Some Remarks on the Analysis of the Sensuous Cognition (Mati-jñāna) Process

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In the Tattvārthādhigamabhāṣya commenting upon the sūtra 1. 15, that deals with the successive stages of mati-jñāna (sensuous, perceptual cognition), we find a brief description of the cognitive process leading to the finally formed perceptual knowledge (or cognition; mati-jñāna) acquired with the help of the five senses and a quasi-sense organ or mind; the four stages are namely—avagraha (perception, sensation), īhā (speculation, stage of hypotheses), aprāya (perceptual judgement) and dhārāṇā (retention, memorizing enabling future recollection). The method employed in the description of the each stage by the author of the T.S.Bh. is two-fold: insertion of synonyms of the technical terms concerned, and a definition or a brief characteristic of a given step.

Thus the synonyms of the perceptual judgement, the third stage of the sensuous cognition, given in the Bhāṣya are as following: apaya, apragama, apanoda, apravyādha, apeta, apagata, apravidhā and apanutta. It is evident, that we can group them in two sets, each of them numbering four synonyms, and besides one can group them into four pairs, each pair derived from the same root or derivative basis, namely—apa √i, apa √gam, apa √nud, apa √vyadh, all meaning etymologically "to destroy; to remove". The four synonyms of the first division are formed with the help of kṛt-affixes denoting nomena agenti or abstract nouns, for instance:

(a) 'apāya' is formed with the help of ac-suffix and therefore it means literary: 'going away; destruction; annihilation' (the Prākṛt form 'avāa' having similar meaning);

(b) 'apagama', being formed with the ap-suffix forming abstract nouns, has therefore, the meaning 'going away; departure; destruction' (the Prākṛt form has got similar meaning);

(c) 'apanoda' as well as 'apavyādha' take ghan-suffix and bear the meaning 'removing; taking away' (the Prākṛt form 'avanoya' meaning 'eliminating; elimination') and 'piercing; removing; removal', respectively.

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Unlike the active meaning of the words belonging to the first group, the synonyms of the second division are Past Passive Participles. We can, therefore, ask why the author of the Bhāṣya has combined terms grammatically bearing opposite or rather contradictory meaning as synonyms?

In the Jaina epistemology the terms under examination denote rather a cognitive process although their etymological meaning is slightly different. Apāya or perceptual judgement is defined in 'Sarvārthasiddhi' as "comprehending of the true nature on account of the distinctive cognition (nirjñāna) of particular characteristics". A closer examination of the definition of the perceptual judgement (apāya) found in T.S. Bh. may lead us to the conclusion that the author upheld the opinion, quoted and criticized by Jinabhadra as well as by Yaśovijaya, which regarded apāya as only excluding the non-existent characteristics: "the perceptual judgement is a removal of the mental process analysing the pros and cons of the hypothesis dealing with the real and non-existing qualities; the hypotheses that were formed previously at the stage of speculation or iñā after perceiving an object. It is therefore self-explanatory that according to the author of the T.S. Bh. — in the apaya stage of the cognitive process the incorrect possibilities are excluded in the course of a deliberate inquiry and only the accurate hypothesis remains. We may also note that the opinion quoted by Yaśovijaya in 'Jaina Tarkabhaṣa' is testified positively by the set of synonyms, given in the Bhāṣya I. 15, related to dhāraṇā or retention of the resultant cognition.13

Having taken into consideration that the synonyms of apāya of the second group are Past Passive Participles denoting a result of a cognitive operation indicated by the first division of the synonyms, i.e., they are to indicate the hypotheses excluded due to the examining process of apāya, we may state that to the author of the Bhāṣya the perceptual judgement (apāya) is not a mere process of negative analysis leading to a determinate judgement but it includes, as well, the result of such inquiry: the cognitive process and the final decision are inseparable. The above ascertainment is justified also by a statement found in the Bhāṣya commenting upon the T.S., I. 11: "sensuous cognition is conditioned by a perceptual judgement and by actual substances."14

We may thus, conclude that according to the T.S. Bh. the cognitive process, namely the perceptual judgement (apāya) as well as the sensuous cognition (mati-jñāna), does not exist without its result in the form of a resultant judgement and, as such, the judgement is an inseparable and essential part of the cognitive process.
Besides, the author of the Bhāṣya can be reckoned a supporter of an opinion considering, on the one hand, the perceptual judgement as a negative process excluding non-existent particulars and on the other hand, the retention (dhāraṇā) as a positive process determining the existent characteristics as well as the retaining of the resultant cognition enabling recollection, which distinguishes him from the Āgamic tradition.

References

2. or 'avāya' which is rather a form of 'apāya' inherited form Prākṛṭ.
3. The authorship of T. S. Bh. ascribed to Umāsvāti is still questionable; vide BRONKHORST, Chronology of the Tattvārtha-sūtra, Wiener zietschrift, BAND XXIX, 1986.
5. See also 'Laghusiddhāntakaumudi', No. 905, 906 and 932.
6. S. Si., l.15.
8. Vi. Bh. I85; after N.Tatia, p. 41.
11. T. S. Bh., avagarhīte visaye samyag asamyag iti guṇa-doṣa-vicāraṇādhyā-vasāyapanod'pāyāḥ :

   In this connection I would like to point out in order of better understanding. Another possibility of interpreting this passage according to which the opinion expressed in T. S. Bh. might be unanimous with the Āgamic conception of apāya as well as with Jinabhadra's statement concerning the nature of the perceptual judgement : "The perceptual judgement is — after perceiving an object (threelfold, namely) a speculation upon and apprehension of the correctness and the inaccuracy (of our earlier hypothesis) as well as removing the uncorrect suggestions or doubts"; but such construction is rather hardly tenable.

12. J. T. Bh., 1/7/15; asadbhūtārtha-viśeṣa-vyatirekāvadharaṇam apāyāḥ, sadbhūtārtha-viśeṣāvadharaṇam ca dhāraṇā.
13. T. S. Bh., l. 15; dhāraṇā pratipattir avadhāraṇam avasthānam niścaye vāgamaḥ avabodha ityanarthāntaram.
14. T. S. Bh., I. ll; \textit{apāya-sad-dravyataya mati-jñānam}.

**Bibliography**


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