#### THE

## SACRED BOOKS OF THE JAINAS

#### Edited

WITH CO-OPERATION OF VARIOUS SCHOLARS

## By

## S. C. GHOSHAL, M. A., B. L.

Sarasvatī, Kūvyatirtha, Vidyūbhūsaņa, Bhūratī, Sometime Professor of Sanskrit, Edward College, Pabna (Bengal), and Professor of English and Philosophy, Hindu College, Delhi (Punjab), Member, Legislative Council, District Magistrate, Cooch Behar.

Volume XI

## PARĪKSĀMUKHAM

PRINTED BY KIRAN KUMAR ROY, AT METROPOLITAN PRINTING & PUBLISHING HOUSE, LTD. 90, LOWER CIRCULAR ŘOAD, CALCUTTA.

# PARĪKSĀMUKHAM

### By

## MÄNIKYANANDĨ

#### (WITH PRAMEYA-RATNAMALA BY ANANTAVIRYA)

EDITED WITH TRANSLATION, INTRODUCTION, NOTES AND AN ORIGINAL COMMENTARY IN ENGLISH

#### Bу

### SARAT CHANDRA GHOSHAL, M. A., B. L.

Sarasvatī, Kāvyatīrtha, Vidyābhūṣaṇa, Bhāratī. Jubilee Post Graduate Scholar, Bankim Chandra Gold Medallist and Jyotish Chandra Medallist (University of Calcutta J; Ewart Prizeman, Scottish Church College; Author of "The Digamvara Saints of India", "Vāruņi", "Yautuk", "Vairāgyer Pathe", Edilor of "Kriyāyogasāra", "Upakathū", "Gitāvalī", "Sundarakānda Rāmāyaṇa", "Dravya-samgraha", "Vedanta Paribhāsā" etc.

#### PUBLISHED BY

THE CENTRAL JAINA PUBLISHING HOUSE, AJITASRAM, LUCKNOW.

1940

## The Sacred Books of the Jainas

Original Texts with Translations, Commentary and Notes.

Volume	I.	Davva-Sangaha (Dravya-Sangraha)			
		of Nemi Chandra Siddhānta-Chakra- varti with Brahmadeva's Commentary	Price Rs. 5-8		
Volume	II.	Tattvārthādhigama Sūtra of Umāsvāmi	Price Rs. 4-8		
Volume	III.	Pañchāstikāyasamayasāra of Kunda- kundāchārya	Price Rs. 4-8		
Volume	IV.	Puruṣārtha-siddhyupāya of Amrita Chandra Sūri	Price Rs. 4-8		
Volume	v.	Gommata-sāra (Jiva Kānda) of Nemi Chandra Siddhānta-Chakravarti	Price Rs. 5-8		
Volume	VI.	Gommata-sāra (Karma Kānda) Part I of Nemi Chandra Siddhānta Chakra- varti	Price Rs. 4-8		
<b>T</b> 7.1	VII	Atmānuśāsana of Guņabhadrāchārya	Price Rs. 2-8		
			Price Rs. 3-0		
		Samaya-sära of Kundakundāchārya			
Volume	IX.	Niyama-sāra of Kundakundāchārya	Price Rs. 2-8		
Volume	X.	Gommata-sāra (Karma Kanda) Part II			
		of Nemi Chandra Siddhanta Chakra-			
		varti	Price Rs. 4-8		

.

#### All available at :--

# THE CENTRAL JAINA PUBLISHING HOUSE,

## Ajitasram, Lucknow.

#### INTRODUCTION

Earlier writers on Jaina Nyāya.

Umāsvāmi.

Parikşāmukham is a standard work on Jaina Nyāya philosophy. The earliest writers on this subject were Kundakundāchārya and Umāsvāmi or Umāsvāti (1st century A. D.). Umāsvāmi wrote his work Tattvārthādhigama Sūtra in the form of aphorisms. Parikşāmukham is also written in the same style. Commentators to Tattvārthādhigama Sütra were many and the most famous of them developed this subject in their commentaries. The following among them are worthy of special mention : . (1) Pujyapāda Devanandi, a Digamvara, the writer of Sarvārtha-siddhi ( 5th century A. D. ); (2) author of Gandhahasti Mahābhāşya ( Samantabhadra according to the Digamvara view, or Siddhasena Divākara according to the Śvetāmvara view or Siddhasena Gani according to another view ): (3) Akalańka, a Digamvara, the writer of Tattvārtharāja-vārttika ( 7th century A. D. ); and (4) Vidyānandi or Vidyānanda, a Digamvara, author of Tattvārtha-sloka-vārttika (9th century A. D. ).

Kundakundāchārya,3 Kundakundāchārya is the author of many works the most famous of them being Pravachanasāra, Pailchāstikāya-samayasāra, Samayasāra and Niyamasāra.

#### Samantabhadra.

Samantabhadra ( 2nd century A. D.?) a Digamvara scholar saint whose date has not been definitely ascertained ) was the author of the famous work  $\overline{A}$ pta-mimāmsā. Akalaňka Deva wrote a commentary on this work entitled Aṣṭa-śati. Vidyānanda or Vidyānandi wrote a commentary on Aṣṭa-śati entitled Aṣṭa-sahasri. Yuktyanuśāsana is another important work of Samanta-bhadra among his voluminous writings.

Siddhasena Divakara. Siddhasena Divākara, a Švetāmvara (6th or 7th century A. D.) wrote Nyāyāvatāra a short treatise in verse on Jaina Nyāya. A commentary on this was written by Siddharsi (10th century A. D.) and Chandraprabha Sūri (12th century A. D.). Siddhasena's other works are Dvātrińsikā and Sammati Tarka the latter commented on by Abhayadeva Sūri (10th century A. D.).

Haribhadra. Haribhadra Sūri the author of Ṣaddarśanasamuchehaya lived about 700—770 A. D.\* Guņaratna (15th century A. D.) wrote a commentary of this work.

Akalanka Deva the great Digamvara writer Akalanka. developed in elaborate treatises the subject of Jaina Nyāya philosophy. His Tattvārtha-rāja-vārttika, Astaśati, Nyāya-viniśchaya, Laghiya-straya, Pramāna-sangraha etc. show the masterly way in which he handled this subject and all writers who followed him, modelled their writings on his treatises. Mānikyanandi the author of Pariksāmukham was Mänikyanandi, the first writer who condensed the subject in the form of aphorisms taking materials from Akalanka's Many commentaries of Pariksamukham works. the most famous among them being Prameyakamala-mārtanda by Prabhāchandra and Prameyaratna-mālā by Ananta-vīrya came to be written and a large number of commentaries on Prameya-ratnamālā exist in manuscript form in many Jain libraries scattered throughout India. The work Pariksä-

\* "हरिभद्र सूरि का समय निर्णय" an article in Hindi published in Jain Sāhitya Sānisodhaka, Bhāga 1, Anka I, Deva-Sūri mukham received such a celebrity that Deva-sūri (11th century A. D.) wrote Pramāņa-naya-tattvā-lokālankāra with its commentary Syādvāda-ratnākara closely imitating the aphorisms of Parīkṣā-mukham and substituting merely synonyms in many of the aphorisms. Ratnaprabha-sūri (12th century A. D.) wrote a commentary Syādvāda-ratnākarāva-tārika to Syādvāda-ratnākara. Rājasekhara (14th century A. D.) wrote a Panjikā on Ratnaprabha's work and Jnānachandra (14th century A. D.) wrote a Tippaņa to the same.

Hemachandra.

The next great writer was Hemachandra who wrote voluminous works on almost every subject. His celebrated work Dvātrinšikā on the model of Siddhasena's work has been commented on in detail by Mallişena (13th century) in a commentary entitled Syādvādamañjari in which different systems of Hindu, Bauddha, Chārvāka and other systems of philosophy have been reviewed and criticised. His famous work on Jaina Nyāya is Pramāņamīmāņsa a portion only of which has up to this date been discovered.

Many other more or less important works on Jaina Nyāya such as Nyāya-dīpikā of Dharmabhūşaņa, Saptabhangitaranginī of Vimala-dāsa, Patraparīksā and Āpta-parīksā of Vidyānanda, Pramālaksma and Pramāņa-parīksā of Vidyānandi, Jainatarka-bhāsā, Jaina-tarka-vārttika, Naya-chakram, Naya-pradīpam, Naya-rahasyam, Nayopadešah, Pramāņa-nirņayah and innumerable glosses on the standard works and their commentaries already mentioned came to be written, but no new viewpoint was adopted by any of these later writers whose main object was to explain or amplify the view of older writers.

Later works on Jaina Nyāya. iv

The goal of Nyāya philosophy. The real object of the Nyāya philosophy in the Hindu śāstras was propounded as attainment of liberation<sup>4</sup>. In Brihadāraņyaka Upanişad, the sage Yājňavalkya told his wife Maitreyi that we should learn about the soul, understand it and meditate on it<sup>2</sup>. For proper understanding of the nature of a thing, help of the Nyāya philosophy is essential. It is said that we suffer misery because we have false knowledge regarding the soul, such as considering the body as soul. When we perceive the error of such a wrong belief, we get true knowledge<sup>3</sup>. The Jain view also is that the Nyāya philosophy leads to right faith, right knowledge and right conduct which produce liberation<sup>4</sup>.

Difference in philosophical views is based on different kinds and methods of appreciation of the one eternal truth All Indian philosophies aim at

1. "निःश्रेयसाधिगमः ।" Gautama Nyāya Sūtra I. 1.

"प्रमाणादि-पदार्थ-तत्वज्ञानान्निःश्रेयसं दृष्टं, नहि कश्चित् पदार्थो ज्ञायमानो हानोपादानोपेक्षाबुद्धिनिमित्तं न भवतीति । एवश्व क्रत्वा सर्वे पदार्थो होयतया खप-क्षिप्यन्ते इति । परन्तु निःश्रेयसमस्यादेस्तत्वज्ञानाद् भवति ।"

Nyāya-vārttika by Udyotkara.

2. "आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्ट्रव्यः श्रोतव्यो मन्तव्यो निद्ध्यासितव्यो मैत्रेथ्यात्मनो वा अरे दर्शनेन श्रवणेन मत्या वा विज्ञानेनेदं सर्वं विदितम्।" Brihadāraņyaka Upanişad. 4.4.5. Śańkarāchārya has mentioned that Manana as laid down in the word "Mantavya" is to be made by Tarka "पश्चान्मन्तव्यस्तकेत:।" This gives rise to the development of the Nyāya philosophy.

- 3. "दोषनिमित्तानां तत्वज्ञानादहंकारनिष्टत्तिः ।" Nyāya Sūtra, 4. 2. 1.
  - "मिध्योपछन्धिविनाशस्तत्वज्ञानात् ॥" Ibid. 4. 2. 35.

4. See Luges 5 und 4.

the attainment of real happiness and destruction of misery. In Yogavāsistha Rāmāyaņa it is mentioned: "O Rāma! the idea of creation consisting of Ahamkāra, Manas, Buddhi etc. which have been described by me as modification of one, are differently described by the authors of Nyāya philosophy. The Sānkhya and Chārvāka philosophies have described the same differently. The followers of Jaimini (Mimāmsā philosophy), Arhats (Jainas), Bauddhas, Vaišeşikas and others of peculiar views like Pancharātras have described the same in different manner. All of them however will go to the same eternal goal as passengers from different places travelling at different times reach a particular city".<sup>1</sup>

The great masters of philosophy knew this truth and in ancient times though each propounded his own theory and even criticised the views of others, intolerance was absolutely absent. All great teachers and writers were always eager to learn what others have thought and said on a particular question and an attempt was always made to discuss a particular point from different aspects. There is indisputable

 "अहंकारमनोबुद्धिदृष्टयः सृष्टिकल्पनाः । एकरूपतया प्रोक्ता या मया रघुनन्दन ।। नैयायिकैरितरथा ताहरों परिकल्पिताः । अन्यथा कल्पितैः सांख्येश्चार्वाकेरपि चान्यथा ।। जैमिनीयैश्चाईतैश्च बौद्धेर्वेशेषिकैस्तथा । अन्यैरपि विचित्रैस्तैः पाश्वरात्रादिभिस्तथा ।। सर्वेरपि च गन्तव्यं तैः पदं पारमार्थिकम् । विचित्रं देशकालोत्थैः पुरमेकमिवाध्वगैः ।।"

Utpatti Prakarana 96. 48-51.

. •

evidence that Buddha discussed the views of the Jainas as well as of other sects in his time. There is evidence of such discussions by Sri Mahāvira the twenty fourth Tirthańkara of the Jainas.

Different systems of Indian philosophy.

The first attempt to give a concise view of the different systems of philosophy was made by Jain sage Haribhadra Sūri in his Saddarśana-samuchchaya. In this work he has described (1) Bauddha (2) Nyāya (3) Sānkhya (4) Jaina (5) Vaišeşika and (6) Mimāmsā systems of philosophy.<sup>1</sup> We find that within Sānkhya, he has also described Pātanjala philosophy and within Mimāmsā, he has dealt with Pūrva-mimāmsā as well as Uttara-mimāmsā or Vedānta. Thus though Haribhadra's work is named "A compendium of six philosophies", in reality it treats of eight systems of philosophy. In Vivekavilāsa by Jinadatta Sūri (13th century) the same enumeration has been followed. Rajaśekhara Sūri (13th century) mentioning these six (really eight) systems of philosophy has stated that the Nāstika views cannot be accepted as philosophies.<sup>2</sup>

Astika and Nästika philosophies. It is necessary to understand the difference of Astika and Nāstika philosophies. Though Mādhavāchārya in his Sarvadarśana-saṅgraha has described sixteen systems of philosophy viz. (1) Chārvāka

 "बौद्धं नैयायिकं सांख्यं जैनं वैशेषिकं तथा। जैमिनीयञ्च षड्विधानि दर्शनानाममून्यहो ॥"

Saddarsana-samuchchaya 3.

''जैनं सांख्य जैमिनीय योग वैशेषिक तथा।
 सौगतं दर्शनान्येवं नास्तिकं न तु दर्शनम् ॥"

Şaddarśanasamuchchaya Page 1 (Yaśovijaya series, Benares)

(2) Bauddha (3) Arhata (4) Rāmānuja (5) Mādhava (6) Pāšupata (7) Śaiva (8) Pratyavijñā (9) Raseśvara (10) Pāņiņiya (11) Nyāya (12) Vaišesika (13) Sānkhya (14) Yoga (15) Pürva-mimāmsā (16) Uttaramimāmsā, it is on the basis of the distinction of the Astika and Nāstika philosophies that the so-called Nāstika philosophies came to be excluded in the subsequent list of approved philosophies. By six systems of Indian philosophy, according to current acceptance Nyāya, Vaišeşika, Sāńkhya, Pātañjala (Yoga), Mīmāmsā and Vedānta are understood. The Jaina and Bauddha philosophies were excluded from this list by later writers on the ground that these systems are Nāstika philosophies. Raghunandan has quoted a verse from Hayaśirşa-pañcharātra that the philosophies of Gautama, Kānada, Kapila, Patañjali, Vyāsa and Jaimini are the only six systems of philosophy<sup>1</sup>.

The word Nāstika is differently interpreted. The derivative meaning from the Sūtra of Pānini<sup>2</sup> is taken to be "he who does not accept Paraloka or existence after death"<sup>3</sup> The second interpretation is that by Nāstika we mean the person who does not accept the existence of Iśvara<sup>4</sup> and the third

 "गौतमस्य कणादस्य कपिछस्य पतथ्बलेः । व्यासस्य जैमिनेश्चापि दर्शनानि षडेव हि ॥" Devapratisthātattva.
 "अस्ति नास्ति दिष्टं मतिः ।" Astādhyāyi of Pāṇiṇi. 4.4.60.
 "परलोकः अस्तीति यस्य मतिरस्ति स आस्तिकः । तद्विपरीतो नास्तिकः ॥" Kāsikā.
 "नास्तिकः परलोकतत्साधनाद्यभाववादी । तत्तसाक्षिण ईश्वरस्य असत्यवादी च ॥" Nyāyakosa. meaning is that Nāstika indicates the man who denies the authority of the  $Vedas^{1}$ .

Now, if we accept the meaning of Nāstika as one who does not accept Paraloka (existence after death), Karma and the fruits of Karma, we cannot say that Jaina and Baudha philosophies are Nāstika philosophies for both of these systems of philosophy accept these.

Again, if we interpret 'Nästika' to mean 'denying the existence of Iśvara', the Sāńkhya as well as Mīmāmsā systems of philosophy should be taken as Nāstika philosophies as neither Kapila nor Jaimini has accepted the existence of a creator (Iśvara). But we have shown above that these two systems of philosophy have not been excluded from the list of six philosophies on such a ground.

The conclusion is therefore inevitable that to call Bauddha and Jaina philosophies "Nāstika", the third interpretation of the word "Nāstika" viz. denying the authority of the Vedas, must be accepted, for these philosophies do not accept the Vedas as eternal or as infallible. The Bauddhas accept two Pramāņas, Pratyakṣa and Anumāna and do not accept the authority of the Vedas. <sup>2</sup> In Jain

- 1. "नास्तिको वेदनिन्दकः।" Institutes of Manu.
- 2. ''ये तु सौगतसंसारमोचकागमाः कस्तेषु प्रामाण्यमार्योऽनुमोदते,

बौद्धशास्त्रे हि विशिष्टा दृश्यते वेदवाहयता ।

जातिधमौदिताचार परिहारावधारणात् ॥" Nyāyamañjarī. "महाजनश्च वेदानां वेदार्थानुगामिनां च पुराणधर्मशास्त्राणां वेदाविरोधिनाञ्च केषाञ्चिदागमानां प्रामाण्यमनुमन्यते, न वेदविरुद्धानां बौद्धाद्यागमानाम् ॥" Nyāyamañjarī.

For a full discussion vide a Bengali article "Astika and Nastika Darsana" by Dr. Ashutosh Saştri, philosophy  $\overline{A}$ gama (words, signs etc. of an  $\overline{A}$ pta or reliable person), has been accepted as a variety of Pramāņa but the authority of the Vedas has not been accepted<sup>1</sup>.

But this exclusion of Jain philosophy was effected at a very late stage. We find that its doctrines were attempted to be refuted in the Vedānta-sūtras, and Kumärila and Śańkarāchārya levelled their arguments against certain Jain views such as existence of omniscient beings. There cannot be any doubt that all the different systems of philosophy whether the same were Astika or Nāstika according to different interpretations were thoroughly studied and in conferences before saints, kings and scholars, discussions and refutations of various doctrines were of very frequent occurrence. We find in Saktisangama Tantra [between 1555 to 1604 A. D.] that Jaina philosophy was taken as one of Kāli Darśanas<sup>2</sup> Even Jayanta Bhatta the celebrated Hindu anthor of Nyāya maňjarî [9th century] accepted Jaina philosophy to be authoritative<sup>3</sup>.

1. Vide Pages 44 to 49 of Prameya-ratnamālā appended to this work in which the view that  $\overline{A}$  gama can include the Vedas is refuted whether it be accepted that the Vedas are Pauruşeya (produced by human beings) or Apauruşeya (not produced by human beings and eternal).

2. Śaktisangamatantra edited by Binayatosh Bhattacharya M.A. Ph. D. (Gaekwad Oriental Series).

3. Jayanta Bhatta began his argument that others can be Apta like the author of the Vedas, saying "अन्ये सवगिमानान्तु प्रामाण्यं प्रसिपेदिरे". His conclusion is exemplified in the verse :---

"नानाविधैरागममार्गभेदैरादिश्यमाना बहवोऽभ्युपायाः ।

एकत्र ते श्रेयसि संपतन्ति सिन्धौ प्रवाहा इव जाह्णवीयाः ॥"

P-2

Nomenclature of Nyāya.

The name "Nyāya" came to be applied later to a system of philosophy which dealt with logic. The original name was "Anvīksikī" from Anvīksā (discussion). Fruitless Tarka Vidyā was always discouraged' but that Anviksiki which will lead to the attainment of a knowledge of self was always regarded as a subject to be learnt. In Manu-samhitā we find that a King should learn Anviksiki<sup>2</sup>. Rājasekhara in his Kāvya-mīmāmsā has mentioned that-Anviksiki knowledge is of two kinds, being of the nature of Pürvapaksa and Uttarapaksa and that Jaina, Bauddha and Chārvāka systems are of the former and Sānkhya, Nyāya and Vaiseşika systems are of the latter kind<sup>3</sup>.

In Chhāndogya Upaniṣad (VII-1) and in Mahābhāṣya of Patañjali, we find Nyāya philosophy named as "Vāko-vākya." Vātsyāyana mentioned the fivelimbed syllogism (for Parārthānumāna) as Nyāya.

After describing persecution of persons who set up new sects for worldly enjoyment and profligacy, by king Śankaravarmā of Kashmir, Jayanta Bhatta says that the doctrines of the Jains etc. are not such :

## ''तदपूर्वमिति विदित्वा निवारयामास धर्मतत्वज्ञः । राजा शंकरवम्मा न पुनर्जैनादिमतमेवम् ॥''

1. Vide: "आन्वीक्षिकीं तर्कविद्यामनुरक्तो निर्धिकाम्।" Mahābhārata Śāntiparva 180. 47. To what extent such wrong arguments can proceed will appear from the attempt of sage Jābāli to dissuade Rāma from going to the forest to fulfil the vow of his father. Rāmāyana. Ayodhyākānda. Canto 109.

2. "आन्वीक्षिकीश्वात्मविद्याम्।" Manu-samhitā, 7.43.

3. Kāvyamimāmsā. Chapter II.

From analogy the science propounding this has also been called Nyāya<sup>1</sup>.

The Hindu Nyāya and Vaišesika philosophies are mentioned as Yauga by Jain logicians. The Vaiśesika system is earlier than the Nyāya philosophy and its logical principles are accepted by the latter. "The Nyāya analyses the different ways in which our knowledge is acquired. They are said to be intuition (Pratyakşa), inference (Anumāna), comparison (Upamāna), and verbal testimony (Śabda). Though Pratyaksa originally meant sense-perception, it soon came to cover all immediate apprehension whether through the aid of senses or otherwise. It is knowledge whose instrumental cause is not knowledge (Jňānākaranakam jňānam). In inference comparison etc. we require a knowledge of premises or of similarity, but such knowledge is not an antecedent condition of intuition. The word is used for the result or the apprehension of the truth as well as the process or the operation which leads to the result.

Sense-perception follows on the modification of the self produced by the contact of the senses with their objects. Two kinds of perception are distinguished, determinate (Savikalpaka) and indeterminate (Nirvikalpaka) which correspond roughly to knowledge about and acquaintance with an object.

Inference operates neither with regard to things unknown nor with regard to that known

1. In Subalopanisad we find : "न्यायो मीमांसा धर्मशास्त्राणि।" In Yājňavalkya Samhitā we read : "पुराणन्यायमीमांसा।" Some also use the word Niti to mean Nyāya e.g. "सांख्ययोगा नीतिविसेसिका" Milinda pañha.

Essence of Nyāya-Vaiśeşika principles of reasoning. definitely for certain; it functions only with regard to things that are doubtful.' (N. B. I. I. i.). It derives a conclusion from the ascertained fact of the subject possessing a property which is constantly accompanied by another. We ascertain that the hill is on fire from the fact that the hill has smoke and smoke is universally accompanied by fire. Inferential reasoning is stated in the form of a syllogism of which the five members are: 1. Proposition (Pratijna): the hill is on fire; 2. Reason (Hetu): because it smokes; 3. Example (Udāharaņa): whatever shows smoke shows fire e. g. a kitchen; 4. Application (Upanaya): So is this hill, and 5. Conclusion (Nigamana): therefore, the hill is on fire. The first member states the thesis to be established. It is only a suggestion. It contains a subject of what is observed, which is generally an individual or a class, and a predicate, which is to be proved. The subject is the minor term ( Pakşa, Dharmin) and the predicate the major (Sādhya, Dharma). The second member of the syllogism states the presence in the minor of the middle term called ground (Hetu). 'The third takes us to the basis of inference, the major premise. Though Gautama and Vātsyāyana may not have regarded the example as the illustration of a general rule later Nyāya looks upon it as the statement of an invariable concomitance between the mark and the character inferred (Vyāpti-prati-pādakam Vākyam). The conclusion re-states the proposition as grounded. Nāgārjuna is given the credit for dispensing with the last two members of the syllogism as superfluous.

Universal propositions are reached through enumeration, intuition and indirect proof. Uninterrupted agreement (Niyata Sāhacharya) reinforced

by absence exceptions (Avinābhāva-rūpaof sambandha) leads to unconditional concomitances. Nature does not always supply us with positive and negative instances of the necessary type. In such cases indirect proof (Tarka) may be used. By pointing out the absurdities in which we are landed, if we deny a suggested hypothesis, we indirectly prove its validity. Even when we observe all possible cases and strengthen our conclusion by indirect proof we cannot reach absolute certainty. Experience of sensible particulars, however thorough and exhaustive, cannot give rise to universal relations. Gangeśa recognises the non-sensuous (Alaukika) activity involved in the apprehension of universals (Sāmānyalakṣaṇa)<sup>1</sup>."

In my commentary on the Parikṣāmukham, I have pointed out in detail where and in what manner Jain logicians differ from the above views of Hindu Nyāya and Vaišeṣika Philosophies.

Pramāņa is the main theme of all Nyāya philosophies. Different systems admit different number of Pramāņas In Tārkika-rakṣā (11th century) we find; "The Chārvākas accept only one Pramāņa viz. Pratyakṣa ; Kaṇāda and Buddha accept two Pramāṇas Pratyakṣa and Anumāna; the Sāṇkhya system and some sects of Nyāya philosophy acknowledge three Pramāṇas viz, Pratyakṣa, Anumāna and Śabda; some followers of the Nyāya philosophy accept four Pramāṇas, Pratyakṣa, Anumāna, Śabda and Upumāna; Prabhākara (one school of Mīmāmsā philosophy) accept five Pramāṇas, Pratyakṣa, Anu-

1. S. Radhakrishnan : Indian Philosophy Encyclo. Britt. Vol. 12. Page 250. māna, Upumāna, Šabda and Arthāpatti; the Bhāttas (followers of Kumārila Bhatta, another school of Mimāmsā philosophy) as well as the followers of the Vedānta philosophy accept six Pramāņas viz. Pratyakṣa, Anumāna, Upamāna, Šabda, Arthāpatti and Abhāva."<sup>4</sup>

Jain Nyāya before Māņikyanandi. The earliest detailed reference to the subject of Pramāņa in Jain Nyāya is found in the Tattvārthādhigama Sūtra of Umāsvāmi. The twelve Angas of the Jainas prevalent at the time of Śrī Mahāvira only give a hint of Anekāntavāda but no specific reference of Pramāņa, Naya or Sapta-Bhangi is found in the same. Kundakunda in his Pravachanasāra has mentioned the two kinds of Pramāņa viz Pra-

Kunda-kunda.

 "प्रत्यक्षमेकं चार्वाकाः कणादसुगतौ पुनः । प्रत्यक्षमनुमानञ्च सांख्याः शब्दश्च ते अपि ।। न्यायैकदेशिनोऽप्येवमुपमानं च केचन । अर्थापत्त्या सहैतानि चत्वार्याह प्रभाकरः ।। अभावषष्ठान्येतानि भाट्टा वेदान्तिनस्तथा ।"

Tārkika rakṣā by Varadarāja

Writers like Varadarāja as above have termed scholars who have formulated different views from the same of Gautama as "Nyāyaika-deśins". Mallinātha in his commentary on Tārkika-rakṣā has explained Nyāyaikadešins as Bhūṣaṇa and others ("न्यायैकदेशिनो मूफ्णीया: 1") The Jain scholor Guṇaratna in his commentary on Saḍdarśanasamuchchaya (Haribhadra Sūri) has mentioned a commentary called Nyāya-bhuṣaṇa among the eighteen commentaries of the work Nyāya-sāra by Bhā-sarvajňa ("भासर्वज्ञप्रणीते न्यायसारेड **ष्टादशटीका: तासु मुख्या टीका न्यायमूषणाख्या** !") Some infer that the view of Bhūṣaṇa is novel and opposed to Nyāya-sūtras of Gautama on some points which include the number of Pramāṇas, Bhūṣaṇa accepting only three (Pratyakṣa, Anumāna and Śabda) though Gautama admits four (Prayakṣa, Anumāna, Upamāna and Śabda). tyaksa and Paroksa and the Sapta-bhangi. But these references give only the barest outlines without any definite details. For example, Kundakunda says:

"The knowledge of him who beholds the immaterial, the supra-sensorial in material objects (mūrtāni), and the hidden, complete (embracing) the self and the other, is called Pratyakṣa (immediate)" <sup>1</sup>

1. Pravachanasāra. Śruta-skandha I. 54 Trans. by Barrend Faddegon.

Amritachandra in his commentary thus explains this verse: "Supra-sensorial knowledge beholds the immaterial, the suprasensorial even in material objects, and the hidden complete, whether included in own as in other. Such knowledge surely is a seer, owing to its immediateness, with reference to (a) immaterial (a-mūrta) substances such as the principles of motion and stationariness (b) immaterial, but supra-sensorial substances, such as the ultimate atom, (c) that which is hidden in respect of substance e. g. time: that which is hidden in respect of place e. g. the Pradesas of space located outside the world; that which is hidden in time, e. g. in non-present modifications; that which is hidden in respect of forms-of-being, namely five (Suksma) modifications latent within gross (Sthūla) modifications: thus with reference to all things, distinguished as own and other.

Immediate knowledge indeed, bound to a single self, called the Akşa and having the immediacy of its manifested infinite purity and beginning-less connection with the generality of perfect intelligence (Siddha-Chaitanya Sāmānya) does not search for exterior means, enjoys infinity, because of its possession of infinite energies. Knowledge enjoying such prestige, seeing that the knowable appearances no more outgo knowledge than combustible appearances the fire, what can resist such knowledge ? Therefore it is acceptable." Ibid p. 35.

Here Akşa is taken as synonym of  $\overline{A}$ tman. This is to be remembered to contrast the interpretation of Akşa as Indriya (senses) by other Naiyāyikas. "The soul, in itself immaterial, goes into materiality (mūrti) and then apprehending with this material (body) the material (world), sometimes knows and sometimes does not know that—which-isfit-for-knowledge (yogya)."

"Touch, taste, smell, colour and sound are the material objects (pudgalas) for the sense-organs; the sense organs do not grasp them simultaneously."

"The sense-organs are called an exterior (para) substance, and not an innate nature of the self; how then could that which is reached by them be an immediate perception for the self?"

"Knowledge of objects from another is called indirect; but if knowledge is acquired by the soul alone (Kevala Jhāna) then it is direct." <sup>1</sup>

Kundakunda describes the sensorial joy; not supremely real of those who possess indirect knowledge (Parokṣa-Jñāna) thus:

"The lords of men, demons and Gods, oppressed by their natural (sahaja) organs of sense, unable to withstand that misery, find pleasure in satisfying objects"<sup>2</sup>.

1. Pravachana-sāra. I. 55-58 Trans by Barend Faddegon.

2. Ibid I-63. Amritachandra explains this verse thus: "Those creatures who through lack of immediate knowledge take refuge in indirect knowledge have a congenial affection for their organs of sense, which are the equipment therefor. So in these persons having this affection for their sense-organs and, while devoured by the flaring  $K\bar{a}la$ -fire of great infatuation, utterly longing and thirsty, like heated balls of iron, and unable to withstand the vehemence of this misery, there arises a satisfaction (rati) with these satisfying (ramya) objects, which serve to soothe their disease. Hence since the sense-organs must be compared to a disease and the objects to means for soothing the disease, no really-true joy exists for those who have a limited knowledge."Ibid. pp. 41-42. Kundakunda lays down that a soul in its perfect condition has omniscience knowing by direct intuition (pratyakşa) substances, states etc. in all times and places without operation of senses. Parokşa (indirect) knowledge is sense-knowledge, the senses being a material accretion to the soul.

Saptabhangi is briefly described in Pravachanasāra II.23. As this matter is not dealt with in Parikṣāmukham, we do not dilate upon this subject here.

Umāsvāmi in the Tattvārthādhigama Sūtra made a more detailed reference to Pramāņas and its subdivisions. Laying down the utility of Pramāņas and Nayas as means of instruction for attaining right faith<sup>1</sup>, Umāsvāmi has mentioned that "Mati, Śruta, Avadhi, Manaḥparyaya and Kevala are right knowledge"<sup>2</sup> and these also consist of two Pramāṇas.<sup>3</sup> Mati and Śruta are taken to be Parokṣa<sup>4</sup> and Avadhi, Manaḥparyaya and Kevala as Pratyakṣa<sup>5</sup>. We find in Kundakunda's Pravachana-sāra the idea of Mati, Śruta, Avadhi and Manaḥparyaya in the following verse :

"The saint (Sādhu) has the scripture for eye; all creatures have their sense-organs for eyes; the Devas have eyes which see the remote (avadhi); but the liberated souls (siddhas) have eyes which see everywhere."<sup>6</sup>

1. "प्रमाणनयैरधिगमः ।" Tattvārthādhigama Sūtra, I. 6.

- 3. "तत् प्रमाणे।" Ibid I. 10.
- 4. "आद्ये परोक्षम् ।" Ibid I. 11.
- 5. "प्रत्यक्षमन्यत्।" Ibid I. 12.

Pravachana-sāra III. 34. Trans. by Barend 6. Faddegon p. 177.

P--3

Umāsvāmi,

<sup>2. &</sup>quot;मतिश्रुतावधिमनःपर्ययकेवल्लानि ज्ञानम्।" Ibid I. 9.

Kundakunda's description of Kevala knowledge has already been quoted.

The oldest idea of Pramāņā in Jainism as expounded by Umäsvämi and as already described is that the knowledge which is derived without the help of the senses or mind is Pratyaksa and the knowledge derived from the help of the senses or mind is Among the three varieties of Pratyaksa Paroksa. Ayadhi, Manahparyaya and Keyala, the first two cognise only objects having form. For this reason knowledge derived from these two kinds of Pratyakşa Pramāņa are called Vikala Pratyakşa, but Kevala knowledge cognises all objects with or without form in the past, present or future and is therefore known as Sakala Pratyaksa. Mati and Śruta are the two varieties of Paroaksa and Umāsvāmi has mentioned that Smriti, Sanjinā (Pratyabhijnāna), Chintā (Tarka), and Abhinibodha (Anumāna) are within Mati Jňāna (the first variety of Paroksa)<sup>1</sup>.

Samantabhadra first used the nomenclature "Nyāya" and in this respect he inaugurated a separate subject. He however did not compose any special work in Jain Nyāya. He mentions that Pramāņa illuminates itself as well as other objects<sup>2</sup> and states that the result of Pramāņa is acceptance of desirable things, leaving undesirable things or indifference <sup>3</sup> He has also mentioned Śruta Pra-

Samantabhadra.

### 1. ''मतिः स्मृतिः संझा चिन्ताभिनिबोध इत्यनर्थान्तरम् ।''

Tattvārthādhigama Sūtra.

See Parikṣāmukham page 80. Aphorism 2.

"स्वपरावभासकं यथा प्रमाणं मुवि बुद्धिलक्षणम् ।"

Svayambhū Stotra. Verse 63.

3. "उपेक्षा फल्माद्यस्य शेषस्यादानहानधीः ।"

Apta-mimāmsā Verse 102.

1. '

māņa as Syādvāda and has stated Naya to be its part<sup>1</sup>.

Siddhasena Divākara added the word "Bādhavivarjjita" (without any obstruction) to the definition of Pramāņa by Samanta-bhadra viz. that it illuminates itself as well as other objects<sup>2</sup>. Though Samantabhadra used inference to establish an omniscient being in his Apta-mīmāmsā, yet we find the definition of Anumāna with its subdivisions Svārtha and Parārtha for the first time in the Nyāyāvatāra of Siddhasena. In this work also we get definitions of limbs of Parārthānumāna such as Pakṣa, Hetu and Driṣṭānta. The fallacies also have been described in the aforesaid treatise<sup>3</sup>.

It is of the utmost importance to remember that except in the Jaina Nyäya, we nowhere find knowledge derived from the senses being called Parokşa Pramāņa. In Hindu Nyāya philosophy \* and in all other Hindu Śāstras, knowledge derived from the senses is known as Pratyakṣa Pramāṇa. Akalaṅka the greatest of Jain logicians attempted to reconcile this in the following way. He accepted Pratyakṣa and Parokṣa as two Pramāṇas but instead of dividing Pratyakṣa into Śakala and Vikala, he laid down two hitherto unknown divisions viz.

Akalaṅka.

Siddhasena.

1. "स्याद्वाद प्रविभक्तार्थे विशेषव्यंजको नयः ।"

Äpta-mimämsä. Verse 106.

2. Vide Parikṣāmukham p. 20 Note 9.

3. Verses from Nyāyāvatāra on all these matters have been quoted in footnotes in Parikṣāmukham in appropriate places.

4. "इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षोत्एनं झानमञ्यपदेश्यमञ्यभिचारि-व्यवसायात्मकं प्रत्यक्षम् ॥" Nyāya Sūtra ( Gautama ) I. 1. 4. Sānvyavahārika and Mukhya Pratyakşa'. He further laid down that Mati Jnana derived through the senses and mind is not Paroksa but Sānvyavahārika As Mati came to be recognised as Pratvaksa<sup>2</sup>. Sānvyavahārika Pratyaksa, its corelated Smriti, Sanjñā, Chintā and Abhinibodha as mentioned by Umāsvāmi also came under the same head. a subtle distinction was made by Akalanka. subdivided Sānvyavahārika Pratyaksa into heads (a) Indriva-pratyaksa (knowledge derived through the senses) under which came Mati

But

He

two

and

(b) Anindriya-pratyakşa (knowledge derived through mind)<sup>3</sup> under which came Smriti, Sanjñā, Chintā and Abhinibodha<sup>4</sup> as mind is prevalent in these four. This change necessitated a change of definition of Pratvaksa and Akalanka accordingly defined Pratyakşa as "clear knowledge." ("Pratyakşam visadam jnānam.")

Now, to meet the argument that if we take Mati as Pratyaksa we must say that the traditional acceptance of the view that it is Paroksa is denied undermining the oldest authorities like Umāsvāmi, Akalanka has written that Mati, Smriti, Sanjñā, Chintā and Abhinibodha will be Pratvaksa so long as these


1.	''प्रत्यसं विशदं झानं सुख्यसांव्यवहारिकम् ।				
	परोक्षं शेषविज्ञानं प्रमाणमिति संग्रहः ॥" Laghiyastraya Verse 1.				
2.	"आद्ये परोक्षमपरं प्रत्यर्क्ष प्राहुरंजसा ।				
	केवलं लोकनुद्धैयव मतेर्लक्षणसंग्रहः ॥'' Nyāya-vinischaya				
	Verse 93.				
3.	' तत्र सांन्यवहारिकं इन्द्रियानिन्द्रियप्रत्यक्षम् ।"				
	Vivriti on Laghiyastraya. Verse 4.				
4.	"अनिन्द्रियप्रत्यक्षं स्मृतिसंज्ञाचिन्ताभिनिवोधारमकम् ।"				
	Vivriti on Laghivastrava, Verse 61				


remain in the mental state. The moment these are connected with words i.e. are expressed in words they will become Parokṣa<sup>1</sup>. Thus, Akalaṅka has accepted Mati etc, as Pratyakṣa in one sense and Parokṣa in another sense. According to Akalaṅka Śruta is what is heard and so the knowledge derived through words is Śruta and the knowledge having no connection with words is Sāṅvyavahārika Pratyakṣa.

The peculiarity of Akalanka is that under Sruta in Paroksa Pramāņa he has two subdivisions Aksarātmaka and Anakşarātmaka. Other Jain logicians have mentioned that Anumana (inference) is of two kinds.Svärthänumäna (inference for one's own self) and Parārthānumāna ( inference for the sake of others). Akalanka says that it is not inference alone that has these two subdivisions but other Pramānas also may be for Svārtha and Parārtha. Svārthānumāna is accepted by Akalańka to be included in Anakşarātmaka Śruta Pramāņa as no help of words is necessary for its acceptance and Pararthanumana according to Akalanka comes within Aksarātmaka Anumāna as this cannot arise without help of words. The Pramanas Arthapatti, Agama etc are all recognised by Akalanka to be varieties of Śruta Pramāna.

The following tables will illustrate the difference between the divisions of Pramāņa by the oldest writers such as Umāsvāmi and Akalanka.

 "ह्रानमाद्यं मतिः संज्ञा चिन्ता चाभिनिवोधनम् । प्राङ्नामयोजनाचछेषं अतं शब्दानुयोजनात् ॥" Laghiyastraya.





The writers who followed Akalanka (such as Ananta-virya, Vidyānanda etc.) did not accept Smriti etc. as Anindriya-pratyakṣa though in one sense they were ready to accept knowledge derived through the senses to be Sānvyavahārika Pratyakṣa. The views of later writers have been fully discussed by me in

the commentary of Parikṣāmukham and the charts printed in Pages 76 and 77 of the work might be

Later Writers,

Māņikyanandi in his Parikṣāmukham has elosely followed the views of Akalańka. Before the time of Māṇikyanandi, Pramāṇa was defined as "Svaparavyavasāyi jūāna" (valid knowledge of itself and other). Māṇikyanandi added thẹ word "Apūrva" (not proved before) in the definition. Akalaňka has mentioned the same thing by the word "Anadhigatārthagrāhi"<sup>1</sup>. A verse (the author of which has not been identified) in Mīmāmsā philosophy shows that the element "Apūrva" was also accepted as essential to Pramāṇa in that philosophy also<sup>2</sup>.

Māņikyanandi has not followed Jaināgama by including Avagraha etc. within knowledge. He has mentioned Āgama in place of Śruta Pramāņa and has placed it under Parokṣa Pramāṇa.

Subsequent developments and detailed definitions and discussions have been investigated in my commentary on Parikṣāmukham where in all cases the original authority has been quoted to give the readers an opportunity to form their own opinions in case they wish to differ from the same of my own.

- 1. "प्रमाणमविसंवादि ज्ञानम् अनधिगतार्थाधिगमल्व्रणत्वात् ।" Asta-sati
- "तत्रापूर्वार्थविज्ञानं निश्चितं वाधवर्ज्जितम् । अदुष्टकारणारवधं प्रमाणं लोकसम्मतम् ॥"

compared with the charts printed above.

The use of 'Vyavasāya' or "Niśchaya" in the definition of Pramāņa as used by Māņikyanandi is to differentiate the Jain view from that of the Buddhists who do not accept this to be essential in Pramāņa. Some Buddhist philosophers also deny the existence of external objects. To differentiate the Jain view the word "Artha" has been introduced in the definition of Pramāņa by Māņikyanandi (see page 29).

There are four sects of Buddhist philosophers: 1 Mādhyamika 2 Yogāchāra 3 Sautrāntika and 4 Baibhāsika.<sup>1</sup> Those who maintain that everything is void are Mādhyamikas or Śūnyavādins or Nihilists. Those who maintain the reality of everything are known as Sarvāstitvavādin or Realists divided into two groups (a) Sautrāntikas and (b) Baibhāsikas. Those who maintain that thought only is real are known as Vijūānavādins or Idealists.

Śańkarāchārya in his Bhāṣya an Vedānta Sūtra II. 2-18 writes that the difference of views arose either from expounding different views at different times by Buddha or from the different views adopted by the disciples of Buddha<sup>2</sup>. Śańkarāchārya mentions that there are three kinds of disciples known as Sarvāstitvavādins, Vijňānavādins and Sarvasūnyatāvādins <sup>3</sup>Bāchaspati Miśra in his commentary Bhāmati on the same Sūtra says "Disciples have great, medium or little intelligence. Those who have little

1.	"बुद्धस्य हि माध्यमिक-योगाचार-सौत्रान्तिक-वैभाषिक-संझकाश्चत्वारः					
	शिष्याः ।"	Brahmavidy <b>ā</b> bh <b>araņ</b> a				
2.	"स च बहुप्रकारः प्रतिपत्तिभेदाद्विनेयमेदाद् वा ।"					
	Śāńkarabhāsya to Vedānta Sūtra II. 2. 18					
3.	"तत्रैते त्रयो वादिनो भवन्ति ।	केचित् सर्वास्तित्ववादिनः, केचिद्रिज्ञाना-				
• .	स्तित्त्वमात्रवादिनः, अन्ये पुनः	सर्वशून्यत्ववादिन इति ।" Ibid.				
P4						

The Buddhist views, intelligence descend into Nihilism following the existence of everything. Those who have medium intellect descend into Nihilism following the view that thought only is real. Those who have great intellectual capacity grasp Nihilism without any intermediate hold of anything"<sup>4</sup>. The following verses. from Bodhicharyāvatāra are quoted in the Bhamati :

"The instructions of the preceptors of people follow the inclination of their souls and so differ in many ways by various means. Sometimes the instructions are deep, and sometimes superficial. Sometimes these are of both the above kinds. Though these are different, really they are not different being characterised by  $\hat{Sunyata}$  (Nihilism)<sup>2</sup>.

The view of Sarvāstitvavādins (Realists) who maintain that everything whether external or internal is real is thus described by Śańkarāchārya. "What is external is either element (Bhūta) or elementary (Bhautika); What is internal is either mind (Chitta) or mental (Chaitta). The elements are earth, water and so on; elementals are colour etc.

1. In explaining "Vineyabhedāt vā" in the Śāńkara Bhāṣya, Bāchaspati Miśra says :

> "होनमध्यमोत्कुष्ठधियो हि शिष्या भवन्ति । तत्र ये हीनमतयस्ते सर्वास्तित्ववादेन तदाशयानुरोधाद् शून्यतायामवतार्थन्ते । ये तु मध्यमास्ते ज्ञानमात्रास्तित्वेन ज्ञून्यताया—मवतार्थन्ते । ये तु प्रक्रष्टमतयस्तेभ्यः साक्षादेव शुन्यतातत्त्वं प्रतिपाद्यते ।"

> > Bhāmati on Vedānta Sūtra II. 2. 18

 "देशना लोकनाथानां सत्वाशयवशानुगाः । भिद्यन्ते बहुधा लोक उपायैर्बहुभिः पुनः ॥ गंभीरोत्तानमेदेन क्वचित्रोभयल्क्षणा । मिन्नापि देशनाभिन्ना शून्यताद्वयल्क्षणा ॥" Bodhichittavivarana.

#### xxvii

on the one hand, and the eye and the other senseorgans on the other hand. Earth and the other three elements arise from the aggregation of the four different kinds of atoms; the atoms of earth being hard, those of water viscid, those of fire hot, those of air mobile.

The inward world consists of the five so-called 'groups' (skandha), the group of sensation (rupaskandha), the group of knowledge (vijňānaskandha), the group of feeling (vedanā-skandha) the group of verbal knowledge (sańjāskandha) and the group of impressions (samskāraskandha); which taken together constitute the basis of all personal existence"<sup>1</sup>. (Dr. Thibaut's translation. Sacred Books of the East. Vol. XXXIV Page 403).

The Skandhas are thus described in the following Note of Dr. Thibaut to the above. This will explain the Alayavijñāna and Pravrittivijňāna mentioned in Page 29.

"The rüpaskandha comprises the senses and their objects, colour etc.; the sense-organs were above called Bhautika, they here reappear as Chaittika on account of their connection with thought. Their objects likewise are classed as Chaittika in so far as they are perceived by the senses. The vijiānaskandha comprises the series of self-cognitions (ahamaham ityālayavijiānapravavaḥ) according to

1. ''सर्वास्तित्ववादिनो वाह्यमान्तरञ्च वस्त्वम्युपगच्छन्ति, भूतं भौतिकं चित्तं चैत्तञ्च। तत्र भूतं पृथिवीधात्वादयः, भौतिकं रुपादयश्चक्षुरादयश्च। चतुष्टये च पृथिव्यादिपरमाणवः खरस्नेहोष्णेरणस्वमावास्ते पृथिव्यादि-भावेन संहन्यन्त इति मन्यन्ते । तथा रुपविज्ञानवेदनासंज्ञासंस्कारसंज्ञकाः पंच स्कन्धाः, तेऽप्याध्यात्मं सर्वव्यवहारास्पदभावेन संहन्यन्त इति मन्यन्ते ।" Śänkarabhāşya to Vedānta Sūtra II. 2. 18

all commentators; and in addition according to Brahmavidyābharaņa, the knowledge determinate and indeterminate of external things (savikalpakam nirvikalpakañcha pravrittivijñānasangitam). The vedanāskandha comprises pleasure, pain etc. The sanjāskandha comprises the cognition of things by (Gaurasva their names ityādi-sabda-sanjalpitapratyayah, Ānanda Giri ; Gauraśva ityevam nāmaviśista-savikalpah pratyayah, Go. Au; Sanjnā Yajnadattādipada-tadullekhi savikalpapratyayo vā dvitīvapakse vijnānapadena savikalpapratyayo na Brahmavidyābharana) The Samskāragrāhyah. skandha comprises passion, aversion etc. dharma and adharma....The Vijñānaskandha is Chitta, the other skandhas Chaitta."

Similarities between the aphorisms in Parikṣāmukham and the same in Nyāya-prabeśa and Nyāyavindu of Dharma-kirti have been shown by Pandit Kailās Chandra Śāstri<sup>4</sup>.

Nyāya-praveśa		Parikşāmukham
1. ञुचि नरःशिरःकपालं प्राण्यङ्गत्वात् शंखशुक्तिवत् ।		VI. 19
2. माता मे बन्ध्या ।	·	<b>VI.</b> 20
<ol> <li>वाष्पादिभावेन संदिहयमानो भूतसंघातोग्निसिद्धा-</li> </ol>		
वुपदिश्यमानः संदिग्धासिद्धः ।		VI. 25, 26
4. तत्र पक्षः प्रसिद्धो धर्मी ।		III. 26, 27
Nyäya-vindu		
1. अनुमानं द्विधा।	••••	III. 52
2. स्वार्थ परार्थ च ।		III. 53
<b>३ नेहा</b> प्रतिवद्धसामर्थानि धूमकारणानि		
ः असन्ति, धूमाभावात् ।		III. 81
4. नात्र झिंशपा वृक्षभावात् ।		III. 80
<ol> <li>नास्त्यत्र शीत्तस्पर्धाः धूमात् ।</li> </ol>	••••	III. 73

Meaning of the title "Parikşāmukham." The title of the work Parikṣāmukham is thus derived according to the author of Nyāyamanidīpikā : Parikṣa or Tarka is the discussion used in finding out the strength or weakness of various arguments which are opposed to one another. 'Pari' means 'full' and 'Īkṣaṇam' means 'discussion' (of subjects). 'Āmukha' means 'the entrance' to those who want to understand this subject. This work (Parīkṣāmukham) is like such a door."'

Another derivation is also suggested by the same writer as follows : "As examination of all objects is made by Pramāņa so Pramāņa is the first thing (Āmukha) in Parikṣa (discussion). Here the work itself describing Pramāṇa (which is Parikṣāmukhaṃ) is also titled in the same name. As ascertainment is made by Pramāṇas leaving aside fallacies, discussion goes on with the help of Pramāṇas by those engaged in arguments. So the name 'Parikṣāmukhaṃ' of this work is justified.<sup>2</sup>

Manikyanandi.

Nothing in detail is known about Māņikyanandi the author of Parikṣāmukham. In the Visvakoṣa

 "अन्योन्यविरुद्ध-नानायुक्तिप्रावल्यदौर्वल्यावधारणाय प्रवर्त्तमानो विचारः परीक्षा तर्क इति यावत् । 'परि' समन्तादशेष निःशेषत 'ईक्षणं' विचारणं यत्र अर्थानाम् इति व्युतपत्तेः । तस्य 'आमुखं' तद्वव्युतपत्तौ प्रवेशार्थिनां प्रवेशद्वारमिदं प्रकरणम् ।"

 "अथवा समस्तप्रमेयजालपरीक्षायाः प्रमाणपूर्वकत्वात् प्रमाणं परीक्षामुखम् । अत्र मुखराब्दस्य प्रथमार्थवाचित्त्वात् प्रमाणप्रतिपादकं प्रकरणमपि परीक्षामुखमित्युच्यते । प्रमाणनिश्चयस्यापि एतत् प्रकरणपूर्वंकत्वात् तदाभासव्यावृत्त्या निश्चितं हि प्रमाणं पुरस्कृत्य परीक्षा क्रियते प्रेक्षापूर्वकारिभिरिति प्रकरणस्य परीक्षामुखनामधेयमनुपचरितम् ॥"

Nyāyamaņi-dīpikā, a commentary on Prameya-ratna-mālā. [From a Manuscript preserved in Jain Siddhānta Bhavan, ARRAH ]. (a Bengali encyclopaedia) it is mentioned "According to the Pattāvali of the Sarasvati Gachcha of the Digamvaras, Māņikyanandi became Pattadhara in 585 Vikrama Samvat (523 A. D.) Before be became a Pattadhara that is to say, in the beginning of the 6th century, Māņikyanandi wrote Parikṣāmukham.

This view is untenable. It is accepted by everyone that Māņikyanandi was later than Akalańka and that he based his work or Akalańka's writings. Anantavirya, the author of Prameya-ratna-mālā a commentary on Parikṣāmukham begins his work by saluting Māņikayanandi in this manner :

Salutation to that Māņikyanandi who has churned the nectar of the knowledge of Nyāya from the ocean of the words of Akalanka<sup>1</sup>.

In Nyāyamaņi-dipikā a commentary on Prameya-ratna-mālā we find :

"Bhatta Akalańka Deva promulgated the influence of the true religion by the weapon of arguments delighting the hearts of all scholars of the world in the court of King Hima-śītala....Afterwards the great sage Māņikyanandi wrote the Prakaraņa Parīkṣāmukham culling the subject matter from the ocean of the śāstra written by him (Akalańka). This work (of Māņikyanandi) is like a vessel to cross the ocean (of the work of Akalańka.)"<sup>2</sup>

 "अकलंकवचोऽम्मोधेरुइझे येन धीमता। न्यायविद्यामृतं तस्मै नमो माणिक्यनन्दिने ॥" Prameyaratnamälä.

2. 'सकळराजाधिराजपरमेश्वरस्य हिमशीतत्स्य महाराजस्य महास्थानमध्ये …भगवान् भट्टाकलंकदेवो विश्वविद्वन्मण्डलहृद्दयाह्रादियुक्तिशस्त्रेण जगत्सद्धर्मप्रभाव-

मतूबुधत्तमाम् । तदनु माणिक्यनंदिमुनिवृन्दारकस्तत्प्रकाशितशास्त्रमहोदधेरुद्धृत्य तद्वगाहनाय पोतोपमं 'परीक्षामुख' नामधेयमन्वर्थमुद्रहत्प्रकरणमारचयन् मुदा ।" Nyāyamanidipikā ( A Mss. ).

Māņikyanandi was later than Akalańka.

#### xxxi

Prabhāchandra the author of Prameyakamalamārtaņḍa has written: "As the subject as laid down by Akalaṅka could be understood only by the wise, the  $\overline{A}ch\overline{a}rya$  (Māņikyanandi) composed this Prakaraṇa to explain that subject quoting the same with the object of laying down the same and wishing to explain the same (to all)<sup>4</sup>.

There are differences of opinion as to the time during which Akalanka flourished In Aradhanakathā-kosa (15th or 16th century A.D.), Akalańka is described as the son of the minister of Subhatunga the King of Manyakheta. It is also mentioned that there was a discussion in the court of King Himasitala between him and the Buddhists. In the Mallisena · Praśasti in Sravana Belgola the latter incident is supported. It is also mentioned therein that Akalanka visited the court of King Sāhasatunga. Dr. Satish Chandra Vidyābhūşana has taken Subhatunga or Sāhasatunga as Krisņarāja I of the Rashtrakuta dynasty<sup>2</sup>. Pandit Nathuram Premi following this view has mentioned that the time of Akalańka was from Vikram Samvat 810 to 832  $(753 \text{ to } 775 \text{ A.D.})^3$  Dr. K. B. Pathak holds the view

1. ''श्रीमदकलंकार्थोऽ व्युत्पन्नप्रझैरकगन्तुं न शक्यत इति तद्व्युत्पादनाय करतलामलकवत् तदर्थमुद्धृत्य प्रतिपादयितुकामस्तत्परिज्ञानानुप्रहेच्छाप्रेरितस्तदर्थ-प्रतिपादमप्रवणं प्रकरणमिदमाचार्यः प्राह।'' Prameya-kamala-mārtaņḍa.

2. "Māņikyanandi was a Digamvara author.. As his work is based on that of Akalanka, he must have lived after 750 A. D.... Māņikyanandi seems to have lived about 800 A.D." History of the Medieval School of Indian Logic. Page 28.

3. Jain Hitaishi Bhaga 11. Page 428. Vide "अकलंकदेव ८१० से ८३२ तक के किसी समय में जीवित थे।"

Time of Akalańka, that Akalanka was a contemporary of Sāhasatunga Dantidurga. B. Kamta Prasad Jain criticising the view of Mr. Premi, has accepted the view that Sāhasatunga was none other than Dantidurga who reigned from 744 to 759 A.D. and has suggested that the time of Akalanka was from 744 to 782 A. D. B. Kamata Prasad has given arguments to support his view in his article in Hindi entitled "Sree Bhattākalanka Deva" published in Jain Siddhānta Bhāskar Bhāga 3, Kiran 4. This view has however been ably refuted by Pandit Kailās Chandra Śāstrī in his article "Bhattākalanka kā Samaya" printed in the same journal (Bhāga 4 Kiran 3).

The first argument of B. Kamtaprasad is that Akalańka has been mentioned by Jinasena in his. Harivaṃśapurāṇa and two verses have been quoted in support of this view<sup>4</sup> and it is also mentioned that Dr. R. G. Bhandarkar has also mentioned this fact<sup>2</sup>. It has however been pointed out by Pandit Kailās Chandra Śāstrī that it is not correct to interpret the word 'Deva' in the first verse to mean Akalańka. It really refers to Devanandi alias Pūjyapāda the author of Jainendra Vyākaraṇa. In the second verse it is merely mentioned that the fame of Virasena is 'akalańka' ('free from any flaw'). It has no

 "इन्द्रचन्द्रार्कजैनेन्द्रव्याडिव्याकरणेक्षिणः । देवस्य देवसंधस्य न वन्द्र्यन्ते गिरः कथम् ॥" Verse 31. Hariyamáa Purāna. "वीरसेनगुरोः कीर्त्तिरकलंकावभासते ।" Verse 39. Hariyamáa Purāna.

2. Principal Results of my last two years studies in Sanskrit Mss. Literature by R. G. Bhandarkar (Wier, 1889) Page 31.

#### xxxiii

connection with the author 'Akalanka'. Had Jinasena any desire to eulogise Akalanka, he would have done this in an un-ambiguous manner.

It is however not disputed by Pandit Sästri that Jinasena was a writer later than Akalanka. Vidyānanda in his Astasahasri a commentary on Akalanka's Astasati has mentioned Kumārasena. This Kumārasena has also been mentioned in Harivamsapurāna of Jinasena. Prabhāchandra a commentator on Pariksāmukham who was undoutedly later than Māņikyanandi who followed Akalanka is mentioned in the Adipurana of Jinasena. The next argument of B. Kamtaprasad is that Akalanka was later than Dharmakirti, the Buddhist philosopher who flourished in the beginning of the seventh century (635 to 650 A.D. approximately) Pandit Śāstri admits this and gives examples showing that Akalanka has quoted and refuted the views of Dharma-kīrti<sup>1</sup>. Pandit Śāstri however

1. The following instances are given : (a) The Kārikā in Akalanka's Laghiya-straya beginning with "स्वसंवेद्यविकल्पानां" mentions "सर्वतः संहृत्य चिन्तास्तिमितान्तरात्मना" found in kārikā 124 Chapter III of Pramāņa-vārttika written by Dharma-kīrti.

Vide also "Dharmakirti who is not referred to by Hieun Thsang but is referred to by I-Tsing very probably belonged to a period between 600-650 A.D." Introduction to Sādhana-mālā Page XXVII by B. Bhattacharya M.A. (Gaekwad's Oriental Series).

(b) The argument "भेदानां बहुभेदानां तत्रैकस्मिन्नयोगतः ।" mentioned in Pramāṇa-vārttika I. 91 has been met by Akalaṅka in his Nyāyavinischaya in the verse beginning with "भेदानां बहुमेदानां तत्रैकत्रापि संभवात् ।"

(c) In Aşta-satī of Akalanka on Āptamimāmsā verse 53 we $\rm P{-}{-}5$ 

is unable to accept the conclusion of B. Kamtaprasad from this fact that Akalanka was at least hundred years later than Dharmakirti, for it is urged that even contemporary writers can quote and refute each other's views and many examples can be given of such refutations.

Dr. K. B. Pathak has mentioned that as Kumārila Bhatta has attacked some of the views of Samantabhadra and Akalanka, it must be supposed that he was a contemporary of those writers and lived even after the death of Akalanka. In his article discussing the date of Samanta-bhadra' he has mentioned that the refutations of each other's views by Kumärila and Akalanka took place at the latter half of the eighth century A.D. B. Kamtaprasad has accepted this view and lays down that the time of Kumārila is 700 to 760 A.D. Pandit Sāstrī points out that as B. Kamtaprasad accepts the time of Akalanka to be 744 to 782 A.D., how can it be possible that Kumārila lived even after the death of Akalanka as Kumārila according to B. Kamtaprasad (following Dr. K. B. Pathak) lived only up to 760 A. D. ? Further, Pandit Śāstri is unable to accept this date of Kumārila without satisfactory proof, but is willing to accept that Kumārila

find "न तस्य किंचिद् भवति न भवत्येव केवलम्". This is exactly the second half of verse 279, Chapter I of Pramäņa-vārttika.

(d) The view of Akalanka expressed in the sentence beginning with "मतान्तरप्रतिक्षेपार्थ ना" mentioned in Astasahasri Page 81 discussing the Nigraha-sthānas of the Buddhist philosophers is a refutation of the Vāda-nyāya of Dharmakirti.

1. Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute Vol. II. p. 141,

#### XXXV

existed during the latter part of the seventh century refuting the view of Dr. K. B. Pathak that Kumārila flourished in the 8th century<sup>1</sup>.

In the work 'Akalańka-charitra' it is mentioned that in 700 Vikrama Samvat (643 A.D.) there was a great discussion between Akalańka and the Buddhists<sup>2</sup>. Pandit Śāstrī points out that B. Kamta Prasad has taken the date as saka 700 but it is clear from the Sanskrit verse that Vikram Samvat is referred herein.

Pandit Śāstri holds the view that Akalańka flourished in the middle of the 7th century. After criticising the views of B. Kamtaprasad, Dr. Pathak, Dr. Bhandarkar, and Dr. S. C. Vidyābhüṣaṇa as mentioned above, he mentions the following evidence regarding the time of Akalańka.

Siddhasena Gani has written a commentary on the Tattvärtha Bhāşya. Siddhasena has mentioned Dharmakīrti (7th century). Silānka (9th century) has mentioned Siddhasena as Gandhahasti. The date of Siddhasena therefore lies between these broad periods. Siddhasena has mentioned the work

1. Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute Vol. XIII. P. 157.

## "विक्रमार्कशताब्दीयशतसप्तप्रमाजुषि । कालेऽकलंकपतिनो बौद्धैर्बादो महानभूत् ॥"

Epigraphia Carnatika II. Introduction.

Pandit Jugalkishore Mukhtar in his article "समन्तभद्र का समय बौर डा० के० वि० पाठक" ( Jaina Jagat. Year IX. Vol. 15 Page I6 ) has given the reading "विक्रमार्कशकाब्दीय" which appears to be the correct one. 'Siddhi-vinischaya', of Akalanka in his Tattvārtha Bhāşya Tikā<sup>1</sup>.

Jinadāsa Gaņi Mahottar composed a Chūrņi on Nišītha-sūtra. In a Mss. of this work, the date of its composition is mentioned as Śaka Samvat 598 (676 A.D.) Jinadāsa has mentioned the work Siddhi-vinišchaya of Akalaňka<sup>2</sup>. So Akalaňka cannot have flourished later than 675 A.D.

Pandit Śāstri quotes the following internal evidence from Akalańka's works which may be valuable ` to ascertain his date.

Dignāga the celebrated Buddhist philosopher in laying down the definition of Pratyakṣa Pramāṇa has mentioned that Pratyakṣa is 'Kalpanāpoḍḥa' Dharmakīrti who was later than Dignāga added 'Abhrānta' to it in defining Pratyakṣa. Akalaṅka in his Tattvārtha-rājavārttika has criticised the definition of Pratyakṣa Pramāṇa as laid down by Dignāga. A verse from Dignāga's Pramāṇa-samuchchaya has also been quoted by Akalaṅka<sup>3</sup>.

Pandit Śāstri is of opinion that as Akalańka has not criticised Dharmakīrti's definition of Pramāņa in his Tattvārtha-rāja-vārttika, though he criticised views of Dharmakīrti in his other works, we may infer that Dharmakīrti's works Pramāņa-

1. 'एवं कार्यकारणसम्बन्धः समबायपरिणामनिमित्तनिर्वर्त्तकादिरुपः सिद्धि-विनिश्चयस्रुष्टिपरीक्षातो योजनीयो विशेषार्थिना दूषणद्वारेण।'' Page 37.

2. ''दंसणगाही—दंसणणाणप्यभावगाणिः सत्थाणि सिद्धिविनिच्छय-संमदिमादि गेण्हंतो असंधरमाणे जं अकण्पियं पडिसेवति जयनाथे तत्थ से सुद्धो अप्रायस्त्रित्ती भवतीत्यर्थः।''

3. "प्रत्यक्षं कल्पनापोढं नामजात्यादियोजना ।

असाधारणद्वेतुत्वाद्ग्रेस्तद्व्यपदिइयते ॥"

Pramāņa-samuchchaya by Dignāga.

#### xxxvii

vārttika, Pramāņa-vinišchaya etc. were composed later than Tattvārtha-rāja-vārttika. In Tattvārtharāja-vārttika, Akalaňka has quoted a verse which is said to be the first verse of the Prakaraņa entitled 'Santānantara-siddhi' of Dharmakirti'. Pandit Śāstri holds:the view that as Dharmakirti flourished from 635 to 650 A. D. Akalańka's date can be ascertained from this.

Akalanka has also quoted from the work 'Abhidharmakoşa' of Vasubandhu<sup>2</sup>.

Pandit Śāstri concludes from the above that Dharmakirti flourished from 635 to 650 A. D. and that Akalańka lived in the middle of the 7th century A. D.

In my opinion, no great help is derived from the internal evidence namely that Akalańka has mentioned Dharmakirti, Vasubandhu or Dignāga. There is a view that Vasubandhu and Dignāga were contemporaries<sup>3</sup>. Udyotakara in his Nyāyavārttika refuted the views of Dignāga while discussing Prameya of Anumāna Pramāņa. Udyotakara has also mentioned Dharmakirti and Vinita-deva in Nyāyavārttika. This Udyotakara has been men-

 "बुद्धिपूर्वी कियां दृष्ट्वा स्वदेहेऽन्यत्र तद्प्रहात् । मन्यते बुद्धिसद्भावं सा न येषु न तेषु धीः ॥"

Tattvārtharāja vārttika. P. 19.

[ Sanātana Jaina Granthamālā ]

2. "सवितर्कविचारा हि पश्च विद्वानधातवः ।

निरुपणानुस्मरणविकल्पनविकल्पकाः ॥"

Abhidharma-koşa of Vasubandhu.

We find the reading "विकल्पाद्विकल्पका:" in Abhidharma-kosa.

3. Nyäyadarsana by Mahamahopādhyāya Phanibhūşaņa Tarkabāgis Vol. I. (first edition) Page 39.

. ،

tioned by Subandhu the author of Vāsavadattā<sup>1</sup>. Subandhu was earlier than Bāṇabhatta who lived in the court of king Harshavardhana of Kanauj (beginning of the 7th century). Bāṇabhatta has praised the work Vāsavadattā in his work Harṣacharita<sup>2</sup>. Thus only this much can be mentioned with certainty that Dignāga, Dharmakīrti and Vasubandhu could not have flourished later than the sixth century. Dr. Jacobi says "He (Udyotakara) may therefore have flourished in the early part of the sixth century or still earlier<sup>\*3</sup>.

But Vasubandhu and Dignāga might have lived long before the 6th century A. D. Yuan Chwang who came to Nālandā Vihāra in 637 A. D. has written that within a thousand years from the death or the Nirvāna of Buddha, Monaratha and his disciple Vasubandhu lived<sup>4</sup>. Samuel Beal in his note to the above passage has written that at that time the Chinese Buddhists, accepted the date of Nirvāna of Buddha as 850 B. C. On this calculation

1. "न्यायस्थितिमिव उदयोत्कर-स्वरुपाम् ।" Vāsavadattā.

2. "कवीनामगल्डरपों नूनं वासवदत्तया।" Harsa-charitam.

3. The Dates of the Philosophical Sūtras of the Brahmaņas by Hermann Jacobi [ Journal of the American Oriental Society Vol. 31, 1911 ].

4. "This Master (Manoratha) made his auspicious advent within the 1000 years after the Buddha's decease...Manoratha... sent an account of the circumstances to his disciple Vasubandhu and died." (Ta-Tang-Hsi-yü-chi by Yuan Chwang).

Thomas Watters writes : "According to Yuan-Chwang Manoratha flourished...within 1000 years after the decease of Buddha. This, taking the Chinese reckoning would place the date of the Śāstra-master before A.D. 150".

#### xxxix

the date of Vasubandhu will fall in the 2nd century B. C.<sup>1</sup> Dignāga accordingly will be of the same date.

The commentator Mallinātha has mentioned while explaining a verse in Kalidāsa's Meghadūta<sup>2</sup> that Dignāga was a contemporary of Kalidāsa. This view has however been not generally accepted.

It is difficult to lay down definitely as has been done by Pandit Śāstri that because Akalańka has criticised the definition of only Dignāga and not that of Dharmakirti in his Tattvartharājavārttika, we should conclude that the work 'Pramāņaviniśchaya' of Dharmakirti was not then written. In our opinion, it is very unsafe to draw such a cónclusion from only this material specially as Pandit Śāstri himself shows that Akalańka named his work 'Nyāya-viniśchaya' on the line of Dharmakirti's 'Pramāṇa-viniśchaya' and the views of Dharmakirti have been refuted in other works of Akalańka.

Kumārila Bhatta was not referred to in the Nyāya Vārttika of Udyotakara<sup>3</sup>. This may sup-

1. But see: "Asanga brother of Vasubandhu (280-360) must have flourished in the first half of the fourth century". Introduction to Sādhana-mālā (Geakwad's Oriental Series) Page XXVII by B. Bhattacharya M.A.

2. "दिङ्नागानां पथि परिहरण् स्थूलहस्तावलेपान् ॥" Meghadütam. Pūrva-meghab verse 14.

"दिङ्नागाचार्यस्य कालिदासप्रतिपक्षस्य इस्तावलेपान् इस्तविन्यासपूर्वकदूषणानि अद्रेरद्रिकल्पस्य दिङ्नागाचार्यस्य श्टंगं प्राधान्यं इरति ।''

Sañjivani ( commentary by Mallinätha ).

3. Nyāyadaršana by Mahāmohopādhyāya Phaņibhūṣaņa Tarkabagis Vol. 1 (first edition P. 37-38). port the view of Pandit Śästrī that Kumārila Bhatta was not at least earlier than the 7th century A. D.

A. B. Keith in his Karma-Mimāmsä Pages 10-11 writes : "Kumārila's date is determinable within definite limits ; he used the Vākyapadiya of Bhartrihari ; neither Hieun-Thsang nor It-sing mentions him : he was before Śańkara ; he attacked the Jain theory of an omniscient being as propounded in the Apta-mimāmsā of Samanta-bhadra, but is not answered by Akalanka in his Astasati which comments on the  $\overline{A}$  pta-mimāmsā. On the other hand he is freely attacked by Vidyānanda and Prabhāchandra who both lived before 838 A. D. Vidyānanda assures us, doubtless correctly, that he criticised the Buddhist Dharmakirti and Prabhākara, on the latter point agreeing with the result above arrived from internal The upper limit is therefore, not earlier evidence. than 700 A. D. The lower limit depends on his precise chronological relation to Sankara and the latter's exact\_date. Later tradition, the Sankaravijayas of Mādhava and the pseudo-Anandagiri would make him an older contemporary, but the interval may have been considerably longer."

We agree with the views of Pandit Śāstri regarding his conclusion about the time of Akalańka so far as materials are available up to the present.

We have dealt with the date af Akalanka in detail as we have no other data for fixing the date of Māņikyanandi who we only know flourished later than Akalanka and based his work on Akalanka's writings. From what have already been discussed, we may infer that Mānikyanandi flourished during Commentaries on Parīkṣāmukham.

I. Prameyakamalamārtaņḍa by Prabhāchandra. the end of the 7th or the beginning of the 8th century A. D. He has mentioned the Chārvāka school of philosophy<sup>1</sup> as well as the Buddhist, Sānkhya and Nyāya-vaisesika systems of philosophy and Prabhākara and Jaimini<sup>2</sup>. Prabhāchandra was the most celebrated commentator of Pariksāmukham. His work is entitled "Prameya-kamalamārtaņda". This Prabhāchandra has been mentioned ( with his work Nyāya-kumuda-chandrodaya ) by Jinasena in Ādipurāņa ( 838 A. D. ) in the following verse :

"I praise Prabhāchandra the poet whose fame is white as the rays of the moon and who has encompassed the whole world by making 'Chandrodaya' ('rising of the moon'; another meaning 'the work entitled Kumudachandrodaya')"<sup>3</sup>.

Prabhāchandra saluted Māņikyanandi at the beginning of Prameya-kamala-mārtanda<sup>4</sup>.

1. "लौकायतिकस्य प्रत्यक्षतः परलोकादिनिषेधस्य परजुद्धयादेश्वासिद्धे-रतद्विषयत्वात् ॥" Parikşāmukham VI. 56.

2. "सौगतसांरव्ययौगप्रभाकरजेमिनीयानां प्रत्यक्षानुमानागमोपमानार्था-पत्त्यभावेरेकेकाधिकेव्यांप्तिवत्त ॥" Ibid VI. 57.

3. "चन्द्रांशुशुभ्रयशसं प्रभाचन्द्रं कविं स्तुवे ।

कृत्वा चन्द्रोद्यं येन शखदाच्छादितं जगस् ॥'' Adi-purana.

Jinasena lived in the court of Amoghavarsa I who reigned according to Vincent Smith from 815 to 877 A.D. (Early History of India P. 328).

4. "शास्त्रं करोमि वरमल्पतराववोधो

-माणिक्यनन्दिपदपंकजसतप्रसादात् ।

अर्थ कि न स्फ़ुटयति प्रकृतं लधीयां-

होकस्य भानुकरविस्फुरिताद् गवाक्षः ॥"

Prameyakamala-mārtaņda.

P-6

Prabhāchandra's commentary is specially valuable as it quotes the views of various Hindu and Buddhist writers on Nyāya philosophy and criticising the same establishes the Jain view.

The view of Dr. K. B. Pathak that Prabhāchandra was a disciple of Akalańka is erroneous<sup>1</sup>.

 II. Prameyacatnamālā by Anantavīrya. The most widely read commentary of Parikşāmukham is Prameya-ratnamālā. We have published the full text of it in this edition. The writer of this is Ananta-vīrya who also wrote commentaries of Akalanka's works. Prabhāchandra has mentioned at the beginning of the fourth Chapter of his Nyäyakumudachandra that he has been able to study and discuss many times through the writings of Anantavīrya, the difficult expositions of Akalanka imparting a knowledge of all objects in the three worlds<sup>2</sup>. Vādirāja Sūri in his Nyāya-viniśchaya-vivaraņa writes that at every step the deep meaning of Akalanka's writing has been illuminated by the writings of Anantavīrya like a lamp<sup>3</sup>.

1. Dr. Pathak has taken the following verse of Prabhāchandra in his work Nyāyakumudachandrodaya to mean that Prabhāchandra was a disciple of Akalanka, but no such interpretation is possible (Vide article by Pandit Jugalkisore published in Anekānta Vol. I. Page I30).

"बोधः कोऽप्यसमः समस्तविषयं प्राप्याकलंकं पदम् जातस्तेन समस्तवस्तुविषयं व्याख्यायते तत्पदम् । कि न श्रीगणमृज्जिनेन्द्रपदतः प्राप्तप्रभावः स्वयं व्यारव्याखप्रतिमं वच्चो जिनपतेः सर्वात्मभाषात्मकम् ॥"

- "त्रैलेक्योद्रवर्त्तिवस्तुविषयज्ञानप्रभावोद्यो दुष्प्रापोऽप्यकलंकदेवसरणिः प्राप्तोऽत्र पुण्योदयात् । स्वभ्यस्तश्च विवेचितश्च शतशः सोऽनन्तवीर्याक्तितो भूयान्मे नयनीतिदत्तमनसस्तद्ववोधसिद्धिप्रदः ॥"
- "गूढ्मर्थमकलंकवाङ्मयागाधभूमिनिहितं तदर्थिनाम् । व्यक्तयत्यमलमनन्तवीर्यवाव दीपवर्त्तिरनिशं पदे पदे ॥"

Though such a great writer, Anantavirya professed utmost humility in saying at the beginning of his commentary on Siddhiviniśchaya :—"It is a great wonder that even Anantavirya (in another sense 'one who has infinite power') is unable to explain fully the meaning of the work of Akalaňka"<sup>1</sup>.

In this commentary on Siddhiviniśchaya, Anantavirya has mentioned Dharmottar, Prajňākar and Archata. The date of Archata the author of the commentary on Hetu-vindu is according to Rāhula Sankrityāyana 825 A. D. Ananta-virya must have therefore flourished not earlier than the 9th century A. D.

In Prameyaratnamālā, Anantavīrya has referred to Dharmakīrti (page 10) Vyāsa (page 20), Pataňjaļi (page 20) Avadhūta (page 20) and Manu (page 49). He has mentioned the works Āpta-parikṣā (page 23), Devāgamālankāra also known as Āpta-mimāņīsā (page 24) by Samantabhadra and Naya-chakra. He has quoted from the Vedas (page 20) and Sānkhya-kārika (page 52) of Iśvara-kriṣṇa.

Sāyana-Mādhava in his Sarva-darśana-samgraha while explaining Saptabhanginaya of Ārhata Darśana has quoted Ananta-virya<sup>2</sup>.

1.	"देवस्यानन्तवीयोऽपि पदं व्यक्तुं तु सर्वतः ।
	न जानीतेऽकलंकस्य चित्रमेतद् परं सुवि ॥"
2.	"सत्सर्वमनन्तवीर्यः प्रत्यपीपदत् —
	तद्विधानविवक्षायां स्यादस्तीति गतिर्भवेत् ।
	स्याज्ञास्तीति प्रयोगः स्यात्तत्रिषेधे विवक्षिते ॥
	क्रमेणोभयवाञ्छायां प्रयोगः समुदायभाक् ।
	युगपत्तद्विवक्षायां स्यादवाच्यमशक्तितः ॥
	आद्यावाच्यविवक्षायां पञ्चमो भंग इष्यते ।
	अन्त्यावाच्यविवक्षायां षष्ठभंगसमुद्भवः ॥
	समुबयेन युक्तस्त्र सप्तमो भंग उच्यते ॥ इति ।"

Ananta-virya has mentioned Prabhāchandra in the beginning of his work : "When there is a moon like the work of Prabhāchandra, how can I resembling a fire-fly expect to be counted ?"<sup>1</sup>

It is mentioned in the beginning of Prameyaratna-mālā that this commentary 'Paūchikā'<sup>2</sup> on Parīkṣāmukhaṃ was composed for study of Śāntiṣeṇa at the request of Hīrapa the favourite son of Vaijeya<sup>3</sup>. At the colophon of this work it is mentioned that Vaijeya was born in the family of Vadaripāla. His wife was Nāṇāmba who was also known as Revatī, Prabhāvatī and Prathitāmbikā. Hīrapa was their son. At his request, Anantavīrya has cleared the meaning of the work of Māṇikyanandi<sup>4</sup>.

Sarvadarśana-samgraha Edited by V. S. Abhayankar Pages 83-84.

- 1. "प्रमेन्दुवचनोदारचन्द्रिकाप्रसरे सति । मादृशाः क तु गण्यन्ते ज्योतिरिङ्गणसन्निभा ॥" Prameya-ratnamālā.
- 2. Pañchikā is a commentary in which each word of the original work is explained. c.f.

"कारिका स्वल्पवृत्तिस्तु, सूत्रं सूचनकं स्पृतम् ।

टीका निरन्तरं व्याख्या, पंचिकां पदमंजिका ॥"

- "बैजेयप्रियपुत्रस्य हीरपस्योपरोधतः । झान्तिषेणार्थमारब्धा परीक्षामुखपंचिका ॥" Prameyaratnamālā.
- 4. "श्रीमान् बैजेयनामाभूदमणोर्गुणशालिनाम् । वद्रीपालवंशालिव्योमदयुमणिरुर्जितः ॥ तदीयपत्नी भुवि विश्रुतासीन्नाणाम्बनान्मा गुणशीलसीमा । यां रेवतीति प्रथिताम्विकेति प्रभावतीति प्रबद्दन्ति सन्तः ॥ तस्यामभूद्विश्वजनीनवृत्तिदानाम्बुवाहो भूवि हीरपारव्यः । स्वगोत्रविस्तारनभोंशुमाली सम्यक्त्वरत्नाभरणार्चितांगः ॥ तस्योपरोधवशतो विशदोरुकीर्त्तेर्माणिक्यनन्दिकृतशास्त्रमगाधबोधम् । स्पष्टीकृतं कतिपयैर्वचनैरुदारैर्वलिप्रवोधकरमेतद्दनन्तवीयैंः ॥" Colophon to Prameyaratnamālā.

Prameyakamalamārtaņda being a voluminous work and full of discussions regarding views of logicians other than Jain logicians, could not easily be tackled by those who wanted to learn the subjectmatter only of Pariksāmukham. Prameya-ratnamālā satisfied their want being a shorter and simpler work though it briefly alluded to the views of other logicians wherever necessary. Many expositions of this commentary Prameyaratnamālā were written. Three of these are preserved in Jain Siddhanta Bhavan, Arrah.

Commentaries on Prameya ratna-mālā.

> (a) Arthaprakāśikā.

The first is Arthaprakāśikā. In the verses at the beginning it is mentioned that it is written by Panditāchārya (no specific name being given)<sup>1</sup>. Some attribute it ( without however any definite proof ) to Chārukirti. There were several Chārukirtis and nothing definite can be said as who really was the author of this treatise. The Mangalācharana, the colophon and a portion from the middle of this work have been printed from the Mss. in Jain Siddhānta Bhāskara. Bhāga 4. Kirana 1. Praśasti-sangraha page 66.

- (b) Prameya-The second is Prameya-ratna-mālā-lankāra. ratnamālālankāra.
  - After saluting Akalanka<sup>2</sup>, and Mānikyanandi<sup>3</sup> the author praises Prabhāchandra the author of Prameva-
  - "श्रीमन्नेमिजिनेन्द्रस्य वन्दित्वा पादपंकजम् । 1. प्रमेयरतूनमालार्थः संक्षेपेण विविच्यते ॥ प्रमेथरतूनमालायाः ब्यारब्यास् सन्ति सहस्रशः । तथापि पण्डिताचार्यक्रुतिग्रं छैव कोविदैः ॥'' Arthaprakāsikā.
  - "जित्वा रळाध्यतमोऽभवत सपदि तं वंदेऽकलकं मुनिम् ।" 2.

Prameyaratnamālālankāra.

"हर्ष वर्षत सन्ततं हृदि गुरुमणिक्यनन्दी मम।" З. 1bid. kamalamärtanda<sup>1</sup>. The author then mentions his name as Chāru-kīrti and the name of the work as Prameyaratnamälālaṅkāra<sup>2</sup>. From the colophon of this work we learn that this Chārukīrti resided in Śravana Belgola (where the world-renowed image of Gommateśvara exists) and belonged to Deśi Gaṇa<sup>3</sup>. Gommateśvara or Vāhuvali is saluted in two verses at the end<sup>4</sup>.

Pandit Bhujavali Śāstri is of opinion that it is very probable that this Chārukirti was the author of the same name who composed commentaries on Pārśvābhyudaya, Chandraprabha kāvya, Ādipurāņa, Yaśodharacharita, Neminirvāņa etc. The Pattādhīšas of Śravana Belgola are all known by the common name of Chārukīrti. So it is difficult to settle who this particular person was<sup>5</sup>.

The Mangalācharaṇa, the colophon and some portions from the middle of this manuscript have been printed in Jain Siddhānta Bhāskar. Bhāga 4. Kiraṇa 1. Praśasti saṅgraha pages 68-71.

1. "जयत प्रमेन्द्रसूरिः प्रमेयकमल्प्रकाण्डमार्तण्डेन।" Ibid.

 "श्रीचारकीर्त्तिधुर्यस्तन्तनुते पण्डितार्यमुनिवर्यः । व्याख्यां प्रमेयरत्नाछंकाराख्यां मुनीन्द्रसूत्राणाम् ॥" Ibid.

 "श्रीमद्देशिगणाश्रगण्यस्य श्रीमद् वेल्गुलपुरनिवासरसिकस्य चाहकोर्त्ति-पण्डिताचार्यस्य कृतौ परीक्षामुखसूत्रव्याख्यायां प्रमेयरत्नमालालंकारसमाख्यायाम् …" Ibid.

4. "किं च श्रीगुमटेश्वरस्य ऋषया विंध्याद्रिचूडामणे: ।" Ibid. Also :

## ''श्रीमद्वेलुगुलमध्यभासुरमहाविन्ध्याद्रिचिन्तामणिः

श्रीमद् बाहुबली करोतु कुशलं भव्यात्मनां सन्ततम्।" Ibid.

5. Notes by Pandit K. Bhujavali Śāstri on Praśasti sangraha Page 71 ( Jain Siddhānta Bhāskara. Bhāga 4. Kiraṇa 1).

#### xlvii

(c) Nyāyamaņi dīpikā. The third work is Nyāyamaņidīpikā. Two Mss. of this work are preserved in Jain Siddhānta Bhavan, Arrah. The name of the author is not found in the Mss. Pandit Subayya Śāstrī says that in some palm leaf Mss. of this work, the name of the writer is mentioned as Ajitasenāchārya. Pandit K. Bhujavali Śāstrī says that this is supported by "Catalogue of Sanskrit and Prākrita Manuscripts in the Central Provinces and Berar by R. B. Hiralal B. A. Appendix B"<sup>1</sup>.

The author has made obeisance to Akalanka, Anantavirya, Mānikyanandi and Prabhāchandra in the Mangalächarana of his work<sup>2</sup>. As regards commentaries to Pariksāmukham, he mentions that Prabhächandra wrote an exhaustive commentary entitled Prameyakamalamārtanda. Though this work was suitable to scholars, there was a necessity for a shorter and easier commentary. Hirapa Vaisya the son of Vaijeya of the family of Badripāla requested Ananta-vīrya to teach Santisena. Anantavirya composed Prameya-ratna-mālā under these circumstances<sup>3</sup>.

1. Notes hy Pandit K. Bhujavali Śāstrī on Prasasti sangraha Page 2-3 (Jain Siddhānta Bhāskar Bhāga II. Kirana 1).

 श्रीवर्द्धमानमकलंकमनन्तवीर्यमाणिक्यनंदियतिभाषितशास्त्रवृत्तिम् । "भक्त्या प्रमेन्दुरचितालघुवृत्तिदृष्ट्या नत्वा यथाविधि वृणोमि

लघुप्रपश्चम् ॥" Nyāya-maņi-dipikā.

3. ''तदनु तत्प्रकरणस्य विशिष्टतमोऽतिस्पष्टं....प्रभाचन्द्रभट्टारकः प्रमेय-कमलमार्त्तण्डनासवृहद्वृत्तिं चरीकरोति स्म । तद् वृत्तिप्रन्थस्य....सकलविद्वचित्त-प्रकाशकत्वेऽपि....बालान्तः करणा....प्रकाशनसामर्थ्याभावमाकल्प्य तत्प्रकाशनाय.... प्रमेयरत्नमालेत्यन्वर्थनामोद्वहत्तां....ल्प्वां वृत्ति....अनन्तवीर्याचार्यवर्यो....वैजेय-प्रियसूनुना हीरपाख्यवैश्योत्तमेन वदरीपाळवंशद्रयुमणिना शान्तिषेणाध्यापनाभिलाषिणा प्रेरितः सन् प्रारीप्सु:.....' Ibid.

#### xlviii

III. Prameyakanthikā.

A commentary named Prameya-kanthikā on Pariksāmukham was written by Śantivarni. It has not been possible to ascertain details about this Santithe probable time when his work was varni or There are five Sections ( स्तवक ) in this written. work. Following the Sütras of Pariksāmukham the author has refuted the views of other logicians ( Bauddha etc. ) and established the Jain view. A Mss. of this work is preserved in Jain Siddhanta Bhayan, Arrah and the portions at the beginning and the colophon have been published in Jain Siddhänta Bhāskara Bhāga 4, Kiraņas 1 and 2. Praśasti-Sangraha, pages 72 and 73<sup>1</sup>.

Parīksāmukham and Pramāņanaya-tattvālokālańkāra, Vādiveva Sūri (12th century A. D.) composed Pramāņa-naya-tattvālokālankāra closely following Parikṣāmukham. Many aphorisms are exactly the same, only synonyms being used<sup>2</sup>. In some aphorisms, an attempt is seen to show some novelty by giving examples of a different kind but the examples

 The Mangalächarana runs thus : "श्रीवर्धमानमानम्य विष्णुं विश्वस्तृजं हरं । परीक्षामुखसूत्रस्य मन्यस्यार्थं विष्टुण्महे ॥"

The Colophon is :

"श्रीशान्तिवर्णिविरचितायां प्रमेयकण्ठिकायां पञ्चमः स्तवकः समाप्तः ।

प्रमेयकण्ठिका जीयात् प्रसिद्धानेकसद्गुणा ।

लसन् मार्त्तण्ड-साम्राज्ययौवराज्यस कण्ठिका ॥

स निष्कळ्द्वं जनयन्तु तर्के वा बाधितकों मम तर्करत्ने ।

केनानिशं ब्रह्मकृतः कलंकश्चन्द्रस्य किं भूषणकारणं न ॥"

2. Compare "हिताहितप्राप्तिपरिहारसमर्थं हि प्रमाण ततो ज्ञानमेव तत् ॥" Pariksāmukham. I. 2.

and "अभिमतानभिमतवस्तुस्वीकारतिरस्कारक्षमं हि प्रमाणमतो ज्ञानमेवेदम्।" Pramāņanayatattvālokālankāra I. 3 in Parikşāmukhum are more simple and easily understood<sup>1</sup>. In many places some extra words have been introduced in aphorisms<sup>2</sup>. A detailed comparison between Parikşāmukham and Pramāņa-nayatattvālokālankāra will be found in the article in Hindi entitled 'Pramāņa-nayatattvālankāra ki samīkşa' by Pandit Bansidhar Ji in Jain Siddhānta Bhāskar, Bhaga 2. Kiraņas 1 and 2. Pages 18 and 70.

•					
1.	Compare : "घट्रमहमात्मना वेद्मि।" Pariksämukham I. 8.				
	"करिकलभकमहमात्मना जानामि ।"				
	Pramāņanayatattvālokālankāra I. 16.				
	or "प्रदीपवन्।" Pariksāmukham I. 12.				
	"मिहिराऌोकवत् ।"				
	Pramāņanayatattvālokālankāra I. 17.				
-	or "यथा नद्यास्तीरे मोदकराइायः सन्ति धावध्वं मानवकाः ।"				
,	Parikṣāmukham VI. 52.				
	"यथा मेकलकन्यकायाः कूले तालहिन्ताल्योर्मूले सुलमाः				
	पण्डखजुराः सन्ति त्वरितं गच्छत गच्छत शावकाः ।"				
	Pramāņanayatattvālokālankāra VI. 84.				
2.	Compare : "सहचारिणोरपि परस्परपरिहारेणावस्थानात्				
	सहोत्पादाच ।" Pariksāmukham III. 64.				
	'सहचारिणोः परस्पररुपत्यागेन तादात्म्यानुपपत्तेः सहोत्पादेन				
	तदुन्पत्तिविपत्तेश्च सहचरहेतोरपि प्रोक्तेषु नानुप्रवेशः ।''				
	Pramāņanayatattvālokālankāra III. 76.				
or	' ''उपलम्भानुपलम्भनिमित्तं व्याप्तिझानमूहः ।। इदमस्मिन् सत्येव				
	भवत्यसति न भवत्येवेति च॥" Pariksämukham III.11.12.				
	' उपळम्भानुपऌम्भसंभवं त्रिकालीकलितसाध्यसाधनसम्बन्धाद्-				
यालंबनम् इद्मस्मिन् सत्येव भवतीत्याद्याकारं संवेदनमूह					
	तर्कः ॥" Pramāņa-naya tattvālokālankāra III. 7.				
P—					

1

Hemachandra also wrote his Pramāņa mīmāmsā in aphorisms though Sūtra works at such a late period when he flourished were unnecessary. (Vide Pramāņa mīmāmsā by S. C. Ghoshal Jain Gazette Vol. XI p. 1.18).

Subject matter of Par.kşimukham.

into six sections Pariksāmukham is divided (Samuddesa). In the first section Pramana is defined and explained. In the second section two kinds of Pramāna viz. Pratyaksa and Paroksa are mentioned and Pratyakşa with its varieties are described. The third section deals with Paroksa Pramana and its subdivisions Smriti, rabhijnana, rann, and Agama. reater portion, of this section is devoted to Anu (interact) the most important subject in all works. The two varieties of Anumana viz. Swarina and Parartha are described in detail. The fourth section treats with the subject of Pramana with two varieties its Sāmānya and Višesa with their subdivisions. In the fifth section, the result of Framana is described. The sixth and the last section deals with fallacies.

There are 13 aphorisms in the first, 12 in the second, 101 in the third, 9 in the fourth, 3 in the fifth and 74 in the sixth section of this work.

In the present edition, a new line has been struck out in writing the English commentary. Without entering into the usual refutations and counterrefutations of views of Jain, Hindu and Buddhist logicians as is found in Sanskrit commentaries which whit create a volumious work and cloud the main theme, I have taken special pains to make a comparative study of the subject matter and have quoted the views of all important older and later writers on this subject. It is hoped that the reader by going

Jain Education International

COOCHBEHAR,

August, 1940.

www.jainelibrary.org

through this commentary will not only gain a thorough idea of Jain Nyāya as succintly put down by the celebrated Digamvara writer Mānikyanandi who was never surpassed by any other author in making a clear and brief exposition of the subject but he will also have a grasp of the work of other Digamvara as well as 'vetāmvara authors many of whom like Vadideva composed works which attempted to rival that of Mānikyanandi. My attempt has been to explain in a simple and clear way the views of Jain Nyaya taking great pains to cull authorities from all available important Jain works. I have not left out the views of Hindu and Buddhist philosophers which are referred to in the work itself though I have dealt with the same only so far as is necessary for the understanding of the subject. The present work was undertaken with the generous help of the trustees of J. L. Jaini Memorial

generous help of the trustees of J. L. Jaini Memorial Fund to whom my heartfelt thanks are due. Portions of the work were printed in the Jain Gazette through the courtesy of Pandit Ajit Prasad M.A. LL.B., the Editor of the said journal without whose efforts this work would never have been undertaken.

I am deeply indebted to Brahmachari Sital Prasādji and Pandit Sumerchand Nyāyatirtha M. A. LL.B. for their valuable suggestions. For loan of rare books and manuscripts my sincerest gratitule is due to the authorities of the Jain Siddhānt Bhavan, Arrah. late Puran Chand Nahar M. A., B. L. Vakil, High Court, Calcutta, Seth Ananda Raj Surana of Delhi and Pandit K. Bhujabali Šāstrī, Arrah.

S. C. GHOSHAL.

#### VOWELS

<b>ड</b> —U	ਲ੍ਵ—LI	ओ—⊖
<u>ऊ –</u> U	र्खु LLI	औ—OU
<b>₹</b> —ŖI	<b>ч</b> —Е	.—М
<del>ॹ</del> ॖ—ŖĨ	रे—AI	:H
	. •	
	ड −Ū इर—ŖI	ऊ –Ū ॡ LLI ऋ−ŖI ए—E

#### CONSONANTS

<b>₩</b> —Ka	₹-Ţa	<b>q</b> —Pa	<b>q</b> —Sa
ख-Kha	z−Ţha	<b>फ</b> −Pha	<b>स</b> −Sa
ग—Ga	<b>€</b> −₽a	<b>च</b> —Ba	<b>द</b> −Ha
च-Gha	<b>⋷</b> −̀Dha	भ—Bha	
<b>₹</b> Ňa	ण—-Na	म—Ma	
चCha	त—Ta	<b>य</b> —Ya	
छ—Chha	थ—Tha	<b>₹</b> —Ra	
ज्ञ—Ja	द्-Da	<b>⊗</b> —La	
<b>sı</b> —Jha	ध—Dha	चVa	
<b>च</b> —Ña	न—Na	<b>, श</b> —Śa	

#### ðío

# परीक्षामुखम्

# PARÏKSĀMUKHAM

~\_~~~~~~~~~\_~~\_\_

# प्रमाणादर्थसंसिद्धिस्तदाभासाद्रिपर्ययः । इति वक्ष्ये तयोर्लक्ष्म सिद्धमल्पं लघीयसः ॥

Pramāņādarthasamsiddhistadābhāsādviparyayah. Iti vaksye tayorlaksma siddhamalpam laghīyasah.

Padapāțha. प्रमाणात् Pramāņāt, from Pramāņa ( valid knowledge ), अर्थसंसिद्धि: Arthasamsiddhih, knowables are rightly ascertained, तदासासान् Tadābhāsāt, from Pramāņābhāsa ( false knowledge ), विषर्ययः Viparyayah, the opposite ( happens ), इति Iti, for that reason, ख्यीयसः Laghīyasah, for those who desire a short exposition, तयोः Tayoh, of those ( i. e. Pramāņa and Pramāņābhāsa ), सिद्धम् Siddham, as laid down by authorities, अरूषम् Alpam, short, ख्र्स्म Lakşma, definition, नश्ये Vakşye, ( I shall ) speak ( describe ).

1. From Pramāņa ( valid knowledge ) knowables are rightly ascertained and from Pramāņābhāsa (false knowledge), the opposite happens. For this reason, I shall describe the definitions of these as laid down by authorities in a concise manner for the benefit of those who desire a short exposition ( of this subject ).

#### Commentary

Māņikyanandi the author of Parikṣāmukham begins his work by mentioning the subject matter of the treatise and says that he will define and deal with Pramāņa (valid knowledge) and Pramāņābhāsa (false knowledge). Prabhāchandra in his commentary named Prameyakamalamārtanda on Parikṣāmukham writes that the wise only appreciate a work which has coherence in its subject-matter, which has some object in view and this object is possible of attainment. Incoherent words like those of a mad man find no hearing. Useless attempts like counting the hairs of an ass or teeth of a crow or finding the weight of an egg of a sheep (which are impossibilities) are not made by wise men.<sup>1</sup> They are not also attracted to a task which is unpalatable such as finding out another husband to one's own mother or to follow an advice to perform a task incapable of being fulfilled like the finding out of a jewel on the head of a snake known as Takṣaka which is said to cure all kinds of fever.<sup>2</sup>

Prabhāchandra quotes these verses to support his view :

"At the beginning of every  $\hat{S}$  astra, the object with its connection should be mentioned, for a hearer pays attention to only a definite subject and things connected with the same. Who would pay attention to a treatise or do any kind of work till its necessity is patent? That  $\hat{S}$  astra for which no necessity is explained is not desired by the wise. So at the outset, the necessity is to be explained. When the results of studying a  $\hat{S}$  astra are known, the wise begin to read it with the object of attaining these results. Until connection with the subject matter is established, the writing is regarded as speech of a man uttering incoherent words in delirium. So commentators should explain the necessity of a work with its connected subject-matter. Otherwise it will be useless."

## "काकस्य कति वा दन्ता मेषस्याण्डं कियत्पलम् । गर्दभे कति रोमाणीत्येवं मूर्खविचारणा ॥"

2 "सम्बन्धाभिधेयशक्यानुष्ठानेष्ट्रप्रयोजनवन्ति हि शास्त्राणि प्रेक्षावद्भिराद्रियन्ते, नेतराणि । सम्बन्धाभिधेयरहितस्योन्मत्तादिवाक्यवत्, तद्वतोऽप्यप्रयोजनवतः काकदन्तपरीक्षावद्, अनभिमतप्रयोजनवतो वा मातृविवाहोपदेशवद्, अशक्यानुष्ठानस्य वा सर्वज्वरहरतक्षकचूडारत्नाऌंकारोपदेशवद्, तरनादरणीयत्वात् ॥"

3 "सिद्धार्थं सिद्धसम्बन्धं श्रोता श्रोतुं प्रवर्त्तते । शास्त्रादौ तेन वक्तव्यः सम्बन्धः सप्रयोजनः ॥

#### Parikṣāmukham

The necessity for studying logic and attaining right knowledge will be evident from the following. The path of liberation according to Jain doctrines, consists of right faith, right knowledge and right conduct.<sup>1</sup> These three are called the three jewels in Jain works. These are attained in a particular stage of development by the householder. Their perfection is attained in the Arhat stage. Right faith is the belief in the seven Tattvas ( essential principles ) of Jainism.<sup>2</sup> The Tattvas are Jiva, Ajiva, Asrava, Bandha, Samvara, Nirjarā and Mokṣa.<sup>3</sup>

सर्वस्यैव हि शास्त्रस्य कर्मणो वापि कस्यचित् । यावत् प्रयोजनं नोकृतं तावत्तत् केन गृह्यताम् ॥ अनिर्दिष्टफलं सर्वं न प्रेक्षापूर्वकारिभिः । शास्त्रमाद्रियते तेन वाच्यमप्रे प्रयोजनम् ॥ शास्त्रस्य तु फले झाते तत्प्राप्त्याशावशीकृताः । प्रेक्षाबन्तः प्रवर्त्तन्ते तेन वाच्यं प्रयोजनम् ॥ यावत् प्रयोजनेनास्य सम्बन्धो नाभिधीयते । असम्बद्धप्रछापित्वाद्ववेत्तावदसङ्गतिः ॥ तस्माद् व्याख्याङ्गमिच्छद्भिः सहेतुः सप्रयोजनः । शास्त्रावतारसम्बन्धो वाच्यो नान्योऽस्ति निष्फलः ॥'' "सम्यगदर्शनज्ञानचारित्राणि मोक्षमार्गः ।" 1 . • Tattvärthädhigama Sütra I. 1. "कृतसनकर्मक्षयो मोक्षो भव्यस्य परिणामिनः । ज्ञानदर्शनचारित्र-त्रयोपायः प्रकीर्त्तितः ॥" Chandraprabha-charitam XVIII. 123. "ज्ञानदर्शनचारित्रैरुपायैः परिणामिनः । भव्यस्यायमनेकाङ्गविकल्पैरेव जायते ॥" Dharmasarmābhyudayam XXI. 161. "तत्वार्थश्रद्धानं सम्यग्दर्शनम्।"  $\mathbf{2}$ Tattvārthādhigama Sūtra I. 2. "जीवाजीवासंववंधसंवरनिर्जरामोक्षास्तत्वम्।" 3 Tattvārthādhigama Sūtra I. 4.

A sincere belief in the Tattvas which is called right faith or Samyaktva arises either of itself or through instruction.<sup>4</sup> That is to say, it may arise from intuition independently of any precept or it may come to exist from external sources e.g. from precept of others or by reading the scriptures. There is no necessity for any work on Logic for those who get right faith through intuition, but as regards others, Pramāņa and Naya are the means of instruction.<sup>a</sup> Thus the connection of Pramāņa with the highest goal vizthe attainment of liberation is established.<sup>a</sup>

The pursuit of study of Pramāņas accordingly cannot be unpalatable. It is the object of every being to acquire what is desirable and leave what is un-desirable. In Nyāya philosophy, an example is commonly cited that people like to have garlands of flowers, sandal paste etc. while they wish to avoid snakes, thorns etc. This like or dislike arises from actual perception. People act accordingly towards these objects to acquire or avoid the same. Vātsyāyana, the writer of the Bhāşya on the Nyāya Sūtras of Gautama writes "The knower by Pramāņa only understands the real nature of knowables and wishes to have or leave the same."<sup>4</sup>

These Tattvas have been explained in detail in Dravyasamgraha (Edited by S. C. Ghoshal), Vol. I, Sacred Books of the Jainas.

1 "तन्निसर्गादधिगमाड् वा।"

Tattvärthädhigama Sūtra I. 3.

2 "प्रमाणनयैरधिगमः ।"

Tattvärthädhigama sütra I. 6.

3 Dharmabhūșana Yati has begun his Nyāya-dípikā in the above strain :

' प्रमाणनयैरधिगम इति महाशास्त्रतत्वार्थसूत्रम् । तत् खलु परमपुरुषार्थनिःश्रेय-ससाधनसम्यग्दर्शनादिविषयीभूत जीवादि-तत्त्वाधिगमोपायनिरुपणपरम् । प्रमाणनयाभ्यां हि विवेचित्रा जीबादयः सम्यगधिगम्यंते । तद्व्यतिरेकेण जीवाद्यधिगमे प्रमाणान्तरा-संभवात् । तत एव जीवाद्यधिगमोपायभूतौ प्रमाणनयावपि विवेक्तव्यौ ॥''

🛓 "प्रमाणेन खल्वयं ज्ञाताऽर्थमुपऌम्य तमर्थमभीप्सति जिहासति वा ।"

4

#### Pariksāmukham

In spiritual activities also, a man who understands the transitory character of the worldly objects of enjoyment and the eternal nature of the supreme being, leaves the temporal things and turns to God. This knowing of the real nature of things is a path to liberation and this knowledge is Pramāņa. Māņikyanandi has expressed the same idea in the third aphorism of Samuddeśa I of Parikṣāmukham.<sup>4</sup>

The result of Pramāṇa has been mentioned to be the destruction of wrong knowledge, leaving (undesirable objects), acquiring (desirable objects) or acting indifferently towards objects.<sup>3</sup> Siddhasena Divākara has mentioned in his Nyāyāvatāra : "The immediate effect of Pramāṇa is the removal of ignorance, the mediate effect of the absolute knowledge is bliss and equanimity while that of the ordinary practical knowledge is the facility to select or reject".<sup>3</sup> (Translation by Dr. Satis Chandra Vidyabhusan)

In another way, it may be urged that it is only when we use our faculties after understanding the real nature of a thing, that our efforts succeed. If a man wants water but wrongly supposes oil to be water, his efforts towards the oil would be fraitless in the attainment of his object. By Pramāņa we understand the real nature of objects and by Pramāņābhāsa, we get false knowledge. So we must leave Pramāņābhāsa and through Pramāņas, understand the real nature of objects. This is the meaning of the first

'हिताहितप्राप्तिपरिहारसमर्थं हि प्रमाणं ततो ज्ञानमेव तत् ।''

Parikşāmukham I. B.

🖞 - ''अज्ञाननिबृत्तिर्हानोपादानोपेक्षाश्च फल्प् ।'''

Pariksāmukham V. 1.

अग्रमाणस्य फलं साक्षादज्ञानविनिवर्त्तनम् । केवलस्य सुखोपेक्षे शेषस्यादानहानधीः ॥"

Nyäyävatāra Ed. by S. C.

Vidyābhusana p. 26.

line of the first Śloka of Parikṣāmukham. The same has been mentioned by Vātsyāyana<sup>1</sup> and by Vidyānanda Svāmi.<sup>2</sup>

The importance of Pramāņa is thus established both as regards our worldly pursuits and as regards the attainment of liberation by understanding the way to it with the removal of hindrances by Pramāņas and Nayas.<sup>3</sup>

In Parikşānukham the author deals mainly with Pramāņas without discussing the Nayas. Many authors like Hemachandra have held that Nayas are part of Pramāņas and many authors on Jain Logic have set out only the word "Pramāņa" in the title though they discussed both Pramāņas and Nayas in their works. For example, Hemachandra has named his work "Pramāņa-mimāmsā" though he dealt with both Pramāņas and Nayas in his treatise. Hemchandra writes in his Bhāşya to the first aphorism of Pramāņamīmāmsā : "In this work we have not only a discussion of Pramāņas but also of Nayas which form part of Pramāņas and by which a correct knowledge is obtained by refutation of wrong Nayas".<sup>4</sup> There are also separate works like Saptabhangitarangiņi in which Nayas have been discussed in detail.

Prabhāchandra mentions that the word "Pramāņa" is used in the singular number in the Śloka, in the general sense as the author has no intention to set up the various kinds of Pramāņas in the enumeration.<sup>5</sup>

 "प्रमाणतोऽर्धप्रतिपत्तौ प्रवृत्तिसामर्थ्यादर्थवन् प्रमाणं, प्रमाणमन्तरेण नार्थ-प्रतिपत्तिः, नार्थप्रतिपत्तिमन्तरेण प्रवृत्तिसामर्थ्यं ।"

2 "प्रमाणादिष्ट संसिद्धिः ।"

3 Hemachandra affirms this : "तत् स्थितमेतत् प्रमाणनयपरिशोधित-प्रमेयमार्गं सोपायं सप्रतिपक्षमोक्षं बिवक्षितुं ।" Pramāņa Mīmāņsā I. 1. 4 "न प्रमाणमात्रस्यैव विचारोऽत्राधिकृतः किन्तु तदेकदेशमूतानां दुर्णय-

4 "न प्रमाणमात्रस्यैव विचारोऽत्राधिकृतः किन्तु तदेकदेशमूतानां दुर्णय-निराकरणद्वारेण परिशोधितमार्गानां नयानामपि ।" Pramāņa Mimāmsä

[ Translated by S. C. Ghoshal.

Jain Gazette (1915) Vol. XI. Page 278] 5 ' वक्ष्यमाणलक्षणलक्षितप्रमाणभेदमनभिप्रेत्यानन्तरसकलप्रमाणविशेषसाधारण-प्रमाणलक्षणपुरःसरः 'प्रमाणादू' इत्येकवचननिर्देशः कृतः ।"

6

#### Pariksāmukham

An objection is raised by the commentator Prabhāchandra "Does the author Mānikyanandi wish to define Pramāna and Pramānābhāsa according to the previous authors on the subject or according to his own inclination ? If the former, there is no reason for his undertaking this labour, for a thing which has already been reduced to powder, should not be powdered again. If the latter, there is no necessity to take all this trouble, for scholars would not consider with regard any compilation produced according to one's own inclination (as opposed to the works of old writers)." The commentator replies to this objection by saying that (i) by the use of the word "Siddham", it is meant that the author will follow the definitions as laid down by venerable writers of old and (ii) by the use of the word "Alpam" it is meant that the method of treatment will be different viz. that the author will treat the subject in a concise manner leaving aside the detailed exposition of writers like Akalanka. That is to say, though the writer will follow the definitions of the older writers, the method of treatment being new ( as it will be brief as distinguished from the detailed statement of older writers) there cannot be any apprehension that the work will be a use-less repetition. Those who do not want a very lengthy and detailed treatment of a subject would be satisfied with a short exposition. The author whose mind is always prone to doing good to others cannot be said to have any intention of cheating the disciples by promulgating definitions opposed to older writers and invented by himself.<sup>4</sup>

1 "ननु चेदं वक्ष्यमाणं प्रमाणळक्षणं पूर्वशास्त्राप्रसिद्धं तद्विपरीतं वा, यदि पूर्वशास्त्राप्रसिद्धं, तर्हि तद्व्युत्पादनप्रयासो नारम्भणीयः, स्वरुचिविरचितत्त्वेन सतामना-दरणीयत्वात् । तत्प्रसिद्धं तु नितरामेतन्न व्युत्पादनीयं, पिष्टपेषणप्र संगाद् इत्याहः 'सिद्धमल्पम्' । प्रथमविशेषणेन व्युत्पादनवत् तत्क्क्षणप्रणयने स्वातन्त्र्यं परिहृतम् । तदेवाकलंकमिदं पूर्वशास्त्रपरम्पराप्रमाणप्रसिद्धं रुघूपायेन प्रतिपाद्य प्रज्ञापरिपाकार्थं व्युत्पद्यते, न स्वरुचिविरचितं ; नापि प्रमाणानुपपन्नं, परोपकारनियतचेतसो प्रन्थकुतो विनेयसंवादने प्रयोजनाभावात् । तथाभूतं हि वदन् विसंवादकः स्यात् । 'अल्प' मिति विशेषणेन यदन्यत्राकलंकदेवैर्विस्तरेणोक्तं प्रमाणेतरत्व्क्षणं, तदेवात्र संक्षेपेण विनेय-व्युत्पादनार्थं अभिधीयते इति पुनरक्तत्वनिरासः ।'' In older works of Jain writers, logic was mixed up with metaphysics and religion. Subsequent writers composed separate works confining themselves exclusively to the subject of pure Logic. These writers however did not depart from the original definitions of older works though in delineation they adopted different methods and even when they tried to modify the definitions, they laid down that the modified meaning was the intention of the old writers. The veneration to the oldest propounders of Logic will be universally found in the works of all subsequent writers. So Māņīkyanandi also begins his work by saying that he will lay down the definitions of Pramāņa and Pramāņābhāsa according to ancient authorities ("Siddham").

The same fact appears in Hindu philosophies where the authors attempt to base their theories on texts of the Vedas which are universally accepted as undisputable authorities. We find attempts to explain a particular passage from the Vedas in diverse ways to suit the purpose of different expositors.

Māņikyanandi has based his Parikṣāmukham on the work of Akalańka Deva. Anantavīrya the writer of Prameyaratnamālā a commentary on Parīkṣāmukham has offered his obeisance to Māṇikyanandi thus : "Salutation to that Māṇikyanandi who has churned the nectar of Nyāya-vidyā from the ocean of Akalaṅka's words."<sup>1</sup> Prabhāchandra also states that as the work of Aklaṅka would not be easily understood by all, Māṇikyanandi has composed the Prakaraṇa Parikṣāmukham.<sup>2</sup> In Nyāyamaṇidipikā the same has been mentioned."

"अकलंकवचोऽम्भोधेरुद्दचे येन धीमता ।
 न्यायविद्यामृतं तस्मै नमो माणिक्यनन्दिने ॥"

Frameyaratnamālā 2.

े "श्रीमदकलंकार्थोऽव्युत्पन्नप्रह्तैरबगतुं न शक्यते, इति तद्व्युत्पादनाय करतलामलकवत् तदर्श्वमुद्घृत्य प्रतिपादयितुकामस्तत्परिज्ञानानुप्रहेच्छाप्रेरितस्तदर्थ-प्रतिपादनप्रवणं प्रकरणमिदमाचार्यः प्राह्।" Prameyakamala-Mārtanda.

अ "भगवान् भट्टाकलंकदेवो विश्वविद्वनमण्डलहृदयाल्हादियुत्तिशास्त्रेण जगत्-

8

## Parikṣāmukham

The commentators of Parikṣāmukham were faced with the fact that there is no Mangalācharama in this work. In most of Brahmanical works, Mangalācharama verses are found and even where there are no special verses, attempts are made by commentators to show that the first words of such works e.g. "Atha" is auspicious and serves the purpose of Mangalācharama.<sup>1</sup> The Jain writers also hold that Mangalācharama should be used to remove obstacles to a successful completion of the work, as even the great men are subject to many obstructions even in good work.<sup>2</sup> The use of Mangalācharama is also supported by Śiṣtāchāra ( practice of the good or the respectable ).

Prabhāchandra and Anantavīrya write that salutation can be made by words, by the body and also mentally. So though salutation in words is not found in this work, it can be urged that salutation by bodily movements or a mental salutation has been made. If any one is unwilling to accept this, it can be said that the words in the beginning viz. "Pramāṇa" can have a secondary meaning which would serve the purpose of salutation. "Mā" means "Lakṣmī" and "Āṇa" means "Śabda". He who has "Pra" (Prakrista =

सद्धर्मप्रमावमवूबुधत्तमाम् । तदनु वालानुजिवृक्षुः .....माणिक्यनन्दिमुनिट्टन्दारकस्तत्-प्रकाशित-शास्त्रमहोद्धेरुद्धृत्य तदवगाहनाय पोतोपमं परीक्षामुखनामधेयमन्वर्थमुद्वहत् प्रकरणमारत्त्रयन् ......" Nyāyamaņi dipikā. (This work has not been printed. The quotation is from a MSS. preserved in the Jain Siddhānta Bhaban, Arrab. See also Jaina Siddhānta Bhāskara, Bhāga. II. Kirana I. Praśasti-sangraha P. 1.)

- "ओंकारआधशब्दश्च द्वावेतौ ब्रह्मणः पुरा।
   कन्ठं भित्वा विनिर्यातौ तेन मांगळिकावुभौ ॥"
- 2 "ग्रेयांसि बहुविन्नानि भवन्ति महतामपि । अश्रेयसि प्रवृत्तानां कापि यान्ति विनायकाः ॥

तस्मादशेषप्रत्यूहोपशमनाय मंगळमभिघेयम्।"

Śilāńkāchārya's Commentary on the Achārāńga Sūtras. P-2

#### The Sacred Books of the Jainas

excellent) Māṇa is Pramāṇa (i. e. the omniscient Arhat) from whom right knowledge can be obtained (Arthasaṃsiddhih) and from his Ābhāsa (viz. Gods like Hari, Hara etc.) the opposite happens.<sup>1</sup> It must be confessed that this interpretation is too farfetched. There are instances of writers like Dharma-kirti beginning his work<sup>2</sup> without any Maṅgalācharaṇa, which was completed and there are instances of works like Bāṇa-bhatta's Kādambari which was never completed though it began with a Maṅgalācharaṇa. To readers of the present day, this question of Maṅgalācharaṇa may appear to be of little importance, but in old texts and commentaries, a good deal of ingenuity has been displayed to

1 "ननु निःशेषविन्नोपशमनायेष्टदेवतानमस्कारः शास्त्रकृता कथं न कृत इति न वाच्यम् । तस्य मनःकायाभ्यामपि सम्भवात् । अथवा वाचनिकोऽपि नमस्कारोऽ-नेमैवादिवाक्येनाभिहितो वेदितव्यः । केषांचिद् वाक्यानामुभयार्थप्रतिपादनपरत्वेनापि दृश्यमानत्वात् ।....तत्रादिवाक्यस्य नमस्कारपरताभिधीयते ।....अनन्तचतुष्टयस्वरुपा न्तरंगरक्षणा समवसरणादिस्वभावा वहिरंगरव्ह्षणा त्र्व्श्मीर्मा इत्युच्यते । आणः शब्दः । मा च आणश्च माणौ । प्रकुष्टौ माणौ यस्यासौ प्रमाणः । हरिहराद्य-संभविविभूतियुक्तो दृष्टेष्टाविरुद्धवाक् च भगवान् अईन्नेर्व अभिधीयते, इत्यसाधारण-गुणोपदर्शनमेव भगवतः संस्तवनमभिधीयते । तस्माद् प्रमाणाद् अवधिभूताद् अर्थ-संसिद्धिर्भवति । तदाभासाच हरिहरादेरर्थसंसिद्धिर्न भवति ।"

### Prameyaratnamālā.

2 Dharmakirti the celebrated Buddhist philosopher is said to have flourished in the 7th Century A.D. He is mentioned by the Jain writer Vidyānandi Svāmi in Aşta-sāhasri and Patraparikṣā. He begins his work without any Mangalācharaņa thus : "सम्यग्ज्ञानपूर्विका सर्वपुरुषार्थसिद्धिः !" Prabhāchandra hints that Dharmakirti must have made mental or bodily obeisance though not verbal salutation : "हृश्यते धर्मकीत्त्यदिनामप्येवंविधा प्रवृत्तिः, वाङ्नमस्कारमन्तरेणेव 'सभ्यग्ज्ञानपूर्विका सर्वपुरुषार्थसिद्धिः' इत्यादि वाक्योपन्यासात्।"

Prameyakamalamārtanda.

10

## Parikṣāmukham

explain away the exceptional cases of works of Dharma-Kirti and Bāṇa-bhatta. It is mentioned in Muktāvalī that in cases where the work is completed without any hindrance though no Maṅgalācharaṇa is made, the explanation is that a counteraction of bad luck by Maṅgalācharaṇa was made in a previous life and where we see that in spite of a Maṅgalācharaṇa, the work is not completed, we should suppose that the evil karma of the writer offering hindrances to a successful completion was so great that the merit obtained by Maṅgalācharaṇa is not sufficient to counteract the same.<sup>1</sup>

1 "इत्थं च यत्र मंगलं न टरयते तत्र जन्मान्तरीयं तत् कल्प्यते । यत्र च सत्यपि मंगले समाप्तिर्न टरयते तत्र वलवत्तरो विघ्नो विघ्नप्राचुर्यं च वोध्यम् ।" Muktāvali.

In Jain tradition Mangalācharaņa is observed in three ways :

- (i) by rećiting the word Namah, especially bowing to the worshipful, as Samantbhadra has done in the beginning of Ratņa Karaņda Śrāvakāchāra, नम: अीवर्द्धमानाय etc.
- (ii) by singing a song of victory in the name of the worshipful, as has been done by Amritachandra in Puruşārtha Siddhyupāya, तजज्यति परं ज्योतिः etc.
- (iii) by proclaiming the basic principles so as to include both the above ideas, as has been done by Umasyāmi in Tattyārthādhigama Sūtra, सम्यग्द्र्शन-ब्रानचारित्राणि मोक्षमार्गः।

All these modes show the good and pious thought-activities of the writer. According to Jainism thoughts are the main causes of bondage, liberation, or decrease in the intensity or duration of Karmas already bound. Thoughts bring about a change in the nature of the obstructive Karma. If that Karma is mild, it will be altered; if very strong, it cannot be altered. That is why some authors succeed in their undertaking, while others do not. Pious motives of an author considerably help in combating vicious Karmas, if they are not of a very strong kind.

# प्रथमः समुद्देशः

# स्वापूर्वार्थव्यवसायात्मकं ज्ञानं प्रमाणम् । १ ।

I. Svāpūrvārthavyavasāyātmakam jňānam Pramāņam.

I. Pramäna is valid knowledge of itself and of things not proved before.

#### Commentary

The word 'Apūrvārtha' will be explained in sūtra 4 which follows and the word 'Sva-vyavasāya' will be explained in sūtra 6. Briefly speaking, Apūrvārtha is that whose nature was not definitely ascertained before by any Pramāņa. The valid knowledge of such an object is Pramāņa. Knowledge illumines itself at the same time as well as its object. That is to say, Pramāņa knows itself simultaneously with the object not definitely ascertained before.

This view of the Jains is in great contrast with the view as laid down in the Nyāya philosophy of the Hindus. In Tarkasangraha we find "of whatever description anything is, when our idea of that thing is of that same description, it is called a right notion; as in the case of silver, the idea of its being silver. This is called Pramā ( commensurate with its object ). The supposing a thing to be as the thing is not, is called a wrong notion; as in the case of a shell, the notion of its being silver. This is called Apramā." ( Dr. Ballantyne's translation ).<sup>1</sup>

The principle of Pramāņa in the Nyāya philosophy of the Hindus, is that there are causes which produce right notion (Pramā)

1 "तद्वति तत्प्रकारकोऽनुभवो यथार्थः। यथा रजत इदं रजतमिति झानम्। सैव प्रमेत्युच्यते। तदभाववति तत्प्रकारकोऽनुभवोऽयथार्थः। यथा शुक्ताविदं रजत-मिति ज्ञानम्। सैवाप्रमेत्युच्यते।" Tarka-sangraha.

### Pariksāmukham

and because these causes produce Pramā they are called Pramāņas. The causes are of four kinds and the right notion produced by them are also of four kinds. In Tarka-saṅgraha we find "Right notion is of four kinds through the divisions of Pratyakṣa (Perceptions), Anumiti (Inferences ) Upamiti (conclusions from similarity) and Śābda (Authoritative Assertions) understood. The efficient (peculiar) cause of those also is of four kinds, through the divisions of Perception, Inference, Recognition of similarity and Authoritative Assertion" (Dr. Ballantyne's translation).<sup>1</sup>

Vātsyāyana in his Bhāşya on Nyāyasūtras of Gautama says "Pramā is the right knowledge of objects"<sup>2</sup> that is to say "it is a notion of that which exists in its right form"<sup>3</sup> or in other words "it is a knowledge of a thing in the same form as it really is".<sup>4</sup> The instrument of this Pramā is Pramāņa.

The Jain doctrine is that Pramāņa is not the cause of right knowledge but right knowledge of itself and of the objects not previously ascertained rightly.

The subject of Pramāņa is treated in older Jain works like the Tattvārthādhigama Sūtra in connection with knowledge. Umāsvāmi writes "Mati, Śruta, Avadhi, Manahparyaya and Kevala (are right) knowledge".<sup>5</sup> These (five kinds of knowledge) are the (two kinds of) Pramāņas".<sup>6</sup> "The first two (kinds

1 "यथार्थानुभवश्चतुर्विधः प्रत्यक्षानुमित्युपमितिशाब्दमेदात् । तत्करणमपि चतुर्विधं प्रत्यक्षानुमानोपमानशब्दमेदात् ।'' Tarka-sangraha.

- 2 "यदर्थविक्रानं सा प्रमा ।" Vātsyāyana Bhāṣya.
- 8 "यदत्र यदस्ति तत्र तस्यानुभवः ।" Vātsyāna Bhāsya.
- 4 "तद्वति तत्प्रकारको ज्ञानम्।" Vātsyāyana Bhāṣya.
- 5 "मतिभुतावधिमनःपर्ययकेवळानि ज्ञानम् ।"

Tattvärthädhigama Sütra I. 9.

6 "तत् प्रमाणे।"

Tattvārthādhigama Sūtra I. 10.

of knowledge viz. Mati and Śruta ) are Paroksa (Pramaņas )"<sup>1</sup> and "the remaining ( three ) are Pratyakṣa ( Pramāṇas )<sup>2</sup>

With these five kinds of knowledge, Kumati, Ku-Śruta and Vibhangāvadhi are added to make up eight kinds of knowledge. These three are nothing but false knowledges of Mati, Śruta and Avadhi, that is to say, Kumati is Ajñāna (false knowledge) of Mati ; Kuśruta is Ajñāna of Śruta and Vibhangābadhi is Ajñāna of Avadhi. Kundakundāchārya has mentioned all these eight varieties of Jňāna in Pañchāstikāyasamayasāra : "Abhinibodhika or Mati, Śruta, Avadhi, Manah-paryaya and Kevala—these are the five varieties of Jňāna. Kumati, Ku-śruta and Vibhanga these three also are connected with Jňāna."<sup>3</sup>

Mati Jhāna is knowledge derived through the senses including the knowledge which arises from the activity of the mind. In Jain psychology, four stages of Mati Jhāna which follow Darśana (inexpressible contact of an object with sense consiousness) have been mentioned. These are (i) Avagraha (ii) Ihā (iii) Avāya and (iv) Dhāranā. When an object is brought in contact with a sense-organ, we have a general knowledge of an object. There is an excitation in the sense-organ by the stimulus i.e. the object present in the outside world Then there is an excitation in the consciousness. Thus, in the first stage, a person is barely conscious of the existence of an object. This is Avagraha.<sup>4</sup> The second stage Ihā consists in the desire to know

- 1 "आहो परोक्षम् ।" Tattvärthadhigama Sutra I. 11.
- 2 "प्रत्यक्षमन्यत्।" . Tattvārthādhigama Sūtra I. 12.
- 3 ''आभिणिवोधिसुदोधिमणकेवळाणि णाणाणि पंचभेयाणि । कुमदिसुद-विभगाणि य तिण्णि वि णाणेईि संजूत्ते ॥''

Pañchāstikāya samayasāra 41.

4 "अश्वार्थयोगे दर्शनानन्तरमर्थप्रहणमवयहः ।"

Pramāņa-mimāmsā I. 1. 27.

### Parikşāmukham

whether it is this or that, That is to say, similarities and differences of the object with and from other objects become the subject of consciousness in this stage.<sup>1</sup> For example, when we see a man, the first stage is that we are simply conscious that it is a human being and in the second stage we want to know the particulars such as that this man is a resident of Karņāta or Lāta country<sup>2</sup>; or, when we hear a noise, at first we are conscious of merely a sound, then we desire to know whether it is from blowing a conch shell or from blowing a horn.<sup>a</sup>

In the third stage Aväya, there is a definite finding of the particulars which we desired to know in the second stage. The

# "विषयविषयिसंनिपातसमनंतरमाद्यधहणमवप्रहः।"

Tattvārtharājavārttika.

"विषयविषयिसंनिपातानन्तर--समुद्भूत--सत्तामात्र- गोचरदर्शनाज्जातमाद्य--मवान्तर सामान्याकार विशिष्टवस्तुप्रहणमवप्रहः ।''

Pramāņa-Naya-tattvālokālankāra. H. 7.

''अक्षार्थयोगजाद् वस्तुमात्रपहणलक्षणात् ।

जातं यद्वस्तुभेदस्य महणं तदवमहः ॥" Tattvārthaslokavārttika. 1 "अवगृहीतविशेषकाङ्क्षणमीहा ।" Pramāņa Mimāmsā I. I. 28. "अवगृहीतार्थविशेषकाङ्क्षणमीहा ।"

Pramāņa-Naya-tattvālokālankāra II. 8. "अवगृहीतेऽर्थे तद्विशेषाकाङ्क्षणमीहा।" Tattvārtharājavārttika. "तद्गृहीतार्थसामान्ये यद्विशेषस्य काङ्क्षणम् ।

निश्चयाभिमुखं सेहा संशीतेभिन्नलक्षणा ।।" Tattvarthaslokavarttika.

2 "अवप्रहेण विषयीकृतो योऽथोंऽवान्तर-मनुष्यत्वादिजातिविशेषरुक्षणस्तस्य विशेषः कर्णाट-लाटादिभेदस्तस्याकाङ्क्षणं भवितव्यताप्रत्ययरुपतया प्रहणाभिमुख्य-मीहेत्यभिधीयते।" Ratnākarāvatārikā II. S.

5 "अवग्रहगृहीतस्य शब्दादेरर्थस्य किमयं शब्दः शाङ्का वेति संशये सति माधुर्यादयः शङ्खधर्मा एवोपलभ्यन्ते न कार्कश्यादयः शार्ङ्कधर्मा इत्यन्वयव्यतिरेक-रुपविशेषपर्यालोचनरुपा मतिश्चेष्ठेहा (" Pramāņa mimāmsā,

## The Sacred Books of the Jainas

second stage is merely an attempt to know the particulars, while the third stage consists of the ascertainment of these particulars.<sup>1</sup> There may be some doubt in the first and second stages but in the third stage this is absent. For example, in the third stage there is a finding that the sound is of a conch shell and not that of a horn.<sup>2</sup>

The fourth stage Dhāraṇā consists of the lasting impression which results after the object with its particulars is definitely ascertained.<sup>3</sup> It is this impression (Saṃskāra) which enables us to remember the object afterwards.<sup>4</sup>

1 "ईहित्तविशेषनिर्णयोऽचाय: ।" Pramāņa-mimāmsā I. 1. 29. and Pramāņa-Naya-tattvālokālankāra I. 9. "विशेषनिर्ज्ञानाद्याथात्म्यावगमनमवाय: ।" Tattvārtharājavārttika. "तस्यैव निर्णयोऽवाय: ।" Tattvārthaslokavārttika.

- 2 ''इह चावप्रहेहयोरन्तराले अभ्यस्तेऽपि विषये संशयज्ञानमस्त्येव ।'' ''ईहाकोडीकृते वस्तुनि विशेषस्य शाङ्क एवायं शब्दो न शार्ङ्क इत्येवं-रुपस्यावधारणमवायः ।'' Pramäņa-mimāmsä.
- 8 'निर्ज्ञातार्थाविस्मृति धौरणा ।'' Tattvārtharājā-vārttika. ''स एव हठतमावस्थापन्नो धारणा ।''

Pramāņa-Nayatattvālokālankāra I. 10.

4 "स्मृतिहेतुः सा धारणा।" Tattvārthaslokavārttika. "स्मृतिहेतुर्धारणा।" Pramāņa-mīmāmsā I 1. 30.

All these four stages of Matijnāna have been summarised by Vidyānandi thus :

''अक्षार्थयोगजाद् वस्तुमात्रग्रहणलक्षणात् । जातं यद्वस्तुमेदस्य प्रहणं तदवप्रहः ॥ तद्गृहीतार्थसामान्ये यद्विशेषस्य काङ्क्षणम् । निश्चयाभिमुखं सेहा संशयाद् भिन्नलक्षणा ॥ तस्यैव निर्णयोऽवायः स्मृतिहेतुः सा धारणा ।"

16

Śruta Jňāna is knowledge derived from words spoken or from gestures or facial expressions, from reading books and from all other kinds of signs or symbols.

Avadhi Jüāna is the knowledge directly acquired by the soul without the medium of the activity of the mind or the senses<sup>1</sup>. Knowledge in the hypnotic state is the nearest approach to an illustration. As this knowledge also is acquired through the medium of the brain and the senses according to the Jain view, this can not be accepted as an example of Avadhi Jüāna.

Manahparyaya Jñāna is the knowledge of thoughts of others<sup>2</sup>. Thought-reading may be mentioned to convey some feeble idea of this kind of knowledge. According to Jainism, no lay man can have this knowledge. Only a saint in a particular stage of spiritual advancement can acquire or develop this knowledge. Kevala Jñāna is omniscience or knowledge unlimited by space, time or object. According to Jainism, Jain saints who completely practise right faith, right knowledge and right conduct can attain this knowledge. In the Hindu Purāņas, some saints are said to have such a knowledge and are called Sarvajñas or Trikāladaršis.

These eight kinds of knowledge viz. Mati, Kumati, Śruta, Ku-śrutra, Avadhi, Vibhańgāvadhi, Manahparyaya and Kevala are classified from another point of view into two classes viz. Pratyakṣa and Parokṣa<sup>8</sup> and these two constitute the Pramāṇas of the Jain Logic<sup>4</sup>.

1	''परापेक्षां विना ज्ञानं रूपिणां भणितोऽवधिः ।''
	Tattvārthasāra by Amritachandra Sūri I. 25.
2	''परकीयमनःस्पार्थज्ञानमक्षानपेक्ष्या ।
	स्यान्मनःपर्ययो ॥" Tattvärthasara I. 28.
-3	''णाणं अट्टवियप्पं मदिसुदओही अणाणणाणाणि ।
	मणपज्जय केवलमवि पत्त्वक्ल परोक्खमेयं च ॥''
·	Dravya-samgraha 5.
4	''मतिश्रुतावधिमनःपर्यंथकेवल्रानि ज्ञानम् ।''
P3	3

According to Umasvāmi, Mati and Śruta are Parokṣa knowledge and Avadhi, Manahparyaya and Kevala are Pratyakṣa knowledge. A detailed description of Pratyakṣa and Parokṣa will follow in the present treatise and we shall discuss later on the criticism how Mati and Śruta Jñāna described as Parokṣa Pramāṇa in the Tattvārthādhigama Śūtra, can be called Sānvyavahārika Pratyakṣa in works on Jain Logic.

We shall now deal with the derivation of the word 'Pramāṇa' according to the writers of Jain Logic.

It has been laid down by Prabhāchandra in Prameyakamalamārtaņda that the word Pramāņa may be derived in three ways. In the first place, the suffix "Anat" may be held to be used in active voice meaning "That which knows rightly (viz the soul) is Pramāņa". From the definition of Pramāņa, we learn that Pramāņa is right knowledge of itself and of objects not previously ascertained. This derivation means that just as a lamp illumines itself as well as other objects, the soul knows itself as well as other objects. In the second place the suffix may be used in the sense of instrumentality. The meaning would then be "That by which right knowledge is gained is Pramāņa". In this case just as light appears when obstructions to it are removed, so right knowledge will come on removal of obstructions to it. In the third derivation there is use of the suffix in Bhāva-vāchya (passive intransitive

## "तत् प्रमाणे।"

## "आहे परोक्षम्।"

"प्रत्यक्षमन्यत्।" Tattvārthādhigama Sūtra I. 9-12.

1 "अत्र प्रमाणशब्दः कत्तुं करणभावसाधनो ।....तत्र स्वपरप्रमेयस्वरुपं प्र मिमीते यथावज्जानातीति प्रमाणमात्मा अत्मन एव द्वि कत्तुं साधनप्रमाणशब्देनाभिधानं स्वातन्त्र्येन विवक्षितत्वात् स्वपरप्रकाशात्मकस्य प्रदीपादेः प्रकाशाभिधानवत् । साधक-तमत्वादिविवक्षायां तु प्रमीयते येन तत् प्रमाणं प्रमितिमात्रं वा प्रतिवंधापाये प्रादुर्भूत-विज्ञानपर्यायस्य प्राधान्येनाश्वयणात् प्रदीपादेः प्रभाभारात्मकप्रकाशवत् ।"

Prameyakamalamārtanda.

19

voice) where stress is laid on the verb only, the meaning being the same as in active voice.

In Tattvārtharājavārttika it has been mentioned : "What is the meaning of the word Pramāņa? The meaning of the word Pramāņa can be understood according to one's desire by deriving it in Bhāva-vāchya (passive intransitive voice) Kartri-vāchya (active voice) and Karaņa-vāchya (instrumental voice)"<sup>2</sup>.

A grammarian might object that according to Jainendra Vyākaraņa the suffix Anat is used only in the sense of Karaņa (instrumentality) and  $\overline{A}$ dhāra (or Adhikaraṇa, locative sense)<sup>3</sup>. So how can it be suffixed in Kartri or Bhāva-vāchya? The reply to this is given by a commentator on Prameyaratnamālā that though the aforesaid aphorism exists in Jainendra Vyākaraṇa, we may accept the principle that "There are exceptions in krit suffixes" and this covers cases like the present one where suffixes are used in senses not provided in particular aphorisms<sup>4</sup>.

2 "प्रमाणशब्दस्य कोऽर्थः ? भावकर्त्तृ करणत्वोपपत्तेः प्रमाणशब्दस्येच्छातोऽ-र्थाध्यवसायः ।"

"अयं प्रमाणशब्दः, भावे, कर्त्तरि, करणे च वर्त्तते। तत्र भावे, तावत् प्रमेयार्थं प्रति निवृत्तव्यापारस्य तत्वकथनात् प्रमाणमिति। कर्त्तरि, प्रमेयार्थं प्रति प्रमातृत्व-शक्ति-परिणतस्याश्चितत्वान् तत् प्रमिणोत्ति प्रमेयमिति प्रमाणं। करणे प्रमातृप्रमेययोः प्रमाणप्रमेययोश्च स्यादन्यत्वात् प्रमिणोत्त्यनेनेति प्रमाणम्।"

Tattvārtharājavārttika.

3 "करणाधारे चानट्।" Jainendra Vyākaraņa II. 3. 112.

4 "ननु प्रमाणशब्दो क्थं कत्तु साधन इति चेत् , न । 'करणाधारे चानट्' इति करणाधिकरणभावेष्वनटो विहितत्वेऽपि 'छद्वहुरुम्' इति वचनात् अन्यत्र कारकेष्वपि बहुलं छत्प्रत्ययसद्भावादनटोपि छत्यादन्यत्रापि भावादपादीयतेऽस्मादित्य-पादानं संप्रदीयतेऽस्मादिति संप्रदानमित्यादिवत् ।" Nyāyamaņi-dipikā. ( A. Mss. in Jain Siddhānta Bhaban, Arrah ). Other writers have derived the word Pramāņa by holding that the suffix "Anat" is used in the sense of instrumentality as laid down in Jainendra Vyākaraņa.

Dharmabhūşaṇa in his Nyāya-dipikā has laid down that the word Jñāna as well as Pramāṇa are derived with the affix "Anat" in the Karaṇa-vāchya (instrumental voice)<sup>3</sup>. Dharma bhūṣaṇa supports his view by a quotation from Pramāṇa-nirṇaya<sup>6</sup>. Hemachandra in his Pramāṇa-mimāṃsā writes "That by which the essence of substances is rightly understood by eliminating doubt etc. is Pramāna which is the instrumental cause of Pramā (right knowledge)"<sup>7</sup>. In Pramā lakṣma the same has been laid down in another language<sup>8</sup>.

The definition of Pramāņa as given by other Jain writers may be compared with that of Māņikyanandi. First, we may mention the definition as laid down in Nyāyāvatāra :

"Pramāņa (valid knowledge) is the knowledge which illumines. itself and other things without any obstruction" (Trans. by Dr. S. C. Vidyābhūṣana)<sup>9</sup>.

Dr. Vidyābhūşana writes in his commentary on this definition : "The Jains maintain that it is only when knowledge illumines itself that it can take cognizance of the external object. So, accord-

5 "करणसाधनं खल्वेतत् ज्ञायते अनेन इति ज्ञानमिति ।....एवमेव प्रमाण-पदमपि प्रमीयतेऽनेनेति करणसाधनं कर्त्तव्यम् ।" Nyāya-dipikā

6 "इदमेव हि प्रमाणस्य प्रमाणत्वं यत् प्रमितिक्रियां प्रति साधकतमत्वेन करणत्वम् ।" Pramāņa-nirņaya.

7 "प्रकर्षेण संशयादिव्यवच्छेदेन मीयते परिच्छिद्यते वस्तुतत्वं येन तत् प्रमाणं प्रमायां साधकतमं ।" Pramaņa-mimamsa.

8 "प्रमीयते स्वान्यात्मकोऽथोंऽनेनेति करणसाधनं प्रमाणं तथाव्यवधानेन प्रमितौ साधकतमत्वात् ।" Pramā-lakşma.

9 "प्रमाणं स्वपराभासि ज्ञानं बाधविवर्जितम्।" Nyāyāvatāra.

ing to them, knowledge like a lamp illumines itself as well as the object lying outside it.

Those whose sight has been obscured by darkness often see many false images, such as two moons etc.; men bewildered by sophism are found to believe that everything is momentary or the like. With a view to differentiate such kinds of false knowledge from Pramāņa (valid knowledge) the phrase 'without obstruction' has been used." (Nyāyāvatāra, page 7).

The definition in Pramā-lakṣma of Buddhisāgara is the same as that in Nyāyāvatāra.

In Nyāya-dīpikā we find "Pramāņa is perfect knowledge<sup>10</sup>." Vidyānanda in his Pramāņa-parīksā also lays down the same definition.

Hemachandra defines Pramāņa thus : "Pramāņa is the perfect ascertainment of a knowable"<sup>11</sup> and criticises the definition of Māņikyanandi in Parikṣāmukham. He says "Some say that if we accept that we again know a thing which had been previously ascertained by Pramāņa, the result would be that a thing which has already been powdered will be powdered again. Also, by accepting this view, Pramāņa would apply to knowledge of objects already ascertained and in the case of continuous knowledge of an object. So, according to those who object thus, the definition should be that Pramāņa is ascertainment of objects not previously ascertained. So some one (referring to the definition adopted by Māņikyanandi) has laid down the definition of Pramāņa to be 'Pramāņa is valid knowledge of itself and of things not proved before".<sup>12</sup>

- 10 ''सम्यग्झानं प्रमाणम्।" Nyāya-dipikā.
- 11 "सम्यगर्थनिर्णय: प्रमाणम्।" Pramāņa-mīmāmsā. I. I. 2.

12 "ननु च परिच्छिन्नमर्थं परिच्छिन्दता प्रमाणेन पिष्टं पिष्टं स्यात् । तथाच गृहीतमाहिणां धारावाहिकज्ञानानामपि प्रामाण्यप्रसङ्ग्रस्ततोऽपूर्वार्थनिर्णय इत्यस्तु लक्षणम् ,

### The Sacred Books of the Jainas

Hemachandra criticises the definition of Pramāņa as mentioned in the Parikṣamukhaṃ on two grounds. First, that this definition excludes the knowledge of a thing already ascertained. According to Hemachandra, it is equally Pramāṇa when a thing is ascertained for the first time, as when a thing which has previously been ascertained, is again known<sup>13</sup>. So Hemachandra says that Pramāṇa is perfect ascertainment of a knowable.

The second objection refers to Dhārābāhik Jňāna. This is a series of states throughout which the same object is presented in consciousness. This for example arises when we see an object continuously for some time. Each state of consciousness in this case lasts only for a moment. Then follows a second state and is Then a third state succeeds and is lost and so on-Now if lost. we define Pramāna as knowledge of things not ascertained before, the objection is that in the first state of Dhārābāhik Jňāna, this may apply. But in the second and subsequent stages of the presentation of the object, the object cannot be said to be 'Apūr- $\bar{var}$ tha' (not previously ascertained ) as mentioned in the definition for it was ascertained after it had been cognised in the first momentary state. So Dhārābāhik Jňāna will be excluded from Pramāna if we accept the definition of Pramana in Pariksamukham.

A similar objection was raised and refuted in works in Hindu philosophy. To give an example, we may quote the definition of Pramāņa in Vedānta-paribhāṣā. The author Dharmarājādhvarīndra writes that if re-collection be included within Pramā (right knowledge), the definition of Pramāņa will be of one kind and if re-collection be excluded from Pramā, the definition will be of a different kind. According to this writer : "Pramāņa is the instrumental cause of right knowledge (Pramā). When the defini-

यथाहुः 'स्वापूर्वार्थव्यवसायात्मकं ज्ञानं प्रमाणम्' इति तथापूर्वार्थविज्ञानमिति ।'' Pramāna-mimāmsā.

13 "ब्रहीष्यमानमाहिण इव गृहीतमाहिणोऽपि नाप्रामाण्यम्।" Pramanamimamsa I. 1. 4.

## Parikṣāmukham

tion of Pramā excludes re-collection, Pramā is defined as consisting in the knowledge of an object, which has not been previously perceived and which is not rejected as false. But when re-collection is included, Pramā consists in the knowledge of an object which is not rejected as false"<sup>1</sup>.

Now, in the first place when Pramā is taken to exclude recollection, the definition being knowledge of an object not previously perceived and not rejected as false, how can this definition apply to Dhārābāhik Jňāna? For as we have noted before in Dhārābāhik Jnana, in the second and succeeding presentations of an object, it cannot be "not previously perceived" as it was perceived in the first momentary state. This criticism is met by Dharmarājādhvarindra by saying "In the definition of Pramā from which re-collection is excluded, there is no fault of non-pervasiveness. For since it is admitted that time though destitute of form can be cognised through the sense-organs, even a persistent state of cognition has for its object that which is particularised by association with each separate moment and is not the object of each previous cognition"<sup>2</sup>. That is to say, knowledge of a jar even at the first moment will be different from knowledge of the same jar at the second moment for there will be distinct knowledge in each case e.g. this is a jar seen at the first moment, this is a jar seen at the second moment and so on. "The object known in each moment is particularised or determined by that moment and thus differs from the object presented in each previous or succeeding moment"<sup>3</sup>. Further, the

1 Translation by A. Venis. "तत्र प्रमायाः करणं प्रमाणं। तत्र स्मृतिब्यावृत्तं प्रमात्वमनधिगतावाधितार्थविषयज्ञानत्वं, स्मृतिसाधारणन्तु अवाधितार्थ-विषयज्ञानत्वम्।" Vedanta-paribhasa. Chapter I.

2 Translation by A. Venis. "नीरुपस्यापि कालस्य इन्द्रिय-वेद्यत्वाभ्युपगमेन धारावाहिकवुद्धेरपि पूर्वपूर्वज्ञानाविषय-तत्तत्क्षणविशेषविषयकत्वेन न तत्र अच्याप्तिः ।" Vedānta-paribhāsā.

3 A. Venis. Notes on Vedānta-paribhāṣā.

### The Sacred Books of the Jainas

objection may be met in another way, if we say that really speaking the knowledge in Dhārābāhik Jňāna is one and the same throughout and not different in each of the different moments. Dharmarājādhvarindra says : "More-over, according to (Vedantic) tenet, there is no variation of knowledge in the case of a persistent cognition ; but as long as there is a presentation of the jar, so long the modification of the internal organ in the form of the jar is one and the same and not various. For the persistence of the modification is admitted until there arises a modification which excludes the former. And thus the knowledge of a jar or like object, consisting in the intelligence which is reflected in the modification of the internal organ persists there during that time and is one and the same. Therefore the fault of non-pervasiveness is not to be feared in our definition"<sup>4</sup>.

The criticism of Hemachandra as regards the definition of Pramāṇa as laid dawn by Māṇikyanandi may be met in the manner described above

We may note that Udayanāchārya in his Kusumāñjali has also said that faults of non-pervasiveness (Avyāpţi) and Ativyāpţi will arise if we accept the definition of Pramāņa to be the cause of knowledge of an object which was not perceived before. So Pramāņa should be defined only as right knowledge<sup>5</sup>. In Jain works like Tattvārathasāra<sup>6</sup> the same has been laid down.

4 Translation by A. Venis. "किश्व सिद्धान्ते धारावाहिकबुद्धिस्थले न झानमेदः, किन्तु यावद् यावद् घटस्फुरणं तावद् घटाकारान्तः करणवृत्तिः एकैव, न तु नाना, वृत्तेः स्वविरोधिवृत्त्युत्पत्तिपर्यन्तस्थायित्वाभ्युपगमात् । तथाच तत्प्रतिफल्जि-चैतन्यरुपं घटादिज्ञानमपि तत्र तावत्कालीनम् एकमेव, इति न अव्याप्ति-शङ्घापि।" Vedānta-paribhāsā. Chapter I. For a detailed treatment, the reader may refer to Vedantaparibhāsā edited by S. C. Ghoshal Pages 5-S.

5 "अप्राप्तेरधिकप्राप्तेरलक्षणमपूर्वदृक्। यथार्थानुभवो मानं अनपेक्षतयेष्यते ।" Kusumänjali.

In the Sāmkhya philosophy, it is laid down that Pramā (right knowledge) consists of ascertainment of a thing which was not previously ascertained and Pramāņa (which according to the Sāmkhya doctrine is of three kinds) is the instrumental cause of Pramā<sup>7</sup>. Prabhākara Bhatta in his exposition of Mīmāmsā philosophy has defined Pramāņa to be ascertainment of things not ascertained before.<sup>4</sup> Thus, the definition in Partkṣāmukham is in agreement on this point with the Sāmkhya philosophy.

Though by means of explanation and argument as adopted in Vedānta-paribhāṣā as quoted above, the definition of Pramāņa can be applied to Dhārābāhika Jňāna even if we hold the ascertainment of things not perceived before (Apūrvārtha) as one of its characteristics, yet commentators of Parikṣāmukham have held that Dhārābāhika Jňāna is excluded from Pramāņa. For example, Anantavirya in Frameyaratnamālā writes "The adjective Apūrva is used to exclude from Pramāņa Dhārābāhika Jňāna which cognises things already cognised<sup>2</sup>." This has been expanded in Arthaprakāšikā an unpublished commentary on Prameya-ratnamālā in this manner :--

"Why has the adjective Apūrva been applied to Artha? We reply, it is to exclude Dhārābāhika Jnāna. Dhārābāhika Jnāna means a series of knowledge like 'this is a pitcher, this is a pitcher, etc'. In this series, the first knowledge is Pramāņa as this consists

6 "सम्यगज्ञानात्मकं तत्र प्रमाणमुपवर्णितम् ।" Tattvārthasāra.

7 "द्वयोरेकतरस्य वाप्यसन्निक्रष्टार्थपरिच्छित्तिः प्रमा, तत्-साधकतमं यत् तत् त्रिविधं प्रमाणम् ।'' Sāmkhya-daršana. Chapter I. Sūtra 87. Here the word Asannikristārtha means the same as Apūrvārtha in Pariksāmukham.

1 In Nyāyadīpikā, this definition of the Mimāmsā philosophy is quoted : "'अनचिंगततथाभूतार्थनिश्चायकं प्रमाणं' इति भाट्टाः ।"

2 "अस्य चापूर्व-विशेषणं गृहीतमाहिधारावाहिज्ञानस्य प्रमाणतापरिहारार्थ-मुक्तम्।" Prameya-ratnamālā.

**P---**4

### The Sacred Books of the Jainas

of ascertainment of the object. The second and succeeding knowledge is not Pramāņa as in the same the object is not ascertained. As the object is ascertained by the first knowledge, the subsequent knowledge is quite insignificant. So the word Apūrva has been used as an adjective to Artha so that the (definition of Pramāņa) may not extend to the second and succeeding states of knowledge which would become included (in the definition if merely Pramāņa be defined) as ascertainment of object. By Apūrva it is understood that which has not become the object of previous knowledge. So in Dhārābāhika Jūāna, in the second and subsequent states of knowledge, the definition does not apply as in the first stage the object has been ascertained and in the second and subsequent stages, the object is not one which is previously unascertained"<sup>1</sup>.

Nyāyamaņidipikā also follows Artha-prakāsikā by laying down "Dhārābāhika Jňāna is excluded by this adjective, Apūrvārtha<sup>2</sup>." In Nyāyadīpikā it has been mentioned that in Jain logic, Dhārābāhika Jňāna is not recognised as Pramāņa<sup>3</sup>.

1 "अर्थस्य अपूर्वविशेषणं किमर्थम् ? इति चेत् , धारावाहिकज्ञान-व्यवच्छेदार्थमिति ब्रूमः । घटोऽयं घटोऽयं इत्यादि-ज्ञानपरंपरा धारावाहिकज्ञानम् । तादृश्रज्ञानपरंपरायां प्राथमिकज्ञानमेव प्रमाणं, तस्यैव विषयपरिच्छित्तिजनकत्वात् । द्वितीयादिज्ञानं तु न प्रमाणं, तस्य विषयपरिच्छित्तिजनकत्वाभावात् । प्रथमज्ञानेनैव परिच्छित्तेः जनितत्वेन द्वितीयादिज्ञानस्य अकिंचित्करत्वात् । तादृशद्वितीयादिज्ञाने परिच्छित्तेः जनितत्वेन द्वितीयादिज्ञानस्य अकिंचित्करत्वात् । तादृशद्वितीयादिज्ञाने अर्थविषयकव्यवसायात्मकत्वज्ञानत्वरुपनिरुक्तछक्षणसत्वेन अतिव्याप्तिनिरासार्थं अर्थे अपूर्वविशेषणम् । अपूर्वत्वं च पूर्वकालीनज्ञानान्तराविषयत्वं । तथाच, धारावाहिक-ज्ञानेषु द्वितीयादिज्ञाने प्राथमिक-ज्ञानगृहीतार्थविषयकत्वस्यैव सत्वेन पूर्वकालीनज्ञानान्तरा-गृहीतार्थविषयकव्यवसायात्मकत्वरुपल्छ्क्षणस्य अभावात् नातिव्याप्तिः ।'' Arthaprakāsikā (from a Mss. in Jain Siddhānta Bhavan, Arrah. )

2 "अनेन अपूर्वार्थविशेषणेन धारावाहिविज्ञानमेव निरस्यते।" Nyāyamaņidīpikā ( from a Mss. in Jain Siddhānta Bhavan, Arrah )

3 "अथापि धारावाहिकबुद्धिष्वतिव्याप्तिस्तासां सम्यगज्ञानत्वात् । न च तासामाईतमते प्रामाण्याभ्युपगम इति । उच्यते एकस्मिन्नेव घटे घटविषयाज्ञानविघटनार्थं आद्ये झाने प्रवृत्ते तेन घटप्रमितौ सिद्धायां पुनर्घटोऽयं घटोऽयमित्येवसुत्पन्नान्युत्तरोत्तर

We have thus seen that in all earlier works on Nyāya philosophy Pramāna has been taken to consist of knowledge of an object not ascertained before. The Mimāmsā philosophy of the Hindus have accepted that Gautama the propounder of the old school of the Nyāya philosophy of the Hindus must have taken Pramāna in this sense and we have shown that the Mimāmsakas led by Kumārila Bhatta have defined Pramā as ascertainment of an object not ascertained before. The older writers on Jain logic like Mānikya-nandi lay down a definition of Pramāna which is not at all different in this particular point (though there are differences on other points as already mentioned). Later writers specially those of the new school of Nyāya philosophy of the Hindus led by Gangeśa the author of Tattva-Chintāmani who flourished in the 14th Century have discarded this peculiarity in the definition of Pramāna and satisfied themselves by saying that Pramā is knowledge free from fallacy<sup>1</sup>. Their view has been summarised in the extract from Tarka-sangraha quoted above. Later Jain writers like Hemachandra who flourished in the twelfth century as shown

ज्ञानानि खलु धारावाहिकज्ञानानि। न होशं प्रमित्तिं प्रति साथकतमत्त्वं प्रथमज्ञानेनेव प्रमिते: सिद्धत्त्वात्। कथं तत्र ख्रूपणमतिव्याप्नोति तेषां गृहीतमाहित्वात्।" Nyāyadipikā. i.e. "This definition that Pramāņa is right knowledge may overlap the case of Dhārābāhika Jñāna. These knowledges (viz Dhārābāhika knowledges) are not Pramāņas according to Jain doctrine. It may be mentioned that when a pitcher is seen, first of all there is Pramāņa of a pitcher when the Ajñāna regarding a pitcher is removed. In the first knowledge, there is right conception of a pitcher. The subsequent knowledges 'this is a pitcher' are Dhārābāhika Jñāna. As by the first knowledge, we have Pramiti (right conception), the subsequent knowledges not being instrumental in producing Pramiti, are not Pramāņas. So the definition does not overlap as there are cases where a thing already perceived are again perceived."

1 "भ्रमभिन्नन्तु ज्ञानमत्रोच्यते प्रमा।" Vide Visva kosa 1st Edition Vol. X. P. 481. above similarly discarded this peculiarity in the definition of Pramāņa and criticised the older writers.

The writers who appeared still later reverted to the definition of the earliest writers and we have shown an example from Vedānta-paribhāsā how this was done. The writer of the Vedāntaparibhāsā was later than Gangeśa as he wrote a commentary on the works of Gangesa. The main object of attack of writers like Hemachandra was the inapplicability of the definition of Pramana in Dhārābāhika Jñāna. Though some of the Jain commentators lay down that only the first state of knowledge in Dhārābāhika Juāna is Pramāņa, if we follow the arguments in Vedānta-paribhāṣā, the object cognised in the second and subsequent stages can also be said to be Apürvārtha and hence the knowledge in these stages also would be Pramāna. The main point of attack being thus met, we do not see any fault in the definition as adopted by Mānikya-nandi. The subtle discussions in the new school of Nyāya philosophy on this point will necessitate a seperate work and so we refrain from embo-. dying the same in this commentary.

In Prameya-ratnamālā each of the words in the definition of Pramāņa as laid down by Māņikya-nandi has been explained as refuting definitions of other philosophies. According to this commentary, the word Jñāna (knowledge) shows that the Jain doctrine does not follow the view of Naiyāyikas that Pramāņa consists of connection of the senses with the objects<sup>1</sup>. The word Vyavasāya is used refuting the view of the Buddhists viz. Pramāņa consists of Nirvikalpa Pratyakṣa of four kinds i.e. Sva-saṃvedanapratyakṣa (understanding of the self), Indriya-pratyakṣa, (cognition through senses), Manopratyakṣa (understanding by mind) and Yogipratyakṣa ( cognition of the Yogis )<sup>2</sup>. The Buddhists do

1 'तस्य च ज्ञानमिति विशेषणं अज्ञानरूपस्य सत्रिकर्षादे-नैँयायिकादि-परिकल्पितस्य प्रमाणत्वव्यवच्छेदार्थमुक्तम् ।'' Prameyaratnamälä.

2 'तथा ज्ञानस्यापि स्वसंवेदनेन्द्रियमनोयोगिप्रत्यश्रस्य निर्विकल्पकस्य प्रत्यक्षत्वेन प्रामाण्यं सौगतैः परिकल्पितं तन्निरासार्थं व्यवसायात्मकप्रहणम् ।'' Ibid.

 $\overline{28}$ 

## Parikṣāmukham

not accept Vyavasāya or Niśchaya to be essential in Pramāņa. The word Artha is used to refute the views of those who deny the existence of external objects like Vijnanadvaitavadins, Mayavadins and Mādhyamikas<sup>1</sup>. The view of Vijnānādvaitavādins is that every object consists of knowledge and there is nothing to be cognised. Knowledge according to this view is of two kinds Alaya-vijnana and Pravrittivijňāna. Alaya-vijňāna is the self and Pravrittivijnāna is jar, cloth etc.<sup>2</sup> A verse is quoted in Arthaprakāsikā meaning "That is Alaya-vijhana which consists of the self and the knowledge of bluishness etc., is Pravrittivijñāna"<sup>3</sup>. The persons holding this view say that everything is knowledge and there is nothing to be cognised. The Māyāvādins say that everything is Brahma, that what we see as a jar, a cloth etc., are all unreal, and only Brahma is real. Mādhyamikas are Śūnyavādins who say that the essence is void. It does neither exist, nor is non-existent, nor existent as well as non-existent, nor distinct from existence and non-existence<sup>4</sup>. The word 'Sva' is used to refute the views of the

For details of Bauddha Nyāya view on this point, the reader may refer to the work Nyāyavindu of Dharma-kirti.

1 "तथा वहिरर्थापड्नोतॄणां विज्ञानाद्वेतवादिनां पुरुषाद्वेतवादिनां परयतोहराणां शून्यैकान्तवादिनां च विपर्यासव्युदासार्थमर्थ- प्रहणम् ।" Prameyaratnamālā.

2 "तत्र तावद्विज्ञानाद्वैतवादि सर्वं वस्तु ज्ञानात्मकमेव, तदितरज्ञेयाकारस्तु नास्त्येव। तच ज्ञानं द्विविधं, आलयविज्ञानं प्रवृत्तिविज्ञानं च तत्र आलयविज्ञानं आत्मपदवाच्यं, प्रवृत्तिविज्ञानं तु घटपटादिपदवाच्यम् ।" Arthaprakāsikā.

3 'तत् स्यादालयविज्ञानं यत्तु स्यादहमास्पदं।

तत् स्यात् प्रवृत्तिविज्ञानं यत्तु नीलादिगोचरं ।"

Verse quoted in Arthaprakāsikā.

4 'माध्यमिकास्तु…..शून्यमेव तत्वं। तथाहि सर्वं जगत्। न सत्, नास्तित्वप्रतीतिविरोधात्। नाप्यसत्, अस्त्त्वप्रतीतिविरोधात्। नापि सदसत्, सत्वासत्वयोरत्यन्तविरूद्धयोरेकत्र समावेशासंभवात्। नापि सदसद्विष्ठक्षणं सत्वादि-प्रतीतिविरोधादेव। तस्मात्रिरूक्तचतुःप्रकाररहितं शून्यमेव तत्त्वं। तदुक्तं Nyāya, Sāmkhya, Mimāmsā and Yoga philosophies in which Pramāna does not include the knowledge itself as well as the objects known at the same time<sup>1</sup>.

We have thus seen that most of the definitions of Pramāņa lay down that it is the right knowledge of objects. Some hold like Māņikyanandi that the object must be one which was not ascertained before; while others are of view that this is not at all essential. The main difference in Jain doctrine is that knowledge as Pramāņa like the sun or a lamp illumines itself as well as the objects simultaneously.

# हिताहितपासिपरिहारसमर्थं हि प्रमाणं, ततो ज्ञानमेव तत् ॥ २ ॥

2. Hitāhitaprāptiparihārasamartham hi prmāņam tato jūānameva tat.

2. Because Pramāņa enables acquiring beneficial things and leaving non-beneficial objects, this is nothing but knowledge.

### Commentary

Pramāņa leads to the acquirement of pleasure and its causes and abstention from sorrow and its causes. When a man is thirsty, he searches for an object to quench the thirst and begins to seek water. That Pramāņa which points out this water is sought by a thirsty man, for by a right knowledge that this is water acquired by Pramāņa there is no want of receipt of the object desired viz., water<sup>2</sup>.

# न सन्नासन्न सद्सन्न चाप्यनुभयात्मकं । चतुष्कोटिविनिर्मुक्तं तत्वं माध्यमिका विदुः ॥

इति तथाच शून्यमेव तत्वमिति वदन्ति ।" Arthaprakāsikā. ( Mss. )

1 "तथा परोक्षज्ञानवादिनां मीमांसकानामस्वसंवेदनज्ञानवादिनां सांख्यानां ज्ञानान्तरप्रत्यक्षज्ञानवादिनां योगानां च मतमपाकर्तुं स्वपदोपादानम् ।" Prameyaratnamälä.

2 This is shortly expressed by Prabhāchandra as follows :

"हितं सुखं तत् साधनं च, तद्विपरीतं अहितं, तयोः प्राप्तिपरिहारौ । प्राप्तिः खलू-घादेयभूतार्थकियाप्रसाधकार्थप्रदर्शकत्वम् । अर्थकियार्थी हि पुरुषः तन्निष्पादनसमर्थं

## Parikṣāmukham

The acquirement of desired objects depends on the activities (Pravritti) and not on Pramāņa. One first desires to have an object and then performs activities. It cannot be said that without the activity to acquire the object, Pramāņa points out objects because this view is contrary to our every day experience. It is known to every body that even such prominent objects like the sun and the moon are not seen by men when they do not direct their activities to the same<sup>1</sup>. Where the sun and the moon are not causes of activities (Pravritti), there is no showing (Pradarśakattva) and hence there is no Pratyakşa. The function of Pramāņa is not to give objects (Prāpaka) but to show them (Pradarśaka).

By this aphorism the view that Pramāņa can be anything which is not knowledge like connection of the senses with external objects (which is technically called Sannikarsa) is refuted<sup>2</sup>. Chandraprabha Sūri in his Nyāyāvatāra-vivriti has mentioned that as the Jains accept that knowledge illumines itself as well as the object, they refute the views of Yogāchāra Buddhists who hold that knowledge only illumines itself and the views of Mimāņsakas, Naiyāyikas etc., who maintain that knowledge illumines the external object alone, as it cannot illumine itself<sup>3</sup>.

प्राप्तुकामस्तत्प्रदर्शकमेव प्रमाणमन्वेषत इत्यस्य प्रदर्शकत्वमेव प्रापकत्वम् । न हि तेन प्रदर्शितेऽर्थे प्राप्त्यभावः'' Prameyakamala-mārtanda

1 "प्रष्टत्तिमूला तूपादेयार्थप्राप्तिर्न प्रमाणाधीना तस्याः पुरुषेच्छाधीन प्रष्टत्ति-प्रभवत्वात् । न च प्रष्टत्यभावे प्रमाणस्यार्थप्रदर्शकत्वलक्षणव्यापाराभावो वाच्यः प्रतीतिविरोधात् । न खलु चन्द्राकीदिविषयं प्रत्यक्षमप्रवर्त्तकत्वात् न तत् प्रदर्शकमिति लोके प्रतीतिः ।" Prameyakamala-mārtaņda.

2 "यस्माद्धिताहितप्राप्तिपरिहारसमर्थं प्रमाणं, ततस्तत् प्रमाणत्वेनाभ्युपगतं वस्तु झानमेव भवितुमर्हति । नाज्ञानरूपं सन्निकर्षादि ।" Prameyaratnamala.

3 "ये स्वाभास्येव झानं मन्यन्ते ते ज्ञानवादिनो वौद्धविशेषाः, ये च परा-भास्येव मीमांसकनैयायिकादयः, ते निरस्तास्ते हि वहिरर्थाभावात् ज्ञानं स्वांशपर्यवसित-सत्ताकम् इत्याचश्चीरन् । तद्युक्तम् । ह्येयार्थाभावे ज्ञानाभावप्रसङ्घात् ।...पराभास्यपि This is laid down in "An Epitome of Jainism" as follows :

"The question, therefore, to begin with is, what is Pramāņa from our point of view ? Pramāņa, we define, is the valid knowledge which reveals itself as well as its knowable. It is worthy of note that by this we, first, put aside the Buddhist view that there being nothing external, knowledge only reveals itself and secondly, we contradict as well the Naiyāyika and the Mimāmsaka schools of thought who teach that knowledge does not reveal itself but reveals external relations. We hold however, that just as colour reveals itself as well as the object to which it belongs, so knowledge revealing itself reveals the knowable as well."<sup>4</sup>

# तन्निश्चयात्मकं समारोपविरुद्धत्वादनुमानवत् ॥ ३ ॥

3. Tanniśchayātmakam samāropaviruddhatvādanumānavat.

3. That (viz. Pramāņa) being opposed to Samāropa (viz. fallacies) consists of definiteness like Anumāna (inference).

### Commentary

Pramāņa must be free from Samāropa ( fallacies ) which is of three kinds Samšaya, Anadhyavasāya and Viparyaya<sup>2</sup>. Samśaya arises when there is a doubt about an object i.e. when our mind sways between this or that, without being able to assert the true nature of a thing<sup>3</sup>. For example, when a person sees some-स्वप्रकाशाभावात् अभिदधीरन् तदण्यसम्बद्धम् । स्वप्रकाशाभावे परप्रकाशायोगात् । न हि प्रदीपः स्वरुषमनुद्योतयन् घटाद्युयोतने व्याप्रियते ।" Nyāyāvatāra-vivriti

- 1 An Epitome of Jainism by Nahar & Ghosh. P. 70.
- 2 "अतस्मिंस्तद्ध्यवसायः समारोपः।" Pramāņa-nayatattvālokālankāra. I. 7

"स विपर्ययसंशयानध्यवसायभेदात् त्रेधा ।" Pramāņa-nayatattvālokālankāra. I. 8.

3 "अनुभयत्रोभयकोटिसंस्पशी<sup>®</sup> प्रत्ययः संशयः।"

Pramāņa-mimāmsā I. I. 5.

"साधकवाधकप्रमाणामावादनवस्थिताऽनेककोटिसंस्पर्शि ज्ञानं संशयः ।" Pramāņa-naya-tattyālokālankāra. I, 11,

 $\mathbf{32}$ 

. ·

### Parîksāmukham

thing at a distance in the darkness, a doubt arises in his mind whether it is a man or a post<sup>4</sup>. The knowledge in this case touches two ideas without being able to fix it to a particular right knowledge of the object seen. It must be understood that when a thing is capable of two conceptions, there is no Doubt, though there are two ideas in the same object. For example in the Saptabhangi Naya in Jain philosophy a pitcher is in one sense, said to exist while in another, it is said not to exist<sup>2</sup>. When the details of the head, hands etc. of a man or the branches, hollow etc. of a tree are not perceived being at a distance and in the darkness, we have knowledge of only something high. In this case a doubt arises whether it is a tree or a man<sup>3</sup>.

When we have a knowledge that this is something without any clear idea what it is, we have Anadhyavasāya which is also known as Vibhramá (Indefiniteness). If a man touches something when he walks but does not understand what it is, his knowledge is Anadhyavasāya. He is conscious that he has touched something but is unable to say what its real nature is<sup>4</sup>.

1 "यथाऽयं स्थाणुर्वा पुरुषो वा।" Pramāņanayatattvālokālankāra I. 12. "यथान्धकारे दूरादृद्धीकारवस्तूपल्लम्भात् साधकवाधकप्रमाणाभावे सति स्थाणुर्वा पुरुषो वेति प्रत्ययः।" Pramāņa-mimāmsā. Bhāsya to Aphorism I. 1. 5.

2 To emphasize this, Hemachandra has used the word "Anubhayatra" in the definition of Samsaya quoted above e.g. "अनुभयत्र-प्रहणसुभयरुपे वस्तुन्युभयकोटिसंस्पर्शोऽपि संशयत्वनिराकरणार्थ, यथाऽस्ति च नास्ति च घट: नित्यश्चानित्यश्चात्मेत्यादि ।" ( Pramana-mimamsa. )

3 "चिरुद्धानेककोटिस्पर्धि ज्ञानं संशयः । यथाऽयं स्थाणुर्वा पुरुषो वेति । स्थाणुपुरुषसाधारणोर्द्धतादिदर्शनाद् तद्विशेषस्प वककोटर-शिरः-पाण्यादेः साधकप्रमाण-स्याभावादनेककोट्यवलंवित्वं ज्ञानस्य ।" Nyāya-dīpikā.

4 "किमित्यालोचनमात्रमनध्यवसायः । यथा गच्छतस्तृणस्पर्शज्ञानम् ।" Pramāņa naya-tattvālokālankāra. I. 13. 14.

P-5

### The Sacred Books of the Jainas

The knowledge of an object as quite the contrary to its real self is known as Viparyaya or Vimoha. When we think nacre to be silver or a rope to be a snake, we have a knowledge vitiated by Viparyaya or Vimoha (Perversity<sup>1</sup>). Such is also the case when a person attacked by a particular disease tastes a sweet thing as bitter, or sees two moons by a defect in vision or thinks trees to be moving while travelling in a boat or a railway carriage or sees a circle of fire when a burning brand is spun round<sup>2</sup>.

Pramāņa is free from these three kinds of fallacies. These

## "किमित्यालोचनमात्रमनध्यवसायः । यथा पथि गच्छतस्तूणस्पर्शादिज्ञानम्"

Nyāya-dipikā. Dharmabhūṣana lays down that Anadhyavasāya does not touch different ideas, so it is not Samśaya. It is also not Viparyaya as it does not comprehend the reality of the opposite idea :

## "इदं हि नानाकोट्यवलंबनाभावादू न संज्ञयः ।

विपरीत्तेककोटि-निश्चयाभावान्न विपर्ययः ।" Nyāya-dipikā. "विशेषानुल्लेल्यमनध्यवसायः ।" Pramāņa-mīmāṃsā I. 1. 7.

"दूरान्धकारादिवशादसाधारणधर्मावमर्शरहितः प्रत्ययोऽनिश्चयात्मकत्वादनध्य-वसायः यथा किमेतदिति ।" Bhasya on Ibid.

1 "विपरीसैककोटिनिष्टंकनं विपर्ययः। यथा शुक्तिकायामिदं रजतमिति।" Pramāņanayatattyālokālankāra. 1. 9. 10.

"अतस्मिंस्तदेवेति विपर्ययः ।" Pramāņa-mimāmsā I. 1. 7.

''विपरीतकोटिनिश्चयो विपर्ययः। यथा शुक्तिकायामिदं रजतमिति ज्ञानम्। अश्रापि साहृश्यादिनिमित्तवज्ञात् शुक्तिविपरीते रजते निश्चयः।'' Nyāya-dīpikā.

2 ''यथा धातुनैपम्यान्मधुरादि-द्रव्येषु तिकादिप्रत्ययः, तिमिरादिदोषादे-कस्मिम्नपि चन्द्रे द्विचन्द्रादिप्रत्ययः, नौयानादगच्छत्स्वपि वृक्षेषु गच्छत्-प्रत्ययः आशुश्रमणादलातादावचकेऽपि चक्र्यात्ययः ।'' Bhāşya to Aphorism 1.1.7 in Pramāņa-mimāmsā. are termed Pramāņābhāsas by Māņikyanandi and are mentioned in the sixth chapter of Parikṣāmukham<sup>1</sup>.

According to the Jain doctrine, liberation is attained by a soul possessed of certain characteristics, viz. right faith, right knowledge and right conduct. Right faith or Samyaktva is a sincere belief in the seven Tattvas (essential principles) of Jainism viz. Jiva, Ajiva, Asrava, Bandha, Samvara, Nirjarā and Moksa. It is only after a person has right faith that he can attain right knowledge. Right knowledge or Samyak Jñāna is the detailed cognition of the ego and non-ego and is free from the fallacies Samsaya, Anadhyavasāya and Viparyaya as described above<sup>2</sup>. A person may have a knowledge of the aforesaid seven principles of Jainism but that knowledge may be vague or indefinite or it may be full of doubts or it may be entirely wrong. When indecision, doubts or belief in opposite principles disappear from removal of fallacies, a person attains perfect knowledge. The understanding of Pramāņas is therefore not useless even to a person who has given up worldly pursuits and is bent upon obtaining liberation.

Anantavirya says that the Buddhists might say that they agree to the view that Pramāņa is knowledge as mentioned in the second aphorism but they do not agree that all Pramāņas consist of definite knowledge. According to them it is only in case of one variety of Pramāņa viz. inference that correctness can be asserted. In other cases for example in Nirvikalpaka Pratyakṣa as understood by the Buddhists, definiteness is not essentially found. In opposition to this view this aphorism has been laid down in which

1 "अस्वसंबिदितगृहीतार्थंदर्शनसंशयादयः प्रमाणाभासाः।" Pariksāmukham VI. 2.

2 "संसयविमोइवित्र्भमविवज्जियं अप्पपरसहवस्स । गहणं सम्मं णाणं साथारमणेयमेयं च ।।"

Dravya-samgraha. Verse. 42.

it has been mentioned that not only in Anumāna but in all kinds of Pramāņa, there is definite knowledge<sup>1</sup>.

# अनिश्चितोऽपूर्वार्थः ॥ ४ ॥

4. Anischitohpūrvārthah.

4. Apūrvārtha is that which has not been ascertained.

#### Commentary

In the definition of Pramāņa as laid down in the first aphonism, the word Apūrvārtha has been used. This word is explained in this aphorism. Apūrvārtha is that which has not previously been ascertained by any Pramāņa by making it free from fallacies like Doubt, Indefiniteness or Perversity<sup>2</sup>.

We have previously mentioned that there are four stages of knowledge. First, we have a general knowledge of a thing brought into contact with a sense organ (Avagraha). Then we have a desire to know the particulars (Ihā). A doubt may be started by saying that as Avagraha precedes Iha, the knowledge in the second stage viz. Ihā cannot be said to be a knowledge of a thing not ascertained before as in the first stage (Avagraha) it has already been ascertained. The reply to this is that as details are not ascertained by Avagraha but only by Ihā it cannot be said that ascertainment of the object takes place during the first stage viz. Avagraha<sup>3</sup>. The ascertainment consists of a perfect and correct idea of the thing.

1 "अत्राह सौगतः, भवतु नाम सन्निकर्धादिव्यवच्छेदेन ज्ञानस्यैव प्रामाण्यं, न तदस्माभिर्निषिध्यते । तत्तु व्यवसायात्मकमेवेत्यत्र न युक्तिमुत्पत्त्यामः । अनुमान-स्येव व्यवसायात्मनः प्रामाण्याभ्युपगमात् । प्रत्यक्षस्य तु निर्विकल्पकत्वेऽप्यवि-संवादकत्वेन प्रामाण्योपपत्तेरिति तत्राह ।" Prameyaratnamālā.

2 "यः प्रमाणान्तरेण संशयादिव्यवच्छेदेनानध्यवसितः सोऽपूर्वार्थः ।" Prameyaratnamālā.

5 "तेनेहादिज्ञानविषयस्यावमहादिगृहीतत्वेऽपि न पूर्वार्थत्वम् । अवमहादिने-. द्वादिविषयंभूतावान्तरविशेषनिश्चयाभावात् ।" Prameyaratnamālā.

# दष्टोऽपि समारोपात्ताहक् ॥ ५ ॥

5. Dristohpi samāropāttādrik.

5. Even an ascertained thing becomes so (i.e., unascertained) through Samāropa (fallacies).

### Commentary

It is urged in this aphorism that by Apūrvārtha, we not only mean a thing not ascertained before but also a thing previously ascertained but which has subsequently become involved in fallacies<sup>4</sup>. In the latter class, we do away with the fallacies and ascertain the thing again correctly. This subsequent ascertainment is also said to be of a thing not ascertained before as in the interval there were fallacies destroying the true idea of the object.

Dharmabhūṣaṇa has quoted this aphorism in Nyāya-dipikā saying that after we see a pitcher, we may see other things and then again see the pitcher and the question may arise whether the subsequent knowledge of the pitcher is Pramāṇa as it had been already ascertained before. The answer to this question is that in this case the pitcher is to be taken as unascertained because there may be fallacies in the interval<sup>2</sup>.

This however can be explained in another way following the argument in the case of Dhārāvāhika Jňāna. Though a section of Jain writers exclude Dhārāvāhika Jňāna from Pramāņa, we have shown how it can be fitted to the definition of Pramāņa. Similarly when we have knowledge of a pitcher followed by knowledge of other things and then again we have knowledge of the pitcher it

 "अथोक्तप्रकार एवापूर्वार्थः किमन्योऽप्यस्तीत्याह हष्टोऽपि गृहीतोऽपि न केवलमनिश्चित एवेत्यपिशब्दार्थः । ताद्यगपूर्वार्थो भवति । समारोपादिति हेतुः ।" Prameyaratnamala.

2. नतु घटे दृष्ट पुनरन्यव्यासंगे परचाद् घट एव दृष्टे परचात्तमं झानमप्रमाणं प्राप्नोति…इति चेत्, न। दृष्टस्यापि मध्ये समारोपे सत्यदृष्ठत्वात्। तदुर्क्त 'दृष्टोऽपि समारोपात्तादृक्' इति।'' Nyāya-dīpikā.

### The Sacred Books of the Jainas

may be said that different knowledges of the pitcher on the two occasions are different ascertainments characterised by different time, place, etc. So the second ascertainment can be Pramāņa as well as the first.

The view is therefore clear that not only an object never ascertained before can be Pramāņa but the same object after previous ascertainment can again be Pramāņa for fallacies may vitiate the first ascertainment making it necessary for another ascertainment of the true characteristics of the object. In our everyday life we may see an object previously perceived but be unable to find out its real nature owing to its being covered by dirt etc., when we see it for the second time. But if this dirt be removed we get a real knowledge of it. So a Pramāņa also may be vitiated by fallacies and again become Pramāņa when the fallacies are removed<sup>1</sup>.

# स्वोन्मुखतया प्रतिभासनं स्वस्य व्यवसायः ॥ ६ ॥

6. Svonmukhatayā pratibhāsanam svasya vyavasāyah.

6. The ascertainment of self is the illumination of it towards itself.

#### Commentary

This aphorism explains the words "Sva... vyavasāya" used in the definition of Pramāņa in the first aphorism.

When the knowledge becomes its own object, it illumines itself and we say that in Pramāņa there is ascertainment of itself ( as well as of the object )<sup>2</sup>.

This is further explained in the next aphorism.

1. "एतदुक्तं भवति, गृहीतमपि ध्यामल्तिताकारतया यन्निर्णेतुं न शक्यते तदपि वस्त्वपूर्वमिति व्यपदिश्यते प्रवृत्तसमारोपाव्यवच्छेदात् ।" Prameyaratnamālā.

2. The word स्वोन्मुखतया is explained as स्वविषयकत्वम् i.e. becoming its own object of ascertainment or in other words, स्वतः प्रकाशनं ज्ञानं i.e. the knowledge illumines itself. (Arthaprakāsikā )

# अर्थस्येव तदुन्मुखतया ॥ ७ ॥

7. Arthasyeva tadunmukhatayā.

7. It becomes its own object, like other objects.

### Commentary

This aphorism gives an example explaining the preceding aphorism. As the ascertainment of external objects results from directing attention towards them, so the knowledge itself is ascertained by it. In every knowledge there is a subject and an object and in valid knowledge the object as well as the knowledge itself is ascertained. A concrete example is given in the next aphorism to elucidate this.

## धटमहमात्मना वेद्मि ॥ ८ ॥

8. Ghatamahamātmanā vedmi.

8. I know the pitcher through myself.

#### Commentary

Here "I" is the subject (Pramātā ) and "the pitcher" is the object (Prameya), "knowing" is the action (Pramiti ) and "through myself" is the instrumental cause of this knowledge (Pramāņa ). Thus in such a knowledge we have an understanding of a subject, an object, an instrumental cause and a verb signifying action. This is mentioned in the next aphorism.

Aphorisms 6, 7, 8 arc embodied in a different language in a single Sūtra in Pramāņanayatattvālokālankāra. Instead of a pitcher, the example given there is that of a baby elephant<sup>1</sup>.

# कर्मवत्कर्त्तू करणकियाप्रतीतेः ॥ ९ ॥

9. Karmavatkartrikaraņakriyāpratiteķ.

1. "स्वस्य व्यवसाथः स्वाभिमुख्येन प्रकाशनं वाक्यस्येव तदामिमुख्येन करि-कल्लभकमहमात्मना जानामि।" Pramāņanayatattvālokālankāra, I. 17.

### The Sacred Books of the Jainas

9. Because (in our knowledge) we have an understanding of the subject, an instrumental cause and the verb, in the same manner as the object.

#### Commentary

Anantavirya says that this aphorism denies the views of those who maintain that knowledge ascertains only the object but not itself, others who hold that knowledge ascertains either itself or an object, others again who lay down that in knowledge there is understanding of only the subject and the object and of others who say that in knowledge there is understanding of subject, object and a verb<sup>1</sup>. By this aphorism it is laid down that according to the Jain view, in knowledge there is understanding of four things, a subject, an object, a verb and an instrumental cause. The thing which is known is the object. The subject is the self. Pramāņa is the instrumental cause and Pramiti is the verb.

In Arthaprakāsikā, it is mentioned that this is in contradistinction with the view of Naiyāyikas who hold that in Pratyakṣa Pramāṇa only the object (Prameya) is understood e.g. that this is a pitcher and that the knowledge does not know itself or the subject (Pramātā) or the result (Pramiti). It is urged that this is also in opposition to the view of Mimāṃsakas following Prabhākara who say that objects like pitchers and the self are ascertained by Pratyakṣa Pramāṇa and who deny that Pramiti or the instrumental cause is ascertained by such Pramāṇa. Further it is mentioned that this refutes the view of the followers of Jaimini who admit the understanding of Pramāṇa, Prameya and Pramiti in Pratyakṣa Pramāṇa but deny the instrumental cause<sup>2</sup>.

 "ननु ज्ञानमर्थमेवाध्यवस्यति न स्वात्मानम् । आत्मानं फलं वेति केचित् । कर्त्तृ कर्मणोरेव प्रतीतिरित्यपरे । कर्त्तु कर्मक्रियाणामेव प्रतीतिरित्यन्ये । तेषां मत-मखिलमपि प्रतीतिवाधितमिति दुर्शयत्राह ।" Prameyaratnamala.

2. "अत्रार्हु नैयायिकादयः अज्ञानं प्रमेयमेव प्रत्यक्षीकरोति । अयं घट इत्याकारेण ज्ञानेन प्रमेयरूपघटादेरेव प्रत्यक्षीकरणात् । अतः ताद्दराज्ञानं न स्वस्वरूपं, नाप्यात्मानं प्रमातारं, नापि प्रमितिरूपं फलं वा प्रत्यक्षीकरोति ।

# शब्दानुचारणेऽपि स्वस्यानुभवनमर्थवत् ॥ १० ॥

10. Śabdānuchchāraņehpi svasyānubhavanamarthavat.

10. Just as in the case of objects, there is understanding of itself ( the knowledge ) without utterance of the word ( signifying it ).

### Commentary

It is our everyday knowledge that though the word "pitcher" is not uttered, we can have experience of a pitcher. So we can have experience of the knowledge itself though no word signifying knowledge is uttered. This is urged to meet the view of those who say that there can be no experience without the help of words. It cannot be urged that as there is no use of the word 'knowledge' in an experience of an object, the knowledge cannot become its own object; for we see that even when the word 'pitcher' is not uttered we can have experience of a pitcher.

# को वा तत्वतिभासिनमर्थमध्यक्षमिच्छंस्तदेव तथा नेच्छेत् ॥११॥

11. Ko vā tatpratibhāsinamarthamadhyakṣamichchhamstadeva tathā nechchhet.

11. Who does not accept it (i.e. knowledge) to be of that manner (i.e. being the subject-matter of experience) when one admits that in Pratyaksa the object is illumined by knowledge?

# प्रदीपवत् ॥ १२ ॥

12. Pradipavat.

12. Like a lamp.

भाद्रास्तु प्रमाणप्रमेययोरेव प्रत्यक्षतः प्रतिपत्तिः । प्रत्यक्षेण प्रमेयस्य घटादेः प्रमातुश्च आत्मनः प्रत्यक्षीकरणात् । न तु प्रमितिकरणज्ञानयोरपि प्रत्यक्षतः प्रति-पत्तिः सम्भवतीति वदन्ति ।

प्रमाणप्रमेयस्मितीनामेव प्रत्यक्षतः प्रतिपत्तिः, न तु प्रमितिकरणज्ञानस्येति जैमिनीयाः ।

तेषां सेवेंधामपि मत्तमनुभवपराहतमिति दर्शयन्नाह ।" Arthaprakāsikā. P-6

### Commentary

Just as a lamp illumines itself as well as objects like a jar etc., so knowledge illumines itself as well as objects known. There cannot be any one who would accept objects as knowable by knowledge but deny that knowledge itself can be known.

In Pramāņanayatattvālokālankāra, aphorisms 11 and 12 of Parīkṣāmukham are written in a slightly different language<sup>1</sup>. The example there given is that of the sun instead of a lamp.

The fact that knowledge illumines itself is accepted by later Jain writers like Hemachandra though in the definition of Pramana accepted by them they exclude this. Hemachandra mentions that older writers have laid down that as objects are ascertained by knowledge, so the knowledge itself becomes its own object. Hemachandra quotes two definitions of older writers : one is of Siddhasena in Nyāyāvatāra in which it is laid down that Pramāna illumines itself as well as other objects and the other is of Manikyanandi in Pariksämukham as we have already discussed<sup>2</sup>. Hemachandra admits following the example as given by Mānikyanandi 'I know a pitcher', that the knowledge illumines itself in such a case like the subject and object<sup>3</sup>. He also mentions that as an object reveals itself, so the knowledge reveals itself and consequently a knowledge can know itself<sup>4</sup>. It is also stated by him that like a lamp, knowledge reveals an object capable of revealing itself as knowledge has the power of illumination<sup>5</sup>. It cannot be urged that

1. "कः खलु झानस्यालंवनं वाह्यं प्रतिभातमभिमन्यमानस्तद्पि तत्प्रकारं नाभिमन्येत मिहिरालोकवत् ।" Pramānanayatattyālokālankāra, I. 18.

2. "नन्वर्धनिर्णयवत् स्वनिर्णयोऽपि वृद्धेः प्रमाणलक्षणत्वेनोक्तः 'प्रमाणं स्वपराभासि' इति, 'स्वार्थव्यवसायात्मकं प्रमाणम्' इति च" Pramanamimamsä. Bhasya to 1. 1. 2.

3. "धटमहं जानामीत्यार्गे कर्चु कर्मवज् इप्तेरप्यवभासमानत्वात्" Ibid.

4. "अर्थोन्सुखतयेव स्वोन्सुखतयापि ज्ञानस्य प्रतिभासात् स्वनिर्णयात्मकत्व-मण्यस्ति ।" Ibid.

5. "तथाहि झानं प्रकाशमानमेवार्थं प्रकाशयति प्रदीपवत् ।" Ibid.

## Pariksāmukham

as illumination is the very essence of knowledge, it cannot be the illuminator for its illuminating characteristic is established by the destruction of wrong knowledge<sup>1</sup>. But admitting all these Hemachandra propounds the following aphorism "The ascertainment of itself though it happens, is not the definition ( of Pramāņa) as this happens also in fallacies ( which are not Pramāņas)"<sup>2</sup>.

Hemachandra himself in his own Bhāṣya to this aphorism writes that the views of others who lay down that knowledge illumines itself is approved by me. But in laying down a definition that quality only which distinguishes the object defined should be mentioned and not all the qualities which exist in a thing. In other words, a definition is not a description. Hemachandra adds that there is no knowledge whether right or wrong which does not illumine itself. So even in doubt etc., the knowledge illumines itself but this kind of knowledge being false is excluded from Pramāņas. For this reason, Hemachandra says that he has excluded self-illumination as a characteristic of Pramāņa in his definition<sup>3</sup>.

But he supports the older writers by saying that they have not committed any fault by using this characteristic in the definition of Pramāņa as they have done so for examination of the characteristics of Pramāņa<sup>4</sup>.

।. "संवेदनस्य प्रकाशत्वात् प्रकाशकत्वमसिद्धमिति चेत्, न, अझान-निरासादिद्वारेण प्रकाशकत्वोपपत्तेः।" Ibid

2. "स्वनिर्णयः सन्नध्यत्व्क्षणमप्रमाणेऽपि भावात् ॥"

Pramāņamimāmsā. 1. 1. 3.

3. "सन्नपि परोक्तमनुमोदते अयमथों, नद्दि अस्तीत्येव सर्व रुश्रणं वाच्यं किन्तु यो धर्मो विपक्षाद् व्यावर्त्तते, स्वनिर्णयस्त्वप्रमाणेऽपि संशयादौ वर्त्तते, नद्दि काचित् ज्ञानमात्रा सास्ति या न स्वसंविदिता नाम ततो न स्वनिर्णयो रुश्रणयुक्तोऽ-स्माभिः ।" Bhāsya to Aphorism I 1. 3. in Pramaņa-mimāmsā.

4. "वृद्धेस्तु परीक्षार्थमुपक्षिप्त इत्यदोषः ।" Ibid.

## तत्मामाण्यं स्वतः परतश्च ॥१३॥

13. Tatprāmāņyam svatah paratascha.

13. The validity of Pramāņa rises from itself or through another (Pramāņa).

#### Commentary

In this aphorism, the point how a Pramāņa establishes its validity, is discussed. In the Nyāya philosophy as propounded by Gautama, it has been laid down that the validity of Pramāņa arises through other help. Vātsyāyana the writer of the Bhāşya of Nyāya-sūtras of Gautama says that through inference, the validity of a Pramāņa is established. We know that Pramāņa is not the opposite of a correct understanding by the help of inference. So we must say in such a case that the validity of Pramāņa is established through another viz. inference.

An example will make this clear. A thirsty man seeks water. That which causes a knowledge of water in a mirage is not Pramāņa, for in a mirage the thirst of that man cannot be mitigated. Such a knowledge is a fallacy. Conformity with the object presented is known as the validity of Pramāņa, and nonconformity with the object presented is the opposite of Pramāņa<sup>1</sup>.

A criticism may be made of the view that if by inference, the validity of a Pramāņa is established, we may ask : if an inference which is itself a Pramāņa confirms another Pramāņa to establish its validity, how will this inference be validated ? If we say, that another inference will validate this, the result would be an endless chain of inferences. So we must accept that in some cases Pramāņa validates itself and in other cases, its validity is established by inference. Jain writers accordingly hold that validity of Pramāņa

## 1. "किमिदं प्रमाणस्य प्रामाण्यं नाम ? प्रतिभातविषयाव्यभिचारित्वम् ।" Nyāyadīpikā.

# "ज्ञानस्य प्रमेयाव्यभिचारित्वं प्रामाण्यम् । तदितरत्त्वप्रामाण्यम् ।" Pramānanayatattyālokālankāra, I. 19. 20.

Pariksāmukham

arises either from itself or through another Pramāņa (like inference).

It may be asked, in what case does the validity of a Pramāņa arises of itself and in what case through another Pramāņa ? The answer is that in the case of objects with which we are already familiar, the Pramāņa rises of itself. For example, when we look at our palm and have a knowledge of the same, no inference is necessary to establish its validity. Similarly when we see a pond previously seen many times in our own village, the validity does not require the help of inference but arises of itself. This is shown by the fact that immediately afterwards we go to it to wash ourselves or drink water. But when we see a reservoir of water not seen before at any time, we may have a doubt at first whether this is really water or a mirage. Then we use our inference and say that as we are having a smell of lotuses, feeling cool wind etc., it must be water and no mirage and so our former knowledge of water is Pramāņa and not a fallacy<sup>1</sup>.

Hemachandra also mentions that we become certain of the validity of a Pramāna either by itself or through the help of others<sup>2</sup>. When we look at our palm of hand which is familiar to us, we have no wish to examine whether this knowledge is valid or not, for we have not the slightest doubt regarding it. Similarly

 'तत्र तावदभ्यस्तविषये जल्लमिदमिति ज्ञाने जाते ज्ञानस्वरूपज्ञप्तिसमय एव तद्गतं प्रामाण्यमपि ज्ञायत एव। अन्यथोत्तरक्षण एव निःश्शंकप्रवृत्तेर-योगात्। अस्ति हि जल्ल्ज्ञानोत्तरक्षण एव निःश्शंका प्रवृत्तिः। अनभ्यस्ते तु विषये जल्ल्ज्ञाने जाते जल्ल्ज्ञानं मम जातमिति ज्ञानस्वरूपनिर्णयेऽपि प्रामाण्य-निर्णयोऽन्यत एव। अन्यथोत्तरकाले संदेहानुपपत्तेः। अस्ति हि संदेहो जल-ज्ञानं मम जातं, तत् किं जल्म्मुत मरीचिकेति ? ततः कमल्परिमल्शिशिरमंदमस्त्-प्रचारप्रभृतिभिरवधारयति। प्रमाणं प्राक्तनं जल्ज्ज्ञानं, कमल्परिमल्श्यिन्यथानुपपत्तेः।'' Nyāyadipikā.

2. "प्रामाण्यनिश्चयः स्वतः परतो वा।" Pramāņa-mimāņsā, I. I. 8.

when we are afflicted by thirst and want to drink water, or when we want to bathe or to assuage the heat of our body and see a tank already familiar to us, we at once proceed to it without stopping to examine, whether the knowledge is valid or not. But in other cases regarding objects with which we are not already familiar, we take the help of inference etc., to establish the validity of the knowledge<sup>1</sup>.

Vidyānanda has affirmed this by saying "Pramāņa establishes itself regarding objects with which we are already familiar and takes the help of other in other cases".<sup>2</sup>

In Pramāņanayatattvālokālankāra, it is mentioned that Prāmāņya and Aprāmāņya (validity and its opposite) arise through others, but regarding their knowledge, they arise by themselves or through others.<sup>3</sup> In Prameyaratnamālā also we find that Prāmāņya arises by itself.<sup>4</sup>

In Arthaprakāśikā it is mentioned that in this aphorism the words "utpattau" ("when it arises") and "svakārye" ("in its working") may be taken as understood. The meaning would then be that when Prāmāņya arises it takes help of others but regard-

1. "प्रामाण्यनिश्चयः कचित् स्वतो यथाऽभ्यासदशापन्ने स्वकरतलादिज्ञाने स्नानपानावगाहनोदन्योपशमादावर्थकियानिर्भासे वा प्रत्यक्षज्ञाने, नहि तत्र परीक्षा-कांक्षाऽस्ति प्रेक्षावताम्, तथाहि जळज्ञानं ततो दाहपिपासात्त्तस्य तत्र प्रवृत्तिस्ततस्तत्मप्राप्तिः ततः स्नानपानादीनि ततो दाहोदन्योपशम इत्येतावतैव भवति कृती प्रमाता न पुन-दहिोदन्योपशमज्ञानमपि परीक्षते इत्यस्य स्वतः प्रामाण्यम् ।....कचिन् परतः प्रामाण्य निश्चयो यथाऽनभ्यासदशापन्ने प्रत्यक्षे ।" Bhāsya to Pramāņa-mimāņsā I. 1.8.

2. "प्रामाण्यं तु स्वतः सिद्धमभ्यासात् परतोऽन्यथा ॥"

Pramäņa-pariksā.

"तदुभयमुत्पत्तौ परत एव इप्तौ तु स्वतः परतश्च।"

Pramāņa-nayatattvālokālankāra I. 11.

4. "अथवा प्रामाण्यमुत्पत्तौ परत एव ।" Prameyaratnamālā.

### Parikṣāmukham

ing its work viz. determination of objects, it takes its own help in the case of familiar objects and help of others in other cases.<sup>1</sup>

Here ends the first chapter of Parikṣāmukham. We have seen that in the first aphorism of this chapter, the definition of Pramāņa has been given. In the aphorisms which follow this definition is explained. For example in the second aphorism it is laid down that Pramāṇa cannot be anything else than knowledge as indicated in the definition. The words "sva-vyavasāya" in the definition is explained in aphorisms 6 and 7 and a concrete example is given in aphorism 8. The word "Apūrvārtha" is explained in aphorism 4. Thus defining Pramāṇa and explaining the general characteristics of Pramāṇa in the first chapter the author will proceed in the next chapter to mention the different varieties of Pramāṇa viz. Pratyakṣa and Parokṣa. Pratyakṣa Pramāṇa will be discussed in detail in the second chapter and Parokṣa Pramāṇa will be examined in the third chapter.

### End of Chapter I.

 "अथवा उत्पत्तौ स्वकार्यं च इति पदद्वयमपि अस्मिन् सूत्रे अध्याहर्त्तव्यं । तथाच अयमर्थः । प्रामाण्यमुत्पत्तौ परत एव ।...विषयपरिच्छित्यादिरुक्षणस्वकार्ये प्रामाण्यमभ्यासदशायां स्वतो गृह्यते । अनभ्यासदशायां परतो गृह्यत इति ।" Arthaprakāśikā

# द्वितीयः समुद्देशः

## SAMUDDEŚA II

# तद्वेधा॥ १॥

1. Taddvedhā.

1. This ( Pramāņa ) is of two kinds.

### Commentary

Jain Logic accepts only two kinds of Pramāņas, Pratyaksa This distinguishes the Jain view from the views of and Paroksa. Hindu and Buddhist philosophers. According to the Chārvāka school of philosophy there is only one Pramana named Pratyaksa. Buddhist philosophy admits two varieties of Pramāna viz. Pratvaksa and Anumana. In Vaisesika philosophy also Pratyaksa and Anumana are the only Pramanas which are recognised, for according to this system of philosophy Sabda etc. ( which are recognised by some as Pramānas) are included within Anumāna. In Sāmkhya and Yoga philosophies, three kinds of Pramāņas viz. Pratyaksa, Anumāna and Āgama (Śabda) are accepted. In Nyāya philosophy four kinds of Pramāņas, Pratyakṣa, Anumāna, Upamāna and Śabda are recognised. The Mimāmsā school of philosophy as propounded by Prabhākara and his followers recognise five Pramāņas, Pratyakṣa, Anumāna, Upamāna, Śabda and Arthāpatti. The Bhatta school of Mīmāmsā philosophy recognises one more Pramāņa viz. Abhāva in addition to the five Pramāņas accepted by Prabhākara. The Vedānta view as discussed in the Vedānta-paribhāsā is that there are six kinds of Pramāņas viz. Pratvaksa, Anumāna, Upamāna, Śabda, Arthāpatti and Anupalabdhi.

Hemachandra in his Pramāņamīmāņsā laying down that "Pramāna is of two varieties<sup>1</sup> mentions in his Bhāşya that this refutes the views of Chārvāka, Vaišeşika, Sāņkhya, Nyāya,

I. "प्रमाणं दिधा।" Pramāņa-mimāmsā, I. I. 9.

Prābhākara and Bhāṭṭa (the two schools of Mimāmsā) philosophy.<sup>1</sup>

In Pramāņanayatattvālokālankāra we have "Pramāņa is of two kinds—Pratyakṣa and Parokṣa"<sup>2</sup>. Dharmabhūṣaṇa also lays down the same<sup>3</sup>.

# प्रत्यक्षेतरभेदात् ॥ २ ॥

2. Pratyakşetarabhedāt.

2. As it is of two varieties, Pratyaksa and another (viz. Paroksa).

### Commentary

This is connected with the previous aphorism which lays down that Pramāņa is of two kinds and this aphorism mentions the two kinds of Pramāņas. In Pramāņanayatattvālokālankāra as we have already quoted these two aphorisms have been put down in a single aphorism. Hemachandra follows Māņikyanandi and after mentioning that Pramāņa is of two kinds<sup>4</sup> lays down in the next aphorism that the Pramāņas are Pratyakşa and Parokşa<sup>5</sup>. In Nyāyāvatāra we find "Pramāņa is divided as Pratyakşa and Parokşa as knowables are ascertained in two ways"<sup>6</sup>. Haribhadra Sūri lays down "According to the (Jain) view, Pratyakşa and

 "तेन प्रत्यक्षमेवैक प्रमाणमिति चार्वाकाः, प्रद्यक्षानुमानागमाः प्रमाणानीति वैशेषिकाः, तान्येवेति सांख्याः, सहोपमानेन चल्वारीति नैयायिकाः, सद्दार्थापत्त्या पश्चेति प्राभाकराः, सहाभावेन षडिति भाट्टा इति न्यूनाधिक प्रमाणवादिनः प्रतिक्षिप्ताः ।" Bhasya to Ibid.

2. "तद्ग्रिमेदं प्रत्यक्षं च परोक्षं च।" Pramāņanayatattvālokālankāra, II. I.

3. "प्रमाणं द्विविधं प्रत्यक्षं परोक्षं च ।" Nyāyadīpikā, Prakāśa II.

- 4. "प्रमाणं द्विधा।" Pramāņa-mimāmsā. I. I. 9
- 5. "प्रत्यक्षं च परोक्षं च।' Ibid I. I. I0
- 6. "प्रत्यक्षं च परोक्षं च द्विधा मेयविनिश्चयाद् ॥" Nyāyāvatāra I. P-7

Parokṣa are two kinds of Pramāṇas"<sup>1</sup>. In Tattvārtha Sūtra, Pramāṇas have been laid down in three aphorisms : "This knowledge consisting of Mati, Śruta, Avadhi, Manaḥparyaya and Kevala<sup>2</sup> consists of two Pramāṇas<sup>3</sup>. The first two are Parokṣa Pramāṇas<sup>4</sup>. The remaining ones are Pratyakṣa"<sup>5</sup>.

# विशदं प्रत्यक्षम् ॥ ३ ॥

3. Viśadam Pratyaksam.

50

3. (The knowledge) which is clear is Pratyaksa.

### Commentary

The word "Knowledge" (Jůānam) is to be understood in this aphorism<sup>6</sup>. Clearness is the characteristic of Pratyaksa Pramāņa. This clearness is expressed by the words Viśada, Spasta, Nirmala etc. in works on Jain Logic<sup>7</sup>. The idea may be thus explained by an example. We may have knowledge of fire directly or when we are told by a reliable person whom we believe "Here is fire" or when we see smoke and infer that there is fire. The second and third kind of knowledge is not direct and not therefore styled as clear. That there is difference between this direct and indirect knowledge is understood by every one. This direct knowledge is not dependent on Śabda or Anumāna. It

1. "प्रत्यक्षं च परोक्षं च हे प्रमाणे तथा मते ।" Saddarsanasamuchchaya. Sloka 55.

- 2. "मतिश्रुतावधिमनःपर्यंयकेवलानि ज्ञानम् ।" Tattvärtha Sätra. I. 9.
- 3. "तत् प्रमाणे।" Ibid I. 10.
- 4. "आद्ये परोक्षं।" Ibid I. 11
- 5. "प्रत्यक्षमन्यत्।" Ibid I. 12.
- 6. "ज्ञानमिति वर्त्तते ।" Prameyaratnamālā.
- "स एव नैर्मर्ल्यं वैशद्यं स्पष्टत्वमित्यादिभिः शब्दैरभिधीयते।"

Nyāya-dipikā.

. •

## Pariksāmukham

arises when there is destruction or mitigation of the obstruction to Jhana<sup>1</sup>.

Akalaňka Deva in Nyāyavinišchaya has mentioned that the definition of Pratyakṣa has been mentioned to be clear knowledge<sup>2</sup>. Syādvādavidyāpati has explained in the commentary that clearness means perspicuous illumination. This is felt by every one when one proceeds to examine the character of the knowledge<sup>3</sup>.

In Pramāņanayatattvālokālankāra, the word Spasta has been used in place of Viśada. The meaning is the same. In Nyāyadipikā<sup>4</sup> and in Pramāņa-mīmāṃsā<sup>5</sup> the word Viśada has been followed.

The older Jain logicians have accepted the view which is contrary to that adopted in other philosophies that knowledge derived through the senses is Paroksa and not Pratyaksa. Their view is based on the authority of Umāsvāmi ( as already quoted ), Akalaaka etc., who maintain that knowledge derived through meditation independant of the senses is Pratyaksa ( direct knowledge ). Later writers on Jain logic however have laid down that senseperception is Pratyaksa and other kinds of knowledge are Paroksa. For example Siddhasena Divākara writes "Such knowledge that

 "किमिदं विशदप्रतिभासत्वं नाम ? उच्यते :--- ज्ञानावरणस्य क्षयाद-विशिष्टक्षयोपशामाद्वा शब्दानुमानाद्यसंभवि यन्नैर्मल्यमनुभवसिद्धं । दृश्यते खल्वप्नि-रस्तीत्याप्तवचनाद् घूमादिर्लिंगाचोत्पन्नाज् ज्ञानादयमग्निरित्युत्पन्नस्यैंद्रियिकस्य ज्ञानस्य विशेषः ।" Nyāya-dipikā.

2. "प्रत्यक्षलक्षणं प्राहुः स्पष्टं साकारमंजसा।" Nyäyavinischayālankāra.

3. "निर्मेळप्रतिभासत्वमेव स्पष्टत्वं । स्वानुभवप्रसिद्धं चैतत् सर्वस्यापि परीक्ष-कस्येति नातीव निर्बोध्यते ।" Comm. by Syādvāda-vidyāpati.

4. "तत्र विशदप्रतिभासं नाम प्रत्यक्षम् ।" Nyāyadipikā.

5. "विद्याद: प्रत्यक्षम्।" Pramāņa-mimāmsā. I. I. 13.

takes cognizance of objects, not beyond the range of the senses, is Pratyakşa (direct knowledge or perception); the other is known as Parokşa (indirect knowledge) in reference to the manner of taking the cognizance"<sup>1</sup>. (Translation by Dr. S. C. Vidyābhūşana).

Dr. S. C. Vidyābhūşaņa in his notes on the above verse of Siddhasena Divākara has mentioned the difference between the views of the older and later writers on Jain Logic thus :

"The words Pratyaksa ( direct knowledge ) and Paroksa ( indirect knowledge ) have been used here in their ordinary acceptations, namely, the first for sense-perceptions, and the second for inference and verbal testimony. In the ancient Jaina scriptures, however, Pratyaksa ( direct knowledge ) signified perfect knowledge acquired by the soul direct through meditation and not through the channels of the senses, while Paroksa ( indirect knowledge ) signified knowledge derived through the medium of the senses or signs comprising perception, inference and the verbal testimony"<sup>2</sup>.

Now we may turn to the derivation of the word Pratyakşa as given by different Jain writers. In Syādvādaratnākara we find that the derivative meaning of Fratyakşa is that which rests on Akşa (i. e., a sense). There it is also mentioned that the derivation is by Tatpuruşa Samāsa. It cannot be Avyayıbhāva, as in that case the word should always be in the neuter gender but we use Pratyakşa in all the three genders<sup>3</sup>. Haribhadra Sūri derives

 "अपरोक्षतयार्थस्य माहक ज्ञानमीद्दशम् । प्रत्यक्षमितरत् ज्ञेयं परोक्षं प्रहणेक्षया ॥" Nyāyāvatāra. 4

2. Nyāyāvatāra Edited by Dr. S. C. Vidyābhūṣaṇa P. 9.

3. "अर्क्षामंद्रियं प्रति गतं कार्यत्वेनाश्चितं प्रत्यक्षम् । 'कुगतिप्रादयः' इति तत्पुरुषः । ततश्च 'द्विगुप्राप्तापन्नालं पूर्वगतिसमासेषु' परवर्ङ्णिगताप्रतिषेधादमिधेय-बङ्गितायां विर्लिंगः प्रत्यक्षराब्दः सिद्धः । एवं च प्रत्यक्षां ज्ञानं, प्रत्यक्षो बोधः, प्रत्यक्षा

### Parikṣāmukham

the word thus: "Akṣā means Jīva as it enjoys or pervades all Dravya, Kṣētra, Kāla and Bhāva. Akṣā also means Indriya (senses) as it enjoys objects. When Akṣā meets Akṣā we have Pratyakṣā that is to say knowledge arises through the senses"<sup>1</sup>. Hemachandra also lays down the derivation adopted by Haribhadra<sup>2</sup>. These derivations have been criticised in Syādvādaratnākara as already mentioned.

Now a question may be asked, if by the derivation we get that knowledge arising from sense-perception is Pratyakşa, how can the view of writers who call such knowledge Parokşa and only direct knowledge derived through meditation Pratyakşa, be tenable. The answer has been given in Syādvādaratnākara that whatever the derivative meaning of a word may be, in use we do not stick to it. For example the derivative meaning of the word "Gauh" ( a cow ) is that which goes. This meaning can apply to any moving thing but use of the word Gauh is not at all made in its derivative sense. So in the case of Pratyakşa Pramāņa also, its derivative meaning cannot stop its being applied to knowledge like Avadhi etc., derived without the help of any sense<sup>3</sup>.

बुद्धिरित्यादयो व्यपदेशाः प्रवर्त्तन्ते । अक्षमक्षं प्रति वर्त्तत इति प्रत्यक्षमिति त्वव्ययी-भावे 'अव्ययीभावश्च'इत्यनेन सदा नपुंसकत्वं स्यात् ।'' Syadvadaratnakara, II. 1.

1. "अश्मुतेऽक्ष्णोति वा व्याप्नोति सकल्द्रव्यक्षेत्र-कालभावानित्यक्षो जीवोऽ-श्मुते विषयमित्यक्षमिन्द्रियं च। अक्षमक्षं प्रतिगतं प्रत्यक्षमिद्रियाण्याश्रित्य व्यवहार-साधकं यजज्ञानमुत्पद्यते तत् प्रत्यक्षमित्यर्थः i' Saddarsanasamuchebaya. Comm. on Verse 55.

2. "अरुनुते अक्ष्णोति वा व्याप्नोति सकलद्रव्यक्षेत्रकालभावानित्यक्षो जीवः । अरुनुते विषयमित्यक्षमिद्रियं च प्रतिः प्रतिगतार्थः अक्षं प्रतिगतं तदाश्रितं अक्षाणि चेंद्रियाणि तानि प्रतिगतमिद्रियाण्याश्रित्योज्जिहीते यज्ज्ञानं तत् प्रत्यक्षम् ।" Pramāna mīmāņsā. Bhāşya on J. I. 10.

 अनन्देवं प्रत्यक्षराब्दस्य व्युत्पत्तौ कथमिंद्रियानाश्रितस्य मानसस्यावध्या-देश्च प्रत्यक्षव्यपदेशः स्यादिति चेत् ? उच्यते । प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तस्य तत्रापि सद्भावात् ।

We have already mentioned that according to the Jain doctrine, knowledge is of five kinds : (1) Mati ( knowledge derived through the senses including the knowledge which arises from the activity of the mind ), (2) Sruta ( knowledge derived through symbols or signs e. g. words, gestures etc. ), (3) Avadhi (psychic knowledge which the soul acquires without the help of any sense ), (4) Manahparyaya (knowledge of thoughts of others) and (5) Kevala ( omniscience ). There are false knowledges of Mati, Śruta and Ayadhi which make up a total of eight kinds of knowledge recognised in Jainism. We have seen that in Tattvārtha Sūtra, Mati and Śruta Jūāna have been described as Paroksa Pramāņas and Avadhi, Manahparyaya and Kevala as Pratyaksa Pramāņas. The distinction between Pratyaksa and Paroksa according to Tattyārtha Sūtra is that in the former the soul gets a clear knowledge of an object without depending upon any other knowledge while in the latter, the cognition is not clear by itself but has to depend upon some other kind of knowledge. We have already given an example of this dependance when, to have a knowledge of fire by seeing smoke, we have to depend on the knowledge of smoke and then infer the existence of fire.

But later writers like Jain logicians have laid down that Mati and Śruta Jñāna are Sānvyavahārika Pratyakṣas and Avadhi, Manahparyaya and Kevala are Pāramārthika or Mukhya Pratyakṣa. Brahmadeva in his commentary on Dravya-samgraha tries to reconcile this contradiction in the following manner. First he raises the question : "The disciple asks 'In Tattvārtha Sūtra, Mati and Śruta have been described as Parokṣa in the aphorism Ādye

अक्षाश्चितत्वं हि प्रत्यक्षराब्दस्य व्युत्पत्तिनिमित्तं, गतिक्रियेव गोशब्दस्य, प्रवृत्ति-निमित्तं त्वेकार्थसमवायिनाऽक्षाश्चितत्वेनोपलक्षितमर्थसाक्षात्कारत्वं गतिक्रिययोपलक्षितं गोत्वमित्र गोशब्दस्य । अन्यद्धि शब्दस्य व्युत्पत्तिनिमित्तं, अन्यच प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तम् । इतरथा गच्छन्नेव गौगौरिति व्यपदिश्येत नापरो व्युत्पत्तिनिमित्ताभाषात् । जात्यन्तर-विशिष्टं हि तुरगादिकं गति-क्रियापरिणतं व्युत्पत्तिनिमित्तसद्भावात् गोशब्दाभिधेयं स्यात् ।'' Syādvādaratnākara, II. 1.

Paroksam (I. 11). How can these be Pratyaksa (according to the view of Jain writers on Logic ?<sup>1</sup> Brahmadeva then answers this question by saying that the aphorism of Umasvami is to be regarded as a general rule (utsarga) while the sayings of Jain logicians are to be taken as special rules or exceptions ( Apavada ). In special or exceptional cases, the general rule is not followed. So though in Tattvärtha Sütra it has been mentioned that Mati and Śruta Jūānas are Paroksa knowledge, there are particular cases which may be taken as exceptions where these may be called Pratvaksa<sup>2</sup>. For example, Śruta Jňāna can be wholly Paroksa as when it arises from words only or when it consists of knowledge of outside objects c.g. heaven, liberation etc. But when the soul has internal knowledge that it has happiness or misery or it consists of infinite knowledge, this Sruta Jūāna is partially Paroksa. But Śruta Jňāna is Pratyaksa in case of ordinary householders ( though Paroksa in case of Kevalins who have omniscience ) when it cognizes the soul<sup>3</sup>. Brahmadeva further says that we all know

1 'अत्राह शिष्यः :--- 'आद्ये परोक्षम्' इति तत्त्वार्थसुत्रे मतिश्रुतद्वयं परोक्षं भणितं तिष्ठति, कथं प्रत्यक्षं भवति ?'' Commentary on Dravyasamgraha, Verse 5.

2 "परिहारमाह । तदुत्सर्गव्याख्यानम् , इदं पुनरपवादव्याख्यानम् । यदि तदुत्सर्गव्याख्यानं न भवति, तर्हि मतिज्ञानं कथं तत्त्वार्थे परोक्षं भणितं तिष्ठति ? तर्कशास्त्रे सांव्यवहारिकं प्रत्यक्षं कथं जातम् ? यथा अपवादव्याख्यानेन मतिज्ञानं परोक्षमपि प्रत्यक्षज्ञानं तथा स्वात्माभिमुखं भावश्रुतज्ञानमपि परोक्षं सत् प्रत्यक्षं भण्यते ।" Brahmadeva : Dravyasamgraha—Vritti Verse 5.

३ "शब्दात्मकं श्रुतज्ञानं परोक्षमेव तावत् । स्वर्गापवर्गादिबहिर्विषयपरिच्छित्ति-परिज्ञानं विकल्परूपं तदपि परोक्षं । यत्तपुनरभ्यन्तरे सुखदुःखविकल्परूपोऽहमनन्त-ज्ञानादिरूपोऽहमिति वा तदीषत्परोक्षम् । यच्च निश्चय-भावश्रुतज्ञानं तच्च शुद्धात्माभि-मुखसुखसंवित्तिस्वरूपं स्वसंवित्त्याकारेण सविकल्पमपीन्द्रियमनोजनितरागादिविकल्प-जाल्लरहितत्वेन निर्विकल्पम् , अभेदनयेन तदेवात्मशब्दवाच्यं, वीतरागचारित्राविनाभूतं केवलज्ज्ञानापेक्षया परोक्षमपि संसारिणां क्षायिकज्ञानाभावात् क्षायोपशमिकमपि प्रत्यक्ष-मभिधीयते ।" Ibid.

### The Sacred Books of the Jainas

that the knowledge of our happiness and misery is Pratyakṣa, but if we say that according to Tattvārtha Sūtra, Mati and Śruta Jňāna are always Parokṣa, the knowledge of our happiness or misery should also become Parokṣa which is absurd<sup>4</sup>.

In this connection we may mention the view of Dharmabhūsana who says : "Some say that Pratyaksa should only be that which arises through the senses, eye etc., as Aksa means the senses (and according to the derivative meaning Pratyaksa means that arising from the senses ). This view is not correct. The knowledges Avadhi, Manahparyaya and Kevala arise through the soul and are independent of the senses. There is no doubt that these are Pratyaksa. The characteristic of Pratyaksa is clearness and not being caused by the senses. For this reason among the five kinds of knowledge Mati, Sruta, Avadhi, Manahparyaya and Kevala, it has been mentioned ( in the Tattvārtha Sūtra ) that the former two are Parokşa and the others are Pratyakşa"<sup>2</sup>. Whatever may be the derivative meaning, the meaning fixed by use makes Avadhi, Manahparyaya and Kevala to be Pratyaksa.3 Or the derivation can be changed in the following manner. Aksa means the soul as it pervades or knows and that which arises in the soul

1 "यदि पुनरेकान्तेन परोक्षं भवति तर्हि सुखदुःखादिसंवेदनमपि परोक्षं प्राप्नोति, न च तथा।" Ibid

2 "कश्चिदाह अक्ष नाम चक्षुरादिकमिंद्रियं तत् प्रतीत्य यदुत्पद्यते तदेव प्रत्यक्ष्मुचितं नान्यत्' इति तद्प्यसत् । आत्ममात्रसापेक्षाणामवधिमनःपर्ययकेवलाना-मिंद्रियनिरपेक्षाणामपि प्रत्यक्षत्वाविरोधात् । स्पष्टत्वमेव हि प्रत्यक्षत्वप्रयोजकं नेंद्रियजन्यत्वं । अत एव हि मतिश्रुतावधिमनःपर्ययकेवलानां ज्ञानत्वेन प्रतिपन्नानां मध्ये 'आद्ये परोक्ष', 'प्रत्यक्षमन्यत्' इत्याद्ययोर्मतिश्रुतयोः परोक्षत्वकथनमन्येषां त्ववधिमनःपर्ययकेवलानां प्रत्यक्षत्ववाचो युक्तिः ।'' Nyāyadipikā. Prakāsa II.

3 "कथं पुनरेतेषां प्रत्यक्षराब्दवाच्यत्वमिति चेत् ? रूढित इति श्रूमः ।" Ibid.

#### Parikṣāmukham

independent of the senses is Pratyaksa<sup>1</sup>. So if we quarrel that we must follow the derivative meaning, a solution is given by adopting a derivation which fits with the definition.

# प्रतीत्यन्तराब्यवधानेन विद्येषवत्तया वा प्रतिभासनं वैशयम् ॥४॥

4. Pratityantarāvyavadhānena višesavattayā vā pratibhāsanam vaišadyam.

4. Clearness means illumination without any other intermediate knowledge or illumination in details.

#### Commentary

In Aphorism 3, it was mentioned that the knowledge which is clear is Pratyakşa. In the present aphorism, clearness is explained.

Clearness of knowledge means illumination of an object when there is no intermediate knowledge. For example, in inference we have an intermediate knowledge. When we see smoke and infer that there is fire, there is the intermediate knowledge of smoke before we have the knowledge of fire. Where there is no such intervention of another knowledge, we hold that the knowledge is clear. Another definition is also given. Clearness means knowledge of an object with all its details.

Hemachandra has laid down : "Clearness means illumination which does not depend on any other Pramāņa ( Anumāna, Śabda etc. ) or understanding that it is of such and such a nature"<sup>2</sup>. In Anumāna and Śabda, the knowledge depends on other Pramāņas but that is not the case in Pratyakṣa Pramāṇa. There is another

1 "अथवा अञ्चणोति व्याण्नोति जानातीत्यक्ष आत्मा तन्मात्रापेक्षोत्पत्तिकं प्रत्यक्षमिति।" Ibid.

2 "प्रमाणान्तरानपेक्षेदन्तया प्रतिभासो वा वैशद्यम्।" Pramāņamimāņsā I. 1. 14.

P-8

definition of clearness viz. that it grasps all the details and hence forms a correct knowledge by being a Pratyakṣa Pramāṇa<sup>1</sup>.

In Syādvādaratnākara this aphorism is criticised. It is mentioned there : "Some say 'Clearness means illumination without any intermediate knowledge'. They say that in Parokṣa Pramāṇas like Anumāna, the knowledge of fire arises after the intermediate knowledge of smoke, so that knowledge is not clear but in Pratyakṣa there is no such intermediate knowledge, so it is clear. Those who hold this view have not got an idea of Jain philosophy even in their dreams. For, how will they establish the knowledge Ihā etc. when connected with doubt ?"<sup>2</sup> So in Syādvādaratnākara, support is given to the definition of clearness as laid down in Pramāṇanaya-tattvālokālaṅkāra which is as follows :

"Clearness means the illumination of details in excess of that produced by Anumāna etc."<sup>3</sup>. A verse is quoted in Syādvādaratnākara meaning the same thing<sup>\*</sup>.

1 "प्रस्तुतात् प्रमाणादन्यत् प्रमाणं शब्दलिंगादिज्ञानं तत् प्रमाणान्तरं, तन्निर-पेक्षता वैशद्यम्। न हि शब्दानुमानादिवत् प्रत्यक्षं स्वोत्पत्तौ शब्दलिंगादिज्ञानं प्रमाणान्तरभपेक्षते इत्येकं वैशद्यल्र्यणम्। ल्र्ञ्यणान्तरमपि इदन्तया प्रतिभासो वेति। इदन्तया विशेषनिष्ठतया यः प्रतिभासः सम्यगर्थनिर्णयस्य सोऽपि वैशद्यम्। वा शब्दः ल्र्य्रणान्तरत्वसूचनार्थः।" Bhāsya on Pramāṇa-mimāṃsā I. 1. 14.

2 "केचित्तु तार्किकम्मन्याः प्रतीत्यन्तराव्यवधानेन प्रतिभासनमपि झानस्य वैशद्यं वदन्ति । अनुमानादिपरोक्षप्रमाणभेदेषु हि धूमादिगोचरप्रतीतिव्यवधानेन धूमध्वजादिवस्तुनः प्रतीतिरित्त्यवैशद्यं तेषाम् , प्रत्यक्षे तु नैवं प्रतीत्यन्तरव्यवधानम-स्तीति वैशद्यं तस्य । न ते जैनदर्शनोपनिषदं स्वप्नेऽपि प्रापुः । एवं प्रकारं वैशद्यं वदन्तस्ते कथमीहादिज्ञानस्य संदेहाद्यपेक्षिणः प्रत्यक्षतां व्यवस्थापयिष्यन्ति ?" Syadvadaratnäkara.

3 ''अनुमानाद्याधिक्येन विशेषप्रकाशनं स्पष्टत्वम् ।''

Pramāņanayatattvālokālankāra. II. 3 4 "अनुमानाद्यतिरेकेण विशेषप्रतिभासनं । तद्वैशद्यं मतं ब्रुद्धेरवैशद्यमतः परम ॥"

Verse quoted in Syādvādaratnākara.

### Parikşāmukham

We have already mentioned while discussing the definition of Pramāņa, the four kinds of Mati Jňāna viz. Avagraha, Īhā, Avāya and Dhāraņā. The first stage is the bare knowledge of an object. In the second stage there is an attempt to know the particulars of the object whereby similarities with or differences from other objects are known. In the third stage there is a definite finding of these particulars and in the fourth stage there is a lasting impression which arises after the object is known with all its particulars.

Now these four stages are accepted in Sāňvyavahārika Pratyakṣa which will be discussed in the next aphorism. The criticism of Syādvādaratnākara is that as in the case of Sāńvyavahārika Pratyakṣa we recognise one knowledge after another (viz. Avagraha, Īhā, Avāya and Dhāraṇā) there are intermediate knowledges and so the definition of clearness that it is bereft of intermediate knowledge cannot be correct. For clearness being the characteristic of Pratyakṣa Pramāṇa we see that it cannot apply to Sāňvyavahārika Pratyakṣa where four stages of knowledge arise one after another.

This criticism however has been met in the commentaries of Parīksāmukham and other works on Jain Logic. In Prameyaratnamālā, it is mentioned that "by intervention of another knowledge" it should be understood that the intermediate knowledge is of a quite different object and not of the same object. For example, in Anumāna we have knowledge of one object, smoke and a quite different object, fire, later on. But in \Sānvyavahārika Pratyakṣa we have knowledge of the same object in four stages. For example, first we are merely conscious of a man ; then we desire to know his particulars. In the third stage we ascertain the particulars that he belongs to such and such a country etc., and in the fourth stage we get a lasting impression<sup>1</sup>. In Prameyakamalamārtanḍa, the

 "यद्यप्यवायस्यावग्रहेहाप्रतीतिभ्यां व्यवधानं, तथापि न परोक्षत्वं विषय-विषयिणोर्भेदं सति व्यवधानं तत्र परोक्षत्वम् । तर्हि अनुमानाध्यक्षविषयस्यैकात्ममाह्य-स्याग्नेरभिन्नस्योपलम्भादध्यक्षस्य परोक्षतेति तद्प्ययुक्तम् । भिन्नविषयत्वाभावात् । definition of Māņikyanandī has been supported. That view has again been criticised in Syādvādaratnākara<sup>1</sup>. It will serve no purpose to go into details of this controversy. We have explained the main point fully and we have seen that no fault appears in the definition of clearness as given by Māņikyanandī. Though in Pramāņa-naya-tattvālokālaṅkāra an attempt is made to give a different definition, later writers like Hemachandra have followed Māņikyanāndī.

# इग्द्रियानिन्द्रियनिमित्तं देशतः सांव्यवहारिकम् ॥ ५ ॥

5. Indriyānindriyanimittam deśatah sāņvyavahārikam,

5. (The knowledge )which is partially clear and arises from Indriya (the senses) and Anindriya (the mind) is Sāňvyavahārika Pratyakṣa.

विसदृशसामग्रीजन्यभित्रविषया प्रतीतिः प्रतीत्यन्तरमुच्यते नान्यदिति न दोषः ।" Prameyaratnamālā.

1 "नन्धेवमीहादिज्ञानस्यावप्रहाद्यपेक्षत्वाद्व्यवधानेन प्रतिभासनल्क्षण-षैशद्याभावात् प्रत्यक्षता न स्यात्तदसारम् । अपरापरेन्द्रियव्यापारादेवावप्रहादीनामुत्-पत्तेस्तत्र तद्पेक्षत्वासिद्धेः । एकमेव चेदं विज्ञानमवग्रहाद्यतिशयवदपरापरचक्षुरादि-व्यापारादुत्पन्नं सत् स्वतन्त्रतया स्वविषये प्रवर्त्तत इति प्रमाणान्तराव्यवधानमत्रापि प्रसिद्धमेव । अनुमानादिप्रतीतिस्तु लिंगादिप्रतीत्त्येव जनिता सति स्वविषये प्रवर्त्तते इत्यव्यवधानेन प्रतिभासनाभावान्न प्रत्यक्षता" Prameya-kamala-martanda

The above has been criticised in Syādvādaratnākara thus : "अथ ष्रयुरपरापरेन्द्रियव्यापारादेवेहादीनामुत्पत्तेः सन्देहाद्यनपेक्षत्वात् प्रतीत्यन्तरा-च्यवधानेन प्रत्यक्षतेति, तदपि प्रतीतिपराङ्मुखत्वम् । ईहादयो हि संदेहादिभ्यः समुप-जायमानाः प्रतीयन्त एवेति कथं तदनपेक्षत्वम् ? प्रतीयमानस्यापि कार्यकारणभाव-स्यान्नापह्ववे सर्वत्र तदपह्रवः किं न स्यात् ? अथैकमिदं संवेदनमवम्रहाद्यतिशयोपेत-मित्यन्नापि प्रतीत्यन्तराव्यवधानमस्तीति, ननु तथापि तदनेकत्वपक्षे प्रतीत्यन्तराव्यव-धानमऌब्धसमाधानं, स्याद्वादिना ह्यवप्रहादीनामेकत्त्वमिवानेकत्वमपि वक्तव्यम् ।"

### Parikşāmukhaņ

#### Commentary

Pratyakṣa Pramāṇa is subdivided into two classes Sāṅvyavahārika and Mukhya or Pārarmārthika. In this aphorism the definition of Sāṅvyavahārika Pratyakṣa is given<sup>4</sup>

In Pramānapariksā, Vidyānanda Svāmi has divided Pratyakşa into three classes Indriya-pratyakşa, Anindriya-pratyakşa and Atindriya-pratyaksa.<sup>2</sup> The first two however can be included under Sāňvyavahārika Pratyakṣa. So the twofold division of Pratyaksa will be sufficient. In Pramāņa-nayatattvālokālankāra, Pratyakşa has been divided into Sāňvyavahārika and Pāramārthika and Sānvyavahārika again has been subdivided into Indrivanivandhana and Anindriya-nivandhana<sup>3</sup>. In Pramāņa-mīmāmsā Pratyakşa has been divided into Mukhya and Sānvyayahārika<sup>4</sup> and in Nyāyadīpikā, the divisions are Sāńvyavahārika and Pāramārthika<sup>5</sup>. Mukhya or Pāramārthika are one and the same thing.

1 "तच प्रसं द्वेधा मुख्यसंव्यवहारमेदाद इति मनसि इत्य प्रथमं सांव्यवहारिकप्रत्यक्षस्योत्पादिकां सामग्रीं तद्मेदं च प्राह।" Prameyaratnamālā.

2 "तत् त्रिविधं, इन्द्रियानिन्द्रियातीन्द्रियप्रसंक्षिकल्पनात् ।"

Pramāņapariksā.

61

5 ं ''तद्द्रिप्रकारं सांव्यवहारिकं पारमार्थिकं च ।'' ''तत्राद्यं द्विविधमिन्द्रियनिवन्धनमनिन्द्रियनिवन्धनं च ।''

Pramāņanayatattvālokālankāra. II. 4. 5

4 "तत् सर्वथावरणविळये चेतनस्य स्वरूपाविर्मावो मुख्यं केवलम् ।"

Pramāņa-mīmāmsā I. 1. 15

"तत् तारतम्येऽत्रधिमनःपर्ययौ च ।" Ibid 1. 1. 18

"इन्द्रियमनोनिमित्तावयहेहावायधारणात्मा सांव्यवहारिकम्।"

Ibid, 1. 1. 21

5 "तत् प्रत्यक्षं द्विविधं सांव्यवहारिकं पारमार्थिकं च।"

Nyāya-dipikā.

The knowledge which is partially clear is Sānvyavahārika Pratyakṣa and the knowledge which is fully clear is Mukhya or Pāramārthika Pratyakṣa'.

Saňvyavahāra is the perfect satisfaction of a desire to cognize<sup>2</sup>. That which arises from Saňvyavahāra is called Sāňvyavahārika<sup>3</sup> The knowledge in Sāňvyavahārika Pratyakṣa being partially clear, it is also called Amukhya Pratyakṣa as opposed to Mukhya Pratyakṣa where the knowledge is fully clear<sup>4</sup>.

Sānvyavahārika Pratyakṣa is caused by Indriya and Anindriya. According to Jainism, the Indriyas (senses) are five viz. touch, taste, smell, sight and hearing<sup>5</sup>. Mind is called Anindriya or No-indriya. But by this distinction it should not be supposed that mind is not Indriya. Akalaāka Deva in Tattvārtharāja-vārttika has laid down "We call a female who is unable to conceive, 'a woman without a belly'. This does not mean that really this female has no belly at all but the meaning is that she is unable to conceive. So when we call mind to be Anindriya it means that it does not produce impressions of objects like organs of sense eye etc. on contact. This does not however mean that mind is not a sense".<sup>8</sup>

"यज्ज्ञानं देशतो विशदमीषत्रिर्मलं तत् सांव्यवद्दारिकप्रत्यक्षम् ।"
 "यज्ञ्ञानं सांकल्येन स्पष्टं तत् पारमार्थिकप्रत्यक्षं मुख्यप्रत्यक्षमिति यावत् ।"
 Nyāya-dipikā.
 "समीचीनः प्रवृत्तिनिव्वत्तिरूपो व्यवद्वारः संव्यवद्वारः ।"

Pramāņa-Mimāņsā Vritti on I. I. 21.

- 3 "समीचीनः प्रद्वतिनिवृत्तिरूपो व्यवहारः संव्यवहारः, तत्र भवं सांव्यव-हारिकम्।" Prameya-ratna-mālā.
- 4 "इदं च अमुख्यप्रत्यक्षमुपचारसिद्धत्वात् ।" Nyäya-dipikä.
- 5 'स्पर्शरसगन्धरूपशब्दब्रहणळक्षणानि स्पर्शनरसनघ्राणचक्षुःश्रोत्राणी-निद्रयाणि द्रव्यभावमेदानि।" Pramāņa-mimāmsā I. 1. 22.
- 6 "अर्निद्रियं मनोऽनुदरावत्।" Tattvārtharājavārttika on Sūtra I. 14. It is thus explained in the Commentary on this:

Pariksāmukham

In Nyāya philosophy of the Hindus, mind has been accepted as Indriya. But a distinction has been made from other senses. It has been mentioned that the true senses touch, taste etc. are fixed in their particular objects. For example, the sense of smell can produce a knowledge of smell but not of taste, sight etc. The mind however can apply itself to every object in all its qualities. In mind there is no special quality like those existing in senses e. g. smell etc.<sup>1</sup> This has been affirmed by Uddyotkara<sup>2</sup> and in substance this view is the same as that of Hemachandra already quoted in the footnote.

Gautama has taken consideration of the five Jnānendriyas, eye, ear etc., but in Smritis and other philosophies of the Hindus, five Karmendriyas (Vāk, Pāda, Pāņi, Pāyu and Upastha) have also been mentioned as senses. Thus the total number of senses according to this view is ten. Manu has mentioned that mind is

"मनोऽतंकरणमनिन्द्रियमित्युच्यते । कथं इंद्रियप्रतिषेधेन मन उच्यते १.... यथानुदरा कन्या इति नास्या उदरं न विद्यते, किन्तु गर्भभारोद्वइनसमर्थोदरा-भावादनुदरा । तथानिंद्रियमिति नास्येंद्रियत्वाभावः । किन्तु चक्षुरादिवत् प्रतिनियत-देशविषयावस्थानाभावादनिन्द्रियं मन इत्युच्यते ।"

This is affirmed in Pramāņa-mīmāmsā : "सर्वार्थप्रहणं मनः ।" J. 1. 25. The Bhāşya on it lays down "सर्वे न तु स्पर्शनादीनां स्पर्शादिवत् प्रतिनियता एवार्था गृह्यन्ते तेनेति सर्वार्थप्रहणं मनोऽनिन्द्रियमिति नो इन्द्रियमिति चोच्यते ।"

1 "भौतिकानीन्द्रियाणि नियतविषयाणि, सगुणानाञ्चेषामिन्द्रियभाव इति । मनस्तु अभौतिकं सर्वविषयञ्च, नास्य सगुणस्येन्द्रियभाव इति । सति चेन्द्रियार्थ-सन्निकर्षे सन्निधिमसन्निधिञ्चास्य युगपजज्ञानाऽनुत्पत्तिकारणं वक्ष्याम इति । मन-श्वेन्द्रियभावान्न वाच्चं लक्षणान्तरमिति । तन्त्रान्तरसमाचाराच्चैतत् प्रत्येतव्यमिति ।" Vātsyāyana Bhāsya to Nyāya-sūtra I. 1. 4.

2 "मनः सर्वविषयं स्मृतिकारणसंयोगाधारत्वात् आत्मवत् सुखप्राहक-संयोगाधिकरणत्वात् समस्तेन्द्रियाधिष्ठातृत्वात् ।" Nyāya-vārttika. the eleventh sense<sup>1</sup> In Sāṅkhya Sūtra<sup>2</sup> and Sāṅkhyakārikā<sup>3</sup> of Isvarakriṣṇa we find that mind is both Jñānendriya and Karmendriya.

In Vedānta paribhāṣā however it is laid down that mind is not a sense<sup>4</sup>. To support this view the following is quoted from Katha Upaniṣad III. 10 : "Objects are beyond the organs of senses, mind is beyond the sense-organs."<sup>3</sup> In Vedānta Sūtra however (II. 4. 17) we find mind accepted as a sense. Śańkarāchārya in his Bhāṣya to the above Sūtra has taken mind as a sense supporting his view by quoting Smriti. In Bhāmatī, Vāchaspati Miśra quoted different views regarding the acceptance of mind as a sense but his own conclusion is that mind is a sense. In Śrimadbhagavadgītā mind has been accepted as a sense<sup>6</sup>.

> "एकादरोन्द्रियाण्याहुर्यानि पूर्वे मनीषिणः । तानि सम्यक् प्रवक्ष्यामि यथावदनुपूर्वराः ।। श्रोत्रं स्वक् चक्षुषी जिह्वा नासिका चैव पञ्चमी । पायूपस्थं हस्तपादं वाक् चैव दशमी स्मृता ।। बुद्धीन्द्रियाणि पञ्चेषां श्रोत्रादीन्यनुपूर्वशः । कर्मेन्द्रियाणि पञ्चेषां पाय्तादीनां प्रचक्षते ।। एकादशं मनो होयं स्वगुणेनोभयात्मकम् ।"

#### Manusamhitā II. 89-92

- 2 "जभयात्मकं मन: I" Sānkhya Sūtra II. 26.
- 3 "внитсняня на: i" Sānkhya-kārikā 27.
- 4 "न तावत् अन्तः करणम् इन्द्रियम् इत्यत्र मानमस्ति ।"

Vedānta-paribhāsā.

- 5 "'इन्द्रियेभ्यः परा हार्थाः अर्थेभ्यश्च परं मनः।' इत्यादि श्रुत्या मनसोऽनिन्द्रियत्वावगमाच्च।'' Vedanta-paribhasa.
- 6 ''वेदानां सामवेदोऽस्मि देवानामस्मि वासवः । इन्द्रियाणां मनश्चास्मि भूतानामस्मि चेतना ॥'' Gita X. 22,

Thus the view of the Jain Logic is in accordance with the view which preponderates in the Hindu philosophy regarding mind being a sense. But though Jain Logic accepts mind as a sense it calls it a small or intangible sense (No-indriya or Iṣat-indriya) because it is not materially cognisable like the other senses. Its function according to Jain view is discernible only by highly developed souls who have Manaḥparyayajūāna as described in the commentary on Aphorism I. Samuddeśa I of this work.

## नार्थालोकौ कारणं परिच्छेचत्वात्तमोषत् ॥ ६ ॥

6. Nārthālokau kāraņam parichchedyatvāttamovat.

6. The object and light is not the instrument ( of Pratyakşa knowledge ) as the same are capable of being ascertained as in the case of darkness.

## "ममैवांशो जीवलोके जीवभूतः सनातनः । मनःषष्ठानीन्द्रियाणि प्रकृतिस्थानि कर्षति ॥" Ibid XIV. 7.

In Vedānta-paribhāṣā the latter verse has been tried to be explained away thus : "If you object that the quotation from the Bhagavadgita is conclusive 'the organs of sense with the mind to make up six' ( 'मन: qgiनीन्द्रियाणि'), we reply, no; for no contradiction results in filling up the number six with mind, though mind be not reckoned as an organ of sense. There is no positive injunction restricting the completion of the number relating to the organs of sense to such an organ only. Instance the text : 'the five including the sacrificer eat the Idā oblation'; here we notice that the completion of the number five, relating to the Ritvik priests, is effected by means of the sacrificer ( himself the fifth ) who is not a Ritvik. And in the quotation 'He taught the five, the Vedas and Mahābhārata, we observe that the completion of the number five relating to the Vedas, is effected by the Mahābhārata which is not a Veda." ( Trans. by A. Venis )

But this argument is use-less as in the first verse (X. 22), it is unmistakably mentioned "I am Manas ( the Mind ) among the senses," where the best among the senses is meant.

P---9

#### Commentary

In the preceding aphorism, it has been mentioned that mind and the senses cause Pratyakṣa knowledge. One may urge that light or a particular object is also necessary to give rise to Pratyakṣa knowledge. So these should also be mentioned as cause of Pratyakṣa knowledge. To refute this, it is mentioned in the present aphorism that an object or light does not cause Pratyakṣa knowledge. The example of darkness is cited to establish this for it is well-known that we have a knowledge of darkness though it obstructs perception and is not the cause<sup>1</sup>

This is further elucidated in the following two aphorisms.

## तद्न्वयव्यतिरेकानुविधानाभावाच केशोंडुकज्ञानवन्नर्क्तंचरज्ञानवच ॥ ७

7. Tadanvayavyatirekānuvidhānābhāvāchcha kešondukajňānavannaktancharajňānavacheha.

7. That (is established) from universal affirmative and universal negative propositions like the knowledge of mosquito on a hair and like the knowledge of animals which see during the night.

#### Commentary

Some may urge, that it may be established by inference that an object or light is the cause of Pratyaksa knowledge<sup>2</sup>. To refute this it is mentioned that even by inference this cannot be established. For a deduction by inference follows from a knowledge of a concomitance expressed in an universal affirmative proposition (Anvayavyāptijnāna) e. g. where there is smoke, there is fire or from a knowledge of a concomitance expressed in a universal negative proposition e. g. where is no smoke, there is no fire.

1. "प्रसिद्धं हि तमसो विज्ञानप्रतिबन्धकत्वेनातत्कारणस्यापि परिच्छेद्यत्वम् ।" Prameyakamala-mārtaņda.

2. ''अथानुमानात् तत्कार्यंतावसायः । तथा हि, 'अर्थालोककार्यं विज्ञानं तदन्वयव्यतिरेकानुविधानात् । यद् यस्यान्वयव्यतिरेकावनुविधत्ते, तत् तस्य कार्यम् । To establish an inference, it will be necessary to hold where there is light, there is knowledge but we see that even where there is no light there can be knowledge as in the case of cats or owls in a dark night when there is no light. Further lice cannot see even when there is light. So, it cannot be propounded that where there is an object there is knowledge, for some persons in a particular state may have a knowledge of a mosquito on a hair though really there is no such mosquito<sup>1</sup>. A person suffering from jaundice may perceive yellowness while really there is no yellowness. So the relationship of cause and effect which is recognised by concomitance expressed in an universal affirmative or negative proposition cannot be found in light or object with knowledge.

Hemachandra in his Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā also affirms this by saying "An object or light is not the cause of knowledge as knowledge can arise without the universal negative proposition (viz. where there is no object or light, there is no knowledge)."<sup>2</sup> Hemachandra cites examples of knowledge of water in a mirage though there is really no water or knowledge of objects in darkness by certain animals and the knowledge of Yogis about things in the past and the future and urges that this proves that object or light is not the cause of knowledge<sup>3</sup>.

यथा अग्नेर्धूमः । अन्वयव्यतिरेकावनुविधत्ते चार्थाल्ठोकयोर्ज्ञानम्', इति । न चात्रासिद्धो हेतुस्तत्सद्भावे सत्येवास्य भावादभावे चाभावाद् ।" Prameyakamalamärtanda.

 "अन्वयव्यतिरेकगम्यो हि कार्यकारणभावः। तत्रालोकस्तावन्न ज्ञान-कारणं तदभावेऽपि धूकादीनां तदनुन्पत्तेः । तट्वदर्थोऽपि न ज्ञानकारणं तदभावेऽपि केशमशकादिल्लानोत्पत्तेः । तथा च कुतोऽर्थजत्वं ज्ञानस्य ? तटुक्तं परीक्षामुखे 'नार्थालोकौ कारणं' इति । प्रामाण्यस्य चार्थाव्यभिचार एव निवंधनं, न त्वर्थजन्यत्वं, स्वसंवेदनस्य विषयाजन्यत्वेऽपि प्रामाण्याभ्युपगमात् । नहि किंचित् स्वस्मादेव जायते ।" Nyaya-dipika.

2. "नार्थालोकौ ज्ञानस्य निमित्तमव्यतिरेकास्।" Pramanamimamsa I. 1. 26

3. "मरुमरीचिकादौ जलाभावेऽपि जलज्ञानस्य वृषदंशादीनां चालोका-

## अतज्जन्यमपि तत्प्रकाशकं प्रदीपवत् ॥ ८ ॥

8. Atajjanyamapi tat-prakūśakam pradipavat.

8. Though it ( i. e. knowledge ) is not caused by it ( i. e. the object ), it ( i. e. knowledge ) illumines it ( i. e. the object ) like a lamp.

#### Commentary

The knowledge of an object though not caused by the object illumines the object. By the expression 'without being caused by it', it is also implied "though of not the same shape". An object is illuminated by a lamp which is neither caused by an object, nor is of the same shape as the object<sup>1</sup>.

# स्वावरणक्षयोपशमलक्षणयोग्यतया हि प्रतिनियतमर्थं व्यवस्थापयति ॥ ९ ॥

9. Svāvaraņaksayopasamalaksaņayogyatayā hi pratiniyatamartham vyavasthāpayati.

9. Surely (Pratyakşa knowledge) always illumines objects according to its power characterised by the mitigation of its hindrances.

#### Commentary

According to Jain philosophy, Upayoga is the sole characteristic of Jiva. Upayoga is a sort of inclination which arises from consciousness. This inclination is either towards Darsana or towards Jñāna. Darsana is of four kinds Chakşu, Achakşu, Avadhi

भावेऽपि सान्द्रतमतमःपटछविछिन्नदेशगतवस्तुप्रतिपत्तेश्च दर्शनात् योगिना चातीताना-गतार्थप्रहणे किमर्थस्य निमित्तत्वं, निमित्तत्वे चार्थक्रियाकारित्वेन सत्त्वादतीतानागतत्व-क्षतिः ।" Bhāsya to Aphorism I. I. 26 in Pramāņa-mimāmsā.

 "अर्थाजन्यमप्यर्थप्रकाशकमित्यर्थः । अतज्जन्यत्वमुपरुक्षणम् । तेना-तदाकारमपीत्यर्थः । उभयत्रापि प्रदीपो दृष्टान्तः । यथा प्रदीपस्यातज्जन्यस्याऽतदा-कारभारिणोऽपि तत्प्रकाशकत्वं, तथा ज्ञानस्यापि ।" Prameyaratnamala.

### Parikşāmukham

and Kevala<sup>1</sup> and Jäāna as already expounded in commentaries of previous aphorisms in this work is of eight kinds viz. Mati, Śruta, Avadhi, Manaḥparyaya and Kevala and false knowledges of Mati, Śruta and Avadhi.

In Darśana, details are not perceived but in Jňāna details are perceived. "Before we know things in a detailed way, there is the stage where we simply see, hear, or otherwise become conscious of it in a general way without going into its ins and outs. This is the first state of knowledge: it may be called indefinite cognition (Darśana). If this stage is not experienced, there can be no knowledge of the thing"<sup>2</sup>. In Jňāna, there is cognition of details.

Jain philosophy lays down that there are certain classes of Karma which obscure the four kinds of Darśana as well as the eight kinds of Jñāna. "Darśana is of four kinds : Chakşu, Achakşu, Avadhi and Kevala ; so there are also four kinds of Karma which obscure each of these varieties. When there is a cessation or mitigation (Kşayopaśama) of one or more of these varieties of Karma, the corresponding class or classes of Darśana is or are evolved. Thus by the removal of these Karmas, which obscure the Darśana which is received through the eye, a Jiva can see through the eyes. This is Chakşu Darśana ( Darśana through the eye ). Again, by the removal of that Karma which obscures the Darśana through any sense other than the eye, or mind, a Jiva can cognize through the four organs of sense—ear, nose, tongue or skin and through the mind.

 ''खत्रओगो खलु दुविहो णाणेण य दंसणेण संजुत्तो । जीवस्स सव्वकालं अणण्णभूदं वियाणीहि ।। दंसणमवि चक्खुजुदं अचक्खुजुदमवि य ओहिणा सहियं । अणिधणमणंतविसयं केवलियं चावि पण्णत्तं ॥''

Pañchāstikāyasamayasāra 40, 42.

"ज्वभोगो दुवियप्पो दंसण णाणं च दंसणं चदुधा । चक्खु अचक्खू ओही दंसणमध केवलं णेयं ॥" Dravya-samgraha 4.

2. Jainism by Herbert Warren, Page 29.

70 The Sacred Books of the Jainas

This is called Achakşu Darśana (Darśana not through the eye). Similarly, when Karmas obscuring Avadhi Darśana are removed, a Jiva can have Avadhi Darśana (conation before particular kind of psychic knowledge, limited by space and time and obtained directly by the soul e.g. clairvoyance). Lastly by the removal of the Karmas which obscure Kevala Darśana, a Jiva can have Kevala (or perfect) Darśana (in which everything in the three worlds existent in the present, past and future is at once cognized ).

Besides the four varieties of Karmas obscuring Darśana already mentioned, there are also five others mentioned by Umāsvāmi e. g. Nidrā (sleep), Nidrānidrā (deep sleep), Prachalā (Trance), Prachalāprachalā ( drowsiness ) and Styānagriddhi ( Somnambulistic state)<sup>1</sup>. These together with the Karmas obscuring Chakşu, Achakşu, Avadhi and Kevala Darśana already mentioned, make up nine Darśanāvaraņīya Karmas<sup>2</sup>.

Just as there are Darśanāvaraņīya Karmas which obscure Darśana, so there are Jňānāvaraņīya Karmas which obscure Jňāna. Umāsvāmi has mentioned that there are five sorts of Jňānāvaraņiya Karmas which obscure Mati, Śruta, Avadhi, Manahparyaya and Kevala knowledge<sup>3</sup>.

One may argue that in a knowledge of a pitcher, the pitcher and nothing else is the object of knowledge. Here the substance is the cause of its being the object of knowledge. But by denying as in the previous aphorism that the object is not the cause of knowledge, you must satisfy us by laying down the cause which particularises that such and such a thing would produce such and such a knowledge.

 'चक्षुरचक्षुरवधिकेवलानां निद्रानिद्रानिद्राप्रचलाप्रचलाप्रचलाप्रचलाप्र्ययानगृद्धयश्च।' Tattvārtbādbigama Sütra VIII. 7.

2. Dravyasamgraha Edited by S. C. Ghoshal Page 10.

3. "मतिश्रुतावधिमनःपर्ययकेवलानाम्।" Tattvārthādhigama Sūtra VIII. 6.

### Parikşāmukham

Raising this objection in Nyāyadipikā, Dharmabhūṣaṇa meets it by saying that Yogyatā is the cause regarding the object of knowledge and this Yogyatā is nothing but the mitigation or cessation of Karma obstructing knowledge. Dharmabhūṣaṇa quotes the present aphorism of Parīkṣāmukhaṃ to support his view<sup>1</sup>.

That is to say when a Karma obstructing a particular kind of Jhāna is mitigated or entirely removed, knowledge arises and illumines objects like a lamp. This knowledge is not therefore caused by the object and is not of the same shape as the object.

In Vedānta-paribhāṣā it has been laid down that just as water goes out from a pond and entering fields of different shape, assumes different shape, so mind getting out through the sense-organs eye etc. goes to objects like pitchers and is changed like those objects<sup>2</sup>. This view is not accepted by Jain logicians as laid down in this aphorism. According to Jain view, the object is neither the cause nor the transformer of the mind to its shape.

## कारणस्य च परिच्छेद्यत्वे करणादिना व्यभिचार: ॥ १० ॥

10. Kāraņasya cha parichchedyatve karaņādinā vyabhichārah.

10. There will be non-application in the case of senses etc. if you accept the cause as the thing perceived.

### Commentary

This aphorism is laid down to refute the view that a cause of a knowledge can be the object of knowledge. We know that the

 "यदुक्तं घटज्ञानस्य घट एव विषयो, न पर इति । अर्थजत्वं हि विषयं प्रति नियमकारणं, तज्जन्यत्वात् । यद्विषयमेव चैतदिति । तत्तु भवता नाभ्युपगम्यते इति चेत् , यौग्यतैव विषयं प्रति नियमकारणमिति ब्रूमः । का नाम योग्यतेति, उच्यते— स्वावरणक्षयोपशमः । तदुक्तं 'स्वावरणक्षयोपशमळ्क्षणयोग्यतया हि प्रतिनियतमर्थं व्यवस्थापयति' इति ।" Nyāyadipikā.

2. "तत्र यथा तड़ागोदकं छिद्रात्रिर्गत्य कुल्यात्मना केदारान् प्रविश्य तहदेव चतुष्कोणाद्याकारं भवति तथा तैजसमन्तःकरणमपि चक्षुरादिद्वारा निर्गत्य घटादिविषय-देशं गत्वा घटादिविषयाकारेण परिणमते ॥" Vedanta-paribhāşā Chapter I. senses or mind are instrumental in producing knowledge. In this sense, these can be said to be the cause of knowledge. But these cannot be the objects of knowledge for when we get knowledge of objects through these, we have not the knowledge of the senses or mind. So we cannot accept that a cause of knowledge is the object of knowledge.

## सामग्रीविशेषविश्लेषिताखिलावरणमतीन्द्रियमशेषतो मुख्यम् ॥११॥

11. Sāmagrīvišesavislesitākhilāvaraņamatindriyamašesato mukhyam.

11. Mukhya or supreme (Pratyaksa) is clear in every respect, has no dependance on any sense and arises after destruction of all obstructions by perfection of Sāmagrī (Dravya, Ksetra, Kāla and Bhāva).

#### Commentary

That knowledge which is absolutely clear is called Pāramārthika or Mukhya Pratyakşa. This is of two kinds, Sakala and Vikala. Vikala Pratyakşa is subdivided into Avadhi and Manaḥparyaya (which we have previously described.)<sup>1</sup>.

Vikala Jääna is knowledge of certain things while Sakala Jnāna is knowledge of all things or omniscience<sup>2</sup>. Sakala Jnāna is also known as Kevala Jääna. Ordinary individuals do not have this knowledge. According to Jain view it is only the Arhats who can have this knowledge<sup>3</sup>. When Mohaniya or alluring Karmas are destroyed and the Karmas obstructing Jääna and Darsana are

 "सर्वतो विशदं पारमार्थिकं प्रत्यक्षं। यज्ज्ञानं साकल्येन स्पष्टं तत् पारमार्थिकप्रत्यक्षं मुख्यप्रत्यक्षमिति यावत्। तद्दद्विविधं सकछं विकछं च।…तदपि द्विविधं अवधिज्ञानं मनःपर्ययज्ञानं चेति।" Nyāyadīpikā.

2. "तत्र कतिपयविषयं विकलं…सर्वद्रव्यपर्यायविषयं सकलं ॥"

Nyāyadīpikā.

3. "तदवान्नईत्रिदोंधत्वान्।"

Pramāņanayatattvālokālankāra. II. 14.

removed and the Antaräyas (obstructive Karmas) are also destroyed, Kevala knowledge arises<sup>1</sup>.

Siddhasena defines Mukhya Pratyakṣa as follows : "That which is characterised as free from all obstructions and shines as the absolute is called supreme or transcendental perception ; it uninterruptedly illumines the nature of all objects."<sup>2</sup>

In Mukhya Pratyaksa, knowledge is acquired by the soul direct without the intervention of senses or signs<sup>3</sup>.

In Pramāņanayatattvālokālankāra, the two varieties of Pārmārthika Pratyakṣa viz. Vikala and Sakala have been mentioned. The two subdivisions (Avadhi and Manaḥparyaya Jħāna ) of Vikala have also been laid down\*. Hemachandra defines Kevala

# 1. "मोहक्षयाज्ज्ञानदर्शनावरणान्तरायक्षयाच केवलम् ।"

Tattvārthādhigama Sūtra X. 1.

During different stages of development, these Karmas disappear. At the end of the tenth Gunasthāna, Mohanīya Karmas are destroyed and at the end of the twelfth Gunasthāna, Antarāya Karmas disappear.

2. Nyāyāvatāra. Tr. by S. C. Vidyābhūşaņa Pages 25-26. The original verse is as follows :---

"सकलावरणमुक्तात्मकेवलं यत् प्रकाशते ।

प्रत्यक्षं सकछार्थात्मसततप्रतिभासनम्॥" Nyāyāvatāra 27.

3. "पारमार्थिकं पुनस्त्पत्तावात्ममात्रापेक्षम् ।"

- - Pramāņanayatattvālokālankāra II. 18. 4. "तद्विकलं सकलं च।"

"तत्र चिकलमचधिमनःपर्ययज्ञानतया द्वेधा।" Ibid. II. 19 and II. 20.

The difference between Avadhi and Manahparyaya is shown in the next two aphorisms :

**P-1**0

Pratyakşa as the appearance of the true nature of itself when all the obstructions are thoroughly removed<sup>1</sup>. Hemachandra also mentions that besides Kevala, Avadhi and Manahparyaya are also Mukhya Pratyakşa and Avadhi is of two kinds Bhava-pratyaya and Gunapratyaya. Bhava-pratyaya concerns celestials or inmates of hell and Gunapratyaya concerns human and sub-human beings<sup>2</sup>.

When we establish Kevala Jñāna, we must accept the existence of omniscient beings. So, the celebrated Jain writer Samantabhadra in his work  $\overline{A}$ pta-mimāmsā has laid down :

## "सूक्ष्मान्तरितदूरार्थाः प्रत्यक्षाः कस्यचिद् यथा । अनुमेयत्वतोऽग्न्यादिरिति सर्वज्ञ-संस्थितिः ॥"

i.e. The existence of an omniscient being is established from the fact that to some beings invisible things like atoms, things or persons remote in time or things far beyond (like the Meru hill) become known as objects of direct perception just like the knowledge of the existence of fire in a hill (which ordinary people know through inference by seeing the smoke) is also the subject of perception.

This knowledge can not be derived through the senses for in that case it could not have cognated all objects, for the senses can only stimulate knowledge of objects which can be perceived by them. So when there is knowledge of things beyond the perception of

	"अवधिज्ञानावरणविलयविशेषसमुद्भवं भवगुणप्रत्ययं रूपिद्रव्यगोचरम-
	वधिज्ञानम् ।" Ibid II. 21.
	"संयमविशुद्धिनिबन्धनाद् विशिष्टावरणविभेदाज्जातं मनोद्रव्यपर्यायाऌंवनं
	मनःपर्ययज्ञानम्।" Ibid II.22.
1.	''तत् सर्वथावरणविलये चेतनस्य स्वरूपाविर्मावो मुख्यं केवलम् ।''
	Pramāņa-mimāņsā. I. 1. 15
2	

2. 'तत्तारतम्यऽवधिमनःपययो च ।'' Ibid I. 1. 18. "स द्वेधा भवप्रत्ययगुणप्रत्ययश्च ।'' Ibid I. 1. 19.

### Pariksāmukham

senses it must be held that this arises without the intervention of senses and so it is Atindriya and acquired by the soul direct.

# सावरणत्वे करणजन्य च प्रतिवन्धसम्भवात् ॥ १२ ॥

12. Sāvaraņatve karaņajanya cha pratibandhasambhavāt.


I2. Obstruction may arise in the case of a knowledge which is caused by senses and which has hindrances.


#### Commentary

It has been mentioned in the previous aphorism that in Mukhya Pratyaksa, we have a knowledge absolutely clear in all respects. A question may now be asked "What is the cause which may give rise to such a clearness ?" The answer is "Removal of all obstruction is the cause of clearness." Where there is possibility of obstruction there may be hindrance of knowledge and similarly where there is dependance on the senses knowledge might not arise of things which are beyond the perceptive power of the senses. So in this aphorism the definition of the previous aphorism is supported by saying that we have defined Mukhya Pratyaksa as not arising through senses and as arising after destruction of hindrances because there is possibility of obstruction of perfect knowledge when hindrances exist or senses are depended on for acquiring knowledge.

The second chapter ends here. In this chapter we have seen that Pratyakşa Pramāņa is of two kinds Sāńvyavahārika and Mukhya. Māņikyanandi has not given the subdivisions of these two kinds of Pratyakşa but we have shown from other works on Jain logie that Sāňvyavahārika Pratyakşa is of four kinds Avagraha, Īhā, Avāya and Dhāraņā and Mukhya or Pāramārthika or Atīndriya Pratyakşa is of two kinds Vikala and Sakala or Kevala. Vikala Pratyakşa is of two kinds Avadhi and Manahparyaya. Avadhi again may be of Bhava-pratyaya or Gunapratyaya and Manahparyaya is of two kinds Riju ( the knowledge of simple impressions in the mind of another ) and Vipula ( the knowledge of all kinds of thoughts and impressions whether simple or complex ).

End of Chapter II.





### CHAPTER III.

# परोक्षमितरत् ॥ १॥

1. Parokşamitarat.

1. The other variety of Pramäna is Paroksa.

#### Commentary

In Chapter I Pramāņa has been defined. In Chapter II, aphorism I it has been mentioned that Pramāņa is of two kinds (Pratyakṣa and Parokṣa). Pratyakṣa Pramāṇa with its subdivisions has been described in detail in Chapter II. In the third chapter, the author proceeds to describe Parokṣa Pramāṇa with its varieties.

Paroksa Pramāņa is knowledge which is not clear.<sup>1</sup>. What is meant by clearness has been explained in Aphorism II. 4 of Pariksā-mukham. The knowledge in which the illumination is not clear according to this exposition is Paroksa<sup>2</sup>.

In Saddarsana-samuchchaya, the derivation of Paroksa has thus been given : "अक्षणां परं परोक्षं, अक्षेम्यः परतो वर्त्तत इति वा, परेणेन्द्रियादिना वोक्ष्यते परोक्षम्"।

In Nyāyāvatāra, Pratyakṣa and Parokṣa have thus been defined :

1. "अस्पष्टं परोक्षम् ।" Pramāna-naya-tattvālokālankāra III. I.

"स्वपरव्यवसायज्ञानं यदस्पष्टमुक्तळक्षणात् स्पष्टाद्विपरीतमविश्चदं तत् परोक्ष-मित्यवगन्तव्यम्।" Syādvādaratnākara, Chapter III. I.

"अविशदः परोक्षम्।" Pramāņa-mimāmsā, I. 2. I.

"अविशदः सम्यगर्थनिर्णयः परोक्षप्रमाणम् ।" Bhasya to Ibid.

"अविशदप्रतिभासं परोक्षम् ।" Nyāya-dipikā.

2. "यस्य ज्ञानस्य प्रतिभासो विशदो न भवति तत् परोक्षप्रमाणम् ।"

Nyāya-dīpikā.

"Such knowledge that takes cognizance of objects, not beyond the range of the senses, is Pratyakṣa (direct knowledge or perception); the other is known as Parokṣa (indirect knowledge) in reference to the manner of taking the cognizance" (Trans. by Dr. S. C. Vidyābhūṣaṇa)<sup>1</sup>.

In a note to this Dr. Vidyābhūṣaṇa writes "The words Pratyakṣa (direct knowledge) and Parokṣa (indirect knowledge) have been used here in their ordinary acceptations, namely, the first for sense-perceptions, and the second for inference and verbal testimony. In the ancient Jain Scriptures, however, Pratyakṣa (direct knowledge) signified perfect knowledge acquired by the soul direct through meditation and not through the channels of the senses, while Parokṣa (indirect knowledge) signified knowledge derived through the medium of the senses or signs comprising perception, inference and the verbal testimony." Nyāyāvatāra p. 9.

In defining clearness, Māņikyanandī has mentioned in Parīkṣā-mukham II. 4 that in case of clear knowledge there is no existence of any intermediate knowledge. In Parokṣa there is always an intermediate knowledge. For example, Parokṣa Pramāṇa as will be mentioned in the next aphorism is of five kinds : Smriti, Pratyabhijiāna, Tarka, Anumāna and Āgama. Of these Smriti (remembrance) is dependant on a previous experience. Pratyabhijiāna (recognition) depends on Smriti (remembrance) and cognition, Tarka depends on cognition, Smriti and Pratyabhijiāna; Anumāna depends on recognition of Linga (middle term) and Āgama depends on hearing of words. In each variety of Parokṣa

## "अपरोक्षतयार्थस्य माहकं ज्ञानमीदृशम् । प्रत्यक्षमितरत् ज्ञेयं परोक्षं महणेक्ष्या ॥"

Nyāyāvatāra IV.

This is identical with Verse 86 in Ṣaḍdarśana-samuchchaya of Haribhadra Sūri,

1.

Pramāņa, therefore, there is a dependance on another cognition while as shown before there is no such dependance in Pratyakşa Pramāņa<sup>1</sup>.

## प्रत्यक्षादिनिमित्तं स्षटतिप्रत्यभिज्ञानतर्कानुमानागमभेदम् ॥ २ ॥

 Pratyakşādinimittam smritipratyabhijñānatarkānumānāgamabhedam.

2. (Parokṣa) consists of varieties Smriti, Pratyabhijāāna, Tarka, Anumāna and Āgama and is caused by Pratyakṣa etc

#### Commentary

In this aphorism the five kinds of Parokṣa Pramāṇa are enumerated. It is mentioned that all these are caused by Pratyakṣa etc. In Prameya-ratnamālā it is mentioned that by the word "etc."<sup>2</sup> Parokṣa is to be understood as included as a cause. That is to say that some variety of Parokṣa Pramāṇa may be caused by Pratyakṣa Pramāṇa and some may be caused by Pratyakṣa as well as Parokṣa Pramāṇa or only by Parokṣa Pramāṇa. We have mentioned in the commentary on the previous aphorism how each of these varieties of Parokṣa Pramāṇa is dependant on Pratyakṣa and Parokṣa Pramāṇa.

Hemachandra mentions these varieties of Paroksa mentioning "Uha" in place of "Tarka" which is merely a synonym<sup>3</sup>. In

 "पंचविधस्याप्यस्य परोक्षस्य प्रत्ययांतरसापेक्षत्वेनैवोन्पत्तिः । तद् यथा, स्मरणस्य प्राक्तनानुभवापेक्षा, प्रत्यभिज्ञानस्य स्मरणानुभवापेक्षा, तर्कस्यानुभवस्मरण-प्रत्यभिज्ञानापेक्षा, अनुमानस्य च लिंगदर्शनाद्यपेक्षा, आगमस्य शब्दश्रवणसंकेतप्रहणाद्य-पेक्षा । प्रत्यक्षं तु न तथा, स्वातंत्र्येणैवोत्पत्तेः ।" Nyāya-dipikā.

2. "प्रत्यक्षादिनिमित्तमित्यत्रादिशब्देन परोक्षमपि गृहाते।" Prameyaratna-mala.

3. "स्मृतिप्रत्यभिज्ञानोहानुमानागमास्तद्विधयः।"

Pramāņa-mimāmsā, I. 2, 2,

Jain Education International

Pramāņanayatattvālokālankāra, the varieties are the same as mentioned in Parikṣāmukham<sup>1</sup>.

Maņibhadra mentioning these five varieties of Pramāņa adds that Mati-jñāna and Śruta-jñāna also are Parokṣa Pramāṇa<sup>2</sup>.

# संस्कारोद्वोधनिबन्धना तदित्याकारा स्मृतिः ॥ ३ ॥

3. Samskārodbodhanivandhanā tadityākārā smritih.

3. Remembrance is of the form "it is that" produced by the raising up of previous experience.

#### Commentary

We have mentioned before that when an object with all its particulars is definitely ascertained, we get a lasting impression of the object which is called Dhāraṇā. This impression is the Saṃskāra which enables us to remember the object afterwards. Remembrance consists of the knowledge "this is that" when this impression is aroused by any cognition.

In Pramāņa-naya-tattvālokālankāra it is mentioned "Remembrance arises from the awakening of the impression regarding an object previously cognised to the effect that this is that"<sup>3</sup>. Hemachandra calls this impression (Saṃskāra) Vāsanā and defining remembrance as caused by the awakening of Vāsanā to the form

## 1. "स्मरणप्रत्यभिज्ञानतकांनुमानागमभेदतस्तत् पञ्चप्रकारम् ।"

Pramāņanayatattvālokālankāra, III. 2.

2. "परोक्षं स्मरणप्रत्यभिज्ञानतर्कानुमानागमभेदम् । अमुयैव भङ्गया मतिश्रुत-झाने अपि परोक्षमेव ।" Commentary on Saddarsana-samuchchaya.

Dharmabhūṣaṇa also mentions the same five varieties of Parokṣa thus : "तत् पंचविधं—स्मृति: प्रत्यभिज्ञानं तर्कोऽनुमानागमश्चेति।" Nyāyadīpikā.

3. "तत्र संस्कारप्रवोधसंभूतमनुभूतार्थविषयं तदित्याकारं वेदनं स्मरणम् ।"

Pramāņanayatattvālokālankāra III. 3.

P-11

that 'this is that' lays down that though the impression exists always, it does not become the cause of remembrance unless it is awakened from its dormant state by the mitigation or disappearance of the obstructions and cognition of the previously experienced objects<sup>2</sup>.

In remembrance, therefore, there must be a previous cognition. For example, when we see a man named Devadatta and subsequently again see him, the impression of him derived at the first cognition is aroused on the second occasion and we have a knowledge "This is that Devadatta". Remembrance cannot arise when there is no previous cognition<sup>3</sup>.

The root of remembrance is Dhāraṇā<sup>4</sup>. Avagraha, Īhā and Avāya cannot cause remembrance as there is no Dhāraṇā in these stages of cognition. We have already stated that in the first stage (Avagraha) we have simply a knowledge of an object e.g. a man; in the second stage (Īhā) we desire to know particulars about the man and in the third stage (Avāya) we find the particulars. It is not until we go to the fourth stage (Dhāraṇā) that we acquire a lasting impression. This Dhāraṇā so modifies the soul that it produces knowledge in that object even after a lapse of time<sup>5</sup>.

"वासनोद्वोधहेतुका तदित्याकारा स्मृतिः।"

2. "चिरकालस्थायिन्यपि वासनाऽनुहुद्धा न स्मृतिहेतुः, आवरणक्षयोपशम-सदृशदर्शनादिसामग्रीलब्धप्रबोधा तु स्मृतिं जनयति " Bhāşya to Ibid.

3. ''तत्र का नाम स्मृतिः ? तदित्याकारा प्रागनुभूतवस्तुविषया स्मृतिः । यथा स देवदत्त इति । अत्र हि प्रागनुभूत एव देवदत्तस्तत्तया प्रतीयते, तस्मादेषा प्रतीतिस्तत्तोष्ठेखिन्यनुभूतविषया च, अननुभूतविषये तदनुत्पत्तेः ।'' Nyāya-dipikā.

4. "स्मृति-हेतुर्धारणा।" Pramäņa-mīmāmsā I. L. 29.

"तन्मूलं चानुभवो धारणारूप एव।" Nyāyadipikā.

5. "अवधहाद्रयनुभूतेऽपि धारणाया अभावे स्मृतिजननायोगात् । धारणा हि तथात्मानं संस्करोति यथासावात्मा काळान्तरेऽपि तस्मिन् विषये ज्ञानमुत्पादयति ।" Nyāya-dipikā.

Pramāņa-mimāņsā I. 2. 3.

One may object that Smriti can never be Pramāņa as it cognises an object already once cognised. The reply to this is that this objection is not maintainable. For as the different stages of Avagraha, Īhā, Avāya and Dhāraņā are Pramāņas though an object is perceived through these stages owing to peculiarities of each stage as distinct from those in other stages, so remembrance having a peculiarity viz. the knowledge "this is that" is a separate Pramāņa being not identical with the simple knowledge of an object on the first occasion<sup>1</sup>. Further, remembrance is opposed to forgetfulness, doubt etc. and so is recognised as a separate Pramāņa<sup>2</sup>.

Again, when one sees smoke and infers a fire, he goes to the spot to get fire if he wants it. Here the knowledge of fire is at first Parokṣa Pramāṇa being caused by inference and then when the person goes to the spot and sees the fire with his eyes, there is Pratyakṣa Pramāṇa. If we say that there cannot be any Pramāṇa when there is a first cognition, this Pratyakṣa knowledge of fire which follows an inference of fire does not also become Pramāṇa<sup>3</sup>.

## स देवदत्तो यथा॥ ४॥

4. Sa devadatto yathā.

4. As for example, "This is Devadatta".

### Commentary

This is an example of remembrance defined in the previous aphorism. When one sees a man named Devadatta previously seen 1. "नन्वेवं धारणागृहीत एव स्मरणस्योत्पत्तौ गृहीतम्राहित्वादप्रामाण्यं प्रसज्यत इति चेन्न, विषयविशेषसद्भावादीहादिवत्। यथा हि अवग्रहादिगृहीत-विषयानामीहादीनां विषयविशेषसद्भावात् स्वविषयसमारोपव्यवच्छेदकत्वेन प्रामाण्यं

तथा स्मरणस्यापि धारणागृहीतविषयप्रवृत्तावपि प्रामाण्यमेव। धारणाया हीदन्ता-वच्छित्रो विषयः, स्मरणस्य तु तत्तावच्छित्रः ।" Nyāya-dipikā.

2. "विस्मरणसंशयविपर्यासलक्षणः समारोपोऽस्ति तनिराकरणाचास्याः स्मृतेः प्रामाण्यम् ।" Prameyakamala-märtanda

3. "यदि चानुभूते प्रदुत्तमित्येतावता स्मरणप्रमाणं स्यात्, तर्हि अनुमिते अग्नौ पश्चात् प्रदृत्तं प्रत्यक्षमपि अप्रमाणं स्यात् ।" Nyāya-dipikā. and remembers that this is Devadatta we have Smriti. In Pramāņanayatattvālokālankāra, this example is given "As for example, this is that image of the Tirthankara"<sup>1</sup>.

# दर्शनस्मरणकारणकं संकल्जनं पत्यभिज्ञानम् , तदेवेदं तत्सदृशं तद्विलक्षणं तत्प्रतियोगोत्यादि ॥ ५ ॥

5. Darśanasmaraņakāraņakam samkalanam pratyabhijāānam tadevedam tatsadrišam tadvilakṣaṇam tatpratiyogītyādi.

## यथा स एवायं देवदत्त: ॥ ६ ॥

6. Yathā sa evāyam devadattah.

## गोसदृशो गवयः ॥ ७ ॥

7. Go-sadriśo gavayah.

# गोविलक्षणो महिषः ॥ ८ ॥

8. Go-vilakṣaṇo mahiṣaḥ.

## इद्मस्माद् दूरम् ॥ ९ ॥

9. Idamasmād dūram.

## व्रक्षोऽयमित्यादि ॥ १० ॥

10. Vrikşoyamityādi.

5. Pratyabhijůāna is the deduction following from Darsana and Smriti e. g. this is verily that, this is like that, this is different from that, this is opposite to that etc.

6. As for example, this is that Devadatta.

7. A Gavaya is like a cow.

- 8. A buffalo is different from a cow.
- 9. This is far from this.
- 10. This is a tree etc.

## "तत्तीर्थकरविम्बमिति यथा।"

Pramāņa-naya-tattvālokālankāra III. 4.

### Pariksāmukham

#### Commentary

In Pratyabhijñāna, we recognise an object by noticing similarities and differences. The differences between Smriti and Pratyabhijňāna may be illustrated thus. We see a certain man. We then remember that we have seen him previously. This is Smriti or Smarana. Then if we deduce that this is that very man named Devadatta, we have Pratyabhijñāna. Again, we may go to a forest and see a strange creature like a Gavaya. Then we remember that we have read or heard about such a creature and deduce from its similarities with a cow and the description read or heard before, that this is a Gavaya. We notice the characteristics of a buffalo and distinguish it from a cow. We judge the distance of an object and say that this is far or near. We decide that this is a tree or other object. All these and others are examples of Pratyabhijîāna.

In Hindu philosophics, a deduction from similarities has been recognised as a separate Pramāņa named Upamāna<sup>1</sup>. The Jain

 "उपमितिकरणमुपमानम् । तच्च सादृश्यज्ञानात्मकम् । उपमितित्व-जातिमत्युपमितिः । कथमियम् उत्पद्यत इति चेदुच्यते । गवयमजानन् कश्चिन्नागरिकः कंचिद्वनेचरं कीदृशो गवयपदवाच्य इति पृच्छति । ततस्तेनोक्तो गोसदृशो गवयपदवाच्य इत्युत्तरितः स कदाचिद् वनं गतो गोसदृशं पिंडं पश्यन् प्रागुक्तातिदेशवाक्यार्थं स्मृत्वासौ गवयपदवाच्य इति प्रतिपद्यते सोपमितिः ।" Tarka-kannudi

"तत्र साइंश्यप्रमाकरणमुपमानम् । तथाहि नगरेषु दृष्टगोपिण्डस्य पुरुषस्य वनं गतस्य गवयेन्द्रियसजिकर्षे सति भवति प्रतीतिः अयं पिंडो गोसदृश इति । तदनन्तरञ्च भवति निश्चयः अनेन सदृशी मदीया गौरिति ।" Vedanta-paribhasa. Chapter IV.

"Comparison or the recognition of likeness, is the cause of an inference from similarity. Such an inference consists in the knowledge of relation between a name and the thing so named. Its instrument is the knowledge of a likeness. The recollection of the purport of a statement of resemblance is the operation of that instrument. For example, a person not knowing what is meant by

### 86 The Sacred Books of the Jainas

view is that there is no necessity to recognise a separate Pramāņa named Upamāna arising from noticing similarities as this can be included within Pratyabhijñāna and not only similarities but dissimilarities ( e. g. those distinguishing a buffalo from a cow ) and knowledge of distance or nearness is got from Pratyabhijñāna. Dharmabhūṣaṇa summarises this and a detailed exposition of the same has been made by Prabhāchandra<sup>1</sup>.

Hemachandra has followed the definition of Pratyabhijiāna as laid down in Parikṣā-mukham<sup>2</sup>. The substance of the definition in Pramāṇa-nayatattvālokālaṅkāra is the same though the language is somewhat different<sup>3</sup>.

the word Gavaya having heard from some inhabitant of the forest that a Gavaya is like a cow, goes to the forest. Remembering the purport of what he has been told, he sees a body like that of a cow. Then this inference from similarity arises (in his mind) that this is what is meant by the word Gavaya." Tarka-sangraha, Translated by Jacob. Page 12.

 "साद्दरयप्रत्यभिज्ञानसुपमानाख्यं पृथक् प्रमाणभिति केचित् कथयन्ति तदसत् । स्मृत्यनुभवपूर्वकसंकल्लज्ञानत्वेन प्रत्यभिज्ञानत्वानतिव्वत्तेः । अन्यथा गोविल्रक्षणो महिष इत्यादिविसद्दरात्वप्रत्ययस्य इदमस्माटदूरम् इत्यादेश्च प्रत्ययस्य स-प्रतियोगिकस्य पृथक्-प्रमाणत्वं स्यात् । ततो वैसाद्दरयादि-प्रत्ययकत् साद्दरयप्रत्ययस्यापि प्रत्यभिज्ञानल्रक्षणाक्रान्तत्वेन प्रत्यभिज्ञानत्वमेवेति प्रामाणिकपद्धतिः ।"

Nyāya-dipikā.

''गोसदृशगवयाभिधानयोर्वाच्यवाचकसंबंधं प्रतिपद्यं पुनर्गवयदर्शनात् तत्प्रतिपत्तिः प्रत्यभिज्ञा किं नेष्यते ?'' Prameyakamala-mārtaņḍa.

2 "दर्शनस्मरणसंभवं तदेवेदं तत्सदृशं तद्विलक्षणं तत्प्रतियोगीत्यादिसंकलनं प्रत्यभिज्ञानम्।" Pramāņa-mīmāmsā I. 2. 4.

 "अनुभवस्मृतिहेतुकं तिर्थगूर्ध्वतासामान्यादिगोचरं संकलनात्मकं ज्ञानं प्रत्यभिज्ञानम्।"

"यथा तज्जातीय एवायं गोपिण्डो गोसदृशो गवयः स एवायं जिनदत्त इत्यादि।" Pramāņanayatattvālokālankāra. III. 5. 6.

#### Pariksāmukham

In the tenth aphorism, the word "etc." has been used. In Prameya-ratna-mālā, it is mentioned that by this word the recognition of other objects from distinguishing characteristics is included. For example, a swan is recognised from its power of separating milk from water, a bee is recognised from having six legs, a Saptaparna tree is recognised from having seven leaves, a Mechaka jewel is recognised from its having five colours, a young woman is recognised from her high breasts, a rhinoceros is recognised from its single horn, a Śarabha ( a fabulous creature ) is recognised from its eight legs and a lion is recognised from its manes"<sup>1</sup>.

# डपलम्भानुपलम्भनिमित्तं व्यासिज्ञानमूहः ॥११॥

11. Upalambhānupalambhanimittam vyāptijāānamūhah.

# इदमस्मिन् सत्येव भवत्यसति न भवत्येवेति च ॥१२॥

12. Idamasmin satyeva bhavatyasati na bhavatyeveti cha.

# यथाग्नावेव धूमस्तद्भावे न भवत्येवेति च ॥१३॥

13. Yathāgnāveva dhūmastadabhāve na bhavatyeveti cha.

11. The knowledge of universal concomitance arising from finding and not finding, is  $\overline{U}ha$  (or Tarka ).

17. Such as, this exists when that exists and this does not exist when that does not exist.

13. For example, smoke exists only in fire and when there is no fire, there is no smoke.

 "पयोंबुभेदी हंसः स्यात् षट्पदैः श्रमरः स्मृतः । सप्तपर्णैस्तु तत्त्वज्ञैर्विज्ञेयो विषमच्छदः ॥ पंचवर्णौर्भवेद् रत्नं मेचकाख्यं पृथुस्तनी । युवतिश्चैकश्वं गोऽपि गण्डकः परिकीर्त्तितः ॥ शरभोऽप्यष्टभिः पादैः सिंहश्चारुसटान्वितः ॥''

Verses quoted in Prameya-ratnamālā.

#### Commentary

From this aphorism, begins the most important subject of inference which attracted the subtle brains of all the Jain, Hindu and Buddhist logicians. In this aphorism Vyāptijñāna ( the knowledge of universal concomitance ) which is the basis of all inference is defined. It should be remembered that in Hindu Nyāya philosophy Tarka is defined as a special kind of knowledge ( Sambhāvanā ). Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara have followed this interpretation in their commentaries on the Nyāyasūtra of Gautama. The later writers like Udayana also define Tarka as a special kind of objection. But in Jain logic Tarka is defined as knowledge of universal concomitance. In Nyāya-dipikā we-find "The knowledge of universal concomitance is Tarka"<sup>1</sup>.

Vyāpti (universal concomitance) is a kind of relation-ship between the middle term and the major term. The middle term is technically called (as will be seen later on) Hetu, Linga or Sādhana. The major term is known as Sādhya or Vyāpaka. The minor term is known as Pakṣa. Vyāpti is also called Avinābhāva<sup>2</sup>. The example given universally to explain Vyāpti is this : 'Where there is smoke, there is fire'.

In other words, Tarka is a separate Pramāņa which is instrumental in producing a knowledge of Vyāpti or Abinābhāva<sup>3</sup>. In Śloka-vārttika it is mentioned "Tarka is the instrumental cause of the result consisting of cessation of ignorance regarding the relationship of the major term and the middle term"<sup>4</sup>.

 $\overline{\mathbf{U}}$ ha is another name of Tarka<sup>5</sup>.

1. "व्याप्तिज्ञानं तर्कः ।" Nyāya-dipikā.

2. "साध्यसाधनयोर्गम्यगमकभावप्रयोजको व्यभिचारगंधासहिष्णुः संबंध-विशेषो व्याप्तिरविनाभाव इति च व्यपदिश्यते ।" Nyäya-dipikā.

3. "तस्याश्चाविनाभावापरनाम्न्या व्याप्तेः प्रमितौ यत् साधकतमं तदिदं तर्कीख्यं पृथक् प्रमाणम् ('' Nyāya-dipikā.

4. "साध्यसाधनसंबंध्यज्ञाननिवृत्तरूपे हि फले साधकतमस्तर्कः ।"

Śloka-vārttika.

5, "उह इति तर्कस्यैव व्यपदेशान्तरम्।" Nyāya-dipikā.

Tarka or Uha concludes the presence or absence of one thing in connection with another in all places and times. We find fire when we see smoke. After constant knowledge of this kind we conclude that in all places and at all times smoke is inseparable from fire. This Tarka Pramāņa is different from Pratyakşa in which the relationship of fire and smoke is perceived only in a place which is near but no knowledge of universal concomitance arises from Pratyakşa<sup>1</sup>.

In Pramāņanayatattvālokālaņkāra, it has been mentioned "Tarka which is also called Uha is knowledge produced from finding and not finding, dependant on the relationship of the major term and the middle term in the past, present and future viz. that this happens on that. As for example, wherever there is some smoke, this must be on account of the existence of fire and when it ( i.e. fire ) does not exist, this ( smoke ) does not exist"<sup>2</sup>.

Hemachandra's definition of Tarka or Uha is identical with that in Parīkṣā-mukham<sup>a</sup>.

In the relation of two things like smoke and fire, one object (e.g. smoke) is called Vyāpya, and the other (e.g. fire) is known as Vyāpaka. Hemachandra therefore defines Vyāpti thus : "Vyāpti is existence of Vyāpaka whenever there is Vyāpya or the existence of Vyāpya whenever there is Vyāpaka"<sup>4</sup>.

 'अत्र हि धूमे सति भूयोऽग्न्युपलंभे, सर्वत्र सर्वदा धूमोऽग्निं न व्यभिचरति, एवं सर्वोपसंहारेणाविनाभाविज्ञानं पश्चादुत्पन्नं तर्काख्यं प्रत्यक्षादेः पृथगेव । प्रत्यक्षस्य सन्निहितदेश एव धूमाग्निसंबंधप्रकाशनान्न व्याप्रिप्रकाशकत्वम् ।'' Nyāya-dīpikā.

 "उपलंभानुपलंभसंभवं त्रिकालीकलितसाध्यसाधनसंबध्याद्यालंबनमिद-मस्मिन्सत्येव भवतीत्याद्याकारं संवेदनमूहापरनामा तर्कः ॥

"यथा यावान् कश्चिद् धूमः स सर्वो वह्नौ सत्त्येव भवतीति तस्मिन्नसत्यौ न भवत्येवेति ॥" Pramāņanayatattvālokālankāra. III. 7. 8.

"अपलंभानुपलंभनिमित्तं व्याप्तिज्ञानमूहः।"

Pramāņa-mimāmsā. I. 2. 5.

4. "व्याप्तिव्यापकस्य व्याप्ये सति भाव एव व्याप्यस्य वा तत्रैव भावः ।"

Pramāņa-mimāmsā. 1. 2. 6.

**P-1**2

## साधनात् साध्यविज्ञानमनुमानम् ॥१४॥

14. Sādhanāt sādhyavijnānamanumānam.

14. Anumāna (inference) is the knowledge of Sādhya (the major term) from Sādhana (the middle term).

#### Commentary

A definition of Sādhana will be given in the next aphorism and Sādhya will be defined in aphorism 20.

Sādhana as we have already mentioned is the middle term and Sādhya the major term. In inference we have a knowledge of Sādhya (e.g. fire) from Sādhana (e.g. smoke). The syllogism will be detailed later on.

It may be mentioned here that in Hindu philosophies like the Nyāya and Vaišesika systems, the knowledge derived from Anumāna Pramāņa is called Anumiti but in Jain logic, the knowledge itself is called Anumāna. The result of Anumāna, according to Jain logic, is the cessation of ignorance. Māņikya-nandī has devoted a separate chapter (Samuddeša V) where the result of Pramāņas is discussed in detail. We shall deal with this subject there.

Hemachandra and Dharma-bhūṣaṇa's definition of Anumāna is the same as mentioned in this aphorism<sup>1</sup>. In Śloka-vārttika it is mentioned "The wise know Anumāna to be the knowledge of Sādhya from sādhana"<sup>2</sup>. The Sādhana must be Jňāyamāna ( in a knowing state ) to produce Anumāna. Otherwise no inference can arise. For example, to a sleeping man, smoke cannot give rise

1. "साधनात् साध्यविज्ञानमनुमानम्।"

Pramāņa-mīmāmsā I. 2. 7 and Nyāya-dipikā.

2. "साधनात् साध्यविज्ञानमनुमानं विदुर्बुधाः ।" Śloka-vārttika.

## Pariksāmukham

to an inference of fire<sup>1</sup>. Sādhana is also known as Linga or Hetu. Vātsyāyana in his Bhāşya on Nyāya-sūtras of Gautama (I. 1. 3) has mentioned "Anumāna is the subsequent knowing of the Lingi (e. g. fire) by the Linga (e. g. smoke) in its knowing state"<sup>2</sup>. Udayanāchārya while explaining "Tallingamanu-māpakam" of the Praśastapādabhāṣya has mentioned that Jnāyamāna linga is the instrumental cause of Anumāna<sup>3</sup>.

It appears from the Vaišeşika Sūtra of Kaņāda<sup>\*</sup> and the statement of Prašastapāda the writer of the Bhāşya on the Vaišeşika Sūtras<sup>5</sup> that they also admit that inference results from Jňāyamāna Linga.

# साध्याविनाभावित्वेन निश्चितो हेतुः ॥१५॥

15. Sādhyāvinābhāvitvena niśchito hetuh.

15. Hetu ( or Sādhana or Linga ) is that which is fixed in concomitance with Sādhya.

### Commentary

In this aphorism Sādhana is defined. That which cannot be without Sādhya is Sādhana or Hetu, e. g. smoke which can never

 "साधनाज्ज्ञायमानाद् धूमादेः साध्येऽग्न्यादौ छिंगिनि यद्विज्ञानं तदनु-मानम् । अज्ञायमानस्य तस्य साध्यज्ञानजनकत्वे हि सुप्तादीनामण्यग्न्यादिज्ञानोत्पत्ति-प्रसंगः ।" Nyāya-dipikā.

2. "मितेन लिंगेन लिंगिनोऽर्थस्य पश्चानमानमनुमानम्।"

Vātsyāyana-Bhāşya.

<u>91</u>

"अनुमितिरूपप्रमाकरणम् । एतेन परामृब्यमाणं लिंगमनुमानम् ।"

Guņa-Kiraņāvali.

4. "देतुरपदेशो लिंगं प्रमाणं करणमित्यनर्थान्तरम् ।"

Vaiseșika Sūtra. 9. 2. 4.

 "अनुमेयेन संबंध प्रसिद्धं च तदुन्विते । तदभावे च नास्त्येव तद्धिंगमनुमापकम् ॥" Prasastapāda. be without fire. This is also known as Linga (sign or mark) and is the same as the middle term of a syllogism.

Kumāranandi Bhaṭṭāraka has mentioned "A Linga has the characteristic of being non-existent otherwise" ( "अन्यथानुपपत्त्येकल्ल्ल्ण् लिंगमम्येत ।") e. g. smoke is non-existent otherwise than with fire. In Pramāṇa-naya-tattvālokālaṅkāra the same view is expressed<sup>4</sup>. In other words, a Sādhana can exist only in relation with Sādhya. It is therefore the determinant of Sādhya.

# सहक्रमभावनियमोऽविनाभावः ॥ १६॥

16. Sahakramabhāvaniyamo a-vinābhāvah.

16. Avinābhāva ( or Vyāpti ) is the rule of co-existence or the existence of one following the other ( being related as cause and effect ).

### Commentary

Vyāpti, which has already been explained before, is here deseribed as being of two kinds being connected in co-existence or in existence of one after another as in the case of a cause and its effect. These are being elucidated in the aphorisms which follow. Hemachandra also defines Avinābhāva in a similar manner<sup>2</sup>.

## सहचारिणोर्व्याप्यव्यापकयोश्च सहभावः ॥ १७ ॥

17. Sahachārinorvyāpyavyāpakayoscha sahabhāvah.

17. Sahabhāva exists in objects co-existent or in objects Vyāpya and Vyāpaka.

1. "निश्चितान्यथानुपपत्त्येकल्क्षणो हेतुः ॥"

Pramāņa-nayatattvālokālankāra III. 11.

2. ''सहक्रमभाविनोः सहक्रमभावनियमोऽविनाभावः ।''

### Pramāņa-mimāņsā 1. 2. 10.

## Pariksāmukham

### Commentary

The universal concomitance as exemplified by Sahabhāva can be seen in the form and colour in a fruit or being a tree and being a Śimśapā ( a kind of tree ). The former is an example of co-existence and the latter a relationship of Vyāpya and Vyāpaka<sup>1</sup>.

# पूर्वोत्तरचारिणोः कार्यकारणयोश्च क्रमभावः ॥ १८ ॥

18. Pürvottarachāriņoķ kāryakāraņayoscha kramabhāvaķ.

18. Krama-bhāva exists in cases when one follows the other or in the case of cause and effect.

### Commentary

The example commonly given in Jain logic of one following the other is : the constellation Krittikā is followed by the constellation Rohiņī. The example of cause and effect is given as smoke following fire<sup>2</sup>.

## तर्कात्तन्निर्णयः ॥ १९ ॥

19. Tarkāt tannirņayah.

19. This is ascertained by Tarka.

### Commentary

We have already explained that by Tarka (universal concomitance) inference is caused. The Jain philosophers sometimes hold that cause and effect are the same (Abheda) and according to such a view though universal concomitance itself is called Tarka, it is mentioned in this aphorism that Tarka determines universal concomitance. Hemachandra also holds this view<sup>3</sup>.

1. 'सहचारिणोः रूपरसयोः व्याप्यव्यापकयोश्च वृक्षत्वशिंशपात्वयोरिति।"

Prameya-ratna-mālā.

2. "पूर्वोत्तरचारिणोः कृत्तिकोद्यशकटोदययोः कार्यकारणयोश्च धूमधूमध्व-जयोः क्रमभावः ।'' Prameya-ratna-mālā.

3. "उद्यात्तनिश्चय: ।" Pramāņa-mimāmsā I. 2. 11.

# इष्टमबाधितमसिद्धं साध्यम् ॥ २० ॥

20. Iştamabādhitamasiddham sādhyam.

# सन्दिग्धविपर्धस्ताव्युत्पन्नानां साध्यत्धं यथा स्यादित्यसिद्धपदम् ॥ २१ ॥

21. Sandigdhaviparyastāvyutpannānām sādhyatvam yathā syādityasiddhapadam.

# अनिष्ठाध्यश्नादिवाधितयोः साध्यत्वं माभूदितीष्ठा-बाधितवचनम् ॥ २२ ॥

22. Aniştādhyakşādivādhitayoh sādhyatvam mā bhūditistāvādhitavachanam.

# न चासिद्धवदिष्टं प्रतिवादिनः ॥ २३ ॥

23. Na chāsiddhavadistam prativādinah.

## प्रत्यायनाय हीच्छा वक्तुरेव ॥ २४ ॥

24. Pratyāyanāya hichchhā vaktureva.

20. Sādhya is what is desired and what is Abādhita (i. e. opposed to Pratyakşa etc.) and what is not Siddha (already established).

21. The word "Asiddha" has been used in defining Sādhya so that the doubtful, the false and the not understood may become Sādhya.

22 The words "Işta" and "Abādhita" have been used so that what is not desired and what is opposed to Pratyakṣa etc. might not be ( included in the definition of ) Sādhya.

23. In the case of an adversary, "Ista" is not required like "Asiddha".

24. The intention to explain exists only in the speaker.

## Parīkṣāmukham

#### Commentary

Sādhya (the major term) is defined in Aphorism 20. That which one wishes to establish is Sādhya. For example, we want to establish fire when we see smoke. So fire is Sādhya. But it should be noted that there should not be any Bādhā (hindrance). Hemachandra has mentioned that Bādhā is of six kinds (i) that which is opposed to Pratyakṣa (ii) that which is opposed to Anumāna (iii) that which is opposed to Āgama (iv) that which is opposed to popular belief (v) that which is opposed to one's own words and (vi) that which is opposed to belief<sup>4</sup>

That which is opposed to Pratyaksa is thus illustrated. If one says that fire is cold, honey is not sweet, jasmine flowers are not sweet-scented, a pitcher is invisible etc. we have examples of Pratyakşabādhā. The instance of Bādhā by Anumāna is : "The palm of the hand is hairy". Agama-badha is what is against the injunctions of scriptures, for example, "Dharma does not produce happiness after death". It is enjoined in the scriptures that Dharma leads to happiness after death. Loka-bādhā is what is against popular belief. For example, "The skull of a human being is a clean object". The popular belief in this case is that skulls of human beings are unclean objects. Bādhā regarding one's own words are exemplified in "My mother is barren." That which is against belief is Pratiti-bādhā e.g. Chandra ( the moon ) is not Śaśi ( the moon ) We know that Chandra and Śaśi are synonyms signifying the moon<sup>2</sup>.

1. "प्रत्यक्षानुमानागमळोकस्ववचनप्रतीतयो बाधाः ॥"

Pramāņa-mīmāņsā I. 2. 14.

2. "तत्र प्रत्यक्षबाधा यथा अनुष्णोऽग्निः, न मधु मधुरं, न सुगंधि विदल्त्-मालतीमुकुलं, अचाक्षुषो घटः, अश्रावणः शब्दः, नास्ति बहिरर्थ इत्यादि । अनुमान-बाधा यथा, सरोम हस्ततलं, नित्यः शब्द इति वा ।…आगमबाधा यथा प्रेत्यासुखप्रदो धर्म इति, परलोके सुखप्रदत्वं धर्मस्य सर्वागमसिद्धम् । लोकबाधा यथा, शुचि नरशिरः-कपालमिति, लोके हि नरशिरःकपालादीनां अशुचित्वं सुप्रसिद्धं । स्ववचनबाधा Śadhya again should be one not previously established. Objects in cases of doubt e. g. when we are not certain whether this is a post or a man, cases of mistake e. g. when we mistake nacre to be silver and cases where we have no clear knowledge as when we merely touch a thing while going without clearly perceiving what it is, can become Sādhya. For, in these cases we establish by inference what the real thing is.

The three adjectives "Işta", "Abādhita" and "Asiddha" are therefore necessary. These have been termed "Abhipsita", "Anirākrita" and "Apratīta" in Prameya-naya-tattvālokālankāra<sup>1</sup> and "Sisādhayişita", "Abādhya" and "Asiddha" by Hemachandra<sup>2</sup>.

Some may say, you have mentioned that what is desired is Sādhya. The desire of human beings is to sit, lie down, eat, go etc. So these should be Sādhya. In Prameyaratnamālā this is refuted by saying that by desire is meant the desire in connection with Sādhana. The meaning is to be understood according to the context. When we see a Sādhana ( e. g. smoke ) we desire to know of what this is a sign and the desired object inferred from the Sādhana ( e. g. fire ) is the Sādhya<sup>3</sup>.

यथा माता मे बन्ध्येति। प्रतीतिवाधा यथा, अचनद्रः शशीति, अत्र शशिनश्चन्द्र शब्द-वाच्यत्वं प्रतीतिसिद्धम् इति प्रतीति-वाधा।" Pramāņa-Mimāmsā Bhāsya to 1. 2. 14.

 "अप्रतीतमनिराक्ठतमभीष्सितं साध्यम्॥ शंकितविपरीतानध्यवसितवस्तॄनां साध्यताप्रतिपत्त्यर्थमप्रतीतवचनम् ॥ प्रत्यक्षादिविरुद्धस्य साध्यत्वं मा प्रसञ्यता-मित्यनिराक्ठतप्रहणम् ॥ अनभिप्रेतस्यासाध्यत्वप्रतिपत्त्तपेऽभीष्सितपदोपादानम् ॥"

Pramāņanayatattvālokālankāra. III. 14-17

2. "सिसाधयिषितमसिद्धमवाध्यं साध्यं पक्षः ॥"

Pramāņa-mimāņisā I. 1. 13.

3. "अत्रापरे दूषणमाचश्चते, आसनशयनभोजनयाननिधुवनादेरपीष्ठत्वात्तदपि साध्यमनुषज्यत इति । तेऽप्यतिवालिशा अप्रस्तुतप्रलापित्वात् । अत्र हि साधनमधि-क्रियते । तेन साधनविषयत्वेनेप्सितमिष्टमुच्यते ।" Prameya-ratna-mālā. This adjective "Ista" (desired) is to be taken in connection with one's own intention. For, the person wishing to know fire from the smoke has this desire. When the inference of fire from smoke is explained to another person (who is technically called Prativādī), the Sādhya (fire) is not "Ista" to the latter. All the adjectives are not applicable to all parties but some to some parties according to use<sup>1</sup>. Hemachandra has used the word "सिसाधयिषितम्" explaining it as "साधयितुमिष्ट" (i.e. desired to establish) to evade this controversy in his definition of Sādhya.

Akalańka Deva in Nyāya-vinišchaya has thus defined Sādhya :—

# "साध्यं शक्यमभिष्रेतमप्रसिद्धं ततोऽपरं । साध्याभासं विरुद्धादि साधनाविषयात्वतः ॥"

i. e. "Sādhya is Śakya (fit to be established not being opposed to Pramāna etc.), Abhipreta or Işta ( desired ) and Aprasiddha or Asiddha ( like objects in cases of doubt, mistake or non-distinction ). The opposite to Sādhya is Sādhyābhāsa. These are Viruddha ( opposed to Pratyakṣa etc ) etc. because these cannot be made known by Sādhana."

In Śloka-vārttika Sādhana and Sādhya have been similarly defined :

# "अन्यथानुपपत्त्येकछक्षणं तत्र साधनं ।

## साध्यं शक्यमभिन्नेतमप्रसिद्धमुदाहतं ॥"

i. e. "the characteristic of Sādhana is that it does not arise otherwise and "Sādhya is Śakya, Abhipreta and Aprasiddha."

Dharmabhūşaņa also has followed these definitions<sup>2</sup>.

 ''न हि सर्वं सर्वांपेक्षया विशेषणम् , अपि तु किंचित् कमण्युद्दिश्य भवतीति ।…यथा असिद्धं प्रतिवाद्यपेक्षया न तथेष्ठम् इत्यर्थः ।''

Prameyaratnamālā. 2. "शक्यमभिप्रेतमप्रसिद्धं साध्यं। यत्प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणाबाधितत्त्वेन साधयितुं शक्यं, वाद्यभिमतत्वेनाभिप्रेतं, संदेहाद्याक्रान्तत्वेनाप्रसिद्धं तदेव साध्यम्।" Nyāyadipikā.

P-13

. •

# साध्यं धर्म: कचित्तविशिष्ठो वा धर्मी ॥२५॥

25. Sādhyam dharmah kvachittadvisisto vā dharmī.

25. Sādhya is a Dharma and sometimes it is Dharmi in which there is the abode of the Dharma.

#### Commentary

In our familiar example we have seen that fire is the Sādhya (or the major term). Now, a distinction is being made. It is urged that when we have a knowledge of universal concomitance, Sādhya is a Dharma. For in such cases we hold : wherever there is smoke there is fire. Here Sādhya is fire. But after the inferential process we have the Dharmi (e.g. the mountain in which the fire is) which is the abode of the Dharma (Sādhya ) as described above. This Dharmi is technically called the Paksa (the minor term) as will be mentioned in the next aphorism. When Sādhya is merely Dharma, there is no For example, whenever we see smoke, we knowledge of Dharmi. have an idea of fire but not of mountain or other object containing It is only when Sādhya is Dharmi, that we have the idea the fire. of the thing which is the abode of Dharma which is technically called Paksa<sup>1</sup>.

## पक्ष इति यावत् ॥ २६ ॥

26. Pakşa iti yāvat.

26. This is also known as Paksa ( the minor term ).

#### Commentary

It has been explained in the previous aphorism that the Dharmi containing the Dharma of Sädhya is called Pakşa. For

1. "साध्यं साध्यधर्मविशिष्टो धर्मी कचित्तु धर्मः ।" Pramāņamimāmsā I. 2. 15

'व्याप्तिग्रहणसमयापेक्ष्या साध्यं धर्म एवान्यथा तदनुपपत्तेः ॥

## न हि यत्र यत्र धूमस्तत्र चित्रभानोरिव धरित्रीधरस्याप्यनुवृत्तिरस्ति ॥

आनुमानिकप्रतिपत्त्यवसरापेक्ष्या तु पक्षापरपर्यायस्तडिशिष्टः प्रसिद्धो धर्मी ॥''

Pramāņanayatattvālokālankāra III. 19-21

### Pariksāmukham

example, a mountain is Pakṣa as in it there is fire (Sādhya). In other words when we want to separate Dharma and Dharmī, we say that Sādhya is Dharma (viz. in the case of fire) but when we do not want to separate Dharma from Dharmī, we say that Sādhya is Dharmī or Pakṣa (e. g. the mountain in which there is abode of fire).

## प्रसिद्धो धर्मी ॥ २७ ॥

27. Prasiddho dharmi.

27. Dharmi is well known.

### Commentary

A Dharmi is known sometimes by Pramāṇa, sometimes by Vikalpa (imagination) and sometimes both by Vikalpa and Pramāṇa<sup>1</sup>. Hemachandra writes that a Dharmi is Pramāṇasiddha as well as Buddhi-siddha<sup>2</sup>.

The example of knowledge of a Dharmi by Vikalpa is : "There exists an omniscient being". The example of knowledge of a Dharmi by Pramāņa is : "This mountain has fire." The example of knowledge of a Dharmi both by Pramāņa and Vikalpa is "Sound is not eternal"<sup>3</sup>.

# विकल्पसिद्धे तस्मित् सत्तेतरे साध्ये ॥ २८ ॥

28. Vikalpa-siddhe tasmin sattetare sädhye.

# अस्ति सर्वज्ञो नास्ति खरविषाणम् ॥ २९ ॥

29. Asti sarvajño nāsti kharavişāņam.

- "प्रसिद्धत्वं च धर्मिणः कचित् प्रमाणात्, कचिद्विकल्पात्, कचित्-प्रमाणविकल्पाभ्याम्।" Nyāyadipikā.
  - "कचिद्विकल्पतः कुत्रचित् प्रमाणतः कापि विकल्पप्रमाणाभ्याम् ।"

Pramāņanayatattvālokālankāra III. 21

2. "धर्मी प्रमाणसिद्धः ॥ बुद्धिसिद्धोऽपि ॥"

Pramāņa-mimāņsā, I. 2. 16-17

3. "यथा समस्ति समस्तवस्तुवेदी, श्चितिधरकंधरेयं धूमध्वजवती, ध्वनिः परिणतिमान् ॥" Pramāņanayatattvālokālankāra III. 22

### 100 The Sacred Books of the Jainas

28. When it ( Dharmi ) is established by Vikalpa, the Sādhya consists of existence and non-existence.

29. The omniscient exists. Horns of the ass do not exist.

#### Commentary

When we see smoke and infer fire, the object in which the fire is (e. g. the mountain) is known by Pratyaksa Pramāna. But in the case of our belief in the existence and non-existence viz. "the omniscient exists" or "Horns of the ass do not exist" the Sādhya consisting of existence or non-existence is preceded by our such belief. So these are cases of Vikalpa-siddhi of the Dharmi<sup>1</sup>.

# प्रमाणोभयसिद्धे तु साध्यधर्मविशिष्टता ॥ ३० ॥

30. Pramāņobhayasiddhe tu sādhyadharmavišistatā.

## अग्निमानयं देश: परिणामी शब्द इति यथा ॥ ३१ ॥

31. Agnimānayam dešah pariņāmi šabda iti yathā.

30. When (a Dharmi) is established by Pramāņa or by both (i. e. by Pramāņa and Vikalpa), it is characterised by having the Dharma as Sādhya.

31. As for example, this place has fire ; sound is transient.

#### Commentary

In a Dharmi which is establihed by Pramāņa, the Sādhya exists as Dharma. For example, we see by Pratyakşa a place

 'विकल्पसिद्धो यथा, सर्वज्ञः अस्ति सुनिश्चित्तासंभववाधकप्रमाणत्वात् इत्यस्तित्वे साध्ये सर्वज्ञः । अथवा खरविषाणं नास्तिति नास्तित्वे साध्ये खरविषाणं । सर्वज्ञो ह्यस्तित्वसिद्धेः प्राङ् न प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणसिद्धः । अपि तु प्रतीतिमात्र-सिद्ध इति विकल्पसिद्धोऽयं धर्मी । तथा खरविषाणमपि नास्तित्वसिद्धेः प्राग् विकल्प-सिद्धं ॥'' "विकल्पसिद्धे तु धर्मिणि सत्तासत्त्तयोरेव साध्यत्वमिति नियमः ।'' Nyāyadipikā. containing fire and the place (which is Dharmi or Pakşa) has the Dharma (or Sādhya) c. g. fire. The example of a Dharmi established by Pramāņa as well as by Vikalpa is this: Sound is transient because it is caused (by some). Here sound can be established by Pramāņa as well as by Vikalpa<sup>1</sup>.

# व्यासौ तु साध्यं धर्म एव ॥ ३२ ॥

32. Vyāptau tu sādhyam dharma eva.

## अन्यथा तद्घटनात् ॥ ३३ ॥

33. Anyathā tadaghatanāt.

32. In universal concomitance, the Sādhya is only Dharma ( and not Dharmi )

33. Otherwise, it (i.e. universal concomitance) cannot happen.

### Commentary

It is not possible to find an universal concomitance seeing smoke that all mountains contain fire<sup>2</sup>. So in such a case the Sādhya viz. the fire is only Dharma and not Dharmi or Pakṣa viz. mountain. In other words, the universal concomitance is between fire and smoke but not between smoke and the object which is the abode of fire. So, a distinction should be made in this case by saying that here the Sādhya is only a Dharma and not a Dharmi.

# साध्यधर्माधारसंदेहापनोदाय गम्यमानस्यापि पक्षस्य वचनम् ॥ ३४ ॥

34. Sādhyadharmādhārasandebāpanodāya gamyamānasyāpi pakṣasya vachanam.

1. 'तत्र प्रमाणसिद्धो धर्मी यथा धूमक्तवादग्निमत्वे साध्ये पर्वतः खलु प्रत्यक्षेणानुमूयते ।....उभयसिद्धो धर्मी यथा शब्दो परिणामी कृतकत्वात् इत्यत्र शब्दः ।" Nyāya-dīpikā.

2. "न हि धूमदर्शनात् सर्वत्र पर्वतोऽग्निमानिति व्याप्तिः शक्या कर्त्तुं प्रमाण-विरोधात् ॥" Prameyaratnamālā.

## साध्यधर्मिणि साधनधर्माववोधनाय पक्षधर्मोपसंहारवत् ॥ ३५ ॥

35. Sādhyadharmiņi sādhanadharmāvavodhanāya pakṣadharmopasaṃhāravat.

# को वा त्रिधा हेतुमुक्त्वा समर्थयमानो न पक्षयति ॥ ३६ ॥

36. Ko vā tridhā hetumuktvā samarthayamāno na paksayati.

34. The Pakṣa is used though it is understood (from Pratyakṣa) to dispel doubts regarding the abode of Sādhya when it is a Dharma.

35. As for example, Upanaya is used to explain the Dharma of Sādhana (the middle term, sign or mark) in the Dharmi containing Sādhya.

36. Is there any one who does not use a Pakṣa to substantiate after mentioning the three kinds of Hetu?

#### Commentary

It may be urged that in inference, there is no necessity of a Pakşa. For in the case of inference of fire in a mountain by seeing smoke, the mountain (Pakşa) is established by Pratyakşa. So it is not necessary to establish it again by inference (Anumāna). It is redundant to establish by inference, what we get by Pratyakşa.

In answer to this, it is urged, that mention of Pakşa is necessary to localize the Sādhya. Smoke may be in the mountain or in kitchens or in other places. To remove doubts as to where the smoke exists, the use of Pakşa is necessary. Excluding the Pakşa, we will only get a mention of the abstract relationship between smoke and fire. It may in such a case reduce Anumāna to Tarka e.g. 'where is this fire which is indicated by smoke ?' Or it may lead to an absurd inference e.g. existence of fire in a lake.

"Some philosophers hold that the minor term ( Pakşa ) is not an essential part of an inference. But this view according to the Jainas, is untenable, it being absolutely necessary to state the minor term ( Pakşa ) in the inference<sup>1</sup>."

<sup>1.</sup> Dr. Satischandra Vidyābhūşan : Nyāyāvatāra. p. 15

Siddhasena Divākara has mentioned in his Nyāyāvatāra :

"It (i.e. Pakşa) is to be used here (in an inference for the sake of others), as exhibiting an abode of the reason (i.e. the middle term called Hetu).

Otherwise owing to a misconception as to the abode of reason (i.e. Pakşa or the minor term) as intended by the disputant his reason (Heta or the middle term) may appear to his opponent as absurd.

A man who has come to behold the excellence of an archer will have to behold the opposite of it, if the archer hits without fixing an  $aim^{4}$ ."

Dr. Vidyābhūṣaṇa has amplified this as below :

"If any disputant does not explicitly state the minor term (Pakşa) his reason might be misunderstood by his opponent e.g.

(1) This hill (the minor term) is full of fire (the major term);

(2) Because it is full of smoke ( the middle term ).

The above inference, if the minor term is omitted, will assume the following form :—

(1) Full of fire ( the major term )

(2) because full of smoke ( the middle term )

Here the opponent might not at once recollect any abode or place (the minor term, Pakşa) in which the fire and smoke abide in union, and might mistake a lake for such an abode. In such a case the whole argument will be misunderstood.

Just as a clever archer, with a view to preventing his arrow from going to a wrong direction, fixes his aim before hitting, so a

1.	'तत्प्रयोगोऽत्र कर्त्तव्यो हेतोगोंचरदीपकः ।''
	''अन्यथा वाद्यभिप्रेतहेतुगोचरमोहितः ।
	प्रत्यायस्य भवेद्वेतुर्विरुद्धारेकितो यथा ॥
	धानुष्कगुणसंप्रेक्षि जनस्य परिविध्यतः ।
	धानुष्कस्य विना लक्ष्यनिदें शेन गुणेतरौ ॥" Nyāyāvatāra 14-16

skilful disputant, in order to avoid being misunderstood, should, in stating an inference, mention the minor term ( Paksa ) with which the major term ( Sadhya ) and the middle term ( Hetu ) are both connected.

In Pramāņanayatattvālokālankāra the same is mentioned as follows: "The use of Pakṣa must be adopted as we always mention as conclusion by word expressing Dharmi (Pakṣa or the minor term e. g. mountain) Dharma (Sādhya or the major term e. g. fire) and Hetu ( the middle term ). Who will not agree to the use of Pakṣa in support of the Sādhana (the middle term) after mentioning the three varieties of the same<sup>1</sup>.

The three kinds of Hetu will be described later on.

Hemachandra has mentioned the subject of this aphorism in a similar language<sup>2</sup>.

## एतद्द्रयमेवानुमानाङ्गं नोदाहरणम् ॥ ३७ ॥

87. Etaddvayamevānumānāngam nodāharaņam.

37. These two only are the limbs of Anumana, and not the Udaharana.

### Commentary

In Prameyaratnamālā, it is mentioned that this Aphorism refutes the view of the Sānkhya philosophy which holds that Anumāna has three limbs viz. Pakṣa, Hetu and Drisṭānta or Udāharaṇa, that of the Mīmāmsā philosophy according to which there are four limbs of Anumāna viz. Pratijīnā, Hetu, Udāharaṇa and Upanaya and that of the Nyāya-vaiśeṣika philosophies which hold

 "साध्यस्य प्रतिनियतधर्मिधर्महेतोरुपसंहारवचनवत् पक्षप्रयोगोऽप्यवश्यमा-श्रयितव्यः।" "त्रिविधं साधनमभिधायैव तत्समर्थनं बिद्धानः कः खलु न पक्ष-प्रयोगमंगीकुरुते।" [प्रमाणनयतत्वालोकालंकारः। ३।२४।२५।]

2. "गम्यमानत्वेऽपि साध्यधर्मा-धार-सन्देहापनोदाय धर्मिणि पक्षधर्मोपसंहार-वत्तदुत्पत्तिः ।" Pramāņa-mimāņisā 2.1.8. that there are five limbs of Anumāna viz. Pratijňā, Hetu, Udāharaņa, Upanaya and Nigamana<sup>1</sup>.

It may be urged that the words "and not the Udäharana" are redundant in this aphorism, as the word 'only' in the aphorism is sufficient for the purpose. The commentator Anantavirya says that these words have been used to refute the views of others<sup>2</sup>.

In the Nyāya philosophy of Gautama, five limbs of syllogism are recognised. These are Pratijñā (proposition), Hetu, Udāharaṇa (illustration), Upanaya (application) and Nigamana (conclusion). The following is an example :---

(1) This hill is full of fire. (Pratijñā)

(2) Because it is full of smoke. (Hetu)

(3) Whatever is full of smoke is full of fire, as a kitchen ( Dristanta )

(4) So is this hill full of smoke. ( Upanaya )

(5) Therefore this hill is full of fire. (Nigamana)

According to the view of Jain logicians as propounded in Parikṣāmukham, only Pakṣa and Hetu are the two limbs of Anumāna.

In Pramāņanayatattvālokālankāra, it is mentioned : "Inference derived from the speech of another has only two parts viz. Pakṣa and Hetu and not Dristānta etc<sup>3</sup>.

 "ननु भवतु पक्षप्रयोगस्तथापि पक्षहेतुदृष्टान्तमेदेन ज्यवयवमनुमानमिति सांख्यः । प्रतिज्ञाहेतूदाहरणोपनयभेदेन चतुरवयमिति मीमांसकः । प्रतिज्ञाहेतूदाहरणो-पनयनिगमनमेदात् पंचावयवमिति यौगः । तन्मतमपाकुर्वन् स्वमतसिद्धमवयवद्वय-मेवोपदर्शयन्नाह ।" Prameyaratnamālā.

2. "एवकारेणै"वोदाहरणादिव्यवच्छेदे सिद्धेऽपि परमतनिरासार्थं पुनर्नो-दाहरणमित्युकृतम्।" Prameyaratnamālā.

3. "पक्षहेतुवचनल्रञ्स्णमवयवद्वयमेव परप्रतिपत्तेरंगं न दृष्टान्तादिवचनम्।" Pramananayatattyalokalankara III. 28

P-14

This aphorism is amplified in the aphorisms which follow.

# न हि तत् साध्यप्रतिपत्त्यङ्गं तत्र यथोक्तहेतोरेव व्यापारात् ॥ ३८ ॥

38. Na hi tat sādhyapratipatyangam tatra yathoktahetoreva vyāpārāt.

# तद्विनाभावनिश्चयार्थं वा विपक्षे बाधकादेव तत्सिद्धेः ॥ ३९ ॥

39. Tadavinābhāvanišchayārtham vā vipakse vādhakādeva tat-siddheh.

38. That (Udāharaṇa) is not the cause of understanding the Sādhya because, the aforesaid Hetu works there ( as the cause )

39. (That Udāharaṇa) also is (not necessary) for establishing the universal concomitance (with the Sādhya). That (universal concomitance) is established from the opposition to its adverse (character).

#### Commentary

When we give the example of a kitchen to illustrate the universal concomitance 'where there is smoke, there is fire,' we cannot say that the illustration is of any help in the understanding of the Sādhya viz. fire, for the knowledge of fire is derived from the Hetu (viz. 'Because it is full of smoke'). 'The Udāharaņa therefore is not a part of inference. It cannot also be said that Udāharaņa causes a belief of universal concomitance with the Sādhya, because the universal concomitance is established when we get proof opposed to its adverse character.

# व्यक्तिरूपं च निदर्शनं सामान्येन तु व्यासिस्तत्रापि तद्वि-प्रतिपत्तावनवस्थानं स्वात् दृष्टान्तान्तरापेक्षणात् ॥ ४० ॥

40. Vyaktirüpam cha nidarśanam sāmānyena tu vyāptistatrāpi tadvipratipattāvanavasthānam syāt drstāntarāpeksanāt.

40. A Udāharaņa deals only with particular but Vyāpti deals with universal concomitance. If that is not understood, the fault of Anavasthā will arise, as recourse to another example will have to be made,

106

## Parikṣāmukham

### Commentary

The existence of smoke in a kitchen is a particular instance of the concomitance of smoke and fire. It cannot establish universal concomitance of smoke and fire. If we doubt the example of the kitchen, another example will have to be cited and even if the latter again be disbelieved, a third illustration will be necessary. So the Udāharaņa cannot be said to be the cause of the knowledge of universal concomitance. At the utmost it can be said to yield a knowledge of concomitance in a particular instance. The fault of Anavasthā ( no final settlement ) arises when we seek one instance after another to come at the idea of universal concomitance from particular instances.

This aphorism in another language is given in the Pramāņanayatattvālokālankāra III. 36<sup>1</sup>.

# नापि व्यासिस्मरणार्थं तथाविधहेतुप्रयोगादेव तत्स्मृतेः ॥ ४१ ॥

41. Nāpi vyāpti-smaraņārtham tathāvidhahetuprayogādeva tatsmriteh.

41. (This Udāharaṇa) cannot remind the universal concomitance, because such a reminiscence arises from the use of Hetu of that kind (which is connected with previously understood knowledge of the connection between smoke and fire).

#### Commentary

The knowledge of relationship between Sādhya and Sādhana (e. g. fire and smoke) must exist before there can be any Anumāna. Udāharaņa gives an example of this relationship or Vyāpti (universal concomitance) and only tends to establish the validity of Vyāpti. It cannot be said to be of any real help in reminding us about the universal concomitance. This Vyāpti is reminded by the Hetu "where there is smoke, there is fire" and not by the Udāharaṇa viz. "As in the kitchen". Only a thing which had been

## "नियतैकविशेषस्वभावे च दृष्टान्ते साकल्येन व्याप्तेरयोगतो विप्रतिपत्तौ सत्यां तदुन्तरापेक्षायामनवस्थितेदुर्निवारः समवतारः ।"

experienced before, can be remembered. So universal concomitance can be reminded only by the Hetu and not by hundreds of examples<sup>1</sup>. This is also mentioned in Pramāņanayatattvālokālankāra III 37<sup>2</sup>.

# तत्परमभिधोयमानं साध्यधर्मिणि साध्यसाधने सन्देहयति ॥४२॥

42. Tatparamabhidhiyamānam sādhyadharmiņi sādhyasādhane sandehayati.

42. This (Udāharaṇa) only raises a doubt in establishing Sādhya (e. g. fire) in the Dharmi (e. g. mountain) containing Sādhya (e. g. fire).

### Commentary

Udāharaņa is not the cause of universal concomitance. On the contrary, it raises a doubt whether fire is really in the mountain or not for we are given an illustration where fire may exist without the mountain which we see. It is after we remember the universal concomitance through Hetu that we come to the conclusion that the mountain is full of fire. Udāḥaraṇa therefore is not an essential part of inference.

# कुतोऽन्यथोपनयनिगमने ॥४३॥

43. Kutohnyathopanaya-nigamane.

43. Otherwise, why should there be Upanaya and Nigamana?

### Commentary

We have already mentioned the five parts of the inference as accepted in the Nyāya philosophy of Gautama. The fourth and the fifth parts are Upanaya and Nigamana, viz. 'So is this hill full of smoke' (Upanaya) and 'Therefore this hill is full of

 "गृहीतसम्बन्धस्य हेतुप्रदर्शनेनैव व्याप्तिसिद्धिरगृहीतसम्बन्धस्य दृष्टान्त-इतिनापि न तत्रस्मरणमनुभूतविषयत्वात् स्मरणस्येति भावः ।" Prameyaratnamālā.

 "नाष्यविनाभावस्मृतये प्रतिपन्नप्रतिबन्धस्य व्युत्पन्नमतेः पक्षहेतु-प्रदर्शनेनैव तत्प्रसिद्धेः ।" fire' (Nigamana) Māņikyanandī urges that acceptance of these two presupposes some doubt about the existence of fire in the mountain owing to the use of the Udāharaņa. Otherwise, what is the use of having these two parts Upanaya and Nigamana?

The modern syllogism of European philosophy following the same of Aristotle is of three propositions.

- 1. All things which are full of smoke are full of fire,
- 2. This mountain is full of smoke,
- 3. Therefore this mountain is full of fire.

It will be seen that in the first proposition, Vyāpti or universal concomitance is laid down. In the second proposition the Hetu is mentioned and in the third the Pratijnā is given. The Upanaya, Nigamana ann Dristānta are not accepted in modern syllogism. Really speaking, the Upanaya and Nigamana (which will be defined in Aphorisms 50 and 51 which follow) are merely repetitions of what is stated in the Pratijnā and Hetu. So these are not necessary parts of Anumāna. This is laid down in the next aphorism.

# न च ते तदंगे । साध्यधर्मिणि हेतुसाध्ययोर्वचनादेवासंशयाद् ॥४४॥

44. Na cha te tadange. Sādhyadharmiņi hetu-sādhyayorvachanādevāsamšayāt.

44. These (Upanaya and Nigamana) are not parts of that (Anumāna) because by mentioning the Sādhya and the Hetu in the Dharmi containing the Sādhya, no doubt exists.

### Commentary

When we mention the Hetu ( the middle term e.g. smoke ) and the Sādhya ( the major term e.g. fire ) in the Dharmi ( e.g. mountain ) which contains the Sādhya ( e.g. fire ), we have no kind of doubt in the knowledge of the Sādhya ( e.g. fire ) or in other words the existence of the Hetu ( smoke ) and Sādhya ( fire ) is ascertained by their mention without there being any kind of doubt. So it is redundant to repeat them again in the form

109

of Upanaya and Nigamana. So these two parts should not be considered as necessary limbs of Upamāna.

"There is no power of Upanaya and Nigamana to produce a knowledge in the mind of others as this knowledge arises from the use of the Pakṣa and the Hetu." Pramāṇanayatattvālokālaṅkāra. III. 40.

# समर्थनं वा वरं हेतुरूपमनुमानावयवो वाऽस्तु साध्ये तद्रुपयोगात् ॥ ४५ ॥

45. Samarthanam vā varam heturūpamanumānāvayavo vāhstu sādhye tadupayogāt.

45. (The establishment e.g. fire) is got from the support of the limb of Anumāna named Hetu ( c.g. smoke) as this ( Hetu e.g. smoke) is connected with the Sādhya ( e.g. fire).

#### Commentary

The purport of this aphorism is that there is no necessity of the parts of Anumāna, Dristānta, Upanaya and Nigamana because the Sādhya ( e. g. fire ) is established by Hetu ( e. g. smoke ). As we have knowledge of the Sādhya without the help of Dristānta, Upanaya and Nigamana these cannot be said to be essential parts of Anumāna.

When faults of Hetu are dispelled and it is supported, it is said to have samarthana. If you say that that which is not supported can never be a Hetu, and so after mentioning Dristanta etc. a support should be given to the same, we reply that it is the very Hetu which is a part of Anumāna which establishes the Sādhya and it is not at all necessary to give any other support by mentioning Udāharaņa etc. first<sup>1</sup>.

 "किं चाभिधायापि दृष्टान्तादिकं समर्थनमवश्यं वक्तव्यम्, असमर्थितस्य अहेतुत्वात्, इति ; तदेव वरं हेतुरूपम् अनुमानावयनो वाऽस्तु साध्यसिद्धौ तस्यैवोपयो-गान्नोदाहरणादिकम् ।" Prameyaratnamālā. Pramāņanayatattvālokālankāra mentions the same in another language<sup>1</sup>.

# वालब्युत्पत्त्वर्थं तत्त्रघोपगमे शास्त्र एवासौ न वादे, अनुपयोगात् ॥ ४६ ॥

46. Bālavyutpattyartham tattrayopagame šāstra evāsau na vāde, anupayogāt.

46. These (Drisțānta) etc. may be for understanding of those who have little knowledge and for this purpose may be discussed only in the Śāstra, but these are quite unfit to be used in logical discussions.

### Commentary

When we try to teach others who have no full knowledge of inference, we may use Dristanta etc. and for this purpose in works on logic, we may treat this subject. Such words may be of use to students. But in logical discussions between trained men, these are useless.

"The statement of Pakṣa…and Hetu are alone needed in an inference at the instance of another. It is obvious that the true basis of Anumāna is always the force of Vyāpti (logical connection), so that the moment this relationship is asserted by mentioning the Sādhana, smoke and the like, mind is immediately led to that which is inseparably connected therewith, and discovers the Sādhya… Upanaya and Nigamana besides serving no useful purpose, are also objectionable as pure repetition of what is already stated in the Pratijūā and Hetu; and Udāharaṇa would reduce logic to a child's play. For while it may be necessary to cite an actual instance of Vyāpti (logical connection) in a Vītarāgakathā (lecture to a pupil) to enable little children to familiarize themselves with the basis of inference it is bad rhetoric to do so in the course of a

## 1. "समर्थनमेव वरं परप्रतिपत्त्यंगमास्तां तदन्तरेण दृष्टान्तादिप्रयोगेऽपि तदसंभवात्।" Pramāņanayatattvālokālankāra III. 41.

Vijigisukathā (logical discussion) with a clever and presumably learned opponent. And after all Udāharana only tends to establish the validity of Vyāpti and may be useful in showing the necessary relationship between the Sādhana and its Sādhya; it is of no real help in Anumāna which presupposes the knowledge of this relationship.

The modern syllogism of three steps, or propositions, as they are called, is also open to objection for similar reasons. It is the culmination of a highly elaborate system of ratiocination, it is true, but it is no less true that the system of which it is the outcome is not a natural but a highly artificial one. The practical value of modern logic, as a science, is to be judged from the fact that its inferential processes, though suitable to a certain extent, for the purposes of the school room, are never actually resorted to by men —not even by lawyers, philosophers and logicians—in their daily life, nor can they be carried out without first bending the current of thought from its natural channel, and forcing it into the artificial and rigid frame-work of an Aristotelian syllogism.

The syllogism that answers the practical requirements of life and is natural to rational mind, then, consists of two and only two steps—Pratijñā and Hetu<sup>\*</sup>."

# हष्टान्तो द्वेधा, अन्वयव्यतिरेकमेदात् ॥ ४७ ॥

47. Dristanto dvedha anvayavyatirekabhedat.

47. The Driștânta is of two kinds, being with Anvaya and Vyatireka.

### Commentary

It has been mentioned that Drisțānta, Upanaya and Nigamana are not parts of Anumāna. But in the previous aphorism it was stated that these may be discussed in the Śāstras

1. The Science of Thought by C. R. Jain Pp. 42, 43, Foot note.

for teaching students. So in this and the next two aphorisms the two kinds of Driṣṭānta, and in aphorisms 50 and 51 Upanaya and Nigamana are explained.

# साध्यव्याप्तं साधनं यत्र प्रदृर्घते सोऽन्वयदृष्टान्तः ॥ ४८ ॥

48. Sādhyavyāptam sādhanam yatra pradarsyate sohnvayadristāntah.

## साध्याभावे साधनाभावो यत्र कथ्यते स व्यतिरेकदृष्टान्तः ॥४९॥

49. Sādhyābhāve sādhanābhāvo yatra kathyate sa vyatirekadristāntah.

49. Where the Sādhana is shown as always concomitant with Sādhya, that is ( an example ) of Anvaya Dristānta.

50. Where the absence of Sādhana is mentioned through the absence of Sādhya, that is (an example) of Vyatireka Dristānta.

### Commentary

The Drisțānta or illustration which states a connection between the Sādhya (fire) and Sādhana (smoke) affirmatively e.g. 'where there is smoke, there is fire as in a kitchen' is Anvaya Drisțānta. The Drisțānta which mentions the same connection negatively e.g. 'where there is no smoke, there is no fire as in a lake' is Vyatireka Dristānta.

This is propounded in another language in the Nyāyāvatāra as follows :

"Where the inseparable connection of the major term (Sādhya) and the middle term (Sādhana or Hetu) is shown by homogeneousness (Sādharmya) the example is called a homogeneous one, on account of the connection (between those terms) being recollected.

The heterogeneous example is that which shows that the absence of the major term (Sādhya) is followed by the absence of the middle term." Verses 18 and  $19^4$ .

 "साध्यसाधनयोर्व्याप्ति-यंत्र निश्चीयतेतराम् । साधम्म्येण स दृष्टान्तः सम्बन्धस्मरणान्मतः ।। P-15 Dr. Satischandra Vidyābhūşaņa has commented on the above thus :

"An example ( Dristanta ) is a familiar case which re-assures the inseparable connection ( Vyāpti ) between the major term ( Sādhya ) and the middle term ( Hetu ). It is of two kinds : 1. homogeneous (Sādharmya) and 2. heterogeneous (Vaidharmya). The homogeneous example is that which re-assures the connection ( Vyāpti ) by homogeneousness ( Sādharmya ) thus :

- 1. This hill is full of fire ( major term );
- 2. Because it is full of smoke (middle term);
- 3. Just as the kitchen ( homogeneous example ).

Here the fire and smoke abide homogeneously in the kitchen.

The heterogeneous example re-assures the connection (Vy $\bar{a}$ pti) by contrariety, that is, by showing that absence of the major term (S $\bar{a}$ dhya) is attended by the absence of the middle term (Hetu) thus:

- 1. This hill has no smoke ( major term );
- 2. Because it has no fire ( middle term ) :
- 3. Just as a lake ( heterogeneous example )'."

In Pramänanayatattvälokälankära (III. 43-46) we find: "Illustration (Dristanta) consists of knowledge of obstruction. It is of two kinds being connected with homogeneousness or heterogeneousness. Homogeneous example is that where the existence of the quality of the Sādhya is invariably revealed with the existence of the quality of Sādhana. Heterogeneous example is that where the invariable absence of Sādhana is shown on account of the absence of the Sādhya<sup>2</sup>."

	साध्ये निवर्त्तमाने तु साधनस्याप्यसंभवः । ख्याप्यते यत्र दृष्टान्ते वैधम्म्येंणेति स स्मृतः ॥"
1. 2.	Nyāyāvatāra by Dr. S. C. Vidyābhūşaņa p. 17. "प्रतिबंधप्रतिपत्तेरास्पदं दृष्टान्तः । स द्वेधा साधर्म्यतो वैधर्म्यतश्च । यत्र साधनधर्मसत्तायामवश्यं साध्यधर्मसत्ता प्रकाश्यते स साधर्म्यदृष्टान्तः । यत्र तु साध्याभावे साधनस्यावश्यमभावः प्रदर्श्यते स वैधर्म्यदृष्टान्तः ।"

Pariksāmukham

The Naiyāyikas following Gautama also mention "Udāharaņa is illustration following a mention of universal concomitance, e.g. whatever is full of smoke is full of fire as a kitchen. This is Sādharmya Udāharaṇa. Whatever is not full of fire is not full of smoke as a lake. This is an example of Vaidharmya Udāharaṇa<sup>1</sup>."

# हेतोरुपसंहार उपनयः ॥ ५० ॥

50. Hetorupasamhāra upanayah.

50. Upanaya is the application (asserting the existence) of the Hetu (in the Dharmi after a knowledge of concomitance).

### Commentary

Upanaya is the description of the undoubted existence of the Hetu (e.g. smoke) in the Pakşa (e.g. mountain) in concomitance<sup>2</sup>.

We have already mentioned the five parts of Anumāna as adopted by Gautama viz. Pratijūā, Hetu, Udāharaņa, Upanaya and Nigamana<sup>3</sup>. Upanaya or application is used after Dristānta e. g. "So is this hill full of smoke."

## प्रतिज्ञायास्तु निगमनम् ॥ ५१ ॥

51. Pratijňāyāstu nigamanam.

51. Nigamana is the ( conclusion ) of the Pratijñā.

 "व्याप्तिपूर्वकदृष्टान्तवचनमुदाहरणम् । यथा यो यो धूमवानसावसावग्निमान् यथा महानसः । इति साधर्म्योदाहरणम् । यो योऽग्निमान्न भवति स स धूमवान्न भवति यथा महाहृदः । इति वैधर्म्योदाहरणम् ।" Nyāya-dipikā. Prakaśa III. 2. "हेतोः साध्यधर्मिणि उपसंहरणमुपनयः ।"

Pramāņa-naya-tattvālokālankāra, III. 47.

3. "प्रतिज्ञाहेतूदाहरणोपनयनिगमनान्यवयवाः।"

Nyāyasūtra of Gautama.

115

### Commentary

Pratijñā is the proposition to be proved. In other words the statement of the Pakṣa is the Pratijña<sup>1</sup>, e.g. this hill (minor term) is full of fire (the major term). This proposition is the Pratijñā.

After setting out the Pratijñā, we mention the Hetu, Udāharaṇa and Upanaya. Last of all we come to the conclusion as already set forth in the Pratijñā. This conclusion is the fifth part of Anumāna and is called Nigamana.

It may be urged that as according to the Jain logicians Udāharaṇa, Upanaya and Nigamana are not accepted as parts of inference, why have these been described in this work? In answer to this, it may be said that we have already mentioned that in works on Logic, these may be described for teaching students. According to the different manners of exposition, the parts of Anumāna in Vitarāgakathā (lecture to pupils) may be two (Pratijňā and Hetu), three (Pratijňā, Hetu and Udāharaṇa), four (Pratijňā, Hetu, Udāharaṇa and Upanaya) or five (Pratijňā, Hetu, Udāharaṇa, Upanaya and Nigamana)<sup>2</sup>. This use of different parts depends upon the suitability of persons to whom the subject is explained<sup>3</sup>.

## तदनुमानं बेघा ॥ ५२ ॥

52. Tadanumānam dvedhā.

1. ''साध्यधर्मस्य पुनर्निगमनम्।''

Pramāņanayatattvālokālankāra, III. 48.

2. "वीतरागकथायां तु प्रतिपाद्याशयानुरोधेन प्रतिज्ञाहेतू द्वाववयवौ, प्रतिज्ञाहेतूदाहरणानि त्रयः, प्रतिज्ञाहेतूदाहरणोपनयाश्चत्वारः, प्रतिज्ञाहेतूदाहरणोपनय-निगमनानि वा पंचेति यथायोग्यं प्रयोगपरिपाटी ।" Nyäya-dipika. Prakäsa III.

3. "प्रयोगपरिपाटी तु प्रतिपाद्यानुरोधतः।"

Kumaranandi Bhattāraka, quoted in Nyāya-dípikā.

116

Parikşāmukham

# स्वार्थ-परार्थभेदात् ॥ ५३ ॥

53. Svärtha-parärthabhedät.

## स्वार्थमुक्तलक्षणम् ॥ ५४ ॥

54. Svārthamuktalaksaņam.

# परार्थं तु तद्र्थपरामर्श्तिवचनाज्ञातम् ॥ ५५ ॥

55. Parārtham tu tadarthaparāmarsivachanājjātam.

52. This Anumāna is of two kinds :

53. Svārtha and Parārtha.

54. Svārtha ( Anumāna ) has already been defined.

55. Parārtha ( Anumāna ) arises from words touching that ( Svārthānumāna )\*.

#### Commentary

Anumāna is of two kinds, Svārthānumāna and Parārthānumāna. The former variety has been defined in aphorism 14 of the third samuddeśa of this work viz. "the knowledge of Sādhya (the major term e. g. fire) from Sādhana or Hetu (the middle term e. g. smoke) is Anumāna." Parārthānumāna arises through words of another.

"Inference is of two kinds: 1. Svärthänumäna, inference for one's own self, and 2. Parärthänumäna, inference for the sake of others. The first kind is the inference drawn in one's own mind after having made repeated observations. Suppose that having repeatedly seen in the kitchen and other places, that where there is smoke there is fire, and having realised in his mind that there is a universal antecedence of fire in respect of smoke, a man after-

# \* ''तद्द्विधा स्वार्थं परार्थं च ।'' "स्वार्थं स्वनिश्चितसाध्याविनाभावैकल्झणात् साधनात् साध्यज्ञानम् ॥'' ''यथोक्तसाधनाभिधानजः परार्थं ।''

Pramāņamimāmsā, 1. 2. 8, 1, 2, 9, and II, 1, 1,

wards goes to a hill and entertains a doubt as to whether or not there is fire in it. Instantly when he observes smoke on it, he recollects the inseparable connection between fire and smoke, and concludes in his mind that the hill has fire in it, as it has smoke on it. This is an inference for one's own self<sup>1</sup>."

Parārthānumāna has thus been defined in Nyāyāvatāra :

"A statement expressive of the reason (i. e. mark or the middle term, called Hetu) which is inseparably connected with that which is to be proved (i. e. the major term, called Sādhya) having been composed of the minor term (called Pakşa, signifying a side or place) etc., is called an inference for the sake of others (Parārthānumāna)<sup>2</sup>."

This is amplified by Dr. Satischandra Vidyābhūṣaṇa as follows :

"In an 'inference for the sake of others' the minor term (pakşa) etc. must be explicity set forth. The major term or 'proven' (Sādhya) is that which is to be proved. The middle term or reason (hetu, linga or sādhana) is that which cannot exist except in connection with the major term or 'proven' (sādhya or lingi). The minor term or abode (Pakṣa) is that with which the reason or middle term (hetu) is connected, and whose connection with the major term (Sādhya) is to be proved. In a proposition the subject is the minor term (pakṣa) and the predicate the major term (sādhya). The following is an inference for the sake of others:

1. This *hill* (minor term ) is full of *fire* (major term ) – Proposition (pratij $n\bar{a}$ ),

2. Because it is full of smoke (middle term),

1. Nyāyāvatāra by Dr. S. C. Vidyābhūşaņa, p. 9.

 "साध्याविनाभुवो हेतोर्वचो यत् प्रतिपादकम् । परार्थमनुमानं तत् पक्षादिवचनात्मकम् ॥"

Nyāyāvatāra. verse 10.

•

3. Whatever is full of smoke is full of fire, just as the kitchen (example, dristanta),

4. So is this hill full of smoke ( application, upanaya ),

5. Therefore, this hill is full of fire ( conclusion, nigamana )<sup>1</sup>."

The example given above consists of five parts as acknowledged in the Nyäya philosophy of Gautama. But Jain logicians accept only two parts. So according to them "Parārthānumāna means the knowledge of Sādhya from its Sādhana arising in the mind in consequence of the speech of another. It consists of two parts, Pratijňā and Hetu. Pratijňā means the proposition to be proved and Hetu is the statement of the logical connection called Vyāpti advanced in proof thereof. Illustration : There is fire in this hill (Pratijňā ), because there is smoke on it (Hetu)"<sup>2</sup>.

# तद्रचनमपि तद्वेतुत्वात् ॥ ५६ ॥

56. Tadvachanamapi taddhetutvāt.

56. The words expressing this ( Pararthanumana ) is also **Pararthanumana** as these (words) are the cause of that (know-ledge arising in Pararthanumana)<sup>3</sup>.


### Commentary

Anantavirya says that though really the knowledge is Parārthānumāna, the words in a secondary sense are also called so. In such cases the cause is taken as the effect or the effect is taken as the cause<sup>4</sup>.

- 1. Nyāyāvatāra by Dr. S. C. Vidhyābhūşaņa, pp. 13-14.
- 2. The Science of Thought by C. R. Jain pp. 41-43.
- 3. "वचनमुपचारात्।" Pramāņa-mimāmsā. II. 1. 2.

4. ''परार्थानुमानप्रतिपादकवचनमपि परार्थानुमानम् .... । कारणे कार्यस्योपचारात् । अथवा तत्**घतिपादकानुमानं हेतुर्यस्य तत्-तद्**धेतुस्तस्य मावस्त<del>र्न्वं</del> ततस्तद्वचनमपि तथा....अस्मिन् पक्षे कार्ये कारणस्योपचारः ।''

Prameyaratnamālā.



The Sacred Books of the Jainas

Jain Education International

www.jainelibrary.org

## स हेतुद्वेंघोपलब्ध्यनुपलव्धिभेदात् ॥ ५७॥

57. Sa heturdvedhopalabdhyanupalabdhibhcdāt.

57. That Hetu is of two kinds: Upalabdhi and Anupalabdhi.

### Commentary

We have already mentioned that universal concomitance can be expressed in two ways viz. affirmatively called Anvaya e. g. 'wherever there is smoke there is fire' or negatively called Vyatireka e. g. 'where there is no fire there is no smoke.' The first kind of Hetu is known as Upalabdhi and the second Anupalabdhi<sup>1</sup>.

# उपलब्धिर्विधिप्रतिषेधयोरनुपलब्धिश्च ॥ ५८ ॥

58. Upalabdhirbidhipratişedhayoranupalabdhischa.

58. Upalabdhi is subdivided into Vidhi and Pratisedha. Anupalabdhi also ( is subdivided into the same two kinds ).

### Commentary

In Upalabdhi Hetu, the Sādhya may be of two kinds, Vidhi and Pratisedha. These two kinds of Sādhya also can exist in Anupalabdhi Hetu. It should not be said that in Upalabdhi the Sādhya is only in the form of Vidhi and in Anupalabdhi, it is in the form of Pratisedha.

The Upalabdhi and Anupalabdhi Hetus are subdivided into two kinds each : those which prove the existence of a fact (Vidhi) and those that prove the non-existence of a fact (Nisedha).

A Hetu may also be of Viruddha (contradictory) nature implying existence of a fact which is incompatible with the Sādhya e.g. there is no fire in this pitcher, because it is full of water; or it may be of Aviruddha (non-contradictory) nature such as in an argument which is not based on any fact incompatible with the

1. "तद् द्वेधा।" "तथोपपत्त्यन्यथानुपपत्तिमेदात्।"

Pramāņa-mimāmsā II. 1. 3 and II. I. 4,

P-16

existence of  $S\overline{a}dhya$  e. g. there is fire in this hill, because there is smoke on it. (Vide The Science of Thought by C. R. Jain, p. 44).

# अविरुद्धोपलब्धिविंधौ षोढा व्याण्यकार्यकारणपूर्वोत्तर-सहचरभेदात्॥ ५९॥

59. Aviruddhopalabdhirvidhau şodhā vyāpya-kārya-kāraņapūrvo-ttara-sahachara-bhedāt

59. Aviruddha Upalabdhi is of six kinds in Vidhi viz. Vyāpya, Kārya, Kāraņa, Pūrvachara, Uttarachara and Sahachara.

### Commentary

Upalabdhi in Vidhi will be explained in Aphorisms 65, 66, 67, 68, 69 and 70 respectively.

In Pramāņanayatattvālokālankāra III. 6.4. it is mentioned that the Aviruddhopalabdhi in establishing a Vidhi is of six kinds<sup>1</sup>.

In the Buddhist philosophy it is held that the inference proving the existence of a fact (Vidhi) is only of two kinds Svabhāva (own nature) and Kārya (effect)<sup>2</sup>. But in this aphorism, six varieties of Aviruddha Upalabdhi establishing Vidhi have been mentioned. So in the following five aphorisms the view of the Buddhist logicians is refuted and that of the Jain logicians established.

The next aphorism lays down why Kāraņa should be accepted as a Hetu.

# रसादेकसामग्रधनुमानेन रूपानुमानमिच्छद्भिरिष्टमेव किञ्चित् कारणं हेतुर्यत्र सामर्थ्याप्रतिबन्धकारणान्तरावैकल्ये ॥ ६० ॥

60. Rasādekasāmagryanumānena rüpānumānamichchhadbhiristameva kinchit kāraņam heturyatra sāmarthyāprativandhakāraņāntarā-vaikalye.

- 1. "तत्राविरुद्धोपलब्धिर्विधेः सिद्धौ षोढा।"
- 2. ''अत्राह सौगतः, विधिसाधनं द्विविधमेव, स्वभावकार्यभेदात् ।''

Prameyaratnamālā.

### Pariksāmukham

60. From Rasa ( juice ), one thing is inferred and from that,  $R\bar{u}pa$  ( form ) is inferred. Those who accept this, accept also some Kāraņa as Hetu where there is no other Kāraņa to obstruct the potency of the Kāraņa ( or cause).

### Commentary

Kārana ( cause ) is not accepted by all logicians as a true Hetu because according to their view, a Kāraņa (cause) is not always followed by its appropriate Kārya ( effect ). Dharmabhūsana says, "An effect may preclude a cause for without a cause no effect can take place. But a cause can exist without any effect<sup>1</sup> e. g. we see fire though there is no smoke. So a fire cannot be said to indicate smoke. To this argument, the following is the rcply. Whenever there is a cause having potency, we invariably find its effect".<sup>2</sup> There may be cases in which a cause is opposed by some other cause by which the potency of the first cause is lost. In such cases the first cause may not cause any effect but where this potency is not obstructed, we are certain to find a result. By accepting Kārana as a Hetu, we mean a Kārana having potency. "The true Kāraņa always implies an active, potent ( having Sāmarthya) cause which nothing can prevent from producing its effect. In the instance of rain-clouds, the absence of all those causes which prevent them from giving rain is presumed and implied."<sup>3</sup>

In this aphorism an illustration is given. There is juice in some fruit. Suppose a man in the dark tastes juice of a mango. He

1. "कारणस्य तु कार्याविनाभावामावादस्तिंगत्वम्। नावश्यं कारणानि कार्यवन्ति भवन्तीति वचनात्।" Prameyaratnamala.

2. 'ननु कार्यं कारणानुमापकमस्तु कारणाभावे कार्यस्यानुपपत्तेः । कारणं तु कार्याभावेऽपि संभवति । यथा धूमाभावेऽपि संभवन् वह्रिः सुप्रतीतः । अतएव न बह्रिधूमं गमयति इति चेत्, तन्न । उन्मीलितशक्तिकस्य कारणस्य कार्याव्यभिचारित्वेन कार्यं प्रति हेतुत्वाविरोधात् ।" Nyāyadipikā.

3. The Science of Thought by C. R. Jain, P. 47.

infers its form from the juice arising from previous experience that such a juice is connected with such a fruit. In this case as there is no obstruction to the inference and existence of another cause one must accept the Kāraņa (cause)<sup>1</sup>. So the view of the Buddhists that there are only Svabhāva-Hetu and Kārya-Hetu is not correct.

# न च पूर्वेात्तरचारिणोस्तादात्म्यं तद्दुत्पत्तिर्वा कालव्यवधाने तद्नुपलब्धेः ॥ ६१ ॥

61. Na cha pürvottarachāriņostādātmyam tadutpattirvā kālavyavadhāne tadanupalabdheh.

61. In the case of antecedence and consequence, there is no identity or its appearance, for there is no knowledge of these after an interval of time.

### Commentary

In this aphorism, it is asserted that the Pūrvachara and Uttarachara Hetus (i. e. Hetus concerned with antecedence and consequence) cannot be said to be included within the Svabhāva-Hetu or Kāraya-Hetu as accepted by the Buddhists. Svabhāva-Hetu is concerned with identity and in Kārya-Hetu, one thing arises from another. So in both these cases the two things exist at the same time. But in antecedence and consequence, the two things do not exist together<sup>2</sup>. The example of identity is as follows :—There is no jar in this room, because its Svabhāva (identity) is not to be found (that is, nothing resembling its identity is present in it). The example of Kārya is : There is fire

 "तमस्विन्यामास्वाद्यमानादाम्रादिफल्लरसादेकसामप्रथानुमित्या रूपाद्यनु-मितिमभिमन्यमानैरभिमतमेव किमपि कारणं हेतुतया यत्र शक्तेरप्रतिस्खलनमपरकारण-साकल्यं च।" Pramanayatattvalokalankara III. 66.

2. ''पूर्वे।त्तरचरयोर्न स्वभावकार्यकारणभावौ तयोः काल्रव्यवहितावनुप-लम्भात् ।'' Ibid, III. 67.

### Pariksāmukham

in this hill, because there is smoke on it. Now these illustrations will show that Svabhāva or Kārya Hetu cannot include Pūrvachara (antecedent) or Uttarachara (consequent) Hetus in which cases there is an interval between two things e.g. It will be Sunday tomorrow because it is Saturday to-day (antecedence), or yesterday was a Sunday, because it is Monday to-day (consequence).

# भाव्यतीतयोर्मरणजाग्रद्वोधयोरपि नारिष्ठोद्वोधौ प्रति हेतुत्वम् ॥ ६२ ॥

62. Bhābyatītayormaraņajāgradbodhayorapi nāristodbodhau prati hetutvaņ.

62. The future and the past, death and the knowledge of waking are not the causes of Aristas ( omens of death ) or of rising ( in the morning ).

#### Commentary

The Buddhist logicians hold that a relationship of cause and effect can exist though there be an interval of time, as the death which will occur in the future is the cause of the Aristas ( signs preceding and foretelling death ) or the past knowledge of waking is the cause of rising in the morning after sleep. Jain logicians say that death which will occur in future is not the cause of omens of death and the past knowledge of waking is not the cause of our rising in the morning for the existence of an effect when there is a cause depends on the cause. In the aforesaid examples, causes do not exist up to the happening of the effect. So there cannot be any Kāraņa Hetu in these instances. This has been propounded in another language in Pramāṇanayatattvālokālankāra III. 68<sup>4</sup>.

## तद्व्यापाराश्रितं हि तद्भावभावित्वम् ॥ ६३ ॥

63. Tadvyāpārāśritam hi tadbhāvabhāvitvam.

63. Because that (Kārya) happens with the existence of that (Kāraņa) as that is connected with this.

 'न चातिक्रान्तानागतयोर्जाप्रदृदशासंवेदनमरणयोः प्रबोधोत्पत्तौ प्रति कारणत्वं व्यवहितत्वेन निर्व्यापारत्वात् ।''

#### Commentary

As a potter is the cause of a pot having connection with the latter, so the causality of a thing depends on its connection with the thing. So where there is no such connection, it is not proper to infer the relation of cause and effect<sup>1</sup>.

## सहचारिणोरपि परस्परपरिहारेणावस्थानात् सहोत्पादाच ॥ ६४ ॥

64. Sahachāriņorapi parasparaparihāreņābasthānāt sahotpādācheha.

64. Co-existence (is also a separate Hetu) because the things exist independently of each other and arise together.

#### Commentary

The Sahachāri ( co-existent ) Hetu is also not included within Kārya Hetu, Kāraņa Hetu or Svabhāva Hetu. As the things have separate and independent existence, this Sahachāri Hetu cannot be said as the same as Svabhāva Hetu which signifies identity. Also, as these arise simultaneously, it cannot be said to be Kārya Hetu or Kāraņa Hetu<sup>2</sup>.

 'स्वव्यापारापेक्षिणी हि कार्यं प्रति पदार्थस्य कारणत्वव्यवस्था कुलालस्येव कल्ल्सं प्रति।''

> "न च व्यवहितयोस्तयोर्व्यापारपरिकल्पनं न्याय्यमतिप्रसक्तेः ।" "परंपराव्यवहितानां परेषामपि तत्कल्पनस्य निवारयितुमशक्यत्वात् ।।"

> > Pramāņanayatattvālokālankāra III. 69, 70, 71.

2. "परस्परपरिहारेणोपाछंभात् तादात्म्यासंभवात् स्वभावहेतावनन्तर्भावः । सहोत्पादाच न कार्ये कारणे वा इति । न च समानसमयवर्त्तिनोः कार्यकारणभावः सच्येतरगोविषाणवत् । कार्यकारणयोः प्रतिनियमाभावप्रसंगाच ।"

Prameyaratnamālā "सहचारिणोः परस्परस्वरूपपरित्यागेन तादात्म्यानुपपत्तेः सहोत्पादेन तदुत्तपत्तिविपत्तेश्च सहचरहेतोरपि प्रोक्तेषु नानुप्रवेशः ।"

Pramāņanayatattvālokālankāra III. 72

Example of Vyäpya Hetu :--

परिणामी इाब्दः कृतकत्वात् । य एवं स एवं दृष्टो, यथा घटः । कृतकइचायं तस्मात् परिणामीति ।

# यस्तु न परिणामी स न कृतको दृष्टो, यथा बन्ध्यास्तनंधयः । कृतकइचायं तस्मात् परिणामीति ॥ ६५ ॥

65. Pariņāmi sabdah kritakatvāt.

Ya evam sa evam dristo yathā ghatah.

Kritakaschāyam tasmāt pariņāmīti.

Yastu na pariņāmi sa na kritako dristo, yathā vandhyāstanandhayaḥ.

Kritakasehāyam tasmāt pariņāmīti.

65. Sound is subject to modification, because it is a product

All products are seen as liable to modifications e.g. a pitcher. This is a product, so this is subject to modification.

That which is not a product is not seen as liable to modifications as the son of a barren woman.

This is a product, so this is subject to modification<sup>1</sup>.

#### Commentary

In Aphorism 59, it has been mentioned that there are six kinds of Aviruddha Upalabdhi in Vidhi. In the present aphorism an example of the first variety viz., Aviruddha Vyāpyopalabdhi is given.

 "Here sound falls in the larger category of products which is characterised by the quality of being subject to modification. Therefore being Vyāpya (included) in the larger class Vyāpaka it is liable to have the whole class predicated of itself." The Science of Thought by C. R. Jain, P. 47, footnote, In this aphorism all the parts of the inference are given in detail showing Sādharmya and Vaidharmya. In subsequent aphorisms only the example in short will be given. It may be expanded like the present aphorism in all its parts.

Example of Kärya Hetu ( effect ):---

## अस्त्यत्र देहिनि बुद्धिर्व्याहारादेः ॥ ६६ ॥

66. Astyatra dehini buddhirbyāhārādeh.

66. There is intelligence in this animal as it shows activities like speech etc.

#### Commentary

The familiar example 'There is fire in this hill, because there is smoke on it' is also an illustration of Kārya Hetu.

Example of Kāraņa Hetu ( cause ) :---

### अस्त्यन्न छाया छत्रात् ॥ ६७ ॥

67. Astyatra chhāyā chhatrāt.

67. There is shade here, as there is an umbrella.

### Commentary

Another example is this: "There will be rain, as potent rain-clouds are seen."

Example of Purvachara ( antecedent ) Hetu :---

## उदेष्यति इाकटं क्रुत्तिकोदयात् ॥ ६८ ॥

68. Udeşyati sakatam krittikodayāt.

68. The Rohini (constellation) will appear (after a muh $\overline{u}$ rta) as the Krittik $\overline{a}$  (constellation) has arisen.

### Commentary

There are twenty seven Nakṣatras which rise one after the other. The first four are the Asvini, the Bharani, the Krittikā and the Rohiņi. Now as the time of the Krittikā is going to pass, we infer that the Rohiņi will now arise. Similarly, we infer from the existence of the Krittikā, that the Bharani had arisen before. This is an example of consequence which is mentioned in the next aphorism. Parīkṣāmukham

Example of Uttarachara ( consequence ) Hetu :---

# उदगाद् भरणिः प्राकुतत एवः॥ ६९ ॥

69. Udagād bharaņiķ prāktata eva.

69. The Bharani had already risen before this.

Example of Sahachara Hetu ( co-existence ) :---

## अस्त्यत्व मातुलिंगे रूपं रसात् ॥ ७० ॥

70. Astyatra mātulinge rūpam rasāt.

70. There is colour in this Mātulinga ( fruit ) as there is juice ( in it )'.

We have finished the description of the six varieties of Aviruddha Upalabdhi. Now follows the illustrations of six kinds of Viruddha Upalabdhi after its definition.

## विरूद्धतदुपलन्धिः प्रतिषेधे तथा ॥ ७१ ॥

71. Viruddhatadupalabdhih pratişedhe tathā.

71. Viruddha Upalabdhi is also the same (i.e. of six varieties) implying a Sādhya of a non-existent nature (or which is refuted).

Example of Viruddha Vyāpya Upalabdhi :--

## नास्त्यत्र शीतस्पर्श औष्ण्यात् ॥ ७२ ॥

72. Nästyatra sitasparsa ausnyät.

72. There is no feeling of cold here, as it is hot.

### Commentary

By refuting (Pratisedha) the feeling of cold, its antithesis (Viruddha) fire and the heat pervading (vyāpya) the same is inferred.

1. "This illustration proceeds on the principle of concomitance or co-existence of colour and taste, so that the presence of the one is an index to the existence of the other." The Science of Thought by C. R. Jain, P. 48, footnote.

P-17

. •

Example of Viruddha Kāryopalabdhi :---

## नास्त्यत्र झीतस्पर्झो धूमाल् 🕯 🕫 ॥

73. Nāstyatra šītasparšo dhūmāt.

73. There is no feeling of cold here, because there is smoke.

### Commentary

Here cold is the antithesis of heat the Kārya of which is smoke. So this is an example of inference of a Kārya ( effect ) of the antithesis.

Example of Viruddha Kāraņopalabdhi :---

## नास्मिन् शरीरिणि सुखमस्ति हृदयशल्यात् ॥ ७४ ॥

74. Nāsmin sarīriņi sukhamasti hridayasalyāt.

74. There is no happiness in this creature because it has grief (the antithesis of happiness)

Example of Viruddha Pūrvachara Upalabdhi :---

# नोदेष्यति मुहूर्त्तान्ते शकटं रेवत्युदयात् ॥ ७५ ॥

75. Nodeşyati muhūrtānte sakatam revatyudayāt.

75. The Rohini will not rise after the end of a Muhūrta as the Revati has arisen.

### Commentary

The constellation of the Rohimi will not appear after a Muhūrta (two ghatikās = 48 minutes) as now the constellation Revati which succeeds the constellation Aśvini (which as opposed to the Rohimi) has arisen.

Another example is this : Tomorrow will not be a Sunday, because it is Friday today.

Example of Viruddha Uttarachara Upalabdhi :---

# नोदगाद् भरणिर्मु हूर्तात् पूर्वं पुष्योदयात् ॥ ७६ ॥

76. Nodagād Bharaņirmuhūrttāt pūrvam puşyodayāt.

76. The Bharani ( constellation ) did not appear before the Muhūrta because ( now ) the constellation Puṣyā has arisen.

130

### Pariksāmukham

#### Commentary

The constellations up to Puşyā according to sequence are these: The Aśvini, the Bharani, the Krittikā, the Rohini, the Mrigaśirā, the  $\overline{A}$ drā, the Punarvasu, and the Puṣyā. So when there is the Puṣyā constellation which follows the Punarvasu, it follows that the Bharani did not rise one Muhūrta before it as it was Punarvasu which rose in that time.

Another example of this is : "Yesterday was not a Friday, because it is Tuesday to-day".

Example of Viruddha Sahachara upalabdhi :---

# नास्त्यत्र भित्तौ परभागाभावोऽर्वाग्भागदर्द्रा नात् ॥ ७७ ॥

77. Nästyatra bhittau parabhāgābhāvo'rvāgbhagadarśanāt.

77. This wall is not devoid of an outside, because it has an inside [ the Sahachara ( coexistent ) of the outside ].

Six varieties of each of Aviruddha and Viruddha upalabdhi have now been described. Next we proceed to describe the (seven) varieties of Aviruddha Anupalabdhi and (three) varieties of Viruddha Anupalabdhi.

## अविरुद्धानुपलब्धिः प्रतिषेधे सप्तधा स्वभावव्यापककार्यकारण-पूर्वीत्तरसहचरानुपलम्भभेदात् ॥ ७८ ॥

78. Aviruddhānupalabdhih pratisedhe saptadhā svabhāvavyāpakakāryakāraņa-pūrvottarasahacharānupalambhabhedāt.

78. When (the Sādhya consists of) Pratisedha (nonexistence of some fact), Aviruddha Anupalabdhi is of seven kinds viz non-finding of Svabhāva, Vyāpaka, Kārya, Kāraņa, Pūrvachara, Uttarachara and Sahachara

### Commentary

There are seven kinds of Aviruddha Anupalabdhi which cause knowledge of nonexistence of some fact. Not finding the antithesis consists of Aviruddha Anupalabdhi and when this establishes non-existence of some fact, we call it Aviruddha Anupalabdhi in Pratişedha. This is of seven kinds, examples of which will be given in the following seven aphorisms 79-85<sup>4</sup>.

Example of Aviruddha Svabhāva Anupalabdhi :--

## नास्त्यत्र भूतले घटोऽनुपलब्धेः ॥ ७९ ॥

79. Nāstyatra bhūtale ghato'nupalabdheh.

79. There is no pitcher in this place because (its Svabhāva or identity ) is not to be found (i.e. nothing resembling its identity is present here ).

Example of Aviruddha Vyāpaka Anupalabdhi :-----

# नास्त्यत्र शिंशपा वृक्षानुपलव्घेः ॥ ८० ॥

80. Nāstyatra sinšapā vriksānupalabdheh.

80. There is no Sinsapā (tree) here, because no tree is found here.

Example of Aviruddha Kāryānupalabdhi :---

# नास्त्यत्राप्रतिवद्धसामर्थ्योग्निर्भू मानुपल्रब्धे: ॥ ८१ ॥

81. Nāstyatrāpratibaddhasāmarthyo'gnirdhūmānupalabdheh.

81. There is no fire whose potency (Sämarthya) has not been obstructed here, because we do not find smoke.

Example of Aviruddha Kāraņānupalabdhi :

## नास्त्यन्न धूमोऽनग्नेः ॥ ८२ ॥

82. Nāstyatra dhūmo'nagneķ.

82. There is no smoke here because there is no fire.

### 1. "तत्राविरुद्धानुपलन्धिः प्रतिषेधावबोधे सप्तप्रकाराः।"

Pramāņanayatattvālokālankāra, III. 90.

"प्रतिषेध्येनाविरुद्धानां स्वभावव्यापककार्यकारणपूर्वचरोत्तरसहचाराणाम-

तुपल्ल्ब्घिः ।" Ibid. III. 91.

Example of Aviruddha Pūrvachara Anupalabdhi:

# न भविष्यति मुहूर्त्तांते शकट कृत्तिकोदयानुपलष्धेः ॥ ८३ ॥

83. Na bhavişyati muhūrtānte sakatam krittikodayānupalabdheḥ.

83. There will be no rise of the Rohini after a Muhürta as we have no knowledge of the rise of the Krittikä.

### Commentary

Another Example is this : It will not be Sunday tomorrow because it is not Saturday to-day.

Example of Aviruddha Uttarachara Anupalabdhi:

## नोद्गाद् भरणिर्मुहूर्त्तात् प्राक्तत एव ॥ ८४ ॥

84. Nodagād Bharaņirmuhūrttāt prāktata eva.

84. The Bharani had not risen before a Muhūrta because now the Krittikā is not up.

Example of Aviruddha Sahachara Anupalabdhi :

### नास्त्यत्र समतुलायामुन्नामो नामानुपलब्धेः ॥ ८५ ॥

85. Nāstyatra samatulāyāmunnāmo nāmānupalabdheh.

85. One pan of this pair of scales does not touch beam as the other one is on the same level with it.

Now, the varieties of Viruddha Anupalabdhi ( nonfinding of antithesis ) establishing a Sādhya of Vidhi ( existence of a fact ) are being described.

# विरुद्धानुपलन्धिर्विधौ त्रेधा विरुद्धकार्यकारणस्वभावा-नुपलन्धिभेदात् ॥ ८६ ॥

86, Viruddhānupalabdhirvidhau tredhā viruddhakāryakāraņasvabhāvānupalabdhibhedāt.

Jain Education International

### Example of Viruddha Kārya Anupalabdhi :---

## व्याइतिमन् प्राणिनि व्याधिविद्येषोऽस्ति

निरामयचेष्टानुपलब्धे: ॥ ८७ ॥

87. Yathāsmin praņini vyādhivišeşosti nirāmayachestānupalabdheh.

87. As for example, some disease exists in this animal, because the actions of a healthy body are not found.

Example of Viruddha Kāraņa Anupalabdhi :----

## अस्त्यत्र देहिनि दुःखमिष्टसंयोगाभाषात् ॥ ८८ ॥

88. Astyatra dehini duhkhamistasanyogābhāvāt.

88. There is grief in this creature, because it has no connection with its dear ones.

Example of Viruddha Svabhāva Anupalabdhi :----

## अनेकान्तात्मकं वस्त्वेकांतस्वरूपानुपलब्घे: ॥ ८९ ॥

89. Anekāntātmakam vastvekāntasvarūpānupalabdheh.

89. All things are Anekāntika (posessed of different aspects) because we do not find that these have only one aspect.

### Commentary

In Pramāņanayatattvālokālankāra, five varieties<sup>1</sup> (instead of three as described in the Parikṣāmukham) of Viruddha Anupalabdhī in Vidhi have been described. The first three are the same as described in aphorisms 87, 88 and 89. The additional ones are Viruddha Vyāpaka Anupalabdhi e. g. "There is wind here because there is no heat" and Viruddha Sahachara Anupalabdhi e. g. 'He has false knowledge because we do not find perfect knowledge in him"<sup>2</sup>.

1. "विद्यूधानुपछवधिस्तु विधिप्रतीतौ पंचधा।"

Pramāņanayatattvālokālankāra, III. 99.

"किल्ट्रमन्यापकासुपरुव्धिर्यथा अस्त्यत्र छाया औष्ण्यानुपरुव्धेः।"

"विरुद्धसद्धधारानुपल्लव्धिर्यथा अस्त्यस्य मिथ्याज्ञानं सम्यग्दर्शनानुपल्लवेः ।" Ibid III. 104, 105

# परंपरया संभवत् साधनमञ्जैवान्तर्भाषनीचम् ॥ ९० ॥

90. Paramparayā sambhavat sādhanamatraivāntarbhāvanīyam.

90. The Hetus which arise one after the other should be included within those ( which have been described ).

### Commentary

There are cases where a Hotu is not the direct cause of anything but it leads to another and that leads to a third etc. In such cases there is no necessity of accepting these as separate Hetus, but we should include these within the proper Hetus already defined and illustrated. Examples of such Hetus are given in the following aphorism.

### अभूदन्न चके शिवकः स्थासात् ॥ ९१ ॥

91. Abhūdatra chakre śivakah sthāsāt.

## कार्यकार्यमविरुद्धकायों पल्डब्धौ ॥ ९२ ॥

92. Kāryakāryamaviruddhakāryopalabdhau.

91. There was Śivaka (a clod of earth resembling a Śivalinga) on this potter's wheel because we see  $Sth\bar{a}sa$  there.

92. (This Hetu showing ) effect of an effect will be included within Aviruddha Kārya upalabdhi ( as already defined ).

### Commentary

To manufacture a pitcher, a clod of earth is necessary. This clod resembling a Śivalinga is placed on the potter's wheel. *Chhatraka* (mushroom) may grow on it and after that *Sthāsa* (signs of mushroom) may be found on the earth. As *Sthāsa* is now seen, we infer Śivaka though the intervening Hetu *Chhatraka* is not seen or mentioned. Sthāsa is therefore the effect of Chhatraka which is an effect of Śivaka. This can be included within Aviruddha Kāryopalabdhi as already defined.

# नास्त्यन्न गुहायां मृगकीडनं मृगारिसंशब्दनात् । कारणविरुद्धकार्यं विरुद्धकार्यो पल्ज्यूधौ यथा ॥ ९३ ॥

93. Nästyatra guhāyām mrigakridanam mrigārisamsabdanāt. Kāraņaviruddhakāryam viruddhakāryopalabdhau yathā.

### The Sacred Books of the Jainas

93. There is no play of deer in this cave because there is a roar of lion. Here there is an effect opposed to a cause. This should be (included) within Viruddha Kārya Upalabdhi.

#### Commentary

In the example given, deer (Kāraṇa) are the causes of play (Kārya). A lion is the antithesis (Viruddha) of deer for no deer can play in the presence of a lion. The Kārya of lion is the roaring. So we have Kāraṇa Viruddha Kārya in this place. This should be included within Viruddha Kārya Upalabdhi and not recognized as a separate inference.

# ब्युतपन्नप्रयोगस्तु तथोपपत्त्याऽन्यथानुपपत्त्यैवः वा ॥ ९४ ॥

94. Vyutpannaprayogastu tathopapattyānyathānupapattyaiva vā.

94. The use by those who are conversant ( with the process of inference ) is from existence or non-existence of that universal concomitance ( between the Sādhya and the Sādhana ).

#### Commentary

It has already been mentioned (Aphorism 46) that though five parts of Anumāna are used for teaching students, really there are only two parts of an inference (Aphorism 37). But those who are conversant with processes of reasoning employ inference through the knowledge of the existence of Sādhya (e.g. fire) always along with Sādhana (e.g. smoke) or the nonexistence of Sādhya where Sādhana is absent. This is amplified in the four aphorisms which follow.

# अग्निमानयं देशस्तथैव धूमवत्त्वोपपत्तेर्धू मवत्त्वान्यथानुपपत्तेर्वा ॥९५॥ हेतुप्रयोगे हि यथा व्यासिग्रहणं विधीयते सा च तावन्मात्रेण व्युत्पन्नैरवधार्यते ॥ ९६॥

95. Agnimānayam dešastathaiva dhūmavattvopapatterdhūmavattvānyathānupapattervā.

96. Hetuprayoge hi yathā vyāptigrahaņam vidhīyate sā cha tāvanmātreņa vyutpannairavadhāryate.

Jain Education International

136

### तावता च साध्यसिद्धिः ॥ ९७ ॥

97. Tāvatā cha sādhyasiddhih.

### तेन पक्षस्तदाधारसूचनायोक्तः ॥ ९८ ॥

98. Tena pakṣastadādhārasūchanāyoktaķ.

95. This place is full of fire, for existence of smoke is only possible if there be fire here or ( this place is not full of fire ) as smoke does not exist here.

96. In the employment of Hctu, the use of Vyāpti (universal concomitance) is made. That (Vyāpti) is understood by the persons conversant (with the process of inference) from it (viz. Hetu) (without use of Udāharaņa etc.).

97. The Sādhya is established from this (viz. Hetu) only.

98. So it has been mentioned that it is necessary to mention Pakşa to indicate the Adhāra ( abode ) of Hetu consisting of universal concomitance.

#### Commentary

The subjectmatter of these four aphorisms has already been discussed in connection with the establishment of the principle that Dristanta etc. are not necessary in inference by logicians conversant with the processes of reasoning, though these may be used in lectures to pupils for their better understanding (vide Aphorisms 37, 43, 44 and 46).

## आप्तवचनादिनिवंधनमर्थज्ञानमागमः ॥ ९९ ॥

99. Aptavachanādinivandhanamarthajilānamāgamah.

99. Agama is knowledge derived from words etc. of a reliable person.

#### Commentary

The characteristics of Anumäna have been described. Now the same of Agama are mentioned. Knowledge derived from in-P-18 terpretation of signs, symbols, words etc. is called Śruta Jñāna. Now the words, signs etc. of a person who has no motive for deceiving or misleading any one, are reliable. Such a person is known as Apta. The knowledge derived from words etc. of an Apta is called Agama.

This is the same as Śabda Pramāņa of Hindu philosophers. Knowledge may be derived from words of living beings or from scriptures. In Nyāyāvatāra, the Śabda Pramāņa with its subdivision scriptural knowledge is thus described :---

"Knowledge arising from words, which taken in their proper acceptance express real objects not inconsistent with what are established by perception, is known as *Sabda* (the verbal testimony).

The scripture ( $\hat{S}astra$ ) is that which was invented (or first known) by a competent person, which is not such as to be passed over by others, which is not incompatible with the truths derived from perception, which imparts true instructions and which is profitable to all men and is preventive of the evil path<sup>1</sup>."

Dr. S. C. Vidyābhūsana in his notes to these verses has written: "Śabda ( the word or verbal testimony ) is of two kinds, viz. (1) Laukika ( the knowledge derived from a reliable person ), and (2) Śāstraja ( the knowledge derived from scripture ). This definition sets aside the view of those ( Mimāmsakas ) who maintain that the scripture ( such as the Veda ) is eternal and was not composed by any human being. The scripture could not have

 "दृष्टेष्टाव्याइतत्वाद् वाक्यात् परमार्थाभिधायिनः । तत्त्वमाहितयोत्पन्नमानं शाब्दं प्रकीर्त्तितम् ।। आप्तोपझमनुङ्झ्यमदृष्टेष्टविरोधकम् । तत्त्वोपदेशऋत् सार्वं शास्तं कापथधट्टनम् ॥" Nyāyāvatāra 8. 9.

Tr. by Dr. S. C. Vidyābhūṣana. The latter verse appears as verse 9 in Ratnakaraņḍaśrāvakāchāra by Samantabhadra (2nd century).

### Parikşāmukham

been called a verbal testimony ( Śabda or word ) unless it embodied the words of any particular person or persons<sup>1</sup>."

In Pramāņanayatattvālokālankāra it is mentioned : "Āgama is knowledge derived from words etc. of an Āpta. The words themselves are also called Āgama in a secondary sense. For example, there is a mine of jewels in this place. Hills etc. containing jewels exist. An Āpta is a person who knows the real nature of a thing about which he speaks and who speaks according to his correct knowledge. Only words of such a person are established without any opposition. Such an Āpta is of two kinds Laukika or Lokottara. A Laukika person is ( an ordinary human being ) like Janaka. Lokottara persons are like the Tirthankaras<sup>2</sup>." In the Hindu Nyāya philosophy also Śabda ( Pramāņa ) is said to be derived from the speech of one worthy of confidence and a person who speaks the truth becomes worthy ( Āpta ) of such confidence<sup>3</sup>.

An Apta is free from eighteen faults viz hunger, thirst, senility, disease, birth, death, fear, pride, attachment, aversion, infatuation, worry, conceit, hatred, uneasiness, sweat, sleep and

1. Nyäyävatāra Edited by S. C. Vidyābhūşana, Pp. 11-12.

2. "आप्तवचनादाविभेतमर्थसंवेदनमागमः॥"

"उपचारादाप्तवचनञ्च ॥"

"समस्त्यत्र प्रदेशे रत्ननिधानं, सन्ति रत्नसानुप्रभृतयः ॥"

"अभिधेयं बस्तु यत्रावस्थितं यो जानीते यथाझानं चाभिधत्ते स आप्तः ॥"

"तस्य हि वचनम् अविसंवादि भवति ।"

"स च द्वेधा लौकिको लोकोत्तरख ।"

"छौकिको जनकादिर्छोकोत्तरस्तु तीर्थकरादितः ॥"

Pramāņanayatattvālokālankāra IV. 1-7

3. "आप्तवाक्यं शब्दः । आप्तस्तु यथार्थवक्ता ।"

Tarkasangraha by Annam Bhatta 48.

surprise<sup>1</sup>. He is the knower of all things. Being free from faults, he reveals the scriptures<sup>2</sup>. He is of the highest status and of unsurpassed splendour. He is free from attachment and void of impurities. He has omniscience and has no beginning, middle or
end and is a friend of all living beings and their teacher<sup>3</sup>. Just as a drum sounds being struck by the hands of the drummer without any desire of its own, so an Apta reveals the Truth for the benefit of people without any personal motive<sup>4</sup>. Revelation comes out of an Apta spontaneously to remove sufferings of people.

सहजयोग्यतासंकेतवशाद्धि शब्दादयो वस्तुप्रतिपत्तिहेतवः ॥१००॥

100. Sahajayogyatāsaņketavasāddhi sabdādayo vastupratipattihetavah.

### यथा मेर्वादयः सन्ति ॥ १०१ ॥

101. Yathā mervādayah santi.

100. Words etc. (signs, symbols and other things of like nature) are causes of knowledge of things through their inherent power in connoting things.

101. As for example "The Meru etc. exist."

#### Commentary

A question may arise, how do we have knowledge derived from words? In Hindu Nyäya philosophy it is mentioned "The

 "क्षुत्पिपासाजरातङ्कजन्मान्तकभयस्मयाः । न रागद्वेषमोद्दाश्च यस्याप्तः स प्रकीत्तिंतः ॥"

Ratnakarandaśrāvakāchāra, Verse 6

- 2. "आप्नेनोच्छिन्नदोषेण सर्वज्ञेनागमेशिना । भवितन्यं नियोगेन नान्यथा धाप्तता भवेत ॥'' Ibid Verse 5
- "परमेष्ठी परंज्योतिर्विरागो विमलः छती । सर्वझोऽनादिमध्यान्तः सार्वः शास्तोपलाल्यते ॥" Ibid Verse 7
- 4. "अनात्मार्थं विना रागेः शास्ता शास्ति सतो हितम् । ध्वनन् शिल्पिकरस्पर्शान्सुरजः किमपेक्षते ॥" Ibid Verse 8

Parikşāmukham

141

cause of the knowledge of the sense of a sentence is the interdependance, Compatibility and Juxta-position (of the words). Inter-dependance means the inability of a word to indicate the intended sense in the absence of another word. Compatibility consists in (a word's) not rendering futile the sense (of a sentence). Juxta-position consists in the enunciation of the words without a (long) pause between each.

A collection of words devoid of interdependance etc. is no valid sentence. For example 'cow, horse, man, elephant' gives no information, the words not looking out for one another. The expression 'He should irrigate with fire' is no cause of right knowledge, for there is no compatibility ( between fire and irrigation ). 'The words 'Bring-the-cow' not pronounced close together but with an interval of some three hours between each, are not a cause of correct knowledge, from the absence of ( the requisite closeness of ) juxta-position<sup>1</sup>."

"A speech is a collection of significant sounds as for example, Bring the cow. A significant sound is that which is possessed of power ( to convey a meaning )<sup>2</sup>."

Now, if we ask, who decides that such and such a word means such and such a thing, the answer given by some Hindu logicians is that it is God's will which decides this. "The power (of a word) is the appointment, in the shape of God's will that such and

 "आकाङ्क्षा योग्यता संनिधिश्च वाक्यार्थज्ञानहेतुः। पदस्य पदान्तर-व्यतिरेकप्रयुक्तान्वयाननुभावकत्वमाकांक्षा। अर्थावाधो योग्यता। पदानामविलंवेनोचारणं संनिधिः।

आकांक्षादिरहितं वाक्यमप्रमाणम् । यथा गौरश्चः पुरुषो इस्तीति न प्रमाण-माकांक्षाविरहात् । अग्निना सिञ्चेदिति न प्रमाणं योग्यताविरहात् । प्रहरे प्रहरे-Sसहोचारितानि गामानयेत्यादिपदानि न प्रमाणं सांनिष्यामावात् ॥" Tarkasangraha, 49-50.

2. "वाक्यं पदसमूहः । यथा गामानयेति । शक्तं पदम् ।" Tarkasangraha, 48.

### 142 The Sacred Books of the Jainas

such an import should be recognizable from such and such a significant sound<sup>1</sup>. Or, we may hold that we take the meaning of words from its use in a particular sense by previous users<sup>2</sup>.

In this connection we may remember the conclusions arrived at by scholars dealing with the science of language regarding sematology or the science of meaning of words. "The phenomena with which sematology deals are too complicated, too dependent on psychological conditions; the element of chance or conscious exertion of will seems to enter into them, and it is often left to the arbitrary choice of an individual to determine the change of meaning to be undergone by a word. Still this meaning must be accepted by the community before it can become part of language; unless it is so accepted it will remain a mere literary curiosity in the pages of a technical dictionary. And since its acceptance by the community is due to general causes, influencing many minds alike, it is possible to analyze and formulate these causes, in . fact, to refer significant change to certain definite principles to bring it under certain definite generalizations. Moreover, it must be remembered that the ideas suggested by most words are what Locke calls 'mixed modes.' A word like just or beauty is but a shorthand note suggesting a number of ideas more or less associated with one another. But the ideas associated with it in one mind cannot be exactly those associated with it in another; to one man it suggests what it does not to another. So long as we move in a society subjected to the same social influences and education as ourselves we do not readily perceive the fact, since the leading ideas called up by the word will be alike for all; but it is quite otherwise when we come to deal with those whose education has been imperfect as compared with our own. A young speaker often imagines that he makes himself intelligible to an uneducated

1. ''अस्मात् पदात् अयमर्थो बोद्धव्य इतीश्वरेच्छासंकेतः शक्तिः ।''

Tarkasangraha, 48.

2. "संकेतस्य प्रद्व: पूर्व वृद्धस्य व्यवद्वारत: I" Sabdasaktiprakāsikā

audience by using short and homely words ; unless he also suits his ideas to theirs, he will be no better understood than if he spoke in the purest Johnsonese. If we are suddenly brought into contact with experts in a subject we have not studied, or dip into a book on an unfamiliar branch of knowledge, we seem to be listening to the meaningless sounds of a foreign tongue. The words used may not be technical words; but familiar words and expressions will bear senses and suggest ideas to those who use them which they will not bear to us. It is impossible to convey in a translation all that is meant by the original writer. We may say that the French juste answers to the English just, and so it does in a rough way; but the train of thoughts associated with juste is not that associated wih just, and the true meaning of a passage may often depend more on the associated thoughts than on the leading idea itself. Nearly every word, in fact, may be described as a complex of ideas, which is not the same in the minds of any two individuals, its general meaning lying in the common ideas attached to it by all the members of a particular society. The significations, therefore, with which the comparative philologist has to concern himself are those unconsciously agreed upon by a body of men, or rather the common group of ideas suggested by a word to all of them alike. Here again some general causes must be at work which may yet be revealed by a careful analysis. The comparative philologist has not to trouble himself, like the classical philologist, with discovering the exact ideas connected with a word by some individual author; it is the meaning of words as they are used in current speech, not as they illustrate the idiosyncrasies of a writer, which it is his province to investigate.<sup>1</sup>."

We must also remember that analogy lends new senses to words. The original meaning is forgotten and metaphorical senses come to be used in its place. A dead meaning may again be

<sup>1.</sup> Introduction to the Science of Language ( Sayce ) Vol. I Pp. 336-338,


revived. There are also metaphors, variation of meaning according to their application to persons or things, to what is good or bad, great or small. Words change their signification according to their use as active or passive, as subjects or as objects. An idea may also be expressed either by a compound or periphrasis or by a single word. The same word may also be applied in a variety of senses, the particular sense which it bears being determined by the context. Change of meaning may also follow from change of pronunciation or the introduction of new words<sup>1</sup>.

In aphorism 99 it has been mentioned that knowledge can be derived from "words etc." of an  $\overline{A}$  pta. We have mentioned that by 'etc.' it is implied that signs, symbols etc. can also impart knowledge. The modern science of language also recognises that thoughts can be expressed by other symbols than words. Writing consisting of hieroglyphics or mathematical symbols and gesture language are examples of this. Onomatopaeia, interjectional or instinctive cries also of men whose language we do not know are intelligible to us.

End of Samuddeśa 3. .

### 1, Ibid Pp. 338-343,

144



# चतुर्थंः समुदेशः

### SAMUDDEŚA IV.

This samuddesa deals with the object of Pramana.

## सामान्यविद्येषात्मा तदर्थो विषय: ॥ १ ॥

1. Sāmānyavisesatmā tadartho visayah.

1. The subject matter of it (Pramāņa) is visaya of two kinds characterised by sāmānya and visesa.

#### Commentary

The subject matter of this samuddes is summarised in the Chart which faces this page.

"Things in nature are characterised by many-sidedness. Each of them presents a number of aspects which have to be known before we can be said to have exact knowledge of their nature.

The different points of view for studying things are called Nayas of which the Dravyārthika ( the natural ) and the Paryāyārthika ( changing or conditional ) are the most important.

The Dravyārthika point of view only takes into consideration the nature of the substance of material of a thing, while the Paryāyārthika confines itself to the study of the form or forms in which substances manifest themselves<sup>1</sup>."

"Jainism aims, from the very commencement, at a systematic classification of the subject-matter of knowledge, and divides the philosophical standpoint into two main heads, the Niśchaya and the Vyavahāra. Of these, the former deals with the permanent qualities, hence, the essential nature of things about which there can be no possibility of doubt, and which remains true under all

1. The Science of Thought by C. R. Jain, Pp. 21-22,

Pariksāmukham

circumstances, conditions and states. For this reason, it is called the Niśchaya i. e. the natural or certain. The latter, however, only deals with things not with reference to their real or essential nature, but with respect to their utility or non-natural states and conditions. The statement "This is a jar of clay' is an illustration of the Niśchaya Naya, while "This is a jar of butter' is true only from the Vyavahāra or the practical point of view<sup>1</sup>."

In Naya-karnikā by Vinaya-vijaya we have : "All objects possess two kinds of properties, viz. 1. Sāmānya or the generalizing (general) and 2. Višeṣa or the differentiating (specific) properties; the general expressing the genus ( $j\bar{a}ti$ ) etc. and the specific expressing the species, differences and distinctions. By means of general properties in each of a hundred ('hundred' here means 'all') jars, one idea (that of jarness is recognised and by means of specific properties, people distinguish each individual particular jar as their own<sup>2</sup>."

Hemachandra writes : "The objects of Pramāņa are things characterised by Dravya or Paryāya<sup>a</sup>." Dravya and Paryāya are the same as Sāmānya and Viseṣa or Niśchaya and Vyavahāra.

## अनुष्टत्तव्याष्टत्तप्रत्ययगोचरत्वात् पूर्वोत्तराकारपरिहारावाप्ति-स्थितिलक्षणपरिणामेनार्थकियोपपत्तेश्च ॥ २ ॥\*

2. Anuvritta-vyāvritta-pratyaya-gocharatvāt pūrvottarākāraparihārāvāpti-sthiti-lakṣaṇa-pariṇāmenārtha-kriyopapattescha.

\* "पूर्वोत्तराकारपरिहारस्वीकारस्थितिल्रक्षणपरिणामेनास्यार्थकियोपपत्तिः।" Pramānamimāmsā I. I. 34

- 1. The Nayakarnikā by M. D. Desai. Introduction Pp. 5-6.
- "अर्थाः सर्वेऽपि सामान्यविशेषा उभयात्मकाः । सामान्यं तत्र जात्यादि विशेषश्च विभेदकाः ।। ऐक्यबुद्धिर्घटशते भवेत् सामान्यधर्मतः । विशेषाच निज निज लक्षयन्त्रि घढं जनाः ॥"
- Nayakarnikā 3 and 4 3. "प्रमाणस्य विषयो द्रव्यपर्यायात्मकं वस्तु।" Pramāņa-mīmāmsā I. 1 31,

2. As there is attainment of the object (as a result of knowledge) from signs of changes from its original state to a later state preserving its essential characteristics and from our idea of general and special characteristics.

#### Commentary

In every substance, there is knowledge of its general and special characteristics. For example, we have a general knowledge of a man and a special knowledge whether he is a Brahmin or not etc. Also, a thing changes its qualities for example a man grows up, leaving his childhood and youth and becomes old. But throughout his different ages, he maintains essential charcteristics of being a person.

This acceptance of change leading to the manysidedness of a thing is a peculiarity of Jain doctrine establishing the Anekāntavāda.

"Dravya means that which flows or changes. While changing through its different qualities and modifications, its essential nature persists. This kind of progressive development is associated with Dravya. But such development is also the characteristic of substance. Hence according to Jaina attitude, Dravya is not entirely different from Sattā or substance...

According to this view there is no unchanging substance or Sattā in Jaina system...Here...the similarity between the Hegelian concept of 'thing' and the Jaina concept of Dravya is worth noticing. Sattā is not 'a thing in itself' behind Dravya. Sattā and Dravya are one and the same as Hegel mentioned. Thing in itself and experience are not absolutely distinct. Dravya refers to facts of experience. Sattā refers to existence or reality. One may be abstracted from the other but it is not different from the other as a fact<sup>1</sup>."

 "द्वियदि गच्छदि ताइं ताई सब्भाव प्रज्जयाई जं। द्वियं तं भण्णति अण्णणणभूदं तु सत्तादो ॥"

Pańchāstikāyasamayasāra. Verse 9.

### Pariksāmukham

This changing nature of the substance is mentioned in the Tattvārthādhigama Sūtra as "Sat ( the dravya ) consists of utpāda, vyaya and dhrauvya<sup>t</sup>." Utpada is appearance i. e., assuming new modification. This does not mean creation out of nothing. Creation by the fiat of a will is not recognised by the Jainas. Utpāda therefore means that phase of the process of the development when a new form is assumed. Vyaya is losing the previous form. Here also it is different from absolute disappearance. It only means that phase in the process of development where the earlier form is replaced by the succeeding one. Dhrauvya refers to the persistence of the essential nature of dravya which undergoes development and which makes both utpada and vyaya simultaneously possible. In fact the process of development includes all the three phases. This fact is not only recognised by scientists like Darwin and Spencer, but by the great French philosopher Bergson who has raised it to an important philosophical principle<sup>2</sup>."

Hemachandra says that from the fact that only a thing characterised by Dravya and Paryāya is capable of producing the result of Pramāņa viz. acceptance of things desirable and nonacceptance of undesirable things or indifference to the latter, we say that merely a Dravya or a Paryāya or both of them independantly of the thing cannot be the object of Pramāņa<sup>3</sup>.

"सत् द्रव्यरुक्षणम् ।"
 "उत्पादव्ययध्रौव्ययुक्तं सत् ।"

Tattvārtha Sūtra V. 29 and 30.

2. Sacred Books of the Jainas Vol. III. P. 9.

3. "कुतः पुनर्द्रव्यपर्यायात्मकमेव वस्तु प्रमाणानां विषयो, न द्रव्यमात्रं पर्यायमात्रमुभयं वा स्वतन्त्रमित्याह, अर्थक्रियासामर्थ्यात् । अर्थस्य हानोपादानादि-ल्झणस्य क्रियानिष्पत्तिस्तत्र सामर्थ्यात् द्रव्यपर्यायात्मकस्यैव वस्तुनोऽर्थक्रियासमर्थ-त्वादित्यर्थः ।" Pramāṇa-mimāṃsā 1. 1. 32.

# सासान्यं देशा तिर्यगुर्ध्वताभेदात् ॥ ३ ॥

3. Sāmānyam dvedhā tiryagūrdhvatābhedāt.

3. Sāmāņya is of two kinds being divided into Tiryak (sāmānya) and ūrdhvatā (sāmānya).

# सहरापरिणामस्तिर्थक् खंडमुंडादिषु गोत्ववत् ॥ ४ ॥

4. Sadrisapariņāmastiryak khandamuņdādişu gotvavat.

4. Tiryak (sāmānya) is the same modification such as Khanda Munda etc. in the condition of a cow.

# परापरक्विर्क्तव्यापिद्रव्यमूर्ध्वता सदिव स्थासादिषु ॥ ५ ॥

5. Parāparavivartavyāpidravyamūrddhvatā mridiva sthāsādișu.

5. Urdhvatā sāmānya is a thing which remains the same through changes such as earth in its ( modifications ) sthāsa etc.

## विद्योषश्च ॥ ६ ॥

6. Viśeşascha.

150

# फ्पीयव्यतिरेकभेदात् ॥ ७ ॥

- 7. Paryāyavyatirekabhedāt.
- 6. Viśesa ( is ) also ( of two kinds ).
- 7. Being divided into Paryāya and Vyatireka.

# एकस्मिन् द्रव्ये कमभाविनः परिणामाः पर्याया आत्मनि हर्षविषादादिवत् ॥ ८ ॥

8. Ekasmin dravye kramabhāvinah pariņāmāh paryāyā ātmani harşavişādādiyat.

8. Paryāyās are modifications in sequence in a single substance e. g. joy and grief in oneself.

# अर्थान्तरगतो विसदृशपरिणामो व्यतिरेको गोमहिषादिवत् ॥ ९ ॥

9. Arthāntaragato visadriśa-pariņāmo vyatireko gomahişādivat.

9. Vyatirekas are different modifications in different objects such as a cow and a buffalo etc.

### Commentary

With this aphorism, the description of the subject matter of Pramāņa ends. In the next samuddesa the result of Pramāņa will be discussed.

End of Samuddesa IV.

# पञ्चमः समुद्देशः

## SAMUDDEŚA V.

## अज्ञाननिष्टत्तिर्हानोपादानोपेक्षाश्च फलम् ॥ १ ॥

1. Ajňāna-nivrittirhānopādānopeksāscha phalam.

1. The result is the dispelling of false knowledge and leaving (the undesirable things), acquirement (of desirable things) and indifference (to other things).

#### Commentary

The result of Pramāņa primarily consists of correct knowledge dispelling false knowledge, secondarily it leads to the acquirement of desirable objects, discarding of undesirable objects and indifference to other objects. This secondary result arises after we ascertain an object correctly by Pramāņa<sup>1</sup>.

Hemachandra mentions : when Pramana arises in a person, the correct knowledge of an object is established. The immediate result is therefore the destruction of false knowledge<sup>2</sup>, or the idea of leaving ( the undesirable ) etc. The following verse of Nyāyāvatāra is quoted in the commentary by Hemachandra.

# "प्रमाणस्य फलं साक्षादज्ञानयिनिवर्त्तनम् । केवलस्य सुखोपेक्षे दोषस्यादानहानधीः ॥"

 "द्विविधं हि फलं साक्षात् धारम्पर्येणेति । साक्षादज्ञाननिष्टत्तिः पारम्पर्येण द्वानादिकमिति । प्रमेयनिश्वयोत्तरकालभावित्वात् तस्येति ।"

Prameyaratnamālā.

2. "तस्यां सत्यामर्थप्रकाशसिद्धेः ।"

Pramāņa-mimāmsā I. 1. 38,

"अज्ञाननिवृत्तिर्वा।" Ibid. I. 1. 39. "हानादिबुद्धयो वा।" Ibid. I. 1. 41. That is to say, the immediate result of Pramāņa is the removal of ignorance. So the mediate effect is happiness and indifference or equanimity to a Kevali (one possessed of absolute knowledge) and to others, a desire to accept (desirable objects) and leave (undesirable objects).

In Apta Mimāmsā also the same has been mentioned :

# ''उपेक्षा फलमाद्यस्य दोषस्यादानहानधीः । पूर्वा वाऽज्ञाननाशो वा सर्वस्यास्य स्वगोचरै ॥''

In Sarvārtha-siddhi while explaining the aphorism "Tat Pramāņe" of Tattvārthādhigama Sūtra, the result of Pramāņa is mentioned as "अन्धकारकरपाज्ञानाभाव: अज्ञाननाशो वा फल्लमित्युच्यते ।" i. e. "the result is said to be the want of false knowledge resembling darkness or the destruction of false knowledge."

We have discussed while dealing with the definition of Pramāņa that the Jain logicians have accepted the result of Pramāņa to be the same as Pramāņa. In Hindu philosophical systems like the Nyāya and Vaišeşika systems, the knowledge is mentioned as a result of Pramāņa. For example Gautama in his Nyāya Sūtras has propounded that the knowledge of fire from smoke is the result known as Anumiti from Anumāna Pramāņa (inference). But in Jain logic, this result itself has been called Anumāna and the dispelling of false knowledge is said to be the result of Pramāņa.

It will be laid down in the two aphorisms which follow that in one sense a result is indentical with Pramāņa and in another sense it is different.

In the different stages of knowledge Avagraha,  $\bar{I}h\bar{a}$ , Avāya Dhāraņā, Smriti, Pratyabhijūāna,  $\bar{U}ha$ , and Anumāna, the first is Pramāņa and the second is the result of the first. Again the second becomes Pramāņa and the third becomes the result of the second and so on<sup>1</sup>.

1. "अवप्रहादीनां वा कमापेक्षजननधर्माणां पूर्व पूर्व प्रमाणमुत्तरमुत्तरं फलम् ।" Pramāņa-mimāmsā I. 1. 40.

P-20

### प्रमाणादभिन्नं भिन्नं च॥२॥

2. Pramāņādabhinnam bhinnam cha.

2. (The result) is different and not different (in another sense) from the Pramāņa.

## यः प्रमिमीते स एव निष्टत्ताज्ञानो जहात्यादत्त उपेक्षते चेति प्रतीतेः ॥ ३ ॥

3. Yah pramimite sa eva nivrittājāāno jahātyādatta upeksate cheti pratiteh.

3. He who takes cognizance, becomes free from false knowledge and rejects ( undesirable objects ), selects ( desirable objects ) or becomes indifferent.

#### Commentary

The self which is changed in the form of a Pramāņa is also changed in the form of the result. In this sense Pramāņa is not different from its result. But if we take that Pramāņa is the instrumental cause (Kāraņa) of the action (Kriyā) viz. the result, we can say in this sense, that Pramāņa is different from the result<sup>1</sup>.

''अवम्रहेहावायधारणास्मृतिप्रत्यभिज्ञानोहानुमानानां क्रमेणोपज्ञायमानानां यद् यत् पूर्वं तत्तन् प्रमाणं यद्यदुत्तरं तत्तन्फल्लपं प्रतिपत्तव्यम् । अवम्रह्परिणामवान् ह्यात्मा ईहारूपफलतया परिणमति इतीहाफलापेक्षया अवम्रहः प्रमाणम् , ततोपीहा प्रमाणमवायः फलं. पुनरवायः प्रमाणं धारणा फल्रम् , ईहाधारणयोर्ज्ञानोपादानत्वात् ज्ञानरूपतोत्रेया, ततो धारणा प्रमाणं स्मृतिः फल्लम् , ततोऽपि स्मृतिः प्रमाणं प्रत्यभिज्ञानं फलं, ततोऽपि प्रत्यभिज्ञा प्रमाणमूहः फलं. ततोऽप्यूहः प्रमाणमनुमानं फलमिति प्रमाणफलविभाग इति ।" Bhaşya to Ibid.

). ''यस्यैवात्मनः प्रमाणाकारेण परिणतिस्तस्यैव फलरूपतया परिणाम इत्येकप्रमात्रपेक्षया प्रमाणफलयोरभेद् । करणक्रियापरिणामभेदाद् भेदः ।''

Prameyaratnamālā.

This is also laid down in Pramāņa-mimāņsā<sup>1</sup>.

It is mentioned in Prameyaratnamālā that the propounders of Nyāyavaišeşika philosophies maintain that Pramāņa is different from its result and the Buddhists say that the result is identical with the Pramāņa. Refuting these views, it is laid down by Māņikyanandi that result is in one sense different from Pramāņa and in another, identical with it<sup>2</sup>.

End of Samuddeśa V.

2. "तद्विविधमपि फलं प्रमाणाद्भिन्नमेवेति यौगाः । अभिन्नमेवेति सौगताः । तन्मतद्वयनिरासेन स्वमतं व्यवस्थापयितुमाह ।" Prameyaratnamālā.

 <sup>&</sup>quot;प्रमाणाद मिन्नाभिन्नम्।" Pramāņa-mīmāmsa. I. I. 24.
 "करणरूपत्वात् क्रियारूपत्वाच प्रमाणफल्योरमेदः ।…तस्यैवात्मनः प्रमाणाकारेण परिणतिस्तस्यैव फल्लपतया परिणाम इत्येकप्रमात्रपेक्षया प्रमाणफल्योर-मेदः ।" Ibid. Bhāsya.

## षष्ठः समुदेशः

### SAMUDDEŚA VI.

### ततोऽन्यत्तदाभासम् ॥ १ ॥

- 1. Tatonyattadabhāsam
- 1. The opposite of it, is Abhāsa of the same.

#### Commentary

In this Chapter, the fallacies will be taken up and described. We have mentioned before hand the nature, number, object and result of Pramāņa. The opposite of these will be fallacies of these. The fallacies of Pramāņa are described in Aphorisms 2-54, those of number are described in aphorism 55; those of object are described in aphorism 61 and those of result in aphorism 66.

## अस्वसंचिदितग्रहीतार्थदर्शनसंशयादयः प्रमाणाभासाः ॥ २ ॥

2. Asvasamviditagrihitārthadaršanasamšayādayah pramāņābhāsāh.

2. Pramäņābhāsas (fallacies of Pramāņa) are non-cognizance by one's own-self, knowledge of what has already been known, doubt etc.

# स्वविषयोपदर्शकत्वाभावात् ॥ ३ ॥

3. Svavişayopadarśakatvābhāvāt.

3. Because ( such knowledge ) does not establish its own object.

# पुरुषान्तरपूर्वार्थगच्छत्तृणस्पर्शस्थाणुपुरुषादिज्ञानवत् ॥ ४ ॥

4. Puruşāntarapūrvārthagachchattriņa-sparša-sthāņupuruşādijnānavat

4. As ( for example ), the knowledge of another person, the knowledge of a thing previously known, the knowledge of touching

### Parikşāmukham

grass of a person moving, the knowledge whether this is a post or a man etc.

#### Commentary

That which is not cognized by one's own self does not establish one's own knowledge; so it is not fit to establish the object of knowledge. Consequently knowledge of others is not Pramāņa but only a fallacy.

Again Nirvikalpaka Darśana is a fallacy as the Vikalpa caused by it ( and not itself ) shows the object.

Knowledge of what has already been known is a fallacy as it does not establish the object ( being already known by previous experience ).

By the word "doubt etc." in the aphorism, Samśaya ( doubt ), Anadhyavasāya and Viparyaya are meant. These have been thoroughly described in the commentary on Aphorism 3 Samuddeśa I of this work.

# चक्षू रसयीईव्ये संयुक्तसमवायवच ॥ ५ ॥

5. Chakşū rasayordravye samjuktasamavāyavacheha.

5. Like Samjukta Samavāya of eye and juice in a thing.

### Commentary

According to the view of Hindu Nyāya philosophy, knowledge of colour etc. arises in Samavāya Samvandha (intimate relation or co-inherence). Seven categories viz. substance (Dravya), quality (Guṇa), action (Karma), genus (Sāmānya), difference (Viśeṣa). co-inherence (Samavāya) and non-existence (Abhāva) are recognized in Hindu Nyāya philosophy<sup>1</sup>. Samavāya is thus described : "Intimate relation is co-inherence (Samavāya). It exists in things which cannot exist separately. Two things which cannot exist separately are those of which two, the one exists only as lodged in the other. Such pairs are, parts and what is made up of the parts,

1. "द्रव्यगुणकर्मसामान्यविशेषसमवायाभावाः सप्तपदार्थाः ।'' Tarkasangraha.

Jain Education International

qualities and the thing qualified, action and agent, species and individual, and difference and eternal substances<sup>1</sup>." "It exist, between the whole and its parts, the class and the individual, substance and qualities, agent and action, the ultimate atom and its visesa<sup>2</sup>." When the eye sees a pitcher, the colour which is co-inherent in the pitcher is cognized by the eye. So according to Hindn Naiyāyikas, the relationship of Samjukta Samavāya can be the cause of the knowledge of colour.

In Jain Nyāya philosophy this view is not accepted and is refuted by this aphorism. It is urged that when we see a fruit, we do not cognise its taste though the taste has co-inherence in the fruit. So it cannot be said that knowledge arises from Samjukta Samavāya Samvandha. Though in a thing (fruit) there is co-inherence of sight and taste, Pramāņa of taste cannot arise from the sight. In the same manner coinherence of sight and colour also cannot be accepted as Pramāņa. So the Pramāņa called Sannikarśa in Hindu Nyāya philosophy is not accepted by Jain logicians.

# अवैशर्**ये प्रत्यक्षं तदाभासं बौद्धस्याकस्माद्** धूमदर्शनाद्दहिविज्ञानवत् ॥ ६ ॥

6. Avaišadye pratyakşam tadābhāsam bauddhasyākasmāt dhüma-daršanādvanhivijnānavat.

6. When Pratyaksa is accepted in (things) not clear, we have its fallacy e.g. cognizance of fire by the followers of the Buddhist philosophy from sudden vision of smoke.

### Commentary

In this aphorism, fallacy of Pratyakṣ<br/>a ( ${\rm Pratyakṣābhāsa}$ ) is described.

 Dr. Ballantyne's Translation of the following passage from Tarkasangraha : "नित्त्यसंबन्धः समवायोऽयुतसिद्धवृत्तिः । ययोईयोर्मध्य एकमपराश्रितमेवावतिष्ठते तावयुतसिद्धौ ॥ अवयवावयविनौ गुणगुणिनौ क्रिया-क्रियावन्तौ जातिच्यक्ती विशेषनित्यद्रव्ये च ।"

2. Arthur Venis. Notes on Vedānta-Paribhāşā.

### Pariksāmukham

Acceptance of Pratyaksa knowledge without clearness is fallacy of Pratyaksa. This happens in the case of the followers of the Buddhist Nyāya philosophy who hold that from a sudden vision of smoke, a knowledge of fire arises by Pratyaksa and not by inference ( Anumāna ). Clearness has already been defined in Samuddesa II. Aphorism 4 as illumination without any other intermediate knowledge or illumination in details. In Anumana or inference we have an intermediate knowledge of smoke before we have a knowledge of fire and from the smoke we infer that there is fire. In Pratyaksa we see the fire with our own eyes or learn of its existence by words of a reliable person. The view of the Buddhist Nyāya philosophy that we have a Pratyakşa knowledge of fire from the sudden vision of smoke is held to be faulty in this aphorism. It is said that such a knowledge wants clearness which is the characteristic of Pratyakşa is Pratyakşābhāsa. Details of Pratyakşa knowledge have already been mentioned in Samuddeśa II. a reference to to which may be made. In a sudden vision of smoke, there is no definite ascertainment (Niśchaya) whether it is smoke or steam. So the knowledge of concomitance of fire and smoke cannot arise. For this uncertainty the knowledge of fire as derived from a sudden vision of smoke is Pratyakşābhāsa. The Nirvikalpa Pratyakşa as accepted by the Buddhists is for this reason Pratyakṣābhāsa (fallacy of Pratyaksa)1.

# वैशद्येऽपि परोक्षं तदाभासं मीमांसकस्य करणस्य ज्ञानवत् ॥ ७ ॥

7. Vaišadyehpi parokṣaṃ tadābhāsaṃ mīmāṃsakasya karaṇasya jūānavat.

7. In Parokṣa (accepted) in clearness, (we have) its fallacy (Parokśābhāsa) e.g. knowledge derived from the senses as accepted by the Mimāsakas.

 "यथा धुमवाष्पादिविवेकनिश्चयाभावाद् व्याप्तिप्रहणाभावाद् अकस्माद् धुमदर्शनाज्जातं यद्वह्विविज्ञानं तत्तदाभासं भवति कस्मादनिश्चयाद् । तथा वौद्धपरि-कल्पितं यन्निर्विकल्पकप्रत्यक्षं तत् प्रत्यक्षाभासं भवति कस्मादनिश्चयात् ।" Note on Prameyakamalamartanda.

#### Commentary

Parokṣābhāsa ( fallacy of Parokṣa ) arises when we accept Parokṣā knowledge as clear. The followers of the Mimāmsā philosophy hold that knowledge derived from the senses is Parokṣā. This view is refuted in this aphorism which lays down that such knowledge is clear and hence cannot be Parokṣā. In Samuddeśa III of this work, Parokṣā knowledge has been described in detail and clearness has been described in Aphorism 3 Samuddeśa II. In knowledge derived from the senses, we have no intermediate knowledge ( as in the case of inference e. g. of smoke before we cognise fire ). So clearness exists in these cases<sup>1</sup> and to hold such cases to be Parokṣā will be fallacy of Parokṣā.

## अतस्मिंस्तदिति ज्ञानं स्मरणाभासं जिनदत्ते स देवदत्तो यथा ॥ ८ ॥

8. Atasminstaditi jñānam smaraņābhāsam jinadatte sa Devadatto yathā.

8. Smaraņābhāsa ( fallacy of memory ) is the knowledge in one of another e.g. when we ( falsely recognise ) Jinadatta as Devadatta.

#### Commentary

Fallacies of each of the subdivisions of Pratyakṣa viz. Smriti, Pratyabhijñāna, Tarka, Anumāna and Āgama are described in Aphorisms 8, 9, 10, 11-50 and 51 of this Samuddeśa.

Smriti or Smarana (recollection) has been defined in Aphorism 3 of Samuddeśa III. We see Jinadatta. Later on when we see him again, we recognise him to be that Jina-datta. This is Smriti or recollection. But if we have remembrance of Devadatta when we see Jinadatta, this will be a fallacy of recollection (Smaranābhāsa).

1. "न हि करणज्ञानेऽव्यवधानेन प्रतिभासलक्षणं वैशद्यमसिद्धं स्वार्थयोः प्रतीत्यन्तरनिरपेक्षतया तत्र प्रतिभासनात् ।" Prameyakamalamārtaņda

# सदृद्दो तद्देवेदं तस्मिन्नेव तेन सदृद्दां यमलकवदित्यादि प्रत्यभिज्ञानाभासम् ॥ ९ ॥

9. Sadriše tadevedam tasminneva tena sadrišam yamalakavadityādi pratyavijāānābhāsam.

9. Fallacy of Pratyabhijňāna is the knowledge of "this is that" in things bearing similarity or knowledge of similarity in the identical thing e.g. in the case of twins.

#### Commentary

In the case of twins, we may falsely take one of them as the other from the similarity or we may fail to recognise the real person wanted and say that he resembles the real man ( without understanding that he is the real man ). There are therefore two kinds of fallacy of Pratyabhijñāna one referring to identity ( Ekatva Pratyabhijñānābhāsa ) and the other to similarity ( Sādriśyapratyabhijñānābhāsa<sup>1</sup>.

Pratyabhijñāna has already been defined and explained in Aphorisms 5-10 Samuddeśa III to which a reference may be made.

## असम्बद्धे तज्ज्ञानं तर्काभासम् ॥ १० ॥

10. Asambaddhe tajjñānam tarkābhāsam.

10. Knowledge of concomitance in objects not related is fallacy of Tarka.

#### Commentary

Tarka or Uha has been defined in Aphorism 11 of Samuddeśa III. In Tarka we have knowledge of universal concomitance viz. that of fire and smoke. Fallacy of Tarka occurs when we set up inseparable connection between objects which are independent of each other e. g. smoke and water.

1. "द्विविधं प्रत्यभिज्ञानाभासमुपदर्शितं ; एकत्वनिवंधनं, साटश्यनिबंधन-श्वेति । तत्रैकत्वं साटश्यावभासः, सादश्ये चैकत्वाभासस्तद्दाभासमिति ।" Prameyaratnamālā.

P-21

### इदमनुमानाभासम् ॥ ११ ॥

11. Idamanumānābhāsam.

11. The following are fallacies of Amunăna.

#### Commentary

Anumāna has been defined in Aphorism 14 of Samuddeša III Anumāna is employed by using Pakşa, Hetu and Drisţānta. Fallacies of these viz Pakṣābhāsa, Hetvābhāsa and Drisţāntābhāsa with their subdivisions will be described in the following aphorisms.

## तत्रानिष्टादि पक्षाभासः ॥ १२॥

12. Tatrānistādi paksāblasab.

### अनिष्ठो मीमांसकस्यानित्यः शब्दः ॥ १३ ॥

13. Anişto mimāmsakasyānityah sabdah.

### सिद्धः आवणः शब्दः ॥ १४ ॥

14. Siddhah śrāvaņah śabdah.

### वाधितः प्रत्यक्षानुमानागमलोकस्ववचनै: ॥ १५ ॥

15. Vādhitah pratyaksānumānāgamalokasvavachanaih.

12. Among them Pakṣābhāsa ( fallacy of the minor term or thesis ) is Anista ( un-accepted ) etc.

13. Anista (un-accepted) is (the view of)  $Mim\bar{a}msakas$  that sound is momentary.

1%. It is established that sounds can be heard by the ear.

15. Opposition (may exist) from Pratyakşa, Anumāna, Āgama, popular acceptance and one's own words.

#### Commentary

The followers of Mimāņisā philosophy hold that sound is eternal. So in their case there will be Pakṣābhāsa if we establish that sound is momentary. In the definition of Pakṣa we have laid down that it must be Işta (acceptable or that what we want). Opposite of it will be Anişta and hence it will be a fallacy of Pakşa.

Next, to establish by inference what is accepted (Siddha) is also Pakṣābhāsa e. g. 'Sound can be heard by the car'.

There is also Pakṣābhāsa when it involves opposition to Pratyakṣa, Anumāna,  $\overline{\Lambda}$ gama, Loka-vachana and Sva-vachana. These will be illustrated in the following five aphorisms. (See Page 95).

Siddhasena Divākara has defined Pakṣābhāsa in his Nyāyāvatāra as follows :---

"If that of which the major term or predicate (Sādhya) is affirmed is opposed by evidence (Linga), the public understanding, one's own statement etc. we have that which is known as the fallacy of the minor term or thesis (Pakṣā-bhāsa) of which there are many varieties<sup>1</sup>".

## तन्न प्रत्यक्षवाधितो यथाऽनुष्णोऽग्निर्द्रव्यत्वाज्जलवत् ॥ १६ ॥

16. Tatra pratyaksavādhito yathānusņognirdravyatvājjalavat.

16. In these subdivisions, Pratyakṣa-vādhita ( opposed to Pratyakṣa ) may be exemplified by "Fire is not hot as it is a thing e. g. water".

#### Commentary

Any proposition laying down anything opposed to actual perception is an instance of Pratyaksa-vädhita. We know by actual perception that fire is hot. If anyone tries to lay down in the shape of inference "Fire is not hot as it is a thing e.g. water", it will be an example of Pratyaksa-vädhita.

### अपरिणामी शब्द: कृतकत्वात् घटवत् ॥ १७ ॥

17. Apariņāmi šabdah kritakatvāt ghatavat.

1. "प्रतिपाद्यस्य यः सिद्धः पक्षाभासोऽस्ति लिंगतः । लोक-स्वयचनाभ्यां च बाधितोऽनेकधा मतः ॥" Nyāyāvatāra, 21. 164 The Sacred Books of the Jainas

17. Sound is without modification as it is something caused e. g. a pitcher.

#### Commentary

This aphorism gives an example of the fallacy Anumānavādhita. The following is the correct inference or Anumāna :

"Sound has modification.

Because it is caused.

Like a pitcher."

But if we try to establish an inference opposed to this inference as follows :

"Sound is without modification.

Because it is caused.

Like a pitcher."

It will be an instance of Anumäna-vādhita that is to say opposed by inference.

# प्रेत्यासुखप्रदो धर्मः पुरुषाश्रितत्वादधर्मवत् ॥ १८ ॥

18. Pretyāsukhaprado dharmah purusāśritatvādadharmavat.

18. Dharma will produce grief after death as it is subservient to beings like Adharma.

#### Commentary.

This is an example of the fallacy  $\overline{A}$  gama-vādhita. In all śastras, it is accepted that pursuit of Dharma will produce happiness after death and Adharma will cause misery. If we try to establish by inference that Dharma will produce misery after death, it will be an example of  $\overline{A}$  gama-vādhita Anumana (i. e. inference as opposed to the śāstras).

# शुचि नरझिर:कपालं प्राण्यंगत्वाच्छद्वशुक्तिवत् ॥ १९ ॥

19. Śuchi naraśiraḥkapālaṃ praṇyaṅgatyāchehaṅkhaśuktivat.

#### Pariksāmukham

19. A human skull is pure as it is a part of the body of an animal like a conch-shell or oyster.

#### Commentary

This is an example of Loka-vādhita Anumāna or inference opposed to public understanding. According to popular acceptance parts of bodies of some animals e.g. conch-shells and oysters are accepted as pure, while parts of bodies of other animals e.g. human skull are considered as impure. So if we try to establish by inference as mentioned in the aphorism that human skull is pure, it will be a fallacy of Loka-vādhita Anumāna.

## माता मे बन्ध्या पुरुषसंयोगेऽप्यगर्भत्वात् प्रसिद्धबन्ध्यावत् ॥२०॥

20. Mātā me bandhyā puruṣasaṃyogepyagarbhatvāt prasiddhabandhyāvat.

20. My mother is barren because she does not conceive in spite of connection with a male like women famous as barren.

#### Commentary

This is an example of Sva-vachana-vādhita Anumāna ( or inference opposed to one's own words ). If a person says that his mother is barren and tries to establish this by an inference as shown in the aphorism, the inference will be opposed to his own words and will be a fallacy of Svavachana-vādhita Anumāna.

Dr. Satis Chandra Vidyābhuṣaṇa in his notes on the translation of Nyāyāvatāra has mentioned the following with reference to different kinds of Pakṣābhāsa which will further elucidate the aphorisms in Parīkṣāmukham regarding this subject.

"The semblance or fallacy of the minor term or thesis (Pakṣābhāsa) arises when one predicates of the minor term (Pakṣa) that which is yet to be proved to the opponent, or which is incapable of being proved, or when it is opposed to perception and inference, or inconsistent with the public understanding or incongruous with one's statement thus :--- (1) 'The jar is corpored (Paudgalika)'—This is a conclusion which is yet to be proved to the opponent.

(2) 'Everything is nothing'. This is a Saugata (Buddhist) doetrine which according to the Jainas, is incapable of being proved.

(3) 'The general (Sāmānya) and particular (Višesa) things are without parts, are distinct from each other and are like themselves alone'. This is opposed to perception.

(4) 'There is no omniscient being'. This is, according to the Jainas, opposed to inference

(5) 'The sister is to be taken as wife'. This is inconsistent with the public understanding.

(6) "All things are non-existent'. This is incongruous with one's own statement.

## हेत्वाभासा असिढविरुद्धानैकान्तिकाकिश्चित्कराः ॥२१॥

21. Hetvābhāsā asiddhaviruddhānaikāntikākinchitkarāh.

21. Hetvābhāsas are Asiddha, Viruddha, Anaikāntika and Akiňchitkara.

#### Commentary

Now the fallacies of Hetu are being described. Hetu has been defined in Aphorism 15 in Samuddeśa III. The opposites of this are fallacies of Hetu<sup>4</sup>. These are of four kinds : Asiddha, Viruddha, Anaikāntika and Akiňchitkara.

Siddhasena has laid down "The reason ( i. e. the middle term called Hetu has been defined as that which cannot exist except in connection with the major term ( Sādhya ); the fallacy of the rea-

1. "साघ्याविनाभाषित्वेन निश्चितो हेतुरित्युक्तं प्राक् । तद्विपरीतास्तु हेत्वाभासाः ।" Prameya-kamala-märtapda. sou ( Hetväbhasa ) arises from non-conception, doubt or misconception about it ( the middle term )"<sup>1</sup>.

Siddhasena lays down that there are only three ( and not four as mentioned in Pariksāmukham ) varieties of Hetvābhāsa: "That which has not yet been established is called 'the unproved' (Asiddha); that which is possible only in the opposite way is called 'the inconsistent' ( Viruddha ); that which can be explained in one way as well as in the opposite way is called 'the uncertain' ( Anaikāntika )"<sup>2</sup>

Hemachandra also in his Framāņa-mīmāmsā lays down that there are only three kinds of Hetvābhāsa *viz*. Asiddha, Viruddha and Anaikāntika<sup>9</sup>. He rejects the view of those who maintain that there are two other forms of Hetvābhāsa viz. Kālātita and Prakaraņa-sama. According to Hemachandra, Kālātita is included within the fallacy of Paksa and Prakaraṇa-sama is an impossibility as none but a madman can use it. In arguments between sane men this is an impossibility<sup>4</sup>.

- 1. "अन्यथानुपपन्नत्वं हेतोर्छक्षणमीरितम् । तदप्रतीतिसन्देहविपर्यासैस्तदाभता ॥" Nyayavatara 22.
- 2. "असिद्धस्त्वप्रतीतो यो योऽन्यथैवोपपद्यते ।
- विरुद्धो योऽन्यथाप्यत्र युक्तोऽनैकान्तिकः स तु ॥" Nyāyāvatāra 23.
- "असिद्धविरुद्धानैकान्तिकास्त्रयो हेत्वाभासाः ॥"

Pramāņa-mimāmsā II. 1. 16.

4. "त्रय इति संख्यान्तरच्यवच्छेदार्थम् । तेन कालातीत-प्रकरणसमयो व्यंवच्छेदः । तत्र कालातीतस्य पश्चदोषेव्वन्तर्भावः प्रत्यक्षागमवाधितधर्मिनिर्देशानन्तर-प्रयुक्तः कालात्ययापदिष्ट इति हि तस्य लक्षणम् इति, यथाऽनुष्णस्तेजोऽवयवी छुतकत्वाद् घटवदिति । प्रकरणसमस्तु न सम्भवत्येव नह्यास्ति सम्भवो यथोक्तल्क्षणोऽनुमाने प्रयुक्तेऽदूषिते वानुमानान्तरस्य यत्तूदाहरणमनित्यः शब्दः पक्षसपक्षयोरन्यतरत्वादिति तद्तीवासाम्प्रतम् । को दि चतुरंगसभायां बादी प्रतिबादी चैवंविधमसम्बद्धमनुन्मत्तोऽ भिद्यीत ?" Framāna Mimāmsā. Bhāsya to Aphorism II. 1, 16,

## असत्सत्तानिइचयोऽसिद्धः ॥ २२ ॥

22. Asatsattānischayo'siddhah.

22. Asiddha is that whose existence is wanting in Paksa and which is not definitely established.

#### Commentary

Asiddha Hetväbhäsa is of two kinds : Svarūpāsiddha and Sandigdhāsiddha.

These will be described in the aphorisms which follow.

## अविद्यमानसत्ताकः परिणामी शब्दइचाक्षुषत्वात् ॥ २३ ॥

23. Avidyamānasattākah pariņāmi sabdaschāksusatvāt.

### स्वरूपेणासत्वात् ॥ २४ ॥

24. Svarüpeņāsatvāt.

23. "Sound is perishable because it can be seen by the eyes." This is ( an example of ) non-existence of itself.

24. Because it does not exist at all in its self.

#### Commentary

Sound is heard by the ear and not seen by the eye. So in the Pakṣa 'Sound,' Hetu in its real nature does not exist. So this is an example of Svarūpāsiddha Hetvābhāsa where the falsehood is a matter of certainty.

### अविद्यमाननिश्चयो मुग्धबुद्धिं प्रति, अग्निरत्र धूमात् ॥ २५ ॥

25. Avidyamānanišchayo mugdhabuddhim prati agniratra dhūmāt.

## तस्य वाष्पादिभाबेन भूतसंघाते संदेहात् ॥ २६ ॥

26. Tasya vāspādibhāvena bhūtasamghāte sandehāt.

25. When there is uncertainty, if one says to a man of inferior intellect 'Here is fire because there is smoke.'

26. He has doubt owing to the existence of vapour etc. in the collection of many elements (earth, water, etc. and he cannot definitely ascertain whether it it is smoke or vapour.)

#### Pariksāmukham

#### Commentary

Sandigdhāsiddha is described in these aphorisms. This fallacy arises where there is an uncertainty of the Hetu itself. For example, where there is no certainty whether what is seen is smoke or vapour, if one infers 'there is fire because there is smoke', the inference will not be sound as the very existence of the Hetu viz. smoke is involved in doubt.<sup>1</sup> A person who is not thoroughly conversant with the major term (Sādhya) or the middle term (Hetu or Sādhana) will not be able to ascertain 'this is smoke' and 'this is vapour'<sup>2</sup> So there is absence of certainty in these cases which is the criterion of the fallacy of Sandigdhāsiddha.

### सांरच्यं प्रति परिणामी शब्दः कृतकत्वात् ॥ २७ ॥

27. Sänkhyam prati pariņāmi šabdah kritakatvāt.

### तेनाज्ञातत्वात् ॥ २८ ॥

28. Tenājītātatvāt.

27. To (the follower of) the Sāńkhya (philosophy): 'Sound is perishable, because it is caused (by some one).

28. Because he does not know ( or accept ) it.

#### Commentary

In Sāňkhya philosophy, appearance and disappearance ( and not creation and destruction ) of things are accepted. So the inference 'Sound is perishable because it is created' by a follower of the Sāňkhya philosophy is an example of Sandigdhāsiddha because he does not accept creating of a sound as creation is unknown ( Ajňāta ) to him.

1. "सत्वस्य संदेहेऽप्यसिद्धो हेत्वाभासः संविग्धासिद्ध इत्यर्थः यथा बाष्पा-दिभावेन संदिह्यमाना धूमळताग्निसिद्धानुपदिश्यमाना।" Pramaņa-mimāmsā. Bhāşya on II. 1. 17.

2. "कुतोऽस्याविद्यमाननियततेत्याह । मुग्धबुद्धेर्बाष्पादिभावेन भूतसंघाते संदेहात् । न खलु साध्यसाधनयोरव्युत्पन्नवज्ञो धूमादिरीहशो बाष्पादिश्चेदृश इति विवेचयितुं समर्थः ।" Prameyakamala-mārtaņda.

**P**--22

#### The Sacred Books of the Jainas

Hemachandra has mentioned that Asiddha Hetvābhāsa may be Svarūpāsiddha or Sandigdhāsiddha.<sup>1</sup> The first should not be held to arise from not having the quality of a Pakṣa (minor term) because the definition of a Hetu has no connection with the quality of a Pakṣa. This fallacy arises from the fact that it wants the essence of Hetu viz. that it cannot arise otherwise. Hemachandra quotes the following verse from Kumārila Bhatta :---

"To infer the son of a Brahmin, to be a Brahmin is not universally accepted as it depends on the quality of Paksa". (For the mother might be unchaste).<sup>2</sup>

Hemachandra has mentioned three subdivisions of Asiddha Hetvābhāsa viz Asiddha regarding Vādī, that regarding Prativādī and that regarding both.<sup>3</sup> The illustration of the first of these is the same as given in Aphorism 27 of this Samuddesa of Parikṣāmukham.<sup>4</sup>

Some Jain logicians have laid down that there are other varieties of Asiddha Hetvābhāsa viz. Višesyāsiddha, Višesaņā-

1. "नासन्ननिश्चिततसत्वो वान्यथानुपपन्न इति सत्वस्यासिद्धौ सन्देहे वाऽसिद्धः ।" Pramāņa-mimāņsā II. 1. 17.

2. "अपक्षधर्मत्वादयमसिद्ध इति न मन्तव्यमित्याह नान्यथानुपपन्न इति, अन्यथानुपपत्तिरूपहेतुरुक्षणविरहात् अयमसिद्धो नापक्षधर्मत्वात् । नहि पक्षधर्मत्वं हेतो-र्ल्रक्षणं तदभावेऽप्यन्यथानुपपत्तिवलाद्धेतुत्वोपपत्तेरित्युक्तप्रायम् । भट्टोऽप्याह---

पित्रोरच ब्राह्मणत्वेन पुत्रब्राह्मणतानुमा ।

सर्वछोकप्रसिद्धा न पक्षधर्ममपेक्षते ॥"

Pramāņa-mimāņsā II. 1. 17.

"वादिप्रतिवाद्युभयभेदाचैतद्भेदः ॥"

Pramāņa-mimāmsā II. 1. 18.

4. "तत्र वाद्यसिद्धो यथा परिणामी शब्द उत्पत्तिमत्त्वात् अयं सांरव्यस्य स्वयंवादिनोऽसिद्धः । तन्मते उत्पत्तिमत्त्वस्यानभ्युपेतत्वात् नासदुत्पद्यते नापि सद्-विनश्यत्युत्पादविनाशयोराविभीवतिरोभावरूपत्वादिति तत्सिद्धान्ताच ।" Pramāņamimāmsā. II. 1. 18.

170

171

siddha, Bhāgāsiddha, Āśrayāsiddha, Aśraiyakādešasiddha, Vyarthavišeşyāsiddha, Vyarthavišeşaņāsiddha, Sandigdhavišeşyāsiddha and Sandigdha-višeşaņāsiddha<sup>1</sup>. Hemachandra says that all these are included within Vādyasiddha, Prativādyasiddha and Ubhayāsiddha as defined by him<sup>2</sup>.

In Prameyakamala-mārtaņda also it is mentioned "Others accept varieties of Asiddha viz. Višesyāsiddha etc. These are mere varieties of Asiddha Hetvābhāsa ( as defined in Parīkṣāmukham ) because they bear the criterion of non-existence of itself. So these are not separate varieties, for there is no separate characteristics of these"<sup>3</sup>.

# विपरोतनिइिचताविनाभावो विरुद्धोऽपरिणामी शब्दः कृतकत्वात् ॥ २९ ॥

29. Viparītanišchitāvinābhāvo viruddhopariņāmī šabdaķ kritakatvāt.

 'तत्र विशेष्यासिद्धादय उदाहियन्ते । विशेष्यासिद्धो यथाऽनित्यः शब्दः सामान्यवत्वे सति चाक्षुषत्वात् । विशेषणासिद्धो यथाऽनित्यः शब्दश्चाक्षुषत्वे सति सामान्यविशेषवत्वात् । भागासिद्धो यथानित्यः शब्दः प्रयत्नानन्तरीयकत्वात् । आश्रया-सिद्धो यथास्ति प्रधानं विश्वपरिणामित्वात् । आश्रयैकदेशासिद्धो यथा नित्याः प्रधान-पुरुषेश्वराः अञ्चतकत्वात् । व्यर्थविशेष्यासिद्धो यथा नित्यः शब्दः इतकत्वे सति सामान्यवत्वात् । संदिग्धविशेष्यासिद्धो यथा नित्यः शब्दः इतकत्वे सति सामान्यवत्वात् । संदिग्धविशेष्यासिद्धो यथा अद्यापि रागादियुक्तः कपिछः पुरुषत्वे सत्यद्याप्यनुत्पन्नतत्वज्ञानत्वात् । संदिगधविशेषणासिद्धो यथा अद्यापि रागादियुक्तः कपिछः सर्वदा तत्वज्ञानरहितत्वे सति पुरुषत्वात् ।" Pramāṇa-mimāṃsā. Bhăṣya to II. 1. 19.

 "एते असिद्धभेदा यदान्यतरवाद्यसिद्धत्त्वेन विवक्ष्यन्ते तदा वाद्यसिद्धाः प्रतिवाद्यसिद्धा वा भवन्ति, यदोभयवाद्यसिद्धत्वेन विवक्ष्यन्ते तदोभयसिद्धा भवन्ति ।" Ibid.

 "ये च विशेष्यासिद्धादयोऽसिद्धप्रकाराः परैरिष्टास्तेऽसत्सत्ताकत्व-ट्रम्रणासिद्ध-प्रकारान्नार्थान्तरं, तल्ल्क्षणमेदाभावान्।"

Prameyakamala-märtanda.

#### The Sacred Books of the Jainas

29. Viruddha (Hetvābhāsa) is concomitance with the opposite of the major term e.g. sound is not perishable because it is caused.

#### Commentary

In this aphorism, Viruddha Hetvābhāsa is defined and illustrated. Where the universal concomitance (Avinābhāva or Vyāpti) is ascertained with the opposite of the major term, we get the fallacy of Viruddha Hetvābhāsa. In this case the inseparable connection (Vyāpti) of the middle term is not with the major term but with its antithesis. The example given is "Sound is eternal because it is an effect". Now there is universal connection of an effect with perishability, but if we try to establish its opposite by the example given above, we get fallacy of Viruddha Hetvābhāsa.

Dr. S. C. Vidyābhūṣaṇa in his notes on Nyāyāvatāra gives another example : "The inconsistent (viruddha) such as "This is fiery because it is a body of water'. Here the reason alleged is opposed to what is to be established".

Hemachandra defines Viruddha as that whose concomitance is the opposite or which is derived otherwise<sup>4</sup>.

Some hold the view that there are eight kinds of Viruddha, but in Prameya-kamala-mārtanda it is mentioned that all of these come under the definition here given<sup>2</sup>. Hemachandra also is of the same view<sup>3</sup>.

1. 'विपरीतनियमोऽन्यथैवोपपद्यमानो विरुद्धः ॥"

Pramāņa-mimāņisā II. 1. 20.

2. "ये चाष्ट्रौ विरुद्धभेदा परैरिष्टास्तेऽप्येतहक्षणलक्षितत्वाविशेषतोऽत्रैवान्त-भैवन्ति ।" Prameyakamala-martanda.

3. "अनेन येऽन्येरन्ये विरुद्धा उदाहतास्तेऽपि संगृहीता।" Pramāņamīmāņsā Bhāṣya on II. 1. 20. These eight varieties of Viruddha are described as follows by Hemehandra. There are four varieties where Sapakṣa exists and there are four varieties when Sapakṣa Pariksāmukham

# विपक्षेऽप्यविरुद्धवृत्तिरनैकान्तिक: ॥ ३० ॥

30. Vipakşepyaviruddhavrittiranaikāntikaķ

30. In Anaikāntika ( Hetvābhāsa ), ( Hetu ) residęs also in Vipakṣa ( in addition to being in Pakṣa and Sapakṣa ).

### निइचितवृत्तिरनित्यः शब्दः प्रमेयत्वाद् घटवत् ॥ ३१ ॥

31. Nischitavrittiranityah sabdah prameyatvād ghatavat.

31. Where it is certain that ( Hetu ) is in ( Vipakṣa ) ( we have the fallacy of Niśchita vipakṣa vritti Hetvābhāsa ), e. g. "Sound is perishable because it is knowable like a pitcher.

# आकाद्यो नित्येऽप्यस्य निइचयात् ॥ ३२ ॥

32. Ākāśe nityepyasya niśchayāt.

32. Because it ( the quality of knowability ) is ascertained in things like  $\overline{A}k\overline{a}sa$  which are imperishable.

## शंकितवृत्तिस्तु नास्ति सर्वज्ञो वक्तृत्वात् ॥ ३३ ॥

33. Sankitavrittistu nästi sarvajño vaktritvät.

does not exist.: "सति सपक्षे चत्वारो भेदाः। (1) पक्षविपक्षव्यापको, यथा नित्यः शब्दः कार्यत्वात्। () पक्षव्यापको विपक्षेकदेशवृत्तिः, यथा नित्त्यः शब्दः सामान्यवत्वे सत्यस्मदादिवाह्येन्द्रियत्राह्यत्वात्। (3) पक्षेकदेशवृत्तिर्विपक्षव्यापको, यथा अनित्या पृथिवी क्रुतकत्वात्। (4) पक्षविपक्षेकदेशवृत्तिः, यथा नित्त्यः शब्दः प्रयतनानन्तरीयकत्वात् ।

असति सपक्षे चत्वारो विरुद्धाः । (5) पक्षविपक्षव्यापको, यथा आकाश-विशेषगुणः शब्दः प्रमेयत्वात् । (6) पक्षव्यापको विपक्षेकदेशष्टत्तिः, यथा आकाश-विशेषगुणः शब्दो बाह्रोन्द्रियप्राह्यत्वात् । (7) पक्षेकदेशष्टत्तिर्विपक्षव्यापको, यथा आकाशविशेषगुणः शब्दो प्रदात्मकत्वात् । (8) पक्षविपक्षेकदेशष्टत्तिः, यथा आकाश विशेषगुणः शब्दो प्रयत्नानन्तरीयकत्वात् । एषु च चतुर्षु विरुद्धता पक्षेकदेशष्टत्तिषु चतुर्षु पुनरसिद्धता विरुद्धता च इत्युभयसमावेशः ।" Ibid.

-- - - -----

33. Where the matter is involved in doubt ( we have the fallacy of Śańkita vipakṣa vritti e. g. an omniscient being does not exist for he can speak.

# सर्वज्ञत्वेन वक्तृत्वाविरोधात् ॥ ३४ ॥

34. Sarvajňatvena vaktritvāvirodhāt.

34. Because there is no opposition of being able to speak with omniscience.

#### Commentary

When Hetu is found in Pakşa, Sapakşa and Vipakşa we have the fallacy of Anaikāntika Hetvābhāsa. "The effect of the presence of the Hetu in Vipakşa is to rob the conclusion of that logical validity which Anumāna (inference) directly aims at".

"Anaikāntika Hetvābhāsa is of two kinds (1) the Niśchita Vipakṣa vritti where it is certain that the Hetu resides in the Vipakṣa and (2) the Śańkita Vipakṣa vritti where the matter is involved in doubt."<sup>1</sup>

The following are illustrations :

(1) "Sound is perishable because it is knowledge".

This is an instance of the Niśchita Vipakṣa Vritti type, because it is certain that the quality of knowability resides not only in perishable things, but also in those that are imperishable e.g. space, souls and the like.

(2) Watches are fragile because they are manufactured with machinery.

This is an instance of the Śańkita Vipakṣa Vritti. The fallacy in this case lies in the fact that it is not certain whether the quality of being manufactured with machinery does or does not reside in things which are not fragile i. e. the Vipakṣa.<sup>2</sup>

1. The Science of Thought by C. R. Jain Page 55.

2. The Science of Thought by C. R. Jain Pages 55-56.

Dr. Vidyābhūsaņa in his note on Verse 23 of Nyāyāvatāra already quoted says :

"The uncertain (Anaikāntika) such as 'All things are momentary, because they are existent'. Here the reason alleged is uncertain, because 'existence' may or may not be a proof of momentariness, for, an opponent may equally argue : 'all things are eternal, because they are existent'.<sup>1</sup> This example corresponds to the Śańkita Vipakṣa Vritti variety of Anaikāntika Hetvābhāsa mentioned above. The first variety is not described in Nyāyāvatāra.

Hemachandra defines and illustrates both the varieties and uses the same examples as given in Parikṣāmukham.<sup>2</sup> He mentions that some logicians accept other varieties of Anaikāntika Hetvābhāsa but it is not necessary to accept these as all of these are included in the definition of the two varieties Niśchita Vipakṣa Vritti and Śańkita Vipakṣa Vritti varieties.<sup>3</sup>

1. Nyāyāvatāra by S. C. Vidyābhūşaņa Page 21.

2. "नियमस्यासिद्धौ संदेहे वाऽन्यथाप्युपपद्यमानोऽनैकान्तिकः।"

Pramāņamimāmsā II. 1. 21.

"नियमोऽविनाभावस्तस्यासिद्धावनैकान्तिको यथाऽनित्यः शब्दः प्रमेयत्वात् प्रमेयत्वं नित्येप्याकाशादावस्तीति । संदेहे यथा सर्वज्ञः कश्चिद्रागादिमान् वा वक्तृत्वात् स्वभावविप्रकुष्टाभ्यां हि सर्वज्ञत्ववीतरागत्वाभ्यां हि न वक्तृत्वस्य विरोधः सिद्धः, न च रागादिकार्यम् वचनमिति संदिग्धोऽन्वयः ।" Bhāşya to Ibid.

3. "ये चान्येऽन्येरनैकान्तिकभेदा उदाहतास्ते उक्तळ्क्षण एवान्तर्भवन्ति ( (1) पक्षत्रयव्यापकः, यथानित्यः इाव्दः प्रमेयत्वात् । (2) पक्षसपक्षव्यापको विपक्षैकदेशवृत्तिः, यथा गौरयं विषाणित्वात् । (3) पक्षविपक्षव्यापकः सपक्षेकदेशवृत्तिः यथा नायं गौरविषाणित्वात् । (4) पक्षव्यापकः सपक्षविपक्षेकदेशवृत्तिः, यथानित्यः राव्दः प्रत्यक्षत्वात् । (5) पक्षेकदेशवृत्तिः सपक्षविपक्षव्यापको, यथा न द्रव्याण्याकाश-काळदिगात्ममनांसि क्षणिकविशेषगणरहितत्वात् । (6) पक्षविपक्षेकदेशवृत्तिः सपक्ष-विपक्षव्यापकः, यथा न द्रव्याप्याकाशकाल्यदिगात्ममनांसि क्षणिकविशेषगुणरहितत्वात् ।

# सिद्धे प्रत्यक्षत्वादिवाधिते च साध्ये हेतुरकिंचित्कर: ॥३५॥

35. Siddhe pratyakṣatvādivādhite cha sādhye heturakiñchitkaraḥ.

### सिद्धः श्रावणः शब्दः शब्दत्वात् ॥ ३६ ॥

36. Siddhah śrāvaņah šabdah šabdatvāt.

### किंचिदकरणात् ॥ ३७ ॥

37. Kinchidakaranat.

# यथाऽनुब्णोऽग्निईव्यत्वादित्यादौ किंचित् कत्तुं महाक्यत्वात् ॥३८॥

38. Yathānuṣṇo'gnirdravyatvādityādau kiñchit karttumašakyatvāt.

## लक्षण एवासौ दोषो च्युत्पन्नवयोगस्य पक्षदोषेणैव दुष्टत्वात् ॥३९॥

39. Laksaņa evāsau doso vyutpannaprayogasya paksadosenaiva dustatvāt.

35. Akiñchitkara (Hetvābhāsa) consists of (use of) Hetu (middle term) in connection with a Sādhya (major term) which had already been established and which is opposed by Pratyakṣa etc.

36. Capability of being heard by the ear is established regarding sound, as it is sound.

37. Because (Hetu) does not do anything (in such a case).

38. As for example, fire is cold as this a thing. In such cases ( Hetu ) cannot do anything.

39. This fault arises only in definition. For in use by those conversant with reasoning, the fault is proved by fault of Pakşa (minor term).

(7) पक्षविपक्षेकदेशवृत्तिः सपक्षव्यापी, यथा न द्रव्याणि दिक्कालमनांस्यमूर्त्तत्वात् ।
 (8) सपक्षपक्षेकदेशवृत्तिर्विपक्षव्यापी, यथा द्रव्याणि दिक्कालमनांस्यमूर्त्तत्वात् ।
 (9) पक्षत्रयैकदेशवृत्तिर्यथा अनित्या पृथिवी प्रत्यक्षत्वात् ॥'' Ibid.

#### Parikşāmukham

#### Commentary

Akiñchitkara Hetvābhāsa is here defined. Really speaking, this is not a separate variety as this is included in the fallacy of Pakṣābhāsa as already defined being opposed to Pratyakṣa, Anumāna, Āgama, Loka-vachana and Sva-vachana (Aphorism 15). This fault is included in those varieties of fallacies. If you say, that it is redundant to lay down a separate definition of Akiñchitkara Hetvābhāsa, we reply (by Aphorism 39) that this fallacy is described only for the understanding of students in a treatise dealing with definitions though this is not used at the time of discussion by logicians<sup>1</sup>.

As this is not really a different variety, it is not mentioned in works such as Nyāyāvatāra, Pramāņa-mīmāmsā etc.

Two examples of Akiňchitkara Hetväbhāsa are given in Parīkṣāmukham. The first is : "Sound is capable being heard by the ear, because it is a sound". Here the capability of being heard is established by itself. So it is useless to establish this by employing a Hetu. So this is an example of Akiňchitkara Hetvābhāsa where Sādhya (Major term) is Siddha (already established). The second example is "Fire is cold as this is a thing". Here coldness of fire is opposed to Pratyakṣa. So employment of such a reasoning cannot produce any result in such cases. This is an example of Akiňchitkara Hetvābhāsa where Sādhya is opposed by Pratyakṣa<sup>2</sup>.

 "ननु प्रसिद्धः प्रत्यश्चानुमानागमलोकस्ववचनैश्च वाधितः पक्षाभासः प्रतिपादितः । तद्दोषेनैव चास्य दुष्टत्वात । पृथगकिंचित्कराभिधानमनर्थकमित्याशङ्कय 'लक्षण एव' इत्यादिना प्रतिविधत्ते । लक्षणे लक्ष्यव्युत्पादनशास्त्रे एवासावर्किचित्करत्व-लक्षणो दोषो विनेयव्युतपत्त्यर्थं व्युत्पाद्यते । न तु व्युत्पन्नानां प्रयोगकाले । कुत एत-दित्याह व्युत्पन्नप्रयोगस्य पक्षदोषेणैव दुष्टत्वात् ।" Prameyakamala-mārtaņda

2. "सिद्धे निणींते प्रमाणान्तरात् साध्ये प्रत्यक्षादिवाधिते च हेतुर्नं किंचित् करोतीत्यकिंचित् करोऽनर्थको यथा आवणः शब्दः शब्दत्वात् । नह् यसौ स्वसाध्यं साधयति तस्याध्यक्षादेव प्रसिद्धेः । नापि साध्यान्तरं तत्राष्ट्रतेरित्यत आह 'किंचिद-

P-23

"Akiñchitkara Hetvābhāsa is the fallaey of redundancy. This is also of two kinds.

(a) The Siddhasādhana which means the establishing of that which has already been proved by some other kind of Pramāņa. Illustration: Sound is heard by the ear, because it is sound.

(b) The Vādhita vişaya which relates to a proposition inconsistent with Pratyakşa (direct observation or jūāna), logical inference, scriptural text or its own sense. Illustrations: (i) Fire is not endowed with warmth, because it is a substance (inconsistent with Pratyakşa). (ii) Sound is unchanging, because it is not an effect (inconsistent with Anumāna). (iii) Dharma (virtue or righteousness) is the cause of pain, because it resides in man (inconsistent with scripture according to which Dharma is the cause of happiness). (iv) Z is the son of a barren woman because she has never conceived (inconsistent with the proposition itself)".<sup>1</sup>

### दृष्टान्ताभासा अन्वयेऽसिद्धसाध्यसाधनोभयाः ॥ ४० ॥

40. Dristantabhasa anvaye'siddhasadhyasadhanobhayah.

# अपौरुषेय: शब्दोऽमूर्त्तत्वादिन्द्रयसुखपरमाणुघटवत् ॥४१॥

41. Apauruseyah sabdo'műrttatvädindriyasukhaparamännghatavat.

# विपरीतान्वयइच यद्पौरुषेयं तद्मूर्त्तम् ॥ ४२ ॥

42. Viparitānvayašcha yadapauruseyam tadamūrttam.

# विद्युदादिनातिप्रसंगात् ॥ ४३ ॥

43. Vidyudādinātiprasangāt.

करणात्' प्रत्यक्षादिवाधिते च साध्येऽकिंचित्करोऽसौ अनुष्णोग्निईच्यत्वात् इत्यादे यथा । कुतोऽस्यार्किचित्करत्वमित्याह् 'किंचित्कर्त्तुमशक्यत्वात् ।'' Prameyakamala-mārtaņda.

1. The Science of Thought by C. R. Jain Pages 56-57

40. Fallacies of Dristanta (illustration) in Anvaya consists of non-establishment of Sādhya, Sādhana or both of them.

41. Sound is unproduced by man because it has no form like sensual pleasure, atom or pitcher.

42. Viparitānvaya also : "That which is unproduced by man has no form".

43. Because this will be applied in lightening etc.

## व्यतिरेके सिद्धतद्व्यतिरेकाः परमाण्विन्द्रियसुखाकाशवत् ॥४४॥

44. Vyatireke siddha-tadvyatirekāli paramāņvindriyasukhākāšavat.

## विपरीतव्यतिरेकइच यन्नामूर्त्तत्वं तन्नापौरुषेयम् ॥ ४५ ॥

45. Viparita-vyatirekašcha yannāmūrttatvam tannāpauruseyam.

44. In Vyatireka, Siddha and the Vyatirekas of the same, like atom, sensual pleasure and  $\overline{A}k\overline{a}sa$ .

45. Viparita Vyatireka : The quality of not being without form, is not unproduced by man.

#### Commentary

"Dristantabhasa (fallacy of illustration) occurs when a Dristanta is not an appropriate illustration. This is of two kinds: (i) Sadharmya or Anvaya Dristantabhasa and (ii) Vaidharmya or Vyatireka Dristantabhasa.

The Sādharmya fallacy arises when a negative illustration is given in place of an affirmative one. Illustration : There is no Sarvajůa (omniscient being) because he is not apprehended by the senses, like a jar. [The illustration should have been of some thing not perceivable with the senses ].

The Vaidharmya is the opposite of Sādharmya. Illustration: Kapila is omniscient, because he is beset with desires like the Arhanta (Tirthaňkara). [Here the comparison should have

179

been with some one who became omniscient without giving up his desires, not with the Arhanta who is absolutely desircless ].

Every illustration has reference to either the Sādhya, or Sādhana or both. This gives us three forms of the Anvaya and three of the Vyatireka Dristantabhasa. Illustrations: (i) Sound is Apauruşeya (unproduced by man) because it is devoid of sensible qualities; whatever is devoid of sensible qualities is Apauruseya, like (a) sensual pleasure (6) an atom or (c) a jar. [ Here (a) is an instance of the wrong illustration of the Sādhya ( because sensual pleasure is the opposite of Apauruşeya ) (b) of the Sādhana (an atom is not devoid of sensible qualities) and (c) of both, the Sādhya and Sādhana ( for a jar is neither Apauruseva nor devoid of sensible qualities ). These are instances of the Anvaya Dristantabhasa. (ii) Sound is Apauruseya because it is Amürttika (devoid of sensible qualities); whatever is not Apauruseya is not Amūrttika as (a) an atom (b) sense-gratification or (c) space. [ This is a three-fold illustration of the Vyatireka Dristāntābhāsa. The atom, being Apauruşeya does not furnish an instance of the not Apauruseya quality; sense-gratification is not not-Amūrttika, and space is neither not-Apauruşeya nor not-Amūrttika ].

Anvaya Dristāntābhāsa also occurs where the order of the Sādhya and Sādhana is reversed in the exemplification of Hetu. Illustration : There is fire in this hill. Because there is smoke on it. Whereever there is fire there is smoke (Anvaya Dristāntābhāsa). [The true form of the Anvaya exemplification here should be "Whereever there is smoke there is fire"].

Similarly, Vyatireka Dristäntäbhäsa also occurs when the Sädhya and Sädhana replace each other in Vyatireka exemplification. Illustration :

This hill is full of smoke.

Because it is full of fire.

Whatever is not full of smoke is also not full of fire.

[ The fallacy is obvious, for there may be fire without smoke  $]^{i}$ .

Siddhasena has defined Dristantabhasa as follows : "Logicians have declared that fallacies of the example (Dristantabhasa) in the homogeneous form, arise here from an imperfect middle term or from a defect in the major term etc.

Logicians have declared that fallacies of the example in the heterogeneous form arise when the absence of the major term (Sādhya) or the middle term (Sādhana or Hetu) or both, is not shown, or when there is a doubt about them"<sup>2</sup>.

In the commentary to Nyāyāvatāra the varieties of Sādharmya and Vaidharmya Dristāntābhāsa are thus described :

"Fallacies of the homogeneous example (Sādharmya Drişțāntābhāsa) arise from a defect in the major term (Sādhya) or middle term (Hetu) or both, or from doubt about them, thus:---

(1) Inference is invalid (major term) because it is a source of knowledge (middle term) like perception (homogeneous example). Here the example involves a defect in the major term (Sādhya) for perception is not invalid.

(2) Perception is invalid (major term) because it is a source of true knowledge (middle term) like a dream (homogeneous example). Here the example involves a defect in the middle term (Hetu) for a dream is not a source of true knowledge.

- 1. The Science of Thought Pages 57-58
- 'साधम्म्येंणात्र दृष्टान्तदोषा न्यायविदीरिताः । अपल्रक्षणहेतूत्थाः साध्यादिविकलादयः ।। वैधम्म्येंणात्र दृष्टान्तदोषा न्यायविदीरिताः । साध्यसाधनयुग्मानामनित्रृत्तेश्च संशयात् ॥''

Nyāyāvatāra. 24, 25. Translated by S. C. Vidyābhūṣaṇa. Pages, 21 and 23.

(3) The omniscient being is not existent (major term) because he is not apprehended by the senses (middle term) like a jar (homogeneous example). Here the example involves a defect in both the major and middle terms (Sādhya and Hetu) for the jar is both existent and apprehended by the senses.

(4) This person is devoid of passions (major term) because he is mortal (middle term) like a man in the street (homogeneous example). Here the example involves doubt as to the validity of the major term, for it is doubtful whether the man in the street is devoid of passions.

(5) This person is mortal (major term) because he is full of passions (middle term) like the man in the street (homogeneous example). Here the example involves doubt as to the validity of the middle term, for it is doubtful whether the man in the street is devoid of passions.

(6) This person is not omniscient (major term) because he is full of passions (middle term) like the man in the street (homogeneous example). Here the example involves doubt as to the validity of both the major and middle terms, for it is doubtful whether the man in the street is full of passions and not omniscient.<sup>1</sup>

1. "तत्र साध्यविकलो यथा, भ्रान्तमनुमानं प्रमाणत्वात् प्रत्यक्षवत्, प्रत्यक्षस्य भ्रान्तताविकलत्वात् । साधनविकलो यथा जाप्रत्संवेदनं भ्रान्तं प्रमाणत्वात् स्वण्न-संवेदनवत्, स्वण्नसंवेदनस्य प्रमाणताव्यैकल्यात् । उभयविकलो यथा, नास्ति सर्वज्ञः प्रत्यक्षाद्यनुपलब्धत्वात् घटवत्, घटस्य सत्वात् प्रत्यक्षादिभिरूपल्रव्धत्वाच्च । संदिग्ध-साध्यधर्मो थथा, वीतरागोऽयं मरणधर्मत्वात् रथ्यापुरुषवत्, रथ्यापुरुषे वीतरागस्य संदिग्धत्वात् । संदिग्धसाधनधर्मो यथा, मरणधर्मोऽयं पुरुषो रागादिमत्वात्, रथ्या-पुरुषवत् द्रष्टव्यः, पुरुषे रागादिमत्त्वस्य संदिग्धत्वात् वीतरागस्यापि तथा संभवात् । संदिग्धोभयधर्मो यथा असर्वज्ञोऽयं रागादिमत्वात् रथ्यापुरुषवत् इति रथ्यापुरुषे प्रदर्शित-न्यायेन उभयस्यापि संदिग्धत्वात् ।" Nyāyāvatāra-vivriti. Translation by Dr. S. C. Vidyābhūşaņa. The fallacy of the heterogeneous example (Vaidharmya Drisțāntābhāsa) is of six kinds, thus :---

(1) Inference is invalid (major term) because it is a source of true knowledge (middle term); whatever is not invalid is not a source of true knowledge, as a dream (heterogeneous example). Here the example involves in the heterogeneous form a defect in the major term (Sādhya) for a dream is really invalid though it has been cited as not invalid.

(2) Perception is non-reflective or Nirvikalpaka (major term) because it is a source of true knowledge (middle term); whatever is reflective or Savikalpaka, is not a source of true knowledge, as inference (heterogeneous example). Here the example involves in the heterogeneous form a defect in the middle term (Sādhana) for inference is really a source of true knowledge, though it has been eited as not such.

(3) Sound is eternal and non-eternal (major term), because it is an existence (middle term); whatever is not eternal and non-eternal is not an existence, as a jar (heterogeneous example). Here the example involves in the heterogeneous form a defect in both the major and middle terms (Sādhya and Sādhana) for the jar is both 'eternal and non-eternal' and 'an existence'.

(4) Kapila is non-omniscient (major term) because he is a non-propounder of the four noble truths (middle term); whoever is not non-omniscient is not non-propounder of the four noble truths, as Buddha (heterogeneous example). Here the example involves in the negative form a doubt as to the validity of the major term (Sādhya) for it is doubtful whether Buddha was omniscient.

(5) This person is untrustworthy (major term) because he is full of passions (middle term); whoever is not untrustworthy is not full of passions, as Buddha (heterogeneous example) Here the example involves doubt as to the validity of the middle term ( Hetu ) for it is doubtful whether Buddha is not full of passions.

(6) Kapila is not devoid of passions (major term) because he did not give his own flesh to the hungry (middle term); whoever is devoid of passions gives his own flesh to the hungry as Buddha (heterogeneous example). Here the example involves doubt as to the validity of both the major and middle terms (Sādhya and Sādhana) for it is doubtful whether Buddha was devoid of passions and gave his own flesh to the hungry".<sup>1</sup>

"तदनेन षड् दृष्टान्ताभासाः सूचिताः । तद् यथा साध्याव्यतिरेकी 1. साधनाव्यतिरेकी (२) साध्यसाधनाव्यतिरेकी (३) तथा संदिग्धसाध्याव्यतिरेकः (9) -(४) संदिग्धसाधनव्यतिरेकः (५) संदिग्धसाध्यसाधनव्यतिरेकश्च (६)। तत्र साध्या-व्यतिरेकी यथा, आन्तमनुमानं प्रमाणत्वात् , इत्यत्र वैधर्म्यदृष्टान्तो यत् पुनःआन्तं न भवति न तत् प्रमाणं तद् यथा स्वष्नज्ञानमिति । स्वष्नज्ञानात् भ्रान्ततानिवृत्तेः साध्या-व्यतिरेकित्वम् । साधनाव्यतिरेकी यथा, प्रत्यक्षं निर्विकल्पकं प्रमाणत्वात् । अत्र वैधर्म्यदृष्टान्तो, यत् पुनः सविकल्पकं न तत् प्रमाणं तद् यथानुमानमनुप्रमाणतानिवृत्तेः साधनाव्यतिरेकित्वम् । उभयाव्यतिरेकी यथा, नित्यानिद्धः शब्दः सत्वात् इत्यत्र वैधम्म्यदृष्टान्तो यः पुनर्न नित्यानित्यः स न सन् तद् यथा घटः घटाडुभयस्यापि अन्यावृत्तेरुभयान्यतिरेकित्वम् । तथा संदिग्धसाध्यन्यतिरेकः, असर्वज्ञा अनामा वा कपिलादयः आर्यसत्यचतुष्टयाप्रतिपादकत्वात् । अत्र वैधम्म्यर्टदृष्टान्तः यः पुनः सर्वज्ञ आप्नो वा असौ आर्यसत्यचतुष्टयं प्रत्यपीपदत् तद् यथा शौद्धोदनिरिति । अयं च साध्यव्यतिरेकी वा आर्थसत्यचतुष्टयस्य दुःखसमुदयमार्गनिरोधल्क्षणस्य प्रमाणवाधित-त्वेन तद्भाषकस्य असर्वज्ञतानाप्ततोपपत्तः ।...तस्मात् शौद्धोदनेः सकाशात् असर्वज्ञता-नाप्ततालक्षणस्य साध्यस्य व्यावृत्तिः सन्दिग्धेति सन्दिग्धसाध्यव्यतिरेकित्वम् । सन्दिग्ध-साधनव्यतिरेको यथा, अनादेयवाक्यः कश्चिद् विवक्षितः पुरुषो रागादिमत्वादित्यत्र वैधम्म्यदृष्टान्तो यः पुनः आदेयवाक्यो न स रागादिमान् तद्यथा सुगत इति ।… सुगतात् रागादिमत्त्वच्यावृत्तिसंशयात् संदिग्धसाधनव्यतिरेकित्वम् । संदिग्धसाध्यसाधन-ू व्यतिरेको यथा, वीतरागाः कपिछादयः करुणास्पदेषु अपि अकरुणापरीतचित्ततया दत्त-निजमांसशकल्दवात् । अत्र वैधम्म्यदृष्टान्तो ये पुनर्वीतरागास्ते करुणापरीतचित्ततया दत्तनिजमांसशकलाः तद् यथा बोधिसत्वा इत्यत्र साधनसाध्यधर्मयोर्बोधिसत्वेभ्यो

**18**<sup>‡</sup>

Hemachandra in his Pramāņa-mīmāņsā lays down that there are eight varieties of Dristāntābhāsa according to Sādharmya and Vaidharmya<sup>1</sup>. First, he defines and exemplifies the three varieties of Sādharmya Dristāntābhāsa as given in the Parikṣāmukham viz. Sādhya-vikala, Sādhana-vikala and Sādhyasādhanovaya-vikala<sup>2</sup>. Then he defines and illustrates the three varieties of Vaidharmya-Dristāntābhāsa viz. Sādhya-vyatireki, Sādhanavyatireki and Ubhaya-vyatireki<sup>3</sup>. Then he mentions the three varieties Sandigdha Sādhyānvaya, Sandigdha Sādhanānvaya and Sandigdha Ubhayānvaya and the three varieties Sandigdha Sādhya Vyatireka, Sandigdha Sādhana Vyatireka and Sandigdha Ubhaya Vyatireka<sup>4</sup>. Besides these he mentions two varieties Viparitānvaya and Viparita Vyatireka and two varieties Apradaršita Anvaya and Apradaršita Vyatireka<sup>5</sup>. These last four varieties are not accepted by all.

व्यावृत्तिः सन्दिग्धा ततः प्रतिपादितप्रमाणवैकल्यात् न ज्ञायते किं ते रागादिमन्तः उत वीतरागास्तथानुकम्प्येषु किं स्वपिशितखण्डानि दत्तवन्तो नेति वा अतः सन्दिग्धसाध्य-साधनव्यतिरेकित्वमिति ।" Nyāyāvatāra-vivriti.

"साधम्म्य्वैधम्म्याभ्यामष्टावष्टो दृष्टान्ताभासाः ॥"

Pramāņa-mimāmsā, II. 1.22.

2. "अमूर्त्तत्वेन नित्त्ये शब्दे साध्ये कर्मपरमाणुघटाः साध्यसाधनोभय-विकलाः॥" Ibid. II. 1. 23.

"वैधम्म्येण परमाणुकर्माकाशाः साध्याद्यव्यतिरेकिणः ॥"

Ibid II, 1. 24.

4. "वचनाद्रागे रागान्मरणधर्मत्वकिंचिज्ज्ञत्वयोः सन्दिग्धसाध्याद्यन्वय-व्यतिरेका रथ्यापुरुषादयः॥" Ibid II. 1. 15.

5. "विपरीतान्वयव्यतिरेको ॥" Ibid II. 1. 26.

"अप्रदर्शितान्वयव्यतिरेकौ ॥" Ibid II. 1. 27.

The eight varieties of Sādharmya Driṣṭāntābhāsa are thus summed up by Hemachandra :

P-24

#### The Sacred Books of the Jainas

For example, the author of the Nyāyāvatāra-vivriti refutes the view that there are three other varieties of Sādharmya Driştāntābhāsa viz. Ananvaya, Apradarsitānvaya and Viparītānvaya and three other varieties of Vaidharmya Drişṭāntābhāsa viz. Avyatireki, Apradarsita-vyatireka and Viparīta-vyatireka.

"Some unnecessarily lay down three other kinds of fallacy of the homogeneous example (Sādharmya Drisṭāntābhāsa) viz. (1) Un-connected (Ananvaya) such as, this person is full of passions (major term), because he is a speaker (middle term) like a certain man in Magadha (example). Here though a certain man in Magadha is both a speaker and full of passions, yet there is no inseparable connection between "being a speaker" and "being full of passions".

(2) Of connection unshown (Apradarśitānvaya) such as, Sound is non-eternal (major term) because it is adventitious (middle term), as a jar (example). Here though there is an inseparable connection between 'adventitious' and 'non-eternal', yet it has not been shown in the proper form, as :--'Whatever is adventitious is non-eternal as a jar'. [Dignāga the Baddhist urged the necessity of converting the example into a universal proposition with a view to show the connection between the middle term and major term in the proper form ].

ंसाध्यविकलः साधनविकलः उभयविकलः सन्दिग्धसाध्यान्वयः सन्दिग्ध-सायनान्वयः, सन्दिग्धोभयान्वयः विपरीतान्वयः अप्रदर्शितान्वयः चेत्यष्टौ साधम्म्य-दृष्टान्ताभासाः ।''

The eight varieties of Vaidharmya Driṣṭāntābhāsa are mentioned by Hemachandra as follows :

'साध्याव्यावृत्तसाधनाव्यावृत्तोभयव्यावृत्ताः सन्दिग्धसाध्यव्यावृत्तिसन्दिग्धसाधन-व्यावृत्तिसन्दिग्धोभयव्यावृत्तयो विपरीतव्यतिरेकोऽप्रदर्शितव्यतिरेकश्चेत्यष्टावेव वैधर्म्य-दृष्टान्ताभासा भवन्ति ।''

186

(middle term). Here if the inseparable connection ( $Vy\bar{a}pti$ ) is shown, thus 'whatever is non-eternal is adventitious as a jar' instead of thus: 'Whatever is adventitions, is non-eternal as a jar' the example would involve the fallacy of contrary connection"<sup>1</sup>.

"Some unnecessarily lay down three other kinds of fallacy of the heterogeneous example (Vaidharmya Driṣṭāntābhāsa) viz. (1) Unseparated (Avyatireki): This person is not devoid of passions (major term) because he is a speaker (middle term); whoever is devoid of passions is not a speaker as a piece of stone (heterogeneous example). Here though a piece of stone is both 'devoid of passions' and 'not a speaker', yet there is no unavoidable separation (Vyatireka Vyāpti) between 'devoid of passions' and 'a.speaker'.

(2) Of separation unshown (Apradarsita Vyatireka) Sound is non-eternal (major term) because it is adventitions (middle term) just as ether (example). Here though there is an unavoidable separation between 'adventitious' and 'eternal', yet it has not been shown in the proper form such as 'whatever is not adventitious is eternal, just as ether'. [Dignāga the Buddhist urged the necessity of converting the heterogeneous example into a universal negative proposition, with a view to point out the connection of the middle term and major term ].

(3) Of contrary separation (Viparita Vyatireka): Sound is not eternal (major term), because it is adventitious (middle

 "ननु च परैरन्यदपि दृष्टान्ताभासत्रयमुक्तं तद् यथा अनन्वयोऽप्रदर्शिता-न्वयो विपरीतान्वयश्च । तत्र अनन्वयो यथा, रागादिमान् विवक्षितः पुरुषो वक्तृत्वाव् इष्टपुरुषवत् इति । यद्यपि किलेष्टपुरुषे रागादिमत्वं वक्तृत्वं च साध्यसाधनधर्मौ दृष्टौ सथापि यो यो वक्ता सो सो रागादिमानिति व्याप्त्यसिद्धेरनन्वयोऽयं दृष्टान्तः । तथा-प्रदर्शितान्वयो यथा, अनित्यः शब्दः क्रुतकत्वात् घटवदिति । अत्र यद्यपि वास्तवो-ऽन्वयोऽस्ति तथापि वादिना वचनेन न प्रकाशित इति अप्रदर्शितान्वयो दृष्टान्तः । विपरीतान्वयो यथा, अनित्यः शब्दः क्रुतकत्वात् । देतुमभिधाय यद्तित्यं तत् क्रुतकं घटवदिति विपरीत्तव्याप्तिदर्शनात् विपरीतान्वयः ॥" Nyāyāvatāra-vivriti. term ); whatever is eternal, is not adventitious, just as *ether* (example). Here the example has been put in a contrary way, for the proper form should have been : 'Whatever is not adventitious is eternal just as *ether*'<sup>1</sup>.

Hemachandra agrees that Ananvaya and Avyatireki might be excluded from varieties of Dristantabhāsa<sup>2</sup>.

## बालप्रयोगाभासः पंचावयवेषु कियद्घीनता ॥ ४६ ॥

46. Bālaprayogābhāsah palichāvayavesu kiyaddhinatā.

## अग्निमानयं देशो धूमवत्वात् यदित्थं तदित्थं यथा महानसः ॥४७॥

47. Agnimānayam dešo dhūmavatvāt yadittham tadittham yathā mahānasah.

1. "परें: परेऽपि दृष्टान्ताभासास्त्रयो विष्टृश्यभाषितया दर्शितास्तद्यथा-Sव्यतिरेकोऽप्रदर्शितव्यतिरेकोऽविपरीतव्यतिरेकश्च। ते अस्माभिः अयुक्तत्वात्तु दर्शयि-सव्याः। तथा दि अव्यतिरेकस्तैर्दर्शितो यथा, अवीतरागः कश्चिद् विवक्षितः पुरुषो वक्तृत्वादित्यत्र वैधम्म्य्यदृष्टान्तो यः पुनः वीतरागो न स वक्ता यथोपरुखण्ड इति। यद्यपि किस्ठोपरुखण्डात् उभयं व्याष्टत्तं तथापि व्याप्त्या व्यतिरेकासिद्धेः अव्यति-रेकित्वमिति।…तथाहि अप्रदर्शितव्यतिरेकस्तैरुक्तो यथा, अनित्यः शब्दः छतकत्वात् श्वाकाशवदित्यत्र विदयमानोऽपि व्यतिरेकस्तैरुक्तो यथा, अनित्यः शब्दः छतकत्वात् भाकाशवदित्यत्र विदयमानोऽपि व्यतिरेको वादिना वचनेन उद्गावित इति दुष्टता। विपरीतव्यतिरेकः पुनरभिहितो यथा, अनित्यः शब्दः छतकत्वात्, इत्यन्न वैधम्म्य-दृष्टान्तो यदक्वतकं तन्नित्यं भवति यथाकाशमिति इत्यत्र विपर्यस्तव्यतिरेकप्रदर्शनात् विपरीतव्यतिरेकित्वम्।" Nyäyävatära-vivriti.

2. "ननु अनन्वयाव्यतिरेकावपि कैश्चिद्दष्टान्ताभासाबुक्तौ, यथा रागादि-मानयं वचनात् अत्र साधर्म्यदृष्टान्ते आत्मनि रागवचनयोः सत्यपि साहित्ये वैधर्म्य-दृष्टान्ते चोपळखण्डे सत्यामपि सह निष्टत्तौ प्रतिबन्धाभावेनान्वयव्यतिरेकयोरभाव इत्यनन्वयाव्यतिरेकौ तौ कस्मादिह नोक्तौ । उच्यते, ताभ्यां पूर्वे न भिद्यन्त इति साधर्म्यवैधर्म्याभ्यां प्रत्येकमष्टावेव दृष्टान्ताभासा भवन्ति यदाहुः---

छिंगस्यानन्वया अष्टावष्टावव्यतिरेकिणः ।

नान्यथानुपपन्नत्वं कथंचित् ख्यापयन्त्यमी ॥"

Bhāşya to Aphorism II. 1. 27 in Pramāņa-mimāņsā.

188

# धूमवांश्चायमिति वा ॥ ४८ ॥

48. Dhūmavānschāyamiti vā.

### तस्माद्ग्निमात् धूमवांश्चायं ॥ ४९ ॥

49. Tasmādagnimān dhūmavānschāyam.

## स्पष्टतया प्रकृत-प्रतिपत्तेरयोगात् ॥ ५० ॥

50. Spașțatayā prakrita-pratipatterayogāt.

46. The fallacy of Bāla-prayoga consists of absence of one of the five limbs ( of syllogism ).

47. This place is full of fire as it is full of smoke. Where there is smoke there is fire. As for example, a kitchen.

48. Or, this is full of smoke.

49. So it is full of fire and it is full of smoke.

50. As clear understanding of the real thing is not established from it.

#### Commentary

In Chapter III, the five limbs of syllogism have been described. These are as follows :—

1. This hill is full of fire ( Pratij $\hbar \bar{a}$  ).

2. Because it is full of smoke ( Hetu ).

3. Whatever is full of smoke is also full of fire, as a kitchen (Udāharaņa ).

4. So is this hill full of smoke ( Upanaya ).

5. Therefore, this hill is full of fire (Nigamana).

It has been mentioned in that Chapter, that only the first two are really necessary for inference, the last three being only used to convince children.

Fallacy in using syllogism to convince children arises if we do not mention all the five limbs of syllogism ; e. g. if we mention

only the first three or the first four of these limbs. This fallacy also arises if we mention these in a wrong order i. e. if Nigamana be mentioned before Upanaya for this debars a clear understanding of the real thing.

### रागद्वेषमोहाकान्तपुरुषवचनाज्जातमागमाभासम् ॥ ५१ ॥

51. Ragadveşamohākrāntapuruşavachanājjātamāgamābhāsam.

### यथा नद्यास्तीरे मोद्कराशयः सन्ति धावध्वं माणवकाः ॥५२॥

52. Yathā nadyāstīre modakarāšayah santi dhāvadhvam māņavakāh

## अंगुल्यग्रे हस्तियूथशतमास्त इति च ॥ ५३ ॥

53. Angulyagre hastiyūthaśatamāsta iti cha.

### विसंवादात् ॥ ५४ ॥

54. Visaņvādāt.

51. Fallacy of  $\overline{\Lambda}$  gama arises from words of a person seized by attachment, hatred, mistake etc.

52. As for example, Run boys. There are a large quantity of sweetmeats on the river-bank.

53. Or, one hundred elephants are standing on the tip of the finger.

54. Because ( these ) want ( the element of Pramāņa ) viz. true knowledge.

#### Commentary

Agama has been defined in Aphorism 99, Samuddeśa III as the knowledge of objects got from words of reliable person etc. (viz. scripture). Now, the words of persons who are not reliable and who may be actuated to deceive people are examples of  $\overline{A}$ gamābhāsa. If one utters a falsehood urging that there are sweetmeats on the banks of a river and urges boys to run to the river side, this will be an example of fallacy of  $\overline{A}$ gama. Further, if one

### Parikṣāmukham

says what is impossible viz. one hundred elephants are standing on the tip of a finger, it will also be  $\overline{\Lambda}$ gamābhāsa. Jain logicians also say that when true scripture is mis-quoted to support a false proposition, we have an example of  $\overline{\Lambda}$ gamābhāsa.

# प्रत्यक्षमेवैकं प्रमाणमित्यादि संरव्याभासम् ॥ ५५ ॥

55. Pratyakşamevaikam pramāņamityādi sankhyābhāsam.

# लौकायतिकस्य प्रत्यक्षतः परलोकादिनिषेधस्य परबुद्ध<mark>यादे</mark>-श्चासिद्वेरतद्विषयत्वात् ॥ ५६ ॥

56. Laukāyatikasya pratyakṣatalı paralokādiniṣedhasya paravudhyādeschāsiddheratadviṣayatvāt.

# सौगत-सांख्ययौगप्राभाकर-जैमिनीयानां प्रत्यक्षानुमाना-गमोपमानार्थापत्त्यभावैरेकैकाधिकैर्व्यासिवत् ॥ ५७ ॥

57. Saugata-sāńkhya-yauga-prābhākara-jaiminīyānām pratyakṣānumānāgamopamānārthāpattyabhāvairekaikādhikairvyāptivat.

## अनुमानादेस्तद्चिषयत्वे प्रमाणान्तरत्वम् ॥ ५८ ॥

58. Anumānādestadvisayatve pramāņāntaratvam.

# तर्कस्येव व्यासिगोचरत्वे प्रमाणान्तरत्वम् अप्रमाणस्याव्यव-स्थापकत्वात् ॥ ५९ ॥

59. Tarkasyeva vyāptigoelaratve pramāņāntaratvam apramāņasyāvyavasthāpakatvāt.

## प्रतिभासभेदस्य च भेदकत्वात् ॥ ६० ॥

60. Pratibhāsa-bhedasya cha bhedakatvāt

55. Saùkhyābhāsa (Fallacy of number) is maintaining 'Pratyakşa is the only Pramāņa' etc.

56. Because according to the view of the followers of Chārvāka philosophy the other world is denied from Pratyakṣa and knowledge of others cannot be derived ( from Pratyaksa ), so these cannot be the subject matter of it ( Pratyaksa ).

57. Like Vyāpti in case of the followers of the Buddhist, Sānkhya, Nyāya, Prabhākara (school of Mimāmsa philosophy) and Jaimini ( school of Mimāmsa philosophy ) who accept Pratyakşa, Anumāna, Āgama, Upamāna, Arthāpatti and Abhāva exceeding one by one ( in their doctrines respectively ).

58. Knowledge of others being the subject of Anumāna etc. will become another Pramāņa.

59. Tarka also being understood from Vyāpti will become another Pramāņa. For that which is not Pramāņa cannot establish anything.

60. Because there is a difference according to difference of illumination.

#### Commentary

There is a great difference of opinion among Indian philosophers regarding the number of Pramāņa According to the Chārvāka view, there is only one Pramāņa viz. Pratyakṣa. According to the Buddhist philosophy, there are two Pramāņas viz. Pratyakṣa and Anumāna. In Vaiśeṣika philosophy, Pratyakṣa and Anumāna are accepted as Pramāṇas for according to this philosophy the Pramāṇas Śabda etc. are included within Anumāna.

In Sāńkhya philosophy, three Pramāņas viz. Pratyakṣa, Anumāna and Āgama have been accepted. In Nyāya philosophy, four kinds of Pramāņa viz. Pratyakṣa, Anumāna, Upamāna and Śabda have been mentioned. In Mīmāṃsa philosophy those who follow the school of Prabhākara mention that there are five Pramāṇas : Pratyakṣa, Anumāna, Upamāna, Śabda and Arthāpatti, and those who follow the Bhatta school mention that there are six Pramāṇas viz. Pratyakṣa, Anumāna, Upamāna, Śabda, Arthāpatti and Abhāya.

In Parikṣāmukham it is mentioned that denial of any kind of Pramāņa as accepted in this work will lead to the fallacy of Sańkhyäbhäsa ( fallacy with reference to the number ). It is urged that an example of this fallacy is the view of the Chārvāka philosophy that there is no other Pramāņa except Pratyakṣa. For the other world or knowledge of others cannot be derived from Pratyakṣa Pramāṇa. That knowledge which cannot know an object cannot establish the existence or non-existence of that object. So the Chārvāka philosophy cannot establish the non-existence of the next world, or the existence of knowledge of others through Pratyakṣa.

Again the knowledge of Vyāpti has to be accepted separately. So the view of philosophers who accept two, three, four, five or six Pramāņas commit the fallacy of Sańkhyā (number). For example, if Chārvāka will say 'I will prove the other world by Anumāna (inference), he will have to accept a Pramāņa other than Pratyakṣa. So the view of Chārvāka that there is only one Pramāṇa viz. Pratyakṣa, becomes vitiated by Sańkhyābhāsa.

Again, some like the Buddhists accept Tarka to be a separate Pramāņa to establish Vyāpti. The fallacy will be similar as shown in the acceptance of 'inference' by the Chārvākas for Tarka will increase the number of Pramāņas as accepted by these philosophers. It cannot be said that though Tarka is accepted, it is not accepted as Pramāņa. To hold such a view will lead to the failure of establishing Vyāpti for if Tarka be not accepted as Pramāņa, Vyāpti will not be established by it. That which is not a Pramāņa cannot establish an object. So if we accept establishment of Vyāpti by Tarka, we must accept Tarka to be a Pramāņa.

There is a further reason for accepting Tarka etc. as Pramāņas. Where illuminations are different, Pramāņas must also be different. In Pratyakṣa, Tarka etc. the illumination is not the same. So these must be treated as different Pramāṇas.

# विषयाभासः सामान्यं विद्रोषो द्वयं वा स्वतंत्रम् ॥ ६१ ॥

61. Vişayābhāsalı sāmānyam viseso dvayam vā svatantram.  $\rm P{--}25$ 

### तथा प्रतिभासनात् कार्याकरणाच ॥ ६२ ॥

62. Tathā pratibhāsanāt kāryākaraņāchcha.

## समर्थस्य करणे सर्वदोत्पत्तिरनपेक्षत्वात् ॥ ६३ ॥

63. Samarthasya karane sarvadotpattiranapeksatvāt.

### परापेक्षणे परिणामित्वमन्यथा तदभावात् ॥ ६४ ॥

64. Parāpeksaņe pariņāmitvamanyathā tadabhāvāt.

## स्वयमसमर्थस्य अकारकत्वात् पूर्ववत् ॥ ६५ ॥

65. Svayamasamarthasya akārakatvāt pūrvavat.

61. Vişayābhāsa (fallacy of object) (happens) where Sāmānya or Višeşa or both of them (arc) separately (accepted).

62. As it appears like the same, and as it does not do any work.

63. Accepting it to be Samartha (effective) will lead to creation (of result) at all times, being independant.

64. On accepting dependency on other (causes), the quality of being modified will have to be accepted as otherwise, this does not exist.

65. Because, that which is ineffective in itself cannot cause anything as the former.

#### Commentary

Fallacy of Vişaya (object) arises when we say that the object of Pramāņa is only Sāmānya or only Viseşa or that Sāmānya and Viseşa are separate objects of Pramāņa. In objects only Sāmānya etc. are not seen and only Sāmānya etc. cannot produce any result. On accepting that Sāmānya etc. can effect something we are led to two stand-points viz. whether Sāmānya etc. effect anything being Samartha (effective cause ) or Asamartha (non-effective cause). If we accept that Sāmānya etc. effect things being Samartha, we will be led to the inevitable conclusion that

#### Pariksāmukham

effects will always arise for no other thing than Sāmānya etc. will be required to produce effects. If we maintain that Sāmānya etc. require other accessories, we must maintain that it consists of modification. Whenever we accept accessory causes for production of an effect, the conclusion is inevitable that modification will occur. To accept the second view viz. that Sāmānya etc. produce effect being Asamartha will not be proper. A cause which is Asamartha cannot produce anything either before or after combination with accessory causes. So Sāmānya etc. if taken as Asamartha will not be able to produce any result.

## फलाभासं प्रमाणादभिन्नं भिन्नमेव वा ॥ ३६ ॥

66. Phalābhāsam pramāņādabhinnam bhinnameva vā.

# अमेदे तद्व्यवहारानुपपत्तेः ॥ ६७ ॥

67. Abhede tadvyavahārānupapatteh.

# व्याद्वत्त्यापि न तत्कल्पना फलान्तराद्व्याद्वत्त्याफलत्व-प्रसंगात् ॥ ६८ ॥

68. Vyävrittyäpi na tatkalpanā phalāntarādvyāvrittyāphalatvaprasangāt

### प्रमाणाद्व्यावृत्त्येवाप्रमाणत्वस्य ॥ ६९ ॥

69. Pramäņādvyāvrittyevāpramāņatvasya.

### तस्माद्वास्तवोऽभेदः ॥ ७० ॥

70. Tasmādvāstavo'bliedah.

## भेदे स्वात्मान्तरवत्तदनुपपत्तेः ॥ ७१ ॥

71. Bhede tvätmäntaravattadanupapatteh.

## समवायेऽतिव्रसंगः ॥ ७२ ॥

72. Samavāye'tiprasangah.

66. Phalābhāsa (fallacy of result) is either separate or not separate from Pramāņa.

67. If we accept inseparableness, its ( separate ) use cannot happen.

68. Its imagination by its opposite cannot (be accepted) for (we) shall have to assume (then) non-result by its opposite (e.g.) another result.

69. Just as Apramäna is derived from Pramäna by holding the opposite.

70. So, really there is no difference.

71. ( If ) difference ( be accepted ), it will not be derived as in the case of another soul.

72. There will be Atiprasanga ( if we urge ) Samavāya.

#### Commentary

Phalābhāsa (fallacy of the result of Pramāņa) is either separate from Pramana or inseparable from it. If we accept that the result is always inseparable from Pramāna, we cannot say as usual that this is the Pramana and this is the result. If it is mentioned as is done by the Buddhists, that the result will be understood by absence of non-result, it will not be correct. For non-result can then in a similar manner be understood by result of a like nature just as the Buddhists agree to Apramāņa by absence of Pramāna of a like nature. If non-result is taken to be imagined in all cases, there will be nothing as result in this world. So it must be accepted that there is a real difference between Pramāna and its result. But it cannot be said that the difference is absolute. For in that case there will be the following difficulty. The result of Pramana in a being other than myself is separate from me. If the difference of Pramana and its result is taken as absolute the result of Pramāna of my own soul will also be different from me. It will therefore become impossible to say "this result is the result of my Pramāņa". If you urge that though Pramāņa and its result are separate, still according to the relation-ship of Samayāya ( co-inherence ), wherever there will be Pramāņa in a soul, there will also be the result by relationship of co-inherence,

196

we will reply that there will be the fault of Atiprasanga viz. as Samavāya has been accepted as Nitya (eternal) and Vyāpaka (pervasive), all souls will have the quality of equal co-inherence, and it cannot be that in a particular soul Pramāņa and the result will exist in relationship of Samavāya.

## भमाणतदाभासौ दुष्टतयोद्भावितौ परिहृतापरिहृतदोषौ वादिनः साधनतदाभासौ प्रतिवादिनो दूषणभूषणे ्च ॥७३॥

73. Pramāņatadābhāsau dustatayodbhāvitau parihritāparihritadosau vādinah sādhanatadābhāsau prativādino dūsaņabhūsaņe cha.

73. Pramāna and its Ābhāsa being shown as faulty and being made free from or connected with fault will be Sādhana or its Ābhāsa in case of the Vādi and Duṣaṇa (fault) or Bhūsaṇa (adornment) respectively of Prativādi (opponent).

#### Commentary

In a discussion between two persons, one uses Pramāņa first. He is called the Vādi. His opponent is known as Prativādi. When the Vādi uses a Pramāņa his Prativādi may say that this is faulty. If the Vādi can show that the fault urged is really nonexistent, he wins in the argument and the Pramāņa becomes Sādhana in case of the Vādi and Dusaņa in case of the Prativādi. If again, at the outset the Vādi uses Sādhanābhāsa and the Prativādi points out the fault which the Vādi fails to refute, then this Sādhanābhāsa becomes Duṣaṇa to the Vādi and Bhūṣaṇa to the Prativādi.

Hemachandra defines Dūşaņa as the words by which faults like Asiddha, Viruddha etc. are shown in propositions<sup>1</sup>. There can also be Dūşaņābhāsa viz. an apparent Dūşaņa though really it can be proved to be non-existent<sup>2</sup>. Vāda is laying down of a

- 1. "साधनदोषोद्भावनं दूषणम् ॥" Pramāņa-mimāmsā, II. 1. 28.
- 2. "अभूतदोषोद्भावनानि दूषणाभासा आत्युत्तराणि ॥"

Pramāņa-mimāmsā II. 1. 29.

proposition and its faults in the presence of members of a council and others to prove the real thing<sup>1</sup>. When the Vādi lays down a proposition, the Prativādi finds out its fault. Again when the Prativādi lays down anything, the Vādi finds out its fault. The utterances of the Vādi and Prativādi in this manner are vāda<sup>2</sup>.

## संभवदन्यद्विचारणीयम् ॥ ७४ ॥

74. Sambhavadanyadvichāraņīyam.

74. Other (varieties) which exist, are to be understood by reasoning (from other works).

#### Commentary

In Parīkṣāmukham, Pramāņa only is described in detail. But it has been laid down that Pramāņa as well as Naya are means of instruction ("प्रमाणनयेर्धिगम:" Tattvārtha Sūtra I. 6) by which right faith is established. In this aphorism it is mentioned that Nayas are not described in detail in this work but may be learnt from other works<sup>3</sup>.

## "तत्वसंरक्षणार्थं प्राहिनकादिसमक्षं साधनदूष्णवद्नं वादः ॥"

Pramāńa-mimāmsā II. 1. 30.

2. "स्वपक्षसिद्धये बादिनः साधनं, तत्प्रतिषेधाय प्रतिवादिनो दूषणं, प्रति-वादिनोऽपि स्वपक्षसिद्धये साधनं तत्प्रतिषेधाय वादिनो दूषणं, तदेवं वादिनः साधनदूषणे प्रतिवादिनोऽपि साधनदूषणे तयोर्वादिप्रतिवादिभ्यां वदनमभिधानं बादः ॥" Bhāsya to Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā. II. 1. 30. Hemachandra says that Vādi, Prativādi, Sabhāpati ( the president or umpire ) and members of the Council—these four are limbs of a discussion. The members of the Council must be impartial, learned, efficient in discussions and capable of balancing the arguments like a scale "स्वसमयपर-समयझा: कुलजा: पक्षद्वयेप्सिता: क्षमिणः । वादपथेष्वभियुक्तास्तुलासमा: प्राहिनका: प्रोक्ता: ॥"

 "संभवद्विद्यमानं अन्यत् प्रमाणतत्वात् नयस्वरूपं शास्त्रान्तरप्रसिद्धं विचारणीयमिह् युक्त्या प्रतिपत्तव्यम् ।" Prameya-ratnamālā.

**19**8

Parikṣāmukham

Nayas are mainly divided into two classes : (i) Dravyārthika Naya and (ii) Paryāyārthika Naya. Dravyārthika Naya is subdivided into (a) Naigama (b) Saāgraha and (c) Vyavahāra and Paryāyārthika Naya is subdivided into (a) Riju-sūtra (b) Šabda (c) Samabhiruḍha and (d) Evambhūta<sup>1</sup>.

Siddhasena mentions: "Since things have many characters (that is, may be conceived from many points of view) they are the objects of all-sided knowledge (omniscience); but a thing conceived from one particular point of view is the object of Naya (or one-sided knowledge)"<sup>2</sup>.

"Objects whether intrinsic or extrinsic, possess many different characteristics, and may be taken from different stand-points. They are understood in their entire character by omniscience alone, while to take them from a certain stand-point is the scope of Naya ( the one sided method of comprehension )"<sup>3</sup>.

To be more clear, All that exists is capable of being known and as such is an object of knowledge and each substance is possessed of innumerable attributes. We sometimes take a partial view of reality and sometimes we apprehend the whole reality. The former view is known as the Naya or the theory of stand-points, whereas the latter is called the Pramāņa or complete comprehension<sup>4</sup>.

A Naya deals with only the particular aspect in view of the speaker but it does not deny the existence of the remaining attri-

 'तत्र मूलनयौ द्वौ द्रव्यार्थिकपर्यायार्थिकभेदात् । तत्र द्रव्यार्थिकस्त्रेधा नैगम-संग्रहव्यवहारभेदात् । पर्यायार्थिकश्चतुर्धा ऋजुसूत्रसमभिरूढैवम्भूतभेदात् ॥" Prameya-ratnamāla.

"अनेकान्तात्मकं वस्तु गोचरः सर्वसंविदाम् ।

एकदेशविशिष्टोऽर्थो नयस्य विषयो मतः ॥" Nyayavatara 29.

3. Ibid. Note to the above by Dr. S. C. Vidyäbhūṣaṇa.

For Personal & Private Use Only

4. "सकलादेशः प्रमाणाधीनः, विकलादेशो नयाधीनः।" Quotation in Tattvärtharäjavärttika. butes. When we speak of the colour of gold, we make no mention of its weight, touch, taste, smell and other attributes but our statement does not mean that gold is devoid of all the other attributes besides colour. When speaking from a limited point of view, Jain scholars prefix the word Syat to every such predication to signify that the object is of a particular type from a particular stand point but it is not so from other points of view. 'Syat' suggests the existence of other attributes but does not give primary importance to them. This is the differentiating point which helps in accuracy of expression by a scholar of the Jain school of thought. One school of philosophy might say that all that exists is momentary and another school might say that reality is permanent. Jainism reconciles both these seemingly contradictory statements by pointing out that the first view is true from the stand point of modifications only which are subject to change every moment and the second view is also correct from the standpoint of elements of which the thing is composed. One sided systems of philosophy deny the existence of attributes other than what they adopt, whereas the Jain point of view admits their existence though these are not described being not of primary importance. This Nayavada or Syādvāda system is the distinctive feature of Jain philosophy and logic<sup>1</sup>.

The Nayas have broadly been classified as Dravyārthika i. e. statements which refer only to the general attributes of a substance and not to the modifications which the substance is constantly undergoing and (2) Paryāyārthika i. e. statements which refer to the constantly changing conditions of a substance.

The Nayas are further classified into (1) Artha-naya and (2) Sabda-naya. The former deals with the objects and the latter

1. A detailed description of Nayas and Saptabhangi (seven modes of predication) has been given in Pages LII-LXXXV of the Introduction to Paüchāstikāya-samayasāra Vol, III of The Sacred Books of the Jainas. Parikṣāmukham

lays emphasis on the words and their grammatical significance.

The Nayas have again been classified as (1) Naigama, (2) Sangraha, (3) Vyavahāra, (4) Riju-sūtra, (5) Śabda, (6) Samabhirūḍha and (7) Evambhūta. The first three are subdivisions of Dravyārthika because they deal with objects and the last four are the same of Paryāyārthika Naya because they are concerned with the modifications of substances.

I. Naigama (Not literal or figurative). When we speak of a past or future event as a present one, we have an illustration of this Naya. It is of three kinds relating to past, present and future. If we say on the Diwali day "Lord Mahāvīra attained liberation to-day" we mean that this day is the anniversary day of the past event. Again, we see a man booking his passage and on our query, he says "I am going to England." This is a figurative way of speaking about a present event. Further, when we see a man making a fire and on our questioning him, he says "I am cooking", he really speaks of a future event for which he is making only a preparation.

II. Samgraha (common or general). When we use a word denoting a class to mean the whole, we have an example of this Naya. By using the word Dravya we take the six kinds of Dravyas, taking only the general attributes of Dravya (substance) and not considering the distinguishing features.

III. Vyavahāra (distributive). When we divide or separate a general term into its classes, orders, kinds or species, we have an example of this Naya. For example when we speak of Dravya (substance) implying its six subdivisions soul, matter, space, time, media of motion and rest, we have an example of this Naya.

By Sangraha Naya the generic properties alone are taken into consideration without any cognizance of the particular properties and by Vyavahāra Naya the particular properties alone are considered.

**P**-26

IV. Riju-sūtra ( the straight expression ). This Naya takes into account of (1) the actual condition at a particular moment and (2) the actual condition for a long time. The first variety is called Sūkṣma ( fine ) and the second Sthūla ( gross ). A soul with a momentary good thought is an example of the former while a man with a human condition for a life time is an example of the latter.

By this Naya a thing as it exists at present is considered without any reference to the past or future. The followers of this Naya say that it is useless to ponder over things as they were in the past or will become in the future. All practical purposes are served by the thing itself as it exists at the present moment.

V. Śabda (descriptive). This Naya includes grammatical correctness and propriety of expression. From this point of view we can use the present for the past tense, plural for the singular number, faminine for the masculine gender etc. An example of the first is when we speak "In 1066 A. D. we see the Normans attack the Anglo-Saxons". The second is illustrated by the use of "you" for one man. The third is exemplified by the use of a masculine name e. g. Lord Nelson for a vessel which is used in feminine gender.

VI. Samabhirūdha (specific). This Naya is employed when we give a word a fixed meaning out of several which it has. This is exemplified by the use of the word 'Nut' to denote an extra smart man or "Dread nought" to denote a particular kind of warship.

VII. Evambhūta (active). When we restrict the name to the very activity which is connoted by the name we have an example of this Naya e. g. when we call Stratford on Avon by that name only so long as the town stands on the banks of the river  $Avon^{1}$ .

1. "नैगम संग्रह व्यवहारजु सूत्रशब्दसमभिरूढेवम्भूता नयाः।" Tattvārthādhigama Sutra I. 33. See The Sacred Books of the Jainas Vol. II. P. 45. Amongst these Nayas, the range of each becomes more and more fine according to their position in the list as mentioned above<sup>1</sup>.

These Nayas deal with the various aspects of reality from their particular angles of vision, but they do not predicate the nonexistence of other points of views. When one point of view becomes primary, the others become of secondary importance. It is incorrect to suppose that only a particular Naya is correct and others are erroneous. As a matter of fact all these stand points are equally true and valid and lead to correct knowledge, provided that they do not deny the existence of the other points of view, for

"अनभिनिष्टतार्थसंकल्पमात्रमाही नैगमः । सजात्यविरोधेनैकघ्यमुपनीय पर्या-यानाकान्तभेदानविरोधेण समस्तप्रहणात् संग्रहः । संप्रहनयाश्चिप्तानामर्थानां विधिपूर्वक-मवहरणं व्यवहारः । ऋजुं प्रगुणं सूत्रयति तन्त्रयत इति ऋजुसूत्रः । सिंगसंख्या-साधनादिव्यभिचारनिष्टत्तिपरः शब्दनयः । नानार्थसमभिरोहणात् समभिरूढः । येनात्मना भूतस्तेनैवाध्यवसाययतीति एवंभूतः ।" Sarvartha-siddhih.

The definition of Nayas with Nayābhāsas is thus given in Prameya-ratna-mālā :

"अन्योऽन्यगुणप्रधानभूतभेदाभेदप्ररुपणो नैगमः । नैकं गमो नैगम इति निरक्तेः । सर्वधाभेदवादस्तदाभासः । प्रतिपक्षव्यपेक्षः सन्मात्रप्राही संप्रहः । ब्रह्म-वादस्तदाभासः । संष्रहगृहीतभेदको व्यवहारः । काल्पनिको भेदस्तदाभासः । शुद्ध-पर्यायप्राही प्रतिपक्षसापेक्ष ऋजुसूत्रः । क्षणिकैकान्तनयस्तदाभासः । काल्छकारक-लिंगानां भेदाच्छव्दस्य कथंचिदधभेदकथनं शब्दनयः । अर्थभेदं विना शब्दानामेव नानात्वैकान्तस्तदाभासः । पर्यायभेदान् पदार्थनानात्वनिरूपकः समभिरूढः । पर्याय-नानात्वैकान्तस्तदाभासः । पर्यायभेदान् पदार्थनानात्वनिरूपकः समभिरूढः । पर्याय-नानात्वमन्तरेणापीन्द्रादिभेदकथनं तदाभासः । कियाश्रयेण भेदप्ररुपणमित्यंभावः । कियानिरपेक्षत्वेन कियावाचकेषु काल्पनिको व्यवहारस्तदाभासः । इति नयस्तदाभास-लक्ष्णं संक्षेपेणोक्तं विस्तरेण 'नय-चक्रा'त् प्रतिपत्तव्यम् ॥" Prameya-ratnamālā.

]. ' नैगमादयो नया उत्तरोत्तर-सूक्ष्मविषयत्वादेषां क्रमः, पूर्वपूर्वदेतुकत्वाच । एवमेते नयाः पूर्वपूर्वविरुद्धमहाविषया उत्तरोत्तरानुकूळाल्पविषयाः ।''

Tattvārtha-rāja-vārttika,

one will be wholly untrue without the existence of others. In other words, the valid Nayas are inter-dependent and when they become independent, the result is that their very nature is annihilated. For example, the inter-dependence of cotton threads is possessed of the potentiality of warding off cold and providing comfort to the body, but if each of these threads become independent of others, these will not be able to serve the aforesaid purpose. This pinciple is applied to the doctrine of Nayas. Achārya Amritachandra Sūri has mentioned that as a milk-maid draws part of the rope of the churning rod by one hand loosening the other part to get butter out of curd, so the Jain doctrine of Naya gives prominence to a particular attribute leaving aside the other views and by this means churns the nectar of reality (Tattva)<sup>1</sup>.

The harmonious combination of these coordinating Nayas paves the way to right faith (Samyog-darśana)<sup>2</sup>.

This aphorism of Parikṣāmukhaṃ has been given an alternative explanation by Anantavirya. He says that besides being explained as above, we may take this aphorism to mean "Vādalakṣmaṇa or Patra-lakṣmaṇa which are mentioned elsewhere should be noted here"<sup>3</sup>.

Vāda has been defined as words which establish their import<sup>4</sup>. Patra is defined as a sentence the limbs of which are well-known and which establish the import which it desires to convey

 "एकेनाकर्षयन्ती इख्ययन्ती वस्तुतत्वमितरेण । अंतेन जयति जैनी नीतिर्मथाननेत्रमिव गोपी ॥" Purusārtha-siddhyupāya, Verse 225.
 2. "एते गुणप्रधानतया परस्परतंत्राः सम्यग्दर्शनहेतवः ।" Tattvārtha-rāja-vārttika.
 3. "अथवा संभवद् विद्यमानं, अन्यद् वादछक्षणं पत्रछक्षणं वान्यत्रोक्तमिह द्रष्टव्यम् ।" Prameya-ratna-mālā.
 4. "समर्थवचनं वादः ।" Ibid, and which consists of correct and unambiguous words having a deep significance<sup>1</sup>.

According to this interpretation the Aphorism will mean that Vāda and Patra have not been described in this work, but these should be studied from other works where the same have been treated in detail.

## परीक्षामुखमादर्श' हेयोपादेयतत्वयोः । संचिदे मादृशो वालः परीक्षादक्षवद् व्यधाम् ॥

Parikşāmukhamādaršam heyopādeyatattvayoļi. Sanvide mādrišo vālah parikşādakşavad vyadhām.

I, having little knowledge ( like a child ) have written as one who is conversant with Parikṣā, ( this work ) Parikṣāmukham ( resembling ) a mirror for understanding of realities to be accepted or discarded.

#### Commentary

The author Māņikyanandi in this concluding verse of his work shows humility by describing himself as a child having little knowledge. This work is compared to a mirror. As good or bad looks of a person adorned with ornaments are seen in a mirror so things to be accepted or discarded will be determined by this work by means of Pramāņa<sup>2</sup>. As a man conversant with Pariksā"

 "प्रसिद्धावयवं वाक्यं स्येष्टस्यार्थस्य साधकम् । साधुगुढ्रपद्प्रायं पत्रमाहरनाकुल्म् ॥" Ibid.

 "यथैवादर्श आत्मनोऽलंकारमंडितस्य सौरुष्यं वैरुष्यं वा प्रतिविंवोपदर्शन-द्वारेण सूचयति तथेदमपि हेयोपादेयतत्त्वं साधनदूषणोपदर्शनद्वारेण निश्चाययतीत्त्या-दर्शत्वेन निरूष्यते।"

3. Parikṣā is a full discussion used in finding out the strength and weakness of various arguments which are opposed to one another. 'Pari' means 'full' and 'Ikṣaṇaṇ' means discussion of of subjects. Vide :

#### The Sacred Books of the Jainas

completes the work undertaken by him, so the author also has completed this book<sup>1</sup>.

End of Samuddeśa VI.

#### Finis.

-:\*:---

"अन्योन्यविरुद्ध-नानायुक्ति-प्रावल्यदौर्वल्यावधारणाय प्रवर्त्तमानो विचारः परीक्षा तर्क इति यावत् । परि समन्तादशेषनिःशेषत ईक्षणं विचारणं यन्न अर्थानामिति ब्युत्पत्तेः ।'' Nyāyamaņi-dipikā.

1. "यथा परीक्षादश्चः स्वप्रारब्धशास्त्रं निरुढवांस्तथाहमपि।"

Prameya-ratna-mālā.

206

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction

	Page
Early writers on Jaina Nyāya	i
Umāsvāmi	i
Kudakundāchārya	i
Samantabhadra	i
Siddhasena Diväkara	ii
Haribhadra	ii
Akalanka	ii
Manikyanandi	ii
Deva-Sūri	iii
Hemachandra	ili
Later works on Jaina Nyaya	iii
The goal of Nyāya philosophy	iv
Different systems of Indian Philosophy	vi
Astika and Nastika philosophies	vi
Nomenclature of Nyāya	x
Essence of Nyāya-Vsišesika principles of reasoning	xi xi
Pramanas	xiii
Jaina Nyāya before Māņikyanandi	xiv
Kunda-kunda	xiv
Umāsvāmi	xvii
Samanța-bhadra	xviii
Siddhasena	xix
Akalanka	xix
Later writers	xxi <b>v</b>
The Buddhist views	XXV
Meaning of the title 'Pariksamukham'	xxix
Mānikyanandi	xxix
Manikynandi was later than Akalanka	XXX
Time of Akalanka	xxxi
Commentaries on Parikşāmukham	xli
1. Prameyakamalamürtanda by Prabhāchandra	, xli
2. Prameyaratnamālā by Anantavīrya	xliii
Commentaries on Prameyaratna-mālā	xlv
(a) Arthaprakāšikā	xlv
(b) Prameyaratnamālālaukāra	xly

Page
xlvii
xlviii
xlviii
1
lii
I

## SAMUDDEŚA I.

Definition of Pramana	12
Pramana cannot be anything but knowledge	30
Pramana is characterised by definiteness	32
Meaning of Apūrvārtha	36
Meaning of Sva-vyavasāya	38
Example of Sva-vyavasāya	39
Four things in knowledge	40
Understanding is independent of words	41
Validity of Pramana from itself or through another Pramana	44

## SAMUDDEŚA II.

Two kinds of Pramāņa	48, 49
Definition of Pratyakşa Pramāņa	50
Meaning of Vaisadya (clearness)	57
Sānvyavahārika Pratyakṣa Defined	60
Object & light are not instruments of Pratyakşa	65
Mukhya Pratyaksa defined	72
Hindrances may obstruct knowledge	75

## SAMUDDEŚA III.

Definit	ion of Parokşa Pramāņa	78
Five varieties of Paroksa Pramāna		80
1.	Definition of Smriti	81
	Example of Smriti	83
2.	Definition of Pratyabhijñānam	84
	Examples of Pratyabhijñānam	84
3.	Definition of Uha or Tarka	87
	Examples of tha	87

		Page
4.	Definition of Anumana	90
5.	Definition of Hetu	91
Ũ	Definition of Avinābhāva or Vyāpti	92
	Definition of Sahabhāva	92
	Definition of Kramabhava	93
	Definition of Sādhya	94
	Pakṣa	9 <b>8</b>
	Udaharana ( example ) is not a limb of Anumana	104
	Upanaya and Nigamana are not limbs of Anumana	109
Two ki	nds of Dristanta	I 1 2
1.	Anvaya-Drișțânta	113
2.	Vyatireka-Dristanta	113
	Definition of Upanaya	115
	Definition of Nigamana	115
Two ki	nds of Anumana :	116
Ι.	Svārtha Anumāna	117
2.	Parartha Anumana	117
Two ki	nds of Hetu :	
	Upalabdhi and Anupalabdhi	121
Two ki	nds af Upalabdhi Hetu	
:	and two kinds of Anupalabdhi Hetu	121
Six var	ieties of Aviruddha Upalabdhi :	122
1	Aviruddha Vyāpyopalabdhi ( Aphorism 65 )	127
2.	Kārya Hetu ( Aphorism 66 )	128
3.	Kāraņa Hetu ( Aphorism 67 )	128
4.	Pūrvachara Hetu (Aphorism 68)	128
5.	Uttarachara Hetu ( Aphorism 69 )	129
6.	Sahachara Hetu (Aphorism 70)	129
Six var	ieties of Viruddha Upalabdhi	129
1.	Viruddha Vyäpyopalabdhi ( Aphorism 72 )	129
2.	Viruddha Kāryopalabdhi ( Aphorism 73 )	130
3.	Viruddha Kāraņopalabdhi ( Aphorism 74 )	130
4	Viruddha Pūrvacharopalabdhi ( Aphorism 75 )	130
5•	Viruddha Uttartcharopalabdhi ( Aphorism 76 )	130
6,	Viruddha Sahacharopalabdhi ( Aphorism 77 )	131
Seven	varieties of Aviruddha Anupalabdhi :	
.1	Aviruddha Svabhāva Anupalabdhi ( Aphorism 79 )	132
2,	Aviruddha Vyāpaka Anupalabdhi ( Aphorism 80 )	132
3.		132
4.	Aviruddha Karanānupalabdhi ( Aphorism 82 )	132
Υ <b>!</b>		2

	Page
5. Aviruddha Pūrvachara Anupalabdhi ( Aphorism 83 )	133
6. Aviruddha Uttarachara Anupalabdhi ( Aphorism 84 )	133
7. Aviruddha Sahachara Anupalabdhi (Aphorism 85)	133
Three varieties of Viruddha Anupalabdhi :	
1. Viruddha Kārya Anupalabdhi ( Aphorism 87 )	134
2. Viruddha Kāraņa Anupalabdhi ( Aphorism 88 )	134
3. Viruddha Svabhāva Anupalabdhi ( Aphorism 89 )	134
Hetus following one another	135
Definition of Agama	137
Words etc. cause knowledge	140

## SAMUDDEŚA IV.

Vișaya ( subject matter ) of Pramāņa	146
Two varieties of Vișaya : Sāmānya and Viśeșa	146
Two varieties of Sämänya : Tiryak and Urddhvata	150
Two varieties of Viśeșa : Paryāya and Vyatireka	150

## SAMUDDEŚA V.

Resu	lts	of	Pra	mäna

152

, ·

## SAMUDDEŚA VI.

	Fallacies ( Pramāņābhāsa )	156
	Fallacy of Pratyaksa	158
	Fallacy of Parokşa	159
	Fallacy of Smriti	160
	Fallacy of Pratyabhigñāna	161
	Failacy of Tarka	161
	Fallacies of Anumana :	162
Ι.	Fallacies of Pakşa	162
	(a) Pratyakṣa-vādhita ( Aphorism 16 )	163
	(b) Anumäna-vädhita ( Aphorism 17 )	163
	(c) Ägama-vädhita ( Aphorism 18 )	163
	(d) Loka-vādhita (Aphorism 19)	163
	(e) Svavachana-vādhita ( Aphorism 20 )	165
2,	Fallacies of Hetu;	166
	(a) Asiddha	168
	(i) Svarūpa Asiddha	168
	(ii) Sandigdha Asiddha	169

	Page
(b) Viruddha	172
(c) Anaikāntika	173
(i) Niśchita-vipakșa-vritti	173
(ii) Šankita-vipaksa-vritti	174
(d) Akiñchitkara	176
3. Fallacies of Drisțānta	178
(a) Anvaya or Sādharmya	179
(b) Viparīta or Vaidharmya	179
Fallacy of Bāla-prayoga	188
Fallacy of Agama	190
Fallacy of number ( of Pramāņas )	191
Fallacy of subject matter	193
Fallacy of results	195
Nayas ( the seven categories )	199
Concluding verse	205
PRAMEYARATNAMĀLĀ (Sanskrit commentary)	8 <i>0</i> —5
Alphabetical Index to Sūtras in Sanskrit Prameyaratna	nālā -
Alphabetical Index to quotations in Prameyaratnamālā	
ALPHABETICAL INDEX OF APHORISMS	
TABLE OF WORKS CONSULTED	
GENERAL INDEX.	

## LIST OF CHARTS

	Page
Pramāņas according te Akalańka	xxii
Pramāņas according to Umāsvāmi	xxiii
Pratyaksa Pramana and its varieties	76
Paroksa Pramana and its varieties	77
Hetu and its varieties	129
Vișaya and its varieties	145

.

۰.

## Alphabetical List of Works Quoted and Consulted

Abhidharmakoşa (Vasubandhu). Kāśi Vidyāpitha Granthmālā, Benares. Achārānga-Sūtra (Commentary on ; by Sīlānkāchārya) Agamodaya Samiti, Surat. Ādipurāņa (Jinasena) Akalańka-charitra Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute Vols. II, XIII. Apta-mîmāmsā (Samantabhadra) Jain Siddhānta Prakāsini Samsthā, Calcutta, 1914. Apta-parikșa (Vidyananda) Jain Siddhanta Prakasini Samstha. Calcutta, 1913. Aradhana-Katha-Kosa Astādhyāyi ( Pāņiņi ) Nirņaya Sāgar Press, Bombay. Aştasati ( Akalanka ) Nirnaya Sagar Press, Bombay. Astasahasri( Vidyānanda ) Bhāmatī ( Vāchaspati Miśra ) Nirnaya Sāgar Press, Bombay. Bhāşya on Nyāya Sūtras of Gautama (Vātsyāyana) Bangiya Sāhitya Pārisat, Calcutta, Bhāşya on Vaišeşika Sūtras (Praśastapada) Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, Benares. Bhāsva on Vedānta Sūtras (Sankarāchārya) Nirnaya Sāgar Press, Bombay. Brahmavidyābharana Brihadāranyak Upanisad Nirnaya Sāgar Press, Bombay. Catalogue of Sanskrit and Prakrit Mss, in the Central Provinces and Berar (R. B. Hiralal, B. A.) Chandraprabhacharitam (Viranandi) Ed. by Pandit Durgaprasad and V. L. Sastri, Nirnaya Sagar Press, Bombay 1912. Chhandogya Upanisad Nirnaya Sagar Press, Bombay. Devapratisthatattva (Raghunandana) Dharmaśarmâbhyudayam Edited by Pandit Durgaprasad, Bombay, 1894. Dravya-Samgraha. Edited by S. C. Ghoshal. Sacred Books of the Jainas Vol. I. Dravya-samgraha-Vritti (Brahmaveva) Do Dvātrimśikā (Hemachandra) Dvātrimśikā (Siddhasena ) Bhavanagar. Early History of India ( Vincent Smith ) Oxford 1914. Encyclopædia Brittannica Vol. XII. Ephigraphia Carnatica ( Lewis Rice ) Vol. II. Bangalore 1889.

Epitome of Jainism, An ( Nahar and Ghosh ) Calcutta. Gunakiranāvali. History of the Medieval School of Indian Logic (S. C. Vidyabhusana) Harivamsapurāna (Jinasena) Harșa-charitam ( Bāṇabhatta ), Nirnaya Sāgar Press, Bombay. Hayaśīrsapañcharātra, Introduction to the Science of Language ( Sayce ) London 1900, Jaina-tarka-bhāsā. Sindhi Jain Series. Calcutta. Jaina-tarka-varttika, Lazarus and Company, Benares. Jainendra Vyākaraņa ( Devanandi alias Pūyapāda ) Srilal Jain, Benares, 1014. Jainism (Herbert Warren ) Madras 1912 ; Arrah 1916. Kādambarī (Bāņa-bhatta) Nirnaya Sāgar Press, Bombay. Karma-mīmāmsā ( A. B. Keith ) Heritage of India Series. London, 1921. Kāśikā ( Vāmana and Jayāditya ) Lazarus & Co., Benares, Kāvya.mīmāmsā ( Rājašekhar ) Gaekwad Oriental Series, Baroda. Kusumānjali ( Udayanāchārya ) Laghiyastraya ( Akalanka ) Sindhi Jain Series, Calcutta. Mahābhāratam. Bangabasi Press, Calcutta. Mahābhāsya ( Patañjali ) Nirnaya Sāgar Press, Bombay. Manusamhita. Nirnaya Sagar Press, Bombay. Meghadūtam (Kālidāsa) Nirnaya Sāgar Press, Bombay. Milinda Pañha. Pali Text Society. Mimāmsā Sūtras. (Jaimini). Muktāvali. Nirnaya Sāgar Press, Bombay. Nayachakram. Manikchandra Granthamālā, Bombay. Nayakarnikā ( Ed. by M. D. Desai ) Arrah, 1915. Nayapradīpa. Jaina-dharma-prasārak Sabhā, Bhāvanagar. Naya-rahasyam. Jain-dharma-prasārak Sabhā, Bhāvanagar. Nayopadeśah. Jain-dharma-prasārak Sabhā, Bhāvanagar. Nemi-nirvāņam (Ed. by Pandit Sivadatta) Bombay, 1896. Niśitha-sūtra-chūrņi (Jinadas Gaņi Mahottar) Niyama sāra ( Kundakunda ) Nyaya-darsana Edited by Mahamahopadhyaya Phnibhusan Tarkabagis Bangiya Sahitya Parisat, Calcutta. Nyāya-dīpikā ( Dharmabhūsaņa ) Srilal Jain, Calcutta, 1915 Nyāya-kosa.

Nyāyakumudachandrodaya (Prabhāchandra)

Nyāyamañjarī ( Jayanta Bhatta ) Vijaynagaram Series, Benares.

Nyāya-praveša ( Dharmakirti ) Gaekwad Oriental Series, Baroda, Nyāya-Sāra ( Bhāsarvajāa )

- Nyäya-sütras ( Gautama ) Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, Benares.
- Nyāya-vārttika ( Udyotkara ) Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, Benares.
- Nyāyāvatāra (Siddhasena Divākara) Ed. by S. C. Vidyabhusan. Central Jain Publishing House, Arrah 1915.

Do

- Nyāyāvatāra-vivriti ( Chandraprabha Sūri )
- Nyāya-vindu ( Dharmakīrti ) Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, Benares.
- Nyāya-viniścháya (Akalaúka ) Sindhi Jain Series, Calcutta.
- Nyāya-vinišchaya-vivaraņa (Vādirāja Sūri) Syadvādavidyālaya Benares, (Mss.)
- Pañchāstikāya-samaya-sāra (Kundakunda) Rāyachandra Sāstramālā, Bombay.
- Pārsvābhyudayam ( Jinasena ) Bombay, Vira Nirvāna 1913.
- Patraparīksā ( Vidyānanda ) Jaina Siddhanta Prakāšinī Samsthā, Calcutta. Pramālaksma ( Vidyānandi )
- Pramāņa-mīmāņsā ( Hemachadra ) Sindhi Jain Series, Calcutta.
- Pramāņa-naya-tattvālokālankāra (Deva-sūri) Jašovijaya Granthamālā, Benares.
- Pramāņa-nirņayah. Manikchandra Granthmālā, Bombay.
- Pramāņa-parīkķā (Vidyānanda) Jain Siddhanta Prakāšinī Saņsthā, Calcutta.
- Pramāņa-samgraha ( Akalaŭka ) Sindhi Jain Series, Calcutta,
- Pramāņa samuchchaya ( Dignāga ) Mysore University Series.
- Pramāņa-vārttika (Dharma-kīrti) Ed. by Bhikṣu Rāhula Sānkrityāyana (Proofs)
- Pramāņa-vinišchaya (Dharma-kīrti)
- Prameyakamala-mārtaņda (Prabhāchandra) Nirņaya Sāgar Press, Bombay.
- Pravachana-sāra (Kundakunda ) Edited by Barrend Faddegon.
- Principal results of my last two years studies in Sanskrit Mss. Literature (R. G. Bhandarkar) Weir 1889.
- Puruşārthasiddhyupāyah ( Amritachandra ) Ed. by Ajitprasāda.
- Rāmāyaņa (Vālmīki ) Nirnaya Sagar Press, Bombay.
- Ratnakarāvatārikā. Yaśovijaya Granthamala, Benares.
- Ratnakaranda śrāvakāchārah (Samantabhadra) Tr. by C. R. Jain. Central Jaina Publishing House, Arrah 1917.
- Śabdaśaktiprakāśika ( Jagadis ) Jivananda Vidyasagar, Calcutta.
- Sacred Books of the East Edited by Max Muller, Vol. XXXIV.
- Sacred Books of the Jainas Edited by S. C. Ghoshal Vols. II and III.
- Saddarśanasamuchchyaya (Haribhadra) Yaśovijaya Granthamālā, Benares.
- Sādhanamālā Edited by B. Bhattacharya. Gaekwad's Oriental Series, Baroda.
- Śaktisangama Tantra.
- Do

- Samaya sāra ( Kundakunda ) Brahmachari Sitalprasad, Surat.
- Sammati Tarka (Siddhasena) Purātattvamandir, Ahmedabad.
- Sanjīvanī ( on Meghadūtam ) (Mallinātha) Nirnaya Sagar Press, Bombay. Šabkaravijaya ( Mādhava )
- Sānkhyakārikā ( Isvarakrisna ) Chaukhamba Sanskrit Series, Benares.
- Sānkhyapravachana Sūtra. Jivananda Vidyasāgar, Calentta.
- Saptabhangitarangini ( Vimaladāsa ) Rayachandra Sastramala, Bombay.
- Sarvadarśanasamgraha ( Mādhavāchārya ) Ed. by V. S. Abhayankar.
- Sarvārtha-siddhih (Pūjyapāda Devanandi) Kalāpa Sarmā, Kolhapur, 1903.
- Science of Thought, (C. R. Jain) Central Jain Publishing House. Arrah, 1916.
- Siddhi-vinischaya ( Akalanka )
- Śloka-vārttika ( Kumārila Bhatta ) Lazarus & Co., Benares.
- Śrimadbhagavadgitā. Nirnaya Sagar Press, Bombay.
- Svayambhū-stotra ( Samanta-bhadra ) Brahmachāri Sitalprasad, Surat.
- Suvalopanișad. Nirnaya Sagar Press, Bombay.
- Syādvādaratnākara (Devasīīri) Ārhat Prabhākara Kāryālaya, Poona.
- Syādvādaratnākarāvatārikā (Ranaprabhasūri)
- Tārkika-raksā (Varadarāja) Ed. by V. P. Dvivedi. Lazarus & Co., Benares.
- Tarkakaumudi ( Laugāksi Bhāskara ) Nirnaya Sagar Press, Bombay.
- Tattva-chintāmaņi (Gangeśa)
- Tattvärthädhigama Sūtra (Umāsvāmi) Sacred Books of the Jainas Vol. II.
- Ta-Tang-Hsi-Yu-Chi ( Yuan Chwang ) Tr. by T. Watters.
- Tattvärtha-räja-värttika ( Akalańka ) Pandit Gajadharlal, Benares, 1915.
- Tattvärtha-sara. Sanatan Jain Granthamala, Bombay, 1905.
- Tattvärtha-śloka-värttika ( Vidyänandi ) Nirnaya Sagar Press, Bombay.
- Vaiseșika Sūtras ( Kaņāda ) Lazarus & Co. Benares.
- Vākyapadīya (Bhartihari)
- Vāsavadattā (Subandhu) Ed. by Jibananda Vidyasagar, Calcutta.
- Vedānta-paribhāsā Ed. by S. C. Ghoshal. White Lotus Publishing House, Calcutta.
- Vedanta-Sūtras. Nirņaya Sāgar Press, Bombay.
- Viśvakoşa (First Edition ) Ed. by Nagendranath Basu, Calcutta.
- Vivekavilāsa (Jinadatta Sūri)
- Yājñavalkya samhitā. Anandasram Series, Poona.
- Yasodharacharitam.
- Yoga-Sūtras ( Patanjali ) Anandasram Series, Poona.
- Yogavāšistha Rāmāyaņa, Nirnaya Sagar Press, Bombay.

#### Journals.

10

Anekānta (Hindi)

Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute Vols. II, XIII.

Jain Gazette, The

Jain Hitaisi (Hindi) Bhag II.

Jain Jagat (Hindi ) Year IX, Vol. 15.

Jain Sähitya Samsodhaka (Hindi) Bhag I Anka I.

Jain Siddhānta Bhāskar (Hindi) Bhag 2 Nos. 1, 4 Bhag 3. No. 4 Bhag 4 Nos. 1 and 3.

Journal of the American Oriental Society Vol. 31.

#### Manuscripts.

[Preserved in Jain Siddhānta Bhavan, Arrah] Arthaprakāšikā (Panditāchārya?) Nyāyamaņidīpikā (Ajitasenāchārya) Prameyakaņthikā (Sāntivarņi) Prameya-ratnamālīņkāra (Chāru-kīrti).

## ALPHABETICAL INDEX OF THE APHORISMS.

#### A

11	
Abhede tadvyavahārānupa	
(VI. 67)	195
Abhūdatra chakre ( III. 91 )	135
Agnimānayam dešah ( III. 31 )	100
Agnimānayam deśastathaiva 👘	
( III. 95 )	136
Agnimänayam deso dhūmavatvāt	
( VI. 47 )	188
Ajnāna-nivritti (V. 1)	152
Ākāśe nityepyasya ( VI. 32 )	173
Anekāntātmakam ( III. 89 )	134
Añgulyagre hasti (VI. 53)	190
Aniśchito pūrvārthaḥ ( I. 4 )	36
Anişţādhyakşādi ( III. 22 )	94
Anișto mīmāmsaka (VI. 13)	162
Anumänädestadvisayatve	
(VI. 58)	I91
Anuvrittavyävritta ( IV. 2 )	147
Anyathā tadaghatanāt (III. 33)	τοI
Apariņāmi šabdaļı ( VI. 17 )	163
Apauruseyah sabdo (VI. 41)	178
Aptavachanādi (III. 99)	137
Arthantaragato (IV. 9)	151
Arthasyeva tadunmukhataya	
(I.7)	39
Asambaddhe tajjñānam (VI. 10)	161
Asatsattaniśchayo (VI. 22)	168
Asti sarvajno ( III. 29 )	99
Astyatra chhāyā ( III. 67 )	128
Astyatra dehini (III. 66)	128
Astytatra dehini (III, 88)	134
Astyatra mātulinge ( III. 70 )	129
Asvasamvidita (VI. 2)	156
Atajjanyamapi (II. 8)	68
Atasminstaditi (VI. 8)	160

Avaišadye pratyakṣam (VI. 6) 158 Avidyamānanišchayo (VI. 25) 168 Avidyamānasattākah (VI. 23) 168 Aviruddhānupalabdhih (III. 78) 131 Aviruddhopalabdhi (III. 59) 122

### B

Bālaprayogābhāsaḥ ( VI. 46 )	188
Balavyutpattyartham ( III, 46 )	111
Bhābyatītayor ( III. 62 )	125
Bhede tvātmāntara (VI. 71)	195
С	
Chakṣū rasayor ( VI. 5 )	157
D	
Darśana smaraņa ( III, 5 )	84
Dhūmavānschāyam (VI. 48)	189
Drisțāntābhās (VI. 40)	178
Drisțânto dvedhā ( 111. 47 )	112
Driśto'pi samāropāt ( I. 5 )	37
E	
Ekasmin dravye ( IV. 8 )	150
Etaddvayamevānumānāngam	
(III. 37)	104

#### $\mathbf{G}$

Ghatamahamātmanā vedmi			
(I.8)	39		
Gosadriśo gavayaḥ ( III. 7 )			
Govilakșano mahișah (III, 8)	84		

## H

Hetuprayoge hi ( III, 96 )	136
Hetorupasamhära ( III. 50 )	115
Hetvābhāsā asiddha (VI, 21)	166
Hitähitaprāptiparihāra (I. 2)	30

ii

Idamanumānābhāsam ( III. 11 )	162
Idamasmäddūram ( III. 9 )	84
Idamasmin satyeva (III. 12)	87
Indriyanindriyanimittam (II. 5)	60
Istamavādhita ( III. 20 )	94

#### $\mathbf{K}$

Kāraņasya cha (II. 10)	<b>7</b> 1	
Karmavat kartrikarana (I.9)	39	
Kāryakāryamaviruddha (III. 92)	135	
Kiñchidakaranāt (VI. 37)	176	
Ko vā tatpratibhāsinam (I, II)	41	
Ko vā tridhā hetumuktvā	•	
(III. 36)	102	
Kuto'nyathopanaya ( III. 43 )	108	
$\mathbf{L}$		
Lakşana evāsau (VI. 39)	176	

Laukāyatikasya (VI. 56)	19
36	

#### М

Mātā me bandhyā ( VI. 20 )

#### Ν

		Pradipavat (1.12)
Na bhavişyati muhūrtānte		Pramāņādabhinnam (V. 2)
(III. 83)	133	Pramāņādartha ( Opening vers
Na cha pūrvottara (III. 61)	124	Pramāņādvyā ( VI. 69 )
Na chāsiddhavad ( III. 23 )	94	Pramāņatadābhāsau ( VI. 73. )
Na cha te tadange ( III, 44 )	109	Pramāņobhayasiddhe ( III. 30
Na hi tatsādhya ( III. 38 )	106	Prasiddho dharmī ( III. 27 )
Nāpi vyāptismaraņa ( III. 41 )	107	Pratibhāsabhedasya (VI. 60)
Nārthālokau kāraņam ( II. 6 )	65	Pratijūāyāstu ( III. 51 )
Nāsmin śarīriņi ( III. 74 )	130	Pratītyantarāvyava ( II. 4 )
Nāstyatra bhittau (III. 77)	131	Pratyaksādinimittam ( III. 2 )
Nāstyatra bhūtale ( III. 79 )	132	Pratyakşamevaikam (VI. 55)
Nāstyatra dhūmo ( III. 82 )	132	Pratyakșetarabhedāt (II. 2)
Nāstyatra guhāyām ( III. 93 )	135	Pratyāyanāya ( III. 24 )
Nāstyatrā-pratibaddha ( III. 81 )	132	Pretyāsukhaprado (VI. 18)
-	•	

Nästyatra samatuläyä (III. 85)	133
Nāstyatra šimšapā ( III. 80 )	132
Nāstyatra šītasparša ausņyāt	
(III. 72)	129
Nāstyatra šītasparšo dhūmāt	
( III. 73 )	130
Niśchitavrittiranityah (VI. 31.)	173
Nodagād Bharaņi ( III. 84 )	133
Nodagād bharaniḥ ( III. 76 )	130
Nodeșyati muhūrtânte ( III. 75 )	130

## $\mathop{P}_{\cdot}$

176	Pakșa iti yāvat (III. 26)	98
41	Paramparayā sambhavat	
• • •	( III, 90 )	135
102 108	Parāparavivartta (IV. 5)	I50
100	Parāpeksaņe (VI 64)	194
	Praokșamitarat (III, 1 )	78
	Parārtham tu tadartha	
176	( III, 55 )	117
191	Paryäyavyatireka ( IV. 7 )	150
	Parīksāmukhamā (Concluding ver	se)
		205
165	Pariņāmi šabdaķ ( III. 65 )	127
	Phalābhāsam ( VI. 66 )	4 I
	Pradipavat ( I. 12 )	195
	Pramānādabhinnam (V. 2)	154
133	Pramānādartha ( Opening verse )	I
124	Pramānādvyā ( VI. 69 )	195
94	Pramāņatadābhāsau ( VI. 73. )	197
109	Pramāņobhayasiddhe ( III. 30 )	Ioo
106	Prasiddho dharmī ( III. 27 )	99
107	Pratibhāsabhedasya (VI. 60)	191
65	Pratijūāyāstu ( III. 51 )	115
130	Pratītyantarāvyava ( II. 4 )	57
131	Pratyakṣādinimittam ( III. 2 )	80
132	Pratyaksamevaikam (VI. 55)	191
132	Pratyakșetarabhedāt (II. 2)	49
135	Pratyāyanāya ( III. 24 )	94
132	Pretyāsukhaprado (VI. 18)	164

1 ar ( ) ( 11, 10 )	23	oundarn Saitunda Janda ( )) )	
Purușantarapūrvartha (VI. 4)	156	Siddhah śrāvaņah ( VI 14 )	162
P		Siddhah śrāvaņah ( VI. 36 )	176
R		Siddhe pratyakşatvādi (VI. 35)	176
Rāgadvesamohākrānta (VI. 51)	190	Spastatayā prakrita (VI. 50)	189
Rasādekasāmagrya ( III. 60 )	122	Śuchi naraśirah ( VI. 19 )	164
		Svārthamuktalakšaņam ( III. 54 )	117
S		Svārthaparārthabhedāt ( III. 53 )	117
,		Svāpūrvārthavyavasāyā ( I. 1 )	12
Sabdānuchchāraņe'pi (I, 10)	41	Svarūpeņāsatvāt ( VI. 24 )	168
Sa Devadatto (III. 4)	83	Svavișayopadarśaka ( VI. 3 )	156
Sädhanät sädhyavijiianam		Svāvaraņakšayo ( II. 9 )	68
· (III. 14)	90	Svayamasamarthasya (VI. 65)	194
Sādhyābhāve sādhanābhāvo		Svonmukhatayā pratibhāsanam	
(III. 49)	113	(1.6)	38
Sādhyam dharmah ( III, 25 )	98	~	
Sadhyadharmādhāra ( III. 34 )	101	$\mathbf{T}$ .	
Sädhyadharmini ( III. 35 )	102	Tadanumānaņi ( III, 52 )	116
Sādhyābinābhāvitvena (III. 15)		Tadavinābhāva ( III. 39 )	306
Sādhyavyāptam sādhanam	, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,	Tadanvayavytirekā (II, 7)	66
(III. 48)	113	Taddedhā (II. I)	48
Sadriśapariņāma (IV, 4)	150	Tadvachanamapi (III. 53)	119
Sadriše tadevedam (VI. 9)	161	Tadvyāpārāšritam (III. 63)	125
Sahachāriņorapi ( III. 64 )	126	Tanniśchayātmakam (1.3)	32
Sahachāriņorvyāpya (III. 16)	92	Tarkāt tannirņayah ( III. 19 )	- <u>9</u> 3
Sahakramabhāva (III. 17)	9- 92	Tarkasyeva vyäpti (VI, 59)	191
Sahajayogyatāsamketa ( III. 100)		Tasmādagnimān (VI. 49)	189
Sa heturdvedho ( 111. 57 )	121	Tasmādvāstavo (VI. 70)	195
Sāmagrīvišesā (II. 11)	72	Tasya vāspādibhāvena (VI. 26)	168
Sāmānyam dvedhā ( IV. 3 )	150	Tathā pratibhāsanāt (VI. 62)	194
Sāmānyavisesātmā (IV. 1)	146	Tatparamabhidhiya (III. 42)	108
Samarthanam va varam (III. 45)		Tatprāmāņyam svatah ( I. 13 )	44
Samarthasya karane (VI. 63)	194	Tatrānistādi (VI. 12)	162
Samavāyetiprasaigah (VI. 72)	195	Tatra pratyakşa (VI. 16)	163
Sambhavadanyad (VI. 74)	198	Tato'nyat tadābhāsam (VI-1)	156
Samskārodbodha (III. 3)	81	Tāvatā cha sādhya (III. 97)	137
Sandigdhaviparyasta (III. 21)	94	Tenājnātatvāt (VI. 28)	169
Sankitavrittistu (VI. 33)	173	Tena pakṣastadādhāra (III, 98)	137
Sāńkhyam prati (VI. 27)	169		- 77
Sarvajñatvena (VI. 34)	174	U	
Sāvaraņatve (II. 12)	75	Udagād Bhāraņiņ ( III. 69 )	
	73 .	- andre manufint ( 111. 09 )	129

Pürvottarachāriņoķ (III. 18) 93 | Saugata-sāņkhya-yauga (VI. 57) 191

www.jainelibrary.org

Upalabdhirvidhi (III. 58) 1	128 121 87	Visamvādāt (VI, 54) Visayābhāsah (VI. 61) Višesascha (IV. 6)	190 193 150
v		Vrikșoyamityādi ( III, 10 ) Vyaktirūpam cha ( III, 40 ) Vyāptau tu sādhyam ( III, 32 )	84 106 101
- manual band - day	162 159	Vyatireke siddha ( VI. 44 ) Vyāvrittyāpi na tat ( VI. 68 )	179 195
Vidyudadināti (VI. 43)	178	Vyutpannaprayogastu (III. 94)	136
	99 173	Y	
Viparīta-niśchita (VI. 29) 1	171	Yah pramimite (V. 3)	154
Viparītānvayašcha (VI. 42)	178	Yathā anuṣṇo'gnir ( VI. 38 )	87
Viparītavyatirekašcha (VI. 45) I	79	Yathä mervādayah ( III. 101 ) 🛸	140
Viruddhānupalabdhi (III. 86) 1	133	Yathāsmin prāņiņi ( III. 87 )	134
Viruddhatadupalabdhih ( III. 71 ) 1	129	Yathā nadyāstīre ( VI. 52 )	190
Viśadam pratyakṣam ( II. 3 )	50	Yathā sa evāyam ( III. 6 )	84

## **GENERAL INDEX.**

Α	Anupalabdhi 48, 121
	Anvaya 112, 121
Abādhita 94, 9	
•	6 Anvaya-vyāpti-jūāna 66
Abhāva 48, 15	
	i Apramā 12
Abheda 9	
	4 Aprasiddha 97
-	7 Apratīta 96
+ /	6 Apta 138, 139, 144
Abhrānta xxxv	•
Abinābhāva 88, 9	
Achakşu 68—7	
Agama 48, 79, 80, 137, 13	
Agamabādhā 9	5 Artha 29
Agamabādhita Anumāna 16	
Āgamābhāsa I9	o Aristotle 109
Ajīva 3, 3	
Ajnāna 2	7 Asiddha 94,96
Akalanka i, ii, xix-xxiii, xxx-xl	
Akşa 5	6 Atīndriya Pratyakša 61, 75
Alayavijāāna xxvii, 2	9 Ativyāpti 24
Amukhya Pratyakşa 6	2 Avadhi 13, 14, 17, 18, 50, 53, 54,
Anadhyavasāya 32, 33, 35, 15	7 56, 69, 70, 72-75
Anandagiri	1 Avagraha 14, 36, 59, 75, 82, 83
Ananta-vīrya ii, xxiv, xxx, xlii, xli	
Anavasthā 10	1
Anindriya 60, 6	2 " Vyāpyopalabdhi 127
Anindriya-nivandhana 6	1 ,, Auupalabdhi 131
Anindriya-pratyakşa 6	1 ,, Svabhāva Anupalabdhi 132
Anirākrita 9	6 " Vyāpaka Anupalabdhi 132
Antarāya 7	3 , Kāryānupalabdhi 132
Anumāna 36, 48, 57-59, 79, 80	, Kāraņānupalabdhi 132
90, 91, 116, 11	1 2
Anumāna-bādhā 9	5 "Sahachara Anupalabdhi 133
Anumänäbhäsa 19	<b>**</b> • • •
Anumiti 139	
· • •	

В	Do (Sādharmya or Anvaya) 179,	
Bāchaspati Miśra xxv, xxvi	180, 181, 185, 186	
Bādhā 95	Do (Vaidharmya or Vyatireka)	
Baibhāsika xxv	179, 180, 181, 183, 185, 187	
Bāla-prayogābhāsa 188, 189	Dūșana 197	
Bāņa-bhatta xxxviii	G	
Bandha 35		
Bhartrihari xl	Gautama vii	
Bhāva 72	Gavaya 84, 85, 119	
Bhava-pratyaya 74, 75	Guņa 157	
Bhūşana 197	Guna-pratyaya 74, 75	
Bimala-dāsa iii	Guna-ratna ii	
Buddha xxxviii	Guna-sthāna 73	
Buddhi-siddha . 99	Ĥ	
С.	п	
0.	Haribhadra ii, vi	
Chakşu 68, 69	Hemachandra iii	
Chandraprabha Sūri ii	Hetu 88, 91, 105, 109, 110, 111, 113,	
Chārvāka xli, 48	114-119, 121, 123, 169, 176	
Ð	Hetvābhāsa 166, 167	
D.	Do Asiddha 166—168	
Dantidurga xxxii	Do Viruddha 166, 167, 172	
Darśana 68, 69, 70, 72	Do Anaikāntika 166, 167, 173,	
Darśanāvaraņīya Karmas 70	174, 175	
Devanandī i, xxxii	Do Akischitkara 166, 176, 177	
Deva-Süri iii	, —	
Dhāraņā 14, 16, 59, 75, 81, 82, 83	Do Vādhita-viṣaya 178	
Dhārāvāhika Jāāna 22, 23, 37	Do Kälātīta 167	
Dharmabhūṣaṇa iii	Do Prakarana sama 167	
Dharmakirti xxxiii, xxxiv xxxvi,	Do Vādyasiddha 170, 171	
xxxviii, xxxix, xl	Do Prativādyasiddha 171	
Dharmottara xliii	Do Ubhayāsiddha 171	
Dhrauvya 149	Do Viseşyāsiddha 170	
Dignāga xxxvi, xxxvii, xxxviii, xxxix	Do Visesaņāsiddha 171	
Dravya 72, 148, 149, 157	Do Bhāgāsiddha 171	
Dravyārthika 146	Do Asrayasiddha 171	
Drisțanta 105, 109, 110, 112, 114, 115	Do Āśrayaikādeśāsiddha 171	
Drisțāntābhāsa 179, 181	Do Vyartha-viśeşyāsiddha 171	
Do (according to Hemachandra)	Do Vyartha-višesanāsiddha 171	
158, 188	Do Sandigdha-viśesyasiddha 171	

	. <b>T</b>	<i>r</i> ii	
Hetvābhāsa, Sandigd	lha-viśesana-	l	68, 69, 70, 74
	siddha 171	Kevalin	55
Do Niśchita-vip	akșa-vritti 173	Kevala jāāna	72, 74
Do Sańkita-vipa	ıkşa-vritti	Kevala Pratyaks	
	174, 175	Krittikā	93
I		Kşayopaśama	69
		KSetra	72
Îdă	65	Kundakunda	i, xiv, xvii
	36, 59, 75, 82, 83	Kumārasena	xxxiii
Indriya	60, 62, 63	Kumārila Bhatta	ix, xiv, xxxiv, xxxix
Indriya-nivandhaua	60	Kumati	14, 17
Indriya-pratyaksa	28, 60	Kuśruta	14, 17
Îșat-indriya It Sing	65 . xl		L
J	£11	Linga	88, 91
. ၂		Loka-bādhā	95
Jaimini	vii, viii, xli	Loka-vādhita Ar	
Jāvāli	x		Ū
Jayanta Bhatta	ix, x	}	М ,
Jinadās Gaņi Mahot		Mādhava	vi, xl
Jinadatta	vi	Mādhyamika	xxv, 24
Jinasena	xxxiii, xli	Mahabharata	65
Jiva	35, 68, 70	Mahāvīra	vi
Juāna	28, 68. 72	Maitreyī	iv
Juānachandra	iii	Mallinätha	xxxix
Jnayamana	90, 91	Mallişena	iii
Jnanävaraniya Karm		Manas	65
Juanendriya	63, 64	Mańgalächaraņa	9
K		Manahparyaya	13, 14, 17, 18, 50, 54,
Kāla	72	F	56, 65, 69, 72-75
Kālidāsa	39	Māņikyanandi	ii, xxiv, xxv, xxix,
Kalpanapodha	xxxvi		xli
Kaņāda	vii	Manahpratyakşa	28
Kapila	vii, viii	Manoratha	xxxviii
Kāraņa	122, 123, 124	Mati	13, 14, 17, 18, 54, 55,
Kāraņa-hetu	125, 128		56, 69, 81
Karma	69, 71, 157	Māyāvādin	- 29
Karmendriya	63, 64	Mechaka	87
Kārya	122, 123	Meru	74
Kārya-hetu	124, 128	Mohaniya karma	is 72
	14, 17, 18, 54, 56,	Mokşa	Şı 35

Mukhya pratyak	sa 54, 61, 62, 72,	Prachaläprachalä	70
	731 74+ 75	Pradarśaka	31
		Pradarśakatva	. 31
	N	Prajñākara	xliii
Naya	4, 6, 199-204	Pramā	12, 20, 25, 27
Nidrā	4, 0, 199 204	Pramāņa (definition	n) 12
Nidrānidrā	70 70	Pramāņābhāsa	156
Nigamana	108-111, 113, 115,	Pramāņa-siddha	
	116, 119	Prāmāņya	46
Nigraha-sthānas	xxxiv	Pramātā	39, 40
Nirjarā	3, 35	Prameya	<b>39,</b> 40
Nirmala	50	Pramiti	27, 39, 40
Nirvikalpaka dars		Prāpaka	. 31
Nirvikalpa praty	•.	Pratijnā 105,	109, 111, 115, 116,
Niśchaya	29, 146, 147		118, 119
Nişedha	121	Pratiședha	121
No indriya	62, 65	Prativādi	- 197
Nyāya-vaišesika	xli	Pratīti-bādhā	95
		Pratyabhijŭāna	79, 80, 84, 85, 86
	Р	Pratyabhijnānābhās	5 <b>a</b>
Pāda 63		(Ekatva and Sâdriśya) 161	
Paksa	88, 98, 102, 104, 111,	Pratyakša , xx	xvi, 13, 48-55, 57,
	116, 118, 176	60	6, 79, 80, 8 <u>3,</u> 89, 94
Paksābhāsa	162, 163, 165	Pratyakşa-bādhā	95
Pāņi	63	Pratyaksabhasa	158, 159
Paramärthika pra	atyaksa 54, 61, 62,	Pratyakşa-vādhita	163
	72, 73, 75	<b>P</b> ravritti	31
Parärthänumäna		Pravrittivijnāna	<b>xxvii, 2</b> 9
Parokşa	49, 50-56, 58, 78-	Pürvachara	122, 124, 125, 128
	81, 83, 115	Pūjyapāda	xxxii
Parokṣābhāsa	159, 160		
Paryāya	149	l F	ł
Paryāyārthika	146	Rājašekhara	iii, vi, x
Patanjali	vii, x	Rasa	123
Pāyu	63 -	Ratnaprabhasūri	iii
Phalabhasa	195, 196	Right conduct	
Prabhāchandra i	ii, xxxi, xxxiii, xl, xli,	Right faith	3 3, 4
	xliv	Right knowledge	
Prabhākara	xiii, xl, xli, xlx	Riju	3 75
Prachalā	70	Ritvik	73 65
	• ,	· · ·	•5

## viii

www.jainelibrary.org

ix

Rohini	93	Sanvyavahāra	38
	23	Sānvyavahārika Pratyaksa	28
	vii	Sapta-bhangi Naya 🛛 💈	iv, 33
-		Saptaparna	87
S		Śarabha	87
Sabda 13, 48, 50, 57, 138, 1	39	Sarvajñas	17
Sādhana 88, 90, 92, 97, 111, 1	13,	Sarvāstitvavādin	xxvi
117, 1		Sattā	148
Sādharmya 113, 114, 1	28	Sautrantika	XXV
Sadharmya Udaharana 💦 🛛	15	Seven Tattvas	3, 35
Sādhya 88, 90, 92, 94—98, 1	01,	Siddharși	ii
111, 113, 114, 1	D8	Siddhasena i, ii, xix	, xxxv
Sādhyābhāsa	97	Śīlāńka	XXXV
Sahabhāva 92,	93	Śimśapā	93
Sahachara 122, 1	129	Siṣādhayişita	96
	124	Śistuchāra	9
Sāhasatunga xxxi, xx	cxii	Smaraņa	85
Sakala Juana	72	Smaraņābhāsa	160
Sakala Pratyaksa 72, 73,	75	Smriti 79, 80,	83, 85
Śakya	97	Spașta	50, 51
Sāmagri	72	Śruta 13, 14, 17, 18, 50,	54, 55,
Samanta bhadra i, xviii, xxxiv		56, 69,	81, 138
Sāmānya 146, 147,		Subandhu	xxxviii
-	37	Subhatunga	xxxi
	157	Svabhāva	122
Sambhāvanā	88	Svabhāva Hetu	124
Samjukta Samavaya 157,		Svavachanabādhita Anumāna	165
Samvara	35	Svārthānumāna	117
Samśaya 32, 33, 35		Svarūpasiddha 1	68, 170
	, 81	Svavyavasāya	38
Samyak Charitra	3	Styānagriddhi	70
Samyak Darsana	3	Śūnyavādin	29
	1 35	Т	
·	. 35	Tarka 79, 80, 87	. 80. 93
Sandigdhāsiddha 168-	• .	Tarkābhāsa	161
Distribusine	xvii	Tiryaksāmānya	150
Sankara iv, ix, xxy		Trikaladarśi	17
Sänkhya	xl	U	-1
Sankhyäbhäsa	191		10 116
	158		
Sańskāraskandha x	xvii	Udyotkara iv, xxxvi	1, XAXIX

www.jainelibrary.org

~

Ūha –	80, 87—89	Viparyaya	32, 34, 35, 157
Umāsvāmi	i, xiv, xvii	Vipula	75
Upalabdhi	121	Viruddha	I21
Upamāna	48, 85, 86	" Vyāpya upalal	
Upamiti	13	"Kārya "	
Upastha	63	"Kāraņa "	
Upayoga	68	" Pūrvachara "	130
Ürddhatā-sāmānya	150	"Utiarachara "	
Utpāda	149	" Sahachara "	131
Uttara-chara 1	22, 124, 125, 129	" Anupalabdhi	- 133
Utsarga	55	" Kārya Anupal	abdhi 134
v		"Kāraņa "	134
· Y	_	" Svabhāva "	
Vāda-nyāya	xxxiv	", Vyāpaka "	34
Vādi	197	" Sahachara "	<b>-</b> ·
Vädideva Süri	xlvii)	" Kāryopalabdh	i 137
Vādirāja	xliii	Vișāda	50, 51
Vaidharmya	114, 128	Vişaya	146
Vaidharmya Udāhara			194
Vāk	63	Viseșa	146, 147, 157
Vāko-vākya	x	Vîtarāgakathī	111, 116
Vāsanā			89, 92, 93, 112
Vasubandhu xxxvii, xxxviii, xxxix		Vyāpaka	88, 89, 92, 93
Vātsyāyana	x	Vyāpti 88,	92, 106, 109, 111,
Vedas	65		114, 119, 172
Vedanā-skandha	xxvii	Vyāptij: āna	88
Vibhangāvadhi	14, 17	Vyāsa	viii
Vibhrama	33	Vyatireka	12, 121, 150, 151
Vidhi	121	Vyatireka dristanta	113
Vidyānanda	iii, xxxiii, xl	Vyavahāra	146, 147
Vidyānandi	iii, xxiv	Vyavasāya	28, 29
Vijigīšu kathā	112	Vyaya	[49
Vijnānaskandha	xxvii		
Vijnānādvaitavādin 29		Y	
Vikala Jnāna	72	Yājñavalkya	iv
Vikala Pratyaksa	72, 73, 75	Yogāchāra	xxv, 31
Vikalpa	99, 101	Yogipratyakşa	28
Vikalpa-siddhi	100	Yogis	67
Vimaladāsa	iii	Yogyatā	71
Vimoha	34	Yuan Chwang	xxxviji, xl
T MOM	51	<u> </u>	

.

# PRAMEYA-RATNA-MALA (PARIKSAMUKHA-LAGHU-VRITTI)

BY ANANTA VĨRYA.

<sup>अनन्तवीर्थरचिता</sup> प्रमेयरत्तमाला ( परीक्षामुखलघुटत्तिः )



# प्रमेयरत्नमाला

॥ ॐ नमः सिद्धेभ्यः ॥
 नतामरशिरोरत्न--प्रभामोतनखत्विषे ।
 नमो जिनाय दुर्वारमारवीरमदच्छिदे ॥ १ ॥
 तमो जिनाय दुर्वारमारवीरमदच्छिदे ॥ १ ॥
 त्रयायविद्यामृतं तस्मै नमो माणिक्यनन्दिने ॥ २ ॥
 म्यायविद्यामृतं तस्मै नमो माणिक्यनन्दिने ॥ २ ॥
 ममेन्दुवचनोदारचन्द्रिकाप्रसरे सति ।
 मादशाः इ न गण्यन्ते ज्योतिरिङ्गणसन्निमाः ॥ ३ ॥
 तथाऽपि तद्वचोऽपूर्वरचनारुचिरं सताम् ।
 चेतोहरं स्तं यद्वत्रद्या नवघटे जलम् ॥ ४ ॥
 वेतोहरं स्ताप्रदेश्या नवघटे जलम् ॥ ४ ॥

शान्तिषेणार्थमारब्धा परीत्तामुखपश्चिका ॥ ५ ॥ श्रीमन्न्यायावारपारस्यामेयप्रमेयरत्नसारस्यावगाइनमव्युत्पन्नैः कर्तुं न पर्यित इति तदवगाहनाय पोतपायमिदं प्रकरणमाचार्यः पाइ ॥ तत्प्रकरणस्य च सम्बन्धादित्रयापरिज्ञाने सति प्रेत्तावतां प्रवृत्तिर्नस्यादिति तत्रयानुवादपुरः-सरं वस्तुनिर्देशपरं प्रतिज्ञाश्लोकमाइ—

प्रमागादर्थसंसिद्धिस्तदाभासाद्विपर्ययः ।

इति वच्च्ये तयोर्लेच्म सिद्धमल्पं लधीयसः ॥ १ ॥

## भमेयरत्नमाला ।

ज्यभावो भवति । कस्मात्तदाभासात् प्रमाणाभासात् ।। इतिशब्दो हेत्वर्थे इति हेतोः ॥ अयमत्र समुदायार्थः । यतः कारणात्प्रमाणादर्थसंसिद्धिभवति । यस्माच तदाभासाद्विपर्ययो भवति । इति हेतोस्तयोः ममाणतदाभासयोर्लत्तम लत्तराणमहं वत्त्र्ये इति ॥ ननु सम्बन्धाभिधेयशक्यानुष्ठानेष्टमयोजनवन्ति हि शास्त्राणि भवन्ति । तत्रास्य प्रकरणस्य यावदभिधेयं सम्बन्धो वा नाभिधी-यते न तावदस्योपादेयत्वं भवितुमईति । एष वन्ध्यासुतो यातीत्यादिवावय-वत् । दशदाडिमादिवाक्यवच्च ।। तथा शक्यानुष्ठानेष्ठप्रयोजनमपि शास्ता-दाववर्श्यं वक्रव्यमेव । अशक्यानुष्ठानेष्टस्येष्टपयोजनस्य सर्वज्वरहरतत्तकचुडा-रत्नालङ्कारोपदेशस्येव मेत्तावद्धिरनाद्रणीयत्वात् ॥ तथा शक्यानुष्ठानस्या-त्यनिष्टमयोजनस्य विद्वज्रिरवधीरणान्मातृविवाहादिप्रदर्शकवाक्यवदिति ॥ सत्यं, प्रमाखतदाभासपदोपादानादभिधेयमभिहितमेत्र । प्रमाणतदाभास-योरनेन प्रकरणेनाभिधानात् ॥ सम्बन्धरचार्थायातः प्रकरणतदभिधेययो-र्वाच्यवाचकभावलत्तरणः प्रतीयत एव ।। तथा प्रयोजनं चोक्नजत्तरणमादि-रलोकेनैव संलत्त्यते, प्रयोजनं हि द्विधा भिद्यते । सात्तात्परम्परयेति । तत्र सात्तात्त्रयोजनं वद्त्ये इत्यनेनाभिधीयते । प्रथमं शास्त्रव्युत्पत्तेरेव विनेधेरन्वे-षणात् ॥ पारम्पर्येग तु प्रयोजनमर्थसांसिद्धिरित्य्रनेनांच्यते शास्रव्युत्पत्त्य-नन्तरभावित्वादर्थसंसिद्धेरिति ॥ ननु निःशेषविघ्रोपशमनायेष्टदेवतान-मस्कारः शास्त्रकृता कथं न कृत इति न वाच्यम् । तस्य मनःकायाभ्यामपि सम्भवात् ॥ अथवा वाचनिकोऽपि नमस्कारोऽनेनैवादिवाक्येनाभिहितो वेदितव्यः । केषाञ्चिद्राक्यानामुभयार्थप्रतिपादनपरत्वेनापि दृश्यमानत्वात् । यथा श्वेतो धावनीत्युक्ने श्वा इतो धावति श्वेतगुणयुक्तो धावति इत्यर्थद्वय-प्रतीतिः ॥ तत्रादिवाक्यस्य नमस्कारपरताभिधीयते ॥ अर्थस्य हेयोपादेय-लत्तरणस्य संसिद्धिईप्तिभवति । कस्मात्ममाणात् । अनन्तचतुष्टयस्वरूपान्तरङ्ग-लत्तरणा, समवसरणादिस्वभावा बहिरङ्गलत्तरणा लत्त्मीर्मा इत्युच्यते । अण-नमाणः शब्दः मा च आणश्च माणौ प्रकृष्टौ माणौ यस्यासौ प्रमाणः । इरिइराद्यसम्भविविभूतियुक्तो दृष्टेष्टाविरुद्धवाक्च भगवानईत्रेवाभिधीयत इत्यसाधारणगुणोपदर्शनमेव भगवतः संस्तवनमभिर्धायते । तस्मात्ममाणादः वधिभूतादर्थसंसिद्धिभवति तदाभासाच हरिहरादेरर्थसंसिद्धिर्न भवति । इति हेतोः सर्वद्वतदाभासयोर्लेच्म लत्तरणमहं वच्ये-सामग्रीविशेषेत्यादिना ॥

२

## ममेयरत्नमाला

श्रथेदानीमुपत्तिप्तप्रमाणतत्त्वे स्वरूपसंख्याविषयफललत्तणासु चतस्रषु विमतिपत्तिषु मध्ये स्वरूपविमतिपत्तिनिराकरणार्थमाइ—

स्वापूर्वार्थव्यवसायात्मकं ज्ञानं प्रमार्खमिति ॥ १ ॥

भकर्षेण संशयादिव्यवच्छेदेन मीयते परिच्डियते वस्तुतच्वं येन तत्प्रमा-णम् ॥ तस्य च झानमिति विशेषणमज्ञानरूपस्य सन्निकर्षादेर्नैयायिकादि-परिकल्पितस्य ममारणत्वव्यवच्छदार्थमुक्तम् ॥ तथा ज्ञानस्यापि स्वसंवेदने-न्द्रियमनोयोगिमत्यत्तस्य निर्विकल्पकस्य मत्यत्तत्वेन मामाएयं सौगतैः परि -कल्पितं तन्निरासार्थं व्यवसायात्मकग्रहणम् ॥ तथा बहिरथीयहोतृणां विज्ञानाद्वैतवादिनां पुरुषाद्वैतवादिनां पश्यतोईराणां शून्यैकान्तवादिनां च विपर्यासव्युदासार्थमर्थग्रइणम् ॥ अस्य चापूर्वविशेषणं ग्रहीतग्राहिधारावा-हिज्ञानस्य प्रमासतापरिहारार्धमुक्रम् ॥ तथा परोक्तज्ञानवादिनां मीमांसका-नामस्वसंवेदनज्ञानवादिनां सांख्यानां ज्ञानान्तरमत्यत्तज्ञानवादिनां यौगानां च मतमपाकर्तुं स्वपदोपादानमित्यच्याप्त्यतिव्याप्त्यसम्भवदोपपरिहारात्सुव्य-वस्थितमेव ममाणलत्तरणम् ।। अस्य च ममाणस्य यथोकलत्तरणत्वे साध्ये मनार्णस्वादिति हेतुरत्रैव द्रष्टव्यः । प्रथमान्तस्यापि हेतुपरत्वेन निर्देशोप-पत्तेः ॥ मत्यत्तं विशदं झानमित्यादिवत् ॥ तथाहि — ममाणं स्वापूर्वार्थ-व्यवसायात्मकं झानं भवति प्रमाखत्वात् ॥ यत्तु स्वापूर्वार्थव्यवसायात्मकं इतनं न भवति न तत्ममाणम् । यथां संशयादिर्घटादिश्च । ममाणं च विवादापन्नम् । तस्मात्स्वापूर्वार्थेव्यवसायात्मकं ज्ञानमेव भवतीति ॥ न च प्रमारात्वमसिद्धम् । सर्वप्रमारास्वरूपवादिनां प्रमारासामान्ये विप्रतिपत्त्य-भावात् अन्यथा स्वेष्टानिष्टसाधनद्रुपणायोगात् । अथ धर्मिणं एव हेतुत्वे मतिज्ञार्थैकदेशासिद्धो हेतुः स्यादिति चेत्र। विशेषं धर्मिणं कृत्वा सामान्यं हेतुं ब्रुवतां दोषाभावात् ।। एतेनापत्तधर्मत्वमपि प्रत्युक्तम् । सामान्यस्याशेषविशेष-निष्ठत्वात् ।। न च पत्त्वधर्मताबलेन देतोर्भमकत्वमपि त्वन्यथानुपपात्तवलेनेति । सा चात्र नियमवती विपत्ते बाधकममाणवलात्रिश्वितैव । एतेन विरुद्धत्व-मनैकान्तिकत्वं च निरस्तं बोद्धव्यम् । विरुद्धस्य व्यभिचारिखश्वाविना-भावनियमनिश्रयलत्तरणत्वायोगादतो भवत्येव साध्यसिद्धिरिति केवलव्यतिरे-किग्गोऽपि हेतोर्गमकत्वात् । सात्मकं जीवच्छरीरं प्राग्णदिमत्वादितिवत् ॥

ş

## प्रमेयरत्नमाला

अथेदानीं स्वोक्नमाखलत्तरास्य ज्ञानमिति विशेषणं समर्थयमानः माह---हिताहितप्राप्तिपरिहारसमर्थं हि प्रमार्ग, ततो ज्ञानमेव तदिति ॥२॥

तन्निश्चयात्मकं समारोपविरुद्धत्वादनुमानवदिति ॥ ३ ॥

तत् ममाणत्वेनाभ्युपगतं वस्त्विति धर्मिनिर्देशः । व्यवसायात्मकमिति साध्यम् । समारोपविरुद्धत्वादिति हेतुः । अनुमानवदिति दष्टान्त इति ॥ अयमभिमायः — संशयविपर्यासानध्यवसायस्वभावसमारोपविरोधिग्रहणत-त्तरणव्यवसायात्मकत्वे सत्येवाविसंवादित्वप्रुपपद्यते । आविसंवादित्वे च ममाणत्वमिति चतुर्विधस्यापि समत्तस्य प्रमाणत्वमभ्युपगच्छता समारोप-विरोधिग्रहणत्तत्त्त्तां निश्रयात्मकमभ्युपगन्तव्यम् ॥ ननु तथापि समारोप-विरोधिग्रहणत्त्त्तार्णं निश्रयात्मकमभ्युपगन्तव्यम् ॥ ननु तथापि समारोप-विरोधिव्यवसायात्मकत्त्वयोः समानार्थकत्त्वात् कथं साध्यसाधनभाव इति न मन्तव्यम् । झानस्वभावतया तयोरमेदेऽपि व्याप्यव्यापकत्त्वधर्माधारतया मेदोपपत्तेः । शिंशपात्वदृत्तत्ववत् ॥ अथेदानीं सविशेषणमर्थग्रहणं समर्थ-यमानस्तदेव स्पष्टीकुर्वनाइ—

# श्रनिश्चितोऽपूर्वार्थ इति ॥ ४ ॥

यः प्रमाणान्तरेण संशयादिव्यवच्छेदेनानध्यवसितः सोऽपूर्वार्थः ॥ तेनेहादिज्ञानविषयस्यावग्रहादिग्रहीतत्वेऽपि न पूर्वार्थत्वम् । अवग्रहादिनेहा-दिविषयभूतावान्तरविशेषनिश्रयाभावात् ॥ अथोक्रप्रकार एवापूर्वार्थः किम-न्योऽप्यस्तीत्याह—

दृष्टोऽपि समारोपात्तादृगिति ॥ ४ ॥

दृष्टोऽपि ग्रहीतोऽपि-न केवलमानिश्चित एवेत्यपि शब्दार्थः । तादग-पूर्वार्थो भवति । समारोपादिति हेतुः ॥ एतदुक्तं भवति---ग्रहीतमपि ध्याम-लिताकारतया यन्निर्ऐतुं न शक्यते तदपि वस्त्वपूर्वमिति व्यपदिश्यते प्रदृत्तसमारोपाव्यवच्छेदात् ॥ ननु भवतु नामापूर्वार्थव्यवसायात्मकत्वं विज्ञा-नस्य स्वव्यवसायं तु न विद्य इत्यत्राह----

स्वोन्मुखतया प्रतिभासनं स्वस्य व्यवसाय इति ॥ ६ ॥ स्वस्योन्मुखता स्वोन्मुखता तया स्वोन्मुखतया स्वानुभवतया प्रतिभासनं स्वस्य व्यवसायः ॥ अत्र दृष्टान्तमाइ—

श्चर्थस्येव तदुन्मुखतयेति ॥ ७ ॥

घटमहमात्मना वेद्मीति ॥ ⊂ ॥

ननु झानमर्थमेवाध्यवस्यति न स्वात्मानम् । आत्मानं फलं वेति केचित् । कर्त्वकर्मगोरेव मतीतिरित्यपरे । कर्त्वकर्मक्रियागामेव प्रतीतिरि -त्यन्ये । तेषां मतमखिलमपि प्रतीतिवाधितमिति दर्शयत्राइ---

कर्मवत्कर्त्त कररणकियाप्रतीतेरिति ॥ १ ॥

इानविषयभूतं वस्तु कर्माभिधीयते । तस्यैव इप्तिक्रियया व्याप्यत्वात् । तस्येव तद्वत् । कत्ती आत्मा । करणं ममाण्णम् । क्रिया ममितिः । कत्ती च करणं च क्रिया च तासां मतीतिः तस्या इति हेतौ का मागुक्रानुभवोल्लेखे यथाक्रमं तत्मतीतिईष्टव्या ॥ ननु शब्दयरामशिसचिवेयं मतीतिर्न वस्तुत्व-बल्लोपजातेत्यत्राह----

शब्दानुचारगोऽपि स्वस्यानुभवनमर्थवदिति ॥ १० ॥

यथा घटादिशब्दानुचारणेऽपि घटाद्यनुभवस्तथाऽहमहमिकया योऽयम-न्तर्भुखाकारतयावभासः स शब्दानुचारणेऽपि स्वयमनुभूयत इत्यर्थः ॥ भ्रमुमेवार्थमुपपत्तिपूर्वकं परं प्रति सोल्लुएठमाचष्टे—

को वा तत्प्रतिभासनमर्थमध्यन्नमिच्छंस्तदेव तथा नेच्छेत् ॥ ११ ॥

को वा लौकिकः परीचको वा । तेन ज्ञानेन प्रतिभासितुं शीलं यस्य स तथोक्वस्तं प्रत्यच्चविषयमिच्छन् विषयिधर्मस्य विषये उपचारात् तदेव ज्ञानमेव तथा प्रत्यच्चत्वेन नेच्छेत्, अपि त्विच्छेदेव । अन्यथा अप्रामाणिक-त्वपसङ्गः स्यादित्यर्थः ॥ अत्रोदाहरणमाह—

### प्रदीपवदिति ॥ १२ ॥

तत्प्रामार्ग्यं स्वतः परतश्चेति ॥ १३ ॥

सोपस्काराणि हि वाक्यानि भवन्ति । तत इदं प्रतिपत्त्तव्यं-अभ्यास-दशायां स्वतोऽनभ्यासदशायां च परत इति ॥ तेन पागुक्वैकान्तद्वयनि-रासः न चानभ्यासदशायां परतः प्रामाण्येऽप्यनवस्था समाना, झानान्तर-स्याभ्यस्तविषयस्य स्वतः प्रमाण्भूतस्याङ्गीकरणात् ॥ अथवा प्रामाण्ययु-त्पत्तौ परत एव । विशिष्टकारण्प्रभवच्चाद्विशिष्टकार्यस्येति । विषयपरि-च्छित्तित्तत्त्वणे या स्वकार्ये अभ्यासेतरदशापेत्तया कचित्स्वतः परतश्वेति निश्चीयते ॥ ननूत्पत्तौ विद्वानकारणातिरिक्तकारणान्तरसच्यपे-त्तत्वमसिद्धम् । प्रामाण्यस्य तदितरस्यैवाभावात्।। गुणारूयमस्तीति वाङ्गात्रं, विधिमुखेन कार्यमुखेन वा गुणानामप्रतीतेः ॥ नाप्यमामाण्यं स्वत एव प्रामाग्र्यं तु परत एवेति विपर्ययः शक्यते कल्पयितुम् ॥ अन्वयव्यतिरे-

काभ्यां हि त्रिरूपाल्लिङ्गादेव केवलात् पामाएयमुत्पद्यमानं दृष्टम् । मत्यत्ता-दिष्वपि तथैव प्रतिपत्तव्यं नान्यथेति । तत एवाऽऽप्तोक्तत्वगुणसद्भावेऽपि न तत्कृतमागमस्य प्रामाएयम् । तत्र हि गुर्ऐाभ्यो दोषारणामभावस्तदभावाच संशयविपर्यासत्तत्तयामाग्रयद्वयासत्त्वेऽपि मामार्ग्यमौत्सर्गिकमनपादित-मास्त एवेति । ततः स्थितं प्रामाण्यमुत्पत्तौ न सामग्रचन्तरसापेत्तमिति !! नापि विषयपरिच्छित्तित्तत्तत्ते स्वकार्ये स्वग्रइएएसापेत्तम् । अग्रहीतमामा-ययादेव झानाद्विषयपरिच्छित्तिलत्तरणकार्यदर्शनात् ॥ नजु न परिच्छित्ति-मात्रं प्रमाणकार्य तस्य मिथ्याज्ञानेऽपि सद्भावात् । परिच्छित्तिविशेषं तु नाग्रहीतप्रामाएयं विद्वानं जनयतीति ॥ तदपि बालविलसितम् । नहि प्रामाख्यग्रहणोत्तरकालमुत्पत्त्यवस्थातः परिच्छित्तेविंशेषोऽवभासते, यृदीत-मामाएयादपि विज्ञानात्रिर्विशेषविषयपरिच्छेदोपलब्धेः ॥ ननु परिच्छि-त्तिमात्रस्य शुक्तिकायां रजतझानेऽपि सद्धावात्तस्यापि प्रमाखकायत्वप्रसङ्ग इति चेत्-भवेदेवं, यद्यर्थान्यथात्वमत्ययस्वहेतृत्थदोषज्ञानाभ्यां तन्नापोद्येत॥ तस्माधत्र कारणदोषज्ञानं बाधकपत्ययो वा नोदेति, तत्र स्वत एव प्रामा-एयमिति ॥ न चैवममामाएयेऽप्याशङ्कनीयं, तस्य विज्ञानकारणातिरिक्रदो-षस्वमावसामग्रीसव्यपेत्ततयोत्पत्तेः निष्टत्तिलत्तणे च स्वकार्ये स्वग्रइणसा-पेत्तत्वात् ।। तद्धि यावन्न् ज्ञानं न तावत्स्वविषयात्पुरुषं निवर्तयतीति ।। तदेतत्सर्वमनल्पतमोवित्तसितम् ॥ तथाहि--न तावत्मामाएयस्योत्पत्तौ सामग्रचन्तरायेत्तत्वमसिद्धम् । आप्तप्रणीतत्वलत्तरणगुण्यसन्निधाने सत्येवाप्त-मर्गातवचनेषु मामाग्रयद्र्शनात् । यद्भावाभावाभ्यां यस्योत्पत्यनुत्पत्ती तत् तत्कारणकमिति लोकेऽपि सुपसिद्धत्वात् ॥ यदुक्रम्---''विधिमुखेन कार्य-मुखेन वा गुणानामप्रतीतिरिति'' तत्र तावदाप्तप्रणीतशब्दे न प्रतीतिर्गुणा-नामित्ययुक्तं आस्रप्रणीतत्त्वहानित्रसङ्गत् ॥ अथ चत्तुरादौ गुणानाममतीति-रित्यूच्यते तद्ध्ययुक्तम् । नैर्मस्यादिगुणानामवलावालादिभिरष्युपलब्धेः ॥ त्र्य नैर्मल्यं स्वरूपमेव न गुग्गः तर्हि हेतोरविनाभाववैकल्यमपि स्वरूप-विकलतैव न दोष इति समानम् ॥ अथ तद्वैकल्यमेव दोषः तर्हि लिङ्गस्य चच्चुरादेर्वा तत्स्वरूपसाकल्यमेव गुर्णः कथं न भवेत् १ आएतोक्नेऽपि शब्दे मोहादित्तत्तणस्य दोषस्याभावमेव यथार्थद्वानादित्तत्त्तणगुणसद्धा-वमभ्युपगच्छ ा त्र तथा नेच्छतीति कथमनुन्मत्तः १ अथोक्नमेव---शब्दे

गुणाः सन्तोऽपि न प्रामाण्योत्पत्तौ व्याप्रियन्ते किन्तु दोषाभाव प्वेति ॥ सत्यमुक्तं, किन्तु न युक्रमेतत् । प्रतिज्ञामात्रेण साध्यसि-दे्रयोगात् ॥ नहि गुखेभ्यो दोषाणामभाव इत्यत्र किश्चित्रिवन्धनमुत्पश्या-मोऽन्यत्र महामोहात् ॥ अथानुमानेऽपि त्रिरूपलिङ्गमात्रअनितमामार्ग्योपल-ब्धिरेव तत्र हेतुरिति चेन्न । उक्नोत्तरत्वात् ।। तत्र हि त्रैरूप्यमेव गुग्गो यथा तद्वैकल्यं दोष इति नासंमतो हेतुः । ऋषि चाप्रामाण्येऽध्येवं वक्तुं शक्यत एव । तत्र हि दोषेभ्यो गुणानामभावस्तदभावाच प्रामाख्यासत्त्वे अप्रामा-रायमोत्सर्गिकमास्त इत्यमामार्ग्यं स्वत एवेति तस्य भिन्नकाररणमभवत्ववर्श-नमुन्मत्तभाषितमेव स्यात् ॥ किश्व गुर्ग्रेभ्यो दोषाग्रामभाव इत्यमिदधता गुर्खेभ्यो गुर्णा एवेत्यभिहितं स्यात् । भावान्तरस्वभावत्त्वादभावस्य । ततो- प्रमामारायसंच्वं प्रामारायमेवेति नैतावता परपत्तप्रतित्तेपः । अविरोधकत्त्वात् । तथा अनुमानतोऽपि गुणाः प्रतीयन्त एव, तथाहि--मामाएयं विज्ञानकारणाति रिक्नकारणप्रभवं, विद्वानान्यत्त्वे सति कार्यत्त्वात् अप्रामाण्यवत् ॥ तथा मगाणमामाण्ये भित्रकारणजन्ये, भित्रकार्यत्वात् । घटवस्रवदिति च ॥ ततः स्थितं मामार्ग्यमुत्पत्तौ परायेत्तमिति ।। तथा विषयपरिच्छित्तित्तत्तरणे प्रवृत्ति-लत्तरणे वा स्वकार्ये स्वग्रहणं नापेत्तत इति नैकान्तः क्रचिद्भ्यस्तविषय एव परा-नपेत्तत्वव्यवस्थानात् ॥ अनभ्यस्ते तु जलमरीचिकासाधारणमदेशे जलज्जानं परापेत्तमेव । सत्यमिदं जलं, विशिष्टाकारधारित्वात् घटचेटिकापेटकदर्दुरा-रावसरोजगन्धवत्त्वाच, परिदृष्टजलवादित्यनुमानज्ञानादर्थक्रियाज्ञानाच, स्वतः सिद्धमामाएयात्माचीनझानस्य यथार्थत्वमाकल्पमवकल्प्यत एव ॥ यद्प्यभि-हितं प्रामाएयग्रहणोत्तरकालमुत्पत्त्यवस्थातः परिच्छित्तेर्विशेषो नावभासत इति । तत्र यद्यभ्यस्तविषयेनावभासत इत्युच्यते तदा तदिष्यत एव । तत्र प्रथममेव निःसंशयं विषयपरिच्छित्तिविशेषाभ्युपगमात् । अनभ्यस्तविषये तु तद्ग्रहणोत्तरकालमस्त्येव विषयावधारणस्वभावपरिच्छित्तिविशेषः । पूर्व ममार्गाप्रमायाराया एव परिच्छित्तेरुत्पत्तेः ॥ नतु प्रामाण्यपरिाच्छ-च्योरभेदात्कथं पौर्वापर्यमिति १। नैवम् । नदि सर्वाऽपि परिच्छित्तिः प्रामा-एयात्मिका, प्रामाएयं तु परिच्छिच्यात्मकमेवेति न दोषः ।। यदृष्युक्तम्-बाध-काररगद्रोपद्मानाभ्यां प्रामारयमपोद्यत इति-तदपि फल्गुभाषितमेव। अप्रामा-रायेऽपि तथा वक्तुं शक्यत्वात् ॥ तथाहि-मथममममारणमेव झानमुत्पचते

C

पश्चादबाधबोधगुरग्रहानोत्त्तरकालं तदपोवत इति । तस्मात्मामारग्रमभामारग् वा स्वकोर्ये कचिदभ्यासानभ्यासापेत्तया स्वतः परतश्रेति निर्गेतव्यमिति ॥

देवस्य सम्मतमपास्तसमस्तदोषं वीद्त्य प्रपञ्चरुचिरं रचितं समस्य । माग्णिक्यनन्दिविभुना शिशुबोधहेतो-र्मानस्वरूपमयुना स्फुटमभ्यधायि ।। १ ।। इति परीचामुखलघुवृत्तौ प्रमाणस्य स्वरूपोद्देशः ॥ ३ ॥

अथ प्रमाखस्वरूपवित्रतिवर्त्ति निरस्येदानीं संख्याविमतिपत्तिं प्रतित्ति-पन्सकत्तप्रमाखभेदसन्दर्भसंग्रहपरं प्रमाखेयत्ताप्रतिपादकं वाक्यमाह----

### ॥ तद्द्वेधेति ॥ १ ॥

तच्छब्देन मनार्ख परामृश्यते । तत्प्रमार्खं स्वरूपेखावगतं द्वेधा द्विपकार-मेव । सकलप्रमार्खभेदानामत्रैवान्तर्भावात् ।। तद्द्वित्त्वमध्यत्तानुनानमकारेखा-पि सम्भवतीति तदाशङ्कानिराकरखार्थं सकलप्रमाखभेदसंग्रद्दशालिनीं संख्यां प्रव्यक्रीकरोति----

प्रत्यचेतरभेदादिति ॥ २ ॥

प्रत्यत्तं वत्त्यमाछत्तत्त्तर्णं, इतरत्परोत्तं, ताभ्यां भेदात्ममाणस्येति शेषः ॥ म हि परपरिकल्पितैकद्वित्रिचतुःपञ्चषट्प्रमाणसंख्यानियमे निखिलप्रमाण्य-भेदानामन्तर्भावविभावना शक्या कर्त्तुम् ॥ तथाहि मत्यत्तैकप्रमाणवादिनश्चा-वांकस्य नाध्यत्ते लैङ्गिकस्यान्तर्भावो युक्तः तस्य तद्विलत्तणत्वात् । सामग्री-स्वरूपभेदात् ॥ अथ नामत्यत्तं प्रमाणमस्ति विसंवादसम्भवात् । निश्चिता-विनाभावाच्चिङ्गाच्चिङ्गिन् झानमनुमानमित्त्यानुमानिकशासनं । तत्र च स्वभा-वलिङ्गस्य बहुलमन्यथाऽपि भावो दृश्यते । तथाहि कषायरसोपेतानामाम-लकानामेतदेशकालसम्बन्धिनां दर्शनेऽपि देशान्तरे कालान्तरे द्रव्यान्तर-सम्बन्धे च अन्यथाऽपि दर्शनात्स्वभावहेतुर्व्यभिचार्येव लताच्यूतवच्चतार्शिश-पादिसम्भावनाच्च ॥ तथा कार्यलिङ्गमपि गोपालघटिकादौ धूमस्य शक्रमूर्धिन चान्यथाऽपि भावात्पावकव्यभिचार्येव । ततः प्रत्यत्तमेवैकं प्रमाणमस्यैवावि-संवादकत्त्वादिति ॥ तदेतद्वार्लवित्तसितमिवाभात्युपपत्तिशून्यत्वात् ॥ तथाहि--किममत्त्यत्त्तस्योत्पादककारणाभावादालम्बनाभावाद्वा मामाण्य

\$

#### **ममेयरत्नमा**ला

निषिध्यते १ तत्र न तावत्पाक्वनः पत्तः । तदुत्पादकस्य सुनिश्चितान्यथा-नुपपत्तिनियतनिश्चयलत्तागस्य साधनस्य सद्भावात् ॥ नो खस्वप्युदीचीनः पत्तः । तदालम्बनस्य पावकादेः सकलविचारचतुरचेतांसे सर्वदा प्रतीयमा-नत्त्वात् ॥ यद्षि स्वभावहेतोर्व्याभिचारसम्भावनमुक्रम् तद्प्यनुचितमेव स्वभावमात्रस्याहेतुत्त्वात् । व्याप्यरूपस्यैव स्वभावस्य व्यापकम्प्रति गमक-त्वाभ्युपगमात् ॥ न च व्याप्यस्य व्यापकव्यभिचारित्वं व्याप्यत्त्व-विरोधमसङ्गात् ॥ किञ्च एवंवादिनो नाध्यत्तं प्रमार्गं व्यवतिष्ठते । तत्रा-प्यसंवादस्यागौणत्वस्य च प्रामाण्याविनाभावित्वेन निश्चेतुमशक्यत्त्वात् । यच कार्यदेतोरप्यन्यथापि सम्भावनं तद्प्यशिचितलचितं सुविवेचितस्य कार्यस्य कारणाव्यभिचारित्त्वात् । यादशो हि धूमो ज्वलनकार्यं भूधर-नितम्बादावतिबद्दलधवलतया प्रसर्पन्नुपलभ्यते, न तादशो गोपालघटि-कादाविति ॥ यद्प्युक्तम् ''शकमूर्द्धनि धूमस्यान्यथापि भाव इति'' तत्र किमयं शक्रमूर्द्धा अग्निस्वभावोऽन्यथा वा १ । यद्याग्निस्वभावस्तदाग्निरे-वेति कथं तदुद्भूतथूमस्यान्यथाभावः शक्यते कल्पयितुम् ॥ अथानग्नि-स्वभावस्तदा तदुद्धवो धूम एव न भवतीति कथं तस्य तद्वचभिचारित्व-मिति ॥ तथाचोक्रम्-अग्निस्वभावः शक्रस्य मूर्द्धा चेदग्निरेव सः । अधा-नग्निस्वभावोऽसौ धूमस्तत्र कथं भवेदिति ॥ १ ॥ किञ्च प्रत्यत्तं प्रमाण-मिति कथमयं परं प्रतिपादयेत् । परस्य प्रत्यत्तेगा गृहीतुमशक्यत्त्वात् । व्याहारादिकार्यप्रदर्शनात्तं प्रतिपद्येतेति चेत्- आयातं तर्हि कार्यात्करणानु-मानम् ॥ ऋथ लोकव्यवहारायेत्त्तयेष्यते एवानुमानमपि परलोकादा-वेवानभ्युपगमात्तदभावादिति । कथं तदभावोऽनुपलब्धेरिति चेत-तदाऽनुपत्तव्धित्निज्जनितमनुमानमपरमापतितमिति ॥ मत्यत्तप्रामाएयमपि स्वभावहेतुजातानुमितिमन्तरेण नोषपत्तिमियर्तीति प्रागेवोक्नमित्युपरम्यते ॥ यदृष्युक्तं धर्मकीर्तिना—प्रमाखेतरसामान्यस्थितेरन्यघियो गतेः । प्रमाखा-न्तरसद्भावः प्रतिषेधाच कस्यचिदिति ॥ २ ॥ ततः प्रत्यत्तमनुमानमिति ममाणद्वयमेवेति सौगतः । सोऽपि न युक्तवादी । स्मृतेरविसंवादि-न्यास्तृतीयायाः प्रमाणभूतायाः सञ्चावात् ॥ न च तस्या विसंवादाद-मामाएयम् । दत्तग्रहादिविलोपापत्तेः ॥ अथानुभूयमानस्य विषयस्या-भावात् स्मृतेरमामाएयं न तथापि अनुभूतेनार्थेन सालम्बनत्वोप-

१०

पत्तेः । श्रन्यथा प्रत्यत्तस्याप्यनुभूतार्थविषयत्वादप्रामाख्यमनिवार्यं स्यात् स्वविषयावभासनं स्मरगेऽत्यवशिष्टमिति ॥ किश्च स्मृतेरमामाग्येऽनुमा-नवार्ताऽपि दुर्र्लभा । तया व्याप्तेरविषयीकरणे तदुत्थानायोगादिति ॥ तत इदं वक्तव्यम्— ''स्मृतिः मनाराम्, अनुमानमामारायान्यथानुपप-द्वित्वसंख्यानियमं त्तेरिति" प्रमार्गस्य सैव पत्यत्तानुमानस्वरूपतया तथा प्रत्यभिज्ञानमपि सौगतीयप्रमाणः विघटयतीति किं नश्चिन्तया ॥ संख्या विघटयत्येव । तस्यापि प्रत्यत्तानुमानथोरनन्तर्भावात् ॥ ननु तदिति स्मरणमिदमिति प्रत्यच्चमिति ज्ञानद्वयमेव । न ताभ्यां विभिन्नं प्रत्य-भिक्वानाख्यं वयं प्रतिपद्यमानं प्रमार्णान्तरमुपत्तभामहे । ततः कथं तेन प्रमाणसंख्याविघटनमिति तद्प्यघटितमेव । यतः स्मरणप्रत्यत्ताभ्यां प्रत्यभि-ज्ञानविषयस्यार्थस्य ग्रहीतुमशक्यत्वात् ।। पूर्वोत्तरविवर्तवर्त्येकद्रव्यं हि प्रत्य-भिद्याविषयः । न च तत्स्मरगोनोपलभ्य ( चय )-ते तस्यानुभूताविषयत्वात् । नापि प्रत्यत्त्रेण तस्य वर्त्तमानविवर्त्तवर्तित्वात् ॥ यद्ण्युक्तम्— ''ताभ्यां भित्र-मन्यत् इनिं नास्तीति''। अभेदपरामर्शरूपतया भित्रस्यैवावभासनात् ॥ न च तयोर-यतरस्य वा भेदपरामर्शकत्वमस्ति विभिन्नविषयत्वात् ॥ नचैतत्प्रत्यत्ते-ऽन्तर्भवत्यनुमाने वा तयोः पुरोऽवस्थितार्थविषयत्वेनाविनाभृतत्तिङ्गसम्भावि-तार्थविषयत्वेन च पूर्वापरविकारव्याय्येकत्वाविषयत्वात् ॥ नापि स्मरणे,तेना-षि तदेकत्वस्याविषयीकरणात् ।। अथ संस्कारस्मरणसंहकृतमिन्द्रियमेव मत्य-भिज्ञानं जनयतीन्द्रियजं चाध्यत्तमेवेति न प्रमाणान्तरमित्यपरः । सोऽप्यति-बालिश एव । स्वविषयाभिमुख्येन प्रवर्त्तमानस्येन्द्रियस्य सहकारिशतसमवधा-नेऽपि विषयान्तरप्रदृत्तिलत्तणातिशयायोगात् । विषयान्तरं चातीतसाम्पति-कावस्थाव्यास्येकद्रव्यमिन्द्रियाणां रूपादिगोचरचारित्वेन चरितार्थत्वाच ॥ नात्यदृष्टसहकारिसव्यपेत्तामिन्द्रियमेकत्वविषयं । उक्वदोषादेव ॥ किश्चा-दृष्टसंस्कारादिसञ्यपेत्तादेवात्मनस्तद्विज्ञानमिति किन्न कल्प्यते १ । दृश्यते हि स्वमसारस्वतचाग्रडालिकादिविद्यासंस्कृतादात्मनो विशिष्टज्ञानोत्पत्ति-रिति ॥ नन्वञ्चनादिसंस्कृतमपि चत्तुः सातिशयमुपलभ्यते इति चेत् न तस्य स्वार्थानतिक्रमेर्ऐवातिशयोपलब्धेर्न विषयान्तरग्रहरणलत्तरणातिशयस्य तथाचोक्तम्-----यत्राऽध्यतिशयो दृष्टः स स्वार्थानतिलङ्घनात् । द्रसूच्मा-दिइष्टो स्यांगरूपे श्रोत्रहत्तित इति ॥ ३ ॥ नन्वस्य वार्तिकस्य सर्वेद्रपति-

षेधपरत्वाद्विषमो दृष्टान्त इति चेन्न--इन्द्रियाणां विषयान्तरप्रदृत्तावात्तेशयामा-वमात्रे साहरयात् दृष्टान्तत्वोषपत्तेः ॥ न हि सर्वो दृष्टान्तधर्मो दार्ष्टान्तिके भवितुमईति । अन्यथा दृष्टान्त एव न स्यादिति । ततः स्थितं प्रत्यसा-नुमानाभ्यामर्थान्तरं प्रत्यभिद्वानं सामग्रीस्वरूपमेदादिति ॥ न चैतदप्रमाखं ततोऽर्थे परिच्छिद्य प्रवर्त्तमानस्यार्थक्रियायामविसंवादात् प्रत्यत्तवदिति ! नचैकत्वापलापे बन्धमोत्तादिव्यवस्था अनुनानव्यवस्था वा । एकत्वामावे बद्धस्यैव मोत्तादेर्ग्रहीतसम्बन्धस्यैव लिङ्गस्यादर्शनादनुमानस्य च व्यवस्था-योगादिति॥ नचास्य विषये बाधकप्रमाखसद्धावादपामाण्यं तद्विषये प्रत्यत्तस्य लौङ्गिकस्य चामद्यत्तेः । मद्यत्तौ वा प्रत्युत साधकत्वमेव न बाधकत्वमित्यलम⁻ तिमसंगेन ॥ तथा सौंगतस्य ममाणसंख्याविरोधिविध्वस्तवाधं तर्काख्यमुपढौ-कत एव ॥ नचैतत्प्रत्यक्षेऽन्तर्भवति । साध्यसाधनयोव्योप्यव्यापकभावस्य साकल्येन प्रत्यत्ताविषयत्वात् ॥ न हि तदियतो व्यापारान्कर्तुं शक्रोति । अविचारकत्वात् सन्निहितविषयत्त्वाच ॥ नाष्यनुमाने, तस्यापि देशादि-विषयविशिष्टत्वेन व्याप्त्यविषयत्वात् । तद्विषयत्वे वा प्रकृतानुमानान्तर-विकल्पद्वयानतिक्रमात् ॥ तत्र प्रकृतानुमानेन व्याप्तिमतिषत्तावितरेतरा-श्रयत्वत्रसङ्गः । व्याप्तौ हि मतिपत्रायामनुमानमास्मानमासादयति । तदा-त्मलाभे च व्याप्तिमतिपत्तिरिति अनुमानान्तरेणाविनाभावमतिपत्तावन-परपत्तचमुं चश्चमीति इति नानुमानगम्या व्याप्तिः ॥ नापि वस्थाचमुरी संख्यापरिकल्पितैरागमोपमानार्थापत्यभावैः साकल्येनाविनाभावावगतिः । तेषां समयसंग्रहीतसादृश्यान्यथाऽनन्यथाभूताभावविषयत्वेन व्याप्त्यविषय-त्वात् । परैस्तथाऽनभ्युपगमाच । अथ पत्यचपृष्ठभाविविकल्पात् साक-मृग्यभित्यपरः । ल्येन साध्यसाधनभावप्रतिपत्तेर्न प्रमा**र्णन्तरं** तदर्थ सोऽपि न युक्तवादी-''विकल्पस्याध्यत्तग्रहीतविषयस्य तदग्रहीतविषयस्य वा तद्वचनस्थापकत्वम्'' । आद्ये पत्ते दर्शनस्येव तदनन्तरभाविनिर्श-यस्यापि नियतविषयत्वेन व्याप्त्यगोचरत्वात् । द्वितीयपत्तेऽपि विकल्प-वेति १ द्वयमुपढौकत एव । तद्विकल्पज्ञानं प्रमारणमन्यथा प्रथमपत्ते प्रमाणान्तरमनुमन्तव्यं, प्रमाणद्वयेऽनन्तर्भावात् ॥ उत्तरपत्ते तु न ततोऽनु-मानव्यवस्था ॥ न हि व्याप्तिझानस्य।मामाएये तत्पूर्वकमनुमानं प्रमारणमा-स्कन्दति सन्दिग्धादिलिङ्गादत्युत्पद्यमानस्य प्रामाख्यप्रसङ्गात् । ततो व्याप्ति-

हानं सविकल्पमविसंवादकं च प्रमार्ग्यं प्रमारणद्वयादन्यदभ्युपगम्यमिति न सौगताभिमतप्रमाणसंख्यानियमः ॥ एतेनानुपत्तम्भात्कारणव्यापकानुपत्त-म्भाच कार्यकारखव्यात्यव्यापकभावसंवित्तिरिति वदत्रयि मत्युक्तः अनुपत्तम्भस्य प्रत्यत्तविषयत्वेन कारणाधनुपत्तम्भस्य च लिंगत्वेन तज्ज-नित्तस्यानुमानत्वात् प्रत्यत्तानुमानाभ्यां व्याप्तिग्रहणपत्तोपत्तिप्तदोषानुपं-गात ॥ एतेन प्रत्यत्तफलेनोहापोइविकल्पज्ञानेन व्याप्तिपत्तिपत्तिरित्यप्य-पास्तम् । प्रत्यत्तफलस्यापि प्रत्यत्तानुमानयोरन्यतरत्वे व्याप्तेरविषयीकर-णात् । तदन्यत्वे च प्रमाणान्तरत्वमनिवार्यमिति ॥ अथ व्याप्तिविकल्पस्य फलत्वान प्रामाएयमिति न युक्तम् । फलस्याप्यनुमानलच्चणफलहेतुतया ममाखत्वाविरोधात् ॥ तथा सन्त्रिकर्षफलस्यापि विशेषखझानस्य विशेष्य-झानलत्तराफलापेत्तया प्रमाखत्वमिति न वैशेषिकाभ्युपगतोहापोहविकल्पः प्रमाणान्तरत्वमतिवर्त्तते ॥ एतेन त्रिचतुःपश्चषट्प्रमाणवादिनोऽपि सांख्या-त्तपादमभाकरजैमिनीयाः स्वप्रमाखसंख्यां न<sup>े</sup>व्यवस्थापयितुं त्तमा इति मतिपादितमवगन्तव्यम् ॥ उक्तन्यायेन स्मृतिमत्यभिज्ञानतर्काणां तदभ्यु-पगतप्रमाणसंख्यापरिपंथित्वादिति प्रत्यत्तेतरभेदात् द्वे एव प्रमाणे इति स्थितम् ॥ अथेदानीं मधमप्रमाणभेदस्य स्वरूपं निरूपयितुमाह----विशदं प्रत्यक्षमिति ॥ ३ ॥

ज्ञानमिति वर्तते । प्रत्यच्चमिति धर्मिनिर्देशः । विशदज्ञानात्मकं साध्यम् । प्रत्यच्चचादिति हेतुः ॥ तथाहि-प्रत्यच्तं विशदज्ञानात्मकमेव प्रत्यच्चचात् । यन्न विशदज्ञानात्मकं तन्न प्रत्यच्तं, तथा परोच्तम् । प्रत्यच्तं च विवादापन्नं, तस्माद्विशदज्ञानात्मकमिति ॥ मतिज्ञार्थैकदेशासिद्धो हेतुरिति चेत् का पुनः प्रतिज्ञा तदेकदेशो वा १ धर्मिधर्मसमुदायः मतिज्ञा । तदेकदेशो धर्मो धर्मी वा १ हेतुः प्रतिज्ञार्थैकदेशासिद्ध इति चेन्न धर्मिणो हेतुत्वे असिद्ध-त्वायोगात् । तस्य पत्तपयोगकालवद्धेतुप्रयोगेऽप्यसिद्धत्वायोगात् ॥ धर्मिणो हेतुत्वे अनन्वयदोष इति चेत् न विशेषस्य धर्मित्वात् । सामान्यस्य च हेतुत्वात् तस्य च विशेषेष्वनुगमो विशेषनिष्ठत्वात्सामान्यस्य ॥ त्रध साध्यधर्मस्य हेतुत्वे प्रतिज्ञार्थैकदेशासिद्धत्वमिति तदप्यसम्मतम् । साध्यस्य स्वरूपेखैवासिद्धत्वात् ॥ न प्रतिज्ञार्थैकदेशासिद्धत्वेन तस्यासिद्ध-त्वं, धर्मिणा व्यभिचारात् ॥ सपत्ते दृत्त्वमावाद्वेतोरनन्वय इत्यप्यसत् । सर्वभावानां चरणभङ्गसङ्गमेवाङ्गश्रङ्गारमङ्गीकुर्वतां तथागतानां सत्त्वादिहेत्-नामनुदयप्रसङ्गात् । विपत्ते बाधकप्रमार्णाभावात् । पत्तव्यापकत्वाचान्वय-वत्वं प्रकृतेऽपि समानम् ॥ इदानीं स्वोक्नमेव विशदत्वं व्याचष्टे— प्रतीत्यन्तराठ्यवधानेन विशेषवत्तया वा प्रतिभासनं वैशद्यमिति ॥४॥

एकस्याः मतीतेरन्या मतीतिः मतीत्यन्तरम् । तेनाव्यवधानं तेन मति-भासनं वैशद्यम् ॥ यद्यप्यवायस्यावग्रहेहामतीतिभ्यां व्यवधानं, तथापि न परोत्तत्वं विषयविषयिणोर्भेदेनामतिपत्तेः ॥ यत्र विषयविषयिणोर्भेदे सति व्यवधानं तत्र परोत्तत्वम् । तर्द्यनुमानाध्यत्तविषयस्यैकात्मग्राह्यस्याग्नेर-भिन्नस्योपलम्भादध्यत्तस्य परोत्तति तद्द्ययुक्तम् । भिन्नविषयत्वाभावात् ॥ विसदृशसामग्रीजन्यभित्रविषया मतीतिः मतीत्यन्तरमुच्यते नान्यदिति न दोषः ॥ न केवलमेतदेव । विशेषणवत्तया वा मतिभासनं सविशेषवर्ण-संस्थानादिग्रहणं वैशद्यम् ॥ "तत्त मत्यत्तं द्वेधा मुख्यसंव्यवहारभेदादिति" मनसि कृत्य मथमं सांव्यवहारिकमत्यत्तस्योत्पादिकां सामग्रीं तद्भोदं च माह—

इन्द्रियानिन्द्रियनिमित्तं देशतः सांव्यवहारिकमिति ॥ ५ ॥

विशदं झानमिति चानुवर्तते । देशतो विशदं झानं सांव्यवहारिकमित्यर्थः समीचीनः प्रष्टत्तिनिष्टत्तिरूपो व्यवहारः संव्यवहारः तत्र भवं सांव्यव-हारिकम् । भूयः किंभूतमिन्द्रियानिन्द्रियनिमित्तम् । इन्द्रियं चत्तुरादि, प्रानिन्द्रियं मनः ते निमित्तं कारणं यस्य । समस्तं व्यस्तं च कारणमभ्यु-पगन्तव्यम् ॥ इन्द्रियमाधान्यादनिन्द्रियवलाधानादुपजातमिन्द्रियमत्यत्तम्, श्रानिन्द्रियादेव विशुद्धिव्ययेत्तादुपजायमानमनिन्द्रियमत्यत्तम् ॥ तत्रेन्द्रिय-पत्तव्यम् ॥ इन्द्रियमाधान्यादनिन्द्रियवलाधानादुपजातमिन्द्रियमत्यत्तम्, श्रानिन्द्रियादेव विशुद्धिव्ययेत्तादुपजायमानमनिन्द्रियमत्यत्तम् ॥ तत्रेन्द्रिय-भत्यत्तमवग्रहादिधारणापर्यन्ततया चतुर्विधमपि वद्दादिद्वादशभेदमष्टचत्वा-रिंशत्संख्यं प्रतीन्द्रियं प्रतिपत्तव्यम् । आनिन्द्रियपत्यत्तस्य चोक्रमकारेणाष्ट-चत्त्वारिंशन्द्रदेन मनोनयनराहितानां चतुर्णामपीन्द्रियाणां व्यञ्जनावग्रहस्या-ष्टत्त्वारिंशन्द्रदेन च समुद्तिस्येन्द्रियानिन्द्र्यप्रत्यत्तस्य पट्त्रिंशदुत्तरा त्रिंशती संख्या प्रतिपत्तव्या ॥ नतु स्वसंवेदनभेदमन्यदपि मत्यत्तमस्ति, तत्कथं नोक्रमिति न वाच्यम् । तस्य सुखादिझानस्वरूपसंवेदनस्य मानस-पत्त्यत्तत्वात् । इन्द्रियज्ञानस्वरूपसंवेदनस्य चेन्द्र्या तस्य स्वव्यवसायायोगात् ॥ स्मृत्यादिस्वरूपसंवेदनं मानसमेवेति नापरं स्व-संवेदनं नामाध्यत्तमस्ति ॥ ननु प्रत्यत्तस्योत्पादकं कारणं वदता ग्रन्थकारे-णेन्द्रियानिन्द्रियवदर्थालोकावपि किं न कारणत्वेनोक्नौ १ तदवचने कार-णानां साकल्यस्यासंग्रहाद्विनेयव्यामोह एव स्यात् । तदियत्ताऽनवधारणात् । न च भगवतः परमकारुणिकस्य चेष्टा तद्व्यामोहाय भभवतीत्याशङ्काया-मुच्यते—

नार्थालोकौ कारगां परिच्छेचत्वात्तमोवत् ॥ ६ ॥

सुगममेतत् ॥ ननु बाह्यालोकाभावं विद्वाय तमसोऽन्यस्याभावात् साधन-विकलो दृष्टान्त इति । नैवम् । एवं सति वा ह्यालोकस्यापि तमोभावादन्य-स्यासम्भवात्तेजोद्रव्यस्यासम्भव इति विस्तरेग्रौतदलङ्कारे प्रतिपादितं बोद्ध-व्यम् ॥ अत्रैव साध्ये हेत्वन्तरमाद---

तदन्वयव्यतिरेकानुविधानाभावाच |

केशोएडुकज्ञानवन्नक्तं चरज्ञानवच्च ॥ ७ ॥

त्रत्र व्याप्तिः । यद्यस्यान्वयव्यतिरेको नानुविदधाति न तत्तत्कारणकं, यथा केशोण्डुकज्ञानं, नानुविधत्ते च ज्ञानमर्थान्वयव्यतिरेकाविति । तथा त्रालोकेऽपि । एतावान् विशेषस्तत्र नकंचरदृष्टान्त इति । नकंचरा मार्जा-रादयः ननु विज्ञानमर्थजनितमर्थाकारं चार्थस्य प्राहकम् । तदुत्पत्तिमन्तरेण विषयं प्रति नियमायोगात् । तदुत्पत्तेरालोकादावविशिष्टत्त्वात्ताद्र प्यसहिताया एव तस्यास्तं प्रति नियमहेतुत्त्वात् भिन्नकालत्त्वेऽपि ज्ञानज्ञेययोर्प्राह्यप्राहक-भावाविरोधात् । तथाचोक्रम्-भिन्नकालं कथं थ्राह्यमिति चेद् प्राह्यतां विदुः । हेतुत्त्वमेव युक्तिज्ञास्तदाकारार्पणत्तमम् ।। इत्याशङ्कायामिदमाह---

श्रतज्जन्यमपि तत्प्रकाशकं प्रदीपवत् ॥ 🖛 ॥

त्र्याजन्यमत्यर्थप्रकाशकमित्यर्थः । अतज्जन्यत्वमुपलच्चणम् । तेनात-दाकारमपीत्यर्थः । उभयत्रापि मदीपो दृष्टान्तः । यथा मदीपस्या-तज्जन्यस्याऽतदाकारधारिणोऽपि तत्मकाशकत्त्वं, तथा ज्ञानस्यापीत्यर्थः ॥ ननु यद्यर्थादजातस्यार्थरूपाननुकारिणो ज्ञानस्यार्थसाच्चात्कारित्वं तदा नियतदिग्देशकालवर्त्तिपदार्थमकाशमतिनियमे हेतोरभावात्सर्वं विज्ञानममति-नियतविषयं स्यादिति शङ्कायामाह----

# ॥ स्वावरराज्वयोपशमलज्ञरायोग्यतया हि प्रतिनियतमर्थं व्यवस्थापयति ॥ ६ ॥

स्वानि च तान्यावरणानि च स्वावरणानि तेषां त्तय उदयाभावः ! तेषामेव सदवस्था उपशमः तावेव लत्तणं यस्या योग्यतायास्तया हेतुभूतया प्रतिनियतमर्थं व्यवस्थापयति प्रत्यत्तमिति शेषः । हि यस्मादर्थे । यस्मादेवं ततो नोक्कदोष इत्यर्थः ॥ इदमत्र तात्पर्यम् – कल्पयित्वाऽपि ताद्र प्यं तदु-त्पत्ति तदध्यवसायं च योग्यताऽवश्याऽभ्युपगन्तव्या । ताद्र प्यस्य समाना-र्थेस्तदुत्पत्तेसिन्द्रियादिभिस्तद्द्वयस्यापि समानार्थसमनन्तरमत्ययेस्तत्रितय-स्यापि शुक्ने शंखे पीताकारक्कानेन व्यभिचाराद्योग्यताश्रयण्रमेव श्रेय इति॥एतेन यदुक्तं परेण- "अर्थेन घटयत्येनां नहि मुक्त्वार्थरूपताम् । तस्मात्यमेया-धिगतेः प्रमाणं मेयरूपतेति" तन्निरस्तम् ॥ समानार्थाकारनानाक्कानेषु मेयरूपतायाः सद्धावात् ॥ न च परेषां सारूप्यं नामास्ति वस्तुमुतमिति योग्यत्येवार्थप्रतिनियम इति स्थितम् ॥ इदानीं कारणत्त्वात्परिच्छेद्योऽर्थ इति मतं निराकरोति----

> कारणस्य च परिच्छेचत्वे कर्रणादिना व्यभिचार इति ॥ १० ॥

करणादिकारणं परिच्छेद्यमिति तेन व्यभिचारः । न व्रूमः कारण-च्वात्परिच्छेद्यत्वमपि तु परिच्छेद्यच्वात्कारणत्वमिति चेत्र। तथापि केशोण्डु-कादिना व्यभिचारात् ।। इदानीमतीन्द्रियप्रत्यच्तं व्याचष्टे---

सामग्रीविशेषविश्लेषिताखिलावरण्मती-

न्द्रियमशेषतो मुख्यम् ॥ ११ ॥

सावरणत्वे करण जन्यत्वे च प्रतिबन्धसम्भवात् ॥ १२ ॥ नन्ववधिमनःपर्यययोरनेनासंग्रहादच्यापकमेतल्लत्तरामिति न वाच्यम् । तयोरपि स्वाविषयेऽशेषतो विशदत्वादिधर्मसम्भवात् । न चैवं मतिश्रुतयोरित्य-तिच्याप्तिपरिहारः । तदेतदतीन्द्रियमवधिमनःपर्ययकेवलप्रमेदात्रिविधमपि मुख्यं प्रत्यत्तमात्मसन्निधिमात्रापेत्तत्वादिति ॥ नन्वशेषविषयविशदावभासि झानस्य तद्वतो वा प्रत्यचादिषमाखपञ्चकाविषयत्वेनाभावप्रमाखाविषमविष-धरविध्वस्तसत्ताकत्वात् कस्य मुख्यत्वम् १ तथाहि– नाध्यत्तमशेष**द्ग**-विषयं, तस्य रूपादिनियतगोचरचारित्वात् सम्बद्धवर्तमानविषयत्वाच ॥ न चाशेषवेदी सम्बद्धो वर्तमानश्रेति । नाप्यनुमानात्तरिसद्धिः । अनुमानं हि गृहीतसम्बन्धस्यैकदेशदर्शनादसन्निकृष्टे बुद्धिः ॥ न च सर्वज्ञसद्भावा-विनाभाविकार्यलिङ्गं स्वभावलिङ्गं वा सम्परयामः । तदुद्वप्तेः पूर्व तत्स्वभा-बस्य तत्कार्यस्य वा तत्स्वभावाविनाभाविनो निश्चेतुमशक्तेः ॥ नाध्यागमा-त्तराद्रावः । स हि नित्योऽनित्यो वा तत्सद्भावं भावयेत् । न तावत्रित्यः-त्तस्यार्थवादरूपस्य कर्मविशेषसंस्तवनपरत्वेन पुरुषविशेषाव बोधकत्वायोगात् ॥ अनादेरागमस्यादिमत्पुरुषवाचकत्वाघटनाच ॥ नाप्यनित्य आगमः सर्वेत्रं साधयति । तस्यापि तत्मणीतस्य तन्निश्चयमन्तरेख मामाण्यानिश्चयादितरे-तराश्रयत्वाच ॥ इतरप्रणीतस्य त्वनासादितप्रमाणभावस्याशेषद्भप्ररूपण-परत्वं नितरामसम्भाव्यभिति सर्वे इसदृशस्यापरस्य ग्रहणासम्भवाच नोपमा-नम् । अनन्यथाम्तस्यार्थस्याभावान्नार्थापत्तिरपि सर्वेज्ञावगोधिकेति धर्मायु-पदेशस्य च्यामोहादपि सम्भवात् ॥ द्विविधो श्रुपदेशः सम्यंमिथ्योपदेश-मेदात् । तत्र मन्वादीनां सम्यगुपदेशो यथार्थज्ञानोदयवेदमूलत्वात् । बुद्धादीनां तु व्यामोइपूर्वकः तदम्ू्लत्वात् तेषामवेदार्थज्ञत्वात् ॥ ततः ममारणपश्चकाविषयत्वादभावत्रमारणस्यैव मष्टत्तिस्तेन चामाव एव ज्ञायते । भावांशे प्रत्यत्तादिममारापश्चकस्य व्यापारादिति ॥ अत्र प्रतिविधीयते । यत्तावदुक्रम्- मत्यत्तादिममार्गाविषयत्वमशेषद्भस्येति तद्युक्तं, तद्ग्राहकस्या-नुमानस्य सम्भवात् ॥ तथाहि- कश्चित्पुरुषः सकलपदार्थसाचात्कारी । तद्ग्रहणस्वभावत्वे सति पत्ती एमतिबन्धमत्ययत्वात् । यद्यप्रहणस्वभावत्वे सति मन्तीणमतिबन्धप्रत्ययं तत्तत्सान्तात्कारि । यथाऽपगततिमिरं लोचनं रूपसाचात्कारि ॥ तदुग्रहणस्वभावत्वे सति मन्तीणमतिबन्धमत्ययथ विवादा-

पन्नः कथिदिति सकलपदार्थग्रहणस्वभावत्वं नात्मनोऽसिद्धं चोदनातः सकलपदार्थपरिज्ञानस्यान्यथायोगादन्धस्येवादर्शाद्रूपप्रतिपत्तेरिति।।व्याप्ति-बानोत्पत्तिवलाचाशोपविषयबानसम्भवः केवलं वैशद्ये विवादः। तत्र चाव-रणापगम एव कारणं रजोनीहाराद्यादृतार्थज्ञानस्येव तद गम इति !! मत्तीणमतिबन्धमत्ययत्वं कथमिति चेदुच्यते-दोषावरणे कचित्रिमुल प्रत्तयमुपत्रजतः प्रकृष्यमाणहानिकत्वात् । यस्य त्रकृष्यमाणहानिः स प्रलयमुपव्रजति । यथाऽग्निपुटपाकापसारितकिट्टकालि-कचित्रिमेलं काद्यन्तरङ्ग्रबहिरङ्गमलद्वयात्मनि हेन्नि मलमिति निर्हासातिशयवती च दोषावरणे इति ॥ कथं पुनर्विवादाध्यासितस्य झानस्यावरणं सिद्धं १ मति-षेधस्य विधिपूर्वकत्वात् इति ॥ अत्रोच्यते-विवादापनं ज्ञानं सावरणं, विशद्तया स्वविषयावबोधकत्वाद्रजोनीहाराद्यन्तरितार्थझानवदिति चात्मनोऽमूर्त्तत्वादावारकादृत्त्ययोगः । अमूर्तीया अपि चेतनाशक्नेर्मदिरा-मदनकोद्रवादिभिरावरणोपपत्तेः ॥ न चेन्द्रियस्य तैरावरणं, इन्द्रियाणाम-चेतनानामध्यनाद्वतप्रख्यत्वात् । स्मृत्यादिप्रतिबन्धायोगात् ।। नापि मनसस्तै-रावरणमात्मव्यतिरेकेणापरस्य मनसो निषेत्स्यमानत्वात् । ततो नामुर्त-स्यावरणाभावः ॥ अतो नासिद्धं तद्ग्रइणस्वभावत्ये सति प्रक्तीणप्रति-बन्धमत्ययत्वम् । नापि विरुद्धं विपरीतनिश्चिताविनाभावात् । नाप्यनै-कान्तिकं देशतः सामस्त्येन वा विपत्ते इत्यभावात् । विपरीतार्थोपस्था-पकमत्यत्तागमासम्भवात्र कालात्ययापदिष्टत्वम् । नापि सत्प्रतिपत्तं प्रति-पत्तसाधनस्य हेतोरभावात् ।। अथेदमस्त्येव विवादापत्रः पुरुषो नाशेषद्भो वक्तृत्वात्पुरुषत्वात्पाएया।देमत्वाच । रथ्यापुरुषवदिति ॥ नैतचारु वक्तृ-त्वादेरसम्यग्धेतुत्वात् ॥ वक्तृत्वं हि दृष्टेष्टविरुद्धार्भवक्तृत्वं तदविरुद्धवक्-तृत्वं वक्तृत्वसामान्यं वा गत्यन्तराभावात् ॥ न तावत् प्रथमः पत्तः सिद्धसाध्यतानुपङ्गात् । नापि द्वितीयः पत्तः विरुद्धत्वात् । तदविरुद्धव-क्तृत्वं दि झानातिशयमन्तरेख नोपपद्यत इति ॥ वक्तृत्वसामान्यमपि विपत्ताविरुद्धत्वात्र प्रकृतसाध्यसाधनायालं, ब्रानमकर्षे वक्तृत्वापकर्षा-द्रीनात्मत्युत ज्ञानातिशयवतो वचनातिशयस्यैव सम्भवात् ॥ एतेन पुरुष-त्वमपि निरस्तं-पुरुषत्वं हि रागादिदोषदृषितं, तदा सिद्धसाध्यता, तद-द्षितं तु विरुद्धं वैराग्यझानादिगुणयुक्रपुरुषत्वस्याशेषझत्वमन्तरेणायोगात् ॥

## **ममेयर**त्नमांत्तां

पुरुषत्वसामान्यं तु सन्दिग्धविपत्तव्याद्यत्तिकमिति सिद्धं सकलपदार्थसा-त्तात्कारित्वं कस्यचित्पुरुषस्य । अतोऽनुमानादिति न प्रमाखपश्चकाविष-यत्वमशेषब्रस्य ॥ अथास्मित्रनुमानेऽईतः सर्ववित्त्वमनईतो वा १ । अनई-तथेदईद्वाक्यप्रमार्गं स्यात् । ऋईतथेत्सोऽपि न श्रुत्या सामर्थ्येन वाऽव-गन्तुं पार्थते । स्वराक्त्यां दृष्टान्तानुग्रहेण वा हेतोः पत्तान्तरेऽपि तुल्य-ष्टत्तित्वादिति । तदेतत्परेषां स्वववाय कृत्योत्थापनं, एवंविधविशेषमश्नस्य सर्वद्वसामान्याभ्युपगमपूर्वकत्वात् । अन्यथा न कस्याप्यशेषद्वत्वमित्येव वक्रव्यम् । प्रसिद्धानुमानेऽत्यस्य दोषस्य सम्भवेन, जात्युत्तरत्वाच ॥ तथाहि-- नित्यः शब्दः प्रत्यभिज्ञायमानत्वादित्युक्ते व्यापकः शब्दो नित्यः मसाध्यते अव्यापको वा १ यद्यव्यापकः तदा व्यापकत्वे नोपकल्प्यमानो न कञ्चिदर्थे पुष्णाति । ऋथ व्यापकः सोऽपि न । श्रुत्या सामर्थ्येन वाऽवगम्यते । स्वशक्त्या दृष्टान्तानुग्रहेण वा । पत्तान्तरेऽपि तुल्यद्वत्तित्वा-दिति ॥ सिद्धमतो निर्दोषात्साधनादशेषद्वत्वमिति । यचाभावममाणकव-लितसत्ताकत्वमशेषज्ञस्येति तदयुक्रमेवानुमानस्य तद्ग्राहकस्य सद्भावे सति ममारणपश्चकाभावमूलस्याभावममारणस्योपस्थापनायोगात् ''ग्रहीत्वा वस्तु-सद्भावं स्पृत्वा च मतियोगिनम् । मानसं नास्तिताज्ञानं जायतेऽज्ञानपेज्ञ-या" इति च भावरकं दर्शनम् । तथा च कालत्रयत्रिलोकलत्तरणवस्तुसद्भावग्रह-खेऽन्यत्रान्यदाग्रहीतस्मरणे च सर्वज्ञनास्तिताज्ञानमभावममार्णं युक्नम् । नाप-रथा।) न.च कस्यचिद्वांग्दार्शीनस्त्रिजगन्निकालज्ञानमुपपद्यते सर्वज्ञस्याती-न्द्रियस्य वा । सर्वतत्वं हि चेतोधर्मतयाऽतीन्द्रियं तदपि न प्राकृतपुरुषविषय-मिति कथमभावप्रमाखमुदयमासादयेत् ।। ऋसर्वद्वस्य तदुत्पादसामग्रचा ऋसं-भवात । सम्भवे वा तथाइतिरेव सर्वइत्वमिति । अत्राधना तदभावसाधन-मित्यपि न युक्तं सिद्धसाध्यतानुषंगात् । ततः सिद्धं मुख्यमतीन्द्रियज्ञानम-शेषतो विशदम् । सार्वज्ञज्ञानस्यातीन्द्रियत्वादश्रुत्यादिदर्शनं तद्रसास्वादन-दोषोऽपि परिहृत एव ॥ कथमती।न्द्रियझानस्य वैशयमिति चेत् । यथा सत्य-स्वमज्ञानस्य भावनाज्ञानस्य चेति । दृश्यते हि भावनावलादतदेशवस्तुनोऽपि विशददर्शनमिति । पिहिते कारागारे तमसि च सूचीमुखाग्रदुर्भेचे ॥ मयि च निमीलितनयने तथापि कान्ताननं व्यक्तमिति बहुलमुपलम्भात् ॥ ननु च नावर्श्यविश्लेषादशेषइत्वमपि तु तनुकरणभुवनादिनिमित्तत्वेन । न चात्र

तन्वादीनां बुद्धिमद्धेतुकत्वमसिद्धमनुमानादेस्तस्य सुप्रसिद्धत्वात् । तथाहि-विमत्यधिकरणभावापत्रं उर्वीपर्वततरुतन्वादिकं बुद्धिमद्धे तुकं कार्यत्वादचे-तनोपादानत्वात्सात्रिवेशविशिष्टत्वाद्वा वस्त्रादिवदिति । त्रागमोऽपि तदावे-दकः अयुते-- ''विश्वतश्चज्जुरुत विश्वतोमुखो विश्वतोबाहुरुत विश्वतः-पात् । सम्बाहुभ्धां धमति सम्पतत्रैद्यीवाभूमी जनयन्देव एकः" तथा व्यास-वचनं च "आह्रो जन्तुरनीशोऽयमात्मनः सुखदुःखयोः । ईश्वरप्रोस्तो गच्छे-रस्वर्भे वा श्वभ्रमेव वा !! १ ।।" न चाचेतनैरेव परमाग्रवादिकारगौः पर्याप्त-त्वाद्बुद्धिमतः कारणस्यानर्थक्यम् । अचेतनानां स्वयंकार्योत्पत्तौ व्यापारा-योगात्तुर्यादिवत् ॥ न चैवं चेतनस्यापि चेतनान्तरपूर्वकत्वादनवस्था । तस्य सकलपुरुषज्येष्ठत्वानिरातिशयत्वात्सर्वज्ञवी जस्य वलेशक में वियाकाशीयरपरा-मृष्टत्वादनादिभूतानश्वरह्नानसम्भवाच ॥ यदाइ पतञ्जालिः-- '' क्लेशकर्भ-विपाकाशायैरपराम्षष्टः पुरुषः सर्वज्ञः स पूर्वेषामपि गुरुः कालेनाविच्छेदा-दि" ति च "ऐश्वर्यममतिइतं सहजो विरागस्तृप्तिर्निसर्गजानेता वाशितेन्द्रि-येषु ॥ त्रात्यान्तिकं सुखमनावरणा च शक्विर्झान च सर्वविषयं भगवंस्तवैव" इत्यवधूतवचनाच ॥ न चात्र कार्यत्वमसिद्धम् । सावयवत्वेन कार्यत्वसिद्धेः ॥ नापि विरुद्धं, विपत्त एव दृत्त्यभावात ॥ नात्यनैकान्तिकं, विपत्ते परमा-एवादावमद्वत्तेः । मतिपत्तासिद्धिनिबन्धनस्य साधनान्तरस्याभावात्र मकरण-समम् ॥ अथ तन्वादिकं बुद्धिमद्धेतुकं न भवति दृष्टकर्तृकपासादादिविलत्तरण-त्वादाकाशवदित्यस्त्येव मतिपत्तसाधनमिति । नैतयुक्तं, हेतोरसिद्धत्वात् । सन्निवेशविशिष्टत्वेन मासादादिसमानजातीयत्वेन तन्वादीनामुपलम्भात् ॥ अथ यादृशः प्रासादादौ सन्निवेशविशेषो दृष्टो न तादृशस्तन्वादाविति चेन्न सर्वात्मना सदृशस्य कस्यचिद्य्यभावात् । सातिशयसन्त्रिवेशो हि सातिशयं कत्तीरं गमयति पासादादिवत् । न च इष्टकर्तृकत्वादृष्टकर्तृकत्वाभ्यां बुद्धि-मत्रिमित्तेतरत्वसिद्धिः । कुत्रिमैर्मेणिमुक्ताफलादिभिर्व्यभिचारात् ॥ एतेनाचे-तनोपादानत्वादिकमपि समर्थितमिति सूक्तं बुद्धिमद्धेतुकत्वं ततरच सर्ववे. दित्वमिति ॥ तदेतत्सर्वमनुमानमुद्राद्रविर्णदरिद्रवचनमेव कार्यत्वादेरसम्य\_ ग्घेतुत्वेन तज्जानितझानस्य मिथ्यारूपत्वात् ।। तथाहि- कार्यत्वं स्वकारण. सत्तासमवायः स्यादभूत्वाभावित्वमक्रियादर्शिनोऽपि कृतबुद्ध्युत्पादकत्व कारग्णच्यापाराजुविधायित्वं वास्याद्रत्यन्तराभावात् । अथायः पत्तस्तदा

योगिनामशेष कर्मचये पद्मान्तःपातिनि हेतौ कार्यत्वलच रास्यामर चेर्भागा-सिद्धत्वम् ॥ न च तत्र सत्तासमवायः स्वकारणसमवायो वा समस्ति, तत्प्र-त्तयस्य प्रध्वंसरूपत्वेन सत्तासमवाययोरमावात् सत्ताया द्रव्यगुणक्रियाधार-त्वाभ्यनुज्ञानात समवायस्य च परैंद्रेच्यादिपञ्चपदार्थद्वत्तित्वाभ्युपगमात ॥ अथाभावगरित्यागेन भावस्यैव विवादाध्यासितस्य पत्तीकरणानायं दोषः प्रवेशमागिति चेत्— तर्हि मुक्त्यर्थिनां तदर्थमीश्वराराधनमनर्थकमेव स्यात् । तत्र तस्याकिञ्चित्करत्वात् सत्तासमवायस्य विचारमधिरोइतः शतधा विशीर्यमारणत्वात् स्वरूपासिद्धं च कार्यत्वम् ॥ स हि समुरपत्रानां भवेदु-त्पद्यमानानां वा १ यद्युत्पत्रानां, सतामसतां वा १ न तावदसतां खरविषा-णादेरपि तत्प्रसङ्गात् । सतां चेत् सत्तासमवायात्स्वतो वा १ न तावत्सत्ता-समवायादनवस्थापसङ्गत प्रागुक्वविकल्पद्वयाऽनतिवृत्तेः । स्वतः सतां तु सत्ता-समवायानर्थक्यम् ॥ अथोत्पद्यमानानां सत्तासम्बन्धो निष्ठासम्बन्धयोरेक-कालत्वाभ्युपगमादिति मतम् । तदा सत्तासम्बन्ध उत्पादाझित्रः किं वा आभित्र इति । यदि भित्रस्तदोत्पत्तेरसत्वाविशेषादुत्पत्त्यभावयोः किं कृतो भेदः। अथोत्पत्तिसमाकान्तवस्तुसत्त्वेनोत्पत्तिरपि तथा व्यपदिश्यते इति मतम् । तदपि अतिजाड्यवल्गितमेव । उत्पत्तिसन्वमतिविवादे वस्तुसत्त्वस्यातिदुर्घ-टत्वात् ।। इतरेतराश्रयदोषरच । इत्युत्पत्तिसत्त्वे वस्तुनि तदेककालीनसत्ता-सम्बन्धावगमस्तद्वगमे च तत्रत्यसंच्वेनोत्पत्तिसच्वनिश्चय इति ॥ अथैत-दोषपरिजिहीर्षया तयोरैक्यमभ्यजुज्जायते, तर्हि तत्सम्बन्ध एव कार्यत्वमिति। ततो बुद्धिमद्धेतुकत्वे गगनादिभिरनेकान्तः ॥ एतेन स्वकाररासम्बन्धोऽपि चिन्तितः ॥ त्रथोभयसम्बन्धो कार्यत्वमिति मतिः सापि न युक्ता । तत्सम्ब-न्धस्यापि कादाचित्कत्वे समवायस्यानित्यत्वनसङ्गत् घटादिवत् अकादा-चित्कत्वे सर्वदोपलम्भप्रसङ्गः ॥ अथ वस्तूत्पादककारणानां सन्निधाना-भावान सर्वदोपलम्भमसङ्गः ॥ ननु वस्तूत्पत्त्यर्थं कारणान्तं व्यापारः। उत्पादश्च स्वकारणसत्तासमवायः सं च सर्वदाप्यस्ति, इति तदर्थं कारखो-पादानमनर्थकमेव स्यात् । श्रभिव्यक्वचर्थे तदुपादानमित्यपि वार्त्ते वस्तूत्पादा-पेत्तया त्रभिव्यक्नेरघटनात् । वस्त्वपेत्तयाऽमिव्यक्नौ कार**एसम्पातात्माग**पि कार्यवस्तुसद्भावमसङ्गात् । तल्लचार्यात्वाद्वस्तुसत्त्वस्य माक् सत एव हि केन-चित् तिरोहितस्याभिव्यञ्जकेनाभिव्यक्निस्तमस्तिरोहितस्य घटस्येव मदीपा-

दिनेति । तत्राभिव्यक्त्यर्थे कारणोपादानं युक्तं, तत्र स्वकारणसत्तासम्बन्धः कार्यत्वम् । नाप्यभूत्वाभावित्वम् । तस्यापि विचारासहत्वात् । अभूत्वा-भावित्वं हि भित्रकालक्रियाद्वयाधिकरणभूते कर्त्तरि सिद्धे सिद्धिमध्यास्ते । क्त्वान्तपद्विशेषितवाक्यार्थत्वाञ्चुक्त्वा व्रजतीत्यादिवाक्यार्थवत् ॥ न चात्र भवनाभवनयोराधारभूतस्य कर्तुरनुभवोऽस्ति । अभवनाधारस्याविद्य-मानत्वेन भवनाधारस्य च विद्यमानतया भावाभावयोरेकाश्रयविरोधात् । ऋविरोधे च तयोः पर्यायमात्रेर्णैव भेदो न वास्तव इति ॥ अस्तु वा यथा-कथंचिदभूत्वाभावित्वं, तथापि तन्वादौ सर्वत्रानभ्युपगमाज्जागासिद्धम् । न हि महीमहीधराकूपारागादयः प्रागभूत्वाभवन्तोऽभ्युपगम्यन्ते परेः। तेषां तैः सर्वदावस्थानाभ्युपगमात् ॥ त्रथ सावयवत्वेन तेषामपि सादित्वं मसाध्यते, तद्प्याशित्तितत्त्तिम् । अवयवेषु हत्तेरवयवैशारभ्यत्वेन च सावयवत्वानुपपत्तेः ॥ प्रथमपत्ते सावयवसामान्येनानेकान्तात् । द्वितीयपत्ते साध्याविाशिष्टत्वात् ॥ अथ सन्निवेश एव सावयवत्वं तच घटादिवत् पृथि-व्यादावुपत्तभ्यते इत्यभूत्वाभावित्वमभिधीयते तद्द्यपेशलम् । सत्रिवेश-स्यापि विचारासहत्वात् ॥ स ग्रवयवसम्बन्धो भवेद्रचनाविशेषो वा । यद्यवय-वसम्बन्धस्तदा गगनादिनानेकान्तः सकलमृतिंमद्रव्यसंयोगनिबन्धनप्रदेश-नानात्वस्य सद्भावात् । अथोपचरिता एव तत्र प्रदेशा इति चेत् तर्हि सकल-म्तिंमद्द्रव्यसम्वन्धस्यारयुपचरितत्वात्सर्वगतत्वमष्युपचरितं स्यात् ।्श्रोत्र-स्येर्थक्रियाकारित्वं च न स्यात् । उपचरितप्रदेशरूपत्वात् ॥ धर्मादिना संस्कारात्ततः सेत्ययुक्तम् । उपचरितस्यासद्रूपस्य तेनोपकारायोगात् । खर-विषासारयेव ततो न किञ्चिदेतत् ॥ अथ रचनाविशेषस्तदा परम्प्रतिभागा-सिद्धत्वं तदवस्थमेवीत नाभूत्वाभावित्वं विचारं सहते ॥ नाष्याक्रियादर्शि-नोऽपि कृतबुद्ध्युत्पादकत्वम् । तद्धि कृतसमयस्याकृतसमयस्य वा भवेत् ॥ कृतसमयस्य चेत् गगनादेरपि बुद्धिमद्धेतुकत्वं स्यात् । तत्रापि खननोत्से-चनात् कुतमिति गृदीतसङ्केतस्य कुतबुद्धिसम्भवात् । सा मिथ्येति चेत् भवदी-यापि किं न स्यात् । बाधासद्भावस्य मतिममाणविरोधस्य चान्यत्रापि समानत्वात् । प्रत्यत्तेग्गोभयत्रापि कर्तुरग्रहणात् ॥ त्तित्यादिकं बुद्धिम-द्धेतुर्कं न भवति अस्मदायनवग्रासपरिमाखाधारत्वात् गगनादिवदिति प्रमा-णस्य साधारणत्वात् । तन कुतसमयस्य कृतवुद्ध्युत्पादकत्वम् ॥ नाध्यकृत

समयस्याऽसिद्धत्वाद्विंगतिपत्तिनसङ्ग्राच्च।कारणव्यापारानुविधायित्वं च का-रणमात्रापेत्तया यदािष्यते तदा विरुद्धं साधनम् । कारणविशेषापेत्तया चे-दितरेतराश्रयत्वम् । सिद्धे हि कारणविशेषे बुद्धिमति तदपेत्तया कारणव्या-पारानुविधायित्वं कार्यत्वम् । ततस्तद्विशेषसिद्धिरिति सन्निवेशविशिष्टत्वम-चेतनोपादानत्वं चोक्नदोषदुष्टत्वान पृथक् चिन्त्यते । स्वरूपभागासिद-त्वादेस्तत्रापि सुलभत्वात् ॥ विरुद्धावामी हेतवो दृष्टान्तानुग्रहेण सशरीरा-सर्वद्वपूर्वकत्वसाधनात् । न धूमात्पावकानुमानेऽष्ययं दोषः । तत्र तारार्श-पार्ण्णादिविशेषाधाराग्निमात्रव्याप्तधूमस्य द्शीनात्। नैवमत्र सर्वझा सर्वझरुत्ती-विशेषाधिकरणतत्सामान्येन कार्यत्वस्य व्याप्तिः सर्वन्नस्य कर्तुरतोऽनुमानात्मा-गसिद्धत्वात् ॥ व्यभिचारिणश्रामी हेतवो बुद्धिमत्कारणमन्तरेणापि विद्युदा-दीनां मादुर्भावसम्भवात्।।सुप्ताचवस्थायामबुद्धिपूर्वकस्यापि कार्यस्य दर्शनात्।। तदवरयं तत्रापि भर्गाख्यं कारणभित्यतिमुग्धविलसितं, तद्व्यापारस्याध्य-सम्भवादशारीरत्वात् ॥ ज्ञानमात्रेण कार्यकारित्वाघटनादिच्छामयत्वयोः शरीराभावेऽसम्भवात्तदसम्भवश्व पुरातनैर्विस्तरेणाभिहित आप्तपरीत्तादौ । अतः पुनरत्र नोच्यते ॥ यच महेश्वरस्य लेशादिभिरपामृष्टत्वं निरतिशय-त्वमैश्वर्याद्युपेतत्वं तत्सर्वमपि गगनाब्जसौरभव्यावर्र्यनमिव निर्विषयत्वादु-पेचामईति । ततो न महेभ्वरस्याशेषज्ञत्वम् । नापि ब्रह्मणः । तस्यापि सद्भावावेदकममाणाभावात् ॥ न तावत्प्रत्यत्तं तदावेदकमविपतिपत्ति-चानुमानमविनाभाविलिङ्गाभावात् मसङ्गत् ॥ न ननु 1 मत्यत्तं तद्ग्राहकमस्त्येव, अत्तिविस्फालनानन्तरं निर्विकल्पकस्य सन्मात्रविधि-विषयतयोत्पत्तेः । सत्तायाश्व परमब्रह्मरूपत्वात् ॥ तथाचोक्नम्-"अस्ति बालोचनाज्ञानं मथमं निर्विकल्पम् । बालमुकादिविज्ञानसदृशं शुद्धवस्तु-जम्।।"न च विधिवत् परस्परव्याद्वत्तिरध्यध्यच्चतः प्रतीयत इति हैतसिद्धिः । तस्य निषेधाविषयत्वात् ॥ तथा चोक्रम्-"आहुर्विधातृमत्यत्तं न निषेधवि-पश्चितः । नैकत्वे आगमस्तेन पत्यत्तेण प्रवाध्यते ॥" अनुमानादपि तत्स-द्धावो विभाव्यत एव । तथाहि ग्रामारामादयः पदार्थाः मतिभासान्तः मविष्ठाः प्रतिभासमानत्वात् । यत्यतिभासते तत्यतिभासान्तः प्रविष्टम् । यथा अतिभास-स्वरूपं मतिभासन्ते च विवादापन्ना इति ॥ तदागमानामपि पुरुष एवेदं यद्भूतं यद भाव्यमिति बहुलमुपलम्भात् । "सर्वे वै खाल्वदं ब्रह्म नेह नानास्ति

#### त्रमेयरवमाला

किञ्चन ॥ आरामं तस्य परयन्ति न तं परयति कथन ॥" इति अतेथ ॥ ननु परब्रह्मण एव परमार्थसत्त्वे कथं घटादिभेदोऽवभासत इति न चोद्यम् । सर्वस्या-पि तद्विवर्ततयावभासनात् । न चाशेषभेदस्य तद्विवर्तत्वमसिद्धं সদায়-प्रसिद्धत्वात् । तथा**हि--विवादाध्यासितं विश्वमेककार**णपूर्वकमेकरूपान्वि-तत्वात् । घटघटीसराबोदञ्चनादीनां मृद्पान्वितानां यथा मृदेककारण-पूर्वकत्वं सद्दरूपेणान्वितं च निखिलं वस्त्वति । तथाऽगमोऽप्यस्ति-"ऊर्णनाभ इवांशूनां चन्द्रकान्त इवाम्भसाम् । परोहाणाभिव सत्तः हेतुः सर्वजन्मिनामि" ति ॥ तदेतन्मादिरारसास्वादगद्गदोदितमिव मद-नकोद्रवाद्यपयोगजनितव्यामोइमुग्धवित्तसितमिव निखिलमवभासते विचा-रासहत्वान् ॥ तथा हि- यत्मत्यत्तसत्ताविषयत्वमभिहितं तत्र किं निर्वि-शेषसत्ताविषयत्वं सविशेषसत्तावबोधकत्वम् वा १। न तावत्पौरस्त्यः पत्तः । सत्तायाः सामान्यरूपत्वात् । विशेषनिरपेत्ततयाऽनवभासनात् । शावलेया-दिविशेषानवभासने गोत्वाऽनवभासनवत् ॥ निर्विशेषं हि सामान्यं भवेच्छश-विषाखवादित्यभिधानात् ॥ सामान्यरूपत्वं च सत्तायाः सत्सदित्यन्वयदु-दिविषयत्वेन सुप्रसिद्धमेव ॥ अथ पाश्वात्यः पत्तः कत्तीकीयते, तदा न **परमपुरुषसिद्धिः। परस्परव्यादृत्ताकारविशेषा**र्णामध्यज्ञतोऽवभासनात्। यदपि साधनमभ्यधायि मतिभासमानत्वं तद्ि न साधु, विचारासहत्वात् ॥ तथाहि प्रतिभासमानत्वं स्वतः परतो वा ? न तावत्स्वतोऽसिद्धत्वात् । परतथे-द्विरुद्धम् । परतः मतिमासमानस्वं हि परं विना नोपपधते मतिमासनमात्र-मपि न सिद्धिमधिवसति । तस्य तद्विशेषणान्तरीयकत्वात्तद्विशेषाभ्युपगमे च द्वैतमसकिः ॥ किञ्च धर्मिहेतुदृष्टान्ता अनुमानोपायभूताः मतिभासन्ते न वेति । प्रथमपन्ने मतिभासान्तः पविष्टाः पतिभासबाहिर्भूता वा । यद्याद्यः पत्त-स्तदा साध्यान्तःपातित्वाञ्च ततोऽनुमानम् । तद्बहिभीवे तैरेव हेतोव्र्यभि-चारः ॥ अप्रतिभासमानत्वेऽपि तद्वत्यवस्थाभावात् ततो नानुमानमिति ॥ अथानाद्यविद्याविजुम्भितत्वात्सर्वभेतदसम्बद्धमित्यनल्पतमो विलसितम् नैष दोष श्रविद्यायामृत्युक्वदोषानुष**न्नात् ।** सकलविकल्पविकलत्वात्तस्या इत्यायतिमुग्धभाषितम् । केनापि रूपेण तस्याः मतिभासाभावे तत्स्वरूपान-वधारणात् ॥ अपरमप्यत्र विस्तरेण देवागमालङ्कारे चिन्तितमिति नेद मत-न्यते ॥ यच परमन्नसविवर्त्तत्वमस्वित्तमेदानामित्युक्रम् । तत्राध्येक रूपेणान्वि- प्रमेयरलमाला

तत्वं हेतुरन्यत्रान्वीयमानद्वयाविनाभावित्वेन पुरुषाद्वैतं मतिवध्नातीति स्वेष्ट-विघातकारित्वाद्विरुद्धः । अन्वितत्वमेकहेतुके घटादावनेकहेतुके स्तम्भकुम्भा-म्भोरुहादावत्युपलभ्यत इत्यनैकान्तिकथ । किमर्थं चेदं कार्यमसौ विदधाति १ अन्येन मयुक्तत्वात् कृपावशात् कीडावशात् स्वभावाद्वा १ अन्येन प्रयुक्तत्वे स्वा-तन्त्र्यद्दानिद्वैतप्रसङ्गश्च । ऋपावशादिति नोत्तरम् । ऋपायां दुःखिनामकारुणप्र-सङ्गात् । परोपकारकरणानिष्ठत्वात्तस्याः सृष्टेः प्रागनुकम्पाविषयप्राणिनामभा-वाच न सा युज्यते । कृपापरस्य प्रज्ञयविधानायोगाच ॥ अदृष्टवशात्ताद्वधाने स्वातन्त्र्यहानिः कृपापरस्य पीडाकारगादष्टव्यपेत्तायोगाच ॥ क्रीडाव-शात्मवृत्तौ न मभुत्वं क्रीडोपायव्यपेत्तणाद्वालकवत् । क्रीडोपायस्य तत्सा-ध्यस्य च युगपदुत्वत्तिप्रसङ्गश्र । सति समर्थे कारणे कार्यस्यावश्यम्भावात् ।। अन्यथा क्रमेणापि सा ततो न स्यात् ॥ अथ स्वभावादसौ जगत्रिर्मि-नोति यथाग्निर्दहति वायुर्वातीति मतं, तदपि बालभाषितप्रेव पूर्वोक्रदोषा-निद्वत्तेः ॥ तथाहि- क्रमवर्तिविवर्त्तजातमस्वित्तमपि युगपदुरपद्येत । त्र्रापे-ज्ञगीयस्य सहकारिणोऽपि तत्साध्यत्वेन यौगपद्यसम्भवात् उदाहरणवैषम्यं च । वद्वचादेः कादाचित्कस्य हेतुजनितस्य नियतशक्त्यात्मकत्वोषपत्तेरन्यत्र नित्यव्यापिसमर्थेकस्वभावकारराजन्यत्वेन देशकाजमतिनियपस्य कार्ये दुरु-पपादात् ॥ तदेवं ब्रह्मणोऽसिद्धौ वेदानां तत्सुप्तमगुद्धावस्थात्वमतिपादनं परम-पुरुषाख्यमहाभूताने :श्वसिताभिधानं च गगनारबिन्द मकरन्दच्यावर्णनवद नव-वेयार्थविषयत्वादुपेत्तामईति ॥ यचागमः भमार्खा 'सर्वं वे खाल्वदं ब्रक्षे"-''ऊर्ग्यनाभ'' इत्यादि च तत्सर्वमुक्नविधिना ऋद्वैतविगेथीति त्त्यादि नावकाशं लभते ।। न चापौरुषेय आगमोऽस्तीत्यग्रे प्रपञ्चयिष्यते । तस्माञ्च पुरुषोत्तमोऽपि विचारणां माअति ॥

प्रत्यत्तेतरभेदभित्रममलं मानं द्विधैवोदितं देवैदीप्तगुर्णविंचार्थ विधिवत्संख्याततेः संग्रहात् । मानानामिति तदिगप्यभिहितं श्रीरतनन्द्यःह्वयै-स्तद्वधाख्यानमदो विशुद्धधिषर्णेर्वोद्धव्यमव्याहतम् ॥ १ ॥ युख्यसंव्यवहाराभ्यां प्रत्यत्तमुपदर्शितम् । देवोक्तमुपजीवद्भिः सूरिभिर्झापितं मया ॥ २ ॥ इति परीक्षामुखस्य लघुवृत्तौ द्वितीयः समुद्देशः ॥ २ ॥ २ ४

## तृतीयः समुद्देशः ।

अथेदानीमुद्दिष्टे मत्यत्तेतरमेदेन प्रमार्णाद्वेत्वे प्रथमभेदं व्याख्याय, इतरद्वचाचष्टे-

परोत्तमितरदिति ॥ १ ॥

उक्नमतिपत्तमितरच्छब्दो ब्र्ते । ततः प्रत्यत्तादितरदिति लभ्यते, तच परोत्तमिति ॥ तस्य च सामग्रीस्वरूपे निरूपयत्नाइ-

प्रत्यत्तादिनिमित्तं स्मृतिप्रत्यभिज्ञानतर्कानुमानागमभेदमिति ॥ २ ॥ मत्यत्तादिनिमित्तमित्यत्रादिशब्देन परोज्ञमपि गृह्यते । तच्च यथावसरं निरूपयिष्यते ॥ मत्यत्तादिनिमित्तं यस्य इति विप्रहः ॥ स्मृत्यादिषु द्वंद्वः ॥ ते भेदा यस्य इति विग्रहः ॥ तत्र स्मृतिं क्रमप्राप्तं दर्शयत्राह-

संस्कारोद्भोधनिबन्धना तदित्याकारा स्मृतिरिति ॥ ३ ॥ संस्कारस्योद्दोधः माकटचं स निबन्धनं यस्याः सा तथोका तदित्या-कारा तदित्युन्नेखिनी, एवम्भूता स्मृतिर्भवतीति शेषः ॥ उदाइरणमाइ--

स देवदत्तो यथेति॥ ४॥

प्रत्यभिद्वानं प्राप्तकालमाइ----

दर्शनस्मरणकारणकं सङ्कलनं प्रत्यभिज्ञानम्।

तदेवेदं तत्सदृशं तद्विलक्षणं तत्प्रतियोगीत्यादि ॥ ४ ॥

अत्र दर्शनस्मरणकारणत्वात् सादृश्यादिविषयस्यापि भत्यभिज्ञानत्व-मुक्तम् । येषां तु सादृश्यविषयमुपमानारूयं भमाणान्तरं तेषां वैलत्त्तरणयादि-विषयं भमाणान्तरमनुषज्येत ॥ तथा चोक्तम्–॥ उपमानं मसिद्धार्थसा-धर्म्यात्साध्यसाधनम् । तद्वैधर्म्यात्प्रमाणं किं स्यात्संज्ञिपतिपादनम् ॥ १ ॥ इदमर्ष् महद्द्रमासत्रं प्रांशु नैति वा । व्यपेत्तातः समत्तेऽर्थे विकल्पः साधनान्तरमिति ॥ २ ॥ एषां क्रमेणोदाहरणं दर्शयत्राद-

यथा स एवायं देवदत्तः ॥ ६ ॥ गोसदृशो गवयः ॥ ७ ॥ गोविलद्यगो महिषः ॥ ५ ॥ इदमस्माद्दूरम् ॥ ६ ॥ वृत्तोऽय-मित्यादि ॥ १० ॥

अगदिशब्देन—पयोम्बुभेदी हंसः स्यात् पट्पादैर्भ्रमरः स्यतः ॥ सप्तपर्णैस्तु तत्त्वद्वैविंद्वेयो विषमच्छदः ॥ १ ॥ पञ्चवर्णं भवेद्रत्रं मेचकार्ख्यं पृथुस्तनी ॥ युवतिश्वैकश्वकोऽपि गण्डकः परिकीर्तितः ॥ २ ॥ शरमोऽ-प्यष्टभिः पार्दैः सिंहश्वारुसटान्वितः ॥ इत्येवमादिशब्दश्रवणात्तथाविधानेव मरालादीनवलोक्य तथा सत्यापयति यदा तदा तत्सङ्कलनमपि मस्यभि-झान9ुक्तं, दर्शनस्मरणकारणत्वाविशेषात् ॥ परेषां तु तत्प्रमाणान्तरमेवोप-पद्यते उपमानादौ तस्यान्तर्भावाभावात् । अथोहोऽवसरमाप्त इत्याइ--

उपलग्भानुपलम्भनिमित्तं व्याप्तिज्ञानमूहः ॥ ११ ॥

इदमस्मिन्सत्येव भवत्यसति न भवत्येवेति च ॥ १२ ॥

उपलम्भः ममाखमात्रमत्र ग्रह्यते । यदि मत्यत्तमेवोपलम्भशब्देनोच्यते तदा साधनेष्वनुमेयेषु व्याप्तिज्ञानं न स्यात् ॥ अथ व्याप्तिः सर्वोपसंहारेण मतीयते, सा कथमतीन्द्रियस्य साधनस्यातीन्द्रियेण साध्येन भवेदिति । नैवं मत्यत्तविषयेष्विवानुमानविषयेष्वपि व्याप्तेरविरोधात् ॥ तज्ज्ञानस्या-मरयत्तत्वाभ्युपगमात् ॥ उदाहरणमाह-

यथाग्नावेव धूमस्तदभावे न भवत्येवेति च ॥ १३ ॥

इदानीमनुमानं क्रमायातमिति तल्लचणमाह-

साधनात्साध्यविज्ञानमनुमानम् ॥ ११ ॥

साधनस्य लत्तरणमाह-

साध्याविनाभावित्वेन निश्चितो हेतुः ॥ १५ ॥

ननु त्रैरूप्यमेव हेतोर्स्तत्रणं, तस्मिन्सत्येव हेतोरसिद्धादिदोषपरिहा-रोपपत्तेः। तथा हि-- पत्तधर्मत्वमसिद्धत्वच्यवच्छेदार्थमभिधीयते । सपत्ते सत्त्वं तु विरुद्धत्वापनोदार्थम् । विपत्ते चासत्त्वमेवानैकान्तिकव्युदा-सार्थमिति ॥ तदुक्रम् । ''हेतोस्विध्वपि रूपेषु निर्ण्यस्तेन वर्णितः । असिद्ध-विपरीतार्थव्यभिचारिविपत्ततः'' इति ॥ १ ॥ तदयुक्तं— अविनाभाव-नियमनिश्रयादेव दोषत्रयपरिहारोपपत्तेः । अविनाभावो ह्यन्यथानुपपन्नत्वं, तचासिद्धस्य न सम्भवत्येव । अन्यथानुपपन्नत्वमसिद्धस्य न सिद्ध्यतीत्य-भिधानात् ॥ नापि विरुद्धस्य तल्लत्त्वणस्वानिर्विपरीतनिश्चिताविनामा-विनि यथोक्तसाध्यविनाभावनियमलत्त्तणस्यानुपपत्त्तविरीरोधात् ॥ व्यभि-चारिग्रयपि न प्रकृतलत्त्तणावकाशः । तत एव ततोऽन्यथाऽन्जुपपत्त्तिरेव

### **ममेयरतमा**ला

श्रेयसी । न त्रिरूपता । तस्यां सत्यामपि यथोक्वलचुरणभावे हेतोर्गम-कत्वादर्शनात् ॥ तथाहि- स श्यामस्तत्पुत्रत्वादितरतत्पुत्रवादित्यत्र त्रैरूप्य-सम्भवेऽपि न गमकत्वभुपलत्त्यते । अथ विपत्ताद्वचाद्यत्तिनियमवर्ता तत्र न हरयते । ततो न गमकत्वमिति । तद्पि मुग्धविलसितमेव। तस्या एवाविना-भावरूपत्वातु ।। इतररूपसञ्चावेऽपि तदभावे हेतोः स्वसाध्यसिद्धिस्प्रातिगम-कत्वानिष्टों सैव मधानं लत्तरणमत्तुरण्णमुपलत्तर्णीयमिति ॥ तत्सद्भावे चेतररूप-द्वयनिरपेत्ततया गमकत्वोपपत्तेश्व । यथा सन्त्यद्वेतवादिनोऽपि ममाणानिष्टा-निष्टसाधनद्षणाऽन्यथाऽनुपपत्तेः॥ न चात्र पत्तधर्मत्वं सपत्तान्वयो वाऽस्ति। केवलमविनाभावमात्रेगा गमकत्वप्रतीतेः।।यद्ष्यपरमुक्तं परैः पत्तधर्मताभावेऽपि काकस्य काष्ण्याद्भवत्ताः मासाद इत्यस्यापि गमकत्वापत्तिरिति तदायनेन निरस्तम् ॥ अन्यथानुपपत्तिबलेनैव पत्तधर्मस्यापि सःधुत्वाभ्युपगमात् ॥ न चेह साऽस्ति । ततोऽविनाभाव एव हेतोः भधानं लत्तरणमभ्यपगन्तव्यम् । तस्मिन्सत्यसति त्रिलच रणत्वेऽपि हेतोर्गमकत्वदर्शनादिति न त्रैरूट्यं हेतुलच-र्णमच्यापकत्वात् ॥ सर्वेषां चाणिकत्वे साध्ये सच्वादेः साधनस्य सपत्ते सतोऽपि स्वयं सौगतैर्गमकत्वाभ्युपगमात् । एतेन पश्चलत्तरणत्वमपि यौगप-रिकल्पितं न हेतोरुपपत्तिमियत्तीत्यभिहितं बोद्धृत्र्यम् । पत्तधर्मत्वे सत्य-न्वयव्यतिरेकावबाधितविषयत्वमसत्प्रातिपत्तत्वं चेति पञ्चलत्तरणानि. तेषामप्यविनाभावप्रपञ्चतैवाबाधितविषयस्याविनाभावायोगात् । सत्प्रतिष-त्तस्येवेति साध्याभासविषयत्वेनासम्यग्घेतुत्वाच ।। यथोक्नपत्तविषयत्वाभावा-त्तद्देषिर्णेव दुष्टत्वात् । अतः स्थितं साध्याविनाभावित्वेन निश्चितो हेतु-रिति ॥ इदानीमविनाभावभेदं दर्शयत्राह-

सहक्रमभावनियमोऽविनाभावः ॥ १६ ॥

तत्र सहभावनियमस्य विषयं दर्शयत्राह-

सहचारिणोर्व्याप्यव्यापक्योश्च सहभावः ॥ १७ ॥

सहचारिणो रूपरसयोर्व्यापयव्यापकयोश्च टत्तर्त्वांशशपात्वयोरिति सतम्या विषयो निर्दिष्टः ॥ क्रमभावनियमस्य विषयं दर्शयन्नाह-

पूर्बोत्तरचारिगोः कार्यकारग्रयोश्च कमभावः ॥ १⊏ ॥ प्**वीत्तरचारिग्गोः** कृत्तिकोदयशकटोदययोः कार्यकारग्रयोश्व धृमधूम- ध्वजयोः क्रमभावः ॥ नन्वेवम्भूतस्याविनाभावस्य न मत्यत्तेण ग्रहणं, तस्य सन्निहितविषयत्वात् ॥ नाष्यनुमानेन, प्रकृतापरानुमानकल्पनाया-मित्तरेतराश्रयत्वानवस्थावतारात् ॥ त्रागमादेरपि भिन्नविषयत्वेन सुप्रसिद्ध-त्वान्न ततोऽपि तत्प्रतिपत्तिरित्यारेकायामाह-

तर्कात्तनिर्गायः ॥ १६ ॥

तर्काद्यथोक्नलत्तरणाद्हात्तात्रिर्णय इति ॥ अथेदानीं साध्यलत्तरणमाह--

इष्टमबाधितमसिद्धं साध्यम् ॥ २० ॥

अत्रापरे दूषणमाचत्तते-----आसनशयनभोजनयाननिधुवनादेरपीष्टस्वात्त-दपि साध्यमनुषज्यत इति । तेऽप्यतिवालिशा अप्रस्तुतप्रलापित्वात् ॥ अत्र दि साधनमधिक्रियते । तेन साधनविषयत्वेनेप्सितमिष्टगुच्यते ॥ इदानीं स्वाभिदितसाध्यलत्तरणस्य विशेषणानि सफलयकसिद्धविशेषणं समर्थयितुमाइ---

> सन्दिग्धविपर्यस्ताव्युत्पन्नानां साध्यत्वं यथा स्यादित्यसिद्धपदम् ॥ २१ ॥

तत्र सन्दिग्धं स्थाणुर्वा पुरुषो वेत्येनवधारणेनोभयकोटिपरामाईांसंश-याकल्तितं वस्तु उच्यते ॥ विपर्यस्तं तु विपरीतावभासिविपर्ययद्वानविषय-भूतं रजतादि ॥ ऋव्युत्पन्नं तु नामजातिसंख्यादिविशेषापरिज्ञानेनानि-र्णीतविषयानध्यवसायग्राह्मम् ॥ एषां साध्यत्वमतिपादनार्थमासिद्धपदो-पादानमित्यर्थः ॥ ऋधुनेष्टाबाधितविशेषणद्वयस्य साफच्यं दर्शयन्नाद----

श्रनिष्टाध्यक्षादिबाधितयोः साध्यत्वं मा भू-

दितीष्टाबाधितवचनम्॥ २२ ॥

त्रनिष्टो मीमांसकस्यानित्यः शब्दः भत्यत्तादिवाधितश्चाश्रावण-त्वादिः । आदिशब्देनानुमानागमलोकस्ववचनबाधितानां ग्रहणम् । तदुदा-हरणं चाकिश्चित्करस्य हेत्वाभासस्य निरूपणावसरे स्वयमेव ग्रन्थकारः प्रपञ्चायिष्यतीत्युपरम्यते ।। तत्रासिद्धपदं प्रतिवाद्यपेत्तयैव,इष्टपदं तु वाद्य-पेत्तयेति विशेषमुपदर्शयितुमाह-- न चासिद्धवदिष्टं प्रतिवादिनः ॥ २३ ॥

अयमर्थः--न हि सर्वे सर्वापेत्तया विशेषणमपि तु किश्चित्कमप्युद्दिश्य भवतीति । असिद्धवदिति व्यतिरेकमुखेनोदाइरणम् । यथा असिद्धं प्रतिवाद्यपेत्तया न तथेष्टमित्यर्थः ॥ कुत एतदित्याइ--

प्रत्यायनाय हीच्छा वक्तुरेव ॥ २४ ॥

इच्छायाः खलु विषयी इतमिष्टमुच्यते । पत्यायनाय हीच्छा वक्तुरेवेति ॥ तच साध्यं धर्मः किं वा तद्विशिष्टो धर्माति प्रश्ने तद्भेदं दर्शयत्राह--

साध्यं धर्मः कचित्तद्विशिष्टो वा धर्मीति ॥ २४ ॥

सोपस्काराग्ति वाक्यानि भवन्ति । ततोऽयमथों लभ्यते-व्याप्तिकाला-पेत्तया तु साध्यं धर्मः । क्रचित्मयोगकालापेत्तया तु तद्विशिष्टो धर्मी साध्यः ॥ अस्यैव धर्भिणो नामान्तरमाइ-

पत्त इति यावत् ॥ २६ ॥

ननु धर्मधर्मिसमुदायः पत्त इति पत्तस्वरूपस्य पुरातनैर्निरूपितत्वा-द्धमिंणस्तद्वचने कथं न राद्धान्तविरोध इति ॥ नैवं--साध्यधर्माधारतया विशेषितस्य धर्मिणः पत्तत्ववचनेऽपि दोषानवकाशात् । रचनावैचित्र्य-मात्रेण तात्पर्यस्यानिराक्वतत्वात्सिद्धान्ताविरोधात् ॥ अत्राद्द सौंगतः भवतु नाम धर्मी पत्तव्यपदेशमाक् तथापि सविकल्पबुद्धौ परिवर्तमान एव न वास्तवः । सर्व एवानुमानानुमेयव्यवहारो बुद्धचार्ष्टदन धर्मधर्मिन्यायेन बहिः सदसत्त्वमपेत्तत इत्यभिधानादिति तन्निरासार्थमाइ--

प्रसिद्धो धर्मीति॥ २७॥

त्र्यमर्थः- नेयं विकल्पबुद्धिर्बद्दिरन्तर्वा नासादितालम्बनभावा धर्मिणं व्यवस्थापयति । तदवास्तवत्वेन तदाधारसाध्यसाधनयोरपि वास्त-वत्वानुपपत्तेस्तद्बुद्धेः पारंपर्येणापि वस्तुव्यवस्थानिबन्धनत्वायोगात् । ततो विकल्पेनान्येन वा व्यवस्थापितः पर्वतादिर्विषयभावं भजन्नेव धर्मितां प्रतिपद्यत इति स्थितं प्रसिद्धो धर्मीति । तत्प्रसिद्धिश्व कचिद्विकल्पतः कवि-त्यमाणतः कचिच्चोभयत इति नैकान्तेन विकल्पाधिरूढस्य ममाणप्रसिद्धस्य वा भार्मित्वम् ॥ ननु धर्मिणो विकल्पात्पत्तिपत्तो किं तव साध्यमित्याशङ्कायामाह--- विकल्पसिद्धे तस्मिन्सत्तेतरे साध्ये ॥ २० ॥

तस्मिन्धर्मिणि विकल्पसिद्धे सत्ता च तद्पेत्तयेतराऽसत्ता च ते द्वे ऋपि साध्ये सुनिर्णीतासम्भवाद्वाधकप्रमाणवलेन योग्यानुपलव्धिवलेन चेति शेषः॥ अत्रोदाहरणमाह–

अस्ति सर्वज्ञो नास्ति खरविषाग्रमिति ॥ २६ ॥

सुगमम् ॥ ननु धर्मिंण्यसिद्धसत्ताके भावाभावोभयधर्माणामसिद्धविरुद्धा-नैकान्तिकत्वादनुमानविषयत्वायोगात् कथं सत्तेतरयोः साध्यत्वम् १ ॥ तदु-क्रम्—असिद्धो भावधर्मश्वेद्व्यभिचार्युभयाश्रितः । विरुद्धो धर्मो भावस्य सा सत्ता साध्यते कथम् । इति ॥ तदयुक्रम्—मानसमत्यत्ते भावरूपस्यैव धर्मिणः मतिपन्नत्वात् ॥ न च तत्सिद्धौ तत्सत्त्वस्यापि मतिपन्नत्वाद्वयर्थमनुमानम् । तदभ्युपेतमपि वैययात्याद्यदा परो न मतिपद्यते तदाऽनुमानस्य साफल्यात् ॥ न च मानसद्द्रानाद्वगनकुसुमादेरपि सद्भावसम्भावनाऽतोऽतिमसङ्गः । तज्ज्ञानस्य बाधकमत्ययव्यपाकुतसत्ताकवस्तुविषयतया मानसमत्यत्तासत्वात् कथं तर्हि तुरगश्द्वादेधीर्मत्वमिति न चोद्यम्—धर्मिंमयोगकाले बाधकमत्य-यानुदयात्सत्त्वसम्भावनोपपत्तेः ॥ न च सर्वद्वादौ साधकप्रमाणासत्त्वेन सत्त्वं मति संशीतिः सुनिश्चित्तासम्भवाद्वाधकप्रमाणत्वेन सुखादाविव सत्त्वनि-श्वयात्तत्र संशयायोगात् ॥ इदानीं प्रमाणोभयसिद्धे धर्मिणि कि साध्यमि-त्याराङ्कायामाह-

प्रमागोभयसिंखे तु साध्यधर्मविशिष्टता ॥ ३० ॥

साध्ये इति शब्दः माक् द्विवचनान्तोऽप्यर्थवशादेकवचनान्ततया सम्ब ध्यते । ममाणं चोभयं च विकल्पममाणद्वयं, ताभ्यां सिद्धे धर्मिणि साध्य-धर्मविशिष्टता साध्या ॥ अयमर्थः – भमाणपतिपत्रमपि वस्तु विशिष्टधर्मा-धारतया विवादपदमारोहतीति साध्यतां नातिवर्त्तत इति एवमुभयसिद्धेऽपि योज्यम् ॥ ममाणोभयसिद्धं धर्मिंद्रयं क्रमेण दर्शयक्राह-

त्रगिनमानयं देशः परिगामी शब्द इति यथा ॥ ३१ ॥

देशो हि पत्यत्तेण सिद्धः शब्दस्तूभयसिद्धः । नहि पत्यत्तेणार्वाग्दर्शि-भिरनियतदिग्देशकालावच्छिमाः सर्वे शब्दा निश्वेतुं पार्थन्ते । सर्वदर्शिनस्तु

तत्रिश्वयेऽपि तं प्रत्यनुमानानर्थक्यात् ॥ प्रयोगकालापेत्तया धर्मविशिष्ट-धर्मिर्णः साध्यत्वमभिधाय व्याप्तिकालापेत्तया साध्यानियमं दर्शयत्राह--

# व्याप्तौ तु साध्यं धर्म ९वेति ॥ ३२ ॥

सुगमम् ॥ धर्मिणोऽपि साध्यत्वे को दोष इत्यत्राह-

### **श्चन्यथा तद्घटनादिति ॥ ३३ ॥**

उक्तविपर्ययेऽन्यथाशब्दः । धर्मिणः साध्यत्वे तदघटनात् व्याप्त्यघटना-दिति हेतुः ॥ न हि धूमदर्शनात्सर्वत्र पर्वतोऽग्निमानिति व्याप्तिः शक्या कर्तुं प्रमाणविरोधात् ॥ नन्वनुमाने पत्तप्रयोगस्यासम्भवात् प्रसिद्धो धर्मीत्यादिवचनमयुक्तम् । तस्य सामर्थ्यलब्धत्वात् ॥ तथापि तद्वचने पुनरुक्ततापसङ्गात् । अर्थादापत्रस्यापि पुनर्वचनं पुनरुक्तमित्यभिधाना-दिति सौगतस्तत्राइ--

साध्यधर्माधारसन्देहापनोदाय गम्यमानस्यापि पत्तस्य

## वचनम्॥ ३४॥

साध्यमेव धर्मस्तस्याधारस्तत्र सन्देहो महानसादिः पर्वतादिर्वेति । तस्यापनोदो व्यवच्छेदस्तदर्थं गम्यमानस्यापि साध्यसाधनयोर्व्याप्यव्या-पकभावप्रदर्शनान्यथानुपपत्तेस्तदाधारस्य गम्यमानस्यापि पत्तस्य वचनं प्रयोगः ॥ अत्रोदाहरण्माह—

साध्यधर्मिशि साधनधर्मावबोधनाय पत्नधर्मोपसंहारवत् ॥ ३४ ॥

साध्येन विशिष्टो धर्मी पर्वतादिस्तत्र साधनधर्मावबोधनाय पत्तधर्मो-पसंहारवत् । पत्तधर्मस्य हेतोरुपसंहार उपनयस्तद्वदिति ॥ अयमर्थः----साध्यव्याप्तसाधनप्रदर्शनेन तदाधारावगतावपि नियतधर्मिसम्बन्धिता-प्रदर्शनार्थं यथोपनयस्तथा साध्यस्य विशिष्टधर्मिसम्बन्धितावबोधनाय पत्त-वचनमपीति ॥ किश्व हेतुप्रयोगेऽपि समर्थनमवश्यं वक्तव्यम् । असमर्थितस्य हेतुत्वायोगात् ॥ तथा च समर्थनोपन्यासादेव हेतोः सामर्थ्यसिद्धत्वादेतु-प्रयोगोऽनर्थकः स्यात् । हेतुप्रयोगामावे कस्य समर्थनमिति चेत् --पत्तप्रयोगा-भावे क हेतुर्वर्ततामिति समानमेतत् ॥ तस्मात्कार्यस्वभाषानुपत्तम्भभेदेम पत्तधर्मत्वादिभेदेन च त्रिधा हेतुमुक्त्वा समर्थयमानेन पत्त्रप्रयोगोऽत्यभ्यु-पगन्तव्य एवेति ॥ अमुमेवार्थमाह-

को वा त्रिधा हेतुमुक्तवा समर्थयमानो न पत्तयति ॥ ३६ ॥

को वा वादी प्रतिवादी चेत्यर्थः । किलार्थे वा-शब्दः । युक्त्या पत्त-प्रयोगस्यावश्यंभावे कः किल न पत्तयति ? पत्तं न करोत्यपितु करोत्येव ॥ किं कुर्वन्समर्थयमानः । किं कृत्वा हेतुमुक्त्वैव । न पुनरनुक्त्वेत्यर्थः । समर्थनं हि हेतोरसिद्धत्वादिदोषपरिहारेण स्वसाध्यसाधनसामर्थ्यप्ररूपण-मबगां वचनम् । तच हेतुशयोगोत्तरकालं परेणाङ्गीकृतमित्युक्त्वेति वचनम् ॥ ननु भवतु पत्तप्रयोगस्तथापि पत्तहेतुदृष्टान्तभेदेन त्र्यवयवमनु-सांख्यः । मतिज्ञाहेतृदाहरगोपनयभेदेन चतुरवयवमिति मानमिति मीमांसकः । प्रतिश्वाहेतूदाहरग्णेपनयनिगमनभेदात्पश्चावयवमिति यौगः । तन्मतमपाकुर्वन्स्वमतसिद्धमवयवद्वयमेवोपदर्शयत्राह-

एतदृद्रयमेवानुमानाङ्गं नोदाहर रामिति ॥ ३७ ॥

एतयोः पत्तहत्वोद्वेयमेव नातिरिक्रमित्यर्थः । एवकारेणैवोदाहरणादि व्यवच्छेदे सिद्धेऽपि परमतनिरासार्थं पुनर्नोदाइररणमित्युक्रम् । तदि किं साध्यमतिपत्त्यर्थमृतस्विद्धेतोरविनाभावनियमार्थमाहोस्विद्व्याप्तिस्मरणा-र्थमिति विकल्पान् क्रमेण द्षयत्राह-

न हि तत्साध्यप्रतिपत्य क्नं तत्र यथोकहेतोरेव व्यापारात् ॥ ३८ ॥

तदुदाहरणं साध्यमतिपत्तेरक्नं कारणं नेति सम्बन्धः । तत्र साध्य-मतिपत्ती यथोक्नस्य साध्याविनाभावित्वेन निश्चितस्य हेतोव्यीपारादिति ॥ द्वितीयविकल्पं शोधयत्राह--तदविनाभावनिश्चयार्थं वा विपत्ते बाधकादेव तत्सिद्धेः ॥ ३६ ॥

तदिति वर्तते । नेति च । तेनायमर्थः तदुदाहरणं तेन साध्येना-विनाभावानिश्रयार्थं वा न भवतीति । विपत्ते बाधकादेव तरिसदेर-विनामावनिश्वयसिद्धेः ॥ किञ्च व्यक्तिरूपं निदर्शनं तत्कथं साकल्येन व्याप्ति गमयेत् । व्यक्त्यन्तरेषु व्याप्त्यर्थं पुनरुदाइरणान्तरं मृग्यम् । तस्यापि व्यक्तिरूपत्वेन सामान्येन व्याप्तेरवधारयितुमशक्य स्वाद परापर-तदन्तरापेत्तायामनवस्था स्यात् ॥ एतदेवाइ---

व्यक्तिरूपं च निदर्शनं सामान्येन तु व्याप्तिस्तत्रापि तद्विप्रति-पत्तावनवस्थानं स्यात् दृष्टान्तान्तरापेक्षणात् ॥ ४० ॥

तत्रापि उदाइरणेऽपि। तद्विपत्तिपत्तौ सामान्यव्याप्तिविमतिपत्तावित्यर्थः ॥ शेषं व्याख्यातम् ॥ तृतीयविकल्पे दूषणमाइ--

नापि व्याप्तिस्मरगार्थं तथाविधहेतुप्रयोगादेव तत्स्मृतेः ।। ४१ ॥

ष्टद्वीतसम्बन्धस्य हेतुमदर्शनेनैव व्याप्तिसिद्धिरग्रद्वीतसम्बन्धस्य दृष्टान्त-शत्वेनापि न तत्स्मरणमनुभूतविषयत्वात्स्मरणस्येति भावः ॥ तदेवमुदा-हरणमयोगस्य साध्यार्थं प्रति नोपयोगित्वं प्रत्युत्त संशयहेतुत्वमेवेति दर्शयति----

तत्परमभिधीयमानं साध्यधर्मिशि साध्य-

साधने सन्देहयति ॥ ४२ ॥

तदुदाइरणं परं केवलमभिधीयमानं साध्यधर्मिणि साध्यविशिष्टे धर्मिणि साध्यसाधने सन्देहयति सन्देहवती करोति । दृष्टान्तधार्मीणि साध्यव्याप्तसाधनोपदर्शनेऽपि साध्यधर्मिणि तत्रिर्णयस्य कर्तुमशक्य-त्वादिति शेषः ॥ अधुमेवार्थं व्यतिरेकपुखेन समर्थयमानः प्राह-

कुतोऽन्यथोपनयनिगमने ॥ ४३ ॥

श्चन्यथा संशयदेतुत्वाभावे कस्माद्धेतोरुपनयनिगमने मयुज्येते ॥ ऋपरः प्राह–उपनयनिगमनयोरप्यनुमानाङ्गत्वमेव, तदप्रयोगे निरवकर-साध्यसंवित्तेरयोगादिति । तन्निषेधार्थमाह–

न च ते तदङ्गे । साध्यधर्मिणि हेतुसाध्ययो-

र्वचनादेवासंशयात् ॥ ४४॥

ते उपनयनिगमने अपि वत्त्यमाणलत्त्तणे तस्यानुमानस्याङ्गे न भवतः । साध्यधर्मिणि इतुसाध्ययोर्वचनादेवेत्येवकारेण दृष्टान्तादिक-मन्तरेणेत्यर्थः ॥ किश्वाभिधायापि दृष्टान्तादिकं समर्थनमवश्यं वक्वव्यमसम-र्थितस्याहेतुत्वादिति तदेव वरं हेतुरूपमनुमानावयवो वाऽस्तु साध्यसिद्धौ-तस्यैवोपयोगात्रोदाहरणादिकमेतदेवाह--

# समर्थनं वा वरं हेतुरूपमनुमानावयवो बाऽस्तु साध्ये तदुपयोगात् ॥ ४४ ॥

मथमो वाशब्द एवकारार्थे । द्वितीयस्तु पत्तान्तरसूचने । शेषं सुगमम् ॥ ननु दृष्टान्तादिकमन्तरेण मन्दधियामवबोधयितुमशक्यत्वात्कथं पत्तहेतुमयोगमात्रेण तेषां साध्यविमतिपत्तिरिति तत्राह--

> बालव्युत्यत्त्वर्थं तत्रयोपगमे शास्त्र एवासौ न वादेऽनुपयोगादिति ॥ ४६ ॥

बालानां अल्पप्रज्ञानां व्युत्पत्त्यर्थं तेषामुदाइरणादीनां त्रयोपगमे शास्त्र एवासौ तत्रयोपगमो न वादे नहि वादकाले शिष्या व्युत्पाद्याः । व्युत्पन्नानामेव तत्राधिकारादिति ॥ बालच्युत्पत्त्यर्थं तत्रयोपगम इत्यादिना शास्त्रेऽभ्युपगतमेवोदाहरणादित्रयमुपदर्शयति–

दृष्टान्तो द्वेधा । अन्वयव्यतिरेकभेदादिति ॥ ४७ ॥

दृष्टतन्तौ साध्यसाधनलत्तरणौ धर्मीवन्वयमुखेन व्यतिरेकद्वारेण वा यत्र स दृष्टान्त इत्यन्वर्थसंज्ञाकरणात् । स द्वेधैवोपपद्यते ॥ तत्रान्वयदृष्टान्तं दर्शयत्राह--

साध्यव्याप्तं साधनं यत्र प्रदर्श्यते सोऽन्वयदृष्टान्तः ॥ ४८ ॥

साध्येन व्याप्तं नियतं साधनं हेतुर्यत्र दर्श्यते व्याप्तिपूर्वकतयेति भावः ॥ द्वितीयभेदमुपदर्शयति–

साख्यामावे साधनामावो यत्र कथ्यते स व्यतिरेकदृष्टान्तः ॥ ४९॥

असत्यसद्भावो व्यतिरेकः । तत्पधानो दष्टान्तो व्यतिरेकदष्टान्तः । साध्याभावे साधनस्याभाव एवेति सावधारणं द्रष्टव्यम् ॥ क्रमपाप्तमुपनयस्व-रूपं निरूपयति–

हेतोरुपसंहार उपनयः ॥ ४० ॥

पत्ते इत्यध्याहारः । तेनायमर्थः-हेतोः पत्तधर्मतयोपसंहार उपनय इति ॥ निगमनस्वरूपग्रुपदर्शति-

## प्रतिज्ञायास्तु निगमनमिति ॥ ४१ ॥

उपसंहार इति वर्त्तते । प्रतिज्ञाया उपसंहारः साध्यधर्मविशिष्टत्वेन पदर्शनं निगमनामित्यर्थः ॥ ननु शास्त्रे दृष्टान्तादयो वक्रव्या एवेति नियमानभ्युप-गमात्कथं तत्त्रयमिह सूरिभिः प्रपश्चितमिति न चोद्यम् । स्वयमनभ्युपगमेऽपि प्रतिपाद्यानुरोधेन जिनमतानुसारिभिः प्रयोगपरिपाट्याः प्रतिपन्नत्वात् । सा चाग्नाततत्स्वरूपैः कर्तुं न शक्यत इति तत्स्वरूपमपि शास्त्रेऽभिधातव्यमेवेति॥ तदेवं मतभेदेन द्वित्रिचतुःपञ्चावयवरूपमनुमानं द्विप्रकारमेवेति दर्शयत्राह-

# तदनुमानं द्वेधा॥ ५२ ॥

तद्द्वैविध्यमेवाह—

स्वार्थपरार्थमेदादिति ॥ ४२ ॥

स्वपरविप्रतिपत्तिनिरासफलत्वाद्द्रिविधमेवेति भावः स्वार्थानुमानभेदं द्र्शयन्नाह—

स्वार्थमुक्तलचरणम् ॥ ४४ ॥

साधनात्साध्यविद्वानमनुमानमिति पागुक्तं लच्च्र्यं यस्य तत्त्रथोक्तमि-त्यर्थेः ॥ द्वितीयमनुमानमेदं दर्शयत्राह—

परार्थं तु तदर्थपरामर्शिवचनाज्जातमिति ॥ ४४ ॥

तस्य स्वार्थानुमानस्यार्थः साध्यसाधनलत्तरणः । तं पराम्रशतीत्येवं शीलं तर्द्धपरामार्शि । तच तद्वचनं च तस्माज्जातमुत्पत्रं विद्वानं परार्थानु-मानमिति ॥ ननु वचनात्मकं परार्थानुमानं प्रसिद्धं, तत्कथं तर्द्धपति-पादकवचनजनितविद्वानस्य परार्थानुमानत्वमभिदधता न संग्रहीतमिति न वाच्यम् । अचेतनस्य सात्तात्प्रमितिहेतुत्वाभावेन निरूपचरितप्रमाणभावा-भावात् । मुख्यानुमानहेतुत्वेन तस्योपचरितानुमानव्यपदेशो न वार्यत एव ॥ तदेवोपचरितं परार्थानुमानत्वं तद्वचनस्याचार्यः प्राह--

तद्वचनमपि तद्धेतुत्वादिति ॥ ४६ ॥

उपचारो हि मुख्याभावे सति प्रयोजने निमित्ते च प्रवर्त्तते । तत्र वचनस्य परार्थानुमानत्वे निमित्तं तद्धेतुत्वम् । तस्य भतिपाद्यानुमानस्य हेतुस्तद्धे- तुस्तस्य भावस्तत्त्वम् । तस्मात्रिभित्तात्तद्वचनमपि परार्थानुमानप्रतिपाद-कवचनमपि परार्थानुमानमिति सम्बन्धः । कारणे कार्यस्योपचारात् ॥ अथवा तत्प्रतिपादकानुमानं हेतुर्यस्य तत्त्तद्वेतुस्तस्य भावस्तत्त्वं ततस्तद्वचन-मपि तथेति सम्बन्धः ॥ आ्रीसन्पत्ते कार्ये कारणस्योपचार इति शेषः ॥ वचनस्यानुमानत्वे च प्रयोजनमनुमानावयवाः प्रतिज्ञादय इति शास्ते व्यवहार एव ॥ ज्ञानात्मन्यनंशे तद्वचवहारस्याशक्यकल्पनत्वात् ॥ तदेवं साधनात् साध्यविज्ञानमनुमानमित्यनुमानसामान्यत्तत्तणम् ॥ तदनुमानंद्वेधेत्यादिना तत्त्रकारं च समपञ्चमभिधाय साधनमुक्तलत्त्तणापेत्तयैकमप्यातिसंत्तेपेण भिद्य-मानं द्विधिमित्युपदर्शयीत---

स हेतुर्द्वेघोपलब्ध्यनुपलब्धिभेदादिति ॥ ४७ ॥

सुगममेतत् ॥ तत्रोपलब्धिविंधिसाधिकैव । अनुपलब्धिः प्रतिषेधसाधि-कैवेति ॥ परस्य नियमं विघटयन्नुपलब्धेरनुपलब्धेरचाविशेषेण विधियति-षेधसाधनत्वमाइ—

उपलब्धिर्विधिप्रतिषेधयोरनुपलब्धिश्चेति ॥ ४८ ॥

गतार्थमेतत् ॥ इदानीमुपलब्धेरपि संत्तेपेख विरुद्धाविरुद्धभेदात् द्वैविध्य-मुपद्र्शयत्रविरुद्धोपलब्धेर्विधौ साध्ये विस्तरतो भेदमाह----

श्रविरुद्धोपलब्धिर्विधौ षोढा व्याप्यकार्यकारणपूर्वोत्तरसहचर-भेदादिति ॥ ४६ ॥

पूर्वं च उत्तरं च सह चेति द्वंद्वः । पूर्वोत्तरसह इत्येतेभ्यश्चर इत्यनुकरण-निर्देशः ॥ द्वन्द्वात् अयु्यमाणश्चरशब्दः मत्येकमभिसम्बध्यते । तेनायमर्थः पूर्वचरोत्तरचरसहचरा इति । पश्चाद्व्याप्यादिभिः सह द्वन्द्वः ॥ अत्राह सौगतः-विधिसाधनं द्विविधमेव । स्वभावकार्यभेदात् । कारणस्य तु कार्याविनाभावाभावादलिङ्गत्वम् । नावश्यं कारणानि कार्यवन्ति भवन्तीति वचनात् ॥ अप्रतिबद्धसामर्थ्यस्य कार्यम्पति गमकत्वमित्यपि नोत्तरम् । सामर्थ्यस्यातीन्द्रियतया विद्यमानस्यापि निश्चेतुमशक्यत्वादिति ॥ तदस-मीत्तिताभिधानमिति दर्शयितुमाह- रसादेकसामग्न्यनुमानेन रूपानुमानमिच्छद्भिरिष्टमेव किञ्चित्कारण' हेतुर्यत्रसामर्थ्याप्रतिबन्धकारणान्तरावैकल्ये ॥ ६० ॥

त्रास्वाद्यमानादि रसात्तज्जनिका सामग्रयनुमीयते । ततो रूपानुमानं भवति । माक्वनो हि रूपत्तणः सजातीयं रूपत्तणान्तरत्वत्तणं कार्यं कुर्ववेव विजातीयं रसलत्तणं कार्यं करोतीति रूपानुमानमिच्छद्धिरिष्टमेव किश्चि-त्कारणं हेतुः माक्तनस्य रूपलत्तत्तणस्य सजातीयरूपत्तणान्तराव्यभिचारात् । अन्यथा रससमानकात्तरूपभतिपत्त्तरेयोगात् ॥ नह्यनुकूत्तमात्रमन्त्यत्तणप्राप्तं वा कारणं त्तिङ्गमिष्यते । येन मणिमन्त्रादिना सामर्थ्यमतिबन्धात्कारणान्तर-वैकल्येन वा कार्यव्यभिचारित्वं स्यात् ॥ द्वितीयत्त्तणे कार्यभत्यत्तीकरणे-नाऽनुमानानर्थक्यं वा । कार्याविनाभावितया निश्चित्तस्य विशिष्टकारणस्य छत्रादेर्त्तिङ्गत्वेनाङ्गीकरणात् ॥ यत्र सामर्थ्याप्ततिवन्धः कारणान्तरावैकल्यं निश्चीयते तस्यैव त्रिङ्गत्वं नान्यस्येति नोक्वदोषमसङ्गः ॥ इदानीं पूर्वोत्तरचर्याः स्वभावकार्यकरणेष्वनन्तर्भावाद्वेदान्तरत्वमेवेति दर्शयति--

> न च पूर्वे।त्तरचारिग्गोस्तादात्म्यं तदुत्पत्तिर्वा काल-व्यवधाने तदनुपलब्धेरिति ॥ ६१ ॥

तादात्म्यसम्बन्धे साध्यसाधनयोः स्वभावहेतावन्तर्भावः, तदुत्पत्ति-सम्बन्धे च कार्ये कारणे वान्तर्भावो विभाव्यते । न च तदुभयसम्भवः कालव्यवधाने तदनुपलब्धेः । सहभाविनोरेव तादात्म्यसम्भवादनन्तरयोरेव पूर्वोत्तरत्तरणयोईतुफलभावस्य दृष्टत्वात् । व्यवहितयोस्तदघटनात् ॥ ननु कालव्यवधानेऽपि कार्यकारणभावो दृश्यत एव । यथा जाग्रत्मबुद्धदशा-भाविमबोधयोर्भरणारिष्टयोर्वेति ॥ तत्परिहारार्थमाइ---

> भाव्यतीतयोर्भरखजाग्रद्बोधयोरपि नारि-ष्टोद्वोधौ प्रति हेतुत्वम् ॥ ६२ ॥

सुगममेतत् ॥ अत्रैवोपपत्तिमाह----

तद्वचापाराश्रितं हि तद्भावभावित्वम् ॥ ६३ ॥

हिशब्दो यस्मादर्थे । यस्मात्तस्य कारणस्य भावे कार्यस्य भावित्वं

तद्भावभावित्वं तच्च तद्वचापाराश्रितं तस्माञ्च प्रकृतयोः कार्यकारस्णभाव इत्यर्थः ॥ अयमर्थः-- अन्वयव्यतिरेकसमाधिगम्यो हि सर्वत्र कार्यकारस-भावः । तौ च कार्यम्प्रति कारसव्यापारसव्यपेत्तावेवोपपस्येते कुलालस्येव कलशम्प्रति । न चातिव्यवहितेषु तद्वचापाराश्रितत्वमिति ॥ सहचरस्याप्यु-क्रहेतुष्वनन्तर्भावं दर्शयति---

सहचारिणोरपि परस्परपरिहारेणावस्थानात्सहोत्पादाच ॥ ६४ ॥

हेत्वन्तरत्वमिति शेषः । अयमभिषायः परस्परपरिहारेग्रोपालम्भात्ता-दात्म्यासम्भवात्स्वभावहेतावनन्तर्भावः । सहोत्पादाच न कार्ये कारग्रे वेति ॥ न च समानसमयवार्तिनोः कार्यकारग्रभावः सव्येतरगोविषाणवत् । कार्यकारग्रयोः मतिनियमाभावमसङ्गाच ॥ तस्माद्धेत्वन्तरत्वमेवेति ॥ इदानीं व्याप्यहेतुं क्रममाप्तभुदाहरन्तुक्तान्वयव्यतिरेकपुरस्सरं मतिपाद्याश्रयवशात्म-तिपादितमतिझाधवयवपश्चकं प्रदर्शयति-

परिणामी शब्दः कृतकत्वात् । य एवं स एवं दृष्टो, यथा घटः, कृतकश्चायं, तस्मात्परिणामीति, यस्तु न परिणामी स न कृतको दृष्टो यथा वन्ध्यास्तनन्धयः,

कृतकरचायं, तस्मात्परिणामीति ॥ ६५ ॥

स्वोत्पत्तौ त्र्रापेच्चितव्यापारो हि भावः क्वतक उच्यते । तच क्वतकत्वं न कूटस्थनित्यपत्ते नापि चाणिकपत्ते किन्तु परिणामित्वे सत्येवेत्यग्रे वद्यते ।। कार्यहेतुमाह—

श्रस्त्यत्र देहिनि बुद्धिव्याहारादेः ॥ ६६ ॥

कारणहेतुमाइ---

श्रस्त्यत्र च्छाया छत्रात् ॥ ६७ ॥

अथ पूर्वचरहेतुमाइ-

उदेष्यति शकटं कृत्तिकोदयात् ॥ ६⊏ ॥ मुहूर्तान्ते इति सम्बन्धः ॥ ग्रथोत्तरचरः---- उदगाद्भरणिः प्राक्तत एव ॥ ६९ ॥

अत्रापि मुहूर्तात्पागिति सम्बन्धनीयं, तत एव कृत्तिकोदयादेवेत्यर्थः ॥ सहचरत्तिङ्गमाह—

श्रस्त्यत्र मातुलिङ्गे रूपं रसात् ॥ ७० ॥ विरुद्धोपत्तव्धिमाह—

विरुद्धतदुपलन्धिः प्रतिषेधे तथेति ॥ ७१ ॥

मतिषेधे साध्येऽमतिषेध्येन विरुद्धानां सम्बन्धिनस्ते व्याप्यादयस्ते-षामुपत्तब्धय इत्यर्थः । तथेति षोढेति भावः ।। तत्र साध्यविरुद्धव्याप्यो-पत्तब्धिमाह—

नास्त्यत्र शीतस्पर्श श्रीष्एयात् ॥ ७२ ॥

शीतस्पर्शप्रतिषेधेन हि विरुद्धोऽग्निस्तद्वचाप्यमौष्एयमिति ॥ विरुद्ध-कार्योपलम्भमाह—

नास्त्यत्र शीतस्पर्शे। धूमात् ॥ ७३ ॥

अत्रीपि प्रतिषेध्यस्य साध्यस्य शीतस्पर्शस्य विरुद्धोऽग्निस्तस्य कार्यं धूम इति ॥ विरुद्धकारग्णेपलाव्धिमाह----

नास्मिन् शरीरिणि सुखमस्ति हृदयशल्यात् ॥ ७४ ॥ सुखावेरोधि दुःखं, तस्य कारणं हृदयशल्यमिति ॥ विरुद्धपूर्वचरमाह—

नोदेष्यति मुहूर्तान्ते शकटं रेवत्युदयात् ॥ ७४ ॥ शकटोदयविरुद्धो ब्रश्विन्युदयस्तत्पूर्वचरो रेवत्युदय इति ॥ विरुद्धो-त्तरचरं लिक्रमाइ—

नोदगाद्भराष् नोदगाद्भरणिमु हर्तात्पूर्वं पुष्योदयात् ॥७६ ॥ भरण्युदयाविरुद्धो हि पुनर्वसूदयस्तदुत्तरचरः पुष्योदय इति ॥ विरुद्ध-सहचरमाह--

नास्त्यत्र भित्तौ परभागाभात्रोऽर्वाग्भागदर्शनादिति ॥७७ ॥ परभागाभावस्य विरुद्धस्तद्रावस्तत्सद्दचरोर्ज्वाग्भाग इति ॥ श्रविरुद्धा-नुपलब्धिभेदमाह— श्रविरुद्धानुपलुब्धिः प्रतिषेधे सप्तधा स्वभावव्यापककार्यकारण-

पूर्वा तरसहचरानुपलम्भभेदादिति ॥ ७८ ॥ स्वभावादिपदानां द्वन्द्वः तेषामनुपत्तम्भ इति पश्चाच्चष्ठीतत्पुरुषः समासः ॥ स्वभावानुपलम्भोदाइरणमाह—

नास्त्यत्र भूतले घटोऽनुपत्तब्धेः ॥ ७६ ॥

पिशाचपरमाएवादिभि<sup>हुं</sup>यभिचारपरिहारार्थमुपलब्धिलत्तरण्याप्तत्वे ग्रम्र सतीति विशेषणमुत्रेयम् ॥ व्यापकानुपलब्धिमाइ----

नास्त्यत्र शिशपा वृत्तानुपलब्धेः ॥ ८० ॥

शिंशपात्वं हि दृत्तत्वेन व्याप्तम् । तद्भावे तद्व्याप्यशिंशपाया त्रप्यभावः । कार्यातुपत्तव्धिमाद— नास्त्यत्राप्रतिबद्धसामथ्यो ऽग्निर्घूमानुपत्तव्धेः ॥ ⊏१ ॥

अप्रतिबद्धसामर्थ्य हि कार्यं प्रत्यनुपहतशक्तिकत्वमुच्यते । तदभावरच कार्यानुपलम्भादिति ॥ कारणानुपलब्धिमाइ---

नास्त्यत्र धूमोऽनग्नेः ॥ ⊂२ ॥

पूर्वचरानुप्राब्धिमाह—

न भविष्यति मुहूर्तान्ते शकटं कृत्तिकोदयानुपलब्धेः ॥ ८३ ॥ उत्तरचरानुपलाव्धमाह----

नोदगाद्भरणिमु हूर्तात्प्राक्तत एव॥ ८४ ॥

तत एव कृत्तिकोंदयानुपत्तब्धेरेवेत्यर्थः ॥ सहचरानुपत्तब्धिः माप्त-कालेत्याह—

नास्त्यत्र समतुलायामुन्नामो नामानुपलुब्धेः ॥ ५५ ॥

विरुद्धकार्याद्यनुपलब्धिविंधौ सम्भवतीत्याचस्तार्यास्तझेदास्त्रय एवेति तानेव मदर्शयितुमाह----

विरुद्धानुपल्चिधिविधौ त्रेधा । विरुद्धकार्यकारणस्वभावा-

नुपलब्धिभेदात् ॥ म६ ॥

विरुद्धकार्याद्यनुपत्ताव्धिविधौ सम्भवतीति विरुद्धकार्यकारणस्वभावा-नुपत्तब्धिरिति ॥ तत्र विरुद्धकार्यानुपलाब्धिमाह----

γį

यथाऽस्मिन्प्राशिनि व्याधिविशेषोऽस्ति निरामयचेष्टा-

नुपलन्धेरिति ॥ ८७ ॥

व्याधिविशेषस्य हि विरुद्धस्तद्भावस्तस्य कार्यं निरामयचेष्टा तस्या अनुपत्तव्धिरिति ।। विरुद्धकारणानुपत्तव्धिमाइ----

श्रस्त्यत्र देहिनि दुःखमिष्टसंयोगाभावात् ॥ ८८ ॥ दुःखविरोधि सुर्खं, तस्य कारणमिष्टसंयोगस्तदनुपत्तन्धिरिति ॥ विरुद्ध-स्वभावानुपत्तन्धिमाह—

त्रनेकान्तात्मकं वस्त्वेकान्तस्वरूपानुप**ल**ब्धेः ॥ ⊏६॥

अनेकान्तात्मकविरोधी नित्याचेकान्तः।न पुनस्तद्विषयाविज्ञानम् । तस्य मिथ्याज्ञानरूपतयोपलम्भसम्भवात् ॥ तस्य स्वरूपं वास्तवाकारस्तस्यानु-पत्तब्धिः ॥ ननु च व्यापकविरुद्धकार्यादीनां परम्परया विरोधिकार्या-दिलिङ्गानां च बहुलमुपलम्भसम्भवात्तान्यपि किमिति नाचार्यैरुदाहृतानी-त्याशङ्कायामाह—

परम्परया सम्भवत्साधनमत्रैवान्तर्भावनीयम् ॥ ९० ॥

अत्रैवैतेषु कार्यादिध्वित्यर्थः ॥ तस्यैव साधनस्योपलत्तरणार्थमुदाहरण-द्रयं प्रदर्शयति---

त्रभूदन्न चके शिवकः स्थासात्॥ ११ ॥

एतच किं संहितं कान्तर्भवतीत्यारेकायामाइ-

कार्यकार्यमविरुद्धकार्योपलब्धौ ॥ ९२ ॥

द्यन्तर्भावनीयमिति सम्बन्धः । शिवकस्य हि कार्यं छत्रकं, तस्य कार्यं स्थास इति ।। दृष्टान्तद्वारेण द्वितीयहेतुमुदाहरति—

> नास्त्यत्र गुहायां मृगकीडनं मृगारिसंशब्दनात् । कारण-विरुद्धकार्यं विरुद्धकायो पलब्धौ यथेति ॥ ६३ ॥

मृगक्रीडनस्य हि कारणं मृगस्तस्य विरोधी मृगारिस्तस्य कार्यं तच्छ-ब्दनमिति । इदं यथा विरुद्धकार्योपलब्धावन्तर्भवति तथा प्रकृतमपीत्यर्थः॥ बालव्युत्पत्त्यर्थं पञ्चावयवप्रयोग इत्युक्तं व्युत्पत्तं प्रति कथं प्रयोगनियम इति शङ्कायामाह---- व्युत्पन्नप्रयोगस्तु तथोपक्त्याऽन्यथानुपक्त्यैव वा ॥ ९४ ॥

व्युत्पन्नस्य व्युत्पन्नाय वा प्रयोगः क्रियते इति शेषः। तथोपपत्त्या तथा साध्ये सत्येवोपपत्तिस्तया अन्यथानुपपत्त्यैव वा अन्यथा साध्याभावे-ऽनुपपत्तिस्तया ॥ तामेवानुमानमुद्रामुन्मुद्रयति—

> श्रग्निमानयं देशस्तथैत्र धूमवत्वोपपत्तेर्धू मश्रत्वान्यथा-नुपपत्तेर्वेति ॥ ९४ ॥

ननु तद्तिरिक्तदृष्टान्तादेरपि व्याप्तिमतिपत्तावुपयोगित्वात् । व्युत्पन्ता-पेत्तया कथं तदमयोग इत्याद----

हेतुप्रयोगा हि यथाव्यासिग्रहग्रं विधीयते सा च तावन्मात्रेग् व्युत्पक्रेंग्वधार्यत इति ॥ ९६ ॥

हिशब्दो यस्मादर्थे, यस्माध्याच्याप्तिप्रइर्णं व्याप्तिप्रइणानतिकमेण्णैव हेतुप्रयोगो विधीयते । सा च तावन्मात्रेण व्युत्पन्नैस्तथोपपत्त्याऽन्यथानु-पपत्त्या वाऽवधार्यते दृष्टान्तादिकमन्तरेण्णैवेत्यर्थः ॥ यथा दृष्टान्तादेव्याप्ति-प्रतिपत्तिम्प्रत्यनङ्गत्वं तथा प्राक्त प्रपश्चितमिति नेइ पुनः मतन्यते ॥ नापि दृष्टान्तादिप्रयोगः साध्यसिद्धचर्थं फलवानित्याइ---

तावता च साध्यसिद्धिः ॥ १७ ॥

चकार एवकारार्थे । निश्चितविपत्तासम्भवहेतुमयोगमात्रेणैव साध्य-सिद्धिरित्यर्थः ॥ तेन पत्तप्रयोगोऽपि सफल इति दर्शयत्राह----

तेन पद्मस्तदाधारसूचनायोक्तः ॥ १८ ॥

यतस्तथोपपत्त्र्यम्यथानुपपत्तिभयोगमात्रेण व्याप्तिमतिपत्तिस्तेन हेतुना पत्तस्तदाधारसूचनाय साध्यव्याप्तसाधनाधारसूचनायोकः ॥ ततो यदुक्तं परेख-तद्भावहेतुभावो हि दृष्टान्ते तदवेदिनः ॥ ख्याप्येते विदुषां वाच्यो हेतुरेव हि केवलः ॥ १ ॥ इति तत्रिरस्तम् ॥ व्युत्पन्नं मति यथोक्रहेतुमयो-गोऽपि पत्तमयोगाभावे साधनस्य नियताधारतानवधारणात् ॥ अथानुमा-नस्वरूपं मतिपाधेदानीं क्रममाप्तमागमस्वरूपं निरूपयितुमाह-

#### प्रमेयरत्नमाला

# **श्राप्तवचनादिनिबन्धनमर्थज्ञानमागमः ॥ ९९ ॥**

यो यत्रावञ्चकः स तत्राप्तः । आप्तस्य वचनम् । आदिशब्देनांगुल्या-दिसंज्ञापरिग्रहः । आप्तवचनमादिर्यस्य तत्तथोक्नं तनिबन्धनं यस्यार्थज्ञा-नस्येति ॥ त्राप्तशब्दोपादानादपौरुषेयत्वव्यवच्चदेः । अर्थज्ञानामत्यनेना-न्याप्तेइज्ञानस्याभिमायसृचनस्य च निरासः ॥ नन्वसम्भवीदं लत्तरण. नित्यत्वेनापौरुषेयत्वादाप्तप्रणतित्वायोगात् 1 तन्नित्यत्वं च शब्द स्य तद्वयवानां वर्णानां व्यापकत्वात्रित्यत्वाच ।। न च तद्वचापकत्वमसिद्धम् । एकत्र मयुक्तस्य गकारादेः मत्यभिश्चया देशान्तरेऽपि ग्रहणात् ॥ स एवायं गकार इति नित्यत्वमपि तयैवावसीयते । कालान्तरेऽपि तस्यैवं गकारादे-निश्चयात् ॥ इतो वा नित्यत्वं शब्दस्य सङ्केतान्यथानुपपत्तेरिति । तथाहि गृहीतसङ्केतस्य शब्दस्य प्रध्वंसे सत्यग्रहीतसंकेतः शब्द इदानीमन्य एवो-पलभ्यते इति तत्कथमर्थप्रत्ययः स्यात् १ न चासौ न भवतीति स एवायं शब्द इति प्रत्यभिद्वानस्यात्रापि सुलभत्वाच ॥ न च वर्णानां शब्दस्य वा नित्यत्वे सवैं: सर्वदा अवणप्रसङ्गः । सर्वदा तदभिव्यक्नेरसम्भवात् । तद्सम्भवश्चाभिव्यञ्जकवायूनां प्रतिनियतत्वात् ॥ न च तेषामन-ममार्गमतिपत्रत्वात् ॥ तथाहि-वक्तरमुखनिकटदेशवर्तिभिः पपञत्वम् । स्पर्शनेनाध्यत्तेण व्यञ्जका वायवो ग्रह्मन्ते । दुग्देशस्थितेन मुखसमी-पस्थिततूलचलनादनुमीयन्ते । श्रोतृश्रोत्रदेशे शब्द श्रवगान्यथानुप्पत्तेरर्था-पत्त्यापि निश्चीयन्ते ॥ किञ्चोत्पत्तिपत्तेऽपि समानोऽयं दोषः । तथाहि वाय्वाकाशसंयोगादसमवायिकारणादाकाशाच समवायिकारणाहिग्देशा-द्यविभागेनोत्पद्यमानोऽयं शब्दो न सर्वेरनुभूयते । ऋषि तु नियतदिग्देशस्थै-रेव तथाऽभिव्यज्यमानोऽपि ॥ नाष्यभिव्यक्रिसांकर्यमुभयत्रापि समान-स्वादेव । तथाहि--अन्धैस्ताल्वादिसंयोगैर्यथान्यो वर्णों न क्रियते तथा ध्वन्यन्तरसारिभिस्ताल्वादिभिरन्यो ध्वनिर्मारभ्यते इत्युत्पत्त्यभिव्यक्त्योः समानत्वेनैकत्रैव पर्यनुयोगावसर इति सर्वं सुस्थम् ॥ मानूद्रर्णानां तदात्म-कस्य वा शब्दस्य कौटस्थानित्यत्वम् । तथाप्यनादिपरम्परायातत्वेन वेदस्य नित्यत्वात्प्रकृतलत्तरणस्याव्यापकत्वम् ॥ न च मवाइनित्यत्वमयमा-णकमेवास्येति युक्तं वक्तुम् ॥ अधुना तत्कर्तुरनुपलम्भादतीतानागतयोरपि

88

लिङ्गस्याभावात्तदभावोऽपि सर्वदार्यतान्द्रिय-कालयोस्तदनुमापकस्य प्रत्यत्तपत्रमेव हि साध्यसाधनसम्बन्धस्येन्द्रियग्राह्यत्वायोगात् П ग्रहीतसम्बन्धस्यैकदेशसन्दर्शनादसन्तिक्रष्टेऽर्थे हि लिङ्गम् । ग्रनुमानं बुद्धिरित्यभिधानात् ॥ नाप्यर्थापत्तेस्तत्सिद्धिः । अ्रन्यथाभूतस्यार्थस्याभा-वादुपमानोपमेययोरमत्यत्तत्वाच नाष्युपमानं साधकम् ॥ केवलमभावप-मारगुमेवावशिष्यते तच तद्भावसाधकमिति ॥ न पुरुषसद्भावव-ৰ दस्यापि दुःसाध्यत्वात्संशयापत्तिस्तदभावसाधकप्रमार्गानां सुलभत्वात् ॥ अधुना हि तदमावप्रत्यचमेवातीतानागतयोः कालयोरनुमानं तदभावसा-धकमिति ॥ तथा च-व्रतीतानागतौ कास्तो वेदकारविवर्जितौ ॥ कालश-ब्दाभिधेयत्वादिदानीन्तनकालवत् ।। १ ॥ वेदस्याध्ययनं सर्वे तदध्ययन-पूर्वकम् 🔢 वेदाध्ययनवाच्यत्वादघुनाध्ययनं तथेति ॥ २ ॥ तथा अपौ-रुपेयो वेदः अनवच्छित्रसम्प्रदायत्वे सत्यस्मर्यमार्ग्यकर्तृकत्वादाकाशवत् ॥ प्रामार्ख्यलत्तरग्रस्यार्थस्यानन्यथाभूतस्य दशेनात्तदभावे **अर्थापत्तिर**पि निश्चीयते ॥ धर्माद्यतीन्द्रियार्थविषयस्य वेदस्यार्घाग्दार्शभिः कर्तुमशक्य-स्वात् । प्रतीन्द्रियार्थद्शिनश्चाभावात्प्रामाण्यमपौरुषेयतामेव कल्पयतीति ।। अत्र मतिविधीयते- यत्ताबदुकं वर्ग्यानां व्यापित्वे नित्यत्वे च मत्यभिक्का-मनारणमिति, तदसत् । मत्याभिझायास्तत्र मनारणत्वायोगात् ॥ देशान्तरेऽपि तस्यैव वर्श्यस्य सत्त्वे खराडशः मतिपत्तिः स्यात् । नहि सर्वत्र व्याप्त्या वर्तमानस्यैकस्मिन्यदेशे सामस्त्येन ग्रहणमुपपत्तियुक्रम् । अव्यापकत्वमस-ङ्गात् ।। घटादेरपि व्यापकत्वमसङ्गः । शक्यं हि वक्तुमेवं घटः सर्वगतश्च-ज्ञरादिसन्निधानादनेकत्र देशे मतीयत इति ॥ नतु धटोत्पादकस्य मृत्यि-एहादेरनेकस्योपलम्मादनेकत्वमेव । तथा महदग्गुपरिमाणसम्भवाचेति ॥ तच वर्गेष्वपि समानम् । तत्रापि मतिनियतताल्यादिकारणकलापस्य तीवा-दिधर्मभेदस्य च सम्भवाविरोधात् । ताल्वादीनां व्यञ्जकत्वमत्रैव निषेत्स्यत इत्यास्तां तावदेतत् ॥ अथ व्याप्तित्वेऽपि सर्वत्र सर्वारमना द्रत्तिमत्वात्र दोषोऽयमिति चेत्र । तथा सति सर्वथैकत्वविरोधात् । नहि देशभेदेन युग-परसर्वात्मना प्रतीयमानस्यैकत्वमुपपत्रं ममारणविरोधात् ॥ तथा च प्रयोगः---प्रत्येकं गकारादिवर्णोऽनेक एव युगपद्धित्रदेशतया तथेव सर्वात्मनोपलभ्य-मानत्वात् घटादिवत् ॥ न सामान्येन व्यभिचारः । तस्यापि सदृशपरिग्ण-

मात्मकस्यानेकत्वात् । नापि पर्वताद्यनेकप्रदेशस्थतया युगपदनेकदेश-स्थितपुरुषपरिदृश्यमानेन चन्द्रार्कादिना व्यभिचारः । तस्यातिद्विष्ठतयैक-देशस्थितस्यापि भ्रान्तिवशादनेकदेशस्थत्वेन प्रतीतेः ॥ न चाभ्रान्तस्य भ्रान्तेन व्यभिचारकल्पना युक्नेति । नापि जलपात्रमतिबिम्बेन । तस्यापि चन्द्रार्कादिसन्निधिमपेदय तथापरिरणममानस्यानेकत्वात् । तस्मादनेकमदेशे युगपत्सर्वात्मनोपलभ्यमानविषयस्यैकस्यासम्भाव्यमानत्वात्तत्र प्रवर्त्तमानं प्रत्यभिज्ञानं न प्रमार्गमिति स्थितम् ॥ तथा नित्यत्वमपि न प्रत्यभिज्ञानेन निश्चीयत इति । नित्यत्वं हि एकस्यानेकत्तराज्यापित्वम् । तचान्तराले सत्तानुपसम्भेन न शक्यते निश्चेतुम् । न च मत्यभिज्ञानबस्नेनेवान्तराले सत्तासम्भवः । तस्य सादृश्यादपि सम्भवाविरोधात् ॥ न च घटादावत्येवं भसङ्गः । तस्योत्पत्तावपरापरमृत्पिएडान्तरलत्तरणस्य कारगणस्यासम्भाव्य-मानत्वेनान्तराले सत्तायाः साधायतुं शक्यत्वात् । अत्र तु कारणानाम-पूर्वाणां व्यापारसम्भावनातो नान्तराले सत्तासम्भव इति ॥ यचान्यदुक्तं संकेतान्यथानुपपत्तेः शब्दस्य नित्यत्वमिति । इदमप्यनात्मझभाषितमेव श्रनित्येऽपि योजयितुं शक्यत्वात् ॥ तथा हि गृहीतसंकेतस्य दएडस्य प्रध्वंसे सत्यग्रदीतसंकेत इदानीमन्य एव दएडः समुपलभ्यत इति दएडीति न स्यात् । तथा धूमस्यापि ग्रहीतव्याप्तिकस्य नाशे अन्यधूमद्र्शनाद्वद्विविज्ञाना-मावरच ।। अथ साहरयात्तथामतीतेर्ने दोष इति चेदत्रापि साहश्यवशादर्थ-मत्यये को दोषः ? । येन नित्यत्वेऽत्र दुरभिनिवेश आश्रीयते । तथा कल्पनायामन्तराले सत्त्वमध्यदृष्टं, न कल्पितं स्यादिति ॥ यचान्यदभिहितं व्यछकानां प्रतिनियतत्वात्र युगपत् श्रुतिरिति तद्प्याशिक्षितलक्षितम् । समानेन्द्रियश्राग्रेषु समानधर्मसु समानदेशेषु विषयिविषयेषु नियमायोगात् ॥ तथाहि-अत्रिं समानदेशसमानेन्द्रियग्राह्यसमानधर्मापत्रानामर्थानां ग्रहणाय प्रतिनियतसंस्कारकसंस्कार्यं न भवति । इन्द्रियत्वात् चत्तुर्वत् ।। शब्दा वा मतिनियतसंस्कारकसंस्कार्या न भवान्ति ! समानदेशसमानेन्द्रियग्राग्रसमान-धर्मापत्रत्वे सति युगपदिन्द्रियसम्बद्धत्वात् । घटादिवत् ॥ उपपत्तिपत्ते-अ्ययं दोषः समान इति न वाच्यं मृत्पिएडदीपदृष्टान्ताभ्यां कारकव्यञ्जक-पत्तयोर्विशेषासिद्धेरित्यलमतिजल्पितेन ॥ यच्चान्यत्प्रवाइनित्यत्वेन वेदस्या-

१ अत्पत्तिपचे, इत्यपि पाठमेदः ॥

88

पौरुषेयत्वमिति तत्र किं शब्दमात्रस्यानादिनित्यत्वमुत विशिष्टानामिति १ त्राद्यपत्ते य एव शब्दा लौकिकास्त एव वैदिका इत्यल्पमिदमभिधीयते वेद एवापौरुषेय इति । किन्तु सर्वेषामपि शास्त्राणामपौर्षपेयतेति ॥ अथ विशि-ष्टानुपूर्विका एव शब्दा अनादित्वेनाभिधीयन्ते तेषामवगतार्थानामनवगता-र्थानां वा अनादिता स्यात ? यदि तावदुत्तरः पत्तस्तदाऽज्ञानलत्तगाममान-रायमनुषज्यते ॥ अथ आद्यः पत्त आश्रीयते तद्च्याख्यातारः किञ्चिजज्ञाभवेयुः वा १ प्रथमपत्ते दुराधिगमसम्बन्धानामन्यथाप्यर्थस्य केल्पयितुं सर्वज्ञा इति शब्दा वदन्ति न । कल्प्योऽयमर्थः पुरुषेस्ते च रागादिविष्लुताः ।।१।। किञ्च किञ्चिज्इव्याख्यातार्थाविशेषात् अग्निहोत्रं जुहुयात् स्वर्गकाम इत्यस्य सादेच्डवमांसमित्यपि वाक्यार्थः किं न स्यात् संशयलत्तरणममामाएयं वा ॥ श्रथ सर्वविद्विदितार्थ एव वेदोऽऽनादिपरंपराऽयात इति चेत् । हन्त धर्भे चोदनैव ममाणमिति इतमेतत् ॥ अतीन्द्रियार्थप्रत्यचीकरणसमर्थस्य पुरुषस्य सद्धावे च तद्वचनस्यापि चोदनावत्तदवबोधकत्वेन पामाएयाद्वेदस्य पुरुषा-भावसिद्धेस्तत्मतिबन्धकं स्यात् ॥ अथ तद्व्याख्यातृणां किश्चिज्झत्वेऽपि यथा-र्धव्याख्यानपरम्पराया अनवच्छित्रसन्तानत्वेन सत्यार्थ एव वेदोऽवसीयत इति चेन्न । किंचिज्ज्ञानामतीन्द्रियार्थेषु निःसंशयव्याख्यानायोगादन्धेना-कृष्यमाग्रस्यान्धस्यानिष्टदेशपरिहारेणाभिमतपथप्रमाग्रानुपपत्तेः ॥ किश्चा-नादिव्याख्यानपरम्परागतत्वेऽपि वेदार्थस्य ग्रहीतविस्मृतसम्बन्धवचनाकौ-शलदुष्टाभिन्नायतया व्याख्यानस्यान्यथैव करणादविसंवादायोगादपामाएय-मेव स्यात् । दृश्यन्ते ह्यधुनातना ऋषि ज्योतिःशास्त्रादिषु रहस्यं यथार्थमन-यन्तोऽपि दुरभिसंधेरन्यथा व्याचत्ताखाः । केचिज्जानन्तोऽपि वचनाकौश-लादन्यथोपदिशन्तः । केचिद्रिस्मृतसम्बन्धा अयाथातथ्यमभिद्धाना इति ।। कथमन्यथा भावनाविधिनियोगवाक्यार्थप्रतिपत्तिर्वेदे स्यान्मनुयाज्ञवल्क्या-दीनां अत्यर्थानुसारिस्मृतिनिरूपणायां वा १ तस्मादनादिमवाहपतितत्वेऽपि वेदस्यायथार्थस्यमेव स्यादिति स्थितम् ॥ यचोक्रमतीतानागतावित्यादि तदपि स्वमतनिर्मूलनहेतुत्वेन विपरीतसाधनात्तदाभासमेवेति ॥ तथाहि----''त्रज्ञतातानागतौ कालौ वेदार्थज्ञविवर्जितौ ।। कालराब्दाभिधेयत्वादधुनात-नकालवदिति'' ॥ १ ॥ किञ्च कालशब्दाभिवेयत्वमतीतानागतयोः कात्त-

योर्भ्रहणे सति भवति । तद्प्रहणं च नाध्यज्ञतस्तयोरतीन्द्रियत्वात् ॥ अनु-मानतस्तद्ग्रह रोऽपि न साध्येन सम्बन्धस्तयोर्निश्चेतुं पार्थते । प्रत्यत्तगृही-तस्यैव तत्सम्बन्धाभ्युपगमात् ॥ न च कालाख्यं द्रव्यं मीमांसकस्यास्ति ॥ मसङ्ग्रसाधनाददोष इति चेत्र । परम्पति साध्यसाधनयोव्याप्यव्यापकमा-वाभावादिदानीमपि देशान्तरे वेदकारस्याष्टकादेः सौगतादिभिरभ्युपगमात् ॥ यद्ट्यपरं वेदाध्ययनमित्यादि तदपि विपत्तेऽपि समानम्-"मारताध्य-यनं सर्व गुर्वध्ययनपूर्वकम् । तदध्ययनवाच्यत्वादधुनाध्ययनं यथे"ति ॥ १ ॥ यचान्यदुक्रम्—-अनवच्छित्रसम्पदायत्वे सत्यस्मर्यमाणकर्तृत्वादिति । तत्र जीर्ग्येकुपारामादिभिव्यंभिचारनिद्वत्यर्थमनवच्छित्रसम्प्रदायत्वविशेषगेपि वि-**शेष्यस्योस्मर्यमार्णकर्त्वक्त्वस्य** विचार्यमार्णस्यायोगादसाधनत्वम्ं ।। कर्तुर-स्मरणं हि वादिनः मतिवादिनश्च सर्वस्य वा १ वादिनश्चेदनुपत्तव्धेरमा-बाहा ? । आद्ये पत्ते पिटकत्रयेऽपि स्यादनुपलब्धेरविशेषात ॥ तत्र परैः कर्तुरङ्गीकरग्गान्नो चेत् । अत एवात्रापि न तदस्तु । अभावादिति चेदस्मा-त्तदभावसिद्धावितरेतराऽऽश्रयत्वम् । सिद्धे हि तदभावे तन्निवन्धनं तदस्मरण-मस्माच तदभाव इति ॥ भामाण्यान्यथानुपपत्तेस्तदभावान्नेतरेतराश्रयत्व-भिति चेन्न । प्रामाण्येनाप्रामाण्यकारणस्यैव पुरुषविशेषस्य निराकरणात् पुरुषमात्रस्यानिराक्रतेः ॥ अथातीन्द्रियार्थदर्शिनाउँभावादन्यस्य च प्रामाएय-ू कारगात्वानुपपत्तेः सिद्ध एव सर्वथा पुरुषाभाव इति चेत् कुतः सर्वज्ञाभावो विभावितः १। मामाएयान्यथानुपपत्तेरिति चेदितरेतराश्रयत्वम् । कर्तुर-स्मरगादिति चेचककमसङ्गः अभावभमाणादिति चेन्न । तत्साधकस्यानुमा-नस्य प्राक्प्रतिपादितत्वादभावप्रमाणोत्थानायोगात प्रमाणपश्चकाभावे-ऽभावममाणमद्यत्तेः---''ममाणपश्चकं यत्र वस्तुरूपेण जायते । वस्तुसत्तावबो-धार्थं तत्राभावप्रमाखते''ति परैरभिधानात् । ततो न वादिनः कर्तुरस्मरण-मुपपन्नम् ॥ नापि मतिवादिनोऽसिद्धेः । तत्र हि मतिवादी स्मरत्येव कर्तार-मिति ॥ नापि सर्वस्य, वादिनो वेदकर्तुरस्मरगोऽपि प्रतिवादिनः स्मरणात् ॥ नन प्रतिवादिना बेदेऽष्टकादयो बहवः कर्त्तारः स्मर्थन्तेऽतस्तत्स्मरणस्य विवादविषयस्यामामाग्ग्याद्ववेदेव सर्वस्य कर्तुरस्मरणमिति चेत् न । कर्टू-विशेषविषय एवासौ विवादो न कर्त्रसामान्ये ॥ अतः सर्वस्य कर्तुरस्मरण-मप्यसिद्धम् । सर्वोत्मज्ञानविज्ञानराहितो वा कथं सर्वस्य कर्त्वरस्मरणम्वैति ।

तस्मादपौँरुषेयत्वस्य वेदे व्यवस्थापयितुमशक्यत्वान्न तल्लत्तरणस्याव्याप-कत्वमसम्भवितत्वं वा सम्भवति ॥ पौरुषेयत्वे पुनः भमाग्णानि बहूनि सन्त्येव सजन्ममरणर्षिगोत्रचरणादिनामश्रुतेरनेकपदसंहतिपतिनियमसंदर्श-नात्फलार्थिपुरुषप्रष्टत्तिनिष्टत्तिहेत्वात्मनां अतेश्च मनुसूत्रवत् पुरुषकर्तृतेव अपौरुषेयत्वेऽपि वा न मामाएयं वेदस्योपपचते श्रीतरिति वचनात् ॥ तद्धेतूनां गुणानामभावात् ॥ ननु न गुणकृतमेव भामाण्यं किन्तु दोषाभाव-मकारेगापि, स च दोषाश्रयपुरुषाभावेऽपि निर्श्वायते न गुएगसद्भाव एवेति । तथाचोक्रम्-शब्दे दोषोद्धवस्तावद्वकत्रधीन इति स्थितम् । तदभावः क्रचि-त्तावद्गुणवद्वकृतकृत्वतः ॥१॥ तद्गुणैरपक्रष्टानां शब्दे संक्रान्स्यसम्भवात् । यद्वा वक्तुरभावेन न स्युर्दोषा निराश्रयाः ॥ २ ॥ इति ॥ तद्ष्ययुक्तम् । पराभित्रायापरिक्वानात् ॥ नास्माभिवक्तुरभावे वेदस्य **मामा**एयाभावः समुद्धाव्यते । किं तु तद्व्याख़्यातृृणामतीन्द्रियार्थदर्शनादिगुणाभावे । ततो दोषाणामनयोदितत्वान्न प्रामाएयानश्चय इति । ततोऽपौरुषेयत्वेऽपि वेदस्य प्रामाएयनिश्चयायोगान्नानेन लत्तरणस्याव्यापित्वमसम्भावित्वं वेत्यलमति-जस्पितेन ॥ ननु शब्दार्थयोः सम्बन्धाभावादन्यापोहमात्राभिधायित्वादाप्त-प्रणीताद्पि शब्दात् कथं वस्तुभूतार्थावगुम इत्यत्राह-

सहजयोग्यतासङ्क तवशाद्धि शब्दादयो वस्तुप्रतिपत्तिहेतवः ॥१००॥

सहजा स्वभावभूता योग्यता शब्दार्थयोर्वाच्यवाचकशाक्विः तस्यां सङ्के-तस्तद्रशाद्धि स्फुटं शब्दादयः प्रागुका वस्तुपतिपत्तिहेतव इति ।। उदादर-खमाह—

# यथा मेर्वादयः सन्ति ॥ १०१ ॥

#### प्रमेयरत्नमात्ता

धात् ॥ न हि गवादिशब्दअवग्णादगवादिव्याद्यत्तिः प्रतीयते । ततः सास्ना-दिमत्यर्थे प्रवृत्तिदर्शनादगवादिबुद्धिजनकं तत्र शब्दान्तरं मृग्यम् ॥ अये-कस्मादेव गोशब्दादर्थद्वयस्यापि सम्भावनान्नार्थः शब्दान्तरेणेति चेन्नैवम् । एकस्य परस्परविरुद्धार्थद्वयप्रतिपादनविरोधात् ॥ किश्व गोशब्दस्यागोच्या-हत्तिविषयत्वे प्रथममगौरिति प्रतीयेत न चैवमतो नान्यापोदः शब्दार्थः ॥ किआ अपोहारूयं सामान्यं वाच्यत्वेन प्रतीयमानं पर्युदासरूपं प्रसञ्यरूपं वा ? प्रथमपत्ते गोत्वमेव नामान्तरेगोक्तं स्यात् । अभावाभावस्य भाषान्त-रस्वभावेन व्यवस्थितत्वात् ।। कश्चायमस्वादिनिष्टत्तित्तत्ताणो भावोऽभि-धीयते १ न तावत्स्वलत्तरणरूपस्तस्य सकलविकल्पवाग्गोवरातिकान्तत्वात्।। नापि शावलेयादिव्यक्तिरूपस्तस्थासामान्यत्वप्रसङ्गात् ।। तस्मात् सकलगो-व्यक्तिष्वनुद्वत्तप्रत्ययजनकं तत्रैव प्रत्येकं परिसमाप्त्या वर्तमानं सामान्यमेव गोशब्दवाच्यम् । तस्यापोइ इति नामकरणो नाममात्रं मिद्येत नार्थ इति । अतो नादाः पत्तः श्रेयान् ॥ नापि द्वितीयो गोशब्दादेः कचिद्वालेऽर्थे मट-स्ययोगात् । तुच्छाभावाभ्युपगमे परमतप्रवेशानुषंगाच ।। किश्च गवादयो ये सामान्यशब्दा ये च शावलेयादयस्तेषां भवदभिमायेण पर्यायता स्यात । अर्थभेदाभावाद्द्वत्तपाद्पादिशब्दवत् ।। न खलु तुच्द्राभावस्य भेदो युक्नो वस्तुन्येव संस्टष्टत्वैकत्वनानात्वादिविकल्पानां प्रतीतेः ॥ भेदे वा अभावस्य वस्तृतापात्तिः तल्लक्तरणत्वाद्रस्तुत्वस्य ॥ न चापोश्वलक्तरणसम्बन्धिभेदाझेदः । भमेगाभिधेयादिशब्दानाममहत्तिप्रसङ्गात् ॥ व्यत्तत्त्वेधस्यातद्र पेणाप्यत्रमेया-दिरूपत्वे ततो व्यवच्छेदायोगात्कथं तत्र सम्बन्धिमेदाझेदः १ किञ्च **शावलेयादिष्वेकोऽपोहो न पसज्येत** किन्तु प्रतिव्यक्ति भिन्न एव स्थात् ॥ ऋथ शाबलेयादयस्तन्न भिन्दन्ति तर्ह्वश्वादयोऽपि भेद्का मामूवन् ॥ यस्यान्तरङ्गाः शावलेयादयो न भेदकास्तस्याश्वादयो भेदका इत्यतिसाइ-सम् ।। बस्तुनोऽपि सम्बन्धिभेदाझेदो नोपलभ्यते किमुतावस्तुनि ।। तथास्तेक एव देवदत्तादिः कटककुण्डलादिभिरभिसम्बन्ध्यमानो न नानात्वमास्तिष्तु-वानः समुपलभ्यत इति ॥ भवतु वा सम्बन्भिभेदाझेदस्तवापि न वस्तुभूत-सामान्यमन्तरेणान्यापोहाश्रयः सम्बन्धी भवतां भवितुमईति । तथादि यदि शावलेयादिषु वस्तुभूतसारूप्याभावोऽश्वादिपरिहारेण तत्रैव विशिष्टाभिधा-नप्रत्वयौं कथं स्याताम् । ततः सम्बन्धिभेदाझेदमिच्छतापि सामान्यं बास्त- वमङ्गीकर्तव्यमिति ॥ किञ्चायोहशब्दार्थपत्ते संकेत एवानुपपन्नस्तद्ग्रहणोपा-यासम्भवात् ॥ न मत्यत्तं तद्ग्रइणसमर्थं तस्य वस्तुविषयत्वात् । अन्यापो-हस्य चावस्तुत्वात् ॥ अनुमानमपि न तत्सद्भावमवबोधयति तस्य कार्यस्व-भावलिङ्गसम्पाद्यत्वात् ॥ अपोइस्य निरुपारूयेयत्वेनानर्थकियाकारित्वेन च स्वभावकार्ययोरसम्भवात् ॥ किञ्च गोशब्दस्यागोपोहामिधायित्वे गौरि-त्यत्र गोशब्दस्य किमभिधेयं स्यादझातस्य विधिनिषेधयोरनधिकारात् ॥ अगोद्यत्तिरिति चेदितरेतराश्रयत्वमगोव्यवच्छेदो हि अगोनिश्चये भवति स चागौगोनिदृत्त्यात्मा गौरचागोव्यवच्छेदो हि अगोनिश्चये भवति स चागौगोनिदृत्त्यात्मा गौरचागोव्यवच्छेदरूप इति ॥ अगौरित्यत्रोत्तर-पदार्थोऽप्यनयैव दिशा धिन्तनीयः ॥ नन्वगौरित्यत्रान्य एव विधिरूपो गोशब्दाभिधेयस्तदाऽपोदेः शब्दार्थ इति विवटेत । तस्मादपोहस्योक्तयुक्त्या विचार्यमाखस्यायोगान्नान्यापोहः शब्दार्थ इति, स्थितं सहजयोग्यतासद्वे-तवशाच्छब्दादयो वस्तुर्पतिपत्त्तिहत्व इति ॥

> स्मृतिरनुपहतेयं मत्यभिक्रानवक्रा प्रमितिनिरतचिन्ता लैक्तिकं सङ्गतार्थम् । मवचनमनवद्यं निश्चितं देववाचा रचित्तकुचितवाग्भिस्तथ्यमेत्तेन गीतम् ॥ १ ॥

इति परीक्षामुखस्य लघुबृत्तौ परोक्षप्रपद्धस्तृतीयः समुद्रेशः ॥ ३ ॥

अथ स्वरूपसंख्याविमतिपत्तिं निराकृत्य विषयविमातिपत्तिनिरासा-र्थमाइ—

सामान्यविशेषात्मा तदथों विषयः ॥ १ ॥

तस्य मामाग्रयस्य ग्राह्मोऽथों विषय इति यावत् । स एव विशिष्यते सामान्यविशेषात्मा । सामान्यविशेषौ वद्त्यमाग्छलज्ञग्गौ तावात्मानौ यस्येति विग्रहः ॥ तदुभयग्रहणमात्मग्रहणं च केवलस्य सामान्यस्य विशेषस्य तदु-भयस्य वा स्वतन्त्रस्य ममाणविषयत्वमतिषेधार्थम् । तत्र सन्मात्रदेहस्य पर-ब्रह्मणो निरस्तत्वात्तदितरद्विचार्यते ॥ तत्र सांख्यैः मधानं सामान्यमुङ्गं ''त्रगुणमविवेकिविषयः सामान्यमचेतनं मसवधार्मव्यक्तं तथा मधानं तद्विप-

ΥŻ

रीतस्तथा च पुमानिति'' वचनात् ॥ तच केवलं मधानं महदादिकार्यानेष्पा-दनाय प्रवर्तमानं किमय्यपेच्य प्रवर्तते निरपेच्य वा ? प्रथमपत्ते तन्निमित्तं वाच्यं यदपेच्य प्रवर्तते ॥ ननु पुरुषार्थ एव तत्र कारखं, पुरुषार्थेन हेतुना मधानं मवर्तते । पुरुषार्थश्च द्वेधा, शब्दायुपलब्धिर्गुरापुरुषान्तराविवेकदर्शनं चेत्यभिधानादिति चेत् सत्यम् । तथा प्रवर्तेवानमपि बहुधानकं पुरुषक्ठतं कश्चिदुपकारं समासादयत्ववतेतानासादयदा ? प्रथमपत्ते स उपकारस्तस्मा-द्भिन्नोंऽभिन्नो वा १ यदि भिन्नस्तदा तस्येति व्यपदेशाभावः । सम्बन्धा-भावात्तदभावश्च समवायादेरनभ्युपगमात् । तादात्म्यं च भेदविरोधीति ॥ अधाभिन्न उपकार इति पद्म आश्रीयते तदा मधानमेव तेन कृतं स्यात ॥ अधोपकारनिरपेत्तमेव प्रधानं प्रवर्त्तते तर्हि युक्तात्मानम्प्रत्यपि प्रवर्त्तेता-विशेषात् ॥ एतेन निरपेत्तमहत्त्विपत्त्रोऽपि मत्युक्रस्तत एव ॥ किश्व सिद्धे प्रधाने सर्वमेतदुपपत्रं स्यात् न च तत्सिद्धिः कुतरिचलिश्चीयत इति ॥ ननु कार्याणामेकान्वयदर्शनादेककारणमभवत्वं भेदानां परिणामदर्शनाचेति । सुखदुःखमोहरूपतया घटादेरन्वयाभावादन्तस्तत्वस्यैव तटप्यचारुचर्वितं तथोपलम्भात् ॥ अथान्तस्तत्वस्य न सुखादिपारिणामः किन्तु तथापारिण-ममानप्रधानसंसर्गादात्मनोऽपि तथा प्रतिभास इति तद्प्यनुपपन्नम् । अप्र-तिभासमानस्यापि संसर्गकल्पनायां तत्त्वेयत्ताया निश्चेतुमशक्तेः । तदुक्तम्— संसर्गाद्विभागश्चेदयोगोलकवद्विवत् ।। भेदाभेदव्यवस्थैवमुत्पना सवे-वस्तुषु ॥ १ ॥ इति । यदपि परिखामारूयं साधनं, तद्व्येकप्रकृतिकेषु घटघटीशरावोदश्चनादिष्वनेकप्रकृतिकेषु पटकुटमकुटशकटादिषु चोपलम्भा-दनैकान्तिकमिति न ततः प्रकृतिसिद्धिः । तदेवं प्रधानग्रइग्गोपायासम्भवा-त्सम्भवे वा ततः कार्योदयायोगाच ॥ यदुक्तं परेण---प्रकृतेर्महान् ततोऽहं-कारस्तस्माद्ररणरच षोडशकः ।। तस्माद्पि षोडशकात्पश्चभ्यः पंचभूतानीति ।। स्टष्टिकमे, ''मूलमकुतिरविकृतिर्महदाद्याः मकृतिविकृतयः सप्त । षोडशकश्च विकारो न प्रकृतिर्न विकृतिः पुरुष ॥'' इति स्वरूपाख्यानं च वन्ध्यासुतसौरू-त्यवर्णनभिवासद्विषयत्वादुपेत्तामईति ॥ अमूर्तस्याकाशस्य मूर्तस्य पृथिव्या-देश्चैककारगाकत्वायोगाच्च ।। अन्यथा अचेतनादपि पंचभूतकदम्बकाचै-तन्यसिद्धश्चार्वाकमतसिद्धिप्रसङ्गत् सांख्यगन्ध एव न भवेत् ।। सत्कार्यवा-दमतिषेधरचान्यत्र विस्तरेणोक्न इति नेहोच्यते संत्तेपस्वरूपादस्येति ॥ तथा

विशेषा एव तत्त्वं तेषामसमानेतरविशेषेभ्योऽशेषात्मनो विश्लेषात्मकत्वात्सा-मान्यस्यैकस्यानेकत्र व्याप्त्या वर्त्तमानस्य सम्भवाभावाच्च 🛮 तस्यैकव्यक्ति-निष्टस्य सामस्त्येनोपलब्धस्य तथैव व्यक्त्यन्तरेऽनुपलम्भमसङ्गात् ॥ उप-लम्भे वा तम्नानात्वापत्तेर्युगपत् भिन्नदेशतया सामस्त्येनोपत्तब्धेस्तद्यक्रि-वदन्यथा व्यक्तयोऽपि भिन्ना माभूवन्त्रिति ॥ ततो बुद्धभेद एव सामान्यम् । तदुक्रम्---एकत्र दृष्टो भावो हि कचिन्नान्यत्र दृश्यते । तस्मान्न भिन्नमस्त्य-न्यत्सामान्यं बुद्ध्यभेदतः ॥ १ ॥ इति ॥ ते च विशेषाः परस्परासम्बद्धा एव, तत्सम्बन्धस्य विचार्यमाणस्यायोगात् ॥ एकदेशेन सम्बन्धे ऋणुषट्केन युगपद्योगादग्गोः षढंशतापत्तेः ॥ सर्वात्मनाभिसम्बन्धे पिष्ण्डस्यागुमात्रेक-त्वापत्तेः ॥ अवयविनिषेधाचासम्बद्धत्वमेषामुपपद्यत एव ।। तन्निषेधश्च टत्तिविकल्पादिबाधनात् ॥ तथाहि अवयवा अवयविनि वर्तन्त इति नाभ्यु-पगतम् । अवयवी चावयवेषु वर्तमानः किमेकदेशेन वर्त्तते सर्वात्मना वा ? एकदेशेन वृत्ताववयवान्तरप्रसंङ्गः । तत्राप्येकदेशान्तरेणावयविनो वृत्तावन-वस्था ॥ सर्वात्मना वर्तमानोऽपि प्रत्यवयवं स्वभावभेदेन वर्तेत, आहोस्वि-देकरूपेग्रेति १ प्रथमपत्ते अवयविवहुत्वापत्तिः ।। द्वितीयपत्ते तु अवयवाना-मेकरूपत्वापत्तिरिति । मत्येकं परिसमाप्त्या दृत्तावध्यवयविवद्घुत्वमिति ।। तथा यत दृश्यं सत्रोपलभ्यते तत्रास्त्येव यथा गमनेर्न्दावरं नोपलभ्यते चाव-यवेष्ववयवीति ॥ तथा यद्ग्रहे यद्बुद्ध्याभवस्तत्ततो नार्थान्तरम् । यथा इत्ताग्रहे वनमिति ॥ ततश्च निरंशा एवान्योन्यासंस्पर्शिणो रूपादिपरमा-गुवस्ते च एकत्तगुस्थायिनो न नित्या, विनाशं प्रत्यन्यानपेत्तणात् ॥ प्रयोगश्च यो यद्भावं पत्यन्यानपेत्तः स तत्स्वभावनियतो यथान्त्या कारण-सामग्री स्वकार्ये ॥ नाशो हि मुद्ररादिना क्रियमाणस्ततो मिन्नोऽभिन्नो वा क्रियते ? भिन्नस्य करणे घटस्य स्थितिरेव स्यात् ॥ अथ विनाशसम्बन्धा-न्नष्ट इति व्यपदेश इति चेत्, भावाभावयोः कः सम्बन्धः ? न तावत्ता-दात्म्यं तयोर्भेदात् । नापि तदुत्पत्तिरभावस्य कार्याधारत्वाघटनात् । अभि-त्रस्य करणो घटादिरेव कृतः स्यात् । तस्य च प्रागेव निष्पन्नत्वाद्यर्थं करण-मित्यन्यानपेत्तत्वं सिद्धमिति, विनाशस्वभावनियतत्वं साधयत्येव ॥ सिद्धे चानित्यानां तत्स्वभावनियतत्वे तदितरेषामात्मादीनां विमत्यधिकरणभावा-पत्रानां सत्त्वादिना साधनेन तदुदद्यान्ताज्जवत्येव चर्णास्थतिस्वभावत्वम् 🍴

#### प्रमेयरत्नमाला

तथा हि यत्सत्तत्तर्वमेकत्तरणस्थितिस्वभावं यथा घटः सन्तश्चामी भावा इति ।। ऋथवा सत्त्वमेव विपत्ते बाधकप्रमार्ग्यवलेन दृष्टान्तनिरपेत्त्रमशेषस्य वस्तुनः चाणिकत्वमनुप्रापयति।। तथाहि सत्त्वमर्थक्रियया व्याप्यम् । अर्थक्रिया च क्रमयौगपद्याभ्यां, ते च नित्यात्रिवर्त्तमाने स्वव्याप्यामर्थकियामादाय निवर्तेते । सापि स्वव्याप्यं सत्वभिति, नित्यस्य क्रमयौगपद्याभ्यामर्थाक्रेया-विरोधात्सत्त्वासम्भावनं विपत्ते वाधकप्रमार्णमिति ॥ नहि नित्यस्य क्रमेण युगपद्वा सा सम्भवति । नित्यस्यैकेनैव स्वभावेन पूर्वापरकालभाविकार्यद्वयं कुर्वतः कार्याभेदकत्वात्तस्यैकस्वभावत्वात् । तथापि कार्यनानात्वे अन्यत्र कार्यभेदात कारणभेदकल्पना विफलैंब स्यात् । तादृशमेकमेव किश्चित्कारण कल्पनीयं, येनैकस्वभावेनैकेनैव चराचरमुत्पद्यत इति ॥ अथ स्वभावनाना-त्वमेव तस्य कार्यभेदादिष्यत इति चेत्तहिं, ते स्वभावास्तस्य सर्वदा सम्भ-विनस्तदा कार्यसाङ्कर्यम् । नो चेत्तदुत्पत्तिकारणं वाच्यम् । तस्मादेवमित्ये-कस्वभावात्तदुत्पत्तौ तत्स्वभावानां सदा सम्भवात्सैव कार्याणां युगपत्प्राप्तिः॥ सहकारिक्रमापेचया तत्स्वभावानां क्रमेग भावात्रोक्वदोष इति चेत्तदपि न साधुसङ्गतम् । समर्थस्य नित्यस्य परापेत्तायोगात् 🚽 ॥ तैः सामर्थ्यकरणे नित्यताहानिः ॥ तस्माझित्रमेव सामर्थ्य तैर्विधीयत इति न नित्यता-हानिरिति चेत्तर्हि नित्यमकिंचित्करमेव स्यात् । सहकारिजानितसा-मर्थ्यस्यैव कार्यकारित्वात्तत्सम्बन्धात्तस्यापि कार्यकारित्वे तत्सम्बन्धस्यैक-स्वभावत्वे सामर्थ्वनानात्वाभावात्र कार्यभेदः । अनेकस्वभावत्वे क्रमवत्वे च कार्यवत्तस्यापि साङ्कर्यमिति सर्वमावर्तत इति चक्रकप्रसङ्गः ॥ तस्मात्र क्रमेण कार्यकारित्वं नित्यस्य । नापि युगपत् अशेषकार्याणां युगपदुत्पत्तौ द्वितीयचणे कार्याकरणादनर्थक्रियाकारित्वेनावस्तुत्वप्रसंगादिति नित्यस्य क्रमयौगपद्याभावः सिद्ध एवेति सौंगताः प्रतिपेदिरे ॥ तेऽपि न युक्तवा-दिनः---सजातीयेतरव्यादृत्तात्मनां विशेषार्णामनंशानां ग्राहकस्य भमाण-स्याभावात् ॥ प्रत्यत्तस्य स्थिरस्थूलसाधारणाकारवस्तुग्राहकत्वेन निरंशवस्तु-ग्रहणायोगात् ।। न हि परमारणवः परस्परासंबद्धाश्वचुरादिबुद्धौ प्रतिभा-न्ति तथा सत्यविवादमसंगात् ॥ अथानुभूयन्त एव प्रथमं तथाभूताः चरणाः विकल्पवासनावलादान्तरादन्तरालानुपलम्भलचणाद्वाग्राचाविय-पश्चात्त मानोऽपि स्थूलाद्याकारो विकल्पबुद्धौ चकास्ति ॥ स च तदाकारेणानुर-

48

ज्यमानः स्वव्यापारं तिरस्कृत्य प्रत्यस्रव्यापारपुरःसरत्वेन प्रहत्तत्वात्पत्य-च।यत इति । तद्प्यतिवालाविलासितम् ।। निर्विकल्पकवोधस्यानुपलचणात् । ग्रहीते हि निर्विकल्पकेतरयोर्भेदे अन्याकारानुरागस्यान्यत्र कल्पना युका स्फटिकजपाकुसुमयोरिव नान्यथेति ॥ एतेन तयोधुगपद्ष्वत्तेर्लछ्वत्तेर्वा तदे-कत्वाध्यवसाय इति निरस्तं तस्यापि कोशपानमत्येयत्वादिति ॥ केन वा तयोरेकत्वाध्यवसायः १ न तावद्विकल्पेन, तस्य विकल्पवातीनभिक्तवात् ॥ नाष्यनुभवेन, तस्य विकल्पागोचरत्वात् ॥ न च तदुभयाविषयं तदेकत्वा-ध्यवसाये समर्थमतिषसङ्गात् ।। ततो न पत्यत्तबुद्धौ तथाविधविशेषावभासः ।। नाप्यनुमानबुद्धौ सदविनाभूतस्वभावकार्यलिङ्गाभावादनुपलम्भोऽसिद्ध एव । अनुव्रत्ताकारस्य स्थूलाकारस्य चोपत्तब्धेरुक्वत्वात् ॥ यद्पि परमारगुनामे-कदेशेन सर्वात्मना वा सम्बन्धो नोपपद्यत इति तत्रानभ्युपगम एव परिद्वारः ॥ स्निग्धरूत्तार्णां सजातीयानां च व्यधिकगुणानां कथञ्चित्स्कन्धाकारपरिणा-मात्मकस्य सम्बन्धस्याभ्युपगमात् ॥ यचावयविनि द्वत्तिविकल्पादि बाधकमुक्तं तत्रावयविनो टत्तिरेव यदि नोपपद्यते तदा न वर्तत इत्यभि-धातव्यम् ।। नैकदेशादिविकल्पस्तस्य विशेषान्तरान्तरीयकत्वात् ।। तथा द्वि नैकदेशेन वर्त्तते नापि सर्वात्मनेत्युक्ने त्रकारान्तरेख द्वत्तिरित्यभिदितं स्यात् । अन्यथा न वर्त्तत इत्येव वक्रव्यमिति विशेषप्रतिषेधस्य शेषाभ्यनुद्रानरू-पत्वात् कथञ्चित्तादात्म्यरूपेण टत्तिरित्यवसीयते ।। तत्र यथोक्रदोषाणा-मनवर्काशाद्विरोधादिदोषथाग्रे प्रतिषेत्स्यत इति नेह प्रतन्यते ॥ यचैक-त्रणस्थायित्वे साधनं 'यो यद्भावं प्रती' त्याचुक्तं, तदप्यसाधनमसिद्धादि-दोषदुष्टत्वात् ॥ तत्रान्यानपेत्तत्वं तावदसिद्धं घटाद्यमावस्य मुद्ररादिव्या-पारान्वयव्यतिरेकानुविधायित्वात् तत्कारणत्वोपपत्तेः ॥ कपालादिपर्या-यान्तराभावो हि घटादेरमावस्तुच्छाभावस्य सकलप्रमाणगोचरातिक्रान्त-त्वात् ॥ किश्च अभावो यदि स्वतन्त्रो भवेत्तदाऽन्यानपेत्तत्वं विशेषग्रं युक्रम् । न च सौगतमते सोऽस्तीति इतुप्रयोगानवतार एव, अनैकान्तिकं चेदं शालिबीजस्य कोद्रवांकुरजननम्प्रति अन्यानपेत्तत्वेऽपि तज्जननस्व-भावानियतत्वात् ।। तत्स्वभावत्वे सतीति विशेषणात्र दोष इति चेत्- न सर्वेथा पदार्थानां विनाशस्वभावासिद्धेः । पर्यायरूपेग्रैव हि भावानामुत्पा-दविनाशावङ्गीक्रियेते न द्रव्यरूपेण ॥ समुदेति वित्तमम्च्झति भागो

नियमेन पर्ययनयस्य । नोदेति नो विनश्यति भावनया लिङ्गितो नित्यम् ॥ १ ॥ इति वचनात् ॥ नहि निरन्वयावेनाशे पूर्वचण्यस्य ततो मृताच्छिखिनः **केकायितस्येवोत्तरत्तर्णस्योत्पत्तिर्घट**ते द्रव्यरूपेण कथश्चिदत्यक्र-I. रूपस्यापि सम्भवात् न सर्वथा भावानां विनाशस्वभावत्वं यक्रम् ॥ द्रव्यरूपस्य गृहीतुमशक्यत्वादभावस्तद्ग्रहणोपायस्य मत्यभि-न झानस्य बहुलमुपलम्भात्तत्पामार्ग्यस्य च प्रागेवोक्वत्वादुत्तरकार्थोत्पत्त्यन्था-नुपपत्तेश्र सिद्धत्वात् ॥ यचान्यत्साधनं सत्त्वाख्यं तद्पि विपत्तवत्स्वपत्तेऽपि समानत्वात्र साध्यसिद्धिनिबन्धनम् ॥ तथा हि सत्त्वमर्थक्रियया व्याप्तमर्थ-क्रिया च क्रमयौगपद्याभ्यां ते च चाििकाविवर्तमाने स्वव्याप्यामर्थक्रिया-मादाय निवर्तेते । सा च निवर्तमाना स्वव्याप्यं सत्त्वमिति नित्यस्येव त्तरिणकस्यापि खरविषाखवदसत्त्वमिति न तत्र सत्त्वव्यवस्था ।। न चणिकस्य वस्तुनः क्रमयौगपद्याभ्यामर्थक्रियाविरोधोऽसिद्धस्तस्य देशकृतस्य कालकृतस्य वा क्रमस्यासम्भवात् ॥ अवस्थितस्यैकस्य हि नानादेशकाल-कलाच्यापित्वं देशक्रमः कालक्रमश्राभिधीयते ॥ न च चरिएके सोऽस्ति, 'यो यत्रैव स तत्रैव यो गदैव तदैव सः ॥ न देशकालयोर्व्याप्तिर्भावानामिइ विद्यत' इति स्वयमेवामिधानात् ॥ न च पूर्वोत्तरचत्रणानामेकसन्तानापेचया क्रमः सम्भवति, सन्तानस्य वास्तवत्वे तस्यापि चाणिकत्वेन क्रमायोगा-दत्ताणिकत्वेऽपि वास्तवत्वे तेनैव सत्त्वादिसाधनमनैकान्तिकम् । अवास्तवत्वे न तद्पेत्तः क्रमो युक्त इति ॥ नापि यौगपद्येन तत्रार्थकिया सम्भवति, युगपदेकेन स्वभावेन नानाकार्यकरणे तत्कार्येकरवं स्यात् ॥ नानास्वभावकल्प-नायां ते स्वभावास्तेन व्यापनीयाः। तत्रैकेन स्वभावेन तद्वचाप्तौ तेषामेकरूपता, नानास्वभावेन चेद्नवस्था ॥ अर्थेकत्रैकस्योपादानभाव एवान्यत्र -Ħ-इकारिभाव इति न स्वभावभेद इष्यते । तर्हि नित्यस्यैकरूपस्यापि वस्तुनः क्रमेण नानाकार्यकारिणः स्वभावभेदः कार्यसाङ्कर्यं वा माभूत् ॥ अक्रमात् क्रमिणामनुत्पत्तेनैवमिति चेदेकानंशकारणाद्यु गपदनेककारणसाध्यानेककार्य-विरोधादक्रमिणोऽपि न चाणिकस्य कार्यकारित्वमिति ॥ किश्व भवत्पत्ते सतोऽसतो वा कार्यकारित्वम् १ सतः कार्यकर्तृत्वे सकलकालकलाव्या-पित्तणानामेकत्तरणद्वत्तिप्रसङ्गः ॥ द्वितीयपत्ते खरविषाणादेरपि कार्यकारित्व-मसत्त्वाविशेषात् सत्त्वलत्तरणस्य व्याभिचारश्र, तस्मात्र विशेषैकान्तपत्तः

#### प्रमेयरत्नमाला

श्रेयान् ॥ नापि सामान्यविशेषौ परस्परानपेत्ताविति यौगमतमपि युक्नियुक्न-मवभाति, तयोरन्योन्यभेदे द्वयोरन्यतरस्यापि व्यवस्थापयितुमशक्तेः ॥ तथा हि-विशेषास्तावत् द्रव्यगुराकर्मात्मनः सामान्यं तु परापरभेदाद्द्विविधं, तत्र परसामान्यात्सत्तालत्त्रणाद्विशेषाणां भेदे सत्त्वापत्तिरिति । तथाच मयोगः। द्रव्यगुराकर्माण्यसद्रूपाणि सत्त्वादत्यन्तं भित्रत्वात्मागभावादिव-दिति ॥ न सामान्यविशेषसम्वायैर्व्याभेचारः । तत्र स्वरूपसचस्याभित्रस्य परैरभ्युपगमात् ।। ननु द्रव्यादीनां प्रमाणोपपन्नत्वे धर्मिंग्राहकप्रमाणवाधितो हेतुर्येन हि ममाखेन द्रव्यादयो निश्चीयन्ते तेन तत्सत्त्वमपीति ॥ अभ 'न प्रमार्खप्रतिपन्ना द्रव्यादयस्तईि हेतोराश्रयासिद्धिरिति<sup>7</sup> तदयुक्तम् । प्रसङ्गसाध-नात्मागभावादौँ हि सत्त्वाझेदोऽसत्त्वेन व्याप्त उपलभ्यते ततथ व्याप्यस्य द्रव्यादावभ्युपगमो व्यापकाभ्युपगमनान्तरीयक इति पसङ्ग्रसाधने अस्य दोषस्याभावात् ॥ एतेन द्रव्यादीनामृष्यद्रव्यादित्वं द्रव्यत्वादेभेंदे चिन्तितं बोद्धव्यम् । कथं वा षएगां पदार्थानां परस्परं भेदे प्रतिनियतस्वरूपव्य-वस्था ? द्रव्यस्य हि द्रव्यमिति व्यपदेशस्य द्रव्यत्वाभिसम्बन्धाद्विधाने ततः पूर्वे द्रव्यस्वरूपं किञ्चिद्राच्यं, येन सह द्रव्यत्वाभिसम्बन्धः स्यात् ॥ द्रव्यमेव स्वरूपमिति चेन्न, तद्व्यपदेशस्य द्रव्यत्वाभिसम्बन्धनिबन्धनतया स्वरूपत्वायोगात् ॥ सत्त्वं निजं रूपमिति चेत्र, तस्यापि सत्तासम्बन्धादेव तद्व्यपदेशकरणात् ॥ एवं गुणादिष्वपि वाच्पम् ॥ केवलं सामान्यविशे-पसमवायानामेव स्वरूपसत्त्वेन तथाव्यपदेशोपपत्तेस्तत्रयव्यवस्थैव स्यात् ।। ननु जीवादिपदार्थानां सामान्यविशेषात्मकत्वं स्याद्वादिभिरभिधीयते तयोश्च वस्तुनोर्भेदाभेदाविति ॥ तौ व विरोधादिदोषोपनिपाताझैकत्र सम्भविनाविति ॥ तथाहि-भेदाभेदयोर्विधिनिषेधयोरेकत्राभित्रे वस्तुन्य-सम्भवः शीतोष्णस्पर्शयोर्वेति ।। भेदस्यान्यदधिकरणामभेदस्य चान्यदिति वैयधिकरण्यम् । यमात्मानं पुरोधाय मेदो यं च समाश्रित्यामेदः तावा-त्मानौ भिन्नौ चाभिन्नौ च तत्रापि तथा परिकल्पनादनवस्था । येन रूपेण मेदस्तेन भेदश्वाभेदश्वेति सङ्करः । येन भेदस्तेनाभेदो येनाभेदस्तेन भेद इति व्यतिकरः । भेदाभेदात्मकत्वे च वस्तुनोऽसाधारणाकारेण निश्चेतुमशक्नेः संशयः । ततश्राप्रतिपत्तिस्ततोऽभावः । इत्यनैकान्तात्मकमपि न सौस्थ्य-मामजतीति केचित् । तेऽपि न पातीतिकवादिनः । विरोधस्य पतीयमान-

#### **ममेयरत्नमा**ला

योरसम्मवादनुपत्तम्भसाध्यो हि विरोधः, तत्रोपत्तभ्यमानयोः को विरोधः ॥ यच शीतोप्णस्पर्शयोर्वेति दष्टान्ततयोकं तच धूपदइनाद्येकावयविनः शीतो-ष्णस्पर्शस्वभावस्योयलब्धेरयुक्रमेव ॥ एकस्य चलाचलरकारकाटतानाटता-दिविरुद्धधर्माणां युगपदुपलब्धेश्र प्रकृतयोरपि न विरोध इति ॥ एतेन वैयधि-करण्यमप्यपास्तम् । तयोरेकाधिकरणत्वेन प्रतीतेः । अत्रापि मागुक्वनिदर्श-नान्येव बोद्धव्यानि ॥ यचानवस्थानं द्षणं तद्पि स्याद्वादिमतानभित्रेरेवा-पादितम् । तन्मतं हि सामान्यविशेषात्मके वस्तुनि सामान्यविशेषावेव भेदः । भेदध्वनिना तयोरेवाभिधानात् । द्रव्यरूपेणाभेद् इति । द्रव्यमेवाभेद् एका-नेकात्मकत्वाद्वस्तुनः ।। यदि वा भेदनयप्राधाण्येन वस्तुधर्माखामानन्त्या-न्त्रानवस्था । तथा हि- यत्सामान्यं यश्च विशेषस्तयोरनुष्टत्तव्यादृत्ता-भेदस्तयोथार्थक्रियामेदाद्वेद**थ** कारेग शक्तिभेदात । सोऽपि सहका-रिभेदादित्यनन्तधर्माणामङ्गीकरणात् कृतोऽनवस्था ।। तथा चोक्रम् । मलज्ञतिकरीमाहुरनवस्थां हि दूपराम् । वस्त्वानन्त्येप्यशक्तौ च नानवस्था विचार्यते ॥ १ ॥ इति ॥ यौ च सङ्करव्यतिकरौ तावपि मेचकज्ञाननिदर्श-नेन सामान्यविशेषदृष्टान्तेन च परिहृतौं ।। अथ तत्र तथा प्रतिभासनं परस्यापि बस्तुनि तथैव प्रतिभासोऽस्तु तस्य पत्तपाताभावात्रिर्णीते संशयोऽपि न युङ्गः । तस्य चलितप्रतिपत्तिरूपत्वादचलितपतिभासे दुर्घटत्वात् । प्रतिपन्ने वस्तुन्यमतिपत्तिारित्यतिसाहसम् । उपलब्ध्यभिधानादनुपत्तम्मोऽपि सिद्धस्ततो नाभाव इति दृष्टेष्टाविरुद्धमनेकान्तशासनं सिद्धम् । एतेनावयवा-वयविनोर्गुणगुणिनोः कर्मतद्वतोश्च कथंचिन्नेदाभेदौ प्रतिपादितौ बोद्धव्यौ ॥ अथ समनायनशाझित्रेष्वप्यभेदमतीतिरनुपपत्रवह्यतुलाख्यज्ञानस्येति चेत न, तस्यापि ततोऽभित्रस्य व्यवस्थापयितुमशक्तेः । तथा हि- समवायहत्तिः स्वसमवायिषु दृत्तिमती स्यादवृत्तिमती वा ? दृत्तिमत्वे स्वेनैव दृत्त्यन्तरेण १ न तावदाद्यः पत्तः समवाये समवायानभ्युपगमात् । पश्चानां समवायित्वमिति वचनात् ॥ दृत्त्यन्तरकल्पनायां । तदपि स्वसम्बन्धिष वर्तते न वेति कल्पनायां दृत्त्यन्तरपरम्परामाप्तेरनवस्था ।। वृत्त्यन्तरस्य स्वसंबन्धिषु हत्त्यन्तरानभ्युपगमात्रानवस्थेति चेत्, तर्हि समवायेऽपि वृत्त्यन्तरं माभूत् ॥ अथ समवायो न स्वाश्रयदृत्तिरङ्गीक्रियते, तर्हि षगणामाश्रितत्वमिति ग्रन्थो विरुध्यते ॥ अथ समवायिषु सत्स्वेव समवाय-

भत्तीतेस्तस्याश्रितत्वमुपकल्टयते तर्हि मूर्तद्रव्येषु सत्स्वेव दिग्लिङ्गस्ये-दमतः पूर्वेण इत्यादिज्ञानस्य कालालिङ्गस्य च परापरादिमत्ययस्य सञ्जावात्तयोरपि तदाश्रितत्वं स्यात् । तथा चायुक्रमेतदन्यत्र नित्यद्रव्येभ्य इति ॥ किञ्च समवायस्यानाश्रितत्वे सम्बन्धरूपतैव न घटते । तथा च मयोगः-- समवायो न सम्बन्धः । अनाश्रितस्वादिगादिवदिति ॥ अत्र समवायस्य धर्मिणः कथंचित्तादात्म्यरूपस्यानेकस्य च परैः प्रतियन्नत्वा-धर्मिग्राइकप्रमाखवाध आश्रयासिद्धिश्व न वाच्येति ॥ तस्याश्रितत्वेऽप्येतद-मिधीयते न समवाय एकः सम्बन्धात्मकत्वे सत्याश्रितत्वात् संयोगवत् । सत्तयाऽनेकान्त इति सम्बन्धविशेषणम् ॥ अथ संयोगे निविद्वशिथिलादि-पत्ययनानात्वान्नानात्वं नान्यत्र विपर्ययादिति चेत् न, समवायेऽप्युत्पत्ति-मत्वनश्वरत्वमत्ययनानात्वस्य सुत्तभत्वात् ॥ सम्बन्धिभेदाझेदोऽन्यत्रापि समान इति नैकत्रैव पर्धनुयोगो युक्तः ॥ तस्मात्समवायस्य परपरिकल्पितस्य विचारासहत्वान्न तद्वशाद्गुणगुण्यादिष्वभेदप्रतीतिः ॥ अथ भिन्नपति-भासादवयवायवयव्यादीनां भेद एवेति चेन्न, भेदमतिभासस्याभेदाविरोधात् । घटपटादीनामपि कथञ्चिदभेदोपपत्तेः ॥ सर्वथा प्रतिभासभेदस्यासिद्धेश्र ॥ इदमित्याद्यभेदप्रतिभासस्यापि भावात्ततः कथंचिद्धेदाभेदात्मकं द्रव्यपर्या-यात्मकं सामान्यविशेषात्मकं च तत्त्वं तीरादर्शिशकुनिन्यायेनायातमित्यत्त-मतिप्रसङ्गेन ।। इदानीमनेकान्तात्मकवस्तुसमर्थनार्थमेव हेतुद्रयमाह—

श्रनुइत्तव्यावृत्तप्रत्ययगोचरत्वातपूर्वोत्तराकारपरिहारावासिस्थिति-लत्तगापरिणामेनार्थकियोपपत्तेश्चेति ॥ २ ॥

अनुष्टत्ताकारो हि गौगौँरित्यादिषत्ययः । व्याद्यत्ताकारः श्यामः शवल इत्यादिषरययः । तयोगोंचास्तस्य भावस्तत्त्वं तस्मात् । एतेन तिर्यक्-सामान्यव्यतिरेकलत्तरणविशेषद्वयात्मकं वस्तु साधितम् । पूर्वोत्तराकारयो-र्यथासंख्येन परिद्वारावाप्ती, ताभ्यां स्थितिः, सैव लत्तरणं यस्य, स चासौ परिणामश्र, तेनार्थक्रियोपपत्तेश्वेत्यनेन तूर्ध्वतासामान्यपर्यायाख्यविशेषद्वय-रूपं वस्तु समर्थितं भवति ॥ अथ प्रथमोदिष्टसामान्यभेदं दर्शयत्राह—

सामान्यं द्वेधा तिर्यगूर्ध्वतामेदात् ॥ ३ ॥

प्रथमभेदं सोदाहरणमाह----

सदृशपरिएामस्तिर्यक्, खएडमुएडादिषु गोत्ववत् ॥ ४ ॥ नित्यैकरूपस्य गोत्वादेः क्रमयौगपद्याभ्यामर्थकियाविरोधात् । प्रत्येकं परिसमाप्त्या व्यक्तिषु इत्ययोगाचानेकं सदृशपरिएामात्मकमेवेति तिर्यक्-सामान्यमुक्तम् ॥ द्वितीयभेदमपि सदृष्टान्तमुपदर्शयति—

परापरविवर्त्तत्यापिद्रव्यमूर्ध्वेता मृदिव स्थासादिष्त्रिति ॥ ४ ॥ सामान्यमिति वर्तते तेनायमर्थः- ऊर्ध्वतासामान्यं भवति । किं तत् ? द्रव्यम् । तदेव विशिष्यते परापरविवर्तव्यापीति पूर्वापरकालवर्तित्रिकाला-नुयायीत्यर्थः । चित्रज्ञानस्यैकस्य युगपद्भाव्यनेकस्वगतनीलाद्याकारव्या-सिवदेकस्य क्रमभाविपरिणामव्यापित्वमित्यर्थः ।। विशेषस्यापि द्वैविध्य-मुपदर्शयति-

विशेषश्चेति ॥ ६ ॥

द्वेधेत्यधिक्रियमाणेनाभिसम्बन्धः । तदेव प्रतिपादयति-

पर्यायव्यतिरेकभेदादिति ॥ ७ ॥

प्रथमविशेषभेदमाइ-

अत्रात्मद्रव्यं स्वदेहममितिमात्रमेव न व्यायकम् नापि वटक-रिएकामात्रम् । कायाकारपरिणतभूतकदम्बकमिति, न च तत्र व्यापकत्वे यरेषामनुमानमात्मा व्यापकः द्रव्यत्वे सत्यम्तेत्वादा-काशवदिति । तत्र यदि रूपादिलत्तरणं मुर्तत्वं तत्मतिषेधोऽमुतत्वं तदा मनसाऽनेकान्तः ।। ऋथासर्वगतद्रव्यपरिमाेगं मूर्तत्वं तन्निषेधस्तेथा चेत्परं-मति साध्यसमो हेतुः ।। यचापरमनुमानम्--त्रात्मो व्यापकः अणुपरिमाणा-नधिकरणत्वे सति नित्यद्रव्यत्वादाकाशवदिति । तदपि न साधुसाधनम् । त्र्रसुपरिमाणानधिकरणत्वमित्रत्य किमयं नञर्थः पर्युदासः प्रसज्यो वा भवेत् ? तत्राद्यपत्ते अणुपरिमाखप्रतिषेधेन महापरिमाणमवान्तरपरिमाणं परिमाणमात्रं वा १ महापरिमाणं चेत् साध्यसमो हेतुः । अवान्तरपरिमाणं चेतु विरुद्धो हेतुरवान्तरपरिमाणाधिकरणत्वं स्रव्यापकत्वमेव साधयतीति ॥

#### प्रमेयरतमाला

परिमाणमात्रं चेत्-तत्परिमाणसामान्यमङ्गीकर्तव्यम् । तथाचागुपरिमाग-प्रतिषेधेन परिमाखसामान्याधिकरणत्वमात्मन इत्युक्तम् । तचानुपपन्नं, व्य-धिकरण्णसिद्धिप्रसङ्गात् । न हि परिमाणसामान्यमात्मनि व्यवस्थितं किन्तु परिमाग्गच्यक्विष्वेति ॥ न चावान्तरमहापरिमाग्गद्वयाधारतयाऽऽत्मन्यमति-पत्रे परिमार्गमात्राधिकरणता तत्र निश्चेतुं शक्या । दृष्टान्तश्च साधनवि-कलः । त्राकाशस्य महापरिमाणाधिकरणतया परिमाणमात्राधिकरणत्वा-योगात ।। नित्यद्रव्यत्वं च सर्वथाऽसिद्धम् । नित्यस्य क्रमाक्रमाभ्यामर्थ-क्रियाविरोधादिति ॥ प्रसज्यपत्तेऽपि तुच्छा भावस्य ग्रहणोपायासम्भवात् न विशेषणत्वम् । न चाग्रहीतविशेषर्णं नाम न चाग्रहीतविशेषणाविशेष्ये बुद्धिरिति वचनात्र प्रत्यत्तं तद्ग्रहणोपायः सम्बन्धाभावादिन्द्रियार्थसन्नि-कर्षजं हि पत्यत्तं तन्मतेऽपसिद्धम् ।। विशेषरणविशेष्यभावकल्पनायामभा-वस्य नाग्रहीतस्य विशेषगत्वमिति तदेव द्षणम् । तस्मान्न व्यापकमात्म-द्रव्यम् । नापि वटकग्णिकामात्रं कमनीयकान्ताकुचजघनसंस्पर्शकाले प्रति-लोमकूपमाह्लादनाकारस्य मुखस्यानुभवनात् । अन्यथा सर्वाङ्गीणरोमाञ्चा-दिकार्योदयायोगात् ।। त्राशुटत्त्यालातचक्रवत् क्रमेर्णैव तत्सुखमित्यनुपप-न्नम् ।। परापरान्तःकरग्रसम्बन्धस्य तत्कारग्रस्य परिकल्पनार्यां व्यवधान-भसङ्गात् । अन्यथा सुखस्य मानसप्रत्यच्चत्वायोगादिति ।। नापि पृथिव्या-दिचतुष्टयात्मकत्वमात्मनः सम्भाव्यते । अचेतनेभ्यश्चेतन्योत्पत्त्ययोगाद्धा-रंगेरगद्रवोष्णतालचणान्वयाभावाच । तदहर्जातवालकस्य स्तनादावभि-लाषाभावप्रसङ्गाच । त्राभिलाषो हि पत्यभिज्ञाने भवति, तच स्मरणे स्मरणं चानुभुवे भवतीति पूर्वानुभवः सिद्धः । मध्यदशायां तथैव व्याप्तेः । मृतानां रचोयचादिकुलेषु स्वयमुत्पचत्वेन कथयतां दर्शनात् ॥ केपाश्चित् भवस्मृते-रुपलम्भाचानादिश्वेतनः सिद्ध एव ॥ तथा चोक्रम्---तदहर्जस्तनेहातो रत्तोदृष्टेभेवस्मृतेः । भूतानन्वयनात्सिद्धः भक्ततिज्ञः सनातनः ॥ १ ॥ इति ॥ न च स्वदेहममितिरात्मेत्यत्रापि ममाणाभावात् सर्वत्र संशय इति वक्वव्यं तत्रानुमानस्य सद्धावात् । तथाहि देवदत्तात्मा तद्देह एव तत्र सर्वत्रेव च विद्यते तत्रैव तत्र सर्वत्रैव च स्वासाधारणगुणाधारतयोपलम्भात् । यो यत्रैव यत्र सर्वत्रैव च स्वासाधारणगुणाधारतयोपसभ्यते स तत्रैव तत्र सर्वत्रैव च विद्यते यथा देवदत्तगृहे एव तत्र सर्वत्रैव चोपसभ्यमानः स्वा-

साधारणभासुरत्वादिगुणः भदीपः तथा चायं तस्मात्तथेति । तदसाधारण-गुणा ज्ञानदर्शनसुखवीर्यलज्जणास्ते च सर्वाङ्गीणास्तत्रैव चोपलभ्यन्ते ॥ सुखमाह्वादनाकारं विज्ञानं मेयबोधनम् । शक्तिः क्रियानुमेया स्यायूनः कान्तासमागमः ॥ १ ॥ इति वचनात् ॥ तस्मादात्मा देइप्रमितिरेव स्थितः ॥ द्वितीयं विशेषभेदमाइ----

अर्थान्तरगतो विसदृशपरिगामो व्यतिरेको

गोमहिषादिवत् ॥ म ॥

वैसादृश्यं हि प्रतियोगिग्रहणे सत्येव भवति । न चायेचिकत्वादस्या-वस्तुत्वमवस्तुन्यापेच्निकत्वायोगात् । ऋपेचाया वस्तुनिष्ठत्वात् ।।

स्यात्कारलाञ्चित्रमबाध्यमनन्तधर्म-

संदोइवर्मितमशेषमपि ममेयम् ॥

देवैः प्रमाखबलतो निरचायि यच

संचिप्तमेव मुनिभिविंग्टतं मयैतत् ॥ १ ॥

इति परीचामुखस्य लघुवृत्तौ विषयसमुद्देशरचतुर्थः ।) ४ ॥

अथेदानीं फलविमतिपत्तिनिरासार्थमाइ— अज्ञाननिवृत्तिहीनोपादानोपेत्तारुच फलम् ॥ १ ॥

द्विविधं हि फलं साचात्पारम्पर्येग्रेति । साचादज्ञाननिष्टत्तिः पारम्प-र्येण हानादिकमिति, प्रमेयनिश्चयोत्तरकालभावित्वात्तस्येति ॥ तद्द्विविध-मपि फलं प्रमाणाद्धित्रमेवेति यौगाः । अभिन्नमेवेति सौगताः । तन्मत-द्वयनिरासेन स्वमतं व्यवस्थापयितुमाह—

प्रमागादमिन्नं मिन्नं च ॥ २ ॥

कथश्चिदभेदसमर्थनार्थं हेतुमाह----

यः प्रमिमीते स एव निवृत्ताज्ञानो जहात्या-

दत्त उपेतते चेति प्रतीतेः ॥ ३ ॥

अयमर्थः----यस्यैवात्मनः प्रमाग्गाकारेण परिणतिस्तस्यैव फलरूपतया

### ममेयरत्नमाला

परिखाम इत्येकप्रमात्रपेत्तया प्रमाराफत्तयोरभेदः । करणक्रियापरिखाम-भेदाझेद इत्यस्य सामर्थ्यसिद्धत्वात्रोक्तम् ॥ पारम्पर्येख सात्ताच फलं द्वेधाऽभिधायि यत् ।

देवैर्भित्रमभिन्नं च प्रमाखात्तदिहोदितम् ॥ १ ॥

इति परीक्षामुसलघुवृत्तौ फलसमुद्देशः पद्ममः ॥ ४ ॥

त्रथेदानीमुक्त्रमाणस्वरूपादिचतुष्टयाभासमाइ— ततोऽन्यत्तद्दाभासमिति ॥ १ ॥

तत उक्वात् ममार्गास्वरूपसंख्याविषयफलमेदादन्यद्विपरीतं तदाभा-समिति ॥ तत्र क्रमप्राप्तं स्वरूपाभासं दर्शयति--

अस्वसंविदितगृहीतार्थदर्शनसंशयादयः प्रमाणाभासाः ॥ २ ॥

अस्वसंविदितश्च गृहीतार्थश्च दर्शनश्च संशय आदिर्येषां ते संशया-दयश्वेति सर्वेषां द्वंद्रः ॥ आदिशब्देन विपर्यानध्यवसाययोरपि प्रहणम् ॥ तत्रास्वसंविदितं ज्ञानं ज्ञानान्तरमत्यत्तत्वादिति नैयायिकाः । तथाहि ब्रानं स्वच्यतिरिक्तवेदनवेद्यं वेद्यत्वात् घटवदिति । तदसङ्गतम्- धर्मिं हानस्य ज्ञानान्तरवेद्यत्वे साध्यान्तःपातित्वेन धर्मित्वायोगात् ॥ स्वसंविदितत्वे तेनैव हेतोरनेकान्तात् ॥ महेश्वरहानेन च व्यभिचाराद्व्याप्तिहानेनात्यने-कान्तादर्धमतिपत्त्ययोगाच ॥ नहि **ब्रापकम**प्रत्यत्तं ज्ञाप्यं गमयति शब्दलिङ्गादीनामपि तथैव गमकत्वपसङ्गात् ॥ अनन्तरभाविज्ञानप्रद्यात्वे तस्याध्यग्रहीतस्य पराह्रापकत्वात्तदनन्तरं कल्पनीयम् । तत्रापि तदनन्तर-मित्यनवस्था ॥ तस्मात्रायं पत्तः श्रेयान् ॥ एतेन करणझानस्य परोत्त-त्वेनास्वसंविदितत्वं ब्रुवत्रपि मीमांसकः प्रत्युक्तः । तस्यापि ततोऽर्थप्रत्यत्त-त्वायोगात् ।। त्रथ कर्मत्वेनामतीयमानत्वादमत्यत्तत्वे तर्हि फल्ज्ज्जानस्या-मत्यत्तता तत एव स्यात् ॥ ऋथ फलत्वेन मतिमासनं नो चेत कररणकान-स्यापि करणत्वेनावभासनात् प्रत्यक्तत्वमस्तु । तस्मादर्थ्वप्रतिपत्त्यन्यथाऽनु-पपत्तेः करणज्ञानकल्पनावदर्थप्रत्यत्तत्वान्यथाऽनुपपत्तेर्ज्ञानस्यापि मत्यत्त-त्वमस्तु ॥ अथ करणस्य चत्तुरादेरमत्यत्तत्वेऽपि रूपमाकटचाद्वचामिचार इति चेन्न, भिन्नकर्तृककरणस्यैव तद्रधभिचारात् ॥ अभिन्नकर्तृके करणे

सति कर्त्तृप्रत्यचतायां तदभिन्नस्यापि करणस्य कथश्चित्प्रत्यचत्वेनाप्रत्यच-तैकान्तविरोधात्मकाशात्मनोऽमत्यत्तत्वे मदीपमत्यत्तत्वविरोधवदिति ॥ गू-इीतग्राहिधारावाहिझानं, ग्रहीतार्थं दर्शनं, सौगताभिमतं निर्विकल्पकं, तच स्वविषयानुपदर्शकत्वादप्रमार्एं व्यवसायस्यैव तज्जनितस्य तदुपदर्श-त्रथ व्यवसायस्य प्रत्यचाकारेणानुरक्रत्वात्ततः प्रत्यचस्यैव 11 कत्वात व्यवसायस्तु गृहीतग्राहित्वादममारणमिति तन्न सुभाषितं-प्रामाएयं दर्शनस्याविकल्पकस्यानुपलत्तरणत्तरसद्भावायोगात् सद्भावा वा नीलादाविव चगुच्चयादावपि तदुपदर्शकत्वप्रसङ्गात् ।। तत्र विपरीतसमारोपात्रेति चेत्तई सिद्धं नीलादौ समारोपविधिग्रहणलत्ताणो निश्वय इति तदात्मक-मेव प्रमागमितरत्तदाभासमिति ॥ संशयाद्यश्च प्रसिद्धा एव । तत्र संशय-उभयकोटिसंस्पर्शी स्थागुर्वा पुरुषो वेति परामर्शः ॥ विपर्ययः पुरस्तस्मिस्त-दिति विकल्पः । विशेषानवधाररणमध्यवसायः ॥ कथमेषामस्वसंविदितादीनां तदाभासतेन्यत्राह-

स्वत्रिषयोपदर्शकत्वाभावात् ॥ ३ ॥

गतार्थमेतत् । अत्र दृष्टान्तं यथाक्रममाह----

पुरुषान्तरपूर्वार्थगच्छत्तृएास्पर्शस्थागुपुरुष।दिज्ञानवत् ॥ ४ ॥ पुरुषान्तरं च पूर्वार्थश्च गच्छत्तृएास्पर्शश्च स्थागुपुरुषादिश्च तेषां झानं तद्वत् ॥ अपरं च सत्रिकर्षवादिनं प्रति दृष्टान्तमाह----

चन्नूरसयोईव्ये संयुक्तसमवायवच ॥ ५ ॥

अयमर्थो यथा चत्तूरसयोः संयुक्तसमवायः सत्रपि न प्रमाणं तथा चत्तु-रूपयोरपि । तस्मादयमपि प्रमाणाभास एवेति ॥ उपलत्तणमेतत् अतिव्याप्ति-कथनमव्याप्तिश्च । सन्निकर्षमत्यत्तवादिनां चत्तुपि सन्निकर्षस्याभावात् ॥ अथ चत्तुः प्राप्तार्थपरिच्छेदकं व्यवहितार्थाप्रकाशकत्वात् प्रदीपवदिति तत्सि-द्धिरिति मतं तदपि न साधीयः । काचाभ्रपटलादिव्यवहितार्थानामपि चत्तुषा प्रतिभासनाद्धेतोरसिद्धेः । शाखाचन्द्रमसोरेककालदर्शनानुपपत्तिमस-क्रेश्च ॥ न च तत्र क्रमेऽपि यौगपद्याभिमान इति वक्वव्यम् । कालव्यवधा-नानुपलब्धेः ॥ किश्च क्रमप्रतिपत्तिः प्राप्तिनिश्चये सति भवति । न च क्रम-प्राप्ती प्रमाणान्तरमस्ति । तैजसत्वमस्तीति चेन्न तस्यासिद्धेः ॥ अथ चत्तुस्तै- त्रसं रूपादीनां मध्ये रूपस्यैव मकाशकत्वात् मदीपवदिति । सदप्यपर्यात्तो-चिताभिधानं मएयञ्जनादेः पार्थिवत्वेऽपि रूपप्रकाशकत्वदर्शनात् ॥ पृथिव्या-दिरूपप्रकाशकत्वे पृथिव्याद्यारव्धत्वप्रसङ्गाच । तस्मात्सत्तिकर्षस्याव्यापक-त्वात्र प्रमाणत्वं कारणज्ञानेन व्यवधानाचेति ॥ पत्यत्ताभासमाह— घवैशद्ये प्रत्यत्तं तदाभासं बौद्धस्याकरमाद्धूमदर्शनाद्ध-

ह्निविज्ञानवदिति ॥ ६ ॥

परोचामासमाइ—

वैशदोऽपि परोचं तदाभासं मीमांसकस्य करणज्जानवत् ॥ ७ ॥ माक् मपश्चितमेतत् । परोज्ञभेदाभासपुपदर्शयन् मथमं क्रममाप्तं स्मरुणा-भासमाह----

श्रतसमिस्तदिति ज्ञानं स्मरग्राभासं जिनदत्ते स

देवदत्तो यथेति ॥ न ॥

प्रत्यभिज्ञानाभासम् ॥ १ ॥

द्विविधं प्रत्यभिद्वानामासमुपदर्शितं, एकत्वनिबंधनं सादरयनिबंधनं चेति ॥ तत्रैकत्वे सादरयावगासः सादश्ये चैकत्वामासस्तदामासमिति ॥ तकीम्रासमाद----

श्रसम्बद्धे तज्ज्ञानं तर्काभासम् ॥ १० ॥

यावाँस्वस्पुत्रः स श्याम इति यथा । तज्ज्ञानमिति व्याप्तिसत्तव्यक्तम्बन्ध-ज्ञानमित्यर्थः ॥ इदानीमनुमानाभासमाइ----

### इदमनुमानाभासम्॥ ११ ॥

इदं वत्त्र्यमाखमिति मावः ॥ तत्र तदवयवाभासोपदर्शनेन समुदाय-रूपानुमानाभासमुपदर्शयितुकामः प्रथमावयवाभासमाह—-तत्रानिष्टादिः प्रज्ञाभासः ॥ १२ ॥

इष्टमगाधितमित्यादि तल्लचाणमुक्तमिदानीं तद्विपरीतं तदामासमिति कथयति—

ग्रनिष्टो मीमांसकस्यानित्यः शब्दः ॥ १३ ॥ असिद्धाद्विपरीतं तदाभासमाइ----

सिद्धः श्रावराः शब्द इति ॥ १४ ॥

श्रवाधितमविपरीतं तदामासमावेदयन् स च प्रत्यत्तादिवाधित एवेति ৱৰ্ঘায়কাচ-

बाधितः प्रत्यक्षानुमानागमलोकस्ववचनैः ॥ १४ ॥

पतेषां क्रमेणोदाहरणमाह----

\$ \$

तत्र प्रत्यत्तवाधितो यथा श्रनुष्णोऽग्नि-

ईव्यत्वाज्जलवत् ॥ १६ ॥

ग्रुष्णरपर्शात्मकोऽग्निरनुम्यते ॥ स्पर्शनमत्यत्तेण मनमान-बाधितमाइ--

ग्रपरिणामी राब्दः कृतकत्वात् घटवत् ॥ १७ ॥

अत्र पत्तोऽपरिणामी शब्दः कृतकत्वादित्यनेन बाध्यते ॥ भागम-बाधितमाह----

प्रेत्यासुखप्रदो धर्मः पुरुषाश्रितत्वादधर्मवत् ॥ १८ ॥

आगमे हि पुरुषाश्रितत्वाविशेषेऽपि परलोके धर्मस्य सुलहेतुत्वमुक्तम् । लोकवाधितमाइ----

शुचि नरशिरःकपालं प्राएयंगत्वाच्छंखशुक्तिवत् ॥ १६ ॥

लोके हि प्राएगंगत्वेऽपि कस्यचिच्छचित्वमशुचित्वं च।तत्र नर-कपालादीनामशुचित्वमेवेति लोकवाधितत्वम् । स्ववचनवाधितमाइ---माता मे वन्ध्या पुरुषसंयोगेऽप्यगर्भत्वात्प्र-

सिद्धवन्ध्याक्त् ॥ २० ॥

इदानीं हेत्वामासान् कमापनानार-

हेत्वाभासा असिद्धविरुद्धानैकान्तिकाकिञ्चित्कराः ॥ २१ ॥ पर्गं यथाकमं तत्त्रणं सोदाहरणमाह-

त्रसत्सत्तानिश्चयोऽसिद्धः ॥ २२ ॥

सत्ता च निश्रयश्व सत्तानिश्वयौ, इप्रसन्तौ सत्तानिश्वयौ यस्य स भवत्यसत्सत्तानिश्वयः । तत्र मथमभेदमाइ--

अविद्यमानसत्ताकः परिग्णामी शब्दश्चानुषत्वात् ॥ २३ ॥ कयमस्यासिद्धत्वमित्याह—

स्वरूपेगासत्त्वात् ॥ २४ ॥

दितीयासिद्धभेदमुपदर्शयति----

श्वविद्यमाननिश्चयो मुग्धबुद्धि प्रत्यग्निरत्र धूमादिति ॥ २४ ॥ अस्याप्वसिद्धता कथमित्यारेकायामाद--

तस्य वाष्पादिभावेन भूतसंघाते संदेहात् ॥ २६ ॥ तस्येति मुग्धबुद्धिं प्रतीत्यर्थः । श्रपरमपि भेदमाह—

सांख्यम्प्रति परिग्रामी शब्दः ऋतकत्वादिति ॥ २७ ॥

मस्यासिद्धतायां कारणमाइ-

तेनाज्ञातत्वादिति ॥ २८ ॥

तेन सांख्येनाहातत्वात्तन्मते हाविभावतिरोभावावेव प्रसिद्धौ नोत्पच्या-दिरिति ॥ अस्याप्यनिश्रयादसिद्धत्वमित्यर्थः ॥ विरुद्धं हेत्वाभासमुप-दर्शयकाह-

विपरीतनिश्चिताविनाभावो विरुद्धोऽपरिएामी राब्दः

### कृतकत्वात् ॥ २६ ॥

विपत्तेऽप्यविरुद्धवृत्तिरनैकान्तिकः ॥ ३० ॥

अभिशब्दात्र केवलं पत्तसपत्तयोरिति इष्टव्यम् । स च दिविधौ विपत्ते निश्चितद्वत्तिः शङ्कितदृत्तिश्चेति ॥ तत्राद्यं दर्शयत्राह--

निश्चितवृत्तिरनित्यः शब्दः प्रमेयत्वात् घटवदिति ॥ ३१ ॥ कथमस्य विषसे निश्चिता दृत्तिरित्याशङ्कयाह----

श्राकाशे नित्येऽप्यस्य निश्चयात् ॥ ३२ ॥ शक्कितहत्तिपुदाहरति–

शङ्कितवृत्तिस्तु नास्ति सर्व ज्ञो वक्तृत्वादिति ॥ ३३ ॥ अस्यापि कथं विषचे दत्तिराशंक्यत इत्यत्राइ----

सर्व ज्ञत्वेन वक्तृत्वाविरोधादिति ॥ ३४ ॥ अविरोधरव ज्ञानोत्कर्षे वचनानामपकर्षादर्शनादिति निरूपितप्रायम् ॥ अकिश्चित्करस्वरूपं निरूपयति—

सिद्धे प्रत्यचादिबाधिते च साध्ये हेतुरकिश्चित्करः ॥ ३४ ॥ तत्र सिद्धे साध्ये हेतुरकिश्चित्कर इत्युदाहरति----

सिद्धः श्रावर्णः शब्दः शब्दत्वात् ॥ ३६ ॥ कथमस्याकिञ्चित्करत्वमित्याइ----

किञ्चिदकर सात् ॥ २७ ॥

अपरं च भेदं प्रथमस्य दृष्टान्तीकरणद्वारेणोदाइरति---यथाऽनुष्णोऽग्निईव्यत्वादित्यादैर्किञ्चिरकर्तु मशक्यत्वात् ॥ ३८ ॥ अकिञ्चित्करत्वमिति शेषः ॥ अयं च दोषो हेतुलज्ञणविचारावसर एव,

न वादकाल इति व्यक्वीकुर्वनाह— लत्त्वण एवासी दोषो व्युत्पन्नप्रयोगस्य पत्तदोषेणे व दुष्टत्वात् ३६ ॥ दृष्टान्तोऽन्वयव्यतिरेकभेदाद्द्विविध इत्युक्तं तत्रान्वयदष्टान्ताभासमाद— दृष्टान्ताभासा अन्वयेऽसिद्धसाध्यसाधनोभयाः ॥ ४० ॥ साध्यं च साधनं च उभयं च सांध्यसाधनोभयानि असिद्धानि सानि

येष्विति विग्रहः ॥ एतानेकत्रैवानुमाने दर्शयति----

अपौरुषेयः शब्दोऽमूर्तत्वादिन्द्रियसुखपरमागुघटवत् ॥ ४१ ॥ इन्द्रियसुखमसिद्धसाध्यं तस्य पौरुषेयत्वात् । परमागुरसिद्धसाधनं तस्य मूर्तत्वात् । घटश्चासिद्धोभयः पौरुषेयत्वान्मूर्तत्वाच ॥ साध्यव्याप्तं साधनं दर्शनीयमिति दृष्टान्तावसरे मतिपादितं तद्विपरीतदर्शनमपि तदाभास-मित्याइ—

विपरीतान्वयश्च यदपौरुषेयं तदमूर्तम् ॥ ४२ ॥ कुतोऽस्य तदामासतेत्याइ—

विद्युदादिनाऽतिप्रसङ्गात् ॥ ४२ ॥

तस्याप्यम्तितामाप्तेरित्यर्थः । व्यतिरेकोदाहरणाभासमाइ—

व्यतिरेके सिद्धतद्व्यतिरेकाः परमाणिवन्द्रियसुखाकाशवत्॥ ४४॥

श्रणौरुषेयः शब्दोऽमूर्तत्वादित्यत्रैवासिद्धाः साध्यसाधनोभयव्यतिरेका यत्रेति विग्रद्दः । तत्रासिद्धसाध्यव्यतिरेकः परमाणुस्तस्यापौरुषेयत्वात् इन्द्रि-मसुखमसिद्धसाधनव्यतिरेकम् ॥ आकाशं त्वसिद्धोभयव्यतिरेकमिति । साध्याभावे साधनव्याद्वत्तिरिति व्यतिरेकोदाहरणमघट्टके ख्यापितं तत्र तद्विपरीतमपि तदाभासमित्युपदर्शयति—

विपरीतव्यतिरेकरच यन्नामूर्तं तन्नापौरुषेयम् ॥ ४४ ॥

बालच्युत्त्पत्यर्थ तत्रयोपगम इत्युक्तमिदानीं तान्प्रत्येव कियद्धीनतायां मयोगाभासमाह—

बालप्रयोगाभासः पञ्चावयवेषु कियद्वीनतां ॥ ४६ ॥ तदेवोदाहरति—

श्रग्निमानयं देशो धूमवत्वात् यदित्थं तदित्थं यथा

महानस इति ॥ ४७ ॥

इत्यवयवत्रयप्रयोगे सतीत्यर्थः । चतुरवयवप्रयोगे तदाभासत्वमाह— धूमवांश्चायमिति वा ॥ ४८ ॥

मब्बब्बिपर्ययेऽपि तत्त्वमाह----

तस्मादग्निमान् धूमवांश्चायमिति ॥ ४६॥

कथमनयवविपर्यये प्रयोगाभास इत्यारेकायामाइ---स्पष्टतया प्रकृतप्रतिपत्तेरयोगात् ॥ ४० ॥

इदानीमागमामासमाह----

रागद्वेषमोहाकान्तपुरुषवचनाज्जातमागमाभासम् ॥ ४१ ॥ उदाहरणमाह----

यथा नचास्तीरे मोदकराशयः सन्ति, धावष्वं माखवकाः ॥४२॥

करिचन्माखवकैराकुलीकृतचेतास्तत्सक्र्पीरजिहीर्षे**या** प्रतारणवाक्येन नद्या देशं तान् प्रस्थापयतीत्यात्प्तोक्नेरन्यत्वादागमाभासत्वम् । मथमोदाइरण-मात्रेणातुष्यन्तुदाहरणान्तरमाह-

त्रंगुल्यग्रे हस्तियूथशतमास्त इति च ॥ ५३ ॥

अत्रापि सांख्यपशुः स्वदुरागमजनितवासनाहितचेता दृष्टेष्टविरुद्धं सर्वे सर्वत्र विद्यत इति मन्यमानस्तथोपदिशतीत्यनाप्तवचनत्वादिदमपि तथे-त्यर्थः ॥ कथमनन्तरयोर्वाक्ययोस्तदाभासत्वमित्यारेकायामाह----

विसंवादात् ॥ ५४ ॥

अविसंवादरूपप्रमाणलत्तरणाभावात्र तद्विशेषरूपमपीत्यर्थः ॥ इदानी संख्याभासमाइ-

प्रत्यत्तमेवैकं प्रमार्ग्रामित्यादि संख्याभासम् ॥ ४४ ॥

प्रत्यत्तपरोत्तभेदात् द्वैविध्यमुकं तद्वैपरीत्येन मत्यत्तमेव प्रत्यत्तानुमाने, ष्वेत्याद्यवधारणं संख्याभासम् ॥ प्रत्यत्तमेवैकमिति कथं संख्याभास-मित्याह----

लौकायतिकस्य प्रत्यत्ततः परलोकादिनिषेधस्य परबुद्धवा-

देशचासिद्धेरतद्विषयत्वात् ॥ ४६ ॥

अतद्विषयत्वात् अमत्यत्तविषयत्वादित्यर्थः । शेषं सुगमम् ॥ मपश्चितमे-वैतत्संख्याविमतिपत्तिनिराकरण इति नेइ पुनरूच्यते ॥ इतरवादिममाणे-

यत्तावधारणमपि विघटत इति लौकायतिकदृष्टान्तद्वारेण तन्मतेऽपि संख्या-भासमिति दर्शयति—

सौगतसांख्ययौगप्राभाकरजैमिनीयानां प्रत्यत्नानुमानागमो-

पमानार्थापत्यभावैरेकैकाधिकैर्व्याप्तिवत् ॥ ४७ ॥

यथा प्रत्यत्तादिभिरेकैकाधिकैच्याप्तिः मतिपत्तुं न शक्यते सौग-तादिभिस्तथा प्रत्यत्तेण लौकायतिकैः परबुद्धवादिरपीत्यर्थः ॥ अथ परबुद्धचादिप्रतिपत्तिः प्रत्यत्तेण माभूदन्यस्माद्रविष्यतीत्याशङ्कचाइ----

श्रनुमानादेरतद्विषयत्वे प्रमाणान्तरत्वम् ॥ ४८ ॥

तच्द्रव्देन परबुद्धादिरभिधीयते । अनुमानादेः परबुद्धादिविषयत्वे मत्यद्वैकप्रमाखवादो हीयत इत्यर्थः ।। अत्रोदाहरखमाह--

तर्कस्येव व्याप्तिगोचरत्वे प्रमाखान्तरत्वम् ।

श्रप्रमाग्रात्याव्यवस्थापकत्वात् ॥ ४६ ॥

सौगतादीनामिति शेषः ॥ किश्च भत्यचैकप्रमाणवादिना मत्यच्चाचे-कैकाधिकप्रमाणवादिभिश्व स्वसंकेदनेन्द्रियमत्यच्चभेदोऽजुमानादिभेदश्व मति-भासमेदेनेव वक्तव्यो गत्यन्तराभावात् । स च तब्नेदो लौकायतिकं मति प्रत्यच्चानुमानयोरितरेषां व्याप्तिज्ञानमत्यच्चादिष्रमाणेष्विति सर्वेषां ममाण-संख्या विघटते ॥ तदेव दर्शयति—

प्रतिभासभेदस्य च भेदकत्वात् ॥ ६० ॥

इदानीं विषयाभासमुपदर्शयितुमाह----

विषयाभासः सामान्यं विशेषो द्वयं वा स्वतंत्रम् ॥ ६१ ॥ कथमेषां तदाभासतेत्याइ---

तथाप्रतिभासनात्कार्याकरणाच ॥ ६२ ॥

किश्व तदेकान्तात्मकं तत्त्वं स्वयं समर्थमसमर्थ वा कार्याकारि स्यात् ! मधमपन्ने द्पणमाह----

समर्थस्य करणे सर्वदोत्पत्तिरनपेचत्वात् ॥ ६३ ॥

सहकारिसात्रिध्यात् तत्करणात्रेति चेदत्राह----

परापेत्नगो परिगामित्वमन्यथा तदभावात् ॥ ६४ ॥

वियुक्रायस्थायामकुर्वतः सहकारिसमवधानवेलायां कार्यकारिणः पूर्वो-त्तराकारपरिहारावासिस्थितिलत्तरणपरिणामोपपत्तेरित्यर्थः । अन्यथा कार्यकारणाभावात् । प्रागभावावस्थायामेवेत्यर्थः । अथ द्वितीयपत्त-दोषमाह—

स्वयमसमर्थस्य श्रकारकत्वात्पूर्व वत् ॥ ६५ ॥ अथ फलाभासं मकाशयबाह—

फलाभासं प्रमाखादभिन्नं भिन्नमेव वा ॥ ६६ ॥ कुतः पत्तद्रयेऽपि तदाभासतेत्याशङ्कायामाद्यपत्ते तदाभासत्वे हेतुमाह— श्रभेदे तद्वत्त्ववहारानुपपत्तेः ॥ ६७ ॥

फलमेव भमारणमेव वा भवेदिति भावः । व्यादृत्त्या संदृत्यपरनामधेयया तत्कल्पनाऽस्त्वित्याइ—

व्यावृत्त्याऽपि न तत्कल्पना फलान्तराद्व्या-

वृत्त्याऽफलत्वप्रसङ्गत् ॥ ६ न ॥

अयमर्थः--यथा फलाद्विजातीयात् फलस्य व्यादृत्त्या फलव्यवहार-स्तथा फलान्तरादपि सजातीयाद्व्यादृत्त्तिरव्यस्तीत्यफलत्वम् । अत्रैवाभेद-पत्ते दृष्टान्तमाह----

प्रमागाद्व्यावृत्त्येवाप्रमागत्त्वस्येति ॥ ६ ९ ॥

अत्रापि माक्रन्येव मकिया योजनीया ॥ अभेदपत्तं निराक्रत्य आवार्य उपसंहरति--

तस्माद्वास्तवोऽभेद इति॥ ७०॥

भेदपत्तं दूषयत्नाह-

भेदे त्वात्मान्तरवत्तदनुपपत्तेः ॥ ७१ ॥

काम बन्नैवात्मनि भमार्गं समवेतं फलमपि तन्नैव समवेतमिति समवाय-लत्तरणपत्त्यासत्त्या भमारणफलव्यवस्थितिरिति ॥ नात्मान्तरे तत्प्रसङ्ग इति चेत्तदपि न सूज्ञमित्याद्--

# समवायेऽतिप्रसङ्ग इति ॥ ७२ ॥

समवायस्य नित्यत्वाड्व्यापकत्वाच सर्वात्मनामपि समवायसमान-धर्मिकत्वान्न ततः प्रतिनियम इत्यर्थः ।। इदानीं स्वपरपत्तसाधनद्षण-व्यवस्थामुपदर्शयति–

प्रमासतदाभासौ दुष्टतयोद्घावितौ परिहतापरिहतदोषौ वादिनः साधनतदाभासौ प्रतिवादिनो दूषसमूषसो च ॥ ७२ ॥

बादिना प्रमाणमुपन्यस्तं तच प्रतिवादिना दुष्टतयोद्धावितं पुनर्वादिना परिहतं तदेव तस्य साधनं भवति प्रतिवादिनश्च दूषणमिति ॥ यदा तु वादिना प्रमाणाभासमुक्तं प्रतिवादिना तथैवोद्धावितं वादिना चापरिहतं तदा तद्वादिनः साधनाभासो भवति प्रतिवादिनश्च भूषणमिति ॥ अथोक्र-प्रकारेणाशेषविप्रतिपत्तिनिराकरणद्वारेण प्रमाणत्वं स्वप्रतिज्ञातं परीच्य नयादितत्त्वमन्यत्रोक्नमिति दर्शयन्नाह-

सम्भवदन्यद्विचारग्रीयमिति ॥ ७४ ॥

सम्भवद्विद्यमानमन्यत्प्रमाणतत्त्वान्नयस्वरूपं शास्तान्तरप्रसिद्धं विचार-णीयमिइ युक्त्या प्रतिपत्तव्यम् । तत्र मूलनयौ द्वौ द्रव्यार्थिकपर्यायार्थिक-भेदात् । तत्र द्रव्यार्थिकस्तेधा नैगमसंग्रद्दव्यवहारभेदात् । पर्यायार्थिकश्व-तुर्धा ऋजुसूत्रशब्दसमभिरूढैवम्भूतभेदात् । ज्रन्योऽन्यगुर्ग्धप्रधानभूतभेदाभेद-पुर्छा त्रग्धसुत्रशब्दसमभिरूढैवम्भूतभेदात् । ज्रन्योऽन्यगुर्ग्धप्रधानभूतभेदाभेद-प्ररूपणो नैगमः नैकं गमो नैगम इति निरुक्तेः ॥ सर्वथाऽभेदवादस्तदा-भासः ॥ मतिपत्तव्यपेत्तः सन्मात्रग्राही संग्रहः ॥ ब्रह्मवादस्तदाभासः ॥ संग्रहग्रहीतभेदको व्यवहारः ॥ काल्पनिको भेदस्तदाभासः ॥ शुद्धपर्या-यग्राही प्रतिपत्तसापेत्त ऋजुसूत्रः ॥ काल्पनिको भेदस्तदाभासः ॥ श्रद्धपर्या-यग्राही प्रतिपत्तसापेत्त ऋजुसूत्रः ॥ काल्पनिको भेदस्तदाभासः ॥ श्रद्यर्भदं विना शब्दानामेव नानात्वैकान्तस्तदाभासः ॥ पर्यायभेदात्पदार्थनानात्व-तिरूषकः समभिरूढः ॥ पर्यायनानात्वमन्तरेणापीन्द्रादिभेदकथनं तदा-भासः ॥ क्रियाश्रयेण भेदप्ररूपणमित्थम्भावः ॥ क्रियानिरपेत्तत्वेन क्रिया-वात्तकेषु काल्पनिको व्यवहारस्तदाभास इति ॥ इति नयतदाभासलत्त्वर्ण सङ् त्त्रेपणोक्तं विस्तरेण नयत्त्रकात्त्यत्त्वम् ॥ अथवा सम्भवद्विद्यमान- मन्यद्वादलत्तर्णं पत्रलत्तर्णं वाऽन्यत्रोक्रमिइ द्रष्टव्यं तथा चाइ ॥ समर्थवचनं वाद इति । प्रसिद्धावयवं वाक्यं स्वेष्टस्यार्थस्य साधकम् । साधुगूढपदप्रायं पत्रमाद्रुरनाकुलम् ॥ १ ॥ इति ॥

परीत्तामुखमादर्शं हेयोपादेयतत्त्वयोः ।

संविदे मादृशो बालः परीत्तादत्तवद्व्यधाम् ॥ १ ॥

व्यधामकुतवानस्मि । किमर्थं संविदे । कस्य मादृशः । अहं च कथंभूत इत्याह बालो मन्दमतिः अनौद्धत्यसृचकं वचनमेतत् । तत्त्वझत्वश्च मारब्धनिर्वदृणादेवावसीयते ॥ किं तत् परीत्तामुखम् । तदेव निरूपयति आदर्शमिति । कयोः हेयोपादेयतत्त्वयोः यथैवादर्श आत्मनोऽलङ्कारम-षिडतस्य सौरूप्यं वैरूप्यं वा मतिबिम्बोपदर्शनद्वारेण सूचयति तथेदमपि हेयोपादेयतत्त्वं साधनद्पणोपदर्शनद्वारेण निश्चाययत्तीत्यादर्शत्वेन निरूप्यते क इव परीत्तादत्तवत् परीत्तादत्त इव, यथा परीत्तादत्त्वः स्वमारब्धशास्तं निरूदवाँस्तथाऽहमपीत्यर्थः ॥

अकलङ्कश्रशांकैर्यत्पकटीक्रतमखिलमाननिभृनिकरम् । तत्संचिप्तं सृरिभिरुरुमतिभिर्व्यक्रमेतेन ॥ १ ॥ इति परीद्यामुखबधुवृत्तौ प्रमाखाद्याभाससमुद्देशः षष्ठः ॥ ६ ॥

> श्रीमान् वैजेयनामाभूदव्रखीर्गुखशालिनाम् । बदरीपालवंशालिव्योमद्युमीखरूजितः ॥ १ ॥

तदीयपत्नी भुवि विश्रुतासीत्राणाम्बनाम्ना गुणशीलसीमा । यां रेवर्ताति प्रथिताम्बिकेति प्रभावतीति प्रवदन्ति सन्तः ॥ २ ॥ तस्यामभूद्विश्वजनीनद्यत्तिर्दानाम्बुवाहो भुवि हीरपाख्यः । स्वगोत्रविस्तारनभोऽशुमाली सम्यक्त्वरत्नाभरणाचिताङ्गः ॥ ३ ॥ तस्योपरोधवशतो विशदोरुकीर्त्तर्भाणिक्यनन्दिकुतशास्त्रमगाधबोधम् । स्पष्टीक्रुतं कतिपयैर्वचनैरुदारैर्बालप्रबोधकरमेतदनन्तवीयैः ॥ ४ ॥

इति प्रमेयरत्नमालापरनामधेया परीचामुखबघुषृतिः समासा ॥

# प्रमेयरत्नमालायां परीत्तामुखस्त्राखामकारादिवर्णानुक्रमेख

सूचीपत्रम्

	ī	रहाडु:		ş	(61 <b>2</b> :
श्रग्निमानयं देशो धूमवःवात्	<b>.</b> .	६६	, इ्दमनुमानाभा <del>स</del> ं		हर
अग्रिनमानयं देशः परिणामी		5 9	इदसस्माद्दूरम्		२६
अगिनमानयं देशस्तथैव		ષર	इदमस्मिन् सत्येव		२७
अङ्गुल्यमे हस्तियूथशतमास्त इति	<b>.</b>	90	इन्द्रियानिन्द्रियनिमित्तं		18
ग्रज्ञाननिवृत्तिर्हानो	<i>.</i> .	६२	इष्टमबाधितमसिद्धं साध्यम्		२६
त्रतजन्यमपि ततप्रकाशकं		34	उदगाद् भरशिः प्राकृतत एव	• • • •	80
श्रतस्मिस्तद्ति ज्ञानं	• • • •	<b>६</b> २	उदेध्यति शकटं		38
त्रनिश्चितौऽपूर्वार्थ		· *	उपलब्धिः विधिप्रतिषेधयोः		হ ৩
श्र <b>निष्टा</b> ध्यद्यादिबाधितयोः		२१	उपलंभानुपलंभनिमित्तं		<b>4</b> 9
त्रनिष्टो मीमांसकस्य		६६	एकस्मिन् द्रव्ये		६०
ञनुमानादेस्तद्विषयक्षे	<i></i>	9 <b>1</b>	एतद्द्रयमेवानुमानाङ्गं		३३
भ्रनुबृत्तव्यावृत्तप्रस्यय		3 \$	कर्मदत् कर्त्तृ कर खकिया प्रतीतेः	· · · •	×
ञनेकान्सारमकं	••••	४२	कारणस्य च परिच्छेथन्त्रे	···•	9 Ę
त्रन्यथा तद्घटनात्		३२	कार्यंकार्यमविरुद्ध	• • • •	४२
चपरिणामी शब्दः	• • • •	६६	किचिदकरणात्	• • • •	६म
न्नपौरुपेयः शब्दोऽमूर्त्तस्वात्	••••	६६	कुतोऽन्यथोपनयनिगमने		३४
त्रभेदे तद्व्यवहारा <sup>-</sup>	••••	७२	को वा तत्प्रतिभासनमर्थ		Ę
श्रभूदत्र चके शिवकः		খ২	को वा त्रिधा हेतु <b>ुक्</b> रवा	••••	३३
चर्थस्येव तदुन्मुखतया	••••	*	गोविलच्रणो महिषः		२६
भ्रर्थान्तरगतो विसदश	••••	६२	गोसदशो गवयः	••••	२ ६
त्रविद्यमाननिश्चयो	••••	६७	धटमहमारमना वेद्मि		¥
<b>त्रविद्यमानसत्ताकः</b>	••••	ର୍ ଓ	चचूरसयोर्द्रव्ये		६४
म्प्रविरुद्धानु <b>प</b> ल व्िध	• • • •	88	ततोऽन्यत्तदाभासम्		६३
ग्रविरुद्धोपलव्धिविधौ पोढा	••••	३७	तत्परमभिधीयमानं	••••	રૂઝ
खवैशये प्रत्यत्त		€.¥	तत्प्रामार्ग्यं स्वतः परतश्च	• • • •	Ę
श्रसत्सत्तानिश्चयो	• • • •	8 9	तत्रानिष्टादिः पत्ताभासः	••••	٩.¥
च्चसम्बद्धे तज्ज्ञानं		६₹	तत्र प्रत्यक्तबाधितो यथा		ęę
अस्ति सर्वज्ञो नास्ति खरविष	।। एम्	३ १	तथा प्रतिभासनात्	••••	93
ग्रस्थत्र छाया छत्रात्		३ह	तदन्वयच्यतिरेकानुविधाना	<b>.</b>	ንኛ
ग्रस्यग्र देहिनि दुःखम्		४२	तदनुमानं द्वेधा		३६
ग्रस्थत्र देहिनि छुद्धिः	• • • •	३ ६	तद् <b>चिनाभावनिश्चयार्थ</b>	• • • • •	રર
ग्रस्यत्र मातुलिंगे रूपं रसात्	••••	80	तद्द्वेधा	••••	ş
ग्रस्वसंविदितगृहीतार्थं	· · · · ·	६ ३	तद्वचनमपि तद्धेतुखात्	••••	ર્વ
व्याकाशे नित्येऽप्यस्य	••••	६८	तद्ब्यापाराश्रितं		३म
न्नाप्तवचनादिनिबंधन	••••	88	तनिश्चयात्मकं समारोप	••••	8

÷

( २)

पृष्ठाङ्कः

	-				
तकौत्तन्निर्णयः	••••	38	परापरविधर्त्तच्यापि	••••	ξ¢
तर्कस्येव व्याष्ठिगोचरत्वे		99	परापेच खे परिखामि	••••	
तरमादगिनमान् धूमवांश्चायम्		99	परार्थं तु तदर्थपरामर्शि	••••	३६
तस्माद् वास्तवोऽभेदः		७२	परिणामी शब्दः कृतकरवात्	• • • •	३१
तस्य वाष्पादिभावेन	••••	६७	परीचामुखमादर्श	••••	98
तावता च साध्यसिद्धिः		४३	परोच्तमितर <b>द्</b>	••••	२६
<b>तेनाजा</b> तत्वात्		૬ ૭	पर्यायव्यतिरेकभेदात्		
तेन पत्तस्तद्धार		४३	पुरुषान्तरपूर्वार्थ	••••	
दर्शनस्मरणकारणकम्		२६	पूर्वोत्तरचारियोः	••••	
दष्टान्ताभासा ग्रन्वये	••••	६२	A	• • • •	
दष्टान्तो द्वेधा		३४	प्रतिज्ञायास्तु निगमनम्	••••	
दष्टोऽपि समारोपात्ताहक्	••••	×	प्रतिभासभेदस्थ च	••••	
धूमयांश्चायमिति वा	••••	६ ६	प्रस्यचादिनिभित्तं स्मृतिप्रस्यभि	••••	२६
न च ते तदंगे	••••	३४	प्रस्यचेतरभेदात्	••••	8
न च पूर्वोत्तरचारिखोः		३ द	प्रत्यच्चमेवैकं प्रमाणमित्यादि	• • • •	90
न चासिद्धवदिष्टं		३०	प्रस्यायनाय हीच्छा वक्नुरेव		३०
न भविष्यति मुहूर्त्तान्ते		83	प्रदीपवत्	••••	Ę
न हि तत्साध्यप्रतिपत्त्यंगं		રર	प्रमाखतदाभासौ	••••	
नापि व्याप्तिस्मरखार्थं	· · • •	ર્ષ્ટ	प्रमागादभिन्नं भिन्नं च	• • • •	६२
नास्त्वत्र गुहायां		85	प्रमाणादर्थसंसिद्धि	• • • •	3
नारस्यत्र धूमोऽनग्नेः	••••	81	प्रमाशाद् व्यावृत्त्ये वा	••••	७२
नास्त्यम्र भित्तौ		80	प्रमागोभयसिद्धे तु साध्यधर्म	••••	
नास्त्यत्र भूतज्जे घटः	• • • •	81	प्रसिद्धो धर्मी		३०
नास्त्यन्न शिशपा		81	प्रेरयासुखप्रदो धर्मः	• • • •	
नास्त्यत्र शीतस्पर्श श्रीष्ण्यात्	••••	80	फलाभासं प्रमाखाद्		-
नास्स्यत्र शीतस्पर्शी धूमात्	• • • •	80	बाधितः प्रत्यचानुमाना		६ ६
नास्यत्र समतुलाया	••••	81	बालव्युःपत्त्यर्थं	••••	३१
नारत्यत्राप्रतिबद्धसामथ्यो		83	वालप्रयोगाभासः	••••	ĘĘ
नार्थालोकी कार गां		98	भाव्यतीतयोर्भरणजाग्रद्बोधो		३म
नास्मिन् शरीरिणि		80	भेदे खाश्मान्तरवत्	• • • •	७२
निश्चितवृत्तिरनित्य		६२	माता मे वम्ध्या	• • • •	ĘĘ
नोदगाद् भरणिर्मुहूर्त्तात्प्राक्षत प	श्व	83	यथाग्नावेव धूमस्तदभावे	••••	२७
नोदगाद् भरणिर्मुहूर्त्तात् प	रूवे -		यथा नद्यास्तीरे	••••	90
पुष्योदयात्	••••	80	यथाऽनुष्णोऽग्निः	••••	훅 드
नोदेष्यति मुहूत्तन्ति	••••	80	यथा मेर्वादयः सन्ति	••••	88
पत्त इति यावत्	••••	३०	यथा स एवायं देवदत्तः	••••	२६
परंपरया संभवत्	••••	४२	यथास्मिन् प्राणिनि	••••	४२

( २ )

रष्टाङ्कः |

	-			
यः प्रसिमीते स एव	• • • •	<b>६</b> २	समवायेऽतिप्रसंगः	હર
रसादेकसामग्यूनुमानेन		३=	सर्वज्ञःखेन वक्रुःखाविरोधात्	६इ
रागद्वेषमोहाकान्त		90	सहक्रमभावनियमो	२⊏
बच्च्या पवासौ दोषो	••••	<b>٤</b> 5	सहचारियोब्योप्य	२द
लौकायतिकस्य प्ररयचत		99	सहचारियोरपि	₹ ६
विकल्पसिद्धे तस्मिन् सत्तेत	रि		सहजयोग्यतासंकेत	88
साध्ये		39	स हेतुर्द्वेधोपलब्ध्य	30
विद्युदादिना		६६	सांख्यं प्रति परिग्रामी	<b>ଞ୍</b> ଓ
विषचेऽप्यविरुद्ध		ĘIJ	साधनात् साध्यविज्ञानं	29
विपरीतनिश्चिताविनाभावो	. <b></b>	६७	साध्यं धर्मः कचित्तद्विशिष्टो वा धर्मा	३०
विपरीतव्यतिरेकश्च		६१	साध्यधर्माधारसंदेहा	३२
विपरीतान्वयश्च		ĘĘ	साध्यधर्मिणि साधनधर्मावबोध	રર
विरुद्धतदुपलब्धिः		80	साध्याविनाभावित्वेन	2.9
विरुद्धानुपलडिधविधौ पोंडा	••••	83	साध्यब्याहं साधनं यत्र	३४
विशदं प्रस्यचम्		23	साध्याभावे साधनाभावो	3.4
विशेष <b>श्च</b>		ξo	) सामग्रीविशेषविश्त्वेषित	38
विषयाभासः सामान्यं		69	सामान्यं द्वेधा	-
विसंचादात्		90	सामान्यविशेषात्मा तदर्थी विषयः	
वृत्तोऽयम्		२६	सावरणः वे करणः जन्यस्वे	9.9
वैशयेऽपि परोचम्	••••	<b>8</b> .8	सिद्धः श्रावर्णः शब्दः	<b>4</b> 6
व्यक्तिरूपंच निदर्शनं		३४	सिद्धः श्रावयाः शब्दः शब्दस्वात्	
व्यतिरेके सिद्धतद्व्यतिरेका	••••	६ १	सिदे प्रस्यचादिवाधिते	•
च्यासौ तुसाध्यं धर्म एव		३२	सौगतसांख्ययौगप्राभाकर	69
ब्यावृत्त्यापि न		७२	स्पष्टतया प्रकृतप्रतिपत्तेरयोगात्	90
ब्युरपन्न प्रयोगस्तु		83	स्वयमसमर्थस्य	<b>9</b> २
शब्दानुचारखेऽपि स्वस्यानुभवन	••••	Ę	स्वरूपेणासस्वात्	ĘIJ
शंकितवृत्तिस्तु नारित		६≍	स्वविषयोपदर्शक	६४
शुचि नरशिरः कपालं	••••	६६	स्वापूर्वार्थध्यवसाया	Ę
स देवदत्तो यथा	••••	२६	स्वार्थपरार्थमेदात्	ર્રે
संभवदन्यद् विचारणीयम्		હર્	स्वार्थमुङ्गलचग्रम्	ર્શ
संस्कारोद्बोधनिबन्धना		२६	स्वावर या स्वयोपशम	98
संदिग्धविपर्यस्ताब्युत्पन्नानां		3.5	स्वोन्मुखतया प्रतिभासनं	6
सदृशपरियामस्तिर्यंक्		६०	हिताहितप्रासियरिहार	ะ
सदशे तदेवेदं तस्मिन्नेव	••••	ęę	हेतुप्रयोगा हि यथाच्यासि	83
समर्थनं वा वरं	••••	34	हेखाभासा श्रसिद्ध	-र इ.७
समर्थस्य करणे		93	हेतोरुपसंहार उपनयः	34
		1		

.

प्रमेयरत्नमालायामुद्धृतकारिक।	वचनानामका	राद्यनुकम	: }	ગ્રદાજ્ય:
श्रग्तिस्वभावः शकस्य मूर्द्धा चेदग्निरंव सः	••••			30
म्रज्ञो जन्तुरनीशोऽयमास्मनः सुखदुःखयोः				२०
न्नतीतानागती कालौ वेदकारविवर्जितौ		• • • •		85
त्रतीतानागतौ कालौ वेदार्थज्ञविवर्जितौ				89
न्ननवच्छिन्नसम्प्रदायत्वे सत्यस्मर्यमाणकर्चु त्वात्		••••		४म
ग्रयमधों नायमर्थ इति शब्दा वदन्ति न	****		••••	80
म्रर्थेन घटयन्त्येनां नहिं मुख्यार्थरूपताम्			••••	58
न्न्रस्ति ह्यालोचनाज्ञःनं प्रथमं निर्विकल्पकम्			••••	२ ३
म्राहुविधातृप्रत्यत्तं न निषेधुविपश्चितः			••••	२३
इदमल्पं महद्दूरगासश्चं प्रांशु नैति वा	• • • •			<b>२ ६</b>
उपमानं प्रसिद्धार्थसाधम्यति साध्यसाधनम्				२६
ऊर्णनाभ इवांशूनां चन्द्रकान्त इवाग्भसास्				२४
एकत्र दृष्टो भावो हि कचिन्नान्यत्र दश्यते				२३
ऐश्वर्यमप्रतिहतं सहजो विरागः	••••		• • • •	२०
क्लेशकर्मविपाकाशथैरपराम्छः पुरुषः सर्वज्ञः				२०
गृहीरवा बस्तुसद्भावं स्मृत्वा च प्रतियोगिनम्		••••	••••	28
त रहजस्तनेहातो रचोदष्टेर्भवस्मृतेः	· · · · ·			Ę 🤉
तदगुगौरपकृष्टानां सब्दे संकान्ध्यसंभवात्				38
तद्भावहेतुभावौ हि दृष्टान्ते तद्वेदिनः		••••	••••	ષર
त्रिगुग्मधिवेकिविषयः सामान्यमचेतनम्		••••		* 1
पंचवर्षं भवेद् रतं मेचकाख्यं पृथुस्तनी				. २६
पयोंबुभेदी हंसः स्यात् षट्पादैः अमरः स्मृतः	• • • •			२६
पिहिते कारागारे तमसि च सूची मुखामदु में बे	••••			3 5
प्रकृतेमहान् ततोऽहंकारस्तस्माद् गण्रच षोडशक	<b></b> .		••••	<i>१</i> २
प्रमाणेतरसामान्यस्थितेरन्यधियो गतेः				50
प्रमाणपञ्चकं यत्र वस्तुरूपेण जायते	••••	••••	• • • •	8 5
भारताध्ययनं सर्वं गुर्वध्ययनपूर्वकम्		••••	••••	85
भिन्नकालं कथं प्रखमिति चेर्यासतां विदुः		****	••••	१२
मूत्रप्रकृतिरविकृतिर्महदाद्याः प्रकृतिविकृतयः सम्				ধৰ
मूलच्तिकरीमाहुरन्वस्थां हि दूषण् म्	••••			*=
युद्धतः परीचितं कार्यं कारणं नानिवर्त्तते	••••			88
यत्राप्यतिशयो दृष्टः स स्वार्थानतिलंघनात्				11
यो यत्नैत्र स तत्नैत्र यो यदेव तदेव सः			• • • •	* 5
विधिमुखेन कःर्यमुखेन वा गुर्णानामप्रतीतिः				ও
विश्वतरचजुरुत विश्वतोमुखो				२०
वेदस्याध्ययनं पूर्वं तद्ध्ययनपूर्वकम्				ষষ
शकपुर्द्धनि धूमस्यान्यधापि भोवः				80
शरभोऽप्यष्टभिः पादैः सिंहश्चारुसटान्वितः			••••	২ ৩
शब्दे दोषोद्भवस्तावद् वक्त्रधीन इति स्थितम्		••••		88
सम्देति विज्ञयमुच्छति भागो नियमेन पर्ययन	ायस्य	,		**
संसर्गांद्विभागश्चेदयोगोलकवह्विवत्				<b>२</b> २
सर्व वे खरिवदं ब्रह्म नेह नानारित किंचन			••••	२ ४
सुखमाह्वादनाकारं विज्ञानं मेयबोधकम्		••••	••••	६२
हेतोसिज्वपि रूपेष निर्णयस्तेन वर्णितः			• • • •	९७_