THE NYĀYĀVATĀRA AND BUDDHIST LOGICAL WORKS
BY DIGNĀGA AND RATNĀKARAŚANTI

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The Nyāyāvatāra (N. A. hereafter) is a Jain work whose authorship had been attributed to Siddhasena Divākara. M. A. Dhaky has written an essay claiming with good reasons that Siddhasena Divākara is not the author of N. A., and that the author is rather a different Siddhasena known as Siddharṣi. The present essay is not concerned with authorship of N. A. It is instead concerned with the position that this Jain work accepts certain teachings, opposing certain others, of the Buddhist logician Dignāga. And is also concerned with the N. A.'s theory on antarvāyāpti, and with whether this Jain position agrees with what is set forth in Ratnākaraśanti's antarvāyāpti treatise. Therefore, the present essay is necessarily concerned with the date of the N. A. Dhaky has decided that the N. A. is subsequent to circa A. D. 550, and hence is subsequent to Dignāga, born circa A. D. 480 — hence around the year of death of Vasubandhu (brother, probably half-brother of Asaṅga), circa A. D. 400-480.

Prof. Dhaky kindly supplied me with a copy of the N. A. text and translation by S. C. Vidyābhusaṇa. Therefore, may I speak briefly about this translation and annotation. Since this translation by Vidyābhusaṇa rendered the verses throughout with Western logical terminology (e.g. 'middle term'), as a translation it serves mainly to call attention to the various verses as having such and such content, while not necessarily exposing the intentions of the individual verses. Indeed, it is an unproven contention that Indian logic agrees with the conceptual divisions of Western logic, and there are some who do not concede this; while in my own translations of such logical literature I do not follow this Western terminology. But then the translator Vidyābhusaṇa added extensive comments in English that do not refer to any commentaries on the N. A. These ampie comments agree with his erudite work, A History of Indian logic—a work which reveals his excellent control over these materials. However, as his comments on the N. A. in particular only barely or vaguely contact its verses, while demonstrating that he knows a lot, I decided it would be justified to completely disregard these comments on N.A.

A. Relation with Dignāga

It has been known since the beginning of modern Dignāga studies that his Inference (anumāna) is of two kinds—for oneself (svārtha) and for others (parārtha). In fact, my own researches in Buddhist logic indicate a chief difference to be over the term sādhya. In ‘inference for oneself’ the sādhya is to be determined by the evidence (līnga); and while it is in this condition I render the term as the ‘evidential’. Once one determines the sādhya as the logical conclusion of the evidence, it can then be called the ‘thesis’ and means this during the ‘inference
for others'. That is why in the Dignāga-Dharmakīrti system 'inference for oneself' must precede 'inference for others'. Dignāga was probably not the first one to make such a division and in that order, but he should be given credit for making this division and with the necessary logical qualifications.

Now the Nyāyāvatāra, k. 10, indicates its way of discriminating the two kinds of inference:

svaniscayavād-anyeśām niścayotpādanaṁ budhaiḥ
parārtham mānam ādhyātmaṁ vākyam tad-upacārataḥ

Like the conviction in oneself, the arousal of conviction in others, is called by the wise the standard for others, and that assertion, in the sense of a metaphorical transfer.

We notice the agreement with Dignāga that 'inference for oneself' should precede 'inference for others'. However, the verse's metaphorical attribution (upacāra) to 'inference for others' seems to be a failed attempt to appear 'sparkling' and so at least the composition of this verse agrees with Dhaky's somewhat negative evaluation of this N. A. as a work of Jaina literature.

We pass the N. A. k. 13:

Sādhyaśvinabhuvot hetor-vaco yat pratipādakaṁ
parārtham-anumānam tat pakṣādvacanātmaṁ

A demonstrative statement of a reason that applies to the thesis and which mentions first the locus (pakṣa)—is inference for others.

Here the N. A. does better. This minimal statement—by avoiding explicit mention of an external example—agrees with 'inner pervasion'. And it specifically mentions the pakṣa, going on in N. A. 14 and 15 to insist upon it as essential. So far the N. A. does not disagree with Dignāga.

Let us go to N. A. k. 28, which, as a literal statement, disagrees with Dignāga (here, my own translation):

Pramāṇasya phalam sākṣād-ajñānavinivartanaṁ
kevalasya sukhopekṣe śeṣasyādānāhānadhīḥ

The result of pramāṇa in the direct vision sense is the warding off of ignorance. Bliss and equanimity are the (result of the) kevala (absolute kind). The cognition of accepting and rejecting is the (result of the) remainder (conventional kind).

In Dhaky's article this verse is held to refute k. 1.23 of Dignāga's Pramāṇasamuccaya. I take this number k. 1.23 to be a printer's mistake for k. 1.2.38. If we take the
verse nos. to exclude the maṅgala verse, then the nos. 2-3 can be rendered as follows, as in my own rendition of the initial verse section by Dignāga from the Tibetan version:

Nor are authorised (pramāṇa) those like memory, and so forth, that repeatedly cognize and reduce to an endless series (anavasthā-prasaṅga). Direct perception is free from constructive thought (kalpana) which adds a name, class, etc. (1.2).

Its name (namely ‘pratyakṣa’ = ‘direct[ed] perception’) is called by a sense organ (āksa) because of the unshared causes (namely prati = ‘each one’). A factual base (dharmin) for multiple natures can in no case be understood from a (single) sense organ. (1.3).

Assuming that I have above the right verses from Dignāga’s PS, I have reservations about whether N. A. 28 is really refuting Dignāga. On the surface, it seems so. When this verse states, “The result of pramāṇa in the direct vision sense [= pratyakṣa] is the warding off of ignorance”, this is an other-worldly aim that differs from the Dignāga system which argues in a mundane manner.

Indeed, the N. A. 28 employs the term pramāṇa in an instrumental sense, as does certain Brahmanical systems. Dignāga employs the term pramāṇa in a resultative sense—the result of prameya (which I render ‘sanction’). Now, when scholars or pandits employ the basic words in different, even opposite meanings, the real argument is over the use of those words. The N. A. verse 28 and Dignāga’s verses 1, 2-3 are really talking at ‘cross-purposes’—as though to different audiences. Indeed, each of the systems of Indian philosophy has certain important terms which are employed in senses different from how those words are used in other systems or in general Indian literature. The Jainas are no exception to this practice of employing certain terms in special meanings. One could fault Dignāga if he deliberately used the term pramāṇa in a resultative way in defiance of the standard usage; but, as I myself pointed out, the medieval lexicons when defining the head word Pramāṇa, have a number of definitions of instrumental value, thus agreeing with the instrumental use of the term, as well as definitions of resultative value, thus agreeing with the resultative use of pramāṇa. For example, one of the instrumental definitions is śāstra, a technical treatise—an instrument of information; and one of the resultative definitions is maryāḍā, a boundary, or limitation, evidently related to pramāṇa’s root ‘to measure’; and a boundary is clearly the result of measuring. Hence, Dignāga does not have to argue for his use of the term pramāṇa, any more than his rivals have to argue for their use of it. But clearly, when authors compose verses in the field of logic, employing the term pramāṇa in an instrumental fashion, the verse comes out looking quite different than when
Dignāga writes a verse with contrasting meaning for pramāṇa. I could say for N. A. 28 that this author’s way of writing introduces elements of a sermon nature, with doctrinal declarations, whereas Dignāga’s verses are closely reasoned.

Now I shall consider the implications of N. A. 21, referring to ‘fallacies of the locus’ (pakṣa-ābhāsa) and N. A. 22, referring to ‘fallacies of the reason’ (hetu-ābhāsa). First, N. A. 21:

Pratipādyasya yaḥ siddhaḥ pakṣābhāso, sūri (var. akṣa) lingataḥ | lokasvavacanābhāyaṁ ca bādhito, nekadāḥ maraḥ ||

Vidyābhūṣanā’s translation was a valiant effort to make sense out of this verse11. The verse begins, “What is proved (siddha) of ‘that to be explained’ (pratipādyasa = the sādhyā, as Vidyābhūṣanā correctly interprets)”. Vidyābhūṣanā interpreted the term siddha as ‘affirmed’, but in logic siddha means ‘proved’; sādhanā is the ‘means of proof’; and sādhyā is ‘that to be proved’. Since the verse begins with granting something has been proved of the sādhyā—without qualifying what was proved—it is inconsequential to go on and talk about ‘fallacies of the locus.’

Now we turn to N. A. 22, for ‘fallacies of the reasons’:

Anyathā’nupapannatvarāṁ hetor-lakṣaṇam-irītam | tad-apratīt’samdehaśviparyāsais tad-ābhātā [read : ābhāsah] ||

Besides, a nonsuitable characteristic of the reason has been announced, which is a fallacy by noncognitive dawning, doubt, or contrariness.

The next verse, N. A. 23, attempts to clarify these types. The ‘unproved’ (asiddha) is the ‘noncognitive dawning’ (apparently not in the scope of normal cognition); the ‘contradictory’ (viruddha) is the ‘contrariness’; the ‘uncertain’ (anaikāntīka) kind of reason being the one labelled ‘doubt’. There is a sort of clumsiness in calling these ‘fallacies of the reason’. Usually, it is the ‘locus’ (the pakṣa) which is fallacious (if indeed it be so). For example, if the thesis be “There is a fire on the lake tonight” should the reason be “Because we see smoke there,” the reason is fallacious but not in the statement of the reason itself. If the thesis has been “There is a fire on the mountain tonight,” that same reason would have been appropriate. The fallacy was actually in the pakṣa (the locus), since if it is indeed a lake, we do not see smoke, rather see mist. Thus, a wrong attribution to the pakṣa is involved. Granted though that in ordinary parlance one may speak of a fallacious reason. However, the N. A. itself devoted several verses to insisting upon the pakṣa (locus). In short, if the N. A. had presented the fallacies in terms of the pakṣa rather than in terms of the reason, there would have been consistency with the prior verses on the pakṣa, and then this text should be praised for its cogency and consistency.

Considering the N. A.’s standard in verses 21 and 22, we begin to wonder about the qualifications of the author to write on the topic of logic.
This is not to deny that there is some ambiguity in the term *pākṣa* itself, as has been well discussed by Staal\(^\text{12}\).

**B. The Antarvyāpti theory**

The *N. A.* has its basic statement about “inner pervasion” in its verse 20:

\[
\text{Antarvyāptyaiva sādhyasya siddher-bahirudāhrtih |}
\text{vyarthā syāt tad-asadbhāve ’py-evāṁ nyāyavidō viduḥ ||}
\]

Logicians have noticed that an external example would be useless (*vyarthā*), since even in its absence there is proof of a thesis (*sādhyā*) just by internal pervasion (*antarvyāpti*).

The author seems to have adopted an awkward expression ‘useless’ for what would be more accurate—a term signifying ‘unnecessary’, since external examples are often useful for teaching purposes. Indeed, this author himself presented an external example in his verse 19, which is the best composed of any I have noticed in this text:

\[
\text{Sādhye nivartamāne tu sādhanasyāpy-asambhavah |}
\text{khyāpyate yatra dṛṣṭānte vai dharmyenaḥ sa smṛtaḥ ||}
\]

The clue to the meaning of this verse is his use of the locative absolutes, which lend a conditional “When such and such is the case.” And the explanation is suggested in Stcherbatsky’s well-known work on logic\(^\text{13}\). So the verse is now rendered:

For which place it is mentioned that given a thesis which is being denied, also the impossibility of a means of proof (= a reason), it is held that the example is in the sense of *vaiḍharmya* (discordance).

In illustration, it might be said: “Suppose there were no fire on the mountain, and also suppose there is no reason of seeing smoke there, like the water of a lake (the ‘discordant example’).” And then the speaker continues: “But there is a fire on the mountain, for now we do see some smoke there!”

Also, this author had presented the ‘concordant example’ in his *N. A.* verse 18:

\[
\text{Sādhyasādhanayor-vyāptir-yatra niścīyatetarām |}
\text{sādhyemyena sa dṛṣṭāntaḥ sambhandhasmaraṇān mataḥ |}
\]

Where the pervasion of the thesis and the proving method is definitely established, the example is claimed as with concordance due to remembering the connection.

Here the author shows that the external example is unnecessary for establishing the required pervasion; but since people at large should remember the connection,
a concordant example is used for teaching purposes.

So, even though the author had labelled as ‘useless’ (vyarthā) an external example, he himself found it useful to mention the ‘concordant example’ (sādharmya-ḍṛṣṭānta) (in N. A.18) and the ‘discordant example’ (vaidharmya-ḍṛṣṭānta) (in N. A. 19).

Before comparing Rātanakaraśānti’s position on Antarvāyāpti with that of the N. A. it is well to refer to his approximate dating. Because he is well-established in the field of Buddhist Tantra, I included him in my Sarnath, Varanasi, seminar contribution on “An Historical Review of Buddhist Tantras.” Here I explained why his dating is tied in with that of the great Tibetan translator Rin-chen Bzang-po, born A. D. 958 and that he would be a junior by about 20 years, hence born about A. D. 978. Hence he lived several decades after the author of N. A. It follows that Śānti-pā (as the Tibetans call him), in defending the theory of Antarvāyāpti, does not directly depend on the Jaina work N. A., even though this latter work may contain the first use of the term Antarvāyāpti. Śānti-pā’s treatise is subtle and difficult. When I translated it, using the text edited by Haraprasād Shāstri compared with the Tibetan translation, I found editing mistakes both in the Sanskrit edition as well as in the Tibetan rendition.

I believe that Shāstri’s introductory comments are quite appropriate and insightful. To put it in my own words, the usual examples given for the theory of pervasion (vyāpti), or invariable concomitance, are illustrated by the ‘syllogism’ of claiming that there is fire on that mountain, giving as reason that we notice smoke there, as in the case of the kitchen. Hence, the generality of inferences is based on prior experiences, and there is a constant appeal to previous experiences in a given culture, which justifies the example that has been popularly experienced. Hence, one could not argue against the claim that the pervasion in such cases requires inclusion of the example.

But then Śānti-pā claims that in some cases of a thesis and reason, which he terms sattvaheṭu (reason for a real or existent thing), it is not possible for an example to be part of the pervasion. In illustration, if the Buddhist argues, “What exists is momentary,” and the various sects of India have their own theses (on Ātman, Brahman, etc.) of similar declaration—it does not help to say “like a pot,” since being momentary does not add a quality to the sattva as does the color ‘red’ to a pot, nor is a pot a paragon for what exists. Therefore, Buddhism has doctrinal reasons for the assertion “What exists is momentary,” which presumably appeal to the followers of the lineage which so asserts. The various philosophical and religious schools of India all have their own declarations, giving reasons that appeal to the followers of such schools, and usually not providing any example that is popular and accepted by people at large.

Now, presuming that various of those “reasons for an existent thing” are reasonable and acceptable, it must be that the pervasion was just between the thesis and the reason and does not extend to an example. Hence, even if an example is provided
for such a doctrinal assertion, this example could be explained as intended for teaching purposes, and was outside the inferential process that 'proved' the thesis. in short, this antarvyāpti theory does not displace external pervasion, but rather asserts a class of theses for which external pervasion does not apply.

The N. A. discussed above may well have had a similar theory to justify the antarvyāpti position, but we should grant that this text extends its antarvyāpti coverage to all cases of syllogisms, not just to those where it is difficult to apply a popular example, except one only for teaching purposes. In the following centuries, with much arguing between the Buddhist logicians and other groups such as the followers of Nyāya and certain Jaina authors, these theories became much more subtle, with many more qualifications than we find in the N. A. That we find this theory defended by Ratnakaraśānti—a well-known Buddhist pandit—shows that the rival schools of India are not always disagreeing. They have more agreements than is usually admitted in the survey books on Indian philosophy.

REFERENCES:

2. Cf. Alex Wayman, "Ratnakaraśānti's Antarvyāptisamārthana," Journal of the Asiatic Society (Calcutta), XXVII, No.2, pp. 31-44; Note: the printers of this issue omitted a page between pages 32 and 33; and an insert of the omitted material is available from the author (A. Wayman).
3. Dhaky, "The date...") I also use this date, accepting E. Frauwallner, "Landmarks in the History of Indian Logic" (WZKSO, Band V, 1961).
5. Cf. Hidenori Kitagawa, "A Note on the Methodology in the Study of Indian Logic," Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies, Vol. VIII, No.1, 1960, pp. (19) to (29), beginning, "To interpret Indian logic using the terminology of Aristotelian logic, according to my opinion, is not to represent Indian logic as it is, but merely to review Aristotelian logic as applied to Indian logic." Kitagawa put out a large book on Dignāga in Japanese, publ.1965, including much Tibetan from the Pramāṇasamuccaya and the English translation of Dharmakīrti's Samītanantararāsiddhi as “A Refutation of Solipsism.” Then, the essay by J.F. Staal (unaware of Kitagawa's essay), "The Concept of Paka in Indian Logic," Journal of Indian Philosophy 2 (1973), pp. 156-166, beginning, "In studying a civilization different from our own we are prone to impose the conceptual framework and prejudices of our own tradition...S. C. Vidyābhusāna, the first historian of Indian logic, looked at his subject through eyes so colored by what he regarded as Aristotelian logic, that he talked of the 'Indian syllogism' and saw in it traces of the influence of Aristotle—a historical claim no serious student of Indian logic would nowadays wish to make his
own."


7. For example, H. N. Randle, *Fragments from Diṇāga* (Motilal Banarsidass, 1981 reprint) Index, p. 85, has references to the two kinds of inference.

8. Referring to Masaaki Hattori, *Diṇāga, On Perception*, tr. and annotated (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1968), the verse no. 23 would take the reader out of Diṇāga's own system to a section where he attempts to refute one or other Brahmanical philosophical school in this matter of *pratyakṣa*; whereas the topic of the *N. A.* verse under discussion goes with Diṇāga's own position.

9. From my MS *A Millennium of Buddhist Logic*, Vol. I, section "Introduction to the Diṇāga-Dharmakīrti system by the 'elevens'."

10. Several years ago, at an annual meeting of the American Oriental Society, I delivered a paper, "A lexical approach to the philosophical notion of Pramāṇa."

11. Vidyābhusana, n. 4, above, p.14 : "If that of which the major term or predicate (śādiya) is affirmed is opposed by evidence (śīla), the public understanding, one's own statement, etc., we have that which is known as the fallacy of the minor term or thesis (pakṣābhāsa), of which there are many varieties."

12. As referred to in n. 5, above.


14. This seminar volume is being published by the Tibetan Institute, Sarnath, probably in 1996.