


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# REALS IN THE JAINA METAPHYSICS



By  
**HARI SATYA BHAT**



LATE SHETH SHANTIDAS KHETSY



# REALS IN THE JAINA METAPHYSICS

(A thesis submitted to and approved by the University of Calcutta  
for the Degree of the DOCTORATE OF PHILOSOPHY in  
Philosophy in the year 1947).

*By*  
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THE SETH SANTI DAS KHETSY CHARITABLE TRUST  
BOMBAY



*Published by*  
The Seth Santi Das Khotsy Charitable Trust,  
79, Champa Gali  
Mulji Jetha Market  
Bombay-2

*First Published 1966*

**Price Rs. 15-00**

*Sole Distributors*  
Motilal Banarsidass  
Indological Booksellers & Publishers  
Bungalow Road, Jawahar Nagar  
Delhi-7

Printed in India  
by V. N. Bhattacharya, M.A., through Sri Anil Kumar Kothary at  
the Inland Printing Works, 60/3, Dharamtala Street, Calcutta-13.

TO HIS HOLINESS  
THE MUNI MAHĀRĀJ, ŚRĪ BHADRĀṆKAR-  
VIJAYA-JI

WHOSE unselfish sympathy and active kindness to me  
was really unbounded,

But for WHOSE all-round encouragement and support,  
the publication of this book was well-nigh impossible,

And WHO gladly took the trouble of going through it,  
not once but several times and making valuable suggestions  
relating to the Jaina theories regarding some of the topics,  
discussed in some sections of this book,

This humble production of mine, IS RESPECTFULLY  
DEDICATED.

*Howrah*

14-12-1965

THE AUTHOR



## EXPRESSION OF GRATITUDE

As a piece of advice to an author who had obtained the D.Phil. degree in philosophy and who wanted to publish his Thesis, Dr. S. R. Radhakrishnan wrote to him: "But I may tell you that books of this character do not sell well and their publication is to be undertaken by a subsidy. There are some Jain publishing houses who might be interested in the project." I felt that this hint was equally useful in my case.

Fortunately for me in Rao Bahadoor Sri Jivat Lal Purtupshi of Bombay, I had an earnest patron who is well known for his active and unflagging interest in all noble causes,—a patron, who readily agreed to see to the publication of my Thesis. Formal thanksgiving on my part to the high-minded Rao Bahadoor for all that he did in connection with the publication of my Thesis is a poor substitute for the heart-felt gratitude which I shall ever be feeling towards him

The Seth Shanti Das Khetsy Charitable Trust of Bombay, which in faithful pursuance of its magnanimous Founder, Sri Seth Shanti Das Khetsy's broad-minded principles and practice, has gladly borne the entire cost of the printing and the publication of this books. He shall always be respectfully remembered by me.

I cannot conclude this expression of my sense of gratefulness without referring to Sri Tajmal Bothra of Calcutta who, while scrupulously observing the Jaina Cāritra is supremely liberal in his views and conduct and in whom I was fortunate in finding a sincere friend and guide in all matters concerning my study of Jainism. Ever since the University of Calcutta declared its approval of my Thesis, Sri Bothra evinced an active interest in getting it printed and published and it is because of this his noble,



though unostentatious zeal that my Thesis now appears in the present form of a printed book. To him, my debt is really irrepayable in any way.

*Howrah*

THE AUTHOR

14-12-1965

## FOREWORD

Dr. Harisatya Bhattacharyya is well known to the academic circle for his philosophical essays and papers, particularly with reference to the Jaina System of thought. The credit of the pioneer in the field of Jaina thought must go to Dr. Bhattacharyya. Jaina philosophy has an individuality of its own, but only a few scholars were previously attracted to it in spite of the fact that Jainism is still a living religion with an influential and rich lay community professing allegiance to it. It is more or less a paradox that Buddhist thought engaged the attention of scholars and students of philosophy in India and Europe prior to Jaina philosophy, though India has had no effective Buddhist sect cultivating and practising its tenets. Fortunately there has been a change in the academic attitude. Jainism is now having more and more attention and receiving serious examination. Dr. Bhattacharyya's contribution in the field of Jainological study is worthy of appreciation, as one of the factors for the revival of interest in the rich and original philosophical speculation of the school.

The present work entitled 'Reals In The Jaina Metaphysics' is a comparative and critical study of the ontological speculations of Jaina philosophers. The author of this stimulating book is nowhere dogmatic. He has compared and contrasted Jaina views with those of the rival schools of Indian philosophy and also the speculation of science and philosophy of the West. This adds to the value of the work and students of philosophy will find in it a rewarding study. His interest is purely academic and not inspired by extra-academical considerations. This will be evident to every student of philosophy who will read this book. The fundamental problems and categories have been studied and evaluated with an admirable thoroughness which evinces the author's extensive study of Indian and Western philo-

sophy. It is a matter of reassurance that Jaina thought and doctrines sponsored by the Jaina thinkers have been presented in a philosophical perspective in this work. Though one may not agree in all particulars either with Dr. Bhattacharyya or the original writers of the Jaina school, one must agree with his statement "To every question under investigation, the Jaina philosophy offers a possible line of answer as much plausible and reasonable as those offered by the other systems of Indian philosophy". (Introduction, p. 7.)

I am optimistic that in spite of the distractions and the politico-economic conditions of the world and particularly of our country which are not conducive to the study of abstract speculations, this book will be read with interest by students of philosophy in India, Europe and America. There must come about a better state of affairs in the world, which will alleviate the worries and anxieties of the intellectuals, and then philosophy will regain its position of pristine glory. I wish that every library in India should have a niche for this work of extra-ordinary labour and prolonged reflection.

41 Babu Bagan  
Dhakuria, Calcutta-31  
6th February 1966

SATKARI MUKHERJEE

## PREFACE

The Jaina philosophy, although it is little studied by present day scholars has nevertheless a place of honour among the ancient systems of Indian speculative thought. The present thesis is an attempt to present the problems of the Jaina metaphysics as they are, as well as they appear to be by the side of the same or similar problems of other systems, Indian and non-Indian, ancient and modern. It is thus a comparative study of the topics of the Jaina metaphysics. I have attempted to describe the views of the various schools of Indian philosophy as well as their criticisms by one another. For this, not unoften I have had to enter into tedious details and accounts of verbal warfares indulged in by the exponents of the various schools,—in order that their contentions and criticisms may be fully understood. I have, however, remained strictly neutral throughout and have nowhere expressed my personal liking for any of the views in preference to the other ones.

In quotations, I have named the sources from which my informations have been taken. Generally speaking, it may be said that for my informations about the non-Indian theories, I have been indebted mostly to the various learned articles in *THE DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHOLOGY* edited by J. M. Baldwin and in *THE ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA* (Ninth Edition). As for the Indian non-Jaina doctrines, I have looked for them in the standard Sūtra's of the Sāṃkhya, the Yoga, the Vedānta, the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika schools and such well-known commentaries on those Sūtras as those of Aniruddha, Bhoja, Śankara, Rāmānuja, Nimbha, Vātsāyana etc. Lastly, in the matter of presenting the Jaina views, I have relied on such standard Jaina philosophical works as *TATTVĀRTHĀDHI-GAMASŪTRA*, *TATTVĀRTHA-RAJA-VĀRTTICA*, *PRAMĀṆA-NAYA-TATTVĀLOKĀLAMKĀRA*, *RATNĀKARĀVATARIKĀ*, *DRAVYA-*



SAMGRAHA, BRAHMA-DEVA'S Commentary, PAÑČĀSTIKĀYA-SAMAYA-SĀRA, TATTVĀRTHA-SĀRA, PRAMEYA-KAMALA-MĀR-  
TAṆḌA, GOMMATA-SĀRA etc.

I have read the English translation of the Dravya-Samgraha by late S. C. Ghosal. From the Appendix to that book I came to be acquainted with the view of Dr. B. N. Seal, regarding Dharmāstikāya, from which I have ventured to differ. I have also read Professor Chakravarty's English translation of the Pañcāsti-Kāya-Samaya-Sāra. Some of his views about Dharma, Adharma and Pudgala, as expressed in that book have been critically examined by me in the present thesis. Mr. C. R. Jain's interesting book KEY OF KNOWLEDGE, gave me his theory about the Taijasa Śarīra with which, I regret, I have not been able to agree fully. After the composition of the present thesis, I have read Dr. Satkori Mukherji's THE JAINA PHILOSOPHY OF NON-ABSOLUTISM and I am glad to find that my exposition of the Syād-vāda has been in a line with that of the learned Doctor.

The present thesis has been composed by me thoroughly independently. None has given any advice to me about the subject-matter of my thesis nor has it been written or developed in co-operation with others.

As stated already, the problems of the Jaina philosophy are little known now-a-days. Their detailed description as well as their presentation side by side with similar problems of other systems, both Indian and non-Indian, ancient and modern, as attempted in this thesis, are expected to lead to the advancement of knowledge of Indian philosophy in general and of the Jaina system in particular.

*I Kailas Bose Lane*  
*Howrah*  
*25th July, 1945*

THE AUTHOR

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## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

PHILOSOPHY, AS A COMPREHENSIVE THEORY OF THE WORLD:  
BRITISH, CONTINENTAL AND EARLY GREEK THINKERS

ONE of our professors used to say that in Britain, there was, save and except *Herbert Spencer*, no philosopher in the proper sense of the term. A philosopher according to him, was to give a comprehensive explanation of the world as we see it. *Hume* and *Mill* and the *empiricist school* of thinkers that were associated with them as well as the so-called *Common sense philosophers* were acute thinkers, no doubt, but as they never attempted to give a complete explanation of the world of our experience their speculations hardly stepped beyond the limited range of *psychology* and *epistemology* and as such, have little claims to be looked upon as systems of philosophy. *Descartes* has been fitly described as the father of modern philosophy, in as much as, he it was who first fixed upon and in his own way attempted to deal with *Mind* and *Matter* as the two fundamental reals in the world. *Spinoza* and *Leibnitz* also explained the world of our experience and in *Kant* and the *post-Kantian thinkers*, a comprehensive view of the universe was the goal of thinking. There can be no question that these produced what can be called real systems of philosophy.

At the same time, it would be wrong to undervalue the contributions which the *British* thinkers made to philosophical thinking. They might not have been complete system-builders, but there was certainly a good deal of philosophical thinking in them, in as much as they raised and attempted to solve various problems of philosophy which are now dealt with in specialised provinces of it viz. *psychology*, *epistemology* and *logic*. Rigorously *materialistic* view of the universe ignores or makes short work of the purely subjective aspect of our experience and is surely a defective system of philosophy on that account. In *Greece*, *pre-Socratic*



*thought* was mainly materialistic, excepting of course that of *Parmenides* and probably of *Heracitus* too. It was *Socrates* who diverted the course of Hellenic speculations of the day and although he gave us no consistent, complete and all-round theory of the world, we find in his successors *Plato* and *Aristotle*, fullfledged philosophers developing a comprehensive view of it.

A system of philosophy in the true sense of the term, must then present and deal with the reals involved both in our subjective experiences and in our sensing and apprehensions of outside objects.

#### THE NYĀYA-VAIŚEṢIKA SYSTEM

Viewed from this standpoint, the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* is certainly a complete system of philosophy. On the one hand we have its *Aṇu's* or material atoms; its *Manas* or principle of attention and the *Indriya's* or sensing centres on the other. We have the *Ātmā* or conscious subject with its varied *Pravṛtti's* (inclinations), *Rāgas* (attachments) etc., its *Jñāna* (cognising capacity), *Icchā* (volition), *Çestā* (activity) etc. The *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* philosophy shows how and why the ordinary objects of our experience are what they are: how and why the ordinary man of the world comes to have and develop his experience, limited, pleasant or unpleasant as it is, and finally it points to the goal of man, a sorrowless state, after the realisation of which, he is to strive. This is a complete picture of the universe as a whole; of its infinite reals which are non-psychical in character; and of man, as he is and as he ought to be; and in presenting it, the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* has its claim of being treated as a comprehensive system of philosophy established on the firmest basis.

#### THE SĀMĀKHYA-YOGA SYSTEM

Scarcely less cogent is the claim of the *Sāmkhya-Yoga* for being respected as a complete philosophical system. The *Sāmkhya-yoga* also takes note of the experiential presentations, the various material elements and conscious

phenomena. It refers to two primordial Realities and explains the experiential reals by placing them as series or modes in the various stages of an uninterrupted evolution from the aforesaid fundamental *Duality*. Equally emphatic is the *Sāṃkhya-yoga* in its description of man being in a 'sad' state of limitations and in its insistence on the state of liberation.

#### THE VEDĀNTA AND THE BUDDHIST SYSTEMS

Among the thinkers of the *Vedānta* school, there are some who admit the reality of man and the universe outside him. Similarly there are *Buddhistic* schools who do not deny the reality of man and the outside world. The speculations of these *Vedāntic* and *Buddhist* thinkers are obviously as good philosophies as *materialism* or the *Sāṃkhya-yoga dualism* or the *Nyāya-naiṣeṣika pluralism*. The *Kevalādvaita* or pure *monism* of the school of *Śaṅkara* and the *Śūnyavāda* or absolute *nihilism* of the Buddhist *Mādhyamika* school deny the reality of our experiential reals, both psychical and non-psychical; but these are not the less philosophical systems on that account. Nay, they too are philosophies, complete in themselves. It may be said that both the Buddhist *nihilists* and the Vedāntic *monists* begin by admitting the tentative reality of the objects of our experience and while explaining and laying bare their essential nature in the philosophic manner, the former proves that nothing is real, while the latter establishes that besides the One and the Secondless existence, absolute and abstract, there is no other real. The position of the *nihilist* may be right or wrong, and so of the *monist*. But surely theirs may be two ways of explaining the experiential series and rigorous logic has always been brought to their support. We know, there are modern critics who contend that by denying the reality of our experiential reals, the *Kevalādvaita* and the *Śūnyavāda* shirk, as it were, their responsibility and duty for explaining them and as such they cannot be called systems of philosophy at all. This criticism is hardly fair. A phantom, for instance, is nothing after all and if one's

exposition of this apparently real consists in a ruthless exposure of its nature as unsubstantial nothing, his explanation would not be less correct or acceptable on that account. The *Buddhist* and the *Vedāntist* support their positions by recognised rules and procedure of argumentation and their logic appeals to many, to whom their presentations of the objects of experience as essentially unsubstantial seem to be the only consistent explanations. The *Sūnyavāda* and the *Kevalādvaita* are thus as good systems of philosophy as any other.

### THE JAINA SYSTEM

Even now to many, as to us thirty years ago, the *Jainas* appear to be a queer sort of people who are remarkable for their fastidious and ostentatious practice of non-violence. That the Jainas had a glorious tradition, a rich literature of which any people, ancient or modern, would be proud, is even now not known to those, to whom it is now high time that it should be known. About 25 years ago I came to be acquainted with the fact of the existence of a vast *Jaina* literature, covering almost all the branches of human knowledge. For the first time, then, I came to know that the Jainas had a theory of the universe, a philosophy of theirs. A little introduction into the study of the *Jaina* philosophy convinced me that it has a glorious place in the systems of Indian philosophy. Later, and a bit deeper study has confirmed my view and I shall try in these lectures to indicate briefly the *Jaina* theories about the Reals, side by side, with the similar theories of other schools.

### THE LOGICAL AND THE CHRONOLOGICAL STANDPOINTS

In this connection we feel it necessary to guard our readers against a misconception about our business in these lectures. Here and there, we shall state a particular theory in juxtaposition with another theory or theories about the same matter. We shall describe, for example, the *Jaina* doctrine about a subject, as it is opposed to, say, the *Mīmāṃsā* theory, or as it is similar, say, to the *Nyāya* contention.

One would not be justified from this in concluding that thereby we mean that the Jaina theory is a development later than the *Mīmāṃsā*, or earlier than the *Nyāya*. Nothing is further from our business in these papers than fixing the chronology of Indian philosophical theories. In these lectures we mean simply to show how a particular Jaina theory can be looked upon as *logically* connected with another Indian philosophical theory. This is however not to say that either of the two theories is as a matter of fact historically developed from the other. The *Cartesians* asserted the independent existence of *Soul* and *Matter* and thereby created a gulf between them which, so far as they were concerned, was left unbridged. Centuries before *Descartes*, however, the *Platonic* school avoided the *dualism* by showing that matter in its essence was but non-being after all and that *idea* was the sole reality. The followers of *Democritus*, on the other hand, avoided the same dualism by fixing on *matter-stuff* as the only primal reality and explaining away *mind* as simply a product of *material atoms*. It is thus possible to arrange the *Cartesian dualism*, the *Platonic idealism* and the materialism of ancient *Greece* in a logically successive or progressive series, but this order is not chronological.

While stating the above we are not unmindful of the fact that a favourite mode now-a-days of studying a particular system of philosophy is by looking to its chronological position i.e. by taking into consideration the systems that preceded it as well as those that followed it. But while it is quite easy to arrange the philosophies of *Kant*, *Fichte*, *Hegel*, and *Bradley*, in a logical order which is at the same time *chronological*, in the case of the Indian systems of philosophy such an arrangement seems to be impossible. For, every Indian system is a finished and self-complete system and presents its problems in juxta-position with the similar problems in other systems. The *Vedāntic* criticism of the *Sāṃkhya dualism* is an essential part of the *Vedānta*;—yet, what is *Sāṃkhya*, bereft of its criticism of the *Vedāntic monism*? How are we to determine in this case which is earlier, the *Vedāntic monism* or the *Sāṃkhyan dualism*,



regard being had to the fact that both the systems base their principles in the earliest *Upaniṣads*? Take, again, the theory of *Sound*. The *Nyāya* philosophers are well known for their contention that *Sound* or *Śabda* is a phenomenon which is produced and as such is impermanent. They vehemently criticise the doctrine of the reality and eternity of *Sound* and are obviously opposed to the *Mīmāṃsā* school on this point. Are we to say then, that the *Nyāya* theory is later in origin than the *Mīmāṃsā*? This is extremely doubtful, if for no other reason but for this that the *Mīmāṃsā* philosophy begins with a spirited defence of the doctrine of the eternity and the substantial reality of *Sound* and obviously presupposes the *Nyāya* contention. The thing is that the first rudiments of the Indian philosophical thought are for ever lost to us; what we have are finished systems, each presupposing the other. It is thus impossible to determine which theory is earlier and which later and nothing more than a logical arrangement of the different theories is possible.

#### THE JAINA AND THE BUDDHIST SYSTEMS

The same thing is true about the *non-Vedic* systems too. There are scholars who have maintained that *Jainism* is a later growth from *Buddhism*. The theory loses its force owing to the fact that later researches have conclusively proved that *Buddha* himself was fully acquainted with the *Jaina* theory about the *omniscience* of the *Tīrthaṅkaras*. Scholars, again, there are who insinuate that *Buddhism* itself originated from *Jainism*. So far as the *Buddhist* and *Jaina* philosophical systems are concerned, we think, this contention is easily assailable. The *Jaina* philosophy, like all other systems of Indian philosophical thought is opposed to the celebrated *Vijñāna-vāda* of the *Buddhist* school. The fact is that *Buddhist* philosophy is earlier than the *Buddha* and the *Jaina* philosophy is earlier than the *Jina Mahāvira* who was a contemporary of *Gautama*. The rudiments of both these *non-Vedic* systems are lost to us and it is never possible to decide conclusively which philosophy was earlier in origin.

### THE VEDIC AND THE NON-VEDIC SYSTEMS

We venture to suggest that it is not even possible to establish with certainty, the chronological order between the Vedic systems on the one hand and the non-Vedic systems on the other. It is ordinarily believed that the Vedic systems are earlier than the non-Vedic. The Buddhistic religious tradition, however, is that the religion of the Buddha is eternal. Similarly, the sacred books of the Jainas assert that the doctrines of the Jina were prevalent from beginningless time and that the Vedic ritualism and systematic philosophical thoughts were but after-time corruptions. As a matter of fact in some of the earliest Upaniṣads, we actually come across heterodox lines of thought which foreshadow some of the essential doctrines of the Buddhistic and the Jaina philosophies. The chronological arrangement of the various theories as propounded by the rival schools of Indian thought is thus impracticable and nothing more than a comparative estimate can be done. This is what we shall attempt in these lectures.

### THE JAINA PHILOSOPHY AS A COMPLETE SYSTEM, IN LINE WITH OTHER SYSTEMS OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

Thus when we say that the Jaina philosophy is a complete system having a respectable place within the systems of Indian thought, we mean that for every problem of Indian philosophy, the Jaina system has a solution of its own and for every matter, logical, ethical, epistemological or metaphysical, the Jaina thinkers have a theory peculiar to themselves. Yet, the Jaina doctrines relating to philosophical matters are not casual, vacillating or pedantic, but quite in a line with the similar doctrines of other contending Indian schools and as much logical as those. To every question under investigation, the Jaina philosophy offers a possible line of answer, as much plausible and reasonable as those offered by the other systems of Indian philosophy. We shall here very briefly indicate one or two instances, illustrating what we have said above about the mode of our treating the Jaina theories.

**THEORY ABOUT WORDS**

Take the case of the Word, "Tree". As soon as we hear the Word, we understand the Thing meant by it. Indian philosophers raise the question: How does a Sound (viz. the word "Tree") signify a substance?

**THE BUDDHIST VIEW**

The Buddhist philosophers startle us by saying that it is impossible for a Sound to be related to its so-called object:—

नार्थं शब्दाः स्पृशन्त्यपि

They ask: What can be the relation between a Sound and the real Object? They cannot be identical in nature. For in that case, either there would be no Sounds in the world but only Objects in it or there would be no Objects in the world but only Sounds in it. Then again, it cannot be said that a Sound and its Object are related as the producer and the product. For, if a Word could produce its Object, we would have got our necessary objects by simply using their Names: and if the Objects produced their Sounds, then this world would have been continually sounding. Next, it may be asked:—if there be a relation between a Word and its Object, what is this Relation? A Relation cannot be said to be identical with either of the two things related. The Relation must be other than the things related. But in that case, the question would be: is this relation eternal? This cannot be; because the related phenomena viz. the Word and the Object are themselves non-eternal. If again, the Relation be non-eternal the question would be: is this Relation same in all cases? If so, one Word would indicate all the Objects, which cannot be the case. If the Relation between Words and Objects be different in each case, we are to explain how the Relation itself which is extraneous to the phenomena related, comes to be attached to them.

The Buddhists bring another line of arguments against the theory of the Word expressing a real Object. The real Object is the Object of our sensation and nothing more.

What then is the Object of our sensation? It is something absolutely particular (स्वलक्षण). It contains nothing which is supplied by our faculties of memory or imagination. But what does a Word indicate? A Word, "Tree" for instance, tells us, the Object indicated by it is one among numerous such Objects which we previously perceived and to which we have given the general appellation "Tree". A Word is thus embodied generalisation: that is, a concept which has no real existence. A Word which is thus an embodiment of a general idea cannot signify a real Object, as it presents itself to our *Pratyakṣa* or direct apprehension.

A Word according to the Buddhists, is not really related to its so-called Object but is simply conceived to be attached to it.

#### THE VAIŚEṢIKA VIEW

The Vaiśeṣika school on the contrary point out that it is undeniable that a Word signifies its Object. A Buddhist uses the argument which consists in words to establish his doctrine of the unsubstantiality of sounds. But if Words have no power to signify their Objects, then the Buddhist argument itself becomes unsubstantial. The Vaiśeṣika, however, maintains that the apprehension of an Object from hearing its Sound (i.e. corresponding Word) is really *Anumāna*, mediate or inferential knowledge. The understanding of an Object from hearing its corresponding Word is dependent on one's previously knowing the significance of the Word. A man who has not the previous knowledge about the significance of the Word, "Tree", would not be able to understand the Object, "Tree", from hearing the word "Tree". A man according to the Vaiśeṣika philosopher does thus understand an Object from hearing its corresponding Word, not directly, of course,—but mediately through his previous knowledge about the significance of the Word.

#### THE NYĀYA VIEW

The thinkers of the Nyāya school also reject the Buddhist

theory and assert that a Word and its Object are certainly related. The relation between the Word and its Object is called by the Naiyāyikas *Samaya* or *Saṅketa*—otherwise called the *Vāçya-vāçaka-sambandha*. The Nyāya thinkers mean to say that the relationship between a Word and its Object is such that the former is the *Vāçaka*, i.e. what signifies and the latter is its *Vāçya* or what is signified. But while agreeing with the Vaiśeṣika thinkers thus far, the Nyāya philosophers differ from them by pointing out that the *Śabda-jñāna* or understanding an Object from hearing its corresponding Word is not an inferential knowledge, as alleged by the Vaiśeṣikas. No person who knows the meaning of a Word would take time in going through a mediate course or syllogistic process to understand the Object signified by it. The *Śabda-jñāna* is neither perception nor inference; it is a special mode of knowledge according to the Naiyāyika's. Thus the Naiyāyikas differ from the Buddhists in asserting that a Word does signify a real Object. At the same time they would agree with them that the relation between a Word and its Object is never that of identity or of cause and effect. The theory of the Nyāya school is that a Word expresses its Object, not because they are identical in nature nor because the one originates from the other, but because the Creator fixed particular meanings for particular Words and the Knowledge of these meanings of Words thus fixed by the Creator has been handed down to us through sages and seers of ancient times.

#### THE BASIC NATURE OF SOUND. THE BUDDHIST, THE NYĀYA-VAIŚEṢIKA, THE SĀṆKHYA AND THE MIMĀMSĀ VIEWS

So far as the nature of Sound is concerned, the Buddhists look upon it as purely unsubstantial. The Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika schools also regard it as a temporary phenomena but call it a *Guṇa* or attribute of a material substance *Ākāśa*. The philosophers of the Sāṅkhya school seem to go a step farther. They are not prepared to look upon Sound as wholly unsubstantial or temporary phenomenon. They would not even be satisfied with the position that it is an

attribute of a substance. The Sāṅkhya philosophers hold that Sound is a Tanmātrā or a substance in a subtle state. When we hear a Sound it is not that the phenomenon of Sound comes into existence and when we hear it no more, it is not that the phenomenon is destroyed. According to the Sāṅkhya philosophers, when we hear a Sound, the subtle Tanmātrā which was already in an implicit state becomes explicit and when we hear it no more, it is not destroyed but it continues to exist in the implicit state again. The Sāṅkhya school thus seem to lean to the position that Śabda or Sound is a sort of a substance and it has the permanance attached to a Tanmātrā.

It is the great Mīmāṃsā school of philosophers who are well-known for their doctrine that Sound is a real substance and that it is eternal. They point out,

वाक्यपता वेदुपक्रमेदबोधस्य शास्वती ।

न प्रकाशः प्रकाशत सा हि प्रत्यवर्माशिणी ॥

वाक्यपदीय, प्रथम काण्ड १२५ ॥

If from what we call the knowledge of an Object, you take away the Words, you will see that nothing of the knowledge will be left; on the other hand, all knowledge is found to consist in Words. The Mīmāṃsākas contend that Sound is thus essentially and inextricably connected with its Object; otherwise, how can the knowledge of the latter be so absolutely dependent on the former? The next question is: How to explain this essential relation between Sound and its Object? The Mīmāṃsā school holds that a Sound is *identical* in nature with its Object. Ordinary Sounds which we hear, of course come and go. These are Dhvanis. That these are temporary phenomena is admitted by the Mīmāṃsāka's. But the theory of Mīmāṃsāka's is that underlying the Dhvanis or phenomenal Sounds, there is the eternal and noumenal Sound, which in analogy with the Vedānta position is called by the Mīmāṃsā thinkers the Śabda-brahma, the only existent and basic principle at the root of the universe, of which the so-called objects on the one hand, and their corresponding Sounds on the other, are phenomenal expressions.

**THE JAINA THEORY ABOUT WORDS AND SOUND**

The above are roughly the various positions with regard to Sound, held by the different schools of Indian philosophy. Some maintain that a Word does not express the real Object; others maintain that it does signify it. Some maintain that a Word expresses its Object because its meaning was attached to it by the Creator himself; others hold that meanings of Words are mere conventions; still others contend that the meaning of a Word is really rooted in its essential nature which permeates both itself and its Object.

The Jaina theory of Sound may best be described in this connection. This will show how the Jainas looked upon the problem, considered it seriously and offered their own theory about it, which is unique in some respects.

In agreement with the other schools of Indian thought, the Jainas criticise the ultra-Buddhistic position and maintain that a Word does really express its Object. The Jainas do not believe in the existence of a Creator God; it is accordingly impossible for them to agree with the Naiyāyikas that the Creator fixed the meanings of Words. At the same time they are not prepared to hold that the meanings of Words were matters of arbitrary conventions. And lastly, the Jainas would not contribute to the Mīmāṃsā contention that a Word expresses its Object because the two are identical in nature. How then does the Jaina philosophy explain the admitted fact that a Word expresses an Object? The answer will show the uniqueness of the Jaina position, which in its difference from the other theories of the rival schools, is nevertheless similar to each of them in some respects.

The Jaina's maintain:—

स्वाभाविक सामर्थ्यं समयाभ्यामर्थनिबन्धनः शब्दः ।

प्र० न० त० ४-११

A Word expresses its Object by means of its natural capacity and conventional use.

The Jaina philosophers hold that a Word has a capacity to express its Object; but this capacity is not given to it by God; it is 'natural'. This natural capacity is a mysterious

power inherent in a Word, which is otherwise called “Yog-yatā”. This natural capacity inherent in a Word may be likened to the power of burning inherent in fire. The Jaina doctrine of the Svābhāvika-sāmarthya in a Word, while rejecting the Mimāṃsā theory of the Śabda being a real and eternal substance agrees with it to some extent, in as much as it maintains that in expressing its Object, a Word is not dependent on any outside agency. At the same time, while admitting the natural capacity in a Word to express its Object, the Jainas point out that a Word in spite of this general capacity relies upon outside factors for the purpose of expressing a particular Object. Fire has a general capacity to burn; but what particular things, at what particular places, in what particular times are to be burnt,—well, these are dependent on various other circumstances besides the power of burning inherent in fire. Similarly, the Jainas maintain that every Word has the capacity to express all the Objects of the universe. But actually what particular Objects, at what particular place and in what particular time are to be signified by it, these depend on the local circumstances; these local circumstances or usages determine the local sense of a word, which is called the Samaya or Saṅketa. One not knowing the local sense of a Word, its Samaya or Saṅketa, would not be able to understand the Object signified by it. Thus the Jainas, while they by admitting the Svābhāvika-sāmarthya in a Word reject the theories of the Nyāya and the conventionist schools, adopt their doctrines about outside agencies, so far as it is possible, by admitting the factor of Samaya or Saṅketa, in the matter of expressing its Object by a Word at a particular time, in a particular place.

#### COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE INDIAN THEORIES

Besides describing a Jaina theory as it is with respect to a particular subject-matter, it will be our business in these lectures to indicate its position among the allied theories of the other schools of Indian thought. As a matter of fact, this mode of comparative study was well recognised



and invariably followed by Indian philosophers of the past. Very seldom will a treatise of one school of philosophy be found which does not describe and examine incidentally some points of the philosophical systems of the rival schools. We believe, it is the duty of the present day scholars of Indian philosophy to stick to this method of comparison and widen its scope wherever possible. If our philosophers of the past, for example, compared the Vaiśeṣika theory of Space with the Vedāntic, Sāṃkhya and the Buddhistic, the modern scholar would do well in continuing the study by going a step farther and comparing the Indian doctrine of Space with those of Aristotle, Descartes and Kant. This would save the Indian philosophy from inanity with which it is sometimes charged. As a matter of fact, some of the philosophical problems and doctrines of the present day seem to have been discussed with considerable zeal and ability by the ancient philosophers of India and the results of their study have by no means been negligible. In some cases, the theories of Indian thinkers of the past are likely to arouse considerable interest in the scholars of modern times. We shall here present one such matter which seems to have been much discussed in ancient India and which is still a matter of considerable investigations now-a-days. The Indian theories regarding this matter will appear to have much value for the present psychologists.

In describing Perception, the author of the Nyāya Sūtra's has said:—

इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षोत्पन्नं ज्ञानमव्यवदेश्यमव्यभिचारि व्यवसायात्मकं प्रत्यक्षम् ।

—न्यायदर्शन २-२-४ ; ॥

PURE SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. THE NYĀYA VIEW:  
WARD'S VIEW: THE ŚĀBDIKA VIEW: THE BUDDHIST VIEW:  
THE JAINA VIEW

Pratyakṣa or Perception, as every one knows, arises from a contact of a sense-organ with its object. The question arises: What do we actually sense when the sense-organ comes in contact with the object? It is said that the author of the Nyāya-Sūtra's by inserting the word 'Avyapadeśya'

in his definition of the Pratyakṣa has admitted the possibility of Nirvikalpa or what has been called the Pure Sensation by modern psychologists in addition to the Savikalpa, the developed Perception or Perception proper. The Nirvikalpa or Pure Sensation is just the state produced in our mind by the sense-organ coming in contact with the outside object and nothing more. It is in no way touched or modified by our apperception-mass or by our faculties of productive or reproductive imagination and of conception.

Is such a Pure Sensation a fact? Is it possible? It is contended that our mind is an active field of ideas and as soon as a new sensation is about to arise in it, it becomes modified by the pre-existing mass of ideas. The result is that no sensation in its pristine purity is ever possible and consequently, in the words of Ward:—

“All presentation is but representation” and

“The pure sensation we may regard as a psychological myth”.

What we have is always a Perception i.e. a Sensation modified by the existing mental flow. In ancient India a class of philosophers called the Śābdikas seem to have hinted at this doctrine of the impossibility of the Pure Sensation. Bhartṛhari says:—

न सोऽस्ति प्रत्ययो लोके यः शब्दानुगमादृते ।

अनुविद्धमिव ज्ञानं सर्वं शब्देन भासते ॥—वाक्यपदीय प्र०का० १२४

No apprehension of an Object is possible without Words i.e. without conception.

There is another class of Psychologists today who maintain that Pure Sensation is not impossible. If, the incoming sensation by its sudden and overpowering intensity eliminates for the time being traces of pre-existing ideas, the Object would be sensed in its purity. For instance, when there is a sudden deafening roar of Thunder, our mind becomes absolutely vacant for the time being and what we have then is the Pure Sensation. Pure Sensation is thus possible according to these psychologists, when the existing apperception mass becomes dead, so to say, for the time being.

The Buddhist thinkers of ancient India were celebrated for their doctrine of the Nirvikalpa. According to them, it is the only mode of Pratyakṣa which can be relied on as a Pramāṇa or source of correct knowledge. The Savikalpa or the determined or developed Perception is not correct apprehension according to them, as it is tainted with Kalpanā or conception. As regards the possibility of the Nirvikalpa, Dharmakīrti has said:—

सदृश्य सर्वतश्चिन्तां स्तिमितेनान्तरात्मना ।

स्थितोऽपि चक्षुषा ह्यमीक्षते साक्षजा मतिः ॥ प्रमाणवार्तिक

When the Inner Sense is taken away from all modes of cognising, at that time if something is seen by the eye, the result would be the Pure Sensation.

In the Jaina philosophy, the possibility of the Pure Sensation is admitted. In it, it is called the Darśana<sup>1</sup>.

But although the Jaina's and the Buddhists agree in admitting the possibility of the Pure Sensation, there are differences in their views also. The first difference among them is with regard to the object of Pure Sensation. The Buddhists urge that the matter of the Pure Sensation is the matter itself in its absolute particularity; what we call the general aspect of a thing is unreal: it is the product of our conception or imagination. The real thing or the thing-in-itself is what is capable of practical utility i.e. of serving our purpose (अर्थक्रियाकारित्वात्). A thing in its absolute particularity alone can be of any use to us. Water, as it is, for example, can quench our thirst, not the concept of water. This absolute particularity of the object, which is the thing-in-itself, is called *Svalakṣaṇa* by the Buddhists.

<sup>1</sup> विषयविषयिसन्निपाते दर्शनं भवति ।

Tattvārtha-rāja-vārtika on 1-15, Tattvārtha-sūtram. Pure Sensation results from a contact of the object with a sense-organ. As regards its nature Akalanka-deva says:

जातमात्रस्य बालस्य प्राथमिकोन्मेषोद् ।

(वि) भावितरूपद्रव्यविशेषालोचनाद् दर्शनं विवक्षितम् ।

The very first apprehension of a baby who is just born, which has not the peculiarities or particularities of the thing within its grasp is Darśana.

and they say that this is the object of the Nirvikalpa or Pure Sensation.

तस्य विषयः स्वलक्षणम्—न्यायविन्दुः

प्रथम परिच्छेद

To this view about the matter of the Nirvikalpa, the Jainas are opposed. According to them, a thing in its absolute particularity is not the object of Pure Sensation. The first Sensation is the conscious counterpart of a nervous shock, a bare and colourless affection or apprehension, apprising us of an existence outside. Ratnaprabhācāryya, the Jaina commentator says:—

-----सत्तामात्रगोचरं निःशेषविशेषवैमुख्येन

सन्मात्रविषयं दर्शनं निराकारो बोधः ।

Pure Sensation consists in an absolutely formless apprehension of pure existence, bereft of all modes of particularity. Far from apprehending the particular aspect of the thing under observation, Pure Sensation, according to the Jainas, takes cognisance of the pure existentiality of the thing, which they all Mahāsāmānya, the absolute generality of the barest possible general aspect.

The Jaina and the Buddhist views about the matter of Pure Sensation are thus mutually opposed to each other. The theory of the Nyāya school, however, is that the general aspect of a thing is not a myth as according to the Buddhists. The general idea or Sāmānya, as it is called, has its counterpart in a reality attached to the thing. It is as much real as the particular aspect of the thing. Since we come in contact with the thing in Nirvikalpa, it is clear that both its aspects—its generality and its particularity—the Sāmānya and the Viśeṣa (or, the Svalakṣaṇa, as the Buddhists would call it) would be the matter of the Pure Sensation. The view of the Nyāya school, then, is a combination of the two contending theories of the Jaina and the Buddhist schools.

What exactly is the matter of Pure Sensation, if it is possible at all, is certainly a fit subject of investigation, for the present day psychology.

### VALIDITY OF PURE SENSATION: THE JAINA, THE BUDDHIST AND THE NYĀYA VIEWS

The next point of difference between the Jaina and the Buddhist schools about the Nirvikalpa is with respect to its validity or otherwise. The Buddhists contend, as we have already indicated, that it is the particular aspect or the absolute individuality of a thing that can be of practical utility to us. Water, as it is in itself, can be useful to a thirsty man and not the general concept of water. The test of true knowledge or the Pramāṇa is whether its object is of practical utility ("Artha-kriyā-kāri") and since the Nirvikalpa yields that aspect of a thing which is strictly individual and as such, can be of practical use to us, it is the Pramāṇa. The Savikalpa or determined Perception, mixed as it is, with Kalpanā, conception and imagination, is not a source of true knowledge.

The Jaina theory, on the contrary, is that the Nirvikalpa cannot be a Pramāṇa at all. Pramāṇa or true knowledge, according to the Jaina is व्यवसायस्वभावम् i.e. it yields a knowledge which is free from all forms of doubts and misconceptions. The matter of the Pure Sensation is, as already observed, the barest or empty generality "सत्ता-सामान्यम्" according to the Jainas. It is a vague apprehension and nothing more and as such, cannot be a knowledge which is clear and free from doubts and misapprehensions<sup>1</sup>. It is the Savikalpa which is clear and rich and as such is valid knowledge according to the Jainas.

We have already quoted the Nyāya definition of the Pratyakṣa which would show that to the author of the Nyāya-sūtra's both the forms of Perception, the Nirvikalpa and the Savikalpa, are correct modes of knowledge. Here again, the Nyāya theory combines the contending views of the Jaina and the Buddhist schools.

What should be the test of valid knowledge, whether as according to the Pragmatists, it is what serves useful purpose

<sup>1</sup> The author of the Prameya-kamala-mārtanda means this when he says that Darśana or Pure Sensation is not a Pramāṇa

स्पष्टाकारविकल्पत्वात् ।

or as according to the Rationalists, it is what gives us a correct and clear idea of the thing under observation, is a matter of heated controversy among the epistemologists of the present day.

The mode of our approaching the Jaina theories in these lectures has been indicated above. It will be a comparative presentation of those theories, side by side, with the theories of the other schools of Indian thought and those of the philosophers of other lands, ancient or modern, as far as possible.

**THE SYSTEM OF REALS: THE JAINA VIEW, AS OPPOSED TO THE ĆĀRVĀKA AND THE BUDDHIST AND AS COMPARED WITH THE VIEWS OF THE OTHER SCHOOLS OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY**

Now, as to the subject matter of the present lectures—the system of Reals in the Jaina metaphysics. In opposition to the ĆĀrvākas and the Buddhists, but in agreement with the other schools of Indian philosophy, the Jaina's recognise the Jīva or Soul as a real substance. Opposed to it are the Ajīvas, the non-psychical substances which are five in number viz.—Pudgala or Matter, Ākāśa or Space, Kāla or Time and Dharma and Adharma, i.e. the principles or rather the conditions of Motion and Rest. Of these, the first three are recognised and discussed in other systems of Indian thought but the Jaina ontology is unique in admitting Dharma and Adharma as the two non-psychical real substances which condition the Motion and the Rest of the moving and the resting substances respectively. Lastly, we may here point out that the Jainas are generally looked upon as Atheists or non-believers in God. The accusation is true, if by God is meant an almighty Creator of the universe. But the Jaina's have a theory of God and this God or Gods of theirs are neither abstractions nor mere ideas but are Reals. The Jaina theory of God may conveniently be presented towards the end of these lectures on the Reals, as recognised in the Jaina metaphysics.

## CHAPTER 2

### THE PROBLEM OF REALS

#### PARTICULAR AND GENERAL ASPECTS OF A THING: VIŚEṢA AND SĀMĀNYA

THE Jaina mode of viewing a thing is not confined to a consideration of one or two of its aspects, but of all its aspects. A real according to the Jainas is not simply what comes (उत्पाद) and goes (व्यय), but what has a persisting principle (द्रोव्य) as well. These two aspects are called the Viśeṣa and the Sāmānya. In its Viśeṣa or particular aspect, the attributes or the Guṇa's of the thing as well as its modes or the Paryāya's arrest our attention. But the features and the modifications of the thing are temporary phenomena after all and do not make up the whole of it. For, besides appearing in its fleeting qualities and modes, the thing under observation is found to have persistence. This persisting principle underlying the thing makes it similar to the other things of its class. This is called the (तिर्यक् सामान्य) or the principle of class-essence in a thing. Then again particular modifications of a substance, a golden chain, a golden ring, a golden bangle, for instance, may be produced one after the other, and after a time, destroyed, but the substance, gold continues to persist. This persisting essence in a thing is its ऊर्ध्वतासामान्य or substantial identity. A Real is that which has these सामान्य and विशेष and one must take note of all these aspects; otherwise, his speculations would lead to disastrous results.

#### BUDDHISTS EMPHASISING UPON THE PARTICULAR

A section of the Buddhists used to confine their attention to the purely particular aspect of things. They saw that a phenomenon rose and disappeared; to them accordingly, the Reals of our experience were essentially unreal and these Buddhists, the Śūnyavādins as they were called,

developed arguments to establish that all things were but void and unsubstantial.

### SŪNYA-VĀDA ARGUMENTS

They began by pointing out the obvious fact that a thing as it appears to us at a particular moment, an earthen jar, for instance, decays after a time; therefore, the gross thing, the earthen jar is unquestionably not a permanent substance. We cannot say, again, that the atoms constituting the jar are permanent. We have no direct knowledge *प्रत्यक्ष* of the atoms, as they are admittedly supersensuous; nor can we by means of inference *अनुमान* be ever sure of the nature of a substance which originally does not submit to our senses. The Buddhists contend: Supposing an atom is an eternal reality, how is it to produce actual results (*अर्थक्रियाकारित्व*) which is the sole test of reality? If the atom is to produce the compounds, one after the other, what becomes of it as it is in itself? If you say that it changes its nature in the act of producing its compounds, one after the other, then the atom cannot be said to have a permanent nature. If, on the contrary, it is held that the atom does not change its nature while it goes on producing compounds, A, B and C, how is it that A precedes B, B precedes C and not that the order is otherwise? If in producing its compounds, the atom be held to remain unchanged, one may reasonably expect that all the compounds of atoms should be produced all at once, for there is no reason why they should come out successively. Similar lines of arguments are brought forward by the Buddhists for establishing their position that there would be serious inconsistencies if you hold atoms to be permanent in essence. Thus the gross things of our experience are obviously impermanent; and their subtle constituents also cannot be eternal. The result is that every thing outside us is impermanent and as such, unreal. Our cognitions of these unreal things and for the matter of that, we ourselves, the cognising subjects are consequently unreal. The Buddhist conclusion is that all is *Sūnya*, i.e. there are no Reals at all.



**JAINA CRITICISM OF BUDDHISTIC NIHILISM**

It is impossible to reproduce in extenso the criticism which the Jaina philosophers apply to the Buddhistic nihilism. They point out that it is not always true to say that atoms are the constituent parts of all things. Soul and Space, for instance, are Reals although they are not constituted of material atoms. Then again, it is not impossible for atoms to be eternal and at the same time to produce compounds. It is quite possible for atoms to continue unchanged, so far as their essential nature is concerned, and yet at the same time to combine with each other for making compounds. At the same time, it is to be noted that the production of compounds is not wholly dependent on the atoms themselves. There are other factors which determine what compounds are to be formed at what times and this is why the compounds come up successively and not all at once.

In criticism of the inconsistent position of the *Sūnya-vāda*, it is said:—

विचार वस्तुरूपश्चेत् किं सिध्येत् सर्वशून्यता ।

विचारोऽवस्तुरूपश्चेत् किं सिध्येत् सर्वशून्यता ॥

“If your argument has any substance, how do you establish your doctrine of absolute unsubstantiality? If your argument has no substance, how do you establish your doctrine of absolute unsubstantiality?”

The Jaina philosophers in agreement with the other schools of Indian philosophy thus maintain that absolute nihilism is an impossible position. You must admit reality somewhere. What then, is the Real or the primal substance at the basis of this world?

**THE ŚĀBDIKA THEORY OF WORD AS THE PERMANENT AND ESSENTIAL REALITY**

In our opening lecture, we had an occasion to cursorily indicate the theory of a school of Indian philosophers according to whom Śabda, or Sound was the one fundamental Reality of which all the things of the world were manifestations. There we pointed out how these Śābdika thinkers

showed that on analysis our knowledge of Objects would be found to consist in Words,

यावदर्थं वै नामधेयशब्दा तैरर्थसम्प्रत्ययः ।

and that accordingly Words and Objects must be held to be essentially connected. According to these thinkers, the Noumenal Sound is the ultimate and the only Reality. On the one hand, it is the cause of the Words and consequently, the Vāçaka or what expresses and signifies the Objects of our knowledge; on the other, it is the Vāçya or the Objects, signified by the Words.

These Śābdikas tell us:—

स्थानेषु विवृतं वायौ, कृतवर्णपरिग्रहा ।  
 वैखरीवाक् प्रयोक्तृणां, प्राणवृत्तिनिबन्धना ॥  
 प्राणवृत्तिमतिक्रम्य, मध्यमा वाक् प्रवर्तते ।  
 अविभागानुपश्यन्ती, सर्वतः संहृतक्रमा ॥  
 स्वरूपज्योतिरेवान्तः सुक्षमावागनपायिनी ।  
 तथा व्याप्तं जगत् सर्वं, ततः शब्दात्मकं जगत् ॥

वाक्यपदीय-टीका ।

“When the air passes to the proper places (e.g. the throat etc.) a man is enabled to utter a Word; such a Word is due to the operation of the vital principle (or the air which is in the bosom) and is called the Vaikhari Word. The Madhyamā Word is not dependent on the vital principle or air but consists in an internal vibration, so to say. Lastly, there is the Sūkṣma or subtle Sound which is eternal; it is self-luminous; it has no distinctions within itself (due to component letters etc.) and is indivisible; it is the Revelation. The universe is permeated by such Sound and hence is the world said to consist in Words”.

### JAINA CRITICISM OF THE ŚĀBDIKA THEORY

The Grammarian doctrine of the ultimate reality of Sound which underlies the world and all its objects, sounds somewhat similar to the Biblical dogma:—

“In the beginning was the Word and the  
 Word was with God and the Word was God”.

The Jainas, on the contrary, reject this theory and point

out that Words or Sounds do not necessarily accompany all forms of our cognition. We have visual perceptions of Blue etc., which are not attended with any corresponding words: perception is possible without Sounds. Can we, again, identify Objects with Sounds? It is manifest to everyone that Objects are certainly different from the ordinary Sounds or Words which are used to express them.

As regards the three alleged kinds of Words, the Vaikhari, the Madhyamā and the Sūkṣma, the Jainas point out that the nature of an Object and its perception have nothing to do with the first and the second kinds of Words. The alleged third kind of Words, is no real Word or Sound at all, in as much as it consists in a revelation or direct vision of the Self or the object. Then, again, so far as the Objects of the world are concerned, does the Śabda Brahma or the Noumenal Sound modify itself into each and every object or does it not? In the first case, the Sound becomes many in number, which is opposed to the Śābdika theory. In the second case, the variedness of the Objects and their states become inexplicable.

The theory that the world consists essentially in Sound, being but a modification of it, is thus not acceptable at all. The Jainas thus agree with the Nāiyāyikas and other thinkers in rejecting the Śābdika doctrine that Sound is the one and the ultimate Real, underlying the phenomena of the world.

#### VEDĀNTA THEORY OF BRAHMA, AS THE ONLY REALITY

If the above Śābdādvaita-vāda of the Śābdika school is unacceptable to the Jainas, it may be easily surmised that the Brahmādvaita-vāda or the pure absolutism of the Vedānta schools also would be rejected by them. The Vedānta thinkers, as is well known, maintain that the Brahma is the only Real and the world with its phenomena is unreal. The Vedāntists contend, *inter alia*, that the so-called Reals of the world would, on examination, be found to be निःस्वभाव i.e. lacking in essential reality of their own.

The Vedāntins maintain that so far as experience is concerned, we are to depend on the Nirvikalpa Pratyakṣa or pure Sensation for an apprehension of the real nature, if any, of the thing under observation. But in this form of undetermined perception, we do not get a definite nature of a thing—the thing, that is, as it is distinguished from all other things. An apprehension of this negative aspect of a thing can alone give an idea of its positive nature, if any. But such an apprehension is a later development, the result of Savikalpa Pratyakṣa which is not always reliable. The Nirvikalpa does not show how the thing under observation is different from all other things; it does not present any peculiar nature of the thing. The Nirvikalpa yields an apprehension of pure and abstract Existence only; it does not show that the so-called thing under observation has a peculiar nature of its own at all. The Nirvikalpa is surely the safest and the most reliable source of true knowledge and if Nirvikalpa does not give an apprehension of the nature of a thing, peculiar to it, it is because the thing itself is lacking in that. But although our perception shows that its object, in and by itself, is wanting in a peculiar nature of its own, the positive character of perception goes to show at the same time, that underlying it, there is the Brahma, the pure Existence, which is the only Real, the sole basis of that thing as well as of all the other things of the world, which are all wanting in natures of their own.

#### JAINA CRITICISM OF THE VEDĀNTA THEORY

In our first discourse, we have already pointed out that the Jainas reject the validity of the Nirvikalpa as a source of knowledge. They criticise the Brahmādvaitavāda of the Vedānta by pointing out that our perception does not show that a thing is wanting in a nature of its own. Our perception presents its objects as particularised in some way. This is impossible unless the object itself has a nature of its own which is distinct from the nature of other objects. The Vedānta calls the world of our empirical experience, Prapañca i.e. multiplicity, which shows that even accord-

ing to the Vedāntist observer, the objects of perception are varied, each having a nature distinguished from the nature of others. Why should we look upon this experience of multiplicity as unreal? Why should we go against the yield of our perception and say that the objects of our experience although, appearing as varied, are not really varied at all?

The Vedāntists, of course, as we have seen, point out that our valid perception presents its object as positive only and that this goes to show that the one, non-dual *positive* Brahma is the only Real, underlying all the apparently varied objects of our experience. The Jainas repudiate this Vedāntist contention about the so-called positive (Vidhāyaka) character of the objects of experience. They point out that an object of our experience has certainly a positive character; but as affirmation is impossible without negation, the positive aspect of the character of a thing involves also a negative aspect. The perception of a Blue object is possible only as its differentiation from Yellow ones and so on. It is thus not correct to say that valid perception presents its object as abstract Existence; its positive character does not mean that it is devoid of distinctive contents of its own. Valid perception, according to the Jainas show that its object has a peculiar and individual nature of its own, distinguished from that of the other objects. The Nirvikalpa may consist in a consciousness of the barest Existence but it is too hazy and indistinct a mode of apprehension to be looked upon as a valid source of knowledge. We cannot depend upon the Nirvikalpa for a knowledge of the real nature of the things under observation. Our valid perception, on the contrary, shows that the things of our experience are not निःस्वभाव, that the one, non-dual Brahma is not the only Real, underlying all of them but that the universe is constituted of a multiplicity of Reals.

We shall end this account of the Jaina criticism of the Vedāntic monism, with a quotation from Sri Ratnaprabha Suri's commentary:—

सरलोयमित्याद्याकारं हि प्रत्यक्षं प्रपञ्चस्य सत्यतामेव व्यवस्यति, सरलादि प्रतिनियतपदार्थपरिच्छेदात्मनस्तस्य उत्पादात्, इतरेतरविविक्तवस्तूनामेव अथ कथमेतत् प्रत्यक्षं पक्ष प्रतिक्षेपकम् ? तद्धि विधायकमेव, इति तथा तथा ब्रह्मैव विदधाति, न पुनः प्रपञ्च सत्यतां प्ररूपयति। सा हि तदा परुषिता स्यात् यदीतरस्मिन्नितरेषां प्रतिषेधः कृतः स्यात्। न चेवं निषेधे कुण्ठत्वात् प्रत्यक्षस्येति चेत्-तदयुक्तम्। यतो विधायकमिति कोऽर्थः ? इदमिति वस्तुस्वरूपं गृह्णाति नान्यस्वरूपं प्रतिषंधति प्रत्यक्षमिति चेत् मैवम्। अन्यरूपनिषेधमन्तरैण तत्स्वरूपपरिच्छेदस्याप्यसंभवेः। पीतादिव्यवच्छिन्नं हि नीलमिति गृहीतं भवति, नेतरथा।

“Perceptions, such as ‘this is a Sarala tree’ etc., consist in apprehensions of definite, individual objects e.g. the Sarala tree and so on and as such, prove the reality of the Prapañca (i.e. variety or multiplicity of things). The word, Prapañca itself refers to distinct and varied reals. It may be contended (by the Vedāntist): ‘Perception has for its object the Positive Real; hence in the varied objects of the world, it posits the Brahma; it does not prove the reality of the varied objects in and by themselves; perception would have proved the reality of an individual object, if it had presented it as distinguished from another object; perception, however, has no element of negation in it and therefore, it does not present its object as distinguished from other objects. This contention is not correct. For, what do you mean by Vidhāyaka or determiner of the Positive character? If you say that by Vidhāyaka it is meant that perception grasps only the positive nature of its object and does not negate (in it) the nature of other things, your position is wrong; for, without negating the nature of other things in it, an apprehension of the positive nature of a thing is impossible. A Blue Object is perceived as distinguished from Yellow ones, etc., and not otherwise.”

### ĀRVĀKA THEORY OF MATTER AS THE BASIC REALITY

The Ārvāka or the Indian materialist school was opposed to the nihilism of the Buddhist Śūnyavāda on the one hand and to the monism of the Grammarian, ‘Śābdādvaita-

vāda and of the Vedānta Brahmādvaita-vāda on the other. In this respect the Ārvāka's position is to some extent, similar to the position of the Jainas. Like the Jainas, the Ārvākas maintain that the things of the world are not essentially void or unreal. The Ārvākas, however, contend that the four kinds of Matter are the basic Reals, and that the things of the world are but the groupings and regroupings of the primordial elements. Brhaspati, the alleged founder of the Indian materialist school, is reported to have propounded:—

पृथिव्यापस्तेजो वायुरिति तत्त्वानि, तत्समुदाये शरीरविषयुन्द्रियसंज्ञाः ।  
तेभ्यश्चैतन्यम् ।

“The Material principles of the solid, the liquid, the luminous and the gaseous are the ultimate Reals; their combinations give rise to what are called the Bodies, the Objects and the Senses; Consciousness comes out of them.”

As regards the origin of Consciousness from Matter, the Ārvākas contend that just as certain substances which, taken separately have no intoxicating power in them, when combined in a particular manner do generate such a power; in the same way, the material elements, although unconscious in themselves, do produce Consciousness when combined in such a way as to form a Kāya or Body, the receptacle for Consciousness. This theory of the ancient Ārvākas is essentially similar to the modern materialist's contention, —‘as the Liver secretes Bile, so the Brain generates Consciousness.’

#### JAINA CRITICISM OF THE ĀRVĀKA THEORY

The Ārvāka theory that Matter is the only Real is vehemently attacked by the Jainas and the other schools of Indian philosophy and their criticism is in a line with that levelled against materialism by modern thinkers. The Jainas, for instance, point out that Consciousness cannot come out of the unconscious Matter for the simple reason that only that which is implicit in a substance, can come out of it.

सतः खल्वभिव्यक्तिवृत्ता । न च देहदशायाः प्राक् भूतेषु चैतन्यसत्तासाधकं  
प्रत्यक्षमस्ति, तस्यैन्द्रियकस्यातीन्द्रिये तस्मिन्नप्रवर्तनात् ।

—रत्नाकरावतारिका

Consciousness is immaterial; so how can it come out of Matter which is essentially unconscious? The intoxicating power must be held to be something material; otherwise, it cannot arise from a combination of material substances. If the Body was the cause of Consciousness, a dead man must have Consciousness, because a dead man's Body remains intact. Then again, if the quantity of the Body was a measure of Intelligence, the big animals like elephants or whales would have been vastly more intelligent than man. If the word 'Brain' was substituted for the word 'Body' here, this Indian criticism of the materialistic doctrine would resemble its criticism in modern times. The Ārvākas point out that when the Body is wounded, Consciousness is found to be impaired; when on the other hand, the Body gets good nourishment, Intelligence is found to be better developed. Does it not show that it is the Body that generates Consciousness? The Jainas refute the Ārvāka's suggestion by saying that the Ārvāka's propositions show only that the Body is the instrument or vehicle through which the conscious principle works, so that with the deterioration or improvement of the Body, Consciousness becomes modified. Then again, it is not always true that any and every change in the Body is followed by a corresponding change in Consciousness. It is often found that a person engrossed in meditations or contemplative thoughts or otherwise deeply engaged, would be uninfluenced by even serious changes in his Body, e.g. hurt or a bad cut. This establishes that the conscious principle is essentially different from the Body. This is confirmed by the fact that for many conscious states e.g. joy, sorrow, fear, grief, wisdom etc., we shall be searching causes in the Body in vain. Feelings such as, 'I am happy', 'I am sorry', etc. show that the conscious principle, the 'I' is different from the Body. The Ārvākas contend that really such feelings refer to the Body and in support of their contention they refer to such expres-



sions as, 'I am fat', 'I am lean' etc. The Jainas point out that in many cases things closely connected are identified in common parlance; even a master would sometimes call his servant's act his own. Similarly, the expressions, 'I am fat', 'I am lean' etc. really mean that my Body is fat or my Body is lean; but as the Body and the conscious Subject are closely connected, the expressions which really refer to the former are predicated of the latter. The Ārvākas contend that all data go to show that the Body is at least the Sahakāri Kāraṇam (accompanying cause or condition) of Consciousness, if not the Upādāna Kāraṇam (the material cause) of it. This contention of the Ārvāka is in a way similar to the present day materialist's theory that Consciousness is a by-product of the Brain. The modern criticism applied to the position is that thereby the materialists' theory of the origin of Consciousness from Matter becomes admittedly untenable. The Jainas meant this by saying:—

कलेवरस्य सहकारिभावे किमुपादानं चैतन्यस्य  
स्यात् ? तद्व्यतिरेकेण तत्त्वान्तराभावात् ।

—रत्नाकरावतारिका

#### THE JAINA AND THE VEDĀNTA CRITICISM OF THE ĀRVĀKA THEORY

In this way, the Jainas are opposed to the materialistic position that Matter is the only Real and so far as their criticism of the Ārvāka materialism is concerned, they are one with the thinkers of the other Indian schools. In opposition to the ultra-materialistic position, the Jainas join with the Vedāntins in maintaining that the conscious principle is a Real. But they would not agree with the Vedāntins when the latter say that this conscious principle is one and it is the non-dual Brahma. The Jainas contend that the conscious selves or the Jīvas are infinite in number, and that each of them is a self-existent and independent Real. They would thus agree with the philosophers of the Sāṃkhya and the Yoga schools, according to whom also

the Puruṣas or souls are infinite in number, each self-existent and absolutely Real in itself. In opposition to the Vedānta position, the Jainas would further agree with the Sāṃkhya thinkers in admitting non-psychical Reality over and above the conscious Souls. But with respect to their views about this non-psychical Reality, the Jainas and the Sāṃkhya philosophers differ from each other.

#### SĀMĀNYA THEORY OF MATTER

The Sāṃkhya philosophers begin by pointing out that the objects and the phenomena of our experience which are other than the Puruṣas or conscious Souls are essentially different from the latter. First of all, the non-psychical objects are characterised by three attributes, Sattva, Rajas and Tamas (Triguṇātmaka) but the conscious principle is untouched by these. Secondly, the non-psychical objects are said to be *Aviveki* i.e. in their case, the objects themselves cannot be separated from their Guṇa's, but such a question of Aviveka cannot arise in the case of a Puruṣa which is free from all attributes. Thirdly, the non-psychical phenomena are Viśaya i.e. objects subordinated (Bhogyasvabhāva) to beings other than them, but the conscious principles are essentially free and never subservient to any other principles. Then again, a non-psychical object is a *Sāmānya* i.e. it can be the matter of common enjoyment for all the conscious selves; but conscious principles are fully independent of each other and none of them can be the matter of enjoyment for others. Fifthly, the non-psychical objects are unconscious (Aśetana) and thereby different from the Puruṣa's which are conscious. Lastly, these unconscious phenomena are Prasava-dharmi i.e. they give rise to effects from them; but the conscious principles are immutable identities. So, our experience shows that the world of our experience consists of two classes of substances essentially different from one another: the Puruṣas or conscious principles and the unconscious objects. The Puruṣas are infinite in number, each independent of the other and of the unconscious objects; but the unconscious

objects cannot be said to be infinite in number, so far as their essential nature is concerned.

A study of the further characteristics of the unconscious objects will show this.

The unconscious objects are found to be *Hetumat*; none of them are self-existent, but all of them originate from causes. Secondly, they are all *Anitya* or non-eternal. Thirdly, they are *Avyāpi* i.e. they are all limited in their extent, non-infinite. Fourthly, they are *Sakriya* i.e. active, all of them move and none of them is motionless like the soul. Fifthly, they are *Aneka* i.e. of various kinds. Sixthly, they are *Āśrita* i.e. dependent on their causes. Seventhly, they are *Linga* i.e. all of them have their destructions and ends. Eighthly, they are *Sāvayava* i.e. all of them are constituted of subtler parts. Ninthly, they are *Paratantra* i.e. none of them are independent. What do these characteristics of the objects of our experience show? These characteristics imply that the non-psychical objects and phenomena arise from an ultimate cause. The Sāṃkhya theory is that effects do not come from nothing but come out of their causes in which they lie in a subtle state. Effectuation is becoming explicit of what was already existent in an implicit state in the cause. The Sāṃkhya thinkers support this by their theory of causation—the theory that the effect is existent in the cause, by five modes of argument which are as follows:—

#### SĀMKHYA THEORY OF SAT-KĀRYA-VĀDA

1. असदकरणात्—One strives to produce only what is existent and not what is absolutely non-existent. It is because oil is existent in seeds that one would try to produce it from them.

2. उपादानग्रहणात्—It is because the effect is existent in the cause that people collect their necessary materials. Take the case of a lump of clay; it is neither a pitcher nor a piece of cloth. Still one wanting to make a pitcher would gather the clay. Why? Because he knows that this lump has the pitcher in it in an embryonic state, so to say; that

the pitcher in other words, is existent in the clay in an implicit form.

3. सर्वसम्भवाभावात्—It is impossible to get anything and everything from anything and everything. A certain thing, 'A' for instance, produces AI only; you cannot get B, C, D, etc. out of it. Why? Because AI, and not B, C or D, is implicitly present in A.

4. शक्तस्य शक्त्यकरणात्—A thing is capable of producing only that which is existent in it.

5. कारणाभावात्—A particular phenomena A. is called the cause of another phenomena AI. Why? Why are not the other phenomena B, C or D called the cause of AI? Because the effect AI is existent in A and thereby distinguishes A from B, C or D.

These five lines of arguments, according to the Sāṃkhya thinkers establish the fact that the various non-psychical objects and phenomena are traceable in their causes; these, in their causes and so on until we come at something which is the one ultimate uncaused cause of all non-psychical things. This fundamental nonpsychical cause is the Pradhāna, otherwise called the Prakṛti. It is essentially different from the Puruṣa's or conscious principles and has all the characteristics of non-psychical phenomena mentioned above, viz. it has the *Triguṇa* or three attributes; it is *Aviveki* i.e. it is undistinguishable from its attributes; it is the *Viśaya* or object of enjoyment for principles other than it; it is *Sāmānya* i.e. enjoyable by more than one self; it is *Açetana* or unconscious; and it is *Prasava-dharmi*, i.e. it evolves non-psychical principles from within itself. But although the Pradhāna has the above characteristics in common with its evolutes, it has not their further features which have been mentioned before. It is not हेतुम् i.e. it is self-existent and uncaused. It is not अनित्य i.e. it is eternally existent. It is not अव्यापि i.e. it is limitless and all-pervasive. It is not सक्रिय i.e. it is essentially *Jada* or inactive. It is not अनेक i.e. it is one and not many in number or modes. It is not आश्रित i.e. it is not dependent on anything. It is not लिंग i.e. it has no decay

or destruction. It is not *साव्यव* i.e. it is one whole and not composed of subtler parts. And finally it is not *परतन्त्र* or controlled by any other foreign principle. The thinkers of the Sāṃkhya school contend that besides the infinite number of conscious Reals, called *Puruṣa*'s by them, there is this—the other Real, the *Prakṛti*, which is the one uncaused cause of all non-psychical phenomena. They point out that all non-psychical things and phenomena are limited in some way; *Mahat* or Intelligence, for instance, is one; *Ahaṃkāra* or Egoism is one; the Subtle Elements are five; Senses are eleven; the Gross Elements are five. This shows that the ultimate cause of these must be one, all-pervasive Real, *भेदानां परिमाणात्*. The next argument is *समन्वयात्*. All non-psychical phenomena are found to be characterised by three unstable and disproportionate attributes, *Sattva*, *Rajas* and *Tamas*; therefore, they must have as their ultimate cause, one Real in which these attributes will be in a state of equilibrium. It is next contended that every act is found to have an agent who is capable of doing it. The non-psychical phenomena which are all of the nature of products must refer to one producer which is capable of evolving them *शक्तितः प्रवृत्तेश्च*. The next Sāṃkhya argument is *कारणकार्यविभागात्*. The non-psychical phenomena are found to be Effects; they must have a Cause; for, every Effect has its Cause. And lastly, the Sāṃkhya thinkers argue *अविभागाद्वैश्वरूप्यस्य*. At the time of the *Pralaya* or the final destruction of the world, all the phenomena of the three worlds, their gross objects and their subtler elements, all enter a state of *अविभाग* in which they are undistinguishable. This state which is otherwise called *अविवेक* is the state in which they lie in *Pradhāna*, undistinguished from it and from each other.

#### JAINA CRITICISM OF THE SĀMKHYA THEORIES .

The Jaina Philosophers, as we have stated already, agree with the Sāṃkhya theory about the plurality of conscious Reals but they reject the doctrine of the one, non-dual *Prakṛti*,

as an ultimate principle evolving the non-psychical modes. The Jainas point out that if, as contended by the Sāṃkhya philosophers, the evolutes, Mahat, Ahaṃkāra etc., are not different from the Pradhāna so far as their essence is concerned, you cannot speak of any causal relation between them<sup>1</sup>. For the same reason viz. that the Prakṛti and its evolutes are identical, it is illogical to say that the former is different from the latter. In other words, if you say that the non-psychical things and the Prakṛti have the identical nature, you cannot in the same breath say that the former are हेतुम्, अनित्य, अव्यापि, सक्रिय, अनेक, आश्रित, लिंग, सावयव and परतन्त्र, while the latter is quite the opposite of these.

Then again, how can the Pradhāna which is eternal be the cause of the non-psychical phenomena? If in producing the effects, the Pradhāna be supposed to change its nature, then the Sāṃkhya theory about the immutability of the nature of Prakṛti is contradicted. If on the other hand, the Pradhāna be supposed not to change its nature in producing the effects, then it is inexplicable why the order of evolution is as it is and not otherwise. Nor can it be said that the Prakṛti changes not the whole but only a part of its nature, in producing the effects; because it has been supposed to be one Whole, not constituted of any parts. Then again is an evolute, Ahaṃkāra, for instance, identical in nature with the evolvent, Mahat? In that case, there is no evolution, but continuation of one and the same thing. If again the evolute be different in nature from the evolvent, you cannot say that the former evolves from the latter. The Jaina philosophers criticise the सत्कार्यवाद of the Sāṃkhya philosophers and point out that the five reasons given in support of the theory by the Sāṃkhya thinkers may as well be used in a way so as to establish the opposite

<sup>1</sup> यत् यस्मात् सर्वधार व्यतिरिक्तं तत् तस्य कार्यं कारणं वायुक्तम् भिन्नलक्षणत्वात्तयोः ।

(प्रमेयकमलमार्तण्ड)

theory viz. that an effect is non-existent before its rise. It may be pointed out: (1) One would not strive to produce what is already existent; (2) If a thing is already existent, one would not go to collect it; (3) You can say that anything and every thing cannot come out of anything and every thing, only when you show that a particular thing alone comes out of a particular thing; (4) A thing can be said to be capable of producing another only when it is produced; (5) Similarly, you cannot speak of a phenomena as a cause unless an effect is produced by it. The fact is, the Jaina philosophers point out, that the सत्कार्यवाद, if it means that the Effect is present before it is produced, is not a correct statement. They maintain it would be proper here, as in all cases, to refer to the *Syādvāda* or *Anekānta* standpoint. The effect is present before it is produced; well, this position is true only in the sense that it is present as a *potentiality*. As an actual fact, however, it is non-existent<sup>1</sup>.

Having thus prepared the grounds, so to say, the Jainas finally assail the arguments which the Sāṃkhya philosophers use for proving the Pradhāna as the sole non-psychical Real. They point out: 1. The fact that the non-psychical things are limited in some way shows that they are not self-existent. The argument, भेदानां परिमाणात् does not prove that the cause of these non-psychical phenomena must be one; this argument is quite consistent with the position that their causes may be more than one. 2. The second argument समन्वयात् is also weak. The attributes, Sattva etc., consist, among other states, in joy, sorrow etc. But these are psychical states and do not pertain to unconscious objects. So, the three attributes of Sattva, Rajas and Tamas do not prove the existence of Prakṛti. Even if these attributes be held to pertain to the unconscious pheno-

<sup>1</sup> अथ कथञ्चिच्छक्तिरूपेण सत्कार्यं ननु शक्तिर्द्रव्यमेव । तद्रूपतया सतः पर्यायरूपतया चासतो घटादेरुत्पत्त्यभ्युपगमे जिनपतिमतानुसरणप्रसंगः ।

—प्रमेयकमलमार्तण्ड

mena of our experience, it does not follow that these phenomena must have the non-psychical principle of Pradhāna as their cause in which the attributes have their abode and which at the same time is eternal, non-dual and all-pervasive.

3. The third argument, शक्तिस्तः प्रवृत्तेश्च has its force where the producer is a conscious active agent. A person who is conscious of his capacity to do something, sets his hands to it. So, from the premises that the non-psychical things of our experience are products one may conclude not that the unconscious Pradhāna is their cause but that a conscious agent is at their back. 4. The next argument कारणकार्यविभागात् does not show that the Pradhāna is necessarily the sole cause of the unconscious phenomena of our experience. 5. The Sāṃkhya argument अविभागाद्देववरूपस्य is also is not sound. For, in the first place, the Pralaya or cosmic dissolution is not an event which is admitted by all. Then again at the time of the alleged dissolution, do the natures of non-psychical principles of Mahat etc., continue or do they not? If they continue there is no Pralaya. If they do not, then there is an absolute end of them, which the Sāṃkhya does not admit. Lastly, the Sāṃkhya view about अविभाग at the time of the Pralaya is self-contradictory. If you say that the Pradhāna is the cause of the वैश्वरूप्य i.e. of the existing world, then this world becomes one homogeneous whole like its cause, the undifferentiated Pradhāna; and if that be so, how can we talk of any indistinguishableness, at all, of different principles of Mahat etc. at the time of the Pralaya, seeing that the hypothesis of the Pradhāna has already wiped off all heterogeneity from this world?

The Jainas thus while agreeing with the philosophers of the Sāṃkhya school with respect to the doctrine of the multiplicity of conscious Reals repudiate their theory of the non-dual character of the non-psychical principle. They maintain that the unconscious Reals are more than one in number and in this respect their theory is to some extent similar to the position of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika.



### THE JAINA AND THE NYĀYA-VAIŚEṢIKA VIEWS ABOUT THE NON-PSYCHICAL REALS

It will be seen that Material elements, called Bhūta's by the Nyāya school and *Pudgala* by the Jaina are unconscious Reals, admitted by both the schools. Similarly, Kāla or condition of change is another such Real, acknowledged by both the schools. Besides, both the schools admit that the conscious Reals are infinite in number. But while agreeing so far, the two schools of philosophers, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the Jaina, have remarkable differences. One such difference is this, that while the former school mentions five kinds of elemental Matter-stuff, viz. Pṛthvī, Ap, Tejas, Vāyu and Ākāśa, the latter would affirm that the ultimate Matter-stuff viz. the *Pudgala*, is of one kind only. While according to the Naiyāyikas, Ākāśa is the subtlest kind of material element, it is according to the Jainas no matter at all but a different kind of unconscious Real. We shall see that the Jainas mean Space by Ākāśa. Dharma and Adharma, again, are two unconscious Reals, according to the Jainas, signifying conditions of Motion and Rest respectively. These two Reals have no corresponding counterparts in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, indeed in any other system of philosophy at all. On the other hand, Dik or point of direction is a Real in the Vaiśeṣika metaphysics. Dik according to it is an unconscious Real which determines the directions of things. A is to the *East* of B, B is to the *South* of C and so on; such a determination of the location of things is made possible by the reality of the substance, called Dik by the Vaiśeṣika's. Dik is real, eternal, all-pervasive and one. The ten directions of it viz. East, North-East, North, North-West, West, South-West, South, South-East, Up and Down are due to one Dik being determined by different positions of the Sun in the sky at different times. The Jainas point out that the conception of Dik as a Real is unnecessary. The points of direction are better explained by Ākāśa or space. Space is a Real substance admitted by the Jainas who maintain that our determination of the East is due to a particular point of Space (Ākāśa-pradeśa-

śreṇī or series of space-points) being marked by the rise of the Sun and so on. The apprehension of Space is essential to our apprehension of direction, 'this is to the East of it' etc. It is thus reasonable to explain our apprehension of directions by a reference to Ākāśa or Space without admitting the reality of a separate Real called Dik.

Manas or the Mind is another non-psychical Real admitted by the Vaiśeṣika's. Observation shows that our sensations come in, one after another and not all simultaneously. It is the Manas as a Real which prevents the sensations from rising simultaneously. The Jainas look upon Manas as the internal sense and refuse to regard it as an independent Real. According to them, it is either Dravya-manas or Bhāva-manas and the former is constituted of very fine and subtle matter called *Manovargaṇā*. As such it is purely material in essence.

#### THE JAINA AND THE NON-JAINA ACCOUNTS OF REALS

Now, to sum up, the problem of Reals is raised in the systems of Indian philosophy and the Jaina answer to it has been indicated above, alongside those offered by the other systems. Reals are denied by the Buddhistic Śūnya-vāda. The Jainas would join with a section of the Śābdikas who refute this nihilistic line of thought, but they would repudiate the Śābdika doctrine of the Śābdādvaita and point out that the Real is neither one nor does it consist in Noumenal Sound. The Jainas would agree with the Vedāntins that the conscious principle is a Real but would differ from them by urging that it is not the one and the only fundamental Real in the world, but that there are non-psychical Reals as well. The Jaina's are one with the Ārvāka materialists in maintaining that Matter is a Real, but they would reject their theory of the unsubstantiality of the psychical principle. The Jaina philosophers join the Sāṃkhya thinkers in holding that the conscious souls are Real independent of each other and many in number and that besides these conscious Reals, there is the unconscious Reality; but they would differ from them by pointing out that the unconscious

Real is not the one and the non-dual Prakṛti of the Sāṃkhya philosophy, but that the non-psychical Reals are more than one in number. The Jaina's are one with the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school of thinkers that there is an infinite number of conscious Reals on the one hand and on the other, there are the unconscious Reals, Matter-stuff and Time. But the Jaina's and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika's have their differences also. According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Ākāśa is a kind of Matter-stuff, while the Jainas contend that it is not a material Real but an independent Reality which we otherwise know as Space. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika maintains that Dik or point of direction is a Real as well as Manas or the principle of attention. The Jaina philosophers, on the contrary, urge that these are not separate Reals but that the former is included in the principle of Ākāśa or Space, and the latter, in Pudgala or Matter.

Lastly, the Jaina thinkers differ from the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and for the matter of that, from all other schools of Indian thought in admitting two other unconscious Reals, the Dharma and the Adharma which, they say, are the two passive principles, helping the Motion and the Rest of the moving and the resting substances respectively.

### CHAPTER 3

## THE PRINCIPLES OF MOTION AND REST

### DHARMA AND ADHARMA

THE subjects that we take up for consideration in this chapter are two of the non-psychical Reals of the Jaina metaphysics, viz, Dharma and Adharma, the principles of Motion and Rest. The customary mode of discussing the Reals in the Jaina philosophy, invariably followed by the thinkers of the past was to take up the most important of them, viz, the Jiva or the conscious Subject first and then the Pudgala or the unconscious Matter, the defiler of the pure nature of the psychical Real. Next in order come for consideration the two non-psychical Reals, Ākāśa and Kāla, i.e. Space and Time in which the two foregoing Reals, Soul and Matter have their being. Last of all are taken up the two accompanying causes of Motion and Rest of the moving and the stopping substances respectively, the Dharma and the Adharma.

The ancients, of course, had a reason for following this order. With them, the study of philosophy was not merely a pursuit of knowledge, but a search for the way to liberation of man, who, with the thinkers of all the schools of Indian Philosophy was a miserable being in bondage, subjected to ceaseless pains and the fleeting pleasures of the world. This honest search for the way necessitated a consideration of the nature of man and what constituted the fetters, for him. The Jiva and the Pudgala were for this reason the first subjects for consideration with the ancients;—the Jiva in whom all were directly interested and the Pudgala, which was the cause of his bondage. Space and Time were connected with Jiva's bondage, no doubt, but not so directly as Matter. Dharma and Adharma,—the conditions of Motion and Rest of substances—were not recognised by the other schools of Indian Philosophy, and although with the Jaina's they were Reals, they were

certainly not the direct defilers of the nature of the Jīva as the Pudgala but passive principles or Udāsīna Hetus as they were like Space and Time, they were considered perhaps to be less important than these. This was possibly the reason why the considerations of the nature of Dharma and Adharma were always deferred till after a thorough discussion of the natures of the Jīva and the Pudgala—if not after that of the Kāla and Ākāśa, as well.

We have no such pragmatic end in view; our business is simply to present the natures of the Reals, as recognised in the Jaina metaphysics. Accordingly, we are not bound to make any apology for taking up the Udāsīna Hetus or passive conditions of Jīva's bondage first. Of these passive conditions again, we take up Dharma and Adharma for consideration before the other two, because their recognition as unpsychical Reals is a peculiar feature of the Jaina Philosophy.

### A. MOTION

#### ORDINARY MEANINGS OF THE WORD, DHARMA

The word 'Dharma' is one of the commonest in the orthodox Sanskrit literature. It ordinarily means, as the author of the Amara-Koṣa mentions, Puṇya or Sukṛta, merit or a good act. Not unoften it stands for Sadācāra or commendable customs or lines of actions. The Dharma Śāstra's are books which lay down rules for good conduct of peoples. The word, Dharmādhikaraṇa (a law court), again shows that the word Dharma has sometimes a restricted sense; it means the law, as administered by the courts of justice. These meanings of the word Dharma have obviously no reference to Reals of metaphysics.

At places again, we come across passages like एष धर्मः सनाननः which seem to take the word Dharma from the level of personal acts to the higher sphere of a universal moral law. Even this moral sphere is transcended still at some places where the word Dharma is made to stand for a universal law or principle. Lastly in speaking of the nature of a thing or a substance, the writers in ancient Sanskrit

literature have often used the expression *वस्तुधर्म* where the word *Dharma* means the *स्वभाव* the essence or the essential attributes of it. These latter senses of the word, *Dharma* have nothing to do with moral codes or legal acts or ethical principles but point, though but vaguely, to matters, to some extent metaphysical.

#### DHARMA IN BUDDHIST LITERATURE

In the Buddhist literature also, *Dharma* is ordinarily understood to mean a moral act or a system of moral practices. Occasionally, however, the Buddhists invested the word with a super-ethical significance. In such cases, *Dharma* stood for the Cosmic Law e.g. 'the Law of Progressive Causality' or 'the Law of Impermanence'. In many places, again, the Buddhists stepped further into the strictly metaphysical sphere and identified *Dharma* with 'the nature', 'the essence' or 'the attribute' of a substance.

#### DHARMA IN JAINA METAPHYSICS

In the Jaina system, *Dharma* has a peculiar sense in addition to its above-noted significance, ethical or otherwise. It is described as the *गतिकारणम्* or the cause of Motion, a non-psychical Real, which, like the *Kāla* or the principle of mutation or *Ākāśa* or space is formless (*अमूर्त*). It is said to pervade the whole of the *Lokākāśa* or 'filled space' and has innumerable (*Asamkhyeya*) *Pradeśas* or parts. It is immaterial and eternal. It does not extend to the *Aloka* or the infinite void space.<sup>1</sup>

#### THE NATURE OF DHARMA

The absence of taste, colour, etc. in *Dharma* disting-

<sup>1</sup> The author of the *Pancāsti-kāya-Samayasāra* says—

धम्मत्थिकायमरसं अवन्नगंधं असद्दृग्गोचरं ।

लोकागाढं पुण्ड्रं, पिहलमसंया दियपेदसं ।

*Dharma* is a substance which has not the qualities of taste, colour, smell, sound and contact. It prevades the whole of the filled space and is non-composite, although it has innumerable parts.

wishes it from Matter which has for its essential attributes, taste, colour, touch and smell.<sup>1</sup>

Thus, Dharma is neither identical with Matter nor with Time. How then is it a Real? A Real is, as we indicated in our second lecture,—

उत्पदिव्ययध्नोव्ययुक्तं सत् । (तत्त्वार्थाधिगमसूत्र-५-२९)

A real is a substance which has origin, decay as well as persistence.

Its particular manifestations and modes come and go; but it persists so far as its essential nature is concerned.<sup>2</sup>

The substantial nature of Dharma determines the motions of moving things. In these motions which have their origins and terminations, the particular modifications of Dharma are manifest. But Dharma has a persisting nature of its own which is eternal<sup>3</sup>.

#### OBJECTION TO DHARMA AND ADHARMA AS REALS

It may be contended that we have no Pratyakṣa or direct knowledge about the reality of Dharma and Adharma. Our perception, in other words, does not tell us that there are Reals such as Dharma and Adharma which condition the motion and the stoppage of things. How then can we admit their reality? The Jaina's answer that their reality is proved by their functioning. We are bound to, and as a matter of fact we do admit the reality of many things which we

<sup>1</sup> According to some Jainas both Kāla and Dharma are eternal and formless substances which have Pradeśa's or parts. But while the irreducible parts of Kāla are strictly separate from each other, the parts of Dharma are wholly adhesive, so to say, making Dharma पुट्टं or a continuous whole.

<sup>2</sup> It is said :

अगु लघुगुहि सया तेहि अणन्तेहि परिणदं निचचं ।

गदिकरियाजुत्ताणं कारणभूदं सयमकज्जं ॥ ९१॥

Ibid.

<sup>3</sup> This nature is described as "अगुलघु" i.e. neither heavy nor light. In other words, the movements of things show that there is an uncaused cause of these movements which, though manifesting itself infinitely in these movements, is not exhausted in them. It persists. Any substance, continuing unchanged in its essential nature amidst its infinite functionings is a Real. Hence Dharma is a Real substance.

do not actually perceive. The moving and stopping things must have some substance which help their motions and stoppages. This mode of reasoning leads us to admit the reality of Dharma and Adharma. The Jaina's point out that all philosophers admit many Reals which are not, however, the objects of our sensuous perception. Besides the gross objects, for instance, supersensuous Atoms are admitted as Reals. The Sāṃkhya philosophers admit the reality of the supersensuous attributes, Sattva, etc. of the Prakṛti as well as of the infinite number of Souls. The Jaina's argue that there is no inconsistency, if we admit the reality of Dharma and Adharma, although they are supersensuous; the phenomena of motion and rest necessitate it.

#### CAN DHARMA AND ADHARMA BE IDENTIFIED WITH ĀKĀŚA?

Can we not identify Dharma (and for the matter of that, Adharma also) with Ākāśa or Space? In other words, can we not say that it is Space which determines the motions and stoppages of substances? Space also is immaterial as it is devoid of the material attributes of smell, taste, etc.; it is also eternal, formless and a Niṣkriya Hctu or a passive condition; lastly, its irreducible parts also cohere together so closely that it is one, all-pervasive, continuous whole. Why, then, admit the separate reality of Dharma which also, as described above, has these features? This attempt at identifying Dharma with Ākāśa, the Jaina's oppose by saying, "सर्वत्र विरोधात्". They argue that the determination of the direction of a thing in relation to another is impossible without positing Space; yet, the Vaiśeṣikas admit Dik as a separate Real. Simultaneity or successiveness of phenomena presupposes Space; yet Kāla is an independent Real. Although one all-pervasive Space is in contact with all the conscious selves, the latter are admitted to be more than one in number. The Sāṃkhya philosophers maintain that the attribute Sattva is characterised by all-pervasiveness; yet the separate reality of the other two Guṇa's, Rajas and Tamas is not denied by them. Consciousness is the one characteristic



of all conscious selves; yet their manifoldness is not denied. The five Skandhas, admitted by the Buddhists, viz., The Rūpa, the Vedanā, the Saṃjñā, the Saṃskāra and the Vijñāna—all presuppose the last; yet the independence of each Skandha is admitted by the Buddhists. The Jaina's point out that substances and phenomena may thus presuppose one another but thereby their individuality or independence is not to be denied. Dharma and Adharma do presuppose Ākāśa as their all-pervasive abode, but that does not necessitate their identification with it. It is always to be noted that Ākāśa is what gives space to substances. This function of giving space to substances is obviously different from assisting the motion of a moving thing. Essentially different functions prove the existence of essentially different Reals, and hence Dharma must be supposed to be a separate substance. There is another reason why the function of Dharma cannot be attributed to Ākāśa. The Jaina philosophers, as we shall see later on, divide Space into two parts viz., Lokākāśa or filled space in which the conscious and the unconscious Reals live, move and have their being; and the Aloka or the Anantākāśa, which is infinite void space beyond the Loka, in which there are no substances whatsoever, conscious or unconscious. But it is to be noted that both the Loka and the Aloka are but parts of one Real, the Ākāśa. Now, if Ākāśa were the medium of motion, things would have gone into the Aloka and actually moved there just as they do in the Loka or the world of ours. The fact that the Aloka which is a part of Ākāśa is absolutely devoid of all substances (even the Siddhas or the Liberated Beings cannot enter it) shows that there is a separate Real which is absent in the Aloka and which pervades the Loka and thereby makes the distinction between the Loka and the Aloka possible and real. That is what is meant by saying,—

जादो अलोलोगो जैसि सवभावदो ।

Dharma and Adharma by their real nature make out the difference between the Loka and the Aloka.

### THE MEANING OF DHARMA AS GATI-KARANAM

The definition, however, of Dharma as the गतिकारणम् does not mean that it moves the things. Dharma is clearly stated to be a Niskriya or inactive substance. How, then, can it be said to be the cause of Motion? It is the 'Bahirāṅga-Hetu' or the 'Udāsīnā Hetu' of the motion of a thing, in as much as it only helps the motion of a thing. A material substance or a soul moves of itself; Dharma does not actually and actively move it; what it does is simply to assist or make possible the motion.

The author of Dravya-Saṃgraha says, "Dharma helps the movement of the moving Matter or Soul just as water, that of a moving fish; it does not move the non-moving". The example of water and the moving fish is resorted to also by Kundakundācāryya and other Jaina writers.

उदयं जह मच्छाणं गमणाणुगहकरं हवदिलोए ।

तह जीवपुग्गलाणं धम्मं दव्वं विद्याणाहि ॥ १२ ॥

—पंचास्तिकायसमयसारः

Know that Dharma helps the movement of Jīva and Pudgala, just as water does that of a moving fish.

The Author of Tattvārthasāra also has said "Dharma is what helps the movement of things which are moving of and by themselves. Souls and Material substances resort to Dharma when they are to move, just as fish take the help of water when they move." Brahmadeva illustrates the indirect and non-active causality of Dharma in effecting the movements of things in the following way. A Siddha is a perfectly emancipated soul having no connection with the world of ours. He does neither help nor is helped by any being on earth. He does not lead a man to liberation. Yet, when a man contemplates on the nature of a Siddha in a reverential attitude and thinks that he too is like the Siddha in his essential nature, possessed as he is of infinite faith, knowledge etc., well, the man gradually moves towards the attainment of Siddha-hood. In this case, the man moves towards liberation of and by himself; yet, the

Siddha is in a real sense the cause of his liberation. In the same way, Dharma, although it does not actually and actively push or move things, is a real cause or condition of their motion.

#### DHARMA AS ONE OF THE CONDITIONS OF ORDER IN THE WORLD

The Principle of Dharma does not extend beyond the Lokākāśa. This is the reason why the Emancipated Soul although it has the inherent capacity to rise upwards stops at the Siddhasilā, the top of the Universe, and cannot move in the Aloka or the Infinite Void Space beyond. The existence of Dharma within the confines of the Lokākāśa is one of the marks which distinguishes the Loka from the Aloka. In order that substances can exist in a world and there be order and system in it, there must be motion in it. It is thus that Dharma makes the Loka possible. At the same time, it should never be forgotten that Dharma is nothing more than the assisting cause of Motion. It is because substances move and stop by themselves and Dharma cannot move them when they are to stop that things do not continually fly in space. Dharma is thus only one of the conditions of the order or system in the world.

#### DR. SEAL'S VIEW, EXAMINED

Dr. Brajendra Nath Seal seems to think that Dharma is more than "the accompanying cause of movement". He says, "It is something more, it is the cause (or condition) of the system of movements, the fact of an order in the movements of Jīva and Pudgala." He makes Dharma somewhat like the Pre-established Harmony of Leibnitz and bases his theory on the utterances of Prabhācandra, 'सकृद्गतिं युगपद्भाविवति।'. It is doubtful, however, if Prabhācandra really means Dharma to be such a cause of the *order* or *system* in the movements of things. Dharma is, no doubt, one of the causes of such an order; but for the purposes of the order or the system in the movements of things, other principles in addition to Dharma, are necessary. You cannot say that water alone is the cause of the well-

ordered movements of a number of fish in a tank; for the purpose of the well-ordered movement of the fish, the nature of the fish themselves is as much responsible as the existence of water in the tank. In Pramcya-kamala-mārtaṇḍa, Prabhācandra says:

विवादापन्नाः सकलजीवपुद्गलाश्रयाः सकृद्गतयः साधारणबाह्यनिमित्तापेक्षा  
युगपद्भावविगतिगतिस्त्वादेकसरःसलिलाश्रयाऽनेकमत्स्यगतिवत् । तथा सकल  
ज्यवपुद्गलस्थितयः यत्तु साधारणनिमित्तं स धर्मोऽधर्मश्च ताभ्यां विना तद्  
गतिस्थितिकार्यस्यासंभवात् ।

These passages mean:

“The individual movements of all the souls and the material substances are dependent upon a common external condition because of the simultaneity of these movements just like the movements of a number of fishes which are dependent upon the water of one pond. In the same way, the stoppages of all the souls and the material substances are dependent upon a common external condition, because of the simultaneity of these stoppages just like the staying of a number of plums etc., in one pot. These common conditions are respectively Dharma and Adharma; without these, the above motion and stoppage are impossible.”

It would appear from the above passages of Prabhācandra that the simultaneous motions of a number of things are an evidence of the reality and substantiality of Dharma. Mere simultaneity of movements, however, is no more *order* or *system* than their *succession*. There may be a simultaneity of movements however without there being any order in them. A fish, for example, may run towards the north in a pond, while a man may swim towards the east; a twig which has fallen into the water may float towards the west and a piece of stone may be going downwards in the water. All these movements may be simultaneous and these movements are possible because of water, the medium of motions in this case. Yet no one would see any order in these movements, although they are simultaneous. It is thus that Dharma may account for the simultaneous motions of

things without bringing about any order or system in them. It is conceived as a strictly passive substance. It may be one of the conditions of ordered motions; but it is never an active agent and as such, you cannot fix upon Dharma as the sole cause or condition of the order or the system of motions in the universe.

The truth is that neither Dharma nor Adharma nor Ākāśa nor Kāla—none of these passive principles can be said to bring about the order or system in the movements of substances, either jointly or severally, although their existence may be a help to it. Rigorous monism here would probably introduce the principle of one ultimate Reality or substance, to explain the order in the universe and Theism posits God for this purpose. Jaina Philosophy is opposed to extreme monism and to Theism as well. To explain the ordered motions and for the matter of that, order in the universe, we must fall back upon the nature of Jīva and Pudgala, the two principles which move of and by themselves. The principle of Life is essentially the same in all the Jīva's, so that their functionings, activities and movement must be similar and have even a family likeness. If in addition to this, we take into account the fact that these Jīva's, work within the bounds of the same Kāla, Ākāśa, Dharma, Adharma and Pudgala, we shall see that an order and system is bound to grow among them. As regards the order in the purely physical sphere, we think that Jainism would have no objection to subscribe to the up-to-date scientific explanation of it. Like the scientists of the modern time, the Jaina's may say that the order in the physical plane is due to the nature of the physical substances, their mass and motion, the law of Gravity, the principles of attraction and repulsion inherent in them. And they may add that the existence of Dharma, Adharma, Ākāśa and Kāla is a great help, nay, a *sine-qua-non*, to the growth of order in the purely physical sphere. But the Jaina's are opposed to leaving the cosmic order to chance. They point out that there is a soul in every minute part of the world. The existence of souls in the universe helps the growth of order

in material phenomena, because the matter or Pudgala in the universe is from the beginningless time continually shaping itself or being shaped in accordance with the needs and inclinations of the infinite number of Jīva's existing and struggling in the world. Thus it is that order or system in the movements of substances is primarily due to the active nature of the substances themselves and that the growth of this order is helped by the existence not only of Dharma but of Adharma, Ākāśa etc., etc.

#### AKALANKA'S VIEW

The author of *Tattvārtha-rāja-vārtika* lays emphasis on the initiative taken by the substances in the matter of their moving or stopping and calls Dharma and Adharma simply Upagrāhaka. A blind man, he points out, takes the help of a stick, when walking; the stick does not make him move but only helps in his moving. If the stick were an active agent, it would have moved even senseless and sleeping men. The stick is thus an Upagrāhaka of the blind man's motion. Light, again, helps the power of vision; the eyes have the power of vision and light does not generate it. If light were an active agent, it would have made even senseless and sleeping men see. Light is thus an Upagrāhaka of the power of vision. "In the same way" he says, "souls and material substances move or stop of and by themselves. Dharma and Adharma are only Upagrāhaka or passive conditions of their motion and stoppage. They are not the Kartā or active generators of motion and rest. If they were Kartā or active agents, motion and stoppage would have been impossible". He shows how Dharma and Adharma, if conceived as active principles, would make motion and rest impossible. Dharma and Adharma are cosmic principles, pervading the whole of the world through and through. Now, if Dharma were to move a thing, Adharma would have at once stopped it, thus making motion absolutely impossible in this world. In the same way if Adharma were to stop a thing, Dharma would have at once moved it, thus making stoppage absolutely impossible in this world.

Akalanka-deva accordingly argues if Dharma and Adharma were more than passive principles, motion and rest would have been impossible in this world. Motion and Rest are due to the functioning of souls and material substances. Dharma and Adharma only help them and in a sense make them possible.

As the author of the Pancāstikāya-samayasāra says:

न य गच्छति धम्मत्थो समणं न करेदि भण्णदवियस्स ।  
हवदि गदिस्स प्पसरों, जीवाणं पुग्गलाणं च ॥९५॥

#### THE VIEW OF THE AUTHOR OF PANCAŠTI-KAYA-SAMAYA-SĀRA

Dharma does not move itself nor generate motion in other things. It is only a condition of motion in the conscious and the unconscious principles. May we not go further and say that *ordered* motion and *ordered* rest also are due to the functioning of souls and material substances and not to Dharma and Adharma, either jointly or severally, although these help them and as we have said before, make them possible?

#### ADRṢṬA AS THE CAUSE OF MOTION AND REST

There is a class of thinkers who urge that it is ADRṢṬA which causes the motion or the rest of a substance and that we need not admit the reality of Dharma and Adharma. ADRṢṬA, however, means the effect of good or bad deeds, done by a conscious being. Admitting for the sake of argument that ADRṢṬA is competent to effect the movements of a conscious being, how are we to account for the motion of a purely material substance which has nothing to do with ethical acts and thereby with ADRṢṬA?

#### PRABHĀCANDRA'S REPLY

It may be contended that the material substances are but objects of enjoyments of the conscious selves; they move or stop in accordance with the needs or purposes of the conscious beings; and the needs or purposes of the conscious beings being determined by ADRṢṬA, the corres-

ponding motions and rests in unconscious objects may be said to be due to Adrṣṭa. To this contention, Prabhācandra's reply is that in cases where the unconscious objects are related to the conscious selves as 'the enjoyed' to 'the enjoyers', Adrṣṭa may be admitted as one of the conditions of the motions and the rests of the former. This, however, does not mean that Adrṣṭa is such a condition in all cases. Where, for instance, the material phenomena are not in any way related to the conscious beings, Adrṣṭa cannot be said to be the condition of motions and rests in the unconscious things. According to Prabhācandra, Adrṣṭa is a condition of motion or rest in unconscious beings, only in some cases; it is not, therefore, the invariable condition. Dharma and Adharma, on the contrary, are the invariable conditions of motions and rests in all cases viz., of all conscious souls and of unconscious things, no matter whether the unconscious things are related to the conscious beings or not.

न च तदनिष्टां क्षमातेरिवासाधारणकारणस्यापीष्टत्वात्साधारणं तु कारणं तासां धर्माविर्भाविति ।

#### AKALAMKA'S VIEW

The author of the *Tattvārtha-rāja-vārtika*, however, says that even in cases where a material object is related to a conscious being as 'the enjoyed' to 'the enjoyer', it would not be proper to look upon Adrṣṭa which pertains strictly to the conscious being, as a condition of the motions and rests in the material object. For in such cases, admittedly, Adrṣṭa is not in any way connected with or inherent in the material object; and so, it cannot be said to be a condition of its motion and rest.

स्यादेतत् यस्य धर्मादयः उपकरिष्यन्ति तस्य पुंसोद्दिष्टादिष्टादिकं गतिस्तिष्ठि-  
भवत इति । तन्न । किं कारणं ? अन्यधर्मस्यान्यत्र क्रियारमे सामर्थ्य-  
भावात् । न हि स्वाश्रमे क्रियामनारममाणः अन्यत्र क्रियाहेतुरस्ति इत्यक्तं  
पुरस्तात् ।

According to the author of the *Tattvārtha-rāja-vārtika*, then, Adrṣṭa can in no case be a condition of the motion or



the rest in unconscious matter; for, nothing can be a condition of a phenomena, unless it is inherent in its essence or pervades it. A $\text{dr}\mathring{\text{s}}\text{ta}$  has admittedly nothing to do with unconscious matter; as such, it cannot be a condition of its motion or rest. It is Dharma and Adharma which pervade all substances, material or immaterial, that can be the conditions of their motions or rests.

#### FURTHER JAINA ARGUMENT AGAINST THE THEORY OF A $\text{dr}\mathring{\text{s}}\text{ta}$

The Jaina's bring another argument against the contention that motions and rests of a being are caused by A $\text{dr}\mathring{\text{s}}\text{ta}$  i.e. effects of its own actions. A liberated soul—Siddha as he is called—is free from the effects of his past acts; no Pu $\text{ṇya}$  or merit and no Pāpa or sin can touch him. He is above the effects of his previous acts and as such, beyond the reach of A $\text{dr}\mathring{\text{s}}\text{ta}$ . All the same, however, he has motion and rest. A liberated soul, according to the Jaina's, has the *motion* upwards to the Siddha- $\mathring{\text{s}}\text{ilā}$ , the blessed place at the top of the universe, and he has his *rest* there. A Siddha's motion and rest cannot be explained by A $\text{dr}\mathring{\text{s}}\text{ta}$  which cannot and does not touch him. The motion and the rest in the case of Siddha's can be accounted for only by admitting Dharma and Adharma as the two cosmic Reals at their basis. Thus it is that A $\text{dr}\mathring{\text{s}}\text{ta}$  cannot be said to be the invariable condition of motion and rest<sup>1</sup>.

#### B. REST

##### DUALISM IN ANCIENT THOUGHT

The supposition of two opposite principles to explain the phenomena of the world is peculiar to many systems, to ancient systems of thought in particular. In Zoroastrianism, we have the Ahuro Mazda, the good Principle and the Ahriman, the evil one. In early Judaism and Christian

<sup>1</sup> विनिर्मुक्तापुण्यापुण्यबन्धानां सिद्धानां गतिस्थिती इष्येते ततो नादृष्टहेतुके ।  
गतिस्थिती ।

theology also we meet with the Evil Spirit, sternly opposed to God. Ancient India had its Devas and Asura's. Coming to philosophy proper, we are ever face to face with dualism. Foremost of all dualisms, we have that between soul and non-soul, which is inherent in almost all the systems of philosophical thought. The Sāṃkhya states the problem as the antagonism between the Puruṣa and the Prakṛti; the Vedānta re-states almost the same problem as that between the Brahma and the Māyā. The Cartesians could ill reconcile the dualism between soul and matter. In Jaina philosophy we have the dual principles of the Jīva and the Ajīva. Besides this, we have the various other forms of dualism in philosophical thought viz. the dualism of Being and Non-being, Noumenon and Phenomenon etc., etc.

#### DUALISM OF MOTION AND REST WITH THE GREEKS AND THE JAINA'S

The early Greeks found out another important dualism viz., that between Motion and Rest. The Heraclitians asserted that there was no real rest and that everything was constantly in a flux or changing state and for the matter of that, in motion. The school of Parmenides, on the contrary, contended that motion was an impossibility and that rest which was ever immutable was essential to reality. The arguments in support of the contentions of Heraclitus and Parmenides tend only to show the reality of both Motion and Rest. A practical philosopher cannot ignore the one and admit the exclusive reality of the other. It is no wonder, then, that the Jainas who are upholders of the Anekānta-vāda and as such, opposed to all one-sided views, would admit the reality of both Dharma (the Principle of Motion) and Adharma (the Principle of Rest).

#### CAN EITHER OF DHARMA AND ADHARMA BE SUPPOSED TO BE LOGICALLY PRIOR TO THE OTHER?

Motion is accounted for by Dharma and Rest or stoppage by Adharma, both of which are real substances included in the class of the Ajīva or Non-soul. Both of them are

cosmic principles extending throughout the Lokākāśa or "filled space". They are non-existent in the Aloka or "the void space beyond". It is not to be supposed that Dharma is "something more, it is the cause (or condition) of the system of movements, the fact of an order in the movements of Jīva and Pudgala." According to the Jaina philosophy, the Jīva and the Pudgala move of and by themselves and the Principle of Dharma is strictly passive and as such, cannot account for the order in the universe. Similarly, Adharma also is a passive principle. The Jīva and the Pudgala stop or come to rest, of and by themselves. If there is any systematised or ordered Rest in the universe, its cause is to be sought for, not in the Principle of Adharma but in the essential nature of the Jīva and the Pudgala themselves. It thus appears that neither Dharma nor Adharma brings about the order that is found in the universe. Can we, however, treat one of them as "*logically prior*" to the other? Can we suppose that one principle tends to counteract the effect of the other and thereby the order in the universe is brought about as the resultant? Are Dharma and Adharma similar to the principles of Love and Hate, to the principle "guaranteeing motion within limits" and the principle of "Gravitation" respectively, or to the "electromagnetic influences", positive and negative, like that inherent in the constitution of an Atom? We are afraid they are not to be conceived thus. Dharma and Adharma are strictly inactive substances and we cannot attribute to them any sort of dynamic energising, just as we cannot think of them as "centripetal and centrifugal forces".

#### DR. A. CHAKRAVERTY'S VIEW ABOUT ADHARMA

We have ventured to express in the foregoing paragraph, our categorical disagreement not only with the view of Dr. Seal, which has already been discussed in the section entitled 'Motion', but also with the theory of Professor A. Chakraverty. "The very fact", says Professor Chakraverty, "that the structure of the world is permanent, that the world is a cosmos and not a chaos implies the existence

of another principle which guarantees the permanency of the world's structure and the world-form. This principle has the function of binding the flying atoms to the world's centre. Its function then is distinctly inhibitive, to arrest the flying atom. This non-psychical principle is called *Adharma* or rest. But if *Adharma* alone were to function in the universe there would be absolute rest and universal cosmic paralysis; hence the necessity of a counteracting force called *Dharma*. The function of this is to guarantee free movement for the objects that move of their own accord or otherwise. This principle of *Dharma* or motion then is merely to relieve the universal inhibition that would otherwise result". Elsewhere Mr. Chakraverty goes on: "The Atoms and Jivas may be scattered throughout the infinite space. Therefore, there must be something else . . . . That something must be able to maintain a coherent system of Jiva's and atoms, must have the function of preventing the flying atoms; must limit the boundary of the world of things and persons . . . . without *Adharma* there will be only chaos; there will be no world. Therefore, the Jaina thinkers posited the existence of a fourth entity which binds together things and persons. So the hypothesis of *Adharma*." Professor Chakraverty thus lays greater emphasis on the principle of *Adharma* and concludes, "*Adharma* seems to be logically prior to *Dharma* in the construction of the system", adding in the clearest terms, "hence *Dharma* is not the 'system of movements'. Its meaning is distinctly *subsequent* to that of *Adharma*."

#### EXAMINATION OF DR. A. CHAKRAVERTY'S VIEW

We may at once say that we agree that 'Dharma is not the system of movements'. At the same time it is not quite accurate to maintain that it is due to *Adharma* that "the structure of the world is permanent, that the world is a cosmos and not a chaos" or that it is *Adharma* "which guarantees the permanency of the world's structure and the world's form". Professor Chakraverty is quite correct when he says, "If there were *Adharma* alone . . . . there would

be an eternal paralysis of Reality". The truth appears to be that neither Dharma alone nor Adharma alone is competent to bring about an order or system in the world. Both Dharma and Adharma "must be indispensable to the completion of the world" and "they are two different entities without which the system of reality would be impossible and incomplete", as Mr. Chakraverty himself admits. This, however, does not mean that although neither Dharma alone nor Adharma alone can bring about the ordered universe, it is the result of these two principles counteracting the influences of each other. Such actions and counter-actions of the two Principles of Dharma and Adharma (if we may be permitted to use the words expressing a dynamic sense) are no doubt necessary but the ordered and the systematised cosmos is primarily dependent on the essential nature of its constituents, the Jivas, and the Pudgala, as we have already pointed out.

Coming to Mr. Chakraverty's contention that Adharma is logically prior to Dharma in the construction of the system, we may point out that one is at liberty to contend the other way also, and say that the primordial reals may be conceived to have been originally in ceaseless motion and the ordered world is brought about by the subsequent functioning of the principle of Adharma in arresting this primeval motion, the functioning of the all-primary principle of Dharma. The ancient materialist Leucippus, for example, supposed the atoms to be always in motion and the ordered world to be a complex structure formed by these moving atoms finally stopping and impinging on one another. The modern theory of the world as evolving from a primeval mass of incandescent nebular matter revolving round its centre, by its gradual cooling down and slowing down of its motion, practically presupposes the priority of the principle of motion. At any rate, the contention about the logical priority of Dharma can claim as much plausibility as that about that of Adharma.

### ADHARMA, IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY

In the Jaina philosophy, Adharma is thus not a mere ethical principle meaning Pāpa (sin, vice or demerit) but a real non-psychical substance, conditioning Rest or Stoppage of other substances. It is described as the स्थितिकारणम् or the cause of Rest of souls and material substances. This does not mean that Adharma is an active principle stopping substances in motion<sup>1</sup>.

Adharma is thus an "Akartā" i.e. passive principle. It is no doubt the Hetu or condition of the stoppage of substances; but it is never the dynamic, active or productive cause. This is what is meant by calling Adharma the "Bahiranga-Hetu" or "Udāsīna-Hetu" of Rest. It is eternal (Nitya) and devoid of form or shape (Amūrta) and the sense-qualities of touch, taste, smell, etc. In these respects it is similar to Dharma, Kāla and Ākāśa. Adharma is a real substance in as much as it is possessed of distinctive attributes and underlies various modes and instances of the stoppage of substances. As a substance, of course, Adharma is similar to Jīva or the soul. Like the soul, it is also eternal and immaterial. Adharma, however, as already noticed, is an Ajīva or non-psychical substance.

Adharma like Dharma, Kāla, Pudgala and Jīva is existent within the Lokākāśa or filled space. It does not pervade the Anantākāśa or the infinite void space beyond. As Adharma is existent within the Lokākāśa, the number of its Pradeśa's or irreducible parts cannot be infinite but has a

<sup>1</sup> It is only an accompanying condition of rest—the "Thāna-Sahayāri" of the "Thāna-Judā" i.e. assistant in making stationary things stationary,—as the author of Dravya-Samgraha says. "The Lords whose vision is absolutely free from all covers (i.e. obstacles to clear vision) declare Adharma to be that which helps the stoppage of substances which come to rest. When the Jivas and the Pudgalas are coming to stop, Adharma serves as their common support, just as the earth of the cows." (Tattvārtha-sāra, Chap. 3, Verses 35-36). The earth does not stop the moving cows; yet the stoppage of cows is impossible without the earth. In the same way, the principle of Adharma does not stop a substance in motion; yet a moving substance cannot come to rest without it. In this connection, the Jaina writers often compare Adharma to shade. "Adharma is the cause of the stoppage of Pudgalas and other substances just as Shade is that of people, scorched by heat or as the Earth, of horses, etc."

limit. The Jaina's describe the Pradeśa's or parts of Adharma, Dharma and Jīva to be "Asaṁkhā" i.e. innumerable or beyond calculation.

It should, however, be noted that although Adharma has innumerable Pradeśa's, it is to be treated as one substance. It pervades the whole of the Universe (लोकावगाढ) and is an extended substance (वृक्ष). Adharma like Dharma is one continuous extended whole (स्पष्टः), in as much as its Pradeśa's are inseparable.<sup>1</sup>

#### DHARMA AND ADHARMA, NOT ONE SUBSTANCE

Can we look upon Dharma and Adharma as essentially but one substance? It is pointed out that the place (Deśa) of both is the same, in as much as both pervade the whole of the Lokākāśa. Similarly, the extent (Saṁsthāna) of both is the same. Both of them operate in the same time (Kāla). An observer would cognise (Darśana) both of them in the same way. It may also be said that Dharma and Adharma are interpervasive (Avagāhana) substances in as much they pervade one another through and through. Both of them are substances in the same sense, are formless and are knowable. Is it not reasonable to regard them as essentially but one substance? The author of the Tattvārtha-rāja-vārtika says that the function of Dharma is essentially different from that of Adharma and as such, they are to be looked upon as two different substances. Form (Rūpa), Taste (Rasa) etc., are found in one and the same substance in the same time and so on. But shall we be justified in identifying the former with the latter?

#### EVALUATION OF THE JAINA THEORIES ABOUT DHARMA AND ADHARMA

The Jaina theories about the principles of Motion and Rest may not appear to be of much interest from the view point of the modern science of Statics, Kinetics and Dynamics. But philosophically these theories are the foundations of

<sup>1</sup> In this respect Adharma is different from Kāla the particles of which are strictly separate from each other.

these modern sciences. The Jaina theories of Dharma and Adharma may not give you the different laws of mass and energy, of inertia and motion but they undoubtedly supply the basis upon which an empirical science of these phenomena may be and as a matter of fact, has been built. The idealists, both ancient and modern, of all lands have denied the reality of Motion. Zeno of Elea, for instance, used the famous 'Achilles Argument' against the possibility or reality of Motion. On the other hand, there have been thinkers who have denied the reality of Rest. Heraclitus' theory about Fire as the primal substance which constituted the 'nature' of things, implied a ceaseless process or flux without rest, with 'a way downward' in which Fire is changed into things and 'a way upward' in which things are changed into Fire. Such one-sided theories, denying either the reality of Motion or that of Rest practically cut away the ground upon which the sciences of mass and motion can grow. It must be said to the credit of the Jaina theories of Motion and Rest that they certainly supply the metaphysical background for the empirical science about them.

The Jaina metaphysics, as we have seen, states in clearest terms that Motion and Rest of things are not caused by any agencies outside of the things but that they are due to the very nature of the things themselves. Aristotle, on the other hand, maintained that motions of things were due to the first unmoved Mover, an outside agency, after all. The Jaina theory of Motion is accordingly nearer to the present day mechanical and scientific view of the world.

The Jaina's, however, urge that although Motion and Rest are inherent in the nature of conscious and unconscious substances, accompanying causes are necessary for their actual full play. These attendant conditions are the two Reals, Dharma and Adharma, one helping motions and the other, rests. These are cosmic principles and although they do not actively cause the motions or rests of substances, they are nevertheless, their invariable and indispensable conditions. A fish, for instance, has the power of moving,



but its free movement is impossible except in water. Likewise, although the living and the non-living substances have in them powers of moving and stopping, their actual motions and rests are impossible without the Reals, Dharma and Adharma.

#### OBJECTIONS AGAINST THE JAINA THEORY OF DHARMA AND ADHARMA AND THE JAINA REPLY

Objections may be raised against this doctrine about the cosmic nature of the principles of Dharma and Adharma. It is said that motions and rests of things are infinitely varied and it is not possible for one and the single principle of Dharma or of Adharma to explain these varied phenomena. One and the same Real cannot be the cause of a varied multiplicity of things. The Jaina's, however, argue that it is not impossible for one and the same phenomena to explain quite a number of varied matters.<sup>1</sup>

Thus according to the Jaina metaphysics, Motion and Rest are inherent in the nature of things. But their actual full play is dependent on the Reals, Dharma and Adharma, which, however, are thoroughly formless and inactive agents. The question arises: How is it that such Udāsīna Hetus or passive conditions as the Dharma and the Adharma which are incorporeal, cause Motion and Rest in corporeal things? How do Bahiranga-Hetus or outside agencies which are formless, influence the behaviours of corporeal substances to whose natures they are foreign<sup>2</sup>?

Causation of Motion and Rest in things by Dharma and Adharma is made possible by their all-pervasive nature. Dharma and Adharma as Reals are no doubt incorporeal and different in nature from the things which move or stop;

<sup>1</sup> Prabhācandra points out that a dancing girl's dance raises various feelings of glee, amour, disgust etc., in respective spectators. In the same manner, it is possible for the two cosmic Reals of Dharma and Adharma to be the cause of the infinitely varied motions and rests of the infinite number of things in the universe.

<sup>2</sup> We have seen how Brahma-Deva explains such a possibility by a reference to the example of the totally unconcerned Siddha, influencing the conduct of his admirers.

but all the same, they pervade all things through and through (सर्वगतः) and hence the motions and rests of the corporeal substances are made possible by the simple existence of Dharma and Adharma. The Jaina's point out in this connection that all philosophers admit that a corporeal thing can be influenced by a principle although it is foreign to it and strictly passive. The formless Real, Ākāśa, for instance, is supposed by the Jaina's to supply space to all corporeal substances, though it is perfectly inactive or foreign to them. The Puruṣas and the Pradhāna of the Sāṃkhya philosophy are essentially different from each other; yet, the Pradhāna owing to its proximity with the Puruṣas undergoes modifications into Mahat, etc. Vijñāna or a conscious phenomenon, according to the Buddhists is thoroughly formless; yet, it is said to be the cause of Nāma and Rūpa, names and forms. The Apūrva of the Vaiśeṣika's is incorporeal Reality; but all the same, it is supposed to determine the destinies of all corporeal beings. It is consequently possible for a foreign and incorporeal Real to influence the activities of a thing by its mere existence, though it is strictly inactive. There is thus no inconsistency in the theory that Dharma and Adharma though incorporeal and passive principles in themselves, occasion the motion and the rest of all moving and resting things.

IS THERE ANY CONNECTION BETWEEN THE METAPHYSICAL AND THE ETHICAL SIGNIFICANCES OF THE WORDS, DHARMA AND ADHARMA?

In conclusion, we feel inclined to examine the attempts to trace a connection between the metaphysical and the ethical significances of the words, Dharma and Adharma in the Jaina philosophy. Dharma is the principle of Motion and Adharma, of Rest. In Indian ethics, the word Dharma signifies Merit i.e. a good act, and Adharma, Demerit or a vicious act. There is a tendency in some to think that the metaphysical sense of Dharma is its old and original significance which has determined its ethical significance later on. It is pointed out that the Jīva or the soul is 'Uddha-goī'

(*Ūrdhva-gati*) i.e. has a natural tendency to rise upwards and Dharma as the principle of Motion is what helps the soul in this its motion towards the blissful upper regions. But a soul is enabled to go upwards only by doing good pious acts. Thus, the word Dharma which originally meant the principle that helps the soul in its motion upwards came to signify a good or meritorious act. In the same way, it is said, Adharma which is a principle helping the stoppage of a soul in this universe came to be identified with Pāpa or sinful acts which cause the continuance of the soul in the Saṁsāra. We confess we are unable to accept these theories. To us it appears that the above alleged connection between the metaphysical and the ethical senses of Dharma and Adharma could neither be logical nor chronological. There can be no justification for our thinking that Dharma as the principle of Motion is what helps the soul in its natural tendency to rise upwards. In Jaina metaphysics, Dharma is simply the principle of Motion. It helps not only the Jīva but the Pudgala in its motion. And then, why should we suppose that Dharma as the principle of Motion assists the soul in its tendency to move *upwards*? When a soul goes down to any of the seven infernal regions it is Dharma which helps it then in its motion downwards. Dharma as a metaphysical principle thus assists the downward motion of a soul as well and as effectively as it does its upward motion and it is consequently impossible to trace any connection between Dharma in its sense of a good act and Dharma as the metaphysical principle of Motion. In the case of Adharma too, it may be said that it is the principle which assists the soul in its stay or stoppage in the blissful upper regions, just as well it helps it in its stay in this unhappy earth or miserable hells. It is thus impossible to connect Adharma, the principle of Rest with Adharma, the ethically bad deed. Nor can it be said that as virtue consists in activity, the ethical sense of the word Dharma is in some way connected with its metaphysical sense. Supreme virtue or merit in Jaina ethics—in fact in all the systems of Indian ethics—does not always consist in a state of

activity. A calm state of Rest is always extolled and insisted on and as such, virtue may be said to be more in Adharma than in Dharma.

The fact is that the conceptions of Dharma and Adharma as non-psychical principles of Motion and Rest are peculiar to Jaina philosophy and it is futile to attempt to find out a connection between their metaphysical and ordinary ethical senses.

## CHAPTER 4

### SPACE

THEORY OF SPACE: ZENO, EMPEDOCLES, AND ANAXAGORAS:  
THE ELEATICS: PLATO: ARISTOTLE: THE ATOMISTS: PYTHA-  
GORAS

IDEALISM and Absolutism in all ages have been opposed to the doctrine of a Real Space. "If Space is", said Zeno, "it must be in something; for, every thing that is, is in something and so in space. Space then will be in space and so *ad infinitum*. Therefore, Space is not." The argument on the face of it is fallacious. Why should a Real in order to be a Real, be in something? Pure Being, for instance, is the only absolute Reality according to the philosophy of Zeno himself; but it is not contained in something. Thus it is that although Empedocles, Anaxagoras and the Eleatics denied the reality of Space, it is admitted in some form by Plato, Aristotle, the Atomists and even by the Pythagoreans.

HOBBES: BERKELEY: NEWTON

In modern times, Hobbes described Space as "an imaginary phantasm" and following him Berkeley too declared it to be "a phantom." His argument is that every assignable magnitude of a body is dependent on subjective conditions and that therefore Space or absolute magnitude is nothing more than an idea. But the subjective idealism of Berkeley, in its extreme form, receives its criticism indirectly from his own hands. If the "Esse" of a thing is nothing more than its "Percipi", how is a Percept to be distinguished from a purely imaginary Idea? Berkeley himself admits that in the former case, there is an element of objectivity which is independent of us, the percipients, whereas a purely imaginary Idea is a creature completely dependent on us. The element of objectivity in a Percept consists according to Berkeley, in the Idea being present in the mind of God. But if the hypothesis of a God be eliminated from the

theory of Berkeley, what remains is that our idea of Space has for its background the objective existence of a real Space, outside and independent of us. Thus the doctrine of the subjectivity of Space inevitably leads one to Newton's theory about the reality of absolute Space.

KANTIAN THEORY OF SPACE, AS AN INTUITION OF OUR MIND  
TRENDLENBURG'S VIEW. THE VIEW OF THE MATHEMATICIANS

But the theory of the subjectivity of Space has received its strongest support from the philosophy of Kant. According to him, Space is no real substance but is only the subjective condition of sensibility. In having a sensation, he says, we must locate it in Space. Secondly, although we can hink of all things in space to be non-existent, we can not think of Space itself as non-existence; it is an *a priori* necessity. Thirdly, we do not arrive at a general idea of Space from an observation of a number of individual spaces, but the intuition of Space is already in our mind and the particular individual spaces are found to be contained in it. The possibility of the science of Geometry which has spatial determinations for its subject matter, without any reference to experiential observation or experiments and the certainty of its theories, shows that Space is exclusively an intuition of mind and nothing more. In criticism of the Kantian theory that Space is purely a subjective element supplied by our mind, it is pointed out that our experience is one total whole, in which it is not possible to separate the subjective from the objective element, in the manner Kant does. It may also be urged—as has been done by Trendelenburg—that the arguments of Kant in support of his theory of the subjectivity of space, do not bar out the possibility that Space may be both, i.e. it may be a subjective intuition and at the same time, an objective Real as well. Then again, the empiricist psychologists reject the Kantian contention that our experience does not give us the idea of Space. They, on the contrary, urge that our idea of Space is no *a priori* intuition but is really evolved in us by observation and outside experience. Lastly, with respect

to Kant's argument from the science of Geometry, it is pointed out by eminent mathematicians that Space, as conceived in the Euclidean geometry may be an intuition as contended by Kant. But other conceptions of Space are possible and as a matter of fact, have been developed by modern mathematicians who have shown how there can be non-Euclidean geometries as well. These non-Euclidean geometries are based on notions of Space, widely different from those in the system of Kant and show that Space need not necessarily be a subjective intuition.

#### THE VEDĀNTA CRITICISM OF THE NYĀYA THEORY OF SPACE AS A REALITY

The school of extreme absolutism in India was interested in nothing but the "one and the secondless" Brahma. The philosophers of this school accordingly denied the reality of every substance which was not Brahma. Space was no exception to them and these thinkers put forward various objections to the doctrine of reality of Space. As will be noticed presently, the thinkers of the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika schools of orthodox philosophy upheld the doctrine of the reality of Space as also the Jaina's—and these Vedāntins criticised their position. A real Space, they pointed out, must be possessed of both general and special characteristics. But as Ākāśa is one, it cannot have any general characteristics—characteristics which are called *general*, being found to be common to a group of individuals. You cannot define Space as that which gives space (*Avakāśa*), for such a definition is purely verbal. Nor can you point to Sound as the *special* characteristic of Ākāśa. Sound (*Śabda*), according to the Vedāntins is no quality; as it is perceived to be great etc. The theory that Ākāśa is *Vibhu* or all-pervasive is also untenable. Space is said to be connected with all things having forms (*Mūrta*). But how is it possible? To be connected with a thing having a form, Space itself must have a form and if Space has a form, it cannot be all-pervasive. The Nyāya doctrine is that Space is something formless, the reality of which is always

established by inference (*Anumāna*). These Vedāntins controvert this position also and point out that Space is an object of our visual perception; where the eyes are inoperative, it is the soul that intuits Space. Space, according to these absolutist philosophers of the Vedānta school, is not eternal nor self-existent, it is a *Kārya* or product.

#### THE VEDĀNTA VIEW EXAMINED

In this way, the Vedāntists, opposed as they are to any doctrine admitting the reality of anything beside the Brahma, reject the doctrine of real Space. But the Vedānta contention need not be taken very seriously. For, even according to the Vedānta, next to Brahma, the absolutely Real, Ākāśa or Space is the very first of the derivative realities. The Vedāntins admit that so far as our Vyavahārika Jagat or the world of our sensuous experience is concerned, Ākāśa or Space is a Real. It is the Buddhists who are stout in their opposition to the theory of Real Space and it is interesting to find the greatest of the Vedānta exponents, viz. Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja vehemently criticising their theory.

#### THE BUDDHIST VIEW OF SPACE: EXAMINED BY ŚAṅKARA

The Buddhist looked upon Ākāśa as *Sūnya*, *Nirūpākhyā* and *Avastu* i.e. unsubstantial and unreal. According to them, it is *Āvaraṇābhāva* or negation of occupation. It is practically a total void, which is occupied by nothing. The great Śaṅkara has criticised this negative theory of Ākāśa, put forward by the Buddhists. In the first place he quotes the Vedic texts which admit the reality of Ākāśa. He quotes also the Buddhist texts such as :

पृथिवी भगवन् कितं निश्चया ?

वायुः कितं निश्चया ?

वायुराकाशः कितं निश्चया :

where it is admitted that Vāyu or Air has Ākāśa for its support; this shows that even according to the Buddhists, it is a Real.



तदाकाशस्य वस्तुत्वेन समजसंस्यात् ।

Again the Buddhists, while denying the reality of the Ākāśa say at the same time that it is eternal. Śaṅkara points out that to call a non-existent unreal, eternal is meaningless; to be eternal, Ākāśa must be a Real.

न ह्यवस्तुनो नित्यत्वमनित्यत्वं वा संभवति, वस्त्वाश्रयत्वाद्धर्मधर्मिव्यवहारस्य ।  
धर्मधर्मिभावं हि घटादिवद् वस्तुत्वमेव स्यान्न निरुपाख्यत्वम् ।

Eternality or non-eternality cannot be predicated of the unsubstantial; for, reference as the subject or an attribute can be made only in connection with a substance. If you make the predication of a subject and an attribute, the object of your predication must be a substance like a pitcher etc., and not an unsubstantial unreal.

The reality of Ākāśa is proved by the phenomena of Sound which according to the Vedic school is an attribute. The Buddhists seem to contend that a bird's flying in the so-called Space is possible, only if Space be a negation, i.e. devoid of all positive matter which can offer resistance. Śaṅkara points out that in that case, if one bird flies in Space, the flight of another bird is not possible in it. For, as soon as the first bird flies in Space, its character as an absolute void is destroyed; so that the flight of another bird becomes impossible in it. The Buddhists contend that by the flight of one bird, the character of Space as an absolute void is not destroyed, because only the portion occupied by the first flying bird is obstructed, the other parts of space continue to be void and the flight of other birds is possible in those parts. Śaṅkara points out that it is illogical to speak of an unsubstantial void as having different parts. He argues that if Ākāśa be admitted to have parts it must be held to be a Real.

अपि च आवरणमावभाकाशमिच्छतस्तवैवास्मिन् सुपर्णमुत्पतत्यावरणस्य  
विद्यमानत्वात् सुपर्णान्तरस्यो त्यिस्ततोऽनवकाशत्वप्रसङ्गः । यत्रावरणाभाव  
स्तत्रपतिष्यतीति चेत् येनावरणाभावो विशिष्यते तत्तर्हि वस्तुभूतेमवाकाशं  
स्यान्नावरणाभावमात्रम् ।

### THE BUDDHIST VIEW OF SPACE: EXAMINED BY RĀMĀNUJA

The Vedāntist Rāmānuja urges that Space is perceived as a Real and hence it cannot be looked upon as a mere negation.

आकाश निरुपाख्यता न युक्ताभावरूपत्वेनाभ्युपगतपृथिव्यादिवदाकाश-  
स्यापि अबोधित प्रतीतिसिद्धताविशेषात् । प्रतीयत हि आकाशः अत्र स्थेनः  
पतति अत्र गृद्धः इति, स्थेनादिपतनदेशत्वेन ।

Just as we have perceptions of land etc., as positive abodes, we have the perception of Space also as a positive substance, as a place where, for example, a hawk is flying or a vulture is flying.

### THE BUDDHIST VIEW OF SPACE: EXAMINED BY THE JAINA'S

On a similar line is the Jaina criticism of the Buddhist negative theory of Space. The author of the *Tattvārthā-rājā-vārtika* says,

स्यातेतत् नाकाशं नाम किञ्चिद् वस्त्वस्ति, आवरणाभावमात्रं हि तदिति ।  
तन्न । किं कारणम् ? नामवत् तत्सिद्धेः । यथा तनामवन्ननादि अमर्त-  
त्वादनावृत्तपिसदण्डीत्यभ्युपगम्यते तथा आकाशमपि वस्तुभूतमित्यवेक्ष्यम् ।

It may be said that Space is no real substance in as much as it is simply the negation of Āvaraṇa or occupation. This is not correct. Why? A name etc. are incorporeal and as such cannot be said to be occupied; still, they are known as existing. In the same way, Space also is to be admitted as a real substance.

Another argument in support of their doctrine of spatial unreality seems to have been advanced by the Buddhists which has remarkable similarity with that of Zeno, already noticed. If Space be the abode of all things, it must also have its own abode and this, too, in its turn and so on. This Regression or Anavasthā goes to show that Space is not real. The Jaina's point out that only in the case of Space which is all-pervasive, it cannot arise—the all-pervasive Space being its own abode<sup>1</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> The author of the *Prameya-kamala-mārtanda* says :

ननु निखिलार्थानां यथाकाशावगाहस्तथाकास्याप्यन्यस्मिन्नधिकरणेवगाहनेन

**THE JAINA CRITICISM OF THE VEDĀNTA POSITION**

But although the Vedāntins and Jaina's agree in setting aside the Buddhist doctrine of the spatial unreality, they differ on a very material point. The former urge that Space is real in so far as our experiential world is concerned. Apart from the world of our experience, it has no reality. The experiential world itself has no reality of its own. Brahma is the only one absolute Reality and the Vyavahārika Jagat or the world of our experience has only a derivative reality. Ākāśa or Space likewise has no independent reality of its own; its seeming reality is derived from Brahma, of which it is said to be the first emanation. Opposed to the Vedānta theory of the non-dual Brahma as the Jaina's are, its theory of derivation of Space from Brahma is obviously unacceptable to the Jaina's.

**THE SĀMĀKHYA THEORY OF SPACE: THE NYĀYA AND THE JAINA CRITICISM**

Nor is the Sāmkhya theory about the derivative reality of Ākāśa admitted by the Jaina philosophers. According to the thinkers of the Sāmkhya school, Prakṛti is the primal Real, out of which evolves the Mahat or the principle of cosmic Intelligence. Therefrom evolves Ahaṁkāra or cosmic Egoism. Next in order are evolved the five Tanmātrās or Subtle Elements, of which one is Śabda or Sound-potency. According to the Sāmkhya philosophers, Space is an evolute from this Subtle Sound. This Sāmkhya theory about the derivation of Space from Sound is criticised by the Naiyāyika's who contend that Space is a self-existent eternal Real. The Jaina's also reject the Sāmkhya theory of Space. The Jaina's point out that the Sāmkhya thinkers maintain that a Puruṣa or soul is eternal, inactive and indestructible and as such, no evolute comes out of it. The Prakṛti also is

भवितव्यम् इत्यनवस्था । तस्य स्वस्वेवगाहं सर्वार्थानां स्वात्मन्येवावगाह-  
प्रसंगात्, कथमाकाशस्यातः प्राद्विरित्यप्यमेशलमाकाशस्य व्यापित्वेन स्वागा-  
गाहित्वोपपत्तिरतीतानवस्थासंभवात् । अन्येषामव्यापित्वेन स्वावगाहित्वायोगाच्च ।

conceived by them as eternal, inactive and indestructible; how then is evolution possible in the case of Prakṛti? If thus Prakṛti cannot evolve, the derivation of Space from it is impossible.

प्रधानविकार आकाशमितिवन्न, तत्परिणामाभावात् आत्मवत् ।

Then again, a pitcher which is an evolution from Prakṛti is admittedly destructible, corporeal and limited; how then can Space, evolving as it does from Prakṛti be eternal, formless and all-pervasive?

किं यथा घटस्यप्रधानविकारस्यानित्यत्व मूर्तत्वमसर्वगतत्व च तथाकाशस्य स्यात् ।

The Jaina's thus contend that the Sāṃkhya theory of the derivative reality of Ākāśa is inconsistent. Space, according to them, is self-existent and eternal. On this point, there is thus unanimity between the Nyāya and the Jaina schools of thought.

#### THE NYĀYA THEORY OF SPACE

On the other hand, although the Nyāya philosophers oppose the Vedāntins by maintaining that Space is self-existent and eternal, they agree with them that it is material in essence, that Sound is its distinctive attribute and that we infer the existence of Space from its attribute Sound. They contend that Space is an all-pervasive substance but all the same it is a material element like the material substrata of Earth, Water, Air and Fire.

#### SPACE, TRANSLATED AS ETHER: HAECKEL'S THEORY OF ETHER: SOMEWHAT SIMILAR TO THE THEORY OF ĀKĀŚA OF THE VEDIC SCHOOL

Ākāśa is the Indian name for Space. Ākāśa is also translated as Ether. Scientists have not yet been able to determine the nature of Ether finally. "Although, however, the existence of Ether", said Haeckel, "is now received as a positive fact by nearly all physicists and although many effects of this remarkable substance are familiar to us through an

extensive experience . . . yet we are still far from being clear and confident as to its real character. The views of the most eminent physicists who have made a special study of it, are extremely divergent; they frequently contradict each other on the important points". Professor Hacckel's own views about Ether are given below and it would be interesting to compare them with the corresponding doctrine of the Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika and the Vedānta schools.

1. "Ether", according to Hacckel, "fills the whole of space . . . as a continuous substance; it fully occupies the space between the atoms of ponderable matter". This is also the view of the Vedic school, regarding the nature of Ākāśa.
- 2 and 3. "Ether", according to Hacckel, "has probably no chemical quality and is not composed of atoms". "I postulate for ether" says he, "a special structure which is not atomistic". The Vedic theory of Ākāśa agrees with this.
- 4 and 5. "It (Ether) is neither gaseous . . . nor solid". "Ether may be called *imponderable* matter in the sense that we have no means of determining its weight experimentally". The theory of the Ākāśa of the Vedic schools of philosophers may not dispute these points.
- 6 and 7. "The etheric consistency", says Hacckel, "may probably . . . pass into the gaseous state . . . just as a gas may be converted into a fluid and ultimately into a solid, by lowering its temperature". "Consequently, these three conditions of matter may be arranged . . . in a genctic, continuous order. We may distinguish five stages in it: (1) the etheric, (2) the gaseous, (3) the fluid, (4) the viscous (in the living protoplasm) and (5) the solid state." The etheric, the gaseous, the fluid and the solid states of matter are readily admitted by all the Vedic schools of philosophers in India, including the Nyāya and the Vedānta. But there is a difference of views regarding the question whether "the etheric consistency may

*probably* pass into the gaseous state.” The thinkers of the Nyāya school look upon Ākāśa as a separate and un-transformable matter while the Vedānta explicitly admits that Vāyu or gaseous matter has its origin in Ākāśa, in its Tamas aspect.

8. (Ether) “is in eternal motion”, says Haeckel and regarding the nature of this motion he says, “it is immaterial whether we conceive it as a vibration, strain, condensation, etc.” It will be seen presently how the thinkers of the Vedic school admitted the possibility of some sort of vibration or waving in Ākāśa, *वोचितरंग* as they called it.

So we see that of the above eight fundamental characteristics attributed to Ether by the present-day physicists, almost all are in a similar way attributed to Ākāśa by the Vedic school of philosophers. There is thus considerable justification for identifying the Indian Ākāśa with the Ether of modern science. Like Ether, Ākāśa is “imponderable”. So far as what is called “consistency” is concerned, Ākāśa like Ether is “neither gaseous nor fluid nor solid”. Regarding “structure” also Ākāśa like Ether is “not atomistic, not made up of separate particles (atoms) but continuous”.

#### WHERE THE TWO THEORIES DIFFER

Notwithstanding all that, however, there is one point, and a most important point too, in which Ākāśa differs from Ether. This is with respect to “chief functions”. Light, radiant heat, electricity and magnetism are the chief functions of Ether. The Indian thinkers attributed these phenomena to Tejas, an element different from Ākāśa. According to them, “Light and radiant heat” were due to the functioning of what they called Bhauma Tejas, while “electricity and magnetism” were accounted for by Divya Tejas. The functioning of Ākāśa is different. It is what forms the basis of Sound. Sound abides in Ākāśa and is called its Guṇa by the thinkers of the Vedic school. Thus with

respect to what Haeckel calls "chief functioning", Ākāśa and Ether are different.

**THE NYĀYA THEORY OF SOUND, AS THE ATTRIBUTE OF ĀKĀŚA**

As stated above, Ākāśa is a material substance according to the Vedic school of philosophers. It is characterised by its attribute, Sound. In other words, the phenomenon which we call Sound is an attribute and not a substance or object. The Naiyāyika's point out; a Sound can never be touched; it can pass through extremely gross substances; nothing pertaining to Sound is perceived either before or after the appearance of Sound; it does not move any of the subtlest of substances. All these show that Sound is not a substance but the attribute of a supersensuous substance.

We are led to the hypothesis of this supersensuous substance, the Ākāśa from the nature of Sound. The author of the Bhāṣā Pariçcheda has said:

सर्वः शब्दो नमोवृत्तिः श्रोत्रोत्पन्नस्तु गृह्यते ।

वीचितरंगन्यायेन तदुत्पत्तिस्तु कीर्तिता ।

कदम्बगोलकन्यागोलकन्यायादुपे, कस्यचिन्मते ॥ १६५-१६६

All Sound is due to Ākāśa and is perceived when it is generated in our organ of hearing. Its origination has been described to be like waves. Some, however, say that it originates in the manner of Kadamba flower-tips.

आद्यशब्देन बहिर्दशदिगवच्छिन्नोन्यःशब्दस्तैव शब्देन सदृशो जन्यते, तेन चापरव्यापकः क्रमेण श्रोत्रोत्पन्नो गृह्यत इति । आद्यशब्दाद् दशसु एव दिक्षु दशशब्दा उत्पद्यन्ते इति भावः ।

—सिद्धान्तमुक्तावली

The commentator makes the meaning of these lines clear in this way:

It is pointed out that from the first original Sound, other Sounds are generated on all directions; from them again other Sounds and so on; when any of these waves, वीचितरंग comes in contact with our sense-organ of hearing, we come

to hear it. It need scarcely be said that in this Nyāya doctrine of sound, we have a foreshadowing of the modern theory, which is thus shortly expressed:

“As the result of the vibration of any portion of matter . . . there will be, in general, waves produced in the surrounding medium . . . These waves are propagated through a medium from the vibrating body and in case they reach the ear of a hearing individual, a sound sensation is in general produced.”

—“Hearing”—Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology. The thinkers of the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika schools maintained that this medium in which the waves or *वीक्षितरंग* are produced and through which they are propagated is a supersensuous material substance, *Ākāśa*. According to them sound is an attribute of this substance and from the phenomenon of sound, we infer the existence and reality of *Ākāśa*.

#### THE JAINA CRITICISM OF THE NYĀYA THEORY

The Jaina's do not seem to object to the wave-theory of Sound; but they contend that the phenomenon of Sound does not point to a supersensuous matter as its medium. According to them, Sound is not an attribute of a subtle matter but a modification of matter itself. It is *पौद्गलिक*, material i.e. a mode of matter. Ratnaprabha, the Jaina commentator brings in the analogy of odorous particles and criticises the Nyāya arguments in support of the contention that Sound is an attribute and not a mode of matter. He urges that the fact that Sound cannot be touched need not show that it is an attribute. Odorous particles also cannot be touched; but the fact is not denied that these particles are material modes. In the case of Sound too, its non-touchability only shows that the vibrating medium generating or propagating it, is very subtle. According to Ratnaprabha, the gross character of Sound is proved by the fact that like odorous substance, it is modified by the phenomena



of the hearer being near to or distant from it or of the air blowing alongside or against it and so on'.

Sound is not a formless attribute but an actual mode of matter, having form. An attribute of a substance does not undergo modifications; only a substance can be modified; so, if Sound is found to be modified, it must be held to be a corporeal mode of matter. Now, instances of modification of Sound are very frequent. The chirping of birds is drowned in the loud sounding of a clarion or in the growls of an elephant or a lion. Sound vibrations coming in contact with certain metals are modified into causes of other Sounds. Sounds entering caves are retarded and come back as echoes. All these show that Sounds are variously modified and as it is only a substance and not an attribute that can be modified, Sound must be held to be a mode of matter. Ratnaprabha next points out that odorous particles also are found to pass through very dense objects e.g. closed doors, etc., but these very small particles are particles of matter, all the same. Similarly the fact that Sound can pass through dense matters does not necessarily prove that it is an attribute; it shows that its substrata are very minute particles of matter. It should be observed at the same time that neither Smell nor Sound is found to pass through absolutely closed and dense matters; this shows that Sound is a mode of matter like smelling particles. As regards the Nyāya contention that Sound is an attribute and not a mode of matter on the ground that nothing in connection with it is perceived either before or after it is heard,—the Jaina's point out that in the case of a flash of lightning also, nothing before or after it, is perceived, though all the same it is a mode of matter.

<sup>1</sup> The author of Rāja-Vārtika in commenting on :—

अभिभवादि दर्शनाच्च मूर्तः शब्द इत्यभ्युपगन्तव्यम् ।

means this by saying—

यथा तारकादयो भास्कर प्रभाभिवान्मूर्तिमन्तः, तथा सिंहजमेयादिशब्देबुद्बुद्दि शकुनिहतादयोभिभूयन्ते । तथा कांस्यादिषु पतिता ध्वन्यन्तरारम्भे हेतवो भवन्ति । गिरिगह्वरादिषु च प्रतिहताः प्रतिश्रुतभावभास्कन्दन्ति ।

Lastly the Jaina's urge that particles of odorous substances are not found to move even the tiniest of hairs at the nostrils; so, the argument that sound is an attribute and not a mode of matter because it does not move the subtle particles in its way, cannot be regarded as sound. In conclusion, Ratnaprabha points out that our perception does not tell us that Sound is an attribute of supersensuous substance, Ākāśa.

#### THE THEORY OF SPACE IN SOME NON-JAINA SCHOOLS: JAINA CRITICISM

Ākāśa, according to the Jaina's, is thus not a matter-stuff. This view as shown above is obviously opposed to the theory of the Vedic schools of philosophers on the one hand, and to the contention of the early Pythagoreans whose "*Unlimited*" was at once infinite Space and infinite Stuff, thus identifying Space with primeval Matter. In this connection it is to be recalled that with the Jaina's, the principles of Motion and Rest, Dharma and Adharma are Reals. Space is generally determined by the movement of a thing from one point to another. It appears that in ancient India there was a class of thinkers who contended that motions and movements of bodies as well as their stoppages were accounted for by Ākāśa. Kaṇāda seems to point in 2.1.29 of the Vaiśeṣika Sūtra's to the position of such philosophers:

"(They maintain) Ākāśa is proved by the movements, etc., of bodies."

The atomists in ancient Greece thought that the hypothesis of Space was necessary to explain Motion. With Berkeley pure Space was the mere possibility of bodily Motion. Trendelenburg, who has criticised the Kantian subjectivity of Space, holds also that Space is not the presupposition but the product of Motion. The Jaina philosophers criticise all these attempts to identify Space with the principles of Motion and Rest and in our discourse on Dharma and Adharma we had already an occasion to notice this criticism of the Jaina's. We need not reproduce the arguments *in extenso* here. It would be sufficient to mention here

that Dharma, Adharma and Ākāśa are all non-psychical substances, co-extensive, formless and co-incident too; hence they are one, if considered from this point of view; but their functions being essentially different, they must be held to be distinct substances. As the author of the *Pancāstikāya-Samaya-Sāra* says:—

धम्माधम्मागासा अपुद्भूदा समानपरिमाना ।  
पूरगुलद्धिविसेसा करन्ति एगत्तमन्नशुं । १०३॥

### PLATO'S THEORY OF SPACE

What then is Space? Plato differed from the Pythagoreans who identified it with the subtle primeval matter; nor did he feel inclined to connect it with Motion. Plato's theory of Space, no doubt, is far from clear. He likened Idea to the *father* and the sensible things which according to him were image of the Idea, to children. He likened Space to the *mother* which is impregnated by the Idea, so to say, and which gives birth to the things of our experience. But he does not explain how Space is impregnated by the Idea and how the sensible things are produced. Some have found the principle of absolute idealism in the above metaphorical utterances of Plato. It is said that according to Plato, Space is the "*mother*" through which the absolute Idea realises itself in the finite phenomena of our experience. Understood in this way, the Platonic doctrine of the Idea as the father, Space as the mother and the Finites as the offspring seems to have a remarkable similarity with the theory propounded in the *Bhagavad-Gītā*:

मम योनिर्महद्ब्रह्म तस्मिन् गर्भं दद्याम्यहम् ।  
संभवः सर्वभूतानाम् ततो भवति भारत ॥  
सर्वयोनिषु कौन्तेय, मूर्तयः संभवन्ति याः  
तामां ब्रह्म महद्द्योनिरहं बीजप्रदः तिषा ।

Mahat Brahma, O descendant of Bharata, is the uterine organ of genesis (योनि). I cause impregnation in it. All objects are generated thereby. Mahat Brahma is the uterine organ of genesis and I, the germ-giving

Father, of all corporeal beings that are generated in all the uterine organs of genesis.

Indian commentators generally understood Prakṛti or Māyā by Mahat Brahma. If the word, Space, be substituted for Mahat Brahma, the doctrine propounded in the Gītā in the above passages becomes literally Platonic.

Other thinkers, however, maintain that the above metaphorical expression of Plato mean that Space is the intuition-form, put upon the real substratum in order to produce the sensible phenomena of our experience; viewed in this light, the Platonic theory foreshadows the Kantian doctrine.

Plato himself, however, admits that it is very difficult to explain Space. He has hinted that Space is eternal and ever-self-identical; it is indestructible and utterly formless. He says Space is a third class of being, differing from Ideas on the one hand and from sensible things on the other. All these show that the Platonic theory of Space has some resemblance to the Jaina account of it and it seems that its approach to the Jaina theory is almost complete when it says that Space is the substance which "receives" all things.

### THE JAINA THEORY OF ĀKĀŚA

The word, Ākāśa, etymologically may mean three things: (i) That in which all things are revealed. (2) That which is self-revealing. (3) That which gives Avakāśa or Space to all things.<sup>1</sup>

Of these three meanings, the Jaina's say that Ākāśa as a Real has only the third.<sup>2</sup>

This Avakāśa or the characteristic of giving Space to substances is otherwise explained by a reference to the act of Avagāha or entering into Space by the other substances.

आकाशह्यावगाहः—४५ तत्त्वार्थाधिगमसूत्रम्

<sup>1</sup> As the author of the Tattvārtha-sāra says:—

आकाशन्तेन्द्रव्याणि, स्वयमाकाशतेऽथवा ।

द्रव्याणामवकाशं च, करोत्याकाशमस्तयतः ॥

<sup>2</sup> अवगासदानयोग्यं जीवादीनां विषयण आयासं । —द्रव्य संग्रहः

Be it known that what is capable of giving space to Jiva, etc., is the Ākāśa.

Ākāśa allows Avakāśa or space to all things entering into it; and all things have Avagāha or entrance into Space. So according to the Jaina's Ākāśa or Space is the Real in which all other Reals viz. souls, the principles of motion and rest, matter, time or the principle of change find their abode and we have seen that Space itself is its own abode as well. The Jaina's illustrate Avakāśa and Avagāhana by saying that while a swan puts itself into the water of a pond, the swan has Avagāhana into the water and the water allows Avakāśa to the swan. The mode of Avakāśa and Avagāhana is like that also in the case of Ākāśa.<sup>1</sup>

Ākāśa is infinite, eternal and formless and is included in the Ajīva or the class of non-psychical Reals. Its Pradeśa's or subtle parts are said to be infinite in number. Each Pradeśa of Ākāśa is capable of accommodating at least one Pudgala atom, one irreducible particle of Kāla, one such of each of Dharma, Adharma and Jīva.

#### THE LOKA AND THE ALOKA

Ākāśa is conceived by the Jaina's to consist of two parts-Loka and Aloka. The Loka is the part which accommodates the souls, the material substances, the principles of change,

<sup>1</sup> As the author of the Rāja-vārtika says:

यथा हं सो जलमवगाहते - - - - - तथा जीवपुद्गलाः आकाशमवगाहन्ते ।

In this connection, one may question, "That portion of the water which accommodates a swan cannot accommodate any other thing at the same time; how then is it possible for the Ākāśa to accommodate the souls, material atoms, as well as the principles of motion and rest, the principle of mutation,—all these substances at one and the same time"? To explain this, Brahma-deva introduces the example of lights:

एकदीपप्रकाशे नानादीपप्रकाशवत् ।

He says just as the lights of numerous other lamps are also possible in a room where there is already the light of one lamp, all the Reals, Dharma, Adharma, etc., may find their accommodation in Ākāśa at one and the same time and in one and the same part of it. It may be impossible for two gross material things to occupy one and the same place but not so, if the substance be absolutely subtle like Dharma, etc. The author of the Rāja-vārtika makes it clear by saying:

स्थूला हि परस्परतः प्रतिहन्यन्ते, न सूक्ष्माः ।

motion and rest, in sum, the world of ours. Etymologically, the word Loka may be derived in three ways, which are thus pointed out by the author of the *Tattvārtha-rāja-vārtika*:—

- (१) पुष्पपापयोः कर्मणोः फलं सुखदुःखलक्षणं यत्रालोकयते स लोकः ।  
कः पुनरसौ ? आत्मा ।

Loka is that in which happiness and misery are experienced as effects of virtuous and vicious deeds. What is it? The soul.

- (२) लोकति पश्यत्युपलभतेत्यनिति लोकः ।

Loka is that which sees or gets the objects.

सर्वज्ञेनानन्ताप्रतिहतकेवलदर्शनेन लोकयते यः स लोकः ।

(3) Loka is the region which is perceived by the omniscient. It is said that although the first two derivations point to the observing subject only as the Loka—by implication it refers to the principles of motion, rest etc. The third derivation makes the word Loka include all substances, Dharma, Adharma etc. which are seen by the omniscient. Some object to the third meaning by saying that although the substances, Dharma etc., are included in the Loka, as objects of an omniscient's apprehension, it excludes the observing subject. This objection is groundless. The observing subject is essentially self-conscious and consciousness of outside objects is impossible without self-consciousness; so that when it is said that Loka includes all substances which are seen by the omniscient, it does not exclude the observing subject. Thus the third derivation of the word, Loka, also is quite consistent with the saying in the Jaina scripture:

षड्द्रव्यसमूहो लोकः

Loka is inclusive of the six substances viz:—Soul, Matter, the two Principles of Motion and Rest, the Principle of Mutation and Space.

Another objection to the third derivation is that since void space also is within the range of the omniscient's vision, this definition would include Aloka within the Loka. The

author of the Rāja-vārtika sets aside this objection by saying that in many cases language permits the restriction of the range of a meaning of a word. Hence the word Loka has been given a restricted sense, excluding from its purview the Aloka or void space, although Aloka is within the knowledge of the omniscient. In this connection, the author of the Rāja-vārtika gives practically a fourth derivation of the word Loka, which is connected with and which supports the third definition, He says:

यत्रस्थेन सर्वज्ञेन लोकयते यः स लोकः इति न चालोकस्थेननालोको लोकयते  
ततो नालोकस्य लोकत्वप्रसंगः ।

The place, staying where the omniscient sees all substances is the Loka. The omniscient does not stay in the Aloka when he sees the Aloka. Hence Aloka cannot be Loka.

Beyond the Loka is then the Aloka or the Anantākāśa, the infinite void space, encompassing the Loka or the finite universe. In the Aloka, all substances and principles, e.g. soul, matter, motion, rest or change are entirely absent. The liberated souls have their being in the Siddha-śīlā, which is a blessed place at the top of the Lokākāśa, or filled space, beyond which is the infinite void which even the Siddha's are incapable of entering.

#### VOID SPACE: THE JAINA, THE ARISTOTELIAN, THE EPICUREAN AND THE STOIC THEORIES

It would be seen that even according to some of the earliest Greek thinkers e.g. Anaximander, Anaximenes and the Pythagoreans, Space was '*the unlimited*'. Aristotle, however, thought that Space was a relation between bodies; accordingly he denied the existence of any empty or '*void space*' encompassing '*the filled space*'. With him, Space, like the world, was finite. The Epicureans, on the other hand, admitted the existence of Void Space, both within and outside the world. Strato, however, maintained the curious doctrine that there was no Void Space outside the world but that inside the world there was Empty Space.

which accounted for the interpenetration of bodies by light and warmth. If we leave out of account the last two theories (viz. of the Epicurean and of Strato), as of minor importance, we have two prominent theories of Space viz. the one of Aristotle, denying the existence of Void Space outside the world limit and the other, of the Stoics, which denied its existence within the world but admitted its infinite expansion beyond. The Jaina theory is apparently similar to that of the Stoics and is opposed to the Aristotelian doctrine of finite space.

It has been said that according to the Jaina's, the Aloka or Void Space is absolutely devoid of any Real. If this be so, some argue, how can it be said that Space is what gives accommodation? For, Aloka admittedly does not accommodate any substance. The argument is unsound in as much as it loses sight of the fact that although Aloka does not contain any substances, its capacity to accommodate them is never denied.<sup>1</sup>

#### SPACE, A PASSIVE SUBSTANCE: BALĀDHĀNA: AN ACCOMPANYING CAUSE

It is to be noted that although Space is admitted as a Real in the Jaina metaphysics, it is but an inactive substance. Its capacity to accommodate substances in it does not mean any active energising on its part. Substances have extensions i.e. occupy positions because of themselves; Ākāśa does not actively come forward to give them space. Still, it is a Real, the existence of which we are bound to admit. This passive function on the part of Space is

<sup>1</sup> For, it is a part of Space after all and the author of the Rāja-vartika, puts the matter extremely well, by referring to the example of the swan. There may not be, says he, a swan entering into the water of a certain pond; but this fact does not prove that the water of the pond is devoid of the capacity of accommodating.

यथा हंसस्यावगाहकस्याभावेऽप्यवगाह्यत्वं जलस्य न हीयते तथा  
अवगाहित्वाभावेऽपि नालोकाकाशस्यावकाशदानसामर्थ्यहानिः ।



technically called "Balādhāna". "Balādhāna" is opposed to active causation which is denied to Space.<sup>1</sup>

The Jaina thinkers refer to the example of the sense-organ, Eye, in this connection. It is the soul that sees. The organ of sight has not the power of seeing. A dead man does not see although he has his organ of sight intact. Even a living man, if he has his attention diverted elsewhere, does not see, although he has eyes. All the same, however, the sense-organ of sight is the accompanying cause of our visual perception and visual perception is impossible without it. In the same manner, although substances occupy positions, of and by themselves, and although Space is in no way active in giving them accommodation, it is an accompanying cause of spatial occupation; nay, spatial occupation, is impossible without the spatial principle. Hence Space as a Real must be admitted.

#### DATA FOR THE JAINA INFERENCE ABOUT THE REALITY OF SPACE

We have seen how the philosophers of the Nyāya and other Vedic schools looked upon Sound as an attribute of Space and contended that from the phenomenon of Sound, inference about the reality of Space was to be made. The Jaina philosophers controverted this contention and pointed out that Sound had nothing to do with Space. What then are the data for the inference about Ākāśa according to the Jaina's? Their answer to this question is essentially similar to that to the similar question about Dharma and Adharma. The Jaina's point out that although all things have the capacity to occupy spaces, the phenomena of their simultaneous occupation of spaces necessitates the hypothesis of a Real which serves as the common attendant

<sup>1</sup> क्रियाहेतुत्वमेतेषां निस्कियाणां न हीयते ।

यतः खलु बलाधानमात्रमत्र विवक्षितम् ॥ ३९ तत्तत्त्वार्थसारः

or accompanying cause or condition of these space-occupations.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Almost in the same language in which he established the reality of Dharma and Adharma, Prabhācandra says with respect to the real existence of Ākāśa.

युगपन्निलिखितव्यावगाहः साधारणकारणापेक्षस्तथावगाहत्वान्यथानुपपत्तः

The expression युगपत् is important here. In the case of Dharma and Adharma, it was pointed out that although things had the capacity to move or stop, the phenomena of their simultaneous movements and stoppages proved the reality of common attendant causes, viz., Dharma and Adharma. In the same way, in the case of Ākāśa also it is said that although substances have the capacity to occupy places the phenomenon of their simultaneous occupations of spaces proves the reality of Ākāśa as the common attendant condition of these space-occupations. We have seen how the expression युगपत् led Dr. Seal to think that Dharma was "something more than the attendant cause of motion, as it was the principle that brought about the order or system in the movement of substances in the universe." We ventured to disagree with the view of Dr. Seal and we pointed out that the word युगपत् did not imply that Dharma was responsible for the ordered movements in the world of ours. The use of the expression युगपत् in connection with the argument about Space, supports our contention that the word was not intended for explaining any order or system that we find in the world. If the word had such an implication, Ākāśa also would have some claim over some such order or system. The fact is that the Jaina philosophers infer the reality of Ākāśa from the phenomena of simultaneous space-occupations by substances, just as they think that the phenomena of the simultaneous motions and stoppages of things proved the reality of Dharma and Adharma. The phenomena of the simultaneous motions and stoppages of things was not meant by the Jaina's to imply that Dharma was the cause of the *ordered* motions in the world, any more than it was their intention to contend that the simultaneous space-occupations by things proved that Ākāśa was the cause of some sort of *system* in respect of some ordered phenomena.

## CHAPTER 5

### TIME

REALITY OF KĀLA IS NOT RECOGNISED BY SOME JAINA THINKERS AND THERE ARE SOME WHO ADMIT IT

It should be noted at the outset that there were some old philosophers of the Jaina school who did not recognise Kāla or Time as a separate Real. According to them, Kāla or Time was a paryāya or mode of the other Reals viz., Dharma, Adharma, Ākāśa, Jīva and Pudgala.

In Anuyogadvāra (Sūtra 124), we are told that there are six Dravyas viz., Dharma, Adharma, Ākāśa, Jīva, Pudgala and Addhā-samaya. The last, i.e. the Addhā-samaya is otherwise called Kāla, which is said to contain an infinite number of Samaya's.

#### CHARACTERISTICS OF KĀLA, AS A REAL

In the Uttarādhyayana, Kāla is described as being characterised by Vartanā. The author of the Tattvārthā-dhigama Sūtra's states that the characteristics of Kāla are Vartanā, Pariṇāma, Kriyā, Paratva and Aparatva. To reconcile the latter description with the former, some maintain that the characteristics of Pariṇāma, Kriyā, Paratva and Aparatva are included in the Vartanā, which according to the Scriptures is the sole feature of Kāla.

There are, however, some thinkers among the Jaina's who recognise the independent reality of Kāla and in the present chapter, we are concerned with the doctrines of these philosophers.

#### KANTIAN DOCTRINE OF TIME

Nothing is commoner than to speak of what is with us as a thing of the present time, of what is no more as past and what is yet to come as one in future time. We say, time is either past or present or future. Now, the question is:

How do we come to have an idea of the temporal order of phenomena? It is said that the idea of time is *innate* in us. This contention finds some support in the Kantian doctrine, according to which time is a form of intuition, an *a-priori* form of the inner sense—a sort of a coloured glass, as it were, through which the percipient self views the world. Although the *a-priori* character of the idea of time may be admitted in the epistemological sense i.e. in the sense that it is a presupposition in all our experiential facts, the Kantian doctrine is psychologically untenable. Our ideas about the temporal order of phenomena are connected with our perceptions of change and difference in these phenomena along with a sense of continuity in them and are certainly developed from them. A thing, A, for instance, while maintaining its essential nature is found to be modified into A1; this modification of A is a change in A and is called *Paripāma*. Secondly, the thing, A, which was stationary is found to have activity, *Kriyā*, as it is called. While active, A presents itself as, say, A1. The activity may be due to some efforts in which case the *Kriyā* is called the *Prāyogika*; or it may be spontaneous or *Vaiśraṣika*. In any case, perception of activity in a stationary thing, gives an idea of some difference in it. Next, A may be viewed in relation to a different thing A1, for instance. In that case, it may appear as distant or *Para* from A1; that is, A may appear to come long after or long before A1. Or, it may appear as near, *Apara* to A1, i.e. simultaneous with it. In all these four cases of A viewed in relation to A1, we have the idea of a change or difference along with the idea of continuity. Our idea of a temporal order is based on and developed from such apprehensions of change with a continuous series. “All accounts of time”, it is said, “agree in connecting it with change. A changeless content . . . . is not in time. But though change is essential to time, time is not the mere qualitative form of change. Nor is it mere succession or the mere abstract relation of succession. For succession to be temporal, a relation of the terms is required such as to form a continuous and measurable series”. We have shown above

that our perceptions of *Pariṇāma*, *Kriyā*, *Paratva* and *Aparatva* in things give exactly the apprehensions of change and difference in a continuous series of related phenomena. Hence the theory of the Jaina's seems to be quite in a line with that of the modern psychologists when they say:

व्यावहारिककालस्य परिणामस्तथा क्रिया।

परत्वं चापरत्वं च लिगान्याहुर्महर्षयः। : तत्त्वार्थसार।

The great sages declare that *Pariṇāma* or modification, *Kriyā* or activity, *Paratva* or temporal distance and *Aparatva* or temporal proximity indicate the temporal series of our experience.

#### REALITY OF TIME, DENIED BY THE VEDĀNTA: BY SPINOZA: BY BERKELEY: BY KANT; BY TEICHMULLER: OBJECTIONS TO THEIR THEORIES

It is thus that our idea of Time is not innate in us but is a psychological development. But what is Time in itself? Is it a real or a mere unsubstantial idea? The Vedānta which denies the real existence of the world cannot be expected to admit the reality of Time. "If you maintain" says Ānandajñāna, "that time is the distinctive cause of our idea (of succession, etc.,) your position is not tenable because consciousness which is all-pervasive can establish such relationship; so that from the order or sequence of effects, i.e. phenomena, you are not justified in inferring the real existence of Time (*Tarka-saṃgraha*)". In the west, Spinoza similarly looked upon Time as an imaginary representation, wholly, without any background of reality. To Berkeley also, Time is no Real but is simply the succession of ideas. We have already referred to the doctrine of Kant, according to whom Time is only an intuition of the mind and has no reality outside it. To all these theories denying the reality of Time, the obvious objection is that they are based on a rejection of what is given by our actual observation. Our experience posits the reality of the temporal element; even Kant admits that Time is the presupposition of all experience. One may be justified in contending

that our mind evolves or infers Time because Time, as a Real external to it, necessitates it. The same objection may be pressed against the theory of Teichmüller. According to Teichmüller, Time is a bare abstract concept. Just as the concept of 'Mammal' has in it nothing of the specific nature of a sheep, a cow or a lion, the concept of Time also gives us no idea of actual magnitude. Time is simply a 'perspective order', given to the objects of our experience by our Ego. All determination of duration is after all relative and we cannot say that our separation of the present from the past or the future by the alleged time-intervals corresponds to the actual state of things in themselves. Teichmüller actually hints that as the temporal order does not pertain to reality, the whole history of the world's events should be viewed as being together all at once. The obvious objection to Teichmüller's theory is that his denial of Time as a reality has led him to deny the reality of change also. But change is a phenomena which is given by our direct observation and as such, its reality is undeniable. Even if we leave out of account the external things it is impossible for us not to admit that our subjective ideas are felt to succeed one another. Here at least there is the idea of change involved in our apprehensions of succession of ideas. If then there is real change in the subjective ideas, there is no reason why we should not admit it in the external things also. Since change is a phenomenon which cannot be denied, the admission of Time as a Real explaining change seems to be inevitable.

#### DENIAL OF THE REALITY OF CHANGE AND CONSEQUENTLY THAT OF TIME BY SOME PHILOSOPHERS: JAINA OBJECTION

We have already shown how we have apprehensions of *Pariṇāma* etc. and how our idea of Time is based on these apprehensions. The Jainas contend that *Pariṇāma*'s or modifications in things are not imaginary subjective ideas but are objectively real. Therefore, *Kāla* also, which accounts for *Pariṇāma* in things is a reality. In India, a class of thinkers denied like Teichmüller the reality of change or

modification in substance and their argument was that as no modification was real, there was no real Time as well. A sprout grows from a seed. It is said that the seed is modified into the sprout. But does the seed really modify itself into the sprout? This is impossible, the objectors say. For, the question arises: Does the seed exist in the sprout? If it does, then you cannot call it a sprout. If it does not, then you cannot say that the sprout is the seed modified. Hence it is said that a change or modification of a substance is impossible and Time as the principle of change is unreal. The Jaina's refute this objection by saying that a modification is real. One mode of a thing, seed, for instance is changed into another mode, the sprout, but the substance or the material basis underlying both seed and sprout persists.

परिणामाभावः सत्त्वासत्त्वदर्शोषोपपत्तेरिति चेन्न पक्षान्तरत्वात् ।

**TIME SENSE IS A PECULIAR SENSE AND CONSEQUENTLY, TIME IS A DISTINCT REALITY**

This is the way in which modifications are possible and do occur. Hence change is a reality and time as its principle is also real. At the same time, it is to be noticed that Time cannot be identified with the modifications or the activities etc., of a thing. Time-sense is a peculiar sense of simultaneity or successiveness of phenomena, which is distinct from the sense of their being modifications or activities. This distinct sense of a temporal order requires a distinct Real i.e. Kāla as its cause.

**THE JAINA VIEW OF TIME AS A REALITY IS SOMEWHAT AKIN TO NEWTON'S; TO BERGSON'S; TO KAṆĀDA'S**

Time is thus a reality outside and independent of us as well as of the objects of our observation, according to the Jaina's. Their view is to some extent similar to that of Newton who looked upon "absolute, true and mathematical time" as something which "in itself and from its own nature flows equally without relation to anything external". Although Time is the condition of change, it is according to

Newton immutable. This is the Jaina view also. In modern times, Bergson is well known for his theory that Time is a real factor in evolution. Among the systems of orthodox Indian philosophy, the Vaiśeṣika was conspicuous for its open recognition of Kāla as a reality. "The reality of time" says Kaṇāda "is inferred from the observation of phenomena as successive, simultaneous, of long duration or of short. Its substantiality and eternality are established in the same way as those of Air". (Vaiśeṣika Sūtra, 2.2.6-8)

#### PLATO'S THEORY OF TIME

Plato admits the objective reality of Time, but contends that it was created by the great Demiurge or the architect of the universe. This theory of the creation of Time by God involves the difficulties of all creation theories. Why should the Demiurge create Time at all? Plato's answer is unintelligible; he resorts to meaningless metaphors. He says that Time is "a moving image of eternity", introduced into the world to add to its perfection in order that the world may resemble the eternal nature of the Gods as much as possible. In the Middle Ages, St. Augustine enquired into the nature of Time and at places he seems to have maintained that Time considered in itself is nothing; it has a seeming reality only; the distinctions of past, present and future are not grounded in facts. What we presently attend to, is the present; what we presently recollect is a thing of the past and what we presently expect is in future. Present, past and future times are thus creations of our mind, being creatures respectively of the mental faculties of attention, recollection and expectation. Really, however, all objects of our cognition are present, it is only our faculties which put on them the temporal order of past, present or future. But St. Augustine does not seem to stick to this subjective view of time. For, in many places, he clearly admits that Time is objectively real, although he contends that it is a creation of God. Leibnitz also looks upon Time as a sort of divine thought; but he clearly states that Time is of the nature of "eternal verities", which is not a mere abstraction



from experience but quite independent of the things experienced. It would thus appear that if the element of divine creation which can scarcely be reconciled with the admittedly eternal nature of Time be eliminated from the theories of Plato, St. Augustine and Leibnitz, their doctrines of Time would agree with the Jaina theory, so far as the question of its objective reality is concerned. It is worthy of notice in this connection that the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika schools admit the existence of God; but they say that Kāla or Time is eternal and not a creation of God. Their theory of Time is thus similar to that of the Jaina's who nevertheless deny the existence of a creator God.

#### THE NEO-PLATONIC THEORY OF TIME: SCHELLING'S THEORY

The Neo-Platonists admitted that Time was not only real but in a sense objectively real also. It is objectively real in the sense that our momentary selves and fleeting conscious states do not create it. They maintained that Time was the life of the soul, contained, beheld and involved in it. Plotinus urged that Time was practically the ceaseless energy of the soul seeking to realise its infinite and eternal being in matter. As it is impossible for the soul to do so all at once, it goes through a series of successive acts or moments. This Neo-Platonic theory was subsequently revived by Schelling. According to it, Time is real, in a sense, objectively real also, but all the same involved in the very being of the soul.

#### THE SĀMĀKHYA THEORY OF TIME

The Sāṃkhya theory of Time, though not very clear, may be construed in a way which would give it a very remote resemblance to the above Neo-Platonic doctrine. According to the Sāṃkhya, Kāla is the *Samgati* or conjunction of the Puruṣa and the Prakṛti, the two self-existent and eternal Reals. The implication of this Samgati doctrine may be said to be: 1. That, on the one hand, Puruṣa or the infinite soul, coming in contact with Prakṛti, finds itself finite and compelled to realise its nature in a series of successive acts i.e. in Kāla and 2. that on the other hand the

infinite Prakṛti is compelled to undergo a successive series of evolutionary modifications. The Puruṣa and the Prakṛti, when they come in contact with each other (Saṅgati)—find themselves limited by Time, i.e. compelled to pass through temporal successive series. Kāla, which is independent of one's momentary conscious states and impermanent modes of physical objects and thus objectively real to them, is nevertheless involved in the nature of the Puruṣa and the Prakṛti, when they become Saṅgata and thereby limited.

#### THE SĀMĀKHYA AND THE NEO-PLATONIC THEORIES, EXAMINED IN LIGHT OF THE JAINA THEORY

We are not concerned here with the true nature of the soul or matter nor with the manner of their conjunction. We are concerned with the question: What is Time after all, according to the Neo-Platonic and the Sāṃkhya theories? It is said to be involved in the nature of the soul and matter. The nature of the soul, however, consists in consciousness and that of matter, in material properties of extension, etc. Time is neither consciousness nor any of the material attributes. Thus 'involved in the nature of the soul and matter' does not mean that Time is identical with either soul or matter. It is something other than the soul or matter, which, as the Sāṃkhya and the Neo-Platonic thinkers themselves admit, accounts for the series of their mundane modifications. This is exactly the Jaina view of Time. Kāla or Time does not pertain to the essential nature of substances. Its 'being involved in their nature' means that Kāla is *associated with them*, being the external condition of their modifications, in and through which they persist in their essential nature.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Akalanka-deva means this by saying:

सत्वात् इति चेन्न, तस्याप्यनुग्रहात्

You cannot say that Kāla is involved in the existence (or the essential nature) of things; for, it (i.e. persistence in their essential nature) is dependent on Kāla.

TIME IS NEITHER SOUL NOR MATTER NOR SPACE NOR THE PRINCIPLES OF MOTION AND REST: THEORIES OF PYTHAGORAS, OF THE STOICS, OF THE EPICUREANS, EXAMINED

Time is thus neither soul nor matter. Can we identify it with Space or Motion, Ākāśa or Dharma and, for the matter of that, with Adharma—the other three Reals of the Jaina metaphysics? The early Greeks connected Time with Motion. According to Pythagoras, Time was the moving sphere itself. To this Pythagorean theory, some of the scholastic philosophers of the Middle Ages objected on the ground that if Time was identified with the motion of the celestial sphere all the parts of Time would be together, since the parts of the sphere moved at once. The Stoic theory of Time was that it consisted in a determination of the extent of Motion while according to the Epicureans it was an accompaniment of Motion. Some of the Greek thinkers again went so far as to identify Time with Motion itself.<sup>1</sup>

We speak, for instance, of the past movement of the sun, its present movement and its future movement. This shows that Time as an external and independent Real is associated with the various movements of the sun and cannot be said to be generated by them.

<sup>1</sup> Brahmadeva refers to a similar class of thinkers in India who maintained that Time was generated by a moving thing. A Nimeśa (time consisting in a twinkling of the eyes) was caused by the movement of the eyelids; timings by the water-clock were due to movements in water, movements of hands, all connected with the clock; a Day is caused by the moving sun and so on. Brahmadeva sets aside this theory by pointing out that the effect of material things in motion would bear the stamp of materiality. Food, for instance, which is the effect of rice boiled, has colour (black, white, etc.) smell (good, pleasant, etc.) touch (soft, hard, etc.) and taste (sweet, etc.). If time were nothing but an effect of material things in motion, it would have had colour and other attributes of matter. Akalanka-deva raises another objection to the theory of identifying Time with Motion. He says:

आदित्यगतेरिति चेन्न, तद्गतावपि तत्सद्भावात् ।

We cannot say that the movement of the sun generates Time; for Time is presupposed in the solar movements.

# ARISTOTLE'S THEORY OF TIME: EXAMINED IN LIGHT OF THE JAINA THEORY

According to Aristotle, Time is "the number of motion relative to before and after". By 'number' he means a point numbered. Time is constituted of distinctive points, which can be counted or numbered, analogous to distinctive positions in space, successively occupied by a point in motion. Continuity of Time is but continuity of Motion; continuity of Motion again, is dependent on spatial extension or magnitude. With Aristotle, time, motion and spatial extension are thus convertible terms. We have already seen how Time cannot be identified with Motion in as much as it is presupposed in the movements of the things in motion. Nor can we identify Time with spatial magnitude. The Sāṃkhya school of philosophers hint at such a theory when they say:

"Direction (Dik) and Time (Kāla) are derived from Space (Ākāśa)". 12. Pradhāna-kāryādhya.

Space, however, supplies the location or extension where movements of objects take place; it has nothing to do with the operation of the movements themselves. These movements of the things are conditioned by a Reality which is different from Space and this Reality is Kāla according to the Jaina's.

आकाशप्रदेशनिमित्तेति चेन्न, तां प्रत्यधिकरणभावाद् भाजनवत् ।

Kāla, then, is a separate Real, not to be identified with or accounted for by Soul, Matter, the principles of Motion and Rest, or by Space. Its reality is proved by the temporal order in which things are found. The temporal order in the things of our observation is not our mental creation but it is really associated with the order of things in themselves. Substances are found in various modifications, activities, proximities and distances—all related to one another. With these is associated a *real* duration or temporal order in such a way that with the observation of these modifications, activities, etc. in things, we have the apprehensions of these being past, present or future.

## THE VYAVAHĀRA KĀLA OR SAMAYA

Timings as present, past or future are called *Vyavahāra Kāla* or *Samaya*, i.e. Phenomenal Time by the Jaina's. It is characterised by the duration or 'Sthiti', as it is technically called, connected with a certain phenomena.

द्ववपरिवट्टहरो जो सो कालो हवेइववहारो ।

परिनामादिलक्खो षट्ठलक्खो य परमठो ॥

Phenomenal Time is that which conditions a change in a thing and which is inferred from modifications in it.

This Phenomenal Time, as we have seen, is not generated by or identical with the motions of bodies. But although the Phenomenal Time in itself is essentially different from the motions of bodies, we measure its extent or duration by a reference to these motions.<sup>1</sup>

By the movements of celestial bodies, the phenomenal times such as hours, days, months or years are measured. To emphasise the fact that the movements of the celestial bodies are but measures and no generators of Time, the Jaina writers take care in adding that phenomenal timing is possible in spheres, e.g. in heavens and hells which are beyond the solar course. That other standards of Time are possible, is acknowledged by modern psychologists also.

"But other orders of Time are conceivable and indeed, in a sense, actual. Such for example, is the time of dreams, of works of imagination like an epic or a play; such too is absolute or mathematical Time" ('Time—Dictionary Of Philosophy And Psychology).

## THE NIŚÇAYA KĀLA OR NOUMENAL TIME

The Phenomenal Time is obviously impermanent. It may be of short or long duration; but it has its commencement and termination and hence it must be a modification of some Real which is its substratum. This substratum

<sup>1</sup> As the author of the *Tattvārtha-sāra* says:

ज्योतिर्गतिपरिच्छिन्नो मनुष्यक्षेत्रवर्त्यसौ ।

which forms the basis of the Phenomenal Time is the *Niścaya Kāla* or Noumenal Time.<sup>1</sup>

What is this Noumenal Time, *Niścaya Kāla*, *Dravya Kāla* or *Paramārtha Kāla*, as it is variously called? The Jaina philosophers say that the Noumenal Time is established by *Vartanā*:

वदुदगलवखौ य परमठुौ । २९ द्रव्यसंग्रहः

What is *Vartanā*? The author of the *Tattvārtha-sāra* describes *Vartanā* in the following way:

अन्तर्णीतिकसमया, प्रतिद्रव्यविर्ययान् ।

अनुभूतिः स्वसत्तायाः स्मृता सा खलु वर्तना ।।

The author of the *Rāja-vārtika* makes the meaning of the expression *Vartanā* clear by saying:

एकस्मिन्नविभागिनि समये धर्मादीनी द्रव्याणि षडपि स्वपर्यायैः

आदिमदनादिमदिभहत्पादव्ययधौ व्यविकल्पैर्वर्तन्त इति ककुत्वा तद्विषया वर्तना ।

Each of the six substances, *Dharma*, etc., has many modes, some originating, some decaying and some persisting. The substantiality or the *Dravya*-hood of a thing consists in its persisting in existence with its modes. There is an indivisible duration of Time in which this substantiality of a thing i.e. its continuity amidst changing modes may be perceived. *Vartanā* has for its object this continuity amidst

<sup>1</sup> The question, of course, may be: Why should we go behind the Phenomenal Time and posit the existence and reality of a Transcendental Time? *Brahmadeva* in reply to this objection points out that *Samaya*, as shown before, has a beginning and an end. It is accordingly a *Paryāya*, an evanescent state, which is impossible without a *Dravya* or persisting substance behind it, as its material cause and support. Food, for instance, is a *Prayāya*, an effect; although fire, fuel etc. are operating conditions towards its production, it points to rice as the *Dravya* or the substantial cause. A potter, his wheel, etc. are no doubt necessary for the production of an earthen pitcher; yet it refers to clay, as its *Dravya* or material cause. Lastly, one is, a human being, sometimes; he remains in hell or heaven, sometimes. These states suppose some substance i.e. the soul which persists in these states. It is thus that any phenomenon which is a *Paryāya* always refers to a *Dravya* which underlies it and out of which it arises and into which it disappears. *Samaya* thus proves *Kāla*, the Noumenal Time.

changes, the substantial persistence which is perceivable in one indivisible point of time.

Vartanā is a matter of inference.

सानुमानिकी व्यावहारिकदर्शनात्, पाकवत् ।

as Akalankadeva says. We put rice in a boiling pot and apply the usual fire, water, etc. Some time after, we find the rice in a boiled condition. This period of time which is taken in boiling is divisible into many parts and these parts are further divisible into smaller periods and so on, until we come at infinitesimal points of time which are not further divisible. Let us suppose that the period taken in boiling consists of 10,000 such indivisible points of time. We now turn to the boiling rice. What is it in each of these 10,000 indivisible units of time? The rice was raw but after the given period of time, it is found in a boiled condition. It must be supposed that in each of these 10,000 ultimate points of time, the process of boiling, a change, was ceaselessly going on in the rice; for, if in each such moment, change be not supposed to have been taking place in the rice, its boiled condition after the given period would be impossible. Expressed in a slightly different way, the rice is undergoing modification in each such moment. At the same time, we must also suppose that although in each of these 10,000 ultimate units of time there is modification in the rice, the essential nature of rice continues; otherwise there would be no boiled *rice* at all. So what we get in one particular ultimate moment is neither the pure substance of rice only, nor the modification of rice only, but the essential nature of rice in a process of change. The Jaina philosophers say that Vartanā is the perception of this content of an ultimate indivisible unit of time. This content is the continuity of the essential nature of a thing along with its modification.

The changes and modifications are real and the Vyavahāra Kāla or Phenomenal Time is connected with them, as we have already seen. These are Paryāya's or modes which are temporary. They must find their explanation in

some substantial basis and Vartanā gives us that in each of the ultimate moments, we have a perception of continuity of the essential nature of the thing under observation amidst its changes. Analysing the contents of the Vartanā-experience, we have on the one hand the modifications and the changes in a thing; on the other we have the persisting substance as the basis of these evenescent modes. Now, corresponding to and accompanying these modifications in the thing, we have the time-sense pointing to the Vyāvahāra Kāla or Phenomenal Time. And then, just as the changing modes in the thing under observation find their explanation in a persisting substratum underlying them, the evanescent units of the Vyāvahāra Kāla also must point to the Niścaya Kāla, as their stable basis.

It is thus that the Vyāvahāra Kāla or Phenomenal Time is the principle of change in substances “द्रव्यपरिवर्तरूपो”, as we have seen. Phenomenal timings are evanescent and Vartanā leads us to infer that Dravya-Kāla or Noumenal Time is the substantial basis of the phenomenal times which are but the changing modes of it. The Noumenal Time which is the real basis of the phenomenal temporal order, is thus the cause of changes in things. This, however, does not mean that Time is an active agent; for Kāla does not actively move or work to bring about changes in things. Like Dharma, Adharma and Ākāśa, it is also a Nişkriya or passive condition. Substances change or are modified of and by themselves and Time has no operative hand in it. Yet, Kāla, is, in a true sense, the cause of changes in things:

आत्मना वर्तमानानां, द्रव्याणां निजपययैः।

वर्तनाकरणात् कालो, भजते हेतुकर्तृताम् ॥

न चास्य हेतुकर्तृत्वं, निष्क्रियस्य विरुध्यते।

यतो निमित्तमात्रेऽपि, हेतुकर्तृत्वमिष्यते ॥ ३-८३ तत्त्वार्थसारः

Things exist of and by themselves, with their modes; Time effects change in the things and hence is a condition of it. Its passivity does not oppose the fact of its being a condition, because it can be looked upon as a condition even if it be simply an attendant phenomena.



Shortly put, the position is that Time does not actively work to produce changes in a thing; yet changes are impossible in a thing without time. Kāla is thus called Hetu-Kartā by the author of the Tattvārtha-sāra. Brahmadeva illustrates the Hetu-Kartṛtva or the passive causality of Kāla by referring to the example of fire. "Things change of and by themselves", says he, "and their own essential nature. Vartanā is the accompanying cause of the modifications of those things, like the basal stone in a potter's wheel, like fire in the matter of studying in winter time. This Vartanā is the characteristic of Real Time". He means to say that Real Time, although it does not cause the changes in things is nevertheless an invariable accompanying condition of them. The stone underneath the potter's wheel does not cause motion to the wheel; but in the matter of the movement of the wheel, this stone is indispensable. Fire, again, does not cause one's study in Winter; but study is impossible without fire. So is the case with Time. It would be seen that the word Vartanā is used by Brahmadeva in a slightly different sense. Here Vartanā does not mean "स्वसत्तानुभूतिः" a perception of continuity in a substance amidst change but "पदार्थपरिणतेर्यत्सहकारित्वं सा वर्तना भण्यते" an accompanying cause of the modification of a thing.

#### OPPOSITON TO THE JAINA THEORY OF THE REALITY OF TIME: EXAMINED

The opponents of the Jaina theory of Time contend that Time is no reality. They point out that in the Jaina Āgama itself, 'Samaya' (a duration or a measure of time) is described as the time taken by an atom in crossing over a Pradeśa of Ākāśa and that the same Āgama elsewhere talks of the crossing of the whole universe in the course of the Samaya. What does this show? This shows that Time is no reality; it is more or less a convention. The objection is based on a mistaken identification or connection of Motion with Time, which we have already noticed. "Devadatta by moving slowly", says Brahmadeva, "traverses a distance of 100 yojana's in one hundred days; he may, however, acquire

superhuman powers and swiftly pass over the same distance in one day. Time is real notwithstanding the different results, effected by differences in speed”.

#### HOW TIME IS A REALITY

Time is a Real according to the Jaina philosophers in the full sense of the term. In the Jaina philosophy, as we have already observed more than once, a real thing is characterised by its three aspects, respectively called Utpāda or origination, Vyaya or annihilation and Dhrauvya or persistence. In other words, whatever is real is considered to come into manifestation, to go into annihilation, so far as a particular manifestation or modification is concerned and to persist, so far as its essential substance is concerned. The same fact about a Real is otherwise stated by the Jaina philosophers by recognising in it two aspects, the Paryāya or the mode and the Dravya or the substance. The former is the series of temporary modes which come (Utpāda) and go (Vyaya) and the latter is the essentiality which is constant (Dhrauvya). Time, as a real substance has three aspects of the Utpāda, the Vyaya and the Dhrauvya and its two aspects of the Paryāya and the Dravya may also be distinguished.

Let us suppose the phenomenon of a man's clenching his fingers into a fist. Now, when the clenching of the fingers occurs (Utpāda), the previous state of the fingers is necessarily at an end (Vināśa or Vyaya). Yet so far as the fingers are concerned they continue to be substantially the same (Dhrauvya). Or, again, when pure knowledge arises (Utpāda) as an effect, its cause, undisturbed contemplation is at an end (Vyaya); and yet the same soul in its pure substance underlies both the phenomena (Dhrauvya). In the same way, a certain material phenomena indicates the time which we call, say, the present; when this present time arises, (Utpāda), the time which preceded it is at an end (Vyaya); and the noumenal time underlies both these phenomena of time (Dhrauvya). Thus it is that the three aspects of Time, its origination, its annihilation and its

persistence, may be easily distinguished and that accordingly Time is a substance.

#### TIME AND OTHER REALS

Time as a substance is obviously similar to the Soul but in as much as it is essentially unconscious, it is distinct from the Soul and similar to the other Ajīvas. Time is Amūrta or formless; in this respect, it is similar not only to the Soul but to the non-souls except Matter. Kāla is described as Niṣkriya i.e. devoid of activity and is different from Soul and Matter which are Sakriya or active; other Niṣkriya substances are Dharma, Adharma and Ākāśa.

#### THE VAIŚEṢIKA THEORY OF KĀLA

The philosophers of the great Vaiśeṣika school of Kanāda, as we have seen, agree with the Jaina's in maintaining that Time is a real substance. They argue that the old age of a man, for instance, is said to be *subsequent* to his youth; similarly, some phenomena are *simultaneous*; some are said to last *long*; some again are of *short duration*. Such experiences of succession, simultaneity, etc., lead us to posit the existence of Time. The old man himself is not the cause of the judgement that his old age is subsequent to his youth; nor do the motions of the sun (i.e. the days which intervene between his old age and his youth) give rise to the said idea of succession. Accordingly something real, called Kāla or Time, which is related both to the man under observation and the motions of the sun, must be admitted as the cause of our ideas of succession, etc. This Time is a real substance and is eternal. But the Vaiśeṣika thinkers differ from the Jaina in contending that Kāla is one homogeneous, all-pervasive substance, having no parts. It is one whole. We talk of moments, hours, days and years. But this does not show that Time is essentially many in number. In these varied subdivisions of Time, one and the same essential reality is manifested. These subdivisions are the various modifications of the same substance. Time-phenomena, like the motions of the sun, (which determine the measures of Time) present one and the

same Time in various limitations, called moments, days, years, etc. Hence there is but one Time. Its apparent variety as past, present and future, etc. are due to differences in Upādhi or limitations. In other words, according to the Vaiśeṣika's, Time is one and because the phenomena occur in varied orders, Time appears to us to be varied as present, past and future.

### THE JAINA OPPOSITION TO THE VAIŚEṢIKA THEORY

The Jaina philosophers are opposed to this doctrine of oneness of Kāla. They point out that the varied order of the phenomena indicates nothing but variation in Time units:

स च मुख्यः कालो रनेकद्रव्यं प्रत्याकाशप्रदेशं व्यवहारकालमेदान्वयानुपपत्तेः।

In setting aside the Vaiśeṣika theory of the oneness of Time, Prabhācandra says: How can you talk of a past Time unless you admit real distinctions of Time units? If you say that Time is really one but we call it past when it is related to a past event, the objection is that an event is past only when it is related to a time-stuff which is different from the present time-stuff. Time is thus presupposed in all temporal series. If, on the other hand, it be contended that Time is one, which of itself can be present, past or future, it may be pointed out that this admission of distinctions in Time contradicts the doctrine of its oneness.

निरक्षत्वभेदरूपत्वयोर्विरोधात्।

Prabhācandra shows that if Time were one, all phenomena would have been simultaneous.

“काले कत्वे चाखिलकार्यानामेककालोत्पाद्यत्वेनैकदैवोत्पत्तिप्रसंगात्किंचिदयुगपत्कृतं स्यात्।”

In the case of oneness of Time, we could not talk of long or short durations. The phenomena which occur in many points of Time are of long duration and those which engage fewer points of Time are of short duration. The question of long duration (त्रिरेण) or of short duration (क्षिप्रम्) cannot

arise, if Time were one homogeneous whole, and so also the questions of long (पर) or short (अपर) intervals. The objectors may contend that Time is one and that its variety as past, present or future are due to differences in Upādhi or limiting factor. Prabhācandra says that this doctrine of Upādhi is dependent on real distinctions in the effect-phenomena. You presuppose oneness of the substance; but as soon as you find out variety you say that it is Upādhi or the limiting factor that makes the one appear as many. The Upādhi of Kāla is as unwarranted a supposition as the theory of its oneness. The plain principle is: The multiplicity in our experience requires multiplicity in causes for their explanation. If we have distinctive Times in our experience, they must have distinctive real Time-units as their grounds.

#### KĀLĀṆU'S

The ultimate Time-units are indivisible and are called Kālāṇu's by the Jaina's. The use of the word, Aṇu i.e. atom in connection with Kāla should not lead us to think that the Jaina's look upon Kāla as a material mass and its ultimate parts as material atoms. From what has already been said, it should be sufficiently clear that the Kālāṇu's are not material atoms. These ultimate units of Time are conceived as the last units in the act of dividing Time into smaller and smaller durations. The question is of great psychological interest and may be bluntly put thus: Is there any least span or extent of duration which cannot be divided into smaller parts further? For, we know, we can divide an hour into minutes, a minute into seconds; but is there any smallest period which is grasped by the mind but further subdivisions of which are absolutely impossible? Those who think that our timings are essentially relative would say that there can be no duration which is not further subdivisible. This would lead either to the theory that Time has no essential reality or to the theory that underlying the empirical durations which are infinitely subdivided and which thus negate themselves, there is the one ultimate

transcendental Time, of which our experiential timings are only evanescent manifestations or artificial and unreal limitations. On the other hand, there are psychologists who maintain that "*there is a least amount of time which can be sensibly experienced*". The objective counterpart of this psychological fact seems to be presented by the Jaina's when they say that Kāla is not a homogeneous whole but that it is constituted of infinitesimal parts which are not further subdivisible. A Kālāṇu is thus a duration which cannot be cut into smaller durations.

#### ST. AUGUSTINE'S VIEW OF TIME

The Jaina's not only believe in the real existence of the Kālāṇu's or the objective counterparts of ultimate limits of perceivable durations but they go further and contend that these Kālāṇu's are strictly discrete i.e. separate from each other. Here again there is another question of great psychological interest. We say, ordinarily, Time is one; but within it, we find out the distinctions of past, present and future. Our actual experience, however, does not give us 'before' or 'after'; but it always yields 'now'. Psychologically, we have no experience of the past or of the future. St. Augustine, to whose theory of Time we have already referred, puts this fact extremely well by saying that, truly speaking, we have not the three times, a past which is past, a future which is not yet and a present between the two as a transition point. What we have is always a 'now'—a positive, solid and self-sufficient present. St. Augustine pointed out that things of the present Time are of course present. But what we call things of the past are also present things, appearing only in memory. The future things similarly are also present things, peeping through our faculty of expectation. It is thus that our experience gives us 'now's' only. These 'now's' are strictly discrete and not flowing points of transition. Yet these 'now's' appear to build up one unitary and continuous Time and to give rise to temporal distinctions of pasts and futures. The question is: How are these possible?

## ARISTOTLE'S VIEW OF TIME

Time, according to Aristotle, as we have seen, is only a determinant of Motion. The phenomenon of Motion has within itself distinctions of the various positions in Space, occupied by the moving point. These spatial positions which are time-points may be compared with Kālāṇu's of the Jaina's. Like Kālāṇu's, they are strictly distinct, occupying, as they do, different positions in the series; they can be numbered, summed, and counted, as Aristotle says. Past, present and future are dependent on the distinctive positions, in Space, of these time-points. Every time-unit, according to Aristotle, is a 'now'. In this respect, all the time-units are the same; and this is what explains our idea of the oneness of the Time, taken as a whole, while its continuity is accounted for by the continuity of Motion.

## THE JAINA VIEW, HOW FAR AKIN TO ARISTOTLE'S VIEW

The Jaina's look upon Time as an independent Real, which is not connected with Space or Motion. Still, their doctrine is somewhat similar to that of Aristotle. Kālāṇus are strictly discrete,

एकैकवृत्त्या प्रत्येकमणवस्तस्य निष्ठिक्याः

as the author of the *Tattvārtha-sāra* says. This characteristic of the particles of Time distinguishes it from the other five substances. The minute part of a substance is called *Aṇu* and when these *Aṇu*'s are combined inseparably, the substance constituted of them is called an '*Astikāya*' or extended substance by the Jaina's. *Jiva*, *Pudgala*, *Ākāśa*, *Dharma* and *Adharma* are *Astikāya*'s or extended substances because their minutest constituents are mixed up and inseparably combined with one another. Such is, however, not the case with *Kāla*. There are, no doubt, the *Kālāṇu*'s or the ultimate time-units but each of these *Kālāṇu*'s is strictly separate from each other. The minute parts of Time are never mixed up with one another. This strictly individual character of each *Kālāṇu* has its psychological counterpart in the fact, already noted and admitted by

Aristotle, that every time-unit is an independent 'now' and not a transition point, emerging from the past and flowing towards the future.

We have seen how the past and the future, according to Aristotle, depend on distinctions of positions in Space, successively occupied by a moving point. Although the Jaina's do not connect real Time with Motion or Space, they explain the distinctions of past, present and future by resorting to the example of the phenomena connected with a point in motion. The author of the *Tattvārtha-sāra* says:

यथानुसारतः पङ्क्तिवहुनामिह शास्त्रिणान् ।  
 क्रमेण कस्यचित् पुनः एकैकानेकहं प्रति ॥  
 सम्प्राप्तः प्राप्नुवन् प्राप्तन् व्यपदेशः प्रजायते :  
 द्रव्याणामपि कालानुस्तथानुसरतामिमान् ॥  
 पर्यायचानुभवतां वर्तनाया यथाक्रमम् ।  
 भूतादिव्यवहारस्य गुणभिः सिद्धिरिष्यते ॥ ३-५१-५३

A man wanting to pass a row of many trees passes by them one by one. While passing on, he has trees which he has already passed, trees which he is in the act of passing and trees which he is yet to pass. So with respect to the row of trees, there come up the distinctions of past, present and future. In the same way, say the teachers, distinctions of past, etc., etc., arise when substances feel (i.e. undergo) their respective modifications and come in contact with the time-units (one after the other).

It would appear from the above that distinctions of past, present and future do not really pertain to the *Kālāṇus* or ultimate time-reals. They are all simultaneous; their psychological counterparts are the feelings of 'now'. This fact, as already observed and as pointed out by Aristotle, accounts for our apprehension of Time as one. At the same time, the *Kālāṇus* are all distinct and it is they that condition changes in things. For this reason, although the terms past, present and future are applicable only to the modifications of things and their accompaniments, the *Vyavahāra Kāla* or our empirical timings, they are, by transference of epi-



thets, applied to the real time-units which condition those modifications and underlie our experiential timings. The Jaina's mean this by saying that the application of the distinctions of past, present and future to the Kālāṇus or Dravya-kāla is Gaṇa or Aupaçārika.

#### WHERE THE JAINA'S DIFFER FROM ARISTOTLE

Aristotle, as we have already pointed out, accounted for the continuity of Time by the fact of the continuity of Motion. Such a theory was not open to the Jaina's whose Kālāṇus were strictly static substances. All Jaina descriptions of Kāla, however, compare it with a heap of jewels. The author of the Tattvārtha-sāra, for instance, in describing the Kālāṇus says:

लोककालशब्देषु रत्नराशिरिव स्थिताः

TIME-UNITS, COMPARED TO A HEAP OF JEWELS BY THE JAINA'S  
Similarly, the author of Dravya-saṃgraha says:

रमणाणारासीमिव ते कलाणू असंख दव्याणी । (द्रव्यसंग्रहः)

It is generally supposed that the comparison of Time with a heap of jewels is meant to point out that the time-units are strictly separate from each other and are never mixed up. A jewel is, no doubt, a hard substance which does not lose itself in another jewel. But it is nevertheless a bright thing which has brilliant glow all about it. This halo of jewels makes a heap of them appear as one continuous substance, although each of them is individually separate from others. Strictly static and discrete units cannot otherwise put on the appearance of one continuous whole. I think that the Jaina philosophers had a purpose in view in describing Time as a heap of jewels, viz. that thereby they wanted to offer an explanation of the apparent continuity of Time which is really a conglomerate of strictly discrete units.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The theory that 'Kāla' consists of Kālāṇus or infinitesimal points of Time is the theory of the Digamvara Jaina school. The Svetamvaras do not admit that the Kāla is a conglomeration of 'Kālāṇus'.

### THE ARISTOTELIAN AND THE JAINA VIEWS OF TIME, SIDE BY SIDE

From the comparison of the Aristotelian and the Jaina theories of Time which we have attempted above, one need not think that the former presents a dynamic view of Time while the latter, a static and as such the two theories are essentially opposed to each other. Closer observation, however, will show that Aristotle gives an empirical and scientific account of Time i.e., how inspite of its apparent unity and continuity it has distinctive units within itself and how inspite of these immanent distinctions, Time has the appearance of a continuous whole. Aristotle in presenting a scientific and psychological account of Time was perfectly justified in connecting it with the phenomena of Motion. The Jaina's have also done the same thing; they have also connected it with the Kriyā or the activity of a substance. Accordingly, it may be said that the Aristotelian theory of Time is not at serious variance with the Jaina account of it. But it should be observed at the same time that this is so, so far as the Time of our experience or what is called the Vyavahāra Kāla by the Jaina's is concerned. Both the Aristotelian Time and the Jaina Vyavahāra Kāla accompany the changes or movements connected with a substance. The Jaina's go a step further; they give a further account of Time in which they want to present the metaphysical aspect of the question. They show that accompanying the changing aspects of things and underlying our temporary time-senses, there are Kālānus or the ultimate stuffs of real Time. This ontological side of Time is apparently outside the range of Aristotle's discourse.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> कालश्चेत्येके । तत्त्वार्थाधिगमसूत्र ॥

It should be noted that there are some Jaina philosophers who recognise Kāla or Time as a separate Real. But a great number of Svetamvara philosophers do not recognise Kāla or Time as a separate Real. According to them, Kāla or Time is a Paryāya or effect of the other Reals viz :—Dharma, Adharma, Akāśa, Ātmā and Pudgala.

## CHAPTER 6

### MATTER

#### MATTER IN EARLY GREECE

It may definitely be said that inspite of the leanings to some sort of idealism, the admission of some Real other than and opposed to spirit has continued to assert itself throughout the whole period of philosophical history. With Thales water, with Anaximenes, air, with Heraclitus, fire was the primordial Real and with Empedocles, earth, air, water and fire were "the roots of things". The Unlimited of the Pythagoreans was also the matter-stuff. In Plato, we have the faint foreshadowing of the dualism of form and matter which is confirmed in Aristotle. The Neo-Pythagoreans and the Neo-Platonists admitted the reality of the non-psychical element and the atomists of the school of Democritus and Leucippus openly asserted the reality of material atoms. Although Parmenides is generally conceived to have been an idealist, opinions have nevertheless differed regarding the nature of his Being. Parmenides described Being as "a finite, spherical and motionless plenum"; this account is almost identical with that of the atoms, given by the school of Leucippus. Hence, there seems to be some force in Burnet's contention that "Parmenides is not, as some have said, the father of idealism; on the contrary, all materialism depends on his view of reality."

#### DESCARTES, SPINOZA, LEIBNITZ, LOTZE, GIORDANO BRUNO

Descartes frankly admitted the reality of both spirit and matter and if Spinoza repudiates the substantial character of extension he does the same thing with respect to the finite consciousness also. Although the monads of Leibnitz and Lotze are looked upon as spiritual individuals, they may as well be thought of as "metaphysical points", ever developing from within in accordance with their inward life or force. As a matter of fact, Giordano Bruno to whom

Leibnitz was indebted for his monadology and who, it is true, distinguished the monads from the atoms of Democritus, nevertheless promulgated that a monad is not simply spiritual in character but has a corporeal and material aspect as well.

#### MATTER IN KANT, FICHTE, SCHELLING, SCHLIERMACHER, SCHOPENHAUER, HEGEL

Coming to the philosophy of Kant, we find that beyond the empirical sense-facts, he admits the existence of meta-empirical Reals. These Reals he variously calls Noumena, as opposed to Phenomena, Dinge-an-sich as opposed to Erscheinungen and Transcendentaler Gegenstand as opposed to Vorstellung. But these unknowable Reals do not exhaust themselves in the cognising Ego's which underlie Erkenntni-ss-vermogen (Intellect) das Gefühäl der Lust und Unlust (Feeling) and das Begehrungs vermögen (Volition); the objects of the sense-data or Erfahrung also have their corresponding things-in-themselves. The whole philosophy of Fichte consists in an unwilling confession of the opposition between the Ego and the Non-Ego and a struggle with doubtful success to explain the Anstoss or the possibility on the part of the former to evolve the latter from within itself. In Schelling the fundamental dualism of nature and spirit is clearly acknowledged and his philosophising consists in attempting to show that they are complementary to each other. The Panlogism of Hegel, of course, denies independent reality to matter but his metaphysics involves the admission that matter is not absolutely unreal in as much as it is but a moment or mode of the self-cstrangement of the Absolute. Schleirmacher, although he lays great stress on "the religious consciousness of the unity of the intellectual and the physical world in God" has nowhere denied the real antithesis between the two. The basic cosmical principle is no doubt "Will", according to Schopenhauer; but this fundamental Will is essentially unconscious and in its various grades of evolving objectification, it appears as the physical forces of inorganic nature, as automatic

response to the stimulation from outside in the vegetable world and in the animal kingdom it produces for itself a special organ, the brain.

#### SPENCER, HAECKEL, LEWES

In spite of the prevalence of the doctrines of Bradley and his school, the present age is pre-eminently the age of realism. The "transfigured realism" of Spencer, believing, as it does, in "some objective existence manifested under some conditions" is akin to the position of Ernst Haeckel who says:—"We adhere firmly to the pure, unequivocal monism of Spinoza: Matter of infinitely extended substance and spirit (or Energy) or sensitive and thinking substance are the two fundamental attributes or principal properties of the all-embracing divine essence of the world, the universal substance". The "reasoned realism" of Lewes and what Spencer calls the 'hypothetical realism' are not materially different from his theory; they differ from the latter only in respect of the psychological way of getting at the not-self. If we leave out of account their attempt at giving their systems a monistic colour, the realism of Spencer and Haeckel would appear to be but modified forms of 'natural realism', which attributes independent reality to both mind and matter.

#### MATERIALISTIC THEORIES IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

In the Indian systems of Philosophy a persistent tendency to recognise matter as an independent reality is not less prominent. Some of the earliest Upaniṣads make mention of thinkers who do not believe in the doctrines of the soul and its continued existence.

#### ÇĀRVĀKA SCHOOL

The Çārvāka's were certainly out-and-out materialists, in asserting, as they did, that matter was the only fundamental reality.

#### ŚŪNYAVĀDA

Among the Buddhists, the Śūnyavādin's denied the

reality of all things including matter. In criticism of this nihilistic position, it is pointed out:— 'न ह्ययं सर्वप्रमाण प्रसिद्धो लोकस्य व्यवहारोऽन्यत्तत्त्वमनधिगम्य शक्यतेऽपह्नोत्तुम् । अपवादाभावे उत्सर्गप्रसिद्धेः ।

Some sort of reality is admitted and established by all forms of knowledge; unless very cogent reasons are adduced, extreme nihilism cannot be adopted as a philosophical position.

### YOGĀCĀRA SOLIPSISM

The Buddhist Yogācāra school accordingly reject the Śūnyavāda or absolute nihilism. According to them, however, Vijñāna or mental states are the only reality. Outside mind, there is nothing real. Matter according to these subjective idealists is unreal. It is true that we talk of extramental material things. This, however, does not show that these material things have independent reality. In our dreams, we see many material things, but these are not real. Just as in our dreams, the things seen are creations of our minds, the so-called material things of our experience are really evolutions from our minds. The variety in the outside material things is determined by Vāsanā or mental tendencies left by the previous states of the mind. In criticising the above solipsistic contention, the Vedānta takes up exactly the position of natural realism and says :— 'नाभावः उपलब्धेः ।

Things external to our mind cannot be said to be non-existent as there is the perception of reality.

### SARVĀSTIVĀDA

The analysis of experience would show that the object of our experience is not felt to be identical with the experience itself. In the same manner, the analysis would further show that the difference of one object of our knowledge from another is felt not to consist in the difference in cognition itself; objects are felt to be different because they are felt to be different in themselves. The analogy of dreams does not hold good in the case of the objects of our percep-

tion. The objects of our dreams may be creatures of our minds; but the objects of our perception have a stability peculiar to them; which shows that they have reality independent of our minds. Lastly Vāsanā is incapable of generating the sense of variety of outside things unless there be real things external to mind and there be real variety in them. The Buddhist Sarvāstivāda school accordingly admit the reality of external things and for the matter of that, of matter.

### MĀYĀVĀDA

The Śāṅkara school of the Vedānta deny the reality of everything beside the Brahma, including matter. They uphold the doctrine of the only one Real which is rigidly self-identical. All the same, however, they have got to explain the manifold of our experience. This manifold they look upon as unreal and its appearance as real they attribute to Māyā. It is to be noted that this Māyā which explains the manifold is conceived not to be absolutely unreal. It is described as neither real nor unreal. This shows how difficult it was for the Māyāvāda school to deny the reality of the world of matter. The other schools of the Vedānta, however, admit the reality of unconscious matter either directly or indirectly. The Açit or the unconscious manifold, according to the Viśiṣṭādvaita school, for instance, is real in itself and is not a creation of the Brahma, although closely connected with him. Śāṅkara himself upheld the doctrine of the practical reality of the material manifold and vehemently defended it against the absolute nihilism of the Buddhist Mādhyamika school.

### REALITY OF MATTER ADMITTEED IN THE SĀMKHYA-YOGA, THE NYĀYA-VAIŚEṢIKA AND THE JAINA SYSTEMS

In Sāṅkhya-Yoga again, we have the reality of the Sthūla Bhūta's or material elements and Tanmātrā's or subtler matters, admitted in unequivocal terms and although the reality thus attributed to matter is a derivative reality, its ultimate principle, the Pradhāna is acknowledged as essen-

tially unconscious and unpsychical. The position of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika in respect of matter is equally unambiguous. Its Bhūta's are material elements and although the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika admits the agency of *Īśvara* or a divine Demiurge, the *Paramāṇu*'s or material atoms are said to be uncreate and eternal. Finally, it seems that the Indian approach to natural realism is almost complete in the Jaina philosophy which does away with all theories of the Creator God and maintains that our perception as a veracious guide and reasoning as well convince us of the reality of matter.

#### MATTER CALLED PUDGALA BY THE JAINAS

Matter is called *Pudgala* by the Jaina philosophers. The word occurs in some places of the orthodox and the Buddhist writings as well, but there it means either soul or body. *Pudgala* has thus a peculiar sense in the Jaina metaphysic. Matter is said to be *Pudgala* because on account of combination etc. it has sometimes its extent increased and on account of separation etc. it has sometimes its extent decreased.

भेदादिभ्यो निमित्तेभ्यः पूरणाद् गलनादपि पुद्गलानां स्वभावज्ञः कथ्यते  
पुद्गला इति।३।५।तत्त्वार्थसारः

#### MATTER, HOW FAR SIMILAR TO AND DIFFERENT FROM OTHER REALS

As an unconscious substance, it is an *Ajīva* and is different from the psychical principle and similar to the principles of motion and rest, space and time. On the other hand, matter is similar to the soul in this important respect that both are conceived by the Jaina's to be active principles and to have forms while the other four substances are *Niskriya* or inactive and *Amūrta* or incorporeal reals. The indivisible parts of *Pudgala*, like those of the soul, the space and the principles of motion and rest, are all mixed up and thus constitute one whole body. Matter is thus an *Astikāya* and different from *Kāla*, the *Āṇu*'s or the infinitesimal parts of which are strictly discrete.



### MATTER, MOST IMPORTANT OF THE NON-PSYCHICAL SUBSTANCES

In a sense, matter is the most important of all the non-psychical principles, so far as the soul is concerned. The bondage of the psychical substance is caused by its contact with matter and its dissociation from the latter is its emancipation. The other four unconscious substances are absolutely passive principles and as such, have no hand either in the matter of its bondage or its emancipation. The unemancipated soul has its being in Space, is helped by Dharma and Adharma in its motion and rest and by Kāla in its various modifications. According to the Jaina's, the emancipated soul also has its being on the Siddha-Śilā, a portion of Space after all and the principles of Motion, Rest and Mutation continue to be passively related to it even in its state of emancipation. It is Pudgala which thus determines whether the soul is in bondage or emancipated.

### SUBSTANCE, ATTRIBUTES, MODES

A substance in Jaina philosophy has its Guṇa's or distinguishing Attributes; and it is in continuous Modifications which are called its Paryāya's. The relation between a substance and its attributes and the relation between a substance and its successive modes have always been problems in philosophy. This is not the place to discuss the various attempts on the part of thinkers to solve the problems from time to time. We simply mean to state here that according to the Jaina's, a substance is impossible without its attributes and modes and the attributes and the modes also are impossible without the substance which underlies them.

पञ्जय विजुदं दव्वं दव्वविजुत्ता य पञ्जया णत्थि । १२ ।

दव्वेण विणा न गुणा गुणेहि दव्वं विणा ण संभवदि । १३

(पञ्चासिगुकायसंग्रह)

### ATTRIBUTES OF MATTER

The attributes of matter are touch, taste, smell and colour स्पर्श-रस-गन्ध-वर्णवन्तः पुद्गलाः : as the author of the

Tattvārthādhigama Sūtra says. Of these, touch is said to be of eight kinds, soft (Mṛdu), hard (Kāṭhina), heavy (Guru), light (Laghu), cold (Śīta), hot (Uṣṇa), smooth (Snigdha) and rough (Rūkṣa). Taste is of five varieties:—pungent (Tikta), sour (Kaṭuka), acid (Amla), sweet (Madhura), and astringent (Kaṣāya). Two kinds of smells are recognised viz—fragrant (Surabhi) and bad (Asurabhi). Hues are said to be of five kinds:—they are blue (Nīla), yellow (Pīta), white (Śukla), black (Kṛṣṇa) and red (Lohita). Without entering into finer details, we may say that the thinkers of the other schools as a rule, admitted that the attributes of colour, taste, smell and touch inhere in matter. This doctrine seems to have been a very ancient one and a common conception among the philosophers of old.

#### ACCORDING TO THE JAINAS, SOUND IS NOT AN ATTRIBUTE BUT A MODE OF MATTER

But what about Sound? The thinkers of the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika schools maintained, as we have already noticed, that Sound is a quality, inherent in an invisible, all-pervading substance, Ākāśa. The Jaina's do not recognise Ākāśa as a material substance; nor do they look upon Sound as a quality of matter. According to them, Sound is a mode of matter; it is matter itself modified in a certain way.

#### MODES OF PUDGALA

With regard to the modes of Pudgala, the author of the Pañcāsti-kāya-samaya-sāra speaks of its four possible states or conditions viz:—Skandha, Skandha-pradeśa, Skandha-deśa and Paramāṇu. The first is matter in its gross form, material body having all the physical qualities without exception, while the last is the primary atom. Skandha-pradeśa is described as a part of Skandha and Skandha-pradeśa as an unseparated minuter part of Skandha-deśa. Thus while Skandha is a complete molecular constitution, Skandha-deśa and Skandha-pradeśa are incomplete masses

although both of them are aggregates of Paramāṇu's. According to some Jain, philosophers Skandha-deśa should be looked upon, not as a 'half' but only as a 'part' of the 'Skandha'; the Skandha-pradeśa, "not as a half of the Skandha-deśa, but as an unseparated minutest part of the Skandha. The Paramāṇu is the ultimately separated minutest part of the 'Pudgala'. Of the four modes of matter, just described, Skandha and Paramāṇu are the most important, for they exhibit matter in two of its extreme forms. We shall consider the nature of each of them and we take up the last first viz.

## MATTER IN ITS SUBTLE FORM

### MATERIAL ELEMENTS

Early philosophising began with a search for an ultimate element or elements which would explain the gross modes of matter of our sensuous experience. The "chow" is a part of the fourth book of the Chinese historical records, the "Shoo king" and in it a reference is made to a document supposed to date from 2000 B.C. in which earth, water, fire, metal and wood are described as the five elements. We have already seen how with Thales water, with Anaximenes air, with Heraclitus fire and with Empedocles earth, water, air and fire were the elementary reals. European thinkers of the middle ages generally stuck to this Greek doctrine of elements, so much so, that when Paracelsus in the sixteenth century asserted that sidereal salts, sulphur and mercury were the three elementary principles, Boyle indignantly wrote: "Aristotle's hypothesis had not been called in question till in the last century Paracelsus and a few other sooty empiricks... having their eyes darkened and their brains troubled with the smoke of their furnaces, began to rail at the Peripatetick doctrine which they were too illiterate to understand and to tell the credulous world that they could see the three ingredients in mixed bodies, which, to gain themselves the repute

of inventors, they endeavoured to disguise by calling them instead of earth and fire and vapour, salt, sulphur and mercury to which they gave the canting title of hypostatical principles”.

#### ELEMENTS IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

The orthodox schools of Indian Philosophy recognised Kṣiti, Ap, Tejas, Marut and Ākāśa, generally translated as earth, water, fire, air and ether as five Bhūta's or ultimate elements. The Buddhists denied the reality of Ākāśa. We have already seen how according to the Buddhists, Ākāśa was simply the absence of Āvaraṇa or resistance and no positive substance. The Jainas are opposed to this view of the Buddhists and contend that Ākāśa is a substance. But although the Jainas maintain that Ākāśa is a substance, they are opposed to the view of the Vedic school that Ākāśa is a form of matter. The four material Bhūta's, admitted by the Ājīvika and the Buddhists are thus Kṣiti, Ap, Tejas and Marut. The Jainas call them Dhātus and look upon them as modifications of Pudgala and not as ultimate matter-stuff.

It is needless to state that modern researches have established that the so-called elements, recognised by the ancients are really compounds and that there are about 64 elementary or simple substances which cannot be further separated into simpler elements. There is no gainsaying the fact that if the ancients meant that earth, water, air, etc. were ultimately simple substances which composed the gross bodies of our experience, then their doctrine of elements must be condemned as wrong. The question is whether the Indian doctrine of the Bhūta's must share the same fate.

#### INDIAN ELEMENTS AND GREEK ELEMENTS

We venture to think, however, that the Indian approach to the problem of the composition of things is not exactly the same as that of the ancient Greeks and other non-Indian thinkers, ancient or modern and as such, the Indian doctrine of the Bhūta's need not be identified with that of the elements.

The non-Indian thinkers with the power of analysis that was then at their command saw that all the gross material objects of their experience were either the four substances of earth, air, water and fire or their combinations or transformations. Accordingly they arrived at the conclusion that these were the ultimate and primary elements. The Chinese saw that wood and metallic objects could not be accounted for by earth, water, etc. and therefore they admitted the elementality of wood and metal too. By confining their attention to the ingredients that made up the gross material objects of experience, the early Greeks took up a scientific stand and in a manner prepared the way for the present day science of chemistry. Later researches have no doubt shown that what they thought to be elements were really compounds which were constituted of simpler substances; but the aim of the present day chemistry is still the same as that of the ancient Greeks viz: to find out the elementary substances that combine to make a gross body. The Indian mode of starting, however, was different. The Indians also began with the gross objects of experience. They saw that these objects were objects of four or five modes of sensuous experience, visual, tactual, olfactory, tasting and auditory, in accordance with the sense-organs of the eye, the ear etc. The gross material objects of sense-experience have the qualities of touch, taste, colour, smell and sound. It was taken for granted that the gross material objects of sensuous experience were made up of simple substances. It seems to us that the problem with the ancient Indian was not so much to find out the elements as to determine what should be the nature of those elements in order that they may be competent to explain the gross material objects, as we have them in our sensuous experience. The *Prthvī* of the Indians as an elemental substance is not a bit of earth, as earth was with the ancient non-Indian thinkers; it is said to have the attribute of Smell. Similarly, the *Ap* of the Indians is not a quantity of gross matter, it is what accounts for the *Rasa* or Taste. In the same way, *Tejas* is not fire but is what lies at the root of our sensations of Colour. *Marut*

of the Indians is not gross air but is the material background of our tactile sensibility. And lastly, Ākāśa conceived as a material Bhūta is not even ether, a gross substance after all in an extremely fine form but is what makes possible our sensations of sound.

#### BHŪTAS ARE NOT BITS OF GROSS MATTER

The Guṇa's or the attributes, possessed by the Bhūta's, really imply that they lie implicit in the latter; in other words, the Bhūta's are conceived as ultimate substances which evolve or give rise to the various qualitative phenomena, e.g. colour, taste, etc. which are associated with the gross objects of our experience. The Bhūta's of Indian philosophy thus are not gross substances of matter in finer forms, as with the Greeks but are substances which are infinitely more subtle than the elements of the non-Indian thinkers and which may as well be looked upon as almost immaterial, being the barest background of the material qualities of colour, smell etc. that are met with in the gross bodies.

#### BUT ARE BACKGROUNDS OR POSSIBILITIES OF SENSE-PERCEPTIONS

It may be urged against us that our above contention is unwarranted. The Indian Bhūta's have been definitely said to be possessed of the attributes of colour, taste, etc. This clearly shows that the Indian conception of Pṛthvī is that it is a smelling substance, that of Ap is that it is a liquid substance and so on. It would thus appear that if the elements of the Greeks were gross matters in their finer forms, the Indian Bhūta's also were no less so, the gross sensible qualities of colour etc. being attributed to them. We venture to submit that this objection is founded on a misconception of the nature of inherence of qualities in a substance. It is true that if the material quality of colour, for instance, be found in an explicit form in a thing, the thing is bound to be gross. But the qualities of a substance may not always be explicit in it. Even then, the Indian thinkers do as a

matter of fact attribute those qualities to the substance. We shall have occasion hereafter to refer to Vātsāyana's conception of a mode of Tejas which has neither the brilliance nor the heat of fire explicit in it (अनुद्भूतरूपस्पर्शोऽप्रत्यक्षः). According to the Naiyāyika's, sound is a quality of Ākāśa which is one all—pervasive substance. Yet, sound is neither everywhere nor always heard. We have already referred to the Jaina reply to the objection to the doctrine of the substantiality of Aloka. We have seen how the objectors contended that in Aloka, admittedly there was no object, so that the question of giving space to objects which is the attribute of Space, cannot arise in the case of Aloka, a part of real space after all. We have seen how the Jaina philosophers defended the substantiality of the Aloka by pointing out that although the attribute of giving space to objects was not explicit in the Aloka, it was nevertheless implicit in it. Again, as will be seen hereafter, according to the Jaina's, the liberated soul rests in perfect peace, far away at the top of the universe and is not affected by nor affects the course of the mundane spheres. It has no need of exercising nor ever exercises any power which thus lies inchoate and unused by it. Yet, Ananta-vīrya or infinite power is said to be one of the Ananta-ṣaṭṣṭaya's or four infinite attributes of a liberated soul. It thus appears to us that the Indian thinkers attribute a quality to a substance, although the former is not explicit in it. The Bhūta's are substances in subtlest forms; the material qualities, attributed to them are not explicit in them; they are described in terms of those material qualities because they are their backgrounds. They are not thus bits of gross matter but only potencies, almost immaterial in character.

Thus if the non-Indian standpoint with respect to the elements was empiric, that of the Indian philosophers was clearly metaphysical. The former consisted in finding out, if possible, the ultimate simple substances; the latter wanted to show what must be the nature of the elements, whatever they may be—in order that the sensuous qualities of the gross matters of our experience may be explained.

The Greek and the Non-Indian theories of elements were wrong, in as much as what they considered to be elements were found to be compound substances. The Indian theory, on the other hand, we venture to think, cannot be taken exception to. Its Bhūta's are only the potential substances which form the basis of all material objects having sensuous qualities. The Bhūta's are thus the potential backgrounds or basal possibilities of the sensuous qualities in the gross material matters. As such, they are the ultimate material reals, infinitely simpler than the elements and bereft of all traces of grossness, the very last meta-empirical bases of all things material.

#### RESEARCHES TOWARDS REDUCING DIVERSE ELEMENTS TO ONE ULTIMATE MATTER-STUFF

Recent spectroscopic observations have led the scientists to surmise that at least some of the elements may be further decomposed. This means that those elements may not be the simple substances which we think them to be but are compounds of simpler bodies. Indeed the idea is getting widely prevalent in the scientists' world that although we have not yet succeeded in decomposing them, most of what we call elements may be compounds and that all matter may ultimately be of one kind only. Thales, Heraclitus and Anaximenes attempted, as we have seen, to reduce all matter to one elemental substance but their elements were too gross to be such ultimate principles. The possibility of reducing all material substances into one element was foreseen by Aristotle who called this ultimate principle *Materia Prima*. Boyle also had some idea of "but one universal matter of things". It is interesting to trace a similar tendency to minimise the distinctive characters of the Bhūta's in some of the schools of Indian philosophy. The Ājīvika's appear to have upheld the doctrine of absolute discreteness of each of the four elements. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika of course upholds the theory of five independent elements. But the difference between the Bhūta's is to some extent mitigated when it is said that Pṛthvi has the four attributes of smell, taste,



colour and touch, Ap, those of taste, colour and touch, Tejas, those of colour and touch and Vāyu that of touch: (3-1-62-63 Nyāya Sūtra's). The Buddhists, it is true, attributed a distinct characteristic to each of the four Bhūta's viz:— Khara i.e. roughness or solidity to Pṛthvī, Sneha or liquidness to Ap, Uṣṇa or heat to Agni and Irana or movement to Vāyu.

तृथिव्यादिपरमाणवः खरस्नेहोष्णेरणस्वभावाः । शारीरकभाष्यम् ।

on 2.2.18. Vedānta Sūtra.

But the passages from the Buddhist texts which we have quoted in our discourse on Space go to show that there is at least a relationship of dependance among the four elements. As a matter of fact, the Buddhist position on this point is exactly similar to that of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, as will appear from Rāmānuja's comment on the Vedānta Sūtra, referred to above. 'ते चैवं मन्यन्ते रूपरसस्पर्शगन्धस्वभावाः पाथिवाः परमाणवः रूपरस-स्पर्शस्वभावा श्याव्याः रूपस्पर्शस्वभावास्तैजसाः स्पर्शद्वभावाश्च वायवीयाः ।'

The Vedānta goes a step further and brings Ākāśa also within the scope of assimilation. According to it, sound is the attribute of Ākāśa, sound and touch are the attributes of Vāyu; sound, touch and colour, of Tejas; sound, touch, colour and taste, of Ap; and these four with smell are the properties of Pṛthvī. The Vedānta takes the final step in the assimilation of elements, when it says that Vāyu comes out of Ākāśa, Tejas out of Vāyu, Ap out of Tejas and Pṛthvī out of Ap. The Sāṃkhya philosophy attributes one particular quality to one particular Bhūta e.g. sound to Ākāśa, touch to Vāyu, colour to Tejas, taste to Ap and smell to Pṛthvī. But the mutual independence of the Bhūta's is nullified when it is said that the five Tanmātrās or subtle causes of the Bhūta's evolve from the unitary principle of Ahaṅkāra. It seems to us that the Sāṃkhya theory of evolution gives us an insight into the nature of the ultimate material principle as conceived by the Indians. The gross bodies evolve from the fine bodies or Bhūta's, these from subtler principles, the Tanmātrās. Underlying the Tan-

mātrā's is the Ahaṅkāra which evolves from the Mahat, which again arises from the most ultimate, the primary Real, the Pradhāna. The Pradhāna has been described as the Sāmyāvasthā or the state of equilibrium of the ultimate material Guṇa's. This equilibrium or homogeneity of absolutely indistinguishable material forces becomes unstable and tends towards heterogeneity, which is the Mahat in its material aspect. This heterogeneity of contending forces again, is not absolute but in its turn it tends towards a unification or concentration which is the Ahaṅkāra, considered from the materialistic standpoint. Ahaṅkāra or the unitary principle in which the germs of multiplicity are held together, gives rise to the five Tanmātrās or subtlest bases of grossness, which in their turn develop the Bhūtas or the subtle material elements. This shows how the ultimate material principle, as conceived by the Indian thinkers is infinitely subtler than the elements, recognised by the present day scientists.

#### JAINA THEORY OF PUDGALA, ONE ULTIMATE MATTER

We have seen already how according to the Jaina's, touch, taste, smell and colour are the properties of matter. Although they say that colour is the distinctive attribute of the Dhātu, Tejas, smell of Pṛthvī, taste of Ap and touch of Vāyu, it will be seen that the Jaina's deny the qualitative difference among the atoms which are the "Dhātu-ṣaṭka-kāraṇam" धातुचतुष्कारणम् or the causal bases of the four elements. It seems to me that Śaṅkara's criticism of the theory अथ सर्वे चतुर्गुणाः i.e. each of the four kinds of elemental atoms has all the four attributes, really refers to the doctrine of the Jaina's. It follows that the primary matter, according to the Jaina's is but of one kind which consists in a potentiality to develop the qualities in the gross material bodies of our experience<sup>1</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> The author of the Prameya-kamalamārtaṇḍa distinctly says:—

न खलु रूपं पृथिव्युदकज्वलनवृत्त्येव वायोरपि तद्वत्तासंभवात् ।  
तथाहि—रूपादिमान् वायुः पीदलिकत्वात् स्पर्शवत्त्वाद्वा पृथिव्यादिवत् ।

### THEORY OF CONTINUOUS MATTER

The above contention of ours that while the ancient Greek doctrine of matter cannot be reconciled with the results of modern researches, the Indian theory is not shaken by them, will find further support from a consideration of the nature of atoms. The atomic theory, as is well known, is based on the assumption that if we go on subdividing and analysing a gross material body, we shall at last come across infinitesimally small particles of matter which cannot be further subdivided and which are strictly discrete and separate from each other. These ultimate irreducible matter-stuffs are atoms. There have been some thinkers both in ancient and modern times who have not admitted the doctrine of atoms as indivisible reals constituting matter. To the opponents of the atomic theory, matter is continuous. Anaxagoras, for instance, maintained that there was no vacuum in space, that it was a complete plenum filled with matter which was a totally continuous substance. Descartes who denied the reality of atoms and who was on this point followed by Spinoza, contended that extension was the attribute of matter, so that matter was really an extended substance and extension was really being filled by matter in all its parts. In recent times, we have got the theory of matter of Helmholtz, who maintains that it is an incompressible and homogeneous perfect fluid which is continuous, so much so that it is devoid of all viscosity.

### ATOMIC THEORY

A question of somewhat similar nature seems to have been agitated in ancient India. The controversies centred round the problem whether matter was infinitely divisible. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers, the Sarvāstivādins of the Buddhist Vaibhāṣika and Sāūtrāntika schools as well as the Jaina's maintained the doctrine of the real existence of the Paramāṇu's or atoms. According to them, the process of subdividing matter cannot go on infinitely. They contended

जलानलयोरपि गन्धरसादिमत्ता प्रतिपत्तव्या । रूपरसगन्धस्पर्शवन्तो हि  
पुद्गलास्तत् कथं—तद्विकाराणां प्रतिनियमः ॥'

that this Anavasthā or infinite regression must be made to end somewhere; for otherwise a mustard seed and the Sumeru mountain both of which were premised to be infinitely divisible, would be of the same mass and density. At a certain stage then, we are bound to have the atoms which are reals and which are the last limits to the process of analysis of matter. On the other hand, there were some thinkers of the Buddhist school who denied the reality of atoms and contended that the process of analysis and subdivision of a gross material substance would at last bring us face to face with the Śūnya i.e. the absolute void or nothing. The Vedānta school, on the contrary, rejected this nihilistic position but at the same time criticised the theory of atoms. Śaṅkara, for instance, takes up for consideration the *Vaiśeṣika* contention that the atoms are the ultimate substances which have no parts and as such, they are neither generated nor destroyed. The *Vaiśeṣika* view is based on the assumption that things come into existence when their parts are united, and are destroyed when their parts are separated. Śaṅkara points out that origination does not necessarily consist in a joining together of parts nor annihilation, in their separation. Ice and curd, for instance, are formed out of water and milk although no new parts or substances are added to them. Similarly, on the application of fire, butter and gold are destroyed (i.e. their hardness is annihilated) although there is no question of separation of parts here. Annihilation, according to Śaṅkara, is thus not a mere sundering of parts but a return to the causal state 'Kāraṇa-bhāvāpatti', as he calls it. Origination similarly, is not a joining together of parts but a development or evolution from the causal substance. The *Vaiśeṣika*'s admit, for instance, the eternal existence of an infinite number of Pārthiva Paramāṇu's or earth-atoms. Śaṅkara points out that these atoms are admittedly of one and the same class. This shows that a still more elemental substance Pṛthvī, transcending these atoms underlies them, which is their Kāraṇa or causal basis. We may therefore very well conceive of the origination as well as the decay of atoms,

in as much as when they evolve out of their elemental cause, they may be said to originate and when they return to it, they are annihilated. The Vedānta philosophers thus deny the elemental existence of material atoms. Matter, if it is real, is not atomic, it is one continuous whole. The doctrine of Māyā conceived as an all-pervasive cosmic principle as well as the Vedāntic theory of Ākāśa as the first material element out of which come the other elements and which actually permeates all material substance, certainly point to a doctrine of material continuity and not to that of an infinite number of self-centred atomic reals.

### SĀMĀKHYA THEORY OF CONTINUOUS MATTER

The Sāmkhya conception of Prakṛti also as the one ultimate cosmic material principle unmistakably lends support to the theory of real matter as a continuous substance. In fact the author of the Sāmkhya Sūtra's criticises the atomic theory by saying that the atoms cannot be the basic reality as they are limited in extent, 'परिच्छिन्नत्वाद् न तत् सर्वोपादानम्।' (१४ विषयाध्यायः) thereby implying that real matter is one continuous and all-pervasive substance.

### GREEK ATOMIC THEORY

On the other hand, the atomic theory also has had its prominent supporters from ancient times and is generally accepted by the present-day physicists. In spite of the fact that the science of hydrostatics may be built upon the hypotheses of a continuous fluid, it may safely be said that the physical sciences in general and the science of chemistry in particular, are based upon the assumption of the real existence of atoms. The theory of atoms was propounded by the early Greeks obviously in opposition to the abstract monism of the Eleatic school. "Leucippus", says Aristotle, "thought he had a theory which was in harmony with sense-perception and did not do away with coming into being and passing away nor motion nor the multiplicity of things. . . . He said that what is real is, strictly speaking, an absolute plenum but the plenum

is not one. On the contrary there are an infinite number of them and they are invisible owing to the smallness of their bulk. They are in perpetual motion and by their coming together, they effect coming into being and by their separation, passing away". The essentials of the Greek atomic theory were thus three viz:—(1) There are an infinite number of smallest possible matter-stuff, called atoms which are absolutely hard and impenetrable, each occupying a definite space; (2) Gross bodies are made up of these atoms, which being in perpetual motion come in contact with and impinge themselves on one another; (3) All qualitative differences in gross bodies are explained by the differences in the arrangement, size, form and situation of their constituent atoms; in other words, all qualitative differences in the material things are reduced to quantitative ones in the atoms.

#### BOSCOVITCH'S THEORY OF ATOMS

As in the case of elements, the Greek theory of atoms has undergone considerable modifications in the hands of the modern scientists, so much so, that it has changed beyond recognition, if not altogether given up. Even those modern thinkers who adhere to the Democritian theory of space-filling atom reject the doctrine of its indivisibility and contend that an atom comprises within it matter which is ideally infinitely divisible but the parts of which have in fact never been nor can be separated from each other. Others have questioned the space-filling character of the atoms. Leucippus, as we have said above "thought that he had a theory which was in harmony with sense-perception". But does sense-perception tell us that matter is an extended substance, filling a definite position of space? I hold a book in my hand and try to press it. What I actually feel then is not that the book is an extended substance but is that I am pressing and acting upon the book which in its turn is equally pressing and reacting upon my hand. In other words, what 'I' perceive then is only a pressure and pressure is only a force. Our ideas of extension are

later developments from this primary experience of force. Accordingly Boscovitch rejected the Greek theory of atoms being extended substances and held in consistency with what our sense-perceptions give us, that atoms are only centres of force. They are no doubt in space but they need not be conceived as space-filling substances. They may be said to have a mass; but, for this they need not occupy space; for the purpose of their mass, it is enough that they are endowed with inertia. According to Boscovitch, then, atoms are geometrical centres of force in space, having no extension.

#### J. C. MAXWELL'S CRITICISM

With all this, however, Boscovitch attributes a peculiar force of repulsion to the atoms, whereby one atom when brought into apparent contact with another repels it absolutely; so that it is impossible for two atoms to coincide or occupy one and the same place. Thus although the theory of Boscovitch divests the atom of the attribute of impenetrability, he seems to introduce the very same characteristic by the back door. There is no doubt that we must endow the atom with the power of repulsion along with one of attraction. To say this, however, is very different from laying it down as a universal law that the power of repulsion is ultimate and absolute in an atom whereby it repels another atom without limit whenever the distance between the two diminishes without limit, making it impossible for the two to coincide in any circumstances whatsoever. Referring to this part of Boscovitch's theory, J. C. Maxwell says:—"But this seems to be an unwarrantable concession to the vulgar opinion that two bodies cannot co-exist in the same place. This opinion is deduced from our experience of the behaviour of bodies of sensible size but we have no experimental evidence that two atoms may not sometimes coincide. For instance, if oxygen and hydrogen combine to form water, we have no experimental evidence that the molecule of oxygen is not in the very same place with the two molecules of hydrogen. Many persons cannot get rid of the opinion that all matter is extended in length, breadth

and depth. This is a prejudice of the same kind with the last arising from our experience of bodies consisting of immense multitudes of atoms". Extension and impenetrability are thus not the essential attributes of the ultimate atom, as conceived by the Greeks and all ideas of definite boundaries to it must be abandoned.

#### VAIŚEŚIKA THEORY OF AṆU, DVYAṆUKA, TRYAṆUKA, ÇATURAṆUKA, ETC.

We are definitely of the opinion that the Indian theory of atoms is essentially different from the Greek and is nearer to the modern scientific conception. According to the Vaiśeṣika's the Tryaṇuka's or the Çaturaṇuka's i.e. combinations of one dyad with one atom or combinations of two dyads are practically the last limits to grossness. They are said to be Mahat i.e. gross; Dīrghatva, however, is another characteristic, attributed to them, which makes them resemble the geometrical lines which have length but no breadth. It is said that the Dvyaṇuka's or dyads which form their constituents have a mass (Parimāṇa) which is not only different from that of the Tryaṇuka's and Çaturaṇuka's in quantity but also in kind. The mass or Parimāṇa of a Dvyaṇuka is called Hṛasva and Aṇu. Its mass is not only subtler than that of a triad but is said to be of a totally different sort. Taking the geometrical analogy again, we may say that while a triad is a geometrical line, a dyad is only a geometrical point which has existence but no magnitude. Paramāṇus are the ultimate atoms of the Vaiśeṣika's. The Parimāṇa or mass of these atoms is called Pārimāṇdalya, which in its turn is said to be different in kind from the Hṛasvatva and Aṇutva, the quantitative aspects of the dyads. This Pārimāṇdalya or mass of the ultimate atom is manifestly devoid of extension and in a sense, more immaterial than material.

#### AN ATOM WITH THE JAINA'S IS LIKE A MATHEMATICAL POINT

Coming to the Jaina theory of atom, we find the author



of the Pañcāsti-kāya-samaya-sāra describing it as *Nanava-kāśo-na-Sāvakaśo*. The atom is spatial as well as non-spatial. It is spatial because it has its existence and activities in points of space. Lest this should mean that the atom is therefore a substance having extensions in length, breadth and depth in space, care is taken in the next breath in describing it as non-spatial. The atom of the Jaina's is thus more like a mathematical point than an extended minute particle of the Greeks.

#### IMPENETRABILITY OF ATOMS CRITICISED

With respect to the doctrine of the impenetrability of atoms also, we find that the Indian theory is far in advance of the Greek theory. We have already said that the Vaiśbhāṣika and the Sautrāntika schools of the Buddhist philosophy admitted the reality of material atoms. Their atomic theory, however, was subjected to unrelenting criticism by the Śūnyavādins and the Vijñānavādins, the nihilist and the subjective idealist sections of the Buddhist thinkers. Vasubandhu in his *Viṃśati-kārikā*, for instance, contends

‘षट्केन युगपद् योगात् परमाणोः षडंशता ?’

On account of the possibility of its simultaneous contact with six other atoms, an atom must be said to have six parts. Śaṅkara also raises the same objection against the atomic theory, when he says:— परमाणूनां परिच्छिन्नत्वाद् यावन्त्यो दिशः षडष्टौ दश वा तावद्भिरवयवैः सावयवास्ते स्युः । सावयवत्वादन्त्याश्चति । The objection may be explained in the following way. A gross material object which can be perceived is said to be made up of atoms. But are the atoms ultimate substances, the further subdivision of which is impossible? This cannot be. The combination of the atoms with one atom means that from the north, the south, the east, the west the up and the down i.e., from the six (or more) directions of the given atom, six (or more) other atoms come and get themselves combined with it. What does this combination imply? The combination means that the given atom with which the six (or more) other atoms are combined has six or (more) parts in the six (or more) directions, with which

six (or more) parts, the six (or more) combining atoms come in contact. Vasubandhu and Śaṅkara contend that thereby an atom must be held to have parts; and that if it has parts, it cannot be the ultimate substance; for, a part is conceivably sub-divisible into further parts and so on. This objection to the atomic theory will be considered later on. Here it is sufficient to state that both the Mādhyamika and the Vijñānavāda schools of Buddhism contended that the process of analysis of matter would at last bring us face to face, not with atoms or ultimate reals but with void or absolute nothingness. The Indian upholders of the atomic theory refused to subscribe to this doctrine on the ground that it deprives the world of matter of all positive reality and leads to the view of the outside world as based on and consisting in nothingness. Accordingly they maintain that atoms are the ultimate reals and constitute the ultimate bases of the material world.

#### CRITICISM APPLIES TO THE CASE OF THE GREEK THEORY OF ATOMS

Whether the Vaibhāṣika and the Sautrāntika thinkers actually held that the atoms were hard and impenetrable matter-stuffs is doubtful. But though we are thus not in a position to decide how far Vasubandhu's criticism of their atomic theory is justifiable, it is manifest that it can be applied with considerable force against the Greek theory of atoms. The Greek atom was only a hard material particle with which other such particles could be combined; this shows, it must have parts, however impenetrable it was conceived to be. As a matter of fact, what was considered to be an ultimate atom has been successfully bombarded by present day scientists and shown to be a conglomerate of minuter stuffs. It cannot be said that the same fate awaits the Indian atom. For, it is infinitely subtler than the Greek atom, the electron, the proton, the aeon and so on. According to the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika thinkers, the Paramāṇu is Niravayava i.e. absolutely devoid of parts, a barest material existence point. With all the powers and

contrivances of modern science, such an almost immaterial point is manifestly indivisible. The abstract character of the Indian atom will be further clear from the Nyāya reply to the objection grounded on the Ākāśa-vyatibheda plea. It is said that the Nyāya theory of Ākāśa as a substance which pervades all things cannot be reconciled with the theory of atoms. It is pointed out that if Ākāśa does not permeate the inside of an atom, its all-pervasive character becomes impossible; on the other hand, if it be held to permeate the inside of an atom, the atom cannot be said to be the ultimate plenum. It would be said that this objection would be valid and unanswerable if the atoms be held to be impenetrable substances. But the Naiyāyikā's steer clear of it by saying that the question of permeation of the interior of atoms by Ākāśa does not arise, as the atoms have neither an interior nor any exterior. A compound product alone has an interior which is covered by an exterior and as the atom is not a compound product but a simple self-existent external real, it has no interior or exterior.

अन्तर्वहिश्च कार्यद्रव्यस्य कारणान्तरवचनाद कार्ये तद्भावः । ४।२।२०।

(न्यायसूत्रम्)

What else, then, can the Indian atom which has neither an inside nor an outside, nor any parts at all, be but the bare mathematical point although material in character?

### JAINA DEFENCE OF THE ATOMIC THEORY

The Jaina philosophers refer exactly to the same abstract character of the atom by saying that it has neither an Ādi i.e. beginning nor any Madhya i.e. middle nor any Anta i.e. end. Yet it cannot be looked upon as a non-existent product of imagination. Try, as we may, we can never fix upon anything like the beginning or the middle or the end of consciousness; yet, consciousness is an admitted reality. In the same way, an atom is a real, although we cannot speak of any forepart, middle part or the hind part of it<sup>1</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> The author of the Rājavārtika says:—

‘आदिमध्यान्तव्यपदेशाभावादिति चेन्न विज्ञानवत्’ ।

Indeed, the repudiation of the atomic character of impenetrability is unmis-

It is needless to add that this Jaina theory goes directly against the Greek theory of impenetrable atoms and is the nearest approach to the modern position that an atom is a geometrical point of force to which extension and impenetrability are inapplicable.

### COMBINATION OF ATOMS

The next question that arises in connection with the doctrine of atoms, is: How do the atoms combine with one another in order to form gross materials? We have seen that the theory of the Greek materialists was that the atoms were in perpetual motion and that "by their coming together they effect coming into being and by their separation, passing away". Although the present day mechanical theory also in its extreme form contends that the world is the outcome of the combinations of material atoms, it tries its best to eliminate from it the element of blind chance as much as possible. Even in ancient times necessity was felt for not leaving every thing to atoms and their motion. Anaxagoras, for instance, introduced *Nous*, a sort of intelli-

kable in the Jaina philosophy. It is said that *Pudgala* can have numerable and innumerable *Pradeśa*'s or minute parts as well as an infinite number of them. Now, it is an admitted fact in the Jaina metaphysics that *Lokākāśa* or occupied space is limited and that *Pudgala* is found within it only. How can infinite parts of matter be contained within finite Space? 'असंख्यातप्रदेशो लोकः अनन्तप्रदेशस्य स्कन्धाधिकरण मिति विरोधः।'

To this objection, the author of the *Rājavārtika* replies:— तन्न किं कारणम् ? सूक्ष्म परिमाणाभावगाहनसामर्थ्यात्। परमाण्यादयो हि सूक्ष्मभावेन परिणता एकैकस्मिन्नाकाशप्रदेशेऽनन्तानन्ता अवतिष्ठन्ते अवगाहनसामर्थ्यमप्येषामव्याहृतमस्ति येन एकैकस्मिन्नपि प्रदेशेऽनन्तानन्तानामवस्थानं न विरुध्यते।

The objection is not valid. Why? Because stuffs in the subtle state can coincide with one another. An infinite number of subtle atoms stay in one and the same point of space. These have such an irresistible capability of coincidence that it is never impossible for an infinite number of them to stay in one and the same point of space.

gent world-principle which brought about the ordered universe. We find the ground work of modern theistic theories consisting in the hypothesis of a world-creator and world-governor in the Anaxagorean doctrine of *Nous*. But this is clearly a step beyond the bounds of strict mechanical materialism. The outlook of Stoic philosophy was no doubt pantheistic and according to it the world-reason was at the basis of the cosmic system. Nevertheless the Stoics tried their best to adhere to the materialistic doctrine as much as possible. The world-reason of theirs was conceived as a warm, vital breath permeating all things material and constituting their immanent moving principle. These attempts at eliminating chance from the world system, consisted however in introducing a principle, foreign to the elementary atoms. Empedocles, on the other hand, attributed *love* and *hate* to the elements themselves whereby their combinations and decompositions were determined. Epicurus similarly adhered to the moving atoms themselves and for the purpose of accounting for their combinations without a reference to chance, he ascribed to them a capacity for *voluntary* deviation from the direct line of their movements. It is obvious that attribution of a sort of mentality to the atoms would not be acceptable to a materialist. Bergman explained combinations of atoms by what he called their *elective attractions*. This elective attraction presupposes the law of 'chemical affinity', in accordance with which the ultimate particles of an element unite with those with which they have affinity. This again implies that elements having not the chemical affinity would not combine. Thus the old Democritian theory of the moving atoms being combined by chance is considerably modified, if not replaced by the modern doctrine of atoms having the forces of attraction and repulsion inherent in them, by means of which they combine with or repel one another according to definite and well-established laws.

#### ATOMS ARE ACTIVE

The Indian theory of atoms like the Greek one ascribes

power of motion or activity to the atoms. In the Śvetāśvatāra Upaniṣad, we meet with the passage:—सम्बाहुभ्यां धमति सम्पतर्त्रं छावाभूमी जनयन् देव एकः। श्वेताश्वतरोपनिषद्।३।३।

Udayana says that the expression 'Patatra' there refers to atoms which are so called because they are in motion.

‘ते हि गतिशीलत्वात् पतत्त्वव्यपदेशाः पतन्तीति ।’

The Jains in the same way distinguish Pudgala from the other non-psychical substances, such as space, time and the principles of motion and rest, which are passive and describe it as Sakriya or active. But in the matter of the combination of atoms, the Indian philosophers eliminate the element of chance as much as possible.

#### COMBINATION OF ATOMS

Indian schools of philosophy are as a rule anthropocentric, rather psycho-centric in their outlook. What are other than the conscious principle. i.e. the material series are conceived as so constituted as to be either the conscious principle's objects or means of enjoyment and experience. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika holds that the creation of the world and for the matter of that, the combination of the self-existent and eternal atoms is effected by the *Iśvara* in order that the souls may have the objects and the means of their experience and enjoyment. The Creator again in his act of creation does not act in an arbitrary way; he shapes the worldly series out of the atoms in accordance with the *Adṛṣṭa* of the conscious selves i.e. in a manner that one might reap what he had sown. The Creator's power over the atoms, again, is not absolute. They are not only self-existent uncreates but in the matter of their combination they have laws of their own. Their combination is possible only when there are what are called *Sneha* and *Dravatva* in them. The word, *Sneha* ordinarily means attachment or stickiness and the word *Dravatva* means ordinarily liquidness. In the case of the combination of the supersensuous atoms, *Sneha* and *Dravatva* cannot evidently be taken in their popular sense. May we not be justified in thinking that

Sneha and Dravatva as conditions of atomic combination mean only that it is affinity and attraction which join the elemental corpuscles?

### THE JAINA THEORY OF ATOMIC COMBINATION

The Jaina philosophy does not see the necessity of a world-creator. According to it, atoms combine without the intervention of a God. This, however does not mean that the world is the result of a fortuitous combination of atoms, a combination purely due to chance. The Jaina's believe neither in the creation nor in the destruction of the world at particular points of time. According to them, the cosmic course is beginningless and endless. Matter is eternal but in its unmodified essence, it does never exist. Gross matter on decomposition terminates in atoms and atoms in their turn are forming or are capable of forming gross things; matter is continually going through modes after modes, so that in the case of the Jaina's the question of matter remaining permanently either as atomic or as gross does not arise<sup>1</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> This is the reason why the author of the Rāja-Vārtika refuses to regard atoms either as uncaused cause or as eternal. It is generally assumed that because on ultimate decomposition, we come to atoms which are not further divisible, we must treat them as 'Parama-Kāraṇam' or ultimate i.e. uncaused cause, 'Nitya' or eternal i.e. indestructible. Even the author of the Pancastī-kāya-samaya-sāra describes atoms as 'सर्वेसि खंधानं जो अतो तं विभाग परमाणु सो सम्दो।'

That which is the Anta or terminating point in the process of decomposition of gross things is the ultimate atom which is eternal.

Akalanka Deva, on the contrary, contends that 'कारणमेव तदन्त्यमित्य-समीक्षिताभिधानं कथञ्चित् कार्यत्वात्।'

To say that the atom is the Antya Kāraṇa or ultimate cause is not quite correct; because in some respects, it also is a Kārya i.e. has its cause.

Atoms are come across only when gross things are decomposed.

भेदादणुः।५।२८। तत्त्वार्थाधिगमसूत्रम्।

so that in some sense atoms also have their cause.

'नित्य इति चायुक्तम् स्नेहादिभावेनानित्यत्वात्।'

### ATOMS ARE NOT ETERNAL ACCORDING TO THE JAINA'S

That is to say, we cannot speak of atoms as eternally remaining in self-identity; where by the operation of the laws of chemical synthesis, atoms combine and form a gross thing, they can well be said to have lost their nature and been replaced by other reals. What continues is the material essence underlying them and atoms are only passing phases of matter. The Jaina's accordingly maintain that atoms are no more ultimate and eternal than the grosser compounds. The latter are being constantly decomposed into the former and the former are constantly being turned into the latter. All that we can say is that matter in its essence is eternal and indestructible of which the atomic and the gross are the two changeable aspects or modifications.

### BOTH ATOMS AND GROSSER BODIES ARE PASSING PHASES OF MATTER

This peculiar standpoint of the Jaina's regarding the atoms need not be brushed aside summarily. For the doctrine that it is the atoms that existed from the beginningless time and that thereafter at a certain point of time, the molecular bodies began to be formed out of them, is after all an assumption. It may as well be said that it is the elemental molecules that have existed at all times and that atoms come out only on their decomposition. "The formation of the molecule", says Maxwell, "is therefore an event not belonging to that order of nature under which we live. It is an operation of a kind which is not, so far as we are aware, going on earth or in the sun or the stars, either now or since those bodies began to be formed. It must be referred to the epoch, not of the formation of the earth or of the solar system, but of the establishment of the existing order of nature and till not only these worlds and systems but the very order of nature itself is dissolved we have no reason to expect the occurrence of any operation of a similar

To say that the atom is eternal is also unreasonable, because on account of the operation of the forces of *Sneha* etc, its non-eternality becomes evident.



kind". Our observation and scientific experience yield only this that matter is capable of modifications. These modifications consist in combinations of atoms, their decompositions and again in fresh combinations and so on. These combinations are not due to the interventions of the Creator nor are left to pure chance. Modifications of matter are strictly determined by the conditions and circumstances, then prevailing. There are the infinite number of souls in the world in various stages of developments; there are the principles of motion and rest; there is space in which all substances are contained; there is time, the principle of continuous mutation; there are the innumerable material forces. All these are realities in every moment and the modification of a material phenomena of a given moment is determined by these factors. 'यत्र पुनरणुभ्यस्तदुत्पत्तिस्तत्र तत्तत्काल-  
दिसप्तग्रीसव्यपेक्ष क्रियावशात् प्रादुर्भूतम् .....

as Ratnaprabhāṣya says.

#### COMBINATION OF ATOMS, DEPENDENT BOTH ON INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL CAUSES

As regards the manner of atomic combination, the Jaina's maintain that this is due to the operation of two forces, qualities or Guṇas, as they call them, of Sncha and Rūkṣa. According to the Greek materialists' conception, atoms combined when per chance they happened to come in contact with each other. Combination was thus left to pure chance, an external blind agency after all. We have already referred to the theory of elective attraction of Bergman. Lavoisier and others improved upon this theory and established that combination cannot be said to be due simply to the fact that one factor elected to attract another. The combination of the two constituents in a compound is dependent on their mass, so that the mutual attraction of the two combining substances was governed by the same law by which the planetary bodies attract each other. Thus the combination of one atom with another must be said to be due to both external and internal factors i.e. forces both outside and inherent in the combining particles. This law seems

to have been recognised by the Jaina thinkers who pointed out that Sneha and Rūkṣa, the two forces operating in the matter of combination of atoms with all their various modes and manners of operation were dependent on causes both external and inherent in the nature of the atoms.

बाह्याभ्यन्तरकारणबशात् स्नेहपर्यायाविर्भावात्। and द्वितयनिमित्तबशात् रूक्षणाद् रूक्ष इति व्यपदिश्यते।

#### SNEHA AND DRAVATVA: SNIGDHA AND RŪKṢA

Like the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika expressions, Sneha and Dravatva the Jaina Snigdha and Rūkṣa also cannot be taken in their literal and popular sense. It is only safe to assume that they signify only the grounds or forces which account for the combination of atoms. The Jaina's maintain that an atom with the minimum degree of Snigdha or Rūkṣa cannot combine with another; that atoms with equal degree of either Snigdha or Rūkṣa cannot combine with others of their own or of the opposite state; that, in order that an atom may unite with another there should be a difference of two degrees of Snigdha or Rūkṣa between them. All these assertions of the Jaina physicists, we confess, are unintelligible. At the same time, it is possible to trace in them a vague conception of the important law of chemical combination of elements. Dalton discovered that the atoms of one element which combine with those of another element bear a *weight* which is different from that of the other. These respective weights of the two combining atoms are definite and their ratios can be denoted by numbers. In a similar way Gay Lussac demonstrated that a definite *volume* of oxygen combined with exactly twice its bulk of hydrogen and pointed out that there is a definite relation between the volumes of two combining gases and also between their total volume in the combined and in the uncombined conditions. It is thus established that there are laws governing combinations of atoms. Molecules of a given element consist of similar (Sadrśa, as the Jaina's call them) atoms while those of compounds are conglomerates of dissimilar atoms; but the proportions in weight and volume in which the

elements unite together are definite and constant. As we have said already, the early Greek physicists were ignorant of these laws of atomic combinations but in the mysterious Jaina doctrines of the *Snigdha* and *Rūkṣa*, there seems to be a vague recognition of them.

#### NATURE OF ATOMIC COMBINATION

The next question that arises in connection with the combination of atoms is in respect of the nature of combination itself. What is meant by saying that one atom has combined with another? The early Greek Materialists, as we have seen, maintained that the atoms, hard particles as they were, simply impinged themselves upon one another. The doctrine of impenetrability of atoms has been exploded and as Maxwell points out, the atoms may coincide. It is also to be noted that if atoms be the hard, space-filling substances of Democritus, they become unfitted for the construction of perfect geometrical forms so that the Greek theory of atoms may be said to have failed to explain atomic combination. Boscovitch, on the other hand, endowed atoms with an ultimate force of repulsion. Two atoms said to come in contact with each other, do not actually do so. All that is meant is that as they are being brought closer and closer, a distance is at last reached at which the mutual repulsion becomes so great that their absolute coincidence cannot be effected by any amount of force. The combination of atoms, forming an extended thing thus does not mean their actual contact, it is really action at a distance, although to all intents and purposes, the atoms may be said to have come in contact and combined with each other.

#### VAIBHĀSIKA DOCTRINES

In India, the Vaibhāṣika's of the Buddhist school maintained that atoms have *Samyoga* i.e. are actually combined, when they form a gross body. There was, however, a difference of opinions among them as regards the nature of this combination. Bhadanta Śubha Gupta is said to have held that there was an actual uniting together or mixing

up of the combining atoms. Other thinkers of the Vaibhāṣika school maintained that although the atoms combined to form a gross body, there remained always an intervening space between them. Yet a third view among some of the Vaibhāṣika philosophers was that atoms when combining came in closest contact with each other, so that no space intervened between them. The first of these views is represented in modern times by the school of Maxwell while the second and the third are implied in the theory of Boscovitch.

### VASUBANDHU'S CRITICISM

The first of the above Vaibhāṣika doctrines of combination is criticised by Vasubandhu:—

‘षण्णां समानदेशत्वात् पिण्डः स्यादणुमानकः।’

If the six combining atoms coincide with each other, the result is nothing other than an atom.

That is to say, Vasubandhu points out that if the atoms are Niravayava having like geometrical points positions but no magnitude, any number of them by combining with each other would fail to produce a gross thing having magnitude. The second view is criticised on the ground.

‘द्वयश्लेषो हि सम्बन्धो द्वित्वे स च कथं भवेत्।’

If the two atoms continue to remain two independent atoms by having an intervening space between them, how can we say that they are combined?

Vasubandhu's criticism of the third theory of the Vaibhāṣika's has already been stated:—

‘षट्केन युगपद् योगात् परमाणोः षडंशता।’

If a combination of six atoms coming from six directions be possible with one particular atom, then the latter must be held to have six parts (upon which the former six get themselves impinged).

The atoms, however, are premised to be absolutely simple and to have no parts. The Śūnyavāda and the Vijñānavāda sections of the Buddhist school end their criticism of

the Vaibhāṣika and the Sautrāntika theories of atomic combination by saying:—

तस्मात् प्रकृतिभिन्नानां सम्बन्धो नास्ति तत्त्वतः ।

(धर्मकीर्ति-संबन्धपरीक्षा)

### DOCTRINE OF PRATIGHĀTA

It must be admitted that the above criticisms of the theories of atomic combination have considerable force. It is still a problem how the atoms, supersensuous mathematical centres of force, having no magnitude as they are conceived to be, can by their combination give rise to extended bodies. To explain extension, some Indian philosophers said that the atoms alleged to have combined, do not really unite but approach one another as much as possible. In other words, the combination of atoms does not mean their actual Saṃyoga but their Pratighāta. The word Pratighāta sounds like Boscovitch's ultimate force of repulsion inherent in an atom which prevents two atoms attracting each other from coinciding with each other. It is doubtful if the theory of Pratighāta would fully account for our ideas of combination of atoms. Mere approaching each other or staying side by side, of the atoms would not explain our experience of the oneness and the grossness of a material body. It appears that the Vaibhāṣika's did not admit any assimilating principle in the atoms, so that a gross body in accordance with their theories, was after all a loose conglomerate of independent atoms and not the unitary whole of our experience. It also appears that they failed to explain how the atoms, absolutely insensible substances as they were, could give rise to a sensible body having a mass or density. Unity and massiveness of a gross material body of our sensuous experience remain apparently unexplained by the Vaibhāṣika's. An aggregate of independent particles is not one unitary whole; nor can an infinite number of absolutely insensible particles by their addition produce a sensible gross body. Are we then to submit to the conclusion of some of the Buddhist thinkers:—'ती च भावौ तदन्यस्य सर्वे ते स्वात्मनि स्थिता । इत्यमिश्राः स्वयंभावास्तान् मिश्रयति कल्पना ।'

Each of the atoms is independent; it is impossible for them to really combine with each other; our imagination only presents them as combined.

#### NYĀYA-VAIŚEṢIKA CRITICISM

The philosophers of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school opposed the above Buddhistic doctrine. According to them, the object of our perception is a real unitary and massive whole and not a matter of imagination. The combination of atoms is not a mere Pratighāta and Pratyāsatti or approach to each other short of coalescence. It is a real combination, called Saṁgraha, a mode of Saṁyoga. This Saṁgraha or real combination which is more than Pratighāta, is effected by Sneha and Dravatva, the forces working at and for atomic combination. As the author of the Upas-kāra to the Vaiśeṣika Sūtra's says:—

‘संग्रहो हि स्नेहद्रवत्वकारितः संयोगविशेषः।’

#### ATOMS HAVE NO PARTS—NIRAVAYAVA

This Saṁgraha presents the atoms as combined, so much so, that if one part of the thing constituted by the combined atoms be held (Dhāraṇa) or drawn (Ākarṣaṇa), the whole of it and not some of the atoms only, is held and drawn. As regards the Buddhistic objection that all Saṁyoga or contact implies parts in the united objects, so that in the case of two combining atoms we are to admit parts in the atoms, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika reply is that it cannot apply in the case of the atoms which are Niravayava or absolutely devoid of parts. We can say that one atom combines with two other atoms on two sides of it; the former may intervene between the two and may prevent the latter from coming into contact with each other. But this does not mean that the atom must have parts. All these are possible for a Niravayava atom, only if it be held to have the power of touching i.e. the capacity to combine. As Vātsāyana says:— ‘स्पर्शवान्गुः स्पर्शवतोरण्वोः प्रतिघाताद् व्यवधायको न सावयवत्वाद्।’

We are always to remember that an atom is absolutely simple, *Niravayava*. A gross or *Sāvayava* substance when combining with another may be supposed to have parts of it combined with the parts of the other. But in the case of the combination of simple substances, this supposition would be wrong. Simple substances combine because they have the capacity to combine. In this connection the *Nyāya* thinkers point out that *Samyoga* does not necessarily imply that the things in contact with each other must have parts. In the case of our perception, we talk of a contact between the soul and the mind, none of which has any parts. It is true that atoms combining with a particular given atom come from different directions of it and that thereby the given atom appears as if it has parts in its different directions. This is, however, a mere supposition, an imaginary conception helpful to our understanding of atomic combination. It is called '*Bhāgabhakti*', a false idea that there are parts where in reality there are no parts. The real state of affairs however is that an atom is absolutely *Niravayava*, that its combination with another is due to its inherent capacity to combine and that the phenomena of atomic combination does not necessitate the supposition that atoms are constituted of parts.

#### NYĀYA THEORY OF COMBINATION OF ATOMS

The *Naiyāyika*'s point out that although the atoms are insensible, it is possible for their combination to produce a massive thing. The *Vaiśeṣika*'s held out that our experience of massiveness or *Mahatva* is based on a comparative estimate. One atom may be insensible; a combination of two atoms also may be insensible but a combination of many more atoms will give us the perception of a massive thing. Massiveness according to them does not pertain to the nature of the thing. We call a certain thing massive, as opposed to an insensuous substance because the former is found to have greater quantitative stuff than the latter. *Mahatva* or massiveness is thus different from *Anutva* or atomicness only in degree or quantity—not in kind and the

experience of the former is based on *Atiśaya-jñāna* or a comparative estimate of quantities. As we have already seen, according to the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* the *Pārimāṇdalya* or the *Parimāṇa* of an atom is different from *Mahatva* or the massiveness of a gross thing not only in quantity but also in quality and kind. The massiveness in a gross matter is something essentially and qualitatively different from atomic quantity. The experience of massiveness is thus not the result of *Atiśaya-jñāna* or comparison of quantities of a gross thing and the atomic matter but is a new and qualitatively different one altogether.

#### PERCEPTION OF THE WHOLE

Regarding our experience of the oneness in the gross thing the *Vaiśeṣika*'s contend that it is but the perception of the atomic aggregate. Although the atoms constituting a gross thing are many in number their '*Samastī*' or aggregation appears to us as one undivided whole. The *Nyāya* contention on the contrary is that our perception of oneness also is a unique experience and is different from the experience of an aggregate of discrete parts.

#### UNIQUE SENSATION OF EXTENSITY OR VOLUMINOUSNESS

In modern psychology, we find similar doctrines concerning matters of perception. Our perception of an extended thing consists in our apprehension of discrete but co-existing points having certain quasi-distance between them. But in our perception of the thing, this is not all. We have a peculiar feeling of the undivided wholeness of the thing under observation. This sensation of the thing as one whole is different from its experience as an extended substance having distinguishable dimensions and appearing as a continuous, co-existent manifold of positions. Some have called the former, a feeling of '*voluminousness*' or '*massiveness*'. To distinguish this sense-experience of one whole from our perception of extension, James and Ward have called the former '*extensity*' or '*extensiveness*'. Herbert Spencer contended that this feeling of massiveness



is but a developed form of our sensation of co-existent space-points. In a way, then, Spencer attempted to get extensity out of extension and his theory is comparable to the Vaiśhāṣika doctrine that our experience of the oneness and the wholeness of a thing is due to our perception of the aggregated atoms constituting it. Ward, on the contrary maintains that "the feeling of crude extensity" "discernible in each and every sensation is an original one". "We do not first experience", says he, "a succession of touches or of retinal excitations by means of movements and then when these impressions are simultaneously presented, regard them as extensiveness, but before and apart from movement, altogether, we experience that massiveness or extensity of impressions in which movements enable us to find positions". The theory of Ward is thus similar to the theory of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika regarding the originality and the uniqueness of our experience of Ekatva and Mahatva in a gross thing constituted of discrete atoms.

#### AVAYAVA AND AVAYAVI

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika explains this unique experience by their doctrine of Avayava. They call atoms Avayava's and point out that although atoms constituting a gross thing are many in number and magnitudeless points in themselves they when combined give rise to altogether different characteristics, Vijātīya, as they call them, viz. of massiveness and oneness. Thus when we say that we perceive a gross thing, we do not perceive the atoms, nor a mere arithmetical sum-total of them. We perceive then an altogether new thing, called Avayavī by them which is a strictly one whole substance. This Avayavī is an indivisible whole which with its wholeness is present in every part of the thing under observation, so that the perception of a part of the thing gives an immediate impression of the thing in its totality. This is in consistency with the position of natural realism taken by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika according to which our percepts have a corresponding counterpart outside us, so that our experience of oneness

and wholeness must have a real Avayavī as its objective background.

### JAINA THEORY OF REAL COMBINATION OF ATOMS

The Jaina's do not believe in the real existence of the Avayavī in the way in which it is done by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. All the same, however, they reject the Buddhist objections to the real existence of the atoms on the ground of impossibility of their combination. The Jaina's assert that atoms really exist and they combine. The atomic combination is a real combination and not a mere association. It is due to the two forces of assimilation inherent in atoms viz: Snigdha and Rūkṣa. 'श्लेषः स्निग्धरूक्षतानिवन्धनो बन्धोऽभ्युपगन्तव्यः ।'

They point out that our experience of a thing is that of it as a connected whole; unless there is real and essential connection among the constituent parts of it, such an experience is impossible. If the constituents were not really connected, they would have been perceived as disconnected discretes. 'सम्बन्धाभावे तु तेषां विशिष्टः प्रतिभासः स्यात् ।'

The constituents are perceived as related; they are not perceived as unrelated; why should we then imagine them as unrelated?

'कथं च सम्बन्धे प्रतीयमानेऽप्रतीयमानस्याप्यसम्बन्धस्य कल्पना ?'

If the atoms be held to be mutually unrelated practical functioning would be impossible. No one would think of the possibility of holding or collecting water unless the constituents of water would enter into real combinations with each other and form a measurable quantity.

अर्थक्रियाविरोध इच्छाणूनामन्योऽन्यमम्बन्धतो जलधारणाहरणाद्यर्थं  
'क्रियाकारित्वानुपपत्तेः । रज्जुर्वशदण्डादीनामेकदेशाकर्षणे तदन्याकर्षणं  
चासम्बन्धवादिनो न स्यात् ।'

If the combination of the parts were not real, it would be impossible to draw the other part of a rope or stick by pulling one part of it.

The Jaina's point out that the Buddhists conceive of two modes of combination only सर्वात्मना and एकदेशेन ; that is, the Buddhists think that a substance combining with another must either lose itself in the latter or come in partial or apparent contact with it. But other kinds of combination are possible, in which the two combining substances may preserve their underlying basis and yet evolve characteristics which are new in some respects. Water and barley, for instance, may be combined; in the combination neither barley nor water loses itself; yet from their combination, a new compound comes into existence which is neither barley nor water. This is a mode of combination in which each particle of one of the combining substances permeates or mixes itself with a particle of the other substance. Another mode of combination is that in which all the particles of one of the combining substances do not combine with those of the other, in which there is but partial contact, but out of which, all the same a new thing emerges. An instance of such a combination in grosser matters would be the cleaving of fingers. In cleaving, the fingers do not wholly touch each other; yet what results from cleaving is a fist,—a new phenomenon, in some respects different from the fingers. With regard to the former mode of combination, the Buddhist objection 'विण्णोऽणुमात्रः स्यात्' has obviously no application. Regarding the latter mode of combination, the Buddhists, as we have seen, point out that it involves differentiation within the atom. The Jaina's reply to this by saying that if the differentiation means a differentiation in the *nature* of the atom, the objection is harmless, in as much as it is admitted that an atom has the capacity in combining with various other atoms, coming from various directions of it. If, however by differentiation the Buddhists mean that an atom is to have parts, the objection is unfounded; because it is the ultimate and simple stuff devoid of any parts'.

\* As the author of the *Prameya-Kamala-Mārtanḍa* points out:—

'नन्वेवं परमाणूनामप्यंशवत्त्वप्रसङ्गः स्यात्, इत्यप्यनुत्तरम् यतोऽत्रांशशब्दः

## COMBINATION OF ATOMS ACCORDING TO THE JAINA'S

In short, the Jaina position is that atomic combination is real; it is due to the capacity inherent in the atom; combination does not imply that an atom has parts; the result of combination of atoms is that although the same underlying substance continues and persists in the atoms and their compound, the latter presents characteristics which are in some respects different from those of its constituents.

## NATURE OF ATOMS

The above brings us to a consideration of the last point in the Greek theory of atoms. We have seen that the school of Democritus and Leucippus reduced all qualitative differences in the material things to quantitative ones in the atoms. The position of the present day physicists continues to be essentially the same. It is maintained that the qualities and characteristics that are met with in the gross material things of our experience are explained by the ultimate atoms and their positions and functionings. Colour, for instance, is no attribute inherent in matter. Its sensation is due to wave-lengths and modes, manners and intensities of retinal excitations, caused by them. Physical sciences of today, have demonstrated how our sensations are caused by matters in motion or different collections of them. This, however, does not mean that bare abstract matter bereft of all capacities and attributes is alone sufficient to explain the varied sensations. The sensation of taste, for instance, is different from the sensation of colour. What is this difference due to? The position of natural realism which is taken by the physicists precludes them from making any reference to the idealistic standpoint according to which the cognising subject has a hand in the shaping of the sensation. We are thus to seek the explanation either in the external stimuli causing the excitation of the sense-organs or the sense-

स्वभावाद्यर्थोऽवयवार्थो वा स्यात् । यदि स्वभावाद्यर्थो न कश्चिद्दोषस्तेषां विभिन्न दिग्विभानव्यवस्थितानेकाणुभिः सम्बान्वयानुपपत्त्या तावद्वा स्वभाव भेदो-  
पपत्तेः । अवयवार्थं तत्रासौ नोपपद्यते तेषां मभेदत्वेनावयवासंभवात् ।'

organs excited by the stimuli. But both the stimuli and the receiving organs are matter or modes of matter. It is thus matter in which we are to find out the grounds for our different sensations.

#### QUESTION IS METAPHYSICAL

This, however, does not mean that the atoms or ultimate stuffs of matter must be invested with the explicit characteristics of gross material substances. In other words, the metaphysical necessity of supposing matter to be the grounds of our varied sensations does not imply that the atoms themselves are to be of actual colours, tastes, or smells. It means that for the purposes of our sensations, it is not enough, that there be material atoms endowed with simple inertia, and certain powers of attraction and repulsion but that they should be the ultimate grounds of our varied sensations. The question is not one for the physical sciences which are perfectly justified in demonstrating how or under what conditions e.g. in what modes of matter or their functionings the different sensations arise. It is metaphysical, in as much as it enquires what should be the nature of matter in order that it may be the grounds of our sensations.

In our consideration of the nature of elements, we saw that the Indian standpoint was metaphysical. The attribution of Rūpa and Sparśa, for instance, to the element, Tejas, did not mean that this ultimate element or the elemental atoms were actually hot and brilliant substances. There we referred to the view of Vātsāyana that there may be Tejas in which Rūpa and Sparśa were not explicit (अनुद्भूतरूपस्पर्शोऽप्रत्यक्षः). It appears that when Indian philosophers endowed the elements and the elemental atoms with attributes, found in gross sensuous matters, all that they meant was that it is in the elemental matter that we are to find the grounds of our different sensations.

#### SENSE ATTRIBUTES AND THE MATERIAL ELEMENTS

The sense-attributes of Rūpa etc. attributed to the pri-

mordial Bhūta's and atoms by the Buddhists did not signify the material qualities as we find them in the gross matters. Those attributes when applied to the ultimate elements were described as सर्वापकर्षप्राप्तः i.e. barest capacities or potentialities.

The fact that by attributing colour, taste, etc. to the elements or the elemental atoms, the Indian philosophers did not mean that these were actually coloured or tasteful substances like those gross articles of our taste or vision, will be further evident from the Jaina view about the nature of the Pudgala'.

#### IN A SENSE, THE 'SECONDARY' QUALITIES ARE AS GOOD AS A 'PRIMARY' QUALITIES

The ground of the varieties of our sensations are to be sought for in ultimate matter. This does not mean that the ultimate atoms themselves are actually coloured or tasteful; they have the capacities to develop the sensuous characteristics in gross matters. An eminent science scholar of the present day seems to admit this, when he said: "All this shows that there is something, whatever it may be, in the objects themselves, representative of sensations and a realist is led to think that the so-called secondary qualities of Locke are just as primary as any other. ("Review of Philosophy and Religion", Vol. II, No. I; "Modern Concepts of Matter", p. 24).

<sup>1</sup> Brahma-deva presents this matter extremely well, when he says—

तथाहि यथाऽनन्तज्ञाननदर्शनसुखवीर्यगुणचतुष्टयं सर्वजीवसाधारणं, तथा रूपरसगन्धस्पर्शगुणचतुष्टयं सर्वपदुगलसाधारणं यथा च शुद्धबुद्धैकस्वभाव-सिद्ध जीवेऽनन्त चतुष्टयमतीन्द्रियं, तथैव शुद्धपदुगलपरमाणुद्रव्ये रूपादि-चतुष्टय मतीन्द्रियं यथा रागादिस्नेहगुणेन कर्मबन्धावस्थायां ज्ञानादिचतु-ष्टयस्याशुद्धत्वं तथा स्निग्धरूक्षत्वगुणेन द्राणुकादिवन्धावस्थायां रूपादि-चतुष्टयस्याशुद्धत्वम् ।

The substance of the above is as follows. If we compare the nature of the soul with that of matter, we find that just as the four infinities of Apprehension,

### ATOMS HAVE NO QUALITATIVE OR QUANTITATIVE DIFFERENCE IN THEM

There is another point regarding the Paramāṇu which we want to notice very briefly before we finish our consideration of the nature of an atom. Pudgala has been described by the Jaina's as characterised by touch, taste, smell and colour. The Paramāṇu as the ultimate stuff of the Pudgala must accordingly be thought of as a potentiality which makes those sensuous phenomena explicit in the Skandha, a material mass. Now, touch has been said to be of eight kinds, taste, of five, smell, of two and colour, of five varieties. Of the eight kinds of touch smooth and rough, heavy and light are obviously met only in the gross bodies and cannot be associated with atoms. The Jaina philosophers, however, maintain that one atom has a simple taste, colour and smell and only a pair of compatible touches. Are we then to suppose that atoms are of different kinds, rather of different stuffs, so that some are red colour atoms, some blue colour atoms, some cold touch atoms, some hot touch atoms, some acid taste atoms, some sweet taste atoms, some fragrant smell atoms, some loathsome smell atoms and so on? We think, the fundamental doctrine of the Paramāṇu, as enunciated by the Jaina's would not permit the recognition of any such *qualitative* differences in the atoms. Atoms in themselves are all strictly similar to each other, not only quantitatively but also qualitatively. This means that all the varieties of touch, two kinds of smell, five modes of

Cognition, Joy and Power are inherent in every soul, the four attributes of Colour, Taste, Smell and Touch are inherent in every matter. In a pure soul, unaffected by matter, the four aforesaid psychical characteristics are Atindriya i.e. independent of the sense-operations. In the same way, in pure atomic matter, the four material attributes are Atindriya i.e. lie as implicit capacities. In a soul which is in bondage to Karma on account of Rāga or Dveṣa i.e. attachment and envy, the psychical attributes of knowledge etc. become impure i.e. blurred and limited. In the same way, when the atoms because of the operations of the forces of Snigdha and Rūkṣa undergo combinations into dyads etc. their attributes of colour etc. become impure i.e. become of the nature of the attributes of gross sensuous things. The implications of the above almost classical utterances of the commentator of Dravya-Saṃgraha are unmistakable.

taste and five kinds of colour are implicit in each and every atom. Every atom is capable of producing any colour, any taste, any smell and any touch. What then is meant when the Paramāṇu is said to be of only one single taste, colour etc.? We think, here the nature of Paramāṇu is considered with reference to its corresponding gross material mass. A Skandha or a molecular mass, as every one knows, can have only one taste, it cannot have all the five tastes at one and the same time. So, as regards smell, it is either agreeable or disagreeable, cannot be both. Similarly, with regard to colour, it is either red, or yellow, or of any other colour and cannot be of more than one colour at one and the same time. And lastly, as regards touch, a material gross thing can have two i.e. a pair of such touches as hot and hard and so on and not all the eight kinds of touch all at once. It appears that when the atom is said to be of one taste etc. etc., all that is meant is that so far and so long as you consider the characteristics of a particular Skandha, you must attribute the same qualities to its constituent atoms. Thereby, however, the capacity of an atom to develop different characteristics in different Skandha's under different circumstances is not denied. When we have a particular Skandha, manifesting particular characteristics, we are to attribute only those particular characteristics to its constituent Paramāṇu's; this does not mean that those Paramāṇu's can on no account evolve different characteristics. While commenting on the doctrine that a Paramāṇu has a single taste, colour etc. Professor Chakravarty says, "This description would naturally introduce qualitative difference among atoms and yet according to the author there can be no qualitative difference among atoms as they are identical material units". He stops abruptly, creating an impression that we are here face to face with a manifest contradiction in the Jaina theory, a riddle which it is impossible to explain. The contradiction, we think, would disappear if we remember that an atom is said to be of one colour, one taste etc. only in reference to the gross thing of which it is a constituent part. A Paramāṇu



in itself has a potentiality for any of the sense-phenomena. Thus in the technical terms of the Jaina epistemology, we may say that from the viewpoint of their Dravya or essential substance, all the atoms are similar and there is no qualitative difference among them but that from the viewpoint of the Parayāya's or modifications of that Dravya, an atom has only one taste, one smell etc., so that there is to be admitted a qualitative difference among the atoms<sup>1</sup>.

### IMPORTANCE OF ATOMS

We thus draw our discourse on Paramāṇu's or atoms to a close. These are in a sense most important of the non-psychical substances. According to the Jaina's, it is the Paramāṇu which by its motion from one space point to the immediate next determines the minutest instant of time; in other words, an instant or the shortest point or period of Kāla corresponds to the motion of a Paramāṇu from the spatial point occupied by it to the immediate next. A Paramāṇu is thus the *measure of time*. The quantity or density (Dravya) of a material mass as well as the extent of space (Kṣetra) occupied by it, depend obviously on the Paramāṇu's, the constitutive elements of the mass. The temporal order (Kāla) of the mass also is dependent on the Paramāṇu's. And finally, the Paramāṇu's through their aggregation and disintegration determine the varied modifications (Bhāva) of a material substance. For those reasons,

<sup>1</sup> While expounding the above view of ours, we are not unmindful of what Akalaṅka states in this connection. "The Paramāṇu", says he, "is to be known as of one taste, one smell. Why? Because it has no varied parts". He argues that while a peacock, as a gross thing, may have different colours, you cannot attribute more than one colour to the atom. Closely viewed, the assertion of Akalaṅka does not go against what we have stated. When he says that a peacock has varied colours, all that he means is that the different parts of a peacock's body have different colours. We agree with Akalaṅka in admitting that a particular colour, and no other colour, is to be attributed to those atoms which constitute that part of the peacock's body which bears that particular colour. But this does not mean that they are never capable of producing any other colour. Akalaṅka must have meant that when those atoms combined to make that particular part of the peacock's body, they developed only that one single colour, the capacity for producing other colours being allowed to remain dormant, rather, in abeyance, in them, for the time being.

a Paramāṇu is looked upon as a “Pavīhattā” of “Saṁkhā” i.e. determinant of the number or quantity of a material mass.

## MATTER IN ITS GROSS FORM

Matter in its gross form is called Skandha. It is a complete molecular constitution. In a Skandha, we have the material qualities of touch, taste, odour and colour, in their explicit manifestation<sup>1</sup>.

### COMBINATION, MODES OF

We may, however, consider here some of the gross modes of matter, as stated by the Jaina's.

<sup>1</sup> It is defined as “Sayala Samattham” (Sakala-Samasta) i.e. a complete molecule. Such a molecular body is said to be capable of existing in any of the six forms.

1. Bādara-bādara, a solid thing. Under this class, come those substances which we ordinarily call solid and hard.

2. Bādara—a liquid thing. The characteristic of such a substance e.g. water, is that its parts become combined as soon as they are separated.

3. Sūkṣma—bādara,—a substance, appearing as solid. Instances of such a substance are darkness, lightning, shadow,—a mass of which can neither be broken nor separated nor caught hold of.

4. Bādara-sūkṣma,—a small particle, capable of being perceived. A substance under this class is very minute, although it is perceptible by the senses of touch, taste, smell and hearing.

5. Sūkṣma,—a particle so small as to be imperceptible. Karma-pudgala is a substance of this nature which is so minute as to be supersensuous.

6. Sūkṣma-Sūkṣma,—an extremely small particle. Such a substance is minuter than even the Karma-pudgala. It is Skandha all the same and may be an aggregate made up of two Paramāṇu's only.

“The six forms of molecular aggregates”, says Kunda Kundācāryya, “are Earth, Water, Shadow, the objects of the four senses, Karma and Molecules beyond Karma”. Obviously, this list is only illustrative and not a complete one. Bandha or combination, for instance, is a mode of matter according to the Jaina's which does not find its place in the above list. The author of Dravya-Saṁgraha mentions the following modes of matter,—

सद्दी बन्धौ सुहभौ बूलौ संठाणभेदतमछाया ।

उज्जीदादवसहिया पुगलदव्यस्स पज्जाया ॥

१६ (द्रव्य संग्रहः)

Sound, combination, minute, gross, shape, separation, darkness, shadow, lustre and heat are modes of material substance.

Even this classification hardly gives a complete list of gross matters.

*Combination:* Combination is of two kinds. These are respectively the Prāyogika i.e. caused by the effort of Jīva or Soul and the Vaisrasika i.e. not caused by the effort of Jīva (Soul). The former is of two kinds viz. the combination of two unconscious substances and the combination of living substance with non-living substance. The latter, the Jīvā-jīva Viṣaya-bandha is either due to Karma or to No-Karma. The Bandha due to Karma is of eight modes in accordance with the eight kinds of Karma. Combination due to No-Karma is of five forms viz:—the Ālapana (e.g. the tying of a chain to a cart), the Ālepana (e.g. painting a wall), the Saṁśleṣa (e.g. joining, two pieces of wood, as the carpenter does), the Śarīra (e.g. the union of limbs in a body) and the Śarīrī (e.g. the union of two different bodies). The Vaisrasika Bandha may be either beginningless as in the case of the parts of Ākāśa, Dharma and Adharma which are attached to one another or may have a beginning as in the case of the union of colours in a rainbow.

*Minute, Gross, Shape, Separation, Heat and Lustre:* As has been pointed out before, these are also modifications of matter according to the Jaina's. Of these, Shape or Saṁsthāna is of two forms in as much as it may be stable and definable e.g. the shape of a triangular or a circular thing or it may be unstable as the shape of cloud. Bheda or separation may be of six kinds viz:—(1) Utkāra (separation by sawing), (2) Ārṇa (separation by grinding), (3) Khaṇḍa (separation by breaking into parts), (4) Ārṇika (separation by winnowing etc.), (5) Pratara (separation by cutting into slices) and (6) Aṇuṇātana (separation as in the case of sparks, flying from a mass of burning iron). Heat or Ātapa is that caused by such things as sun's rays etc. while Lustre or Udyota is light without heat as in the case of the moon's rays. Sūkṣma or minute and Sthūla or gross are relative terms. Atoms are the last limits to minuteness. Hence minuteness is either Antya or terminal as in the case of atoms or Āpekṣika or relative. In the case of grossness also, we have the Antya or terminal which is attributed to the cosmic system

as a whole and the Āpeksika due to the various degrees of grossness found in molecular bodies.

**DARKNESS OR SHADOW: MIMĀMSĀ VIEW: NYĀYA-VAIŚEṢIKA VIEW: JAINA VIEW**

*Darkness and Shadow:* According to the Mimāṃsā school of thinkers darkness and shadow are substances. Their reason is that these phenomena are found to have motions. When a man goes, his shadow goes with him. Similarly, shadow and darkness are found to be in different places at different times. This shows that they have motions and all moving phenomena are substances. The philosophers of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school are opposed to the Mimāṃsā contention. According to them, shadow and darkness are but Abhāva's or non-existence of light. Where light atoms are obstructed or prevented from entering, there we have their non-existences. The obstruction of some of the light atoms leaves shadow, while that of a considerable number of these causes darkness. The alleged motions of shadow and darkness are not their motions but are series of obstructions, caused to light-atoms. On the other hand, according to the Jaina's, darkness and shadow are forms of matter i.e. material masses and not negations of light. In criticising the the Nyāya position, Ratnaprabhācārya argues in the following way:—

#### RATNAPRABHĀCĀRYA'S ARGUMENTS

“Darkness and shadow are perceived with the eyes in the same way as light, so that if the latter be held to be a substance, there seems to be no reason why the former are to be but negations. Inference also does not support the negative view of darkness and shadow. For, what is the reason or mark (Hetu) for such a conclusion? Is it because those are perceived to be different from substances? This is not the case, however; for, darkness and shadow are as much positive perceptions as a pitcher etc. Had they been but negations, we could not have such positive perceptions with regard to them but have only negative apprehensions

such as, 'here there is no pitcher', etc. In the same way, the reason for the negative view of darkness and shadow cannot be put in this way, 'because these are due to causes which are different from those that produce a substance'. An effect, according to the Nyāya position is due to 'intimate' (Samavāyi), 'non-intimate' (Asamavāyi) and 'immediate' (nimitta) pre-conditions. The Jaina thinkers object to this view of causation. Even admitting the Nyāya theory of causation, the negative view of darkness and shadow is hardly justifiable. (If you ask) What is the cause of darkness?—(we may similarly ask) what do you say about the cause of light? (If you say that the causes of light are the molecules of light) (we may say, that the causes of darkness are) the molecules of darkness and shadow. Thirdly, the reason for the negative view of darkness and shadow cannot be said to be 'because darkness and shadow become apparent when light is said to be non-existent'. For, it cannot be said to be a general rule that anything appearing when any other thing disappears must be an unsubstantial negation of the latter. It may also be pointed out that a similar line of argument would prove that light is but the negation of darkness. Light appears when darkness disappears. If it be contended that light has the positive attribute of heat it may be said that darkness also has the positive attribute of coolness. How then can it be said that darkness is but the negation of light? The fourth argument in support of the negative view of darkness is thus expressed by Śaṅkara and Nyāyabhuṣaṇa. The conditions that are requisite for the perception of light are found to be requisite also for the perception of darkness; hence the former is a substance while the latter is its unsubstantial negation. The Jaina thinkers point out that a similar line of arguments would show that light is but the unsubstantial negation of darkness and that a pitcher and cloth would be but unsubstantial negations of each other. Fifthly, the reason for the negative conclusion about darkness is said to be 'because there is no cause productive of the alleged substance of darkness'. Śrīdhara points out that there cannot be any

molecules of darkness as no tactual sensations arise from darkness. The Jaina's refute the position of Śrīdhara by showing that as a matter of fact darkness does give rise to tactual sensation viz:—the sensations of coolness. They also argue: 'Darkness does give rise to tactile sensations as it has form like the earth. The fact of darkness having form is not unproved'. Expressions, for example, that 'darkness is black' show that darkness is perceived to have a black form. The next argument in support of the Vaiśeṣika position that darkness is but negation is based on the fact that it is outside the categories of substance, attribute and activity. The Jaina reply is that the doctrine that darkness is not a substance is unproved. Similarly, the argument for the negative view of darkness cannot be built on the fact that it is opposed to light. Water is opposed to fire but is not for that reason an unsubstantial negation. Next,—it cannot be said that there is nothing to support the doctrine of the substantiality of darkness. The very expressions viz:—'deep darkness', 'waves of darkness' etc. indicate that darkness is conceived as a substance. Lastly, it may be pointed out that there is difficulty in conceiving darkness as but the negation or non-existence of light. For, of what kind of non-existence would it be? Darkness cannot be the 'prior-non-existence' of light, for it would then be impossible for darkness to reappear after once light has appeared. The 'prior non-existence' of a thing cannot occur after once the thing has come into existence. Similarly, darkness cannot be treated as 'posterior-non-existence' of light; for it would then be impossible for light to reappear after once darkness has come up. The 'prior non-existence' has no beginning and the 'posterior-non-existence' has no end. Thirdly, darkness cannot be the 'reciprocal non-existence' of light, as it can appear even on a well lighted day. Fourthly, darkness is not the 'absolute non-existence' of light in as much as darkness is due to its own peculiar causes and conditions".

(From my translation of *Pramāṇa-naya-tattvālokāṇ-kāra*).

The Jaina's are thus upholders of the theory that darkness and shadow are modes of matter.

We are not to decide here which of the two theories of darkness,—the Nyāya and the Jaina,—is correct and acceptable. To us, debates like the above are no more than intellectual treats in these days of physical science. We simply want it to be noted in this connection that Ānanda-Jñāna, the Vedānta thinker while criticising the Nyāya doctrine of the reality of substances states: "To hold that substances are nine in number is not correct; for, the reality of darkness as the tenth substance, may also be established by reasoning".

### CLASSES OF SOUNDS

*Sound:* Sound, as already noted, is neither a primary substance nor an attribute (of Ākāśa), according to the Jaina's. It is a modification of material mass, which in itself is Aśabda i.e. unsounding. According to the Jaina writers, sound is of two kinds viz.—linguistic and non-linguistic. The latter is either natural (Vaisrasika) like the sound of thunder or adventitious (Prāyogika). The Prāyogika sounds may be of four modes viz:—Tata, Vitata, Ghana and Sauśira. Of these Ghana is the sound produced from cymbals and other such metallic instruments while Sauśira is that produced from wind-instruments like a pipe. As regards Tata and Vitata we have slightly varied accounts<sup>1</sup>. The linguistic or Bhāṣālakṣaṇa sounds are either expressed

<sup>1</sup> "Sound" says the author of the Pancāsti-Kāya-Samaya-Sāra "is produced by Skandha's which are aggregates of Paramāṇus. When these come in contact with one another, sound is generated".

The author of the Tatvārtha-rāja-vārtika says that Tata is the sound produced by an instrument covered by skin (Ḍarma-tatanāt), while Vitata is that coming from a stringed instrument (Tantṛ-kṛta). Brahma-deva on the contrary, quotes a passage, "Tata is to be known as the sound of a stringed instrument like Vinā etc. while Vitata, as that coming from an instrument covered by leather e.g. a Patāha. The account of the author of Amarakośa seems to be in agreement with the latter description with this variation that he calls Vitata, Anaddha".

The Tīrthāṅkara's or the omniscient teachers, it is also said, deliver their discourses in Anakṣara Dhvani's which are called Divya, a sort of letterless divine language.

in letters of alphabet or not so expressed. The latter are called *Anakṣara Dhvanis* and it is contended by the Jaina's that the lower animals express themselves by such sounds. Linguistic sounds consisting of letters of the alphabet form the basis of the spoken and the written languages of various nations.

It is in this connection that the question of supreme interest viz:—the relation of the words signifying objects to the objects signified by the words, arises. The problem of the origin of language is also indirectly connected with this question. In our introductory discourse as well as in those on the problem of reals and on space, we have indicated the ways in which the various schools of Indian philosophy approach this problem. At the risk of some repetition, we shall, however, restate the Indian theories once more here.

It is to be conceded, as *Bhartrhari* said:—

न सोऽस्ति प्रत्ययो लोके यः शब्दानुगमादृते ।

अनुविद्धमिव ज्ञानं सर्वं शब्देन गृह्यते ॥

वाक्यपदीय

All knowledge, the whole contents of it, calmly analysed, will be found to consist in words. What then is the relationship between the words and their corresponding objects and how are we to account for it?

### ŚABDIKA THEORY OF SOUND AS THE ULTIMATE REALITY

We have already seen how the Śābdika's maintained that a word signified its corresponding object because there was the essential relation between them. Just as the Vedānta contended that *Brahma* was the only reality and the cosmic manifold, its expression or modification, the Śābdika's pointed out that *Śabda* or sound was the only real and the world of objects on the one hand and the world of corresponding names on the other were its manifestations:—

अदादि निधनं शब्दब्रह्म तत्त्वं यदक्षरम् ।

विवर्ततेऽर्थभावेन प्रक्रिया जगतो यतः ॥१॥ वाक्यपदीय

### VEDĀNTA AND THE ŚABDIKA VIEWS

According to the Vedāntin's, the totality of the gross



substances, their subtle causes, the equilibrated state transcending them and the abstract pure being itself are but the aspects of the Brahma respectively as Virāt, Hiranyagarbha, Avyākta and Sanmātra. The individual soul in its corresponding psychical states of awakening, dreamful sleep, dreamless deep slumber and pure consciousness appears respectively as Viśva, Taijasa, Prājña and Ćinmātra. The Śābdikas with whom word is the fundamental reality conceive of four similar aspects of it. The Vaikharī are the sensuous sounds i.e. the words uttered by us. The Madhyamā are the subtle sounds, not audible through the gross senses of our hearing, that are internal cognitive phenomena. The Paśyantī is the supersensuous sound transcending both the preceding while the Parā-Vāk is the ultimate self-luminous reality. The Śābdika thinkers maintain that as word is thus the essential basis of the objects of our experience as well as of the expressions signifying them a word is capable of signifying its object. The Śābdika's point out that unless we posit the real and eternal existence of sound as a substance, our every day expressions such as 'We read the Veda's three times', 'this is the same letter B', become meaningless. These expressions prove that even after the first reading of the Vedas or the first utterance of the letter B is over and inaudible, the sounds continue to exist in a subtle and supersensuous state which makes their subsequent emergence possible.

#### BUDDHIST THEORY OF WORD

In our first discourse we saw how Dharmottara and other Buddhist philosophers criticised the Mīmāṃsaka theory of the reality and substantiality of sound. They pointed out that if there were a real relationship between a word and its object, the two would have been found as actually associated together. In other words, as an example—wherever the word pitcher was uttered, we would have met with an actual pitcher there and wherever there was a pitcher we would have experienced the sound pitcher also there. The Buddhists contend that the nature of a word

makes it impossible for it to express the real nature of its so-called object. For what is a word? A word is the outcome of conception. We find some common characteristics in all cows; the experience and the idea of these common characteristics build up a concept and this concept clothed in a word is the word, cow,—which is thus the result of conception. And as a word is thus a Vikalpa-yoni i.e. the result of conception, it signifies only the concept i.e. the group of general characteristics. But what is the nature of a real object? A real object is characterised by a strictly individual functioning (अर्थक्रियाकारित्व). Nothing that does not actually do anything is real. A glass of water is real because it quenches one's thirst. A concept of water is not real because the concept would not quench one's thirst. A real object is thus strictly particular (स्वलक्षण) as the Buddhists call it. A word which, as shown above, is the outcome of and stands for a general concept only is incapable of expressing the particular and real nature of the object.

#### NEGATIVE SIGNIFICANCE OF A WORD

What then is the function of the word, cow, for instance, according to the Buddhists? It does not directly signify the animal Cow. When we hear the word cow,—there arises a negative apprehension in us, an apprehension consisting in a negation of all beings other than a cow. The primary function of the word cow is thus to remove all our ideas about beings other than a cow. For this reason, the Buddhists described a word as consisting in Apoha or Anyāpoha i.e. negative apprehension about others. Subsequently other concepts and ideas are mixed up with this Apoha or primary negative apprehension, as a result of which we come to understand the meaning of the word cow. The word cow thus does not directly and immediately signify the actual animal. When we hear the word cow, the first apprehension that arises in our mind is that of a removal or cessation of all ideas of things other than a cow; thereafter apperception works upon this primary per-

ception, as a result of which, we come to understand that cow is the animal signified by the word cow. A word is thus not directly related to the object signified by it.

#### NYĀYA CRITICISM OF THE MIMĀMSĀ THEORY OF SOUND

The philosophers of the Nyāya school also object to the Mimāṃsā theory of words. They point out that if there were a relationship of Prāpti (an essential relationship between the two related, such that one yields the other) between the word and its object, our mouth would have been filled with food as soon as the word, food, was uttered; our mouth would have been burnt as soon as the word, fire was uttered and our mouth would have been pierced as soon as the word, sword was uttered.

पूरणप्रदाह्पाटनानुपपत्तेश्च सम्बन्धाभावः । २-१-५३ व्यायसूत्रम् ।

Similarly, when there is an object, we do not find any vocal organs or effort to make sounds,—with the result that there is no sound. As Vātsāyana points out:—

‘अर्थान्तिकौशल इति स्थानकरणासंभवादनुच्चारणम् ।’

Different nationalities use the same word in different senses, which shows that there is no fixed relationship between a particular word and a particular object. The Naiyāyika's point out that if a word and its object were essentially related, the meaning of the former would have been clear to all; but this is not the case. A word signifies its object only to him who knows its meaning already, which indicates that the relation between the word and the object is not essential but one established and built up by an agency external to them. The Nyāya philosophers reject also the Mimāṃsā doctrine of the eternity and the substantiality of sound. They point out that a sound and for the matter of that, a word is generated by material masses coming against and separating from each other; it is found to come to an end when it is no longer heard; the intensity of a sound varies or can be made to vary. As regards the Mimāṃsā contention about the re-emergences of the same sound, the Naiyāyika's point out that we have never the self-same

sound more than once. The reading of the Veda's three times or the fact of having the same letter B for more than once, does not mean that as a matter of fact we have the identical sound or identical group of sounds every time. What we actually have in these cases are but different sounds, although similar to a considerable extent. All these show that sounds and words are neither substantial nor eternal. Sound is an attribute attached to Ākāśa according to the Naiyāyika's.

But although the Nyāya thinkers join the Būddhist in criticising the Mīmāṃsā theory of the eternity and the substantiality of a word, they are opposed to the latter's doctrine that the word is unrelated to its object. The Naiyāyika's reject the Buddhist doctrine of Apoha. A word, they say, do not give rise to a negative Idea at its inception.

नन्वन्यापीहकृच्छन्दो युष्मत्पक्षेऽनुवर्णितः ।

निषेधमात्रं नैवेह प्रतिभासेऽवगम्यते ॥

#### NYĀYA CRITICISM OF THE BUDDHIST THEORY OF APOHA

We have a positive idea about its corresponding object as soon as we hear a word.

किन्तु गौर्गवयो हस्ती वृक्ष इत्यादि शब्दतः ।

विधिरूपव्यवसायेन मतिः शाब्दी प्रवर्तते ॥

If it be said that the word cow yields only a negative idea, then for the positive idea of the thing signified by the word we are to look for another word:—

यदि गौरित्ययं शब्दः समर्थोऽन्यनिवर्तने ।

जनको गवि गौबुद्धे मृग्यतामपरो ध्वनिः ॥

It cannot be said that the word which at its inception yields only a negative idea leads afterwards to the positive idea; for, it is always impossible to do contradictory things; a word cannot have both the senses, one negative and the other positive.

#### NYĀYA CRITICISM OF DIGNĀGA'S VIEW

The celebrated Buddhist thinker, Dignāga contended

that it is not impossible for a word to have two functions, if the two functions are closely connected. Take the case of the word, Blue, in the expression, Blue-Lotus. The word, Blue has a sense of its own but at the same time, it has another function viz:—expressing the character of the Lotus. The Naiyāyika's point out that the relation between Blue and Lotus in the expression Blue-Lotus is a relation between an adjective and a substantive (विशेषण-विशेष्य); such relationship can subsist only where both the words have positive senses, each of its own; the sense of one of the words affects or colours the sense of the other word. The sense of the word Blue does not generate the sense of the word, Lotus. But in the case of the one single word, Cow, we have only one sense a negative one, according to the Buddhists and this negative sense is said to generate the positive sense. These alleged senses in one and the same word cannot hence be said to be related as an adjective and a substantive.

#### WORDS HAVE A POSITIVE SENSE

The Naiyāyika's further point out that the word cow may not indicate a particular cow; but it cannot be said to yield a purely negative idea on that account; it stands for something positive, a collection of characteristics common to a number of cows. The general characteristics of a thing are as much positive and real as its particular behaviours. The word cow thus indicates a positive and a real aspect of the animal cow. It is thus that according to the Nyāya thinkers, the Buddhist theory of Apoha falls to the ground.

सिद्धश्चेद् गौरपोहार्थं वृथाऽपोहप्रकल्पनम् ।

#### KNOWLEDGE OF AN OBJECT FROM A WORD IS INFERENTIAL ACCORDING TO THE VAIŚEṢIKAS

The philosophers of the Vaiśeṣika school also oppose the negative theory of the Buddhists. They point out that a word and its object are related. But any and every word is

not related to any and every object. A particular word signifies only a particular object and only that man understands what object is signified by a word, who knows already the meaning of the word. The Vaiśeṣika's thus point out that the knowledge arising from hearing a word is mediate, depending, as it does, on a previous knowledge of the meaning of the word, which they call *Saṅketa*. The *Ānumānika* or inferential knowledge,—e.g. the reasoning that that hill has fire because it is found to have smoke,—is similarly dependent on a previous knowledge of the invariable relation between smoke and fire and the Vaiśeṣika's accordingly include the *Śabda-jñāna* or the knowledge from words within *Anumāna*. The *Nyāya* thinkers of course do not accept this Vaiśeṣika position, on the ground that the knowledge of an object which we get from hearing its corresponding word is essentially different from inference based on syllogistic reasoning. Both the *Naiyāyika*'s and the *Vaiśeṣika*'s, however, agree that the word is not unrelated to its object and that they are not essentially related.

#### VĀÇYA-VĀÇAKA RELATIONSHIP

What then is the relation between a word and its object? It is a relation of *Vāçya-Vāçaka*. The word signifies the object and the object is signified by the word,—this is the relationship. The significance attached to a word, the fact that a particular word is to signify its corresponding particular object is called the *Samaya* or *Saṅketa*, and only he who knows this *Samaya* or *Saṅketa* is in a position to understand an object on hearing its corresponding word. The *Naiyāyika*'s contend that it is the Creator who fixed the *Saṅketa*'s of words and revealed these significances of words to the early sages. Mankind has learnt them from these sages and it is the business of scientific grammar to find out and determine the real sense of a word, as fixed by God. It goes without saying that according to the *Naiyāyika*'s, there would be besides these fixed words having fixed meanings, a large number of words in every language which are coined by men for practical purposes from time to time.

### JAINA'S REJECT THE MĪMĀMSĀ THEORY

The Jaina philosophers agree with the Buddhists and the Naiyāyika's in rejecting the Mīmāṃsā contention regarding the substantiality of sounds and the essential relationship between a word and its object. They point out:—

‘शब्दाकाररहितं हि नीलादिरूपं लोचनज्ञाने प्रतिभाति  
तद्रहितस्तु शब्दः श्रोत्रज्ञाने इति कथं तयोरैक्यम् ।

An object of the colour, blue etc., though unsounding is perceived by our eyes while a sound which has no colour is perceived by our ears. How then can a sound and an object be identical?

They point out—

‘शब्दपरिणामरूपत्वाज्जगतः शब्दमयत्वम् ।’

If the world were but the modification of sound it would always be sounding.

शब्दात्मकत्वेऽर्थानां शब्दप्रतीती संकेतग्राहिणोऽप्यर्थे सन्देहो न स्यात् । अग्नि पावोणादिशब्दश्रवणाच्च दाहधातादिप्रसङ्गः ।

If the objects in their essence were sounds, one who does not know the meaning of a word (sound) should have no doubt about the object signified by it, on hearing the sound . . . . On the other hand, one's organ of hearing would have been burnt or hurt on hearing the words, fire or stone.

### JAINA'S REJECT THE BUDDHIST THEORY

At the same time, the Jaina's like the Naiyāyikas are opposed to the Buddhists' theory Apoha. They point out—

किञ्चास्यापोहमात्राभिधायित्वे प्रतीतिविरोधो गवादिशब्देभ्यः विधिरूपावसायेन प्रत्ययप्रतीतिः । अन्यनिषेधमात्राभिधायित्वे च तत्रैव चरितार्थत्वात् सास्नादिमतोऽर्थस्यास्तोऽप्रतीतिः तद्विषयायाः गवादि बुद्धेर्जनकोऽन्यः ध्वनिरन्वेषणीयः । अथैकेनैव गोशब्देन बुद्धिद्वयस्योत्पादनात् नापरो ध्वनिमुग्यः । न, एकस्य विधिकारिणो निषेधकारिणो वा ध्वने र्गुणद्वित्वान्नद्वयलक्षण फलानुपलम्भात् । विविनिषेधज्ञानयोश्चान्योन्य विरोधात् कथमेकस्मात् संभवः ? ।

The contention that a word yields a negative apprehension

is against the matter of experience; for, the words, cow etc. are felt to yield positive ideas about their objects. If they yielded only negative ideas, other words are necessary for the positive knowledge about those objects. If it be said that the same word yields both the negative and the positive knowledge, we say this is impossible; affirmation and negation are essentially different and one and the same word cannot generate two such contradictory forms of knowledge.

### JAINA'S REJECT THE NYĀYA THEORY

But although the Jaina's agree with the Naiyāyika's in opposing the Mīmāṃsā and the Buddhist doctrines of words, they do not accept the Nyāya contention that it is the world-creator who has fixed the original meanings of words., They do not believe in the existence of the world-architect, so that it is impossible for them to ascribe to the significance of a word, a divine origin. How then has a word come to have the meaning attributed to it?

### NATURAL AND CONVENTIONAL POWERS IN A WORD TO SIGNIFY OBJECTS

The Jaina's take notice of the fact that one and the same word has different senses in different countries, nay, in one and the same country. This goes to show that in the matter of fixing the meaning of a word, people using the expression have a hand. This is Samaya or the course of the meaning of a word, determined by a man. He alone understands the object on hearing its corresponding word, who is already conversant with this Samaya. The Jaina's further point out that in the case of a word and its meaning, the establishment of the Samaya is not all. A Samaya is the significance fixed by man. But in order that a word may signify an object something more is metaphysically necessary. The word itself must have the competence to signify an object. It must have a natural capacity or स्वाभाविकसामर्थ्य to express an object. The Jaina's maintain that not all sounds have this capacity. According to them, although



all sounds are modifications of matter, only those sounds which are due to peculiar collections of atoms giving rise to peculiar molecules called Bhāṣā-vargaṇā have this capacity called Yogyatā. The Jaina's contend that all words have this supersensuous and natural capacity to signify all objects. In this connection, we have seen, the Jaina's compare a word with fire. Fire has the capacity to burn all objects but what particular objects are to be burnt by it on a particular occasion are determined by the circumstances prevailing on the occasion. In the same manner, every word has the capacity to signify every object in the world. But what particular meaning it actually has in a particular country is indicated by the Samaya or Saṅketa which is fixed by the men of the country. This is what they mean by saying:—

शब्दः सहजयोग्यता सकेतबलादेवार्थं प्रतिपादकोऽयुपगन्तव्यः ।  
(प्रमेयकमलमार्तण्डः)

#### ORIGIN OF LANGUAGE

A patient consideration of the above different Indian theories about the relation of a word to its object will acquaint us with important problems regarding the question of the origin of language. In every language, as we know, there are many words which are pure coinings. These have obviously no sort of correspondence with the objects they are made to signify. There are other words however, in a language, the sense of which does not appear to be wholly dependent on the whims of man, but seems to have been determined by outside agency. Some thinkers maintain that all original words in a language were absolutely independent of human foistings. Just as to a primitive man, the picture of an axe itself conveys the idea of the axe, so all primitive words in a language were originally but imitations or effects of sounds of natural phenomena. Man was more or less a passive agent rather recipient, when his language was being made for him by outside phenomena. "It is through imitation", says G. Eduard Sievers "that all signification becomes directly suggestive. The first written

signs are... the depictions of visible objects and could be nothing else; and by the same necessity, the first uttered signs were the imitations of audible sounds. To reproduce any sound, of which the originating cause or the circumstances of production are known, brings up of course before the conception that sound along with the originator or circumstances of origination or whatever else may be naturally associated with it. There are two special directions in which this mode of sign-making is fruitful imitation of the sounds of external nature.... and imitation of human sounds. The two are essentially one in principle.... There are natural human tones indicative of feeling.... which either are immediately intelligible to us.... or have their value taught us by our earliest experience. If we hear a cry of joy or a shriek of pain, a laugh or groan, we need no explanation in words to tell us what it signifies, any more than when we see a sad face or a drooping attitude. So also the characteristic cry or act of anything outside ourselves, if even rudely imitated, is to us an effective reminder and awakener of conception. We have no reason to question that such were the suggestions of the beginnings of uttered expression". Mīmāṃsā theory about the relation of words to their objects having been determined not by human conventions but by some thing which was not under man's complete control, is a form of an objectivist doctrine and undoubtedly points to the earlier stage in the development of language which consisted of a number of imitative sounds only. Some have maintained on the contrary that all words have been definite and deliberate coinings by man. This may be going too far, but coinings and conventions have certainly been matters of fact in the history of the development of a language. Sievers, whom we have quoted above, says:—"This is a regular and essential part of the process of name-making in all human speech and from the very beginning of the history of speech: in fact.... the latter can only be said to have begun when this process was successfully initiated, when uttered signs began to be, what they have ever since continued to be,

conventional or dependent on a mutual understanding. Thus alone did language gain the capacity of unlimited growth and development". A great part of language is pure invention by its speaking-people and consists in vocal vestures clothing their subjective concepts. The Buddhist denial of all direct relationship between words and objects may be said to emphasise this subjective factor in the development of language. The Nyāya school also seems to do the same thing. Yet a third point in connection with the question of the origin and development of language is that we are to remember that the primitive man heard the sounds emanating from various natural phenomena and observed how these sounds were connected with things in nature. He then subjectively reproduced those sounds and symbolised them in such a way that they came to convey the idea not only of those natural phenomena but of the general characteristics of those as well as of other allied phenomena. For example, the primitive man hears the roaring sound of thunder. He finds that the sound, roar, is connected with thunder. To him, the sound, roar, *naturally* suggests thunder. He then works upon this natural suggestion and seeing that this sound has the capacity to signify other allied phenomena, he goes a step further and invents the word, roar, which is made to stand for not only the roaring characteristics of thunder but for the sounds of other roaring substances as well. The language of primitive people thus began with a certain natural suggestive power in sounds and ended with human working upon it . . . . . " . . . language is a step", says Sievers, "beyond this (mere observing and interpreting natural sounds) and different from it. To make language, the intent to signify must be present. A cry wrung out by pain or a laugh of amusement, though intelligible is not language; either of them, if consciously reproduced in order to signify to another pain or pleasure is language. Vague hints about these elements in the development of language viz:—the natural suggestive power in sounds and its shaping and modification by man, can be traced in the Jaina doctrines of *स्वाभाविक सामर्थ्य* and *समय* in words.

It thus appears that the Indian theories just considered need not be mutually exclusive; they represent different factors in the origin and development of language, which may be described as :—(1) purely imitative, (2) purely conventional and (3) originally imitative but subsequently suggestive and conventional.

*Karma*:—The doctrine of re-incarnation of soul is peculiar to Indian systems of philosophy which distinguishes them from the philosophical systems of other lands.

‘जातस्य हि ध्रुवो मृत्युध्रुवं जन्म मृतस्य च ।’

Whoever is born is sure to die and whoever dies is sure to be reborn. (unless of course he is finally liberated). This series of births and rebirths which is said to be beginningless constitutes *Samsāra* for a *Jīva* and Indian cosmology is not so much an account of the genesis of the cosmic system as a whole, as that of incarnations of the psychical beings in it. A dying man will be reborn. Why? Because he has done acts in this life as well as in previous ones, the fruition of which he is to experience in his next—re-incarnations. Acts done in one’s life thus not only prepare the way for his next life but also its mode. The principle underlying the series of psychical re-incarnations is: ‘What a man soweth, that shall he also reap’. In the words of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* (4.4.5).

यथाकारी यथाचारी भवति । साधुकारी साधुर्भवति । पापकारी पापो भवति पुण्यः पुण्येन कर्मणा भवति, पापः पापेन, यत्कर्म कुरुते तदभिसम्पद्यते ।

SOULS ARE TO EXPERIENCE THE FRUITS OF THEIR OWN KARMA’S

These acts of one’s life are called *Karma*’s, the good or bad effects of which it is impossible for him to avoid. This law of *Karma* is inexorable and is admitted almost in all the different systems of Indian philosophy, however much they may differ in themselves. *Śihlana Miśra*, a poet belonging to the orthodox school in ancient India, sings,—

‘आकाशमुत्पततु गच्छतु वा दिगन्तम्,  
अभ्योर्निधिं विशतु तिष्ठतु वा यथैच्छम् ।’

जन्मान्तराजितशुभाशुभकृत्तराणाम्,

छायेव न त्यजति कार्यफलानुबन्धम् ॥ शान्तिशतकम् ॥

Soar above the sky or go to the end of a direction; dive deep into the sea or stay wherever you please; the effect of the good and the bad actions which you did in your previous births will never leave you but follow you like a shadow.

Buddha is reported to have declared—

‘न अन्तर्लिखे न समुज्जमहो, न पर्वताणं विवरं पविस्स ।

न विज्जति सो जगति प्यदेसो, जत्थद्वितो मुञ्चेयत् पाव कम्मा’ ॥ ‘धम्मपद’

Neither in the sky nor in the depth of the sea nor in the caves of the mountains, there is any place in the universe, staying where one can avoid the effects of his bad deeds.

In the same strain, the Jaina philosopher Amitagati says:—

स्वयं कृतं कर्म यदात्मना पुरा फलं तदीयं लभते शुभाशुभम् ।

परेण दत्तं यदि लभ्यते स्फुटं, स्वयं कृतं कर्म निरर्थकं तदा ।

भावनाद्वात्रिंशत् ।

A Being enjoys the good or the bad effects of Karma which he himself did previously; if it were possible for a Being to experience the fruits of acts done by another person, —well, one's own actions are then fruitless.

### THIS LEADS TO THE DOCTRINE OF RE-INCARNATION

Indian philosophy, as we stated elsewhere is essentially psychocentric. Its fundamental principle is that the world and all the things in it are intended for the experiencing souls. The course of the world is but the progress of the souls and as Karma is at the root of the re-incarnating psychical series, it is not only an ethical principle but a cosmic law, explaining the nature and the purpose of the world as a whole. Śihlana Miśra whom we have already quoted, accordingly begins his book with the significant invocation:—

नमस्तत्कर्मभ्यो विधिरपि न येभ्यः प्रभवति ।

Indeed, it will be shown hereafter how with the Indian atheistic system, the law of Karma was supreme and all

in all, while the theistic systems with one or two exceptions made the activities of the Creator strictly conform to and not transgress the limits set by it.

#### SAMŚĀRA, ACCORDING TO BUDDHA

Cessation of Karma leads to the final liberation but so long as there is Karma or any trace of it, Saṃsāra or the flow of reincarnations is inevitable. Buddha said:—

“Ajñāna (ignorance) begets Saṃskāra (tendency); this leads to Vijñāna (apprehension); from it, emerge Nāma (name) and Bhautika Deha (material body); from them come the Sat-kṣetra (six spheres or centres); these generate Indriya (the senses) and Viśaya (the objects); from the contact of the senses with their objects, there arises the Vedanā (affection); Vedanā leads to Trṣṇā (longing to get); this, to Upādāna (appropriation); this, to Bhāva (being); this to Janma (birth); this to Vārdhakya (old age), Maraṇa (death), Duḥkha (pain), Anuśoṇā (remorse), Yātanā (miscry), Udvega (anxiety) and Nairāśya (despair). Thus flourishes the kingdom of Pain”.

From the above, it will appear that incentive to Karma or spring of action consists primarily in a contact of the conscious flow with any object of the senses. This contact generates Vedanā i.e. a tendency or leaning towards it which in its turn leads to Trṣṇā or a thirst for the object. This longing for getting the thing makes us work for its appropriation and our life or being consists in such series of efforts; these life's efforts leave their traces which make man re-incarnate himself after death.

#### SPRINGS OF ACTIONS ACCORDING TO THE NYĀYA

The view of the Vedic school of thinkers as represented by the author of the Nyāya Sūtra's is scarcely less elaborate. An analysis of 1.1.2, Nyāya Sūtra shows that Mithyājñāna leads to Doṣa, Doṣa to Pravṛtti and Pravṛtti to Janma. Mithyājñāna or false knowledge consists in falsely identifying one's self with what it is not e.g. with one's Śarīra or

body, Indriya or external senses, Manas or the internal sense, Vedanā or the series of pleasurable and painful feelings and Buddhi or intelligence. This Mithyājñānā (false knowledge) or Ahankāra (looking upon not-self as self) is also called Saṅkalpa. Saṅkalpa is explained by Udyotakara as an active or volitional attitude towards an object previously perceived. Vātsāyana, however, identifies Saṅkalpa with Mithyājñāna and Ahankāra, which, as shown above, are modes of cognition only and the author of the Tātparyā Tikā in further explaining his position says that Saṅkalpa consists in a recollection of a previously perceived thing as pleasurable or painful. In other words, the wrong knowledge concerns itself not only with objects foreign to one's self but it thinks them as pleasurable or painful. The former aspect of the false knowledge is called Nimitta Saṁjñā or apprehending a thing and the latter, Anuvyanjana Saṁjñā or clothing a thing with pleasurableness or painfulness. This primary false cognition leads to Doṣa. Doṣa is described as Pravartanā-lakṣaṇa i.e. what leads to activity. Doṣa's thus are the immediate springs of action and consist in either Moha i.e. stupefaction or Rāga i.e. an attitude of attachment or Dveṣa i.e. an attitude of aversion. Moha is the first product of Mithyājñāna and consists in fallacious determination. It is very near to Mithyājñāna and as such, among its modes we find the mention of Mithyājñāna itself. Besides Mithyājñāna or mistaken idea, Viçikitsā or dubitation, Māna or self-conceit and Pramāda or delusion consisting in a determination to do a thing which one knows he ought not to do and a similar determination not to do a thing which he knows he ought to do are said to be modes of Moha. Viśvanātha includes Tarka or Sophistry, Bhaya or fear and Śoka or grief within Moha. Rāga is characterised by Āsakti or attachment and Dveṣa by Amarṣa or aversion. Although all the three Doṣa's are incentives to action, Moha is described as Pāpiyān i.e. worst, because it is the root of all evils. The two feelings of attachment and aversion, Rāga and Dveṣa cannot arise in a being unless it is already

Mūḍha or stupified i.e. steeped in wrong apprehension. Mūḍha consisting, as it does, in Mithyā-pratipatti or wrong apprehension forms the basis of Rāga which paints the object of the wrong apprehension in rosy colour (Ranjanīya-Saṅkalpa) and of Dveṣa which looks upon it as an object to be avoided (Kṣapanīya-Saṅkalpa). Kāma or sexual craving, Matsara or a tendency to prevent others, without any reason whatsoever, from having their own ways, Spṛhā or a desire to appropriate the things of others, Tṛṣṇā or a thirst for worldly objects including miserliness and a desire that such and such a thing of mine may not be destroyed and Lobha or avarice are the different modes of Rāga. Some e.g. Viśvanātha look upon Moha or deceitfulness and Dambha or pride as included in Rāga. Krodha or rage which brings about violent modifications in one's body and sense-organs, Irṣā or malice towards a person who appropriates things which are the common properties of a number of persons, Asūyā or malice at the meritorious attainments of others, Droha or a determination to kill another and Amarṣa or impotent rage are the various modes of Dveṣa in which Viśvanātha includes Abhimāna or a feeling of disgust towards one's own self when one fails to take revenge upon an evil-doer.

#### PRAVṚTTI, DHARMA AND ADHARMA ACCORDING TO THE NYĀYA PHILOSOPHY

The above-mentioned Doṣa's are the springs of our action. They lead to what is called the Pravṛtti or activity. Pravṛtti may be viewed either in its aspect as a Kāraṇa i.e. a cause or as a Kārya i.e. an effect. In its causal aspect, it consists in activities of our tongue (as a speaking organ), of mind and of body. In other words, being guided by the above Doṣa's we do the Karma's or acts of speaking, thinking and making various bodily efforts, which acts are either Śubha i.e. good or Aśubha i.e. bad. These Karma's give rise to certain attributes in the soul, which are called Dharma or merit and Adharma or demerit. These attributes of the soul, Dharma and Adharma, are also called Pravṛtti's,



Kārya Pravṛtti's or Pravṛtti's as effects of the aforesaid Kāraṇa Pravṛtti's. Dharma and Adharma are called Pravṛtti's, because they are the causes or potentialities generated in the soul which produce the succeeding psychical state and its re-incarnation series.

#### NYĀYA DOCTRINE OF KARMA

The Nyāya theory of Karma may thus be shortly stated. Due to Mithyājñāna or wrong knowledge, there arise Moha or stupefaction, Rāga or attachment and Dveṣa or aversion. These make one do Karma's or acts of speaking, thinking and doing bodily efforts. Karma's generate in the doer Dharma and Adharma, potential forces for good or bad which survive the physical death of the doer and help the making of a fresh body for him, in order that he may experience the good or bad effects of those Karma's. It is to be noted that according to the Nyāya theory, Karma's are not the direct causes of one's rebirth or a new body. Their direct effects are the generation of the forces of Dharma and Adharma which account for the doer's re-incarnation in a fresh corporeal frame. Dharma and Adharma constitute what is technically called Adrṣṭa which mediates between the Karma or the ethical act of the doer and his assumption of a new body.

#### BUDDHIST THEORY OF KARMA

According to the Jaina's also, it is Karma that accounts for the finite, unhappy and embodied state of the soul. But their doctrine of the Karma is otherwise different in many respects, from other Indian theories. We know, for instance, that the Sāṅkhya view is that the soul in its purity is untouched by the Karma's. It never does the Karma's nor enjoys their effects. The Jaina view on the contrary is that although the essential nature of the soul is not destroyed by the Karma's, it is the soul that does the Karma's and enjoys their fruits. The Buddhist view by acknowledging that "from the contact of the senses with their objects there arises the Vedanā which leads to Tṛṣṇā and that Tṛṣṇā leads

to Upādāna which again leads to Bhava and this to Janma" establishes a real relation between the Karma's and the conscious agent and is to some extent similar to the Jaina theory. But the above causal nexus is considerably weakened, nay, completely broken, by the Buddhists themselves who adhere to their doctrine of the strictly momentary and non-persisting existence of the psychical principle. In sum, the Buddhist theory amounts to this that the doer of the Karma is not the enjoyer of its fruit. This is practically giving a go-by to the theory of Karma itself and the Jaina's oppose this view by contending that the same psychical principle persists through doing the Karma's and experiencing their effects. This is in essence the Nyāya theory also. But while the Naiyāyika's maintain that it is God who intervenes between the Karma and its fruit and joins them, the Jaina's reject the theory of God and hold that Karma leads to its effect by itself directly and automatically.

According to the Jaina's,

भावणिमत्तो बन्धो भावोरदिरागदोष मोहजुदो ।

पञ्चास्तिकायसमयसारः

Bondage of the soul of due to Bhāva or emotional disposition which is attended with Rati (Lust), Rāga (attachment), Dveṣa (aversion) and Moha (stupefaction).

#### HOW THE SOUL COMES TO BONDAGE

These four Bhāva's or psychical emotions are called the Bhāva Pratyayas. The Bhāva Pratyaya's are generated by Mithyā Darśana (wrong belief), Avirati (unrestraint), Pramāda (recklessness), Kaṣāya's (improper feelings) and Yoga (a state of psychical torpor), which five are collectively called the Bhāva Karma's. A soul thus modified by its Bhāva Pratyaya's and Bhāva Karma's becomes such that peculiar material particles which are foreign to its nature freely flow into it and corrupt its nature. This is the bondage of the soul, its Sāmsārika state, its unhappy encasement in a material body and its various other limitations. This investiture of the soul with a body and other limitations

is not effected by a God according to the Jaina's but is due to the inflow of a peculiar class of material molecules into it. These material molecules, of and by themselves, freely enter into the soul and are called *Dravya Karma's*. The *Karma*, with the Jaina's, is thus not merely an ethical act as with the philosophers of the other Indian schools but it stands, on the one hand, for the psychical feelings (*Bhāva Karma's*) which are springs of our action and on the other, for the actual material corpuscles which, as the result of the said *Bhāva Karma's* or psychical feelings get themselves attached to the soul constituting its corporeal frame.

#### HOW THE SOUL CAN BE UNITED WITH MATTER

This raises the question of the manner in which *Karma*-particles unite with the psychical principle. It involves the perennial problem of metaphysics which has appeared from time to time as the problem of the relation between mind and the material body. Descartes admitted the dualism and his attempt at bridging the gulf between mind and body practically left the problem where it was. Malebranche and the orthodox occasionalists introduced God to effect the union of the two manifestly opposing principles, almost in the way in which the *Nyāya* thinkers propounded the theory of the all-knowing and all-powerful *Iśvara* as the connector of the spiritual force of *Adṛṣṭa* with the material molecules forming an animal's body. Leibnitz also was a believer in God and he pointed out that although the two principles, soul and matter were apparently opposed to each other, there was a pre-established harmony among them. The Jaina solution of the problem, if like Leibnitz's a solution at all, begins with a tacit acknowledgment of this pre-established harmony *minus* the hypothesis of God. In other words the Jaina's assert that the nature of a finite unliberated soul and the nature of the *Karma*-molecules are such that one is modified in consonance with a modification in the other. The Jaina discussion on the subject brings home the difficulty of uniting soul and matter, if once an absolute dualism between them is admitted.

Nemiçandra presents the Jaina position in the following pregnant verse:—

पुगलकम्मादीणं कत्ता ववहारदो दुणिच्चयदो ।  
वेदनकम्माणादा सुद्धणया सुद्धभावाणम् ॥५

द्रव्यसंग्रहः ।

From the practical or experiential standpoint (Vyavahāra), the soul is the cause of Karma modification. From the imperfectly ontological standpoint (Aśuddha-niścaya-naya), the soul is the cause of its own conscious dispositions (c.g. attachment, aversion etc.). According to the purely metaphysical view (Śuddha-niścaya-naya) it is the cause of its own pure, essential states’.

In other words, if we confine our attention to the essential nature of the soul and of matter, we find that they are never destroyed; the integrity of each is permanent. Hence from this standpoint which is called the Śuddha-Naya by the Jaina’s, the essential nature of both soul and matter remains incorruptible, so that neither of them can enter into an unending and inseparable connection with the other. On the other hand, we know, the soul has its modifications i.e. its subjective states, the Bhāva-Karma’s and Karma-matter also, its modes which account for the genesis and growth of various limbs in a body. But even in these cases, we can only say that the soul is the cause of its own states and Karma-matter, of its own modes. This is the position of the Niścaya-Naya, according to which the modes find their explanation in their own underlying substance and not in anything foreign to it. But our observation shows that the psychical principle and its material embodiment are as a matter of fact closely joined and mixed up; we know that our psychical disposition are conditioned by material and bodily states and the latter also are similarly affected in consonance with the former.

भावो कम्मणिमित्तो कम्म पुन भावकारणं हवदि ।

As the author of the Pañcāsti-kāya-samaya-sāra says, We may of course say that the soul is never the Upādāna-Kāraṇa or the essential basis of matter. We may also say

that as the soul's direct causality consists in developing its own psychic states only,

‘कुर्व्वं सगं सहावं अता कता ससस्स भावस्स ।’

and the direct causality of matter similarly consists in evolving the various material modes only,

कम्मं पि सगं कुव्वदि सेन सहायेण सम्मपपानं ।-----

neither of the soul and matter is ever the Nimitta-Kāraṇa or direct attendant cause of each other. But the fact is there that the psychical dispositions and emotions bring in Karma-matter into the soul and modifications in our bodies similarly give rise to varied psychical tendencies. So, a relationship, a capacity to modify each other, although indirectly, must be admitted in between soul and Karma-matter. This is the standpoint of the Vyavahāra-Naya as the Jaina's call it.

Besides the above reason which is a matter of observation the Jaina's adduce another argument why a relationship between soul and Karma must be admitted:—and if the foregoing was the experiential and scientific ground, we may call the following a moral one. The inflow of Karma-matter into the psychical principle is said to yield pleasure or pain to the latter. Now, if there be not a real interaction between the two, how can we talk of the soul enjoying the fruits of Karma and of Karma, yielding its fruits to the soul? If the psychical series and the material Karma-series form two independent series, the enjoyment of the fruits of one's own Karma and moral responsibility become impossible for man. The author of the Pañcāsti-kāya-samaya-sāra says:—कम्मं --- कुव्वदि जदि सो अप्पकरेवि आप्पसाणम् किवसिन् तस्स फलं भुज्जदि अप्पा कम्मंच रेदि फलम् ।

If Karma operates in its own way and the soul also in its own, how can the soul be said to experience the effect of Karma and Karma to yield its fruit to the soul?

Thus the Śuddha-Naya and the Vyavahāra-Naya viewpoints taken by the Jaina's are but the restatements of the

theory of psycho-physical parallelism and the doctrine of pre-established harmony. But they did not confine themselves to this impossible position but candidly acknowledged the fact of our actual and moral experience that the psychical principle and bodily matter are really connected and inter-mixed. It is of course doubtful if the Jaina's with their theories of essential opposition between the natures of soul and matter have succeeded in explaining this real intermixture. They try to do this by pointing out—

ओगाढगाढ डिचिदो पोमलकाय मेहि सब्बदो लोगे ।

The whole of the universe is completely filled up with matter,—so that it is impossible for a soul to exist anywhere where there is no matter. It may be said that even this fact of co-existence is hardly competent to account for the real relationship fully. But dualism cannot do more. The alleged unsatisfactoriness of this explanation is not peculiar to the Jaina philosophy; it is a difficulty with all forms of the dualistic doctrine, a difficulty common to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, the Aristotelian and the Cartesian schools.

#### BANDHA, UNION OF SOUL WITH KARMA

The Bandha or the union of the soul with Karma-matter is caused by stupefaction, attachment etc. as already noted. This state is preceded by the state which has been called Āsrava (Literally, inflow). This penultimate state of Āsrava is the state in which the soul on account of its Bhāva Karma's of wrong belief, unrestraint, recklessness, improper feelings and state of torpor, is in such a condition that Karma corpuscles freely flow into it. The Jaina system gives detailed accounts of the emotional tendencies which cause the soul's bondage and of the psychical feelings which help the inflow of the non-psychical molecules. Corresponding to the various states of the soul, we have various forms of Karma-matter also. The subjective attitudes which cause the Āsrava and the Bandha may be reserved for consideration elsewhere when we shall be dealing with the nature of the soul. As regards Karma-matter the Jaina's generally con-

sider it from four view-points viz—its Prakṛti or modes, its Sthiti or duration, its Pradeśa or the minutest part and its Anubhāga or nature of its fruition. We shall barely state the Jaina account of these.

#### FOUR STANDPOINTS FROM WHICH KARMA-BANDHA IS TO BE VIEWED

(i) *The Prakṛti of Karma*: Under this head, the Jaina's describe the various kinds or classes of Karma-corpuscles. Primarily, the Ghātiyā the destructive and the Aghātiyā i.e. the non-destructive are the two modes of Karma. The Ghātiyā is so called because it destroys i.e. suppresses the infinite cognition and other natural attributes of a soul. The Jñānāvaraṇīya, (knowledge-obscuring), the Darśanāvaraṇīya (intuition-obscuring), the Mohaniya (deluding) and the Antarāya (obstructive) are the four modes of the Ghātiyā Karma. Under the Aghātiyā come the Vedaniya (feeling), the Āyuh (age), the Nāma (species etc.) and the Gotra (lineage). These eight again have their further sub-divisions. Karma is thus primarily of eight kinds, it is of 148 sorts in all.

(ii) *The Sthiti of Karma*: The outflow of Karma from the Jīva is called Nirjarā. The Nirjarā is of two forms viz: the Avipāka or Sakāma and the Savipāka or Akāma. Owing to the practice of severest penances, Karma may flow away from the soul without yielding its fruits; this is Avipāka or Sakāma Nirjarā. If, on the contrary, Karma is not forcibly made to flow away in the above manner, it would be sticking to the soul until it has made the soul feel all its fruits, when it leaves the soul; this is Savipāka Nirjarā. The Jaina scriptures give an account of the period of time for which Karma sticks to a soul in cases in which the soul gets the Savipāka Nirjarā instead of the Avipāka. This period is called the Sthiti-bandha i.e. the time for which a soul is to remain in bondage. Sthiti is of two forms viz:—the Parā and Aparā, the maximum duration and the minimum duration.

(iii) *The Pradeśa of Karma*: A Pradeśa is the point in

space, obstructed or occupied by one single atom. According to the Jaina thinkers, one Pudgala atom, one Pradeśa or point of Dharma, one Pradeśa of Adharma, one minutest point of Kāla and one Pradeśa of Jīva may remain at one and the same time in one and the same Pradeśa of Lokākāśa or "the filled space". The Jainas maintain that the Jīva and the Karma are mixed up ever since the beginningless time. This doctrine implies that every Pradeśa of a Jīva is permeated (and in-formed) by the Karma-pudgala through and through; the soul is thus in a state of bondage; its pure and essential attributes viz;—knowledge, intuition etc. are suppressed and as a consequence of all this, the Jīva is suffering in this painful Saṃsāra or incarnation-series ever since the beginningless time.

(iv) *The Anubhāga of Karma*: The bondage of a soul is caused by the inflow of Karma. The Karma bondage is acute or weak according as the fruit of a Karma is acute or weak. The Anubhāga-bandha of a Karma is determined by the acuteness or weakness of the Karma-fruit. Anubhāga is the power of Karma to yield a peculiar fruit and is otherwise called Anubhāva.

We have seen that when there is inflow of Karma into the soul, its pure attributes of intuition, knowledge etc. begin to be suppressed and the Jīva moves in the Saṃsāra, born and reborn, suffering griefs and sorrows. The effect of a Karma is in strict accordance with its nature. The inflow, for example, of the knowledge-obscuring Karma obscures the Jīva's power of pure cognition; the inflow of the intuition-obscuring Karma obscures its power of pure intuition and so on. The effect of the suppression of the natural attributes of the soul is bondage, miseries of worldly existence, pain, sorrow, griefs, despair, birth, death and sufferings untold; why mention them? Who has not experienced them?

Right faith, right knowledge and right conduct,—called "the three Jewels",—reveal the way to liberation. But so tight is the grip of Karma that overwhelmed with woes and vicissitudes as a Jīva is in this world, it would not ordinarily tread the way to liberation. And lots of unfortunates



there are, who although on the way would often lose sight of it, who would stumble or would turn back to the whirlpools of the world. The way to liberation seems to be so rough and inaccessible because the hold of Karma on the soul is very tight.

### PARIṢAHA'S

The stages or states through which a fortunate being has got to pass, in order to attain the blissful emancipation are called the fourteen Guṇasthānas in the Jaina philosophy. The Guṇasthāna's need not be described in detail here. Wonderful, however, is the power of Karma, so much so that it throws numerous obstacles in the way to liberation which are apparently insuperable. A patient, calm and determined "way-farer" has got to put up with these unquestioningly and ungrudgingly. These obstacles are called the Pariṣaha's which are twenty-two in number. Liberation or Mokṣa is inattainable unless the Pariṣaha's are conquered. Kṣut (hunger), Pipāsā (thirst), Śīta (cold), Uṣṇa (heat), Daṁśa-maśaka (bites of gnats), Nāgnya (nakedness), Arati (dislike), Strī (women), Çaryā (walking a long distance), Niṣadyā (sitting perfectly unmoved), Śayyā (lying on hard ground), Ākrośa (abuse), Badha (assault), Yāçṇā (alms), Alābha (not getting what is asked for), Roga (illness), Tṛṇa-sparśa (touch of thorny grass), Mala (dirt), Satkāra-puraskāra (honour and insult), Prajñā (pride of knowledge), Ajñāna (ignorance) and Adarśana (want of faith) are the Pariṣaha's. The "way-farer" who wants to attain liberation must conquer these Pariṣaha's. He must put up with hunger, thirst, cold, heat and bites of gnats etc. He must not be ashamed of remaining in nakedness. He must never be idle and must always avoid the company of women. Long distances he must walk on foot patiently. When in contemplation, he must not move from his seat although serpents, lions or other ferocious beings may be near him. Hard, uncovered ground must be his bed and he must bear without protest abuses, insults and assaults. Although in need, he must not ask for anything.

Scantiest food given in alms,—even this he may not get; yet he is never to complain. He would be ill but he must not lose his self-control. Thorns and thistles, dirt and mud, honour and insult, nothing should disturb the equanimity of his temper. He must not be proud of his knowledge nor sorry for his ignorance. He must not lose his faith in the fact of the final emancipation, although he may not have any of the superhuman attainments in spite of his long and best efforts. These are the twenty-two *Parīṣaha*'s, the conquest of which makes emancipation attainable.

But what is at the basis of these *Parīṣaha*'s which obstruct the way to one's liberation? It is Karma. The *Jñānā-varaṇīya* Karma produces *Prajñā* and *Ajñāna*. The *Adarśana-Parīṣaha* is due to *Darśana Mohanīya* Karma. The *Antarāya* Karma produces the *Alābha Parīṣaha*. *Nāgnya*, *Arati*, *Strī*, *Niṣadyā*, *Ākrośa*, *Yāçṇā*, *Satkāra-Puraskāra* are based on the *Çāritra Mohanīya* Karma. The rest of the *Parīṣaha*'s are due to the *Vedanīya* Karma's.

#### CONQUEST OF THE *PARĪṢAHA*'S

It seems that Karma is almost inseparable from the *Jīva*. The "way-farers" who have not reached the tenth of the *Guṇasthāna*'s are called the *Bādara Sāmparāya*. The *Jaina*'s say that in a *Bādara Sāmparāya*, all the twenty-two *Parīṣaha*'s are possible and on the other hand, the "way-farers" in whom all the passions save and except a very slight degree of *Lobha* have been destroyed are called *Sūkṣma-Sāmparāya*; these are in the tenth *Guṇasthāna*. The *Upa-śānta Moha* "way-farers" are in the eleventh stage; the *Çāritra Mohanīya* Karma has been suppressed in them. The *Kṣīṇa Moha* are those who are in the twelfth *Guṇasthāna* and whose *Moha* has been totally annihilated. Such, however, is the power of Karma that even in the *Sūkṣma Sāmparāya*, the *Upa-śānta-Moha* and the *Kṣīṇa Moha* saints, the *Parīṣaha*'s except the *Nāgnya*, *Arati*, *Strī*, *Niṣadyā*, *Ākrośa*, *Yāçṇā*, *Satkāra-Puraskāra* and *Adarśana* are present. The super-man who has totally up-rooted

all the four forms of the Ghātiyā Karma in him and has been possessed of the pure omniscient knowledge is the Jina or Arhat. The omniscient Arhat is in the thirteenth Guṇasthāna and the Jaina sacred books call him *Īśvara*—the Lord. Even in so exalted a Being the *Parīṣaha*'s—*Kṣut*, *Pipāsā*, *Śīta*, *Uṣṇa*, *Damśa-maśaka*, *Çaryā*, *Śayyā*, *Badha*, *Roga*, *Tṛṇa-sparśa* and *Mala*,—are present implicitly though not in an explicit form.

It is only the blessed *Siddha*'s who are above the *Parīṣaha*, absolutely free from the influence of Karma. At the topmost peak of the universe, called the *Siddha-śilā*, a place of undisturbed peace and tranquility, free from Karma, from *Bandha*, from *Samśāra*, from *Parīṣaha*, live the *Siddhas*, "from eternity to eternity" possessed of the four blessed Infinities.

#### JIVA, IN BONDAGE SINCE THE BEGINNINGLESS TIME, UNTIL IT IS FINALLY LIBERATED

From all that have been said above, it is not to be thought however, that the soul is originally pure and that at a certain point of time it lost its purity by coming in contact with Karma-matter and had a "fall". The Indian systems are unanimous on the doctrine that it is from the beginningless time that the soul is in bondage and that on account of Karma, whatever it may be, it is moving in the re-incarnating series. The Jaina doctrines of *Āsrava* and *Bandha* do not refer to any chronological "for the first time". The soul is in *Bandha* or union with Karma-corpuscles from the beginningless time and the latter are ever flowing into it. As a matter of fact, the Jaina's assert that every *Pradeśa* or infinitesimal point in *Lokākāśa* or mundane sphere has in it one *Pradeśa* of both matter and soul. Soul and matter are thus mixed up in the world and this mixture is an unstable grouping, so to say, ever yielding to fresh groupings and re-groupings, until on emancipation, the two principles are finally and once for all separated. But it is the Karma-force which determines the bodily and other environments of the soul from births to births. This doctrine of re-in-

carnation has not of course been acceptable to the thinkers of other lands but the Indian doctrine that all evolutions enshrouding and attached to the psychical principle are due to subjective factors seems to be countenanced by a section of the voluntarists of the present day. The great philosopher, Schopenhauer with his celebrated theory of the bodily frame as "the objectification of the will" comes very near to the Indian doctrine when he says "Upon this (i.e. the objectification of the will) rests the perfect suitability of the human and animal body to the human and animal will in general, resembling though far surpassing the correspondence between an instrument made for a purpose and the will of the maker and on this account appearing as design i.e. the teleological explanation of the body. The parts of the body must therefore completely correspond to the principal designs through which the will manifests itself: they must be the visible expression of these desires. Teeth, throat and bowels are objectified hunger; the organs of generation are objectified sexual desire; the grasping hand and the hurrying feet correspond to the more indirect desires of the will which they express. As the human form generally corresponds to the human will generally, so the individual bodily structure corresponds to the individually modified will, the character of the individual and therefore it is throughout and in all its parts characteristic and full of expression". This is almost stating in a different language the Indian doctrine in general that it is Karma which shapes our bodily frame and the Jaina theory in particular that the sense-organs, the bodily structure as a whole, its various limbs and sub-limbs, are respectively determined by the Jāti-karma, the Śarīra-karma and the Angopāṅga-karma. At the same time, it would be wrong not to notice the distinctions between Schopenhauer's principle of Will and the similar principles in the Indian philosophical systems. The Buddhistic doctrine of Tanhā as a subjective thirst striving for and expressing itself in objective realisation in Bhūta, Bhautika, Īitta, and Īaitta i.e. in material and conscious series, resembles Schopenhauer's Will; we miss in the

former only the unitary and cosmic character of the latter. In the Vedāntic Māyā on the contrary, we have the unitary and cosmic character of a world principle but Māyā, at least in Śaṅkara's Advaita system, is more a static and intellectual principle than a dynamic and volitional cause as the Will of Schopenhauer. The Prakṛti of the Sāṅkhya is an unconscious world-force like Schopenhauer's Will, evolving the universe as well as the material environments of the microcosm. But essentially, it is too material to be like the cosmic Will which according to Schopenhauer gives birth to the self-conscious and the cognitive series. In the Nyāya, we have the Pravṛtti backed by the Doṣa's or psychical tendencies which accounts for the physiological frames and in the Jaina system, we have similarly the Bhāva-Pratyaya's and the Bhāva-Karma's which help the formations of bodies and their parts. Like Schopenhauer's Will and unlike the Sāṅkhya's Pradhāna, the Doṣa's, the Pravṛtti's, the Bhāva-Pratyaya's and the Bhāva-Karma's are psychical forces. But not only do we miss the unitary and the cosmic character of Schopenhauer's Will in those generative forces of the Nyāya and the Jaina systems but we find that these are not the only factors in body-making. The physiological structure according to Schopenhauer is the objectified Will itself while the bodies and their parts according to the Nyāya and the Jaina systems are collections of material atoms which, although they move in obedience to the psychical forces of Adṛṣṭa and Bhāva's are essentially independent of them.

#### KARMA, HOW IT IS CONNECTED WITH ITS PHALA?

Finally, there crops up in this connection, the question of relationship of Karma to its Phala or effect. The question is connected with the bigger question: How does the world originate? It is said that a section of Indian philosophers noticed that the act of a person is not always found to be attended with its desired or expected result. It is not uncommon that a virtuous man suffers and that a vicious man prospers. These philosophers accordingly concluded that

Karma is not necessarily connected with its alleged effect. In other words, according to them "There's a divinity that shapes our ends Rough-hew them how we will". This Divinity is an irresponsible arbiter who acts according to his own will, supremely indifferent to all our desires and acts. Mādhavācāryya in his *Sarva-Darśana-Saṁgraha*, ascribes this doctrine to a class of thinkers, called the Nakuliśa Pāśupata, in explaining whose contention, he says—

‘कर्मादिनिरपेक्षस्तु स्वेच्छाचारी यतो स्ययम् ।

अतः कारणतः शास्त्रं सर्वकारणकारणम् ॥’

#### NAKULIŚĀ PĀŚUPATAS' VIEW

But their doctrine is practically a disavowal of the law of Karma itself. The problem therefore becomes this: 'Karma is to bear its fruit unfailingly; yet it appears, not unoften, not to bear its fruit.' The Nakuliśa Pāśupata's account for the latter part of the problem by denying the validity of the former. The Naiyāyika's, however admit both the aspects of the problems and solve the riddle by saying that it is God who intervenes and connects the Karma with its effect.

‘ईश्वरः कारणं पुरुषकर्मवैफल्यदर्शनात् ।

न पुरुष कर्माभावे फलानिष्पत्तेः ॥’ सत्कारित्वादहेतुः ।

#### NYĀYA VIEW

Whatever differences there may be among the commentators in interpreting those Nyāya aphorisms it is clear that according to the Nyāya thinkers, the all-knowing God alone knows what act is to be connected with what effect and that, when and in what manner. Until and unless he decides, a Karma remains fruitless. But it is not really fruitless; it is bound to produce and bear its fruit. Karma is but an unconscious principle and to join it to its effect, a conscious being is necessary. This supreme Being is *Īśvara* who is all-wise and as such, he connects a Karma with

its proper effect in proper time and on proper occasions. This position is practically accepted by Śaṅkara, when he says—

सापेक्षो हीश्वरो विषमां सृष्टिं निर्ममितीति । किमपेक्षत इति चेत्  
वर्मनिर्मपेक्षते इति वदामः ।

### SĀMĀKHYA VIEW

The philosophers of Sāṃkhya school also admit the inexorableness of the law of Karma and in spite of their doctrine of the unconscious Prakṛti as the fundamental principle of the cosmic evolution, they are obviously opposed to the Nakulīśa Pāsupata theory of an arbitrary God. They plainly admit—

कर्मवैचित्र्यात् सृष्टिवैचित्र्यम् । ४२ तन्त्रसंक्षेपाध्यायः ।

Although the Pradhāna is the one principle of the cosmic evolution, the variedness in the evolutes is due to the variedness of Karma.

The Sāṃkhya philosophers, however, reject the theory of God as connecting Karma with its effect. According to them, Karma itself produces its own fruit.

नेश्वाराधिष्ठिते फलानिर्वृत्तिः कर्मणा तत्सिद्धेः । २ ।

परपक्षनिर्जराध्यायः ।

### MIMĀMSĀ VIEW : BUDDHIST VIEW

On this point, the Sāṃkhya doctrine finds its support in the contention of the Mīmāṃsā school who also do not believe in the existence of the supreme Creator and according to whom, also, Karma itself leads to its own unfailing effect. The Buddhist philosophers also do not see the necessity of a God for joining Karma to its fruit. A person, for example, steals; the effect is that he becomes a thief. The Buddhists maintain that the act of stealing itself leads to the stealer's becoming a thief. They point out that the act of stealing is a Vijñāna i.e. a point of consciousness. This Vijñāna or conscious wave loses itself in the Vijñāna Pravāha or unbroken flow of cognitive continuum. What remains

in the next moment is the Saṃskāra or the persisting mark, a peculiar trace (of the act of stealing). This Saṃskāra again, generates the Vijñāna or apprehension of the next moment, —which is nothing other than ‘the person’s becoming a thief.’ It is thus that the act of stealing which is the Vijñāna of the first moment generates “the person becoming a thief,” which is the Vijñāna or cognitive state of the next moment.

### JAINA VIEW

The Jaina theory regarding Karma and its Phala is that Karma is thoroughly self-determined and is not dependent on God in any way. The Jaina’s maintain that from the apparent fruitlessness of Karma it is not right to conclude either its real fruitlessness or the existence of God. The Phala of Karma is irresistible. The Effect of an act may take time to be explicit but the Karma is never fruitless. It is no doubt a matter of common experience that a sinful man is prosperous and that an honest man suffers untold miseries. But this does not prove that Karma is ever fruitless. Ratnaprabhācārya says:—

‘या हिंसावतोऽपि समृद्धिः अर्हत्पूजावतोऽपि दारिद्र्याप्तिः, सा क्रमेण प्रागु-  
पात्तस्य पापानुबन्धिनः पुण्यस्य पुण्यानुबन्धिनः पापस्य च फलम् । तत्रो-  
पात्तं कर्म जन्मान्तरे फलिष्यतीति नात्र नियत कार्यकारणभाव व्यभिचारः ।’

The prosperity of a vicious man and the misery of a man devoted to the worship of the Arhat are respectively but the effects of good deeds and bad deeds done previously. The vice and virtue will have their effects in their next lives. In this way, the law of causality is not infringed here.

### APPARENT FAILURE OF THE LAW OF KARMA EXPLAINED

It is thus that according to the Jaina theory the Phala of the Karma is irresistible. Karma itself produces its own effect. There are certain laws of precedence among the Karma’s, according to which, the fruition of some of the Karma’s may be deferred but it is never absolutely barred. Karma



by itself generates and bears its own fruit and no divine intervention is necessary in this process of operation.

*Body*: Karma, as we have seen, is matter, peculiarly or rather suitably modified, because of its proximity to the conscious principle. Karma supplies to and builds up for the soul, the various instruments through which it functions in the mundane sphere.

शरीरवाङ्मनःप्राणाः पुद्गलानाम् । ५ । तत्त्वार्थाधिगमसूत्रम् ।

Matter (coming in contact with soul) is variously modified as Body, Speech, Mind and Acts of Inhalation and Exhalation. In the various classifications of Karma, it will be found that Prāṇa and Apāna (acts of inhalation and exhalation) are due to the inflow into the soul of the material particles called Uççhhvāsa-Karma. We have seen how according to the Jaina's, Sound and for the matter of that, all Speech, linguistic or non-linguistic are modes of matter. Similarly, the internal organ of Mind, the No-Indriya or Anindriya as it is called by the Jaina's, as well as the Indriya's or the peripheral sense-organs are material modes. The Jaina doctrines of Manas and Indriya will be examined in the next two sections. Śarīra or Body, which, as will appear from the classification of Karma, is a result of Nāma-karma, is intended to be dealt with in the following lines.

Body is admittedly the outer and gross vesture of the soul. The author of the Nyāya-Sūtras characterises Body as,—

चेष्टेन्द्रियार्थाश्रयः शरीरम् । १-२-११ न्यायसूत्रम् ।

#### CONSTITUENTS OF BODY ACCORDING TO THE VARIOUS INDIAN SCHOOLS

Body is the locus where-from efforts are made, in which the sense-organs are located and wherein happiness and misery are felt. This description of Body as the physiological basis of perceiving, feeling and volitional activities, it need scarcely be pointed out, is scientifically exact. Considerable differences, however, seem to have prevailed

in Indian philosophical circles as to the ultimate constituents of our gross body. Some thinkers seem to have maintained that Kṣiti and Ap were the two elements of Body while others held that as Body was characterised by smell, an amount of liquidity and heat, the three elements of Kṣiti, Ap and Tejas were at its basis.

पायिव्याप्यतैजसं तद्गुणोपलब्धेः । ३-१-२५ न्यायसूत्रम्

A third school contended that in addition to the above three, the element of Vāyu was there because the acts of inhalation and exhalation were found in the body.

निश्वासोच्छ्वासोपलब्धेश्चानुभौतिकम् । ३-१-२९ न्यायसूत्रम्

The Vedānta school, on the contrary, seems to have maintained that as Body was characterised by smell, an amount of liquidity, heat, acts of inhalation and exhalation and lastly by porousness, it must be held to be पाञ्चभौतिक i.e. constituted of the elements of the foregoing four elements and of Ākāśa in addition.

गन्धक्लेदपाकव्यूहावकाशदानेभ्यः पाचिभौतिकम् । ३-२-३ न्यायसूत्रम् ।

The author of the Sāṃkhya Sūtra's refers to the above debate in 15, 16 and 17 of the Vairāgyādhyāya.

पाञ्चभौतिको देहः । चातुर्भौतिकमित्येके । एकभौतिकमित्यपरे

His own position, however, seems to be indicated in 102 of the Parapakṣa-nirjayādhyāya, where he says,—

न पाञ्चभौतिकं शरीरं बहुनामुपादानायोगात् ।

Body is not made up of five elements; it is impossible for many elements to combine and be constituents. The theory is that Kṣiti is the basal element of the Body and the other four elements are only उपष्टम्भक or assisting attendants. Kaṇāda also criticises the doctrine of the multi-elemental character of Body.

पञ्चात्मकं न विद्यते । ४-२-२ न आत्मकम् । ४-२-३

He also maintains that Kṣiti is the elemental basis of Body and the other elements help the basal element in making up the body by entering into a relation with Kṣiti which he calls अणुसंयोगः. The author of the Nyāya-Sūtra's in the

same way maintains that Kṣiti or Pṛthvī is the constituent element of Body which is characterised by smell

पार्थिवगुणान्तरोपलब्धेः। ३-२-२९ न्यायसूत्रम्

although भूतसंयोगः or assistance of other elements in the building up of the Body is not denied by Vātsāyana. We have not met with any elaborate examination of the foregoing views about the elemental basis of Body in the Jaina treatises. The Jaina's no doubt admit the four different elements (which they call Dhātu's),—Pṛthvī, Ap, Tejas and Vāyu; but as we have seen, according to them, these so-called elements are not ultimate. The ultimate matter is one, the Pudgala, which according to them is characterised by four attributes of smell, liquidness, visibility and touch. Body is made up of Karma, a mode of Pudgala after all, in which all the above four attributes of the primal matter, are necessarily found,—this is perhaps the Jaina explanation which thus steers clear of the foregoing academical disputations.

#### KINDS OF BODIES

Besides of Audārika or the gross physical body, the Jaina's admit four other kinds of bodies. To the celestials and the infernals, they say, belongs a Body which they call Vaikriyika and which is said to be endowed with eight superhuman powers e.g. continuing as one, becoming many at the same time, assuming subtleness, expanding to a considerable magnitude, changing forms etc. etc. Another kind of Body is admitted by the Jaina's, called the Āhāraka, literally meaning 'assumed'. It is so called because such a Body is evolved by a sage from within his Audārika or gross Body and is sent to the preceptor for the solution of some doubts arising in the sage or for some similar good purposes. In Indian non-Jaina systems also, Bodies of gods are supposed to have superhuman powers. Some kinds of Āhāraka Bodies, again, seem to be supposed to belong to persons for some express purposes. In iii of the Para-pakṣa-nir-jayādhyāya of the Sāṃkhya Sūtra's, for instance, we are told of the Sāṃkalpika (literally, 'born of will') Bodies

of divine world-rulers like Manu etc. and of Sāṃsiddhika (literally 'purposely evolved') Bodies of persons like Dhr̥ṣṭa-dyumna, who was created in fire for the purpose of killing Droṇa. From the stand-point of the ordinary mortals, the three Bodies viz:—the Audārika, the Taijasa and the Kārmaṇa are the most important, in as much as these three are the Bodies which every earthly creature is bound to have and to carry, until the final liberation is attained; the Vaikriyika Bodies are ordinarily for the celestials and the infernals, although in rare cases a mundane creature by dint of penances can have such a Body, while the Āhāraka Body is for particular sages for particular periods and for particular purposes only. It is said that it is impossible for a soul to have simultaneously, the two Bodies of the Vaikriyika and the Āhāraka; only one of these can be had. Thus it is that a soul can have only four Bodies at most and never all the five at one and the same time. When a creature, human, sub-human, celestial or infernal dies and until he is reborn i.e. in the period of Vighrahagati, he has only two Bodies viz:—the Taijasa and the Kārmaṇa. In his living period, he has these two and either, one of the remaining three or the Audārika along with either of the Āhāraka and the Vaikriyika.

The Taijasa literally means 'brilliant'. The Vaikriyika is said to be subtler than the Audārika, while the Āhāraka is described as subtler than the Vaikriyika. The Taijasa Body is subtler than the Āhāraka and is described as 'born of brilliance'.

‘तेजोनिमित्तात् तैजसम् ।’

Like the Kārmaṇa, it is a constant vesture of the soul until it is finally emancipated. All grosser Bodies are dependent as much on the Taijasa as on the Kārmaṇa and every mundane life affects the mode of the Kārmaṇa and the Taijasa Bodies. It is thus that between the Kārmaṇa and the Taijasa on the one hand and the other grosser Bodies on the other, there is a relationship of interdependence which the Jaina philosophers illustrate by referring to that between a seed and its corresponding plant.

The Taijasa Body is said to be characterised by the brilliant whiteness like that of a conch.

‘शंखधवलप्रभालक्षणं तैजसम् ।’

It is this internal Body which gives lustre to the grosser external Bodies, the Audārika, the Vaikriyika and the Āhāraka.

‘ओदारिकवैक्रियाहारकदेहाभ्यन्तरस्य देहस्य दीप्ति हेतुः ।’

It is said that there may be occasions when this Taijasa Body in a sage may come out of his gross Body and then return to it. A sage practising extreme penances may for some reason be at the highest pitch of anger when the brilliant Taijasa Body may suddenly shoot forth from his Body and burn down the object of his anger. On the other hand, a sage may feel extreme pity on which occasion again, his Taijasa Body may similarly come out and do some good act. In the former case, the Taijasa is called the Aśubha or harmful and in the latter, the Śubha or beneficial.

#### TAIJASA BODY WITH THE JAINA'S AND WITH THE VEDIC SCHOOL

The Taijasa Body of the Jaina's which thus goes out of the animal's gross body upon its death and stays within it during its life time giving lustre to it, is apparently, similar to the Sūkṣma or the subtle Body, otherwise called the Līṅga Śarīra which according to the Vedic school is undestroyed and goes out upon the death of the animal. In 103, of the Para-pakṣa-nirjayādhyāya, the author of the Sāṃkhya Sūtra's, refers to such subtle Body which he calls Ātivāhika as distinguished from the gross or Sthūla Body. This Sūkṣma Body is also called the Taijasa because the Śruti or the Scripture has stated that the substance in which, at the time of an animal's death, all its physical and vital principles with their functions lose themselves is Tejas.

‘प्राणस्तेजसि ।’

What thus persists after the animal's death over and above

its soul, is this subtle Taijasa Body. The Vedānta lays down that the heat felt in a living Body is really the heat of this indwelling Taijasa Body,

अस्यैव चोपपत्तेरेष उष्मा । ४-२-११ ।

and that because at the time of death, this Taijasa Body leaves the outward bodily tabernacle, the latter becomes cold. The Taijasa Body of the Jaina's is supposed to be so subtle that when it comes out of the gross Body of an animal, it is not only invisible and imperceptible but it can pass anywhere and through any substance, however hard or thick the latter may be. The author of the Rāja-Vārtika says,— यथाऽऽयिण्डस्यान्तं सूक्ष्मपरिणामात् तेजोनुप्रवेशे दृष्टस्तथा तैजस-  
कर्मणेरपि नास्ति वज्रं पटलादिषु व्याघातः-----। आलोकान्तात्सर्वत्र तैजसकर्मण्योनास्ति प्रतिघातः ।

In the same way, Śaṅkara says that on account of its extreme subtleness the Taijasa Body can pass unseen from anywhere to anywhere through any substance and that its movement is irresistible. It is because of this its extreme subtleness that the Sūkṣma Body is not destroyed when the gross Body is burnt down on the funeral pyre. Lastly, both the Vedic and the Jaina schools maintain that when an animal re-incarnates itself the Taijasa Body enters the new frame.

Notwithstanding the above points of similarity between the Taijasa Śarīra of the Jaina and the Vedic schools, we think they cannot be identified,—one being essentially different from the other. The ingredients of the Taijasa Body of the Jaina's seem to be peculiar modifications of the Tejas i.e. substratum of brilliance only; while those of the Taijasa Body of the Vedic school are not only Tejas but the other elements of Kṣiti, Ap, Vāyu and Ākāśa as well.

Śaṅkara says:—‘तस्मात् प्राणस्तेजसीति प्राणसंयुक्तस्याध्यक्षस्यैवेतेतजः  
सहचरितेषु भूतेष्ववस्थानम् ।’

and his interpretation he supports by Śruti.

‘पृथिवीमय आपोमयो वायुमय आकाशमयस्तेजोमयः ।’

Not only this. It is said that at the time of the animal's death, the subtle potentialities of the sense and the motor organs of the internal sense, Manas and of the Prāṇa or the vital principle come and attach themselves to the soul. Thus the author of the Ātma-Bodha says that the Līṅga Śarīra or the subtle Body which accompanies the soul of a dead animal (परलोकयात्रानिर्वाहकम् - - - - - वेदान्त परिभाषा । ) is made up of the five pure material elements and endowed with the potentialities of the five vital principles, of the internal sense of Manas, of intelligence and of the ten (sense and motor) organs.

(‘पञ्च प्रागननोद्बुद्धि दशेन्द्रिय समन्वितम् । अपञ्चीकृत भूतोभूतोत्थ सूक्ष्माख्यं भोगसाधनम् ।’)

The Sāṃkhya school also describes the subtle Body almost in the same way :— सप्रदेशकलिङ्गम् । वैराग्याध्यायः

Anirudha Bhatta explains the Sūtra. तैराष्टादशोलिङ्ग सूक्ष्मदेह उत्पद्यते । बुद्धार्हकारमनांसि पञ्चसूक्ष्मभूतानि दशेन्द्रियाणि चेति ।

### HOW THEY DIFFER?

Accordingly, the Līṅga, Sūkṣma or Taijasa Śarīra, of the Vedic school is a subtle Body in which the grosser physical Body with its vital functions as well as its sense and motor activities lies in an implicit state. The Taijasa Body of the Jaina's may or may not have a share in the formation of the gross physical Body but is certainly not its potential cause.

The Kārmaṇa Body is so called because it is constituted of the Karma Pudgala.

‘कर्मणामिदं, कर्मणां समूह इति वा कार्माणम् ।’

In a sense, of course, all Bodies are Kārmaṇa, in as much as all of them are made up of Karma-molecules. The Jaina writers, however, point out that all Karma molecules are not of the same character; Karma-matter which forms the basis of the Audārika, for instance, is certainly different in many respects from what makes the Vaikriyika and so on.

Although so far as their ultimate substratum,—Karma is concerned, all the five Bodies are essentially the same, they are functionally different and there is no harm, if the appellation Kārmaṇa is reserved for one of them only. The Kārmaṇa Śarīra is the subtlest of all Bodies, subtler than even the Taijasa and like the latter, it is a constant companion of the soul in its beginningless migrations, until it is finally emancipated. It is, as it were, the basis or ground upon which the structures of the other Bodies are built. All the Bodies come into existence through the Kārmaṇa Body. This is what is meant by

‘कर्मण शरीर प्रणालिकायां चौदारिकादीनामभिनिष्पत्तिः। कामेणस्य सामर्थ्यं सर्वकर्मविकासदानम्।

As already observed in the case of the Taijasa Śarīra, other Bodies in their turn, constantly react on the nature of the Kārmaṇa Śarīra. As a matter of fact, the Jaina's admit a sort of increase and decrease, Upaçaya, and Apaçaya, Āya and Vyāya in the quantity of the Kārmaṇa Śarīra and point out that like all other Bodies, the Kārmaṇa also is characterised by continuous Viśaraṇa or quantitative change. Like the Taijasa, the Kārmaṇa passes unseen and imperceptibly from one dying gross Body to a new Body and no substance is dense enough to obstruct its course. When a soul attains the final liberation, the Kārmaṇa Body drops down once for all and for all times to come.

The word, Kārmaṇa Śarīra, in the sense in which it is used in the Jaina philosophy is not found in the Vedic systems. In the second Brāhmaṇa of the third chapter of the Bṛhat-Āraṇyaka, the question is pointedly raised as to the abode of the soul when its gross vesture dies ‘element to element’ the answer given is,—“तौह यद्यतुः कर्महैव तद्यतुः। अथ यत् प्रशंसतुः कर्म हैव तत्प्रशंसतुः।”

It is said that at that time it is in Karma that the soul lives. This of course is the nearest approach, on the part of the Vedic philosophy to the Jaina conception of the Kārmaṇa Śarīra. Yet, it should never be forgotten that Karma is not material in character in the Vedic philosophy. Accord-



ingly, Karma as the abode of the soul can only mean *Adrṣṭa*. According to the Vedic philosophy, the subjective *Adrṣṭa*, a sort of 'soul-force' as it were,—is instrumental in making up the *Liṅga Śarīra* or the subtle Body for the soul.

THE TAIJASA BODY OF THE VEDIC SCHOOL IS NOT THE SAME AS THE TAIJASA BODY OF THE JAINA'S

It seems to us that the Vedic *Taijasa Śarīra*, the *Liṅga*, the *Ātivāhika*, the *Sūkṣma Śarīra*, as it is variously called,—is more akin to the *Kārmaṇa Śarīra* of the Jaina's than to their *Taijasa Śarīra*. The *Kārmaṇa Śarīra* is the group of material forces or potentialities which form the ground work or basis of the other grosser Bodies. That is also the relation between the *Liṅga Śarīra* and the *Sthūla Śarīra* of Vedic school. There are of course minor differences between the Vedic and the Jaina schools as regards the functioning of the gross and the subtle Bodies. The *Sāṅkhya* philosophers, for instance, maintain that pleasures and pains are primarily felt in and through the subtle Body and that because the subtle Body leaves the gross Body at the time of the latter's death, the latter does not feel them then.

सूक्ष्मशरीरस्य भोगात् । स्थूलशरीरस्य तु गौणो भोगः । मृतशरीरे भोगदर्शनात् । अनिरुद्धभट्टः ।

The Jaina's on the contrary contend that the gross Body has the full-fledged sense-organs which makes the feelings of pleasure and pains in them possible; the *Kārmaṇa Śarīra* has not the developed sense-organs and for this reason, it is impossible for one to feel pleasures or pains through the *Kārmaṇa* Body, in the disembodied state of the physical death. The author of the *Rāja-Vārtika* says:—

‘इन्द्रियप्रणालिकया शब्दादीनामुपलब्धिरुपभोग इत्युच्यते । विग्रहगतौ सत्या-  
मपीन्द्रियोपलब्धौ द्रव्येन्द्रिय निवृत्य भावाच्छब्दादि विषयान् भवना भावान्नि  
रुपभोगं कर्मणामिति कथ्यते ।’

THE TAIJASA BODY OF THE VEDIC SCHOOL IS IN SOME RESPECTS THE SAME AS THE KĀRMAṆA OF THE JAINA'S

Still, it is pertinent to think that it is the *Kārmaṇa Śarīra*

of the Jaina's and not their Taijasa Śarīra that resembles in many respects the Taijasa Body of the Vedic school.

Indeed, we have no hesitation in confessing that we have not quite understood the relation or utility of the Jaina Taijasa Śarīra with respect to the Kārmaṇa and the other grosser Bodies. The Taijasa Śarīra according to the Jaina's as we have seen, is a brilliant inner Body, which is a constant companion of the soul and which is different from the Kārmaṇa. The Vedic school does not admit such a Taijasa Body. The Taijasa Body which is admitted by it accompanies the soul no doubt in its migrations but it is identical with the Sūkṣma Śarīra which is essentially the Jaina Kārmaṇa Body itself.

The eminent Jaina writer, Mr. C. R. Jain maintains that the "Taijasa Śarīra is a coat of luminous matter thrown over the Kārmaṇa Śarīra and forms an atmosphere or *aura* of light round it, "Taken together, the Taijasa and the Kārmaṇa Śarīras form only one organism". In Jaina philosophical treatises the Taijasa Body is generally described as a Body different from the Kārmaṇa. If, however, we are to unite it with the Kārmaṇa,—why, the same thing may be done in respect of the Audārika as well. We may say that the Audārika Śarīra is a coat of non-luminous matter thrown over the Kārmaṇa Śarīra and forms a rough vesture over it'. We may also say, "Taken together, the Audārika and the Kārmaṇa Śarīra's form only one organism." So it seems to us that Mr. Jain's account of the Taijasa Body does not attribute any special functioning or utility to it.

#### C. R. JAIN'S VIEW ABOUT THE KĀRMAṆA AND THE TAIJASA BODIES

Elsewhere, Mr. Jain says:—"The Taijasa is composed of electric or magnetic matter and is a necessary link between the outmost body and the Kārmaṇa Śarīra". We have not, however, in the Jaina literature met with such a conception of the Taijasa Body, the conception, namely, that it is a *necessary link* between the gross Body and the subtle Kār-

maṇa Body. Mr. Jain supports his contention by saying, "The necessity for a link of this kind lies in the fact that the absence would render the gulf between spirit (soul) and gross matter unbridgeable, making it impossible for the ego to come in contact with or to use his bodily limbs". Mr. Jain further supports his position by quoting Dr. J. Bovee Dods: "It is evident that there is no direct contact between mind and gross matter . . . Hence it must be true that the highest and most ethereal inert matter in the universe being the next step to spirit can come in contact with mind. And electricity, changed into nervo-vital fluid (which is living galvanism) is certainly the highest and the most ethereal inert substance of which we can form any conception". In examining this view, we can at once state that once an absolute and essential dualism is admitted between spirit and matter it is questionable if electricity "changed into nervo-vital fluid" "can come in contact with mind"; for, although it is "the highest and the most ethereal inert matter in the universe", it is still matter and as such, is incapable of coming in contact with spirit. Moreover, we are afraid, there is a little confusion in Mr. Jain's line of thinking. All that his quotation from Dr. J. Bovee Dods establishes is that electrical matter, as the most ethereal of substances is competent to serve as an intermediary between spirit and matter. Mr. Jain wants to connect the Kārmaṇa with the grosser outer Bodies. The Kārmaṇa is not spiritual nor psychical in essences; it is the subtlest of matter, yet *matter* after all. Evolution of the outer grosser Bodies from the potential Kārmaṇa need not require any intermediary Taijasa Body. In the Vedic systems, the grosser Body is said to evolve from the Sūkṣma by the force of Adṛṣṭa or the laws of Dharma and Adharma. In the same manner, the Audārika Śarīra of the Jaina's may be said to be brought about by the forces, inherent in the subtle Kārmaṇa. Accordingly, we think, the Taijasa Body of the Jaina's is neither "a necessary link" between the Kārmaṇa and the Audārika nor is in any way functionally instrumental in evolving the latter from the former. The Taijasa Śarīra is a unique conception

among the Jaina's and has not its parallel in the system of the Vedic thought.

#### HOW THE CELLS GIVE RISE TO A BODY

We are afraid in our discussions at some length about the subtle Body, the Sūkṣma or the Kārmaṇa Śarīra, as postulated by the Indians, both Jaina and Vedic,—we may be charged with talking about a matter which is wholly conjectural. Accordingly, we may be pardoned if we attempt to show in the following lines how at least a presentable case for the subtle and potential Śarīra, as conceived by the Indians, can be made out without seriously contradicting the principles of modern science.

#### PRE-FORMATION THEORY OF SCATULATION

The ultimate material basis for the body of an animal is to be traced in the 'Cytula' or the 'Stem-cell' as it has been called, which again is the result of the combination of two separate cells viz: the male spermatozoon and the female ovum. The question arises how the two parent cells which consist in protoplasmic matter give rise to a Body with its varied limbs and sub-limbs. This is the fundamental and the most baffling problem in biology. The biologists of the 17th and 18th centuries represented by Hartsoeker and others put forward a doctrine which is called the Pre-formation theory. According to these thinkers, the complete animal body with all its parts was contained in the minutest form in the protoplasmic cell either of the father or of the mother (according as they attached greater importance to the paternal or the maternal factor), so that the growth of the full-fledged animal body was only an 'unfolding' of what were already 'infolded'. The extreme protagonists of this theory e.g. Haller and others went so far as to say that not only was the Body with all its parts contained in the egg but that the embryo in its turn contained the ova of the following generation, that these again, the ova of the next and so on. This has been called the theory of Scatulation according to which the germs of the whole

human race for instance, of all times were 'infolded in minute and minuter forms in the generating cells of the first man'.

#### EPIGENESIS: PANGENESIS

The theory of Pre-formation is an exploded doctrine and has been replaced by the theory of Epigenesis or new formation. It points out that the body of an animal is not a preformed minute organism, contained in the generating cell but is a series of new constructions from and out of it. Darwin's theory is a theory of Epigenesis in as much as it is opposed to the doctrine of Pre-formation but he chooses to call his theory Pangenesis. He supposed that the cells of all the various parts of an animal's body throw off ultra-microscopic granules, called Gemmulae by him which are at first dispersed throughout the whole system but are thereafter collected from all the parts of the system at the time of reproduction. These collections or packets of Gemmulae constitute ova and spermatozoa and as they had originally emanated from all the cells of all the tissues of an organism, they subsequently develop themselves into those very parts of the organism from which they had emanated.

#### DARWIN'S THEORY REJECTED

Darwin's theory of Pangenesis is now generally rejected by other upholders of the theory of Epigenesis. These contend that differences in the parts of an organism are not due to any essential differences in Gemmulae but are caused by the mutual influences of the cells. The nature of each cell is determined by the other cells surrounding it and the cells thus mutually influenced and modified, account for the growth and development of different parts of an organism. Different parts or limbs thus are not due to any essential difference in the basic Gemmulae but are caused by the peculiar environments of the cells.

#### DIFFICULTY OF THE THEORY OF EPIGENESIS

The above theory of Epigenesis in its extreme form is

questioned by many biologists of the present day. They think that it is impossible to account for the orderly growth of limbs and organs by mere positions and mutual influences of the original cells. To expect the growth and development of an organism from a number of unaided cells is akin to the attempt of ultra-materialism at explaining the origin of the ordered universe from a chaos of material atoms. Accordingly, Weisman and others maintain that the capacity to develop the limbs and organs must be supposed to be inherent in the nature of the sexual cells themselves. Weisman's scheme begins with Biophores, the most fundamental of the cellular substance. These Biophores are supposed to lie originally in the nucleus of a cell and then to pass out into its general protoplasm and rule its activities. A number of Biophores constitutes what is called a Determinant. Determinants correspond to the number of parts of an organism independently variable. These Determinants cohere together and form an Id, which is thus a microcosm, so to say. Id is the basic substance for the new organism and is possessed of all its activities. The nuclear material of a dividing cell breaks up into a definite number of what are called Chromosomes. Weisman calls the Chromosomes Idants. Chromosomes or Idants are more complex than protoplasm and are really constituted of the microcosmata, the above-mentioned Ids.

#### HOW IT GOES AGAINST THE THEORY OF EPIGENESIS

Weisman's theory inspite of the fact that conjecture plays a considerable part in its conception of Ids, Determinants etc. is undoubtedly a remarkable theory. It is the subject of sustained observation and scientific investigation in present days. It replaces the doctrines of Pangenesis and Epigenesis by a new conception of the germ-plasm in which the capacities to develop into parts and limbs of an organism are held to be inherent. If the Darwinian doctrine of the Gemmulae having their genesis in the cells of the various parts of the organism and developing themselves into those parts from which they originated, as

well as the other doctrine of Epigenesis according to which the varied parts of all organism were due to the peculiar positions and the mutual influencing of the germ-cells, were untenable, no course seemed to be left but to return to the old theory of Pre-formation and Weisman's theory is practically the theory of pre-formation shorn of its absurdities. Roughly speaking, the germ-cell according to Weisman did not contain an actual minute creature with all its limbs, as according to the Pre-formationists but was the basis of hidden complexities which under suitable conditions accounted for the varied parts and limbs in a full-fledged body.

#### WEISMAN'S THEORY AND THE DOCTRINE OF THE KĀRMAṆA ŚARĪRA

May it not be submitted that to say that the germ-plasm has the capacities and the complexities to develop the parts of an organism is almost similar to the doctrine of the Līṅga or the Kārmaṇa Śarīra which is no more than a collection of potential forces working out the gross body of an animal? The Indian doctrine may be presented as not only not to contradict any of the scientific standpoints but to throw lights (of course, in its own way) on many of the dark and as yet unexplained problems of biology. Take for instance, the germ-plasm itself. Observation and experiment have shown that it is not an absolutely and inert dead matter. The Indian theory fully acknowledges the fact and in its own way indicates the nature of the germ-plasm by supplementing its material aspect by the doctrine of the Līṅga Śarīra. The germ-plasm is not simply a material mass but is the vehicle or basis through which the body-building forces work. Why, it may be asked, do the Biophores leave the nucleus of the cell, pass into the general protoplasmic matter and rule its activities? How is it that the Determinants are formed of the Biophores, corresponding to the number of parts in an organism? What makes the varied Determinants cohere in a planned and orderly

manner, within the microcosm of the Id? These are questions in Biology as yet unanswered. The Indian theory attempts to offer some explanation by saying that the *Liṅga Śarīra* is a collection of forces directing the plastic germ-matter in a definite manner and towards a definite end and purpose. Biology has been forced to admit that the germ-plasm has rudiments of life in it. It is apparent that even the hypothesis of life is scarcely sufficient to answer the question indicated above. Definite manners of operation and operations towards a definite end require more than life for their guidance. The millions of male ciliated cells, for instance, pressing round the ovum are all living substances; how is it that only one out of these millions penetrates to the nucleus of the ovum in order that the two sexual cells of both parents may coalesce into the formation of the impregnated egg-cell i.e. the individual stem-cell or the 'Cytula', as it has been called? Attempts have been made to account for this coalescence of the nuclei of the spermatozoon and the ovum by saying that they are drawn together by "a mysterious force", by attributing to them "a chemical sense activity", by supposing that the two parent cell nuclei approach each other guided by an instinct of sensitive perception akin to "smell", by ascribing to the two nuclei, a sort of mutual amorous attraction "a kind of erotic chemiotrophism". These are at best figurative expressions concealing the admission that the fact of coalescence of the parent cells is inexplicable even on the hypothesis of life. Indian philosophers on the contrary say that the joining of the parental nuclei is not a fortuitous event; the coalescence is effected by the *Liṅga Śarīra* with the self immanent in it, in order that a new gross Body may be made for its re-incarnation. Take next the question of varieties of Body. How is it that in the one case a lion's body and in the other, a human body, two different Bodies are formed from the cell substance? Weismann of course premises that each Id contains not only the general but specific possibilities also of the new organism. The experiments of Hertwig, however, show that the cells are not



predestined unalterably for particular roles but have a fundamental identity of the germinal substance. If so, then the question re-appears as to why from two cells, essentially similar two altogether different Bodies are grown. In 8, Vairāgyādhyāya, the author of the Sāṅkhya-Sūtra's takes up the question and explains व्यक्तभेदः कर्मविशेषात् । Varieties in corporeal forms are due to the Sūkṣma Śarīra or the body-building forces being peculiarly modified by effects of one's Karma in one's previous life.

#### ACQUIRED CHARACTERS OF ANCESTORS

In the above lines, we have dealt with the problem of the genesis of what is called the "innate character" of the animal Body i.e. its assumption of the normal shape of its limbs and sub-limbs, common to all the individuals of the species. The next question in connection with the animal Body is its relation to the parental bodies. It is ordinarily said that a child inherits from his parents and sometimes from grandparents also in cases of atavism, not only their peculiarities of character and temperament but even those of their bodies. A Scotch Highlander's son, for instance, is ordinarily tall like his parents while people of the dolichocephalic race have ordinarily heads of a peculiar type. From evidences of this nature, it is argued that ancestral characteristics, technically called "the acquired" features are inherited. It may be said that if the acquired characters be thus transmissible, if, that is to say, the peculiarities of the child's body are caused by the peculiarities in his parent's bodies the hypothesis of the Sūkṣma Śarīra, as an independent and external force acting upon the germ-plasma becomes clearly superfluous. But the question of the inheritance of acquired features is not so simple as it is ordinarily thought to be.

#### HERITABILITY OF ACQUIRED FEATURES

The cases of the acquired features in a Body have been broadly brought under three mainheads. First of all, there

are the cases of Mutilations. Secondly, modifications are caused in an animal body by Environments and lastly, changes in the bodily organs are often brought about by Kinetogenesis i.e. through use or disuse. As regards the cases of Mutilation, it is well known that the effects of simple and single mutilations are not inherited. It was at one time thought that mutilations which have a persisting impress on the organism modify it in such a way that their effects would affect the succeeding generations. Darwin thought that the remarkably small prepuce in the Mahomedans of Celebes afforded an instance of the heritability of long continued mutilations. Without entering into further discussions, it may suffice to state here the net result of scientific observations, which is that even the effect of long-continued mutilations are not inherited. The experiments of Naegeli and De Candolle on plants show that the inheritance of the effects of changed conditions is quite uncertain. Lastly, observation and experiments in a similar manner have failed to prove conclusively that effects of the use or disuse of an organ are inherited. Closer estimate of evidence goes to show that in a great majority of cases conclusions about the inheritance of acquired characters are hasty and unfounded. The Scottish Highlanders, for instance, have many individuals among them who are of any ordinary human height while the Spaniards who are dolicho-cephalic people have many who are extremely round-headed. In very many cases, again, likeness of the son to his parents or grandparents need not necessarily mean that the former has actually inherited the acquired features of the latter; the likeness may be explained by the supposition that similar epigenetic influences have produced in the offspring results similar to those produced in the ancestors.

#### DIFFICULTIES OF THE DOCTRINE

Cases, of course, there are where the peculiarities in the features common to the offspring and the ancestors cannot be satisfactorily accounted for by the reference to the epigenetic

factors. If in these cases, we are to admit the doctrine of the inheritance of acquired characters, we must at the same time note its difficulties. In determining the character and the features of the offspring, it is contended by some that they do not reappear in the child in the self-same form in which they were impressed on the parents. Each of the parents contributes a certain part to the child, so that its features are of a blended sort intermediate between those of each of the parents. In this blending, of course, the contribution of either of the parents may be more effective than the contribution of the other, in which case the former is said to be "pre-potent". De Vries' experiments on plant-hybrids, however, show that there is nothing like real mingling or blending but that the child possesses some of the characters of each of the parents; these characters continuing in some sort of separateness from each other. Accordingly, some of the biologists think that it is reasonable to hold that the ancestral characters which are transmissible appear in the offspring not in a blended manner but in their pristine purity or "exclusiveness" so to say. The question then, is: How is it possible? In what manner can an acquired character of a parent be inherited by the offspring?

#### TRANSMISSION OF ACQUIRED CHARACTERS

Darwin's theory of Pangenesis, as we have seen, supposed that the cells in all parts and organs of an animal body threw off minute Gemmules which constituted the germ-cells. There was then no essential difference between the body cells and the germ-cells. A modification in any part of organ of a Body modified the Body cells in a corresponding manner and the germ-cells also in an indirect way. These germ-cells thus modified in a peculiar manner were supposed by Darwin "to be transmitted from the parents to the offspring and were generally developed in the generation which immediately succeeds but were often transmitted in a dormant state during many generations and were then developed". According to Darwin, then, peculiar features being common to the offspring and its

parents are accounted for, as follows: A certain organ or part of an animal is affected; this modifies the body-cells; the modification of the body-cells causes modification of the germ-cells; the modified germ-cells are transmitted and the offspring gets by inheritance these cells with these modifications; these modified cells develop the self-same modifications in the self-same parts or organs of the offspring. The Neo-Lamarkians in their advocacy of the theory of the inheritance of acquired characters hold a view essentially similar to that of Darwin viz:—that it is the parental germ plasm affected in a peculiar way that is transmitted and in the offspring produces a modification similar to that in the parent. But one of the many aspects of the difficulty of this theory relates to the development of the modification in the offspring. There is of course the germ-plasm transmitted from the parents to the offspring. But in this mass of germ-plasm, there is not yet the full-fledged organ to be modified in the given manner. In fact the modified germ-plasm in which the acquired characters of the parental adult are translated with the help of epigenetic factors and which retranslates those characters into the offspring this time without the help of those epigenetic factors is something which is inscrutable.

#### WEISMAN'S THEORY OF THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN GERM-PLASM AND SOMA-PLASM

Another aspect of the difficulty of the Darwinian theory becomes apparent when we consider the views of Weisman. Weisman shows that the germ-plasm is essentially different from the general soma-plasm,—so that when there are modifications in the body-cells due to epigenetic factors, the germ-plasm remains unaffected and unmodified. It is the parental germ-plasm which by amphimixis forms the basis of the general features of the child's body,—features which are common to the species, and if this parental germ-plasm continues unmodified and incorruptible from individual to individual, it is clear that the acquired characters in a parent cannot be inherited by the offspring.

## HOW TO EXPLAIN THE HERITABILITY OF PARENTAL CHARACTERS

The question thus remains unanswered still,—how is it that the acquired characters of the parent are found in the offspring? Some biologists, though unable to shake the foundation of the theory of Weisman suggest that the body-cells modified in the peculiar way, may in some way influence the germ-plasm, so as to generate in it a tendency to give rise to modifications, similar to those caused in those parental body-cells. Professor Haeckel, for example, says that “the new characteristics which the individual has acquired during life may react to some extent on the molecular texture of the germ-plasm in the egg-cell and the sperm-cell and may thus be transferred to the next generation by heredity in certain conditions (naturally, only in the form of latent energy)”. This is difficult to understand, if, as contended by Weisman, the germ-plasm is essentially different from the body-cells and remains unaffected by the modifications in the latter.

The Indian theory of the Sūkṣma Śarīra, as the principle moving and directing the operation of the germ-plasm may be considered in connection with the doctrine of the inheritance of acquired characters which is beset with the difficulties, stated above. The Sūkṣma Śarīra is a collection of latent forces capable of evolving and developing the germ-plasm into a Body, not only with its innate characters i.e. the general features common to the species, but as influenced by Dharma and Adharma, with its peculiar and individual characteristics also, alleged to be its “inherited characters”. The Indian doctrine is that a Sūkṣma Śarīra does not work upon any and every germ-plasm at random. It chooses, rather is drawn towards that germ-plasm which is most suitable for the developing of its general and individual features. The Sūkṣma Śarīra that has the capacity of evolving a lion’s Body would thus be drawn towards the germ-plasm of a lion. And in the same manner, the Sūkṣma Śarīra which on account of its acts done in its previous lives is to incarnate itself in a Body having certain uncommon and peculiar features would be naturally drawn towards the

germ-plasm of the people of the family in which those features are conspicuous. This is the Indian solution of the problem, however fanciful it may appear to the scientists. It is interesting to see how this doctrine is consistent with the present day empiricist positions while steering clear of their difficulties. It shows how the offspring may resemble the parents in their general and some of their individual features. It points out with the advanced scientists that the mere epigenetic factors are not sufficient to account for this resemblance. It agrees with the theory of the school of Weisman that the resemblance is not due to the germ-plasm being modified by the modifications in the body-cells. Lastly, while the theory of Weisman practically fails to account for the resemblance and while the theory of Haeckel and others, attempting to explain it by a reference to the adaptability of the germ-plasm to the influences of the modified body-cells appears to be hardly consistent, the Indian theory attempts to offer an explanation where explanation is not practically forth-coming. With Weisman it admits that the germ-plasm is not modified by the modifications in the body-cells. With the other school again, it acknowledges the instrumentality of the germ-plasm in the genesis in the offspring of the so-called inherited characters.

#### DOCTRINE OF THE SŪKṢMA ŚARĪRA EXPLAINS THE RACIAL, THE ANCESTRAL AND THE INDIVIDUAL FEATURES IN AN ANIMAL

Weisman's theory of the general features of the animal Body evolving from the germ-plasm may be said to refer to the "auto-taxic" character of the evolution. It points out that all the developments as well as the variations are due to vital tendencies to development, immanent in the germ-plasm. We have seen how the germ-plasm by itself will all its capacities to develop was not sufficient for the work of body-building. A guiding principle for the organisation of its potentialities and its operating towards definite ends was necessary and the Sūkṣma Śarīra with the re-incarnating Real immanent in it may well be that directing

principle. The theories of Darwin and Lamarck again, ascribing the appearance of ancestral acquired characters in the offspring to causes external to the germ-plasm, emphasise in a way the "Taxonomic" character of the evolution. Here again, we have seen how the Indian theory of the Sūkṣma Śarīra being drawn towards the germ-plasm suitable for its purpose, attempts to explain with some plausibility the phenomena of the resemblance in special features of the offspring to the ancestors. It is to be observed, however, that besides the general features common to the race and the peculiar features found in the ancestors as well as their offspring, the offspring is possessed of many characteristics which are strictly individual. What about this apparently "Ataxic" aspect of the evolution of an animal's bodily features? To say that the development of these strictly individual features is due to pure chance, is unscientific. The explanation of these peculiar features by the extreme unholders of the theory of Epigenesis is that they are probably due to peculiar collocation of cells. Weisman, however, would not go outside the germ-plasm itself and would explain these peculiarities by a reference to his doctrine of amphimixis or peculiar blending of the paternal masses of germ-plasm. The fact, however, of these individual peculiarities being in complete harmony with the other general features as well as the so-called inherited characters points strongly towards a principle which at once accounts for the former as well as for the latter. Such underlying principle is the Sūkṣma Śarīra working through the germ-plasm and developing in a planned and definite way all the three bodily features in an animal, the racial, the ancestral and the individual,—leaving nothing to chance or disorderliness.

#### MEANING OF INDRIYA

*Sense-organs:* Indriya or a sense-organ is so called as it is the Liṅga or the Karaṇa i.e. the instrument of Indra, the soul, the omniscience of which is suppressed because of its association with Karma and which, thus finite as it is,

requires the aid of the senses for the purposes of its cognition. All the systems of philosophy recognise the five sense-organs of touch, taste, smell, hearing and vision. The author of the Nyāya Sūtra's maintains that senses are made up of fine matters of which their respective objects are made. It is said that Kṣiti is the constituent element of the sense of smell, Ap of taste, Tejas of vision, Vāyu or touch and Ākāśa, of hearing. The Vedānta view is not essentially different from this. According to it, the sense of hearing is made up of pure (Apanchī-kṛta i.e. unmixed with other elements) Ākāśa in its Sattva aspect. The sense of touch similarly comes out of pure Vāyu in its Sattva aspect, and in the same manner, pure Ap, Tejas and Kṣiti in their Sāttvic aspects form the respective bases of the senses of taste, sight and smell. Kapila, however, points out that it is wrong to suppose the Adhiṣṭhāna (abode) e.g. the Eye to be the sense e.g. of vision. The sense according to him is supersensuous (Atīndriya). He admits the non-psychical character of the Indriya's when he says that they are evolved out of Ahaṅkāra. The Jaina philosophers hold that the Indriya's are Paudgalika or material in essence.

#### ASPECTS OF A SENSE-ORGAN

The sense-organs according to the Indian systems are not gross matter, as is often wrongly supposed. They are material in essence, no doubt, but the matters constituting their bases are matters in their most subtle form. They are non-psychical instruments for the psychical principle. The Jaina theory according to which the sense-organs are Paudgalika or material, nevertheless emphasises this aspect of the Indriya in a most conspicuous way and may be shortly stated thus:—The Indriya's, the Jaina's point out, are primarily divided into two classes viz:—Dravyendriya or material organ and Bhāvendriya or subjective organ. Nirvṛtti and Upakaraṇa are the two sub-classes of the former; each of these two again has two parts or aspects, respectively called Bāhya or external and Āntara or internal. Nirvṛtti is that aspect of the sense-organs which is operative in the



matter of generation of knowledge and Upakaraṇa is that which protects Nirvṛtti, the main or the principal part of the sense-organ. When on account of the annihilation or the mitigation of knowledge-enveloping Karma, a part (Pradeśa) of the soul becomes purified, it i.e. the purified part of the soul assumes the shape of the sense-organs e.g. the Eye etc. This purified part of the soul which thus assumes the form of the sense-organs is the Āntara-nirvṛtti. The limb of the part of the physical body in which is located the Āntara-nirvṛtti is called the Bāhya-nirvṛtti. The substance called the Upakaraṇa which exists inside and protects the Nirvṛtti aspect of the Indriya is the Āntara Upakaraṇa. The black, the white fields etc. which are within the Eyes are for example, the Āntara Upakaraṇa. The Bāhya Upakaraṇa is those parts of the sense-organ which exist outside and protect it e.g. the eye-hairs, and eye-lids etc. The Āntara-nirvṛtti, the Bāhya-nirvṛtti, the Āntara Upakaraṇa and the Bāhya Upakaraṇa are all modes of the Dravyendriya or material sense-organ; for these are but the modes of the soul and matter (Ātmā and Pudgala). Labdhi and Upayoga are the two aspects of the Bhāvendriya or the subjective sense-organ. Labdhi is the gain on the part of the soul consisting in the annihilation and the mitigation of the knowledge-obscuring Karma. Upayoga consists in the soul's modification into conscious attention. When the knowledge-enveloping Karma is annihilated and mitigated the soul is possessed of Labdhi; on account of this Labdhi the soul attends to the Dravya-nirvṛtti aspect of the Indriya's. This attention is Upayoga. Labdhi is due to the annihilation and the mitigation of the knowledge-enveloping Karma; the knowledge by the sense-organs is impossible without Labdhi. Sensuous knowledge, again is impossible until and unless there is Upayoga, unless and until, that is to say, there is some subjective effort (attention), to have the sensuous knowledge. Labdhi and Upayoga are the aspects of the soul and the means to its knowledge; hence these are called the Bhāvendriya or the subjective senses. Thus although the Jaina's always contend

that the Indriya's are Paudgalika or material, they take care in mentioning that the material basis of the sense-organs is not ordinary dead and unconscious matter<sup>1</sup>.

#### JAINA AND NYĀYA VIEWS OF THE INDRIYA

The Jaina theory of the sense-organs is thus slightly different from the Nyāya theory, according to which, the sense-organs are rigidly material and unconscious instruments in the hands of the soul. The Jaina's maintain that being impregnated by the soul, the senses become conscious and feel pleasure and pain,—just as a ball of iron being well burnt appears as red like fire itself.

‘निष्ठप्रायः पिण्डवदिन्द्रियपरिणामात् इन्द्रिय मनश्चेतनास्वभाव्यात् इन्द्रियाण्येव वेदनावगमं कुर्वन्ति ।’

The Nyāya theory, on the contrary, is that it is not the function of the senses to feel pleasure or pain, that it is the Manas which operates in the matter of feeling pleasure or pain; but that both the sense-organs as well as the Manas are unconscious and that it is the soul which has the sensuous knowledge and the pleasurable or the painful feelings; that the Indriya's in the former case and the Manas in the latter are the unconscious Karaṇa's or organs of the sensing and the feeling soul.

#### HOW SENSATIONS ARE GENERATED

A question of some present-day interest seems to have been much debated in ancient India, regarding the manner in which the sense-organs help the generation of the sensuous knowledge. The philosopher of ancient Greece held that as only the like could come in contact with the like, it was impossible for the soul which was subtle and conscious to come in contact with a sensuous object which was

<sup>1</sup> The Kārmic matter, coming in contact with or rather being impregnated by the conscious principle itself, become conscious, पौख्येयपरिणामानु रजितत्वात् कर्मणः स्याच्चैतन्यम् as the author of the Rāja-Vārtika points out.

obviously gross and unconscious. Accordingly they felt the necessity of admitting a medium which could effectuate a working connection between the object of cognition and the cognising principle. They thought that the material objects of the senses gave out subtle particles which were carried through the currents of air and which, subtle as they were could come in contact with the sense-organs. These material particles which were thus the medium of *tertium quid*, so to say, made perception possible and were called "Effluvia" by Empedocles and Aristotle and "Eidola" by Democritus and Epicurus.

#### SENSES COME IN CONTACT WITH OBJECTS

Of course, when we have the tactual sensation of an object, it is clear that our sense-organ of touch is in actual contact with the object of touch. Similarly, in the case of tasting a thing, our tongue is in contact with it. No one would deny that even when an object, the smell of which we perceive, is at a distance from us, our olfactory sense-organ is in touch with the object through the "effluvia" or "eidola" arising from it. The sense organs which thus actually come in contact with their objects in order to give rise to sensations, are called "Prāpyakāri" in Indian philosophy and the Indian philosophers of all the schools agree that the senses of touch, taste and smell are all Prāpyakāri in this sense.

#### NO—ACCORDING TO BUDDHISTS

With respect to the sense-organ of hearing the Buddhist philosophers contend that it is not Prāpyakāri. In other words, they say that in the matter of an auditory sensation, the sense of hearing does not come in contact with the object in any way. They point out that in every sound there is what they call a दिग्देशव्यपदेश. This means that whenever we hear a sound, we have as an integral part of the sound some such apprehension as that "this cloud-roar is from the eastern direction", "this singing of the bird is from the wood". It cannot be said that in such

cases our sense-organ of hearing comes in contact with the *direction* (Dik) or the *place* (Deśa), where the sound originates. Accordingly the Buddhists conclude that our auditory sense-organ is not Prāpyakāri i.e. it does not come in contact with the object in the matter of its sensation.

YES—ACCORDING TO THE JAINA'S AND THE NAIYĀYIKA'S

In reply to the above Buddhist contention, the Jaina's point out that although in the matter of olfactory sensations also, we have the Vyapadeśa's or apprehensions e.g. "This sweet smell is from the mādavi-bowers" or 'this sandal scent is from the southern direction', the Buddhists look upon the olfactory sense-organ as Prāpyakāri. Why, then, should not the auditory sense be Prāpyakāri? The Buddhists may contend that in the case of smell, smell is the object of sense and that the olfactory sense-organ comes in contact with smell only and not with the *place* or *direction*. They point out that the *place* and *direction*, connected with smell, are really extraneous matters, the apprehensions of which along with smell are really due to recollection and association. The Jaina's refute this Buddhist contention by pointing out similarly that sound is the object of the sense of hearing and that the latter comes in contact with sound only, to which the apprehensions of the *direction* and the *place* of sound are really extraneous, joined by recollection and association.

WHERE THE JAINA AND THE NYĀYA VIEWS DIFFER

The sense of hearing is thus Prāpyakāri according to the Jaina's, which is the Nyāya view also. We have, however, seen in what respect the Jaina theory of sound is different from the Nyāya. The Nyāya school admits the reality of a subtle material substance, called the Ākāśa, which is the abode of sound and the waves produced in which, when carried to our sense-organ of hearing produce our sensations of sound. The Jaina's, however, do not admit the reality of Ākāśa as a material substance; according to them, sound is Paudgalika i.e. a mode of matter itself. When our sense-

organ of hearing comes in contact with the peculiar modification of matter, connected with sound, we have the auditory sensation of sound.

### VISUAL SENSATION

. As regards our visual sensation, the modern theory is that when our eyes are fixed upon an object, vibrations are caused in the Ether which is the subtle substance, pervading the space between the eyes and the object,—which vibrations affect the retina. It appears thus that in the matter of our visual perception the sense-organ of sight is not wholly unconnected with its object; rather, the organ may be said to come in contact with the object of vision through the intervening subtle substance, Ether.

### MODERN ETHER AND TEJAS

According to the thinkers of the Nyāya and other orthodox schools of Indian philosophy, the sense-organ of sight also is Prāpyakāri i.e. it generates visual sensation by coming in contact with the object. They seem to have made some approach to the modern theory by thinking that this contact is effected through a medium or intermediary substance which they called Tejas. Although according to them, this Tejas was the constituent substance of the visual organ also and in the matter of visual perception, it was conceived to emanate and go out from the visual organ towards the object, the intermediary character of the Tejas in the matter of visual perception was nevertheless frankly admitted. Accordingly, it would be interesting to find out how far this Indian Tejas resembles the Ether of modern science.

### VARIOUS KINDS OF TEJAS

First of all, it should be noted that it would be wrong to identify Tejas with what we ordinarily call Fire. Tejas as Śārira Tejas or bodily element is supposed to constitute the body of the beings in the Sun. It is Tejas, again, which as already observed, is the constituent substance of the sense-organ of vision. The third form of Tejas is the Viśaya Tejas

or objective Tejas. It is said to be of four modes. The first mode is called the Bhauma Tejas, of which our ordinary Fire is an instance. Electricity etc. are the instances of what is called Divya or Abindhana Tejas. The digestive activities are said to be the functioning of the third mode of objective Tejas, called the Audārya Tejas. The brilliance in gold and other minerals is due to the mode of Tejas, called the Khaniya Tejas. It is clear that not all these modes of Tejas are fire or modes of ordinary fire. That it is wrong to identify Tejas with ordinary fire is further evident from the fact that the Indian philosophers expressly held that Tejas in many cases is insensible. In fact, the Naiyāyika's admitted four forms of Tejas. The first form of Tejas was that in which there were both visibility and heat. Sun's rays were the instances of this mode of Tejas. In the second mode of Tejas e.g. the light from a candle, there was visibility but no heat. We have an instance of the third mode of Tejas in the heat in a quantity of hot water, where there is heat but no visibility. In the fourth mode of Tejas there was neither heat nor visibility.

#### NYĀYA CONCEPTION OF TEJAS

"Phenomena of radiance and electricity" are said to be the expressions or functionings of the Ether of modern science and in this respect, it is similar to the Divya mode of Tejas, described above. The phenomena of radiance, however, is not explicit in the Ether which serves as the medium in the matter of visual sensation but all the same, the medium is Ether. The Naiyāyika's also seem to have had some such conception in explaining the nature of Tejas which was responsible for the genesis of visual perception. We have seen that the Tejas which generated visual perception was an elementary substance, which instead of calling it the etheric medium the Naiyāyika's chose to describe as the substance emanating from the sense-organ of sight towards the object of vision. But in describing the nature of such Tejas, Vātsāyana says:—

अनुद्भूतरूपस्पर्शोप्रत्यक्षश्चाक्षुषोरश्मिरिति । ३-१-३५

(न्यायसूत्रे वात्स्यायन-भाष्यम्)

The visual Tejas is characterised by insensibility and inexplicit visibility and imperceptible heat.

The Visual Tejas which is perfectly invisible is the fourth mode of Tejas described above and is thus similar to a considerable extent to the intermediary Ether, in the case of visual perception in which the "phenomena of radiance and electricity" are not explicit

Tejas thus resembles Ether. Both of them have for their explicit characteristics "the phenomena of radiance and electricity". In the matter of visual perception too, they are similar. Ether in such a case is not explicitly radiant and the visual Tejas is 'अनुद्भूतरूपस्पर्श' and अप्रत्यक्षः. There is a third point also in respect of which Ether resembles Tejas. Ether is an extremely subtle substance and can pass through hard and apparently impenetrable bodies. "That Ether penetrates transparent bodies is shown by the passage of light through them". The same thing is said of the visual Tejas. Vātsāyana points out—

न च काचोऽभूषटलंवा नयनरश्मिं बिष्टिभ्नाति । ३।१।४५

(न्यायसूत्रे वात्स्यायन-भाष्यम्)

Glass and other such transparent substances cannot obstruct the visual rays.

It is thus that with regard to functions there is considerable similarity between Tejas and Ether. But here the parallel ends. For, if from the phenomena of their functioning, we turn our attention to the structures of Ether and Tejas, we find they are widely different. Tejas is atomic. Ether, on the contrary, as we have seen in our consideration of Space, is "not atomistic", "not made up of separate particles (atoms) but continuous" (in the words of Haeckel). In this respect, Ether is essentially different from Tejas and similar to Ākāśa to some extent.

### BUDDHIST OPPOSITION TO THE NYĀYA THEORY OF VISION

Thus it is that according to the Naiyāyika's, all the five sense-organs including those of hearing and vision are Prāpyakāri. We have seen how the Buddhists are opposed to the view that our auditory sensations are due to the auditory sense-organ coming in contact with the object of hearing. The Jaina's agreed with the orthodox thinkers in refuting this Buddhist contention. As regards the visual sensations, the Nyāya theory, as stated above, is that Tejas which constitutes the material basis of the organ of vision emanates from the eyes and generates the sensation of sight by coming in contact with the objects of vision. The Buddhists are opposed to this theory also. According to them, the organ of vision is not Prāpyakāri. If Viśvanātha is to be relied on as truly representing the Buddhist contention while criticising it, the Buddhist thinkers seem to have held that the black round substance on the eyes was the organ of sight and that as this substance cannot be said to come in contact with the object of vision, the sense-organ of vision cannot be said to be Prāpyakāri. The orthodox schools pointed out that the Buddhist position is fundamentally wrong. The organ of vision is not the gross black round substance on the eyes. According to the Sāṃkhya philosophers, all the sense-organs are supersensuous having their basis in Ahaṅkāra. As Ahaṅkāra is a pervading (Vyāpaka) and not a spatially limited reality, the sense-organs including the organ of vision are really continuous and as such, do come in contact with their objects while perceiving them. The Nyāya, of course, does not endorse this Sāṃkhya doctrine. As we have seen, according to the Nyāya, the organ of vision is not अभौतिक or immaterial, as urged by the Sāṃkhya thinkers, but is essentially भौतिक or material. The Nyāya maintains that the subtler element, Tejas which forms the material basis of the organ goes out of the eyes and comes in contact with the object while generating its sensation. Thus in a different way, the Nyāya arrives at the conclusion, same as that of the Sāṃkhya and opposed to the Buddhist.



**JAINA AGREEMENT WITH THE BUDDHIST VIEW ON VISION**

The Jaina philosophers, however, agree with the Buddhists on this point. Their contention is that Tejas, the functioning of which consists in the phenomena of light and radiance cannot be said to cause our visual sensations; for, we have visual sensations not only of light and radiant things, but of darkness as well. They point out that we never see any Tejas or light shooting from our eyes and coming in contact with the object of vision. Accordingly, the sense-organ of sight cannot be said to be *Prāpyakāri*. How then does our organ of sight cause our visual sensations? The Jaina's contend that our eyes have a power inherent in them, whereby they are able to apprehend the object without coming in actual contact with them. This power in our visual organ, they call *Yogyatā*.

**THEORY OF THE GENETIC SCHOOL REGARDING VISION**

This difference in the modes of operation of the tactual and the visual sense-organs may suggest a point which is of considerable interest in modern psychology. We say, we have the tactual sensation of, say, a square block of wood; we say also, we have the visual sensation of the same block. In our tactual sensation, our sense-organ actually comes in contact with the object, so that we have perceptions of its length, breadth and depth. The Berkeleyan school of psychologists pointed out that our visual sensations do not really give us the apprehensions of the respective dimensions of the thing. When we say that we have the visual perception of the square block of wood, our perception is not really based on the visual sensations of its dimensions but is really a group of ideas based on tactile sensations and revived at the time, giving us a seeming perception of the thing being of three dimensions. This doctrine of the Genetic school regarding the unreality of visual perceptions with respect to dimensional things, is based on associationism, which in its extreme form, is certainly unacceptable. James and Ward, for instance, point out that our perception of an extended object is not fully explained by mere experiences

of its parts and the doctrine of associationism. However much we may differ from the theories of the Nativist schools, we must admit that our sense-organs have a crude apprehension of Extensity, a sensation of what James calls "Roominess,"—when face to face with their objects. This "naïve apprehension of wholeness," we may say, is a capacity in most of the sense-organs generally, in the organ of vision in particular. Of course, the detached and detailed perceptions and experiences of the parts of a thing are essential to the building up of the percept of the dimensional thing,—as urged by the Genetic school; but with the Nativist school, we must admit that at the very first flash of the perceptual process, we have a naïve apprehension of Extensity, a sensation of Wholeness. This apprehension of wholeness is present in visual perception. The Jaina doctrine of *Yogyatā* in the visual sense-organ clearly implies that the visual perception far from being essentially a system of associated ideas consists in actual sensations of Extensity and of Extensions. The theory of the *Nyāya* school according to which the sense-organ of sight is *Prāpyakāri* does not mean that the visual perception of an extended object is a system of associated and revived tactual ideas; it means that our visions of extended things are as good percepts as our tactile experience regarding them. Of course, the *Nyāya* and the Jaina schools differ among themselves with regard to the mode in which the organ of vision causes the visual percepts; but both of them are opposed to extreme associationism and refuse to reduce visual perceptions of extended objects to associated ideas of tactile experiences.

#### REDUCTION OF ALL SENSATIONS TO TACTILE SENSATIONS : NYĀYA VIEW

Another matter of interest is suggested by the Indian theories of sense-organs. Some psychologists of the modern evolutionist school maintain that the sense and the sensuous knowledge are evolved as adaptive reactions from within the living animal organism, when objects from outside come in

contact with and act upon it. According to them, the sense of touch is the first of the sense-organs to evolve; the other organs are later developments from the sense of touch, as adaptive reactions against the more complex and complicated actions of objects from outside. The author of the Nyāya Sūtra's, of course, maintains the essential independence of each of the sense-organs and vehemently protests against the contention that all senses are but the sense of touch and that all sensuous perceptions are tactile perceptions in different forms. But the theory of the Nyāya school that all the sense-organs are Prāpyakāri and cause perceptions of objects by coming in contact with them,—in a way implies that the sense of touch is the original and the most primary of the sense-organs and that the tactile is the most fundamental of the sensuous perceptions.

#### SĀMKNHYA VIEW : AS REPRODUCED BY VĀTSAYANA

It is surmised that the doctrine of the sense of touch being the original and primary sense-organ was the contention in ancient times of the thinkers of the Sāṃkhya school. In his commentary on the 2.2.10 of the Vedānta Sūtra's, the author of the Bhāmatī has referred to the above doctrine in his statements,—*त्वङ्मात्रमेव हि*—etc. and has attributed it to the Sāṃkhya philosophers. The arguments of the Sāṃkhya school in support of their theory about the original and primary character of the tactile sense-organ are not available but an idea of them can be fairly gathered in Vātsāyana's commentary on 3.1.53 Nyāya Sūtra. For, there Vātsāyana has developed his opponent's view in this way. 'न त्वचा किञ्चिदिन्द्रियाधिष्ठानं न प्राप्तं न चासत्यां त्वचि किञ्चिद् विषयग्रहणं भवति । यथा सर्वेन्द्रियस्थानानि व्याप्तानि यस्यां च सत्यां विषयग्रहणं भवति सा त्वगेकमिन्द्रियमिति ।

Tactile sensibility is present in all the locations of all the sense-organs. No object can be perceived by any of the sense-organs unless there is this tactile sensibility. Modern psychologists of the evolutionist school argue in a somewhat

similar way and some support to this doctrine is offered by physiology. The above view of the alleged opponent school, presumably the Sāṃkhya, is further developed by Vātsāyana in the following words.

‘त्वगवयवविशेषणधूमोपलब्धिबत् तदुपलब्धिः।’

Our visual perception of smoke is but a perception by tactile sense-organ modified in a peculiar way.

This implies that the other sense-organs are but the tactile organ itself, peculiarly modified with reference to their locations and modes of operation. It need scarcely be pointed out that in these old and curious doctrines of ancient India, we have a foreshadowing of the modern theory that the other sense-organs are later developments of the primary organ viz: of touch, as well suited adaptive reactions against the more complex and complicated actions of objects on the organism.

#### JAINA DOCTRINE ABOUT THE MULTIPLICITY OF SENSE-ORGANS

Roughly speaking, the Jaina's also support the doctrine of the multiplicity of the sense-organs. In this connection, however, their classifications of sentient beings may be taken into consideration. Man according to them, has Mind and besides that, all the five sense-organs. But the subhuman creatures have not not only the Manas but they have not necessarily all the five sense-organs. Some of course have the five sense-organs, but some of the others have only four of them; some again, only three; some two; some have only one sense-organ. In the class of beings having only one sense-organ, the Jaina's include the immobile vegetables. The trees and vegetables have souls in them, according to the Jaina's and they have only the sense-organ of touch in them and no other organ<sup>1</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> Thus the simplest of the living beings i.e. the creatures having only one sense-organ have the sense of touch,

## SUBJECTIVE AND OBJECTIVE ELEMENTS IN CONSCIOUSNESS

*Mind:* It may be admitted that all experience is 'internal' in the sense that it constitutes a part of an individual's conscious existence. On the other hand, all conscious experience has something for its object which is, at least for the purpose of its objectivity, somewhat distinct in existence from the individual's consciousness; in this respect all experience is 'external'. The distinction between the internal and the external experiences thus appears to break down. Yet the distinction has been recognised from very ancient times and is even now wide spread and persistently maintained. And it is not wholly unjustifiable. Our *perception* of a chair is essentially different from our *recognition* of a chair as one previously perceived or our *feeling* of joy at the sight of the chair. In the former case, our experience refers to the object which has an existence and intrinsic nature of its own, outside and independent of us. It is our peripheral sense-organs that in most cases come in contact with this object which is external to us and the experience of which is thus in a very real sense, external. "External experiences", as Professor Stout points out, "are experiences which have for their object whatever is taken to be distinct in existence from the stream of individual consciousness or any part of it". In the case of our feelings and emotions, of recognitions and reasoning, our experiences are entirely different. Our feelings of joy or sorrow are purely subjective and so are the processes of reasoning and recognition, if

‘एइदिअस्स फूसणं एकं विवहोदि - - - - - ।’ गोम्मटसार-जीवकाण्ड

श्लो-१६६

as the author of Gommaṭa Sāra says. Thus although the Jaina's contend,—

‘ईसन्ति एवकमेकं इन्दा इव इन्द्रियेजाण’ । गोम्मटसार-जीवकाण्ड

श्लो-१६३

‘In the upper regions just as one Indra is completely separate from and independent of another Indra, each of the five sense-organs is to be known as distinct from the other,—

the doctrine of the fundamental and primary character of the organ of touch seems to be somewhat hinted at in their own theory about the simplest one-sensed animal being possessed of the sense of touch.

introspectively looked at. In our feelings and emotions and in our consciousness of our ideational processes, we have experiences which may be and have been fitly called 'internal'. "Now the phrase 'internal experience'", as Professor Stout says, "seems to refer especially to cases in which an experience has other experiences of the same subject for its object; or to cases . . . in which an experience is immediately aware of itself as such". The Indian philosophers recognise this distinction between the External and the Internal experiences and call the former *Indriya-pratyakṣa* and the latter, *Mānasa-pratyakṣa*. In the previous section, we have dealt with the Indian view of the external experience i.e. sensuous perception. In the following lines, the Indian ways of explaining the ideational processes will be considered.

#### INTERNAL EXPERIENCES 'ONE AT A TIME'

Internal experiences may be roughly described as experiences in which objects outside us have no active part to play. Ideas of objects are no doubt there but the actual objects are out of the picture. In ideation and feelings a principle which is entirely different from the outside objects and their activities and which may conveniently be looked upon as internal, seems to be alone in operation. This internal principle has its own manner of operation which is 'one at a time'. One cannot have two sensations at once and the same time. The author of the *Nyāya Sūtra*'s aptly ascribes to the operation of this internal principle our common experience,—*'युगपज्ज्ञानानुत्पत्तिः ।'* i.e. the impossibility of varied experiences arising simultaneously. Even our sensuous or external experiences have to obey this order; sensations come up not simultaneously but strictly one after the other. This shows that even in our external experiences, we come across a principle which in a sense, rules them and makes their emergence successive.

#### EVOLUTION OF EXPERIENCES ACCORDING TO THE BUDDHISTS

The Buddhist philosophers call the series of conscious

phenomena, the *Āntara-Sāmudaya* or the *Adhyātma Saṁghāta* and distinguish them from the *Bāhya-Sāmudaya* or purely material phenomena. The *Mādhyamika* school of Buddhists, of course, deny the reality of both these series, the conscious and the material and the subjective idealists of the Buddhist *Yogācāra* school look upon the material series as subjective objectification of the purely subjective experience. We are not concerned here with the contentions of these two schools but are interested in the Buddhist theory of the conscious experience. In *Śaṅkara's* words, the unbroken series of a life's experience, admitted (अप्रत्याख्येय) by all the Buddhist schools is—'अविद्या संस्कारो विज्ञानं नामरूपं एङायतनं स्पर्शवेदना तूष्णोपादानं भवो जातिर्जरामरणं शोकःपरिदेवनादुःखं दुर्मनस्तेत्येवंजातीयका इतरेतर-हेतुकाः ।'

*Avidyā* is false apprehension, consisting in sensing unity in a real plurality, wholeness in separate things, eternity in the non-eternal, joy in real sorrow, existence in non-existence, relations where there is none and so on. This *Avidyā* leads to *Samskāra* which consists in feelings of attachments, aversion and stupefaction. *Samskāra* in its turn produces *Vijñāna* i.e. the primary or the most rudimentary consciousness (otherwise called, *Ālaya-vijñāna*) about objects. This fundamental cognitive tendency towards outside objects gives rise to *Nāma* which means fundamental matter. From *Nāma* or primary matter, is generated *Rūpa* i.e. the body in its primary stage. This foetal body develops into *Saḍāyatana* or the full-fledged body with the five sense-organs. *Sparśa* consists in the relation mutually entered into by the body and the senses. *Vedanā* i.e. the feeling of joy and sorrow results from *Sparśa* and in its turn gives rise to *Tṛṣṇā* or a thirst for enjoying objects. *Tṛṣṇā* generates *Upādāna* or active efforts for the appropriation of the objects. *Upādāna* produces *Bhāva* i.e. causes of birth which are *Dharma* and *Adharma*. This *Bhāva* or cause of birth determines *Jāti* or the nature of the embodied state, peculiar to each being. Body, in time, deteriorates into *Jarā* or old age which leads to *Maraṇa* or death, to *Śoka* or mental pain

which expresses itself in Paridevanā or outward manifestations of grief, to Duḥkha or apprehensions of future pain, to Dourmanasya or mental agony arising from Duḥkha. The Buddhists assert that besides the above there are other forms of mental states e.g. sense of insult, honour, etc. which are called the Upakleśa's. At the fit and opportune stage, there appears Avidyā again,—thus making an individual wander in the cyclical transmigratory series and feel the rounds of conscious experiences.

#### BUDDHIST CLASSIFICATION OF THE CONSCIOUS EXPERIENCES

It is however, not to be forgotten in this connection that the corner-stone of the Buddhist philosophy is its doctrine of the momentary character of all experiences. It is also to be noted that all experiences, transitory as they are, form causal moments in an unbroken series. The question then naturally arises, how these discrete and separate experiential moments come to be causally connected, so as to constitute a life's experience as a whole. The same question reappears in an insistent and more pointed form when we consider the Buddhist classification of the Āntara-Sāmudaya or conscious experience proper.

#### PAÑÇA SKANDHA

The conscious experiences may be grouped under five classes, the Pañça Skandha's as the Buddhists call them. The Rūpa Skandha has for its matter, the sensuous objects. The momentary consciousnesses of self (Aham), forming a connected series or stream is the Vijñāna Skandha. The Vedanā Skandha consists in feelings of pleasure and pain. All forms of knowledge involving conception and naming come under the fourth class the Saṃjñā Skandha; while Saṃskāra Skandha consists in tendencies of attachment and envy, of pride, and of Dharma and Adharma etc. which lead to re-incarnations. Skandha, Sāmudaya or Sanghāta mean the same thing and indicate a group or compound and the Buddhist theory is that although each of our conscious experiences is strictly individual and momentary



(i.e. dying away as soon as it arises), a number of these experiences may be causally so connected, as to form one connected whole. Plainly, the question crops up:—How do the individual and momentary units of consciousness form a series?

#### FOUR GENERATING CAUSES ACCORDING TO THE BUDDHISTS

It is to be admitted that a number of disparate things or phenomena can form a group and a connected whole, only when there can be traced a sort of continuity in them. One conscious experience can be causally connected with its successor when there is similarity and no barrier between them. It is interesting to note that the Buddhists in their analysis of a particular conscious experience did not lose sight of this fact of continuity. They point out that there are four causes in the matter of the genesis of a conscious experience.

‘चतुर्विधान् हेतून् प्रतीत्य विसृज्य उत्पद्यन्ते ।’

First of all, we have the Adhi-pati Pratyaya i.e. the instrumentality of the sense-organs etc. Secondly, there is the Sahakāri Pratyaya i.e. assistance from the attendant causes like light etc. Next, we have the Ālambana Pratyaya or the object itself (e.g. a pitcher) of experience. Lastly, and in this we are interested at present, there is the “Samanantara Pratyaya”. This has been explained by Dharmotara as,—

‘समश्चासौ ज्ञानत्वेनानन्तरश्चासावव्यवहितत्वेन सचासौप्रत्ययश्च ।’

#### SAMANANTARA PRATYAYA

In other words, it is an apprehension which has similarity with the conscious experience immediately preceding it. Thus although an unit of experience dies as soon as it arises and is really unconnected with the experience that follows it, it may be arranged or grouped with its immediate successor in a series and this is possible because the two experiences in spite of their disparity are similar and there intervenes nothing between them to break their continuity.

## NATURE OF VIJÑĀNA SKANDHA

This theory of the Buddhists raises the further question. In what respect are the two succeeding experiences and for the matter of that, all experiences similar? Here the Buddhists reiterate their doctrine of the Vijñāna Skandha and point out that all experiences are fundamentally but Vijñāna Skandha. Vijñāna Skandha means a group or series of Vijñāna's. It is described as—

‘विज्ञानस्कन्धोऽहमित्याकारो रूपादि विषय इन्द्रियादिजन्यः’ ।

## VIJÑĀNA INVOLVES A SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS

Vijñāna group has the form of self-consciousness, has Rūpa etc. for its object and is generated by senses etc. A Vijñāna Skandha is a group or series of Vijñāna's. Vijñāna's are the individual and the momentary units which form the Vijñāna Skandha. We are not concerned here with the generating causes of the Vijñāna's nor their objects; for obviously, these do not make the Vijñāna's similar. What makes the Vijñāna's similar is their subjective aspect or form. This subjective aspect of a Vijñāna consists in a consciousness of self as the knower (Aham). One Vijñāna is different from another so far as their generating causes and their objects are concerned; but all Vijñāna's or experiences are similar in this respect that in all of them is involved a consciousness of the knowing self. The Vijñāna's of a life, though strictly disparate and transitory, thus succeed one another as a flow of units of self-consciousness and appear as a series or a connected whole.

A Vijñāna is otherwise called Ćitta by the Buddhists which is another name for Manas.

‘चित्तं मनोविज्ञानं विज्ञप्तिश्चेति पर्यायः ।’ ब्रह्मसूत्रम् ।

## ĆITTA OR MANAS IS THE ĀTMĀ ACCORDING TO THE BUDDHISTS

A Ćitta or Manas is thus a momentary experience, different from the succeeding Ćitta or Manas. It is being generated every moment by senses etc. and annihilated as soon

as it arises. The object of a momentary *Çitta* or *Manas* is certainly different from that of its successor. But all the *Çitta*'s are similar in this that all of them involve a consciousness of the knowing self. This similarity running through all the *Çittas* makes it possible for the succeeding *Çittas* appear as an unbroken continuum. This unbroken continuum is called the *Ālaya-Vijñāna* by the Buddhists. Although the Buddhists deny the existence of any permanently existing soul, they point out that this *Ālaya-Vijñāna* as the uninterrupted flow of self-consciousness is virtually the *Ātmā*. On the other hand, each unit of *Ālaya-Vijñāna* is self-conscious; *Ātmā* is also the principle of self consciousness; viewed in this way, *Manas* or *Çitta*, momentary as it is, is the *Ātmā*.

Although the celebrated doctrine of *Vijñāna* is generally associated with the Buddhists, vague hints about it may be traced in some of the doctrines, mentioned in the early Upaniṣads. In the 4th *Anuvāka* of the 2nd *Vallī* of the *Taittirīya*, for instance, we are informed of some thinkers who contended.—‘आत्मा विज्ञानमयः।’

#### BUDDHIST THEORY OF MANAS, COMPARABLE WITH HUME'S DOCTRINE

The points embodied in these doctrines and fully developed in the Buddhist philosophy are:—1. *Manas* is a unit of self-consciousness. 2. It is momentary. 3. Succeeding units of *Manas*, although really unconnected are similar to one another, in as much as self-consciousness is involved in each and this fact of similarity makes the successive units appear as one connected series or *Santāna*. 4. Although there is no permanent Soul, *Manas* as the self-conscious unit and the *Santāna* as the continuum of such units may for all practical purposes, be identified with the *Ātmā* of the other systems. Stated thus the Buddhist theory resembles the present day doctrines of the sensationist school, . . . . “perceptions are distinct existences” says Hume, “they form a whole only by being connected together. But no connections among distinct existences are ever

discoverable by human understanding. We only *feel* a connection or determination of the thought to pass from one object to another. It follows therefore that the thought alone feels personal identity when, reflecting on the train of past perceptions that compose a mind, the ideas of them are felt to be connected together and naturally introduce each other".

### PSYCHOLOGICAL ATOMISM : ITS DIFFICULTIES

The above quotation from Hume puts the doctrine of the psychological individualism or atomism in a nut shell. But it hints at its difficulties as well. It raises the problem of "personal identity" and states that "the train of past perceptions compose a mind". This is similar to the Buddhist contention that the Ālaya-Vijñāna or the Vijñāna-Santāna which is a series of individual Vijñāna's or experiences is the self or the Ātmā. Objections against the sensationist atomism have proceeded from the fact that our sense of personal identity is not a mere series of individual perceptions. Personal identity, as we feel it, involves a conscious principle which does not exhaust itself in a particular atom of experience but which has a permanent and abiding nature underlying the whole series of our passing experiences and manifesting itself in and through them. This conscious principle is ordinarily called Soul and the western philosophers generally make no distinction between Soul and Mind.

### JAINA OBJECTION

In India, excepting that of the Ārvāka's, all the schools of philosophy including the Jaina have raised their voice against the Vijñāna-Vāda of the Buddhists. The objectors have contended that it is impossible for the momentary and the essentially disconnected experiences to form a connected series by themselves<sup>1</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> The Jaina commentator Akalanka points out that if the function of Manas is to consist, as it admittedly does—in judging the comparative goodness or badness of objects in recollections etc., it is impossible for it to be identified with

If then we have a totality of experiences, this shows that a permanent principle of consciousness i.e. the Ātmā is the reality which underlies the series of vanishing units of experiences.

There seems to have been a school of Indian thinkers who like the modern western thinkers and apparently on the same grounds as theirs identified Manas with Ātmā. In the 3rd Anuvāka of the 2nd Valli of the Taittiriya Upaniṣad, we are told that according to some thinkers,

‘अन्योत्तर आत्मा मनोमयः ।’

#### MANAS AND ĀTMĀ IDENTIFIED BY SOME

In 3-1-15, 16 and 17 of the Nyāya Sūtra's, Gautama refers to the contention of a school of philosophers who looked upon Manas and Ātmā as identical. They pointed out that whereas a particular sense-organ can grasp only a particular aspect of outside objects, Manas like what is called Ātmā perceives all the aspects of all things. The scope or range of Manas is as unlimited as that of Ātmā. Secondly, a sense-organ gives knowledge so long as it is in contact with its object. With the absence or removal of the object, sense-knowledge is impossible. The operation of Manas, however, is not in this way or in any way limited. Manas is operative in all forms of knowledge, perceptual, reproductive, productive or inferential. In other words, Manas like Ātmā underlies all cognitive and conscious processes. It is accordingly needless,

the momentary Vijñāna; for comparisons and recollections are possible only when an object previously perceived can be held up before the mind once more; but this is impossible if we have only the Vijñāna which is to die as soon as it arises. ‘वर्तमानं तावद् विज्ञानं क्षणिकं पूर्वोत्तरविज्ञान-सम्बन्धे निवृत्तियुक् कथं गुण-दोष-विचारस्मरणादि-व्यापारे साक्षिव्यं कुर्यात् ।’

Then again, the wholeness of our experiences is also inexplicable by the doctrine of Ālaya-Vijñāna. For, Ālaya-Vijñāna must be a persisting reality in order to explain it; but in that case, the Buddhist doctrine of momentary Vijñāna is given up.

‘तस्यैकस्य कालान्तरावस्थायित्वाभ्युपगमे क्षणिकप्रतिज्ञाहानिः ।’

according to these thinkers, to posit the existence of Ātmā over and above Manas. Manas permeates and informs all forms of knowledge and apprehension in the same manner as the Ātmā does. Why, then, admit a superfluous entity, the Ātmā and not identify it with Manas?

#### JAINA THEORY OF THE BHĀVA-MANAS AND THE DRAVYA-MANAS

Most of the Indian schools of philosophy, however, make a distinction between the operation of Manas, and that of Ātmā. The Jaina's also do the same thing but they feel the necessity of admitting that the Ātmā or the conscious principle in some of its peculiar tendencies may be identified with the Manas. In the case of Karma, we have seen how in spite of their doctrine that Karma is material in nature, the Jaina's draw a distinction between the Dravya-Karma or Karmic matter and the Bhāva-Karma which consists in purely subjective emotions. A similar distinction made by the Jaina's was between the Dravyendriya or the material sense-organ and the Bhāvendriya or a subjective tendency or fitness on the part of the soul for sensing the outside objects. In a similar manner, the Jaina's contend that Manas is of two kinds viz:—Dravya-Manas which, as will be shown hereafter, is material in nature and the Bhāva-Manas. The Bhāva-Manas again is said to be of two modes, Labdhi and Upayoga. In the language in which we described the similar two modes of the Bhāvendriya, we may say:—Labdhi and Upayoga are the two aspects of the Bhāva-Manas or the subjective Manas. Labdhi is the gain on the part of the soul, consisting in the annihilation and the mitigation of the knowledge-obscuring Karma. Upayoga consists in the soul's modification into conscious attention. Internal conscious processes e.g. comparison, conception etc. are impossible unless and until the conscious principle, the soul is possessed of Labdhi i.e. the power of comparing, conceiving etc. These internal processes are impossible again, unless and until there is Upayoga, unless and until, that is to say, there is some subjective effort

(attention) to carry on these mental processes. It may also be pointed out that as the Buddhists chose to call Vijñāna and the Ālaya-Vijñāna (called Manas by the Buddhists) Ātmā, the Jaina's so far as their doctrine of the Bhāva-Manas was concerned, may be said to have admitted (though but superficially) the Buddhists' doctrine also that Manas was Ātmā<sup>1</sup>.

### MANAS, DISTINGUISHED FROM ĀTMĀ

But as has been said already, excepting the Buddhists most of the Indian schools including the Jaina's distinguish Manas from Ātmā. The Jaina's point out that the Ātmā as the underlying subject of all cognitions is found to persist even when the functions of recollection etc., (Manas) are absent and inoperative. Ātmā is thus different from Manas:—

‘मनो निवृत्तावात्मनोज्वस्थानात् स्यादन्यत् ।’

### VEDĀNTA THEORY OF MANAS

According to Śaṅkara, Ātmā in itself is Nirvikāra or rigid unity consisting in pure changeless consciousness; it is not possible for it to evolve the changing, determined and finite consciousness associated with a mundane being. Then again, the sense-organs and the objects are always there;

<sup>1</sup> Although Akalanka sticks to the Jaina contention that Manas including the Bhāva-Manas is Paudgalika i.e. material and although he says,

‘भावमनस्तावद् लब्ध्युपयोगलक्षणं पुद्गलालम्बनत्वात् पौद्गलिकम् ।’

one would scarcely fail to see that Labdhi and Upayoga, the static and the dynamic aspects of the Bhāva-Manas, so to say, are but aspects of the soul. To this very limited extent, the Jaina's seem to agree, on the one hand with the modern European thinkers that mind is soul and on the other hand with some of the ancient Indian thinkers who identified Manas with Ātmā.

‘तथात्मनः एव तत्क्षयोपशमापेक्षस्य मनः परिणामादेशात् स्यादन्यत् ।’

In some respects (Syāt), the Ātmā is identical with the Manas in as much as on the removal of the knowledge-obscuring and other Karma's, from the soul, Manas emerges.

but how is it that we have not always the consciousness of objects? The soul, the sense-organs and the objects are thus not enough for the origin of our empirical knowledge. Something, other than and in addition to them, is necessary for it. This additional real is the *Antaḥ-Karāṇa*. The Vedānta thinkers further maintain that the fundamental reality, the *Ātmā* is one undetermined, unmodified and infinite consciousness and that it is the *Manas* which is the individuating substance and causes the finite and limited modes of consciousness in the mundane beings. It is said that the five subtle elements of *Ākāśa* etc. in their purest or *Sāttvika* aspects combine and generate *Manas*. The pure and infinite consciousness of the *Ātmā* is supposed to be covered by *Avaśthā*, a mode of *Avidyā* or original nescience, so that unless and until this cover is removed, consciousness of objects is impossible. In *Pratyakṣa*, the operation or *Vṛtti* of *Manas* consists in removing this cover, resulting in the direct perception of an object. The Vedāntins hold that in direct perception, the *Manas* goes out of the body, through the channels of the sense-organs and assumes the shape of the object of perception. In feelings of pleasure or pain and in the subjective processes of recollection, reasoning etc. the *Manas* does not go out of the body or identify itself with the objects. *Manas*, according to the Vedāntists is thus essentially material in nature; but it is not the ordinary dead and inert matter. Pure consciousness of the *Ātmā* is reflected in it in a peculiarly modified form. Though essentially material, consciousnesses of the objects are attributed to it. This reflected consciousness in *Manas* takes various forms which are called *Dharmas* or functionings of *Manas*. The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* mentions *Karma*, *Saṅkalpa*, *Viçikitsā*, *Sraddhā*, *Aśraddhā*, *Dhṛti*, *Adhṛti*, *Hṛi*, *Dhī*, *Bhī*, as the functions of *Manas*. In *Mokṣa Dharma*, however, we are told that patience (*Dhairya*), thinking (*Upapatti*), recollection (*Vyakti*), illusion (*Visarga*), imagination (*Kalpanā*), forgiveness (*Kṣamā*), good attitude i.e. resignation (*Sat*), bad attitude (*Asat*), impatience (*Āśutā*), are the nine attributes of *Manas*. The Vedānta



apparently brings all these under the four clases of Saṁśaya, Nīścaya, Garba and Smaraṇa. Saṁśaya means dubitation and Manas as the principle of dubitation is called Manas. Nīścaya consists in definite determinations one way or the other and Manas in this aspect is called Buddhi. Self-conceit is Garba and Manas as the principle of self-conceit is Ahaṅkāra. Smaraṇa is recollection and investigation and Manas in this aspect is called Īitta. With reference to its functionings Manas is thus of four modes, although essentially it is one, a material substance after all. Ātmā is one and its consciousness is one infinite, unmodified unity. It is Manas which makes the one Ātmā appear as many. Manas is matter in its subtlest form and is attended with finite modes of consciousness, reflected from the Ātmā. Some thinkers, however, include Ahaṅkara in Manas and Īitta in Buddhi and hold that Manas is ultimately of two modes only.

#### MIMĀMSĀ VIEW OF MANAS

Manas is not eternal,—it lasts so long as the individual mundane soul is not emancipated. With respect to its functioning or Vṛtti, it is certainly of short duration, continuing only so long as the operation of recollection, perception or reasoning continues as the case may be. As a material substance, Manas is capable of expansion and contraction. Manas's are infinite in number just as the mundane souls. Manas is said to be Sāvayava i.e. having parts,—in as much as it is capable of modifying itself and assuming different shapes. It is a compound of five elements, as said before; the Vedāntists accordingly maintain that Manas is not an Atom. The Bhatta Mīmāṃsaka's hold that Manas is Vibhu i.e. it pervades the universe. The Vedāntists oppose this doctrine and point out that a Manas is what limits the Ātmā and hence it cannot be an all-pervasive substance. The Bhatta Mīmāṃsaka's look upon Manas as a sense-organ. The Vedānta position which we have described above is the position of Dharma-rājā-dhvarīndra, the author of the Vedānta Paribhāṣā. He refuses to look

upon Manas as a sense-organ.

‘न तावदन्तःकरणमिन्द्रियम् ।’

### MANAS AS SENSE-ORGAN

A sense-organ is the instrument of our direct perception. Manas operates in our Anumāna or reasoning; so, if Manas were a sense-organ, reasoning would have been a process of direct perception. Other Vedāntists, however, do not subscribe to this doctrine of the author of the Vedānta Paribhāṣā. They contend that we have direct perception of pleasure and pain through Manas and accordingly they agree that it is a sense-organ after all,—internal sense or Antaḥ-karāṇa, as they call it.

Manas according to the Jaina's is what distinguishes a rational (Saṃjñī) soul from the other irrational (Asaṃjñī) creatures<sup>1</sup>.

### VEDĀNTA AND JAINA VIEWS COMPARED

In one respect at least, the Jaina doctrine of Manas is remarkably similar to the Vedāntic position. We have seen that the function of Manas, according to the Vedānta, consists in Āvaraṇa-bhanga or removal of Avasthā i.e. of what covers the cognitive faculty of the soul. The Jaina's indicate almost the same thing by saying that the Manas is generated by the removal of those Karmas from the soul which cover its knowing power. Further according to them, Manas is of two kinds viz:—the Bhāva-manas and the

<sup>1</sup> The author of Gommatā-sāra indicates the functions of Manas by describing the nature of Saṃjñā in the following way.

सिक्खाकिरियु वदे सालावग्गाहीमणोवलं वेण १६६०

मीमंसदि जो पुब्बं कज्जमकज्जं च तच्चमिदं च स्तिक्खादि णामेणेदि  
(६६१ जीवकाण्डम्)

It is by the help of the Manas that one can learn, understand the gestures, receive instructions and follow conversations . . . . . It is through Manas that one is enabled to decide before doing what ought to be done and what ought not to be done. It is through Manas that one can learn the distinction between the real and the unreal. It is because one has Manas that he responds when he is called by his name.

Dravya-manas. The Bhāva-manas, as we have seen, consists in some attentive tendencies of the soul. As these tendencies are due to the proximity of the soul to the material objects which are the objects of attention, the Jaina's regard the Bhāva-manas as material. The Dravya-manas of course is purely material in essence and on this point also, the Jaina's agree with the Vedāntists. The Jaina's, however, look upon it (i.e. the Dravya-manas) as Pudgalika, a mode of primary matter and refuse to regard it as constituted of the finest aspects of the five elements viz:—of Ākāśa etc., as held by the Vedāntists. The Jaina's maintain that when the Jñānāvaraṇīya (knowledge-obscuring) and other obstacles are removed from the soul, it is enabled to resume its power of Praṇidhāna. Praṇidhāna is practically the power of attention which is involved in all cognitive processes of Guṇa-doṣa-viçāra i.e. judgement, of Smaraṇa or recollection etc. When this power of Praṇidhāna is generated in the soul, a corresponding change takes place in the Pudgala or matter, proximate to the soul, whereby the matter is modified in such a way as to help the soul in its subjective processes of recollections etc. Matter, modified in this peculiar manner is Manas (Dravya-manas) according to the Jaina's<sup>1</sup>.

From the Jaina theory of Manas, as described above, it would appear that the Jaina's are opposed to all one-sided views (Ekānta) about the duration of Manas. According to them Manas is eternal so far as its constituent substance, Pudgala is concerned.

‘द्रव्याथदिशान्मनः स्यादवस्थायि ।’

On the other hand, the particular mode of Pudgala, which is Manas and does a particular act of judgement etc. is

<sup>1</sup> As Akalanka says—

‘द्रव्यमनश्च ज्ञानावरणवीर्यान्तरायक्षयोपशमलाभप्रत्यया गुणदोष विचार स्मरणादिप्रणिधानाभिमुखस्यात्मनोऽनुग्राहकाः, पुद्गलाः वीर्यविशेषार्जन-समर्थाऽमनस्त्वेन परिणता, इति कृत्वा पौद्गलिकं नाकाशमयं ।’

dissolved (into primary Pudgala) as soon as that particular act is done. In this respect, Manas is temporary<sup>1</sup>.

#### EXTENT OF MANAS

The Jaina's do not contribute to the Vedānta contention that Manas is capable of expansion and contraction, nor to the Mīmāṃsā theory of its all-pervasive character (Vibhutva). According to the Digambara Jaina's it is located in the heart and is of a very small, though not of atomic dimension. Ratna-prabhācāryya in his comments on the 2nd Sūtra of the 1st chapter of the Pramāṇa-naya-tattvālokā-larīkāra suggests, however that the Manas is Śarīra-vyāpi i.e. that it pervades the whole body. Manas's of course are infinite in number as they are being formed every moment in beings, as occasions arise. The Jaina's point out that Manas is Mūrta i.e. it has a definite form or shape. It is only a Mūrta thing that can be stopped and overwhelmed by another Mūrta thing outside it. Sounds (which are material modes according to the Jaina's) of thunder are found to stop the operation of Manas and wine etc. overwhelm it; hence the Jaina's argue that Manas must be a Mūrta substance. The Jaina's call Manas a No-indriya or Anindriya, literally signifying not a sense-organ. They however, mean to say that the Mind may be regarded in some respects as a sense-organ. Senses of touch, taste, vision, smell and hearing have fixed locations in the body from which they do not move; but Manas has no such fixed location in the periphery. Mind in this respect is not a sense-organ. It is Manas that first attends to a thing before it can be actually perceived by the other senses. Mental attention is prior to sensuous perception. It is in this respect also that Mind is distinct from the other senses. But it is an Indriya in the sense that like the sense-organs it is an instrument by means of which, the finite soul (Indra) grasps the outside objects. Manas is called the Antaraṅga-karaṇam,

<sup>1</sup> As Akalanka puts it—मनस्त्वेन हि परिणताः पुद्गलाः गुणदोषविचारस्मरणादिकार्यं कृत्वा तदनन्तरसमये मनस्त्वात् प्रच्यवन्ते ।'

the Internal Sense, in as much as in its functionings e.g. in determining or judging the merit or the demerit of a thing, it is independent of the External Senses.

### SĀMKHYA VIEW

According to the philosophers of the Sāṃkhya school, the external sense-organs as well as our organs of action are found to be dependent. It is a matter of common experience that they are guided by some principle within. Our powers of recollection and reasoning presuppose a principle in us which preserves the traces of our past perceptions. The Ātmā or soul is no doubt a permanent reality but it is absolutely passive, self-contained and unrelated to anything outside it; accordingly, it cannot be the internal principle which presides over the activities of the sense-organs, preserves the traces of previous perceptions and makes memory and inference possible. The Sāṃkhya philosophers attribute these functions to Manas which they distinguish from Ātmā. Manas is of a dual nature, Ubhayātmaka, as they call it. It is a cognising organ, Buddhīndriya, as well as a motor organ, Karmendriya,—in as much as, as already pointed out, all our sensuous knowledge and all our activities are dependent on a common directing principle within. This internal principle is sometimes characterised by Saṅkalpa or determination; it is then called Manas. Ahaṅkāra is another internal principle consisting in self-assertion. Buddhi otherwise called Mahat consists in our conscious apprehension and is the most fundamental internal principle. These three are different with reference to their functioning but are all Āntara or internal principles. Accordingly, although the Sāṃkhya philosophers make a distinction between Manas, Ahaṅkāra and Buddhi, they openly identify Manas with Mahat which is the first principle to evolve out of Prakṛi, the Primal Matter.

‘महदाद्यं कार्यं तन्मनः।’ ६९ विषयाध्यायः-सांख्यसूत्रम्।

### SĀMKHYA THEORY OF MANAS

It is Manas which, associated with Ātmā, makes the latter

feel itself finite. We say, the soul has Pramāṇa or right knowledge, Viparyaya or false knowledge, Vikalpa or dubitation, Nidrā or sleep and Smṛti or recollection. Really, however, the soul has nothing of these; it is the Manas which has these five Vṛttis or functions. In short, Jñāna or finite apprehension is the attribute of Manas and as such knowledge is possible only through Manas, it may be regarded as a Karaṇa or sense-organ. Manas as the principle characterised by Saṅkalpa evolves from Ahaṅkāra and is consequently non-eternal. Even if Manas be identified with Mahat or Ahaṅkāra, it is nevertheless non-eternal, because all things other than Prakṛti and Puruṣa,—i.e. things which have their origin, have their annihilations, according to the Sāṃkhya philosophers. Manas cannot be regarded as a substance having no parts. In the matter of the generation of sensuous knowledge, it must be supposed to come in contact with the various sense-organs, so that it must have various parts. The Sāṃkhya philosophers are opposed to the Mīmāṃsā doctrine that Manas is Vibhu or an all-pervading principle. It is only a Karaṇa or Indriya i.e. a sense-organ and as such, it does not pervade even the whole of the body. It is said that the simultaneous feelings of pain in the head and pleasure in the foot show that Manas pervades the whole body. The Sāṃkhya philosophers point out that the said feelings are not really simultaneous. They are successive and it is because Manas moves in considerable speed from one part of the body to another that we are led to feel that we have the simultaneous feelings of pleasure and pain in different parts of the body.

Vijñāna-bhikṣu, however, thinks that according to the Sāṃkhya school of philosophers, Manas is of the extent of the body. The author of the Sāṃkhya Sūtra's, on the contrary, definitely says—'अणुपरिमाणं तत्कृत्तिश्रुतेः' and Aniruddha Bhaṭṭa explains that Manas is of the atomic extent only.

### JAINA'S ARE OPPOSED TO THE SĀMKHYA THEORY

The Jaina philosophers are opposed to the Sāṃkhya

doctrine that Manas is the evolute from the Pradhāna or primal matter. As already pointed out, according to the Jaina's, Manas is instrumental in generating a thought about the various aspects of a thing (Guṇa-Doṣa-Viçāra). Such a thought is a conscious process. Manas is said to evolve from Pradhāna, but Pradhāna itself being essentially unconscious, its evolutes also are necessarily unconscious, so that it becomes impossible for the Manas to help in any way the conscious process of thinking<sup>1</sup>.

### NYĀYA THEORY OF MANAS

According to the thinkers of the Nyāya school, Smṛti (recollection), Anumāna (inference), Āgama (knowledge from hearing words), Saṁśaya (dubitation), Prātibha (a curious apprehension which is unconnected with any internal or external sources of knowledge), Svapna-jñāna (dream-consciousness), Uhā (a sort of hypothetical reasoning), feelings of pleasure etc., volition etc., prove the reality of the principle, Manas. Besides these, the existence of Manas is also proved by the fact that our cognitions arise successively and never simultaneously. Closely connected with the above theory is the unequivocal contention of the Nyāya philosophers that Manas is a Karaṇa (instrument), an Indriya (a sense-organ).

### NYĀYA CRITICISM OF THE SĀMKNHYA DOCTRINE OF MANAS

The Sāmkhya thinkers also, as we have seen, held that Manas was Antaḥ-karaṇa or internal sense. By this, however, they meant that Manas which they sometimes identified with Buddhi or Mahat and which they sometimes held to be an evolute of Ahankāra was itself the seat of all knowledge. The Nyāya philosophers criticise this doctrine of the Sāmkhya school and point out that all knowledge is essentially but consciousness,—so that if, as according to

<sup>1</sup> As the author of the Rāja-Vārtika says—

‘प्रधानमचेतनं तद्विकाराश्च तदात्मकाः इति घटवदचेतनस्य तस्य गुण-  
दोष-विचारणादिसाक्षिव्याभावः।’

the Sāṃkhya, consciousness belongs to Puruṣa or soul, all knowledge must be attributed to the soul, and knowledge cannot belong to Manas which according to the Sāṃkhya is purely material. If knowledge were to be attributed to Manas we would have two conscious principles in a body viz:—Puruṣa and Manas—which is an unreasonable position. The Nyāya philosophers accordingly hold that the above-mentioned modes of knowledge do not inhere in the Manas but in the soul.

In this connection it may be mentioned that some philosophers of a somewhat Sāṃkhya bias maintain that knowledge or Jñāna may be admitted to belong to the soul; but that this does not mean that Içṣhā (desire), Dveṣa (aversion), Prayatna (volitional activity), Sūkha, (feeling of pleasure), Duḥkha (feeling of pain) must also belong to the soul; they may be attributed to Manas. The Nyāya thinkers criticise this position and contend that these also like knowledge must be attributed to the soul. Vātsāyana points out that one's self-consciousness would show that the soul that *knows* does also *desire* to get the object of his *desire* or *avoid* the unpleasant one, *make effort* accordingly and also *feel* pleasure or pain. This shows that all these viz.—Jñāna, Içṣhā, Dveṣa, Prayatna, Sūkha and Duḥkha inhere in and proceed from one and the same substance i.e. the soul.

‘एकेनामिसम्बन्धमेक-कर्तृकम् समानाश्रयत्वं च ।’

#### NYĀYA THEORY OF THE ORIGIN OF KNOWLEDGE

It is then the soul that knows. According to the Nyāya-thinkers, however, a substance in its purity is absolutely devoid of its attributes and it is only in some contingency that attributes come to inhere in the substance. Soul is a substance and in itself accordingly, it must be held to be devoid of all knowledge. How then does knowledge come to be associated with the soul? The Nyāya-thinkers answer that on the occasion of Ātma-manah-saṃyoga or a contact of the soul with Manas, knowledge arises in the soul and that the soul becomes a cogniser only through the instru-



mentality of Manas. Manas is thus a Karaṇa or instrument for the soul.

#### CONTACT OF MANAS WITH ĀTMĀ AND INDRIYA AND OTHER SUCH CONTACTS ACCORDING TO THE NYĀYA

Manas must operate in all cases of knowledge including the cases of sensuous knowledge, i.e. knowledge dependent on external sense-organs. It is thus the indispensable Karaṇa or instrument for the soul in the matter of its knowledge. In the case of sensuous knowledge, however, over and above the Ātma-mañḥ-sañyoga or contact of the soul with the Manas, Indriya-mañḥ-sañyoga (contact of Manas with the sense-organs) and Viṣayendriya-sañyoga (contact of sense-organs with objects of knowledge) are necessary. In the case of the internal experiences of Smṛti, Anumāna, Uha etc. (as mentioned above), Indriya-mañḥ-sañyoga and Viṣayendriya-sañyoga are not necessary. These are due to Ātma-mañḥ-sañyoga only. Without the operation of the eye, the ear etc. external knowledge is not possible for the soul, even if it be in contact with Manas then; hence they are called the Bahirindriya or external sense-organs. In the same manner, no internal experiences of recollection, reasoning etc. are possible for the soul without the co-operation of Manas. Hence, Manas is Āntarindriya or the internal sense.

#### WHY SENSATIONS CANNOT BE SIMULTANEOUS, ACCORDING TO THE NYĀYA

As we have indicated before, another evidence of the reality and substantiality of the Manas, according to the Nyāya thinkers, is furnished by the phenomenon of the successiveness of our sensations. Close psychological observation will show that no two sensations of ours are ever simultaneous. The knowing self, according to the Nyāya-thinkers is an all-pervasive substance, so that it is in actual contact with all the sense-organs and all the sense-objects at one and the same time. How is it then that the self has

not the sensations of all objects at one and the same time? The Naiyāyika's explain it by saying that before any sensation can arise, Manas has got to be in touch with the corresponding sense-organ. The non-simultaneity of sensations thus proves that there is a principle, the Manas, which determines the genesis of all sensuous knowledge, each unit of which follows and never co-exists with another. It also proves that Manas in every body is one. If Manas were more than one there would have been no reason why sensations should not be simultaneous. Some objectors point out that there may be such cases as that of a professor who while going on the way may be found to repeat sacred words, to hold a water pot in his hand, keep his eyes on the pathway, hear sounds from a forest, guess the approach of a ferocious animal from the sound and think about reaching the place of safety as soon as possible. All these appear to be done by the professor at one and the same time. And if this be so, Manas cannot be one in a body. The thinkers of the Nyāya school, on the contrary, contend that these acts of the professor are not really simultaneous. They are successive but the intervals between the several acts being very slight, they appear to be simultaneous. Manas is one, it moves with incredible celerity from act to act. Another contention of the Nyāya thinkers in this connection is that Manas is not only one in a body but that it is non-pervasive or atomic in nature. For, if it were of the extent of the body, it would have been in simultaneous touch with all the sense-organs; nay, if it had even the smallest extent, it could at least touch two points in a body. In any of the cases it would have been possible for Manas to generate more than one sensation at a time. But all sensations are strictly successive. This shows that Manas is but an atomic point, having no dimension at all and incapable of touching more than one sense-organ at a time.

#### NON-SIMULTANEITY OF IDEAS

It is the atomic Manas that accounts for the non-simultaneity of our sensations. Some philosophers maintained

that the atomic character of the Manas explained also the non-simultaneity of our ideas. The Sāṃkhya thinkers held that Manas is the repository of the traces of our decaying percepts. But according to the Naiyāyika's it is the knowing self that has the traces (Saṃskāra) of our sense impressions. These traces of previous percepts make recollection (Smṛti) possible. But why are not all our ideas (traces of previous percepts) revived simultaneously? Some thinkers pointed out that different impressions were located in different parts (Pradeśa's) of the soul and as it is impossible for the atomic Manas to be in contact with all these Pradeśa's all at once, the ideas must emerge one after the other. This theory is criticised by the Nyāya thinkers. At the outset, they point out that supposing there are Pradeśa's or parts in a soul, it is unreasonable to hold that one such Pradeśa bears or preserves the trace of one sense-impression only. For practical purposes of a limited life, the soul which is essentially all-pervasive is to be supposed to be of the extent of the body only. But this dimension of the soul is obviously too small to hold the traces of impressions of all the perceptions which one has in his life. One Pradeśa of the soul must accordingly be held to bear more than one, nay, numerous traces of impressions,—so that when Manas comes to touch one particular Pradeśa of the soul, not one but numerous ideas are to be revived. This shows that the theory that only one idea is revived because the atomic Manas comes in contact with an atomic part of the soul is obviously inadequate. The revival of an idea is no doubt due to the Manas coming in contact with the soul, but the Naiyāyika points out that besides the fact of Manas coming in contact with the soul, there are other factors regulating the revival of ideas. These additional factors determine that not all ideas can be revived pell-mell all at once but that only one idea can come after another and that, only when they are related in one or more of the following ways. This doctrine of the Nyāya philosophy is extremely interesting in as much as in it we have the indications of a thorough grasp by ancient Indians of the

law of association which play such an important part in modern empirical psychology.

#### REVIVAL OF IDEAS ACCORDING TO SOME WESTERN THINKERS

Before we describe the laws of association of ideas as conceived by the Indian Nyāya school, it would not be unprofitable to have a glance at the various views about them, as held by the prominent European thinkers from time to time. "All suggestions may be found" says Brown,—“to depend on prior co-existence or at least on such proximity as is itself very probable a modification of co-existence”. Thus according to Brown, an idea of a thing is followed by that of a thing *contiguous* to it. This is the view of Hartley too. Spencer, on the contrary, laid stress on *similarity* and maintained that an idea revives another which is like it. According to Professor Bain contiguity and similarity are both perfectly distinct principles of association. It is supposed that by saying,—“We hunt through the mental train, excogitating from the present or some other and from *similar* or *contrary* or *coadjacent*. Through this process reminiscence takes place”,—Aristotle meant that not only does an idea of a thing revive that of another contiguous to it or similar to it but that the former may suggest another which is in contrast with it. Contiguity, similarity and contrast are thus the three principles of association and revival of ideas, according to Aristotle. Hume also enumerates these laws as three but according to him they are *similarity*, *contiguity* not only in Place but in Time and Cause or Effect. Thus we find that according to Hume an idea of a thing may suggest another in any of the five ways:—(1) it suggests the idea of a thing if the latter is contiguous to it in place; (2) it may revive the idea of another thing which was proximate to it in time; (3) an idea suggests another, similar to it; (4) an idea of the cause suggests the idea of the effect; (5) and conversely, the effect may suggest the cause. Hamilton, although he reduces the principles of association to two viz:—*Simultaneity* and *Affinity* and these again, ultimately to one viz:—the law of *Totality* or *Redinte-*

gration, nevertheless refers to (1) the law of *Similarity*, (2) the law of *Contrast*, (3) the law of *Co-adjacency* (e.g. cause and effect etc.), (4) the laws of *Immediacy* and *Homogeneity*, (5) the law of *Facility*. Even this list of the laws of association is hardly exhaustive and there may be various other ways in which two ideas may be associated. Dugald Stewart, for instance, thinks that the idea of a thing suggests that of another, if in previous experience (1) it *resembled* it; (2) if it was *contrary* to it; (3) if it was in its *vicinity in place*; (4) if it was in its *vicinity in time*. He also adds that (5) *words* are suggestive; (6) the idea of the *cause* suggests the idea of the effect; (7) similarly, the idea of the *effect* suggests the idea of the cause; (8) the idea of the *means* suggests the idea of the end; (9) the idea of the end may suggest the idea of the means; (10) the premises suggest the conclusion; (11) the conclusion may also suggest the premises. We need not further multiply the principles of association as stated by other thinkers of the west. The list given by any of them is hardly complete and for instances of other principles of association which may claim a place in the list we may turn to the Nyāya theory of the revival of ideas.

### NYĀYA THEORIES ABOUT REVIVAL OF IDEAS

According to the philosophers of the Nyāya school there are no less than 27 ways in which one idea may revive and give rise to another. These are:—(1) *Praṇidhāna*. It means attention. The idea of an object is revived when attention is directed towards it or towards some distinguishing characteristic of it. (2) *Nibandha* or serial order. One unit in a series revives the idea of the next in relation to it. (3) *Samskāra*. Our interest and repeated experience etc. may make two ideas so connected that on the appearance of the one, the other is revived. (4) *Linga* or mark. An idea revives another, if the former is invariably related to the latter. (5) *Lakṣaṇa*. The class-idea revives the idea of the class. (6) *Sādṛśya*;—associated similars revive one another. (7) *Parigraha*. Ideas of objects related as owner and owned revive one another. (8) and (9) *Āśraya* and *Āśrita*.

Ideas of objects related as the shelter and the sheltered revive one another. (10) *Ānantarya*. If an object regularly emerges immediately after another, their ideas would revive one another. (11) *Sambandha-viśeṣa*. Particular relationship e.g. that subsisting between a teacher and a pupil often associates the ideas of the related. (12) *Viyoga*. The fact of separation revives the idea of the one separated. (13) *Eka-kārya*. When many members combine to do one piece of act, the experience of one of the members revives the idea of the other members. (14) *Virodha*. When two members are opposed to one another, the idea of the one revives the idea of the other. (15) *Atiśaya*. When one is the cause of some important change in another, the latter naturally remembers the former. (16) *Prāpti*. When one receives or expects to get something from another, the former naturally thinks of the latter often and on. (17) *Vyavadhāna*. Ideas of objects related as the container and the contained e.g. sheath and sword, suggest one another. (18) and (19) *Sukha* and *Duḥkha*. Experiences of pleasure and pain suggest the objects which give them. (20) and (21) *Icchā* and *Dveṣa*. Desire and aversion suggest the objects desired or wanted to be averted. (22) *Bhaya*. Fear suggests the object feared. (23) *Arthitva*. A needy person remembers the objects which would remove his needs. (24) *Kriyā*. An object e.g. a car suggests the person e.g. the builder who made it. (25) *Rāga*. Love suggests the beloved. (26) *Dharma*. It is said that as an effect of a special knowledge of the Veda's and other meritorious acts, one comes to remember the events of his past life and have a special knowledge of the objects, experienced in the present life. (27) *Adharma*. It is said that as an effect of vicious acts, one is often haunted by ideas of things which gave him pain in the past.

The 27 causes of recollections described above are, however, illustrative and not exhaustive. As Vātsāyana says—

‘निदर्शनं चेदं स्मृतिहेतुना न परिसंख्यानमिति।’

So, according to the philosophers of the Nyāya school, it is Manas that makes recollection possible. But simultaneous

recollection of all the ideas that we had in the past is not possible because there are some laws of association of ideas which determine not only that one idea only is to come up after another but that which idea is to follow which is also determined by them.

#### DHĀRAKA AND PRERAKA ACTIVITIES OF THE SOUL DUE TO MANAS

Besides generating cognition in the soul and the feelings of pleasure and pain in it, Manas according to the Naiyāyika's is also instrumental in generating all activities in the soul, which express themselves in the various functions of the body. These activities of the soul have been divided into two classes, viz.:—the Dhāraka and the Preraka. The Dhāraka keeps the body erect and fit and prevents it from falling, while the Preraka moves it forward. The contention of the Nyāya school is that the soul is enabled to exercise these two functions with respect to the body only when it is in contact with Manas. A corollary to this is that so long as one is living, his Manas is confined within the limits of his body and never goes out of it. If Manas were to go out of the body even for a moment in one's life, his body would at once fall down; because the Manas would be out of touch with the soul then and no Dhāraka energy would be generated in the soul which keeps the body fit and erect. This Naiyāyika doctrine of the Antaḥ-sarīra-vṛttitva or "the within-body" functioning of Manas seems to have been challenged by some Indian thinkers. These thinkers maintained that in order to fully explain the phenomenon of recollection, we must suppose that Manas, when necessary, goes out of the body. Recollection is effected by Manas, coming in contact with Ātmā, the repository of all the Saṁskāra's or impressions left upon it by percepts. Simultaneous recollection of all the things experienced in the past is not possible because simultaneous contact of the Manas with those impressions on the soul is not possible. These objectors agree with the Naiyāyika's that the soul is an all-pervasive substance but contend that it has an infinite number of

Pradeśa's or infinitesimal parts in it wherein those Saṃskāra's are individually located. The part of the soul, contained in the body is but a very small part of it,—indeed, too small to contain the innumerable impressions of one's life. These philosophers held accordingly that a considerable number of Saṃskāra's must attach to the part of the soul outside the body. To have a recollection of the idea, the Saṃskāra of which is thus impressed upon the part of the soul which is outside the body, the Manas necessarily goes out of body and comes in contact with the Saṃskāra located outside the body. It is thus contended that often has the Manas to go out of the body to make recollection possible. The Naiyāyika's on the contrary, are opposed to the doctrine that the soul though all-pervasive bears impressions in individual Pradeśa's of it. As we have seen, they maintain that besides the fact of contact of Manas with the Ātmā, recollection is dependent on certain laws of association. The Nyāya thinkers point out that if Manas were to go out of the body, the latter would at once fall down, because the soul on account of its being out of contact with Manas then, would be devoid of the Dhāraka energy which keeps the body erect and fit. None can say of course that in order to have recollection of an idea, the body must drop down inert and disorganised. The holder of the other theory may contend that at the time of recollection, the body need not fall down; because Manas is possessed of extreme swiftness, so that it takes but imperceptibly short time in going out of the body, coming in contact with the Saṃskāra outside and then returning in the body; the falling of the body would be prevented by the in-coming Manas, generating fresh Dhāraka energy. Or, it may be supposed that the Manas, before it goes out of the body leaves sufficient amount of the Dhāraka energy which continues to hold up the body for the short time which is taken by it in going out of and returning to the body. The Naiyāyika's point out that recollection is not always effected in so short a time; it often takes a long time to remember a thing. It is neither possible for the body to



remain fit and erect for a long time without the supporting force nor for the supporting force to continue to hold up the body so long,—when the Manas is outside the body. The Naiyāyika's accordingly conclude that Manas operates always within one's body and never steps out of it during his life. Indeed life according to the Nyāya school means the contact of an embodied and feeling soul with Manas, as Vātsāyana says,—

‘सदेहस्यात्मनो मनसा संयोगो विपश्यमानकर्माश्रयसहितो जीवनमिष्यते ।’

### MANAS, THE MATI-SĀDHANA

Manas is a sense, the internal sense, according to the Naiyāyika's. It is an instrument for the Ātmā with the help of which the latter comes to have knowledge. It is accordingly called the Mati-sādhana, the means of knowledge. It is Manas also that generates activities (Prayatna) in the soul. Manas is subordinated to the soul and like matter and the sense-organs is different from it. Firstly, consciousness and its modes e.g. desire, aversion, volitional activity, etc. belong to the soul and not to the Manas. Secondly, the soul is independent and self-determined; it of its own accord, proceeds to know or act on objects; while Manas is Paratantra,—in as much as it is meant for the soul and all its dealings with outside objects as well as all its operations have their ‘push’, so to say, from the soul. Thirdly, the soul as the real doer of acts is to experience their fruits; the Manas cannot be said to enjoy them.

### MANAS IS NOT MATERIAL ACCORDING TO NYĀYA

Manas is different from the Ātmā. It is unconscious whereas the soul is conscious. But though unconscious, Manas is not matter. It is atomic no doubt, according to the Naiyāyika's but this does not mean that Manas is a material atom. It means only that it is not an all-pervasive substance like the soul but comes in contact with the peripheral sense-organs only successively, though with extreme swiftness. Like an atom, Manas is extremely subtle and has no parts or dimensions; still it is a substance, essentially different

not only from the soul but from matter as well. The Naiyāyika's maintain that Manas is eternal. It is from the beginningless time in contact with a soul which is passing through series of incarnations and re-incarnations. It is *Adṛṣṭa*, a mysterious force generated in the soul by acts done by it and leading it to its next incarnation to enjoy the fruits thereof, that brings about and maintains this conjunction of a soul and Manas. When acts cease and there are no longer any fruits thereof to be enjoyed by the soul, *Adṛṣṭa* is no longer active and the soul is left to its essential nature. The soul is then said to be liberated and the Manas is separated from it. But Manas continues nevertheless to exist "from eternity to eternity". There are numerous such Manas, it is said, existing separately from the souls which have been liberated. The liberation of a soul is dependent on the experiences of the fruits of its actions. It so happens that a soul wanting to hasten its liberation wants to experience the fruits of its actions all at once. Ordinarily, this is impossible because as shown before, Manas makes experiences successive. It is said, however, that a soul wanting to hasten its liberation and for that, to experience the fruits of actions simultaneously, draws to it as many Manas's (lying unconnected with the souls that have been liberated) as are necessary and through their instrumentality as well as the instrumentality of a corresponding number of bodies made for the purpose,—enables itself to feel the consequences of all its previous acts, all at once. Such a collection of bodies with a corresponding collection of Manas in them, made by a saint for the purpose of simultaneously experiencing, the fruits of actions and thereby hastening his liberation is called the *Kāya-Vyūha*.

#### MANAS, ACCORDING TO NYĀYA IS NEITHER MATERIAL NOR PSYCHICAL

What, then, is the nature of Manas, if it is neither soul nor matter? Ordinary minds cannot conceive of a substance which is not tangible. It has been difficult even for many cultured people to have a clear understanding of the soul

as an immaterial substance. Modern thinkers would feel inclined to reject the substantiality of a real which is neither psychical nor material. Indian philosophers, however, had ideas of such reals. We have seen how the Jaina's looked upon Dharma and Adharma, the principles of motion and rest, as well as Ākāśa or space as reals which were unpsychical but not material on that account. With the Vaiśeṣika's as well as with the Jaina's, Kāla or the principle of mutation was such a reality. The former looked upon Dik or the principle of direction as a real which was neither material nor psychical. Manas according to the thinkers of the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika schools were similarly eternal reals which had neither the nature of a soul nor that of matter.

#### CAN MANAS OF THE NYĀYA BE IDENTIFIED WITH LIFE?

We have seen how the thinkers of the Nyāya school attributed to the instrumentality of Manas, not only the soul's power of knowing, feeling and willing but also the generation and operation of the vital force itself. This foreshadows the supposition of the modern school of thinkers that the psychical operations of cognition, volition and affection as well as the vital operations connected with the preservation and movements of the body, are to be traced to one and the same fundamental principle of life. Life may thus be identified with the Manas of the Naiyāyika's. The Sāṃkhya philosophers, reducing Manas to Mahat, a mode of matter after all, seem to agree with those modern thinkers of a strong materialistic bias, according to whom all phenomena, conscious, vital and physical are but different ways of operations of the physico-chemical forces. The Buddhist Vijñāna-vāda and the Vedāntic monism on the contrary, reduce all the three phenomena, conscious, vital and physical, to the conscious principle. According to the Sāṃkhya, Manas is essentially matter, while according to the Buddhists and the Vedāntins, it is consciousness (directly according to the Buddhists and indirectly according to the Vedāntins). The Naiyāyika's are opposed to the doctrine of pure consciousness as a real principle, existing in and by itself. They

rather attribute the generation of consciousness to the operation of a principle (i.e. the *Manas*) which is the cause of vitality also. The *Nyāya* school maintain also that *Manas* is different from matter as well. In a way, then, the *Nyāya* thinkers hold that the vital and the conscious phenomena cannot be reduced either to the modification of a self-existent principle of pure consciousness or to the physico-chemical forces. They are due to the intervention and operation of a different principle. This *Nyāya* position is somewhat similar to the theory of the neo-vitalists, who, relying on the observation of Oscar Hertwig and others that "none of the protoplasm now living has been formed in any other way than by the propagation of pre-existing protoplasm", see in Life a reality which is essentially different from matter.

#### JAINA OPPOSITION TO THE NYĀYA VIEWS

The Jaina's are opposed to most of the *Naiyāyika* doctrines about *Manas*. They point out that *Manas* is in some respects identical with and in some respects different from the soul. *Manas* is identical with the *Ātmā* in as much as the former comes into existence only when some obstacles are removed from the latter. On the other hand, *Manas* and *Ātmā* are different because the latter is found to exist even when the former ceased to exist and function. The Jaina's oppose the *Naiyāyika* doctrine of the eternity of the *Manas*. They maintain that in some sense *Manas* is persisting and that in some sense, it is evanescent. Its function is to judge the good and the bad aspects of a thing under observation and it ceases to exist as soon as this functioning of it is over. On the other hand, so far as its ultimate essence (which is *Pudgala* or matter) is concerned, it is eternal. The Jaina's differ from the *Naiyāyika*'s in maintaining that *Manas* is neither one (in a body) nor atomic. The *Naiyāyika*'s, as we have seen, held that *Manas* comes in contact with the soul and the sense-organs and gives rise to perceptual cognition in this way. The Jaina's point out that if *Manas* be a rigid atomic unity, it cannot come in contact with the soul on the one hand and at the same time with

the sense-organ, on the other. The contact of Manas with the soul, they urge, militates against the Naiyāyika doctrine of the atomic character of the Manas. The soul is all-pervasive according to the Naiyāyika's; if the Manas is to come in contact with it, it also becomes pervasive. You cannot say that in generating knowledge, Manas comes in contact with a part only of the soul; for in that case, the soul must be held to have parts, which is against the Nyāya theory. The contact of the Manas with a sense-organ also becomes full of difficulties, if Manas be atomic; for in that case, the sense-organ also becomes atomic. It is contended by the Nyāya school that Manas makes perceptions successive and because of its extreme swiftness, makes really successive perceptions appear as simultaneous. The Jaina's urge that if Manas is unconscious (as held by the Naiyāyika's), its movements become inexplicable. How is the unconscious Manas to determine to which parts of the body, it is to attend from moment to moment? Every moment the periphery of the body is being affected from the outside in various ways. If Manas is unconscious, how is it to move to point A in the moment and not to the points B, C or D and in the next moment to point X and not to the points Y, Z or P? The Jaina's next attack the Nyāya position that Manas is attached to the soul from the beginningless time. They point out that if the conjunction of the soul with the Manas be so essential it would be impossible for them to be separated at any time, so that Mokṣa or emancipation becomes impossible. No doubt, the Jaina's admit that the soul is attached to Karma-matter from the beginningless time and that yet the emancipation of the soul from Karma-contact in the Mokṣa stage is possible. But there is a difference between Karma-matter and Manas, attaching to the soul. In the case of the former, Karma, though joined with the soul, is always dropping down and being replaced by fresh Karma,—so that there is the possibility of Karma being absolutely removed without being succeeded by fresh Karma. Manas, on the contrary, is an eternal and unalterable substance, according to the Naiyāyika's, so that

if it is attached to the soul from the beginningless time, there is no reason why it would drop down and be separated from the soul at any time. The next doctrine of the Nyāya school, criticised by the Jaina's is that Manas is the Saha-kāri-kāraṇa or a cause accompanying the sense-organ. It is said that the sense-organ may come in contact with an outside object; still, perception is impossible without the intervention of the Manas. It is also said that feelings of pleasure or pain arising from the perceptions of outside objects are due to the operation of Manas and not of the sense-organ. The Jaina's, on the contrary, maintain that consciousness of objects is not impossible without the operation of Manas. The sense-organs, according to them are the material counterparts of the soul-attitudes and as such, are capable of giving rise to conscious sensations of objects. The sense-organs have also a power of yielding conscious feelings of pleasure and pain. The Jaina's urge that there are innumerable one-sensed, two-sensed, three-sensed, four-sensed, and even five-sensed animals which can perceive objects and have feeling of pleasure and pain, —although they have not Manas in them. This Jaina doctrine about the lower animals is extremely interesting from the view-point of animal psychology. It implies on the one hand that the sub-human animals are not automata having only the material and physical forces working in and moving them but that they have consciousness in them with powers of perceiving and feeling. On the other hand, the Jaina theory suggests also that the consciousness in man is of a different and higher type. It is thus that the Jaina contention is that for the generation of sense-knowledge, the sense-organs are not dependent on Manas.

#### WHY SHOULD MANAS BE ADMITTED?

It may be said that if sense-organs have the power of yielding conscious sensations and feelings of pleasure and pain, why should we admit the reality of Manas at all? The Jaina answer to this has already been indicated. In man, we have the power of Guṇa-doṣa-viçāra,—of judging

the good and bad aspects of a thing under observation. He can understand the meaning of gesture made to him. He can receive instructions, follow conversations and distinguish the real from the unreal. He responds when he is called by his name. These powers refer to powers of recollection, conception and reasoning in man. These are absent in most of the sub-human animals and prove the operation in man, of a superior internal principle, which is *Manas*, otherwise called *Antaḥ-karaṇa*.

#### JAINA, SĀMKHYA AND VEDĀNTA THEORIES OF MANAS SIMILAR IN ONE RESPECT

What then is the nature of *Manas* according to the Jaina's? Leaving out of consideration, the *Bhāva-Manas* which is but an aspect or attitude of the soul, we find the Jaina philosophers describing *Manas* as 'Paudgalika' i.e. a mode of matter, compounded of peculiar material molecules, called the *Mano-vargaṇā*. The *Manas*, however, is not dead, unconscious matter on that account. It is matter, peculiarly modified in strict consonance with soul-attitude, so much so that although it is never identical with the soul in essence, consciousness may be attributed to it by transference of epithet. In this, its last aspect, the Jaina theory of *Manas* comes very near to its Vedāntic counterpart. On this point, there is some similarity between the Jaina theory and the Sāṃkhya theory also, inspite of the apparent antagonism between them which we have already noticed. For the Sāṃkhya school also maintains that *Manas* is material in essence and is characterised by the empirical consciousness, reflected upon it from the *Puruṣa*. Thus it is that *Manas* is essentially and continues to be unconscious all along, according to the *Naiyāyika*'s,—while the Jaina's, the Sāṃkhya and the Vedānta thinkers agree that although *Manas* has its essential basis in unconscious matter, it acts as a conscious agent, being inspired, so to say, by the essentially conscious principle, the soul.

## CHAPTER 7

### SOUL

#### I. THE NATURE OF THE SOUL

##### CHARACTERISTICS OF THE JĪVA

WHAT is other than Matter, Space etc., in the universe is called *Jīva* or *Soul* by the Jaina philosophers. Roughly speaking, what is “*Puruṣa*” in the Sāṃkhya and the Yoga systems of philosophy, “*Ātmā*” in the Nyāya, the Vaiśeṣika and the Vedānta thoughts, is *Jīva* in the Jaina philosophy. Yet there is difference between the *Puruṣa* of the Sāṃkhya and the Yoga and the *Jīva* of the Jaina; the *Ātmā* of the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika philosophy is not quite the same as the *Jīva* of the Jaina system of philosophy; the *Ātmā* of the Vedānta again, is different from the *Jīva* of the Jaina system. The Jaina’s repudiate the Soul-denying position (*Nirātma-vāda*) of the Ārvāka’s and criticise the Buddhist theory of the Conscious Series (*Vijñāna-vāda*, *Santāna-vāda*) as well. What, then, are the characteristics of the *Jīva*, according to the Jaina’s?

Vādi-deva, a thinker of the Svetāmbara Sect of the Jaina’s says,—

“*Jīva* is essentially conscious; undergoes modification; is a doer; is a direct enjoyer; is of the same extent as its body; is different in each individual; has transmigrations owing to its being attached to *Pudgala* or Matter”.

7-56. *Pramāṇa-naya-tattvāloka-lāṃkāra*

<sup>1</sup> Kuṇḍakūṇḍācāryya says,—

“*Jīva* is existent; is conscious; has cognition; is a doer; is active; is an enjoyer; is of the same extent as its body; is formless; is attached to *Karma* or non-psychical Matter”.

27. *Pañcāstikāya-samaya-Sāra*

Ācāryya Nemicaṇḍra also has said,—

“*Jīva* is possessed of cognition; is formless; is a doer; is of the same extent as its body; is an enjoyer; migrates (in its state of Bondage) in the *Samsāra* or the series of existences; is free (in its essence); and has an upward motion”.

2. *Dravya-Saṃgraha*



The quotations would show that according to the Jaina's, there is a real substance, called the *Jiva* which is different from the unconscious Matter and that this *Jiva* is conscious, formless, subject to the influence of *Karma* in its mundane state, is an active agent and enjoyer of the fruits of its acts and is of the same extent as its body and so on.

#### DENIAL OF SOUL BY THE ĀRĀVĀKA'S

The Ārāvāka's do not admit the reality of any substance besides Matter. According to them, the elements of Earth, Water, Air and Fire are the four fundamental realities; there is no other reality besides them; all the things of the world are but the combinations of these four primal substances. It cannot of course be denied that Man etc. are *conscious*; but the fact of their having consciousness need not necessarily prove that they have *Souls*. The theory of the Ārāvāka's is that just as intoxicating substance is the effect of the fermentation of rice, mollasses etc., consciousness is a peculiar effect of the combination of the four primordial material Elements. The materialists of the present day argue in a similar way. According to them, consciousness is produced by the brain in the same manner as bile is secreted by the liver. Hence there is no necessity for admitting the reality of the Soul.

One of the answers to the above materialist contention is that the intoxicating substance originating from rice, molasses etc. is a material substance after all and that the bile secreted by the liver is nothing other than material in nature. Matter only can come out of Matter; what is produced by the brain is but something material like the brain itself. But how can consciousness which is different from Matter be regarded as the effect of material substances like the brain etc.? The idealist thinkers of modern times accordingly repudiate the materialist theory and admit the separate reality of consciousness. The Buddhist philosophers in India also could not look upon consciousness as nothing but a product of Matter; in enunciating

the momentary reality of sensations etc., they rather rejected the materialist contention. The Jaina's attributed consciousness to the soul as a quality and like the Buddhists, they repudiated the theory of the materialist Çārvāka's.

### JAINA CRITICISM OF THE ÇĀRVĀKA POSITION

In criticising the Çārvāka position, the Jaina philosophers point out that if consciousness were an outcome of the physical body, it would have continued to persist in a dead body. For, the body remains as usual even when the animal dies; rather on account of the subsidence of fever etc., the body of the dead animal may be said to be in a healthier state. The physical body cannot be said to be the cause of consciousness. If you look upon the body as the *Attendant Cause* (Sahakārī-Kāraṇa or accompanying condition) of consciousness, you are led to admit the reality of a non-physical, non-material substance as the *Material Cause* (Upādāna-kāraṇa or substantial cause) of consciousness,—which is against the Çārvāka theory. Nor, can you say that the physical body is the Material Cause of consciousness. For, in that case every modification in the body would have been followed by a corresponding modification of consciousness. On the other hand, no modifications are found in the body, corresponding to such modifications of consciousness, as Gladness, Sorrow, Unconsciousness, Sleep, Fear, Grief etc. Animals having huge bodies are often found to be possessed of very little intelligence and small animals are sometimes found to be remarkably intelligent. Besides, Self-consciousness,—The Consciousness of 'I', which is embedded in every series of consciousness cannot be said to originate from the Body. For, every one feels, 'it is my body'; hence the fact that this 'I' or the Self is separate from the body must be admitted as a matter of direct perception.

### BUDDHIST REJECTION OF THE DOCTRINE OF SOUL

Although there is general agreement between the Jaina's and the Buddhists in this that consciousness is not a modi-

fication of matter, the Buddhists deny the real existence of the Soul. They contend that a sensation comes into existence every moment and it perishes immediately after it; there is no permanent persistent reality underlying the series of momentary sensations. The sensation of one moment perishes leaving a tendency or trace (*Samskāra*) and is in this way the cause of the sensation of the next moment. This sensation of the next moment which is thus an effect is again the cause of the sensation of the following moment. These sensations although different and separate from each other are linked together in a chain, as it were, through the law of Causality. For this reason the momentary sensations following one another are conceived as a stream of consciousness and the Buddhist philosophers call this stream "the Series of Sensations" (*Vijñāna-Santāna*). According to them, there is no necessity of admitting the *Ātmā*, or the Soul, besides this stream of consciousness, this series of sensations. There are many philosophers e.g. Hume, Mill etc. in modern times, who like the Buddhists are the advocates of the sensationist theory, and who deny the real existence of the Soul. Their conception of "the flow" or "the continuum" of consciousness is very similar to the Buddhist conception of the "Series of Sensations".

#### VEDĀNTA AND JAINA CRITICISM OF THE BUDDHIST SENSATIONIST THEORY

The objection against the sensationist theory is that if there be not any persisting reality underlying the momentary sensations, these become disconnected with each other and the "stream" or "*Santāna*" becomes impossible. Without the soul as the principle of connection there cannot be any link between a sensation and a sensation; and without this linking, Recollection and Conception are impossible and Self-consciousness or the Consciousness of the 'I' referred to before, becomes inexplicable. For these reasons, the Vedānta philosophy in India has always criticised the *Vijñāna-vāda* of the Buddhists. The Jaina philosophers also have rejected the sensationist position of the Buddhists

by admitting the super-material reality of the *Jiva* and by attributing real existence to it.

### JAINA ARGUMENTS

In criticism of the Kṣaṇika (momentary) doctrine of the Buddhist thinkers, the Jaina's point out that *Smṛti* or Recollection is impossible, if the soul be denied. Sensations, according to the Buddhists are absolutely self-identical or particularistic (*Svalakṣaṇa*), so that if it were possible for one such sensation to revive another, it should also be possible for the perceptions of one man to be recollected by another man. The Buddhists no doubt urge here that Recollection is possible only where the reviving sensation and the revived sensation are causally connected and thus belong to the one and the same series or *Santāna*. But the Jaina's contend that since according to the Buddhists themselves, the Sensations are *Svalakṣaṇa* or absolutely different from each other they cannot urge that one sensation can in any way revive another. Besides, there is no rule that where the two ideas are causally related, one must revive the other, and that where the two ideas are not causally related, one cannot revive the other. Further, the Jaina's point out that if Sensations be absolutely self-identical and there be no Soul underlying, connecting and persisting in and through them, two fallacies viz :—'Fruition of what was not done' (*Akṛitābhyaṅama*) and 'Annihilation of what was done' (*Kṛtaprāṇāśa*) become irresistible. Worship of the shrine is a pious act, according to the Buddhists and they say that one, worshipping the shrine, gets Happiness as the effect of his pious act. Now, the cognition that worshipped the shrine perishes, for all sensations are momentary, according to the Buddhists; the question then is, Who or what is it that enjoys the fruits of the shrine-worship? This is *Kṛtaprāṇāśa* or annihilation of what is done. On the other hand, the cognition consisting in the enjoyment of the alleged happy effect of the shrine-worship, is in no way connected with the cognition of the shrine-worship itself; how then can it be said to enjoy the fruit

of shrine-worship? This is *Akṛtābhyāgama* or fruition of what was not done. The Jaina's point out that the Soul-denying theory of the Buddhists, practically, contradicts the doctrine of Karma—the theory that every act is sure to be followed by an effect and that no effect can come out which was not preceded by an act.

#### VEDĀNTA DOCTRINE OF THE NON-DUAL BRAHMA

Although the Jaina system agrees with the Vedānta in refuting the Soul-denying sensationist theory of the Buddhists, there are, however, very material differences between the two systems. In the Vedānta, the real existence of the '*Jīvātmā*'s' or the finite Souls is denied; the *Ātmā* is said to be *one* and *secondless*,—the non-dual Brahma. The Vedānta theory is that the infinite number of finite Souls are but the *modifications* (*Parīṇāma*) or the aspects (*Vivarta*) of the non-dual Brahma which is the only reality. The thinkers of this Advaita-vāda school contend that one Paramātmā is present in, permeates and informs all the finite souls and that there is no other Soul or reality besides it. The Vedānta philosophy is somewhat similar in this respect to the pantheistic systems of the West.

#### JAINA CRITICISM OF THE VEDĀNTA THEORY

The Jaina philosophy, on the contrary, does not subscribe to the extreme monism of the Vedānta. According to the Jaina thinkers the *Jīva*'s or the Souls are infinite in number and every Soul is different from the other in some respects. If the Souls were not mutually exclusive and different and were but one and the same, one might have expected to find the happiness, the misery, the bondage or the emancipation of all the Souls with the happiness, the misery, the bondage or the emancipation of one Soul respectively. The varied conditions of the Souls have led the Sāṃkhya philosophers to reject the monistic position of the Vedānta and admit the reality of *many* Souls. The Jaina's also maintain that 'the soul is different in each body' and

thus agree with thinkers of the Sāṃkhya school in upholding the doctrine of the multiplicity of the Souls.

#### JAINA AGREEMENT WITH THE SĀMĀHYA

With regard to the Advaita contention, the Jaina philosophers point out that on examination, a group of attributes e.g. existence, consciousness, joy, etc. will be discovered which are found in all the Souls. If we fix our attention to this group of common attributes all the Souls or Jīva's may be said to be one and identical in nature; for, this group of qualities is inherent in every Soul. The Vedānta position is true up to this point. But the above common attributes do not make up the whole of a Jīva; every Soul has its peculiarity as well. This peculiarity or individuality of a Soul differentiates it from another. If there were not this principle of separateness, all the Souls would have been emancipated as soon as one Soul attained salvation. It is because there is this element of particularity in each Soul, that the theory of the multiplicity of the Souls is to be admitted.

#### WHERE THE JAINA'S DIFFER FROM THE SĀMĀHYA POSITION

The Sāṃkhya and the Jaina philosophical systems, similar as they are, so far as the doctrine of the plurality of Souls is concerned, differ, however, with respect to the theories of 'agent-hood' and 'enjoyer-hood' of the Soul. According to the Sāṃkhya, 'the *Puruṣa* or the Soul is eternal, absolutely pure, intelligent and free'. It is absolutely un-attached to anything; is desireless; self-identical; and is never a doer or agent. It has no interest in or connection with the cosmic course. It is the *Prakṛti* which on account of its proximity to the Soul evolves the universe; the *Puruṣa* on the contrary never does any act, nor enjoys the fruit of any action. It is absolutely passive (*Niṣkriyā*) and a strict non-enjoyer (*Abhoktā*). Just as the Noumenal self of Kant has no connection with the Phenomenal psychical course, the *Puruṣa* of the Sāṃkhya is absolutely unrelated to the phenomenal course of the world.

**WHERE THE JAINA'S AGREE WITH THE NYĀYA**

But the question that arises in connection with the above Sāṃkhya position is: If the Soul is not an active agent, what is it that gets bondage and what is it that is emancipated? What is it that strives after salvation? If the Soul does not enjoy pleasure or pain how is the evolution and course of the world possible? To avoid these difficulties, the philosophers of the Nyāya school reject the doctrines of the Soul's non-agent-hood and non-enjoyer-hood and attribute to it the qualities of joy, activity etc. In this respect, the Jaina system may be said to agree with the Nyāya; they both repudiate the doctrine of the Soul's absolute indifference.

**JAINA CRITICISM OF THE SĀMKNHYA POSITION**

In criticism of the Sāṃkhya theory, the Jaina's point out that if the Soul be held to be absolutely inactive, the act of perception also would be impossible for it. 'I hear', 'I smell', every one has got such feelings; this shows that the theory of the Soul's absolute inactivity is opposed to the experience and feeling of all men. It cannot be said that the feelings of 'I hear', 'I smell' etc. are due to Ahaṃkāra or the principle of Egoism; for, then, consciousness which the Sāṃkhya philosophers themselves attribute to the Soul, may also be said to be due to Ahaṃkāra. It is accordingly to be admitted that the Soul is an active agent. Another contention of the Sāṃkhya is that the Soul in itself does not enjoy anything but that the fact of enjoyment is foisted upon it, so to say. Pleasure and pain are grasped by Buddhi or the principle of Intelligence and Buddhi is an evolute of Prakṛti. Hence the Sāṃkhya contention is that the fact of the Puruṣa's enjoying pleasure or pain is imaginary only. It is Buddhi, an evolute of Prakṛti, which appropriates pleasure or pain; pleasure or pain is merely reflected in the Puruṣa which is absolutely pure and incorruptible. The Jaina's maintain, on the contrary, that unless you admit some sort of modification of a thing, even a reflection in it is impossible. A piece of glass may be said to be modified in some way, when things are reflected in it. Accordingly,

if it is conceded that pleasure and pain are reflected in the Soul, you are bound to admit that the Soul undergoes modification; in other words, that it is an enjoyer. This fact of modification, again proves that the Soul is an active agent too. For these reasons, the Jaina philosophers look upon the Soul as a doer and an enjoyer.

Yet although the Nyāya and the Jaina systems think that the Soul is possessed of attributes, there are differences between them. The Naiyāyika's contend that the Soul is essentially (1) unconscious (Jaḍa-svabhāva), (2) absolutely immutable (Kūṭastha-nitya) and (3) all-pervasive (Sarvagata); the Jaina's repudiate these doctrines.

#### NYĀYA THEORY ABOUT THE SOUL

According to the thinkers of the Nyāya school, Desire, Repulsion, Activity, Cognition, Joy etc. are the attributes (Guṇa) of the Soul. Attributes are said to be connected with the substance in 'intimate'. (*Samavāya*) relationship; in other words, although the attributes e.g. cognition etc. are related to the Soul, the Soul in its essence is without any attributes (*nirguṇa*). For this reason, the Naiyāyika contention is that cognition or consciousness is not inherent in the nature of the Soul. In its freed state i.e. when it exists purely in and to itself, the Soul is devoid of all attributes. It is because 'knowledge' is not essential to the Soul, the Soul according to the Nyāya philosophers is non-cognising and unconscious essentially. Just as the Greek philosopher, Plato absolutely separated the Idea from the Phenomena at places, although at many places he connected them, the Naiyāyika's considered the Soul to be essentially 'unconscious'; although they connected it with 'Consciousness' in 'intimate' relationship. The second contention of the Nyāya philosophers, as noted above, is that just as the Soul in its essential nature is devoid of all attributes, it continues unchanged in its apparent modifications (*Paryāya*). No matter whether it is connected with 'cognition' or not, the Soul is always immutable and unmodified. The last contention of the Naiyāyika's with regard to the nature of the



Soul is that it is 'all-pervasive' and "all-informing". As the Soul is essentially unconscious it must be supposed to permeate all things; otherwise, its connection with the things and phenomena of the world becomes impossible. If it were not all-pervading, its simultaneous connection with the atoms of all directions would not be possible; and if the Soul could not connect itself simultaneously with those atoms, Body etc. could not be formed. Hence the Soul is looked upon as all-pervading by the Naiyāyika's.

#### DIFFICULTIES OF THE NYĀYA THEORY

It is only reasonable to think that all the philosophers would not subscribe to the Nyāya theories. Consciousness is not merely an *attribute* of the Soul, but it is the very *nature* of the Soul; in other words, the Soul in its essence is not unconscious but consists in consciousness;—well, this is the doctrine of the Sāṃkhya and the Vedānta also. If the Soul is essentially unconscious, how can it know the objects? And if it is absolutely unchangeable, how can it cognise them? And lastly, if the Soul be held to be all-pervasive, one need not admit the reality of many Souls; one and the secondless Soul of the Vedānta school would be enough. For these reasons, the Jaina philosophy rejects the doctrine of the Nyāya system and maintains that the soul (1) consists in consciousness, (2) undergoes modifications and (3) is of the form of the Body.

#### JAINA CRITICISM OF THE NYĀYA THEORY OF THE SOUL, THAT IT IS ESSENTIALLY UNCONSCIOUS

The Jaina's point out that if the Soul be essentially unconscious, knowledge would not be possible in it. The sky is unconscious, so that if it is impossible for the sky to know anything, how can knowledge be possible in the essentially unconscious Soul? The Naiyāyika's contend that although the Soul is essentially unconscious, knowledge is possible for it as consciousness is 'intimately' related to it; but the sky is absolutely unconscious and hence knowledge is never possible in it. But the question is,—The Soul and the sky

are both essentially unconscious; yet, how is it that consciousness becomes 'intimately' connected, with the former and never with the latter? This rather proves that consciousness forms the nature of the Soul. The Nyāya thinkers here point out that the Soul is possessed of 'Soul-hood'; this 'Soul-hood' is established by the fact of Self-consciousness,—the consciousness of the 'I'. It is because the Soul is possessed of this 'Soul-hood' that consciousness becomes 'intimately' attached to it. The sky has no 'Soul-hood' and therefore consciousness cannot be attached to it. In answer to this contention of the Naiyāyika's, the Jaina's point out that according to the Nyāya thinkers themselves, the 'Soul-hood' being a genus, it is but 'intimately' related to the Soul. The Nyāya position thus involves the fallacy of 'Anyonya-saṁśraya' or mutual dependence. It is in this way. It is because 'Soul-hood' is perceived in the Soul that it concludes that 'Soul-hood' and not 'sky-hood' is intimately connected with the Soul; and it is because 'sky-hood' is perceived in the Sky that 'sky-hood' and not 'Soul-hood' is said to be 'intimately' related to the sky. Hence the 'intimate' connection of a genus with its individuals, is determined by our perception. On the other hand this perception is accounted for by the Naiyāyika's by a reference to the 'Intimate' relationship itself. In other words, it is said that we perceive 'Soul-hood' and not 'Sky-hood' in the Soul because 'Soul-hood' is 'intimately' related to the Soul and that we perceive 'Sky-hood' and not 'Soul-hood' in the Sky because 'Sky-hood' is 'intimately' related to the Sky. The Jaina's argue that the perception of 'Soul-hood' in the Soul proves that consciousness pertains to the very essence of the Soul. It is impossible to satisfactorily account for such perception without identifying to some extent consciousness with the soul. The Nyāya thinkers urge that it is the common experience of all people that consciousness is but 'intimately' related to the Soul. The answer of the Jaina's to this is that if the common experience of all people is to be relied on as a source of valid knowledge, then it is proved that consciousness is inherent in the nature

of the soul; for such is exactly what is commonly felt. No one perceives "I am essentially unconscious; I become conscious when consciousness is joined to me" or "consciousness becomes 'intimately' attached to me who am unconscious in nature". The common feeling of all people is "I am essentially a knower". Just as the knowledge, "I am a knower" is impossible in unconscious objects e.g. a pitcher etc. the knowledge, "I am a knower" would have been equally impossible in the Soul, if it were essentially unconscious. It is in this way that the Jaina philosophers show how knowledge of objects would be impossible for the soul, if it be held to be essentially unconscious. Another argument, advanced by the Naiyāyika's is as follows:—"I am a knower"; such a perception shows that the "I" and the "knowledge" or "consciousness" are separated; for, if the perception, "I am a knower" proves that the "I" and "knowledge" were identical, the perception, "I am wealthy" would have proved also the identity of the 'I' and 'Wealth'. The Jaina's contend that the perception, "I am a knower" does prove the identity of the 'I' and 'knowledge'; for, if the soul were not identified with consciousness, the perception, "I am a knower" would have been impossible for itself. If the Naiyāyika's contend that the soul, although essentially unconscious, becomes a knower, the Nyāya position itself is weakened thereby. The soul is the Substantive (Viśeṣya) and knowledge is the Adjective (Viśeṣaṇa); when both the Substantive and the Adjective are perceived, we have the perception "I am a knower". This is the Nyāya theory. But how is this knowledge of the 'I' and 'knowledge' to be explained by the Naiyāyika? The soul cannot have such perception; for, according to the Nyāya theory, the soul cannot directly know itself. If it be held that the 'I' and the 'knowledge' are perceived by another piece of knowledge, the fallacy of 'Infinite Regression' (Anavasthā) becomes irresistible; for, this another piece of knowledge is possible only when its Adjective 'knowledge-hood' is perceived along with it,—this again supposes a third piece of knowledge,—and so on. It is in this way that the cognition, "I am a knower"

becomes impossible, if the soul be not identified with consciousness. For this reason, the Jaina's reject the theory of the Nyāya philosophy that the soul is essentially unconscious.

#### JAINA CRITICISM OF THE NYĀYA THEORY THAT THE SOUL IS ESSENTIALLY IMMUTABLE

The second Nyāya doctrine with regard to the soul is that it is eternally unchangeable i.e. absolutely immutable. The Jaina's criticise this doctrine also and hold that the soul is subject to modification. They ask: If the soul remain the same at the time (or, rather, *state*) of cognition as it was before the time (or, rather *state*) of cognitions how can it evolve knowledge? Immutability or "*Kūṭastha-bhāva*" consists in eternal self-identity. Before knowledge arises in it, the soul is non-cognising, but at the time of the origin of knowledge in it, it is the knower,—the cogniser of objects, so that a sort of difference in the soul is undeniable between its state of non-cognising and its state of cognising. And, if there be a difference in the states of the soul, you cannot call it absolutely immutable.

#### JAINA CRITICISM OF THE NYĀYA THEORY THAT THE SOUL IS ALL-PERVASIVE

By regarding the soul as 'of the same extent as the Body', the Jaina philosophers have attacked the theory of the Nyāya school that the soul is 'pervasive' (*Vyāpaka*). They point out that if the soul be held to be all-pervasive, one need not maintain the doctrine of the plurality of souls, Minds (*Manas*) are admittedly many; souls are inferred to be many as they are attached to these Minds. But if the soul be an all-permeating pervasive substance, its contact with many Minds at one and the same time may be possible, like that of the one, all-pervasive Sky with the many pitchers. If the soul be all-informing, its contact with the varied Bodies and senses at one and the same time would be similarly possible. There would thus be no necessity for admitting the multiplicity of the souls. If it be contended that the contact of the one soul with the varied Bodies etc. at one

and the same time is impossible on the ground that in that case there would arise in the soul, such contradictory feelings as Pleasure and Pain, which cannot be possible, the answer is that, that line of argument is faulty in as much as it would show that varied sounds of musical instruments would not be possible in the sky at one and the same time. It may be said that the sounds of the musical instruments although different from each other, are possible in one and the same Sky, because the cause of one sound is different from the cause of another. But the answer to this is that the cause of one psychical phenomena (e.g. pleasure or pain) is different from the cause of another, so that contradictory psychical phenomena may be simultaneously possible in the all-pervasive soul and the one all-pervasive soul may simultaneously come in contact with varied Bodies etc. If the Nyāya-thinker contend that the variedness in the psychical series points to the multiplicity of souls, the Jaina urges that the same line of argument would point to the multiplicity of Skies. If it be held that the sky is one although it gives space to many objects, it may similarly be said that the all-pervasive soul is but one and that the various bodies etc. touch only its different parts. The Naiyāyika says that the varied phenomena e.g. one man is dying, another is being born, a third is actively engaged etc. etc. show that the souls are many. The Jaina's contend that if you maintain the doctrine of the all-pervasive soul, the mutually opposed phenomena of death, birth and so on, may prove the one-ness of the soul as well. One piece of sky is being generated in one pitcher when another piece of sky is being destroyed in another pitcher and a third piece of sky continues to exist; just as these phenomena do not prove the multiplicity of the sky, the phenomena of birth, death etc. need not prove the multiplicity of the souls; these are possible even if the soul be one. If it be contended that the Bondage and the Emancipation of the soul would be impossible without the multiplicity of the souls on the ground that in one and the same thing mutually contradictory phenomena are not simultaneously possible, the answer is that a similar line

of argument may be put forward to the effect that if sky be confined in one pitcher, there cannot be any free sky outside it and that if there be free sky anywhere, there cannot be any confined sky anywhere. If it be said that confinement and non-confinement are simultaneously possible in the case of sky because it has parts, we may say that there is no harm in considering the one all-pervasive soul as constituted of different parts and thus attributing Bondage and Emancipation simultaneously to it. The Jaina philosophers show in this way that if the soul be supposed to be all-permeating and all-pervasive, one need not admit its multiplicity.

The Nyāya thinkers contend that if the soul were not all-pervasive, it could not come in contact with the proper Atoms lying in infinite directions, with the result that no Body could be produced. The Jaina's point out that in order that the Atoms may be drawn towards it and joined, the soul need not be all-pervasive. Magnet draws Iron; but Magnet is not all-pervasive substance. It may be contended that if all the Atoms of infinite directions be supposed to be attracted towards the Soul, the form and magnitude of the Body becomes indefinite. The Jaina's point out that the same difficulty may arise if you suppose the soul to pervade and thereby draw all the Atoms. If it be said that owing to '*Adṛṣṭa*', only those Atoms which are competent to form the Body are drawn towards the soul, the Jaina's answer that the very same thing may be urged by those who deny that the soul is all-pervasive.

#### NYĀYA OBJECTION TO THE JAINA THEORY

According to the Jaina philosophers, the soul is of the same extent as the Body. The Naiyāyika's say that if the soul be supposed to be confined within the Body, the soul like the Body must be said to have *parts*: if the soul be supposed to have parts, it is to be looked upon as an *effect*: if it be an effect, what is its *cause*? The soul cannot have anything which is not of the same nature with it (*Vijātiya*) as its cause; because it is impossible for the soul to be

generated from the Non-soul. Nor can we think that the soul generates from substances which are of the same nature with it (*Sajātiya*); for, these causes must have 'soul-hood' (i.e. must themselves be souls) in order that they may be of the same nature with the soul; it then comes to this that soul generates from the souls,—which according to the Nyāya thinkers is an unreasonable theory. For, how can more than one soul operate in one and the same body? Even admitting it to be possible, how can the effect of one *cause-soul* be combined with the effect of another *cause-soul*? A pitcher has parts; when the parts separate, the pitcher is destroyed. In the same way, if the soul be supposed to be constituted of parts, the soul must be said to be subject to destruction.

#### JAINA REPLY

In reply to the above Nyāya criticism, the Jaina's put forward their theory that in some respects, the soul may be supposed to have *parts*, and be an *effect*—although it has neither parts nor is an effect in other respects. A pitcher is made up of limbs, all of the same nature; but the soul is not an effect like that. It is undoubtedly an effect. But what is the meaning of an effect? A substance is an effect which assumes a new form by giving up the old. The Effect-hood of the soul consists in its undergoing varied modifications. Viewed from this point, the soul appears to be impermanent in some sense. It, however, continues to be substantially unchanged, although it undergoes constant modifications. For this reason, the soul is undivided and eternal and a homogenous whole,—although looked through its modifications, it has parts (i.e. varied modes) and is an effect.

#### ANOTHER NYĀYA OBJECTION TO THE JAINA THEORY

Another objection of the Naiyāyika's to the Jaina doctrine that the soul is of the same extent as the Body is that in that case, the soul becomes a substance having a *form* (*Mūrta*); now, if the soul have a *form* it cannot enter into

the body; for, how can a thing having a form enter into another having a form? The Jaina theory, contends the Nyāya thinker, thus leads to the position that the Body is devoid of the Soul. Secondly, if the soul is of the same extent as the Body, how can the *Jīva* of a child-Body assume the bigger form of an adult Body in future? If it be said that when the soul assumes the bigger form of the Adult-body, it leaves aside the smaller form of the child-Body, then you must admit that the soul is non-eternal like the Body. If, on the contrary it be contended that in assuming the bigger form, the soul does not leave aside the smaller form of the child-body, it must be said that something impossible happens; for, how can another form be taken without leaving aside the existing form? The last argument of the Naiyāyika's is that if you say that the soul is of the form of the Body, you must admit that the soul is cut in parts when the Body is cut.

#### JAINA REPLY

In reply to the above criticism, the Jaina philosophers ask: What is meant by the soul having a *form*? If you mean that the soul does not permeate all the things of the world but is confined within one single Body, you thereby support the Jaina theory. But if you mean that the soul has a *visible shape* etc. the Jaina's object to the contention. If the soul be not all-permeating i.e. be of the same extent as the Body, it need not have a *visible shape*. etc. Mind, for example, is not all-permeating; but it is not a thing, having a visible shape on that account. The soul has no *Shape*; accordingly, it enters into the Body just as the Mind does so. The Jaina's point out that Water etc. which are grossly *en-shaped* matter can easily enter into Ashes etc; Why, then would it be impossible for the soul which has no *shape* to enter into the Body? Next, when the soul assumes the bigger form of the adult Body, it must be understood to have left aside the smaller form of the child body. There is no inconsistency here. It is possible for the soul to assume different forms by means of expansion or contraction just as



a Snake may expand itself and assume a bigger form by leaving aside the quiescent and smaller form and *vice-versa*. If you view the soul through its varied states and modifications, it must be admitted that the soul undergoes change and is non-eternal in that respect. But substantially it is immutable and eternal. As regards the objection that the soul is cut when the Body is cut, the Jaina theory is that when a portion of the Body is cut off, a portion of the soul does extend to the sundered part of the Body. Tremors are often found in such sundered parts of the Body; these are inexplicable unless you admit the existence of a part of the soul in these separated parts of the Body. Of course, no new soul comes into these parts; what persists there is nothing but a part of the soul which dwells within the Body and is of the same extent with it. The soul continues to be one, although the Body is divided into two. It is possible for one and the same soul to exist in the two separated parts of the Body, just as one and the same soul permeates the varied parts of one *series* of knowledge. The soul is not *really* cut in two; it simply extends itself to the sundered part of the Body. It is for this reason that the whole soul is once more found in the living portion of the maimed Body. The philosophers of the Jaina school establish in this way that there can be no valid objection to their doctrine that the Soul is of the same extent as the Body.

#### THE POSITIVE ARGUMENT OF THE JAINA'S THAT THE SOUL IS OF THE SAME EXTENT AS BODY

After setting aside the Nyāya objections in the above manner, the Jaina's advance the following positive argument: "The soul is not all-pervasive because it is conscious; whatever is all-pervasive is not conscious; as for instance, the Sky; the Soul is conscious; hence it is not all-pervasive". "If the Soul is not all-pervasive, it must be of the same extent as the Body; because the existence of the soul is perceived within the Body only".

## NĀSTIKA VIEW THAT THERE IS NO NEXT WORLD

It has already been said that according to the Jaina's, the Jīva is "joined with Karma" or "undergoes transmigrations owing to its being attached to Puḍgala or Matter". The Nāstika's (nihilists) do not believe in the doctrine of Transmigration, Rebirth or Next World; they do not believe that every Act is sure to be followed by its Fruit. The theory that "the soul undergoes transmigrations" refutes the position of the nihilistic thinkers. It was pointed out before that if one's Act be not held to be indissolubly connected with its Fruit, the fallacies of 'annihilation of what is done (*Kṛtapraṇāśa*)' and of 'fruition of what is not done (*Akṛtābhyāgama*)' become irresistible. For this reason, the Transmigration or Rebirth is to be admitted. If it be said that the Next World is not a matter of Perception, the answer is that you cannot deny the Next World on the ground that it is not perceived. One's grand-father, great-grand-father etc. are not seen by one but their existence at some past time is never denied. Besides, the nihilist is not justified in saying that no body has ever perceived the Next World; for, the nihilist is not omniscient. There are thinkers e.g. the Jaina's who, on the contrary, do believe that there are omniscient Beings who see the Next World. The Nāstika's may urge:—If there be a Next World it must have a cause; but what is this Cause? If it be said that the Next World, Rebirth or Re-incarnation is due to 'Adṛṣṭa' (fruition of one's Karma or act), the position involves 'Infinite Regression' (*Anavasthā*). If, on the contrary, Re-incarnation be said to be due to one's feeling of Attachment (*Rāga*) or Envy (*Dveṣa*), then a state of Emancipation becomes impossible; for, all people of the world are more or less subject to these feelings. If, lastly, it be contended that Re-incarnation is determined by such acts e.g. of injury done to others, the position becomes contrary to common experience. For, it is often found that such acts are not followed by their alleged definite effects. A vicious and envious man is often found to be prosperous while an honest and virtuous man leads a life of terrible misery. This shows that there is no *invariable* effect of an

act and hence Re-incarnation need not be believed in. To these three objections, the Jaina's reply as follows: In some respect, we admit all the three positions involved in these objections; but the *Adṛṣṭa* or the next life is not contradicted thereby. The Jaina's admit that the *Jīva* is attached to Karma from the beginningless time; "Infinite Regression" (*Anavasthā*) is not fallacy here. Secondly, if attachment and envy be held to lead to Re-incarnation, emancipation from the Karma has been urged to be impossible; the Jaina's point out that Emancipation may or may not be possible but that Re-incarnation of the soul is proved. The Jaina theory is that so long as salvation is not attained, the *Jīva* remains subjected to attachment and envy and continues to run between Karma (temporal acts) and its Fruit, consequently. Lastly, the certainty of the Fruit, following the Act is not disproved by the prosperity of the wicked and the misery of the honest people. The prosperity of a wicked man is to be attributed to the meritorious acts of his previous life and the misery of a good man, to the impious acts of his past incarnation. But the future misery of the bad man and the future blessedness of the pious man are inevitable. So, the argument based on the alleged variation of the Karma from its fruit does not disprove the *Adṛṣṭa* or the next life.

#### ĀGAMA TEXTS RELATING TO ADRṢṬA

The Jaina's point out there are Authoritative Sayings (*Āgama*) in support of the doctrine of Re-incarnation. 'Blessed effects of a good act', 'Bad effects of a bad Act', these are found in the Jaina scriptures which (the Jaina's contend) are Revelations of absolutely true things.

#### INFERENCE ABOUT ADRṢṬA

Anumāna or Inference also proves the reality of the *Adṛṣṭa*. At one and the same moment, a chaste lady gives birth to two sons; but as time goes on, the two sons are found to differ considerably from each other in respect of their

strength, knowledge, etc. Nothing but *Adṛṣṭa* (pre-existence) can explain this difference.

#### ADṚṢṬA IS MATERIAL ACCORDING TO THE JAINAS

According to the Jaina's the *Adṛṣṭa* is *material* (i.e. due to attachment of the soul to Pudgala). The Body etc. of the soul in its future incarnation are determined by the Karma-atoms which flow into it owing to the peculiar acts and tendencies of the soul in its present life. The soul is ruled by *Adṛṣṭa* i.e. bound in fetters of Karma. The Naiyāyaika's, on the contrary, look upon the *Adṛṣṭa* as a special attribute of the soul; the philosophers of the Sāṃkhya school regard it as a mode of the Prakṛti; according to the Buddhists, *Adṛṣṭa* is *Vāsanā* i.e. a peculiar psychical tendency. The Vedāntists maintain that it is Avidyā or nescience. By regarding the *Adṛṣṭa* as material, the Jaina's mean to oppose all these theories.

The Jaina conception of the soul has been indicated above. With the theories of the Sāṃkhya and other schools of Indian philosophy, it has points of similarity; it is different from them as well. This shows that the Jaina philosophy is one of the oldest philosophical systems of India. We cannot admit that the Jaina system is a new system, developed after the Buddhistic period; nor even can we suppose that it evolved during the life time of Gautama Buddha. If the Jaina theory is in some respect similar to the Nyāya, the Vedānta etc. and in some respect different from them as well, it may safely be concluded that the Jaina doctrine was developed in those forgotten ages of the past, when the Nyāya system etc. were developed. History and antiquarian researches point to the same conclusion.

## II. THE MODIFICATION OF THE SOUL

It has already been said that according to the Jaina's "*Jīva* is possessed of cognition; is formless; is a doer; is of the same extent as its body; is an enjoyer; migrates (in its

state of Bondage) in the *Samsāra* or the series of existences; is free (in its essence); and has an upward motion”.

## 2. *Dravya-Saṃgraha*

The Jīva's of such a nature are infinite in number and are divided by the Jaina philosophers in the following way:—  
“With reference to its common essence, the Jīva is of one kind. It is of two kinds in as much as it may be in Bondage or Emancipated. The Jīva may be Imperfect or Nearly-Perfect or Perfect and thus be of three modes. With respect to its state of existence, the Jīva may be divided into four classes viz: Celestial Beings, Infernal Beings, Human Beings and Sub-human Beings. In consideration of its five-fold conditions viz:—Mitigation, Annihilation, Partial Annihilation and Partial Mitigation, Modification and Genesis or Rising, the Jīva is of five kinds. The six modes of cognition divide the Jīva into six classes. The seven ways of Predication make seven classes of the Jīva. In consideration of the eight essential attributes of the soul or of the eight modes of the Karma, the Jīva may be divided into eight classes. Nine categories make the Jīva nine. Ten kinds of life divide the Jīva into ten classes”.

## 234-237. *Tattvārtha-sāra*

To understand the true nature of the Soul, a clear conception of these divisions and of many allied things is necessary.

# THE SOUL OF ONE KIND

## A. THE FACULTIES OF THE SOUL

### COGNITIVE PROCESS

If we confine our attention to the common essence of all the souls, we may maintain that all of them are but of one and the same kind. This common essence is ‘Upayoga’ or Consciousness. Every soul is possessed of consciousness. Upayoga is of two sorts viz:—*Darśana* and ‘*Jñāna*’. *Darśana* is the consciousness of the abstract Being of an object without the consciousness of any of its details. *Jñāna* is the cognition of an object with its details. *Jñāna* or cognition is divided

into two modes viz.,—‘*Pramāṇa*’ and ‘*Naya*’. *Pramāṇa* is valid knowledge of an object in all its aspects i.e. an object taken as a whole, while *Naya* is right apprehension of a part or a particular aspect of it. ‘*Pratyakṣa*’ or direct apprehension and ‘*Parokṣa*’ or indirect knowledge are the two subdivisions of the *Pramāṇa*. The former is clearer and more vivid than the latter. ‘*Avadhī*’ or clairvoyance’, ‘*Manah-paryāya*’ or telepathy and ‘*Kevala*’ or omniscience are the *Pratyakṣa Pramāṇa*’s. The *Avadhī*-knowledge is the knowledge of the object having a form, which is obtained without the help of the Senses and the Mind. The cognition of the matter of another man’s Mind, which is independent of the operation of the senses etc. is called *Manah-paryāya-Jñāna*. The *Kevala Jñāna* or omniscience is the direct apprehension of all the objects of the universe with all their modes and aspects. The *Parokṣa* or indirect knowledge is of two kinds viz:—‘*Matī*’ and ‘*Śruta*’. *Matī-Jñāna* is cognition which is dependent on the operation of the *Indriya* (Senses) and *Anindriya* (Mind). Sensuous apprehension (*Indriya-jñāna*), Self-Apprehension (*Sva-saṁvedana*), Recollection (*Smarāṇa*), Conception (*Pratyabhijñāna*), Induction (*Uha*) and Deduction (*Anumāna*) are included in *Matī Jñāna*. In *Darśana* we have no apprehension of the form or the shape of the object; in *Matī-Jñāna*, we have it. The *Matī-Jñāna* or sensuous knowledge has four modes, rather four stages of development; these are called *Avagraha*, *Iha*, *Avāya* and *Dhāraṇā*. *Avagraha* is the lowest stage in *Matī-Jñāna*; it is the perception of the lesser generality (*Avāntara-sāmānya*) as distinguished from the formless abstract generality which is the object of *Darśana*. *Iha* is the inclination to know the details of an object apprehended through *Avagraha*. The perception of the details is *Avāya* and the retention of it is ‘*Dhāraṇā*’. *Indriya-jñāna* or sensuous knowledge, as shown before, is knowledge obtained through the operation of the Senses and the Mind. The internal feelings e.g. of pleasure or of pain etc. which are independent of the operation of our sense-organs are the *Anindriya-jñāna* or *Sva-Saṁvedana* (Self-Apprehen-

sion). Smaraṇa is Recollection of an object perceived before. Pratyabhijñā or conception is knowledge obtained through a comparison of similar or dissimilar objects. The knowledge of universal application such as, 'Wherever there is Smoke, there is Fire', which is generalised from observations of particular instances is Uha or Tarka (Induction). Anumāna or Deduction is the knowledge of the form, 'That Hill is fiery', which is deduced from the general truth established by Tarka. The Śruta-jñāna is included in the Parokṣa Pramāṇa; the Śruta-Jñāna consists of the sayings of an Authoritative person. Naya, as distinguished from Pramāṇa, is the knowledge of a mode or aspect, of a thing under observation. 'Dravyārthika' and 'Paryāyārthika' are the two modes of Naya. 'Dravya' or Substance is the object of the former and 'Paryāya' or Mode is that of the latter Naya. 'Naigama-Naya', 'Saṃgraha-Naya' and 'Vyavahāra-Naya' are included in the Dravyārthika Naya. The Naigama Naya indicates a thing by its purpose. The Saṃgraha Naya considers only the general essence of an object, while the Vyavahāra Naya takes into consideration only its particular modification. The Paryāyārthika Naya is of four kinds viz: 'Ṛju-Sūtra', 'Śabda', 'Samabhirūḍha' and 'Evambhūta'. The Ṛju-Sūtra is confined to the particular aspect of a thing for the time being. According to the Śabda-Naya, all the synonyms express but one and the same object. Samabhirūḍha-Naya, on the contrary, contends that the synonyms express different objects, in as much as they differ in genders, derivative roots etc. etc. According to the Evambhūta-Naya every word signifies some action or activity, so that as soon as an object is deprived of the activity, signified by the word, the word cannot be applied to it.

Thus, the Pratyakṣa and the Parokṣa are the two modes of the Pramāṇa. The Pramāṇa and the Naya are included in the Jñāna. The Jñāna and the Darśana are the subdivisions of the Upayoga. The Jaina theory is that in consideration of the Upayoga, the Jīva or soul may be said to be of one sort only.

## B. THE FACULTIES OF THE SOUL (*Contd.*)

In the foregoing section, we have given a bare description of the psychical faculties in the Jaina system. We propose to consider the true significance of these faculties and indicate their scope and real functions in the following lines, at the risk of a considerable amount of repetition.

### ASPECTS OF CONSCIOUSNESS

Kuṇḍa-Kuṇḍācāryya points out the characteristics of a psychical being,—

“The soul, as it is, exists; is conscious; has the power of understanding; is potent; is active; enjoys the fruits of actions; is limited by the body; is not corporeal; is mixed with Karma (Matter)” —27, *Pañcāstikāya-Samayāsāra*.

Nemi-çandra also says:—

“The soul has the power of understanding; is formless; is the agent; is of the same size as its body; is the enjoyer of the fruits of its actions; moves in incarnations; is (substantially) perfect; has the tendency to move upwards”. —2, *Dravya-Saṁgraha*

It would be seen that so far as psychology is concerned, the most important characteristics of a psychical being are consciousness and the power of understanding. Kuṇḍa-Kuṇḍācāryya means this, when he says:—

“The Soul and the other existents are the reals. The qualities of the soul are consciousness and the power of understanding.” —16, *Pañcāstikāya-Samayāsāra*

Consciousness (*Çetanā*), according to the Jaina's, stands for (1) the passive experience of agreeable or disagreeable phenomena; (2) the consciousness of purposive activity and (3) the more complicated psychical state, associated with, or rather leading to pure knowledge.

“As conscious, the souls experience in the three following ways. Some experience merely the fruits of Karma, some, their own activity; some again, knowledge”.

—*Ibid*, 33



## JAINA DOCTRINES AND THE THEORIES OF EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY

These three modes or aspects of consciousness are essentially the same as those stages recognised by the modern psychologists, in the process of evolution of the fully developed conscious nature. The first form of consciousness consists simply in the passive feeling of the agreeable or the disagreeable; it is scarcely to be distinguished from the vitality of the lower forms of life. It is consciousness, no doubt, but of the lowest form. The second mode of consciousness is better developed and more complicated. For, whereas the first form is simply the passive consciousness of being acted on from the outside, the second consists in the awareness of the animal's own purposive activities. Such a consciousness is possible only in (more developed) animals. The last mode of consciousness is associated with knowledge and is possessed of by man and superior beings only. The Jaina view of consciousness unmistakably suggests the remarkable theories of the modern psychology of the evolutionary school,—(1) that human consciousness is developed from forms of sub-human consciousness presumed to be present in sub-human animals and (2) that life and consciousness are probably co-extensive. Kuṇḍa-kuṇḍācāryya definitely says:—

“All immobile organisms (e.g. plants) have feelings (of being acted on) only; the animals have feelings of their own purposive activity; the beings who are above the merely organic or animal nature, possess knowledge”.

This theory of consciousness conclusively proves that the early Jaina thinkers clearly grasped the basic principles of the evolutionary psychology of modern times. It shows also that there was in ancient India a considerable amount of clear and sober thinking about the nature of animals, plants and beings, low in the scale of life and mentality. By attributing to them a consciousness of their own purposive activity, the Jaina theory, certainly rejects the notorious Cartesian doctrine that the sub-human animals are unconscious automata. It does more than that, in as much

as it foreshadows the celebrated theory of Sir J. C. Bose, which is rapidly gaining ground, that the operations of life-consciousness are traceable even in plants. We shall come to these in a later section.

Çetanā or consciousness culminates in pure and perfect knowledge. It seems that the Jaina psychologists were able to discover that knowledge itself has grades and modes. This will appear from their description and classification of Upayoga, the other distinguishing characteristic of a soul. Kuṇḍa-kuṇḍāçāryya observes:—

“Understanding is of two modes, Cognition and Sensation”. According to Nemi-çandra also, Upayoga or understanding is divided into two species viz:—Darśana or sensation and Jñāna or cognition. Of these, cognition is of eight kinds and sensation, of four. Umā-Svāti-says:—

“Understanding is the distinguishing characteristic of the soul. It is of two sorts (viz: Jñāna or Cognition and Darśana or Sensation. The first is of eight kinds and the second, of four”.

—8 and 9, Chapter II. *Tattvārthādhigama-Sūtra*

#### ASPECTS OF SENSATION

Darśana or sensation is the first determination of the psychic mass. The knowledge given by sensation is wanting in details and definiteness, yet, it is a distinct advance from the merely vital or organic state, towards the psychical. The four modes of sensation are thus described.

“Sensation is of four kinds,—Visual, Non-visual, Clairvoyant and Pure,—in the purview of the last of which, come all the phenomena in their variety and infinity”.

—48, *Pañçāstikāya-samaya-sāra*

Nemi-çandra also says,—

“Understanding is of two modes viz: Sensation and Cognition. Sensation is of four kinds, Visual, Non-visual, Clairvoyant and Pure”.

—4, *Dravya Saṁgraha*

Darśana does not give anything definite.

“Darśana is said to consist in the sensation of the (vaguest)

generality of objects in which the forms and specifications are not recognised".

Thus, Visual sensation may be said just to consist in the consciousness that the eyes are affected: Non-visual sensations are similarly affections of the ears, the tongue, the skin and the olfactory organ. The last two modes of Sensation are of the super-normal types. The Clairvoyant sensation is the sensation of the mysterious parts or aspects of material things. The Pure sensation consists in sensing all the things of the universe.

The process of Understanding is more complicated when it is Jñāna or Cognition. Cognition is of eight kinds.

"Cognition is of five species,—Ābhinibodhika, Śruta, Avadhī, Manaḥ-paryaya and Kevala; Kumati, Kuśruta and Vibhaṅga also are connected with cognition".

—41, *Pañcāsti-kāya-samaya-sāra*

Ābhinibodhika, otherwise called Mati-Jñāna, is sensuous knowledge. Śruta is knowledge based on authority. Avadhī-jñāna consists in a sort of clairvoyant perception. Manaḥ-paryaya is telepathic knowledge. Kevala-jñāna is identical with omniscience. Kumati, Kuśruta and Vibhaṅga are fallacious forms of Mati, Śruta and Avadhī-jñāna respectively.

#### ASPECTS OF UNDERSTANDING

It would be seen that the modes of cognition which are of psychological importance are the first five, Mati, Śruta, Avadhī, Manaḥ-paryaya and Kevala. Umā-Svāti classifies these five forms of knowledge under two heads,—Pratyakṣa Pramāṇa and Parokṣa Pramāṇa.

"Modes of cognition are Sensuous, Authoritative, Clairvoyant, Telepathic and Pure. They are the two sources of valid knowledge. The first two are the *indirect* sources. The remaining are *direct* sources".

—9, 10, 11 and 12, Chapter I, *Tattvārth Sūtra*  
Nemi-çandra also observes,—

"Cognition is of eight modes viz:—Knowledge and Fallacy of the Sensuous, the Authoritative, the Clairvoyant

and the Telepathic and the Pure. From a different standpoint, cognition is either Direct or Indirect”.

—5, *Dravya-Saṅgraha*

It is to be observed, however, that the Pratyakṣa and the Parokṣa of Uma-Svāti and Nemi-çandra do not signify the same thing as those of Vādi-deva. The Pratyakṣa of the latter gives clearer and more distinct matter than the Parokṣa. Hence Vādi-deva includes not only Clairvoyance, Telepathy and Omniscience but also sensuous knowledge in Pratyakṣa. Umā-Svāti, on the other hand, defines the Pratyakṣa as knowledge which is directly evolved from within the soul itself and which is independent of any external help. Hence Clairvoyance, Telepathy and Omniscience (the natures of which will shortly be described) are Pratyakṣa Pramāṇa according to him. On the other hand Śruta-jñāna being dependent on testimony and Mati-jñāna, on the sense-organs and the mind, cannot be called Pratyakṣa. These are Parokṣa or indirect sources of knowledge. Ultimately, however, the difference between the school of Umā-Svāti and the latter school amounts only to this,—that whereas Umā-Svāti relegates all the modes of Mati-jñāna to the status of the Parokṣa Pramāṇa, the latter school chooses to include the perceptual mode of Mati-jñāna into the Sāmvyavahārika Pratyakṣa, regarding the rest viz:—Memory, Inference etc. as forms of the Parokṣa Pramāṇa.

Mati-jñāna is sensuous knowledge or rather knowledge which is either perception or one dependent on perception. It is based on previous Darśana or sensation. The Mati-jñāna with its various modes is developed stage by stage from pure Sensation. This will appear from a consideration of the modes of Mati-jñāna, which are thus described.

“Mati-jñāna or sensuous knowledge is of three kinds, viz: Upalabdhi or perception, Bhāvanā or memory and Upa-yoga or Advanced understanding”.

—42, *Pañcāstikāya-samaya-sāra*

It would be seen that the three modes of the sensuous knowledge are expanded into five by Umā-Svāti,—

“Mati or Perception, Smṛti or Memory, Saṁjñā or Conception, Ābhinirodha or Induction and Ābhinirodha or Deduction are essentially one”.

—*Tattvārtha Sūtra*, Ch. 1, 13

This knowledge is dependent on sensation and is gradually developed and evolved through the processes of Perception, Recollection, Generalisation, Induction and Ratiocination. These psychological processes may be arranged in an ascending or descending series. It would be noticed that this gradation of the psychological faculties by the Jaina school is not different from what is found in the works of the modern psychologists of the West.

The process which is operative immediately after the Darśana or Sensation and which is first in the scale of the developing knowledge is Upalabdhi or Mati-jñāna proper. This is identical with the process of Perception. The Jaina psychologists divide Mati-jñāna proper into two kinds, viz:—Indriya-nimitta i.e. that which is dependent on the sense-organs and Anindriya-nimitta i.e. that which is dependent on the mind. As Umā-Svāti says:—

“That (Perception) is dependent on either the sense-organs or the mind”.

—*Ibid.* 14

It seems that what Locke meant by Ideas of Sensation and Ideas of Reflexion and what modern psychologists express by knowledge obtained by Extraspection and knowledge obtained by Introspection are essentially the Indriya-nimitta Mati-jñāna and the Anindriya-nimitta Mati-jñāna respectively of the Jaina school.

The Anindriya-nimitta Mati-jñāna consists in a knowledge of the operations of one's own mind. Such knowledge, it is clear, is dependent on nothing but the introspective mind. The Indriya-nimitta Mati-jñāna, on the other hand, is dependent on the sense-organs. No doubt, the mind also is operative in the generation of the Indriya-nimitta Mati-jñāna. But as in addition to the operation of mind, that of the sense-organs is necessary in the genesis of such a perception it is called the Indriya-nimitta Mati-jñāna in

contradistinction from the Anindriya-nimitta Mati-jñāna which is dependent on the operation of the mind alone. The Indriya-nimitta Mati-jñāna is of five modes in as much as perception is either Visual or Olfactory, or Tactile or Auditory or that through the Tongue.

The Jaina psychologists are far from maintaining that a fully developed perception is a simple psychosis suddenly taking the place of sensation. As a matter of fact, they point out that no less than four processes are involved in the genesis of a perception, properly so called. Their analysis of perception will be found not to differ materially from that given by the modern psychologists of Europe. Perception is developed from Sensation. The Jaina writers express this by saying that perception is of four modes. Their own description, however, shows that we are justified in looking upon these four processes as stages in the progressive development of perception, rather than its four modes or types. The four processes are,—

“Avagraha or Grasp, Ihā or Attention, Avāya or Determination and Dhāraṇā or Retention”.

—*Ibid*, 15

The description of these four processes of Perception may not detain us long. (1) Avagraha is Darśana, only a little bit advanced. If in Darśana we have the sensation that our senses are affected, in Avagraha we have the consciousness that something outside is affecting the sense-organs. What that something is, Avagraha does not tell us. It consists simply in grasping a vague indeterminate something disturbing the consciousness. It gives only a feeling of what the modern psychologists call, “Extensivity” (as distinguished from “Extension”) or as James calls it, a feeling of “Roominess”. Hence the Jaina thinkers (e.g. Umā-Svāti) choose to say that “Vyanjanā” i.e. something vague and indeterminate, though manifest, and not “Artha” or determined object is the matter of Avagraha. In this connection, they point out that Visual perception and Introspective perception, Çakṣu-Indriya-Nimitta and Anindriya-Nimitta, can have no Vyanjanā Avagraha stage.

“Vyanjanā Avagraha” is not possible in the case of the Eye or of the Mind”.

—*Ibid.* 19

Why? Apparently, the reason is that according to the Jaina thinkers the eye and the mind cannot turn to an object without distinguishing some of its parts and consequently determining it, in some way. (2) *Ihā* works upon the material furnished by *Darśana* and *Avagraha* and consists in an *inclination* to know the something more fully. *Ihā* is thus Attention directed to it. (3) *Avāya* is the third stage in the development of the Percept and consists in a detailed idea of the object on which *Ihā* was fixed. (4) *Dhāraṇā* is the process of perceptual Retention, giving the percept some persistence in our mind. When this stage is reached, the process of perception may be said to have reached its culminating point. This finishes *Upalabdhi* (or *Matī-jñāna* proper), which consists in perception.

We shall not attempt an elaborate description of *Smṛti*, *Samjñā*, *Çintā* and *Ābhinibodha* here, for, this can be met with in any logical treatise of the later Jaina school. *Smṛti* is Recollection or Reproduction; *Samjñā*, otherwise called *Pratyabhijñā*, consists in Comparison and Conception. *Çintā* or *Tarka* is Induction; *Ābhinibodha*, more commonly called *Anumāna*, consists in Deductive Reasoning.

#### ASPECTS OF AUTHORITATIVE KNOWLEDGE

The above are the five modes of *Matī-jñāna* or sensuous knowledge i.e. knowledge consisting either in sensuous perception or one dependent on or developed from it. The other great *Parokṣa Pramāṇa* or indirect source of valid knowledge, according to the Jaina thinkers, is *Śruta-jñāna* or Authoritative knowledge. *Śruta-jñāna* may be said to embody the highest and the most advanced knowledge, arrived at by the most perfect form of *Matī-jñāna*. It is based on *Matī-jñāna* and consists in truths, discovered, developed and revealed by the most perfect of the rational souls. It is a system of scriptural Truths, the holiness of which is unimpeachable. *Śruta-jñāna* is thus Authoritative

knowledge, the validity of which is unchallengeable. Nevertheless, it is connected with and as a matter of fact, dependent on Sensuous knowledge. As Umā-Svāti says:—

“Authoritative knowledge is preceded by Sensuous knowledge; it is of two kinds,—the first of which is of twelve and the second, of many modes”. —*Ibid* 20

The two kinds of the Jaina scriptural truths are (1) *Aṅga-praviṣṭa* i.e., those that are embodied in the *Aṅga*'s or the Jaina sacred books and (2) *Aṅga-vāhya* i.e., those that are outside such scriptures. The first class is composed of 12 modes e.g. the *Sūtra-Kṛtāṅga* etc. etc. while the second includes many subdivisions e.g. the *Sāmāyika*, the *Pra-kirṇaka* etc. etc. We shall not enter into the dogmatology of the Jaina faith here.

The *Śruta-jñāna* is thus finished, cut and dried, ready-made unimpeachable system of truths, which we are profited by making use of *Kuṇḍa-kuṇḍācāryya* divides it into four classes.

“They say that the *Śruta-jñāna* or authoritative knowledge is of four kinds,—viz : *Labdhi* or Integration, *Bhāvanā* or Consideration, *Upayoga* or Understanding and *Naya* or Interpretation”.

—*Pañcāsti-kāya-samaya-sāra*, 43

From the description of these four modes of authoritative knowledge, it would appear that it is far more reasonable to look upon these processes as four steps to the progressive explanation of a phenomena than as so many independent and mutually exclusive kinds of scriptural knowledge. In other words, the so-called modes of the *Śruta-jñāna* are practically the four ways in which the accumulated mass of knowledge in a man may be applied or utilised to the interpretation of phenomena that are pressing upon his mind every moment.

The *Śruta-jñāna* embodies a system of absolute truths and thus furnishes principles of explanation of phenomena. *Labdhi* is the mode of *Śruta-jñāna*, through which a phenomena is explained, being referred to an idea with which it is associated. This is, of course, the most primitive



and ordinary way of explaining a thing. What is the nature of A? Well, since A is known to be associated with B, the nature of which is already well-known, the nature of A is determined in terms of B. This is Śruta-jñāna of the Labdhi type. It may be observed, however, that the phenomena of the world, are of too complex a nature to admit of such a simple explanation. Hence although the nature of B may be already known and the fact of its association with A, a great deal of concentrated attention on the nature of B may be necessary in order that the true place, significance and function of A may be determined. Bhāvanā consists in this more advanced way of explaining a phenomena and implies a diligent direction of attention to the nature and the various aspects of an idea (i.e. B) which is already known, in order that the true nature of the phenomena (i.e. A) which is associated with it, may be rightly understood. Upayoga is the third stage, consisting in the understanding of A in the light of B, through the process of Bhāvanā, just described. Thus, these three processes, Labdhi, Bhāvanā and Upayoga, may be arranged in serial order. Labdhi is the rough and ready way of interpretation; it consists in referring an idea to its associated one in an off-hand manner. Bhāvanā is more circumspect and attempts to explain every link in the concatenation of phenomena. Upayoga consists in such fully developed interpretation. It thus seems that what Avagraha, Ihā and Avāya are to Mati-jñāna, Labdhi, Bhāvanā and Upayoga respectively are to Śruta-jñāna.

Like Dhāraṇā which is the fourth stage in the development of Mati-jñāna of the sensuous type, we have Naya, which, as Kuṇḍa-kuṇḍācāryya points out, is the fourth mode of Śruta-jñāna. The parallelism may be carried a step further. Dhāraṇā consisting, as it does, in the mental retention of a percept, is practically the extreme limit of the sensuous Mati-jñāna, if not altogether outside it. In the same manner, Naya which consists in explanation of a phenomenon by emphasising its particular aspect, is the farthest limit of the Śruta-jñāna. No doubt, Naya refers to the

accumulated mass of knowledge in explaining a phenomenon; but it refers not to the whole of it but to a particular aspect of it. It may be said that Naya explains a thing more by looking to its various modes and particular aspects directly, than by referring it to a mass of authoritative knowledge with regard to it. Hence, we say that Naya is the extreme limit of the Śruta-jñāna. Indeed, Umā-Svāti instead of looking upon it as a mode of Śruta-jñāna chooses to consider it as a special form of knowing things. He thus differentiates it not only from Śruta-jñāna but from the entire category of the Pramāṇa, as will be apparent from his aphorism,—

“Valid knowledge is acquired through the Pramāṇa’s and the Naya’s”.

प्रमाणनयैरधिगमः । *Tattvārtha-sūtra*, Ch. 1,6

The Naya is primarily divided into two modes viz:—the Dravyārthika i.e. that having substance for its object and the Paryāyārthika i.e. that having Mode for its object. The former again is subdivided into three classes and the latter, into four,—so that ultimately, we have seven kinds of the Naya. These are,—

“The Naigama or the Transferred; the Saṃgraha or the General; the Vyavahāra or the Specific; the Rju-sūtra or the Straight; the Śabda or the Verbal; the Samabhirudha or the Actual; and the Evambhūta or the Such-like; are the Nayas or Ways of expressions or explanation”.

—*Ibid.* 33

The Naya is the way of explaining a thing from a particular standpoint. A thing or a phenomena has admittedly various modes or aspects. To approach the consideration of it from any of these modes or aspects is the business of the Naya. The seven classes of the Naya indicate seven different standpoints from which a thing can be considered. It is better,—as our description would show,—to look upon these seven modes of the Naya as seven progressive ways of having a more and more limited conception of a thing or phenomenon under consideration.

(1) The Naigama: According to Vādi-deva, Siddha-sena

Divākara and other logicians of the Jaina school, it consists in viewing a thing composed of various parts and aspects, as an undifferentiated abstract unity. Pūjya-pāda and some other logicians describe the Naigama in a different way. According to them, it consists in describing a thing or phenomenon not as it really or essentially is, but as it appears when something external is foisted on it. Thus when a man carrying wood, water and other raw materials is asked what he is doing and he answers, "I am cooking meals",—his reply may be said to be based on Naigama Naya. He explains the wood, water, fire and other materials which he carries, not by giving an account of their true and essential natures but by referring them to the purpose for which they are carried. The Naigama Naya thus consists in a figurative description of its object. It is said to be of three modes viz: the Vartamāna, the Bhūta and the Bhavya,—the Present, the Past and the Future. The example just given is one of the first mode; because a series of present things are explained by a present purpose. The Bhūta Naigama is illustrated in the following way. If on the Dipāvālī day, one says,—

"This day is the day of the Lord's attainment of liberation," he may be said to have the Bhūta-Naigama point of view; because what he says is not strictly or literally true; the Lord Mahāvīra attained liberation centuries ago; the man's words figuratively express the fact that on the day on which the Lord attained his liberation was such and such a day of the week or of the month. This is the Naigama Naya of the Bhūta-Naigama type, because the characteristic of something past is transferred to something present. In the same manner, where the marks of a future phenomenon are figuratively applied to a present one, we have an instance of the Naigama Naya of the Bhavya type. For example, if a good man is called the Siddha or the Perfect One, it would be due to the Bhavya Naigama point of view. The good man is not yet a Perfect Being. He is called what he will be in some future time.

So, these are the three types of the Naigama which consists in describing a thing not in and through its essential nature but by presenting it through some phenomena, external to it. The Naigama Naya may thus be said to be *approaching* its object but not yet *touching* it. It gives an explanation from the out-side and does not hold out any of its essential and actual features. The next type of Naya looks the phenomenon in the face and picks out and emphasises one of its essential aspects.

(2) The Saṃgraha: This Naya consists in viewing a thing from the standpoint of its class or species. When in considering the nature of a thing, we shut our eyes to the peculiarities and look only to the attributes which it has in common with the other members of the class, we have the Saṃgraha or the Collective view. This Naya authorises us to call an individual thing by the name of its class.

(3) The Vyavahāra: This is the counterpart of the preceding Naya. It consists in emphasising the peculiar and distinguishing features of an individual thing, ignoring for the time being the class-essence or the universal, which is immanent.

(4) The Rju-Sūtra: This mode of the Naya limits the extent of its subject-matter still further and consists in understanding a thing in and through its present state only.

(5) The Śabda: This Naya and the following two Nayas deal with the significance of a word. What meaning is to be attached to a word? The three Naya's give three answers, each Naya restricting the meaning more and more than its preceding one. The Śabda Naya attributes the widest possible meaning to a word. According to it, synonyms mean the same thing and refer to one and the same object,—although the synonyms may differ in gender, number etc.

(6) The Samabhiruḍha: This Naya limits the meaning of a word and holds that the significances of the so-called synonyms are different and need not refer to one and the same object. If we attend to the derivations of words, we shall find out such differences in the significations of synonyms.

(7) The *Evambhūta*: According to this *Naya*, a name is to be attributed to an object, so long as the object exercises the activity which is connoted by the name. As soon as the object ceases to energise in the said way, the name ceases to be applicable to it. This *Naya* accordingly limits the meaning of a word to the exact possible extent.

The above are the seven modes of the *Naya*. There is an altogether different account of the *Naya*, given by the Jaina thinkers, which also we may briefly notice here.

The *Naya*'s are the different ways of conceiving the nature of an object. They are said to be six in number. These six *Naya*'s are especially employed in the investigation of the nature of the Soul. Primarily, the *Naya* is of two modes viz:—the *Niścaya Naya* and the *Vyavahāra Naya*. The first conceives the soul in its fulness, grasps it as a concrete whole, a plenary reality. The latter mode of the *Naya* chooses to attend to a particular aspect of the soul. The *Niścaya Naya* again is either *Śuddha Niścaya* or *Aśuddha Niścaya*. The *Vyavahāra Naya* is primarily subdivided into *Sadbhūta* and *Asadbhūta*. Each of these two is either *Upaśarita* or *Anupaśarita*. Thus we have the six *Naya*'s.

(1) The *Śuddha-Niścaya*: This *Naya* consists in a statement of the essential characteristics of the soul,—the characteristics, which are eternal and which run through all its course.

(2) The *Aśuddha-Niścaya*: This *Naya* examines the nature of the soul in its *Aśuddha* state i.e. contemplates its nature in its material environment, although the soul is regarded still as a whole, i.e. an indistinguishable totality of substance and attributes.

(3) The *Upaśarita-sadbhūta-vyavahāra*: This *Naya* attributes to the soul, a quality or faculty, which, although it belongs to it, is manifested only when the soul is brought into relation with some thing foreign to it. Thus, according to it, *Mati-jñāna* or sensuous knowledge is a faculty of the soul. But it is only figuratively so. It cannot arise unless the soul comes in contact with material bodies.

(4) The *Anupaśarita-sadbhūta-vyavahāra*: This *Naya*

attributes to the soul some faculty e.g. Jñāna or knowledge which is really inherent in it.

(5) The Upaṣarita-asadbhūta-vyavahāra: This Naya brings the Soul into relation with something which is really foreign to and easily separable from it. When one says "This house is *mine*", his statement is based on this Naya point of view, because it relates the soul to something viz.—the house, which has nothing to do with the intrinsic nature of the soul.

(6) The Anupaṣarita-asadbhūta-vyavahāra: This Naya brings the soul into relation with something which, although it is foreign to and different from it, is often found with it. The familiar example of the point of view is to say, "This is *my* (i.e. my soul's) body".

This finishes the account of the Naya which consists in a mode of explanation of the system of verities, called the Śruta-jñāna.

The three forms of knowledge which still remain for our consideration are supernormal faculties of the Avadhi or Clairvoyance, the Manaḥ-paryaya or Telepathy and the Kevala or Omniscience. These are the only Pratyakṣa Pramāṇa's or direct sources of valid knowledge according to Umā-Svāti and Nemi-çandra.

The Avadhi-jñāna is the super-lucid or clairvoyant perception of the peculiar aspects of the material bodies, i.e. of bodies having form and magnitude. This fact differentiates the Avadhi-jñāna from the Manaḥ-paryaya which consists in a telepathic knowledge of the contents of other men's minds. Telepathic knowledge is considered by the Jaina thinkers to be of far greater purity than Clairvoyance.

The Avadhi-jñāna is of three modes viz: the Deśāvadhi, the Paramāvadhi and the Sarvāvadhi. The range of Deśāvadhi is limited by spatial and temporal conditions, while that of Paramāvadhi is not so limited. Sarvāvadhi is the faculty by which we may perceive the non-sensuous aspects of all the material things of the universe. The Deśāvadhi is subdivided into two kinds,—The Bhava-pratyaya or congenital and the Guṇa-pratyaya or acquired.

The faculty of Deśāvadhi is connate in the superhuman beings of the heavens and the hells. The acquired mode of the Deśāvadhi is due to the destruction or subsidence-in-part of the obstacles that hinder the operation of Clairvoyance. The Guṇa-pratyaya Avadhi may be acquired by all beings who have Minds. It is of six modes, which are:—

- (1) Anugāmi—Clairvoyance which never leaves its possessor.
- (2) Ananugāmi—Clairvoyance which is lost after some time.
- (3) Varddhamāṇa—Clairvoyance which is ever-increasing.
- (4) Hīyamāṇa—Clairvoyance which is ever-decreasing.
- (5) Avasthita—Clairvoyance which is constant and steadfast.
- (6) Anavasthita—Clairvoyance which is in-constant and unsteady i.e. changeable.

The Manaḥ-paryaya-jñāna is a sort of telepathic knowledge, consisting in the perception of the contents of other people's minds. It is always an acquired faculty and can never be connate in any being. The telepathic knowledge is of two kinds, viz:—Rju-mati and Vipula-mati. This difference between the two is one of range and extent only. The Rju-mati faculty can know the thoughts of beings that are within from four to eight Krośa's to four to eight Yojana's from the knower. The spatial range of the Vipula-mati varies from four or eight Yojana's to two-half Dvīpa's. As regards the temporal limit, the Rju-mati can know the thoughts of the person during his life-time. The farthest temporal range of Rju-mati is seven or eight incarnations before and after the present existence of the person under observation. The Vipula-mati relates to from seven or eight to innumerable incarnations.

The difference between the Avadhi and the Manaḥ-paryaya is thus indicated by Umā-Svāti:—

“The difference between the Avadhi and the Manaḥ-paryaya relates to purity, place, possession and object”.

*Tattvārtha-Sūtra*, Ch. 1,25

In other words:—

- (a) The Manaḥ-paryaya is purer than the Avadhi.
- (b) The spatial range of the Avadhi is wider than that of the Manaḥ-paryaya. While the whole universe can be known by the Avadhi, the Manaḥ-paryaya cannot extend farther than the Maṇuṣyottara Śāila, the ultimate limit of the regions of human birth and habitation.
- (c) The Avadhi-jñāna can be possessed by men and some of the sub-human beings; the Manaḥ-paryaya is attainable only by the saints.
- (d) The object of the Avadhi is always gross; that of the Manaḥ-paryaya is obviously fine.

The last form of knowledge is Kevala-jñāna. It is identical with Omniscience. As Umā-Svāti says:—

“All substances with all their modes are the object of the Kevala”. —*Ibid.* 29

It is the highest knowledge attainable by conscious beings. Nothing remains outside its range. It evolves from within the soul and is never dependent on any sense-organ or object of knowledge. It is the pure, perfect and absolutely self-determined knowledge. Kuṇḍa-kuṇḍāçāryya observes,—

“The Kevala is not dependent on the objects of knowledge. It is not Śruta-jñāna. For a being who has Kevala, knowledge and non-knowledge do not exist. The Kevala-jñāna is thus to be understood”.

—*Pañçasti-kāya*, 46

It is thus that we propose to finish this short survey of the Jaina psychology. The Jaina account of the psychical faculties is highly interesting and instructive, not simply because it shows how the conscious principle works but because it also shows how the progressive rational mind develops stage after stage. For, throughout the Jaina description of the psychical faculties, the idea is clearly manifest that the principle of consciousness is an evolving and developing reality. In applying the principle of evolution to the psychical faculties, the Jaina psychology places itself side by side with the most modern of the psychological



systems. The crowning merit of the Jaina psychologists is that they not only acknowledged the reality of forms of sub-human consciousness but held the psychical life of man himself as a subject of continuous and progressive development. Leaving aside the supersensuous faculties like the Avadhi, the Kevala etc. we may thus recapitulate the principles of the Jaina psychology. The lowest form of consciousness consists merely in the passive experience of agreeable or disagreeable phenomena. This form of consciousness develops in some animals into a consciousness of purposive activity. This again leads to the more complex forms. The first is sensation. Sensation, although a more advanced mode of consciousness than those just described, is still but crude sentience, consisting in the consciousness that the sense-organs are affected. Next is the process which we have called the Grasp. It is more advanced than Sensation in as much as it includes the consciousness that something outside is affecting the sense-organs. The processes of Attention and Determination work upon the matter yielded by Grasp and present the something,—the object of Perception,—in its details. Next operates the process of Retention and thus the Perception of the object is completed. Recollection revives the idea of the object of Perception and Conception forms the class-ideas by comparing the idea with its similars. Induction utilises these general ideas in establishing general truths and Deduction verifies and carries further the results of Induction. Thus is developed a system of unimpeachable authoritative truths. These truths supply us with principles of Explanation and help us in arriving at exact conceptions of the things under our observation. Ordinary Explanation is simply Integration of one idea to its associated one in an off-hand manner. The process of sustained Consideration and Mediation explain every link of the Integration. Explanation is logically complete and scientific, when the object under observation is viewed from its particular aspects and the word signifying it represents its exact nature.

This is the order of mental development according to the

principles of the Jaina psychology. Who will fail to observe that this embodies a substantially accurate account of the intricate operations of the faculties of the developing and evolving mind?

## THE SOUL OF TWO KINDS

The Mundane (Saṃsāra-stha) and the Liberated (Mukta) are the two kinds of the Jīva. The soul which is bound in *Karma* is 'Mundane' and the Soul which is free from it is 'Liberated'.

### GUṆASTHĀNA'S OR STAGES OF SELF-PERFECTION

Although the Mundane souls are bound in *Karma*, all of them do not belong to one and the same class; there are differences in stages or modifications among them. The Jaina philosophers describe fourteen "stages of development (Guṇasthāna's)", to show these differences. The *Guṇasthānas* are states or stages through which a *Bhavya Jīva* (i.e. a soul capable of attaining Perfection) advances on his way to liberation. A Mundane soul must necessarily be in one of these fourteen states. The fourteen *Guṇasthāna's* are:—(1) *Mithyā-Dṛṣṭi*, (2) *Sāsādana*, (3) *Miśra*, (4) *Asaṃyata*, (5) *Deśa-Saṃyata*, (6) *Pramatta*, (7) *Apramatta*, (8) *Apūrvā-karaṇa*, (9) *Anivṛttikaraṇa*, (10) *Sūkṣma-kaṣāya*, (11) *Upasanta-kaṣāya*, (12) *Samkṣīṇa-kaṣāya*, (13) *Sayoga-kevalī* and (14) *Ayoga-kevalī*. When the *Karma*, called the *Mithyā-darśana* finds its way to the soul and makes it repudiate the Truth and believe in what is untruth, the *Jīva* has the first *Guṇasthāna*,—the *Mithyā-dṛṣṭi*. The soul is in the stage of *Sāsādana*, when its true faith is destroyed because of the rise, not of the *Mithyā-Darśana* but of the *Karma*, called the *Anantānubandhi*. The third stage is called the *Miśra* i.e. the Mixed; the Soul is in this stage when on account of the rise of the *Samyak-mithyātva Karma*, its faculty of True faith is partly purified and partly stained. When the *Kaṣāya*, called the *Apratyākhyānāvaraṇa* arises in

the soul, the Jīva, although it is possessed of True Faith then, becomes unrestrained; this is the fourth stage of the soul, called the *Asaṃyata*. When the *Apratyākhyānāvaraṇa Kaṣāya* ceases to arise, the Jīva finds itself in the fifth state called the *Deśa-saṃyata*; it is then partly restrained and partly unrestrained. When, again, the *Kaṣāya*, called the *Pratyākhyānāvaraṇa* ceases to be virulent, the soul becomes fully restrained; but the *Pramāda* continues to exist in it; this state of the soul is called the *Pramatta-saṃyata*. Next, the soul finds itself in the seventh *Guṇasthāna*, called the *Apramatta* when on account of the annihilation of the *Kaṣāya*, called the *Sanjvalana*, the fully restrained Jīva extricates itself from the *Pramāda*. The soul advancing on the way to Emancipation, gradually attains the curious White Contemplation (*Śukla-dhyāna*) and consequent Purity,—this is its stage of *Apūrva-karaṇa*. When the gross parts of the sage's Moha-karma become powerless on account of the great increase of the aforesaid White Contemplation in him, the Jīva comes to the ninth *Guṇasthāna* called the *Anivṛtti-karaṇa*. When the powerless *Kaṣāya*'s remain only in a subtle state, the Jīva finds itself in the stage of *Sūkṣma-kaṣāya*. When all kinds of Moha are mitigated, the *Guṇasthāna* which is attained by the soul is called *Upaśānta-kaṣāya*. When these are absolutely annihilated, the Jīva attains the twelfth stage, called the *Kṣīṇa-kaṣāya*. After this, the four kinds of Ghāti-karma are absolutely destroyed and the soul is possessed of the pure Kevala-jñāna or Omniscience; this is the thirteenth *Guṇasthāna* called the *Sayoga-kevalī*. The fourteenth or the last stage has the duration of a few moments only; it is the state of the soul immediately before all its Karma's are annihilated and is called the *Ayoga-kevalī*; when this state is attained, the soul leaves all connection with all kinds of the Karma.

Every Mundane soul must be in any one of these fourteen *Guṇasthāna*'s.

The Liberated state is beyond these fourteen stages and is one of uninterrupted joy,—an inexpressible state of

glory. The Siddha's or the Liberated Beings are unconnected with all kinds of the Karma; they live in the Siddha-śilā at the summit of Lokākāśa or filled space, they have transcended the Saṁsāra, the series of mundane existences and are emancipated, free souls.

## THE SOUL OF THREE KINDS

### ASIDDHA, NO-SIDDHA AND SIDDHA

The souls may also be divided into three classes viz:—*Saṁsāri* or Mundane (otherwise called the *Asiddha*), *Jīvanmukta* or Liberated-in-Life (otherwise called the *No-siddha*) and *Siddha* or Liberated. The Mundane soul is one which is attached to the Karma. The Karma is of two sorts,—*Ghātiyā* or destructive and *Aghātiyā* or non-destructive. The soul advancing on the way to salvation goes on breaking the ties of Karma, one after the other. At that auspicious moment when the soul struggling towards the Emancipation renounces the world and perfectly annihilates the four forms of the Ghātiyā-karma, it reaches the thirteenth Guṇa-sthāna,—a state in which it is liberated although still alive or belonging to this world. It is then called the *Jīvanmukta* or liberated-in-life, the *Sayoga-kevali* or Omniscient-with attachment (for it is still attached to the Aghātiyā or non-destructive Karma's) and the No-Siddha or Not-fully-perfect (because it is not yet completely emancipated). The physical body is still attached to the Jīvanmukta although for all intents and purposes such a soul is an Emancipated soul. Owing to the destruction of Ghātiyā-karma's, it attains the Kevala-jñāna i.e. pure knowledge or omniscience and is possessed of Infinite Perception, Infinite Joy, Infinite Knowledge and Infinite Power. The omniscient soul which is liberated-in-life is of two kinds viz:—the Ordinary Omniscient soul (*Sāmānya-kevali*) and the Venerable (Arhat). The Sāmānya-kevalins effect their own salvation only. The Arhat, on the contrary, teaches the way to the salvation of all the mundane souls. The

Arhat is otherwise called the Tirthaṅkara; because through his instructions he makes the Tirtha (landing steps) for all beings who are afraid of the Sāṃsāra. He is called the Tirthaṅkara, also because he addressed the Tirtha or the congregation of the four orders viz:—the monks (*Sādhu*), the nuns (*Āryikā*), the householders men (*Śrāvaka*) and the householders, women (*Śrāvikā*). The Arhat is so called because the gods with their lords offer him Arhā or worship with great pomp and ceremony at the times (1) when he enters the mother's womb, (2) when he is born, (3) when he renounces the world, (4) when he attains omniscience and (5) when he attains final emancipation. Although he has not the least concern for his body, the body in which he dwells is perfectly pure and is brilliant like a combination of one thousand suns; it is free from seven constituents (*Dhātu's*), and is devoid of the eighteen faults (*Doṣa's*) e.g. sweat etc. The Tirthaṅkara is possessed of the four Atiśaya's or Excellences viz: (1) *Apāyāpagama*,—He is not touched by grief etc. (2) *Jñāna*,—He is the knower of all phenomena of the world, (3) *Pūjā*,—He is worshipped by all beings and (4) *Vaṣana*,—His instructions are sweet, efficacious and intelligible to all. The Arhat is thus the visible God himself; thirty-four uncommon phenomena (*Vāibhava's*) are found with him.

Then, when the four *Aghātiya* Karma's are destroyed as well, the already omniscient soul leaves off this miserable prison of the *Saṃsāra* or mundane existence where the Karma reigns with an iron hand and goes to the Siddha-śilā, the ever-peaceful abode of the Perfect Beings at the summit of the worldly space. This is the final Emancipation of the soul. Absolutely free from the dirt of *Karma*, the Perfected soul exists in its own pure state,—possessed of its eight essential attributes (*Avyābādha* etc.) which will be described hereafter.

#### NATURE OF EMANCIPATION, ACCORDING TO THE VARIOUS SCHOOLS

The Jaina doctrine of Emancipation may be shortly

noticed here. Emancipation is that state, according to the Jaina thinkers in which the soul exists in and to itself, in a state of bliss. The Buddhist philosophers, on the contrary look upon *Nirvāṇa* as extinction or annihilation of the conscious series (*Santāna*). The Jaina's who uphold the theory of the real existence of the soul, necessarily reject the extinction theory of Emancipation. The thinkers of the *Vedānta* school contend that when emancipated, the soul exists as pure existence, pure consciousness and pure bliss; no attributes remain attached to it. The theory of the *Nyāya* school is that in its state of Emancipation, the soul becomes devoid of its nine attributes e.g. Intelligence (*Buddhi*) etc. The Jaina doctrine is essentially opposed to both the *Vedānta* and the *Nyāya* contentions in as much as according to it, the essential attributes of the soul become fully manifest and explicit only when it is emancipated. The Jaina's point out that there is no reason why the psychical attributes would be severed from the soul in its state of emancipation. The *Nyāya* philosophers refuse to admit that the *Mokṣa* is a state of bliss; they describe it as a state in which there is no misery. Their contention is that pleasure or bliss is impossible without pain or misery; hence if *Mokṣa* be supposed to be a state of bliss, it must presuppose the existence of pain in it. It is safer accordingly to think of it as a state in which there is no misery. The *Naiyāyika's* urge further that if *Mokṣa* be supposed to be a state of pleasure, it becomes unattainable; for, people striving after it would be striving after the attainment of pleasure; this is *Rāga* which blocks the way to salvation. To all these objections the Jaina reply is that the state of an emancipated soul, as conceived by the *Nyāya* school is no better than the state of an unfeeling stone. Unless *Mokṣa* be a blissful state, no body would feel tempted to strive after its realisation. The Jaina's point out that to be a state of bliss, there need not be pain in *Mokṣa*. It is Karma which brings pain to the soul which is essentially blissful; in the state of *Mokṣa*, Karma is destroyed and joy becomes explicit in the soul, as a matter of course. Lastly, the Jaina philo-

sophers urge that the *Rāga* for Mokṣa or Emancipation, a state of bliss, is nothing wrong. *Rāga* is harmful when it is for the transitory pleasures of the world. The Jaina's turn the Nyāya line of argument against the Nyāya thinkers themselves. If Mokṣa consists in want of misery, people striving after it would be actuated by *Dveṣa* of misery,—*Dveṣa* which is as much an impediment to the attainment of Mokṣa as *Rāga* itself. The fact is that there is no inconsistency in regarding emancipation as a state of joy. Indeed, in the state of Mokṣa,—the Jaina's contend, the psychical attributes e.g. joy, knowledge etc. etc. become fully explicit in the soul, and not uprooted as the Naiyāyika's and the Vedāntins maintain.

## THE SOUL OF FOUR KINDS

In accordance with the differences in the Becoming or Status (*Gatī*) the souls are divided into four classes viz:— (1) the Celestial (*Deva*); (2) the Infernal (*Nāraka*); (3) the Human (*Manuṣya*); and (4) the sub-human (*Tiryak*).

### CELESTIALS, HUMANS, SUB-HUMANS AND INFERNALS

According to the Jaina's, the Deva's are either (a) Bhavana-vāsi i.e. home-living or (b) Vyantara i.e. beings living in various places or (c) *Jyotiṣka* i.e. luminaries or (d) *Vaimānika* i.e. living in high heavens. The Bhavana-vāsidities are of 10 kinds viz:—Nāgakumāra, Asūra-kumāra, Suparṇa-kumāra, Agni-kumāra, Dik-kumāra, Vāta-kumāra, Stanita-kumāra, Udadhi-kumāra, Dvīpa-kumāra and Vidyut-kumāra. The Vyantara Deva's are of eight modes viz:—Kinnara, Kīṃpuruṣa, Gāndharva, Mahoraga, Yakṣa, Rākṣasa, Bhūta and Piśāca. The Jyotiṣkas are of five classes viz:—Sūryya, Čandra, Graha, Nakṣatra and Tāraka. The Kalpotpanna and the Kalpātita are the two subdivisions of the Vaimānika gods. These Deva's are not emancipated souls, they enjoy heavenly pleasures as results of meritorious deeds, done in their previous lives. They have births and

deaths and in some respects are not better off than the human beings. Like ourselves, they also want pleasant things and avoid unpleasant ones.

The Infernal beings live in the various hells. They are endowed with the power of assuming any shape or form, but this power is only a source of trouble and pain to them. There is nothing like the miseries and pains of the hellish beings. On account of vicious acts, done in their previous incarnations, they become denizens of the hells and suffer untold and unbearable pains for a very long time. In some of the hells, there are Devils who excite the Nāraka's, one against the other; these unfortunate infernal beings constantly fight against and smite one another and thus enhance their own pains.

The Manuṣya's or human souls are divided into two classes, viz:—the Ārya's and the Mleçcha's. The Ārya's are born in that part of the world which is called Ārya-khaṇḍa. The Śaka's, the Bhīla's etc. although they are found in Ārya-khaṇḍa, are Mleçcha. These inhabit the Mleçcha-khaṇḍa and the Āntar-dvīpa's (inner islands) of the universe. The people who are born in sacred places e.g. Kāśī, etc. are Kṣetrīya i.e. Ārya's, on account of the Place. Those who come of such noble families as Ikṣvāku etc. are Jātyārya i.e. Ārya's by Birth. The Ārya's who earn their livelihood by trade etc. are called Sāvadya-karmārya i.e. Ārya's whose acts are not pure. Those again who are householders and believers as well, with a partial self-control are Alpa-sāvadya-karmārya i.e. Ārya's whose acts are slightly impure. The Ārya's who are pious persons with perfect self-control are called Asāvadya-karmārya i.e. Ārya's whose acts are never impure. The holy persons who practise right conduct and are on the way to final emancipation, Mokṣa,—are Çāritrārya i.e. Ārya's by conduct. He who is possessed of Right Faith is Darśanārya i.e. an Ārya by Faith. Besides, people who have a highly developed Buddhi, Kriyā, Tapa's, Bala, Auśadha, Rasa, Kṣetra and Vikriyā are also Ārya's.

All animals, other than the human beings, who are found



in the world are called the Tiryak or lower animals. These sub-human souls are variously sub-divided into one-sensed Beings etc. which will be described hereafter.

## THE SOUL OF FIVE KINDS

### FIVE STATES OF A JĪVA

The philosophers of the Jaina school point out five Bhāva's or conditions of the soul. These are technically called the Pāriṇāmika, the Audayaika, the Aupaśamika, the Kṣāyopśamika and the Kṣāyika.

The condition of the Jiva which is not dependent on any thing or mode other than the Jiva itself, is its Pāriṇāmika Bhāva. The Jaina philosophers describe three such Bhāva's viz:—'Jivatva', 'Bhavyatva' and 'Abhavyatva'. Jivatva means Life; a soul is always living; it can never be an Ajiva or non-living. Ordinarily, life consists in such acts as inhalation and exhalation etc. but truly speaking, Life or Jivatva means being attended with psychical qualities of knowledge etc. Hence, the Jīva may be defined as a being which is never separated from the psychical qualities e.g. knowledge etc. As long as Jiva does not assume a fresh body after leaving one body, it is called 'Dead'. It is admitted of course that a disembodied soul has not the attributes of Perception, Cognition etc., but the 'capacity' (Yogyatā) for knowledge exists in the soul even then; in other words, Perception, Cognition etc. although not explicitly present then, inhere in the soul in an implicit form; it is for this reason that the soul, when dead and disembodied—cannot be said to be devoid of cognition etc. 'Bhavyatva' and 'Abhavyatva' are opposed to each other; accordingly only one of these two essentialities can be found in a Jiva. The Jiva which is a Bhavya cannot be an Abhavya and one which is an Abhavya cannot be a Bhavya. The word 'Bhavya' technically means 'one who is capable of attaining Salvation'. The soul which is capable of attaining Mokṣa is a 'Bhavya' and one which shall never attain it is an 'Abhavya'. Life or

'Jivatva' inheres in a 'Bhavya' as well as in an 'Abhavya'; so far as the principle of life is concerned, both the 'Bhavya' and the 'Abhavya' souls are similar. The Kevala-jñāna or omniscience again is present in the 'Bhavya' as well as in the 'Abhavya' in a potential form; in this respect also, the two kinds of the Jiva are not different from each other. This omniscience in potentiality becomes explicit and manifest in a 'Bhavya' soul on account of the lapse of usual time or on account of penance etc. practised by the soul, but it remains an eternal potentiality (without ever being explicit and an actual fact) in the 'Abhavya'. Consequently the 'Bhavya' attain salvation and the 'Abhavya' can never get it. No doubt, there are many among the 'Bhavya' souls which have turned away from the path of 'Mokṣa' and are moving in the round of 'Saṃsāra', just like an 'Abhavya' being. These may be called 'Atidūra' (literally 'very distant') Bhavya's; still, there is a fundamental difference between the nature of such 'Bhavya's' and that of the 'Abhavya's'; the difference between an Atidūra Bhavya and an Abhavya may be likened to that between a chaste widow and a barren lady. Although an widow has the capacity for giving birth to a child, she cannot do so, on account of the want of any sexual connection with a male person. A barren woman, on the contrary cannot give birth to a child in spite of her contact with a male person as her nature does not permit her to bear the child. An Atidūra Bhavya remains unemancipated as it does not get the opportunity or the motive for emancipating itself: but the Abhavya would not tread the path to Mokṣa, although it gets the opportunity of doing so. This is the difference between an Atidūra Bhavya and an Abhavya.

Karma is essentially opposed to the nature of the soul. The 'Audayika' Bhāva of the soul is that condition of it which is brought about by Udaya or rise of Karma. This Audayika Bhāva is of 21 kinds which are as follows:—four 'Gati's' or status viz:—(1) Deva, (2) Maṇuṣya, (3) Nāraka, (4) Tiryaṅga; six Leṣāy's or Paints viz: (5) Kṛṣṇa (or black), (6) Nīla (or blue), (7) Kāpota (or Pigeon-coloured), (8) Pīta

(or yellow), (9) Padma (or Lotus-coloured) and (10) Śukla (or white); four Kaṣāya's (or passions) viz: (11) Krodha or anger, (12) Māna or conceit, (13) Māyā or deceit and (14) Lobha or greed; three Veda's or sexual feelings viz: (15) Strīveda or feelings peculiar to a female, (16) Puruṣa-veda or feelings peculiar to a male person and (17) Napuṃsaka-veda or feelings peculiar to an eunuch; (18) Mithyātva or wrong Belief, (19) Ajñāna or Ignorance, (20) Asiddhi or Imperfection and (21) Aśaṃyama or non-restraint. When there is an influx of the Karma, named Gati, the Jīva gets one of the status e.g. Deva etc. Kaṣāya Karma is included in the class of Āritra Moha or conduct—deluding Karma; at the influx of the Kaṣāya Karma, the four Kaṣāya's or passions are generated in the soul. Veda Karma also is included within the Āritra Moha. The influx of the Veda Karma accounts for the three kinds of the sexual feelings, found in a soul. Mithyātva or false faith is due to the influx of the Mithyātva Karma included in the Darśana Moha or Faith-deluding Karma. Ajñāna (Audayika)<sup>1</sup> is want of knowledge. This is generated in the soul by the rise of Jñānāvaraṇīya or knowledge-obscuring Karma. Aśaṃyama (Audayika) is the wrong inclination which is found in the soul, due to the rise of the Kaṣāya or passions. Perfection is impossible, if there is even the slightest taint of Karma in the soul; hence it goes without saying that Asiddhi or Imperfection must be attached to the soul, as long as there is influx of Karma into it. Leśyā or Paint has been defined as "that condition which is due to the psychical Torpor (Yoga) tinged with Passions (Kaṣāya)". It has already been said that the Passions viz:—Anger, Greed etc. arise in the soul when the Kaṣāya Karma flows into it. 'Yoga' is a sort of Torpor, generated in the soul when the Śarīra, the Nirmāṇa etc. (i.e. the Body-making etc.) Karma's flow into it. Leśyā or Paint is that condition of the soul which is accounted for by the Passion (Kaṣāya) and the Torpor

<sup>1</sup> This is different from Kṣāyopāśamika Ajñāna which means false knowledge.

(Yoga) described above. It is needless to point out that the six Leśyā's or colours of the soul mentioned above are all due to the influx of Karma.

The Aupaśamika Bhāva is attained by the soul when the Karma's that destroy Right Faith and Right Conduct do not flow into it but are mitigated (Upaśama). It is of two sorts in as much as it is concerned with Right Faith and Right Conduct respectively. It is to be noted here that Right Faith may be found in all the Guṇasthāna's or stages of development, described before, from the fourth to the eleventh and that Right Conduct is met with in the eleventh stage alone.

Karma injures the natural attributes of the soul. The Karma which envelopes the attributes of the soul fully is called Sarvaghāti or Complete Destroyer and that which envelopes only a part of them, is called Deśaghāti or Partial Destroyer. When for some time Karma is found not to yield its natural fruits, it is to be understood to have its Upaśamā-bhāva or condition of mitigation and when Karma is radically rooted out, it is said to have its Kṣaya-bhāva or a state of annihilation. When the Jīva has the Kṣāyopaśamika Bhāva (1) the Sarvaghāti Karma which is capable of coming into the soul at the given time must have been annihilated, (2) The Deśaghāti and the Sarvaghāti Karma's which would be capable of flowing into the soul in future are for the time being in a state of mitigation and (3) the Deśaghāti Karma, capable of flowing into the soul at that particular time is in force or active. Let us take the example of Mati-jñāna or sensuous knowledge which is due to the Kṣāyopaśamika condition of the soul. When Mati-jñāna arises in the soul (a) the Sarvaghāti Karma which envelopes Mati-jñāna completely must have been annihilated; (b) it may be that in future that Mati-jñāna will be fully destroyed or a part of it will be enveloped; but when the soul is in possession of Mati-jñāna, such Sarvaghāti Karma or Deśaghāti Karma as would envelop it fully or partially in future, must be understood to be inactive for the time being; (c) at the time when the soul has Mati-jñāna

such Deśaghāti Karma as envelopes Mati-jñāna partially, must be active. The Kṣāyopasaṃika Bhāva thus depends on the Kṣaya (Annihilation), Upaśama (Mitigation) and Udaya (Activity or in-flow) of these three conditions of Karma. The Kṣāyopasaṃilka Bhāva of the Soul has the following eighteen modes i.e. give rise to the following eighteen psychoses; the three forms of Ajñāna or false knowledge viz:—(1) Kumati or false sensuous knowledge, (2) Kuśruta or false scriptural knowledge, (3) Vibhaṅga or false Clairvoyance; the four forms of Samyak-jñāna, or Right knowledge viz:—(4) Samyak-mati or right sensuous knowledge, (5) Samyak-śruta or right scriptural knowledge, (6) Avadhi or Clairvoyant cognition and (7) Manaḥ-paryaya or telepathy; the five kinds of Labdhi or attainments viz:—(8) Dāna or power of giving, (9) Lābha or power of gaining, (10) Bhoga or power of enjoying consumable things, (11) Upabhoga or power of enjoying non-consummable things, (12) Vīrya or energising, (13) Deśa-saṃnyama or partial restraint, (14) Samyak-darśana or right faith, (15) Ācāritra or right conduct, (16) Ākṣurdarśana or visual apprehension, (17) Aṣākṣurdarśana or non-visual apprehension and (18) Avadhi-darśana or Clairvoyant apprehension. It may be noted incidentally that the Antarāya or the Obstructive Karma's may have Kṣaya (Annihilation) or Kṣāyopasaṃika (partial annihilation and partial mitigation) but they cannot have pure Upaśama (mitigation). Every Kṣāyopasaṃika and Kṣāyika Bhāva in the soul must be preceded by either Kṣāyopasaṃika or Kṣaya of the Antarāya Karma's. The Aupaśamika Bhāva of the soul also involves the Kṣāyopasaṃika of the Antarāya Karma's.

When Karma is radically rooted out, the Jīva attains, the Kṣāyika Bhāva. It has nine modes viz:—(1) Samyak-darśana or right faith, (2) Jñāna or right knowledge, (3) Ācāritra or right conduct, (4) Vīrya or power, (5) Dāna or giving, (6) Darśanopayoga or pure intuition, (7) Bhoga or enjoying, (8) Upabhoga or enjoying specific things and (9) Lābha or gain. One may attain the Kṣāyika Samyak-

darśana between the fourth and the seventh Guṇasthāna's. The Kṣāyika Āritra is manifested when the Soul is in the Twelfth Guṇasthāna. The remaining seven Kṣāyika Bhāva's appear in the thirteenth stage when the soul attains the Kevala-jñāna or omniscience. One characteristic of every Kṣāyika Bhāva is that it remains attached to the Soul, even in its state of Emancipation. This is also true of the Aupaśamika Bhāva's. Of the Kṣāyopāśamika Bhāva's, this can be said of Samyak-darśana only.

## THE SOUL OF SIX KINDS

### SIX CLASSES OF THE JĪVA, ACCORDING TO THE NUMBER OF ITS ORGANS OF KNOWLEDGE

Souls are divided into six classes in accordance with the number of the organs of their knowledge, viz: (1) Ekendriya or one-sensed, (2) Dvīndriya or two-sensed, (3) Trīndriya or three-sensed, (4) Čaturīndriya or four-sensed, (5) Amanaska-Pañčendriya or mindless five-sensed and (6) Samanaska-Pañčendriya or minded five-sensed.

The word 'Indra' means 'one who has excellent wealth'; it thus means the soul which is possessed of incomparable attainments. 'Indriya' is that which is a mark, a sign or an instrument of 'Indra', the soul. The Indriya's are thus the organs of knowledge, the instruments, that is to say, by means of which the soul acquires knowledge. The Indriya's are primarily divided into two classes viz:— Dravyendriya or material organ and Bhāvendriya or subjective organ. *Nirvṛtti* and 'Upakaraṇa' are the two sub-classes of the former; each of these two again has two parts or aspects, respectively called Vāhya or external and Āntara or internal. 'Nirvṛtti' is that part of the sense-organs which is operative in the matter of the generation of knowledge and 'Upakaraṇa' is that which protects Nirvṛtti, the main or principal part of the sense-organ. When on account of the annihilation or the mitigation of knowledge-enveloping Karma, a part (Pradeśa) of the soul becomes

purified, it (i.e. that purified part of the Soul) assumes the shape of the sense-organs e.g. the Eye etc. This purified part of the Soul which thus assumes the form of the sense-organ is the 'Āntara Nirvṛtti'. The limb or the part of the physical body in which is located the Āntara-Nirvṛtti is called the Vāhya Nirvṛtti. The substance, called the Upakaraṇa which exists inside and protects the Nirvṛtti aspect of the Indriya is the 'Āntara Upakaraṇa'; the black, the white fields etc. which are within the Eyes are, for example, the Āntara Upakaraṇa. The Vāhya Upakaraṇa is those parts of the sense-organs which exist outside and protect it e.g. the Eye-hairs, the Eye-lids etc. The Āntara Nirvṛtti, the Vāhya Nirvṛtti, the Āntara Upakaraṇa and the Vāhya Upakaraṇa are all modes of the Dravyendriya or material sense-organ; for, these are but the modes of the Soul (Ātmā) and Matter (Pudgala). 'Labdhi' and 'Upayoga' are the two aspects of the Bhāvendriya or the subjective sense-organ. 'Labdhi' is the gain on the part of the soul, consisting in the annihilation, or the mitigation of the knowledge-obscuring Karma. 'Upayoga' consists in the Soul's modification into consciousness or attention. When the knowledge-enveloping Karma is annihilated or mitigated, the Soul is possessed of 'Labdhi'; on account of this 'Labdhi', the Soul attends to the Dravya-Nirvṛtti aspect of the Indriya; this attention is 'Upayoga'. 'Labdhi' is due to the annihilation or the mitigation of the knowledge-enveloping Karma; the knowledge by the sense-organs is impossible without 'Labdhi'. Sensuous knowledge is impossible again, unless and until there is Upayoga, unless and until, that is to say, there is some subjective effort (attention) to have the sensuous knowledge. Labdhi and Upayoga are the aspects of the Soul and means to its knowledge; hence these are called the Bhāvendriya's or subjective senses.

The organs of 'touch', 'taste', 'smell', 'vision' and 'hearing' are the five sense-organs. Like these sense-organs, the Mind (Manas) also is an instrument of knowledge; it is known as the 'No-Indriya' or 'Anin-

driya'. Touch, Taste, Odour, Colour and Sound are the objects of the five sense-organs respectively. The object of the Mind is scriptural knowledge. Besides this, Mind is an assistant to the senses. The philosophers of the Vaiśeṣika, the Nyāya, the Mīmāṃsā and the Sāṃkhya schools maintain that the perceptions of objects take place when the sense-organs come in contact with those objects; according to them, all the five sense-organs are thus "Prāpyakāri" or "capable of coming in contact with objects". The Buddhist thinkers contend, on the contrary, that the organs of vision and hearing cannot be Prāpyakāri. The Jaina theory, however, is that all the sense-organs save and except the Eyes are capable of coming in contact with their objects. Mānasa-Jñāna or Mental perception arises without the Mind coming in contact with the external objects.

The one-sensed Soul has the organ of touch only, the two-sensed animal can touch and taste; the three-sensed creature is possessed of the powers of touching, tasting and smelling; a four-sensed soul's organs are those of touch, taste, smell, and vision; the mindless five-sensed animal has the organ of hearing in addition to the above four sense-organs; the minded five-sensed soul is possessed of the five sense-organs and the mind.

The one-sensed Animals are immobile and are divided into two kinds viz:—The Bādara (i.e. Gross) and Sūkṣma (i.e. minute). Besides this division, the one-sensed souls have another division which groups them into five classes viz:—Pṛthivī-kāya (earth-bodied), Jala-kāya (water-bodied), Agni-kāya (fire-bodied), Vāyu-kāya (air-bodied) and Vanaspati (vegetable). The philosophers of the Jaina schools recognise thirty-six kinds of hard earth; the hard earth-bodied animals are accordingly of the following thirty-six modes:—(1) Mṛt, (2) Vālukā, (3) Sarkarā, (4) Upala, (5) Śilā, (6) Lavaṇa, (7) Lauha, (8) Tāmra, (9) Trapu, (10) Sisaka, (11) Raupya, (12) Suvarṇa, (13) Vajra, (14) Haritāla, (15) Hīṅgula, (16) Manaḥ-śilā, (17) Tuttha, (18) Añjana, (19) Pravāla, (20) Kṛolaka, (21) Abhraka, (22) Gomeda, (23) Ruçakamka, (24) Sphaṭika, (25) Lohitaprabha,



(26) Vaidurya, (27) Çandrakānta, (28) Jala-kānta, (29) Sūryyakānta, (30) Gairika, (31) Çandana, (32) Varçura, (33) Ruçaka, (34) Moṭha, (35) Masara, (36) Galla. Water is of various sorts viz:—*Āvasyāya*, *Himabindu*, *Śuddhodaka*, *Ghanodaka*, *Śitodaka* etc. and the water-bodied animals also are of various sorts accordingly. *Jvālā*, *Aṅgāra*, *Arçcis*, *Murmura*, *Śuddha*, *Agni* etc. are the various modes of fire and the fire-bodied souls are of varied kinds accordingly. Air also has many modes viz:—*Mahā-vāyu*, *Ghana-vāyu*, *Tanu-vāyu*, *Gunjamandali*, *Ukali-vāta* etc. and the air-bodied animals are of many modes accordingly. The Vanaspati's are divided into *Mūlaja*, *Agraja*, *Parvaja*, *Kandaja*, *Skandharuha*, *Bija-ruha*, *Sanmurçchi* and *Tṛṇa*; all these Vanaspati's or vegetables come under two broad classes,—(1) *Pratyeka* or having one soul in one body and (2) *Sādhāraṇa* or *Ananta-kāya* i.e. vegetables like potatoes etc. having a group of Souls within one body. Animals having more than one sense are *Trasa* i.e. having the power to move.

#### CLASSIFICATION OF ANIMALS

The one-sensed animals have only one sense. The two-sensed animals e.g. Shells, Oysters, Conch-shells etc. have two senses. Ants, Leeches etc. are three-sensed creatures. Bugs, Worms, Gnats, Mosquitoes, Flies etc. are four-sensed creatures. Snakes and all four-footed animals are five-sensed animals. Man, celestial Beings and Infernal Beings are five-sensed animals with Minds. An animal who has Mind is distinguished by his powers of learning, of imitating and of understanding talks etc. of other people. A Minded Soul is called 'Samjñi' and a Mind-less creature, 'Asamjñi'.

The above six kinds of the Jīva take their birth in three ways. The way in which the Deva's and the Nāraka's are born is called 'Upapāda'. Sometimes atoms collect from all directions and many small animals are produced in an unexpected place,—this form of genesis is called 'Sammurçhana'. *Pota*'s, *Jarāyuja*'s and *Andaja*'s are produced from wombs. The creatures that can move to and fro, as soon as

they are born are 'Pota's' e.g. the new-born elephant; they have no sac or shell over them when they are born. The creatures who are born with such sacs or shells are called Jarāyuja's e.g. the human infants. 'Andaja's' are creatures, produced from eggs e.g. the birds.

#### JAINA THEORY AND THE SIMPLEST ORGANISMS OF MODERN BIOLOGY

Before dismissing summarily the above Jaina account and classification of psychical beings, as having little or no matter of real biological interest, it would not be wholly unprofitable to examine it more closely. Re-arranging the Jaina classification we find that according to the Jaina's the lowest in the order are beings (viz. the fire-bodied etc.) which are said to have souls in them but which are encased in and scarcely distinguishable from elemental matter. Higher up in the scale are the Sthāvara's which are what we call Vegetables. Next up in the scale, are the worms, the flies, the birds, the brutes which we ordinarily call lower (sub-human) animals. And the highest in the order are the human beings (leaving out of account, the super-human beings). It may at once be stated that this Jaina classification tallies with the modern account of the evolution of life. Let us leave aside for the time being the earth-bodied and such souls. The fact is now scientifically established that it is the unicellular organisms that gave out the first and the crudest indications of life. These earliest protozoa were similar to the protists of today. Each of these was a strictly unicellular being and whatever life or feeling it had, coincided with the molecular processes in its protoplasm. These simplest possible unicellular organisms are comparable to the Pratyeka Śarīra Sthāvara's of the Jaina's, which are said to have one soul in one body. Higher up in the order, come next the multicellular protozoa. The body of these multicellular protozoa is a conglomeration of heterogeneous (originally homogeneous) cells, formed into a consistent cluster. In the diatomacca, the panlomotomacca, the volvocinae and such other plasmodomous

primitive plants, we have instances of such multicellular organisms. The remarkable fact about these protozoa is that not only had each of these cells forming their body an individual life of its own but that the total body had a cenobitic i.e. a communal life. In metaphyta which are multicellular tissue-forming plants, we find the same thing. Each single cell in the organ and tissue of these plants has a life of its own; at the same time, each organ and each tissue e.g. the pollen and stamens, composed of a number of homogeneous cells has a special vital function. It may be said that these multicellular organisms are in some respects akin to the Sādhāraṇa Vanaspati or the Ananta-kāya Sthāvara's of the Jaina's.

Coming next to the Jaina description of the two-sensed and other higher animals, we find that the principle is recognised that the human organism is the most developed, that there are animals which are less and less developed and that an order is traceable in the scale of animal evolution.

#### JAINA THEORY OF SUB-HUMAN ANIMALS HAVING SOULS—ITS IMPLICATIONS

The Jaina's call all their six classes of beings, Jīva's. This means that all these existences including the earth-bodied etc. have Souls in them. However much the ultra-materialists may object to the reality and substantiality of Soul, it is generally conceded that man may be said to be possessed of a Soul, whatever meaning that expression may bear. Can we say, however, the same thing about the brutes and other sub-human animals? As is well known, Descartes suggested that there is a clear-cut and essential distinction between the Soul of a man and his body. Matter which constitutes the human body is extended and as such, is absolutely different from Soul which is characterised by consciousness. The Cartesians worked upon this dualism and contended that Soul was the monopoly of man and the lower animals who were wanting in the power of thought had no Souls. The bodies of the latter were only cleverly

made machines, subject to the ordinary laws of physics. The sub-human animals, according to these thinkers, were thus automata, absolutely devoid of Souls. Manifestly, of course, this Cartesian doctrine is opposed to the Jaina theory which endows the sub-human animals with Souls. In defence of the Cartesians, it may be pointed out, that according to them consciousness was identical with thought. No body would deny that man alone has the power of thinking,—so that if consciousness and for the matter of that, Soul is identified with the principle of thinking, man alone is to be endowed with a Soul and no other animal. The psychologists of the present day, however, reject the narrow view of consciousness and Soul, taken by the Cartesians. Consciousness is not limited to the process of thinking only. It is of varying degrees and possibly of different kinds. The movements and activities of the lower animals are not fully explained by purely mechanical laws; they refer to something more. Reasoning, conception and power of comparing may not be found in the sub-human creatures; but these are not the whole of consciousness. Perception and Reaction to stimuli, Feelings of want, of pleasure and pain, of satisfaction and of volitional activities, for example, are also modes of operation of the principle of consciousness; and these are certainly present in the lower animals in various forms and degrees. Some zoologists, while admitting the possibility of consciousness in animals other than man confine the sub-human consciousness to those animals only which have a centralised nervous system. They maintain that while the higher vertebrates and mammals, especially the dogs and the apes, are capable of forming some sorts of judgments and developing even crude forms of thought and reasoning, animals having no nervous system have no consciousness. Darwin, confesses that it is impossible to determine the first stage in the conscious operation in lower animals. Later researches have shown that even the infusoria and the microscopic protists exhibit some expressions which are similar to the expressions of sensation and will of higher animals; that some

of their propensities and movements are remarkably similar to the vital functionings, instincts and movements of the higher animals. Accordingly, a considerable number of students of animal psychology have no hesitation in attributing Soul and consciousness to the sub-human animals without exception.

#### CONSCIOUSNESS ATTRIBUTABLE TO VEGETABLES

But what about the vegetable kingdom,—which also, the Jaina's say, have Souls? According to Linne, it is only the animals which have sensation and consciousness and the plants are devoid of them. The Buddhist logicians were fond of exposing the fallacy in arguments which were put forward in support of the theory of existence of life and consciousness in plants. The author of the Nyāya-Vindu, for instance, in illustrating the fallacy in which the Hetu or Reason is Asiddha or unproved says:—*चेतनास्तरु इति साध्ये सर्वत्वगपहरणे मरणं प्रतिवाद्यसिद्धं विज्ञानेन्द्रियायुनिरोधलक्षणस्य मरणस्यानेनाभ्युपगमात्तस्य च तरुत्वसंभवात् ।*

*When the Sādhyā or the Proven is, Trees are conscious,—if the reason is asserted to be, Because it dies, when it is stripped of all its barks.—the Reason would be unproved so far as the Prati-vādi or the Opponent is concerned. Because according to the Opponent, Death consists in the cessation of all sensations, of all functions of the sense-organs and of all the vital activities and such a Death is impossible in Trees.*

#### BUDDHIST CONTENTION THAT TREES ARE UNCONSCIOUS

Dharmottara, commenting on the above, observes:—The Digambara's (i.e. the Jaina's) put forward the Hetu. *The tree dies when it is stripped of all its barks* in order to prove the proposition, *Trees are conscious*. Now the Hetu or Reason is Asiddha, so far as the opponent, the Buddhist is concerned. Why is it unproved with the Buddhist? The Buddhist define Death, if it is to serve as the competent Hetu in this case, as the cessation of sensations, of the acti-

vities of the sense-organ which are located in one's body and the existence of which is inferred from the genesis of sensation and of the vital activities. Such Nirodha or cessation of sensations etc. is impossible in trees. A cessation of something implies its previous existence. Hence he who would suppose the possibility of a cessation of sensation etc. in trees must also admit the actual perceiving power in trees. Whoever denies cognition in trees cannot speak of its cessation in them. It may be said that drying up is also Death and this is found in trees. This is true no doubt. But the Death in the case of trees would be a competent Hetu, only if it meant a cessation of sensations etc. which we have seen, presupposes a previous existence of the sensing power in trees. Hence the Reason i.e. Death (put forward by the Jaina's) is unproved in the case of trees. The drying up of trees is no doubt an admitted fact but this is Ahetu i.e. an incompetent Reason. (Cessation of sensations etc. is Death; drying up is also Death; the former proves consciousness; but the latter does not). Without properly considering which kind of death is competent to prove consciousness in trees and which not, the Digambara has stated Death only to be the Hetu in the proposition under consideration. He does not know the real character of Death requisite for the purposes of the case here. He has seen the Death of trees, consisting in their drying up. Death, so far as it consists in drying up, is a Hetu proved with him. But with the opponent (i.e. the Buddhist) who knows the real nature of the Hetu, Death, which is competent to prove the proposition under consideration, the Hetu is certainly unproved. Scientific observation and experiment in modern times have tended to show that the distinction between a plant and the lowest kind of animal is hardly maintainable. It has been found that the manner of reaction to the various stimuli of heat, light, electricity, friction, gravity, chemical action etc. by animals and what has been called "the sensitive" portion of many plants is exactly the same. The phenomena of "irritability" of some of the higher plants and their movements have been in many cases found to

be similar to those found in the lower animals. It has been now definitely established that sponges are animals in which the power of sensation is developed in but the faintest degree. Yet there is so little difference between the vital operation in the sponge and that in a plant that the former was long taken to be a plant. The mimosa closes its leaves and lets down its stalk on touch or on being shaken. This shows that the power of sensation in the mimosa is keener and its transmission of a stimulus is more rapid than that in the sponge. As soon as its prey touches it the dionæa imprisons the fly by immediately pressing its leaves together. This also indicates that in some of the plants, the sensation is acuter and reflex actions more energetic and instantaneous than in sponges and polyps. Purely mechanical laws clearly fail to explain the healthy manner of climbing as done by trees and creepers. If such shapeless, stationary and apparently insensitive organisms as sponges and polyps are to be classed as animals, there seems to be no reason why plants are to be considered as outside the class. Indeed, Fechner, Leitzeb and many others are strong advocates for a 'plant' soul.

#### SOULS, IN ELEMENT-BODIED BEINGS,—THE JAINA THEORY

Lastly, let us take up the first Soul-species of the Jaina's. Are there fire-bodied, earth-bodied, air-bodied and water-bodied Souls? The Jaina's as we have seen, affirmed their existence. Their theory, it should be carefully noted, does not refer to those microscopically small tiny animals as may be found, say, in a glass of water. Their theory suggests that there are animals clothed in elemental matters. It should be remembered in this connection that according to the Jaina's, the whole of the cosmic space is filled with Matter and Souls. Put in another way, the Jaina theory implies that every irreducible minimum of space contains both Soul and Matter. Some have taken this Jaina contention to be a form of animism. But this is a mistake. The Jaina's do not say that matter itself is living. They are thus not animists.

### ATOMISTIC THEORY OF CONSCIOUSNESS—HAECKEL

Ever since Descartes drew the distinction between Soul and body, the gulf between consciousness and matter has appeared to be unbridgeable, to the natural realists. To avoid the dualism between the two, the idealists have denied the reality of matter and the materialists, of Soul. Neither of the solutions of the problem has been acceptable to the natural realists who have continued to affirm the reality and real existence of both consciousness and matter. They have taken also due notice of their close connection; and scientific observation and experiment have told them how a protoplasmic cell has a life and a sort of a soul of its own. From all these facts some of the realists have contended that not only a plasmic cell but every atom has its Soul. Their theory has been called the Atomistic theory of consciousness by Haeckel. It easily avoids the trouble of explaining the first origin of consciousness,—in as much as according to it, like gravitation or chemical affinity, consciousness is inherent in or coherent with matter.

The Jaina theory of the earth-bodied and such Souls, boiled down, implies, as we have seen, not that the element or the ultimate matter stuff is itself living or conscious but that a Soul or consciousness is attached to it. As such, the Jaina theory resembles to some extent the atomistic theory of consciousness, stated above, shorn, of course, of its animistic implications.

### ATOMISTIC THEORY OF CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE JAINA THEORY

In describing the atomistic theory of consciousness, we did not mean to be its advocate in any way; we wanted only to show its partial similarity to the old Jaina doctrine which has seemed to many to be fanciful. We have seen how the observation of the actions of the stimuli on the sub-human higher vertebrates and mammals and their reactions to them has led the biologists to attribute consciousness to them. The similarity of the same actions and reactions in lower animals devoid of a central nervous system, to



those in higher species entitles the former also to the possession of a Soul. Thirdly, we have seen that the vegetable organisms also exhibit in them similar actions of and reactions to external stimuli, which led Fechner and others to treat them no longer as unconscious substances but as living and conscious organisms on a line with the least developed sub-human animal. So, when the Jaina's attribute a soul to their element-bodied beings, they may be asked to state the nature of such a Soul.

#### SIR J. C. BOSE'S EXPERIMENT

Sir J. C. Bose has shown by experiment that a piece of metal can be influenced suitably and when so excited, it responds to stimuli in definite manners, just like a plant or an animal. If the matter constituting the metal be held to be a dead and inert mass, something else in the matter is certainly responsible for the action and reaction. It has also been shown by experiment that this something can be made to leave the metal when it would no longer be influenced by nor respond to the stimuli, just as in the case of a plant or an animal, when it is made to die by administration of poison. This something is in a sense super-physical, if the appellations, soul or consciousness, are not to be given to it on account of their associations with powers of developed thought, reasoning and conception. The fact is there then, that elemental matter may encase something extra-material which is excitable and responsive. The upholders of the atomistic theory of consciousness mean by 'consciousness' nothing but this excitability and responsiveness.

#### EMIL DU BOIS REYMOND

Emil du Bois Reymond took Professor Haeckel to task for supporting the atomistic theory of consciousness. He said that the latter "laid it down as a metaphysical axiom that every atom has its individual consciousness". Professor Haeckel, however, complains that he never ascribed consciousness to atoms. According to him, "true consciousness (thought and reason) is only present in those higher animals

which have a centralised nervous system and organs of senses of a certain degree of development". Mere responsiveness to a stimulus is not consciousness according to him. He appears, however, to have no objection to the word, soul, standing for the powers of responsiveness. Accordingly the responsiveness in elements is due to their having souls in them,—this is the view of Haeckel, although he has objection to attributing to them consciousness "which is but a part of the higher activity of the soul" according to him.

It comes to this then that the upholders of the atomistic theory of consciousness look upon the elemental atom as "conscious" and Professor Haeckel has no objection to endowing it with a "soul" exactly for the same reason viz.: that the atom is responsive to a stimulus. Neither the atomistic theory nor the theory of Haeckel implies that an atom has the powers of reasoning or conceiving, of the power of perceiving in the way an animal or even a plant does. Does not the Jaina doctrine of the earth-bodied souls etc. suggest the same thing? If so, then, it is somewhat in a line with some of the up-to-date biological theories.

#### DIFFERENCE BETWEEN VEGETABLES AND ELEMENT-BODIED BEINGS

It is to be observed that the Jaina's, although they credit the earth-bodied beings etc. with having souls in them, clearly and definitely maintain that those beings are not possessed of Manas. This means that these beings are not possessed of the power of thinking, reasoning, recollecting, conceiving etc. They are not endowed with the sense-organs of hearing, seeing, tasting or smelling so that these beings cannot hear, see, taste, or smell. They are Ekendriya or one-sensed animals, possessed of the power of touch only. The Vanaspati-Kāya or the Vegetable also are one-sensed animals having the sense-organs of touch but the Jaina's differentiate the earth-bodied etc. from the vegetables also. The difference obviously lies in the constituents of their respective bodies. For, whereas the plasmic cells are what consti-

tute the physical frame of a plant, it is elemental matter which forms the bodies of the earth-bodied etc. Does not this difference in the bodies of the two classes of organisms imply a difference in their "Consciousness" and "Souls"? The Jaina's of course endow the earth-bodied etc. with the power of tactile perception; but their tactile perception, is certainly much more simple and much less complicated than that of a cellular body like that of a plant. It is impossible to characterise the "Consciousness" or the "Souls" of the earth-bodied etc. as anything more than responsiveness to stimuli, a responsiveness of the barest kind, infinitely simpler than the responsiveness in a plant or an animal.

### THE SOUL OF SEVEN KINDS

In accordance with the principles of the *Syādvāda* or the theory of Possibility, the Jaina's draw attention to the seven stand-points from which the Jīva may be viewed.

#### SAPTA-BHAṆGA-NAYA

To give an idea of the nature of a substance, its attribute is to be stated and the substance, described in relation to it. The Jaina philosophers maintain, that to show the relation of a substance to its attribute, no less than seven statements are necessary. These seven statements are called the seven *Bhaṅga's* and the Jaina consideration of Reality is based on this *Sapta-Bhaṅga-Naya* or theory of seven-fold Possibility.

Jīva or Soul is a substance and *Astitva* or existence, say, is one of its attributes. To understand the nature of the soul, we must understand its attributes e.g. Existence etc. But, then, all is not said when it is said, "soul exists"; rather, in saying so, we make only a partial, imperfect, one-sided and consequently, incorrect statement of truth. Hence, it is necessary to enquire into the true significance of the statement, 'soul exists'.

## THE FIRST AND THE SECOND BHANĠA'S

By the expression, 'soul exists', we do not mean that the soul exists absolutely in all its forms and modes simultaneously. The soul exists, only in so far as its *Sva-dravya* (own substance), *Sva-kṣetra* (own place), *Sva-kāla* (own time) and *Sva-bhāva* (own modification) are concerned. Thus Jīva exists in its own substance; it exists, that is to say, as a *cognising psychical substance*. Similarly, a Jīva may be said to exist with reference to its own *place*; the soul which is in *Pāṭali-putra* must be understood as a soul, "existing in *Pāṭali-putra*", only. In the same way, the *time* also is to be considered in connection with the existence of a soul; one would be mistaken in not considering the soul which exists in Winter, as one 'existing in Winter'. The particular modification or state of the soul is to be considered also for the same reason; full truth is not correctly stated, if the soul which is angry at a particular time is not described as an 'angry soul'. It is for this reason that the Jaina philosophers in explaining the fact of a soul's existence, say that the soul exists only with reference to its own *Substance*, own *Place*, own *Time* and own *Mode*. According to them, it is philosophically more correct to say, '*Syāt-Jīvaḥ Asti*' ('in some respects the soul exists') than to say simply '*Jīvaḥ Asti*' ('the soul exists'). In determining the nature of a substance, they thus use the expression, *Syāt* (in some respects) and hence their theory has been well-known as *Syād-Vāda*. (Theory of Possibility)

In the doctrine that '*Syāt*' i.e. in some respects only, the soul is existent, it is implied that '*Syāt*' i.e. in some respects again soul does not exist. Accordingly to understand how the soul exists, it is also necessary to see in what respects, it does not exist. The Jaina thinkers maintain that with reference to *Para-dravya* (the substance of another thing), *Para-kṣetra* (the place of another thing), *Para-kāla* (the time of another thing) and *Para-bhāva* (the state of another thing) the Jīva is non-existent. 'Rasa' (liquidity) is an attribute of the '*Pudgala*' (matter), a kind of Ajīva or non-psychical substance. 'Rasa' is not an attribute of the soul. Hence

with reference to Pudgala with its attribute 'Rasa', the Jiva may be said to be non-existent. The soul which is in *Pāṭaliputra* again, is non-existent in the place of another thing e.g. *Avantī*. The soul whose existence has been admitted in Winter must be said to be non-existent at the time of another thing. e.g. in Spring. The soul to which has been attributed the state of anger may be said to be non-existent, so far as the state of another substance e.g. calmness is concerned. This is the second *Bhaṅga* of the *Sapta Bhaṅga*. '*Syāt-Asti Jīvaḥ*', i.e. in some respects the soul exists, is the first *Bhaṅga* or the statement; the second is '*Syāt-Nāsti Jīvaḥ*', i.e. in some respects, the soul is non-existent.

### THE THIRD AND THE FOURTH BHAṆGA'S

It is accordingly as much true to say that the soul exists as to say that it does not. Human language may be unable to express simultaneously the facts, 'the soul exists' and 'the soul does not exist', but there is no inconsistency in making two such successive statements as 'the soul exists' and 'the soul does not exist'. This is the third *Bhaṅga* of the *Sapta-Bhaṅga* with respect to the Jīva,—'*Syāt-Asti Ca Jīvaḥ*', '*Syāt-Nāsti ca Jīvaḥ*' i.e. in some respects the soul is existent and in some respects, the soul is non-existent. Again if in one and the same statement, it is desired to express simultaneously the facts that the *soul exists* and the *soul does not exist*, the nature of the soul becomes '*Avaktavya*' i.e. inexpressible; for, in language there is no such word which can express simultaneously two such mutually contradictory qualities, states or modes as Existence and Non-Existence. Hence the fourth *Bhaṅga* or statement of the *Sapta Bhaṅga*—"*Syāt-Avaktavya Jīvaḥ*" i.e. in some respects the soul is inexpressible, is to be admitted.

### THE FIFTH BHAṆGA

In the same way, we may combine the first and the fourth *Bhaṅga*'s and say, *Syāt Asti ca Jīvaḥ—Syāt Avaktavyaḥ ca Jīvaḥ* i.e. 'In some respects, the soul exists and in

some respects the soul is inexpressible'. This is the fifth *Bhaṅga*.

#### THE SIXTH BHAṆGA

Again, according to the second *Bhaṅga*, 'The soul is non-existent' and according to the fourth *Bhaṅga* 'The soul is inexpressible'; combining these two, we get the sixth *Bhaṅga*, *Syāt-Nāsti ṣa Jīvaḥ, Syāt Avaktavyaḥ ṣa Jīvaḥ* i.e. in some respects the soul is non-existent and in some respects the soul is inexpressible.

#### THE SEVENTH BHAṆGA

The last *Bhaṅga* of the *Sapta-Bhaṅga* is the combination of the third and the fourth *Bhaṅga*'s, '*Syāt Asti ṣa Jīvaḥ, Syāt Nāsti ṣa Jīvaḥ, Syāt-Avaktavyaḥ ṣa Jīvaḥ* i.e. In some respects, the soul exists, in some respects, the soul does not exist and in some respects, the soul is inexpressible.

#### ONE EACH OF THE BHAṆGA'S BY ITSELF IS A PARTIAL STATEMENT

The Jaina philosophers contend that the *Syādvāda* or the theory of Possibility is the only guide to a true determination of the Reals (Tattva's) e.g. Jīva etc. To express the nature of an object, all the above seven statements, marked by *Syāt* i.e. 'in some respects', should be used. The fact that 'Jīva exists' is true but not absolutely so, for in some respects 'the Jīva does not exist' just as in some respects it may be said to exist. Hence, the fact is to be admitted as well that 'Jīva does not exist'. Again, although the fact that the soul is non-existent is true, it is not absolutely so; hence the statement, 'the soul is non-existent' does not fully express the true nature of the Jīva. The Jaina theory is that all the seven statements taken together reveal the true nature of a thing. Hence those thinkers who have given out only such theories as 'The soul exists', 'The soul does not exist', 'The soul is inexpressible', are guilty of stating partial truths according to the Jaina philosophers.

## SYĀDVĀDA NOT SĀMŚAYAVĀDA

The Jaina's, as shown above, thus assert that the soul exists and that it does not exist. Failing to understand the true position of the Jaina thinkers, some philosophers look upon the *Syādvāda* as *Sāṃśāyavāda* or doctrine of Indefiniteness. A little consideration, however, would show that there is no doubt, in-decisiveness or in-definiteness in the Jaina theory. Soul has been said to be existent with regard to its own Substance, own Place, own Time and own Mode; if at the same time it were said that the soul is non-existent in those very respects i.e. in respect of its own Substance, own Place, own Time and own Mode, there arises a reasonable doubt regarding the nature of the soul and the *Syādvāda* becomes of course the *Sāṃśāyavāda*. It would be seen, however, that the propounders of the *Syādvāda* regard the soul as non-existent only in respect of the *Para-dravya* (other substance), *Para-kṣetra* (other place), *Para-kāla* (other time) and *Para-bhāva* (other mode); i.e. they do not say that the soul is non-existent in those very respects in which it is existent. Hence there cannot be any question of doubt with reference to the *Syādvāda*.

According to the *Sapta Bhaṅga*, the soul may be viewed from seven stand-points and has accordingly been said to be of seven modes.

## WHY THE BHAṅGA'S ARE SEVEN, NEITHER MORE NOR LESS

Before we bring our consideration of the *Syādvāda* or the Jaina theory of Possibility to a close, it is necessary to have the clearest idea of its implications. The *Syādvāda* is ordinarily taken to be the right method of *thought* so far as the philosophical enquiries are concerned. The predications are said to be seven in number, neither more nor less, because with respect to the subject of enquiry, there can be only seven forms of questionings,—

सप्तविधतज्जिज्ञासानियमात् । (प्रमाणनयतत्वालोकालंकारः)

And the forms of questionings are said to be seven because with respect to the matter of enquiry, there can be seven

possible modes of doubt. तस्यापि सप्तविधत्वं सप्तधैव तत्सन्देह  
समुत्पादात् । (प्रमाणनयतत्त्वालोकालंकारः)

**SYĀDVĀDA REPRESENTS THE OBJECTIVE REALITY, AS IT IS**

The Syādvāda is thus a correct procedure of thought. It is, however, not limited within the circle of subjective reasoning. It is not merely consistent or comprehensive thought but something more. It is a true picture of the objective reality itself. According to the Jaina thinkers, there is no absolute cleavage between the real and the rational; the rational represents the real in a faithful manner. In serious enquiries doubts are seven, not because these are 'a priori' or subjective forms which are spontaneously evolved by the thinking principle from within itself but because the real, the subject of enquiry itself is a unity in multiplicity having seven aspects.

तस्यापि सप्तप्रकारस्त्वनियमः स्वगोचरवस्तुधर्माणां सप्तविधत्वस्यैवोपपत्तेः ।

(प्रमाणनयतत्त्वालोकालंकारः)

The Syādvāda is thus more a picture of reality than a mode of thinking. It has a subjective aspect no doubt but this subjective aspect is determined by objective necessity.

One of the aims of all systematic philosophy is to understand the nature of the objects of our experience. The Jaina philosophy has also that end in view. The Syādvāda is the method of its investigation and its distinctive feature is that it remains closely attached to empirical experience throughout its course. This will be manifest from a comparison of the nature of reality as presented by the Syādvāda with that, as conceived by other systems of Indian philosophy.

### ULTRA-PRACTICALISM

Ultra-practicalism has no patience for critical examination of things. To people of such persuasion, everything that is found to exist is real. To such people, real is existent and existent is real. The Jaina's would like to point out that one must consider the implications of experience when one calls



a thing real. A Ring exists; but experience shows that it is not absolutely real on that account. A Chair also exists and the Ring does not exist as a Chair. Thus an element of non-existence is involved in the reality of the Ring and the mistake of unthinking ultra-practicalism lies in denying or ignoring this aspect of non-existence in a thing of experience, which is not unoften of serious consequences.

Let us consider the position of the Buddhist Vijñānavāda or thorough-going subjective idealism. It starts from the proposition.

भूतियेषां क्रिया सैव कारणं सैव चोच्यते ।

### SUBJECTIVE IDEALISM

The origination, the activity and the agent are all identical. What we call a thing outside and external to us has origin and persistence in our mind. What, then, is the result?

न चित्तव्यतिरेकिणो विषया ग्राह्यत्वाद्भेदनावदिति । न्यायवार्तिकम् ।

Objects are perceived by our mind; therefore, just like our feelings, the objects have no existence apart from and independent of our mind. The Buddhist idealists' theory of reality is thus exactly Berkeleyan.

Its *Esse* is its *Percipi*.—The Jaina's admit that the outside real is no doubt knowable and perceptible but our experience tells us that it is certainly more. Every one feels that the object of his experience is not his creation but has an existence independent of him.

### ŚŪNYAVĀDA OR VOIDISM

The Śūnyavādin's or the philosophical Voidists declared that nothing is real, that neither the thing perceived as existing outside us nor ourselves, the percipients are real. This theory is absurd. Its suicidal character, was exposed in India centuries before Descartes put forward the criticism, 'Dubito ergo Cogito ergo sum', One's internal experience would repudiate this voidist contention. Thus it is that while the ultra-practicalists unduly emphasised the

positive and the existential aspect of a thing, the Vijnānavādin's and the Śūnyavādin's fixed upon its negative and the non-existential aspect. The views of both the schools are one-sided and incomplete. The Jaina's would appeal to experience and point out that a real is existent in some respects and in some respects it is non-existent too.

### ŚŪNYA AS CONCEIVED BY THE MĀDHYAMIKA

The Mādhyamika school of Buddhist thinkers are generally classed as Śūnyavādin's, although they do not positively assert that a real thing is a nothing. They call a real, Śūnya no doubt; their conception of Śūnya is essentially different from that of the ultra-voidist's, as noticed above. According to the Mādhyamika's. अतस्तत्त्वं सदसदुभयानुभयात्मकचतुष्कोटि-  
विनिर्मुक्तं शून्यमेव (सर्वदर्शनसंग्रहः)

What we call a real is (1) neither existent (2) nor non-existent (3) nor both existent and non-existent (4) nor something which is different from both existent and non-existent. The Mādhyamika position is more like that of a sceptic than that of a positive nihilist.

### VEDĀNTIC THEORY OF THE UNREALITY OF THINGS

The Vedāntist's differ from the Mādhyamika's by positively admitting the reality of a transcendental substance. But so far as the things of our ordinary experience are concerned, the position of the former is not very different from that of the latter. It is true that according to the Vedāntist's, a thing of our experience is not wholly unsubstantial in as much as it is grounded in the transcendental reality of the Brahma. But so far as the thing is conceived by itself, it is said to be Mithyā or unreal. The Vedāntist's contend that a thing of our experience cannot be said to be either existent or non-existent. It is not existent because its persistence is not permanent. It is not non-existent because it has at least a temporary existence as an object of our empirical experience. A thing which is neither existent nor non-

existent, as a thing of our experience is,—is *Anirvācya* i.e. indeterminable and as such, *Mithyā* or unreal.

#### JAINA EXAMINATION OF THE ABOVE POSITIONS

The Jaina's would appeal to experience and tell the *Mādhyamika*'s and the *Vedāntin*'s: Why go astray from our guide, the experience? Experience presents a thing as a many-sided reality; it does not show that any one aspect of a thing is its unalterable and eternal aspect; a thing has various aspects and our experience presents it as such. Why not take the thing as it is presented in experience? Why call it *Śūnya* or *Mithyā*, because it is found to have varied, nay, apparently contradictory aspects?

The Jaina's of course do admit that the nature of a thing is in some respects inexpressible because such contradictory aspects as existence and non-existence are found in it. They would, however, point out that this would not justify the theories of the *Mādhyamika*'s or the *Vedāntists*. For, a thing is not existent in those very respects in which it is non-existent. A jar is not said to exist as a jar as well as a cloth. Therefore, there is no real contradiction in the nature of reality, as presented by the *Syādvāda*.

#### ILLUSTRATION OF THE SYĀDVĀDA

The seven predications of the *Syādvāda* do not thus contradict one another. The question, however, may be asked: Are all of them necessary? The Jaina's contend that each of the predications points to a new aspect and as such, all the seven predications are necessary in order to have a comprehensive grasp of the nature of the thing under consideration. An example would show this better. And here we choose to deviate from the beaten track deliberately and leaving aside the textual illustrations of jar and existence or soul and existence have recourse to an example which, we hope, would clarify the position.

The omniscient *Arhat* is the Deliverer, according to the Jaina's. Let us take the *Arhat* as the subject of predication and deliverership as his attribute. Applying the attribute

to the subject here, we shall see that seven statements may be made, each of which will reveal a new aspect of the character of the subject.

### THE FIRST BHANĠA

1. The first statement is, the *Arhat is the deliverer*. Here is a predication about the Arhat, which is true. It reveals one side of the Arhat's character. It shows (1) how the Arhat as an omniscient being (Sva-dravya) is the deliverer; (2) how he installed in the Siddha-śīlā (Sva-kṣetra) delivers a being struggling in the Saṁsāra; (3) how the Arhat in his appearance and posture as deeply absorbed in contemplation (Sva-bhāva) is the deliverer; and lastly (4) how the Arhat delivers the sufferer only when (Sva-kāla) the latter has carefully and scrupulously observed the moral rules, the Vrata's, the Śīla's, the Tapa's etc. This first predication about the Arhat reveals the positive side of his character. It states a truth about him, which, however, is not the whole truth. There are other aspects of his character which should be stated and understood before we can have a comprehensive idea of the Arhat.

### THE SECOND BHANĠA

2. *The Arhat is not the deliverer*,—is the second predication. Although put in a form, contradictory to the first, the second predication does not really contradict the first but reveals only another side of the Arhat's character. It states (i) that the Arhat is not a deliverer in the way in which in omniscient persons like Nelson who saved England from Napoleon's attack are deliverers (Para-dravya); (ii) that he is not a deliverer installed in e.g. the battleship, Victory (from which Nelson directed the battle of Trafalgar) (Para-kṣetra); (iii) that the Arhat is not the deliverer, when, for example the people to be delivered are under the leadership of a hero like Nelson in the midst of a war (Para-kāla); and lastly (iv) that the Arhat is not the deliverer in a fighting mood and armed in weapons of offence and defence. (Para-bhāva) like, say, Nelson in the battle of Trafalgar.

So, this second proposition does not contradict the first proposition about the Arhat. The second predication is not redundant either, dealing as it does, with a new aspect of the Arhat's character, in a negative manner.

### THE THIRD BHANĠA

3. The third mode of predication is that the *Arhat is the deliverer and then, he is not the deliverer*. Here the two former predications are made about the Arhat, one after the other. One may think that this third predication reveals nothing new about the Arhat, it merely re-states the former two propositions or rather the above two attributes or characteristics of the Arhat. It should be observed however, that a summation or totality has a novelty of its own. Sounds, each of which is distinct and different from the other, make up a song; a picture, parts of which are coloured in different ways is not a mere juxtaposition of those parts; it is more, as one object, perceived and enjoyed as such; so is a garden,—not a mere arithmetical sum-total of the trees, the creepers, the tanks and the passages in it but an ordered whole in which the constituents are complementary to each other. Take the case of England's deliverer fighter, Nelson. At a certain stage of the battle of Trafalgar, he charged with all his force; at another stage, he did not fight, remained quiescent, and allowed the enemy to proceed. Nelson was a fighter, this is a true statement about him. He was not a fighter, this is also true. The third statement, Nelson was a fighter, and was not a fighter, is also true. It is however, not a mere re-statement of the former two propositions. It points to a new side of Nelson's character, showing how he was a consummate and skilful fighter, knowing when to strike and when, not. In the case of the Arhat, we may say that the third proposition shows a new side of his character as a deliverer. People wanting redress from worldly needs and privations in the form of acquisitions of wealth, fame and other worldly enjoyments must seek worldly deliverers; the Arhat is not their deliverer. Again, the Arhat does not deliver people by actively work-

ing or fighting for their deliverance; he delivers those who by self-culture and moral practices are on the way to supramundane deliverance. In other words, this third predication of the Syādvāda shows that the Arhat is the deliverer of those people only who seek emancipation from the bondage to Saṃsāra and who by their own right faith, right knowledge and right conduct help themselves to its attainment.

#### THE FOURTH BHAṄGA

4. We now come to the next mode of predications,—*The Arhat is at once and at the same time both a deliverer and not a deliverer.* The fourth Bhaṅga or statement in the Syādvāda is, like the foregoing third, a combination of the first and the second predications, with this difference that whereas in the third Bhaṅga, the attributes of deliverership and non-deliverership are attributed to the Arhat one after the other (Kramārpaṇa), in the fourth, their application is simultaneous (Sahārpaṇa). We have seen that although the third Bhaṅga is a combination of the first two Bhaṅga's, it nevertheless implies an attribute or aspect which was not signified by either of the two. In the same manner, the fourth Bhaṅga is not a mere summation of the first two predications nor a re-statement of the third in a different form. It presents a fresh characteristic of the subject. This will appear from a careful consideration of the nature of the fourth Bhaṅga.

Deliverership and non-deliverership are obviously contradictory attributes,—which as the first and the second statements show,—can be equally applied to the Arhat. No difficulty arises if the two attributes are applied to the Arhat successively, as is done in the third Bhaṅga. The two attributes, however, being applicable to the Arhat, they can be applied to him simultaneously, and this is what is done in this fourth Bhaṅga. But the difficulty in the case of simultaneous attribution of contradictory attributes arises from the fact that language is incapable of doing so. A word has always a definite sense and it is impossible for

it to signify two contradictory matters. Hence although the Arhat is a deliverer and not a deliverer at one and the same time, language is incapable of expressing this nature of his. The fourth Bhaṅga of the Syādvāda accordingly is otherwise put as "The Arhat is inexpressible".

It is interesting to observe that both the Vedāntins and the Mādhyamika Buddhists arrive at the conclusion that things are Anirvāçya or indeterminable, the fourth Bhaṅga of the Jaina's. The difference however, between the Jaina theory on the one hand and the Vedāntist and the Buddhist on the other, is that while with the latter two, the indescribability or inexpressibility of the nature of things is absolute, that with the former is Syāt i.e. in some respects only.

In this connection, we venture to submit that possibly it would not be wrong to hold that just as language is incapable of expressing the aspect of the nature of reality which is contemplated in the fourth Bhaṅga, an ordinary mind is also unable to have a definite grasp of it. A real has two aspects, one of which apparently contradicts the other. But language cannot express these two aspects by means of one and the same word. In the same manner, our empirical mind also is incapable of having a simultaneous grasp of contradictory aspects of the nature of a real. Reality, so far as the fourth predication goes, is thus not only inexpressible but also in some respects, unknowable. As a matter of fact, Herbert Spencer, Kant and many upholders of the doctrine of the psycho-physical parallelism have held that the ultimate nature of things is unknowable.

In the third Bhaṅga, the totality or summation of the constituent contradictory elements was found to present a new characteristic of its own. The fourth Bhaṅga also presents in the same manner, an aspect of its subject which was not presented by the first, the second or the third. The difference between the third and the fourth Bhaṅga seems to be this that while in the former, the constituent elements preserve their mutual existence and independence, in the

latter, they are all fused and mixed up together in the evolution of the total whole, although they can always be found to exist, on analysis. The fourth Bhaṅga may be illustrated by taking up the phenomena of sun-light. Sun-light has a colour of its own. Yet sun-light is but a compound of and can be found on analysis to consist in rays, each of which has a colour different from that of the other and from that of the compound i.e. what we call our sun-light.

The Mādhyamika theory of reality illustrates how the simultaneous application of contradictory characteristics to a thing result in the discovery of an altogether new characteristic in it. As we have seen, the Mādhyamika contended that a thing was neither existent nor non-existent and so on; their ultimate conclusion was that the thing was Śūnya or Niḥsvabhāva, a characteristic which was not implied in the four categories taken either singly or as juxtaposed. The theory of the Vedāntists also shows the same thing. In their case, the application of contradictory attributes to things resulted in the conclusion that things were Mithyā i.e. unreal by themselves but all the same grounded on some transcendental one and indivisible reality. Obviously this Mithyātva is different from existence, non-existence and the two considered successively. To observers, the inner nature of Nelson which was the self-same seat of his moods for fighting and for non-fighting as well was certainly indescribable. Similarly, we get at a new aspect of the character of the Arhat, in whom deliverership and non-deliverership are equally grounded and whose ways are accordingly "like the ways of God, inscrutable".

#### THE FIFTH BHAṅGA

5. The fifth Bhaṅga is a combination of the first and the fourth Bhaṅgas. It states that the *Arhat is the deliverer and is inexpressible*. Nevertheless, it is not a superfluous proposition nor a redundant jugglery in words. Like the preceding predications, it also presents its subject in a new light. When the up-holders of the theory of psycho-physical parallelism



say that the ultimate substance which is unknowable, manifests itself in the physical and the mental phenomena of our experiential world and when the Kantians under the stress of the necessity of practical reason urge that the positive existence of some of the transcendental ultimates of pure reason must be admitted, they really put forward the statement of the fifth Bhaṅga. When the Mādhyamika's state that our Vāsanā leads us to attribute existence to the Anirvācya Śūnya, their statement is in a way a form of the fifth predication of the Syādvāda. The conception of the ultimate substance as inscrutable and at the same time manifesting itself through specific channels is certainly different from its conception as simply inscrutable. Similarly, the conception of the Kantian postulates of practical reason is admittedly different from the conception of the transcendental things-in-themselves of pure reason. It has been pointed out by a good many critics of the Mādhyamika theory that the Śūnya as existent is certainly different from the Śūnya, pure and simple. There is a difference between the Advaita view of the Brahma as simply the Avāṇ-manaso-goṣara or inapproachable through sources of empirical knowledge and the view of the Bhedābheda school that the same unknowable Brahma in some of his aspects is manifested in the world of sense. If Nelson's nature were simply an enigma, people of England would have been in a fix; it was because it was more than that, it was because they knew that in spite of the inscrutability of his nature, Nelson would fight when there would be need for it, that the people of England made him their leader in the naval war against Napoleon. In the same manner, it may be said that inexpressibility of his nature may make the Arhat an object of awe to the seekers of deliverance. It is because the Arhat is more than that, that is to say, it is because the Arhat in spite of the inexpressibility of his nature is a deliverer that the Jaina thinkers have laid down rules for his worship. At the same time, it should be observed that the Arhat of this fifth Bhaṅga is something more than what he is in the first. While the Arhat of the first Bhaṅga

appears as a perfectly peaceful being, he of the fifth predication, because of the inexpressibility of his nature is awe-inspiring; and seekers of deliverance approach him with a feeling of reverence. Nelson as a fighter and Nelson with the background of an inscrutable nature taking the role of a fighter are not the same; the first, people would admire and honour, the second, they would revere with awe.

#### THE SIXTH BHAṄGA

6. *The Arhat is not the deliverer and is inexpressible*,—is the sixth statement in the Syādvāda. This sixth Bhaṅga is a combination of the second and the fourth Bhaṅga's and reveals a new aspect of the Arhat's character. In this predication, the Arhat appears as the awe-inspiring high being and makes seekers of deliverance more and more self-reliant in the matter of their deliverance without forgetting the Arhat. The second proposition,—*The Arhat is not the deliverer*,—if it were a statement of the complete character of the Arhat might have made the seekers of deliverance look upon the Arhat with a feeling of perfect unconcern. The fourth Bhaṅga presents the Arhat in a mysterious light,—he is both a deliverer and not a deliverer. The two predications combined yield the net result viz. the seekers of deliverance must be self-reliant, "up and doing" keeping the Arhat in view as "God over head". Such subjective attitudes have an objective counterpart of a real aspect of the Arhat's character, which is stated in the sixth Bhaṅga. When Nelson with his inscrutable nature used temporary quiescence as his *modus operandi*, his naval units practised utmost patience, self-control and readiness for operation without losing confidence in him.

#### THE SEVENTH BHAṄGA

7. The last of the Bhaṅga's in the Syādvāda is of the form, —*The Arhat is the deliverer, the Arhat is not the deliverer and the Arhat is inexpressible*,—a combination of the first, the second, and the fourth of the Bhaṅga's. It may be said that the first Bhaṅga in our illustration is evidenced by a feeling of

admiration; the second, by an attitude of self-reliance, the third, by a feeling of harmony among multifarious attitudes; the fourth, by a feeling of awe, the fifth by a spirit of veneration towards its sublime object; the sixth, by an attitude of self-reliance, fastened to an awe-inspiring object of veneration. All these subjective attitudes refer to real aspects in the character of Arhat. Similarly the seventh statement also reveals a new aspect of the character of the Arhat, which is evidenced by the uniqueness of a corresponding attitude in his devotees. The fact that Nelson fights, that he does not fight, that his nature is inexpressible, is certainly more than any of the facts noticed about him previously. It shows that Nelson was marked out as the fittest man for England's purpose and the feeling evoked by the (seventh) aspect of Nelson's character, may be called the feeling of satisfaction. In the same manner, the Arhat in this seventh aspect of his character may be said to satisfy the spiritual needs of the seekers of deliverance. He evokes admiration, generates self-reliance and is awe-inspiring; but the seventh statement is not confined to those only; it shows that he is more; he is a unique being satisfying all the religious, the moral and the artistic sentiments of the devotees's heart. In one word, the Arhat of the seventh proposition is the being for the seekers of deliverance.

#### EACH BHANĠA POINTS TO A REAL ASPECT

It is thus that each of the seven propositions of the Syādvāda reveals a new aspect of the subject under consideration. A consideration and statement of all these seven propositions are necessary for the purpose of having a complete idea of the subject. Each Bhaṅga expresses but a partial aspect of the subject and its picture will not be complete until and unless all the above seven statements are made. The seven predications are not mere verbal constructions but are statements expressing objective realities. We have tried to show above how each of the seven statements regarding the subject of our illustration of the Arhat, evokes a distinct feeling in us, which proves that each of

the seven statements reveals a distinct aspect of the character of the subject. It is quite possible that we have made mistakes in our characterisation of the respective distinct feelings. But the fact is not to be gainsaid that the seven statements of the Syādvāda express seven distinct aspects of the objective real and that the apprehensions of the distinct aspects of the real would generate distinct ideas and feelings in the percipient.

#### WHY THE BHAṄGA'S ARE SEVEN ONLY

Lastly, it may be pointed out that the statements in Syādvāda are seven and cannot be more; because these seven express all the aspects of the reality. A real in connection with an attribute cannot have more than seven aspects, so that expressions of these aspects cannot exceed seven. For example, if we try to evolve another Bhaṅga by combining the third and the first Bhaṅga's, there will be tautology in the form,—The Arhat is the deliverer, he is not the deliverer and he is the deliverer. Similarly, in attempting to combine the second and the third Bhaṅga's, we shall have tautology of the form,—The Arhat is not the deliverer, he is the deliverer and he is not the deliverer. The fourth Bhaṅga gives an entirely new idea, the Inexpressible, which was not found in its constituents, the first and the second Bhaṅga's and therefore combinations with it, of the first, the second and the third Bhaṅga's were possible. It may be said that the third Bhaṅga, also gives a new idea, as we ourselves have tried to show above; that combinations with it of the first and the second Bhaṅga's may yield new ideas, just as the combinations with the fourth Bhaṅga, of the first, the second and the third evolve new ideas. It would be observed, however, that although the third Bhaṅga expresses a new aspect, its constitutive elements, the first and the second Bhaṅga's are not obliterated thereby; these also with their respective expressions of aspects, remain alive. When we perceive a garden, for instance, the perceptions of trees, tanks, passages, in it are not obliterated; so that with the perception of the garden are allied the perceptions of

these. Accordingly, there will be tautology, if, we say there is a garden in A and there is a tree in A. But in the case of the fourth Bhaṅga, its constitutive elements viz:—the first and the second Bhaṅga's are obliterated,—so that what we get in the fourth Bhaṅga is a new idea and nothing more. For this reason, it is possible to make combinations with this Bhaṅga, of the first, the second and the third. In sun-light, for instance, its constitutive rays have mingled up their colours beyond recognition, so that the sunlight is a new colour altogether with no other colour by its side; and it is always possible accordingly to exhibit the colours e.g. black, blue, green, red etc. in sunlight. It is thus that while combinations with the fourth Bhaṅga, of the first, the second and the third have yielded new results, the combinations of the first and the second Bhaṅga's with the third will yield nothing new and end in tautology.

## THE SOUL OF EIGHT KINDS

With reference to the eight attributes of the soul, it is said to be of eight modes. The eight kinds of the Karma also account for the eight modifications of the soul.

### EIGHT NATURAL ATTRIBUTES IN A SOUL

The eight natural attributes of the soul are as follows:—  
 (1) the soul has knowledge (Jñāna), (2) has the power of perception (Darśana), (3) it is possessed of power (Virya), (4) it has minuteness (Sūkṣmatva), (5) Inter-penetrability (Avagāhana) is another attribute of soul, (6) The soul is neither heavy nor light (Agurulaghutva), (7) Right Faith (Samyaktva) is an essential attribute of the Jīva, (8) It is also possessed of equanimity (Avyāvādha). Although, however, these are natural attributes of the soul, they can not be explicit in it because it has been perverted by the dirt of Karma since the beginningless time. These qualities become manifest in the Siddha (the perfected soul). It is

thus that (1) The Siddha is possessed of Infinite knowledge (Ananta Jñāna); there is nothing in the Lokākāśa (filled space) or the Alokākāśa (void space) beyond it, which is beyond the cognition of the Siddha. (2) The Infinite power of Perception (Ananta Darśana) is another attribute of the Siddha. (3) The perfected soul is said to be possessed of Infinite Power (Ananta Vīrya), as it is never tired of holding in consciousness all the things of the world with their infinite modes. (4) Formlessness (Sukṣmatva) is an attribute of Siddha in as much as it can never be an object of sensuous perception. (5) The perfected soul has no attribute in common with Pudgala or matter; hence it is possible for many such souls to exist in one and the same place: this extraordinary attribute of the soul is called Inter-penetrability (Avagāhana). (6) The Siddha is neither heavy nor light (Agurulaghu). (7) Pure Faith (Samyaktva) is another attribute of the Siddha. (8) Infinite, interminable and unchangeable joy (Avyāvādha) inheres in the perfected soul.

#### EIGHT MODES OF KARMA, ATTACHED TO THE UNLIBERATED SOUL

As said before, the eight modes (Prakṛti) of Karma also which are opposed to the nature of the Jīva account for its being regarded as of eight modifications. The eight forms of Karma are (1) Jñānāvarṇīya; this envelopes the cognising power of the soul. (2) Darśanāvarṇīya; this envelopes the natural power of perception. (3) Mohanīya; this destroys the pure faith and the right conduct of the soul. (4) Antarāya; this Karma is an obstacle to soul's power of gaining (Lābha etc). (5) Vedanīya; this Karma brings in objects of worldly pleasure and pain. (6) Gotra; on account of the in-flow of Gotra Karma, the Jīva is born in high or low families. (7) Āyus; this Karma accounts for the varied age (periods of living) of the souls. (8) Nāma; owing to the in-flow of this Karma, the soul gets the various status or (Gati) of an Infernal Being etc., birth (Jāti) of an one-sensed animal etc.

## THE SOUL OF NINE KINDS

### NINE CATEGORIES, JIVA OR CONSCIOUS SOUL

The Jiva or the soul involves the nine *Tattva's* (categories) viz:—*Jiva*, *Ajiva*, *Āsrava*, *Bandha*, *Samvara*, *Nirjarā*, *Mokṣa*, *Pūṇya* and *Pāpa*. In consideration of these nine *Tattva's* or categories, the Jaina thinkers talk of the nine subdivisions of the soul.

That which is characterised by its attributes of consciousness, is the '*Jiva*', or Soul.

### AJIVA OR UNCONSCIOUS REALS

What is other than the *Jiva* is the '*Ajiva*' or Non-soul. It has five modes viz:—'*Pudgala*', '*Kāla*', '*Ākāśa*', '*Dharma*' and '*Adharma*'. '*Varṇa*' (Colour), '*Gandha*' (Smell), '*Rasa*' (Taste) and '*Sparsā*' (Touch) are the four Guṇas or attributes of *Pudgala* and '*Śabda*' (Sound), '*Samsthāna*' (form), '*Sūkṣma*' (Minute), '*Sthūla*' (Gross), '*Bandha*' (Unity), '*Tamas*' (Darkness), '*Chhāyā*' (Shade), '*Ātapa*' (Heat), '*Udyota*' (Revelation without being hot) and '*Bheda*' (Separateness) are the various modes or states of *Pudgala*. *Kāla* or Time itself is inactive; but it is on account of it that things are variously modified i.e. (1) do acts of moving from place to place, (2) move from one state to another, (3) and (4) are considered great or small etc. in relation to one another. The mutation of things is due to time. What reveals all things, is self-revealed and gives space to all substances e.g. soul etc. is '*Ākāśa*' or Space. '*Dharma*' is what helps the motion of soul or matter, just as water does that of a moving fish. '*Adharma*' on the contrary, helps a stopping soul or matter in its stoppage just as ground does a stopping cow.

### ĀSRAVA

'*Āsrava*' means a 'door way' or a 'channel'. The passage through which water finds its way into a tank is called '*Āsrava*'; in the same way, the principle through which '*Pudgala*' flows into the *Jiva* has been called '*Āsrava*' in Jaina philosophy. *Jiva* and *Pudgala* are mixed up from the

beginningless time. Pudgala comes and goes; it is always unstable; and hence the Body which is made up of Pudgala is also unstable. Like the Body, the Mind and the Words are always wanting in stability. These unstabilities viz:— of the Body, the Mind and the Words are called in Jaina philosophy, 'Kāya-yoga', 'Mana-yoga' and 'Vaçana-yoga' respectively. On account of these three forms of the Yoga or 'Torpor', Karma flows into the soul. Yoga, is thus 'Āsrava'. The Jaina's consider two forms of the 'Āsrava', called the Karmāsrava and Bhāvāsrava. The water which comes into the pond through a channel is also called 'Āsrava' and similarly, the Karma which is essentially opposed to the nature of the Jīva and which flows into it through the three channels of the Yoga, is called Karmāsrava. The three forms of the Yoga which serve as channels for the in-flow of Karma constitute what has been called Bhāvāsrava.

#### BANDHA

'Āsrava' leads to 'Bandha' or Bondage of the soul. On account of Yoga, there is Karmāsrava i.e. Karma begins to collect in the soul, bringing about its bondage. These Karma Pudgala's, in-form every 'Pradeśa' (Part) of the soul, operate in accordance with their 'Prakṛti' (nature), give rise to varied 'Anubhāga' (intense or low feelings) and thus persist in their 'Sthiti' (stay) in the soul. Hence the 'Bandha' or Bondage is considered with reference to 'Pradeśa', 'Prakṛti', 'Anubhāga' and 'Sthiti'. It is to be noted that along with the Karmāsrava or in-flow of Karma into the soul, Kaṣāya's or passions make their appearance and as a consequence of that, the Jīva goes straight to the path of its own Bondage, by continuing to take in the Karma Pudgala; there arise in it 'Mithyātva' or false faith, 'Asaṁyama' or non-restraint and 'Pramāda' or delusion, and thus the Bondage of the soul becomes complete. Accordingly, 'Yoga', 'Kaṣāya', 'Mithyātva', 'Asaṁyama', and 'Pramāda' are said to be five-fold causes of the Bandha of Jīva.



## SAMVARA

Bondage of the Soul consists in its subjection to the *Karma*. Hence, the Soul that wants Salvation, must first try to break the *Karma-fetters*. Ordinarily it is very difficult to break them off all of a sudden. It is for this reason that the activity of the Soul is first directed to the stoppage of the *Karma-flow*. '*Samvara*' consists in the stoppage of the *Āsrava*. *Samvara* prevents the further in-flow of *Karma*. The Jaina's maintain that *Samvara* is effected by '*Gūpti*' (preservation), '*Samiti*' (carefulness), '*Dharma*' (piety etc.), '*Parisaha-jaya*' (suffering of privations), '*Tapascharaṇa*' (penance), '*Anuprekṣā*' (contemplation of the unsatisfactory nature of the world) and '*Cāritra*' (good conduct).

## NIRJARĀ

*Samvara* stops the in-flow of the fresh *Karma's*. But it is also necessary that the already collected *Karma's* are destroyed; for salvation is impossible as long as there is any *Karma* in the Soul. '*Nirjarā*' consists in the annihilation of the already introduced *Karma's*. '*Saviṇṇa*' and '*Aviṇṇa*' are the two forms of the *Nirjarā*. The former consists in the annihilation of the *Karma's* because of their fruits being all enjoyed. *Aviṇṇa Nirjarā* is the destruction of the *Karma's* through penance etc.

## MOKṢA

The blissful *Mokṣa* is attained when '*Āsrava*' is stopped on account of the want of *Yoga*; '*Bandha*' becomes loosened owing to the annihilation of *Kaṣāya* etc.; the already collected *Karma's* are destroyed by *Nirjarā*;—and thus when all the *Karma's* subside from the Soul altogether. In the state of salvation, there is no Bondage, nor the possibility of a future one. '*Mokṣa*' consists in the endless and unchangeable state of Knowledge, Perception, Power and Joy. It is attained through Right Faith, Right Knowledge and Right Conduct,—the three '*Jewels*' as they are called.

*Jīva*, *Ajīva*, *Āsrava*, *Bandha*, *Samvara*, *Nirjarā* and *Mokṣa* are

the seven primary and principal Tattva's or categories. 'Pūṇya' and 'Pāpa' are not separate categories; they are included in 'Āsrava'. It has already been stated that the three forms of Yoga effect the *Karmāsrava*. Some *Āsrava* may generate pleasure, some again produce misery. The former is called 'Pūṇya' ('Pūṇyāsrava' i.e. good in-flow) and the latter 'Pāpa' ('Pāpāsrava' i.e. bad in-flow). A Yoga which is *Śubha* or good causes 'Pūṇyāsrava' and the Yoga which is *Aśubha* or bad causes 'Pāpāsrava'. 'Ahiṃsa' (non-injury), 'Açaurya' (non-stealing), 'Brahmaçaryya' (strict celibacy) etc. are instances of *Śubha Kāya-yoga*; *Satya-vaçana* ('telling the truth'), *Hita-vaçana* (telling words which are useful to another) etc. are *Śubha vaçana-yoga*: '*Arhat Bhakti*' (regard for the Lord), '*Śāstra-bhakti*' (regard for the scripture) etc. are '*Śubha-Manoyoga*'; '*Himsā*' (injury), '*Maithuna*' (sexual connection) etc. are instances of '*Aśubha-kāyayoga*'; '*Asatya-bhāsaṇa*' (telling a lie) etc. are *Aśubha-vaçanayoga*, '*Vadha-çintā*' (determination to kill), '*Irşā*' (malice) etc. are *Aśubha Mano-yoga*. The *Karma*'s also that flow into the soul on account of the *Śubha* and the *Aśubha* Yoga's are respectively called the 'Pūṇya' and the 'Pāpa'. The three *Āyus-karma*'s viz: *Deva-āyus* (the life-period of a heavenly being), *Manuṣya-āyus* (the life-period of a human being) and the *Tiryak-āyus* (the life-period of a lower animal); the thirty seven *Nāma-karma*'s e.g. *Deva-gati* etc. (the status of a heavenly being) etc.; *Uçça-gotra karma* (the Karma that accounts for one's birth in a high family); and *Sātā-vadanīya-karma* (Karma that accounts for a pleasurable feeling), these forty-seven are the Pūṇya Karma's. The remaining eighty-two Karma's are *Aśubha* and *Pāpa Karma*'s.

## THE SOUL OF TEN KINDS

### TEN PRĀNAS

The '*Prāṇa*'s' (or life energies) account for the ten modes of a soul. The five '*Indriya*'s' (senses), '*Vaçana*' (speech), '*Manas*' (Mind), '*Śarīra-bala*' (bodily energy), '*Pranāpāna*'

(Inhalation and exhalation) and Āyus (life period) constitute the ten *Prāṇa*'s.

'*Paryāpti*' is the cause of getting life; a soul is '*Paryāpta*' or fully capable in that respect in which he attains '*Paryāpti*' and gets the particular mode of life accordingly. *Paryāpti* is of six forms:—*Āhāra-Paryāpti*, *Śārīra-Paryāpti*, *Indriya-Paryāpti*, *Prāṇāpāna-Paryāpti*, *Vaṇana-Paryāpti* and *Manas-Paryāpti*. The one-sensed animal is never possessed of *Vaṇana-Paryāpti* and *Manas-Paryāpti*; hence it is devoid of *Manas* (Mind) and *Vaṇana* (power of speech). In the same way the two-sensed, the three-sensed, the four-sensed and the non-minded five-sensed animals are devoid of Mind as they never have the *Manas-Paryāpti*. All the six forms of the *Paryāpti* are found in a minded (*Samjñi*) animal.

#### PARYĀPTI

As soon as the soul is possessed of the *Āhāra-Paryāpti*, it becomes capable of taking in Pudgala which is competent to form the Body and thus is generated the Life, called the 'Āyus'. The soul which has thus the '*Āhāra-Paryāpti*' is called the '*Āhāraka*'; when it is stripped off this *Paryāpti*, it is called the '*Anāhāraka*'. The soul which has reached the fourteenth i.e. the last *Guṇasthāna* is called the *Ayoga-kevali*; it is an *Anāhāraka*. The Siddha's are '*Anāhāraka*'s'. A soul remains in the state of the *Anāhāraka*, after it has left one body and before it assumes a fresh one; this state is called the *Vigraha-Gati*. The soul, as was pointed out before, is of the same extent as the Body; but when for some reasons, the Soul expands itself beyond the dimensions of the Body and then contracts itself into the form of the Body again, it is said to have '*Samudghāta*'. During certain time of the *Samudghāta* the Jīva is said to be in the state of *Anāhāraka*.

When the soul has '*Śārīra-Paryāpti*', it gets the body, becomes capable of doing the bodily functions e.g. moving from place to place etc. and is possessed of the life, called '*Śārīra-bala*'. The Body is of five kinds viz: *Audārika*, *Vai-kriyika*, *Āhāraka*, *Taijasa* and *Kārmaṇa*. The last two bodies have no sense-organs; these two are attached to the soul

from the beginningless time. The other three Bodies are some times joined to the soul and sometimes they fall off. Besides, the Kārmaṇa and the Taijasa, the human beings and the lower animals have the Audārika Body. The celestial and the infernal beings have the Vaikriyika Body in addition to the Kārmaṇa and the Taijasa bodies. The Body which some anchorites assume for some particular purposes in addition to the Kārmaṇa, the Taijasa and the Audārika Bodies is called the 'Āhāraka'.

The Jīva is possessed of the life, called the *Indriya* when the *Indriya-Paryāpti* is complete. Senses are five in number and hence the corresponding sense-life also is of five modes.

On the completion of the *Vaṇa-Paryāpti*, the soul gets the life which is called *Vaṇa-Bala*, enabling it to speak.

When the soul has the *Prāṇāpāna-Paryāpti*, it attains the *Prāṇāpāna*.—life, i.e. it becomes capable of breathing.

On the attainment of the *Manah-Paryāpti*, the Jīva is possessed of the life called the *Manas* or Mind.

### MĀRGAṆĀ

Every *Samsāri* soul has the above *lives*. The expression of a temporal soul in and through those avenues, has been called the *Mārgaṇā*. The *Mārgaṇā*'s are fourteen in number, *Gati*, *Indriya*, *Kāya*, *Veda*, *Yoga*, *Kaṣāya Jñāna*, *Samyama*, *Darśanopayoga*, *Leśyā*, *Bhavyatva*, *Samyak-Darśana*, *Samjñitva* and *Āhārakatva*. *Gati* is a Karma which accounts for a soul's varied status as a celestial being etc. *Indriya* or sense is the organ of *Indra*, the soul. A *Samsāri* Jīva has a *Kāya* or body e.g. the earth-body etc. *Yoga* is a Torpor in a *Pradeśa* or part of the soul. *Veda*, consists in the sexual feelings of a male, female or an eunuch. Anger, Conceit, Deceit and Greed are the four *Kaṣāya*'s which are inimical to Right conduct. *Jñāna* is the knowledge of Truths. *Samyama* is the spirit of restraint which arises when the *conduct-deluding-karma* (*Çāritra-Moha*) is stayed, annihilated or partially stayed and annihilated. *Darśana* consists in the apprehension of the generality of an object. The psychical tendency due to *Yoga*, tinged with *Kaṣāya* is the *Bhāva-Leśyā* or subjective

Tinge and the complexion of the Body is the *Dravya-Leśyā* or material tinge. The soul which is capable of attaining salvation is *Bhavya* and one which is not so, is *Abhavya*. Samyak-darśana is the right faith in the verities. The soul which is capable of taking instructions, imitating others, understanding what others say, is a Saṃjñī Jīva. The soul which is capable of attaining *Śarīra-Paryāpti* is called *Āhāraka*.

### CONCLUSION

The nature and the classifications of the souls according to the principles of the Jaina philosophy are briefly described above. In the above Jaina account many new matters will be seen which are not met with in the theories of the other schools of Indian Philosophy. Some modern biological doctrines may be seen to be foreshadowed in the Jaina conception of the one-sensed animal etc. It must be admitted that there are some philosophical and scientific truths of priceless value in the Jaina doctrine of the soul, notwithstanding the fact that accounts of many supernatural phenomena are ordinarily mixed up with it.

## III. THE OMNISCIENCE OF THE SOUL

### JIVA'S OMNISCIENCE

We began our discourses with a consideration of the natures of the principles of motion and rest, of space and of the principle of mutation. These were rigid, unpsychical and unconscious reals. Next, we took up matter which, though unpsychical and unconscious like the foregoing, could influence and be influenced by the conscious subject. We have seen how linguistic sounds which were modes of matter according to the Jaina's, served as instruments for the expression of the conscious real. In Karma we had matter which accounted for the bondage of the soul. Śarīra was a mode of matter which encased the Jiva. The Indriya and the Manas also were modes of matter but they were so much under the influence of the soul that the Jaina philosophers

attributed a sort of derivative or transferred consciousness to them. Proceeding onward, we considered next the nature and the attributes of the soul. We have considered its various modes and have seen that lowest in the scale are the microscopic one-sensed animalcules and higher up, in a graduated series, as it were, are the various species of creatures in various degrees of perfection. Highest in the series of conscious beings are the Omniscient. We have cursorily referred to omniscience at various places but the discourse on the Jaina theory of the Jīva will not be complete without a fuller treatment of the subject viz: omniscience; and it is consistent with the order in which we have discussed the various reals of the Jaina metaphysic that the discourse should be closed with a consideration of omniscience and the omniscient. This is also important in view of the fact that the Jaina thinkers recognise no creator God but look upon the omniscient as their God.

## THE POSSIBILITY OF OMNISCIENCE: THE MIMĀMSĀ AND THE JAINA VIEWS

### MIMĀMSĀ VIEW—IMPOSSIBILITY OF OMNISCIENCE

The philosophers of the Mīmāṃsā school, through various modes of arguments establish that there can be no omniscient being at all. Their argument may be grouped into two parts. In the first place, they contend that there is no Pramāṇa or reason in support of the doctrine of omniscience. Secondly, they show that omniscience is something impossible.

### MIMĀMSĀ ARGUMENTS

As regards the first line of their arguments, the Mīmāṃsaka's begin by pointing out that Pratyakṣa (direct perception), Anumāna (inference), Upamāna (analogy), Āgama (authoritative sayings) and Arthāpatti (necessary implication) are the five sources of valid knowledge. Bhatta adds Abhāva (non-existence) as the sixth source of knowledge.

The Mīmāṃsaka's state that none of these Pramāṇa's establish the existence of an omniscient being.

The Pratyakṣa is generally what we call sensuous perception. Visual perceptions of colour and form, auditory apprehensions of sound are for example, Pratyakṣa. Pratyakṣa yields knowledge only of so much of a thing as comes in contact सन्निकर्ष with the sense-organs; the remaining part of the object which does not so come in contact with the sense-organs remains outside the ambit of the Pratyakṣa. The range of the Pratyakṣa is thus limited. We see, for instance, persons outside us; but the complexion, the form, the shape etc. of their bodies only are the objects of our Pratyakṣa. We cannot perceive what is in their mind. Now, if the contents of the mind of a person are outside the range of our sensuous knowledge, how shall we be able to have a Pratyakṣa or direct perception of an omniscient being? As it is impossible for us to have a direct apprehension of even the limited number of ideas which another has in his mind, it can on no account be stated that it is possible for us to have a Pratyakṣa of an omniscient being, in whose mind the ideas of all objects (beginningless, endless, past, present, future, subtle etc.)—अनाद्यनन्तातीतानागतवर्तमानसूक्ष्म—, Pare present in one eternal Now.

Coming to Anumāna, we find that it consists in a knowledge about a hitherto unknown object from the knowledge of a given object with which the former is invariably अविनाभाव connected. The stock example of Anumāna is the inference of fire in a hill from the observation of smoke there. In all Anumāna, it is clear, the Hetu or ground should be competent. In the inference of fire, smoke is the valid Hetu, because an inseparable connection between fire (the Sādhya or the proven) and smoke (the Hetu or the reason) is well known. Conversely where such invariable relationship between the proven and the reason is not known inference becomes impossible. To establish omniscience, only that would be a good Hetu with which omniscience is known to be invariably connected. But how is such

invariable relationship to be known? It is impossible for the Pratyakṣa to know such relationship. As shown already, omniscience itself is beyond the range of the Pratyakṣa and the knowledge of a relation is impossible without a previous knowledge of the related. Hence in the matter of an inference about the omniscient a valid Hetu is wanting.

Upamāna consists in a determination about an object from the knowledge of an object similar to it. If one is told "A Gabaya is like a Go (cow)", he decides the quadruped which he meets in the forest to be a Gabaya, if it is found to resemble a cow. This is Upamāna or analogical reasoning. None, however, resembling an omniscient being is seen, so that the very basis of the Upamāna is wanting. Hence the Mīmāṃsaka's contend that an omniscient being cannot be an object of Upamāna.

The Veda's are the Āgama or the collection of the authoritative sayings. According to the Mīmāṃsaka's, only those parts of the Veda's are authoritative and valid which deal with injunctions about what are to be done (Vidhi) and what are not to be done (Niṣedha). The portions of the Vedas which contain the Mantra's and the Brāhmaṇa's are thus Pramāṇa or sources of valid knowledge, while the Upaniṣads which do not deal with the moral injunctions are not valid authorities. The Mīmāṃsaka's point out that nowhere in the Vedic Mantra's or Brāhmaṇa's we come across any conception about the omniscient. The Veda's themselves are the unquestioned and the unquestionable teachers regarding man's duties and it is superfluous to admit an omniscient being for the purpose of teaching duties to mankind. Hence we find no mention of any omniscient being in the authoritative portions of the Veda's and if there is any mention of such a being in any parts of the Veda's, the septs are not authoritative. It is said that there are mentions of the omniscient in the various non-Vedic texts e.g., the Purāṇas. The Mīmāṃsaka's ask: Are these non-Vedic texts composed by an omniscient being or an inomniscient being? If by the latter, they are not authoritative. In the former case, there would be fallacy



of अन्योन्याश्रय or mutual dependance of the following form: The omniscient exist because they are mentioned in the non-Vedic texts; the non-Vedic texts are authoritative because the omniscient are their authors. The Āgama or the authoritative scripture does not thus lend support to the doctrine of omniscience.

Arthāpatti consists in an argument like this: Devadatta is found to be fat; it is also known that he does not take meals in day time; hence he must be supposed to eat at night. It is ordinarily said that Buddha and others are found to teach duties to their disciples; it is also known that they are not versed or believers in the Veda's; how then could they have taught? The answer based on Arthāpatti is that Buddha etc. must have been omniscient. The Mīmāṃsaka's oppose this argument by saying that one, teaching about duties need not be omniscient. It is true that Buddha and others have taught about duties; but omniscience need not be ascribed to them on that account. It is possible even for an ignorant man to lecture on what should or should not be done. The Mīmāṃsaka's declare that Buddha etc. are to be understood to have taught from their ignorance only,—व्यामोहादेवकेवलम् ।

The second line of argument that is advanced against the Mīmāṃsaka position is that leaving aside the teachers like Buddha etc. we find that wise men like Manu etc. have been teachers of duties. How could they be instructors without being omniscient? The Mīmāṃsā thinkers admit that Manu etc. were not ignorant men like Buddha and that their competency as teachers is in no way to be questioned. Still, according to the Mīmāṃsaka's even Manu etc. are not to be thought as omniscient persons. They were well-versed in the Veda's and this was the source of their teachership. Hence it is pointed out by the Mīmāṃsaka thinkers that Arthāpatti does not prove the reality of omniscience.

Lastly, the Mīmāṃsā philosophers show that the Pramāṇa which is called Abhāva does not establish omniscience. The nature of Abhāva Pramāṇa is as follows: A pitcher is an object capable of being perceived; when it is

not found in a certain place, we may say there is no pitcher there. Everywhere persons that are found are all inomniscient,—from which it follows that an omniscient being who is the very opposite of the inomniscient persons is no where to be found.

Hence the existence of omniscient persons is in no way proved.

The second contention of the *Mimāṃsaka*'s is that it is impossible for a person to be omniscient. An omniscient being must know not only the gross objects which are perceptible by our senses but also the subtle-most things which are beyond their purview. Hence one cannot be omniscient by *Pratyakṣa* or direct perception. Reasoning is based on matters of sense-perception and accordingly one cannot be omniscient by reasoning. If it were possible for men to be omniscient by reasoning, every one could be omniscient. No such scripture is available which gives omniscience to its readers. It is to be noted that the knowledge which is derived from reasoning and scripture is so vague and indistinct that it cannot be looked upon as a full and complete knowledge about objects. Next, it may be questioned: Does omniscience consist in a knowledge of all things or does it consist in a knowledge of some principal things only? If omniscience be knowledge of all things, how does it arise? If it arises gradually i.e. successively from the knowledge of one thing to that of another and so on omniscience as a complete knowledge of all things past, present, future, distant and infinite becomes obviously impossible. If, on the contrary, it is said that the knowledge, of all the objects arises simultaneously, very serious difficulties crop up. Things are of different natures; some for example, are cold, some hot and so on. How can perceptions of such essentially different things arise simultaneously? Secondly, it may be pointed out that feelings of attachment, envy etc., are present in every man's heart; so that one who is to be omniscient must perceive these feelings of other's hearts; the result is that the omniscient himself comes to have the feelings of love, hatred etc. If it be maintained on the

contrary that omniscience implies a knowledge, not of all things but of some principal things only, it may be pointed out that this presupposes omniscience or a knowledge of all things first, out of which some competent principal things are to be selected for cognition. Lastly, with respect to the omniscient being, it may be asked: How is he to know the past and the future? The past and the future are not present and as such, they are non-existent. A knowledge of non-existent things cannot be *Pramāṇa* or a valid knowledge. If it be said that the omniscient knows the things of the past and the future as things of the present time, his knowledge of those things would then not be correct.

It may not be worthy of credit to the uninformed Hindus but is nevertheless true that the *Mīmāṃsaka*'s who are the most orthodox and firm supporters of the Vedas, deny the existence not only of the omniscient but also of the Creator. In none of the communities, Moslem, Christian or Jewish can be found such unperturbed faith in the scripture or the Revelation, in close alliance with atheism, as characterises the Indian *Mīmāṃsā* school.

### JAINA REFUTATION OF THE MIMĀMSĀ THEORY

The Jaina's on the contrary maintain that omniscience is not only possible but that it is a potentiality in all souls, which has been actually realised in the Arhat's. They point that the *Vira-vardhamāna* and other Arhat's were all-knowing perfect beings. In criticism of the *Mīmāṃsā* objections, *Ratnaprabhācāryya* urges that "*Pratyakṣa* is either transcendental or practical. The transcendental perception again is either incomplete or complete. The incomplete transcendental perception is either clairvoyance or telepathy. Neither of these, however, opposes the possibility of omniscience, in as much as they deal with things having 'form' and 'mental substance' respectively. It goes without saying that the complete transcendental perception which is omniscience itself cannot be said to oppose the possibility of omniscience. Coming to the practical perception, we may say that neither of its two modes viz:—the

sensuous and the non-sensuous opposes the possibility of omniscience. The non-sensuous or internal perception consists in pleasurable or painful feelings, arising from within the Soul itself. None of these prove the impossibility of omniscience. If it be said that the sensuous perception, opposes the possibility of omniscience,—we ask, whose perception is it, your (i.e. the opponent's) own or other person's? If your own perception opposes it, there may be two alternatives. You may say that your perception at the present moment is opposed to omniscience; this position, however, is not contested. But if you say that your perception is at all times and in all places is opposed to omniscience,—we ask,—do you say it after having experience of all times and of all places or do you say it without having them? In the first case, you yourself are an omniscient being and thus contradict your own position. In the latter case, your assertion is dogmatic. If however, it be argued that other persons' perception opposes omniscience, all the difficulties just discussed crop up. It may be urged, moreover, that as no person can make you feel his own perception, you must be dependent on his *ipse dixit*, that omniscience is impossible. In that case, why should you not believe in our assertion regarding the possibility of omniscience? For all these reasons, the Pratyakṣa or direct perception cannot be said to oppose the possibility of omniscience. If it be said that our experience other than direct perception is opposed to omniscience, we ask what is this experience? You cannot say that as we have not yet come across an omniscient being in our experience, such a being must be impossible. For, when we are asleep, pillars, pitchers, lotus, flowers, clouds etc. are not perceived; but certainly we are not justified in saying that they are 'non-existent' then. It cannot be said that the Pramāṇa's,—Anumāna or inference, Śabda or authority, Arthāpatti or the method of residues, Upamāna or analogy and Abhāva or proof with regard to non-existence, are opposed to the possibility of omniscience. Anumāna cannot establish the non-existence of omniscient beings. Rather, it, in trying to do that, posits the

possibility of omniscience. Anumāna is based on the invariable relationship between the Hetu and the Sādhya. You yourself say that you have no experience of omniscience; how then can you get a Hetu, which may be (negatively) connected with it? Hence in trying to refute the doctrine of omniscience, Anumāna rather posits it. The Commentator Ratnaprabhācārīya shows how "the Lord Varddhamāna may be proved to be an omniscient being. The Hetu or reason which establishes omniscience in the Lord is not fallacious. The facts that the Lord Varddhamāna's knowledge was not confined within a small number of objects, that he did not teach about only a limited number of objects, that he did not observe only a small number of objects, that the hindrances to his knowledge did all totally subside, that he was free from attachment and envy, that what he taught were not opposed to the Pramāṇa's, that his being a teacher and his being an omniscient being are not facts contradictory of each other,—these facts and similar evidence conclusively determine that the Hetu establishing omniscience in the Lord Varddhamāna is perfectly faultless, according to the rules of logic. Hence Anumāna is not opposed to the possibility of omniscience; it rather proves that the Lord Varddhamāna at least was an omniscient being. Next, it cannot be argued that Śabda or scriptural authority is opposed to the possibility of omniscience. What kind of scripture is it that opposes omniscience? If you say that it is Apauruṣya or not-man-made scripture, we answer that there cannot be any such scripture. If, however, you say that it is 'man-made' scripture, we say that in order that such a scripture may be authoritative, it must be revealed by a being who is omniscient (in which case, the possibility of omniscience is proved by the scripture itself); if it is not revealed by such an absolutely wise and omniscient being, we cannot accept its doctrines. Arthāpatti, as we have seen, proves a fact by offering an explanation which could not be put forward by the other Pramāṇa's. Upamāna or analogy deals with similarity and similars. None of these obviously has anything

to offer against the possibility of omniscience. The Abhāva-pramāṇa deals with the fact of non-existence. But as Anumāna can establish the positive existence of an omniscient being, it cannot be the business of the Abhāva-pramāṇa to establish the impossibility of omniscience. Lastly, it cannot be said that there is no proof for the possibility of omniscience; for, Anumāna, as we have shown, does conclusively prove it. The Jaina Āgama which successfully stands the test of a true scripture, indicated above, also shows that the Tirthamkara's and the Siddha's were all omniscient beings. It is in this way that the Jaina's maintain against the Mīmāṃsaka's that omniscience is possible.

## B. THE WORLD-CREATOR AND OMNISCIENCE: THE SĀMKHYA VIEW

### SĀMKHYA THEORY OF THE WORLD EVOLVING FROM PRAKṚTI

All the different schools following the authority of the Veda's agree that although the cosmic course has no beginning, it has its temporary breaks,—when the world is destroyed and then evolved afresh. An account of the creation of the universe is accordingly found in all the systems. The Mīmāṃsaka's are content with saying this that the Jiva's are wandering in the Saṃsāra from the beginningless time, driven by Adr̥ṣṭa or the force generated by their Karma's. Kapila, the author of the Sāmkhya Sūtra's admits the existence of a world-evolving Prakṛti over and above the infinite number of eternal and self-existent Ātmā's.

‘इतश्चास्ति प्रधानम्-वैश्वरूप्यस्याविभागात् । वैश्वरूप्यं हि लोकत्रयमभिधीयते । तच्च प्रलयकाले क्वचिदविभागं गच्छति । उक्तं च प्राक् पञ्चभूतानि पञ्चसु तन्मात्रेष्वविभागं गच्छन्तीति । अविभागो हि नामाविवेकः । यथा क्षीरावस्थायामन्यत्क्षीरमन्यदधीति विवेको न शक्यते कर्तुं तद्वत्प्रलयकाले व्यक्तमिदमव्यक्तं चेदमिति । अतो मन्यामहेऽस्ति प्रधानं यत्र महदाद्यविभागं गच्छतीति । प्रकृतेः सर्वज्ञत्वं जगत्कर्तृत्वं चेति शङ्काप्रकरणे (प्रमेयकमलमार्तण्डः) ।

Curd is made from milk. When milk remains as milk, curd remains in it in a subtle state; curd is not then found as separate from milk. The five

**PRAKṚTI, AS AN OMNISCIENT PRINCIPLE**

According to the author of the Sāṃkhya, this Prakṛti is unconscious. But though unconscious, it is what evolves the universe. There is thus some similarity between this Prakṛti and the Unconscious of the present day voluntarist school.

“According to V. Hartmann. . . . . the Unconscious is the absolute principle active in all things, the force which is operative in the inorganic, organic and mental alike. . . . . The Unconscious exists independently of space, time and individual existence, timeless before the being of the world”.

“Unconscious” in Dictionary Of Philosophy And Psychology.

Some, however, of the Sāṃkhya philosophers thought that there was nothing inconsistent if the cosmic principle of the Prakṛti were considered as omniscient. They held that the Prakṛti was the creator of the world and as such, was necessarily all-knowing.<sup>1</sup>

It is to be noticed also that according to the Sāṃkhya, there are the conscious Souls or Puruṣa's, besides the Prakṛti. These Souls also are beginningless. It may be said that although the Prakṛti is essentially unconscious, there would be a sort of transferred or reflected consciousness in it, owing to its proximity to the conscious Puruṣa's. Its

elements of Earth etc. intelligence, self-consciousness etc. are not found in their separate state in the time of the Pralaya or cosmic involution; at that time their Vibhāga or independent existences are not perceived. Something, in which these remain in a subtle state at that time of involution must be admitted as existent and as one. This something is the Prakṛti otherwise called the Pradhāna. It is in this Prakṛti that the Vaiśvarūpya or the explicit universe enters and remains in an implicit state at the time of Pralaya. At the time of creation, it is from this Pradhāna that the reals e.g. intelligence, self-consciousness etc. emerge and account for the world-phenomena. Prakṛti is thus the creator of the world.

<sup>1</sup> निखिल जगत्कर्तृत्वाच्चास्या एवाशेषज्ञत्वमस्तु—

प्रकृतेः सर्वज्ञत्वं जगत्कर्तृत्वं चेति शङ्काप्रकरणे

(प्रमेयकमलमार्तण्डः)

evolution or creation of the world-reals, e.g. intelligence, self-consciousness etc. is due to its having this kind of derivative consciousness. Prakṛti as the world-creator may be regarded as omniscient, although it is not possessed of the pure consciousness of a Puruṣa. It is on this point that the Sāṃkhya philosophers differ from the voluntarists. According to Schopenhauer, and the voluntarists of his school, there is no conscious Soul by the side of the primal unconscious Will. The unconscious Will evolves the world unconsciously and even when after millions of years after the world-creation there emerge the conscious beings, the Unconscious Will continues as unconscious. For, consciousness of man, according to the voluntarists is after all a negligible and superfluous excrescence; its emergence or evolution makes no difference in the unconscious nature of the world-evolving unconscious Will. The unconscious Will is eternally unconscious according to the voluntarists; there can never arise any question about its omniscience.

#### OR, PRAKṚTI EVOLVES INSTINCTIVELY

There certainly are rooms for doubt whether Prakṛti can be omniscient, even though the creation of the world may be attributed to it. Admittedly, the Prakṛti is unconscious at the time of the involution up till the point when the creation begins. The Sāṃkhya philosophers have nowhere expressly stated that when the Prakṛti evolves the world, it does so consciously. There is no wisdom in birds nor even a clear idea in them about the object of their nests; they instinctively build their highly intricate nests and they cannot be said to be intelligent in the matter of making their nests. A cow holds and preserves milk in her which nourishes her calf, although she has no idea about the property of her milk nor its usefulness in connection with the nourishment of her calf; a cow is not called intelligent notwithstanding the fact of her preserving her milk for the calf. It may similarly be maintained that the Prakṛti evolves the world although it has no conscious idea about its cause or end. The Prakṛti need not be omniscient so far as the



creation of the world is concerned. The present day voluntarists also contend that the unconscious Will which is at the basis of the world has not evolved the world with a conscious end in view but has done so under a blind urge which is akin to the various instincts found in lower animals. The world-evolving Prakṛti is not omniscient; it is essentially unconscious.

#### ADṚṢṬA, AS DISCRIMINATING PRINCIPLE

The question will then arise: How can the unconscious Prakṛti have an urge for creation? The question becomes complicated when we find that the Sāṃkhya philosophers are themselves not prepared to say that the Prakṛti in the matter of creating the world creates it in an arbitrary and unconditioned manner. The Adṛṣṭa or the mysterious force, generated by one's acts, is admitted by the Sāṃkhya thinkers to be a discriminative principle in cosmic evolution.

कर्मवैचित्र्यात् सृष्टिर्देविच्यम् । सांख्यसूत्रम् । तन्त्रार्थसंक्षेपाध्यायः । ४२  
—upon which Aniruddha Bhaṭṭa comments:—

उपादानाभेदेऽपि निमित्तभेदेन भेद इत्यर्थः ।

#### THEORY OF GOD, AS THE DIRECTOR OF PRAKṚTI

The world is not created without any reference to this Adṛṣṭa. The Prakṛti creates rather in accordance with it. The Prakṛti, however, is unconscious. How can it be possible for the Pradhāna, unconscious as it is, to create a well-ordered universe, with its infinite varieties organised into a system, fully consistent with the variedly infinite. Adṛṣṭa's or forces generated by the acts of the infinite number of Jīva's? A section of the Sāṃkhya philosophers who have been called the *सेश्वरसांख्यवादी* admit, the existence of a presiding God to escape the difficulty. They maintain that the Prakṛti is unconscious. It is impossible for the Prakṛti not only to create a universe consistent with the Adṛṣṭa's of the Jīva's but to create at all. Prakṛti is unmoving and passive by nature. For the purpose of

the evolution of the universe, a presiding and directing God is to be admitted, who moves the passive Prakṛti towards the creation of the world in accordance with the Adṛṣṭa's<sup>1</sup>. This God is conscious of all the Adṛṣṭa's. He knows accordingly what should be the nature of the universe and knows also how the Prakṛti should be directed in the course of the cosmic evolution. This presiding God is necessarily omniscient.

But most of the Sāṃkhya philosophers have not accepted this theistic theory. They point out that Kapila has nowhere expressly admitted the existence of God. Rather, in many of his aphorisms, he has said there are no Pramāṇa's or grounds in support of the doctrine of a creator God.

### C. THE WORLD-CREATOR AND OMNISCIENCE: THE NYĀYA VIEW: THE JAINA CRITICISM

#### NYĀYA AND VAIŚEṢIKA THEORY OF GOD

It is in the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika systems of philosophy that we find the theory of an omniscient and all-powerful God, clearly stated and supported. The philosophers of the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika schools like all other Indian philosophers admit that the Adṛṣṭa or the force due to their acts is the cause of the Jīva's wanderings in the Saṃsāra from the beginningless time through transmigrations. But they do not admit the existence or agenthood of the world-evolving Prakṛti of the Sāṃkhya. Like the Sāṃkhya philosophers, however, they admit the existence of an infinite number of eternal and uncreate souls; and in the place of one Prakṛti, the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika philosophers posit an infinite number of material atoms, as the material basis of the universe.

<sup>1</sup> 'न प्रधानादेव केवलादमी कार्यभेदाः प्रवर्तन्ते, तस्या अचेतनत्वाद्वाहि  
अचेतनोद्धिष्ठायकमन्तरेण कार्यमारभमाणो दृष्टः' । -----

तस्मादीश्वर एव प्रधानापेक्षः कार्यभेदानां कर्ता । -----  
प्रकृते सर्वज्ञत्वं जगत्कर्तृत्वं चेति शङ्का प्रकरणे (प्रमेयकमलमार्तण्डः)

## NYĀYA INFERENCE ABOUT THE CAUSE FROM THE EFFECT

So, according to the Naiyāyika's, we have on the one hand an infinite number of material atoms and on the other, an infinite number of souls with *Adṛṣṭa*'s peculiar to each. The question thus arises: How do the bodies which are the means of the soul's varied worldly enjoyments and for the matter of that, the physical world originate? The souls, are, by nature, passive; they cannot create their bodies. The material atoms also are inactive, they also cannot be the creators of bodies, of and by themselves. Accordingly the Naiyāyika's conclude that there is an all-powerful God who for enabling the Jiva's to experience the good and the bad fruits of their actions creates bodies as the means and the world, as the place of their enjoyments, out of the material atoms. In the matter of the creation of the world, God's infinite intelligence is manifest. If an object is made up of parts, the former is called the *Kārya* i.e. the effect. A house, for example, which is constituted of smaller parts is thus an effect. But in order that the smaller parts may be suitably joined, an intelligent builder is necessary, who by his own intelligence and efforts would organise these parts in accordance with his plan and thus make up a whole object. Thus in the matter of building a house, we find that there is an intelligent builder who constructs it by intelligently and actually placing the building materials in consistency with the building plan. An effect is thus always the work of an intelligent maker. In other words, an effect leads us to conclude that there is an intelligent agent behind it. We find that material objects and molecules are made up of subtle atoms; so, the former are effects. Who, then, has made the effects? The Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika philosophers argue that since the world and the material objects are effects, there must be an intelligent Being as their creator<sup>1</sup>.

‘क्षित्यादिकं बुद्धिमद्भेतुकं कार्यत्वात् । यत्कार्यतद् बुद्धिमद्भेतुकं दृष्टं यथा घटादि । कार्यं चेदं क्षित्यादिकम् । तस्माद्बुद्धिमद्भेतुकम् ।’

## TELEOLOGICAL ARGUMENT

This world-creator is the infinitely intelligent God. There is obviously some similarity between the Naiyāyika argument from effect to its intelligent maker and the teleological argument of the modern theists, “—that theistic argument which proceeds on the principle of finality and which reasons from the rational constitution of the world to the necessity that it should be grounded in a purposive intelligence.” It is also called the ‘design argument’ (Teleological Argument—Dictionary Of Philosophy And Psychology).

According to the Naiyāyika’s, God is necessarily omniscient. He makes such a body and such environments for each soul as are exactly in accordance with its *Adṛṣṭa*.<sup>1</sup>

The infinite forms of the *Adṛṣṭa* of the infinite number of souls, the infinite ways of their fruition, the infinite means and environments for their enjoyment, the nature and the competency of the infinite number of atoms as materials of creation and the infinite methods of creation can be present only in the infinite intelligence of the all-knowing God. Omniscience must be attributed to God: otherwise, his creative function becomes impossible<sup>2</sup>.

## JAINA CRITICISM OF THE SĀMKHYA AND THE NYĀYA-VAIŚEṢIKA THEORIES

The Jaina’s, as we have seen, maintain, against the contention of the *Mīmāṃsā* school, the doctrine that omniscience

‘न चात्र कार्यत्वमसिद्धम् । यथाहि—कार्यं क्षित्यादिकं सावयवत्वात् । यत्सावयवत्वम् तत् कार्यं प्रतिपन्नम् । यथा प्रासादादि । सावयवं चेदं । तस्मात् कार्यम् ।’----- “ईश्वरस्य सर्वज्ञस्य सृष्टिकर्तृत्वसमर्थनम्” प्रकरणे  
—प्रमेयकमलमार्तण्डः ।

‘यस्य यथाविधोऽदृष्टः पुण्यरूपोऽपुण्यरूपो वा तस्य तथाविधफलोपभोगाय तत्सापेक्षस्तथाविधशरीरादीन् सृजतीति “ईश्वरस्य सर्वज्ञस्य सृष्टिकर्तृत्वसमर्थनम्” । प्रकरणे—

सर्वज्ञतः चास्याशेषकार्यकरणात्सिद्धा । यो हि यत्करोति स तस्योपादानादिकारणकलापं प्रयोजनं चावश्यं जानाति’ ।

ईश्वरस्य सर्वज्ञस्य सृष्टिकर्तृत्वसमर्थनम्—प्रकरणे—प्रमेयकमलमार्तण्डः ।

is possible and that there are omniscient beings. They, however, do not admit that the world-evolving Prakṛti of the Sāṃkhya school is an omniscient principle. They are also opposed to the theistic doctrines of the Sēśvara Sāṃkhya as well as of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika systems. The Jaina's repudiate the theory of God as the First Cause or the Architect of the universe. Shortly put, their arguments (as described by the commentator of the Pramāṇa-naya-tattvālokālaṅkāra) are as follows:—"The thinkers of the Nyāya school contend that omniscience is not possible in a man like the Arhat but that it is possible only in the Lord who has created the things of the universe. These theistic philosophers argue that the earth, the hill etc. in question are determined (i.e. created, in some sense) by an intelligent being; for, their coming into existence is due to a cause; that their coming into existence is due to a cause, is determined by an intelligent being; for instance, a temple; such is the case here; so it is. In criticism of the above Nyāya theory, the Jaina's point to the two aspects of a thing viz:—its essential *substance* and its *modes*. So far as their *substance* is concerned the Jaina's contend that the things of the universe e.g. the earth, the mountain etc. are certainly uncreate and eternal, so that we cannot talk of any causes bringing them into existence. The Naiyāyika's urge that all things have parts and that from this fact it follows that they must have a beginning in existence. The Jaina philosophers point out that such a line of argument would go to establish that a soul (which is admittedly an uncreate and eternal substance) has also a beginning in existence. It is argued that not the essential *substance* of a thing but its *modes* have a beginning in existence and that from this it follows that the thing in question must be determined by an intelligent being. The Jaina's point out that a soul sometimes manifests itself as a god, sometimes as a man and so on, so that it has various impermanent modes. But it would be illogical to conclude from this that a soul is created by an intelligent being. The further objection of the Jaina's to the theory of an omniscient creator of the things of the universe is that

no such intelligent being is even an object of our perceptual observation. The contention that the creator is an imperceptible being is also unsound. If the reason or the ground be perceptible things, the consequent or the object of the conclusion will also be perceptible. It is not to be argued that the creator may be imperceptible, just as fire within the hill, which is inferred from the observation of smoke, is unscen. For, the fire in itself is not imperceptible; it is not observed, as there is some obstacle. So, the analogy does not hold good in the case of the creator who is supposed to be an essentially imperceptible being. Lastly, the Jaina's point out that although a thing may have a beginning, it may not have an intelligent creator. We can guess a thing as man-made i.e. made by an intelligent being; but the nature of the things of the universe e.g. the earth, the mountain etc. is so very different from the nature of man-made things, that it is unreasonable to suppose an intelligent creator of those. If thus there is no creator of the things of the universe, the theory that the creator is the only omniscient being, falls to the ground". (My translation of the *Pramāṇa-naya-tattvālokāraṅkāra*).

Any comments on the above line of Jaina criticism of the theistic theory is uncalled for here. We shall conclude by simply pointing out that the two main arguments of the present day anti-theistic thinkers against the theistic position can be traced in the above Jaina criticism. In the Jaina contention that the creator, if there were any, would have been an object of perception, is fore-shadowed the charge of anthropo-morphism levelled against theism; secondly, the present day antitheistic criticism of the theistic doctrine based on evidences of what has been called "dis-theology" is essentially similar to the Jaina contention that the things of the universe are so very different from the man-made things that it is unreasonable to suppose the creator of those to be an intelligent being.

## D. THE COSMIC BEING AND OMNISCIENCE: THE VEDĀNTA VIEW

### SAGUṆA BRAHMA IS OMNISCIENT

There is unanimity that the *Brahma* is omniscient, among those Vedāntins who are not Māyā-vādins or absolute monists, however much they differ among themselves on other points. The dualists of the Vedānta school maintain that in spite of the essential difference between the *Brahma* and the world, the finite souls and the material universe are moved in accordance with the will of the *Brahma*, just as “the club in the hand of the club-holder”. It can easily be inferred that such a *Brahma* is omniscient like the *Īśvara* of the *Naiyāyika*’s. In the same manner, the *Brahma* who, according to the Vedānta school of the *Viśiṣṭādvaita*, is *Antaryāmī* or immanent in the world of finite souls and material objects, is all-knowing. The Vedāntist of the *Dvaitādvaita* school maintains that the *Brahma* is perfect and all-embracing and the finite souls are but imperfect parts of him and that consequently the former is both identical with and distinct from (*Bhedābheda*) the latter; but these Vedāntists also do not maintain any doubt about the omniscience of the *Brahma*. The Māyā-vādin Vedāntists notwithstanding their absolute monism admit the practical reality of a determined (*Saguṇa*) *Brahma* at the basis of the empirical world; this *Brahma* is admitted to be omniscient and it is said of him,—‘एतदुपहितं चैतन्यं सर्वज्ञत्वसर्वेश्वरत्व-सर्वनियन्तृत्वगुणकं सदसदव्यक्तमन्तर्यामि जगत्कारणमीश्वर इतिव्यपदिश्यते।’  
—वेदान्तसारः

## E. THE COSMIC BEING AND OMNISCIENCE: THE YOGA VIEW

### YOGA VIEW, OMNISCIENT GOD JOINS PRAKṚTI AND PURUṢA AND SEPARATES THEM

The author of the *Yoga-Sūtra*’s while admitting the dual reality of the *Prakṛti* and the *Puruṣa*’s at the root of the

universe, maintains nevertheless the doctrine of God. This God is "untouched" by any of the five modes of pain (Kleśa) e.g. ignorance etc; by acts (Karma); by the effects of acts (Vipāka); or by any impression or tendency (Āśaya or Saṁskāra). Bhoja-rāja, the commentator of Patañjali's Yoga Sūtra's says that the creation and the preservation of the universe are due to the conjunction of the Prakṛti and the Puruṣa's and its annihilation, to their separation. He points out that this conjunction and the separation of the Prakṛti and the Puruṣa's are impossible without the intervention of God, over and above them. In other words, the creation and the destruction of the world are dependent on the will of God. 'प्रकृतिपुरुषसंयोगवियोगयोरीश्वरेच्छा व्यतिरेकेणानुपपत्तेः'।

भोजवृत्तिः २४॥ समाधिपादः।

This God of the Yoga philosophy is omniscient.

'तत्र निरतिशयसर्वज्ञत्वबीजम्।'

योगसूत्रम्। २५॥ समाधिपादः।

All objects gross, subtle, present, past and future as well as all phenomena are ever present in the knowledge of God. His is knowledge in its perfect form and there is nothing outside its range.

## F. THE ARBITRARY WORLD-CREATOR

THE VIEW, THAT THE OMNISCIENT GOD IS NOT GUIDED BY  
ADṚṢṬA

Most of the systems of philosophy which claim to follow the lead of the Vedas and which admit the existence of God in the abovementioned ways, maintain that God shapes his creation and directs his creative activity in accordance with the Adṛṣṭa of the Jīva's. The creation is meant for making the souls enjoy the effects of their acts. But there are philosophers who also claim to represent the Vedic views, but who maintain that in the matter of the creation of the world, God is not guided by the Adṛṣṭa. These thinkers point out that very often the acts of a person are found not to bear their expected fruits, so that there is no reason for holding that God creates the world for making the Jīva's



enjoy the fruits of their actions. It is said that the author of the Nyāya Sūtra's had the theory of these philosophers in view when he stated—

‘ईश्वरः कारणं पुरुषकर्माफल्यदर्शनात्।’ न्यायसूत्रम्। ४।२।

God is the sole cause of the creation; (he is not guided by the Adrṣṭa) for, often the acts of persons are found to be fruitless.

As we have seen already, the philosophers of the Jaina school are opposed to all theories about an Architect of the Universe.

## G. THE LIBERATED STATE AND OMNISCIENCE: THE BUDDHIST VIEW

LIKE THE JAINA'S BUDDHISTS DENY THE CREATOR GOD

Save and except the Mīmāṃsā, the Vedic systems of philosophy, as we have seen, mostly admit that there is a God on whose will and intelligent efforts, depend the creation, the preservation and the annihilation of the world and in whatever manner he may be called, the Pradhāna, the Īśvara, the Saṅga Brahma or the Parama Puruṣa,—God is omniscient. The Jaina's, as we have pointed out more than once, do not admit the existence of an architect God and so the question of divine omniscience does not arise with them. So far as the doctrine of God's omniscience is concerned, the Buddhist position is similar to that of the Jaina's. The Buddhists also do not believe in the existence of God. Therefore, the problem boils itself down to this. Either the finite beings are capable of attaining omniscience or omniscience is an impossibility. Now, with regard to the problem of omniscience in finite beings, the Buddhistic attitude may be indicated in the following manner.

## NIRVĀṆA IN BUDDHISM

That the mundane unliberated souls are not omniscient is admitted not only by the Mīmāṃsaka's but by all the philosophers. The fact is a matter of observation and not

denied by the Buddhists. The liberated souls are, in the language of the Buddhists, निर्वाणतागत i.e. in the state of Nirvāṇa. Scholars have differed regarding the meaning of Nirvāṇa but with respect to omniscience in the liberated, the difference is of no effect. For, if Nirvāṇa means extinction like that of the light of an extinguished lamp, then a Jīva is no more alive when it enters the Nirvāṇa, so that it is quite meaningless to talk of it then as omniscient. If on the other hand, Nirvāṇa means a state 'शरणम्, परायणम् or अक्खरणम्' which is everlasting ('अनन्तम्' 'अच्युतम्' 'असंख्यतम्' —or अनुत्तरेन्) and which has been described in the sacred books of the Buddhists as blessed and true खेमम्, शिवम्, सच्चम्, केवलम्, पदम्, then a being in Nirvāṇa may not be devoid of existence. But with respect to a being in such a state also, the question of omniscience does not arise. For, according to the Buddhists, Taṇhā is the root of all knowledge; owing to Taṇhā and the Vāsanā, momentary apprehensions regarding momentary objects arise every moment. This series of momentary apprehensions (Santāna) stops absolutely when Nirvāṇa is attained at the annihilation of Vāsanā, so that it is not possible for a Jīva who has attained the Nirvāṇa to have omniscience or knowledge of all or any of the objects of the world.

## H. THE LIBERATED STATE AND OMNISCIENCE: THE NYĀYA AND VAIŚEṢIKA VIEWS

ACCORDING TO THE NYĀYA-VAIŚEṢIKA VIEW, APAVARGA OR LIBERATION IS AN UNCONSCIOUS STATE

Just as omniscience is impossible in a being who has entered the state called the Nirvāṇa by the Buddhists, it is impossible in a similar way in a soul which has attained absolute liberation, called Apavarga by the Naiyāyika's. According to Gautama, desire, aversion, effort, pleasure, pain and knowledge are the attributes or peculiar characteristics of a soul; some add three other attributes to this list.

In any case, the theory of the Nyāya philosophy is that when Apavarga or final emancipation is attained, all those attributes or characteristics of the soul leave it absolutely.

‘तदेव’ विषणादीनां नवानामपि मूलतः गुणानामात्मनो ध्वंसः सोपवर्गः प्रतिष्ठितः ।’ —कारिकावली

In a Jīva, which has attained Apavarga, Jñāna or consciousness is absent just like its other attributes, so that when one thinks that the state of liberation, as conceived by Gautama, is not unlike the absolutely passive and unconscious state of a stone—,

‘मुक्तये यः शिलात्वाय शास्त्रमूचे सचेतसाम् ।’ १७,७५ । नैषधीय चरितम्  
he is not probably wrong. According to the Vaiśeṣika’s also, the soul is in the state of liberation when on the annihilation of all its attributes e.g. consciousness etc. it exists like the expanse of sky,—

‘अत्यन्तनाशे गुणसङ्गते यां ।’ स्थितिर्नभोवत् कणभक्षपक्षे ।

मुक्तिः :-----संक्षेपशंकरविजयः १६, ६९ ।

A liberated soul is thus unconscious; so that it must be understood to be the theory of the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika systems that a liberated soul cannot be omniscient. Although some of the Naiyāyika’s hold that there is a feeling of “eternal happiness” ( नित्यसुख ) in a soul in its liberated state, it is the common contention of all the Naiyāyika’s that the liberated soul has no consciousness of the world and its objects. Consequently, the emancipated being is not omniscient.

## I. THE LIBERATED STATE AND OMNISCIENCE: THE ADVAITA VEDĀNTA VIEW

ADVAITA VEDĀNTA VIEW, OMNISCIENCE IMPOSSIBLE IN A LIBERATED SOUL

According to the Vedāntins of the Advaita (absolute monist) school, neither the bondage nor the emancipation of the soul is real. If from the Vyavahārika or empirical

standpoint, a soul be said to be freed from its state of bondage, even then, omniscience cannot be attributed to the emancipated being. For, a liberated soul is nothing but a soul in itself; in such a soul which is absolutely non-dual consciousness, there can be no internal division 'स्वगतभेद'. And because there is nothing outside it which is similar to or dissimilar from it, there cannot be any distinction of it from its similars 'सजातीयभेद' or from its dissimilars 'विजातीयभेद'. A liberated soul is not a knower but consciousness itself; there is nothing beside it,—

‘नेह नानास्ति किञ्चन ।’

Owing to the Avidyā or false knowledge, of course, there may be consciousness of outside objects in a soul in bondage,

‘यत्र हि द्वैतमिव भवति तदितर इतरं पश्यति ।’

But in its state of liberation there is nothing outside or beside it, so that liberated soul has no consciousness of objects other than itself. ‘यत्र तस्य सर्वमात्मैवाभूत् तत्केन कं पश्येत् ।’

Accordingly from the standpoint of the Advaita Vedānta, omniscience in a liberated being is impossible.

## J. THE LIBERATED STATE AND OMNISCIENCE: THE SĀMKHYA AND YOGA VIEWS

The philosophers of the Sāṃkhya and the Yoga schools maintained, as we have seen, that the evolution of the world was due to the conjunction of the Prakṛti and the Puruṣa's. The soul may be said to be in a state of bondage, so long as the Prakṛti remains proximate to it. The soul, however, is absolutely incorruptible; there cannot be any real connection of the Prakṛti with it. It is owing to Aviveka or ignorance that the essentially incorruptible Puruṣa is looked upon as affected or influenced by the Prakṛti. ‘निसंगेष्वप्युपरागो विवेकात्, सांख्यसूत्रम्, तन्त्रार्थसंक्षेपाध्यायः ।’

When a red flower is held over a glassware, the shade of redness falls upon the latter and makes it appear as red; but the real nature of the glassware is not modified in the least thereby;—in the same manner, the proximateness of

the Prakṛti to the Puruṣa makes no change in the essential nature of the latter.

‘जपास्फटिकयोरिव तोषरागः किन्त्वभिमानः।’ २९

### WITH THE SĀMKNHYA-YOGA NO OMNISCIENCE IN A LIBERATED SOUL

It is thus that owing to the Aviveka, the soul is considered to be in bondage when the Prakṛti is near it and that it is said to be emancipated when the Prakṛti is no longer near it. Really, there is no relation whatsoever between the Puruṣa's on the one hand and the Prakṛti with its evolutes on the other. When a soul is liberated, it is even impossible to imagine a connection. The liberated Puruṣa cannot thus be said to be omniscient or a knower of all things, according to the principles of the Sāmkhya and Yoga systems.

It is consequently clear that the Buddhists and the Vedic systems agree that not only are the mundane souls not omniscient but that the liberated and the finally disembodied souls also are not such.

## K. THE STAGE PENULTIMATE TO LIBERATION AND OMNISCIENCE: THE YOGA VIEW

### YOGA VIEW, OMNISCIENCE IS POSSIBLE IN A SOUL IN THE STATE, PENULTIMATE TO ITS LIBERATION

Although neither a mundane soul nor an emancipated being is omniscient, a soul *on the way to liberation* may be possessed of a kind of knowledge just before its final emancipation which may be called omniscience. The author of the Yoga Sūtra's calls it Prātibha and the Sāmkhya also believes in its possibility. According to Patañjali, one possessed of the Prātibha has the knowledge of all things,—

‘प्रातिभाद्वा सर्वम्’ । योगसूत्रम्, विभूतिपादः ३४

—upon which Bhoja-rāja comments,—यथोदेत्यति सवितरि पूर्वं प्रभाप्रादुर्भवति तद्वद् विवेकख्यातेः पूर्वं तारकं सर्वविषयं ज्ञानमाविर्भवति ।

Just as immediately before the sun-rise, a brilliant glow is visible in the sky, in the same manner just before the rise

of the Viveka-Khyāti or consciousness of emancipation, there arises the knowledge, called Tāraka. Through this Tāraka knowledge, all things are known. This Tāraka is otherwise called the Prātibha.

## L. THE STAGE PENULTIMATE TO LIBERATION AND OMNISCIENCE: THE SĀMKHYA VIEW

### SĀMKHYA VIEW: A YOGI CAN BE OMNISCIENT

The Sāmkhya school of philosophers attribute to the Yogi's or sages, a supernatural mode of perception in which all things and phenomena of all places and of all times are cognised and they account for it in this way. The Yogi's or seers through their penances and self-perfection attain a power by which they come in direct contact with the Pradhāna, the potential basis of all things. As all things evolve from the Pradhāna and on their dissolution enter into it, the Pradhāna is the real substance in which all phenomena live, move and have their being. By seeing the Pradhāna, one sees all things evolving out of it. It is thus that the Yogi's being in contact with the universal basis of all things through their supernatural attainment are enabled to perceive all things.

‘लीनवस्तुलब्धातिशयसम्बन्धात् ।’ ८९ विषयाध्यायः सांख्यसूत्रम्

The commentator explains,—

सत्कार्यस्थितेर्नष्टमपि स्वकारणे लीनं भूतत्वेनास्ति । भविष्यदपि स्वकारणे जायतत्वेनास्ति । योगजधर्मानुग्रहात्तुलब्धातिशयस्य योगिन एव प्रधानसम्बन्धात् सर्वदेशकालादिसम्बन्ध इति ।

The effect is existent in the cause. What is found to perish exists in a potential state in its basal ground. What is future exists in its cause as something not come as yet. On account of their attainment of supernatural power of vision the Yogi's come in contact with the Pradhāna and through this contact, they come in contact with (things of) all places and all times.

This supernatural power of vision in the Yogi's is practically omniscience. Thus although the Sāmkhya philosophers

do not believe in divine omniscience nor in the omniscience of a liberated being they admit the possibility of omniscience in the Yogi's or persons on the high way to self-culture.

### M. THE STAGE PENULTIMATE TO LIBERATION AND OMNISCIENCE: THE NYĀYA AND VAIŚEṢIKA VIEWS

SAMŪHĀLAMBANA OF THE NYĀYA AND ĀRṢA-JÑĀNA OF THE VAIŚEṢIKA ARE OMNISCIENCE

The thinkers of the Nyāya school maintain that it is impossible for the instrument (Karaṇa) of knowledge to be simultaneously connected with more than one percept; for this reason, a simultaneous cognition of all things is impossible according to them. But they admit that the recollections of all things or cause of the cognitions of all things, may simultaneously present themselves to a sage, when he may be possessed of a knowledge which relates to the whole collection of the objects. Such a knowledge has been called by them 'समूहालम्बन' or collective knowledge. This Samūhā-lambana is practically identical with the Prātibha-knowledge noticed before and consists in a sort of omniscience. The Vaiśeṣika thinkers have given the name Ārṣa-jñāna or 'the knowledge of a seer' to the Prātibha which relates to the knowledge of all things.

### N. THE STAGE PENULTIMATE TO LIBERATION AND OMNISCIENCE: THE ADVAITA VEDĀNTA VIEW

ADVAITA VEDĀNTA VIEW, OMNISCIENCE POSSIBLE IN A SOUL,  
IN A STATE, PENULTIMATE TO LIBERATION

Omniscience is impossible in both liberated and an unliberated soul, according to the absolute monist school of the Vedānta philosophy. But it is possible in a highly developed sage. It is said that a Naiyāyika in order to test the

profoundness of Śaṅkara's knowledge, once asked him to explain the difference in the conceptions of liberations, of the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika schools. The questioning Naiyāyika was a very conceited person and so he addressed Śaṅkara as follows,—‘वद सर्वविच्छेदोचेत् प्रतिज्ञां त्यज सर्ववित्त्वे ।’ संक्षेपशंकरविजयः

If you are omniscient, answer the question. If not, give up your contention about omniscience.

From the above, it is apparent that according to the thinkers of the Advaita school, omniscience is not impossible. Śaṅkara has said that to the nature of a liberated soul or Brahma, omniscience, omnipotence etc. सर्वज्ञत्वं सर्वेश्वरत्वं च are not to be attributed,—

‘न चैतन्यवत् स्वरूपत्वसंभवः ।’ वेदान्तसूत्रभाष्य । ४-४-६

But he admits that supernaturalities like omniscience etc. are possible in a determined सगुणः soul, in a certain stage of its development. ‘विद्यमानमे वेदं सगुणावस्थायामैश्वर्यं भूमविद्यास्तुतये संकीर्त्यते ।’ वेदान्तसूत्रभाष्ये शंकरः । ४।४।११।

In other words, Śaṅkara's opinion is that by worshipping the Saguṇa Brahma, the worshipper while attaining his likeness etc. (सायुज्य) becomes possessed of such supernaturalities as omniscience etc.

‘सगुणविद्याविपाक स्थानत्वेतत् ।’ वेदान्तसूत्रभाष्ये शंकरः । ४-४-१६ ।

## O. THE STAGE PENULTIMATE TO LIBERATION AND OMNISCIENCE : THE BUDDHIST VIEW

सर्वज्ञ सुगतो बुद्धः धर्मराजस्तथागतः

ACCORDING TO THE BUDDHISTS, YOGI-PRATYAKṢA IS OMNISCIENCE

The word, सर्वज्ञ in the above list of Buddha's name shows that although omniscience, according to him, is impossible in a mundane being or in a being who has entered the Nirvāṇa, it is possible in a person in a certain stage of mental development. Neither sensuous knowledge nor inference can yield omniscience; for, not only is the range of such forms of knowledge limited but they are after all vague and indistinct. Without a full and clear knowledge



of objects the knower cannot be said to have attained omniscience. This perfect and clearest possible knowledge about all the things of the universe has been called the 'स्फुटाभ' knowledge, by the Buddhist thinkers. According to them, the 'स्फुटाभ' is due to a direct perception, which is peculiar to sages, 'योगिप्रत्यक्ष'. The ordinary knowledge about objects which we get through the Pramāṇa's or empiric sources of knowledge is 'भूतार्थ' and to contemplate the 'भूतार्थ' again and again is 'भूतार्थभावना'. As a result of the 'भूतार्थभावना' the knowledge of its object comes to be clearer and clearer. The 'भूतार्थभावना' has various stages,—the 'भूतार्थभावनाप्रकर्ष' but these do not yield the full and the perfect knowledge about things, until the last stage 'भावनाप्रकर्षपर्यन्त' is reached. From the 'भावनाप्रकर्षपर्यन्त' is evolved a direct apprehension about objects in the mind of the sage, which is called 'योगिप्रत्यक्ष', the perception of a sage. 'भूतार्थभावनाप्रकर्षपर्यन्तजं योगिज्ञानं चेति ।' (न्यायविन्दुः, प्रथम परिच्छेदः)

The three forms of perception viz:—sense-perception 'इन्द्रियज्ञान', internal perception 'मानसप्रत्यक्ष', or self-perception 'स्वसंवेदन' cannot yield omniscience; neither can inference 'अनुमान' yield it. For, all these modes of cognition are imperfect and indistinct. The fourth mode of perception, according to the Buddhists, is the 'योगिप्रत्यक्ष' which we have just noticed. The 'योगिप्रत्यक्ष' yields omniscience. It should be noticed, however, that even the perceptual stage, penultimate to the 'योगिप्रत्यक्ष',—the 'भूतार्थभावनाप्रकर्षपर्यन्त' does not give perfect and the clearest possible knowledge about objects. It is said that the knowledge obtained at this is like the knowledge of a thing seen through a thin, transparent substance.

‘अन्नकव्यवहितमिव यदा भाव्यमानं वस्तु पश्यति, सा प्रकर्षपर्यन्तावस्था ।’

न्यायविन्दु टीका ।

The object when seen in 'योगिप्रत्यक्ष' is like a small fruit named Āmalaka in one's hand, perceived in the perfect and the clearest possible manner.

‘करतलामलकवद् भाष्यमानस्यार्थस्य यद्दर्शनं तद्योगिनः प्रत्यक्षम्  
तद्विस्तृतामम् ।’ न्यायविन्दु टीका ।

As the result of this uncommon perception, peculiar to a sage, the objects of the universe were apprehended by Buddha and the saints like him “like the Āmalaka-fruit in hand” and they succeeded in attaining omniscience.

## P. THE LIBERATED STATE AND OMNISCIENCE: THE NON-ADVAITA VEDĀNTA VIEWS

DUALISTIC VEDĀNTA VIEW, OMNISCIENCE IS ATTAINED BY  
A LIBERATED SOUL

It has been pointed out more than once that the liberated soul and the soul which has entered the Nirvāṇa, are not omniscient, although omniscience may be possible in a being who is about to attain final emancipation. This is the theory, upon which the Sāṅkhya, the Yoga, the Nyāya, the Vaiśeṣika, the Buddhist and the Advaita monists of the Vedānta school are agreed. But those philosophers of the Vedānta school who do not admit the identity of the Brahma and the Jīva hold a different view. According to them the liberated Jīva becomes omniscient and the grounds for this view of the dualistic Vedāntists are obvious. They do not admit the reality of the absolute and undetermined (Nirguṇa) Brahma. The Brahma, according to them is Saṅguṇa i.e. determined and endowed with attributes. The absolute monists of the Vedānta school maintain that it is impossible to ascribe omniscience or any qualification to the liberated soul which is merged in the attributeless Brahma. Even these monists do not deny that a soul which by dint of its self-culture and self-development has succeeded in closely associating itself with the qualified or the Saṅguṇa Brahma, attains omniscience. The Vedāntins other than the absolute monists hold that Brahma is Saṅguṇa or qualified and that the absolute, unqualified or the Nirguṇa Brahma is an unreal abstraction, that the Mukti or emancipation of a soul consists in its inseparable association with (and not an absolute merger in) the Saṅguṇa Brahma and that such a

liberated soul comes to be possessed of the qualities of the Lord, including omniscience.

#### OMNISCIENCE OF THE LIBERATED IN THE DUALISTIC VEDĀNTA IS LIMITED

It seems to us, however, that the omniscience thus attributed to the liberated soul by the dualistic schools of the Vedānta is not of the same nature or extent with the omniscience attributed to the *Iśvara* by the Nyāya, the Vaiśeṣika, the theistic Sāṃkhya, the Yoga and the Vedānta. The omniscience of the latter is eternal, unfettered and all-embracing. It is, however, the very nature of the *Jīva* to have but a limited range of apprehension and this limited capacity of the *Jīva* is not radically changed even when it attains liberation. Accordingly it would probably not be correct to say that all the cosmic things and phenomena of all times and places, beginningless and endless, are ever present in the omniscience of the liberated *Jīva*, as 'now' and 'here' simultaneously. Even when a soul associates itself with the Lord in its emancipated state, its powers are still limited in comparison with the powers of the latter. A liberated soul, for instance, has no power to interfere in or modify the "*Jagat-Vyāpāra*" i.e. the creation of the world, which is the sole prerogative of the *Iśvara*. It is true that a liberated soul comes to be possessed of many supernatural powers; it can go anywhere it likes.

‘सर्वेषु लोकेषु कामचारो भवति ।’

छान्दोग्योपनिषत् । ८।२५।२

But from the word, *Kāma*, it is manifest that the power of unrestricted movement is dependent upon his *desire*. Similarly, it is not true that all the things and the phenomena of the world, past, present future, subtle, near, distant etc. are simultaneously and actually and always present in the consciousness of the emancipated *Jīva*. Its supernatural attainment consists in the fact that unlike a soul in bondage it can know them *whenever it likes*. Let us explain the position by an example. It is not a fact that his ancestors are always present before a liberated being or in his mind. Whenever he wants to see them, they appear before him

at once. 'स यदा पितृलोककामो भवति संकल्पादेवान्य पितरःसमुत्तिष्ठन्ति' ।  
छान्दोग्योपनिषत् ८।२।३।

#### OMNISCIENCE OF IŚVARA IS UNLIMITED

The omniscience of a liberated soul thus consists in the fact that it has the power to know at once whatever it wants to know, and not that all the cosmic things and phenomena are ever present in its consciousness. The omniscience of the Lord, however, is not of this sort. His omniscience is eternal; in it are ever present all objects and occurrences of all times and places. The liberated soul has not this kind of omniscience,—this is the view of the Vedāntists of the Dvaita or dualistic, the Dvaitādvaita or dualistico-monist and the Viśiṣṭādvaita or differentiated monistic schools. The Advaita or the absolutely monistic schools of the Vedānta also attribute such an omniscience to the highly developed worshipper of the Saguṇa Brahma and we believe, such an omniscience and nothing more than that has been said to be attainable in the Samūhālabhāna of the Nyāya, the Ārṣa-jñāna of the Vaiśeṣika, the Prātibha of the Sāṃkhya and the Yoga and the Yogi-pratyakṣa of the Buddhist.

#### Q. THE LIBERATED STATE AND OMNISCIENCE: THE JAINA VIEW

##### GOD, AS THE TEACHER IN THE VEDIC SYSTEMS OF PHILOSOPHY

That the unliberated Jiva's wandering in the Saṃsāra are not omniscient is a matter of common experience and has been admitted in the Jaina philosophy, just as in all other systems. There is a remarkable unanimity between the Jaina's who repudiate the authority of the Veda's and the Mīmāṃsaka's who are firm supporters of the Vedic orthodoxy and ritualism, regarding the doctrines that the Jiva's have been wandering from the beginningless time in the Saṃsāra, driven by the force of their Karma's and that there is no creator of this universe. But although the Jaina's

agree with the Mīmāṃsaka's in admitting the inexorableness of the law of Karma and repudiating the creatorship or governorship of Īśvara, they do not like to be looked upon as atheists like the latter. In the theistic schools of the Vedic philosophy, besides the creation of the world, another matter is ascribed to God. The Veda's are the source of Dharma i.e. knowledge of duty and God is said to be the author or the revealer of the Vedas. Accordingly God is the Seer of the Dharma and the first Teacher. While proving the omniscience and the omnipotence of Brahma 'सर्वज्ञत्वं सर्वशक्तित्वं' चेति ।' Śaṅkara quotes from the Śruti. 'अस्य महतो भूतस्य निःश्वसितमेतद्' and says that the Veda's and the scriptures have like breath emerged from the Great Being 'the Īśvara' or 'Brahma'. In describing the infallibility of the Veda's, the author of the Nyāya Sūtra's says,

‘तत्रामाप्यमानप्रामाण्यात्’—२।२।६८। न्यायसूत्रम् ।

The infallibility of the Vedas is due to the infallibility of the Āpta.

Here the word, Āpta refers to the Veda-reciter 'वेदज्ञ'. Īśvara who is, 'साक्षात्कृतधर्मी' i.e. direct knower of the Dharma and a faithful teacher of what he knows,—

‘यथादृष्टस्यार्थस्य निख्यापयिषयाप्रयुक्त उपदेष्टा’ ।

Kaṇada also has referred to the teachership of God in the very same manner,—

‘तद्वचनादाम्नायस्य प्रामाण्यम्’—१।२।२३ वैशेषिकसूत्रम् ।

Amnāya or the Veda's are the words of God. Their infallibility arises from the infallibility of God.

With reference to the teachership of God, the author of the Yoga-Sūtra's has said,—

‘स पूर्वेषामपि गुरुः कालेनानवच्छेदात् ।’ योगसूत्रम्—समाधिपादः २६  
That beginningless Being is the teacher even of the early teachers (c.g. Brahmā).

## JAINA THEORY OF THE TEACHERSHIP OF GOD, THE TIRTHAMKARA

Although the Jaina's do not admit an Īśvara who is the

world-creator, they do admit a perfect human being who is the best of teachers. This perfect Being is called the Tīrthaṅkara and the Jaina's call him Īśvara i.e. God. The teachings of the Tīrthaṅkara are not of course, the R̥k, the Yajus, the Sāma or the Atharva (which are repudiated by the Jaina's) but are certainly the best authorities on matters philosophical, ethical and religious. The Jaina's call the teachings of the Tīrthaṅkara God, the Jaina Veda and according to them it is the Jaina Veda which alone embodies the true teachings of the true God, and as such, is the real, infallible Veda. In this way, the Jaina's show that they are not opposed to the doctrine of the Veda-reciter, omniscient God. With all this, however, it is obvious that there is essential difference between the Īśvara of the Jaina's and the Īśvara of the Vedic school. The God of the Jaina's is not the creator of the world; he was originally a mortal human being who through self-culture and self-development attained the God-hood, consisting in teachership; the Tīrthaṅkara Gods are also more than one in number. The God, of the Vedic school, on the contrary is the world-creator and "from eternity to eternity" is the one ever-free Lord, revealing the Veda's in the early dawn of the cosmic creation.

#### MIMĀMSĀ AND JAINA THEORIES ABOUT FINAL LIBERATION

The Tīrthaṅkara, otherwise, called the Arhat, is then the Īśvara according to the Jaina's, who is the author of the Veda's (of course, the Jaina scriptures). By admitting in this way the doctrine of the authorship and of the teachership of the Veda's, the Jaina's distinguish their view from that of the Mīmāṃsaka's, according to which, the Veda's are uncreate and self-existent. Regarding the question of Mukti or final emancipation also, the Jaina and the Mīmāṃsaka views are different. According to the Mīmāṃsaka's, a good, well-behaved and dutiful man on his death goes to heavens and enjoy the best happiness. Mukti or complete liberation, however, is inattainable. According to the Mīmāṃsaka thinker, the Saṃsāra or the existential

series is not only beginningless but endless also. The Jaina's on the contrary maintain that save and except the Abhavya Jiva's (described before) all souls are capable of attaining liberation. A soul, when liberated is possessed of Kevala-jñāna, which is nothing other than omniscience.

Besides the disembodied perfect Beings who are completely free and are omniscient according to the Jaina's, as stated above, a highly developed being while in Body may attain omniscience also. The Tirthaṅkara's were such Beings who attained omniscience, while they lived, moved and had their Being still in this world. This Jaina doctrine of omniscience in a Being who is not yet disembodied, is obviously akin to the theories of the other Indian schools, according to which, omniscience is possible before final liberation.

#### OMNISCIENCE OF A LIBERATED SOUL RESEMBLES THE OMNISCIENCE OF ĪŚVARA

A liberated soul is omniscient according to the Jaina's. On this point and, it seems to us, on the question of the nature of omniscience in souls which have attained it, the Jaina's differ from the other Indian schools. In most of the philosophical systems of India, other than the Jaina, omniscience has not been attributed to a liberated soul. It is true that in the Vedāntic systems except that of the Advaita school, omniscience has been attributed to a liberated soul. But as we have already pointed out, omniscience in these souls seems to be of a limited type. In the Yoga and other systems also, omniscience has been attributed to souls about to attain the final liberation. But in the case of these souls also, omniscience seems to be limited. The omniscience attributed to the liberated souls by the Jaina's, on the contrary, is perfect, unrestricted and unlimited. It seems to us that the omniscience attributed to liberated souls by the Jaina's resembles that attributed to the Īśvara by the Vedic theistic schools.

According to the Jaina's, the Jīva's are omniscient by nature. Just as pure and clear water becomes muddy on being mixed with clay, in the same manner, the naturally

omniscient Jīva's wander in the Saṁsāra in an inomniscient state of knowledge, being polluted by the dirt of Karma. As soon as the clay is removed, water resumes its clearness and purity; in the same way, the Jīva's also resume their pure state of omniscience, when they succeed in removing the Karma-impurities from them by dint of self-culture and self-development. The liberation of a Jīva means its liberation from the influence of Karma.

In the liberated state of a soul, all Karma-forces covering its pure knowledge and omniscience are absolutely set aside. Accordingly Mokṣa or liberation has been described as—

‘समस्तावरणक्षयापेक्षम् ।’ २।२३। प्रमाणनयतत्वालोकालंकारः ।

dependent on a complete annihilation of all (the Karma's) that cover (knowledge). Kevala-jñāna arises in the soul automatically as soon as these obstacles or Karma-coverings are removed from it. Kevala-jñāna is omniscience and as conceived by the Jaina's, it is not at all limited in any way.

‘निखिलद्रव्यपर्यायसाक्षात्कारित्वरूपकेवलज्ञानम् ।’

२।२८। प्रमाणनयतत्वालोकालंकारः ।

Omniscience consists in a direct apprehension of all the things with all their modes.

#### JAINA DOCTRINE OF UNRESTRICTED OMNISCIENCE IN A LIBERATED SOUL

To a liberated soul are directly revealed and clearly known all the things of the universe, past, present and future, with all their infinite qualities, modes and aspects. Omniscience, as conceived by the Jaina's, is thus unlimited, infinite, unrestricted and all-embracing. It seems to us that such an omniscience might have been attributed to Īśvara by some of the theistic systems of India; but none of them appear to have thought it possible in a soul either, as emancipated or as approaching emancipation.





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## ERRATA

We regret that inspite of our carefulness to avoid them some mistakes in printing have found their way into the book. A list of them is appended herewith but we are afraid, the list may not be exhaustive.

*The Author*

In	Page	Line	For	Read
„	26	24	show	shows
„	28	1	Brahmadvita	Brahmadvaita
„	29	27	is	in
„	37	15	is also is	is also
„	43	33	provades	porvades
„	67	13	hink	think
„	102	35	alredy	already
„	117	13	Buddhis	Buddhist
„	118	33	पञ्चासिगुकायसंग्रह	पञ्चास्तिकायसमयसारः
„	132	36	canot	cannot
„	134	20	षडंशता ?	षडंशता ।
„	169	15	do	does
„	183	21	soul of due	soul is due
„	185	35	As	as
„	„	„	says,	says.
„	196	11	arbitrary	arbitrary
„	213	15	coalescence	coalesce
„	219	36	immanetn	immanent
„	221	7	or	of
„	233	14	well suited	well-suited
„	274	13	the	be
„	301	17	of Kundakundaçāryya	of. Kundakandaçāryya
„	306	10	conceivg	conceiving
„	318	31	bea	be a
„	322	18	nonconsummable	non-consumable
„	355	25	Jnānāvarṇiya	Jnānāvarṇiya
„	361	23	Kaṣāya Jñāna	Kaṣāya, Jñāna.
„	364	„	Paro	are.
„	365	33	the separts	these parts
„	371	32	{ प्रमेयकमल	प्रमेयकमल-
„	392	7	not or the same nature of extent	not of the same nature or extent.





