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The Library of Jaina Literature—Vol. III.

THE NAYA-KARNIKA

A WORK ON JAINA LOGIC

BY

SRI VINAYA VIJAYA MAHARAJ

*Edited with Introduction, English Translation
and critical notes*

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PREFACE

THE *Naya-Vāda*, or philosophy of standpoints, is a unique feature of Jaina metaphysics, and has been fully dealt with by some of the great *āchāryas* of the past. The text of the present work—the *Naya Karmikā*—is by Śrī Vinaya Vijaya Upādhyāya, a famous Logician of the 17th century A. D., and has been selected for translation on account of its general freedom from tiresome technicalities as well as for its brevity.

The *Naya-Vāda*, it is to be observed, is an essential department of knowledge by itself, and bears the same relation to philosophy as logic does to thought, or grammar to language, or speech. I have ventured on a general outline of the subject in the introduction for the benefit of the non-Jaina readers, though the observations of one so little acquainted, like myself, with the basic principles of the rules of Thought, laid down by the Giant-Philosophers of the *Naya-Vāda*, are hardly likely to throw much light on the subject.

I avail myself of the present opportunity to acknowledge my indebtedness to the authors of the

different works, such as 'The First Principles of Jaina Philosophy,' 'The History of The Medieval School of Indian Logic,' 'An Introduction to Jainism,' etc., which I have consulted for the purposes of translation. I have also derived useful help from 'The Speeches and Writings of Mr. V. R. Gandhi,' who attended the Parliament of Religions at Chicago, U.S.A., as the representative of Jainism.

My sincere thanks are specially due to Mr. Champat Rai Jain, Bar-at-Law, for his valuable help in the preparation of this book and to my friend Kumar Devendra Prasadji without whose kindly help the book would never have seen the light of day.

PRINCESS STREET, }
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INTRODUCTION.

THE philosophy of *Nayas* (standpoints) is an integral part of Jaina Metaphysics, and Jaina philosophers have always laid the greatest emphasis on its proper comprehension. It is maintained that no one who is not fully acquainted with this department of philosophy is likely to make any real progress in knowledge, and none whatever in religion, however much he might make himself familiar with other matters. To estimate the true value of this statement it is necessary to determine the nature of knowledge itself, in the first instance.

The object of knowledge is to make us acquainted with the nature of things, so that when we know a thing fully we are said to have knowledge of it. Now, knowledge arises in one of the two following ways: (1) it is either perceived directly, or (2) is inferred from facts of observation or record. The first kind, called *Pratyakṣa*, includes the *kevalajñāna* (Omniscience) of the *Siddhātman*¹, the *Manahprayaya*²

1. A Perfect or Deified Soul.
2. Knowledge of the thoughts of others.

and *Avadhi*¹ of the *Muni*², and the sense-perception of the ordinary living beings in the world. The second category comprises mostly what has been called the indirect, or mediate, knowledge. Leaving aside the first class of knowledge with which we have no concern in the present work, we notice that the indirect, or mediate, knowledge itself is of two kinds, namely, (1) that which is heard from others, and (2) that which is intellectually inferred. It is in respect of these two kinds of non-immediate knowledge that the greatest care is to be observed in accepting the statements of others or the deductions of our own reason.

A number of tests have been laid down by the wise for the purpose of testing the accuracy of both these kinds of indirect knowledge. One of these tests, and the one with which we are mostly concerned at present, is the relativity of knowledge. Obviously, everything exists in relation to a number of other things, and is liable to be influenced by them. Hence, knowledge to be complete must describe it with reference to its relations with other things.

Similarly, when things are described by men they are described generally from some particular point of

1. A kind of telepathy.

2. A Jaina ascetic.

view, though some people are led to imagine this one-sided description to be exhaustive, as, for instance, is the case with Advaitism which adheres to the standpoint of qualities alone and neglects that of evolution. This kind of knowledge, though true from the particular point of view from which it is arrived at, is certainly not true from any other.

It is thus obvious that no piece of information, judgment, or scriptural text, can be relied upon to impart full knowledge of a thing, unless it is comprehensive enough to embrace the various descriptions thereof obtained from the different points of view. Jainism, therefore, warns us against falling a victim to imperfect information and being misled by it. Hence the importance which is attached to the philosophy of standpoints by the Jaina Metaphysicians.

The oft-quoted parable of the blindmen and the elephant is admissible here to illustrate the point under consideration. Each of these persons, desirous of knowing what an elephant was like, touched and felt a separate part of its body, and went home pleased with the information they derived concerning its form. They then sat down to compare notes, and soon discovered that there was no agreement among them as to the form of the animal. The man who had only touched its leg described it

as a huge column, the one who had felt the ear as a winnowing fan, and so forth. They soon came to words and then to blows ; and still no one was willing to admit that he was in the wrong. At last, there appeared another man on the scene who was not blind, and he was with difficulty able to pacify them and settle their disputes by convincing them of their partial knowledge.

The lesson to be learnt from this instructive parable is that unless all the different aspects of a thing have been enquired into and studied, the partial knowledge based on any one aspect alone is liable to lead us into error and conflict with others.

All the confusion of thought which is prevailing in the world is thus the outcome of inexhaustive research, and of the acceptance of a part for the whole. A single instance would suffice to satisfy the reader that most, even if not all, of our disputes only betray the pig-headedness of the blindmen of the parable in ourselves. For a long time past a keen controversy has been raging among philosophers as to the nature of will, some holding that it is free, others denying it. As a matter of fact, both parties are right, but only from their respective standpoints. If we approach the question from the point of view of the nature of will, that is to say, in respect of its

natural qualities, we must, with Bergson, arrive at the conclusion that it is free, but if we look at it as regards its manifested appearance, that is to say, from the point of view of evolution, it is certainly subject to predeterminism of *karmas* (actions). It is thus clear that both the parties to the controversy have only got hold of partial truth, and are trying to pass it off for absolute wisdom. The truth is neither in the view of the one nor in that of the other, but in a perfect synthesis of both, since will is free by nature, but liable to predeterminism of *karmas* as an incarnating ego.

It is thus evident that the greatest care must be taken in accepting all one-sided statements of facts, whether they come from gods or men. It must be remembered that our language makes it impossible for us to describe things in all their aspects at one and the same time, and, for that reason, is liable to lead us into error to a considerable extent. He who would avoid falling into the pitfalls of error must, therefore, first of all, try to understand and master the philosophy of *Nayas*.

Jainism aims, from the very commencement, at a systematic classification of the subject-matter of knowledge, and divides the philosophical standpoint into two main heads, the *Nis'chaya* and the *Vyavahāra*..

Of these, the former deals with the permanent qualities, hence, the essential nature of things about which there can be no possibility of doubt, and which remains true under all circumstances, conditions and states. For this reason, it is called the *Nis'chaya*, i.e., the natural or certain. The latter, however, only deals with things not with reference to their real or essential nature, but with respect to their utility, or non-natural states and conditions. The statement,—‘This is a jar of clay’—is an illustration of the *Nis'chaya Naya*, while, ‘This is a jar of butter,’ is true only from the *Vyavahāra*, or the practical, point of view.

Nis'chaya Naya is again divided into two kinds, namely, (1) the *Dravyārthika* and (2) the *Paryáyārthika*. The former of these is the substantive point of view, since it describes things with reference to their general qualities or substances. The latter is the standpoint of evolution and gives prominence to forms or conditions, which souls and matter assume from time to time, in the course of evolution. From the *Dravyārthika* point of view, it is correct to say that souls are all alike, since they are made of the same substance and have the same nature, but from that of the *Paryáyārthika Naya* they differ in respect of their special qualities, which have

evolved out in the course of transmigration or evolution.

The *Dravyārthika Naya* is further sub-divided into three classes, *Naigama*, *Samgraha*, and *Vyavahāra*.¹ The *Paryāyārthika* is also sub-divided into *Rijusūtra*, *S'abda*, *Samabhirūḍha*, and *Evambhūta*. According to some *āchāryas* (philosophers), the *Rijusūtra* is to be treated as a sub-division of the *Dravyārthika Naya*, but this is only a matter of classification and has no bearing on the general aspect of the subject.

It is not to be supposed that there are only seven *Nayas* or standpoints of view : there are many sub-divisions, and, according to the author of the original text, their number is seven hundred. But as the principal ones are the seven described here, it would serve no useful purpose to enumerate the others.

We may now proceed to consider these seven principal *Nayas* separately.

(1) *Naigama*, from *na*, not, *eko*, one, and *gama*, certainty, hence the non-distinguished, is a point of view which does not distinguish between the general

¹ The word *Vyavahāra* occurs twice in this classification, firstly, as one of the two main divisions of philosophical standpoint, and, secondly, as a sub-division of the *Dravyārthika Naya*. In the first case it means the practical standpoint, and in the second the particular as defined later on.

and special qualities of a thing. For instance, when the word bamboo is used, a number of general as well as special qualities are at once referred to without a distinction being made among them. The bamboo tree has a number of qualities which are common to it and other trees, and, in addition, it is possessed of a number of special qualities which are peculiar to it alone, and are not to be found in the remaining members of the genus tree. The word bamboo, therefore, at once refers the mind to a large number of qualities, some of which are the special property of the bamboo alone, while the rest are common to it and all other trees in general.

Since it is not possible to separate these two kinds of qualities in an actual bamboo, the particular qualities thereof remain undistinguished from those common to all the trees in existence. This kind of description is, therefore, called the non-distinguished. It is not to be supposed that no distinction whatever is implied in the Naigama Naya, inasmuch as the mere mention of the word bamboo is sufficient to exclude all other trees from consciousness. What is meant is only this, that as the concept bamboo is equivalent to the concept tree *plus* a number of special qualities added to it, the word bamboo at once calls to mind a class of concepts in which the qualities of a tree are

intermingled with those of a bamboo without distinction or demarcation among them.

(2) *Samgraha* is the description of a thing from the standpoint of its general qualities alone. It is the standpoint of genus. For instance, when the word *jîva* (soul) is uttered, it refers to all kinds of *jîvas*, without distinguishing among them, in respect of type, form, etc., etc.

(3) *Uyavahâra*, or the particular, is that point of view which makes a distinction between a genus and its species.

The feature of distinction between the *Samgraha* and the *Uyavahâra* lies in the fact that, while the former takes into consideration only the general qualities of a thing, the latter deals only with the particular attributes thereof. The *Samgraha* is the standpoint of a *genus*, but the *Uyavahâra* that of *species*.

(4) *Rijusûtra* is the standpoint which only takes into account the present form of a thing, without reference to its past or future aspects. When a statement is made from this standpoint it is not to be taken as an absolute truth under all conditions, since the speaker only confines his observations to the present condition of the thing he describes, without troubling himself as to its past and future possibilities

or aspects. The *Rijusûtra* recognises nothing but the thing itself as it appears at the moment, and has no concern with its name (*nâma*), or image (*sthâpana*), or with the causes which bring it into existence (*dravya*). A certain class of philosophers attach great importance to this point of view, and maintain that one ought to consider things only as they appear at the present moment, and should not worry oneself over their past or future.

This view is certainly not likely to result in the perfection of knowledge or happiness by any means, being only confined to a very limited aspect of things.

(5) The *S'abda*, or the verbal standpoint, observes the distinctions of gender, number, case, tense, etc., in synonymous words. For instance, the words *Dârâ*, *Bhâryâ* and *Kalatra* differ in their grammatical gender, though they all signify wife. We may, therefore, say that the *S'abda Naya* is the standpoint of the grammarian who distinguishes between the meaning of words, on the ground of gender, number, etc. According to some writers, the *S'abda Naya* ignores the differences of synonymous words and treats them as if they all signified identically the same thing. This seems to be the view of the author of the original text of this work.

(6) The *Samabhirúḍha Naya* distinguishes between words on etymological grounds. For instance, the words *Indra*, *S'akṛa* and *Purandara*, though of the same gender and applicable to the rulers of the Heaven-worlds, yet differ in meaning from one another, *S'akṛa* signifying strong, *Indra*, the possessor of many divine powers, and *Purandara*, the destroyer of the cities of the enemy. The difference between the *S'abda* and the *Sams'abhirúḍha Nayas* seems to lie in the fact that, while the former is the standpoint of a grammarian, the latter is that of an etymologist who tries to trace words to their roots.

(7) The *Ēvambhūta Naya* is that mode of comprehending things which takes into account their special functions or activities, and describes them by such words as are justified by their actual functions or activities. For instance, a *pujāri* (worshipper) is called a *pujāri* when he performs *pujā* (worship). Similarly, only a strong man is entitled to be called *S'akṛa*. *Indra* can be called *Purandara* only when he is engaged in the act of destroying the cities of enemies, and so forth. This *Naya* is also the standpoint of etymologists.

As the fallacies of these different kinds of *Nayas* throw considerable light on the nature of the *Nayas* themselves, they may also be mentioned here. There

are the following seven fallacies, corresponding to the seven *Nayas* :—

(1) *Naigamābhāsa* is the fallacy of the *Naigama Naya*, and consists in making a separation between the general and special properties of things, e.g., to speak of the existence and consciousness of soul as if they could be separated from one another.

(2) *Samgrahābhāsa*, the fallacy of the *Samgraha Naya*, occurs when we describe the generic properties alone as constituting a thing. This gives rise to confusion of thought, because the general qualities alone can never constitute an actual object. For instance, the general qualities of a tree only give us the idea of tree-ness, never an actual tree. The latter will have to be some particular kind of tree—an oak, a mango, a *nimb*, or the like—and will, therefore, possess its own special qualities along with those of a tree in general. Whenever this fallacy has crept into a system of philosophy, the harvest of the scholar has been only a whirlwind of wordy abstractions instead of a knowledge of things as they exist in nature.

(3) *Vyavahārabhāsa* lies in a wrong selection of species, as, for instance, is the case with Charvakism which makes wrong distinctions between substances and qualities, etc.

(4) *Rijusûtrâbhâsa* occurs when permanence, hence reality, of things is altogether denied, as is the case in the philosophy of Buddhism.

(5) *S'abdûbhâsa*, the verbal fallacy, occurs when we ignore the distinguishing features of the *S'abda Naya* and deal with empty words as if they were applicable without reference to time, number, gender, etc., etc.

(6) *Samabhirûdhâbhâsa* consists in treating the words *Indra*, *S'akra*, *Purandara*, etc., as synonymous.

(7) *Ėvambhûtabhâsa* lies in making the existence of a thing depend on the performance of the special function with reference to which it has been given a particular name, e.g., to say that a *pujâri* is a non-entity because he is no longer engaged in performing *pûja*, is fallacious.

From the above classification of *Nayas* it is clear that the first four of them relate to things (*vâchya*) and the last three to words (*vachaka*). The former, strictly speaking, are the true standpoints of philosophy, since the latter are meant specially for linguists, grammarians and etymologists alone. But since the *S'ûstras* (scriptures) are couched in words only, and since the selection of words depends on the rules of grammar and is determined by their

derivations, the last three standpoints have also to be taken into consideration, in the interpretation of scriptural text.

The above is necessarily a brief explanation of a subject which is capable of an enormous amplitude. If the reader is desirous of studying it fully, he should make himself familiar with works such as the *Viśeśāvas'yakā*, the *Naya-Chakṛa*, etc., where the philosophy of *Nayas* is more elaborately and fully explained.

As a result of the foregoing analysis of the different kinds of standpoints, we may say that the *Nayas* constitute the very foundation of the science of Thought. They are not rules of logic as understood in its strict sense, but in a very much wider though simpler aspect. As Mr. A. B. Lathe points out (see 'An Introduction to Jainism,' p. 108):—

“Logic, as applied to our present subject, is not a term denoting formal laws of thought. It constitutes the essence of Jain philosophy, without an adequate conception of whose importance, it would be impossible to realize the place of Jainism in the philosophical systems of the world, and the contribution it has made to the progress of human thought. As will be indicated further on, *Anekant Logic* is

the doctrine which means to examine the very foundations of knowledge, and also to explain the autological problems that have beset philosophical speculations in all times. The value that Jainism itself attaches to this basis of its philosophy may appear extravagant to any superficial observer. It is asserted by a great Jain *Acharya* that this *logic* is as important as the Absolute Wisdom possessed by the *Kevalin*. It differs from the latter only in being 'indirect,' as distinguished from 'immediate' which is the characteristic of Absolute Wisdom. This loss caused by its being 'mediate' (*Apratyaksha* or *Shruta*) is fully made up by its exclusive capacity to demonstrate the truth of Absolute Wisdom to mankind. Thus Absolute Wisdom itself, not to speak of inferior degrees of knowledge, is baseless, without the *Anekant Logic*. Obviously, the reason of this is that this Logic is that which guarantees our capacity to know and provides us with criteria by which we should be able to test our knowledge. In one word, it may be called the 'method' of philosophy, or that instrument of thought by which *Tattva-Jnyan* or philosophy is polished (*Sanskrit*). It bears therefore the all-comprehending sense that 'logic' is invested with in Hegel. It is in Jainism what the science of ideas is in Plato or the Metaphysics in Aristotle."

Coming to the place of *Nayas* in Jainism, it is to be observed that the most prominent feature of its philosophy is the quality of many-sidedness, the *anekānta-vāda*. If the reader has followed me thus far, he will have no difficulty in following me still further when I say that all one-sided systems of Thought are liable to error and inaccuracy because of their very one-sidedness. There are more aspects than one of each and everything in nature, and it is obvious that the system which deals, not with all such sides, but with only one of them, can have absolutely no claim to perfection or comprehensiveness of knowledge. Jainism avoids this one-sidedness of knowledge, and is enabled by the many-sidedness of its philosophy to deal effectively with all the moot points in their entirety. With the aid of its *Anekānta* method, it effectually disposes of all those hard problems of theology and metaphysics which have proved a fruitful source of error and dispute to the followers of all non-Jaina religions in the world.

This many-sidedness of the Jaina philosophy is the true secret of its irrefutable perfection, though modern Orientalists have hitherto only discovered it to be a feature of indefiniteness. If these gentlemen had taken the trouble to understand the primary basis of philosophy, they would not have failed to observe

that all knowledge is only relative and has to be described from different points of view to avoid falling into the errors which abound in all departments of Absolutism. One can readily find an excuse for their error, especially as they are not philosophers, but linguists, laboriously trying to force the concepts and ideas of a perfect system of living Thought into the imperfect and rigid frames of modern speculation.

The absolute deliverance of the soul from the bondage of *Karmas* is the final goal of knowledge and the secret craving of every animate being. There is no religion, worth the name, which does not aspire and profess to secure it for its votaries. This is what Jesus of Nazareth referred to when he said : ' Be ye therefore perfect even as your Father which is in heaven is perfect ' (Matthew, v. 48). This 'father-like' perfection is to be attained by knowledge, and knowledge alone, in the first instance. Even here we find Jesus giving out the plain truth in plain language. He said :

" Ye shall know the truth and the truth shall make you free."—John, viii. 32.

Knowledge of truth, then, is the means of the attainment of the perfection of gods and of freedom from the bondage of *Karmas*. The Bible is, however,

silent as to the things to be known, but Jainism points out that right knowledge (*Samyak Jñāna*), right belief or faith (*Samyak Dars'ana*) and right conduct (*Samyak Chāritra*), combined together, constitute the path to *Nirvāna*. Analysis shows that right conduct characterises only those beings who possess faith in its power to procure deliverance for the soul from the bondage of *Karmas*. Thus, no one who is devoid of right belief, or faith, can possibly realise the great ideal of perfection and bliss expressed by the simple word *mokṣ'a*. Now, right belief depends on right knowledge, and cannot be thought of apart from it. Where knowledge is not made the foundation of faith, where reason does not endorse the formula of belief and where the germ of doubt is not destroyed by the fire of wisdom, nothing but confusion, bigotry and sin are to be found there ; for the smothering of the voice of intellect can only give us fanatics of bigotry and prejudice ; it can never enable men to acquire the wisdom of gods which shall make them free. Knowledge, and knowledge alone, then, is the door to power and freedom from bondage. But knowledge is not to be acquired by the perusal of scriptures alone, since the scriptural text has to be understood and reconciled to one's own limited knowledge in the first instance, and where, as in the case of the

non-Jaina scriptures, the text is jumbled up regardless of the standpoint from which alone it is true, the necessity of reconciling its sense to the judgment of one's own intellect becomes a matter of the utmost degree of importance. Hence, the *Naya-Vāda* is the touch-stone of the dogmatic pronouncements of all one-sided scriptures.

There are three kinds of scriptural text, called *S'ruta Jñāna*, namely, (1) *Kunaya S'ruta*, or *Nayābhāsa S'ruta*, (2) *Naya S'ruta* and (3) *Sunaya S'ruta* or *Syādvāda S'ruta*. *Kunaya S'ruta* means one-sided knowledge only; *Naya S'ruta* is also one-sided knowledge, but it does not disregard the other sides of things, while *Sunaya S'ruta*, or *Anekāntavāda*, also called the *Syādvāda* or *Pramāṇa S'ruta*, recognizes all the sides of things. The qualities, or properties, of a thing are ascertained from its different aspects, and constitute its true knowledge. *Sunaya* or *Pramāṇa S'ruta*, i.e., the *Syādvāda* recognizes all of them; *Naya S'ruta* recognizes the one which has been ascertained from a particular standpoint, without denying the rest; but *Kunaya*, or *Nayābhāsa*, recognises only one of them, to the exclusion of the rest. True *Naya* always predicates *one* of the innumerable qualities of a thing, without denying the rest. If it deny the rest, or any

of the qualities not in consideration, at any particular moment of time, it becomes *Nayābbāsa*—a fallacy, that is, a *Naya*, which appears to be correct, but is not so in fact. It is thus clear that no one who has not mastered the philosophy of *Nayas* and is not in a position to find out from which point of view a certain passage in the *S'ruta Jnana* is true, is at all likely to benefit by the study of scriptures.

According to Jainism, the kind of knowledge which leads to the realisation of the great ideal of divine perfection, consists in the mastery of *tattvas* (principles) which are seven in number. They are :—

(1) *Jīva*, the living or animate substance, or essence, (2) *Ajīva*, the inanimate things, or substances, (3) *Āsrava*, or the inflow of matter (*karmas*) into souls, or the causes of the bondage of *jīvas*, (4) *bandha*, the absorption of matter (the energy of *Karmas*) into, or the union of *karmas* with, the soul, (5) *Samvara*, the stopping of the inflow of matter into the soul, (6) *Nirjarā*, the gradual removal of the matter already in combination with the soul, *i.e.*, its partial deliverance from *karmas* and (7) *Mokṣ'a* or complete deliverance of the soul from its *Karmas*.

If merit (*puṇya*) and demerit (*pāpa*), the results produced by the varying good combinations in the case of *puṇya*, and by the varying bad combinations in the

case of *pāpa karmas* of Soul, be considered as separate principles, instead of being included, as they are here, under *Asrava*, there will be 9 principles.

The knowledge of these principles is acquired by means of *pramāṇas* (proofs of knowledge) and *nayas* (the methods of comprehending things from different standpoints). Thus *nayas* are essential to the acquisition of true knowledge.

In the parable of the blind men we saw that the knowledge of each of them was only partially true, and that their different and seemingly conflicting views only needed a comprehensive and all-embracing statement to be reconciled to one another. Precisely the same is the case with philosophy and religion, and the comprehensive survey of the different aspects of things presented by Jaina philosophy enables us, at once, to reconcile the seemingly hostile and irreconcilable views of all the non-Jaina doctrines of the *ekānta-vāda* (one-sided) type.

Comprehensiveness of thought, then, is the real basis of philosophy. But since ordinary speech is ill suited to the requirements of such a system of Thought, the *āchāryas* had to resort to a unique system of predication to carry on their metaphysical discussions. This system, known as the *Saptabhangi*, is the basis of the synthetical comprehensiveness of

knowledge which is characteristic of Jainism. The *Nayas* give us what may be termed the analytical knowledge of things, and the *Saptabbangi*, literally, the seven-fold or seven-branched system of predication, enables us to sum up the results of investigation, without departing from the strict rules of Logic. To understand the basic principles of this method, it is necessary to understand the nature of predication first of all.

Predication is the statement of our conclusions in respect of things. Of all kinds of possible judgments, the affirmative and the negative are necessary for the description of things when the truth is known with certainty, since they affirm or deny the existence of a property or quality in reference to them. So far there is no difficulty involved in predication, but things assume a very different aspect when comprehensiveness of thought is aimed at, for then the results of enquiry from different standpoints have to be incorporated in one and the same judgment and at one and the same time. The greatest confusion is likely to result from the summation of affirmative and negative conclusions in one and the same judgment, unless there be a method of logical predication to avoid inconsistency of thought. To avoid this possibility of confusion, the *ácháryas* have laid down seven

different types of predication which cover all possible cases of simple as well as complex judgments. Each of these predications begins with the word *syát*, (literally somehow, hence, from a particular stand point, or in a certain manner,) to avoid denying the other possible aspects. These seven kinds of predications are :—

- (1) *Syádasti* (exists).
- (2) *Syánnásti* (does not exist).
- (3) *Syádasti násti* (affirmation of existence from one point and of non-existence from another).
- (4) *Syádavaktavya* (indescribable).
- (5) *Syádasti avaktavya*.
- (6) *Syánnásti avaktavya*.
- (7) *Syádasti násti avaktavya*.

Of these seven kinds of predications, the first two alone are simple judgments. The rest are all complex predications, describing things from different points of view at the same time. A thing is said to be *avaktavya*, i.e., indescribable, when existence and non-existence are both attributed to it at one and the same time, as must be the case with pure abstractions, such as heat, cold, goodness, etc., etc. They cannot exist by themselves, that is, apart from the substances in which they inhere, and yet are capable of being mentally conceived in the abstract.

Hence, they are indescribable and unanalysable any further.

Thus, the *Saptabhangī* is the method of synthesis devised to express the comprehensive knowledge of things, without being inconsistent or illogical. The *Nayas* enable us to study the nature of things from the analytical point of view, and the *Saptabhangī* sums up the results of the investigation in a systematic logical way.

To conclude, the different kinds of *Nayas* are the instruments of analysis whereby different aspects of things are isolated and studied from different points of view, and the *Saptabhangī* is the method of synthesis which sums up the results of investigation in logical thought. They are both essential to avoid the common errors of the *ekānta-vādins* of the non-Jaina schools of philosophy and for arriving at the true nature of things. It is the philosophy of the *Syād-Vāda* propounded, in full, for the last time, by *Bhagvān Ś'ri Mahāvīra Svāmi*, the last of the 24 *Tīrthāṅkaras*, which alone is characterised by the feature of many-sidedness, the sole test of the relativity of knowledge, and which, in the words of a great American thinker, is "competent to descend into the utmost minutiae of metaphysics and to settle all the vexed questions of abstruse speculation by a positive

method (not merely asserting *na iti*, *na iti*, not so, not so)—to settle at any rate the limits of what it is possible to determine by any method which the human mind may be rationally supposed to possess. It promises to reconcile all the conflicting schools, not by inducing any of them necessarily to abandon their favourite ‘standpoints,’ but by proving to them that the standpoints of all others are alike tenable, or at least, that they are representative of some aspect of truth which under some modification needs to be represented ; and that the integrity of Truth consists in this very variety of its aspects, within the rational unity of an all-comprehensive and ramifying principle.”

AUTHOR'S BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH.

SRI VINAYAVIJAYA was born in a *Vanika* (Śrāvaka) family, in Gujarat, his father's name being Tejapâla, and his mother's Râjśrī.* When and at what place he was born and when he was initiated into the Jaina Monks' order (took *dîkṣā*) remain in oblivion. Notwithstanding this, from the traditions and a crop of legends that have surrounded his name, the date of his birth may be assigned to S. Y. 1670. This would make him a co-student and a co-worker of Sri Yashovijaya, who received a command for reforming the Jaina Church from Vijayasinha Sûri †. Vijayasinha Sûri who is referred to in the

*. *Vide* a concluding verse of all the chapters of his great work '*Loka-Prakāśa*,' *vide*.—

विश्वाश्रयदकीर्त्तिकीर्त्तिविजयश्रीवाचकेन्द्रान्तिपद्

राजश्री तनयोऽस्तनिष्ठ विनयः श्रीतेजपालात्मजः ।

काव्यं यत्किल तत्र निश्चितजगत्तत्त्वप्रदीपोपमे


संपूर्णः खलु सप्तविंशतितमः सर्गो निसर्गोज्ज्वलः ॥

† Vijayasinha Sûri was born in S. Y. 1644 at Merta, and initiated into the Monks' order in S. Y. 1654. He got the title of Upādhyāya in S. Y. 1673, became Âchārya in S. Y. 1682, and died on Âṣāḍha Sukla 2nd, S. Y. 1709, at Ahmedabad.

concluding verse of this book) died in S. Y. 1709, when our author must have been more than 30 years old.

From his works it is certain that Vinayavijaya's preceptor's name was Kīrtivijaya *Upādhyāya*, who was a disciple of Hīravijaya Sūri, while Yashovijaya was the pupil of Nayavijaya whose *guru*, Labhavijaya, was a disciple of Kīrtivijaya's co-pupil Kalyānavijaya, as will appear from the following list of succession of *acharyas* :—

Hīravijaya Sūri (No. 58).



* Hīravijaya Sūri was the 58th Pontiff of Tapa Gachha from Śrī Mahavira. He was born on the 9th of Margasīrṣa Sukla, S. Y. 1583, at Prahlādanapura (modern Pālanpur), and was initiated on Kārtika Kṛṣṇa 2nd of S. Y. 1596, at Pātan. He got the title of Upādhyāya on Māgha Sukla 5th, at Nārādapuri, and that of Āchārya in S. Y. 1610, at Shirohi. He died at Unā, on 11th Bhādrapada Sukla, S. Y. 1652.

† Vijayadeva Sūri, the 60th Pontiff, was born in S. Y. 1643. He got the title of Pandvyaśa (pandit) in S. Y. 1655, and that of Āchārya Sūri, in S. Y. 1656. On account of his great austerities and learning, the then Emperor Jehangir awarded him the title of 'Mahā-Tapā.' He died on Āṣāḍha Sukla 11th, S. Y. 1713, at Unā, near Junagadh after Vijayasinha Sūri.

Thus Vinayāvijaya and Yashovijaya trace their descent from the illustrious Jaināchārya Hīravijaya Sūri who lived in the time of Akbar the Great. Hīravijaya, whose memory is preserved in the Mahākāvya, entitled the Hīra Saubhāgya, was of the Svetāmbara sect, and is especially known for the great service he did to the cause of Jainism, by obtaining several *firmāns* from the Great Emperor Akbar in favour of the Jainas. One of these *firmans* (Royal Warrants) recognised the right of Jainas to their *Tīrthas* (holy places) which the Emperor made over to certain Jainas, and another prohibited the slaughter of animals during the *Pajusana* and on the dates held sacred by the Jain community.

Vinayavijaya studied from his *guru* all the Jain scriptures, and then asked his permission to go to Benares, well-known from ancient times as the most famous centre of learning, to study the metaphysics of the non-Jaina schools of philosophy.

Yasovijaya joined him on his journey to Benares, and they soon reached that famous city. Here they found themselves compelled to put off their Jain-ascetic's dress because of the prejudices of Brāhmaṇas against the Jainas who were termed *Nastīkas* (heretics or atheists). The nature of the hatred of the Brāhmaṇas for the Jainas may be judged from

the following saying which was openly taught by the Pandits :

हस्तिना ताड्यमानोऽपि न गच्छेज्जैनमंदिरम् ।

[Trans.—Even if one be killed by an elephant one should not take shelter in a Jaina temple.]

Under the circumstances, no Brâhmaṇa Pandit was expected to accept a Jaina as his pupil. Vinavijaya and his companion Yaśovijaya therefore, changed their dress, and calling themselves Vinayalâl and Jasulâl respectively appeared before a learned Brâhmaṇa who was well known for his erudition in the six famous *darśhanas* (systems) of Hindu metaphysics. They were readily accepted as pupils, and began to pursue their studies, Yaśovijaya taking a great interest in Logic and Vinayavijaya in Grammar. In due course of time, they successfully completed their study of the six *darśhanas* and other subjects connected with philosophy. Both Yaśovijaya and Vinayavijaya were endowed with wondrous memory, and used to astonish the people with their memorizing feats. Their *guru's* library contained a certain book which had descended to him from his ancestors, and which was only meant to be taught to his own progeny. One day it so happened that Jasulâl was sitting by the side of his preceptor when he was giving lessons to his eldest son from that book. He noticed the embarrassment of the old Pandit in explaining a particular passage

of the text, and, being a brilliant logician himself, respectfully threw a suggestion as to the true mode of its interpretation. The *guru* was delighted with his pupil's intelligent explanation, and acceded to his request for a loan of the manuscript for a day. The book contained twelve hundred verses, but both Vinayalâl and Jasulâl managed, between themselves, in the short interval of 24 hours, to commit to memory the whole of it,—Jasulâl 700 verses and Vinayalâl the remaining 500.

It took Vinayavijaya and Yasovijaya twelve years to complete their course of study, at the end of which they both adopted their original Jaina ascetic's dress. Yasovijaya succeeded in winning a victory over a great disputant, who surrendered his two diplomas of *Mahamahopâdhyâya* and *Nyâya Viśārada*. Subsequently, Yasovijaya also acquired the coveted title of *Nyâyâchârya** on his composing one hundred works. Yasovijaya and Vinayavijaya finally took leave of their *guru* and departed from Benares. They separated from one another, and travelled to different places. Vinayavijaya came to Junagadh, in Kathiawad, on pilgrimage to the holy Jaina *Tîrtha*, Girnar Hills, in S. Y. 1708, in which

* This is borne out by the following verse at the end of the Jaina *Tarka Paribhâṣā* :—

पूर्वं न्ययविशारदत्वविरुद्धं काश्यां प्रदत्तं बुधै-

न्यायाचार्यपदं ततः कृतशतग्रंथस्य यस्यार्पितम् ।

year he also finished his grand and voluminous work, the *Loka-prakāśa*. About this time he must have repaired to the seaport *Dīva* (*Dwīpa*), where he composed the '*Naya-karmikā*.' Then he went to *Radhanpur*, in S. Y. 1710, where he composed a commentary on *Hemachandra's Grammar*, called *Haimalaghu-prakriyā*.

As the tradition goes, *Vinayavijaya* halted at *Cambay* for four months. At this time *Cambay* was a great commercial port and its *Jaina Śrāvakas* were wealthy and prosperous, firm in faith and obedient to the monks. In this town there were many *Brāhmaṇa* Pandits. They often came and debated with *Vinayavijaya*, when the latter would proceed with his morning sermon (*Vyākhyāna*). On account of this, *Vinayavijaya* could not go on smoothly with his lecture, and the *Śrāvakas* found the constant interruption a source of annoyance, and felt irritated and disappointed. *Vinayavijaya* sent for *Yasovijaya* to put a stop to the disturbance. *Yasovijaya* came and devised a novel plan. He wrote out a verse containing a large number of labials and affixed it to the door of the *Upāśraya*, with a note to the effect that he who wished to debate could enter within and debate only if he could repeat that verse without allowing his lips to come together. The test of a successful fulfilment of the condition consisted in the application of red lead (*sandura*) to the lower

lip, so that if the upper lip received any colouring matter the candidate must be deemed to have failed in his attempt. In the morning, the sermon proceeded, and the Brāhmaṇa Pandits came as usual to carry on their debates. They read the verse and the remarks on the door, and, finding themselves unable to fulfil the condition, went away. The sermon went on without any hitch, and the Śrāvakas were pleased. Subsequently, Yasovijaya, when asked by the Brāhmaṇas to repeat his verse according to his condition successfully performed the feat, as he had acquired the proper knack of doing so by long practice. Though the matter should have ended here, Yasovijaya offered his readiness and willingness to open regular debates. He defeated his adversaries in argument, and in consequence five hundred Brahmanas became converted to Jainism, in fulfilment of the condition transcribed on a copper-plate in the State assembly. (It is said that this copper-plate is still preserved in some Upâśraya temple or *Bhandâr* at Cambay.)

Vinayavijaya passed the rainy season of S. Y. 1716 at Surat, and of S. Y. 1723 at Gandhar, in Marwar, where he finished his composition 'Śânta-sudhâ-râsa'. He spent the *Chaumasa* (rainy season) of the *Samvata* years 1729 and 1738 at Rânder in Gujarat, and died at that place towards the end of 1738, leaving his Gujarati work 'Sripâlaś Râsa'

half finished. This unfinished work was completed by Yasovijaya.*

The following is a list of some of the works written by Sri Vinayavijaya *Acharya*.

Sanskṛita Works.

1. The *Sukhabodhikā*.—A commentary on the well-known Kalpa-Sūtra, which is read by the Jainas during their *Pajusana* holidays. This was composed on Jyestha Sukla 2nd, S. Y. 1696. It has been published by Devachanda Lalbhāi Pustakoddhāra Fund, Javeri Bazar, Bombay.

2. The *Loka-Prakāśa*.—An original voluminous work of 20,621 verses, dealing with the Jaina view of the Universe (cosmos). The author has cited more than 700 authorities, showing that he was a voracious reader and an exact writer. The work was completed at Jirṇadurga, (modern Junagadh, in

* Refer to the last praśasti of the said Rāsa

सूरि हीर गुरुनी बहुकीर्त्ति, कीर्त्ति विजय उवम्मायाजी ।
 शिष्य तास विनयविजय वर, वाचक सुगुण सोहायाजी ।
 विद्या विनय विवेक विचक्षण, लक्षण लक्षित देहाजी ।
 सोभागी गीतारथ सारथ । संगत सखर सनेहाजी ।
 संवत् सत्तर अठ्ठतीसा वरसे, रहि रंदेर चोमासेंजी ।
 संवत्तणा आग्रहथी मांड्यो, रास अधिक उल्लासेंजी ।
 सार्ध ससशत गाथा विरची, पहेता ते सुरलोकेजी ।
 तेहना गुण गावेछे गोरी, मलि मलि थोके थोकेजी ।

Kathiawad) on Jyestha Śukla 5th, S. Y. 1708. This has been published by Pandit Hirālāl Hansarāj of Jamnagar.

3. The *Naya-karnikā*.—A small elementary primer for those who want to understand the a, b, c of the Jaina philosophy of standpoints (*nayas*). This was composed before or at the end of S. Y. 1708, as appears from its concluding verse, which mentions the name of Vijayasinha Sūri, who died in S. Y. 1708, at Dwīpa (modern Diva), near Junagadh, in Kathiawad. This, with its commentary by Muni Śri Gambhīravijaya, since deceased, is published in Jaina Stotra Sangraha, Part I, by The Yasovijaya Jaina Pāthasālā of Benares.

4. The *Haima-laghu-prakriyā*.—A commentary on Śri Hemachandrāchārya's Great Grammar, entitled 'Śri Siddha-Haima Śabdānuśāsana, in 2,500 ślokas (verses). It was completed at Rājadhanyapura, modern Rādhanpur, in Gujarat. This has been published by The Jaina Dharma Prasāraka Sabhā of Bhāvnagar. The author has written a commentary on this very work, in 35,000 verses, which is still unpublished.

5. The *Śāntasudhārasaḥ*.—A treatise on the sixteen *bhāvna* (points of moral and mental culture for meditation and concentration), including the four chief ones, *maitri* (friendship) and the like, and the twelve subordinate ones, *anityatva* (transitoriness),

etc. This with a commentary by Muni Sri Gambhiravijaya, since deceased, has been recently published by The Jaina Dharma Prasāraka Sabhâ of Bhâvnagar. The work was composed at the seaport town of Gandhapura (modern Gandhâr, near Cambay) in S. Y. 1723.

Gujarati Compositions.

These with the exception of the Sripâla Râsa are all short poems composed by the author. The following are a few of his more important works in Gujarati :—

A prayer in glory of Dharmanâtha, entitled the *Laghu-upamitibhava-prapañcha*. The *Stavana* is a short allegory on this illusory world. This was composed in S. Y. 1716, at Surat.

The *Stavana*, embodying the significance of the five causes necessary for the accomplishment of a thing, viz., *kâla*, *svabhâva*, *niyati*, *pîrva karma*, and *puruṣârtha*, was composed in S. Y. 1723.

The *Punyaparakâśa-stavna* or *Ârâdhanâ-stavana*, was composed in S. Y. 1729 on Vijayâ Daśamî, in glory of the last Tîrthankara Mahâvîra, in answer to a question 'How can the path of salvation be attained?'

The *Vinaya-Vilâsa* is a collection of 37 spiritual poems which are simple, sweet, and full of pathos.

The *Sripâla Râsa* is the author's long descriptive and narrative poetical work, which was left unfinished on account of his sudden death, in S. Y. 1738, at Rânder (in Gujarat), and was completed by his co-student, Sri Yasovijaya Upâdhyâya, as stated before. The poetry of our author can vie with that of the premier Gujarati poet, Premânandâ, who was his contemporary.

In the end, it can be said of the author that he has rendered a valuable service to the cause of Jainism by utilizing his abilities in writing useful works on its philosophy and religion in Sanskrit and Gujarati.

नयकर्णिका

NAYA-KARNIKA.

TEXT AND TRANSLATION.

Naya-karnikâ is composed of two words, *naya* and *karnikâ*. *Naya* means a standpoint or an aspect of viewing a thing from that standpoint or aspect. *Karnikâ* means a pericarp, or the central point, of a flower. The thing which is to be viewed from different aspects is the pericarp or the central point, and the various standpoints from which it is viewed form the various petals surrounding the pericarp. Thus the title '*Naya-Karnikâ*' is fully appropriate to the subject-matter of this book. Taken as a whole, *Naya-karnikâ* means a flower which has for its pericarp, or central point, the thing to be viewed ; and for its petals the various standpoints from which it is to be viewed.

Benediction and subject-matter.

वर्धमानं स्तुमः सर्वनयनद्यर्णवागमम् ।

संक्षेपतस्तदुन्नीतनयभेदानुवादतः ॥ १ ॥

Vardhamānam stumahaḥ sarvanayana—dyarṇa-
vāgamam,

Śaṅkṣepatastadunnītanayabhedānuvādataḥ.—1.

[यथेनां Shri Vardhamāna or Lord Mahāvīra the last,
i.e., 24th Tirthaṅkara, who attained nirvāṇa in 527
B.C. स्तुतः (we) praise ; सर्वं all ; नय standpoint ; नदी river ;
अप्य ocean ; आगमं scripture ; संक्षेपतः briefly ; तद् (from) it ;
उन्नीत culled ; नयभेद various aspects ; अनुवादतः transcribing].

We offer our praise to Lord Vardhamāna, whose
gospel is an ocean, with all kinds of *nayas* as so
many streams flowing into it, by transcribing, in
brief the various view-points culled from it (the
ocean-like gospel).—1.

[This verse is in *anuṣṭup* metre, and the follow-
ing 20 verses are also in the same metre, while
the last two are in *vasantatilakā* metre.]

Names of Standpoints.

नैगमः संग्रहश्चैव व्यवहारज्जुसूत्रकौ ।

शब्दः समभिरुद्धैवभूतौ चेति नयाः स्मृताः ॥ २ ॥

Naigamah Sangrahas' chaiva Vyavaharajjusū-
trakau.

S'abdaḥ Samabbirūḍḍhaivambhūtau cheti nayāḥ
Smṛitāḥ—2.

[नैगमः the non-distinguished (standpoint); संग्रहः the
collective-generic, चैव and also, व्यवहार the practical,
अनुसूत्रकी and the straight-expression, शब्दः the verbal,
समभिरुद्धैवभूतौ the subtle and the such-like, चेति and that
नयाः aspects, स्मृताः are spoken of.]

The standpoints are the non-distinguished (*Nai-gama*), the collective — generic (*saṅgraha*), the practical (*v'yavahāra*), the straight-expression (*rijuśūtra*), the verbal (*śabda*), the subtle (*samabhirūḍha*) and the such-like (*evambhūta*).

General and Specific Properties of Things.

अर्थाः सर्वेऽपि सामान्यविशेषा उभयात्मकाः ।

सामान्यं तत्र जात्यादि विशेषाच्च विभेदकाः ॥ ३ ॥

Arthāḥ Sarvepi Sāmānya viśeṣā Ubhayaâtṃakāḥ,
Sāmānyam tatra jātyādi viśeṣāścha vibhedakāḥ.

—3.

[अर्थाः objects ; सर्वे all ; अपि also ; सामान्यविशेषाः having general and particular properties ; उभयात्मकाः possessed of both ; सामान्यं general properties ; तत्र therein ; जात्यादि (expressing) : *jāti* (genus), etc., विशेषाः the particular properties ; च and ; विभेदकाः (are) differentiating].

All objects possess two kinds of properties, *viz.*, (1) *Sāmānya* or the generalizing (general), and (2) *viśeṣa* or the differentiating (specific) properties ; the general expressing the genus (*jāti*), etc., and the specific expressing the species, differences and distinctions.

*Distinction between General and Specific properties,
or Illustrations of Sāmānya and Viśeṣa.*

यदुद्दिघटशते भवेत्सामान्यधर्मतः ।

तेषाञ्च निजं निजं लक्षयन्ति घटं जनाः ॥ ४ ॥

Aikyabuddhirghaṭasāte bhavet Sāmānyadhar-
mataḥ,

Veśiṣāchcha nijam nijam lakṣayanti ghaṭam
janāḥ.—4.

[रेक्यबुद्धिः recognising oneness ; घटयते in each of a hun-
dred jars ; भवेत् (there) would be ; सामान्यधर्मतः by means
of general properties ; विशेषात् by means of specific or
particular properties ; च and ; निजं निजं one's own, as the
case may be ; लक्षयन्ति distinguish ; घटं a jar ; जनः people].

By means of general properties in each of
a hundred (hundred here means 'all') jars, one
idea (that of jar-ness) is recognised, and by means
of specific properties, people distinguish each
individual-particular jar as their own.—4.

Explanation.—Suppose there are lying here
many jars ; if we look at them from the standpoint
of their general properties, we know only their
jar-ness which is common to all of them : but if
we view them from the aspect of their differentiat-
ing properties, we notice their differences, since
they are not all alike, some being large, some small,
some of red colour, some of black, some belonging
to A, some to B, and so on.

*The Characteristics of the Non-distinguished
(Naigama) Standpoint (naya).*

नैगमो मन्यते वस्तु तदेतदुभयात्मकम् ।

निर्विशेषं न सामान्यं विशेषोऽपि न तद्विना ॥ ५ ॥

Naigamo manyate vastu tadetadubhayaâtmakam,
Nirvişesam na sâmanyaam vişesopi na tadvinaâ.

—5.

[नैगमो the non-distinguished (standpoint); मन्यते regards, considers; वस्तु an object, thing; तदेतद् those, aforesaid; उभयात्मकं possessed of both (specific and general properties); निविशेयं devoid of—without specific property; न not; सामान्यं the general property; विशेषे the specific property; अपि also; न not; तद्विना without that, i.e., general property.]

The non-distinguished (*naigama*), regards an object as possessing both the aforesaid (general and specific) properties; (because) no particular thing in nature is possessed of a general property unaccompanied with some specific property, nor even of a specific property unaccompanied with the general one common to its class. 5

Explanation.—*Naigama* (नैगम = न + एक + गम — नैको गमो यस्येति — न = not, एक = one, गम = aspect, view, standpoint) means that which does not consider (only) one aspect, that is, which regards both the *sâmanya* and *vişesa*. This aspect of *Naigama* is true, because *sâmanya* is not irrelative of *vişesa* or *vice versa*. In the third verse we saw that all objects are possessed of both general and specific properties.

Characteristics of the Collective (Saṅgraha)

Standpoint (naya).

संग्रहो मन्यते वस्तु सामान्यात्मकमेवहि ।

सामान्यव्यतिरिक्तोऽस्ति न विशेषः खपुष्पवत् ॥ ६ ॥

Saṅgraho manyate vastu sāmānyātmakamevahi,
Sāmānyavyatiriktoṣi na viśeṣaḥ khaṇḍapavata-

—6.

[संग्रहे collective standpoint; वस्तु deals with; एवहि an object; सामान्यात्मकं possessing the general property; एवहि only as it were; सामान्यव्यतिरिक्तो apart from the general property; अस्ति is; न not; विशेषः the specific property; खण्डपवत् like a sky-flower.]

The collective (*saṅgraha*) deals with the general properties alone of an object, while recognizing that there exists no *viśeṣa* (specific property) apart from *sāmānya* (general property), i.e., both *viśeṣa* and *sāmānya* are co-existing and coincident. *Sāmānya*, devoid of *viśeṣa*, is like a *khaṇḍapavata* (sky-flower), quite a nonentity, i.e., existing “no where.” 6.

*Saṅgraha illustrated, or instances of the
Collective standpoint.*

विना वनस्पतिं कोऽपि निम्बाद्यादिर्न दृश्यते ।

हस्ताद्यन्तर्भाविन्यो हि नाङ्गुलाद्यास्ततः पृथक् ॥ ७ ॥

Vinā vanaspatiṁ kopi nimbādyaḥ dṛśyate.

Hastādyantarbhāvinyo hi nāṅgulādyāstataḥ
prithak.—7.

[विना without; वनस्पतिं vegetable; कोऽपि any single; निम्बाद्यादिः A nimb tree, a mango tree and others; न not; दृश्यते is seen, —conceived; हस्ताद्यन्तर्भाविन्यो being included in the hands, &c.; हि in the same way—as for an example; न not; अङ्गुलाद्याः the fingers, &c.; ततः from them (fingers, &c.); पृथक् separately.]

Not a single nimb, mango or any other tree is ever conceived, apart from (its general property) vegetable-ness. In the same way, fingers, etc., which are included in the idea of hands, etc., cannot be conceived of separately from the hands, etc. 7.

Explanation.—In this verse, the emphasis is on the fact that special qualities can have no existence without a substratum of general properties. No one has yet seen a mango plant which did not possess the general quality of tree-ness.

*Characteristics of the practical (vyavahāra)
standpoint.*

विशेषात्मकमेवार्थं व्यवहारश्च मन्यते ।

विशेषमिन्नं सामान्यमसत्त्वरविषाणवत् ॥ ८ ॥

Viśeṣātmakamevārtham vyavahāraścha manyate,
Viśeṣabhinnam sāmānyamasat kharaviṣaṇavat.

—8.

[विशेषात्मकं possessing special properties ; एव only ; अर्थं an object ; व्यवहारः the practical standpoint ; च and ; मन्यते takes into consideration ; विशेषमिन्नं apart from the specific quality ; सामान्यं general quality ; असत् false ; खरविषाणवत् like a donkey's horns.]

The practical (vyavahāra) takes into consideration an object as possessing specific properties only ; as the specific, apart from the general, is a nonentity like a donkey's horns. 8.

Instances of the Practical standpoint.

वनस्पतिं गृहाणेति प्रोक्ते गृह्णाति कोऽपि किम् ।

विना विशेषान्नाम्रादौस्तन्निरर्थकमेव तत् ॥ ९ ॥

Vanaspati grihāneti prokte grihṇāti kopi kim,
Vinā Viśeṣānnāmradīmstaṁ nirarthakameva
tat.—9.

[वनस्पतिं vegetable; गृहाण take, bring; इति that; प्रोक्ते on being asked,—told; गृह्णाति brings; कोऽपि anyone; किं what; विना without; विशेषान् specified; आन्नादौ a mango tree, etc.; तत्; therefore; निरर्थकं vain, purposeless; एव simply; तत् that (general quality)].

If one is asked to bring 'vegetable,' can one do so? Without the specification of particularity, e.g., mango, etc., such speech is vain. 9.

Explanation.—This is to illustrate the principle that general qualities have no existence of their own. If they did, we should have manhood, stupidity, wisdom, etc., existing apart from living beings—which is absurd.

Another Illustration.

व्रणपिण्डीपादलेपादिके लोकप्रयोजने ।

उपयोगो विशेषैः स्यात्सामान्ये न हि कर्हिचित् ॥ १० ॥

Vraṇapindīpādalepādike lokaprayojane.
Upayogo Viśeṣaiḥ syāt sāmānye na hi karhichit.
-10

[व्रण a wound, sore, bruise or hurt; पिण्डीपादलेप a kind of

unguent ; आदिके and in other such things ; लोकप्रयोजने in the interests of the people ; उपयोगे any act contributing to the fulfilment of a desired object, usefulness ; विशेषैः by means of the specific properties ; स्यात् would be (accomplished) ; सामान्ये in the general property ; नहि by no means, not at all ; कर्हिचित् at any time]

No wound, bruise or scratch can possibly be healed by the application of the general property of poultice-ness or ointment-ness. The healing properties only inhere in specific poultices or ointments. 10.

*The Characteristics of the Straight
Expression (Rijusûtra naya).*

ऋजुसूत्रनयो वस्तु नातीतं नाप्यनागतम् ।

मन्यते केवलं किन्तु वर्तमानं तथा निजम् ॥ ११ ॥

Rijusûtranayo vastu nâtîtam nâpyanâgatam,

Manyata kevalam kintu vartamânam tathâ
nijam.—11.

[ऋजुसूत्र straight expression ; नयो a standpoint ; वस्तु an object ; न not ; अतीतं past ; न not ; अपि even ; अनगतं future ; मन्यते considers ; केवलं solely, only ; किन्तु but ; वर्तमानं present ; तथा and ; निजं one's own, natural state.]

The straight expression (rijusûtra naya) does not trouble itself with the past nor the future aspect of a thing ; it is only confined to the present and refers to the ' *nijam*,' i.e., the natural state. 11.

Explanation.—This standpoint does not consider

the past because of its having ended, nor the future because of its having not arisen, but solely deals with the present and natural aspect of a thing because that alone is *kāryakārin*, i.e., useful for the moment.

*Argument as to the characteristics of the
Straight Expression standpoint.*

अतीतेनानागतेन परस्कीयेन वस्तुना ।

न कार्यसिद्धिरित्येतदसद्गगनपद्मवत् ॥ १२ ॥

[अतीतेन with the past; अनागतेन with the future; परस्कीयेन with non-natural; वस्तुना with a thing; न not; कार्यसिद्धिः the serving of purpose; इति because; एतद् this; असद् wrong, false; गगनपद्मवत् like a sky-lotus.]

Neither the past, nor the future, nor the non-natural qualities serve any purpose. They are false; [they are like] a sky-lotus (non-entity.)
—12.

Explanation.—The argument underlying the *rijuśūtra* view point is that of immediate utility which naturally must be grounded upon the present aspect of a thing. For instance, it is of no use to a beggar in his present life if his son of a previous birth, or the would-be daughter-in-law of a future incarnation, i. e., re-birth, happens to be a ruling prince. In the same way, qualities not belonging to a thing would stand it in no good stead in the immediate concerns of life.

*Modes of recognizing things (nikṣepas),
and their bearing on the rijusûtra,
and the succeeding nayas.*

नामादिचतुर्वेषु भावमेव च मन्यते ।

न नामस्थापनाद्रव्याण्येवमग्रेतना अपि ॥ १३ ॥

Nāmâdichaturṣveṣu bhāvameva cha manyate,

Na nâmasthâpanâdravyâṇyevamagretanâ api.

—13.

[नाम the name ; आदि and other ; चतुर्वेषु among the four (*nikṣepas*—modes of recognizing things) ; भाव the nature—real natural state ; एव only—truly ; च and ; मन्यते considers ; न not ; नाम the name ; स्थापना an image, form. द्रव्याणि and the causes which bring a thing about ; एवं in the same way ; अग्रेतनाः the succeeding (*nayas*) ; अपि also.]

(The *rijusûtra naya*) recognises only the real natural state of a thing out of the four, the name—*nâma nikṣepa*, etc ; in the same way, the succeeding *nayas*. 13.

Explanation.—A thing is recognised (1) by its name (*nâma nikṣepa*), (2) by its shape or image (*sthâpanâ nikṣepa*), (3) by the causes which bring it about (*dravya nikṣepa*), or (4) by its nature, i.e., the real, natural state (*bhâva nikṣepa*). Neither name nor shape, nor image, nor the causal antecedents can, however, be termed the true attributes of a thing. They are all its unreal, attributed qualities. The only natural attributes (*bhâva nikṣepa*)

of a thing are those which really constitute its nature.

The *Rijusûtra* and the succeeding three *nayas*, viz., *Sabda*, *Samabhirûdha* and *Evambhûta* take cognizance of the fourth, or the *bhâva nîkṣepa* only. They only study the real. natural aspect of things, and attach no importance to the unreal, attributed state, viz., name, shape—image, or causal antecedents. The *Naigama*, *Sangraha*, and *Vyavahâra* however, recognise all the aforesaid modes, or *nîkṣepas*.

*The Characteristics and Instances of the
Verbal (Sabda) standpoint.*

अर्थ शब्दनयोऽनेकैः पर्यायैरेकमेव च ।

मन्यते कुम्भकलशघटाद्येकार्थवाचकाः ॥ १४ ॥

Artham Śabdanayonekaiḥ paryâyairekameva
cha,

Manyate kumbhakalaśaghatâdye-kârtha vâcha-
kāḥ.—14.

[अर्थ sense ; शब्दयो the verbal standpoint ; अनेकैः many ; पर्यायैः by synonyms ; एकं one ; एव only ; च and ; मन्यते treats ; कुम्भ a jar ; कलश a jar ; घट a jar ; आदि etc., स्कार्थवाचकाः signifying the same sense.]

The *Sabda Naya* treats synonymous words as all having the same sense, for instance, *kumbha*, *kalaśa*, *ghata*, etc., are all expressive of one and the same object (viz., a jar). 14.

Explanation.—The meaning is that the *Śabda Naya* does not concern itself about the difference of synonymous words, but simply deals with them as if they were pure equivalents of one-another.

The Characteristics and Instances of the subtle (Samabhirūḍha) standpoint.

ब्रूते समभिरूढोऽर्थं भिन्नपर्यायभेदतः ।

भिन्नार्थाः कुम्भकलशघटा घटपटादिवत् ॥ १५ ॥

Brûte samabhirūḍhortham bhinnaparyâyabhedatah,

Bhinnârthâḥ kumbhakalaśaghaṭâ ghaarpâṭâdivat.—15.

[ब्रूते speaks of ; समभिरूढे the subtle standpoint ; अर्थं sense ; भिन्नपर्यायभेदतः by the difference in different synonyms ; भिन्नार्थाः having different senses ; कुम्भकलशघटा the *kumbha*, *kalāśa* and *ghaṭa*—a jar, a jug and a pitcher ; घटपटादिवत् like a *ghaṭu*—a jar, a *pata*—cloth, etc.]

The *Samabhirūḍha naya* holds that, with the difference of the words expressing the object, the significance of the object also differs : just as a jar (*ghaṭa*) and a piece of cloth (*pata*) are different, so a jar, a pitcher and a pot (*kumbha*, *kalāśa*, and *ghaṭa*, though synonyms) signify different things (according to their derivative sense: for instance, a *ghaṭa* is that which makes a noise like *ghaṭ*, *ghaṭ*, and so on.) 15.

Explanation—The meaning is that, while the *S'abda naya* would treat synonyms as equivalent words, the *Samabhirûdha* would distinguish them from one another on etymological grounds.

Argument as to the Characteristics of the subtle (Samabhirûdha) Standpoint.

यदि पर्यायभेदेऽपि न भेदो वस्तुनो भवेत् ।

भिन्नपर्याययोर्न स्यात् स कुम्भपटयोरपि ॥ १६ ॥

Yadi paryâyabhedepi na bhedo vastuno bhavet, Bhinnaparyâyayorna syât sa kumbhabaatyorapi.—16.

[यदि if ; पर्यायभेदे in the different synonyms ; न not ; भेदो difference ; वस्तुनो of a thing ; भवेत् (there) would be ; भिन्न-पर्याययोः possessing different words ; न not ; स्यात् (there) would be ; स that (difference) ; कुम्भपटयोः of *kumbha* and *paṭa*, i.e., a jar and a cloth ; अपि also.]

[For] if different synonyms (*paryâyas*) of a thing do not distinguish that thing, (there) can be no such (distinction) between a jar and a cloth, which have also different words (*paryâyas*) for them. 16.

The Characteristics of the such-like (Evambhûta) standpoint.

एकपर्यायाभिधेयमपि वस्तु च मन्यते ।

कार्यं स्वकीयं कुर्वाणमेवंभूतनयो ध्रुवम् ॥ १७ ॥

Ekaparyâyâbhidheyamapi vastu cha manyate.

Kâryam svakiyam kurvanamevambhûtanayo-
dhruvam.—17.

[एकपर्यायामिधेय expressed by one controvertible term; अपि only, however; वस्तु an object; मन्यते recognises; कार्यं function; स्वकीयं one's own, natural; कुर्वाणं in the state of doing; एवंभूतनयो the such-like standpoint; भ्रुवं verily, surely.]

Evambhûta naya (the such-like standpoint) verily recognises an object denoted by a word only when the object is in the actual state of performing its own natural function (as suggested by the derivative meaning of that word). 17.

*Argument as to the Characteristics of the such-like
(Evambhûta) standpoint.*

यदि कार्यमकुर्वाणोऽपीष्यते तत्तथा स चेत् ।

तदा पटोऽपि न घटव्यपदेशः किमिष्यते ॥ १८ ॥

Yadi kâryamakurvâno piṣyate tattayâ sa chet,
'Tadâ paṭepi na ghaṭavyapadeśaḥ ksmiṣyate.—18.

[यदि if; कार्यं function; अकुर्वाणः not doing; अपि even; इष्यते is recognised; तत्तथा really; च It (object); चेत् if; तदा then; पटे in a cloth; अपि also; न not; घटव्यपदेशः an appellation of a jar; किं why; इष्यते is accepted.]

[For] if a thing be really recognized, even when it does not fulfil its function, then why can cloth be not called a jar? 18.

Explanation.—If a thing is not in the state of performing its function, as expressed by the term at the moment of recognition, and still it

be recognised as that thing, then even a jar can be called a cloth, though it is not in the state of discharging the function of a cloth. Etymologically, *Evaṃbhūta* means 'true in its entirety to the word and the sense.' This means that all the qualities denoted by the word are prominent and observable; the *Samabhirūḍha* is also true to the word and the sense, but not entirely, some of the qualities being in the background or not yet realized. Similarly, the *Śabda* is also true to the word and the sense, but not so true as the *Samabhirūḍha*, since it throws a larger number of qualities into the background than the last-named standpoint. Thus each of these *nayas* is purer than each preceding one, although they all belong to the same type, more or less.

Inter relation between the said standpoints, their importance and divisions.

यथोत्तरं विशुद्धाः स्युर्नयाः सप्ताप्यमी तथा ।

एकैकः स्याच्छतं भेदास्ततः सप्तशताप्यमी ॥ १९ ॥

Yathottaram viśuddhāḥ syurnayāḥ saptaapyami tathā.

Ekaikaḥ syâchchhatam bhedâstataḥ soptasapyami.—19.

[यथोत्तरं in regular order or succession, one by one; विशुद्धाः pure; स्युः would be; नयाः standpoints; सप्त seven; अपि also; अमी these; तथा and; एकैकः each of them; स्यात् would be;

अं a hundred ; भेदाः divisions ; ततः therefore ; सप्तत seven hundred ; अपि also ; अनी these.]

Each succeeding standpoint of these seven *nayas* is purer than the preceding one : each of them has a hundred sub-divisions ; therefore there are seven hundred *nayas* (in all). 19.

अथैवंभूतसमभिरूढयोः शब्दएव चेत् ।

अन्तर्भावस्तदा पंच नयपंचशतीभिदः ॥ २० ॥

Athaivambhūtasamabhirūḍhayoh śabda eva chet,
Antarbhāvastadā pancha naya panchaśatī-
bhidaḥ.—20,

[अथ but, एवंभूतसमभिरूढयोः of the *Evambhūta* and *Samabhirūḍha nayas*; शब्दे in the *Śabda naya*; एव only; चेत् if; अन्तर्भावः inclusion; तदा then; पंच five; नयपंचशतीभिदः (would be) divided into five hundred *nayas*]

But if we include* the subtle (*Samabhirūḍha*) and such-like (*Evambhūta*) in the verbal† (*śabda*)

* Compare with the *bhāṣya* on *Umāsvātī's Tattvārthādhigama sūtra*, 1'35 saying—

१ यथार्थमिधानं शब्दः ।

Cf. नैगमसंग्रहव्यवहारजुः सूत्रशब्दा नयाः ॥ १ ॥ ३४॥

—Tattvārthādhigama Sūtra.

† Note.— From both of the above quotations, it will appear that *Umāsvāti* makes a mention of five *nayas*, including the subtle and such-like (*Samabhirūḍha* and *Evambhūta*) standpoints in the verbal (*śabda*), and, while doing so, he gives a different name, *viz.*,—the suitable (*Sāmprata*) to what is here described as the 'Verbal' (*śabda*).

standpoint, then there would be five standpoints, and the same could be divided into five hundred.
20.

द्रव्यास्तिकपर्यायास्तिकयोरन्तर्भवन्त्यमी ।

आदावादिचतुष्टयमन्त्येचान्त्याऽस्त्रयस्ततः ॥ २१ ॥

Dravyāstikaparyāyāstikayorantarbhavantyamī,

Ādāvādicatuṣṭayamrntyechāntyāstrayastataḥ.—

21.

[द्रव्यास्तिकपर्यायास्तिकयोः in the *Dravyāstika* and *Paryāyāstika* *nayas*; अन्तर्भवन्ति are included; अमी these; आदौ in the first, i.e., in the *dravyāstika naya*; आदिचतुष्टयं the first four; अन्त्ये in the last, i.e., in the *paryāyāstika naya*; च and; अन्त्याः final; त्रयः three (*nayas*); ततः therefore.]

These (seven aspects) can be included in or grouped under [two, i.e.,] (1) the *dravyāstika* (which considers the common attributes of all the *dravyas*, that is to say the general properties of substances and objects) and (2) the *paryāyāstika* (which deals with the specific attributes, qualities and conditions of objects) *nayas*. The former of these includes the first four, and the latter the last three.
21.

According to some *Āchāryas*, the former includes the first three and the latter the last four.

* The *dravyāstika* and the *paryāyastika* are more commonly called *dravyārthika* and *paryāyārthik* *nayas*.

*How are all these aspects embodied in the
Jaina Philosophy ?*

सर्वे नया अपि विरोधभृतो मिथस्ते,
सम्भूय साधुसमयं भगवन् भजन्ते ।
भूपा इव प्रतिभटा भुवि सार्वभौम-
पादाम्बुजं प्रधानयुक्तिपराजिता द्राक् ॥ २२ ॥*

Sarve naya api virodhbhṛto mithaste,
Sambhūya sādhusamayam bhagavan bhajante ;
Bhûpâ iva pratibhaṭâ bhuvi sârvabhauma,
Pâdâmbujam yaadhanayukti parâjitâ drak.—22.

[सर्वे all ; नयाः standpoints ; अपि also ; विरोधभृतः bearing-
difference ; नियः mutually ; ते they ; संभूय gathered together ;
साधुसमयं good scriptures ; भगवन् Oh Lord ! भजन्ते worship,
serve ; भूपाः kings ; इव like ; प्रतिभटाः hostile warriors ; भुवि on
earth ; सार्वभौमपादाम्बुजं the lotus-like feet of the Sovereign-
Emperor ; प्रधानयुक्तिपराजिताः defeated in military warfare ; द्राक्
quickly.]

Oh Lord ! although all standpoints differ from
themselves *inter se*, they collectively serve your
Gospel, just as on earth kings, though hostile to
each other, after having been defeated in military
warfare serve at the lotus-like feet of, or pay
homage to, the Sovereign-Emperor. 22.

* This verse is in the *Vasanta-tilakâ* metre.

Conclusion.

इत्थं नयार्थकवचःकुसुमैर्जिनेन्दु-
र्वारोऽर्चितः सविनयं विनयाभिधेन ।

श्रीद्वीपबंदरवरे विजयादिदेव-

सूरीशितुर्विजयसिंहगुरोश्च तुष्ट्यै ॥ २३ ॥*

Ittham nayārthakavachahkusumairjinendur,

Virorchitaḥ savinayam Vinayâbhidhena ;

Sri Dvīpabandaravare Vijayâdideva Sūrīśitur-
vijayasinhaguroścha tuṣṭyai.—23.

[इत्थं thus ; नयार्थकवचःकुसुमैः by means of flowers, in the form of words, explaining the significance of *nayas* (standpoints) ; जिनेन्दुः the moon among the *Jinas* (conquerors) or *kevalins*, the omniscient ones ; वीरः the Lord Mahāvīra ; अर्चितः worshipped ; सविनयं with modesty ; विनयाभिधेन by (me), named Vinayavijaya) ; श्रीद्वीपबंदरवरे in the beautiful auspicious seaport of Dvīpa, the modern Diva ; विजयादिदेवसुरेशितुः of the disciple of Vijaya-deva Sūri ; विजयसिंहगुरोः of the preceptor, Vijayasinha ; तुष्ट्यै for the satisfaction.]

Thus the Lord Mahāvīra—the moon among the *Jinas* or *Kevalins*—was, with modesty, worshipped by means of flowers, in the form of words, explaining the significance of *nayas* (standpoints) by me, named Vinayavijaya, in order to satisfy the Guru (preceptor) Vijayasinha, a disciple of Vijaya-deva Sūri, in the beautiful, auspicious seaport town of Dvīpa (the present Diva in Kathiawad). 23.

* This verse is also in the *Vasanta-tilakā* metre.

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