Mahāmahopādhyāya Satis Chandra Vidyābhūṣaṇa's

NYĀYĀVATĀRA

The Earliest Jaina Work on Pure Logic

By

SIDDHASENA DIVĀKARA

(The celebrated Kṣapaṇaka of Vikramāditya's Court)

Edited, re-arranged and augmented with an
Introduction and notes

By

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PREFACE BY THE EDITOR

I have great pleasure in presenting S. C. Vidyābhūṣaṇa's *Nyāyā-vatāra* which had practically two editions at the life time of the author. The first edition appeared in 1909 in Calcutta, and the second from Arrah in 1915. In fact, it was S. C. Vidyābhūṣaṇa who gave a due honour to Siddhasena's work. My esteemed friend Dr Joydeb Ganguly Shastri, M.A., Ph.D, of Calcutta University, drew my attention to the fact that there was a reprint edition of *Nyāyāvatāra* published in 1971 from Bombay under the able editorship of Dr A. N. Upadhye. He was also kind enough to hand over his personal copy to me for my use. I am really grateful to him for this piece of information.

Dr Upadhye's edition is a reprint from the second, while ours is a reprint from the first. Though there is hardly any advance in the second edition, I consider that the first edition has still some value. This edition is entirely re-arranged and re-set. Each verse is followed by an extract from the *Nyāyāvatāra-vivṛti* and an English translation and notes. In the introduction an analytical content of the *Nyāyā-vatāra* culled out from S. C. Vidyābhūṣaṇa's 'A History of Indian Logic' is added for the benefit of the readers. I have also given in the appendix A what S. C. Vidyābhūṣaṇa has written about Siddhasena in his History of Indian Logic. Though this is almost a repetition of what he says in the Introduction to his *Nyāyāvatāra*, some new pieces of information are also available there. I hope this will also be beneficial to the readers. I have also presented a chart to show how the Jaina *Pramāṇa-Śāstra* is related to Jaina Philosophy. As Jaina logic is mainly intended to establish the validity of the nine principles of Jaina philosophy, the doctrines of Jainism are presented here for those who are not fully conversant with the technical terms of Jaina principles. In short, I have tried my best to make this edition handy and useful to the scholars.

My acknowledgments are due to Shri Abhoy Kumar Burman of Sanskrit Book Depot (Pvt) Ltd. for undertaking such a reprint scheme, and to Pandit Madhusudan Vedantashastri of Sanskrit Sahitya Parishat, Calcutta, for going through the galley proofs of this book. All attempts have been made to make this edition free

from printing mistakes, and yet if any misprints have crept into the book through oversight, I hope readers will be kind enough to correct them. My thanks are also due to Shri Suresh Datta for printing this book in a very short time.

Lastly, I can say that if this edition proves useful to the students of Jaina logic, I shall consider my labour worth undertaking and the publisher's desire also fulfilled.

University of Calcutta,   }
    20 June, 1981   }
                                                Satya Ranjan Banerjee

The Doctrines of Jainism and Jaina Logic
By
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I. Siddhasena Divākara

Siddhasena Divākara alias Kṣapaṇaka (crica 480-550 A.D.), a celebrated logician, is claimed by both the Digambaras and Śvetāmbaras as one of their own authorities. The earlier eminent authorities before Siddhasena were Kundakunda (1st cent. A.D), a pupil of Bhadrabāhu II, and his disciple Umāsvāmī or Umāsvāti (1-85 A.D), Bhaṭṭakera (1st Cent. A.D.) and Kārttikeyasvāmī (1st Cent. A.D,). According to the evidence of Paṭṭāvali's Vṛddhavādin, Pādalipta (= Pkt. Pālitta) and Siddhasena Divākara were contemporaries[1].

Siddhasena Divākara is famous both as a logician and a lyrical poet. His book, *Kalyāṇa-mandira-stotra* of 44 stanzas is a hymn-book addressed to Pārśvanātha. His other two books—*Dvātriṁsad-dvātriṁśikā* and *Sammati-tarka-sūtra*—though form a part of his Nyāyāvatāra, exhibit his poetic talent.

The work for which Siddhasena Divākara is famous is his *Nyāyā-vatāra*. It is written in 32 Sanskrit stanzas and is a fundamental work on Jaina logic. The book discusses the means of acquiring right knowledge (*pramāṇa*) and of methods (*naya*). In Jaina logic *Pramāṇaśāstra* is necessary to establish the validity of the nine categories (*nava-tattva*) of Jaina Philosophy.

The *Pramāṇa-Śāstra*, i.e., the science of right knowledge, discusses mainly the principles of pure logic in order to expound the dogmas of Jaina religion and metaphysics. But, in fact, Siddhasena Divākara and Diṅnāga, the Buddhist logician, by about 450 A.D., differentiated first the principles of Logic from the domain of religion and metaphysics. Gautama, the ancient logician, enumerates the sixteen categories of knowledge, of which pramāṇa is one with other fifteen things. But Siddhasena and Diṅnāga discuss only one category, i.e., *Pramāṇa*, in their treatises in order to establish the doctrines of Jainism and Buddhism respectively. They even excluded *prameya*, the object of knowledge, from their consideration.

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1. Klatt. IA. Vol. 11, p. 257

The relationship of Logic with the Jaina Philosophy is shown below :

The Doctrines of Jainism
(Philosophical and Practical)

Philosophical	*Practical Ethics*
[Metaphysics, Ontology & Psychology]	[Ethics, Asceticism, Monasticism, & Laity rules]

A. *Metaphysics* : (Substance)
   Navatattva (nine cardinal
   principles)

   [*Jīva, ajīva, āsrava, bandha, puṇya, pāpa, saṁvara, nirjarā & mokṣa*]→ For Mokṣa the necessary elements are
   to be comprehended by
   LOGIC

    (a) tri-ratna
    (b) tri-gupti
    (c) pañca-samiti

B. *Philosoyhy* :
   1. Anekāntavāda
   2. Syādvāda (Sapta-bhaṅgī)
   3. Jaina-naya (Sapta-naya)

   [*naigama, saṁgraha, vyavahāra, ṛju-sūtra, śabda, samabhirūḍha & evambhūta*]

C. *Karmavāda :*   → application of the Krma theory to Ethics.

Let me discuss the above principles briefly.

II. The Doctrines of Jainism

The foundation of Jaina philosophy is mainly based on the conception of the constitution of the world. To the Jains, the world is eternal and vast, it is beginningless and endless. Time is also eternal and is like a wheel with twelve spokes. The wheel of time is divided into two halves : *avasarpiṇī* (descending order) and *utsarpiṇī* (ascending order). The present age is the age of *avasarpiṇī*. This universe is composed of two things : *loka* and *aloka*. Loka consists of living and non-living things and all phenomena around it. *Aloka* is space which we normally call by the term *ākāśa*. It is void and empty, "an abyss of nothing". Having given this description of the world, the Jains have considered the nature of matter or substance (*padārtha*) which is eternal as well as ever-changing. With this idea in their background, they have proceeded to analyse the substance on the one hand and to establish their philosophical speculation on the other. So the doctrines of Jainism will consist of the philosophical and practical utility of their speculations. Jaina philosophy consists of Metaphysics, Ontology and Psychology, while the practical doctrines are concerned with ethics and asceticism, monasticism and the conduct of the laity. Let us first start with Jaina Metaphysics.

In the domain of Loka (or lokāstikāya, as it is often called), all things (i.e. *dravya*, substance) are classified into 9 categories : *jīva, ajīva, āsravo, bandha, puṇya, pāpa, saṃvara, nirjarā,* and *mokṣa. Jīva* (lit. 'lives') is the soul. There are infinite numbers of souls ; the whole world is filled with souls. The souls are eternal, but they can grow, contract or expand according to the necessity of the body in which they are incorporated. The characteristic mark of the souls is intelligence, which is never destroyed, but can be obscured by extrinsic causes.

Jīva is of two kinds : *Saṃsārī* (mundane) and *mukta* (liberated). *Saṃsārī jīva* (mundane souls) are the embodied souls of the living beings in the world and they are subject to the cycle of Birth. *Mukta jīvas* are liberated souls and so they will not come to this world again. They are free from the bondage of the world. Man is made up with *cetanā* (consciousness) and *jaḍa* (unconsciousness). So long as *jaḍatva* in man remains, he will come to this world again and again. If *jaḍatva* is removed, he will be free (*mukta*) and will attain *nirvāṇa*. *Āsrava* means flow of Karmic matter into the nature

of self or soul. *Bandha* implies the mixture of the Karmic matter with the nature of the soul on account of which the soul loses its intrinsic purity and brilliance. *Saṁvara* represents the act of presenting the inflow of the Karmic matter and hence it is the blocking of *Āsrava*. *Nirjarā* represents the act of destroying the Karmic matter which may adhere to the soul. Each particular *karma* has been caused by some action, good, bad or indifferent, of the individual being in question, so that *karma* in return, produces certain painful, or pleasant, or indifferent conditions and events which the individual in question must undergo. If the condition is good, it is called *puṇya*, if it is opposite, it is *pāpa*.

The conception of *Jīva* may be said to be the central doctrine of Jaina philosophy, all the other categories being merely secondary and subsidiary to the central entity. The *saṁsāra jīva* is again divided into four classes : *deva, manuṣya, tiryak* and *naraka*. The *devas* live in the upper world (*Devaloka*), while the *nārakas* live in hell. *Manuṣya* (men) live in this world along with the *tiryak* animals belonging to the zoological and botanical kingdoms. All beings of these four different groups are called *saṁsāra Jivas,* because they are subject to the cycle of birth and death. This *saṁsārī jīva* associated with its own karmic bondage and its own corporeal existence is considered to be uncreated and therefore beginningless. For the Jaina metaphysican the question when the soul did get associated with material body is a meaningless question, because they say *saṁsāra* is *anādi* (beginningless). At the time of liberation of the soul from material and karmic bondage, it is said to attain *Mokṣa,* i.e. the cycle of births and deaths is stopped for him.

The five categories which are grouped in the *ajīva* class are distinctly non-spiritual and hence incapable of consciousness. They are therefore *acetana*. These are—*dharma, adharma, ākāśa, pudgala* and *kāla*. The inherent character of *dharma* is to make move, or to be moved, while *adharma* is the opposite to it. The idea is that *dharma* and *adharma* are necessary conditions for the subsistence of all other things, viz. souls and matter. *Ākāśa* is space, while *pudgala* is matter which is eternal and consists of atoms. There are two kinds of matter : gross (*sthūla*) and subtle (*sūkṣma*). Gross matter are the things which we perceive, while subtle matter is beyond the reach of our senses. Subtle matter is that matter which is transformed into the different kinds of karma. *Kāla* (time) is a quasi-substance, and its necessity to accept it as a substance is to explain

the changing state of the souls and matter. Now the last substance *mokṣa*.

But before examining the nature of *mokṣa*, let us explain some of the fundamental philosophical doctrines associated with it. Let us first take the doctrine of Reality (*Sat*). The definition of *sat* as given by Uvāsvāmī is *utpāta-vaya-dravya-yuktaṁ sat* (it is a permanent reality in the midst of change of appearance and disappearance). This conception of reality is peculiar to Jainism. An existing reality in order to maintain its permanent and continued existence must necessarily undergo change in the form of appearance and disappearance. It seems to us a paradox at the very beginning. But a closer analysis and minute observation will help us to appreciate the significance of this description of reality. For example, let us look at the seed of a plant. When the seed is planted in the soil it must necessarily break the shell and sprout out. This is the first step in its attempt to grow. Then the sprouting seed further undergoes change and some portion of it comes out seeking the sunlight and another goes down into the earth. That portion of the sprouting which goes down into the soil will undergo enormous changes into the root system. Similarly, the portion that shoots up into the air and sunlight will also undergo enormous change, of sprouting out in tendrils and leaves finally resulting in branches and stem of the plant all engaged in the task of procuring nourishment with the help of sunlight. At every stage thus we find change, the old leaves being shed off and the new sprouts coming in. This seems to be the general law of Nature. The life of the seed *does* never *die* ; it lives even though it is being constantly changed, and this is what is *sat*. What is true of a plant, is also true with regard to the basic or fundamental things of Nature. In this respect, I believe, Jaina conception of Reality is different from the other Indian philosophies. Some philosophers would only emphasize permanency as the nature of reality, while others would emphasize change alone as the characteristic of reality. The one-sided emphasis either of permanency or change is rejected by Jaina thinkers. They consider this system as *anekānta-vāda*, a system which clings to a partial aspect of the reality. So they call their own system as *anekānta-vāda*, that is to say, a system of philosophy which maintains that Reality has multifarious aspects and that a complete comprehension of such a nature must necessarily take into consideration all the different aspects through which reality manifests itself. Hence the Jaina darśana is technically called

Anekāntavāda, often translated as "Indefiniteness of Being". It tells us that any material thing continues for ever to exist as matter, and this matter may assume any shape and quality. Thus *mṛttikā* (clay) as a substance may be regarded as permanent, but the form of a jar of clay (*ghaṭa-paṭādi*), or its colour, may come into existence and perish.

The doctrine of *anekāntavāda* is upheld by a logical method called *syād-vāda.* According to the doctrine, there are seven forms of metaphysical propositions and all contain the word *syāt,* meaning 'may be'. As it consists of seven propositions, it is known as Sapta-bhaṅgī. These propositions are—

      (1)   *syād asti,*
      (2)   *syān nāsti,*
      (3)   *syād asti nāsti ca,*
      (4)   *syād avyaktavyaḥ,*
      (5)   *syād asti avyaktavyaśca,*
      (6)   *syān nāsti avyaktavyaśca,*
      (7)   *syād asti nāsti avyaktavyaśca.*

According to this logical doctrine every fact of reality can be described in two logical propositions—one affirmative and the other negative. We have described before that the ultimate reality is a permanent and changing entity manifesting itself through constant change of appearance and disappearance, then we can understand that a fact of reality when looked at from the underlying permanent substance may be described to be non-permanent and changing. When a substance is described from the aspect of the underlying substance, it is called *dravyārthikanaya* and when the description is based on the modifications or changes, it is called *paryāyārthikanaya.* As a *dravya* has two aspects, it should be described logically from two points of view : positive and negative. For example, if a jar is made of clay, then it is possible to describe it as a jar made of clay. But can we describe it as 'a jar made of stone' ? Certainly not. But it must be remembered that to describe every fact of reality, four conditions are to be taken into considerations : *dravya, kṣetra, kāla* and *bhāva.* Name of the substance, the place where it is, the time when it exists, and characteristics intrinsically presented in it. Every object from its own *dravya* admits an affirmative predication and looked at from the *paradravya* admits of a negative predication. So the example given above from its own substance (clay) admits of affirmative predication, and from the view of *paradravya,* a negative

predication. Similarly, from the point of view of *kṣetra*, it can be stated in two ways : if a thing is really in the room, then we can say affirmatively it is in the room, and negatively it is not in the verandah. Similarly in other two cases. For want of space I cannot dilate upon this point any more.

Supplementary to the doctrine of *syād-vāda* is the doctrine of *naya-vāda*. The *nayas* are ways of expressing the nature of things. There are seven *nayas* : *naigama, saṁgraha, vyavahāra, ṛjusūtra, śabda, samabhirūḍha* and *evambhūta.* Without going into detail, it can be said that the *nayas* are necessary in order to understand the partial true nature of a thing. Now let us come back to the last substanc *mokṣa.*

The path to Salvation (*mokṣamārga*) is different in Jainism from other religious systems. It is the Right Faith (*samyag darśana*), Right Knowledge (*Samyag jñāna*), and Right Conduct (*samyak cāritryam*). The emphasis is laid on all the three : only when all the three characteristics are combined, they can constitute *Mokṣamārga.* Each by itself is imperfect and therefore insufficient. To depend on any of them will not lead one to *Mokṣa.* Further, it is emphasized that these three (faith, knowledge and conduct) must be of right type. Hence the word *samyak* is prefixed to each of these terms. To bring out the force of the meaning of this definition, one metaphorical example is given by the commentator. A person suffering from a disease (if he desires to cure himself of the disease) must have faith in the capacity of a doctor and must know the exact nature of the medicine prescribed by him for his disease and must take the medicine according to the instructions of the doctor. Mere faith in the doctor will be of no use. Faith in the capacity of the doctor and the knowledge of the nature of the medicine would equally be useless unless the patient takes the medicine. In this case beings in the world of *saṁsāra* are assumed to be patients suffering from a spiritual disqualification or disease who desire to get rid of this disease and to attain perfect spiritual health. Thus for the purpose of helping such persons this *Mokṣamārga* is prescribed as a spiritual remedy and the spiritual remedy therefore must be associated with all three characteristics of right faith, right knowledge and right conduct in order to be effective. These three constituent elements of the path to salvation are called *Ratna-traya* (the three jewels).

To effect this *ratna-traya* the rules of conduct must be observed and corresponding virtues must be acquired. The Jains have

formulated certain vows (*vratas*) for that. These are : *pañca mahāvrata* (five great vows), *pañca anuvrata* (five small vows), *tri-guṇa vrata* (three good qualities) and four *śikṣāvratas* (four educational vows). Of these the first five vratas are mainly and strictly to be observed by the monks while the rest are mainly meant for the laity. The five *mahāvratas* are—(1) *ahiṁsā* (abstain from killing, (2) *asatya* (abstain from telling lies), (3) *acaurya* (abstain from stealing), (4) *abrahmacarya* (abstain from sexual intercourse), and (5) *aparigraha* (to renounce all interest in worldly things, and not to keep any property). For a monk many rules have been laid down, which aim at preventing the destruction of the life of any living whatsoever. But for a layman these vows are also applicable, but in a less rigorous way. A layman may, for a limited time, follow a rigorous practice, but that is to regulate his conduct. But a monk on entering the order (*dīkṣā*), should practise these vows rigorously. To effectuate them, more regulations are required, and these constitute the disciplin of the monk. These are—*three guptis* (i.e. guarding of body, speech, and mind) and *five samitis* (i.e. a monk must be cautious in walking, speaking, collecting alms, taking up or putting down things, and voiding the body). Besides these, a monk should practise other conduct, such as, *kṣamā* (forgiveness), *mārdava* (modesty), *ārjava* (simplicity), *nirlobhatā* (not to be greedy), *akiñcanatā* (to consider worldly things insignificant), *satya* (to speak the truth), *tapasyā* (penance), *śauca* (purity) and *brahmacarya* (abstain from any sexual desire). On the whole, there are innumerable vows laid down for a monk who wants to attain salvation (*mokṣa*) which is the ultimate object of a monk.

In conclusion, it can be said that Jaina religion is mainly a monastic religion, full of vows and penances, required for a monk as well as for a laity to keep them away from killing of any kind of living beings. Life is very much respected by the Jains. Character has also been given a great prominence, and to control mind from every sphere of life is highly eulogised. The Jains believe that if anybody follows truly their code of conduct, there will be no violence (*hiṁsā*) in the world and a permanent bliss will pervade throughout the world. It is not the Jains who alone will follow their doctrines, but all the citizens of the world. The Jains also believe that if the peoples of the world can understand Jaina religion as such, then we shall be able to broaden our visions for our future life, to fasten our fraternal ties with our neighbours, to strengthen our minds with a new

vigour for our future activities, to deepen our trenchant ideas and reveted thoughts in human beings, to enlighten our future generations for the betterment of our life, and to heighten our ultimate supreme love in mankind. And in this way, we shall be able to slacken completely our narrow-mindedness at the altar of our pride and prejudices, to loosen our beastly acrimony and mental malady for the sake of humanity, and to liken all human beings as belonging to one *chum* though separated by their natural qualities and environments.

After having described briefly the doctrines of Jainism let me now pass on to the study of the *Nyāyāvatāra*

Nine categories of Jaina Philosophy can only be comprehended by

pramāṇa   *and*   *Naya*

pratyakṣa   *parokṣa*   [*naigama, saṁgraha. vyavahāra, rju-sūtra, śabda, samabhirūḍha, & evambhūta*]

vyavahārika   *pāramārthika (kevala)*

[*anumāṇa, sādhya, hetu/linga*]   *Śabda*

svārthānumāna   *parārthānumāna*   *Laukika Śabda*   *Śāstrīya Śabda*

1. *pakṣa*
2. *sādhya*
3. *hetu*
4. *dṛṣṭānta*
5. *upanaya*
6. *nigamana*
[*terms of a Syllogism*]

vyāpti

sādharmya   *vaidharmya*

antar vyāpti   *bahir vyāpti*

pakṣa   *hetu*   *sādhya*   *dṛṣṭānta*   *hetu*   *sādhya*

Fallacies of parārthānumāna
1. *pakṣābhāsa*
2. *hetvābhāsa*
3. *dṛṣṭāntābhāsa*
4. *dūṣaṇābhāsa*

sādharmya dṛṣṭāntābhāsa   *vaidharmya dṛṣṭāntābhāsa*   *asiddha*   *viruddha*   *anaikāntika*

Effects of pramāṇa (Mokṣa)

The above chart is explained below.

III. Analytical Contents of the Nyāyāvatāra

I. *Pramāṇa—Right knowledge.*

1. *Perception*

Pramāṇa is right knowledg which illumines itself as well as other things without any obstruction. It is of two kinds : (1) direct valid knowledge or perception (pratyakṣa) and (2) indirect valid knowledge (parokṣa). Direct valid knowledge (pratyakṣa) is two-fold : (1) practical (vyāvahārika) which is the knowledge acquired by the soul through the five senses (the eye, ear, nose, tongue and touch) and the mind (manas), and (2) transcendental (pāramārthika) which is the infinite knowledge that comes from the perfect enlighten-ment of the soul : it is called kevala or absolute knowledge.

2. *Verbal testimony*

Indirect valid knowlege (parokṣa) is also of two kinds : (1) inference (anumāna) and (2) verbal testimony (śabda). Verbal testimony is the knowledge derived from the words of reliable persons including knowledge from scripture. Suppose a young man coming to the side of a river cannot ascertain whether the river is fordable or not, and immediately an old experienced man of the locality, who has no enmity against him, comes and tells him that the river is easily fordable : the word of the old man is to be accepted as a source of valid knowledge called personal testimony or laukita śābda. Scripture is also a source of valid knowledge for it lays down injunctions on matters which baffle perception and inference : for instance, it teaches that misery is the consequence of vice. Knowledge derived from this source is called scriptural testimony or śāstraja śābda. Scripture is defined as that which was first cognised or composed by a competent person, which is not such as to be passed over by others, which is not incompatible with the truths derived from perception, which imparts true instruction and which is profitable to all men and is preventive of the evil path.[1]

3. *Inference*

Inference (anumāna) is the correct knowledge of the major term (sādhya) derived through the middle term (hetu, reason, or liṅga, sign) which is inseparably connected with it. It is of two kinds :

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1 आप्तोपज्ञमनुल्लङ्घ्यमदृष्टेष्टविरोधकम् ।
तत्त्वोपदेशकृत् सार्व शास्त्रं कापथघट्टनम् ॥ (Verse 9, Nyāyāvatāra)

(1) inference for one's own self (svārthānumāna) and (2) inference for the sake of others (parārthānumāna).

The first kind is the inference deduced in one's own mind after having made repeated observations. A man by repeated observations in the kitchen and elsewhere forms the conclusion in his mind that fire is always an antecedent of smoke. Afterwords, he is not certain whether a hill which he sees has fire on it or not. But, noticing smoke, he at once brings to mind the inseparable connection between fire and smoke, and concludes that there must be fire on the hill. This is the inference for one's own self.

If the inference is communicated to others through words, it is called an inference for the sake of others. A type of this kind of inference is as follows :—

(1) The hill (minor term or pakṣa) is full of fire (major term or sādhya) ;

(2) because it is full of smoke (middle term or hetu) ;

(3) whatever is full of smoke is full of fire, as, e.g. a kitchen (example or dṛṣtānta) ;

(4) so is this hill full of smoke (application or upanaya) ;

(5) therefore this hill is full of fire (conclusion or nigamana).

4. Terms of a syllogism

In a proposition the subject is the minor term (pakṣa) and the predicate the major term (sādhya). The minor term is that with which the connection of the major term is to be shown. In the proposition "the hill is full of fire," the hill is the minor term and fire major term. The middle term (hetu) is defined as that which cannot occur otherwise than in connection with the major term. Thus in the proposition : "the hill is full of fire because it is full of smoke," smoke is the middle term which cannot arise from any other thing than fire which is the major term. The example (dṛṣtānta) is a familiar case which assures the connection between the major term and the middle term. It is of two kinds. (1) homogeneous or affirmative (sādharmya), such as, "the hill is full of fire because it is full of smoke, as a kitchen," and (2) heterogeneous or negative (vaidharmya) which assures the connection between the the middle term and major term by contrariety, that is, by showing that the absence of the major term is attended by the absence of the middle term, such as "where there is no fire there is no smoke, as in a lake,"

In an inference for the sake of others the minor term (pakṣa) must be explicitly set forth, otherwise the reasoning might be misunderstood by the opponent, e.g. This hill has fire because it has smoke.

This instance, if the minor term is omitted, will assume the following form :—

Having fire, | Because having smoke.

Here the opponent might not at once recollect any instance in which fire and smoke exist in union, and might mistake a lake for such an instance. In such a case the whole reasoning will be mis-understood.

If that of which the major term or predicate is affirmed, is opposed by evidence, public opinion, one's own statement, etc., we have that which is known as the fallacy of the minor term (pakṣā-bhāsa) of which there are many varieties.

5. *Fallacies of the minor term*

The semblance or fallacy of the minor term (pakṣābhāsa) arises when one attributes to it as a proved fact that which is yet to be proved, or which is incapable of being proved, or when it is opposed to perception and inference, or inconsistent with public opinion or incongruous with one's own statement, thus :—

(1) "The jar is corporeal (*paudgalika*)"—this is a conclusion which is yet to be proved to the opponent.

(2) "Every thing is momentary"—this is a Saugata conclusion which, according to the Jainas, is incapable of being proved.

(3) "The general particular (sāmānya viśeṣa) things are without parts, are distinct from each other and are like themselves alone"—this is opposed to perception.

(4) "There is no omniscient being"—this is, according to the Jainas, opposed to inference.

(5) "The sister is to be taken as wife"—this is inconsistent with public opinion.

(6) "All things are non-existent"—this is incongruous with one's own statement.

6. *Inseparable connection*

Inseparable connection or invariable concomitance (vyāpti) is the constant accompaniment of the middle term by the major term. In the inference : "this hill is full of fire, because it is full

of smoke," the connection between fire and smoke, that is, the cons-
tant presence of fire with smoke, is called vyāpti or Inseparable
connection. It is of two kinds : (1) Intrinsic, and (2) Extrinsic.

7. *Antar vyāpti*

Intrinsic inseparable connection (antar-vyāpti) occurs when the
minor term (pakṣa), itself as the common abode of the middle term
(*hetu*) and the major term (sādhya), shows the inseparable connection
between them, thus :
    (1)   This hill (minor term) is full of fire (major term) ;
    (2)   because it is full of smoke (middle term).

Here the inseparable connection between fire and smoke is shown
by the hill (minor term) in which both of them abide.

8. *Bahir Vyāpti*

Extrinsic inseparable connection (bahir-vyāpti) occurs when an
example (dṛṣṭānta) from the outside is introduced as the common
abode of the middle term (hetu) and the major term (sādhya) to
assure the inseparable connection between them, thus :
    (1)   This hill is full of fire (major term) ;
    (2)   because it is full of smoke (middle term) ;
    (3)   as a kitchen (example).

Here the reference to the kitchen is no essential part of the
inference, but is introduced from without as a common instance of a
place in which fire and smoke exist together, and so it reaffirms
the inseparable connection between them.

Some logicians hold that that which is to be proved, that is, the
major term (sādhya), can be established by intrinsic inseparable
connection (antar-vyāpti) only : hence the extrinsic inseparable
connection (bahir vyāpti) is superfluous.

9. *Fallacies of the middle term*

The semblance of reason or fallacy of the middle term (hetvā-
bhāsa) arises from doubt, misconception or non-conception about it
(the middle term). It is of three kinds :—

(1) The unproved (asiddha) : This is fragrant, because it is a
sky-lotus.

Here the reason (middle term), viz. the sky-lotus, is unreal.

(2) The contradictory (viruddha) : "This is fiery, because it is a
body of water."

Here the reason alleged is opposed to what is to be established.

(3) The uncertain (anaikāntika). "Sound is eternal, because it is always audible."

Here the reason or middle term is uncertain, because audibleness may or may not be a proof of eternity.

10. Fallacies of homogenous examples

The Fallacy of example (dṛṣṭāntābhāsa) may arise in the homogeneous or heterogeneous form, from a defect in the middle term (hetu) or major term (sādhya) or both, or from doubt about them.

Fallacies of the homogeneous example (sādharmya-dṛṣṭāntā bhāsa) are follows :—

(1) Inference is invalid (major term), because it is a source of knowledge (middle term), like perception (homogeneous example).

Here the example involves a defect in the major term (sādhya), for perception is not invalid.

(2) Perception is invalid (major term), because it is a source of valid knowledge (middle term), like a dream (homogeneous example).

Here the example involves a defect in the middle term (hetu) for the dream is not a source of valid knowledge.

(3) The omniscient being is not existent (major term), because he is not apprehended by the senses (middle term), like a jar (homogeneous example).

Here the example involves a defect in both the major and middle terms (sādhya and hetu), for the jar is both existent and apprehended by the senses.

(4) This person is devoid of passions (major term), because he is mortal (middle term), like the man in the street (homogeneous example).

Here the example involves doubt as to the validity of the major term, for it is doubtful whether the man in the street is devoid of passions.

(5) This person is mortal (major term), because he is full of passions (middle term), like the man in the street (homogeneous example).

Here the example involves doubt as to the validity of the middle term, for it is doubtful whether the man in the street is devoid of passions.

(6) This person is non-omniscient (major term), because he is full of passions (middle term), like the man in the street (homogeneous example).

Here the example involves doubt as to the validity of both the major and middle terms, for it is doubtful whether the man in the street is full of passions and non-omniscient.

It is stated in the Nyāyāvatāra-vivṛti that some unnecessarily lay down three other kinds of fallacy of the homogeneous example (sādharmya-dṛṣṭāntābhāsa), viz. :—

(1) Unconnected (ananvyaya), such as : This person is full of passions (major term), because he is a speaker (middle term), like a certain man in Magadha (example).

Here though a certain man in Magadha is both a speaker and full of passions, yet there is no inseparable connection between "being a speaker" and "being full of passions".

(2) Of connection unshown (apradarśitānvaya), such as :—

Sound is non-eternal (major term), because it is produced (middle term), as a jar (example).

Here though there is an inseparable connection between "produced" and "non-eternal", yet it has not been shown in the proper form as :—

"Whatever is produced is non-eternal, as a jar."

(3) Of inverted connection (viparītānvaya), such as :

Sound is non-eternal (major term), because it is produced (middle term). Here if the inseparable connection (vyāpti) is shown thus—

"Whatever is non-eternal is produced as a jar," instead of—

"Whatever is produced is non-eternal as a jar," the example would involve the fallacy of inverted connection.

11. *Fallacies of heterogeneous example*

Fallacies of the heterogeneous example (vaidharmyadṛṣṭāntā-bhāsa) are of six kinds, thus :

(1) inference is invalid (major term), because it is a source of knowledge (middle term) : whatever is not invalid is not a source of knowledge, as a dream (heterogeneous example).

Here the example involves in the heterogeneous form a defect in the major term (sādhya), for the dream is really invalid though it has been cited as not invalid.

(2) Perception is non-reflective or nirvikalpaka (major term), because it is a source of knowledge (middle term) : whatever is reflective or savikalpaka, is not a source of knowledge, as inference (heterogeneous example).

Here the example involves in the heterogeneous form a defect in the middle term (sādhana), for inference is really a source of knowledge it has been cited as not such.

(3)   Sound is eternal and non-eternal (major term, because it is an existence (middle term) : whatever is not eternal and non-eternal is not an existence, as a jar (heterogeneous example).

Here the example involves in the heterogeneous form a defect in both the major and middle terms (sādhya and sādhana), for the jar is both "eternal and non-eternal" and "an existence".

(4)   Kapila is not omniscient (major term), because he is not a propounder of the four noble truths (middle term) : whoever is omniscient is propounder of the four noble truths, as Buddha (the heterogeneous example).

Here the example involves in the heterogeneous form a doubt as to the validity of the major term (sādhya), for it is doubtful whether Buddha was omniscient.

(5)   This person is untrustworthy (major term), because he is full of passions (middle term) : Whoever is trustworthy is not full of passions, as Buddha (heterogeneous example).

Here the example involves doubt as to the validity of the middle term (hetu), for it is doubtful whether Buddha is not full of passions.

(6)   Kapila is not devoid of passions (major term), because he did not give his own flesh to the hungry (middle term) :   Whoeve is devoid of passions gives his own flesh to the hungry, as Buddha (heterogeneous example).

Here the example involves doubt as to the validity of both the major and middle terms (sādhya and sādhana), for it is doubtful whether Buddha was devoid of passions and gave his own flesh to the hungry.

It is stated in the Nyāyāvatāra-vivṛti that some unnecessarily lay down three other kinds of fallacy of the heterogeneous example (vaidharmya-dṛṣṭāntābhāsa), viz.—

(i)   Unseparated (avyatireki) :   This person is not devoid of passions (major term), because he is a speaker (middle term) :   Whoever is devoid of passions is not a speaker, as a piece of stone (heterogeneous example).

Here, though a piece of stone is both devoid of passions and "not a speaker," yet there is no invariable separation (vyatireka vyāpti) between "devoid of passions" and "a speaker".

(ii) Of separation unshown (apradarśita-vyatireka) :

Sound is non-eternal (major term), because it is produced (middle term) ; as ether (example).

Here, though there is an invariable separation between "produced" and "eternal", yet it has not been shown in the proper form, such as : "Whatever is non-non-eternal is not produced, e.g. ether".

(iii) Of contrary separation (viparīta-vyatireka) :

Sound is non-eternal (major term), because it is produced (middle term) : Whatever is not produced is non-non-eternal, e.g. ether (example).

Here the example has been put in a contrary way, for the proper form should have been :

Whatever is non-non-eternal is not produced, e.g. ether."

12. Refutation

Refutation (dūṣaṇa) is the pointing out of defects or fallacies in the statements of the opponent in any of the forms enumerated above. The semblance of a refutation (dūṣaṇābhāsa) is the contrivance to allege defects where there are no defects at all.

13. Consequence of Pramāṇa

The immediate effect of pramāṇa (valid knowledge) is the removal of ignorance. The consequence of the transcendental perception (pāramārthika pratyakṣa pramāṇa) is bliss and equanimity consisting in salvation (Mokṣa or final emancipation), while that of the other kinds of pramāṇa (direct and indirect knowledge) is the facility which they afford us to choose the desirable and reject the undesirable things.

II. Naya—the method of descriptions

Naya is the method of comprehending things from particular standpoints. Thus we may conceive rose either as a flower possessing the attributes common to all flowers or as a thing possessing attributes which are peculiar to the rose as distinguished from other flowers. The Naya is of seven kinds : naigama, saṁgraha, vyavahāra, ṛju-sūtra, śabda, samabhirūḍha, and evambhuta.

1. Syādvāda

Knowledge which determines the full meaning of an object through the employment, in the scriptural method, of one-sided

nayas, is called Syādvāda-śruta. It is the perfect knowledge of things taken from all possible standpoints. Thus a thing may be, may not be, both may or may not be, etc., according as we take it from one or other standpoint.

The soul (Jīva) is the knower, the illuminator of self and non-self, doer and enjoyer. It undergoes changes of condition and is self-conscious, being different from the earth, water, etc.

This system of *pramāṇa* and *Naya*, with which all of us are familiar and which serves to perform all practical functions, cannot be traced to its beginning or followed to its end.[1]

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1 Adapted from S. C. Vidyābhūṣaṇa's A History of Indian Logic.

Original Title Page of the First Edition

NYĀYĀVATĀRA

The Earliest Jaina Work on Pure Logic

By

SIDDHASENA DIVĀKARA

(The celebrated Kṣapaṇaka of Vikramāditya's Court)

With Sanskrit Text and Commentary

Edited for the first time
with notes and English Translation

By

Mahāmahopādhyāya SATIS CHANDRA VIDYĀBHŪSAṆA

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PREFACE

(First Edition)

Professor Peterson, *in his Fifth Report on the Search for Sanskrit Manuscripts in the Bombay Circle,* mentions a Jaina Sanskrit work called Nyāyāvatāra by Siddha Sena Divākara. A manuscript of this work, *together with a commentary on it called Nyāyāvatāra-vivṛti,* was kindly procured for me from a private library in Bhavanagar, Bombay, by the well-known Svetāmbara Sādhus, Muni Dharmavijaya and Indravijaya.

Seeing that the Nyāyāvatāra is a very important work, being the earliest known Jaina treatise on Pure Logic, I have, in the present volume, attached the text of it with extracts from its verbose commentary. I have also included in the volume an English translation which I prepared for the "Journal" of the Indian Research Society of Calcutta. The notes which I have added to elucidate the translation are based on the commentary already referred to.

I acknowledge with thanks that Mr. C. Russel, M.A., Principal, Patna College, has kindly helped me with a number of suggestions while the translation was passing through the press.

My thanks are also due to Rai Sarat Chandra Das, Bahadur, C.I.E., at whose instance I undertook this work, and who, at the suggestion of the Government of Bengal, forwarded its advance proof to the International Congress of Orientalists held at Copenhagen in August 1908. It was kindly accepted by that learned body as a contribution on the Jaina philosophical literature.

SATIS CHANDRA VIDYABHUSANA

PRESIDENCY COLLEGE,
    CALCUTTA.
  February, 1909.

PREFACE

(Second Edition)

The second edition of this treatise on Jaina Logic is intended to be included as a volume of *the Library of Jaina Literature* in the publication of the Sacred Books of the Jaina Society, Arrah.

I take this opportunity of expressing my sincere thanks to my friend Kumar Devendra Prasad, Managing Director of the said Society, at whose suggestion this edition was undertaken.

I hope the work, which as a treatise on Jaina Logic is unique in its character will in this way obtain a wider circulation.

SANSKRIT COLLEGE,,
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December, 1915.

SATIS CHANDRA VIDYABHUSANA

INTRODUCTION

1. Siddha Sena Divākara, the author of Nyāyāvatāra.

Logic was mixed up with metaphysics and religion in the ancient writings of the Jainas as in those of other sects in India. The first Jaina writer on Pure Logic appears to have been Siddha Sena Divākara. It was he who, for the first time among the Jainas, distinguished logic from the cognate branches of learning by composing a metrical work called Nyāyāvatāra on Logic in thirty-two couplets (ślokas).

Siddha Sena Divākara is the famous author of the **Sammati-tarka-sūtra**, which is a Prākṛta work on philosophy containing an elaborate discussion on the principles of logic. This author, who belonged to the Svetāmbara (white robed) sect, has been mentioned by Pradyumna Sūri (980 A.D.) in his Vicāra-sāra-prakaraṇa.[1]

He was a pupil of Vṛddha-vādi Sūri, and received the name of Kumuda-candra[2] at the time of his ordination. He is said to have split, by the efficacy of his prayers, the *Liṅga* (Brāhmanical symbol) of Rudra in the temple of Mahākāla at Ujjaini, and to have called forth an image of Pārśvanātha by reciting the hymn Kalyāṇa-mandira-stava. He is believed to have converted king Vikramāditya to Jainism, 470 years after the *Nirvāṇa* of Mahāvira.[3] The Jainas believe that he was the spiritual tutor of that famous king, as is evident from the Kumāra-pāla-caritra and other works.

It may be noted here that Vikramāditya of Ujjaini has been considered by some scholars to be identical with Yaśodharma Deva, king of Malwa, who, according to Alberuni, had defeated the Huns at Korur in 533 A.D. The Chinese pilgrim Hwen-tshang (Yuan chwang), who came to India in 629 A.D., says that a very powerful king [presumably Vikramāditya] reigned 60 years[4] before his arrival there. From these it appears that Siddha Sena Divākara, who was a contemporary of Vikramāditya, must have lived at Ujjaini about 550 A.D.

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[1] पंचेव य वरिससए सिद्धसेण-दिवायरो य जयपयडो ।
छच्चसए वीसहिए सक्कथ्युऊ अज्जरविखपहू ॥ २६ ॥

(Vicāra-sāra-prakaraṇa, noticed by Peterson in his Third Report, p. 272.)

[2] Cf. Prabhāvakacarita VIII. V. 57.

[3] See Klatt's Paṭṭāvalī of the Kharatara Gaccha in the Indian Antiquary, Vol. XI, Sept. 1882, p. 247.

[4] *Vide* Beal's Buddhist Records of the Western World, Vol. II, p. 26.

Legends and historical accounts show that Siddha Sena was the well-known *Kṣapaṇaka* (the Jaina sage), who adorned the court of Vikramāditya and was one of the Nine Gems (*Nava Ratna*).[1] Varāha-mihira, the famous astronomer, who also was another of the Nine Gems of the court of Vikramāditya, lived between A.D. 505[2] and A.D. 587. We are told that Kṣapaṇaka *alias* Siddha Sena was a contemporary of Varāmihira ; so he must have flourished about the middle of the 6th Century.

2 . Candraprabha Sūri, author of Nyāyāvatāra-vivṛti (?)

There is an excellent commentary on the Nyāyāvatāra called the **Nyāyāvatāra-vivṛti** possibly by Candraprabha Sūri,[3] who also belonged to the Svetāmbara sect and founded the Pūrṇimā Gaccha[4] in Saṁvat 1159 or A.D. 1102. He was a pupil of Jayasiṁha Sūri and preceptor of Dharmaghoṣa. He wrote another logical treatise called **Prameya-ratna-koṣa**[5] and a philosophical treatise called *Darśana-śuddhi* otherwise called *Samyaktva-prakaraṇa*. He was a great logi-cian, and in controversy appeared as a lion before the opponents,

[1] The Nine Games are :—

धन्वन्तरि: क्षपणकोऽमरसिंह: शङ्कु वेतालभट्टघटखर्परकालिदासा: ।
ख्यातो वराहमिहिरो नृपते: सभायां रत्नानि वै वररुचिनैव विक्रमस्य ॥

(Jyotirvidābharaṇa).

[2] *Vide* Dr. Thibaut's Introduction to Pañcasiddhāntikā, p. xxx. Varāhamihira chose Śaka 427 or A.D. 505 as the initial year of his astronomical calculation, showing thereby that he lived about that time. So—

सप्ताश्विवेद-संख्यं शककालमपास्य चैत्रशुक्लादौ ।
अर्द्धास्तमिते भानौ यवनपुरे सौम्यदिवसाद्ये ॥ ८ ॥

(Pañcasiddhāntikā, Chap. I, edited by Dr. G. Thibaut and Sudhākara Dvivedi.)

[3] For Candraprabha Sūri see Peterson's Fourth Report, p. xxvii, and Peterson 3, xvi. In the Nyāyāvatāra-vivṛti itself there is no mention of Candraprabha Sūri. I remember to have found somewhere that he was the author of it. The author-ship of the Nyāyāvatāravivṛti must however for the present remain an open question. In the colophon of the Nyāyāvatāra-vivṛti it is stated that it was the work of Siddhasena-Divākara-vyākhyānaka, or simply Siddha-vyākhyānaka, which was evidently a surname. Muni Dharmavijaya and Indravijaya, relying on the line व्याख्यातृचडामणिसिद्धनाम्न: (quoted from Ratnaprabha Sūri's Upadeśa-mālā-viśeṣa-vṛtti in Peterson's Third Report, p. 168) are inclined to identify Siddha-vyākhyānaka with Siddharṣi who lived in Saṁvat 962 or 905 A.D. (as is evident from Peterson's Fourth Report, p. cxxix). There is another commentary on the Nyāyāvatāra by Haribhadra Sūri.

[4] See Dr. R. G. Bhandarkar's Report 1883-84, p. 147.

[5] *Vide* Jaināgama List, Bombay, p, 77, and Peterson's Third Report on Sanskrit MSS., Appendix. p. 9.

who resembled elephants.[1] In the introduction to his Nyāyāvatāra-vivṛti (q. v.) he has quoted the Buddhist logicians, Dharmottara and Arcaṭa, and in the concluding lines has craved the mercy of Jina.

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The 12th June, 1908.

AN OBSERVATION.

Mahāmahopādhyāya Dr. Satis Chandra Vidyābhūṣaṇa maintains here that Siddhasena Divākara was identical with the well-known Kṣapaṇaka. This view perfectly commends itself to me. There is proof enough that Siddhasena was a Jaina sage and lived in the court of Vikramāditya. That Kṣapaṇaka was one of the Nine Gems of the court of Vikramāditya is also very widely known, and it remains only to prove that he was a Jaina sage. We have instances enough in the Pañcatantra and the Mahābhārata where the Jaina ascetics are nicknamed as Kṣapaṇaka. The following instances from the Avadānakalpalatā will show that the Buddhists also designated, rather nicknamed, the Jaina ascetics as Kṣapaṇaka :

भगवद्भ्राषितं तत्तु सुभद्रेण निवेदितम् ।
श्रुत्वा क्षपणकः क्षिप्रमभूद् द्वेषविषाकुलः ॥ ६ ॥

तस्य सर्वज्ञतां वेत्ति सुभद्रो यदि मद्गिरा ।
तदेष क्षपणश्रद्धां त्यक्ष्यति श्रमणादरात् ॥ १२ ॥

मूर्खक्षपणभक्तेन तद्गिरा हतयोषिता ।
त्वया त्यक्तस्वपुत्रेण किं नाम सुकृता कृतम् ॥ ४० ॥

<div align="right">(Jyotiṣkāvadāna).</div>

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[1] तीर्थे वीरविभो: सुधर्मगणभृत् सन्तानलब्धोन्नति-
श्चारित्रोज्ज्वलचन्द्रगच्छजलधिप्रोल्लासशीतद्युति: ।
साहित्यागमतर्कलक्षणमहाविद्यापगासागर:
श्रीचन्द्रप्रभसूरिरङ्गतमतिवर्दादीभसिंहोऽभवत् ॥ १ ॥

(Daśavaikālika-ṭīkā by Tilakācārya, noticed in Peterson's Fifth Report, p. 65.)

सिद्धसेनदिवाकरकृतः

न्यायावतारः

१९८१

न्यायावतारः

प्रमाणं स्वपराभासि ज्ञानं बाधविवर्जितम् ।
प्रत्यक्षं च परोक्षं च द्विधा मेयविनिश्चयात् ॥ १ ॥

न्यायावतारविवृतिः

[अंशतो गृहीता]

अवियुतसामान्यविशेषदेशिनं वर्धमानमानम्य ।
न्यायावतारविवृतिः स्मृतिबीजविवृद्धये क्रियते ॥

'प्रमाणेत्यादि' अनेन च तादात्म्य-तदुत्पत्तिलक्षणसंबन्धविकलतया ध्वनेर्बहिरर्थं प्रति प्रामाण्यायोगाद् अभिधेयादिसूचनद्वारोत्पन्नार्थसंशयमुखेन श्रोतारः श्रवणं प्रति प्रोत्साह्यन्ते इति धर्मोत्तरो मन्यते । ...अर्चटस्तु आह । न श्रावकोत्साहकमेतत् प्रामाण्याभावात् तेषां चाप्रमाणादप्रवृत्तेः ।

स्व आत्मा स्वरूपं, परोऽर्थः । तौ आभासयितुं प्रकाशयितुं शीलं यस्य तत् । तथा ज्ञायते निर्णीयते तत्त्वं येन तत् ज्ञानम् । बाध्यते अनेनेति बाधः, विपरीतार्थो- पस्थापकप्रमाणप्रवृत्तिरिति यावत् । तेन विशेषेण वर्जितं रहितं यत् ज्ञानं तत् प्रमाणमिति संटंकः । स्वपराभासीत्यनेन ये स्वाभासेव ज्ञानं मन्यन्ते ते ज्ञानवादिनो बौद्धविशेषाः ; ये च पराभासेव मीमांसकनैयायिकादयः ते निरस्तास्ते हि बहि- रर्थाभावात् ज्ञानं स्वांशपर्यवसितसत्ताकम् इत्याचक्षीरन् । तदयुक्तम् । ज्ञेयार्था- भावे ज्ञानाभावप्रसङ्गात् । ... ...पराभासस्यपि स्वप्रकाशाभावात् अभिदधीरन् तदप्य- सम्बद्धम् । स्वप्रकाशाभावे परप्रकाशायोगात् ; न हि प्रदीपः स्वरूपमनुद्द्योतयन् घटाद्युद्द्योतने व्याप्रियते ।

तत्र सिद्धान्तप्रसिद्धपारमार्थिकप्रत्यक्षापेक्षयाऽक्षशब्दो जीवपर्यायतया प्रसिद्धः । इह तु व्यवहारिकप्रत्यक्षप्रस्तावाद् अक्षध्वनिरिन्द्रियवचनो गृह्यते ततश्च अक्षं प्रति गतं प्रत्यक्षं यदिन्द्रियमाश्रित्य उज्जिहीते अर्थं साक्षात्कारिज्ञानं तत् प्रत्यक्षमित्यर्थः । ... ... ततश्च सर्वज्ञानानां यत् स्वरूपसंवेदनं तदपि प्रत्यक्षमित्युक्तं भवति । तत्रापि स्वरूपस्य ग्राह्यस्य साक्षात्करणसद्भावादिति । अक्षेभ्यः परतो वर्तते इति परोक्षमक्षव्यापार- निरपेक्षं मनोव्यापारेण असाक्षादपरिच्छेदकं यत् ज्ञानं तत्परोक्षमिति भावः । ... ... द्विधैव ... द्वाभ्यामेव प्रकाराभ्यां मेयस्य ग्राह्यार्थस्य विनिश्चयात् स्वरूपनिर्णयात् ॥ १ ॥

Nyāyāvatāra-vivṛtiḥ
[Extracts]

Translation with notes :

1. *Pramāṇa* (valid knowledge) is the knowledge which illumines itself and other things without any obstruction : it is divided as

pratyakṣa (direct knowledge or perception) and *parokṣa* (indirect knowledge) as knowables are ascertained in two ways.

This definition sets aside the view of those Buddhists [Yogācāras] who maintain that knowledge illumines itself alone, inasmuch as there is, according to them, no external object beyond it. The same definition is also in direct opposition to the doctrine of the Naiyāyika, Mīmāṁsaka and others who hold that knowledge illumines external objects alone, as it cannot illumine itself. The Jainas maintain that it is only when knowledge illumines itself that it can take cognizance of external objects. So according to them knowledge, like a lamp, illumines itself as well as objects lying outside it.

Those whose sight has been obscured by darkness often see many false images, such as two moons, etc. ; and men bewildered by sophism are found to believe that every thing is momentary or the like. With a view to differentiate such kinds of false knowledge from *pramāṇa* (valid knowledge) the phrase "without obstruction" has been used.

Pramāṇa (valid knowledge) is divided here into *pratyakṣa* (direct knowledge) and *parokṣa* (indirect knowledge) including in the latter *anumāna* (inference) and *śabda* (verbal testimony). This division contravenes the conclusion of Cārvāka that there is only one *pramāṇa*, viz., *pratyakṣa* (perception or direct knowledge). Cārvāka's view is unreasonable, for *pratyakṣa* cannot be established as a *pramāṇa* except through the medium of *parokṣa* (indirect knowledge). It also sets aside the view of the Saugatas (Buddhists) who divide *pramāṇa* into *pratyakṣa* (direct knowledge or perception) and *anumāna* (inference) without any notice of *śabda* (verbal testimony).

प्रसिद्धानि प्रमाणानि व्यवहारश्च तत्कृतः ।
प्रमाणलक्षणस्योक्तौ ज्ञायते न प्रयोजनम् ॥ २ ॥

प्रसिद्धानि प्ररूढानि, नाधुना साध्यमीत्यर्थः । प्रमाणानि प्रत्यक्षानुमानशब्दानि ।
... ... यदर्थं प्रमाणपरीक्षणमसावपि जलपानशीतत्राणादिर्व्यवहारोऽनादिप्ररूढः ।
तन्निरर्थकं प्रमाणलक्षणाभिधानमिति ॥ २ ॥

2. *Pramāṇas* and the practical use made of them are well known : there appears no necessity for giving any definition of *pramāṇa*.

There was never a time when the acts of seeing, inferring, etc., were not performed. The use of these acts is also well known, for it is through them that we can choose one thing and reject another thing. So it appears superfluous to explain the nature of *pramāṇa* (valid knowledge).

प्रसिद्धानां प्रमाणानां लक्षणोक्तौ प्रयोजनम् ।
तद्व्यामोहनिवृत्तिः स्याद् व्यामूढमनसामिह ॥ ३ ॥

यद्यपि प्रतिप्राणिप्रसिद्धानि प्रमाणानि । अन्यथा तत्कृतनिखिलव्यवहारोच्छेद-

प्रसंगात्तदुच्छेदे च दृष्टहान्याद्यापत्ते: । ··· व्यामूढं विपरीतग्रस्तं विचित्रतां गतं
मनोऽन्तःकरणं येषां ते तथा तेषाम्, इहेति लोके । ··· यद्यनादिप्रसिद्धं प्रमाणलक्षणं
प्रति न केचित् अपि व्यामुह्येयुस्तदा यद् भवद्भिः प्रागुदग्राहि निरर्थकं प्रमाणलक्षणमिति
तद् युक्तमेव स्यात् । न चैतदेवम्, तत्र व्यामूढानां दर्शनात् ॥ ३ ॥

3. The necessity here for giving the definition of the well-known
pramāṇas is to remove stupidity from the mind of stupid people.

Pramāṇa (valid knowledge), though well known, is explained here to warn
foolish people against taking false knowledge as true.

अपरोक्षतयाऽर्थस्य ग्राहकं ज्ञानमीदृशम् ।
प्रत्यक्षमितरज्ज्ञेयं परोक्षं ग्रहणेक्षया ॥ ४ ॥

परोक्षोऽक्षगोचरातीतस्ततोऽन्योऽपरोक्षस्तद्द्रावस्तत्ता   तया   साक्षात्कृततयेति
यावत् । तस्य [अर्थस्य] ग्राहकं व्यवसायात्मकतया साक्षात् परिच्छेदकं यत् ज्ञानं
तदीदृशमिति ईदृगेव प्रत्यक्षमिति संटंकः । ··· अर्थस्य ग्राहकमित्यस्य ग्रहणेक्षयेति
वक्ष्यमाणपदसापेक्षत्वादमुना बहिरपि येऽर्थकालाकलनविकलं सकलमपि ज्ञानं प्रलपन्ति
तान्निरस्यति । ··· ··· ग्राहकमिति च निर्णायकं द्रष्टव्यं निर्णयाभावेऽर्थग्रहणायोगात् ।
तेन यत् तथागतैः प्रत्यपादि प्रत्यक्षं कल्पनापोढमभ्रान्तमिति तदपास्तं भवति । तस्य
युक्तिरिक्तत्वात् । तथाहि, ते निर्विकल्पकत्वेऽध्यक्षस्य युक्ता: खेटयन्ति किलेदमर्थ-
सामर्थ्येनोदीयते सन्निहितार्थक्रियासमर्थार्थग्राहकत्वात् । ··· तस्मात् [प्रत्यक्षात्]
इतरद् असाक्षादर्थग्राहकं ज्ञानं परोक्षमिति ज्ञेयमवगन्तव्यमेतदपि स्वसंवेदनापेक्षया
प्रत्यक्षमेव । बहिरर्थापेक्षया तु परोक्षव्यपदेशमश्नुते इति दर्शयन्नाह ग्रहणेक्षयेति ।
इह ग्रहणं प्रक्रमाद् बहिःप्रवर्तनमुच्यते । अन्यथा विशेषणवैयर्थ्यात् तस्येक्षापेक्षतया
बहिःप्रवृत्तिपर्यालोचनयेति यावत् । तदयमर्थो यद्यपि स्वयं प्रत्यक्षं तथापि लिग-
शब्दादिद्वारेण बहिर्विषयग्रहणेऽसाक्षात्कारितया व्याप्रियते इति परोक्षमित्युच्यते ।
··· तद्यथा अनुमानं शाब्दं चेति ॥ ४ ॥

4. Such knowledge that takes cognizance of objects, not beyond
the range of the senses, is *pratyakṣa* (direct knowledge or percep-
tion); the other is known as *parokṣa* (indirect knowledge) in reference
to the manner of taking the cognizance.

The words *pratyakṣa* (direct knowledge) and *parokṣa* (indirect knowledge) have
been used here in their ordinary acceptations, namely, the first for sense-
perception, and the second for inference and verbal testimony. In the ancient
Jaina scriptures, however, *pratyakṣa* (direct knowledge) signified perfect
knowledge acquired by the soul direct through meditation and not through the
channels of the senses, while *parokṣa* (indirect knowledge) signified knowledge
derived through the medium of the senses or signs comprising perception,
inference and verbal testimony.

साध्याविनाभुनो लिङ्गात् साध्यनिश्चायकं स्मृतम् ।
अनुमानं तद्भ्रान्तं प्रमाणत्वात् समक्षवत् ॥ ५ ॥

साध्याविनाभुन इत्यनेन परप्रणीतलिंगलक्षणव्युदासमाचष्टे । ततश्च यत् परे
प्रोचु: । पक्षधर्मान्वयव्यतिरेकलक्षणरूपत्रयोपलक्षितानि त्रीणि एव लिंगानि अनुप-
लब्धि: स्वभाव: कार्यंतेति । तदुक्तं

"अनुमेयेऽथ तत्तुल्ये सद्भावो नास्तिताऽसति ।

निश्चितानुपलम्भात्मकार्यर्त्ख्या हेतवस्त्रय:" ॥ इति ॥

तथाऽन्येऽस्येदं कार्यं कारणं संयोगि समवायि विरोधि चेति लिंगिकमिति । तथा
पूर्ववत् शेषवत् सामान्यतोदृष्टमित्यादि । तद्वालप्रलपितप्रायमित्यवगन्तव्यम् । पक्ष-
धर्मत्वविरहेऽपि अनुमिमीमहे कालादिकसूत्रधर्मी समस्त्येव तत्र पक्षधर्मता लिगस्य
गृह्यते इति चेत् न, अतिप्रसङ्गात् । एवं हि शब्दस्य अनित्यत्त्वे साध्ये काककार्ष्ण्या-
देरपि गमकत्वप्रसक्ते: । तत्रापि लोकादेर्धर्मिण: कल्पयितुं शक्यत्वात् । ... अधुना
यत् शौद्धोदनशिष्यकैर्न्यगादि यदुत भ्रान्तमनुमानं सामान्यप्रतिभासित्वात् तस्य च बहि:
स्वलक्षणे व्यतिरेकाव्यतिरेकविकल्पाभ्यामपाक्रियमाणतया योगात्तद्रूपतया वत न
तस्याध्यवसायादतस्मिन् तद्ग्रहस्य च भ्रान्तिलक्षणत्वात् ... तदुक्तम् "अतस्मिन् तद्-
ग्रहो भ्रान्तिरपि संबन्धत: प्रमा" इति तदपाकर्तुमाह तद्भ्रान्तमित्यादि ॥ ५ ॥

5. Knowledge eterminant of that which is to be proved (*i.e.*, the major term called in Sanskrit *sādhya*), derived through the mark (*i.e.* the middle term called in Sanskrit *liṅga*) which is inseparably connected with the same, is known as *anumāna* (inference) : being a *pramāṇa* it is free from invalidity like perception (*pratyakṣa*).

Inference is of two kinds : (1) *svārthānumāna*, inference for one's own self, and (2) *parārthānumāna* inference for the sake of others, The first kind is the inference drawn in one's own mind after having made repeated observations. Suppose that having repeatedly seen in the kitchen and other places, that where there is smoke there is fire, and having realised in his mind that there is a universal antecedence of fire in respect of smoke, a man afterwards goes to a hill and entertains a doubt as to whether or not there is fire in it. Instantly, when he observes smoke on it, he recollects the inseparable connection between fire and smoke, and concludes in his mind that the hill has fire in it, as it has smoke on it. This is an inference for one's own self. Inference for the sake of others will be defined later on.

This definition of inference, says the commentator, sets aside the view of certain writers [such as Dharmakīrti the Buddhist] who maintain that non-perception (*anupalabdhi*), identity (*svabhāva*) and causality (*kārya*) are the marks or grounds of inference, or of certain other writers who hold the effect (*kārya*), cause (*kāraṇa*), conjunction (*saṃyoga*), co-existence (*samavāya*), and opposition (*virodha*) to be such marks or grounds. The division of inference as (1) à priori (*pūrvavat*, from cause to effect), (2) à posteriori (*śeṣavat* from effect to cause),

and (3) from analogy (*sāmānyato-dṛṣṭa*, perception of homogeneousness, that is, the recognition of the subject as being referrable to some class, and as being thence liable to have predicated of it whatever may be predicable of the class) [as given in the Nyāya-sūtra of Akṣapāda Gautama] is also hereby set aside.

न प्रत्यक्षमपि भ्रान्तं प्रमाणत्वविनिश्चयात् ।
भ्रान्तं प्रमाणमित्येतद् विरुद्धवचनं यतः ॥ ६ ॥

न केवलमनुमानं भ्रान्तं किं तर्हि यद्रुवद्भिः दृष्टान्ततया उपात्तं प्रत्यक्षं तदपि भ्रान्तमेव "सर्वमालम्बने भ्रान्तम्" इति वचनात् । ··· लोकसंवृति घटयन्तो वयं दृढतरवासनाप्रबोधसंपादितसत्ताकयोः प्रत्यक्षानुमानयोः प्रमाणतामाचक्ष्महे ॥ ६ ॥

6. Since it is a *pramāṇa*, *pratyakṣa* (perception), too, is not invalid, for "a *pramāṇa* is invalid" is an absurd expression.

Some [Buddhists] who maintain that the world is true only from the practical or illusory point of view (*lokasaṁvṛti*), but false from the transcendental or absolute standpoint (*pāramārthika*), consider perception (*pratyakṣa*) to be merely illusory and consequently invalid from the absolute standard of truth. But this view is opposed by the Jainas who maintain that the world is real from all standpoints and consequently perception is not invalid.

सकलप्रतिभासस्य भ्रान्तत्वासिद्धितः स्फुटम् ।
प्रमाणं स्वान्यनिश्चायि द्वयसिद्धौ प्रसिध्यति ॥ ७ ॥

सकलप्रतिभासस्य समस्तसंवेदनस्य भ्रान्तत्वासिद्धितो विपर्यस्तत्वानिष्पत्तेः यत् स्फुटं स्वान्यनिश्चायि सुनिश्चिततया स्वपरप्रकाशकं तत् प्रमाणमिति सम्बन्धः । तच्च द्वयसिद्धौ स्वरूपार्थलक्षणयुग्मनिष्पत्तौ प्रसिध्यति निष्पद्यते नान्यथा प्रमेयाभावे प्रमाणाभावात् ॥ ७ ॥

7. Owing to the impossibility of all phenomena (external objects) being invalid, *pramāṇa* is evidently a determinant of self and other things and serves to establish both.

The world is not an illusion : knowledge and its objects are all real.

दृष्टेष्टाव्याहताद्वाक्यात् परमार्थाभिधायिनः ।
तत्त्वग्राहितयोत्पन्नं मानं शाब्दं प्रकीर्तितम् ॥ ८ ॥

दृष्टेन प्रमाणावलोकितेन इष्टः प्रतिपादयिषितोऽव्याहतोऽनिराकृतः सामर्था-दर्था यस्मिन् वाक्ये तत् तथा प्रमाणनिश्चितार्थाबाधितमिति यावत् । तस्मात् परमोत्कृतिमः पुरुषोपयोगी शक्यानुष्ठानो वाच्यार्थो वाच्यस्तमभिधातुं शीलं यस्य तत् परमार्थाभिधायि विशिष्टार्थदर्शकमित्यर्थः । ततस्तत्त्वग्राहितया उत्पन्नं प्रकृतवाक्य-

प्रतिपाद्यार्थादानशीलतया लब्धात्मसत्ताकं यन्मानं तत् शाब्दमिति प्रकीर्तितम् । ···
तदप्रामाण्ये परार्थानुमानप्रलयप्रसंगात् तस्य वचनरूपत्वात् । ··· शाब्दं च द्विधा
भवति । लौकिकं शास्त्रजं च । ·· यादृशः शास्त्रात् तज्जातं प्रमाणतामनुभवति
तद्दर्शयति ॥ ८ ॥

8. Knowledge arising from words, which taken in their proper
acceptance express real objects not inconsistent with what are establi-
shed by perception, is known as *śābda* (verbal testimony).

Śābda (the word or verbal testimony) is of two kinds, *viz.*, (1) *laukika* (know-
ledge derived from a reliable person), and (2) *śāstraja* (knowledge derived from
scripture).

आप्तोपज्ञमनुल्लङ्घ्यमदृष्टेष्टविरोधकम् ।
तत्त्वोपदेशकृत् सार्वं शास्त्रं कापथघट्टनम् ॥ ९ ॥

आप्तः प्रक्षीणाशेषरागादिदोषगणस्तेनोपज्ञम् आदौ उपलब्धम् अनेन अपौरुषेया-
पोहमाह ; तस्य प्रमाणबाधितत्वात् पुरुषव्यापाराभावे वचनानुपलब्धेरुपलम्भेऽपि
तदर्थानवगमात् तदर्थनिश्चयार्थं पुरुषाश्रयणे गजस्नानन्यायप्रसंगात् । ··· उल्लङ्घ्यते
प्राबल्येन गम्यते अभिभूयते अन्यैरित्युल्लङ्घ्यं ततोऽयदनुल्लङ्घ्यं सर्ववचनातिशायीति
यावत् । ··· दृष्टेन प्रमाणनिर्णीतेन इष्टस्य तद्द्राव्यस्य विरोधो यस्मिन् तत् तथा
तदेव । यदि चादृष्टः प्रमाणेन इष्टो वचनान्तरेण तयोर्विरोधकं तद्विरुद्धार्थाभिधानात् ।
ततोऽन्यत् अदृष्टेष्टविरोधकम् अबाधार्थाभिधायीत्यर्थः । ···· तत्त्वं जीवादयः पदार्थाः
प्रमाणप्रतिष्ठितत्वात् तेषाम् उपदेशः स्वरूपप्रकाशनं तद्रक्षणादिविधानं वा तं करोतीति
तत्त्वोपदेशकृत् अतएव सार्वं सर्वस्मै हितं ··· । कुत्सिताः पन्थानः कापथास्तीर्थां-
न्तराणि तेषां घट्टनं विचालकं निराकारकं सर्वजनापकारिकुमतविध्वंसकमित्यर्थः ॥९॥

9. Scripture (*śāstra*) is that which was first known by a competent
person, which is not such as to be passed over by others, which is not
incompatible with the truths derived from perception, which imparts
true instructions and which is profitable to all men and is preventive
of the evil path.

This definition sets aside the view of those [Mīmāṁsakas] who maintain that
scripture [such as the Veda] is eternal and was not composed by any human
being. Scripture could not have been called a verbal testimony (*śābda* or word),
unless it embodied the words of any particular person or persons.

स्वनिश्चयवदन्येषां निश्चयोत्पादनं बुधैः ।
परार्थं मानमाख्यातं वाक्यं तदुपचारतः ॥ १० ॥

स्व आत्मा तस्य निश्चयः प्रमेयाधिगमः तद्वदन्येषां प्रतिपाद्यानां निश्चयोत्पादनं

प्रमेयपरिच्छेदकज्ञानप्रादुर्भावनं यथाऽऽत्मनोऽर्थं निर्णयस्तथा परेषां निर्णयजननमित्यर्थः ।
बुधैर्विद्वद्भिः परस्मै अर्थः प्रयोजनं येन तत् पराथं मीयतेऽनेनेति मानम् ।   ननु च यदि
निश्चयोत्पादनं परार्थमानं तदा ज्ञानमपि परप्रत्यायनाय व्याप्रियमानं पराथं प्राप्नो-
तीत्याह ।   वाक्यं पराथं न ज्ञानं तस्यैव आनन्तर्येण व्यापारात् परप्रयोजनमात्त्वाच्च
इतरस्य तु व्यवहितत्वात् स्वपरोपकारित्वात् च । कथं वचनमज्ञानरूपं प्रमाणमित्याह ।
तदुपचारतस्तस्य ज्ञानस्य उपचारोऽतद्रूपस्यापि तदज्ञतया तद्रूपत्वेन ग्रहणं ततः
इदम् उक्तं भवति प्रतिपाद्यगतमुत्पत्स्यमानं यत् ज्ञानं तदव्यवहितकारणत्वात् वचनमपि
उपचारेण प्रमाणमित्युच्यते ।। १० ।।

10. Like the decision for oneself, the production of a decision in
others is called by the learned 'knowledge for the sake of others
(*parārthamāna*) : speech is designated as such by metaphor.

Knowledge is of two kinds : (1) knowledge for one's own self (*svārtha
māna*), and (2) knowledge for the sake of others (*parārtha māna*). The second
is defined as that which produces decision or belief (*niścaya*) in others, *i.e.*, which
enables others to ascertain the nature of things. The "word" or "speech" (*śabda*)
or *vākya*) comes under this class, that is, it is knowledge for the sake of others,
for it produces decision in others, It is true the "word" itself is not knowledge,
but being the medium through which knowledge is conveyed to others, it is
figuratively identified with knowledge.

प्रत्यक्षेणानुमानेन प्रसिद्धार्थप्रकाशनात् ।
परस्य तदुपायत्वात् पराथेत्वं द्वयोरपि ।। ११ ।।

प्रत्यक्षेणापि अनुमानेनैव प्रसिद्धार्थप्रकाशनात् स्वप्रतीतप्रमेयप्रत्यायनात् पराथेत्वं
प्रतिपाद्यप्रयोजनत्वं द्वयोरपि प्रत्यक्षानुमानयोस्तुल्यकारणत्वान्नानुमानस्यैवैकस्येत्यभि-
प्रायः । ··· तद्यथाऽनुमानप्रतीतोऽर्थः परस्मै प्रतिपाद्यमानो वचनरूपापन्नः पराथेमनु-
मानम् तथा प्रत्यक्षप्रतीतोऽपि पराथे प्रत्यक्षं परप्रत्यायनस्य तुल्यत्वात् वचनव्यापारस्यैव
भेदात् । तथाह्यनुमानप्रतीतं प्रत्यायन्नेव वचनयति । अग्निरत्र धूमात् । यत्र यत्र
धूमस्तत्र तत्राग्निः । यथा महानसादौ । वैधर्म्येण वा अग्न्यभावे न क्वचिद् धूमो
यथा जलाशयादौ । तथा च धूमोऽयं तस्मात् धूमादग्निरत्रेति । ··· प्रत्यक्षप्रतीतं
पुनर्दर्शयन् एतावद्वक्ति । पश्य राजा गच्छति । ततश्च वचनात् विविधादपि समग्र-
सामग्रीकस्य प्रतिपाद्यस्य अनुमेयप्रत्यक्षार्थविषया यतः प्रतीतिरुल्लसत्यतो द्वयोरपि
पराथेता इत्याह च । परस्य तदुपायत्वात् प्रतिपाद्यस्य प्रतीतिप्रतिपादकस्य प्रत्यक्षानु-
माननिर्णीतार्थप्रकाशनकारणत्वादित्यर्थः । एतेन पूर्वकारिकोक्तोपचारकारणं च
लक्षयति ।। ११ ।।

11. Perception and inference having disclosed objects with which
we are familiar and they being the means of communication to other
people, both of them are knowledge for the sake of others.

Perception and inference are as much knowledge for one's own self (*svārtha māna*) as for the sake of others (*parārtha māna*). They are called "knowledge for the sake of others" because the results of perception and inference arrived at by one's own self can be communicated to others through words.

प्रत्यक्षप्रतिपन्नार्थप्रतिपादि च यद्वचः ।
प्रत्यक्षं प्रतिभासस्य निमित्तत्वात्तदुच्यते ॥ १२ ॥

यद्वचः प्रत्यक्षप्रतिपन्नार्थप्रतिपादि साक्षात्कारिज्ञानगोचरकथनचतुरं तत् प्रत्यक्ष-मुच्यते । ··· वचनं कुतः प्रत्यक्षमित्याह । प्रतिभासस्य निमित्तत्वात् प्रतिपाद्यप्रत्यक्ष-प्रकाशहेतुत्वाद् उपचारेण उच्यते ॥ १२ ॥

12. A statement expressive of the object ascertained by perception is also called perception : it is so called being the cause of the object's manifestation.

As the result of perception can be communicated to others through word, the word itself is figuratively called perception. For instance, the deposition of a witness is taken by the judge as equivalent to perception, though in truth the judge has not perceived the fact deposed to.

साध्याविनाभुवो हेतोर्वचो यत् प्रतिपादकम् ।
परार्थमनुमानं तत् पक्षादिवचनात्मकम् ॥ १३ ॥

पक्षो वक्ष्यमाणलक्षणः स आदिर्येषां हेतुदृष्टान्तोपनयनिगमादीनां तानि तथा तेषां वचनानि प्रतिपादका ध्वनयः तान्येवात्मस्वरूपं यस्य तत्पक्षादिवचनात्मकं न तु च हेतुप्रतिपादकं वचः परार्थमनुमानमित्यभिधाय तत्पक्षादिवचनात्मकमिति वदतः पूर्वापर-व्याहृता वाचोयुक्तिः । नैतदस्ति । एवं मन्यते । नैकः प्रकारः परार्थानुमानस्य किं तर्हि यथा परस्य सुखेन प्रमेयप्रतीतिर्भवति तथा यत्न सः प्रत्ययायनीयः तत्र दशा-वयवसाधनं प्रतिपादनोपायः तद्यथा पक्षादयः पञ्च तच्छ्रद्वयश्च ॥ १३ ॥

13. A statement expressive of the reason (*i.e.*, mark or the middle term called *hetu*) which is inseparably connected with that which is to be proved (*i.e.*, the major term called *sādhya*) having been composed of the minor term (called *pakṣa* signifying a side or place), etc., is called an inference for the sake of others (*parārthānumāna*).

In an "inference for the sake of others" the minor term (*pakṣa*), etc., must be explicitly set forth. The major term (*sādhya*) is that which is to be proved. The middle term or reason (*hetu*, *liṅga* or *sādhana*) is that which cannot exist in connection with the major term (*sādhya* or *liṅgi*). The minor term, locus or abode (*pakṣa*), is that with which the reason or middle term (*hetu*) is connected, and whose connection with the major term (*sādhya*) is to be proved.

In a proposition the subject is the minor term (*pakṣa*), and the predicate the major term (*sādhya*). The following is an "inference for the sake of others" :—

    (1) This *hill* (minor term) is full of *fire* (major term)—proposition (*pratijñā*) ;

    (2) because it is full of *smoke* (middle term) ;

    (3) whatever is full of smoke is full of fire, *e.g.*, a *kitchen* (example, *dṛṣṭānta*) ;

    (4) *so* is this hill full of smoke (application, *upanaya*) ;

    (5) *therefore* this hill is full of fire (conclusion, *nigamana*).

The above is a mediocre (*madhyama*) form of an "inference for the sake of others." Here the minor term (*pakṣa*), the major term (*sādhya*), the middle term (*hetu*) and example (*dṛṣṭānta*) have been used. The worst (*jaghanya*) form of an "inference for the sake of others" consists in a mere statement of the reason or middle term (*hetu*) in addition to the major term (*sādhya*) and minor term (*pakṣa*), thus :—

    (1) This *hill* (minor term) is full of *fire* (major term).

    (2) because it is full of *smoke* (middle term).

The best (*uttama*) form of an inference for the sake of others consists in the statement of the following ten parts or members (*daśāvayava*) : (1) proposition (*pratijñā*) ; (2) correction of the proposition (*pratijñā-śuddhi*) ; (3) reason or middle term (*hetu*) ; (4) correction of the reason or middle term (*hetu-śuddhi*) ; (5) example (*dṛṣṭānta*) ; (6) correction of the example (*dṛṣṭānta-śuddhi*) ; (7) application (*upanaya*) ; (8) correction of the application (*upanaya-śuddhi*) ; (9) conclusion (*nigamana*) and (10) correction of the conclusion (*nigamana-śuddhi*).

Any form containing less than ten members down to five is called mediocre (*madhyama*).

साध्याभ्युपगमः पक्षः प्रत्यक्षाद्यनिराकृतः ।
तत्प्रयोगोऽत्र कर्तव्यो हेतोर्गोचरदीपकः ॥ १४ ॥

साध्यस्य अनुमेयस्य अभ्युपगमोऽङ्गीकरणं प्राश्निकादीनां पुरतः प्रतिज्ञास्वीकार इत्यर्थः । ··· प्रत्यक्षाद्यनिराकृत इति प्रत्यक्षं साक्षात्कारिसंवेदनमादिशब्दादनुमान-स्ववचनलोका गृह्यन्ते ते: अनिराकृतः अबाधितः । ··· तद्यथा सर्वमनेकान्तात्मकम् अस्तिसर्वज्ञ इत्यादि । तस्य पक्षस्य प्रयोगोऽभिधानमत्र परार्थानुमानप्रस्तावे कर्तव्यो विधेयः । हेतोर्गोचरदीपक इति निर्देशस्य विषयसंदर्शकत्वात् इत्यर्थः ॥ १४ ॥

14. *Pakṣa* (the minor term) is that which is asserted to be connected with the (major term or) *sādhya* and is not excluded by perception, etc. : it is to be used here (in an inference for the sake of others) as exhibiting a locus or abode of the reason (*i.e.*, the middle term called *hetu*).

Some philosophers hold that the minor term (*pakṣa*) is not an essential part of an inference. But this view, according to the Jainas, is untenable, it being absolutely necessary to state the minor term (*pakṣa*) in an inference,

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अन्यथा वाद्यभिप्रेतहेतुगोचरमोहितः ।
प्रत्याय्यस्य भवेद्धेतुर्विरुद्धारेकितो यथा ॥ १५ ॥

अन्यथेत्युक्तविपरीताश्रयणे पक्षप्रयोगाकरणे इत्यर्थः । वादिनो हेतुपन्यासकर्तुर भिप्रेतोऽभिमतः स चासौ हेतुगोचरश्च वाद्यभिप्रेतहेतुगोचरस्तत्र मुह्यति दोलायते तच्छीलश्च यस्तस्य प्रत्याय्यस्य प्रतिवादिनो हेतुविरुद्धारेकितो भवेत् विरोधशङ्का- कलङ्कितः स्यादित्यर्थः । ततश्च सम्यग् हेतावपि विपक्षे एवायं वर्तते इति व्यामोहात् विरुद्धदूषणमभिदध्यीत । पक्षोपन्यासात्तु निर्णीतहेतुगोचरस्य नैष दोषः स्यादित्यभि- प्रायः । अमुमेवार्थं स्पष्टं दृष्टान्तेनाह ॥ १५ ॥

15. Otherwise owing to a misconception as to the locus or abode of the reason (*i.e.*, *pakṣa* or minor term) as intended by the disputant, his reason (*hetu* or middle term) may appear to his opponent as absurd.

If any disputant does not explicitly state the minor term (*pakṣa*), his reason might be misunderstood by his opponent, *e.g.* :—

    (1) This hill (minor term) is full of fire (major term)

    (2) because it is full of smoke (middle term).

The above inference, if the minor term is omitted, will assume the following form —

    (1) Full of fire (major term) :

    (2) because full of smoke (middle term).

Here the opponent might not at once recollect any locus or abode (minor term, *pakṣa*) in which the fire and smoke abide in union, and might mistake a lake for such a locus or abode. In such a case the whole argument will be misunderstood.

धानुष्कगुणसंप्रेक्षिजनस्य परिविध्यतः ।
धानुष्कस्य विना लक्ष्यनिर्देशेन गुणेतरौ । १६ ॥

यथा लक्ष्यनिर्देशं विना धानुष्कस्य इषुं प्रक्षिपतो यौ गुणदोषौ तौ तद्दृशिजनस्य विपर्यस्तावपि प्रतिभातः । गुणोऽपि दोषतया दोषोऽपि वा गुणतया तथा पक्षनिर्देशं विना हेतुमुपन्यस्यतो वादिनो यौ स्वाभिप्रेतसाध्यसाधनसमर्थत्वासमर्थत्वलक्षणौ गुण- दोषौ तौ प्राश्निकप्रतिवाद्यादीनां विपरीतावपि प्रतिभात इति भावार्थः ॥ १६ ॥

16. A man who has come to behold the excellence of an archer will have to behold the opposite of it, if the archer hits without fixing an aim.

Just as a clever archer, with a view to preventing his arrow from going to a wrong direction, fixes his aim before hitting, so a skilful disputant in order to avoid being misunderstood, should in stating an inference mention the minor term (*pakṣa*) with which the major term (*sādhya*) and the middle term (*hetu*) are both connected.

हेतोस्तथोपपत्त्या वा स्यात् प्रयोगोऽन्यथापि वा ।
द्विविधोऽन्यतरेणापि साध्यसिद्धिर्भवेदिति ॥ १७ ॥

स्वार्थानुमानप्रस्तावे हि परप्रणीतलक्षणान्तरव्यपोहेन साध्यव्यतिरेकात् सामस्त्येन
हेतोर्व्याप्तिरेवैकं लक्षणमिति निर्णीतं पराथार्नुमानेऽपि तदेव प्रकाशनीयं वचनरचना
तु क्वचित् प्रवर्तते इत्यभिप्रायवांस्तद्द्वैविध्यमाह । हेतोर्द्विविधः प्रयोगः स्यादिति
सम्बन्धः । कथमित्याह । तथैव साध्यसद्भावे एव उपपत्तिविद्यमानता तया तथोप-
पत्त्या यथा अग्निरत्र धूमस्य तथैव उपपत्तेरिति । अन्यथापि वा इत्यनेनावयवे
समुदायोपचारात् अन्यथानुपपत्तिं लक्षयति अन्यथा साध्यव्यतिरेके अनुपपत्तिः अविद्य-
मानता एव तया वा अन्यथानुपपत्त्या हेतोः प्रयोगः स्यात् । यथा अग्निरत्र धूमस्य
अन्यथानुपपत्तिरिति एते च द्वे अपि एकस्मिन् साध्ये प्रयोक्तव्ये इति मन्येत । ...
तथोपपत्तिप्रयोगेण अन्यथाऽनुपपत्त्यप्रयोगेण वा साध्यस्य प्रतिपिपादयिषितार्थस्य
सिद्धिनिष्पत्तिः ... भवेत् ॥ १७ ॥

17.   The reason (or the middle term *i.e.*, *hetu*) may be used to
show connection or the opposite of it :   in either of these two ways
the *sādhya* (that which is to be proved) can be proved.

The reason or middle term (*hetu*) can be used in two ways as follows :   (1) the
reason or middle term (*hetu*) may exist only if the major term (*sādhya*) existed,
such as in the proposition "here there is fire because there is smoke," the smoke
(middle term) may exist only if there is fire (major term) ; and (2) the reason or
middle term (*hetu*) cannot exist if the major term (*sādhya*) does not exist, such as
in the proposition "here there is fire because otherwise there could not be any
smoke" the smoke (middle term) could not have existed if there had been no fire
(major term).

साध्यसाधनयोर्व्यातिरियत निश्चीयतेतराम् ।
साधर्म्येण स दृष्टान्तः सम्बन्धस्मरणान्मतः ॥ १८ ॥

साध्यं जिज्ञासितार्थमिकं साधनं तद्गमको हेतुः तयोः साध्यसाधनयोः व्याप्तिः
इदमनेन विना न भवतीत्येवंरुपा यत्र क्वचिन्निश्चीयतेतराम् अतिशयेन निर्णीयते स
साधर्म्यदृष्टान्तः । यथा अग्निरत्र धूमस्य तथैव उपपत्तेः महानसादिवत् । इत्ययं
च अविस्मृतप्रतिबन्धे प्रतिवादिनि न प्रयोक्तव्य इत्याह ॥ १८ ॥

18.   Where the inseparable connection of the major term (*sādhya*)
and the middle term (*sādhana* or *hetu*) is ascertained by homogene-
ousness (*sādharmya*), the example is called a homogeneous one on
account of the connection (between those terms) being recollected.

An example (*dṛṣṭānta*) is a familiar case which assures the inseparable
connection (*vyāpti*) between the major term (*sādhya*) and the middle term (*hetu*).

It is of two kinds : (1) homogeneous (*sādharmyavat*), and (2) heterogeneous (*vaidharmyavat*). The homogeneous example is that which assures the connection (*vyāpti*) by homogeneous (*sādharmya*) thus :—

      (1) This hill is full of fire (major term) ;

      (2) because it is full of *smoke* (middle term) ;

      (3) as a *kitchen* (homogeneous example).

Here the fire and smoke abide homogeneously in the kitchen.

साध्ये निवर्तमाने तु साधनस्याप्यसम्भवः ।
ख्याप्यते यत्र दृष्टान्ते वैधर्म्येणेति स स्मृतः ॥ १६ ॥

साध्ये गम्ये निवर्तमाने असंभवति तु शब्दोऽवधारणार्थो भिन्नक्रमः स च साधनस्य असंभव एव इत्यत्र द्रष्टव्यः । ख्याप्यते प्रतिपाद्यते यत्र क्वचित् दृष्टान्ते स वैधर्म्येण भवति इति शब्देन सम्बन्धस्मरणाद् इति इदमत्रापि संबध्नाति अस्यापि स्मर्यमाणे संबन्धे अप्रयोगाद् इति किमर्थं विस्मृतसंबन्धे एव प्रतिवादिनि दृष्टान्तः प्रयुज्यते नान्यदेति परवचनावकाशमाशङ्ग्राह ॥ १६ ॥

19. The heterogeneous example is that which shows that the absence of the major term (*sādhya*) is followed by the absence of the middle term (*sādhana*).

The heterogeneous example assures the connection (*vyāpti*) by contrariety, that is, by showing that the absence of the major term (*sādhya*) is attended by the absence of the middle term (*hetu*), thus :—

      (1) This hill has no *smoke* (major term) ;

      (2) because it has no *fire* (middle term) ;

      (3) as a *lake* (heterogeneous example).

अन्तर्व्याप्त्यैव साध्यस्य सिद्धर्बहिरुदाह्रति ।
व्यर्था स्यात्तदसद्भावेऽप्येवं न्यायविदो विदुः ॥ २० ॥

अन्यदा हि स्मर्यमाणे वा संबन्धे अप्रयुज्येतागृहीते वा ··· ततश्च अन्तः पक्षमध्ये व्याप्तिः साधनस्य साध्याक्रान्तत्वम् अन्तर्व्याप्तिस्तस्यैव साध्यसंगम्यसंसिद्धेः प्रतीतेः बहिर्विवक्षितधर्मिणोऽन्यत्र दृष्टान्तधर्मिणि उदाह्रतिः व्याप्तिदर्शनरूपा व्यर्था निष्प्रयोजना । तदसद्भावेऽप्येव संबन्धाद् ग्रहणाद् अन्तर्व्याप्त्यभावेऽप्येवमिति व्यर्थेव बहिरुदाह्रतिः । नहि सहदर्शनात् । क्वचित् सर्वत्र तद्रूपता सिध्यति व्यभिचारदर्शनात् । तस्माद् अगृहीतसम्बन्धे प्रतिपाद्ये प्रमाणे न प्रतिबन्धः । साध्यस्ततुसिद्धौ तत एव साध्यसिद्धेरकिञ्चित्करी दृष्टान्तोदाह्रतिरिति न्यायविद्वांसो विदुरवबुध्यन्ते इति । इह च प्रकरणे शेषावयवानां उपनयनिगमनशुद्धिपञ्चकलक्षणानां संक्षिप्तरुचिसत्त्वानुग्रहपरत्वाद् अस्य यद्यपि साक्षाल्लक्षणं नोक्तं तथाप्यत एव प्रतिपादितावयवत्रयं बुद्धिमद्भिरुन्नेयम् । यतोऽवयवापेक्षया जघन्यमध्यमोत्कृष्टाः तिस्रः कथा भवन्ति इति ।

तत्र हेतुप्रतिपादनमात्रं जघन्या, द्व्राद्यवयवनिवेदनं मध्यमा, संपूर्णदशावयवकथनमुत्-
कृष्टा । तत्र इह मध्यमायाः साक्षात् कथनेन जघन्योत्कृष्टे अर्थतः सूचयति ;
तत्सङ्ग्रावस्य प्रमाणसिद्धत्वादिति ॥ २० ॥

20. Logicians maintain that to cite an example from outside is useless as that which is to be proved (*sādhya*) can be proved through internal inseparable connection (*antar-vyāpti*) even without such example.

Internal inseparable connection (*antar-vyāpti*) occurs when the minor term (*pakṣa*) itself as the common abode of the middle term (*hetu*) and the major term (*sādhya*) shows the inseparable connection between them, thus :—

(1) This hill (minor term) is full of *fire* (major term) ;
(2) because it is full of *smoke* (middle term).

Here the inseparable connection between fire and smoke is shown by the hill (minor term) which is their common abode.

External inseparable connection (*bahir-vyāpti*) occurs when an example (*dṛṣ-ṭānta*) from outside is introduced as the common abode of the middle term (*hetu*) and the major term (*sādhya*) to assure the inseparable connection between them thus :—

(1) This hill is full of *fire* (major term) ;
(2) because it is full of *smoke* (middle term) ;
(3) as a *kitchen* (example).

Here the kitchen, which forms no essential part of the inference, is introduced from outside as the common abode of fire and smoke to assure the inseparable connection between them (the fire and smoke).

Some logicians [such as Vasubandhu] hold that that which is to be proved, that is, the major term (*sādhya*) can be established by the internal inseparable connection (*antar-vyāpti*) alone, so the pointing out of the external inseparable connection (*bahir-vyāpti*) is superfluous. Other logicians go so far as to say that even if the minor term (*pakṣa*) is not used, there will be no impossibility in establishing the major term (*sādhya*). Cf.

(1) This *hill* (minor term) is full of *fire* (major term) ;
(2) because it is full of *smoke* (middle term) ;
(3) as a *kitchen* (example).

In the above example "as a kitchen," that is, the example, is, according to these logicians, superfluous. Even the minor term (*pakṣa*) can, according to them, be dispensed with thus :

(1) Full of *fire* (major term) ;
(2) because full of *smoke* (middle term).

Even here, where there is no minor term (*pakṣa*), the example (*dṛṣṭānta*), according to them, is useless.

प्रतिपाद्यस्य यः सिद्धः पक्षाभासोऽस्ति लिङ्गतः ।
लोकस्ववचनाभ्यां च बाधितोऽनेकधा मतः ॥ २१ ॥

प्रतिपाद्यस्य प्रतिवादिनः यः कश्चित् सिद्धः प्रतीतावारुढ एव स पक्षाभासः ।

साध्यस्यैव पक्षत्वात् सिद्धस्य साधनानर्हत्वाद् अतिप्रसक्तेस्तथाऽक्षलिंगतोऽध्यक्षहेतुभ्यां लोकस्ववचनाभ्यां च बाधितस्तिरस्कृतो यः स पक्षाभासस्तत्र प्रतिपाद्यसिद्धो यथा पौद्गलिको घटः । सौगतं वा प्रति सर्वं क्षणिकमित्यादि । प्रत्यक्षबाधितो यथा निरंशानि स्वलक्षणानि परस्परविविक्तौ वा सामान्यविशेषाविति । अनुमानबाधितो यथा नास्ति सर्वज्ञ इति । लोकबाधितो यथा गम्या माता इति । स्ववचनबाधितो यथा न सन्ति सर्वे भावा इति ॥ २१ ॥

21. If that of which the major term or predicate is affirmed is opposed by evidence (*liṅga*), the public understanding, one's own statement, etc., we have that which is known as the fallacy of the minor term or thesis (*pakṣābhāsa*) of which there are many varieties.

The semblance or fallacy of the minor term or thesis (*pakṣābhāsa*) arises when one predicates of the minor term (*pakṣa*) that which is yet to be proved to the opponent, or which is incapable of being proved, or when it is opposed to perception and inference, or inconsistent with the public understanding or incongruous with one's own statement, thus :—

(1) "The jar is animate (*paudgalika*)"—this is a conclusion which is yet to be proved to the opponent.
(2) "Every thing is momentary"—this is a Saugata (Buddhist) doctrine which, according to the Jainas, is incapable of being proved.
(3) "The general (*sāmānya*) and particular (*viśeṣa*) things are without parts, are distinct from each other and are like themselves alone"— this is opposed to perception.
(4) "There is no omniscient being"—this is, according to the Jainas, opposed to inference.
(5) "The sister is to be taken as wife"—this is inconsistent with the public understanding.
(6) "All things are non-existent"—this is incongruous with one's own statement.

अन्यथानुपपन्नत्वं हेतोर्लक्षणमीरितम् ।
तत्प्रतीतिसन्देहविपर्यासैस्तदाभता ॥ २२ ॥

हेतोर्लक्षणम् असाधारणधर्मरूपं यदीरितं गमितं अनेकार्थत्वाद्वा धातोः प्रतिपादितं स्वार्थानुमानप्रस्तावे । यदुतान्यथानुपपन्नत्वमिति । तस्य अप्रतीतिरनध्यवसायः, संदेहो दोलायमानता, विपर्यासो वैपरीत्यनिर्णयोऽप्रतीतिश्च संदेहश्च विपर्यासश्चेति द्वन्द्वः । तदाभता हेत्वाभासता ॥ २२ ॥

22. The reason (*i.e.*, the middle term called *hetu*) has been defined as that which cannot exist except in connection with the major term (*sādhya*) : the fallacy of the reason (*hetvābhāsa*) arises from non-conception, doubt or misconception about it (the middle term).

(1) This hill is full of *fire* (major term) ;

(2) because it is full of *smoke* (middle term).

In this example "smoke" is the middle term or reason (*hetu*) which cannot exist except in an inseparable connection (union) with "fire" which is the major term (*sādhya*).

असिद्धस्त्वप्रतीतो यो योऽन्यथैवोपपद्यते ।
विरुद्धो योऽन्यथाप्यत्र युक्तोऽनैकान्तिकः स तु ॥ २३ ॥

यः कश्चिदप्रतीतः प्रतीत्यागोचरीकृतोऽनिश्चितः सोऽसिद्धनामा हेत्वाभासः । ... यस्तु अन्यथैव साध्यं विनैव विपक्ष एवेति यावद् उपपद्यते सम्भवति स विरुद्धाभिधानः । यः पुनः अन्यथापि साध्यविपर्ययेणापि युक्तो घटमानकोऽपि शब्दात् साध्येनापि सोऽत्र व्यतिकरेऽनैकान्तिकसंज्ञो ज्ञातव्य इति । तत्र प्रतिप्राणिप्रसिद्धप्रमाणप्रतिष्ठितानेकान्त- विरुद्धबुद्धिभिः कणभक्षाक्षपादबुद्धादिशिष्यैरुपन्यस्यमानाः सर्व एव हेतवः । तद्यथा एकान्तेन नित्यः शब्दोऽनित्यो वा । सत्त्वात् उत्पत्तिमत्त्वात् कृतकत्वात् प्रत्यभिज्ञाय- मानत्वाद् इत्याह । ... कल्पनारचितसत्ताकानां च सर्वशक्तिविरहरूपतया निःस्व- भावत्वात् । तथापि तेषां साधनत्वे साध्यमपि निःस्वभावमिति । खरविषाणं शशविषाणस्य साधनमापद्यते इति शोभनः साध्यसाधनव्यवहारः । ... एवं हि नभः- पुण्डरीकं तत्र नास्तीति सत्तादिकमपि कल्पयितुं न शक्यमिति प्रसज्येत । ... अनित्यवादी नित्यवादिनं प्रति प्रमाणयति । सर्वं क्षणिकं सत्त्वात् ... ... नित्यवादी पुनः एवं प्रमाणयति । सर्वं नित्यं सत्त्वात् । तस्माद् अमी सर्व एव हेतवः सन्तोऽनेकान्तमन्तरेण नोपपद्यन्ते इति तमेव प्रतिपादयितुम् ईशते विमूढबुद्धिभिः पुनः विपक्षसाधनार्थम् उपन्यस्यमाना विवक्षया असिद्धविरुद्धानैकान्तिकतामाबिभ्रतीति स्थितम् ॥ २३ ॥

23. That which has not yet been established is called "the unproved" (*asiddha*); that which is possible only in the opposite way is called "the contradictory" (*viruddha*); and that which can be explained in one way as well as in the opposite way is called "the uncertain" (*anaikāntika*).

Semblance of the reason of fallacy of the middle term (*hetvābhāsa*) is of three kinds, as follows :—

(1) The unproved (*asiddha*) such as : "this lotus is fragrant because it is a sky-lotus." Here the reason, *viz.*, the sky-lotus [which is unreal] is unproved.

(2) The contradictory (*viruddha*) such as : "this is fiery because it is a body of water." Here the reason alleged is opposed to what is to be established.

(3) The uncertain (*anaikāntika*) such as : "all things are momentary because they are existent." Here the reason alleged is uncertain because 'existence' may or may not be a proof of momentariness, for, an opponent might equally argue : "all things are eternal because they are existent."

साधर्म्येणात्र दृष्टान्तदोषा न्यायविदीरिताः ।
अपलक्षणहेतूत्थाः साध्यादिविकलादयः ॥ २४ ॥

दृष्टान्तदोषा दृष्टान्ताभासा इत्यर्थः । ··· साध्यं गम्यम् आदिशब्दात् साधनोभय-
परिग्रहः । तद्विकलास्तच्छून्या आदिशब्दात् सन्दिग्धसाध्यसाधनोभयधर्मा गृह्यन्ते ।
किंभूता एते इत्याह । अपगतं लक्षणं येभ्यस्ते तथा च ते हेतवश्च तेभ्य उत्था उत्थानं
येषां ते अपलक्षणहेतूत्थाः । इदं च प्रत्येकं विशेषणं, सम्यग्हेतावपि वक्तृदोषवशात्
दृष्टान्ताभासतोपपत्तेः यथा नित्यानित्यः शब्दः श्रावणत्वात् घटवदिति । तत्र साध्य-
विकलो यथा, भ्रान्तम् अनुमानं प्रमाणत्वात् प्रत्यक्षवत् प्रत्यक्षस्य भ्रान्तताविकलत्वात्··· ।
साधनविकलो यथा, जाग्रत्संवेदनं भ्रान्तं प्रमाणत्वात् स्वप्नसंवेदनवत् स्वप्नसंवेदनस्य
प्रमाणतावैकल्यात् ··· । उभयविकलो यथा, नास्ति सर्वज्ञः प्रत्यक्षाद्यनुपलब्धत्वात्
घटवत् घटस्य सत्त्वात् प्रत्यक्षादिभिरुपलब्धत्वाच्च । सन्दिग्धसाध्यधर्मो यथा,
वीतरागोऽयं मरणधर्मत्वात् रथ्यापुरुषवत् रथ्यापुरुषे वीतरागत्वस्य सन्दिग्धत्वात्··· ।
सन्दिग्धसाधनधर्मा यथा, मरणधर्माऽयं पुरुषो रागादिमत्त्वात् रथ्यापुरुषवद्
द्रष्टव्यः पुरुषे रागादिमत्त्वस्य सन्दिग्धत्वात् वीतरागस्यापि तथा सम्भवादिति ।
सन्दिग्धोभयधर्मो यथा, असर्वज्ञोऽयं रागादिमत्त्वात् रथ्यापुरुषवद् इति रथ्यापुरुषे
प्रदर्शितन्यायेन उभयस्यापि सन्दिग्धत्वादिति । ननु च परैरन्यदपि दृष्टान्ताभासत्रय-
मुक्तं तद्यथा अनन्वयोऽप्रदर्शितान्वयो विपरीतान्वयश्चेति । तत्र अनन्वयो यथा,
रागादिमान् विवक्षितः पुरुषो वक्तृत्वाद् इष्टपुरुषवदिति यद्यपि क्लिष्टपुरुषे रागादि-
मत्त्वं वक्तृत्वं च साध्यसाधनधर्मौ दृष्टौ तथापि यो यो वक्ता स स रागादिमानिति
व्याप्त्यसिद्धेरनन्वयोऽयं दृष्टान्तः । तथा अप्रदर्शितान्वयो यथा, अनित्यः शब्दः
कृतकत्वात् घटवदिति । अत्र यद्यपि वास्तवोऽन्वयोऽस्ति तथापि वादिना वचनेन
न प्रकाशित इति अप्रदर्शितान्वयो दृष्टान्तः । विपरीतान्वयो यथा, अनित्यः शब्दः
कृतकत्वाद् इति । हेतुमभिधाय यदनित्यं तत् कृतकं घटवदिति विपरीतव्याप्ति-
दर्शनाद् विपरीतान्वयः ॥ २४ ॥

24. Logicians have declared that fallacies of the example (*dṛṣṭāntābhāsa*) in the homogeneous form arise here from an imperfect middle term or from a defect in the major term, etc.

Fallacies of the homogeneous example (*sādharmya-dṛṣṭāntābhāsa*) arise from a defect in the major term (*sādhya*) or middle term (*hetu*) or both or from doubt about them, thus :—

(1) Inference is *invalid* (major term), because it is a *source of knowledge* (middle term), like a *perception* (homogeneous example).

Here the example involves a defect in the major term (*sādhya*), for perception is not invalid.

(2) Perception is *invalid* (major term), because it is a *source of true knowledge* (middle term), like a *dream* (homogeneous example).

Here the example involves a defect in the middle term *(hetu)*, for a dream is not a source of true knowledge.

(3) The omniscient being is not *existent* (major term), because he is not *apprehended by the senses* (middle term), like a *jar* (homogeneous example).

Here the example involves a defect in both the major and middle terms *(sādhya* and *hetu)*, for the jar is both existent and apprehended by the senses.

(4) This person is *devoid of passions* (major term), because he is *mortal* (middle term), like the *man in the street* (homogeneous example).

Here the example involves doubt as to the validity of the major term, for it is doubtful whether the man in the street is devoid of passions.

(5) This person is *mortal* (major term). because he is *full of passions* (middle term), like the *man in the street* (homogeneous example).

Here the example involves doubt as to the validity of the middle term, for it is doubtful whether the man in the street is devoid of passions.

(6) The person is not *omniscient* (major term), because he is *full of passions* (middle term), like the *man in the street* (homogeneous example).

Here the example involves doubt as to the validity of both the major and middle terms, for it is doubtful whether the man in the street is full of passions and not omniscient.

Some unnecessarily lay down three other kinds of fallacy of the homogeneous example *(sādharmya-dṛṣṭāntābhāsa)*, viz. :—

(1) Unconnected *(ananvaya)*, such as : This person is *full of passions* (major term), because he is a *speaker* (middle term), like a *certain man in Magadha* (example).

Here though a certain man in Magadha is both a speaker and full of passions, yet there is no inseparable connection between "being a speaker" and "being full of passions."

(2) Of connection unshown *(apradarśitānvaya)*, such as :—
Sound is *non-eternal* (major term), because it is a product (middle term) as a jar (example).

Here though there is an inseparable connection between "product" and "non-eternal" yet it has not been shown in the proper from, as :—
"Whatever is a product is non-eternal as a jar."

[Diṅnāga the Buddhist urged the necessity of converting the example into a universal proposition with a view to showing the connection between the middle term and the major term in the proper form.]

(3) Of contrary connection *(viparītānvaya)*, such as :—
Sound is non-eternal (major term), because it is a product (middle term).

Here if the inseparable connection *(vyāpti)* is shown thus—
"Whatever is non-eternal is a product as a jar." instead of thus—
"Whatever is a product is non-eternal as a jar," the example would involve the fallacy of contrary connection.

3

वैधर्म्येणात्र दृष्टान्तदोषा न्यायविदीरिताः ।
साध्यसाधनयुग्मानामनिवृत्तेश्च संशयात् ॥ २५ ॥

साध्याभावः साधनाभावव्याप्तौ दर्शयितुमभिप्रेयते यस्मिन् तद् वैधर्म्यम् । तेनात्र दृष्टान्तदोषा न्यायविदीरिता इति दत्तार्थं साध्यसाधनयुग्मानां गम्यगमकोभयानाम् अनिवृत्तिः अविवर्तनात्, चशब्दस्य व्यवहितप्रयोगत्वात् संशयाच्च निवृत्तिसंदेहाच्चेत्यर्थः । तदनेन षड् दृष्टान्ताभासाः सूचिताः । तद्यथा साध्याव्यतिरेकी(१), साधनाव्यतिरेकी (२), साध्यसाधनाव्यतिरेकी (३), तथा सन्दिग्धसाध्यव्यतिरेकः (४), सन्दिग्धसाधन-व्यतिरेकः (५), सन्दिग्धसाध्यसाधनव्यतिरेकश्चेति (६) । तत्र साध्याव्यतिरेकी यथा, भ्रान्तमनुमानं प्रमाणत्वाद् इत्यत्र वैधर्म्यदृष्टान्तो यत् पुनर्भ्रान्तं न भवति न तत् प्रमाणं तद्यथा स्वप्नज्ञानमिति स्वप्नज्ञानाद् भ्रान्ततानिवृत्तेः साध्याव्यतिरेकित्वमिति । साधनाव्यतिरेकी यथा, प्रत्यक्षं निर्विकल्पकं प्रमाणत्वादिति । अत्र वैधर्म्यदृष्टान्तो यत् पुनः सविकल्पकं न तत् प्रमाणं तद्यथानुमानमनुप्रमाणताऽनिवृत्तेः साधनाव्यति-रेकित्वम् । उभयाव्यतिरेकी यथा, नित्यानित्यः शब्दः सत्त्वाद् इत्यत्र वैधर्म्यदृष्टान्तो यः पुनर्नं नित्यानित्यः स न सन् तद्यथा घटः घटादुभयस्यापि अव्यावृत्तेरुभयाव्यति-रेकित्वमिति । तथा सन्दिग्धसाध्यव्यतिरेकः, असर्वज्ञा अनाप्ता वा कपिलादयः आर्यसत्यचतुष्टयाप्रतिपादकत्वादिति । अत्र वैधर्म्यदृष्टान्तः यः पुनः सर्वज्ञ आप्तो वा असौ आर्यसत्यचतुष्टयं प्रत्यपीपदत् तद्यथा शौद्धोदनिरिति । अयं च साध्याव्यतिरेकी वा आर्यसत्यचतुष्टयस्य दुःखसमुदयमार्गनिरोधलक्षणस्य प्रमाण-बाधितत्वेन तद्भ्राषकस्य असर्वज्ञतानाप्ततोपपत्तेः … … तस्मात् शौद्धोदनेः सकाशाद् असर्वज्ञतानाप्ततालक्षणस्य साध्यस्य व्यावृत्तिः सन्दिग्धेति सन्दिग्धसाध्यव्यति-रेकित्वमिति । सन्दिग्धसाधनव्यतिरेको यथा, अनादेयवाक्यः कश्चिद्विवक्षितः पुरुषो रागादिमत्त्वादित्यत्र वैधर्म्यदृष्टान्तो यः पुनः आदेयवाक्यो न स रागादिमान् तद्यथा सुगत इति … सुगतात् रागादिमत्त्वव्यावृत्तिसंशयात् सन्दिग्धसाधनव्यतिरेकित्वमिति । सन्दिग्धसाध्यसाधनव्यतिरेको यथा, वीतरागाः कपिलादयः करुणास्पदेषु अपि अकरुणापरीतचित्ततया दत्तनिजकमांसशकलत्वादिति । अत्र वैधर्म्यदृष्टान्तो ये पुनर्वीतरागास्ते करुणापरीतचित्ततया दत्तनिजमांसशकलाः तद्यथा बोधिसत्त्वा इत्यत्र साधनसाध्यधर्मयोर्बोधिसत्त्वेभ्यो व्यावृत्तिः सन्दिग्धा ततः प्रतिपादितप्रमाणवैकल्यात् न ज्ञायते किं ते रागादिमन्त उत वीतरागास्तथाऽनुकम्प्येषु किं स्वपिशितखण्डानि दत्तवन्तो नेति वा अतः सन्दिग्धसाध्यसाधनव्यतिरेकित्वमिति । परैः परेऽपि दृष्टान्ता-भासास्त्रयो विमृश्यभाषितया दर्शितास्तद्यथाऽव्यतिरेकोऽप्रदर्शितव्यतिरेकोऽविपरीत-व्यतिरेकश्चेति । ते अस्माभिः अयुक्तत्वात् दर्शयितव्याः । तथाहि अव्यतिरेकस्तु-र्दर्शितो यथा, अवीतरागः कश्चिद् विवक्षितः पुरुषो वक्तृत्वादित्यत्र वैधर्म्यदृष्टान्तो यः पुनः वीतरागो न स वक्ता यथोपलखण्ड इति ; यद्यपि किलोपलखण्डाद् उभयं व्यावृत्तं तथापि व्याप्त्या व्यतिरेकासिद्धेः अव्यतिरेकित्वमिति । … तथाहि अप्रदर्शित-

व्यतिरेकस्तैरुक्तो यथा, अनित्यः शब्दः कृतकत्वात् आकाशवदित्यत्र विद्यमानोऽपि
व्यतिरेको वादिना वचनेन उद्धावित इति दुष्टता । विपरीतव्यतिरेकः पुनरभिहितो
यथा, अनित्यः शब्दः कृतकत्वाद् इत्यत्र वैधर्म्यदृष्टान्तो यदकृतकं तन्नित्यं भवति
यथाऽऽकाशमिति इत्यत्र विपर्यस्तव्यतिरेकप्रदर्शनात् विपरीतव्यतिरेकित्वम् ॥ २५ ॥

25. Logicians have declared that fallacies of example in the
heterogeneous form arise when the absence of the major term
(*sādhya*) or the middle term (*sādhana* or *hetu*) or both is not shown
or when there is a doubt about them.

The fallacy of heterogeneous example (*vaidharmya-dṛṣṭāntābhāsa*) is of six
kinds, thus :—

(1) Inference is *invalid* (major term), because it is a *source of true knowledge*
(middle term) ; whatever is not invalid is not a source of true
knowledge as a *dream* (heterogeneous example).

Here the example involves in the heterogeneous form a defect in the major
term (*sādhya*), for a dream is really invalid though it has been cited as not invalid.

(2) Perception is *non-reflective* or *nirvikalpaka* (major term), because it is a
source of true knowledge (middle term) ; whatever is reflective or
savikalpaka is not a source of true knowlege, as *inference* (hetero-
geneous example).

Here the example involves in the heterogeneous form a defect in the middle
term (*sādhana*), for inference is really a source of true knowledge though it has
been cited as not such.

(3) Sound is *eternal* and *non-eternal* (major term), because it is an *existence*
(middle term) ; whatever is not eternal and non-eternal is not an
existence, as a *jar* (heterogeneous example).

Here the example involves in the heterogeneous form a defect in both the
major and middle terms (*sādhya* and *sādhana*), for the jar is both "eternal and
non-eternal," and "an existence."

(4) Kapila is *non-omniscient* (major term), because he is a non-*propounder
of the four noble truths* (middle term) ; whoever is not non-
omniscient is not non-propounder of the four noble truths, as
Buddha (the heterogeneous example).

Here the example involves in the negative form a doubt as to the validity of
the major term (*sādhya*), for it is doubtful whether Buddha was omniscient.

(5) This person is *untrustworthy* (major term), because he is *full of
passions* (middle term) ; whoever is not untrustworthy is not full of
passions, a *Buddha* (heterogeneous example).

Here the example involves doubt as to the validity of the middle term (*hetu*),
for it is doubtful whether Buddha is not full of passions.

(6) Kapila is not devoid of *passions* (major term), because he did *not give
his own flesh to the hungry* (middle term) ; whoever is devoid of
passions gives his own flesh to the hungry, as *Buddha* (hetero-
geneous example).

Here the example involves doubt as to the validity of both the major and middle terms (*sādhya* and *sādhana*), for it is doubtful whether Buddha was devoid of passions and gave his own flesh to the hungry.

Some unnecessarily lay down three other kinds of fallacy of the heterogeneous example (*vaidharmya-dṛṣṭāntābhāsa*), viz. :—

(1) Unseparated (*avyatireki*) : This person is not *devoid of passions* (major term), because he is a *speaker* (middle term) ; whoever is devoid of passions is not a speaker, as a *piece of stone* (heterogeneous example).

Here though a piece of stone is both "devoid of passions" and "not a speaker," yet there is no unavoidable separation (*vyatireka-vyāpti*) between "devoid of passions" and "a speaker."

(2) Of separation unshown *apradarśita-vyatireka* :—

Sound is *non-eternal* (major term), because it is a product (middle term) ; as *ether* (example).

Here though there is an unavoidable separation between "product" and "eternal", yet it has not been shown in the proper form, such as : "Whatever is eternal is not a product, as ether."

[Diṅnāga the Buddhist urged the necessity of converting the heterogeneous example into a universal negative proposition with a view to pointing out the connection of the middle term and the major term].

(3) Of contrary separation (*viparīta-vyatireka*) :

Sound is not *eternal* (major term), because it is a product (middle term) ; whatever is not a product is eternal, as *ether* (example).

Here the example has been put in a contrary way, for the proper form should have been : "Whatever is eternal is not a product, as *ether*."

वाद्युक्ते साधने प्रोक्तदोषाणामुद्भावनम् ।
दूषणं निरवद्ये तु दूषणाभासनामकम् ॥ २६ ॥

साध्यते प्रतिपाद्यप्रतीतौ आरोह्यते तु मेयं येन तत् साधनं तच्च अनेकरूपं प्राक् प्रत्यपादि । तद्यथा । क्वचित् हेतुरेवैकः, क्वचित् पक्षहेतु, क्वचित् पक्षहेतुदृष्टान्ताः क्वचित् ते एव सोपनयाः, क्वचित् सनिगमनाः, क्वचित् एकैकतच्छ्द्विवृद्ध्येति । ... तत्नेह सम्यक्साधनस्य दूषयितुमशक्यत्वात् साधनाभास एव तत्सामर्थ्योपपत्तेः ... । तत्र प्रोक्तदोषाणां प्रत्यक्षादिनिराकृतपक्षासिद्धादिहेतुसाध्यादिविकलदृष्टान्ताद्युपन्यास- लक्षणानामुद्भावनं प्राश्निकानां पुरतः प्रकाशनं यत् तद् दूष्यते स्वाभिप्रेतसाध्यप्रत्यायन- वैकल्यलक्षणं विकृतिं नीयते साधनमनेनेति दूषणमिति ज्ञेयम् ॥ २६ ॥

26. Refutation (*dūṣaṇa*) is the pointing out of the aforesaid fallacies in the reasoning of an opponent; but it is called a semblance of a refutation (*dūṣaṇābhāsa*) when the reasoning is really devoid of defects.

A disputant is said really to refute his opponent, if the former can detect in the reasoning of the latter any of the fallacies aforementioned. But it will be a mere semblance of refutation if he ascribes to his opponent fallacies which he has not really committed.

सकलावरणमुक्तात्म केवलं यत् प्रकाशते ।
प्रत्यक्षं सकलार्थात्मसततप्रतिभासनम् ॥ २७ ॥

सकलं समस्तम् आवृणोति आन्रियते वा अनेनेत्यावरणम् । तत् स्वरूपप्रच्छादनं कर्मेत्यर्थः । सकलं च तदावरणं च सकलावरणं तेन मुक्तो रहितः आत्मा स्वरूपं यस्य तत् तथा । अतएव केवलम् असहायम् आवरणक्षयोपशमविचित्रतयैव बोधस्य नानाकारस्य प्रवृत्तेः । सामस्त्येन पुनः आवरणनिर्दलने विबन्धकारणवैकल्याद् एकाकारतयैव तस्य विवर्तनाद् अतो ज्ञानान्तरनिरपेक्षं यत् प्रकाशते प्रथते निरुपाधिकं द्योतते इत्यर्थः । तत् परमार्थतः प्रत्यक्षं तदिदं सकलावरणमुक्तात्मेति हेतुद्वारेण तथा केवलं तत् प्रकाशते इति स्वरूपतो निरूप्य अधुना कार्यद्वारेण निरूपयन्नाह । सकलार्थात्मनां समस्तवस्तुस्वरूपाणां सततप्रतिभासनम् अनवरतप्रकाशनं सकलार्थात्म-सततप्रतिभासनमिति प्रतिभास्यतेऽनेनेति प्रतिभासनम् आत्मनो धर्मरूपतया भेदवद्वि-वक्षितं ज्ञानमिति यावत् । अस्य च पारमार्थिकत्वं निरुपचरितशब्दार्थोपपत्तेः । तथाहि । अक्षशब्दो जीवपर्यायस्ततश्चाक्षं प्रति वर्तते इति प्रत्यक्षं यत्रात्मनः साक्षाद्व्यापारः । व्यावहारिकं पुनरिन्द्रियव्यवहितात्मव्यापारसम्पाद्यत्वात् परमार्थतः परोक्षमेव धूमादग्निज्ञानवत्तिरोधानाविशेषात् ॥ २७ ॥

27. That which is characterised as free from all obstructions and shines as the absolute is called (supreme or transcendental) perception ; it uninterruptedly illumines the nature of all objects.

Perception (*pratyakṣa*) is used in two senses : (1) supreme or transcendental (*pāra-mārthika*), and (2) practical (*vyāvahārika*). The practical perception consists of knowledge acquired by the soul through the channels of the senses such as the visual knowledge, auditory knowledge, etc. The transcendental perception is knowledge acquired by the soul direct through meditation without the intervention of the senses or signs.

प्रमाणस्य फलं साक्षादज्ञानविनिवर्तनम् ।
केवलस्य सुखोपेक्षे शेषस्यादानहानधीः ॥ २८ ॥

द्विविधं हि प्रमाणस्य फलं साक्षाद् असाक्षाच्च अनन्तरं व्यवहितं चेत्यर्थः । तत्र साक्षाद् अज्ञानम् अनध्यवसायः प्रमेयापरिच्छित्तिस्तस्य विनिवर्तनं विशेषेण प्रलयापादनं प्रमाणस्य फलम् अज्ञानोद्धलनद्वारेण तस्य प्रवृत्तेः तस्य सर्वानर्थमूलतया प्रमात्रपकारित्वात् तन्निवर्तनस्य प्रयोजनता युक्तैव । एतच्चानन्तरप्रयोजनं सर्वज्ञानामेकरूपत्वात्

सामान्येनोक्तम् । व्यवहितप्रयोजनं पुनः विभागेनाह । केवलस्य सर्वज्ञ-ज्ञानस्य सुखं
वैषयिकं सुखातीतपरमाह्लादानुभव उपेक्षा साक्षात् समस्तार्थानुभवेऽपि हानोपादानो-
पादानेच्छाभावान्मध्यस्थवृत्तिता ते सुखोपेक्षे फलमित्यर्थः । शेषस्य तद्व्यतिरिक्तप्राकृत-
लोकप्रमाणस्य आदानं ग्रहणं हानं परित्यागस्तयोरादानहानयोर्धीः बुद्धिरादानहानधीः,
सा फलमिति यावत् । ततश्च आदेयानां सम्यग्दर्शनस्रक्चन्दनादीनां या दित्सा
तथा, हेयानां मिथ्यादर्शनादिविषकण्टकानां या जिहासा प्रमाणसाध्या प्रमाणात्तत्-
सिद्धेः ॥ २८ ॥

28. The immediate effect of *pramāṇa* (valid knowledge) is the
removal of ignorance ; and the mediate effect of the absolute know-
ledge is bliss and equanimity while that of the ordinary practical
knowledge is the facility to select or reject.

Pramāṇa (valid knowledge) is of two kinds : (1) *kevala*, absolute and (2)
a-kevala, ordinary. The immediate effect of both is the cessation of ignorance.
The mediate effect of the absolute knowledge is happiness and equanimity, while
that of the ordinary knowledge is the facility which it affords us to choose the
desirable and reject the undesirable.

अनेकान्तात्मकं वस्तु गोचरः सर्वसंविदाम् ।
एकदेशविशिष्टोऽर्थो नयस्य विषयो मतः ॥ २९ ॥

अनेके बह्वोऽन्ता अंश धर्मा वा आत्मनः स्वरूपाणि यस्य तद् अनेकात्मकं किं
तद्वस्तु बहिरन्तश्च गोचरः विषयः सर्वसंविदां समस्तसंवित्तीनामनेन अनेकान्तमन्तरेण
संवेदनप्रसरव्यवच्छेदं दर्शयति … । एक इत्यादि अनन्तधर्माध्यासितं वस्तु साभिप्रतैक-
धर्मविशिष्टं नयति प्रापयति संवेदनमारोह्यतीति नयः प्रमाणप्रवृत्तेरुत्तरकालभावी
परामर्श इत्यर्थस्तस्य विषयः प्रमाणस्य गोचरो मतोऽभिप्रेत एकदेशेन अनित्यत्वादिधर्म-
लक्षणेन विशिष्टः पररूपेभ्यो व्यवच्छिन्नेत्यर्थः । … सर्वसंग्राहिसत्ताभिप्रायपरिकल्पना-
द्वारेण सप्त नयाः प्रतिपादिताः, तद्यथा । नैगम-संग्रह-व्यवहार-ऋजुसूत्र-शब्द-समभि-
रूढएवंभूता नया इत्यतोऽस्माभिरपि ते एव वर्ण्यन्ते कथमेते सर्वाभिप्रायसंग्राहका इति
चेत् । उच्यते । इति प्रायस्तावद् अर्थद्वारेण शब्दद्वारेण वा प्रवर्तेत गत्यन्तराभावात् ।
अर्थश्च सामान्यरूपो विशेषरूपो वा शब्दोऽपि रूढितो व्युत्पत्तितश्च व्युत्पत्तिरपि
सामान्यनिमित्तप्रयुक्ता तत्कालभाविनिमित्तप्रयुक्ता वा स्यात् । … येऽपि परस्पर-
विशकलितौ सामान्यविशेषौ इच्छन्ति तत् समुदायरूपो नैगमः । … ये पुनः केवलं
सामान्यं वाञ्छन्ति तत् समूहसंपाद्यः संग्रहः । ये पुनरनपेक्षितशास्त्रीयसामान्यविशेषं
लोकव्यवहारमवतरन्तं घटादिकं पदार्थम् अभिप्रयन्ति तन्निचयजात्या व्यवहारः । ये तु
क्षणक्षयिणः परमाणुलक्षणा विशेषाः सत्या इति मन्यन्ते तत्संघातघटित ऋजुसूत्र
इति । तथा ये रूढितः शब्दानां प्रवृत्ति वाञ्छन्ति तन्निवहसाध्यः शब्द इति ।

ये तु व्युत्पत्तितो ध्वनीनां प्रवृत्ति वाञ्छन्ति तान्यथा तद्द्वारजन्यं समभिरूढ इति ।
ये तु वर्तमानकालभाविव्युत्पत्तिनिमित्तमधिकृत्य शब्दाः प्रवर्तन्ते नान्यथेति मन्यन्ते
तत्संघटितः खल्वेवंभूत इति । तदेवं न कश्चन विकल्पोऽस्ति वस्तुगोचरो योऽत्र
नयसप्तके नान्तर्यातीति सर्वाभिप्रायसंग्राहका एते इति स्थितम् । ... तथाहि
नैगमनयदर्शनानुसारिणौ नैयायिकवैशेषिकौ, संग्रहाभिप्रायप्रवृत्ताः सर्वेऽपि अद्वैतवादाः
सांख्यदर्शनं च, व्यवहारनयानुपातिप्रायश्चार्वाकदर्शनम्, ऋजुसूत्राकूतप्रवृत्तबुद्धयस्तथा-
गताः, शब्दादिनयमतावलम्बिनो वैयाकरणादयः ।। ... तथाहि नयति केनचिद् अंशेन
विशिष्टमर्थं प्रापयति योऽभिप्रायः स नयः ।। २९ ।।

29. Since things have many characters (that is, may be conceived from many points of view), they are the objects of all-sided knowledge (omniscience) ; but a thing conceived from one particular point of view is the object of *naya* (or one-sided knowledge).

Objects, whether intrinsic or extrinsic, possess many different characteristics may be taken from different standpoints. They are understood in their entire character by omniscience alone, while to take them from one particular standpoint is the scope of *naya* (the one-sided method of comprehension).

Naya (the one-sided method of comprehension) is of seven kinds mentioned below :—

(1) *Naigama* (the non-distinguished) is the method by which an object is taken in its generic and specific capacities not distinguished from each other. For instance, by the term "bamboo" one may understand a number of properties, some of which are peculiar to its own species, while the remaining ones are possessed by it in common with other trees such as a mango, jack, banyan, etc., without any distinction being made between these two classes of properties. The Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika schools of philosophy follow the *Naigama naya*.

(2) *Saṁgraha* (the generic) is the method by which the generic properties alone are taken into consideration without any cognizance of the particular properties which, independent of the former, are non-entities, like sky-flowers. Thus, when we speak of a mango, jack or bamboo, we mean that it is a tree, The Advaita and Sāṁkhya systems of philosophy follow the *Saṁgraha naya*.

(3) *Vyavahāra* (the practical) is the method by which the practical or particular alone is considered, for the general without the particular is a non-entity like the horn of a hare. On being asked to bring a tree, can anybody bring the tree in general ? No, he can bring only a particular tree such as a mango, jack or bamboo. The Cārvāka philosophy follows the *Vyavahāra naya*.

(4) *Rju-sūtra* (the straight expression) is the method by which a thing, sa it exists at present, is considered without any reference to the past or future. It is useless to ponder over things as they were in the past or will become in the future. All practical purposes

are served by the thing itself as it exists at the present moment. For instance, a man, who was formerly (in a previous birth) my son, is now born as a prince somewhere else ; he is of no practical use to me now. So the *Rju-sūtra* recognises only the entity itself (*bhāva*) and does not consider the name (*nāma*), image (*sthāpanā*) or the constituent cause (*dravya*). For instance, a poor cowherd, if he bears the *name of Indra*, does not thereby become the lord of heavens. An *image* of a king cannot accomplish the function of the king himself. The *causes* in me which will lead to my accepting a different kind of body in a future birth cannot enable me to enjoy that body now. Some hold that the atoms alone are true, and aggregates or lumps of them constitute things. This doctrine is followed by the Buddhists.

(5) *Śabda* (the verbal) consists in using a word in a conventional sense and not according to its etymological derivation. Thus the word *śatru* usually, or in its conventional sense, means "enemy," while etymologically "a destroyer." The grammarians are the followers of this method.

(6) *Samabhirūḍha* (the subtle) consists in making nice distinctions among the synonyms, applying each name appropriately according to their etymological derivation. The grammarians are the followers of this method.

(7) *Evambhūta* (the such-like) consists in naming a thing only when it possesses its practical efficiency. Thus a man should be named *Śakra*, if he actually possesses strength (*śakti*) implied by the name. The grammarians are the followers of this method.

नयानामेकनिष्ठानां प्रवृत्तेः श्रुतवर्त्मनि ।
सम्पूर्णार्थविनिश्चायि स्याद्वादश्रुतमुच्यते ॥ ३० ॥

इह द्विविधं श्रुतम् । तद्यथा । मिथ्याश्रुतं, नयश्रुतं, स्याद्वादश्रुतम् । तत्र श्रूयते इति श्रुतमागमः । मिथ्याऽलीकं श्रुतं मिथ्याश्रुतम् । तच्च दुर्नयाभिप्रायप्रवृत्तं तीर्थिकसम्बन्धि निर्गोचरत्वात् । तथा नयैः हेतुभूतैः श्रुतं नयश्रुतम् । एतच्च अर्हंदागमान्तर्गतमेव एकनयाभिप्रायप्रतिबद्धम् । ... तथा निर्दिश्यमानधर्मव्यतिरिक्ता- शेषधर्मान्तरसंसूचकेन स्यात् युक्तो वादोऽभिप्रेतधर्मवचनं स्याद्वादः । तदात्मकं श्रुतं तत् किंभूतमुच्यते इत्याह । संपूर्णो विकलः स चासावर्थश्च तद्विनिश्चायि तन्निर्णयहेतुत्वाद् एवमभिधीयते । ... नयानां नैगमादीनाम् एकनिष्ठानां एकधर्मग्रहण- पर्यवसितानां श्रुतवर्त्मनि आगममार्गे प्रवृत्तेः प्रवर्तनात्त तदेकैकाभिप्रायप्रतिबद्धं संपूर्णार्थविनिश्चायि ततसमुदायस्यैव संपूर्णार्थविनिश्चायकत्वाद् इत्याकूतम् ॥ ३० ॥

30. Knowledge which determines the full meaning of an object through the employment, in the scriptural method, of one-sided *nayas*, is called *Syādvāda-śruta*,

The *śruta* or scriptural knowledge is of three kinds, *viz*, (1) false hearing or knowledge (*mithyā-śruta*), such as that derived from the scripture of the bad Tīrthikas ; (2) hearing of the one-sided method (*naya-śruta*), that is, knowledge derived from that part of the Jaina scripture which teaches us to comprehend things from any particular standpoint ; and (3) hearing of the all-sided method (*syād-vāda-śruta*), that is, knowledge derived from that part of the Jaina scripture which teaches us to comprehend things from all-sided standpoints. The *naya-śruta* (knowledge of the one-sided method) has been described in the previous verse. The *syād-vāda* (knowledge of the all-sided method) is described below :—

Syād-vāda, which literally signifies assertion of possibilities, seeks to ascertain the meaning of things from all possible standpoints. Things are neither existent nor non-existent absolutely. A thing may be said to exist in a certain way and to be non-existent in another way, and so forth. *Syād-vāda* examines things from seven points of view, hence the doctrine is also called *sapta-bhaṅgī-naya* (seven-fold paralogism). It is stated as follows :

(1) May be, it is (*syād-asti*) ;
(2) may be, it is not (*syād-nāsti*) ;
(3) may be, it is and it is not (*syād-asti-nāsti*) ;
(4) may be, it is indescribable (*syad-avyaktavyam*) ;
(5) may be, it is and yet indescribable (*syād-asti ca avyaktavyañca*) ;
(6) may be, it is not and also indescribable (*syād nāsti ca avyaktavyañca*);
(7) may be, it is and it is not and also indescribable (*syād asti ca nāsti ca avyaktavyañca*).

When a thing is to be established we say "it is," when it is to be denied, we say "it is not." When a thing is to be established and denied in turn, we say "it is and it is not." When a thing is to be established and denied simultaneously, we say "it is indescribable." When a thing is to be established and yet to be described as indescribable, we say "it is and yet indescribable." When a thing is to be denied and also declared as indescribable, we say "it is not and also indescribable." When a thing is to be established and denied as well as declared indescribable at the same time, we say "it is and it is not, and also indescribable." *Syād* which signifies "may be" denotes all these seven possibilities, that is, a thing may be looked upon from one of the above seven points of view, there having been no eighth alternative.

प्रमाता स्वान्यनिर्भासी कर्ता भोक्ता विवृत्तिमान् ।
स्वसंवेदनसंसिद्धो जीवः क्षित्याद्यनात्मकः ॥ ३१ ॥

स्वान्यौ आत्मपरौ निर्भासयितुम् उद्द्योतयितुं शीलमस्येति स्वान्यनिर्भासौ स्वस्वरूपार्थयोः प्रकाशक इति यावत् । ... विवर्तनम् अपरापरपर्यायेषु गमनं विवृत्तिः परिणामः सा विद्यते यस्येति विवृत्तिमान् । स्व आत्मा संवेद्यते अनेनेति स्वसंवेदनं तेन सम्यक् सिद्धः प्रतिष्ठितः प्रतीतो वा स्वसंवेदनसंसिद्धः । क्षितिः पृथिवी आदिर्येषां तानि क्षित्यादीनि । आदिशब्दाद् अम्बु-तेजो-वाय्याकाशानि गृह्यन्ते ।

4

न विद्यते आत्मा स्वरूपमस्येति अनात्मकः ... क्षित्यादिस्वरूपो न भवति इत्यर्थः ।...
स्वान्यनिर्भासीत्यनेन प्रागुक्तस्वपराभासिप्रमाणविशेषवन्मीमांसकान् परोक्षबुद्धिवादिनो
योगाचारांश्च ज्ञानमात्रवादिनः प्रतिक्षिपति । कथं ज्ञानज्ञानिनोः कथ्चिदभेदेन
तदुक्तन्यायाविशेषादिति कर्ता भोक्तेति विशेषणद्वयेन सांख्यमतं विकुट्टयति ।
विवृत्तिमानित्यमुना तु एकान्तनित्यं अपरिणामिनं नैयायिकवैशेषिकादिप्रकल्पितं
प्रमातारं निरस्यति सर्वथाऽविचलितरूपस्य अर्थग्रहणपरिणामानुपपत्तेः ॥ ३१ ॥

    31. The spirit (soul or *jīva*) is the knower, doer and enjoyer,
illumines itself and others, undergoes changes of condition, is realised
only in self-consciousness and is different from the earth, etc.

    The soul (*ātman* or *jīva*) *has* knowledge and so is different from knowledge
itself. As an enjoyer and doer the soul of the Jaina philosophy is different from
that of the Sāṁkhya philosophy. The soul of the Jainas is described as under-
going changes of condition. In this respect it is different from that of the Nyāya
and Vaiśeṣika philosophy.

प्रमाणादिव्यवस्थेयमनादिनिधनात्मिका ।
सर्वसंव्यवहर्तृणां प्रसिद्धापि प्रकीर्तिता ॥ ३२ ॥

    कृतिरियं श्रीसितपट्टसिद्धसेनदिवाकरस्य ॥

प्रमाणानि प्रत्यक्षादीनि आदिशब्दान्वयपरिग्रहः । तेषां व्यवस्था प्रतिनियत-
लक्षणादिरूपा मर्यादा सा इयमनन्तरोक्तस्थित्या प्रकीर्तितेति । ... सर्वसंव्यवहर्तृणां
लौकिकतीर्थिकभेदभिन्नसमस्तव्यवहारवतां प्रसिद्धापि रूढापि तदप्रसिद्धौ निखिल-
व्यवहारोच्छेदप्रसंगात् । ... प्रकीर्तिता संशब्दिता अव्युत्पन्नविप्रतिपन्नव्यामोहापोहायेति
गम्यते ॥ ३२ ॥

स्याद्वादकेसरिसुभीषणनादभीतेरुत्तस्तलोलनयनान् प्रपलाय्यमानान् ।
हे दुर्नयाश्रितकुतीर्थिमृगाननन्यत्राणान् विहाय जिनमेत्य तमाश्रयध्वम् ॥ १ ॥
भक्तिमया भगवति प्रकटीकृतेयं तच्छासनांशकथनान्न मतिः स्वकीया ।
मोहादतो यदिह किंचिदभूदसाधु तत् साधवः कृतकृपा मयि शोधयन्तु ॥ २ ॥
न्यायावतारविवृतिं विधिना विधित्सोः सिद्धः पुनर्य इह पुण्यचयस्ततो मे ।
नित्यः परार्थकरणोद्यतमाभवान्ताद् भूयाज्जिनेन्द्रमतलपटमेव चेतः ॥ ३ ॥

इति न्यायावतारविवृतिः समाप्ता । कृतिरियं सितपट्ट श्रीसिद्धसेनदिवाकर-
व्याख्यानकस्य तर्कप्रकरणवृत्तेरिति ।

    32. This system of *pramāṇa*, etc., is beginningless and endless ;
and though familiar to all persons in every day practice it is yet
explained here.

    This shows that the world as conceived by the Jainas is eternal.

APPENDIX A

SIDDHASENA DIVĀKARA alias KṢAPAṆAKA
(ABOUT 480—550 A.D.)

[from S. C. Vidyābhūṣaṇa's A History of Indian Logic]

The first Jaina writer on systematic logic was Siddhasena Divākara. It was he who for the first time laid the foundation of a science called Logic among the Jainas by compiling a treatise called Nyāyāvatāra[1] in thirty-two short stanzas.

Siddhasena Divākara is also famous as the author of the Sammati-tarka-sūtra which is a work in Prākṛta on general philosophy containing an elaborate discussion on the principles of logic. This author, who belonged to the Śvetāmbara sect, has been mentioned by Pradyumna Sūri (980 A.D.) in his Vicāra-sāra-prakaraṇa[2] and by Jinasena Sūri in the Ādipurāṇa dated 783 A.D.

Siddhasena, who was a pupil of Vṛddha-vādisūri, received the name of Kumudacandra[3] at the time of ordination. He is said to have split, by the efficacy of his prayers, the Liṅga, the Brāhmaṇical symbol of Rudra, in the temple of Mahākāla at Ujjainī, and to have called forth an image of Pārśvanātha by reciting his Kalyāṇa-mandira-stava. He is believed by Jainas to have converted Vikramāditya to Jainism 470 years after the nirvāṇa of Mahāvira, that is, 57 B.C.[4]

But Vikramāditya of Ujjainī does not seem to be so old, as he has been identified by scholars with Yaśodharma Deva, King of

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1 Vide No. 741 in the list of Mss. purchased for the Bombay Government as noticed by Peterson in his 5th Report, p. 289. A manuscript of the Nyāyāvatāra with Vivṛti was procured for me from Bhavanagara, Bombay, by Muni Dharmavijaya and his pupil Śrī Indravijaya. The Nyāyā-vatāra with commentary and translation edited by Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana is available in Calcutta and Arrah.

2 The verse पंचेव (26) etc. quoted from Vicāra-sāra-prakaraṇa, and noticed by Peterson in his 3rd Report, p. 272, is already quoted in the introduction foot note 1, p. 28.

3 cf. Prabhāvakacarita VIII. V. 57.

4 For other particulars about Siddhasena Divākara see Dr. Klatt's Paṭṭāvalī of the Kharataragaccha in the Indian Antiquary, Vol. XI, Sept. 1882. p. 247. Vide also Dr. R. G. Bhandarkar's report on Sanskrit Mss., during 1883-84, p. 118, 140. Also the Prabandha-cintāmaṇi translated by Mr. Tawney in the Bibliotheca Indica series of Calcutta, pp. 10—14.

Malwa, who, on the authority of Alberuni, defeated the Huns at Korur in 533 A.D. This view of scholars agrees well with the statement of the Chinese pilgrim Hwen-thsang, who visited India in 629 A.D. and says that a very powerfull King, presumably Vikramāditya, reigned at Ujjainī 60 years before his arrival there.[5] Moreover, Varāhamihira, who was one of the nine Gems at the court of Vikramāditya, is known to have lived between 505 A.D. and 587 A.D.[6] It is therefore very probable that Vikramāditya and his contemporary Siddhasena Divākara lived at Ujjainī about 530 A.D. I am inclined to believe that Siddhasena was no other than Kṣapaṇaka[7] (a Jaina sage) who is traditionally known to the Hindus to have been one of the nine Gems that adorned the court of Vikramāditya.

Siddhasena Divākara seems to have been a senior contemporary of Jinabhadra Gaṇi Kṣamāśramaṇa (484—588 A.D.) who criticises Dvātriṁśat-dvātriṁśikā of which the Nyāyāvatāra is a part.

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[5] Vide Beal's Buddhist Records Vol. II. p. 261.

[6] Varāhamihira chose śak 427 or A.D. 505 as the initial year of his astronomical calculation, showing thereby that he lived about that time. सप्ताश्वि-वेदस'ख्यं etc. is already quoted in the introduction p. 29.

(Pañcasiddhāntikā, Chap. I, edited by Dr. G. Thibaut and Sudhākara Dvivedi). Vide also Dr. Thibaut's Introduction to the Pañcasiddhāntikā, p. XXX.

[7] The nine Gems are ध्वन्वन्तरि etc. from Jyotirvidābharaṇa is already quoted in the introduction p. 29.

In the Pañcatantra and other Brahmanic Sanskrit work as well as in the Avadānakalpalatā and other Buddhist Sanskrit works the Jaina ascetics are nicknamed as Kṣapaṇaka. The verse भगवद्भाषितं etc. (Avadānakalpalatā, Jyotiṣkāvadāna) is already quoted in the introduction p. 30.

श्लोक-सूची

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