

## ON THE TRANSLATION OF THE BASIC NYĀYA TERMS :

### PAKṢA, HETU AND DRṢTĀNTA

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A discussion of the problems of the translation of PA terms and Anglo-European logical terms is always in order, for to translate the vocabulary of the former into the vocabulary of the latter is to presuppose some implicit theories of and assumptions about logic. In this light, I shall consider the three widely used Sanskrit PA terms, pakṣa, hetu and drṣtānta.<sup>1</sup>

*Thesis* ( pakṣa<sup>1</sup> ) : this word is used interchangeably with pratijñā, e. g., as in pratijñādoṣa, 'faults of the thesis statement'. The word 'pakṣa' has been used in three senses; pakṣa<sup>1</sup> is the statement of the thesis or conclusion of the PA schema, i. e., the whole statement 'Sound ( śabda ) is impermanent' ( anitya ) 2, 2.1, 2.3-4, 3.1 ); pakṣa<sup>2</sup> refers to property ( dharma ) of the thesis ( pakṣa<sup>1</sup> ) which is extensionally equivalent to the sādhyā ( the property-dharma-to-be-justified, 2.2, 2.4, 3.2.2 (5), 3.2.2 (4), e.2.2 (5); pakṣa<sup>3</sup> has one occurrence in the NP ( 2.1. (1) ) where it has been used to refer to the dharmin ("locus/property-possessor") of the dharma "property" of the sādhyā ( "property-to-be justified" ) which is held to be concomitant with the sādhanā dharma ("justifier-property," ( hetu<sup>2</sup> ) of the justification ascription ( hetu<sup>1</sup> ) (2.2) :

Both words, "hetu<sup>1-2</sup>" ( below ) and "pakṣa<sup>1-2-3</sup>", have been much equivocated upon in this early period; sometimes a property was meant, pakṣa<sup>2</sup>; other times the whole proposition ( or ascription ) pakṣa<sup>1</sup> has been referred to by this word. The translation 'conclusion' for pakṣa<sup>1</sup> may suggest that "pakṣa; is the sequential end of a true deductive or inductive inference-schema. I would hold that the PA is closer to a formalistic deductive explanation, rather than a clear deductive inference; hence the less restrictive "thesis" seems more appropriate for pakṣa.<sup>1</sup> The awkwardness of translating pakṣa<sup>3</sup> may be lessened by indicating the meaning of the pakṣa<sup>3</sup>-dharmin in "thesis-locus." Other well-worn words of twentieth century nyāya studies, hardly to be called "standard," merely common, such as "subject ( and ) predicate", "probans" or, "minor terms", are misleading. First, the logician's use of the former two terms is significantly different from a grammarian's use; second, their metalogical assumptions are simply out of date.

"Justification" ( hetu ) also exhibits an equivocation; hetu<sup>1</sup> is the whole ascription 'because ( of its being a ) causally generated thing ( kṛtakatvāt )'; the usual transformation of the ascription into a statement is another etic but implicit transformation rule sometimes ignored by nyāya scholars. I hold that "justification" is a better translation of hetu<sup>1</sup>; hetu<sup>1</sup> is the ascriptive "statement" which indicates the

specific property ( the *hetu*<sup>2</sup> *dharma* ) of the justification-member (*hetu*<sup>1</sup>) ( for *hetu*<sup>1</sup>: 2.1-4; *hetu*<sup>2</sup> : 2.2, 2.3 ); *hetu*<sup>2</sup> refers to a property (*dharma*).

I suggest 'justifier' for *hetu*<sup>2</sup> rather than 'mark' or 'reason'. First, it is better because *hetu*<sup>1</sup> refers to the ascriptive statement, not the property ( *dharma* ) which is either empirically observable ( rare in the NP ) or is mutually presupposed within the context of the competitive *darśana*(s) ( philosophical schools ) context. If this property ( *dharma* ) ( *hetu*<sup>2</sup> ) is emically acceptable, by observation or, as is more likely, by finding no contradiction in it's assertion with one's *darśana* philosophy, and if the concomitance elicited in the warrant ( *dr̥ṣṭānta*<sup>1</sup> ) is acceptable, then the acceptance of both ( *hetu*<sup>1</sup> and *hetu*<sup>2</sup> ) is at least a necessary condition for concluding that the thesis-member (*pakṣa*<sup>1</sup>) is legitimate. A rule of logical debate ( *vāda* ) is that both or all parties to the evaluation of the PA must accept the justifier-property (*hetu*<sup>2</sup>). The metaphysical limitations presupposed by many of the opposing *darśanas* regarding the latter rule make such evaluation processes of PAs non-deductive but not non-formal.

Mr. Tachikawa translates the property, *hetu*<sup>2</sup> as 'mark', one-half of the concomitance of the two properties.<sup>1</sup> I take it here that he is also alluding to the common term '*liṅga*' ( mark ), as found in the *Nyāya Sūtra* and also in the *Nyāya Sūtra Bhāṣya* of the *darśana*. While it is true that in the orthodox (*āstika*) *Nyāya darśana*, 'consideration' or 'reflection' (*parāmarśa*) on the mark ( *liṅga* ) of the *hetu*<sup>1</sup> may be the sufficient condition for noting the concomitance of the two properties postulated in the PA and thus the legitimacy of a *pakṣa*<sup>1</sup>-*pratijñā*, no such discussion of *parāmarśa* is found in either the *Nyāyapraveśa* or the *Nyāyamukha*.

I would suggest 'justification' for '*hetu*<sup>1</sup>, ( the ascription ) and 'justifier' for '*hetu*<sup>2</sup>, the observable or assumed *darśana*-restricted property. Such translations reflect the important distinction between *hetu*<sup>1</sup> and *hetu*<sup>2</sup>, whereas 'mark,' 'reason,' 'predicate', 'middle term', or 'probans', do not so distinguish. Such words as 'mark' obviously overemphasizes '*hetu*<sup>2</sup>, 'while obscuring the ascriptive '*hetu*<sup>1</sup>.' In a modern context where many scholars have all-too readily supplied dummy subjects to make *hetu*<sup>1</sup> into a proposition, which it is not ( *ityāha* ), it is important to make this distinction explicit.

"Warrant" ( *dr̥ṣṭānta*<sup>1</sup>, 2.1, 2.3 ). Although the word 'concomitance' or 'pervasion' ( *vyāpti* ) as is commonly found in the later tradition, is absent in the NP, clearly the concept of two concomitant properties is operative; this relation we find expressed in the *dr̥ṣṭānta*. There are three major components of the *dr̥ṣṭānta* statement. First there is the "yat. . .tat," conditional proposition stating the concomitance of two properties, *dr̥ṣṭānta*<sup>1</sup>; second there is *dr̥ṣṭānta*<sup>2</sup>, 'the similar exemplification' ( *sapakṣa* ) and third, the dissimilar exemplification' ( *vipakṣa* ). All three are referred to simply as the '*dr̥ṣṭānta*' in the text. The whole *dr̥ṣṭānta* functions in this text as the expression of an exemplified warrant, which when juxtaposed with the proto-metalogical rule ( *trirūpahetu* ) and when satisfied, serves as a necessary condition

for legitimizing the thesis ( pakṣa<sup>1</sup> ). The two exemplifications (sapakṣa, and vipakṣa-dṛṣṭānta<sup>2</sup> ) of the warrant serve to satisfy : (1) the need for the loci or exemplification of the two necessary conditions of the three-fold trirūpa hetu<sup>2</sup> rule and, (2) the early Indian rhetorical tradition which has its historical roots in the *Nyāya Sūtra*. This tradition required the presence of (generally) “concrete” exemplifications, perhaps as a vestige of the earliest arguments by analogy. The dṛṣṭānta<sup>2</sup>, the sapakṣa and vipakṣa, and the great metalogical role they play in non-deductive mode of argumentation, leads one to suggest that the use of the term “dṛṣṭānta”<sup>2</sup> is historically prior to “dṛṣṭānta.”<sup>1</sup>

While my translations of pakṣa<sup>1</sup> and hetu<sup>1</sup> are not the more common ones, such as “proposition/conclusion” and “reason” respectively, my translation of dṛṣṭānta<sup>1</sup> as “warrant” is much more controversial and hence requires a more complex justification.

We shall now turn to a justification of the translation of dṛṣṭānta<sup>1</sup> as “warrant”. In the history of secondary scholarship about the Buddhist PA, “dṛṣṭānta” has been usually translated as either “example” or “exemplification.” Emically, there are two metalogical types of dṛṣṭānta(s) : “concordant” (sādharmya) and “discordant” (vaidharmya).<sup>2</sup> Sometimes, in the texts, the conditional “yat...tat” is referred to the word “dṛṣṭānta” ; so sometimes the sapakṣa and vipakṣa exemplifications are meant, another equivocation.

Let us first dispose of two responses to my non-traditional translation of dṛṣṭānta as “warrant,” that it is neither a “standard” translation nor as etymological one. That is, “warrant” does not convey the metaphor of exemplification, as indicated in the etymology of dṛṣṭānta<sup>2</sup> (√dṛṣt, to see, to visually observe), the statement of the example in which the concomitant properties, or their joint absence, are illustrated.

To claim that one should translate etymologically, that “dṛṣṭānta”<sup>1</sup> “means” example, illustration or exemplification, may be refuted by a counter-example concerning “pakṣa”. If etymological translation is of primary importance in nyāya texts, then we should translate “pakṣa” as “wing.” Of course we should not do so, for the word “pakṣa” has acquired a semi-technical meaning in nyāya vāda and a simple claim to translate in such a manner illustrates the methodological inappropriateness of trying to justify translating “dṛṣṭānta”<sup>1</sup> solely on etymological grounds rather than on emic and etic logical grounds.

Since 1900, scholars have struggled with many difficult nyāya translation problems, but given the multiplicity of logics, syllogistics, propositional and predicate calculi, even the logic of relations,<sup>3</sup> which have been used with and projected upon the PA, there is no more a “standard” translation than there is a standard source language logic. The comparisons and variations in the PA sources, in the target logics of formal translation and comparative metalogical interpretations, are the theoretical sources of the metalogical evidence for selecting a new translation of any PA term; it

is so with *drṣṭānta*<sup>1</sup> and<sup>2</sup> my point is that most scholars have discounted the metalogical function of the *drṣṭānta*<sup>1</sup> (conditional) and have emphasized the *drṣṭānta*<sup>2</sup> function of referring to the descriptive exemplifications (*sapakṣa*, *vipakṣa*) of concomitance.<sup>4</sup> This latter emphasis is quite in accord with the emic PA process of the justification of the legitimacy of a specific PA; however, while such scholars so emphasize in the *drṣṭānta*, they usually project other non-emic assumptions onto the PA, for example, formal deductive validity. We shall examine ten textual sources of evidence in the -NP regarding my case for “warrant.”

The text employs *drṣṭānta*<sup>2</sup> in only six cases among ten in the fallacies of the concordant *drṣṭānta* (*sādharmya*) (3.3.3.1-3) and the discordant *drṣṭānta* (*vaidharmya*) (3.3.2.1-3). The remaining four cases of *drṣṭānta*<sup>1</sup> (3.3.1.4,5 and 3.3.2.4,5) explicitly require both the conditional statement, *drṣṭānta*<sup>1</sup> with the conditional expression of *drṣṭānta*<sup>1</sup> in the proper order (3.3.1.5 and 3.3.2.5). This completes the distribution of *drṣṭānta*<sup>1-2</sup> in the ten *sādharmya* and *vaidharmya* fallacies. The discordant *drṣṭānta* (*vaidharmya*, 3.3.2.1-3) and *drṣṭānta*<sup>1</sup>, the conditional (*yat... tat*) as in the last two fallacies (3.3.2.4, 5) is repeated as in the concordant section (3.3.1.1-5). Thus for a PA *drṣṭānta* not to be fallacious, one must explicitly state the *drṣṭānta*<sup>1</sup> in correct conditional form.

Now we shall turn first to the *drṣṭānta*<sup>2</sup> because this side of the equivocation is the usual referent when the term “*drṣṭānta*” is employed emically. The following is a translation of *drṣṭānta*<sup>2</sup> where the focus is upon the similar exemplification (*sapakṣa*) rather than on the conditional *drṣṭānta*<sup>1</sup>, thus it is an example of *drṣṭānta*.<sup>9</sup>

*Sādhana-dharma-asiddha*. “A fallacious warrant is one in which the property (*dharma* (=hetu<sup>2</sup>) of the means of proof (*sādhana*) is not established (*asiddha*)” as in the following :

“The property-to-be-proved, permanence, resides in the exemplification, atom, but the property of the means of proof, corporeality, does not exist in the exemplification, atoms, because atoms are corporeal” (3.3.1(1)).

This instance of the fallacy of the *drṣṭānta*<sup>2</sup> does not focus on the conditional warrant but focuses on 1) the exemplification *sapakṣa* as the dual loci (*dharmin*) of two properties and 2) the presence of the *sādhya-dharma* and the absence of the *sādhana-dharma* in the exemplification. Tachikwa notes this,<sup>5</sup> but he fails to recognize the (fallacious) significance of the explicit informal fallacy of equivocation which has occurred here with the concordant (*sādharmya*) “*drṣṭānta*”.

The first three fallacies (*ābhāsa*(s)) (in 3.3.1.1-3) are about *drṣṭānta*<sup>2</sup>-as-*sapakṣa*; the last two (3.3.1.4, 5) are about the conditional statements (*yat... tat*) *drṣṭānta*<sup>1</sup> the pattern of three *drṣṭānta*<sup>2</sup> is repeated with discordant *drṣṭānta* (*vaidharmya*, 3.3.2.1—3 and 3.3.2.4, 5). *Drṣṭānta*<sup>1</sup> denotes the conditional warrant; *drṣṭānta*<sup>2</sup> denotes the exemplifications as *dharmins*. However, it is well to note that to omit *drṣṭānta*<sup>1</sup> is to violate a necessary condition of a legitimate PA; that is, it is fallacious to so omit

*dr̥ṣṭānta*<sup>1</sup> regardless of what the recipient “understands” about the “understood” concomitance of a particular PA (3.3.1.4, 5 and 3.3.2.4, 5).

I now offer two translations and comments regarding *dr̥ṣṭānta*<sup>1</sup> about which shall argue in my discussion of the justification of *dr̥ṣṭānta*<sup>1</sup> as “warrant”. The fallacy of the absence of a conditional formulation of concomitance (3.3.1. (4)) “*Ananvaya*” is the name of the fallacy of a statement of (positive) concomitance which lacks the conditional form.<sup>6</sup>

“A fallacious warrant (*dr̥ṣṭānta*<sup>1</sup>) is where a statement of (positive) concomitance (which expresses) the co-existence of both the property-to-be-proved and the property of the means of proof, lacks explicit illustration; hence, it is well-known that (the properties of) being causally generated and impermanence reside in a pot.” Note that this fallacy (“resemblance” (*ābhāsa*) of a legitimate PA) is an extension of a legitimate PA, as in Model I. However the explicit statement of the conditional warrant is missing, “whatever is causally, that is impermanent generated.” Thus the explicit presence of the conditional warrant, not just the statement of the similar exemplification nor merely the juxtaposition of the properties, is a necessary condition for a legitimate PA. If the statement of the *dr̥ṣṭānta*<sup>1</sup> is necessary, what then, is its metalogical function, its logical role? My emic conclusion is that it may be described as an implicit emic rule disguised as an alleged universally quantified law of concomitance.

In the other three fallacies of the *dr̥ṣṭānta* (3.3.1.1-3), excluding the fifth fallacy of an (improperly) reversed warrant, the justification of fallaciousness focusses not upon the conditional warrant (*dr̥ṣṭānta*<sup>1</sup>) but upon the presence and/or absence of the justifier (*hetu*<sup>2</sup>) and thesis properties (*pakṣa*<sup>2</sup>=*sādhya*) in the similar exemplification (*sapakṣa*). Thus the fallaciousness of the conditional warrant (*dr̥ṣṭānta*<sup>1</sup>) is quite different than the fallaciousness of the first three fallacious uses of the term “*dr̥ṣṭānta*<sup>2</sup>.” This emphasis upon the presence or absence of the alleged concomitant properties in the exemplifications and the metalogical procedures of ignoring the etic potential role of the *dr̥ṣṭānta*<sup>1</sup>, is a particular feature of the (metalogical) mode of argumentation in this text. Hence, this focus upon the specific exemplification(s) and not on the warrant constitutes more evidence for the non-deductive nature of the PA and its emic metalogical theories and procedures. Consider the contrary : a) if there were an emphasis on the warrant and b) if the PA were asserted with the thesis last, preceded by the justification and the warrant, and c) if there were replacement or transformational rules for the rearrangement of the latter two (*hetu*<sup>1</sup> and *dr̥ṣṭānta*<sup>2</sup>) and d) if there were explicit valid inference rules to which the *nyāya* logician could then appeal, to check, and against which to justify the PA at issue as in true deductive validity rules, then and only then, would we be able to make the case for and deductively argue that the PA is deductive, and in specific cases sound and valid. -

But we do not find a, b, c, and d exhibited in the PA and its metalogical theories and procedures or modes of argumentation. To pursue these questions further, let us consider the last fallacious warrant, the illicitly reversed expression of concomitance (*viparitanvaya*).

Also relevant to our discussion is the fallacy of a reversed warrant (*Viparitanvaya*): An example of a fallaciously reversed warrant (3.3.1.(5)) follows: “A fallacious warrant (*dr̥ṣṭānta*<sup>1</sup>) which is illicitly reversed is, for example, where one states “whatever is impermanent, that is well known to be causally generated” when one should say (*vāktavye*) “whatever is causally generated, that is well known to be impermanent.”

Note that the preferred warrant here is the reversed order of the missing warrant of the last fallacious warrant 3.3.11(4); the latter fallacious warrant lacked “whatever if impermanent, that is causally generated” which is the fallacious instance quoted in this fifth of the fallacious warrants through similarity (*sādharmya*). Thus the PA model implicit here is different than the only other fallacious warrant (*dr̥ṣṭānta*<sup>1</sup>).

It is also clear that in neither “reversed” (*viparita*) fallacy (3.3.1.(5) or 3.3.2.(5)) is there any justification or evidence explicitly offered in the NP text as to *why* the warrant must be explicitly expressed. The reader is reminded that normative *recommendation* concerning the correct order of the conditional warrant does not constitute *evidence* for the issue of why the warrant is needed. While the text then offers no explicit evidence for the answer to this extremely important metalogical question, the reasons are not difficult for supply; it is the necessary requirement of the explicit expression of the relation of concomitance (*vyāpti*).

Given the textual evidence just cited we now turn to make the case for the translation of “warrant” for *dr̥ṣṭānta*<sup>1</sup>. First, there is the implicit but obvious and simple normative rule that one should not utilize fallacious PA expressions; to omit the proper expression of the conditional *dr̥ṣṭānta*<sup>1</sup> is to commit a fallacy (as in 3.3.1.4, 5). Thus one should not omit the conditional *dr̥ṣṭānta*<sup>1</sup> regardless of how deceptively “clear” the PA seems without it. To do so is to commit an explicit emic fallacy; and to merely mention or simply conjoin the two properties in exposition is also to commit an emic fallacy (3.3.1.4).

Second, the correct order of the conditional *dr̥ṣṭānta*<sup>1</sup> can be accurately described as the naming of the justifier (*hetu*<sup>2</sup>-*dharma*) as the antecedent of the conditional *dr̥ṣṭānta*<sup>1</sup> and the property-to-be-justified (*sādhya*=*pakṣa*<sup>1</sup>-*dharma*) as the consequent. This is found in the legitimate PA (Model 1) where “causal generation” (*kṛtakatva*) is the name of the antecedent property and “impermanence” (*anitya*) is the name of the consequent of the conditional. The antecedent property “causal generation” is the justifier (*hetu*<sup>2</sup>). This is purportedly concomitant with the consequent property named in the *dr̥ṣṭānta*<sup>1</sup>; this property (*anitya*) is the thesis-property (*pakṣa*<sup>2</sup>) which is the property-to-be-justified (*sādhya*). This asymmetrical relation of causally generated things and impermanent things is expressed in the conditional *dr̥ṣṭānta*<sup>1</sup>, the absence

or the improper formulation of which necessitates the legitimate charge of asserting a fallacious PA.

The fifth fallacy (3.3.1.5) of concordance (dṛṣṭāntābhāsa sādharmanena) also illustrates the antecedent/consequent relation of the conditional described in the preceding sentences. Again, rules of fallaciousness are normative; hence the conditional form of dṛṣṭānta<sup>1</sup> is the implicit expression of a normative rule, as was the rule stating the fallaciousness concerning the omission as the improper form of the conditional dṛṣṭānta<sup>2</sup> (3.3.1.4); the warrant states the concomitance as a generic relation, a law. My translation of “warrant” conveys its *normative* rule-like metalogical function; “example” or “exemplification” do *not* convey this normative function of dṛṣṭānta.<sup>1</sup>

Thus I have established two bases for normative rules with the dṛṣṭānta fallacies (3.3.1.4, 5), its absence and improper form. Does “warrant” better express these normative factors than “example” or “exemplification”? I think it clearly does. Both “example” and “exemplification” are usually taken as purely *descriptive* terms, whereas “warrant” explicitly conveys the metalogical *normative* function of dṛṣṭānta<sup>1</sup>. That is, the function of dṛṣṭānta<sup>1</sup> is to serve as an explicit license or authorization rule, the appeal to which not only reminds the recipient (psychologically) of the concomitance of justifier (hetu<sup>2</sup>) and thesis property (sādhya-dharma), but the dṛṣṭānta<sup>1</sup> serves as the basis of a universally quantified law utilized as a normative standard; it is a rule which authorizes and thus justifies the concomitance (vyāpti) of the alleged concomitant properties of thesis-property and the justifier (pakṣa<sup>2</sup>=sādhya).

This specific normative function of the rule in dṛṣṭānta<sup>1</sup> occurs at the metalogical level; additionally, dṛṣṭānta<sup>1</sup> as a metalogical rule instansitates the general tendency in early Buddhist nyāya (and of course, in Jaina and āstika darśanas) to develop greater degrees of such general metalogical qualities as precision, clarity, formalism, freedom from error and formal explicitness. These metalogical qualities are repeatedly exhibited in nyāya texts in epistemology, ontology and in formal logic.

Other instances of these qualities in the Buddhist PA are found in the development of the explicit metalogical content-free “wheel of justifier” (Hetu<sup>2</sup>-cakra), the explicit metalogical rule of the three characteristics of the justifier (trirūpahetu<sup>2</sup>), the generation of such explicit metalogical terms as sādhya, sādhana, viśeṣa, anumeya, prameya, the generalized property/possessor descriptive relation (dharma-dharmin), and the whole varigated metalogical theory of error (ābhāsa). The latter theory of error is clearly normative and constitutes a rich fund of implicit metalogical rules and illustrations not all of which have been made explicit in the few explicit metalogical rules such as the three characteristics of the justifier (trirūpahetu<sup>2</sup>) or in the few non-fallacious PA models.

The paucity of non-fallacious models and the varigated complexity of the fallacies (ābhāsa) is necessary, for while it is easy to give an example of how a good

PA should appear, complete knowledge of the almost infinite string of possible PA's that people could possibly generate is impossible to anticipate. Thus the most efficient device for helping one evaluate this near infinite series of generated strings of PAs, is to codify an inclusive range and type of possible errors regarding the construction and justification of PAs. These PA models, metalogically explicit rules, and illustrations of errors constitute the normative base of evaluating PAs.

The two normative characteristics of the last two fallacies of the *dr̥ṣṭānta*<sup>1</sup> with concordance (3.3.1.4, 5) are captured in the explicitly normative term “warrant,” whereas, this normative quality is absent, or, at best, only very vaguely implicit in the translations “example” or “exemplification.” As noted, the latter two candidates are primarily descriptive in meaning. It is the clear conveyance of the crucial normative meaning and rule of *dr̥ṣṭānta*<sup>1</sup> as a universally quantified law used as a rule that provides the crucial evidence of the superior translation of “warrant” over “example” or exemplification.” The term “exemplification” is exactly right for the *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa*, for both, descriptively do exemplify, illustrate or exhibit the alleged concomitance of the properties, the justifier (*hetu*<sup>2</sup>) and of the thesis (*pakṣa*<sup>2</sup>). The roles of the *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa* are illustrative but not primarily normative, whereas the role of the *dr̥ṣṭānta*<sup>1</sup> is primarily normative. My translations of *dr̥ṣṭānta*<sup>1</sup> and *dr̥ṣṭānta*<sup>2</sup> conveys these descriptive and normative aspects more explicitly and accurately than other translations.

In summary, four important points are now established; first, that, the absence of an explicit statement of either positively or negatively expressed concomitance (*vyāpti*, although this word is not used in the NP) is fallacious. Second, it is clear that the mere juxtaposition, however accurately named, of the two properties of the thesis (*pakṣa*<sup>2</sup>) and the justifier (*hetu*<sup>2</sup>) is also fallacious. Third, the correct warrant (*dr̥ṣṭānta*<sup>1</sup>) must express accurately in a conditional statement, the legitimate concomitant properties of the thesis (*pakṣa*<sup>2</sup>=*sādhya*) as necessary condition, the consequent, and justifier (*hetu*<sup>2</sup>) as sufficient condition of the antecedent. These relations are to be expressed in an appropriate conditional statement such as “where there is causally generatedness, there is impermanence”. Fourth, the characteristic of the discussion of the *dr̥ṣṭānta* supports my claim (argued elsewhere) that the PA and its theories are neither deductive nor is validity an appropriate metalogical concept here.

Given my analysis of these two types of metalogical errors (*ābhāsa*), the absence of the conditional statement and the illicitly reversed order, I would hold that the implicit normative rule-like functions of the *dr̥ṣṭānta* (both *sādharmya* or *vaidharmya*) are explicitly expressed in “warrant” and significantly less (if at all) in either “example” or “exemplification.”

Thus I conclude that, by appeal to the implicit methodological rule that one should choose the more accurate technical translation, my case for translating “*dr̥ṣṭānta*”<sup>1</sup> as “warrant” has been stated and so stands justified.



**Footnotes :**

1. This article is an excerpt from an almost completed monograph on comparisons of formalism in Anglo-European and early Buddhist formal logics. However here, my textual for the parārthānumāna (cited hereafter as the PA) sources are *Nyāyapraveśa* and the *Nyāyamukha*.

Sanskrit editions of the *Nyāyapraveśa* (cited hereafter as NP) may be found in : Dhruva, A. B. *The Nyāyapraveśa, Part I*, Gaekwad's Oriental Series, Baroda, 1930; Ui, H. *Bukkyo Ronrigaku* (Buddhist Logic), Tokyo, 1944; Mironov, N.D., "Nyāyapraveśa, 1, Sanskrit Text, edited and reconstructed," in *T'oung Pao*, Leiden, 1931, pp. 1-24; Tachikawa, M., "A Sixth-Century Manual of Indian Logic," in *Journal of Indian Philosophy*, I (1971) p. 111-145, Toronto. A Chinese translation of this text may be found in the *Taisho Shinshū Daizokyo*, Buddhist Tripiṭaka, Vol. 32, no 1630, 11-13. The Tibetan translation has been edited by V. Bhattacharya in *The Nyāyapraveśa, Part II*, Gaekwad's Oriental Series, Baroda, 1927 and in the *Tibetan Tripiṭaka*, Peking edition, Reprint, edited by D.T. Suzuki, Tokyo, 1962, No. 5706, 130, 74-76. The other text, the NM, is the Chinese translation of Dignāga's *Nyāyamukha*, Taisho, Vol, 32, 1628. Textual examples could have been taken from a wide variety of Sanskrit texts, but I picked this one for four reasons : 1) I have worked with these texts in Chinese and Sanskrit most often; 2) Tibetan and Japanese editions are available : 3) it is available in all four languages thus being at hand for more scholars; and 4) it seems to me to be representative of many of the interesting but messy problems common to a formal lineage slowly emerging out of an ordinary-language tradition of debate and reliance on concrete examples.

There follows my paradigmatic example, model 1, of the PA. The following is a representative example of a PA reconstructed from the *Nyāyapraveśa*. "An Introduction to Logical Analysis."<sup>1</sup> This may be taken as a general paradigm of the Buddhist PA schemas; the old chestnut "the mountain has fire because it has smoke" is not typical, for it is empirically contingent, whereas many Indian schemas are not directly empirically contingent at all.

Thesis. "SOUND (IS) IMPERMANENT"

(pakṣa<sup>1</sup>) sabdo'nityaḥ

Justification : BECAUSE ( IT POSSESSES THE PROPERTY OF ) CAUSAL GENERATEDNESS

(hetu<sup>1</sup>) kṛtakatvāt

Warrant : WHATEVER (IS A) CAUSALLY GENERATED (THING), THAT (IS) WELL KNOWN (AS AN) IMPERMANENT (THING)

(dṛṣṭānta<sup>1</sup>) yat kṛtakam tad anityam dṛṣṭam

Similar Exemplification.....AS (IN THE) CASE OF SPACE, ETC.

(sapakṣa) yāthā ghaṭa-adis

Dissimilar Exemplification .....AS NOT (IN THE) CASE OF SPACE, ETC.  
(vipakṣa) na yathā akāśā-adis

2. The translation “concordant” and “discordant” were kindly suggested to me on April 15, 1980 at the University of California at Berkeley, by Dr. Alex Wayman, Professor of Sanskrit, Columbia University.
3. Staal, J. F., “Formal Structures in Indian Logic”, in *Synthese*, Vol. 12, September, 1960, 279-286.
4. Tachikawa, *op. cit.*
5. *Ibid.*, also relevant are the remarks of R.S.Y. Chi in his *Buddhist Formal Logic*, Royal Asiatic Society, London, 1967, 105.
6. Sanghavi, S., *Advanced Studies in Indian Logic and Metaphysics*, Indian Studies : Past and Present, Calcutta, 1961, 109.