

Some Remarks on the Analysis of the Sensuous Cognition (*Mati-jñāna*) Process

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In the *Tattvārthādhigamabhāṣya* commenting upon the *sūtra* I. 15, that deals with the successive stages of *mati-jñāna* (sensuous, perceptual cognition), we find a brief description of the cognitive process leading to the finally formed perceptual knowledge (or cognition; *mati-jñāna*) acquired with the help of the five senses and a quasi-sense organ or mind¹; the four stages are namely — *avagraha* (perception, sensation), *ihā* (speculation, stage of hypotheses), *apāya*² (perceptual judgement) and *dhāraṇā* (retention, memorizing enabling future recollection). The method employed in the description of the each stage by the author of the *T.S.Bh.*³ is two-fold : insertion of synonyms of the technical terms concerned, and a definition or a brief characteristic of a given step.

Thus the synonyms of the perceptual judgement, the third stage of the sensuous cognition, given in the *Bhāṣya* are as following : *apaya*, *apagama*, *apanoda*, *apavyādha*, *apeta*, *apagata*, *apavidha* and *apanutta*. It is evident, that we can group them in two sets, each of them numbering four synonyms, and - besides - one can group them into four pairs, each pair derived from the same root or derivative basis, namely — *apa √i*, *apa √gam*, *apa √nud*, *apa √vyadh*, all meaning etymologically "to destroy; to remove". The four synonyms of the first division are formed with the help of *kṛt*-affixes⁴ denoting nomena agenti or abstract nouns, for instance :

(a) '*apāya*' is formed with the help of *ac*-suffix and therefore it means literary : 'going away; destruction; annihilation' (the Prākṛt form '*avāa*' having similar meaning);

(b) '*apagama*', being formed with the *ap*-suffix forming abstract nouns, has therefore, the meaning 'going away; departure; destruction' (the Prākṛt form has got similar meaning);

(c) '*apanoda*' as well as '*apavyādha*' take *ghan*-suffix⁵ and bear the meaning 'removing; taking away' (the Prākṛt form '*avaṇoya*' meaning 'eliminating; elimination') and 'piercing; removing; removal', respectively.

Unlike the active meaning of the words belonging to the first group, the synonyms of the second division are Past Passive Participles. We can, therefore, ask why the author of the *Bhāṣya* has combined terms grammatically bearing opposite or rather contradictory meaning as synonyms ?

In the Jaina epistemology the terms under examination denote rather a cognitive process although their etymological meaning is slightly different. *Apāya* or perceptual judgement is defined in '*Sarvārthasiddhi*'⁶ as "comprehending of the true nature on account of the distinctive cognition (*nirjñāna*) of particular characteristics"⁷. A closer examination of the definition of the perceptual judgement (*apāya*) found in *T.S. Bh.* may lead us to the conclusion that the author upheld the opinion, quoted and criticized by Jinabhadra⁸ as well as by Yaśovijaya⁹, which regarded *apāya* as only excluding the non-existent characteristics¹⁰ : "the perceptual judgement is a removal of the mental process analysing the pros and cons (of the hypothesis dealing with) the real and non-existing (qualities; the hypotheses that were formed previously at the stage of speculation or *ihā*) after perceiving an object"¹¹. It is therefore self-explanatory that according to the author of the *T. S. Bh.* — in the *apaya* stage of the cognitive process the incorrect possibilities are excluded in the course of a deliberate inquiry and only the accurate hypothesis remains. We may also note that the opinion quoted by Yaśovijaya in '*Jaina Tarkabhāṣa*'¹² is testified positively by the set of synonyms, given in the *Bhāṣya* I. 15, related to *dhāraṇā* or retention of the resultant cognition.¹³

Having taken into consideration that the synonyms of *apāya* of the second group are Past Passive Participles denoting a result of a cognitive operation indicated by the first division of the synonyms, i.e., they are to indicate the hypotheses excluded due to the examining process of *apāya*, we may state that to the author of the *Bhāṣya* the perceptual judgement (*apāya*) is not a mere process of negative analysis leading to a determinate judgement but it includes, as well, the result of such inquiry : the cognitive process and the final decision are inseparable. The above ascertainment is justified also by a statement found in the *Bhāṣya* commenting upon the *T.S.*, I. 11 : "sensuous cognition is conditioned by a perceptual judgement and by actual substances."¹⁴

We may thus, conclude that according to the *T. S. Bh.* the cognitive process, namely the perceptual judgement (*apāya*) as well as the sensuous cognition (*mati-jñāna*), does not exist without its result in the form of a resultant judgement and, as such, the judgement is an inseparable and essential part of the cognitive process.

Besides, the author of the *Bhāṣya* can be reckoned a supporter of an opinion considering, on the one hand, the perceptual judgement as a negative process excluding non-existent particulars and on the other hand, the retention (*dhāraṇā*) as a positive process determining the existent characteristics as well as the retaining of the resultant cognition enabling recollection, which distinguishes him from the *Āgamic* tradition.

References

1. *T. S.*, I. 14.
2. or 'avāya' which is rather a form of 'apāya' inherited from Prākṛt.
3. The authorship of *T. S. Bh.* ascribed to Umāsvāti is still questionable; vide BRONKHORST, *Chronology of the Tattvārtha-sūtra*, Wiener zietschrift, BAND XXIX, 1986.
4. Vide Kale, 777ff.
5. See also 'Laghusiddhāntakaumudī', No. 905, 906 and 932.
6. *S. Si.*, I.15.
7. Compare : N.Tatia, p. 41.
8. *Vi. Bh.* 185; after N.Tatia, p. 41.
9. *J. T. Bh.*, I. (7), 15.
10. Vide N.Tatia, p. 41.
11. *T. S. Bh.*, *avagarhīte visaye samyag asamyag iti guṇa-doṣa-vicāraṇādhyavasāyapanod'pāyaḥ* :

In this connection I would like to point out in order of better understanding. Another possibility of interpreting this passage according to which the opinion expressed in *T. S. Bh.* might be unanimous with the *Āgamic* conception of *apāya* as well as with Jinabhadra's statement concerning the nature of the perceptual judgement : "The perceptual judgement is – after perceiving an object (threefold, namely) a speculation upon and apprehension of the correctness and the inaccuracy (of our earlier hypothesis) as well as removing the uncorrect suggestions or doubts"; but such construction is rather hardly tenable.

12. *J. T. Bh.*, 1/7/15; *asadbhūtārtha-viśeṣa-vyatirekāvadharaṇam apāyaḥ, sadbhūtārtha-viśeṣāvadhāraṇam ca dhāraṇā*.
13. *T. S. Bh.*, I. 15; *dhāraṇā pratipattir avadhāraṇam avasthānam niścaye vāgamaḥ avabodha ityanarthāntaram*.

14. *T. S. Bh.*, I. II; *apāya-sad-dravyatayā mati-jñānam*.

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4. N.Tatia, *Studies in Jaina Philosophy*, Jaina Cultural Research Society, Banaras, 1951.
5. Varadarāja, *Laghusiddhāntakaumudī*, ed. by J. R. Ballantyne, Motilal Banarasidass, 1961.
6. Umāsvāti, *Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra & Bhāṣya*, ed. by K. P. Mody, Asiatic Society of Bengal, Calcutta 1903. (*T. S. & T. S. Bh.*)
7. Yaśovijaya, *Jaina-tarka-bhāṣa*, ed. by Dr. D. Bhargava, Motilal Banarsidass, 1973. (*J. T. Bh.*)
8. *Viśeṣāvaśyaka-bhāṣya*, Yaśovijaya Jaina Granthamala No.35.

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