takes place when, in the *prāpañcika-prakāśa,* Kṛṣṇa becomes manifest together with his attendants (*parikara*). Hence it is only in the *prakaṭa-līlā* of Kṛṣṇa that the *prakaṭa-prakāśa* of his abode takes place[21]. Let us now proceed to the explanations of the commentators.

VC and VD quote a whole string of scriptural passages to prove that Kṛṣṇa's bodies (*vigraha*), names, abodes, qualities (*guna*), sports (*līlā*) and

attendants are all eternal (VC, VD on 11.30.5). Their contention is that ordinary people, and even others, will be deceived by *māyā* and think that Kṛṣṇa is destroying the Yādavas and that he himself abandons his body, but actually the Yādavas and Kṛṣṇa are only becoming invisible[22] in the *prakaṭOa-līlā* and entering into the *aprakata-līlā*. This is how they explain it : It is only after Kṛṣṇa's *līlās* are over, i.e. when his *prakaṭa-līlā* ceases, that the age of Kali will have authority on earth. Kṛṣṇa has already destroyed those who were opposed to him [namely demons, wicked kings, etc. who were a burden to the earth (see., e.g., 11.1.1-3.)]; those who are for him will have their *bhakti* doubled, and those who are very much for him will have their love multiplied a hundredfold; and even those who are indifferent to him will become devotees. Hence *dharma* will in fact increase and, as a result, Kali's power cannot become manifest. [So in order to usher in the Kali Yuga], Kṛṣṇa decides to bring about the restriction of *dharma* in the following manner. He decides to reign in Dvārakā together with his attendants, namely the Yādavas, but, becoming hidden to the empirical (*prāpañcika*) world, he will first expel the deities who have entered his attendants and establish those deities in their heaven, and then enter Vaikuṇṭha together with his retinue (i.e., he will enter into his *aprakaṭa-līlā*]. Now, due to the defect of *māyā,* the ordinary people mistakenly think that all the Yādavas go to Prabhāsa where, under the influence of the curse of the Brahmins, they become intoxicated and, being killed by one another, they give up their bodies. Similarly, the people erroneously think that Kṛṣṇa, too, together with Balarāma, abandons his human body and ascends to his abode. In fact, others will publicly proclaim that just as the Kuru race was wiped out, so also Kṛṣṇa falls in Prabhāsa together with his own clan. Due to such despicable proclamations, *dharma* will suddenly be left with only one leg,[23] and then not only the ordinary people, but also Kṛṣṇa's *aṁśas* like Arjuna and others, will look upon Kṛṣṇa's exit (*niryāṇa) līlā* as an ordinary and calamitous (*duravasthāmayī)* one. Sages like Vaiśaṁpāyana, Parāśara and others have described in their *Saṁhitās* that, in order to establish the power of Kali, even Kṛṣṇa's devotee Śaṅkara, who will be born in the Kali Yuga, will write his commentary on the Vedānta in a false light so that the other commentators, whose intellects are deprived of sense, will come to the wrong conclusion that the body of Kṛṣṇa is illusory (VC, VD on 11.30.5). So these

commentators claim that, even though not only the ordinary people, but also others like Arjuna, think that the Yādavas are annihilated, the real situation is that it is a mere transition from the *prakaṭa-līlā* to the *aprakaṭa-līlā*.

When Kṛṣṇa decides that he will return to his abode in peace (11.1.4), he means that he will return to the *nitya-līlā*, to his eternal abode of Dvārakā. It is not proper for Kṛṣṇa to become invisible while leaving the Yādavas behind. In fact, when the text (11.1.4) asserts that the Yādavas cannot be overcome by others, it also implies that they cannot be destroyed by themselves nor by Kṛṣṇa himself, since the same verse (11.1.4) mentions that they are always under his protection. Hence their being "overcome" (*paribhava*) really refers to their being made to turn away from the [*prakaṭa*] *prakāśa* (JG(Ks), VD on 11.1.4). Kṛṣṇa's withdrawing the Yādavas (11.1.5) signifies his making them invisible (RR on 11.1.5), or making them enter into his abode (JG(Ks) on 11.1.5). Similarly, when 11.1.10 states that Kṛṣṇa wants to withdraw the Yādavas, what is meant is that he desires to make them go to his own abode, whose *prakāśa* is beyond the empirical (*prapañca*)(JG (Ks), VD on 11.1.10). Kṛṣṇa still has things left to be done (11.1.10): These include his making himself as welll as his eternal attendants [the Yādavas] become invisible to the eyes of people who are in the empirical world (*prāpañcika*) (VD on 11.1.10). RR points out that when Kṛṣṇa tells the Yādavas that they should all immediately leave Dvārakā (11.30.5), what he means is that they should not stay on in Dvārakā characterized by the *prakāśa-prakāśa* [i.e., where Krisna's abode as well as Kṛṣṇa and his attendants are visible to empirical beings], but continue to stay on in the *aprakaṭa-prakāśa* [i.e., in which they are all invisible to empirical beings] (RR on 11.30.5). When Kṛṣṇa tells the Yādavas that the worship of Brahmins is the best way to get rid of evil and secure auspiciousness (11.30.9), he does so in the context of obtaining the *(aprakaṭa-) prakāśa* which is beyond the empirical (JG (Ks) on 11.30.9). SS, commenting on 11.30.9, says that, according to Kṛṣṇa, the Yādavas' worship of Brahmins, etc. would lead to the highest benefit in heaven (*devaloka*). By this Kṛṣṇa secretly means to say that this worship will be the cause of welfare in his own divine world, namely in the *aprakaṭa-prakāśa* (VD, RR on 11.30.9). The description of

the Yādavas drinking liquor, slaying each other with weapons and the *erakā* grass—which becomes hard like iron—, as well as Kṛṣṇa's participating in the killing, and Balarāma's leaving the world (11.30.12-26), all this is not the true state of affairs. The real purpose is not to kill all the Yādavas, but in order that Kṛṣṇa and Yādavas become invisible [and thus enter into the *aprakaṭa-līlā*] (VC, VD on 11.30.12). Since 11.30.13 states that Yādavas are deluded by Kṛṣṇa's *māyā*, it is clear that all this [destruction] is caused by his *māyā*. Thus the passages in the *Purāṇas* which give the opposite meaning [namely that the destruction really takes place] should be construed as corroborating the fact that it is all brought about by his *māyā* (JG(Ks), VD on 11.30.12).

When 11.30.25 mentions that the Yādavas were destroyed (*naṣṭeṣu*), it refers to their becoming invisible to the people who are in the empirical world (*prapañca*) (RR, VD, on 11.30.25). Similarly, when 11.30.26 states that Balarāma united his soul with the Self and left the human world, it means that he united his soul, namely the *prakāśa* in the *prakaṭa-līlā*, to the Self, namely the *prakāśa* in the *aprakaṭa-līlā;* in other words, he considered both the *prakāśas* as non-different from each other. His leaving the human world means that he became invisible to it. (RR, VD, on 11.30.26). The same idea is expressed more briefly by JG, when he explains that Balarāma joined his soul manifest (*prakāśamāna*) in the *prakaṭa-līlā* to the Self manifest in the *aprakaṭa-līlā*, and thought of them as non-different from each other (JG(Ks) on 11.30.26). Again, Balarāma's passing away (*niryāṇa),* mentioned in 11.30.27, is said to refer to his entrance into the *aprakaṭa* abode (RR on 11.30.27), or his return to Mahā Vaikuṇṭha[24] in his own form (*svarūpa*) and his going to Pātāla in his *svāṁśa* form[25] (VD on 11.30.27). So also the condition (*daśā*) of Kṛṣṇa after being shot by the hunter, does not refer to his impending death, but to his body becoming invisible (VD on 11.30.46), to his future entry into the *aprakaṭa-līlā* (VC, VD [who quotes VC] on 11.30.46), following in the footsteps of the Yādavas (JG(Ks), VD on 11.30.46).

GS gives an interesting argument to show that the killing of the Yādavas could not have taken place. According to 3.4.2, the battle of the Yādavas took place in the evening. It is after this that the hunter is said to have

arrived. Now this could not have been so because the animals would not have come out at that time due to their being frightened by the battle involving crores of Yādavas; and it is impossible for the hunter not to have known the time beneficial for hunting. Hence it means that the hunter arrived in a solitary place, after the deities [the Yādavas] became invisible. Therefore the annihilation of the Yādavas has to be false (GS on 11.30.28). GS adds that, even though the destruction of the Yādavas is untrue, Kṛṣṇa makes people believe in it in order to produce dispassion or indifference to the world (*vairāgya*) in them (GS on 11.30.28).[26]

Just as the Yādavas enter into the *aprakaṭa-līlā*, so also does the city of Dvārakā. The impending inundation of Dvārakā by the sea (11.30.4, 11.31.23) is with the intention of making Dvārakā enter into the *aprakaṭa-līlā* (VC and VD [who quotes VC] on 11.30.46). 11.30.47 mentions only the flooding [and not the destruction] of Dvārakā, so that the Yādavas would abandon it [to enter into the *aprakaṭa-līlā*] (VD on 11.30.47). Verses 11.31.23-24 speak of the submersion of Dvārakā, except for Kṛṣṇa's palace or temple (*ālayam*) where, he is always present. However, these verses are uttered by Śuka to console king Parīkṣita, who is sad because he imagines that Kṛṣṇa's Dvārakā-*līlā* is not eternal. The statement that Dvārakā was abandoned (*tyaktām*) by Kṛṣṇa in v.23 is only from the popular point of view. In fact, the Dvārakā-*līlā* is eternal, and the verse actually says that Dvārakā is not forsaken (*atyaktām*, taking the negative *a* from the long *ā*-ending of the preceeding word, *hariṇā*) since in v. 24 it is said that Kṛṣṇa is always present there (*tatra*).[27] The flooding is not of Dvārakā, which has been made by Viśvakarman; rather, it is the inundation of the surrounding land; i.e., Kṛṣṇa caused Dvārakā to be surrounded by water so as to act like a moat around it. The words *mahārāja śrīmadbhagavadālayam* (in a11.31.23) can be construed as an attribute of the city of Dvārakā[28]: the city of Dvārakā (*dvārakāpuram)* which is in the form of Kṛṣṇa's eternal abode (*ālayam=śrīkṛṣṇanityadhāmarūpam*) which is characterized by the great kings, namely the Yādavas (*mahārāja=mahāntaḥ rājāno yādavalakṣaṇā yatra tathābhūtam tadālayam)*[29] When the text says that the inundation did not include (*varjayitvā)* Kṛṣṇa's palace (v.23), and that Kṛṣṇa is always present there (v.24), it means that Kṛṣṇa was present also to those [Yādavas] who

belong to his palace, or it means that 'Kṛṣṇa's palace' refers [not just to the palace in the narrows sense, but] to the palace situated in the beautiful ambience of the houses of the Yādavas[30]. 11.31.24 mentions the benefits gained by people remembering (*smṛti*) Kṛṣṇa's abode in Dvārakā : this remembrance is mentioned because it cannot be actually seen now[31] (JG (Ks), RR, VD on 11.31.23-24). Hence, that Dvārakā is experienced otherwise [i.e., as if destroyed] is due only to the imitation of what is mundane, popular or secular (*laukikatva*); whereas, in reality, it is characterized by the eternally established supra-mundane (*alaukika) prakāśa* (JG (Ks), VD on 11.1.1.) The 11th *skandha* of the *Bhāgavata* really describes Kṛṣṇa's ascension (*āroha*) into the *aprakaṭa-prakāśa* of Dvārakā (RR, VD on 11.1.1.) Dvārakā is eternal because it is the meeting point of all that is divine and superdivine (VD on 11.31.23). VC briefly states that the view that the Yādavas, Krisna's palace, etc. are not eternal is rejected in vv. 23-24, since it is asserted that the Lord's palace is an exception (v. 23) and Kṛṣṇa is present there eternally (v.24) (VC on 11.31.23.24). Hence, Kṛṣṇa cannot abandon Dvārakā (VC on 11.1.7).

Therefore, the so-called destruction of the Yādavas is actually their transition from the *prakaṭa-līlā* to the *aprakaṭa-līlā*. In keeping with this understanding, a number of verses are ingeniously interpreted to yield a meaning different from the obvious meaning that strikes one at first sight. We shall now take up examples of these different interpretations.[32]

The plain meaning of verse 11.30.12 is : Then in that place, the Yādavas, whose judgement was destroyed by fate (*diṣṭavibhramiśitadhiyaḥ)*, drank the highly intoxicating, sweet drink called Maireyaka, by whose juices the intellect is deluded. RR reinterprets this verse to show that the Yādavas move from the empirical (*prapañca*) to the *nitya-līlā*, in the following manner. The intellect (*dhiyaḥ*) of the Yādavas was deprived by time (*diṣṭa = kāla*, one of the meaning given by the lexicographer Viśva) which was under the influence of *prakaṭa-līlā*.[33]. i.e., their intellect was deprived of the experience of the *nitya-līlā*. They drank the honey (madhu) in the form of the *maireyaka*. The word *maireyaka* consists of *mā+ irā+ka. Mā* means the *nitya-līlā,* which is brought about by *irā*, i.e., by Sarasvatī, a deity who is fond of *nitya-līlā*, i.e. it pervades the devotees. In other words, *irā* stands for the Śruti or

Scripture (e.g., "What was, may be, and will be becoming' ) which produces the *nitya-līlā. Ka* is a suffix which does not convey any meaning of its own, i.e., it does not add anything to the original meaning of the base [*maireya]* to which it is appended (*svārthe ka).* Hence *maireyaka* means `that which gives the understanding of the *nitya-līlā,* since it makes one forget the empirical (*prapañca*). By the tasting (*dravaih = āsvādanaiḥ)* of this *maireyaka's* eternality (*nityatva*) the Yādava's intellect (*mati*) in the form of separation (*viyoga*) was destroyed, i.e., the eternal union (*sanyoga*) shone forth (RR on 11.30.12).

11.30.13 speaks of a clash (*saṅgharṣaḥ*) among the Yādavas, who were deluded by Kṛṣṇa's *māyā(kṛśṇamāyāvimūḍhānām*) and whose hearts were proud (*dṛptacetasām*). This is given a symbolic meaning : The conflict is actually between the *prakaṭa-līlā* and the *nitya-līlā*. In this struggle the *prakaṭa-līlā,* consisting of separation (*viyoga),* was defeated by the *nitya-līlā*. The Yādavas are those to whom (*yebhaḥ*) Kṛṣṇa's *māyā,* namely his desire indicating separation, was hidden (*vimūḍāḥ = tirohitāḥ)*, and their hearts are proud due to their union (*sanyoga*) with the *nitya-līlā* (RR, VD, on 11.30.13).

The ordinary meaning of 11.30.14 is : Agitated by anger (*krodhasaṁrabdhāḥ*) those killers (*ātatāyinaḥ*), fought with one another (*yuyudhuḥ*) on the sea-shore (*velāyām*) with bows (*dhanurbhiḥ*), swords (*asibhiḥ)*, spears (*bhallaiḥ),* maces (*gadābhiḥ*), iron clubs and lances (*tomararṣṭibhiḥ)* Now RR and VD propose a deeper, spiritual meaning : This verse (and also the following verse) enumerates the order of the spiritual means (*sādhana*) for the adepts (*sādhakas)* to see the entrance to the *nitya-līlā.* They are agitated by anger in order to destroy the pain of separation (*viyoga*) at the time (*velāyām*) of their going to the abode of aprakaṭa-prakāśa. They become killers in order to destroy the pain of separation; they fight against *avidyā*, etc. which are the cause of the cycle of rebirth. The spiritual means they use are bows, namely the *praṇava;* swords, namely indifference to hope or hopelessness, spears, namely each one's purity, etc. The word *gadā* (mace) is explained thus : *Gadā = ga+dā. Ga* is a dance characterized by song (*ga=gītopalakṣita nṛtya*) and *dā=dīyante*, 'are given'; i.e., "with maces" (*gadābhiḥ)* means 'with the clapping of hands, which are given in

dance, they fight with sins', since the *Padma Purāṇa* says that, by the clapping of hands while dancing in front of the Lord, the sins in one's person fly away like so many birds. Similarly, *tomararṣṭibhiḥ* (with clubs and lances) is interpreted differently to mean 'the destruction of ignorance' : *Tomara= tau+mara. Tau=tauti,* i.e. it goes to cover the *svarūpa-jñāna* (knowledge of the essence); *mara=mārayati,* causes to die. So *tomara* is that which causes the *svarūpa-jñāna* to die, i.e., *tomara* means ignorance *Ṛṣayaḥ=riṣanti=nāśayanti,* 'they destroy'. So the Yādavas fight with six kinds of *prapattis,* which destroy ignorance (RR, VD on 11.30.14).

Verse 11.30.15 says that, having accosted (*sametya)* each other with their chariots, elephants, etc. (*rathakuñjarādibhiḥ*), as well as with donkeys, camels, bulls...and men (*kharoṣṭrgobhiḥ....naraiḥ*), all of which carried flying banners (*patatpatākaiḥ),* the Yādavas killed (*nyahan*) each other with arrows (*śaraiḥ*). However, going beyond this mundane menaing, RR and VD interpret the verse in a spiritual sense : The Yādavas mutually tasted (*sametya=āsvādyatvena sametya=āsvādya*) the Vaiṣṇava *śāstras* like the *Bhāgavata,* which are comparable to the storehouse (*kuñjara=kośa)* of the components (*ratha=avayava*) of *bhakti.*[34] From these *śāstras* blessings (*patāka=saubhāgya*) in the form of Kṛṣṇa's grace flow out (*patantyaḥ=nissarantyaḥ).* Thus fortified by these *śāstras,,* the Yādavas encountered (*sametya)* men (*nara)* who were like donkeys, camels, etc. They made these men listen to the *Bhāgavata* etc.—and this (making to listen) was made to flow like water (*śara=jala).*[35] By these means, the Yādavas killed (*nyahan*) these men's dependence on sensual objects, which (dependence) had a nature similar to that of donkeys, camels etc. In other words, the Yādavas destroyed the *karman and avidyā* characteristic of the Kali age, and through this victory over Kali, saved these men. The commentators justify the peculiar meanings they have given to some of the words in this verse by quoting the dictionaries of Hemacandra, Medinī and Viśva (RR, VD, on 11.30.15) Similarly, verse 11.30.16, which outwardly mentions duels between various couples, such as Pradyumna and Sāmba, is interpreted differently to mean : Each of these couples, namely Pradyumna and Sāmba, Akrūra and Bhoja, etc. came together in twos (*samīyatuḥ*) in order to discuss with each other the highest truth (*paramārtha*) with regard

to the battle (*yudhi)* with *saṁsāra* and with the separation (*viyoga)* [from the *prakaṭa-līlā]* (RR, VD, on 11.30.16).

The statement in 11.30.17, namely that, deluded by Kṛṣṇa, the Yādavas attacked (*āsādya*) each other and struck or killed (*jaghnuḥ*) one another, is reinterpreted in the following way : The Yādavas are deluded (*vimohitāḥ*) by Kṛṣṇa, i.e., they are made to forget the separation from the *prakaṭa-līlā* by their coming in contact with the light of the *nitya*-(i.e. *aprakaṭa-)līlā.* That is, being blinded by the intoxication of exhilaration (*madāndhakāritāḥ*) generated by their experiencing the happiness of the *nitya-līlā* they met (*āsādya=militvā*) each other, and came to know (*jaghnuḥ=jñātavantaḥ)* the secret of the *nitya-līlā.* The verb *jaghnuḥ,* which is derived from the verbal root *han,* does not mean 'they killed', but 'they came to know' because, since the root *han* also means 'to go', it can mean 'to know' (RR, VD on 11.30.17). In 11.30.18 forgetting (*visṛjya*) their friendship (*sauhṛdam*), they fought (*ayudhyan)* with one another. This is interpreted differently : Having abandoned (*visṛjya)* the empirical world (*prapañca)*[36] they experienced[37] their mutual friendship in the state of *nitya-līlā* (RR, VD on 11.30.18). They as it were waged war (*ayudhyan=yuddham iva)* in order to destroy the enemy[38] in the form of the separation from the *prakaṭa-līlā,* and thus be connected with the *aprakaṭa-līlā*. The fighting among relatives in 11.30.19 is given the following new meaning : Being *mūḍhāḥ* (v. 19), i.e., devoid of the contact with the separation from the *prakaṭa-līlā,* the relatives (*jñātayaḥ*) recognized (*ahan=jñātavanaaḥ*) their relatives (*jñātīn)* as the eternal attendants of Kṛṣṇa in other words, they thus obtained inspiration. In connection with this unconventional meaning given to the root *han*, RR and VD remark that the claim that the root *han* does not mean 'to go'[39] because it is not used in this sense, is a mere rash statement or temerity on the part of those who are confined to the narrow well of poetry and not immersed in the vast ocean of the Scriptures. The *Mahābhāṣya* of Patañjali can be adduced in support of this remark (RR, VD on 11.30.19).

11.30.20. mentions that when their arrows were depleted, their bows broken, and their weapons exhausted, the Yādavas took hold of (*jahruḥ*) the *erakā* grass in their clenched fists (*muṣṭibhiḥ*) in order to use this grass as weapons. However, RR and VD bring to light the hidden and deeper

import of this verse : Once one has reached the goal (*sādhya*), namely the eternal world of *nitya-līlā*, the means (*sādhana*) to the goal come to an end, just as in the maxim 'when Indra, the god of rain, is present, there is no need of implements to dig a well'. After the arrows in the form of the 'discernment of objects' were reduced, i.e., abandoned (*kṣīyamāṇeṣu=tyjyamāneṣu*), the bows in the form of the 'reflections on the meaning of Om' were broken, and the weapons, namely the spiritual means (*sādhana)* in the form of the 'four kinds of asceticism' were neglected (*kṣīyamāṇeṣu=upekṣyamāṇeṣu)*, the Yādavas grasped or recognized the '*erakās*" by stealing away, i.e., by deception (*muṣṭibhiḥ=moṣaṇaiḥ= vañcanaiḥ)*, i.e., by becoming invisible from the empirical world (*prapañca*).[40] *Eraka* is composed of *ā+īra+ka,* and thus means the happiness (*ka=sukha*) of *Era.* And *Era (ā+īra)* means one who goes (*īra)*, i.e., knows, from all sides (*ā=sarvataḥ);* in other words, *Era* refers to the omniscient one, the Lord. Hence, *erakāḥ* are those to whom (*yābhyaḥ*) the omniscient Lord (*Era)* is their happiness (*ka*): these are the residents in the *nitya-līlā*. Thus, when it is said that the Yādavas grasped (*jahruḥ=jaghruḥ*). i.e. recognized, these residents (*erakāḥ*), it means that the Yādavas experienced the *aprakaṭa-prakāśa* (RR, VD on 11.30.20).

The ordinary meaning of 11.30.21-22 is : The *erakā* grass held (*dhṛtāḥ*) in the fists (*muṣṭīnā*) of the Yādavas became *(abhavan)* iron bars (*parighāḥ*) hard like adamant (*vajrakalpāḥ*. (With these they struck (*jaghnuḥ*) their enemies. Being prevented by Kṛṣṇa and being deluded (*mohitāḥ*) by him, they considered Kṛṣṇa and Balarāma as opposed to them, and so, deciding to kill (*hantum)* them, they attacked them. However, RR and VD interpret these verses in the context of the Yādavas entering the *nitya-līlā* : Those *erakāḥ*, who were residing [in *nitya-līlā*], who were *vajrakalpāḥ*, i.e., shining *(kalpa=kalpante=prakāśante)* with spiritual diamonds (*vajra*) who were always abiding (*dhṛtāḥ*[41]*=avasthitāḥ*) [in *nitya-līlā*] due to the deception (*muṣṭinā=vañcanena*), namely the hiding of the *prapañca*, and who were *parighāḥ*, i.e. surrounded (*pari=paritaḥ*) by bells (*ghāḥ=ghaṇṭāḥ*, according to Medinī), met (*abhavan = prāpuḥ*) the Yadus.[42] Hating (*dviṣaḥ)* the *prakaṭa-līlā* which was consisting of separation, the Yādavas, being prevented by Kṛṣṇa, i.e. being prevented as it were from experiencing the *nitya-līlā* through

the guise of the *prakaṭa-līlā* and being *mohitāḥ*, i.e., becoming devoid of the close connection with separation through the joy of experiencing the *nitya-līlā*, with loving anger considered Kṛṣṇa as an enemy as it were, due to his causing them to suffer separation, and so they came to know (*jaghnuḥ, jñātavantaḥ* the root *han* signifies 'to know' since it means 'to go'[43]) Kṛṣṇa and Balarāma as united with the *nitya-līlā*. Since they already held in their hands the weapons of dispassion, etc.,[44] the Yādavas became eager (*āpannāḥ=udyuktāḥ*) to kill (*hantum*) the *prakaṭa-prakāśa* that was replete with the sorrow of separation, i.e., they became eager to disappear from the *prakaṭa-līlā* (RR, VD on 11.30.21-22).

11.30.23 reports that after (*atha*) being attacked, Kṛṣṇa and Balarāma, angrily moving about (*carantau*) and exerting (*udyamya*) themselves in the battle, retaliated by hitting back (jaghnatuḥ) at the Yādavas with the *erakā* grass that had become like iron clubs (*parigha*) in their fists (*muṣṭi*). RR and VD, however, look at this verse from a different perspective : Afterwards (*atha*) i.e., after the Yādavas had reached *nitya-līlā*, Kṛṣṇa and Balarāma, intending to remove their own pain of separation, became angry and began to exert (*udyamya*), i.e., in order to cross beyond the empirical (*prapañca*) world they began to make the effort of meditation etc. They began moving about (*carantau*) in the battle (*yudhi*), i.e., they began moving about in order to wage war *as* it were, and becoming destroyers (*parighau=ghātakau*) of deception (*muṣṭi=vañcanā*)[45], they came to know (*jaghnatuḥ= jñātavantau*)[46] the *erakās,* namely those who were residing in the *nitya-līlā*. In other words, they made the two *prakāṣṭās* into the *prakāśa,* thus making it an object of inspiration (RR, VD on 11.30.23).

The obvious meaning of verse 11.30.24 is : The anger accompanied by rivalry (*spardhā*) of the Yādavas, who were affected (*upasṛṣṭa*) by the curse of the Brāhmins and whose souls were covered by the *māyā* of Kṛṣṇa, led them to their destruction (*kṣaya*), just as fire generated from bamboo sticks destroys a forest (*vanam*). RR and VD give the verse a more sophisticated meaning : The curse of the Brahmins was broken (*upasṛṣṭa=rugṇa)* or destroyed (*upasṛṣta=upaplavam prāpitaḥ=nāśitaḥ*) by the Yādavas : both these meanings of *upasṛṣta* are given by Medinī. The soul of the Yādavas covered even Kṛṣṇa's *māyā* in the form of his desire showing separation : in

other words, their nature was eternally united with him [in the *nitya-līlā*]. Their anger (*krodha*) accompanied by competition (*spardhā*) led them to *kṣaya*, i.e., to the place which is characterized by the eternal *prakāśa*. Just as a fire born of the friction of bamboo sticks drives away the *avana* ('non-forest')[47], namely human beings—who, being different from the natural produce of the forest, are intruders in the forest[48]—and makes these humans reach their own residence, similarly the anger of the Yādavas drove them—who were foreign to what occurs in the empirical world (*prapañca*)—to their eternal abode [*nitya-līlā*] (RR, VD, on 11.30.24). This interpretation is briefly, but essentially, mentioned by the earlier commentator JG, who writes that the real meaning of *kṣaya* is the eternal abode of the Yādavas. Similarly, he gives the same explanation of the simile of the bamboo fire and the *avana*, as later given by VD and RR (JG (Ks) on 11.30.24).

The death (*nidhanam*) of Kṛṣṇa's relatives (11.30.46) is interpreted to mean not 'death', but *nitarām dhanam,* the acquisition of the great wealth of the *aprakaṭa-līlā* (JG(Ks), RR, VD on 11.30.46). 11.31.12 asserts that Kṛṣṇa, who had restored his teacher Sāndīpani's son and worked other wonders, could surely protect his own person (*svāvane*) [from dying at the hands of the hunter]. Some of the commentators take the *sva* either to refer to Kṛṣṇa's own attendants, namely the Yādavas, or to include them in addition to Kṛṣṇa himself. Since Kṛṣṇa is surely capable of protecting his own (*sva*), namely the Yādavas, interpreting their case otherwise would not be in accordance with the true *līlā* of Kṛṣṇa; rather their going to their abode together with their bodies [i.e., without being killed] is very appropriate (JG (KS), VD on 11.31.12) RR points out that it is very appropriate in the cases of both Kṛṣṇa and of the Yādavas (RR on 11.31.12). VC derives a somewhat different conclusion, which, neverthless emphasizes the same idea, namely that the Yādavas are not really destroyed by Kṛṣṇa. He says that, even though Kṛṣṇa, together with his attendants [the Yādavas], is visible to the empirical world (*prapañca*) he can [at the same time] also shine, i.e., be manifest, [together with them, in the *aprakaṭa-līlā*] (VC on 11.31.12; also cited by VD on 11.31.12).

The reference to the wives of Balarāma and Vāsudeva embracing the [dead] body of their respective husbands in 11.31.20 should not be taken

literally. The wives of Balarāma embraced Balarāma himself, and not his body, for, according to a *Brahmatarka* saying, in the case of the Deity there is no difference between the body (*deha*) and the Embodied (*dehin*)[49] 'Vasudeva' means the *śuddha-sattva* or pure matter; in other words, since Vasudeva is the very essence of the *hlādinī, saṁvit* and *svarūpa śaktis,*[50], he cannot be an individual self (*jīva*), and so there cannot be a distinction between the body and the embodied for him either (RR on 11.31.19; VD on 11.31.20[51]) In other words, Balarāma and Vasudeva did not die, but entered into the *aprakaṭa-līlā*. SD reasons that Balarāma's wives could not have embraced his body, because it is said (in 11.31.18) that Devakī, Rohiṇī and Vasudeva were unable to see Kṛṣṇa and Rāma,[52] and also because both Kṛṣṇa and Balarāma are eternal *vigrahas*. Therefore, in reality, his wives embraced Balarāma's 'body' made up of [the outline of] his clothes or they embraced a mental image of his body (SD on 11.31.20). VD points out that Kṛṣṇa's wives, Rukmini and others, are said to be *tadātmikāḥ* (11.31.20), i.e., their minds are given to him (*tadarpitacittāḥ*) : in other words, they meditated on him since his replica (body) had become invisible (VD on 11.31.20; so also GD on 11.31.20[53]). When it is said that Arjuna made the funeral arrangements (*sāmparāyika*) for the Yādavas (11.31.22), the real meaning is that he arranged for the chanting of the names of God (*nāma-kīrtana*) and other such actions by Vaiṣṇavas, which are appropriate for the *uttara-kāla* (the interval from one full moon to another : *samparāya=uttarakāla,* according to Medinī), which in turn helps in obtaining the eternal abode of *aprakaṭa-līlā* (RR, VD on 11.31.22). Although 11.31.25 appears to refer to those who have survived the killing (*hataśeṣān*) [thereby implying that many of the Yādavas were in fact annihilated], in reality the reference is to the Yādavas, who are known to have survived (*hata=jñāta*[54]) [thus indicating that none of the Yādavas were destroyed] (RR, VD on 11.31.25). In 11.31.26 it is reported that the grandfathers, after hearing of the killing of their friends (*suhṛdvadha*) [the Yādavas], took to the Great Path (*mahāpatha*) [the other world]. But the real meaning is that they heard about their friends [the Yādavas] having reached *vadha* or the place of *nitya-līlā,* for *vadha* is that which gives (*dha=dadhāti*) consolation (*va=sāntvana,* according to Medinī). Then, being eager to reach that same place, they went to the Great Path, namely the place conducive to meditate on the *nitya-līlā* (RR, VD on

11.31.26); i.e. they went to the Himālaya (VD on 11.31.26).

Such then are the numerous examples of ingenious interpretations which demonstrate the way in which some of these commentators proceed in showing that Kṛṣṇa does not really destroy the Yādavas, but only makes them enter into the *aprakaṭalīlā*.

In conclusion, we can see how the commentators go even beyond the BhP in justifying Kṛṣṇa. These commentators are much later than the BhP. They range from SS, who is said to be born around 1325 CE, to GS, whose birth is claimed to be in Saṁvat 1892 [1835 CE][55] Not coming from a folk background, they have a more sophisticated understanding of what it means to be divine. Further, although the commentators do not mention it, they may have been aware of adverse criticism from Christians and Muslims, and possibly even from other Hindu sects. Hence the changed sociocultural conditions and the further development in the understanding regarding Kṛṣṇa's divinity impelled the commentators to go beyond even the *Bhāgavata* in their efforts to remove any blemish that they felt tarnished Kṛṣṇa's divine portrait.

**Annotations :**

1. Originally presented at the 10th World Sanskrit Conference, Bangalore, 1997, this article has been both revised and enlarged, including as it also does much new material.
2. For justifications of Kṛṣṇa in other matters, *see* my :

   (A) Book : *The Divinity of Kṛṣṇa (*New Delhi : Munshiram Manoharlal, 1984). under "Justification of Kṛṣṇa's" in the Index; and (B) Articles : (1) "The impeccable Kṛṣṇa", *Indica* 18 : 1 (March 1981) : 1-6; (2) "Kṛṣṇa as a portion of the Supreme", *Purāṇa* 24:1 (January 1982): 79-90; (3) "The Justification of Kṛṣṇa's Affair with the Hunchbacked Woman", *Purāṇa* 25:2 (July 1983) 225-234; (4) "Kṛṣṇa's stealing of the Herdsmaidens' clothes", *Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute* 66:1-4(1986): 161-174; (5) "Transformation through Denudation", *Indica* 23:1-2 (March-September, 1986): 51-62. (6) "The Justification of Kṛṣṇa's Childhood Pranks" : (a) *proceedings of the VIIth World Sanskrit Conference Leiden, 1987, in Indologica Taurinensia* 15-16 (1989-90) : 325-352; (b) *The Journal of Religious Studies* 18:1 (Spring 1990) :

76-99. (7) "The Good Thief : The Justification of Kṛṣṇa's Acts of Stealing", *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens* : 36, *Supplement* (1992): 149-166; (8) "The Justification of Kṛṣṇa's Disfigurement of Rukmin", *The Journal of Religious Studies* 22:1 (Spring 1993) : 118-125.

3. The following editions have been used : (1) *Mausalaparvan.* ciritically ed. by Shripad Kṛṣṇa Belvalkar, Vol 19, pt 2(1959), of *The Mahābhārata,* critically ed. by Viṣṇu S. Sukthankar and others, 19 vols. : Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona 1933-1959. (ii) *The Mahābhāratam,* with the Commentary of Nīlakaṇtha called *Bhāratabhāvadīpa*. ed. Rāmacandraśāstrī Kiñjavḍekar, 6 vols., vol. 6 : Oriental Books Reprint Corporation, New Delhi 1979. I refer to this edition as the Vulgate ed. (iii) *Harivaṁśaḥ,* critically ed. by Parashuram Lakshman Vaidya, 2 vols : Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona 1969-71. (iii) *Viṣṇupurāṇam* with the commentary of Śrīdhara called *Svaprakāśa* ed. by Jīvānanda Vidyāsāgara : Śarasvati Press, Calcutta 1882 (iv) *Śrīmadbhāgavata-mahāpurāṇam, Ekādaśaḥskandaḥ,* with various commentaries, vol. 11. Samvat 2029 [1973], of *Śrīmadbhāgavata-mahāpurāṇam,* with various commentaries, ed. by Kṛṣṇaśaṅkara Śāstrī, vols 1-9 and 11-12, Ahmedabad : Śrībhāgavata-vidyāpīṭha, Samvat 2033 [1965]-Samvat 2029 [1973]. (v) *Śrībhāgavata-tātparya-nirṇaya* of Ānandatīrtha [Madhva], ed. by Bannañje Govindācārya, *Sarvamūla-granthāḥ* vol. 3. Udipi : Sarva Mula Publication committee. 1980.

4. There are a few passing references to this episode elsewhere in the BhP, e.g., 3.3.14-15, 24; 3.4.1-2, 23, 29.

5. In the Mbh it is stated that, after uttering the curse, the sages went to Kṛṣṇa (16.2.12). The commentator Nīlakaṇtha suggests that they went to him to ask him to permit or pardon (*ksantavya)* it (on 16.2.12=16.1.23 in the Vulgate ed.)

6. Actually not all the Yādavas are destroyed. There are some survivors, e.g., Dāruka (VhP 5.37.48) and Vajra, who is later crowned king (VhP 5.37.57). Similarly, Bhp 11.31.25 mentions not only Vajra, but also women, children and elders. Some commentators assert that, although women survived, no Yādava male—other than Vajra—escaped the destruction (GD on 11.31.25 [=23], BP on 11.31.25 [=24]; GD, VR on 11.31.25). *See* also BhP 3.4.28-31, where reference is made to Uddhava being spared.

7. *See* my book, *Divinity of Kṛṣṇa,* pp. 70-73
8. *See* p. xxxiv.
9. *See* Belvalkar's note on 16.7.11 ed. critical ed. p. 48.
10. Nīlakaṇṭha reads *anayāt,* instead of *anayam* (Critical text, 16.7.11) : Kṛṣṇa is indifferent, he says, because the Yādava boys are guilty. However, in an alternative explanation, he identifies Kṛṣṇa's indifference with the calamity (on 16.7.11=on 16.6.13 in the vulgate text.)
11. This passage, however, is a later interpolation, according to Paranjpe : *Strīparvan, ed.* Vasudev Gopal Paranjpe, Vol. 12. pt 2 (1956), of *The Mahābhārata,* critically ed. by Vishnu S. Sukthankar and others, 19 vols. (Poona : Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona 1933-1959), p. 120, note on 12.26.1.
12. For some other past publications, I have also referred to the commentary of Ratnagarbha, called *Vaiṣṇavākuṭacandrikā*, Bombay Śaka 1824. This time, however, in spite of searching in several libraries, I have not been successful in tracing the book. However, in connection with our topic, I do not expect Ratnagarbha's gloss to differ much from that of Śrīdhara.
13. Śrīdhara clarifies that Kṛṣṇa does so under the guise of the Brahmins' curse (on 5.37.21).
14. Śrīdhara points out that this means they do not heed Kṛṣṇa's words. (on 5.37.43; in my text, his comment is wrongly assigned to v.42).
15. Wrongly printed as his comment on v. 44.
16. In my printed text, BP's gloss is on the same verse, but his comment is numbered as 11.1.25.
17. GD on 11.1.1; GD, JG (Ks), RR, VD on 11.1.10; BP, SD, SS, VB, VR on 11.1.10-11; GS, VJ, Sudarśanasūrin on 11.1.11; VB on 11.1.18; GS on 11.30.1.
18. However, in 11.30.24 Kṛṣṇa himself kills some of the Yādavas, although he does so only when attacked by them (11.30.23).
19. *See* S.K. De, *Early History of the Vaiṣṇava Faith and Movement in Bengal,* 2nd ed. : Firma K. L. Mukhopadhyay, Calcutta 1961, pp. 342-344.
20. For more details, see O.B.L. Kapoor, *The Philosophy and Religion of Śrī Caitanya : The Philosophical Background of the Hare Kṛṣṇa Movement* : Munshiram

Manoharlal, N. Delhi 1977, pp. 115-117.

21. De, *Vaiṣṇava Faith and Movement,* pp. 336-337.

22. In his introduction to XI.30. SS mentions that Kṛṣṇa destroys his own clan. Commenting on this, RR points out that Kṛṣṇa makes his race invisible under the pretence of destruction (RR on 11.30.1).

23. *See* Bhp 1.7.24-25

24. This is the highest abode, also called Goloka : *See* De, *Vaiṣṇava Faith and Movement,* pp. 333-334.

25. On the *Svāṁśa* form, *see ibid.,* pp. 240-241.

26. *See* also SS on 11.1.1., where he explains that the episode is meant to generate dispassion as well as the ephemeral character of the pleasure of sense objects. Of course, not belonging to Bengal Vaiṣṇavism, he does not subscribe to the view that the Yādavas merely become invisible in the *aprakaṭa-līlā,* and are not really destroyed. BP and GD on 11.1.1. also mention dispassion.

27. That is, Kṛṣṇa is not only present always in his palace or temple, but there, namely in Dvārakā.

28. This interpretation is not mentioned by RR.

29. In other words, Dvārakā is the central abode not only of Kṛṣṇa but also of the Yādavas.

30. That is, not only is Kṛṣṇa's palace not wrecked, but so too the Yādavas as well as their dwellings are not destroyed.

31. Since it has become invisible in the *aprakaṭa-līlā.* That is, it is a remembrance not of something that has been demolished, but of something that continues to exist, albeit invisibly.

32. In order to keep a better track of the reinterpretations by the commentators, it is recommended that the reader looks at the original text of each reinterpreted verse of the BhP. Space does not permit me to reproduce each verse in this article.

33. *Prakaṭa-līlā* the Yādavas the experience of time (*kāla*) or temporality, as opposed to the eternality of the *nitya-līlā* or *aprakaṭa-līlā.*

34. According to VD and RR (on 11.30.15), the components of *bhakti,* in this

context, are such forms of *bhakti* is listening (*śravaṇa*) to, and chanting *kīrtana*) the names and deeds of God.

35. Through this metaphor of water the verse suggests the producing of love (*preman*) by these *śāstras*) (VD, RR on 11.30.15).

36. This word is not in the verse. Often words which are not in the text are supplied by the commentators. In particular they frequently supply the words *prakaṭa-* and *aprakaṭa-(*or *nitya-)līlā.*

37. Lit, 'came to know' (*jñātavantaḥ*), which glosses *jaghnuḥ*, supplied from the previous verse.

38. Here, as well as in a few other places (e.g., in VD's commentary on v. 11.30.20), there appear some printing mistakes in the volume I am using.

39. And therefore does not mean 'to know', as explained in the commentary on 11.30.17, above.

40. Their entering into the *aprakaṭa-līlā* by disappearing from the *prakaṭalīlā* is a sort of deception, since ordinary people may not realize that they still continue to be present, albeit invisibly.

41. VD (on 11.30.21) mentions the v. 1. *bhṛtāh* which my edition has chosen as the preferred reading, but adds that the word comes to mean the same thing as *dhṛtāḥ.*

42. This word is to be supplied, according to RR and VD.

43. *See* the commentary of RR and VD on 11.30.17 and 19 above.

44. Mentioned in RR and VD's interpretation of 11.30.20.

45 *See* above, RR, VD on 11.30.20.

46. *See* above, RR, VD on 11.30.17.

47. VD and RR read *avanam* instead of *vanam,* supplying the negative *a* from the previous word, *yathā,* in the text : *vaiṇavo 'gniryathā vanam.*

48. Human beings do not belong to the natural setting of the forest : they generally do not live in forests.

49. *See* De, *Vaiṣṇava Faith and Movement,* pp. 284-285.

50. On these *śaktis, see ibid.* pp. 276-284.

51. RR's reference is to v. 19, and not to v. 20, because RR takes the half verse

(*rāmapatnyaśca.....)* as part of v. 19, while VD takes the same half verse as part of v. 20.

52. That, is, according to SD, they did not see the bodies of Kṛṣṇa and Balarāma.

53. However, unlike VD, he holds that the wives of Balarāma embraced his (dead) body.

54. *See* above, RR, VD on 11.30.17, where the root *han* is claimed to mean 'to know'.

55. *See* Vāsudeva Kṛṣṇa Caturvedi, *Śrīmadbhāgavat ke ṭikākār* (Mathurā : Rajyashri Prakashan, 1977), pp. 66 and 159.

# A note on Śabara's India

**Shripad Bhat**

In the development of Indian philosophy, through the ages, the Pūrvamīmāṁsā system plays an important role. The object of the Mīmāṁsā seems to have been 'Vedārthavicāra' or the investigation into the interpretation of the Vedas. In order to understand the Vedas, Jaimini sūtras serve as an important tool of interpretation. The sūtras of Jaimini were interpreted by some Bhāṣyakāras, such as Bodhāyana, Bhavadāsa Upavarṣa, and so on. Among them Śabara became very popular, whose work is known as Śabarabhāṣya, which, in fact, formed the basis and starting point for all later Mīmāṁsā works.

In this work of Śabara, along with Dharmamīmāṁsā, we find a number of geographical, social and cultural references which were subjected to a critical analysis as being reliable sources of Dharma. Besides Vedic texts, Smṛti and Sadācāra also got importance as the sources of Dharma. Śabara asserts the significance of the influence of Smṛti texts, popular customs, rights of women etc. which are closely related and have become familiar in the life of ordinary people. He shows that there was a unity of language and culture from the Himālayas to Capecomorin.

An effort has been made in the present work to being into limelight the geographical, social, and cultural facts as reflected in the Śabarabhāṣya.

**Date of Śabara**—To fix the date of Śabara, a number of attempts have already been made. A. B. Keith concludes that 400. A. D. is the earliest date of Śabara[1]. According to P. V. Kane, the date of Śabara is not earlier than 100 A. D. and not later than 500 A. D[2]. G. N. Jha assigns him as a senior contemporary of the great 'Vikramāditya' the founder of the 'saṁvat' era and therefore believed as having lived in 57 B. C[3]. He quotes a verse which

speaks of Śabara as the father of Vikramāditya[4]. Besides, Śabara refers to the Aśmaka country more than once. Siddheshwar Shastri Citrav opines that whole Aśmaka country might become under the Sātavāhana dynasty[5]. Sātavāhana flourished in I cent. B. C[6]. Therefore, taking into consideration of the period of Sātavāhana and the Aśmaka country one may conclude that the period of Śabara belongs to I cent. B. C.

**Geographical aspects**—Śabara knows a wide geographical horizon. The extant of country known to him is indicated by several landmarks mentioned in the Bhāṣya. For example—

1) On J. S. 7. 1. 7 Śabara refers to the colour of cloth. Such as, 'colour is spoken of in connection with a cloth; yet it does not subserve the purpose of cloth but of the man or woman[7]. This kind of fashion, according to Maṇḍana Miśra refers to the people of north-east or Kashmir[8].

2) On J. S. 7. 1. 8 the author of the Bhāṣya clearly refers to Punjab, when he says, "When it is said that a Punjabi [Vāhīka] has come as guest so prepare for him a barley-meal, this same barley-meal is prepared for any and every Punjabi[9].

3) On J. S. 2. 3. 2 Śabara gives an example that 'One should eat ṣāṣṭika grain with milk; if he eats Śāli, he should mix curd with it[10]. Maṇḍana Miśra says that this type of tradition is in practice in Mithilā[11]. A. S. Agarwal says that it was best suited to grow in Punjab, since it does there with little water. It is a core rice, the grains of which agglutinate when boiled[12].

4) On J. S. I. 3. 9 while discussing the Vedic sentence, 'Therefore cows run after Varāha', Śabara says that 'Varāha' the word denotes Hog, as it is Hog that cows run after[13]. This type of tradition is seen at a festival held along with the Dīpāvalī. Maṇḍana Miśra says that this shows the close relation of Śabara with Mithilā[14].

5) On J. S. 1. 3. 20 the author of the Bhāṣya speaks of the Māthura resident of or born at or migrated from Mathurā[15].

6) On J. S. 2. 3. 3 the author says 'such usage would not be contrary to the usages of the Āndhras[16]. On this Kumārila comments that Bhāṣya refers to the usage of the Draviḍs who have been spoken of as Āndhra[17].

7) On J. S. 1. 1. 13 Śabara refers to Pāṭaliputra (Patna) and Srughna (Hastināvati) more than once.

8) Śabara more than one place refers to the whole of India from the Himālaya to Kanyākumari, For example—

i) On J. S. 10. 2. 51 Śabara says that from the Himālaya down the Kumāri (Capecomorin) the term 'parvan' is known as denoting a point of time as also a group[18].

ii) At another place while discussing the meaning of 'caru' Pūrvapakṣin refers to the use of the word as a pot. The term 'caru' is generally known from the Himālayas to Capecomorin as standing for a pot. As a matter of fact, all over the country the 'caru' is found to be used in the sense of a pot. The most reasonable course is to accept what is well recognised[19]. Siddhāntin's answer is that it is more reasonable to take the word as cooked rice. Further he adds that the term 'caru' is recognised as denoting cooked rice from the Himālayas down to Capecomorin[20].

9) On J. S. 1. 3. 18 Śabara speaks of the southerners as dark skinned, large-bodied and red-eyed[21].

**Social and cultural facts**—Śabara is well acquainted with a number of social and cultural aspects which are subjected to a critical analysis of the sources of Dharma and their reliability.

**i) Education**—P. V. Kane opines that the Mīmāṁsāsūtra does not state how much of the Veda has to be studied before one enters on understanding the meaning of it[22]. However J. S. 3. 8. 18 says that one who knows the Veda has adhikāra for performing the sacrifices[23]. In this connection Śabara raises a question how much of the Veda must a man know in order to be entitled to perform a Vedic sacrifice and replies that he must memorize as much as would enable him to carry to its completion the Vedic sacrifice undertaken by him[24]. However, it should be noted that, one should study the Veda but he must also understand its meaning. The first sūtra of Jaimini mentions that 'Now, therefore, comes to the enquiries into Dharma'. The word 'atha' in the sūtra denotes reading the Vedas according to the prescribed text, according to the rules and injunctions prescribed for its study. Such

knowledge is a general requisite as the Mīmāṁsa involves various kinds of discussion about the Vedic texts. After the study of the Vedas, a student may either return from the teacher's house and enter married life or may continue to remain in the teacher's house carrying on investigation into the meaning of the Vedic texts.

**ii) Respect to the teachers**—Śabara gives great respect to the teachers. He emphasizes that the teacher should be followed and saluted[25]. Further he asserts that, if one follows his teacher, the teacher becomes pleased and teaches him with care and also being satisfied with the pupil, explains to him the reasonings that go to solve the various difficulties[26].

**iii) Hospitality**—Śabara shows great respect to hospitality. He emphasizes that what is done for the guest must be regarded as prompted by the guest, because in the honouring of the guests, what is enjoined is that the guests should be pleased. The injuction being that the guest is to be treated in such a manner as to please him. Gifts should be offered to him or he should be fed. Whatever else he wants should be done. He should not be forced to do what he does not wish to do[27].

**iv) Medicine**—It is interesting to point out that Śabara suggests medicine for certain diseases. For example, in every case of eye-disease, mudga rice is eaten; and in every case of stomach disease, milk is drunk[28].

**v) Killing of foetus**—Śabara says that killing of foetus before its concept is known leads to sin, since it has been referred to as the sin of foetus murder. A foetus murder is the worst of sinners because it makes benefit in both worlds. Foetus means sacrifice. One who destroys sacrifice, he is called a murderer of foetus[29].

**vi) Use of oil in meals**—At many places Śabara refers to the use of oil in meals. He says that oil has capacity to lubricate the food. For example - i) On J. S. 10. 3. 16 the author says giving with an example that Yajñadatta should be fed with oil. Oil is mentioned as of use in feeding and it is to be used only in the place of clarified butter, the purpose of which alone can be served by oil, the capacity to lubricate the food being common to oil and clarified butter[30].

2) On J. S. 7. 1. 5 he says regarding the results of using oil, such as it would be like drinking of oils just as when oil or clarified butter is drunk, though this drinking is ephemeral yet it brings about at another time. Such results as improvement of intelligence, memory strength and so forth[31].

**vii) Authority of popular customs**—There are certain duties which are not laid down in the Vedas but are established by the customs, such as, "Teacher should be followed; Tank should be dug; Drinking booths should be set up[32]. Śabara asserts that drinking booths and tanks are philanthropic works, conducive to the benefit of people and not conducive to the Dharma[33]. He shows the Vedic authority which indicates the digging of the water reservoirs[34]. Further, he adds that the teacher should be followed and saluted; elders should be welcomed by rising from the seat and should be respected. He emphasizes that these customs should be repeated whenever the occasion presents itself[35].

There are some texts which say that the Holāka and the like should be practised by the Easterners only. The Āhninaibuka and the like should be practised by the southerners only. The Udvṛṣabhayajña and the like should be practised by Northerners only. Here, Pūrvapakṣa tries to restrict them to the particular places, i. e. East, South, and North where the said customs are found. The answer for this question made by Siddhāntin is that the customs like those mentioned should be a duty for all, because all injunction has that character and injunctive word that cannot denote either the class (universal) or the individual (particular). Hence there is no authority for restricting its application to any other particular person. It could be found that a person who has gone out of the southern country and is residing either in the East or in the North still continue to perform Āhnīnaibuka. In fact when a person migrates to another country, he does not follow its customs. Hence it can be concluded that there can be no restriction in the authority of popular customs[36].

**viii) Marriage is not a deed of sale and purchase.**

On J. S. 6. 1. 10 Pūrvapakṣin says that women can possess no property on account of sale and purchase, because women are bought and sold. They are sold by their father and bought by their husband. And since they are sold

by their father, they have no rights over the father's property and since they have been bought by their husband, they have no right over the husband's property[37].

However, Śabara states in Siddhāntapakṣa that, as for the sale that is spoken of in regard to the wife, it is a purely religious function and not really a sale. A thing is said to be sold when its price is a fluctuating factor—sometimes more or sometimes less. In the case of marriage, however, the so called price is a fixed item, whether beautiful or ugly. Consequently, the case of wife is not one of sale or purchase[38].

**ix) Rights of women**—While discussing the rights of women to perform a sacrifice, pūrvapakṣin says that a woman cannot perform a sacrifice as she has not the property of her own and what she earns that belongs to her husband. He relies on the text of Manu, 'The wife, the slave, and the son are all devoid of property; whatever they can earn is the property of him to whom they themselves belong. However, the Siddhāntin points out that the famous Vedic text 'svargakāmo yajeta' applies equally to all men and all women because both have a desire for 'svarga'. This is established by Śabara as the correct one and this allows woman the right to perform a sacrifice.

As a matter of fact, the woman is actually connected with property. Śabara emphasizes that in matters relating duty [religious acts], property and pleasure, the wife should not be ignored. Further he adds that religious acts should be performed jointly. Performance should be defective whether the man or woman did not participate in it and the performer cannot associate with any woman he likes, because the texts say that the performer should associate with only that woman who is his wife[39].

**Earth is a property of all men**—Regarding the land on J. S. 6. 7. 3, Śabara states that the land should not be given away, because people are found to be owners of lands, not of the entire globe. In fact the 'Lordship of the earth' given to him by reason that he is being engaged in the protecting of corns and other produces. He receives a share out of it, which he alone possesses not the earth and there is nothing peculiar in regard to his ownership over such supporting and preserving etc. of living beings as are done by persons inhabiting the earth[40]

Within the limited scope of this paper only a few references have been shown regarding the geographical, social and cultural aspects found in the Bhāṣya. It may be a good contribution, if one studies the Bhāṣya with the help of contemporary literature and evaluate the Bhāṣya on these above said aspects.

**Annotations :**

1. D. V., Garge *Citations in Śābarabhāṣya,* p. 23.
2. *Ibid.*
3. Ganganath Jha, *Pūrvamīmāṁsā in its sources,* p. 14.
4. ब्राह्मण्यामभवद्वराहमिहिरो ज्योतिर्विदामग्रणीः
   राजा भर्तृहरिश्च विक्रमनृपः क्षत्रात्मजायामभूत् ।
   वैश्यायां हरिचंद्रवेद्यतिलको जातश्च शङ्कुः कृतीः
   शूद्रायाममरः षडेव शबरस्वामीद्विजस्यात्मजाः ॥
   Jha, *Pūrvamīmāṁsā.*, p. 14.
5. Chitrav Siddheshvar Shastri, *Prācīna Bhāratīya Caritrakośa,* Vol. I, p. 164.
6. Shobhana Gokhale, *Purabhilekhavidyā,* p. 112.
7. वाससि रागः, श्रूयते, वासो रञ्जयतीति, वाससि च क्रियते न चासौ तदर्थः, स्व्यर्थः पुरुषार्थो वा भवति ।
8. Mandanamiśra Shastri, *Mīmāṁsādarśana,* Ramesh Book Depot, Jaipur 1955, p. 137.
9. यथा वाहीकोऽतिथिरागतः यवान्नमस्मै प्रक्रियतामित्युक्ते यो यो वाहीकस्तस्य तस्य यवान्नं क्रियते ।
10. पयसा षाष्टिकं भुञ्जीत, यदि शालिं भुञ्जीत तत्र दधि उपसिञ्चेत ।
11. Shastri Mandanamisra, *Mīmāṁsādarśana,* p. 167.
12. V. S. Agarwal, *India as known to Pāṇini,* p. 206.
13. तस्माद् वराहं गावोऽनुधावन्ति [श॰ ब्रा॰ ४. ४. ३. १९] इति शूकरे वराहं दर्शयन्ति ।.....सूकरं हि गावोऽनुधावन्ति ।
14. Shastri Mandanamishra, p. 137.
15. यतो दृश्यते - मथुराभिप्रस्थितो माथुर इति । मथुरायां वसन्, मथुराया निर्गतश्च ।
16. जनपदपरिपालनमकुर्वत्यपि राजेत्यान्ध्रा वदन्तीत्युक्तम् ।
17. *Tantravārttika* of Kumārila, *Ed.* Anandashrama, Vol. II, p. 160.
18. उभयत्र हि पर्वशब्दो लोकप्रसिद्धः काले समुदाये च आ हिमवतः आ च कुमारीभ्यः ।

19. प्रसिद्धश्च स्थाल्यां चरु शब्दः । आ च हिमवतः आ च कुमारीभ्यः । प्रसिद्धस्य ग्रहणं न्याय्यम् । S. B. on 10. 1. 35.
20. ओदने च चरु शब्दः आ च हिमवतः आ च कुमारीभ्यः । S. B. on १०. १. ४२.
21. येऽपि श्यामा बृहन्तो लोहिताक्षाः.....ये दाक्षिणात्या इति समाख्याताः ।
22. P. V., Kane *History of Dharmaśāstra,* Vol. V, part II, p. 1280.
23. ज्ञाते च वचनं न ह्यविद्वान् विहितोऽस्ति ।
24. न ह्यविद्वान् विहितोऽस्ति । योह्यविद्वान्नसावधिकृतः सामर्थ्याभावात् ।.....कियता पुनर्विदितेन विद्वानधिक्रियत इति । यावता विदितेन शक्तो भवति यथोक्तं क्रतुमभिनिवर्तयितुं तावद्यो वेद स तेन क्रतुना अधिक्रियते ।
25. गुरुरनुगन्तव्यः १. ३. ७; गुरुरनुगन्तव्योऽभिवादयितव्यश्च 9. 2. 30.
26. गुरुरनुगमात्प्रीतो गुरुरध्यापयिष्यति, ग्रन्थग्रन्थिभेदिनश्च न्यायान् परितुष्टो वक्ष्यतीति.....
27. आतिथ्यमतिथिप्रयुक्तं स्यात् । आतिथ्ये ही तत्प्रीतिर्विधीयते । अतिथिः परिचरितव्यः । यथा प्रीयते तथा कर्तव्यमिति । दानं भोजनं वा कार्यमिति । यद्यतिथये रोचते तत्कर्तव्यं, यत्तस्मै न रोचते न तद्बलात्कारयितव्यमिति । ९. ९. ९०.
28. यथा वा अक्ष्यामये मुद्गौदनो भोक्तव्यः, उदरामये पयः पातव्यमिति । सर्वत्र च मुद्गौदनो भुज्यते, उदरामयेऽपि पयः पीयते । ७. १. ८.
29. अविज्ञाते गर्भे हते भ्रूणहत्यानुवादो भवति । तस्मादविज्ञातेन गर्भेण हतेन भ्रूणहा भवतीति । भ्रूणहा पापकृत्तमः । यश्चोभयोर्लोकयोरुपकरोति तस्य हन्ता भ्रूणहा । यज्ञहन्ता भ्रूणहा ।....तस्माद्यज्ञं भ्रूणशब्देनाभिदधाति । ६. १. ७.
30. देवदत्तवत् यज्ञदत्तस्तैलेनेति भोजने तैलमुपकारकं श्रूयमाणं यस्य प्राकृतस्य कार्यमभिनिर्वर्तयितुं शक्नोति, तस्य कार्ये विनियुज्यते घृतस्य । सामान्यं ह्यस्य स्नेहनकार्यं घृतेनेति ।
31. यथा तैलपानं घृतपानं वा भङ्क्त्वेऽपि सति कालान्तरे मेधास्मृति बलपुष्ट्यादीनि फलानि करोति ।
32. गुरुरनुगन्तव्यः, तडागं खनितव्यम्, प्रपा प्रवर्तयितव्या.....१. ३. १.
33. प्रपास्तडागानि च परोपकाराय, न धर्माय इत्यवगम्यते । १. ३. २.
34. *Ibid.,*
35. गुरुरनुगन्तव्योऽभिवादयितव्यश्च, वृद्धवयाः प्रत्युत्थेयाः समन्तव्याश्चेति । ६. २. ३०.
36. *Vide. Holākādhikāraṇa* 1. 3. 15.
37. क्रयविक्रयसंयुक्ता हि स्त्रियः । पित्रा विक्रीयन्ते । भर्त्रा क्रीयन्ते । विक्रीतत्वाच्च पितृधनानामनीशिनः । क्रीतत्वाच्च भर्तृधनानाम् ६. १. १०.
38. यत्तु क्रयः श्रूयते धर्ममात्रं तु तत् । नासौ क्रयो इति । क्रयो हि उच्चनीचपण्यपणो भवति । नियतं त्विदं दानम् । शतमतिरथं शोभनामशोभनां च कन्यां प्रति.....तस्मादविक्रयोऽयमिति ।

39. *Vide* 6. 1. 6-16.

40. न भूमिर्देया इति। क्षेत्राणामीशितारो दृश्यन्ते, न कृत्स्नस्य पृथिवीगोलकस्य।.....यदसौ पृथिव्यां सम्भूतानां व्रीह्यादीनां रक्षणेन निर्विष्टस्य कस्यचिद् भागस्येष्टे न भूमेः, तन्निविष्टाश्च ये मनुष्यास्तैरन्यत् सर्वप्राणिनां धारणचङ्क्रमणादि यद्भूमिकृतं तत्रेशित्वं प्रति न कश्चिद् विशेषः।

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# विचित्रा हि सूत्रस्य कृतिः पाणिनेः

**वा. बा. भागवत**

भगवता पाणिनिना संस्कृतभाषायाः सूत्ररूपं व्याकरणं प्रायः सार्धद्विसहस्र-संवत्सरेभ्यः पूर्वं व्यरचि । तदेवाष्टाध्यायीति नाम्ना प्रथितम् । तस्य च सूत्ररूपत्वात् सर्वतन्त्रस्वतन्त्र तन्त्र निबद्धत्वाच्च सूत्रार्थं ज्ञातुं व्याख्यानं नितरामपरिहार्यं वर्तते । तत्र व्याख्यानं नाम तावत् किंस्वरूपमिति जिज्ञासायां

पदच्छेदः पदार्थोक्तिः विग्रहो वाक्ययोजना ।
आक्षेपोऽथ समाधानं व्याख्यानं षड्विधं मतम् ॥ इति परिभाषितं वर्तते ।

यद्यप्यत्र व्याख्यानलक्षणे षड्विधत्वं संगृहीतं, तथापि पाणिनिसूत्रदृष्ट्या तदुपलक्षणभावेनैव ग्राह्यम् । उदाहरणप्रत्युदाहरणादीनामप्यवश्यसंग्राह्यत्वात् । यत उदाहरणं नाम सूत्रस्य फलरूपं साध्यम्, प्रत्युदाहरणं नाम सूत्रस्थपदानां समर्थकम् ।

एतादृशं सर्वाङ्गपूर्णं व्याख्यानं भगवता पाणिनिना स्वयमेव स्वशिष्येभ्यः पाठितं स्यादित्यनुमातुं शक्यते । यद्यप्येतादृशं स्वोपज्ञं व्याख्यानमद्यत्वे न क्वाप्युपलभ्यते, तथापि विनैतादृशं व्याख्यानं बहूनि सूत्राणि मूकानि अर्थात् निरर्थकान्येव स्युः, अत एतादृशं स्वोपज्ञं व्याख्यानं केवलं मुखपरंपरया सामाजिकस्मृतिसंतानेन बहूनि संवत्सरशतकानि वेदवत् प्रवाहरूपेणाभ्यासकैरधीतं ज्ञातं च स्यादित्यत्र न संशीतिलेशोऽपि । 'आकडारादेकासंज्ञा' १. ४. १ इतिसूत्रविवरणे महाभाष्यकारः वदति यत् केचन शिष्याः भगवता एवमध्यापिता इति ।

यद्यपि महाभाष्यमपि पाणिनिसूत्रव्याख्यानमेव, तथापि न तत् सर्वाङ्गपरिपूर्णम्, नापि अष्टाध्याय्याः समेषां सूत्राणां व्याख्यानम् । यतः अष्टाध्याय्यां वर्तमानानां सूत्राणामर्धाधिकानि सूत्राणि महाभाष्ये नैव व्याख्यातानि ।

सांप्रतमुपलब्धेषु नैकेषु अष्टाध्यायीव्याख्यानेषु ऐशवीये सप्तमसंवत्सरशतके वामनजयादित्याभ्यां द्वाभ्यां विद्वद्भ्यां लिखिता काशिकावृत्तिरेव प्राचीनतमा सर्वाङ्गपरिपूर्णा सर्वेषु सूत्रेषु उपलभ्यते । अष्टाध्यायी-सूत्रकालमारभ्य काशिकावृत्तिकालं यावत् प्रायः सहस्रं संवत्सराणामतीतम् । तेषु नैकानि व्याख्यानानि बहुभिर्विद्वद्भिर्लिखितानि स्युरेवपरमधुना

नैकमप्युपलभ्यते इत्यहो महद्दौर्भाग्यं पाणिनिपरंपरायाः ।

कदाचित्स्यादेतद्प्रस्तुम्, अधुना प्रस्तुतमनुसरामः ।

उच्चैस्तरां वा वषट्कारः' १. २. ३५ इतिसूत्रव्याख्यानावसरे काशिकायां वषट् शब्देनात्र वौषट् शब्दो लक्ष्यते, वौषट् शब्दस्यैवेदं स्वरविधानम्, तर्हि वौषट् ग्रहणमेव कुतो न कृतम् ? वैचित्र्यार्थम्, 'विचित्रा हि सूत्रस्य कृतिः पाणिनेः' इति लिखति वृत्तिकारः ।

स्वं रूपं शब्दस्याशब्दसंज्ञा १. १. ६८ इति व्यवस्था सूत्रकारेण पाणिनिना स्वयमेव प्रतिज्ञाता । तामनुसृत्य सूत्रे निर्दिष्टाः शब्दाः तानेव शब्दान् उद्दिश्य प्रयुज्यन्ते, न तत्समानार्थान् पर्यायान्, विशेषान् वा । अस्यां स्वतन्त्रव्यवस्थायां सूत्रेऽत्र निर्दिष्टः 'वषट्' शब्दः समानार्थं वौषट् शब्दं लक्षणया बोधयति, तस्य लक्षितस्य वौषट्शब्दस्यैव स्वरविशेषणमुच्चैस्तरत्वं सूत्रमिदं विदधाति । इति स्वयमभ्युपगतस्य तन्यस्य परित्यागः कुतः ? इत्यनुयोगे काशिकाकारः समाधत्ते 'वैचित्र्यार्थम्, विचित्रा हि सूत्रस्य कृतिः पाणिनेः' इति ।

'मन्त्रे वृषेषपचमनभूवीरा उदात्तः' ३.३.९६ इतीदं सूत्रं वेदे वृष्इष् इत्यादिभ्यो धातुभ्यः क्तिन् प्रत्ययं तस्योदात्तस्वरं च विदधाति । प्रत्ययविधायकेषु सूत्रेषु सर्वत्र 'परः' इत्यधिकारो वर्तते । तदनुसृत्य सर्वत्र प्रकृतिवाचकस्य पञ्चमीविभक्तिः प्रयुज्यते । यथा 'धातोः' 'प्रातिपदिकात्' 'गुप्तिज्किद्भ्यः' इत्यादि, परमत्र सूत्रे प्रकृतेः प्रथमा विभक्तिः प्रयुक्ता तदयं स्वयमभ्युपेताया बहुत्रानुसृताया व्यवस्थायाः परित्यागः कुतः ? काशिकाकारः समाधत्ते । 'वैचित्र्यार्थम्' इति ।

एवमेवान्यत्रापि बहुषु सूत्रेषु सूत्रकृता कृतं स्वतन्त्रपरित्यागमनुयुज्य इदमेव वैचित्र्यमुत्तरमावर्तयति । 'उदीचाभिञ्' ४. १. १५३, 'प्राचामवृद्धात् फिन् बहुलम्' ४. १. १६०, 'उत्तमैकाभ्यां च' ५. ४. ९० 'ईडजनोर्ध्वे च' ७. २. ७८ एतेषु सूत्रेषु काशिकावृत्तिर्द्रष्टव्या ।

नैकवारमेवमेव समाधातुः काशिकाकारस्य कोऽभिप्रायः संभाव्यते विचित्र-शब्दस्यार्थाः वक्तुरभिप्रायं संदर्भं चानुसृत्य भिद्यन्ते 'विचित्रं हि परमेशानस्य सामर्थ्यम् । अत्र कर्तुमकर्तुमन्यथाकर्तुमलंभावः इत्यर्थः प्रतीयते स च परमेशितुरन्येभ्यः विशेषगुणवत्तां स्तौति । परं 'हतविधिलसितानां हि विचित्रो विपाकः' शिशुपालवधे ११. ६४ इत्यादौ अन्यवैलक्षण्येपि न स्तुतिः पर्यवस्यति, किंतु उच्छृङ्खलत्वमतएव दोषवत्त्वं प्रतीयते ।

पाणिनिमुनौ द्रढिष्ठं श्रद्धानाः प्राचीना अभ्यासका स्तावत् एवमभिप्रयन्ति यत्-इदं काशिकारकृतं नैकवारमावृत्तं समाधानं भगवतः पाणिनेः विशेषगुणवत्तामेव स्तौति । परमेशानस्य विश्वरचनायां यथा कर्तुमकर्तुमन्यथाकर्तुं विलक्षणं सामर्थ्यमव्याहतम्, एवमेव

व्याकरणसूत्ररचनायां सूत्रकर्तुः भगवतः पाणिनेः । अतः ते प्राचीनाः टीकाकाराः क्वचन कंचन पर्यनुयोगमुद्भावयन्ति, परं सर्वतन्त्रस्वतन्त्रस्य मुनेरीदृशपर्यनुयोगानर्हत्वादिति समाधाय पर्यनुयोगमूले एव कुठाराघातमाघ्नन्ति । महाभाष्यकारादिभिस्तत्रतत्रैवमेव बहव उद्भाविताः पर्यनुयोगाः सूत्रदोषा वा एवमेवापातरमणीया इत्येव श्रद्दधते श्रद्धावन्तः पाणिनीयाः ।

अधुना अपरा विमर्शसरणिः प्रस्तूयते-महाभाष्यं तथैव काशिकाया अनन्तरं यानि नैकान्यष्टाध्याय्या व्याख्यानानि ऐशवीयसप्तदशशतसंवत्सरं यावत् बहुभिर्विद्वद्भि र्लिखितानि, तेषु काशिकाव्याख्यानं तदितरेभ्यः सर्वेभ्यः वैलक्षण्यं बिभर्ति । महाभाष्यादीनि व्याख्यानानि पाणिनिमुनौ पाणिनीयपरंपरायां विशिष्य वैदिकपरंपरायां नितरां श्रद्दधते । ते सर्वेपि व्याख्याकाराः 'भगवान् पाणिनिः' इत्येव संवदन्ति । ग्रन्थादौ महाभाष्यकारेणेदंप्रथमतया बहुत्र नितरां प्रस्तुतां मङ्गलाचरणपरंपरां श्रुतिवचनमिव स्वतः प्रमाणमिति नियतमनुसरन्ति । काशिकाकारः स्वव्याख्योपक्रमे नेष्टां देवतां वन्दते, नापि सूत्रकारं स्मरति । किंतु सर्वथा तटस्थतामवलम्ब्योदास्ते । साक्षाट्टीकावस्त्वेवोपन्यस्यति 'वृत्तौ भाष्ये तथा धातुनाम-पारायणादिषु' इत्यादि ।

यद्यपि काशिकाकारः पाणिनिमुनौ विद्याकारणान्महान्तमादरभावं बिभर्ति यथा 'आकुमारंयशः पाणिनेः' (१. ४. ८९, २. १. १३), तथाप्यन्यआदरभावः, अन्यः च श्रद्धातिशयः । श्रद्धातिशये केवलं गुणपक्षपातिनी भक्तिर्दृश्यते सा श्रद्धेयस्य देवताया, ऋषेः, मुनेर्ग्रन्थस्य वा केवलं गुणानेव पश्यति, गुणानेव गायति, प्रशंसति वा न दोषं दोषसमुदायमपि । आदरभावे आदरार्हस्य गुणानिव दोषानप्यादर्तावश्यं जानीयात्, लब्धेऽवसरे च दोषानपि स्पष्टं ब्रूयात् सूचयेद्वा । यत आदरभावे मध्यस्थता, उदासीनता तटस्थवृत्तिर्वा नियतं जागर्ति, या श्रद्धातिशये आवृता भवति, निद्राति, अन्धतामुपयाति वा । अतः मध्यस्थः काशिकाकारः आदरभावं दधानोऽपि नैकवारमावृत्तेन वैचित्र्यार्थम् इति समाधानेनेदमेव सूचयति सूत्रकारस्येयं विचित्राकृतिः स्वयमभ्युपगतस्य तन्त्रस्य नैकवारं परित्यागादभ्यासकानां संभ्रमकारिण्येवात एव न शोभना, नापि कथमपि सोढुं शक्या क्षमार्हा वा ।

यतः

मनागतभ्यावृत्या वा कामं क्षाम्यतु यः क्षमी ।
क्रियासमभिहारेण निस्तन्त्रत्वं क्षमेत कः ॥

अतः एतानि तन्त्रोल्लंघनानि-कामं तानि सर्वतन्त्रस्वतन्त्रस्य मुनेर्वर्तन्ताम्-दोषा एव ।

# An Earlier Reference to 'Śālāturīya (Pāṇini)'

**M. A. Dhaky**

For some years past, George Cardona has emerged as one of the few front-ranking authorities on Pāṇini and Pāṇinian literature. A few years ago, in his famous work—*Pāṇini : His Work and its Traditions,* Vol. 1, "Background and Introduction"[1]—,he had succinctly dwelt upon the historical facts relating to that greatest of all Sanskrit grammarians. Observed Cardona : "1. The available evidence does not allow one to determine Pāṇini's dates with absolute precision. Nevertheless, the evidence also precludes placing Pāṇini at a time later than the early fourth century B. C. : 500 B. C. is reasonable date to accept. According to a tradition which there is no cogent reason to doubt, Pāṇini was native to Śalātura, in the northwest of the subcontinent. Thus, in his Gaṇaratnamahodadhi (GRM 1.2 : शालातुरीयशकटाङ्गजचन्द्र-गोमिदिग्वस्त्रभर्तृहरिवामन-भोजमुख्या: । मेधाविन: प्रवरदीपककर्तृयुक्ता: प्राज्ञैर्निषेवितपदद्वितया जयन्ति ॥) Vardhamāna uses *śālāturīya* in speaking of Pāṇini, and in his commentary on the passage in question he explains (शलातुरो नाम ग्राम: सोऽभिजनोऽस्यास्तीति शालातुरीयस्तत्रभवान् पाणिनि:) that this term refers to the respected Pāṇini (*tatrabhavān pāṇiniḥ*), whose ancestral place was the village Śalātura. See A 4. 3. 90, 94 (344, 345)."[2] Now, the date of the Jaina Śvetāmbara author whom Cardona quoted, namely Vardhamāna Sūri (of an unknown *gaccha*), is S. 1197 / A. D. 1141[3]. There are, however, a couple of other references (and in one case at least definitely an earlier one) to the 'Śālāturīya' cognomen of Pāṇini. The first is the lexicon *Trikāṇḍaśeṣa*—a later supplementum to the *Amarakośa* (*c.* 6th cent. A. D.)—referred to by Viśvanātha Śāstrī in his preface to the *Laghusiddhāntakaumudi* (reprints, Delhi 1983, 1988)[4]. And some years ago, as I was going through Cardona's learned Introduction, I recalled a reference to 'Śālāturīya' by another, but earlier, Śvetāmbara Jaina writer, namely Siddhasena gaṇī, that figures in his commentary on the *Sabhāṣya-Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra* of Umāsvāti (*c.* A. D. 350)[5]. In his commentary on

the *bhāṣya* of the *Sūtra* 5-24, Siddhasena records the opinion of the followers of 'Śālāturīya' that *dhvani* (suggestive notion) and *sphoṭa* (connotative implication) are different from each other : *tadvān dhvanir-eva ca śabdaḥ-śrotragrahaṇaḥ, na sphoṭaḥ Śālāturīya matānusāri-vaiyākaraṇa-nikāya parikalpitaḥ*.....[6] Since Siddhasena gaṇī lived between *c.* A. D. 690-770[7], and the mean date for his commentary arguably seems *c.* A.D. 760-65, we now have an unambiguous reference to 'Śālāturīya' which is at least 375 years anterior to the one encountered in the *Gaṇaratnamahodadhi.* Predictably, Siddhasena gaṇī must have had before him an earlier written or oral tradition which so reported : hence this fact lends a very firm support to, and positively stipulates Cardona's palpably well-considered assertion.

**Annotations :**

1. Delhi 1988.
2. *Pāṇini.,* "1. Pāṇini's works, I. O. Introduction, Remarks," p. [2].
3. *See* Mohanlal Dalichand Deshai, *Jaina Sāhitya-no Saṁskipta Itihāsa,* (Gujarātī), Mumbai 1933, p. 254.
4. *Laghusiddhāntakaumudī* (of Varadarāja), "Bhūmikā", p. 3. The editor, in his preface, however, does not quote the original verse/passage from the *Trikāṇḍaśeṣa*, but quotes there from Vardhamāna Sūri cited also by Cardona. (Also *see* the 'Introduction' to the selfsame work, edited in this case by Pt. Nārāyaṇadatta Tripāṭhī, 23rd edition, Gorakhapur S. 1993 / A.D. 1937, p. 2, for the identification of Śalātur.)
5. Umāsvāti was a pre-Śvetāmbara pontiff who belonged, according to his own colophon, to the Ucchairnāgara-śākhā of the main northern Nirgrantha stream. He was neither Yāpanīya nor Digambara as I elsewhere have discussed. Siddhasena gaṇī, the commentator, plausibly lived in the ancient Pāṭalā and Moḍherā tract, located within northeastern Gujarat.
6. *Cf.* the *Tattvārthādhigamasūtra,* Pt. 1, *Ed.* Hiralal Rasikdas Kapadia, Śreṣṭhi Devacandra Lālbhāi-Jaina Pustakoddhāra Series, Vol. 67, Bombay 1926, p. 327.
7. *See* my paper, "A Propos of "The chronology of the Tattvārtha Sūtra and Some Early Commentaries"," *Nirgrantha* 3, Ahmedabad 1998, pp. 18-21, for the discussion on the date of Siddhasena gaṇī.

# Vivakṣā in Kāśikāvṛtti : Jayāditya and Vāmana

**Anna Radicchi**

The discussion regarding the authorship of the various parts of the Kāśikāvṛtti by Jayāditya and Vāmana respectively has been going on for more than a century.

From the time when the Kāśikā began to be published in *The Pandit* (March 1874, Vol. VIII) by Bālaśāstrī, the task of reliably giving the name of the *vṛttikāra* at the end of each *pāda* had to be faced. However, the manuscript tradition was contradictory. In the *Report*[1] R. G. Bhandarkar concluded that the first five *adhyāyas* of the Kāśikā should be attributed to Jayāditya and the last three to Vāmana. This was contrary to the attribution of the first four *adhyāyas* to Jayāditya and the last four to Vāmana, believed to be valid, based as it was on the evidence of the Kashmirian manuscripts collected by G. Bühler in 1875-76[2].

Haridīkṣita had stated yet another division in the Śabdaratna to Bhaṭṭojīdīkṣita's Prauḍhamanoramā under 5. 4. 42 : the *vṛtti* of the I, II, V and VI *adhyāyas* is by Jayāditya, while the *vṛtti* of the other *adhyāyas* is by Vāmana. Bālaśāstrī also took the latter division into consideration at the end of his edition of the Kāśikā[3]; in this edition he had however practically assigned the first four *adhyāyas* and the fifth up to the end of the third *pāda* to Jayāditya, the rest to Vāmana, occasionally mentioning the name of the *vṛttikāra* at the end of the *pādas*. Although the theory presented in their introductions may differ, this division has in fact remained in the three editions most frequently consulted today : Prāchya Bhāratī's 1965-1967 edition, the one from Osmania University, and finally the most recent one edited by J. Sh. L. Tripathi and S. Malaviya[4].

When S. Ch. Chakravarti published the Bhāṣāvṛtti in 1918[5], one could

see that Puruṣottamadeva, who was writing in the XII century, frequently mentions Jayāditya in the first five *adhyāyas* as the author of the Kāśikāvṛtti, from the VI *adhyāya* onwards Jayāditya is no longer named, but a Vāmanavṛtti is referred to. Another important edition we owe to S. Ch. Chakravarti, that of the Nyāsa or Kāśikāvivaraṇapañjikā, marked a turning-point in these studies. Vol. I already contained *sūtra* 1. 1. 5 under which the *Nyāsakāra* Jinendra pointed out Jayāditya and Vāmana's respective contrasting opinions and mentioned the text of a *vṛtti* by Jayāditya on 7. 2. 11. "Did Jayāditya write a complete commentary on the Kāśikā ?", wondered Chakravarti[6]. The reference in the Nyāsa to a *vṛtti* by Jayāditya on the seventh *adhyāya* certainly contrasted with all previous attributions of parts of the *vṛtti* to the two authors.

The Nyāsa, carefully-studied with the support of the Padamañjarī, proved in fact to be the most important source for discovering and listing the internal contradictions in the Kāśikāvṛtti.

Initially, the research concentrated on linking contradictions to differences of opinions between the two authors, Jayāditya and Vāmana. Dineshchandra Bhattacharya's work belongs to and emerges during this first period. In 1922, in "Pāṇinian Studies in Bengal"[7], he expressed his opinion, based on examination of references in the Nyāsa, that Jayāditya had himself completed his *vṛtti* and Jinendra had at least partial access to its lost portions. Vāmana's *vṛtti* thus seemed to assume the role of a revised enlarged edition of Jayāditya. What then led Vāmana to revise only the last three chapters remained unexplained.

Bhattacharya came back to the double authorship of the Kāśikāvṛtti in 1946, in the Introduction to his edition of Puruṣottamadeva's Paribhāṣāvṛtti[8]. There he presented some 'interesting facts' gathered from a careful analysis of the respective works of Jayāditya and Vāmana (i. e. the first five *adhyāyas* and the last three *adhyāyas* of the Kāśikāvṛtti), which seemed to demonstrate that Jayāditya and Vāmana were separated by 'some length of time'. This should lead, in his opinion, to the abandonment of the current view that Jayāditya and Vāmana were contemporaries or that Vāmana 'came soon after Jayāditya', as stated by S. K. Belvalkar in his *Systems of Sanskrit Grammar*. Bhattacharya counted 42 references to previous writers (under expressions

such as *'kecit'*, etc.) in Jayāditya's larger portion (I-V) as opposed to 103 references in Vāmana's smaller portion (VI-VIII). He then noted that in the section of the Vedic accent (VI. 2), all the illustrations under the *sūtras* of the II and the III *adhyāyas* commented on by Jayāditya were collected, but others were also added. Finally, the 'polemical discussions' in which Vāmana indulges, practically inexistent in Jayāditya. It seems, however, that rather than 'polemical discussions', it is a matter of a clear tendency on Vāmana's part to go into the intricacies of the rules and grammatical technique, also constantly referring, in many passages cited by Bhattacharya, to the *paribhāṣās*, the rules of interpretation. The increase in reference to the other authors, as well as an increase in the number of examples certainly accounted for a period of time between Jayāditya and Vāmana longer than what scholars had generally been ready to concede. "Vāmana could never be supposed to have revised the last three chapters of Jayāditya's *vṛtti* before 700 A. D. and probably did so about 750 A. D.", according to Bhattacharya, who placed Jayāditya in 650 A. D. However, it seems that—indeed Vāmana's attention to the interpretation of the rules and interpretative technique also indicates—perhaps more than anything else, a later time in respect to Jayāditya, near the Middle Ages.

In the 60's, Yutaka Ojihara began systematic research on facts of 'Incoherence interne chez la Kāśikā'[9]. Would a complete collection of these facts, Ojihara wondered, have served, if not to revise, at least to verify the standard opinion on the division of the extant text of the Kāśikā between Jayāditya and Vāmana ? Ojihara's research was not completed and did not solve the problem of the division of the parts of the text of the Kāśikāvṛtti as we know it today between Jayāditya and Vāmana. Judging from the state of research, Ojihara believed that each of them had independently commented, in his own time, on all of Pāṇini's grammar.

Ojihara's articles initiated the final stage in the history of these studies. By now the most important references from the Nyāsa and the Padamañjarī, as well as from native commentators, have all been taken, and confidence has been lost that we may be able to learn more about the original work by Jayāditya and Vāmana. The II volume of the latest edition of the Kāśikā with Nyāsa and Padamañjarī edited by J. Sh. L. Tripathi and S. Malaviya, has

reprinted the Introduction to the Kāśikāvivaraṇapañjikā by Srish Chandra Chakravarti, dated 1925. On the one hand this rightly indicates the importance of the publishing of the Nyāsa, in Chakravarti's excellent edition, as a contribution to this field of studies; on the other hand, it implies that in 1986 it was believed that nothing of significance had been contributed to the subject following the 1925 study.

Shortly afterwards, in 1988, Narayana Miśra reconsidered, in *"Varttamānakāśikāvṛttigata-jayādityavāmanāmśa-vibhājana-vivecanam"*[10], the evidence from native commentators already examined by Chakravarti and drew his first conclusion : the *vṛttis* by Jayāditya and Vāmana originally must have been extended to the entire Aṣṭādhyāyī and the evidence now allows us to affirm that the Kāśikā we know contains Vāmana's *vṛtti* only from 6. 2 to the end of the Aṣṭādhyāyī. Then, however, Narayana Miśra also considered the Nyāsa under *pratyāhārasūtra* 4 and under 7. 4. 71 (and also the Padamañjarī under 7. 4. 71 and 8. 2. 18) and reached the final conclusion that although the attribution of the Kāśikāvṛtti to the double authorship of Jayāditya and Vāmana is based on tradition, commentaries like the Nyāsa do not in any case allow the definitive ascription of the parts of the *vṛtti* to Vāmana or Jayāditya respectively. Nor do we find greater clarity or authority in more recent native commentators. We must be satisfied with considering the Kāśikā as the work of the two authors. After more than a century of research, this is a meagre result indeed.

Taking a different path in the same period, another scholar became even more sceptical regarding the possibility of now determining the real author of the Kāśikāvṛtti. J. Bronkhorst, on two occasions,[11] dealt with the controversial passage of the Chinese pilgrim I-ching who mentions, in the context of Indian grammatical studies, a work he calls the *vṛtti-sūtra* that he attributes to Jayāditya who, he says, had died thirty years earlier. Both the term *vṛtti-sūtra*, which in fact is used in the Mahābhāṣya in the sense of *sūtra* tout court, and the mere mention of Jayāditya, whom tradition names along with Vāmana as the author of the Kāśikāvṛtti, have been discussed since the first appearance of the translation from I-ching by Takakusu, who considered *vṛtti-sūtra*=Kāśikāvṛtti.

Bronkhorst lastly adopted and elaborated J. Brough's idea[12] (originally perceived by H. Oldenberg) that the *vṛtti-sūtra* cited by I-ching, who attributes its authorship to Jayāditya, must actually be understood as the body of *vārttikas* that the *curṇi*, that is the *bhāṣya*, comments on, I-ching's *vṛtti-sūtra* and *curni* together making up the present Mahābhāṣya.

A few years earlier[13], Bronkhorst had explained that Jayāditya's name must have emerged from confusion between *vārttikakāras*, because the Kāśikā, as well as the Mahābhāṣya, includes a collection of *vārttikas*. Bronkhorst initially spoke of two authors for the Kāśikā, the *vārttikakāra* Jayāditya and Vāmana, and believed that I-ching was indicating the Kāśikā when using the term *vṛtti-sūtra*. But in the end he has fully rejected tradition : "The opinion that the Kāśikā had two authors, Jayāditya and Vāmana, is almost certainly wrong and probably due to Jinendrabuddhi's Nyāsa[14]."

Here we would like to go back to the arguments set forth by D. Bhattacharya as early as 1946, when the inconsistencies which cannot be explained by assigning them to the respective opinions of Jayāditya and Vāmana had not yet been sufficiently taken into consideration. However, the important annotations from the Nyāsa, the Padamañjarī, and the Bhāṣāvṛtti as well as those from more recent commentators had already been collected, and attention had focused on manuscript tradition. In 1946, that name mentioned by I-ching, Jayāditya, was still generally considered as the name of the author of the Kāśikā, the only inexplicably strange thing being that he had been regarded as the sole author, while tradition named two. On the basis of this knowledge and with the self-confidence of one who feels history has not completely left him in the dark, D. Bhattacharya had attempted to grasp the distinctive features of that part of the *vṛtti* attributed to Vāmana (VI-VIII *adhyāyas*) as opposed to that attributed to Jayāditya.

It is from this point of view that we wish to determine whether there was an evolution in the idea of *vivakṣā* between the first and the second part of the Kāśikāvṛtti[15]. From a review of the occurrences of *vivakṣā* terminology in the two parts of the Kāśikāvṛtti traditionally attributed to Jayāditya and Vāmana respectively (*adhyāyas* I-V; *adhyāyas* VI-VIII), it becomes evident that the second part moves decisively towards the medieval idea of *vivakṣā*

and towards the function the *vivakṣā* will have in the grammatical technique of the Middle Ages. Thus the fact that the second part of the Kāśikā is later than the first remains demonstrated, just as the existence of different authors is demonstrated.

Philology can make its voice heard where history does not shed sufficient light and where textual comparisons are not convincing.

* * *

We may attempt to group all the occurrences of the term *vivakṣā* and related terminology in the first five *adhyāyas* of the Kāśikāvṛtti under seven headings[16]. They will naturally not be watertight compartments but broadly overlapping areas. The complete list of the occurrences grouped under the seven headings is found in the Appendix at the end of this article.

Now follows a definition of the headings with selected examples for each of them.

Let us establish the first heading, 1) in the most general way possible, as 'the desire to express or utter something.' It is indeed difficult to find, in a grammatical context, something that one wants to express or utter which does not at the same time have a grammatical connotation. The most satisfactory example seems to be found in that 'desire to faithfully reproduce a sound' in the *vṛtti* under 1. 1. 16, which is, freely translated, the sense of *anukāryānukaraṇayorbhedasyāvivakṣitatvāt*.

After all, even 'the desire to express a meaning not provided for by a *sūtra*' is inseparably linked to the other face of the coin, that of 'the desire to express a meaning provided for by a *sūtra*', with the consequent application of the same. We would therefore also place the examples for 'the desire to express meanings not provided forby the rules' under the second heading.

* * *

2) 'The desire to express a meaning provided for or not provided for by the rules', a meaning, it should be noted, which can be analysed according to grammatical categories, concepts, and terminology. Here are included the paraphrases of the text of the *sūtras*, which more fully explain the meaning provided for, that is the one wanted or not wanted to be expressed, and the

elucidations given in the debates on examples and counter-examples. Thus the *vṛtti* explains under 1. 4. 42 what the *sādhakatamam karaṇam* of the *sūtra* is, paraphrasing it with *kriyāsiddhau yatprakṛṣṭopakārakam vivakṣitam*, 'what one wants to express as the preëminent means for carrying out the action'; under 1. 4. 54 it describes the *svatantraḥ kartā* as *kriyāsiddhau svātantryeṇa vivakṣyate*, 'what one wants to express as independent in the carrying out of the action.'

In these expressions, individual judgement and taste seem to be emerging. It is in the eye of the individual that in the course of an action something seems to assume the prominent role of a means, *karaṇa*, like the sickle used to cut grass or the axe used to cut wood, and one wants to coherently express the carrying out of the action. It is once again the individual who bestows independence of action on a person and now expresses himself with *devadattaḥ pacati*, 'Devadatta cooks', and then gives the pot the role of Devadatta because he sees it as the agent and therefore expressed himself with *sthālī pacati*, 'the pot cooks.'

It is however certain that what the speaker wants to express according to his own individual feeling must then be expressed grammatically to be correct and understandable. The means must be expressed with the instrumental and the agent, however singled out, becomes the grammatical subject.

*Sūtra* 4. 3. 163, *phale luk*, prescribes that, when dealing with the fruit, affixes indicating 'product or part' undergo *luk* and are thus elided. The *vṛtti* glosses *phale* of the *sūtra* with *phale ...vivakṣite*, 'when one wants to express the fruit,' and gives as the first example *āmalakam* (the fruit of the Emblic Myrobalan), in which the affix *mayaṭ* prescribed by 4. 3. 144 is dropped. *Phale vivakṣite* of the *vṛtti* is the same as *phale'bhidheye*, which in fact substitutes it under 4. 3. 166 : here the individuality contained in the desire to express oneself in one's own way is lost and is replaced by the meaning of 'what the speakers have to express', and want to express, to communicate correctly, according to rules.

In the *vṛtti* to the section under *tasyāpatyam* (4. 1. 92), the expressions of the *sūtras*, *gotre* (4. 1. 93), *yūni* (4. 1. 94), are amplified and explained

with *gotrāpatye vivakṣite, yūnyapatye vivakṣite,* that is 'when one wants to express a *gotra* descendant,' 'when one wants to express a *yuvan* descendant.' Under 4. 1. 98 instead of *vivakṣite* we find *vācye, gotrasamjñāke' patye vācye,* which is in fact synonymous. In these contexts, *vivakṣā* is nothing more than the desire to communicate, using, according to grammatical rules, the various affixes on the basis of their range of usage. The speaker's intention can be deduced from the form used.

4. 1. 161 regulates formations deriving from *manu-*, like *mānuṣaḥ, manuṣyaḥ*, which indicates species, *jāti*, not descend, *apatya*. However, one may want to express *apatya, apatyavivakṣāyām* : *mānavī prajā*, 'Manu's progeny', adopting the affix *aṇ* which is used for *apatya*, clearly shows the speaker's intention, that of expressing descent.

The *yañ* affix is prescribed by 4. 1. 105 for formations indicating *gotra* descendants, with the *gargādis*. However, we find *jāmadagnyaḥ*, the name of Paraśurāma, 'Jamadagni's son,' and *pārāśaryaḥ*, the name of Vyāsa, 'Parāśara's son' : here the affix has not been used for *gotra* descent as prescribed by the 4. 3. 166 *sūtra*. A *gotra* form has been superimposed, says the Kāśikā. When, however, one wants to express direct descent, *anantarāpatyavivakṣāyām*, this superimposition may not take place, and the affix prescribed for descent is used, with the resulting forms *jāmadagnaḥ* and *pārāśaraḥ*, and we understand that direct descent is being expressed.

There are numerous examples under this second heading. We might say that 'the meaning the speaker wants to communicate, which is or is not identified with the meaning codified by the rules' is the signification occupying the foremost place among all usages of *vivakṣā* and related terminology observed in the first five *adhyāyas* of the Kāśikāvṛtti.

Forms like *kartrābhiprāyakriyāphalavivakṣā*, used repeatedly in the *vṛtti* under 1. 3. 80 foll., meaning 'the desire to express that the fruits of the action are directed towards the agent,' are listed under this heading as well (*see* Appendix), as the concept of wanting to convey a meaning provided for by the rules overlaps and prevails over the concept of wanting to express oneself according to the dictates of the rules. This is also present, since the *kartrābhiprāyakriyāphalavivakṣā* involves a use of the *ātmanepada* on the

basis of what 1. 3. 72 prescribes, according to a fundamental analysis of functions assigned to verbal diathesis. Analogously, with tenses and moods, which 'want' to follow the rules, and so on.

More simply, one could say that *vivakṣā* sometimes takes on the meaning of 'the desire to correctly apply the rules'; however, this leads to the specific cases under the third heading.

* * *

3) 'The desire to express oneself by following the dictates of the rules', where the grammatical means rather than the meanings are directly involved; 'the desire to express oneself using specific grammatical means', as for example a *pratyaya*, with the consequent iter of the *prakriyā*.

We arrive at grammatically abstract expressions like 'the desire to express a *pratyaya*'; see under 4. 1. 90 and 91 *prāgdīvyatīye' jādau pratyaye vivakṣite*; under 4. 4. 109 *yakārādau pratyaye vivakṣite*, under 5. 4. 57 *ḍāci vivakṣite*; finally under 2. 4. 35 and 3. 1. 31 *ārdhadhātukavivakṣāyām*. The *vṛtti* under 2. 4. 35 warns : it is a *viṣayasaptamī : ārdhadhātukavivakṣāyām* means *ārdhadhātukaviṣaye*, thus explicitly under 3. 1. 31, that is 'in the range of usage of the *ārdhadhātukas'* or rather 'when an *ārdhadhātuka* has to be used.'

Elsewhere the *vivakṣā* of *pratyaya* is explained as 'the *pratyaya* that one has in mind and wants to express'; clearly stated under 4. 1. 90 : *prāgdīvyatīye' jādau pratyaye vivakṣite buddhisthe*.

The *prakriyā* is in any case put to work both in the objective range of application of the rules and in the subjective choice of them. The *vṛtti* under 2. 4. 35 says that when an *ārdhadhātuka* affix has to be used, first one effects the substitutions and then uses the various affixes as required. Thus the form *hanyāt*, 'let him kill', in the *liṅ sārvadhātuka*; but in the *ārdhadhātuka liṅ*, the so-called Benedictive, first one must substitute *vadh* for *han* as prescribed by 2. 4. 42 and then the required affix is added and the correct third person is produced : *vadhyāt*, 'may he kill'.

In the same way, the *vṛtti* explains under 4. 1. 90 that when one wants to add a *pratyaya* of the *prāgdīvyatīya* type beginning with a vowel, *pratyaya* which one has in mind, elision of the *yuvan* affix takes place before it is

added. The example is *phāṇṭāhṛtāḥ*, 'disciples of the *yuvan* descendant of Phāṇṭāhṛti'. To form *phāṇṭāhṛtāḥ*, the *prāgdīvyatīya ajādi* affix which one has in mind is *aṇ* of 4. 2. 112; before this can be added, the *yuvan* affix must be dropped, as it would otherwise produce the form *phāṇṭāhṛtāḥ*, 'a descendant of *phāṇṭāhṛtiḥ*.' Once the affix is dropped, *an* can be directly added to *phāṇṭāhṛtiḥ*, producing *phāṇṭāhṛtāḥ* as per 4. 2. 112, with the desired meaning of '*tasya chātrāḥ*'.

The reverse of the process, which moves from the *vivakṣā* through the iter of the *prakriyā* to the form itself, is also practicable. One may start, for instance, with the *dāśarathāya* form in the expression *pradīyatām dāśarathāya maithilī*, 'let Sītā be given to Daśaratha's son', to conclude that the form does not follow 4. 1. 95, which regulates formations regarding descent (*tasyāpatyam*, 4. 1. 92) for bases in *-a*, because according to 4. 1. 95 Daśaratha's descent should have been called *dāśarathiḥ*. Thus it means there was no intent to use a specific affix for descent, but an affix generically indicating *tasyedam* was chosen, according to *sūtra* 4. 3. 120 in the section beginning with *śeṣe* in 4. 2. 92. The form, says the Kāśikā, will result from *śeṣavivakṣā śeṣavivakṣayā bhaviṣyati*. In conclusion, observing the usage one can go back to the *vivakṣā*, what the speaker wants to express. It is clear that we are dealing with a speaker, or rather speakers, who want to express themselves in a grammatically correct way.

* * *

4) The *vivakṣā* as determining usage, which is then recorded by the rules.

Let us consider as an instance 4. 4. 83, *vidhyatyadhanuṣā*, which prescribes the use of the *yat* affix with the meaning of 'that pierces', provided that the piercing instrument is not a bow.

The affix is added to the base indicating the object to be pierced, for example *pādya*, 'that pierces the foot', said of pebbles which pierce the feet, *pādyāḥ śarkarāḥ*, or of thorns that pierce the thighs, *ūravyāḥ kaṇṭakāḥ*. For these forms, the *sūtra* excludes the bow as the piercing instrument; here the spoken language provides confirmation, as we do not find formations in *-ya* meaning 'to pierce' when the piercing instrument is the bow. One would not

understand the desired meaning, says the Kāśikā under the *sūtra* : *na vivakṣito'rthaḥ pratīyate*.

The *vṛtti* under 2. 2. 36 speaks of *viśeṣaṇa* and *viṣeṣya*, i. e. of the qualifier and the qualified, alternating according to *vivakṣā*. The example is *kṛtakaṭaḥ*, 'who made the mat', in which the first member, *niṣṭhā*, is the qualifier; but the *vigraha* may also be *kaṭe kṛtam anena*, 'made by him on the mat', and here *kṛta, niṣṭhā*, is qualified by *kaṭe* (see Nyāsa under the *sūtra*).

In other contexts the Mahābhāṣya had considered *viśeṣaṇa* and *viśeṣya* alternating according to what one wants to express as fundamental (*prādhānyena vivakṣitāḥ*, under 2. 1. 57, Vol. I. 399); the genus, *sāmānyam*, is *gauḥ* and the particular, *viśeṣa*, is *kṛṣṇa* only if this is what one wants to express, the *bhāṣya* says once again under 1. 1. 67 (Vol. I, p. 172). But roles can be reversed. How ? The reply is : *vivakṣātaḥ*, 'on the basis of *vivakṣā*.'

Although *viśeṣaṇa* and *viśeṣya* may alternate on the basis of *vivakṣā*, the grammatical concepts the two terms convey remain firm : without them it is impossible to analyse compounds or to explain the concord which is the foundation of syntax. Analogously with *svātantrya*. The 'agent as possessing *svātantrya*' was already codified by Pāṇini in 1. 4. 54, and remained acquired knowledge. But identification of the agent possessing *svātantrya* depended on one's subjective viewpoint and pointing or not pointing it out depended on *vivakṣā*. When one says that 'a door looks towards', *abhiniṣkrāmati dvāram*, the *vṛtti* under 4. 3. 86 comments, one wants to express the door as the agent possessing *svātantrya, svātantryeṇa vivakṣyate*[17].

* * *

5) The desire to express oneself = usage, to be observed to integrate or limit, specify or render the rules more flexible.

The Mahābhāṣya already pointed out the *iti*, which often appears in the text of the *sūtras* especially in the section on *taddhita* affixes, as an indicator that in these cases usage must be observed; this allows us to go back to the desire to express oneself, *vivakṣā*; it is indeed the *vivakṣā* which finally determines the range and limits of application of these *sūtras*. The formula *itikaraṇas tataścedvivakṣā*, 'there is an *iti* in the *sūtra* and *vivakṣā* derives

from it', is already *bhāṣyan*. The Kāśikā uses it and often also uses its shorter equivalent, *itikaraṇo vivakṣārthaḥ*.

Under 4. 4. 125, which contains *iti* in the *sūtra*, in place of *itikaraṇo vivakṣārthaḥ* we read *itikaraṇo niyamārthaḥ : niyama* means the limit of application of the *sūtra* depending on the speaker's desire to express himself, as shown by usage. '*Itikaraṇa* indicates there are limits on usage', *itikaraṇādviṣayaniyamaḥ*, we read under 5. 2. 94 before the traditional *śloka* enumerating the meanings in which we find the affix *matup* employed. The *vṛtti* considers this *itikaraṇa* repeated by *anuvṛtti*, with its effect of evoking the *vivakṣā*, under 5. 2. 95 and the following *sūtras* regulating the use of the *matvarthīya* affixes.

Under 2. 2. 27 governing the formation of compounds like *keśākeśi*, 'by the hair,' and *daṇḍādaṇḍi*, 'stick against stick', it is said that the *iti* in the *sūtra* makes one go back to, i. e. it makes one understand what people want to express (*laukikamartham*); the seizing, fighting, reciprocity, the struggle : all contribute to the meaning of the compound and all derive from *iti*. Here one is talking about the *laukikī vivakṣā*; the Mahābhāṣya had already named it, contrasting it with a *prayoktrī vivakṣā*, an 'individual *vivakṣā*', which the Kāśikā does not mention.

On the one hand, *itikaraṇa* is restrictive, that is it specifies usages by referring back to spoken language; on the other hand, it leaves room for further additions. For example, *iti* in 5. 2. 93 indicates that the list of meanings of *indriya* given in the *sūtra* can be enlarged in case different etymologies occur.

Elsewhere, *iti* allows further clarifications to be added to the wording of the *sūtra*, for instance, 5. 2. 45 names only '(numerals) ending in *daśa* in the sense of "this is surplus in it"; examples are *ekādaśaṁ śatam*, 'hundred + eleven', *ekādaśaṁ sahasram*, 'thousand + eleven'. The *sūtra* does not say that the surplus must be of the same nature as that to which it is added : 11 *kārṣāpaṇa* added to 100 others = *ekādaśaṁ kārṣāpaṇaśatam*, '111 *kārṣāpaṇa*'; nor does the *sūtra* explain that it is to be applied only to the numbers one hundred and one thousand. A traditional *śloka* focused attention on these details. But, the *vṛtti* concludes, it has been said that *itikaraṇa* is '*vivakṣārtha*',

and thus permits all these particularities.

The *vṛtti* under 5. 1. 16, which regulates formations like *prākārīya* said of bricks 'sufficient to erect a wall' or *prāsādīya* said of land 'sufficient to construct a building on', also goes back to the *iti* of the *sūtra* which 'it has been said is "*vivakṣārtha*" when it poses the question : why is *prāsādo devadattasya syāt* not integrated into *prāsādīya*? Theoretically, the *sūtra* would allow integration because what one wants to express, by forms which the *sūtra* regulates, is only possibility, *yogyatāmātra*; however, integration of the analytical expression *prāsādo devadattasya syāt* is not found in usage. Here the Kāśikā reëchoes Patañjali's *bhāṣya* under the *sūtra*.

There is one more passage from the Kāśikā which should be cited under this heading. It is under 4. 2. 21 which the Kāśikā reads *sāsminpaurṇamāsīti samjñāyām*. The *sūtra* must have originally read *sasminpaurnamasiti*; the proposal to add the term *samjñā* is discussed in the *bhāṣya*, which rejects it. *Samjñā* limited the application of the *sūtra* to terms in use, actually only appellations of a month, a half-month or a year. But, Patañjali concludes, there is *itikaraṇa* and that is sufficient, because the presence of *iti* in the *sūtra* refers to *vivakṣā*, and this accounts for the real range of the *sūtra* application. The Kāśikā, which accepts the reading *samjñāyām*, must then justify the redundancy and embarks on explanations. The Kāśikā says that the use of *iti* and *samjñā* in the *sūtra*, both having the same purpose, that of seeing that usage is observed, must aim at the indirect teaching (*jñāpaka*) that *iti* is synonymous with *samjñā*. The expressions of usage (*yattatra tatrocyate*) are '*itikaraṇa*', they depend on people's desire to express themselves, and grammar must take them into consideration.

* * *

6) 'What a rule requires, or does not require.'

This meaning is clear in *akārasya vivakṣitatvāt* under 3. 2. 61 : 'because the *sūtra* requires the form with an indicatory *a* (of the three *dhātus : vida jñane, vida sattāyām, vida vicāraṇe*)', thus excluding *vidḷ* listed in the *dhātupāṭhas* with the meaning of *lābha*, with an indicatory *l*.

* * *

7) 'What a formulation intends, or does not intend.'

An important example is found under 4. 1. 92 (*tasyāpatyam*). The *vṛtti* says that the genitive, *tasya* of the *sūtra*, concerns the base *upagu-* in the expression *upagorapatyam*, and is restricted to the meaning of 'descent.' In place of *upagorapatyam* we may use *aupagavah*, 'the offspring of Upagu', deriving from the base *upagu-* with the affix *aṇ* as per 4. 1. 83. The wording of the *sūtra* indicates nothing else, neither gender nor number. *liṅgavacanādikamanyatsarvamavivakṣitam*; the fact that *tasya* is masculine does not mean that the affixes whose use is regulated by 4. 1. 92 are added only to masculine bases nor does the singular form of *apatyam* restrict descent to a single individual.

A *vārttika* in the Mahābhāṣya under 4. 1. 92 already advised that gender and number in the indication of the meaning of a *taddhita* are not meant to teach anything because they do not in fact attempt to communicate gender and number. *taddhitārthanirdeśe liṅgavacanamapramāṇam tasyāvivakṣitatvāt*. The words of a text must obligatorially have gender and number, Patañjali reacts in his comment under the *vārttika*. The *vārttika* developed a following; we also find it in the form of *paribhāṣā* in the Cāndravyākaraṇa : *sūtre liṅgavacanamapramāṇamavivakṣitatvāt*.

* * *

To analyse the difference between the Kāśikāvṛtti to the last three *adhyāyas* of the Aṣṭādhyāyī and the Kāśikāvṛtti to the first five *adhyāyas* as regards the use of *vivakṣā* terminology, it seems useful to review once again the meanings under the seven above-given headings for the first five *adhyāyas* and see if they are also found in the last three *adhyāyas* and what developments they eventually undergo there.

1) 'The desire to express or utter something' is present. One example of several : *auttarādharyam...vivakṣitam*, 'the desire to express the state of one thing being over the other,' under 8. 1. 7.

2) 'The desire to express a meaning provided for, or not provided for, by the rules;' for example, *dravamūrtisparśavivakṣāyām* under 6. 1. 26, which repeats the wording of 6. 1. 24, or also *samipye vivakṣite* under 8. 1. 7. In

these cases, *vivakṣā* terminology is used to express 'the desired meaning', which is then that of the *sūtra*. However, we also find, even more frequently, expressions with *abhidheya, gamyamāna* and also *vartamāna* which substitute *vivakṣita* in constructions of absolute locatives or substitute *-vivakṣāyām* in compounds : see *nagare' bhidheye* under 6. 1. 155, *eteṣvartheṣu gamyamāneṣu* under 6. 1. 139, *guṇakārtsnye vartamānam* under 6. 2. 93, etc. *Vācin* is often used in the sixth *adhyāya, kratuvācini samāse* under 6. 2. 97, etc., where the fourth would use *vācya*. In the long second *pāda* of the sixth *adhyāya, vivakṣita* does not appear even once in the sense of 'wanted to be expressed according to the rules'; in its place we find synonyms which lack, however, that sense of individual will to express oneself which is present in *vivakṣā* terminology.

3) 'The desire to express oneself by following the dictates of the rules'; 'the desire to express oneself using specific grammatical means', as for example a *pratyaya*.

Here we will consider that 'not wanting to express the feminine', which actually represents 'the desire to express oneself not using specific grammatical means', that occurs repeatedly in the *vṛtti* to the series of *sūtras*, beginning from 6. 3. 34, regulating the substitution of the masculine for the feminine. 6. 3. 34 governs forms like *darśanīyabhāryaḥ*, 'who has a beautiful wife,' with the masculine substituting the feminine in the first member of the compound. The formulation of the *sūtra* excludes the *priyādis* from the application of the rule, but an instance like *dṛḍhabhaktiḥ*, 'of firm faith', with *bhakti* included in the list of the *priyādis* as its second member does not respect the exclusion of the *sūtra*, with its masculine in the first member. How can this be justified? The *vivakṣā* provides the answer : it was chosen not to use the feminine gender in the first member : *strīpūrvapadasyāvivakṣitatvāt*. This teaching is found in the Mahābhāṣya where a *vārttika* under 6. 3. 42 which prescribed masculine with the *kukkuṭyādis* in compounds with the *aṇḍadis* (*kukkuṭya aṇḍam kukkutāṇḍam*, 'a hen's egg') was followed by another : *na vā'strīpurvapadavivakṣitatvāt*. 'Perhaps', this second *vārttika* said, 'it is more correct to maintain that one did not want to use the feminine in the first member.' The Kāśikā, repeating the *vārttika*, added under the *sūtra* : the first *pāda* means *jāti* in general, not

gender.

The *vṛtti* under 6. 3. 45 as well, which legitimates the alternating of forms with short *i* like *śreyasitarā* and forms with long *ī* like *śreyasītarā*, turns to the *strītvasyāvivakṣitatva* for instances like *śreyastarā*. One could formulate a rule to legitimate the masculine, but 'not wanting to express the feminine' accounts for the *prakriyā* better : one did not want to use the feminine before adding the comparative affix, which is then applied to *śreyas*, with the resulting *śreyastarā*.

In this way, one proceeds further. The Vedic *niṣṭaptam rakṣaḥ* and *niṣṭaptā arātayaḥ*, with the cerebralization of *nis* before the verb *tap* prescribed by 8. 3. 100 (numbering from the Kāśikā), a cerebralization which according to the *sūtra* itself should not have occurred because there is a sense of repetition, can be considered Vedic irregularities. However, the *vivakṣā* can also provide an explanation : the sense of repetition is there but one does not want to express it. Not wanting to express something provided for by the *sūtra* exempts one from applying the rule. Here we have a meaning of *vivakṣā* not found in the Kāśikāvṛtti to the first five *adhyāyas*.

A remark of the *vṛtti* under 7. 4. 57 is also worth being noted. The *sūtra* establishes the *guṇa* option for forms like *mokṣate*, as an alternative to *mumukṣate*. The *sūtra* speaks of *muc akarmaka*, intransitive *muc*. In the examples then given by the *vṛtti*, *mokṣate vatsaḥ svayameva, mumukṣate vatsaḥ svayameva*, 'the boy wants to free himself', the reflexive is used. The *vṛtti* explains that *muc* is intransitive in the reflexive; therefore the *sūtra* that speaks of the intransitive *muc* regularly applies. Then it adds a further consideration : *karmaviśeṣasyāvivakṣitatvādvā*, 'or, it may be maintained that one does not want to express the kind of action (but only action and that is all)'. It is the same as saying that the restriction of the *sūtra*, *akarmaka*, is overcome if there is no desire to take into account, and consequently express, the type of *karman*. This is more than the *vivakṣā* that guides the iter of the *prakriyā* and determines the form; it is the *vivakṣā* that legitimates forms which according to the rules should be considered irregular. In the final analysis, the *vivakṣā* acts as a substitute for the rules.

In the *vṛtti* to the last three *adhyāyas* we do not find 4) the *vivakṣā* as determining usage, which is then recorded by the rules or 5) the desire to

express oneself = usage, to be observed to integrate or limit, specify or render the rules more flexible.

Without observing the *prayoga*, which meant highlighting tendencies developing in the spoken language, the *vivakṣā* remained only a device for justifying forms which would otherwise be considered aberrant according to the rules. The device lies at the beginning of a path it will continue to travel during succeeding centuries; the Kāśikāvṛtti takes this path only in the last three *adhyāyas*.

As regards the observation of usage to integrate, limit, specify or render the rules more flexible, an important role in the *vṛtti* to the first five *adhyāyas* was played by the *iti* of the *sūtras*, which acted as an indicator of the need in these cases to resort to *vivakṣā*. The indication of the *iti* of the *sūtras* as *vivakṣārtha* completely disappears from the *vṛtti* to the last three *adhyāyas*. It is true that the Mahābhāṣyan *itikaraṇas tataścedvivakṣā* appeared in and was limited to the context of the *taddhita* affixes. However the Kāśikāvṛtti had also commented on it as *itikaraṇaśceha vivakṣārthaḥ* under 2. 2. 27 on compounds, nor does the use of *iti* in the *sūtras* disappear in these last three *adhyāyas*; however, it is noted here and there without mentioning the *vivakṣā*. See, under 7. 2. 34, *itikaraṇam pradarśanārtham* : *iti* in this *sūtra* comes to an end of a long list of Vedic forms, and here *iti*, says the Kāśikā, means that we are dealing with examples that do not exclude others. Along with *amiti* listed in the *sūtra* we find *abhyamiti* in the Vedic expression *ravimabhyamiti varuṇaḥ*. Regarding another *iti*, in *sūtra* 7. 4. 65, again coming to an end of a list of Vedic forms, it is said that it is meant to include other forms of the same type : *itikaraṇamevamprakā-rāṇāmanyesamapyupaṣāmgrahārtham*.

*Itikaraṇaḥ pradarśanārthaḥ* was already present in the *vṛtti* under 3. 1. 41 and *itikaraṇaḥ prakārārthaḥ* under 5. 2. 93 (note the masculine instead of the neuter); thus the interpretation of *iti* as *pradarśanārtha* and *prakārārtha* is not an innovation of the *vṛtti* to the last three *adhyāyas*. However, it is certain that here it is used to the exclusion of any other mention of *iti* as *vivakṣārtha*.

Vedic forms, we have said, and this is not a negligible detail. *Bhāṣā* was the language in use, but Vedic was the sacred language which did not permit

innovation or free expression. It is no wonder that the *prayoga* is not taken into consideration in a Vedic context.

6) 'What a rule requires or does not require.' *Avivakṣite karmaṇi* under 6. 1. 207, in which *avivakṣita* is rather 'what a rule does not require', may be taken here as an example : it excludes *āsīta* in the passive sense.

7) 'What a formulation intends, or does not intend' is amply represented. For example, under 6. 1. 36 it is said of *śrātāḥ* that 'it does not intend to express the plural'; under 6. 1. 143 it is said of *kustumburūṇi* that 'it does not intend to express the neuter'; the endings with which the *kārtakaujapādis* in 6. 2. 37 are given 'do not want to express number', while for *śaitikākṣapañcāleyāḥ* 'the plural is not prescribed' because *śaitikākṣapañcāleyau* in the dual is also found; the genitive *aṅgasya* in 6. 4. 1, which acts as *adhikāra* until the end of the VII *adhyāya*, can also be considered a pure theme, without 'its use wanting to signify an ending'; finally, under 8. 2. 46, regarding the formulation of another *sūtra*, 1. 3. 19, using *jeḥ* as an inflected form of the *dhātu ji*, it is said that the *sūtra* merely uses the form *ji* and 'does not intend to express the meaning of the *dhātu ji*.'

We have listed here all the examples of heading 7) occurring in the *vṛtti* to the last three *adhyāyas*. They are statistically numerous compared to the total number of occurrences of *vivakṣā* terminology, much more numerous than in the first five *adhyāyas*.

* * *

In conclusion, in the last three *adhyāyas* of the Aṣṭādhyāyī commented on in the Kāśikāvṛtti, anything referring to the *prayoga*, that is 4) and 5), disappears from the context of the *vivakṣā*.

2) is modified, because the meaning to be expressed, as the rules prescribe it, is more often given as *abhidheya, gamyamāna*, etc. than as *vivakṣita* or *vivakṣā* : it becomes the objective meaning prescribed by the rules rather than the individual choice of the meaning to be expressed, according to rules.

3) undergoes substantial evolution in the direction of a 'device to justify otherwise irregular forms.'

6) is present, but it is principally 7) which expands due to the above-stated attention paid to the objective meaning, the positive aspect of which is a more profound analysis of the formulation and interpretation of the rules.

**Annotations :**

1. *A Report on the Search for Sanskrit Manuscripts in the Bombay Presidency during 1883-84*, Bombay 1887, see pp. 57-58.
2. JBBRAS, Extra No. XXXIV A, Vol. XII, Bombay 1877.
3. *The Pandit*, N. S. III (1879), see *Upasaṁhāra*, p. 20.
4. See Appendix for bibliography.
5. *Savitārāya-smṛtisaṁrakṣaṇa-granthamālā 1*, The Varendra Research Society, Rajshahi.
6. *The Kāśikā Vivaraṇa Pañjikā (The Nyāsa). A commentary on Vāmana-Jayāditya's Kāśikā by Jinendra Buddhi*, Vol. I, The Varendra Research Society, Rajshahi 1913-1916; see Introduction, separately paginated, p. 16, and Notes pp. 47-48.
7. *Sir Asutosh Mookerjee Silver Jubilee Volumes*, Vol. III, Orientalia - Part 1, Calcutta 1922 : 189-208; see pp. 190-191.
8. *Paribhāṣāvṛttih, jñāpakasamuccayaḥ, kārakacakram. Mahopādhyāyaśrīpuruṣottamadevavir-acitam, śrīdinesacandrabhaṭṭācāryeṇa sampāditam. Paribhāṣāvṛtti Jñāpakasamuccaya Kārakacakra by Puruṣottamadeva*. Ed. Dinesh Chandra Bhattacharya. Varendra Research Museum, Rajshahi 1946, see. pp. 2-3.
9. '*Causerie Vyākaraṇique* III1, III2, III3. *Incoherence interne chez la Kāśikā*'. Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies (Indogaku Bukkyōgaku Kenkyū), IX, 2 (1961) : 753-749 (11-15); X, 2 (1962) : 776-766 (7-17); XII, 2 (1964) : 847-845 (13-15).
10. *V. Raghavan Commemoration Volume*, Chief Editor V. Subrahamaṇya Śāstrī. Chaukhambha Prāchyavidyā Series 16, Vārānasī Delhi 1988 : 185-188.
11. 'On the History of Pāṇinian Grammar in the Early Centuries following Patañjali,' JIP 11 (1983) : 357-412, see p. 401; '*Vārttika*', WZKS 34 (1990) : 123-146, see p. 140 fol.
12. 'I-ching on the Sanskrit Grammarians,' BSOAS XXXVI (1973) : 248-60, see p.

255 fol.

13. JIP 11 (1983), above quoted, p. 401.

14. WZKS 34 (1990), above quoted, p. 142.

15. On *vivakṣā* see my articles : '*Vivakṣā* in the Vākyapadīya,' Proceedings of the First International Conference on Bhartṛhari, University of Poona, January 6-8, 1992, AS/EA XLVII.1.1993 : 221-233; 'Cāndravyākaraṇa e buddhismo', *Bandhu*. Scritti in onore di Carlo Della Casa. Vol. I, Alessandria 1997 : 389 : 411.

16. This experiment was presented for discussion at one of the sections of the 35th ICANAS, held in Budapest in July 1997. We still hold to the general lines of that presentation, here revised and corrected.

17. Regarding the desire to express the independence of the agent, cp. *svātantryeṇa ... kartā vivakṣitaḥ* in the Mahābhāṣya under 3.1.87, Vol. II, p. 67; and also *imānīndriyāṇi kadācitsvātantryeṇa vivakṣitāni* under 1.2.59, Vol. I, p. 230 and passim.

APPENDIX

Occurrences of *vivakṣā* terminology in Kāśikāvṛtti I-V *

1) : 'The desire to express or utter something'

1.1.16 : (*anukāryānukaraṇayorbhedasya*) *avivakṣitatvāt*

2.1.19 : *abhedavivakṣā*

2.4.6 : *niyatadravyavivakṣāyām*

3.3.99 : (*vācyatvena*) *vivakṣitaḥ*

3.4.21 : (*śaktiśaktimatorbhedasya*) *avivakṣitatvāt*

*) The following editions have been used :

I) *Bodhisattvadeśīyācāryajinendrabuddhipādaviracitayānyāsāparaparyāya-kāśikāvivaraṇapañcikayā vidvadvaraharadattamiśraviracitayā padamañjarīvyākhyayā ca sahitā śrīmadvāmanajayādityaviracitā kāśikāvṛttih [pāṇinīyāṣṭādhyāyīvyākhyā]. Nyāsa or Pañcikā Commentary of Acārya Jinendrabuddhipāda and Padamañjarī of Haradatta Miśra on The Kāśikāvṛtti [Commentary on The Aṣṭādhyāyī of Pāṇiṅi] of Vāmana-Jayāditya.*

Critically edited by Dwarikadas Shastri and Kalikaprasad Shukla. Part I-VI. Prāchya Bhāratī Series 2-7. Varanasi, 1965-67.

II) *Śrīvāmanajayādityaviracita pāṇiniyāṣṭādhyāyīsūtravṛttiḥ kāśikā. Kāśikā. A Commentary on Pāṇini's Grammar by Vāmana & Jayāditya*. Part I, Part II. Editors Aryendra Sharma, Khanderao Deshpande. Sanskrit Academy, Osmania University, Hyderabad, 1969, 1970.

III) *Śrīmadvāmana-jayādityaviracitā pāṇinīyāṣṭādhyāyīsūtravṛttih kāśikā śrimajjinendrabuddhivir acitayā nyāsāparaparyāyakāśikāvivaraṇapañjikākhyayā vidvadvaraśrīharadattamiśraviracita-padamañjarīsamākhyayā ca vyākhyayā sahita jayaśaṅkaralālatripāṭhiviracitayā bhāvabodhini-hindivyākhyayā ca vibhūṣitā.*

*Kāśikā (A Commentary on Pāṇini's Grammar) of Vāmana & Jayāditya, with Nyāsa or Kāśikā-vivaraṇapañjikā of Jinendrabuddhi and Padamañjarī of Haradatta Miśra, with Bhavabodhini Hindi Exposition by Jaya Shankar Lal Tripathi*. Critically ed. Jaya Shankar Lal Tripathi and Sudhakar Malaviya.

Vol. I-IX, *Prācyabhāratīgranthamālā* 17, 18, 19, 20, 25, 26, 29, 30, 34, Varanasi 1985-1994.....(planned in 11 volumes).

3.4.26 : (*na... śaktiśaktimatorbhedo*) *vivakṣyate*

5.2.94 : *astivivakṣāyām* (twice)

2) : 'The desire to express a meaning provided for, or not provided for, by the rules.'

Here are included the paraphrases of the text of the *sūtras*, which more fully explain the meaning, and the elucidations given in the debates on examples and counter-examples.

1.2.73 : *sahavivakṣāyam*

1.3.45 : *(nātra sarpirādi jñeyatvena) vivakṣitam...(karaṇatvena)*

1.3.80 : *kartrabhiprāyakriyāphalavivakṣāyām*

1.3.81 : *kartrabhiprāyakriyāphalavivakṣāyām*

1.3.86 : *kartrabhiprāyakriyāphalavivakṣāyām*

1.3.87 : *kartrabhiprāyakriyāphalavivakṣāyām*

1.3.88 : *kartrabhiprāyakriyāphalavivakṣāyām*

1.3.89 : *kartrabhiprāyakriyāphalavivakṣāyām*

1.4.42 : *(yatprakṛṣṭopakārakam) vivakṣitam*

1.4.54 : *(svātantryeṇa) vivakṣyate*

2.3.16 : *āsirvivakṣāyām*

2.3.67 : kartṛvivakṣāyām

2.3.53 : *kartrabhiprāyakriyāphalavivakṣāyām*

3.2.56 : *(prakṛter) avivakṣāyām*

3.3.131 : *viprakarṣavivakṣāyām*

3.3.143 : *bhūtavivakṣāyām*
*bhaviṣyadvivakṣāyām*

3.3.145 : *bhutavivakṣāyām*

3.4.71 : *(ādikarmaṇi...) vivakṣite*

4.1.90 : *(tasya chāttrā iti) vivakṣite ('rthe buddhisthe)*

4.1.93 : *(tasmin) vivakṣite (bhedena pratyapatyam)*
*(gotrāpatye) vivakṣite*

4.1.94 : *(yunyapatye) vivakṣite*

4.1.105 : *anantarāpatyavivakṣāyām*

4.1.161 : *apatyavivakṣāyām*

4.3.50 : *(phale ṛṇatvena) vivakṣite*

4.3.74 : *(mukhyaṁ yadapādānam) vivakṣitam*

4.3.163 : *(phale...) vivakṣite*

4.3.164 : *(phale...) vivakṣite*

5.1.12 : *(prakṛterananyārthatve) vivakṣite*
*(prakṛtyantaranivṛttitratra) vivakṣitā (na tādarthyam)*
*vivakṣitaḥ (prakṛtivikārabhavo labhyate)*

5.1.14 : *(carmaṇyapi prakṛtitvena) vivakṣite*

5.1.16 : *(prakṛtivikārabhāvastādarthyam ceha na) vivakṣitam...*
*(yogyatāmatram)*

5.2.41 : *(aparicchedakatvena) vivakṣyate*

5.4.47 : *(kṣepasya...) avivakṣāyām*

5.4.50 : (*nātra prakṛtir*) *vivakṣitā*

3) : 'The desire to express oneself by following the dictates of the rules', 'the desire to express oneself using specific grammatical means', as for example a *pratyaya*.

2.3.33 : (*dharmamātram karaṇatayā*) *vivakṣyate* (*na dravyam*)

2.3.52 : (*karmaṇi kārake śeṣatvena*) *vivakṣite*

2.3.53 : (*karmaṇi kārake śeṣatvena*) *vivakṣite*

2.3.54 : (*karmaṇi kārake śeṣatvena*) *vivakṣite*

2.3.55 : (*karmaṇi kārake śeṣatvena*) *vivakṣite*

2.4.35 : *ārdhadhātukavivakṣāyām*

3.1.31 : *ārdhadhātukavivakṣāyām*

4.1.90 : (*prāgdīvyatīye' jādau pratyaye*) *vivakṣite* (*buddhisthe*)

4.1.91 : (*prāgdīvyatīye' jādau pratyaye*) *vivakṣite*

4.1.95 : *śeṣavivakṣayā*

4.4.109 : (*yakārādau pratyaye*) *vivakṣite*

5.4.57 : (*ḍāci*) *vivakṣite*

4) : *Vivakṣā* as determining usage, which is then recorded by the rules

2.2.36 : (*viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvasya*) *vivakṣānibandhatvāt*

4.1.19 : *tasyedamvivakṣāyām*

4.3.86 : (*svātantryeṇa*) *vivakṣyate*

4.4.83 : *vivakṣito* (*ṛthaḥ*)

5) : The desire to express oneself = usage, to be observed to integrate or limit, specify or render the rules more flexible. It is made known by *'iti'* in the wording of the *sūtras*.

2.2.27 : (*itikaraṇaḥ...*) *vivakṣārthaḥ*

4.2.21 : (*itikaraṇastataśced*) *vivakṣā*

(*itikaraṇastataśced*) *vivakṣā*

4.2.55 : (*itikaraṇo*) *vivakṣārthaḥ*

(*itikaraṇastataśced*) *vivakṣā*

4.2.57 : (*itikaraṇastataśced*) *vivakṣā*

4.2.58 : (*itikaraṇo*) *vivakṣārthaḥ*

4.2.67 : (*itikaraṇo*) *vivakṣārthaḥ*

(*itikaraṇastataśced*) *vivakṣā*

4.4.125 : (*itikaraṇastataśced*) *vivakṣā*

5.1.16 : (*itikaraṇo*) *vivakṣārthaḥ*

(*itikaraṇastataśced*) *vivakṣā*

(*itikaraṇo*) *vivakṣārthaḥ* (*ityuktam*)

5.2.45 : (*itikaraṇastataśced*) *vivakṣā*

(*itikaraṇo*) *vivakṣārthaḥ* (*ityuktam*)

5.2.77 : (*itikaraṇo*) *vivakṣārthaḥ*

5.2.94 : (*itikaraṇo*) *vivakṣārthaḥ*

(*itikaraṇastataśced*) *vivakṣā*

5.2.95 : (*itikaraṇo*) *vivakṣārtho* (*nuvartate*)

5.2.107 : (*itikaraṇo*) *vivakṣārthaḥ*

5.4.10 : (*itikaraṇo*) *vivakṣārthaḥ*

6) : 'What a rule requires, or does not require'

3.2.61 : (*akārasya*) *vivakṣitatvāt*

7) : 'What a formulation intends, or does not intend'

4.1.92 : (*liṅgavacanādikamanyatsarvam*) *avivakṣitam*

4.3.120 : (*prakṛtipratyayārthayoḥ ṣaṣṭhyarthamātram tatsambandhi-mātram ca*)

4.4.2 : (*samkhyākālayor*) *avivakṣā*

5.1.47 : (*adhikaraṇatvena*) *vivakṣitatvāt*

5.1.131 : (*ayamartho*) *vivakṣitaḥ*

5.2.47 : (*ekatvam*) *vivakṣitam*

(*ādhikyamātram*) *vivakṣitam*

Occurrences of *vivakṣā* terminology in Kāśikāvṛtti VI-VII

1) : 'The desire to express or utter something'

8.1.7 : (*auttarādharyameva*) *vivakṣitam*

8.2.13 : (*udakasattāsambandhasāmānyam*) [*vivaksyate*]

2) : 'The desire to express a meaning provided for, or not provided for, by the rules'

6.1.26 : *dravamūrttisparśavivakṣāyām*

6.1.144 : (*na ... sātatyaprabandho*) *vivakṣitaḥ*

6.3.42 : (*pūrvapadārtho'tra jātiḥ sāmānyena*) *vivakṣitaḥ*

8.1.7 : (*sāmīpye*) *vivakṣite*
(*na sāmīpyam*) [*vivakṣitam*]

8.1.12 : (*purvaprathamayor*) *arthātiśayavivakṣāyām* (it is a *vārttika*)

8.2.13 : (*dadhātyartho na*) *vivakṣyate*

8.2.59 : *bhidikriyāvivakṣāyām*

3) : 'The desire to express oneself by following the dictates of the rules,' 'the desire to express oneself using specific grammatical means', as for example a *pratyaya*

6.3.34 : (*śtrīpūrvapadasya*) *avivakṣitatvāt*

6.3.42 : (*na va'strīpūrvapadasya*) *vivakṣitatvāt* (*vārttika* : *nava'strīpūrvapad-avivakṣitatvāt*)

6.3.45 : (*strītvasya*) *avivakṣitatvāt*

6) : 'What a rule requires, or does not require'

6.1.207 : *avivakṣite* (*karmaṇi*)

7) : What a formulation intends, or does not intend'

6.1.36 : (*bahuvacanasya*) *avivakṣitatvāt*

6.1.143 : (*napuṁsakaliṅgam*) *avivakṣitam*

6.2.37 : *vacanavivakṣārthaḥ*
(*bahuvacanam*) *avivakṣitam*

6.4.1 : *avivakṣitatvibhaktyartham*

8.2.46 : (*dhātutvamanukāryagataṁ sadapy*) *avivakṣitatvāt* further more

7.4.57 : (*karmaviśeṣasya*) *avivakṣitatvāt*

8.3.100 : (*sadapyāsevanaṁ na*) *vivakṣyate*

# Meaning of the Accusative in Desiderative

**V. P. Bhatta**

## Introduction

Sanskrit, perhaps, is the only language which has a large number of finite non-periphrastic desideratives *(sannantas)*. For instance consider, 'He wishes or desires to do' *(cikīrṣati)*, and 'He wishes or desires to eat' *(bubhukṣate)*. These desideratives are found to be used with the accusatives such as 'cooking' *(pākam)* in 'He desires to do cooking', *(pākam cikīrṣati)* and 'rice' *(odanam)* in 'He desires to eat rice' *(odanam bubhukṣate)* etc. When the desideratives are used, the agent (speaker) generally wishes to accomplish an object, and therefore, wishes to accomplish the actions as well. Consider for instance *'pākam cikīrṣati'* and *'odanam bubhukṣate'* once again. Here the person wishes to accomplish the cooking and the rice; and therefore, wishes to accomplish the action of doing and the action of eating respectively. Recognising this fact, Pāṇini has assigned the desiderative affix *(san)* optionally in the sense of the wishing (desiring) after a simple root expressing the (accomplishment of the) action, i. e. the object wished for, and having the same agent as the wisher there of (p. iii. 1. 7). Thus the desiderative *'cikīrṣati'* in *'pākam cikīrṣati'* can denote the desire to accomplish the action of doing which has the same agent as that of the desire and functions as the object of desire.

A point to be noted here is that Sanskrit allows desiderative constructions such as *'cikīrṣati'* only optionally; and hence periphrastic phrases such as *'kartum icchati'* can be freely used to express the same sense of desire as the finite desiderative form *'cikīrṣati'* in *'pākam cikīrṣati'* etc.

Also, it should be noted that Sanskrit restricts the desiderative affixes to the roots which are intended to express the objects of accomplishment; for instance the desiderative affix *(san)* is used after *'gam'* in *'gantum icchati'*

= *jigamiṣati* as the root *'gam'* is intended to express only the action of going, the object of accomplishment; whereas the same desiderative *(san)* is not used after *'gam'* in *'gamanena icchati grāmam'* as the root *'gam'* is not intended there to express the object of accomplishment. *Cit* is intended to express the instrument of accomplishing the village.

By far the single most important criterion for the desiderative usage is that the subject (agent) of the verb 'to wish' should also be the subject (agent) of the verb denoting the action, the object of accomplishment *(samānakartṛka)*. For instance, consider *'odanam bubhukṣate'*. Here the subject of the verb 'to wish' is also the subject of the verb 'to eat' expressing the action of eating (the rice), the object of accomplishment. Thus, the desideratives *'bubhukṣate'* etc. are not found in 'Yajñadatta wishes that Devadatta should eat' *(Devadattasya bhojanam icchati yajñadattaḥ)* where the subject of the verb 'to wish' is different from the subject of the verb 'to eat'. Also, while the desideratives are found to be mostly used in the sense of desire or wish *(icchāyām)*, the same desideratives are not found used in any other sense such as knowing; thus, *'kartum jānāti'* is not *'cikīrṣati'*. However, they are found to be used, as an exception, in the sense of doubt or fear of an imminent danger *(śankāyām)*. Thus, when one doubts or fears that the bank is in an imminent danger of breaching down, the desiderative usage *'śaṅke patiṣyati kūlam = kūlam pipatiṣati'* is found. Lastly but not lastly, desideratives are stems or bases from which primary and secondary derivatives can be formed, and thus *'nididhyāsitavyaḥ'* is explained.

**Problem :**

However, epistemologists differed as to whether the accusative-meanings (such as the cooking and the rice) function as the objects of the root-meanings or that of the desire; and also whether the root-meanings, such as the action of doing etc., function as the objects of desire or not. Consequently, different epistemologists have analysed the meanings of the accusative and that of the roots differently. Also, they have analysed the relationships between the accusative-objects and the root-meanings and the relationships between the root-meanings and the desire differently.

## Grammarians' theory

Influenced by Pāṇini (p. iii. i. 7), Kātyāyana (Vār, 10, on p. iii. 1. 7) analyses the desideratives such as 'He desires the doing' 'cikīrṣati' with an infinitive as 'He desires to do' *(kartum icchati)*; and holds that the root-meaning such as the action of doing functions as the object of the desire. Also, he opines that the desiderative such as *'devadattaḥ bubhkṣate'* is to be understood as 'Devadatta desires to eat rice by himself' *(devadattaḥ svataḥ bhoktum icchati)*; and therefore, the root-meaning such as the eating has the same agent as that of the desire (the desiderative is not used when Yajñadatta desires that Devadatta should eat *(devadattasya bhojanam icchati)*. Thus Vārtikakāra suggests a direct relationship between the root meaning such as the action, and the desire.

Now, the grammarians such as Nageśa (Laghumañjuṣā, p. 1075) perceive that, when the root-meaning such as the doing is the object *(karman)* of desire and has the same agent as that of the desire *(samānakartṛka)*, the same becomes the qualifier *(viśeṣaṇa)* with respect to the desire, the chief qualificand *(pradhāna)*; and therefore, the same root-meaning, i. e. the action, can be related to the desire through the relations of both the objecthood *(karmatva)* and the state of having the same agents *(samāna kartṛkatva)*. Further, they perceive that when the root-meaning, i. e. the action qualifies the desire, the latter (desire) becomes the qualificand of the former (action), and the relations will be both the community of locus *(sāmānādhikaraṇya)* and the state of having the reference described by the objectness of the root-meaning *(viṣayatānirūpita viṣayitva)*. For instance, consider the usage 'He desires to make the pot' *(ghaṭam cikīrṣati)*. Here the desiderative expresses the desire which is qualified by the root-meaning, i. e. the action of doing (making), through the community of locus and the state of having a reference to the objectness described by the objectness of the doing itself. Now, in such cases, the accusative expresses the objecthood to be related to the root-meaning, i. e. the action, directly through describing and to the desire indirectly through the action; and also in such cases the *ākhyāta* expresses the substratumness; therefore, the cognition produced is that one has the desire qualified by the root-meaning, i. e. the action of doing describing the objecthood resident in the pot.

**Accusative-meaning, too, is the object of desire.**

It should be observed here that, while the root-meanings such as the action of doing are the objects of desire *(icchākarman)*, the accusative-meanings such as the cooking, too, can function as the objects of desire indirectly through the actions, as they are the objects that one ultimately wishes for. Consider, for instance, *'pākam cikīrṣati'* and *'grāmam jigamiṣati'*. Here the cooking and the village, the accusative-meanings, which are the objects of doing and going respectively, function as the objects of desire indirectly through the actions of doing and going, as they are the objects that the agents wish for. Thus, recognizing this crucial linguistic factor, Patañjali (Mahābhāṣya on p. vii. i. 7) has suggested that, while the root-meaning such as the going has one object, namely the village, the desire has two objects, namely the village and the action of going *(gamer grāmaḥ karma iṣes tūbhe karmāṇi)*.

**Logician's Theory**

Logicians, especially Gaṅgeśa (Tattvacintāmaṇi, IV) etc. were greatly influenced by Patañjali's statement that accusative-meanings, too, can function as the objects of desire and so desire has two objects *(iṣes tūbhe karmāṇi)*, and also they were greatly influenced by the semantic fact that in producing the effects such as the cooking, the root-meanings such as the doing function as the means of accomplishment while being accomplished in themselves. Thus, they have analysed the accusative desiderative usages such as 'He desires to do cooking' *(pākam cikīrṣati)* as 'He desires to accomplish the cooking by means of the doing' *(pākam kṛtyā sādhayati)*; and have held that the desideratives express the desire that has the root-meaning, i. e. the action, as the qualifier and the accusative-meaning, i. e. the cooking, as the qualificand (object). Also thus, they have held that while the accusatives after *'pāka'* etc. express the objecthood of the form of qualificandness *(viśeṣyatārūpakaramatva)* relating to the desire through the describing, the instrumental expresses the instrumentality of the form of the qualifierness of the action that can be related to the desire through the relation of describing the accomplishedness of oneself *(svasadhyatvaprakāritā)*. Thus, one cognizes that one has the desire that has the action as the qualifier and

the cooking as the qualificand from *'pākam cikīrṣati'* etc.

## Saundaḍas Theory

However, the problem with such a theory of Gaṅgeśa is that it directly contradicts the grammatical convention that the desiderative suffix is applied after the root expressing the (accomplishment of the) object wished for; and hence the root-meaning, i. e. the action functions as the object of desire. Further, it contradicts the grammatical convention that the *kāraka* - case-meanings are to be related to the root-meanings such as the actions; and therefore, the objecthood expressed by the accusative *'pākam'* etc. needs to be related to the root-meaning such as the action of doing in *'pākam cikīrṣati'* etc. Also, suppose such a grammatical convention is not adhered to, then the problem would be that the incorrect accusative usages such as 'He desires to stay the home' *(gṛham tiṣṭhāsati)* instead of the correct locative usage 'He desires to stay at home' (gṛhe tiṣṭhāsati) could be contingent. This is possible on the ground that the desire to stay (as opposed to the staying) can have the home as its object; and hence the objecthood of the home expressed by the accusative *(gṛham)* can be related to the desire through describing.

Thus Saundaḍa (Nyāyakośa) proposes that the accusative in *'pākam cikīrṣati'* etc. must be admitted to express the objecthood of the form of objectness of cooking *(viṣayatva)*; and the same can be related to the root-meaning such as the action of doing; and thus the convention that kāraka-case-meanings are to be related to the root-meaning such as the action, gets adhered to. Also, he proposes that the root-meaning such as the action of doing can be held to function as the object of the form of being the object of desire and the same can be related to the desire through the objecthood and the state of having the same agent as that of the desire. Thus one cognizes in such cases that one has the desire that describes the objecthood of the action which in turn describes the objecthood of the cooking.

Now, the advantage of this proposal is that the incorrect accusative usage *'gṛham tiṣṭhāsati'* can be avoided. Since the staying cannot be said to describe the objecthood of the home—it can only describe the locushood of the home—the same objecthood cannot be related to the staying; and thus the accusative usage expressing the objecthood of the home becomes avoided.

## Gadādhara's theory

Gadādhara (Vyutpattivāda, II (ii. 17) was also convinced of the fact that the desiderative cannot express the desire having the root-meaning (such as the action) as the qualifier and the accusative-meaning as the qualificand; and therefore, the accusative-meaning such as the qualificandness of the cooking cannot be related to the desire through describing. Thus, he proposes that the desiderative must be admitted to express the desire having the root-meaning (the action) as the qualificand *(kṛtiviśeṣyakecchā)* such as 'Let there be the action accomplishing the cooking' *(pākakṛtir bhavatu)*. Now, since in such a theory, the accusative is admitted to express only the objecthood of the cooking relating to the action *(kṛtikarmatva)* and not the objecthood of the cooking relating to the desire *(icchākarmatvam)*, the incorrect accusative usage such as *'gṛham tiṣṭhāsati'*, wherein the home can appear as the object of desire, is avoided.

A point to be noted here is that, in the case of desideratives, the affix must be admitted to be expressing the desire as having the root-meaning as the qualificand *(dhātvarthaviśeṣyaka)*, (it cannot be admitted to be expressing the desire as having the root-meaning as the qualifier *dhātvartha'prakāraka)* to facilitate the usage *'odanam bubhukṣate'* wherein the eating of the rice is the qualificand. Also, it cannot be argued that in such a case as *'odanam bubhukṣate'*, only a desire wherein the eating is the qualifier and the rice is the qualificand through the objectness, is understood; for, the same usage *'odanam bubhukṣate'* is made even when the desire such as *'odanabhojanam bhavatu'*, wherein the eating of the rice is cognised to be the qualificand. Further, it should be noted that while the cognitions produced in the active usages such as *'pākam cikīrṣati'* and *'odanam bubhukṣate'* etc., are that one has the desire referring to the action of doing having the cooking as the object' *(pākādikarmakakṛtyādi viṣayakecchāśrayaḥ)* and that 'one has the desire referring to the eating having the rice as the object' *(odanakarmakabhojana viṣayakecchāśrayaḥ)*, the cognitions produced in the passive usages such as *'pākaḥ cikīrṣyate'* and *'odano bubhukṣyate'* are that 'the cooking is the object of the action of doing, the object of desire' *(icchāviṣayībhūta kṛti viṣayaḥ pākaḥ)* and that 'the rice is the object of eating, the object of desire' *(icchāviṣayībhūta bhakṣaṇnaviṣayaḥ odanaḥ)*.

## Conclusion :

While desideratives are a common features of all languages for expressing speaker's desire, non-periphrastic finite desideratives are the peculiarities of only Sanskrit. Now, since the primary condition for the desiderative usage is that the speaker must necessarily wish for the accomplishment of an object, the accusatives express the objects wished for in the desiderative usages as in *'pākam cikīrṣati'* etc. (excepting that nominative expresses recipient of disadvantages) (when the *san* is used in the sense of fear) as in *'svā mumūrṣati'* etc.

Also, since the speaker wishes to accomplish an object by accomplishing an action first, the desiderative roots express the actions functioning as the objects of desire. Also, since the speaker wishes to accomplish the object by accomplishing the action by himself, the action and the desire have the same person (speaker) as the agent *(samānakartṛka)*.

Grammarians, especially Nageśa and others perceived that when the root-meaning such as the action is the object of desire and has the same agent as that of the desire, the same becomes a qualifier qualifying the desire, the qualificand, through the objected *(karmatva)* and the state of having the same agent *(samānakartṛkatva)*.

However, the real point of difference among the epistemologists is regarding the function and the relation of the accusative-meanings. Following the Mahābhāṣya statement and general linguistic theory, Gaṅgeśa has proposed that the accusative meanings such as the cooking are the objects and hence the qualificands of desire; whereas the root-meanings such as the action of doing are the means and hence the qualifiers of the desire. However, since such a theory contradicts the general grammatical convention that kāraka-meanings are related to the actions, and also since such a theory cannot avoid the incorrect accusative usages such as *'gṛham tiṣṭhāsati'*, Saundada and Gadādhara have proposed the theory that the accusatives must be admitted to be expressive of the objecthood relating to the root-meanings (actions) and the same root-meanings are the objects and hence the qualificands of desire. Now, as regards the Mahābhāṣya statement : Patañjali does not deny that accusative-meanings are the objects of the root-

meanings; rather he merely states that when the root-meanings are the objects of desire, even the accusative-meanings, which are the objects of root-meanings, become the objects of desire indirectly. And this view is supported by the linguistic fact that the accusatives associated with the roots such as *'jnā'* and *'is'* referring to some objects as in ghaṭam *'jānāti'* and *'sukham icchati'* etc., refer to the objectness *(viṣayatva)* or the chief-qualificandness *(mukhyaviśeṣyatva)*; and hence the accusatives, associated with the desideratives referring to some objects, too, can refer to the objecthood, described by the root-meanings (actions), which can be considered as the chief qualificandness described by the desire.

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# Semantic Randomness and the Comparative Method

**Henry M. Hoenigswald**

1. The prototypical phonological innovations are *mergers*, since by Polivanov's Law, phonemes can merge spontaneously but will split only in conjunction with a merger. In the prehistory of Sanskrit an Indo-European **e* has merged with **o* into *a*. The merger can be inferred from such facts as that (1) Skt. *a* will in some words be found to correspond to one Greek vowel (viz. *e*), while in other words Skt. *a* will correspond to another Gk. vowel (viz. *a*). Contrariwise, (2) Gk. *h-*, word-initially before a vowel, corresponds to a Skt. *y-* in some words (Gk. *hepar*, Skt. *yakṛt* 'liver') but to a Skt. *s-* in others (Gk. *hepta*, Skt. *sapta* 'seven'). In the first case (1) it is Sanskrit that has innovated by eliminating a contrast; in the second case (2) it is Greek (phonetic properties are not at issue; only identities and differences). The languages, we say in such cases, are *related*.

2. Two related languages may be related in a special way : they may be *ancestor* (or older stage) and *descendant* (or later stage). When (3) one language has all the mergers while the other has none, the second is the ancestor of the first. To the extent that it is true that Sanskrit has only retentions but no innovations when matched against the modern Indo-Aryan languages, Sanskrit is their ancestor. In most—perhaps all—known histories, perfectly pure ancestor languages are not on record, but a collection of all the retentions may always be constructed. The result is known as a *reconstruction*. The process leading to a reconstruction as we have just described it[1] is the *comparative method* (which is not 'comparison' in the ordinary sense but rather a technique to tell phonological innovation from retention).

3. Thus, the German *Traum* 'dream' (with *tr-*) corresponds to

English *dream* (with *dr-*), but Ger. *treu* 'faithful' (with the same Ger. *tr-*) corresponds to E. *true* (with *tr-*); here German has innovated. On the other hand, Ger. *Schwalbe* 'swallow (the bird)' has *-lb-* while *schwelgen* 'indulge' has *-lg-*. Since both appear in E. in identical shape as *swallow*, English is the innovator here. The two languages continue one common parent language ('West Germanic') which had two different initial consonants in 'true' and in 'dream', and two different internal clusters in the name of the bird and in 'devour, indulge'. Latin and Italian, however, exhibit (practically) *only* instances in which differences in Latin are matched by identities in Italian (e.g. Lat. *crēdit* '[s] he believes' but *uidet* '[s] he sees', with *ē* and *i*, respectively, against Italian *crede*, rhyming with *vede*); (practically) *never* the other way round. Consequently we regard Latin as the ancestor of Italian[2].

4. This summary not only omits considerable additional detail; it is also flawed. Take the following case : German *scheinen* 'appear' matches English *shine* but Ger. *Schaum* 'froth' matches E. *scum*. Where German has one and the same *sch-* in both words, English shows a contrast between *sh-* and *sc-*. On the surface the lineup is the same as it is for *G. Traum* and *treu* as against *E. dream* and *true*. Our conclusion from that state of affairs was that German had undergone a sound-change where English had not (*see* section 3). But this cannot be the case here. Certain *particular* recurrences—we shall call them 'doublets'—give away the true story. Here is an example : Ger. *Schiff* corresponds to *E. ship* but also to E. *skip-* in *skipper*. The obvious fact that the two are semantically related (almost to the point of synonymy in this instance) shows that we are dealing here with only one earlier morpheme but, as it were, with two channels of transmission. From our extraneous knowledge of the historical setting, we designate the one carrying the *sh-* words as the channel of true descent and the one carrying the *sc-* words as loanwords from another Germanic language such as Dutch or Scandinavian[3]. To be sure, evidence of this kind is rare; we are not always lucky enough to have any of it.

5. We must now amend our earlier pronouncement. The rule covering *true* and *dream* and their German cognates should be this : if one phoneme (in a given environment) of a language A corresponds to one phoneme of a related language B in one set of words and to another phoneme in another

set of words *of randomly different meaning*, A is the innovator in that particular respect.

6. In spite of its tenuous character and its precarious standing, this proviso is of uncanny importance. An accident of history has allowed us to lift the veil just a little from a fundamental relationship between the two layers of *double articulation*, narrow phonological and wide-ranging morphemic structure which will never cease to obsess us. Distinguishing what is distinct is fine, but absolute Manichaean dichotomy is not, and when all is said and done, language is an integral whole.

**Annotations :**

1. There are others.
2. Something very much like this was in effect said long ago, though it was since forgotten. *See* Morpurgo Davies 1998 : 169.

   "Dialect borrowing is only half the story. There is another body of material to be taken care of before sound-changes can be formulated : *analogic* formations that look like sound-changes but aren't. These may in theory and under the same lucky circumstances be recognized in the same way as dialect loans, provided there is an added finding that the discrepancy between the doublets they create recurs also in *alternants* in *paradigms* (most of them originally created by sound-changes). The requirement of preliminary winnowing-out of non-sound-changes is, in other words, not always just a pious wish." *See* Hoenigswald 1983.

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# The Aurasa Son

**Ludo Rocher**

"In modern times the courts generally recognize only two kinds of sons, namely *aurasa* and *dattaka*, the other kinds of sons being held to be obsolete."[1] In fact, the claim that most of the various kinds of sons recognized by the ancient *ṛṣis* had become obsolete is not restricted to "modern times." It goes back far into the past. According to a verse attributed to Bṛhaspati, "present-day" people were no longer able to distinguish between the different kinds of sons introduced by the Seers :

*anekadhā kṛtāḥ putrā ṛṣibhiś-ca purātanaiḥ;*
*na śakyantedhunā kartuṁ śaktahīnair-idantanaiḥ*. (26.69)

Yet, the *dharmaśāstras*—including Bṛhaspati's—, the commentators, and the modern treatises on Hindu law prior to 1955/56 went on to list and, in many cases, define and discuss 12 different kinds of sons[2].

Even though the lists of 12 kinds of sons differ in detail[3], there are some features which most of them share :

(1) The different kinds of sons are always listed in descending order of importance. Says Nārada :

*pūrvaḥ pūrvaḥ smṛtaḥ śreṣṭho jaghanyo yo ya uttaraḥ* (13. 47 cd/45cd[4]).

And so does Viṣṇu :

*eteṣāṁ pūrvaḥ pūrvaḥ śreyān* (15. 28)

(2) Whereas all other sons appear at different places in the several lists, the *aurasa* son invariably occupies the first place. Some texts underscore this position explicitly. Vasiṣṭha's definition (17. 13; see below) does not include the term *aurasa*[5], but is followed by *prathamaḥ*. Viṣṇu's definition

(15. 2; *see* below) ends : *aurasaḥ prathamaḥ*. And the second half of the *śloka* in which Manu defines the *aurasa* son (9. 166; *see* below) reads :

*tam aurasaṁ vijānīyāt putraṁ prathamakalpitam (or -kalpakam).*

Being *prathama* "first" in a descending line implies that the *aurasa* is also *mukhya* "most important[6]." Vijñāneśvara introduces Yājñavalkya's list of sons (2. 128) as follows :

*adhunā mukhyagauṇaputrāṇāṁ dāyagrahaṇavyavasthāṁ darśayiṣyaṁs teṣāṁ svarūpaṁ tāvad āha.* |

Similarly, Nandapaṇḍita introduces Viṣṇu's definition of *aurasa* (15. 2) : *tatra mukhyaṁ lakṣayati*; and he comments : *prathamo mukhya ity-arthaḥ*. More important in the context of this article is the fact that Nandapaṇḍita subsequently introduces his discussion of the order eleven kinds of sons thus : *atha gauṇān lakṣayati*. In other words, the *aurasa* is the single *mukhya* "primary" son; all others are *gauṇa* "secondary" sons[7].

The idea that the *aurasa* son is different from all other kinds of sons is also expressed in another way. According to Manu :

*kṣetrajādīn sutān etān ekādaśa yathoditān*
*putrapratinidhīn āhuḥ kriyālopān manīṣiṇaḥ* | (9. 180)

Whatever the often discussed meaning of *kriyālopād*[8], it is clear that any one of the other sons is only a *pratinidhi* "substitute" for the *aurasa*[9]. The fact that, and the reason why, substitute sons are allowed only when a father does not have an *aurasa* son appears in a verse attributed to Atri *(Dharmakośa,* p. 1352) :

*aputreṇaiva kartavyaḥ putrapratinidhiḥ sadā* |
*piṇḍodakakriyāhetor yasmāt tasmāt prayatnataḥ*[10] | |

At this point it is necessary to digress for a moment and look at the peculiar position of one of the "substitutes," the *putrikāputra* "the son of an appointed daughter." In the lists of sons the *putrikāputra* occupies the second place with Baudhāyana, Yājñavalkya, Bṛhaspati, and Kauṭilya; the third place with Vasiṣṭha[11], Śaṅkha-Likhita, Nārada, Viṣṇu, and Yama; the fifth place with Hārīta and Devala[12]; the tenth place with Gautama[13]

Manu's position is ambivalent. The *putrikāputra* is not mentioned in the list of sons. On the other hand, on two occasions the son's son and the daughter's son (whom most commentators interpret as the son of a *putrikā*) are said to be equal[14] :

*pautradauhitrayor loke na viśeṣo 'sti dharmataḥ* (9. 133ab);
*pautradauhitrayor loke viśeṣo nopapadyate* (9. 139ab).

Yājñvalkya goes farther, and clearly equates the *putrikāputra* with the *aurasa* :

*auraso dharmapatnījas tatsamaḥ putrikāsutaḥ*. (2. 128cd)[15]

And so does Kauṭilya :

*tena tulyaḥ putrikāputraḥ*. (3. 7. 5)

When Bṛhaspati illustrates what it means to be a *pratinidhi* type of son, he excludes from that category not only the *aurasa* but the *putrikāputra* as well :

*ājyaṁ vinā yathā tailaṁ sadbhiḥ pratinidhīkṛtam* | (26. 78)
*tathaikādaśa putrās tu pautrikauraṣayor vinā.* ||

What this means is that the rules regarding the *aurasa* son that will be discussed in the remaining pages of this article in the opinion of many also apply to the *putrikāputra*.

The *aurasa* being different from the superior to all other kinds of sons entails that he is entitled to special privileges. Most important are those related to inheritance. Without going into details which are beyond the scope of this study, I will just mention that, according to a number of sources, the *aurasa* alone inherits the paternal property to the exclusion of any other son. According to Manu :

*eka evaurasaḥ putraḥ pitryasya vasunaḥ prabhuḥ* |
*śeṣānām—ānṛśaṁsyārthaṁ pradadyāt tu prajīvanam* || (9. 163)

Similarly Bṛhaspati, although again ranking the *putrikāputra* with the *aurasa* :

*eka evaurasaḥ pitrye dhane svāmī prakīrtitaḥ |*
*tattulyaḥ putrikāputro bhartavyās tv apare smṛtāḥ ||* (26. 70)

Nārada lays down the order in which different kinds of sons inherit as follows :

*kramād dhy-ete prapadyeran mṛte pitari taddhanam |*
*jyāyaso jyāyaso'bhāve jaghanyas-tad avāpnuyāt ||* (13. 49/46)

Yājñavalkya more generally concludes his discussion of the different kinds of sons as follows :

*piṇḍado'mśaharaś-caiṣāṁ pūrvābhāve paraḥ paraḥ |* (2. 132cd)

In view of these and other privileges accorded to the *aurasa* son, it is important to define exactly which kind of son qualifies as an *aurasa*. I will now examine the various definitions of the term *aurasa* in the *smṛtis*[16], and the several ways in which the commentators have tried to reconcile the differences.

A number of *smṛtis* provide remarkably similar definitions for the term *aurasa* :

(1) Vasiṣṭha :

*svayam-utpāditaḥ svakṣetre saṁskṛtāyām* (17. 13);

(2) Viṣṇu :

*svakṣetre saṁskṛtāyām utpāditaḥ svayam* (15. 2);

(3) Manu :

*svakṣetre saṁskṛtāyāṁ tu svayam-utpādayed dhi yam* (9. 166ab);

(4) Devala :

*saṁskṛtāyāṁ tu bhāryāyāṁ svayam-utpādito hi yaḥ (Dharmakośa,* p. 1350);

(5) Hārīta :17

*sādhvyāṁ svayam-utpāditaḥ (Dharmakośa,* p. 1265);

(6) Kauṭilya :

*svayaṁjātaḥ kṛtakriyāyām (3. 7. 4).*

All these definitions basically require only two qualifications for a son to be *aurasa* : (1) he must have been sired by his father, and (2) his mother must be his father's duly wedded wife. Yet, there are other restrictions.

**First restriction**

Except for Kauṭilya, who uses the term *jātaḥ*, all other texts quoted so far include either *utpādayet* or *utpāditaḥ* "sire, be sired." As a result, some commentators require that the mother must be the father's duly wedded wife, not only at the time of their son's birth, but also at the time of his conception. E. g., Kullūkabhaṭṭa (on Manu 9. 166) :

*svabhāryāyāṁ ... kṛtavivāhasaṁskārāyāṁ yaṁ svayam-utpādayet* | |

That means that, according to Kullūka, a son born after the wedding of his father and his mother, but conceived prior to it, is not *aurasa*[18].

**Second restriction**

According to some commentators, for a son to be *aurasa* he must not only have been conceived after the wedding of his parents; his mother must also be a virgin at that time. Kullūka's sentence which I quoted earlier in a truncated form reads :

*svabhāryāyāṁ kanyāvasthāyām-eva kṛtavivāhasaṁskārāyāṁ yaṁ svayam-utpādayet*[19].

**Third restriction**

At least one *dharmaśūtra* explicitly requires that the mother of an *aurasa* son be of the same *varṇa* as his father's[20]. Baudhāyana's definition of *aurasa,* although close to the definitions cited above, adds one important word :

*savarṇāyāṁ saṁskṛtāyāṁ svayam-utpāditam aurasaṁ putraṁ vidyāt* | (2. 2. 3. 14)

A number of commentators interpret the term *savarṇāyām* literally. For instance, Kullūka (on Manu 9. 166) quotes the Baudhāyana text to restrict Manu's definition of the *aurasa* son :

... *iti Baudhāyanavacanāt sajātīyāyām-eva svayam-utpādita auraso jñeyaḥ*[21] | Among the commentaries that accepted the requirement that the

mother of an *aurasa* son be of the same *varṇa* as his father's is Vijñāneśvara's *Mitākṣarā*, which was to become very influential in Anglo-Indian law. While commenting on Yājñavalkya's requirement that the *aurasa* son be *dharmapatnīja* (2.128a; *see* above), Vijñāneśvara says :

*savarṇā dharmavivāhoḍhā dharmapatnī; tasyāṁ jāta aurasaḥ putro mukhyaḥ*[22] |

Other commentators adopted a more liberal interpretation. Even Vijñāneśvara's own commentator, Bālambhaṭṭa, argues that the term *dharma* in *dharmapatnīja*, though preventing sons of *pratiloma* marriages to be *aurasa*, does not exclude sons of *anuloma* marriages, including sons of brahmans, kṣatriyas, and vaiśyas by duly wedded śūdrā wives (pp. 538-39)[23].

Similarly, Mitramiśra, who most often supports the views of the *Mitākṣarā*, in this case criticizes Vijñāneśvara for being inconsistent by excluding the sons of *anuloma* marriages, whom he elsewhere in the *Mitākṣarā* declares to be *aurasa* :

*"savarṇā dharmavivāhoḍhā dharmapatī; tasyāṁ jāta aurasaḥ putra" iti Mitākṣarā. vastutas tu nedam evaṁ boddhavyaṁ,* (1) *anulomajānāṁ mūrdhāvasiktādīnām auraseṣv antarbhāvād iti svavacanavirodhāt*[24] *—na hi te savarṇāyām-utpannāḥ;* (2) *brāhmaṇādiṣu yeṣāṁ yena dharmavivāhas-taduḍhotpannānāṁ aurasaprasaṅge teṣu satsv—apy—anyeṣāṁ dāyagrahaṇaprasaṅgāc-ca (Vyavahāraprakāśa* p. 467).

At the same time Mitramiśra proposes an interesting way of reconciling the *smṛtis* that require the wife to be *savarṇā* with those that do not :

*utkarṣābhiprāyaṁ savarṇābhiprāyam.*

The idea that a son born to a woman of the same *varṇa* as his father's is a superior *(utkṛṣṭa, prakṛṣṭa)* type of *aurasa* son, but that a son born to a mother of a lower *varṇa* is *aurasa* as well, is formulated even more clearly by Nandapaṇḍita (on Viṣṇu 15. 2) :

*yat tu "savarṇāyāṁ saṁskṛtāyāṁ svayam-utpāditam aurasam putraṁ jānīyād" iti Baudhāyanīyaṁ savarṇatvaviśeṣaṇam tad—auraseṣu prakṛṣṭaurasapratipādanāya nānyeṣāṁ nirākaraṇāyeti mantavyam*[25] |

As one might expect, even among those who accepted the fact that the son born to a duly wedded wife of a lower *varṇa* qualifies as *aurasa,* the question arose whether this extended meaning also applies to the case in which the husband was a twice-born and the wife a *śūdrā*[26]. The commentators disagree.

Rāmacandra (on Manu 9. 166), without explicitly excluding the son of a *śūdrā,* does so indirectly by referring to the *aurasa* as a *dvija* :

*svakṣetre saṁskṛtāyām-ūḍhāyāṁ svayam-utpādayed dvijaṁ tam aurasaṁ putraṁ ... vijānīyāt* |

In its comment on the term *savarṇā* at Āpastamba 2. 2. 3. 14, the *Pārijāta* (as quoted in the *Vyavahāraprakāśa*, p. 468) is willing to extend the meaning of the term to include any *dvija* female married to any *dvija* male—it is not clear whether or not both *anuloma* and *pratiloma* marriages are included, but for the son of a *śūdrā* wife to be *aurasa* his father has to be a *śūdrā* :

*savarṇātra dvijasya dvijā śūdrāsya śūdrā na tu brāhmaṇasya brāhmaṇī kṣatriyasya kṣatriyā vaiśyasya vaiśyā. anyathā brāhmaṇādipariṇīta-kṣatriyādiputrāṇāṁ dvādaśa-vidhaputrāntarbhāvo na syāt* |

In the passage from the *Mitākṣarā* where Vijñāneśvara includes sons of *anuloma* marriages among the *aurasas*, and, therefore, allows them to claim the entire inheritance prior to any other kind of sons, he immediately follows up by declaring that sons born of a *śūdrā* wife, though *aurasa,* do not enjoy that privilege :

*śūdrāputras tv auraso'pi kṛtsnaṁ bhāgam-anyābhāve'pi na labhate* |

Aparārka agrees, and adds a reason why this is so :

*dharmapatnī-śabdena śūdrā vyāvartate, tasyāḥ sahadharmacāritv-ābhāvāt.*

Bālambhaṭṭa, on the contrary, in the passage quoted earlier, holds that

*patnītvaṁ mukhyam-avivakṣitam-iti śūdrāpi tādṛśī dvijānām* (p. 538).

Nandapaṇḍita (on Viṣṇu 15. 2) deals with this problem at length. He first mentions an objection to the effect that the son of a *śūdrā* cannot qualify

as an *aurasa*, because the *śaudra* is listed among the "substitutes" for the *aurasa (putrapratinidhitvena tasya gaṇanam)* at Manu 9. 160[27]. Nandapaṇḍita retorts that the *śaudra* who is made a substitute *(pratinidhīkriyate)* by Manu is not a son born to a duly wedded *śūdrā* woman, but to a *śūdrā* who is not his father's wife. And he concludes that nothing prevents the son born to a male dvija by his duly wedded *śūdrā* wife from being *aurasa* :

*tasmād ūḍhāyāṁ śūdrāyām utpannasyaurasatve na kiṁcid bādhakam |*

This brief survey of the various definitions of the term *aurasa* in the *smṛtis* and of some of the ways in which the commentators have tried to reconcile the differences clearly shows that the concept of an *aurasa* son in Hindu legal literature is far more varied and complex than the English "legitimate son," the term which is most often used to translate it.

**Annotations :**

1. P. V. Kane : *History of Dharmaśāstra*, vol. 3, p. 657. Kane refers to *Nagindas v. Bachoo* (1916) 43 I. A. 56, 57, and adds : "But two more kinds of sons have been recognized in modern times in certain provinces only, namely the kṛtrima in Mithilā (modern Tirhut) and the putrikāputra among the Nambudri brāhmaṇas of Malabar." For details, *see Ibid.,* pp. 659 and 660.
2. In only very few *smṛtis* is the number of sons different from 12 : Baudhāyana (2. 2. 3. 31-33) and Bṛhaspati (26. 70-74) list 13, Devala *(Dharmakośa*, vol. I, p. 1373; all references to the *Dharmakośa* are to vol. i : *Vyavahārakāṇḍa*) 15. The view that these were merely apparent deviations from the number 12 is clearly expressed by Nandapaṇḍita (on Viṣṇu 15. 2) : *yat tu Bṛhaspatinā "putrās trayodaśa proktā Manunā ye 'nupūrvaśa"* (26. 77ab) *iti trayodaśatvaṁ, Devalena ca "putrākhyā daśa pañca ca" iti pañcadaśatvam-uktaṁ, tad avāntarīyabhedam-ādāya nātyantabhedeneti na virodhaḥ, teṣāṁ apy atrāntarbhāvāt |*
3. For comparative lists, *see* Kane : *op. cit.,* p. 645; Mayne : *Treatise on Hindu Law and Usage,* 11th ed., 1950, p. 107.
4. The first verse number refers to Jolly's *Nāradasmṛti* edition (1885), the second to Lariviere's (1989).
5. The term *aurasa* does occur elsewhere in the text, in connection with the share of an adopted son in case an *aurasa* is born after the adoption : *tasmiṁś (=*

*dattake) cet pratigṛhīta aurasaḥ putra utpādyate caturbhāgabhāgi syād dattakaḥ* (Vasiṣṭha 15. 9).

6. Baudhāyana (2. 2. 3. 33) quotes the opinion of Aupajanghani to the effect that the *aurasa* is the one and only true son : *teṣāṁ prathama evety-Aupajaṅghaniḥ*, on which Govindarāja comments : *Aupajaṅghanir-ācāryo manyate-sma aurasa eva putro na putrikāputrādaya iti.*

7. *Cf.* Aparārka (on Vasiṣṭha 17. 13, sub Yājñavalkya 2. 128) : *prathamo mukhyaḥ. tena sa eva putraśabdasya mukhyo 'rthaḥ kṣetrajādis tu gauṇaḥ.*

8. *Eg., Vyavahāraprakāśa*, p. 480 : *kriyālopāt pariṇayādikriyālopād ity arthaḥ. kriyālopād iti pratinidhitve hetuḥ | Smṛticandrikāyāṁ tu "aurasābhāve tatkartṛkaśrāddhādilopād bibhyato manīṣiṇa ṛṣaya ekādaśa putranidhīn kartavyatvenāhur" iti vyākhyātam |*

9. Immediately after the list of 12 kinds of sons Manu (9. 161) exhibits the following simile :

*yādṛśaṁ phalam-āpnoti kuplavaiḥ saṁtarañ jalam |*
*tādṛśaṁ phalam-āpnoti kuputraiḥ saṁtaraṁs tamaḥ ||*

Whether or not the term *kuputra* was originally meant to refer to "bad" sons generally, as opposed to "good" sons, the commentators agree that *kuputra* here refers to any son who is not an *aurasa*. E.g. Kullūka : *kuputraiḥ kṣetrajādibhiḥ |*

10. *Cf.* a verse attributed, among others, to Yama *(Dharmakośa,* p. 1352) :

*aputreṇa sutaḥ kāryo yādṛk tādṛk prayatnataḥ |*
*piṇḍodakakriyāhetor-nāmasaṁkīrtanāya ca ||*

Jolly's interpretation of the existence of other sons than the *aurasa* : "originally an economic motive was perhaps a more important factor in it—to get for the family as many powerful workers as possible" *(Law and Custom,* p. 156), was dismissed by Kane *(op. cit.,* pp. 648-49) and Mayne *(op. cit.,* p. 114). Kane and Mayne refer to the fact that only in the absence of an *aurasa* son substitute sons could be recurred to. Both also agree that the lists of 12 different kinds of sons were due to "the systematizing habit of Sanskrit writers" (Mayne), or to "the ancient writers' great *penchant* for divisons and sub-divisions based upon very slight differences of circumstances" (Kane).

11. Vasiṣṭha (17. 15) lists the *putrikā* rather than the *putrikāputra : tṛtīyaḥ putrikā vijñāyate.*

12. In the enumeration of sons attributed to Devala (Nandapaṇḍita on Viṣṇu 15. 27; *cf. Dharmakośa*, p. 1373 : *smṛtyantaram) putrikāputra* occupies the fifth place, *putrikā* the second.

13. For an interpretation of this unusual and extreme position at Gautama 28. 33, see, e.g., the *Mitākṣarā* (on Yājñavalkya 2. 132) : *Gautamīye tu pautrikeyasya daśamatvena pāṭho vijātīyaviṣayaḥ.*

14. Hence Bṛhaspati's statement (26. 77) that Manu recognizes 13 kinds of sons :

*putrās trayodaśa proktā Manunā ye'nupūrvaśaḥ |*
*saṁtānakāraṇaṁ teṣām aurasaḥ putrikā tathā ||*

*Cf.* also Mayne *(op. cit.,* p. 107) : "Manu mentions the aurasa and the appointed daughter's son as of equal status and then mentions the aurasa and the eleven secondary sons, altogether, thirteen sons."

15. The *Mitākṣarā* comments : *tatsamaḥ putrikāputraḥ tatsama aurasasamaḥ putrikāyāḥ sutaḥ putrikāsutaḥ,* but also adds an alternative interpretation based on Vasiṣṭha 17. 15 (*cf.* note 11) : *athavā putrikaiva sutaḥ. so'py-auraṣasama eva pitravayavānām alpatvān mātravayavānāṁ bāhulyatvāc-ca.*

16. I must mention in passing that some commentators offer etymological explanations for the term *aurasa*. For instance, the *Mitākṣarā* (on Yājñavalkya 2. 128) says that *aurasa* means *uraso jātaḥ; cf.* Aparārka (on the same verse) : *urasi bhāvaḥ*. Hence the translation of *aurasa* as "son of the body." According to Rāghavānanda (on Manu 9. 166), *svayam-udvāhitāyām uraḥsaṁśleṣaṇajātatvāad aurasaḥ; kṣetraje tadabhāvo Nāradenokto "gātrair gātrāny asaṁspṛśann"* (12. 82d/81d) *ity ādinā |*

17. As far as we know from the fragments collected by Jolly (Munich, 1889), Hārīta does not use the term *aurasa.*

18. Nevertheless, in *Pedda Amamni v. Zamindar of Marungapuri* (1874) 1 I. A. 282, 293, the Privy Council decided that the fact that a son was conceived prior to the wedding of his parents does not prevent him from being a "legitimate" son. "That would be a most inconvenient doctrine. If it is the law that law must be administered. Their Lordships, however, do not think that it is the Hindu law. They are of opinion, that the Hindu Law is the same in that respect as the

English law." This decision drew strong criticism from Gooroodass Banerjee : "with every respect due to the decision of the highest tribunal for India, I may be permitted to say that the doctrine of procreation in lawful wedlock is necessary to constitute legitimacy, is not only supported by the language of the texts cited above, but is also in accordance with the general spirit of the Hindu law, by which the nuptial rites are primarily meant only for girls [note : Manu 8. 226]; while the necessity of marrying girls before puberty, reduces the practical inconvenience of the doctrine within the narrowest possible limits." *(Marriage and Strīdhana,* 3rd ed., 1913, p. 166).

19. Although Kullūka does not say so explicitly, he may have been influenced here by several *smṛti* texts which require that a bride be *ananyapūrvā* "not having belonged to another man." *Cf.* Yājñavalkya 1. 52 *ananyapūrvikā*, Āpastamba 2. 6. 13. 1 *apūrvā*, etc.

20. One might be tempted to read the same requirement into Āpastamba 2. 6. 13. 1-4, were it not that Āpastamba's is the only text that is brief and vague on the subject of sons, to the extent of not mentioning any of the 12 kinds of sons by name. Yet, Āpastamba distinguishes between two types of sons : (1) sons begotten on a woman who is *savarṇā, apūrvā*, and *śāstravihitā*, and (2) sons by a woman who is *pūrvavatī,* by one who is *asaṁskṛtā*, and sons begotten *varṇāntare maithune*. The privileges of the first type of sons *(teṣāṁ karmabhiḥ sambandhaḥ, dāyenāvyatikramaś-ca)* have been differently interpreted. In the second case there is *doṣa* on the part of the father (or the parents ?), and, more important, the son *(tatrāpi doṣavān putra eva)*. Based on Pāṇini 5. 3. 14, according to which the suffix *-tra* in *tatra* can have other meanings than that of the locative, Haradatta interprets the latter sentence as follows : *tābhyām-ubhābhyām-api putra evātiśayena doṣavān.* This seems to indicate that for Āpastamba and, even more so for his commentator Haradatta, the son of an *asavarṇa* marriage did not qualify as an *aurasa.*

21. Similarly, Sarvajñanārāyaṇa (on the same verse) : *svakṣetre svasavarṇakṣetre.*

22. The term *dharmavivāhoḍhā* may imply that, in Vijñaneśvara's opinion, the parents' wedding must have been one of the "higher," not one of the "lower" types of wedding. *Cf.* Viśvarūpa's *Balakṛīdā* (on the same verse) : *savarṇā brāhmādivivāhasaṁskṛtā dharmapatni.*

23. References to the *Bālambhaṭṭī* are according to the Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series (work 41) edition.

24. This is a reference to a passage in the *Mitākṣara* (on Yājñavalkya 2. 132cd) where Vijñāneśvara includes sons of *anuloma* marriages among the *aurasas* and, hence, makes them inherit prior to all other kinds of sons : *anulomajānāṁ mūrdhāvasiktādīnām auraseṣv antarbhāvāt teṣām-apy-abhāve kṣetrajādināṁ dāyaharatvaṁ boddhavyam* |

25. *Cf.* Rāghavānanda (on Manu 9. 166, after quoting Baudhāyana) : *atra savarṇāpadaṁ dvijatvādijātiparam. anyathā kṣatriyāvaiśyāśūdrāsu jātānāṁ viprāditrayapitṛkānāṁ aurasābhāvenāputratvāpattir-iti. tatra paraṁ sajātīye mukhyam-aurasatvam-anyeṣāṁ gauṇam-iti bhāvaḥ* |

26. Note that a number of *smṛti* texts list the son of a *śūdrā* wife separately, invariably at or near the end of their lists.

27. *Cf.* Aparārka (on Yājñavalkya 2. 128) : *ata eva putrapratinidhiṣu ca tam āha Manuḥ.*

# Sāra, A-sāra, Saṁ-sāra

**Minoru Hara**

These three words do not appear in consecutive order with prefixes *a-* and *sam-* as indicated above in the title, but appear usually in the order *asāre saṁsāre sāra.* The phrase is apparently intended to show the poetical device of alliteration (*anuprāsa*).

The phrase without the last word *sāra*, that is *asāra saṁsāra*, means "the current of transmigration (*saṁsāra*), destitute of solid essence (*a-sāra*)," and thus is imbued with a pessimistic tinge, peculiar to the Hindu religion of asceticism and renunciation. A few examples suffice to illustrate this :

(0-1) *asāro* 'yaṁ *saṁsāraḥ*/giri-nadī-vegopamaṁ yauvanaṁ/ tṛṇāgnisamaṁ jīvitam/abhra-cchāyā-sadṛśā bhogāḥ/svapna-sadṛśaḥ putra-mitra-bhṛtya-kalatra-varga-sambandhaḥ ||

(PPT. Book 1, tale 4, p. 23, lines 18-21).

"Essenceless is this world of transmigration. Youth is comparable to a rapid current in a mountain. Life is equal to fire on grass. Enjoyments are like clouds. Association with son, friends, servants and wife is like a dream."

(0-2) aho *asāro* 'yaṁ *saṁsāraḥ*/kṣaṇa-bhaṅgurāḥ prāṇāḥ/svapnasadṛśāḥ priya-samāgamāḥ/indrajālavat kuṭumba-parigrahaḥ/tad dharmaṁ muktvānyā gatir nāsti ||

(PPT. Book 3, tale 3, p.190, lines 6-8).

"Oh, essenceless indeed is this world of transmigration. Life is instantly breaking. Meeting with dear persons is like a dream. A family is like a magic. Thus, there is no way other than (practising) meritorious acts."

(0-3) bhogās tuṅgataraṅgabhaṅga-capalāḥ prāṇāḥ kṣaṇa-dhvaṁsinaḥ stokāny eva dināni yauvana-sukhaṁ prītiḥ priyeṣv asthirā tat *saṁsāram*

*asāram* eva nikhilaṁ buddhvā budhā bodhane lokānugraha-peśalena manasā yatnaḥ samādhīyatām ||

(IS. 4634)

"Enjoyments are unsteady like the breaking of billows. Life perishes in a moment. The happiness of youth lasts only a few days and love with one's beloved is unstable. Oh, wise men, having realized the whole world of transmigration as essenceless, an effort should be made for enlightenment with your mind skilled at helping people."[1]

With the addition to this of the word *sāra* (essence), the phrase is endowed with a positive value, meaning "something solid or essential (*sāra*) in this ephemeral world of human existence." An oft-quoted passage of the Pañcatantra reads,

Ananta-pāram kila śabda-śāstraṁ
svalpaṁ tathāyur bahavaś ca vighnāḥ |
*sāraṁ* tato grāhyam apāsya phalgu
haṁsair yathā kṣīram ivāmbu-madyāt ||

(IS. 243)

"Verbal science is shoreless(ly extended), life is short and beset with many obstacles. Thus, one should grasp the essential, leaving the essenceless, as geese extract the milk out of water (mixed)."[2]

But, the content of the word *sāra* here varies in accordance with the nature of the contexts in which it occurs. It is, then, an interesting task to collect the passages which contain the phrase and investigate their contexts, analysing what is meant by the word *sāra* in each and every context. This analysis will show what is considered by the ancient Indians to be the most valuable thing in human life, and eventually reveal some aspects of the Hindu view of life in general.

Though material will be multiplied in the course of further extensive reading in Sanskrit texts, here is presented the result of modest gleanings from classical Sanskrit literature which may encourage more competent scholars to further comprehensive and systematic studies in the future.

# I

## (1) *asāre saṁsāre...*

In addition to the three passages quoted above, we have the following examples.

(1-1) The essencelessness of the world of transmigration is often compared to the interior of a plantain tree (kadalī) :

*Asāraḥ saṁsāraḥ* sārāsa-kadalī-*sāra*-sadṛśo[3]
lasad-vidyul-lekhā-cakita-capalaṁ jīvatam idaṁ |
Yad etat tāruṇyaṁ naga-gata-nadī-vega-sadṛśam
aho dhārṣṭyaṁ puṁsāṁ tad api viṣayān dhāvati manaḥ ||
(MSS. 3734)

"Essenceless is the world of transmigration as a juicy stem of a plantain tree. Human life is shaky and unsteady like a momentary lightning flash. Youthfulness is similar to the rapids of a mountain-stream. Oh, men's impudence, that their mind still runs after (the enjoyment of) sense-objects."[4]

(1-2) An expression *asāra ghora-saṁsāra* is found in an address to Viṣṇu by Garuḍa :

Bhagavan devadeveśa śaraṇā-gata-vatsala |
*asāre* ghora-*saṁsare* sarva-duḥkha-malīmase ||
(Pretakalpa 16.2)

"O Lord, the master god among gods, compassionate to those who seek refuge in this essenceless, terrible world of transmigration, stained by all sorts of suffering."

(1-3) In this ephemeral world, meeting ends in separation.

*Asāre* bata *saṁsāre* karma-tantraḥ śarīriṇāṁ |
jāyante priya-saṁyogā viyoge hṛdaya-chidaḥ ||
(MSS. 3743)

"In this essenceless world of transmigration, the thread of karma is interwoven through human beings. Union with one's beloved becomes heart-rendering at separation."

(1-4) We have a verse tinged with a pessimistic and deploring tone.

*Asāre saṁsāre* viṣama-viṣa-pāke nṛpa-sukhe
kṛtāntenācānte prakṛti-capale jīvita-bale |
Ohruvāpāye kāye viṣaya-mṛgatṛṣṇāhata-hṛdaḥ
kṣara-prāṇaiḥ prāṇān ahaha parimuṣṇanti kudhiyaḥ ||
(MSS. 3744)

"In this essenceless world of transmigration, where even the happiness of kings eventually develops into vehement poison, where life-power, fickle by nature, is sucked away by death, and where the body is subject to sure annihilation, fools, whose mind are carried away by the mirage of (the enjoyment of) sense-objects, hurt their life by flowing breaths."[5]

(1-5) It is, then, a vain effort to look for happiness in this world. It simply ends in delusion :

*Asāre* khalu *saṁsāre* sukha-bhrāntiḥ śarīrināṁ |
lālā-pānam ivāṅguṣṭhe bālānāṁ stanya-vibhramaḥ ||
(MSS. 3742)

"In this essenceless world of transmigration, people conceive a delusion of happiness, as babies falsely consider the playful sucking on their thumbs as sucking their mother's breasts."[6]

(1-6) An Epic passage, then, recommends a wise man to abandon it :

Janma-mṛtyu-jarā-vyādhi-vedanābhir upadrutaṁ |
*asāram* imam asvantaṁ *saṁsāraṁ* tyajataḥ sukham ||
(MBh. 12.9.33=Hitopadeśa 4.87)

"By abandoning this essenceless and unpleasant world of transmigration, which is beset by the anguish of birth, death, old age, and illness, one becomes happy."[7]

(1-7) Thus, a certain idea came into the mind of a wealthy merchant Dhanana one day, which led him to renunciation :

evaṁ sakala-saṁpadām āśrayasya tasya cetasi sarva-vastuṣv anitya-buddhir utpannā : kim iti, *saṁsāro 'yam asāraḥ* : sarvam api vastu-jātaṁ anityam

(Vikramacarita Southern Recension of 7, p.78. lines 16-18)

"Though he was thus endowed with all good fortune, there arose in his heart a consciousness of the transiency of all goods : 'How now ! unprofitable is this round of existence, and the whole mass of objects of wealth is transient.'"

(Edgerton)[8-9]

(1-8) One should always think of *asāratā* of *saṁsāra :*

Kāharniśam anucintyā *saṁsārāsāratā* na tu pramadā |
Kā preyasī vidheyā karuṇā dākṣiṇyam atha maitrī ||
(IS. 1717)

"What should be thought of day and night ? Essencelessness (*asāratā*) of the world of transmigration (*samsāra*), but not women.

What should be taken to be the dearest ? Compassion, skilfulness and friendliness."

## II

### (2) *asāra* (*niḥsāra*) and *sāra*.

(2-1) *asāra* and *sāra*.

Prior to considering *asāre saṁsāre sāra*, it is convenient to examine passages where the two words, *asāra* and *sāra*, are contrasted.

(2-1-1) The best known example is found in the Pāli Dhammapada.

*Asāre sāra*-matino[10] *sāre cāsāra*-dassino |
te *sāraṁ* nādhigacchanti micchā-saṅkappa-gocarā ||[11]
*Sārāñ* ca *sārato* ñatvā *asārāñ* ca *asārato* |
te *sāraṁ* adhigacchanti sammā-saṅkappa-gocarā ||
(Dhammapada 12)

"Holding the essential in the unessential, and seeing in the essential the unessential, they fail to reach the essential, their judgement being subject to error.

Knowing the essential as the essential and the unessential as the unessential, they reach the essential, their judgement being subject to right."[12]

(2-1-2) Two things are contrasted as *asāra* and *sāra*. One is recommended to take *sāra* out of *asāra*. In the Pāli "Kaṅha-jātaka" we read,

*Asārassa* dhanassa dānaṁ *sāro*, bahu-roga-sādhāraṇa-bhāvena *asārassa* kāyassa sīlavantesu abhivādanādi-kammaṁ *sāro*. aniccatābhibhūtassa *asārassa* jīvatassa aniccādivasena vipassanā-yogo *sāro*. tasmā *asārehi* bhogehi *sāra*-gahaṇatthaṁ dānaṁ dassāmi | (Kaṅhajātaka 440, J. 4. 7. 23-27)

"Charity is the essence of essenceless wealth. Such actions as respectful greeting to the virtuous, and other things are the essence of body, essenceless because of its being the receptacle of various diseases. The essence of life, essenceless because of its being subject to transitoriness, is one's application to insight by means of transitory(-ness) and others (*dukkha* and *anattā* ?). Thus, I practise charity in order to get the essence from essenceless enjoyment."

(2-1-3) We have a Sanskrit verse in a similar tone :

Dānaṁ vittād ṛtaṁ vācaḥ kīrti-dharmau tathāyuṣaḥ |
paropakaraṇaṁ kāyād *asārāt sāram* āharet | |
(IS.2750)

"Man should take from the essenceless the essence; from wealth charity,[13] from speech the truth, from life fame and merit, from the body altruism."[14]

Here the *sāra*-s are the act of giving (*dāna*), truth (*ṛta*), fame (*kīrti*) and religious merit (*dharma*) and altruism (*paropakaraṇa*), while the *asāra*-s are wealth (*vitta*), speech (*vāc*), life (*āyus*) and body (*kāya*).[15]

(2-2) *niḥsāra* and *sāra* :

(2-2-1) The contrast of wealth and charity is further emphasized :

Dhanasya *niḥsāra*-laghoḥ sa *sāro*
yad dīyate loka-hitonmukhena |
nidhānatāṁ yāti hi dīyamānam
adīyamānaṁ nidhanaika-niṣṭham | |
(JM. 2. 50)

"Wealth is a contemptible thing, because it is pithless, yet it has one

virtue, that it can be given away by him who aims at the welfare of the creature; for if given away, it becomes a treasure, otherwise its ultimate object is only death."

(Speijer)

(2-2-2) The human world (*mānuṣya*) is styled as essenceless (*niḥsāra*). A man, who seeks after the essence there, is deluded :

Mānuṣye kadalī-stambha-*niḥsāre sāra*-mārgaṇam |
yaḥ karoti sa saṁmūḍho jala-budbuda-saṁnibhe ||
(YS. 3. 8=IS. 4823)

"He, who seeks after the essence in the essenceless world of human beings, comparable to the stem of the Kadalī tree and to foam in water, is a fool."

### (3) *Sāra* and *saṁsāra*

(3-1) In the Kuṭṭanīmata, the courtesan Mālatī is called *saṁsāra-sāra*, the essence of the world of transmigration :

Śithilayatu kusama-cāpaṁ kṣipatu śarān vāṇadhau manojanmā *saṁsāra-sāra*-bhūtā vicarati bhuvi mālatī yāvat ||
(Kuṭṭanimata 121)

"Let the god of love unstring his flower-bow and place his arrows in his quiver, as long as Mālatī, the essence of the world of transmigration, roams over the earth."

## IV

### (4) *asāre saṁsāre sāra*

Despite its essencelessness, there exists something essential, what is indicated here by the word "essence" (*sāra*) is nothing but the most valuable object in human life. Below, we shall investigate this.

(4-1-1) The first sounds economico-practical :

*Asāre* khalu *saṁsāre sāraṁ* śvaśura-mandiram |
Haro Himālaye śete Viṣṇuḥ śete mahodadhau ||
(IS. 776=MSS. 3739-40)

"The essence of the essenceless world of transmigration is the house of one's father-in-law. Śiva reposes in the Himālaya and Viṣṇu in the Ocean."

(4-1-2) The second sounds erotic, *sāra* being "woman." In his reflections, king Vikramāditya says :

tan mahat kaṣṭam kṛtvāpi *saṁsāra-sāra*-bhūtaṁ strī-sukhaṁ eva bhoktavyam, uktaṁ ca

*Asāre* khalu *saṁsāre sāraṁ* sāraṅga-locanā
tad-arthaṁ dhanaṁ icchanti tat-tyāge tu dhanena kim ||[16]
*asāra*-bhūte *saṁsāre sāra*-bhūtā nitambinī
iti saṁcintya vai śaṁbhur ardhāṅge kāminīṁ dadhau ||[17]

tad Vikramārko rājātra samāgatah : taṁ ekaṁ agrahāraṁ yācayitvā kām cana kanyāṁ vivahya *saṁsāra*-sukhaṁ anubhaviṣyāmi ||

(Vikramacarita 6 Story Southern Recension) (p. 74, lines 5-12)

"Therefore even at the expense of great trouble one should certainly enjoy the pleasure of (the love of) women, a happiness which is the cream of this round of existence. And it is said :

'In this unprofitable round of existence, the best thing of all is a gazell-eyed woman. For her sake men seek after wealth, and without her what is the use of wealth ? In this unprofitable round of existence, the best thing of all is a fair hipped woman. It was with this thought in mind, I ween, that Śambhu took his beloved upon his lap.'[18]

Now King Vikramārka has come hither. So I will beg of him a donation of land, marry some girl, and engage in worldly pleasure..."

(Edgerton)

(4-1-3) Gamblers consider gambling as *sāra*. A gambler addresses king Vikrama as follows,

Tasmād *asāre saṁsāre sāraṁ* dyūta-sukhaṁ, yato 'sya layaprārthanāṁ yogino 'pi kurvanti (Vikramacarita Jainistic Recension of 27, 4 prose, p. 200)

"Therefore in this unprofitable round of existence, the cream of all is

the joy of the play, so that even ascetics cherish the desire to become absorbed in it."

(Edgerton)

(4-1-4) The plighted word is called the *sāra* :

*Saṁsāre 'sāratāsāre* vācā *sāra*-samuccayaḥ |
vācā vicalitā yasya sukṛtaṁ tena hāritam ||

(Vikramacarita Brief Recention of 24, p. 183, lines 20-21)

"In this wholly unprofitable round of existence (a plighted) word is the only thing of importance. Whosoever breaks his word loses his acquired merit.".

(Edgerton)

(4-1-5) Renunciation is recommended. He who seeks vainly after *sāra* in *saṁsāra* is betrayed and resorts to detachment (*vairāgya*), renouncing the world :

*Saṁsāram* eva *niḥsāraṁ* dṛṣṭvā *sāra*-didṛkṣayā |
pravrajanty akṛtodvāhāḥ paraṁ vairāgyaṁ āsritāḥ ||

(Nāradaparivrājaka Upaniṣad 3. O. Schrader ed., p. 139, lines 2-3)

"Seeing that *saṁsāra* is truly without substance, people are imbued with intense detachment and, desirous of seeing the substance, renounce while they are still unmarried." (Olivelle)

(4-2) Though the following passages do not contain the word *sāra* as such, what is meant there has a similar purport.

(4-2-1) Corresponding to (4-1-2) above, which praises the enjoyment of women, we have a verse in the Mālatīmādhava, where the hero condemns a murderer of Mālatī, considering his beloved as if *sāra*. We notice that in the case of Bhavabhūti the tone is much more serious than Vikramāditya !

*Asāraṁ saṁsāraṁ* parimuṣita-ratnaṁ tribhuvanaṁ |
nirālokaṁ lokaṁ maraṇa-śaraṇaṁ bāndhava-janaṁ ||

adarpaṁ kandarpaṁ jana-nayana-nirmāṇaṁ aphalaṁ jagaj jīrṇāraṇyaṁ kathaṁ asi vidhātuṁ vyavasitaḥ ||

(Mālatīmādhava 5. 30)

"How did you decide to make this world of transmigration deprived of essence, the three-worlds of a jewel, the shining world of light, her kinsfolk of hope to live, the god Kāma of pride, the creation of human eyes of fruit, and to make the world like a weathered forest ?"

(4-2-2) Corresponding to (4-1-5) above, we have a verse in the Prabodhacandrodaya, which praises detachment (*vairāgya*) :

*Asāre saṁsāre* virāsa-pariṇāme tu viduṣāṁ |
viyogo vairāgyaṁ dradhayati vitanvañ śama-sukham ||
(Prabodhacandrodaya 5.28cd)

"On the contrary, in this essenceless world of transmigration which develops eventually into tastelessness, separation strengthens detachment in the case of the wise, manifesting the happiness of tranquillity."

(4-2-3) Friendship is also considered as the *sāra* of *saṁsāra*. The hardship of living in this world is rewarded by one's association with good people, especially a person who knows the right thing (ucita-jña).

citresu pathiṣu caratāṁ kvacid ucitajñaḥ sa ko'pi saṁghatate yena samaṁ *saṁsāratām saṁsāra*-pariśrāmaḥ saphalaḥ ||

(Vikramacarita, Jainistic Recension of 20 verse 8, p. 158)

"Sometimes by chance those who wander on random paths meet with some man who knows what is truly fitting; and if they wander through life with him, the toil of their existence becomes fruitful."

(Edgerton)[19]

(4-2-4) The following verse sounds cultural, *sāra* being the elegant taste of "poetical composition (kāvya-karaṇa)."[20]

*Asāre saṁsāre* sumati-śaraṇe kāvya-karaṇe
yatheṣṭam ceṣṭante kati na kavayaḥ sva-sva-rucayaḥ |
pāraṁ dugdha-snigdhaṁ madhura-racanaṁ yas tu vacanaṁ
prasūte brūte vā bhavati viralaḥ ko 'pi sāralaḥ ||
(MSS. 3745=Vikramacarita p. 235 verse 14)

"There are many poets, each brilliant in his own way, who busy themselves at their own pleasure with the art of poetry, which is the refuge

of the wise in this unprofitable round of existence. But it's rare to find some genuine poet, who can produce or speak milk-sweet words, exquisite in composition."

(Edgerton)[21]

(4-2-5) Some also sound philosophical and altruistic :

*Saṁsāre* kiṁ *sāraṁ* bahuśo'pi vicintyamānam idam eva |
manujeṣu dṛṣṭa-tattvaṁ sva-para-hitāyodyataṁ janma ||
(IS. 6639)

"What is the essence of the world of transmigration ? Thinking of this problem again and again, then (he finds) only this. Once born among human beings, (one should) see the truth and make an effort for the good of himself and others."

(4-2-6) Similarly, genuine judgement (*sāttvikī buddhi*) is called the valuable object which is hard to find in this essenceless world of transmigration. In the reflections of king Vikramāditya it is said :

*Asāre* khalu *saṁsāre* vartamānasya dehinaḥ |
tattvataḥ sāttvikī buddhir jāyate durlabhā yadā ||
(Vikramacarita 30th story, Metrical Recension p. 213, lines 11-12)

"When genuinely pure consciousness, so hard to obtain, is produced in a mortal who dwells in the truely unprofitable round of existence..."

(Edgerton)

## V

(5) Occasionally, two things are called *sāra* in *asāra-samsāra*.

(5-1) Wealth (vibhava) and a son (tanaya) are called *sāra*-s.

*Saṁsāre* 'smin *dvayaṁ sāraṁ* vibhavas tanayo'pi ca |
tenaikaikena hīnasya janmino janma niṣphalam ||
(IS. 6640)

"In this world of transmigration, the following two are its essence : wealth and a son. If destitute of one of them, one's birth is fruitless."

(5-2) Worldly success (*śrī*) and women (*strī*) are enumerated, with the

intention of showing the poetical skill of alliteration.

rājan, *asāre saṁsāre sāra-dvayam* ahaṁ manye, śrīḥ strī ca (Vikramacarita 30th story Jainistic recension, p. 216, lines 12-13)

"O, king, in this essenceless world of transmigration, I think the following two are its essence; success and women."

(5-3) The essential two are expresed in a different way, philosophical insight (tattva-jñāna) and women :

*Saṁsāre*'sminn *asāre*pariṇati-tarale *dve gatī* paṇḍitānāṁ tattvajñānāmṛtāmbhaḥpla-valulita-dhiyāṁ yātu kālāḥ kadācit no cet mugdhānganānāṁ stanajaghanaghanābhoga-sambhoginīnāṁ sthulopasthasthalīṣu sthagita-karatalasparśalolodyamānām | |

(IS. 6642)

"In this essenceless world of transmigration, transient after all, two (things) are the resort of the wise. Time should pass for those wise ones, whose minds are shaken on the raft on the water of ambrosia styled as knowledge of truth."

Otherwise one should enjoy women." (too erotic to translate)

(5-4) Four things [22] are considered as *sāra* in a more religious context.

*Asāre* khalu *saṁsāre sāraṁ* etac *catuṣṭayaṁ* |
Kāśyāṁ vāsaḥ satāṁ saṅgo Gaṅgāmbhaḥ Śaṁbhu-sevanaṁ | |

(IS.778)

"The essence of the essenceless world of transmigration is the four things : residence in Kāśi, association with the good, the water of the Ganges and the serving of Śiva."

## VI

The contrast of *sāra* and *asāra* is not limited to the world of transmigration (*saṁsāra*), but is further extended to the body (*śarīra*), which is also ephemeral.[23] The wise man seeks to find something contributive (*sāra*) by means of this unprofitable (*asāra*) body. This construction is met particularly frequently in the context of self-sacrifice for the sake of others.

(6-1) A Brahmin boy decided to offer himself in order to save the life of the king, persuading his parents as follows :

Tad etenātyasāreṇa sukṛtaṁ yad upārjyate |
tad eva *sāraṁ saṁsāre* kṛta-buddhibhir ucyate ||
(KSS. 94. 107)

"So wise men say that the only solid and permanent thing in a fleeting universe is that merit (*sukṛta*) which is acquired by means of this very frail and perishable body." (Tawney and Penzer)

(6-2) In Buddhist texts which relate the self-sacrifice of the Bodhisattva, we often meet passages of a similar purport. In the story of Jīmūtavāhana who decided to sacrifice his life to save Śaṅkhacūda, we read :

Ity uktvā sa mahāsattvo hṛdi cakre manorathaṁ |
apy *asāreṇa dehena sāram* atrāpnuyām aham ||
(KSS. 90. 111)

"When the noble-hearted one had said this, he formed this wish in his heart : May I obtain the one essential object in this world by the sacrifice of my unsubstantial body."[24]

(6-3) In the story of the great monkey, who tried to save a man with no regard for his own body, the monkey addresses the man as follows :

Ehi pṛṣṭhaṁ mamāruhya sulagno 'stu bhavān mayi yāvad abhyuddharāmi tvāṁ *svadehāt sāram* eva ca | (11)

*Asārasya śarīrasya sāro* hy eṣa mataḥ satām |
yat pareṣāṁ hitārtheṣu sādhanī-kriyate budhaiḥ ||
(JM. 24. 12)

"Come, climb upon my back and cling fast to me, while I bring out both thee and the usefulness of my body.

For the pious pronounce this to be the usefulness of the body, otherwise a worthless thing, that it may be employed by the wise as an instrument for benefitting our neighbour." (Spejer)

The Mahāyāna Buddhist texts which speak of the great deeds of the Bodhisattva are full of these stories.[25]

## VII

To sum up the result of our investigation.

Though the contexts we have dealt with above are not always uniform, some being comical and others rather serious, we may classify them in several categories :

(1) Some are economic and practical, the *sāra* being the house of the father-in-law (*śvaśura-mandira*), and a son (*tanaya*).

(2) Some are secular : *sāra* being wealth (*vibhava*) and success (*śrī*).

(3) Some are hedonistic and erotic, *sāra* being gambling and women (*strī*).

(4) Some are philosophical, *sāra* being philosophical insight (*tattva-jñāna* and *sāttvikī buddhi*).

(5) Some are moral, *sāra* being to keep one's promised words.

(6) Some are cultural, *sāra* being poetical composition (*kāvya-karaṇa*).

(7) Some are religious, *sāra* being detachment (*vairāgya*) and serving gods.

(8) Some are social, *sāra* being association with good men (*satāṁ saṅga*).

(9) Some are altruistic, *sāra* being serving others (*para-hita, paropakaraṇa*).

We notice here that those items which we have picked out of the examples mostly correspond to the Hindu ideals of human life *puruṣārtha* (*trivarga*, or *caturvarga*), that is, *dharma, artha, kāma* and *mokṣa*. Furthermore, this idea of finding *sāra* in *asāra saṁsāra* is akin to that of *janma-sāphalya* (fruitfulness, or the significance of birth as a human being).[26]

**Annotations :**

1. *Cf. asāro saṁsāro* bhaṅguraṁ sarīraṁ, sāray'abbha-vibbhamaṁ jīviyaṁ taḍi-vilasiyāṇugāri jovvaṇaṁ, kimpāga-phalovamā bhogā...(Jacobi p. 14, lines 21ff.)
   janma-maraṇa-roga-soga-pauro *asāro saṁsāro* (Jacobi p. 35, lines 34ff.)

Though not directly construed with each other, the following passages are worthy of attention :

aho aṇiccyā *saṁsārassa, asārayā* sarīrassa (Jacobi p. 27, lines 21)

jao *asārā* pariṇāma-dāruṇa *saṁsāra*-paribbhamaṇa-heū kāmabhogā (Jacobi p. 3, line 38-p. 4, line 1)

For *kāma* as *asāra*, *Cf.* also Saundarānanda 15. 11 (*asārān...kāmān*)

2. *Cf.* IS. 245 (yat *sāra-bhūtam* tad upāsanīyam)

3. For *kadalī-sāra*, *Cf.* also Mahommagga-jātaka (546) 91 (yathā *kadalino sāraṁ anvesaṁ*). *Cf.* also (546) 92 (*simbalino sāram*) and note 8 below.

4. In the following passage, *saṁsāra* is replaced by *mānuṣya* (human world) and *asāra* by *niḥsāra* :

mānuṣye kadalī-stambha-*niḥsāre sāra*-mārgaṇaṁ |
yaḥ karoti sa saṁmūḍho jala-budbuda-saṁnibhe ||
(IS. 4823)

5. *Cf. saṁsāre* 'sminn *asāre* kunṛpati-bhavana-dvāra-sevā-kalaṅka-vyāsaṅgadhvastadhairyaṁ kathaṁ amaladhiyo mānasaṁ saṁvidadhyuḥ |
(IS. 664lab)

6. *Cf.* IS. 4823 quoted above in note 4.

7. *Cf.* MBh. 12. 177. 45 (*asāram iva mānuṣyam...*)

8. *Cf.* also

*Asāra-saṁsāra*-vivartaneṣu mā yāta toṣaṁ prāsabhaṁ bravīmi |
sarvatra daityās samatām upeta saṁatvam ārādhanam acyutasya ||
(Viṣṇu Purāṇa 1. 17. 90)

buddhvā *niḥsāratāṁ saṁsārasya* (Kādambari p.315, line 9)

Ity evam smaratas tasya babhūva niyatātmanaḥ |
*kadalī-garbha-niḥsāraḥ saṁsāra* iti niścayaḥ ||
(Buddhacarita 14. 6)

For the expression *kadalī-garbha-niḥsāra* (essenceless as the pith of a plantain tree), *Cf.* MBh. 12. 287. 16c (martya-loke) and *kadalī-stambha-niḥsāra*, *Cf.* IS. 4832. *Cf.* also note 2 above.

For the expression *saṁsāre 'sāra-sāgare*, *Cf.*

Indrajālaṁ ahaṁ manye saṁsāre 'sāra-sāgare |
kartā ko 'tra mahābāho sarvaṁ vada mama prabho ||
(Garuḍa Purāṇa Uttarakaṇḍa 22. 4)

9. In the following passages, the word *saṁsāra* is replaced by *loka, jagat*, etc.

*niḥsāraṁ* paśyato *lokaṁ* toya-budbuda-durbalam |
(Saundarānanda 15.63ab)

Yataś ca *lokaṁ* saṁjanma-niṣṭhaṁ |
paśyāmi *niḥsāraṁ* asac ca sarvam ||
(Saundarānanda 18. 17ab)

asāram asvantam aniścitam jagaj jagaty anitye balam avyavasthitam
(Saundarānanda 9. 16cd)

Paumaraha-rāyā vi muṇiūṇa *asārattaṁ jīva-loyassa*
(Jacobi p.46, line 30)

10. The first part of the verse is quoted in Mahāyāṇa-sūtrālaṁkāra (ed., by S.Levi vi p.82) with a hidden, and enigmatic meaning (*abhisaṁdhi*)

Asāre sāra-matayo viparyāse ca susthitāḥ |
kleśena ca susaṁkliṣṭā labhante bodhim uttamām ||

Here, *asāra* is used in the sense of *samādhi* and *sāra* in the sense of *visāraś cetasaḥ=vikṣepa*. *Cf.* also E. Lamotte. *La Somme du Grand Vehicule d'Asanga* (Mahāyāna-saṁgraha) II (Louvain 1973) p.132. I owe this reference to M. Hattori.

11. *Cf.* also *asāre sāra*-yogaññū matiṁ na tv-eva vindati |
sārabho va giri-duggasmiṁ antarā yeva sīdati ||
(Haṁsa-Jātaka 502.24)

12. *Cf.* Udānavarga 29.3-4,

*Asāre sāra*-matayaḥ *sāre cāsāra*-saṁjñinaḥ |
te *sāraṁ* nādhigacchanti mithyā-saṁkalpa-gocarāḥ ||
*sāraṁ tu sārato* jñātvā hy *asāraṁ* cāpy *asārataḥ* |
te *sāraṁ* adhigacchanti samyak-saṁkalpa-gocarāḥ ||

For a further reference, see F. Bernhard *Udānavarga* (Göttingen 1965) pp. 366-7 and K.Mizuno, *Studies in the Dhammapada* (Tokyo 1981) pp. 86-7.

13. There are two verses which recommend charity :

dhanasya *niḥsāra*-laghoḥ sa *sāro*
yad dīyate loka-hitonmukhena |
nidhānatāṁ yāti hi dīyamānam
adīyamānaṁ nidhanaika-niṣṭham ||
(JM. 2. 50)

evaṁ ca ye dravyam avāpya loke
mitreṣu dharme ca niyojayanti |
*avāpta-sārāṇi* dhanāni teṣāṁ
bhraṣṭāni nānte janayanti tāpam ||
(Buddhacarita 11. 5)

14. *Cf.* also its variant in

Dānam arthād ṛtam vācaḥ kīrti-dharmau ca cetasaḥ |
*dehāt* paropakāritvam *asārāt sāram* uddharet ||
(Cānakya-rāja-nīti-śāstra 8.25)

15. Though in a different context, the contrast of *sāra* and *asāra* is found in the following passage.

Tad etad avagamyāham *asāraṁ sāram* uttamaṁ |
niśāmaya mahābhāga praṇipatya bravīmi ||
(Viṣṇu Purāṇa 1. 19. 42)

varam alpa-balaṁ *sāraṁ* na bahvī muṇḍa-maṇḍalī |
kuryād *asāra-bhaṅgo* hi *sāra-bhaṅgam* api sphuṭam ||
(IS. 5966)

16. *Cf.* IS. 778=MSS. 3736.

17. *Cf.* MSS. 3737

18. *Cf.* also,

rājā *saṁsārodāra-sāra*-sukha-mayaḥ saṁaajani
(Jainistic Recension, 1, prose p. 77, line 11)
tan mayā labdhaṁ *saṁsāra*-sukhaṁ maugdhyena muktam
(Jainistic Recension, 2, prose p. 77, line 1)

19. *Cf.* also,

*Saṁsāra*-viṣa-vṛkṣasya dve phale amṛtopame |
kāvyāmṛta-rasāsvāda *ālāpaḥ sajjanaiḥ* saha ||
(IS. 6636)

*Saṁsāra*-śrānta-cittānāṁ tisro viśrānti-bhūmayaḥ |
apatyaṁ ca kalatraṁ ca *sādhu-saṁgatir* eva ca ||
(IS. 6637)

Snigdhair mugdhair vidagdhais ca yad *āryais saha saṁgatiḥ*
etad evāyuṣaḥ *sāraṁ* nisarga-kṣaṇa-bhaṅginaḥ |
(Cānakya-rāja-nīti-śāstra 7.67)

20. *Cf.* also, *kāvyāmṛta-rasāsvāda* of IS.6636 as quoted in the note 19 above.

21. *Cf.* also,

Anityatāvyanusṛtāṁ karma-cchidrasasaṁśayāṁ |
*ātta-sāram* kariṣyāmi kathaṁ nemāṁ *sārasvatīm* ||
(Mātṛceṭa Satapañcāśataka 6)

Poetical composition is called "the epitome of existence" by Jayadeva who uses the word *bhava-sāra* in place of *saṁsāra-sāra*.

Śrī-jayadeva-kaver idam uditam udāraṁ
śṛṇu sukhadaṁ śubhadaṁ *bhava-sāraṁ* |
keśava dhṛta-daśa-vidha-rūpa
jaya jagad-īśa hare ||
(Gītagovinda 1.15)

22. Three things are also enumerated in a similar context.

*Saṁsāra*-śrānta-cittānāṁ *tisro* viśrānti-bhūmayaḥ |
*apatyam* ca *kalatraṁ* ca *sādhu-saṁgatir* eva ca ||
(IS. 6637)

23. The body is often styled as *asāra*. For example,

*Saṁucchrayaṁ* tadvad *asāram* udvahan
balaṁ vyavasyed viṣayārtham udyataḥ (10cd)
*śarīram* āmād api mṛn-mayād ghaṭād
idaṁ tu *niḥsāratamaṁ* mataṁ mama ||
(Saundarānanda 9. 11ab)

Sa rūpiṇaṁ kṛtsnam arūpiṇaṁ ca |
*sāram* didṛkṣur vicikāya *kāyaṁ* ||
(Saundarānanda 17.16ab)

tataḥ sa *kāyaṁ* saṁavekṣaṁāṇaḥ |
*sāraṁ* vicintyāṇv api nopalebhe ||
(Saundarānanda 17.36cd)

24. *Cf.* also,

Tad enam eḳam ārtaṁ ced *dehenaikānta-nāśinā* |
rakṣāṁi nāmunā nāgaṁ tan me dhig *janma niṣphalam* ||
(KSS. 90. 130)

25. *Cf.* D.R. Shackleton Bailey, *The Śatapañcāśatka of Mātṛceṭa* (Cambridge 1951) p. 153.

aham *ātta-sārah* kālam kariṣyāmi.....(SS. p. 20, line 2)

*asārāc-ccharīrāt sārā*dānābhiprāyya...(SS. p. 23, line 13)

*asārāt kāyāt sāram* ādātu-kāmo...(SS. p. 26 line 2) (BB text)

avahastena dānaṁ dadāti *asārāt kāyāt sāra*-saṁgṛahārtham |
(Divyāvadāna p. 482, lines 6-7)

bhavanād iva pradīptān nimajjamānād ivāpsu ratna-nidheḥ *kāyād* vidhāna-nidhanād ye *sāraṁ* nādhigacchanti te *sāram* apaśyantah *sārāsāreṣv* akovidāprajñaḥ te maraṇa-

makara-vadana-praveśa-saṁaye viṣīdanti |
(Divyāvadāna p. 384, lines 4-7) (BB text)

26. I had an occasion to collect and discuss the passages of *janma-sāphalya* in Japanese in 1972 (*Ancient Indian Concept of Destiny* pp. 25-78)

## Abbreviations and Texts used in this article are as follows :

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| BB | : | Bibliotheca Biddhica |
| HOS | : | Harvard Oriental Series (Cambridge, Mass.) |
| IS | : | Indische Spruche, by O. Böhtlingk 1-3 (St. Petersburg 1870-3) |
| J | : | The Jātaka, ed., by V. Fausbll (PTS. text) |
| JM | : | Jātakamālā, ed., by H. Kern (HOS 1, third ed. 1943) |
| KSS | : | Kathāsaritsāgara of Somadevabhaṭṭa (NSP. 1930) |
| MSS | : | Mahāsubhāṣitasaṁgraha by L. Sternbach (Hoshiarpur 1974-) |
| MBh | : | The Mahābhārata (Poona Critical Edition) |
| NSP | : | The Nirṇaya Sagar Press (Bombay) |
| PPT | : | The Pañcatantra of Pūrṇabhadra, ed., by J. Hertel (HOS 11,1908) |
| SS | : | The śikṣāsaṁuccaya |
| YS | : | Yājñavalkya-smṛti (NSP. 1949) |
| Jacobi | : | Ausgewahlte Erzahlungen im Māhārāshṭrī (Leipzig 1886). |
| Olivelle | : | Saṁnyāsa Upaniṣads, Hindu Scriptures on Asceticism and Renunciation, Translated and with an Introduction by P. Olivelle (New York, Oxford 1992) |
| Buddhacarita | : | Text ed. by E. H. Johnston (Lahore 1936) |
| Cāṇakya-rāja-nīti-śāstra | : | Text ed., by L. Sternbach (Vishveshvaranand Indological Series 28, Hoshiarpur 1964) |
| Kādambarī | : | NSP. 1921. |
| Kuṭṭanīmata | : | Bibliotheca Indica 266 (Calcutta 1944) |
| Mālatīmādhava | : | Bombay Sanskrit and Prakrit Series 15 (Pooṇa 1970) |

Nāradaparivrājaka Upaniṣad : Text ed., by F. O. Schrader, The Minor Upaniṣads, vol. 1 : Saṁnyāsa Upaniṣads (Adyar 1912)

Prabodhacandrodaya : NSP. 1935.

Pretakalpa : The Garuḍa Purāṇa (Sāroddhāra) Sacred Books of Hindu 9 (Allahabad 1911)

Saundarananda : Text ed., by E. H. Johnston (Oxford 1929)

Vikramacarita : Text ed., by F. Edgerton (HOS 27 1926)

Viṣṇu Purāṇa : Text ed., by the Gitapress, Gorakhapur (date not given).

# Ānandavardhana's Contribution to Research Methodology

**C. Panduranga Bhatta**

The aim of research is to advance over the knowledge already possessed in a subject. The ancient Indian teacher was expected to make his student superior to himself in the acquirement of the stock of knowledge. This is proven by the ancient Indian saying *'śiṣyāt parābhavamicchet'* (A teacher should invite defeat at the hands of his students). By preparing students superior to what he himself was, the teacher in Ancient India was expected to effect the progress of his branch of knowledge. Ancient Indian thinkers encouraged the dissemination of knowledge, as is evident in the following verse;

अपूर्वः कोऽपि कोशोऽयं विद्यते तव भारति ।
व्ययतो वृद्धिमायाति क्षयमायाति संचयात् ॥[1]

It may be said that the contribution of knowledge may be either by discovering new truths as such or by revising and correcting the existing knowledge of truths and thereby presenting the known truths in a new light.

The history of Sanskrit poetics bears ample evidence of how each successive thinker has taken off from the point at which some previous thinker has left the state of knowledge, either by adding to it or by revising it. The search for the ultimate reality in the field of the Sanskrit poetics led to the emergence of various concepts. Each concept regard one or the other aspect as the soul of poetry. This process of evolution over the centuries marks clear advancement in formulating norms of evaluation of the poetic composition, from gross to more subtle aspects. Ānandavardhana was a great poet of both Sanskrit and Prakrit and he had the first hand knowledge of the poetic process. He was well versed in the tenets of Vedānta, Tarka, Mīmaṁsā,

Vyākaraṇa, and Buddhism. He demonstrated the inadequacy of the ancient principles of criticism for a proper estimate of literature.

Ānandavardhana's dhvani-theory marks a clear advancement in the evolution of the concept of poetry. He investigates into the inner spirit which he finds in the suggestive power of word (vyañjanā) and suggestion (dhvani). All theories of Alaṅkāra, Guṇa etc., formulated by rhetoricians of the past are confined to an elucidation of the beauty of the vācya element alone. Thus real philosophy of poetry, which is concerned with the soul, begins at the point where the early theories end. This paper attempts to analyse the research methods adopted by Ānandavardhana in his *Dhvanyāloka*.

## (a) Introduction

The introduction given by Ānanda explains in detail the nature and importance of the problem proposed to be discussed. The introduction given by him is :

काव्यस्यात्मा ध्वनिरिति बुधैर्यः समाम्नातपूर्व-
स्तस्याभावं जगदुरपरे भाक्तमाहुस्तमन्ये ।
केचिद्वाचां स्थितमविषये तत्त्वमूचुस्तदीयं
तेन ब्रूमः सहृदयमनः प्रीतये तत्स्वरूपम्[2] ॥

The earlier poeticians believed that the field of poetry had been exhaustively explained by the well-known categories of Alaṅkāra etc. and there was no scope left for propounding any original theory like Dhvani afresh, the philosophers denied the validity of the theory of Dhvani on logical grounds, and laymen simply asserted that Dhvani was a thing beyond their comprehension. The whole of the *Dhvanyāloka,* containing as it does the definition, classification and illustration of dhvani, as also the clear lines of demarcation between dhvani and other concepts, presents a long and sound response to the charge of poeticians and others that dhvani was a superfluous and meaningless concept. This is made clear in the introduction. In his introduction Ānanda also states that the 'dhvani' is the quintessence of the poetry of all master poets and is the most beautiful in itself, though undetected and left unexplained by all the writers on poetry in the past. But it is widely instanced in great works like the *Rāmāyaṇa* and the *Mahābhārata* : तस्य हि ध्वनेः स्वरूपं सकलसत्कविकाव्योपनिषद्भूतमतिरमणीयसीभिरपि चिरन्तकाव्यलक्षणविधायिनाम्

बुद्धिभिरनुन्मीलितपूर्वम्, अथ च रामायणमहाभारतप्रभृतिनि लक्ष्ये सर्वत्र प्रसिद्धव्यवहारं लक्षयतां सहृदयानामानन्दो मनसि लभतां प्रतिष्ठामिति प्रकाश्यते[3] ॥

Only the experience of a tasteful reader can decide whether something is genuine poetry or not and not the pronouncements of theorists. The connoisseur of poetic art plays an important rôle in Ānandavardhana's scheme of poetry. He was the first to assign such an important rôle to the poetic reader (Sahṛadaya or Sāmājika). Ānanda mentions all these points in his introduction and hence we can say that the introduction found in his work sets the trend for the rest of the work and it stimulates reader's interest besides helping the reader to have the whole work in perspective.

### (b) Chapter Division and Headings

The chapters in the *Dhvanyāloka* represents stages in the arguments of the work, each stage resting on a distinct class of data. Ānanda has maintained some measure of uniformity in the size of the chapters. The *Dhvanyāloka* contains four chapters called Udyotas (Flashes). The first chapter deals with all the objections, assumed as well as real, that may possibly be brought against the validity of the theory of Dhvani. The charges made by the followers of different schools of Philosophy, Grammar and ancient poetics, are all shown here as baseless. After this Ānanda gives a definition of Dhvani and a clear explanation of the various terms involved in the definition. He also gives a brief indication of the major varieties of Dhvani, their relative importance and their relation to the other concepts. In the second chapter he proceeds to enumerate the sub-divisions of Dhvani, and to bring out the peculiarity of each of them with the aid of striking examples. He also precisely defines the province of each of the several concepts like Guṇa, Rīti and Alaṅkāra. The third chapter deals with various fundamental factors related to the the process of composition. Very interesting research relating to the theme, style, characters and propriety are all found here. He also discusses here the various degrees of excellence in poetry. In this chapter Ānanda gives for the first time detailed rules on the following :

(1) The relation of phonetic patterns of diction (Saṅghaṭanā) to the psychological theme of rasas.

(2) The canon of propriety which decides the success or failure of a

poet.

(3) Deterrents of rasa.

(4) Opposition and harmony between rasa.

In the fourth chapter he explains how the province of poetry is never completely exhausted even when the subject of poem happens to be one and the same thing for a number of poets. In this chapter he also makes interesting comments about the predominent sentiments of the *Rāmāyaṇa* and the *Mahābhārata*.

This division of the *Dhvanyāloka* into four chapters is more arbitrary than logical. Instead of any exclusive consideration of the different aspects of Dhvani in the different chapters, we find all the topics running into each other in every chapter. On this K. Krishnamoorthy observes; "Ānanda's treatment of all the various topics in the *Dhvanyāloka* may be said to be conditioned by his attitude towards Rasa. If, amidst all the mass of Ānanda's scattered speculations, we are still able to recognise a running thread, it is entirely due to his steady and systematic appraisal of Rasa as the highest goal in poetry[4].

The plan adopted by Ānanda in his treatment of Dhvani is very well brought out by Abhinavagupta in his Locana : **उक्तया नीत्या 'यत्रार्थः शब्दो वा इति' सामान्यलक्षणं प्रतिपादितम्। वक्ष्यमाणया तु नीत्या विशेषलक्षणं भविष्यति 'अर्थान्तरे सङ्क्रमितम्' इत्यादिना। तत्र प्रथमोद्द्योते ध्वनेः सामान्यलक्षणमेव कारिकाकारेण कृतम्। द्वितीयोद्द्योते कारिकाकारोऽवान्तरविभागं विशेषलक्षणं च विदधदनुवाद-मुखेन मूलविभागं सूचितवान्[5]।**

The whole of the first chapter is concerned with a general exposition (Sāmānya laksaṇa) of Dhvani. The general definition itself is contained in the Kārikā **"यत्रार्थः शब्दो वा तमर्थमुपसर्जनीकृत स्वार्थौ"** etc.[6]

While all the preceding Kārikās lead up to it, the succeeding ones follow from it. But the specific treatment (विशेषलक्षण) of the types of Dhvani in poetry is to be found only in the following chapters, from the point of view of Vyaṅgya in the second chapter and from the point of view of vyañjaka in the third chapter.

The procedure adopted in the *Dhvanyāloka* is as follows; first the author states the theory in nut-shell, then examines it in all its implications, and

finally sums up the main results of his investigation in a memorable verse. The bare essence of the theory is given in about 120 kārikās. Ānanda avoids all details and debates in the kārikā portions reserving them all for his prose vṛtti or gloss. The vṛtti is a supplement of the kārikā. It supplies illustrations and offers explanations, it adds new material and answers objections, both actual and anticipated. The remarkable observations made in the vṛtti portion are summed up in the form of memorable verses called parikara-ślokas. Thus the method adopted by Ānanda for presenting the results of his investigation is very sound and novel.

### (c) Relevance of Research to Contemporary Society

Ānanda built a new structure of poetic theory on the foundation of the thought of his predecessors namely Bharata, Bhāmaha, Udbhaṭa and Vāmana. For the first time in the history of Indian poetics he asked basic questions relating to aesthetics and semantics and answered them systematically like a philosopher.

Ānanda was both a poet-critic and philosopher of the first rank, a fact which is evidenced by one of his verses cited in the vṛtti on *Dhvanyāloka*, III.44

**या व्यापारवती रसान् रसयितुं काचित्कवीनां नवा**
**दृष्टिर्या परिनिष्ठितार्थविषयोन्मेषा च वैपश्चिती ।**
**ते द्वे अप्यवलम्ब्य विश्वमनिशं निर्वर्णयन्तो वयं**
**श्रान्ता नैव च लब्धमब्धिशयन त्वद्भक्तितुल्यं सुखम् ॥**

Ānanda defines poetry as combination of word and sense that imparts aesthetic pleasure to the refined reader; **सहृदयहृदयाह्लादि शब्दार्थमयत्त्वमेव काव्यलक्षणम् ।** His Dhvani-theory makes a clear advancement in the evolution of the concept of poetry. He investigates into the inner spirit which he finds in the suggestive power of word (Vyañjanā) and suggestion (Dhvani). He recognised powers of word namely (i) Abhidhā that gives literal sense, (ii) Lakṣaṇā that gives secondary sense. He thought that these two were not adequate to give the complete meaning of poetry and hence he has accepted the meaning of poetry and hence he has accepted the third power of word called Vyañjanā which gives deeper sense.

For the first time in Indian literary criticism Ānanda propounded the fundamental principle of aesthetic judgement namely "**चारुत्वोत्कर्षनिबन्धना हि वाच्यव्यङ्ग्ययोः प्राधान्यविवक्षा.**"[7] In all poetry, there will be two elements : the plainly stated and the suggested. The literary critic's judgment is involved in deciding which is relatively more prominent. The criterion for such judgment is provided only by his aesthetic impression of the two. That which strikes him as more beautiful will decide his characterizing it as Dhvanikāvya or Guṇibhūta-vyaṅgya. Inspite of so much discussion of the nature of poetry by language philosophers, theoreticians, and rhetoricians, there is very little of practical criticism in Sanskrit poetics. Such applied criticism is available to some extent for the first time in the work of Ānanda.

According to Ānanda, it is not consistent with propriety to describe love in its vulgar form, in the case of divine characters. Though Ānanda criticises this in his *Dhvanyāloka* he is moderate in his remarks on this literary flaw. According to him, this poetic blemish does not become patent in Kālidāsa as it is submerged by the artistic beauty of the description; **महाकवीनामव्युत्पत्तिकृतमप्युत्तमदेवताविषयप्रतिषिद्धसंभोगशृङ्गार निबन्धनाद्यनौचित्यं शक्तितिरस्कृतत्वात् ग्राम्यत्वेन न प्रतिभासेत यथा कुमारसंभवे देवीसम्भोगवर्णनम्**[8] ॥

Thus the adverse criticism raised by Ānanda against Kālidāsa paves the way for a glowing tribute to his extraordinary genius. This appears revolutionary in the light of the dogmatic approach of other poeticians who, following the traditional method, ignore or decry such tendencies in the literature of the period[9].

Ānanda says that, in the *Mahābhārata,* Mokṣa is depicted as the foremost of human values and Śānta as the predominant sentiment[10]. At the end of the war, Yudhiṣṭhira was in the dejected mood, and, being unable to derive any pleasure in victory, hankered after quietude and final emancipation. The self-realization on the part of Yudhiṣṭhira, the vibhāva of Śāntarasa in the epic, is testified by the following verse. He says, fie on the usages of Kṣatriya, fie on might and valour, fie on wrath, since through these such a calamity has overtaken us;

**धिगस्तु क्षत्रमाचारं धिगस्तु बलमौरसम् ।**
**धिगस्त्वमर्षं येनेमामापदं गमिता वयम्**[10] ॥

Thus the *Mahābhārata* clearly shows that human nature ultimately pines for tranquility and peace. It further emphasizes the futility of war or violence as a means of attaining artha, kāma, and dharma. The *Mahābhārata* offers us an alternative method, which is self-realization through the control of human desire. To a world, which is seeking desperately for an alternative to war and violence, the poem seems to offer a solution. Again it is Ānandavardhana who gave this remarkable interpretation of the epic poem for the first time. All these issues investigated by Ānandavardhana were not only relevant to his own contemporary society but they will remain relevant for ever.

**(d) Citations and References**

In discussing different problems regarding the Dhvani theory, Ānanda cites about 150 passages. Of these many verses are from the works of eminent poets like Kālidāsa, Amaruka, Bāṇa, Mayūra, Śrīharṣa, Dharmakīrti, Bhaṭṭanārāyaṇa, and others. In his efforts to propound his own theory of poetry by probing into its form and structure, he has drawn upon the evidence of his own experience as a poet; **अस्माभिरपि स्वेषु काव्यप्रबन्धेषु यथायथं दर्शितमेव**[11] ॥

It may be pointed out here that Ānanda had no false modesty and did not refrain from citing a few of his own verses, too, as illustrations.

Again, Ānanda for the first time gives us, in Indian poetics examples of literacy analysis. Unlike his predecessors he cites a large number of illuminating examples from the best writers in Sanskrit literature and discusses with insight the reasons for their appeal to a man of taste. It may be observed here that citations made in the *Dhvanyāloka* serve the definite purpose and they are not cited for the sake of filling space or for displaying author's erudition. Some citations themselves form the subject of discussion and others lend support to author's own argument.

**(e) Style**

Ānanda avoids making tall claims about the importance of his findings and slighting the work of other researchers in the same area. At one place Ānanda says that he has nothing but respect for the work of the ancients; and that he will utilize the same wholeheartedly;

तत्र वाच्यः प्रसिद्धो यः प्रकारैरुपमादिभिः ।
बहुधा व्याकृतः सोऽन्यैः काव्यलक्ष्मविधायिभिः ॥

ततो नेह प्रतन्यते ॥ and केवलमनूद्यते यथोपयोगम्[12] ।

Ānanda has avoided strong language while criticizing others and this is instanced in the following :

अस्फुटस्फुरितं काव्यतत्त्वमेतद्यथोदितम् ।
अशक्नुवद्भिर्व्याकर्तुं रीतयः सम्प्रवर्तिताः[13] ॥

Those who were unable to explain properly this essential principle of poetry as they had only a glimmer of it, have brought into vogue the theory of styles.

At one place Pūrvapakṣin says that he cannot understand the reason why persons should close their eyes under the self-assumed illusion of being 'perceptive critics' and dance about with joy saying that they have discovered dhvani therein; ध्वनिर्ध्वनिरिति यदेतदलीकसहृदयत्वभावनामुकुलितलोचनैर्नृत्यते तत्र हेतुं न विद्मः[14] ।

For this Ānanda says that the enthusiasm of persons imbued in their minds with the value of suggestion is quite proper. None need display jealousy to show somehow that they are all men of deranged minds; न च तेषु कथञ्चिदीर्ष्यया कलुषितशेमुषीकत्वमाविष्करणीयम् ।[15]

At another place Pūrvapakṣin asks 'will quality of forcefulness ever arise from words without the texture of long compounds ?' ओजसः पुनः कथमनियतसङ्घटनाशब्दाश्रयत्वम् न ह्यसमासा सङ्घटना कदाचिदोजस आश्रयतां प्रतिपद्यते[16] ।

For this Ānanda very politely replies : 'if your mind is possessed by the ghost of blind faith in convention, we cannot say anything. Otherwise, we will ask you why it should not be so ? उच्यते यदि न प्रसिद्धिमात्रग्रहदूषितं चेतस्तदत्रापि न न ब्रूमः । ओजसः । कथमसमासा सङ्घटना नाश्रयः[17] ।

Ānanda avoids labouring the obvious and supplying the elementary information on the subject. He says :

दिङ्मात्रं तूच्यते येन व्युत्पन्नानां सचेतसाम् ।
बुद्धिरासादितालोका सर्वत्रैव भविष्यति[18] ॥

Refined critics can be educated even by a mere indication of the direction. With their enlightened minds they will guess aright everywhere. Ānanda contented himself with indicating the broad types of Dhvani-varieties. He says that innumerable varieties of Dhvani were possible;

एवं ध्वनेः प्रभेदाः प्रभेदभेदाश्च केन शक्यन्ते ।
संख्यातुं दिङ्मात्रं तेषामिदमुक्तमस्माभिः[19] ॥

It may be pointed out here that Abhinavagupta gives 9940 varieties whereas Mammaṭa's figure is 10455. But when we see the preponderance of minute classification and subtle hairsplitting arguments in the *Dhvanyāloka* we may feel that Ānanda has wasted his energy on matters insignificant in respect of literary criticism. But we must not forget that Ānanda is an ancient writer living in an age when the whole atmosphere was permeated with a love for philosophical argument and logical subtlety.

Ānaṇda refrains from illustrating the blemishes seen in the works of great poets. He feels that a loud exposure of the defects of great men who have the bright light of a thousand good sayings about them would amount to a censure of the critic himself; सूक्तिसहस्त्रद्योतितात्मनां महात्मनां दोषोद्घोषणमात्मन एव दूषणं भवतीति न विभज्य दर्शितम्[20] ।

Ānanda's foremost aim was to establish the existence of the pratīyamāna sense. About the function which was required to convey that sense, opinions might differ—he himself has acknowledged this and on his part he thought vyañjanā or suggestion as the most logical and convenient way of revealing that sense : वाचकत्वगुणवृत्ति व्यतिरिक्तो व्यञ्जकत्वलक्षणः शब्दव्यापारोऽस्ति-इत्यस्माभिरभ्युपगतम् । तस्य चैवमपि न काचित् क्षतिः । तद्धि व्यञ्जकत्वं लिङ्गत्वमस्तु अन्यद्वा प्रसिद्ध शब्दप्रकारविलक्षणत्वं शब्द व्यापारविषयत्वं च तस्यास्ति-इति नास्त्येवावयोर्विवादः[21] ॥

On the whole, the style of Ānanda is very similar to the style adopted in the research works of modern days.

## Conclusion

The conclusion of Ānanda recalls to the reader the claim made in the introduction and then, on the basis of the whole argument of the work, it reiterates in summary form the findings and this restatement highlights the soul of the argument in his work. Ānanda in his conclusion says that the

theory of principal suggestion has been propounded thus for in all its bearings with the view to clearing up conflicting opinions; **एवं ध्वनिं सप्रपञ्चं विप्रतिपत्तिनिरासार्थं व्युत्पाद्य तदव्युत्पादेन प्रयोजनान्तरमुच्यते**[22] ।

He also explains the other practical uses to which such a theory might be put. According to him, endless of creative imagination in poets will be another outcome of the theory of principal and subordinated suggestion.

He says in his conclusion that he has shown in poetry the presence of dhvani or suggestion so that it may prove a source of enjoyment to sublime souls even like magnificent wish-fulfilling tree;

**काव्याख्येऽखिलसौख्यधाम्नि विबुधोद्याने ध्वनिर्दर्शितः ।**
**सोऽयं कल्पतरूपमानमहिमा भोग्योऽस्तु भव्यात्मनाम्**[23] ॥

He further says that the true nature of the essence of good poetry was but dimly discerned and remained asleep as it were, all along, even in the minds of men with mature intelligence. It has now been set forth at length in order that it might wake-up once again in refined critics.

**सत्काव्यतत्त्वनयवर्त्म चिरप्रसुप्त**
**कल्पं मनस्सु, परिपक्वधियां यदासीत् ।**
**तदव्याकरोत् सहृदयोदयलाभहेतो-**
**रानन्दवर्धन इति प्रथिताभिधानः**[24] ॥

Like a true research work, instead of stopping the controversy about literary theories once and for all time, the *Dhvanyāloka* gave a fresh impetus for discussions with a greater zest. Later poeticians of repute like Mammaṭa, Viśvanātha, Vidyānātha, Vidyādhara and Jagannātha simply accepted the Dhvani-theory as the last word in Indian poetics. Even independent writers, who differed from Ānanda, found it impossible to ignore him. In fact, Kuntaka, Mahimabhaṭṭa, Rājaśekhara and Bhoja have all restated as it were the essentials of the new theory itself by adopting different terminologies. Ānanda is recognized as the greatest authority in the field of Sanskrit poetics by Jagannāthapaṇḍita. He noted : **ध्वनिकृतां आलङ्कारिकसमयव्यवस्थापकत्वात्**[25] ॥

Ānanda's *Dhvanyāloka* sums up and explains all the previous speculations on the subject. It makes the end of the old school of criticism and heralds the birth of a modern school, modern in style, in theory, and in approach.

Annotations :

1. *Subhāṣitaratnabhāṇḍāgāra,* p. 29.
2. *Dhvanyāloka,* I.1.
3. *Ibid.,* before I.2.
4. *The Dhvanyāloka and Its critics,* p. 153.
5. *See Locana on Dhvanyāloka* I. 19.
6. *Dhva.,* I.13.
7. *Ibid.,* p. 22.
8. *Ibid.,* p. 124.
9. *Ibid.,* p. 274 : शान्तो रसो रसान्तरैः, मोक्षलक्षणः पुरुषार्थः पुरुषार्थान्तरैः ।
10. *Mahābhārata, "Śānti".,* 7.5.
11. *Dhvanyāloka, Ed.* K. Krishnamoorthy, p.
12. *Dhvanyāloka,* I. 3.
13. *Ibid.,* III. 46.
14. *Ibid.,* p. 4.
15. *Ibid.,* p. 28.
16. *Ibid.,* p. 122.
17. *Ibid.*
18. *Ibid.,* II. 14.
19. *Ibid.,* III. 45.
20. *Ibid.,* p. 70.
21. *Ibid.,* III.
22. *Ibid.,* IV Udyota beginning.
23. *Ibid.,* after IV. 18.
24. *Ibid.,*
25. *Rasagaṅgādhara,* p. 19.

# Ecological Awareness in Indian Tradition

**(Specially as Reflected in Sanskrit literature)**

**Leela Arjunwadkar**

Ecology is a relatively new science that concerns itself with the inter-relationship of organisms and their environments. Paradoxically enough, it owes its existence to the amazing progress man has made in certain branches of science during the last 50 years. The span and stride of this progress is so great that it is threatening the very survival of man. And hence an awareness for ecological balance gained momentum all over the world. So ecological awareness, *per se,* is of very recent origin. 'Put an end to the destructive progress and use of science. Love and nurture, not loot and plunder, nature'—is the motto of this new branch of science.

In this ambit I have tried to see the relation between man and Nature as it existed in Indian tradition. My conclusions would be—the ancient Indian attitude as reflected in Sanskrit literature (which is the most important source of information in this context) has never been anthropocentric and relationship between man and nature has always been that of love, harmony, and peaceful inter-dependence.

In the end, however, I have posed some questions that are very pertinent to the present situation.

Nature means 'the external world in its entirety, the creative and controlling force in the universe.' In that sense man is also a part, and a very important one, of nature. But we list him apart because he is intellectually the most gifted and developed species in nature. So much so, that he is able to pose serious threats even to nature. The present situation is so grave that man and nature could very well be a dichotomical division.

Moreover, it is not unlikely that we Indians have started taking the attitude of man and nature as something different from each other since Western influences have started gathering around us. During the last 200 years in general and last 50 in particular, our life and attitudes have changed enormously. Our thinking patterns, attitudes, lifestyles have become more and more West-oriented—more specially with the thrust of industrialization, urbanization, and population explosion.

The Greek and Roman cultures were born and brought up within the ramparted cities of Athens and Rome. Indian culture, on the other hand, was born and nurtured on the lap of Mother Nature. And hence, nature always had an inseparable and vibrant share in the Indian ethos, though affluent citylife was not unknown. We have vivid descriptions of big cities humming with various activities, crowded with people from all directions and resounding with tenfold sounds. Even today several rites and austerities are centered around trees and creepers, birds and mountains and rivers. A *tulsi* plant is a must in every Indian home. Pilgrimages to holy places that are mostly situated in natural surroundings hold an attraction for an Indian. Anchorite life has always fascinated Indian mind. In fact scriptures ordain it as the third stage in the life of every Hindu.

The thought that there is a very intimate relationship between nature and man appeared in English literature as late as Wordsworth and Coleridge in the first generation and Keats, Shelley and Byron in the second. It is these poets that ushered in the era of Romanticism and in it there was a profound shift in sensibility. These poets had an altogether new intuition for the primal power of the wild landscape, the spiritual correspondence between man and nature. They displayed an immense sense of the Infinite and the Transcendental.

Prior to that, Greek thought held its sway. Europe, following the Greek thought, had always felt a great attraction for tragedy in literature, where the hero is always in conflict with his surroundings. A culture that fights with its environment creates tragedies, while a culture that has a harmonious relationship with its environment has a liking for comedies, or rather happy endings in a drama. Following this pattern of thought a new branch of literary

studies, known as 'literary ecology' has come into being. Though pastorals had been in vogue since Greek times, tragedy had always held the place of honour. In his constant battle against nature, his confirmed adversary whom man has always wanted to conquer and subjugate, the only saving grace for man in his moral height. This is the great quality of a tragic hero. To a Westerner, man is most blatantly the measure of all things and nature exists only for him.

In Indian thought, on the other hand, this is not entirely and blatantly so. Since Vedic times, it has been believed that the world is a cosmos, and an ordered whole, governed by the principle of Ṛta. Then the metaphysical concept of *Brahman* linked up all things in this world as products of one and the same principle. Again the principles of rebirth and retribution (*Karmavipāka*) have resulted in the innate belief in the continuum of existence and linkage in all species,—whether birds or animals or reptiles or insects or human beings or also gods. And so, by definition as well as in belief, Indian mind has not been totally anthropocentric. This awareness for existence may not have been cultivated on a conscious plane, but it has percolated down the centuries in the Indian mind as a vague nimbus of collective conscience. It got expressed through religious terms, through the concepts of *Dharma* and *A-dharma*, through the terms of merit and sin. Fear and attraction and awe for nature also must have got intermixed. Today in the twentieth century these beliefs seem to be tenuous and have mostly taken the form of dead tradition.

Ancient Indian tradition has always cherished, respected and adored nature. Perhaps this is the characteristic of several ancient peoples like the Chinese, Japanese, the Red Indians, Eskimos. I remember to have read the letter written around 1880 by a Red Indian chieftain to the President of the United States regarding how the white man is recklessly plundering nature, denuding forests and killing wildlife just for the sake of his own pleasure and luxury, which is seriously and adversely affecting their own right to live. They themselves had been using nature-resources, no doubt, but very frugally and without in any way disturbing its cycle. That is the best way to love and respect Nature and live in harmony with it.

Indian mind has always believed in a harmonious relationship with nature. (It is because of this attitude, among other things, that Sanskrit literature does not have any tragedy.) 'If by felling trees, slaughtering animals a person goes to heaven, which is the pathway to hell ?' asks one poet and registers his objection to sacrifice. Man may be different from other species because of his brain faculties and abilities, but he is as much an integral part of Nature as are other things and creatures. I remember a poem—a modern one—in which the sun gets uneasy because the tiny grass flower has not bloomed. The sweet little flower answers—'I will open up and smile provided you promise to shine.' Just imagine a puny thing laying down a condition for the sun ! Man has no right to thwart and destroy this harmony and balance in Nature, through his unbridled grabbing of nature's resources. Manu, the well-known ancient Indian law-maker, asks hermitage-dwellers not to till the land around their penance-grove. They are supposed to be of very simple habits so far as food and other things are concerned.

In this context the philosophical stand of Masanobu Fukuoka regarding man-nature relationship is worth noting. He has a lot to say on nature remaining undisturbed, unlooted and enriched. It is for this end, we find in Sanskrit literature, that man has sought peace and bliss from nature. For that end he has also sought to make a discreet distinction between need and greed, to lessen at least, if not to minimize, his wants and live a simple life with only a few wants. In this connection I am reminded of Galbraith's famous remark—'We have to give up the mania of changing our car every six months.' Another thoughtful American friend had said—'I am not so much afraid of the human over-population in the underdeveloped countries, as I am of the unbridled consumerism of the affluent countries.'

In classical Sanskrit literature we have very happy pictures of the penance-groves, the entrancing beauties of thick forests that are uncontaminated by the hum and noise, hustle and bustle of urban life. We have contrasting pictures of the penance-grove culture and urban culture. The former is full of love, cherished memories, goodwill for everyone. No one is an orphan there. Lofty trees shower loving presents and cuckoos sing benedictions. Urban culture, on the other hand, is like a house engulfed in flames, full of a maddening crescendo of noises, unconcerned people and,

above all, bereft of memory, steadfast love and full of fickle passions.

One poet wonders, like the Duke in Shakespeare's *As You Like It*, why people seek to wallow in the dirt of city life and go on begging and bowing before vile people when all good things are waiting for them in the forest glades. Nature is to them a living and loving character, a symbol of intense and deep love.

In fact nature was the chief raw material of the Indian poet, who usually treated it in relation to man and rarely described it for its own sake. The phenomena of seasons, day and night, birds and beasts and flowers are employed to frame human emotions or are personified as counterparts of the human subjects of the poet. There are umpteen literary conventions or symbols to this effect. Throughout this literature a deep love of nature is implicit, especially in Kālidāsa, who for this reason among others, has a higher reputation in the West than any other ancient Indian poet. In Indian thought a sharp line is not drawn between the worlds of man and nature. The Universe is an ordered *Whole* of which man is a part. Imbued with the spirit that is transcendent and immanent, the same life-giving essence that is in man, circulated in every part of it. The propelling force, therefore, in Kālidāsa's poetry is to see nature, not as a setting for man and a backdrop to the human drama, but to perceive it as possessing a life of its own and as related to the human world in many complex ways.

This is very true. To Kālidāsa, not only the seasons, but all nature in all its aspects and moods, was a living being. To him it became a vivid and sentient replica of the human world—expecting and giving love in abundance, displaying intense emotions and attachments. This might be the cause why Lord Śiva in his eight-fold form (*Aṣṭamūrti*) appealed to him. That form embraces the whole universe. In the absence of this attitude he could not have written several of his beautiful pieces. In fact the ever-changing charms of the seasons, as also the beauty of rivers, ocean, mountains, sunrise and sunset have become a must for Sanskrit epic poetry. Stray verses also display a rich love of nature, though they frame it in the span of only four lines.

It must be mentioned, however, that attitudes change from poet to poet and writer to writer and nature has been viewed by different poets and

writers from diverse points of view—pragmatic, realistic, idealistic.

Kauṭilya, not a poet but a third century B. C. theoretician, took an entirely pragmatic view of nature when he wrote on the science of statecraft. From that point of view he recommends how sites should be selected for the capital, for the royal palace, how particular plants and trees as also birds and animals be kept to protect the king from fire, poison and snakes. He tells us about how the king should use rivers, mountains, forests, lakes, trees to fix up boundaries. How, further, he should use barren land and develop special sanctuaries for elephants and deer. He has sharply decried addiction to hunting. But that is because it spoils the king, not because of any ecological awareness. In such details, we find, Kauṭilya is utilizing every detail and contour of nature for the benefit of the king.

I have heard of a manuscript on the science of animals and birds (*Mṛgapakṣiśāstra*), a remarkable text of the 14th century. A king, who was fond of hunting, felt one day that if such unrestricted hunting continued all the beasts and birds would get destroyed. So he asked a Jain Pandit in his court to write down their descriptions, habits, habitats etc. This is a remarkable piece of awareness for nature. The fear of that king came into reality during the one hundred and fifty years of British rule, when because of too much hunting tigers, cheetas etc. actually became endangered or extinct species.

Nature descriptions in the *Rāmāyaṇa* are generally realistic or photographic. But there, too, the mental frame of the person concerned is not entirely absent. Kālidāsa's nature pictures emerge as if from the brush of a painter, but still nature is a living reality for him. He expresses human emotions in terms of nature, and natural phenomena in terms of human emotions.

Even in stray verses we have ideas and figures of speech that prove how macrocosm and microcosm merge into each other. In fact most of the imagery of Sanskrit poets, be they epic poets, dramatists or poets composing stray verses, is inspired and shaped by nature. If sun, moon, stars, sky, clouds, mountains, rivers, ocean, birds, animals, flowers—especially lotus,—fruits, trees etc. were to be left out, what would the poets do ? Several figures of speech in Sanskrit literature mostly derived their material from nature.

Literary conventions like the longings *(dohadas)* of different trees also show how the hero with his erotic longings is symbolized in those trees.

Along with this we must take into account one particularly striking facet of man-nature relationship in Sanskrit literature and Indian ethos. If the king does not behave properly, in keeping with *Dharma*, the cycle of nature stands obstructed. The King's sinful ways make his subjects suffer. An irresponsible king's sins visit upon his subjects. That means nature responds to or is affected by the good and evil of the humans, especially of the ones in high office.

I have often wondered whether this is just a conventional belief or just a laudatory statement or if there is any grain of metaphysical or mystical truth in it. If we ponder over what Fukuoka has to say regarding man-nature relationship, if we try to fathom the depths of the Upaniṣadic statements like *'Thou art That'*, and if we read what great souls have to say about their mysterious mystical experiences, I think, this attitude towards nature, gives an altogether new perception and insight to us. We begin to realize that the emotional life of all things and species in nature is the same. That even the trees and plants are sentient was proved by J. C. Bose in the last century. That is why we find all types of characters in Sanskrit Literature—human beings, gods and goddesses, rivers, demons, trees, serpents, celestial nymphs etc., and that their share in the same emotional life is the umbilical cord that binds all to Mother Nature.

Amazing corroboration for this point comes from modern physicists like Fritjöf Capra and David Bohm. Capra tells us that mystics in the East have through intuition grasped the fundamental unity of all things in the universe. David Bohm, while discussing the cosmic dimension speaks of the healing touch of nature. Quite a few books dealing with the living touch of jungle life breathe of the same spirit. The thrilling account of a young girl who traversed the great Australian desert from the east to the west coast in the company of only four camels and two dogs describes the remarkable insight she got into space and time during that journey.

The same is the attitude of Sanskrit writers towards nature. It shows a harmonious part-whole relationship with nature. To a certain extent at least

it has percolated down to the present times as an inherited faith. I had to get a tree in my garden felled. The man whom I had hired for the purpose came with all the materials of worship. He worshipped the tree, broke a coconut, begged the tree to forgive him—for the sin of killing a living being, though for the sake of his livelihood. I was sincerely moved by this act of his and got indirectly a confirmation of the correctness of the picture of man-nature relationship in my mind.

It can be said a bit derogatorily that this is just symbolic, an idealistically conceived point of view, and that also may be tinged with fear, merit- and-sin consideration, *Dharma-Adharma* concept. That may be so. But what is significant is that it has seeped down to the lowest strata of Indian society as is evinced by the above experience of mine.

But recently an agro-economist, who is also a Sanskritist, has completely shattered this picture to pieces. With his crassly pragmatic approach and ruthless logic he has pointed out that unless we want to have 'planned poverty', especially for the people in hilly and backward areas, we have got to take up more and more developmental projects. A harmonious and ideal relationship between man and nature was possible in olden days because there was no population explosion, and social fabric was essentially based on inequality and accepted as such. With the menacing problem of population growth and the aim of our development as a nation, we have to accept the fact of, as also the hazards of spiralling industrialization. May be, because of this, our moon and constellations will be contained in neon-signs and we will have to be content with indoor plants and pet animals etc. If ecological imbalance and environmental problems is the price we have to pay, we will have to pay it and seek newer solutions. But now the wheel cannot be turned back.

This shattering stance has completely undone me and quite a few vexing questions are tormenting me :

1. Is my analysis of the old Indian ethos correct or is it mere escapism or idealism?

2. Was the old harmonious relationship possible only because there was no population problem and inequality was the accepted norm of the social structure ?

3. Did the theory of retribution (*Karmavipāka*) gain a very strong foothold in India because it was the only panacea for this structure ?

4. Is it, as the great philosopher J. Krishnamurti asked—'is the mind in India being caught and carried away by the materialistic wave ? The wave is threatening the Western World, expressing itself through technology, materialism, nationalism. The Western mind is moving in the direction of the outer and it dominates the world. So is India losing something that was there ?'

5. What is in store for us ? Mutation or metamorphosis ? Or is complete destruction waiting to pounce on us—the *homo sapiens* ?

To sum up :

Science has been more a problem-monger than a problem-solver. It has created and complicated more problems, than it has solved. So we cannot hope to find any solution for the present crisis in the progress of science. We have to seek solution elsewhere.

Religion in the traditional sense also will bring no solution as with all its dogma and ritual it has become outdated. So what is essential is a truly religious feeling, an inculcation of ethical values that make a clearcut distinction between need and greed as also deep feeling of reverence, love, sanctity and responsibility towards Nature. Ancient man had a close and live relationship with nature, which he kept alive through his myths, rites etc. Now in a complex society like ours every man, every scientist has to find out and reinterpret his own relationship with nature. To rediscover this is to have a true ecological awareness. For that, education at the individual level is the only solution, though it is a very slow meandering process. But it is as essential as it is difficult. In this great struggle of ours, no sacrifice is too great, no effort too small.

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# Vyāsa's Leftovers : Food Imagery in Indian Literature

**Vidyut Aklujkar**

I have a feeling that, in representing South and Southeast Asia on this panel on Food, I may have bitten off more than I can chew. But I am going to follow a practice of my childhood of finishing everything on my plate, once I have been served. A Marathi proverb prescribes that one should chew every bite thirty-two times. Hence, I am going to deal with my meal in all possible ways, even if in brief morsels, so as to savour all the rasas, or tastes that can be savoured.

[Since the South and Southeast Asian section is habitually placed at the tail end of the plenary session panel, after the appetizers, main course and deserts have been served, my topic today is entitled, Leftovers, or to be exact, Vyāsa's Leftovers : Food in Literature. I shall interpret literature to denote mainly Indian literature, in Sanskrit and in vernaculars, from Vedic to contemporary times.]

The paper is divided into two sections. In the first, I shall take note of the most valuable conceptual and theoretical contributions of South Asia to the study of food, and in the second, I shall discuss the treatment of leftover food in life and literature. The latter excursion will allow me to discuss topics such as purity and pollution, clannish acceptance and rejection, Bhakti, or worship and its ritual practices, and finally, originality and plagiarism in literature.

Since ancient times, food has been studied in India from all possible angles, such as the Dharma-śāstra or religious lawbooks, politics, philosophy, including logic, ethics, and metaphysics, mythology, medicine, social studies, poetics and the science of literary criticism, to name a few. Although several

original contributions can be traced in each of these disciplines, the two or three most well-known deserve mention here. One is the Rasa theory of Indian science of dramaturgy and poetics. Rasa can be translated as juice, essence, sap, flavour or enjoyment. Rasa theory, first elaborated by Bharata[1] uses the culinary model/motif to explain literary enjoyment. Just as different tastes of food combine to produce flavour in food, similarly different emotions expressed by the actors and actresses generate the aesthetic enjoyment in the audience[2]. Just as food is classified as sweet, sour, salty, bitter, hot and astringent, literature is classified with reference to the dominant moods : love, humour, pathos, valour, danger, disgust and terror. The rasa theory has had many eminent exponents since and it remains a standard theory of literary criticism even in contemporary India.

The second most important current of thought is the one which upholds purity of food to be of central importance in purifying one's body and mind, thus leading on to the ultimate goal of human life, salvation. The earliest expression of this is in the Chāndogya Upaniṣad VII. 26. 23. This line of thought links food with Karma and rebirth, thus generating several corollaries in ethics, religion and mythology. One such corollary is the supposition that a person should always give out portions of his cooked food to Gods, guests, beasts etc, and only after the sacrifice should himself eat. Those that cook for themselves are said to be the sin-eaters[4]. The triangle of food, Karma and rebirth is pivotal to the later development of Indian religions such as Hinduism, Buddhism and Jainism which stress non-violence as a virtue and prescribe vegetarianism as a morally superior diet.

Indians acknowledge the all-pervasiveness of food early on by equating food with the all-pervasive principle, Brahman. The Upaniṣads have declared food to be the highest ultimate principle, 'annaṁ brahmeti vyajānāt[5].' The central concept regarding food in general in ancient Indian literature is that you are what you eat, and therefore, all actions of eating, conscious or unconscious, are to be taken seriously, and each one is supposed to have its consequences, if not here and now, then in the next birth, or even several births later[6]. This conviction of dietary accountability gets translated in the Dharmaśāstra[7], into elaborate injunctions and taboos regarding food preparation, serving and consumption, whereas in the epics and the purāṇas,

it generates innumerable myths and stories of rewards of pious actions such as guest-feeding, and gift of food, and stories of gory consequences to wrong food-consumption or food-theft[8]. Such an attitude is crystallized in a celebrated definition of meat with reference to the reciprocity of dinner and diner. Manu, the most influential lawgiver [*circa* 1st c. A.D.], declares that the animal whose meat I am eating here and now will eat me later. That is why meat is called "me + eat" by the wise thinkers[9].

In most literature, food remains a central metaphor spanning the poles of life and death and encompassing everything in between. It is obvious that food is associated with life, since experience tells us that eating of food sustains life. This fact leads to the belief that food actually generates life, annād bhavanti bhūtāni, to quote the Bhagavad Gītā 3.14. The idea is found in many texts such as the Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa[10], the Taittirīya Upaniṣad[11] etc. Later on in the epics and purāṇas, this idea of the life-giving potency of food is stretched to the point of literally positing certain foods as producing progeny. Many variations on the theme are found, where oral consumption of actual semen or of rice, ghee, mango etc. leads to the birth of a baby, eating multiple portions of a dish leads to multiple births, as in the case of the twin princes in the Rāmāyaṇa, and eating of half portions leads to incomplete births as in the case of Jarāsandha, or the king who was put together by the Demoness Jarā, when he was born in two halves from his twin mothers' eating half a mango each. The transformation of food into progeny is a theme exploited innumerable times in the epic and purāṇic literature[12]. On the other hand, progeny may be viewed as food, either by human or divine diners, albeit in very rare instances. Myths centering upon cannibalism, ritual or real explore the darker side of the food/progeny complex[13]. In the eleventh canto of the Bhagavad Gītā, when Lord Kṛṣṇa manifests his cosmic form to the warrior Arjuna, he appears as Kāla or Time which devours the entire universe. This cosmic vision of the Almighty manifests his multiple molars, chewing and pulverizing the multitudes of beings that enter the hungry hole. The triple world becomes a divine morsel and all people simply become sesame seeds on top. Food thus comes to be connected with death, in more ways than one. From the point of view of dietary commonsense, if a person has indigestion, then food is detrimental

to his health and excess of food in extreme cases may lead to death. On the other hand, food is like medicine to starving people. Perhaps it is with similar outlook that the Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa II.8.8.3 declares that food is said to be both death and the medicine that averts death[14]. A carnivorous diet connects food at once with life and death. The epic Mahābhārata illustrates a chain of successive victims and diners, such as a hunter killing an eagle, which is swooping on a snake, which is about to devour a frog which is finishing off a fly. Whether food is connected with life or death depends only on one's point of view. As a contemporary poet Shel Silverstein has noted in his poem, "Thanksgiving dinner's sad and thankless. Christmas dinner's dark and blue, When you stop and try to see it, from the turkey's point of view." As we noted earlier, the turkey's point of view is taken quite seriously in Indian literature and the awareness of the possibility of role reversal between the diner and his dinner permeates several myths and informs many lawbooks.

Perhaps thanks to this built-in bipolarity, any concept of food exhibits ambivalent associations. This can be seen by examining the concept of leftover food as it is treated in Indian literature. Leftover food is a complex concept loaded with contradictory associations. In what follows, I shall attempt to show how it vacillates between opposites such as purity and pollution, generosity and miserliness, sacrality and profanity, desirability and disgust, acceptance in and rejection from a community, and plagiarism and originality in literature.

The Sanskrit word for leftover food is 'ucchiṣṭa,' which is explained as 'bhaktāvaśeṣa' which means food left over in a person's dish, or food that has once been in his mouth, or touched by his lips, tongue or saliva, and then left over, rejected or abandoned[15]. Since purity of food is of central importance in the ancient Indian literature the topic of ucchiṣṭa becomes equally important. The Bhagavad Gītā[16] classifies the ucchiṣṭa along with food that is stale by standing overnight, food which is devoid of flavour, and stinking. The lawbooks consider leftover food even if it is not stale, polluted and hence unfit to be consumed by anyone. Texts like the *Gṛhastha ratnākara* explain the rationale by saying, "The evil deeds of men resort to their food. Whoever eats the food of another partakes of that man's sin[17]." The Dharmaśāstras or religious lawbooks allow only babies and children upto

five years old to accept their parents' leftovers, but after that, no one can. Until the thread ceremony, a boy may dine from his mother's plate, but after that, he may not, since he then assumes his own personhood, and as an adult must observe the basic rules of hygiene and purity. Partaking of anyone's leftovers is forbidden, whereas partaking of a lower-class person's leftovers is particularly associated with dire consequences. The Viṣṇu Smṛti dictates that if one partakes of the leftovers of a Śūdra, one should atone for it by throwing it up and later observe fast for seven nights in order to purify one's self[18].

Rules regarding purity and pollution that centre around the concept of leftover food are so strong that their observance is essential to an individual's acceptance in a community and their disregard, even inadvertent failure to observe them leads to the errant members' eviction from within a community. Eating someone else's leftover food is believed to be equivalent to sharing his sins. That is why it is dangerous, and such a behaviour gives rise to shame and disgust. These are not only old beliefs expressed in ancient texts, they are very much alive even today in most orthodox circles in India. So strong were these beliefs that in the early days of the Portugese régime in Goa, entire towns of Hindus were converted to Christianity because they happened to drink water from a well into which a piece of bread was thrown or even believed to be thrown by Christian missionaries. The villagers believed that they had eaten someone's leftover bread, and thereby were somehow 'changed' or 'defiled' and thereby they lost their own religious identity and were thus tricked into accepting the other's religious identity. This is an instance of what some scholars have called gastro-politics[19].

Of course, to all restrictions regarding leftover food there were exceptions, both within the orthodox tradition and within the subsequent reforms. Since ancient times, these exceptions were also practiced along with strong prohibitions. Thus we find injunctions such as : A person should always leave something on his plate, and whatever remains is to be given to his wife, servant or slave[20]." For a wife to be dining from her husband's plate eating his leftovers was supposed to be a sign of her loyalty. Even until now, such a behaviour was praised as exhibiting proper conjugal relationship. Needless to say that the opposite, that is, eating of the wife's leftovers by the

husband, was rarely if ever publically practiced, and hardly ever confessed, let alone praised.

To the general attitude of aversion towards eating anyone's leftovers, some other powerful exceptions have also been recorded. As early as in the Chāndogya Upaniṣad[21], we find the story of Uṣasti Cākrāyaṇa which shows that in a dire calamity, to save one's life, one may eat even the remnants of another's food[22]. Considerations such as sustaining life may force one to eat leftovers, but on the other hand, we find that strong motives such as love or worship may lead a person to willingly accept leftovers from the beloved, the Guru, or God.

This brings me to discuss the turnabout that the concept of leftover food makes under the sweeping influence of the doctrine of Bhakti or intense personal worship. Not only does it lose its negative associations with pollution, danger, and disgust but it assumes the connotations of highest purity, honour and bliss. The common practice of devotees is as follows : Food is prepared afresh daily and before serving anyone else, is arranged neatly in a dish and offered to God as one would to an honoured guest. It is believed that God blesses it, some believe that God actually samples it, and then, after the ritual offering is completed, the same food is offered as prasāda, or blessed leftovers from God to all the assembled devotees. This ritual of worship transforms the profanity of defiled leftover food-consumption into the sacrality of sharing the divine feast. In some sects of worship or Bhakti, or in Sikhism where the Guru or spiritual teacher is equivalent to the Almighty, eating the leftovers of one's own Guru is taken to be the utmost token of the disciple's loyalty. Thus with the advent of Bhakti, or intimate personal worship of God, we find the concept of leftover food assuming interestingly significant and positive associations.

It may seem that in the disciple's partaking of the teacher's leftovers there is a lopsided power politics as in the gender relations, where we noted how a wife is blessed when she eats the husband's leftovers but not vice versa. However, all such neat preconceived notions topple when we study the phenomenon of Bhakti. The concept of leftover food performs a double somersault as it were, and manages to land on all fours, without breaking

any limbs. It is not only honourable for a devotee or a disciple to share the leftovers of his God or Guru, but we find stories in the Bhakti tradition where even God loves to share leftovers from his devotees. I have discussed these at length earlier in my paper "Sharing the Divine Feast"[23], so here I shall mention a few examples just to explain the turnabout of the purity-pollution notions.

The earliest example of reciprocal love or reward of worship in this manner is noted by Sāyaṇa[24] in explaining Ṛgveda 8.91, where Apālā, a woman suffering from white leprosy chews the leaves of the soma plant to extract juice from them and offers it with love to Indra. Indra drinks the juice with pleasure, and sets up a paradigm of God's behaviour towards his devotees. Later Bhakti literature abounds in such instances where just like the devotee that partakes of God's leftover food, God also enjoys the leftovers of his devotees[25]. The earlier injunctions of observing purity of food are deliberately flaunted by the reformist strategies of the devotees of God, since they want to break the earlier barriers that separate humankind into rigid castes and they aspire to share the divine love among all, regardless of gender or status.

We saw how the notions of purity and pollution undergo a radical change when coloured with Bhakti. The connected notions of clannish acceptance and rejection that we saw earlier expressed in orthodox Hinduism are also turned upside-down when we are dealing with leftovers in the context of Bhakti. Eating of leftovers of "the other" was enough for an orthodox Hindu to be polluted and therefore, rejected from within his caste, and in extreme cases, from his religious identity. Under the discourse of Bhakti, ideally this is reversed, and it is precisely the eating of leftover food, of the God or of the devotees, that becomes desirable, and is denied to all but the fortunate few. I shall mention only one such instance. Bhakta poet Sant Ekanātha (1533-1599) was a brahmin by birth, and a well-read pandit by profession. He practised and preached the message of equality regardless of caste or creed. In his poems, he describes the pastoral life of Lord Kṛṣṇa in great detail, dwelling at length on the favourite games of Kṛṣṇa and his friends. He describes the communal meals of Kṛṣṇa and his friends on the banks of Yamunā[26]. Ekanātha's Kṛṣṇa comes from an affluent home, so he brings from

home rich food for his midday meal, but his humble cowherd friends bring dried pieces of roties and whatever else they find tied somehow in their napkins[27]. Ekanātha's Kṛṣṇa never eats alone. He makes everyone open his *shidori,* the bag-lunch, and makes each one put his meal together in a big pile. He adds his own meal to the pile as well. Then the friends feed each other, and share the mixture of all tastes. The superb flavour, the divine 'rasa' that this feast produces can only be imagined. Sometimes the cowherds engage in mock quarrels as to who should take the first morsel. Sometimes they accuse Kṛṣṇa of being mischievous and gobbling up their food. Kṛṣṇa often must break up their friendly quarrels by sharing his food with them. The gods in heaven are envious of the joy of the innocent cowherds and they want to share it too. So the gods assume the forms of the fish in the river Yamunā and wait in the hope of sharing the crumbs, *ucchiṣṭa,* when the cowherds come to wash their hands in the river. But God Kṛṣṇa plays a mischief again. He scares his cowherd friends away from the river by telling them about a ghost in the river. So they resume their play by simply wiping their hands on their bottoms. The cunning gods are thus deprived of sharing their leftovers, their *ucchiṣṭa* which is freely available to those who are Kṛṣṇa's friendly devotees. Ekanātha believes that he was blessed enough to partake the sacred leftovers from that common meal of Kṛṣṇa's cowherds[28].

Now that we have travelled through centuries of Indian literature tracing the aroma of leftovers, it is time to turn to Vyāsa and his leftovers. Vyāsa is traditionally believed to be the visionary author of the great Indian epic, the Mahābhārata. While praising the wealth of his insights, breadth of his topics and depth of his characters, it is said in Sanskrit, "vyāsocchiṣṭaṁ jagat sarvaṁ" : "This entire world is Vyāsa's leftovers." This can be interpreted in more than one senses. In one sense, it means that all later literature is like crumbs of Vyāsa's plate. What is praise for Vyāsa may sound like deprecation for other poets. Since Vyāsa has already tasted it, it follows that the others are only savouring his stale leftovers, or using Vyāsa's stolen goods. If this is so, then is there any room for freshness or originality in literature anymore ? Are all later poets plagiarizers ? Interpreted thus, the metaphor of leftovers again helps us, since garnishing leftovers is a real test of any good cook's creativity. Any cook worthy of her salt will take the challenge and surprise

her diners. Originality in this context simply gets redefined. Judging by the astounding volume and quality of reinterpretations of the themes, characters and messages of the Mahābhārata, ranging from Bhāsa and Bhaṭṭanārāyaṇa to Peter Brook and Shashi Tharoor, Vyāsa's praise seems to have deterred no new poet or novelist of South Asia.

In another sense, the adage means, that there is nothing new under the sun, that Vyāsa has anticipated it all in the Mahābhārata. As his disciple Vaiśampāyana proclaims, "that which is elsewhere is already here, and what is not here is found nowhere[29]". When one seriously begins to study the Mahābhārata, [I say, begins to study, since no one has yet finished studying the Mahābhārata,] one finds the above praise to be not an exaggeration, but simply a modest description of the great epic. To take an example, in addition to all the topics that I have discussed so far in connection with the leftover food, the Mahābhārata presents us with stories that give quite different connotations to the concept of leftover food. I am going to consider only two stories here before I conclude. In each of these there is a bird or a beast eating leftover food, and each in turn, links these birds and beasts with humans and their morality. Furthermore, each story takes the otherwise eulogized heroes of the epic such as Bhīṣma and Yudhiṣṭhira, and shows them in a less flattering light. One of these[30] mentions a curious female bird called Bhūliṅga śakuni, perhaps meaning the land-indicator bird, who lives on the other side of Mt. Himavat, and subsists by eating only leftover food. This bird eats not just any leftover food, but she carves out the particles of flesh stuck between a lion's teeth, and eats only those bits while chanting constantly, "Don't be foolhardy." King Śiśupāla of Cedi insults the grand old celibate Bhīṣma of the Kuru clan by equating his life with that of the Bhūliṅga bird. In calling Bhīṣma these names, Śiśupāla doubly insults Bhīṣma. He implies that Bhīṣma's speech contradicts his own actions just as the silly bird's foolhardy action contradicts her own instruction. And secondly, Śiśupāla suggests that just as the bird stays alive only thanks to the lion's indulgence and mercy, Bhīṣma owes his life to the mercy and indulgence of Duryodhana, the present Kaurava king. The leftover-eating Bhūliṅga bird mentioned, to my knowledge, only in the Mahābhārata, stands as a solitary example of someone who combines vanity and stupidity with a dangerously marginal

existence.

The second story is about a mongoose and the Pāṇḍava prince Yudhiṣṭhira[31]. It frames the concepts of gift of food in the context of hunger, not only of the diners, but also of the donors. It makes us re-examine the normal connotations of miserliness and generosity associated with small and large gifts, in particular, gifts of food, with reference to leftover food. Needless to say that the gift of food is always praised in Indian literature as the most precious gift of all[32]. We also saw that on the whole, leftover food was associated with defilement and pollution in the mainstream, and hence was forbidden as a gift[33]. The Mahābhārata narrates several stories of gifts of all kinds, and it often praises the eldest Pāṇḍava, Yudhiṣṭhira as a great donor, a kindhearted and generous king. However, in the Āśvamedhika parvan, the following tale is told. Yudhiṣṭhira has just finished performing the great sacrifice, Asvamedha. He has given away untold wealth. Brahmins have received gold, gems, and money, the guest kings have received elephants, horses, jewels and women. There are streams of honey, wine and other intoxicants everywhere. There are tanks of ghee, and mountains of food being given away. Heavenly flowers are falling upon Yudhiṣṭhira's head and people are returning to their own countries singing praises of the great king. At that point a mongoose whose body is half golden comes out of a hole and makes a thunderous noise. The mongoose then declares in a human voice that this royal sacrifice cannot hold a candle to the one made by that poor brahmin living in this Kurukṣetra earlier. They all are shocked to hear that and ask it to enlighten them further. The mongoose tells the king a story of the poor old Brahmin and his family. They had not had anything to eat for days together, because there was a famine. Finally, they come by some grains and with great effort prepare a meal. They are about to sit down to eat when a guest comes to the door, and the brahmin gives up his own share of food to satisfy the guest's hunger. When that is not enough, the brahmin's wife, then his son and then the daughter-in-law also give up their own portions of food to the guest. He eats, is satisfied, and praises the family, which remains starving. The guest declares, "Hunger gnaws at wisdom, hunger clouds morality. Hunger engulfs knowledge, and drives away courage. The one who can conquer hunger indeed wins the kingdom of heaven." With these words the guest leaves, and a

heavenly chariot descends to take the blessed family to heaven. The mongoose says that he was drawn by the smell of food to that place of sacrifice by the Brahmin family, and he rolled in the leftover food and water spilled on the ground. Lo and behold, half his body which came into contact with those leftovers became golden. The other half, untouched by that food, remained dark. The mongoose says to King Yudhiṣṭhira, "Since then I have visited several sacred places in the hope of making my remaining body golden. I had no such luck again. I had come in great expectations to your sacrifice but even here, it did not turn golden. That is why I said earlier, that this sacrifice is not as great as the sacrifice made by that starving Brahmin and his family." The humbled King remains speechless.

**Annotations :**

1. Nāṭya Śāstra 6.32-33 यथा बहुद्रव्ययुतैर्व्यंजनैर्बहुभिर्युतम् । आस्वादयन्ति भुञ्जाना भक्तं भक्तविदो जनाः ॥
2. को दृष्टान्तः । अत्राह.... यथा हि नाना व्यञ्जनौषधिद्रव्यसंयोगाद्रसनिष्पत्तिः तथा नानाभावोपगमाद् रसनिष्पत्तिः भरत नाट्यशास्त्र, अध्याय ६
3. आहारशुद्धौ सत्त्वशुद्धिः सत्त्वशुद्धौ ध्रुवा स्मृतिः । स्मृतिलम्भे सर्वग्रन्थीनां विप्रमोक्षः ॥ छांदोग्य ७.२६.२
4. यज्ञशिष्टाशनः सन्तो मुच्यन्ते सर्वकिल्बिषैः । भुञ्जते ते त्वघं पापाः ये पचन्त्यात्मकारणात् ॥ भगवद्गीता
5. Taittirīya Upaniṣad 3.2.1-3.
6. O"Flaherty 1980, David White in Khare 1992.
7. Kane 1941, Rocher in O"Flaherty 1980.
8. Ludo Rocher in "Karma and Rebirth in the Dharma Śāstra" in O"Flaherty, 1980.
9. मां स भक्षयितामुत्र यस्य मांसमिहाद्म्यहम् । एतन्मांसस्य मांसत्वं प्रवदन्ति मनीषिणः ॥ मनु ५.५३
10. अन्नमाहुः प्रजननं प्रजानाम् । तैत्तिरीय ब्राह्मण, अन्नाद्वै प्रजाः प्रजायन्ते ॥ तैत्तिरीयोपनि. २२
11. अन्नाद् भवन्ति भूतानि जातान्यन्नेन वर्धन्ते । अद्यतेत्ति च भूतानि तस्मादन्नं तदुच्यते ॥ तैत्तिरीयोपनि. २२
12. O"Flaherty 1980;
13. Aklujkar 1996; Shulman 1993 etc.
14. अन्नं प्राणमन्नमपानमाहुः । अन्नं मृत्युं तमु जीवातुमाहुः ॥
    अन्नं ब्रह्माणो जरसं वदन्ति । अन्नमाहुः प्रजननं प्रजानाम् ॥ तैत्तिरीय ब्राह्मण २.८.८.३
15. By extension, 'ucchiṣṭa' is also applied to a person who has not washed his hands and mouth after eating. Thus, Manu declares that one who is an ucchiṣṭa

should not go anywhere. *na cocchiṣṭaḥ kvacidvrajet.* Manusmṛti 2.56. This also is later connected with Tantra divinities such as the ucchiṣṭa Gaṇeśa and ucchiṣṭa cāṇḍālī. I shall not deal with these in this paper. For more on these topics, see Chitrav Śāstri's Bhāratīya Sanskrti Kośa.

16. यातयामं गतरसं पूति पर्युषितं च यत्। उच्छिष्टमपि चामेध्यं भोजनं तामसप्रियम्॥ भगवद्गीता १७.१०
17. Cited in Kane, 1941. p. 758.
18. शूद्रोच्छिष्टाशने च वमनं कृत्वा सप्तरात्रमुपवसेत्। विष्णुस्मृति. This quotation is taken from Bhāratīya Saṁskṛti Kośa. p. 596.
19. Appadurai 1981.
20. Parāśara mādhavīya. I. pt. 1 p. 422, cited in Kane, 1941. p. 769.
21. Chāndogya Upaniṣad 1. 10-11.
22. The learned brahmin Uṣasti declines from accepting water from the person whose leftover food he accepts, since taking any more than is absolutely necessary would be still accepting 'ucchiṣṭa' or defiled food. This shows that even in dire circumstances, a man must use his own discretion and decline from indulging in acceptance of ucchiṣṭa. For more on the subject of a particular ascetic practice of eating remnants of leftover meat, and on the word vighasāśin : see Wezlar, 1978.
23. Aklujkar in Khare, 1992.
24. Cited in Chitrao, 1964.
25. Aklujkar 1992, Lutgendorf 1996,
26. SSG 3 : pp. abhaṅgas 240-269.
27. *"śilyā viṭakyā bhākarī dahī bhāta loṇī, meḷavonī meḷā karī cakrapāṇī.* SSG. 3 : p. 65, abhaṅga 240.
28. SSG. 4 : p. abhaṅga 241. *Śriharī vāḍhīle, gopāḷa jevīle, ucchiṣṭa sevile ekā janārdanīṁ.*
29. धर्मे चार्थे च कामे च मोक्षे च भरतर्षभ। यदिहास्ति तदन्यत्र यन्नेहास्ति न तत्क्वचित्॥ महाभारत. आदिपर्व ५६.३३
30. MBh Sabhā Parva, sarga 42. 19-23.
31. MBh *Āśvamedhika parvan adhyāya* 91-96. *nakulopākhyānam.*
32. अन्नदानात्परं दानं न भूतं न भविष्यति। पुण्यं यशस्यमायुष्यं बलपुष्टिविवर्धनम्॥ हलायुधकोशः।
33. नोच्छिष्टं कस्यचिद्दद्यात्। मनुस्मृति २.५६

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# The Resurrection of Cārvāka

**Krishna S. Arjunwadkar**

THE INTELLECTUAL

"The intellectual should constantly disturb, should bear witness to the misery of the world, should be provocative by being independent, should rebel against all hidden and open pressures and manipulations, should be the chief doubter of systems....and for this reason, an intellectual cannot fit into any role that might be assigned to him...and essentially doesn't belong anywhere : he stands out as an irritant wherever he is."

Quoted by Alan Clements in *The Voice of Hope* by Aung San Suu Kyi (Penguin Books, 1997; p. 92).

(Abbr. : DPC stands for Debi Prasad Chattopadhyaya. p stands for page numbers from *Lokāyata*. For consistency, I have used diacritical marks irrespective of their use or otherwise in the original works.)

**Prologue :**

Literature on Cārvāka

Since Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya (DPC) published his *Lokāyata : A Study in Ancient Indian Materialism* (People's Publishing House, 1959), interest in Cārvāka *alias* Lokāyata seems to have been revived at least in Maharashtra. With the solitary exception of Sadashiv Athavale's work. *Cārvāka : Itihāsa va Tattvajñāna* (Vāī 1958), all recent studies are post-*Lokāyata*. Among them may be listed

(1) *Cārvāka-darśana* (1982, 1987),

(2) *Āstika-śiromaṇī Cārvāka* (1992), and

(3) *Vaidika Paraṁparā viruddha Cārvāka* (Jan.-Mr. 1994 issue of the

Navabhārata magazine)—all the three by A. H. Salunkhe; and

(4) *Cārvāka-samīkṣā* (*Ed.* G. U. Thite, 1978).

(5) *Cārvākavāda va Advaitvāda* (Pradeep Gokhale, 1989).

Of these, No. 1 is a doctoral thesis, later revised and enlarged into No. 2. No. 3 is a detailed refutation (221 pages in Royal size) of the review of No. 1 by Shriniwas Dikshit published in the Navabhārata, Nov.-Dec. 1992. This game of polemic exchanges was going on in the Navabhārata even at the time I was writing this article; and I, too, have made my own contribution to it as noted below. No. 4 is a collection of papers read at a seminar on Cārvāka in Pune in 1975. All these four books, along with the one by Athavale, are in Marathi. In a Marathi article entitled '*Cārvākāce Punarujjīvan*' (1 and 2), I have discussed points arising from the Marathi books, particularly those by Salunkhe. (The Navabhārata, April and May, 1998). The present article is, therefore, focused on DPC's *Lokāyata*, with occasional references to other works. In writing this article, my intention is not so much as to review *Lokāyata* in detail as to discuss inherent weaknesses in DPC's methodology and arguments.

## *Lokāyata* : an outline

DPC's *Lokāyata*, extending over about 700 pages and eight chapters, is divided into four 'books' : I. The Problem and the Method (ch. 1-2); II. The Social Background (ch. 3-4); III. Materialism (ch. 5-7); IV. Idealism (ch. 8). He has discussed the nature of the contents of the book, chapter by chapter, in his 'Introduction'. DPC's span of ancient Indian materialism covers a wide range of cults, concepts, practices and philosophical schools spreading over a long period beginning with the Vedic times and reaching as far as our own, and detecting materialistic core even in apparently orthodox traditions. The tradition of materialism is traced by DPC to the Asuras (identified by some with Assyrians) of Vedic times who are associated with *Deha-vāda*, the view that the material body itself is the soul, and is shown by him, through his interpretative skills, to cover the cults of the so-called orthodox deities like Gaṇapati and Gaurī, Tantric cults and even the Sāṁkhya-Yoga schools of philosophy and sections of Buddhism. He devotes the last two chapters to the discussion of the contrasting idealistic outlook, also having its roots in

the oldest stratum of the Vedas and found in some crucial concepts in Buddhism. In this study DPC has drawn inspiration from the writing of George Thompson upon which, he confesses, he has depended throughout his study. (Intro. p.xix). My criticism, therefore, applies in its essence as much to his guide as to DPC himself.

## Views DPC approves not

DPC starts with the unreliability of Mādhava's account of Cārvāka as presented in his *Sarva-darśana-saṁgraha*, a Sanskrit work assigned to the 13th *c.* A.D. (p. 4), despite the fact that it is 'clear and coherent' (p. 9), and quotes views of authors like Tucci, Garbe and Dasgupta who believe, on the basis of stray references in old works, that authentic works on Cārvāka school are lost. A certain *Bṛhaspati Sūtra* posing to be an authentic work by Bṛhaspati, the mythical originator of the Cārvāka school, published by F. W. Thomas (1921) is brushed aside by Tucci as unauthentic but consisting of authentic passages from older sources (p. 8). This is followed by different views regarding the origin and development of the Cārvāka school. These vary between two extremes : (i) the Lokāyata, as a branch of ancient Indian philosophy, never existed at all (p. 11, Rhys Davids p. 18); (ii) it was imported into India from Sumerian civilization (p. 13). This latter view is held by Dasgupta on the basis of the similarity between the burial custom of the Sumerians and that attributed to Asuras, who believed that the soul is not different from the body, in the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* (p. 14). DPC does not agree with Dasgupta, obviously because the former is interested in finding roots of materialism in ancient India. In between the two extremes stands the view that (iii) Lokāyatas survive in India even today as one can judge from the practices of the Kāpālikas and such other sects making sex a part of religious ritual (p. 16).

## Fact and fiction : Characteristics

What is it that DPC is out to prove or establish ? Is it his Marxist stand that, like all civilizations, Indian civilization, too, must have started at the lowest rung of the ladder, the primitive conditions, namely the primary needs of the man—food, clothing and shelter ? Perhaps not. This is too obvious a reality to need any evidence or argumentation, in line with the one that any

grown up man opens his account of growth from the womb of his mother. DPC is out to prove that these primitive conditions are reflected in the ancient Indian literature. In other words, it is his imaginative way of interpretation of the said literature based on certain presumptions/observations (such as importance of woman in primitive societies as the source of production, woman as the centre of an agricultural society and so on) that make his quasi-theoretical views unacceptable. If scientific exposition of a *fact* (which needs undeniable proof leading to inevitable conclusions) and writing classed as *fiction* (in which imagination plays the decisive role) based on only a broad framework of the fact are considered to be the two extremes of literature, DPC's writing has the appearance of the former but in fact tends towards the latter. This is perhaps owing to the influence of the western tenets of hermeneutics which can work on possibilities lacking support to translate them into certainties. This may, incidentally, open up doors to a comparative study of hermeneutics—Western and ancient Indian, i.e., Mīmāṁsā.

## Materialism, magic and ritual

Materialism is defined as 'belief that only matter is real or important' characterised by "rejection of spiritual values etc.' (OED) Materialism being this, how can it be reconciled with magic which is defined as the 'art of influencing events by occult control of nature or spirits' (OED) ? For, what is 'occult' ? It is something 'involving the supernatural, mystical,....' All this terminology militates against the very foundation of materialism which denies anything and everything beyond matter. And DPC talks of magic as a characteristic of materialism of primitive man and illustrates it by citing the description of dogs chanting for food occurring in a principal Upaniṣad, and enlists even some deities like Gaṇapati, Gaurī and the whole gamut of Tantric practices as part of ancient Indian materialism. It is like avowed enemies being made to join hands for diametrically opposite goals. If this is said to be justified on the ground that it is meant for material, this-worldly gains, any religious prayer can have an equal claim to materialism, for being meant for material gains ! With this approach, DPC can enrol almost the whole of Vedic and later religious literature as representing ancient Indian materialistic tradition, leaving out very little of it as really religious; for the Vedic seers and common people pray gods for progeny, horses, wealth, conquest of the

enemies and what not—everything material. Under these circumstances, I fail to understand why DPC had to rely on a solitary and rare example of the chanting dogs. Apparently it is confusion, may be deliberate, or 'judicial blindness' as Marx remarks. It is amusing to see this latter criticism, flung by DPC on non-Marxists, devolve on the champion of Marxism himself.

## Totemism

Whenever DPC finds references to animals and plants in ancient Sanskrit literature, he thinks of totemism. Now, totemism is understood as taking animals as emblems of families. The chanting dogs, names of humans after birds and animals are, he thinks, indicators of totemism; and lots of these are found in ancient Indian society. Conceding his view as a possibility, how can he explain the fact that various physical postures in the Yoga tradition are named after animals and birds ? Is Yoga also materialistic in essence and a characteristic of the primitive society ? The primitive society which can develop such a complicated system as Yoga must be far advanced than many developed and civilized ones ! I am aware that, in DPC's view, Yoga has its origin in the magic of the primitive man; but, as shown earlier, magic and materialism do not go together. Even if they are supposed to go together, the outlook and the approach of these two, on the one hand, and those of Yoga, on the other, are diametrically opposite—the former recognising no goal beyond worldly gains, and the latter advising control of mind through discarding everything worldly for spiritual sublimation.

Talking of the chanting dogs in the Chāndogya Upaniṣad (I.12.4) out of which he has made his major capital, DPC has blamed Radhakrishnan for tampering with the contents of the original passage by making the dogs go around, each following dog holding the tail of the preceding one. Had he consulted the Śāṁkarabhāṣya on the passage, he would have found it to be Radhakrishnan's source. It is Śaṁkara who, considering that the dogs are meant to imitate the style of the brahmins going around in a particular ritual (associated with the *bahiṣpavamāna* song) in a Soma sacrifice, each holding on to the one ahead of him (*cf. Śrautakośa* by Dandekar and Kashikar, English version, Vol. II, Pt. II, p. 454), makes the dogs hold tails, in a bid to complete the comparison. So, the blame, if any, lies at the door of Śaṁkara. But the

context given above will make it clear that Śaṁkara has introduced the said detail on the basis of his perfect knowledge of the sacrificial tradition and his sense of responsibility as a commentator. He in fact deserves to be praised for that.

As to human beings being named after animals etc., men are even today named after birds and plants / flowers even among culturally and educationally advanced sections of human society. The suffix 'Siṁha' (meaning a lion) is added to men's names for centuries in many an Indian community like the Sikhs. Jawaharlal Nehru was never found in public functions without a rose in his button hole. None but DPC would think that it was a totem or its survival. In ancient Indian literature, we find some *kṣatriya* families tracing their origins to the Sun and the Moon (this belief perpetuated through historical times even to this day), and display them on the banners of their chariots etc. There is no reason why it should be kept outside the span of totemism. In fact, even poetry with innumerable comparisons from the world of animals and plants cannot escape the claim of totemism and primitive character. The logical conclusion is : we are all a primitive society and shall so remain to the end ! This position, incidentally, so perfectly tallies with that of Śaṁkara who maintains that, in matters fundamental, all human beings behave like animals, following their instincts—*paśvādibhiś cāviśeṣāt*. (Brahmasūtrabhāṣya, introduction). The only difference would be : while a Marxist will stop at instincts, Śaṁkara goes deeper to trace the behaviour to a primordial cause, namely mistaking the identity of the Self as that of the non-Self.

What about the monkeys in the Rāmāyaṇa ? Humans with monkey totems, actual monkeys or primates humanized for poetic effect aimed at an element of miracle ? And what again about the animal characters in Aesop's fables and the Pañcatantra of Viṣṇuśarman ? If DPC cannot see them, is it a case of 'judicial blindness' as Marx observes ? This literary tradition of representing human beings by animals for artistic purposes comes as close as the too well known 'Animal Farm' of our own times criticizing Communistic way of thinking.

## Varieties in names

Many are the varieties in which names are given to persons and families. Of these, to give only some a preferential treatment as indicating a primitive practice, particularly when their style is seen persisting even in a contemporary society, is to ignore the resourcefulness of man in giving names and his reluctance to change them, may be for practical considerations, once they are established. This view presumes that words denoting animals and plants make their appearance in a language or attract its speakers earlier than any other words. Those who hold such a view should explain why we do not find words denoting food, clothing and shelter which are so basic to the primitive society, in the list of words used as given names in a sizeable proportion. By floating his theory of totemism as reflected in given names, DPC is unwittingly encroaching upon the domain of linguistics and risking postulates that cannot be defended on linguistic grounds. The purpose of names is to distinguish one thing from another; and this is achieved in a variety of ways reflecting man's resourcefulness. Even words expressing physical defects are found to be in vogue as family names. The point to be made is : considering the vast variety of styles in naming animals and humans, it fails to convince a discrete reader to separate a group of words as reflecting totemism.

The word *totem* is explained as a natural object (esp. animal) adopted among North American Indians as emblem of family or clan (OED). These emblems have found an expression there in huge wooden carved memorials that can still be verified. In extending the same tendency to primitive Indian society, DPC has relied solely on linguistic evidence without a support from archaeological findings. How far can a linguistic evidence be relied upon in the face of the fact that, as shown elsewhere in this article, names of families and individuals in India are drawn from a variety of fields, and the proportion of the so called 'totemic' family names to other varieties thereof is trivial.

While interpreting Indian given names in his own way, is DPC aware that English given names normally do not mean or signify anything else ? For instance, 'John' means just the name of a person and nothing else. English, therefore, does not leave any scope for the sort of deliberations DPC has

made in connection with Sanskrit names (that they suggest a primitive, totemic society). Does it mean that the English society managed to escape a stage of development which other societies could not ? If it does, DPC owes an explanation why; as such a position militates against Marx's observation that every society begins from the lowest stage of development.

## Totemism and linguistics

Treating use of words denoting animals, birds and plants as names of humans to be indicative of totemism, and hence of primitive society, DPC is presuming that the class of words he separates was the earliest to come into existence in Sanskrit (or, for that matter, in any language) before the rest as also before the practice of giving names to human beings; and also that they have retained their meanings through the ages. Is it possible to map on definite lines the development of a language and take it as the basis for a theory ? All such attempts are no more than flights of imagination. This is not in keeping with the reality. Language continually changes with time in vocabulary and grammatical structure. Old words die, new words arise; the surviving old words, too, change their meaning. To summon language to give witness in defence of a theory is, therefore, a journey in the dark leading to nowhere.

## Uniform scheme of social development

Another fallacy in DPC's argument is that everywhere in the world human society has a uniform scheme of development. This makes him think that if totemism is found to be a stage somewhere, it must be so everywhere. Human societies on the whole develop not in isolation but through an interaction with other societies. This has happened with ancient societies separated even by seas. Human beings can see what others do and follow suit if it is to their advantage. This is how India, after the stagnation of centuries, came to develop the ability to understand and produce the latest in technology developed by other societies. Evidence has been brought to light to show that ancient societies, with their crude technology, could establish contacts with distant continents. Like individuals, societies, too, differ in their ability to develop; it is, likewise, not a rare phenomenon that one can skip a stage in which another pulls on for ages. It is, therefore, idle,

to presume a single formula of development and try to fit it on the history of the human society everywhere in the world. It is primitive logic, if logic it could be named.

## Endogamy and exogamy

DPC traces the practices of endogamy and exogamy still in vogue in India and associated with the *gotra* system, to those among ancient tribes. A rational approach to these practices would reveal that there are several factors responsible for them such as the proportion of males to females in a social group, relation of one group to another, development of means of communications with far-off groups, practical needs and instincts and so on, numerous instances of which can be drawn from history and mythology. The complex system of smaller castes and sub-castes owes its origin to the violation, rather than observation, of the practice of endogamy and exogamy. The Greek princes and their protéges settled in India after Alexander's invasion were presumably married to Indian women and were absorbed in Indian society in the course of time. History records that the daughter of Alexander's officer was married to Chandragupta. The surest counter force challenging these practices may be found in the development of the institution of prostitutes, a universal phenomenon not taken notice of by the learned author. It is, therefore, illogical to think, as DPC does, that these practices governed ancient tribes on a large scale and continued to prevail over the *gotra* groups even in the contemporary society. Human physiology being the same everywhere, man's intelligence must have discovered long ago the futility and irrationality of the practices under discussion. This is all the more true when seen in comparison to animal species that have, out of natural instincts, developed cross breeding without the intervention of man.

## The miraculous in Sanskrit literature

DPC's approach to ancient Sk literature as a means of social history is based on certain presumptions. How is he going to defend his approach against those who regard it as a symbolic-cum-poetic representation of astronomical facts ? For example, Hanumān in the Rāmāyaṇa is interpreted by some as a comet on the basis of the tradition associated with his exploit of jumping at the Sun soon after his birth. Similar explanations have been

offered of other characters in the celebrated epic. This point leads us to the general question how far can we rely on theories of the nature of possibilities based on interpretations of ancient literature as means of reconstructing ancient history, and prefer one to another ? For, all talk of possibility is inherently tied with the claims of other credible possibilities and even impossibility. This naturally lends them an utterly subjective character, and no scientific discussion can afford to allow a subjective element to colour an evidence. Viewed from this angle, one can reasonably maintain that all attempts at culling information of definite, specific facts from ancient literature, not produced as history, which are based on interpretations, are open to challenge and doubt as to their acceptability as proven conclusions.

## Ancient literature as a source of history

Again, if ancient literature is viewed as a source of social history, what prevents its use as a source of the history of technology ? There are magical formulas for every imaginable purpose in the Atharvaveda. We find innumerable references to extra-sensory perception and supernatural powers arising from penance and illustrated by curses and boons. There are references in the Rāmāyaṇa to aerial carriers (*vimānas*) used by gods and *gaṅdharvas*. Vālmīki employs a huge aerial carrier, *Puṣpaka* (said to be in the service of Kubera before Rāvaṇa robbed him of it), spacious enough to accommodate an entire army (even Jumbo Jets of our own times of technological advancement cannot hope to perform this feat), to fetch Rāma and his army to Ayodhyā after the conquest of Rāvaṇa. Rāma's army of monkeys is credited with building of a stone bridge across the sea to reach Laṅkā to wage a war against Rāvaṇa. Equally challenging is the episode of the touch of Rāma's foot restoring Ahalyā to her human form from the state of a stone she was reduced to as a result of her husband's curse. The great Mahābhārata (really great !) speaks of an artificial nourishment of Gāndhāri's foetus, cut into a hundred pieces, finally producing a hundred sons called Kauravas. (Some scholars see in this episode an evidence of the practice of 'cloning' being known in those times !) Savitri is said to have restored her dead husband to life after negotiations with the god of death. Kṛṣṇa, when in danger of being attacked by Duryodhana's guards in an open court where he was pleading for Pāṇḍavas, is said to have assumed myriad forms to confuse them. Hiḍimbā,

Bhima's consort from a demonic family, could change her appearance at will. And so could Śūrpaṇkhā of the Rāmāyaṇa fame. Such examples can be multiplied to any extent. There are innumerable references to weapons having unlimited destructive power when used along with magic chants, such as Brahmāstra. One can infer from this (and some actually do) that a highly developed technology existed in those times. DPC is using such methods to find evidence in ancient literature of a primitive society as are capable of supplying evidence that, like a boomrang, would recoil on him and prove to the contrary that the society reflected in it was technically far advanced than the present-day society boasting of its achievements.

### *Prakṛti* in Sāṁkhya : Building castles in the air

Coming to the concept and term *Prakṛti* in Sāṁkhya which DPC regards as an indicator of the importance of woman in primitive societies and relates it to the worship of woman in Tantrism, what are we to say about the occurrence of the same term in Pāṇinian grammar ? Is it also a heritage of a primitive society ? Surely, DPC is confounding grammatical gender with sex. With his peculiar view regarding feminine words in technical works, he may also like to bring even Vedānta under the roof of materialism on the basis of important feminine words like Avidyā, Māyā etc. Is he aware that Sanskrit language has words meaning a wife in all the three genders (*bhāryā f., dāra m., kalatra n.*) ? Even if the grammatical gender is supposed to be related to sex, it would be a gross mistake to take as a basis for building up social theory the metalanguage in scientific works which is exclusively decided by definitions. Building up a theory on the basis of a feminine word, DPC rounds up Vaiśeṣika atomism with materialism despite the fact that the Vaiśeṣika word for an atom is *paramāṇu*, a masculine word. Are Vaiśeṣikas also related to Tantrism, male-oriented in this case ?

If DPC's theory is extended to other areas of life, we will have to conclude that feminine words denoting parts of body (such as *nāsikā, jihvā, yoni, kaṭi, jaṅghā*....) imply a female-dominated society. Its corollary would be that heart (hṛdaya), being neuter, was the last part of the body to be identified. On the basis of this hypothesis, we can assume that the parts in feminine gender were the earliest to be identified. DPC owes special thanks to Sanskrit

language for its arbitrary scheme of genders of nouns providing an unthought-of source for his research. The only question he has to answer is whether this theory is applicable to societies speaking languages which lack this characteristic. English, for example, has the use of masculine and feminine genders limited only to words denoting men and women, all the rest being generally treated as having the neuter gender. English shares this feature with many other languages with minor variations. In the light of DPC's theory that female domination indicates an agricultural society, would it be reasonable to conclude that speakers of these languages skipped some stages of development ? The basic weakness of DPC's theory is that he bases his social theory on linguistic facts which vary from language to language and, hence, are unreliable as a scientific evidence; and, even in doing so, he takes this evidence to areas of study in which meanings of words are controlled not by convention, but by definition.

## Woman as a link between Tantrism and Sāṁkhya

This brings us to a seminal question : is Tantrism necessarily centred round woman as the creative force as DPC maintains ? Tantrism in India has both male as well as female deities as its objects of worship, of which only the female element attracts DPC's attention. What about the Tantric traditions highlighting male as the creative force, as, for example, the Śiva sect is, with 'phallus' (*liṅga*) as the symbol of its deity ? Is it (male-oriented Tantrism) reflected in any philosophical system as, for instance, the female-oriented Tantrism is, according to DPC, in the Sāṁkhya system ? Perhaps, DPC would like to associate Vaiśeṣikas with male Tantrism, as they regard *paramāṇu*, atom, masculine in gender, as the ultimate cause of the world (a perfect symbolic description of phallus), and are traditionally associated with the Śiva sect. In this way, any philosophical system, or, for that matter, any discourse in Sk tradition, necessarily using masculine and feminine words which abound in Sanskrit, can be associated with Tantrism, male or female, or both; and all Sanskrit literature can be brought under a single banner of Tantrism. This will show again that DPC is illogically mixing up philosophical systems with linguistic traits and social history, blissfully unaware of the logical conclusions that inevitably follow his presumptions. He is putting together unrelated areas to justify his favourite theory.

To show how irrelevant DPC is, I am tempted to cite the tradition of Sanskrit grammar known as Harināmāmṛta. This tradition explains Sanskrit grammar by using terms resembling, but different from, the grammatical terms in vogue. For example, *vibhakti* in Pāṇinian grammar is *Viṣṇubhakti* in it. Does it establish any natural relation between grammar and the devotional sect ? As the author of the Harināmāmṛta grammar himself declares, his purpose is only to promote merit of the student by inducing him to utter God-related words while he studies grammar. Tantrism and the Sāṁkhya system, too, do not have any natural relation; imagination of such a relation may, if at all, promote the merit of a Marxist if he cares to study Sāṁkhya.

Obsessed with the element of woman as a link between anything and Tantrism, DPC discovers succour from an unexpected direction. In a story related to the Sāṁkhya tradition occurring in the Mahābhārata, the name Kapila is found as Kapilā being the name of the wife of Āsuri, a celebrated authority of the system and traditionally the teacher of Pañcaśikha, another authority. What is unusual in this story is that this Kapilā is said to have breast-fed Pañcaśikha, which DPC interprets to mean that she tutored him in the system, and raises the question whether the originator of the Sāṁkhya system was a male or a female. (p ..364..) DPC would be happy if the second alternative prevails; for it would smoothen his way to establish Lokāyata-Sāṁkhya-Tantra axis. But I have discussed elsewhere in this article the hazards of seeing history in ancient stories interpreted at will. In a story of a similar nature occurring in the Padmapurāṇa (Uttara-khaṇḍa) in praise of the greatness of the Bhāgavata Purāṇa, the sage Gokarṇa is said to have been born of a cow and, consequently, having cow-like ears which gave him his name. How is DPC going to interpret it ? I wonder how a useful reference in the Brahmasūtra of Bādarāyaṇa escaped the notice of DPC. He would have found the sūtra I.1.3, *śāstrayonitvāt*, involving the word *yoni*, to be an evidence for aligning with Tantrism even Vedānta, presumably in its older version as in the case of Sāṁkhya.

This habit of sky-rocketing on the basis of solitary words usual with DPC's style is the most disqualifying factor in his research. Speaking of the name Kapila/ā cited above, does he know that as an adjective it simply means tawney-coloured and may have (but not necessarily) the colour of the eyes

of the person concerned as the reason why it was selected as his / her name. In other words, there may be several Kapilas / Kapilās, including even the present-day cricketer. Even a tawney-coloured cow is named Kapilā, even today. This would take the wind out of his novel suggestions of identifying Kapilavastu of the Buddha as the native place of the originator of the Sāṁkhya system, and Kapila, the son of Prahlāda, an *asura*, with Kapila the Sāṁkhya. DPC may note that there is also a place named Kapilatīrtha in Kolhapur in Maharashtra; it may help him to extend the area of influence of Kapila and materialism. Some years ago, Vātsāyana, a contemporary celebrity from India, is said to have visited Indian Embassy abroad, where, in a reception in his honour, he was introduced as the author of the famous ancient Sanskrit work on erotics, the Kāmasūtra ! We need not laugh at the embassy people for their ignorance.

## Primitive society in the Ṛgveda ?

While referring to Vedic passages making a reference to Gaṇapati, is DPC aware that there is a whole *sūkta* in the Ṛgveda devoted to thoughts on gambling presented in a poetic way as the monologue of a gambler. It strikes the repenting note of a gambler who has lost all his possession in a bait. There are likewise references in Vedic literature to theft, excessive drinking of liquor as well as womanisation. Now, even by Marxist standards, gambling etc. cannot be regarded as a natural development in a primitive society; it is necessarily an evil, an economically developed society breeds. The very fact that some seer thought of using language effectively for this purpose reflects an advanced stage of a language and literature that no primitive society can be reasonably associated with. And that is not all. Besides compositions displaying considerable poetic quality, Vedic literature proves its strength of handling topics of philosophical significance with supreme confidence. Can these be explained on the presumption of a primitive society ? Modern surveys reveal that backward social groups use a language with a poor vocabulary of a few hundred words and coarse grammatical structure putting severe limitations to their ability to think. In the light of these findings revealing essential relationship between language and social development, would it be reasonable to maintain that the Vedic society with a highly developed language and literature was little more than a primitive society ? Reference

may be made to another Ṛgvedic *sūkta* which portrays Indra jabbering under the effect of excessive drinking. Apart from the very unique, highly literary idea of composing such a hymn, it may be legitimately asked if such an event and its expression is possible in a primitive society.

## Marxist Utopia and exploitation

DPC positions materialism against idealism, and, following in the footsteps of Marx and his followers, talks of the Utopia that the primitive human society was, and criticises surplus production as the root cause of exploitation. With Utopia as an ideal of human relations, it would be idle to speak of materialism and idealism as opposing outlooks. Secondly, all talk of Utopia is founded on the wrong presumption that it is possible to manage a society in isolation. The stark reality is that, given the possibility of inter-communication, no intelligent society can think of going its own way except at the cost of being severed from the rest of the world and, by implication, from better means of livelihood and openings for development.

## Tantra and Tantrism

DPC relates Sāṁkhya to Lokāyata through Tantrism on the slender basis of the Sāṁkhya being referred to as a Tantra by Śaṁkara. This effort is as funny as one to relate *grāmasiṁha* (dog) to *simha* (lion) or *geheśūra* (coward) to *śūra* (brave) ! And he thinks that the etymology of the word Tantra supports his conclusions !! Judicious thinkers do not rely on etymologies of words when they are interested in a serious dialogue, knowing that, whatever the etymology, words denote the conventional meaning. And as to Śaṁkara, he uses the term Tantra as much to refer to Sāṁkhya as to Vaiśeṣika. (*Vide* Brahmasūtra-bhāṣya 2-2-17) Leaving Śaṁkara aside, how would DPC account for the use of the term Tantra in such words as *śalyatantra, prasūtitantra, pañcatantra, kātantra*, and above all, *svatantra* and *paratantra* ? As with the word Tantra, DPC has fumbled with the pronominal feminine form *kāṁcana* in the passage '*na kāṁcana parihare*t' ('one should never abstain from any woman'—DPC's translation) in the Chāndogya II.13.2, which he understands to mean any woman (p. 66), not aware that it can, and, in the context, legitimately does, refer to one's wife. These instances show the weaknesses of a researcher who has no access to the first sources; and DPC admits that

he knows no Sanskrit and has to rely on translations of Sanskrit works. The other alternative conclusion is that he purposely avoids evidence that would damage his theory. It is for him to choose between the charges of being uncritical and dishonest.

## Sāṁkhya, Yoga and Vedānta

DPC's basic presumption is that the original Sāṁkhya is materialistic and akin to Lokāyata. So he owes an explanation of the non-materialistic elements in Sāṁkhya. How does he meet with this problem ? With reference to the oldest extant work on Sāṁkhya, Īśvarakṛṣṇa's Sāṁkhyakārikā, he observes : 'The author of the Kārikā wanted to graft upon the Sāṁkhya system certain elements of idealistic thought, evidently borrowed from the Vedāntic circle.' This, he thinks, 'resulted in internal inconsistency in his work.' (p. 371) Weigh this view with Īśvarakṛṣṇa's own statement at the end of his work that he has presented the tenets of the system as reaching him through an unbroken tradition starting from Kapila, but in an abridged form (*kārikā* 69). Who should we consider is more reliable ? And what is the basis on which to discredit Īśvarakṛṣṇa as unreliable ? If Īśvarakṛṣṇa's inconsistencies, as DPC views them, make him unreliable, what evidence is there to prove that the original system itself did not have them ? DPC is obviously influenced by Garbe who thinks that all appeal to *śruti* in the Sāṁkhya texts lying before us are subsequent additions. (p. 380).

Īśvarakṛṣṇa, in *kārikā* 2, enumerates reasons why Vedic ritual is unacceptable as a means of permanent and final liberation from suffering. DPC reads in it Sāṁkhya objection to the validity of the Vedas. (p. 378) The same view is shared even by Vedānta, to be found expressed in the Upaniṣads too. (*Vide* Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad I. 7.) What is materialistic in it ? This view denies the efficacy of the Vedic ritual, not of knowledge. This, when read with a later reference to scriptures as a means of knowledge, led DPC to find an inconsistency / contradiction in the *Kārikā* which he attributes to the author's 'compromise', concluding therefrom the character of the earlier Sāṁkhya as materialistic (p. 380). What Sāṁkhya is emphasizing in the *kārikā* under discussion is the inability of the Vedic ritual to produce permanent results, leading to a search for other means for a permanent

solution to the problem of getting rid of suffering. This implies his acceptance of the Vedic ritual as a restricted means of the objective and not a total disapproval.

DPC thinks that 'as contrasted with *Prakṛti, Puruṣa* in the Sāṁkhya was secondary or *a-pradhāna, udāsīna*.' (p 383) How did such a principle creep into the system ? 'The whole thing was surreptitiously borrowed by some later exponent of Sāṁkhya (DPC means Īśvarakṛṣṇa) from the circle of philosophers who were really the followers of the Vedas.' (p. 384) Further, 'the place of the Puruṣas... is utterly unimportant and even redundant or superfluous.' (p. 385) This is all confusion. Space is inactive in the process of creation. Is it unimportant ? *Puruṣa* is a class, a principle. A scientist has nothing to do with activity or otherwise of his subject. He just observes. What is the place of the myriad stars above us in our daily life, except, of course, those taken note of by astrologers ? Are they, too, redundant or superfluous ? What use are winter days to us to deserve notice in our calendars ? They must be superfluous. Wonderful logic ! What does DPC think about the substance called a 'catalytic agent' in scientific terminology ? Utterly useless, as it stays inactive and unaffected in electrolysis. Is not the scientist obliged to say so ? The duty of a scientist is to observe and present his conclusions on the support of evidence, not by choice or at will. Sāṁkhya view of *Prakṛti* and *Puruṣa* is thus the result of scientific thinking, not prompted by Īśvarakṛṣṇa's likes or dislikes. Such views create doubt about the very *bonafides* of DPC as a researcher. He has turned science into trade. This shows how a Marxist is in his subconscience dominated by trade unions !

Turning to Bādarāyaṇa and his Brahmasūtras (BS), DPC observes that, of the total 555 sūtras, 60 sūtras are devoted to refuting the Sāṁkhya, considered to be the '*pradhāna-malla*', the chief opponent, as Śaṁkara deems him; but there is not a single sūtra to refute Lokāyata; for 'to the author of the text, the refutation of the Sāṁkhya was all that was needed to refute the materialistic standpoint.' (p. 374) This is absolutely wrong. BS 3-3-53 and 54 are *sūtras* exclusively dealing with and refuting the Lokāyata view with cogent arguments. As elsewhere, DPC is hiding this information from his readers only to damage his own credibility. Earlier on he has quoted only a part of Śaṁkara's evaluation of Sāṁkhya. So does he tamper with Kauṭilya

by quoting from his work an isolated reference to Lokāyata. No honest researcher would degrade himself into playing such tricks.

It is on the authority of Śaṁkara that DPC equates Sāṁkhya with Tantra and further with Lokāyata, setting aside Śaṁkara's evaluation of Sāṁkhya as a system closest to the Vedic philosophy (*vaidikasya darśanasya pratyāsannatvāt*)—a compliment DPC omits while citing a passage in Brahmasūtra-bhāṣya (2-1-12) in which Śaṁkara praises the Sāṁkhya, 'however grudgingly' (p. 364). This is another example of DPC playing tricks with evidence. (The other one being that of the term 'Tantra'). He omits this portion because it is damaging to his theory of aligning Sāṁkhya with Lokāyata. And if there is some evidence he is not free to omit, he chooses to abuse it as 'highly deceptive' (p. 364). To those who do not wish to lend themselves to DPC's ways of misleading, a remark from an authority on Vedānta may show the facts in their true perspective : If Sāṁkhya and Yoga give up their insistence on the following three points, there would be no difference between them and Vedānta—(i) that Puruṣas Selves/Souls) are many; (ii) that the world is real; and (iii) that the Universal principle and the Self are different. (*Pañcadaśī* of Vidyāranya, VI. 228) But this valuation may be dubbed by DPC as based on an adulterated version of Sāṁkhya resulting from Īśvarakṛṣṇa's tampering of the original Sāṁkhya in order to graft it on the Vedānta. (p 371)

### Primitive conditions : Symptom of retarded society

What is objectionable in DPC's argument is that he takes a static view of a thought, denying possibilities of further development thereof, and, like a true Marxist, views the primitive conditions as ideal, Utopian. (Yes, the Marxists, too, like idealogists, have their own Utopia consistent with materialism.) This is the reason why he treats as adulteration the features of a system historically later to emerge. But thoughts, like those who create them, are never static, despite their champions' claims to their static nature. The child develops with years its intellectual and psychological, no less than its physical, faculties; and what is natural at one stage is not so at the next. If a full grown man continues to take interest in toys fit for a child, instead of human 'toys', it is perhaps a case of retarded growth and a matter of worry

to be concerned. This is true of a society too. If after generation after generations, it is not out of its primitive stage, it is a symptom of its retarded condition. Given enough intellectual capital of its members and favourable surroundings, a society is bound to change, howsoever slowly, in the direction of what is called civilisation. All effort to stall this process would be as futile as one to stall the development of an individual. The development of thought as the heritage of a society proceeds on similar lines from grosser to subtler, from outer to inner, from surfacial to fundamental, from force to psychological approach, from object to subject. All talk of going back to primitive conditions is as ridiculous as that of turning a grown up man into a child again.

## Epilogue :

### Motivated research

The common characteristic of all the books on Cārvāka listed at the opening of this article is that they are, on the whole, the outcome of a motivated research. An attempt is apparent in these books to raise Cārvāka in status and thus compensate for his despised position for centuries, and thereby providing an ancient basis for some modern movements / outlooks of their authors' liking. Thus DPC is interested in establishing roots of materialism, styled also as Marxism, in ancient Indian thought, while Salunkhe sees in Cārvāka an ancient champion of anti-Brahmanism and / or anti-Vedism. Both have based their conclusions on imaginative interpretations of material from mythical and poetic works which have no place in scientific discussions, along with philosophical and other treatises which are admissible as reliable sources,—all in Sanskrit. What distinguishes DPC from others in his decent language characteristic of serious research and his anxiety to support his views by quoting from a wide range of literature. He claims no first hand knowledge of Sanskrit sources, and, as such, he has to rely on English translations thereof. Salunkhe is a Sanskritist and writes with a missionary /adolescent zeal that knows no bounds in reaching conclusions and attacking an adversary.

### Imaginative school of research

DPC's claims made in behalf of Cārvāka, shared by others listed at the beginning of this article, show that a distinct school of research—the

imaginative school—is spreading, like an epidemic, with unprecedented speed, in humanity subjects. This conclusion is supported by DPC himself when he says that his is a 'systematic effort to study ancient Indian philosophy from the materialistic point of view' and that 'it has to be highly argumentative'; for, he argues, 'What we are actually left with are merely a few fragmentary survivals of Lokāyata...of those who wanted only to refute and ridicule it.' He, therefore, believes that 'Lokāyata thus remains to be reconstructed from the essentially hostile references to it.' (Preface to *Lokāyata*, pp. xiii and xv.) This explains why imagination plays the key-role in the writings of those who are for the resurrection of Cārvāka. We do not find this type of research / scientific discourse in ancient Indian tradition; it is a gift from the West—a boon to motivated research which inevitably leads to predetermined conclusions. The magic touch of the hand of Midas changed everything into the coveted precious metal; DPC's Marxist touch changes everything into materialism. What worries a discrete mind on seeing such a huge intellectual expenditure over anything but substantial is : in what way is human thought benefitted or furthered by such ventures founded basically on imagination ?

This, ultimately, leads us to a more serious question : does imagination which can at best indicate *possibilities* have a respectable place in a scientific discussion which requires its conclusions to be based on *certainty* ? The difference between a possibility and a probability may be a point in a practical approach; for science, these two are no more than aspects of the same phenomenon. Unless a possibility is converted into a certainty by an unchallengeable proof, no guess can hope to be raised to the status of a scientific one. Till this stage is reached, all theories stand on the same level; and priorities are a matter of subjective views. This should not and must not prevent one from making and presenting enquiries at the sight of possibilities. What is to be noted is that an enquiry may start, but not end, with mere possibilities.

This discussion may not be construed to mean a denial of the existence of sects in India centred around woman and sex and all that goes with a licentious way of life as part of religious practices. They were, are, and will be there under one pretext or the other, even justifiably, as long as human

society is what it is. What is objected to is the unrestricted use of imagination in drawing biased conclusions based on data, at times partially presented, interpreted with prejudice by ignoring the context, going under the name of scientific research.

## Forces : Natural and Cultural

All culture has developed as a counter-balancing psychological human invention to make social life possible and progressive against the natural forces of self-interest, greed, vices, immunity to the interests of fellow creatures, appropriation of others' assets by brutal force, and thus protect interests of humanity in exclusion of other forms of life. It would be worthwhile to see how culture achieves this end with its multi-pronged approach. It all starts with generating group interests to curb individual interests. This means creating a group ego side by side with the individual ego which is instinctive. An individual can be persuaded to surrender or delimit some of his interests when he is convinced that individual interests are best protected by the protection of the group interests. This is the beginning of the process we call reasoning which is corroborated particularly when groups are attacked by foreign groups. Success or failure in such events must have led people to form larger groups with increased power of group action which eventually developed into states. The so called primitive democracies form part of this process of boosting group strength.

With the evolution and growth of groups came the need to form rules as an objective machinery to resolve internal conflicts which, considering the human nature as it is, were bound to arise. In the wake of the rules came a machinery to enforce them in case individuals, as a matter of instinct, tended to violate them. This is the beginning of what we now call law and administration. The 'communistic' rules which the primitive societies formed and followed were the precursors of the 'values' in more developed cultures. Even religion played its role in containing the human instincts. If values in any form cannot exist without faith, which is after all a cultivated view, why a faith in the unseen be labled as 'out of bounds'. The concept of the State is thus a natural development of the organisation of human society and in no way something that ruined the primitive tribal democracies. Tribal

democracies died because they could not survive in changed circumstances. Even tribal groups on their way to becoming states fight with each other for material or imaginary, even flimsy, reasons that hurt their group ego as illustrated by the war between Kosala and Magadha on the score of dowry unpaid. DPC assigns the responsibility of this war to the emergence of states, presuming that tribal groups never fight each other. Even today fights are not uncommon among the urban as well as rural groups. Nothing but prejudice can explain persistence in the view that social evils are the result only of civilization including religion. Cases after cases of corruption against political leaders today are enough to falsify this claim. Human nature is instinctively prone to go to any extent for personal gains.

## All roads lead to faith

How to counter this nature has been a matter of worry for cultured minds for ages. No way has been found out of this situation except education in a wider sense in various forms. Education is the cultivation of social qualities which is based on the distinction between good and bad which is a matter of faith. Once this is realised, it carries little weight to argue about the foundation of faith, this-worldly or other-worldly. Whatever the foundation, it is the result that matters for a practical man. That is the reason why the author of Arthaśāstra, an expounder of stark politics, advises the rulers to see that the established social order based on religious faith is scrupulously maintained. But prejudiced research finds in his work a reference to the study of Lokāyata in exclusion of what he states elsewhere. It is not 'judicial blindness', to quote Marx's words ?

# Valāhassajātaka and Telapattajātaka*

**Siegfried Lienhard**

The legend of the merchant Siṁhala as it appears in the later Sanskrit versions contained in the *Mahāvastu,* the *Divyāvadāna,* the *Kāraṇḍavyūha,* the *Guṇakāraṇḍavyūha* as well as in the Newārī recensions looks back on a long development. While its beginnings cannot be exactly localized in time, there is no doubt whatsoever that many persons worked on the narrative over a period of centuries and, attuned to new aims with the passages of time, often changed, supplemented and elaborated on it. Standing at the beginning of the development, it seems, is the *Valāhassajātaka*, 'The Reincarnation Story of (the flying steed) Valāha', which was composed not in Sanskrit but in Pāli, the language of Theravāda Buddhism. What is remarkable is that in this early version[1], contained in the Jākata collection of the Pāli recension of the Buddhist canon, we do not yet meet the merchant Siṁhala, the later hero of the Siṁhalāvadāna.

The high point of the relatively short Pāli version is the episode of the white and — according to this text — crow-headed steed Valāha, who, as in the later versions, saves five hundred shipwrecked merchants. In this account, too, the witches' city[2], here called Sirīsavatthu, is located on Sri Lanka. Whenever merchants suffer shipwreck on the island, the witches regale them, pitiable and stranded that they are, with drinks and savory dishes. They allege that their husbands are merchants, whom, however, they are forced to assume to be dead, as they have undertaken a voyage by ship but have not yet returned, although three years have passed. In the Pāli version, too, the witches deceive their newly arrived guests, whom they lead to their city Sirīsavatthu. The men soon succumb to the alluring women's charms. However, this deception is not long-lived : Whenever persons turn up shipwrecked off the island's shores, those who had before them are put in

chains and thrown in prison. And so it happened when, one day, a large caravan with five hundred shipwrecked merchants went ashore on Sri Lanka. The witches again sported in games of love with the merchants, who were easily lured into their nets. The eldest witch chose the eldest merchant as her friend. After the latter had fallen into a deep sleep, she went to the witches' prison in order to slay the men held captive there and to eat their flesh. When she returned and they both again embraced, the merchant noticed that her body emitted a coldness, and immediately suspected that the friendly being must in reality be a dangerous witch who ate human flesh. The next day, when he revealed the truth to his men, only two hundred fifty believed his words of warning, and thus only one half of the trading company fled. Now, the Bodhisattva, i. e. the future Buddha, had been born at this time in the form of a white-coloured horse, and it was on Sri Lanka, as it happened, that he was sojourning, eating grass. When he compassionately called out three times to see whether anybody was there who wanted to return home, the fleeing men made themselves known immediately. At the horse's invitation some climbed on his back, while others clasped his tail, and still others held their place with folded hands. The Boddhisattva saved them all, but the witches ate the two hundred and fifty merchants who remained behind.

As we see, in this Jātaka the horse Valāha, or Valāhassa[3], is identified with the Venerable One, whereas in the version of the legend contained in the *Guṇakāraṇḍavyūha* and in the Newārī version, the rescuing horse is taken to be a manifestation of Avalokiteśvara. As for the plot, the episodes of the first part of the later versions differ only slightly from the events recounted in the *Valāhassajātaka.* Substantial differences can be seen, in the main, only in those particular elements which lead gradually, after the pairs have been formed, to the flight of the merchants. Whereas in the later versions it is the caravan leader who leaves his bed at night and, having come to the witches' prison, recognizes the extreme threat of the situation, in the Pāli narrative, the eldest witch having stolen off for a short time, it is the renewed embrace which triggers the eldest merchant's plan to flee. Those who carry the action forward in the version in Pāli are again the five hundred tradesmen and witches as well as, in the last part, the Buddha, reborn as a miraculous

horse. Only the head witch and the eldest merchant, moreover, stand out as individuals clearly identifiable as such, though the role of the latter in the Nepalese tradition and in the versions of the *Kāraṇḍa-* and *Gaṇakāraṇḍavyūha* is no longer anonymous, but has crystallized into the figure of Siṁhala, the young, handsome and pious son from a rich merchant's house. It is worth noting that the pretext of being widowed merchants' wives, and as such objects of pity, is obviously meant to excuse the lust of the Ceylonese witches, but this psychologically quite subtle nuance, which figures only in the Pāli version, was no longer held to be so important in the later period[4].

The narrative of the *Valāhassajātaka* extends up only to the rescue of the eldest merchant and—according to this version—also half of his followers. A story which presumably represents the pattern used for the fable's continuation spun out in the other versions is recounted, surprisingly in another reincarnation story in Pāli, the *Telapattajātaka*[5], whose hero, however, appears not as a seafaring merchant but as the Bodhisattva, i. e. the future Buddha, in his former existence as one of the hundred sons of King Brahmadatta of Benares. It has been prophesied to the young prince that he would never ascend his father's throne, but rather would be crowned king of Takṣaśilā[6] in the far-off land of Gandhāra. The prophesy, however, would only be fulfilled if the prince was able to defy the dangers lying in wait for all sojourners on the road to Gandhāra : in a large forest live witches[7] who, able to infatuate men with their charms, continuously invite weary travellers for a refreshing drink. Once they have seduced their guests, they murder them and devour their barely cold corpses.

The prince fares forth. He is accompanied by five men of the court who, in spite of his warning, want to go along at all costs. The first of them is a savorer of beauty, the second a music enthusiast, the third a connoisseur of select aromas, the fourth a gourmet and the fifth a lover of great comforts. When they reach the witches' villages together with the prince, all five fall victim in turn to the witches' seductive arts. Only the king's son remains steadfast. But when he moves on, one of the witches follows him. She tells the people living in the forest that she is the prince's spouse, and though the prince denies this, the forest dwellers give her a ready ear. She even produces a son later and, child in arm, follows in the tracks of the prince. When the

two arrive in Takṣaśilā, the witch makes her small son disappear and waits, radiating in the sheen of her beauty, in front of the house where the king's son has found lodging. It so happens that the king of Takṣaśilā just then comes past. He is blinded by the witch's charms and learns that the beautiful lady is the wife of a prince who has just come to Takṣaśilā. The king now has the stranger to his city summoned but, like the people in the forest, does not believe the prince's words. He invites the beautiful woman into his palace, passes an evening in her company and finally, exhausted from the joys of love, falls into sleep. The witch immediately fetches her companions. While she eats the king up, her female comrades exterminate the remaining being in and around the palace. Since bones are lying in front of the palace the next day and the palace gate remains closed, the subjects come together and elect as their king the prince who had remained steadfast in spite of all temptations.

It is interesting to note that individual elements of the fable just depicted are also met with in the account of the colonization of Sri Lanka, as rendered in two important chronicles of Ceylon composed in Pāli, the *Mahāvaṁsa*[8] and, in shorter format, the *Dīpavaṁsa*[9]. As these two works based on the historical tradition of old commentaries (*aṭṭhakathā*) report, the daughter of a king once coupled with a lion in India, and out of this unusual bond came both a son, Sīhabāhu (Skt. Siṁhabāhu)[10], who later became king of Lāḷa, this native land, and Sīvalī, a daughter. From the marriage of these two siblings sprang at last Vijaya, a surely prince and the eldest of a total of 32 brothers, whom Sīhabāhu presently banned, placing him, together with seven hundred families, on an ocean-going ship with distant destination. After many adventures, Vijaya and his men reached the island of Sri Lanka, at the time populated only by snakes and various kinds of demonic beings, above all *rākṣasas* and *yakṣas*. Near the *yakṣa*-city Sirīsavatthu, Vijaya meets a dangerous *yakṣiṇī*, a threat to his people, who later, after the two have dined together, turns herself into a beautiful 16-year-old girl. At her command Vijaya destroys numerous *yakṣas* and afterwards takes up residence in the city he himself has founded, Tambapaṇṇi (Tāmraparṇī), together with his *yakṣa* wife and his men, who call themselves—after Sīhabāhu—Sīhalas (Skt. Siṁhala). Two children come out of this marriage, but hostile *yakṣas* kill his

spouse, and Vijaya, crowned king and ruling the whole of Ceylon, weds a second time. There is a magnificent wedding feast, and his bridge and future queen is now no longer a *yakṣiṇī* but a real princess from South India.

As we see, the *yakṣa*-city here, as in the *Valāhassajātaka*, again bears the name Sirīsavatthu, and the witch is a *yakṣiṇī* who, at the suitable moment, takes on the appearance of a young and captivating girl.

**Annotations :**

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1. *Jātakaṭṭhavaṇṇanā* no. 196. Text edition by V. Fausbll 1879 (reprint 1963), II, pp. 127ff. - Translations in E. B. Cowell 1895, pp. 89ff.; (the same translation) in H. T. Francis and E. J. Thomas 1916, pp. 164ff., J. Dutoit 1908, pp. 149ff.; E. luders 1961, pp. 26ff. : *Die Kaufleute und das Flügelross*; and H. Mode 1981, pp. 14ff. : *Die Erzählung von dem Flugelross.*

2. The term applies in Pāli is *yakhinī* (Skt. *yakṣiṇī*) and not *rākṣasī* (as in the Sanskrit texts).

3. The noun *valāhassa*, 'cloud horse', as in the designation of a mythical steed is documented also in the *Samyuttanikāya* (III, 145). Instead of *valāhassa,* the forms valāhaka or, in Sanskrit and Newārī texts, *bălāha(ka)* also occurs. It is worth noting that a horse of the breed of Valāhassarāja, 'king of the cloud horses', is numbered among the seven precious objects (*sattaratana*) belonging to the throne of a universal monarch, namely the sovereign's wheel (*cakka*), state elephant (*hatthi*), state steed(*assa, valāhaka*), wish-granting jewel (*maṇi*). consort (*itthi*), treasurer (*gahapati*) and field marshal or king's advisor (*pariṇāyaka* or *senāpati*). Thus in the "Mahāsudassanasuttanta", *Dīghanikāya* II, p. 174 (PTS) the *assaratana*, i. e. 'the jewel horse', is not only designated *valāhaka*, but also, exactly like the steed Valāha in the *Valāhassajātaka*, as *sabbaseto kākasīso muñjakeso iddhimā vehāsaṁgamo*, i. e. as 'completely white, crow-headed, having a mane like *muñja*- grass, possessing supernatural powers

(and) flying through the sky'. As H. von Stietencron 1972, p. 8f. has shown, the cloud horse is closely connected with the folk cult of *yakṣas*. *Yakṣas* and *yakṣīs* have as their mount (*vāhana*) a water or cloud horse, a normal horse or an animal half horse and half fish. Horses with magical powers also occur elsewhere in Indian literature. The steed Indrāyudha in Bāṇa's Sanskrit novel *Kādambarī*, for example, a present given by king Tārāpīḍa to his son, Candrāpīḍa, is a magical wonder horse, as is a horse named Manojava in Subandhu's story *Vāsavadattā*.

4. Both the *Kāraṇḍavyūha* and the *Guṇakāraṇḍavyūha* provide the reader only with the information that the witches are without husbands (Guṇak. : *asvāmika*), whereas the Newārī tradition represents the beautiful ladies not as widows at all but as young girls still unlearned in the ways of love.

5. *Jātakaṭṭhavaṇṇanā* no. 96. Text edition by V. Fausbll 1877 (reprint 1962), I, pp. 393ff. Translations in E. B. Cowell 1895 (reprint 1981), I, pp. 232ff.

6. Pāli *Takkasilā*.

7. The term used in the Pāli text is *yakkhinī* (Skt. *yakṣiṇī*). Whereas most versions have the adventures of the hero transpiring in Ceylon, in that of the *Telapattajātaka* the witches' mischief runs its course in or near Gandhāra in the extreme northwest of ancient India. The folk tradition of Nepal, in contrast, shifts the scene of action to Tibet.

8. Chapters VI and VII : W. Geiger 1958, pp. 56 - 69 and W. Geiger 1980 (translation), pp. 51 - 61.

9. Chapter IX : H. Oldenberg 1879, pp. 54 - 57 (Pāli text) and pp. 160 -163 (translation).

10. I. e. 'lion-armed'. In the Newārī tradition the hero of the Siṁha(la) legend is often called Siṁhalasārthabāha. This name, however, is hardly understood any longer by the youngest generations in its meaning 'Siṁhala, the caravan leader', but usually—in its entirety—taken as the personal name for the short form Siṁhala, appearing in Newārī usage often in the slightly corrupted form Siṁhalasārthabāhu.

## Abbreviations

Cowell, E. B. (*Ed.*), *The jātaka or Stories of the Budha's Former Births*. Vols. I-VI. Cambridge 1895 (reprint London 1981, PTS, Vols. I - Vi in 3 volumes). - Translations of the *Valāhassajātaka*, by W. H. D. Rouse in II, pp. 89ff., of the *Telapattajātaka* in I, pp. 232ff.

Dutoit, J., *Jātakam. Das Buch der Erzählungen aus früheren Existenzen Buddhas*. Vol. II. Leipzig 1908. Translation of the *Valāhassajātaka* pp. 149ff.

Fausbll, V., *The Jātaka, together with its commentary*. Vols. I - VI. PTS. London 1877 - 1896 (reprint 1962 - 1964). *Jātakaṭṭhavaṇṇanā* 196 (=*Valāhassajātaka*) in II, pp. 127ff. and *Jātakaṭṭhavaṇṇana* 96 (= *Telapattajātaka*) in I, pp. 393ff.

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Lüders, E., *Buddhistische Märchen*. Düsseldorf - Köln 1961 (reprint). Translation of the *Valāhassajātakaa* pp. 31ff.

Mode, H. (Ed.), *Sri Lanka. Aus Legende, Märchen, historischer Ueberlieferung und Bericht*. Hanau/Main 1981. Translation of the Valāhassajātaka pp. 14ff.

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Stietencron, H. von, *Gaṅga und Yamunā, Zur symbolischen Bedeutung der Flussgöttinnen an indischen Tempeln*. Wiesbaden 1972 (Freiburger Beiträge zur Indologie, 5).

# Notes on Avestic Asha 'Truth'

**Helmut Humbach**

As is well-known, numerous phrases found in the Avesta have parallels in the Ṛgveda, both the Iranian and the Indian branch of the Aryan languages and literatures having inherited them from the Proto-Aryan period. Thus OAv. Y33, 5 ereẓūš paϑo corresponds with RVI, 41, 5 *ṛjūnā pathā* 'straight path', and YAv. Y10, 4 *zam pereϑβīm* corresponds with RV1, 67, 5 *kṣām pṛthivim* 'broad or spacious earth'.

A few of these phrases, Gaϑic as well as Yound Avestic, show the term *aša-/rta* - 'truth' as one of their two members :

Y 31, 22 *ašem hapti* = RV5, 68, 4 *ṛtam sapantā* 'observe / hold truth';

Y 49, 9 *aša.yuxta-(stem yuxti-)* = RV10, 61, 10 *ṛtayukti* - 'yoking together with truth'.

Y 10, 4 *aṣahe* xā = RV2, 28, 5 Khām ṛtasya 'source of truth';

Yt 10, 86 *ašahe....paṇtam*=RV5, 45, 8 *ṛtasya pathā* 'path of truth'.

In the unspoken view of most scholars of Indo-Iranian, such correspondences justify the assumption that the meaning of Av. *aṣa*-exactly agrees with that of Ved. *ṛta*-, both of them continuing the meaning of their joint Proto-Aryan predecessor without any change. Yet this view seems to me too superficial, at least as far as the Avesta is concerned. The phrases just quoted are nothing but a sort of petrefacts from which only limited information can be drawn regarding the meaning of *aṣa*- in the entirety of its Avestic occurrences. As a matter of fact, there can be no doubt that the position of *aṣa*- in its semantic field and environment has undergone some notable changes in the Gāϑās of Zarathushtra, and some more in the Younger Avesta.

Whereas Vedic ṛta- always is non-personified, Gāθic *aṣa-* is a divine entity which can manifest itself as a cosmical power or divine quality (non-personified), and as a divine person (personified). In a phrase such as aṣāt *hacā* 'in accordance with truth' personification is clearly ruled out whereas it is evident in the vocative case, e.g. in Y28, 5 *aṣa kat θβa darəsānī* 'O truth, shall I see you'. A typical Gāθic problem is just that due to the indistinctness of some transmitted forms of endings (*aṣā*=voc. or instr. sg. or nom. acc. pl.), and even more due to the mystical ambiguity of the Gāθās it is difficult, if not impossible, to decide for non-personified or personified in the majority of the occurrences of *aṣa-*.

In the case of non-personification there is also ambiguity regarding non-materiality and materiality. In the passages in which Ahura Mazdā is said to be offered *aṣa-* by humans and in those in which humans are said to be granted *aṣa-* by Ahura Mazdā, materiality of *aṣa-* is as possible as immateriality. Most typical of this ambiquity are the passages in which *aṣa-* is the grammatical object of the root *dā* 'to place, offer, grant' in the meaning 'to acquire, accept, obtain' of its medial forms :

Y 34, 1 *aṣem....taibiiō dånhā* 'you (Ahura Mazdā) obtain truth', i. e. 'you obtain the truth offered to you at the actual ceremony', in which not only the piety of the worshippers but also their ritual offering (myazd) are referred to;

Y 46, 15 *aṣəm xšmaibiiā daduiiē* 'you (human persons) will obtain truth', i. e. 'you will be granted bliss in this and / or the afterworld' or 'you will obtain material welfare'.

The reference to material welfare is unequivocal in the phrase *astuuat aṣəm* 'corporeal truth' found in Y 43, 16 in which Zarathushtra alludes to the Fraškōkərəiti, the renovation of the world at the end of time, and, at the same time, to the sacrificial fee to be paid in pieces of cattle etc. he is entitled to expect (*cf.* particularly Y44, 18-19 and 46, 19).

In the Gāθās, the inherited concept of *aṣa* - 'truth' has proliferated the concept of a group of divine entities, led by Ahura Mazdā and called Ahuras as attested in the phrase *mazdåscā ahurånhō* 'the Ahuras and (Ahura) Mazdā' Y 30, 9 and 31, 4. Whereas the number of these Ahuras is as open in the

Gāϑās as is the number of the Young Avestic Yazatas, that of the Young Avestic Amδša Spδṇtas is limited. Their canonical number is one-plus-six (= Ahura Mazdā plus six), and it is just Yt 13, 83 (=19, 16) in which we find the number one-plus-seven (= Ahura Mazdā plus seven) : *yōi hapta hamō. mananjō yōi hapta hamō. vacanhō yōi hapta hamō.šiiaoϑnānhō....yaēšam asti hamō.ptāca frašāstaca yodaspa ahuro mazdā* 'the seven (Amδša Spδṇtas) who are of the same manner of thinking....speaking.....acting.....whose father and master is the same, Ahura Mazdā, the creator.'

The picture reflected in the mystic poetry of the Gāϑās does not necessarily agree with what Zarathushtra taught in prose all the major part of the Gāϑā text was unintelligible to his adherents. The only Gāϑic passage that could have some chance of being close to the prophet's actual teachings regarding the Ahuras (> Ameša Spδṇtas) is Y 47, 1. In this stanza, the series *maṅiiū - manah -, vacah-, šiiaoϑana* - 'spirit, thought, word, action' (cf. Y 30, 3 *maṅiiū...manahicā vacahicā šiiaoϑanōi* 'both spirits, both thoughts, both words, both actions' ) is artistically intercrossed with the series *ahura- mazdā, speṇta- maṅiiū-, aša-, vohu- manah-, xšaϑra-, ārmaiti-, hauruuatāt-, amδrδatatāt-* 'Ahura Mazdā, holy spirit, truth, good thought, power/rule, right-mindedness, integrity/nectar (=liquid offering), immortality/ambrosia (=solid offering)', thus describing Ahura Mazdā as being accompanied by seven divine entities (one-plus-seven) :

Y 47, 1. *Spδṇta mainiiu vahištācā mananhā*
with holy spirit and best thought
*hacā aṣat šiiaoϑanācā vacanhācā*
with action and word in accordance with truth
*ahmāi dan hauruuatā ameretātā*
they shall offer Him nectar and ambrosia
*mazdā xšaϑrā ārmaitī ahurō*

The Lord is Wise through power and right-mindedness.

There is an evident similarity between this Old Avestic Y 47, 1 which suggests the number one-plus-seven, and the Young Avestic Yt 13, 83 which expressly mentions this number. On the basis of this similarity one could hypothesize that Y 47, 1 reflects the real teaching of Zarathushtra but it is

equally possible that the number one-plus-seven of Yt 13, 83 is derived by priestly speculation from the Gāϑā stanza.

The original precedence of *aṣa-* 'truth' over the other Ahuras is not perspicuous in Y 47, 1 for metrical reasons but it is ascertained by historical plausibility, by the overwhelming number of its occurrences in the Gāϑās, and by Y 37, 1-5 (Haptanhāiti), which has the one-plus-six series *ahura mazdā, aṣa vahišta, vohu manah, vohu xšaϑra, vanhīdaēnā, vanhīfseratū, vanhī ārmaitī*. Yet a notable rearrangement must have happened in the canonical series of the Younger Avesta in which *aṣa-*, having ceded his precedence to Vohu Manah, was shifted to the second place. This rearrangement is also mirrored in the report of Plutarch de Iside et Osiride 47 according to whom Oromazes created six divinities, namely first Good Will (*eunoia*), second Truthfulness (*alētheia*), third Good Order (*eunomia*), fourth Sound Judgement (*sophia*), fifth Wealth (*plūtos*), sixth Producer of the pleasantness rewarding for good works (*tōn epi tois kalois hēdeōn dēmiūrgos*). The rearrangement is based on a speculative theological interpretation of Y 43, 7. 9. 11. 13. 15 *spəntəm at ϑβā mazdā məṇhī ahurā hiiat mā vohū pairī.jasat mananhā* as a recountal by Zarathushtra on his legendary meeting with Vohu Manah, who came to guide him to the first audience granted him by Ahura Mazdā. (Actually, the prophet describes himself as meditating in front of the holy fire).

The canonical number one-plus-six of the YAv. Amǝsa Spenṭas with the inversion of the precedence is found in Y 57, 24 *ahurō mazdā aṣ̌auua...vohu manō...aṣ̌əm vahistəm...xsaϑrəm vairīm...xšaϑrəm vairīm...spenṭa ārmaitiš....hauruuatās...amərətatas*. The same can be detected in the Haft Amesaspand Yast (Yt 2, 1-3) and the two Sīrōzas (S1, 1-7, 2, 1-7). The Sīrōza occurrences particularly suggest that the development of the one-plus-six pattern is closely connected with the introduction of the Mazdayasnian calendar, which is customarily attributed to the period of the Younger Avesta.

The Pahlavi translation of the Gāϑās tries to make a difference between the non-personified Ahurian concept *ahlāyīh* 'truthfulness (often glossed by *frārōnīh* 'honestly') and the personified Ahura *aṣ̌wahišt*, a differentiation which is appropriate in principle but which suffers very much from the translator's

incompetence in matters of Avesta grammar. In his Sanskrit version of the Pahlavi Neriosangh simply renders *aṣwahišt* by *aṣawahišta-*. More notable is his rendering of *ahlāyīh* 'truthfulness' by the expected dharma- or, alternatively, by the unexpected punya- 'religious merit'.

Also surprising is Neriosangh's rendering of Phl. *ahlaw* 'truthful' by *puṇyātman-* 'whose soul has religious merit, of meritorious soul' or *muktātman-* 'of emancipated soul', and of Phl. *druwand* 'deceitful' by *durgatimant* - 'unfortunate, distressful'. On this occasion he breaks the stereotype of the Pahlavi translation, obviously describing *aṣa-* as a condition that is enjoyed by pious people in both this world and the afterworld.

Av. *aṣauuan-* 'truthful' describes the condition of a pious person in this world in V 5, 61 *juuascit nōit buuat aṣauua, maṣascit nōit baxšait<e> vahištahe anhəuš* = PhlT. *zīwandag nē bawēd ahlaw [kū bē nē wizārēd ā-š] murd nē baxšēnd ān ī pahlom axwān*) 'when living he cannot become truthful [i.e. he cannot expiate his soul], when he has died they will not allot to him the best existence'. In contrast, Old Persian *ṛtāwān-* is said of a person in the afterworld in Xerxes Ph 47-48 *šiyāta ahaniy jīva utā mṛta ṛtāvā ahaniy* 'happy may I be when living, and when dead may I be truthful (=blessed)', and ibidem 54-56 *hauv utā jīva šiyāta bavatiy utā mṛta ṛtāwā bavatiy* 'he becomes happy while living, and becomes truthful (=blessed) when dead'.

A parallel of the Old Persian interpretation of the term is obvious in *Mēnōy i Xrad* 44, 34, which says of the inhabitants of *Erān Wēz ka mīrēnd ahlaw hēnd* 'when they die they are truthful (=blessed)' which in Neriosangh's Sanskrit reads *yadi* (**yadā*) *mriyante muktā bhavanti* 'when they die they become emancipated'.

# Avestan Eschatology

**N. M. Kansara**

The sacred literature produced by the efforts of the prophet Zarathushtra and his disciples, as well as the language of this literature, are generally designated 'Avesta' or Zend-Avesta'. The word 'Avesta' however, does not occur in this earliest Iranian texts, but is found first in the Pahlavi, a language which came into existence in Iran after the extinction of the Avestan tongue as a vernacular. It designates the original Zoroastrian texts as Avastak, Avistak, or Avastak u Zand. The Pahlavi word 'Zand' has for its original Avestan 'Azainti' which means explanation. Hence, the expression '*Avastak u Zand*' is generally taken to represent the original Avestan texts, together with the commentary upon them, in Pahlavi. '*Zand*' refers to the short commentaries, rather explanatory glosses in the Avestan language itself upon the difficult Avestan texts, and found interspersed in the extant Avestan texts. At a later period the expression *Zend-Avesta* became more popular among the Zoroastrians of Persia and India, both as the name of the Zoroastrian scripture and their language. The ancient Iranians and the Vedic Indians, in their pre-historic home, spoke two dialects of one original language. As a result, there is a close affinity between Avesta, the sacred language of Ancient Iran, and Vedic Sanskrit, the sacred tongue of Ancient India. The resemblance is so great that, with careful observance of certain phonetic laws, the whole lines and stanzas may be converted, word for word, from the one language into the other. Apart from certain distinctive idioms, the grammar and syntax of both languages are closely similar. Avesta is the sister language of Vedic Sanskrit[1]. Thus, '*Zand*' would immediately remind us about '*Chandas*' the name by which Pāṇini refers to the Vedic Sanskrit in his Aṣṭādhyāyi[2]. The Gāthās, being the oldest part of the Avesta, embody the veritable words of Zarathushtra, and are akin to the verses of the Vedic bards. They contain the

teachings of the Prophet, summed up in metrical stanzas which he composed as a nucleus of his discourses.

Among the nations of antiquity there seems to have been none else, except the Vedic ones, that had a more clearly developed system of eschatology, a firmer conviction of the immortality of the soul, and a surer belief in a resurrection and a future life, than had the ancient Iranians as can be judged from their sacred literature. Through all the writings of Zoroastrianism runs a stain of hope that the good will be rewarded hereafter and the wicked punished; that right will triumph and evil will be vanquished; that the dead shall arise and live again; and that the world will be restored to perfection so that joy and happiness may reign supreme. In the Gāthās themselves, the pious expectatin of a new order of things is the motif upon which Zarathushtra rings continual changes[3].

The Avesta and the Pahlavi texts often refer to a new era and the rejuvenation as *frasokereti* and *fraskart*, respectively[4]. In this way the millennium is really the preparation of all mankind for eternity and perfection of the world, a blessed consummation in which man should have a share[5]. At the great crisis or final change of the world[6] there will be a decisive division and separation of the evil from the good[7], and a complete establishment of Ahura's sovereignty, 'the Good Kingdom'[8]. This dogma of a 'new heaven and a new earth' is found both in the Gāthās and in the Younger Avesta. It is decidedly a millennial doctrine which is closely associated with the belief in the coming of a saviour (*Saosyant*) and the resurrection of the dead[9].

In Gāthā Ushtavaiti, Zarathushtra declares his message of immortality saying : 'All those who will give hearing for Meunto this one (the prophet) will come unto Salvation and Immortality through the works of the Good Spirit[10].' Zarathushtra's pre-eminent concern with the bearing of eschatology was on conduct, as can easily be seen from a study of the Gāthās. Faith and works form the foundation of the doctrine of salvation in the religion of Ancient Iran. A belief in the freedom of the will, in the acknowledgment of man's ability to choose the right or to choose the wrong, and in his consequent responsibility to his Creator, lies at the basis of the moral and ethical system

of the Zoroastrian religion, which above all emphasizes the existence of the two warring principles of Good and Evil, Light and Darkness. To guide man to the choice of right, and thus to assure his gaining the eternal salvation, was the very purpose of Zarathushtra's mission upon earth[11].

According to Zoroastrianism, death means the cessation of physical life, caused by the separation of the soul from the body[12]. According to the Iranian Bundahishn, the five constituents of human personality, which are body (*tan*), life or vitality (*jān*), soul (*ruvān*), form (*ēvīnak*), and Fravashi (*frōhar*), are separated at death; the body returns to the earth, the life to the wind, the form to the sun, and the soul is joined to the Fravashi, so that the soul cannot be destroyed[13]. As to the fate of the soul (*urvan* or *ruvān*) immediately after death, the Gāthās do not provide us with a clear picture. The later Avesta, however, contains several passages explicitly describing how the soul of the righteous or of the wicked is believed to hover near its earthly tenement, in confidence or in fear, for three days and three nights before it passes to the individual judgment. The Pahlavi and the Parsi-Persian texts not only paraphrase the Avestan material with elaboration of detail but also contribute some new ideas concerning the state of the soul during this period of suspense[14]. According to the description in the Hadhokht Nask, when a righteous man passes away, his soul takes his seat near the head, chanting the sacred hymns and proclaiming the happiness which Ahura Mazdāh will accord to the blest. On the first night his soul experiences as much joy as all that which he experienced as a living being. On the second night and the third one, it continues. Thus during the first, second, and third nights after death the soul of the pious sings in exultation the Song of Salvation, beginning with the verse : usta ahmai yahmai usta kahmaicit. The Avestan texts do not state explicitly what other experiences befall the soul of the pious during these three nights, but we may infer from the developments in the Pahlavi literature[15] that the demon Vizaresha, who awaits the soul at the Chinvat Bridge[16], makes a fruitless attack on it beforehand and struggles in vain to capture it. In the attempt the other 'wicked malicious demons' may be thought to join, namely those who 'cut the thread' of life[17], and especially Asto-vidhātu and the evil Vayu, who would naturally seek to ill the soul as they do the body[18]. Probably for that reason the angel Sraosha is

invoked in the Avesta to protect in both lives 'against the onslaughts of Aēshma, which the evil-minded Aēshma, together with the demon-created Vidhati, launches'[19]. Contrary to the spirit of the Avesta, the Pahlavi writers picture the newly departed soul as more or less helpless, and they indulge in elaborate descriptions of how it must rely upon the righteous Srōsh for protection from evil influences, and the surviving relatives are expected to properly propitiate him, so that he will afford his guardianship to the soul[20].

In accordance with the Zoroastrian fondness for symmetry, the experience of the soul of the wicked, as it lingers in anguish near the body, is the exact opposite in every detail to that of the righteous soul. The description given in the Hadhokht Nask informs us that during the first, second, and third nights after death the soul of the wicked cries aloud the Wail of Woe, the Gāthā of lamentation, which begins with the verse : *kam namōi zam kuora namoi ayenī*. The cause of these lamentations of the soul is obviously the fact that, besides the mental anguish suffered on account of a life spent in sin, there is the prospect of the impending doom at the Chinvat Bridge[21].

The concept of the Daēnā, or Conscience, and the role it plays in determining man's destiny hereafter, is one of the fundamental doctrines of Zarathushtra and forms a keynote of his eschatological teachings in the Gāthās. Man is endowed with free will. Though helped by the teachings of the Prophet, which are the revelation of the good laws of Mazdāh, it is left entirely to man to make a free choice between the Two Principles, the warring kingdoms of Good and Evil[22]. It is the wise who choose aright, and who, by their good thoughts, words, and deeds, acquire merit in this life and felicity in the life hereafter. The foolish, on the other hand, do not choose rightly, but, yielding to the temptation of evil thoughts, words, and needs, bring misery upon themselves in the present world and demnation in the next[23]. Therefore, the Daēnā of the wicked destroys the verity of the Right Way for him, and his soul will suffer anguish at the Judgment of the Chinvat Bridge, having strayed from the Path of Asha through his own deeds and tongue[24].

Wholly in the spirit of the Gāthās is the beautiful conception of the later scriptural writings, according to which the Conscience comes to greet

the soul at the dawn of the fourth day after death, either in the form of a lovely maiden, or in the shape of a hideous hag. The maiden appears amid a breath of balmy wind, fragrant with scents and perfumes; the hag arrives amid the chill of a foul blast heavy with sickening stench[25]. According to the account given in the Dātastān i Mēnūk i Khrat, the soul of the righteous commences its journey to the great beyond with the help of the powers of Good, but not without facing opposition and impediments thrown in its way by the powers of Evil. The latter are ever eager to drag it to hell, without making any distinction whether it be a righteous or a wicked soul, and without waiting for the trial which it must undergo at the Judgment Seat before its destiny is determined[26]. The Denkart informs that if a person becomes a follower of the Principle of Evil by doing deeds that help sinfulness, the Daēnā appears in the guise of a courtesan, who drags him to hell[27]. The Shkand-vimanik Vichār also furnishas the converse picture to that of the lovely damsel, namely the ghastly form of the courtesan, who is a tormentor and comes to meet the wicked soul with the store of its sin[28]. However, the Iranian Bundahishn supplements its account of the hideous Hag, in contrast with the Maiden, by logically adding a lean cow and a barren garden to offset the figure of the milch-cow and the flourishing vineyard seen by the soul of the righteous. No sooner has the wicked breathed the stench of a foul wind than he beholds these frightful apparitions. They are the grim messengers of the coming retribution; and the soul, filled with anguish, questions each of them in turn as to its significance, and learns in answer that each typifies the individual Conscience (*dēn*), evil in thought, word, and deed, as the result of a life of sin in this world[29].

The soul now stands at the Individual Judgment in the presence of one or more heavenly assessors before whom the life-account is rendered. The good and evil deeds are weighed in the balance; and the final decision is made according to the turn of the scales, which are counterpoised with perfect justice. Next comes the crossing of the Chinvat Bridge, the Bridge of Judgment, over which the righteous and the wicked alike must pass—the one to felicity, the other to damnation. This doctrine of an individual judgment at the Bridge is clearly discernible throughout the Zoroastrian scriptures, from the Gāthās to the latest Persian religious writings[30]. This doctrine of a

spiritual accounting of man's life record, the weighing of merits and demerits, forms an integral part of Zarathushtra's message[31]. All the daily actions of man are entered, so to speak, as items (*dā0ra*) of debit and credit in the record for the hereafter; and only by increasing the credit side of the account can the debits be counterbalanced[32]. When the account is brought to a final reckoning (*henkeratā*), if there be any excess of good deeds, as in the case of the righteous, these souls find their final destiny in the Abode of Good Thought or House of Song[33]. But if, owing to bad deeds, the claims (*išudō*) cannot be satisfied, the result is reversed, as in the case of the wicked, who are destined to become veritable inmates of the House of the Lie[34]. All meritorious deeds are regarded as stored up in the treasure-house of Heaven, where they are entrusted to the divine protection of Maẋdāh[35]. There is no doubt that this takes place at the Individual Judgment, and before the twofold award is meted out to the souls, with a possible intermediate state. We are not in a position, however, to determine with precision the time when the Individual Judgment takes place. It is a matter of little concern to the Prophet whether the Judgment takes place immediately after death or on the dawn of the fourth day after death. That the fate of each man is determined in strict accordance with the kind of life he has led on earth, or 'the first life', is the thing that is of moment[36].

Another important observation to be made in this connection is that Zarathushtra's teachings of a strict reckoning of man's actions leaves no room for a real remission of sins, whereas later Zoroastrianism admits repentance, expiation, and remission. 'The laws of the first life'[37], cannot be turned aside or altered by any sacrifices or offering; and it is in accordance with these laws that man shall be judged, both here and hereafter. Yet, in spite of this, we may infer that Zarathushtra's sense of justice allowed that strenuous effort in performing good deeds would ultimately create a surplus of merit to outweigh the accumulation of past evil[38].

As to the place where the Individual Judgment is held, there are several passages in the Gāthās which either expressly, or by mere suggestion, point to the well-known Chinvat Bridge as the scene of reckoning and balancing where the souls of both pious and the wicked will stand in judgment. It is at the bridge, moreover, that the first separation of the pious from the wicked

shall take place[39].

There are numerous passages in the Gāthās where Ahura Mazdāh is invoked by Zarathushtra as the Ruler over the twofold awards[40], who at the time of the Final Dispensation will divide the wise from the unwise[41]. He is the supreme arbiter, and His decision is final[42]. At the time of the Resurrection it is Zarathushtra who will be the Judge (*ratav*), Mazdāh being the Overlord (*ahū*); and Zarathushtra expressly declares himself to be the *ratav* appointed by Ahura[43]. Thuš the Gāthās contain, at least in substance, those essential elements that are elaborated in the Later Avesta and in the Pahlavi books. And, the doctrine of the Individual Judgment is one of the cardinal teachings of Zarathushtra concerning the life hereafter[44].

There is also in Zoroastrianism the doctrine of an intermediate stage, the tenet of Hamistakān, oe 'Equilibrium'. Zarathushtra recognized the possibility that the good and evil deeds of an individual might balance exactly when weighed in the scales at the heavenly tribunal; and a special place and condition are assigned to such a soul until its ultimate fate shall have been determined at the Universal Judgment. Zarathushtra's keen vision and logical mind caught glimpses of this General Judgment at the end of all things. This optimistic hope of the dawn of a new and better eon is the note that rings again and again in the Gāthās. The Prophet's graphic presentation of these events may well have stirred the imagination of his hearers and inspired his followers to carry on the task of furthering the Wished-for-Kingdom (*xsaOra vairya*) and to look forward to the day when good shall finally triumph over evil, and the world shall be restored to perfection (*frašokereti*). The accounts given in the Later Avestan and Pahlavi books are essentially the same as those found in the Gāthās, except that the picturesque side is more fully developed[45].

**Annotations :**

1. Maneckji Nusservanji Dhalla *Zoroastrian Civilization* (ZC) Oxford University Press, New York 1922, pp. 38-39.
2. Pānini - '*Aṣṭādhyāyī*', 1. 2. 61; 1. 4. 81; 3. 1. 84; 4. 3. 71; 5. 2. 89; 6. 4. 5; 7. 1. 96; 8. 1. 35, etc.
3. A. V. Williams Jackson, *Zoroastrian Studies* (ZS), AMS press Inc., New York

1963, pp. 143ff.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 149.
5. *Avesta*, Part 1. *Yasna (Ys)* and *Visparat (Vsp)*, edited in Devanāgarī script by Ervad M. F. Kanga and N. S. Sontakke, Vaidika Saṁśodhana Mandala, Poona 1962; Ys. 62. 3; *Yasht (Yt)* 13. 58; *Vendīdād (Vd)* 18. 51; *Artāk Virāz Nāmak (AVN)* 64. 13; 87. 9.
6. *Ys*. 30. 2; 51. 6; 43. 5.
7. *Ys*. 31. 19; 47. 6.
8. *Ys*. 51. 1; 41. 2; 48. 8; 32. 6.
9. Jackson, *ZS*, p. 149.
10. *Ys*. 45. 5.
11. Jal Dastur Cursetji Pavry, *The Zoroastrian Doctrine of a Future Life (ZDFL)*, AMS Press Inc., New York 1965, pp. 1-2.
12. *Avesta*, Part III : *Vendīdad (Vd) and Fragments*, edited in Devanāgarī script by Ervad M. F. Kanga and N. S. Sontakke, Vaidika Saṁśodhana Mandala, Poona 1978, Vd. 5. 37; 7. 1-2; 8. 81; 9. 43; 13. 12.
13. Pavry, *ZDFL*, p. 1, Ft. Nt. 2.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 9.
15. *Ibid.*, pp. 12-13; 15-16.
16. *Vd.* 19. 29.
17. *Vd*. 19. 28.
18. *Vd*. 5. 8-9.
19. *Ys* 57. 25; *Avesta*, Part II : *Khordeh Avesta and Yasts (Yt)*, edited in Devanāgarī script by Ervad M. F. Kanga and N. S. Sontakke, Vaidika Saṁśodhana Mandala Poona 1962, *Yt*. 10. 93; Parvi, *ZDFL*, pp. 83-85.
20. Parvy, *ZDFL*, pp. 15-16.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 22.
22. *Ys*. 30. 2-3; 31. 11-12.
23. *Ys*. 30. 3.
24. *Ys*. 51. 13; Parvy, *ZDFL*, pp. 29-31.
25. Pavry, op. cit., p. 33.

26. *Ibid.*, p. 39.
27. *Dēnkart (Dk),* 'The Dinkard' edited and translated by P. B. and D. P. Sanjana, Vols. 1-18, Bombay 1874-1926, Vol. 2, Text p. 74-75, Tr. p. 83.
28. *Dātastān i dēnik (DD),* translated by E. W. West, in *'Pahlavi Texts',* Part 2, p. 1-276, Oxford 1882 (SBE. Vol. 18), 25. 5; *Shkand-vimānik Vichār* (SVV), edited by H. D. J. Jamasp-Asana and E. W. West, Bombay 1887, 4. 91-96.
29. Pavry, *ZDFL*, pp. 43-44.
30. *Ibid.*, p. 49.
31. *Ys.* 31. 14.
32. A. W. Williams Jackson, *A Hymn of Zoroaster : Yasna 31'*, translated with comments, Stuttgart 1888, p. 45.
33. *Ys.* 32. 15; 46. 10; 15-17; 50. 4; 51. 15.
34. *Ys.* 49. 11; 46. 11; 31. 20.
35. *Ys.* 49. 10.
36. Pavry, *ZDFL*, p. 53.
37. *Ys.* 33. 1.
38. Pavry, *ZDFL*, pp. 53-54.
39. *Ys.* 51. 13.
40. *Ys.* 51. 1.
41. *Ys.* 31. 19; 47. 6 (*Vīdātay*)
42. *Ys.* 51. 14; 32. 6.
43. *Ys.* 33. 1
44. *Pavry, ZDFL, p.* 59.
45. *Ibid.*, p. 113.

# Manuscript Collection in the Asiatic Society of Bombay

**B. V. Shetti**

The Asiatic Society of Bombay came into existence, as the Literary Society of Bombay on the 26th of November 1804, at the meeting held in the building which at present houses the Haffkins Institute, but which was then the Government House. At the suggestion of Sir John Malcolm, on the 27th of February 1828, Society's name was changed as Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland, but it was not till the 27th of January of 1930, that the new name appears in the minutes of the Bombay Society. The Society moved into the Town Hall in September 1930. After Independence of India, the Society's name was changed as The Asiatic Society of Bombay.

The Asiatic Society of Bombay has a collection of about 3,500 manuscripts, some of which are very rare. 17 manuscripts are illustrated. In 1826, the Government of Bombay gave to the Asiatic Library a rich collection of the very valuable collection of manuscripts, which had been bequeathed to the Court of Directors of the East India Company by Dr. Taylor. Some Gujarātī MSS. procured in Gujarat were presented by Colonel Miles. The holdings were further enriched by the presentation of several Oriental MSS. in 1834 by Mr. Borradaile. Further, a part of the Pandit Bhagawanlal Indraji collection came by way of presentation to the Society. Thereafter, the most notable addition to the Library was a donation of Sanskrit MSS. belonging to Dr. Bhau Daji Lad : This was presented to the Society at the public meeting held in Bombay to perpetuate the memory of the departed scholar, and is known as the "Bhau Daji Memorial." A noteworthy presentation some years ago has been a collection of Sanskrit MSS. of the late Mr. Shankar Pandurang

Pandit by his daughter, Mrs. Kshamabai Row. Further additions were made by D. P. Podar and others.

In 1919, a Sub-Committee had been appointed to prepare for a list of manuscripts in the Society's possession and to recommend steps necessary for their careful preservation. A catalogue of these collections which had been a desideratum all these years was at long last completed in 1931, albeit in parts—the Sanskrit, Jaina and Vernacular sections in four volumes by Prof. H. D. Velankar after an assiduous labour of ten years, and the Arabic, Persian, and Urdu sections by Mr. A A A Fyzee rendering a service of love. Velankar's catalogue includes 2093 MSS. and Fyzee's work includes 28 MSS. Velankar's catalogue which became out of stock is now being reprinted. At present the Society has 356 MSS. which are yet to be studied and catalogued.

In recent years not much effort has been made to collect manuscripts. Through the media, an appeal can be made to the public to donate manuscripts in their possession for study and preservation for posterity.

In 1820, Mountstuart Elphistone, Governor of Bombay, and President of the Society, presented a number of books in foreign languages, which included, amongst others, the Dante Manuscript, one the most precious possessions of the Society, The Dante Ms. is a quinternion, $12\frac{1}{2}" \times 8\frac{1}{2}"$ of great beauty and excellence. It has wide margins and is in single columns. The calligraphy is large, attractive and clear. The title of the cantos are done in beautiful red and gold. The initial letter of each canto is blue, embellished by scrolls and beautifully illuminated, while each terzina begins with a simple ornament alternating in gorgeous blue and red. The inside of the leather binding has an inscription in Italian which says : "Magnificient book in parchment of the *Divina Commedia* of Dante Aleghieri, which equals in preservation and beauty those existing in the leading libraries of Europe, especially those in the Ambrosian Library of Milan, with which it has been compared. The form of the characters shows that the date is near the middle of the fourteenth century, that is thirty years after the death of Dante, which took place in A. D. 1321 at the age of fifty-six. The miniatures at the head of each canto allude to the contents of each canto and indicate the style of the art of the fourteenth century in a way that renders the book highly precious."

The MS. was rebound in calf, when on a visit to the Library in 1906. His Excellency the Governor of Bombay remarked that it was in a dilapidated condition needing repairs. Offers for the purchase have been received in the past, including one from the Italian Government under Mussolini. But the Management rejected these offers and the manuscript remains one of the proudest possessions of the Society.

Also, one more very prized collections of the library is an illustrated manuscript of *Shāhnāmāh* of Firdausi. *Shāhnāmāh* is an epic accounting the history of the early kings of Persia and other episodes, such as the fight between the hero Rustom and his son Suhrab, and from these epochs down to the reign of Yazdagir who reigned in A. H. 411/A. D. 1020, with whom the epic ends. The manuscript is profusely illustrated, every chapter beginning with a painting. The colophon of the manuscript mentions that it was prepared in A. H. 900/A. D. 1495 at Shirāz, which was a famous school of painting in Iran. The paintings are mainly illustrations of war scenes or of the feats of the heroes. The warriors and the heroes are seen fighting the enemies either on foot or on saddled horses, wearing heavy armours, inside the fort or outside in an open landscape. Paintings are colourful, being in various shades of red, pink, mauve, green, and also the prominent gold. The calligraphy of this very beautiful manuscript is of very high quality.

The discovery of the dated illustrated manuscript of The 'Āraṇyaka Parva' has been an event of major importance for the history of Indian miniature painting. It affords a reasonable basis for ascribing approximate dates to a number of well known illustrated manuscripts, as also for determining their provenance. The Society got this manuscript along with other manuscripts of Dr. Bhau Daji Lad collection in 1882. It is apparent from the colophon folio that the manuscript originally had 362 folios but at present only 230 folios are extant. It is dated Saṁvat 1573/A. D. 1516. This manuscript was copied at Yoginīpura, under the rule of Sikandar Lodi for Bhanudas Chaudhari. Almost all the folios of the Ms. are ornamented with beautiful old pictures indicative of the story written on them, The 'Āraṇyaka Parva' of the *Mahābhārata* deals with the events during the 12 years of exile of the Pāṇḍavas after Yudhiṣṭhtira's defeat at the game of dice.

The Jaina tradition has patronised painting illustrating the episodes

from the life of Tīrthaṅkaras a great deal, mainly as visual aid to the devotees. The illustrations were also done to aquire religious merit by the pious Jainas. The Society has four such illustrated MSS. of the *Kalpasūtra*, one of the important religious texts of the Jainas. They are painted in the western Indian style of painting of the 15th century and later. They are in order dated A. D. 1415, 1625, 18th century, and A. D. 1826.

Palm-leaf illustrated MSS. painted during Pāla kings in Bihar and Bengal became very popular. They usually illustrated Tāntric Buddhist deities. But the invasion of Bakhtyar Khalji in A. D. 1200 put an end to this art. However, this art later spread to Nepal and Tibet. In this art there is influence of paintings from Ajaṇṭā and Ellorā. There are six palm-leaf illustrated folios from the Buddhist MS. *Aṣṭasahasrikā Prajñāpāramitā* of *c.* A. D. 1200 in the Asiatic Library.

All the MSS. in the Society's collection are now micro-filmed. Scholars can now refer to these MSS. with the help of the micro-film reader provided at the Society's premises. They can also get photostat copies of folios at nominal fixed rates.

**LIST OF RARE MANUSCRIPTS :**

**Brahmanical :**

Gaṇaratnamahodadhi, Saṁvat 1480 (B. D. 63)

Sūryasiddhānta of Caṇḍeśvara, Saṁvat 1452, Sāke 1318 (B. D. 282).

Sūryasiddhānta of king Madanpāla, Saṁvat 1459 (B. D. 282).

Atharvavedasaṁhitā of Paippaladaśākha, Saṁvat 1925 (B. D. 246).

Bhāgavatapurāṇa of Yogeśvara, Saṁvat 1573 (B. D. 231).

Āraṇyakaparva of Mahābhārata, Saṁvat 1573 (B. D. 245).

Pañcadaṇḍatpatrachatraprabandha, Saṁvat 1499.

Vikramacaritra, Saṁvat 1492, Sake 1357.

**JAINA :**

Kalpasūtra, Saṁvat 1472 (B. D. 63/4).

Ṣaḍāvaśyakasūtra, Saṁvat 1455 (B. D. 202).

Ṣaḍāvaśyakasūtra, Saṁvat 1525 (B. D. 141).

Gautamapṛicchā of Śrītilaka, Saṁvat 1480 (B. D. 234).

Saṁgrahaṇīratna of Śrītilaka, Saṁvat 1480 (B. D. 234).

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**BUDDHIST :**

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# Concept of Śiṣṭācāra

**Hukam Chand Patyal**

0.0. An attempt is made in this paper to discuss the concept of *śiṣṭâcāra* ('practice or conduct of the *śiṣṭas*' ['learned or virtuous persons']). The word *śiṣṭa* (< *śās-* (substituted by *śiṣ-*, *vide* P. 6. 4. 34; 8. 3. 60; also *see* Vāyu P. i. 59. 33; Matsya P. 145. 34)[1]. The earliest occurrence of the word *śiṣṭa adj.* 'taught, instructed' is met with in AV. 2. 29. 4; 5. 26. 4 etc. also cf Śat Br. 13. 1. 6. 1 wherein *śiṣṭāḥ prajāḥ* means 'clever children'.

0.1. In ancient India, law was closely connected with religion. According to the Dharma-texts, the whole body of *dharma* (sacred law) can be divided into three parts - namely *ācāra* 'rules of conduct or established practices'; *vyavahāra* 'rules of government and judicature or jurisprudence'; and *prāyaścitta* 'atonement or penance and expiation' (*see* especially the division of Manu Sm. and Yājña Sm.).

1.0. The main contents of the Dharma - and Smṛti - texts are concerned with the duties of men in different stages of life, namely studenthood, householdership, renunciation, asceticism; they are also concerned with dietary regulations; and also with the rights and duties and functions of kings. These texts also deal with socio-religious matters, such as purificatory rites, funeral ceremonies, modes of hospitality, daily observances etc. They are also concerned with juridical matters.

1.1. The term *ācāra*—religious custom, established usage—is transcendent law, and that should be very carefully observed by a twice-born person (Manu Sm. 1. 108). The term *dharma* is the most comprehensive and important term in the whole range of Sanskrit literature. It embraces sacred law and duty, justice, religious merit etc. Many Dharma-texts enumerate three sources (*mūlas*) of *dharma*, namely the Veda, Tradition,

'Good Custom or Practice of the *śiṣṭas*' (Gaut DS. 1(1). 1-2; Vāsi DS. 1. 4-7 (*cf.* Āpa DS. 1(1). 1. 2). Manu Sm. 2. 6. and Yājña Sm. 1. 7 add one more source, namely self-satisfaction or inner contentment (*ātmatuṣṭi*). Manu Sm. 2. 12 also enumerates these four sources of *dharma* (on the term *dharma*), *see* Patyal 1997 : 157-65). As a matter of fact, every rule of *dharma* must find its foundation in the *Veda*. "But in reality, it seems that when a Hindu affirms that *dharma* rests entirely upon the Veda, the word Veda does not mean in that connection the Vedic texts, but rather the totality of knowledge, the sum of all understanding of all religious and moral truths, whether revealed or not." (Lingat 1973 : 8; *cf.* ḤDS. I. 4).

1.2. Dharma is not 'visible' to an ordinary man. That rule is of great significance and importance for which there is 'no visible purpose' (*adṛṣṭārtha*), than a rule for which there is 'visible purpose' (*dṛṣṭārtha*). The king should be impartial to both friends and foes (Yājña Sm. 2. 1-2). He should be the supporter and protector of *dharma* (Yājña Sm. 2. 21). The semidivine nature of the king was vested with temporal power, and the enforcement of law was primarily his responsibility (Manu Sm. 7. 4-5).

2.0. The *śiṣṭācāra* is the very touchstone for judging whether an act is in consonance with what the scriptures require us to do. The *sadācāradharma* and *śiṣṭācāradharma* are even above *Śruti* and *Smṛti*. If *Śruti* and *Smṛti* both fail to elucidate a ticklish problem, then the community may look for guidance and model in the actions of the people 'who practise what is right or proper' (*sadācāra*), or who generally 'act according to the (Vedic) instruction' (*śiṣṭācāra*).

2.1. The earliest reference to the *śiṣṭas* appears to be found in Tai U. I. II (though the word *śiṣṭa* itself is not used in this text). If there is any doubt regarding any deeds, regarding conduct, one should behave in such matters, as the Brāhmaṇas (who are) competent to judge, devoted (to noble deeds), not led by others, not harsh, lovers of virtues. In sum, the noble behaviour of the so-called Brāhmaṇas is the secret doctrine of the Veda, this is the teaching.

2.2. The *śiṣṭas* are variously defined in the Dharma-texts and also in Mahā

Bhā. and the Purāṇas. Baudh DS. (1. 1. 5-6) clearly says 'śiṣṭas are those who are free from envy and pride, who keep only as much corn as is measured in *kumbhī*, who are free from greed and hypocrisy, arrogance, covetousness, delusion and anger. Those are *śiṣṭas* who have studied the Veda according to the prescribed methods, together with appendages (i. e. *Itihāsa* and *Purāṇa*), who know how to draw inferences from that and, who tend to make people realize the teaching of the Veda[2]. Vāsi DS. (1. 6) defines *śiṣṭa* as one whose mind is free from desires. In Mahā Bhā. (3. 198. 55 ff.) it is said that department of the strict (*śiṣṭācāra*) is difficult to acquire. In the same epic (3. 198. 57 f.) the following are mentioned as the means of acquiring *śiṣṭācāra* 'Sacrifice, gifts, austerities, the Vedas, and truthfulness my good Brahmin, are five purifying means for those whose department is informed, and they are always effective. After controlling lust and anger, arrogance, greed and insincerity the strict or virtues (*śiṣṭas*) are contended with the law and are applauded by the *śiṣṭas*'. Matsya P. (145. 39) mentions eight characteristics of the *śiṣṭas*, namely gifts, truthfulness, asceticism, learning, sacrifice, worship, self-restraint, and want of greed. Mahā Bhā. (13. 30. 20-23) defines and praises the *śiṣṭas*. The *śiṣṭas* are those who are engaged in carrying out the duties of the aggregate of three (namely *dharma, artha* and *kāma*), who are engaged in righteous conduct or behaviour, who are conversant with Brahman, who are possessed of the knowledge of the Vedas; who are free from lust and follow righteous behaviour, who subsist on water and air alone, who partake of the remnants of food offered to the deities and guests, who observe diverse kinds of vows. They are worthy of worship who have no spouses (observe celibacy), who have spouses and maintain domestic fire, who are refuge of the Vedas and also of all creatures in the universe.

2.3. In Tantr Vā. 1. 3. 7 (see p. 128 ff.) authoritativeness of the *sadācāra* (the custom and usages of the *śiṣṭas*) is discussed. *śiṣṭas* are those who perform the religious acts expressly enjoined by the Veda. The *sadācāra* is what is practised by the *śiṣṭas* and *śiṣṭas* are those who practise *sadācāra*. These practices followed by the *śiṣṭas* constitute a part of *dharma*, and thereby *dharma* leads to heaven.

These practises become authoritative with the observance of the *śiṣṭas* (HDS. III. 82, 843-4).

3.0. Resumé

From the foregoing discussion we are led to the following considerations *argumenti causa* :

1) The *śiṣṭas* are those who possess all virtues, knowledge of the Vedas and other *śāstras*.

2) The conduct of the *śiṣṭas* (*śiṣṭācāra*) is even above *Śruti* and *Smṛti*.

3) The *śiṣṭas* are the refuge of the Vedas and also of all creatures in the universe. The religious practices become authoritative because of observence of the *śiṣṭas*. The *śiṣṭācāra* is the very touchstone for knowing whether an act is in consonance with what the scriptures require us to do.*

**Annotations :**

1. It appears that Vāyu P. 1. 59. 33 and Matsya P. 145. 34 derive *śiṣṭa* from *śiṣ* - 'to remain'. Hence *śiṣṭācāra* by these *Purāṇas* is understood to be the conduct of life for those who remained (i.e. survived) after the Manvantara. This Puranic etymology does not appear to be convincing. The correct etymology is *sas* - (*sis* –'to teach') + -ṭa-.

2. *Śiṣṭāḥ khalu vigatamatsarā nirahaṁkārāḥ kumbhīdhānyā alolupā dambhadarpalebhamoha-krodhavivarjitāḥ / dharmeṇādhigato yeṣāṁ vedas saparibṛṁhaṇaḥ / śiṣṭās tad anumānajñāḥ śrutipratyakṣahetava iti //*

   Baudh DS. 1. 1. 5-6. Baudh DS. 1. 1. 6 is found in Manu Sm. 12. 109 and Vāsi DS. 6. 43 (with some variants). *Cf.* Mahā Bh. iii. 174. 10 (*on* vi. 3. 109) which also gives more or less the same type of description of the *śiṣṭas* as is found in Baudha DS.

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# પદ્મસાગરગણિકૃત 'પ્રમાણપ્રકાશ'

જિતેન્દ્ર શાહ

## કર્ત્તા પરિચય

પ્રસ્તુત કૃતિના રચયિતા પં૰ પદ્મસાગરગણિ છે. તેઓ સમ્રાટ્ અકબર પ્રતિબોધક, પ્રભાવક આચાર્ય હીરવિજય સૂરિના પ્રશિષ્ય છે. તેમણે પ્રસ્તુત કૃતિના અંતે પ્રશસ્તિ સ્વરૂપ લખેલ કૃતિમાં જણાવ્યું છે કે—

**भट्टारकघटाकोटिकोटर श्री ६ हीरविजयसूरीश्वरविजयराज्ये महोपाध्याय श्री धर्मसागरगणिशिष्य पं૰ पद्मसागरगणिकृता ।**

અર્થાત્ તેઓ આચાર્ય હીરવિજયસૂરિના શિષ્ય મહોપાધ્યાય ધર્મસાગરના શિષ્ય છે. આ કૃતિ તેમણે ક્યારે રચી તેનો ઉલ્લેખ પ્રાપ્ત થતો નથી પરંતુ **નયપ્રકાશ** નામની અન્ય કૃતિમાં તેનો રચના સંવત્ ૧૬૨૩ (ઈસ્વી ૧૫૬૭) દર્શાવ્યો છે. આ ઉપરથી એવું અનુમાની શકાય કે આ ગ્રંથ પણ તે જ વર્ષોની આસપાસના સમયમાં લખ્યો હશે. તેમના જીવન વિશે વિશેષ માહિતી મળતી નથી પરંતુ હીરવિજયસૂરિના એક શિષ્ય શ્રી શુભવિજયે કેશવમિશ્ર કૃત **તર્કભાષા** ઉપર એક વાર્તિક રચના કરી છે. તે વાર્તિક પં૰ પદ્મસાગરગણિએ સંશોધ્યાનો ઉલ્લેખ પ્રાપ્ત થાય છે. આ ઉપરથી એમ માની શકાય કે પ્રસ્તુત પદ્મસાગરગણિ સંસ્કૃત ભાષાના અને દર્શનશાસ્ત્રના ઊંડા અભ્યાસી હશે. તેમણે સાહિત્ય અને ઇતિહાસ વિષયક ગ્રંથો તો રચ્યા છે. સાથે સાથે દર્શનને લગતા ગ્રંથો પણ લખ્યા છે. તેમના ગ્રંથોની યાદી નીચે પ્રમાણે છે.

૧. **સ્વોપજ્ઞ ટીકા** સહીત **નયાષ્ટક** અથવા **નયપ્રકાશ**
૨. **શીલપ્રકાશ** (સં૰ ૧૬૩૪, સ્થૂલિભદ્રચરિત્ર)
૩. **ધર્મપરીક્ષા** (સં૰ ૧૬૪૫)
૪. **જગદ્‌ગુરુકાવ્ય** (સં૰ ૧૬૪૬, હીરવિજય સૂરિ જીવનવૃત્તાંત)
૫. **ઉત્તરાધ્યનકથાસંગ્રહ** (સં૰ ૧૬૫૭)
૬. **યુક્તિપ્રકાશ** (સ્વોપજ્ઞ-ટીકા સહિત)
૭. **પ્રમાણપ્રકાશ** (સ્વોપજ્ઞ-ટીકા સહિત)

૮. **તિલકમંજરીવૃત્તિ**

૯. **યશોધરચરિત્ર**

આમ તેઓએ સંસ્કૃત ભાષામાં સારી એવી કૃતિઓ રચી છે અને તેમાંની મોટા ભાગની બધી જ પ્રકાશિત પણ થયેલી છે.

## પ્રતિ પરિચય :

આ ગ્રંથની મૂળ પ્રત ભોગીલાલ લહેરચંદ ભારતીય સંસ્કૃતિ વિદ્યામંદિરના હસ્તપ્રત સંગ્રહમાંથી પ્રાપ્ત થયેલ છે. તેનો ક્રમાંક નંબર-૭૨૭ છે. કાગળ ઉપર લખાયેલ આ હસ્તપ્રતની સાઇઝ ૧૧ × ૨૬ સેમી.ની છે. કુલ ૧૨ પાના છે. દરેક પાનાની આગળ પાછળ સુંદર સુવાચ્ય અક્ષરે પડિમાત્રા લિપિમાં લખાણ કર્યું છે. દરેક પૃષ્ઠ ઉપર ૧૩ પંક્તિઓ છે અને દરેક પંક્તિમાં આશરે ૪૫ અક્ષરો છે. પ્રતના અંતે લેખન સંવત્ દર્શાવ્યો નથી પરંતુ આ હસ્તપ્રતના અક્ષર અને મરોડના આધારે આશરે ૧૭મા સૈકાની હસ્તપ્રત હોવાનું અનુમાની શકાય.

## દર્શન-વિષયક ગ્રંથો :

પં૰ પદ્મસાગરગણિએ ત્રણ પ્રકાશાંત કૃતિઓની રચના કરી છે. આ કૃતિઓ કદમાં લઘુ હોવા છતાં વિષય અને વિવેચનની દૃષ્ટિએ મહત્ત્વની છે. નયના સ્વરૂપને દર્શાવતી કૃતિ **નયપ્રકાશ** છે, યુક્તિના સ્વરૂપને સ્પષ્ટ કરતી **યુક્તિપ્રકાશ** છે, અને પ્રમાણના લક્ષણને દર્શાવતી કૃતિનું નામ **પ્રમાણપ્રકાશ** છે. આ ત્રણેય કૃતિઓ સંસ્કૃત ભાષામાં પદ્યરૂપે લખાયેલ છે. પ્રાચીન કાળમાં તેમ જ મધ્યકાળમાં જૈન ધર્મમાં દાર્શનિક સ્તોત્રો રચાતાં હતાં તે સ્વરૂપની આ કૃતિઓ મૂળે તો તીર્થંકરના સ્તવના રૂપે લખાયેલ તો છે, પરંતુ તેમાં ભક્તિનું તત્ત્વ અત્યલ્પ છે. આ કૃતિઓમાં તીર્થંકરની દેશના-સ્વરૂપ તેમના તત્ત્વજ્ઞાનને કેન્દ્રસ્વરૂપે મૂકી તેમની સ્તુતિ કરી છે. અને ત્રણેય કૃતિ ઉપર તેમણે સ્વયં સરળ ભાષામાં સંસ્કૃતમાં ટીકા રચી છે, જે ઉપલબ્ધ થાય છે.

પ્રસ્તુત કૃતિમાં દર્શનશાસ્ત્રમાં પ્રસિદ્ધ એવા પ્રમાણના લક્ષણ અંગે ચર્ચા કરવામાં આવી છે. ભારતીય દર્શન પરંપરામાં પ્રમાણને ઘણું જ મહત્ત્વનું સ્થાન આપવામાં આવ્યું છે. પરંતુ પ્રમાણના લક્ષણ વિશે વિભિન્ન દર્શનોમાં વૈમત્ય પ્રવર્તે છે. નૈયાયિકો સન્નિકર્ષને પ્રમાણ તરીકે સ્વીકારે છે, સાંખ્યો ઇન્દ્રિયવૃત્તિને, જૈનો જ્ઞાનને પ્રમાણ તરીકે સ્વીકારે છે. અહીં નૈયાયિક સંમત ઇન્દ્રિય-સંનિકર્ષને પૂર્વપક્ષરૂપે સ્થાપિત કરવામાં આવ્યો છે અને તેમાં રહેલાં દૂષણ દાખવી, અંતે તેનું ખંડન કરી, જૈનદર્શન સંમત જ્ઞાનને પ્રમાણ તરીકે સ્થાપિત કરવામાં આવેલ છે.

स्वोपज्ञवृत्तिसहितः

# प्रमाणप्रकाशः

॥ अथ प्रमाणप्रकाशवृत्तिः ॥

सरस्वत्याः पदद्वन्द्वं नमस्कृत्य पुनर्गुरोः ।
श्री प्रमाणप्रकाशस्य वृत्तिं कुर्वे यथामतिम् ॥१॥

इह स्व-पर-परिछित्ति-जनन-समर्थ-प्रमाण-लक्षण-व्युत्पादनाय प्रमाणप्रकाशं चिकीर्षुः प्रकृतशास्त्र-परिसमाप्तये लौकिकाविगीत-शिष्टाचारावबोधित-कर्त्तव्यताकं प्रस्तुत-स्तुतिकश्री शान्तिजिननामाङ्कित-प्रथमकाव्येन मङ्गलमाचरति ।

**स्वस्ति श्रियां यस्य पदं प्रमाणप्रकाशमाविःकुरुते मतं मतम् ॥**
**उपास्महे तं प्रणिधान-सुस्थितं ज्ञानात्मकं शान्तिजगत्त्रयेश्वरम् ॥१॥**

**व्याख्या** - इह वक्ष्यमाणरीत्या प्रतिबन्धापायरूप-योग्यतात्मकत्व-स्व-पर-व्यवसायिज्ञान लक्षणाक्रान्त-स्व-पर-परिछित्तिजनक-प्रमाणवेद्यत्वेन भावानां सन्निविष्टत्वाद्भाव व्यवस्थितेरितितास्थात्तव्यपदेश इति त्वाप्रमाणशब्देनाभिधीयन्ते पदार्थास्तेषां यं प्रकाशः स्व-पर परिछित्ति-जनरूपः तं पर-परिछित्ति-कल्पित-जडरूपसन्निकर्षादि-जन्यत्व-तिरस्कार-पुरस्सरमाविःकुरुते प्रकटीकरोतीति संटकः । तत्र प्रमाण-प्रकाशेति पदम् । अनन्तरमेव वक्ष्यमाण एकविंशतिकाव्यात्मक-शान्तिस्तवाभिधायित्वेन साभिप्रायं इति प्रथमकाव्यार्थः ।

अथ स्व-समय-सिद्ध-ज्ञान-प्रामाण्यव्यवस्थापनाय परपरिकल्पित-सन्निकर्षादि-प्रामाण्यं निरस्यन् जगन्नाथ-स्तुति-स्वरूपेण द्वितीयकाव्यमाह ।

**प्रामाण्य हेमेश्वर-सन्निकर्ष-पोते क्षिपत्येषतवारियौगः ।**
**त्वद्दर्शितं न व्यभिचाररन्ध्रं ददर्श जात्यन्ध इवापि पश्यन् ॥२॥**

**व्याख्या** - अहो स्वामिन् यौग-नामा त्वदीय-ज्ञान-प्रतिभात-सकलपदार्थ-सार्थ स्वरूपापरथा-वक्तृत्व त्वदुक्त विधि-विपरीताचरणाभ्यां चारित-वद्विट्-सन्निकर्षात्मके पोते वाहने प्रामाण्यरूपं हेमनुवर्ण्यं क्षिपति न्यस्यति । परं परमकारुण्याद्भवेतापदर्शित अन्वय-व्यतिरेकाभ्यां व्यभिचार-रन्ध्रं सन्निकर्षान्तस्थं प्रामाण्य-हेमापगमकरं जात्यन्ध इव नयनाभ्यां पश्यन्नपि न ददर्श न पश्यति । स्मेति शब्दार्था भावार्थस्त्वयम् । यौगा हि किल सन्निकर्षस्य घटादिपदार्थ-विषयक-प्रमां प्रत्यतिशयित कारणत्वेन प्रामाण्यं स्वीकुरुते । तत्रान्वयव्यतिरेक-व्यभिचाराभ्यां सन्निकर्षस्यप्रमां प्रति कारणत्वमपि नास्तीति कुतस्तस्यातिशयित कारणत्वं तां प्रतीति स्याद्वादिभि र्निगद्यते । तथाहि गगनस्य विभुत्वेन सकलमूर्त्तद्रव्य-संयोगित्व-लक्षण-लक्षित्वेन सत्यपि चक्षुः सन्निकर्षे प्रमानुत्पादादनूय व्यभिचारः विशेषेण ज्ञानेन वैशिष्ट्य प्रमितौ जनयितव्यायां असत्यपि सन्निकर्षे प्रमोत्पादाद्व्यतिरेक व्यभिचारः ॥

न च तत्र योग्यताया अभावान्नान्वय-व्यतिरेके व्यभिचार इति वाच्यम् । तदवष्टंभस्याप्याग्र (सू)?त्रे एव विकल्पजालैर्निरस्यमाणत्वात् । तदेतदन्वय-व्यतिरेकव्यभिचाररन्ध्रं सन्निकर्षवाहने त्वयोपदर्शितमपि न दृष्टवान् यौगः एतेन भगवतो वैरिणामपि हितोपदेशदानेन परमकारुण्यं ध्वन्यत इति द्वितीय-काव्यार्थः ॥

**अथ सन्निकर्षवाहने व्यभिचाररन्ध्रेण को दोषः । प्रामाण्य हेम्न इत्याह ॥**

**तच्छिद्र तत्स्व-विनाशयायिनः प्रामाण्य हेम्नः खलुरक्षणाय ।**
**चिक्षेप धूर्त्तोऽथ च योग्य-भावा भावैकयुक्त्युत्कट-पट्टिकंसः ॥३॥**

अथ तत् छिद्रतस्त्वयोपदर्शिता व्यभिचार-रन्ध्रात् विनाशयायिनो विनश्यतः प्रामाण्य हेम्नः क्षरतः प्रामाण्यरूप-स्वर्णस्य खल्विति निश्चितं रक्षणाय त्राणाय धूर्त्तः स्वग्रहग्रहिलः स यौगो योग्यभावो योग्यता तत्प्रति योगिको योऽभावस्तदवष्टंभेणैकाद्वैतयुक्तिस्तूर्येत्कट-पट्टिकं तत् छिद्रपिधानाय चिक्षेप तत्र योग्यताभावाच्चक्षुः सन्निकर्षस्य गगने विद्यमानस्यापि तद्विषयक प्रमित्वजनकात्वपि न व्यभिचरित्वमिति तृतीय-काव्यार्थः ।

**अथ यौगेन तद्वाहनान्तर्व्यभिचार छिद्रपिधानाय तत्पदकेन्यस्तेकि-कृतं भगवंस्त्वावत्याह ।**

**लग्नत्वयानैक-विकल्प-मुद्गुरोरेतैरमीषां किल पट्टकं तत् ।**
**तथाहि भो का वद योग्यतेति नूनं भवोच्चत् सहकारि-संनिधिः ॥४॥**

अहो स्वामिन् एतैरिति अनन्तरमेव वक्ष्यमाणै र्योग्यताविकल्प-मुद्गरैस्तत्पट्टिकं भवता भग्नम् । तथाहीति तान् विकल्पान् सूत्रकार एव स्वयं सूत्रान्तबध्नाति । भो यौग वद ब्रूहि । तत् छिद्रपिधायिका का योग्यतेति स्याद्वादिना पृष्टे प्राह यौगः सहकारि सन्निधिर्योग्यता । अयमाशयो यथा दण्डादि-सकलकारण-समवधानेप्येकं द्रव्यादिकारणवैगुण्ये किल नोत्पद्यते घटस्तथा व्योम्न्यपि सन्निकर्षादिसकल-कारणसमवधानेप्येक-द्रव्यादिसहकारिकारणवैगुण्ये न तद्विषयकप्रमोत्पादनं इति सहकारि-सन्निधिर्योग्यतेति नैयायिकेनोक्ते दूषयति स्याद्वादी चेदिति चतुर्थकाव्यार्थः ॥

**अथ तद्दूषणप्रकारक-सहकारिकारण-विकल्पानाह ॥**

**स्यात्तत्र किं भो सहकारिकारणं, द्रव्यं गुणो वा वद यौग कर्म ॥**
**द्रव्यं हि चेद्व्याप्यथ को विशेषस्तत् सन्निधिर्यघूटसन्निकर्षात् ॥५॥**

अहोश्चिद्यौगत्वं विद्यमानेऽपि सन्निकर्षेण प्रमानुत्पत्तौ सहकारिकारण-संनिध्यात्मक-योग्यता-प्रतियोगिकाभावं कारणं ब्रूषे । तत्र प्रमोत्पत्तौ सहकारि-कारणं किं द्रव्यं गुणः कर्म वा स्यात् द्रव्यमपि व्याप्यव्यापि वेति विकल्प्य दूषयति चेद्व्यापीति । अयं भावः यदि व्यापि द्रव्यं सहकारिकारणं स्यात् । तर्हि दिगादिव्यापिद्रव्य-लक्षण-सहकारिकारणं सहकृतत्वाविशेषेण सन्निकर्षाद् गगनविषयक-प्रमोत्पादः केन निवार्यः । यद्यस्मात्कारणात् घटसन्निकर्षवदिति । घट

सन्निकर्षे यथा व्यापिद्रव्य-सहकारि-कारणं सन्निधिरस्ति । तथा प्रकृतेऽपि तत्सन्निधिरस्तीति तेन तद्विषयक प्रमोत्पाद-प्रसंग इति पञ्चमकाव्यार्थः ॥

**अथान्यापि द्रव्यस्य सहकारिकारणत्वं तिरस्कुर्वन्नाह ॥**

**अव्यापि चेद्द्रव्यमहो ततः किं मनस्तथालोक इहेदमंबकम् ।**
**एतत्त्रयस्यापि च तत्र सन्निधिर्घटादिवद्वियत एव यस्मात् ॥६॥**

**व्याख्या** - चेद्यद्यव्यापिद्रव्यं गगन-सन्निकर्षेण तत्प्रमोत्पादे सहकारिकरणं स्यादिति ब्रूषे मनस्तथे सति तत्सहकारि किं मनो वालोको वा अंबकमिति चक्षुर्वा सहकारि स्यात् नैतत्पक्षत्रयमपि संगच्छते । यतस्तदानीममीषां त्रयाणामपि घटसन्निकर्षवत् सान्निध्यात् न च मनसा सह तदानीं चक्षुः । सन्निकर्षाभावेन आत्मा मनसा सह संयुज्यते मन इन्द्रियेणेत्यादि प्रक्रियास्तत्रासंभवेन विद्यमानेनापि सन्निकर्षेण न गगनविषयक प्रमोत्पाद इति वाच्यम् । मनसः शरीरपरिमाणकत्वे-नेन्द्रियसन्निकृष्टत्वात् । प्रयोगो यथा-मनो मध्यमपरिमाणाधिकरणं पृथिव्यादिपरमाणुद्व्यणुक चतुष्टय व्यतिरिक्तत्वे सति अविभु-द्रव्यत्वात् यश्चैवं स चैवं स चैवं यथा घट इति घ्रट इति घटवत्वस्यापि मध्यम परिमाणाधिकरणत्वे सिद्धे आत्मवद्देह परिमाणकत्वं सिद्ध्यति हि प्रयोगः मनोदेह परिमाणकं मध्यमपरिमाणाधिकरणत्वात् आत्मवत् न चात्मनो मध्यमपरिमाणाधिकरणत्वस्या-सिद्धत्वेन दृष्टान्तासिद्धिरिति वाच्यम् । आत्मनोऽपि मध्यम-परिमाणाधिकरणत्वस्य युक्तिसाध्यत्वात् तथाहि युक्तयस्तत्र प्रथममनुमानं निगद्यते । आत्मादेह-प्रमाणस्तत्रैव विशेषतद्गुणोपलब्धेः यस्य यत्रेवोपलभ्यन्ते गुणाः स तत्रैव स्यात् । यथा घटः न च पक्षावृत्तित्वेनाश्रयासिद्धोऽयं हेतुरिति वाच्यम् । जले चन्द्रो गगने चन्द्रोपलम्भात् । इत्यादे-रनुमानत्वाङ्गीकारेण पक्षावृत्तित्वेऽपि हेतोरनाभासत्वस्य वक्ष्यमाणत्वात् न च पुष्पादीनाम् । तत्प्रदेशापरगन्धादिगुणोपलब्ध्या यावद्गन्धप्रदेशस्थितिकत्वाभावेन पुष्पादिषु व्यभिचार्ययं हेतुरिति वाच्यं तत्र पुष्पारम्भकपरमाणूनां परप्रयत्न-स्वभावापरपर्यायाभ्यां प्रयोगविश्र-साभ्यामुपलब्धेर्नतु केवलं गन्धाद्युपलभ्यते । न जातु गुणो गुणिनमतिरिच्य वर्त्तत इति **प्रमेय-कमल-मार्त्तण**डवचनात् । तस्मान्नायं व्यभिचारीहे(तु)रिति । ननु मन्त्रादेराकर्षणोच्चाटनादि गुणानां योजन-शतान्तरेऽपि लभ्यमानत्वेन व्यभिचार्येवायं हेतुरिति चेत् न नायं मन्त्रादिर्गुणः किन्तु तदधिष्ठातृदेवस्य तस्य तु तत्तद्देशगमनेनैव तदुपलब्धेः । ततो घटादिदृष्टान्तावष्टम्भेण देहे एव सुख-दुःखादितद्गुणोपलब्ध्यासिद्धं आत्मनः काय-प्रमाणत्वं इति न चात्मनो दूरदेसीय-कनकरत्न-चन्दनाङ्गनादिभोगात्मनो व्यापकत्वव्याहति-निवारकादृष्टस्य देहातिरिक्तदेशे सत्वात् असिद्धोऽयं हेतुरिति वाच्यम् । अदृष्टस्यानुमानेन देहाद्बहिः सत्वनिषेधात् तथाहि नादृष्टं देहाद्बहिः सम्भवति आत्मासाधारणगुणत्वात् सुखतदित्थं दृष्टस्यैव बहिः सत्वे निषिद्धे कथन्ते-नात्मनो देहाद्बहिः सत्वं अनुमेयं कनक-रत्नादीनां तु अदृष्टजनितसामर्थ्येन देहस्थस्यैवात्मानो भोगसम्भवात् तस्माद् देहप्रमाणमेवाय मात्मेति । किं चायमात्माभोगायतनं सर्वात्मऽनावष्टभ्नीयात् । एक देशेन वा चेत् सर्वात्मना तर्त्वं(त्त्व) स्मत्पक्षाङ्गीकारः । अथ चेत्

एकदेशेनावष्टभ्नाति तर्हि सावयवत्व-प्रसङ्ग एकदेशे नैवाभात्कृत्वं वा पद्येत तस्मान्न व्यापक पक्षः । नन्वात्मनः काय-प्रमाणत्वे बालशरीरपरिमाणवतस्तस्य युवशरीरपरिमाणांगीकारः कथं स्यात् इति चेत् न तस्य कुण्डलीभूत सर्पदृष्टान्तावष्टम्भेण संभवात् । यथा हि द्विहस्त-प्रमाणोऽपि सर्प्पः कुण्डलीभूतत्वेन वितस्त्यादि प्रमाणः समीक्ष्यते तथायमपि तत्तद्देहपरिमाणवानपि बालावस्थाकत्वेन तावत् परिमाणवानेवोपलभ्यते । इत्यात्मनः कायप्रमाणत्वे न कश्चिद्दोष-लेशोऽपि । न चात्मनः काय-प्रमाणत्वे हस्तपादादि खण्डने खण्डनप्रसङ्ग इति वाच्यम् । आत्मनोऽपि खण्डनस्यास्माकमिष्टत्वात्कथमन्यथा छिन्नदेहावयवेऽपि कं कोपलब्धिः स्यात् इत्यात्मनो मध्यमपरिमाणाधिकरणत्वे देह-प्रमाणत्वमिति मनसा सहेन्द्रियस्य सम्बन्ध-त्वेनाव्यापि-द्रव्यस्य मनोनयनालोकत्रयस्यापि सान्निध्यात् तदानीं गगन-विषयक-प्रमोत्पादप्रसङ्गस्तस्मान्नाव्यापिद्रव्यमपि सहकारिकारणम् । यस्मात्कारणात् घटादीतिं घटादि सन्निकर्षस्येव अस्य त्रयस्यापि सन्निधिर्विद्यत एवेति षष्ठकाव्यार्थः ।

**सन्निकर्षेण प्रमोत्पादेव्यापि-द्रव्यस्याव्यापि-द्रव्यस्य च सहकारिकारणत्वं निषिध्य गुणस्यापि विकल्पद्वयेन सहकारिकारणत्वं निषेधयति ॥**

**गुणोपि किं मातृगतः प्रमेयगतोऽथवा तत् सहकारिकारणम् ।**
**प्रमेयगः स्यान्न घटादिवद्यत् व्योम्नोपि संख्यादि गुणान्वितत्वात्॥७॥**

अहोश्चिद् यौगगुणोऽपि प्रमेयगतः सहकारिकारणं स्यात् प्रमातृगतो वा स्यात् इति विकल्प्य प्राग्विकल्पं दूषयति । न स्यान्न भवेत् प्रमेयगतो गुणः सहकारि कारणम् । यत्कारणात् घटादि-वत् । व्योम्नोऽपि गगनस्यासंख्यादि गुणान्वितत्वात् सन्निकर्षेण तत्प्रमोत्पादप्रसङ्गः स्यात् अयमर्थः यथा हि गुणवत्त्वेन घटविषयकप्रमोत्पत्तिर्दृश्यते । तथा गगनविषयकप्रमोत्पत्ति-रप्यास्ताम् । उभयत्रापि गुणवत्वाविशेषादिति सप्तमकाव्यार्थः ॥

**अथ घटादौ विद्यमानस्य गगने चाविद्यमानस्य गुणविशेषस्य सन्निकर्षेण प्रमोत्पादे सहकारि कारणत्वं स्यादित्याशंकापनोदायाह-**

**द्रव्यग्रहोत्पादक रूप( ? )वत्वा भावस्य तत्र प्रतिबन्धकत्वात् ।**
**न सन्निकर्षोऽपि विहायसः प्रमां नत्वक्षमः कर्त्तुमिहेति चेत् न ॥८॥**

ननु द्रव्यग्रहस्य द्रव्यविषयक प्रमाया उत्पादकं रूपवत्वं स्यात्तच्च तत्र नास्तीति कथं सन्निकर्षेणापि तत्प्रमितिः स्यात् । सन्निकर्षेणापि तत्प्रमितौ जनयितव्यायां रूपवत्वाभावस्य तत्र प्रतिबन्धकत्वात् सन्निकर्षोऽपि विहायसो गगनस्य प्रमां कर्त्तुमक्षम इति चेन्नेत्यष्टमकाव्यार्थः ।

**इत्येवं नैयायिकेन शंकिते स्याद्वाद्याह-**

**वस्त्वस्तु तावत्प्रतिबन्धनाशात्मकं हि भावेन्द्रियमेव कारणम् ।**
**किलातिशायि-स्वपर-प्रमायाः प्रमाणमावश्यक-भावलाघवात् ॥९॥**

अहो यौग ! यदि रूपवत्वाभावस्य तत्र प्रतिबन्धकत्वेन सन्निकर्षस्य न व्योम-विषयक-प्रमाजनकत्वमिति त्वं ब्रूषे !

तर्ह्यस्तु प्रतिबन्धनाशः प्रतिबन्धप्रतियोगिकं प्रध्वंसः तदात्मकं तदन्योन्याभावा-प्रतियौगिकं भावेन्द्रियमेव स्वपरप्रमाया इति स्वं ज्ञानं तदन्योऽर्थः परस्तयोः प्रमापरिछित्तिस्तस्या अतिशायिकारणं तदेव प्रमाणम् । आवश्यक-भाव-लाघवादिति आवश्यकत्व विशिष्ट लाघवात् ॥

आवश्यकत्वाल्लाघवाच्चेत्यर्थः । भावार्थस्तावदयं यौगा हि सन्निकर्षेणापि व्योमविषयक प्रमोत्पादे प्रत्यक्ष-प्रमोत्पत्ति-प्रयोजक-प्रतिबन्धकाभावात्मक-रूपवत्त्ववैगुण्यं संगिरन्ते । तत्र स्याद्वादिनस्तावदित्थं ब्रुवते । सन्निकर्षेणापि यदि प्रत्यक्ष-प्रमितौ जनयितव्यायां प्रतिबन्धकाभावापेक्ष्यते तर्हि प्रतिबन्धकाभावस्यैवोपजीव्यत्वाल्लाघवाच्च कारणत्वे नास्तु प्रामाण्यं किमित्यन्तर्गडुना सन्निकर्षेण प्रतिबन्धाभावस्तु ज्ञानात्मको भावेन्द्रियमेवेति नवमकाव्यार्थः ।

**अथ प्रमेयगतगुणस्यप्रत्यक्ष-प्रमितौ सहकारिकारणत्वं निषिध्य प्रमातृगतस्यापि गुणस्य सहकारिकारणत्वं निषेधयति-**

**अदृष्टमुख्यस्य गुणव्रजस्य प्रमातृगस्यापि हि सन्निधानम् ।**
**अस्तीतिकुंभादिकसन्निकर्षवत् तत्सन्निकर्षो जनयेन्न किं प्रमाम् ॥१०॥**

अहो यौग ! यदि अदृष्टादि गुणाः प्रमातृगतस्तत्र सहकारिकारणं स्वीकुरुषे तर्हि घटसन्निकर्षवत् सान्निध्ये अस्तीति सन्निकर्षेण प्रमातृगतादृष्टादि सान्निध्य सहकृतेन गगनविषयक-प्रमोत्पादः स्यात् प्रमातृगत गुणानां सान्निध्याविशेषात् । इत्थं भावार्थं प्रपञ्च्याक्षरगमनिकां कुरुते । प्रमातृगस्येति आत्माधिकरणकस्यादृष्टमुख्यस्येति अदृष्टादेर्गुणव्रजस्य अपि द्वितीय विकल्पा सामर्थ्यं द्योतकः । तत्रेत्यनुवर्तमानमध्याहार्य गगनसन्निकर्षेऽपि सन्निधानं सन्निधिरस्ति इति हेतोः कुंभादिकसन्निकर्षः कथं न प्रमां जनयेदुभयत्राविशेषादिति दशमकाव्यार्थः ।

**अथ प्रमेयप्रमातृगतगुणस्य सहकारिकारणत्वं निषेध्य कर्मणोऽपि सहकारिकारणत्वं निषेधयति ।**

**कर्मापि किं तत् सहकारिकारणं व्योमोद्भवं वा नयनोद्भवं वा ॥**
**व्योमोद्भवे तस्य सदाप्यसिद्धिर्नेत्रोद्भवस्तस्य तदेति सा स्यात् ॥११॥**

अहो यौग ! कर्मापि किं व्यामोद्भवं व्योम्नि समुत्पन्नं नयनोद्भवं चक्षुः समुत्पन्नं वा सहकारि कारणं स्यात् । इत्थं विकल्पं दूषयति व्यामोद्भव इति व्योमतस्तस्य कर्मणः समुत्पत्तौ असिद्धिः व्योम्नो निःक्रियत्वेन तज्जननासम्भवात् । नेत्रोद्भवस्तु नेत्रतस्तदुत्पत्तिरस्तीति तस्य व्योम्नः प्रमा स्यात् समुत्पद्यतेत्येकादशकाव्यार्थः ।

**अथ द्रव्यगुणकर्मणां तत्र सहकारिकारणत्वे निषिद्धे सन्निकर्षवाहने व्यभिचार-छिद्रपिधानाय यौगैर्यत् योग्यताभावरूपं यदकं न्यस्तं तद्भङ्गे योभूद्गुणो भगवतस्तं दर्शयति ।**

**इत्युद्भटैर्देव विकल्पमुद्गरै-स्तत्पोत-संन्यस्तकुयुक्ति यदकम् ।**
**भक्त्वा त्वया तद्व्यभिचाररन्ध्रमाविःकृतं तत्परमोपकारी ॥१२॥**

सुगमं द्वादशं काव्यम् ।

**इत्थं यौगमतसंसिद्धप्रमाणलक्षणं निर्लोव्य परमोपकारिणा भगवता यत्प्रमाणलक्षणं न्यगादि तस्य रत्नहारौपम्यं दर्शयन् भगवत्स्तुति स्वरूपेण त्रयोदशं काव्यमाह ॥**

**स्वामिन्निजान्य-व्यवसायिसम्यग् ज्ञान-प्रमाणोत्तमरत्नहारम् ॥**
**चिक्षेप यः स्वहृदये त्वयार्पितम् श्लाघ्यः स एव प्रकटं महेमतम् ॥१३॥**

अहो स्वामिन्निज शब्देन ज्ञानं अन्य शब्देन घटादिरर्थस्तयोर्व्यवसायि निश्चायकं यत् सम्यग्ज्ञानं तच्च तत्प्रमाणं चेति तद्रूपं रत्नहारं चिक्षेप न्यश्यति स्म यः स्व हृदये पुमान् किं विशिष्टं त्वयार्पितं भगवत्प्रणीतत्वेन श्रद्धाणाचरीकृतं स कीदश इत्याह स एवेत्यन्य-योगव्यवच्छेदार्थ एवकारः । स एव निखिलसुरासुराणां श्लाघ्यो यतश्चैवं ततः किमित्याह महेमतं पूजयामः एतेन भगवद्वचः श्रद्धावतां हि पूज्यत्वं दर्शितमिति चतुर्दशकाव्यार्थः ।

**अथ प्रमाणरूपहारस्य एकत्वेऽपि स्पष्टास्पष्ट-भेदरूप सरिद्वयं दर्शयति ।**

**एकोऽपि यः स्पष्ट तदन्यभेद युग्मात्मकोयं हृदि पण्डितानां ।**
**न्यस्ताश्चकास्तीव मनुष्यदेव द्वयात्मको लोक इतं स्फुरद्गुणः ॥१४॥**

एकोऽपि एकसंख्यकोऽपि यो हारः स्पष्ट(त)दन्य भेद-युग्मात्मक इति प्रत्यक्षाप्रत्यक्ष भेदयुग्मेन द्वि-सरिक इत्यर्थः। स च पण्डितानां हृदि न्यस्त श्चकास्ति भ्राजते इतं यथा मनुष्यदेव द्वयात्मको लोकः शोभते । इतः प्राप्तः स्फुरद्वैर्यादि लक्षणो दवरकलक्षणश्च गुणो येनेति संक्षेपार्थः ॥

व्यासार्थस्त्वयं स्याद्वादिमते किल प्रमाणं द्विविधं स्पष्टास्पष्टभेदात् । तत्र स्पष्टं नामांतःकार्मण, मलविश्लेष-विशेष-कारणको विशुद्धिविशेष एव तत् स्पष्टमपि द्विप्रकारकं साव्यवहारिकं मुख्यं चेति । तत्र सांव्यवहारिक मपि द्विप्रकारकं इन्द्रियप्रत्यक्षं अनीन्द्रि(य)प्रत्यक्षं चेति तत्रेन्द्रियान्नयनादेर्यद् घटादिविषयसंवेदनं तदिन्द्रिय प्रत्यक्षं, सुखादेः स्मरणादि ज्ञानस्य यत् स्वरूप वेदनं तदनिन्द्रिय प्रत्यक्षं, अनिन्द्रियं क्षयोपशमविशेषाध्यासितः कश्चिदात्मप्रदेश-विशेष एव मनो वा प्रतिपत्तव्यम्। इतीन्द्रियानिन्द्रियप्रत्यक्षभेदभिन्नं सांव्यवहारिकप्रत्यक्षम् मुख्यं तु प्रत्यक्षम् । अतीन्द्रियमेव तदपि द्विविधं विकलं सकलं च । तत्र विकलं द्वेधा अवधिर्मनः पर्यायश्च । सकलं तु केवलज्ञानमेवेति मुख्यं प्रत्यक्षं ।

प्रतिभास-विशेषः परोक्षम् । तदपि द्विविधं अनुमानं आगमश्चेति अनुमानमपि द्वेधा गौणं मुख्यं चेति तत्र गौणं त्रिधा स्मरणं प्रत्यभिज्ञानं तर्क्कश्चेति । मुख्यं तु तदतिरिक्तं धूमादिना वह्न्याद्यनुमानमिति । तदप्यनुमानं द्वेधा स्वार्थं परार्थञ्चेति । योग्यता विशेषात्तर्क्क-निर्णीत्यविनाभावेन साध्यविज्ञानं स्वार्थं तत्र साध्यं इष्टमबाधितमसिद्धमिति तत्र वाद्यभिप्रायेच्छया विषयीकृतमिष्टं यथा शब्दः कथञ्चिदनित्यः । स्याद्वादिनो न सर्वथेति अबाधितं तु प्रत्यक्षानुमानादिभि र्यथा शब्दो नित्यः श्रावणत्वादिति प्रत्यक्षः बाधितं न तथेति । असिद्धपदं तु विपर्यस्तादीनां साध्यत्वव्यवस्थापनाय प्रतिवाद्यपेक्षया हि असिद्धं भवति तेन साध्यस्य प्रतिपाद्य स्वरूपत्वेनाविज्ञातार्थ-स्वरूपकत्वात् वादिनस्तु प्रतिपादकत्वेन विज्ञातार्थस्वरूपकत्वेन न तथेति साध्यविज्ञानं च हेतुविज्ञानपूर्वकमेव हेतुश्च साध्याविनाभाव-नियमलक्षणः । केचित्त्रैरूप्यं पाञ्चरूप्यं हेतोर्लक्षणं वदन्ति तन्न हेत्वाभासेऽपि त्रि-पञ्चरूप सम्भवात् । पक्षान्येतानि फलानि एकशाखाप्रभवत्वात् उपयुक्त फलवदित्यादौ हेत्वाभासेऽपि आमफलग्राहि प्रत्यक्षादिनाऽगृहीत-बाधपुरुषापेक्षया त्रिधा, पंचरूपसंभवात् ।

पक्षधर्मत्वं हेतावगमकं उदेष्यति शकटं कृत्तिकोदयादित्यत्र शकटलक्षणपक्षे उदेष्यत्व साध्यककृत्तिकोदयलक्षण हेतोरवृत्तित्वेऽपि ॥ अनुमितेर्जायमानत्वेन पक्षधर्मत्वस्यागमकत्वं इत्यादि त्रैरूप्यं च पाञ्चरूप्यं च न हेतोर्लक्षणमिति । किन्तु साध्याविनाभावनियम एव हेतोर्लक्षणं तच्च स्वार्थानुमानेऽपि समानं न तु साध्याविनाभावनियतस्य हेतुत्वं उक्तवता भवता साध्याविनाभावो व्याप्तिरित्युक्तं भवति तच्चानुपपन्नं इदं प्रमेयत्वादभिधेयं इत्यादौ केवलान्वयिनि अविनाभावनिरूपक साध्यभावस्याप्रसिद्धत्वेनाव्याप्तेरिति चेत् न । अभिधेयत्वाभावस्य समवायित्वावच्छेदेन घटे एव प्रसिद्धत्वात् ।

न चैवं प्रमेयत्वलक्षणहेतु सत्वे अभिधेयत्वलक्षणसाध्यासत्वेन घटे एव व्यभिचार इति वाच्यम् । समवायित्वावच्छेदेन प्रमेयत्व लक्षण-साधनस्यापि तत्रासत्वात् साधन-त्वावच्छेदकावच्छिन्न-प्रतियोगिकाभाववद्वृत्तित्वं व्यभिचार इति **तत्त्वचिन्तामणि**-सूत्रवचनाच्चेति ।

न च समवायित्वस्य प्रतियोगितया सह व्यधिकरणत्वेन नावच्छेदकत्वमिति वाच्यं सामानाधिकरण्यस्यातन्त्रत्वात् शशे शृंगाभावे वक्तव्ये श्रृंगनिष्ठप्रतियोगितया सह वैयधिकरण्येऽपि शशीयत्वस्याप्य-वच्छेदकत्वात् । उक्तं च **तत्त्वचिन्तामणि**प्रगल्भ्यां प्रतियोगितावच्छेदकप्रकारेण प्रतियोगिज्ञानमभावप्रत्यक्षे कारणम् नतु प्रतियोगितावच्छेदकस्य प्रतियोगिवृत्तित्वमपि तन्त्रं गौरवादिति न च समवायित्वावच्छिन्न-प्रमेयत्व-लक्षण-प्रतियोगिनोऽप्रसिद्धत्वेन न तदभावो घटे वक्तुं शक्य इति वाच्यम् । आहार्यज्ञान विषयत्व दशायां तस्य प्रसिद्धत्वात् न चानाहार्यज्ञानविषयत्वस्य तन्त्रत्वात् अन्यथोत्कृष्टं नीलतमं इह नास्तीत्यत्र का गतिः तमसस्तवमतेऽभाव रूपत्वेन उत्कृष्टत्वनीलत्वासंभवात् तस्माद्यथा तत्र त्वया आहार्य ज्ञानविषयत्व दशायां उत्कृष्टत्वं नीलत्वं च व्यवस्थाप्यं तथास्माभिरपि समवायित्वावच्छिन्न-

प्रमेयत्व-लक्षणति-प्रतियोगी आहार्यज्ञानविषयत्व दशायामपि व्यवस्थाप्यत इति सिद्धः समवायित्वावच्छिन्न प्रमेयत्व प्रतियोगिकाभावो घट एवेति ।

ननु प्रतियोग्यारोपपूर्विका अभावप्रतीतिः सम्भवति न च प्रकृते प्रतियोग्यारोपः संभवति प्रमेयत्वस्य वास्तवत्वात् इति चेत् न । प्रतियोग्यारोपस्याभाव-प्रत्यक्षेऽतन्त्रत्वात् श्यामरूपस्य विनश्यदवस्थस्य ध्वंसग्रहे आरोपादर्शनात् अधिकरणे प्रतियोगिज्ञानमेवाभाव-प्रत्यक्षे कारणं न च घटवत्ता दशायामपि अभावधीप्रसंग इति वाच्यं अभावधी प्रसंगो हि किं अभाव-प्रमा-प्रसंगो भावभ्रम-प्रसंगो वा नाद्यस्तत्र घटस्याविद्यमानत्वेन तद्विषयकज्ञानस्याप्रमात्वात् न भ्रमोऽपि तदानीमिन्द्रियस्या दुष्टत्वेन भ्रमत्वाभावात् । तस्मा(दभा)व ग्रहेऽधिकरणे प्रतियोगिज्ञानं तन्त्रं न तु प्रतियोग्यारोप इति । ननु समवायित्वावच्छिन्न प्रमेयत्व ग्रहदशायां यद्दोष-साचिव्यम् । तद्दोषसाचिव्यं तदभाव ग्रहेऽपि अस्ति नवेति चेदस्ति तर्हि प्रतियोगिग्राहके विद्यमाने कथं तदभावग्रहः स्यात् अथ चेन्नास्ति तर्हि प्रतियोगितद्व्याप्येतर-सकलप्रतियोगि-ग्राहकग्राह्यत्वाभावेन कथं तदभावोऽपि गृह्यत इति चेत् न समवायित्वावछिन्नाप्रमेयत्व ग्राहकाहार्यज्ञान-ग्राह्यत्वात्तस्तेति पूर्वोक्त दोषा सम्भवादिति । तस्मादविनाभावनिरूपकाभि-धेयत्वलक्षणसाध्यप्रतियोगिकाभावस्य घटे एव प्रसिद्धत्वेन नाव्याप्तिरिति साध्याविनाभावो व्याप्तिस्तन्नित्यत्वं च हेतोर्लक्षणं इति सिद्धम् ॥

योग्यता विशेषात्तर्क निर्णीत्यविनाभावेन साध्यविज्ञानं स्वार्थसाध्यसाधने तद्विमर्शि-वचनोद्भूतं परार्थानुमानं तद्वचनस्यापि तदर्थ हेतुत्वात् प्रामाण्यमुपचारात् मुख्यतस्तु ज्ञानस्यैवेति । तत्र हेतु-प्रयोगो द्वेधा तथोपपत्तिरन्यथानुपपत्तिश्चेति । यदिदं साधनत्वाभिमतं धूमादि वस्तुसाध्यत्वाभिमते वह्नौ सत्येव भवतीति तथोपपत्तिमन्यथाभावेन भवतीत्यन्यथानुपपत्तिं तत्रापि हेतोरन्तर्याप्त्य साध्यसिद्धौ वह्निव्याप्तिप्रयोगो व्यर्थ एव पक्षीकृते साध्यस्य साधनेन सह व्याप्तिरन्तर्व्याप्ति-र्यथा सर्वमनेकान्तात्मकं सत्वादिति धूमादिना वह्न्यादौ साध्य-बहिर्व्याप्तिरेवातः साध्याविना-भावनियम-लक्षणस्य हेतोर्व्याप्यत्वं साध्यस्य व्यापकत्वमिति । प्रतिज्ञा हेतुश्चेति द्वयमेवानुमानाङ्गं मन्दमति प्रतीत्यर्थं दृष्टान्तोऽपि ज्ञेयः स च द्विधा साधर्म्य वैधर्म्य भेदात् इदं द्रव्यं पृथिवीत्वाद्घटवदिति साधर्म्यदृष्टान्तः । जीवच्छरीरं सात्मकं प्राणादिमत्वात् इति वैधर्म्यदृष्टान्तः । वस्तुतस्तु प्रतिज्ञाहेतुभ्यामेव साध्यसिद्धेः शेषावयवव्यर्थत्वमिति । ततः साध्यं प्रतिपित्सुना हेतुप्रयोगवत् पक्षप्रयोगोप्यङ्गीकार्यः । ततः साध्याविनाभाव-नियम-लक्षणो हेतुरिति सिद्धम् साध्यसाधनं तद्विमर्शिवचनोद्भूतं परार्थानुमानं उपमानञ्च प्रत्यभिज्ञानान्तःपात्यनुमानम् ।

अथास्पष्ट-प्रमाणान्तःपात्यागमो निरूप्यते । साक्षादाप्तज्ञानातिशयपरिछिन्न यथावदर्थ-प्रतिपत्तिरागमः स च शब्दात्मकः । आप्तप्रणीतत्वात् आप्तश्चातीन्द्रियार्थद्रष्टा केवलज्ञानी । अतएव नेश्वरप्रणीतवेदानां प्रामाण्यं तस्य सार्वज्ञ्याभावेनानाप्तत्वान्न चोर्व्यादि कर्तृत्वेन नित्यत्वेन स्वातन्त्र्येण च तस्य सार्वज्ञं सिद्धमिति वाच्यम् । सार्वज्ञ्य निषेधे तन्निषेधात् तथाहि तस्य सार्वज्ञ्यं केन प्रमाणेन गृहीतं प्रत्यक्षेण परोक्षेण वा । न तावत् प्रत्यक्षेण तस्येन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षोत्पन्नतया

अतीन्द्रिय-ग्रहणासामर्थ्यात् नापि परोक्षेण तद्धि अनुमानं शाब्दं वा स्यात् न तावदनुमानं लिंगलिंगिसम्बन्धस्मरण-पूर्वकत्वात् । न च तस्य सर्वज्ञत्वं विना जगद्वैचित्र्यं अनुपपद्यमानं सर्वज्ञत्वं अर्थादापादयतीति चेत् न अविनाभावा (द्)जगद्वैचित्र्यस्य सार्वज्ञ्यं विनाप्युपपत्तेः । तथाहि । द्विविधं जगत् स्थावर जंगम भेदात् । तत्र जंगमानां वैचित्र्यं स्वोपात्त-शुभाशुभकर्मपरिपाकवशेनैव । स्थावराणान्तु सचेतनानामियमेव गतिः । अचेतनानान्तु तदुपभोगयोग्यता साधनत्वेनानादिकालसिद्धमेव वैचित्र्यमिति नाप्यागाम(गम)स्तत् साधकः । स हि तत्कृतः परकृतो वा स्यात् तत्कृत एव चेत्तस्य सर्वज्ञतां साधयति तर्हि तस्य नीचतापत्तिं स्वयमेव स्वगुणोत्कीर्तने महतां लाघवात् शक्रोऽपि लघुतां याति । स्वयं प्रख्यापितैर्गुणैरिति वचनात् किं च तस्यागमकर्तृत्वमेवायुक्तं आगमस्य ताल्वादिव्यापारजन्यवर्णात्मक-त्वेनाशरीरिण्स्तस्य विधाने समर्थत्वात् तस्मान्न तत्कृतागमस्तस्य सार्वज्ञ्यं साधयतीति अन्यकृतश्चेत् स चान्यः सर्वज्ञोऽसर्वज्ञो वा स्यात् सर्वज्ञस्तर्हि तेनैव संसिद्धौ किमित्यन्तर्गडुनेश्वरेण । असर्वज्ञश्चेत्तर्हि कस्तस्य वचसि विश्वासः । अस्मदादिवत्तस्याप्यविशेषात् किञ्च स सर्वज्ञः रचयति चेज्जगत् तर्हि किं तदधिक्षेपकारिणोऽस्मदादीन् सृजतीति तन्नायं सर्वज्ञः ।

न च क्षित्यादिकर्तृत्वेन तस्य सार्वज्ञ्यं सिद्ध्यति तत्र तत्सिद्धौ केचिदिच्छं प्रमाणयन्ति-उर्व्वी-पर्वत-तर्वादिकं बुद्धिमत्कर्तृकं कार्यत्वात् यद्यत् कार्यं तत्तत् सर्वं बुद्धिमत्कर्तृकं यथा पटस्तथा चेदं तस्मात्तथेति व्यतिरेके व्योमादि यस्तत्कर्त्ता बुद्धिमान् स ईश्वर एवेति न चायमसिद्धो हेतुः । कार्यत्वस्य सावयवत्वेन पर्वतादौ सिद्धत्वात् नापि व्यभिचारीविरुद्धो वा विपक्षादत्यन्तं व्यावृत्तत्वात् । नापि बाधः प्रत्यक्षानुमानोपमानागमाबाधितत्वात् नापि प्रकरणसमस्तत्प्रतिपंथि-प्रत्यनुमानाभावात् नत्वीश्वरो भूभूधरादेर्विधाता न भवति अशरीरित्वात् निर्वृतात्मवदिति प्रत्यनुमानं तद्बाधकमिति चेत् न यतोऽत्रेश्वररूपो धर्मी प्रतीतोऽप्रतीतो वा प्ररूपितो न तावदप्रतीतस्त-स्याप्रतीतत्वे हेतोराश्रयासिद्धि प्रसङ्गात् प्रतीतश्चेद्येनैव प्रमाणेन स प्रतीतस्तेनैव प्रमाणेन सप्रतीतस्तेनैव किं स्वयमुत्पादितस्व तनुऽर्प्रतीयतेऽतोऽशरीरित्वाभावेन न प्रकरणसमोऽयं हेतु र्यद्यपीश्वरस्य वस्तुगत्या शरीरित्वं नास्ति तथाप्यागम-प्रकाशनावसरे तस्य शरीरित्वात् अशरीरित्वाभावः सचोर्वी-पर्वत-तर्वादिकर्त्ता एक एव भगवान् सर्वज्ञः बहूनां जगद्विधातृत्व स्वीकारे परस्परवैमत्ये नैकस्यैवान्यान्य रूप-तयासर्वमसर्वादि कर्त्ता एक एव भगवान् सर्वज्ञः । वामंजसमापद्येत इति नास्योर्वादिकर्तृत्वेन सार्वज्ञ्यं सिद्ध्यतीति तदयुक्तं व्याप्तेरग्राहणात् साधनं हि सर्वत्र प्रमाणसिद्धायां व्याप्तौ साध्यगमकं स्यात् । इति तावत् सर्ववादि-संवादः स चायं जगति सृजन् शरीरी वा स्यात् अशरीरी वा सशरीर्यपि किं अस्मदादिवत् दृश्यशरीरी उत पिशाचादिवत् अदृश्य शरीरी प्रथमपक्षे बाधः प्रत्यक्षादिना शरीरित्वस्य तस्यादृश्यमाणत्वेन बाधितत्वात् । द्वितीयविकल्पे तस्यादृश्यशरीरित्वे माहात्म्यविशेषः कारणं अस्मदाद्यदृष्ट-वैगुण्यं वरं प्रथमविकल्पकल्पितकदाग्रहग्रहिलोभवान् कोशपान-प्रत्यायनीयस्तत्सिद्धौ प्रमाणाभावात् अन्योन्याश्रयापत्तेश्च सिद्धे हि माहात्म्यविशेषे तस्यादृश्यशरीरित्वं प्रत्येतव्यं तत् सिद्धौ च

माहात्म्यविशेष सिद्धिरिति अस्मदाद्यदृष्टवैगुण्य विकल्पस्तु न सम्भवत्येव संशयानिवृत्तेः किं तस्या दृश्यत्वाददृश्यशरीरित्वं बान्धेयादिवत् यद्वास्मदाद्यदृष्ट वैगुण्यादिति न द्वितीयविकल्पेनापि तस्यादृश्यशरीरित्वं सिद्ध्यति किं च घटादिकार्याणां शरीरिकर्तृकत्वदर्शनात् । कथं तद् दृष्टान्तावष्टम्भेण भू-भूधरादीनामशरीरिकर्त्ता कल्पयितुं शक्यः तस्मात् सशरीराशरीरलक्षण-पक्षद्वयेऽपि कार्यत्व हेतोर्व्याप्त्यसिद्धिं जगद्विधातृणामनेकत्वेऽपि न वैमत्ये ना समंजसापत्तिः । कीटिकाशतनिष्पाद्यतेऽपि शक्रमूर्ध्नि एकरूपतयोपलंभात्तथा प्रकृते ऽपि संभवात् । किं च यथा अपरकर्त्तृ तिरस्कारेण भू-भूधराणामीश्वरः कर्त्ता कल्पते तथा किं न घटपटादीनामपि कुंभकार कुविंदादि कर्तृतिरस्कारेण स एव कर्त्ता कल्पते । अथ तेषां प्रत्यक्षसिद्धं प्रत्यक्ष सकर्तृकत्वं कथमपह्नोतुं शक्यते तर्हि कीटिकादिभिः किमपराद्धं यत्तेषां तथाविधप्रयाससाध्ये शक्रमूर्ध्नादौ महेश्वरकत्तृत्वं कल्पत इति तस्माद्वैमत्य-भयान्महेशितुरेकत्व कल्पना व्यर्थैव तस्मादुर्व्यादि कर्तृत्वाभावान्न तस्य सार्वज्ञ्यं नापि तस्य नित्यत्वेन सार्वज्ञ्यं सिद्ध्यति तस्य नित्यत्वाभावात्तथाहि महेश्वरः खलु नित्यत्वेनैकस्वभावः सन् भुवनानि सृजति अपरस्वभावो वा प्रथमविकल्पेदान कदाचिज्ज-गन्निर्माणादुपरमते । तदुपरमे च एक स्वभावत्व व्याहतेः तथा च सकल क्रियाया अपर्यवसानात् एकस्यापि कार्यस्य न सृष्टिं अपर-स्वभावत्वे तु तस्या नित्यत्वमेव स्वभावभेदेन स्वभाववतोऽपि भेदात् इति **प्रमेयकमल-मार्त्तण्ड**वचनात् ।

किञ्चेश्वरो येनैव स्वभावेन जगन्ति सृजेत्तेनैव तानि संहरेत् स्वभावान्तरेण वा । तेनैव चेत् सृष्टि संहारयोर्यौगपद्यप्रसङ्ग एकस्वभावाविशेषात् । जगत्सर्जनस्वभावभिन्न स्वभावेन चेत् संहरते तर्हि स्वभाव भेदात् कुतस्तस्य सार्वज्ञ्यं सिद्ध्यति नापि स्वातन्त्र्येण तस्य सार्वज्ञ्यं सिद्ध्यति महेश्वरो हि परमकारुणिकः स्वाधीन एव विश्वं विधत्ते तत् किं सुखित दुःखिताद्यनेकावस्थं घटति अनन्ताद्वैतसुखवदेव किं न निर्मिमीते अथ पूर्वार्जित तत्तत्तदीय शुभाशुभादृष्टप्रेरित एव तथा करोतीति चेत् तर्हि अदृष्टजन्ये जगद्वैचित्र्ये किमनेनान्तर्गडुनेति । किं च जन्तूनां धर्माधर्मावपेक्ष्य चेत् सृजति तर्हि तु न तो सृजतीति सम्पन्नं तथा च कथं तस्य जगद्वर्त्ति सकलो-त्पत्तिमत्पदार्थकर्तृत्वं तथा च धर्माधर्मापेक्षकत्वेन स्वातन्त्र्याभावान्न तस्य सार्वज्ञ्यं तस्मादतीन्द्रियार्थद्रष्टा भगवान् सर्वज्ञ आप्तसूत आप्तज्ञानपरिछिन्न यावत्पदार्थ प्रतिपत्तिरागम इत्यागम प्रमाणं ततः स्पष्टास्पष्टभेदाभ्यां स्वपरव्यवसायिज्ञानात्मक एक एव हारो युग्मात्मको द्विसरिको भातीति भावः एतादृशमपि हारं त्यक्त्वा विपरीतदर्शीयः कश्चिदयोग्य हारं परिधत्ते तस्य मौढ्यं दर्शयन्नाह ।

**यौगो हृदि स्वे जिन सन्निकर्षधत्तूरहारं निदधाति मूढः ।**
**हित्वा तमप्युष्ट्र इवेक्षुकाण्डं बुब्बूलजालं वदने स्वकीये ॥१५॥**

तमपि स्व-पर-व्यवसायिज्ञानलक्षणप्रमाणहारं हित्वा त्यक्त्वा यौगः स्वहृदि सन्निकर्षरूपधत्तूरहारं निदधाति न्यस्यति अयं भावः । ज्ञानात्मकत्वेन स्वप्रकाशे परमुख प्रेक्षित्वाभावेना जाड्यवत्यपि वस्तुनि प्रामाण्यमनादृत्य स्वप्रकाशासमर्थे सन्निकर्षादौ स मूढः

प्रामाण्यमङ्गीकुरुते इति तत्र दृष्टान्तमाह ॥ इव यथा ॥ उष्ट्रः इक्षुकाण्डं त्यक्त्वा बुब्बूलजालं बुब्बूलवृन्दं स्वमुखे निदधाति । अत्र चोष्ट्रस्थानीयो यौगः स च बुब्बूलस्थानीयं सन्निकर्षप्रामाण्यं इक्षुकाण्डस्थानीयं ज्ञानप्रामाण्यं हित्वा आदत्त इति न च सन्निकर्षस्य प्रमाकरणत्वेन प्रामाण्यं स्यादिति वाच्यम् । प्रमाकरणत्वस्य घटादावप्यविशेषेण तस्यापि प्रामाण्यप्रसंगात्तथाहि किं नाम करणत्वं व्यापारवत्कारणत्वं चेत्को हि व्यापारस्तज्जन्यत्वे सति तज्जन्यजनकत्वं चेद् व्यापारवत्वं तर्हि घटादावप्यविशेषात्तस्येति संनिकर्षस्य हि घटजन्यत्वे सति घटजन्य चाक्षुष प्रमाजनकत्वेन घटस्यापि सन्निकर्षलक्षणव्यापारवत्वात् न च तन्मात्रनिष्टकार्यतानिरूपित कारणता-वच्छेदकधर्मवत्वं करणत्वं इति वाच्यम् । तस्यापि घटादावविशेषात् तत् शब्देन हि चाक्षुषज्ञानं तन्निष्ठा या कार्यता तन्निरूपिताया कारणता तस्या योऽवच्छेदको धर्मस्तद्वत्त्वं करणत्वं घटेऽपि समानमेव तत्र तच्छब्देन हि घटविषयकं चाक्षुषज्ञानं तन्निष्टकार्यतानिरूपित कारणतावच्छेदक धर्मो हि घटत्वं भवति । घटत्वावच्छेदेनैव घटविषयक चाक्षुष ज्ञानोत्पत्तेः । ततो न प्रमाकरणत्वेन सन्निकर्षस्य प्रामाण्यं स्यात् किं च न सन्निकर्षः प्रमाणं स्व परिच्छित्य जनकत्वात् यदेवं तदेवं यथा घटः न च प्रमाणत्वलक्षणसाध्यव्यापकत्व-परिच्छित्य-जनकत्व लक्षणसाधना-व्यापकत्वेनार्थ परिछित्तिजनकत्वं उपाधिस्तस्य साधनव्यापकत्वात् । न सन्निकर्षः प्रमाणं जडत्वाद् घटवत् चेति न च यत्र प्रमाणत्वं तत्र प्रमाकरणत्वमिति । साध्यव्यापको यत्र च जडत्वं तत्र प्रमाकरणत्वं एव नास्ति घटे व्यभिचारादिति । साधनाव्यापकं प्रमाकरणत्वमुपाधिरिति वाच्यम् उपाधेः साध्यव्याप्तौ अन्वय-व्यतिरेक-व्यभिचारस्य पूर्वोक्तत्वात् । तस्माद्धत्तूरहारप्राय सन्निकर्षस्य जडरूपस्यापि प्रामाण्याङ्गीकरणे तस्य मौढ्यं दर्शितमिति पञ्चदशकाव्यार्थः ॥

**अथ यौगेनोपचारादि प्रकारतः प्रमाणाभासस्यापि सन्निकर्षस्य कथञ्चित्प्रामाण्यं व्यवस्थाप्य तद्रूपधत्तूरहारं परिहितं दृष्ट्वा यत्कृतं भगवता तदाह ॥**

**अत्रोटि तीर्थाधिप सन्निकर्ष हारस्त्वयेत्थं प्रतिबंदि पाणिना ॥**
**तथाहि विज्ञान विधायकरत्वोपचारतस्तस्य यदि प्रमाणता ॥१६॥**

अहो स्वामिंस्त्वयेत्थं वक्ष्यमाण-प्रकारप्रतिबंदिरूपो यः पाणिस्तेन कृत्वा सन्निकर्ष हारस्त्रोटितस्तस्य प्रामाण्यं निरस्तमित्यर्थः । तामेव प्रतिबन्दीं दर्शयन्नाह तथाहीति ॥ अहो यौगेत्यध्याहार्यं अहो यौग ! तस्य सन्निकर्षस्य विज्ञानविधायकत्वेन उपचारतो घृतमायुरित्यादौ यथा घृते आयुः कारणत्वेनायुरुपचारो दृश्यते तथा स्व-पर व्यवसायि-ज्ञान-लक्षणप्रमाणजनक सन्निकर्षे ज्ञानलक्षण प्रमाण कारणत्वेन प्रमाणोपचारात् यदि प्रामाण्यं ब्रूषे तर्हि श्रुणु प्रतिबन्दी विचारमिति षोडशकाव्यार्थः ।

अथ तमेव प्रतिबन्दीमाह ॥

**आत्मादिकं तह्यंविशेषतस्तु तत्कारणत्वे तदिवोपचारतः ॥**
**प्रमातृमेयत्व विरोधितत्वादङ्गिनो तन्न तथेति वाच्यम् ॥१७॥**

अहो यौग ! यदि सन्निकर्षस्य ज्ञानकारणत्वेनोपचारात् प्रामाण्यमङ्गीकरुषे तर्हि आत्मादिकमपि अविशेषतो ज्ञानकारणत्वेनोपचाराविशेषात् प्रमाणमस्तु अविशेषं सूत्रं एव दर्शयति तत्कारणत्व इति प्रमाणज्ञान कारणत्वे तदिव सन्निकर्ष इव ज्ञानात्मनो रुपचारस्या विशेषादिति ।

अथ यौग विकल्पितवत्प्रामाण्यव्यवस्थापक-शंकानिरासमाह प्रमात्रीति । न च घटांगिनाविति घटादिप्रमेयं वस्तु अङ्गी इत्यात्मानौ घटात्मानौ तदिति प्रमाणं नेति न स्यात् कुतः प्रमातृमेयत्व विरोधितत्वात् प्रमातात्मामेयं घटादिवस्तु तयोर्विरोधितत्वं स्वरूपं यस्येति भावप्रधाननिर्देशात् अयमर्थः । प्रमातृप्रमेययोर्विरोधि किल प्रमाणं न तौ तयोर्विरोधिनौ प्रत्येकं स्यातां न हि स एव घटस्तद् घटविरोधीति वक्तुं शक्यते । तस्मात् सन्निकर्ष दृष्टान्तावष्टंभेण प्रमाणविरोधिनौ घटवदात्मनः प्रामाण्य-प्रसंग-प्रतिबन्दी-असिद्धैवेति वाच्यमिति सप्तदश-काव्यार्थः ।

**अथ प्रमाणत्वस्य प्रमेयत्वविरोधित्वे दूषणमावि:कुर्वन्नाह ।**

**यदि प्रमेयत्व-विरोधि-मानता स्यात्तर्ह्यमेयं किल भो प्रमाणम् ॥**
**वंध्यासुतस्येव तथा च तस्यासत्ता प्रसंगश्च तथात्मनोऽपि ॥१८॥**

अहो यौगप्रमाणत्वस्य प्रमेयत्वेन सह विरोधित्वे वक्तव्ये यत्र-यत्र प्रमाणत्वं न तत्र प्रमेयत्वमिति सम्पन्नं तथा च प्रमाणस्याप्रमेयत्वेन वंध्यास्तनयवदसत्वमापद्यते । ततोयमर्थः । यदि प्रमेयत्व विरोधिनी-मानता-प्रमाणत्वं स्यात्तर्हि प्रमाणमप्रमेयमेव स्यात् । ननु तर्हि को दोष इत्याशङ्क्याह वंध्येति तथा चाप्रमेयत्वापत्या तस्य प्रमाणस्य वंध्यास्तनयस्येवासत्त्व प्रसंगः यथा हि वंध्यास्तनयो प्रमेयत्वेनासन्निति निगद्यते । तथा प्रमाणमपि अप्रमेयत्वे नासन्निति निगद्यं स्यादिति भावार्थः । किं च सद्भूत भावस्यापि प्रमाणस्य प्रमाविषयत्वाभावापरपर्याये प्रमेयत्वे प्रमाणज्ञानाभावेन कथं सर्वज्ञस्य सार्वज्ञ्यं स्यादिति सर्वज्ञोच्छेदः किं च यथा प्रमाणत्वं प्रमेयत्वेन सह विरोधि तथा प्रमातृत्वमपि प्रमेयत्वेन सह विरोध्येव निगद्यं तथा च तस्यापि तद्वदसत्व प्रसंग इति न प्रमातृत्व-प्रमेयत्व-विरोधित्वेनात्मनि सन्निकर्षवत् ज्ञानकारणत्वाविशेष कल्पनीय प्रामाण्योपचाराविशेषेणोपचारात् प्रामाण्य-प्रसंग-प्रतिबंध्यानोपचारादपि सन्निकर्षस्य प्रामाण्यमिति अष्टादशकाव्यार्थः ॥

**अथ प्रमेयत्व प्रमातृत्व विरोधि प्रमाणाज्ञाने महेश्वरस्यापि सार्वज्ञ्यं न सिद्ध्येदिति दर्शयन्नाह ॥**

**किं चाप्रमेयत्ववता सद्भूत भावेन कथं तवेश्वरः ॥**
**सर्वार्थवेदी प्रतिबन्दि-पाणिनैवं त्रोटितो यौग हृदिस्थहारः ॥१९॥**

सुकरमेवेदं किं च सन्निकर्षस्य प्रामाण्ये वक्तव्ये सर्वज्ञाभावः प्रसज्येत तथाहि-चक्षुषः साक्षात्परमाण्वादिभिः सम्बन्धो नास्तीति सर्ववादिसंवादस्तथा च योगिचक्षुषोऽपि

साक्षात्परमाणुभिः सम्बन्धाभावात् कथं तस्य सार्वज्ञ्यं, न च तच्चक्षुषो योगज-धर्मानुग्रहात् तत्संबन्धं स्यादेवेति वाच्यं, कोऽयं योगीन्द्रियाणां योगज-धर्मानुग्रहः स्वविषये प्रवर्त्तमानस्य चक्षुरादेरतिशयाधानं सहकारिमात्रं वा । नाद्यो युक्तिमान् पक्षः परमाण्वादौ प्रवर्तमानस्य चक्षुरादेरसंभवात् अथ योगिनस्तत्र प्रवर्तमानमेवास्तीति चेत्तर्हि स्वयमेव तत्र प्रवर्त्तमानस्य चक्षुषः को योगजधर्मेणानुग्रहः कर्त्तव्यः किं चान्योन्याश्रयदोषोऽपि । सिद्धे हि योगजधर्मानुग्रहे तत्र प्रवृत्तिस्तत्र प्रवृत्तौ च सत्यां स्वविषये प्रवर्त्तमानातिशयापर-पर्याय योगजधर्मानुग्रहः सिद्ध्येत् न द्वितीय पक्षोऽपि घटादिस्वविषयातिक्रमेणाह प्रसंगः तथा चैकमेवान्तःकरणं योगजधर्मानुगृहीतं सत् युगपत्परमाण्वाद्यनेकातीन्द्रियार्थ-विषयक-ज्ञानजनकं स्यादिति योगजधर्मानुग्रहस्यासंभवेन चक्षुः सन्निकर्षजन्य परमाणुविषयकज्ञानाभावेन सर्वज्ञाभावप्रसङ्गान्न चक्षुःसन्निकर्षः प्रमाणं स्यात् इति ।

**अथ परपरिकल्पित सन्निकर्षप्रामाण्यं निरस्य स्वमत सिद्धप्रमाणलक्षणं व्यवस्थापयन् प्रमाणरूप-हार-माहात्म्यं वर्णयति ॥**

**स्वामिन्निजान्यवसायि सम्यग् ज्ञान प्रामाणोत्तम-रत्नहारम् ।**
**यो न्यस्यति स्वे हृदये स नूनं स्यात् सम्पदामास्पदमंगि-वल्लभः ॥२०॥**

अहो स्वामिन् त्वयार्पितं सम्यग् व्यवसायि ज्ञान-लक्षण-प्रमाणरूपहारं यः पुमान् स्वे हृदि न्यस्यति स्थापयति स अङ्गिवल्लभः सन् सम्पदामास्पदं स्यादित्यक्षरार्थो, व्यासार्थस्त्वयं सम्यग् स्व-पर व्यवसायिज्ञानं प्रमाणं स्याद्वादिमते । नन्वतिव्याप्त्यव्याप्त्यसंभवादिदोषनिवारकाण्येव पदानि सार्थकानि स्युः प्रकृते चैतावद्भिः पदैः व्प्तातिव्याप्त्यादि दोषानिवार्यन्ते इति चेत् शृणु प्रकृते हि न दर्शन-प्रतियोगिकान्योन्याभाववत् ज्ञानं विवक्षितं किन्तु ज्ञायन्ते सामान्य विशेषाध्यासिताः पदार्था अनेनेति ज्ञान-दर्शन-साधारणं तथा च ज्ञानमित्युक्ते दर्शनेऽति-व्याप्तिस्तन्निषेधाय व्यवसायीत्युक्तं विशेषेण गौणीभावे द्रव्यत्वादि सामान्यधर्माग्राहकत्वेऽपि मुख्यतया घटत्वादि विशेषधर्मग्रहण पुरस्कारेणावस्यति निश्चिनोतीति व्यवसायि न चैतादृशं दर्शनं संभवति । ये हि घटत्वादयो धर्मा ज्ञाने मुख्यतया भातास्ते हि दर्शने गौणत्वेन भासन्ते ये हि ज्ञाने गौणतया द्रव्यत्वादयो भातास्ते च दर्शने मुखतयावभासन्ते इति दर्शनस्य व्यवसायित्वाभावेन तत्रातिव्याप्ति निषेधकं व्यवसायीति । व्यवसायिज्ञानं चेत्युक्ते संशयज्ञानेति । व्याप्तिं संशयस्यापि निश्चायकत्वेन व्यवसायित्वात् इति तन्निषेधाय सम्यगिति । सम्यग् व्यवसायिज्ञानं प्रमाणमित्युक्ते ज्ञानाद्वैतवादि कल्पित-ज्ञानेतिव्याप्तिस्तन्निषेधाय परेति अथ सम्यक् पर-व्यवसायि ज्ञानं प्रमाणमित्युक्ते अप्रमाणे यौगकल्पित घटादि ज्ञानेऽतिव्याप्तिरित्युक्तं स्वेति । ननु घटादि ज्ञानस्य मनो ग्राह्यत्वेनार्पितं स्वाकारानुव्यवसाय-वेद्यत्वेन कथमप्रामाण्यमिति चेत् तस्य मनोग्राह्यत्वे घटादिग्रहो न स्यात् तस्य स्व-गृहे एव व्यग्रत्वात् किं च घटज्ञानं मनोजन्यानुव्यवसायग्राह्यं मन्योजन्यानु व्यवसायस्त्व परज्ञानग्राह्यस्तदप्यपरज्ञानग्राह्यमित्यनवस्था-प्रसंग इति सकलज्ञानस्य स्व पर-व्यवसायित्वेन यौग कल्पिते पर व्यवसायिन्यप्रमाणे ज्ञानेतिव्याप्ति-निषेधकं स्वेति पदं

ततः सिद्धं सम्यक् स्व-पर-व्यवसायिज्ञानं प्रमाणमिति । तथाविधज्ञानलक्षण प्रमाणरूपहारस्य कण्ठे स्थापकः पुमान् सम्पदामास्पदं स्यादिति भावार्थः ।

**अथोपसंहरन्नाह**

**इतिस्फुरद्वाचक-धर्मसागर-क्रमाब्जभृङ्गः कविपद्मसागरः ॥**
**श्री शान्तिनाथस्तवनं प्रमाण-प्रकाशसंज्ञं विदधे विशुद्धम् ॥**

सुकरमेवेदमिति ॥

इति श्री प्रमाणप्रकाशवृत्तिः पूर्णा ॥

भट्टारक-घटाकोटि-कोटीर-श्री हीरविजयसूरीश्वरविजयराज्ये महोपाध्याय श्री धर्मसागर-गणिशिष्य पं० पद्मसागर गणिकृता ॥

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