

SAHRDAYĀLOKA

[Thought-currents in Indian Literary Criticism]

[Vol. I, Part 1]

L. D. Series : 141

General Editor
Jitendra B. Shah

TAPASVI NANDI



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TAPASVI NANDI

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Publisher's Note

We feel pleasure to place before the learned "SAHRDAYĀLOKA" OR "Thought-currents in Indian Literary Criticism" - (Vol. I) by Prof. Tapasvi Nandi. The author hardly requires any introduction to the learned working in the area of Sanskrit Alamkāraśāstra or Literary Aesthetics. The work attempts to cover the basic thought - currents prevalent in Sanskrit Literary criticism, trying to unearth the origin and development of each topic beginning with the "Definition and scope of poetry, Sanskrit semantics, the theories of Dhvani, Rasa etc." The author has taken care to record and accept the views of his predecessors in his area of research and has very gratefully acknowledged the honourable acceptance of their views and has also tried to discuss modestly differences of opinion if any, at various places. The whole work presents the material in an historical, critical and comparative perspective. We feel sure that the learned will appreciate his efforts in an unbiased way. Prof. Nandi's observations on Dhvani and Rasa deserve special mention as he has made a special effort to explain how these thought currents which form a special contribution of Indian Literary Aesthetics are relevant even to-day and how they can be applied to the most modern patterns of literature world over, including absurd poetry and absurd theatre as well.

The author also proposes to bring out Vol. II covering the area of literary criticism that is not discussed in the present volume, of course, god willing.

We are thankful to Prof. Nandi for agreeing with us to publish the present work. We are also thankful to the Swaminarayan press, and all our colleagues in seeing this work through. Hope this work will stand the test of the learned and will fulfil a gap left out by earlier experts. It may be noted that for the sake of convenience, this work is presented in three parts such as, Part I - chs. I-VII (pp. 1-575); Part II - chs. VIII-XIII (pp. 576-1195) and Part III - chs. XIV - XVIII (pp. 1196-1843), with select Bibliography (pp. 1844-1850) appearing at the end of Part III. The Publisher's note, the author's preface - Namaskaromi, contents, detailed contents and abbreviations appear in all the three parts.

Jitendra Shah

L. D. Institute Of Indology,
Ahmedabad.

Dedication

This work is for,

Parth (my grandson, doing medicine)

Mit (my grandson, doing physiotherapy)

Smt. Chinmayee (my daughter, pharmacist)

Dr. Mayur (my son-in-law, Gynecologist)

Harsha, (Smt. Nandi, rtd. Librarian)

Sragdharā, (The late, my sister)

The Late, Smt. Madhumati,

The Late, Shri. Shambhucandra, my parents;

and

my mahā-gurus

Prof. R. C. Parikh,

Prof. R. B. Athavale

&

Prof. Dr. V. M. Kulkarni,

Awardee, President's Certificate of Honour

and also for

Dr. K. Kunjunni Raja,

Dr. P. C. Chakravarty

Prof. Devasthai, - my sources;

To whom I have turned, at places, for inspiration and guidance
and for Dr. Rewaprasad Dwivedi and Dr. Satyavrat Shastri.



“Namaskaromi....”

Salutations to the Divine !
Salutations to my three Mahā-gurus;
Salutations to my parents,
Salutations to all the sources
consulted by me

And, Salutations to all of you, who are all all sparks of the Divine !

“Aum pūrṇam adaḥ, pūrṇam idam
pūrṇāt pūrṇam udacyate
pūrṇasya pūrṇam ādāya
pūrṇam evā'va śiṣyate.”

“That [Source, which has been drawn upon by me is respectable and] is perfect,

This [Work, which is presented before you in this respectable shape] is perfect.”

Perfect (material-; ideas, inspiration) has been drawn from perfect (respectable, reliable source). After drawing upon perfect (material) from perfect (and respectable source), only the perfect is left behind (before you).”

This, in short, is the story of my spiritual endeavour that started on 7th Aug. 2000 A.D. and reached its completion on 20th July, 2003 A.D.

The great yogin said, “In the stillness of the night, the eternal speaks.” And yes; I do not know when, in the stillness of the night, my eyes kept wide open staring in the darkness around me, and when these thought-currents sneaked into my inner consciousness from various sources-first like light ripples of the quiet and dignified flow of the sacred Gaṅgā, and then like the mighty billows of the stormy Atlantic, dashing against the shores, washing them clean. They settled into my mind and then sank deep into it. I do not know when my eyes were closed and

I was overpowered by sleep, as if embraced by the Divine Grace ! I feel floating in the wide stream, rich in currents and cross-currents, whirls and pulls; deep, full fathom five; quiet and dignified. I feel dragged and dragged, up and down, and then I slip towards the bottom, like in the womb of the mother earth, with a hundred thousand daffodils, red and pink, green, blue, white, violet and golden - on top of the surface !

So, as suggested in the beginning, I have accepted, with gratitude, of course after verifying with the original, the material, - line by line, paragraph by paragraph, at times, - from the works of my predecessors, who I thought are most reliable, and for whom I have tremendous respect and love in my heart, - from their works, dealing with the topics of word and meaning as discussed by the ancients - the Mīmāṃsakas, the Naiyāyikas and above all the great Vaiyākaraṇas, - the “prathame hi vidvāṃsaḥ” as Ānandavardhana would call them. I take these works as starting points, and as absolutely reliable sources and they are authored by great scholars such as Dr. P. C. Chakrawarty, Prof. Devasthali and Prof. Dr. K. Kunjunni Raja, Dr. Sri P. Ramchandrudu and some others. At every step, wherever I have sought inspiration and help from these master works, I have clearly indicated my indebtedness.

My work has grown both in size and dignity due to this, like the sacred flow of the Gaṅgā growing vaster and vaster with the waters from the innumerable springs, rivulets and rivers mixing with the main stream; and shooting out from the bosom of the great Nagādhirāja Himalaya. Those who have undertaken the “caturdhāma yātrā” are a witness to this. By accepting everything from various springs the Gaṅgā has carved out its own identity, sanctity and dignity. Same is the case with this work. I owe a lot to the great modern ṛṣi-trayī-i.e. Dr. P. V. Kane, Dr. S. K. De and Dr. V. Raghavan, in particular, who has shaped my views on Bhoja. But it may also be noted that, without showing disrespect, I have ventured to dispute their results, and this happens quite often with Dr. Raghavan, when I feel, on verifying with the original words of Bhoja, that I am on firmer ground. This, the discreet will find out for himself, and there is no doubt about it. But this does not minimize their greatness and my adoration for their lotus-feet. They are the great thinkers spreading light and bearing the torch of Indian Literary Aesthetics for the modern scholars, both in east and west alike.

Over and above this, I owe everything, - i.e. beginning from my initiation into this ancient lore of Sāhitya-śāstra to whatever I have done till day, in serving its

cause, to my great gurus - the three of them, the 'guru-śikhi-trayī' of professors R. C. Parikh, R. B. Athavale, and Dr. V. M. Kulkarni and especially Dr. Kulkarni; for it is he who even to-day, at the age of 85+ yrs., inspires me, guides me and blesses me and in my moments of personal despondency fills me with warmth, love, guidance and inspiration.

I am also indebted to the works of some of my senior contemporaries and to most of them personally also when I have met them, such as Dr. Rama Rañjan Mukherjee, Dr. Mukund Madhava Sharma, Dr. Pratap Bandopadhyāya, Prof. Dr. Satyavrata Shastri, Prof. Rasik Vihari Joshi and my most respected and learned friends such as Prof. Dr. Rewaprasad Dwivedi, Prof. Dr. Kamalesh Dutta Tripathi, the late Prof. Ramcandra Dwivedi (Jaipur), the late Prof. Biswanath Bhattacharya (Shantiniketan), the late Prof. K. Krishnamoorthy, Prof. N. P. Unni, Prof. Dr. K. K. Chaturvedi, and prof. Dr. S. D. Joshi, and some very brilliant young friends such as Prof. Dr. Sarojaben Bhate, Dr. C. Ramchandran, Prof. Dr. V. N. Jha, Dr. G. C. Tripathi, Dr. Radhavallabh Tripathi, Prof. M. M. Agrawal Dr. Goparaju, Rama, Dr. Jagannātha Pathak, and the rest. I have met all these dignitaries personally and I stand benifitted. I also will show my respect for Prof. Sri. Ramchandrudu for his great work on Jagannātha. True, my Guru Prof. Athavale taught me some portion of the great R. G., and his work on Pundit Jagannātha is monumental.

So, I am made of all these stalwarts. But kindly note that with all this I remain myself, i.e. I have carefully carved out and preserved my identity. If at all I have accepted their ideas and views as sacred mantra, it is because I feel convinced about the same. I feel convinced first about their reliability and integrity, and then their output; their great reputation apart. Believe me, and I am honest, that I have practically verified every source in the original, before putting the stamp of my humble acceptance of their thoughts and writing. It is never a blind acceptance. In the words of Rājaśekhara - "tad etad svīkaraṇam, na tu haraṇam." I have accepted them, for I have found them acceptable, like the great Vāgdevatāvatāra Mammata or the great Kalikāla-Sarvajña ācārya Hemacandra accepting the dictates of Abhinavaguptapādācārya, or like the latter himself accepting the ruling of his seniors when he says :

“ūrdhvo’rdhvam āruhya yad artha-tattvaṃ
dhīḥ paśyati, śrāntim avedayanti,
phalaṃ tad ādyaiḥ parikalpitānām
viveka-sopāna-paramparānām.”

However, the discreet will find out that my acceptance ends with the field covering the ancient literature laying down the thoughts of the Mīmāṃsakas, the Naiyāyikas and the Vaiyākaraṇas. With our entry into the wide and open field of Alampkāraśāstra proper, i.e. with the works of Bharata, Bhāmaha and down to Jagannātha, of course including Ānandavardhana, Abhinavagupta and Mammaṭa, I have tried to project some original line of thinking that may prove to be of great value to the adhikārins. This is a modest claim but a sure one. I have accepted ideas and also drafting from Gnoli, Masson, Patwardhan, K. Krishnamoorthy, and the rest, but with a touch of my own original contribution. I feel I am on absolutely sure and safe ground when I travel through this area of alampkāra-Śāstra proper, converging nearly two thousand years of creative thinking. My work will surely guide the adhikārī aspirant who wants to have a glimpse of the greatness of the Indian ācāryas, who have left behind their foot-prints on the sands of literary aesthetics. It may be noted that I have presented the rasa theory in a new perspective, and believe me, this is what I claim for sure, - a perspective which acknowledges the catholicity of rasa theory as it seems to serve the cause even of what they term 'absurd theatre' or 'absurd poetry'. I am sure the discerning will take note of all this and try to evaluate this work in an unbiased way. At the same time may I remind the learned of the words of Jayanta who said, "kutōsti nūtanam vastu ?", or of the words quoted as above of Abhinavagupta suggesting that all fresh results follow the achievements of the earlier masters, i.e. after climbing the 'viveka-sopāna-paramparā' one gets into something fresh. So, I invite the sensitive and thoughtful adhikārins to have a soft corner for me and extend their helping hand. The great Mahimā observes : (Vyakti-viveka) -

“yuktōyam ātmasadrśān prati me prayatno
nā'sty eva taj jagati, sarva-manoharāṃ yat,
kecij jvalanti, vikasanty, apare nimīlanti
anye yad abhyudayabhāji jagat-pradīpe.”

The discerning are requested to read every line, before pronouncing a judgement.... I wish that only those, through whose arteries and veins alampkāra-śāstra flows, should venture to review this work. No lesser soul should attempt it.

So, we humbly say -

“adya pratanyate'smābhiḥ
vidusāṃ prītaye mudā
aṣṭādaśā'dhikariṇī
mīmāṃsā kāvya-vartnani.”

This forms only the first volume of my “Sahṛdayā”loka” or “Thought-currents in Indian Literary Criticism.” The proposed second volume will try to study the concepts of guṇa, doṣa, alaṃkāra, lakṣaṇa, aucitya, rīti, vṛtti, kaviśikṣā and some modern writers on Sanskrit poetics, such as Dr. Rewaprasadjee etc.

I sincerely thank the publishers and Shri. Dr. Jitendra Shah the Director, L. D. Institute of Indology, Ahmedabad, for seeing this work through. I also thank his colleagues, and also Principal Kanjibhai Patel for kindly co-operating with us. The press - Shri Swaminārāyaṇa Mudraṇa Mandir, of course deserves full praise and thanks for doing its job so carefully.

I also thank, Smt. Harsha Nandi, my wife, Smt. Chinmayee M. Rali, my beloved daughter, M. Pharm., Dr. Mayur S. Rali, M.D., D.G.O., my son-in-law, and our two grandsons - Parth who studies medicine, and Mit, doing physiotherapy bearing with me through all the inconveniences caused due to my sādhanā, and providing love and inspiration through out the course of these three years when this work was carried out. I also thank the Divine, and our Sadguru Raja-yogī Shrī Narendrajee for his blessings and who has also suggested that even after this polite achievement, I have to travel further, through the woods, dark, deep and lovely, before I rest and lay down my pen. Aum mā Aum. iti Śivam...

19 Aug. 2004

TAPASVI NANDI

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(Gujarat State)
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Bio-data of Dr. T. S. Nandi

M. A. Ph.D

Born : 22nd Sept., 1933, Kheda, Gujarat; India.

Special achievements :

- (i) Smt. Nāthībā Gold Medal, '53; Guj. Uni., Ahd.
- (ii) Dr. Nayak Gold Medal for Research '73; Guj. Uni.; Ahmedabad.
- (iii) Śāstra-cūḍāmaṇi fellowship; Rashtriya Sanskrit Sansthan, New Delhi; Feb. '94
- (iv) Awardee, President's Certificate of Merit, Aug. '90.
- (v) Emeritus Professor; Uni. Grants. Comm. New Delhi, Feb. '95;

Teaching Experience : '55 June - '64 June; H. K. Arts College, Ahd.; as Lecturer and Professor; Jun '64 - '93 Oct. (Total 29 yrs and Six months). at P. G. School of Languages Guj. Uni., as lecturer, Reader and Prof. Head, ['84 feb.-'85 Dec. as Director, L. D. Inst. of Indology, on lien.]

Area of specialisation : Sanskrit Literature and Literary Criticism - alaṃkāraśāstra.

Research Articles - A hundred odd articles published in various research journals of repute.

Research Works :

- (i) The Origin and Development of the theory of Rasa and Dhvani in Sanskrit Poetics (Doctoral thesis); Pub.; Gujarat Uni. Research publication series; '73.
- (ii) "Dhvanyāloka-Locana", critical Intro. and Translation in Gujarati; Pub. Guj. Uni. '73
- (iii) Sanskrit Nāṭakono paricaya (in gujarat) [Introduction to Sanskrit Drama] Pub.; Uni. Book Production Board; Guj. State; Ahd. '73; Third Edn. '96.
- (iv) 'Bhāratiya Sāhitya-śāstranī vicāra-parṃparāo" (in Guj.) Uni. Book. Production Board, '74; Third Edn.; 2000.

(v) Mammaṭa's Kāvyaṭprakāśa with Sāradīpikā of Guṇaratnagaṇi; ullāśas I-VI; Vol. I; Critically edited for the first time; Pub; Guj. Uni.; '76.

(vi) Mammaṭa's Kāvyaṭprakāśa, with Sāradīpikā of Guṇaratnagaṇi; critical Edition; (vol. II) Pub. Guj. Uni. '84;

(vii) Bhāratīya Nāṭyaśāstranī Vicāra-paramparāo (in Guj.); Pub. Uni. Book-production Board Guj. State; Ahd. '85

(viii) Jinasaṃudra's Commentary on the Raghuvamśa of Kālidāśa; Critical Edn.; Pub. Guj. Sāhitya Akademi; Guj. State, Ahd. '85 critical Intro. in English.

(ix) Nāṭyaśāstra - Bharata; Ch. VI. with Abhinavabhāratī; (in Guj.) Critical Intro. Translation, etc. with Harṣavaṭī, Guj. Comm.; Pub. Guj. Uni. Research Publication series; '79.

(x) Nāṭyaśāstra - Bharata; Ch. s I. II and III. and Ch. VI. with Abhinavabhāratī; (in Guj.); critical Intro, Translation etc.; Pub. Sarasvatī research prakāśana series; Vol. I; Ahd. '94

Second Edn. 2001 A.D.

(xi) Nāṭyaśāstra - Bharata; Ch. VI; with Abhinava-bhāratī, Chs. XVI, XVIII & XIX, Guj. Trans. Critical Intro. etc. (Vol. II), '94; Sarasvatī Research Prakāśana, series, Vol. 8, 2nd. Edn. 2001, A.D.

(xii) Mṛcchakatika; Śudraka; - by Sragdhara Nandi; Revised Critical Edn.; Dr. T. S. Nandi; Sarasvatī Research Publication Series; Ahd. '97

(xiii) Dhvanyāloka, with Locana; (in Guj.) critical Intro; Translation etc.; Pub. Sarasvatī; Research Publication series, Vol. 11; Ahd. '98 (in Gujarati)

(xiv) Nāṭyaśāstra - Bharata; Vol. II Gaekwad oriental series; critical Edn. with special ref. to MS. 'N' (from Nepal) - jointly with Dr. V. M. Kulkarni; Intro. in English Pub. Oriented Institute, Vadodara; 2001 A.D.

(xv) Haima - vāṇmaya-vimarśa; Edited by Dr. T. S. Nandi; Jointly with Dr. R. I. Nanavati, Research Articles Read at international and national level seminars in Ahd., and Surat; Pub. skt-sāhitya Akademi., Guj. State : '87.

(xvi) Kāvya'nuśāśana; Ācārya Hemacandra, with critical Intro; Trans.; in Gujarati Pub. The L. D. Institute of indology, Ahd.; L. D. Series; Vol. 123; Jun. 2000 A.D.

(xvii) "Abhidhā"; Pub. L. D. Inst. of Indology, Ahd.; L. D. Series, 131; Feb. 2002 A.D.

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Nāṭyaśāstra, Vol. III (Ch. XIX-XXVII) (Published; 2004 A.D.); & IV. (Ch. XXVIII-XXXVI) (in press) with Abhinavabhāratī; Critical new edition with special ref. to Ms. 'N' (from Nepal) - jointly with Dr. V. M. Kulkarni; Pub. - Oriental Institute, Vadodara; under G.O.Series publication;

XX - Sahrdayāloka - or

Thought-currents in Indian Literary Criticism; Pub. L. D. Institute of Indology, Ahd., 2004-2005 A.D.

Works on Hand

XXI - Jayanta's Kāvyaṇṇakāśa Dīpikā; Critical Edn. in view of a fresh ms. from Hemacandra Jñāna bhaṇḍāra, Pātan (N. Guj.), with critical Intro; and comparative critical observations written in Sanskrit.

XXII Ālaṇṇkārikas from Gujarat.

or Jaina Aesthetics; (in English) -

XXXIII Kālidāsa and Sanskrit Literary criticism;

(with ref. to all major ālaṇṇkāra works)

XXIV Vyaktiviveka of Mahima Bhaṭṭa - critical Intro; Translation etc. in English.

Dr. Nandi has attended various seminars, and conferences at local, state, national and international level, sometimes as chairperson or sectional president,- He attended the W.S.C., in Philadelphia, U.S.A. '84; and also in Benglore, A.D. '98. He was nominated as chair-person; for a session at the W.S.C., in Delhi, 2002;

His works have been favourably reviewed in national and international journals.

14 Students earned their doctorate (Ph.D.) under his supervision and 25 odd got their M. Phil degree under his guidance.



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Abbreviations

AVM.	—	Abhidhāvr̥tta-Mātrkā of Mukula.
A-bh	—	Abhinavabhārati
AG.	—	Abhinavagupta
A-Śe.	—	Alaṃkāra-śekhara-Keśava;
Ā.	—	Ānandavardhana
Bhā	—	Bhāmaha
B. P.	—	Bhāva Prakāśana
B.	—	Bharata
Bho.	—	Bhoja
DR.	—	Daśa-rūpaka-
Da.	—	Daṇḍin
Dha	—	Dhanañjaya - Dhanika
Dhv.	—	Dhvanyāloka.
Dhv. L.	—	Dhvanyāloka-Locana-Abhinavagupta's.
H. (or. H. C.)	—	Hemacandra.
J.	—	Jagannātha
K. Kris.	—	K. Krishnamoorthy, Prof.
Kā.	—	Kāvyā'laṃkāra, Bhāmaha.
Kā.Sū.Vṛ.	—	Kāvyā'laṃkāra-Sūtra-vṛtti-Vāmana's
Kā-Śā	—	Kāvyā'nuśāsana, Hemacandra.
KD.	—	Kāvyā'darśa-Daṇḍin
K. P.	—	Kāvya Prakāśa.
Ku.	—	Kumārila-
K.	—	Kuntaka,
Mī-Sū.	—	Mīmāṃsā-Sūtra.

Mbh.	—	Mahābhāṣya
M.	—	Mahimabhāṭṭa;
M.	—	Mammāṭa.
NLRK.	—	Nāṭaka-Lakṣaṇa-Ratna-Koṣa
N. S.	—	Nāṭyaśāstra, Bharata;
P.	—	Pāṇini
PR.	—	Punditarāja-Jagannāth.
RS.	—	Rasā'rṇavasudhākara.
R. G.	—	Rasa-Gaṅgādhara
Śā	—	Śāradātanaya
Śr.Pra.	—	Śṛṅgāra-Prakāśa; Bhoja
Ś.B.	—	Śīṅgabdhūpāla
Sā	—	Sāgaranandin
Sā	—	Sā-Sāyaṇa (in vedic context)
S-D.	—	Sāhityadarpaṇa-Viśvaanātha
SP.	—	Sanskrit Poetics, S. K. De.
S.K.Ā.	—	Sarasvatī-Kaṇṭhā"- bharṇa.
Vāg.	—	Vāgbhaṭa II
Vātsyā	—	Vātsyāyana
V. J.	—	Vakrokti Jīvita; Kuntaka
V.	—	Viśvanātha
Vya.V.	—	Vyakti-Viveka



Chapter I

Definition and Scope of Poetry

(Kāvya; Literature i.e. belles lettres)

Introduction :

Sound thinking on aesthetics started in India in very early period. It was reliable and thought-provoking. It continues to be so even today in modern context. It centred round arts such as drama, literature, music, dance, architecture, sculpture etc. The aesthetics developed with reference to nāṭya i.e. dramatic art, and sāhitya, i.e. literary art, in particular, seems to be unparalleled even when compared to the thinking of modern aesthetes, both in east or west. Our context, for the present, centres round only literary aesthetics. It may be noted that in India, thinking concerning literary criticism originated from very very early period and this observation is supported by documentary evidences. The nāṭyaśāstra (= N.S.) of Bharata (4th cen. A.D.) (We have accepted the dates of all works referred to in our writing, as fixed by Dr. S. K. De; Sanskrit Poetics, History of; Calcutta, 60.) which covers critically the dramatic art in all its forms, and in which all forms of dramatic art are subsumed under the terminology viz. rūpaka, - deals with certain basic principles concerning literary criticism, such as 'guṇa' or literary excellence, doṣa or literary blemish, alaṃkāra or figures of speech and lakṣana or distinctive mark, while treating "vāg-abhinaya" i.e. vocal acting concerning the speech, along with other three forms of acting such as 'āṅgika abhinaya' i.e. bodily acting or gestural, āhārya i.e. extraneous, conveyed by costumes, settings, make-up etc., and 'sāttvika' i.e. internal, conveyed by the manifestation of internal feelings, which required greater concentration and subtler effort on the part of the artist. With reference to the same, the N.S. also considers the problem of 'rasa' i.e. aesthetic experience. It

should always be kept in centre that Bharata is concerned only with aesthetics concerning the dramatic art. For him dramatic art was totally different and independent of the literary art. He has discussed the topic of *rasa* i.e. aesthetic experience, in the context of dramatic art only and this thinking which could have originated with reference to dramatic art, or, any art in general, could have been applied to literary art as well by literary critics later. But this could be only a guess work and it may be noted that nobody is in a position to pass any observation on oath. May be dramaturgy preceded literary criticism and the topic of *rasa*-experience was later covered up in literary criticism also, when written form of drama was subsumed under literary form called '*dr̥śya-kāvya*' or visual form of literature. But exactly at what stage of literary criticism and when this happened, one can not say. True, Bharata's N.S. is earlier among available documents concerning art, especially dramatic art, and it does precede any oldest available document concerning literary art, i.e., *kāvya-alamkāra-grantha*, but at the same time it is equally true that Bharata himself while dealing with literary principles such as *guṇa*, etc. as mentioned above, talks of their application in dramatic art, particularly in preparing written literary script of a play, with reference to '*kāvya-rasa*' i.e. aesthetic experience through literature. Thus, '*kāvya-rasa*' is an accepted concept for Bharata while dealing with '*nāṭya-rasa*' and we do not know exactly when these two thought-currents of *kāvya-rasa* and *nāṭya-rasa* got mingled with each other, even if they had an independent origin. Actually they were always taken care of together, like two sides of the same coin. The fact remains that this situation is even prior to Bharata, though of course, we have clear evidence of his recognising "*rūpaka*" or drama/play in general, as form of literature. It is quite possible that later literary critics subsumed drama as a variety of *dr̥śya* i.e. visual or *abhineya* i.e. representable form of literature. Thus, dramatic art was embraced and taken in its fold by literary art. Other forms of literature which were '*an-abhineya*' i.e. not meant for dramatic representation on stage, i.e. not part of performing art in general, such as verse-form beginning with '*muktaka*' or a single-verse composition, ending with *mahā-kāvya* or epic form of literature, were topics of works on literary criticism i.e. *alamkāra-grantha* in particular. The literary critics also covered in their *kāvya-alamkāra-granthas*, '*gadya*' i.e. prose forms of literature such as *kaṭhā*, *ākhyāyikā* etc. To repeat, one thing is absolutely clear, that Bharata also gave a thought to some form of a written script while dealing with *vācika-abhinaya* i.e. acting concerning speech. Thus, he had an occasion to think of such topics as *guṇa*, i.e. literary excellence, *doṣa*, i.e. literary blemish, *alamkāra* i.e. figure of speech and *lakṣaṇa* i.e. distinctive mark, — topics which normally occupy

the thinking of literary critics. The use of these categories was recommended by Bharata with reference to 'kāvyā-rasa'. Thus thinking concerning 'kāvyā' i.e. literature and 'kāvyā-rasa' i.e. aesthetic experience through literature was even prior to Bharata. And this should be taken as a fact beyond debate. We can not imagine exactly at which period of time aesthetics concerning literary art only, originated as a separate discipline and that literary aesthetics came to be regarded as independent of aesthetics concerning dramatic art and, or, vice versa. N.S. of Bharata continues to be the oldest available document in art-criticism which centring round dramatic art, also embraces dance, music, literature, architecture, sculpture etc. in its fold, and treats of certain principles of literary criticism which keep aesthetic enjoyment in their focus. We have evidences to this effect from the VII th as well as XVIth chapters of the N.S. (Edn. G.O.S.) e.g.,

Nā-Śā. (Edn. G.O.S. '59) pp. 348 (Vol. I) has -

"evaṃ ete kāvyā-rasābhivyakti-hetavaḥ ekónapañcāśad bhāvaḥ pratyavagantavyāḥ."

and also - pp. 339 ibid - "yadi kāvyārtha-saṃśritair-vibhāvā'nubhāva-vyañjitair-ekónapañcāśadbhāvaiḥ sāmānyaguṇa-yogena abhinispadyante rasāḥ, tat katham sthāyina eva bhāvā rasatvaṃ āpnuvanti"...

and also - pp. 380 - (N.S. VII. 120) -

"nānābhāvārtha-saṃpannāḥ
sthāyi-sattvābhicāriṇaḥ,
puṣpāvakīrṇāḥ kartavyāḥ
kāvyeṣu hi rasā budhaiḥ."

and also - pp. 364, Vol. II; -

"etāni kāvyasya ca lakṣaṇāni
ṣaḍ-trimśad uddeśa-nidarśanāni,
prabandha-śobhākarāṇi tajñaiḥ,
samyak prayojyāni yathā-rasāni." (XVI. 42)

So, observes Bharata; "Forty-nine bhāvas are to be recognized in view of the manifestation (i.e. suggestion) of this kāvyā-rasa".

"When, with the help of the forty-nine bhāvas (i.e. basic feelings/emotions), that are suggested with the help of the vibhāvas i.e. determinants, anubhāvas i.e. consequents and vyabhicārins or accessories that rest on 'kāvyārtha' i.e. poetic meaning, 'rasas' i.e. aesthetic experience are born due to generalization, how is it

that it is stated that, only the sthāyibhāvas or basic emotions attain to the status of aesthetic rapture ?" Again, Bharata observes : "The wise have to spread, like flowers, rasas or aesthetic experience, in kāvyas i.e. poetry; rasas; that reside in sthāyī i.e. basic emotion, sāttvika i.e. involuntary consequents, (and vyabhicārins) accessories that are accomplished with the help of different feelings and meanings. Again, "The enumeration and illustrations of these thirty-six lakṣaṇas i.e. distinctive marks are provided. These make for the beauty of a composition. The experts have to utilize them (in poetry) with reference to rasa i.e. aesthetic experience." It is clear from these references from N.S., that rasa was considered with reference to 'kāvyā' i.e. poetry also and that Bharata was fully cognizant of it. Of course, we do not come across any direct reference to the acceptance of 'rūpaka' or a dramatic piece, as a special form of literature or poetry in N.S. But there we have no indications to the contrary either in Bharata. In short, literary criticism has its beginnings even prior to Bharata.

The works that dealt primarily with poetic beauty were recognized as "ālaṃkāra-granthas", and the literary critics were designated as ālaṃkārikas. The śāstra i.e. discipline, that dealt with literary forms, their varieties and their beauty i.e. ālaṃkāra or 'saundarya'; the discipline of literary criticism; was termed "ālaṃkāraśāstra". There is a definite idea behind the usage, viz, "ālaṃkāra-śāstra". To-day, normally, by the term 'ālaṃkāra' in literature, we refer to the various poetic figures of words and sense such as 'anuprāsa' or alleiteration, 'yamaka' or rhyme etc. and 'upamā' or simile, 'rūpaka' or metaphor, 'utprekṣā' or poetic fancy etc. Thus we take the term 'ālaṃkāra' to refer to a limited sense only. But the earlier ālaṃkārikas or literary critics did not accept the term ālaṃkāra in this specific limited sense only. They took it in a much wider sense. For what we term as 'sāhitya' i.e. belles lettres to-day, these earlier critics, used the term 'kāvyā' which consisted of the co-existence - i.e. beautiful balancing - of both word and sense. As Kuntaka (vakrokti-jīvitā = V.J. - I. 7) puts it, "Poetry is that word and sense together enshrined in a style revealing the artistic (lit, 'out-of-the-way') creativity of the poet on the one hand and giving aesthetic delight to the man of taste on the other." (Trans. K.Kris.) Kuntaka makes it clear that normally word and sense go together in ordinary parlance, say for example, in day-to-day worldly talks, in various types of literature such as legal, scientific, etc. or even in a bare statement which reads news etc. But this sort of association of word and sense does not make for "literature" for an ālaṃkārika or a literary critic. Kuntaka places it clearly when he observes, (V. J.,

Edn. K. Krishnamoorthy, Dharwad, 1977. (V. J. I. 16, 17) : "when it is so obvious that word and meaning are ever experienced jointly, what is the special import of mentioning it (in the definition) ? The *sāhitya* or mutual coherence between word and meaning in respect of beauty is nothing but a unique poetic usage, involving neither more nor less than the exact form of word and meaning required to make the whole beautiful. So, this is exactly meant by the term 'kāvyā' i.e. poetry, irrespective of its form, i.e. prose or verse. There are many varieties of poetry both in *gadya* i.e. prose, such as *kathā*, *ākhyāyikā* etc. and verse beginning with single verses i.e. *muktaka* and ending with a large composition an epic i.e. *mahākāvyā*". Dr. A. K. Warder (Indian *kāvyā* literature Vol. I-V; Edn. Motilal Banarasidass, Delhi, '72) uses equivalents such as 'novel' and 'biography' or 'little history' for '*kathā*' and '*ākhyāyikā*' respectively, but we do not accept these terms, for these terms are tainted with different shades of meaning in modern context. The various forms, prose and verse, as mentioned above are all '*an-abhineya*' i.e. not to be staged, as against '*abhineya*' variety of literature which covers various forms of drama that are to be staged. Poetic beauty as revealed through *kāvyā* of all these forms, is brought about by '*sāhitya*' or special togetherness of word and sense. The *ālaṃkārikas* or literary critics investigated into the problem of this poetic beauty i.e. '*kāvyā'ālaṃkāra*' or '*ālaṃkāra* of poetry.' From a strict logical point of view, they had two categories viz. '*kāvyā*' and '*kāvyā-śobhā*', i.e. poetry and poetic beauty. Whatever was responsible in either creating poetic beauty directly or adding to it, was termed as '*ālaṃkāra*' in a wider sense of the term. The works which contained serious discussion concerning the beauty of poetry, were widely called '*kāvyā'ālaṃkāra*' works, and the discipline, '*ālaṃkāra-śāstra*'. Thus whatever factors that render some polish to literature, and whatever caused or added to its beauty, were all subsumed under one wider general term viz. '*ālaṃkāra*'. So, the work, as noted above that concerned itself with poetry and its '*ālaṃkāra*' i.e. its beauty in general, went under the name of *kāvyā'ālaṃkāra-grantha*. Thus, we have, '*kāvyā'ālaṃkāra*' of *Bhāmaha*, '*kāvyā'ālaṃkāra*' of *Udbhata*, '*kāvyā'ālaṃkāra-sūtra-vṛtti*' of *Vāmana*, *kāvyā'ālaṃkāra* of *Rudraṭa* and also that of *Kuntaka*. The secret is that a work dealing with poetry i.e. belles lettres, and its beauty, i.e. its '*ālaṃkāra*', is termed *kāvyā'ālaṃkāra* and the discipline dealing with literary criticism is '*ālaṃkāra-śāstra*'. Thus whatever caused beauty in poetry is termed '*ālaṃkāra*' in a wider sense of the term in the literary circle of critics of those times. A sort of convention grew in literary circles around the word '*ālaṃkāra*'

with reference to all factors that either caused or added to beauty in poetry. Thus, observes Daṇḍin, "The factors that make for beauty in poetry are (all) termed as alaṃkāra", and Vāmana observes that, "Poetry is understood through alaṃkāra; verily, beauty is alaṃkāra." Daṇḍin in, kāvyā'darśa (Edn. B.O.R.I.) observes, - "kāvyasobhākarān dharmān alaṃkāraṇ pracakṣte." - and also Vāmana, Kāvyaalaṃkāra-sūtra-vṛtti - (Edn. '71. Chowkhamba skt. series) - "kāvyam grāhyam alaṃkārat, saundaryam alaṃkārah." -

When a man of taste experiences a feeling such as, "it is all perfect now; it is 'alaṃ'-enough", then only an "alaṃkāra" is said to have taken shape. We have a term, "araṃkr̥tiḥ" in the Vedas to the same effect.

This tradition - which is prior to Bharata - of literary criticism, in its very initial stages, had literary thinkers attempt a coherent and logical definition of poetry, while directing their search towards deciphering the secret of beauty in poetry. While attempting a thorough investigation in the nature of factors that caused or promoted poetic beauty, these 'ālaṃkārikas' or literary critics of yore, came across various thought currents under terms such as guṇa or poetic excellence, alaṃkāra, or figures of speech, or turns of expression, rīti or style or diction, vṛtti or mode, doṣa i.e. poetic blemish; lakṣaṇa or natural mark, rasa or aesthetic experience, dhvani or suggestion; vakratā or devitation or beautiful expression, aucitya or propriety, etc. which started gathering currency, weight and momentum. Thus, various currents and cross-currents originated with reference to the quest for the beautiful in poetry. In the works on kāvyā'alaṃkāra i.e. beauty in poetry, all these topics were debated vigorously and ālaṃkārikas i.e. literary critics, tried to promote or put more stress on this or that concept according to their individual preference and taste. As a result traditions and theories in thought currents concerning rīti, i.e. style, alaṃkāra or figures of speech, rasa or aesthetic pleasure, dhvani or suggestion and vakrokti or beautiful expression and aucitya or propriety, started taking shape. These thought-currents and cross-currents at times vied with one another and at times merged with one another and again parted and merged to form a varitable flux of indian literary criticism termed "alaṃkāraśāstra" in general. However, it has to be carefully kept in mind that no ālaṃkārika or literary critic has pressed for the acceptance of this or that concept at the cost of total elimination or disrespect for any other concept. True, we observe passionate insistence on this or that thought-current, but this attitude does not push out any other thought-current as rank bad and useless. On the contrary, by and large, there is a tendency to accomodate, a tendency to tolerate and respect other literary

traditions and evolve a fabric of variagated colours. This happens with great thinkers such as Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin and Vāmana among the earlier ālaṃkārikas, and then the great Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta followed by Mammāta, down to Appayya Dixit and Pundita-rāja Jagannātha - all belonging to what we may term the Kashmir School of thought as against what we may term the Mālava School of literary criticism with Bhoja supposedly taking its lead. Even in the Mālava tradition the same spirit of tolerance and respect for rival thought current is equally prominent and this is a trait of Indian culture and tradition in general. These thinkers have tried to accomodate all concepts, all thought-currents in their wider coherent and catholic scheme of thought, but of course, with more or less weightage given to this or that concept. For example, penning 'Hṛidayadarpaṇa' with a vow to demolish dhvani, its author, Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka accepts the concept of rasa-rasadhvani - in his own way. The process of arriving at rasa, for Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka is reached with the help of powers called bhāvakatva or revelation and bhojakatva or enjoyment as against vyañjanā i.e. suggestion as advocated by Ānandavardhana. Dr. Warder (p. 37. Vol. I. Para, 85) uses the equivalent 'development' for bhāvanā or bhāvakatva. We have preferred 'generalization' as it forms the essence of bhāvakatva, or 'revelation' as Dr. Gnoil puts it. Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka wielded great influence on Bhoja but Bhoja did not reject either dhvani or vyañjanā, though Dhanañjaya and Dhanika emphasised on 'tātparya', a separate power and denounced vyañjanā. But even these two did not reject 'rasa', as well as, implicit sense. Thus, while Bhaṭṭa-Nāyaka while respecting rasa, marginalized vyañjanā and promulgated the cause of bhāvakatva and bhojakatva, Mahimā, the author of 'Vyakti-viveka' and a great exponent of poetic inference-kāvya'numiti accepted only one power of word, called abhidhā and covered up everything else than the expressed sense, under anumiti or poetic inference and denounced vyañjanā or the power of suggestion as advocated strongly by Ānandavardhana who claims that his theory of "vyañjanā-dhvani-rasa" has been proclaimed by ancients from times immemorial. So, Mahimā revolted against vyañjanā/dhvani but accepted implicit sense - pratiyamāna artha and 'rasa' or aesthetic experience. He accepted the supremacy of only 'rasa', through 'kāvya'numiti', without objecting to the implicit sense in general which also fell under inference in poetry, according to him. Same is the thinking of Dhanañjaya and Dhanika, who promote, the cause of tātparyavṛtti or purport at the cost of vyañjanā, in their famous utterance viz. 'tātparyam na tulādhṛtam' i.e. "tātparya or purport is not held in a scale of balance", all the time not rejecting the implicit

sense in general and 'rasa' in particular in poetry. Again, the predecessors of Ānanda-vardhana such as Bhāmaha and the like, have also discussed all topics such as guṇa, doṣa, alaṃkāra, rīti etc. Thus all these literary critics beginning with Bhāmaha and down to Jagannātha and post-Jagannātha, are all 'kāvyā'laṃkāravādins', i.e. 'kāvyā-saundarya-vādins', i.e. those who investigated into the nature of "beauty" in poetry, or aesthetics of poetry. Of course, it is a different story that the word 'alaṃkāra', used in the general sense of poetic beauty got restricted to a limited sense of 'figures of word and sense' only in the Kashmir tradition of critics who were post-Ānandavardhana. But the point to be noted is that none of these critics, has rejected a single topic or thought-current out-right, but has accepted in his own way all these concepts and has accommodated them in his theory of literary criticism. Thus the term 'alaṃkāra' originally made current to connote poetic beauty in general, was instrumental in the very designation of this discipline as 'alaṃkāra-śāstra', and also in naming of the works of literary criticism as 'kāvyā'laṃkāra-grantha', i.e. a treatise on 'beauty in poetry'.

As observed earlier, the beginning of literary criticism is even prior to Bharata, though of course such written documents, containing principles of literary criticism, prior to Bharata, can not be traced to-day. Works, available to us to-day, that discuss the nature of those forms of poetry that are not to be staged, are all post-Bharata. The oldest available among these, is "Kāvyā'laṃkāra" of Bhāmaha (end of 7th Cen. A.D. and beginning of 8th A.D.). After this, we have 'Kāvyādarśa' of Daṇḍin (first half of 8th Cen. A.D.), followed by 'Kāvyā'laṃkāra-sūtra-vṛtti' of Vāmana (middle of 8th Cen. A.D. to advent of 9th Cen. A.D.), 'Kāvyā'laṃkāra' of Udbhaṭa (end of 8th Cen. - to beginning of 9th Cen. A.D.), and Kāvyā'laṃkāra of Rudraṭa (first quarter of 9th Cen. to end of 9th Cen. A.D.), to be followed by 'Dhvanyāloka' of the great Ānandavardhana (9th Cen. A.D.) and works of Abhinavaguptapāda (Cir. 10th Cen. A.D., last quarter to beginning of 11th Cen. A.D.) in form of commentaries on Dhvanyāloka of Ānandavardhana and N.S. of Bharata Brilliant authors such as those beginning with Mammaṭa down to Jagannātha who firmly backed and established the schools of literary criticism as introduced by Ānandavardhana and supported by Abhinavagupta, capture our attention. These authors belong to what we may loosely term as the Kashmir tradition in literary criticism. Almost parallel to that runs a second flow of literary criticism seeking perhaps its original inspiration in Daṇḍin, Śaṅkuka etc., and yet not completely turning away from Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta, which we may term as Mālava tradition of literary criticism, when juxtaposed with the

Kashmir tradition, represented by such great writers as Bhoja, Śāradātanaya and the rest with their monumental, works such as Saraswati-kaṇṭhābharāṇa, Śṛṅgāraprakāśa, Bhāvaprakāśana etc. We do not rate Agnipurāṇa as an older document and our impression is that it is closer to the Mālava tradition though not completely departing from the kashmir tradition. We will try to trace the graph of such literature on literary criticism in Sanskrit that spans over between fifteen hundred to two thousand years.

The chief trait of the efforts of indian literary critics who attempted to unveil the secrets of poetic beauty, to get closer to what it makes for poetry, to get into the root of it and to explain the whole thing clearly, is the sincerity of the enquiry. The critics are honest, true, forthright and without personal bias. The critics have not hesitated in accepting, to their advantage, the outcome of solid thinking by any predecessor, albeit with certain basic differences in approach and attitude. Application of the thinking of an earlier master in literary criticism and his thought process by a later critic, is a common trait. Even die-hard critics of an earlier master do not hesitate to draw quotations that may suit their purpose from the same critic. They accept the words of honourable antagonists with dignity and self-respect. This is honesty and culture, pure and simple. In doing so, they do not bring in individual differences on certain subtle points, and their criticism never speaks the language of personal prejudice. For example, take the concept of what is termed 'sādhāraṇīkaraṇa'; the normal english equivalent sought for this is 'generalization', which we do not accept; and instead we coin a new term such as, 'de-individualization'. Now this concept of 'sādhāraṇīkaraṇa' is normally associated with Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka by modern scholars. Even here we beg to differ. We feel that the germs of this concept can be traced even in the N.S. of Bharata, when he uses terms such as, 'sādhāraṇa-guṇa-yoga'. Perhaps this concept also was floated by some critic not known to us and was even prior to Bharata. Precisely because of this perhaps Abhinavagupta tried to trace the origin of this concept in traditions of mīmāṃsādarśana and even in what is called 'loka-vyavahāra' or normal worldly business. Whatever it may be, but even Abhinavagupta, a staunch advocate of Ānandavardhana's views, quotes with great admiration and respect from Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, an avowed opponent of dhvani, - a 'dhvani-dhamsin'. We can observe a similarity of approach in case of Bhoja also, an exponent of Mālava tradition, quoting with respect from Ānandavardhana, though of course, it may be observed that the Mālava-tradition does not oppose the Kashmir tradition tooth and nail. On the other hand Mahimā an exponent of kāvyānumiti or poetic inference and a die-hard critic of Ānandavardhana's vyañjanā-dhvani

concept, also quotes from the Dhvanyāloka with respect, whenever it suits his presentation. The point is that these indian critics, especially the earlier lot, never showed any personal malice against their opponents though of course some sort of veiled malice - mark the term veiled - is noticeable in Jagannātha's criticism of Appayya Dixit. But then this could be the result of the times in which Jagannātha lived; a period of Muslim rulers. The Mālava tradition does not seem to be as antagonistic to Kashmir tradition as is 'anumiti' parampara' or thought current of poetic inference which is almost at daggers drawn to the former. But the fact remains that these critics, advocating whichever thought-current, were all gentlemen and were bestowed with highest culture and moved with great human dignity. The crux of the whole argument is that the indian literary critics have never advocated any thought-current in a fanatic and sectarian fashion, and were large hearted and honest and gentlemanly while dealing with critics belonging to different schools of thought. They have been free and liberal in accepting views of others on points where differences were not basic. Actually they even tried to merge their differences and bridge the gulf by giving a new interpretation to certain norms as is seen in case of Abhinavagupta who makes an effort to patch up any difference with Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka when he explains a famous quotation from Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka who observed rasa to be - "bhāva-saṃyojanā-vyaṅgyaḥ para-saṃvitti-gocaraḥ." This fact of reconciling on basic issues becomes evident even in the words of the same master Abhinavagupta while initiating a thorough explanation of the famous rasa-sūtra by Bharata, where he concedes that when newer and newer ideas flash in his intellect which is ever green and never feels tired, the secret of this event is accredited to the viveka-sopāna-paramparā, - to the series of steps of discrimination as laid down by earlier thinkers. It is exactly for this reason, he adds, that he has avoided finding faults in the thinking of earlier masters.

"tasmāt satām atra na dūṣitāni
matāni tāny eva tu śodhitāni..."

- Abhinavabhārati (A.bh.) on N.S. VI-31; Vol. I, pp. 272, Edn. '92, G.O.S.

and also, "pūrva-pratiṣṭhāpita-yojanāsu

mūla-pratiṣṭhā-phalaṃ āmananti." - ibid., pp. 272.

The outcome of this discussion is that the indian literary critics have never entertained any gross sectarian outlook, but have on the other hand, chosen to enrich their own thinking by free exchange and acceptance of views held by others. This is true even in case of the aesthetics advanced by Vaiṣṇava authors

such as Rūpa Goswamī and Jīva-Goswamī, whose external covering looks sectarian, but virtually it proves to be as aesthetic as any other theory, with of course, devotion to Lord Kṛṣṇa being the central thing. The indian aesthetes, in their quest for the secret of poetry, have nurtured a healthy and open approach and wherever they absolutely agree with their predecessors, they quote from their masters verbatim, accept the view honestly, and exhibit a sort of rare disinterestedness. Vāgdevatāvatāra Mammaṭa and Kalikāla-sarvajñya Ācārya Hemacandra are instances in point. This is what Rājaśekhara terms "svīkaraṇam, na tu haraṇam". The ālaṃkārikas thus, to get at the secret of poetic beauty, first tried to form a logical definition of poetry and then tried to coin special terminology for all factors that either contributed directly to cause poetic beauty or added charm to it, - factors such as guṇas, ālaṃkāras, rīti, vṛtti, etc. etc., as and when such factors opened out before their discriminative attitude. At the same time it should be clearly understood that there was absolute unanimity of opinion concerning various aspects or categories of literary criticism. We know that different views have been postulated even with reference to the nature and birth of 'rasa' i.e. aesthetic experience or art-experience, eventhough it has been held by almost all of them to be the prime purpose of poetry - i.e. 'kāvyārtha'. When one discipline held 'rasa' to be the centre of all poetic creativity-ātmā-of poetry', there ran another thought current which held 'rasa' also as 'ālaṃkāra' (of course, in a wider sense) of kāvyā, and perhaps even to-day there are great modern critics such as Dr. Rewaprasad Dwivedi from Vārāṇasī who subsume 'rasa' under 'kāvyā'ālaṃkāra' and certainly the present writer, Dr. Nandi, also subscribes to this view. The present writer arrived at this conclusion as early as in 1972 A.D. in his first edn. of "Bharatīya Sāhitya Śāstranī Vicāra paramparā" (in Guj.) and when he met Dr. Rewaprasad for the first time in Ujjain at Kālidāsa-samāroha in '76, both were overwhelmed with love and respect for each other because Dr. Rewaprasad had also arrived at the same conclusion in his publication in the same year (= '72) - both of them of course, unmindful of each other's efforts. This is what they call - "saṃvādinyah medhāvināṃ buddhayaḥ bhavanti." It may be said in short, that all earlier masters were correct in their individual assessment from their own point of view, and their presentation was logical and honest and even flawless. We will try to evaluate this broad flux of indian literary criticism that took its shape by the amalgamation of small and smaller currents of literary criticism. We will take its stock in a careful, critical and comparative approach and try to read the whole graph that runs through centuries.

We will unfold our discussion, topic by topic. Before we do this I feel like thanking some modern ālamkārikas such as Dr. P. V. Kane, Dr. S. K. De, Dr. Rama Ranjan Mukhurjee, Dr. V. Raghavan, Dr. K. Krishnamoorthy, Dr. K. Kunjunni Raja, Pandit Viśvesvarajee, Dr. Rewaprasad Dwivedi, Dr. Mukunda Madhav Sharma, and Dr. Pratap Bandopadhyay through whose works I have drawn inspiration and also my gurus, Prof. Rasiklal Parikh, Dr. V. M. Kulkarni and Prof. R. B. Athavale whose guidance and blessings are always with me and whose outstanding contributions in the field of Sanskrit literary criticism has left me richer, and last, but not the least, some of my great friends such as the late Dr. Ram Chandra Dwivedi (Jaipur), Dr. Biswanath Bhattacharya (Shanti Niketan), Dr. Rewaprasad Dwivedi (varanasi), and Dr. N. P. Unni (Kerala), Dr. Radhavallabh Tripathi, Dr. Rajendra Nanavati and Dr. S. P. Narang (Delhi). I have always gained with direct or indirect encounters with them. As noted by Abhinavagupta, originality in scientific investigation lies in giving newer and newer dimension, giving newer and newer design to the finding of the earlier masters. Our effort also will be in the direction of providing fresh approach and fresh interpretation to the material collected.

The concepts of literary criticism which will be examined by us will follow the sequence as given in the contents at the beginning of this book. We directed our efforts in Gujarati language in the three editions of our book entitled. "Bhāratiya Sāhityaśāstranī Vicāra-parṃparāo" (Pub. Uni. Book Production Board, Guj. State) wherein each newer edition had something treated more elaborately and the effort was fresher every time. But the present work is not a mere translation of the original. In all humility we claim it to be a rare transformation, a re-creation, a rebirth so to say, of the thinking carried out in a span of more than five decades. We have embarked upon a new adventure so to say, a new journey. We feel we have scaled greater heights then ever, to the best of our capacity, as we have attempted expansion and eluciation of basic ideas and have seriously contemplated upon the conclusions drawn by such all time greats as even Dr. V. Raghavan, on certain points, and have also ventured to differ from them.

DEFINITION AND SCOPE OF POETRY :

Thus, to begin with, the definition of poetry, the wider concept of poetry as visualized by the masters, its wider scope, the cause and purpose or object of poetry, will be taken up first for our detailed investigation. While treating this or any other topic concerning a given aspect of literary criticism, we will begin with Bhāmaha and take up almost all major critics down to Jagannātha and will try to underline

the growth of a given concept while critically also attempting a comparative evaluation through various stages of its growth and development.

With reference to the available documents, keeping Bharata (N.S.) away from this investigation as his principal interest centred round the dramatic art and not poetry, we will begin the discussion of each given topic with Bhāmaha. Bhāmaha, yes, because we follow Dr. De's chronology, and Bhāmaha, also because later critics, including Abhinavagupta to begin with, use such terms as "yathā Bhāmahā"dibhiḥ uktam" - thus placing Bhāmaha as first and foremost and also most honourable. As noted earlier the exact beginning of literary criticism in India cannot be traced, for even in Bharata we come across a fairly developed stage, but practically, with reference to the available documents, Bhāmaha's work is the oldest available one. It is true that literary criticism was revolutionized by the advent of Ānandavardhana, or at least by the thought current he represented, but for all practical purposes, the investigation of the origin and development of any concept in literary criticism, though shrouded in unknown time and source, should begin with Bhāmaha's Kāvya'lamkāra, for in truth it is the oldest available written document that has come down to us and also because Bhāmaha's reputation went on increasing for ever, in the post-Bhāmaha period as a rare intellectual. True, Ānandavardhana cor-related all the thought-currents in literary criticism that had come down to him, in his wider scheme of vyañjanā-dhvani-rasa, without degrading or throwing out any concept of literary criticism and his scheme took deeper roots as he found great supporters in Abhinavagupta, Mammaṭa, Ruyyaka, Hemacandra, Viśvanātha, Appayya and Jagannātha to mention only a few. There were others also who challenged Ānandavardhana, or to be precise, who challenged his advocacy of vyañjanā, the power of suggestion in a word. They were Bhaṭṭa-Nāyaka, Mukula, Pratiḥarendurāja, Mahimā, Dhanañjaya, Dhanika etc. But even these critics had an open mind and are catholic enough to borrow from Ānandavardhana with respect, when it suits them. We see this in Mahimā also, who posed perhaps the greatest challenge to the concept of vyañjanā. Rājaśekhara was posterior to Ānandavardhana by less than a hundred years and we cannot exactly make out his approach to vyañjanā as his magnum opus - Kāvya-mīmāṃsā-has not come down to us in its complete form, or perhaps he left it unfinished. So, we will try to study the graph of progress of various concepts of literary criticism as painted on the canvas of various documents that fall broadly in three phases such as from untraced beginnings to Bhāmaha and earlier writers on poetics upto Rudraṭa, then Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta and their near contemporaries, and then

post-Ānandavardhana period beginning with Mammṭa, down to Jagannātha. It may be noted however, that Kuntaka, a close successor of Ānandavardhana, and perhaps a predecessor or a senior contemporary of Abhinavagupta, commands a special status, because on one hand we may call him "Ānandavardhana re-incarnated" and perhaps he is held as a 'mānasa-putra' - a spiritual heir of Ānandavardhana and is therefore spared the jaws of biting criticism by Abhinavagupta and other dhvanivādins, on the other we can see that he has not openly committed himself to the acceptance of vyañjanā, though of course, openly not denouncing it either. Dr. K. Krishnamoorthy seems to support this image of Kuntaka. But we feel reluctant at times to brand him as a pure dhvanivādin - i.e. an ardent supporter of 'dhvani'. This topic will be taken up later at the right place. For the present we have to bear in mind first and last, the fact, that all the thought-currents prevalent in the field of Indian Literary Criticism, tend to supplement one another and they seem as streams at times running parallel to one another, at times cutting across one another, while at other times meeting and merging with one another to form a single powerful flux of high thinking, and once again yet parting ways, thus posting mile stones at places.

DEFINITION AND SCOPE OF POETRY — BHĀMAHA :

Presenting a logical definition of poetry, Bhāmaha notes that, "Word and sense coming together, make for poetry. [śabdārthau sahitaṁ kāvyam :] (Bhāmaha, I. 16). From this it is safe to guess that for him word and sense staying in union make for poetry. Apparently this definition suffers from the fault of being 'ativyāpta' i.e. too broad. We will go to see when we proceed in our effort, how Sanskrit literary critics have put 'loka-vyavahāra' or use of language in ordinary parlance, and also scientific use of language of various scriptures-śāstra or disciplines out of the exact scope of what we term literature. We will also consider, in due course, the tendency of extreme logicity in defining poetry only as "word alone", to keep away from the mixing up of other fine arts such as music, dance, painting etc. which imbibe in themselves the element of meaning also, along with their respective differentia. But in case of Bhāmaha, it may be noted that, before striking at the definition of kāvyā i.e. poetry in I. 16, he prepares a background and also carves out the definition/description of a 'mahā-kāvyā' or an epic form of poetry. Thus we will try to consider his definition of poetry in a wider context and try to understand the full scope of poetry as he wants us to understand.

Bhāmaha (I. 2.) declares “dharmārthakāma-mokṣeṣu vaicakṣaṇyaṃ kalāsu ca, karoti prītiṃ kīrtiṃ ca, sādhu kāvya-niṣevaṇam.” that good poetry is composed for the attainment of the four ends of life - puruṣārthas - viz. dharma, i.e. law of life, artha i.e. desire, wealth, prosperity, kāma or desire for love or any cherished object, and mokṣa i.e. deliverance from the bondage of birth and death and rebirth. It also brings expertise in various fine arts bringing also in its fold fame and pleasure. By this we come to appreciate Bhāmaha's stand on the purpose of poetry both for the poet and the reader. Bhāmaha does not seem to encourage the western view point of 'art for art's sake'. He seems to support and perhaps the whole indian thinking sides with the opinion that, art deserves attention because it nourishes some eternal values of life, i.e. 'art for life's sake'. Bhāmaha believes that knowledge of scriptures is useless without a poet's genius, like charity of a pauper, or expertness in using weapons by a man wanting in manly virtues, or like self-praise of an idiot. Expertness concerning language is useless without capacity to poetry. On receiving lessons from a great teacher even a dull-witted person can study scriptures, but poetry is born if at all, only in case of one who is blessed with genius alone. (Bhāmaha I. 5.) We will discuss the topic of the cause of poetry - kāvyahetu - later, but Bhāmaha's bias towards inborn genius can be easily noticed here. Bhāmaha further notes that though departed from earth and moved into heaven, the body in form of poetic compositions of great poets, being immortal, lasts for ever. People desirous of keeping their fame ever-lasting and staying till the end of earth, should strive for composing poetry after seeking full knowledge and information about everything on earth that deserves to be known. Grammar, prosody, lexicography, history, worldly behaviour, logic and fine arts - knowledge of all these is essential for composition of poetry. After learning fully the essence of word and meaning, serving men of knowledge who are experts in the science of word and meaning, having closely studied the works of other great poets, one should make an effort in the direction of composing poetry. Thus, it seems, Bhāmaha seems to have underlined the importance of 'vyutpatti' i.e. learning as a kāvya-hetu. Thus for him 'vyutpatti' is also a factor that makes for poetry, though of course, he puts greater weight on 'pratibhā', i.e. inborn genius. We will go to see later how Daṇḍin attaches equal status to proficiency or learning and practice or application, leading in the end to Maṃṣa's famous observation that genius, learning and application taken together make for the cause, and not “causes” of poetry.

A very important point observed by Bhāmaha is that in the composition of poetry not a single word used should be faulty. In short, blemish in any form has

to be carefully avoided in poetry. He has discussed the topic of poetic blemishes at two places and this shows how serious he is regarding avoidance of a blemish i.e. *doṣa-tyāga*, or what Vāmana and Bhoja later call '*doṣa-hāna*'. We will discuss this later in a separate chapter. But Bhāmaha's concern in this respect is seen clearly when he observes that use of a single faulty word or phrase has to be avoided like the status of having a son of bad character. It becomes a source of censure. Bhāmaha (I, 12) suggests that nobody is said to commit breach of '*dharma*' - Law, nor is inflicted by disease, or is punished for not writing poetry; but bad poetry, for sure, is death itself. After putting stress on '*doṣa-tyāga*' - avoiding blemishes in poetry, Bhāmaha talks about '*alaṃkāras*' i.e. sources of beauty in general and also of figures of speech such as *upamā* or simile, *utprekṣā* or poetic fancy etc. He holds that figures of speech such as metaphor - *rūpaka* - and the rest that have been discussed by others, are also a welcome factor in poetry. The face of women, though beautiful does not appear so without ornamentation (Bhāmaha I. 13). In the same way poetry should be decorated with sources of beauty such as figures of speech etc. May be some modern scholars are prompted to brand Bhāmaha as, '*alaṃkāravādin*' - a propagator of figures of speech in poetry by such remarks. But all this makes no sense as we will go to observe that Bhāmaha uses the term '*alaṃkāra*' in a wider sense of, 'source of poetic beauty in general', and it is precisely this wider sense of 'poetic beauty in general', i.e. '*kāvya-saundarya*' which has been instrumental in calling this discipline of literary criticism by the name of '*alaṃkāra-śāstra*'. Kuntaka's thinking — viz. "The truth is this. Poetry is the work of a poet wherein the undivided whole of the 'adorned' and the 'adornment' is the reality. Therefore, it is clear that poetry is the name of what is adorned and the question of super-adding adornments to pre-existing poetry does not arise", *Vakrokti-jīvita*, (*vṛtti* on I. 6., Trans. K. Krishnamoorthy, pp. 292, *ibid* Edn.,) — finds its roots in Bhāmaha's observation. '*Alaṃkāra*' here, of course, covers the so called figures of speech also provided, as we will go to see Ānanandavardhana observing that, they come naturally to a poet, i.e. are genuine components of a poet's imagination. It is this insistence on the natural place of figurative expression which inspires Mammata, as we will go to observe later, to count it as an essential of poetry and include the terms '*analaṃkṛti punaḥ kvāpi*' in his famous definition of poetry. The term viz. '*alaṃkṛti*' here has a reference to its limited connotation of figures of speech such as *upamā* or simile, *anuprāsa* or alliteration, etc.

So then, after observing that in poetry figures of speech are welcome, Bhāmaha *obliquely refers to what is meant by this*. Bhāmaha (I. 14-15) holds that, "Others take

figures of speech such as 'rūpaka' i.e. metaphor etc. as external. They hold learning concerning nouns and verbs (i.e. grammatical accuracy in use of language) as (real) ornamentation of language. This is called (only) correct use of words (by us). The expertness concerning (the beauty) of meaning is not like this. For us, both the beauty of word and sense is equally welcome." By this beauty of word and sense Bhāmaha hints at poetic beauty as a whole, including the correctness of language from the point of view of grammar, and also figures of speech of both word and sense, and also 'poetic beauty' in general caused due to any source of charm in poetry. We may quote Bhāmaha's exact words here which read as :

"rūpakā"dim alaṃkāraṃ
 bāhyam ācakṣate pare |
 supāṃ tiṇāṃ ca vyutpattim
 vācāṃ vāñcchanty alaṃkṛtim || (I. 14)

tad etad āhuḥ sauśabdyam
 nārtha-vyutpattir īdrṣī |
 śabdābhidheyālaṃkāra-
 bhedād iṣṭam dvayam tu naḥ ||" (I. 15)

Thus purity of language from the point of view of grammar is only one aspect of poetic beauty, and also the fundamental one with which efforts in the direction of poetry should start. But it is not an end in itself. The wider scope of poetry, say poetic beauty, is hinted at by Bhāmaha when he is open to incorporate any source of beauty - alaṃkāraṇa-in his concept of poetry. We may also observe that a difference of opinion concerning what makes for natural beauty in poetry and which are the external or artificial devices causing or adding to poetic beauty, must have existed in circles of literary critics even prior to Bhāmaha. Perhaps Bhāmaha tried to bridge the gulf, and move in the direction of harmony. Bhāmaha is definitely aware of the wider connotation of the term 'alaṃkāra' as, "source of poetic beauty in general" when he refers to what he terms as, "vācāṃ alaṃkṛtiḥ" - i.e. "beauty of (poetic) language." We will go to see later how Vāmana has clearly used the term 'alaṃkāra' in the wider sense of 'saundarya' or 'poetic beauty' when he observes, "kāvyam grāhyam alaṃkāraḥ", "saundaryam alaṃkāraḥ", (Vāmana, I. i; 1, 2). Perhaps the origin of this thought-current was much older than Vāmana and Bhāmaha. As observed earlier, Bhāmaha also clearly distinguishes between poetic beauty caused by mere grammatical correctness, and poetic beauty caused

by other 'alaṃkāra'. If some scholars feel that by 'rupakā"di alaṃkāra' Bhāmaha refers only to the narrow connotation of alaṃkāra as 'figures of speech' only, then also they cannot escape Bhāmaha's observation at (I. 36), viz. - "vakrābhidheya-śabdokṭiḥ iṣṭā vācāṃ alaṃkr̥tiḥ" i.e. the poetic expression of beautiful meaning and beautiful word, i.e. beauty concerning form and content, word and sense in general in poetry, is the real source of beauty in a poet's composition. Bhāmaha, we will go to observe further, takes this 'alaṃkāratva' i.e. the state of being the source of beauty of any given alaṃkāra, as "conveying of something extra-ordinary - 'atīśaya' -", i.e. 'vakrokti' or expression of beauty, or 'atīśayokti', an expression of something special, something out of this work-a-day world, something extraordinary; "alaukika".

With this introduction, Bhāmaha embarks upon the actual definition of poetry at I. 16, when he observes :

‘śabdārthau sahitaṃ kāvyam’

Poetry is word and sense taken together. Not that Bhāmaha did not know that in any use of meaningful language, i.e. even in our day to day wordly parlance, or literature of any kind, i.e. dealing with scriptures or any writing covering legal, commercial or any drafting whatsoever, we come across of this 'togetherness', 'saha-bhāva' of word and sense. We will go to see how Bhoja has enumerated all types of possible 'sahabhāva' i.e. 'sāhitya' or coming together of word and sense. But all this, 'sāhitya' is not what we call 'belles lettres'. And Bhāmaha knew this very well and yet there was a purpose behind this which we will go to reveal in due course. Ordinary writing is termed by Bhāmaha as 'vārtā' i.e. 'bare statement' elsewhere, while questioning its capacity to poetry. Bhāmaha accepts only a special coming together of word and sense as poetry, i.e. only when it is 'śālaṃkāra' and 'adoṣa' i.e. blessed with some source of charm and is free from poetic blemish. We will go to see that if in Mammaṭa, reference to 'alaṃkāra' in the definition of poetry is with some reservation, in Hemacandra it is forthright and clear, and all this is *to be read as the stamp of Bhāmaha. Thus Bhāmaha and later Kuntaka have prepared a 'pakka' concrete road for the presence of 'alaṃkāra' in poetry; 'alaṃkāra' both in the general sense of source of beauty as well as in the sense of figures of speech, both of word and sense.*

So, it becomes clear that for Bhāmaha, literature, i.e. poetic literature, poetry, is presented in a language which is poetic i.e. beautiful, i.e. something special as compared to the language of ordinary communication, or language of this or that śāstra i.e. discipline, including what we call 'scriptures'. While discussing alaṃkāras

or figures of speech such as rasavat, preyaḥ, etc. and including thereby the beauty of a feeling or emotion, etc. in alaṃkāras, Bhāmaha has suggested that kāvya or poetry for him can be, or even has to be from a different angle, 'sa-rasa' i.e. with emotive or aesthetic appeal also. While discussing the secret of rasa-experience or aesthetic pleasure derived from poetry, we will go to discuss later that the essence of poetic art, or, as a matter of fact any art, lies not only in its emotive appeal but also in its volitional and intellectual appeal also, i.e. in cognitive, emotional and conative aspects, if any, and hence there is chance for any newer form of poetry or drama of being included in such literature as causes art-experience. Bhāmaha thus, by including the element of feeling and emotion also as source of charm, has reserved its place in total art experience, which results from sheer intellectual appeal also; as art-experience involves the true participation of the total, integral self of the connoisseur. Indian literary criticism is absolutely clear about the fact that art-experience does not end in the explanation of the enhancement of this or that feeling or emotion only, but reaches out to explain the total effect of art which embraces all aspects of the personality of a connoisseur. Bhāmaha talks of the emotive appeal of poetry also, when he discusses the characteristics of a 'māhā-kāvya' or epic poetry, which should be blessed with all rasas i.e. all sentiments : "rasaiśca sakalaiḥ prthak" (I. 21, Bhāmaha). That it has to be, - 'a-grāmya-śabdaṃ-arthyam ca, śālaṃkāram' - i.e. without any misuse of language resulting in vulgarity concerning word and sense, and also decked by figures of speech or by sources of charm' - (Bhāmaha, I. 19), suggests his integral approach to understanding poetic art. That Art has to make appeal to the intellectual, imaginative and emotive aspect of the personality of the man of taste, is clear to Bhāmaha and also to other earlier literary critics.

Bhāmaha also refers to various forms of literature both prose and verse, enumerating sarga-bandha i.e. a mahākāvya, kathā and akhyāyikā, three bigger compositions in verse and prose, and also stray attempts at minor poetic compositions such as gāthā, śloka, etc. i.e. individual independent verses. But Bhāmaha underlines one major characteristic common to all creative writing, which is that, all this has to be blessed with "expression of artful essence" - yuktaṃ vakra-svabhāvoktyā sarvaṃ eva etad iṣyate" (Bhāmaha, I. 30), The expression has to be artistic for being branded as poetry. What exactly could this "vakrasvabhāvokti" mean ? Some modern commentators such as the great D. T. Tatacharya in his Udyana Vṛtti (pp. 13, ibid) suggest that Bhāmaha here talks of figures of speech such as 'svabhāvokti' or "Natural Description" and "vakrokṭi" or

“artistic turn of speech” only. But Bhāmaha no doubt includes these two figures of speech in his ‘vakra-svabhāva-ukti’ but he also includes everything beautiful concerning the content, idea and expression of a given piece of poetry. This is against ‘vārtā’-a bare statement of fact only, that is resorted to in our ordinary day-to-day parlance, in our work-a-day-word. It is something special, the beautiful, the extra-ordinary, which makes for a poet’s creation, ‘kavi-karma’. This beautiful statement of something extra ordinary is acceptable to Bhāmaha, as poetry. With this clear understanding of Bhāmaha’s view we will not find it difficult to sail over to Kuntaka’s ‘vakrokti’, and prior to that Ānandavardhana’s ‘dhvani’. This expression of the extraordinary is - vakra-svabhāvokti-acceptable to Bhāmaha. Thus, for Bhāmaha that togetherness of word and sense which is ‘a-dosa’, free from poetic blemishes, ‘śāṃkāra’, gifted with a source of charm or a figure of speech, and ‘sa-vakrokti’ - having an artistic expression is accepted as kāvya. It is observed by Bhoja (Śr. Pra. Ch. XI) that - ‘vakroktireva kāvyānām parā bhūṣeti Bhāmahaḥ.” - i.e. for Bhāmaha charming expression is the highest decoration of poetry.

Bhāmaha only casually refers to the two patterns of writing, or say, the stylistic peculiarities prevalent in the regions of vidarbha and guḍa, viz. vaidarbha-mārga and gauda-mārga as others would have put it. The almost casual approach was perhaps to promote as much individuality in artful expression as possible, a point also underlined by the great Ānandavardhana when he said (Dhvanyāloka-Dhv. IV. i) that by taking recourse to this path of suggestion as laid down by him, the quality of creative imagination in poets will assume endlessness. (anena ānantyaṃ āyāti, kavīnaṃ pratibhāguṇaḥ-Dhv. IV-i). He goes to observe that, ‘even trite subjects in poetry will put on new freshness, if they get into touch with ‘rasa’ or aesthetic delight, just as the same trees appear quite new with the advent of spring.’ (Dhv. IV 4); and also, “whatever theme it might be, so long as it produces the impression in the minds of people :, “Yes, this is a lovely and unique flash;” - The meaning is, ‘so long as the favourable impression that it is an extraordinary flash produced in the minds of refined critics.”

“Though it might smack of earlier usages, a theme can very well be utilised by a good poet. He will never become an object of censure by so doing.” (Dhv. IV. 16; Trans. K. Krishnamoorthy (K. Kris. pp. 297). Thus poetry it is, that carries the stamp of poetic, i.e. extraordinary creation. Precisely for this, Ānandavardhana also did not attach any special importance to the concepts of rīti i.e. mārga and vṛtti. For him it was ‘dhvani’ - the essential poetic part of a poet’s expression that was the be-all and end-all of poetry. He therefore observes, (“Dhv. III 46, 47, Trans. K. Kris. pp.

261), "Those who were unable to explain properly this essential principle of poetry as they had only a glimmer of it (and nothing more), have brought into vogue the theory of styles." And also, "Once this theory of poetry is fully understood, even the so called 'Modes' relating to the nature of sounds as well as to the nature of meanings will become intelligible." So, when Bhāmaha pays scant respect to the vaidarbha and gauda styles, it is presumably first to discourage imitation and hypocrisy and to promote individual talent. This is exactly the consideration which drives Kuntaka to divorce the concept of styles from any local i.e. geographical colouring and name even the poetic excellences in a different way using his own terminology. However, Kuntaka gives some reasonable consideration to the concept of this or that style - call it by any name and it is rose only - simply because we do find common cultural and educational heritage playing a positive part in an artist's creation. But Bhāmaha was perhaps fed up with imitations and so categorically declares that : (Bhāmaha I. 36) -

“na nitāntā”dī-mātreṇa jāyate cārutā girām |
vakraḥbhidheya-śabdoktiḥ iṣṭā vācām alaṃkṛtiḥ ||”

“Not only by usages such as ‘nitānta’ etc. (i.e. use of soft consonants as advocated by the so called vaidarbha style), beauty in poetry is caused. (only) The ukti-expression – of vakra i.e. beautiful sense and (vakra, beautiful) expression (or word) is accepted by us as the alaṃkṛti - or (only) source of beauty in language (i.e. poetic language). ‘Vācām alaṃkṛtiḥ’ is beauty of language. The word ‘alaṃkṛtiḥ’ is used here by Bhāmaha in the wider sense of source of beauty in poetry, or poetic beauty, and not in the narrow sense of a figure of speech only, which by itself is, of course, included in the former. The use of the term ‘alaṃkāra’ in its wider connotation of poetic beauty - saundaryam - is specifically noted by Vāmana, if we look at available documents only. But the thought current had its origin even prior to Bhāmaha or even Bharata. The point is that we do not have to wait for the arrival of Vāmana to understand this underlying basic concept of poetic beauty, for Bhāmaha’s concept of beautiful expression and beautiful content - vakra śabda and vakra artha, are enough for this. This vakratā or poetic beauty is the highest or only quality a poet has to aspire for in the making of poetry. This is absent in ordinary expression, i.e. ‘loka-ukti’. So, sāhitya, i.e. coming together of beautiful expression and content is poetic creation, i.e. kāvyā, poetry.

With this Bhāmaha also talks of ‘āśraya-saundarya’, i.e. beauty pervading the whole composition. A sort of an idea of contextuality is also engrammed in it, for, observes Bhāmaha, that collyrium though black, when applied in the eye of a

damsel, becomes a source of beauty, in the same way, in a particular context, even a poetic blemish acquires beauty (Bhāmaha, I. 54). A further discussion on this will be taken up when we examine Bhāmaha's concept of poetic blemishes. But at I. 55 he observes that like a black palāśa flower, placed at the right juncture, adds to the general beauty of a garland, a poetically faulty expression only, read in its special context, serves as a source of charm in poetry. Like a gardener, arranging flowers of different hues at right places in a garland, weaves a beautiful garland, so also a poet selects such words which assume beauty when arranged in style in poetry. (Bhāmaha, I. 59) Bhāmaha says (I. 59) :

“etad grāhyam surabhi kusumam, grāmyam etan nidheyam |
 dhatte śobhām viracitam idam sthānam asyaitad asya
 mālākāro racayati yathā sādhu vijñaya mālām
 vojyam kāvyeshv avahitadhiyā tādavad evābhidhānam ||”

Thus beauty of an expression or a particular word, read at exactly this or that place in poetry has a poetic appeal for Bhāmaha. This can be called beauty in arrangement - or 'viniveśa-gata-saundarya'. This concept of Bhāmaha prepares the road leading to Kuntaka's 'bandha-saundarya' - beauty of poetic composition, or style on one hand, and also for the concept of propriety - aucitya - i.e. decorum as advocated by Kṣemendra on the other.

As observed earlier, Bhāmaha has also given thought to the element of aesthetic rapture caused due to the delineation of feelings and emotions by the poet. He holds that the epic-poem - 'mahākāvya' has to be endowed with different sentiments (Bhāmaha, I. 21). Though this is considered with reference to an epic poem, it can very well go with poetry in general also. Bhāmaha seems to favour this idea of application of sentiments to poetry in general, of any form or size, when he advocates certain figures of speech based on feelings and emotions, such as rasavat, preyas, ūrjasvi, and samāhita, the four emotion-based alaṃkāras and then also 'bhāvika' which he says is a 'quality of (the whole composition)' - "prabandha-ṣaya-guṇa". Now, we see that, used in this sense, the terms 'alaṃkāra' and 'guṇa' acquire a wider dimension which is something else than the normal narrower connotation of a figure of speech or a particular poetic embellishment seen in a particular style or going with this or that sentiment.

Thus for Bhāmaha poetry or kāvya is expected to be 'sa-rasa' i.e. endowed with flavour or excellence of feelings and emotions. All this has to be free from poetic blemishes, adorned with figures of speech and beautified by vakrokti or poetic use of language and content. We will consider Bhāmaha's handling of the emotive stuff

i.e. rasa, bhāva, tad-ābhāsa, etc. i.e. of sentiment, feeling, their semblance, etc., later, but for the present suffice it to say that Bhāmaha does not attach any less importance to the concept of rasa and bhāva i.e. sentiments and emotions in poetry.

We have already noticed that though Bharata's prime concern was drama, he has advocated the use of alaṃkāra, guṇa, lakṣaṇa and avoiding of doṣa with reference to kāvyā-rasa i.e. aesthetic pleasure in poetry. Bharata observes : (N.S. XVI-113, Vol. II, G.O.S. Edn.)

“evam ete hy alaṃkārah
guṇā doṣās ca kīrtitāḥ |
prayogaṃ eṣāṃ ca punar
vakṣyāmi rasa-saṃśrayam ||”

So, Bharata was not unaware of 'kāvyā-rasa' i.e. art-experience from poetry, and also the appropriate use of alaṃkāra etc. to derive the same from poetry. Bhāmaha also advocates the same usage. So, when Śrī G. T. Deshpande observes that sanskrit poetics branched off from dramaturgy at a later stage, it looks like a figment of his own imagination. In fact both these enquiries in poetic and dramatic beauty were pari-passu, at times running parallel, at times mixing and merging with each other, thus passing through their next phases, enriching each other and also preserving their distinct character.

Bharata (N.S. XVI, 116-128, Vol. II G.O.S. Edn.; also Dr. Nandi's edn., 'Sarasvati Research Prakashana series, Vol. IX, Edn.' 94-'95, Ahmedabad) has clearly declared kāvyā or poetry as 'rasā"śraya'. Not only this, he has recommended the use of figures of speech, metre etc. also in harmony with the prevailing emotive context; rasa. That the methodical discussion concerning the use of these concepts in conformity with rasa in poetry was done by Ānandavardhana, will be observed later by us. At the same time it is equally true that poeticsians like Bhāmaha and others of the pre-Ānandavardhana period were not unaware of this usage. So Bhāmaha and other earlier literary critics also attach importance to 'rasa' in poetry and discuss other topics with reference to their contribution to evoking the same in poetry and this was in agreement with Bharata's position. As Bharata co-ordinated the concepts of poetic beauty such as guṇa, doṣa, alaṃkāra and lakṣaṇa to dramatic art through vācika-abhinaya or acting concerning speech, in the same way, ālaṃkārikas placed the different forms of rūpaka or drama, under 'abhineya kāvyā' or 'poetry that was to be presented on the stage', and thus brought about the integration of dramaturgy and literary criticism.

DANḌIN : In his Kāvyaadarśa (= Kā.) Daṇḍin has formulated the definition of poetry : “śarīraṃ tāvad iṣṭārtha-vyavacchinnā-padāvaliḥ” (Kā. I. 10b.). There were two major thought-currents prevalent concerning the definition of poetry; one being that as read in Bhāmaha which lays equal stress on both word and sense in the making of poetry, i.e. which proclaims that “śabdārthau sahitaṃ kāvyam”. Actually, according to a variant noticed in the Nā-Śā. of Bharata, on pp. 347, under XVI-128, (G.O.S. Edn.), we read as follows :

“mrdu-lalita-padārtham gūḍha-śabdārtha-hīnam
janapada-sukha-bhojyam yuktiman nṛtayojoyam |
bahukṛta-rasa-mārgam sandhi-sandhāna-yuktam
bhavati sukavi-kāvyaṃ nāṭyakāle manoḥjanam ||”

“Poetry of good poets, that wins the heart at the time of dramatic performance, is having soft and pleasing word and sense, is bereft of word and meaning that are difficult to understand (because of their being hidden or obscure); is enjoyed easily by people, which stands to reason and which can be conveyed through dance, in which there is scope for a style that conveys many sentiments and which is gifted with junctures and their limbs”. We can see the thought-current of calling both word and sense together as poetry can be read in the above quotation. But we do not know whether this variant can be taken as reliable. But we can surely begin with Bhāmaha who advocated the company of both word and sense to make for poetry. The second thought current seems to be represented by Daṇḍin which takes ‘śabdaḥ’ i.e. ‘word only’ as the distinctive mark of poetry. Whatever it may be, but the fact remains that definitions explaining the concept of ‘kāvyā’ i.e. poetry need not be taken as opposing one another, but only as complementary, because those who accept the second line of thinking giving prominence to the ‘word’ element in the definition, never support the position where this word stands by itself, regardless of the meaning element. The problem centres round the differentia. Earlier literary critics, perhaps also well versed in logic - i.e. nyāyaśāstra - to exhibit their learning and their absolute faith in the science of logic or reasoning, utilize the technical terminology to crystallise and sharpen literary criticism also. It is because of this tendency to perfection which brings forth the subtle designs evolved in literary criticism by succeeding poetics such as Viśvanātha and Jagannātha and which also reveals the close affinity of alamkāra-śāstra, to the disciplines of nyāya i.e. logic, and vyākaraṇa i.e. grammar.

In his Kāvya-darśa, Daṇḍin has defined poetry as, “iṣṭārtha-vyavacchinṇā padāvalī (I. 10b)” i.e. pada-samūha, a collection of words i.e. vākya, a sentence, graced by i.e. associated with ‘iṣṭa’ - desired charming meaning, makes for poetry. But before coming to the actual definition of poetry, Daṇḍin takes note of some basic points concerning poetry, and these points prove to be helpful in fully grasping his concept of ‘kāvyā’ i.e. poetry. Talking about the importance of poetry he observes (Kā. I. 4) that the three worlds will plunge into pitchy darkness if the lamp (or light) in form of word does not shine forth. Mirrored into literature, the great men of yore, eventhough parted from life, remain alive. Language showers all gifts, if properly utilised by the intelligent people, and in case misused, it declares the idiotic state of the speaker (Kā. I. 6). So, not even a smallest blemish is to be tolerated in poetry (I. 7 Kā), for it deforms it like beautiful body marked by a small sign of laxoderma. Like a blind man not able to distinguish between various forms, a person not well-versed in the lore of poetry, cannot distinguish between a literary excellence and a literary blemish. These remarks make it clear that not unlike Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin also recommends that poetry has to be absolutely free from poetic blemish whatsoever. We will have an occasion later to go into the details of Daṇḍin’s handling of this topic of poetic blemishes, but what we have to underline here is his absolute apathy towards accomodating even a slightest blemish in poetry. This characteristic of insistance on absence of blemish gathers momentum in literary criticism, with the result that stalwarts like the great vāg-devatāvatāra Mammaṭa had to incorporate it in the definition of poetry. The ‘navīnas’-new generation of literary critics led by Mammaṭa-place this ‘a-doṣatva’ i.e. absence of blemish - as an unavoidable characteristic in the definition of poetry and others such as Hemacandra follow the suit. Daṇḍin goes on to declare that men of thought - sūrayaḥ - have produced manuals concerning writing of poetry, rich in various and beautiful styles (Kā. I. 9). These great souls have laid down the ‘body of poetry’ i.e. have discussed what poetry is made of, ‘and also’ the ‘alaṃkāras’ or sources of beauty in poetry :

“taiḥ śarīraṃ kāvyānām
alaṃkāraś ca darśitāḥ” (Kā. I.10-a).

Experts explain that the particle ‘ca’ after ‘alaṃkāraḥ’ stands to suggest the inclusion of the consideration of poetic blemishes also; while poetic excellences - i.e. the concept of ‘guṇas’ - are covered up by the mention of the word ‘śarīra’ itself. So, when Daṇḍin talks of a collection of words endowed with - ‘iṣṭārtha’ - coveted meaning, this ‘iṣṭa’ meaning may include meaning congenial to ‘rasa’ - or

sentiment i.e. the emotive stuff of human feelings and emotions or, aesthetic enjoyment in general. The commentary 'prabhā' (pp. 8, edn. B.O.R. I. Poona) explains it as the desire to provide description leading to 'camatkāra' or 'lokóttarā'hlāda' i.e. extra ordinary joy. Or, we may say that by 'iṣṭa' or coveted quality is covered Bhāmaha's 'vakrokti' or artful expression, covering beauty concerning both the poetic expression and the poetic theme as well, or perhaps the 'vakratā' or art-expression emphasized by Kuntaka later. As if Bhāmahas words : "vakrā'bhidheya-śabdoktiḥ-iṣṭā vācāṃ alaṃkṛtiḥ" once again come alive here and are resounded as it were ! Or, as later commentators explain, by 'iṣṭa artha' is covered all beautiful meaning at the level of expression-abhidhā, and secondary usage i.e. lakṣaṇā, and even deviation leading to vyaṅgyārtha or suggested sense both of the dhvani and guṇībhūta variety i.e. meaning suggested principally or in a subordinate way. This insistence on 'padāvalī' i.e. collection of words, i.e. word element in poetry, is supported with great gusto by Jagannātha in his Rasa-gaṅgā-dhara (= R.G.) later. Till we reach Jagannātha we find literary critics either putting equal weight on both word and sense taken together, or only on word element in particular, in the definition of poetry. We will go into the details of the views expressed by the protagonists of both these streams of thought, as and when the context permits.

One more point is to be noted with reference to Daṇḍin's draft of the definition of poetry. Daṇḍin, in the definition itself uses the term 'śarīra' i.e. body of poetry, which was also used by Bhāmaha when he observed, at Bhāmaha VI. 65, that,

ṣaṣṭyā śarīraṃ nirmītaṃ
ṣaṣṭyā tv alaṃkṛtiḥ | ...

i.e. he has talked of kāvya śarīra in sixty kārīkās, etc. But this comes at the end of his work and not in the definition. Now, bypassing Bhāmaha, we may observe that Daṇḍin's is the first known metaphorical usage concerning literary criticism. Normally 'śarīra' goes with sentient beings, the 'śarīrins' having a body. So, when poetry is said to have a body, this usage should be termed as secondary or metaphorical. In the same vein Daṇḍin further calls poetic excellences or guṇas as the vital breath or vital airs of poetic style - i.e. "prāṇāḥ" of 'vaidarbha mārṅa' in particular, or say, of poetry in general. So, it should be carefully borne in mind that even where there is the mentioning of 'soul' - ātmā - of poetry, it has to be understood only secondarily or metaphorically. This metaphorical usage is drawn to further dimensions in Rājaśekhara and later in Vidyānātha's Pratāpa-rudra-yaśo-bhūṣaṇa.

But some later commentators, and some leading modern scholars seem to have missed the real spirit behind this metaphor and have been arguing for and against the importance or inclusion of this or that concept in the definition of poetry. This is sad. For basically kāvyā or poetry is abstraction. Only to explain the secrets of beauty in poetry, and more, the variety of the poetic devices leading to beauty in poetry, the ancients, the "sāksāt-kṛta-dharmāna ṛṣayaḥ" - the seers, who had the direct vision of poetic beauty, resorted to this sort of metaphorical usage only to bring home the subtle differences between this device of poetic beauty and that, to the smaller people who had no direct vision of poetic beauty. But, this was taken only literally and too seriously by lesser people without grasping the spirit behind this metaphorical style of explanation of various poetic devices. In fact poetry is an abstract art and it need not detain us in naming this or that as 'body', 'soul', 'excellence', 'ornamentation', etc. So, for the enlightened masters this usage was only a means to explain poetic beauty and was never taken as an end in itself. They were open minded and not too earnest or obstinate about this. The great sages of earlier times resorted to such metaphorical use of language only to bring home absolutely abstract ideas in the minds of lesser people. This explains the terminology such as 'śarīra', 'jīva' or 'ātman', 'guṇa', 'doṣa', 'ālaṃkāra' and the like which others with lesser imagination, not unlike Virocana of the Indra-Virocana myth, took just literally.

When Daṇḍin takes 'padāvalī' or collection of words having desired (charming) meaning as poetry, we may say that here for him 'word' element serves as 'viśeṣya' or the basic factor which is qualified by 'artha' or the qualifying adjunct, i.e. 'viśeṣana'. In poetry the coming together of both word and (charming) sense is welcome to him also, but while logically further investigating, he feels that in poetry the sound or word element makes for the stuff, poetry is made of, and sense or meaning aspect is only a qualifying adjunct. This explains his subtle framing of the definition.

As observed earlier (Daṇḍin I. 10 a) by 'ālaṃkāraś ca' i.e. 'also figures of speech (or sources of beauty)', he seems to have covered the topics of 'guṇa' i.e. poetic excellence and 'doṣa' or poetic blemish also in his definition of poetry, or in the larger scope of poetry. So, for Daṇḍin also the sum total comes to 'word and sense', which are 'saguṇau', 'a-doṣau' and 'śālaṃkārau' i.e. with poetic excellences, free from poetic blemishes, and adorned by poetic figures (of both word and sense). Again when he qualified the 'padāvalī' or 'collection of words' by the term 'iṣṭārtha-vyavacchinā', i.e. 'accompanied by most cherished meaning', he drives out from the domain of poetry such coming together of word and sense that we come across in 'loka-vyavahāra' i.e. ordinary parlance, or in 'śāstra' i.e. literature on various

disciplines, i.e. scientific writing. One thing becomes very very clear that Daṇḍin prepares the bridge to reach Jagannatha's famous definition viz. "raṇaṇīyārtha-pratipāḍakaḥ śabdaḥ kāvyam" which we will have an occasion to consider in greater details later. By 'most cherished' - 'iṣṭa' meaning, is meant all meaning inclusive of the expressed, indicated and also suggested. Though of course, whether the predecessors of Ānandavardhana, beginning with Bhāmaha to Rudraṭa, — and here we are mentioning those who are known to us, — had a clear idea of 'vyañjanā' or the word-power of suggestion, and 'vyaṅgya' or the suggested meaning, in the technical context, is debatable, and we will pick up this discussion in due course later, we incline to suggest that the earlier poets were not totally unaware of the quality of suggestivity of language. At the same time we will do full justice to Daṇḍin if we take 'raṇaṇīya artha' or 'charming sense' as equivalent of 'iṣṭārtha' - the desired sense - rather than insisting on the reference to the suggested-vyaṅgya-sense. Perhaps this is more advisable and safe also. We can also commence, from this point, our march towards Kuntaka also. In both Daṇḍin and Kuntaka we miss the extreme attitude that expects the beautiful meaning in poetry to put on the garb of suggestivity alone. It can be charming even when it is expressed directly, or conveyed through secondary use of language. The result is that poetic beauty has a wider field in Daṇḍin and Kuntaka, and later in Bhoja also, as compared to the vyañjanā dominated approach of Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta.

So, as in Bhāmaha, so also in Daṇḍin, the distinction between 'kavikarma' - a poet's creation, and 'lokoṭi'-ordinary use of language - is to be seen in the poet's writing being endowed with what Bhāmaha calls 'vakratā' i.e. beauty or with 'atiśaya' or that extra ordinary element, as termed by Daṇḍin. Daṇḍin observes :

"vivakṣā yā viśeṣasya lokasīmātivartinī |
asāv atiśayoktiḥ syād alaṃkāroṭtamā yatha ||" (II. 214)

and

alaṃkāraṇtarāṇām apy āhur ekaṃ parāyaṇam |
vāgīśa-mahitām uktim imām atiśayā"hvayām ||" (II. 220)

i.e. "The desire to convey the extra ordinariness or the viśeṣa i.e. contextual superiority (of poetry), is what is termed 'atiśayokti' or 'statement of the special', and that is the highest source of beauty." And, "This (= statement of something special or extra ordinary) is the supreme source of charm in case of other sources of beauty also. This speciality called 'atiśaya', is honoured even by great masters of language." So this, what Daṇḍin terms as 'atiśaya' or the 'extra-ordinary' seen in a

poet's language, is what Bhāmaha termed as, 'vakra-svabhava-ukti' - 'statement of the beautiful'. This transforms the worldly objects of movable and immovable nature, from their original form of cause, effect etc. into what is termed by Bharata as 'vibhāva' and 'anubhāva' etc. i.e. determinants and consequents respectively and whatever is ugly or gross or physical, turns into 'sa-rasa' or beautiful. This 'vaktrokti' or 'atīśayukti' or beautiful expression of a poet turns worldly objects into what we call vibhāvā'di' i.e. the poet's milieu; it grants them the capacity to 'vibhāvana', i.e. the status of being worthy of aesthetic enjoyment; turns them into objects of aesthetic chewing - 'carvaṇā'.

It may also be noted that like Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin also has taken a note of the element of rasa/sentiment and bhāva/feeling element. He has also, like Bhāmaha, placed 'rasa' under 'rasavat' alaṃkāra. So, for him the emotive richness of poetry is also welcome as a source of beauty. He has also suggested that the epic form of poetry - i.e. mahākāvya - should be overflowing with sentiments, emotions and feelings - "rasa-bhāva-nirantaram". (I. 18, Daṇḍin) At I. 51, Kāvyaḍarśa, Daṇḍin offers a useful observation. Says he -

“madhuraṃ rasavad; vāci, vastūny api rasa-sthitiḥ |,
yena mādhyanti dhīmanto madhunēva madhu-vratāḥ ||”

“Sweet (poetry) is that which is endowed with rasa (i.e. sentiment or, - aesthetic enjoyment). Rasa (i.e. aesthetic delight or sentiment) rests in both word and sense. (It is that element) by which the wise get infatuated like bees by the spring season (or, honey.).”

Thus rasa/sentiment or emotive richness, according to Daṇḍin can result from both word and sense in poetry on one hand, and also by form and content i.e. theme. Even a particular form or structure can be suggestive of this or that feeling or emotion as the case may be. Even in Bharata we find particular metres (cchandoviśeṣaḥ) as suggestive of this or that feeling. In Ānandavardhana we will go to observe that different styles or structures (rīti; saṃghaṭanā) normally going with shorter or longer compounded words, change their exterior, when used in different forms of art. Thus 'ojas' - the vigorous - guṇa or excellent, and a structure abounding in long compounds - dirgha-samāsā-saṃghaṭanā-, are normally associated with the sentiments and emotions such as vīra, the heroic, and raundra, the violent, but when the context concerns the dramatic form, the structure softens. Thus even form and content are suggestive of rasa as observed by Daṇḍin here. Of course, as in Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin also places this emotive element under the general

head of 'alaṃkāra' i.e. a figure of speech, as also guṇa i.e. poetic excellence. We should carefully note that by subsuming under 'alaṃkāra' both Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin have not under-rated the emotive stuff in poetry, on the other hand, they have elevated a figure of speech as a real source of beauty, which is not externally grafted on poetry, but is an inborn quality of poetry, as Kuntaka will make it clear. Actually it is in Ānandavardhana and his successors that we read the word 'alaṃkāra' in its narrower or limited sense of a figure of speech only and there too Ānandavardhana is absolutely clear that if this element is seen rightly utilized i.e. in conformity with the prevailing sentiment, it is as much an integral portion of poetry as any other element : "nāsti bahiraṅgatvaṃ eteṣāṃ rasābhivyaktau" - The alaṃkāras, if 'samyak prayojita' i.e. used with discretion, - are not external to poetry so far as rasa is to be suggested. Again, when they are themselves principally suggested, i.e. when it is a case of 'alaṃkāra-dhvani', they are as much the 'soul' of poetry as vastu-dhvani or rasā"di-dhvani. We will discuss this in greater details later. But, for the present, it should be clear that the earlier ālaṃkārikas never under-rated the value of emotive stuff in poetry, nor were they mad after figures of speech at the expressed level only and thus created, what people under delusion call, the so-called 'alaṃkāra-school' of poetics. For Daṇḍin 'alaṃkāra' in its most catholic sense is a 'source of poetic beauty' - 'kāvyā-śobhākara-dharma' and this covers up everything that goes under the names of rasa, bhāva, saṃdhi, saṃdhyāṅga, vṛtti, vṛtṭyaṅgas, guṇa, lakṣaṇa, etc. i.e. everything. Daṇḍin observes :

"yac ca saṃdhyāṅga-vṛtṭyaṅga-lakṣaṇā"dy āgamāntare |
vyāvarnītam idaṃ cēṣṭaṃ alaṃkāratayaiva naḥ ||" (Daṇḍin, II. 367)

"That in other scriptures is discussed under the titles of saṃdhyāṅgas i.e. parts of junctures or vṛtṭyaṅgas i.e. divisions of modes etc. and also as natural marks, is taken as 'alaṃkāra' - the source of poetic beauty - by us." By 'āgamāntaraḥ' i.e. other scriptures, works on dramaturgy are meant.

Thus Daṇḍin also discusses all sources of poetic beauty and this is brought out by discussing the nature and scope of poetry by the ancients.

Vāmana : In both Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin, we noticed the metaphorical use of language such as, '(kāvyā)śārīra'. Vāmana drags it still further. Without revelling in hair-splitting concerning what exactly forms the body of poetry, i.e. whether it is śabda - word, or artha - meaning, which is the diffentia of poetry, Vāmana straight away points at some other subtlty, taking for granted the equal weight of both word and sense. Equal importance of both word and sense is acceptable to

Vāmana when he notes that, 'the word 'poetry' here is used with both word and sense rendered beautiful by both 'guṇa' i.e. excellence and 'alaṃkāra' i.e. - a figure of speech. Says he : "kāvyā śabda'yam guṇālaṃkāra-saṃskṛtayoḥ śabdā'rthayoḥ vartate, bhaktyā tu śabdā'rtha-mātra-vacano'tra grhyate." (Vāmana, vṛtti on Kāvyaālaṃkāra-sūtra-vṛtti, (= KSV.) I. 1. i). This remark has to be carefully examined. For Vāmana, kāvyā is śabda and artha i.e. word and sense, that are rendered beautiful by guṇa and alaṃkāra. Without this beauty of poetic excellences or poetic figures of speech 'kāvyā' i.e. poetry is primarily no poetry. You may call mere coming together of word and sense as poetry in a secondary sense of the term i.e. by 'bhakti'-'secondary usage' only. Thus Vāmana also underlines the difference between kāvyā and mere 'sāhitya'. 'Sāhitya' or coming together of word and sense with beauty inherent in it only, makes for kāvyā or poetry. So, for Vāmana also, kāvyā and 'kāvyā-śobhā' do not seem to be separate entities but are always located in one and the same substratum. Poetry is poetry, only when we experience poetic beauty in it. Poetic beauty is thus an integral portion of the 'whole' called poetry. Thus Vāmana accepts the concepts of guṇa and alaṃkāra in poetry, which make for the beauty - i.e. "saundarya". Vāmana at KSV. I. i. 1 & 2, very clearly declares : "kāvyam grāhyam alaṃkārāt. saundaryam alaṃkārah." - i.e. poetry is to be recognised through its alaṃkāra or beauty, for poetic beauty is known as 'alaṃkāra'. Going still deeper, Vāmana declares that this 'alaṃkāra' i.e. this source of beauty in poetry is caused by avoiding poetic blemishes and accepting poetic excellences and figures of speech : "sa doṣa-guṇā-laṃkāra-hānā'dānābhyām. sa khalv alaṃkārah doṣahānāt guṇālaṃkāra'dānāc ca sampādyah kaveḥ" (Vāmana, I. ii. 3). This means, that the beauty in poetry (i.e. saundarya/alaṃkāra) has to be acquired by the poet by avoiding poetic blemishes (in poetry) and accepting poetic excellences and figures of speech. So, what Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin termed as 'vakratā' and 'atīśaya' in poetry, that extra-ordinary element or 'saundarya' is termed as 'alaṃkāra' - the term used here in its wider connotation - by Vāmana. In Bhāmaha, and more clearly in Daṇḍin (Daṇḍin II. 367) we saw the term 'alaṃkāra' used in a wider sense. This finds still clearer expression in Vāmana, and we say 'clearer' because Vāmana uses the term alaṃkāra both in a wider and also in a technical sense of a figure of speech, side by side. So, whatever was opaque in both Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin becomes crystal clear in Vāmana; that which was in a concealed form, so to say, is presented in an open, unveiled form in Vāmana, or that which was fluid or nebulous takes a solid appearance, or that which was, say, abstract, takes a concrete form in Vāmana. That which was perhaps presented by

'ghuṇākśara-nyāya' or accidental design carved out by the movement of a worm on a leaf, appears as letters firmly embroidered on the canvass of poetry.

- With reference to available documents, - we can say that Vāmana is the first to present the terminology viz. 'alaṃkāra' both in its wider sense of poetic beauty - 'śaundarya' - and also in the later narrower connotation of a 'figure of speech only. This could be taken as an important land-mark in the history of literary criticism. He also seems to extend the metaphorical use of language as introduced by Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin, for, as against 'kāvyā-śarīra', 'the body of poetry', he also refers to the 'ātman' - 'soul' of poetry, which for him is 'rīti' or 'style'. He declares that, "rītiḥ ātmā kāvyasya"; (Vāmana, I. i. 3) i.e. 'rīti' or 'style' is the soul of poetry and he goes to observe in the gloss over this that, "rītir nāma iyaṃ ātmā kāvyasya; śarīrasya iva iti vākyaśeṣaḥ" - 'Rīti' is, verily, the soul of poetry; 'as of body' is the remainder of this statement". We have to constantly keep this fact in mind that the abstract beauty of poetry was revealed to these great thinkers in all its radince and they revealed this secret to lesser people in a language these people could understand. It is precisely for this reason that these ancient thinkers resorted to the metaphorical use of language such as 'body', 'soul', 'vital airs', etc. of poetry, which in itself defies all description, it being just abstract and to be experienced only by men of cultivated taste. Even the technical terms such as 'alaṃkāra', 'guṇa', 'doṣa', etc. also are part of this effort as they tried to differentiate between one source of beauty and another, or between one form of beauty and another. As a matter of fact, how can an abstract entity be said to possess qualities that go with only the sentient beings ? In short, as observed earlier, these metaphorical usages were meant only to bring home the subtle aspect of poetry, an abstract art, within the grasp of lesser people. They are not the end in themselves. We see that even some of the Sanskrit poeticians also are deluded by these terms taking them to be the end of everything, rather taking them as means, as key, to understand the richness of poetic art. We will not mention here some modern innocent scholars writing in Hindi or other modern indian languages such as Gujarati, without caring to have a direct relation with or, insight in the original literature in Sanskrit.

As noted earlier, with reference to available documents, Vāmana, seems to be the first earliest poetician who talks about the soul of poetry. But, even if the word 'soul' is used here, we need not attach extra weight to it, for in the same breath Vāmana explains that, 'as are lines in a painting, so in rīti rests poetry'. Now if we drag this imagery further, we can say that actually the lines in a picture make for the particular picture, so also 'rīti' i.e. form should be taken as poetry and thus

Vāmana becomes a 'dehā'tmavādin', i.e. one who regards the physical body as soul. But all this does not make any sense, as strictly speaking an abstract art as poetry, need not be imagined as having a 'body' or a 'soul'. In fact what comes out of this sort of usage is the particular poetician's personal insistance on this or that source of beauty as more or less important. Actually there is no aesthete of poetic arts who has totally rejected any source of beauty altogether. For Vāman, 'rīti' the soul resides in poetry on one hand and on the other when he says, 'rekḥāsu iva citram', - i.e. poetry resides in rīti as picture in lines, he almost upturns the 'āśraya-āśrayi-bhāva' or the relation of a thing and its substratum. In fact, Vāmana is not very serious about these metaphors and we are not supposed to drag them too far !

After suggesting that 'rīti'/style is the soul of poetry, he explains 'rīti' as a special type of arrangement of words; and that this speciality or 'viśeṣa' is of the form of 'guṇa' or poetic excellence. Vāmana observes : kiṃ punaḥ iyaṃ rītiḥ iti āha, 'viśiṣṭā padaracanā rītiḥ' (Vāmana, I. ii. 7) And adds, "ko'sau viśeṣaḥ ? ity āha - viśeṣo guṇā'tmā. (Vāmana, I. ii. 8). - "What then is this 'rīti' or style ? Says he, "Rīti is a special arrangement of words." This 'speciality' (= viśeṣa) is explained as poetic excellence.' Thus perhaps poetic excellence is the category which finds greatest favour with Vāmana. We will go to that when Ānandvardhana talks about 'saṃghaṭanā' i.e. poetic structure, and he expects it to reside in 'guṇa' or poetic excellence as either its soul or its substratum. But again, the point is, do we hold that the concepts of rīti and saṃghaṭanā are absolutely congruent ? But one point emerges that when Ānandvardhana suggests the option of those who hold saṃghaṭanā as residing in 'guṇa' which is its 'soul' (= ātmabhūta) then, it is likely that perhaps he seems to echo the view of the followers of Vāmana, i.e. "Vāmanīyāḥ".

Vāmana has also tried to present the concept of poetic blemishes in his own way but it does not take us further than Bharata. He takes doṣa/poetic blemish as either the opposite or absence of 'guṇa' i.e. poetic excellence. He has also tried to distinguish between 'ālamkāra' i.e. a figure of speech, taken in its narrower connotation and poetic excellence. He observes : (Vāmana, III. i. 1) : "kāvyasobhāyāḥ kartāro dharmāḥ guṇāḥ", ye khalu śabdārthayordharmāḥ kāvyasobhāṃ kurvanti, te guṇāḥ ||" and (Vāmana, III, i. 2) - "tad atīśayahetavas tvalamkārah". - tasyāḥ kāvyas'obhāyā atīśayaḥ tadatīśayaḥ, tasya hetavaḥ. Then at, III. i. 3 he observes : "pūrve nityāḥ". pūrve guṇāḥ nityāḥ tair vinā kāvyas'obhā-'nutpatteḥ." i.e. Poetic excellences are the cause of poetic beauty. Those that are basically the qualities of word and sense and make for poetic beauty are 'guṇas' or poetic

excellences. The alaṃkāras (such as yamaka, upamā etc.) only enhance the poetic beauty of poetry (which is basically caused by poetic excellences.). The figures of speech only make for the enhancement of poetic beauty (i.e. they do not cause the same). They only add to the poetic beauty caused by guṇas or poetic excellences. We will discuss this point later in greater detail but it may be noted at this juncture that more and more clarity and subtlety are added to literary criticism and the literary critics now get ready for sharper analysis. We have seen that Vāmana starts with clarifying the concept of poetry from the point where Daṇḍin had ended. Daṇḍin mentioned only the 'body' and 'vital airs' - 'śarīra' and 'prāṇāḥ' - of poetry, whereas Vāmana talks of 'soul-ātmā-of poetry. It may also be carefully noted that by the very mention of rīti/style as the 'soul' of poetry, we do not score a point in branding Vāmana as a 'rīti-vādin' or promulgator of 'rīti'. Actually even his predecessor Daṇḍin also devoted a lot of space to the consideration of "mārga", and even Bhāmaha was not totally ignorant of this concept. Actually, on the other hand, Vāmana, though declaring 'rīti' as the soul of poetry, has started his work with the famous words that "kāvyam grāhyam alaṃkārat", i.e. poetry is to be understood or felt through poetic beauty or alaṃkāra." This drives us to believe that even Vāmana, not unlike almost all ālaṃkārikas or literary critics, is also a 'kāvyālaṃkāra-vādin' - i.e. one who considers 'alaṃkāra' (i.e. any source of beauty) as the - soul of poetry. It is only in this sense that we have to understand the so called 'Alaṃkāra-school'. Actually all, including you and I, are kāvyālaṃkāra-vādin i.e. one who tries to appreciate and realize the secret of poetic charm. The earlier masters, as seen clearly in Daṇḍin considered all factors that caused poetic beauty as 'alaṃkāra'. It is childish to brand Bhāmaha and the rest as belonging to the so called alaṃkāra school which took only yamaka-upamā etc. only as the soul of poetry. Actually nobody has sworn in this name and declared from the top of the roof that, "alaṃkāraḥ (i.e. yamaka, upamā etc., the figures of speech) is the soul of poetry". If some modern scholars take it this way, it is sad and naive on their part. Actually, all the literary critics beginning with Bhāmaha, or even earlier, concentrated on one point and that was poetry itself, and by poetry was meant the extra-ordinary literature that was graced by beauty. The decyphering of this poetic beauty is the sole concern of any literary critic, any ālaṃkārika, worth the name, including the great Ānandavardhana, Abhinavagupta and Maṃmaṭa. These literary critics started noting down all devices that caused poetic beauty and tried to discriminate among them on their own preference. Thus the devices came to be branded as alaṃkāra, guṇa, rīti, vṛtti, dhvani, rasa, bhāva,

vakrokti, atis'aya, aucitya and what not ? To be very clear, poetic beauty or kāvya-saundarya is itself 'alamkāra', is the same as the poet's charming way of expression - vakra-kavi-vyāpāra-, and is the same as the extra-ordinary, the 'atis'aya' in poetry. This extra-ordinariness is expressed through immense varieties and who can explain the same in its entirety ? - 'kas tām kārtsnyena vaksyēti' ? It is this which makes for the countless varieties of 'dhvani'. Bhoja and his Mālava tradition subsume dhvani also under 'alamkāra' and there is nothing wrong in it for this 'alamkāra' is 'poetic beauty' itself. It is only childish to suggest that the earlier masters such as Bhāmaha and the rest were deluded only by the 'external' beauty in poetry and only the dhvanivādins delved deeper into the inner and subtle beauty of poetry. In fact whatever pleases the connoisseur, whatever is a poet's creation in the real sense of the term, is 'kāvya' i.e. poetry. By resorting to such a catholic explanation of the poet's muse, Kuntaka, crosses the biggest hurdle viz. that poetic beauty is arrived at only through the word-power of suggestion or vyañjanā, and embarks upon a larger area of poetic beauty which places even at times the expressive power-abhidhā and also the secondary word-power, lakṣaṇā on the same footing as vyañjanā. Poetic beauty may take the form of vyañjanā also, or it can be only an 'abhidhā-vilasita-mātra'. It also depends on the poet's mood at a particular mement. As the famous poet-devotee Narasimha Mehta from Gujarat puts it, 'the endless reveals itself as manifold' - "jūjave rupe ananta bhāse". There can be no rules and regulations that go to restrict the poet's muse. All that is required is that it should be poetry and poetry alone from the point of view of an aesthete or 'rasika'. It is with this in view that Ānandvardhana declares :

"pratāyantām vāco nimīta-vividhārthā'mṛtarasā |
na sādah kartavyaḥ kavibhir anavadye sva-viṣaye ||" (Dhv. IV. 17 at)
parasvā'dānecchā-virata-manaso vastu sukaveḥ |
sarsvatyaivaiṣā ghaṭayati yathēṣṭaṁ bhagavatī || (Dhv. IV. 17 cd)

"May words that appear (to critics) as full of manifold ideas and ambrosial sentiments be freely spread out. Poets need have no compunctions in the flawless realm of their own. (IV. 17 ab.)."

"The goddess of speech, Sarasvatī, herself will provide the desired ideas of (to) a good poet whose mind is averse to borrowing the belongings of another." (Dhv. IV. 17 cd). (Trans. K. Kris. pp. 299, ibid.)

The poet should be honest, and poetry pure. It is because of this fact, viz. that of poetry being projected effortlessly only by a genuine poet, that Mammaṭa, in his

definition of poetry also includes, or refers, to the device of beauty called 'alaṃkāra', deemed as 'external to poetry', by people of smooth intelligence and sensitivity. That poetic muse manifests itself only in a particular form is a dream cherished by innocent souls. Actually all newer and newer forms of poetry, drama or any creative writing is welcome to these ālaṃkārikas and their all-encompassing theory of rasā'nubhūti or art-experience is loving enough and broad enough to welcome the same in its carassing close embrace. In reality, whatever moves a man of taste is poetry; and it can take a form of a figure of speech also, and also that of beautiful suggestion or dhvani. Vāmana, in comparison to his predecessors, has also discussed the nature of meaning - 'artha-tattva' - to a greater detail and this we will pick up in due course.

Udbhaṭa : Udbhaṭa has not attempted to float a definition of poetry but with some other reference in mind, scholars are inclined to view him as closer to Bhāmaha and think that Udbhaṭa's concept of poetry was identical with that of Bhāmaha and that perhaps he also called poetry to be, '(a charming) coming together of word and sense.' Udbhaṭa also wrote, now not available, "Bhāmaha-vivarāṇa i.e. commentary on 'Bhāmaha's Kāvya'ālaṃkāra, a portion from which is quoted by no less an authority than the great Abhinavagupta in his famous 'Locana' commentary on Ānandavardhana's Dhvanyāloka. So, it is safe to surmise that Udbhaṭa's concept of poetry was identical with that of Bhāmaha. This conclusion derives strength from another observation, perhaps also from Udbhaṭa's Bhāmaha-vivarāṇa, as quoted by Mammāṭa in his Kāvya-prakāśa, that Udbhaṭa laughs at Vāmana's distinction of 'guṇa' or 'poetic excellence' and 'alaṃkāra' or a 'figure of speech' under the pretext that the former is interior to poetry and therefore 'nitya-dharma' or essential characteristic of poetry, and the latter being external are accidental to poetry and therefore only 'anitya' or 'impermanent'. Mammāṭa has not accepted this observation and has gone for its refutation also. We have also observed that if Vāmana calls 'alaṃkāra' as 'anitya' or 'impermanent', it is only in the sense of a figure of speech, a device which may or may not be resorted to by a poet. But in itself, i.e. as 'saundarya' or poetic beauty itself, ālaṃkāra is as essential to poetry as any other device could be, even in Vāmana's estimation. No wonder if Udbhaṭa laughs at a purist point of view concerning poetic charm. It may also be noted that Udbhaṭa was also open to poetic beauty as manifested through emotive stuff such as rasa or sentiment, bhāva or feeling and all their newer and newer forms of manifestation. This we will pick up later. But by and large Udbhaṭa also is a kāvyā'ālaṃkāra-vādin' in the wider sense of the term.

Rudraṭa : In his Kāvya'laṃkāra, II, i, Rudraṭa, following Bhāmaha suggests that word and sense together make for poetry :

“nanu, śabdārthau kāvyam
śabdastatrā'rthavān anekavidhaḥ |
varṇānām samudāyaḥ, sa ca
bhinnāḥ pañcadhā bhavati ||” -

Word is having manifold meaning. In itself it is a collection of letters (that tend to be meaningful). Word is five-fold. They are (II. ii, Rudraṭa) : nāma, ākhyāta, nipāta, upasarga, and also 'karma-pravacanīya. i.e. noun, verb, particle, prefix and prepositions or adverb. Rudraṭa adds (II. 3) that nouns are either compounded or single. The compounded state of nouns is divided into three rītis or styles viz. pāñcālī, lāṭiyā and gaudīyā. - We will talk of this later but we may note for the present that the concept of rīti i.e. style based on compounded words leads to 'saṃghaṭanā' or 'arrangement' or “structure” of Ānandavardhana. But Rudraṭa has caused a mix-up here which we will discuss later. Rudraṭa also discusses like his predecessors alaṃkāras, doṣas etc. and stresses on the need for - 'rasa' or sentiment as the outcome - phala - of kāvyā i.e. poetry. Rudraṭa observes that the connoisseurs - sahrdayas - get to the four ends of life, viz. dharma, artha, etc. in a light or easy way through poetry alone. It is therefore that a poet, involving major effort should make his kāvyā full of 'rasas'. If it is not the case then men of taste would suffer from poetry without rasa, as in case of s'āstra or any discipline. The 'rasas' impart joy to the enjoyers endowed with rasas and therefore the poet should take care to promote 'rasa'. Without knowing this element of 'rasa', a poet can not create poetry which tends to be charming. It should be clearly noted that Rudraṭa, as compared to his predecessors, is more vocal about incorporating 'rasa' in poetry. He observes : (Rudraṭa, I. 4) :

jvalad-ujjvala-vāk-prasaraḥ
sarasaṃ kurvan mahākaviḥ kāvyam |
sphuṭam ākalpaṃ analpaṃ
pratanoti yaśaḥ parasyā'pi ||

Thus, the predecessors of Ānandavardhana imagined poetry to be word and sense, or attached little more importance to the word element in the definition of poetry and discriminated between one or the other devices that caused poetic beauty under the titles of guṇa, alaṃkāra, mārga, or rīti etc. They also tended to consider in a scientific or disciplined way the concept of poetic blemish, and

attached more or less importance to the sources of beauty enumerated as above. While doing this they used the term 'alaṃkāra' in both its wider connotation of 'a source of poetic beauty', and also in its local context of a figure of speech. They also at times pointed out to rīti or style as the soul of poetry. It is absolutely naive to think that these literary critics, in their total concept of poetry or scope of poetry, talked only of external factors that enhance poetic beauty, and never touched the essentials of poetry, that they cared only for the external of poetry and were not initiated in the secrets of inherent poetic beauty. Actually they deliberated over the form and also the content of poetry, the external and the interior of poetry, the word and sense, form and content or theme of poetry and everything that laid charm to the expression and turned an ordinary expression into poetry. Singing the songs of glory of alaṃkāras in poetry, Daṇḍin has suggested any number of internal sources of beauty in poetry. Vāmana has laid down shades of meaning such as sūkṣma or subtle, bhāvya and vāsanīya. Says Vāmana : (Vāmana, III. 2. s) - artho vyaktaḥ sūkṣmaś ca. i.e. meaning is two fold, the expressed and the subtle. The subtle then is bhāvya and vāsanīya (vāmana, III, 2.10). That which is easily discernible is 'bhāvya'. 'Vāsanīya' is that which is understood by concentration formed by a sympathetic heart. The Kāmadhenu commentary explains : "bhāvakānām avadhānamātreṇa vimarśo bhāvanā. tad yogaḥ bhāvyaḥ. sahrdaya-sadvyavahāra - samullasita-samskāra - sampanno yo'vadhāna-prakarsaḥ tena gamyo vāsanīyaḥ." We may say that this leads to what Ānandavardhana calls vācya or expressed and 'pratiyamāna' or implied. The earlier critics have also given a thought to the emotive stuff in form of 'rasa' or sentiment and 'bhāva' or feeling, or emotion. At this juncture, however, it is not safe to observe that they had a clear concept of the word-power called vyañjanā or suggestion. Actually, like Ānandavardhana and his illustrious followers, the earlier critics had never applied themselves to the consideration of what we call the topic of semantics including powers of word such as abhidhā, i.e. direct expression, lakṣaṇā i.e. indication and vyañjanā i.e. suggestion. This we can say, so far as available documents are concerned. But, it can be observed safely, as we will go to discuss the topic of word-powers later, that these earlier literary critics were not absolutely unaware of this system, and they had some glimpses of vyañjanā also. One thing is absolutely clear that they have thought of what we call 'pratiyamāna' artha i.e. implicit sense, under various heads of alaṃkāras. This also will be discussed in due course. That Rudraṭa laid special stress on the element of rasa, goes to create a sort of background for advocating the importance of 'rasa-dhvani' or suggestion of the emotive stuff in

Ānandavardhana, and his great followers. We will now proceed to examine the definition and scope of poetry as thought of by Ānandavardhana and his followers.

Ānandavardhana and his followers :

Ānandavardhana has not attempted a definition of poetry. The reason could be that in the period between Bhāmaha and himself the clear concept of poetry had already evolved. The central point of debate perhaps was giving prominence to either the word element alone or to give equal prominence to both word and meaning. Which of these two should be regarded as the differentia of poetry was a topic hotly debated by literary critics. But, by and large a tendency to pay equal respect to both these i.e. word and sense, seemed to gain ground. It is precisely for this reason that Ānandavardhana has kept away from this and observed on Dhv. 1. i, only tantatively that -

“tatra kecid ācaksīran - śabdārtha-śarīraṃ tāvat kāvyam.”

On this, observes Abhinavagupta in his Locana : “tāvad-grahaṇena na kasyā'py atra vipratipattir iti dars'ayati.”

Of course, the remark of Ānandavardhana follows the words : “tad abhāvavādināṃ cā'mī vikalpāḥ saṃbhavanti.” i.e. “The following are the different views of those who believe in its (= i.e. dhvani's) non-existence.” (Trans. K. Kri. pp. 1 ibid).

But the use of “tāvat” by Ānandavardhana implies that the view of even the opponents regarding the definition of poetry is acceptable to him. This is explained by Abhinavagupta who clarifies that by the use of ‘tāvat’ (- which is a correlative of yāvat) it is implied that nobody (including Ānandavardhana) has any dispute or disagreement over this (i.e. over the acceptance of both word and sense taken together to form poetry.)

On Dhv. I. 2, in his vṛtti or gloss Ānandavardhana has the following observation : “kāvyasya hi lalitōcita-sanniveṣa-cāruṇaḥ śarīrasya iva ātmā sārārūpatayā sthitaḥ sahrdaya-s'lāghyo yo'rthas tasya vācyaḥ pratiyamānas'ce ti dvau bhedaḥ.” (pp. 6, ibid)

“That meaning which wins the admiration of perceptive critics and which is of the very essence of poetry - even as the soul is of a body which is naturally handsome by the union of graceful and proper limbs - has two aspects, viz. the explicit and the implicit.” (Trans. K. Kri. pp. 7, ibid). Ānandavardhana is careful here not to call any meaning to be the soul of poetry, not to commit that only word element is poetry. He uses a simile viz. “as soul in a body”, implying thereby that

body and soul can never be thought of separately. Thus for him both word and sense together go to form poetry. Abhinavagupta in his Locana over this, goes to add : “kārikābhāgagataṃ ‘kāvyā’śabdaṃ vyākartuṃ āha- “kāvyasya hi iti”. i.e. in order to explain the term ‘kāvyā’ i.e. poetry in the kārikā (viz. Dhv. I. 2), Ānandavardhana observes... etc. Abhinavagupta, on behalf of Ānandavardhana goes to add, “lalita-padena guṇā’lāmṛkā’nugrahaṃ āha, ucita-śabdena rasa-
viśayaṃ aucityaṃ bhavati iti darśayan rasa-dhvaner jīvitatvaṃ sūcayati.” i.e. by the term ‘lalita’ or ‘graceful’ is meant the beauty caused by excellences and figures of speech (i.e. by sources of beauty), and by the term ‘ucita’ or ‘proper’ is meant only propriety concerning aesthetic pleasure-rasa - suggesting this, the author (i.e. Ānandavardhana) points out to the fact that ‘rasa-dhvani’ suggestion of ‘rasa’ is the soul (of poetry).”

The idea is that here as soul rests in body so does meaning as soul, rest in poetry. All meaning is not to be understood as the ‘soul’ or ātman of poetry. It may also be observed that here the term ‘ātman’ is also used not in the normal sense but only in a metaphorical sense meaning the “most essential” element in poetry. For it was, as observed earlier, very clear to any literary critic in India and also equally to Ānandavardhana that poetry is an abstract art and has nothing to do with the idea of body or soul. The simile drives clear only one point viz. that charming sense - “sahrdayas’lāghya - artha” is all that is required to make poetry what it is. Now all this naturally terminates in aesthetic pleasure, or art-experience or rasā’nubhūti is a distant cry. Thus, we can observe, for the present that for Ānandavardhana word and sense taken together, and graced by excellences and figures-, the sources of poetic beauty - make for the definition and concept of poetry. Abhinavagupta’s insistence on ‘rasa-dhvani’ need not contradict this observation, for everything in poetry that helps create poetic beauty, leads to rasadhvani i.e. suggestion of aesthetic pleasure - In fact all art, including the poetic art is meant to cause art-experience which is not a physical experience, but a ‘mānasa-bodha’ a mental perception and hence is ‘suggested’ only, i.e. it is of the form of ‘dhvani’ or suggestion only. By ‘rasa-dhvani’ is also meant the suggestion of emotive stuff which results from any poetic milieu. It may also be observed that Ānandavardhana has in a way, steadied the metaphorical usage promoted by Vāmana regarding the ‘body’ and ‘soul’ of poetry. It is out of context, as seen in case of Visvanātha to read contradiction between one observation that calls both ‘word and sense’ as ‘body’ of poetry, and another observation which notes that the charming sense as appreciated by the men of taste is the ‘soul’ of poetry, and then

again calling only the 'principally suggested sense alone - i.e. 'dhvani' alone', as soul of poetry. The clear picture that emerges from this discussion is that the metaphorical usages of 'body', 'soul' etc. are not to be drawn to their last limits and that they are meant, at the best, as proposed explanations of the abstract art of poetry. In short, the concept that poetry is word and sense taken together with any number of devices to cause poetic beauty which are natural with the combination of word and sense, seems to have taken root in literary circle, and Ānandavardhana has no objection to that. As a matter of fact he is prepared to accept any turn of expression, any deviation, provided it is beautiful, as poetry, though of course in his estimation the highest art lies in concealing art, i.e. in the implicit sense projected as the highest source of beauty in a given piece of poetry. It is therefore that the use of poetic excellences and figures of speech has to be conditioned by the fact that they help in evoking rasa, i.e. aesthetic pleasure or even a sentiment, as the principal feature of poetry. This insistence on his part is in keeping with the view held by Bharata also, who has recommended every device with reference to evocation of rasa. Perhaps Ānandavardhana is clearer in his understanding as compared to some of his predecessors and as observed earlier, Rudrata's stand was a bridge between Bharata and Ānandavardhana. Ānandavardhana holds that this evocation of sentiment takes place in poetry through the medium of the word-power called vyañjanā and is termed rasa-dhvani when it is singled out as the principal source of poetic charm. He holds that in poetry, through this word-power called vyañjanā is arrived at a three-fold suggested meaning, which could be of the form of vastu-or matter of fact, or idea, alaṃkāra or a figure of speech, or rasādi, i.e. emotive stuff, the sentiment, emotion or feeling, and if any of it proves to be the principal source of poetic beauty, it is termed as 'dhvani' of vastu, alaṃkāra, or rasādi, as the case may be. The type of poetry having this implicit sense arrived at through the word-power of suggestion or vyañjanā, is also termed as 'dhvani kāvya' provided this pratīyamāna or implicit sense proves to be the principal source of charm. We will discuss this in a greater detail later. We will also go to observe that in his wider scheme of poetry Ānandavardhana finds suitable space for all the concepts of literary criticism such as alaṃkāra, guṇa, rīti, vṛtti, doṣa, etc., as advanced by earlier ālaṃkārikas and thus makes his theory of "vyañjanā - dhvani-rasa" more acceptable, logical and catholic. Ānandavardhana has advanced the theory of three powers of the poetic word and there too he has attached more importance to the power of suggestion or vyañjanā.

Rājaśekhara, in the sixth chapter of his *Kāvyamīmāṃsā*, viz. 'pada-vākya-viveka' tries to arrive at the definition of poetry while discussing the varieties of a sentence. He suggests that a sentence blessed with excellences and poetic figures : "guṇavad alaṃkṛtaṃ ca vākyaṃ eva kāvyam." (pp. 24, G.O.S., Edn.). We may observe that here when Rājaśekhara takes 'vākya' i.e. sentence as poetry he seems to lean towards the tradition represented by Daṇḍin which seems to attach greater weight to the element of śabda or word as against the thought current that holds both word and sense in equal balance. The commentary wants us to understand that the 'ca' placed with 'guṇa' and 'alaṃkāra' goes to explain that these have got to be "without blemish". (See, Madhusūdanī, pp. 81, Chowkhamba, edn., '34.) Thus Rājaśekhara's definition is in tune with the concept of poetry as divined by the earlier masters. Actually Ānandavardhana also talks of dhvani, guṇībhūtavyaṅgya and citra, the three varieties of poetry from the point of view of literary criticism. His accepted definition of poetry speaks only of a (harmonious) combination of word and sense only. We may say that only the first section viz. 'kavirahasya' of the wider project called 'kāvyamīmāṃsā' is available to us, and so, we do not know the exact attitude of Rājaśekhara towards the concept of dhvani and vyañjanā, though of course, he mentions Ānandavardhana in certain contexts with great admiration. But acceptance of dhvani does not compel a critic to mention it in the definition of poetry and we will see that Mammāṭa does exactly this. So, as it were, Rājaśekhara seems to pave the way to what we read in the *Kāvyaprakāśa* later.

We can also safely suggest that taking into consideration other references from the available portion of the *Kāvyamīmāṃsā*, Rājaśekhara has attached supreme importance to the concept of 'rasa' in poetry, though of course, not mentioning it in the pure definition of poetry.

Kuntaka : It may be noted that Kuntaka's concept of literature could be taken as an important mile-stone in the onward journey of poetics. We hear the reverberation of the earlier masters such as Bhāmaha and also echos of his near predecessor Ānandavardhana in Kuntaka, who tries to strike a balance and go for a re-evaluation of the two streams of thought. For in Kuntaka, we find the ideas of the earlier masters such as Bhāmaha and the like and also those of Ānandavardhana, getting settled in a clearer, and more definite pattern, so to say. We have seen that Ānandavardhana thought of the classification of poetry on the basis of more or less influence of vyañjanā power, giving prime importance to this suggestive power of word in poetry, thus promoting a criticism-based classification and concept of poetry. In establishing 'dhvani' i.e. principal

suggested sense arrived at through the word power of suggestivity, Ānandavardhana's approach, we feel, has been little more aggressive in favour of vyañjanā or suggestive power of poetic word, perhaps unwittingly on his part. His approach seems a bit tainted by his rather over enthusiasm for suggestivity. This creates an impression that the great master betrays a distinct partiality towards vyañjanā or word-power of suggestivity thus promoting a purely vyañjanā-biased school of literary criticism. The obvious outcome of this attitude was that even though he realized the simple yet beautiful designs prepared by the word power of direct expression i.e. abhidhā or denotation, he just ignored it. He almost established a thought - current that prohibited the poets to revel in the beauty of pure expression i.e. denotation - abhidhā-vilasita-mātra - i.e. what he called 'citra kāvya' or 'picture-like poetry', after realizing the secret of what he termed 'dhvani' or principal suggested sense. He however left the field of citra-kāvya for only the beginners. His great followers, Mammata being the leader, called this variety as 'adhama' poetry, i.e. poetry of very low order. Thus Ānandavardhana's effort led to a sort of negative evaluation of poetry wherein some sterling merits were downgraded to the level of ordinary achievement. On the contrary, without dishonouring in the least the brilliant standard of literary criticism set by the theory of vyañjanā-dhvanī-rasa, if thoughts are promoted on pure and śāstrīya i.e. scientific process, we can never afford to ignore the beauty of just the expressive word power either. This is exactly what Kuntaka cares for and drives us to. He does not seem to be primarily interested in the three-fold classification of word power, into what is termed as 'abhidhā' or expressive power, i.e. denotation, 'lakṣaṇā' or power of indication or, say, deviation, and vyañjanā or the power of suggestivity of a poetic word. He therefore, is inclined to accept only one function, viz. 'vicitrā abhidhā' or the beautiful poetic expression in poetry and accepts that what we term as 'kāvya' or 'sāhitya' or poetry is worth its name only when it creates an impression of its being a poet's work; first and last. Poetry has to be recognised as 'kavi-karma' the creation of a poet's genius, which alone is 'kāvya' for Kuntaka, and all else is "a-kāvya" i.e. non-poetry. Kuntaka's definition and concept of poetry are based on this said foundation.

Before evaluating Kuntaka's concept of poetry, it is necessary to study the background on which it is nurtured. Among available documents of pure literary aesthetics, Bhāmaha's Kāvya-lamkāra is considered to be the earliest. His near follower is said to be Daṇḍin and this is accepted by scholars in general. In both Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin we find preserved even earlier thought-currents. Bhāmaha

has considered the topics of 'kāvyā-s'arīra' i.e. body of poetry in sixty kārīkās or verses, that of alamkāras or poetic figures in one hundred and sixty, of blemishes in fifty, of poetry in seventy and of śabda-śuddhi i.e. correctness of words in yet another sixty kārīkās. The definitions and illustrations read in his work are believed to be Bhāmaha's own creation, i.e. he has not borrowed the same from elsewhere. We have discussed Bhāmaha's concept of poetry earlier, but here, even at the cost of repetition we will take up some topics as discussed by Bhāmaha, as they serve a useful background for Kuntaka's thought-process.

Bhāmaha accepted the coming together of both word and sense as poetry; - śabdārthau sahītau kāvyam -, but this sāhītya acquires an uncommonness - alaukikatva - only when it is beset with 'alamkāra' i.e. poetic beauty in general. This beauty of poetic language - vācāṃ alamkāritih - is brought about by what is termed as 'vakra artha' and 'vakra śabda' i.e. by both poetic/beautiful meaning and poetic/beautiful word of expression (Bhāmaha, I. 36). Thus both poetic expression and poetic content, make for poetry. Bhāmaha notes very candidly at V. 64-66, that descriptions of brilliant jewels, or of trees lowered by fruits, or of flowers in full bloom, do not cause poetic beauty. They only contribute to advance the beauty of ornaments, garden and garland alone respectively. Beauty of expression is brought about by 'vakrokti' alone, i.e. by beautiful poetic expression only - (Bhāmaha, I. 30) - Literature i.e. - poetry worth its name, takes shape through 'vakrokti' alone. At VI. 23, Bhāmaha discusses correct or incorrect usages of words with reference to the practices of poets having 'beautiful expression' - 'vakravācāṃ kavīnāṃ ye, prayogaṃ prati sādhaṇaḥ'... etc. Here also it is insisted that the poet's expression has to be 'vakra' i.e. 'beautiful' for becoming worth its name. In short, we can not imagine the existence of poetry in the absence of this 'vakrokti' i.e. poetic expression.

Though Bhāmaha has insisted on the presence of this element of 'vakrokti' in poetry, he has not attempted any technical elaboration of this concept. Only at the end of the discussion on the poetic figure atis'ayokti - i.e. hyperbole -, at II. 85, Bhāmaha suggests that 'all hyperbole or extra-ordinary expression is 'vakrokti' i.e. beautiful expression which means expression of that which is 'beyond ordinary' - i.e. which is 'lokātis'aya'. He observes : "saiśā sarvaiva vakroktiḥ, anayārtho vibhāvyaḥ" - all this (atis'ayokti) is vakrokti and by this everything (belonging to the day-to-day world) turns into 'vibhāvaś' - i.e. (poetic) determinants, or it is that by which things belonging to the ordinary parlance, become objects of delight. The poet has to be active to realize this element of vakrokti. In fact, which poetic expression or figure is without this vakrokti; and without this where is 'kāvyā' ? The

full expression (Bhāmaha, II. 85) reads as :

“saiṣā sarvaiva vakroktiḥ
anayā'rtho vibhāvyate |
yatno'syāṃ kavīnā kāryaḥ
ko'laṃkāro'nayā vinā ||”

This verse has been quoted by Bhāmaha's successors, beginning with Ānandavardhana and Mammata. It is on the count of absence of 'vakrokti' that Bhāmaha (II. 86) rejects *hetu*, *sūkṣma*, and *leśa* as poetic figures :

“hetuś ca sūkṣmo leśo'tha
nā'laṃkāratayā matāḥ |
samudāyābhidheyasya
vaktroky-anabhidhānataḥ ||”.

It is surprising that after drawing his basic inspiration from Bhāmaha, Kuntaka has not quoted Bhāmaha, II. 85, though he has a number of other quotations from Bhāmaha.

Abhinavagupta has explained Bhāmaha, II. 85, viz. *saiṣa sarvaiva* etc. in his commentary viz. *Locana* on the *Dhv.* (III. 36). He explains that the definition of *atiśayokti* which is given, is form of 'vaktrokti' or a figure of speech, because *Bhāmaha* (I. 36) himself has observed that expression of *vakra* (= beautiful, poetic) word and *vakra* (= beautiful, poetic) meaning makes for the much wanted *alaṃkāra* i.e. source of beauty of *vāṇī* i.e. language or poetic expression. Elaborating this line of thinking Abhinavagupta explains further that by 'vaktṛtā of śabda i.e. word', and 'vakratā of artha i.e. meaning', is meant the state of word and sense being placed in an extra-ordinary fashion. Thus this 'vakratā' is itself the 'alaṃkāratā' of an *alaṃkāra*, i.e. this beautiful poetic expression, makes for a true figure of speech. 'Vakratā' is explained here as 'avasthāna' or being placed in a 'lokottirṇa' form. i.e. extra-ordinary fashion. Bhāmaha means exactly this. 'Atiśaya' is that which is other than i.e. superior to, the worldly or śāstric expression. Only this makes for its quality of being 'a-laukika'. Bhāmaha very clearly (II. 81) brings home this point that, an expression causing apprehension of an extra-ordinary meaning (i.e. - content) is *atiśayokti*. Thus *vakratā* is, “lokottirṇa-rūpeṇa avasthānam.” An *alaṃkāra* or a poetic figure becomes worth its name only if this element of *atiśaya* i.e. extra-ordinariness enters in it, or pervades it.

Ānandavardhana clearly observes : (Dhv. III. 36, vṛtti) :

‘tatrā’tiśayoktir yaṁ alaṁkāraṁ adhiṣṭhati kavi-pratibhāvaśāt tasya cārutvā’tis’ayayogo ‘nyasya tv alaṁkāra-mātratā eva iti’ i.e. ‘only that figure in which exaggeration reigns supreme, acquires abundant beauty due to the poet’s genius. Others are ornamental figures only in name.’ (Trans. K. Kri., pp. 229, ibid). What is arrived at by the advent of this ‘atiśaya’ or by this ‘lokātikrānta-gocaratā’ or ‘lokottara-tā’ ? The answer to this question is - ‘anayā arthaḥ vibhāvyaṭe’ i.e. worldly objects are turned into sources of aesthetic pleasure. The process of ‘vibhāvana’ is explained by the Locanakāra in three ways, such as -

(i) the meaning which rendered old or respeated due to the use made by all people, is realized in a beautiful form; - or,

(ii) the worldly objects such as a lady, a garden etc., become vibhāvas, i.e. determinants causing a feeling or emotion to be awakened; - or,

(iii) these objects turn into bhāvas i.e. feelings and become objects of rasa - Thus, through vakrokti old objects take newer forms, become vibhāvas that evoke feelings, and get transformed into the shape of bhāvas or feelings themselves leading to rasa.

Thus Bhāmaha recommends the coming together of such word and sense that are promoted by such vakratā, that turns the worldly into aesthetic. The repetition of Bhāmaha’s ideas here, is to introduce clearly the views of Kuntaka. That Bhāmaha has under-rated the concept of rīti-or mārga i.e. poetic style, has not missed the attention of the experts. Bhāmaha welcomes both gauḍa and/or vaidarbha style only if it caters to vakrokti, - without which even the so called ‘vaidarbha’ composition carries no weight for Bhāmaha, and even gauḍa-composition steals his admiration if it is blessed with this vakratā or poetic beauty (Bhāmaha, I. 34, 35)

Kuntaka’s advent on the horizon of indian literary criticism took place at the most opportune moment. Ānandavardhana had welcomed and woven in his scheme all thought-currents that came from his predecessors. He accomodated everything in his wider scheme of vyañjanā-dhvani-rasa, in the context of rasa-dhvani. At the same time he accorded new connotation to certain terms and thus dwarfed the concepts of alaṁkāra, rīti and the rest in comparision with the tall all-embracing concept of dhvani in general and rasa-dhvani in particular. Other thought-currents almost merged and melted into this, leaving very thin individuality of their own. The forceful and successful establishment of vyañjanā as an

independent power of word turned out to be an important mile-stone in the history of literary criticism. New dimensions opened out on the horizon of literary criticism. What Ānandavardhana did, i.e. his rendering all other thought-currents to a position subordinate to rasa-dhvani, demanded some rethinking. Precisely because of this the thinking of Ānandavardhana's close successors such as Kuntaka, Kṣemendra, Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, Mahimā and the rest, took a different shape. They as it were, challenged, stopped and applied brakes on the gushing flow of Ānandavardhana's thought-current; – vyañjanā.

At the root of Kuntaka's thinking lie the views of Bhāmaha and we may say that actually Bhāmaha's ideas are as it were, "sprouted, turned into leaf, budded and blossomed" - (aṅkuritaḥ pallavitaḥ korakitaḥ, puspitaḥ) in Kuntaka. Of course, it is childish to suggest that Kuntaka echoes only Bhāmaha's views alone. Be it a Kuntaka, or Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, or Mahimā, or Bhoja or be it anybody, there is no single successor of Ānandavardhana - and this includes Dhanañjaya and Dhanika also - who remains completely free from the great impact of the vyañjanā-dhvani-rasa doctrine. And yet, there are some sterling peculiarities in Kuntaka's concept of poetry, which cannot be overlooked and which have carved out a niche of their own in literary criticism.

The very first noteworthy point is that Kuntaka lays great emphasis on 'kavikarma' i.e. a poet's creation. Whatever goes in the name of poetry should carry an attached stamp that it is first and last, 'a poet's creation'. He is never fed up of mentioning now and again the term, "kavi-vyāpāra" i.e. a poet's effort. So, for him, poetry is 'kavi-karma'. The poet-'kavi' and 'poetic effort/creation, 'kavi-karma' - these two remain in focus in Kuntaka's thinking. He always keeps in mind that a poet's distinct individuality plays an important role in his creation. A poet's nature, his leanings, his likes and dislikes, go to contribute to the creation of newer and newer designs and Kuntaka is of the opinion that differences in a poet's nature bring about different styles of poetic creation. He has called his work by the name, 'alaṃkāra' and 'vakrokti-jīvitā' is a gloss written by himself on his own composition. It is under this title viz. 'vakrokti-jīvitā' that the whole work is - well-known among the learned. We may observe that by holding this principle of the stamp of a poet's individuality bringing about individualistic creation, Kuntaka comes closer to the western pattern of literary criticism. But it is also true that under the local colouring of a poet's individuality lies concealed an element of eternality of literature resulting in extra-worldly pleasure or 'camatkāra'; 'rasa'.

In the context of literary criticism Kuntaka has made an important observation that due to a sort of chemical composition brought about by word, meaning and 'alamkāra', poetry is born which is an indivisible whole. He says : (Vakroktijīva = V.J.; I. 6) :

“alamkṛtir alamkāryam
apóddhṛtya vivecyate |
tadupāyatayā, tattvam
sā'lamkārasya kāvyatā ||”

“The ‘adornment’ and ‘adorned’ are distinguished artificially for the purpose of our enquiry, because this would be the only means to attain the ultimate goal. The truth of the matter, however, remains that the two together constitute poetry.” - (Trans. K. Kris. pp. 291, ‘VJ. of Kuntaka’, Dharwad, Edn. '77).

“Ornament or adornment relates to the act of embellishing. That which is adorned is the content and that which adorns is the linguistic means or medium. Both are subjected to examination here. The method adopted is that of definition of the general and the particular. For purposes of such a definition it becomes essential to consider the two separately, though they form an indivisible unity. The nature of poetry as a whole is realized through the means of the ‘adornment’ and the ‘adorned’. Such a distinction is very helpful in offering one a course of instruction in poetry. In fact, this is a common practice in other disciplines also to make such unreal distinctions in order that the purpose of education is fulfilled. For instance in grammar, a whole word is split into base and termination, and a whole sentence is subdivided into words”-(yathā padāntarbhūtaṃ prakṛti-pratyayaṃ vākyāntarbhūtaṃ padānaṃ ceti.) (vṛtti, on VJ. I. 6; Trans. K. Kris., pp. 291, 2, ibid)

Kuntaka further observes that this distinction is attempted only to cultivate understanding. The real truth is that poetry is a work of a poet, wherein the undivided whole of the ‘adorned’ and the ‘adornment’ is the reality. So, it is clear that poetry is the name of what is adorned already and the question of adding adornment to pre-existing poetry does not arise :

“tattvam sālamkārasya kāvyatā tad ayaṃ atra paramārthaḥ - sālamkārasya alamkāraṇa-sahitasya sakalasya nirastāvayavasya sataḥ, samudāyasya kāvyatā, kavikarmatvam tena alamkṛtasya kāvyatvam iti sthitam, na punaḥ kāvyasya alamkārayogaḥ” - (vṛtti; VJ. I. 6)

It may be noted that here 'alamkāra' or 'adornment' does not stand only for figures of speech such as upamā, or anuprāsa and the like, however these are not excluded either. For Kuntaka this adornment is 'vakrokti', 'a poet's charming expression', which can take any shape including that of a poetic figure also, and also that of vyañjanā. But the condition is that it should be an in-born quality. This is exactly what Ānandavardhana had said about the figures of speech, when they seem to stick naturally in the description and therefore are not taken as external to poetry -

“na teṣāṃ bahiraṅgatvaṃ rasābhivyaktau” - (Dhv. Vṛtti, II. 16).

That a work of art is 'akhaṇḍa-buddhi-samāsvādyā' i.e. something to be enjoyed as a whole undivided unit, is what Kuntaka means here. Actually by taking this holistic view of a poet's creation, Kuntaka has, as it were, disowned the system of 'ātmā' i.e. soul of poetry, śarīra i.e. 'body' of poetry, and the adornment or 'alamkāra'. We may also observe that Ānandavardhana also had accepted this view point of poetry being an indivisible, whole unit. Actually he has also talked about the soul and adornment separately only to cultivate the proper understanding of poetry. His words quoted as above, viz. 'na teṣāṃ bahiraṅgatvaṃ' bear out this fact. So, when Kuntaka suggests that poetry is always found with adornment - “śālamkārasya kāvyatā”, if some understand it as suggesting that, 'poetry is no poetry, if it is without upamā i.e. simile, etc. then this may be taken as pure innocence.

After this Kuntaka makes an effort to strike a definition of poetry. For him poetry is :

“śabdārthau sahitaṃ
vakra-kavi-vyāpāra-śālini |
bandhe vyavasthitau, kāvyam;
tadvidā'hlāda-kāriṇi ||” (V. J. I. 7).

“Poetry is that word and sense together enshrined in a style revealing the artistic (lit, - 'out of the way') creativity of the poet on the one hand and giving artistic *delight to a man of taste on the other.*” (Trans. K. Kris. pp. 292, *ibid*)

The first point to be noted is that in his definition of poetry, Kuntaka has called both 'word' and 'sense' taken together as poetry. He goes to observe in his vṛtti on VJ. I. 7, that, “Poetry is nothing but word and sense in their unity. The 'denoter' and the 'denoted' taken together constitute poetry. That they are two yet one is a welcome paradox.” (Trans. K. Kris., *ibid*) - “śabdārthau kāvyam, vācako vācyam ceti dvau sammilitau kāvyam. dvāvekam iti vicitraivoktiḥ.” (Vṛtti, on V.I. I. 7). We

may observe that as it were, the point which Punditaraja Jagannātha raised later, is anticipated and answered here. Kuntaka further observes : "As a result of this, the view of some that poetry is word alone beautified highly by the skill of the poet, as also the view of some others that poetry is sense alone causing aesthetic delight as a result of beauty in style, both these stand refuted. Thus, the quality of giving aesthetic delight co-exists in both severally, even as oil exists in every grain of sesamum and is not exclusive to either of them. - He observes : "yasmāt dvayor api pratyekaṃ vartate, na punar ekasmin." (Vṛtti, on V.J. I. 7). He further observes : "tasmāt sthitam etat - na śabdasyaiva ramaṇīyatā-viśiṣṭasya kevalasya kāvyatvam, nā'pyarthasyeti." (Vṛtti, on V.J. I. 7) i.e. "Thus the conclusion is clear that neither beautiful 'word-form' alone, nor beautiful content alone can constitute real poetry." (Trans. K. Kris., pp. 295, ibid).

With this observation he offers quotations from Bhāmaha (i.e. Bhāmaha I. 15-17). If either of the two, viz. word and sense, is inferior, poetry does not take shape. To bring home this point, the term 'sahitau' - i.e. 'together' is used in the definition, Normally word and sense are always found together, but Kuntaka here expects a special form of 'sāhitya' or coming together. It is a unique kind of togetherness. "The uniqueness lies in the fact that the graces due to excellences and figures of speech assuming complex shades of artistic beauty will compete, as it were, with one another in any given instance." (Trans. K. Kris., pp. 296, ibid) - "kintu viśiṣṭam eva iha sāhityaṃ abhipretam, kīdrśam ? vakratā-vicitra-guṇālaṃkāra-sampadāṃ paraspara-spardhā'dhirohaḥ" (Vṛtti - VJ. I. 7) -

Kuntaka explains that the dual form used in 'sahitau' of word and sense is denotative of two classes taken as a whole, and not taken as individuals. For, if two particulars were meant, even a single meaningful word-would have to constitute poetry. So, Kuntaka is clear in suggesting that the two, viz. word and sense, as woven in a composition go to form poetry. By 'bandha' or composition is meant the fashioning out through sentences, i.e. use of a number of sentences. 'vyavasthitau' or 'woven, enshrined', suggests the profusion of excellences like 'grace' and of figures of speech : "bandho vākya-vinyāsaḥ. tatra vyavasthitau, viśeṣeṇa lāvanyā"di-guṇā'laṃkāra śobhinā sanniveṣeṇa kṛtā'vasthānau." (Vṛtti, on VJ. I. 7). Kuntaka further suggests that in the expression 'together' the togetherness implied is presumably the harmony between one word and another, and between one meaning and another. Or else, it will not attract the readers of cultivated taste : "sahitāv ity atrā'pi yathā-yukti sajātīyā'pekṣayā śabdasya śabdāntareṇa vācyasya vācyā'ntareṇa ca sāhityaṃ paraspara-spardhitvalakṣaṇaṃ eva vivakṣitam." (Vṛtti,

VJ. I. 7). Kuntaka observes that the absence of concord or togetherness in one type (i.e. set of words) is sure to mean the absence of concord in the other (i.e. meaning) too. Thus meaning though striking in itself, will be no better than a dead body when it is not embodied in an adequately striking word. Similarly, a word which does not have an adequate meaning-content, but which expresses something out of context is to be taken as, 'disease of a poem.' - "paramārthataḥ punar ubhayor apy ekatarasya sāhitya-viraho'nyatarasya api paryavasyati. tathā ca arthaḥ samartha-vācaka-a-sadbhāve svātmanā sphurann api mṛta-kalpa eva avatiṣṭhate. śabda'pi vākya'payogi-vācyā'sambhāve vācyā'ntara-vācakaḥ san vākya'sya vyādhībhūtaḥ pratibhāti." (Vṛtti, V.J. I. 7).

In short, word and sense, as if competing with each other, used in a given composition, make for poetry. For Kuntaka this 'bandha' or style or composition should be such as, "revealing the artistic creativity of the poet" - i.e. 'kavi-vyāpāra-śālīni'. By 'vakre' or 'out of the way' as an adjective of style or composition is meant that the poetic process involved is different from the well known denotation of words familiar in scientific writing (i.e. śāstra). This 'vakratā' is six-fold according to Kuntaka. The poetic style or composition acquires unique beauty therefrom. This adjective of difference from well-known linguistic usage is not enough to define poetry, as it is too wide and may include instances marked by farfetched conceits. So, Kuntaka adds another attribute viz. "giving aesthetic delight to the man of taste."

After elaborating over the definition and scope of poetry, Kuntaka discusses the nature of word and sense in greater detail. He says (VJ. I. 8) & (VJ. I.9) :

vācyo'rtho vācakaḥ śabdaḥ
 prasiddham ityadyapi,
 tathā'pi kāvya-mārgesmin
 paramārtho'yaṁ etayoḥ ||
 śabda vivakṣitaikārtha-vācako
 'nyeṣu satsvapī,
 arthaḥ sahrdaya-hṛdayā"hlādakāri-
 sva-spanda-sundaraḥ ||

"That 'meaning' is what is signified and 'word' is that which signifies is so well-known that it needs no elaboration. Yet, in the province of poetry, their true nature is as follows : " (VJ. I. 8) (Trans. K. Kris., pp. 300, ibid)

“That unique expression which alone can fully convey the poet’s intended meaning out of a hundred alternatives before him is to be regarded as ‘word’. Similarly that alone which possesses such refreshing natural beauty as to draw the appreciation of delighted readers is to be reckoned as ‘meaning’ (VJ. I. 9) (Trans. K. Kris. pp. 300, 301 *ibid*).

Kuntaka also talks of ‘word’ being ‘dyotaka’ and ‘vyañjaka’. The exact distinction between these two is not clear, but Dr. K. Krishnamoorthy perhaps renders the terms as ‘indicative’ and ‘suggestive’ and the two meanings viz. ‘dyotyā’ and ‘vyañgya’ as ‘indicated’ and ‘suggested’. Actually we use ‘indicative’ for ‘lakṣaka’ and ‘indicated’ for ‘lakṣya’. This is common practice. These two, viz. ‘dyotaka’ and ‘vyañjaka’ varieties are covered by ‘vācaka’ because, Kuntaka thinks, that the business of a word is to convey meaning, i.e. apprehension of meaning is the main or only function of a word and this attribute is applicable to all types of words including ‘dyotaka’ and ‘vyañjaka’. Similarly ‘dyotyā’ and ‘vyañgya’ varieties of meaning are also covered up by ‘vācya’ in general. In his gloss on VJ. I. 8, Kuntaka observes :

“iti, evaṃvidhaṃ vastu prasiddham pratītaṃ - yo vācakaḥ pratyāyakaḥ sa śabdaḥ, yo vācyaścābhidheyaḥ so’rtha iti. nanu ca dyotaka-vyañjakāv api śabdau sambhavataḥ, tadasaṃgrahān na avyāptiḥ, yasmād artha-pratīti-kāritva-sāmānyād upacārāt tau api vācakaḥ eva evaṃ dyotyā-vyañgyayor arthayoḥ pratyeyatva-sāmānyāt upacārāt vācyatvaṃ eva.”

Thus for Kuntaka a word i.e. a poetic word is only that which is communicative of the exact intended sense alone. There may be any number of synonymous expressions, i.e. alternate general expressions in any number, with an outwardly identical meaning. But the unique shade of the particular meaning as intended by the poet cannot be conveyed fully by any or all of them. We may observe here that Kuntaka seems to echo the words of Ānandavardhana, who in Dhv. I. viii, observes :

“so’rthaḥ tadvyakti-sāmarthya-yogī
śabdaś ca kaścana |
yatnataḥ pratyabhijñeyau,
tau śabdārthau mahā-kaveḥ ||”

“That meaning, and that rare word which possesses the power of conveying it, only these two deserve the careful scrutiny of a first-rate poet.” (Trans. K. Kris. Dhv. pp. 15, *ibid*)

How does a poet arrive at this rare word to convey the exact sense is explained by Kuntaka, while explaining the process of poetic composition resulting in the togetherness aimed at.

Kuntaka (Vṛtti on I. 9) observes that when poets are interested in describing a particular feature, they are seen preferring an apt particular word as in the illustration viz. “dvayam gatam samprati” etc. (Kumāra. V. 71). While explaining the illustration in detail, Kuntaka suggests that the poet's preference for words with possessive terminations in respect of proper names of both (i.e. ‘kalāvataḥ’ and ‘kāntimatī’) is also a means of excellence which cannot be conveyed by using their synonyms. He says :

“kavi-vivakṣita-viśeṣābhidhāna-kṣamatvaṃ eva vācakatva-lakṣaṇam. yasmāt pratibhāyām tatkalollikhita kenacit parispaṇḍena parissphurantaḥ padārthāḥ, prakṛta-prastāvasamucita kenacit utkarṣeṇa vā samācchādita-svabhāvāḥ santo vivakṣā-vidheyatvena abhidheyatāpadaviṃ avatarantas tathāvidhaviśeṣa-pratipādana-sāmarthyena-abhidhānena abhidhīyamānās cetaś camatkāritam āpadyante.” (Vṛtti, on VJ. I. 9) -

“Therefore, the proper definition of ‘signification’ is that capacity to convey the particular shade of thought intended by the poet. In fact, in the world of the poet's creative imagination, things come to life with a touch of original invention; or their real nature gets veiled by a rich afflatus calculated to present the subject in a most attractive light; as such, the process of communication is a slave to the poetic intention. Only when the right verbal correlative for the particular has been found, the delight of the reader is assured.” (Trans. K. Kris., pp. 302, *ibid*)

Kuntaka here seems to convey that while composing poetry, an original invention or a flash takes shape in the poet's mind, as a result of which the external worldly objects leave their worldly nature and become objects, emotive in nature, in the poet's heart, and because of this they turn into ‘bhāvas’ or emotive or aesthetic stuff. Thus through words, that are appropriate to convey this internal vision of the poet, these objects are signified. Thus, they become objects of aesthetic delight for the sympathetic souls. Two things happen in this process. First, on account of the poet's original invention, the external worldly objects turn into objects of relish, and with the help of the same flash the poet is able to convey his internal stuff in words of poetry. These words are having the capacity to signify exactly what the poet intends to do. Kuntaka says that when the objects first appear in the poet's imagination, they are originally of the nature of a rough

stone; they come to be finally polished by the poet in the course of being embodied in beautiful language, and strike the men of taste as a precious diamond, fully polished. - He observes (Vṛtti, on VJ. I. 7)

“yasmāt alamkāreṇa aprastuta-prasamsā lakṣaṇena, anyā'padeśatayā sphuritāṃ eva kavi-cetasi prathamam ca pratibhā-pratibhāsamāna-ghatita-pāṣāṇa-śakala-kalpa-maṇi-prakhyam eva vastu, vidagdhakavi-viracita-vakra-vākyopā”rūḍham śāṇollidha-maṇi-manoharatayā tadvidāhlādakāri-kāvyatvam adhirohati.”

About the vācya-signified-meaning in poetry, Kuntaka elaborates : (Vṛtti, VJ. I. 9)

“arthaś ca vācya-lakṣaṇaḥ kīdrīśaḥ ? kāvye yaḥ sahrdayā”hlādakāri-svaspanda-sundaraḥ. sahr'dayāḥ kāvyā'rthavidāḥ teśāṃ āhlādam ānandam karoti yas tena svaspandena ātmīyena svabhāvena sundaraḥ, sukumāraḥ. tad etaṃ uktaṃ bhavati-yady api padārthasya nānāvidha-dharma-khacitatvam saṃbhavati tathā'pi tathāvidhena dharmeṇa saṃbandhaḥ samākhyāyate yaḥ sahrdayā”hlādamā”dhātum kṣamate. tasya ca tadā”hlāda-sāmarthyam saṃbhāvyate yena kācid eva svabhāva-mahattā rasa-parīpoṣāṅgatvam vā vyaktim āśādayati.”

“Coming to meaning, what is its speciality in poetry ? That is precisely what is meant by saying that, that alone which possesses such refreshing beauty as to draw the appreciation of delighted readers, is to be reckoned ‘meaning’. The readers referred to are those sensitive to poetic beauty. That which delights them by its own refreshing beauty is the nature of meaning in poetry. To put it in other words; although an object may be qualified to diverse attributes, the poet will select, only one of them which is capable of delighting sensitive readers. Its capacity to delight is referred on the basis of the rare grandeur added to the subject in the poet's treatment or the force added to the literary sentiment developed.” (Trans. K. Kris.; pp. 304, ibid).

After thus clarifying his opinion about ‘word’ and ‘meaning’, Kuntaka suggests :

“ubhau etāv alamkāryau
tayoh punaḥ alamkr̥tiḥ |
vakroktir eva vaidagdhyā-
bhaṅgībhaṇitīḥ ucyate ||” (V.J. I. 10)

“Both these are the ‘adorned’. Their adornment consists in the poetic process known as ‘artistic turn of speech’. (Trans. K. Kris. pp. 306, ibid)

‘Both these’ refer to words and meanings. They are to be taken as subjects of ornamentation for their special appeal. Their ornament - i.e. ornament for both word and sense - is only one viz. ‘artistic turn of speech’. This stands for a charming

and novel utterance peculiar to poetry and quite different from familiar usage. Thus, artistic utterance itself makes for ornament. The poetic process itself is the real ornament. So, it is wrong to presume that word and sense are on one side and that they are to be later connected to some ornamentation which lies separate on the other side. *Striking turn of expression itself is ornament which is not external to word and sense.* It is inherent in the poetic process, it is natural to a poet's speech; it is an inborn quality.

Further elaborating the concept of 'sāhitya' or togetherness of word and sense that make for poetry, Kuntaka (VJ. I. 16) observes :

“śabdarthau sahitaṭ eva
pratītau sphurataḥ sadā |
sahitāv iti tāv eva
kiṃ apūrvam vidhīyate ||”

“When it is so obvious that word and meaning are ever experienced jointly, what is the special import of mentioning it (in the definition).” (Trans. K. Kris. pp. 310, *ibid*) -

The idea is that the intimate relation of word and meaning is inherent. What then is the special significance of mentioning this togetherness in the definition ?

The point is that here this innate intimate relationship is not meant. This relationship is found even in Pāṇini's aphorisms and even in irrelevant talking of a cart-driver also. This is not covered by this special 'sāhitya'. For in that case we need not go for the discipline of sāhitya, its purpose being served even by the disciplines of grammar, exegesis and logic also. But then even this difference is also well known. What is the purpose of saying it again ? Kuntaka, with a touch of pride replies : (Vrtti, on I. 16, V.J.) :

“What we call sāhitya has been invariably referred to by that name in the long course of the history of poetics and yet, so far, there has not been a single scholar who has devoted his attention to explaining even a little of this concept, although the concept itself is very interesting, representing as it does the highest watermark of the poetic art. So, let us undertake for the delight of the bee-like critics, a consideration of the strikingly beautiful essence of the concept underlying all compositions of the best poets and impressing us as containing the collective beauty of the ambrosial drops to be found in the lotus-heart of Sarasvatī, the goddess of poetry.” (Trans. K. Kris., pp. 310, 311, *ibid*).

As compared to Ānandavardhana's flow of words which like that of the great Ādi Śaṅkara, and which matches with the pure and serene flow of the Gaṅgā, Kuntaka's verbocity makes his effort less remarkable.

Explaining this special togetherness of word and sense, Kuntaka observes : (V.J. I. 17) :

“sāhityaṃ anayoḥ śobhā-
śālitāṃ prati kā'py asau |
anyūna-anatiriktatva-
manohāriṇy avasthitiḥ ||”

“The sāhitya or mutual coherence between word and meaning in respect of beauty is nothing but a unique poetic usage, involving neither more nor less than the exact form of word and meaning required to make the whole beautiful.” - (Trans. K. Kris., pp. 311, ibid).

So, for Kuntaka, what is meant by 'sāhitya' is not merely the mutual coherence necessarily found between word and sense, but their extra-ordinary efficiency in artistic usage of the poet to bring joy to the man of taste. The attribute, viz. 'the usage involving neither more nor less than the exact form of word and meaning required to make the whole beautiful is placed to suggest that the two are competing with each other, as it were, to produce delight. Between the two, there should be no excess nor deficiency in respect of the contribution of either.

Kuntaka elaborates the idea as given above by citing three 'antara-śloka' (= nos, 34, 35, 36 under VJ. I. 17, pp. 25, ibid) in which he observes :

“The rise of excellences like 'sweetness' in harmony with the 'style', the employment of figures endowed with abundant artistic beauty; (34)

The full development of 'sentiments' in keeping with the prescribed 'modes' - when all these are competitively (= spardhayā) present in both word and meaning; (35)

We have the quintessence of speech classified as word etc., and causing delight to the reader by its beauty. It is this which is designated here as 'sāhitya'. (36) - (Trans. K. Kris. pp. 312, ibid)

Kuntaka says that the four śāstras of grammar, exegesis, logic and poetics are also of help to every sentence-construction. Among these, in his opinion, poetics is of supreme importance. It confers a beauty of its own on a composition in the absence of which we miss beauty.

Kuntaka suggests (Vs. 37-40; V.J. I. 17 Vṛtti) in the antaras'loka that he will now onwards discuss that element which produces delight in sensitive readers, even by the beauty of its style (= bandha), even if it is lacking in thoughtful content, just like melodious music; - the element which is relished in its entirety without distinction of word and sentence import after the initial grasping of primary meaning, even like the unique savour of a sweet drink (pāṇaka-swādat), by men of taste; - the element without which a composition would appear lifeless to critics, like a body without life, or like life without vitality; - the element from the presence of which creative freshness of speech proceeds, the beauty of which is grasped only by the men of taste. - This element Kuntaka takes up for discussion now onwards.

After a detailed discussion of the exact import of 'sāhitya' the general nature of art as revealed in the poetic process is explained by Kuntaka : (V.J., I. 18) :

kavi-vyāpāra-vakratva-prakārāḥ
sambhavanti ṣaṭ |
pratyekaṃ bahavo bhedāḥ
teṣāṃ vicchitti-śobhināḥ ||

“Art in the poetic process is divisible into six categories. Each one of them may have numerous subdivisions, every subdivision striking one by a new shade of beauty.” (Trans. K. Kris. pp. 313, ibid)

The process of creative poets is poetry itself - kavīnām vyāpāraḥ kāvyā-kriyā-lakṣaṇaḥ, - (vṛtti, on V.J., I. 18). Its art distinguishes it from other forms of composition. The main categories are six, having numerous sub-divisions.

Kuntaka enumerates six art-forms or 'vakratā' as : (V.J., I. 19, 20, 21) 'varṇa-vinyāsa-vakratā' or art in arrangement of syllables; 'pada-pūrvārdha-vakratā' or art in the base-form of substantives; 'pratyā-vakratā' i.e. art in inflection forms, 'vākya-vakratā' i.e. art in a whole sentence, which has a thousand-varieties and which takes in its fold the whole lot of poetic figures; 'prakaraṇa-vakratā' i.e. art in a section of a work, and 'prabandha-vakratā' i.e. art revealed in a whole composition.

It may be noted that Kuntaka has practically covered up all vyañjakas or suggesters as pointed out by Ānandavardhana in his Dhv. III. 16 and at other places scattered over the whole of his Dhv. The Dhv. III. 16 reads as :

“sup-tiṅ-vacana-sambandhaiḥ
tathā kāraka-śaktibhiḥ |

kṛt-taddhita-samāsaiś ca
dyotyolakṣya-kramah kvacit ||” -

It is one thing that Ānandavardhana has harnessed all agents to a direct or indirect suggestion of emotion or aesthetic delight-rasa, while Kuntaka is virtually supporting this position. For Ānandavardhana case-terminations, conjugational terminations, number, relation, accident, primary affixes, secondary affixes and also compounds become conveyers of suggestion of ‘alakṣya-krama-dhvani’ - i.e. suggestion with imperceptible sequence, i.e. what we may term ‘rasādi-dhvani’. Kuntaka has also covered up any number of instances of what goes under the name of abhidhā or pure expression, and also lakṣaṇā i.e. deviation, which for Ānandavardhana also, become instruments of vyañjanā. A number of illustrations from the Dhv. are also accepted by Kuntaka to explain and illustrate this or that sub-variety of vakratā. It makes an interesting study to examine illustrations, especially from Kālidāsa being treated by both these great critics. A comparative study of the approach of these two stalwarts to the great Kālidāsa promises to be an interesting journey.

After this Kuntaka turns his attention to style or diction of composition at V.J., I. 22, wherein he observes :

vācya-vācaka-saubhāgya-
lāvaṇya-paripoṣakaḥ |
vyāpāra-sālī vākyasya
vinyāso bandha ucyate.”

“Diction is the name given to the art of sentence-construction which is congenial to heighten inner and outer charm of both ‘meaning’ and ‘word’ and which is at the same time a partaker of the poetic process.” (Trans. K. Kris., pp. 324, ibid).

Here, in place of the traditional names of excellences, Kuntaka uses new names such as ‘saubhāgya’ and ‘lāvaṇya’. The former stands for inner charm, which is the fruit of dynamic imagination which causes delight of the heart : “saubhāgyam pratibhā-saṃrambha-phala-bhūtam, cetanacamatkāritva-lakṣaṇam”, (vṛtti on V.J. I. 22), while the latter i.e. ‘lāvaṇya’ is explained as : “sanniveśa-saundaryam” i.e. the beauty of arrangement-which makes for the outer charm. ‘Bandha’ i.e. diction makes for both these.

At V.J., I. 23, Kuntaka proceeds to explain the term 'tad-vid-āhlāda-kāritva' i.e. the quality of delighting men of taste, which is used in his definition of poetry given in V.J., I. 7. He has already explained the other three elements viz. 'meaning' (i.e. arthaḥ), 'word' (i.e. śabdaḥ) and 'artful expression', i.e. 'vakrokti', or 'alaṃkaraṇa'. Kuntaka says that poetry has a power that brings delight to the connoisseurs. This is other than 'meaning' i.e. content, 'word' i.e. language, and artful expression i.e. ornament. These three do contribute to excellence in poetry but Kuntaka says that there is something else also viz. beauty which is beyond these three : "tad-vid-āhlāda-kāritvaṃ kāvya-vid-ānanda-vidhāyitvaṃ | kīḍṣam ? vācya-vācaka-vakrokti-tritayā-'tiśayottaram |" (Vṛtti, on I. 23, V.J.). Kuntaka holds it as the fourth principle having its own distinct nature and excellence. Its charm carries a unique unfailing appeal. Uniqueness consists in its being felt only by men of taste. It is like perfume sweetly surrounding an object : Vṛtti on I. 23 runs as :

"svarūpeṇa atīśayena ca svarūpeṇa anyat kim api tattvāntaram etad atīśayena etasmāt tritayād api lokottaram itī arthaḥ. anyac ca kīḍṣam ? kim api āmoda-sundaram |. kim api avyapadeśyaṃ sahrīdaya-hṛīdaya-samvedyam āmodaḥ sukumāra-vastu-dharmaḥ, rañjakatvaṃ nāma, tena sundaram, rañjakatva-ramaṇīyam |"

We may observe that here we can read the impressions of Ānandavardhana's famous uttering, viz. "vibhāti lāvaṇyam iva aṅganāsu" (Dhv. I. 4)

After thus discussing at length the definition and scope of poetry in its full concept, Kuntaka observes that there are three styles in poetry which serve the poets as high-roads and these three are the sukumāra i.e. elegant, vicitra i.e. brilliant and madhyama i.e. the mixture of these two. This he gives in VJ. I. 24 :

"santi tatra trayo mārḡaḥ
kavi-prasthāna-hetavaḥ |
sukumāro vicitraś ca
madhyamaś ca ubhayātmakaḥ ||"

He is clear that they are three only and neither two nor four. They are the stimulators of creative process in poets and are therefore responsible for the creation of poetry itself. Kuntaka has correlated them with a poet's creative power, his genius, his nature and refuses to link them with any geographical regions. This will be discussed by us in greater detail later in volume II, but for the present we may say that Kuntaka, as compared to the vyañjanā-biased criticism of

Ānandavardhana, has opted for a more broadbased scheme and held 'kāvyā', which theoretically shuns classification, as only 'kavikarma' or poet's creation. Though of course, without any outward gradation even in Kuntaka we find leanings towards Ānandavardhana's rasa-vyañjanā, and this is borne out by the practical poem-oriented criticism which Kuntaka works out even in cases of varṇa-vinyāsa-vakratā.

Kṣemendra : In his Kavi-kaṇṭhābharāṇa Kṣemendra discusses only the external factors concerning poetry, while in Aucitya-vicāra-carcā he touches an absolutely internal condition viz. 'aucitya' or 'propriety' concerning the concept of poetry. He has not attempted to construct any definition of poetry but has concentrated on a very important concept or thought-current concerning the basic idea of poetry. He has called it to be the very life of rasa-oriented poetry. His fuller discussion concerning the propriety or 'aucitya' in all its details has a basic concern with 'rasa' or aesthetic pleasure only. But this does not mean that he has embarked upon a totally new and original thought current or ideology concerning literary criticism. *He has tried to put in focus, perhaps with a greater emphasis, whatever was laid down originally by Bharata and approved and supported by Ānandavardhana and in his own turn by Abhinavagupta.* We will discuss this thought-current or concept of 'aucitya' i.e. propriety in due course later in Vol. II but here, suffice it so say that Kṣemendra takes 'rasa' i.e. aesthetic pleasure as the 'soul' of poetry and 'aucitya', 'propriety' stands for the 'jīvita' i.e. life-force - prāṇāḥ - of poetry. Keeping this element of aucitya at the centre does not stand to provide an independent path of literary criticism. It is not a new dimension so to say. Precisely because of this, we do not find any independent school of 'aucitya' and its followers, as in case of 'dhvani'. We may say that this is only a branch or an off-shoot of dhvani theory and Kṣemendra turns out to be a spiritual heir, a 'mānasa-putra' of the great Abhinavagupta his guru, and therefore also of Ānandavardhana.

Bhoja : In his Sarasvatī-kaṇṭhābharāṇa (SKA) and Śṛiṅgāra-prakāśa, (Śr. Pra) Bhoja has discussed the concept of 'sāhitya' and 'kāvyā' and has also attempted definition of the same.

At Sarasvatī-kaṇṭhābharāṇa (= S.K.Ā.; N.S. Edn. '34, Bombay) I. 2 he defines 'kāvyā' as :

“nirdoṣaṃ guṇavat kāvyam
alamkāraiḥ alamkṛtam,
rasānvitam kaviḥ kurvan
kīrtim prītim ca vindati.”

“The poet acquires both fame and pleasure by composing poetry which is bereft of (poetic) blemishes, qualified by (poetic) excellences ornamented by ornaments, and is united (or is full of) with ‘rasa’ i.e. sentiment (or emotional stuff, or aesthetic pleasure).”

Thus Bhoja has underlined the four attributes of poetry viz. *doṣa-hāna* i.e. avoiding blemishes, *guṇa-ādāna* i.e. acquisition of poetic excellences, *alaṃkārayoga* or having ornaments or figures of speech and *‘rasa-a-viyoga’* i.e. non-exclusion of *rasa*. But he has not attempted the basic definition of ‘*kāvya*’ or poetry here, and for that we have to look into the discussion read in his *Śringāra-prakāśa*. (= *Sr Pra*) (Edn. Josyer - Vol. I-IV; Mysore)


Bhoja in his *Sr. Pra.* explains ‘*sāhitya*’ as relation between word and meaning and this relation is very wide so as to include even *śāstra* - i.e. scientific literature. He holds that ‘*kāvya*’ is togetherness of word and meaning as suggested in the famous definition (of *Bhāmaha*) that takes ‘*kāvya*’ or poetry as both ‘word’ and ‘meaning’ taken together. He says (*Sr. Pra.* Vol. I, pp. 2 Edn. Josyer), “tat (= *kāvyaṃ*) punaḥ śabdārthayoḥ *sāhityaṃ āmananti*; tad yathā, ‘*śabdārthau sahitaṃ kāvyaṃ*’.”

This relation of word and meaning called ‘*sāhitya*’ is twelve-fold according to Bhoja. Eight relations out of these twelve are normal relations, and the remaining four are special that go to make this ‘*sāhitya*’ i.e. togetherness as ‘*kāvya*’ or poetry. In reply to a query as to ‘what makes for *sāhitya*?’ Bhoja observes that, ‘the relation of word and meaning makes for ‘*sāhitya*’. This relation is twelve-fold such as : *abhidhā*, *vivakṣā*, *tātparya*, *pravibhāga* *vyapekṣā*, *sāmarthyā*, *anvaya*, *ekārthibhāva*, and *doṣahāna*, *guṇopādāna*, *alaṃkārayoga*, and *rasa-a-viyoga*. (*Sr. Pra.* Vol. I, pp. 2, 3).

In the beginning of Ch. VII Bhoja once again mentions these twelve relations.

Thus in a wider sense of ‘*sāhitya*’ or ‘togetherness of word and sense’, Bhoja seems to cover even the use of language that we come across in *loka-vyavahāra* i.e. day-to-day parlance, and also in scientific literature that we term as ‘*śāstra*’. In the special sense of ‘*sāhitya*’, Bhoja enumerates the last four which only go to make for poetry i.e. ‘*kāvya*’, proper. It is noteworthy that following the tradition of *Bhāmaha* and *Ānandavardhana*, Bhoja mentions both ‘*śabda*’ i.e. word and ‘*artha*’ i.e. ‘sense’ in the definition of ‘*kāvya*’ i.e. poetry. We, however, may choose to call the first eight relations not by the name of ‘*sāhitya*’, but by the simple reference of ‘*vānmaya*’ i.e. all literature in general, i.e. technical and also that which we come across in our worldly context.

The wider relationship of word and meaning as suggested by Bhoja can be shown in a tabular form as given below. The first eight varieties of togetherness of word and sense are termed as “kevala-śabda-sambandha-śaktayaḥ” by Bhoja, while the latter four are termed as “sāpekṣa-sambandha-śaktayaḥ” i.e. word-powers depending on relationships that are ‘relative’ to something in nature. The table is shown as :



Of these, the first eight have been discussed by Bhoja in the VIIth and VIIIth chapters of his *Sr. pra.* and the last four are discussed in Ch. IX of *Sr. pra.* These last four relationships are termed as ‘samyak-prayoga’ i.e. ‘right or proper-usage’ and he has observed that, “samyak-prayogaś ca asya tadā upa-padyate, yadā doṣa-hānam, guṇopādānam, alaṃkārayogaḥ, rasā-‘viyogaś ca bhavati’, i.e. right usage takes place when there is avoidance of poetic blemishes, acceptance of poetic excellencies, acceptance of poetic turns of expression i.e. figures of speech, and absence of disconnection with aesthetic pleasure. (*Sr. Pra.* Vol. II, Ch. IX, pp. 305).

Thus Boja's concept of ‘sākṣya’ i.e. togetherness of word and sense is very wide. He has absorbed all thought-currents promulgated by ālaṃkārikas beginning with Bhāmaha, down to Ānandavardhana and Dhanañjaya-Dhanika, in his *Sr. Pra.* He

has welcomed the concept of 'alaṃkāra' or 'source of beauty' as advanced by Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin and has accepted in toto the definition of kāvya viz. 'śabdārthau sahitaṃ kāvyaṃ' from Bhāmaha. He has practically accepted everything mentioned in Daṇḍin's Kāvyaadarśa, while with reference to the concepts of guṇa i.e. poetic excellence, and alaṃkāra as poetic figures, and their inter-relation, he has accepted Vāmana's views. It seems Bhoja is also inspired by Vāmana in mentioning the two attributes viz. 'doṣa-hāna' and 'guṇó-pādāna', with reference to 'kāvya'. On the other hand by recognizing all poetic figures as forms of 'vakrokti' or poet's special turn of expression, Bhoja seems to be indebted to Bhāmaha. He has called 'rasa' and 'guṇas' as 'alaṃkāra' in the wider sense, in keeping with Daṇḍin's observation. (Sr. Pra. Vol. II, Ch. XI, pp. 448).

Following Vāmana, he seems to attach a comparatively greater importance to the thought-current of 'guṇa' than with reference to 'alaṃkāra'. 'Rasa-aviyoga' or absence of disconnection from rasa is the most important attribute of kāvya for Bhoja, and thus he observes in his 'Sarasvatī - kaṇṭhā'bharaṇa (V. 8) that :

“vakroktiś ca rasoktis' ca
svabhāvoktis' ca vāṇmayam |
sarvāsu grāhiṇīm tāsū
rasoktiṃ pratijānate ||”

- Vakrokti or beautiful expression, rasokti or expression charged with aesthetic delight, and svabhāvokti or natural description, (all these three) make for literature. In all these expressions 'rasokti' is said to be (principal) factor (that goes to make for kāvya).

Thus, Bhoja has attached supreme importance to 'rasa' i.e. aesthetic delight in poetry, all the time also welcoming the thought currents of 'doṣa', 'guṇa' and 'alaṃkāra' as floated by his predecessors. He has also accepted the concept of 'dhvani' from Ānandavardhana in his own style. It may be noted however, that with Dr. Rewaprasad Dwivedi we can also raise some objection against Bhoja's use of the term "rasokti", for in fact 'rasa' or aesthetic delight is anything but an 'ukti' or expression. Though of course in Bhoja's favour it can be stated that here by 'rasokti' can be understood a poetic expression, charged with 'rasa' or aesthetic delight. It is not rasasya-uktiḥ but it is 'rasa-mayī uktiḥ'. But we will go to observe later especially appreciating Dr. Rewaprasad's views as mentioned in his "Kāvyaālaṃkāraśāstra", a modern work on Sanskrit poetics, that he has some quarrel even against this explanation. This will be discussed later in greater details in a special appendix (in Vol. II).

Agnīpurāṇa : in the seventh verse of its 337th chapter, the Agnīpurāṇa attempts the definition of poetry which is qualified by clear alamkāras, guṇas and is bereft of doṣas :

“kāvyam sphurad alamkāram
guṇavad doṣa-varjitam.”

It should be noted that we have no faith in placing Agnīpurāṇa as an ancient document prior to Daṇḍin and we honestly believe that Agnīpurāṇa carries clear influence of Daṇḍin, and other earlier ālamkārikas. Actually the author seems to be a devout follower of Daṇḍin and hardly deserves the status of an independent thinker on literary aesthetics.

Mahima Bhaṭṭa : Among the near posterior writers of Ānandavardhana, the names of Kuntaka and Mahimā figure at the top. Of course, Abhinavagupta also kept the tradition of dhvani running high, but perhaps he was a junior contemporary of Kuntaka, and we accept this observation of Dr. K. Krishna-moorthy, but Abhinavagupta was a protegonist of vyañjanā-dhvani-rasa thought-current and Kuntaka had slightly different ideas while Mahimā, not unlike Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, challenged the very concept of vyañjanā-dhvani, though of course accepting the pratiyamāna artha or implicit sense and explaining it in his own way and accepting also the suprenacy of the concept of rasa, but not through the agency of vyañjanā.

Mahimā has stoutly opposed the concept of vyañjanā as a word-power and has tried to give a totally new direction to the definition and scope of kāvyā or poetry. Ānandavardhana, as we know, accepted the thought-currents promulgated by his earlier masters and tried to charge them with a new orientation of vyañjanā and thus added a new dimension to literary criticism and aesthetics in general, a new direction, so to say. We will go to see later how this vyañjanā-prasthāna was challenged and opposed vehemently by critics such as Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka in his now not available work called “Hṛdaya-darpaṇa”, drafted specially for demolition of dhvani-theory i.e. ‘dhvani-dhvaṃsa’. This challenge and opposition to vyañjanā is pursued with a greater gusto by Mahimā, the protegonist of kāvyānumiti i.e. poetic inference. His sole object is to defy and demolish the concept of vyañjanā which he has done in his work named “Vyakti-viveka” or discriminating thinking concerning vyañjanā. Instead, he favours ‘anumiti’ or ‘inference’ which he calls ‘kāvyānumiti’ or poetic inference. He establishes a new mile-stone on the high-way of literary aesthetics but he was not lucky enough to get staunch and strong supporters as Abhinavagupta in case of Ānandavardhana, and so his lonely voice was, say, muffled up in the chorus of vyañjanā-dhvani-rasa theory. His shout in favour of poetic inference died down

with him and he was subjected to fierce, though undue as we will observe later, criticism advanced by Vāgdevatāvatāra Mammaṭa, and Viśvanātha and the rest. We know that Daṇḍin did not prefer the idea of putting poetry to logical test and called this approach 'karkaśa' i.e. rough or, insensitive, and therefore unwelcome in the domain of literary aesthetics, while Mahimā — seeking inspiration from Bhāmaha, who, out of his disgust and scorn for a number of Dūta-kāvya following the pattern of Kālidāsa's Meghadūta, and himself being an intellectual of rare qualities, had considered a number of poetic blemishes from the point of view of logic, and supported the notion of kāvya-nyāya or poetic inference, — also establishes 'kāvyānumiti' i.e. poetic inference at the centre of literary aesthetics and makes a valiant effort to get it stamped as the be all and end-all of poetry. We can observe that we are perhaps not off the mark, if we do not consider Mahimā as the first protagonist of poetic or aesthetic inference or kāvyānumiti, as there were supporters of kāvyānumiti or poetic-inference even prior to him, of course, the un-named aesthetes whose ideas were promulgated by the likes of Śrī. Śaṅkuka and also those who figure as holders of prima-facie view - the naiyāyikas - who oppose vyañjanā and whose views are considered thoughtfully and denounced by Ānandavardhana under Dhv. III. 33, in the āloka.

The obvious purpose of the auother of Vyaktiviveka is to demolish the principle of vyañjanā i.e. poetic suggestion. He has never discarded the fact of implicit sense - or the 'pratīyamāna artha' in poetry, nor has he challanged the element of 'rasa' i.e. aesthetic pleasure. On the contrary, he feels that these two are arrived at by poetic inference - kāvyānumiti - which is different from 'tarkānumiti' i.e. logic of the śāstras. He accepts only the power of direct expression i.e. abhidhā in case of a word, and holds that whatever goes under the name of indicated sense or 'lakṣyārtha', and suggested sense or 'vyaṅgyārtha' are arrived at by the process of poetic inference or 'kāvyānumiti'. It is precisely for this reason that he has severely criticised Ānandavardhana's definition of 'dhvanikāvya' (Dhv. I. 13) and has pointed out exactly ten blemishes in this definition. We will consider all this in full details. But before we appreciate his presentation, we will look in for the definition of poetry as attempted by him at Vyakti-viveka (= V.V.) (Edn. Rewaprasad, chow-skt. Sr. Varanasi, "64) I. 25.

He observes :

“vācyas tad anumito vā
yatrārtho'rthāntaram prakāśayati |
saṁbandhataḥ kutaścit
sā kāvyānumitir ity uktā ||”

“That is designated as *kāvyaānumiti* i.e. poetic inference, wherein either the directly expressed sense or a sense inferred therefrom, flashes forth another meaning, based on any relation.”

OR

“That is called ‘*kāvyaānumiti*’ wherein the literal meaning or the inferred meaning gives rise to another meaning due to some kind of relation between them.” (Trans. C. Rajendran, pp. 66, 67 “A study of Mahima Bhatta's *Vyaktiviveka*” - Edn. '91, Calicut).

Thus, Mahimā stands in support of the concept of poetry being both word and sense together. For Ānandavardhana the principal suggested sense is the soul of poetry and is termed ‘*dhvani*’. With this in mind Ānandavardhana has attempted the definition of poetry gifted with principal suggested sense, i.e. what he calls ‘*dhvani-kāvya*’, as follows :

“*yatrārthaḥ śabdaḥ vā
taṁ arthaṁ upasarjanīkṛta-svārthau |
vyañktaḥ, kāvya-viśeṣaḥ sa
dhvanir iti sūribhiḥ kathitaḥ ||*” (Dhv. I. 13)

“That kind of poetry, wherein the (conventional) meaning renders itself secondary, or the (conventional) word renders its meaning secondary and suggests the (intended) (or) implied meaning, is designated by the learned as *Dhvani* or “suggestive poetry”. (Trans. K. Kris. pp. *ibid*), (Edn. '74, Dharwad)

Ānandavardhana takes *dhvanikāvya* as a special variety of poetry. He attempted to give a definition only of this variety perhaps because he wanted to convey to the younger poets that now that the definition and scope of what he terms as *dhvanikāvya* have been laid down clearly, following the principle of *vyañjanā-dhvani-rasa*, they i.e. the younger poets had to strive for that only, or, as he later concedes, for the next variety of poetry called the ‘*guṇibhūta-vyaṅgya-kāvya*’ or poetry with subordinated suggested sense. He only theoretically talks of a third variety of poetry called the ‘*citra*’ *kāvya*, wherein only the directly expressed sense is a source of some beauty. He does not recommend it but gives a concession that those who are in a stage of primarily trying out their hand at drafting poetry may have a go at it. We will discuss these varieties when we deal with the topic of classification of poetry. For the present, suffice it to say, that by keeping *vyañjanā* or the suggestive word-power in the centre, Ānandavardhana

talked of varieties of poetry with vyañjanā either dominating or remaining subordinate to the other powers of word, and thus he added new dimension to literary criticism. But, with all this, this theory of vyañjanā was not received with equal acceptance by literary aesthetes, and we have seen how Kuntaka, though not opposing vyañjanā openly, placed his own views of vakrokti with great confidence and fanfare. On the other hand Mahimā openly revolted against this concept of vyañjanā and applied all his energy in demolishing the same, though without expected success or support. He raised his voice to the highest pitch, aiming at Ānandavardhana's definition of 'dhvani-kāvya'. He expanded the horizon of literary criticism by inculcating śāstriya or scientific colouring in this field, which can match with the highest traditions of the nyāyadarśana. He tried to find ten faults with Ānandavardhana's definition of dhvanikāvya though of course, all the blemishes pointed out by him, do not carry equal merit. But the fact remains that in the ānanda-yātra or journey to bliss-of Ānandavardhana, Mahimā plays the role of a Jayad-ratha and tries to stall its forward march. As observed earlier, misfortune intervened and he did not get lieutenants to carry on his anti-vyañjanā crusade in his absence. It is no small achievement on his part that such stalwarts as the great Mammāṭa and Viśvanatha had taken special pains to refute the anumiti-vāda, though of course to be candid to Mahimā, we will have to accept the fact that what these stalwarts refuted was not the intended kāvyā'numiti or poetic inference of Mahimā but anumiti in general or say, tarkā'numiti, superimposed on Mahimā's kāvyā'numiti. It may also be observed that on occasions - the difference between Ānandavardhana and Mahimā looks as thin as that deciphered between Ānandavardhana and Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, in the estimation of Abhinavagupta.

Mahimā finds ten faults (vv. I) in the definition of dhvanikāvya as advanced by Ānandavardhana. They are : 'arthasya viśiṣṭatvam', 'śabdaḥ saviśeṣaṇaḥ, vyakti, dhvaniḥ, 'vā'śabdaḥ, the dual in 'vyañktaḥ', tadaḥ pumstva, the use of the specific term viz. kāvyā-viśeṣaḥ, and the plural in 'sūribhiḥ' i.e. vacanaṃ ca kathana-kartuḥ. We will examine all this in details as below :

(1) Ānandavardhana has added the attribute 'upasarjanīkṛta-sva' to the expressed meaning. Mahimā feels that this is redundant because whenever there is apprehension of the implicit sense, the expressed sense is necessarily subordinate to it. Thus Mahimā does not accept the concept of 'guṇībhūta-vyaṅgya' or subordinated suggested sense, because for him no suggested sense worth its name can ever be subordinate to the expressed sense.

This is an interesting situation. In our appreciation of Kuntaka's position, we had observed that eventhough without rebelling against the concept of vyañjanā and the supremacy of only dhvani, Kuntaka had exerted to press the point that even an expression pure and simple, provided it is 'vicitra' i.e. artistic, stands on the same pedestal as is a principally conveyed suggested sense. Thus Kuntaka's vicitrā abhidhā' was inclusive of vyañjanā, both when the latter is either principal or subordinate. But Mahimā, in his zeal to squash vyañjanā and dhvani, actually goes a step further than Ānandavardhana, who was liberal enough to accept the possibility of an implicit sense arrived at through vyañjanā, to be less charming than the expressed sense arrived at through pure poetic expression i.e. abhidhā. What Mahimā says is that abhidhā and abhidhā'rtha or expressed sense can never be more charming than vyañgyārtha which he terms as 'anumeyārtha' arrived at by the channel of kāvyā'numiti or poetic inference. While Kuntaka was liberal enough to put the same theoretically on equal footing, while Ānandavardhana accepted the superiority of either, here is Mahimā, the greater champion of the implicit sense, who refuses to recognize the case of an expressed sense as superior to the implicit under special context. Thus we may say that Mahimā's approach seems to be narrower and more rigid as compared to the liberal stance of both Ānandavardhana and Kuntaka and actually by taking such an extreme position, Mahimā becomes a greater champion of vyañjanā, which he calls by the name "kāvyā'numiti", there being no virtual distinction between these two positions as will be explained later by Viśvanātha, the author of Sāhityadarpaṇa. Thus in his effort to undo vyañjanā, Mahimā re-establishes the same with a greater gusto, of course, in a different garb.

The second objection Mahimā raises is with reference to śabda - i.e. word. A word cannot be instrumental in giving meaning other than only primary. "śabdaḥ punaḥ anupādeya eva. tasya svārthā'bhidhānam antareṇa vyāpārāntara-anupapatteḥ, upapādayiśyamānatvāt. (vṛtti on V.V. I. 6, pp. 16, Edn. Rewaprasad, Varanasi, 64). It can make its meaning subordinate only when it is a quote, i.e. quoted for conveying some-one-else's view : na ca tasya anukaraṇa-vyatirekeṇa upasarjanikṛtārthatvaṃ sambhavati - (pp. 16, ibid) (vṛtti on vv. I. 6). We may observe that there is a lot of truth in Mahimā's position, when he convinces us that a means is always subordinate to an end and the word which is used as a means only to convey a given meaning is necessarily subordinate to it : yo hi yadartham upādīyate, na asau tam eva upasarjanī karoti iti vaktum yuktam. (pp. 17, ibid).

Naturally the pot is subordinate to the water it contains. Thus there is the blemish called 'asaṃbhava' - impossibility, with reference to Ānandavardhana's definition.

Mahimā has pointed out, as observed earlier, ten faults in the definition of dhvanikāra, which he summarizes in kārīkās I. 23, 24 (v.v.) (pp. 110, *ibid*) as under :

arthasya viśiṣṭatvaṃ, śabdaḥ sa-viśeṣaṇaḥ, tadaḥ puṃstvam |
dvivacana-vā-śabdau ca, vyaktir dhvanirnāma, kāvya-vaiśiṣṭyam || (I. 23)

“vacanañca kathana-kartuḥ kathitā dhvani-lakṣmaṇi daśa doṣāḥ ||
ye tu-anye tadbheda-prabheda lakṣaṇāḥ na te gaṇitāḥ ||” (I. 24)

Accordingly we examined the second and third blemishes as above. We saw that logically he drives at a point that a means is necessarily subordinate to its end and hence a word, the only use of which is to give its primary meaning alone, has to be subordinate. The attribute 'upasarjanikṛtasva' has thus no chance. But when we look at Ānandavardhana's treatment of the variety of dhvani called śabda-śakti-mūla-dhvani, we have to accept the speciality of a given word which superimposes a sort of principality upon it, though secondarily. The universal experience to this effort of all men of taste can not be wished away and it has to be remembered that whatever way the literary criticism is advanced, it has its concern with poetry which is an absolutely abstract art and therefore, no rules as hard and fast as rules seen to operate in case of natural sciences, can be expected in case of poetry. A critic has to be liberal and has to take a view in wider context, or else he will do injustice both to poetry and to men of taste in general. So, howsoever logical the stand Mahimā has taken may be, it cannot be defended rigidly and he himself is on his knees when he accepts that his own 'kāvyā'numiti' has to be spared the scrutiny of a 'tarkā'numiti'.

“tadaḥ puṃstvam” in 'taṃ arthaṃ', i.e. the reference to the suggested sense in the masculine gender is not in harmony with the neuter gender applied to the same in dhvanikāra's earlier kārīkā, when at Dhv. I. 6, the words are :

“sarasvatī svādu tad-artha-vastu...” etc., Mahimā observes : (p. 97, *ibid*) :

“kiṃ ca 'taṃ' iti tadaḥ puṃstvena nirdeśaḥ anupapannaḥ.” Here 'taṃ' has reference to something which is taken up here through context. Mahimā says that the context in Dhv. I. 4 has, “praṭīyamānaṃ punaḥ anyad eva” suggesting neuter gender. Same is the case with the expression, “sarasvatī svādu tad artha-vastu...” (Dhv. I. 6). Mahimā suggests that to support masculine gender in Dhv. I. 13, we will have to reconstruct the text as “praṭīyamānaḥ punaḥ anya eva...” and “sarasvatī svādutamam taṃ arthaṃ” etc. which involves greater effort.

Earlier also, Mahimā had pointed out that there was 'punarukta doṣa' also in the definition because when a word and/or sense is instrumental in giving some other sense, they are automatically subordinate and so the mention of their subordination gives rise to the blemish called 'punar-ukta' or repetition. He also tries to find 'avyāpti doṣa' or 'inadequate extent'. In his opinion there is suggestion of similarity (i.e. upamāna-upameya-bhāva) in figures such as 'dīpaka' (or, Illuminator).

The alaṃkāras such as these are not covered up in the definition (Dhv. I. 13) because the alaṃkāras are taken as identical with 'abhidhā', the power of expression of a word, and not as 'word' or 'meaning' itself. So, as the subordination of 'word' and 'sense' is clearly mentioned in the definition (i.e. in Dhv. I. 13), the same should have been clearly mentioned with reference to 'abhidhā' also. And if it is felt that the clear mention of 'abhidhā' is redundant, then the same of 'śabda' also should be taken as equally useless. Says he :

“kim ca, yathā abhidheyo'rthaḥ tad-viśeṣaṇaṃ ca upāttam, tad-vad abhidhā api upapādanaṃ arhati eva. anyathā yatra, dīpakā”deḥ alaṃkārat alaṃkāraṅtarasya upamā”deḥ pratītiḥ tatra dhvanitvam iṣṭam na syāt; tat-lakṣaṇena avyāpteḥ alaṃkāraṇāṃ ca abhidhātvaṃ upagataṃ, teṣāṃ bhaṅgī-bhaṇitibheda-rupatvāt.” (pp. 22, ibid).

Dr. Rewaprasadjee has tried to refute Mahimā's point (pp. 24, 25, ibid). He observes that when Mahimā uses the term, 'teṣāṃ bhaṅgī-rūpatvāt', he seems to echo Kuntaka's expression in the VJ., who he quotes elsewhere directly. Kuntaka at VJ. I. 10 has stated :

“ubhau etau alaṃkāryau
tayoh punaḥ alaṃkr̥tiḥ,
vakroktiḥ eva, vaidagdhya-bhaṅgī-bhaṇitiḥ ucyate.”

“Both these are 'adorned'. Their adornment consists in the poetic process known as 'artistic turn of speech.’” (Trans. K. Kris., pp. 306, ibid).

Kuntaka further observes : (vṛtti on I. 10, pp. 20, ibid) : “tad idaṃ tātpayam - yat śabdārthau pṛthag avasthitau na kenā'pi vyatiriktena alaṃkaraṇena yojyete, kimtu, vakratā-vaicitrya-yogitayā abhidhāna-mātraṃ eva anayoḥ alaṃkāraḥ, tasyaiva śobhā'tisāya-kāritvāt.” - “Let us sum it up once again : apparently, words and meanings both have their distinct existence in poetry and come to be adorned by something different from themselves. The fact of the matter is that the very process of poetic utterance is constituted by the artistic turns assumed by words and meanings. The poetic process itself, in this sense, is the real ornamentation. For it is extremely delighting in itself.” (Trans. K. Kris. pp. 307, ibid). So, the idea is that

both word and sense are 'to be adorned'. The adornment is vakrokti or artistic expression, which consists of 'vaidagdhya-bhaṅgī-bhaṇiti' wherein Mahimā takes 'bhaṅgī' as 'vicchitti' i.e. beauty, and "tayā uktiḥ, vicitrā eva abhidhā, vakroktiḥ." So, "vakratā-vaicitrya-yogitayā abhidhānam eva etayoḥ alaṃkāraḥ" is taken by Mahimā as 'abhidhā' the famous word-power of expression. Actually 'artistic expression' of Kuntaka is not pure abhidhāśakti only, as understood by Mahimā.

Mahimā holds that in such cases as dīpaka alaṃkāra, the real beauty lies in 'upamā' or simile. So, this dīpaka alaṃkāra itself should be taken as dhvani or, the attribute 'upasarjanīkr̥tā'tmatva' should have touched such cases as of dīpaka etc. also. Now, because the alaṃkāras such as dīpaka and the rest are of the form of abhidhā i.e. pure expression only, Ānandavardhana should have also mentioned the word 'abhidhā' in the definition of dhvani in Dhv. I. 13. As the dhvanikāra has failed to mention the same, there is 'avyāpti doṣa' in the definition, as noted above.

Now the point is that Mahimā takes alaṃkāras as identical with 'abhidhā' or the power of expression of a word. But this approach cannot be accepted. In fact, alaṃkāras are such qualities of the apprehension of poetic word and sense, that deliver charm, and that are different from both rasa or sentiment and other suggested meanings. Abhidhā is only the intellectual relationship of the apprehension of word and meaning. This apprehension of word sense rests in mind i.e. antaḥkaraṇa, or soul i.e. ātman. These two apprehensions, i.e. one each of word and sense, are basically unrelated. The speaker uses one's apprehension of meaning, and to reach the mind of his hearer, he connects it with the apprehension of word. This connection of both apprehensions is termed as abhidhā, or vācakatva, or śakti. This can not be called 'alaṃkāra' i.e. a figure, as it is bereft of basic charm. The charm i.e. 'vicitratā' is perceived only in the correlation of word - meanings and this perception is of the form of knowledge. When we say 'mukhaṃ candraḥ', there is no charm in the expression of 'mukha' i.e. face, which reveals only the word-sense of 'face', i.e. 'mukha'. The charm consists in the word-sense of 'mukha' being taken as identical with word-sense of 'candra' i.e. moon. This is not 'abhidhā' or the power of expression of a word. But it is 'relation of word-senses'. Thus figures or alaṃkāras cannot be taken as identical with 'abhidhā' as has been wrongly understood by Mahimā.

Dr. Rewaprasad objects to even Ānandavardhana's observation that in dīpaka, upamā alaṃkāra is not principal because dīpaka is designated as 'dīpaka' and not 'upamā'. Actually Dr. Rewaprasad holds that even in dīpaka, there is no 'upamā alaṃkāra', but there is apprehension of only 'upamāna-upameya-bhāva' i.e. idea of upamāna and upameya. It is precisely to underline this distinction that Abhinavagupta has explained the word 'upamāyāḥ' used by the dhvanikāra as

equivalent to 'upamānopameyabhāva' i.e. the idea of similitude and not 'upamā-alamkāra' or 'expression of similitude'. The notion of being an alamkāra i.e. alamkāra-katva does not seem to reside in it and hence it is not an alamkāra, observes Rewaprasadjee. Actually, we feel that when Rewaprasadjee quotes Abhinavagupta as suggesting that by dhvanikāra's expression viz. 'upamāyāḥ' is meant only 'upamānopameya-bhāvasya', and not 'upamā-alamkārasya', then why not accept Ānandavardhana also to mean exactly that ?

Any way, one thing clearly emerges that Mahimā's observation that 'abhidhā' should also have been mentioned clearly in the definition of dhvani, stands refuted.

Mahimā further observes that the use of the indeclinable viz. 'vā' is yet another blemish. He observes, (pp. 94-95, *ibid*) : "kim ca atra 'vā'śabdo vikalpārtho vā syāt samuccayārtho vā. na tāvat vikalpārthaḥ, pakṣā'nra-asambhavasya vyutpāditatvāt. sambhave vā asya dvi-vaṇa-anupapattiḥ, tayoḥ samuccayā'bhāvāt. yathā.... "śiraḥ śvā kāko vā drupada-tanayo vā parimṛśet" iti atra bahuvacanasya samuccayārthatve yatra śabdārthayor ekaikasya vyañjakatvaṃ tatra dhvanitvaṃ iṣṭaṃ na syāt." (pp. 94, *ibid*).

The indeclinable 'vā' can mean either option (i.e. vikalpa) or conjunction (i.e. samuccaya). But with reference to this context on hand, it cannot mean 'option' because word cannot be considered as an alternate suggestive element along with meaning, because word, as maintained by Mahimā, is capable of rendering only the primary sense and hence it has no power to convey the suggested sense at all. If we accept the other alternative, i.e. if we hold that here 'vā' is used in sense of conjunction, the definition of Ānandavardhana would cover only those instances where both word and meaning together become suggestive. In that case the instances of dhvani where either word alone or sense alone conveys the suggested sense will fall out of the scope of dhvani. Again the attribute, viz. "upasarjanīkṛtasvārthau" will also become useless, because in all poetry both word and meaning, taken together only, become suggestive. Thus, in this situation, the description of only the expressed sense as qualified by the attribute 'upasarjanī kṛta' will cover all instances of dhvani.

Even this argument of Mahimā taken as a whole falls flat. He rejects the first alternative on the basis of his own assumption that a word has no power except that to convey the primary sense, and rejects the second alternative, resorting to Ānandavardhana's stand that both word and sense can individually also convey the suggested sense. To accept a personal position to reject the first alternative and to accept the opponent's position also to reject the second alternative, does not sound logical, but the approach smacks of only personal convenience and a tendency to find fault somehow or other with the opponent. This is just prejudice, pure and

simple. And we also know that when Ānandavardhana talks of the suggestivity of either word or sense alone, he knows that both are necessarily jointly suggestive in poetry and yet to underline the relative greater importance of a given factor, i.e. either word or sense, he gives these options. And in this he is not only more charitable, but more realistic also.

Next, Mahimā observes, and this follows his earlier observation, that the dual form in 'vyañktaḥ' also is a blemish in case the indeclinable 'vā' means option between word and meaning. Grammatically if 'Vā' governs option, then the verb should be in singular only as in the illustration viz. "śiraḥ śvā kāko vā drupadatanayo vā parimrṣet" - "Either a dog or a crow or the son of Drupada touches the head (of my father)..." (Veṇisaṃhāra, III. 22). Here, Mahimā examines the defence of the use of dual in 'vyañktaḥ', in Locana by the great Abhinavagupta, against Bhaṭṭa Nayākā's lethal attack in his Hṛdaya-darpaṇa. As observed earlier, we have explained Ānandavardhana's use of dual as suggested by Abhinavagupta that though in fact the two viz. sound and sense jointly act in poetry, the relative greater importance of either is stressed in 'vā' and their joint natural operation is aimed at in this use of dual. But Mahimā, charged as he is by the enthusiasm to demolish the definition, rejects this explanation suggesting that the cognitions of sound and sense do not take place simultaneously and hence the question of their joint operation does not arise at all and also that the sound - śabda-does not have the power to give any suggested sense beyond only its primary sense : "atra kecin vidvan-māninaḥ dvivacana-samarthanā-manorathā"ḥkṣipta-cittatayā tad bhrānti-mātra-mūlaṃ, na tattvaṃ iti alaṃ avastu-nirbandhena." (pp. 95, 96, *ibid*).

As observed earlier Mahimā depicts a biased approach and also perhaps a smaller mind.

Next, Mahimā attacks the very acceptance of 'vyañjanā' or 'vyakti' in conveying the implicit sense, beyond the literal sense in poetry. Mahimā refers to a definition of 'abhivyakti' or suggestion which suggests that it means, "attainment of the state of being illumined, on the part of an object, real or unreal, simultaneously with the illuminating object, without the requirement of the memory of their mutual connection" :

rad uktam -

"sva-jñānena anya-dhī-hetuḥ
siddhe arthe vyañjako mataḥ,
yathā dīpo'nyathābhāve
ko viśeṣo'sya kārakāt." (pp. 80, *ibid*)

If an object illuminates something else, while illuminating itself, then only it is said to be a suggestor, otherwise what is its difference from a normal cause-effect relationship ?

Mahimā explains that abhivyakti of real objects is three-fold : tatra sataḥ abhivyaktiḥ trividhā; tasya traividhyāt.” (pp. 80, ibid). It is thus, either when, “(i) the manifestation of the effect takes place from the material cause in which it pre-exists potentially, e.g. the manifestation of curd from milk, or (ii) there is manifestation of an object with help of a manifestor, as in case of a lamp illuminating an object pre-existing in impediments like darkness, but remaining invisible to sight; or (iii) in case of the revival of the impression of an object experienced before, through yet another object invariably connected with it; or through the word that denotes it; e.g. the cognition of fire when we see smoke, and the cognition of cow from its picture, or reflection or representation of the object say a cow, from the word denoting a cow. The manifestation of an unreal object is one of the type of say a rainbow, illumined by the rays of the sun : asataḥ tu eka-prakārā eva, tasya prakārāntara-asambhavāt, yathā arkā”lokādinā indra-cāpā”deḥ.” (pp. 80, ibid)

Mahimā says that given this three-fold explanation of abhivyakti, the definition of dhvanikāra is faulty for the manifestation of suggested sense cannot be equated with any of these three alternatives.

The apprehension of the suggested sense cannot be included in the first two varieties of manifestation of real objects for it is neither an object of senses like curd, nor does it co-exist in the fashion of a lamp and a pot : “na caital lakṣaṇam vācye saṃgacchate. tathā hi - satōbhivyakteḥ yadā”dyayor arthayor lakṣaṇam na pratīyamāneṣu ekaṃ apī saṃspraṣṭuṃ kṣamate, tasya dadhyāder iva indriya-viṣaya-bhāvā”patti-prasaṅgāt, ghaṭādeḥ iva vāc्यārtha-saha-bhāvena idaṃtā-pratīteḥ asaṃbhavāt. na ca svarūpa-asamsparsī lakṣaṇam bhavati (pp. 81, ibid).

The third type of manifestation is nothing else but reasoning or anumāna. The cognition of something with the help of another, preceded by the memory of their invariable concomitance should be taken as anumāna only and not ‘abhivayakti’ i.e. manifestation : tritīyasya astu yallakṣaṇam tad anumānasya eva saṃgacchate, na vyakteḥ” (pp. 81, ibid). For in ‘abhivyakti’ i.e. manifestation the manifestor is not in need of the recollection of the invariable concomitance with the manifested object. Here, the expressed sense does stand in need of the remembrance of its invariable relation with the suggested sense, otherwise any suggested sense would follow from any expressed sense, which is not the case : “na ca vāc्यād arthāt arthāntara-pratītiḥ avinābhāva-saṃbandha-smaraṇam antareṇa eva saṃbhavati; sarvasya apī tatpratīti-prasaṅgāt.” (pp. 83, ibid).

In abhivyakti or manifestation, both the 'vyañjaka' (i.e. manifestor) and the 'vyaṅgya' (i.e. manifested) shine simultaneously. But in poetry the suggested meaning is cognised only after the collection of the expressed sense as both are related to each other in form of cause and effect respectively. In case, simultaneity is accepted in case of rasa-dhvani, the definition will still fall short of covering the cases of vastu-dhvani and alamkāra-dhvani where sequence between the two senses is glaringly grasped. Even in rasa-dhvani, it is accepted that perception of rasa follows the same of vibhāvā"dis such as determinants etc. and hence sequence, though not noticeable has to be accepted : na ca rasā"diṣu api vibhāvā"di-prakāśana-sahabhāvena prakāśanam upapadyate. (pp. 83, ibid).

The manifestor can be an attribute (upādhi) or an independent object. Knowledge, word and lamp are manifestors of the first type since these reveal the objects suggested by them mixing themselves with the latter in the manifestation. Thus, the knowledge and the object known, the word and its meaning and the lamp and the object illumined by it all present themselves simultaneously. The revealer becomes the 'upādhi' or attribute of the revealed object in this process. The independent agent is exemplified in case of smoke giving the knowledge of fire. Poetry cannot be the first type of manifestor because only an object perceivable or nameable can fall in this case. The second, like smoke, cannot be a manifestor as in smoke-fire-perception there is no simultaneity, which is expected in manifestor-manifested-relationship. The next variety of manifestor is only the probans (i.e. līṅga) giving rise to probandum (i.e. līṅgin). Because of sequence, manifested sense and poetry cannot be vyaṅgya-vyañjaka, but only gamya-gamaka : "dvidvidho hi prakāśakórthaḥ upādhirūpaḥ svatantraś ca. tatra jñāna-śabda-pradīpā"diḥ upādhirūpaḥ. tad uktam - 'trayaḥ prakāśakāḥ sva-para-prakāśā' iti, anyāḥ svatanthro dhūmā"diḥ. tatrā"dyas tāvad bhavadhbhir na abhyupagantavyaḥ eva pratyakṣa-abhidheyayoḥ eva arthayoḥ kāvyatā'patti-prasaṅgāt. anyasya tu līṅgarvam eva upapadyate, na vyañjakatvam - vyakteḥ anupapatteḥ." (pp. 84, ibid)

Mahimā thus concludes that the so called 'abhivyakti' of the dhvanivādin is just inference and nothing else. Thus Mahimā says that the statement that both word and meaning manifest (vyañktaḥ) the suggested sense, is false and therefore it makes for the blemish called "asambhava doṣa" : "tasmāt tad avasthaḥ eva sambhavo lakṣaṇa-doṣaḥ" (pp. 86, ibid).

We have taken care above to suggest that even the explanation of Mahimā in individual instances of poetry abound in logical felacies - tarka-doṣas - as pointed out by Mammāṭa and others later, and hence Mahimā, apprehensive of this possibility is careful to add that his "poetic inference" i.e. 'kāvyānumiti' is not

absolutely identical with tarkā'numiti or strictly logical inference. In the same way the 'abhivyakti' of the dhvanivādins is not absolutely identical with 'dārśanikī abhivyakti' i.e. manifestation as explained in philosophical context. If kāvyā'numiti is not tarkā'numiti then vyaṅgya-abhivyakti in poetry is not abhivyakti of the philosophical systems. Thus both kāvyānumiti and abhivyakti are loose terms to be understood only in the sense intended by their promoters only. In a way thus, because of the inherent looseness, they can be said to be identical, for both cannot stand the logical objections raised against them.

The next blemish, Mahimā says is with reference to the term 'dhvani' itself. According to Ānandavardhana, the term 'dhvani' as applied to poetry and poetic criticism, was coined after the grammarians, the first among the most learned. For them, 'śabda' i.e. 'sound', is 'dhvani', and it manifests 'sphoṭa' the 'eternal word' which is ever associated with meaning. Thus for them word manifests sphoṭa. Taking a clue from the great grammarians the critics applied the term 'dhvani' to any suggester that suggested the 'vyaṅgyārtha'. Abhinavagupta explains in his 'Locana' how the term 'dhvani' is made applicable to 'word', 'sense', 'the power of suggestion', 'the suggested sense', and finally to the variety of poetry itself which carries principal suggested sense.

Mahimā pooh poohs at this, challenging first, like the Mīmāṃsakas the very concept of sphoṭa, which is only a myth. He maintains that neither sphoṭa nor dhvani of Ānandavardhana can be taken as manifested. The relation between word i.e. sound and sphoṭa is that of cause and effect only since there is a perceptible sequence between the apprehension of the order of letters, which the word is made of, and the cognition of meaning. So, no relationship of 'the suggestor and suggested' or vyaṅgya-vyañjaka-bhāva can be accepted between the two cognitions. Their actual relationship can be the 'gamyā-gamaka-bhāva' only, or the relation of the conveyor and the conveyed. Thus the appellation 'Dhvani' seems to be absolutely defective as it is based on false analogy : - "...ataḥ eva śrūyamāṇānām śabdānām dhvani-vyapadeśyānām antaḥsanniveśinaś ca sphoṭā'bhimatasya arthasya vyaṅgya-vyañjaka-bhāvo na sambhavati iti vyañjakatva-sāmyād yaḥ śabdārthā"tmani kāvyē dhvani-vyapadeśaḥ sōpy anupapannaḥ, tatrā'pi kārya-kāraṇa-mūlasya gamyā-gamaka-bhāvasya upagamāt."

We may note a point here that during the viva voce of our doctoral thesis on, "The origin and Development of the theory of Rasa and Dhvani in Sanskrit Poetics", Prof. K. V. Abhyankar had also observed that 'manifestation' (i.e. abhivyakti of sphoṭa) is not 'suggestion' (i.e. vyañjanā of the Ālankārikas.). And we know it. To bring home this point in a separate paper on, "Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka's Blunder", we had

suggested that Bhatta Nāvaka criticises 'abhivyakti' of Ānandavardhana because he fails to collect a point that 'abhivyakti' in strict sense of the darśanas, is not vyañjanā. Abhivyakti presupposes pre-existence of a thing, say ghaṭa or a pot covered in darkness, but of course existing in advance and later manifested by light. But 'rasa' is not 'pūrva-siddha' in this sense. It is 'pari-passu' with the presentation of vibhāvā"dis. So, the abhivyakti or vyañjanā of the ālaṃkārikas is different from the abhivyakti we are acquainted with in śāstras. But for want of any other suitable term, the ālaṃkārikas have called it 'abhivyakti', like the 'kāvyānumiti of Mahimā, which is not 'anumiti' in the strict śāstra sense. So, it is futile to attack either by either. Mahimā also takes abhivyakti, or dhvani, or vyañjanā as absolutely identical with the abhivyakti or manifestation of the śāstra context. This is wrong. Actually 'dhvani' or 'vyañjanā' of the dhvani-vādins is an 'apūrva', an 'alaukika' i.e. it is "sui generis". not found anywhere else; neither in the world of day to day existence, nor in śāstra. So, Mahimā's criticism of dhvani is ill-founded like that of Bhatta Nāvaka.

Next, according to Mahimā, the designation of Dhvani as 'kāvyā-viśeṣa' - in the dhvani-kārikā makes for yet another blemish. Mahimā holds that 'viśeṣa' means either 'superiority' or particularity : 'api ca kāvyā-viśeṣa ity atra kāvyasya viśiṣṭatvaṃ anupapannaṃ..." (pp. 98, ibid). Mahimā holds that 'Dhvani' can be either 'superior poetry' or 'a particular type of poetry' as per its definition. But we fail to apply both the meanings in the present context. Poetry proper is invariably characterised by Rasa which transcends all distinguishing classifications and hence one type of poetry cannot be regarded as superior to another in this respect. Thus 'Dhvani' cannot mean superior variety of poetry.

We may say here that Mahimā's acceptance of only poetry with principal rasa i.e. emotive appeal here, as poetry and non-acceptance of anything else is equivalent to Viśvanātha's position that poetry has to be and can be 'sa-rasa' only i.e. charged with 'rasa' only as its principal source of charm. But this concept of poetry which has basically only emotive character is too narrow a concept. This will not only drive out what Ānandavardhana explains as vastu-dhvani and ālaṃkāra-dhvani from the sphere of poetry, but it will therefore equally frustrate the efforts of newer and newer art-forms such as absurd theatre or absurd poetry as attempted by such great moderns as Samuel Beckett, or Ionesco, or Albert Camus etc. who gave us modern absurd forms of drama and novel. Actually these artists in their own way tried to communicate their sense of despair and despondency - vastudhvani - or bhāva-dhvani, resulting in śānta-rasa, ultimately. It is this suggestion of doubts, disputes, distractions and disbelief, - the vastu-dhvani where a man's intellect or rationality is involved, which renders special charm to

the play concerned. By rejecting anything else as principal except rasa-dhvani, i.e. emotive poetry only for him, Mahimā rejects such excellent attempts by modern playwrights. And it is criminal. We, therefore, cannot endorse Mahimā's position.

The next alternative Mahimā considers is that of 'viśeṣa' being taken as 'particularity'. Mahimā holds, that if kāvyaviśeṣa simply means, a particular type of poetry, the question that would arise is whether there are other types of poetry also from which the dhvani-kāvya is expected to be distinguished. Mahimā argues that if, for example, a poem presenting a particular rasa, say sṛṅgāra, or karuṇa, for example, is sought to be a kāvyaviśeṣa in the present context, and is regarded as excellent, then poems presenting other rasas will fall outside the scope of dhvani-kāvya ! Mere word and meaning regarded beautiful on account of the presence of guṇas i.e. poetic excellences and alamkāras i.e. beautiful turns of speech, cannot also be regarded as poetry in general in order to take dhvani-kāvya as particular type, because the former with guṇa and/or alamkāra only, but devoid of the charm caused by rasa, cannot be taken as poetry at all ! 'Nor, can it be regarded as poetry in a secondary sense (gauṇa-vṛtti) also, when poetry in the literal sense - i.e. 'sa-rasa-kāvya' is very much there, and when this primary meaning is not rejected (i.e. bādhita). The primary meaning, if not contradicted, can never be rejected. So, for Mahimā poetry without rasa is no poetry, i.e. it is only a misnomer : ata eva ca na guṇā'lamkāra-samskṛta-śabdārtha-mātra-śarīraṃ tāvat kāvyam; tasya yathokta-vyaṅgyārthopānibandhe sati viśiṣṭatvam iti śakyam vaktum. tasya rasā'tmatā'bhāve mukya-vṛttyā kāvyavyapadeśa eva na syāt; kim uta viśiṣṭatvam ?"

But all this, as observed earlier by us, suffers from the blemish of jts, being "too-narrow" i.e. 'avyāpti-doṣa' in Mahimā's thinking.

Mahimā goes on to argue that 'kāvyaviśeṣa' cannot also mean poetry suggesting vastu and alamkāra, because they also lead us finally to rasa-realization like poetry directly responsible for the suggestion of rasa. He also holds that it is not proper to distinguish rasa on the basis of suggestive elements such as guṇas i.e. poetic excellences and alamkāra i.e. poetic figures of speech. Here he points out by way of an illustration the concept of cowness and cows of different colours. We do not distinguish cows on the basis of different colours as the class of cowness goes equally with all the colours. Says he : (pp. 104, ibid) : na ca rasā'tmanaḥ kāvyasya vastumātrā'dibhir viśeṣaḥ śakyam ādhātum, teṣāṃ vibhāvā'dirūpatayā rasā'bhiivyakti-hetutvopagamāt; na ca vyañjakānāṃ vaicitrye vyaṅgyasya viśeṣo'bhyupagantum yuktaḥ, śābaleyā'dīnāṃ iva gotvasya". Mahimā further argues that if poetry wherein vastu or alamkāra suggests rasa is recognized as dhvanikāvya, then poetry directly suggesting rasa will fall out of the

scope of dhvanikāvya. Again, poems like 'prahelikā', suggesting some sort of 'vastu' or 'alaṃkāra', but with its rasa-pratīti obscured, will have to be counted as dhvanikāvya. We can see that in all these arguments Mahimā suffers from a too narrow concept of dhvanikāvya or even kāvya in general, and hence his line of thinking cannot be accepted by us. We have seen how liberal was Kuntaka, who accepts 'vakratā' or poetic beauty even at the level of pure abhidhā or direct expression. But regardless of understanding the spirit of what Ānandavardhana, Kuntaka and Abhinavagupta stand for, Mahimā concludes that "kāvya-viśeṣa" can signify only poetry in general, and in that case there is no justification for excluding instances of samāsokti or condensed speech and other types of guṇībhūta-vyaṅgya or poetry with subordinated suggestivity, from the range of dhvani as done by Ānandavardhana : "tatōsya viśiṣṭatopagame vā yatra tayoh ubhayoh ekaikasya vā vyaṅgyatā tatraiva dhvani-vyapadeśaḥ syāt na kevala-rasā"-tmani kāvye, vaiśiṣṭyā"bhāvāt. iṣyate cā'sau tatrā'pi. prahelikā"daḥ ca nīrase syāt. tatrā'pyukta-prakāreṇa vastumātrā"der abhivyaṅgyatvena iṣṭatvāt, iti anvaya-vyatirekābhyaṃ kāvyatva-mātra-prayukto-'sāv ity anumīyate". (pp. 104, ibid)

and also, ataś ca samāsokty ādāv apy asāv upagantavya eva, na pratiṣ'edhyah. pratiyamānasya cārthasya dvaividhyaṃ eva. ṛṭṭiyasya rasā"deḥ prakārasya ukta-nayena kāvyatvād eva siddhatvād iti. na ca tasya tadaṅgabhāvo bhaṇitum yujyate, aṅgitvena iṣṭatvāt, iti kāvyatvaṃ eva dhvani-vyapadeśa-viśayo 'bhyupagantum yukto, na tad viśeṣaḥ." (pp. 105, ibid).

So, according to Mahimā, even if, for the sake of an argument, it is accepted that dhvanikāvya is a particular type of poetry, the term 'viśeṣa' is superfluous and therefore need not have been mentioned. Mahimā argues that the very definition of an object can itself convey the particularity of the object defined, as in the case of a king described as one mounted on a horse. He observes (pp. 107) : itthaṃ ca kāvyasya viśiṣṭatā'nupapattau itarat-lakṣaṇa-vidhāyi-matātiriktaṃ na kiṃcid anena abhihitam syāt, anyatra, dhvani-vyapadeśa-mātrāt. na ca tenā'pi kiṃcit. -kathaṃcit vā tad upapattau tad avācyaṃ eva, tat-paryavasāyino lakṣaṇa-viśeṣa-saṃbandhāt eva tad avagateḥ. yathā yōśvam ārūdhah sa puruṣo rājā ity atra.

Mahimā further suggests that if it is argued that the definition befits the object already characterized by particularity, and this particularity cannot be cognised from the definition, even then the term 'kāvya-viśeṣa' is not necessary because the term 'kāvya' itself signifies rasa, and the presence of rasa is the particularity desired to be conveyed by the definition of dhvani : "atha puruṣasya aśva-viśiṣṭasya eva sataḥ taḥ lakṣaṇa-saṃbandho, na tu tata eva asya vaiśiṣṭyaṃ iti, tathā'pi avācyaṃ; kāvyatvād eva tasyā'pi avagatatvāt. tat ca uktaṃ, iti avācya-vacanam doṣaḥ.

Mahimā thus concludes that in mentioning 'dhvani' as kāvya-viśeṣaḥ the blemish of avācya-vacana (i.e. redundant) takes place. We have seen above how Mahimā's concept of poetry itself suffers from narrowness of approach as in case of the later ālaṃkārika Viśvanātha, who is at least liberal enough to recognise guṇībhūtavyangya variety and therefore is less objectionable, though his approach to vastu-dhvani is equally unacceptable. We have suggested elsewhere that actually the scope of vastu-dhvani and ālaṃkāra-dhvani need not be imagined on the strength of the simple illustrations cited by Ānandavardhana. Actually for him rasānubhūti is involvement of the total personality of the connoisseur and vastudhvani and ālaṃkāradhvani should be taken as devices that take care of a man's intellectual and imaginative faculties along with the emotional aspect of the enjoyer's self taken care of by rasādi dhvani. This thinking is broader and healthier and it goes to include even the newer and newer art-forms of absurd theatre and absurd poetry as practiced by modern geniuses. So, Mahimā seems to suffer from a too narrow concept of poetry that goes to take care of only the emotive aspect of an enjoyer's personality.

In the end Mahimā points out the tenth blemish in the superfluous mentioning of "sūribhiḥ" (i.e. by the learned) as the subject of the word "kathitaḥ". He suggests that the presence of the subject can be understood of its own from the verb itself. Mahimā argues that perhaps the dhvanikāra's intention may be to convey either (i) that the act of 'kathana' has an agent, or (ii) the act of 'kathana' has a particular agent (here, e.g. the learned men). But Mahimā finds no need to specify either of these two, as all activity has to have an agent. If the intention is to convey the particularity of the agent, then this can be conveyed by the very definition of dhvani itself.

: kiṃ ca, 'sūribhiḥ kathitaḥ' iti kathana-kriyā-karṭṭr-nirdeśaḥ pakṣadvaye api avācya eva. karṭṭr-mātra-vivakṣāyāṃ kriyāyāṃ karṭṭravyabhicārāt karṭṭr-viśeṣa-vivakṣāyāṃ antareṇa vyāpāra-viśeṣa-sambandhād eva tad-viśeṣa-avagati-siddheḥ, iti avācya-vacanam doṣaḥ.

So, even here Mahimā points out "avācya-vacana-doṣa", (= redundant) as the agent of 'kathana' is conveyed by the very verb. But we know, as Abhinavagupta has pointed out that by the use of the term 'sūribhiḥ' the dhvanikāra wants to emphasise that this talk of dhvani is not made prevalent by people of no consequence - 'na khalu yathā-kathāñcit-pravṛttā', but by responsible and honourable people - the 'sūris'.

In short, Mahimā's attempt to denounce dhvanikāra's definition of dhvanikāvya can be termed only as malice caused by ego-centred approach. We have seen above

how he arrives at a definition at the end of all this discussion when he says : (pp. 111, ibid, I. 25 V.V.)

“vācyas tad anumito vā, yatrārthōrthāntaram prakāśayati |
saṁbandhataḥ kutaścit, sa kāvyānumitir ity uktā ||”

We have already discussed the limitations of Mahimā's concept of poetry. We will now proceed to the group of poeticians beginning with Mammata to Viśvanātha who have chosen to follow the lead of the dhvanivādius, i.e. of Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta.

But eventhough we fail to agree with Mahimā's line of thinking, it can be conceded that we can underline Mahimā's contribution in two directions. First is that we know that eventhough Ānandavardhana had supported the cause of three-fold dhvani i.e. suggestion, at heart he was a great protagonist of only rasā²dhvani. Of course, here 'rasa' should be taken not as emotive stuff only but total aesthetic delight that involves the total personality - i.e. the cognitive, emotive and connetive aspects of the “sāmāsika”. Mahimā makes bold to break the ice and declare only rasā²di-anumiti of any consequence, denouncing both vastu-anumiti and alamkāra-anumiti. For this he receives moral support even from a later dhvanivādin of Viśvanātha's stature. Even Abhinavagupta had suggested that the suggestion of both vastu and alamkāra has a tendency to terminate in rasā²dhvani. Mahimā's second noteworthy achievement is his style of criticism. Ānandavardhana was satisfied only in neat presentation of what he believed to be true and never engaged himself in criticising others. His style therefore is simple, direct and flowing. On Mahimā's part, he was interested not only in establishing what he considered as true, but in logically denouncing what others laid down in a way not congruent to his line of thinking. Thus in Mahimā's writing, an element of scholastic style of discussion becomes an added feather in his cap. As a result his style at times acquires the sharpness of a razor., say 'razor's edge': Thus, Mahimā promotes a sort of new idea of stylistics of prose writing in literary criticism.

Again, it has to be also taken note of that though denouncing Ānandavardhana, Mahimā is full of respect for him and quotes from him when the point is favourable to his position. He also, not unlike Ānandavardhana, accepts all thought-currents prevalent in literary criticism, and keeping kāvyānumiti in the centre, in place of Ānandavardhana's vyañjanā, he also gives due respect to other concepts. In his scheme also we come across such divisions as saṁlakṣya-krama and asaṁlakṣya-krama. We also have anumiti of vastu and alamkāra. Thus ultimately the victory of Ānandavardhana over all his talented dissidents - Kuntaka, Bhoja, Mahimā, Dhanañjaya, Dhanika and all - is clearly established.

“From Mammāta to Viśvanātha” -

The age in which some posteriors of Ānandavardhana challenged his vyañjanā-dhvani-rasa theory, also presented to him a great protagonist of dhvani-theory, Abhinavagupta, who by his great commentary - *Locana*-on the Dhv. supported Ānandavardhana's cause. He also made it applicable to the art of drama as well in his great *Abhinavabhāratī* on the N.S. of Bharata. He established the supremacy of the three-fold dhvani as enunciated by Ānandavardhana and also established the superiority of rasā”di-dhvani albeit in the wider sense, over the other two varieties. Not that this was not in the mind and heart of the author of the Dhv., but he had not said it in so many terms. Abhinavagupta went flat out to establish this and eventhough with a different bias, both Kuntaka and Mahimā also established the evocation of rasā”di as the quint-essence of great poetry. The influence of Abhinavagupta was so pronounced that thoughts floated by Kuntaka, Mahimā, Dhanañjaya and Dhanika could not find roots in the minds of literary critics in general. This resulted in the supremacy of the Dhvani at the hands of great followers beginning with Mammāta and Hemacandra and down to Jayadeva, Vidyādhara, Vidyānātha, Viśvanātha and Jagannātha. All these literary critics firmly established the kashmir - thinking of literary criticism as promoted by Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta. At the same time we will go to observe that the scratches carved by Kuntaka, Mahimā and the rest did leave their marks on the thought-process of even stalwarts such as Mammāta and the rest. We will observe this in greater detail.

Mammāta : Mammāta is one of the main pillars of the edifice of dhvani. Actually the Dhvanvāloka of Ānandavardhana, the Locana of Abhinavagupta and the Kāvya-prakāśa of Mammāta can be termed as the “prasthāna-trayī” of the kashmir thought-current of literary criticism. There are great commentators such as Caṇḍidāsa, the author of “kāvyā-prakāśa-dīpikā” and others who rank Mammāta only as a blind imitator of the views of earlier masters, “prācīnamata-niryantṛva”. Caṇḍidāsa observes : “satyaṃ evaṃ; kintu gaḍḍalikā-pravāha-patitānām gaurava-bandha-niryantṛito’ yaṃ grantha-kṛt, traividhyaṃ uktavān” (pp. 23); and also, “etac ca prācīna-praṇayā’nurodhinā grantha-kṛtā kaṇṭhato nōktaṃ, pramātreṭi, vedyāntareṭi ca vadatā sūcitaṃ eva.” On the other hand a majority of commentators respect Mammāta as a “vāgdevatā’vatāra”.

Actually Mammāta has systematically arranged all important thought-currents, such as concerning śabdārtha-vicāra, śabdaśakti, subtle discussion on the nature of rasa-niṣpatti, the establishment of vyañjanā, the concepts of guṇas, doṣas, rītis, and alaṃkāras - all — as related to the supreme concept of ‘dhvani’ and then ‘rasa-dhvani’ in particular. Actually he has churned successfully the ocean in form of the

whole of Dhvanyāloka, Lōcana and Abhinavabhāratī and laid bare the essence of the subtle thinking in these works. His is an excellent “ākara-grantha”, in which all the thought-jewells are collected and then carefully arranged. At the same time he was careful enough to assimilate the wisdom of the ancients beginning with Bhāmaha, and also the successors of Ānandavardhana, such as Kuntaka Ksemendra, Mahimā, Dhanañjaya, Dhanika and the rest.

Caṇḍidāsa came down rather heavily on Mammaṭa because he failed to correlate his definition of poetry on one hand and the division, and concept of poetry on the other hand. We know that commentators such as Śrīdhara, the author of kāvyaprakāśa-viveka have tried to defend Mammaṭa. A number of ālaṃkārikas have been influenced by Mammaṭa's definition of poetry and there are also those who have made it an object of sharp criticism. These ālaṃkārikas include names such as those of Hemacandra, Jayadeva, Viśvanātha, Siddhicandra and also Jagannātha. It goes entirely to the credit of Mammaṭa, that he is an author who has activated so many great literary critics who have either fallen with him or have raised a bogey of arguments against him.

Mammaṭa's definition of poetry runs as : “*tad adōsau śabdārthau saganau, analaṃkrīṭi puṇaḥ kvāpi.*” (K. P. I. iv). i.e. “It (i.e. poetry) consists of word and sense, which are without blemishes, possessed of excellences, and are, rarely, devoid of figures.” (Trans. R. C. Dwivedi, The Poetic Light, pp. 9) (2nd Edn. Motilal Benarasidass, Delhi, '67). In Mammaṭa's definition of poetry, we observe the following traits; he keeps up the tradition of Bhāmaha and Ānandavardhana and calls poetry to be “śabdārthau” i.e. both “word and meaning” taken together. These ‘śabdārthau’ have to be ‘sa-guṇau’ i.e. they have to be qualified by excellences. Thereby Mammaṭa shows respect to the school of thought as represented by both Daṇḍin and Vāmana who showed great respect for the thought-current of rīti or mārḡa with ‘guṇa’ or poetic-excellence as its quint-essence. We remember the words of Daṇḍin saying, “*praṇāḥ daśa-guṇāḥ*”, and of Vāmana saying, “*viśiṣṭā padaracanā rītiḥ*”; and “*viśeṣo guṇātmā*”. These two i.e. word and sense are again expected to be ‘adōsau’, i.e. free from (poetic) blemishes. In keeping with the tradition of Bhāmaha and other ancients, and especially Mahimā whose direct influence is clearly visible on Mammaṭa's treatment of doṣas in his VIIth Chapter, Mammaṭa puts great stress on the fact of poetry being free from poetic blemishes. He gives a very catholic interpretation of ‘doṣa’ when he says : “*mukhyārtha hatīḥ doṣaḥ*”, and by ‘mukhya-ārtha’ he convers primarily rasa-bhāva etc., and also vācya or expressed meaning also implying lakṣyārtha as well, and then śabda, varṇa and racanā also. Thus Mammaṭa has taken care of all prevedent thought-currents of his time and has tried

to cor-relate all these with the main-stream of rasa-dhvani in the centre. Mammaṭa, though a dhvanivādin to the core has not mentioned either rasa or dhvani directly in the definition of poetry thus suggesting that at gross common-sense level it is only the qualified 'śabdārthau' - word and meaning that make for poetry. We know that even Ānandavardhana also had suggested the same when he observed : "śabdārthau tāvat kāvyam" and Abhinavagupta had explained that, by the word 'tāvat', it is suggested that in this matter there is no ghost of a chance of any difference of opinion. Mammaṭa has also specially mentioned 'analamṛtī punaḥ kvāpi', meaning thereby that both these word and meaning are almost ever graced by poetic figures, which are rarely found absent. Kuntaka's influence is very obvious, here.

If may be noted here that by the acceptance of 'guṇa', the element of rasa-bhāva etc. is covered, because following the thinking of the dhvani-vādins, the relation between guṇas and rasa is that of "dharma-dharmin", which is a 'samavāya' or constant relation. As are bravery or śaurya and the rest qualities of soul, so also are the poetic excellences are related to the soul called 'rasa'. We can say that bravery etc. are for sure qualities of the soul but they are not observed in each individual at worldly level. So also, the poetic qualities do not go with all śabdārthau'. But Mammaṭa is clear. Whether the poetic excellences are observed with each set of 'śabdārthau' or not, their relation with 'rasa' the 'soul' is inseparable or constant, i.e. 'samavāya'. We have also noted that the ancients such as Bhāmaha had attached great importance to the concept of poetic figures of speech suggesting that "vācām alamṛtiḥ" makes for the essence of poetry. For Bhāmaha, 'atīśayokti' or poetic excess is a quality that makes for the 'vibhāvana' i.e. relish of poetic content. Thus, alamkāra in the wider sense of saundarya or poetic beauty in general was a major thought-current which could not be ignored. Kuntaka, who proclaimed, "śālamkārasya kāvyata", thereby suggesting the natural relationship between poet's language and poetic figures, i.e. poetic expression, had a clear impact on Mammaṭa's thinking and of course Mahimā and Bhoja laid the roots still deeper. Thus Mammaṭa as a sensitive and intelligent thinker assimilates the concept of 'alamkāra' in his definition and on the other hand the element of guṇa or poetic excellence, as advocated by Daṇḍin and Vāmana, and also seen under 'svabhāvokti' in Bhoja, also finds favour with Mammaṭa. His predecessors included Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, the author of Hṛdaya-darpana, Kuntaka, Mahimā, Mukula, Dhanañjaya, Dhanika and Bhoja on one hand, and Bhaṭṭa Tāuta, the author of kāvyā-kautuka and one of the gurus of Abhinavagupta, and Ānandavardhana, and Abhinavagupta on the other. It is robust common-sense like one characterizing the thinking of Ānandavardhana, that prompts Mammaṭa also under the influence of Bhāmaha and Kuntaka to include the element of 'alamkāra' i.e. poetic turn of expression, in the

definition of poetry and to refuse a direct mention of either dhvani or rasa in the same. Though of course, all these predecessors of Mammaṭa, including Rājaśkhara also, gave prominence to the emotive element of rasa-bhāva in poetry. But even Ānandavardhana chose to call 'kāvyā' as 'śabdārthau' only, and left the mentioning of dhvani in the criticism aspect wherein he discussed dhvani-kāvyā and also the gaṇībhūta variety and citra-kāvyā. All this he mentioned by way of literary criticism and not as the definition of poetry as such. So, dhvani for him was a "kāvyā-viśeṣaḥ" and not 'kāvyā' as such. We do not have a clear idea of Rājaśekhara's thinking vis-a-vis dhvani, as his whole work - the 'Kāvyamīmāṃsā' - split in eighteen adhikaraṇas is not available to us, but even he accepts the common-sense line while defining poetry. Perhaps, under, the influence of Bhāmaha, Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, Kuntaka, Mahimā and Bhoja and also perhaps Ānandavardhana himself that Mammaṭa avoided the mention of 'dhvani' in the definition of poetry, and opted for the safer line of mentioning only 'guṇa', 'doṣa' and 'alaṃkāra', in the definition.

Caṇḍidāsa's ons'aught on Mammaṭa was inspired by the apparent controdiction between K. P. I. IV a, which contains the definition of kāvyā on one hand and I. IV b which embarks upon the three-fold classification of kāvyā such as uttama i.e. dhvanikāvyā, madhyama i.e. gaṇībhūta-vyaṅgya and 'adhama' i.e. citra-kāvyā. However, we can safely trace the influence of Bhāmaha in Mammaṭa's definition of poetry, that of Mahimā in the treatment of 'doṣa', of Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta in the delineation of dhvani, rasa, śabda-śaktis especially vyañjanā, and of a number of his predecessors in the treatment of alaṃkāras. The criticism-oriented classification of poetry also follows Ānandavardhana's lead, with a more pronounced bias. Viśvanātha has severely criticised Mammaṭa's definition of poetry as we will go to observe.

Caṇḍidāsa's Dīpikā (Edn. Nag Publishers, Delhi, '95) is very aggressive, as the editor Dr. Jyotna Mohan suggests. Caṇḍidāsa is very critical of his predecessors who could not properly interpret Kāvya-prakāśa. He observes : "kāvyaprakāśa-tarur-eṣaḥ ku-saṃpradāya-vyākhyā-vilola-marudākulita-pratānaḥ" perhaps the predecessors were Maṇikyalandra, Ruyyaka, Someśvara, Narahari Sarasvatīrtha, Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, Vācaspati Miśra as mentioned by Caṇḍidāsa, and Śrīdhara. Caṇḍidāsa has influenced later commentaries such as the Vistārikā of Paramānanda Cakravartin and also Kāvya-prakāśa Darpaṇa and Sāhitya-darpaṇa of Viśvanātha, and also Kāvya-prakāśa-khaṇḍana of Siddhicandra to a great extent. He criticizes Mammaṭa's definition in the words : ye tv adoṣāv iti lakṣaṇāmśaṃ icchanti, teṣāṃ kāvyatvaṃ nirviṣayaṃ atyanta-pravīrala-viṣayaṃ vā bandhā"di-sāmyād gaṇa eva, tac ca sarvaṃ uktaṃ vitatyā'smābhir dhvani-siddhānta saṃgraha ity eva dik." (pp. 86, Edn. ibid).

It seems Caṇḍidāsa has overlooked what Śrīdhara has said in his Viveka. Śrīdhara observes : kāvya-sāmānya-lakṣaṇe vibhāgo viśeṣa-lakṣaṇaṇca vaktavyaṃ ity āha - 'tadbhedān' iti, śliṣṭaṃ padam : bhidyate iti avāntara-viśeṣo, bhidyate'nena iti bhedo, vyāvartako dharma iti ca. vibhāgasya viśeṣa-lakṣaṇa-prayojaka-dharma-nirdeśa-rūpatvād bhinnam vākyaṃ kriyate. pratilakṣaṇam vākyaṃ tena upādīyate iti na kaścīd viśeṣaḥ. (pp. 13, edn. Sivaprasad Bhattacharya, skt. college, Calcutta, 1959) (Calcutta Sanskrit College Research Series, No.VII)

We will discuss the criticism by Viśvanātha and Jagannātha at relevant places later. But, suffice it to say for the present, that Mammāta did not let go the heritage of thinking that came down from Bhāmaha to Abhinavagupta, Kuntaka, Mahimā and the rest. His approach was not aggressive but logical, judicious and conciliatory.

Hemacandra : In his Kāvyaṇuśāsana, I. 11, he says : "a-doṣau sa-guṇau śālaṃkārau ca śabdārthau kāvyam." Thus he seems to follow the track laid down by Mammāta, who also has 'word and sense together' as poetry. In place of 'analaṃkṛitī punaḥ kvā'pi' of Mammāta, Hemacandra (= H.C.) has 'śālaṃkārau ca' which is perhaps more emphatic and clearer in favour of the presence of alaṃkāras or beautiful turns of expression in poetry, though of course, 'ca' suggests that poetry can be, at times, even without an 'alaṃkāra'. H.C. observes : "ca-kāro niralaṃkārayor-api śabdārthayoḥ kvacit-kāvyatva-khyāpanārthaḥ." In his Viveka, H.C. observes : "niralaṃkārayorapīti" - "anena hi analaṃkṛtaṃ api guṇavad vacaḥ svadate" - i.e. by the term 'niralaṃkāryaḥ' it is suggested that excellences are a must for poetry. Even if poetic speech is without adornment it can be relished on account of the presence of excellences. Thus for H.C., excellences are more essential to poetry as compared to adornment i.e. alaṃkāraṇa. He gives illustrations both positive and negative. Negative illustration suggests that, "alaṃkṛtaṃ api nirguṇam na svadate" i.e. eventhough poetry is with figures of speech but without excellences, it does not yield (rasa)-enjoyment. This brings H.C. closer to Daṇḍin and Vāmana, but at core he is dhvanivādin first and last. With his kā. śā. and viveka on it, he saw to it that Mālava influence of Bhoja remained out of the boundary of Jaisimhadeva's Gujarat, wherein the influence of Kashmir school flourished.

Vāgbhaṭa (Iṣṭ), the author of Vāgbhaṭālaṃkāra, at I. 2 observes :

"sādhu-śabdārtha-sandarbhāṃ
guṇā'laṃkāra-bhūṣitam,
sphuṭa-rīti-rasopetaṃ
kāvyam kurvīta kīrtaye."

A poet should compose poetry for fame. Poetry, which consists of both word and sense that are 'sādhū' - i.e. nirdoṣa-free from blemishes, and adorned with excellences and figures of speech, is endowed with clear rīti-i.e. style and rasa or sentiment (or aesthetic pleasure). Thus by 'sādhū' is meant 'nir-doṣatva' as also explained by Siṃhadevaṅgi, the commentator. The mention of guṇa and rīti brings him closer to the earlier ālaṃkārikas such as Daṇḍin and Vāmana. By insistance on 'guṇa', both Mammāṭa and H.C. had 'rasa' in their mind, but they had avoided a clear mentioning of the same. On the other hand, Vāgbhaṭa makes a clear mention of rasa and lays down a road to Viśvanātha.

Vāgbhaṭa (II ṇḍ), in his Kāvyaṇuśāsana almost reverberates the words of Mammāṭa when he observes :

"śabdārthau nirdoṣau, sa-guṇau, prāyaḥ sālaṃkārau kāvyam" - (I. pp. 14) i.e. word and sense, free from poetic blemishes, and having excellences, and mostly adorned by figures of speech, make for poetry." He adds that by "prāyaḥ sālaṃkārau" is meant, "niralaṃkārayoḥ śabdārthayoḥ kvacit kāvyatvam" i.e. "only at times, even word and sense bereft of adornment, make for poetry." He cites the same illustration viz. "śūnyaṃ vāsa-grhaṃ...." etc. as given by Mammāṭa. We can see that following Mammāṭa and H.C., a clear line of remaining faithful to the kashmir tradition of literary criticism is noticed here. In Gujarat, both the streams of literary criticism, i.e. Kashmir thought-current of Ānandavardhana, Abhinavagupta and Mammāṭa, and Mālava tradition of Bhoja, are seen intermingling, at times cutting across each other, at times merging with each other and at other times again bifercating, and at times running even parallel. But the clear out-come is that the kashmir tradition, the tone of which was set by H.C., emerges as a clear victor. Perhaps the political ambitions of Siddharāja Jaisiṃhadeva must be at the root of this situation.

Jayadeva : The author of Candrālōka, Jayadeva, defines poetry at I. 7 :

"nirdoṣā lakṣaṇavatī
sa-rītir guṇa-bhūṣaṇā |
sālaṃkāra-rasā'neka-
vṛttir vāk kāvyā-nāma-bhāk ||"

"That speech is termed poetry, which is free from poetic blemishes, having 'lakṣaṇas' i.e. natural marks, is accompanied by rīti-or style and is adorned by poetic excellences (i.e. guṇas), and is having ālaṃkāras or poetic figures and rasa or relish, (and) is with any number of vṛttis or diction."

Over and above the mention of doṣa, guṇa and ālaṃkāra, we find herein the mentioning of lakṣaṇa, rīti, rasa and vṛtti. So far as available documents are concerned after Bharata, Jayadeva seems to be the first ālaṃkārika to revive the concept of 'lakṣaṇas', which practically gets merged with ālaṃkāras even in Abhinavabhāratī, as we will go to observe later in vol. II. So, this revival of the concept of lakṣaṇas is surprising and it again fades out after Jayadeva, though of course, we come across 'nāṛya-lakṣaṇas' in Sāhityadarpaṇa (= S.D.) of Viśvanātha. These nāṛyālaṃkāras come closer to lakṣaṇas of Bharata, and Viśvanātha also treats them as part of dramaturgy though Jayadeva has tried to correlate them with kāvya or poetry, in the third mayūkha (= chapter) of his Candrālōka. Jayadeva also revives the concepts of 'rīti' and 'vṛtti' as seen in Vāgbhaṭa (Ist) and also 'rasa'. He is hereby trying to revive old literary traditions that were going out of vogue with literary criticism. How far he was successful in this goes by the obvious result seen in his successors again not giving greater thought to the concepts of lakṣaṇa, rīti and vṛtti and choosing to follow the royal track of kashmir literary criticism as almost fixed by Mammaṭa. But between Mammaṭa and Viśvanātha, Jayadeva can be taken as a very important mile-stone and his encouraging the concept of vṛttis, which were taken only as varieties of anuprāsa even by Abhinavagupta, is a bold step. Gāgābhāṭa, the commentator on Jayadeva explains 'vṛtti' as the five kāvya-vṛttis such as madhurā and the rest and also the three powers of word such as abhidhā or the power of direct expression and the like. Thus we can take Jayadeva to follow the lead of Kuntaka who accepts great poetry even at abhidhā level. The Paurṇamāsī Commentary expails 'vṛtti' as : "vṛttis tridhā. nāṛyopayuktā prathamā. eṣā kaiśikī-sātvati-ārabhaṭī-bhāratī-nāmnā caturvidhā. dvitīyā madhurā"dayaḥ ṣaṣṭha-mayūkhoktāḥ." tṛtīyā śabda-śakti-rūpā." i.e. vṛttis are three-fold (i) those pertaining to drama such as kaiśikī etc., the four vṛttis otherwise known as artha-vṛttis also elsewhere; (ii) the five-fold vṛttis such as madhurā, prauḍhā, paruṣā, lalitā and bhadṛā. There are what others call śabda-vṛttis or 'anuprāsa-jātayaḥ' as equated in Locana. The third group of vṛttis are abhidhā, lakṣaṇā and vyañjanā otherwise termed as śabda-śaktis by other ālaṃkārikas. Thus Jayadeva installed a broader look in literary criticism.

Next comes Vidyādhara. We observed that Jayadeva was highly critical of Mammaṭa's observation, viz. "analaṃkṛtī punaḥ kvā'pi" by saying that those who accept the possibility of poetry without 'ālaṃkāra' should also accept that fire (= agni) is not hot. This line of thinking is under strong influence of Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin and Kuntaka.

Vidyādhara, the author of *Ekāvalī* (I. 6) holds 'kāvyā' i.e. poetry to be equivalent to a beloved, *kāntā-sammita* and, observes that in poetry having the suggested sense as principal (= *dhvani*), word and meaning are subordinated to the suggested sense. He explains the etymology of 'kāvyā' as : *kavayate iti kaviḥ. tasya karma kāvyam. tat ca arthād varṇanā*"tmakam. i.e. one who describes, is a poet. His act is 'kāvyā' or poetry. It is descriptive on account of its meaning. In the second chapter he observes that as both word and sense make for poetry, their nature is discussed. At I. 10, *Ekāvalī*, he says that in poetry the word is as if mounted on a whetstone and is therefore brilliant. The 'bandha' or arrangement is even superior to the one of "*ardha-nārīśvara*". The apprehension of meaning derived therefrom shines forth like a streak of lightening and the aesthetic relish derived from poetry is as pleasing as nectar oozing out from the orb of the moon. The act of a poet having such qualities is poetry. We may say that in all this *Vidyādhara* equals *Kuntaka* in verbocity. He goes to suggest that anything else than that described as above (I. 10) as poetry, is 'karna-kolāhala' i.e. a jarring noise for the ear. At I. 13, *Vidyādhara* observes that word and meaning form the body of poetry and 'dhvani' i.e. suggested sense, is the soul of poetry according to the learned. Pointing out the doubts raised against *dhvani* he completes the first chapter of his *Ekāvalī*. He clearly seems to follow the lead of *Ānandavardhana*, *Abhinavagupta* and *Mammaṭa*.

Vidyānātha : In the *kāvyā-prakaraṇa*, *kārikās* 1-5, in his *Pratāpa-rudrīya*, *Vidyānātha* discusses the nature and scope of poetry. He observes -

“guṇālaṃkāra-sahitau
śabdārthau, doṣavarjitam,
gadya-padyobhaya-mayaṃ
kāvyam kāvyā-vido viduḥ.”

“The knowers of poetry know that to be poetry, which is word and sense, and is both in prose and verse (in its outer form), to be free from blemishes and is adorned with excellences and *alaṃkāras*.” This definition follows *Mammaṭa* and *Hemacandra* and expects 'alaṃkāra' or figures of speech as an indispensable attribute. In his *kāvyā-prakaraṇa*, verses 2-5 (pp. 32) he observes in a metaphorical presentation that,

“śabdārthau mūrtir ākhyātau
jīvitam vyaṅgya-vaibhavam |

hārā"divad alamkāras-
tatra syuḥ upamā"dayaḥ ||2||

śleṣā"dayo guṇās tatra
śauryā"daya iva sthitāḥ |
ātmoṭkarṣā"vahās tatra
svabhāvā iva rīṭayaḥ ||3||

śobhāṃ ārthikīm prāptāḥ
vṛttayo vṛttayo yathā |
padānugūṇya-viśrāntiḥ
śayyā śayyeva sammatā ||4||

rasā"svāda-prabhedāḥ syuḥ
pākāḥ pākā iva sthitāḥ |
prakhyātā lokavad iyaṃ
sāmagrī kāvya-sampadaḥ ||5||

Both word and sense are like the body of poetry. The richness of the suggested sense makes for its life. Thus like Vidyādhara, Vidyānātha also accepts 'dhvani' as the 'soul' of poetry. Then following the lead of Mammata, he calls figures such as 'upamā' i.e. simile and the like, as ornaments such as necklace etc. He takes śleṣa and other 'guṇas' or excellences as qualities such as bravery. It may be noted here that while the kashmir tradition of Ānandavardhana, Abhinavagupta and Mammata accepts only three excellences such as mād'hurya, ojas and prasāda - i.e. sweetness, floridity and perspicuity - Vidyānātha following Bhoja's lead, accepts twenty four excellences, thereby trying to strike a balance between the Kashmir and Mālava schools of thought. Over and above this, Vidyānātha mentions rīti i.e. style, which is displaying the predominance of 'soul'-factor. They i.e. 'rītis' are like human nature - svabhāvā iva - In this respect we can place Vidyānātha along with Vāgbhata (I) and Jayadeva Pīyūṣavarṣa. Like Jayadeva again, he mentions vṛttis or modes that reveal the beauty of sense. He again revives the concept of 'śayyā', the bed. The 'śayyā' or accomodation is a quality of words that are favourably matched with one another. Thus a poet's ability to choose such words that not be replaced by synonyms, makes for this quality of śayyā. This quality of śayyā is first noticed in Rājaśekhara's Kāvya-nimāṃsā, so far as available records are concerned. This almost forgotten concept of literary criticism is revived by Vidyānātha. Likewise, from Rājaśekhara, he also revives the concept of 'kāvya-

'pāka' i.e. maturity in poetry. He correlates the concept of 'pāka' with the concept of rasa. 'Pāka' for him is 'rasā"-svāda-bheda' - the variety of rasa-experience. This tradition of Pāka also had disappeared after Vāmana and Rājaśekhara. But it is interesting to note that Vidyānātha has called 'pāka' to be 'rasā"-svāda-bheda', i.e. variety of taste or relish. In Rājaśekhara also we have a hint to this effect and he recommends that certain pākas are not welcome in poetry. This, and the correlation with taste or rasa, would lead us to the obvious conclusion that perhaps Rājaśekhara and also Vidyānātha believed in the "sukhaduḥkhā"tmaka nature of rasa, i.e. they both took rasas as both pleasurable and also painful, a tradition already hinted at as early as in the Nāṭyaśāstra in the expression : "harṣā"diṇś ca adhigacchanti sumanasah prekṣakāḥ", and openly advocated by the authors of Nāṭyadarpaṇa, - Rāmacandra and Guṇacandra, and also supported later by Siddhicandra. Thus Vidyānātha has a number of points to his credit in reviving some lost traditions of literary criticism.

Viśvanātha : Among the followers of Mammāṭa, Hemacandra feels full satisfaction in promoting the Kashmir tradition of literary criticism in Gujarat, but Viśvanātha, the author of Sāhitya darpaṇa (= S.D.), even though being a follower of the vyañjanā - dhvani-rasa school of Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta makes bold to announce certain conclusions not proclaimed by Ānandavardhana clearly in many words, but promoted by Abhinavagupta openly, and again not clearly expounded by Hemacandra, perhaps in view of the political context in Gujarat. Viśvanātha not only lays down whatever is concealed yet meant principally by Ānandavardhana, but makes bold to criticise Ānandavardhana and Mammāṭa for not coming out openly. Viśvanātha defines poetry as "vākyam rasā"tmakam kāvyam" (S.D.I. 3)

We have noticed that Ānandavardhana had described 'dhvani' - principal suggested sense - as the soul of poetry (Dhv. I. 1). In Dhv. I. 2 he had said :

"arthah saḥṛidaya-ślāghyah
kāvyā"tmēti vyavasthitah
vācya-pratīyamānā"khyau
tasya bheda ubhau smṛtau." (Dhv. I. 2)

Thus there seemed to be an apparent contradiction between Dhv. I. 1 and Dhv. I. 2, for in the latter kārikā, the 'saḥṛidayaślāghya kāvyātmā artha' - i.e. 'meaning appreciated by men of taste and which is the soul of poetry', is said to be both, 'vācya' or expressed and 'pratīyamāna' or implicit. This apparent contradiction was

first criticized by Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka in his *Hṛdayadarpaṇa*, written to denounce dhvani - i.e. for 'dhvani-dhvaṃsa' only. The answer to this was ably given by Abhinavagupta in his *Locana*, who observes : (*Locana* on Dhv. I. 2) :

“bhūmiḥ iva bhūmikā. yathā apūrva-nirmāṇe cikūrṣite pūrvaṃ bhūmiḥ viracyate tathā dhvanisvarūpe pratiyamānā”khye nirūpayitavye nirvivāda-siddha-vācyā'-bhidhānam bhūmiḥ. tat prṣṭhe'dhika-pratiyamānāmsollīnganāt. vācyatvena sama-śīrṣikayā gaṇanam tasyā'pi anapahnavanīyatvaṃ pratipādayitum.” ‘śabdārtha-śarīram kāvyam’ iti yad uktam, tatra śarīra-grahaṇād eva kenacid ātmanā tad anuprāṇakena bhāvyam eva. śabdāś tāvāt śarīrabhāgaḥ eva sanniviśate sarvajana-samvedya-dharmarvāt sthūla-kṛṣā”divat. arthaḥ punaḥ sakala-jana-samvedyaḥ na bhavati, na hi artha-mātreṇa kāvya-vyapadeśyaḥ laukika-vaidika-vākyeṣu tad abhāvāt. tad āha - sahrdayaślāghyaḥ iti. sa eka evārtho dviśākhayā vivekibhir vibhāgabuddhyā vibhajyate. tathā hi tulye'rtha-rūpatve kim iti kasmaicid eva sahrdayāḥ ślāghante ? vācyā-samvalanā-vimohita-hṛdayais tu tat-prthag bhāve vipratipadyate, cārvākair iva ātma-prhak bhāve. ata eva artha iti ekatayā upakramya sahrdayas'laghya iti viśeṣaṇa-dvārā hetuṃ abhidhāya, apoddhāra-dṛṣā tasya dvau bhedāv aṃsau iti uktam, na tu dvāv apy a”tmānau kāvyasya.”

Abhinavagupta categorically lays down that both - i.e. the expressed (vācyā) and the implicit (pratiyamāna) are not to be taken as 'soul' of poetry, but they are just the 'bheda' i.e. divisions or parts or varieties of meaning. To take both as soul of poetry is like cārvākas not recognising body as apart from soul.

But even with this explanation before him, Viśvanātha behaves in the same way as Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka did, and it was nothing else but just practicing “gaja-nimīlikā” - i.e. ignoring something knowingly. What Ānandavardhana has tried to do is to differentiate between what we call belles lettres on one hand and anything else that goes under the name of literature, say scientific, religious, legal etc. on the other. We can also realize the signal of not sticking to the metaphorical usage of terminology such as 'ātman', 'śarīra' etc. very literally. Viśvanātha, also forgets the subtle point that 'dhvani' is taken either as 'kāvya-viśeṣa' - a special variety of poetry, or as the 'soul' of a special variety of poetry.

Viśvanātha on the other hand seems to accept what is already implied in Ānandavardhana's delineation. Thus he openly accepts the supreme position of rasa - i.e. aesthetic relish - in poetry. So, when he says, “vākyam rasā”tmakam kāvyam’ (S.D.I. 3) i.e. a sentence with rasa as its soul is poetry, he accepts the inner truth of poetry which the dhvanivādins wanted to convey, but for reasons more

important, they refused to lay down clearly. He has also mentioned the preference for 'rasa', which is also noticed in Kuntaka, Mahimā, Bhoja or say, in all of his predecessors. Viśvanātha does not accept Ānandavardhana's ruling that 'the soul of poetry is dhvani', for he accepts only rasa-dhvani as the soul of poetry. Viśvanātha carries a false apprehension that if all the dhvani i.e. dhvani in its three-fold varieties - is accepted as the soul of poetry than by the acceptance of vastu-dhvani we will be allowing even trivial poetry in 'prahelikā' or riddles as genuine poetry. But it is exactly here that Viśvanātha blunders, because under vastu-dhvani and alamkāra dhvani Ānandavardhana had left space for all intellectual poetry, or, say poetry such as seen in absurd theatre or absurd poetry, and also all flight of fancy to be covered under alamkāra-dhvani. In his wide scheme of dhvani Ānandavardhana has place for any form of suggesters beginning with a letter or a part of a word to a whole composition, or any other that a newer poet may imagine or advocate in his poetry. All this is welcome under three-fold dhvani and for Ānandavardhana, precisely to accomodate for any newer and newer form of literature under the banner of dhvani, only rasa-dhvani alone, which is normally understood as suggestion of emotive stuff only, does not, make for great poetry. Actually rasānubhūti is kalā'nubhūti is ānandānubhūti, or art-experience, which transcends not only vastudhvani or thereby even absurd theatre, but also alamkāra-dhvani or highest flight of fancy and imagination and also the so called rasa-bhāvā"di-dhvani or emotive stuff. The dhvani theory aims at a rasa-experience which is catholic in its nature and covers up newer and newer forms of literary art such as absurd poetry or absurd theatre, problem plays, social satires, and what not - that have appeared in modern literature and may yet appear in future poetry of centuries to come. So, vastu-dhvani is not mere prahelikā or riddle-poetry, for in it there is no delight for the men of taste - i.e. "sahṛdaya-ślāghyatva". On the contrary we will go to observe that by keeping the doors open only to rasa-bhāvā"di-oriented poetry, actually Viśvanātha has narrowed the scope of poetry and has also promoted the cause of sentimental verse under the guise of 'rasā"tmaka kāvya'. We will dwell upon this later. Jagannātha also discusses this point.

But for the present, we will consider only the aggressive aspect of Viśvanātha's criticism which does not spare Mammaṭa also. He, following the lead of his predecessors, especially Caṇḍidāsa, the author of Dipikā, and others as suggested by us earlier, denounces vehemently Mammaṭa's definition of poetry. This approach can be compared with the negative and non-fruitful approach of Mahimā with regard to Ānandavardhana.

Viśvanātha comes down heavily on Mammaṭa's definition of poetry. Subtle, forceful and destructive method as seen in Mahimā seems to be continued by Viśvanātha, who has taken Mammaṭa to task for every word used in the definition of poetry. He has, as it were, mounted the definition of poetry in the K.P. on a grinding wheel. We will first give Viśvanātha's views and then try to evaluate his observations. He first picks up the word 'a-doṣau' used as an attribute of 'śabdārthau'. He observes that if we take only those word and sense which are completely free from blemishes as poetry, then such examples of poetry as - "nyakkāro hy ayam eva..." will fail to pass the test of being poetry at all, because the blemish viz. 'vidheya-avimarśa' is very much there and hence what is taken as an illustration of "uttama" poetry by aesthetes will have to be discarded as 'no poetry' or 'a-kāvya'. Thus 'a-vyāptidoṣa' embraces the definition as coined by Mammaṭa. Continuing with his relentless assault Viśvanātha observes that it cannot be held that a part with blemish should be taken as no-poetry (i.e. a-kāvya) and a portion with dhvani should be taken as uttama-kāvya or highest type of poetry. For this way, in a tug of war the particular piece of poetry will neither remain poetry nor 'no-poetry'. Again, it cannot be said that such blemishes as śruti-duṣṭa mar only a portion of poetry. Actually such blemishes mar the beauty of a whole piece of poetry. But, in fact, if they do not harm the cause of rasa i.e. aesthetic relish, they are no blemishes at all. The fact of being a blemish depends on its being harmful to rasa. If such blemishes as "śruti-duṣṭa" harm the cause of rasa, then they are positively to be reckoned as blemishes. Precisely for this reason, the aesthetes have thought of the position of 'nitya-anitya-doṣa' i.e. of blemishes being all-time blemishes or being occasional blemishes. If we do not accept this position then poetry will either have no scope at all, or will have very little scope, if at all, because poetry being absolutely free from any fault whatsoever is a rare dream ! For Viśvanātha, the particular example, viz. "nyakkārohy ayam eva", etc. is excellent poetry for the blemish viz. vidheya-avimars'a is of no consequence at all as it does not interrupt the enjoyment of relish. But, observes Viśvanātha, that for Mammaṭa this poem will be no-poetry - i.e. 'a-kāvya' as the blemish is very much there and he wants 'śabdārthau' to be "a-doṣau".

Continuing his tirade against 'a-doṣau', Viśvanātha further observes that, in case if by 'a-doṣau' is meant "iṣad-doṣau" i.e. poetry having negligible amount of blamish, then such poetry which is absolutely free from blemish will cease to be poetry. Now if the negative suggester i.e. nañ "नञ्" in 'a' (= 'अ') is taken as "smallest amount of fault if at all present", then such accidental attributes as "blemish, if at all present" need not find mentioning in the definition of poetry. No accidental

attributes find a place in a logical definition of poetry. No accidental attributes find a place in a logical definition of anything. When you define a jewel or a diamond, you do not have to say that it should not be having any negative mark in its *kīṭā'nuviddhatva*; or being damaged in any way need not be mentioned while examining a diamond. For, thereby a diamond does not cease to be a diamond.

After this, Viśvanātha concentrates on the attributes 'sa-guṇau' in the definition. He holds that guṇas or excellences are said to be the attributes of 'rasa' i.e. aesthetic relish, and in that case how can they be mentioned as attributes of word and sense? Now, it also cannot be mentioned that as word and sense are suggesters of 'rasa' and therefore 'guṇas' or excellences which are the attributes of rasa, can be metaphorically said to be attributes of word and sense. For, in a given poem 'rasa' or aesthetic relish may be either present or absent. In case rasa is not seen with reference to word and sense in a given piece of poetry, then these particular set of word and sense will cease to be 'sa-guṇau', because guṇas or excellences are associated with 'rasa' only, through the relation of invariable concomitance. And in case 'rasa' is found to be present in word and sense of a given piece of poetry then why not call them 'sa-rasau' directly? The attribute 'sa-rasau' is clearer and more direct as compared to 'sa-guṇau' which leads to 'rasa' at the next stage. Viśvanātha holds that by 'sa-guṇau', it cannot be implied that in poetry only such words and sense should be used which manifest guṇas or excellences, because this has no relation with the form of basic nature of poetry, but it can only enhance the charm of poetry. Even here we will go to observe that it is Viśvanāth's narrow approach which comes in his way of accepting the attribute 'sa-guṇau'. Ānandvardhana implicitly, and Jagannātha perhaps clearly, suggest that "guṇas" are qualities of śabda i.e. word and 'artha', i.e. sense. This also is overlooked by Viśvanātha.

He also objects to the words, 'an-alaṃkṛtiḥ puṇaḥ kvā'pi'. He holds that the presence or absence of a figure of speech is only an accident. It is not a basic qualification of poetry. So, such features that are accidental to poetry, need not find an expression in the definition of poetry. Again, alaṃkāras make for the enhancement of poetic charm; they do not cause it.

Now, we will critically examine Viśvanātha's position.

As for his first observation concerning 'a-doṣau', even he himself is conscious that a poetic blemish is accepted only as a blemish when it harms the realization of aesthetic pleasure i.e. rasa. Mammaṭa in his K.P. VII - i, clearly says that :

“mukhyārtha haṭiḥ doṣaḥ
rasas tu mukhyaḥ....”

So, by 'a-doṣau' Mammaṭa wants a poet to avoid such doṣas as are capable of damaging the relish of aesthetic pleasure. Literary critics beginning with Bhāmaha or even earlier, perhaps even prior to Bharata, have unanimously denounced the occurrence of a poetic blemish and if Mammaṭa cautions a poet of keeping clean out of this, he is within his rights to do it, and to be honest any good critic should remind a poet that poetry has to be free from blemishes whatsoever. Even blemishes that seem to go with word and sense in outward expression, also render the relishing of rasa less transparent. This is a universal experience of men of taste.

As for the next attribute 'sa-guṇau', even here Viśvanātha's mind seems to be too much biased in favour of the metaphor given by dhvanīvādins concerning poetry. True, rasa or dhvani is 'ātman', and 'word and sense' form the 'body' of poetry. But, as observed earlier by us, this is only a metaphorical way of presenting things. Metaphor is only a means and not an end in itself. It is used with a specific purpose of enlightening the lesser souls who do not enjoy an entry into the region of abstract thinking. In fact, poetry is an abstract art and it has nothing to do with 'body' or 'soul'. Even 'words and meanings' are all abstractions and what we read and write are merely physical signs of whatever is only mentally cognized and enjoyed. But, if at all we have to translate, or try to translate the abstract into something concrete, we have to use metaphor. Even the great Ānandavardhana, while discussing the topic of 'saṃghaṭanā' or construction, almost concedes the point that 'guṇas' or excellences are attributes of word and meaning virtually. Jagannātha, the author of Rasagaṅgādhara (= R. G.) and even Appayya, who was his senior contemporary, also tend to correlate 'guṇas' or poetic excellences with word and sense. So, Viśvanātha's stubborn approach does not stand to logic.

As for the mention of alaṃkāras in the definition, once again Viśvanātha overlooks the fact that the term 'alaṃkāra' had a very very wide connotation almost equivalent to 'kāvyā-saudārya', in earlier times. Actually the discipline of literary criticism and literary critics have acquired such denomination as alaṃkārasāstra', 'ālaṃkārika' etc. only with reference to this wider concept of 'alaṃkāra' as 'poetic beauty'. With Ānandavardhana we find a second parallel application of this term 'alaṃkāra', fixed with reference to precisely indicate the figures of word and sense such as anuprāsa', 'upamā' etc. But even while keeping this narrower connotation before him, Ānandavardhana never underestimated the potential charm of these devices causing poetic beauty. It is therefore, that he stated in so many terms that, these alaṃkāras were not 'external' to poetic beauty "tasmāt na teṣāṃ bahiraṅgatvaṃ rasābhivyaktau" - (Dhv. vṛtti on II. 16). The recognition of these

devices of poetic beauty, as “kaṭaka-keyūrā”divat” in a metaphorical expression, does not render them as ‘external’ to poetry. We have discussed this point on an earlier occasion in greater details. So, Viśvanātha’s outburst is only peevishness on his part. His criticism is not only not justified but is totally unwanted. He does it because he has failed to collect the very essence of metaphorical usage with reference to poetic devices.

Again, as quoted just above, even the Locanakāra observes that ‘śabda’ is said to be śarīra only because, it is “śarva-jana-samvedya”. So also alamkāra-s are sarva-jana-samvedya.’

No wonder that, smarting under the same illusion, Viśvanātha locks horns with Kuntaka also while rejecting the latter’s observations. He also rejects Boja’s definition of kāvya as read in the Sarasvatī-kaṇṭhā”-bharana, while rejecting Mammaṭa’s definition. He rejects Vāmana’s observation viz. ‘rītiḥ ātmā kāvyasya’, for rīti is only arrangement of word and sense in a style. How can it be termed as ‘ātman’, when it is a mere arrangement of parts and limbs ? All this is taking the metaphor too far literally.

While mentioning ‘rasā”tmaka vākya’ as poetry, Viśvanātha seems to have paid greater importance to the word-element in poetry, not unlike perhaps Daṇḍin. This tradition was forcefully established later by Jagannātha also. Viśvanātha attached importance to ‘rasa’ in poetry in keeping with the highest traditions established by Bharata, Ānandavardhana, Abhinavagupta, Kuntaka, Mahimā, Dhanañjaya-Dhanika, Bhoja and of course Mammaṭa, whom he criticises severely. He tried to establish ‘rasa’ as a central concept in poetry. But in doing so he has only echoed the inner voice of his great predecessors. “Rasa” here is not emotive stuff only, but is aesthetic flavour as a whole.

Keśava Miśra in his Alamkāra-Śekhara (pp. 2 Edn. ‘26, Bombay, kāvyamālā, ’50;) holds : “kāvyam rasādimad vākyaṁ śrutam sukha-viśeṣa-kṛt.” i.e. “poetry is said to be sentence charged with aesthetic delight etc., which causes special happiness.” He adds : ādipadena alamkāra-parigrahaḥ i.e. by the term ‘ādi’ is meant the inclusion of alamkāras. He introduces navya-nyāya style in his writing, as if paving way for the advent of the great Appayya Dikṣita and Jagannātha and also Siddhicandra to some extent. He observes : (pp. 2, 3 ibid) : “tathā ca tad-ubhayā’nyatara-vattvaṁ (vā) kāvyalakṣaṇam. anyatarattvaṁ ca tad-anyā’nyatvam. sukhaviśeṣa-sādhanaṭvaṁ vā lakṣaṇam. samudāyārtha-śūnye (V.L. śūnyatve)’ pi tad-ubhayaṁ asti eva iti vṛddhāḥ. adṛṣṭa-dvārā tad-hetu-śabde ativyāptir āha, - śrutam iti. sad iti śeṣaḥ. sukhe vajjātyam sarvānubhava-siddham eva.” -

Thus Keśava suggests that having either of the attributes (i.e. *rasā*’dimat/alamkāra-vattva) is the definition of poetry. Having either of the attributes means to be different from something which is different (from poetry) (i.e. to be poetry itself.). Or, the definition terminates into saying that (that sentence is said to be poetry) which is the instrument of special happiness. The ancients hold that these two qualities (viz. *rasā*’dimat-tva and *sukhaviśeṣa-kṛt-tva*) are present even in cases (of sentences) where the meaning of the ‘*samudāya*’ is even absent (i.e. wherein only the meaning of parts is prevalent such as in ‘*pañkaja*’ meaning ‘that which is born in mud’ and not lotus’ - the *samudāya* meaning.) This opinion of the ancients cannot be traced for the present. We cannot say for certain who these ancients are. Or, it may mean that according to the ancients, even if the whole ‘*samudāya*’, i.e. the whole of poetry is not found to be ‘*rasavat*’, even then the two qualities are at least partially present in a given poem. Keśava then observes : by ‘*śrutam*’ is meant ‘is said to be only. By this word, ‘*śruam*’ the vedic ritual causing ‘*adṛṣṭa*’ or ‘*apūrva*’ giving rise to varieties of happiness is not meant here.

Keśava then has a dig at other definitions. He says - “*kecit tu - ‘tad a-doṣau...*”. This is a clear reference to Mammāṭa. But he does not discuss his point and leaves it at this only showing perhaps his displeasure with Mammāṭa. He also quotes ‘*apare*’ saying, “*rasa-pratipatti (guṇa) dvārā sukhaviśeṣa-sādhanaṃ vākyam kāvyam*’ iti *apare*.” - i.e., by (the attribute) *rasa-pratipatti* or apprehension of *rasa*, is meant such sentence to be poetry, which causes a special happiness. Then he says, “*kecit tu padāvalī kāvyam*” - which is perhaps a reference to Daṇḍin. Perhaps he gives a common answer to all these definitions. He goes on to observe that, “*na tu nir-doṣa-guṇavadādi; kāvyā-doṣāṇām aparigaṇanā-’patteḥ.*” i.e. the attributes viz. ‘*nir-doṣam*’ (i.e. *a-doṣau*) and ‘*guṇavad*’ (i.e. *sa-guṇau*) of *kāvya* cannot be accepted as there arises the contingency of not being able to count the poetic blemishes. (perhaps, he suggests that even some *doṣas* are not permanent *doṣas*, so to count *doṣas* is not possible). He further observes that, “*na ca - doṣābhāva-ghaṭita-kāvyatva-jñānārthaṃ eva, pratiyogī parigaṇanaṃ - iti vācyam.*” (pp. 3 *ibid*). He further observes : “*na ca etat kāvyam duṣṭam*” iti *an-udbhāvanā*’*patteḥ*, ‘*idaṃ kāvyam eva na iti abhidhānasya eva, ucitatvāt - ity āhuḥ tanna. tavāyam heturā*’*bhāsa itivad ukteḥ. vyāptiviśiṣṭa-pakṣa-dharmasyaiva hetutvāt. na ca hetutvena abhimata iti vācyam. tulyatvāt iti. vastutas tat kāvyam pṛthag eva yatra doṣa-guṇādi-cintā. na hi śariraṃ śariraṃ eva na bhavati, iti anye.*

He seems to criticize the attribute ‘*a-doṣau*’ in definitions such as those coined by Mammāṭa and others and seems to recommend that poetry is possible even if poetic

blemishes are seen in it. He says that the observations of the predecessors can not be accepted for, those who hold that if it is understood that the mention of pratiyogi - (i.e. a-kāvya or absence of poetry) is for the understanding that poetry can be caused by absence of poetic blemish only, it is not proper, because in that case the apprehension viz. "this poetry is free from blemishes" will not arise, and instead, only an apprehension that, "this is no poetry et al", will follow. Because in that case a poetry with no faults only will be called poetry for only there the invariable concomitance of "yatra yatra doṣābhāvatvaṃ tatra tatra kāvyatvaṃ" will be applicable. But this sort of vyāpti is not accepted as a hetu of kāvyatva. As a body with deformities does not cease to be body, in the same way poetry with poetic blemishes does not cease to be poetry. Thus Keśava seems to follow the original source, so far as available documents are concerned, the school of critics such as Caṇḍidāsa the commentator of Mammata and Viśvanātha and the rest who are angry with Mammata and others who include 'adoṣau' or absence of poetic blemish as an attribute of poetic word and meaning, in the definition of poetry.

Keśava then quotes the definitions given by his predecessors. He quotes Mammata first and leaves it without comment. It should be noted that Kesava does not seem to revel in the refutation of others as is done by Viśvanātha. He quotes 'apare' - saying, (Ist Marīci) : "rasa-pratipatti-dvārā sukha-viśesa-sādhanaṃ vākyaṃ kāvyam |" (pp. 3) i.e. "Poetry is that sentence which through the apprehension of rasa, becomes the instrument of a special (form of) happiness." Who these 'a-pare' are is not known but this comes closer to Viśvanātha. Then Keśava observes - "kecit tu padāvalī kāvyam" i.e. for some, 'a string of words' is poetry. These people, he observes, do not include the attributes viz. 'nir-doṣa' and 'guṇa-var' etc., because of the contingency of there being (innumerable) poetic blemishes which defy counting. They hold that it is not pertinent to hold that only for a clear understanding of poetry which is the creation of absence of blemishes, we should cultivate the knowledge of blemishes (- na ca doṣābhāva-ghaṭita-kāvyatva-jñānārthaṃ eva pratiyogi-parigaṇanam - pp. 3. Ālamkāra śekhara, (A. śe.), Edn. N.S., Bombay, '26). (objector) Because, (in the absence of understanding of poetic blemishes), there will not be such cognition as, 'this poetry is having blemishes', and it will be only a proper observation that 'this is no poetry at all'. (So, the objector again suggests that the knowledge of poetic blemishes is essential). To this the siddhāntin says that this objection represents only a 'hetvābhāsa' i.e. false reasoning. Real 'hetu' is having qualities of 'vyāpti-viśiṣṭa-tva' i.e. - having concomitance and it resides in the 'pakṣa' i.e. substratum. The objector cannot say

that here it (= knowledge of blemishes) is taken as a 'hetu'. Actually it is no 'hetu'. Actually that poetry in which there is consideration of excellences and blemishes is different altogether. Not that a body having blemishes is no body at all. This is the opinion of some others.

Keśava observes that earlier in a definition given by 'apare', there was an attribute viz. 'sukha-viśeṣa-sādhanaṃ'. Now, by this 'viśeṣa' is meant 'speciality of being an instrument in winning such things as fame and the like.' To support this, he quotes two definitions without mentioning the name, but they are one each from Vāgbhaṭa (I) and Bhoja (in S.K.). The definitions are read as :

“sādhū-śabdārtha-sandarbhāṃ
guṇālaṃkāra-bhūṣitaṃ |
sphuṭa-rīti-rasopetaṃ
kāvyāṃ kurvīta kīrtaye.” (I. 2. vāgbhaṭā'laṃkāra)

and,

nirdoṣāṃ guṇavat kāvyāṃ
ālaṃkārair ālaṃkṛtaṃ |
rasānvitaṃ kaviḥ kurvan
prītiṃ kīrtiṃ ca vindati. (I. 2. S. K.; Bhoja)

Keśava leaves the discussion here only.

Keśva is taken as a predecessor of Viśvanātha by some scholars. At least this impression is created by Dr. P. Sri. Ramachandrudu in his, “the contribution of paṇḍitarāja Jagannātha to sanskrit poetics” (Vol. I. pub. - nīrājanā publishers and book sellers, Delhi. 7, 1st Edn. '83, pp. 41, 42) where the learned professor treats Keśava first, followed by both Caṇḍidāsa and Viśvanātha-kavirāja (pp. 42 ibid). We have chosen to follow the lead of Dr. De. S. K., (Skt. Poetics) in matters concerning chronology. Dr. Ramachandrudu observes : (pp. 42, ibid) - 'Keśava, while remarking 'tadubhayānyatara-vattvaṃ' must have been influenced by the views expressed by Govinda Ṭhaṅkura in Pradīpa. For there, differing with (from ?) Mammaṭa he remarks that “camatkāra” being the essence of poetry, it should contain either Rasa or Ālaṃkāra, for producing Camatkāra (Pradīpa, K.P. p. 10). Again Keśava's last remark, 'sukha-viśeṣa-sādhanaṃ vā lakṣaṇaṃ' is an indirect acceptance of 'camatkāra-vattva' as the Lakṣaṇa. In this context Keshava Mishra quotes two more lakṣaṇas by some old unknown authors, who appear to be in favour of accepting śabda as the body of a poem.”

Here again, Dr. Sri. Ramacandraru seems to take even Govinda Ṭhākara as prior to Keśava and therefore prior to Viśvanātha.

Caṇḍidāsa who comments on the K.P., and who is the great grand-father of Viśvanātha, defines kāvya as : “āsvāda-jīvaṛuḥ padasandarbhah kāvyam”, which is quoted by Dr. P. V. Kane in his History of Sanskrit Poetics (pp. 354). Thus for Caṇḍidāsa poetry is ‘collection or arrangement of words, with (rasa) āsvāda i.e. relish as its soul.’ This is what later Viśvanātha almost translates as “vākyam rasā”tmakam kāvyam”. These attempts at giving greater importance to śabda or word element in the definition of poetry, lays the road to Paṇḍitarāja Jagannātha who clearly advocates this position.

Jagannātha : (= J.). When J. arrived on the horizon of literary criticism, he not only had inherited the above trend, but was also nurtured in the atmosphere of learning, vibrant with the air of navya-nyāya discipline and vyākaraṇaśāstra. He tries to frame his definition of poetry in the most accurate terminology with the help of navya-nyāya style of writing. We believe in an opinion aired by responsible scholars that navya-nyāya is less of an independent darśana and more of an attempt at most accurate and scientific drafting of views concerning various subjects, including kāvyasāstra here in particular.

J. starts by defining poetry first as, “ramaṇīyārtha-pratipāḍakah śabdah (kāvyam).” (R. G. pp. 4). Thus for him poetry is that ‘word which conveys a beautiful sense.’ J. then elucidates what is exactly meant by ‘ramaṇīya’ or ‘beautiful’, and cites two more definitions of poetry trying to improve upon the original definition as quoted above. Thus the next two definitions of poetry serve as amplifications of the earlier definition. As observed by us, the trend of paying greater importance to the ‘word’ element as compared with the ‘artha’ element while defining poetry was noticed first, in available documents, in Daṇḍin’s Kāvyaadarśa, who observed that poetry was, “iṣṭārtha-vyavacchinā padāvaliḥ.” Dr. Ramachandraru (pp. 43, ibid) holds that this is not a full lakṣaṇa given by Daṇḍin but only a part of it, “and the complete lakṣaṇa can be inferred only on combining what was said by him in different places...” We beg to differ. Daṇḍin’s words are - “śarīraṃ tāvat...”. Here the use of ‘tāvat’, as done later by Ānandavardhana and explained by Abhinavagupta, suggests that, “there is no difference of opinion concerning this fact that, poetry is arrangement (or group, combination) of words... etc.” The force of ‘tāvat’ is unmistakable. Yes, the scope of poetry is larger than the definition, and is explained by us earlier. But the same is the case with Bhāmaha also, as also explained by us earlier. But the fact stands that Daṇḍin’s definition precisely puts greater weight on ‘word’ element, as is done by J.

J. after defining poetry as above, continues to explain minutely the import of the term 'ramaṇīya'. He explains that 'ramaṇīya-artha' is not to be taken in a broad sense so as to include statements such as, 'putras te jātaḥ', 'a son is born to you', which is a pleasant statement causing joy to the person concerned. Such statements causing boundless pleasure, cannot be termed poetry. So, J. observes that what is meant by 'ramaṇiyatā' is 'lokottara-āhlādajanaka-jñāna-gocaratā.' i.e. 'being the object of such knowledge or information as that which causes delight of an extra-ordinary type.' The above quoted statement causes only worldly pleasure which is only personal. For J. 'lokottaratva' is equivalent to 'camatkāratva', which is for him a special type - 'jātivīśeṣa' and therefore beyond the lack of 'anugama' i.e. comprehension. The R. G. (pp. 5) observes that this special type of joy - camatkāratva - is to be realized through one's own experience and that it cannot be described in words. This special joy - 'lokottara-āhlāda' is the result of 'bhāvanā', which is constant or repeated contemplation over kāvyārtha. J. is very clear about the fact that as 'kāvyā' i.e. poetry is the topic of discussion, only that attribute which can distinguish 'kāvyā' from other likes such as 'śāstra', 'purāṇa', etc. can be its distinguishing mark i.e. lakṣaṇa. Thus, for 'kāvyā' this special attribute is 'kāvyatva'. Thus the examination of what exactly is this distinguishing mark called 'kāvyatva' is, - forms the matter of investigation in the present context. The poet and the man of taste stand in need of a clear understanding of the nature of poetry which causes fame and extra-ordinary pleasure. So, a definition of it is being framed to define poetry - kāvyā - which is presented through the *(use of) excellences and beautiful turns of speech*, a definition which clearly explains its speciality, to distinguish kāvyā from anything else than poetry : (R. G. pp. 4) : "tatra kīrti-paramā"hlāda-guru-rājā-devatā-prasādādy aneka-prayojanakasya kāvyasya vyutpatteḥ kavi-saḥrīdayayor-āvaśyakatayā guṇālamkāradibhir nirūpaṇīye tasmin, viśeṣyatāvacchedakam tad-itara-bheda-buddhau sādhanam ca tallakṣaṇam tāvan-nirūpyate."

Here, particularly the words viz. "tasmin viśeṣyatāvacchedakam tad-itara-bheda-buddhau ca sādhanam lakṣaṇam" deserve special attention. By 'lakṣaṇa' is meant an un-common attribute i.e. distinguishing mark. Now that which is an exclusive attribute of poetry should be taken as its 'lakṣaṇa' or distinctive mark. As observed earlier the characteristic viz. 'kāvyatva' distinguishes poetry from śāstra and the rest, and gives an idea of how the rest are different from poetry. Thus the special attribute viz. 'kāvyatva' makes for the instrument that distinguishes poetry from other substances : "tad itara bheda-buddhau sādhanam." In śāstra, two aims or 'prayojanas' of 'lakṣaṇa' or definition are laid down as : "vyāvṛttir-vyavahāro vā

lakṣaṇasya prayojanam” (Tarka-dīpikā). Thus the first aim is to distinguish a given item which is to be defined, from other objects. The second aim is that an object which is to be defined becomes useful for vyavahāra i.e. practical purposes. Out of these the first aim or prayojana is given as above. Now that lakṣaṇa i.e. asādhāraṇa-dharma-distinguishing characteristic or mark, brings poetry in daily usage, by becoming viśeṣyatāvacchedaka - i.e., the mark viz. by becoming an agent of suggesting speciality, brings poetry in daily usage. This is the second aim of ‘lakṣaṇa’. Keeping these two characteristics of a ‘lakṣaṇa’ or definition J. has tried to frame the definition of poetry. If we take ‘guṇā-lakṣārā”dī’ i.e. excellences and figures of speech as viśeṣaṇa or attributes, then kāvya i.e. poetry becomes ‘viśeṣya’ or a particular entity which is to be defined and which is contextual. Now in that poetry which is ‘viśeṣya’, a characteristic viz. ‘viśeṣyatā’ is created. This special type of ‘viśeṣyatā’ which is caused by the presence of guṇas and lakṣārās, removes the possibility of other ‘viśeṣyatā’s - i.e. other particularities caused by ‘dravyatva’, ‘śabdātva’ etc. creeping in poetry. Thus speciality in form of being a substance (dravyatva) or in being a word (in general) is excluded from the realm of poetry. Thus the characteristic of being poetry is itself a special characteristic which becomes the avacchedaka-dharma i.e. distinguishing attribute of poetry. Thus ‘kāvya’ is a viśeṣya and in it there is the distinctive characteristic of viśeṣyatā. Again, there is also a special attribute called ‘kāvyatva’ also associated with it. Thus ‘viśeṣyatā’ and ‘kāvyatva’ are two characteristics (= dharma) which are ‘avacchedya’ and ‘avacchedaka’ i.e. distinguishing that viśeṣyatā from other ‘viśeṣyatās’. Now, according to Nyāya-śāstra, the maxim goes as : “samānādhikaranayoḥ eva dharmayoḥ parasparam avacchedya-avacchedakabhāvaḥ.” i.e. two characteristics residing in the same substratum become ‘avacchedya’ and ‘avacchedaka’ with respect to each other. Now this maxim of Nyāya-śāstra can be applied to poetry in the following way.

As two characteristics viz. ‘viśeṣyatā’ and ‘kāvyatva’ reside in the same substratum i.e. kāvya or poetry, out of these two, one viz. ‘kāvyatva’ becomes ‘avacchedaka’ of the other viz. ‘viśeṣyatā’. So, it is to be understood that in the definition of poetry, ‘kāvya’ becomes ‘viśeṣya’ through the characteristic viz. ‘kāvyatva’. So, we have to consider ‘kāvya’ from the point of view of ‘kāvyatva’ only. This means that ‘kāvya’ or poetry is not to be looked at as any physical substance. Again, it is implied that this ‘kāvya’ is characterized by attributes such as guṇas and lakṣārās. If we try to describe its form in such a way, then only we will be able to bring poetry in the sphere of practical usage. Again, when it is stated that poetry is different from other objects like itself, then its ‘bhinnatva’ or

'distinction' is to be understood in two ways. First, we have to point out how 'kāvyā' is different from objects which can be termed as its likes - i.e. 'sa-jātīya'. - i.e. similar objects. This means that poetry is dependent on word-element. So also are the other śāstras. Thus they (i.e. śāstrā"di) are 'sa-jātīya' or similar objects. So, when it is explained how 'kāvyā' is different from its sa-jātīya objects such as śāstrā"di, this is one kind of 'tad-itara-bheda'. The other type of tad-itara-bheda is of the form of the distinction of poetry from objects such as 'katākṣa' i.e. glances of the eye, or 'abhinaya' i.e. acting etc. Now these 'katākṣa' i.e. glances etc. do not depend on śabda i.e. word, so this is the second variety of 'tad-itara-bheda'. J. tries to incorporate both types of distinction in his definition of poetry.

J.'s definition of poetry is free from the three faults viz. a-vyāpti, ati-vyāpti and a-saṃbhava. The term 'ramaṇīya' in the definition, as observed above, excludes the use of word and sense in works on various disciplines - the śāstra-granthas. In the absence of the term 'ramaṇīya', the śāstra-śabda also would have been covered by the realm of poetry, thereby the fault of ati-vyāpti could have crept in the definition. The word 'śabda' in the definition is also to stop the musical notes from being dubbed as poetry. The musical notes are 'ramaṇīya' and tend to suggest ramaṇīya-artha in form of rasa-bhāva and the like. So, in order to prevent the musical notes from being dubbed as poetry, as they also tend to suggest various moods and feelings, the term 'śabda' is included in the definition of poetry. Poetry is for J., a creation of 'śabda' and not of musical notes i.e. svara. For J. here, it may be noted that 'śabda' is that unit of sound which is accompanied by expressed meaning. Mere sound, having no dictionary meaning, or 'abhidhārtha' is no 'śabda' for J. But if this position is accepted then the whole thing amounts to virtually accepting 'śabdārthau' - i.e. both word and sense as poetry. Normally, 'śabda' is always accompanied by meaning. On the other hand 'dhvani' or mere sound having no primary meaning, may not be termed 'śabda', but it has still the capacity to suggest some meaning, i.e. it is capable of 'vyāṅgyārtha', e.g. the blowing of a horn of a vehicle, though not yielding a primary meaning as read in a dictionary. So, J.'s whole effort, not to call 'śabdārthau' as "kāvyam" seems to fall flat. But, it may be said that to his satisfaction he has served his cause of calling poetry as only 'śabdaḥ' and not 'śabdārthau'.

Again, in his definition J. has used the term, 'pratipādaka'. There is a reason behind this. The term 'pratipādaka' means 'that which yields meaning'. J. suggests that this yielding of meaning can be through the agency of any power of word; be it either abhidhā or the primary power of expression, lakṣaṇā, or the secondary

power of word, i.e. indication; or vyañjanā or the suggestive power of word. Thus the term 'pratipādaka' means that the word can be a vācaka, laksaka or a vyañjaka. The basic condition however stands that whatever the type of meaning, it has to be 'ramaṇīya' i.e. beautiful. By this term, viz. 'ramaṇīya' all such sources of beauty such as śabdālamkāra, arthālamkāra, guṇa, bhāva, rasa, etc. are covered up, as they all tend to make for supreme delight. J. hereby also tries to indicate as it were, that the field of poetry would be too narrow if only rasa-bhāva-oriented poetry i.e. only emotive stuff alone is covered by the definition. Thus, J. tries to expand the limits of poetry that were narrowed by the efforts of Mahimā, Viśvanātha and such others. He comes closer to Kuntaka who made an effort to expand the limits of poetry, and also to Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta for whom rasa was 'aesthetic delight', and not just emotive stuff only.

By the term 'śabdaḥ' J. has precluded such things as 'katākṣa' - i.e. glances, abhinaya' i.e. acting etc. from the scope of poetry, as these do not depend on word. By the term 'artha' in the definition he keeps poetry away from the discipline of grammar i.e. vyākaraṇa-śāstra. Only a 'ramaṇīya śabda' by itself does not make for poetry, because the discipline of grammar which accounts for the currency of such a word, is only a 'śabda-pratipādaka' i.e. one taking care of the word, i.e. word in its 'form' only. It is not an artha-pratipādaka discipline. Again, the 'artha' also has to be beautiful or 'ramaṇīya' to make for poetry. So, bare statements such as, 'ghaṭaṃ ānaya' - (please) "Bring a pot", is no poetry. Such statements yielding worldly pleasure as, "There is birth of a son in your family", are also no poetry. By 'ramaṇīya' is meant something extra-worldly - "a-laukika".

J. further elaborating the concept of poetry observes :

(R.G. pp. 4, 5) : "itthaṃ camatkāra-janaka-bhāvanā-viśayārtha-pratipādaka-śabdatvaṃ yat-pratipāditārtha-viśayaka-bhāvanātvaṃ camatkāra-janakatāvacchedakam tattvaṃ, sva-viśiṣṭa-janakatāvacchedakārtha-pratipādakatā-samsargeṇa, camatkāratva-vattvaṃ eva vā kāvyatvaṃ iti phalitam."

As observed earlier, the extra-worldly pleasure is the result of 'bhāvanā' which is 'constant i.e. repeated contemplation' (over kāvyārtha). Here, the word 'bhāvanā' substitutes the word 'jñāna'. Originally, 'ramaṇīyatā' was explained as, "lokottarā"hlāda-janakajñāna-gocaratā". Now for 'jñāna' the word 'bhāvanā' is preferred when J. explains 'ramaṇīyatā' as "lokottara-āhlāda-janaka-bhāvanā-gocaratā." This substitution of the word is necessitated because of the fact that there is some possibility of "samūha-ālamkāra-jñāna" (or cognitive mixture) also to be taken as "camatkāra-janaka-jñāna". The samūhālamkāra-jñāna comprises

of two cognitions of which one is 'ramaṇīyārtha' and the other 'a-ramaṇīyārtha'. Such a possibility is removed by replacing the term 'jñāna' by the newer term 'bhāvanā'. 'Bhāvanā' is a chain of cognitions which is connected only with 'ramaṇīya-artha' here, i.e. under special circumstances. So, as quoted above, for J. 'that word is poetry, which gives, such a meaning which is the object of 'bhāvanā' which yields 'camatkāra'. Or, poetry is that word, which, yields such a meaning, the 'bhāvanā' of which has a speciality to create 'camatkāra'. Or, 'kāvyarva' means being associated with 'camatkāratā' caused by collection of words that give a meaning which has the capacity to qualify bhāvanā with ānanda-janakatā i.e., the bhāvanā which creates delight qualified by 'camatkāratā'.

The simple explanation of this discussion amounts to the following easy explanation. There is a specific bhāvanā (i.e. constant thinking) which yields extra-worldly joy. The meaning of poetry becomes the object of such a 'bhāvanā'. The word that gives this sort of a meaning yields a special camatkāra. This camatkāra is kāvya. Thus we arrive at -

"camatkāra-janaka-bhāvanā-viṣayārtha - pratipādaka-śabdatvam." (R.G. p. 5). Herein, the word 'bhāvanā' stands for a special type of knowledge as already explained by J. So, the word 'jñāna' is taken out and is replaced by the word 'bhāvanā'. As noted earlier the word 'jñāna' was wide enough to include 'samūhā"lambana jñāna' also, which is not acceptable to J., for this means, "nānā-prakāratā-nirūpīta-nānā-mukhya-viśeṣyatāśāli ekaṃ (jñānaṃ) samūhā"lambanam." A cognition which covers many objects appearing differently, is one pertaining to a group and is therefore termed 'samūhā"lambana'. For example, when we say, "this pot", "that pillar", "this piece of cloth" etc., the cognition covering all three objects is termed group-cognition i.e. samūhā"lambana jñāna. The objects of such a cognition are many and so also words that convey these objects are many. If in the definition of poetry, as we explained earlier, the term 'jñāna' were preferred to bhāvanā, then such samūhā"lambana-jñāna would also have made for poetry. But such group-cognitions have a-ramaṇīya cognitions also as part of them and so J. disapproves of the term 'jñāna' in preference to 'bhāvanā', which is thinking of only one (ramaṇīya) object.

But even in this amplification there is a loose string. Of course, by the term 'bhāvanā' the meaning of repeated thinking of only one object is arrived at, which in śāstrīya jargon can be termed 'dhārāvāhika jñāna' or cognition in form of continuity. But by bringing in the definition such a continuous stream of cognition of one object only, there is no guarantee for its making for 'camatkāra'. Bhāvanā is only another name of dhārāvāhikajñāna. But this can have a dry object also at

its centre, which may not cause camatkāra. So, there can be the fault of 'ativyāpti' i.e. being too wide, in the definition where there is possibility of the creeping in of such a bhāvanā concerning un-interesting object. To avoid this contingency of 'ativyāpti' J. modifies the definition still further.

He uses the words, "bhāvanātvam camatkāra-janakatāvacchedakam." A śabda or a sentence gives a meaning in a particular order and then the bhāvanā or constant thinking with that vākyārtha as its object or 'viśaya' arises. This bhāvanā produces camatkāra. As the bhāvanā is camatkāra-janaka, the bhāvanātvam becomes "camatkāra-janakatāvacchedaka." Such a sentence in this special order can be taken as 'kāvyā'. Thus the definition would mean, "the śabda (i.e. sentence) of particular order, the meaning of which is the object of bhāvanā is kāvyā, when such a bhāvanā is camatkāra-janaka. Thus the bhāvanātvam is camatkāra-janakatāvacchedaka. Now the group of sentences in the dhārāvāhika-jñāna cannot be said to have that particular order that yields camatkāra, and so the ativyāpti doṣa is avoided, because only the sentence first heard in a particular order produces camatkāra and not all the sentences in the dhārāvāhika-jñāna. Thus the second definition is free from the faults of ativyāpti, avyāpti and asambhava.

But then still a small difficulty has crept in even here. A scientific definition has to be as brief as possible. Dr. P. Sri. Ramacandrudu (pp. 45, 46) observes that, "Not content with this, PR (= Paṇḍita Rāja) gives another amplification in Anugama style. He feels that the second one is much cumbersome because it contains "yacchabda" and "tacchabda", which being the words of uncertain meanings, hinder the Anugama. Therefore he gives a third modified lakṣaṇa which is comparatively simple according to the tradition of the Tarkikas as there will be no need of bringing many things into śabda-bodha as in the case of the second form of lakṣaṇa. The final lakṣaṇa is : "sva-viśiṣṭa-janakatāvacchedakārtha-pratipādakatā-saṃsargeṇa camatkārattva-vattvam kāvyattvam." (R.G. pp. 5). In this lakṣaṇa, a long compound is placed to show the relation with 'camatkāra'. According to the nyāyaśāstra, no relation (saṃbandha) or doubt (saṃśaya) is expressed by a word directly, because such a saṃbandha is collected automatically by the force of its own self (sva-māhātmya). So, such relation need not be expressed in a lakṣaṇa. So, the third definition is as brief and perfect as possible. 'Saṃsarga' or 'saṃbandha' is automatically conveyed as in, "ghaṭavat bhūtaḥ". The relation between pot and surface is that of 'saṃyoga' (= accidental relation). This relation is automatically brought out - "saṃsarga-maryādayā." Gadādhara observes in 'Vyutpattivāda', in this context, "śābdabodhe caika-padārthe apara-padārthasya saṃsargaḥ saṃsarga-maryādayā bhāṣate."

So, J. has framed the third brief definition as - “camatkāra-vattvaṃ kāvyattvaṃ”. In this definition, the saṃsarga, viz. “sva-viśiṣṭa - janakatā-vacchedakārtha-pratipādakatā” is of course a long one, but this may not be brought into verbal explanation viz. śabda-bodha. This means that the word has the capacity to express a meaning which becomes the object of ‘bhāvana’ i.e. constant thinking. This means that the word has the attribute of ‘artha-pratipādakatā’ and by the relation with this attribute, ‘camatkāratva’ is associated with śabda. And only this camatkāratva can be designated as ‘kāvyatva’. No other ‘camatkāratva’ can be said to be ‘kāvyatva’. This is the simple meaning of the compound. When the meaning is said to be, “sva-viśiṣṭa-janakatā-vacchedaka”, the ‘sva’ in it means ‘camatkāratva’. Qualified by this, the joy or pleasure (= ānand, āhlāda) enter into bhāvanā. Thus ‘bhāvanā’ causes āhlāda or joy qualified by camatkāra. But this joy caused by the bhāvanā depends on ‘kāvyārtha’ i.e. poetic meaning alone. So, in nyāya terminology it is stated here, that ‘artha’ is the ‘avacchedaka’ of the janakatā (= causality) which lies in the bhāvanā. In simple words this can be put as, “whatever joy is derived by kāvyā-bhāvanā in kāvyā, is caused by its meaning only. No other object, except the kāvyārtha or poetic meaning can cause this special joy. So, the attribute (= dharma) which distinguishes this ‘janakatā’ residing in ‘bhāvanā’ is the poetic meaning only. So, bhāvanā with reference to the (poetic) meaning causes a special joy which is poetry itself. ‘Artha’ - poetic meaning is the distinguishing mark-avacchedaka-of the joy caused by ‘bhāvanā’, cannot be said to be born of poetry (= kāvyā-janya). Thus J. has drafted three definitions with a special intention in his mind. To remove the loop-hole in the first definition, the second one is given, and the third one is attempted to clear any fault seen in the second one. He also accomplished brevity thereby. The long compound seen in the third definition helps the cause of brevity and it indicates only the relation between śabda-poetic word and ‘camatkāratva’ - “sva-viśiṣṭa-janakatā-vacchedakārtha-pratipādakatā.”

In the first definition J. has suggested that, “artha-pratipādaka-śabdatva is kāvyatva.” By this he has emphasised the importance of śabda only in poetry. In the second definition he has put weight on the word ‘bhāvanā’. Thereby he suggests that by repeated thinking of poetry only, the quality of joy or camatkāratva is caused. In the third definition it is emphasised that the ‘camatkāra’ means extra-worldly joy and this is derived from poetry only. Only poetry, and poetry alone can generate this extra-ordinary pleasure. Thus in these three definitions J. has emphasized three important points. After this J. evaluates the definitions cited by Mammaṭa and Viśvanātha.

Jagannātha on Mammāṭa :

Mammāṭa has defined poetry as 'śabdārthau.' J. feels that this is not correct, as there is no authority for this. On the other hand, such popular usages as, "kāvyā is read loudly," "meaning is derived from poetry," "I heard poetry, but could not catch its meaning," etc. point to the fact that by the term 'kāvyā' is meant a special type of word only, i. e. word which gives a beautiful meaning.

The objector (i.e. the supporters of Mammāṭa) can argue that, first define poetry as word and sense and then as we have to give more importance to word from the point of view of practical usage, we can resort to secondary power-lakṣaṇā-with reference to the term 'kāvyā' to derive the meaning of 'word' only. So, for this, there is no need to define poetry as "śabdaḥ kāvyam." The basic purpose can be served by "śabdārthau kāvyam" also.

To this, J.'s reply is as follows : The objector's view can be accepted only if there is any authority in favour of taking the term 'kāvyā' to mean 'śabdārtha-yugala' i.e. both word and sense—by the power of denotation i. e. abhidhāśakti. But there is no greater authority to this effect. We cannot accept this merely relying on the word of the objector. So, in the absence of any authority in favour of accepting the term 'kāvyā' meaning both word and sense by abhidhāśakti, how can we reject the abhidhāśakti of the term 'kāvyā' as 'word yielding a beautiful meaning,' on the basis of usages quoted as above ?

So, by 'kāvyā' is meant only a special type of word alone, and it is therefore pertinent to define only this special variety of word. It is not proper to define 'kāvyā' which is imagined by the opponent (i. e. Mammāṭa) as both 'word and sense.' J. adds that this practice of taking kāvyā to mean only word alone, should also be utilized in defining vedas, purāṇas etc. also, because this practice is supported by public usage. The only difference is that word in poetry is yielding a charming meaning, while the word in vedas and purāṇas is yielding instruction i.e. "upadeśa."

J. further continues his refutation and considers yet another option. 'āsvādobdhabodhakatva' 'to evoke delight' is the cause of 'kāvyatva' i. e. poetry. So at all places where we find this characteristic of causing delight, we understand the presence of 'kāvyatva.' Now this special attribute is seen in both word and meaning equally and so, the objector feels that poetry should equally be found resting in sense also and not in word alone. But J. feels that this argument is not valid. The fact is that any 'rāga'-melody in music is also 'āsvādobdhabodhaka,' and this

is accepted even by the Dhvanikāra and others, and so the above definition of poetry will also be found applicable to any *rāga*-melody of music. Again the factors of *nāṭya*-dramatic—art such as *abhinaya* or acting, *veśa* i.e. costumes, *bhāṣaṇa* i.e. dialogue, etc. are also conveyors of aesthetic delight (*rasa*), like '*rāga*' of music, and so even they will have to be termed '*kāvya*' or poetry. So, the opinion that whatever is '*āsvādódbodhaka*'-causing relish-is *kāvya*, is refuted and hence, the definition-viz. "whatever is capable of evoking *rasa*—'*rasódbodhana-samartha*' is *kāvya*" does not stand.

J. puts a further question to the objectors who uphold M.'s views. The question is, "what do you feel is the '*pravṛtti-nimitta*' of the term '*kavya*' ? Is it used for the twin of *śabda* and *artha* together, or for each of these two independently ? : "*api ca kāvyaśabda-pravṛtti-nimittaṃ śabdārtha-vyāsaktaṃ pratyeka-paryāptaṃ vā ?*" (R. G. pp. 6). First, we have to grasp the exact connotation of the word "*pravṛtti-nimitta*." This technical term occurs in the *pūrva-mīmāṃsā-śāstra*, quite often. Its definition is cited as, "*pada-śakyatā-avacchedakam*"—i.e. that which gives the special connotative power to a given '*pada*' i.e. word. Why a particular meaning is to be derived from a particular word is explained by the *nyāya-śāstrin* in the following manner. He feels that there is a special meaning in a given '*pada*'—word. This '*dharma*' distinguishes that '*padārtha*' from other '*padārthas*' or word-meanings. Because of such a special '*dharma*' or characteristic, special words give special meanings. And this is indicated by the particular '*pada*' or word concerned. In the definition of '*pravṛtti-nimitta*' cited as above, the term '*śakya*' means the meaning of a *pada*. So, that particular '*śakyatā*'—capacity to yield a particular meaning—is whatever the distinguishing factor of a given '*padārthatā*.' This is termed as "*śakyatā-avacchedaka*." This special attribute in any '*padārtha*' is the '*nimitta*' or cause for the '*pravṛtti*' i.e. popular usage of a given '*pada*.' This '*pravṛtti*' is its capacity to give a particular meaning. e.g. if you ask how the term '*go*' gives the meaning of '*a cow*' ?— the answer is, there is a special quality of '*go-tva*' in the word '*go*', which helps the particular word '*go*', to give the meaning viz. '*a cow*'. In the same way, there is a special quality of '*kāvyatva*', in the word '*kāvya*', which is the '*pravṛtti-nimitta*' of the word '*kāvya*.' What is the form of this special quality called '*kāvyatva*' ? The reply to this question as given by *Bhāmaha*, *Mammata* and others is different from the one given by J. The former take the twin of word and meaning to mean *kāvyatva*, and hold the same as the '*pravṛtti-nimitta*' of '*kāvya*.'

Now, after clearing the concept of '*pravṛtti-nimitta*' we will continue with J.'s line of thinking. For J., it is not possible to accept the first alternative i.e. of

taking the pravṛtti-nimitta of kāvyatva with reference to both word and sense taken together. Like the usage of a sentence viz. "One cannot be called two," any śloka-vākya i.e. collection of words in poetry will not be said to be poetry. To put it more clearly we may say that, if kāvya is accepted as consisting of both of word and sense, we will have to take a position whether the two together (vyāsakta) or separately (= pratyeka paryāpta) should be taken as kāvyatva. Either of these two alternatives is untenable because in the former case such expressions as, 'the sentence of a verse is not a 'kāvya'—“śloka-vākyaṃ na kāvyam” will come into vogue, on the basis of the general rule that, 'one is not two'—'eko na dvau.' In the latter case, two kāvyas will have to be accepted in one verse. So, concludes J., the definition of kāvya, be associated with śabda—i.e. 'word' alone as in case of the definitions of veda and purāṇa also—“eṣaiva ca veda-purāṇa-lakṣaṇatve'pi gatiḥ, anyathā tatrā'pi iyaṃ duravasthā syāt. J. therefore concludes : tasmāt veda-śāstra-purāṇa-lakṣaṇasya iva kāvya-lakṣaṇasya api śabda-niṣṭhatā eva ucitā.” (R. G. pp. 7).

The thrust of J.'s argument is that if we take both word and sense together as poetry, then we will have to accept that word alone is not kāvya, and if we accept the second alternative then there will follow the contingency of accepting two kāvyas in a single sentence, one of the form of word alone, and another of the form of sense alone. So, there is an escape, according to J., from this, by accepting the fact of a word, characterised by charming sense - ramaṇīyārtha viśiṣṭa śabda- only as poetry.

To be very frank, to us this sounds not as 'tarka' but 'vitaṇḍā' i.e. fallacious argument. J. holds that if word and sense together are taken as 'kāvya', then only word will not be a kāvya. But this is exactly what we want. J. distinguished the 'svara' i.e. note of music as something different from 'śabda' of poetry which is always associated with poetic meaning. So pure word — i.e. pure dhvani, i.e. pure 'svara' is no poetry even for us. Such popular usages as “kāvyam śṛtaṃ, artho na jñātaḥ” does not support that poetry is word alone. This usage only suggests that 'poetic word' — with a special meaning which is always inherently present, is not understood by all. It requires a special faculty—sahṛdayatva—on the part of listener also, to get at poetic meaning. So, popular usages do not go against our taking poetry as both word and sense together. Even for J. poetic word is necessarily associated with poetic meaning. If there are two sides of the coin, the coin does not become 'two'. There is no independent existence of a coin beyond its two sides. So, it is not proper on J.'s part to say 'one is two.' Thus, J.'s position is really vulnerable.

We know that kuntaka also has thought of J.'s arguments in anticipation and has asserted that both word and sense taken together make for poetry.

Next, J. proceeds to criticise Mammaṭa's definition still further with reference to the mentioning of 'guṇas' and 'alaṃkāras.' J. argues that if M.'s position is accepted, then such illustrations as "uditam maṇḍalam vidhoḥ" will cease to be poetry, and hence 'a-vyāpti-doṣa' will follow. J. argues that when this statement is pronounced by agents such as sārīkā, or virahīṇī i.e. a woman in separation from her loving husband etc. such matters as 'abhisaraṇa', its negation, the time when vital airs are about to leave the body, etc. etc. are suggested which make it an illustration charged with suggested sense. But in the absence of guṇa-and alaṃkāra this poetry will be taken as 'a-kāvya' or no poetry ! Same will be the case of such illustrations as "gatoṣṭam arkaḥ" etc. The objector (i. e. M.) will not be able to call it 'no-poetry' because in that case whatever is taken as poetry will be branded by the siddhāntin (i. e. J.) as no-poetry ! In reality, in both the illustrations cited above, 'camatkāra' seems to follow equally. J. further argues that M. has incorporated guṇālaṃkāra in the definition of poetry without clarifying the pravṛtti-nimitta—i. e. the 'anugata-dharma.' Now, argues J., that as 'ghaṭatva' is the anumata-dharma in ghaṭa, similarly in all alaṃkāras, there is no alaṃkāratva as an anumata-dharma. The reason is that as for the nature and number of alaṃkāratva and alaṃkāras respectively, there is no unanimity of opinion. Thus, in the absence of a fixed form and nature of both guṇa and alaṃkāra, how can they find a place in the definition of poetry ?

J. says that perhaps the followers of Mammaṭa (= M.) may argue that the 'anugata-dharma' of both guṇa and alaṃkāra is not uncertain. Because it is fixed respectively, as "kāvyā-dharmatva or rasa-dharmatva is guṇatva," and "kāvyā-dharmatva or kāvyā-śobhā-ādhāyakatva is alaṃkāratva." J. for the time being accepts this position and turns his guns towards a new aim, such as "a-doṣau."

Here also, we disagree with J. As seen above even J. is silenced by the last argument. But even in his earlier thinking there is lack of perfection. The illustration 'uditam maṇḍalam vibhoḥ' is not without a guṇa. For, we feel that even here the guṇa called 'prasāda' is very much there for its presence is accepted by Ānandavardhana and the whole lot of dhvanivādins in all rasas and all types of good poetic compositions—i. e. 'sarvatra.' Prasāda-guṇa is said to be "sarvatra-vihita-sthitiḥ." The second argument that the nature and number of poetic figures-alaṃkāras-is not fixed,—is also not accepted by us. Even from the times of earlier aestheticians as Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin, the wider concept of alaṃkāras was in

vogue and Vāmana had tried to coin it as “saudaryam alaṃkāraḥ.” It was a universal ‘kāvyā-śobhā-kāra-dharma’ for Daṇḍin and “vakroktiḥ” for Bhāmaha. It is not proper on the part of J. to perform gaja-nimīlikā-to this ‘darśana’ of the ancients. As for the number, it is innumerable; for any new poetic turn by any newer poet springs a new alaṃkāra which yields poetic beauty ! So, it is not proper for J. to attack M.’s definition of poetry, in this way.

Let us now follow J. about his views concerning ‘a-doṣau’. J. argues that this term need not be read in the definition because a poem does not cease to be poetry even if a poetic blemish is seen therein. J. here also takes recourse to popular usage such as “duṣṭam kāvyam” i.e. this poetry is having a poetic blemish.” J. feels that if we insist on ‘a-doṣau’, then in the presence of even a small blemish good poetry will turn into no-poetry ! We feel that here J. is under the impression of Viśvanātha’s line of thinking. J. argues that if ‘a-doṣau’ is insisted upon, then a number of verses or poems from Kālidāsa’s pen will cease to be poetry, and the popular usage such as “duṣṭam kāvyam” will also become redundant. J. here considers the view of the objector (i. e. supporters of M.) which runs as follows. The pūrva-pakṣa can say that even in a duṣṭa-kāvya i.e. in poetry with poetic blemishes, there is necessarily the presence of both word and sense. So, such poetry with blemishes can be termed poetry secondarily. But for J. this is not acceptable. He feels that it is not proper for the objector first to negate poetry because of the presence of a poetic blemish and then to accept it secondarily only to justify such popular usages as “duṣṭam kāvyam”! In fact, argues J., there is no scope for indicative power i.e. lakṣaṇā-śakti, here. If popular usage is contradicted by any direct means of knowledge, then only there is scope for lakṣaṇā. But here, in case of ‘duṣṭam kāvyam’, it is possible to support it from another angle also. So, in the absence of mukhyārtha-bādha’, etc. there is no scope for lakṣaṇā according to J. When the siddhāntin (i. e. J.) does not mention ‘a-doṣatva’ in the definition, he has no difficulty in explaining the loka-vyavahāra or popular usage such as “duṣṭam kāvyam.”

The objector has yet another argument to support ‘a-doṣau.’ It proceeds like this — just as a tree which has no external connection i.e. ‘saṃyoga’ and yet there is nothing wrong when we say that it is having connection, i.e. it is ‘saṃyogin’, in the same way, poetry in one portion is without a blemish if in other part a blemish is located. This argument will be clearer by an illustration. ‘Saṃyoga’ or external connection is said to be ‘a-vyāpya-vṛtti’ when there is atyanta-abhāva and partial abhāva of the same. When a bird is sitting on the top of a tree, there is relation of

the bird with the tree, but as the bird is not in connection with the root of that tree, we can also say that there is absense of connection between the bird and the tree. Thus in case of the bird, we can say that both vṛkṣa-samyoga and vṛkṣa-samyoga-abhāva reside simultaneously with reference to the tree concerned. Thus, the samyoga is said to be a-vyāpya-vṛtti i.e. not total, but partial. Similarly, with reference to the usage such as duṣṭaṃ kāvyam, there is kāvyatva in one portion of poetry, and its absence in another. So, in a given poem both kāvyatva and kāvyatva-abhāva will be accepted to stay simultaneously. But J. is not prepared to accept such a-vyāpya-vṛttitā in case of kāvyatva as this is not experienced by all people with exception and without doubt ! So, the argument of the objector, according to J. does not stand to reason. We had earlier seen that Viśvanātha had also argued in the same manner suggesting that the tug-of-war between kāvyatva and a-kāvyatva with reference to the same piece of poetry, will lead us nowhere !

But as in case of Viśvanātha, so in case of J. also, the position taken by us earlier while dealing with Viśvanātha remains the same. M.'s very concept of a doṣa is 'mukhyārtha hatih,' and 'mukhya' is only 'rasa'. So, only such 'doṣas' are potent doṣas and they have not only to be totally avoided but the younger aspirants have to be instructed to that effect while explaining the nature and scope of true poetry. The arguments advanced by both Viśvanātha and J. are directed in a wrong direction altogether.

J. also exhibits a narrow and too literal understanding of the concepts of both guṇa and alaṃkāra when he takes the metaphorical usage of 'ātman' and 'śarīra' in a narrow and limited sense. J., taking the metaphor literally, argues that guṇas or excellences are qualities of 'rasa' the soul, and alaṃkāras of both word and sense go only with the body of poetry, like a garland, necklace, etc. Thus 'guṇā'laṃkāra' need not be mentioned while defining poetry, according to J. But on an earlier occasion we have taken sufficient care of this situation and we may here note only this much that J. falls in the same trap as Viśvanātha while taking the metaphor too literally. The net result is that Mammāta stands fully defended and J.'s effort falls flat.

After Mammāta J. consider's Viśvanātha's definition of kāvyā, which as we know runs to this effect that "rasavad-eva-kāvyam." It is clear, that in that case poetry with vastu-dhvani and alaṃkāra-dhvani will fall out of the orbit of genuine poetry. J. does not accept this, for we cannot say that this situation is welcome i.e. is an 'iṣṭa-āpatti', for there will arise a contingency of defeating the tradition set by great poets-mahā-kavis-of the past. The poets describe everything including such

object as the flow and fall of water, the whirlpools created in water or the dancing ripples or waves of water, and also the activities of monkeys and even children etc. etc. Such descriptions are like paintings and therefore are without a touch of emotive depth, i.e. *rasa*. The argument of the opponent that even here there is chance for emotive appeal from the point of ultimate experience, can not be accepted here because such emotive appeal can be traced even in bare statements such as 'gauḥ calati'-a cow walks; or a deer runs, etc. etc. Any worldly object in form of *vibhāva* or determinant etc. is ultimately connected with *rasa*-experience. So, everything on earth is ultimately *rasa*-oriented and this fact can not be negated, argues J. So, far J. Viśvanātha's definition is charged with the fallacy of 'avyāpti', and is therefore 'too narrow.' J.'s positive placing of *ramaṇiya-artha* not only keeps *prahelikā*-or riddles out of the scope of genuine poetry, but keeps him i.e. J. himself, also out of the charge of narrowness associated with Viśvanātha. Thus, here his effort is fruitful and we have also on earlier occasion supported such a situation, wherein the efforts of modern writers in writing absurd plays and absurd poetry also can be covered by *vastu-dhvani* and *alaṃkāra-dhvani*.

Thus we have thus far tried to discuss as fully as possible the efforts of *ālaṃkārikas* beginning with *Bhāmaha* down to J., in defining poetry. For us the school of thought laying down 'śabdārthau kāvyam' seems to have an upper hand for even in case of J. who vehemently tries to establish 'śabdaḥ kāvyam', we feel that his efforts do not convince us as even for him, the poetic-word has to be qualified as 'ramaṇiyārtha-pratipādaka' i.e. ultimately it can not stand totally divorced from 'artha' i.e. meaning, altogether. We will now take up the next topics, of *kāvya-hetu* and *kāvya-prayojana*, but before that here are some other observations concerning J.'s effort at defining poetry.

Later challenges to J.'s definition of poetry.

As noted above we, in our personal capacity, have tried to explain independently the short-comings of J.'s definition of poetry. But here also we are not without company. We have no less an authority than Nāgeśa, the great grammarian, on our side. This is explained by Prof. Dr. P. Sri Ramachandrudu (pp. 49-56, *ibid.*). Nāgeśa has the following observation : J. is of the opinion that 'śabda' alone makes for poetry on the strength of *loka-vyavahāra* such as "kāvyam śrutam, artho na jñātaḥ" etc. Nāgeśa quotes another popular usage such as 'kāvyam buddham'—poetry is understood, suggesting that poetry stands for sense also. Nāgeśa also suggests that even *veda* is both 'śabda and artha' together, on the strength of a remark in *Patañjali* (Ref. *sūtra*, IV. 2. 59, Pāṇini) which says, "tad

adhīte tad-veda” which implies that veda is also both śabda and artha together. Nāgeśa also holds that though kāvya should mean both śabda and artha together only, it may mean either, only through secondary usage i.e. lakṣaṇā. It may be noted that irrespective of Nāgeśa our independent criticism as above of J.’s approach is also noteworthy and deserves attention of scholars.

Dr. Sri Ramachandrudu (pp. 50, ibid) also quotes the opinion of Gangadhara Śāstri (R. G. Kaśī, edn., pp. 50) that the attributes viz., ‘sa-guṇau’ and ‘a-doṣau’ need not be taken as uddeśyatā-avacchedaka’ (i.e. they need not be taken as part of the lakṣaṇa), but ‘śabdārthau’ has to be taken as uddeśyatā-avacchedaka, because poets direct their efforts in perfecting both word and sense, and not either alone. He further argues that if śabda alone is taken to be poetry, why should one discuss things connected with ‘artha’ alone, i. e. aṭamkāras and doṣas concerning ‘artha’ alone ? One should discuss only śabda-doṣas and śabdāṭamkāras ! We may say that even in his defence Gangadhara Śāstri at least concedes half the ground by letting ‘sa-guṇau’ and ‘a-doṣau’ fall way side, by not accepting them as uddeśyatā-avacchedaka. But in our defence as above we have taken care of even these attributes while defending M.’s definition as above. Our views certainly deserve better attention from scholars. Prof. Dr. Sri Ramcandrudu’s personal attitude of accepting J.’s view point that śabda alone is kāvya does not look sound in our estimation for we have strongly defended the fact of poetry being both word and sense while accepting wholly the definition as advanced by Mammāṭa. We stand by our criticism and we feel that we have served the cause of ‘śabdārthau kāvyaṃ’ even to a greater extent than the efforts made by Nāgeśa and Gangadhara Śāstri.

Dr. Ramacandrudu tries to criticise Nāgeśa who had quoted Patañjali. He gives a fuller statement which runs as : “kim arthau imau ubhau ? na yódhīte vetti api asau. yas tu vetti adhīte api asau. na etayoḥ āvaśyakaḥ samāveśaḥ bhavati; kaścit sampāṭhaṃ paṭhati, na ca vetti, kaścit vetti, na ca sampāṭhaṃ paṭhati.” (Mahābhāṣya, pp. 190). Now it may be said that this fuller quotation also does not preclude the fact of veda being both word and sense together. The fact of reading or memorizing veda without knowing its meaning does not divorce veda from its meaning; for the meaning is very much there inherent in the vedic text even though a person may not get at it. So, veda does not cease to be both word and sense. As for the meaning of veda, investigations were afoot right in the age of Yāska himself who quotes different schools who attempted the explanation of vedic texts. The ritualistic approach as suggested by the Brahmana literature and supported by

commentators such as Sāyaṇa is only one explanation, while the mystic, grammatical, historical, natural, linguistic explanation etc. and the modern attempts at geographical and cultural explanations—all these suggest that veda is both word and sense together. Its śabda-prādhānya is one thing and it should not be confused with śabda-rūpatva. “There is not to reason why, there is but to do and die,”—is the spirit in commands made in army. Same is the case with the vedas and they are said to be “prabhu-sammita” only because of the irrevocability of vedic injunctions. The veda, like the order of a master, is not to be challenged. Actually people while performing rituals follow this command only after they get at the meaning. Without getting at the meaning which is the integral part of a vedic injunction, how are we to follow any injunction. The very fact of the pūrva-pūrva-baliyastva i.e. the earlier agent being taken as more authentic in case of śruti, vākya, samākhyā, etc. proves that vedic injunctions do carry meaning and that they cannot be divorced of it. ‘Śabda-prāmānya’ of veda means a word in an injunction cannot be replaced by a synonym, but it does not mean that the particular śabda is taken as meaningless. When we say, “agniṃ ile purohitam” we cannot replace ‘agniṃ’ by ‘vahnim’, but ‘agni’ would mean fire, and fire alone. It will never mean water. It is like clear and irrevocable drafting in legal literature. This also is divine law and the word in divine injunction cannot ever be substituted, though of course it has to be understood to put it in practice. It is precisely for this purpose that Yāksa explains that the Brāhmaṇa texts enjoin that which is stated :— ‘jānantam abhivādayate’ and this does not go against veda having any meaning at all !

Prof. Ramacandrudu observes that the words ‘vāṇmaya’ and ‘sārasvata’ prove that poetry is śabda only. But on the contrary this proves otherwise. It is meaning through vāk, or sarasvatī which is poetry. Meaning through colours is painting; through mudras it is dancing, through svara-or notes it is music and through ‘vāk’ it is poetry. But this does not mean that poetry is ‘vāk’ alone. Only the innocent would subscribe to such a view. He observes : “Therefore, PR. need not be considered to have committed any serious error, in giving prominence to śabda.” We wholly agree with this, because poetic art has word for its external skin as against other arts such as painting, dancing, etc. as explained above. But word, though being, the medium, does not cease to be ‘sārtha’ i. e. necessarily accompanied by meaning —first and last.

Prof. Ramachandrudu (p. 53, *ibid*) rejects the view of scholars quoting both Kalidāsa—‘vāgarthau iva samprktau’ and Māgha—‘sābdarthau iva satkaveḥ’ suggesting that these quotations do not lead us anywhere. But we feel that they

do lead us where Mammāta and others have been striving to reach, and also trying to take us to. The learned professor quotes the Mīmāṃsā maxim viz. “autpattikas tu śabdasya arthena sambandhaḥ” (Jaimini 1.1.5) and asserts that this could not have escaped J.’s notice also; because J. himself, while talking about pratibhā at R. G. pp. 9— “sā ca kāvya-ghaṭanānukūla-śabdārthopasthitiḥ.” The professor argues to support J.’s view about kāvya being śabda only, by saying—“Only, thing he wanted to establish is that ‘kāvya’ means śabda conveying artha, but not śabda and artha together.” In fact, as will be explained later PR. gives more importance to artha in a kāvya, than what is given by ubhayavādins (pp. 54, *ibid*).—Now, with due respect to the professor we may say that we have yet to read something more funny. For, śabda conveying artha is seen elsewhere also. E. g. when there is a big sound we get at a meaning that something has dashed against another thing. When a railway engine is fixed with a carriage, there is sound and a meaning is conveyed. When tyres of an auto screech we realise that brakes are heavily applied. Now in poetry word conveys meaning through its powers of direct expression, indication and suggestion. The third one, i.e. suggestion is shared by illustrations cited earlier, and also when there is no sound also, as in case of soundless signs and signals. There is no case when a sound does not convey a meaning. Even yawning makes a sound and it conveys a sense of feeling sleepy or languid etc. So, whenever sound conveys sense, everytime it is not a case of poetry. Actually sound i.e. word conveying beautiful sense through abhidhā, or lakṣaṇā or also vyañjanā is the field of poetry. A poetic word has to be accompanied by either an expressed, or an indicated as also a suggested sense; of course its being charming is a pre-condition. Actually J. while insisting on ‘rāmaṇīya artha’ echoes Bhāmaha’s famous words viz. “vakrābhidheya-śabdoktiḥ iṣṭā vācām alamkṛtiḥ.” So, when we pass an observation such as, “kāvya means śabda conveying artha, but not śabda and artha together” we hardly make any sense. Even when water starts flowing from municipal tap, some sound is created by the fall of water in an empty bucket. It conveys its own meaning. Word of any sort is necessarily accompanied by meaning. Kāvya-śabda is never without its charming meaning arrived at through the word-power of abhidhā, lakṣaṇā and vyañjanā. It is but illusory to hold that śabda alone is kāvya. Śabda in fact is never alone. Even a different bark of a dog conveys different meanings. So, we fail to agree with J.’s observation that poetry is ‘śabda’ alone, for we reject the very possibility of śabda being absolutely alone. But kāvya-śabda is different from other śabdās and herein ‘rāmaṇīyatā’ enters, along with the three powers of a word.

**‘Kāvya-hetu’ or cause of poetry
and**

Kāvya-prayojana or aims or purpose of poetry.

As for the cause -hetu- of poetry, sanskrit literary critics have advanced pratibhā, i.e. poetic genius, vyutpatti, i.e. learning and abhyāsa i.e. practice as the cause of poetry, either jointly or individually. By and large the importance of pratibhā i.e. poetic genius is held as uppermost by critics. Thus Bhāmaha holds that ‘pratibhā’ is the only cause of poetry. He is candid when he observes that : “kāvyam tu jāyate jātu kasyacit pratibhāvataḥ” (*Bhāmaha*, I.5b.) Daṇḍin has a different approach when he observes :

nāisargikī ca pratibhā
sṛtaṃ ca bahunirmalam |
amandaścābhiyogośyāḥ
kāraṇaṃ kāvya-saṃpadaḥ || (I. 103)

Natural genius, great proficiency in various branches of knowledge, great endeavour and repetition of efforts—all these taken together make for the cause of poetry for Daṇḍin. Here, for the first time so far as available documents are concerned, we come across an approach which is supported by Mammata later. So, for Daṇḍin, inborn genius as well as human endeavour jointly make for poetry. For him, it seems, poets are both born as well as made. In two more kārīkās that follow; i.e. at I. 104 and 105 he clearly favours human endeavour as against only inborn genius. Daṇḍin observes —

na vidyate yady apī pūrva-vāsanā-guṇā’nubandhi
pratibhānaṃ adbhutam |
sṛtena yatnena ca vāg upāsītā dhruvaṃ karoty
eva kaṃ apy anugrahaṃ || (I. 104)

My guru Prof. Athavale suggested that ‘kaṃ apī’ here refers to ‘some extraordinary favour,’ and not ‘just little favour.’ So, for Daṇḍin, even in absence of inborn genius, human endeavour is capable to cause poetry of the highest order. So, at Kāvya-darśa I. 105, he eloquently declares that : people should wake up from laziness and continuously get themselves engaged in propitiating the goddess of speech and by this honest effort, even with pale inborn genius, people will be able to move in the company of the learned with their heads held high :

tad asta-tandraiḥ anīṣaṃ sarasvatī
 śramād upāsyā khalu kīrtiṃ ipsubhiḥ |
 kṛṣe kavitve'pi janāḥ kṛta-śramā
 vidagadha-goṣṭīṣu vihartuṃ īśate || (I. 105)

Thus insistence on either pratibhā alone, or on both pratibhā and vyutpatti (= learning) or on all three - i.e. pratibhā, vyutpatti and abhyāsa- i.e. practice taken together making a 'single unit' seems to continue to be the topic of discussion among literary critics with Mammaṭa preferring to side with the organic unity of all the three factors taken together, while Hemacandra insisting on pratibhā at Kāvyaṇuśāsana (=kā.śā) — I. 4 when he observes :

pratibhā asya hetuḥ. (kā. śā. I. 4)

He further observes that vyutpatti or learning i.e. proficiency in various branches of knowledge, and 'abhyāsa' i.e. practice give an edge to inborn pratibhā. Thus they are welcome as shaping influences. He further classifies 'pratibhā' into 'sahajā' (=inborn) and aupādhikī (=acquired). Sahajā is the result of 'āvaraṇa-kṣaya', and 'upaśama.' The first is the removal of coverings that obstruct the flash of pratibhā, and the second is 'removal' of possible coverings that may obstruct the flash of genius. The aupādhikā is the result of such occult causes as 'mantra' etc. Hemacandra thus seems to move closer to the tradition of Bhāmaha, which insists on the basic undeniable necessity of in-born genius, which ultimately finds favour even with Jagannātha the last greatest luminary in the sky of Indian literary criticism.

Thus, prior to Jagannātha and before Mammaṭa we have protagonists of only pratibhā, such as Bhaṭṭa Tauta-who observes :

"prajñā nava-navollekha-śālinī pratibhā matā.

**tad anuprāṇanā-jīva-varṇanā-nipuṇaḥ kaviḥ
 tasya karma, smṛtaṃ kāvyam"**

then, Abhinavagupta suggests :

"pratibhā apūrva-vastu-nirmāṇa-kṣamā prajñā.

tasya viśeṣo rasā"-veśa-vaiśadya-

saundarya-kāvya-nirmāṇa-kṣamatvam, (Locana)

and also

"śaktiḥ, pratibhānam varṇanīya-vastu

-viśaya-nūtanóllekha-śālitvam"

(also, Locana)

It is clear that both Tauta and Abhinava-gupta seem to hold that pratibhā is that inborn quality in a poet which prompts him to describe things in newer and newer light and perspective.

Vāgbhaṭa (I) who is posterior to both Mammaṭa and Hemacandra again holds inborn genius-pratibhā-as the supreme cause of poetry. He observes : (vāgbhaṭālaṃkāra I. 3, and 4) :

‘pratibhā kāraṇaṃ tasya
vyutpattis tu vibhūṣaṇaṃ |
bhṛṣotpatti-kṛd-abhyāsaḥ
ity ādyā-kavi=samkathā ||-
‘prasanna-pada-navyā’rtha-
yuktyudbodha-vidhāyinī |
sphurantī sat-kaver-buddhiḥ
pratibhā sarvatomukhī ||-

But even prior to Abhinavagupta it was Rājaśekhara who in his Kāvya-mīmāṃsā devoted two full chapters (i. e. Chs. IV and V) that discuss the nature of pratibhā and vyutpatti. He quotes various opinions of some ālaṃkārikas who are almost forgotten names for us. He gives names of Śyāmadeva and Maṅgala. He, on his part, seems to favour only ‘pratibhā’ which is made to flash forth both by internal effort—i.e. samādhi—backed by Śyāmadeva, and also external effort-abhyāsa-backed by Maṅgala. Rājaśekhara seems to accept a compromising attitude but for him śakti or pratibhā is the prime cause : “tāv ubhāv api śaktim udbhāsayataḥ. sā kevalaṃ kāvyē hetuḥ.” He explains pratibhā as that flash of imagination which prompts a poet to use (appropriate) words, meanings, ālaṃkāras, excellent turns of expressions (-ukti-mārgam-perhaps rīti-mārga) and such other things which make for poetry. Says he : (Kāvya-mīmāṃsā, ch. IV) : yā śabda-grāmaṃ artha-sārthaṃ, ālaṃkāra-tantraṃ, ukti-mārgaṃ, anyad api tathāvidhaṃ adhi-hṛdayaṃ pratibhāsayati sā pratibhā.”

It is this which seems to be echoed in the opinion of Vāgbhaṭa (I) as quoted above. When Rājaśekhara quotes the views of Śyāmadeva who pressed for samādhi—the internal effort, he seems to be quoting a tradition upheld by Śyāmadeva but perhaps also represented by Rudraṭa the predecessor of even Ānandavardhana. For Rudraṭa had also, while insisting on pratibhā had observed in his Kāvya-ālaṃkāra I. 14 that all the three i.e. pratibhā, vyutpatti and abhyāsa make for poetry :

“tasya-asāranirāsāt
sāra-grahaṇāt ca cāruṇaḥ karaṇe
tritayaṃ idaṃ vyāpriyate
śaktir-vyutpattir abhyāsaḥ ||”

and then,

“manasi sadā susamādhini
visphuraṇaṃ anekadhā abhidheyasya |
akliṣṭāni padāni ca
vibhānti yasyāṃ asau śaktiḥ ||” (I. 15).

Here, Śyāmadeva's 'samādhī' is taken note of. Rudrata further observes : (I. 16) :

“pratibhety aparair-uditā
sahajótpādyā ca sā dvidhābhavati |
puṃsā saha jātātvd
anayos tu jyāyasī sahaajā ||”

Two fold pratibhā is accepted by Hemacandra also and later by Jagannātha. Earlier, Vāmana while accepting the importance of vyutpatti and abhyāsa, had attached greater importance to pratibhā and later Kuntaka while putting stress on pratibhā held that a poet's vyutpatti and abhyāsa also fall in line of his inherent nature. Supremacy of pratibhā is suggested by Kuntaka when he observes :

“yat kiṃcanā'pi vaicitryaṃ
tat-sarvaṃ pratibhodbhavan |
saukumārya-parispanda-syandi
yatra virājate ||” — (V. J. J. 28)

“wherein every element of beauty is a result of the poet's imagination alone, and succeeds in conveying flashes of gentle gace” (Trans. K. Kri. —This is Sukumāra-mārga. pp. 329).

With all these thoughts in the background we come to evaluate Jagannātha's approach, wherein again 'pratibhā' is taken as the supreme and only cause of poetry.

Jagannātha is clear when he states that only pratibhā is the cause of poetry. He observes : (R. G. pp. 25, Edn. Prof. Athavale, uni. Book Production board, Guj. state, '74):

“tasya ca kāraṇaṃ kavīgatā kevalā pratibhā. sā ca kāvyā-ghaṭanā'nukūla-śabdārthopasthitiḥ.” —

J. has the following observation—The cause of poetry is only genius which rests in a poet. This pratibhā or poetic genius is of the nature of flashing forth of word and sense that are congenial to creation of poetry. The special quality of 'pratibhātva' which rests in this pratibhā, when taken as the cause of poetry, removes all other factors that may claim to be the cause of poetry. This special attribute viz. pratibhātva is the cause of poetry alone and nothing else whatsoever. Now this special quality of 'pratibhātva' resting in pratibhā may either be taken as 'siddho jāti viśeṣaḥ' a special jāti or class, or as 'sa-khaṇḍa upādhi' i.e. attribute which can be described in many terms. The idea is that in different poets we come across different flashes of genius. But common to all these flashes, we can imagine a quality called, 'pratibhātva' which goes to make 'pratibhā' what it is. Thus taken, 'pratibhātva' can be taken as a 'jāti' or class. But such a quality can not be described in brief, as it is united with many qualities. Thus the nature or form of pratibhātva being inherently complex, can only be described by a number of adjectives or words. If we accept this position, then the speciality called 'pratibhātva' can be described as 'sa-khaṇḍa-upādhi-rūpa-dharma' ! The Nyāyakośa (pp. 943) explains sa-khaṇḍopādhi as, “bahu-padārtha-ghaṭito dharmah sa-khaṇḍopādhiḥ.” In the N. S. (=Nirṇaya sāgār) Edn. of R. G. we have a reading viz. “upādhirūpaṃ vā akhaṇḍam.” But Prof. Athavale observes (pp. 30, ibid) that this reading is faulty and should be emended as “sa-khaṇḍam” as Nāgeśa clearly says. Prof. Athavale supports Nāgeśa and says that the Nyāyakośa explains a-khaṇḍa-upādhi as, 'anirvacanīyo dharmah.' Now the special dharma called pratibhātva is not a nirvacanīya, but it can be described. Hence, it cannot be termed as 'akhaṇḍopādhi.'

Now this pratibhā is the result of 'adrṣṭa.' This 'adrṣṭa' is either 'puṇya' meritorious deed or, pāpa i.e. sinful act done either in previous birth or present birth. This adrṣṭa (of course here caused by meritorious deeds) is caused by the grace of either some divinity or a great man. J. holds that perhaps at times, this pratibhā seems to have resulted from extra-ordinary learning and practice of writing poetry also : “kvacit ca vilakṣaṇa-vyutpatti-kāvyakaraṇa-abhyāsau.” (R. G. pp. 25, ibid). But the cause of pratibhā is never these three factors taken together, i.e. not adrṣṭa vyutpatti and abhyāsa taken together—na tu trayaṃ eva. (R. G. pp. 25, ibid). At times even in the absence of vyutpatti and abhyāsa, by the grace of some great man alone, pratibhā seems to flash forth in a certain child. Some objector may hold that in case of such a child, along with adrṣṭa, his vyutpatti and

abhyasa of his earlier birth also make for the cause of his pratibhā. But J. holds that this opinion of the objector is not acceptable as there is 'gaurava doṣa' or the fault of cumbrousness in accepting vyutpatti and abhyāsa of the earlier birth. The idea is that when the purpose is served by recognizing only adrṣṭa, why unnecessarily add vyutpatti and abhyāsa of the earlier birth ? Again, in holding this in case of a particular child there is no pramāṇa or guarantee, or authority. Again the presence of pratibhā which is of the nature of a 'kārya' or result, can be explained even differently from both vyutpatti and abhyāsa. Even in our worldly parlance, when we decide the cause of something with the help of the authority of veda, etc., in case a vyabhicāra-or deviation is seen from that cause, then only when yet another device is not seen to explain this deviation, meritorious deeds or otherwise, i.e. dharma or adharma are taken as explanations for that deviation. If we do not resort to such normal course of explanation, argues J., then a great mismanagement will follow. Again, we cannot say that only adrṣṭa alone is the cause of pratibhā because we see that a particular person cannot write poetry upto a certain period, but we find the flashing of pratibhā in the same person after some time, as a result of vyutpatti and abhyāsa. Now, if it is said that even here only 'adrṣṭa' is the cause of pratibhā, then this adrṣṭa was present even prior to this acquiring vyutpatti and abhyāsa. Then we will have to accept that the pratibhā born of that adrṣṭa was also present earlier. If the objector holds that yes, that pratibhā was present even prior to those two (i.e. vyutpatti and abhyāsa) but there was yet another adrṣṭa coming in way of its external manifestation, then this argument says J. is not satisfactory. For in all such cases, in place of accepting two adrṣṭas. it is safer to hold vyutpatti and abhyāsa as cause of pratibhā and in this acceptance there is lāghava-guṇa i.e. brevity. Thus, J. holds that it is safer to accept either adrṣṭa or vyutpatti and abhyāsa together, as cause of pratibhā. Of course, pratibhā born of adrṣṭa and pratibhā born of both vyutpatti and abhyāsa, are different in nature from each other, because the quality of 'kāryatāvachedaka' in pratibhā born as kārya, differentiates the two. When we take these two pratibhās as different, as they are born of different causes, we also understand the difference in the quality of poetry produced by either. And in that case there will not arise any deviation (vyabhicāra) in the relation of cause and effect. Now, it is clear that the exceptional quality of pratibhātva residing in these two types of pratibhā, establishes pratibhā only as the cause of poetry. Again there will not be any misunderstanding in explaining the kārya-kāraṇabhāva, of each variety of pratibhā, if we hold that there is difference in the result i.e. poetry caused by either.

The objector may raise the following point : when inspite of there being 'vyutpatti' and 'abhyāsa', pratibhā is not seen, then there will be 'vyabhicāra' or transgression or deviation in the cause-effect relationship, so it will not be safe to assert this cause-effect relationship. To this, J.'s reply is that it can be so maintained that the vyutpatti and abhyāsa are lesser than the required proportion to generate pratibhā (=anavacchinna), or, it can be also said that at such places, even if 'vyutpatti' and 'abhyāsa' are sufficiently powerful to cause 'pratibhā' here, some special type of unrighteous act comes in its way and hence no transgression should be imagined here. In justifying cause-effect relationship the negation of a 'pratibandhaka' or obstructing factor has to be asserted. This removal of obstructing element has to be taken care of even by those who either hold all the three i.e. pratibhā, vyutpatti and abhyāsa taken together as 'the cause' of poetry, or by those who take only pratibhā as the only cause of poetry. For, due to some practice of mantras, the process of poetry writing of a given poet can be stopped for a while. Thus, J. favours 'pratibhā' alone as the only cause of poetry.

'Prayojana' — or purpose or aims of poetry : With reference to the purpose of poetry, sanskrit literary critics have advanced some items such as kīrti or yaśas, i.e. fame for the poet, 'prīti' or 'ānanda' or joy i.e. 'sadyaḥ paranirvṛti' as coined by Mammaṭa for the reader, bhāvaka, as principal aims of poetry. But poetry, they say, is also written for money,—arthakṛta, for avoiding evil effects, 'śivetara-kṣataye' for knowledge of the worldly business—'vyavahāravide' as Mammaṭa puts it, and also for a message such as 'you have to behave like Rāma and not Rāvaṇā.' i.e. 'upadeśa-yuje.' But Mammaṭa, and the rest take care to note that the instruction supplied by the poet through poetry is in the fashion of a beloved who lovingly forbids her erring husband from misbehaviour—"kāntā-sammita-tayā upadeśa-yuje." Poetry does not issue a command in the fashion of śāstras, nor does it coax like a friend in the fashion of the purāṇa-literature. These and such other objectives are laid down for a poet's activity of writing poetry, but 'ānanda', 'yaśas' and kāntā-sammita-tayā upadeśa—these three have found general favour with sanskrit critics.



Chapter II

Śabda-vyāpāra-vicāra

or

Functions of a word

General Introduction :

Sanskrit literary criticism has applied itself to classification of poetry both from the angle of its external form, i.e. its being written in prose, verse or in mixed style, and also its being written either for reading or hearing only or also for presentation on stage etc., and also from the point of view of its internal beauty, i.e. from the point of view of how it suggests what. The first is the formal approach and the second which covers all poetry—whether śravya/pāṭhya or prekṣya—i.e. to be presented on the stage, also, touches the criticism aspect. This criticism oriented approach ultimately finds greater favour and was, so far as available documents go, promoted by Ānandavardhana and his earlier dhvanivādins. This approach was kept up by Kuntaka, Mahimā, and practically all who followed them including the great Mammaṭa, down to Jagannātha.

Now this criticism-based classification and evaluation of poetry required a through inquiry into the semantic aspect and Sanskrit critics have, as a result, evolved a virtually perfect science of semantics taking care of different shades of meanings and also imagining different powers of words giving different meanings. But Sanskrit aesthetics, especially literary aesthetics is indebted to a rich heritage received from previous thinking in the branches of knowledge such as pūrva-mīmāṃsā, nyāya and vyākaraṇa to a great extent. In this chapter we will try to have a glimpse of this rich heritage which in its turn inspired thinking in semantics, which again inspired literary criticism and classification of poetry from the point of view of its literary worth. Thus criticism-oriented classification

rests on a serious contemplation on the science of semantics evolved by the ālaṃkārikas with original inspirations received from both Mīmāṃsā-śāstra and vyākaraṇa-śāstra, to a great extent.

So, for the sanskrit ālaṃkārikas word in poetry has three powers or functions called śakti or vyāpāra. These powers or functions are three, the first to begin with is termed as mukhyā-śakti or primary power, or abhidhāśakti also called vācakaśakti or the power of direct expression of primary sense, i.e. denotation or the power which gives the conventional meaning or dictionary meaning. The second is the power of indication or lakṣaṇā-śakti, also called a-mukhyā śakti or secondary power giving a secondary sense. This lakṣaṇā-vyāpāra makes for any deviation, giving a-mukhyārtha or lakṣyārtha. The third is the power of suggestion or vyañjanā-vyāpāra giving the suggested sense. We will go to see the nature and scope of these three powers or functions of a word and will evaluate the whole discussion by various ālaṃkārikas accepting or rejecting the power of suggestion. The terms vyāpāra, śakti and vṛtti are used as synonyms from practical point of view. These different śabda-vyāpāras give word-meanings that are different in nature and scope.

Ālaṃkārikas by and large have termed kāvya i.e. poetry as both word and meaning i.e. the sāhitya or coming together of sound and sense. As observed earlier the sense in poetry has to be charming and thus a close study of the powers of a word is basically related to the appreciation and classification of poetry. As noted, the abhidhā-vṛtti or mukhyā-vṛtti or vācaka-vṛtti delivers the abhidhārtha, or the mukhyārtha, also called the vācyārthā or the conventional meaning. The abhidhārtha is termed the saṃketita-artha also. The lakṣyārtha or secondary or indicated sense is derived through lakṣaṇā or the secondary power of a word under some special circumstances. So, also the vyañgyārtha or suggested sense is derived from the suggestive function, the vyañjanā vyāpāra under special context. These powers operate on account of their special conditions. The word giving abhidhārtha or vācyārtha is designated as vācaka śabda, and the others responsible for the secondary and suggested senses are termed indicative and suggestive words i.e. lakṣaka and vyañjaka śabdas. One and the same word, under special context can be termed as vācaka and vyañjaka or vācaka, lakṣaka and vyañjaka as the case may be.

Yet another power or function termed 'tātparya'-vṛtti is also mentioned in ālaṃkāra works. But the general opinion is in favour of calling it a 'vākya-vṛtti' and not a śabda-vṛtti. By vākya-vṛtti is meant power of conveying sense that goes with

a sentence as a whole. Here the sense-giving unit is not an individual word but an independent sentence which gives the correlated meaning of all the words taken together. This vākya-vṛtti is not a pada-vṛtti but has yet a distinct role and hence the sequence fixed is abhidhā, tātparya, lakṣaṇā and vyañjanā which is therefore termed as turīyā-vṛtti also.

The consideration of the topic of śabda-vyāpāra has been followed by Sanskrit ālaṃkārikas in a scientific manner. But as observed earlier, their thinking carries deep influences of disciplines such as vyākaraṇa, nyāya and mīmāṃsa discipline trying to manage the topic of fixing the meaning of the vedas. It is precisely for this that the mīmāṃsā darśana is said to be the 'vākya-śāstra' of ancient India, and the mīmāṃsakas are said to be 'vākya-vid.' In the same way the discipline of grammar applied itself to the consideration of a 'pada' or individual word-unit of language. The Naiyāyikas, Bauddha and Jaina dārśanikas also contributed seriously to semantics. So, when earlier ālaṃkārikas beginning with Bhāmaha, followed by Ānandavardhana and post—Ānandavardhana ālaṃkārikas such as Mammaṭa applied themselves to this topic of śabda-vyāpāra-vicāra, the thinking of philosophers and grammarians serves as a useful background or say, original source to their thinking. Thus a closer acquaintance with this original source material becomes useful in understanding the mind-set of the ālaṃkārikas. We will first cultivate this acquaintance with this original source from which thought-currents started in the direction of literary critics who got inspired by it. After this we will consider the stage of śabda-vṛtti-vicāra as reflected in ālaṃkārikas such as Bhāmaha to Rudraṭa, the predecessors of Ānandavardhana. After this we will consider Ānandavardhana's approach and then more scientific approach of Mukula Bhaṭṭa, Mammaṭa and the rest down to important ālaṃkārikas such as Appayya Dixit and Jagannātha on topics such as abhidhā, lakṣaṇā and vyañjanā, not neglecting in between the position taken by Kuntaka, Mahimā, Bhoja and the rest also. We will end with vyañjanā or suggestive power of word as an independent and indispensable power of word in poetry.

As for the function and nature as well as number of these word-powers differences of opinion are seen not only in philosophers and grammarians, but they continue to surface even among ālaṃkārikas, many of whom do not accept vyañjanā as an independent power of a word. Possibly, even the predecessors of Ānandavardhana beginning with Bhāmaha to Rudraṭa also could not recognise vyañjanā as an independent power of a word and this explains the absence of any direct mention of vyañjanā in their works. But this may not be totally conclusive

also because these earlier masters were not ignorant of the fact of 'pratīyamāna artha' or implicit sense in poetry. The fact emerges that though no clear mentioning by name of vyañjanā is seen in their works, indirect references to the same cannot be ruled out, if viewed critically. Tārkikas or logicians, Mīmāṃsakas and their followers such as MahimaBhaṭṭa openly vote against the acceptance of vyañjanā as an independent separate power of a word. The Tarka-dīpikā observes :

“vyañjanā tu śaktir
lakṣaṇā'ntarbhūtā śabda-śakti-mūlā |
artha-śakti-mūlā tu
anumānā”dinā anyathā siddhā ||”

Of course, this evidence is much later in date but it reveals the anti-vyañjanā stand among thinkers even after its very successful establishment by leading ālaṃkārikas. And we have Hemacandra from Gujarat the protegonist of Kashmir school of literary criticism advocating the cause of an independent 'gauṇī-vṛtti' over and above the vyāpāra-traya i.e. the three powers such as abhidhā, lakṣaṇā and vyañjanā.

Ancient Background : First, we will look into the philosophical background. In India dārsanikas and vaiyākaraṇas have seriously discussed the problems connected with linguistics and linguistic philosophy. They have also advanced various principles to explain the multiple activity of language. Bhartṛhari, Kumārila and later the great literary critic Ānandavardhana have made invaluable suggestions. In Indian thinking with reference to meaning content, by and large two thought currents seem to be major e.g. khaṇḍa-pakṣa and akhaṇḍa-pakṣa, which may roughly be equated with the Association theory and the Gestalt theory in psychology, observes Dr. K. K. Raja (Ref. Indian Theories of Meaning, pp. 6, edn., 69, Adyar.) According to the khaṇḍa-pakṣa or the analytical method, a word is taken as an autonomous unit of thought and sense and studies concerning language are made on the basis of words. A sentence is made up of such independent words coming together. That an individual word possesses an individual word-meaning is a common idea found in all schools of Indian Philosophy. In case of nouns the word is taken as the 'name' of a 'thing'. Hence, observes Dr. Raja (pp. 6, ibid) the regular philosophic term for a 'thing', viz. 'padārtha' is literally the meaning of a word, or that which a word means. 'Nāma-rūpa' is the Sanskrit term which stands for the world of things. It suggests the view that objects can be comprehended by means of their names or their visible shapes

or forms and that the name and shape make for the essence of a thing. Only the nature of individual words alone is discussed by the Nyāya-sūtras while in later Nyāya-vaiśeṣika works discussion regarding the factors necessary for the understanding of a sentence is met with. Pāṇini, Patañjali and Kātyāyana, the grammarians, concern themselves chiefly with the derivation of correct form of words, while Yāska and his followers deal with the etymological study of word-meanings. We may add to Dr. Raja's observation, that etymological study in its not so scientific form, is seen as early as in the Brāhmaṇa literature also. We humbly suggest that Dr. Raja should have mentioned Yāska prior to Pāṇini as the former is placed earlier than the latter. It is in the Mīmāṃsā discipline, that a detailed study of sentences is observed for the first time. Mīmāṃsā is termed the 'vākya-śāstra' of ancient India, because it is the first, so far as documents go, to perpetuate cannons of interpretation along with a full fledged study of sentence-unit. Once again the date of Nyāyasūtras, or Mīmāṃsā-sūtras is decided on faith only and hardly any concrete evidences can be floated to discuss the priority of either. And even if it is done, the thought-currents represented in either go back to times of yore. But all this material taken together forms a rich heritage, which India is proud of and such an earlier material is not available in any known language except Sanskrit. Even the study as reflected in the Mīmāṃsā texts was mainly on the basis of words and word-meanings and so, the relation between word and sentence, between word-meaning and sentence-meaning always remained in the centre.

A number of Mīmāṃsā documents are available, the oldest being Jaimini's *Mīmāṃsā sūtras*. This is followed by a commentary, the Śābara-bhaṣya, by Śābara swāmin, with vṛtti of Upavarṣa (200 B. C.) preceeding it. This is followed by Kumārila's Śloka-vārttika (630-700 A. D.), Tantra-vārttika and Ṭup-ṭikā. We have Prabhakara Miśra's Lighvī Ṭika or Bṛihaṭī or Nibandhana Ṭikā (A. D. 650-700 A. D.). Following Dr. Raja, we will record some more documents that could have proved to be shaping influences on the theories held by ālamkārikas. They were written upto A. D. 1200, or even A. D. 1300, though many more works were written upto 1700 A. D. These are : Maṇḍana Miśra's (680-750 A. D.) Vidhi-viveka, Bhāvanā-viveka, Mīmāṃsā-sūtrānukramaṇī and Sphoṭa-siddhi; Umbekācārya, who was nicknamed Bhavabhūti wrote (A. D. 670-700 A. D.) Ṭikā on Śloka-vārttika and also on Bhāvanā-viveka. Prabhākara Miśra's disciple Śālikanṭha (A. D. 68-760) gave Dīpaśikhā Ṭikā on Laghvī (i.e. Bhāṣya-vivarāṇa), and also commentaries such as Rju-vimalā and Prakaraṇa-pañjikā on Bṛihaṭī; Vācaspati Miśra (A. D. 800-900 A. D.) wrote Nyāya-kaṇikā and Tattva-bindu on Vidhi-viveka. Sucitra Miśra (A. D.

1000-1100 A. D.) wrote kāśikā on Śloka-vārttika. Pārtha-sārathi Miśra (A. D. 1050-1120 A. D.) contributed Nyāya-ratnākara, Tantra-ratna, Śāstra-dīpikā and Nyāya-ratna-mālā, and Bhavanātha Bhaṭṭa gave Nyāya-Viveka (A. D. 1050-1150 A. D.). We have Bhavadeva Bhaṭṭa's (A. D. 1100) Ajitā or Tantra-ṭīkā-nibandhana and Bhaṭṭa Someśvara's (A. D. 1200) Nyāyasudhā. Murārимиśra's (A. D. 1150-1220 A. D.) Tripādī-nīti-nayana, Nandīśvara's (A. D. 1200-1300 A. D.) Prabhākara-vijaya, and Cidānanda-Paṇḍita's (A. D. 1200-1300 A. D.) Nīti-tattva-saṃgraha also are noteworthy. Thus literature both on Mīmāṃsā, and Nyāya disciplines swelled and the tradition was kept alive even upto 17th or 18th Cent. A. D. when we have such works as Gāgābhāṭṭa's or Viśveśvara Bhaṭṭa's (A. D. 1630-1730) Bhāṭṭa-cintāmaṇi, Kolūra-Nārāyaṇa Śāstri's (A. D. 1630-1700 A. D.) Mīmāṃsā-sarvasva and Vidhi-viveka and Pārtha-Sārathi Miśra's Nyāya-ratna-māla-ṭīka.

We have seen that in ancient india, there were ācāryas who insisted on the 'anityatva' or unreality of words, i.e. for them the nature of words was unreal. Yāska, we know, quotes one Audumbarāyaṇa's view to this effect such as - indriya-nityam vacanam audumbarāyaṇaḥ (Nirukta I. i.). This means that it is the statement as a whole which is regularly present in the perceptive faculty of the hearer-, and that the 'catuṣṭva' or the four-fold classification of words in to noun, verb, upasarga and nipāta does not stand. He is of the opinion that—"vyāptimattvāt tu śabdasya, anīyastvāc ca śabdena saṃjñākaraṇam vyavahārārtham loke" (Nirukta, I, i.)—i.e. words are used for naming in daily parlance, because of their universal applicability and convenience in their case due to simplicity. Bhartṛhari while referring to this view in the Vākyapadīya (II. 345-349) observes that Vārtākṣa also accepted this and held that it is only the sentence that remains present for all time in the mind of the hearer.

The akhaṇḍa-pakṣa of Bhartṛhari accepts sentence as the fundamental linguistic fact and it is taken as Gestalt, in which parts are not deemed as relevant. The view of Audumbarāyaṇa as seen quoted in Nirukta stands at the root of this line of thinking. Among the protegonists of those who accept reality of words, i.e. those who are śabda-nityatva-vādins, two thought-currents such as abhihitānvaya-vāda and anvitābhīdhāna-vāda held by some naiyāyikas and mīmāṃsakas of the Bhāṭṭa and Prābhākara school respectively are noted. We will consider these at a later stage.

Dr. Raja suggests that in the akhaṇḍa-pakṣa advanced by Bhartṛhari the fundamental linguistic unit is a sentence, which is taken as a Gestalt whose parts are irrelevant. This thought-current was perhaps inspired by the view of

Audumbarāyaṇa and was perfected by Bhartṛhari who explains all irregularities in language behaviour. His definition of sentence reads as : eko'navayavaḥ śabdaḥ — i.e. word i.e. sentence is one without parts and it is revealed by the letters and words that go to make it. The meaning is conveyed by this integral unit, the vākya-sphoṭa. The sentence is thus taken as an indivisible and integral linguistic symbol. Its meaning is 'instantaneous flash of intuition' i.e. pratibhā, which is also partless. Words have no reality of their own except on worldly parlance i.e. pragmatic level.

We also come across different thought-currents with reference to the change of meaning. Indian thinkers have dealt with the conditions of metaphorical transfer of meaning from a synchronic point of view and not from diachronic or historical point of view except with reference to nirūḍha-lakṣaṇā or faded metaphor as suggested by Dr. Raja.

The importance of a word lies in its significative power. The power of a word, śakti, means the relation between a word and its sense :

“śaktiś ca padena saha padārthasya sambandhaḥ”— [Siddhānta-muktāvalī, pp. 265]. The Laghumañjuṣā (pp. 28) observes : “pada-padārthayoḥ sambandhāntaraṃ eva śaktiḥ, vācya-vācaka-svabhāva-apara-paryāyaḥ.” Whenever a word is pronounced it is through the agency of this śakti or word-power that a meaning is conveyed. With reference to the relation between word and its meaning two principal thought-currents are noticed such as one each held by the Mīmāṃsā darśana and the Nyāya-darśana. We also come across the thought-current represented by the grammarians also.

Word-Meaning Relationship : Actually the problem of relationship between word and meaning seems to have originated even prior to the composition of the Nighaṇṭu, wherein words are arranged in different groups such as those signifying the same sense, those having multiple sense etc. The Nirukta (ch. IV) observes : “ekā'rthaṃ aneka-śabdāṃ ity etad uktam. atha yāni anekā'rthāni eka-śabdāni tāni ato'nukramiṣyāmah. anavagata-svara-saṃskārān ca nigamān. tad aika-padikaṃ ity ācaksate.” Patañjali also draws attention to this: (M.bh. on Vārtika 16. Pā. sū. I. 3.1)

Language has both physical and psychological aspects. Our thoughts find audible expression through sounds produced through the agency of vocal organs. Of course all sounds may not constitute words but surely those sounds that directly signify objects are popularly known as 'śabda.' Patañjali observes in the M. bh. (=Mahābhāṣya) on Vārtika 15, Pā. Sū. III. 1.7 viz. “artha-gatyarthah śabda-

prayogaḥ. “artham sampratyāyayiṣyāmi iti śabdaḥ prayujyate.” The Tantra-Vārtika on Mīmāṃsā sūtra (= Mī. Sū.) I. 3.8. also observes — śarvo hi śabdo'rtha-pratyāyanā'rthaṁ prayujyate. Language thus becomes an instrument to convey our thoughts and sentiments, and the science of meaning i.e. semantics deals with this psychological aspect of language. Thus it shows how certain things are signified by certain words, how things are named, how meanings are widened or narrowed or specialised. Etymologists like Yāska had attached great importance to this psychological aspect of language in their principles of derivation. Yāska categorically emphasizes that while attempting an etymological derivation of a word, the meaning has to be taken care of first and last. Says he : ‘artha-nityaḥ parīkṣeta’—Ni. (=Nirukta) II. Durga here observes : “artho hi pradhānam. tad-guṇa-bhūtaḥ śabdaḥ.” Thus, grammar is concerned with the formal aspect and Nirukta is concerned with the semantic aspect of language, as Durga observes : “tasmāt svatantram eva idaṁ vidyā-sthānam, artha-nirvacanam. vyākaraṇam tu lakṣaṇa-pradhānam iti viśeṣaḥ.”

The Indian thinkers tried to approach this problem of word-meaning relationship in more, say, metaphysical way, than pure linguistic, though of course, the latter was equally important to them. They looked upon language, more as an expression of internal consciousness. Puṇyarāja observes (on V. P. I. i)—“pratyak-caitanyasya-antaḥ-sanniviṣṭasya para-bodhanāya śaktiḥ abhi-syandate.” Thus, a constant and invariable association of word with sense follows. When we utter any particular word at any time, some special sense is conveyed at once. To signify everything, there is always a competent word for it. Vātsyāyana on the Nyāya-sūtra (Nyā-Sū.) I. i, 4, observes -yāvad arthaṁ vai nāmadheya-śabdāḥ; taiḥ artha-pratyayah. artha-sampratyayāt ca vyavahārah.” Worldly business proceeds from understanding of a meaning.

In the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad II. iv — the first manifestation of the Indeterminate is said to be dual aspects of mind and speech—i.e. śabda and artha. Thus consciousness first splits itself up into the categories of subject and object—“sa manasā vācam mithunaṁ sama-bhavat.” For the upaniṣads thought and speech are interchangeable. The mind finds its full expression in speech and also vice-versa. The Aitārya upaniṣad observes : “vān me manasi pratiṣṭhā, mano me vāci pratiṣṭhitam. The Chāndogya upaniṣad VI.8.6. observes : “puruṣasya prayato vān manasi sampadyate,” i. e. when a man dies, his speech sinks into that of mind, the mind into prāṇa, and so on. What is implied is that speech is the product of mind. Puṇyarāja on V. P. I. i., quotes a śruti which suggests that there is a subtle form

of speech i. e. vāk, which is inherent in soul i. e. pure consciousness and that it is not divided from meaning : “sūkṣmāṃ arthena a-pravibhakta-tattvāṃ ekāṃ vācāṃ abhisyandamānāṃ uta anye viduḥ. anyāṃ iva ca pūtāṃ nānārūpāṃ ātmani sanniviṣṭāṃ.”

Speech and thought are not spearable, and this is realised only in a stage of higher spirituality. It is consciousness itself which is presented to us in two inseparable parts thus suggesting that śabda and artha are but different aspects of one and the same thing. The V. P. II. 31, says the same when it is observed that :

“ekasya eva ātmano bhedaḥ
śabda-tattvaṃ yad akṣaram |
vivartate artha-bhāvena
prakriyā jagato yataḥ ||” — V. P. I.

Being himself under the influence of Vedantic non-dualism, Bhartṛhari holds that all speculations about śabda and artha are more internal than external. He observes : “artha-bhāgaḥ tathā teṣāṃ āntaro'rthaḥ prakāśate”

So, Puṇyarāja observes that for those who hold speech to be purely an internal phenomenon i.e. a manifestation of the consciousness that lies within, word and meaning which are in reality basically unseparated, appears as though distinct, only through ‘māyā’:

“teṣāṃ āntara-vākya-vādināṃ ācāryāṇāṃ mate, āntara eva atra vākya'rthaḥ. tau ca tatra śabdārthau abhinnau, ekasya anyatarasya tattvasya sambandhinau, vastutaḥ bahiḥ sthitau bhedaḥ iva pratibhāṣate iti boddhavyaṃ.”

The Vākyapadīya :— In his saṃbandha - samuddeśa Bhartṛhari observes that the relation between word and meaning is by no means such as anyone can deny — “saṃbandhaḥ samavasthitaḥ.” Helārāja observes here : “svabhāvataḥ eva nirūḍho, na tu puruṣeṇa niveśitaḥ ity arthaḥ.” The relation is absolutely natural and not man-made. It is fixed by nature. V. P. III. 3 holds that the mutual relation between both word and meaning is proved by the very fact that the word is called ‘vācaka’ and the meaning, ‘vācya’ :—

“asyā'yaṃ vācako vācya
iti śaṣṭhyā pratiyate,
yogaḥ śabdārthayo's —
tattvaṃ apy ato vyapadiśyate.”

When it is said that 'this is pointed out by the word', or, when it is said, 'this word expresses this sense,' it is understood that there is some kind of relation between vācya and vācaka. When Bhartṛhari observes at V. P. I. 6 that 'śabdānām yataśakti-tvam...', he implies, explains Puṇyarāja, that words by their very nature have the power to signify definite ideas of which they are treated as symbols, and that their potency is never exhausted and remains particularly inherent in them :

—“śabdānām yataśaktitvam; niyatārtha-pratyāyana-sāmarthyam.” V. P. II. 29 observes:

“yasmīn tūccārte śabde
yayā yo'rthaḥ pratīyate |
taṁ āhur arthaṁ tasyaiva
nānyad arthasya lakṣaṇam ||”

The meaning of a word is what presents itself to us whenever that word is heard. The utterance of the word 'gauḥ' gives rise, immediately, to the idea in our mind of a being, possessing dewlap, hump, etc. and this naturally is its meaning.

Word and its meaning are related to each other from times immemorial. The analogy to this relation is found in the functioning of sense-organs with respect to the object-world. Thus both are without beginning, observes Bhartṛhari at V. P., Saṁbandha-samuddeśa, III. 29 :—

indriyāṇām sva-viśayeṣu
anādir yogyatā yathā,
anādir arthaiḥ śabdānām
saṁbandho yogyatā tathā.”

Word and meaning are being so absolutely connected with each other that it is impossible to think of one without the other. Kālidāsa has suggested the relation of 'vāg-arthau' for the union of Śiva-Pārvatī. The V. P. I. 50 observes that word, like knowledge, reveals itself as well as the idea or thing comprehended :

“ātma-rūpaṁ yathā jñāne
jñeya-rūpaṁ ca dṛśyate,
artha-rūpaṁ tathā śabde
sva-rūpaṁ ca prakāśate.”

For Bhartṛhari, three things are simultaneously comprehended when we utter a word, such as, the particular word, the intention of the speaker, and the object

denoted :

“jñānaṃ prayoktur, bāhyo'rthaḥ
svarūpaṃ ca pratiyate
śabdair uccaritaḥ teṣāṃ
saṃbandhaḥ samavasthitaḥ.” (V. P. III. 1)

A sound is meaningless, if it does not convey these three things, viz. the sound itself, its import and the actual fact. So, in case of an absence of relation existing between word and its meaning, we cannot account logically for the derivation of a given meaning from a given word. So, in such a relation, a fundamental solution of a question, as to why things are invariably signified by their corresponding words, is seen by Bhartṛhari.

Different Views :—

The relation of word and meaning has been explained differently by different schools of thought. The Mīmāṃsakas and the grammarians hold the relation between word and meaning as permanent : Vācaspati in his Tātparya-ṭīkā on Nyāya-sūtra (=Nyā. Sū.) II.1.55 takes note of this : ye'pi mīmāṃsakā vaiyā—karaṇā vā svābhāvikaṃ śabdā'rthayoḥ saṃbandham āsthiṣata.” —

The Naiyāyikas and the Vaiśeṣikas look upon this relation as conventional i.e. 'saṃketita' or creation of Divine Will. Still others maintain that the relation between sound and sense is like one that exists between cause and effect, or manifest and manifested, i.e. grāhaka and grāhya, etc. : Puṇyarāja on V. P. I. observes : śabdārthasya kārya-kāraṇa-saṃbandhaśca iti eke. —

The V. P. I. has :

“grāhyatvaṃ grāhakatvaṃ ca
dve śaktī tejaso yathā,
tathaiva sarva-śabdānāṃ
ete pṛthag avasthite.”

and also,

“prakāśaka-prakāśyatvaṃ
kārya-kāraṇa-rūpatā,
antar mātṛā”tmanas tasya
śabdā-tattvasya sarvadā.” (V. P. II)

For still others, speech and thought, or word and things are mutually convertible, and, there is also some reciprocity of causal connection between the two : V. P. III. 32. Saṃbandha-samuddeśa reads as —

“śabdaḥ kāraṇaṃ arthasya,
sa hi tenópajāyate,
tathā ca buddhi-viśayād
arthā cchabdaḥ pratiyate.”

For some, again, sound and sense are essentially the same, i.e. they come from the same source :

“ekasyaiva ātmano bhedaḥ
śabdārthāv aprthak sthitau.” (V. P. I.)

This view is criticised by some who feel that in case word and sense are essentially the same, then one should experience burn while pronouncing ‘agniḥ’ or fire. But this criticism is misdirected. What is actually meant by the view quoted as above is that one and the same thing gets manifested in different forms in which objects are usually comprehended by all beings. Thus quotes Puṇyarāja :—eko’yaṃ śakti-bhedena bhāvātmā pravibhajyate, buddhi-vṛtty anusāreṇa bahudhā jñānavādinām.” He further quotes :

“śabdārthayor a-sambhede
vyavahāre prthak-kriyā
yataḥ śabdārthayos-tattvaṃ
ekaṃ tat samavasthiṭam.”

i.e. word and meaning, fundamentally non-different appear to be different only in popular usage.

We will consider as below, different views as held by the Mīmāṃsakas, Nyāya-vaiśeṣikas etc. in greater details.

Mīmāṃsakas :

The Mīmāṃsakas have seriously thought about this problem. Before discussing the relation as such between word and its meaning, the Vṛttikāra (pp. 43) discusses in the beginning as to whether there is any possibility of there being any relation as such between word and sense. They, for sure, can not be connected by saṃśleṣa or saṃyoga i.e. association, because in that case, the utterance of a word, say ‘kṣura’ or ‘modaka’, could cut or sweeten the mouth respectively. This is not our

common experience. There again cannot be the relation of kārya-kāraṇa or cause-effect, or nimitta-naimittikabhāva, or āśraya-āśrayi-bhāva i.e. the relation of a thing and its substratum, existing between them. As the śabda and artha are both 'nitya' or eternal, the first two relations are out of question. The third is also not possible, because of the fact that they have different āśrayas or substratum as the śabda or word resides in ākāśa, ether, and the artha i.e. meaning resides in pṛthivī. So then, what kind of relation can there be ?—The Vṛtti, pp. 43 reads as—

“naiva śabdasya arthena sambandhaḥ, kuto'sya pauruṣeyatā a-pauruṣeyatā vā iti. katham ? syāc ced arthena sambandhaḥ, kṣra-modako-ccāraṇe, mukhasya pātana—pūraṇe syātām; yadi saṁśleṣa-lakṣaṇaṁ abhipretya ucyate. kārya-kāraṇa, nimitta-naimittika, āśrayāśrayibhāvādayas tu sambandhāḥ, śabdasya anupapannā eva.

To this, the answer from the Mīmāṃsaka, is very simple, viz. that the śabda is 'pratyāyaka' and the artha is 'pratyāyya', i.e. there is the relation of 'conveyor and conveyed'—or “pratyāyya-pratyāyaka-sambandha.” So, between śabda and artha, there is 'pratyāyya-pratyāyaka-bhāva or “saṁjñā-saṁjñi-lakṣaṇa-sambandhaḥ.” Now, if this relation is accepted, then we should expect the word to convey its artha even on its first hearing. But our experience goes against this. The word listened for the first time does not convey a meaning —i.e. The prathama-śruta-śabda is not a 'pratyāyaka.' In that case the relation cannot be that of 'pratyāyya-pratyāyaka.' But this argument can be refuted by pointing out to our experience which surely is of the form that the word is pratyāyaka-conveyor, and the sense is 'pratyāyya' or conveyed; for we find invariably that śabda conveys 'artha.' In case of its not being 'pratyāyaka'—or conveyor, when 'prathama-śruta' or heard for the first time, it may be observed that it becomes 'pratyāyaka' or conveyor, as many times as it is necessary for it to become so. Only thus our normal experience can be explained. We cannot regard an eye to be an adraṣṭṛ—or non-perceiver—only because it fails to see objects in the absence of light. The same is the case with reference to the word : Just as light is the ancillary cause or saha-kāri kāraṇa in the act of perceiving objects, similarly 'bahukṛt-śravaṇa' or repeated hearing is the saha-kāri-kāraṇa in śabda being an artha-pratyāyaka or a word conveying some sense : vṛtti on pp. 43 observes : “sarvatra no darśanaṁ pramāṇaṁ, pratyāyaka iti pratyayaṁ dṛṣṭvā avagacchāmo, na prathama-śruta iti. prathama-śravaṇe pratyayaṁ adṛṣṭvā yāvat-kṛtvaḥ śrutena iyaṁ saṁjñā ayaṁ saṁjñi iti avadhāritam bhavati, tāvat-kṛtvaḥ śrutād arthāvagamaḥ, iti. yathā cakṣur draṣṭru, na bāhyena prakāṣena vinā, prakāśayati iti a-draṣṭru na bhavati.”—

Jaimini and Śābara reject the view that this relation viz. *pratyāyaka*—*pratyāyya* *saṃbandha* is a temporal relation and is therefore temporary, or impermanent. They hold that it exists permanently and that it is not created after the existence of word and meaning. Jaimini and Śābara have very often made it clear that the relation between śabda and artha is “*autpattika*” i.e. ‘nitya’ or eternal, and not man-made. See :— *Mī. Sū. I. 15*—*autpattikas tu śabdasyā'rthena saṃbandhaḥ*; also *V. i. 13* — *autpattikatvāt*, also *Mī. Sū. VII. 2.5*—*vikāro nautpattikatvāt*; *Mī. Sū. VI. 8.41*—*utpatti-nāmadheyatvād bhaktyā prthak satīsu syāt*; *Mī. Sū. VII. 3. 22* — *autpattiko hi nāmi-nāmnoḥ saṃbandhaḥ*; see also Śābara *bhāṣya* on *VI. 8.41*, pp. 1522; on *VII. 2.5*, pp. 1543, and on *VIII 3. 3*, pp. 1550.

So, according to both Jaimini and Śābara, because the relation between word and sense is eternal, i.e. *autpattika*, a word can be expressive of one and only one signification and that it cannot be made to signify that, with which it is not connected naturally.

As for the objection (i.e. *pūrva-pakṣa*) to this, it may be said that the main defect of this view (i.e. of the *siddhāntin*) is that there is no ‘*puruṣa*’ whom they can prove to be *saṃbaddhā* or connector or co-ordinator. His existence can not be proved by *pratyakṣa*, or direct means. Again, when *pratyakṣa* fails, the other means of knowledge i.e. *pramāṇas* dependent on it also fail. You cannot say that he must have been *pratyakṣa* to people of his times, because we do not have any traditional account to support this. The tradition can be broken also. Actually the *pūrva-pakṣa* i.e. objectors should furnish us with strong reasons to support their plea. The tanks etc. on the *Himālayas*, for example, must be the work of some *puruṣa* totally unknown to us even by tradition. But here the absence or break of tradition is caused by *deśotsāda* or *kulotsāda*, resulting ultimately in the loss of memory of men. But the same cannot be said about śabda and artha, as we cannot imagine a period when man was not connected with śabda-vyāpāra.

Thus, in the absence of any break or ‘*viyoga*’ there is no reason why there should be no memory i.e. *smaraṇa* of some *saṃbaddhā*. The absence of his *smaraṇa*, therefore, can be taken as an indication of the absence of any *saṃbaddhā* himself. Thus the objector’s view stands refuted — see *vṛtti* on pp. 53 :—

—“*tad idānīm ucyate, apauruṣeyatvāt saṃbandhasya siddham iti. katham punaḥ avagamyate apauruṣeya eva saṃbandhaḥ iti ? puruṣasya saṃbandhuḥ abhāvāt. katham saṃbandho nāsti ? pratyakṣasya pramāṇasya abhāvāt. tat-pūrvakatvācchetaṣām. nanu cira-vṛtta-tvāt pratyakṣasya a-viśayo bhaved idānīntanānām. na hi cira-vṛttaḥ san na smaryeta. na ca hima-vṛkṣādiṣu*

kūpa-ārāma-ādivad asmaranam bhavitum arhati, puruṣa-viyogo hi teṣu bhavati deśotsādena vā kulotsādena vā. na ca śabdārtha-vyavahāra-viyogaḥ puruṣaṇām asti.”

Now, it may be argued that the saṃbaddhā goes out of memory because it was not necessary to remember him in the śabdārtha-vyavahāra which could be continued even without remembering him. We tend to forget things which cease to be useful for our immediate purpose. It should not mean that they never existed before. So, mere non-remembrance does not prove the total absence of a co-ordinator or saṃbaddhā. But this point of the objector can be set aside as fallacious. It is true that people are primarily concerned with the relation or saṃbandha of word and meaning, and not with the saṃbaddhā or co-ordinator. But, it can not be said that the relation of saṃbaddhā is useless, as it is the pre-requisite of vyavahāra-siddhi, i.e. the common activity depends on that. For any vyavahāra to be fruitful, it should be necessarily preceded by the full agreement between saṃbandha-kartā and vyavahāra, because in the absence of either sampratipatti or agreement, or vipratipatti or disagreement, fruition i.e. artha-siddhi becomes impossible. Thus, the terms ‘vṛddhi’ and ‘ma-kāra’ will not convey the senses of ‘ai’ and ‘an’ and ‘a-sarva-gurutrika’ respectively, when used by somebody who does not agree with Pāṇini or Piṅgala. Now, the point is that, if there is no smarana or remembrance of the kartā i.e. agent or doer, the sampratipatti illustrated as above, cannot follow. So, it is wrong to say that karṭṛ-smarana or remembering the agent is not necessary for immediate purposes. So, in the absence of smarana, it can be safely concluded that there was no kartā i.e. doer i.e. co-ordinator at all (see vṛtti on pp. 53).

Jaimini and Śābara hold that the existence of a saṃbandha-kartā cannot be proved by arthāpatti i.e. implication. We can resort to it only in the absence of any other possible explanation. In arthāpatti we attempt to explain facts which are apparently inexplicable. Impossibility of application of any other pramāṇa or means of knowledge forms the very basis of arthāpatti (see vṛtti on pp. 38, and also Śābara-bhāṣya on Mī. Sū. II. 2. 1., pp. 462, and on VI. 6. 3., on pp. 481).

We will consider the objector’s position in greater detail. According to the objector, no word was connected in the beginning with any meaning at all. Then, somebody, sometime, established the connection between word and meaning. Thus words came to be signficatory of a given sense. This is one explanation of the śabdārtha-vyavahāra. Then, vṛddha-vyavahāra forms yet another explanation. Even to-day we see the younger ones getting at a given sense from a given word,

by first observing the speeches i.e. spoken words and then the consequent transactions or activity of the elders. The elders on their part might themselves have learnt their first lessons in gathering of meaning i.e. artha-grahaṇa by observing the practice of their seniors and so on. Thus vṛddha-vyavahāra is a second explanation, the first being that of a saṁbandha-kartā, such as Pāṇini or Piṅgala in case of words such as vṛddhi and 'ma-kāra' respectively. Now, the point to be raised is that when vṛddha-vyavahāra can be pointed out as a possible solution, why then postulate the theory of a 'saṁbandha-kartā' ? So, the Siddhāntin concludes that there is no scope for 'arthāpatti'-pramāṇa, in this case. The other explanation, viz. vṛddha-vyavahāra, being strengthened by pratyakṣa-pramāṇa, should be more acceptable (Vṛtti, pp. 55).

The fact that youngsters catch 'artha' even if they do not know the saṁbandha, is a matter of everyday experience which defeats all questions. They do not arrive at artha-jñāna by the smaraṇa of a saṁbandha-kartā, i.e. co-ordinator. So, it has to be rejected. See vṛtti on pp. 58—"syād etat. a-pratisaṁbandhā bālāḥ katham vṛddhebhyaḥ pratipayanta iti. nāsti dṛṣṭe anupapannaṁ nāma. dṛṣṭā bālā vṛddhebhyaḥ pratipadyamānāḥ, na ca pratipannāḥ saṁbandhāḥ saṁbandhasya kartuḥ. tasmāt vaiṣamyam."—The very presumption of saṁbandha-kartā is absurd. Saṁbandha-karaṇa means giving names to things. To assume that all things having names were present when this ceremony of giving names was performed, sounds absurd. At least some things could have come into existence later. Thus the assumption of a saṁbandha-kartā sounds futile :— "anupalabdhe ca devadattāv arthe anarthakaṁ saṁjñā-karaṇam, aśakyam ca. viśeṣān pratipattum eva hi saṁjñāḥ kriyante, viśeṣānsca upadiśya. tad-viśeṣeṣu ajñāyamāneṣu, ubhayaṁ api anavakīrptam. tasmāt apauruṣeyaḥ śabdasya arthena saṁbandhaḥ" (Vṛtti. pp. 58). Jaimini and Śābara also show that it is impossible to think of any saṁbandha-kartā in case of the Veda also. (See, Mī. Sū. I. i, 27-32; Śābara bhāṣya thereon).

Thus the relation between word and meaning is 'autpattika' i. e. 'nitya', i. e. not man-made but eternal. The Mīmāṃsakas were compelled to ascribe eternality to both words and their relation with meanings, because, as Kumārila explains, they maintained the trustworthiness of the Vedas beyond question. Kumārila seeks logical justification also.

Just as the operation of the visual organs is said to be immediate instrument of the cognition of form i.e. rūpa, eventhough, ultimately the conjunction of the soul with the mind makes for it, similarly, the cognition of the relation and not that of the word itself, is popularly considered as what directly helps us in determining

the meaning :— Śloka-vārtika, sambandhākṣepa-vāda 41-42 reads :—

“śarīrā'tma-mano-yogāt asādharaṇatābalāt,
vijñānā'sattibhāvāc ca, cakṣuḥ kāraṇaṃ iṣyate.”
“tathaivèhādhi-sambandha—
jñānamaṅgaṃ prasiddhitaḥ,
gauravāt kāraṇatvena
mataṃ cet, kena vāryate ?”

Artha-jñāna, OR Determination of Śabdārtha :

The Mīmāṃsakas have also given thought to the problem of how to determine the śabdārtha. The simplest way is — yaḥ pratīyate sa śabdā'rthaḥ — i.e. that which is understood is the meaning of a word. But then in a sentence such as “pūrvo dhāvati,” the sense of ‘aparo dhāvati’ also clicks, and sure, the word ‘pūrvaḥ’ does not yield the sense of “aparaḥ.” So, the rule as mentioned above viz. ‘yaḥ pratīyate sa śabdā'rthaḥ’ can be modified as, “whatever sense is conveyed, and is intended to be conveyed is the meaning of a word.” Jaimini observes : “tad āgame hi tad dṛśyate.” Śābara reads—“yasya ca āgame, yad upajāyate sa tasya artha iti gamyate.” This can be termed the rule of anvaya-vyatireka. (See Śābara bhāṣya on Mī. Sū. IV. 1. 14. pp. 1203, and on Mī. Sū. IV. 1. 15;) see also — yasya cā'game yad upajāyate sa tasya artha iti gamyate. tasya jñānaṃ yathā anyeṣāṃ śabdānām. aśvaṃ ānaya iti ukte, aśvānayanam pratīyate. gāṃ ānaya iti ukte, gavānayanam. tatra aśvo'paiti, gauḥ ca upajāyate. tena jñātena aśva-śabdasya aśvo'rtho go-śabdasya gauḥ iti ca.” (Śābara bhāṣya on Mī. Sū. I. 3. 9.)

The next source of artha-jñāna is the ‘abhi-yuktas’ or the ‘śāstra-stha's. Jaimini says : “śāstrasthā vā tannimitta-tvāt.” Śābara says — yaḥ śāstrasthānām, sa śabdārthaḥ. (S. B. = Śābara bhāṣya; on Mī. Sū. VIII. 2. 24. pp. 1610). See also — “śabdārthā'-dhigame abhiyuktopadeśaḥ pramāṇam; S. B. on I. 3. 10, pp. 226, and ‘abhiyuktāḥ śabdārtheṣu śiṣṭāḥ; S. B. on I. 3. 10. pp. 226; and — śāstrasthānām sa śabdārthaḥ—S. B. on I. 3. 9. pp. 217; see also S. B. on I. 3. 27. The question is who are these śāstrasthas or abhiyuktas or śiṣṭas ? Why are they held as pramāṇas ? To this Śābara says that their tradition and acquaintance with vedas and śāstras is unbroken and hence they are to be looked upon as authority. Śābara observes : (S. B. on I. 3. 9. pp. 217)—ke śāstrasthā śiṣṭāḥ. teṣāṃ avicchinnā smṛtiḥ śabdeṣu vedeṣu ca. tena śiṣṭānām iti śruti-smṛty avadhāraṇe; and also — “āryāvartanivāsinām śabdārthopāyeṣu abhiyuktānām abhi-vyāharatām karmāṇi

cānutiṣṭhatām antya-janāpada-vāsibhyo mlecchebhyaḥ samicīnatarāḥ ācāro bhavati (S. B. on II. 3. 3., pp. 585). (All references are shown, courtesy - Prof. Devasthali's, "Mīmāṃsā; or the Vākya-Śāstra of ancient India.")

Yet another source is said to be Nigama, Nirukta and Vyākaraṇa. This is more so with reference to such words as — jarbharī, turī, turgarī, etc. found in the Vedas. (see S. B. on I. 2. 41, pp. 156). In the case of words that do not belong to the language of the aryaṇs, and yet are found in the scriptures, Jaimini and Śabara hold that here, i.e. where it is a question of borrowed words, we should accept their original sense which they normally convey in their particular language from which they are taken up. So the rule is—"coditaṃ tu pratīyate, avirodhāt pramāṇena." But if there are such words as are not understood even by the Mlecchas, then, in that case, once again, we have to seek the śiṣṭas or Nigama, Nirukta and Vyākaraṇa (S. B. on Mī. Sū. I. 3. 10; pp. 225, pp. 227 etc.). Again there might be certain cases in which one and the same word might show different usages among different people. For this, Śabara says that a usage which is less wide is not to be accepted when it conflicts with a wider usage — 'a-sārva-laukikasya prayogasya sārva-laukikena prayogena virudhyamānasya a-prāmāṇyaṃ syāt. abhyupagacchanti hi te janāpadinaḥ sārva-bhaumaṃ prayogaṃ.' (S. B. on Mī. Sū. II. 3. 3., pp. 581).

Yet another criterion is that, what conflicts with the śāstras is less acceptable, than what, though not actually supported by the śāstras, at least does not stand in conflict with it. As the inhabitants of āryāvarta are much in touch with the śabdārthopāyas, their view is more acceptable than the antya-janapada-vāsin mleccha : "apī ca avipragītā laukikā vipragītebhyaḥ pratyayita-tarāḥ bhavanti. tathā ca āryāvarta-nivāsināṃ śabdārthopāyeṣu abhiyuktānāṃ abhivyāharatāṃ karmāṇi ca anuṣṭhatām antya-jana-pada-vāsibhyo mlecchebhyaḥ samicīnataro ācāro bhavati." — (S. B. on Mī. Sū. II. 3. 3. pp. 581).

Again, whenever there is conflict between anumāna and pratyakṣa prayoga; or between prayoga and smṛti, the latter is to be regarded as stronger in each case — Śabara says — "prayogācca smṛtir baliyāsī, or prayogo durbalaḥ smṛteḥ, and also, anumānataḥ prayogo balavān, etc. etc. And finally, — 'laukikaḥ prayogaḥ śabdārtha-paricchede hetuḥ.' Words in a vidhi-śāstra like vedas or words in law should be understood exactly as we understand them in ordinary language.

Pravṛttinimitta of śabda is also discussed by the Mīmāṃsakas. The word **putra** denotes 'ākṛti' but it can come into existence, when a person referred to by that word is related to somebody as a son. Thus, in this case, 'saṃbandha' i.e. relation is the pravṛtti-nimitta, i.e. the cause of its being current in usage, of the

word 'putra.' Thus, the word 'yūpa' is a saṃskara-śabda. The word 'rājya' depends on the relation between 'karman' and 'rājan', which shows that it is a 'yaugika' word. Thus 'saṃskāra' and 'yoga' are the pravṛtti-nimittas in these two cases.

Before considering the various pravṛtti-nimittas, we should know what actually it means. Śābara observes : ye naimittikāḥ śabdāḥ te nimittam upalabhya prayujyante, yathā daṇḍī, cchātrī, iti.; i.e. only that factor can be called a pravṛtti-nimitta, in the absence of which the particular word cannot be used. Thus in the absence of saṃskāras or religious inunction a pillar cannot be termed 'yūpa.' 'Jāti'—class, of ākṛti-figure itself is the chief pravṛtti-nimitta. When there is nothing else in particular to be conveyed by a word, it conveys ākṛti-form/figure. So ākṛti is the pravṛtti-nimitta of such words. Same is the case with 'jāti' in case of 'jāti-nimitta-śabdāḥ.' It may be noted that when jāti becomes the pravṛtti-nimitta of a śabda, as a rule, this śabda is to be accepted as a jāti-śabda, even though in special cases, the word might appear to convey something else, e. g. saṃskāra etc. also. (See, Mī. Sū. I. iv. 10, and S. B. thereon). Loka—prayoga or common usage becomes the determinant cause in such cases.

The next pravṛtti-nimitta is 'yoga' or relation, and such words are termed 'yaugika' e. g. the word "prokṣaṇī." Śābara explains the word 'yaugika' when he says—rāja-śabdaḥ prasiddher mūlam. tad-yogāt rājya-śabdaḥ. Thus when a word comes into usage, not directly for its own artha, but owing to its connection i.e. yoga or saṃyoga with some other word, already in usage, such word is called yaugika or yoga-siddha i.e. derived from some relation. Jaimini suggests this in the sūtra— "prokṣaṇīṣu artha-samyogāt,"; see also SB. on Mī. Sū. I. iv. 11, pp. 344; — prokṣaṇī-śabdaṃ prati sandehaḥ, kiṃ saṃskāra-nimittaḥ uta jāti-nimittaḥ.....etc. tasmād yaugikaḥ." Then saṃskāra i.e. inunction is also another pravṛtti-nimitta as in case of words such as 'yūpa' etc. If a word is sometimes found to be used as a jāti-śabda, it must always be taken as a jāti-śabda, eventhough in certain cases it might appear as a saṃskāra śabda e.g. the word 'barhiḥ'. Śābdara justifies the above rule on logical grounds. If words such as 'barhiḥ' are taken as saṃskāra-nimittas, setting aside their laukika usage in that case, we take them as 'alaukika' words. But this is not the right approach. The rule regarding the 'balā'bala' of 'saṃskāra' and 'jāti' as pravṛtti-nimittas is suggested by Jaimini in the sūtra I. iv. 10. viz. 'barhirājyayorasamskāre śabda-lābhāt-a-tac-chabdaḥ.'

Fourth pravṛttinimitta is 'saṃbandha.' A yaugika word, say, rājya is dependent upon some jātiśabda e.g. rājan which is the source of its currency-'prasiddhi-mūla.' But the word rājā by itself is quite independent. The word putra' depends upon the

relation with someone to whom a person is related as a son. Now, in case of words such as 'rājan' and 'rājya', the former is 'jāti' śabda, and is the source- prasiddhi-mūla-of the usage of the word rājya. But this is not the case with the words 'putra' and 'pitṛ', which are mutually dependent and therefore called 'saṁbandhi' śabdas. Śabara explains it as : 'saṁbandhi-śabdāś ca sarve sāpekṣāḥ, vinā padāntareṇa, na paripūrṇaṁ arthaṁ abhi-vadanti.' (See also SB. on VII 7.24, pp. 1500,—bahutvaṁ cāpekṣikam etc.)

'Rūḍhi' i.e. practice is also a pravṛtti-nimitta. The word 'kuśala' i.e. one who cuts kuśa grass, is an illustration here. Now it suggests all the qualities which a man should possess while plucking kuśa blades. Usage has now restricted the sense of this word to this 'nipuṇatā' i.e. expertise alone. Later ālaṁkārika Mammāṭa takes rūḍhi-mūlā lakṣaṇā here, and Viśvanātha rejects it. For Śabara also it is not a case of lakṣaṇā. Śabara holds that such a phenomenon occurs where a word is a composite whole. It gives one signification when taken as a whole—i.e. samudāya, and another signification when taken as made of parts. Śabara opines that in such cases the meaning of the composite whole is to be taken as stronger—"avayava-prasiddheḥ, samudāya-prasiddhiḥ balīyasī." (S. B. on VI. 7. 21, 22, pp. 1499-1500),—yathā kuśalaḥ, pravīṇaḥ"....etc.

All the pravṛtti-nimittas refer to the expressed sense i.e. vācyārtha and not lakṣyārtha or indicated sense. For lakṣaṇā, the Mīmāṃsakas suggest different pravṛtti-nimittas or conditions.

Naiyāyikas :

We will now consider the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika views on the subject of the relationship of word and meaning, or the association of symbol and the symbolised. The Naiyāyikas and the Vaiśeṣikas do not differ much on this issue. For both of them, the meaning of a word is determined by 'samaya' or 'saṁketa' i.e. convention. Difference of opinion between the two i.e. the Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas lies in the fact that while the Vaiśeṣikas include śabda-bodha i.e. verbal cognition in the category of inference, the Naiyāyikas take it as an independent source of knowledge. It should be noted that the Naiyāyikas and the Vaiśeṣikas, both do not recognise the possibility of any relation—i.e. either saṁyoga or samavāya—(= impermanent or permanent relation) between a word and the object it denotes :

"śabdārtha-saṁbandhau"—Vai. Sū. II. 2.18; "tathā ca aśatā ghaṭā" dinā śabdasya na saṁyogo na vā samavāya iti bhāvaḥ." Upaskāra; and "purāṇa-

pradāha-pāṭana-anupapatteś ca sambandhā'-bhāvaḥ." Nyā. Sū. I. 53, and also see Nyāyamañjarī pp. 241—"na hi kuṇḍala-badaryor iva saṃyoga-svabhāvaḥ, tantu-patayor iva samavāyā"tmā vā sambandhaḥ pratyakṣaṃ upalabhyate." The author of Nyāyamañjarī has found fault from logical point of view with the views of Mīmāṃsakas and Vaiyākaraṇas who have tried to establish some sambandha or relation between word and its denotation. Nyāya-mañjarī (pp. 241) observes : "na saṃśleṣa-lakṣaṇaḥ śabdā'rtha-sambando'smābhir abhyupagamyate. tatha kim kārya-kāraṇa, nimitta-naimittika, āśrayāśrayibhāva-ādayaḥ śabdasya arthena sambandhāḥ ? ete'pi na-tarāṃ. tatha kim śabdā'rthayor avinābhāva-sambandhaḥ ? — so'pi nāsti. kas tarhi ? samayaḥ"

The Vaiśeṣika view-point is as below—conjunction or saṃyoga is a kind of quality. Śabda or word being itself a quality of ākāśa, cannot possess 'saṃyoga'—another quality. With the object denoted by it :—'guṇatvāt'—Vai. Sū. VII. 2. 14.; also, 'tathā ca guṇasya śabdasya guṇaḥ saṃyogaḥ kathaṃ syāt ? —upaskāra. Again, there is no action as such which takes place when things are denoted by words. So, we cannot find out any connection between the two : 'niṣkriyatvāt'—Vai. Sū. VII. 2. 16. Things that are formless (i.e. not material) and inactive by nature, can never be related to one another without the intervention of external force. Again, in cases like, 'there is no pot,' one fails to think of any conjunction between the word and its meaning, which is non-existent at present—"asti nā'sti ti ca prayogāt," Vai. Sū. VII. 2. 16. Our universal experience is that things that are mutually related are found to have co-existence. The word 'nā'sti' (= there is no pot), now uttered, does not logically co-exist with the thing which is simply negated. Similarly, samavāya-sambandha between a word and the object also does not stand. The Naiyāyikas do not agree even to the idea of natural relation, either saṃyoga or samavāya, but on the contrary, tried to refute the theory of eternal relation between śabda and artha. A sambandha i.e. connection as such is negated because there is neither pratyakṣa nor anumāna proof for it :— "prāpti-lakṣaṇas tu śabdā'rthayo sambandhaḥ pratiṣiddhah. kasmāt ? pramāṇatónupalabdheḥ."—Vatsyāyana on Nyā. Sū. II. 1. 52. Again, a union of the two is not possible, as the two do not remain in the same locality. A word exists in the vocal organ of the speaker and the object lies in a different place :—"prāpti-lakṣaṇe ca grhyamāṇe sambandhe śabdā'rthayoḥ śabdā'ntike vā arthaḥ syāt, arthā'ntike vā śabdaḥ syāt. tasmān na śabdena arthaḥ prāptaḥ iti." (Vatsyāyana, on Nyā. Sū. II. 1. 52.) and also— "mukhe hi śabdaṃ upalabhāmahe bhūmāv artham," (śabara, on M. S. I. i. 5.). So, in this state of affairs, the conclusion that, the words and things referred

to by them are not connected, forces itself upon us.—“śabdārthau a-sambaddhau.”—Vai. Sū. VII. 2. 18. svabhāvato hy a-sambaddhāv etau śabdārthau. mukhe hi śabdaṃ upa-labhāmahe, bhūmāv artham.”—Śābara; and also see Nyā. Sū. II. 1. 5—śabdārtha-vyavasthānād a-pratiśedhaḥ.” A sound has its origin in the mouth while the object, such as a pot, lies on the earth. But, at the same time, the entire absence of relationship is also against all popular experience. To deny any relation is to strike at the very root of our knowledge of things. There has to be at least some relation—whether real or imposed—between the two, because in the absence of any relation whatsoever, any word would have denoted any object, e.g. the word ‘ghaṭa’ would have denoted the object viz. ‘paṭa’ also (See V. P. i. 125). On the contrary, we find that the utterance of a particular word is always accompanied by the comprehension of a definite thing. “artha-smaraṇasyāpi śabdollekhenaiva darśanāt.” (puṇyarāja)—there is, no knowledge which is not associated with its word : “na so’sti pratyayo loke yaḥ śabdā’nugamād rte, anuviddham iva jñānaṃ sarvaṃ śabdena bhāsate.” (V. P. I. 124). The cognition of a thing from a word is in itself a strong evidence of some relation existing between the two : “sati pratyaya-hetutve sambandha upapadyate śabdasyārthe yatas tatra sambandho’stīti gamyate.” (V. P. Sambandha-samuccaya, III. 37).

The Naiyāyikas did not accept the natural connection between the two, but at the same time, they did not, in any way, deprecate the uniformity of cognition as is represented by words in the way of denoting things.—śabdaḥ sambandho’rthaṃ pratipādayati, pratyaya-niyama-heturvāt, pradīpavat.”—Nyāya-Vārttika. If it is asked that in case of the absence of relation between the two, how can a word as a rule denote some object ? : “nanu yadi na saṃyoga, na samavāyaḥ śabdārthayos tarhi kena sambandhena śabdo niyataṃ arthaṃ pratipādayatīty ata—āha—” Upaskāra. Kaṇāda, with the Naiyāyikas, says that the cognition of a meaning is not because of any connection as such, but it results from the ‘saṃketa’—The Will of God—expressed in the following way, viz., ‘let this meaning be gathered from this word.’—“sāmayikaḥ śabdārtha-pratyayaḥ” Vai. Sū. VII. 2. 20.; na sāmayikatvāt śabārthaṃ saṃpratyayasya.” Vai. Sū. II. 1. 55; and also — sāmayika iti samayaḥ īśvaraḥ, saṃketaḥ. asmāt-śabdād ayamārtho boddhavyaḥ ityā”kāraḥ. yaḥ śabdo yasminn arthe bhagavatā saṃketitaḥ sa taṃ arthaṃ pratipādayati.”

Saṃketa thus, is caused by Divine Will and not established by human agency: “sargāntareṣv api vācya-vācaka-śaktyapekṣaḥ saṅketaḥ kriyate,”—on sūtra—“tasya vācakaḥ prañavaḥ.”—This relation between vācya and vācaka will never come to an end, and will continue even in future stage of existence. It is a fact and not a

fiction. Vyāsa refers to this in his yogasūtra. A word expresses only that sense which is assigned to it by the Divine Will. Thus, between the word and the object, this relation of samketa exists, and not that of samyoga or samavāya. The Vaiśeṣikas and the Naiyāyikas had to go for it. It may be noted however, that from the Nyāya-sūtras and the bhāṣya thereon, it is not sufficiently clear whether by 'samketa' is meant the Divine Will or the human will. The expression—"prayujyamānagrahaṇāc ca samayopayogo laukikānām"—it is intended to imply that samketa follows from vṛiddha-vyavahāra. Grammar also contributes to the same purpose by analysing words into 'prakṛti' and 'pratyaya', —"samayaparipālanārtham cedam padalakṣaṇayā vāco'nvākhyānam vyākaraṇam." Vācaspati, Jayantabhaṭṭa and Gadādhara have clearly referred to the Will of God as Samketa—"parameśvareṇa hi sṛṣṭy ādau yo gavādi śabdānām arthe samketaḥ kṛtaḥ, so'dhunā vṛiddha-vyavahāre prayujyamānānām śabdānām a-vidita-saṅgatibhir api bālaiḥ śakyo grahītum—" Tātparya-tikā; and see also : tasmād īśvara-viracita-sambandhā'dhigamopāyabhūta-vṛiddha-vyavahāra-balāt tad-avyutpatti-sāpekṣo śabdo'rtham avagamayati-ti siddham. : Nyāyamañjarī- pp. 246—This Divine Volition represents the relation and is rightly called the real power of denotation of a word, i.e. śakti. :— "śaktirūpaḥ sambandhaḥ iti uktam."—Nyāyamañjarī; "śaktiś ca padena saha padārthasya sambandhaḥ"—Muktāvalī.

Gotama also arrives at the same point. He holds the relation to be just conventional and certainly not natural or innate : "sāmāyikāḥ śabdārtha-sampratyayaḥ na svābhāvikaḥ. ṛṣyācārya-mlecchānām yathākāmaḥ śabdaprayogo'rtha-pratyāyanam pravartate."—Vātsyāyana, under Nyā. Sū. II. i. 56. If it were natural, as held by the grammarians (siddhaḥ svābhāvikaḥ śabdārthayaḥ sambandhaḥ"Helārāja) he argues, then the same word would have been used by different races of mankind in the same sense, and consequently no varieties of language would have resulted : "jātivīśeṣe cā'niyamāt" : Nyā. Sū. II. i. 56. The word 'gauḥ' is so fashioned by the Divine Will, that it always denotes a particular thing and not anything else. We feel that modern thinkers on this topic would also chose to side with the Naiyāyikas.

How is the Samketa apprehended ?

To this, it is said that its cognition is current from time without beginning. (Nyāyamañjarī-na hi śabdārtha-vyavahāra-rahita kaścit kālaḥ upapadyate). We cannot think of any people any day incapable of signifying objects by the use of sounds—Udayana says that God became a magician in the beginning and brought the words and objects—vācyā and vācaka-together. He assumed the dual forms of

the denotative and the denoted before he could make the first group of people familiar with the saṃketa, which he invented. —“īśvaro’pi prayojya-prayojaka-bhāvāpannam śarīra-dvayaṃ parigṛhya vyavahāraṃ kṛtvā tadānīntanānāṃ śaktiṃ grāhayati.”—(comm. by Haridāsa Bhaṭṭācārya). From this first group of men, the others of later generations gathered the meaning of words. THERE ARE VARIOUS SOURCES OF SAṃKETA-GRAHAṆA : (Jagadīśa quotes in śabda-śakti-prakāśikā)

—“śaktigrahaṇaṃ vyākaraṇopamāna-
koṣāptavākyād-vyavahārataś ca,
vākyasya śeṣād vivṛte vadanti
sānnidhyataḥ siddhapadasya vṛddhāḥ.”

First of all comes the vṛddha-vyavahāra. The logicians and grammarians have explained this. Saṃketa is two-fold : ājānika i.e. one not of human origin but current from eternity; and ādhunika i.e. man-made : “ājānikāḥ ādhunikāḥ saṃketo dvidvidho mataḥ, nitya ājānikas tatra śaktir ity abhigīyate.” “kādācitkas tu ādhunikāḥ śāstrakārādibhiḥ kṛtaḥ”—(V. P.)

Primary signification known as śakti comes under the former and the technical terms such as guṇa, vṛddhi, etc. come under the latter.

We have examined the views of the grammarians. The view of Vyādi as given by Puṇyarāja is that there is no author of the relation that exists between words (both vedic and popular) and the object denoted by them : “saṃbandhasya na kartā’sti śabdānāṃ loka-vedayoḥ.” (quoted by Puṇyarāja, under V. P. I. 26.)

The grammarians insist on the eternity of both words and meanings. The Mahābhāṣya (= M. bh.) says that the words, the meanings, and the relation between them are all eternal.

— “siddhe śabdārtha-saṃbandhe.”—vārttika I Patañjali has explained the word ‘siddha’ as a synonym of ‘nitya’ (nitya-paryāya-vācī siddha-śabdaḥ), and also — “nityo’hy arthavatāṃ arthaiḥ abhi-saṃbandhaḥ”—M. bh. I. i. 1.

How is this permanent relation known ? To this, it is said that the object for which words are expressly used constitutes in itself a sufficient proof to show that the relation between words and meanings is natural and permanent :

—“katham punarjñāyate siddhaḥ śabdārtha-saṃbandhaḥ ca iti ? lokataḥ yallope’rthaṃ upādāya śabdān prayuñjate teṣāṃ vivṛtau yatnaṃ kurvanti.” (M. bh. I. i. 1). In the absence of this permanent and natural relation no one would have ever felt the need for using words for the purposes of communicating

thoughts to others.

Bhartṛhari :— It has been noted that for Bhartṛhari the relationship between word and meaning is as beginningless as the relation between sense-organs and their objects—i.e. indriyārtha-saṃbandha. This relation is explained differently. He regards it as unconventional :

“akṛtrimo'bhisāṃbandho

viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣyavat.” (V. P. II. 370),—

It is as between a noun and adjective. He also suggests that the proper names (such as Dittha) and the technical terms (as vṛddhi, guṇa, etc.) are also permanently related to their specialised senses”—

“nitya eva tu saṃbandho

ditthā'diṣu gavādivat” (V. P. II)

He also shows the mutual causal connection between śabda and artha. A word appears to be the immediate antecedent from which the intended meaning is gathered and again, a word is comprehended only through the instrumentality of sense that is previously ascertained by the intellect.—(V. P. III. 32. saṃbandha-samuddeśa). The meaning of a word is an object which exists externally in the world :

“śabdārtho hy artho bahīrūpatayā'vasthīyamānaḥ.”—Helārāja.

Again, it is held that both śabda and artha stay unseparated in our intellect prior to their outward manifestation :

“yathā hi buddhau śabdār'thayoḥ pūrvam

abhedena avasthānam”—Helārāja,

and also Durga on Nirukta I. ii.

“śarīrehy abhidhānābhidheya-rūpā buddhiḥ

hṛdayā'ntargatā”kāśa-pratiṣṭhitā.”

By this inseparable relation, they become convertible or interchangeable with each other :

“śabdārthayor abhedena saṃbandho'dhyāsa-lakṣaṇaḥ.”—Helārāja.

But in the Yoga-sūtra and Nyāya-mañjarī, an objection is raised against such a view. It is as follows :— A word, its meaning, and the cognition produced by it are all really different from one another. In ordinary usage, we treat these three as one and identical; e. g. we have no other criterion, but the term 'go' itself to distinguish the word 'go' from its meaning and the cognition :

“gaur iti śabdo, gaur ity artho, gaur iti jñānam. ya eṣaṃ pravigrāḥ sa sarvavit.”
— Vyāsabhāṣya.

The author of yogasūtra says that this false identification prevents us from understanding the speech of all beings (Yoga-sūtra III. 17), just as māyā hides from us the essential unity of brahman.

The doctrines of śabdā'dhyāsa and śabda-vivarta as suggested by Bhartṛhari have been noted by us. But these doctrines were strongly criticised by the Naiyāyikas. Jayantabhaṭṭa refutes the interchangeability of word and meaning (i.e. śabdā'dhyāsa-vāda), and also śabda-vivarta-vāda and brands it as inadequate and irrational—

—“sarvathā na saṃbandhaḥ śabdā'dhyāsavādaḥ, vivartavādo'pi.”—

But, Bhartṛhari was a great exponent of the natural relationship between śabda and artha and considered it as the most plausible explanation appealing to one's reason—

—“siddhaḥ svābhāvikaḥ śabdā'rthayoḥ saṃbandhaḥ”—Helārāja.

He thus opposes the theory of saṃketa which brings in the unnecessary discussion of human or Divine volition. He says that if words were naturally not associated with their meanings, nobody could ever connect the one with the other in any way possible :

—“sāmayikas tu saṃbandhaḥ na yujyate.

—“nitye'nitye' pi bāhye'rthe puruṣeṇa kathañcana saṃbandho'mṛta-saṃbandhaiḥ śabdaiḥ kartum na śakyate.” (V. P. IV. 38).

We may now note as to how the meaning is comprehended from a word. The cognition as to the denotative power of the words (śakti) is usually derived from popular usages. There are other means also such as — (i) grammar; —Bhartṛhari and Jayantabhaṭṭa emphasise the importance of grammar —

“artha-pravṛtti-tattvānāṃ
śabdā eva nibandhanam,
tattvā'vabodhaḥ śabdānāṃ nāsti
vyākaraṇād ṛte.” — V. P. IV. 38.

and also —

sādhūpayogān ucitāñś ca śiṣṭān
na veda yo, vyākaraṇaṃ na veda.
quoted by Puṇyarāja on V. P. I. 16,

and also—

“sarvathā prakṛti-nirmalaṃ atyudāraṃ vyākaraṇāḍambaram eva prāyaiḥ parivāda-pāṃsu-pātaiḥ, na manāg api dūrīkartuṃ pāryate iti siddham. tasmāt pavitrāt sarvasmāt pavitraṃ jana-bāhumataṃ adhigata-caturvarga-grāmaṃ ātmānaṃ kartuṃ adhyeaṃ vyākaraṇam.”—

“rūpāntareṇa devās te vicaranti mahītale,
ye vyākaraṇa-saṃskāra-pavitrita-mūkhā narāḥ.”

manunā ca paṅkti-pāvanatvena adhigata-vyākaraṇo mīmāṃsakaś ca sva-smṛtau paṭhitau.

“yaś ca vyākurute vācaṃ
yaś ca mīmāṃsate giram” iti ||

—Nyāyamañjarī pp. 425-426.

(ii) Analogy e.g. ‘gauriva gavayaḥ’

(iii) lexicon, (iv) testimony,—

—“āptopadeśāt sāmāthyāt

artha-saṃpratyayaḥ—Nyā. Sū. II. i. 52.

Words like svarga, apsaras, devatā, uttar-kuru, etc. as pointed out by Vātsyāyana, denote objects which are never perceived by human beings. Their meaning is gathered through āptavākya—

—“svargaḥ, apsarasah, uttarāḥ kuravaḥ, sapta-dvīpāḥ, samudro, lokasanniveśa ity evam āder apratyakṣasya arthasya na śabdāmātrāt saṃpratyayaḥ. kim tarhi ? āptaiḥ ayaṃ uktaḥ śabda ity atah saṃpratyayaḥ.

—Bhāṣya on Nyā. Sū. II. i. 53.

and also,

na hy ayaṃ śabdāmātrāt svargādīn pratipadyate, kimtu puruṣa-viśeṣābhīhitatvena pramāṇatvaṃ pratipadyate, tathābhūtāt śabdāt svargādīn pratipadyate—Nyāya-vārttika and also—

apūrva-devatā-svargaiḥ

samam āhur gadādiṣu.—V. P. II. 121, etc.

(v) Popular usage, i.e. vṛddha-vyavahāra

(VI) Contact, (VII) synonyms and (VIII) association with the words of known signification also, meaning is collected. These sources will be discussed in greater details under abhidhā or word-power of direct expression.

—Bhartrhari also says,

“vākyāt prakaraṇāt arthāt,
arthaucityāt deśakālataḥ,
śabdārthāḥ pravibhajyante
na samayād eva kevalāt.”—V. P. II. 316.

In case of words having multiple sense (anekārtha) the exact contextual meaning is determined by such factors as ‘saṃyogaḥ’ or conjunction, viprayogaḥ or disjunction, etc. —Bhartrhari enlists these factors under V. P. II. 317, ‘saṃyogo viprayogaśca’....etc. In case of multiplicity of meanings two courses are open to us. We may either hold that one meaning is conventional and the rest are of secondary importance as held by ālaṃkārikas such as Mammaṭa and others, or hold that all are equally conventional as held by Naiyāyikas and also by such ālaṃkārikas as Jagannātha and others. It may also be noted that by multiplicity of meanings with reference to the same word, it is implied that there is some laxity of conventional restrictions. Again, this shows the different stages of linguistic development. Many reasons such as analogy, metaphor, and expansion of knowledge etc. can be given for this happening.

Thus, we have examined the different views concerning the relationship of word and meaning. The ālaṃkārikas have not dwelt upon this topic elaborately but they can be taken normally to follow the lead of the grammarians.

WORD AND ITS IMPORT :

We will also discuss this topic of import of a word, as part of general introduction to the topic of word and its powers or ‘śabda-vyāpāra-vicāra. This consideration, as the earlier one of word-meaning relationship is also important from the point of view of studying the theoretical background of the thinking of ālaṃkārikas concerning śabda-vyāpāra-vicāra.

Here again, the topic of word and its import will be closely studied taking into account the views of Vaiyākaraṇas, Mīmāṃsakas, and the different views as expressed in the Vākyapadīya, the views of the Naiyāyikas, Vākyapadīya’s own views, views as held also by the Buddhists, the ālaṃkārikas, etymologists, etc. etc.

The Vaiyākaraṇas :

The first question to be considered is, ‘what precisely is a word ?’ The normal answer is that, sound which is articulate and significant, is word—“śrotra-graṇaṇe hi arthe loke śabda-śabdaḥ prasiddhaḥ (S. B. on Mī. Sū. I. i. 5). Patañjali has raised

this question in the beginning of his śabdā'nuśāsana. For him, word, in its essential aspect, differs from substance i.e. dravya, action i.e. kriyā, quality i.e. guṇa and class i.e. jāti. A sound expressive of sense is called śabda by people : “athavā pratīta-padārthako loke dhvaniḥ śabda ity ucyate.” (M. bh. I. i. 1). That which really constitutes the ‘word’, when one utters ‘gauḥ’ is the sound, which along with its utterance, simultaneously gives the idea of an animal having dewlap, hoofs, horns, etc. etc. A word, therefore, is sound—“tasmāt dhvaniḥ śabdaḥ.”—“atha gauḥ ity atra kaḥ śabdaḥ ? kiṃ yat, tat sāsnaḍi-lāṅgūla-kakud-khura-viśāṇa-rūpaṃ sa śabdaḥ ? na ity āha. dravyaṃ nāma tat tasmāt dhvaniḥ śabdaḥ.” (M. bh. I. i. 1).

When a word like ‘gauḥ’ is pronounced, the following concepts appear in the mind of the hearers, viz. — the individual cow, cow’s action, qualities, genius or class cow, the shape of the cow, and also the word made up of ‘g’, ‘au’ and ‘h’—the ‘visarga’. The hearer wants to find out the exact significance. The individual cow, her qualities, etc. are perceived by the eye, while the word ‘gauḥ’ is perceived by the ear. So, how can these two perceptions of different senses be taken as the meaning of the word ? But this can be taken as the meaning on the basis of a rule of the grammarians viz. that a thing is not different from another thing, when it is so also with a third thing not different from that another thing—*tad abhinnābhinnasya tad abhinnatvam.*” Patañjali, however, says that ākṛiti, guṇa, etc. are not the true significance of a śabda, but the true significance is ‘sphoṭa’—that which, when manifested, enables the hearer to have a clear apprehension of the object cow.

Patañjali has given a detailed discussion in the form of the pūrva-pakṣa or the objector’s view and uttara-pakṣa i.e. the view of the siddhāntin which is a rejoinder to the objection,—to prove that varṇas or sound units by themselves have no meaning. In order to understand this discussion, we may refer to the opinion of Upavarṣa, accepted by the pūrva-mīmāṃsaka Śabara, and the uttara-mīmāṃsaka Śaṅkara. Śabara refers to this view of Upavarṣa at Mī. Sū. I. i. 5, and Śaṅkara refers to it at I. iii. 28, in his bhāṣya on the Vedānta Sūtras. : “gaur ity atra kaḥ śabdaḥ ? gakāra-aukāra-visarjanīyāḥ iti bhagavān Upavarṣaḥ” (S. B. on Mī. Sū. I. i. 5), and ‘varṇaḥ eva tu śabdaḥ’ iti bhagavān Upavarṣaḥ” (Śaṅkara, on Vedānta Sūtra, I. iii. 28). Śabara holds that ‘akṣarāṇy eva padam’ (S. B. on Mī. Sū. I. i. 5), i.e. syllables alone constitute a word. Thus, he refuses to recognise sound as distinct from syllables.—“ato na tebhyo vyatiriktam anyat padam nāma iti.” The pūrva-pakṣa as given by Patañjali is akin to this—“kiṃ punar ime varṇaḥ

arthavantah āhosvit anarthakāh? arthavanto varṇāḥ. dhātu-prātipadika-pratyā-nipātānām ekavarṇānām artha-darśanān manyāmahe arthavanto varṇāḥ iti. etc. and also — saṃghātā'rthatvāc ca manyāmahe arthavanto varṇāḥ iti; yeṣāṃ saṃghātāḥ arthavantah, avayavā api teṣāṃ arthavantah. yeṣāṃ avayavāḥ arthavantah samudāyāḥ api teṣāṃ artha-vantah."—

The pūrva-pakṣa as cited by Patañjali is akin to this. It runs as below : (This is given while explaining the sūtra, 'hayavarat.') :—

"Do these varṇas or sound-units have meaning or not ? (Patañjali thus starts here with the prima-facie view)—"Sound units have meaning, since there is meaning in one-lettered roots, stems, affixes, and nipātas. One-lettered roots having meaning are found as in, "eti" (√in), adhyeti (√ik), adhīte (√id); one-lettered stems having meaning are found as in, "ābhyām, ebhiḥ, eṣuḥ" etc.; affixes such as 'aupa-gavayaḥ', 'kāpaṭavaḥ'; nipātas as in, 'a aphehi,' 'i indram paśya', 'u, uttiṣṭha,' 'a, apakrama,' etc. etc. Thus letters have meaning.

Again, on account of change in meaning due to change in letters, letters should be held to be meaningful. We see that meaning changes in words if one letter is replaced by another, e.g. in kūpaḥ, sūpaḥ, yūpaḥ, etc.—the words having different meanings with the change of k, s, y, respectively.

Again, "varṇā'nupalabdhau ca anarthagateḥ"—i.e. on account of the absence of that meaning in the absence of that letter (varṇas should be taken as meaningful). —varṇā'nupalabdhau cā'narthagateḥ, manyāmahe arthavanto varṇā iti; vṛkṣaḥ, ṛkṣaḥ, kāṇḍīraḥ, vṛkṣa iti sa-vakāreṇa kaścīd artho gamyate, ṛkṣaḥ iti va-kārāpāye so'rtho na gamyate. kāṇḍīra iti sa-ka-kāreṇa kaścīd artho gamyate āṇḍīra iti ka-kāra-apāye so'rtho na gamyate."

—Again, 'saṃghātā'rthatvāc ca.' on account of the collection having meaning, letters should be held as meaningful. If the collections of letters have meaning, their parts too must have meaning. If the parts have meaning, their wholes too have meaning. If one man with eyes, is able to see, a collection of a hundred men is able to see. If one grain of sesamum (i.e. tilaḥ) is capable of giving oil, its collection is also equally capable of it. But if the parts have no meaning, their wholes also cannot have any meaning. If one blind man is unable to see, a collection of hundred blind men also is unable to see. If one particle of sand cannot give oil, hundred bags of the same cannot give oil.

But Patañjali is of the opinion that letters have no meaning. For, if they have meaning, they will be subject to the same rules which apply to those that have

meaning. Thus, they will get the designation, 'prātipadika' by the rule, "arthavat prātipadikam"; they will receive case-affixes after them by the rule—'prātipadikāt....' and will get the designation, 'padam', by the rule 'sub antam padam.'—"yadi tarhi ime varṇaḥ arthavantaḥ, arthavat-kṛtāni prāpnuvanti. kāni ? arthavat prātipadikam iti prātipadika-saṃjñā; prātipadikāt iti svādyut-pattiḥ, sub antam padam iti pada-saṃjñā."—(M. Bh. I.) Again, letters have no meaning because a meaning is not found for every letter—"anarthakās tu prativarnam arthā'nupalabdheḥ, anarthakās tu varṇaḥ. kutaḥ ? prativarnam arthā'nu-palabdheḥ. na hi prativarnam arthāḥ upalabhyante. kiṃ idam prativarnam iti ? varṇam varṇam prativarnam.—(M. bh. I). Letters are meaningless also because the same meaning is not present when there is metathesis, elision, augment or substitution—"varṇa-vyatyaya-apāya-vikāreṣu arthadarśanāt. [M. bh. I]. and also," varṇa-vyatyāpāyopajanavikāreṣu arthadarśanāt manyāmahe anarthakā varṇa iti; varṇa-vyatyaye kṛteḥ tarkaḥ, kaseḥ sikatā, himseḥ siṃhaḥ, varṇavyatyayaḥ na artha-vyatyayaḥ. apāyo lopaḥ—hataḥ, ghnanti, gnantu, a-ghnan, - varṇāpāyo na arthāpāyaḥ; upajanaḥ āgamaḥ, lavitā, lavitum, — varṇopajanaḥ na arthopajanaḥ. vikāraḥ ādeśaḥ. ghātayati, ghātaḥ, varṇavikāraḥ, na arthavikāraḥ. yathaiva varṇavyatyayāpāyopajanavikārāḥ bhavanti, tadvat artha-vyatyayāpāyopajana—vikāraiḥ bhavitavyam. na ca iha tadvat. ato manyāmahe anarthakāḥ varṇaḥ iti. (M. Bh. I.).

Patañjali adds that at times, some of those persons who study equally with the one hope of getting money, get it, while others do not. Now because one gets money, it is not necessary that all get it; and because one does not get money it is not necessary that all do not get money. So, in the same way, we may hold that such single letters as stand as roots, affixes, stems, and nipātas have meaning. This is quite natural—ubhayaṃ idam varṇeṣu uktam; arthavanto' narthakāśca iti ca. kiṃ atra nyāyāyam ? ubhayaṃ iti āha. kutaḥ ? svabhāvataḥ. tad yathā-mamāna-mīhamānantam cādhiyānānam kecid arthe yujyante, apare na. na cedānīm kaścid arthavān iti kṛtvā sarvaiḥ arthavadbhiḥ śakyam bhavitum. kaścit vā'narthakaḥ iti kṛtvā sarvaiḥ anarthakaiḥ. tatra kiṃ asmābhiḥ śakyam kartum ? yad dhātu-pratyaya-prātipadika-nipātā eka--varṇā arthavanto, ato'nye'narthakāḥ, iti svābhāvikaṃ etat."—

The words such as 'kūpaḥ,' 'sūpaḥ,' 'yūpaḥ,' etc. etc. are different letter-groups having different meanings. If the change in their meaning is due only to the change in a single letter, the major portion of the meaning of 'kūpaḥ' should lie in 'sūpaḥ', that of 'sūpaḥ' in 'kūpaḥ', that of 'kūpaḥ' in 'yūpaḥ' and that of 'yūpaḥ' in 'kūpaḥ',

and finally that of 'sūpaḥ' in 'yūpaḥ' and vice versa, 'ūpaḥ' being common to all these three words. But we know them as different letter-groups having different meanings. And it has been actually very well suggested by the opponent himself that letters have no meaning even while actually proving that they have meaning. For, he who holds that the meaning in 'kūpaḥ' rests in 'ka'-kāra, or that of 'sūpaḥ' in 'sa'-kāra, and that of 'yūpa' in 'ya'-kāra, has to accept that 'ūpa' is meaningless: "katham ya eva bhavatā varṇānām arthavattāyām hetur upadiṣṭaḥ, arthavanto varṇāḥ, dhātu-prātipadika-pratyaya-nipātānām ekavarṇānām artha-darśanāt, varṇe vyatyaye ca arthā'ntarāgamanāt, varṇā'nupalabdhau ca anarthagateḥ saṃghātārthatvāc ca iti ? yataḥ tu khalu na kiñcit kūpasya vā sūpe, sūpasya vā kūpe, kūpasya vā yūpe, yūpasya vā kūpe, sūpasya vā yūpe, yūpasya vā sūpe ato na manyāmahe, saṃghātā'ntarāṇy eva etāni evaṃ jātīyakāni arthā'ntareṣu vartante iti. 'ūpa'śabdas tu asyā'narthakaḥ syāt. (M. Bh. on 1. 1. 2.).

Now, with reference to objects denoted by words, Patañjali gives a four-fold classification of words such as words signifying genus or class, quality, action and personal names (=saṃjñā). This division is based on the distinction in regard to things for the signification of which words are used—(pravṛtti-nimitta). : 'catuṣṭayī śabdānām pravṛttiḥ. jāti-śabdāḥ. guṇa-śabdāḥ, kriyā-śabdāḥ, yadṛcchā-śabdāś caturthāḥ." (M. Bh. I. i. 2.)—and also—"śabdānām arthe yā pravṛttiḥ sā pravṛtti-nimitta-bhedāt prakāra-cātuṣṭayavati iti arthaḥ." (pradīpodyote-Nāgeśaḥ)—This division does not apply to things but to their adjuncts —i.e. upādhis. Thus, for Patañjali, words signify these upādhis : 'upādhāv eva saṃketāḥ.' We may note here that ālaṃkārika Daṇḍin has 'dravya' in place of 'yadṛcchā śabda.' Jagadīśa takes him to task because his classification is not extensive enough to comprehend such private terms as 'jaḍa', 'mūka', 'mūrkhā' and also words such as 'anya', 'sūnya', etc.—"

"śabdair eva pratiyante
jāti-dravya-guṇa-kriyāḥ,
cāturvidhyād amiśām tu
śabda uktaḥ caturvidhaḥ."—

and also, "tadetaḥ jaḍa-mūka-mūrkhā'dīnām anya sūnyādīnām ca śabdānām aparigrahāpattī parityaktaṃ asmābhiḥ. — Śabda-śakti-prakāśikā, Jagadīśa; (kārikā 18).

Mīmāṃsakas :— Both Jaimini and Śabara hold that the real import of a śabda is "ākṛti" and not 'vyakti.' Śabara says that 'ākṛti' signifies the mere generality that

pervades all individuals belonging to a class, while 'vyakti' signifies individual, i.e. something which is possessed of certain characteristics which it possesses in common with none else.—“kā punar ākṛtiḥ, kā vyaktir iti ? dravya-guṇa-karmanām sāmānyamātram ākṛtiḥ. asādhāraṇa-viśeṣā vyaktiḥ.”—(S. B. on Mī. Sū. I. iii. 30). The question is which of these is expressed by a word ? But the point is, why then should there be any doubt in this matter ? Well, it is so, because on hearing the word 'go', we get the idea of generality, but when it comes to action, we find that it is related to the generality resting in an individual. The actual usage would seem to show that a word expresses both 'ākṛti' and 'vyakti' in succession—: “kutaḥ saṁśayaḥ ? gaur it yukte sāmānya-pratyayāt vyakttau kriyā-saṁbandhāt.” —S. B. on Mī. Sū. I. iii. 30.

Śabara does not accept the vyaktivāda of the pūrvapakṣa, which he considers fully under Mī. Sū. I. iii 30-32.—The pūrvapakṣa is briefly as below :— The authenticity of the śāstra is unquestionable and we find some of the scriptures enjoining such acts as killing, sprinkling, and cutting with reference to some 'paśu'. Now, if by this 'paśu' only generality is meant, these acts which have been enjoined would be impossible. Again, it is not sound to argue that words should be generally taken to signify 'ākṛti', but at times, in order to avoid 'ānarthakya-doṣa' or, the fault of being not sensible, may be taken to signify 'vyakti' i.e. individual. For, this will take us to a position where we make the word express two senses—a position which cannot plausibly be allowed to stand. So, now, how do we account for the notion of generality that we get from a word ? The objector says that 'ākṛti' is the mark i.e. 'cinha', or 'liṅga'—that leads the hearer on to the 'vyakti'. Just as the idea of a daṇḍa that we derive from hearing the word 'daṇḍin,' only serves as a mark to perceive the man with 'daṇḍa' or a stick, which alone is the real sense of the word 'daṇḍin'—i.e. a man with a stick, similarly, the 'ākṛti' which is conveyed by a word, is only the mark or 'liṅga' to perceive the vyakti, which must therefore be taken as the real sense expressed by a word.

Usage also seems to go against ākṛtivāda. We have such expressions as 'śaḍ deyāḥ', and 'catur-viṁśatir-deyāḥ', where numerals are used with reference to words like 'gāvaḥ'. These seem to signify clearly that 'vyaktis' are not 'ākṛties.' Ākṛti is only one and we cannot think of any numeral except one with reference to it. Again, the acceptance of ākṛtivāda would lead to the futility of the 'ārati-nidhi-śāstra.' The substitution will be impossible if ākṛti is accepted as the real import of a word like 'paśu.' For, the word 'anya', will have 'no sense, since any 'paśu' becomes the same and not 'anya', if 'ākṛti' i.e. paśutva, be the meaning of the word

'paśu'. Now, every paśu is possessed of 'paśutva', so much so that no 'paśu' can be described as 'anya.' To avoid this contingency, vyaktivāda has to be accepted.

:— "vyaktiḥ padārthaḥ iti. kutaḥ ? prayoga-codanā'bhāvāt. ālambhana-prokṣaṇa-viśa-sanādīnām prayoga-codanā ākṛty arthe na sambhaveyuh. atra uccāraṇā'narthakyam, tatra vyaktiyarthaḥ ato'nyatra ākṛti-vacana, iti cet. uktaṁ anyāyaścā'nekārthatvaṁ iti. katham sāmānyāvagatir iti cet, vyakti-padārthakasya ākṛtis' cihnabhūtā bhaviṣyati, ya evaṁ ākṛtikaḥ sa gaur iti. yathā yasya daṇḍo' sti sa daṇḍīti. na ca daṇḍa-vacano daṇḍi-śabdaḥ. evaṁ ihā'pi." [S. B. on Mī. Sū. I. iii. 30, pp. 296-301] and also,

"na tatra, dravyāśraya-vacanaḥ śabda bhaved yathā'kṛtiḥ śabdārtho bhavet. ṣaḍ deyāḥ, dvādaśa deyāḥ, catur-viṁsatir deyāḥ iti. na hy ākṛtiḥ ṣaḍ-ādibhiḥ samkhyābhir yujyate. tasmāt na ākṛti-vacanaḥ." [S. B. on Mī. Sū. I. iii. 32, pp. 301]

and also,

"yadi paśu-rūpākṛtiḥ palāyeta anyam tad varṇam tad dvaya-samālabheta iti. yathākṛti-vacano śabda bhaved anyasyā'lambho no'papadyeta anyasya api paśu-dravyasya saivākṛtiḥ. tasmād vyaktivacana iti." [S. B. on Mī. Sū. I. iii. 32, pp. 302]

Śabara holds that vyaktivāda is unsatisfactory. Take, for example, the texts like "śyenecitaṁ cinvīta." Now, here, if the word 'śyena' is not ākṛtivācaka, how can one obey the said injunction ? For, what is needed for making a 'śyena' is the 'sādrśya' i.e. similarity of the shape carved with bricks, with an actual 'śyena'. This similarity must naturally be with the form that is common to all śyenas i.e. with śyena-tva jāti. Now, if the sādrśya is with reference to śyena-vyakti, then this will not be possible for all sacrificers of different times and places. How can all these meet with one and the same individual śyena simultaneously ? How can the earlier sacrificers have done it ? There again, cannot be a 'vyakti' or individual devoid of all sāmānyas and viśeṣas i.e. generalities and particularities. Thus, some vedic texts favour vyaktivāda, while others favour ākṛtivāda. It is therefore, necessary to seek some more decisive grounds on which to solve this problem.—"ākṛtiḥ śabdārthaḥ. kutaḥ ? kriyārthatvāt. śyenecitaṁ cinvīta iti vacanam ākṛtau sambhavati, yathākṛtyarthaḥ śyenaśabdaḥ. vyaktivacane tu na cayanena śyena-vyaktir utpādayitum śakyata ity aśakyavacanād anarthakaḥ. tasmād ākṛtivacanaḥ. [S. B. on Mī. Sū. I. iii. 33]. We come across such definite ground in the fact that the same word is used in respect of several individuals and this decides the point in favour of the ākṛtivāda. The fact that one and the same word signifies more than one vyakti of the same class, suggests that it signifies something which is common to all. "ākṛtiḥ śabdārthaḥ iti.

yadi vyaktiḥ śabdārtho bhavet, vyakty antare na prayujyeta. atha vyakty antare prayujyate, na tarhi vyaktiḥ śabdārthaḥ. sarva-sāmānya-viśeṣa-vinimuktā hi vyaktir iti ucyate.” [S. B. on Mī. Sū. I. iii. 33]. When the word ‘go’ is applied to other ‘govyaktis, which are devoid of all ‘sāmānya-viśeṣa’ according to the objector, then, in that case this absence of all ‘sāmānya-viśeṣa’ itself is the ‘sāmānya’ signified by the word ‘go’. So, it is not safe to suggest that what is signified by a word everytime, is not the absence of sāmānya-viśeṣa but vyakti, which is but the āśraya i.e. substratum of all these. For then, the word ‘go’ will be applicable to āśva-vyakti as well, and not to go-vyaktis alone, since the former is a vyakti in the sense of the term as seen above.—

“naiṣa doṣaḥ. vyaktyantare sarva-sāmānya-viśeṣa-vinirmukta eva pravartisyate. yadi vyaktantare sarva-sāmānya-viśeṣa-viyukte pravartisyate, sāmānyaṃ eva tarhi syāt. ‘na’ ity ucyate yo’hy arthaḥ sāmānyasya viśeṣāṇāṃ ca āśrayaḥ, sā vyaktiḥ. vyakti-vacanaś ca śabdo na sāmānye na viśeṣe vartate, teṣāṃ tv āśrayaṃ eva abhidadhāti. tena vyaktyantare vṛttir adoṣaḥ. na hi tatsāmānyaṃ, yadi vyaktantareṣu api bhavati, sarva-sāmānya-viśeṣa-viyuktāyāṃ āśva-vyaktau go-śabdaḥ kiṃ iti na vartate ?” [S. B. on I. iii. 33., pp. 303.]

In order to avoid this contingency, one cannot argue that the word applies to only those vyaktis where its use is known by the abhiyuktas—the elite, for, in that case, the word could not be applied to a new born cow !—“āha. yeṣv eva prayogaḥ dṛṣṭas teṣu vartate, na sarvatra. na ca āśvavyaktau go-śabdasya prayoga dṛṣṭaḥ. tasmāt tatra na vartisyate. yadi yatra prayogaḥ dṛṣṭaḥ tatra vṛttiḥ, adya jātāyāṃ gavi prathama-prayogo na prāpnoti, tatra adṛṣṭatvāt.”

[S. B. on Mī. Sū. I. iii, 33, pp. 303]

And we see this actually happening in practice. If, for the sake of argument, the above view is accepted, then the class-perception will become impossible, as this or that vyakti for which ‘saṃketa’ is known by us by usage alone will be recognised as a ‘go’-vyakti, but actually in practice we see that any ‘go-vyakti’, even one so far not seen by us also produces ‘go-pratyaya’ - i.e. apprehension of a cow in us. Thus, the view that the application of a word ‘go’ to go-vyakti depends on usage, has to be discarded. “sāmānya-pratyayaś ca na prāpnoti. iyaṃ api gauḥ iti, iyaṃ vā gaur iti syāt. bhavati ca sāmānya-pratyayo dṛṣṭa-pūrvāyāṃ api go-vyaktau.” “tasmān na prayogā’pekṣo ‘go’ śabdaḥ vyaktivacana iti śakyate āśrayitum.”— [S. B. on Mī. Sū. I. iii. 33, pp. 303].

Moreover, it can be held that a word may be applied to a vyakti which possesses a certain ‘śakti’ i.e. potency or power, for it is possible that this śakti may exist in

all the vyaktis denoted by the word. Śakti by its very nature resides in some only. Thus, a word cannot denote vyakti which is without śakti. And that 'śakti' cannot be 'gotva', because to say that the word 'go' applies to that vyakti where 'gotva' is found to exist means that the idea of 'viśiṣṭa-vyakti' is accepted, and this means that apprehension i.e. pratīti of 'gotva-viśiṣṭa-vyakti.' But in such a cognition or apprehension, 'gotva,' the qualifying attribute, will be naturally perceived first, and this means that 'ākṛti' is the first import of a word.—“evam śakteḥ svabhāvaḥ eṣaḥ yat kasyāmcit vyaktau vartate kasyāms cit na. 'agniḥ usṇaḥ', udakaḥ 'śītaḥ', evam etad bhaviṣyati iti. naivaṁ siddhyati, na hy etad gamyate kasyāṁ cid vyaktau vartate kasyāṁ cid na iti. satyaṁ etat, gotvaṁ lakṣaṇaṁ bhaviṣyati iti. yatra gotvaṁ tasyāṁ vyaktāḥ iti evaṁ tarhi viśiṣṭā vyaktiḥ pratiyeta. yadi ca viśiṣṭaṁ kecana pūrvataraṁ viśeṣaṇaṁ avagamyeta- na hy apratīte viśeṣaṇe viśiṣṭaṁ kecana pratyetur arhanti iti.” [S. B. on Mī. Sū. I. iii. pp. 304.]

Again, it should be noted that here, ākṛti is signified by the word not in the fashion of a 'daṇḍa' or a stick which is a viśeṣaṇa and is conveyed by the word 'daṇḍin.' For, such a position is totally unacceptable because if ākṛti is once admitted as the artha or meaning of a śabda, e.g. 'go', it must be supposed to have exhausted its 'abhidhā' in its expression. It is not necessary to extend the abhidhā to perceive the vyakti, for 'ākṛti' is inevitably associated with vyakti, and due to this, by the perception of ākṛti, 'vyakti' is also perceived—

“astu viśeṣaṇatvena ākṛtiṁ vakṣyati, viśeṣyatvena vyaktim. na hi ākṛtipadārthakasya vyaktir na padārtho, vyakti-padārthakasya vā nā”kṛtiḥ. ubhayaṁ ubhayasya padārthaḥ. kasyacit kiṁcit prādhānyena vivakṣitaṁ bhavati. tena atrā”kṛtirguṇabhāvena, vyaktiḥ pradhānabhāvena vivakṣyate iti. —S. B. on I. iii. 33, pp. 304, and also,

— “naitad evaṁ, ubhayor ucyamānayoḥ guṇa-pradhānabhāvaḥ syāt. yadi cā'tra ākṛtiḥ pratiyate śabdena tadā vyaktir api padārtha iti na śakyate vaditum. kutaḥ ? ākṛtir hi vyaktyā nitya-saṁbaddhā saṁbandhinyāṁ ca tasyāṁ avagatāyāṁ saṁbandhyantaram avagamyate.”—S. B. on Mī. Sū. I. iii. 33, pp. 304.

So, it is needless to extend abhidhā to vyakti. Anvaya-vyatireka i.e. argument in presence and absence exists between śabda and 'ākṛti' and not between śabda and vyakti. For one who sees the ākṛti is invariably observed to see the vyakti also, even in the absence of a word. On the other hand, if through some mental disturbance, one is not able to perceive the ākṛti even on the word being uttered, it is not at all possible for him to perceive vyakti. This shows that for the observer, the perception or non-perception of vyakti depends on the perception or non-perception of ākṛti,

and that this has no connection whatsoever with the uttering or hearing of a śabda.—“tad etad ātma-pratyakṣaṃ yad śabda uccarite vyaktiḥ pratiyate iti. kiṃ śabdād uta ākṛteḥ iti vibhāgo na pratyakṣaḥ. so'nvaya-vyatirekābhyam avagamyate, avabudhyetaivā'sau vyaktim. yas tūccarite'pi śabde mānasād upacārāt kadācid ākṛtiṃ no'palabheta, na jātucid asāv imāṃ vyaktiṃ avagacchet.”—[S. B. on Mī. Sū. I. iii. 33, pp. 304]. Thus, on the strength of this anvaya-vyatireka relation between ākṛti and vyakti, it can be concluded that it is not necessary to extend the abhidhāśakti or power of expression of a word to vyakti.

Śabara holds that the idea of a vyakti-viśiṣṭa-ākṛti is totally unacceptable for the simple reason that such an assumption would disqualify a word from being applicable to “vyaktyantara-viśiṣṭa-ākṛti.” —“nanu vyaktiviśiṣṭāyām ākṛtau vartate. vyakti-viśiṣṭāyām ced varteta vyaktyantara-viśiṣṭā na pratiyeta”—[S. B. on Mī. Sū. I. iii. 33, pp. 317]. Śabara also holds that primarily word signifies ‘ākṛti’, and ‘vyakti’ only by implication, and that it is immaterial for him whether ākṛti is conveyed by a word only as being subordinate to a vyakti or not. The question of the mutual relationship of ākṛti and vyakti does not fall within the province of śabda-śakti. It is decided on the strength of some other factor viz. the purpose in view for which the word is employed. If ākṛti is spoken of with reference to itself, it becomes principal or ‘pradhāna,’ and if it is spoken of with reference to something else, it becomes subordinate i.e. ‘gauṇa.’ The word is incapable of deciding this. : “tasmācchabda ākṛti-pratyayasya nimittam. ākṛti-pratyayo vyakti-pratyayasya.” —[S. B. on Mī. Sū. I. iii. 33, pp. 317] and also — “nanu guṇabhūtā pratiyate iti uktam. na guṇabhāvo'smatpakṣasya bādhakaḥ. sarvathā tāvat pratiyate. arthād guṇabhāvaḥ pradhānabhāvo vā. svārthaṃ ced uccāryate, pradhānabhūtā. atha na svārthaṃ parārthaṃ eva, tato guṇabhūtā. na tatra śabda-vyāpāro'sti.” —[S. B. on Mī. Sū. I. iii. 33, pp. 317]. He says that the analogy of the word ‘daṇḍin’ is also inapplicable, because the word ‘daṇḍin’ is a composite word made up of two separate parts, while it is not so in case of ‘gauḥ.’ In case of ‘gauḥ’ we do not find two parts conveying ‘ga-vyakti’ and ‘gotva’ separately. Thus, Śabara holds that “ākṛti-viśiṣṭa-vyakti” is not tenable. Even in the case of ‘daṇḍin’, the ‘viśeṣaṇa’ viz. ‘daṇḍa’ must be cognised first or else ‘viśiṣṭa-kalpanā’ itself becomes impossible and this shows that the perception of the qualifying attribute must come first. Thus, if ‘ākṛti’ is perceived first, it should naturally be accepted as the real import of a word. Thus, according to Śabara, ‘ākṛti’ and not ‘vyakti’ is the real import of a word.”— “nanu ca daṇḍīti na tāvat daṇḍi-śabdena daṇḍo'bhidhīyate, atha daṇḍa-viśiṣṭo'vagamyate, evaṃ ihā'pi na tāvad ākṛtiḥ abhidhīyate. atha ca ākṛti-viśiṣṭā

vyaktir gamyate iti, naitat sādhu ucyate. satyam, daṇḍi-śabdena daṇḍo nā'bhidhīyate na tv apratīte daṇḍe daṇḍi-pratyayo'sti. asti tu daṇḍi-śabdasya ekadeśabhūto daṇḍa-śabdo yena daṇḍaḥ pratyāyitaḥ. tasmāt sādhu etat yat pratīte viśeṣaṇe viśiṣṭaḥ pratīyate iti. na tu go-śabdā'vayavaḥ kaścīd ākṛteḥ pratyāyakaḥ anyo vyakteḥ, yata ucyate tata ākṛtir avagatā, na go-śabda ākṛtīvacana iti. na ca yathā daṇḍi-śabdo daṇḍe na prayuktaḥ, evaṃ go-śabdo nākṛtau. tad arthaṃ eva nidarśitaṃ kevalā'kṛty abhidhānaḥ syena-śabda iti. tad evaṃ anvaya-vyatirekābhyāṃ asati syena-vyakti-saṃbandhe syena-śabdoccāraṇād ākṛti-vacanaḥ iti gamyate. na tu vṛihyākṛti-saṃbandhaṃ antareṇa, vṛihivyaktau śabdasya prayogo dṛṣṭaḥ. tasmād ākṛti-vacanaḥ śabdaḥ iti etad jyāyāḥ."—[S. B. on Mī. Sū. I. iii. 33. pp. 317].

Again adds Śabara, the texts enjoying killing and such other acts, will not be rendered useless even on accepting 'ākṛti-vāda,' because 'ākṛti' by implication conveys 'vyakti.' So, it can be shown that ākṛti-vacana words in such texts are used to mark out vyaktis which form the substratum of the acts enjoined by them. Thus, when in such cases, ākṛti conveys vyakti by implication, ānarthakya is wiped out. Mī. Sū. I. iii. 35-tad 'arthatvāt prayoga-vibhāgaḥ."—See, S. B. on this sūtra, pp. 319 "ākṛty arthatvāc chabdasya yasyā vyakter ākṛtya saṃbandhaḥ tatra prayogaḥ. prokṣaṇaṃ hi dravyasya kartavyatayā śrūyate. katamasya ? yad yajati sādhanam; apūrva-prayuktatvāt tasya. nā'kṛteḥ. aśakyatvāt. tatra vṛihī-śabdaḥ ākṛti-vacanaḥ prayujyate, prokṣaṇāśraya-viśeṣaṇāya. sa hi ākṛtiṃ pratyāyayīśyati. ākṛtiḥ pratīti sātī prokṣaṇāśrayaṃ virodhyati. tena ākṛti-vacanaṃ na virudhyate iti."—

—In the same way, the objection on the score of numerals used in opposition to nouns can also be refuted by pointing out that even here, it is the number that is intended to be enjoined, and that the ākṛti-vacana śabda is used only as a qualifier (i.e. viśeṣaka) only.— Similarly, the word 'anya' is used with reference to the substitute and is the ākṛti-vacana śabda—"evaṃ ṣaḍ deyā gāvo, dakṣiṇā-dravye saṃkhyāyāḥ prayoktavye gāva ityākṛti-vacano viśekṣyati. [S. B. on Mī. Sū. I. iii. 35, pp. 319], and, "tathā anyam iti vinasṭasya pratīdher anyatva-saṃbandhaḥ, tatra paśu-śabdaḥ ākṛti-vacanaḥ ākṛtyā viśekṣyati iti."— [S. B. on Mī. Sū. iii. 35, pp. 319].

Thus, the Mīmāṃsakas hold that words like 'go', 'aśva,' etc. are expressive primarily of 'ākṛti' or class and not vyakti or individual— "tasmād gaur-aśva ityevamādayaḥ śabdāḥ ākṛter abhidhāyakāḥ iti siddham." — S. B. on Mī. Sū. I. iii. 35, pp. 319].

Different views as mentioned in the V. P. :—

For the Mīmāṃsakas, as seen above words signify genus or universal or class, and not 'vyakti' or individual. We come across a variety of views on this topic in the Vākyapadīya III. 2. — "vājapyāyanā" cārya-matena sārvaśātrikī jāti-padārtha-vyavasthā, upapadyate"; Helārāja on V. P. III. 2. "dravyā'bhidhānam vyāḍiḥ," vārtika, under pāṇini I. ii. 64, and also — "vyāḍimate tu sarva-śabdānām dravyam arthas tasyaiva sāksāt kriyā samanvayopapatteḥ;" [Helārāja, on V. P. II. iii. 2.] Vājapyāyana's view concerning the import of words is in agreement with that of the Mīmāṃsakas. But Vyāḍi does not agree with the same. The main argument in support of vyaktivāda is that as a positive element directly concerned with action, the individual should be considered as the proper significance of all words. Not the genus 'ghaṭatva,' but the individual 'ghaṭa' serves the purpose of fetching water. But this view is unacceptable on the face of it. The vyaktivāda is open to the fallacies of endlessness and vagueness—observes Mammāṭa in the K. P. II—"yady api artha-kriyā-kāritayā pravṛtti-nivṛtti-yogyā vyaktir eva, tathā'pi ānanyād vyabhicārāc ca tatra saṅketam kartum na yujyate." Patañjali explains that according to Pāṇini both genus and individual are meant by words — "pāṇini-darśane jāti-dravye śabdena abhidhīyete. — [Helārāja, on V. p. III. 2], and also, "kiṃ punaḥ ākṛtiḥ padārthaḥ āhosvit dravyam ? ubhayam ity āha. katham jñāyate ? ubhayathā hy ācāryeṇa sūtrāṇi paṭhitāni."—[M. bh. on I. 1, 1.]

Naiyāyikas :

The Naiyāyikas define padārtha in a very comprehensive way such as— "vyaktyākṛtijātayas tu padārthaḥ"—Nyā. Sū. III. ii. 65. The Nyāyabhāṣya suggests as follows. The class theory of the Mīmāṃsakas is not a sufficient explanation by itself. A class, pure and simple, i.e. as dissociated from individuals is far from being the significance of a word. The reason is that the very conception of a class invariably comprehends both the individual as well as the particular physical arrangement i.e. ākṛti, whereby the individual is distinguished from others. (Nyā. Sū. II. ii. 64). The vyaktivāda suffers from anavasthā (Nyā. Sū. II. ii. 60) because an individual without its correlation to a particular class is nowhere signified by a word—"na ca dravya-mātra-viśiṣṭam jātyā vinā'bhidhīyate." [Vātsyāyana bhāṣya, on Nyā. Sū. II. ii. 60]. An unqualified individual is nowhere signified by a word. An individual related to its genus is signified by a śabda. But, even here, there are some difficulties. So, the Nyāya view holds that padārtha comprehends three elements viz. individual, its form and its genus or class—; these three—which are connected with

one another by inseparable relation or “avinābhāva-saṃbandha.” None of these is singly signified by a word. So, when we consider the import of a word, what we generally understand is an individual belonging to a particular class and possessing a certain physical form peculiar to itself. (Nyā. Sū. II. ii. 58).

The Navya-Nyāya practically maintains the same position. Neither the class or genus alone, nor the individual alone, but the individual conditional or qualified by the genus constitutes the significance of a word—“jātimān padārthaḥ. śaktir jātyākṛtviśiṣṭa-vyaktau viśrāmyati.”—*Muktāvalī*. The class therefore makes the cognition of an individual almost impossible.—“jātimātre hi saṃketāt vyakter mānaṃ su-duṣkaram” [śabdaśakti-prakāśikā]

So, it is more reasonable to restrict the saṃketa to the individual qualified by genus. The Navya-Nyāya holds that the addition of ākṛti in the conception of padārtha is quite immaterial in view of the fact that there is an inseparable relation existing between an individual and its form. All individuals belonging to the same class have a particular configuration of their physical structure. Perhaps this led Patañjali to hold that a class is determined by ‘ākṛti’ i.e. physical form.—“ākṛti-grahaṇā jātiḥ.” *M. bh. on Pā. IV. i. 63*.

Bhartrhari's Vākyapadīya :

The discussion that follows is in the light of Dr. Kunjunni Raja's learned observations. The grammarian Bhartrhari discusses this topic in two sections, viz. —‘jāti-samuddeśa’ and ‘vyakti-samuddeśa.’ He discusses in greater details the various issues involved in this problem. He considers and presents in a logical way, all the different views on the topic and arrives at a position which can be regarded more as philosophical than grammatical. First, he takes up the class theory for discussion. A rigid adherence to this view makes us incapable of meeting the situation in which we find that jāti or class is nowhere found directly related to activity i.e. ‘kriyā,’ as signified by the main constituent of a sentence i.e. the verb. In ‘gām ānaya,’ kriyā or activity is connected with ‘kāraṇa’ (case) and not with class i.e. ‘gotva.’ The jātivādis are divided in their way of dealing with this point. Some of them hold class or jāti as ‘upalakṣaṇa’ i.e. a characteristic mark of the power of signification (śaktyupalakṣaṇa). Others hold that jāti itself is signified by the force of implication—“keśaṃ cit sāhacaryeṇa jātiḥ śakyupalakṣaṇam”—V. P. III. 3. The former view lays stress on association i.e. ‘sāhacarya,’ the latter on implication or tātparya,—“iha keśaṃ cit jātivādināṃ ekārtha-samavāyāt śaktaiḥ pratipādane jātirūpalakṣaṇam upāya iti matam. anyeṣāṃ punas tātparyeṇa jātir eva śabdena pratipādyate.” — Helārāja, on V. P. III. 3.

By association it is meant that a class comprises of a good many individuals that are naturally associated with the very idea of that class. The Indian philosophers thus recognise more than one kind of jāti, such as *sva-jāti*, *śabdatva jāti*, *artha-jāti* etc. Bhartṛhari says that every word, as a rule, first signifies a jāti, which is not only un-common i.e. *a-sādhāraṇa*, but also immediately connected with it, and then indicates the community of objects i.e. *artha-jāti*, by means of *adhyāropa*, i.e. transference.—

**“svā jātiḥ prathamam śabdaiḥ
sarvair evā’bhidhīyate,
tato’rtha-jāti-rūpeṣu
tad-adhyāropa-kalpanā.”**

V. P. III. 3.

Thus, e.g. the word ‘gauḥ’, gives the class like ‘go-śabdatva’ i.e. a class pertaining to all go-śabdas. Word in its own form ‘śabda-svarūpa’ implies this kind of ‘jāti’ which is characterised by the particular form of the word itself. This differs from the class known as “śabdatva” which inheres in all varieties of words and not confined to some specific group only.—

—“svā ātmīyā go-śabdātmikā, na tu sakāla-śabda-sādhāraṇī, śabdatvādiḥ”—

How to bring ‘śabda-jāti’ and ‘artha-jāti’ into correlation is a problem. These are not at all convertible in terms of each other but on the contrary for all practical purposes, they remain distinct. As Helārāja observes, the meaning seems to be understood at once from the utterance of a word, because of the supposed identity of śabda and artha, but here also, succession of time actually intervenes between the two. :—“arthasya jḥaṭity eva śabda-svarūpā’bhedenā’vabodhepi yathā pratipādita-kramāśrayeṇa.”—Helārāja. Actually it so happens that word first gives the idea of its own class (=svajāti), and signifies the intended object only later on :—“svajāti-pratyayād anantaram artha-jātīnām gotvādīnāmātmasu tasyāḥ śabda-jāteḥ samāropasya kalpanā.”—Helārāja. Through ‘adhyāropa’ or transference, they are made convertible in terms of each other. This sort of āropa becomes the cause of the apparent identity between śabda and artha. We resort to this same āropa when we try to discern the relation of a word with its meaning.

The jātivādis thus try to prove that jāti forms the meaning of words. For them, the proper names (*saṃjñā-śabda*) also have a class. This sounds rather strange. They also hold that one class can be included in another class. But this position is not philosophical :—“evam ca saṃjñā-śabdānām api jātivādi-mate jātiśabdatvam iti

ekā eva śabdānām pravṛttiḥ”—*Helārāja*; on V. P. III. 2. and also, “jātya’bhidhāyino jātyādiśabdā api jātivācina eva.”— Thus, go-tva is capable of having ‘gotva-tva’, and this is not easily conceivable. The considered opinion viz. “niḥ-sāmānyāni sāmānyānīti”—a class cannot have another class,—is violated. This theory results in a number of misconceptions. Thus, for them, even quality and action are liable to be considered as ‘jāti’ for the simple reason of their being signified by their corresponding words—“tathā cā’nvayi-rūpeṇa guṇo’py abhidhīyamāno jātir-eva. evaṃ kriyām apy abhedena abhidhīyamānā jātiḥ.” —*Helārāja*. on V. P. III. 12.

For the dravya-vādins all that is signified by words is essentially the property pertaining to dravya—

“dravya-dharmā padārthe tu
dravye sarvārtha iṣyate,
dravya-dharmāśrayād dravyaṃ
ataḥ sarvārtha iṣyate.”—V. P. III. 130

So, quality, action, number, class and gender—all might be looked upon as inherent properties of matter.— “śabdaiḥ pratyāyamānāḥ guṇādayo daivya-dharmāṇaḥ sarvo’rtho dravya-rūpeṇa abhidhīyate”—*Helārāja*. There are certain common features between these two views. Whether the meaning is either jāti or ‘dravya’, we have got to resort to ‘upacāra’ or ‘adhyāropa’ i.e. transference of sense — “tathā mamā’pi jātivādino mukhyāṃ jātiṃ abhidadhati kecit upacarati tāṃ anya iti mata-dvaye’pi sāmyam.—*Helārāja*.—Just as for the jātivādin things other than jāti are also treated as such by the help of upacāra, so also with the other one, quality, action, etc. have been taken up as properties of matter by upacāra.

Bhartrhari also suggests that the problem of ‘padārtha,’ especially by the jātivāda, can be approached from an epistemological point of view also.—“idānīm vijñānavādena api padārtha-vyavasthāṃ āha.”—*Helārāja*, (on V. P. III. 19). The meaning of a word is exactly the same as is connected by it. This is accepted by the Vijñānavādī. It is suggested that the use of words gives rise to a kind of intelligence with a definite form which generally corresponds to the object of experience.—

What actually is known by us whenever we hear the sound ‘gauḥ’ is the particular form in which the individual makes its impression on the mind. A dravya (i.e. thing) is, according to this philosophy, not necessarily a material object, but an intellectual image or form only.—

“anupravṛtti-rūpāṃ yāṃ
prakhyātāṃ ākṛtiṃ viduḥ,

kecid vyāvṛtti-rūpāṃ tu

dravyatvena pracakṣate.”—V. P. III. 19

A thing denoted by a word is more mental than material. What is primarily signified by a word is the sense that originates in the intellect (= buddhārthasya vācyatvam), and the world of objects is only a copy of mental states (= antaḥkaraṇa-dharmasya bhāgaḥ bahir avasthitaḥ) (V. P.)—For the vijñānavādin, the whole world of thought is just conceptual; all universals and individuals having their existence in the mind with or without correspondence to the material object perceived by our sense-organs—“vijñāna-naye sarvaḥ eva pratyayātmakaṃ aṅgīkṛtaṃ,”—V. P. —“antaḥstha eva ayaṃ sarvaṃ, vyavahāro na vijñāna-vyatirikto bāhyo'rtho'stīti”—śāṅkara-bhāṣya on Brahma Sūtra, II. ii. 28. Thus, along with the utterance of a word, a definite intellectual image arises in the mind and it is that which one usually understands as the significance of words :—

“śabdād uccāritāt śabdākāravatī buddhir utpadyate, tad ākāraśyaiva śabdārthatvaṃ na buddheḥ.”—Helārāja, on V. P. III. 19. Whether this image has or has not a corresponding embodiment in the world of realities is immaterial.

—“sa hy ākāro bāhyo'stu na vā, śabda-vācyatvasya na kācit kṣatiḥ”—Helārāja;—whatever is signified by a word in the mind, may or may not have its objective equivalent. It is possible for us to picture before our mind a purely subjective world of concepts apart from the one we are familiar with. The yogācāra school of Buddhists actually does so. For them an external world of atoms apart from the internal knowledge, does not exist. The external world is a mere copy of mental impressions.

Bhartrhari finally winds up the discussion with reference to Vedantic monism. The question of jāti and vyakti (i.e. universal and particular) could not stand before the all eliminating advaita- i.e. non-dualism of the vedāntin. Although, there appears to be difference due to 'upādhis' or adjuncts, such as time, space, etc. yet all things having an ultimate common source are said to be one among themselves. —“nanu vastūnāṃ deśa-kālā'di—nimitto bhedaḥ iti tad anādareṇa abhinnāny eva tāni siddhāni iti—

“bhinnā api paropādhir

abhinnā iti vā punaḥ,

bhāvātmasu prapañco'yaṃ

saṃśṛṣṭeṣveva jāyate.”—V. P. III. 20.

Adhyāsa or superimposition is the cause of manifoldness which is only apparent. The difference of adjuncts makes for the distinction between class and individual. We fail to visualise a thing in its own real form. So, nothing separated from its adjunct—upādhi—is comprehended by us.—“nirupādhino vastuno'vyavahāryyatvāt sarva eva paropāśrayo vyavahāraḥ.”—*Helārāja*.

So, observes Bhartṛhari, that there is only one supreme thing beyond the limitations of time and space and possessing all activity by its very nature, and which is beyond division and distinction of any kind.—

“sarva-śaktyā'tmabhūtatvaṃ
ekasyaiveti nirṇayaḥ,
bhāvānāṃ ātma-bhedasya
kalpanā syād anarthikā.”—V. P. III. 22.

Therefore, the categories or padārthas of the Vaiśeṣikas are not different objects of thought but they, in fact, stand for the various types of potency—or śakti—belonging to one and the same thing.—

“tasmād dravyāśrayāḥ sarvāḥ
śaktayo bhinna-lakṣaṇāḥ,
saṃsr̥ṣṭāḥ puruṣārthasya
sādhikā na tu kevalā.”—V. P. III. 23.

Thus, the division, into class and individual, of padārthas, is more formal or imaginary than real—“asmin mate sarvatraiva jāti-vyakti-pravibhāgaḥ kalpitaḥ”—*Helārāja*. And this division is not inconsistent with advaita-vāda. Bhartṛhari says that the unreal and real elements in all the phenomenal entities, indicate respectively, class and individual—

“satyāsatyau tu yau bhāvau
pratibhāvaṃ vyavasthitaḥ,
satyaṃ yat tatra sā jātiḥ
asatyāḥ vyaktayaḥ smṛtāḥ.”—V. P. III. 32.

Individuals are of short duration, of limited nature, and suffer distortions and mutations of various kinds. The class is such a reality whereof the essence or identity cannot be removed, and it remains above distortions and mutations of all types and its identity is absolutely unchanged, thus forming a life-giving essence of a thing as well as shining in its own form, detached from individuals.—

“vikārā’pagame satyaṃ
 suvarṇaṃ kuṇḍale yathā
 vikārā’pagame satyāṃ
 tām āhuḥ prakṛtim parām.” V. P. III. 33.

We find in the Chāndogya Upaniṣad a saying, viz.—“vācāraṃbhaṇaṃ vicāro nāmadheyaṃ mṛttikety eva satyam.” (VI. 4)—i.e. The earth is real, the modifications viz. ghaṭa, paṭa, etc. are unreal. Patañjali gives the illustration of gold and its modifications—“suvarṇaṃ kayācid, ākṛtyā yuktaṃ piṇḍo bhavati. piṇḍākṛtim upamṛdya rucakāḥ kriyante. ākṛtir anyā ca anyā ca bhavati, dravyaṃ punaḥ tad eva.”—M. bh. I. i. 1.

Helārāja says that the āgamavid has identified jāti with the ultimate reality or premordial entity (i.e. parā-prakṛti)—“antyā parā prakṛtiḥ satyā, sarva-vikārā’nuyāyinī praśānta-kallolā cid eka-ghanā brahma, iti āgamavidah—*Helārāja*, on V. P. III. 32.

This parā-prakṛti by itself is an eternal flow of pure consciousness undisturbed from outside. Thus, for the grammarian i.e. āgamika this is the Highest Being and it gives the loftiest idea of a class. This mahā-sattā or mahā-sāmānya permeates the entire universe and appears in different forms through all the individuals. This is the summum genus that is ultimately signified by all words, prātipadikas i.e. crude forms, verbal roots, and suffixes like tva, tal, etc. etc.—

“saṃbandhi-bhedāt sattaiva
 bhidyamānā gavā’diṣu,
 jātir ity ucyate tasyāṃ
 sarve śabdāḥ vyavasthitāḥ.” V. P. III. 34.

All words refer to this ‘sattā.’ It reveals itself, according to Vārṣyāyaṇi in six forms—

“saiva bhāva-vikāreṣu
 śad-avasthāḥ prapadyate” —V. P. III. 36.

Thus, observes Helārāja, all activity is sattā-vivarta—i.e. revelation of ‘sattā.’

“samagraḥ kriyā-kalāpaḥ sattā-vivartaḥ”—*Helārāja*.

This jāti is eternal and indestructible. Vyādi and his followers who uphold the theory of ‘dravya’ i.e. the theory that words signify things and not class, also give a highly philosophical explanation. Under the Vārttika viz. “siddhe śabdārtha-

sambandhe" Patañjali shows how eternality can be attributed to dravya. It is this eternal dravya that constitutes the meaning of all words. 'Dravya' in its ultimate form is like 'brahma.'—

“tad eva brahma-rūpaṃ satyaṃ,
ātmaivedaṃ satyaṃ iti hi śṛtiḥ.”—Helārāja.

Bhartr̥hari also takes dravya in a wider sense, when he gives the following synonyms in V. P. I—such as

“ātmā vastu svabhāvaś ca
śariraṃ tattvaṃ ity api,
dravya-nityasya paryāyās—
tacca nityaṃ iti smṛtam.”
(drava-samuddeśa) V. P.

Thus, whether the padārtha or significance of a word happens to be class or an individual, we are to believe that all that we feel and express is but manifestation of the eternal.

Buddhists :— The Buddhists advance the doctrine of 'apoha' in connection with the significance of words. 'Apoha' means the negation of the contrary. The Buddhists, especially the kṣaṇa-bhaṅga-vādin, refused to accept the eternality of any thing, either class or individual. So, a word does not signify either, as the reality of them is highly controvertial. As there is doubt about the existence of a constant thing like class, the class theory cannot stand. The same is the case with dravya-vāda on the same ground of dravya being momentary.—“kṣaṇa-bhaṅga-vādinah sthira-sāmānyābhāvad ity arthaḥ”—Udyota. So, the word signifies 'apoha' i.e. the act of distinguishing one thing or species from those that are distinct from it.—

“atad-vyāvṛttir-apohaḥ, padārtha iti
kṣaṇa-bhaṅga-vādinah.”—Vistārikā.

Thus, 'gauḥ' necessarily implies, the differentiation of cow individuals from non-cows. i.e. atad-vyāvṛttiḥ. The Mīmāṃsakas and the Naiyāyikas refute this theory. (See Śloka-vārtika).

Alaṃkārikas :— The writers on poetics follow the lead of the grammarians

—“eṣu eva vyakteḥ upādhiṣu samketah gṛhyate, na vyaktau.”—S. D. I. (=Sāhityadarpaṇa).

They are interested in the implication of words which may be at times rendered

striking, so as to lend some special charm to a given piece of literary composition. On the ground of this implication, words, are either vācaka or expressive or denotative, i.e. they express the same thing as is fixed by God's will—i.e. 'saṃketa', or words are lākṣaṇika or having a secondary sense or implicit/metaphorical sense, or words are vyañjaka i.e. are suggesters, having the suggested sense.—

—“syād vācako lākṣaṇikaḥ, śabda'tra vyañjakas tridhā”—Kāvyaprakāśa (=K.P.) I.

The meanings conveyed by these are called respectively 'vācya' i.e. directly expressed, or mukhya i.e. principal, lakṣya i.e. indicated or secondary and vyaṅgya i.e. suggested. The ālaṃkārikas have inherited this thinking from their predecessors i.e. grammarians, and also the mīmāṃsakas and naiyāyikas. Among the ālaṃkārikas, there are some who do not accept the vyañjanā-vyāpāra and the vyaṅgyārtha resulting therefrom. They instead try to explain away vyañjanā/vyaṅgyārtha, by either including it in abhidhā, tātparya or lakṣaṇā. Or, still others postulate 'anumiti-vyāpāra' or poetic inference instead. We will deal with all these views later when we discuss the topic of śabda-vṛtties in the following chapters. But before that, it should be noted that the traditional threefold division of a word into vācaka, lakṣaka and vyañjaka, pertains more to the adjuncts than to the word itself.—“atra upādhiṇāṃ eva tritvaṃ, na tu upādheyānām.”—Sārabodhinī, comm. on the K. P.

The same word can be vācaka, lakṣaka, and vyañjaka as the case may be. The vyaṅgyārtha, when it becomes the principal source of charm in poetry, is termed as 'dhvani' by the dhvanivādins. We will go to observe all this in greater details as and when required, but it may be noted for the present that this particular śakti or power of word called 'vyañjanā' or suggestive power or suggestion is nowhere else recognised as a śabda-vṛtti accept in the field of poetry and there too by some ālaṃkārikas who go by the name of dhvanivādins only. So, for the present we may conclude that no system of Indian Philosophy, dealing with the problem of word and meaning in whatever context, seems to discuss and much less accept this vyañjanā-vyāpāra. To do justice to both the schools of dārśanikas on one hand and vyañjanā-vādins on the other, we may say that the philosophers had nothing to do with the poetic beauty of language and that they had to talk of the great questions concerning jīva or soul, jagat i.e. phenomenal creation, and īśvara i.e. God, and had therefore to confine themselves to the problems of the direct or at the most an indirect expressive power of words and had no business to deal with the poetic or beautiful or the aesthetic aspect of language i.e. suggestive use of words. So, according to

Naiyāyika explanation it is, either unnecessary or it falls under the wider scope of lakṣaṇā i.e. indirect or secondary expression or deviation in general. It is only such later grammarians as Nāgeśa who strongly come out in support of vyañjanā. Actually Nāgeśa has emphasised the desirability of recognising vyañjanā as a word-power even from the stand point of grammar also—

“vaiyākaraṇānām api etat svikāraḥ āvaśyakah”—*Mañjuśā* pp. 160. The old school of logic held that the ‘padārtha’ is a trinity of objects viz. class, form and individual. So, accordingly, words, or more properly nouns are for them either (i) rūḍha i.e. words with conventional meaning assigned to them, or (ii) lakṣaka, i.e. words with secondary signification, or (iii) yoga-rūḍha i.e. words having both conventional and derivative or analytical meaning and (iv) ‘yauḡika’ i.e. words possessing derivative or analytical meaning alone :—

“rūḍham ca lakṣakam caiva
yoga-rūḍham ca yaugikam,
tat-caturdhā paraiḥ rūḍha—
yauḡikam manyate ’dhikam.”

śabda-śakti-prakāśikā- pp. 16. (= śa. śa. pra.)

Under (i) fall words such as ‘gauḥ’. The characteristic feature of such words having fixed conventional meaning is that when such words are analysed into stems and suffixes, the analysis does not correspond to their popular or current meaning. The derivative or etymological sense does not count for much in such cases, e.g. the word ‘gauḥ’ means, ‘that which goes,’ when derived from the √gam- ‘to go.’ Such words are termed as ‘saṃjñā.’—

“saiva saṃjñeti kīrtiyate.” śa. śa. pra. In the expression viz. “gaṅgāyām ghoṣaḥ”—the word ‘gaṅgā’ is an example of ‘lakṣaka’ type, for it yields, the secondary sense of ‘gaṅgā-tāṭa’ or the ‘bank of the river Gaṅgā,’ in place of the flow i.e. ‘jala-pravāha’ of the particular river concerned. The ‘yogarūḍha’ type is seen represented by such words as ‘paṅkaja’, having both the elements of convention when the meaning is taken as a lotus flower, and also derivation when taken as ‘a substance born in mud,’ i.e. mud+production+agent.—

“(paṅka + jani + karṭṛva)- yan nāma sāvayava-vṛtti-labhyā’rthena samam svārthasyā’nvaya-bodha-kṛt, tan-nāma yogarūḍham, yathā paṅkaja-kṛṣṇa-sarpādharmādi.” (Śa. Śa. pra. pp. 26).

The sense derived from parts — i.e. avayavaśakti-has coincidence with what is conveyed by the same as a whole i.e. samudāya-śakti.

—“yoga-rūḍhaṃ tu pañkajā’dīpadam, avayava-vṛtṭyā rūḍhā’rthaṃ eva, samudāya-śaktyā ca avayava-labhyā’rthaṃ eva anubhāvayati, na tv anyam.” —*Śa. Pra.*; P. 27.

The yaugika words as such as; ‘kāraḥ,’ ‘pācaka,’ ‘pāṭhaka,’ etc. are signified by their component parts into which they can be grammatically analysed.

Some hold that there is a class such as “rūḍha-yaugika” which is slightly similar to the ‘yoga-rūḍha’ class. The illustration in this case is such as the word, “maṇḍapa” having two meanings viz. a pendal or house taken as a whole, and also, “one who drinks gruel,” when etymologically explained. —

“maṇḍapa-mahāravainādi kadācid avayavavṛtṭyā yogā’rthaṃ eva, kadācit samudāyaśaktyā rūḍhyarthaṃ eva abhidhatte.” *Śa. Śa. pra. pp. 27.* — The difference between yogarūḍhā and rūḍha-yaugika class is that in the case of the former, the meanings indicated mutually correspond with each other, while in case of the latter, the meaning of the whole seems to be different from the meaning of the parts.

The use of certain words in the secondary sense is noticed by the Mīmāṃsakas, Naiyāyikas, and the Vaiyākaraṇas as well. Patañjali has explained the condition of lakṣaṇā. He has given various examples of lakṣaṇā under Pā. Sū. IV. i. 48.—

“mañcāḥ hasanti, gaṅgāyām ghoṣaḥ, yaṣṭīḥ praveśaya”—. We will have an occasion to deal with all this in greater detail when we pick up the topics of abhidhā, lakṣaṇā, etc. individually, and also their special treatment by such great writers on poetics as Appayya Dīksita, and Jagannātha Pandita.

Etymologists i.e. the Nairuktas have a distinct method of classifying words. It is based not on the general meaning signified by the word, but on direct or indirect implication of action (i.e. kriyā) as seen in the word. Thus, with ‘kriyā’ as the sole criterion, words are said to be three-fold such as (i) pratyakṣa-vṛtṭi i.e. words having the idea of action seen transparent, (ii) parokṣa-vṛtṭi i.e. words having ‘kriyā’ at the base seen in a less transparent way, i.e. in which the underlying ‘kriyā’ is not easily perceptible, and (iii) ‘ati-parokṣa-vṛtṭi’ i.e. words having any relation with whatsoever ‘kriya’ underlying, almost evaporated, i.e. they are either without any kriyā at their base, or it requires a great effort on the part of a scholar to locate and correlate the element of kriya in them.—See *Durga* on Nirukta I. i.

“trividhā hi śabda-vyavasthā.

pratyakṣa-vṛttayah, parokṣa-vṛttayah ati-parokṣa-vṛttayaś ca.”—

Accordingly, Durga attempts a three-fold explanation of the word 'nighaṇṭu' such as "nigamayitāraḥ, nigantavaḥ, nighaṇṭavaḥ."

We have tried to understand the great heritage in the field of word-sense-relationship, as preserved in the writings of the great Mīmāṃsakas, Naiyāyikas, and Vaiyākaraṇas, and also philosophers belonging to other schools of thought such as the Buddhists. The writers on poetics, ālaṃkārikas inherited all these thought-currents and we will go further to see how they developed this thinking almost to perfection, which could be an envy for modern western thinkers on topics of linguistics, or semantics in particular.

Before we start with what the literary aesthetes seem to have finally advocated, we will once again go for a short summary of the total heritage as indicated above.

We have seen that in ancient India there were great teachers such as Audumbarāyaṇa as mentioned by Yāska, who advocated the impermanency - anityatva - of spoken word and supported its 'indriya-nityatva.' For them the sentence-unit stays alive in the sense organs or perspective faculty of the listeners thus rendering the scheme of the four-fold classification of words as totally redundant. People use words in daily parlour because of their universal applicability and their convenience due to simplicity. Bhartr̥hari refers to this view and says that Vārtākṣa also held a similar view, that it is only the sentence that is regularly present in the mind of the hearer (V. P. II. 345-9). Among those who accept the eternity of word—the śabda-nityatva-vādin - some Naiyāyikas and Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas opt for what we will go to discuss later as 'abhīhitānvaya-vāda', and the Prābhākaras accept 'anvitābhīdhāna-vāda.' These trends of thought will be taken up in fuller details later.

Dr. Raja observes that according to the 'akhaṇḍa-pakṣa' supported by Bhartr̥hari, the fundamental linguistic unit is a sentence, which is as a Gestalt whose parts are not relevant to it. Perhaps at the back of this thought current is the original inspiration derived from the view of Audumbarāyaṇa quoted above, such as—"indriya-nityaṃ vacanam." For Bhartr̥hari, a sentence is—"eko'navayavaḥ śabdaḥ"—i. e. "a single integral symbol," revealed by individual letters and words that comprise it. Meaning is gathered through the agency of this 'vākya-sphoṭa'—or the sentence considered as an indivisible and integral linguistic symbol. Meaning thus collected is an, "instantaneous flash of insight or intuition," (= pratibhā), and is also 'nir-avayava' i.e. partless. Words have no reality of their own and are only

of the form of hints that help the listener to collect the meaning. They have 'sattā' or existence only at the popular worldly level. We will go to see how ālaṃkārikas, with Ānandavardhana perhaps taking the lead, derived their inspiration and strength for establishing 'vyañjanā' as an independent function or power of word, from Bhartṛhari. Anandavardhana's vyañjanā touches the emotive as well as the socio-cultural significance of utterances, suggested with the help of contextual factors. On one hand the logicians and philosophers were satisfied only with that portion of the total meaning of an utterance which is absolutely precise and accurate, and which could be the subject of objective study, the poets, linguists and literary critics on the other hand went beyond this and did not choose to neglect vast areas of language behaviour as unreal and indescribable. We will go into this at a later stage.

Thinkers of ancient India have also considered the problem of change of meaning. The conditions for a metaphorical transfer of meaning, through lakṣaṇā, are discussed mainly from a synchronic point of view, observes Dr. K. Kunjunni Rajā—(Indian Theories of Meaning, pp. 10). This is different from the Western study and only in what we call instances of 'nirūḍha lakṣaṇā' or faded metaphor that a historical approach is visible. Dr. Raja observes that even etymology is not studied from a diachronic point of view.

The essential nature of a word lies in its power to render meaning i.e. in its significative power. This power or śakti is normally accepted to be, "śaktiś ca padena saha padārthasya sambandhaḥ," i.e. the relation between a given word and its meaning. This follows the dictum as stated in, "Siddhānta-muktāvalī" (pp. 265). The Laghu-mañjuśā, pp. 28, puts it as, "pada-padārthayoḥ sambandhāntaram eva śaktiḥ; vācya-vācaka-svabhāvā'para-paryāyā." (pp. 28). Thus śakti or power is that relation between word and meaning, by which the meaning is collected whenever the word is heard. As observed earlier, among the thought-currents prevailing with reference to the explanation of this relationship of word and meaning, two accepted by the Mīmāṃsādarśana and the Nyāya-darśana are principal; the former opting for the 'natural' or 'autpattika' i.e. 'nitya' or eternal relationship, and the latter supporting the 'conventional'—relationship. The Mīmāṃsakas, as observed above, brush aside the idea of the relationship of word and meaning brought about or established a new, at a particular moment. For, according to them we cannot imagine a period of time in the history of human society, when language, in any form, was not current. We learn language through the agency of our parents who again learnt it from their parents and so on. So, what the Mīmāṃsakas hold by

eternality of the relationship of word and meaning is that it is impossible to trace the origin either to a person or an assembly of persons. This natural relationship of word and meaning is known as 'pravāha-nityatā' and, as observed by Dr. Raja, is different from the natural theory of Greek scholars (pp. 20, *ibid*, ft. n. 2) who believed that, in giving names to objects the primitive man was inspired by some "innate quality or psychological effect of the thing itself." This of course, does not sound convincing to us. The grammarians agree with the Mīmāṃsakas and also hold that this permanent relationship between a given word and meaning has to be understood from popular or worldly usage. We have referred to this view as explained by Kātyāyana and Patañjali on an earlier occasion.

The natural relationship between word and meaning has also been explained in terms of 'yogyatā' i.e. inherent capacity of words. The V. P. III. 3.29, as quoted above goes to observe that like sense-organs having an innate power to perceive objects of their sphere, words have the power to render particular meanings. Thus, any word has the natural capacity to express a particular meaning and this is restricted by convention.

“sarvā'kāra-paricchedyā—
śakte'rthe vācaka'pi vā,
sarvākārā'rtha-vijñāna-
samarthe niyamaḥ kṛtaḥ.”—

Śloka-vārttika, Pratyakṣa Section, V. 228.

We have seen that the Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas accept the relationship between word and meaning to be conventional. Gautama suggests this when he observes at Nyā. Sū. II. i. 55 that, “sāmayikaṛvāt śabdā'rtha-saṃbandha-pratyayasya,” i.e. the cognition of the relation between word and meaning is through convention. The same view is supported by the Vaiśeṣikas as read in Vai. Sū. VII. 2. 20 : “sāmayikaḥ śabdād artha-prayayaḥ.” The ancient Naiyāyikas (ref. Nyā. Sū. II. i. 55) and also the Vaiśeṣikas hold this conventional relation as being established by God's will. The Tarka-saṃgraha also supports this. But for the later Naiyāyikas it is not only God's will, but “icchāmātra,” i.e. even human will can be an instrument to bring about this relationship. When the 'saṃketa' or conventional relation is established by the will of God, it is deemed as permanent and is termed as 'abhidhā' or 'śakti,' but when it is impermanent and established by human agency, it is termed as 'paribhāṣā.' This is observed by Jagadīśa in his Śabda-śakti-prakāśikā, pp. 122. Bhartṛhari also refers to this two-fold convention and calls them

‘ājanika’ i.e. permanent and ‘ādhunika’ or modern, fixed by experts of various disciplines. The first one is ‘nitya’ or ‘abhidhā,’ the latter is ‘paribhāṣa’. In both these cases the relationship is direct. When the relation is deemed to be indirect we get a case of either lakṣaṇā or gaunī, in which the meaning is collected on the basis of the ‘mukhyārtha’ i.e. primary direct sense.

Thus for the Indian thinkers of all schools, a functional definition of meaning is accepted and thus ‘vṛtti’ or ‘function’ of a word is its relation to sense. This relation is also termed as ‘power’ i.e. ‘śakti’ residing in a word, which enables it to render a particular sense. For the Mīmāṃsakas this power is a separate category i.e. ‘padārtha,’ but for the Naiyāyikas it is only conventional.

Eight factors are counted to explain how a meaning is gathered from a word. They are —śakti-graha, vyākaraṇa, upamāna, kośa, āpta-vākya, vākya-śeṣa, vivṛti or explanation, and siddha-pada-sānnidhya.

Dr. Raja explains that Mathurānātha observes in Tattvā-cintāmaṇi, p. 481—

**“śaktigrahaṃ vyākaraṇopamāna—
kośāptavākyād vyavahārataś ca,
vākyaśeṣād vivṛter vadanti
sānnidhyataḥ siddha-padasya vṛddhāḥ.”**

The Mīmāṃsakas, Naiyāyikas, and Vaiyākaraṇas differ on this or that factor. Prābhākaraśāstrī pay special importance to vṛddha-vyavahāra and Nāgeśa also calls this factor to be “śakti-grāhaka-śiromaṇi,” (ref. Laghumañjuṣā, pp. 64).

The Indian thinkers have also considered the problem of homonyms (=nānārtha). Are homonyms to be taken as the same word with different senses, or different words with different senses—is a problem that pins their attention. Puṇyarāja (on V. P. II. 252) calls them as ‘one-word-theory’ and ‘many-words-theory’, i.e. ‘eka-śabda-darśana’ and ‘aneka-śabda-darśana’ respectively. The Indian thinkers are primarily more concerned with the primary sense or ‘mukhyārtha’ and not with the metaphorical meaning. Even Yāska and Pāṇini do not pay much attention to the latter. Of course, Yāska has suggested different etymologies for different senses derived from the same word, and this could be taken as a pointer to his approach. The author of unādi sūtras has given a thought to multiple senses collected from the same word. Pāṇini does not refer, as noted above, to the metaphorical usages, but the explanation of the term ‘parimāṇa’ in the sūtra II. iii. 46, suggests that perhaps Pāṇini also thought of covering up the metaphorical usage under primary sense. Later lexicographers seem to accept ‘one-word theory.’

They use the terms 'nānārtha' and 'anekārtha' for homonyms. This suggests that they believed that one word can have more than one meaning. They also do not seem to follow the distinction between primary and secondary sense. In the works on Mīmāṃsā, we come across fuller discussion which seems to have influenced the ālaṃkārikas. We feel that Udbhaṭa seems to accept 'aneka-śabda-darśana.' Mammāṭa also, later (K. P. IX. 84) seems to accept that actually in śleṣa, the apparent one word is not one, but many. Some Naiyāyikas seem to hold ekatva-pakṣa with reference to homonyms. For them words are classified in the four-fold way, viz. yaugika, rūḍha, yoga-rūḍha, and yaugika-rūḍha or rūḍha-yaugika. They feel that the last variety can be taken both as yaugika as well as rūḍha.

The importance of contextual factors is accepted from early times, in determining the exact meaning of an expression. The Bṛhaddevatā II. 118, observes :—

“arthāt prakarṇāt liṅgāt
aucityād deśakālatāḥ,
mantreṣv artha-vivekaḥ syād
itareṣv iti ca sthitiḥ.”—

Bhartrhari also supports this, and suggests that the meaning of an expression is determined not merely by its form, but by contextual factors also. He quotes the above list with a slight change, such as :

“saṃsargo viprayogaś ca sāhacaryaṃ virodhitā
arthaḥ prakaraṇaṃ liṅgaṃ, śabdasyā'nyasya sannidhiḥ,
sāmarthyam auciti deśaḥ kālo vyaktiḥ svarā'dayaḥ
arthasya anavacchede viśeṣa-smṛti-hetavaḥ.”

(V. P. II. 317).

Nāgeśa and ālaṃkārikas such as Mammāṭa, Hemacandra, Viśvanātha, Appayya and Jagannātha, quote this from Bhartrhari and discuss the same fully.

We have also noted above the differences among dārśanikas concerning the exact import of a word. For the Naiyāyikas, it is 'vyakti,' 'ākṛti' and 'jāti,' and for the navya-Naiyāyikas (see Śabdaśakti-prakāśikā, under V. 19), it is 'vyakti' qualified by 'ākṛti' and 'jāti'. Some are jāti-viśiṣṭa-vyakti-vādins, and rest are jātivādins. For some abhidhā yields the conventional-sāṃketika-meaning and the philosophers also have differences concerning the exact 'saṃketa.' This will be also taken up in greater details when we will go to discuss 'abhidhā.'

For the sām̐khyas and the navya-naīyāyikas, 'vyakti' is the only conventional meaning of a word.—See Nyāya-sāra, II. ii. 59 and bhāṣya thereon and also—Vivarāṇa-prameha-saṁgraha p. 181; and Nyāyakośa, pp. 855 has, "vyaktau eva śaktiḥ, na tu gotvādi jātāv api, iti navyā āhuḥ." For the Jaina philosophers, the word 'gauḥ' has no convention with reference to 'go' the vyakti i.e. individual, but it refers to all creatures having a form similar to a cow. For the Mīmāṃsakas, the class 'jāti' is the saṁketa of the word 'gauḥ.' On the strength of this convention with reference to the 'go-jāti,' in practice, as an individual cow is involved, the meaning of 'go-vyakti' i.e. an individual cow is arrived at through 'ākśepa' i.e. implication. This meaning is the result of the secondary function—i.e. lakṣaṇā—for them. Prabhākara and Murāri Mishra choose to collect the meaning concerning 'go-vyakti' i.e. an individual cow as implied only. The Vedāntins, though theoretically do not adhere to the distinction of 'jāti' i.e. class and 'vyakti' i.e. individual, from the highest point of view, also, from a practical point of view, accept this difference and admit, following the Mīmāṃsakas, convention with reference to 'go-jāti.' They believe that either by 'avinābhāva' or by 'lakṣaṇā' the meaning of 'go-vyakti' or individual cow is arrived at.

For the Vaiyākaraṇas, Vyādi takes the meaning of a word to refer to 'vyakti' i.e. individual. Vājapyāyana recommends, after Mīmāṃsakas, the saṁketa with reference to a class, or 'jāti.' Patañjali informs us that for Pāṇini the convention is with reference to both a 'jāti' and a 'vyakti,' for Pāṇini I. ii. 58, caters to jātivāda and Pā. I. ii. 64, supports vyaktivāda.—Mahābhāṣya, pp. 6.

—"kim punaḥ ākṛtiḥ padārthaḥ, āhosvit dravyam, ubhayaṁ iti āha. katham jñāyate? ubhayathā hi ācāryeṇa sūtrāṇi prasthitāni."

—Helārāja also takes note of Pāṇini's acceptance of both 'jāti' and 'vyakti' as convention.

In Vākypadīya III, Jāti-samuddeśa and Vyakti-samuddeśa, Bhartṛhari has also discussed a number of topics bearing relevance to this. We will go for a detailed discussion when we take up abhidhā, later. We will also allot more space there to 'apoha' of the Buddhists.

The ālaṁkārikas, as already observed earlier, normally choose to follow the lead of the grammarians and this line of thinking is also adopted by them when they discuss various śabda-vṛttis. Ānandavardhana in projecting the case of vyañjanā relies on the views of the grammarians with reference to 'spotā'. Thus grammar is closest to poetics.

—Śabda-vṛttis, as seen in different schools of thought such as the Vaiyākaraṇas, mīmāṃsakas, etc. :—Vaiyākaraṇas-Patañjali in his Mahābhāṣya discusses the topics of 'mukhyārtha', i.e. primary meaning of a word, and 'lakṣyārtha' i.e. secondary meaning of a word. He uses terms such as 'abhidhāna' while discussing primary meaning. His thinking with reference to the 'gaṇa' i.e. secondary meaning seems to have blossomed in the later concepts of gaṇa-vṛtti and lakṣaṇa-vṛtti.

We come across, for a number of times such usages as 'gaṇa', 'mukhya', 'abhidhātum', 'abhidhānavat', 'abhidhānārtha', 'abhidhīyamāna', etc. in the Mahābhāṣya.—

See, for example, Mahābhāṣya on I. i. 15—"evaṃ tarhi gaṇa-mukhyayoḥ mukhye kārya-sampratyayaḥ-iti.; and also, I. iv. 108—"gaṇa-mukhyayor mukhye sampratyayo bhavati. tad yathā gaur anubandhyaḥ, ajo'gnīsomīya iti na vāhiko'nubadhyate." etc. etc. and also, VIII. 3. 82,—'agneḥ stutstomasomāḥ.....gaṇa-mukhyayor mukhye sampratipattiḥ. tad yathā gaur anubandhyo.....

'abhidhātum' occurs at II. iii. 1, —karoter utpadyamānaḥ kto'navayavena sarvaṃ karma abhidhatte, kṛta-śabdāt punaḥ utpadyamānaya dvitīyayā yat kṛtasthaṃ karma tat śakyaṃ abhidhātum, na hi karma-viśeṣaḥ.

'abhidhīyamāna' occurs at II. ii. 24, 25 ... sāmānyā'bhidhāne hi viśeṣā'nabhidhānam. sāmānye hy abhidhīyamāne viśeṣo anabhihito bhavati. tatra avaśyaṃ viśeṣārthinā viśeṣo 'nuproktavyaḥ... etc. athavā vibhaktārtho'bhi-dhīyate etac cātra yuktam yo vibhaktiyartho'bhidhīyate tatra hi sarvaṃ paścāt padaṃ vartate'syeti....'

abhidhāvat—occurs at I. i. 58, I. iii. 153;

.... anaḍvāham udahāri yā tvaṃ
harasī śirasā kuṃbhaṃ bhag ini,
sācīnam abhidhāvantam adrākṣīriti.
yasya yatheṣṭam abhisambandho bhavati.
udahāri bhagini yā tvaṃ kuṃbhaṃ harasī
śirasā 'naḍvāham sācīnam abhidhāvantam adrākṣīr iti.
abhidhānataḥ —at, I. iii. 1; 6.
prathamabhāvagrahaṇam ca. ||11||

“prathama-bhāva-grahaṇaṃ ca kartavyam.
 prathamam yo bhāvaṃ āheti. kutaḥ punaḥ
 prāthamyam ? kiṃ śabdataḥ āhosvid arthataḥ ?
 kiṃ cā'taḥ ? yadi śabdataḥ sanādināṃ dhātu—
 saṃkhyā na prāpnoti, putrīyati vastrīyati iti.
 atha arthataḥ ? siddhā sanādināṃ dhātusaṃjñā
 sa eva tu doṣo bhāva-vacane tadartha-pratyaya-
 pratiṣedha iti. evaṃ tarhi, naiva arthato nā'pi
 śabdataḥ. kim tarhi ? *abhidhānataḥ*. sumadhyame
 abhidhāne yaḥ prathama bhāvaṃ āha.” VI. 3.46.

....pradhānato vā yato vṛttiḥ. VI.

atha vā *gauṇa-mukhyayor* mukhye kārya-saṃpratyayaḥ. tad yathā gaur
 anubandhyo ajo'gnīṣomīya iti vāhiko'nubadhyate.”

abhidhāna-lakṣaṇa—III. iii. 19; 7/146;

a-kartari kārake ca saṃjñāyām. III. iii. 19.

ati-prasaṅga iti ced *abhidhāna-lakṣaṇatvāt*

pratyayasya siddham ||3|| atiprasaṅga iti cet tanna. kim kāraṇam ?
abhidhāna-lakṣaṇatvāt pratyayasya siddham. *abhidhāna-lakṣaṇāḥ* kṛt-taddhita-
 samāsāḥ. anabhidhānān na bhaviṣyanti.

abhidhānavat and abhidheyavat at I. 2. 51, 15/227;

lupi yuktavad avyakti-vacane. I. iii. 51.

“anyatrābhidheya-vyakti-vacanabhāvāllupi yuktavad anudeśaḥ.” ||1||

anyatrābhidheyavallīṅga-vacanāni bhavanti. kvāny atra ?

luki. lavaṇaḥ sūpaḥ. lavaṇā yavāgūḥ. lavaṇam śākaṃ iti. anyatra abhidheyavad
 a-vyakti-vacanāni bhavanti. luki. ihāpi abhidheyaval līṅga-vacanāni prāpnuvanti.
 iṣyante ca. *abhidhānavat* syur iti, tat ca antareṇa yatnaṃ na siddhyati iti lupi
 yuktavad anudeśaḥ. evaṃ arthaṃ idaṃ ucyate. asti prayojanaṃ etat. kim tarhi iti
 etc.

abhidhānārtha.—II. i. 51; 13/395;

‘tad abhidadhatār'thottara-pada-samāhāre ca.” 2/1/51;

abhidhānrtham tu |7|

abhidhānārtham tu samāhara-grahaṇam. kartavyam. samāhāreṇa abhidhānam yathā syāt taddhitārthena mā bhūd iti.... etc.

abhidhāya—V. iii. 74; IV. vi. 424;

kutsite V. iii. 74. ... iha kutsitakaḥ anukāmpitaka iti sva-śabdenoktatvāt tasyā'rthasya pratyayo na prāpnoti. naiṣa doṣaḥ. kutsitasya anukāmpāyām bhaviṣyaty anukāmpitasya kutsāyām. athavā-

svārtham abhidhāya śabdo nirapekṣo dravyam āha samavetam. samavetasya ca vacane līṅga-vacana-vibhaktiḥ ca. abhidhāya tān viśeṣān apekṣamāṇaś ca, kṛtsnam ātmānam, priya-kṛtnādiṣu punaḥ pravartate'sau vibhakyantaḥ.".....etc.

abhidhāna — I. i. 69; 1/178;

aṇudit savarnasya cā'pratyayaḥ. I. ii. 69.

abhidhānāt pratyayaḥ savarnān na grahiṣyati. yān hi pratyayaḥ sarva-grahaṇena grhṇīyāt na tair arthasya abhidhānam syāt. anabhidhānān na bhaviṣyati.—etc. I. ii. 60, 6/231;

phalgunī-proṣṭha-padānām ca nakṣatre.

I. ii. 60; phalgunī-samīpagate cadramasi phalgunī-śabdo vartate. bahavas te'rthās tatra yuktaḥ bahuvacanam. yadā tayoṛ eva abhidhānam tadā dvi-vacanam bhaviṣyati.

I. ii. 64; 18.21, 233

"sarūpānāmekāśeṣa eka-vibhaktau." I. ii. 64;

pratyartham śabda-niveśān naikenānekasya abhidhānam. ||1|| pratyartham śabdāḥ abhiniviśante. kiṃ idaṃ pratyartham iti. artham artham prati pratyartham. pratyartham śabda-niveśād etasmāt kāraṇāt na ekena śabdena anekasyā'rthasya abhidhānam prāpnoti. tatra ko doṣaḥ ... etc.

also, lines 11, 12, 15, 16, 17, 18, 21, 22, 22/pp. 241—*

..... nanu coktaḥ pratyartham iti. yadi caikena śabdena anekasyā'rthasyā'bhidhānam syān na pratyartham śabda-niveśaḥ kṛtaḥ syāt.

pratyartham śabda-niveśād ekena anekasya abhidhānād apratyartham iti cet tadapī pratyartham eva.||30|| pratyartham śabda-niveśād ekena anekasya abhidhānād a-pratyartham iti ced evaṃ ucyate-yad apyekena anekasya abhidhānam bhavati tad apī pratyartham eva. yāvatām abhidhānam tāvatām prayogo nyāyyaḥ. yāvatām arthānām abhidhānam sa bhavati tāvatām śabdānām prayoga ity eva pakṣo nyāyyaḥ.

* All references to the Mbh. are to the Edn.--Keilhorn. Vol. I, II & III BSS. 1906.

yāvatām abhidhānam tāvatām prayoga nyāyya iti ced ekena api anekasya abhidhānam. ||1|| yāvatāmabhidhānam tāvatām prayoga nyāyya iti ced evaṃ ucyate. eṣo'pi nyāyya eva yadā ekena anekasya abhidhānam bhavati. yadi tarhi ekena anekasyā'pyabhidhānam bhavati plakṣa-nyagrodhau ekena uktatvāt aparasya prayogo'nupapannaḥ.... etc. See also, 1, 2, 3, 5, 79/pp. 242;—

ekena uktavād aparasya prayogo'nupapanna iti ced anuktaḥ plakṣeṇa nyagrodhārtha iti kṛtvā nyagrodha-śabdaḥ prayujyate. katham anukto yāvatedānīm evaoktaṃ ekena api anekasya abhidhānam bhavatīti. sarūpāṇām ekena api anekasya abhidhānam bhavati, na virūpāṇām. abhidhānam punaḥ svābhāvikaṃ. ||33||

svābhāvikaṃ abhidhānam.

ubhaya-darśanāc ca. ||38||

ubhayaṃ khalvapi dṛṣyate. virūpāṇām api ekena anekasya abhidhānam bhavati. tad yathā-dyāvā ha kṣāmā. dyāvā cid asmaī prthivī namete, iti. virūpāṇām kila nāma ekena anekasya abhidhānam syāt kiṃ punaḥ sarūpāṇām.

also, at I. iii. 1.; 6/258;

bhūvādayo dhātavaḥ. I. iii. 1; prathamāva-grahṇaṃ ca. ||11||.... etc. etc., see above; abhidhānataḥ....; again at I. iv. 51; 8/335; kathite' bhīhite tva-vidhi-stvamatiḥ guṇa-karmaṇi lādi-vidhiḥ sapare. kathite lādibhir abhihite tva-vidhir-eṣa bhavati, kiṃ idaṃ tvavidhir iti....etc.

again, 2. 1. 1. 7/363;

saṃkhyā-viśeṣo vyaktābhidhānam upasarjana-viśeṣaṇaṃ ca yoga. athaitasmin nekārthībhāva-kṛte viśeṣe kiṃ svābhāvikaṃ śabdair arthābhidhānam āhosvid vācanikaṃ....etc.

again, 3. 1. 17. 18/12; dhātoḥ karmaṇaḥ samāna-kartṛkādicchāyām vā. III. i. 7; anabhidhānād vā. ||5||

athavā anabhidhānāt subantād utpattir na bhaviṣyati....etc.

again, II. i. 36; 2/389; -artha śabdo'yaṃ puṃliṅga uttara-padārtha-pradhānaśca, tat-puruṣastena puṃliṅgasyaiva samāsasyā'bhidhānam syāt, strī-napuṃsaka-liṅgasya na syāt; etc. etc.

II. i. 51, 13/395—taddhitārthottara-pada-samāhāre ca. II. i. 51, see, abhidhānārthaṃ, above;

II. i. 69; 24/403; —karma-dhārāya-prakṛti-bhir-matvarthaṃ caiva abhidhānam syāt etc. II. i. 67, line 10, 10, 15/ p. 404 —evaṃ api yady atra kadācit

karmadhārayo bhavati karmadhāraya-prakṛti-bhir matvarthīyair abhidhānam prāpnoti. —sarvaścā'yam eva artho yatnataḥ karmadhāraya-prakṛtibhir matvarthīyair abhidhānam mā bhūd iti... etc. tatra karmadhāraya-prakṛtibhir matvarthīyair abhidhānam astu, bahuvrīhiṇeti bahuvrīhiṇā bhaviṣyati laghutvāt....etc.

II. ii. 24. — 18/421; — padārthā'bhīdhāne'nuprayogā'nupapattir abhihitatvāt ||4||. padārthasya abhidhāne'nuprayogasya anupapattiḥ chitragur devadatta iti. kiṃ kāraṇam ? abhihitatvāt. citragu-śabdena abhihitāḥ so'rthaḥ iti kṛtvā'nuprayoga na prāpnoti.—

II. ii. 24; 13, 15/424 — na vā'nabhidhānād asamānādhikaraṇeṣu samjñābhāvaḥ ||16||taccā'vaśyam anabhidhānamāśrayitatvam. kriyamāne'pi vai parigaṇane yatrābhidhānam nāsti na bhavati tatra bahuvrīhiḥ. tad yathā pañca bhuktavanto'syeti. athaitasmin satyabhidhāne yadi vṛtti-parigaṇanam kriyate varti-parigaṇanam apī kartavyam. tat katham kartavyam ? etc.

II. ii. 29. 23/432; — plakṣasya nyagrodhatvān nyagrodhasya plakṣatvāt vaśabdena abhidhānam bhaviṣyati.

again at II. ii. 29, 25/433— “abhidhānam punaḥ svābhāvikam ||15||. svābhāvikam abhidhānam....etc. and II. iii. 1, 12-13/442 — na vā'nyatarenā'nabhidhānāt. ||8||.

na vaiṣa doṣaḥ. kiṃ kāraṇam ? anya-tarenā'nabhidhānāt. anyatarenā'trā'nabhidhānam. sadi-pratyayenābhidhānam asipratyayena anabhidhānam. yato'nabhidhānam tadāśrayā saptamī bhaviṣyati. kuto na khalvetat satya-abhidhāne cā'nabhidhāne cā'nabhihitāśrayā-saptamī bhaviṣyati na punar abhihitāśrayaḥ pratiṣedha iti.

anibhihite hi vidhānam.||9|| anabhihite hi saptamī vidhīyate. nā'bhihite pratiṣedhaḥ....kiṃ punaḥ dravyam sādhanam āhosvit guṇaḥ kiṃ cā'taḥ yadi dravyam sādhanam naitad anyad bhavaty abhihitāt. atha hi guṇa sādhanam bhavaty etad anyad abhihitāt....etc. II. iii. 5; 14/445 —kālādhvanor atyanta-samyoge II. iii. 5. lādibhir abhidhānam yathā syāt etc.

III. i. 7 18/12, see above.

III. i. 7. 13/13; 11/15 — a-karmaṇo hyasamāna—kartṛkād vā'nabhidhānam. ||7||. icchāyām abhidheyāyām san vidhīyate na cākarmaṇo'samāna-kartṛkād votpadyamānena sanecchayā abhidhānam syāt. anabhidhānāt tata utpattir na bhaviṣyati.

..... sarvasya vā cetanāvatvāt ||15||

evam api iṣyate grāmo gantum iti parasādhana utpadyamānena lena grāmasya abhidhānam na prāpnoti.

III. i. 22, 9-11/29. ekāj-jhalādigrahaṇe ca. ||2|| yatraikāco halādiścotpadyamānena yaṅgarthasya abhidhānam bhavati, na bhavati tatrotpattiḥ.etc. ...yatra cā'nekāco halādevotpadyamānena yaṅgarthasya abhidhānam bhavati bhavati tatrotpattiḥ.... etc.

III. i. 26, 22/31 — iha tarhi pācayatyodanam devadatto yajñadattenety ubhayoḥ karttor lenābhidhānam prāpnoti. pratyayārtha-viśeṣaṇe punaḥ sati na doṣaḥ. pradhāna-kartari lādayo bhavantīti pradhānakartā lenābhidhīyate yaścātrāpradhānam siddhā tatra kartarītyeva tṛtīyā.....etc.

III. i. 67, 1/1/3/9/58—kim ucyate kṛtābhihita iti na lenā'pyabhidhānam bhavati. aśakyam lenā'bhidhānam āśrayitum....yadi ca lenā'pyabhidhānam syān nedaṃ vaktum lenā'pyabhidhānam bhavati ti. bhavati ced abhihite vikaraṇābhāva ity eva.....etc.

again at III. iv. 26., 13-18/174—... nanu ca bhuji-pratyayena anabhihitaḥ kartā iti kṛtvā anabhihitāśrayo vidhir bhaviṣyati tṛtīyā. yadi saty abhidhāne cā'nabhidhāne ca kuścid anabhidhānam iti kṛtvā anabhihitāśrayo vidhir bhaviṣyati tṛtīyā yavāgvām dvitīyā prāpnoti. kim kāraṇam ? na-mūlānabhihitam karmeti.... etc. etc. pp. 175;... yadi satyabhidhāne tu kuścid anabhidhānam iti kṛtvā'nabhihitāśrayo vidhir bhaviṣyati tṛtīyā yadukta-modane dvitīyā prāpnotīti sa iha doṣo na jāyate.....

IV. i. 48; 6/218—siddham tu striyāḥ puṃśabdenā'bhidhānāt. siddham etat. katham ? striyāḥ puṃśabdenā bhidhānāt, strī-puṃśabdenākārāntenā'bhidhīyate.

IV. i. 91, 14/15/; 246; apatyābhidhāne strī-puṃllīṅgasyā'prasiddhir-napuṃsakatvāt ||4||

apatyābhidhāne strī-puṃllīṅgasyā'prasiddhiḥ. kim kāraṇam ? napuṃsaka-liṅgatvāt. apatyam napuṃsaka-liṅgam tena napuṃsaka-liṅgasya eva abhidhānam syāt, strī-puṃ-liṅgasya na syāt. nanu cedam purastād eva coditam parihṛtam ca. utpattis tatra codyata iha punar utpannena abhidhānam codyate.

IV. i. 93; 5/248; — utpādayitari cā'patyayukte striyā yuktyā abhidhānam na prāpnoti.

14/249—evam api striyā yuvatyā abhidhānam na prāpnoti....

25/250; — kriyamāṇe'pi hi samjñākāri-graheṇa yatra jātyādibhya utpadyamānena pratyayena arthasya abhidhānam bhavati, bhavati tattvotpattiḥ etc.

IV. ii. 1.; 5/271; raktādīnām arthābhīdhāne pratyaya-vidhānād upādhy anarthakyam. ||1|| raktādīnām arthābhīdhāne pratyavidhānād upādhygrahaṇam anarthakam. na hy arāgād utpadyamānena pratyayena arthasya abhīdhānaṃ syāt. anabhīdhānā'ntataḥ utpattir na bhaviṣyati.

IV. iii. 25; 13/307 ... kasmān na bhavati tatrāste tatra śete iti. anabhīdhānāt. tac cāvaśyaṃ anabhīdhānam āśrayitavyam. kriyamāṇeṣv api hy artha-nirdeśeṣu yatra jātādiṣu utpadyamānena prayatnena arthasya abhīdhānaṃ na bhavati, na bhavati tatra pratyayotpattiḥ.

also at — IV. iii. 155; 3-6/325; IV. iv. 76, 14/333; V. i. 59; 24/355; and VIII. i. 4; 4-4/365-in the same sense.

But apart from this, in the Mbh. we neither come across any direct mention by name of abhīdhā, gauṇī, lakṣaṇā and vyañjanā, nor any attempted definition of any of these functions. With reference to the discussion on 'gauṇārtha' i.e. secondary sense, Patañjali mentions four contexts which we may term as four-fold 'tadyoga'; e.g. "tātsthya" or 'sthānādi' —saṃbandha, tāddharmya-saṃbandha, or relation based on 'samāna-dharma' i.e. common qualities, then 'sāmīpya-saṃbandha' and 'sāhacarya-saṃbandha.' See Mbh. on Pā. IV. i. 48.

: Pā. IV. i. 48 is "pumyogādākhyāyām."

siddham tu striyaḥ puṃśabdāna abhīdhānāt ||3||

...athavā punar astu tasy edame ity anena abhisambandhena. nanu cokaṃ pumyogādākhyāyām tadighatalugvacanamiti. naiṣa doṣaḥ. nāvaśyam ayam evābhisambandho bhavati tasyedaṃ iti. ayam apy abhisambandho'sti śoṃyam iti. katham punar atasmin sa ity etad bhavati.

tātsthyāt tāddharmyāt sāmīpyāt sāhacaryād iti. tātsthyāt tāvat, mañcā hasanti. girir dahyate. tāddharmyāt jaṭinaṃ yāntaṃ brahmadatta ityāha. brahmadatte yāni kāryāni jaṭiny api tāni kriyanta ity ato jaṭi brahmadatta ity ucyate. tatsāmīpyāt, gaṅgāyām ghoṣaḥ. kūpe garga-kulam. tatsāhacaryāt, kuntān praveśaya-, 'yaṣṭiḥ praveśaya' iti.

Thus we see that four-fold 'tadyoga' i.e. the relation of location or tātsthya, the relation of substance and quality or function i.e. tād-dharmya, proximity or sāmīpya, and sāhacarya or being together-are mentioned under Pā. IV. i. 48. **Thus we find terms such as 'abhīdhāna' etc. as used by Patañjali and such usages pave the way for the conception of 'abhīdhāvṛtti.'** Abhīdhā in its shadow is thus seen under such names as abhīdhāna or mukhyārtha, in the Mbh. and material for later vṛttis of gauṇī and lakṣaṇā is also read in the Mbh. The basic material for the

concept of *gaunī* lies in the *sādhāranya* relation as noted above, and that for *lakṣaṇā* in other relations such as *tātsthya*, *sāmīpya*, etc., which led to the secondary sense. No strict line of demarcation is laid between *gaunī* and *lakṣaṇā*.

(—see *Nyāyakośa*; —*śakti-lakṣaṇābhyāṃ* *atiriktā* *eva* *gaunī* *ṛttir* *iti* *mīmāṃsakāḥ*. *sā* *ca* *tad* *atiriktā* *na* *iti* *naiyāyikāḥ* *āhuḥ*—(*Nyāya-siddhānta-mañjarī-prakāśa*).

When we come to the later grammarian of repute, i.e. *Bhartrhari*, we find material which could prove to be the source for the later concept of *vyāñjanā*.

Bhartrhari, the author of *V. P.* (= *Vākyapadīya*), as seen by us, has divided *śabdārtha* into *gauṇa* and *mukhya* and has shown two-fold *upacāra* (i.e. imposition) with reference to *śabda* and *artha*. Those who take one word as capable of expressing several meanings, e.g. the word 'go' for both 'go-vyakti' and 'vāhika', have their theory based on the assumption of restricted or accident meaning.—see *V. P.*—II. 252;

**“ekam āhur anekārtham
śabdaṃ anye parokṣakāḥ,
nimitta-bhedād ekasya
sārvārthyaṃ tasya bhidyate.”—**

See also, *Puṇyarāja*—*tatra ekaśabda-darśane śabdopacāraḥ prasiddhy asiddhi-nimittakāḥ*.

A word does not express more than one meaning at a time — “*yaugapadyam atikramya paryāye vyavatiṣṭhate*.”—(*V. P.*). The other meanings that are not *mukhyārtha*, are to be comprehended by either context, (or *prakaraṇa*), or connection with some other words (*yogāt*, *śabdāntareṇa vā*).— “*artha-prakaraṇābhyāṃ vā yogat śabdāntareṇa vā*.”—*V. P. II*. *Bhartrhari* holds that the word *go* which denotes *go-vyakti* is also applied to 'vāhika' on account of his *sādharmya* with 'go'— “*yathā sāsnaḍimān piṇḍo go-śabdenā bhidhiyate, tathā sa eva go-śabdo vāhike'pi vyavasthitah*.” — *V. P. II*.

Bhartrhari observes that it is through usage that the meaning of a word becomes 'gauṇa' and 'mukhya',—“*prasiddhi-bhedāt gauṇatvaṃ mukhyatvaṃ copapadyate*.”—(*V. P. II*). As explained by *Puṇyarāja* on *V. P. II*. 256, the 'artha' is two-fold viz. 'svarūpa' and 'bāhya'. *Svarūpa* is that which is naturally fixed by its very form such as 'go-tva' of the word 'go'. The 'bāhya' is that which is indicated by 'upacāra' e.g. when *vāhika* is said to be 'go'.—*Puṇyarāja* says :

“arthaḥ śabdasya dvividhaḥ; svarūpaṃ bāhyaśca. tatra nimittād jāḍyāder gotvam vāhike'py anuśajyate, śabdas tu go-tvamevā'bhidhatte iti bāhyārthopacāraḥ.”— Thus far, Bhartṛhari gives basis for abhidhā, gauṇī and lakṣaṇā, almost on the lines of the Mbh.

Over and above this, Bhartṛhari discusses the problem of determination of the sense of a given word which has convention with reference to more than one sense, i.e. a word having multiple sense. Thus, he takes up the problem of a word having multiple senses—, all of which are mukhyārthas. In his view, the particular meaning out of several possible, is determined by factors such as context, time, place etc. In this connection, he cites V. P. II. 316 and 317, 318.

—V. P. II. 316-318; —

vākyāt prakaraṇād arthād

aucityād deśa-kālataḥ

śabdārthāḥ pravibhajyante

na rūpād eva kevalāt.”—V. P. II. 316

saṃyogo viprayogaś ca sāhacaryaṃ virodhitā

arthaḥ prakaraṇaṃ līgaṃ śabdasyā'nyasya sannidhiḥ,

sāmarthyam auciti deśaḥ kālo vyaktiḥ svarādayaḥ

śabdārthasya anavacchede viśeṣa-smṛtihetavaḥ” (V. P. II.317-18)

Here, we may ask as to what is it that fixes the particular meaning of a given word and debars other multiple sense which it has by convention and usage ? To Bhartṛhari, this question does not seem to have occurred. For him, saṃsarga or conjunction and the like limit the word to one mukhyārtha or primary sense. But to later thinkers on this subject, it appears necessary to postulate an additional śabda-vṛtti, over and above abhidhā, gauṇī and lakṣaṇā. In this, we may see the inspiration for the recognition of a separate and independent vyañjanā-vṛtti. This is supported by the fact that later writers on alaṃkāra such as Mammaṭa, Viśvanātha and others mention these very verses (i. e. V. P. II. 317-318) as authority for their theory of 'abhidhāmūlā vyañjanā.' For Puṇyarāja these verses contain the views of others and not Bhartṛhari. Jagannātha also does not read abhidhāmūla vyañjanā here.

Among later grammarians Nāgeśa (cir. 18th Cen. A. D.) was the first to recommend the case of vyañjanā. He apparently follows the lead of the ālaṃkārikas in this respect and repeats the same arguments.

Nāgeśa holds that in certain cases, after 'mukhyārtha' or principal sense is collected, or, after 'mukhyārtha-bādhā' or when the mukhyārtha is negated, as the case may be, a further sense is to be seen. This artha is either 'prasiddha' i.e. known or 'a-prasiddha' i.e. unknown, and is either related to the mukhyārtha or is unrelated to it. This sort of meaning is flashed upon the mind through what is termed as vyañjanā-śakti. —Nāgeśa notes :— “mukhyārtha-sambaddha-a-sambaddha sādharmaṇa-mukhyārthabādhā-grahādi-prayojya-prasiddha-aprasiddhārtha-viśayaka-dhī-janakatvaṃ vyañjanā.”

Thus, Nāgeśa holds vyañjanā to be abhidhāmūlā and lakṣaṇā-mūlā. This vyañjanā rests on śabda, artha, pada, padaikadeśa, varṇa, reṇā, and ceṣṭādi. When a woman casts a glance of her eye, with reference to somebody, her desire is thereby suggested (i.e. by ceṣṭā).

This apprehension is supported by experience—i.e. it is “anubhava-siddha.” So, even in 'ceṣṭā,' vyañjanā can be seen.—* Nāgeśa observes : “anayā katākṣeṇa abhilaṣo vyañjitaḥ, iti sarva-jana-siddheḥ, tasyāṃ ceṣṭā-vṛttitvasya api āvaśyakatvāc ca.”

Vyañjakatva lies both in padas and arthādi. That vyañjanā wherein arthādi are suggested, rests on, “vakṛ-boddhavya-ādi-vaiśiṣṭya-jñāna,” or the knowledge of the speciality of a speaker, listener, etc. The pratibhā or the genius of the hearer acts as an accessory i.e. 'sahakāri' kāraṇa.—Nāgeśa observes : “anayā cārthabodhe jananiye vakṛ-boddhavya-vācya-vaiśiṣṭya-jñānaṃ, pratibhā ca saha-kāri tad-dhī-janaka-jñāna-janakam eva vā.”—

In the absence of pratibhā or the genius of the hearer, there is absence of the apprehension of the suggested sense. By pratibhā is meant the “nava-navonmeṣa-śālinī buddhiḥ.” This nava-navonmeṣa is due to impressions carried from the past birth i.e. pūrva-janma-saṃskāras. So, for Nāgeśa pratibhā is that factor which accompanied by prakaraṇa-jñāna in form of the speciality of the speaker etc., makes for the apprehension of suggested sense. * “vakṛ-ādi vaiśiṣṭya-sahakāreṇa tajjanikā buddhiḥ pratibhā iti phalitam.”

This vyañjanā is held to be connected even with the previous life. Nāgeśa observes: “evaṃ ca śaktir etajjanma-grhītaivārtha-bodhikā, vyañjanā tu janmāntara-grhītā api, iti api śakteḥ asyāḥ bheda-kam.”

In the case of gatoṣṭam arkaḥ, when we desire different meanings, the mukhyārtha i.e. primary meaning viz. that, the sun has set is never contradicted —

(bādhita). So, the other meaning is not gathered through lakṣaṇā. So, vyañjanā is not to be included in lakṣaṇā. Nāgeśa observes : *evaṃ gatoṣṭaṃ arkaḥ ityādeḥ śiṣyeṇa sandhyā-vandanādeḥ kartavyatvābhiprāyeṇa, guruṃ prati prayuktatvāt vaktri-tātparyābhāve'pi prativeśyādīnāṃ abhisaraṇīya-kramādi-bodhasya vācyārtha-pratīti-pūrvakasya vācyārtha-bādhajñāne ajāyamānasya lakṣaṇayā upapādayitum aśakyatvāt ca.*

The nipātas and upasargas also are suggestors as are the padas. The sphoṭa is always 'vyaṅgya' i.e. suggested and is described as such in the works of grammar. Bhaṭṭhari also takes sphoṭa to be 'vyaṅgya'. Thus Nāgeśa considers vyañjanā to be useful even for the grammarians : *Vaiyākaraṇānām api etat-svikāraḥ āvaśyakaḥ.*

After going through Nāgeśa's views carefully it may be noted that Nāgeśa was clearly under the influence of the ālaṃkārikas in this respect, he being himself a commentator on the Rasagaṅgādhara of Jagannātha. So, historically speaking, Nāgeśa's acceptance of vyañjanā should not take us very far in considering the stance of the Vaiyākaraṇas. Actually, even Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta also seem to have interpreted the earlier thinking on 'sphoṭa' by the grammarians to their advantage only. As Prof. K. V. Abhyankar had told us while taking the viva-voce for our Ph. D. thesis, there is a difference between sphoṭa-manifestation and suggestion of the ālaṃkārikas. Manifestation and suggestion can not be taken as absolutely congruent ideas. But we can also say in defence of Ānandavardhana and Abhinava-gupta that we can always give a benefit of doubt to their interpretation and application of sphoṭa theory to dhvani-vyañjanā-theory. For, to be very frank, neither the earlier Vaiyākaraṇas such as Pāṇini or Patañjali, not to mention Bhaṭṭhari, nor even, the earlier Mīmāṃsakas, Naiyāyikas, Vaiśeṣikas, Bauddhas and Jains — i.e. all ancient dārśanikas, had any business to talk, much less to think in detail, about vyaṅgya artha i.e. suggested sense or vyañjanā i.e. the suggestive power of a word, to be considered only with reference to poetry alone and certainly never with reference to the śāstras or literature of various disciplines which had business, first and last, about the injunctions they contained in direct primary sense. As we go to see that for the Mīmāṃsakas lakṣaṇā or secondary function is a doṣa—to be avoided as far as possible. Śāstra-vacana has to be direct and clear in its meaning, while ambiguity seems to be the soul in poetry. Naturally therefore, earlier thinkers, while treating their respective śāstra, dealt with word and sense, the import of words and the relation between word and sense, only from the direct view point of language and never concerned themselves with the

problem of poetic deviations and suggestion seen in literature. This does not mean, and should not mean, that while considering poetic use of language, they would have opposed vyañjanā and vyañgyārtha. At least we can not say so on oath, for Pāṇini, as a poet and writer of mahākāvyas such as Pātāla-vijaya — as quoted by Ānandavardhana must be fairly acquainted with the poetic use of language but had no business to refer to it when he drafted his śāstra-grantha. The very fact of mentioning of ‘gauṇa artha’ by Patañjali, and consideration, as we will go to observe further, of various types of lakṣaṇā in Mīmāṃsā works, goes to suggest that earlier thinkers were conversant with deviation in use of language and also perhaps knew vyañjanā. We will go to observe in greater details the sources of vyañjanā later. For the present let us see what the Mīmāṃsakas have to offer.

Mīmāṃsakas :— We have seen above in greater detail the views of the Mīmāṃsakas as represented by Jaimini and Śabara. We will go for a short resume of the same and also look in for some further aproach to lakṣaṇā as seen in Mīmāṃsā sources. It is clear that Jaimini and Śabara hold that the language of the sūtras must, as far as possible, be understood to convey the same sense as is conveyed by it in common parlance. Jaimini makes this expressly clear in Mī. Sū. I. iii. 30., when it is said, “prayoga-codanābhāvād arthaikatvaṃ avibhāgāt.” Here, ‘avibhāgāt’ means that no difference is seen between the language of the scriptures and that of common parlance. Thus, both words and sentences in the veda are in no way different from those in the popular usage.—

“See, Mī. Sū. I. ii. 32—“a-viśiṣṭas tu vākyārthaḥ.” * and also, aviśiṣṭas tu loke prayujyamānānām vede ca padānām arthaḥ. sa yathaiva loke vivakṣitas tathaiva vede’pi bhavitum arhati.”—S. B. on Mī. Sū. I. ii. 32, pp. 150.

However, the cases of veda and loka are not absolutely parallel. The Vaidika vākya is “a-pauruṣeya” i.e. not of human agency, and is always true, while the laukika vākya, which is ‘pauruṣeya’ or having human agency, may not be necessarily true in all cases. Because of its human agency there is a scope for errors. A further important point of distinction between the two is that in case of a laukika vākya, the abhiprāya or some dṛṣṭa artha or personal intention of the particular speaker is more important than śabda or word element itself. This is underlined later by Ānandavardhana also while establishing vyañjanā as an independent power of word. Thus ‘śabda’ becomes only a means of conveying the ‘artha’ or abhiprāya i.e. intention of the speaker.

MS. XI. i. 26. —“loke, karmārtha lakṣaṇam.”—S. B. on it—“yac ca lokavad iti loke karmārtha-pradhānam. kārya-vaśāt sakṛd api ukto sakṛd āharati nā”harati vā. atha iha śabda-lakṣaṇe karmaṇi yathāśabdārthe pravṛttiḥ. tasmāt lokavad iti a-dṛṣṭāntaḥ.” pp. 2114; and also see MS. XI. i. 62—“arthālloke vidhitaḥ prati-pradhānam syāt.” and also S. B. on it—“arthālloke pradīpasya sakṛd asakṛd vā kriyā. yadi sakṛtkṛtaḥ sarvaṁ prakāśayati, sakṛt kriyate, atha na prakāśayati, tato’sakṛt. tataś ca asya pratyakṣa—sāmarthyam. atheha vidhitaḥ upakāro’nupakāro vā gamyate, na pratyakṣeṇa. S. B. pp. 2129; and also śabda-lakṣaṇe karmaṇi śabdābhīhitam gamyate, na lokābhiprāyaḥ. (S. B. on X. 5. 57, pp. 1968).—loke karmārtha-lakṣaṇam bhavati, na śabdaklakṣaṇam yathā arthas tathā kriyate, na yathā śabdaḥ. vede tu śabdena eva artho’vagamyate. tathaiva anuṣṭheyam iti., on VI. 8. 27, pp. 1516, and also, “śabda-pramāṇakā vayam. yac chabda āha tad asmākaṁ pramāṇam,....loke tu kāryam dṛṣṭvā coditam acoditam api anuṣṭhīyate eva.—S. B. on III. i. 17 pp. 726; and also —loke artha lakṣaṇaḥ sa vyavahāraḥ. yena yenārthaḥ samristena ukto’nukto vā sa mṛjyeta eva. iha tu vede śabda-lakṣaṇaḥ. S. B. on III. 1. 16; pp. 725, etc.

Therefore, in a laukika vākya, śabda in its vācyārtha is not strictly honoured. Sometimes, the vācyārtha is given up in favour of some lakṣyārtha which suits the ‘abhiprāya’ i.e. intention of the speaker in a much better way.—

yathā loke prasthabhug devadatta ity ucyate. yad yapi sūpa-śākādibhir adhikāḥ prastho bhavati, tathā’pi bhujau prastho nirdeśyate vyañjanānyodanārthāni.—S. B. on Mī. Sū. X. viii. 29, pp. 2079.

In the laukika vākya, at times such devices as adhyāhāra or implication and vipariṇāma, or transference are also resorted to. In the Vaidika vākya nothing else but śabda is pramāṇa.

— See S. B. on IV. 3. 2, pp. 1247 —“laukikeṣu tu vākyeṣu evaṁ gamyate. tāni hi vijñāte’rthe prayujyamānāni āhāryapadāni gaunāni vi-pariṇāta-vyavahitārthāni ca prayujyante. tasmāt tat-sādrīśyād vacanā’vagameṣv apy artheṣu bhavati tattva-rūpo mithyā-pratyayaḥ. yathā mṛga-trṣṇadiṣu.; and also see on Mī. Sū. XI. 1. 26 above, and also — “na śabda-pramāṇakāṇām antareṇa śabdamaavagatir nyāyyā. — S. B. on VI. i. 3, pp. 1353; and also, — śabda-lakṣaṇe ca karmaṇi, śabdo na pramāṇam.—S. B. on X. 5. 44, pp. 1962.

Śabara therefore very often refers to the general rule that lakṣaṇā is not admissible in vidhi-vākya, while it has scope elsewhere.—

— nanu anuvāde'pi lakṣaṇā. nā'nuvādapakṣe lakṣaṇāyām doṣaḥ. S. B. on I. 4. 22, pp. 364;— anuvāde hi lakṣaṇā nyāyyā, na vidhau. S. B. on IV. 4. 91, pp. 1278.— “yajñāyudha-śabdaś cānuvādapakṣe nyāyyo, na vidhi-pakṣe. gaṇo hi sa āyudhaśabdaḥ saṅkhyādiṣu.—S. B. on IV. i. 8., pp. 1201.

—Thus, the Mīmāṃsakas mention both mukhya and gaṇa arthas. They seem to accept mukhyā vṛtti, and gaṇī or lakṣaṇā. We will try to see if in the opinion of the Mīmāṃsakas there is any distinction between gaṇī and lakṣaṇā.

Jaimini and Śabara discuss the two senses viz. 'mukhya' and 'gaṇa' under Mī. Sū. III. 2. 1; 2. Śabara holds that 'mukhya' is so termed because it is perceived from the word and is as it were the face of the word. While, that sense which is known from the primary signification on the strength of some connection is termed as 'jaghanya,' it being also termed as 'gaṇa' as it is connected with some 'gaṇa.'

—kaḥ punar mukhyaḥ, ko vā gaṇaḥ iti. ucyate. yaḥ śabdād eva avagamyate sa prathamor'thaḥ mukhyaḥ. mukham iva bhavātīti mukhya iti ucyate. yas tu khalu pratītād arthāt kenacit saṃbandhena gamyate, sa paścādbhāvāj jaghaṇaṃ iva bhavātīti jaghanyaḥ, gaṇa-saṃbandhāc ca gaṇaḥ.”—S. B. on III. 2. 2;

Thus, the Mīmāṃsakas seem to accept at least two śabda-vṛttis viz. mukhyā and gaṇī. They hold that a word, when seen to have two or more senses, one is its mukhyārtha, while the rest are all gathered by the secondary power through the relation such as sādrśya or similarity and the like. The word 'barhiḥ' means grass primarily. But, it is applied to sanctified grass only secondarily through sādrśya. The word 'parvan' in the same way, primarily means 'samudāya,' but through 'samudāya-saṃbandha,' it also secondarily means 'kāla.'

—nāyaṃ ubhayatra parva-śabdo vartate. yadi kālavacanaḥ tatsaṃbandhāt samudaye gamyate. yadi vā samudaya-vacanaḥ tat-saṃbandhāt kāle. anyataravacano no'bhaya-vacanaḥ. tatra samudāya-vacane. kalpyamāne prakaraṇaṃ anugrhitam bhavati. api ca pṛiṇāteḥ parva-śabdaḥ. pṛiṇotiś ca dāne prasiddhaḥ. dānāni ca samudāyāḥ. tasmāt samudāyāmījyā. evaṃ śabdāvayava-prasiddhir anugrhitā bhavati. S. B. on IX. 2. 53. pp. 1739.

Words such as 'mātā', having more than one primary sense are in fact two words and not one.

S. B. on X, i, 14, pp. 1810—“anekasya api ekaḥ śabdo bhavati vācakaḥ. tad yathā 'mātā' iti mātaraṃ api vadati, mātāraṃ api. mātā ca paramaṃ daivatam samā ca putreṣu iti etair upabadhyamāno janani-vacano'vagamyate. mātā samaḥ

ksīpraścaityaiḥ anubadhyamāno dhānyasya mātur vācakaḥ.”—

It should be noted that Śābara seems to suggest that in case of a gaunārtha, it is only a meaning that is somehow or other connected with the primary sense that is indicated and not any other sense at random. The śabdārtha-saṃbandha is nitya or eternal, and therefore it is inadmissible to apply any word to anything which it has no power to signify.

— Read Śābara — śabde uccarite tatra tāvan mukhyā pratipattiḥ. śabde kāryasya a-saṃbhavād arthe kāryaṃ vijñāpyate. yathā, “gāmānaya” iti. iha tu śabda iva kāryaṃ saṃbhavati, nārthe. ato’tra śabdaṃ vijñāsyāmaḥ. pūrvasmād eṣa vādaḥ pāpiyān. kasmāt ? autpattikatvāt. autpattiko hi nāmi-nāmnoḥ saṃbandhaḥ, yo hi śabdo yasmin arthe autpattikena saṃbandhena prasiddho, na tato’nyaṃ pratyāyayitum śaknoti. na hi go śabdena aśvo’—‘bhīdhātum śakyate.—S. B. on “śabdamātraṃ iti cennotpattikatvāt.”—Mī. Sū. VII. 2. 4; 5; pp. 1542.

It is also noted that at times, we come across words that convey two meanings e.g. kuśala, pravīṇa, etc. In such cases, one meaning is derived through etymology and is termed the ‘yauḡikārtha’ and the other one is based on ‘rūḍhi’ i.e. usage, and is termed as rūḍhārtha. On account of ‘prasiddhi’ i.e. because of its being more current, the rūḍhārtha is taken as the ‘mukhyārtha’ i.e. primary sense in such cases. The Mīmāṃsakas seem to hold that lakṣaṇā is resorted to only as a means to avoid ‘ānarthakya’ i.e. a state of being useless or meaningless, when the primary sense is found to be not suited to the context. This again is only as a last resort.

Read S. B. on pp. 488 :—“yadāñjasyena śabdārtho nāvakalpate tadā lakṣaṇayā’pi kalpyamānaḥ sādḥur bhavati. yathā “agnau tiṣṭhati,” “avaṭe tiṣṭhati,” “agni-samīpe tiṣṭhati,” “avaṭa-samīpe tiṣṭhati” iti bhavati, saṃ-vyavahāraḥ. lakṣaṇādi hi laukiky eva.” —and also— “śruty asaṃbhave lakṣaṇayā’pi vyavahāro bhavati. yathā’gnau tiṣṭhati, avaṭe tiṣṭhati, iti”—

S. B. on pp. 1485; and also, “śrutyasaṃbhave lakṣaṇā api nyayyaiva.”, S. B. on pp. 1280; “asati śrutyarthe lakṣaṇārtho grāhyah.”—S. B., pp. 1551, and again

—“mukhyā’bhāve gauno grhyate.” S. B. on pp. 1437, “asaṃbhavati śruty arthe lakṣaṇārtho grāhyah.”—S. B. on pp. 1550, and also, “bhavati lakṣaṇayā’pi śabdārthaḥ.”—S. B. pp. 1230; “agatis caisā yallakṣaṇā-parigrahaḥ.—S. B. on pp. 1545; again, tritvaṃ hi catuṣṭavādīni sāhacaryāt śaknoti lakṣayitum. lakṣaṇā tv ā’śritā bhavati. kim kriyatām ? agatyā āśrīyate, satyaṃ gatau nā’śrayitavyā. —S. B. pp. 2021.

The Mīmāṃsakas hold that the most important principle to be borne in mind is that between the two functions of a word, viz. śruti (i.e. abhidhā) and lakṣaṇā, the former is stronger than the latter.—

— “śrutiśca lakṣaṇāyā jyāyasī.” — S. B. pp. 734; “śruti lakṣaṇādi viśaye śrutir jyāyasī.” S. B. pp. 324; ‘śruti-lakṣaṇādi viśaye ca śrutir nyāyya, na lakṣaṇā.’ S. B. on pp. 565, 1244, 1262; “śruti-lakṣaṇā-viśaye ca śrutir nyāyyā.” S. B. pp. 1210, 1222; again—“śrutiśca lakṣaṇāyā balīyasī.” S. B. pp. 1278; “śruti-lakṣaṇayośca śrutir nyāyyā.” S. B. pp. 1556, and also “śrutiśca lakṣaṇā’to nyāyyā.” S. B. on pp. 2243.

śrutyasaṃbhava or mukhyārtha-bādha is the first pre-requisite of lakṣaṇā. On Mī. Sū. VIII. 3. 34, Śābara lays down that though the direct sense of a word is found unsuitable to the context, the vācyārtha cannot be entirely abandoned. Thus, even the lakṣyārtha is bound to be ‘śabdārtha’ it cannot be “a-śabdārtha.”

— “svārthe vartamānaḥ sādṛśyaṃ gamayati. svārthaṃ jahat katham gamayet ?”—S. B. on Mī. Sū. VIII. 3. 34; and also,

“na ca lakṣaṇayā prayoge śabdārthaḥ paricchidyate. yat-kāraṇaṃ svārthe vartamāno’rthā’ntaraṃ lakṣayati. svārthaṃ jahanneva lakṣayet.”—S. B. on Mī. Sū. VIII. 3. 34.

Thus, the condition of ‘tadyoga’ or ‘connection’ comes in. This is explained under Mī. Sū. I. 4. 23.—

See S. B. on I. 4.23.—“katham nu svārthā’bhidhānena pratyaya-vyavast eti cet, artha-saṃbandhāt. ‘siṃha’ iti nirjñāya prasahyakārītā tatra prāyeṇeti prasahyakārīti gamyate. artha-pratyaya-sāmārthyāt. yo hi manyate prasahyakārīṇaṃ pratyāyayeyaṃ iti sa yadi siṃha-śabdaṃ uccārayati siddhyati asya abhipretam. siṃhārthaḥ pratītaḥ saṃbandhād itaraṃ arthaṃ pratyāyayati. evaṃ svārthā’bhidhāne tad-guṇa-saṃbandhaḥ pratīyate.” S. B. on I. 4. 22; 23 pp. 357-360.

The illustration cited is that of the word ‘siṃha’. Śābdara says that when the word ‘siṃha’ is uttered, with reference to a certain individual, the idea of ‘prasahya-kārīta’ i.e. force is conveyed therewith, and therefore, ‘this gentleman is violent or prasahyakārī is gathered. It should be noted that the Mīmāṃsakas thus recognise abhidhā and lakṣaṇā, while vyañjanā is not referred to by them. The above illustration goes to prove that probably for the Mīmāṃsakas the prayojana or the purpose is also collected by lakṣaṇā alone, i.e. they probably accept “prayojanena sahitā lakṣaṇā.” But this is only a hazard, for as observed earlier, they, primarily

being concerned with śāstra i.e. scientific use of language, had not concerned themselves with what we call the “emotive use of language.” ‘Gaṇa’ is another term used for lakṣyārtha. “guṇa-yogād-gaṇaḥ”, is the explanation. It should be noted that the two vṛttis viz. ‘gaṇī’ and ‘lakṣaṇā’ are taken as almost synonyms by Śabara. The Nyāyakośa mentions that the Mīmāṃsakas take ‘gaṇī’ as a vṛtti different from lakṣaṇā. But this is not borne out, at least, while referring to Śabara. We will go to see that among ālamkārikas normally ‘gaṇī’ is taken as a variety of lakṣaṇā, and this is perhaps settled by Mammaṭa, once and for all. But, it is Hemacandra who again raises the banner of ‘gaṇī’ as a vṛtti, independent of lakṣaṇā. But, we see confusion even in Hemacandra, when the ācārya goes into greater details and tries to illustrate the same. We will examine this later.

We come across, among Mīmāṃsakas the recognition of different types of lakṣaṇās, such as those which convey, (i) the sense of the possessive suffix, i.e. ‘matvartha lakṣaṇā’, (ii) deśa-lakṣaṇā, (iii) dharma-lakṣaṇā or guṇavāda, (iv) kāla-lakṣaṇā, (v) karma-lakṣaṇā (vi) kārya-lakṣaṇā, or sādhyā-lakṣaṇā. (vii) kāraṇa or sādhana lakṣaṇā, (viii) lakṣaṇā conveying some sva-jātiya and also (ix) lakṣaṇā with reference to līṅgin. Sentences like “siṃho devadattaḥ” and “agnir-māṇavakaḥ” are given as popular examples of dharma-lakṣaṇā. (Mī. Sū. III. 2. 4;) ‘guṇād vā’pyabhidhānaṃ syāt, ... etc.

“guṇa-samyogād yad agaṇaṃ idaṃ abhidhānaṃ bhaviṣyati. bhavati hi guṇād api abhidhānaṃ. yathā siṃho devadattaḥ, agnir māṇavaka iti.”

The words ‘siṃha’ and ‘agni’ convey the qualities. This lakṣaṇā corresponds to ‘gaṇī-sārōpā’ of the later ālamkārikas. It should be noted that though it appears that this dharma lakṣaṇā is termed as “guṇa-vāda” by Jaimini at Mī. Sū. I. 2. 10, actually, the term guṇa-vāda is used both by Jaimini and Śabara in a sense much wider than dharma-lakṣaṇā.

—“guṇavādas tu, gaṇa eṣa vādo bhavati, yat-saṃbandhini stotavye saṃbandyantaraṃ stūyate.” S. B. on Mī. Sū. I. 2. 10.

It means upacāra or secondary application in general, as is evident from the fact that ‘anṛta-vādinī vāk’ is given as another example of guṇavāda where lakṣaṇā does not convey dharma but ‘bāhulya’ or ‘prāśastya.’ Hence we find that Jaimini is laying down ‘rūpa’ and ‘prāya’ as two possible grounds for guṇavāda, among others.

— See S. B. on Mī. Sū. I. 2. 11; pp. 127 : “guṇavādas tu rūpāt. yathā stenā-pracchannarūpā evaṃ ca mana iti gaṇaḥ śabdaḥ.”—Thus ‘stenaṃ manāḥ’ is a guṇavāda; and also ‘rūpāt prāyāt,’ Mī. Sū. I. 2. 11.

Later Mīmāṃsakas such as Kumārila and others mention the tātparya-vṛtti also, which we will discuss later. Thus the earlier Mīmāṃsakas give us abhidhā and a variety of lakṣaṇās. As noted earlier, they had no business to refer to vyañjanā, which perhaps for them is of no use when either prayojana-viśiṣṭā-lakṣaṇā, or dīrgha-dīrghatara-abhidhā, or tātparya is accepted. The references to the original works are cited on the authority of Prof. Devasthali.

Naiyayikas : We have observed earlier in our discussion on saṃketa, that Gotama recognises what is specified as abhidhā lateron. For him, the padārthas or the meanings of a word consist in vyakti i.e. individual, ākṛti, or form, and jāti or class. These are aspects of reality expressed by a word. The acceptance of abhidhā by Gotama and other Naiyāyikas is clearly indicated in our discussion on saṃketa earlier. As to what is expressed by a word is shown in the Nyā. Sū. II. 2. 65; “vyaktyākṛtijātayas tu padārthah.” This means that in the opinion of Gotama, a word expresses individuality, form and class. Now let us examine Gotama’s views on lakṣaṇā. This follows Dr. Raja’s observations.

We come across some discussion as to the nature of secondary usage or ‘upacāra’ at Nyā. Sū. II. 2. 64 — “saha-carāṇa-sthāna-tādarthya-vṛtta-dhāraṇa-sāmīpya-sādhana-dhipatyebhyo brāhmaṇa-māṇca-kāṭa-rāja-saktu-candana-gaṅgā-śaṭakāṇṇa-puruṣeṣv atadbhāve’pi tad upacārah.”—Thus Gotama holds that secondary usage or upacāra operates on the strength of ten relations such as saha-carāṇa i.e. going together, sthāna, i.e. place, etc. etc. The Vātsyāyana bhaṣya cites illustrations to the point. Thus, ‘yaṣṭikāṃ bhojaya’ or feed the stick, means that the brahmaṇa with a stick is to be fed. This explains the relation of ‘sahacarāṇa’ (i.e. going together). ‘sthāna’ or location is illustrated in ‘mañcāḥ krośanti,’ ‘tādarthya’ or the relation of purpose is illustrated when straw meant for preparing a mat is itself called a mat. ‘vṛtta’ or behaviour is the relation as seen in, ‘this king is Yama or Kubera.’ He is so called because he behaves like Yama or Kubera. ‘Māna’ i.e. measure is illustrated when grains are said to be of a particular measure. ‘Dhāraṇa’ or relation of weighing is illustrated when sandal wood held in balance is called ‘tulā-candana.’ The relation of ‘sāmīpya’ or proximity is seen as in, ‘gaṅgāyāṃ ghoṣaḥ,’ or ‘cattle are grazing in the Ganges.’ Thus the place near the river is called by the name of the river on the strength of ‘sāmīpya’ i.e. proximity. ‘Yoga’ or combination is one more relation as illustrated in a black piece of cloth being called ‘black’, as it is united with black colour. Later in his Sāhityadarpaṇa (S. D.) Viśvanātha has an illustration viz. “śveto dhāvati” meaning the white dog or horse

is running. 'Sādhana' or 'means' is illustrated when food is said to be 'prāṇa' or life itself. In later ālamkāra works we have "āyur gṛh̥tam." Actually food or ghee is the sādhana or means of life. 'Ādhipatyā' or being the head is illustrated when a man who is the head of the family is said to be family or house himself.

—ayam puruṣaḥ kulam, ayam gotraḥ, etc.—

Elsewhere also in the Vātsyāyana-bhāṣya we come across numerous references to 'bhakti' and 'bhākta-artha.' Now, as with the Mīmāṃsakas, so also with these Naiyāyikas it can be observed that as they were concerned only with the scientific use of language, or as their concern was primarily with the śāstra-granthas, as the present context reveals, they had no business to get involved in anything concerning vyañjanā or the emotive use of language as reflected in literature. It is true that Kālidāsa, and of course Vyāsa and Vālmīki must have preceded most of the great commentators in various disciplines, but they observe exemplary silence about the poetic use of language in their works on śāstra. So, at least we can give a benefit of doubt to these great thinkers, who were concerned with popular usages in language also as the illustrations quoted above go to prove, and perhaps hold that they too while dealing with poetry knew and accepted vyañjanā. Perhaps Ānandavardhana hints exactly at this when he says that 'dhvani' was "samāmnāta-pūrvah," and when Abhinavagupta remarks, "vinā'pi viśiṣṭa-pustakeṣu viniveśanāt." So these earlier thinkers simply had no business with vyañjanā when they talked of use of language in śāstra. Thus, they can be explained away, or forgiven. But later thinkers such as the Navya-Nyāya dignitaries as Gaṅgeśa, Gadādhara and Jagadīśa knowingly disown vyañjanā and we feel it is criminal. Even the great ālamkārika Mahimā, who did not have faith in vyañjanā is prepared to accept what he calls 'kāvyā'numiti' in its place and in our opinion this 'kāvyā'numiti' which is certainly not 'tarkā'numiti' is just something over and above abhidhā and lakṣaṇā. Call it by any other name, a rose is a rose, is a rose. Be it kāvyā'numiti, or tātparya as advanced by Dhanañjaya and Dhanika, or the bhāvakatva/bhojakatva of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka—it is something else than the known track of daily usage i. e. abhidhā and/or lakṣaṇā. We will come to this in greater details later. For the present, it may be noted that the Naiyāyikas, do not accept the word to be nitya and abhivaṅgya or manifested as with the grammarians.

We now turn to the school of thought as represented by the Navya-Naiyāyikas such as Gaṅgeśa (1200 A. D.), Gadādhara (1700 A. D.) and also Jagadīśa (1700 A. D.) Gadādhara, Jagadīśa and Mathurānātha, all of the 1700

A. D. approximately, are the authors of Śaktivāda, Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā, and Vyutpattivāda respectively wherein they have dealt with the topic of śabda, śabdārtha and śabdavṛttis.

Dr. Raja suggests that in the *Śabda-śakti-prakāśikā* (= śa. śa. pra.) words are classified as below :

- (i) words with conventional meanings assigned to them (i.e. rūḍha),
- (ii) words with secondary meaning (lakṣaṇā);
- (iii) words having both primary or conventional and derivative meanings (i.e. yoga-rūḍha)
- and (iv) words having derivative meaning alone (i.e. yaugika).

The Śa. Śa. Pra. 16 reads :—

“rūḍhaṃ ca lakṣakaṃ caiva
yogarūḍhaṃ ca yaugikaṃ,
tat caturdhā parair—
rūḍha-yaugikaṃ manyate 'dhikam.”

We see that this division into four or five varieties has come down from earlier sources.

The word ‘gaṅgāyam’ in the illustration ‘gaṅgāyāṃ ghoṣaḥ’ forms an example of lakṣaṇā. ‘Paṅkaja’ is a yoga-rūḍha word defined as —“yan nāma svāvayava-vṛttilabhyārthena samam svārthasya anvaya-bodha-kṛt, tan nāma yoga-rūḍhaṃ yathā paṅkaja-kṛṣṇa-sarpādharmādi-; śa. śa. Pra. 26. — i.e. they are those which combine in themselves twofold signification i.e. conventional as well as derivative. The yaugika words are those such as kāraka, pācaka, etc., that connote the same meanings as are gathered by their component parts in which they may be grammatically analysed.

Gadādhara in his *Śaktivāda* (= ś. vā.), discusses the problem of śaktigraha. By śakti he means the mukhyā vṛtti called abhidhā. He discusses at length the topic of saṃketa-grāhakatva of this mukhyā vṛtti. At places, he picks up lakṣaṇā also which is connected with abhidhā. In the beginning of his work, he recognizes two functions viz. ‘saṃketa’ and ‘lakṣaṇā’ with reference to padārtha. “saṃketo lakṣaṇā ca arthe pada-vṛttiḥ.” (ś. vā.). He does not go for any further relation. He has neither mentioned nor rejected ‘vyañjanā’ as a vṛtti, but his commentators try to interpret him so as make him refute vyañjanā. Thus, Kṛṣṇabhaṭṭa observes that

vyāñjanā need not be recognized as distinct from lakṣaṇā and so also gaṇī. Both gaṇī and vyañjanā can be included in lakṣaṇā.

*— “evaṃ ca gaṇī-vyañjanayoḥ prthag vṛttitvaṃ ayuktaṃ, tayoh lakṣaṇāyām antarbhāva-sambhavāt.”

Mādhava, yet another commentator of his, tries to refute vyañjanāvēda. The vyañjanāvēdin figures as an objector-pūrva-pakṣin—here. The objection is that, śaktivibhāga of Gadādhara is not correct, for vyañjanā is a separate vṛtti. When it is said by the heroine that “gaccha gacchasi cet kānta,....” etc. The meaning viz. that, “if you will go, I will die”, is gathered through vyañjanā alone, in the absence of which we fail to collect this sense.

— Read, “etad vibhājanam anupapannam, vyañjanāyāḥ atirikta-vṛtta-tvāt.”

The Siddhāntin (i.e. Naiyāyika, as represented in the commentary by Mādhava) does not agree with this. If Vyañjanā is recognised as a separate vṛtti, it must have some definite form. If at all it has any definite form, it is the form of vācya. When there is apprehension of the suggested sense, it is always due to abhidhāñjana. Thus, even in vyañjanā, we cannot proceed without the vācārtha, which is its cause. Thus vyañjanā is not a separate vṛtti. When the suggested meaning is not at all caused by any vṛtti, other than abhidhā, it should not be taken as the result of vyañjanā.

*—“vyañjanā-vṛtṭya-janya-śabdatve'pyasya kāryatā-vacchedakatoktau gauravāt.”— Mādhavī, (Ś. Vā. Tīkā).

The vyañjanāvēdin accepts something like a śābdī-vyañjanā e.g. “vayasthā nāgarāsaṅgād āṅgānāṃ hanti vedanāṃ.” From this sentence, two senses, viz. (i) ‘a young woman, in company of a young man, removes the torment of limbs of the body,’—and (ii) “Harītakī with Śuñthī, removes physical pain,”—are derived. For the supporter of vyañjanā, it is a case of abhidhāmūlā vyañjanā. But for the Naiyāyikas, the other sense is also collected through abhidhā, and it is futile to go for an abhidhāmūlā vyañjanā with reference to the pratiyamānārtha.

*—tādṛśa-bodhe tātparya-jñānasya hetutve śaktyā eva tādṛśa-bodha-sambhave abhidhāmūla-vyañjanā-svīkāra-anupapatteḥ.”—Mādhavī, on ś. vā; pp. 2.

Others (i.e. vyañjanāvēdins, i.e. the pūrvapakṣin here) hold that the fact of pratiyamānārtha i.e. implicit sense can be gathered in poetry, only through vyañjanā, and therefore its acceptance is inevitable.

— Read “na ca vyañjanā-vṛttitva-anupagame tatra tatra tādrśa-bodhasya anubhava-siddhasya anutpattir iti agatyā vṛttitvaṃ aṅgikartavyam. iti vācyam.” — Mādhavī, pp. 3.

But for the Naiyāyikas, this implicit sense is gathered not by a special power i.e. vṛtti-viśeṣa, but by the faculty of mind. Thus, vyaṅgyārtha is just a mental apprehension —“mānasa-bodha-mātra.” Mādhavī observes : “manasaiva tādrśa-bodha-svīkārāt.”—But here may we ask Mādhava or any Naiyāyika worth his name, that which sense is not a mental apprehension ? Whatever is collected even with the help of ‘saṅketa’ is also the ultimate result of mental perception. This is recognized even by the Mīmāṃsakas who accept anvitā’ bhīdhānavāda, a process in which direct perception, anumāna and arthāpatti are the three pramāṇas involved even in simple collection of primary sense.

Jagadīśa in his Śa. Śa. Pra., kārikā 24 refers to the illustration viz. “mukhaṃ vikasita-smitaṃ....” etc., whereby Mammāṭa and others have sought to establish suggestiveness. He discusses at length the problem of the recognition of vyañjanā. He, to his satisfaction, holds that there is no justification to recognize something like suggestiveness, so far as the direct or indirect meaning of a word is concerned.

—yathā-kathañcit upanayavaśena manasaiva viśiṣṭa-dhī-sambhavāt, mānorathika-sukha-prabheda-paryavasitaṃ camatkāraṃ saty api śābdasyaiva mānasasyā’pi bodha-viśeṣasya hetutāyāḥ suvacatvāt. vyañjanākhyapadārthāntarasya svarūpa-sattāyāḥ anvaye buddhau tad-hetutvasya ca pramāṇa-virahena asattvātca iti saṃkṣepaḥ.” Śa. Śa. Pra. -kā 24.

The so called vyaṅgyārtha i.e. śāitya and pāvanatva, or saurabha (i.e. the smiling face is as fragrant as flowers -mukhaṃ vikasitasmitaṃ, etc.) is derived by the usual mental apprehension; the special beauty of erotic sentiment (camatkāra) is also a mental apprehension according to Jagadīśa. But as noted by us collection of any meaning — including vācyārtha-involves a mental effort and is therefore a ‘mānasa-bodha.’ But there is a difference between one and the other. We had observed earlier that benefit of doubt can be granted to the great Pāṇini, Patañjali, Jaimini, Śābara, Gotama, and Kaṇāda. But, after such great efforts of asthetes of the status of Ānandavardhana, Abhinavagupta and Mammāṭa, it is criminal on the part of Jagadīśa and Mādhava to denounce vyañjanā in the field of art in general and poetry in particular. Or, shall we quote yāska ?— “na eṣa sthāṇor aparādhāḥ yad enaṃ andho na paśyati.”

Thus, we have seen that language is used both in a scientific mode in various śāstras or disciplines of thought, and also in an emotive mode in poetry. Scientific usage hovers round what we call abhidhā and gauṇī or lakṣaṇā, and the emotive use has vyañgyārtha and vyañjanā at its centre.

We have tried to give an idea of how the ancients, i.e. the Mīmāṃsakas, Vaiyākaraṇas, Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas and also Jain and Bauddha philosophers had discussed the problem of language and collection of meaning from a historical perspective. We have also tried to correlate this great heritage to the linguistic thinking of literary critics, the aesthetes. Thus the concept of śabdavṛttis in different darśanas in its historical perspective is discussed by us in all possible details. The grammarians and the Mīmāṃsakas were concerned more with the scientific use of language as they were concerned with topic of their special disciplines. Thus they restrict themselves to the discussion of only abhidhā and lakṣaṇā, or guṇavāda. The ancient Naiyāyikas also, for the same obvious reason had no business to talk of vyañjanā. The grammarians of course, in advancing the doctrine of sphoṭa, especially its manifestation, perhaps touched the fringes of vyañjanā and we have seen how Ānandavardhana has ventured to make capital out of this to his advantage. Thus Ānandavardhana and his followers advocate vyañjanā as a separate function in the field of poetry. Ālaṃkārikas normally follow his lead but there have been some exceptions as we will go to observe. But even these so called opponents of vyañjanā are prepared to accept something else, with a different name, in place of vyañjanā, but certainly over and above abhidhā, and lakṣaṇā. We will go to observe all this in greater details later. But it must be confessed that the predecessors of Ānandavardhana even in the field of literary aesthetics, such ancients as the great Bhāmaha down to Rudraṭa, had failed to clearly discuss the topic of śabdavṛttis. So, if at all there is any recognition of vyañjanā in the works of these ācāryas, it is only veiled. We will first, try to discuss which śabda-vṛttis and arthas, are exactly recognised by Ānandavardhana's pūrvācāryas and what is their exact approach to the problem of vyañjanā. Then only we will be able to bridge the two ends, one of the thinkers of various disciplines and the other of Ānandavardhana and his followers. After discussing this topic of recognition of various śabda-vṛttis by the ancient ālaṃkārikas, we will pick up individual śabdavṛtti such as abhidhā, tātparya, lakṣaṇā and vyañjanā, for detailed discussion.

Chapter III

Śabdavṛttis; recognised in the works of earlier Ālaṃkārikas such as Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin, Vāmana, Udbhaṭa and Rudraṭa. (i.e. Ānandavardhana's pūrvācāryas.)

Systematic treatment of the topic of śabdavṛttis such as abhidhā, lakṣaṇā and vyañjanā by attempting their definitions and carving out their scope and distinguishing one from the other etc., has to wait, to the best of our knowledge, till the arrival of Mammāṭa. Of course Ānandavardhana, in his attempt to establish vyañjanā as an independent vṛtti tries to lay down the 'viśayabheda' and 'svarūpabheda' of vyañjanā when compared to abhidhā and lakṣaṇā, and he does initiate a systematic treatment of this topic, but by the time Mammāṭa arrived it was taken as one of the basic problems concerning literary criticism. Mammāṭa not only devotes two full chapters in defining and distinguishing these śabda-vṛttis and also laying down their divisions and sub-divisions, he has also written a separate treatise named 'śabda-vyāpāra-paricaya' (or vicāra) devoted exclusively to this topic. This shows how important and relevant was the topic of semantics to sanskrit literary critics. Independent works such as 'Vyaktiveka' of Mahimā for rejecting Ānandavardhana's vyañjanā, Abhidhāvṛtta-mātrikā of Mukula, Vṛttidīpikā of Kṛṣṇa Bhaṭṭa, Vṛtti-Vārtika of Appayya, on the subject of śabda-Vṛttis followed in due course but after Mammāṭa almost all writers on poetics beginning with Hemacandra, made it almost customary to discuss this very important topic along with 'dhvani' and such other relevant topics.

But all this follows Ānandavardhana. For his predecessors i.e. for Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin, Vāmana, Udbhaṭa and Rudraṭa, the great names whose words have come down to us, this topic of śabdavṛttis never commanded enough attention from them

for being treated as important topic independently. So, as in case of some other sources of still earlier age such as the Nirukta, Mahābhāṣya, Vākyapadīya etc. which we will make it a point to examine while treating each śabda-vṛtti separately, even in case of Bhāmaha and the rest, we will have to find out direct and indirect occurrences and references that may reveal their approach to different śabdavṛttis. Thus all references concerning any indication of their acquaintance of knowledge of abhidhā, lakṣaṇā and vyañjanā will go to suggest once again the heritage that proved to be a shaping influence in crystallizing the concepts of different śabdavṛttis in the hands of later ālamkārikas beginning with Ānandavardhana, Mammaṭa, Hemacandra and the rest. We will also, in the next chapter look into the topic of implicit sense or 'pratīyamāna-artha' in these earlier masters. Whether Bhāmaha and the rest, the predecessors of Ānandavardhana were cognisant of the fact of implicit sense in poetry, whether they collected it through vyañjanā or otherwise, will be an interesting enquiry paving the way to Ānandavardhana's recognition of vyañjanā and dhvani. Thus begins our exercise to get at the exact amount of, either only a nodding acquaintance or a fully conscious approval, of various śabda-vṛttis and pratīyamāna sense in the works of ancient ālamkārikas beginning with Bhāmaha to Rudraṭa. This enquiry will pave the way to the topic of scientific treatment of various śabdavṛttis and dhvani by later ālamkārikas. We are taking up the consideration of the earlier ālamkārikas first because independent and scientific enquiry concerning the topics of śabda-vṛttis and dhvani follows this rich heritage.

Once again, it should be noted at the outset that, the earlier writers whose works have come down to us such as Bhāmaha and others, do not discuss the problem of śabda-vṛttis or pratīyamāna artha i.e. implicit sense theoretically like later writers such as Mammaṭa and the rest. So, we cannot expect any definite mention of this subject in their works, nor an attempt to define and classify a given śabda-vṛtti. However, we meet with passages which go to show that the authors were familiar with the idea of the various functions-vṛttis-of a word. We will go by the authors individually accepting the chronology as suggested by Dr. S. K. De in his Sanskrit Poetics.

Bhāmaha :— We begin with Bhāmaha. We come across direct or indirect references to abhidhā as below :—

In the verse I. 9., he reads —

**“śabdaśchando’bhidhānārthā
itihāsāśrayāḥ kathāḥ,**

**loko yuktiḥ kalāśceti
mantavyāḥ kāvyā-vaikhari.**

(Edn. Tiruvadi, 34, Tatacarya Comm.)

vl. (or kāvyā-hetavaḥ)

vl (or kāvyagair hyamī) (Patna Edn. 52).

Here he obviously seems to enumerate the different branches of learning which a poet-aspirant should study. They are śabda i.e. grammar, chandas i.e. metrics, abhidhāna or lexicography, itihāsa i.e. tradition, loka i.e. worldly affairs, yuktiḥ i.e. logic, and kalā or various fine arts. We find the word 'abhidhāna' in the sense of lexicon. D. T. Tātācārya in his udyānavṛtti (Edn. ibid) (pp. 4-5) however observes:

“śabdo nāmākhyātādiḥ sādhu-śabda-svarūpam yāvat. chandaḥ vṛttaratnākarādyukta-lakṣaṇam, abhidhānam śabdasyārtha-pratipādana-vyāpāraḥ śakti-lakṣaṇādi-svarūpaḥ arthaḥ, asya śabdasya ayaṁ eva arthaḥ iti, ayaṁ artho'syaiva śabda-sya vācya iti ca vivekaḥ. mahābhārata-rāmāyaṇādīṣu pratipādyāḥ kathāḥ, lokaḥ strī-puruṣādi-svabhāva-viśeṣa-avasthāviśeṣādi, yuktiḥ nyāya-mīmāṃsādi rūpāṇi darśanāni, kalā gīta-vādyādayaḥ, ity evaṁ etad aṣṭaka-rūpā kāvyā-vaikhari mantavyā.”

Here Tatacharya explains 'abhidhāna' as abhidhā, lakṣaṇā, etc. suggesting Bhāmaha's acquaintance and also acceptance of śabdavṛttis. Of course, he is careful not to mention vyañjanā. But we beg to differ from Tatacharya's explanation because had Bhāmaha been conscious of various śabdavṛttis, he would have treated them independently. Of course, this does not go to suggest that he was totally oblivious of the concepts of abhidhā and lakṣaṇā. For, he also was fairly conversant with the heritage we discussed earlier,—the discussion of abhidhā and lakṣaṇā in the works on śāstras or various disciplines such as Mīmāṃsā, Vyākaraṇa, Nyāya, etc. But for the present here, we would like to take the word 'abhidhāna' in the sense of dictionary or lexicon i.e. kośa, knowledge of which was a must in the making of a poet.

But we have some other more weighty evidence in favour of taking 'abhidhāna' to mean abhidhā-vṛtti and guṇavṛtti. In his *Locana* on Dhvanyāloka(=Dhv.) I, i, Abhinavagupta has the following remark :— bhāmahena uktam—“śabdaś chando'bhidhānārthāḥ” iti. [pp. 16, Edn. Dhv. -Tapasvi Nandi, '98, Ahmedabad.]

abhidhānasya śabdādbhedam vyākhyātum bhṛṭtodbhāto babhaṣe —śabdānām abhidhānam, abhidhāvyāpāro, mukhyo guṇavṛttiśca, iti.”—Here, according to

Abhinavagupta Bhaṭṭa Udbhaṭa who wrote his now lost Bhāmaha-vivaraṇa, explains the term 'abhidhāna' as abhidhā-vyāpāra, which again is two-fold i.e. mukhya i.e. principal, and guṇa-vṛtti i.e. a-mukhya or secondary. Udbhaṭa wants us to believe that Bhāmaha means abhidhā and guṇavṛtti by the term 'abhidhāna.' He rejects the normal interpretation of the term 'abhidhāna' meaning a word— i.e. śabda itself, as is seen in normal usages such as "abhidhāna-abhidheya-bhāva" meaning "vācaka-vācya-bhāva." Thus for Udbhaṭa and perhaps it is acceptable to Abhinavagupta, and therefore also accepted by Tatacharya the word 'abhidhāna' here stands for śabdavṛttis such as mukhyā abhidhā and a-mukhyā guṇavṛtti or lakṣaṇā which is only an extension—"puccha bhūtā"—of abhidhā. This suggests that Bhāmaha was fairly conversant with the topics of śabdavṛttis such as abhidhā and lakṣaṇā which a poet-aspirant has to be conscious of. But Bhāmaha has not given independent thought and space to this topic and so we humbly submit that perhaps he means 'koṣa' or lexicon by the term 'abhidhāna', for a poet aspirant has to have a fairly good knowledge and command over what we call dictionary or a small glossary. That Bhāmaha must have known abhidhā and lakṣaṇā will be clear, and is absolutely acceptable to us also, from a number of clearer references to the same in other places. And of course, as a learned person and a rare intellectual, Bhāmaha is supposed to be well-versed in various śāstras such as the Mīmāṃsā, Vyāya and of course vyākaraṇa which as we have seen talk clearly of abhidhā and lakṣaṇā. But with all this, in the present context, we stick to our interpretation of the word 'abhidhāna' meaning a lexicon as Bhāmaha here seems to enumerate several branches of learning which a poet aspirant should study.

At III. 21. Bhāmaha discusses apahnuti,—

“apahnutir abhīṣṭā ca
kiñcid antargatopamā
bhūtārthāpahnavaḍ asyāḥ
kriyate ca abhidhā yatha.”

and III. 25, we have,

“guṇasya vā kriyāyā vā
viruddhānya-kriyā-'bhidhā,
yā viśeṣābhidhānāya
virodham taṁ vidur budhāḥ.”

At both these places we have 'abhidhā' in the sense of direct statement, taking

us to perhaps 'mukhya-vyāpāra.' Of course in both the cases, the mention of the word 'abhidhā' is clear, but it means 'clear expression' or 'direct expression' i.e. 'naming' and not "abhidhāvyāpāra," which at the most is only implied. But at I. 4. Bhāmaha, while discussing the 'avācaka' blemish observes :—

**“himāpahāmitradharair
vyāptam vyomety avācakam,
sākṣād arūḍham vācyerthe
nābhidhanam pratiyate.”**

This means, the expression 'himāpahāmitradharair' involves 'avācaka' doṣa : this expression is not having clear direct convention with reference to the meaning of 'a cloud' here. Tatacarya (pp. 23) explains, "himāpaho'gniḥ, tasyā'mitrā āpaḥ tāsām dharāḥ meghāḥ, tair vyoma vyāptam iti." Tatacarya further remarks : "na yathā kathañcit kasyacid arthasya upasthāpakam padaṁ tasya vācakam bhavati mā bhṛt vahnipadena dāhe smṛte tat tasya vācakam. kiṁ tu yasya padasya yasmi arthe sākṣād rūḍhiḥ prasiddhiḥ asti, tat tasya vācakam. yattu padaṁ vācye arthe sākṣāt na rūḍham tat tasya abhidhāyakam vācakam iti na pratiyate."

Here Bhāmaha wants to convey that an expression which is not conventionally related to the direct meaning, is not understood. Here the terms such as 'vācy arthe,' 'sākṣād arūḍham' etc. show Bhāmaha's familiarity with the concept of abhidhā.

The following discussion shows that Bhāmaha knows very well the theories of 'sphoṭa' and 'apoha' in connection with the śabdavṛttis concerned. Bhāmaha, of course, does not endorse to the concepts of sphoṭa as well as apoha.

In the VIth pariccheda Bhāmaha discusses the nature and scope of śabda. He also attempts to strike some definition. In the discussion, he sets aside the views of the sphoṭavādins and the apohavādins. This has a bearing on his views on the import of a word.

At VI. 7, he observes :

**“pratītir artheṣu yatas, tam śabdaṁ bruvate pare,
dhūmabhāsoṛ api prāptā śabdatā agnyanumāṁ prati.”**

Tatacharya observes : "prasaṅgāt padasvarūpaṁ avadhārayan paramatan apākaroti....'pratītiḥ.....'.... etc.arthapratītihetutvaṁ śabdatvaṁ iti anyā bruvate. tannopapadyate. dhūmālokeyorapi vahnir anumityātmaka pratītihetutvena śabdatvaprasaṅgāt iti."

The idea is that some define śabda as one from which apprehension of meaning follows. Bhāmaha rejects this view on the ground that in that case, the appearance of smoke which causes the knowledge of fire through reasoning, should also be recognised as a word. At VI. 8. Bhāmaha quotes another view which holds that a collection of letters having a meaning, and used for conveying a meaning, is a word. Says he :

“nanu akārādivarṇānām
samudāyo’bhidheyavān,
artha-pratītaye gītaḥ
śabda ity abhidhīyate.”

‘abhidheyavān’ suggests that for him vācyārtha is ‘abhidheyārtha’, and śabda is vācaka, and the power of expression is ‘abhidhā.’ Tatacharya observes :

“nanu’ iti avadhāraṇe. abhidheyavān vācyārthavān vṛttimān iti yāvat. abhidheyavān abhidheyārtha-pratītyartham uccāriṭo varṇa-samudāya eva padaṃ iti uktaṃ bhavati. varṇasamudāya iti anena dhūmāder vyāvṛttiḥ. abhidheyavān iti padaikadeśasya padāntarākṣaropetapadaśya ca. lipi-vyāvṛttaye vīśeṣaṇāntaram. kambuḡrīvādimad arthābhidhāyino ghaṭāḍipadaśya ākāśārthe śabdatva vāraṇāya vā.”

But Bhāmaha rejects this view also. He observes : (VI 9, 10)—

“pratyekaṃ asamarthānām samudāyo’rthavān katham
varṇānām krama-vartitvān nyāyyā nā’pi ca saṃhatiḥ.”
and, “na cā’pi samudāyibhyo samudāyo’tiricyate,
dārubbhittibhuvo’tīya kim anyat sadma kalpyate.”

The rejection perhaps here is of the view held by the Naiyāyikas as observed earlier. Bhāmaha says that how can a collection of letters that are meaningless taken individually convey meaning ? Again, as letters follow one another in sequence, no collection of letters is possible because when the next letter is pronounced the earlier one has evaporated. Now a whole cannot be different from its parts; a house cannot be anything else than wall, sticks, and land. The thrust is that how can impermanent letters form a collection ? When letters individually are ephemeral how can their combination remain steady and give a meaning ? Bhāmaha gives an illustration of a house which in itself is the sum total of the materials it is built with. But we fear that this illustration is not proper. Bhāmaha has drawn an illustration from physical plane to disprove a matter which it not at

a physical plane but is a matter staying at the higher level of consciousness. So, there seems to be some logical fallacy in citing this illustration.

Obviously, the arguments mentioned in VI. 9, 10 are in harmony with those advocated by the upholders of the theory of *sphoṭa*. But Bhāmaha does not seem to accept the *sphoṭavāda* either. While the upholders of *sphoṭa* hold *sphoṭa* to be eternal, Bhāmaha differs from them because he feels that neither *pratyakṣa* or direct perception, nor *anumāna* or inference supports the *sphoṭavāda*. He observes:

tasmāt kūṭastha ity eṣā
śābdī vaḥ kalpanā vṛthā,
pratyakṣaṃ anumānaṃ vā
yatra, tat paramārthataḥ.} (VI. 11)

Tatacharya comments (pp. 136, Ibid) : “eṣā uktavidhā vaḥ *sphoṭavādinām* śabda-saṃbandhinī atiriktatva-nityatva-kalpanā niṣphalā, aṅgikāra-anarhā. kasmāt ? aprāmāṇikatvāt. yasmin viśaye pratyakṣaṃ anumānaṃ vā sambhavati - tat paramārthato'sti iti abhyupagamyeta. na ca varṇātirikte pade pratyakṣaṃ asti. adarśanāt. na api anumānaṃ. tādṛśapadanirūpita-vyāptimato hetoḥ kasyacid abhāvāt. tasmāt a-pāramārthikaṃ tat.”—

Bhāmaha then proceeds to refute the *apoha-vāda* in the following verses. At VI. 16, he quotes the view of those who hold that a word connotes a particular meaning through the negation—“*apoha*”—of something else :

“anyāpohena śabdo'rtham
āhēty anye pracakṣate,
anyāpohaś ca nāmāni
apadārthāpākṛtiḥ kila.” (VI. 16)

By ‘*apoha*’ is meant the negation of something else. Bhāmaha argues at VI. 17 that if the particular word ‘*gauḥ*’ has its connotation over only in the negation of something else, then we will have to find out some other sound which makes for the connotation of ‘*gauḥ*’ in that particular word.

“yadi gaur ity ayaṃ śabdaḥ
kṛtārtho' nya-nirākṛtau,
janako gavi gobuddher
mr̥gyatām aparo dhvaniḥ.”

He further argues that the word has artha-jñāna or connection of a particular meaning as its phala or object. So, it cannot have two objects viz. negation as well as injunction. Here Bhāmaha takes into consideration the argument of the apohavādin viz. that by 'apoha' is meant "apoha-viśiṣṭo vidhiḥ"—

Tatacharya observes before VI. 18. : nanu ekaḥ 'go'śabdaḥ ubhayam api janayati apohabuddhiṃ gotva-buddhiṃ ca. na etat upapadyate. tathā hi,

“artha-jñāna-phalāḥ śabdāḥ

na ca ekasya phala-dvayam,

apavāda-vidhi-jñāne

phale ca ekasya vaḥ katham.”—(VI. 18)

Tatacharya further comments (pp. 140, ibid) : śabdānām arthajñānam phalam. tatra ekasya śabdasya ekaṃ eva artha-jñānam phalam. na tad dvayam. āhuś ca sakṛt prayuktaḥ śabdaḥ sakṛd eva artham gamayati iti. tathā sati katham yuṣmākaṃ mate ekasya śabdasya dve jñāne phale ucyete ? apavādaḥ apohaḥ vyāvṛttiḥ bhedaḥ. vidhiḥ bhāvaḥ gotvādiḥ. tayoṛ-jñāne. phala-dvayopapādanam ratnakīrti-kṛtāv apohasiddhau draṣṭavyam.

At VI. 19, Bhāmaha further argues that if you want to negate something else than 'gauḥ', at least in the first instant you must apprehend the meaning of a cow from the word 'gauḥ', or else how are you to negate non-cow from it ?

So, at Vi, 13, Bhāmaha gives his own view as follows, which we think, is closer to the Nyāya discipline :

“iyanta īdṛśāḥ varṇāḥ

īdṛg arthābhīdhāyinaḥ,

vyavahārāya lokasya

prāg ittham samayaḥ kṛtaḥ.”

Tatacharya explains (pp. 137, ibid) : “prāk sargādaḥ lokasya vyavahārāya anyonya-abhiprāya-pratyāyanāya samayaḥ saṅketāḥ ittham kṛtaḥ. katham ? etāvantāḥ etādrśa-krama-viśiṣṭā varṇāḥ etad arthābhīdhāyinaḥ iti. 'kha' iti khakāra-akārau dvau viyad-vācināu. 'khara' iti khakāra-akāra-raipha-ākārāś catvāro tigma-vācinaḥ. tathā 'mā' iti dvau varṇau pratiśedha-vācināu lakṣmī-vācināu ca. 'mālā' iti catvāraḥ srag-vācinaḥ. rāja, jarā, iti ubhayatrā'pi yady api varṇāś catvāra eva, tathā'pi krama-bhedād artha-bhedaḥ. tathā ca ittham saṅketasya grhītatve kramavartinām eva varṇānām śravaṇānantaram tādṛśa-krama-viśiṣṭānām eva, eka-smṛtyārūḍhānām artha-pratīti-janakatve, na kaścit saṅkaṭam iti yatkiñcit

pramāṇa-agocara-sphoṭa-kalpanāprayāso'tyantam anapekṣita iti abhisam̐dhiḥ.”—

Bhāmaha holds that 'samaya' or convention, since ages, has been formed to the effect that these many letters of such and such a type and in such and such a sequence should give such and such a meaning. He further notes, VI. 14.

**“sa kūṭasthaḥ anapāyī ca, nādād anyas ca kathyate,
mandāḥ sāṅketikāḥ arthāḥ manyante pāramārthikāḥ.”**

Tatachārya observes : (pp. 138, 9) :— “saḥ ukta-vidha-saṅketa-viśayaḥ śabdaḥ kūṭasthaḥ avikriyaḥ vikṛti-rahitaḥ anapāyī ca vināśa-śūnyaś ca. yathā tat-tad go-vyakteḥ kiñcit kalam avasthāya vinasvaratve'pi gotvāvacchinnasya vastuno na vināśaḥ kiṃtu ā-pralayaṃ anuvartamānatā eva tathavia devadattōccārīte go-pada varṇānām sadyo nivṛttatve'pi yajñadattādy uccāraṇakāle varṇāntara-prādurbhāvi'pi gakaratvāvacchinnottaraūkāratvarūpānupūrvyavacchinnasya sthāyītvāt tasyaiva saṅketa-viśayattvāc ca nāsty anupapattir artha-pratyayasya iti.

nanu sphoṭā'naṅgikāre nāda eva bhavatām śabdaḥ prāpnoti nādābhivy-āngyaś ca śabda iṣyate. tena śrūyamānadhvanyapara-paryāya-nādātmaka-varṇa-samūhātiriktaṃ padam eṣavyam. atra ucyate—

‘nādād anyas ca kathyate.’

na asmākaṃ nādaḥ śabdaḥ prāpnoti. nādād anyo'smākaṃ api śabdaḥ. kaḥ ? akārādi-varṇa-samudāyaḥ. nanu nāda eva ayam. na. kas tarhi nādaḥ ? vāyvādi-samyoga-vibhāga-santānaḥ yaḥ śabda-janakaḥ iti.

evaḥ śabda-svarūpaṃ sthitam. asya arthena kīdṛśaḥ sambandhaḥ ? tad etad pūrvam eva uktaṃ ‘prāg itthaṃ samayaḥ kṛtaḥ’ iti. gautamo'pyāha ‘sāmayikatvāt śabdārtha- sampratyayasya’ iti. atra anye vipratipadyante. yathā jvalanasya dāhaśaktiḥ svābhāviki tathā śabdasya artha-pratyāyana-śaktir iti eṣāṃ darśanam.

Bhāmaha lays his own track. He neither follows the grammarians, nor even the Naiyāyikas fully. He does not stay to answer any questions that you may raise against his conviction also. So, for him this word is eternal and imperishable (VI. 14a), and is different from sound i. e. ‘nāda’. He adds that the fools take the conventional meanings to be ‘pāramārthika’ or referring to reality. He does not choose to enter into any controversy as to whether word is related to artha which is of the nature of reality, through a relation which is eternal or non-eternal.

Finally at VI. 20, he concludes that :—

**varṇa-bhedād idaṃ bhinnam
varṇāḥ svāmśa-vikalpataḥ,**

**ke śabdāḥ kiñca tad-vācyam
iti aho vartma dustaram.”**

Thus, for Bhāmaha, it is difficult to define precisely as to what a word is, because it becomes manifold on account of the difference in letters which again are manifold on account of their parts. He then proceeds to classify words into a fourfold scheme based on dravya or object, kriyā or action, jāti or class and guṇa or quality. (VI. 21).

On, Bhāmaha VI 20, read Tatacharya : (PP. 141, ibid) : “idaṃ padam. ‘varṇa-bhedāt padam bhinnam’ iti eva paṭhitum yuktam. varṇās ca svāvayava-nirūpaṇa-vaśena bhidyante. sva-lakṣaṇāpara-paryāya-vyakti-vyatiriktaṃ sāmānyam sangatair neṣyate. yathā āhuḥ :-

**“etāsu pañcasv avabhāsinīṣu
pratyakṣabodhe sphuṭaṃ aṅguliṣu,
sādhāraṇaṃ ṣaṣṭhamihekṣate yaḥ
sr̥ṅgaṃ śīrasi ātmana īkṣate saḥ”**

tena sarve varṇāḥ tadā tadā uccārita-pradhvastā bhavanti. tathā sati eko go-śabdaḥ eko ghaṭa-śabdaḥ iti nāsti. kiṃtu yathā ghaṭa-śabda-go-śabdau mitho bhidyete, tathaiva adyeha uccāritāḥ kālāntara-deśāntara-uccāritās ca go-śabdā anyonyam bhidyante. yathaviva padāni sāvayavāni tadā tadā tat tad avayavavināśānupātivināśāni anyāni anyāni bhavanti, tathaiva varṇā api sarvānityatva-vādinām tathāgatānām mate svayam api sāvayavāḥ santo vinasyanti iti anye anye bhavanti. evaṃ sati, ayam śabdaḥ asyārthasya vācaka, iti cirānuvartamāna-vyavahāra-darśanādhīnaḥ saṅkerta-graha eva na niṣpattum arhati iti teṣāṃ mate śabda-pramāṇa-mārgo’ tīva duradhigama iti. ||(20)||

From the above discussion it follows that Bhāmaha has some definite views as to the nature and scope of word (VI 13. 14), and his views seem to be very near to the Mīmāṃsakas when he takes śabda do be (vi. 14) ‘Kūṭastha’, ‘anapāyī’ etc. But at times, as observed earlier, he seems to be closer to the Naiyāyikas also as at VI. 14. At least he does not accept ‘sphoṭa’ and mocks at those who believe in it. One thing is very clear from all this discussion that Bhāmaha is quite familiar with ‘abhidhā.’

As to Bhāmaha’s familiarity with functions of words other than the direct one, particularly ‘vyañjanā’, we may say that, ‘vyañjanā’ does not occupy the same place as ‘abhidhā’ in his mind, i. e. he does not seem to have known ‘vyañjanā’ as a separate vṛtti. He however, uses different forms of vi+√ñj with the later meaning

of 'vyañjanā' at different places. Let us examine these usages.

At. II. 73, we have 'vyajyate' as in,

“hi-śabdenāpi hetvartha.
prathanād ukta-siddhaye,
ayam arthāntaranyāso
sutarām vyajyate yathā.

Tatacharya observes : (PP. 54, ibid) : “apiḥ prakārāntara samuccaye. uktasya prakṛtasya siddhaye heturūpam arthaṃ prathayan 'hi' śabdaḥ sutarām arthāntaranyāsaṃ 'vyanakti'.” – The idea is that by the use of the word 'hi', the idea of “samarthya-samarthaka-bhāva” – i. e. the idea of 'supporter and the supported is suggested.

At II. 79. Bhāmaha defines

'samāsokti' as :—

“yatrōkte gamyate'nyo'rthas—
tatsamāna-viśeṣaṇaḥ,
sā samāsoktir uddiṣṭā
saṃkṣiptārthatayā yathā.”

Tatacharya (pp. 55, ibid) has, “...yasyāṃ uktau uktād anyo'rtho gamayate, sā samāsoktiḥ.” Here, we have a reference to another unexpressed sense which is collected by implication. This gathering of unexpressed sense is mostly by way of suggestion i.e. vyañjanā. 'Implication' may mean something else than vyañjanā also.

At III. 8, 9, Bhāmaha explains and illustrates 'paryāyokta' as,

“paryāyoktaṃ yad anyena
prakāreṇa abhidhīyate,
uvāca ratnāharaṇe
caidyam śārṅga-dhanur yathā.” — III. 8
grheṣvadhvasu vā nānnaṃ
bhuñjmahe yad adhītināḥ,
na bhuñjate dvijās tac ca
rasa-dāna-nivṛttaye.”— III. 9.

Tatacharya has—(pp. 64, ibid)—“vaktavyaṃ sākṣād anuktvā yad bhaṅgyantareṇa abhidhānaṃ tat paryāyoktam.”

Bhāmaha says that Kṛṣṇa's reply to Śiśupāla's invitation for dinner is meant to serve the purpose of avoiding the possibility of taking poison—‘rasa-dāna-nivṛttaye.’ This is also only implied or in a way expressed differently. We know that paryāyokta comes closer to vyañjanā but Bhāmaha is not absolutely clear about it here.

At III. 11, Bhāmaha illustrates ‘udātta’ without defining the same :

“udāttaṃ śaktimān rāmo -
guru-vākyānurodhakaḥ,
vihāyopanataṃ rājyaṃ
yathā vanaṃ upāgamat.” (III. 11)

Here the idea of Rāma's virtue is only implied. ‘āśaya-māhātmya’ on the part of Rāma is implied here but Bhāmaha does not say clearly that it is understood through vyañjanā.

Bhāmaha III, 21 defines ‘apahnuti.’

“apahnutir abhīṣṭā ca
kiñcid antar-gatopamā,
bhūtārthā'phnavād asyāḥ
kriyate ca abhidhā yathā.”—

‘kriyate abhidhā’ has direct mentioning of ‘abhidhā’ but it is only in the sense of “expression.” It has no reference to ‘abhidhā vṛtti’, though of course ‘statement’ or ‘abhidhā’ here is direct. Again, *apahnuti* is ‘kiñcid antargatōpamā’ — i.e. with ‘upamā’ or similarity, inherent in it. This means that the external refusal — *pratiṣedha* — has upamā implied in it. Tatacharya (pp. 69 ibid) observes : “kiṃ tu yatopamā gamyate sa pratiṣedha iha apahnutiḥ.” — This clearly means that the element of ‘upamā’ is contained in apahnuti and this ‘upamā’ is only suggested. But Bhāmaha does not make it explicit that the charm lies in ‘upamā being suggested’ also. Of course Tatacharya is clear and so are we that, “kiñcid antargatiḥ, vinā vacanaṃ pratiyamānatā.” (pp. 69, ibid).

At Bhāmaha V, 58, we have

“yatra dṛṣṭānta-mātreṇa
vyajyete sādhyā-sādhane,

**taṃ āhuḥ śuddha-dṛṣṭāntaṃ
tanmātrāviṣkṛter yathā.”**

‘dṛṣṭānta’ is defined here with a clear use of a form of ‘vi+√āñj’ viz. ‘vyajyete.’ So, vyañjanā can not be far behind in Bhāmaha’s mind. In the illustration that follows wherein a king is said to be Bharata, Dilīpa, Purūravas, and Pradyuma, etc., the underlying qualities of the hero, equating him with these big names, are suggested. Tatacharya observes : “iti tatra tatra sādhyā-sādhana-vyañjanā draṣṭavyā.” (pp. 126, ibid). Thus, we may say that we come across a clearer reference and also acceptance of vyañjanā here in Bhāmaha.

Similarly at V. 60, Bhāmaha has.

**“kathaṃ eka-padenaiva
vyajyeran asya te guṇāḥ,
iti prayuñjate santaḥ
kecid vistāra-bhīravaḥ.”**

‘vyajyeran’ has a clear reference to ‘vyañjanā.’ In V. 59 as seen above Bhāmaha has given an illustration of pure dṛṣṭānta wherein a king is said to be Bharata, Dilīpa, etc. thereby implying the qualities of those monarchs in that king. In V. 60 Bhāmaha says that in order to avoid unnecessary details, people resort to one word in V. 59 as above. So, herein, a clear reference to the power of suggestion where the qualities of Bharata, Dilīpa, etc. are suggested by their meaning.

In his discussion of various alaṃkāras, we see that Bhāmaha seems to take for granted the presence of implicit sense—i.e. pratiyamāna artha—or vyaṅgyārtha, e.g. in a-prastuta-praśamsā, dīpaka, vyājastuti, nidarśanā, etc. etc. This point will be further elaborated to support our observation that Bhāmaha was not unfamiliar with vyañjanā. We will take up this investigation in the next chapter in greater details. But one thing that emerges clearly from our discussion so far, is that ‘vyañjanā’ is not totally absent from Bhāmaha’s mind, though of course, and this applies to all other predecessors of Ānandavardhana such as Daṇḍin, Vāmana, etc. also, that a systematic treatment of the topic of śabdavṛtti is not seen in earlier works, but at least we have traces of vyañjanā scattered everywhere and that vyañjanā as a śabdavṛtti is not only known to them but they all, i.e. Bhāmaha and the rest are inclined to accept it with reference to the poetic word. We will now pass over to the next great name, i.e. Daṇḍin.

Daṇḍin : In the Kāvyaḍarśa (= K.D.) of Daṇḍin, we come across the following direct or indirect references to different śabdavṛttis. Actually, there is no reference to 'abhidhā' as such, but references to 'gaṇavṛtti' or lakṣaṇā are as follows :

K.D. I. 95, has,

“niṣṭhūtódgīṃa-vāntā”di
gaṇa-vṛtti-vyapāśrayam,
atisundaram anyatra
grāmya-kakṣām vigāhate.”

the 'prabhā' (pp. 106), (Edn. B.O.R.I.) observes : “kānicit padāni kāvyē gaṇa-vṛttyā eva śobhām āvahanti, na tu mukhya-vṛtṛtyā.” - Thus it is clear that Daṇḍin here not only clearly refers to the a-mukhya or gaṇa or subordinate power of a word in poetry, but recommends it to create beauty in poetry.

At II. 254, Daṇḍin observes,

“te'mī prayoga-mārgēṣu
gaṇa-vṛtti-vyapāśrayāt
atyanta-sundarā dṛṣṭās
tad-udāhṛtayaḥ yathā.”

Dr. D. K. Guptā, the author of 'sudarśanā vyākhyā' (Edn. '76, Delhi) (pp. 214) observes :

“te amī anantaroktāḥ dūrakāryādayas' citrahetavaḥ prayoga-mārgēṣu kavi-prabandha-paddhatiṣu gaṇa-vṛtti-vyapāśrayād gaṇyāḥ prasiddha-viśaya-viparītāyāḥ samāropitāyāḥ vṛtteḥ śabda-vyāpārasya, hetuvyāpārasya vā vyapāśrayād ālambanād hetoḥ atyanta-sundarāḥ ekānta-hṛdyāḥ dṛṣṭāḥ lakṣitāḥ bhavanti.”

Daṇḍin favours the use of 'gaṇa-vṛtti' as against abhidhā, or mukhyā vṛttiḥ. He says that at times in hetu alambkāra, the cause is said to be residing at a place far from that of the effect, or, the effect is described as occurring simultaneously with its cause, or the hetu is said to operate after the effect takes place. These actually, are instances where gaṇa-vṛtti functions.

III. 100, samānarūpā prahelikā is defined as,

“samānarūpā gaṇārthā”ropitair grathitā padaiḥ,
paruṣā lakṣaṇāstitvamātra-vyutpādita-śrutīḥ ||”

Dr. Gupta observes : (pp. 345 ibid) : “prahelikādvayaṃ aparaṃ āha - samānarūpeti; gaṇārthā”ropitaiḥ gaṇārthena sādhyavasāna-gaṇa-lakṣaṇikena arthena āropitaiḥ upacāritaiḥ padaiḥ grathitā.”

The texture of samānarūpā prahelikā is woven with ‘gaṇārthā”ropita’ padas, i.e. words having a secondary sense.

As in Bhāmaha, so also in Daṇḍin, we do not come across any mentioning of ‘vyañjanā’ as such by name. However, we come across different forms of the root vi+vañj in the sense of, ‘to suggest’. We also meet with the term ‘pratīyate’ in the sense of, ‘is implied’. Thus Daṇḍin seems to know a lot also of what is called implicit sense or, ‘pratīyamāna artha’. The examination of this point will be taken up in due course.

At I. 76 (K.D.), Daṇḍin defines the ‘guṇa’ called ‘udāratā’ as -

“utkarṣavān guṇaḥ kaścīd
yasminn ukte pratīyate
taḍ udārā”hvayaṃ tena
sanāthā sarva-paddhatiḥ.”

Thus udāratā occurs in that sentence, wherein after the expressed meaning is conveyed, - yasmin ukte - there is an implication of some high quality. This can be taken as an indirect reference to vyañjanā.

II. 14, upamā is described as,

“yathā-kathañcit sādṛśyaṃ
yatrodhbhūtam pratīyate,
upamā nāma śā, tasyāḥ
prapañcōyaṃ nidarśyate.”

So, for Daṇḍin, in upamā there is an experience of similarity either by abhidhā, or lakṣaṇā or vyañjanā.

II. 16, ‘vastūpamā’ is said to be “pratīyamānaika-dharmā”. II. 46 (K.D.) has ‘prativastūpamā’ where there is ‘sāmya-pratīti’ or apprehension of similarity in an implied way. We will see in due course that so many varieties of upamā have similarity only implied. At II. 65, Daṇḍin says that words such as ‘spardhate’, ‘jayati’, ‘dveṣṭi’, etc. are ‘sādṛśya-sūcakāḥ’, i.e. suggestive of similarity. II. 136, ‘anujñā ākṣepa’ is said to occur where through apparent ‘anujñā’ or acceptance, something else is implied. Says Daṇḍin,

“ity anujñā-mukhenaiva
kāntasyā”kṣipyate gatiḥ,
maraṇaṃ sūcayantyaiva
sónujñā”kṣepa ucyate.”

Thus, there is some element of suggestion involved in this. So also in “āśīrvacana-ākṣepa” (II. 242 K.D.), the heroine suggests her own helplessness - “svāvasthāṃ sūcayantya”.

At II. 280, ‘vyatireka’ is defined as -

“śabdópātte pratīte vā
sādrśye vastunor dvayoḥ,
tatra yad bheda-kathanam
vyatirekaḥ sa kathyate.”

Thus, vyatireka has some touch of an implied similarity. II. 189 mentions vyatireka, having pratīyamāna-sādrśya :

“śabdopādāna-sādrśya-
vyatirekōyam īdrśaḥ,
pratīyamāna-sādrśyōpy asti
sónuvidhīyate.”

Dr. Gupta observes : (pp. 175) : “...atha pratīyamānaṃ a-śabdopāttam gamyaṃ sādrśyaṃ yatra tādrśōpi vyatirekaḥ asti...”

At II. 234, Daṇḍin holds utprekṣā to be suggested by words such as - ‘manye, śaṅke’, dhruvaṃ”, etc. He observes,

“manye śaṅke, dhruvaṃ prāyo
nūnaṃ ity evaṃ ādibhiḥ,
utprekṣā vyajyate śabdair
iva-śabdōpi tādrśaḥ.”

Thus it seems that Daṇḍin considers utprekṣā to be implied only. There is a clear mention of the term, ‘vyajyate’, ‘is suggested’, and this proves the fact that vyañjanā was not unknown to Daṇḍin.

At II. 303, ‘udātta’ is explained. Daṇḍin says that in the two illustrations, (i.e. at II. 301 & II. 302) ‘āśraya-māhātmya’ and ‘abhyudaya-gaurava’ are respectively,

'su-vyañ jita', i.e. "clearly suggested". He observes :

“pūrvatra-āśayamāhātmyam
atra abhyudaya-gauravam,
su-vyañjitaṃ iti proktaṃ
udātta-dvayaṃ apy adaḥ.” (II. 303, K.D.)

Dr. Gupta explains : (pp. 243, *ibid*) : “pūrvatra, pūrvasmin guror ity ādi śloke rāmagatam āśaya-māhātmyam abhiprāya-gauravam, atra ca anantarokte ratnaḥ ityādi padye rāvaṇa-saṃbandhi abhyudaya-gauravam aiśvarya-mahimā suvyañjitaṃ, samyak prakāśitaṃ, iti tad udātta-dvayaṃ dvividhaṃ udāttaṃ api proktaṃ varṇitaṃ.”

At II. 350, Daṇḍin holds Nidarśanā as containing suggestions : “sūcayanti dur antatām”. Thus, we can read here an indirect reference to vyañjanā. We will go to read in both Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin and, the rest of earlier alaṃkārikas the 'pratīyamāna' - or implicit sense, in various figures of speech, such as dīpaka, samāśokti, aprastuta-praśamsā, vyājastuti, etc. and also in emotion-based alaṃkāras such as rasavat, preyaḥ, ūrjasvi, and samāhita, etc.

Vāmana : Vāmana, in his Kāvyaśāstra-sūtra, -vṛtti (= KSV.) often refers to 'bhakti' or lakṣaṇā, or guṇavṛtti and upacāra. But he also does not mention vyañjanā-vṛtti directly. He seems to touch vyañjanā only indirectly.

At KSV. I. i, 1, Vāmana observes that the word 'kāvyā' here stands for word and sense embellished by guṇa and alaṃkāra, but by 'bhakti' i.e. through secondary usage, it is taken with reference to 'śabdārtha-mātra' i.e. 'word and sense' alone. Says he : - 'kāvyā-śabdōyaṃ guṇā'laṃkāra-saṃskṛtayoh śabdārthayoh vartate. bhaktyā tu śabdārtha-mātra-vacanōtra grhyate.”

The kāmadhenu on this (pp. 6, edn. Becan Jha, Chowkhamba Skt. Sr. - Varanasi, 1971), explains, 'bhaktyā upacāreṇa'. Thus secondary power of the word is referred to by Vāmana under the very first sūtra of his KSV. Vāmana says that the word 'kāvyā' here stands for word and sense embellished by guṇa and alaṃkāra i.e. by excellences and figures of speech or poetic turns of expression. But by 'bhakti' i.e. through secondary usage, it is taken with reference with śabdārtha-mātra or word and sense alone.

On I. ii. 1 KSV. Vāmana observes that the words 'arocakī' and 'satṛṇā'bhyavahārī are metaphorically used : “gauṇārthau”. Vāmana holds that in vaidarbhī style, the presence of all the artha-guṇas i.e. excellences enumerated with reference to sense,

makes for the charm : “tasyām artha-guṇa-saṃpat āsvādyā bhavati.” Now this totality of artha-guṇas by themselves, as it resides in the vaidarbhī, is itself known by the name of ‘vaidarbhī’. I ii. 22 - he says : “sāpi vaidarbhī tātsthyāt.” Vāmana then adds : śāpi iyam artha-guṇa-saṃpat vaidarbhī iti ucyate. tātsthyāt, iti upacārataḥ vyavahāraṃ darśayati.” Thus, we come across a clear reference to the secondary usage of language.

At V. i. 12, Vāmana considers the blemish called ‘neyārtha’. He observes that when some meaning which is not heard of in a particular sentence is inferred, it makes for the blemish called ‘neyārtha’. The term viz. ‘pañkti-vihaṃgama-nāma-bhṛt’, used for Daśaratha is an instance in point. By ‘pañkti’ is meant ‘ten’, by ‘vihaṃgama-nāma’ is meant ‘cakravāka’. ‘Ratha’ i.e. chariot is one that bears the name of cakra-vāka on itself. Thus ‘pañkti’ and vihaṃgama-nāma-bhṛt mean ‘Daśa-ratha’. This makes for the blemish called neyārtha. Then it is argued that if you find neyārtha-doṣa in such illustrations then the word ‘rathāṅganāma’ for cakravāka used by all poets also will be an illustration of neyārtha-doṣa. To this, Vāmana says : na teṣāṃ, “nirūḍha-lakṣaṇatvāt.” Such words as rathāṅga-nāma for cakravāka are instances of nirūḍhā lakṣaṇā and are therefore free from any blemish. Thus Vāmana seems to be conversant with what later ālaṃkārikas term as ‘rūḍhi-mūlā lakṣaṇā’, i.e. secondary usage based on convention.

At II. i. 14 Vāmana says that whatever has an obscene sense as another sense is ‘aślīla’ which is a doṣa or a blemish : “a-sabhyā'rthā'ntaraṃ asabhyā-smṛti-hetuś ca aślīlam.” But he adds at II. i. 15 (KSV.) that, secondary usages do not fall under this. He reads - “na gupta-lakṣita-saṃāvṛtāni.” - “apavādārthaṃ idam. guptaṃ, lakṣitaṃ, saṃvṛtaṃ ca nāślīlam.” Thus, secondary usage of language is clearly referred to by Vāmana and is recommended also in poetry. At II. i. 17 he defines ‘lakṣita’ as : ‘lākṣaṇika - asabhyābhyāṃ lakṣitaṃ.” i.e. if the obscene sense is gathered secondarily, it is called ‘lakṣita’ and it does not give rise to the blemish of vulgarity. The illustration cited is ‘janma-bhūmiḥ’. Vāmana says - “tad eva asabhyā'rthā'ntaraṃ lākṣaṇikena asabhyena arthena anvitaṃ padaṃ lakṣitaṃ, yathā janma-bhūmiḥ iti.” Vāmana adds that here, this word viz. ‘janmabhūmiḥ’ means the female organ - i.e. ‘yonih’, only secondarily and not by the power of expression - “tad hi lakṣaṇayā guhyārthaṃ, na sva-śaktyā iti.” Here ‘sva-śakti’ of a word is ‘abhidhā’ or the power of direct expression and ‘lakṣaṇā’ is secondary power - both of which are clearly known to Vāmana and clearly referred to here by him also.

Under, IV. iii. 7, Vāmana notes that like 'gauṇārtha', the 'lākṣaṇikārtha' can also become an alaṃkāra. This means that as in case of a metaphorical expression, so in case of any secondary usage also, poets can create some beauty, i.e. alaṃkāra. He says : "yathā ca gauṇasya arthasya alaṃkāratvaṃ tathā lākṣaṇikasya api darśayitum āha" - and he quotes IV. iii. 8 here, viz. "sādṛśyāllakṣaṇā vakroktiḥ". He observes : "bahūni hi nibandhanāni lakṣaṇāyām. tatra sādṛśyāllakṣaṇā vakroktiḥ asau iti." Thus Vāmana knows a variety of lakṣaṇās but has a preference for one based on sādṛśya i.e. similarity, as the germ for vakrokti i.e. poetic expression. He quotes an illustration in which "unmīlana" and "nimīlana", i.e. opening and closing, which are the qualities of an eye, are superimposed on 'kamala' and 'kairava', the flowers, through similarity, and secondary meaning of blossoming and fading of the respective flowers is collected at the next step : "sādṛśyāt vikāsa-saṃkocau lakṣayataḥ." He cites some more illustrations to the same effect and adds : "iti evaṃ ādiṣu lakṣaṇārtho nirūpyate iti, lakṣaṇāyām jhatiti artha-pratipatti-kṣamatvaṃ rahasyaṃ ācakṣate iti." The secret of lakṣaṇā lies in an immediate gathering of the sense. He says that lakṣaṇā based on something else than similarity does not make for vakrokti i.e. poetic expression : "a-sādṛśya-nibandhanā tu lakṣaṇā na vakroktiḥ."

At IV. iii. 9, Vāmana defines 'utprekṣā' : "a-radrūpasya anyathā'dhyavasānam atīṣayārthaṃ utprekṣā." To describe an object as one which it is not, and this description to bring about some added charm of it, is utprekṣā. Thus in utprekṣā, the source of charm is 'adhyavasāna' which is neither 'adhyāropa' i.e. superimposition as in case of rūpaka, nor lakṣaṇā as in case of vakrokti. Vāmana observes : "na punar adhyāropo lakṣaṇā vā." 'Adhyavasāna' is 'determination'. It is to determine and present an object in a form and quality which it is not. This is 'āhārya' i.e. done knowingly by a poet's will to impart beauty to a given expression. This is artificial identification wherein the original object is not totally absorbed but also finds independent expression. Vāmana's concept of utprekṣā also suggests that he has a clearer and fuller knowledge of different varieties of lakṣaṇā.

At V. i. 15 Vāmana discusses a topic concerning words, that can and should be used in poetry, and others that cannot be used in poetry, i.e. the topic of 'prayojya' and 'a-prayojya' words, with reference to a poetic expression. He observes - "lakṣaṇā-śabdāś ca". - Vāmana says that words having secondary usage can be utilized by the poets if their practice is very frequent : "lakṣaṇā-śabdāś ca atiprayuktāḥ prayojyāḥ, yatha dvi-refa-rodara-śabdau bhramara-cakravākārthau, lakṣaṇāparau. anati-prayuktāś ca na prayojyāḥ yathā dvikaḥ, kākaḥ iti." The word

'dvika' in the sense of 'kāka' or a crow is not very frequently used in language and so it cannot be used. It is clear that Vāmana here refers to what is termed as 'rūḍhi-mūlā-lakṣaṇā', later on.

As already observed by us, Vāmana does not refer to 'vyañjanā' directly. But at places, he notes certain illustrations of 'punar ukta' or 'repetition', which are actually not 'punar ukta doṣa' or blemish resulting from repetition. He says that such words or such repetitions are charged with some further sense. Now acceptance of this 'further sense' amounts to the acceptance of implicit sense through the medium of 'vyañjanā' or suggestion, though of course Vāmana does not make it clear that this 'further sense' is derived through the agency of vyañjanā or suggestive power of a word.

Under II. ii. 13, Vāmana cites certain illustrations. He says : "dhanur jyādhvanau; dhanuḥ śrutir ārūdheḥ pratipattyai." He further observes : 'dhanur jyādhvanau' iti atra 'jyā'śabdena uktārtharvėpi dhanuḥ śrutiḥ prayujyate, ārūdheḥ pratipattyai. ārohaṇasya pratipattyai. ārohaṇasya pratipattiyartham. The idea is that in case of a sound created by a bow-string, the idea of 'dhanuḥ' or a bow is already gathered by the term 'jyā' or bow-string itself. So, the use of 'dhanuḥ' should be termed redundant. But Vāmana says that here it is not so, i.e. it is not redundant because the idea of 'ārohaṇa' or stretching the string is not collected in the absence of the word 'dhanuḥ' : na hi dhanuḥ śruti-antareṇa dhanuṣi ārūdhā jyā dhanur-jyā iti śakyam pratipattum.

Under II. ii. 14, Vāmana cites further illustrations to the same effect. Says he - "kaṇāvatamṣa-śravaṇa-kundala-śiraḥ-śekhareṣu kaṇā"di nirdeśaḥ sannidheḥ." Thus, in 'kaṇāvatamṣa' the word 'kaṇa' is meant only to help the gathering of the idea of 'sannidhi' i.e. juxtaposition. The idea of closeness cannot be collected merely by the use of the word 'avatamṣa' which by itself means an ear ornament. That this ornament is close to the ear and is dangling on the cheeks is understood only by the presence of the word 'kaṇa'. The Kāmadhenu (pp. 71, ibid) observes : "avatamṣā"di bhiḥ kaṇā"bharaṇā"di ni eva ucyante iti avatamṣādi-prayoge kaṇā"di nām gatārthatvam iti abhiprāyaḥ." II. ii. 15, Vāmana observes : "muktāhāraśabde muktā-śabdaḥ śuddheḥ." - muktāhāraśabde muktā-śabdaḥ hāraśabdena eva gatārthatvam prayujyate, śuddheḥ pratipattiyartham iti sambandhaḥ." In case of the word muktā-hāra the word 'muktā' is redundant because the word 'hāra' is by itself capable of conveying the sense of a pearl-necklace, but an additional word 'muktā' is used to convey that the pearls are very pure i.e. are of the highest quality that is available in the market. Now, Vāmana does not specify that this extra

sense of purity is collected through vyañjanā but his finger does point in the direction of vyañjanā which is instrumental in gathering this extra sense. Thus the concept of vyañjanā cannot be said to be totally absent from his mind. Similarly, at II. ii. 6, 'puśpa-mālā' is an expression with a separate mention of 'puśpa', eventhough the idea is covered by a mere use of the term 'mālā'. Here, by a special mention of 'puśpa' the idea of 'utkarṣa' or excellence is conveyed. Vāmana adds : "utkrṣṭānām puśpānām mālā iti." When we come across the use of 'mālā' with reference to 'ratna' or 'śabda', as in the expression 'ratna-mālā' or 'śabda-mālā', the usage is said to be a secondary one - "sa tāvad upacaritasya prayogaḥ. nir-upapado hi mālā-śabdaḥ puśpa-racanā-viśeṣaṃ eva abhidharte iti." In the same way, the word 'kari' in the expression 'kari-kalabha', is not redundant as it brings about the apprehension of 'tād-rūpya' or similarity. Vāmana says - "kari-kalabha-śabde kari-śabdaḥ kalabhena eva gatārthaḥ prayujyate, tād-rūpyasya pratipattiyartham iti."

So, this type of added sense is derived in certain usages. But whether it can lead us to śabda-śakti-mūlā vyañjanā or not is not made clear by Vāmana.

In the third adhikaraṇa-second adhyāya, Vāmana deals with "samādhi guṇa" with reference to sense. He defines it as - "artha-dṛṣṭiḥ samādhiḥ." (III. ii. 7) The dawning or flashing of (a special) meaning is the excellence called 'samādhi'. When a mind is in a state of poise, meanings flash upon it. At II. ii. 7, Vāmana classifies 'artha' or meaning into 'vyakta' i.e. one that is expressed clearly, and 'sūkṣma' i.e. one that is subtle : "artho vyaktāḥ sūkṣmas'ca". At III. ii. 10, he says that 'sūkṣma' or subtle is also two-fold such as 'bhāvya' or that which can be easily grasped, and 'vāsanīya' or that which can be understood after close application : "sūkṣmo dhvidhā bhavati. bhāvyo vāsanīyas'ca. śighra-nirūpaṇā-gamyo bhāvyaḥ, ekāgratā-prakarṣa-gamyo vāsanīyaḥ iti." He goes on illustrating the same. Now both 'bhāvya' and 'vāsanīya' are more subtle as compared to the 'vyakta' or barely expressed. Out of these two also, 'vāsanīya' is subtler. Thus, we come across a clear recognition of implied sense, without however any reference to the relevant vṛtti viz. vyañjanā here.

KSV. III. ii. 5 defines 'kānti-guṇa' as, "dīpta-rasatvaṃ kāntiḥ", i.e. the narration involving full-fledged rasa-delineation makes for 'kānti-guṇa' in Vāmana's estimation. The illustration he reads is purely an instance with sṛṅgāra-rasa as the dominant one. But again, inspite of recognition of rasa-delineation in poetry, Vāmana does not discuss as to which power of word brings about the particular rasa-realization. But, it is certain that in all the cases pointed out as above, Vāmana comes very close to the recognition of vyañjanā without naming it, of course.

Udbhaṭa : In Udbhaṭa's Kāvyaśaṃkārā (K.L.) we come across some direct or indirect references to all the three vṛttis as below :

At V. 16, Udbhaṭa defines 'vyājastuti' as :

“śabda-śakti-svabhāvena yatra nindeva gamyate.
vastutas tu stutiḥ śreṣṭhā vyājastutir asau matā.”

'śabda-śakti' here stands for abhidhāśakti. 'gamyate' i.e. 'is implied', can refer to 'is suggested'.

I. 21, Udbhaṭa defines rūpaka as,

“śrutyā sambandha-virahāt
yat padena padāntaram,
guṇa-vṛtti-pradhānena
yujyate rūpakam tu tat.”

Pratīhārendurāja in his Laghu-vṛtti (pp. 11, Edn. N.S., Bombay '28) says : “padāntarasya guṇavṛtteḥ apareṇa padena yoge rūpakam bhavati”, ... and adds - “śrutir nirantarā'rtha-niṣṭhaḥ śabda-vyāpāraḥ. tayā śrutyā anupapadyamāna-padāntara-sambandham sat padāntaram guṇavṛtti yatrā'pareṇa padena yujyate tatra rūpakatā.” The Vivṛti (Edn. Oriental Institute, Baroda, 1931), pp. 7, observes : “yat padena padāntaram sambadhyate tad-rūpakam. ... śrutir nirantarā'rtha-niṣṭhaḥ śabda-vyāpāraḥ... guṇavṛttitvam iti hi mukhyā'rtha-bādhaḥ.” - Thus, we come across a clear mentioning of both 'abhidhā' and 'guṇavṛtti' here, as is explained by Pratīhārendurāja (approximately the last half of the 10th Cen. A.D. - De, pp. 74)

At IV. 11, Udbhaṭa defines paryāyokta as,

“paryāyoktam yad anyena
prakāreṇa abhidhīyate,
vācya-vācaka-vṛttibhyām
śūnyena avagamanā'tmanā.”

Here, vācaka-vṛtti is pure abhidhā, vācya-vṛtti could be lakṣaṇā, while 'avagamana' could be vyañjanā. The commentators viz. Pratīhārendurāja, the author of Laghuvṛtti and Rājāṅka Tilaka, the author of Vivṛti, have the following observations : (pp. 60, Edn. Bom. ibid) : “vācakasya abhidhāyakasya sva-śabdasya vṛttir vyāpāro vācyārtha-pratyāyanam. vācyasya tu abhidheyasya vyāpāro vācyāntareṇa saha

ākāṅkṣā-sannidhi-yogyatā-māhātmyāt saṁsarga-gamanam. evaṁvidhaś ca yo vācya-vācakayor vyāpāras taṁ antareṇa api prakārāntareṇa artha-sāmarthyā”tmanā avagamana-svabhāvena yad avagamyate tat paryāyeṇa svakaṅthānabhihitam api śāntareṇa śabda-vyāpāreṇa avagamyamānatvāt paryāyoktam vastu. tena ca sa-saṁśleṣa-vaśena kāvyārtholamkriyate.” - Tilaka (pp. 35) has - “vācakavṛttiḥ abhidhā. vācyavṛttiḥ ākāṅkṣā-sannidhi-yogyatā-vaśāt saṁsarga-gamanam. tābhyāṁ vinā artha-sāmarthyā”tmanā avagamana-svabhāvena yat pratipādyate tat paryāyeṇa anyena rūpeṇa abhidhānam iti paryāyoktam. avagamana-vyāpāreṇa katham abhidhānam iti cet, paryāyokta-tattvaṁ-aprastutaprasaṁsā-vyākhyāne vakṣyāmaḥ.” - Thus, according to these two commentators, Udbhaṭa here seems to refer to vācakavṛtti i.e. abhidhā, vācyavṛtti i.e. tātparya and avagamana i.e. vyañjanā in all probability. As noted above, “vācya-vṛtti” could also mean lakṣaṇā.

Rudraṭa : In Rudraṭa we do not come across any direct reference to ‘abhidhā’, however, at VI. 3 he defines ‘a-samartha’ blemish as :

“padam idam asamartham syād
vācakam arthasya tasya na ca vaktum,
taṁ śaknoti tirohita-
tat-sāmarthyam, nimittena.”

‘asamartha’ occurs when a particular word, which is normally expressive of a particular sense, becomes incapable of doing so on account of its power of expression being eclipsed by some other factors. Read Namisādhu (pp. 151, Edn. Chowkhamba Vidyabhavan, Varanasi, Edn. '66) : “padam iti. yatpadam tasya nirḍiṣṭasya arthasya vācakam. atha ca taṁ eva artham vaktum na śaknoti tadā asamartham. vācakam cet katham na śaknoti iti āha, - nimittena kena-cid śabdāntara-saṁbandhā”dinā tirohitam yasya tat, taṁ abhidhātum na śaknoti iti. etena a-vācakatva-doṣād asāmarthyam doṣa-bheda uktaḥ.” - Herein we may read an indirect reference to, and recognition of, ‘abhidhā’. At VI. 5, and 6 in the same context, Rudraṭa describes another variety of a-samartha wherein a particular meaning, though normal to a particular word and yet not usually read from it, is read, e.g. √“han” in the sense of ‘going’. At VI. 6, Rudraṭa says :

“śabda-prakṛti-hetau, satyam apy asamartham eva rūdhi-balāt,
yaugikam artha-viśeṣam padam yathā vāridhau jalabhṛt.”

Namisādhu observes : (pp. 153, ibid) : “jala-dhāraṇa-kriyā-lakṣaṇe pravṛtti-nimitte satyapi jalabhṛt śabdo vāridhiṁ samudraṁ abhidhātum asamarthaḥ megha eva tasya rūdhitvāt, iti.”

‘Asamartha’ also happens when ordinarily a word is capable of conveying a sense on the strength of etymology, but is rendered incapable to convey it on account of rūḍhi or usage; e.g. ‘jalabhṛt’ cannot be used for ‘vāridhi’ i.e. an ocean. The maxim viz. ‘rūḍhir yogāt balīyasī’ seems to be known to Rudraṭa also and he thus knows a variety of abhidhārtha.

Apratīta, a blemish is defined by Rudraṭa at VI. II, -

“yuktyā vakti taṃ arthaṃ
na ca rūḍhaṃ yatra yad abhidhānatayā,
dvedhā tad apratītaṃ
saṃśayaḥ asaṃśayaṃ ca padam.”

Namisādhu has : (pp. 156, ibid) : “atha ca tatra arthābhidhānatayā vācakarvena na rūḍhaṃ, na prasiddhaṃ, tat ca apratītaṃ dvedhā.”

Thus, Rudraṭa mentions “abhidhānatayā rūḍhaṃ arthaṃ” i.e. a meaning fixed by the power of expression - abhidhā. VI. 12 gives an illustration of ‘apratīta’ involving doubt; e.g. ‘nīmahā’... etc. VI. 13 gives an illustration of apratīta-doṣa having no doubt, - ‘a-saṃśaya’ - ‘aśvayoṣin mukhārciṣman’ is the illustration, and it means ‘vaḍavānala’. Rudraṭa observes that here this particular word is used for the normally used ‘yaugika’ or ‘rūḍha’ words. Here again, we come across, a reference to yaugika and rūḍha śabdās, which lead to abhidhā.

At VII. i. also, Rudraṭa seems to refer to abhidhārtha very clearly when he says :

“arthaḥ punar abhidhāvān
pravartate, yasya vācakaḥ śabdaḥ,
tasya bhavanti dravyaṃ,
guṇaḥ, kriyā, jātir iti bhedaḥ.”

We do not come across any reference to guṇavṛtti or lakṣaṇā in Rudraṭa except at VII. 58 and here too indirectly when he illustrates ‘viparīta’ anumāṇa. The anumāṇa is said to be ‘viparīta’ because the ‘sādhya’ is described as following the sādhakas :

The illustration cited is - (VII. 58) :

“vacanaṃ upacāra-garbhaṃ dūrād
udgamaṇaṃ āsanaṃ sakalam,
idaṃ adya mayi tathā te
yathā’si nūnaṃ priye kupitā.”

Herein, 'vacana' is said to be 'upacāragarbha', and thus a reference to 'upacāra' is found here of course indirectly. Similarly at VII. 49, we have, 'abhidhīyate sato vā' ... etc., giving a clear reference of 'abhidhā'.

VII. 38, Rudraṭa defines 'bhāva' as :

“yasya vikāraḥ prabhavan
apratibaddhena hetunā yena,
'gamayati' tad abhiprāyaṃ
tat-pratibandhaṃ ca bhāvó sau.”

The illustration is,

“grāma-taruṇaṃ taruṇyā
nava-vañjula-mañjarī-sanātha-karam,
paśyantyā bhavati muhur
nitarāṃ malinā mukha-cchāyā.”

Bhāva also occurs, holds Rudraṭa (VII. 40), when a sentence conveying the direct sense, also suggests another sense :

“abhidheyam abhidadhānam tad eva
tat-sadṛśa-sakala-guṇa-doṣam,
arthā'ntaram avagamayati
yad vākyaṃ sóparo bhāvaḥ.”

The illustration (VII. 41) is -

ekākinī yad abalā, taruṇī tathā'ham,
asmin grhe grhapatiś ca gato videśam,
kiṃ yācase tad iha vāsam iyaṃ varākī
śvaśrūr mamā'ndha-badhirā nanu mūḍha pāntha !”

Namisādhū explains : (pp. 209, ibid) -

“ekākinī iti. taruṇa-pathikasya vāsam yācamānasya kācit sābhilāśa yoṣid idam prakṛta-pratiśedhā'rthaṃ vākyaṃ āha. etena ca ukta-padārthena vilakṣaṇo vāsā'numati-vidhi-lakṣaṇo bhāvóvagamyate.” This is an indirect, but clear recognition of vyañjanā, pure and simple.

At VIII. 74, Rudraṭa defines anyokti as -

“asamāna-viśeṣaṇaṃ api yatra
samāna-itivṛttaṃ upameyam,

uktena gamyate param
upamānena iti sā anyoktiḥ.”

This also is a veiled reference to vyañjanā.

Thus, we have observed that in earlier ālaṃkārikas from Bhāmaha to Rudraṭa, we do not find the topic of the word-powers i.e. śabda-vṛttis discussed as an independent topic as is done by later ālaṃkārikas such as Mammata and his followers. But we do, however, find references - both direct or indirect but equally positive, in their works, to various śabda-vṛttis and various types of meanings such as the principal or mukhya, which is abhidheya and the secondary i.e. a-mukhya or gauna, upacarita etc. Thus, we do find references in their works which go to prove that they were absolutely acquainted with abhidhā and lakṣaṇā to be sure, and that the concept of vyañjanā was not absent from their minds. The idea of vyañjanā was surely in its embryonic form, if not flowered in their minds. Though of course they have not clearly defined vyañjanā, but then they have not defined either abhidhā or lakṣaṇā also, precisely because they had no compulsion to do so. Perhaps sāmājikas in those days never confused between one and the other. But for Ānandavardhana, who tried to make a clear distinction between one and the other, explaining and establishing vyañjanā had become a necessity.



Chapter IV

Pratīyamāna artha

OR

**Implicit sense, - as seen in the earlier
ālaṃkārikas such as Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin etc.**

Some of the greatest exponents of the dhvani school such as Ānandavardhana (middle of the 9th Cen. A.D., De, pp. 101), Abhinavagupta (1015 A.D.), Ruyyaka (IIṃḍ and IIIṃḍ quarters of the 12th Cen. A.D., De, pp. 181;) and Jagannātha (17th Cen. A.D., De, pp. 231, SK. Poetics; 1620 A.D. to 1660 A.D. -) hold that the earlier writers such as Bhāmaha and the like, though they had not defined either vyañjanā or dhvani, were more or less familiar with the fact of dhvani.

Ānandavardhana observes : “yadyapi ca dhvani-śabda-saṃkīrtanena kāvyalakṣaṇa-vidhāyibhir guṇavṛttir anyo vā na kaścit prakāraḥ prakāśitaḥ, tathāpi amukhya-vṛttyā kāvyeṣu vyavahāraṃ darśayatā dhvanimārgo manāk sprṣṭōpi na lakṣita iti parikalpya evaṃ uktam, ‘bhāktam āhus tam anye’ iti.” - (Dhv. I. i, āloka; pp. 4, Edn. K. Krishnamoorthy, Dharwad, '74)

Abhinavagupta in his Locana on Dhv. I. i, (above passage), tries to explain as to who were the ālaṃkārikas referred to by Ānandavardhana - Says he - (pp. 16, Edn. Dr. T. S. Nandi, Dhv. with Locana, Ahd. '97, '98) :

darśayatā iti, bhaṭṭodbhaṭṭa-vāmanā”dinā. bhāmahena uktam - “śabdas' cchando'bhidhānārthāḥ” iti. abhidhānasya śabdād bhedam vyākhyatam bhaṭṭodbhaṭṭo babhāṣe - śabdānām abhidhānam abhidhāvypāro mukhyo, guṇa-vṛttis' ca. Vāmanōpi ‘sādṛśyāllakṣaṇā vakroktiḥ’ iti. manāk sprṣṭa iti. tais tāvad dhvani-dig-unmīlita, yathālikhita-pāṭhakais tu svarūpa-vivekam kartum aśaknuvadbhiḥ tat-

svarūpa-viveko na kṛtaḥ, praty uta upālabhyate, abhagna-nārikelavat yathāśruta-tad-granthodgrahaṇa-mātreṇa, iti.”

It is very clear that both Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta are absolutely clear that the ancients knew dhvani, and therefore, we may add, vyañjanā also, even though they did not make any attempt to arrive at its definition.

Ruyyaka, in the beginning of his work Ālaṃkāra-sarvasva says : (‘65 pp. 2, Edn. R. C. Dwivedi, Motilal Banarasidass)

“iha hi tāvad bhāmahodbhāṭa-prabhṛtayaś cirantanālaṃkārakārāḥ pratīyamānaṃ arthaṃ vācyopaskāratayā ālaṃkārapakṣa-nikṣiptaṃ manyante. tathā hi - paryāyokta-aprastuta - praśamsā-samāsoktyākṣepa-vyājastuti-upameyopamā-ananvayā”dau vastumātraṃ gamyamānaṃ vācyopaskāratvena, ‘sva-siddhaye parākṣepaḥ’ ‘parārthaṃ sva-samarpaṇam’ iti yathā-yogaṃ dvidvidhayā baṅgyā pratipāditam taiḥ.

rudraṇa tu bhāvā’laṃkāro dvi-dhaivoktaḥ. rūpaka-dīpaka-apahnuti-tulyayogitā”dau upamā”dy ālaṃkāro vācyopaskāratvena uktaḥ. utprekṣā tu svayaṃ eva pratīyamānā kathitā. rasavat-preyaḥ-prabhṛtau rasabhāvā”dir vācyasobhāhetutvena uktaḥ. tad itthāṃ trividhaṃ api pratīyamānaṃ ālaṃkāratayā khyāpitaṃ eva.

vāmanena tu sādṛśya-nibandhanāyā lakṣaṇāyā vakrokty ālaṃkāratvaṃ bruvatā kaścīd dhvanibhedōlaṃkāratayā eva uktaḥ. kevalaṃ guṇa-viśiṣṭa-pada-racanā”tmikā rītiḥ kāvyā”tmatvena uktā...”

Thus Ruyyaka has analytically specified how threefold implicit sense is covered under various figures of speech by earlier ālaṃkārikas.

Jagannātha in his Rasa-gaṅgādhara (pp. 555 Edn. N.S. Bombay, ‘47) observes :

idaṃ tu bodhyam. dhvanikārāt prācīnair bhāmahodbhāṭa-prabhṛtibhiḥ svagrantheṣu kutrā’pi dhvani-guṇibhūtavyaṅgyā”di śabdā na prayuktāḥ iti etāvatā eva tair dhvanyā”dayo na svīkriyante iti ādhunikānāṃ vācyoktir ayuktā eva. yataḥ samāsokti-vyāja-stuti-aprastutapraśamsādy-ālaṃkāra-nirūpaṇe kiyantōpi guṇibhūta-vyaṅgya-bhedās tair api nirūpitāḥ. aparāś ca sarvōpi vyaṅgya-prapañcaḥ paryāyokta-kukṣau nikṣiptaḥ. na hi anubhavasiddhōrtho bālena api apahnotuṃ śakyate. dhvanyā”di-padaih param vyavahāro na kṛtaḥ. tena na hi etāvatā anāṅgikāro bhavati.

It can be said that the presence of vyañjanā and vyaṅgyārtha or suggested sense can be traced in all poetry beginning from the Rīg-veda, but perhaps it is quite different to discover in poets and critics any theoretically conscious understanding

of vyañjanā and vyaṅgyārtha and 'dhvani' in its technical sense. So, it can be argued that in the discussion that follows, of ālamkāras and guṇas in which vyañjanā and vyaṅgyārtha are subsumed, in case of the treatment by earlier ālamkārikas, there is no positive proof of their conscious understanding of these entities. But, by and large, on second thought, we may choose to go with Ānandavardhana, Abhinavagupta, Ruyyaka and Jagannātha, that the earlier ālamkārikas knew both vyañjanā and vyaṅgyārtha, but they had no apparent reason to define and elaborate these topics, like Yāska, Pāṇini and Patañjali and perhaps also the Mīmāṃsakas, who had no occasion and therefore no business to define these topics separately and carve out their independent existence. Actually after the age of the earlier ālamkārikas and before the time of Ānandavardhana, some misunderstanding started in the circles of literary critics and therefore Ānandavardhana took it upon himself to systematically expound and establish the concept of 'dhvani' in its technical sense, with of course 'vyañjanā' as its poetic instrument. It may be noted that in whole-heartedly supporting the remarks of Ānandavardhana, Abhinavagupta, Ruyyaka and Jagannātha we are shifting from the position taken by us on an earlier occasion, while we prepared our thesis — "The Origin and Development of the theory of Rasa and Dhvani in Sanskrit poetics", — and got it published. (See pp. 179, Edn. Guj. Uni. Ahmedabad, '73)

We will go to see how the fact of pratiyamāna artha i.e. implicit sense is incorporated under various heads by the earlier ālamkārikas such as Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin and the rest.

Bhāmaha : At - II. 85 Bhāmaha's general outlook towards all ālamkāras becomes clear when he observes :

“saiṣa sarvaiva vakroktiḥ
anayārtho vibhāvyaṭe
yatōsyāṃ kavinā kāryaḥ
kōlamkāro'nayā vinā ?” (II. 85, Bhāmaha)

Read Tātacharya (pp. 57, ibid) : vakroktiḥ ālamkāraḥ. 'vakrā'bhidheya-śabdoktir-iṣṭā vācāṃ ālamkr̥tiḥ.” iti vacanāt yā nirūpitā atīśayoktiḥ sā eva sarvā vakroktiḥ, sarvōlamkāraḥ. anayā atīśayoktyā kāvyārthaḥ rasa-carvaṇā-'nugūṇa-vīśada-pratīti-gocarīkriyate. etad ghaṭane kavinā saṃrambhaḥ kāryaḥ. anayā vinā ālamkāraḥ eva na bhavati.” - Thus for Bhāmaha, atīśayokti or vakrokti i.e. beauty lies at the root of all the ālamkāras or beautiful turns of expressions. It is implied in all ālamkāras in one way or the other. The presence of 'pratiyamāna' element

is thus reconised as the very basis on which the whole of art, architecture and edifice of poetry is built.

At I. 30, Bhāmaha asserts that this ‘vakrokti’ should be present in all poetry beginning from a muktaka i.e. a single independent verse to a mahākāvya or an epic :

“anibaddhaṃ punar gāthā
śloka-mātrā”di tat punaḥ,
yuktaṃ vakra-svabhāvoktyā
sarvaṃ eva etad iṣyate.”

Thus vakrokti is omnipresent for Bhāmaha. At I. 34, he is even prepared to reject the so called vaidarbha kāvya if it is found bereft of this element of vakrokti :

“a-puṣṭārthaṃ a-vakrokti
prasannaṃ rju-komalam,
bhinnaṃ geyaṃ iva idaṃ tu
kevalaṃ śruti-peśalam.”

“If the composition is meagre in meaning and bereft of beautiful expression, though clear, uninvolved and soft, it is to be taken as different from poetry, (and) something akin to a musical composition appealing only to the ear.” -

Tatacharya writes : (pp. 15, ibid) : a-puṣṭārthaṃ a-gambhīrārthaṃ, ata eva prasannaṃ kavi-pratibhā-janita-rasopaskāra-rahitaṃ, a-vakrokti ālaṃkāraśūnyaṃ, ata eva rju pāmara-sādhāraṇa-vārtā-tulyaṃ evaṃ kāvya-jīvita-vikalaṃ api komalaṃ lalita-pada-bandhaṃ idaṃ tu vaidarbhaṃ vilakṣaṇaṃ geyaṃ iva kevalaṃ sṛti-madhuraṃ, na tu prīti-hetu-bhūta-viśiṣṭa-śabdārthamaya-kāvya-vyapadeśa-nidāna-śobhāśālī. tathā ca kāvyaatvaṃ eva nāstīti kutas tad-viśeṣatā. geyaṃ gītipradhānā padaracanā.”

Bhāmaha very clearly affirms the use of only ‘vakra’ ‘word and sense’ in poetry when he observes at I. 36 :

“na nitāntā”di-mātreṇa
jāyate cārutā girāṃ,
vakraḥbhidheyaśābdoktir
iṣṭā vācāṃ ālaṃkṛtiḥ.”

“By the use of soft words such as ‘nitānta’ and the like, poetic beauty is not caused. A poetic expression graced by beauty in word and sense is welcome as true ‘ālaṃkāra’ (i.e. inherent poetic beauty) of speech.”

Tatacharya is ill at ease to explain 'nitānta-ādi-mātreṇa' (pp. 17, ibid). But ultimately falls upon the right explanation when he observes : "vaksyamāṇa-anuprāsa-viśeṣa-upasthāpana-dvāreṇa nitāntā" dīti bandha-komalatvaṃ iha lakṣayati. sṛtipeśalatva-saṃpādakena bandhasya komalatva-mātreṇa kāvya-vyapadeśa-ucitā cārutā girāṃ na jāyate-vakrayor abhidheya-śabdayor-ghaṭanā tu vācāṃ alaṃkṛtiḥ. kā śabdasya vakratā. anuprāsā"dimattā."

Thus for Bhāmaha, word and sense charged with vakroti alone make for poetry, and this element of vakroti is mostly implicit, though it could be even explicit at times.

It will be interesting here, even at the cost of little diversion, to note some inherent parallalism in the thinking of both Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin, the earlier masters. Daṇḍin also at K.D. II. 214, observes that 'atiśayokti' is at the root of all poetic expression. He observes : (K.D. II. 214) :

"vivakṣā yā viśeṣasya
loka-sīmātivartinī
asau atiśayoktiḥ syāt
alaṃkārottamā yathā.."

Thus atiśayokti, the best of alaṃkāras, consists of a statement which tends to describe the matter in hand in an uncommon way. The 'atiśaya' is 'lokātiśaya', i.e. something beyond ordinary. It is this something special in poetry which makes for the aesthetic beauty in literature. Daṇḍin, at II. 216 observes :

"saṃśayātiśayā" dīnām
vyaktyai kiñcin nidarśyate."

'vyaktyai' takes us to inherent vyañjanā in the said description. At II. 220 (K.D.) Daṇḍin says that this figure is the essence of all other figures and that this sort of an expression is praised by all the masters of speech. He observes :

"alaṃkārarāntarāṇām apy ekam āhuḥ parāyaṇam,
vāgiśa-mahitām uktim imāṃ atiśayā"hvayām."

So, for Daṇḍin this 'atiśaya', or vakratā of Bhāmaha, forms the essence which makes poetry what it is and separates it from local ordinary expressions. This 'atiśaya' of Daṇḍin or 'vakratā' of Bhāmaha is seen implicit in poetic expression. This leads to the acceptance by both of implicit sense in poetry and also possibly vyañjanā as an instrument conveying this hidden treasure. Both Bhāmaha and

Dandin seem to have an indential attitude to ālaṃkāra or aesthetic beauty revealed through poetry. Both are not struck merely by the outward expression only of a given ālaṃkāra, but by something else, by inner beauty lying at the root of a given poetic figure. We will be able to underline the element of ‘avagamana’ i.e. pratīyamānatā’, perhaps through the agency of vyañjanā, in some of the figures described by both of them. It may be noted here incidentally, that it is more in this implicit element that the charm of a given ālaṃkāra lies.

Bhāmaha’s treatment of various ālaṃkāras will bring home this point.

Bhāmaha begins with ‘rūpaka’. Rūpaka occurs when in consideration of similarity in qualities the upameya is identified with the upamāna (KL II. 22). Thus, it is clear that the idea of similarity is implied in rūpaka, that is to say, upamā is itself implied in rūpaka, or better say ‘aupamyā’ is inherent in rūpaka. At II. 24, Bhāmaha describes ‘eka-deśa-vivartī-rūpaka’ and it is already clear that this sort of expression involves an element of unexpressed or implied sense also. II. 25 describes dīpaka as three-fold. The element of upamā is implied in all the varieties of dīpaka as illustrated by Bhāmaha (II. 27, 28, 29). Prativastūpamā (parallel) occurs -

“samāna-vastu-nyāseṇa
prativastūpamocyate,
yatheva-anabhidhānēpi
guṇasāmya-pratīti-rah.” (II. 34, K.L.)

Thus, there is prativastūpamā when, even in the absence of words such as yathā, vā, etc., which are directly expressive of upamā, we have the apprehension of the similarity of qualities. So, in this figure also the idea of similarity seems to be implied only.

At II. 68, ‘ākṣepa’ (paraleipsis) is defined as :

“pratiśedha iva iṣṭasya
yo viśeṣābhidhīṣayā,
ākṣepa iti taṃ santah
śamsanti dvidvidham yathā.”

Ākṣepa occurs when there is an apparent denial only with a view to convey some further sense - “viśeṣābhidhīṣayā”. This ‘viśeṣa’ is of course, implied only. At II. 75, Bhāmaha defines ‘vyatireka’ (excellence) as :

“upamānavatōrthasya
yad viśeṣa-nidarśanam,

vyatirekaṃ taṃ icchanti
viśeṣā”pādanād yathā.”

Thus vyatireka has also an element of similarity implied in it and the external expression has something more to convey : “viśeṣa-āpādana icchā”. In the same way in vibhāvanā, (abnormal causation) at (II. 77, 78) ‘kāraṇāntara-kalpanā’ - imagining some other cause which is not directly expressed, is at implicit level. This could be through the agency of vyañjanā.

Bhāmaha, at II. 79, defines samāsókti : (Condensed Speech) -

“yatrókte gamyatényóρθaḥ
tat-samāna-viśeṣaṇaḥ,
sā samāsóktir uddiṣṭā
saṃkṣiptārthatayā yathā.”

Tatacharya writes (pp. 55, ibid) : yasmin arthe ukte, anyóρθo gamyate. nanu kathaṃ ekasminn artha ucyamāne aparóρθo gamyeta ? ucyate. tat-samāna-viśeṣaṇāt. uktasya arthasya yāni viśeṣaṇāni tāni ced anyasyāpi samānāni, tāni taṃ gamayanti.

This ‘anyārtha-gamana’ is implied and is mostly through the agency of vyañjanā. At least, there is a clear recognition of an implied sense here.

After defining atīśayokti (hyperbole) at II. 81, as noted earlier, Bhāmaha wants it to remain present in all the alaṃkāras. The poets should be vigilant in bringing forth this element in kāvya as such. Anything bereft of this element of atīśaya is mere ‘vārtā’ a bare local statement not involving the poetic beauty. Precisely for this reason, in Bhāmaha’s understanding, or by the way Bhāmaha has imagined them, the three figures of speech such as hetu, sūkṣma, and leśa are no alaṃkāras, as there is no element of vakrokti or poetic beauty involved in them :

“hetuś ca sūkṣmo leśótha
nālaṃkāratayā matāḥ,
samudāyābhidhānasya
vakrokty anabhidhānataḥ.”

Tatacharya writes : (pp. 58, ibid) : “vakrábhidheya-śabdoktiḥ iṣṭā vācāṃ alaṃkṛtiḥ”, iti tāvat sthitam. lokátikrāntatā ca śabdārthayor vakratā. sā yatra násti sa kathaṃ alaṃkāraḥ. na ca hervādyalaṃkāra-vattayābhimateṣu sthaleṣu vakratā kācid asti. tad ete nā”laṃkāratayā matāḥ. samudāyena abhidhānaṃ yasya

vivakṣitasya vākyārthasya sa samudāyābhidhānaḥ, tasya tatra vakroktya anabhidhānāt na ālaṃkāratā iti." This vakrokti or poetic beauty is implicit in any ālaṃkāra worth the name.

II. 91, defines utprekṣā, (poetic fancy) as :

"a-vivakṣita-sāmānyā
kiñcit ca upamayā saha,
a-tad-guṇa-kriyāyogāt
utprekṣā atīśayānvitā."

Thus utprekṣā has no 'sāmānya' i.e. idea of similarity, commonness, as its purport, i.e. utprekṣā centres round saṃbhāvanā or probability and not mere similarity or sādrśya. But, it has again some element of upamā, and thus similarity is only implied. In utprekṣā the upameya is said to possess such quality or action as normally does not go with it. Thus, it has an element of atīśaya implied in it. At II. 50 also Bhāmaha clearly recognises an element of atīśaya involved in both upamā and utprekṣā. Bhāmaha observes :

"yaś ca atīśayavān arthaḥ
katham sósambhavo mataḥ,
iṣṭam cātīśayārthatvam
upamotprekṣayor yathā." (II. 50)

Tatacharya (pp. 89, ibid) observes : "...niṣpatatām śaraṇām tīvra-pātītvaṃ sānubandha-pātītvaṃ asaṃkhyeyatvaṃ ca pratipādanīyam. sóyam atīśaya iha upamārthaḥ na hi ayam na sambhavati iti vaktuṃ śakyate. tad evaṃ yasya asaṃbhavo na sórho vivakṣitaḥ. yas tu vivakṣitaḥ sórho na asaṃbhavi iti nir-nimitta upālaṃbhaḥ, iti uktaṃ bhavati. śabdārthas tu yasya upamāna-viśeṣasya atīśayavān upameya-viśeṣaḥ arthaḥ tātparya-viśayaḥ sa upamāna-viśeṣaḥ katham sambhava-śūnyaḥ iti manyata iti.

na kevalaṃ upamāyāṃ kiṃ tu ālaṃkārántarēpi atīśaya-vivakṣayā asti asaṃbhavatóρθasya nibandhanam.

In the third chapter, Bhāmaha begins his treatment with ālaṃkāras such as preyas, rasavat, and ūrjasvi. These ālaṃkāras will be taken up for discussion later when we consider the treatment of rasa, bhāva, etc. in earlier ālaṃkārikas in a separate chapter (= ch. XIV).

Bhāmaha defines paryāyokta (periphrasis) - at III. 8a as -

“paryāyoktaṃ yad anyena
prakāreṇa abhidhīyate.”

and 8b - supplies the illustration, the context of which is described as,

“uvāca ratnāharaṇe
caidyam śārṅga-dhanur yathā”

with III. 9 -

“grheṣu adhvasu vā na annam
bhuñjmahe yad adhītinah,
na bhuñjate dvijās, tac ca
rasa-dāna-nivṛttaye.”

Bhāmaha holds that the idea of avoiding the possible intake of poison is implied in Kṛṣṇa's speech who words it differently. Thus, paryāyokta has an element of implied sense. Though Bhāmaha is not so explicit as Mammata who says,

“yad eva vyaṅgyam tad eva vācyaṃ
yathā tu vyaṅgyam na tathā tad ucyate.”

Though Bhāmaha does not call the implicit sense as ‘vyaṅgya’, by name, but he almost seems to be inclined favourably to accept it; and also vyañjanā.

Bhāmaha does not define the figure called ‘udātta’ (exalted) (III. 11, 12), but it follows very clearly that the idea of āśaya-mahattva or vibhūtimahattva is only implied.

Bhāmaha has a totally novel connotation of śleṣa (paronomasia) (III. 14), which occurs according to him, when there is realization of identity of the upameya with the upamāna through a guṇa i.e. quality, kriyā or action, or proper noun i.e. nāmnā. It differs from the figure rūpaka (metaphor) in this respect that in rūpaka there is a clear mention of both upameya and upamāna in different terms (III. 15). Thus, for Bhāmaha, an element of similarity is implied in śleṣa also. He says : (III. 14) :

“upamānena yat tattvaṃ
upameyasya sādhyate,
guṇa-kriyābhyāṃ nāmnā ca
śliṣṭam tad abhidhīyate.”

Tatacharya explains : “...upameya-sambandhinām guṇakriyānāmnām upamāna-sambandhibhir guṇa-kriyā-nāmaḥ abheda-sampādanam iti vivakṣitam.” (pp. 67, ibid)

Bhāmaha defines apahnuti (concealment) at III. 21, as -

“apahnutir abhīṣṭā ca
kiñcid antargatopamā,
bhṛtārthāpahnavaḍ asyāḥ
kriyate cābhidhā yathā.”

Thus, for Bhāmaha, apahnuti has clearly an element of upamā implied - 'kiñcid antargata' — in it.

Tātacharya explains (pp. 69, ibid) :

“apahnutiḥ pratiṣedhā”tmā prasiddhā. tatra sarvatra ālaṃkārabhāvo neṣyate. kim tu yatra upamā gamyate, sa pratiṣedha iha apahnutiḥ. tad āha - kiñcid iti. ‘kiñcid antargatiḥ vinā vacanam pratīyamānatā...’

III. 23 (K.L.) defines viśeṣoktiḥ (peculiar allegation) as, :

“ekadeśasya vīgame
yā guṇāntara-saṃsthiṭiḥ,
viśeṣa-prathanāyāsau
viśeṣoktir matā yathā...”

when a portion of it is lost, another quality (or portion) survives to enhance the superiority of an object, the figure of speech is viśeṣokti. This added sense i.e. of kārāṇāntara-kalpanā is always implied.

In the same way tulyayogitā-(equal pairing) (Bhāmaha, III. 27) has an element of similarity implied in it. It occurs when in order to suggest some similarity in qualities, in case of two objects, one of which is smaller in status, both are narrated as being connected through an identical action.

Bhāmaha, III. 27 says :

“nyūnasyāpi viśiṣṭena
guṇa-sāmya-vivakṣayā
tulya-kārya-kriyā-yogāt
iti uktā tulyayogitā.”

III. 29, defines aprastuta-praśamsā (indirect eulogy) as,

“adhikārād apetasya
vastuṇónyasya yā stutiḥ,
aprastuta-praśamseti
sā caivaṃ kathyate yathā.”

Herein, there is mention of a matter not in hand, implying the matter in hand. Similarly, vyājastuti (artful praise) (Bhāmaha III. 31) has apparent censure and implied praise and is defined as : Bhāmaha III. 31 -

“dūrādhika-guṇastotra-
vyapadeśena tulyatām,
kiñcid vidhitsor yā nindā
vyājastutir asau yathā.”

Tatacharya (pp. 71) observes : “dūram atyantam adhikā guṇā yasya sa dūrādhika-guṇaḥ, tasya stotraṁ guṇakīrtanaṁ kṛtvā tad apekṣayā apakṛṣṭatvena yadi prakṛtasya nindāṁ karoti, kiṁ icchan ? kena-cid aṁśena tat-tulyatām prakṛtasya vidhātum pratipādayitum icchan sā vyājastutiḥ...”

Nidarśanā (illustration) has also implied similarity, because in it, without the use of such terms as yathā, iva, etc., through action only, some idea is expressed. Bhāmaha defines nidarśanā at III. 34, as :

“kriyayā eva viśiṣṭasya
tad arthasya upadarśanāt,
jñeyā nidarśanā nāma
yatheva-vatibhir vinā.”

In upameyopamā (reciprocal simile) (III. 57) the idea of elimination of any third similar object i.e. tṛtīya-sādṛśa-vyavaccheda is implied. In saḥokti (unified description) also (III. 39), there is implied similarity. Sasamdeha (doubtful) is defined at III. 43 as,

“upamānena tattvam ca
bhedaṁ ca, vadataḥ punaḥ,
sasamdehaṁ vacaḥ stutyai
sasamdehaḥ vidur yathā.”

Thus, the idea of praise of upameya is implied only. Bhāmaha defines ‘ananvaya’ (self-comparison) at III. 45, as,

“yatra tenaiva tasya syād
upamānōpameyatā
a-sādrśya-vivakṣātāḥ
tam iti āhur ananvayam.”

Thus, ananvaya occurs when a thing is compared with one's own self, in order to suggest that it is beyond comparison; that is to say it is unrivalled, ananvaya occurs. The idea of asādrśya-vivakṣā is implied only :

Thus utprekṣāvayava (at Bhāmaha III. 47) having in itself the use of double-meaning words, and an element of both utprekṣā and rūpaka, has the idea of similarity between upameya and upamāna necessarily implied.

III. 53, 54 define 'bhāvikatva' (vivid presentation) which is a guṇa i.e. excellence with reference to a whole composition in which past and future events look as if they are present, and which rests on a meaning that is charming, elevated, and uncommon and a narrative that is capable of being effectively staged, wherein the expression is not involved. The definition runs as :

“bāvikatvaṃ iti prāhuḥ
prabandha-viṣayaṃ guṇam,
pratyakṣā iva drśyante
yatrārthāḥ bhūta-bhāvināḥ.”

and,

“citródāttādbhutārthatvaṃ
kathāyāḥ sv abhinītatā,
śabdānākulatā ceti
tasya hetuṃ pracakṣate.”

Tatacharya observes : (pp. 78, ibid) : “mahākavīnām tu kāvyā-viśeṣeṣu prasphuṭābhi-vyaktārtha-varṇanāviśeṣā atra udāharaṇatvena draṣṭavyāḥ.” Thus, *bhāvika ālaṃkāra is by itself of the nature of implied only, as it rests on a whole composition.*

We have thus examined how Bhāmaha has incorporated the pratiyamāna or implied sense in various ālaṃkāras. But he has not declared it to be derived through the agency of vyañjanā, and he has not called it 'guṇībhūta-vyaṅgya' by name also.

But what he is aware of can not be brushed aside and hence Jagannātha has said that the ancients know dhvani, of course without naming it as such - 'dhvani-nāma-saṃkīrtanena vinā', and much earlier Abhinavagupta had also vouchsafed that there was a living oral tradition of dhvani, without of course, putting it in a book form - vināpi viśiṣṭa-pustakeṣu viniveśanāt. Thus Bhāmaha knew it and so also Daṇḍin and the rest of pre-Ānandavardhana writers on literary aesthetics.

We will go to examine how this is borne out in the works of Daṇḍin, Vāmana, Udbhata and Rudrata in the following pages.

Daṇḍin : Daṇḍin in his Kāvyaḍarśa (K.D.) defines 'madhura guṇa' at I. 51, 52 as a statement (= vāci) which is gifted with rasa or aesthetic rapture, and also when rasa is experienced with reference to the object or vastu described (= vastuni). Daṇḍin says that such a composition, padāsattiḥ, has words that look similar when heard, and is also capable of conveying rasa.

Daṇḍin I. 51, 52 read as -

“madhuram rasavad, vāci
vasturi api rasaḥ sthitaḥ,
yena mādyanti dhīmantah
madhunā iva madhuvratāḥ.”

“yayā kayācit śrutyā yat
samānam anubhūyate
tad-rūpā hi padāsattiḥ
sānuprāsā rasāvahā.”

The illustration viz. I. 53,

“eṣa rājā yadā lakṣmīm
prāptavān brāhmaṇa-priyaḥ,
tadā-prabhṛti dharmasya
lokésmin utsavo'bhavat.”

The illustration nourishes the emotion with reference to a religious king. Thus mādhyura has a lot of implicit sense in it.

In I. 62, Daṇḍin proceeds to explain that though all alaṃkāras make for rasa in sense, it is a-grāmyatā i.e. absence of vulgarity, which carries the burden to a greater extent. This a-grāmyatā is virtually artha-gata-mādhyura. Daṇḍin observes : (I. 62) :

“kāmaṃ sarvōpy alaṃkāro
rasaṃ arthe niṣīñcati,
tathā'pi agrāmyatā eva enaṃ
bhāram vahati bhūyasā.”

Daṇḍin further observes that (I. 63, 64) such statements as,

“kanye kāmāyamānaṃ mām
na tvaṃ kāmāyase katham”

- are basically vulgar and make for the detriment of rasa. Says he :

“iti grāmyōyaṃ arthā”tmā
vairasyāya prakalpate.”

He holds that, if the same statement is modified as -

“kāmam kandarpa-cāṇḍālo
mayi vāmākṣi nirdayaḥ
tvayi nīr-matsaro diṣṭyā-
iti agrāmyōrtho rasā”vahaḥ.”

Thus the statement in its new form becomes charged with rasa and is totally free from vulgarity. This madhura is full of implied sense in form of rasa or aesthetic pleasure.

Daṇḍin (exalted) defines ‘udāraguṇa’ (rich) at I. 76, as,

“utkarṣavān guṇaḥ kaścīd
yasmin ukte pratīyate,
tad udārā”hvayaṃ, tena
sanāthā kāvya-paddhatiḥ.”

Thus udāra guṇa consists of a statement which when expressed makes for the implication of some lofty quality, and poetry is highly dependent on it. The prabhātikā observes (pp. 86) :

“yasmin vākye ukte sati utkarṣavān, varṇanīya-utkarṣa-pratipādakaḥ, lokottara-camatkāra-ādhāyī guṇaḥ dharma-viśeṣaḥ pratiyate vākyam udārā”hvayaṃ udāra-saṃjñakam.” Thus, jñāna-viśayo bhavati tad ‘udāra’ is gifted with a lot of implied element. Daṇḍin adds that (I. 78) in the illustration cited as above, the excess of generosity is clearly indicated - “iti tyāgasya vākyésmin utkarṣaḥ sādhu lakṣyate.” This is implicit sense, pure and simple.

K.D.; I. 79 gives another variety of udāra which consists of significant adjectives such as ‘līlāmbuja’, krīḍā-sara, hemāṅgada, etc. Here also the idea of opulence is implied. I. 79 reads as :

“ślāghyair viśeṣaṇair yuktaṃ
udāraṃ kaiścīd iṣyate,

yathā līlāmbuja-kṛīḍāsaro-
hemāṅgadā”dayaḥ.”

‘kānti guṇa’ (beauty) is defined at I. 85 as,

“kāntaṃ sarva-jagat-kāntaṃ
laukikārtha-an-atikramāt,
tac ca vārtābhīdhāneṣu
varṇanāsv api dṛśyate.”

Kānta (beautiful) occurs when there is an absence of hyperbole, i.e. when things are described in a normally charming fashion and is seen both in conveying facts (= vārtā-bhīdhāna) or in description of objects (varṇanāsu api) and is liked by all. Thus kānti guṇa has a natural mode of expression and thereby it implies a world of ideas as is illustrated at I. 86, 87, as -

“grhāṇi nāma tāny eva
taporaśir bhavādṛśaḥ
saṃbhāvayati yāny eva
pāvanaiḥ pāda-pāṃsubhiḥ.”

and,

“anayor anavadyāṅgi
stanayor jṛṃbhamāṇayor
avakāśo na paryāptaḥ
tava bāhu-latāntare.”

In the first illustration, the praise-worthiness of the house is implied, and in the second, feeling of love with reference to the heroine is implied,

In samādhi-guṇa (facilitation) (I. 93 K.D.), according to Daṇḍin, somebody else’s quality is superimposed on somebody else. This is a clear instance of lakṣaṇā based on similarity which is implied.

K.D. I. 93 reads as -

“anyadharṃas tatōnyatra
loka-sīmānurodhinā
samyag ādhīyate yatra
sa samādhiḥ smṛto yathā.”

I. 94 is given to illustrate the above, such as -

“kumudāni nimīlanti
kamalāny unmiṣanti ca,
iti netra-kriyādhyāsāl-
labdhā tad-vācinī śṛtiḥ.”

Daṇḍin then adds that words such as niṣṭhyūta, udgīrṇa, vānta, etc. convey a charming sense when used metaphorically. If they are used in the direct sense, they turn out to be vulgar. Thus, even here, there is not only an acceptance of implicit sense, but there is clear mentioning of “gaṇa-vṛtti” also. K.D. I. 95 says :

“niṣṭhyūta-udgīrṇa-vāntā”di
gaṇavṛtti-vyapāśrayam,
atisundram anyatra
grāmakakṣaṃ vigāhate.”

This samādhi-guṇa, observes Daṇḍin, in which a metaphorical expression is involved, is the quint essence of poetry and is resorted to by all poets : K.D. I. 99 reads as,

“tad-etat-kāvya-sarvasvaṃ
samādhir nāma yo guṇaḥ,
kavi-sārthaḥ samagrōpi
taṃ enaṃ anugacchati.”

Thus, in his treatment of guṇas or excellences Daṇḍin seems to cover a lot of implicit sense. In his treatment of the figures of sense, i.e. arthālaṃkāras also, like Bhāmaha he has incorporated a lot of implicit sense. We have noted earlier his general attitude towards ālaṃkāras. We will not repeat our discussion concerning ālaṃkāras such as rūpaka, dīpaka, apahnuti, vyājastuti, aprastuta-praśamsā, samāsokti tulyayogitā, nidarśanā, paryāyokta, ākṣepa, etc., which contain implied sense as explained when we dealt with these ālaṃkāras in Bhāmaha's Kāvyaalaṃkāra, but we will deal with a good many varieties of upamā pointed out by Daṇḍin, and go to underline that almost all these sub-varieties of upamā are beautified by an element of implied sense inherent in them. With this general note we will go to examine Daṇḍin's treatment of arthālaṃkāras as below.

Daṇḍin defines upamā at II. 14, as -

“yathā-kathañcit sādṛśyaṃ
yatrodhbhūtaṃ pratiyate,
upamā nāma sā, tasyāḥ
prapañcōyaṃ pradarsyate.”

Thus, for Daṇḍin upamā occurs when similarity is apprehended in any way - “yathā-kathañ-cit” i.e. either in a directly expressed fashion or in an implied way. Most of the varieties counted by Daṇḍin have implied similarity. Thus, vastūpamā (II. 16) has the common quality implied only - “pratīyamānaika-dharmā”. Viparyāsopamā has upamāna in place of upamaya and vice versa, thereby implying the superiority of upameya over upamāna (K.D. II. 17). Anyonyopamā (II. 19) is the same as upameyopamā, having the idea of tṛtīya-sadṛśa-vyavaccheda or elimination of a possible third similar object, as implied only. Niyamōpamā (II. 19) has the idea of restriction implied, when the face is described as similar to lotus alone.

In atīśayopamā also (II. 22), in the absence of any upamā-vācaka, the similarity is only implied. K.D. II. 23 gives utprekṣitōpamā and has an element of utprekṣā implied in it. Adbhutōpamā (II. 24), which is the same as what later ālaṃkārikas recognize as ‘yady arthā-tīśayokti’, has also implied similarity. Mohōpamā (II. 25), has moha or bhrānti implied. Saṃśayōpamā (II. 26), is the same as sa-saṃdeha of the later ālaṃkārikas having implied similarity. Nirṇayōpamā (II. 27) is what Viśvanātha later recognizes as niścāyālaṃkāra having implied comparison. II. 30 gives nindōpamā which has also the same quality of implied sense. Similar is the case with praśaṃśōpamā (II. 31), ācikhyāsōpamā (II. 32), virodhōpamā (II. 33), pratiśedhōpamā (II. 34), cātūpamā (II. 35), tattvākhyānōpamā (II. 36), asādhāraṇōpamā (II. 37), a-saṃbhavitōpamā (II. 39), bahūpamā (II. 40), vikriyōpamā (II. 41), etc. etc.

Prativastūpamā (parallel) (II. 46) is,

‘vastu kiñcid upanyasya
nyasanāt tat sadharmaṇaḥ,
sāmya-pratītir astīti
prativastūpamā yathā.”

Thus, there is implied comparison between the statements. Tulya-yogopamā (II. 48), also has the same charm of implied sense. Thus we see that in Daṇḍin also there is a clear recognition of pratīyamāna or implied sense.

Vāmana : For Vāmana the position is still clearer for he recognizes upamā as the basis of all the ālaṃkāras which are termed by him as "upamā-prapañca". His 'kāntiguṇa' is defined as 'dīpta-rasatvaṃ' i.e. one in which rasas are clearly marked, and are in an aroused condition. All this clearly bears the stamp of an implied sense. His 'samādhi' guṇa is defined as 'artha-dṛṣṭiḥ' i.e. perception of the sense (III. 2.7. KSV.). Vāmana goes on classifying 'artha' as 'vyakta' and 'sūkṣma' (III. 2.9) and the latter again is 'bhāvya' and 'vāsānīya', i.e. that which is easily elicited, and that which is elicited after concentration, respectively (III. 2.10 KSV.). The illustrations of both these varieties contain implied sense.

Udbhaṭa - In his Kāvya-ālaṃkāra-sāra-saṃgraha (= K.S.S.), Udbhaṭa follows the same pattern as laid down by Bhāmaha and seems to incorporate the element of implied sense in the same way as seen in Bhāmaha. Pratīhārēndurāja (first half of 10th Cen. A.D., De, pp. 74, ibid), wants us to believe that Udbhaṭa had knowingly incorporated 'dhvani' under ālaṃkāras, when he observes : (pp. 92, 3, NS. Edn. Bombay, '28) :

- 'nanu yatra kāvyē sahr̥daya-hr̥dayā"hlādināḥ pradhānabhūtasya, sva-śabda-vyāpāra-aspr̥ṣṭatvena pratīyamānaika-rūpasya arthasya sadbhāvas tatra tathāvidhārthābhivyaktihetuḥ kāvyā-jīvita-bhūtaḥ kaiścit sahr̥dayair dhvanir nāma, vyañjakarva-bhedā"tmā kāvyā-dharmóbbhihitāḥ. sa katham iha nopadiṣṭaḥ ? ucyate-
eṣv evālaṃkāreṣu antar bhāvāt.

Pratīhārēndurāja then goes to explain with illustrations at places how different ālaṃkāras of Udbhaṭa contain this or that type of dhvani.

Rudraṭa : Rudraṭa also can be safely imagined to have touched the element of implicit sense with reference to all the ālaṃkāras such as rūpaka, dīpaka, paryāyokta, etc. He defines and illustrates the two-fold bhāva also in VIII. 38-41, which contains an implied sense.

VII. 38, reads as :

"yasya vikāraḥ prabhavan apratibaddhena hetunā yena,
gamayati tad abhiprāyaṃ tat-pratibandhaṃ ca bhāvósau."

III. 40 reads as,

"abhidheyam abhidhānam tad eva tat-sadr̥śa-sakala-guṇadoṣam,
arthāntaram avagamayati yad-vākyam sóparo bhāvaḥ."

Rudraṭa's use of words clearly suggest that he is conscious not only of the implied sense, but also of vyañjanā. He has gone for an elaborate treatment of rasa also but is silent about the theoretical discussion concerning rasa-realization.

Our detailed examination as above goes to establish the fact that ālaṃkārikas earlier than Ānandavardhana positively knew the pratiyamāna-artha, without naming it either as 'dhvani' or 'guṇībhūtavyaṅgya' arrived at through the agency of vyañjanā. We feel that the use of such words as 'avagamayati' and 'gamayati', goes to establish their awareness concerning perhaps vyañjanā also. Perhaps they had no occasion, as had Ānandavardhana, to establish dhvani and vyañjanā clearly due to confusion created about their nature by less gifted ālaṃkārikas that followed the earlier masters and preceeded Ānandavardhana. We will now go to examine the nature of śabdavṛtti's i.e. abhidhā, lakṣaṇā and vyañjanā and also tātparya in greater details in the following pages.



Chapter V

Śabdavṛttis, the nature of : 'Abhidhā'

General Introduction :

We have seen how the concept of śabda-vyāpāra is reflected in recognition of abhidhā and guṇavṛtti or lakṣaṇā in various philosophical disciplines such as those represented by the Mīmāṃsakas, Naiyāyikas and the rest and also the earlier grammarians such as Pāṇini, Patañjali etc. All this was a rich heritage which shaped the concepts in their chiseled form in the hands of ālaṃkārikas such as Mammata and others who followed Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta. Actually Ānandavardhana is the first one, so far as available written documents are concerned, who devotes space to draw a line between abhidhā and/or lakṣaṇā guṇavṛtti, on one hand and vyañjanā on the other. He underlines the difference between abhidhā/vyañjanā and lakṣaṇā/vyañjanā by establishing 'svarūpabheda' and 'viśayabheda', and finally establishing vyañjanā as an independent power of words. But it is left to Mammata and his followers to systematically define and distinguish between one and the other function of a word and we will therefore first take up this aspect of definition and distinction of each of these śabdavṛttis and then see how Ānandavardhana establishes vyañjanā as an independent function. Vyañjanā will be treated in greater details because the other two viz. abhidhā and lakṣaṇā have been given enough space when we discussed their position and nature as reflected in various philosophical disciplines on an earlier occasion. We will then first start with abhidhā.

We know that according to sanskrit writers on poetics, words possess three distinct śaktis or vyāpāras i.e. powers or functions, viz. (i) abhidhā śakti or the power of direct expression, (ii) lakṣaṇā śakti or the secondary power of a word, or, the power of indication, and (iii) the vyañjanā śakti or the suggestive power of a word. The terms vṛtti and vyāpāra are used as synonyms for the term śakti. Thus, by the abhidhā śakti or the power of expression, the word is supposed to

give the conventional meaning or the 'saṃketita artha'. It is also called mukhyā śakti i.e. principal power of a word because like the face of a human being normally sighted first when we look at a person, this conventional meaning comes first to mind and is therefore termed 'mukhya' and the śakti instrumental in bringing home this 'mukhya' or principal meaning derived through convention, is termed 'mukhyā' or principal power of a word. The lakṣaṇāvṛtti which is an 'a-mukhyā' i.e. secondary power of a word, gives lakṣyārtha or the secondary or extended meaning. It is based upon certain conditions which we will discuss later. The third power is 'vyañjanā' or the power of suggestion, giving 'vyaṅgyārtha' or suggested meaning. The mukhyārtha which is abhidheyārtha is also termed vācyārtha and so, abhidhā is also known as 'vācakatva' or vācaka-śakti. The word giving this vācyārtha, which is the conventional meaning, is termed vācaka. The word giving lakṣyārtha is called lakṣaka, and the one giving vyaṅgyārtha or suggested meaning is termed 'vyañjaka'. Thus vācya, lakṣya and vyaṅgya meanings are derived from vācaka, lakṣaka and vyañjaka words, with the help of vācakatva or abhidhā power, lakṣaṇā and vyañjanā respectively. We also come across, the mention of a fourth vṛtti or power called 'tātparya' i.e. 'purport', but as it is connected with the sentence - unit, and not with individual word unit, and as it is therefore instrumental in giving the correlated meaning of all the words in a given sentence or statement, the ālaṃkārikas generally do not choose to include it under the functions of a word.

As regards the nature of these śabda-vyāpāras, there is a lot of difference of opinion among thinkers of different schools of thought. The grammarians, the earlier ones among them to be specific, and so also the philosophers or dārśanikas of various schools of thought such as the mīmāṃsā, nyāya, vaiśeṣika, bauddha, jaina etc. had, as observed earlier, no business to think about vyañjanā, or perhaps - only perhaps - they did not accept it. In the same way even the earlier ālaṃkārikas such as Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin and the rest do not come out clearly in favour of vyañjanā and vyaṅgyārtha, though as observed by us in the previous chapters we cannot categorically say that they were against vyañjanā. Ālaṃkārikas later, normally chose to follow the lead of Ānandavardhana, Abhinavagupta and Maṃmaṭa in accepting vyañjanā as an independent and important function of a word. But then there were some who challenged the lead of Ānandavardhana, and writers on literary aesthetics such as Mahimā, or even Bhaṭṭanāyaka and Śaṅkuka prior to Mahimā, and then Mukula, Dhanañjaya, Dhanika, and some others challenged the concept of vyañjanā as a separate power and tried to incorporate

it under various heads. Some later naiyāyikas such as Gadādhara and Jagadīśa vehemently opposed vyañjanā. The Tarkadīpikā observes : “vyañjanā tu śaktir lakṣaṇāntarbhūtā, śabda-śaktimūlā; artha-śakti-mūlā tu anumānā”dinā anyathā siddhā.” We will look into all this later. There are also others who distinguish between gaunī and lakṣaṇā taking the former to be an independent vṛtti.

Abhidhā : We begin with abhidhā or the function of denotation or direct expression. Abhidhā, as noted above, is that function by which the word gives its primary or conventional meaning. The word here is termed vācaka, and the sense is termed vācya :

“sākṣāt saṃketitam yōrtham
abhidhatte sa vācakaḥ.”

K.P. I. 7b. (Kāvyaaprakāśa - (K.P.) of Mammata, Edn. B.O.R.I. Pune). Thus, for example, the word ‘gauḥ’ by abhidhāvyaṅgā means “sāsnā”dimat paśu-viśeṣaḥ”, or an entity having a dew-lap, horns, hoofs, etc. This conventional or saṃketita artha is gathered directly and hence is called ‘mukhyārtha’ or principal meaning and the word is termed ‘mukhya’ and the power, the abhidhāśakti, the mukhyā śakti.

As to the nature of ‘saṃketa-grahaṇa’ or gathering of convention there is a considerable difference of opinion. We have discussed this problem at length in an earlier chapter (i.e. Ch. II). This saṃketa i.e. - convention has been classified in different ways. The Naiyāyikas classify saṃketa as ‘pāribhāṣika’, ‘naimittika’ and ‘aupādhika’. When we fix up a name for calling someone, say, when a father calls his son Devadatta, or, when we fix up a technical term to refer to a particular meaning in a given discipline, say dhvani, guṇa, etc., in alaṃkāraśāstra, it is termed as pāribhāṣika-saṃketa. ‘Naimittika-saṃketa’ is that which refers to jāti or, class, such as ‘aśva’, ‘manuṣya’, etc., and ‘aupādhika’ is that which refers to the upādhis or attributes. For the Naiyāyikas upādhi means that jāti in which so many apara-jātis reside, e.g. paśu consists of aśva, go, etc. etc. The śabda-śakti-prakāśikā observes : “yac cārtho yannāma ādhunika-saṃketavat, tad eva pāribhāṣikam, yathā pitrā”dibhiḥ putrā”dau saṃketitam, caitrā”di, vā śāstra-kṛdbhiḥ sidhyabhāvā”dau pakṣatā”di. jāti-vācya-tā-śaktiman nāma naimittikam, yathā go, gavayā”di; yad upādhy-avacchinna-śaktiman-nāma tad aupādhikam yathā ākāśa, paśvā”di.” -

For Bhartrhari, saṃketa is two-fold viz. ‘ājānika’ i.e. natural, and ‘ādhunika’ i.e. artificial or man-made. By ājānika is meant the same as naimittika of the Naiyāyikas. Thus ājānika is nitya. Ādhunika saṃketa is of the form of ‘yadā-kadā’ i.e. ‘kāḍācitka’, and śāstrakāras make its use -

“ājānikaṣṭv ādhunikāḥ
 saṃketo dvividho mataḥ,
 nitya ājānikas tatra
 yā śaktir iti gīyate.” V.P.
 kādācitkas tv ādhunikāḥ
 śāstra-kārādibhiḥ kṛtaḥ.” - V.P.

(quoted in śabdas'akti-prakāśikā)

Abhidhā is classified in a three-fold way such as (i) rūḍhi, (ii) yoga and (iii) yoga-rūḍhi. These are again known as (i) kevala-samudāya-śaktiḥ, (ii) kevala-avayava-śaktiḥ, and (iii) samudaya-avayava-śakti-saṃkara. - Jagannātha observes : seyaṃ abhidhā trividhā, kevala-samudāya-śaktiḥ, kevala-avayava-śaktiḥ, samudāyāvayava-śakti-saṃkaraś ca - (R.G. pp. 141). We will discuss Jagannātha's views in greater detail below. Rūḍhi is said to be there, where the word as a whole-samudāya-conveys the meaning. Here we gather the meaning with the help of 'akhaṇḍa-śakti' of a word - “akhaṇḍa-śakti-mātreṇaikārtha-pratipāḍakatvaṃ rūḍhiḥ.” holds Vṛttivārtika of Appayya Dixita. Here rūḍhi is formed because the meaning of the components of the word is not at all comprehended separately, or even if the meaning of the word is gathered separately, it is ultimately not recognised. Again, when the meaning of the components of a word becomes important, in order to get the full sense of the word as a whole, it becomes the case of yogātmaka abhidhā. Appayya in Vṛtti-vārtika observes, - “avayava-śakti-mātra-sāpekṣaṃ padasya ekārtha-pratipāḍakatvaṃ yogaḥ.” Yoga-rūḍhi is said to be there in cases where avayavaśakti, and samudāya-śakti both are required. Appayya observes, - “avayava-samudāya-ubhaya-śakti-sāpekṣaṃ ekārtha-pratipāḍakatvaṃ yoga-rūḍhiḥ.” In the case of 'pañkaja', the etymological meaning is, 'that which is born in mud.' This can be applicable to anything born in mud, other than lotus also. The Naiyāyikas do not accept either rūḍhi or yoga in this case. Appayya observes that it is better to accept yoga-rūḍhi here : (pp. 5, Vṛttivārtika) : “naiyāyikās tu pañkajā'di-śabda-rūpaikopādāna-rūpayā'ntaraṅga-pratyāsattyā, nābhi-kamala-kumudānvayāt prāg eva, pañkajanikartṛtva-vaiśiṣṭyena-upasthitasya paprakhya padmāśraya-tvenopasthitasya pañkajanikartṛtvasya ca nābhikamala-kumudā'dyanvaye nākāṅkṣā, na ca viśiṣṭasya tad anvaya-viśayinī śabda-dhīḥ, iti tad anvayārthṃ svatantra-padmatva-pañkajanikartṛtva-upasthitaye pañkajā'dipadasya lakṣaṇaivā'bhyupagantavyā, na tu rūḍhir yoga vā.”

At times it happens that there are more than one conventional meanings attached to one and the same word. Here abhidhārtha is decided with the help of various factors such as context and others (see. Ch. II). Bhartṛhari has mentioned all these factors. Viśvanātha has also given a fuller explanation such as, (S.D.I.) : 'sa-śaṅka-cakro hariḥ', iti śaṅkha-chakra-prayogena hari-śabdo viṣṇuṃ eva abhidhatte. aśaṅkha-cakro hariḥ, iti tad-viyogena taṃ eva. bhīmārjunau iti arjunaḥ pārthaḥ. karmārjunau iti karmṇaḥ sūtaputraḥ. sthānuṃ vande iti sthānuḥ śivaḥ. sarvaṃ jānāti devaḥ iti devo bhavān. kupīto makara-dhvajaḥ iti makaradhvajaḥ kāmāḥ. devaḥ purāriḥ iti purāriḥ śivaḥ. madhunā mattaḥ pikaḥ, iti madhur vasantaḥ, pātu vo dayitā-mukhaṃ iti mukhaṃ sāmukhyam, vibhāti gagane candraḥ iti candraḥ śaśī. niśi citrabhānuḥ iti citra-bhānur vahniḥ. bhāti rathāṅgaṃ napuṃsaka-vyaktyā rathāṅgaṃ cakram. svaras tu veda eva viśesa-pratīti-kṛt na kāvyē iti tasya viśaye nodāhṛtam."

Jagannātha: Mahā-siddhāntin : We will go into greater discussion on abhidhā in context of the Rasagaṅgādhara of Jagannātha. Jagannātha while dealing with śabda-śakti mūla dhvani comes to the two varieties of abhidhāmūlaka dhvani, viz. arthaśaktimūlaka and ubhaya-śakti-mūlaka citing proper illustrations. Then after dealing with the varieties of lakṣaṇāmūlaka dhvani, Jagannātha comes to a very meaningful discussion concerning abhidhā. First he attempts a logical and scientific definition of abhidhā and then comes down heavily on Appayya Dixit's definition of abhidhā as read in his Vṛtti-vārtika. Jagannātha's definition of abhidhā reads as : "śaktyākhyōrthasya śabdagataḥ, śabdasya arthagataḥ vā sambandhaviśeṣo bhidhā" (pp. 429, Edn. Prof. R. B. Athavale, Ahmedabad, Edn. '74). This means that abhidhā, which is called śakti, is a special relation residing in both śabda i.e. word and artha i.e. sense. Relation is an entity connected between two objects as such. One of them is termed 'pratiyogin' and the other, 'anuyogin'. In the absence of any deciding factor, i.e. 'vinigamana abhāva' both śabda and artha can be termed either pratiyogin or anuyogin. So, when Jagannātha says 'arthasya śabdagataḥ', he means, 'artha-pratiyogikaḥ śabdānuyogikaḥ', and when he says 'śabdasya arthagato vā', he means, 'śabdapratiyogi arthānuyogikaḥ'. So, abhidhā is a special relation residing in both word and sense and is therefore not separate from them.

Jagannātha then starts discussing the views of others. He says : (pp. 429, ibid) : "sā ca padārthāntaram iti kecid. "asmāt śabdāt ayaṃ arthaḥ avagantavyaḥ iti-ākārā īśvarecchā eva abhidhā. tasyāḥ ca viśayatayā sarvatra sattvāt paṭā" dīnāṃ api ghaṭā" di-pada-vācyatā syāt. ataḥ vyakti-viśeṣopadhānena ghaṭā" di-padābhidhārtvaṃ vācyam iti apare." 'evaṃ api īśvara-jñānā" dīnā vinigamanā-virahaḥ syāt, ataḥ prathama-mataṃ eva jyāyāḥ' iti api vadanti."

Here, 'kecit' refers to the Mīmāṃsakas and the Vaiyākaraṇas and 'apare' refers to the Naiyāyikas. The Nyāyamañjarī (8-3) observes : "saṃketa-grāhyaḥ śakti-rūpaḥ atiriktaḥ padārthaḥ iti mīmāṃsakāḥ āhuh'. 'pada-padārthayor vācya-vācaka-bhāva-niyāmakaṃ sambandhāntaraṃ śaktiḥ iti śābdikā vadanti."

The Naiyāyikas hold that abhidhā cannot be taken as a separate padārtha, because it is none else than god's desire that, 'such and such' a word should give 'such and such' a meaning.' This 'īśvarecchā' i.e. god's desire can take two forms such as, 'asmāt padāt ayam arthaḥ bodhavyaḥ.' or 'idaṃ padaṃ amuṃ arthaṃ bodhayatu.' - i.e. let this word give this meaning.' Actually both the forms of expression differ externally only and there is no virtual difference between these two expressions of 'īśvarecchā'. The first type of bodha i.e. apprehension can be technically put as, "śabda-prakārikā artha-viśeṣyikā' (īśvarecchā), and the second one can be placed as, 'artha-prakārikā śabda-viśeṣyakā.' Now Jagannātha argues that if 'īśvarecchā' is to be taken in a general way, i.e. if we accept that all worldly objects could be the subject of God's desire, then that desire will stay with all objects through the relation of 'viśayatā', i.e. all objects will fall under the subject-field by God's desire. Thus God's desire is common to both ghaṭa and paṭa i.e. a pot and a piece of cloth, so in that case, what harm is there in understanding the meaning of 'paṭa', from an object called 'ghaṭa' and vice versa ? For this, 'īśvarecchā' or God's desire will not have to be understood in a general way, but will have to be accepted as different with reference to the difference in upādhi or attribute - i.e. 'upādhi-bheda'. Thus God's desire will take the form - "ghaṭa-pada-janya-bodha-viśayatāvān ghaṭo bhavatu", and "paṭa-pada-janya-bodha-viśayatāvān paṭo bhavatu", etc. Thus paṭa-viśiṣṭa or paṭopādhika-īśvarecchā is the abhidhā of the word 'paṭa', and 'ghaṭa-viśiṣṭa ghaṭopādhika-īśvarecchā' is the abhidhā of 'ghaṭa'-pada. Similarly all worldly objects become the attribute or upādhi or dharma, or viśeṣaṇa of īśvarecchā. This 'padārtha-viśeṣa-viśiṣṭa-īśvarecchā' is the abhidhā of a particular word in a particular sense. Thus only a special type of God's desire is to be taken as abhidhā.

This theory of Naiyāyikas taking God's desire as abhidhā is criticised by Mīmāṃsakas and Vaiyākaraṇas. They hold that if we accept abhidhā as 'padārtha-viśeṣa-viśiṣṭa-īśvarecchā, then along with īśvarecchā, īśvarajñāna and īśvara-prayatna will have to be taken as abhidhā. For, as any worldly object is the subject of God's desire, it is the subject of both īśvara-jñāna and īśvara-prayatna also. Thus because all worldly objects are covered by īśvarecchā, they could as well be the subject of īśvara-jñāna and īśvara-prayatna as well. Thus even these two also could

be called 'abhidhā'. And as there is no authority to reject these two also being called abhidhā, they have to be accepted as abhidhā. So, in this situation, the view expressed by the Mīmāṃsakas and Vaiyākaraṇas emerges as more acceptable. Prof. P. Ramachandradu (pp. 231, *ibid*) puts the whole argument this way. He observes : "This theory of Naiyāyikas accepting īśvarecchā as the abhidhā is criticised by both the Mīmāṃsakas and Vaiyākaraṇas. They contend that according to this theory, the īśvarecchā is eternal one, and all comprehensive. Īśvara being Omniscient, is having the knowledge which is also eternal one and all-comprehensive. Now the question arises whether his īcchā should be accepted as Abhidhā or his 'Jñāna' ? In the absence of any deciding factor, both of them will have to be accepted as Abhidhā which only results in needless 'gaurava'. Therefore, it is better to accept Abhidhā as a separate padārtha. This Abhidhā may be Bodhya-bodhaka-bhāva, Bodhakatva, Bodhyatva, or Tādātmya between the word and the meaning."

After this, Jagannātha examines Appayya Dixit's definition of abhidhā, as read in Vṛtti-vārtika. It reads as : "śaktyā pratipādakatvaṃ abhidhā." Jagannātha calls it of no use - 'tat tuccham, upapatti-virodhāt' - (pp. 429, *ibid*) : This definition goes against any type of fitness or proof or attainment. Jagannātha argues that here what is contextual is that word-power called abhidhā which is instrumental in the cognition of meaning caused by a word. Now how can simply the knowledge of 'artha-pratipādatā' in a word give the meaning intended. The idea is that by simply knowing that the word has the special quality - i.e. dharma or sāmārthya to yield meaning alone, can it suffice for cognition of meaning ? That 'dharma' or 'sāmārthya' must be accompanied by some 'vyāpāra' for a particular cognition of meaning. Now, if it is contended that the 'pratipādakatva' i.e. capacity to yield meaning which is in the śabda is a 'vyāpāra' or activity effecting the cognition - 'pratipatti' - and this vyāpāra will be useful in the cognition itself being known. To put it more clearly Jagannātha's argument could be placed as follows : Abhidhā according to Dixita means that dharma of śabda which is of the nature of making a particular cognition effective. But even then, Jagannātha argues that there is a blemish called 'anyonyāśraya'. By saying, 'śaktyā pratipādakatvaṃ', it is accepted that this power is either in śabda or in artha which is responsible for the cognition of artha. Thus this śakti cannot be else than abhidhā, and so the definition would come to, "abhidhayā pratipādakatvaṃ abhidhā". This is absurd and involves ātmāśraya-doṣa. Jagannātha observes : (pp. 429, *ibid*) : "yat tu vṛtti-vārtike, 'śaktyā pratipādakatvaṃ abhidhā' iti appayya-dīkṣitair uktam tat tuccham, upapatti virodhāt. tathā hi-īha śabdājñāyamānāyām arthopasthitau kāraṇabhūtaṃ yađīya-

jñānam sā śabda-vṛttir abhidhā”khyā lakṣyatayā prastutā. pratipādakatvasya ca pratipattiheturva-rūpasya śabdagatasya na jñānam pratipattau kāraṇam. atah katham nāma pratipādakatvaṃ abhidhety ucyate ? atha pratipādakatvaṃ pratipattyanukūla-vyāpārarūpaṃ jñātaṃ sad eva upayujyate pratipattau iti ucyeta, evaṃ api ‘śakṛyā’ iti anena śabdagatā-arthagatā vā kācid śaktiḥ pratipattiheturayā vivakṣitā, sā eva abhidhā iti, ‘abhidhayā pratipādakatvaṃ abhidhā’ iti lakṣaṇam paryavasannam. tathā ca sphuṭā eva asaṃgatiḥ ātmā”śrayaś ca. na ca abhidhātaḥ śaktiḥ atirikṭā śabdajanya-pratipatti-prayojikā kācid asti iti atra pramāṇam asti.”

Dr. Ramachandradu (pp. 232, ibid) further, quotes, Nāgeśa who tries to defend Appayya's definition, by suggesting an expression such as ‘dhānyena dhanavān’, equivalent to ‘abhidhayā pratipādakatvaṃ abhidhā.’ Nāgeśa observes : (pp. 181, N.S. Edn., 1888, Kāvya-mālā, 12). “prakṛtyāditvād dhānyena dhanavān ity ādivat tṛtīyāyāḥ abhedārthakatvena na kaścid doṣaḥ.” But Prof. Ramachandradu observes that this analogy is not applicable here. ‘Dhānya’ being viśeṣa and ‘Dhana’ being ‘sāmānya’ such expression as ‘dhānyena dhanavān’ meaning ‘dhānyābhinna-dhanavān’ may be correct. But, argues the learned professor, how can it be correct when the same thing is mentioned at both the ends ? We have here, ‘abhidhayā pratipādakatvaṃ abhidhā.’ This expression has only ‘abhidhā’ at both the ends. So the analogy cited above is not applicable here. It may be contented that ‘abhidhā’ is a viśeṣa and ‘pratipādakatva’ is a sāmānya and so the analogy could be applied here too. But here, observes Dr. Ramachandradu, it may be correct so far as ‘abhidhayā pratipādakatvaṃ’ is concerned, but when it is said that such ‘pratipādakatva’ is itself ‘abhidhā’ then the blemish of anyonyā”śraya walks in. This sentence would be equivalent to say, ‘dhānyena dhanavatvaṃ dhānyam’ or ‘dhānyavatvaṃ’. This is absurd and so, Jagannātha is correct in his criticism.

Jagannātha then proceeds with the divisions of abhidhā. Abhidhā for him is three-fold, viz. ‘kevala-samudāya-śaktiḥ, kevala-avayava-śaktiḥ, and samudāya-avayava-śakti-saṃkara.’ These varieties are otherwise known as rūdhi, yoga and yoga-rūdhi respectively. The first variety is illustrated by examples such as dīrtha, (kapittha, māṇavaka) etc. In these particular names there is total absence of ‘avayava-śakti’ i.e. power of the parts seen in a given word. That means that the word as a whole only renders some sense and no individual part of it has any independent meaning. The second variety is illustrated by words such as ‘pācaka’, ‘pāthaka’, etc. In the first illustration, the basic root is √pac. According to Pāṇini sūtra 3/1/133 viz. ‘ṇvultṛcau’ the suffixes ‘ṇvul’ and ‘tṛc’ are added to it in the sense of agent or doer. Thus we have ‘ṇvu’ i.e. kṛt i.e. ‘aka’ added to the √pac. From the

power of these two parts i.e. the root and the suffix, we get the senses of 'to cook' and 'the agent (of cooking)'. The combination of these senses renders the sense of 'a cook'. Now beyond this total of two senses there is no extra meaning of the word 'pācaka', 'pāṭhaka' etc. Thus these words do not have a samudāya-śakti over and above their avayava-śakti's. The third variety is illustrated by words such as 'pañkaja'. One part of this word is the root √jan meaning 'to be born'. Prior to that there is one part viz. 'pañka' meaning 'mud', which is 'upa-pada'. Now when the upapada is in locative 'ḍa' suffix is attached to the root √jan, according to pāṇini sūtra (3/2/97) - "saptamyam janerdaḥ". This ḍa (= a) is attached in the sense of agent, and it forms the third portion of the word. Through the three powers of these three individual parts, viz. 'mud, to be born, and agent', coming together by the conditions of ākāṅkṣā, i.e. expectancy, 'yogyatā' or compatibility, and 'āsatti' i.e. proximity we derive the meaning viz. 'that which is born of mud.' But after that total sense is derived by combination of three senses of three parts, there is a special sense of lotus, 'padmatvayukta padma' - which is derived further. Here it is stated as 'padmatva-viśiṣṭa-padma', because out of mud even moss is generated and it is not called 'pañkaja'. For this added sense of 'lotus', we have to imagine a special 'samudāya-śakti' in the word 'pañkaja'. Thus there is 'saṃkara' or mixing up of 'avayava-śakti' and 'samudāya-śakti'. These three varieties are also respectively named as rūḍhi-śakti, yoga-śakti and yoga-rūḍhi-śakti also as noted above.

Appaya Dixit has cited in his Vṛttivārtika the definitions of these three varieties as : "akhaṇḍa-śakti-mātreṇa ekārtha-pratipāḍakatvaṃ rūḍhiḥ", "avayava-śakti-sāpekṣaṃ padasya ekārtha-pratipāḍakatvaṃ yogaḥ", and "ubhaya-śakti-sāpekṣaṃ ekārtha-pratipāḍakatvaṃ yoga-rūḍhiḥ" - respectively. Jagannātha observes that these definitions are not acceptable because the blemishes pointed out in Appayya's original definition of abhidhā continue here also. Thus, in the definition of the first variety viz. to convey a single meaning by akhaṇḍa-śakti, involves the blemish called 'a-saṃgati' because here also the sense, viz. 'that which is conveyed by śakti is śakti', continues. Jagannātha's argument is that here also, whether you call it śakti or rūḍhi-śakti the meaning is the same. So, when these two are of identical nature, there is a 'ātmāśraya-doṣa'. Again the difficulty pointed out earlier, - viz. that the knowledge of the 'pratipāḍakatva' of 'artha' does not render 'arthajñāna', - also continues.

After thus refuting Appayya, Jagannātha concentrates on a different topic, of course, concerning abhidhā. He mentions words such as, "āśvagandhā", "āśva-karṇa", "maṇḍapa", "niśānta", and "kuvalaya", etc. Which variety of abhidhā is

applicable in these cases ? The conventional meaning of the word “aśva-gandhā” is “a particular medicine or herb.” The yogārtha i.e. ‘kevala-avayavārtha’ gives the sense of “smell like that of a horse”, or the stable which carries the smell of a horse. Similarly by samudāyaśakti the word ‘aśva-karṇa’ also means a particular medicine. The avayavārtha or yogārtha gives the sense of “an ear of a horse”. In the first instance the two meanings are illustrated respectively in, “aśvagandhā-rasaṃ pibet”, and, “aśvagandhā vājīśālā”. ‘Maṇḍapa’ conventionally means a temporary hall raised for some occasion, and it means, through avayava-śakti, “one who drinks water or scum on curd.” ‘nīśānta’ has a conventional meaning of ‘a house’ and its yogārtha is ‘end of night’. Kuvalaya means “blue lotus” by convention, and its yogārtha is ‘the globe of earth’. Now all these illustrations carry two meanings, one each by convention, and by avayava-śakti. Jagannātha raises a question as to which variety of abhidhā is to be accepted in case of these illustrations. We cannot accept only ‘samudāya-śakti’ for we get ‘yogārtha’ also, and we cannot accept only ‘yogārtha’ and accept only ‘avayavaśakti’ either. If we accept the ‘saṃkara’ or commixture of both the varieties, then we need not accept both the śaktis in one meaning. But in case of ‘pañkaja’, both these śaktis viz. avayava and samudāya, have a common conventional meaning. Such is not the case here. So, which power is to be ascertained in these illustrations ? The idea is that though these words are having both the śaktis, i.e. samudāyaśakti and yoga-śakti, one of them will be ineffective when the other operates.

Jagannātha continues the discussion as follows : “atra kecit, ‘aśvagandhā rasaṃ pibet’ ity ādiṣu viśaya-viśeṣe kevala-samudāyaśaktiḥ. aśvagandhā vājīśālā, ity ādiṣu tu kevala-yoga-śaktiḥ.” etc. (pp. 430, Prof. Athavale’s Edn.) - Some people are of the opinion that in expressions like, “he drinks the liquid of aśvagandhā”, ‘aśvagandhā’ means ‘a particular herb, and here only the ‘samudāya-śakti’ has to be accepted. In cases like, “The stable with a smell of a horse”, we should accept only yoga-śakti. Now someone may argue that in the word ‘aśvagandhā’, actually both the śaktis are seen to reside. So, accepting either “kevala-samudāya-śakti”, or “kevala-avayava-śakti” is not possible at all. But this objection does not stand because we do not find any correlation of both the senses derived through two different śaktis here, at a time. So, actually when each sense is derived each corresponding śakti operates alone and independently here. When we use the term, ‘kevala-samudāya-śakti’. or, ‘kevala-avayava-śakti’, the part ‘kevala’ means “to apprehend that meaning by that particular śakti, - that meaning which is not correlated with the meaning of the other śakti.” That way, we may say that we

cannot accept a saṃkara or commixture of the two śaktis giving two senses in cases such as 'aśvagandhā' etc. 'Saṃkara' can be said to take place only between such śaktis which convey meaning that can be correlated. So, no 'saṃkara' is possible here.

Still others believe that, in illustrations such as 'aśvakarṇa' etc., there is no question of the first two varieties of abhidhā, because neither of them function here alone i.e. 'kevala' - Jagannātha observes : (pp. 430, ibid) : anye tu - "aśvakarṇā" di śabdeṣu nābhidhāyāḥ prathama-dvītiyayor vidhayoḥ prasaktiḥ, kaivalya-virahāt." But, they say we should accept the commixture or saṃkara of these two varieties. But this 'saṃkara' is two fold viz. (i) yoga-rūḍhi-saṃkara and (ii) yaugika-rūḍhi-saṃkara. The first is illustrated by such words as 'pañkaja' etc., as both the senses caused by two śaktis operate together here. The second saṃkara is illustrated by such words as 'aśvakarṇa' etc. In this saṃkara, the two senses caused by two śaktis are never correlated because they are never apprehended simultaneously. While according to still others, i.e. the Naiyāyikas, says Jagannātha, in case of such words as aśvagandhā etc. a fourth variety of abhidhā has to be recognised. It may be called 'yaugika-rūḍhi'.

Jagannātha quotes still another opinion held by the vaiyākaraṇas. It reads as : (pp. 431, ibid) : "akhaṇḍāḥ eva hi śabdāḥ. tatra samāseṣu padānām, kṛt-taddhita-tiṅ-anteṣu ca prakṛti-pratyayānām vibhāgaḥ kālpanika eva, iti kutrāsti-yogaśaktiḥ ? viśiṣṭasya viśiṣṭārthe rūḍher eva abhyupagamāt' - iti api vadanti - The idea is that for the grammarians a word is an indivisible unit. So how can there be a meaning of its parts, when there is total absence of parts ? So, in case of such as an indivisible word-unit, the pada-vibhāga in a compound, or the division of prakṛti (original stem) and pratyā-suffix as in case of kṛdanta, taddhita or tiṅ-anta formation, - all this has to be taken as imaginary only. So, how can we imagine yogaśakti or avayava-śakti in such illustrations ? So, we accept only rūḍhi-śakti in case of viśiṣṭa-akhaṇḍa-śabdā with reference to special (viśiṣṭa) artha - : obviously this view has a reference to the famous kārīka, 66 of Vākyapadīya, brahmakāṇḍa which reads as :

"pade na varṇā vidyante
varṇeṣv avayavā na ca.
vākyāt padānām atyantam
pravibhāgo na vidyate." (V.P. - Brahmakāṇḍa, 66)

Dr. Ramachandradu (pp. 234, ibid) observes that, "Though he mentions this

theory only as a pāramāṛthika satya, PR. does not have any objection in accepting, in vyāvahārika level, the above mentioned three or four varieties of abhidhā, and this assumption is justified by the ensuing discussion on the basis of yoga etc.” We also feel that at practical level Jagannātha is inclined to accept three or four varieties of abhidhā, though he does not openly commit himself to either acceptance or rejection of the same.

Jagannātha further discusses a fresh point. He says there is a verse viz.,

“gīspatir api āṅgīraso
gaditum guṇa-gaṇān sagarvo na,
indrah sahasra-nayanópi
adbhutarūpaṃ paricchettum.”

i.e. - “Bṛhaspati, - Āṅgīrasa-the lord of speech is rendered without pride when it comes to the topic of describing the total virtues residing in you, and Indra with a thousand eyes can not fully grasp your exceptional beauty.” In this verse, observes Jagannātha, that if we take the conventional meaning of the word ‘gīspati’ which means Bṛhaspati, there will occur a blemish called ‘punar-ukti’ or tautology, for āṅgīrasa also would mean ‘bṛhaspati’. In the same way both ‘Indra’ and ‘sahasra-nayana’ would mean the same thing and thus lead to tautology. Some may say that in such illustrations as gīspati and sahasranayana, we have to accept only avayavārtha-pratipādaka-śakti in case of these yoga-rūḍha-padas. We have not to accept rūḍhi-śakti at all here, because here only the ‘yogārtha’ is utilized. It means that to suggest the access of virtues in case of the king described in context, only ‘yogārtha’ is utilized. The rūḍhyartha of gīspati is of no use here, because another term viz. ‘āṅgīrasa’ expressive of Bṛhaspati is also present here. But, says Jagannātha, this observation is faulty, because, even if we accept that here only the yogārtha is found to be useful, but the rūḍhi-śakti of the words gīspati and sahasranayana is not limited in such cases. It is also not correct to say that only yogārtha alone is apprehended here, because the apprehension of rūḍhyartha automatically gets in, with the result that in such verses as illustrated above, punar ukti-doṣa will positively appear. Again, because only with the yogarūḍha word ‘gīspati’ alone, both the rūḍhyartha and yogārtha are arrived at, the other padas such as āṅgīrasa etc. will be redundant.

Jagannātha replies to this objection in the following way : Here what happens is this. By a single word (i.e. gīspati, here) there is apprehension of both the conventional meaning and the etymological meaning - i.e. yogārtha. So, first of all,

with the help of internal expectancy (antaraṅga ākāṅkṣā) both of them are correlated with each other. From the special sense (i.e. Bṛhaspati, the Lord of Speech) derived from this, correlation is established with the sense of the second word (i.e. with the meaning of the second 'pada' - 'āṅgīrasa' here). Before we proceed with Jagannātha let us first grasp the exact import of 'antaraṅga-ākāṅkṣā'. When two things that have come together are united with a third external thing, these two are first correlated with each other by an internal relation. Thus, it is necessary that first these two things are correlated with each other. This necessity itself is called "antaraṅga ākāṅkṣā" or internal expectancy. After these two things are mutually correlated through internal expectancy, they become fit for getting related with a third external thing.

Now, proceeds Jagannātha, it is true that (- nyāyasiddhóṛthaḥ) the two viz. rūḍhyārtha and yogārtha in their separate form (viśakalita) are not correlated with the other word viz. āṅgīrasa, but we accept that this rule is applicable when it is a case of a meaning to be collected by the power of expression i.e. abhidhāśakti. But in case of illustrations such as the verse 'gīṣpatiḥ api' etc. lakṣaṇā or secondary power is resorted to, so with the help of the word, 'gīṣpati' which is a yoga-rūḍha-pada, there is no harm in establishing 'kevala-yogārtha' (of course taking the yogārtha as lakṣyārtha). Thus, by resorting to the secondary function i.e. lakṣaṇā here, it cannot be said by anyone that such other words as 'āṅgīrasa' are used without any purpose. For, at such places, if the second pada i.e. 'āṅgīrasa' is not used, the result will be that someother difficulty will prop up. It is like this. Because the meaning of 'Bṛhaspati' which is a rūḍhyārtha is already accomplished by the yoga-rūḍha pada viz. gīṣpati, the function of conveying any meaning through that yoga-rūḍha-pada being already accomplished, there will be a fresh problem, a fresh objection, as to whether the yogārtha subsequently apprehended by the yogarūḍha pada, can be an object of principal intention (= tātparya) or not ? - Now we know that the word 'gīṣpati' conveys two meanings viz. (i) lord of speech and (ii) bṛhaspati. But when the poet has, inspite of this, used the word 'āṅgīrasa' meaning also bṛhaspati in the same verse, anybody will start thinking about the poet's motive. Naturally there must be some special underlying intention of the poet after this usage. The reader understands this. So, to justify such a usage by the poet, when both the mukhyārthas are contradicted in case of the word gīṣpati, one is forced to resort to lakṣaṇā in the yogārtha. The 'prayojana' or intention behind this lakṣaṇā is to convey the high qualities of the king under description.

Jagannātha says that here we have to explain the special usage, as in case of words such as 'pañkajākṣī' etc. The idea is that while describing a particular heroine, if we use an adjective such as 'pañkajākṣī' i.e. the lotus-eyed-one, then here the particular meaning of 'lotus' of the word 'pañkaja' becomes important. The poet's intention is only to convey that the heroine's eyes are as beautiful as a lotus. Now, the question is, 'can we take the meaning of 'that which is born of mud', here ? Naturally such meaning cannot be taken. And this is the right answer, because the 'yogārtha' of 'pañkaja' viz. 'that which is born of mud', is not of any use here. On the contrary it goes against the primary principal sense. So, at such places, because the yogārtha of the word 'pañkaja' is not of any use here (i.e. kurvadrūpa), it has to be abandoned. Similarly in such cases as the word 'gīṣpati' in the verse illustrated, the yogārtha of gīṣpati is useless. Now when the usefulness i.e. effectiveness, - 'kurvad-rūpatva' - of the yogārtha of gīṣpati (i.e. lord of speech) is not accepted, there will be another contingency viz. to say whether that yogārtha can be instrumental in suggesting the special qualities of the king - or not - (pākṣikatvā"patteḥ). But when the same second word (i.e. āṅgīrasa) is used along with the yoga-rūḍha-pada viz. gīṣpati, then by that word viz. āṅgīrasa, the rūḍhyartha or conventional sense viz. brhaspati is directly conveyed and hence the objection that yogārtha conveyed by yogarūḍha pada in such cases is of no use (nāntariyaka), i.e. it is not the object of principal intention, - does not arise at all. For, the rūḍhyartha in that yogarūḍha pada is of no use as that rūḍhyartha is already conveyed by the second pada - viz. āṅgīrasa which is also placed side by side. So that yogārtha now gains the capacity to do its real job viz. that of conveying some special sense. So, it necessarily suggests the special suggested sense in form of the high qualities of the king under description - "vyaṅgya-viśeṣa-vyañjakatvaṃ niyamena siddhyati" (pp. 431, ibid, R.G.)

The idea is that in the first illustration there was doubt about the importance of the yogārtha as the yogarūḍha word was used to convey rūḍhyartha. But now in this illustration, with the help of the second pada, viz. āṅgīrasa, the conventional sense being already conveyed, the yogārtha's real use is with reference to convey the suggested sense. Jagannātha says : "eṣā pada-dvayópādāne gatiḥ uktā" (pp. 431, ibid). i.e. hereby a way is laid out in such cases where in a single verse, two words i.e. one a yogarūḍha word and the other a rūḍhyarthaka word - are used together. But now Jagannātha discusses a new situation as below : In instances such as : "puṣpa-dhanvā vijayate jagat, tvat karuṇā-vaśāt", one and the same word viz. 'puṣpadhanvā' first gives the meaning of cupid through rūḍhi, and by the yogārtha

(i.e. one who holds a bow in form of a flower) cupid's weakness is also suggested. In such instances, the poet has not used the word 'manmatha' also meaning cupid, but has resorted to the yoga-rūḍha pada viz. 'puṣpadhanvā'. Taking this special choice of the poet into account we realize the 'kurvad-rūpatā' i.e. effectiveness of the yogārtha of the word 'puṣpadhanvā' : "tatra kavi-kṛta-manmatha-rūḍha-padāntara-anupādāna-pūrvaka-puṣpadhanva- padopādāna-pratisamdhānena tadya-yogārthe kurvad-rūpatā"dhānam bodhyam." (pp. 431, R.G., ibid). In the same way, along with the yogarūḍha-pada, whether there is or is not another rūḍhapada, nothing is lost. The importance of the yogārtha of the yogarūḍha pada is not lost. In the same way, if in a single verse, a word indicating a common class is used and along with that, side by side, another word indicating a sub-class born of that wider class is used (i.e. samabhivyāhṛta), then we have to understand that the yogārtha of the word indicating broder class is to be taken into account and not its rūḍhyartha, e.g. in, "diśi diśi jalajāni santi kumudāni", the word 'jalaja' expresses a broder class. Only the yogārtha is conveyed in such cases through lakṣaṇā; because the yogārtha i.e. 'born in water', rendered through yoga-śakti (i.e. jala + ja) is restricted by the rūḍhyartha i.e. lotus, and so that yogārtha cannot be independently construed directly with 'kumuda'-padārtha. Thus, says Jagannātha, abhidhā is explained - "tad itthaṁ abhidhā nirūpitā" (pp. 432, ibid).

Now Jagannātha turns his attention to the meaning conveyed by abhidhā, after discussing the nature, scope and varieties of abhidhā. Says he : "anayā yaḥ śabdo yaṁ arthaṁ bodhayati sa tasya vācakaḥ" (pp. 432, ibid). With this abhidhā when a particular word conveys a particular meaning, that word is called the 'vācaka' of that primary sense. The meaning that is arrived at through abhidhā, is to be termed 'abhidheya'. This abhidheya-artha is four-fold such as jāti or class, guṇa or quality, kriyā or action and yādṛcchika - i.e. samjñā-rupa or name or substance. Jāti is of the form of 'go-tva', which is manifested through the special figure - ākṛti - of an object : "tatra jātir gotvā"diḥ samsthāna-viśeṣa-abhivyāṅgyā, pratyakṣa-siddhā, gavā"di padānām abhidheyā" (R.G. pp. 432, ibid) - Because it is manifested by a figure it is said to be apprehended by direct means of knowledge. The idea is that objects such as 'go' qualified by 'gotva-jāti' are perceived directly. This 'go-tva jāti' is said to be the abhidheyārtha or directly expressed sense of the word 'go'. There are other jātis or classes such as 'ghrāṇatva', 'rasanātva' etc. which are apprehended through anumāna or inference. The idea is that the organs of smell (i.e. ghrāṇendriya), etc., which are qualified by 'ghrāṇatva-jāti', etc. are themselves 'atīndriya' i.e. beyond sensoral porception, so they can only be inferred. The

convention is made with reference to class alone and not an individual, for fault of 'ānantya' and 'vyabhicāra' : "anumāna-siddhā ca ghrāṇa-rasanatva-ā"dir-ghrāṇa-rasanā"di-padānām; ānantyād, vyabhicārāc ca, vyaktīnām abhidheyatāyā akalpanāt." (pp. 432, R.G. ibid). The contingency of 'ānantya' walks in because if we take saṃketa with reference to an individual, the individuals being innumerable, the saṃketas also will tend to be beyond calculation. Vyabhicāra-doṣa walks in when one saṃketa once when used for a given individual, if it is used for another individual of the same class, it brings in this contingency, because how can one saṃketa fixed for one individual be used for any other individual ? So, convention is not made with reference to an individual i.e. 'vyakti'. Thus it cannot be said that that a 'pada' means an individual.

An objector has the following submission - we accept such 'alaukika-pratyakṣa-jñāna' with reference to objects having relation of the form of 'gotva'-ādi jāti. : The idea is that direct apprehension results from the mutual relation of sense-organs and objects. This relation is termed 'sannikarṣa' or 'pratyāsatti' technically. Jagannātha here uses the term 'pratyāsatti' in this technical sense. Now this relation according to some is 'jñāta', i.e. is of the form of 'gotva-ādi-sāmānya-rūpa' - i.e. of the form of the class - 'go'tva. This is one opinion of some Naiyāyikas. Another section of the Naiyāyikas holds that this relation is of the form of the knowledge of 'go-tva' - ādi-sāmānya.' - Whatever it may be, but by that relation which is of the nature of sāmānya or generality, there results direct perception of all cows endowed by that generality. So, there is no doṣa-contingency - in accepting the 'abhidhāśakti' of the word 'go' with reference to all individual cows.

To this objection of the vyakti-śakti-vādins Jagannātha's reply is : "na ca jñāta-gotvā"di-rūpayā, gotvā"di-jñāna-rūpayā vā pratyāsattiyā, pratyakṣeṇa pari-kalitāsu sakalatadiya-vyakṣiṣu abhidhāyāḥ kalpane nāsti doṣaḥ iti vācyam. sāmānya-pratyāsatter nirākaraṇāt. gaurava-doṣasya-anuddhārāc ca." (pp. 432, R.G. ibid).

Prof. Dr. Ramachandrudu puts it this way : (pp. 238, ibid) - "According to the Naiyāyikas, the pratyakṣa is of two kinds, laukika-pratyakṣa, and A-laukika-pratyakṣa. Laukika-pratyakṣa is the one which is produced by the contact of the senses with the objects which is effected by six kinds of saṃbandhas or relations, viz., saṃyoga, saṃyukta-samavāya, saṃyukta-samaveta-samavāya, samavāya, samaveta-samavāya, and viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya-bhāva. 'A-laukika' pratyakṣa is produced by three kinds of alaukika-sannikarṣas which are called, 'sāmānya lakṣaṇa-pratyāsatti, jñāna-lakṣaṇa-pratyāsatti, and yogaja-pratyāsatti. (Muktāvali, I. 59-63). The meaning of the sāmānya-lakṣaṇa-pratyāsatti is explained in Muktāvali (pp. 272)

as a sāmānya-rūpa-pratyāsatti. Though the sāmānya is not directly connected with the Indriyas, it is said to be sannikarṣa, because it is prakārī-bhūta in the Indriya-sambaddha-viśeṣyaka-jñāna. For example when there is contact of Indriyas with Dhūmā”di, there arises a Dhūma-jñāna in which Dhūmatva is a prakāra i.e. viśeṣaṇa. By the help of this Dhūmatva-sannikarṣa, one can have the knowledge of all the Dhūmas, past, present and future. It is necessary to accept the sāmānya-lakṣaṇa-pratyāsatti, because unless all the Dhūmas and Vahnis are known by Dhūmatva and vahnitva respectively, there can be no saṁśaya about the vahni-vyāpyatva of the Dhūma which is a condition precedent for the Anumāna, for the Vahni-saṁbandha of the pratyakṣa dhūma is known without doubt by pratyakṣa itself and other Dhūmas are not known. (Muktāvali, p. 280)

The ‘sāmānya’ in the ‘sāmānya-lakṣaṇa-pratyāsatti’ need not necessarily mean, Muktāvali states, the ‘Nitya-jāti’ alone. According to the vighraha - “samānānām bhāvaḥ sāmānyam” it can mean such anitya-padārthas like ghaṭa also. Thus, once a ghaṭa is known, as existing on the ground by ‘sāmānya-saṁbandha’, or on the ‘kapāla’ by ‘samavāya-saṁbandha’, one can later on have the knowledge of all such Bhūtalas and kapālā”di with the help of this sāmānya-lakṣaṇa-pratyāsatti (Muktāvali, pp. 275). But one inconvenience appears cropping up here by accepting the sāmānya-lakṣaṇa-pratyāsatti as sāmānya-rūpa-pratyāsatti. When the ghaṭa is lost and even if the place having the ghaṭa is remembered all the places having the ghaṭa cannot be cognised by sāmānya-pratyāsatti, because the sāmānya i.e. ghaṭa is no more. In order to avoid this avyāpti, the word ‘lakṣaṇa’ in ‘sāmānya-lakṣaṇa-pratyāsatti’ is explained to mean viśaya and thus ‘sāmānya-lakṣaṇa-pratyāsatti’ - is to be understood as “sāmānya-viśayakajñāna-pratyāsatti.” In the above place, even though the ghaṭa is lost, its jñāna which is still existing can help as pratyāsatti and thereby produce the cognition of all the ‘bhūtalas’ having ghaṭā”di.

Now coming to the point on hand, the pūrva-pakṣin contends that there is nothing wrong even if the abhidhā is only in vyakti because all vyaktis can be the object of pratyakṣa by the above pratyāsatti, whether it is ‘jñāta-gotvā”di-sāmānya-rūpa-pratyāsatti’, or ‘gotvā”di-sāmānya-jñāna-rūpa pratyāsatti’.

Pandita Rāja refutes this contention by simply saying that the ‘sāmānya-pratyāsatti’ - is not acceptable and that the gaurava-doṣa levelled against your theory is not answered. (R.G. p. 183) (R.G. pp. 432, Edn. Athavale) - “na ca jñāta-gotvā”di-rūpayā gotvā”di-jñāna-rūpayā vā pratyāsattiyā pratyakṣeṇa parikalitāsu

sakala-tadīya-vyaktiṣv abhidhāyāḥ kalpane nāsti doṣa iti vācyam. sāmānya-pratyāsatter nirākaraṇāt. gaurava-doṣasya anuddhārāt ca.”

The following is the contention of the siddhāntin : It is not necessary to accept the sāmānya-lakṣaṇa-pratyāsatti. Even without its help, the ‘cakṣus-saṃyoga’ with one go-vyakti which is gotvā”śraya, can produce the cognition of other go-vyaktis which are at a distance, by the laukika-sannikarṣa of saṃyukta-samaveta-samavāya. Like-wise the go-vyaktis of distant time can be known by becoming buddhi-viṣaya through the same saṃbandha, because they also are gotvā”śraya. To know the go-vyakti as gotvā”śraya is inevitable even in the vyakti-śakti-vāda. Because a man may know the śakti of go-pada in only one vyakti at the first instance. But on a second occasion when he sees an elderly man ordering a young man saying ‘gām ānaya’, ‘gām naya’, ‘gām badhāna’, etc., and the young man brings, takes and ties the cow accordingly, he understands that the second cow also is having the gotva-jāti and that is being meant by the go-pada as the previous one. It may be contended, as explained above, that sāmānya-pratyāsatti is required for vyāpti-saṃśaya and vyāpti-jñāna etc. But the vyāpti jñāna can be had in the ‘mahānāsiya dhūma’ in the dhūmatva-rūpa itself. It may be argued again that there can be no vyāpti-saṃśaya, because there is vyāpti-niścaya in the dhūma which is actually seen, and other dhūmas do not come to the mind of the perceiver (anupasthita). But this argument is unfounded, because even though there is vyāpti-niścaya in a particular dhūma, there is scope for vyāpti-saṃśaya by dhūmatva in general.

Moreover sāmānya cannot be taken as saṃbandha at all; because every saṃbandha invariably implies the existence of anuyogin and pratiyogin which are not found in the case of sāmānya. Again, we do not find also viśiṣṭa-buddhi which is produced by the saṃbandha.

Thus, in the absence of sāmānya-lakṣaṇa-pratyāsatti, the vyabhicāra-doṣa pointed out in vyakti-śakti-vāda remains unanswered. Even if the ‘sāmānya-lakṣaṇa-pratyāsatti were to be accepted, where is the answer for the gaurava doṣa raised above ? Because innumerable śaktis will have to be accepted according to the endless number of vyaktis.

Again Pandita Raja (PR.) refers to another argument of the pūrva-pakṣin in answer to the vyabhicāra-doṣa and says that the persistence of the gaurava-doṣa makes it useless. The argument of pūrvapakṣin runs as follows : of the three things, śakti-graha, padārthopa-sthiti and śābda-bodha, each preceeding

one is the cause of the following, and in all of them only one thing should appear, as prakāra or viśeṣaṇībhūta (samāna-prakāratayaiva) but all of them need not have only one viśeṣya. In other words, gotva-prakāraka-śakti-graha is the cause for the gotva-prakāropasthiti, gotva-prakāropasthiti is the cause of gotva-prakārka-śābda-bodha. It need not be taken that gotva-prakāraka-śaktigraha is the cause of gotva-viśeṣyakopasthiti. Thus even if the śakti-graha was only in a vyakti-viśeṣa, one can have with the help of the above śakti-graha, the śābda-bodha when a particular vyakti is not taken as viśeṣya and so there is no vyabhicāra though there is no śakti-graha in all the vyaktis. In spite of this explanation to avoid vyabhicāra, PR. says, gaurava-doṣa can not be avoided.

In fact the above kārya-kāraṇa-bhāva among śakti-graha, padārthopasthiti and śābda-bodha itself is defective. Because if it is not accepted that tat-prakāraka-śakti-graha etc. is the cause of tad-viśeṣyaka-padārthopasthiti etc., the gotva-prakāraka, śakti-graha may produce aśva-viśeṣyakopasthiti and gotva-prakāropasthiti would result in gotva-prakārakāśva-viśeṣyaka-śābda-bodha." (pp. 238 to 247, Prof. Ramachandrudu.)

Jagannātha then explains that the apprehension of an individual can be had by ākṣepa i.e. arthāpatti, because the jāti cannot exist without vyakti or, it can be had through lakṣaṇā because there can be no anvaya or correlation of jāti in a sentence sense. The lakṣaṇā theory is normally favoured because the verbal explanation (i.e. śābda-bodha) connected with a particular artha can be produced by padārthopasthiti which depends on the vṛtti-jñāna about that particular artha only.

Jagannātha further observes : (pp. 432, ibid, R.G.) : "ayaṃ ca jāti-rūpaḥ padārthaḥ prāṇada iti ucyate. prāṇaṃ vyavahāra-yogyatāṃ dadāti saṃpādayati iti vyutpatteḥ."

Before we proceed further let us have a look at Prof. R. B. Athavale's (pp. 456, 460) explanation of the above discussion. We have already quoted at length the explanation of Dr. Ramachandrudu as above. (pp. 238-248, ibid). Prof. Athavale explains the same point thus : The Naiyāyikas accept alaukika pratyakṣa also along with laukika-pratyakṣa. In laukika pratyakṣa, they accept six sannikarṣas or sambandhas or relations such as saṃyoga, samavāya, etc., while in a-laukika-pratrakṣa they accept only three sannikarṣas. The sannikarṣas in alaukika pratyakṣa are enumerated in kārikā 63, in Siddhānta-

muktāvali, such as :

“alaukikas tu vyapāras
trividhaḥ parikīrtitaḥ,
sāmānya-lakṣaṇo jñāna-
lakṣaṇo yogajas tathā.”

(Si. Mu. pratyakṣa khaṇḍa kārīkā-63)

In this kārīkā, the term ‘vyāpāra’ means sannikarṣa, which is said to be three fold such as, sāmānya-lakṣaṇa, jñāna-lakṣaṇa and ‘yogaja’. Out of these three, the sāmānya-lakṣaṇa-sannikarṣa (or, sāmānya-pratyāsatti) is the first one, which is projected by the Naiyāyikas to support their plea that there is no harm in accepting saṃketa or convention with reference to vyakti i.e. individual. By ‘sāmānya-lakṣaṇa’ is meant such which has ‘sāmānya’ as its lakṣaṇa or svarūpa. Just as when there is direct apprehension of a thing in the world, the sannikarṣa or saṃbandha between any worldly object and sense-organ has to take place first, in the same way for a-laukika pratyakṣa also, the sāmānya-rūpa sannikarṣa of the object is required. This means that the apprehension of an individual i.e. object takes place with the help of sāmānya or jāti such as gotva etc. For example - I saw an individual go-vyakti. This means I have laukika-pratyakṣa-jñāna or direct apprehension of a particular go-vyakti. With the knowledge of that individual go-vyakti, knowledge or apprehension of ‘gotva’ sāmānya or jāti also is accomplished. This is the theory accepted by the Naiyāyikas. They hold that, “yā vyaktiḥ yena indriyeṇa gr̥hyate, tanniṣṭhā jātiḥ, tad abhāvaś ca tena eva indriyeṇa gr̥hyate.” i.e. the sense-organ with which an individual object is apprehended, also brings forth the apprehension of the class-sāmānya i.e. - jāti- of that particular object concerned, and it also brings forth the apprehension of the abhāva - absence-of that object also. The Nyāyaśāstra calls that jñāna or apprehension as alaukika-pratyakṣa, whereby knowledge of all go-vyaktis is also brought about through the gotva-rūpa-sāmānya residing in a single go-vyakti, directly apprehended. We have to accept sāmānya-rūpa-sannikarṣa in the alaukika-pratyakṣa-jñāna, because to bring about the knowledge of all individual go-vyaktis, there is no other agency except the sāmānya. In the illustration cited above of an individual go-vyakti, along with that go-vyakti as there is also an apprehension of the ‘sāmānya’ residing in it, this apprehension is termed sāmānya and, here, i.e. in this alaukika-pratyakṣa, “jñāta-sāmānya-sannikarṣa” is the cause of apprehension.

Let us take another illustration. In the sentence viz. “ghaṭavat bhūtaḥ”, when there is knowledge or apprehension of bhūtaḥ, we also have apprehension of ‘ghaṭa’ which is the ‘viśeṣaṇa’ or ‘prakāra’ or ‘sāmānya’ of ‘bhūtaḥ’. Now ‘sannikarṣa’ is required for the apprehension of that ghaṭa-rūpa-sāmānya. If with that ‘sannikarṣa’ there occurs the apprehension of all ‘ghaṭa-yukta-bhūtaḥ’ then that also is called alaukika-pratyakṣa-jñāna. The difference between the alaukika pratyakṣa caused by the sannikarṣa in form of knowledge of gotva-rūpa-sāmānya, on one hand, and the alaukika pratyakṣa brought about by the sannikarṣa of the knowledge of ghaṭa-rūpa-sāmānya on the other hand, is only this much that in the first alaukika pratyakṣa, gotva, the sāmānya jāti, is nitya, while in the other alaukika-pratyakṣa, ghaṭa-rūpa-sāmānya becomes ‘jñāta’ and is ‘sannikarṣa’. But suppose that in the above illustration of ‘ghaṭavat-bhūtaḥ’, the ghaṭa or pot is broken. Then, if in the absence of the ghaṭa which is broken, next day there is alaukika-pratyakṣa of ‘ghaṭavat bhūtaḥ’, then at such places, ghaṭa is not a ‘sāmānya-sannikarṣa’. But, only the knowledge of that ghaṭarūpa-sāmānya becomes sannikarṣa in alaukika-pratyakṣa. This is the opinion of the second section of the Naiyāyikas. From this, we can say that according to the opinion of this second section of Naiyāyikas, in alaukika-pratyakṣa, we accept jñāna of sāmānya itself as sannikarṣa in place of jñāta-sāmānya. Jagannātha refers to both these options of the Naiyāyikas in the words : “jñāta-gotvā”di-rūpayā gotvā”di-jñāna-rūpayā vā pratyāsattya.”

If we put behind this small difference of opinion, then both the opinions of the Naiyāyikas seem to hold that by sāmānya pratyāsatti there is alaukika-pratyakṣa of all individual objects. So all objects are presented individually, and so there is nothing wrong in accepting śaktigraha - convention - with reference to all individuals. From the point of view of both the sections of the Naiyāyikas, there is nothing wrong in accepting convention-saṃketa-with reference to individuals and no contingencies of ‘ānantya’ and ‘vyabhicāra’ would walk in, in accepting saṃketa with reference to a vyakti.

This is so, because according to the Naiyāyikas, through the ‘sāmānya’ residing in one individual ‘go’, there occurs apprehension of all the rest a-saṃketita ‘go’ - i.e. all other cows that are not the subject of convention, and thus if we accept convention - ‘saṃketa’ - with reference to a given individual ‘go’ vyakti, no blemishes of ‘ānantya’ and ‘vyabhicāra’ will follow. When one individual ‘go’ is perceived directly, through the ‘sāmānya’ residing in that go-vyakti, all other go-vyaktis possessing that sāmānya (i.e. go-tva), are covered by

convention. So, there is no need to go for numberless saṃketas on numberless individuals. The vyabhicāra-doṣa also disappears as all vyaktis are covered by saṃketa.

As noted above, Jagannātha holds that when saṃketa or convention is held with reference to a class, i.e. jāti, the apprehension of a vyakti is either through inference or through lakṣaṇā or secondary function. The jāti-rūpa-śabdārtha is also the 'prāṇa-prada-dharma' of the objects, because it is this which gives 'vyavahāra-yogyatā'. Here Jagannātha quotes from Mammāṭa (K.P. II. 2, vṛtti) the words which are quoted again from what Bhartṛhari has said in the Vākyapadīya : (pp. 432, ibid)

“gauḥ svarūpeṇa na gauḥ, na api agauḥ, gotvābhisambandhād gauḥ.” The idea is that a 'go-vyakti' by its form (svarūpeṇa) does not become a 'go'. This means that without accompanied by its jāti-class-'cowness', - 'go-tva', an individual go, i.e. go-vyakti does not become the object of usage - vyavahāra. It does not become the object of such usage as 'a-go'-either. But once we realize the relation of that go-vyakti with go-jāti (gotvābhisambandhāt) - then only it becomes fit for the usage of the word 'go' with reference to it. Jagannātha explains it clearly as follows : (pp. 432, ibid) :

“asya arthaḥ - gauḥ sāsnādimān dharmī. svarūpeṇa, ajñāta-gotva-kena, dharmi-svarūpa-mātreṇa, na gauḥ, nāpi go-bhinna-iti vyavahārasya-nirvāhakaḥ nāpyagauḥ, nāpi go-bhinna iti vyavahārasya nirvāhakaḥ. tathā sati, dūrād anabhiivyakta-saṁsthānatayā gotvāgraha-daśāyāṁ gavi gaur iti go-bhinna iti vā vyavahāraḥ syāt.”

The idea is that by the special outward form of having a dewlap, etc. an object, by the help of only its external form only, the form by which the apprehension of 'go-tva' has not followed, does not become a 'go', i.e. it does not become the object of the usage of the word 'gauḥ' for it. Nor, it becomes an object of a usage such as 'a-gauḥ', merely by the external form. The idea is that even without the apprehension of go-tva, 'cowness', i.e. class of jāti, if a go-vyakti can become an object of the usage of the word 'gauḥ', then, an object such as 'go' whose 'form is not clearly seen and determined because of distance and in whose case there is no apprehension of gotva-jāti, will also be an object of such usage as, 'this is a cow, or this is some other animal than cow', etc. or, as the special form of that object is not determined, that individual, in absence of apprehension of its speciality, there will follow the usage-vyavahāra of ghaṭa in 'go', and of 'go' in 'ghaṭa'. - “svarūpasya a-viśeṣād ghate gaur iti, gavi ca agaur-

iti vā vyavahāraḥ syād iti bhāvaḥ gotvābhisambandhāt gotva-vattayā jñānād gaur gau-śabda-vyavahārya iti.” (pp. 432, ibid, R.G.)

But no such vyavahāra follows. The idea is that due to distance, when an object is not recognized, we have the apprehension, viz. ‘there is something’. No cognition such as, ‘that object is not a cow but a jar, or it is not a jar but a cow’ - follows. So, when a vyakti is united with go-tva, i.e. when it is realized that the individual is associated with gotva-dharma, i.e. characteristics of a cow, it becomes fit for the usage ‘go’, with reference to itself.

Now Jagannātha turns his attention to what ‘guṇa’ is and what ‘kriyā’ is. Guṇas like śukla, and the rest are the expressed sense (abhidheya) of words such as śukla, etc. In the same way ‘kriyā’ or action is the abhidheyārtha of ‘calana’ and the rest : “guṇaḥ śuklā”dīḥ śuklādi-padānām abhidheyaḥ, kriyā calanā”di-śabdānām. An objection is raised such as follows : In case of colours such as śukla and the rest, and kriyā such as ‘calana’ and the rest, we see difference with reference to different individuals with which they are associated. So, if we accept ‘saṃketa’ with reference to a single śukla or a single calana, then we will have to face contingencies of ānantya and vyabhicāra as in case of saṃketa with reference to a vyakti i.e. individual : R.G. pp. 432, ibid - “śuklā”dīnām calanā”dīnām ca prativyakti-bheda-darśanāt ānantya-vyabhicārābhyām, vyakti-śakti-vāda-doṣābhyām ihā’pi kaluṣikaraṇam, iti cet, - The reply to this is - teṣām lāghavāt pratyabhijñābalāc ca ekatayā abhyupagamāt. - i.e. in case of guṇa and kriyā if we believe that there is only one śukla guṇa, and there is only one ‘calana’ kriyā, then we will have ‘lāghava’ guṇa, i.e. we will have achieved brevity of expression. Again, we experience that all white colours at different substratum are virtually one and the same, and so also ‘calana’ kriyā is one and the same in case of different individuals also. So, due to lāghava, and due to experience as such, pratyabhijñā-balāt, we accept only one whiteness and one action. Jagannātha here quotes from the K.P. of Mammāṭa : “guṇa-kriyā-yadṛcchānām vastutaḥ ekarūpānām āsrayabhedād bheda iva lakṣyate.” (K.P. II. 2, vṛtti). So, bhedajñāna or perception of difference in case of śukla, or calana, etc. with reference to difference in substratum is virtually an illusion : “tathā ca bheda-pratītir bhrama eva iti bhāvaḥ.” (R.G. pp. 433, ibid). Jagannātha says that this is to be understood as an ‘upalakṣaṇa’ or an accidental mark. Such an illusion takes place with reference to other objects also. For example, there is a feeling that guṇas and kriyās are born and destroyed. But actually this impression is illusory. Those who hold letters to be eternal hold that the impression of ‘utpatti’ and ‘vināśa’ with reference to individual letters such as ‘g’ ‘au’ and ‘h’ etc., are also an illusion.

This objection is refuted by Jagannātha thus. He says that even he accepts the fact that sphoṭa is of the form of a word. But because it is of the form of a word it resides in ākāśa, as all words have ākāśa as their substratum : “sarvaḥ śabdaḥ nabho-vṛttiḥ” (Muktāvali) - But the individual pointed out by saṃjñā-śabda (i.e. saṃjñī) is without the dharma called ‘sāmānya’ or ‘jāti’. So, in a vyakti or individual, there is no dharma or quality present which can be taken as the pravṛtti-nimitta of a śabda. That an individual is apprehended by a given saṃjñā śabda (such as e.g. dīṭha), rests only on the wish of the speaker alone. So, as no other quality as pravṛtti-nimitta can be pointed out in a given individual, only the akhaṇḍa-saṃjñā-rūpa-sphoṭa, manifested by a word that is uttered, is imagined to be the pravṛttinimitta of the vyakti. There is no harm in accepting this situation. Therefore, even though the sphoṭa is of the form of a word, it is considered as the dharma of vyakti through parṃparā-saṃbandha i.e. in a successive way, or sequential way. All worldly objects are the ‘vivarta’ of akhaṇḍasphoṭā”tmaka śabda which is non-different from brahma. Thus the worldly objects are ‘pariṇāmas’ so to say. But from the point of view of śabda, the sphoṭa is said to be the dharma of a vyakti through the sva-janya-bodha-ṣaṣayātā-saṃbandha. It means that the meaning of the cognition brought about by śabda is ‘ṣaṣaya’. Thus sphoṭa is held to be the dharma of the sense or vyakti. With this idea in mind, Mammaṭa in his K.P. also holds akhaṇḍa-sphoṭa as the ‘dharma’ of a vyakti. Says he : “dīṭhā”di-śabdānām antya-buddhi-nirghyāhyam saṃhṛta-kramam-svarūpam vaktrā yadṛcchayā dīṭhā”diṣu artheṣu upādhitvena saṃniveśyate iti śoṣam saṃjñārūpaḥ yadṛcchā”tmakaḥ.” (K.P. II). The term “antya-buddhi-nirgrāhya” of Mammaṭa, is read as ‘cārama-varṇābhivyaṅgya’ by Jagannātha. Both the terms mean one and the same thing. The ‘saṃhṛta-krama’ svarūpa of saṃjñā-śabda is itself the akhaṇḍa-svarūpa. In it, the whole word and not the sequence of letters, is to be taken as sphoṭa. Such a sphoṭa is accepted by a speaker by his own will, as the dharma or attribute of an individual. So, “I am going to take the whole word in form of special sphoṭa, as the dharma of a vyakti” - with this determination in mind, the speaker arranges the saṃjñā-śabda. Here, akhaṇḍa-sphoṭa is knowingly taken as an attribute of an individual, the cognition of that individual will be termed in śāstriya i.e. technical jargon, as ‘viśeṣaṇa-viśiṣṭa’ - i.e. ‘sa-vikalpa’ - bodha. This is the view of the grammarians.

Now, because the Naiyāyikas and Mīmāṃsakas do not accept akhaṇḍa-sphoṭa, manifested by a saṃjñā śabda, they accept ‘varṇa-samudāya’ as the pravṛtti-

A meaning ascribed by a speaker following his own will to words such as 'Dittha' etc. is called 'yādr̥cchika-abhidheya'. There are three views regarding this yādr̥cchika-dharma : "R.G. pp. 433, ibid : "yādr̥cchikas tu vaktrā svecchayā ditthā"di-śabdānām pravṛtti-nimittatve sanniveśito dharmah. sa ca, 'paramparayā vyaktigataḥ carama-varṇābhivyāṅgyo'khaṇḍaḥ sphoṭaḥ' iti eke. "ānupūrvyavacchinno varṇa-samudāyaḥ' iti apare. "kevalā vyaktir eva" iti itare. tatrā" dya-mata-dvaye viśeṣaṇa-jñānād viśiṣṭa-pratyayaḥ. tṛtīyamate ca nirvikalpakā"tmakaḥ pratyayaḥ. tad itthaṁ catuṣṭayī śabdānām pravṛttiḥ iti darśanam vyavasthitaṁ." - The three views are as follows. For the vaiyākaraṇas, the yādr̥cchika-dharma which is said to be the expressed sense of the words such as Dittha and the like, is only the akhaṇḍa-sphoṭa which is manifested by the last letter of the particular word, associated with the saṁskāra or impression left by the cognition of each preceeding letter. The last letter alone is the only suggester of sphoṭa, because this sphoṭa cannot be suggested by the whole varṇa-samudāya, because varṇas perish immediately after being uttered and therefore they cannot be grouped together. The second view goes like this. As seen above, varṇas or letters cannot be grouped together, they being perishable the moment they are uttered. So, some are of the opinion that the individual vyakti alone is 'dharma' meant by words like 'dittha' etc. Jagannātha explains that according to the first two views, words like 'dittha' etc. would first convey the dharma 'sphoṭa' or 'varṇasamudāya', and then the cognition of vyakti or individual is inferred by sphoṭa, which leads to the apprehension of vyakti as associated with the above dharmas or qualities. The third view holds that such words convey the vyakti directly and this cognition being devoid of viśeṣaṇas is nirvikalpa, the earlier one leading to savikalpajñāna.

Prof. R. B. Athavale explains these views in greater details as follows - (pp. 461, 463, R. G. Edn., ibid) He explains that here there is scope for raising one objection viz. that the word in form of akhaṇḍa sphoṭa is manifested by saṁjñā śabda. So, it is of the form of a word. So, how do you accept 'sphoṭa' as the nimitta or cause of the pravṛtti of a word ? i.e. how do you take it as the 'nimitta' of the power - śakti - that gives a particular sense ? Normally a 'pravṛtti-nimitta' is a special quality - i.e. 'viśiṣṭa dharma' of a given object. So, on account of that special quality residing in a given object, that particular word yields that particular sense. Now sphoṭa, being of the form of word, can never be a special dharma of a vyakti or object.

This objection is refuted by Jagannātha thus. He says that even he accepts the fact that sphoṭa is of the form of a word. But because it is of the form of a word it resides in ākāśa, as all words have ākāśa as their substratum : “sarvaḥ śabdaḥ nabho-vṛttiḥ” (Muktāvali) - But the individual pointed out by saṃjñā-śabda (i.e. saṃjñī) is without the dharma called ‘sāmānya’ or ‘jāti’. So, in a vyakti or individual, there is no dharma or quality present which can be taken as the pravṛtti-nimitta of a śabda. That an individual is apprehended by a given saṃjñā śabda (such as e.g. dīṭha), rests only on the wish of the speaker alone. So, as no other quality as pravṛtti-nimitta can be pointed out in a given individual, only the akhaṇḍa-saṃjñā-rūpa-sphoṭa, manifested by a word that is uttered, is imagined to be the pravṛttinimitta of the vyakti. There is no harm in accepting this situation. Therefore, even though the sphoṭa is of the form of a word, it is considered as the dharma of vyakti through parṃparā-saṃbandha i.e. in a successive way, or sequential way. All worldly objects are the ‘vivarta’ of akhaṇḍasphoṭa”tmaka śabda which is non-different from brahma. Thus the worldly objects are ‘pariṇāmas’ so to say. But from the point of view of śabda, the sphoṭa is said to be the dharma of a vyakti through the sva-janya-bodha-ṛṣayātā-saṃbandha. It means that the meaning of the cognition brought about by śabda is ‘ṛṣaya’. Thus sphoṭa is held to be the dharma of the sense or vyakti. With this idea in mind, Mammāṭa in his K.P. also holds akhaṇḍa-sphoṭa as the ‘dharma’ of a vyakti. Says he : “dīṭhā”di-śabdānām antya-buddhi-nirghyāhyam saṃhṛta-kramam-svarūpam vaktrā yadṛcchayā dīṭhā”diṣu artheṣu upādhitvena saṃniveśyate iti śōyam saṃjñārūpaḥ yadṛcchā”tmakaḥ.” (K.P. II). The term “antya-buddhi-nirgrāhya” of Mammāṭa, is read as ‘carama-varṇābhivyāngya’ by Jagannātha. Both the terms mean one and the same thing. The ‘saṃhṛta-krama’ svarūpa of saṃjñā-śabda is itself the akhaṇḍa-svarūpa. In it, the whole word and not the sequence of letters, is to be taken as sphoṭa. Such a sphoṭa is accepted by a speaker by his own will, as the dharma or attribute of an individual. So, “I am going to take the whole word in form of special sphoṭa, as the dharma of a vyakti” - with this determination in mind, the speaker arranges the saṃjñā-śabda. Here, akhaṇḍa-sphoṭa is knowingly taken as an attribute of an individual, the cognition of that individual will be termed in śāstriya i.e. technical jargon, as ‘viśeṣaṇa-viśiṣṭa’ - i.e. ‘sa-vikalpa’ - bodha. This is the view of the grammarians.

Now, because the Naiyāyikas and Mīmāṃsakas do not accept akhaṇḍa-sphoṭa, manifested by a saṃjñā śabda, they accept ‘varṇa-samudāya’ as the pravṛtti-

nimitta-dharma of an individual which is the object of convention through a saṃjñā-śabda. And this is also in fitness of things. Here also, as varṇa-samudāya is of the form of a word, it is taken knowingly as the dharma of a vyakti through paṃparā, i.e. succession, because for the pravṛtti i.e. śakti of that particular saṃjñā-śabda, no other dharma or attribute can be pointed out in that individual. Now, this varṇa-samudāya itself is non-existent as each letter when pronounced evaporates in air, so the three or four or any number of letters in a given word do not exist at a fixed given moment at a time. So, to bring a varṇa-samudāya into existence, i.e. to make it possible, the Naiyāyikas believe that each letter, after it is pronounced, leaves its saṃskāra i.e. mental impression behind. So with this impression of each preceeding letter or with the memory caused by the impression of each preceeding letter, the last letter is heard and this makes for the whole collection of letters i.e. varṇa-samudāya. Even in this view of the Naiyāyikas, varṇa-samudāya becomes the viśeṣaṇa or attribute of a vyakti i.e. individual. So, the cognition of that vyakti, is also 'viśeṣaṇa-viśiṣṭa' or 'sa-vikalpa'.

Now still others feel that such an artificial saṃjñā-rūpa-dharma can not be attached to an individual, because as pravṛttinimitta, normally sāmānya-rūpa-dharma cannot possibly reside in an individual. The saṃjñā-rūpa-dharma, on the other hand, being of the nature of a word, cannot be taken as dharma of a vyakti. So, if any dharma is to be fixed as a pravṛtti-nimitta of a saṃjñā-śabda, then only the vyakti, i.e. individual himself can be fixed as such. These people do not accept any other dharma residing in a vyakti. Jagannātha has expressed one view among the three mentioned, through the words : "kevalā vyaktir eva iti itare." This same view is expressed in his Nyāya-Mañjarī, by the famous logician Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, as follows :

"yeṣāṃ artheṣu sāmānyam, na sambhavati taiḥ punaḥ
ucyate kevalā vyaktir ākāśādi-padair iva.
evam dīṭhādi-śabdānām saṃjñāṭva-viditātmanām
abhidheyasya sāmānya-śūnyatvād vyakti-vācitā.
ata eva hi dravya-śabda iti ucyate,
ye punaḥ kalpitāneka-vṛttiṃ pracakṣate.
vācyam tatrāpi sāmānyam drśyate gaganatva-vat
kalpanāyās tu no bhūmiḥ kācid asti vipaścītām."

- Nyāya-mañjarī, āhnika 5.

- It means : In such *saṃjñā*"di i.e. *ditthā*"di words or objects, wherein *sāmānya* or class is not possible, with the help of such *saṃjñā* words (like words such as 'ākāśa' and the like), only the *vyakti*, bereft of a *sāmānya*, is cognised. So, as the meaning of *saṃjñā-rūpa-ditthā*"di words, is without 'sāmānya', the 'vyakti' or individual alone follows as the meaning. Some people may say that even the words such as *dittha* etc. are used by many with reference to many objects. So, why not accept a 'sāmānya' or 'jāti' in such words also ? To this, the reply is, even if that be so, the *vyakti* cognised by such *ditthā*"di words, is without a 'sāmānya'. So, there is no escape from taking such words as 'vyakti-mātra-vācī' i.e. expressive only of an individual. As there is no such substance as 'gaganatva', in the same way, there can not be any *sāmānya* as 'ditthatva'. So, the wise do not subscribe to such imagination of such *sāmānya*.

So, when the Naiyāyikas can not point out any *dharma* as *pravṛtti-nimitta* for the *saṃjñā-śabda* used for a *vyakti* with *saṃjñā*, it is quite appropriate for them to take *vyakti* itself as *pravṛtti-nimitta-dharma* in case of a *saṃjñā śabda*. That 'saṃjñā', i.e. that *vyakti* is bereft of any *viśeṣa* or *dharma*, and hence, the cognition of such a *vyakti* is taken as 'nirviśeṣa' or 'nirvikalpa'. This is simple. Jagannātha thus concludes that - "tad itthaṃ catuṣṭayī śabdānāṃ pravṛttir iti darśanaṃ vyavasthitam." (pp. 433, R.G., ibid)

Next, he presents the view of the Jātivādins. They take only 'jāti' as the meaning of all the words, in place of the four viz. *jāti*, *guṇa*, *kriyā* and *dravya*. In case of *guṇa-vācaka* and *kriyāvācaka* words, the *jāti* as realised in *guṇa* and *kriyā* is the real 'abhidheya' for them. In case of *saṃjñā-śabdas* also, i.e. in case of *yadṛccā* words, the *saṃjñā* or particular name as pronounced by different agents such as the old men, a child, a parrot, or any such other speaker, etc., forms a 'jāti' which is the *abhidheya* in that case. The idea is that in this view the *dharma* called *jāti* is supposed to reside in a word. But, through succession, the *jāti* residing in such words has to be taken as residing in meaning - 'artha-niṣṭha'. To remove this difficulty, it is suggested that : the *vyakti* understood by that *saṃjñā-śabda* though seems to be different when he is a child, or a young man, an old man, carries an identical name or *saṃjñā*, and hence these different *vyaktis* have a common *jāti* in form of an identical name. This 'jāti' is the meaning of a particular *saṃjñāśabda*. Thus, for all words, *śakti* resides in 'jāti' only. With this the last view is fully discussed : (pp. 433, R.G., ibid) : "*guṇa-kriyā śabdānāṃ guṇa-kriyā-gatāyāḥ, yadṛccā-śabdānāṃ ca bāla-vṛddha-śukā*"di-

udīritā-tat tat śabda-vṛttes tat-tat-samaya-bhinnārtha-vṛtter vā jāter eva abhidheyatā-sambhavāt. iti jāti-śakti darśanam” - with this ends the discussion on abhidhā in the R.G. we will pick up the thread and discuss Jagannātha's view on lakṣaṇā at its proper place in due course. For the present we will take up the views of Bhoja on abhidhā.

Bhoja : We know that Bhoja, as he lived much earlier cronologically, should have been taken up prior to Jagannātha, but as he represents, according to us, a tradition, which we call ‘the Mālava tradition’, to distinguish it from the kashmir tradition as respresented by Ānandavardhana, Abhinavagupta, Mammaṭa, Hemacandra, Vidyādhara, to mention a few, we will have to take up Bhoja separately at the end of the discussion of any given topic. This is not to suggest that Bhoja is always at cross-roads with the kashmir tradition and that he always exchanges swords with Ānandavardhana and the rest, but one thing is certain that the tradition Bhoja represents, one which we call the Mālava tradition of literary aesthetics, has certain special traits of its own. So, Bhoja will - be considered separately by us. It has to be candidly admitted that the views of Bhoja as interpreted by the great modern ālamkārika Dr. Raghavan, for whom we have tremendous respect and love, will be our sole friend, philosopher and guide so far as Bhoja is concerned. But with due respect to the great savant of indian literary criticism, we have to make an humble confession that at times we fail to understand what Dr. Raghavan explains, or at times we feel we can supplement his efforts, or in vary rare cases we may even attempt to correct his impression. In doing this, we will surely go with the text of Bhoja as read in both of his works, viz. the Sarasvati-kaṇṭhā”bharāṇa and the Śṛṅgāra-prakāśa. Our efforts should not be misunderstood by the world of scholars, for to us, Dr. Raghavan remains, and will remain for a thousand years to come, as the greatest interpreter of Bhoja, but we try to approach only in the fashion of a student with his curiocity a little more awakened as compared to a general reader. So, with pranams to both Bhoja and Dr. Rāghavan, who for us is an ‘abhinava-bhoja’, we will try to explain the concept of abhidhā, and also other śabda-vṛttis as explained by Bhoja.

It has to be noted that Bhoja has not discussed independently the topic of śabda-vṛttis in his Sarasvati-kaṇṭhā”bharāṇa, comprising of five chapters. However there could be traced stray references to the śabda-vṛttis here and there which do not carry any theoratical value, e.g. on pp. 709 (N.S. Edn. 1934 A.D.) we read : “yato rasā”kṣepāt-parihāsa-leśoktyā”maṅgalam, praviśa, piṇḍim,

dvāraṃ, bhaksaya, iti nyāyāt prasiddha-adhyāhāraḥ, 'darī vadati, mañcāḥ krośanti' iti prayogadarśanāt ādhārādheyayor abhedopacāraśca viruddha-lakṣaṇā" dibhiḥ prayujyamāno na doṣāya iti." - Such direct or indirect references to śabda-vṛttis do not carry any value for us. We will have to turn to the other work, The Śṛṅgāra-prakāśa for a comparatively more systematic approach to the topic of śabdavṛttis, though it has to be admitted at the outset, that Bhoja, in keeping with the tradition which he seems to have directly inherited from alaṃkāra writers prior to Ānandavardhana, does not treat this topic as systematically as is done by Mammaṭa and other followers of the Kashmir school. We will pick up the thread with the help of Dr. Raghavan. We propose to reach him with honest enquiry as an advanced student.

Bhoja's treatment of śabda-śaktis is part of his larger scheme of explaining what 'sāhitya' is. Dr. Raghavan thus explains : (pp. 87, Bhoja's Śr. Pra, '63) "We have already said that poetry being speech supreme, sāhitya is, between the two parts of language - śabda and Artha-relation supreme. Thus, sāhitya first means all linguistic expression and the general and inevitable grammatical and logical relations between word and sense; and then it means poetry and the poetic relations between the two. Bhoja means by sāhitya both kinds of relation and he not only deals with poetry but with language also. At the lower levels, lies language with its general sāhitya; higher up the language has risen above itself and has bloomed in poetry, and here, the sāhitya is poetic relation between word and sense. Bhoja defines kāvyā as the sāhitya or unity of word and sense.

"tat (kāvyam) punaḥ; śabdārthayoḥ; sāhityam āmananti."

tad yathā - "śabdārthau sahitaḥ kāvyam" iti.

It is to a treatment of this Sāhitya of śabda and Artha that the Śr. Pra. is devoted. Bhoja calls his work itself Sāhitya Prakāśa in Chapter XI.

yasmin aśeṣa-vidyāsthānārtha-vibhūṭayaḥ prakāśante,

saṃhṛtya, sa sāhityaprakāśa etādrśo bhavati."

(Chap. XI, pp. 430, Śr. Pra Vol. II)

The scheme of the whole work is contained in the definition, 'śabdārthau sahitaḥ kāvyam', and under the edifice of the Śr. Pra. lies the foundation and system called sāhitya. This has been already pointed out above in Ch. IV (of Śr. Pra. Raghavan). Sāhitya is thus defined by Bhoja : It is the relation between

śabda and Artha and is of twelve kinds. Eight of these twelve Sāhityas can be called general and the last four, are special and can be classed as the poetic Sāhityas.

“kim sāhityam ? yaḥ śabdārthayoḥ sambandhaḥ sa ca dvādaśadhā, - abhidhā, vivakṣā, tātpariyam, pravibhāgaḥ, vyapekṣā, sāmāthyam, anvayaḥ, ekārthī-bhāvaḥ, - doṣahānam, guṇopādānam, alaṃkārayogaḥ, rasa-aviyogaś ceti.”

Again, at the beginning of chapter VII which begins the treatment of Sāhitya, Bhoja repeats these twelve-fold relations between śabda and Artha as constituting Sāhitya.


“tatra abhidhā-vivakṣā-tātpariya-pravibhāga-vyapekṣā-sāmāthya-anvaya-ekārthībhāva-doṣahāna-guṇopādāna-alaṃkārayoga-rasa-aviyogarūpāḥ śabdārthayoḥ dvādaśa sambandhāḥ sāhityam ucyate.” Vol. I. p. 428, Śr. Pra.

Even the earlier work of Bhoja, the S.K.Ā. contains indications of this conception of sāhitya of Bhoja. The first verse of the work - “dhvanir varṇaḥ padaṃ vākyam etc. covers part of contents of chapters I-VI of the Śr. Pra. and the second verse of the S.K.Ā. gives the last four-fold poetic Sāhitya, - doṣahāna, guṇā’dāna, alaṃkārayoga, and rasāviyoga or rasānvaya; commenting on the above-said first verse of the S.K.Ā., Ratneśvara who is acquainted well with Śr. Pra. says : - tad ayam atra tātpariya-samkṣepaḥ. - sāhitya-nirūpanāya kila eṣa granthā”rambhaḥ. sāhityam ca śabdārthayoḥ sambandhaḥ tatra śabda eva ka ityapekṣāyām ayam vibhāgo dhvanir ityā”di. arthas tu stambha-kumbha-ādi-lakṣaṇaḥ loke śāstre ca prasiddhaḥ. sambandhaḥ kaścid anādiḥ. sarvasvāyamānas tu sambandhaḥ nānyatreṭi asminnāyatate. sa caturvidhaḥ - doṣahānam, guṇopādānam, alaṃkārayogaḥ, rasābhi(vi)yogaś ceti.”

Ratneśvara on S.K.Ā.I. i.

This rather long quotation from Dr. Raghavan brings out how ambitious project Bhoja has set himself to. By taking Sāhitya in its widest sense as “coming together of word and meaning”, he wants to cover under this banner both poetry (i.e. kāvya) and non-poetry (i.e. śāstra and loka-bhāṣā). So, Bhoja first takes Sāhitya merely as relation between word and sense in general and includes under it two sets of relations, grammatical and poetical. Among the eight grammatical relations four are classed as kevala-śabda - sambandha-śaktis and the other four as sāpekṣa-śabda-sambandha-śaktis. Dr. Raghavan (pp. 88 ibid) gives the following table to

explain Bhoja's classification :



The first eight go under the name of śabda-saṃbandha-śaktis. Dr. Raghavan notes that in Bhoja, (pp. 89, ibid) Abhidhā comprises the three vṛttis, Mūkhyā, Gaunī, and Lakṣaṇā. Vivakṣā is of three kinds - kākṣā"di-vyaṅgyā, prakaraṇā"di-vyaṅgyā and abhinayā"di-vyaṅgyā. In Tatparya is included the pratiyamāna and Dhvani. (See below, Chapter XII on Bhoja and Dhvani). These eight śabda-saṃbandhas are treated in chapters VII and VIII. Poetic Sāhitya begins in chapter IX.

With this explanation furnished by Dr. Raghavan, we will start our investigation as to what exactly Bhoja wants to cover under 'abhidhā' and whether his treatment is more, or equally or less scientific as compared to Mammata's scheme.

When it is observed by Dr. Raghavan that Bhoja's abhidhā covers three vṛttis viz. mūkhyā, gaunī, and lakṣaṇā, we feel that Bhoja seems to be under the influence of such writers as Mukula and even Mahimā, who take lakṣaṇā only as part of abhidhā. For Mukula, the ten-fold abhidhā covered the field of a-mukhyā vṛtti also. On the face of it the treatment in the works of Mammata and his followers belonging to the kashmir tradition, seems to be more scientific.

Bhoja (pp. 223, Edn. Josyer, Ch. VII) says :

“tatra abhidhā-vivakṣā... dvādaśa samarthāḥ sāhityaṃ iti ucyate.” - Then he proceeds -

“teṣu śabdasya arthābhidhāyini śaktir abhidhā. tayā svarūpa iva abhidheya pravartamānaḥ śabdo vṛtti-trayeṇa vartate, tās ca-mukhyā, gaunī, lakṣaṇā iti tisrah.” - We have a quarrel with the very first statement which is loose. When Bhoja defines abhidhā as, “śabdasya arthābhidhāyini śaktiḥ” - he fails to discriminate between the directly expressed sense, called samketitārtha, the indicated sense or lakṣyārtha and the suggested sense called vyaṅgyārtha in the kashmir school of thought. Even Kuntaka's ‘vicitrā abhidhā’ covered all these three under one banner. May be we are in a frame of mind, or we have inherited a mind-set that tends to appreciate more the system as presented by Ānanda-Abhinava-Mammāṭa-Jagannātha-led school of thought.

Bhoja then proceeds as follows : (pp. 233, ibid) “tatra sāksād avyavahitārthā-bhidhāyikā mukhyā. gamyamā”na-śauryā”di-guṇa-yoga-vyavahitārthā gaunī svārthāvinābhūta-arthāntaropalakṣaṇā tu lakṣaṇā iti. tathā hi gaur iti ayaṃ śabdo mukhyayā vṛtṭyā sāsnā”di-mantaṃ arthaṃ pratipādayati sa eva tiṣṭhan-mūtratā”di-guṇa-sampadam apekṣamāṇo yadā bāhlike vartate tadā gaunīm vṛttim anuvadati.”

So, it is clear that Bhoja's mukhyā is the ‘abhidhā’ proper of the kashmir school. Gaunī and lakṣaṇā are treated by Mammāṭa as part of a-mukhyā vṛtti, i.e. lakṣaṇā which is for him six-fold, sad-vidhā. But Bhoja takes these two as extension of his wider abhidhā, as done by Mukula. Perhaps even the earlier Mīmāṃsakas also took lakṣaṇā (including gaunī) as extension of abhidhā. Bhoja keeps gaunī reserved for relations - ‘tadyoga’ as put by the kashmir school, - based on similarity, and his lakṣaṇā is characterised by such meaning which is another one following from the svārtha. So, ‘tadyoga’ is accepted even by Bhoja here. He illustrates gaunī by the same illustration such as “gaur vāhikāḥ” (= bāhlikāḥ). One who urinates while standing, like a bull, is called ‘gaur’, due to similarity. The kashmir school seeks comparison in ‘jāḍya and māṇḍya’ - dullness and stupidity as seen in both.

Bhoja further observes :

tad āha -

“rūḍhyā yatra sad arthópi
loke śabdo niveśitaḥ
sa mukhyas tat sāmīyāt
gauṇónyatra skhalad-gatiḥ”

yadā tu śabdaḥ svārthataḥ kriyāsiddhau sādhanā-bhāvaṃ gantum asamarthaḥ, tadā abhidheya-avinābhūtaṃ arthāntaram lakṣayati. tadā sā ca lakṣaṇā vṛttiḥ. yathā gaṅgāyām ghoṣaḥ prativasati. atra gaṅgā-śabdo viśiṣṭodaka-pravāhe nirūḍhābhīdhāna-śaktiḥ. sa ca ghoṣa-kartṛkāyāḥ prativasana-kriyāyā adhikarāṇa-bhāvaṃ gantum asamarthaḥ, svārthāvinābhūtaṃ tatam lakṣayati.” (pp. 223, ibid)

This means Bhoja is absolutely clear about the concepts of abhidhā, and also gauṇī and lakṣaṇā and surely he had read what Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta had written. But he chooses a different tradition which recognises ‘gauṇī’ as an independent vṛtti from lakṣaṇā, as seen later also in Hemacandra. But what Bhoja does is still different. Over and above taking gauṇī and lakṣaṇā as separate functions, he clubs them together as extension of abhidhā and thus his abhidhā is wide enough to contain these two in its fold. This is, as observed earlier, like Mukula.

He then quotes from Kumarila viz. “abhidheyāvinābhūta-pratītir lakṣaṇā” and calls it the life of artful expression : “sā eṣā vidagdha-vakrokti-jīvitam.” Now this expression makes it clear that he appreciates the concept of ‘vicitrā-abhidhā’ of Kuntaka, and in the same way he absorbs the influence of Vāmana also. Who suggested : “sādṛśyāt lakṣaṇā vakroktiḥ”. (KSV. IV. iii 8).

Bhoja then attempts the classification of the three-fold abhidhā, out of which the first viz. mukhyā, which is pure abhidhā for the kashmir school, is two-fold : “tatra mukhyā dvidhā, tathā-bhūtārthā, tad-bhāvā”pattīś ca” (pp. 223, ibid). Then, he proceeds : “tathā bhūtārthā śoḍhā, jāti-viśayā, vyakti-viśayā, ākṛti-viśayā, guṇa-viśayā, kriyā-viśayā sambandha-viśayāś ca iti.”

Now, it may be said that the divisions and subdivisions suggested here and also elsewhere normally are six or twelve. This is Bhoja’s special feature. Again, here also, the sub-divisions of ‘tathābhūtārthā mukhyā’ which are six, go by the difference in the nature of the objects described. These are broad divisions seen in the word and there is hardly anything special to be noted. Though Bhoja has taken ‘sāhitya’ in a very wide sense and his concept covers śāstra-bhāṣā and loka-bhāṣā

or vyavahāra-bhāṣā i.e. language in general also, we may say to his credit that he has drawn illustrations from poetry only. 'Sambandha-viṣayā' is illustrated from the Vikramorvaśyam where Puraravas is said to be the grand son of Son and Moon. But our observation stands that the varieties enumerated by Bhoja, all follow the nature of the object under description. Thus if a guṇa is described, it is guṇa-viṣayā, if a kriyā is described it is kriyā-viṣayā, and so on. We may say this is just Bhoja's love for hair-splitting.

'tadbhāvā'patti' variety of mukhyā is explained as : "arthasya a-tathātve adhyāsā'dibhiḥ tathātvā"pādanam tad-bhāvā"pattiḥ." (pp. 224, ibid). This again is six-fold such as - "śāpi ṣoḍhā, adhyāsā"tmikā, kalpanā"tmikā, vivartā"tmikā, vipariṇāmā"tmikā, viparyayā"tmikā, pravādā"tmikā ca iti."

The adhyāsā"tmikā is illustrated by "kalamam anambhasi, kamale ca kuvalaye"... etc. (pp. 225). We know that in the K.P. of Mammaṭa, this is a famous illustration of the figure atīśayokti. Thus, Bhoja has quoted famous illustrations every where which we would put under this or that alamkāra. The Kashmir school, as we know, puts the whole of 'alamkāra' - under vācya-vācaka-bhāva, with some under current of vyañjanā or vyaṅgyārtha in many alamkāras such as samāsokti, ākṣepa, paryāyokta, aprastuta-praśamsā etc. So, they are a 'vācya-vācaka-bhāva-vivarta' for those who follow the kashmir school of thought. Dr. Raghavan should have gone for such critical and comparative study of Bhoja's concept of Śabda-vṛtti. 'mithyājñāna' seems to be, for example, not different from niścayānta sa-saṁdeha, or bhrāntimān alamkāra (pp. 225, ibid). The 'pravāda' variety is illustrated by the famous verse from the Megha-dūta, viz. "ratna-cchāyā-vyatikara iva..." (pp. 226, ibid), which is for us a beautiful utprekṣā in "barheṇa iva sphurita-rucinā gopa-veśasya viṣṇoḥ."

Bhoja then proceeds with the second variety of abhidhā, viz. 'gauṇī' as (pp. 226, ibid) : "gauṇī dvidividhā. guṇa-nimittā, upacāra-nimittā ca. tatra yasyām dvayor vacanayoḥ sāmānādhikaranyena vaiyadhikaranyena vā prayogaḥ, viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya-bhāvānyathā'nupapattyaikasya pratiyamāna-abhidhīyamāna-guṇa-dvārakah sambandho bhavati, sā guṇa-vyavahitārthā guṇa-nimittā." guṇaḥ svārtho viśeṣaṇam pravṛtti-ākṛti-jāti-svarūpā"di bhedād anantaḥ. tat sambandhena yady api tannimittā vṛttir ananta-prakārā eva kalpyate, tathāpi tasyaḥ ṣaḍ eva vikalpā bhavanti. mukhya-viṣayaḥ, amukhya-viṣayaḥ, bheda-viṣayaḥ, abheda-viṣayaḥ, viśeṣaṇa-viṣayaḥ, a-viśeṣaṇa-viṣayaḥ, iti."

Now this again confirms our observation that the divisions and sub-divisions suggested by Bhoja go with the nature of the thing described. There is hardly any logical divide. Bhoja also knows that there can be innumerable varieties that go

with difference in the nature of the thing described. But he insists on six only. So, virtually there is no rhyme or rhythm in Bhoja's varieties except of course the outward system of dividing a point into six or twelve sub-varieties.

The 'upacāra' variety of gaunī which is also six fold is explained as (pp. 229, ibid) : "mukhyayā gaunīyā vā anya-viśeṣaṇasya satōnyatra āropaṇaṃ upacāraḥ" tannimittaka-upacāra-nimittā. sā tu gauṇa-vyavahitārthatvāt gaunī bhavati, tasyā api dharma-guṇa-ākṛti-kriyā-svarūpa-jātyā"dayaḥ pravṛtti-nimitta-rad-bhedāt. sāpi ṣaḍ-prakāra bhavati-dharma-nimittā, guṇa-nimittā, ākṛti-nimittā, kriyā-nimittā, svarūpa-nimittā, jātinimittā ca."

We are reminded of the words of Viśvanātha in his Sāhityadarpaṇa (S.D. II. 9. vṛtti) viz. "upacāro nāma atyantam viśakalitayoḥ padārthayoḥ sādṛśyātīśaya-mahimnā bheda-pratīti-sthagana-mātram."

Bhoja holds that lakṣaṇā is basically two-fold : (pp. 233, ibid) - "lakṣaṇā lakṣita-lakṣaṇā ca. tayoṛ yasyām upātta-śabdasya arthasya kriyāsiddhau sādhanatva-ayogāt svārthōvinā-bhūtaṃ arthāntaram vyavahitaṃ eva lakṣayati sā lakṣaṇā, tad-vyatirikṭā tu vakṣyamāṇa-anekarūpā lakṣita-lakṣaṇā iti.

tatra lakṣaṇā ṣoḍhā. sāmīpya-lakṣaṇā, sāhacarya-lakṣaṇā, saha-carita-lakṣaṇā, hetulakṣaṇā, tādārthya-lakṣaṇā, parimāṇa-lakṣaṇā ca.

lakṣita-lakṣaṇāpi ṣoḍhaiva. rūḍha-lakṣaṇā, pratīka-lakṣaṇā, vivakṣita-lakṣaṇā, viruddha-lakṣaṇā, tad-anya-lakṣaṇā, prakīrṇa-lakṣaṇā ca.

It is surprising that Bhoja refuses to go beyond lakṣaṇā, especially in varieties called 'vivakṣita-lakṣaṇā' and 'viruddha-lakṣaṇā' which normally for a follower of the kashmir school, takes us further to vyañjanā and vyaṅgyārtha. Dr. Raghavan has also not discussed all this in details. On the contrary he has not at all chosen to treat the topic of śabdavṛttis in Bhoja as an independent topic. Bhoja's illustration of vivakṣita-lakṣaṇā follows his explanation of this variety such as : "yatra yathā-kathamcit śabdaprayoge vivakṣitaṃ eva lakṣyānusārato lakṣyate sā vivakṣita-lakṣaṇā" (pp. 235, ibid) - The illustrations cited are - 'manasija-jaitra-ratham', etc. and, 'cakita-hariṇī-hāri-netra-tribhāgaḥ." Bhoja observes (pp. 235 ibid) - 'atra na ardha-śabdasya tribhāga-śabdasya arthaḥ, kiṃtu, tābhyām asamagrā"lokanam lakṣyate. na hi bhavati netra-caturbhāgo netra-ṣaḍbhāgo vā iti."

Bhoja does not go beyond lakṣaṇā here. We know that Ānandavardhana has quoted the verse viz. vṛḍāyogānnata, etc. with its fourth line ending in, "...hāri-netra-tribhāgaḥ" once under Dhv. III. 3, 4; - with the words : "padāvayavena dyotanam yathā." Thus the part 'tribhāgaḥ' of the whole compound is for him

suggestive of 'rasa'. Elsewhere under Dhv. III. 33 also this illustration is quoted to explain how 'ceṣṭāviśeṣa' becomes suggestive of śṛṅgāra-rasa. Under I. 19, Kuntaka also picks up this illustration to demonstrate - viśeṣaṇa-vakratva, a variety of pada-pūrvārdha-vakratā. But Bhoja seems to be satisfied only with the secondary sense here, which is for him only 'a-samagra-ālokanam'. Similarly Bhoja's tad-anyalakṣaṇā, which is illustrated by the famous verse : "suvarṇa-puṣpām prthivīm..." etc. also ends with lakṣyārtha only. Says he - "atra na suvarṇa-śabdārtho, na - api puṣpa-śabdārthaḥ kiṃtu suvarṇa-śabdena sarva-puruṣārtha-mūlaṃ hiraṇyaṃ, puṣpa-śabdena ca prasavārtho lakṣyate. tābhyāṃ ca lakṣitābhyāṃ vyavasāyināṃ puruṣa-viśeṣaṇāṃ vasumatī sarvān kāmān prasūta iti." Bhoja does not go beyond this while we know that this verse is given by Ānandavardhana under Dhv. I. 13, as an illustration of 'a-vivakṣita-vācya-dhvani.' Abhinavagupta in his Locana on this explains both lakṣaṇā and vyañjanā such as - (pp. 78, Edn. Dr. Nandi, Ahd. '97, '98) "suvarṇāni puṣpyati iti suvarṇa-puṣpā. etac ca vākyam eva a-sambhavad-svārthaṃ iti kṛtvā avivakṣita-vācyam. tata eva padārthaṃ abhidhāya anvayaṃ ca tātparya-śaktyā avagamayya eva, bādhakavaśena taṃ upahatya sādrśyāt sulabhasamṛddhi-sambhāra-janatāṃ lakṣayati. tal lakṣaṇāprayojanam śura-kṛtavidya-sevakānāṃ prāśastyaṃ a-śabda-vācyaṛvena gopyamānam san nāyikā-kuca-kalaśa-yugalam iva mahārghatāṃ upanayan dhvanyate iti." We do not know why Bhoja stops at lakṣaṇā only. But one thing is clear that though Bhoja does not mention 'vyaṅgyārtha' by name, he very much knows the same. In a number of illustrations of lakṣita-lakṣaṇā this is borne out. He observes (pp. 236, ibid) - "anye punaḥ lakṣita-lakṣaṇāṃ anyathā vyācakṣate. lakṣaṇayā upacarita-vṛttyā gaun'yābhihitārthena yatra arthāntaram lakṣyate sā lakṣita-lakṣaṇā iti." He illustrates such a variety by 'rathāṅganāma', 'paṅkti-rathaḥ' etc. Then he gives poetic illustrations which for us are charged with vyañjanā also, a name which he does not mention. For example in, "parimlānam pīna-stana..." etc. we have 'vadati bisinī-patra-śayanam.' Bhoja has a note (pp. 237, ibid) : "atra vadati iti anena upacāra-vṛttyā jñāpayati iti, parimlānam ityā" dibhiḥ tad-dharmaḥ tanu-sanniveśa-cārutvotkarṣo lakṣyate." Mammaṭa has quoted this verse as an illustration of prasāda-guṇa (K.P. VIII), while Ānandavardhana, under Dhv. I. 14, takes it as an illustration of 'upacarita-śabda-vṛtti'. Says he, "yatra hi vyañjakatva-kṛtaṃ mahat-sauṣṭhavaṃ nāsti tatrāpi upacarita-śabda-vṛttyā prasiddhy-anurodha-pravartita-vyavahārāḥ kavayo drśyante". Read Abhinavagupta (Locana, pp. 82, Edn. Dr. Nandi) on this : "vayaṃ tu brūmaḥ - prasiddhyāṃ prayojanasya a-nighūḍhatā ity arthaḥ. uttānena api rūpeṇa, tat-prayojanan cakāsan nighūḍhatāṃ nidhānavad apekṣate iti bhāvaḥ." Bhoja also cites the verse : 'niśvāsāndha ivā"darśaḥ candramā

na prakāśate' and adds (pp. 237, ibid) - "atra yathā andhe rūpa-viśeśābhivyaṅgī na sambhāvyate, evaṃ tamasi api yo rūpa-grahaṇāśamarthaḥ sōndha ucyate. tatra upacarita-vṛttyā yōndhavat na paśyati sa evāndha iti ucyate. iha yatra kimcit na drśyate tatrā'pi andha-śabdōpalakṣita-lakṣaṇayā pravartate. We know that Ānandavardhana cites this verse (Dhv. II. i) as an illustration of atyanta-tiraskṛta-vācya-dhvani. With this we come to the end of Bhoja's concept of abhidhā, which includes mukhyā (i.e. abhidhā proper), gauṇī and lakṣaṇā. Bhoja as observed earlier does not treat it as a special topic as is done by ālamkārikas of the kashmir school of thought, but it falls under the twelve types of 'sāhitya' or relation of word and meaning in general, and of course as his illustrations suggest, with a special reference to the poetic use of word and meaning also. With this Bhoja's treatment of abhidhā is screened. His approach to vyañjanā will be examined in due course when we will discuss the concept of vyañjanā. (Ch. 5 VIII, IX)

Mukula and others : We may compare Bhoja's approach, as noted above to that of Mukula Bhaṭṭa, Kuntaka and also Mahima Bhaṭṭa, because these three writers also do not fall in line with the so called kashmir school of thought. Though of course Mukula and Kuntaka were definitely Bhoja's predecessors, Mahimā was perhaps almost a senior contemporary. The consideration of these writers also is taken up here in this chapter, due to the reason that they also do not fall in line with the kashmir tradition. As it is, they are all pre-Mammata, but of course unique in their approach and Bhoja was under their influence. We examine Mukula Bhaṭṭa first.

Mukula Bhaṭṭa, to the best of our knowledge, has contributed a single work called the "Abhidhā-vṛtta-māṭṛkā." Mukula virtually accepts two śabda-vṛttis such as abhidhā and lakṣaṇā, but the latter is also an extension of, and therefore part of abhidhā for him, and is broad enough to include even vyañjanā.

In the very first kārikā he observes :

“śabdavyāpārato yasya
pratītiḥ tasya mukhyatā
arthāvasēyasya punar
lakṣyamāṇatvaṃ ucyate.” - AVM. I. pp. 2

(Edn. Dr. R. P. Dwivedi, Chowkhamba Vidyābhavan, '73)

He further observes : (pp. 2, ibid) “śabda-vyāpārād yasyāvagatis tasya mukhyatvam. sa hi yathā sarvebhyo hastā'dibhyōvayavebhyāḥ pūrvam mukham

avalokyate, tadvad eva sarvebhyah pratiyamānebhyah arthāntarebhyah pūrvam avagamyate. tasmān mukhaṃ iva mukhya iti śākhādiyāntena mukhya-śabdena abhidhīyate. tasya udāharaṇaṃ, 'gaur anubandhya' iti. atra hi go-śabda-vyāpārāt yāga-sādhana-bhūtā go-tva-lakṣaṇā jātir avagamyate. atas tasyāḥ mukhyatā. tad evaṃ śabda-vyāpāra-gamyo mukhyo'rthaḥ." i.e. - "The apprehension of which is derived through the function of employment of a word is termed mukhya i.e. principal. It is said to be 'mukhya' because as is mukha i.e. face seen first as compared to hands and other limbs, in the same way that meaning also is apprehended first in comparison will all other meanings apprehended. So, 'that which is like 'mukha' or 'face' is termed 'mukhya' i.e. principal, which is formed with the help of Pāṇini sūtra 5/3/103, viz. "śākhādibhyo yaḥ" - which recommends 'ya' suffix which is in the sense of comparison and seen in words such as 'śākhā' etc. The illustration is, "gaur anubandhyaḥ" i.e. 'the cow/ox may be fixed for a sacrifice.' Here, 'go' is a word, and due to its employment gotva-jāti is apprehended as instrument for performing a sacrifice. So, the mukhyatā or principality will be fixed with reference to 'go-jāti'. From this illustration, it is understood that the meaning viz. 'gotva-ādi-rūpa' which is derived by the function of the word 'gauḥ' is its mukhya i.e. principal meaning.

But, observes Mukala, that is called 'lākṣaṇika' or secondary, whose apprehension follows the examination of a meaning derived through śabda-vyāpāra - "yasya tu śabda-vyāpāra-avagamyārtha-paryālocanayā avagatis tasya lākṣaṇikarvam. yathā pūrvasmin eva udāharaṇe vyakteḥ." - Mukula thus holds that the meaning of go-vyati or individual cow follows the first apprehension of go-jāti, and therefore the go-vyakti-jñāna is lākṣaṇika for him. Mukula holds that - (pp. 2, 3, ibid) : "sā hi na śabda-vyāpārād avasīyate, 'viśeṣyaṃ nābhidhā gacched kṣīṇa-śaktir viśeṣaṇe' iti nyāyāt śabdasya jātimātra-paryavasitatvāt. jātis tu vyaktiṃ antareṇa yāga-sādhana-bhāvaṃ na pratipadyate iti śabda-pratyāyita-jāti-sāmarthyād atra jāter āśraya-bhūtā vyaktir ākṣipyate. tena asau lākṣaṇikī. evaṃ ayaṃ mukhya-lākṣaṇikā"tma-viśayopavarṇana-dvāreṇa śabdasya abhidhā-vyāpāro dvividhaḥ pratipādito, niranantarārtha-niṣṭhaḥ, śāntarārtha-niṣṭhas' ca."

Mukula holds that go-vyakti is not understood through the function of a word, because there is an all accepted dictum that, "abhidhā can express only one of the two viz. viśeṣaṇa or viśeṣya. If it conveys viśeṣaṇa then it cannot express viśeṣya, for the whole of its capacity is exhausted in apprehending viśeṣaṇa alone. Following this principle, in the said illustration, the word 'go' has a capacity to convey only

'gotva-jāti'. When the apprehender thinks that 'jāti' by itself, cannot be instrumental in the act of sacrifice, without its reference to the 'go-vyati', then this 'go-vyakti' is covered by ākṣepa i.e. implication (= i.e. either by anumāna or inference, or arthāpatti). Thus the meaning of go-vyakti is said to be "lakṣaṇika", according to Mukula. He further observes that thus by the discription of two aspects such as 'mukhya' and 'lakṣaṇika', two fold abhidhāvyāpāra of a word is established. The first (mukhya) flows directly from the word without anything coming in between, and is therefore said to be 'nirantarārtha-niṣṭha' i.e. directly apprehended from a word. The other is termed "sāntarārtha-niṣṭha" as it passes through a veil. It starts from word - goes through mukhyārtha i.e. jāti - and rests in vyakti at the next step. It is 'sāntarārtha-niṣṭha' because it has antara=vyavadhāna, in form of first meaning which is jāti-rūpa.

Mukula accepts a four-fold division of abhidhā : (pp. 4, ibid) - samprati mukhyābhidhā-vyāparasya cāturvidhyam abhidhīyate"

"tatra mukhyas' caturbhedo

jñeyo jātyā"di-bhedataḥ."

Mukula says that the Mahābhāṣyakāra has suggested a four-fold classification of words in form of jāti-śabda, guṇa-śabda, kriyā-śabda and yadṛcchā-śabda. When words operate to convey their meaning (svārthābhidhānāya pravarttamānānām), they are coloured by the upādhis i.e. attributes - upādhy - uparañjita-viśaya-vivekatvād upādhi-nibandhanā pravṛttiḥ. This upādhi i.e. attribute is two-fold, viz. vaktr-sanniveśita, i.e. which is grafted by the speaker, i.e. which is not natural to it, and 'vastu-dharma' i.e. one that naturally resides in an object. The first is illustrated by such words as 'dittha' and the like. The form of such words is collected by the last letter - "antya-buddhi-nirgrāhyam saṃhṛtakramam svarūpam" (pp. 5, ibid). This capacity to yield meaning is injected into a particular word by a speaker, who wants to flash the abhidhā-power of that particular word according to his own choice. - "tat khalu tām tām abhidhāśaktim abhivyañjayatā vaktrā, yadṛcchayā tasmin tasmin saṃjñini upādhitayā saṃniveśyate." (pp. 5)

It may be noted that as Mukula was posterior to Ānandavardhana, he knew vyañjanā very well and yet he willingly disowns it. He uses such words as "abhi-vyañjayatā", but he does not encourage 'vyañjanā śakti' of a word. He only means, "making it manifest, or making it flash something."

Mukula considers another view point also. Says he - some people hold that no such 'saṃhṛta-krama-svarūpa' is injected into the 'saṃjñā' because there cannot be such form independent of 'da' kāra, etc. Thus it being 'abhāvā'tmaka', it virtually does not exist. For these people, the yadṛcchā-śabdatva of such words as 'dittha' and the like is also formed because for them also words such as 'dittha' and the like, having imagined (kalpita) samudāyabhāva, come into exercise for 'abhidhāna' of whatever saṃjñā is desired, through the power manifested through the speaker's desire. The idea is, in the object which is called by the name of dittha, even if some imagined 'dittha-tva' is not there, in the sense of the meaning conveyed by this particular word, the word dittha itself will be taken as its meaning. (pp. 5) : 'yeṣāṃ api ca 'da' - kāra"di-varṇa-vyatirikta-saṃhṛta-krama-svarūpābhāvāt na ditthā"di-śabda-svarūpaṃ, saṃhṛta-kramaṃ saṃjñīṣu adhyavasyate, - iti darśanam, teṣāṃ api vaktr-yadṛcchā'-bhivyajyamāna-śaktibhedānusāreṇa kālpanika-samudāya-rūpasya ditthā"deh śabdasya tat tat saṃjñābhidhānāya pravartamānatvāt yadṛcchā śabdatvaṃ ditthā"dināṃ upapadyata eva."

Mukul of course, sides with the earlier view of the vaiyākaraṇas.

vastu-dharma-rūpa upādhi is also two-fold; 'sādhya' and 'siddha'. The former are the words expressing action-i.e. they are kriyāśabdas, e.g. 'pacati' and the like. The latter i.e. 'siddha upādhi' is also two fold such as 'jāti' and 'guṇa'. 'Jāti' is said to be prāṇa-prada-vastudharma. No object can own its form without its relation with 'jāti'. So, 'jāti' is said to be 'prāṇaprada-siddha-vastudharma'. Mukul quotes Vākyapadiya : "gaur iti; na hi gauḥ svarūpeṇa gauḥ, nāpya-gauḥ. gotvābhisambandhāt tu gauḥ." Some attribute (upādhi) becomes the cause of viśeṣā"dhāna for an object which has obtained its own form : (pp. 5, ibid) : "kaścit punar upādhir labdha-svarūpasya-vastunaḥ viśeṣā"dhānaheṭuḥ, yathā śūklā"dir guṇaḥ." i.e. - like 'guṇa' in form of whiteness etc. These qualities such as whiteness etc. are not responsible for the object to attain its own form. For that only 'jāti' is capable. But after the attainment of its own form, it becomes instrumental in its 'viśeṣā"dhāna' - i.e. in laying down further its speciality. The 'guṇa's such as 'paramāṇurva' - 'atom-ness' or the quality of being an atom, which are permanent (i.e. nitya), are also varieties of 'guṇa' - "teṣāṃ api sarveṣāṃ guṇa-jātyivatvāt, they are also of the same type as these, i.e. śūkatva and the like. As they are 'nitya' they may be like 'jāti', but because they are 'viśeṣā"dhānaheṭu', they are termed guṇas, and not jāti. Thus Mukula concludes : (pp. 6, ibid) - "tad evaṃ prāṇa-prado'pādhi-nibandhanatvaṃ yasya śabdasya sa jāti-śabdo yathā gavā"diḥ. yasmāt labdha-svarūpasya vastuno viśeṣā"dhāna-heṭuḥ arthaḥ pratīyate, sa guṇa-śabdo yathā śūklā"diḥ."

We may observe that these words are taken up fully by Mammaṭa. So, Mukula not only serves as a shaping influence for Bhoja but also for Mammaṭa to some extent because he, i.e. Mukula follows the lead of the grammarians such as Patañjali and Bhartṛhari.

Now, Mukula considers a pūrva-pakṣa. It goes like this - Is it not possible that words connoting 'guṇa', 'kriyā' or 'yadṛcchā' - all can be taken as jāti-śabda ? For example take the word śukla. Now the whiteness in milk, conch, balākā (= name of a bird), etc. is really different but a common word 'śukla' is used for a variety of white colour. Thus 'jāti-nibandhanatva' - of 'guṇa-vācī' words is seen. This can be said of kriyā śabdās also. The kriyā of cooking in case of molasses, sesamum, rice etc. is different yet it is conveyed by the same word viz., 'pacati'. The yadṛcchā words such as 'dittha' etc. as spoken by humans, parrots etc. are really different and yet because of jāti i.e. 'dittha-śabdātva' they are taken to be one. So, as a result the 'catuṣṭayī pravṛtti' of words does not hold good : "ataś ca guṇa-kriyā yadṛcchā-śabdānām api jāti-śabdātvaṭ catuṣṭayī śabdānām pravṛttir na upapadyate." (pp. 9, ibid)

The siddhāntin's answer follows : It is not 'jāti' or 'class' which results in cognition of identity in case of guṇa-śabdās or kriyāśabdās. But it is 'saṃjñī' i.e. the individual who makes for this sense of identity. The difference seen among individuals is the result of their difference in attributes, i.e. the āśraya or substratum. For example, take a face, which when reflected in oil, sword, water or mirror, which are responsible only for the knowledge of the reflections, make for difference seen in the figures seen in them. In the same way, the individual quality such as whiteness etc., owing to difference with reference to time, place, and context, and thus due to difference in medium, 'kāraṇabheda' - appear different when vested in a conch, and the like. The colour looks, as though different. But thereby 'śuklatva' - 'jāti' is not proved to have existence. For 'jāti' is that one 'dharma' which resides in many. But the substratum of the imagined śuklatva jāti, viz. śukla-vyakti is basically one and identical. Same is the case with such words as 'pacati', 'dittha', etc. Thus the 'vyakti' in form of pāka-kriyā is one and the same, and so also the individual-saṃjñī-named 'dittha'. The illusory manifoldness - nānātva-seen in different stages of pāka-kriyā, or in an individual at different years such as of a child, young boy, young man, etc. etc. - makes for this wrong perception of jāti in such cases. This is not real. Says Mukula : (pp. 10, ibid) - "atra api ekasyā eva pākā"di-kriyā-vyakteḥ, ditthā"di-śabda-vyakteḥ, ditthā"deś ca saṃjñīno yathā-kramam abhivyañjakānām pākā"dinām tathā dhvanīnām vayoṽvasthā-viśeṣānām

kaumārā”dīnām ca yo bhedas tad vaśena nānāvidhena rūpeṇa avabhāsamānatvāt sthitaṃ etat śabda-pravṛtti-nimittānāṃ śabdārthas’ catur vidhaḥ iti.”

After this Mukula turns to the second variety of abhidhā, i.e. lakṣaṇika abhidhā. This also is two fold. The AVM 2B reads :

“śuddhopacāra-miśratvāt
lakṣaṇā dvividhā matā.”

Because of its being either śuddha i.e. pure or upacāramiśra, i.e. with (metaphorical) expression, lakṣaṇā is two-fold. The illustrations are ‘gaṅgāyām ghoṣaḥ’ and ‘gaur vāhikāḥ’ respectively. The śuddha-lakṣaṇā is also divided two-fold, such as upādāna-lakṣaṇā i.e. inclusive indication and lakṣaṇa-lakṣaṇā i.e. exclusive indication. (AVM. 3A). Mukula suggests that when something else is imposed to support one thing : sva-siddhyarthatayā”kṣepo yatra vastvantarasya tat (AVM. 3B) - This is called upādānam; or ‘inclusive’ variety. The other is the opposite of this (AVM. IV. A) : lakṣaṇaṃ tu tad-viparyāsato matam.” This is exclusive type. We know that all this has been accepted by Mammaṭa without challenging. But the illustration that Mukula cites for upādāna-lakṣaṇa viz. “gaur-anuvandhyaḥ” is rejected by Mammaṭa. It is taken as ‘arthāpatti’ or presumption or inference from circumstances, i.e. implication, for in the illustration cited by Mukula we cannot show either rūḍhi or prayojana which is the basis of lakṣaṇā. Mammaṭa also feels that śabda-pramāṇa is resorted to only when other pramāṇas do not operate. Here, go-vyakti in the present illustration of ‘gaur-anuvandhyaḥ’ is known through implication. So it is no use utilizing a śabda-vṛtti here.

Lakṣaṇa-lakṣaṇā occurs when one’s meaning is sacrificed to obtain the other sense, as in “gaṅgāyām ghoṣaḥ”.

Mukula proceeds to give a four-fold division of upacāra-miśrā lakṣaṇā (AVM. 4B-5A). He says :

“āropā’dhyavasānābhyām
śuddha-gaunopacārayoḥ (4B) AVM.
pratyekaṃ bhidyamānatvāt
upacāraś caturvidhaḥ.” (5A) AVM.

Thus superimposition (āropa) and introsusception (adhvasāna) make for these varieties. Thus in all four-fold upacāra-metaphorical imposition - is available.

Thus Mukula first begins with upacāra or identification as śuddha and gauna. Śuddha is that which has no upamāna-upameya-bhāva or similarity at its basis. The

guṇa in form of similarity is absent here. This is illustrated by such examples as 'āyur ghṛtam' where kārya-kāraṇabhāva-is at its base. Gauṇa upacāra, or identification based on guṇa such as similarity between upamāna and upameya which results in superimposition of the śabda and artha describing upamāna on that concerning upameya, is illustrated as in "gaur vāhikāḥ".

Now this two-fold upacāra or or identification is also two-fold on the basis of adhyāropa or superimposition and adhyavasāna or absorption, i.e. partial and complete identification. Adhyāropa or partial imposition occurs when the difference between the object superimposed and the basic object on which superimposition is done, is not concealed, i.e. the difference between the two is not eroded. Here a lesser object whose identity is not covered up is seen clearly and on this object, another object of superior quality is superimposed. This is called 'adhyāropa'. This is illustrated in both the illustrations i.e. 'āyur ghṛtam' and 'gaur-vāhikāḥ' cited above. Prior to this Mukula had made one remark that : kecit tu upacāre śabdopacāram eva manyante, na arthopacāram. tad ayuktam. śabdopacārasya arthopacāra-avinābhāvitvāt." (pp. 16) i.e. only śabdopacāra is not possible as believed by some, because it necessarily involves 'arthopacāra'. It may also be observed that when Mukula says (pp. 16), dvividhaḥ upacāraḥ; śuddho gauṇas ca. tatra śuddho yatra mūla-bhūtasya..." This suggests that Mukula is in favour of taking only upacāra based on similarity as real upacāra. In Mammaṭa's mind this impression was lying at the root. It is therefore that by the end of his discussion on upādāna-lakṣaṇā and lakṣaṇa-lakṣaṇā, he writes : "ubhayarūpā ca iyaṁ śuddhā, upacāreṇa a-miśratvāt. So, for Mammaṭa also 'upacāra' is basically rooted in similarity. Precisely for this, Mammaṭa does not use the term 'upacāra' while treating sāropā and sādhyavasānikā. Mammaṭa also did not favour the upacāra which was śabda-gata.

Mukula explains 'āropa' and 'adhyavasāna' as : (pp. 18, ibid) : "yatra adhyāropya-āropa viśayayor bhedaṁ anapahnūtyaiva vastvantare vastvantaram upacaryate tatra an-apahnūta-svarūpa eva vastvantare vastvantarasya adhikasya āropyamānatvād adhyāropah." - We have explained it as above. Adhyavasāna is said to be there - when, "yatra tu upacaryamāṇa-viśayasya upacaryamāṇe antar-līnatayā vivakṣitatvāt svarūpāpahnavaḥ kriyate, tatra adhyavasānam."

The śuddha-upacāragata-adhyavasāna is seen in, "pañcālāḥ". The word 'pañcāla' through lakṣita-lakṣaṇā, it being the place for stay of a child of pañcāla, is itself used in the sense of a village : "atra hi pañcālāpatya-nivāsādhikaraṇatvāj janapade lakṣita-lakṣaṇayā pañcāla-śabdaḥ prayujyate." (pp. 18, ibid) Gauṇa upacāragata-

adhyavasāna is illustrated as in, 'rājā'. Here 'gaṇatva' does not come to mind immediately, but only after some thought is given to it. So, it looks as it were it is ordinary - 'bhraṣṭam iva', for the importance of rūḍhi is more powerful here. Thus we have "adhyavasāna-yukta-gaṇa-upacāra" here.

When to these four upacāra-based varieties two as stated above are added, we have in all six varieties of lakṣaṇā. - "etena caturvidhena upacāreṇa saha pūrvoktau dvau lakṣaṇābhedaḥ saṃkalayya ṣaṭ prakārā lakṣaṇā vaktavyā" - observes Mukula (pp. 18, ibid).

Now this lakṣaṇā is said to be 'tri-skandhā' (i.e. having three basic varieties) on account of its śuddhatva, adhyāropa and adhyavasāna : "eṣā ca lakṣaṇā tri-skandhā, śuddhatvāt, adhyāropād, adhyavasānāt ca." (pp. 20, ibid) - Thus when these three each are divided into two we have a scheme of six-fold lakṣaṇā. Mammata also has the same observation : "lakṣaṇā tena ṣaḍ-vidhā" (K.P. II). Mukula explains the sub-divisions such as -

"taṭasthe lakṣaṇā śuddhā
syād āropastv adūrage || (AVM. VB)
nigirṇe'dhyavasānaṃ tu
rūḍhyāsannataratvataḥ | (AVM VI. A).

i.e. śuddha lakṣaṇā will have āropa with reference to taṭastha (i.e. independently present), 'āropa' i.e. superimposition is with reference to 'a-dūraga', and 'adhyavasāna' or complete identification is in 'nigaraṇa' i.e. swallowing up. This is two fold; - either through rūḍhi or āsannataratā i.e. nearness."

The idea is - Lakṣaṇā is said to be two-fold such as 'upādāna' and 'lakṣaṇa'. Now wherever this occurs, the lakṣya object is not covered up (anuparaktatvāt taṭasthatayā pratiyamāne) by the 'lakṣaka' object, and so it remains 'taṭastha' i.e. independent of the other object.

This means that the 'lakṣya' object is not apprehended as covered up by the 'lakṣaka' object, e.g. "gaṅgāyāṃ ghoṣaḥ." Here 'taṭa' or the bank of the river Gaṅgā is in mind and so, 'taṭa' is not realized as completely covered up by a special flow of water, because that special flow is restricted to the limit of only indicating the bank from a distance. So, the apprehension of the bank takes place independently, and not as identified with the Gaṅgā. We have to accept the same situation in case of upādāna lakṣaṇā also, e.g. in "The fat Devadatta does not eat by day." : "tathā hi - 'gaṅgāyāṃ ghoṣa' iti atra ghoṣādhikaraṇa-bhūta-taṭopalakṣaṇābhisamdhānena

'gaṅgāyām ghoṣo na vitāstāyām' iti gaṅgā-śabde prayujyamāne taṭasya sroto-viśeṣeṇa-upalakṣakatvam-atropayuktatvena uparāgo na pratiyate, taṭasthatvena eva tasya taṭasya pratyayāt. evaṃ upādāne'pi vācyam - yathā, 'pīno devadatto divā na bhūṅkta' iti." (AVM. pp. 20, ibid).

Mukula further observes that when it is required for the taṭa to express itself as covered up by the special flow and yet its own form is also to be revealed, then in the illustration viz. 'gaṅgāyām ghoṣaḥ', first there is superimposition i.e. āropa, for in such an āropa there is apprehension of taṭa as coloured by the flow. So, the apprehension takes this form : "ghoṣa or dwelling is on such a bank which as it is in proximity of a special flow of water, is itself of the form of the flow itself.' As against that when the idea is to convey extreme proximity - 'atyanta āsannatā', and when the particular statement is used to convey this extreme proximity, then the bank is presented as completely covered up by the special flow. So, it is shown that the dwelling is, 'directly on the Gaṅgā, not anywhere else.' There it is the case of complete identification or swallowing up - 'adhyavasāna' : "yadā tu gaṅgā-śabdābhidheyasya sroto-viśeṣasya a-vidūra-vartitayā taṭam anapahnuta-svarūpam sroto-viśeṣoparaktayā taṭasya pratīteḥ sroto-viśeṣa-a-vidūra-vartitvāt sroto-viśeṣa-rūpe taṭe ghoṣa iti. yadā tu atyantam āsannatām ghoṣam prati sroto-viśeṣasya pratipādayitum etad vākyam sroto-viśeṣa-nigīṛṇatayā taṭam apahnutya prayujyate 'gaṅgāyām eva sāksād ghoṣaḥ na tu anyatra iti', tadā adhyavasānam. (pp. 20, 21, ibid)

Thus, "gaur vāhikaḥ" and "gaur eva ayam", are illustrations of gaṇa-upacāra-mūlaka, sārōpā and sādhyavasānikā, respectively. Just as adhyavasāna-lakṣaṇā is possible with reference to proximity, similarly it is possible with reference to rūḍhi also : "yathā ca āsanna-taṭatvena adhyavasānam pūrvam pravibhaktam tathā rūḍhatvena api pravibhaktavyam" (pp. 22 ibid). The illustrations are 'pañcālāḥ' and 'rājā'. Precisely for this the kārīkā said, "rūḍhyā"sannataratvataḥ" rūḍhatvāt āsannataratvāt ca nigīṛṇe arthe adhyavasānam syād ity arthaḥ." (pp. 22, ibid). Thus rūḍhi is also based on a forgotten relation, while prayojanavatī has its sambandha fresh in mind. Mukula has not counted 'prayojana' as the hetu of lakṣaṇā. Mukula here discusses a prima facie view. The objector's contention is - "The 'mukhyārtha' i.e. primary meaning is necessarily conveyed by word itself. As against this, the 'lākṣaṇika' i.e. secondary meaning is not collected through the word. To put it more clearly, it can be said that, the kārya-kāraṇa-relation of a particular meaning with a particular word is ascertained through 'anvaya-vyatireka'. Again this apprehension is with reference only to the four-fold primary meaning such as jāti, guṇa, kriyā and

yadrccā. But this is not so in case of the six-fold *lakṣaṇika* i.e. secondary meaning. This again is in the fitness of things, for if the word is connected directly even with the secondary sense, then even this '*lakṣaṇika*' also will be branded as '*mukhya*'. Again, as the *lakṣaṇika* artha is connected with the *mukhya* i.e. primary sense, and in that case if it is held that this secondary sense is also derived through the agency of the word itself, then the question which arises is that when a word also conveys the secondary sense along with conveying of its primary sense also, is it so that this secondary sense is conveyed in a *sāpekṣa* way, i.e. with some expectancy, or *nirapekṣa* i.e. in an independent way without expectancy ? - If it is conveyed independently i.e. (*nirapekṣaḥ*), then its apprehension should take place for all time. If on the other hand its apprehension occurs in a correlated way - (*sāpekṣaḥ*), then the question is what is expected here ? : "atha śabdasya mukhyo yōsāv arthas tena saha sambandho lakṣyamāṇasya arthasya dṛṣṭa iti tad-dvāreṇa tasya avagatīr iti abhidhīyate, evaṃ sati yadi nirapekṣaḥ svārtha-pratipādana-dvāreṇa lakṣyamāṇaṃ arthaṃ avagamayati tadā sarvadā taṃ arthaṃ avagamayet, atha sāpekṣaḥ, kiṃ tasya apekṣaṇīyam iti āśaṅkya āha" - (pp. 24, *ibid*).

With reference to the above objection, Mukula observes that -

"vaktur vākyasya vācyasya rūpabhedādvadhāraṇāt

lakṣaṇā ṣaṭ-prakāraiṣā vivektavyā maṇiṣibhiḥ." - (7A) (pp. 24, *ibid*)

"The learned divide this *lakṣaṇā*, in a six-fold fashion, keeping in mind the formal varieties of *vaktā* i.e. speaker, *vākya* i.e. the sentence and *vācyā* i.e. the sense conveyed." The idea is that each of *vaktā*, *vākya* and *vācyā* are either staying independently or with one of the other two. (i) '*Vaktā*' is that person, who utters a sentence to convey some sense to someone else. (ii) '*Vākya*' is the use of words having expectancy and which jointly convey a single sense. (iii) '*Vācyā*' is the meaning which is the object of a word either through its primary or secondary function. All these three have two sub-divisions each - i.e. *saṃasta* or *vyasta* i.e. each one stays either with either of the other two, or stays independently. The idea is that with reference to the different situations caused by space and time, these factors are united either in a '*saṃasta*' or '*vyasta*' form. As a result there occurs a difference in their nature. Due to this difference in nature, the experts have thought of the six-fold division of *lakṣaṇā* : "eteṣāṃ trayāṇāṃ vakrā" dīnāṃ vyasta-saṃasta-bheda-bhinnānāṃ deśa-kālāvasthā-vailakṣaṇya-gata-saṃasta-vyasta-bheda-saṃyojitānāṃ yaḥ svabhāva-bheda-prapañcaḥ, tata eṣā ṣaṭ-prakārā lakṣaṇā parāmarśa-kuśalair vivecanīyā." (pp. 24, 25, *ibid*). Through this six-fold meaning only, a word causes the

apprehension of the secondary sense. Thus, through the agency i.e. kāraṇa-sāmagrī such as vaktā or speaker and the rest, the word is connected with the secondary sense and then becomes capable to give the secondary sense. The idea is that the word has expectancy with reference to these six-fold vaktā, vācya etc., when it gives its primary sense. Then, through usage - vṛddha-vyavahāra-through this primary sense, it fixes its relation with the secondary sense. Through the said six-fold meaning the word conveys the secondary sense. So, a word does not give a secondary sense, till its relation with secondary sense is not comprehended. This relation is not brought about naturally, but only through the agency or kāraṇa-sāmagrī such as vaktā or speaker etc., and also only after the primary sense is collected. As is said by Śābarasvāmin - "Then, how is it that a different word (= say, gaṅgā) is used for a different opinion, we say, it is through the medium of conveying of one's own meaning." [Mī. sū. I. 4. 12]. Here, the secondary sense is intended through the primary sense. Śābara has further stated, (Mī. sū. I. iv. i) that lakṣaṇā is from day to day usage, i.e. laukikī. Through this it is suggested by him that, when a word proceeds towards the secondary sense, it has an expectancy of a sort of relation. By 'loka' is meant the means of knowledge that comes into function in day to day affairs. So, 'laukikī' means 'that which is known in ordinary parlance', i.e. which is established by a word which carries some relation : "etad uktaṃ bhavati. na śabdānāṃ anavadhārīta-lākṣaṇikārtha-sambandhānāṃ lākṣaṇikaṃ arthaṃ prati gamakatvam, nāpi ca tatra sāksāt sambandha-grahaṇam, kim tarhi ? vaktrā"di-sāmagrī-apekṣayā svārtha-vyavadhānena iti. yad uktaṃ-ācārya-śābarasvāminā - "katham punaḥ paraśabdaḥ paratra vartate ? svārthābhidhānena iti brūmaḥ" - iti. atra hi svārtha-dvāreṇa lakṣyamānārthābhiniveśitā śabdānāṃ uktā. punaś ca asau eva āha - "lakṣaṇāpi laukikī eva", iti. atra hi sambandhāvadhāraṇa-sāpekṣānāṃ śabdānāṃ lakṣyamāṇe arthe pravṛttir uktā. vyavahāropā"rūḍhāni hi pratyakṣā"dīni pramāṇāni loka-śabdena abhidhīyante. loka eva viditā laukikī, vyavahāra-gamyā, parigrhīta-sambandha-śabda-niṣṭhā iti arthaḥ."

Here Mukula also quotes from Kumārila -

"nirūḍhā lakṣaṇāḥ kāścit
sāmarthyād abhidhānavat,
kriyante sāṃprataṃ kāścit
kāṣcin naiva tv aśaktitaḥ." - iti.

i.e. Some lakṣaṇās are based on usage. They carry the strength of conveying a meaning like the primary function (= abhidhānavat). While some (other) lakṣaṇās

are formed on the spot. Still others are not formed at all (i.e. they are not acceptable at all), because they are bereft of the power to convey sense." (Tantravārtika - 3/1/6 - aruṇādhikaraṇa).

The first one is illustrated by 'rājā' and the like. The second variety which is floated on the spot, i.e. the 'tārkālikī', is the result of the context of vṛddhavyavahāra, vaktā (i.e. the speaker) etc., such as seen in the verse, "snigdhasyāmala" etc. In this verse the word 'lipta' has its primary sense contradicted because lustre or kānti has no inherent capacity to smear anything as is done by saffron powder. This is so with reference to words such as 'suhṛd', 'rāma', etc. also. The third variety is such which is not marked even in the vṛddhavyavahāra or practice of the seniors and the like. Nor, do we find such situation as in case of words such as 'lipta' and the like. So, this third type is unacceptable. They cannot be put into practice. What Mukula drives at is that lakṣaṇā is possible only in cases of such words as are put into practice by seniors, or which are similar to such practice. Lakṣaṇā is not possible anywhere and everywhere. For in that case any word will be able to deliver any sense, and this we do not find in reality : "tad evaṃ, vaktrādi-sāmagrī-anupraveśena śabdānāṃ svārthaṃ arpayatāṃ arthāntaram prati svarūpa-dvāreṇa sajātiya-śabda-dvāreṇa vā gamakatayā avadhāritānāṃ lakṣakatvaṃ iti sthitam." (pp. 30, ibid). The principle established is that, in the context of the instrumentality (sāmagrī) of the speaker etc., words become indicator (lakṣaka) only when through the same instrument (such as vaktā etc.), they are accepted as conveying meaning through their very form either in the practice of the seniors or through such other device."

After dealing with the four-fold 'mukhya artha' and the six-fold lakṣaṇā, Mukula discusses a fresh problem. He discusses the four views concerning (i) abhihitānvaya, (ii) anvitābhidhāna, (iii) the samuccaya of these two and (iv) the 'abhāva' of these two. He discusses the position of lakṣaṇā with reference to these four alternatives. Says he -

"anvayébhihitānāṃ sā
vācyatvād ūrdhvaṃ iṣyate - 7B
anvitānāṃ tu vācyatve,
vācyatvasya puraḥ sthitāḥ,
vākyaṛtha paramārthataḥ - 8
nāsty asau kalpitérthe tu
pūrvavat pravibhajyate." - 9A

i.e. In abhihitānvayavāda lakṣaṇā is believed to take place after vācyatva is over. In anvitābhidhānavāda it is believed to occur prior to the primary i.e., vācyatva. In the two (together), at both the places (i.e. earlier and later), and where 'akhaṇḍatā' is accepted with reference to sentence sense, lakṣaṇā does not take place at all. It is believed and divided as done earlier in an imagined sense such as word-sense (because in reality only the sentence-sense exists)."

Mukula observes : (pp. 48, ibid) : akhaṇḍe tu vākyārthésau lakṣaṇā paramārthena nāsti. bhinnānām padārthānām paramārthatóbhidheya-bhāvasya anupapadyamānatvāt, tad āsritatvāc ca lakṣaṇāyāḥ. kalpita-padārthā"śrayeṇa tu sā lakṣaṇā yathā-ruci pūrvavad abhihitānvaya-anvitābhidhāna - tat-samuccaya-kalpanayā vibhaktavyabhāge niveśyā, parasparasya deśa-kālāvacchedenā'śeṣa-vyavaharṭṭi-niṣṭhatayā rūḍhatvāt."

Mukula observes that in all the four alternatives such as the abhihitānvayavāda and the rest, wherever it is not proper to accept the primary sense, the functioning of lakṣaṇā is suggested. This lakṣaṇā, according to Mukula

(i) the primary sense, being contradicted by any other means of knowledge becomes impossible,

(ii) the lakṣyārtha being closer to mukhyārtha and (iii) and also when this acceptance of the secondary sense - 'sāntarārtha-grahaṇa' - rests on some 'prayojana' or reason :

"yā ca iyaṃ ṣaṭ-prakārā lakṣaṇā pūrvam uktā, sā -

(i) mukhyārthasya pramāṇāntara-bādhitatvena-a-sambhavāt.

(ii) lakṣyamāṇasya ca arthasya mukhyārtham prati āsannatvāt,

(iii) sāntarārtha-grahaṇasya ca sa-prayojanatvāt iti evamvidha-kāraṇa-tritayā"tmaka-sāmagrī-samāśrayeṇa vṛddha-vyavahāre paridrśyate.

Now, says Mukula, the 'āsannatva' or nearness of lakṣyārtha with mukhyārtha is five-fold, according to Bhartṛmitra-such as,

"abhidheyena sambandhāt

sādrśyāt, samavāyataḥ

vaiparītyāt kriyā-yogāt

lakṣaṇā pañcadhā matā" iti (pp. 50, ibid)

i.e. through (i) relation with the primary meaning (ii) through similarity (iii) 'samavāya' i.e. intimate relation, (iv) opposition (iv) relation with verb-kriyāyoga;

lakṣaṇā is said to be five-fold. Thus, says Mukula, the 'prayojana' is also two-fold. One 'prayojana' is such which depends on vṛddhavyavahāra which is beginningless in accepting the meaning that it conveyed and therefore depending on the established custom. This is as good as 'rūḍhi' or convention, e.g. in case of words such as 'dvi-refa' etc. This word is having two 'ra'-kāras, as the word 'bhramara' meaning a bee consists of two ra-kāras. So, 'dvi-refa' - i.e. one having two-'ra'kāras, also conveys the same sense without dragging in the word 'bhramara'. Thus, this is as good as 'rūḍhi' or convention. Now Mukula has suggested that 'following a rūḍhi' is a 'prayojana' here.

The second prayojana is different from the above rūḍhi-tulya-prayojana. Mukula observes (pp. 50, ibid) : "aparaṃ tu rūḍhyanusaraṇātmakam yat prayojanam uktaṃ, tad-vyatirikta-vastvantara-gatasya saṃviññāna-padasya rūpa-viśeṣa-pratipādanam nāma, yathā pūrvam udāhṛtaṃ, "rāmósmīti"o. - This second prayojana is in form of establishment of a special form of an object, which is concealed in that object, but the conveying of which is intended. The illustration is, "rāmósmi..." etc.

Both these purposes or aims (i.e. prayojanas) are to be determined through the secondary meaning arrived at with the help of the above mentioned five-fold relation, when the primary meaning is set aside; it being in-appropriate.

Now it may be observed here, that in nirūdhā lakṣaṇā Mukula tries to find a 'prayojana' in form of 'following convention' as established by usage made current by seniors. But accepting or imagining a 'prayojana' in rūḍhi-mūlā, does not look possible to us. Dr. Rewaprasad observes that even if we accept what Mukula holds here, greater charm is caused by such usages as 'dvi-refa' in place of the direct mention of 'bhramara'. Thus, causing a greater charm could be a prayojana here. But we feel that it is better to hold only rūḍhi as the cause of lakṣaṇā here and such rūḍhi in itself carries its own charm, for ultimately lakṣaṇā or say, poetic deviation of any kind causes charm. So, rūḍhi lakṣaṇā has an inherent charm which does not stand in need of any prayojana.

Mukula provides illustrations for this five-fold lakṣaṇā. At the end of it he observes that in this five-fold lakṣaṇā the expressed meaning is at times (i) atyanta-tiraskṛta i.e. completely lost, or (ii) the expressed is either intended or unintended (vivakṣita/a-vivakṣita) : (pp. 58, ibid) "idānīm pañcavidha-saṃbandha-nibandhanāyām āsattau pūrvopavarnitāyām kvacīd vācyasya atī-tiraskāraḥ, kvacīd vivakṣitatvaṃ, kvacīd ca a-vivakṣitatvaṃ iti evaṃvidhaṃ trayam yat sahrdayair

upadarśitam, tasya viṣaya-vibhāgaṃ upadarśayitum āha -

sādrśye vaiparītye ca vācyasya ati-tiraskriyā - (10 B)

vivakṣā ca avivakṣā ca, sambandha-samavāyayoḥ,

upādāne vivakṣā'tra lakṣaṇe tv avivakṣaṇam || - (11)

tiraskriyā kriyāyoge, kvacit tad-viparītatā - (12 A)

i.e. the expressed is totally abandoned in case of the relations such as sādrśya and vaiparītya. There is intended and un-intended expressed sense in varieties based on 'sambandha' and 'samavāya'. In 'upādāna' we have only the vivakṣā of the expressed, i.e. it is always expected, and in 'lakṣaṇā' there is only a-vivakṣā, while in 'kriyā-yoga' the expressed is either abandoned (tiraskriyā) or not. Mukula explains this with reference to the illustrations cited by him, but we feel there is overlapping in these cases and his treatment is not as scientific as that of either his predecessor Ānandavardhana or his successor Mammaṭa.

Mukula also observes : (pp. 66, ibid) : "lakṣaṇāmārgāvagāhitvaṃ tu dhvaneḥ saḥṛdayair nūtanatayopavarṇitasya vidyate iti diṣaṃ unmīlayitum idaṃ atra uktam. etac ca vidvadbhiḥ kuśāgrīyayā buddhyā nirūpaṇīyam, na tu jhagity eva asūyitavyaṃ iti alaṃ atiprasaṅgena."

i.e. "This is just to suggest that the newly advocated dhvani by the connoisseurs falls into the region of 'lakṣaṇā' only. The learned with very sharp intelligence have to brood over our observation and that it need not be immediately discarded. So now, enough of further elaboration."

Mukula thus tries to incorporate 'dhvani' under lakṣyārtha and thus for him vyañjanā is part of lakṣaṇā which again is abhidhā itself because it is only an extension of abhidhā.

Mukula concludes to his satisfaction that the word-element which is in itself undivided in form of pure śabda-tattva, i.e. prior to its being classified into the four-fold scheme of jātivācaka, etc., the word-element which is 'a-bhinna' in its original form, attains to the 'vivarta' i.e. illusive change in form of 'śabda', 'artha' and 'sambandha' i.e. word, its meaning and their relation later, then only the abhidhā-śakti is said to be ten-fold. In its original non-dualistic form of word, there is no scope for this ten-fold division : (pp. 69, ibid) -

"idānīm sakala-śabda-a-vibhāgā"tmakasya śabda-tattvasya yadā śabdārtha-sambandha-tritaya-rūpatayā rajju-sarpatayā vivarta-mānatvaṃ tadā etad abhidhāvṛttaṃ daśa-vidha-vyavahāro-pārohitayopapadyate, na tu saṃhṛtārtha-vāk-

tattva-viṣayatayā iti darśayitum āha -

vivartamānaṃ vāk-tattvaṃ

daśadhaiva vilokyate. - 12

saṃhr̥ta-kramabhede tu

tasmin teṣāṃ kuto gatiḥ.” - 13A.

ity etad abhidhāvṛttaṃ

daśadhātra vivecitam. - 13B.

mukhyasya abhidhāvṛttasya prakāśaḥ catvāraḥ lākṣaṇikasya tu sad itī evaṃ
daśaprakāraṃ abhidhā-vṛttaṃ atra vivecitam.

This treatment of Mukula's views suggests how he has influenced Bhoja in taking abhidhā as three-fold such as mukhyā, gaunī and lakṣaṇā. We know that this approach is different from the one seen in the kashmir school, the highest expression of which we noticed above in Jagannātha. But prior to that we have also to take note of Kuntaka and Mahimā also, who influenced the Mālava school like Mukula. The flowering of the thought as seen in the kashmir school is to be traced in Ānandavardhana, who discusses abhidhā only from the angle of its difference from vyañjanā, and then in the treatment of Mammata and his followers. Jagannātha of course comes last but as in him we see the highest flight of abstract thinking and the final word on śabda-vṛtti, we placed him first. Mukula, and Kuntaka are viewed as shaping influences for the Mālava tradition as seen in Bhoja and also for the kashmir tradition as seen in Mammata, for the K.P. is influenced by both the Dhv. and also the Abhidhāvṛtta-mātrkā of Mukula. Hemacandra, we will go to observe, follows Mammata, but absorbs the teaching of Mukula and Bhoja also, while Vidyādhara, Vidyānātha, Viśvanātha and Keśava follow the lead of Mammata. So, now we will consider Kuntaka, who like Mukula had his share in shaping the views of Bhoja, because for Kuntaka also, 'abhidhā' has a connotation wider then permitted by the kashmir school of thought.

Kuntaka : After explaining the general definition of poetry and before explaining the special definition of it, Kuntaka first of all explains the form of word and meaning. He observes : evaṃ kāvyasya sāmānya-lakṣaṇe vihitē viśeṣa-lakṣaṇaṃ upa-kramate. tatra śabdārthayos tāvāt svarūpaṃ nirūpayati -

“vācyōrtho vācakaḥ śabdaḥ

prasiddhaṃ iti yady api,

tathāpi kāvya-mārgésmin

paramārthóyaṃ etayoḥ.” - VJ. I. 8.

(pp. 13, Edn. K. Krishnamoorthy)

i.e. ‘After the general explanation of poetry, the question of its detailed definition is taken up. First of all, the nature of word and meaning is examined :

That ‘meaning’ is what is signified, and ‘word’ is that which signifies, is so well known that it needs no elaboration. Yet, in the province of poetry, their true nature is as follows :” (V.J.I. 8) (Trans. K. Kri.) (pp. 300, *ibid*).

Kuntaka goes on observing that the general meaning of the terms, ‘word’ and ‘meaning’ is of course, well known. The ‘word’ is the signifier and the ‘meaning’ is the signified : “yo vācakaḥ pratyāyakaḥ sa śabdaḥ, yo vācyaś ca abhidheyah sōrtha iti” (pp. 14, *ibid*). Thus the word for Kuntaka is that which causes apprehension of meaning, and the meaning is that which is expressed i.e. apprehended. Now, let us first make it clear that Kuntaka also does not attempt any scientific definition of abhidhā, vācaka śabda and vācyārtha here. He does not have a fool-proof scheme as is seen in the K.P. of Mammaṭa. Or, it may be that he knowingly defies the ruling of Ānandavardhana who clearly distinguished between abhidhā, lakṣaṇā and vyañjanā, and vācya, lakṣya and vyaṅgya senses which are rendered in English generally as the expressed, indicated and suggested senses. No; he has his own approach and is closer to Mukula in the sense that he names only ‘abhidhā’ as the śabda-vṛtti or say, viśiṣṭā or, vicitrā abhidhā, i.e. poetic expression, which is wide enough to include lakṣaṇā and vyañjanā in its fold, provided, this deviation is poetic.

It is this trend which is perhaps inherited by Bhoja also. We noticed that it was Bhoja who tried to furnish illustrations, not from worldly usage only, but from pure poetry to illustrate the main three divisions of what he calls abhidhā, with its any number of sub-divisions. This trend is perhaps inherited by Bhoja both from Mukula to some extent and Kuntaka to a greater extent. For Kuntaka, as far as poetry, i.e., the result of the effort of a poet - is concerned, there is only one function of the poetic word and it is ‘abhidhā’ which is not to be confused with the abhidhā or power of expression of a word giving the conventional meaning only, as is seen in the Kashmir school of thought, but it is the ‘power of poetic expression’, which includes poetic usages such as lakṣaṇā or indication and vyañjanā i.e. - suggestion, provided they carry the stamp of being pure and beautiful poetic expression, i.e. artistic expression only.

Kuntaka, as Dr. Krishnamoorthy wants us to believe, uses such terms as 'dyotaka', 'dyotya', and 'vyañjaka', 'vyaṅgya' in the sense of indicator-indicated (i.e. lakṣaka-lakṣya) and suggestor-suggested. But we are not convinced. It is only in a very loose sense that the terms dyotaka-dyotya are used by Kuntaka, and we fail to ascertain the exact import of these terms. Normally in the Kashmir school these pairs of terms are taken as synonyms, but Kuntaka does not do it. Whether he takes it to mean lakṣaka-lakṣya is also not clear. But it is clear that he is out to include dyotaka-dyotya and vyañjaka-vyaṅgya under his wider vācaka-vācya. He raises an objection and then silences it to his satisfaction thus : (under V.J.I. 8. pp. 14, *ibid*) :

“nanu ca dyotaka-vyañjakau api śabdau sambhavataḥ, tad asaṁgrahāt na avyāptiḥ, yasmāt artha-pratīti-kāritva-sāmānyād, upacārāt, tau api vācakau eva. evaṁ dyotya-vyaṅgyayor api arthayoḥ pratyeyatva-sāmānyāt upacārād vācyatvaṁ eva. tasmāt vācakatvaṁ vācyatvaṁ ca śabdārthayor loke suprasiddhaṁ yady api lakṣaṇaṁ, tathāpi asmin alaukike kāvyamārge, kavikarmavartmani ayaṁ etayor - vakṣyamāṇaḥ paramārthaḥ kiṁ api apūrvam tattvaṁ ity arthaḥ.”

Dr. K. Krishnamoorthy translates : (pp. 300, *ibid*) : “The general meaning of the terms ‘word’ and ‘meaning’ is quite well known indeed. The ‘word’ is the signifier and the ‘meaning’ is the signified. One might object that the indicative and suggestive words too which have their own signification may yet be termed ‘word’ and the above statement would illustrate the fallacy of “too narrow”. Our reply is that they are expressive words by implication, the metaphorical application being based on their similarity with denotative words. Similarly, the meanings alluded to are as good as denoted meaning because of the similarity in point of being understood. Thus, although ‘signifying’, and ‘being signified’ are enough qualifications to mark off the nature of word and meaning everywhere in the practical world, they do not serve the purpose of poetry, whose province is supra-mundane. Therefore, their essence in the world of poetry deserves to be pointed out clearly as is done in the next verse.”

One thing is clear. Kuntaka knows the difference between pure abhidhā, gauṇī, lakṣaṇā and vyañjanā. But he refuses to accept any scheme of śabda-vṛttis as is done by the Kashmir school. Bhāmaha had rejected certain alaṁkāras as ‘vārtā’, and promoted the cause of “vakrābhidheya-śabdoktiḥ”. Ānandavardhana had also advised the poet to be in search of ‘special word and sense’ that make for poetry : “yatnataḥ pratyabhijñeyau, tau śabdārthau mahākaveḥ” Dhv. I. 8. Kuntaka therefore chooses to concentrate only on the poetic use of word and sense and as

he has to give some name to this special poetic power of a word, he gives the name 'abhidhā' to it, which is not the technical abhidhā of the Kashmir school.

Kuntaka, it seems, has no concern for the fool-proof scheme of word/meaning/word-power, as seen in the Kashmir school of thought. He is concerned only with the poetic. On the otherhand we saw Mukul carrying on from grammar and Mīmāṃsā, but ending in poetry. Bhoja has a much broad-based scheme as we observed above but is trying to absorb both non-poetic and poetic literature. His scheme with twelvefold relationship of word and meaning of course aims at the poetic in the end. He takes care to illustrate the varieties and sub-varieties of first eight varieties of sāhitya from poetic literature and many of his illustrations are read as this or that variety of dhvani in the Dhv. So, clearly we have two trends of thought. One represented by Ānandavardhana and his followers who present a perfect scheme and the other by such writers as Mukula, Kuntaka, Bhoja, Mahimā, Dhanāñjaya and Dhanika and some others who do not fall in line with the Kashmir school of thought. We will continue with Kuntaka who also forms part of the shaping influence that moulds Bhoja's thinking, Mukula being the earlier one.

As seen above Kuntaka, though not accepting the thinking of the Kashmir school in a sense that he does not welcome the fool-proof scheme of the functions of a word, on the other hand follows the author of the Dhv. when he talks of 'the unique expression' as 'word'. He observes : (VJ. I. 9 pp. 14, *ibid*) :

“śabdo vivakṣitārthaikavācako” nyeṣu satsu api,
arthah sahrdayā”hlāda-kāri-
sva-spanda sundarah.”

“That unique expression which alone can fully convey the poet's intended meaning out of a hundred alternatives before him is to be regarded as 'word'. Similarly that alone which possesses such refreshing natural beauty as to draw the appreciation of delighted readers is to be marked as 'meaning'. (Trans. K. Kris. pp. 300-301, *ibid*) - That Kuntaka's scheme is broad enough to embrace vyañjanā and vyaṅgyārtha is borne out by the famous illustration from Kumārasambhava, viz. “dvayaṃ gataṃ” in which he pin-points the use of the special word “kapālinaḥ”, that is the source of beauty. He observes : (pp. 15, *ibid*) :

“atra parameśvara-vācaka-śabda-sahasra-sambhavēpi ‘kapālina’ iti bībhatsa-rasa-ālambana-vibhāva-vācakaḥ śabdaḥ jugupsā”spadatvena prayujyamānaḥ kām api vācaka-vakratām vidadhāti.” : “Though a thousand and one synonyms are

possible to refer to the Almighty Lord Śiva, the poet has chosen here the word, "One whom only skulls adorn", in order that, it may suggest disgust through a word which serves here as a pointer to the primary sentiment of the 'horrid'. And he succeeds in endowing the verse with artistic beauty of expression." (Trans. K. Kris. pp. 302, ibid).

Kuntaka (V.J. I., Vṛtti) further remarks - kavi-vivakṣita-viśeṣābhidhāna-kṣamatvaṁ eva vācakatva-lakṣaṇam. yasmāt pratibhāyām tat-kālollikhitena kenacit parispaṇḍena parisphurantaḥ padārthāḥ prakṛta-prastāva-samucitena kenacit utkarṣeṇa vā samācchādita-svabhāvāḥ santo vivakṣā-vidheyatvena abhidheyatā-padavīm avatarantaḥ tathāvidha-viśeṣa-pratipādana-samarthena-abhidhānena-abhidhīyamānās cetaś camatkāritām āpadyante."

"Therefore, the proper definition of 'signification' is that capacity to convey the particular shade of thought intended by the poet. In fact, in the world of the poet's creative imagination, things come to life with a touch of original invention; or their real nature gets veiled by a rich afflatus calculated to present the subject in a most attractive light, as such, the process of communication is a slave to the poetic intention. Only when the right verbal correlative for the particular has been found, the delight of the reader is assured." (Trans. K.Kris.; pp. 302, ibid)

From this it becomes absolutely clear that Kuntaka accepts only one power of word and that is abhidhā, or say, 'vicitrā abhidhā' meaning 'beautiful or artful expression'. It is not the abhidhā which signifies only the conventional meaning. But it is that abhidhā, which conveys any meaning intended by the poet, be it vācya, lakṣya, dyotyā or vyaṅgya. So, his is the 'vicitrā abhidhā' which covers up the lakṣaṇā and vyañjanā also. So, we may say, Kuntaka has a definite approach, but no definite scheme. He wants to convey only the poetic.

After mentioning the unique features of words and meanings in poetry as distinct from their commonplace aspect, Kuntaka proceeds to convey that there should also be the presence of positive artistic beauty. He observes (V.J. I. 10) (pp. 20, ibid) -

“ubhau etau alaṃkāryau,
tayorḥ punar alaṃkṛtiḥ
vakroktiḥ eva, vaidagdhyā-
bhaṅgī-bhaṇitiḥ ucyate.” (V.J. I. 10)

"Both these are 'the adorned'. Their adornment consists in the poetic process known as 'artistic turn of speech.'" (Trans. K. Kris. pp. 306, ibid). Thus 'word and

sense' are 'alaṃkārya' and 'vakrokti' is the 'alaṃkāra' for Kuntaka. This is what he calls "vicitrā abhidhā" :

"ubhau etau śabdārthau alaṃkāryau, kenāpi śobhātīśayakāriṇā alaṃkaraṇena yojaniyau. kim tat tayoṛ alaṃkaraṇaṃ iti abhidhīyate-tayoḥ punaḥ alaṃkṛtiḥ - tayoḥ dvitva-saṃkhyā-viśiṣṭayoḥ api alaṃkṛtiḥ prasiddhābhidhāna-vyatirekiṇī vicitrā eva abhidhā." (vṛtti on VJ. I. 10) (pp. 20, ibid) :

" 'Both these' refer to words and meanings which deserve to be looked upon as the subjects of ornamentation for the enhancement of their appeal. "What then is their ornament ?", one might ask. The answer is that though they are two in number, they have only one common ornament.

What exactly is this common ornament ? "Artistic turn of speech" is the reply. It stands for a charming and novel utterance peculiar to poetry and distinct from familiar usage. In other words, artistic utterance itself is the ornament in question." (Trans. K. Kris. pp. 307, ibid)

That Kuntaka is thus a 'kevala-abhidhāvādin', or better say, "kevala-vicitrā-abhidhā-vādin" is now clear. This follows even from the treatment he presents concerning paryāya-vakratā and upacāra-vakratā as well. In the former he incorporates what we call śābdī vyañjanā.

For upacāra-vakratā Kuntaka observes -(V.J. II. 13, 14) (pp. 93, ibid) :

"yatra dūrāntare'nyasmāt
sāmānyam' upacaryate.
leśenā'pi bhavat kāñcid
vaktum udrikta-vṛttitām." (V.J. II. 13)

and, "yan mūlā sarasollekhā
rūpakā"dir alaṃkṛtiḥ,
upacāra-pradhānāsau
vakratā kāñcid ucyate." (V.J. II. 14)

i.e. "Wherein even when the two are far apart from each other, a common attribute, however slight, is metaphorically superimposed in order to indicate that the resemblance is very close... (13)

... and which forms the basis for various pleasing and inventive figures of speech headed by metaphor - such a type of poetic beauty is designated by the name, 'beauty of metaphorical expression.' (II. 14). (Trans. K. Kris. pp. 381, ibid).

Kuntaka's upacāra-vakratā is 'prayojanavatī gauṇī lakṣaṇā' itself. So, he seems to accept lakṣaṇā-mūlā-vyañjanā under 'upacāra-vakratā'.

In this context, the author of Ekāvalī, Vidyādhara, observes that, "etena yatra kuntakena bhaktau antarbhāvito dhvanis tad api..." - But we may say that Kuntaka has only partly subsumed dhvani under 'bhakti'. Moreover, when Kuntaka on one hand holds that 'word and sense' are "alamkāryau", and on the other hand when he rejects the case of 'rasavad alamkāra' on the ground that 'rasa' is always 'alamkārya' and never an 'alamkāra', he seems to contradict himself. On the otherhand, Ānandavardhana has a perfect scheme, which holds the whole of 'alamkāra' field as "vācya-vācaka-rūpa". In short, Kuntaka has no perfect scheme and his 'vicitrā abhidhā' is a loose concept; thus rendering his approach unscientific. Dhanañjaya and Dhanika also accept only abhidhā but their approach shall be dealt with in greater details later when we will pick up the concept of 'tātparya' vṛtti for consideration.

'Bhoja' as observed by us earlier is influenced by Mukula and Kuntaka and carries his own concept of 'abhidhā'. But Mahima Bhaṭṭa is also an important name who defies the scheme of śabda-vṛttis as presented by Ānandavardhana and the whole of the Kashmir school of thought.

Mahimā accepts sādhya-sādhana-bhāva in any verbal function. He not only does not accept Ānandavardhana's scheme of the three functions of a word such as abhidhā, lakṣaṇā and vyañjanā, but positively denounces it and installs only one function of the word, i.e. only abhidhā and leaves all other meaning to be collected by what he calls 'anumiti' or 'kāvyānumiti' i.e. 'poetic inference' to be precise. We will have to examine his approach in greater details as below.

While referring to the powers belonging to word and sense, Mahimā, observes Prof. Dr. C. Rajendran (pp. 67, "A study of Mahima Bhaṭṭa's Vyaktiviveka" pub. Calicut, '91), discusses the various aspects of language like word and sentence. According to him, all verbal expressions should be considered as inference since they consist of establishing something (sādhya) by means of something else (sādhana). The fact that language is used to persuade the hearer to do or not to do something, implies that the hearer has to be convinced of the logic of the speaker's argument. The hearer has to grasp the connection between śabda and artha, the sādhya and sādhana, through inference and then only he is convinced of the soundness of the speaker's idea :

(Vy. Viveka, pp. 26, 27, Edn. Dr. Rawaprasāda Dwivedi, Chowkhamba Skt. series, office, Varanasi, '64) - "sarva eva hi śābdo vyavahāraḥ sādhyā-sādhana-garbhataḥ prāyeṇa anumānarūpōbhyaupagantavyaḥ, tasya para-pravṛtti-nivṛtti-nibandhanatvāt, tayoś ca sampratyaḥ-sampratyaḥ"tmanor anyathākartuṃ aśakyatvataḥ. na hi yuktiṃ anavagacchan kaścid vipaścid vacana-mātrāt sampratyaḥbhāg bhavati."

Mahimā divides śabda into two such as 'pada' or word and 'vākya' or sentence. Word is further subdivided into (i) nāman i.e. noun, (ii) ākhyāta or verb, (iii) upasarga i.e. semantic prefix, (iv) nipāta or preposition, and (v) karmapravacanīya i.e. adverb. - "dvidivho hi śabdah, pada-vākya-bhedāt. tatra padam aneka-prakāraṃ nāmā"khyātōpa-sarga-nipāta-karmapravacanīya-bhedāt (pp. 27, ibid). 'nāmā' denotes an existing object, which is qualified by either jāti i.e. class, guṇa, i.e. quality, kriyā i.e. action or dravya i.e. substance. - Mahimā observes : (pp. 28, ibid) : "tatra sattva-pradhānāni nāmāni. tāni api bahuprakārāni sambhavanti. jāti-guṇa-kriyā-dravyāṇaṃ tat-pravṛtti-nimittānāṃ bahutvāt." Thus jāti, guṇa etc. are the pravṛtti-nimittas.

'Artha', for Mahimā, is two-fold, viz. 'vācya' and 'anumeya'. The 'vācya' or expressed is the object of verbal functioning and it is this which is termed 'mukhya' or principal. He observes : (pp. 47, ibid) : "arthōpi dvidivho, vācyōnumeyaś ca. tatra śabda-vyāpāraviśayo vācyaḥ. sa eva mukhya ucyate."

yad āhuḥ -

"śrutimātreṇa yatrāsya
tādarthyam avasīyate,
taṃ mukhyam artham manyante
gauṇam yatnopapāditam." - iti.

tata eva, tad anumitād vā, līngabhūtād yad arthāntaram anumīyate sōnumeyaḥ. sa ca trividhaḥ vastumātram alaṃkāra-rasādayaś ca, iti. tatra ādyau vācyau api sambhavataḥ. anyāḥ tu anumeya eva iti. tatra padasyārtho vācya eva, na anumeyaḥ, tasya nir aṃśatvāt, sādhyā-sādhana-bhāva-abhāvataś ca. (V.V. pp. 47, ibid)

Mahimā classifies meaning into two viz. (i) expressed (= vācya) and (ii) inferred (i.e. anumeya). The former is called 'mukhya' i.e. principle and is collected by word-power (i.e. abhidhā). It is said, "It is believed to be 'mukhya' i.e. principal

sense, the essence of which is collected immediately on hearing (the same, i.e. the word). That which is collected by (a special) effort, is the secondary one.

The latter, i.e. anumeya or inferred sense is that which is either directly collected from the principal sense (i.e. mukhyārtha), or from the meaning inferred from it. This anumeya artha is again three-fold viz. (i) vastu or idea, or a matter of fact, (ii) alamkāra i.e. a figure of speech and (iii) rasā"di, i.e. aesthetic rapture or feeling, sentiment etc. The first two could be met with at expressed level also (= vācyau api), while the third type is necessarily only inferred.

Mahimā holds that the direct meaning of a word is always vācyā or expressed, because there is no sādhyā-sādhana-bhāva between a 'pada' and its meaning. It means there is no inferential relation between a pada and its artha. The 'pada' is without parts so sādhyā-sādhana-bhāva can not exist.

We have to examine this position minutely. We feel that a sort of self-contradiction can be read in Mahimā's position. At the outset Mahimā had declared that : "sarva eva hi śābdo vyavahāraḥ sādhyā-sādhana-garbhatayā prāyeṇa anumāna-rūpōbhyupagantavyaḥ, tasya para-pravṛtti-nivṛtti-nibandhanatvāt, tayoś ca sampratraya-a-sampratrayā"tmanor anyathākartum aśakyatvāt." (pp. 26, 27, ibid). Here Mahimā suggests that the vācyārtha which is collected from a pada having no parts, is directly expressed as the sādhyā-sādhana-bhāva is not possible in this case. So, there is apparent contradiction. But this contradiction is easily removed when we remember even Ānandavardhana's remarks while advocating the cause of vyañjanā even for the Naiyāyikas under Dhv. III. 33. Mahimā has also derived inspiration from Dhv. here. The point is that when somebody speaks, he wants to convey something. So, a man resorts to śābda-vyavahāra to convey something and to make somebody else do or undo something. So, this verbal practice is resorted to for accomplishing some object. This becomes clear through inference. The inference is simple. It proceeds like this - "When A speaks, he intends to convey something." Thus there must be something behind A's activity of speaking, and this fact is a matter of inference. This becomes clearer when we hear someone shouting in a language not known to us. We infer that he wants to convey to us something for our good or bad. This much is inferred. But what he actually conveys through the words uttered, follows directly, through the power of expression, from the word itself. This is what Mahimā wants to suggest. So, there is no contradiction in his statement.

Thus, here, with the acceptance of the 'mukhya' artha, Mahimā accepts the power of direct expression, i.e. 'abhidhā'. Mahimā accepts only one word-power i.e. abhidhā. All else is 'anumiti' for him. In his 'vyakti-viveka-vyākhyāna', Ruyyaka puts it thus : (pp. 48, ibid) : "arthópi iti. śabdasya vyāpārāntara-nirākaraṇārtham, artha-dvaividhya-ghaṭanam. rathā hi-vṛddhavyavahārāt, saṃketāt vā, śabdeṣu artha-nirṇayaḥ. teṣāṃ ca yatrārthe vidyamānatvaṃ tasya vācyaṭvaṃ eva. anyasya tu teṣāṃ abhāvād artha-sāmarthyād avagatiḥ. na ca asaṃbaddhórthas taṃ arthaṃ pratyāyayati. saṃbaddhāc ca arthāntara-pratipattau anumānaṃ eva. tena lakṣaṇāyāḥ anumānāntarbhāvaḥ pratipādito bhavati. tasya ca vyāpakatvāt... na ca lakṣaṇāyāṃ anumānasya antarbhāvaḥ iti vācyaṃ, tasya tat parihāreṇa vṛtter vyāpakatvāt. vyañjakatvaṃ anumānaṃ eva iti vakṣyate vitatya. tad evaṃ vācyaṇumeyatva-bhedena arthasya dvaividhyam."

Ruyyaka explains that in order to eliminate the possibility of the word having any other (i.e. even a second) power, 'meaning' is said to be two-fold. Meaning is decided in case of a given word with the help of either the vṛddha-vyavahāra, i.e. practice of the seniors, or through 'saṃketa' i.e., convention. In whichever meaning these two factors reside, that meaning is called the 'vācya' i.e. expressed. In case of any other meaning where either of these two does not stay at the basis, the other meaning is collected through implication. If the primary meaning is not connected (i.e. is 'a-saṃbaddha) with the other meaning, the latter is not conveyed at all. And when through connection, the first meaning yields the second meaning, this apprehension is nothing else but 'anumāna' or 'inference' only. So lakṣaṇā is covered up by 'anumāna', the latter having a wider scope... It cannot be said that 'anumāna' is covered up by lakṣaṇā, because even in the absence of lakṣaṇā, anumāna can take place. (Thus, anumāna has a wider field). That (the so called) suggestion is nothing but only inference i.e. 'anumāna' will be discussed in greater details (by Mahimā).

So, for Mahimā there is only one śabda-vyāpāra and that is 'abhidhā'. All else - i.e. lakṣaṇā and vyañjanā - falls in the province of anumāna or inference. This means that though not accepting these two functions, Mahimā accepts the meanings derived through these functions and subsumes these meanings-viz. the so-called 'lakṣyārtha' and 'vyañgyārtha' in the terminology of the Kashmir school of thought, - under 'anumeya artha' i.e. inferred meaning arrived at through 'anumiti', or precisely 'kāvyānumiti', and certainly not by any function or vyāpāra of a word.

For Mahimā, the 'vācya' is the meaning of a 'pada' i.e. word, arrived at through 'abhidhā' on the strength of either 'saṃketa' or 'vṛddha-vyavahāra'. But the vākyārtha, or sentence-sense can be either (i) a fact which is already known and which is not required to be substantiated, and (ii) a fact, which is unknown, expecting to be substantiated. This unknown fact is always established with the help of a known fact with which it is invariably related. Their invariable concomitance is realized from means of valid knowledge i.e. pramāṇas which are three, such as, (i) 'loka' or worldly context, (ii) veda or revealed literature, and (iii) direct experience i.e. adhyātma.

Mahimā observes : (pp. 49, ibid) : "vākyārthas tu vācyasya arthasya aṃśa-parikalpanāyām, aṃśānām vidhyanuvāda-bhāvena avasthiter, vidheyāṃśasya siddha-asiddha-tayā upapādana-anapekṣa-sāpekṣatvena dvidivho boddhavyaḥ.

Mahimā had suggested that the meaning derived from a pada is without parts i.e. nir-aṃśa. But the sentence-sense is having 'aṃśa' or parts. Some part is 'vidheya' i.e. principal and some is 'anuvādyā' i.e. subordinate, i.e. Some part is 'newly enjoined' - i.e. it is predicated, and some is 'anuvādyā' i.e. which is the 'subject' part and hence already known. The vidheya-aṃśa is also either 'siddha' or 'sādhya'. The former does not stand in need of being substantiated, the latter needs substantiation. Thus vākyārtha is two-fold. When the vidheya-aṃśa is 'a-siddha', it takes the form of sādhya-sādhana-bhāva, the 'anuvāda' portion turning into a 'sādhana'. This sādhya-sādhana-bhāva is decided through invariable concomitance i.e. avinābhāva-sambandha. And this depends on means of knowledge which are three-fold : "asiddhau sādhya-sādhana-bhāva-rūpaḥ, anūdyamānasya aṃśasya sādhana-dhurā-adhirohaṭ." (pp. 49, ibid)

(pp. 52, ibid) sādhya-sādhana-bhāvaś ca anayoḥ avinābhāvāvasāya-kṛto'vagantavyaḥ. sa ca pramāṇa-mūlaḥ. tat ca trividham-yad āhuḥ - "loko vedas tathā'dhyātmaṃ pramāṇaṃ trividhaṃ smṛtam." iti.

Mahimā holds that 'loka' pramāṇa depends only on wellknown worldly matters - "tatra loka-prasiddhārtha-ṣaṇḍaḥ." (pp. 52, ibid). 'śāstra-mātra-prasiddhārtha-ṣaṇḍaḥ." (pp. 53, ibid) - i.e. Veda-pramāṇa is that, the subject of which is known in śāstra only i.e. in various disciplines. Mahimā adds that by mentioning 'veda', other sources such as itihāsa, purāṇa, dharma-śāstra etc. are also to be understood, as they all rest on veda : "veda-grahaṇaṃ itihāsa-purāṇa-dharma śāstrā'di-upalakṣaṇaṃ, teṣāṃ tan-mūlatvopagamāt." (pp. 53, ibid). And,

“ādhyātmikārthaviśayaṃ adhyātmam.” (pp. 53, ibid) : “The adhyātma-pramāṇa has spirituality as its subject.” This means that it is self-apprehended.

This sādhya-sādhana-bhāva is two-fold viz., (i) śabda i.e. that which is expressly stated, and (ii) ‘ārtha’ or that which is implicit. Again both the sādhya and sādhana may be expressed either by means of words or by sentence : “sa hi dvividhaḥ śābdaś ca ārthaś ca, iti. sōpi ca sādhya-sādhanayōḥ pratyekaṃ padārtha-vākyārtharūpatvāt ----- yathāyogyam anyonya-sāṅkaryāt bahuvīdha iti, tasya diṇ-mātram idaṃ upadarśyate.” (pp. 54, ibid) - i.e. Words that convey the sādhya-sādhana-bhāva could be jāti-vācaka, guṇa-vācaka, etc. The meaning of the word again can be an attribute - i.e. dharma, or a substratum, i.e. dharmin. Dharma again can be samānādhikaraṇa, or vaiyadhikaraṇa as when both sādhya and sādhana reside either in the same substratum or not. The sādhya-sādhana-bhāva expressed by a sentence differs on the basis of kāraṇas used.

One thing that emerges very clearly from this is that Mahimā accepts only abhidhā, and that too in the normal accepted sense of the term as a word-power that yields the conventional meaning which is called primary or mukhya. All else is collected by inference, i.e. all other meaning is ‘anumeya’ for Mahimā. So, he refutes other śabdavṛttis such as guṇavṛtti, lakṣaṇā, tātparyā and vyañjanā.

The trend of incorporating other śabda-vṛttis such as lakṣaṇā and vyañjanā in abhidhā was traced by us in Mukula, a near successor of Ānandavardhana. Kuntaka also without rejecting positively any other śabda-vṛtti advocated the case of his vicitrā-abhidhā which as observed by us is not the same as ‘abhidhā’ that gives the primary meaning, but it is only a ‘poetic expression’ in general. Bhoja also does not name vyañjanā and incorporates gaṇī and lakṣaṇā under his three-fold abhidhā, the mukhyā being the first variety equivalent to our normal ‘abhidhā’. Mahimā does not subsume other śabda-vṛttis under abhidhā but he totally rejects them as śabda-vṛttis as such and advocates the case of only abhidhā that gives the primary sense, as śabda-vṛtti, one and only. The rest for him is ‘anumāna’ i.e. kāvyānumiti. We will examine how he presents his case.

Mahimā proceeds as follows. In such an example as, “upoḍharāgeṇa vilolātārkaṃ”, etc. we have double-meaning statements. Here, the apprehension of the second meaning takes place according to Mahimā, in the following way :

(pp. 113, 114, ibid) : “yat punaḥ asya aneka-śakti-samāśrayatvāt vyāpārāntara-kalpanam, tad arthasya eva upapadyate, na śabdasya, tasya aneka-śakti-

samāśrayatva-a-siddheh.” - i.e. when a word (in such illustrations as quoted above) is said to have such functions that deliver several meanings, and when based on such a premise an additional word-power called vyañjanā is postulated with reference to a word, virtually it is only the meaning which promotes other meanings and not the word, for a word can never be proved to be the substratum of many functions.

Mahimā further argues : “tathā hi, ekāśrayāḥ hi śaktayaḥ anyonya-anapekṣa-pravṛttayaḥ aprākṛta-paurvāparya-niyamā, yugapad eva svakārya-kāriṇyo dṛṣṭāḥ yathā dāhakatva-prakāśakatvā”dayógneḥ.” - i.e. Those more than one powers residing in a single substratum, have their functions independent of each other and there is no sequence of earlier and later seen with reference to them. The idea is that these powers operate independently of one another and also simultaneously, or at least without a fixed sequence. For example - Fire burns a substance and also gives light. But the imagined other functions of words are not such - “na ca śabdā”śrayāḥ śaktayas tathā dṛśyante, abhyupagamyante vā, niyogataḥ abhidhāśakti-pūrvakatvena itara-śakti-pravṛtti-darśanāt. tasmāt bhinnā”śrayā eva tā na śabdaika-samāśrayā iti avaseyam - i.e. In case word-powers this is not so, because other powers (such as lakṣaṇā and vyañjanā) function after abhidhā's function is over. Thus there is no simultaneity but sequence. So, it is better that different objects should be imagined as their substratum and not just ‘word’.

Now this bhinna-āśraya or different substratum could be ‘artha’ i.e. meaning and not śabda or word. Mahimā observes (pp. 114, ibid) : yaścā’sau āśrayo bhinnah sa ‘artha’ eva iti tad vyāpārasya anumānāntarbhāvo’bhyupagantavya eva.” - This different substratum could be ‘meaning’, and the functions of this ‘meaning’ element, should be subsumed under ‘anumāna’ or inference alone.

Before we proceed with Mahimā's contention, we have to evaluate his conviction. He gives the illustration of fire which has different powers operating simultaneously. But we can have instances of objects having different powers not operating simultaneously but only in a sequence and such powers may not be absolutely independent of each other. For example a cricketer can also be a singer and a performing artist and his different powers may not operate simultaneously. Sachin can be a good batsman and also a modest speaker. Sunil Gavaskar, we know was a great batsman, a captain of the team and now also a good sports-critic and a very good commentator also. When he bats he does not comment. So,

Mahimā's illustration proves something which is partially true. Even fire, when it gives heat and light does not help in cooking or burning, when not so required.

Now let us see how Mahimā further argues : “tathā hi - (pp. 114, ibid) - gaur vāhika ity ādau tāvad gavā”dayōrthāḥ bādhita-vāhikādy arthāntaraikātmyāḥ tād rūpya-vidhāna-anyathā-anupapattyā kenacid aṁśena tatra tatvāṁ anumāpayanti, na sarvā”tmanā.”

Now this other separate substratum is nothing else but ‘sense’. So, its function has to be subsumed under inference. In such illustrations as, “The vāhika is a bull”, the meaning such as ‘go’ - ‘bull’ etc., is not identified with other meaning such as that of vāhika. For Mahimā the process involved is ‘anumāna’. In order to establish ‘abheda’ - superimposition - when no other means is available, the meaning such as ‘go’ makes us infer the superimposition through some portion of it, and not through the whole of it.

No speaker, who is not out of his mind, goes for superimposition of one thing over the other, without realizing any element of similarity between the two. So any intelligent listener, who has knowledge of the speaker's mind, accepts similarity as the basis of superimposition. He does not hold mere physical expression of identity as the basis. Mere physical expression of identity is refuted on the first count by itself, for we can see that ‘vāhika’, the man, cannot be a bull.

So, the expression of identity by the speaker, is only to make the listener apprehend the similarity. The ‘prayojana’ behind this expression is to cause apprehension of such qualities as inertia (jādyā) etc. which are associated with ‘go’, as also seen in the vāhika. This sort of an expression - to use different word for conveying a different substance - is called an ‘atideśa’. Here ‘go’ is used for ‘jādyā’di’.

For, it is said,

“jāti'sabdo'antareṇāpi
jātiṁ yatra prayujyate,
sambandhi-sadṛś'ād dharmāt
taṁ gaṇīṁ apare viduḥ.” - (V.V. 45, pp. 115)

i.e. When a word denoting ‘jāti’ or class, is used with reference to something else than itself (i.e. sva-vācya), it is done when in that other object there is a quality of similarity. Others call such a usage as, “gaṇī”.

The idea is that in such instances as “upodha-rāgeṇa” etc. the word, through abhidhā power gives only the vācya i.e. expressed sense. The power that makes for the apprehension of another sense (arthāntara), rests in the ‘sense’ i.e. ‘artha’ and not the word i.e. śabda. Now this apprehension of another sense, through sense, is, according to Mahimā, through ‘anumiti’ or inference only. So, the power wrtested in sense should be taken as inference. In the illustration viz. “gaur-vāhikaḥ” etc., as there is an apparent difference between ‘go-tva’ and ‘vāhika-tva’, the identity through ‘ekādhikaraṇa’ i.e. the use of same case-termination, does not click to sense. Then it makes us infer the identity of qualities such as jādya”di - intertness - etc. So the identity is based on the qualities of vāhika, which are similar to go-tulya-jādya”di i.e. inertia and the like that are associated with vāhika are similar to those resting in the bull. It is clear that any speaker who is not out of sense, never asserts identity between two separate objects without sensing common qualities between the two. Again, the prayojana or the reason behind such awkward or artful expression as calling a humanbeing a bull, is the existence of such qualities as inertia etc. that normally go with the objects such as bull etc. in the object called ‘vāhika’ on which go-tva is superimposed.

It may be noted that Mahimā has expressed such terms as ‘sādṛśya’ and ‘sādharmya’, simultaneously. He has observed : (pp. 114, ibid) : “na hi an-unmattaḥ kaścit, kvacit, kiñcit, kathamcit, sādharmyam an-utpas’yan eva akasmāt tattvam āropayati” - i.e. without perceiving ‘sādharmya’ i.e. the state of having similar or common qualities in anyway whatsoever, nobody goes for superimposition of any object on any other object. So the cause of superimposition is apprehension of similarity alone. ‘sādṛśya’ i.e. similarity, and ‘sādharmya’ or having common qualities, are two important terms used in literary criticism. Dr. Rewaprasad observes (pp. 115, ibid) that Mammaṭa has accepted ‘upamā’ i.e. simile as “sādharmya resting on difference”, while his followers (such as Viśvanātha) have defined it as similarity (based on difference of objects). Vāmanācārya Jhalkikar in his Bāla-bodhini commentary on the K.P. has discussed at length with reference to both ‘sādharmya’ and ‘sādṛśya’. Between these two he accepts “prayojya-prayojaka-bhāva-saṁbandha” i.e. the relation of promoter and promoted; here sādharmya being the promoter and ‘sādṛśya’ being promoted thereby. For Bhartṛhari ‘sādharmya’ stands for ‘samāna-dharma-saṁbandha’, i.e. relation based on similar or common qualities. The etymology of the term ‘sādharmya’ goes as, “samāno dharmo yayos tau sa-dharmāṇau, taylor bhāvaḥ.” Bhartṛhari explains the taddhita-

pratyaya conveying 'bhāva', and used after a compound, as 'saṃbandha' or relation. - "kṛt-taddhita-samāsebhyaḥ saṃbandhābhidhānam bhāva-pratyayena" - In the term 'sādharmya', the 'ṣyañ' pratyaya is in the sense of 'bhāva' only. In the notes attached to the 'kāma-dhenu' commentary on Vāmana, Kaiyata's words are quoted. There the explanation of 'bhāva' as - "prakṛti-janya-bodhe prakāribhūto bhāvaḥ" - is also useful in the present context. The meaning of this expression is that, "by 'bhāva' is meant that 'dharma' or quality, which is lying inside that portion, of a word, to which a pratyaya is attached. In the word 'sādharmya', the pratyaya 'ṣyañ' is attached to the word 'sa-dharma' or 'sa-dharman'. Its meaning is "that which has similar (or common) qualities." Thus here 'samāna-dharma' is the viśeṣaṇa and the vyakti or person adorned with this is 'viśeṣya'. 'ṣyañ' suffix is used in the sense of 'bhāva'. So, it means, "samāna-dharma". But the apprehension of "samāna-dharma" is caused by 'samāna-śabda' as well. By 'sādharmya' we have apprehension not only of the equality, but also of the vyakti or person in whom this similarity rests, and also of the relation with it. So, Bhartṛhari's view as quoted above is more authentic.

To point out the relation between 'sādṛśya' and 'sādharmya', Jhalkikar (pp. 541, bālabodhinī on G.P.) observes : "yaḥ sādharmaṇa-dharma-pratīyogikaḥ, upamānopameya-bhayaṇuyogikaḥ, saṃbandhaḥ, sa sādharmyaṃ iti ucyate; yaśca upamāna-pratīyogikaḥ, upameyaṇuyogikaḥ saṃbandhaḥ, sa sādṛśyaṃ iti ucyate." - iti sādharmya-sādṛśyayor bhedaḥ" - This explanation in 'navya-nyāya'-style pertains to this much, that - "The relation that simultaneously rests in both upamāna and upameya, is called sādharmya." 'Sādṛśya' is different from this. It does not stay simultaneously in two, but it rises from one and settles in the other. 'Sādṛśya' or similarity is of one into the other, it is not resting in the two - vice versa. In fact, with reference to sādharmya, we cannot call the substratum as upamāna and upameya, because in the apprehension caused by 'sādharmya' the qualities of the two objects are found to be equal. In sādṛśya there is 'nyūna-adhikarva' between the two i.e. there is difference in quantity of the qualities. In case of one we apprehend 'utkarṣa' and in case of the other, 'apakarṣa'. So, the upamāna-upameya-bhāva rests on this 'utkarṣa-apakarṣa' or more and less quantity with reference to the dharma i.e. quality. That having higher degree of quality, 'dharmotkarṣa' is termed upamāna, and that having 'dharmāpakarṣa' is termed upameya. The 'sādṛśya' resting in object having utkarṣa travels into that having 'apakarṣa'. The sādṛśya of both does not go into each other. Thus 'sādharmya' suggests equality

with reference to qualities while *sādrśya* suggests equality in which the 'upamāna' - element is having a greater quantity of equal quality. The dissimilarity between *sādharmya* and *sādrśya* rests on normal worldly usage. In ordinary parlance it is stated that, "there is 'sādharmya' between these two objects, while there is 'sādrśya' between those two."

But actually this difference is not exactly borne out by such normal usages also. For, the normal usage can take the form of such expression also as, "there is *sādharmya* of this into that object, and between them is *sādrśya*." In the usage quoted above, where the *prakṛti* of the term '*sādharmya*' was taken as ending in dual (*dvi-vacanānta*), and wherein that of *sādrśya* as ending in singular (i.e. *eka-vacanānta*) the opposite can also follow in the present usage.

In different disciplines there is difference with reference to the concepts of '*sādharmya*' and '*sādrśya*'. The discipline of grammar takes them as different. While the *nyāya-darśana* takes them as indentical and this is acceptable to Mahimā, he being closer to the *nyāya* discipline.

So, in expressions like '*gaur-vāhikāḥ*', taken as '*gaunī-vṛtti*' and, like '*gaṅgāyām ghoṣaḥ*', taken as *lakṣaṇā*, Mahimā accepts only '*anumāna*'. As noted above, in the case of the former, Mahimā holds that no sensible person will identify one object with a totally different object without seeing some similarity between the two. The expression '*gaur vāhikāḥ*' cannot be taken literally as it is perceived directly as incongruous, so, we infer that *vāhika* is a bull in some respects. This secondary sense which is not given by the word directly is only inferred. In the same way the fact of a hamlet being situated on the flow of the river *Gaṅgā* being contradicted by direct perception, we infer the qualities of coolness and purity of the hamlet from the expressed meaning. Mahimā does not accept *dhvanivādin's* observation that the meaning of the hamlet being situated on the bank of the *Gaṅgā* is derived through *lakṣaṇā*, and the qualities of coolness and purity of the hamlet are derived through the suggestive power i.e. *vyāñjanā*. For Mahimā both the secondary and suggested senses are arrived at through *anumiti kriyā* - or inference and so the distinction observed by the *Dhvanikāra* between *bhakti* and *dhvani* is uncalled for.

Mahimā observes (pp. 118) "*tasmād yōyaṃ vāhikā'dāu gavā'di-sādharmyāva-gamaḥ, sa tattvā'ropa-anyathā-anupapatti-parikalpito'numānasya eva viśayaḥ na śabda-vyāpārasya, iti sthitam.*"

He further observes (pp. 119, ibid) :

“gaṅgāyāṃ ghoṣa ity ādau api gaṅgādayóorthāḥ svātmani-anupapatti-bādhita-ghoṣā”dy adhi-karaṇa-bhāvāḥ, tad-upādāna-sāmarthyāt sambandha-mātra-parikalpita-tattvā”ropam tad adhikaraṇa-bhāvopagama-yogyam arthāntaram eva tatā”di-rūpaṃ anumāpayanti.

Mahimā further observes that only similarity can not be the cause of identification or superimposition. Other relations such as ‘saṃyoga’ or conjunction, etc. also can be the cause. So, through ‘gaṅgā’ etc. the objects such as the bank etc. are inferred, and not through any other vṛtti or function of a word, because the fact of being the substratum of the hamlet can not be understood by any other way : (pp. 119, ibid)

“na hi tat sādṛśyam eva ekaṃ tattvā”ropa-nibandhanam iṣyate, kiṃ tarhi ? tat-sambandhā”dir api, iti tat-sambandha-mātra-samāropita-tadbhāvas tatā”dir eva ghoṣā”dy adhikaraṇabhāvópādāna-anyathā-anupapattyā gaṅgā”dīnām arthānām anumeya eva bhavitum arhati.

Mahimā accepts only one power of the word and that is the power of direct expression viz. abhidhā. He rejects anything else than that and whatever other meaning is comprehended, he holds, is through ‘anumāna’ or inference. He firmly believes that the power of a word is exhausted after giving its expressed sense. So, it has no capacity even to know about the existence of the secondary sense, such as the ‘tatā’ or bank, in this case, then what to think of actually touching this secondary sense ? The metaphorical expression is resorted to only to convey the knowledge of the existence of coolness and purity of the Gaṅgā resting in the hamlet, the object of superimposition, and not similarity, as in the first illustration. The cause viz. ‘tattvā’ropa’ i.e. superimposition is identical in both the cases. Mahimā holds that similarity of the object which is superimposed, or its saṃyogā”di relations, are manifold. He quotes a famous kārīkā here, with a difference in reading from the same quoted by Abhinavagupta in his Locana on Dhv. I. i - with reference to the expression, “bhāktam āhuḥ tam anye.”

Mahimā observes : (pp. 119, ibid) : “śabdaḥ punaḥ svārthābhidhāna-mātra-vyāpāra-paryavasita-sāmarthyō na arthāntarasya tatā”der vārtam api veditum utsahate, kim punaḥ saṃsparsam iti uktaṃ.

prayojanam punaḥ asya evam-vidhasya ukti-vaicitrya-parigrahasya tatā”dau āropa-viṣaye vastuni āropyamāṇa-gaṅgā”di-gata-puṇyatva-śītalatvā”di-dharma-

pratipattiḥ, na sādṛśyaṃ iti pūrvasmād asya viśeṣaḥ. ubhayatra api ca tattvā"ropa eva hetuḥ. sa hi tat-sāmya-tat-saṃbandhā"di-nibandhanatvād bahuvidha dṛṣṭaḥ. - yad āhaḥ -

“abhidheyena saṃbandhāt
sādṛśyāt samavāyataḥ,
vaiparītyāt kriyāyogād
lakṣaṇā pañcadhā matā.” - iti.

In the Locana, we have, “abhidheyena saṃyogāt” and also, “sāmīpyāt” for ‘sādṛśyāt’ of Mahimā.

In Locana, we have ‘abhidheyena saṃyogāt’. The idea is that ‘saṃyoga’ or conjunction is a type of ‘saṃbandha’ i.e. relation in general. Abhinavagupta explains ‘saṃyogāt’ as, ‘bhramara-śabdena yasya saṃyogaḥ saṃbandhaḥ’. Mahimā does not like this usage of a specific term to denote a general term. So, he goes for the reading ‘saṃyogāt’, retaining the term denoting a general relation. Similarly, in Locana we have ‘sāmīpyāt’, while Mahimā reads ‘sādṛśyāt’. Abhinavagupta has explained ‘samavāya’ as ‘saṃbandha-mātra’ i.e. any relation whatsoever. The relations such as ‘sāmīpya’ or proximity could be believed to be covered up by ‘samavāya’, so Mahimā opts for sādṛśya. Actually we can say that not only ‘sāmīpya’, but even ‘sādṛśya’, ‘vaiparītya’ or any other relation could be contained in ‘samavāya’. Because of this only, later naiyāyikas such as Gadādhara and the rest have taken only “abhidheyena saṃbandha”, as definition of lakṣaṇā, which they choose to define as “śakya-saṃbandho lakṣaṇā.” The expression of special relations such as sādṛśya, vaiparītya etc. is covered by ‘saṃbandha’ only, but they are mentioned only to make things clearer. This way, argues Prof. Rewaprasad, the reading of Locana as ‘saṃyogāt’, is more acceptable. The reading ‘sādṛśya’ is not preferred to ‘sāmīpya’ by Locanakāra, because by using the term ‘gauṇa’, the explanation of lakṣaṇā based on similarity is already covered up by him. Virtually ‘saṃbandha’ being manifold, lakṣaṇā may not be taken as five-fold only.

Mahimabhaṭṭa also incorporates what is known as tātparya-śakti under abhidhā only. Some people hold that to convey the correlated meaning of different words in a sentence, there is a separate power called the tātparya śakti which rests in a sentence. Tātparya śakti is thus advocated by some to explain the apprehension of the intention of the speaker from a sentence or a statement. Mahimā feels that the import of the speaker is inferred by the hearer from the expressed sense. When

someone says, “eat poison, but do not eat at his house”, the hearer infers that taking food at his house is more despicable than eating poison. The inference follows the commonsense that, without some special reason, a friend or a well-wisher will never stop anyone from taking food at some person's place. The hearer understands, thus through inference, that eating food will be more harmful than taking poison. Mahimā observes : (pp. 133, ibid)

“viśabhakṣaṇānujñānā”der vākyaṛthasya aprastutasya eva upanyāso hi pūrvoktena nayena prastutātiriktārthāntara-pratipādana-paratvāt, tatra hetutayā avagantavyaḥ, iti na śabdasya tatra vyāpāraḥ parikalpanīyaḥ.

“viśabhakṣaṇād api parām etad
grhabhojanasya dāruṇatām,
vācyād atónumimate
prakaraṇa-vakṛt-svarūpajñāḥ.” - 67
viśabhakṣaṇaṃ anu manute
na hi kaścid akāṇḍa eva suhr̥di sudhīḥ,
tena atra arthāntaragatir ārthī
tātparya-śaktijā na punaḥ.” - 67
iti saṅgrahā”rye.

Mahimā, who accepts only ‘abhidhā’ as word-power, further rejects the views of those who hold a ‘dirgha-ḍirghatara-vyāpāra’ of a word, like that of an arrow. The pūrva-pakṣin argues as follows :

Starting with the expressed sense, till the implied sense is collected, the power of the word extends further and further like an arrow. There is no separate power of a word for collecting the other (= implicit) sense. Like an arrow shot by a brave bow-wielder cuts through the armour, rips through the chest and takes the breath away of an enemy, and there is no difference seen in the function of this single arrow, similarly, a word used by a clever poet, in sequence, conveys its primary meaning through abhidhāna (i.e. abhidhā-vyāpāra), and makes the apprehension of the second implied sense by the same power of the word used. There is no difference in the power or function of one and the same word. Again, argues the objector, that the ultimate meaning should be taken as the meaning of a given word, for conveying which it is used. Thus, this is the power of the word only and not that of the sense : “kiñca yatparaḥ śabdaḥ sa śabdārtha iti śabdasya eva asau

vyāpāro nyāyyo na arthasya.” - (pp. 137, ibid). The objector here seems to be the commentator Dhanika, the brother of Dhanañjaya, the author of Daśarūpaka. This is suggested by Dr. Rewaprasad Dwivedi (pp. 140, ibid).

Mahimā does not accept this. He argues as follows : “This is not correct. : (pp. 140, ibid) tad ayuktaṃ. sāksāt-śabdasya artha-pratītiheturva-asiddheḥ.” The word cannot be taken as cause of the (implied) sense. If it is held as cause through sequence (pāramparyeṇa), there will be difficulty in placing some objects as effect and others as cause, for there is no regulation to that effect. - “pāramparyeṇa tu tasya hetuvopagame vastūnāṃ hetu-phala-bhāva-vyavahāra-niyamo na vyavatiṣṭhate.” (pp. 140, ibid)

Mahimā observes : This cannot be accepted. The reason is that in arriving at the sense, word is not the direct cause. It cannot be taken as a cause in sequence also for it will be difficult to name something specific as cause and also something as effect. In case śabda is held as a parmparā-hetu, then as in case of the spring season being held as the cause of flowering, we will also have to hold a potter who fashions a pot used in watering a plant, as the main cause of flowering. So, it is wiser to accept ‘artha’ or sense as the cause of further sense, and not ‘word’. It is not proper to say that when some function is carried out by a son, his father also is considered the chief substratum of the function concerned. For, in such cases there will follow the contingency of ‘sāṅkarya-doṣa’, - “na hi yatra putrasya vyāpāraḥ sa pituḥ eva iti mukhyatayā śakyate vaktum, tayoṛ anyonya-vyāpāra-sāṅkarya-doṣa-prasaṅgāt.” (pp. 140, ibid). The fault will be of mixing up of activities of different agents.

Mahimā further argues that this illustration of an arrow is also not congruent with the situation : “kīṁca ayaṃ viśamaḥ śara-dṛṣṭāntopanyāsaḥ” (pp. 140, ibid). - The line of his argument proceeds as below : This ‘śara-dṛṣṭānta’ is a mis-fit, because as the arrow on its own does the activities of cutting, piercing; etc. through a single power, the word does not. The word executes its function with the help of ‘saṅketa’ or convention. The word has its function only at places where convention is fixed. So, the function of the word is limited upto the expressed sense only, not upto any ‘arthāntara’ i.e. sense beyond the expressed one, as no ‘saṅketa’ or convention is fixed with reference to the other extra sense. In case we accept the capacity of a word to give ‘arthāntara’ also, i.e. added sense also, then people will be able to apprehend any sense with the help of any word. So, for a meaning which stands in need of convention, to that only

the function of a word is limited, and it does not extend further upto any added sense, in absence of any convention. For the added sense, the function, not of word, but of the expressed sense only, should be accepted : “tataśca abhidheyārtha-viṣaya eva asya vyāpāro yuktaḥ, na arthāntara-viṣayaḥ, tatra saṅketābhāvāt. tad abhāve’pi tatra tat parikalpane sarvaḥ kutaścīd abhidheyārthavad arthāntaram api pratīyāt. tasmād yatra saṅketā”pekṣā, tatra eva asya vyāpāra iti avagantum yuktaḥ, na arthāntare; tatra vakṣyamāṇa-nayena arthasya eva tad-upapatti-samarthanād iti.” (pp. 140, 141, ibid)

We may observe with Dr. Rewaprasad that Mahimā here pushes two arguments in favour of his thinking. First, he holds that a word cannot convey another sense directly, as it does with reference to its conventional sense, and secondly, a word can convey only that sense with reference to which a convention is fixed. Mahimā is of the opinion that the formation of a pot is the result of coming together of the two halves, and not the potter, as the joining of halves immediately preceeds the formation of a pot. Similarly in case of added sense, i.e. ‘arthāntara’ the immediate predecessor is the expressed sense, and not the word itself. So, being an immediate cause the primary sense is the cause of any additional sense, and not the word.

Mahimā also argues that the functions of the arrow and word are not identical. The function of the arrow, in cutting, ripping through and taking the breath away, is its own, i.e. it is an independent power of an arrow. But for the word it is not so. It conveys meaning remaining dependent on the convention. So, the function of the word is not independent but is dependent on something else. Thus a word has a limited capacity to convey only that meaning with reference to which convention is made. It cannot proceed to an added target, like an arrow. It cannot proceed to an added sense of its own. The added sense is collected only by the function of the primary sense, which should be taken here as the cause. So, the added sense has to be accepted as inferred only.

But, we may say that Mahimā’s thinking is faulty. The arrow also, when placed in a sheath does not have any capacity even to pierce the softest thing on earth. Only when it is discharged by a mighty shooter, it does the said tricks. So, even the function of an arrow has its capacity, originally borrowed from the shooter’s strength. Similarly, a word when used by an expert poet attains the added function to convey an added sense also. But, this is not to justify ‘dīrgha-dīrghatara-vyāpāra’. Actually, as explained by Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta, we have to accept

difference in function to explain difference in meaning, otherwise we will get into a mess where any word will start giving any meaning !

Mahimā, as stated above believes only in one power of word and that is abhidhā. For him 'artha' or meaning is two-fold viz. vācya or expressed and 'anumeya' or inferred. He quotes a kārīka - "That whose significance is cognised on hearing alone, is believed to be the primary meaning, and the gaṇa or secondary meaning is that which is collected as a result of (special) effort." He observes : (pp. 47, ibid) :

“artho'pi dvividho, vācya'numeyas'ca.
tatra śabda-vyāpāra-viśayo vācyaḥ.
sa eva mukhya ucyate. yad āhuḥ :
śrutimātreṇa yatrāsya
tādarthyam avasiyate,
tam mukhyam artham manyante
gaṇam yatnōpapāditam.”

'Anumeya' or inferred meaning is that, in whose apprehension, the primary meaning or vācyārtha serves as 'hetu' or 'līnga' i.e. cause, or the 'hetu' can also be that meaning which is derived from the primary sense. - “tata eva, tad anumitād vā līnga-bhūtād arthāntaram anumīyate, saḥ anumeyaḥ.” (pp. 47, ibid). We know that Bhartṛhari incorporates all meaning other than the primary in 'gaṇa' or secondary, but for Mahimā all meaning else than primary is 'anumeya'. The primary meaning for Mahimā is also the 'mukhya' or principal sense. Mahimā accepts the relationship between word and meaning as conventional. Word gives meaning only when there is convention to that effect. He rejects the view that a word can ever convey such a meaning which is other than primary, i.e. one with reference to which a convention is not formed. He feels any other meaning, beyond the primary one, can never be collected by the function of a word and that such added sense is arrived at by inference, the primary sense serving as 'hetu' or cause in it. We have seen that Mahimā therefore rejects all other functions such as lakṣaṇā, tātparya and vyañjanā as functions of a word and subsumes them under 'anumāna' or inference.

Mahimā of course accepts the added sense or what may be called the unexpressed sense. This, for Mahimā, is threefold viz. (i) vastumātra i.e. of the

form of 'vastu' or a matter of fact, or, an idea, (ii) alamkāra i.e. figures of speech or artful expression, and (iii) rasādayas ca, i.e. the emotive stuff such as feelings, emotions, sentiments etc. or, aesthetic rapture in general. The first two could be directly expressed, but for Mahimā, the third variety is 'anumeya' or 'inferred' only. The direct meaning of a word is always expressed, it being without parts and there being no relation of 'sādhya' or that which is to be established and the sādhana or the instrument with - which it is established, between the two i.e. 'vācya artha' and 'śabda'. He observes : (pp. 47, ibid) : "sa ca trividhaḥ. vastumātram alamkāra rasādayas' ca. iti. tatra ādyau vācyau api sambhavataḥ. anyastv anumeya eva iti. tatra padasya artho vācya eva, na anumeyah, tasya nir aṁśatvāt sādhya-sādhana-bhāvā'bhāvataḥ." Mahimā, like Ānandavardhana, also believes that the vācya or expressed is not so charming as is the unexpressed or inferred : "vācya hy artho na tathā camatkāram ātanoti yathā sa eva vidhi- niṣedhā"diḥ kākva"bhidheyatām anumeyatām vā avatīrṇaḥ iti svabhāva eva ayaṁ arthānām." The expressed is not as charming as the same when presented through artful intonation or conveyed through inference. This is in the nature of a meaning. The meaning conveyed through simple assertion is also less charming than the same conveyed through double negation. He substantiates his observation by quoting Ānandavardhana who observes :

"sārarūpo'hy arthaḥ sva-śabda-anabhidheyatvena prakāśitaḥ sutarām śobhām āvahati. prasiddhiś ca iyaṁ asti eva vidagdhapariṣatsu yad abhimatataram vastu vyaṅgyatvena prakāśyate na vācyaatvena" iti.

The sequence i.e. krama, observes Mahimā, in the first two varieties such as vastu or matter of fact or, idea, and alamkāra or artful expression, is self-evident and is clearly observed. So, if we resort to vyañjakatva to explain this sequence it is of no use at all. He rejects vyaṅgya-vyañjaka relation between dhvani (i.e. word) and so called sphoṭa also. Similarly on this analogy the promulgation of dhvani vis-a-vis kāvya which is of the form of word and meaning placed together, is also not acceptable to Mahimā. He accepts 'gamyā-gamaka-bhāva' instead.

Mahima Bhaṭṭa does not accept Ānandavardhana's idea of three types of meaning such as the expressed or vācya, the indicated or lakṣya and the suggested or vyaṅgya. For Mahimā the indicated or lākṣaṇika i.e. metaphorical or secondary sense and the suggested or vyaṅgya fall in the category of the inferred on 'anumeya' only, and thus for Mahimā there is a scheme of two-fold meaning only; the vācya and the anumeya. Thus he seems to reject

Ānandavardhana's observation that the indicated - lakṣyamāṇa and the suggested i.e. the vyajyamāṇa are also different from each other. For Ānandavardhana the secondary function or a-mukhya vyavahāra is only an extension of the primary function and it is resorted to when the primary meaning is found to be non-congruent with the context. This secondary sense may not be charming also, and is arrived at only when the primary sense is rejected. This abandonment of the primary sense, in the opinion of Ānandavardhana, could be either partial or total. This secondary function is seen only when we use language. The suggestive function, for Ānandavardhana, is of wider scope and travels beyond language. When use of language is concerned, then also this suggestive function completely differs from either the primary function of a word in language, i.e. abhidhā, or the secondary function i.e. guṇavṛtti or lakṣaṇā or a-mukhya-vyāpāra, both from the point of view of nature and scope i.e. "svarūpaḥ viśayataḥ ca." Suggestivity, as noted above, travels beyond the medium of language and is seen in any other art-form such as drama, music, painting and what not, - taking the form of abhinaya or acting, or notes i.e. śuddha svara, or colours etc. as the case may be. Thus for Ānandavardhana the suggestivity has to be completely distinguished from lakṣaṇā or secondary function of a word.

Not so with Mahimā. He rejects the very basis on which the concept of lakṣaṇā rests. He rejects any other power or function beyond abhidhā or the direct expressive power in case of a word. Mahimā is of the opinion that the fact of 'krama' or sequence in the functioning of powers called abhidhā, lakṣaṇā and vyañjanā goes against them belonging to the same substratum, i.e. word. As seen earlier, he feels that if more than one power belongs to the same thing, these powers should function simultaneously like heat and light emanating from fire. But we had observed earlier that this analogy is not applicable in case of a word, as there is no hard and fast rule that all powers belonging to the same thing should function simultaneously only. Even in day to day life we see agents using their various powers as and when the situation so demands. A brave soldier enjoys life also to the full and also fights against the enemy as and when required. A man may be gifted with a number of special capacity which he chooses to exhibit or utilize only when the situation so demands. But Mahimā is satisfied with his own argument and his own illustration of fire oozing light and heat simultaneously, and therefore concludes that word has only one power - abhidhā - that gives the primary

sense alone and whatever added sense follows, - call it lakṣyārtha, tātpariyārtha or vyaṅgyārtha - call it by any name, it follows from the primary sense alone as an inferred sense, and the word has nothing to do with it. The other meaning follows from the primary sense due to the relation of līṅga-līṅgi-bhāva only. Mahimā observes : (pp. 121, ibid) : “kiñca upacāravṛttau śabdasya mā bhūd atiprasaṅga itī avaśyaṃ kiṃ api nimittaṃ anusartavyam. anyathā anyatra prasiddha-saṃbandhaḥ kathaṃ asamitam (= saṅketa-virahita) eva arthāntaraṃ pratyāyayet ? yat ca tannimittaṃ tad eva asmābhir iha līṅgaṃ itī ākhyātam. yuktaṃ ca etat. śabdasya tatra vyāpārā'bhāvāt. vyāpārābhāvas' ca saṃbandhābhāvāt. līṅgāt ca līṅginaḥ pratītir anumānaṃ eva, na guṇa-vṛttau arthāntara-pratītiḥ śābdī itī tasyāḥ vācakāś'rayatvaṃ asiddhaṃ eva.”

Mahimā (pp. 122) further observes in Saṃgraha verses :

“yaḥ satattva-samāropaḥ
tat-saṃbandha-nibandhanaḥ,
mukhyārtha-bādhe sópy arthaṃ
saṃbandhaṃ anumāpayet.” (46)

and,

“tat-sāmya-tat-saṃbandhau hi
tattvā”ropaika-kāraṇam,
guṇavṛtter dvirūpāyaḥ
tat-pratītir ato'numā.” (47)

i.e. 'tat-sāmya' and 'tat-saṃbandha' - these two are the causes of 'tattvā'ropa' i.e. superimposition of one object over the other. So, in two types of guṇavṛtti (or lakṣaṇā) the apprehension of the cause - i.e. prayojana - is through inference only.

Thus, Mahimā accepts two types of guṇavṛtti : (i) based on 'tat-sāmya', as in 'gaur vāhikāḥ' and (ii) based on 'tat-saṃbandha' as in 'mañcāḥ kros'anti'.

He further observes that abandoning of mukhya-vṛtti is not possible in case of a word. So, only a meaning superimposed on a (primary) meaning causes inference of similarity.

“mukhya-vṛtti-parityāgaḥ
na śabdasya upapadyate,
vihito'rthāntare hy arthaḥ
sva-sāmyaṃ anumāpayet.” - (48)

Thus, when the function of a word is not established with reference to another sense, how, can we hold śabda as 'askhalad-gati' with reference to a result (phala, i.e. another sense) which follows through inference from a given līnga or mark i.e. cause ?

“itthaṃ arthāntare śabda-
vṛtter anupapattitah,
phale līngaika-gamye syāt
kutaḥ śabdaḥ skhalad-gatiḥ.” - (50)

Thus, observes Mahimā, that whatever factors are considered in favour of gaunī vṛtti, are taken by us as promoting anumāna -

“guṇa-vṛttau girāṃ yāvat
sāmagrī-īṣṭā nibandhanam,
saiva līngatayā'smābhir
iṣyate arthāntaram prati.” - (55) (pp. 123, ibid)

“na hi tat samayābhāvāt
vācyam śabdasya kalpyate
pratīyamānatāyām ca
vyaktasya anumeyatā.” (56)

“tasmāt svārthā'tirikteṇa
gatir na arthāntare girāṃ,
vācakatvās'rayeṇā'to
guṇavṛtter asaṃbhavaḥ.” - (57)

Mahimā suggests that when we resort to metaphorical expression or guṇa-vṛtti, the secret underlying this activity is that it is the natural linguistic habit of people that they identify similar or mutually connected objects. When we see a person with long neck and ugly figure we call him 'karabha' or a youngone of a camel. Again on seeing children crying in a cradle, we describe the cradle as crying : (pp. 121, ibid) :

“loko hi tat-saḍṛśam tat-saṃbaddham ca tattvena vyavaharan dṛśyate, tad yathā dīrgha-grīvaṃ vikāṭa-kāyaṃ ca kaṃcit paśyan 'karabha' iti vyapadiśati, mañca-saṃbaddhān ca kāmścit krośato mañcāḥ krośanti iti.” On hearing such sentences which are non-congruent by nature, an intelligent person concludes that such an

incongruous identification has some valid reason as its basis. This he decides through reasoning. Mahimā does not accept 'arthāpatti' or, implication as a separate means of knowledge - i.e. pramāṇa-and subsumes it under 'anumāna' or inference." arthāpatter anumānāntarbhāva'bhyupagamāt iti uktam." (pp. 118, ibid)

Mahimā classifies guṇavṛtti or metaphorical expression into two, such as (i) based on similarity, and (ii) based on some other connection : "tat-sāmya-tat-sambandhau hi tattvā"-ropa-eka-kāraṇam" (pp. 122, 47a, ibid). For him the apprehension of metaphorical meaning is only logical deduction from literal sense. It is a case of inference where the sādhyā-sādhana-bhāva is collected from loka i.e. worldly parlour. We have noted that for Mahimā, as both 'bhakti' i.e. metaphorical expression and dhvani are covered up by inference, there is no cause to distinguish between the two as is done by Ānandavardhana. Secondary meaning and the so-called suggested sense are, for Mahimā, arrived at by the same process of 'anumiti' i.e. inference, because both are collected from the primary meaning. For Mahimā, even terms involving 'faded metaphors' i.e. rūḍhimūlā lakṣaṇā, have consideration of second meaning and are therefore collected by inference. In that case they are, in the opinion of Mahimā, not different from Dhvani : (pp. 124, ibid) :

rūḍhā ye viṣayēnyatra
śabdāḥ sva-viṣayād api,
lāvanyā"dyāḥ prasaktās te
na bhavanti padaṃ dhvaneḥ - (61)

Mahimā as observed earlier, also rejects tātparya śakti, which for him falls under anumiti. It may be noted that for Abhinavagupta 'tātparya' is a sentence-function, as explained by the Abhihitānvayavādins, which makes for the correlated meaning of various 'pada's or words in a given sentence. Thus this can be equated with saṃsarga-maryādā of the later navya-naiyāyikas, and the lakṣaṇā of the Bhāṭṭas (Ref. Dr. K. Kunjunni Raja, p. 222, ibid). But Dhanika's tātparya travels farther than mere sentence-sense as a result of the total of word-meanings. It is wider enough to cover Ānandavardhana's vyaṅgyārtha also. The famous words of Dhanika are, "tātparyam na tulādhr̥tam", for it extends upto any limit till the speaker's intention is collected - "yāvat-kārya-prasāritvāt". Dr. Raja observes (pp. 216, ibid) it can, "cover the whole range of the speaker's intention and cover all implications coming up in the train of the expressed sense."

But we have seen above how Mahimā rejects the case of tātparya-vṛtti and how he subsumes it under 'anumiti'. Thus Mahimā's concepts of 'abhidhā' and 'anumiti' are powerful enough to digest all other concepts such as gauṇī, lakṣaṇā, tātparya, vyañjanā and even the broad concept of 'vakrokti' involving 'vicitrā abhidhā' of Kuntaka. This is how Mahimā takes Kuntaka to task. Kuntaka holds such 'śabda' and 'artha' to be kāvya, as are charged by charming function of a poet and delight those who know (poetry)." So, for Kuntaka such artful expression is the life of poetry which is different from the practice of word and sense as are seen in various disciplines. But all this is not correct according to Mahimā. He argues as follows :

Is this special arrangement of word and sense merely the proper usage (aucitya-mātra) of word and sense, or is only the suggestion of the implicit sense which is different from the expressed sense as experienced by all ? Because, no third alternative is possible, it has got to be either of the two.

The first alternative is not acceptable as the mention of such propriety is useless, because it stands refuted by the very assertion of the form of poetry. The point is that it is the poet's business to arrange vibhāvā"di, i.e. determinants, etc. It is not different from this. The determinants make for 'rasa' only when presented in a special way, and not otherwise. Again, only that theme makes for poetry, which is charged with rasa. So, no question of impropriety ever arises. In other words Mahimā accepts only that as poetry which is charged with rasa, and this rasa is caused only by proper arrangement of vibhāvā"dis. Thus 'anaucitya' has no scope in genuine poetry, worth its name. He observes (pp. 142, ibid) :

"te ca yathāśāstraṃ upanibadhyamānā rasābhivyakter nibandhanabhāvaṃ bhajante. na anyathā. rasā"tmakam ca kāvyam iti kutas tatra anaucitya-saṃsparśaḥ saṃbhāvyate yan nirāsārthaṃ itthaṃ kāvya-lakṣaṇam ācakṣīran vicakṣaṇammanyāḥ ?"

Mahimā says, that in case you opt for the second alternative, then you are quoting only the definition of dhvani in different words, for the content of thought is one and the same. Now as far as this dhvani-lakṣaṇa goes, it has been already refuted by us. Mahimā sticks to his guns and concludes : (pp. 143, 144, ibid)

"atro'cyate'bhidhā-saṃjñāḥ
śabdasya artha-prakāśane,
vyāpāra eka eva iṣṭaḥ yas tu
anyo'rthasya so'khilaḥ." - (71)

rataśca,
 “vācyād arthāntaram bhinnam
 yadi talliṅgam asya saḥ,
 tan nāntarīyakatayā
 nibandho hy asya lakṣaṇam.” - (72)
 “abhede bahutā na syād
 ukter mārgāntarāgrahāt,
 tena dhvanivad eṣā’pi
 vakroktir anumā na kim ? - (73)

Mahimā also rejects suggestivity - vyañjakatva - as word-power, for there is no other power of the word except ‘abhidhā’ : (pp. 146, ibid) - Mahimā observes - “nā’pi śabdasya abhidhā-vyatirekeṇa vyañjakatvam vyāpārāntaram upapadyate, yena arthāntaram pratyāyayed; vyakteḥ anupapatteḥ, sambandhāntarasya ca asiddheḥ. Even in the absence of ‘vyakti’ or ‘sambandhāntara’, if suggestivity is accepted with reference to a word, then no fixed scheme will hold good in that case - “tad abhāve’pi tad abhyupagame tasya artha-niyamo na syād, nibandhana-abhāvāt.” (pp. 146, ibid) - Word cannot have any direct relationship with suggested meaning. If word had any natural relationship with suggested sense in form of ‘rati’ and other emotions, as in case of songs (i.e. music), then one and all could have been able to apprehend the same - “na hi asya, geyasya iva ratyā”dibhir bhāvaiḥ svābhāvika eva sambandhaḥ, sarvasya eva tat-pratīti-prasaṅgāt.” (pp. 146, ibid)

No relation of a word with the suggested sense can be believed to be born of convention as suggestion is ‘aupādhika’ and ‘upādhis’ are innumerable and uncertain. One and the same word may suggest different meanings under different contexts. So, to fix a particular suggested sense in case of a fixed word, like convention in case of expressed sense, is impossible.

Mahimā also examines the possibility of prefixes (= upasargas) being suggestive. He is clear that if suggestivity is totally denied in case of a word, the prefixes can never be accepted as suggesting any meaning. Dr. C. Rajendran in a foot-note (no. 58, pp. 72, ibid) notes : “Here the assumption of MB (i.e. Mahima Bhaṭṭa) is that Dyotakatva of the grammarians is the same as the vyañjakatva of the Dhvani theorists. There is however, no supporting evidence adduced.” It may be noted that on an earlier occasion we have also noted that the ‘manifestation’ of

sphoṭa cannot be taken as identical with the suggestion of the dhvanivādins. Mahimā holds that the prefixes are said to be 'dyotaka' i.e. suggestive i.e. capable of manifestation, only in a metaphorical sense. Actually they are capable of expression only and not suggestion, or manifestation.

Mahimā argues that in fact when we use such words as 'ghaṭa' or pot and the like, for directly conveying the meaning of the object called a pot, even there these words such as 'ghaṭa' should be held not as directly expressive of a meaning, but only as 'dyotakas' or suggestive, for the meaning of 'ghaṭa-padārtha' is already existent in our mind and is only revealed by the expression of the word 'ghaṭa'. Thus even the whole 'vācya-vācaka-vyavahāra' - the business of expression and expressed - will be negated. So, it is better to accept metaphorical suggestivity here. Says he - (pp. 153, ibid) :

"evaṃ ca antar-mātra viparivartitayā siddha-sadbhāvānām ghaṭā'dīnām ghaṭā'diśabdā api dyotakā eva syuḥ, na vācakā iti vācya-vācaka-vyavahāro'staṃ iyāt. tasmāt bhāktam eva dyotakatvaṃ upagantavyam na mukhyam. bhakeḥ ca prayojanam vācyasya arthasya sphuṭatva-pratipattiḥ, nimittam ca viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya-pratītyor-āśubhāvitayā kramānupalakṣaṇāt sahabhāvapratiṭiḥ."

Mahimā holds that it is only to describe the clarity of the meaning derived from a root modified by a prefix, that the prefix is figuratively stated as suggestive. If it is argued that actually a prefix manifests a particularity i.e. viśeṣa - already existent in a verb and so they are suggestive and not denotative of a 'viśeṣa' in a verb, than Mahimā's reply is that you cannot cognise the exact form of viśeṣa i.e. particularity manifested by a prefix. The meaning invariably apprehended should be taken only as 'expressed' meaning - If we do not accept this dictum then an adjective applied to a noun will also have to be regarded as 'dyotaka'. If taken to its extreme end, this would take us to believe that words like 'ghaṭa' are also dyotakas as they manifest objects that are in the mind. So also will be the case of words such as 'nīla' etc. which are taken as viśeṣaṇas as a rule - "sāmānyāni ca garbhīkṛta-viśeṣāṇi bhavanti iti teṣāṃ tatra sadbhāva-siddhau satyām nīlā'diśabdā api tat-tat-dyotana-mātra-vyāpārāḥ prādi-vad dyotakā bhavitum arhanti, na abhidhāyakā iti." (pp. 152, ibid).

Thus, Mahimā emphatically denies the existence of what is termed as vyañjakatva. He thus accepts only 'abhidhā' as word-power and all sense, other than the expressed is collected, according to him by 'anumāna'. He declares (pp. 157, ibid) : (saṃgrahas'lokas)

“svābhāvikaṃ dhvaner yuktaṃ
vyañjakatvaṃ na dīpavat,
dhūmavat kintu kṛtakam
saṃbandhā”der apekṣaṇāt.” - (74)

“prā”dīnāṃ dyotakatvaṃ
yat kais'cid abhyupagamyate,
tad bhāktam eva, tatra iṣṭam na
mukyaṃ tad asaṃbhavāt.” - (75)

yathā hi yasya śabdasya
bhāvā'bhāvā'nusāriṇī,
yad arthabuddhiḥ tasya asau
vācyo'rtha iti kathyate.” - (76)

“go-śabdasya iva gaur arthaḥ
sā'nyathātvā'vyavasthitā.
vācyatva-vyavahāraś ca
na syād arthasya kasya-cit.” - (77)

“prā”di-prayogā'nugama-
vyatirekānusāriṇī,
prakarsā”dau matis tena
tasya tad-vācyatā na kim.” - (78)

“viśeṣā”vagamasyā”śu-
bhāvād anupalakṣaṇāt
kramasya sahabhāvitvaṃ

bhramo bhakter nibandhanam.” - (79) (pp. 158, ibid)

We have seen how there was a stiff opposition to the Kashmir school of thought that advocates a fool-proof scheme of chiseled concepts of abhidhā, lakṣaṇā and vyañjanā. The challengers were great names such as Mukula, Bhoja, Kuntaka and Mahimā. But this challenge was taken up by the Kashmir-school again with a successful counter attack by Mammata, Hemacandra and their followers, culminating in the efforts of Appayya and Jagannātha. We discussed the views of

Jagannātha as the Mahā-siddhāntin in the beginning, but the road to him is bedecked by efforts of such greats as Mammata and his followers whose views on abhidhā will be examined by us in brief as follows, to sum up this chapter on abhidhā.

What necessitated **this rethinking** and re-establishment from Mammata and his followers is creating again a conceptual clarity which originated with Ānandavardhana who established vyañjanā as a distinct power of word and explained how abhidhā and lakṣaṇā were different from it on account of viśaya-bheda and svarūpabheda i.e. difference in nature and scope. But Ānandavardhana's attempts were challenged by some anti-vyañjanā thinkers and again they mixed up abhidhā, lakṣaṇā and vyañjanā also in an incurable way. Kuntaka, though not an anti-dhvani thinker, was also slightly different from Ānandavardhana in the sense that he cared only for the poetic expression and so his concept of vicitrā abhidhā was more ambitious and less clear. Nobody except Mahimā cared strictly for viśayabheda and svarūpabheda underlying the śabda-vṛttis. But Mahimā erred on the other side. He accepted abhidhā as abhidhā pure and simple as taught by the mīmāṃsakas, grammarians, naiyāyikas and also Ānandavardhana. But for the extra meaning, the pratiyamāna artha, he postulated kāvyānumiti in place of any word-power. For him, anything beyond expressed sense directly following from the word, was due to inference, and the word never could give any other sense beyond vāc्यārtha. Thus, even lakṣaṇā - what Mammata calls 'āropitā-kriyā' also was not acceptable to him. As was lakṣaṇā/lakṣyārtha so was vyañjanā/vyaṅgyārtha - equally non-acceptable as following from word. So, for him there was no hesitation in accepting dhvani as 'bhākta' and therefore, only "anumeya". But with all his vehemence, he was not convincing, for the fact remained that whatever was experienced by a man of taste from poetry, was directly from poetry and not from any other thing such as inference. It was poetry, poetry and poetry alone, with its magic web of word and sense, that delighted the aesthete. Even Mahimā had to concede a point when he accepted that his Kāvya-numiti was not congruent with tarkānumiti. So, once again the balance swung in favour of Ānandavardhana, and so Mammata and others ridiculed Mahimā for rejecting different powers of a word. A clear-cut scheme of three powers of a word was the requirement of the context to explain the experience that accrued from reading of poetry. A change in a word here and there upset the balance of aesthetic experience and therefore it was, word and word and word alone that was held responsible for bringing about the pleasure through the richness of its meaning. Thus, once again Mammata and his followers

laid down the royal road of three word-powers that led to the destination of aesthetic experience from poetry. We will now examine their concept of abhidhā.

Mammaṭa : In the IInd and IIIrd ullāṣas of his K.P., Mammaṭa deals with the topic of word and sense. He has also written an independent treatise called “śabda-vyāpāra-vicāra” on this same topic. He had defined poetry as ‘word and sense’, with some qualifications, in the first ullāṣa, and he now deals with the nature and classification of word and sense. He begins with a three-fold classification of word such as ‘vācaka’ or directly expressive, lakṣaka or word giving secondary sense, i.e. indicator and vyañjaka i.e. word giving the suggested sense, the suggestor. It may be observed at the outset that, with reference to available documents, we meet with a systematic delineation of this topic for the first time in a work on poetics, though of course, Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta and later Mukula also had laid the foundation for such thinking. Following this threefold division of word, Mammaṭa (= M.) explains that the meaning is also three-fold such as, vācya, lakṣya and vyañgya. He observes :

krameṇa śabdārthayoḥ svarūpaṃ āha - (sū. 5) : “syād vācako lākṣaṇikah śabdo’tra vyañjakas tridhā.”

atra iti kāvyē. eṣāṃ svarūpaṃ vakṣyate - (sū. 6) : “vācyā”dayas tad arthāḥ syūḥ.”

vācya-lakṣya-vyañgyāḥ. - (pp. 25, edn. Jhalkikar) He cites an opinion that some others accept the so-called ‘import’ i.e. ‘tātparyārtha’ - also (sū. 7) : “tātparyārtho’pi keṣucit.” (pp. 26, ibid)

Jalkikar (pp. 25, ibid) makes it clear that : “atra kāvyē vācako lākṣaṇiko vyañjakaś ca iti tridhā triprakāraḥ śabdaḥ syād iti arthah. vyañjakasya vācaka-lākṣaṇikau upajīvyau iti krameṇa upanyāsaḥ.

Jhalkikar observes that by this (three-fold) division itself this ‘tri-tva’ is clear. Yet to remove the possibility of either lesser or greater number of varieties, M. has said, “tri-dhā” i.e. “three-fold”. : (pp. 25, ibid) - “vibhāgād eva tri-tve siddhépi nyūnādhika-saṃkhyā-vyavacchedāya ‘tridhēti uktam”. Some people may argue, observes Jhalkikar, that as ‘gauṇī’ and ‘lakṣaṇā’ are separate vṛttis, and as therefore the term ‘gauṇa’ as a variety of word is not mentioned, there is deficiency - or defect - nyūnatā-in the division. Again as there is no authority with reference to vyañjanā, there cannot be a ‘vyañjaka’ word and so there is ‘ādhikya’ - excess - also. To remove this sort of doubt in the minds of others M. has clarified his position. In the 16th sūtra, ‘gauṇī’ is to be described as a sub-division of lakṣaṇā, and so ‘gauṇa’ word

will be subsumed under 'lākṣaṇika'. Vyañjanā also will be established as an independent word-power in the Vth ullāsa.

It may again be noted that this three-fold division of words as suggested by M., is with reference to the attributes - upādhis - and not with reference to words themselves - 'upādheyas'. We have not to understand that some words are only 'vācakas', some are only 'lakṣakas' and some are only 'vyañjakas'. There is no rule as such. It is the context and the attribute thereof which makes for the word as vācaka, etc. Jhalkikar, (pp. 25, ibid) quotes the Sārabodhinīkāra i.e. Śrī Vatsalañcchana-Bhaṭṭācārya : "atra āhuḥ sārabodhinīkārah - "tridheti". atra upādhinām eva tritvaṃ, na tu upādheyānām. na hi kaścīd vācaka eva, kaścīd lākṣaṇika eva, kaścīd vyañjaka eva iti asti niyamah", iti. ata eva 'gaṅgāyāṃ ghoṣah' ity ādau ekasyā'pi gaṅgā"dis'abdasya vācakatvaṃ, lākṣaṇikatvaṃ, vyañjakatvaṃ ca upapadyate."

In his sūtra M. has used the term 'atra' and explained it as 'atra iti kāvyē'. The reason behind this is that this three-fold classification is true with reference to poetry. For, in śāstras such as vaiśeṣika or nyāya, etc., no term such as 'vyañjaka' is ever mentioned or read. But in poetry charm or camatkāra can not be generated without 'vyañjaka' word. Jhalkikar observes (pp. 25, ibid) : "nanu vaiśeṣika-śāstrā"daṃ vyañjakasya nāmā'pi na srūyate. ataḥ katham traividhyaṃ iti ata āha, 'kāvyē' iti. camatkāra-viśeṣasya anyathā anupapattiḥ iti bhāvaḥ."

Before explaining the nature and scope of 'vācaka'/vācya, word and sense respectively, M. observes that some accept what is termed as 'tātparyārtha' also. He observes : (pp. 26, ibid) :

(sūtra. 7) "tātparyārto'pi keṣu cit." -

ākāṅkṣā-yogyatā-sannidhi-vaśāt vakṣyamāṇa-

svarūpāṇāṃ padārthānāṃ samanvaye tātparyārtho viśeṣa-vapur a-padārtho'pi vāk्यārthaḥ samullasati iti abhihitānvayavādināṃ matam."

"There is also the purport sense in the opinion of some.

When owing to the force of expectancy, compatibility and proximity, after the word-meanings whose nature will be explained later, have been co-related, there springs up the purport-sense, which possesses a special form and which, though not the sense of (individual) words, is yet the sense of the sentence - this is the view of those who hold that the correlation is of the expressed words (abhihitānvayavādins).

M. also quotes the views of others who hold that, “the primary sense itself is the sense of the sentence.” This is held by theorists of, “expression of the correlated meaning.” (anvitābhidhāna)

[The translation of the K.P. text is accepted by us from that of our friend, the late, respected professor, Dr. R. C. Dwivedi the author of, ‘The Poetic Light’ - pub. Motilal Banarasidass, Edn. '67, Delhi]

Jalkikar has the following observation : (pp. 26, ibid) :

“nanu padārthavad vāk्यārthasyā’pi vyañjanā-vṛtṭy ārs’rayatayā bhāṭṭa-mīmāṃsaka-mata-siddha-tātpary-ākhyā-vṛtṭi-pratipādyatayā ca tad-vibhāgo’pi kartum ucita iti tad akaraṇāt nyūnatā iti ata āha - tātparyārtho’pi iti -

The idea is that as the word-sense is held to be suggestive, even the sentence-sense is also suggestive, and the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas have established the tātparyā-vṛtṭi, so the inclusion of that (i.e. tātparyārtha) was proper. As it is not done, there is ‘nyūnatā’ i.e. narrowness too in the three-fold classification. To consider this objection M. has used the words - “tātparyārtho’pi” etc. By ‘keṣu cit’ we have to understand “keṣāṃ cit” observes Jhalkikar. So, both tātparyārtha and tātparyā vṛtṭi have to be counted. Jhalkikar observes : (pp. 26, ibid) : “ayaṃ bhāvaḥ. vṛtṭiṃ vinā arthabodhane atiprasaṅgaḥ iti anvaye (vāk्यārtharūpe samsarge) śabdasya tātparyā’khyā vṛtṭir abhyupagantavyā, tatpratipādyóthas tātparyārtha iti cakravarti - kamalākarabhatta-narasimha-thakkura-kṛta-tikāsu amśataḥ spastam.”

We will consider abhihitānvayavāda and anvitābhidhānavāda when we will deal with ‘tātparyā-vṛtṭi’ separately in the next chapter.

Before treating ‘abhidhā’ M. descusses what is meant by vācaka śabda, as -

“sākṣāt saṅketitaṃ yo’rthaṃ
abhidhatte sa vācakaḥ.” (sūtra 9)

“That is the expressive word which conveys a meaning that is directly conventional.” (Trans. R.C.D. pp. 21, ibid). M. further observes : “iha agrhīta-saṅketasya śabdārtha-viśeṣa-pratipatter abhāvāt saṃketa-sahāya eva śabdóthā-viśeṣaṃ pratipādayati iti yasya yatra avyavadhānena saṃketo grhyate sa tasya vācakaḥ.” - “Here, for want of comprehension of the meaning of a word, whose convention is not grasped, a word conveys a particular meaning only when aided by convention. Hence that word is expressive of that meaning in which unimpeded convention is ascertained.” (Trans. pp. 21, ibid)

Discussing the nature of this convention M. observes that the conventional meaning is said to be four-fold from the point of view of jāty ādi i.e. class and the rest. Or, it may be only the class or universal.

M. further observes that though an individual alone is competent of activity or passivity, on account of its capacity for performing a fruitful function, yet it is not compatible to establish the convention with reference to the individual on account of the contingencies of infiniteness and anomaly, because the classification would not obtain in the case of words such as 'a bull' - gauḥ, or 'white/śukla'; 'calah/moving', or 'dittha'. Hence there is convention with reference to the attribute (upādhi) alone.

Poeticians in general and here M., it may be observed, follow the dictum of the grammarians as observed by us earlier.

Now, M. further observes that 'upādhi' or attribute is two fold : vastudharma and 'vakṛt-yadr̥cchā-sanniveśita, i.e. the inherent property of a thing and the one applied to it by the free will of the speaker. The former is also two-fold viz. that which is accomplished and that which is to be accomplished. Again here the accomplished is two-fold viz. that which gives life to an entity, and the one which endows it with a speciality. There, the first is the universal or class. It is said in the Vākyapadīya that : 'a cow is not a cow by its own self, nor even a non-cow; but it is a cow on account of its relation with cowness.'

Jhalkikar (= J.) observes : (pp. 34, ibid) : "vākyapadīyaṃ nāma bhārṭṛharikṛto mahābhāṣya-vyākhyānarūpo vyākaraṇa-granthaḥ. "gauḥ" - 'go'sabdoddeśyo dharmī. svarūpeṇa iti - 'jāti-rahita-vyakti-mātreṇa iti arthaḥ' iti tīkākāraḥ. 'ajñāta-gotvakena dharmi-svarūpa-mātreṇa' ityarthah, iti udyotakārāḥ. na gauḥ - na gauḥ iti vyavahāra-viśayaḥ. anyathā ghaṭōpi gauḥ syāt svarūpa-aviśeṣāt, iti bhāvaḥ. nā'pya-gauḥ iti vyavahāra-viśayaḥ. tathā sati gauḥ api agauḥ syāt iti bhāvaḥ." Jhalkikar then explains how Jagannātha has put it. We have seen the view of Jagannātha earlier as we have called him 'mahā-siddhāntin'.

The second one, observes M. further, is 'guṇaḥ' or quality. For, a thing, which has come into existence, is differentiated by a quality such as white. The property, which is being accomplished, is of the form of action, parts of which are prior and posterior (i.e. they are in a sequence).

M. has observed that there is difference between 'jāti' and 'guṇa'. 'Jāti' comes first and 'guṇa' next. Jhalkikar explains : (pp. 34, ibid) : "labdha-sattākam" jātyā prāpta-vyavahāra-yogyatākam. vastu vyaktiḥ. viśiṣyate, sajātiyebhyo vyāvartyate.

atra 'labdha' iti atīta-nirdeśena utpannasya dravyasya paścād guṇena yoga iti darśitam. evaṃ ca utpannasya dravyasya kṣaṇam ekaṃ nirguṇatvam. jāti-yukta-dravyasya eva utpattiḥ - "janmanā jāyate jātiḥ" iti abhiyuktokteḥ. ato jāti-guṇayor mahān bheda iti tīkākarāḥ. pradīpakāras tu, "yadyapi śuklā"di-guṇasya nityatva-abhyupagame gotvā"dinā samakālaṃ eva sambandhitvam, tathā'pi śuklā"diguṇasya sambandhaḥ kadācid apaity api, na tu gotvā"der iti jāti-guṇayorbhedaḥ iti āhuḥ. -

For M., the form of words such as Dīthā and the like, is completely apprehended by the impression of the last letter. It is divested of successive order. It is imposed by the speaker at his will on entities such as Dīthā as an attribute - So, the attribute, characterized by free will is known as proper name : "dīthā"di śabdānām antya-buddhi-nirgrāhyam samhṛta-kramam svarūpam vaktrā yadṛcchayā dīthā"diṣu artheṣu upādhitvena sanniveśyate iti samjñārūpo yadṛcchā"tmakaḥ." (pp. 35, ibid).

M. quotes the authority of Mahābhāṣya in support of the four-fold classification of words as based on attributes.

As for the 'upādhi' or attribute that is imposed on an individual at free will of the speaker, it may be observed that the 'upādhi' is the 'sphoṭa' of that name, which is here designated as 'samjñā'.

The pradīpa, (pp. 32, Edn. '11, Ānandas'rama skt. granthavalīḥ) has the following observation - "vaktr-yadṛcchā-sanniveśitas tu śabda-rūpaḥ, dīthā"di-yadṛcchā-sanniveśitas tu pratītyā kiṃcit prakāśitam antya-varṇa-buddhyā niḥśeṣato grāhyam nānā-varṇā"tmaka-ghaṭā"divarṇavad varṇa-krama-sūnyam sphoṭā"khyam śabda-svarūpam dīthā"diṣu artheṣu upādhitvena vaktrā yadṛcchayā kalpyate iti samjñārūpayadṛcchā"tmako dīthā"di-śabdaḥ."

We have seen that Jagannātha puts it as : "yadṛcchikas tu vaktrā svecchayā dīthā"diśabdānām pravṛtti-nimittatve sanniveśito dharmāḥ. sa ca paramparayā vyakti-gataḥ carama-varṇābhi-vyaṅgyaḥ akhaṇḍaḥ sphoṭa iti... etc. ānupūrvya-vacchinno varṇa-samudāya iti apare. kevalā vyaktir eva iti itare. tatra tṛtīyamate ca nirvikalpā"tmakaḥ pratyayaḥ. (R.G. pp. 145, ibid)

Prof. Gajendragadkar (Edn. K.P., Bombay, pp. 230, 231) observes : "The sentence "dīthā"di-śabdānām..." etc. is explained in other ways also. The Pradīpa notes the interpretation of Candīdāsa (latter half of 13th Cen.), grand-uncle of Viśvanātha. This interpretation is referred to by Jagannātha in the sentence "kevalā vyaktir eva iti itare" in the passage from the R.G. quoted above.

According to Caṇḍidāsa as 'saṃjñāśabdas' or proper names directly denote individuals alone, no other attribute is imposed upon those individuals by the speaker, when he endows them with the proper names. Thus, proper names have no basis than the individuals they signify, as jāti, guṇa and kriyāvācaka words possess the basic of generality, quality and action, in addition to the individuals they express. It will thus be seen that according to Caṇḍidāsa's interpretation saṃjñāśabdas, otherwise called 'dravya-śabdas' ('ayam eva saṃjñāśabdo dravyaśabda iti vyavahriyate', - udyota), denote individuals alone, as opposed to the first interpretation according to which saṃjñāśabdas express 'sphoṭa-viśiṣṭa' individuals, even as jāti, guṇa and kriyāśabdas, denote jāti-viśiṣṭa, guṇa-viśiṣṭa and kriyā-viśiṣṭa individuals.

The interpretation of Caṇḍidāsa cannot be easily obtained from the passage under discussion. Caṇḍidāsa, therefore, has to interpret some of Mammata's words in a fanciful manner. Those words are, 'antya-buddhi-nirgrāhyam', 'saṃhṛta-kramam', and 'upādhirvena'. 'Antya' according to him, means 'vyakti', which is so-called, because it is understood at the end. Thus, 'antya-buddhi-nirgrāhyam = antyaṃ dharmimātram vyaktimātram vā buddhi-nirgrāhyam yasmin, idṛśaṃ śabda-svarūpam, 'saṃhṛta-kramam'. In the case of jāti, guṇa and kriyā-vācaka words, we first get the idea of jāti, guṇa and kriyā and then of vyakti. This is the krama or order in their case. In the case of saṃjñāśabdas as there is no separate attribute, the individual is directly perceived. So, saṃjñāśabdas are 'saṃhṛta-krama' or 'krama-sūnya' in the sense of 'ātau viśeṣaṇa-pratyayaḥ, tato vyakti-pratyayaḥ iti jāti-guṇa-kriyāśabdeṣu dṛśyamānena krameṇa virahitam.' - 'upādhirvena' - As according to Caṇḍidāsa, no 'upādhi' or attribute is imposed on the individual in the case of saṃjñāśabdas, he cannot take 'upādhirvena' in the natural sense of, 'as an attribute', but interprets it as, 'padārthopasthity-anukūlatayā' i.e. because it is favourable to the understanding of the meaning of the words."

[It may be noted that Prof. A. B. Gajendragadkar's explanation follows the one given by Jhalkikar on pp. 36, *ibid.*]. Prof. Gajendragadkar continues : (pp. 231, *ibid.*) : "Caṇḍidāsa's explanation is unacceptable for three reasons. First the words, 'antya-buddhi-nirgrāhya' and 'saṃhṛta-krama' in their natural sense are quite clear and unmistakably point to 'sphoṭa' as the attribute in question. Secondly, Patañjali suggests that the convention of the four classes of words is understood in the attributes of the individual. This means even in the case of a 'saṃjñā', it is an attribute of the individual that convention is understood. Therefore, Caṇḍidāsa's statement that there is no separate attribute is against the view of Patañjali." [This

explanation also follows Jhalkikara - pp. 36, who observes : “tacca mahābhāṣya-viruddham. mahābhāṣye śabdasya eva upādhitvena vyavasthāpanāt.”]

Prof. Gajendragadkar proceeds - “Thirdly, Caṇḍidāsa’s interpretation of the three words referred to is unsatisfactory. ‘antya’ cannot mean ‘vyakti’. Then, with this sense, the compound should have been ‘buddhi-nirgāhyāntyam’. Again, ‘antya-buddhi-nirgrāhya’ in this sense cannot be exclusive to ‘saṃjñā-vācaka’ words. For ‘vyakti’ is comprehended at the end from jāti, guṇa and kriyā-vācaka words as well. The explanation of saṃhṛta-krama, though understandable, is unnatural. The sense given to ‘upādhi’ by Caṇḍidāsa, viz. ‘padārthapa-sthity-anukūlatā’ is different from what Mammaṭa understands as ‘upādhi’ in the case of the three other kinds of words. Besides such ‘upādhi’ is by no means exclusive to saṃjñā-śabdas. For, it is present in all words.’

Prof. Gajendragadkar here quotes relevant passages from both Pradeepa and Udyota, the summary of which is contained in Jhalkikar’s explanation (pp. 36, ibid) who also concludes with the words : “sarveṣāṃ eva śabdānāṃ tathātvena asya vailakṣaṇya-anā”patter-lakṣaṇā”patteśca iti pradīpodyotayoḥ spaṣṭam.”

Earlier, we observed that Mammaṭa quotes the authority of the Mahābhāṣya in his support : “catuṣṭayī śabdānāṃ pravṛttiḥ.” - Here ‘pravṛttiḥ’ means currency or use in the language, i.e. the reason why words are used in the language - (pravṛtti-nimittam) i.e. the conventional meaning. Thus the word becomes current in four ways; which amounts to saying that ‘saṃketa’ is four-fold.

Mammaṭa here anticipates an objection such as that ‘jāti’ as ‘prāṇa-prada-dharma’ is not comprehensive because there are certain prāṇa-prada-dharmas which are not regarded as ‘jāti’. For the Vaiśeṣikas ‘pārimāṇḍalya’ i.e. the atomic size of a ‘paramāṇu’ or atom is taken as a ‘guṇa’ and not ‘jāti’. This is so because ‘pārimāṇḍalya’ and ‘vibhutva’ are ‘parimāṇas’ or dimensions which fall under the category of ‘guṇa’.

The fact is that an atom is an atom due to its ‘pārimāṇḍalya’, which if removed, the atom will cease to be an atom. ‘Vibhutva’ also is a prāṇa-prada-dharma of ākāśa. How can the Vaiśeṣikas put these under ‘guṇa’ ?

Mammaṭa’s reply is that both these viz. ‘pārimāṇḍalya’ and ‘vibhutva’ are ‘jāti’ only. The Vaiśeṣikas place them under ‘guṇa’ because they subsume ‘parimāṇa’ i.e. measure under ‘guṇa’. So, this is only from a technical point of view. Thus the definition of ‘jāti’ as prāṇa-prada-dharma’ is not violated. The principle of classification as advocated by the Vaiśeṣikas and the one held by the grammarians

are different. The former admitted categories such as dravya, guṇa, karman, sāmānya, viśesa and samavāya (and also 'abhāva'), the latter have jāti, guṇa, kriyā and dravya. The Vaiśeṣikas did not distinguish between a 'prāṇa-prada-dharma', and 'vaiśiṣṭyā"pādaka-dharma'. Whatever was a 'dharma' was subsumed by them under 'guṇa'. The category of 'sāmānya' for them, though based on a 'prāṇa-prada-dharma', refers to the unifying common principle that holds together the individuals of the class - 'jāti' - and it is not an 'attribute' qualifying an individual. The Vaiśeṣikas technically observe that if two jātis are found in an object, they must be related to each other as 'para' (i.e. more extensive) and 'apara' (i.e. less extensive). Say, for example 'pṛthivī' has 'dravyatva' and also 'pṛthivītva'. 'Pṛthivī' is not only an earth, but also a substance. Out of these two jātis that reside in the earth, 'dravyatva' i.e. 'being a substance' is 'para' or more extensive than, 'being earth' i.e. 'pṛthivītva' which is 'a-para' or less extensive. The former i.e. dravyatva is found in 'ap' i.e. water, 'tejas' or 'light', and six other substances over and above 'pṛthivī' or earth. - "tatra dravyāṇi pṛthivī-ap-tejo-vāyu-ākāśa-kāla-dig-ātma-manāṃsi navaiva." Similarly, out of pṛthivītva and ghaṭatva seen in a ghaṭa, the former is 'para' and the latter is 'apara'. But here we may observe that even 'ghaṭa' may be earthen, or made from minerals such as copper, iron, etc. or from brass, aluminium, glass etc. also. Now, according to the Vaiśeṣikas, mf we were to regard 'paramāṇutva' as 'jāti', it will not be possible to fix it as 'para' or 'apara'. In case of a 'pārthiva paramāṇu', we have both 'pṛthivītva' and also 'paramāṇutva'. If we take 'paramāṇutva' as 'para' or more extensive, then a 'ghaṭa' which possesses 'pṛthivītva' will be a paramāṇu. For the rule is that 'para-jāti' is also found in places where 'apara-jāti' is also seen. But 'ghaṭa' is not a paramāṇu and this is common knowledge. So, 'paramāṇutva' cannot be a para-jāti. If we take it as an apara-jāti with reference to 'pṛthivītva', then jala-paramāṇus will be pṛthivī for the atoms of water possess paramāṇutva and as pṛthivītva is para-jāti, we will have to accept its presence in jala-paramāṇu. But common knowledge goes against this also. Thus paramāṇutva, if taken as a jāti, is neither 'para-jāti' nor 'apara-jāti'. Thus Vaiśeṣkas do not place 'paramāṇutva' under jāti. The technical rule thus stops paramāṇutva, though a prāṇa-prada-dharma, from being taken as jāti. But the grammarians do not admit any such rule that when two jātis are found in one object, they must be related as 'para' and 'apara'. So, they have no objection in taking 'paramāṇutva' as 'jāti'. They are satisfied only if two jātis residing in one and the same object are not inherently opposed to each other. For them 'manuṣyatva' and 'simḥatva' cannot stay together in one and the same substratum.

In the K.P. we read 'paramāṇvā" dīnām'. But prof. R. C. Dwivedi in his K.P. (pp. 22, ibid) reads, 'paramāṇutvā" dīnām, which reading follows the Saṃpradāya-prakāśinī of Sṛī Vidyā-cakravartin. This perhaps is a better reading.

But in both cases, 'ādīnām' refers to parama-mahat or vibhu, the dimension which belongs to 'ākāśa' and 'ātmā' as their prāṇaprada-dharma. If we take away parama-mahattva or all-pervasiveness from ether or soul, they will cease to be ether or soul. Thus parama-mahattva or vibhutva, though really a jāti, it being a prāṇaprada-dharma, is taken as 'guṇa' by the Vaiśeṣikas only technically.

We have seen how Jagannātha, whom we have taken as a mahā-siddhāntin and whose views we have therefore placed in the beginning, has also respected Mammata's observations.

Mammata further observes that guṇas i.e. qualities, kriyā i.e. actions, and yadṛcchā i.e. proper names, though uniform in reality appear to be diverse on account of diversity of substratum. The same face appears to be different when reflected in a sword, mirror and oil. Thus, these - guṇa, kriyā and yadṛcchā śabdās are not to be subsumed under jāti. We had seen that Mukula had also observed this. Thus Mammata also absorbs Mukula's influence if it does not go against his basic faith. Thus Mammata does not accept only 'jāti' as the pravṛttinimitta of all words. He also rejects the views of jāti-viśiṣṭa-vyakti-vādins and also of 'apoha'-vādins, who thus say that the meaning of a word is 'exclusion from what it is not'. The former view is held by the Naiyāyikas and the latter by the Bauddhas, while 'kevala-jāti-vāda' was acceptable to the Mīmāṃsakas.

The Mīmāṃsaka view is stated in the ākṛti-śaktyadhikaraṇa - in Jaimini's sūtras - I. iii. 30-35. We have seen this earlier. Kaiyata in his Pradīpa (pp. 17, NS. Edn.) also explains this kevala-jāti-vāda as follows : "tatra jātivādināḥ āhuḥ : jātir eva śabdena pratipādyate vyaktīnām ānantyāt sambandha-grahaṇa-asambhavāt sā ca jātīḥ sarva-vyakṛtiṣu ekākāra-pratyaya-darśanāt asti iti avasiyate. tatra gavā"dayaḥ śabdā bhinnadravya-samavetām jātīm abhidadhati. tasyām pratitāyām tad-āveśāt tad-avacchinnaṁ dravyam pratiyate. śuklā"dayaḥ śabdāḥ guṇa-samavetām jātīm ācakṣate. guṇe tu tat-sambandhāt pratyayaḥ, dravye sambandhi-sambandhāt. samjñā-śabdānām api utpatti-prabhṛti-avināśāt piṇḍasya kaumāra-yauvanādy-avasthā-bhedēpi sa eva ayaṁ iti abhinna-pratyaya-nimittā dīṭharvā"dikā jātir-vācyā. kriyā-śabdeṣu api jātir vidyate sā eva dhātu-vācyā. paṭhati, paṭhataḥ, paṭhanti ity āder abhinnasya pratyayasya sadbhāvāt tannimitta-jāty-abhyupagamah."

The Naiyāyika view of 'jātivīśiṣṭa-vyakti' is explained in Pradīpa as : (pp. 36, edn. ibid) : "naiyāyikā"dayas tu - na vyaktimātram śakyam, na vā jāti-mātram. ādya ānantyād vyabhicārāc ca. antye vyakti-pratīty-abhāva-prasaṅgāt. na ca ākṣepād vyakti-pratītiḥ. tasmād viśiṣṭa eva saṃketaḥ. na ca ānantyād aśakyatā vyabhicāro vā. go-tvā"di-sāmānya-lakṣaṇayā sarva-vyaktīnām upasthitau sarvatra saṃketa-graha-saukaryāt' - iti ātiṣṭhante."

saugatās tu - 'vyaktau ānantyā"didoṣād bhāvasya ca deśakālānugamābhāvāt tad anugatāyām atad-vyāvṛtttau saṃketaḥ.'

Māṇikyacandra in his Saṃketa (pp. 15, Edn. Poona, 1921 A.D. - Ānandaśrama - SKT. - granthāvaliḥ) - puts it as : "jāter artha-kriyā-kāritva-abhāvād viphalāḥ saṃketaḥ. vyaktes tu artha-kriyā-kāritve api ānanta-vyabhicārābhyām na saṃketaḥ kartum śakyate iti jāti-matī vyaktiḥ śabdārtha iti vaiśeṣikā"dayaḥ - apoha iti - jāti-vyakti-tadyoga-jātimad-buddhyākārāṇām śabdārthatvasya anupapadyamānatvāt gavayā"di-śabdānām a-go-vyāvṛtṭyā"di-rūpo"pohaḥ śabdārtha iti bauddhāḥ."

Jhalkikara (pp. 38, ibid) explains the Baudha view as : "go-śabdaśravaṇāt sarvāsām go-vyaktīnām upasthita-itarasmāt aśvā"dito vyāvṛtti-darśanāt ca a-tad-vyāvṛtti-rūpaḥ apohaḥ vācyā iti bauddha-matam. - "atad-vyāvṛttiḥ apohaḥ padārtha iti kṣaṇabhaṅga-vādināḥ. tanmate sthīrasya sāmānyasya abhāvāt apoha-mātreṇa anugata-vyavahāraḥ iti tatraiva śaktiḥ - iti cakravartī-bhaṭṭacārya-kṛta-vistārikāyām api spaṣṭam. - jāter adṛṣṭatvena vicāra-asahatvāt vyakteś ca kṣaṇikatvād ubhayatrā'pi saṃketasya kartum aśakyatvāt gavā"di-śabdānām a-gavā"di-vyāvṛtṭirūpaḥ apohaḥ arthaḥ, iti vaināśīkamataḥ iti anyatrā'pi vyākhyātam."

So, with reference to saṃketa-grahaṇa, or convention of words, we have seen four views viz. jātyā"divāda of the grammarians, the jātivāda of the Mīmāṃsakas, the jāti-viśiṣṭavāda of the ancient Naiyāyikas, and the apohavāda of the Buddhists, of which the first held by the grammarians is favoured by Mammata and his followers belonging to the Kashmir school. We have seen above that this was accepted even by Kuntaka, Bhoja, Mahimā and the rest also, though their concept of 'abhidhā' was not congruent with the Kashmir school of thought. A fifth view of vyakti-vāda or kevala-vyaktivāda is also not accepted by Mammata though it is indirectly referred. This view is held by Navya-Naiyāyikas. These modern Naiyāyikas rely only on 'vyavahāra' for determining saṃketa, and vyavahāra or day-to-day activity is concerned with individual alone. Kaiyata's pradīpa (N.S. Edn. pp. 17) puts this view as : "vyaktivādinā tu āhuḥ. śabdasya vyaktiḥ eva vācyā. jātes tu upalakṣaṇabhāvena āśrayaṇāt ānantyā"didoṣa-anavakāśaḥ.

Mammāṭa has dealt with the views concerning the conventional meaning of words. But he has not explained how conventional meaning is apprehended from words. There are eight ways in which the conventional meaning is collected. They are :

“śaktigrahaṃ vyākaraṇāpamāna-
kośā”ptavākyād vyavahārataś ca,
vākyasya śeṣād vivṛter vadanti
sānnidhyataḥ siddhapadasya vṛddhāḥ.”

(read in-parama-laghu-mañjusa, pp. 145)

Mathurānātha also reads this quotation on Tattvacintāmaṇi, pp. 481. (Ref. K. Kunjunni Raja)

also Tattva-cintāmaṇi pp. 649; Siddhāntamuktavali, p. 266.

These eight ways of collecting conventional meaning can be explained as follows : śaktigraha or collection of conventional meaning from Vyākaraṇa is understood as - (i) “vyākaraṇād śaktigraho yathā, ‘kartari parasmai padam’ iti anuśāsanāt karmatvā”dau dvitīyādeḥ śaktigrahaḥ; dhātu-prakṛti-pratyayā”dinām śaktigraho vyākaraṇād bhavati.” - We learn the meanings of the roots, suffixes and derivatives from grammar. The most important use of grammar is to help people to learn language quickly - ‘laghu’, as Patañjali puts in M.bh. first Āhnika, - and correctly. All the normal derivative words and their meanings can be collected from grammar on knowing the root-meanings and the significance of the suffixes.

(ii) Upamānāt śakti-graho yathā gavādi-pada-śakti-dhī-sācivyena go-sādrśyāti-deśa-vākyāt gavaya-pada-vācyatva-bodhottaram gavayatva-jāty-avacchinne go-sādrśya-grahaṇāt gavayo gavaya-śabda-vācyah ity-ākāraḥ. - ‘Upamāna’ or analogy helps us as follows. A man does not know for example a ‘gavaya’ i.e. a wild-cow. He can identify it through perception after ‘gavaya’ is explained to him as, “go-sadrśaḥ gavayaḥ” - i.e. ‘gavaya’ is like a cow. This method of knowing is taken by the Mīmāṃsakas and Naiyāyikas as a means of knowledge-pramāṇa-different from direct perception and inference. Some scholars translate ‘upamāna’ not as ‘analogy’ but as ‘identification’.

(iii) Kośa or lexicon is useful thus - “kośād api śaktigraho yathā - “svar-avyayaṃ svarga-nāka-tridiva-tridaśālayāḥ.” ityādinā nākā”dipadasya svarge śakti-grahaḥ. - The lexicon may even give the metaphorical senses sanctioned by usage; but the primary power of signification should not be assumed in such cases. Thus when a kośa gives synonyms we understand the meanings of unknown words. Also at times ‘nīla’ figuratively is described as ‘nīla-vastu’, also.

(iv) āptavākya or the direct statement issued by an authority also explains convention. The Nyāya-kośa (pp. 860) puts it as - “aṅgulī-prasāraṇa”di-pūrvakaṃ nirdeśena śaktigraho bhavati. yathā-bāla, taveyaṃ mātā, tavāyaṃ pitā, ayaṃ te bhrātā kadalīphalaṃ abhyavaharati iti nirdeśena bālasya mātṛdaṃ śaktigrahaḥ.” Or, it can be explained as - “āptavākyaḍ api śaktigraho yathā ‘kokilaḥ pika-pada-vācyah’ ityādi-āptavākyaṭ pikā”di-padānām kokile śaktigrahaḥ.”

(v) ‘Vyavahāra’ or vṛddha-vyavahāra can be useful as follows : “vyavahārād api śaktigraho yathā, “ghaṭaṃ naya”, “gām ānaya” ityādy-āvāpōdvāpābhyām pārsvastha-bālasya ghaṭā”di-padasya ghaṭa-mātre śaktigraho bhavati iti. - usage of the words by elders is the most important method. The Prābhākaras, who support anvitābhidhāna, respect this method as the only method to get at the conventional meaning. Mammāṭa, following Kumārila bhaṭṭa says that in this method three pramāṇas or means of knowledge are involved such as pratyakṣa-or direct perception, anumāna or inference, and arthāpatti or postulation. Nāgeśa considers this method as the best - “śakti-grāhaka-śiromaṇi.” (Laghumañjuṣā, pp. 64) Jagadīśa, the great Naiyāyika also carries this opinion - In his śabdaśakti-prakāśikā, (pp. 103) he observes : “saṅketasya grahaḥ pūrvam vṛddha-vyavahārataḥ.” Gaṅgeśa also in Tattvacintāmaṇi (Vol. IV. pt. 2, pp. 462) observes - vṛddhavyavahārāt eva sarveṣām ādyā vyutpattiḥ.”

(vi) Vākyaśeṣa - i.e. ‘rest of the passage in the context’ is yet another source :

“vākyaśeṣād hi śakti-graho yathā, ‘yava-mayaścarur bhavati’ ity-asya yava-padasya dīrgha-śūka-viśeṣe kaṅgau vā śaktir iti saṃdehe vākyaśeṣād dīrgha-śūka-viśeṣe śaktir nirṇiyate. vākyaśeṣas tu ‘yatrānya oṣadhayo, mlāyante atha etc. modamānā iva uttiṣṭhanti iti. ‘vasante sarva-sasyānām jāyate patra-śāsanam. modamānāśca tiṣṭhanti yavāḥ kaṇīśa-śālinah’, iti ca. - Jaimini, - M.S. I. iv. 24 - i.e. - saṃdigdheṣu vākyaśeṣāt - informs that when there is some doubt about the meaning of a word, the rest of the passage must be consulted. In the vedic sentence, “aktāḥ śarkarā upadadhāti”, (= The wet pebbles are placed nearby), the meaning of the term akta (= wet) is to be collected from the rest of the passage - ‘rejo vai ghr̥tam’ (= ghee is the brilliance); from this it is clear that the pebbles are to be soaked in ghee or clarified butter. This method can be tried in arriving at the correct meaning of a word. Thus in ‘yavamayas’ carur bhavati’, the meaning of ‘yava’ - used for long-beared barley by Ārya-s and in the sense of panic seed by Mlecchas, - is known to be long-beared barley here from the rest of the sentence. Thus here ‘yava’ means ‘dīrgha-śūka-viśeṣa’. The rest of the passage viz. ‘yatrānyā oṣadhayo mlāyante athaite modamānā iva uttiṣṭhanti’ - i.e. when the other plants

fade out these stand up as if, they are happy. The illustration is cited in Nyāyakośa, p. 859, and Siddhānta-muktāvalī, p. 275.

(vii) 'Vivaraṇa' / 'vivṛti' or explanation is the next source of collecting meaning. : vivaraṇād api śakti-graho yathā, 'ghaṭo'sti'. ity-asya 'kalaśo'sti' ity-anena vivaraṇād ghaṭa-padasya kalaśe śaktigrahaḥ. - We may say that all ṭikā-literature is an illustration here to the point. The meaning of a word can be known from commentary citing a synonymous word, or explaining the meaning. In the M. bh. - Vol. I. pp. 42, - Patañjali observes : "vyākhyānato viśeṣa-pratipattir na hi saṁdehād alakṣaṇam." The meaning of a word is to be understood by a commentator's explanation especially in cases involving doubt.

(viii) "Prasiddha-pada-sānnidhya" also helps in fixation of meaning : "prasiddha-padasya sānnidhyād api śakti-graho yathā, "iha saha-kāra-tarau madhuraṁ piko rauti", ity-ātau 'pika'-śabdasya śaktigrahaḥ." - [Nyāyakośa 858-859 pp.]. In a statement viz. "The 'pika' sings beautifully on this mango tree", 'pika' means a 'cuckoo'. This meaning is gathered from the presence of other words whose meaning is well-known.

Nyāyakośa also refers to yet another method of collecting meaning : "vedāntinas tu 'aṅguli-prasāraṇā'di pūrvakam nirdeśena śakti-graho bhavati. yathā 'bāla, taveyaṁ mātā, tavāyaṁ pitā, ayaṁ te bhrātā, kandalī-phalaṁ abhyavaharati' iti nirdeśena bālasya mātṛātau śakti-grahaḥ - ityāhuḥ." But we have seen above a method viz. 'āptavākya' under which this can be subsumed.

Mammata's definition of abhidhā : In his K.P. II. sū. 11, Mammata arrives at the definition of abhidhā, such as - sa mukhyo'rthaḥ, tasya mukhyo vyāpāro'syā'-bhidhocyate."

Here 'saḥ' stands for 'sākṣāt samketitaḥ' i.e. 'directly expressed conventional meaning'. 'asya' means 'of the word' - 'śabdasya. So, M. observes : "That is the primary meaning; there the primary function of this (i.e. the word) is called denotation." Sāhityacūḍāmaṇi of Srīvidyā-cakravartin explains 'mukhya' as : "mukhyaḥ prāthamikaḥ, na tu pradhānabhūtaḥ" - i.e. by 'mukhya', we have to understand 'primary', and not 'principal'. Māṇikyacandra in his saṅketa, (pp. 16, ibid) explains : "sa sākṣāt samketitaḥ, mukhaṁ iva, hastā'dy-ava-yavebhyo'rthāntarebhyaḥ prāg jñāyamānatvāt." - Just as the face is seen first, of all other limbs such as hands and the rest, the primary meaning is grasped first of all. The primary function of the word with reference to the direct conventional meaning - 'sākṣāt samketita-artha', is called 'abhidhā' or the power of direct expression.

Mammata has placed the word - “asya” as an adjective of ‘vyāpāraḥ’. This is to exclude “abhidhā-mūlā-vyañjanā” (also called - nānārtha-vyañjanā) by means of which also “sākṣāt-saṃketitārtha” is conveyed. But this another directly conventional meaning is irrelevant to the context and this second irrelevant meaning is conveyed only after the relevant meaning is first expressed, with the help of factors such as, ‘saṃyoga’ or ‘conjunction’ etc. Thus, the ‘abhidhā-mūlā-vyañjanā’ also conveys ‘sākṣāt saṃketita artha’, but as it is not a ‘mukhya’ i.e. primary function with reference to it, it is not ‘abhidhā’. If Mammata had defined abhidhā as, “tatra (= sākṣāt saṃketite arthe) vyāpāraḥ...” then the definition would have been too wide (= ativyāpta) to include ‘abhidhā-mūlā-vyañjanā’ also, which also serves to give a primary meaning, but of course a second primary meaning, when the first one is decided by factors such as ‘saṃyoga’ and the like. But this definition - viz. “sākṣāt saṃketite arthe mukhyo vyāpāro’bhidhā” saves the situation and stops “abhidhā-mūlā-vyañjanā” from entering into the field of pure abhidhā. This ‘abhidhā-mūlā-vyañjanā’ is not a ‘mukhya’ vyāpāra, but is an ‘a-mukhya’ i.e. “else than primary” - function. It is ‘a-mukhya’ in the sense that it is based on ‘abhidhā’ and starts functioning after ‘abhidhā’ is over.

‘Vācyārtha’ or ‘expressed meaning’ is called ‘mukhyārtha’, as seen above, not because it is principal, but because it is comprehended first. Vāmanācārya Jhalkikar also notes : (pp. 39, ibid) - “nanu vācyā-lakṣya-vyaṅgyāḥ padārthā iti vibhāgo’nupapannaḥ. mukhyatvena prasiddhasya turīyasyā’pi sattvād iti ata āha - ‘sa mukhyo’rthaḥ iti.” - Jhalkikar here meets with an objection. The objector says that the three-fold division of meaning into ‘vācyā’, ‘lakṣya’ and ‘vyaṅgya’ is not acceptable, as the turīya or the fourth one is also known to be mukhya (= principal).” To eliminate this objection Mammata has said, ‘sa mukhyo’rthaḥ’ iti. - Jhalkikar explains : “‘sa’ iti avadhāraṇā-garbhāṃ padam.” ‘Avadhāraṇā’ is ascertaining, affirming, determining, emphasising, restraining.’ - This means that only that which is directly conveyed is ‘mukhya’ : sa sākṣāt saṃketita eva artho mukhyaḥ, mukhyatvena prasiddhaḥ, ity-arthāḥ. prathamam pratiyamānatvena eva asya arthasya mukhyatvopapattiḥ. tathā hi. śabda-vyāpārāt yo’rtho’vyavahānena (= directly) gamyate so’rtho mukhyaḥ. sa hi yathā sarvebhyo hastā’dibhyo’vayavebhyah pūrvam mukham avalokyate, tathā sarvebhyah (= lakṣya, - vyaṅgya-tātparya-rūpebhyah) pratiyamānebhyah pūrvam avagamya. tasmāt mukham iva mukhya iti “śākhā’dibhyo yaḥ” (pā. 5/3/03) iti pāṇini-sūtreṇa ‘ya’-pratyayaḥ iti. evam mukhyārtha-viśayaḥ śabdo’pi mukhyaḥ ata eva agre 13 sūtre “mukhya-śabdābhidhānāl-lakṣaṇāyāḥ ko bhedaḥ” iti vṛtti-grantha upapadyate, iti bodhyam.

We can say that Mammāta is here under the influence of Mukula, who, as observed earlier, had said - “śabda-vyāpārād yasya avagatiḥ, tasya [arthasya] mukhyatvam. sa hi yathā sarvebhyo hastā”dibhyo’vayavebhyah pūrvam mukham avalokyate, tadvad eva sarvebhyah pratiyamānebhyah arthāntarebhyah pūrvam avagamyate. tasmāt ‘mukham iva mukhyah’ iti śākhā”di-ya-antena mukhya-śabdena abhidhīyate (A.V.M., pp. 1, ibid). In accordance with this term, viz. ‘mukhyārtha’, the word which gives the same is also called the ‘mukhya-śabda’, or, is also called ‘vācaka-śabda’.

Though Mammāta has not given the divisions of abhidhā, we have noted above, when we dealt with the views of Jagannātha, the Mahā-siddhāntin, that abhidhā is also subdivided into (i) yogaḥ i.e. etymology, (ii) rūdhiḥ or convention and (iii) yoga-rūdhi - i.e. etymology - cum-convention. We have a fourth variety also, as noted above, viz. ‘rūdha-yaugika’, or “yaugika-rūdha”. The last one is illustrated by the word ‘ud-bhid’ which means a tree or a bush which comes out after breaking open the surface of the earth. But it is also the name of a sacrifice. This is its conventional meaning. For “yaugika-rūdha” words; read : “yaugikārtha-rūdhārthayoh svātantryeṇa bodhakam padam yaugika-rūdhām. yathā udbhidādi padam. atra udbhit-padam yogena taru-gulmā”deḥ rūdhyā tu yāgaviśeṣaya vācakam.’ - Nīlakaṇṭhi.

Hemacandra - gives a four-fold classification of words such as - mukhya, gaṇa, laksaka and vyañjaka. Kā. Śā. (I. 15) : “mukhya-gaṇa-lakṣaya-vyañgyārtha-bhedāt mukhya-gaṇa-lakṣaka-vyañjakāḥ śabdāḥ” (pp. 18, Edn. Dr. T. S. Nandi, Ahmedabad, June 2000, pub. L. D. Institute of Indology).

He explains ‘mukhya’ artha as : “sākṣāt saṅketa-viśaya mukhyah.” (Kā. Śā. I. 16, pp. 18, ibid) - He adds in his vṛtti - “avyavadhānena yatra saṅketaḥ kriyate, sa mukham iva, hastā”dy-avayavedhyah prathamam pratiyate iti mukhyah. sa ca jāti-guṇa-kriyā-dravya-rūpaḥ, tad-viśayah śabdo mukhyo vācakaḥ iti ca ucyate. yathā gauḥ, śuklaḥ, calati, devadatta iti. yad āha. mahābhāṣyakāraḥ - ‘catuṣṭayi śabdānām pravṛttiḥ’ iti.

Hemacandra is clearly under the impression of both Mukula and Mammāta. But the chief merit of this ācārya is that he puts things with absolute clarity and lucidity. He observes that the discussion on the nature of ‘jāti’ and the like is irrelevant to the point and is therefore not discussed here : “jātyādi-svarūpaṁ ca prakṛta-anupayogāt na iha vipaṇcyate.” He refers in brief to the views on saṅketagrahaṇa such as : “jātiḥ eva saṅketa-viśaya iti eke. tadvān iti apare. aphoha iti anye.”

Though Hemacandra has not elaborated in the body of text which he calls the Kā. Śā. and alamkāra-cūḍāmaṇi, the name given by him to his svopajñā vṛtti, he discusses at length in his 'viveka' a commentary attached to the text, but also written by himself. Obviously, he has written 'viveka' for the more advanced students of this śāstra, i.e. literary aesthetics. He says : (pp. 1, Edn. Kā. Śā. with viveka, by Prof. R. C. Parikh and Prof. V. M. Kulkarni, Bombay, '64) :

“vivarīkartuṃ kvacid dṛbham
navam sandarbhituṃ kvacit,
kāvyānuśāsanasyāyam
vivekaḥ pravṛtanyate.”

‘to explain something presented, and to add something fresh, - this viveka is presented at length.’ So, in his 'viveka' on sūtra I. 16 Kā. Śā. he has covered everything that is read in Mammaṭa and Mukula. Hemacandra observes : (pp. 43, ibid)

“catusayī iti. jāti-śabdāḥ guṇa-śabdāḥ, kriyāśabdāḥ yadṛcchā-śabdāśca. tathā hi, sarveṣāṃ śabdānāṃ svārthā'bhidhānāya pravartamānānāṃ upādhi-upadarśita-
viśaya-vivekatvāt upādhinibandhanā pravṛttiḥ.

upādhiśca dvividhaḥ - vakṛ-śanniveśitaḥ, vastudharmaś ca. tatra yo vaktrā yadṛcchayā tat-tat-saṃjñi-
viśaya-śakti-abhi-vyakti-dvāreṇa tasmin tasmin saṃjñini niveśyate sa vakṛ-śanniveśitaḥ. yathā dīṭhā'dīnāṃ śabdānāṃ antya-buddhi-nirgrāhyam saṃhṛta-svarūpam. tat khalu tāṃ tāṃ abhidhāśaktim abhivyañjayatā vaktrā yadṛcchayā tasmin tasmin saṃjñini upādhitayā sanniveśyate. atah tannibandhanā yadṛcchā-śabdāḥ dīṭhādayaḥ.”

Hemacandra now makes an interesting note : “yeṣāṃ api ca ḍa-kārādi-varṇa-vyatirikta-saṃhṛta-krama-svarūpābhāvāt na dīṭhādi-śabda-svarūpam saṃhṛtakramam saṃjñiṣu adhyavasyata iti darśanam, teṣāṃ api vakṛ-yadṛcchā-abhivyañjamāna-śakti-bhedānusāreṇa kālpanika-samudāya-rūpasya dīṭhādeḥ śabdasya tat tat saṃjñā'bhidhānāya pravartamānatvād yadṛcchā śabdatvam upapadyata eva. - This is from Mukula - (pp. 5, ibid) Hemacandra then gives the two varieties of vastudharma, such as siddha, and sādhyā. He proceeds exactly in the fashion of Mammaṭa and Mukula and also quotes from the Vākyapadiya of Bhartṛhari.

He also discusses the views of kevala-jātivādins, jāti-viśiṣṭa-vyaktivādins and apohavādins.

The second opinion - viz. 'tadvān' is explained by Hemacandra as : (pp. 44, ibid) -

"jāter artha-kriyāyām anupayogāt viphalah saṃketah. yad-āha

"na hi jātir dāha-pākā" dau upayujyate iti vyakteś ca artha-kriyā-kāritve api ānantya-vyabhicārābhyām na saṃketah kartuṃ śakyate iti jātyupahitā vyaktiḥ śabdārthah."

Now this can be placed with Māṇikyacandra's (= M.C.) remark in his Saṃketa on the K.P. (pp. 15, ibid) :

"vyaktes tu artha-kriyākāritve api ānantya-vyabhicārābhyām na saṃketah kartuṃ śakyate iti jātimatī vyaktiḥ śabdārtha iti vaiśeṣikā" dayah."

We do not know who has influenced whom as both Hemacandra and Māṇikyacandra (M.C.) were almost contemporary. (See. Dr. De.; Dr. Kane).

On 'apoha' also H.C.'s remarks are almost identical and then more explanatory when placed with those passed by M.C. -

M.C. reads : (pp. 15, ibid) :

'apoha iti.' - jāti-vyakti-tadyoga-jātimad-buddhyākārāṇām śabdārthatvasya anupapadyamānarvāt gavayā"di śabdānām a-go-vyāvṛtṭyā"di-rūpaḥ apohaḥ śabdārtha iti bauddhāh."

H.C. (pp. 44, ibid) reads : jāti-vyakti-tadyoga-jātimad-buddhyākārāṇām śabdārthatvasya anupapadyamānarvāt gavādi-śabdānām a-go-vyāvṛtṭyā"dirūpas tad-viśiṣṭam vā buddhi-pratibimbakam sarvathā bāhyārtha-sparśa-śunyaṃ anyāpohaśabda-vācyam śabdārtha iti."

Clearly H. C. seems to offer better comments. Again M.C. has 'gavayādi śabdānām', and H.C. has 'gavādi śabdānām' which makes better sense. Then the remark - 'tad-viśiṣṭam vā...' in H.C. also is further explanatory. Thus, our impression is that perhaps H.C. had M.C.'s 'saṃketa' before him, though he may be himself a senior contemporary of M.C.

With this we move on to Jayadeva. The Candrā"loka carries a stamp of originality not only in its treatment of different topics, but also in the overall scheme. He has ten 'mayūkkhas' - rays - chapters of his work 'Candrā"loka' - the light of the moon. In the first chapter he gives kāvyā-lakṣaṇa and examines Mammata's definition of kāvyā and deals with 'śabda-lakṣaṇa' and 'śabda-bheda', etc. Then doṣa, lakṣaṇa, guṇa and alaṃkāra concepts are taken up in the II-V chapters. The VIṭṭh is devoted to 'rasa', 'rītis' and 'vṛttis'. VIIṭṭh, VIIIṭṭh IXṭṭh & Xṭṭh chapters are devoted to the concepts of vyañjanā, dhvani, lakṣaṇā and abhidhā respectively.

Thus, while other ālaṃkārikas treat vṛttivicāra along with kāvya-lakṣaṇa in the beginning of their works, Jayadeva has almost reversed the treatment and performed a 'śīrṣā"sana', so to say. We will try to examine the merit of his scheme and also the treatment of various topics as and when the context permits.

Jayadeva defines poetry or kāvya at I. 7 :

“nirdoṣā lakṣaṇavatī
sa-rītir guṇa-bhūṣaṇā
śālaṃkāra-rasā-
anekavṛttir vāk kāvya-nāma-bhāk.”

Thus for Jayadeva, 'vāk' i.e. - 'vāṇī' i.e. language - is kāvya, and it is bereft of faults, accompanied by lakṣaṇas (i.e. marks), rītis (= style, diction), bedecked by guṇas (i.e. excellences), and is having ālaṃkāras (i.e. figures of speech) (and) rasas and many vṛttis (= functions or powers; the nāṭya-vṛttis such as kaiśikī and the rest, and śabda-vṛttis i.e. abhidhā and the rest).

We will deal with other topics such as doṣa, guṇa, ālaṃkāra and rīti later, but for the present we will concern ourselves with 'vāk' and 'aneka-vṛtti'.

The 'pauṇamāsī' (Edn. Chawkhamba skt. series - varanasi; '64); observes : (pp. 10, ibid) “etādrśī vāk, ukta-viśeṣaṇa-viśiṣṭā vāṇī kāvyam, kavikarma, tasya nāma-ākhyam bhajatīti kāvya-nāma-bhāk, kāvya-pada-pravṛtti-nimittam bhavati.”

The commentator further explains that Jayadeva hereby wants to convey that poetry is 'word' : etena nirdoṣā"dy-ukta-dharma-viśiṣṭa-śabdātvaṃ kāvyatvaṃ iti kāvya-lakṣaṇam saṃpannam. tac ca kāvyam śabda-niṣṭham iti api asya abhipretam.

kāvya-prakāśam apahāya prāyaḥ sarvépy-ālaṃkārikāḥ kāvyasya śabdaniṣṭhatām eva urarī-kurvate. kāvyaprakāśakāras tu tasya vyāsajya-vṛtṭyā śabdārthobhaya-niṣṭhatām svīkurute.

śabda-niṣṭhatāvādinām tu ayam āśayaḥ - “autpattikas tu śabdasya arthena sambandhaḥ” ityādi-mīmāṃsā-sūtreṇa śabdārthayoḥ svābhāvika-sambandhe niścīte kṛte śabda-grahṇe arthaḥ svayam eva āpatati. artha-śūnye śabde tu prayogārhatā eva nāstīti kāvyasya śabda-niṣṭhatā eva ucitā iti alaṃ vistareṇa.”

There is yet another commentary by Dr. Trilokī Nārtha Dwivedi (Edn. Bharatiya Vidya prakāśana, Varanasi, Delhi, '92) - both in Sanskrit and then in Hindi. This commentary explains the word 'vāk' as : (pp. 11, ibid) : vāk (ucyate anena iti

śabdaḥ, ucyate asau iti arthaḥ) kāvyam kavikarma, tasya nāma samjñā bhajati, samksepeṇa vāk kāvyam iti.”

Now this commentator takes ‘vāk’ as both word and sense, and in the paurṇamāsī, only ‘word’ was taken as kāvyā, according to Jayadeva.

Now, Jayadeva first takes up ‘word’ for discussion. He defines ‘word’ at Candrā”loka I. 9 - as :

“vibhaky-utpattaye yogah
śāstriyah śabda ucyate,
rūḍha-yaugika-tanmīśraiḥ
prabhedaīḥ sa punas-tridhā.”

That (collection of letter) which deserves the appending of case-terminations and is therefore termed ‘śāstriya’ i.e. scientific (such a collection of letters) is termed ‘śabda’ or word (with reference to poetry). This word is three-fold viz. (i) rūḍha i.e. conventional, (ii) yaugika i.e. etymological and (iii) yoga-rūḍha i.e. etymological cum conventional.

For Jayadeva such words as dīrgha and the like, which render meaning depending only on the power of the total collection of letters - kevala-samudāya-śakti, are rūḍha or conventional. Yaugika words are ‘pācaka’ and the like, that give meaning through the association of both ‘prakṛti’ and ‘pratyaya’ i.e. ‘yoga’ śakti, and those which render meaning through both samudāya-śakti and avayava-śakti are yogarūḍha words such as ‘pañkaja’ and the like.

Because Jayadeva had defined poetry as ‘nirdoṣā”di-viśeṣaṇaviśiṣṭā vāk’, he has to explain and define ‘vāk’. This is what ‘paurṇamāsī’ has to explain. Thus here ‘vāk’ is taken only as ‘word’. The other commentary by Dr. Trilokinātha Dwivedi takes ‘vāk’ as both ‘word and sense’. He observes : (pp. 19-20, ibid) :

“kāvyatvena abhimatāyāḥ vāco vyutpatti-bhedāt śabdārtha-rūpatve kramaśaḥ prathamatvāt, prathamopasthiteḥ, arthasya upasthāpakatayā prādhānyāc ca, prathamam śabdam lakṣayan āha - vibhaky-utpattaye ityā”di. vibhaktayaḥ sup-rūpāḥ tiṅ-rūpāś-ca, tāsām utpattaye, dhāraṇāya yogyaḥ prayoga-yogyatām āpannaḥ śabdaḥ varṇa-samudāyaḥ śāstriyah, śāstra-sambandhī iṣyate kathyate. evaṁ cātra śāstriya-śabdatvam lakṣyatāvachchedakam, na tu śabdatva-mātram eva., arthāt ‘apadam na prayuñjīta’, tathā ca ‘vibhaky-antam padam’ ityādi. siddhāntānām jāgarūkatayā vibhaktūnām utpatteḥ samāgamād anantaram eva śabdaḥ prayogayogyo bhavati vibhakti-rahita-varga-samudāyena arthasya apratīteḥ

sa vibhaktiyuktaḥ, prayoga-yogyah artha-samanvitaś-ca śabdaḥ śāstrīyo vyākaraṇa-śāstrānukūla iti kathyate.

evam prathamam śabdo dvividhaḥ aśāstrīyaḥ śāstrīyaś ca, iti. tatra aśāstrīyaḥ śabdaḥ yathā'pi bhavatu, kiṃtu śāstrīyaḥ śabda eva sa bhavitum arhati yo vibhakti-yuktaḥ, prayogayogyah, niścitartha-pratipādakaś ca bhavati.

punaḥ bhūyaḥ rūdhaḥ, yaugikaḥ, tābhyāṃ bhinnaś ca iti rūdha-yaugika-tanmiśrās taiḥ prabhedaiḥ, bhedopabhedaiḥ tridhā tri-prakārako bhavati-rūdhaḥ, yaugikaḥ, rūdha-yaugikaś ca, iti.

tatra prakṛti-pratyayārtha-vicāram vinaiva kevalam samudāya-śaktyā artha-pratipādakatvam rūdhatvam. rūdhiḥ prasiddhiḥ. evaṃca prasiddhyā yaḥ śabdaḥ artha-viśeṣam pratipādayati sa śabdaḥ rūdha iti ucyate.

yogād āgato yaugikaḥ iti su-spaṣṭam. yogah prakṛti-pratyayārthayoḥ sambandhaḥ sammiśraṇam iti, tasmād artha-pratipādakaḥ śabdaḥ yaugikaḥ.

rūdhenā miśro yaugikaḥ, yaugikena miśro rūdhaḥ, arthāt yaḥ rūdhópi yaugikópi bhavati, prakṛti-pratyayārtha-vicāram vinā, prakṛti-pratyayārtha-vicāra-pūrvakam cā'pi ubhayārtha-pratipādanam karoti, sa śabdo rūdha-yaugika iti."

The Paurṇamāsī (pp. 11, ibid) explains : sa śabdo rūdho yaugiko yoga-rūdha iti prabhedais tridhā bhavati. tatra kevala-samudāya-śaktyā arthabodhakatvam rūdhatvam. yathā dīttā"di. kevalāyava-śaktyā artha-bodhakatvam yaugikatvam. yathā pācakā"di. samudāyāyava-ubhayaśaktyā-arthabodhakatvam yogarūdhatvam., yathā pañkajā"di.

rasagaṅgādhakārah eta eva śabdāḥ kevala-samudāyaśakti, - kevala-avayavaśakti-samudāyāyava-ubhaya-śakti-padaḥ vyapadiśyate.

Jayadeva goes for further sub-division.

At Candrā"loka I. 10, he states that avyakta-yoga, nir yoga and yogā"bhāsa are the three sub-divisions of rūdha-śabda. Words such as vṛkṣā"di, bhūvādi and maṇḍapā"di are the illustrations respectively. When avayavārtha (i.e. yaugika artha) is a-sphuṭa i.e. not clear and when meaning is collected through samudāya-śakti, that word is called 'a-vyakta-yoga' śabda. Say, 'vṛkṣa' is so called because it removes the sunshine - "vṛścati ātapaṃ iti vṛkṣaḥ". Here, the apprehension of the yaugikārtha in the sense of 'ātapa-nivāraṇa' or removal of sunshine does not take place everywhere, but we have apprehension in a general form of vṛkṣatva-jāti - or the generality only, though the 'avayavārtha-pratīti' is not totally negated.

Now, when there is no 'avayavārtha-pratīti' whatsoever, it is a case of 'niryoga' word. For example, there is no possibility of any yaugika artha in case of words such as the √bhū and such other dhātus - i.e. verbs.

'Yogā"bhāsa' occurs when the avayavārtha or yaugika-meaning is having no relation whatsoever with the meaning which is supposed to be the purport or tātparya. For example we have 'maṇḍam pibati iti maṇḍapaḥ'. But this has nothing to do with a pendal or a reception gate which is raised on occasions such as marriage, etc.

The 'yaugika' word is again three-fold such as - śuddha-yaugika, yaugika-mūla-yaugika and sambhinna-yaugika. The illustrations are respectively - 'bhrānti', 'sphurat-kānti' and 'kaunteya'. The first, i.e. śuddha-yaugika is one where meaning is apprehended by the union of prakṛti and pratyaya. √'bhramu' is a verb meaning 'gati' and 'bhrama'. When the 'ktin'-pratyaya in feminine gender is attached to it, we get the word 'bhranti' in the sense of gamana/bhramaṇa or 'bhrama' i.e. illusion. This is 'śuddha-yaugika'.

When two śuddha-yaugika words form a compound, we get "yaugika-mūla yaugika", e.g. "sphurat-kānti". This word is derived by a compound of 'sphurat' and 'kānti', which are by themselves śuddha-yaugika words individually. 'sphurat' is formed by attaching 'śatru'-pratyaya to the root √'sphur'. By attaching 'ktin' in feminine gender, to the root √'kamu', we arrive at 'kānti', a śuddha-yaugika-pada by itself.

Sambhinna-yaugika occurs when there is relation between 'yaugika' and 'a-yaugika' word. 'Kuntī' is the daughter of king 'Kunti'. This is a yaugika word. There is 'vyaṅ' pratyaya here, and its 'lopa' i.e. (luk) disappearance also takes place. Then again from 'kuntī', we apply 'niś'-pratyaya because of femininity, and get 'kuntī', which is 'yaugika'. Then by 'dhak'-pratyaya we get 'kaunteya'. But by this we apprehend only 'Arjuna' and no other son of Kuntī. So, this word 'kaunteya' becomes 'a-yaugika'. Thus by the relation of both 'yaugika' and 'a-yaugika' words, the word 'kaunteya', meaning 'Arjuna' is arrived at and is called 'sambhinna-yaugika'.

Paurṇamāsī explains (pp. 14, ibid) : "yaugika-ayaugikayoḥ sambandhena artha-bodhakatvaṁ sambhinna-yaugikam. yathā 'kaunteya' - śabdo yaugikāyaugika-sambandhena artha-bodhakaḥ. rājādī-vācakāt 'kuntī' śabdāt "vṛddhet-kausalājādāñi-vyaṅ" ityanena kunteḥ apatyam strī 'kuntī' ity arthake vyañi pratyaye kṛte sati tatraḥ tatra, 'striyāmavanti-kuntī-kurubhyaśca' ityanena tal-lukī striyām niśi kṛte kuntī śabdo yaugiko bhavati.

‘kuntya apatyam pumān kaunteyōrjunah’ iti, ‘strībhyo dhak’ ity anena raddhitena nispannah kaunteya-śabdō’rjuna-vācako’yaugiko bhavati. kuntyaḥ putrāntarāṇām api sattvāt. evaṃ yaugika-ayaugika yoh sambandhena kaunteya-śabdasya artha-pratyāyakatvāt sambhinna-yaugikatvaṃ sammiśrita-yaugikatvaṃ iti yāvat.”


The yoga-rūḍha is also three-fold such as by the two, by exchange of general and particular quality, - anyonyam mitho yat sāmānya-viśeṣayor yogā”rūḍhayoh parivartanam vinimayaḥ, tasmāt kāraṇāt. This means that at times (i) the general meaning is discarded in favour of the particular and (ii) vice-versa.

The third variety is ‘tan-miśra’ i.e. a mixture of both these, i.e. where at one and the same place both the sāmānya or general and viśeṣa or particular meanings are understood.

The illustrations are - nīradhi, paṅkaja, saudha, sāgara, bhūruha, and śaśī. These words leave their sāmānyārtha i.e. yaugikārtha and give the viśeṣārtha i.e. rūḍhārtha : nirāṇi dadhāti iti nīradhiḥ - putting aside this sāmānya/i.e. yaugika meaning it gives only a viśeṣārtha - a particular rūḍha artha of a sea or ocean. Thus, the term paṅkaja puts aside the meaning of ‘anything that is born of mud’, ‘saudha’ puts aside the meaning of a substance, used for white-wash - born of sudhā, ‘sāgara’ puts aside the meaning of ‘that which is connected with king sagara’, ‘bhūruha’ puts aside the meaning of anything that grows on earth, ‘śaśī’, puts aside the meaning of a person with a hare or rabbit, - these words give only their famous conventional meanings only.

If the third variety of yogarūḍha word is accepted, we come across such words as ‘kṣīra-nīradhi’ and ‘ākāśa-paṅkaja’ etc. In case of the former, there is the apprehension of rūḍha or viśeṣārtha in place sāmānyārtha, and in case of the latter there is accepting the sāmānya/yaugika in place of viśeṣārtha; say, for example in case of ‘kṣīranīradhi’ if the sāmānya meaning in form of a reservoir of water is taken to understand ‘nīradhi’, then ‘kṣīra’ or milk will not be able to stay with water. So here ‘nīradhi’ has to be taken in the particular sense of an ocean only. Opposite is the illustration namely ‘ākāśa-paṅkaja’. ‘ākāśa’ is ‘paṅka’ or mud, and so the word means ‘moon’ that has come out of ākāśa-gaṅgā. So here viśeṣa artha is left out and sāmānya artha of ‘that which is born in mind’, is accepted. The third variety is illustrated by nīradhitayā kūpaḥ samudra iva, rājate.

A table explaining the varieties of śabda can be seen as below :



In śabda-śakti-prakāśikā (1590 A.D.), Jagadīśa Tarkālaṁkāra also has given a nine-fold division which is seen in Jayadeva also.

We have seen that Jayadeva has qualified 'śabda' by 'vibhaktyutpattaye'. Now vibhaktis are mainly two-fold, 'sup' and 'tiṅ'. The 'sup'-case-terminations are twenty one. They are used in kāraṇa-rūpa (i.e. words). The 'tiṅ' are of two types - (i) concerning parasmai pada, which are nine 'tip-ādi'. (ii) The other nine are concerning the ātmanepada - 'ta'-ādi'. On account of the 'utpatti' of these 'vibhaktis', i.e. when a collection of letters deserves to take up these case-terminations, it becomes useful for and are utilized in a language. When these case-terminations are attached to a word, it is called a śāstrīya śabda.

Jayadeva thus (I. 13b) comes to the explanation of 'pada' and 'vākya', as :

vibhaktyantaṁ padaṁ, vākyaṁ - (13b)

tadvyūho'rtha-samāptiḥ, - (14a)

The word with (sup/tiṅ) case-terminations appended is termed 'pada' (in grammar). The collection of such 'padas' is a (grammatical) sentence which conveys one meaning and the padas in which are free from expectancy.

Paurnamāsī observes : (pp. 18, ibid) : "arthasya padārthasya samāptiḥ, avasānaṁ iti artha-samāptiḥ, tasyāṁ artha-samāptito artha-samāptau iti yāvat. nirakāṅkṣaṁ iti yāvat."

After explaining the concepts of 'śabda' and 'vākya' in the first Mayukha, Jayadeva - picks up the topic of śabda-vṛttis which are three for him, viz. vyañjanā, lakṣaṇā and abhidhā, Jayadeva compares these three with the three flows of the Gaṅgā which look to be 'gaṁbhira', 'kuṭila' and 'sarala', following three vṛttis. Jayadeva observes -

"vṛtti-bhedais tribhir yuktā
srotobhir iva jhāhnavī,

bhāratī bhāti gambhīrā
kutilā saralā kvacit.

(chandrāloka VII. i)

Jayadeva's 'vṛtti' is the same as 'śakti' of Viśvanātha and others. Paurṇamāsī explains : (pp. 230, ibid) : "vartate, śabdārthe pravartate anayā iti vṛttiḥ." ... 'yuktā sambaddhā bhāratī vāṇī. tribhiḥ srotobhiḥ pravāhair yuktā, jāhnavī gaṅgeva. kvacit gambhīrā, vyaṅgyārtha-bodha-rūpā. kutilā lakṣyārtha-bodha-rūpā. saralā vācyārtha-bodha-rūpā."

In the VIṭṭ chapter 'rasa' was explained and as 'rasa' is arrived at through 'vyañjanā', Jayadeva treats it first in Ch. VII. Ch. VIII is devoted to dhvani and guṇibhūta-vyaṅgya. Ch. IX deals with lakṣaṇā and Ch. X with abhidhā. Frankly, there is no rhyme or rhythm in this scheme.

We will examine Jayadeva's treatment of abhidhā first. He has called it 'saralā' and the 'ramā' ṭikā of Vidyanātha explains this as : "a-vilambena artha-pratyāyakatvaṃ saralātvam." Abhidhā is termed 'saralā' because the meaning is collected immediately through it.

Abhidhā is defined by Jayadeva at, Candrāloka X. i, as :

"dharmam kamcit puraskṛtya
prāyaḥ śabdaḥ pravartate,
yayā'rtham spaṣṭam ācaṣṭe
śabdāḥ tām abhidhām viduḥ."

The idea is that a word is used in language, with reference to some 'dharma' i.e. some speciality here, which is of the form of either jāti or class/generality, guṇa/quality kriyā/action or dravya/i.e. a thing, substance, etc. Abhidhā is that function, by which, a word clearly conveys the exact - yathārtha - meaning, which here is the conventional or 'saṅketita' meaning. By 'yathārtha' is meant 'saṅketita artha', because that exactly is its real meaning. By the term 'spaṣṭam' is 'sākṣāt saṅketitam' understood. This word which gives the 'sākṣāt saṅketita artha' is called 'vācaka' or directly expressive.

Jayadeva wants us to accept six-fold abhidhā with reference to the six-fold primary meanings it conveys. Over and above the four-fold meaning such as jāti, guṇa, etc. - the attributes -, Jayadeva has two more, such as 'vastu-yoga' and 'nirdeśa'. He observes; (Candrāloka X. ii) :

“jātyā guṇena kriyayā
vastu-yogena saṃjñayā,
nirdeśena tathā prāhuḥ
śaḍvidhām abhidhām budhāḥ.”

The six-fold division of abhidhā is due to the six-fold nature of ‘dharma’ with reference to which a word is used in worldly business. By ‘vastu-yoga’ is meant attachment of something which gives the thing a special name such as a person is called ‘daṇḍin’ because he is having a ‘daṇḍa’ or a stick. ‘Nirdeśa’ is pointing out. When we point out someone by name, that term is called ‘nirdeśa’vācī, e.g. ‘Kāṃsa’.

Dr. Trilokīnārtha Dwivedi explains vastu-yoga, saṃjñā and nirdeśa as follows : (pp. 395, ibid) -

‘vastunaḥ apara-dravyasya saṃyogena, saṃbandhena yathā ‘daṇḍī’ iti atra daṇḍasya saṃyogena daṇḍa-dhāriṇaḥ puruṣasya jñānam bhavati. saṃjñāyā vakṛt-yadṛcchayā dīṭhā”di-rūpayā, yathā ‘dīṭho’yam’, ‘ḍavīṭho’yam’, ityādi. tathā nirdeśena śaḍvidhā iti. vācaka-śabdānām sva-paratvam nirdeśatvam. yathā, “hiraṇya-pūrvam kaśīpum pracakṣate”, ityādinā hiraṇyakaśīpor nirdeśaḥ; yathā ‘deva-pūrvam giriṃ te’ ity anena deva-girer nirdeśaḥ iti.

The paurṇamāsī observes : (pp. 301, ibid) : vastuno yogāḥ sambandhaḥ vastuyogaḥ yathā daṇḍī ity ādau daṇḍa-sambandhaḥ. ayamdaṇḍ-sambandho vācyo, vācyaṭā’vacchedako-atra daṇḍasambandhasya viśeṣaṇatvena bhānam. ayam eva vastu-yoga-śabdaḥ. yatra jāty ādayaḥ sambandhena ca vyavahitās tatra ta eva pravṛtti-nimittāni vācyaḥ vā. yatra tu tena vyavahitās tatra vastu-yoga eva tathā. yathā daṇḍo gorvavān ity ādau. ata eva dravya-yoga iti. upekṣya vastu-yoga iti uktam.

dīṭhā”diśabdāḥ saṃjñā. yadṛcchā-śabda-iti nāmāntaram. ete śabdā eka eva vyakti-vācino bhavanti. “hiraṇya-pūrvam kaśīpum pracakṣate” (śi. śu. I. 42), ‘dhanur upapadam asmai vedam abhyādideśa (Kīrāta. XVIII. 44), ‘devapūrvam giriṃ te’ (Megha. pūrva. 42) ity ādi sthaleṣu nirdeśa-śabdāḥ santi. vācakavarṇānām sva-paratvam nirdeśatvam. uktodāharaṇeṣu ‘hiraṇyapūrvam-kaśīpu’ padābhyām hiraṇya-kaśīpu-varṇa-vattā eva vācyaḥ, vācakatāvacchedikā vā. tenātra nirdeśa-śabdatvam vijñeyam. prastuta-granthakāramate nirdeśa-śabdatayā abhidhayārtha-pratītiḥ. anye tv atra lakṣaṇām svīkurvanti.

The commentary tries to explain that by ‘nirdeśa’ only the letters are meant. The individual is not referred to by this, as in a saṃjñā śabda.

Jayadeva, at X. 3 cites illustrations of all these six varieties of abhidhā, such as -

“gaur nīlaḥ pācako daṇḍī
 dīttahaḥ kaṃsa iti kramāt,
 kaṃ saṃhinasti kaṃśārīr
 naraṃ ca kaṃ samāśritam.”

Here ‘daṇḍī’ gives meaning by daṇḍa-saṃbandha i.e. vastu-yoga. In the illustration, viz. ‘kaṃsa hinasti’, etc., the term ‘kaṃsa’ is nirdeśa-vācaka. There is a question asked viz. “Who was killed by Kṛṣṇa ? The answer is, “A person who was associated with ‘ka’kāra.” This means kṛṣṇa killed ‘naraka’ and also ‘sa’ associated with ‘kaṃ’, i.e. ‘kaṃsa’. As only letters are mentioned, this is a case of ‘nirdeśa’, and not saṃjñā or yadr̥cchā. When ‘kaṃsa’ is referred to by such letters it is ‘nirdeśa’. When he is referred directly as, “kṛṣṇa killed kaṃsa” - it is saṃjñā and not nirdeśa.

Jayadeva (X. 4) suggests that :

“na yogā”der āyatanam
 na saṃketa-niketanam,
 vṛttyā nirdeśa-śabdo’yaṃ
 mukhyayā svābhidheyayā.”

‘Jāti’ etc. are negated in the nirdeśa-pada. This sort of an expression i.e. nirdeśa, is neither capable of ‘vyutpatti’ nor is there any saṅketa in it. Only letters are apprehended through abhidhā. It makes only for ‘sva-rūpa’ - “ato’yaṃ nirdeśe svarūpe śabdo nirdeśa-śabdaḥ kaṃsā”dih. svam varṇa-dvayaṃ eva abhidheyam yasyām sā tayā.” Paurṇamāsī; pp. 303, ibid. In the Mahābhāṣya we have a four-fold scheme of words : “catuṣṭayī śabdānām pravṛttiḥ iti uktam. Here, for Jayadeva, abhidhā is, six-fold - ‘atra tu sā ṣaḍvidhā iti viśeṣaḥ. (pp. 303, ibid)

Vidyādhara (Ekāvalī II. 2) follows Mammaṭa and holds that meaning of a word which conveys ‘sākṣāt saṃketa’ - i.e. convention directly is ‘mukhya’ or primary and the power which directly conveys this ‘saṃketita artha’ - is ‘abhidhā’ and is also ‘mukhya’ i.e. primary.

Vidyānātha, the author of Pratāpa-rudra-yaśo-bhāṣaṇa, holds that tātparyārtha or purport is covered up by vyañjanā only and supports only three powers of a word viz. abhidhā, lakṣaṇā and vyañjanā. He does not accept, as is done by Hemacandra, ‘gaunī’ as an independent power over and above lakṣaṇā. He incorporates ‘gaunī’ in lakṣaṇā and thus, like the kashmir school opts for the

'vṛtti-traya' i.e. three powers or functions of a word. His definition of abhidhā, viz. "that function of a word which has the conventional meaning as its object, is called abhidhā" - (Pra. Ru. Kāvyaaprakaraṇa, pp. 35) follows Mammaṭa. He gives two varieties of abhidhā, viz. (i) rūḍha-pūrvikā and (ii) yoga-pūrvikā. The first variety is one which makes for the conventional meaning of a word, and the second yields the etymological sense. The verse, viz. "tapo-viśeṣaiḥ prathitaiḥ..." etc. illustrates the first one, while in "rājñi rudra-narādhīṣe." the 'yauḡika' - etymological-meaning is resorted to.

Viśvanātha (Sāhitya-darpaṇa, Ch. II) explains the nature of a sentence and gives its varieties. Vākya or sentence for him is 'pada-samūha' or collection of words, and 'pada' is collection of letters capable of yielding sense. Then he gives three varieties of meaning such as vācya/expressed, lakṣya/indicated and vyaṅgya/suggested. Three powers of a word are accepted with reference to these three types of meaning, and they are respectively abhidhā, lakṣaṇā and vyañjanā (S.D. II. 3). Viśvanātha has used the term 'śakti' for all the three functions. Normally, by 'śakti' the ālaṃkārikas refer only to abhidhā. For Viśvanātha these three powers are also 'vṛtti' or 'vyāpāra' also. In fact the 'vṛtti' is called 'śakti' because it has the power to yield a certain meaning. Abhinavagupta also takes 'śakti' as a synonym of 'vyāpāra'. Rucirā explains that as they stay in a word they are called 'vṛtti', but on account of their power to yield a particular meaning, they are termed 'śakti' : See, Rucirā on S.D. II. 3 : "atra idaṃ boddhavyam. artha-bodha-hetu-bhūtatvāt śaktirūpatvam, śabda-gatatvāt tu vṛttitvam."

Explaining the nature of abhidhā Viśvanātha observes - that, as it signifies the conventional meaning, the abhidhā śakti is called 'agrimā' i.e. primary or 'mukhya' : "tatra saṃketitārthasya bodhanād agrimā abhidhā." (S.D. II. 49). He has discussed the factors such as vṛddha-vyavahāra etc., which make for the formation of convention-saṃketa. He has also explained that by the proximity of a famous word - 'prasiddha-pada-sānnidhya' -, and also by āptopadeśa i.e. instructions from seniors, conventional meaning is collected. This abhidhā śakti is without intervention from any other power. There are other factors also for collecting the convention and these are clarified by the vivṛtikāra - (pp. 29-30, vivṛti on S.D.). Viśvanātha accepts saṃketa with reference to the four attributes such as jāti, guṇa, etc., in conformity with Mammaṭa.

Keśava Miśra in the third Mayukha of his Alaṃkāra-śekhara talks of three vṛttis such as (abhidhā) śakti, lakṣaṇā and vyañjanā. Śakti is God's will - īśvarecchā-and

is termed 'saṃketa' - "padānāṃ vṛttayās tisraḥ - tisro vṛttayah padānāṃ bhavanti, śaktir-lakṣaṇā-vyañjanā ceti. tatra śaktir īśvarecchā, yā saṃketa iti ucyate. sā padeṣu prasiddhā eva. sā ca -

“kośa-vyākaraṇa-āptokti-vākya-śeṣa-upamā”ditah
prasiddha-pada-saṃbandhāt
vyavahārāc ca budhyate.”

(pp. 9, Alaṃ. śe. Edn. N.S. Bombay, 1926)

Thus, while others hold that śakti i.e. abhidhāśakti gives saṃketita-artha, Keśava makes a simpler equation and calls śakti itself to be īśvarecchā or saṃketa. He does not elaborate.

Appayya Dikṣita has given a serious thought to the concept of śabada-vṛttis in his Vṛtti-vārtika (Vṛ. V. Edn. Avasthi, Indu Prakashan, Delhi - '77). Of course our Mahā Siddhāntin i.e. Panditarāja Jagannātha controverts Appayya at many places and this we have seen earlier, but that does not reduce the importance of the Vṛ. V. in the least. He, of course follows the Kashmir tradition but, to his credit it may be observed that he has gone much deeper in his discussions and has been very analytical in his observations and this provides the back ground and the heritage which ultimately flowers to its highest in Jagannātha. We will consider his thoughts in detail.

In the beginning of his work, Appayya observes that the ālaṃkārikas have thought of three vṛttis such as abhidhā, lakṣaṇā and vyañjanā, to arrange for alaṃkāras in the kāvya-mārga i.e. the path of poetry. In the first pariccheda (= chapter) he picks up abhidhā for consideration. He holds that 'abhidhā is apprehending meaning through śakti.' : “śaktyā pratipādakatvaṃ abhidhā.” (pp. 1, Vṛ. V.). This is three-fold viz. rūḍhi, yoga, and yoga-rūḍhi. Appayya observes that “rūḍhi-abhidhā is that which gives a single meaning by akhaṇḍa-śakti (i.e. by the whole pada), i.e. without the power of avayava or parts of a word.” - “akhaṇḍa-śakti-mātreṇa ekārthya-pratipādakatvaṃ rūḍhiḥ” (pp. 1, ibid). This giving of a single meaning, which is rūḍhi, is two-fold, viz. (i) by the non-manifestation of the meaning of parts or (ii) by rejection of the apprehended meaning of parts. In the illustration viz. “yat te pādāmbuja-ruha.” etc. the meaning of the parts - i.e. avayavārtha - of the words 'maṇi' and 'nūpura', viz. to make noise from √man, and 'to admire' from √nu + pur, is not apprehended at all, and in case of the word 'atimukta', the meaning of, “transending the mukta i.e. free” is apprehended but is not considered and therefore rejected. In

both these illustrations the meaning is collected by the whole - akhaṇḍa-pada and hence it is 'rūḍhi'.

After that he treats of yoga-śakti. He observes that, "the capacity to apprehend a single meaning, through the avayava-śakti i.e. power of the parts, is yoga' : "avayavaśakti-mātra-sāpekṣaḥ padasya ekārtha-pratipāḍakatvaṃ yogaḥ." (pp. 2, ibid) - This yoga-śakti is also two-fold, viz. (i) the rendering of meaning by the meaning of the parts is due to the non-apprehension of the meaning of the whole, (i.e. the whole has no meaning of itself except the collected meaning of its parts), and (ii) even if the meaning of the whole is conveyed, it is not congruent with the meaning collected from parts. The first variety is illustrated by, "ūrdhvaṃ virañciḥ..." etc., and the second by, "vastu-trayī-maya-tanus-tava." etc. The third viz. yoga-rūḍhi is explained by Appayya as - one in which one meaning is arrived at both with the help of avayava-i.e. parts and samudāya i.e. whole word, as in, "pakṣa-dvaya-kraśima." etc. Here the word 'surā'laya' illustrates this variety. The word-meaning as a whole is 'The mount meru', and the meaning collected through the meanings of the parts is, - "The abode of gods", and these two taken together render the meaning of, "mount Meru, which is the abode of gods." Thus it is an illustration of 'yoga-rūḍhi'.

Appayya here picks up a longer discussion. The objector raises a question as follows :- In such illustrations as above, i.e. 'surā'laya', wherein if both the meanings, i.e. one derived through parts and one through whole, are found to be identical, why should we not accept here rūḍhi-śakti, and why should we think of yoga-rūḍhi in such cases at all ? For, if we do not accept this suggestion, there will follow the contingency of 'punar-ukti' or 'repetition'.

To this Appayya's answer is as follows :- In accepting yoga-rūḍhi here, the reason is that in the meaning derived through parts in such cases, i.e. in 'avayavārtha' here, there is possibility of a suggested sense here and this avayavārtha actually rests in this implied sense alone. So, when we use a pada giving the whole meaning - i.e. samudayārtha-vācaka-padāntara - there is no fault of repetition. For example, in the illustration, viz. "tava prasādāt kusumā'yudho'pi." etc. in the word 'pināka-pāṇi', we arrive at the apprehension of the greatness (= mahimā) of the bow called 'pināka'. The final apprehension rests in understanding this greatness of Śiva's bow. So, the use of the word viz. 'hara' giving the samudāya-vācī-meaning, is not found to be faulty at all. Appayya here considers an objection also. The objection is as follows. As in 'pināka-pāṇi', so also in the word 'kusumā'yudha' also, we arrive at the

apprehension of the greatness of the weapon in form of a flower i.e. 'kusuma'. So, why does the poet here not use another word also giving the meaning of 'cupid' or 'kāma-deva' ? The answer to this query is that the poet has used the word 'kuryām' i.e. 'I shall do', in the first person singular and thereby the implied word will be 'aham' i.e. "I" by which kāmadeva will be implied. So, its separate mention is not required. Dixita observes that this reply follows the view of some 'sāhitya-cintāmaṇī-kāra'. But Appayya further adds that there is no rule or regulation to the effect that when a poet wants to convey the implied sense with the help of the meaning of parts - avayavārtha -, there must necessarily be the use of a samudāyavācī pada or a word giving the whole meaning. For example, in "manye nija-skhalana." etc., we do not see this. To support this observation Appayya quotes the view of the Ekāvalīkāra, i.e. Vidyādhara and says that, 'there is a two-fold narration such as, when there is apprehension of an implied sense, in case of a yoga-rūḍha pada, which springs with the help of yaugikārtha-śakti, there may or may not be the use of a samudāyārtha-vācī-pada, or a word giving only the meaning as a whole. So, there is no rule or regulation in this respect.

After this Appayya proceeds to give such an illustration of yoga-rūḍha pada in which there is no anvaya or correlation of the avayavārtha i.e. meaning of parts, with reference to the subject on hand i.e. viśaya-viśeṣa. Here the apprehension rests only in the collective meaning i.e. samudāyārtha alone. For example the verse, "ullāsayati." etc. In this illustration, as with reference to the word 'amburuha', the correlation of the avayavārtha viz. 'bhagavannābhi-padma' is not established, we find here only rūḍhi. And in the next illustration, viz. 'kalhāra-kairava.' etc. there is no correlation with samudāyārtha, and the final apprehension rests only in the avayavārtha alone. The word 'paṅkaja' here is not correlated with the samudāyārtha in form of kalhāra, kumuda, etc., and so, we see here only 'yoga'. Appayya here quotes the views of Naiyāyikas but does not give his own observation on the same.

After this, covering up the topic of abhidhā, Appayya observes that thus abhidhā is explained as three-fold. Then he picks up the topic of words having a multiple sense; i.e. 'anekārtha śabda'. He holds that a word having a multiple sense is restricted to a single meaning with the help of factors such as 'saṃyoga', 'viprayoga', etc. etc. He explains each abhidhā-niyāmaka with illustration in a scientific way. He observes that in case of a word having multiple sense, if the abhidhā-niyāmaka or restricting factor is seen at more than one places in a general way i.e. in 'aviśiṣṭa' form, then there is no restriction of abhidhā in any particular

meaning. For example the verse, “yena dhvastamanobhavena.” etc. In this verse both Lord śiva and Lord Keśava are delineated as praiseworthy, the regulating factor viz., ‘prakaraṇa’ or context is used in a general form i.e. not in a particular form-aviśiṣṭa-rūpa. So, it is advisable to accept the figure, ‘śleṣa’ or paronomasia here. Thus both the meanings here are vācārtha i.e. expressed-sense only.

Now, Appayya discusses a point further. He observes that in cases such as quoted above (i.e. in, “yena-dhvasta. etc.”) let the abhidhā power operate with reference to senses more than one; i.e. let there be a case of śleṣa alaṃkāra. But when the meaning of regulatory factors such as prakaraṇa etc. have a fixed sense, and even here if an out-of-context a-prākaraṇika-artha is conveyed, what shall we say ? We know that Mammaṭa and some others have accepted the apprehension of additional sense through vyañjanā or suggestion.

But Appayya has the following observation. He says that in instances such as “asau udayaṃ ārūḍhaḥ.” etc., the ancients hold that here vyañjanā has to be accepted. But Appayya does not subscribe to this observation of the ancients. He says : “iti artha-dvayasya api prākaraṇikatvaṃ eva, prākaraṇika-a-prākaraṇika-rūpatve api ubhayatra abhidhā eva vyāpāraḥ, yathokta-samabdhivyāhārasya api śabdāntara-sannidhi-rūpatvena prakaraṇavaśā abhidhā niyāmakatvāt.” (pp. 12, ibid) - i.e. In instances such as, ‘asau udayaṃ ārūḍhaḥ.’ etc. in case of both the contextual and non-contextual senses, the words such as rājā, kara, maṇḍala, etc., the quality of being simultaneously cited - ‘saha-uccaritatva-rūpa-dharma’ is also taken as restrictor of abhidhā as in case of ‘prakaraṇa’ and the like. So, both the contextual and non-contextual meanings are arrived at through abhidhā alone. Appayya further explains this by an illustration such as for example in a single lake, water can flow both in intended and unintended region. Similar is the case of abhidhā here which can give both the contextual and non-contextual meaning as well. We have seen that Jagannātha has also taken this line and elsewhere in a research paper we have indicated that Abhinavagupta in his Locana cites three views in such cases and is also inclined to favour this line of thinking.

Normally if the poet intends to convey non-contextual sense to deliver charm-camatkāra-in poetry, or when it is a case of obscene sense - ‘a-ślīla-artha’, there is scope for vyañjanā. But this is not so always. Hence, the regulators such as saṃyoga and the like, and similar other factors also should be accepted. This way even the supporters of vyañjanā also will have to accept vyañjanā in such cases only.

So, if there is abhidhā, it is very much there even with reference to the non-contextual-sense as well. If according to Mammata, abhidhā is a power yielding 'śakyārtha', then it is there with reference to the non-contextual - 'aprākaraṇika'-sense as well, for this aprākaraṇika sense is also derived through the word alone and not through any other means. If it is said that, "abhidhā is that function, which proceeds to deliver meaning in accordance with śakti-graha' i.e. convention, then can we say that when there is apprehension of non-contextual meaning, the 'agrḥita-śakti' meaning is not through abhidhā ?" The answer is that it is through abhidhā alone.

The objector may say that, giving directly a meaning through śakti is abhidhā. If the term 'sākṣāt' or 'direct' is not accepted, then lakṣaṇā also will be called abhidhā, for the indicated sense is arrived at by the vyavadhāna - intervention - of the expressed sense through the primary power. In the same way through factors such as 'context' or 'prakaraṇa', the meaning yielded by this factor will come first and after its intervention second meaning will be derived and thus here also it will not be a case of abhidhā. So, the objector feels that to avoid such a contingency, the term 'sākṣāttva' - directness has to be accepted. Thus if we describe abhidhā as 'sākṣāt pratipādatva' - conveying a meaning directly, - then only lakṣaṇā and also abhidhā with reference to the non-contextual sense, both will be negated. Thus, we have to accept that the non-contextual meaning is arrived at through vyañjanā or the power of suggestion alone.

To this Appayya says that the objection of the objector, as well as its refutation, both are uncalled for here. In fact by the adjective viz. "sākṣāttva", further difficulty will be created. The definition viz. "tad-viśaya-śaktigrahaṃ apekṣya tat-pratipādanam abhidhā" - is sufficient even in the absence of the term, "sākṣāttva". For, there will be gaurava-doṣa in taking this term viz. 'sākṣāttva', in such cases as when there is 'padāntara-viśeṣa' accepted due to 'pada-viśeṣa' or 'pada-bhaṅga', especially when no obstruction i.e. vyavadhāna is caused in form of apprehension of another meaning. On the other hand, by accepting this viśeṣaṇa i.e. 'sākṣāttva', there will be a-vyāpti-doṣa in illustrations such as "yena dhvasta-manobhavana" etc., for here the contextual meaning is with reference to Viṣṇu and the non-contextual meaning is with reference to Śiva. The words used in this verse are obviously expressive of the meaning with reference to Lord Śiva. The apprehension to this effect is also faster, though the meaning with reference to Lord Śiva is non-contextual. The viṣṇu-paraka meaning, though contextual, is arrived at in an asphuṭa - indirect-way. The terms such as "śaśimacchirohara" and "andhaka-kṣaya-

kara”, which make for the apprehension of meaning with reference to Viṣṇu, are charged with defects such as ‘a-prayuktatva’, and ‘nihatārthatva’. So, when these words are ‘a-prasiddha’ with reference to meaning connected with Viṣṇu, this meaning is derived late - So, if we accept abhidhā with reference to the contextual meaning connected with Viṣṇu here, due to its lateness, the adjective viz. ‘sākṣāttva’ will be out of tune here, and the definition of abhidhā will therefore tend to be too narrow i.e. ‘a-vyāpta’.

Take the case of a particular ‘pada’ i.e. word. Now, looking at the context, there may be a meaning which is contextual and another meaning which is non-contextual. But here, it may happen that a particular meaning which is non-contextual for the present, may actually be more current in daily affairs. So, this meaning will flash first in the mind and therefore it will be arrived at by abhidhā. The contextual meaning which is less current will be the subject of vyañjanā. It is exactly for such a case, that the ālamkārikas have accepted the blemish called ‘nihatārtha’ when a word having more than one sense is used in a non-current sense. Now, if through prakaraṇa or context, a non-current meaning is also accepted, then there will not remain any reason to accept ‘nihatārtha doṣa’ whatsoever. So, this amounts to the fact, observes Appayya that, whether the more current meaning is contextual or otherwise, its apprehension always comes first, and this fact has to be accepted. Again there will be ‘vyavadhāna’ i.e. obstruction by the first apprehension of the more current but non-contextual sense in the apprehension of less-current contextual sense. Thus, the adjective “sākṣāttva” does not stand a chance of being fitted in the definition of abhidhā.

So, for Appayya, the real reason of vṛtti-bheda, i.e. difference in function, lies in dharma-bheda i.e. difference in the fact of the proximity or otherwise of the words that are useful in giving a meaning. The idea is that we either get abhidhā or lakṣaṇā depending on the fact of there being proximity or otherwise which is of the form of usage due to sequence of words having multiple sense in a single statement. We cannot decide upon the difference in vṛtti or function without taking into account the above factor. The net conclusion is that we will accept abhidhā where padas, which are śabda-viśiṣṭa are present and are in proximity. Here the apprehension of meaning could be either direct or indirect i.e. vyavahita. Where there is proximity of such words that are śabdārtha-sambandha-viśiṣṭa, we have to accept lakṣaṇā. So, the definition of abhidhā viz. “tad-viṣayaka-śakti-graḥaṇaṁ apekṣya, tat-pratipādayatvaṁ abhidhā” is the right definition, and thus even the non-contextual meaning also will be collected by abhidhā.

According to the Naiyāyikas, 'prakaraṇa' i.e. context and the like are not the limiting factors of abhidhā, because even in their absence, due to the strength of currency (i.e. prasiddhi), the non-contextual meaning is also apprehended and in the absence of the said 'prasiddhi' i.e. currency, even the contextual meaning is also not remembered. Thus only the expertness (paṭutā) of the saṃskāras i.e. impressions of the śakti-graha or convention, is the sole limiting factor of abhidhā. We have to accept, however, this much that 'saṃyoga' and the like, also help the cause of apprehending the meaning, only in form of 'līnga' or mark.

Thus, Appayya concludes that the presence or otherwise of 'prakaraṇa'di' i.e. context and the like, can not be the limiting factors - 'niyāmaka' - of abhidhā. So, when both contextual and non-contextual meanings are present, the apprehension of the expressed sense is solely due to abhidhā. - "tasmāt prastutāprastutobhayapare'pi prastutāprastutobhaya-vācyārthe abhidhā eva." - (pp. 43, ibid). In both the cases, whatever sense is conveyed through words, with the help of expectancy - ākāṅkṣā etc., we arrive at the apprehension of sentence-sense, be they contextual or otherwise. Vyañjanā should be accepted for the apprehension of word-sense or sentence-sense, only in case of non-contextual subject. Dixita is very clear here that when the ancients accept vyañjanā in illustrations such as, "asau udayaṃ ārūḍhaḥ..." etc. it is only with reference to the figure 'upamā' which is suggested by comparison of the contextual and non-contextual matter.

Now, the problem arises that what shall we do about śabda-śakti-mūla-vastu-dhvani ? There is no suggestion of any figure of speech here. Only the non-contextual meaning is accepted as vastu-dhvani or suggested idea, or matter. So, if this is the position, then shall we have to totally let go śabda-śakti-mūla-vastu-dhvani, where according to Dixita, even the non-contextual meaning is collected through abhidhā alone ? Appayya's answer to this is that even here, both the non-contextual and contextual senses are arrived at through abhidhā alone, but after that some implied fact - anabhidheya vastu - flashes forth which becomes the subject of dhvani, e.g. in the verse, "śaniḥ aśaniś ca..." etc. For Dixita, Mammata's observation that the verse, "bhramiṃ aratiṃ..." etc. is an illustration of śabda-śakti mūla-dhvani is not sound. It is only 'praudhivāda' i.e. bold assertion. In reality, even in that illustration, the non-contextual meaning is arrived at through abhidhā alone. Thus through a sound scientific discussion Appayya has widened the scope of abhidhā so as to cover even a non-contextual sense also, and this is accepted by Jagannātha also.

We have seen above, when we took up the discussion of the views of Jagannātha who for us is a mahā siddhāntī that Appayya's all the three definitions

of the three varieties of abhidhā are ably challenged and refuted by Jagannātha. (pp. 442, onwards)

Dr. Prof. Bhagavatiprasad Pandya (Ahmedabad) who worked on Appayya Dixita for his doctoral thesis ("Appayya Dixita, Kavi ane Ālamkārika" (in Gujarati), pub. Gujarat University, Ahmedabad, '74), under the supervision of our great alamkāra-guru Prof. R. B. Athavale who has produced in three volumes, - including the first volume comprising of the bio-data of Jagannātha and the critical appreciation of the R.G. in both Marathi and Gujarati, - has tried to defend Appaya's observations on abhidhā against J.'s attack. The substance of the defence is as under. (Ref. pp. 196, ibid) - Jagannātha had pointed out the blemish, called ātmāśraya or asaṅgati in Appayya's definition. But Appayya's observation can be defended if we explain his definition as below. We have to take the meaning of the term 'śaktyā' in Appayya's definition as "śakti of saṅketa". If śakti called abhidhā takes the help of this saṅketa-śakti then only a special meaning can be directly apprehended from a special word; and not otherwise. So, if by 'śaktyā' we mean 'saṅketa-śaktyā' then the blemish of ātmāśraya or asaṅgati as pointed out by Jagannātha will have no chance ! Thus, no 'sva-skandhā'rohaṇa' will take place. Of course, there is verbal gimmick in this defence, but then it does not cease to be convincing either.

Dr. Pandya has tried to defend Appayya in one more context also (pp. 199, ibid). He observes that Jagannātha has enumerated a fourth variety of a word such as "yaugika rūḍha", which is not directly mentioned by Appayya. But then the latter, could have accommodated it under either 'rūḍha' or 'yaugika' variety. Jagannātha has given the word 'aśvagandhā' as an illustration. Appayya has also cited a word such as 'niśānta' which means gṛha or house as its rūḍha meaning and which has the sense of 'end of night' as its yaugika sense. But he has not called it 'yaugika-rūḍha' by name, for here both the meanings are not simultaneously apprehended. Thus, Dr. Pandya argues that eventhough Appayya knows the fourth variety of 'yaugika, rūḍha' he did not enumerate it for want of justification. One and the same word, say, 'niśānta' here or 'aśvagandhā' there, can be taken either as rūḍha or yaugika as the context permits, and because both the meanings are not simultaneously apprehended no fourth variety should be considered. This is how Dr. Pandya justifies Appayya's three-fold scheme. We may not find it that convincing.

Thus we have tried to sketch the full graph of 'abhidhā'. We have seen how the original concept was inherited from the śāstras such as the Vyākaraṇa, Mīmāṃsā, and Nyāya. We have seen how various disciplines tried to fix 'saṅketa' at various

places and how ultimately the ālaṃkārikas opted for the four-fold convention with reference to the attributes such as jāti, or class, guṇa or quality etc. Thus the ālaṃkārikas followed the dictates as laid down by the grammarians. We also saw how Ānandavardhana and then Abhinavagupta, followed by the whole kashmir school of ālaṃkārikas beginning with Mammata down to Jagannātha tried to evolve the nature and scope of abhidhā and portrayed it as distinct from either gaṇī and lakṣaṇā on one side, or vyañjanā on the other. But we also observed in between how some successors of Ānandavardhana such as Mukula, Kuntaka, Bhoja, Mahimā and Dhanañjaya tried to evolve a wider concept of abhidhā so as to include lakṣaṇā, and/or even vyañjanā in its fold. All this makes a very interesting reading which is a glorious chapter not only in semantics as discussed in India but also in the subject as expounded even in the west, even to-day.



Chapter VI

“Tātparya”

General Introduction :

Some thinkers feel that through abhidhā we arrive at the primary meaning of a word. Thus abhidhā is a word-power, a śabda-śakti. It is capable of yielding individual meaning of an individual word or ‘pada’. But this abhidhā power can not give us the sentence-sense which is of the form of correlated meaning of all individual word-meanings in a given sentence. The sentence-sense is thus a total sense as against individual word-sense derived from words that are independent units having individual meaning not related to each other. So, according to these thinkers to arrive at this total sense of a statement, i.e. ‘vākyārtha’ a separate function - vṛtti or śakti of the sentence-unit has to be considered. This is named as tātparya-śakti or vākya-śakti, purport, which is supposed to deliver the sentence-sense, which is a correlated sense of individual words that give individual meanings - i.e. padārtha-through abhidhā or vācaka-śakti which is thus a pada-śakti. The tātparya-vṛtti, which is supposed to be a vākya-vṛtti thus gives the total meaning of a given statement and some thinkers suggest that it not merely a sum total of individual padas only, not just a ‘samudāya’ of ‘padārthas’, but is something special-*viśiṣṭa*-over and above that. We will examine the concept of tātparya first in its historical context, i.e. how its separate recognition evolved in the thinking of various schools of thought such as the Vaiyākaraṇas, Mīmāṃsakas, Naiyāyikas etc. and then how this topic was handled by the ālamkārikas.

It is clear by now that tātparya śakti is supposed to be that power which assimilates the sense given by abhidhā and renders a new meaning-abhinavārtha -, which is not just the assimilation of vācyārtha, i.e. not ‘yoga-mātra’, but is something unique - “a-padārtho’pi vākyārthaḥ” as Mammaṭa explains later. The Dhvanivādins have termed it as “tātparya-vṛtti”. We will go to see that in this

observation of the Dhvanivādins, we may be able to read the influence of the abhihitānvaya-vāda of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa. It may be noted at the outset that, though Kumārila recommends a separate function for sentence-sense i.e. vākyārtha, as something different from and independent of abhidhā, which is a word-power, we do not get the clear mentioning of 'tātparya-vṛtti' by name, in the Mīmāṃsā works till we come to Mīmāṃsā-Kaustubha of Khaṇḍadeva in the 13th or 14th Cen. A.D. (Ref. Dr. K. Kunjunni Raja)

Vākya-; its import : First, we will discuss the nature of a sentence or vākya and then its import. (courtesy, Dr. K. Kunjunni Raja)

The sole purpose of the use of language is expression of thoughts, which is carried out best through the medium of sentence as such and not just by means of individual words. So a sentence is the real unit of significant speech. An idea resting in mind becomes definite only when expressed in form of a sentence. Thought in language will therefore mean that a man does not think in isolated words but in a coherent combination of words, called sentence, in order to give consistency and relevancy to his very mode of thinking. The Naiyāyikas have drawn our attention to this important linguistic fact, when they deal with the nature of logical propositions. A logical proposition is, to all appearance, a sentence i.e. a combination of words connected together by mutual relation. Jagadīśa explains that the so-called verbal cognition i.e. śābda-bodha is derivable only from a sentence, that is to say, when a number of significant words - (sārthaka) having expectancy ākāṅkṣā, and compatibility - yogyatā-with one another are related so as to constitute a sentence in the logical sense of the term :

“vākyabhāvaṃ avāptasya
sārthakasyāvbodhanāḥ
saṃpadyate śābda-bodho
na tanmātrasya bodhataḥ.” - (ś. ś. pra. 32)

So, a logical proposition as an idea or judgement is expressed in form of a sentence. However, it should be carefully noted that the meaning of a sentence which follows from it as a whole, should be distinguished from that of its constituent parts. Jagadīśa notes that verbal cognition or śābda-bodha is not materially the same as śābdārtha or the meaning of isolated words. The meaning of a sentence is something more than the mere sum total of the significations of component parts - 'vilakṣaṇo bodhaḥ' - (ś. ś. pra. 32)

Vākya; definition - Before we discuss various views as per the import of a sentence, we will first try to understand the definition of a sentence. Patañjali is of the opinion that action - ākhyāta-along with the help of all or each of the following viz. an indeclinable, i.e. avyaya, kāraka and viśeṣaṇa or adjective makes for a sentence : “āhyātaṃ śā-vyaya-kāraka-viśeṣaṇaṃ vākyaṃ.” - M. bh. II. i. 9 - He observes - (pp. 367 Edn. Keilhorn, Vol. I. '62, third Edn. Abhyankar) - ākhyātaṃ śāvyayaṃ sa-kārakaṃ sa-kāraka-viśeṣaṇaṃ vākya-samjñam bhavati iti vaktavyam. śāvyayaṃ, uccaiḥ paṭhati, nīcaiḥ paṭhati. sa-kārakaṃ odanaṃ pacati. sa-kāraka-viśeṣaṇaṃ-odanaṃ mṛdu-viśadaṃ pacati. sa-kriyāviśeṣaṇaṃ ceti vaktavyam. suṣṭhu pacati duṣṭhu pacati.” etc. - A kriyāviśeṣaṇa i.e. an adverb is also included herein - sa-kriyāviśeṣaṇaṃ ca (ibid, pp. 367). Just action, aided by a viśeṣaṇa alone can also make for a sentence - ākhyātaṃ sa-viśeṣaṇaṃ. At times a sentence is of the nature of an action alone - “ekatiṇ” (mbh. II. i. i., pp. 367). The grammarians hold that the pada-padāmśa aspect of a vākya is ultimately illusory; they accept the sentence-whole as a single unit and give us the concept of vākya-sphoṭa. See Puṇyarāja on V.P. - “tad asmān manyāmahe padāni asatyāni ekaṃ abhinnaśvabhāvakaṃ vākyaṃ. tad abudha-bodhanāya pada-vibhāgaḥ kalpitaḥ iti. -

For the Naiyāyikas, a sentence is a collection of words having expectancy :

“mithaḥ sā”kāṅkṣa-śabdasya
vyūho vākyaṃ caturvidham.” ś. ś pra. 13

We know that later, ālaṃkārika Viśvanātha defines sentence as collection of words having expectancy, compatibility and proximity -

“vākyaṃ syāt yogyatā”kāṅkṣā”sattiyuktaḥ
padoccayaḥ.” S.D. II. i. ab. -

We will discuss the views of the ālaṃkārikas later.

In the vedas we come across only consolidated sentences i.e. sentences which are supposed to have been originally undivided into parts. The Taittirīya Saṃhitā supports this - “vāg vai parācī avyākṛtā.” The grammatical method of analysis is a later development in the history of language. This view is strengthened by the definition of saṃhitā or emphonic combination of letters as we find in the Ṛk-prātiśākhya : “padaṃ prakṛtiḥ saṃhitā.” It is said that the saṃhitā or the close combination of letters such as, “agnim īle” - is what represents the original form and the practice of breaking it up i.e. into ‘agnim’ and “īle”, shows only a grammatical process followed in a much later period. The dictum - ‘pada-prakṛtiḥ saṃhitā’ gave rise to a great controversy. The Mīmāṃsakas i.e. the padavādins, and the Vaiyākaraṇas or Vākya-vādins have explained it in different ways. The Padavādins take padas as real and

significant and for them the sentence is only a combination of such padas i.e. inflected words. They explain the compound 'pada-prakṛtiḥ' as 'padāni prakṛtiḥ yasyāḥ' i.e. saṃhitā which has 'padas as its 'original nature', and thus they try to prove the priority or 'being a source' - prakṛitva - of the padas or words. The Vākya-vādins explain it as "padānām prakṛtiḥ" i.e. saṃhitā is the original source or original form of padas or words which have no real existence. Thus they take the sentence, or say, Vākya-sphoṭa to be the only significatory unit of speech. They simply reject the concept of the precedence or priority of the padas in preference to that of a sentence. It is difficult for us to say, which interpretation is more acceptable or which one was earlier. We may humbly add that if 'padas' have no real existence, how can a vākya—their prakṛti—have any existence at all ? We know that Durgācārya on Nirukta I. 17 observes : "saṃhitāyāḥ prakṛitvaṃ jyāyāḥ. mantrō saṃhitayaiva abhivyaajyate, na padaiḥ. ataś ca saṃhitāṃ eva pūrvam adhyāyanti anūcānā brāhmaṇā adhiyate cādhyetāraḥ. api ca yājñe karmani saṃhitayaiva viniyuujyante mantrāḥ na padaiḥ." Thus it is emphasized that the mantras, as they were revealed through the holy seers of yore, manifested themselves in the compact form of the saṃhitā or combination and not in form of isolated words. The teacher makes the student acquainted first with the vedas in their saṃhitā form before he is allowed to proceed in his study on a grammatical line. Again, at the time of performing vedic rites, the priest cites the mantra in their consolidated-saṃhitā-form only. Now, can we think of word and sentence absolutely divorced from the said ritual ? What about those who have a complete disregard for vedic saṃhitā and ritual ? Can we think of this topic independently of the ritual context ?

Grammarians : They attach much importance to vākya-sphoṭa as the really significant element of speech. Thus the sphoṭa-vādins are the same as vākya-vādins. The author of the Śabda-kaustubha says that of the eight varieties of sphoṭa, only vākya-sphoṭa is accepted to be real and significant : "yady api iha aṣṭau pakṣāḥ uktāḥ, tathā'pi vākya-sphoṭa-pakṣe tātparyam grantha-kṛtām" - (Śabda-kaustubha.) So, for the sphoṭa-vādin the sentence is an indivisible unit - akhaṇḍa - and analytical method of grammar that breaks up a sentence into parts is but an artificial device used for the understanding of unintelligent people. - The V.P. II. 240, observes -

“upāyāḥ śikṣamāṇānām
bālānām apalāpanāḥ,
asatye vartmani sthitvā
tataḥ satyam samīhate.”

(II. 238 (pp. 19 appendix) in word-index to V.P. - Saroja Bhate)

Puṇyārāja on V.P. II. 57 observes : “tasmān manyāmahe padāni asatyāni, ekaṃ abhinna-svabhāvakaṃ vākyam. tad abudha-bodhanāya pada-vibhāgaḥ kalpitaḥ.” Puṇyārāja also holds that this view is shared even by Pāṇini and Patañjali : “evaṃ sūtrakārasya bhāṣyakārasya ca akhaṇḍa-pakṣo’bhirucitaḥ.” - on V.P. II. 37. So, “padāni asatyāni vākyam eva satyam iti arthaḥ” notes Puṇyārāja on V.P. I. 174. Bhartṛhari establishes this view very emphatically. He uses such vedantic terms as upādhi or attribute, and adhyāsa or superimposition to explain the cognition of the diversity of words in the unity of a sentence. Puṇyārāja observes : “upādhibhedena eva bheda-pratibhāso, na svato nityatvāt.” on V.P. II. 228 See also : abhijanyarvaṃ adhyāsarūpatvaṃ āgataḥ śabdaḥ-Puṇyārāja on V.P. II. 129a. For Bhartṛhari the ‘akhaṇḍa’ is real, and the divisible - khaṇḍa is unreal i.e. a-satya. The grammarians enter into the investigation of the nature of words, but they reach the supreme truth : “asatye vartmani sthitvā tataḥ satyam samīhate.” (quoted as above). It is thus said as letters like vk, kh, etc. do not admit of further division into parts so there are no parts in a word, and words have no separate existence apart from a sentence :

“pade na varṇā vidyante
varṇeṣu avayavā iva,
vākyāt padānām atyantam
praviveko no kaścana.” - V.P. I. 173.

Again, just as we have recourse to an unnatural thing like the practice of analysing a word into stem (prakṛti) and affixes or formative elements (pratyaya), in the same way, we disjoin the words from the sentence in pursuance of the principle of ‘apoddhāra’ i.e. disintegration :

yathā pade vibhaksyante
prakṛti-pratyayā’dayaḥ,
apoddhāras tathā vākye
padānām upavarṇyate.” - V.P. II. 10.

It is also stated that the sense conveyed by a sentence is also indivisible : “vākyasya arthasya api tathaiva nirvibhāgatvaṃ pratipādayitum āha... Puṇyārāja on V.P. II. 10. Just as a word (śabda-sphoṭa) or a sentence does not really consist of any parts, so the meaning conveyed by it does not admit of any division :

“śabdasya na vibhāgōsti
kutórtasya bhaviṣyati ?
vibhāgaiḥ prakriyābhedaṃ
a-vidvān pratipadyate.” V.P. II. 13

What is emphasised here in particular by the Vākyavādin is that words which seem to enter into the composition of a sentence do not retain their separate identity, either in their formal or material aspect. The meaning of each individual word is found to lose itself almost entirely in the sense that is finally expressed by the sentence in its harmonious unity, e.g. the word 'Brahmaṇa' has no separate meaning in the expression Brāhmaṇa-kambala :

“brahmaṇārtho yathā nāsti
kaścid brāhmaṇa-kambale
devadattā”dayo vākye
rathaiva syur anarthakāḥ.” V.P. II. 14

Again we may beg to differ. If “brāhmaṇa” has no separate meaning in “brāhmaṇa-kambala”, then it should have an identical meaning with either a “vaiśya-kambala” or a “śūdra-kambala” etc. But this is not so.

What is Vākyārtha ? As to the nature of Vākyārtha we read different views (Ref. Dr. Kapil Dev Dwivedi; 'Artha-vijñāna', quoting Jayanta Bhaṭṭa. This again is quoted by Dr. Bholashanker Vyas). The views are -

- (i) The sense of a sentence is 'jñāna'.
- (ii) The vākyārtha is 'kriyā' or action, which is the most important element in a statement.
- (iii) The vākyārtha is 'phala' - result or fruit as we perform any action with a view to some 'phala'.
- (iv) The vākyārtha is 'puruṣa' (i.e. īśvara) for the 'phala' of an action is directed towards him.
- (v) The vākyārtha is 'bhāvanā' i.e. the activity or vyāpāra of the kartā, the doer, or agent, with reference to some desired object such as heaven/'svarga'.
- (vi) The vākyārtha is śabda-bhāvanā or vidhi.
- (vii) The vākyārtha is 'niyoga' or preraṇā.
- (viii) The vākyārtha is 'udyoga'.
- (ix) The vākyārtha is 'pratibhā'.

The Naiyāyikas hold phala to be the Vākyārtha while the Vaiyākaraṇas believe it to be pratibhā or intuition. We may assume that, as is normally the case elsewhere, in this respect also the ālamkārikas follow the lead of the Vaiyākaraṇas and accept 'pratibhā' to be 'vākyārtha'.

Thus for the grammarians the meaning expressed by a sentence is pratibhā or intuition, which is innate or ingrained in all of us : “tatra akhaṇḍa-pakṣe pratibhā vākyārthaḥ.” - observes Puṇyārāja on V.P. II. i. This pratibhā is inborn and not post-natal; it is neither a sense-born acquisition nor a result from common experience. It is termed as ‘saṃskāra’ or ‘bhāvanā’, firmly seated in our mind and linked together with the continuous currents of knowledge flowing from previous stages of existence. Thus it is termed as pūrvavāsanā also. The Vaiyākaraṇa has to take recourse to the theory of previous existence in order to explain the concept of ‘pratibhā’.

So, ultimately it comes to this that what a sentence really signifies is the sense abiding in intelligence (bauddhārthasya vācyatvam). Words may have different meanings and they may be taken individually, but when grouped together in a sentence, we have a single sense that is different from the padārthas or the meanings of isolated words. This kind of a sense derived from the whole is called pratibhā or intuition :

“viccheda-grahaṇérthhānām
pratibhā’nyaiva jāyate,
vākyārtha iti tāṃ āhuḥ
padārthair upapāditam.” V.P. II. 145

According to Puṇyārāja, the padārthas, unreal in themselves, help in the manifestation of pratibhā. : “padair asatyair eva upādhibhūtair upapāditām abhivyaktām iti.” - on V.P. II. 145. According to Bhartṛhari the first thing that pratibhā achieves is to bring about an association of the meanings which seem to be otherwise unconnected - ‘asaṃsrṣṭa’ - It is this objective (viśaya) that is directly conveyed by a sentence :

“upaśleṣaṃ iva arthhānām
sā karoti avicāritā,
sārva-rūpaṃ iva āpannā
viśayatvena vartate.” V.P. II. 147.

This pratibhā is directly manifested by the use of words or by the ever blossoming intellect which originates from the experience or memory of previous lives :

“sākṣāt śabdena janitām
bhāvanā’nugamena vā
iti kartavyatāyām tāṃ
na kaścīd ativartate.” V.P. II. 148

Pratibhā is the source of all popular usages, and serves as the most reliable evidence determining the ultimate reason for one's particular inclination (pravṛtti) :

“pramānatvena tāṃ lokāḥ
sarvaḥ samanupaśyati.” V.P. II. 149

It is seen in the human beings as well as in all creatures alike :

“samārambhāḥ pratīyante
tiraścāṃ api tādrśāt.” V.P. II. 14 cd.

The swan, the moment it comes out of its egg, begins to swim, the younger-one of a monkey clings to the branch of a tree and the newly born babe sucks its mother. Thus, the existence of pratibhā is self-certifying. It flashes upon a being as an intellectual heritage by the force of abhyāsa i.e. practice, experienced in the long chain of previous cycles of births : Puṇyarāja observes - “janmāntarābhyāsa-hetukā iyaṃ” - on V.P. II. 149. The cuckoo pours its music in the spring, the birds build their nests, and their simple mode of dancing, jumping, amusement, jealousy, and the very manner of their collecting food etc. are inborn with them, and all this is due to pratibhā, according to Bhartṛhari :

“svaraṇṭīm vikurute
madhau puṃskokilasya kaḥ,
jantv ādayaḥ kulāyā”di-
karaṇe kena śikṣitāḥ.” - II. 151,
āhāra-prīty-abhidveṣa-
plavanā”di-kriyāsu kaḥ,
jātyanvaya-prasiddhāsu
prayoktā mṛga-pakṣiṇām.” - II. 152

Thus, pratibhā actually means the same as instinct. Bhartṛhari concludes that the use of words rouses this innate intelligence : Puṇyarāja observes : -
“pratibhāyāś ca śabda eva mūlam iti āha.”

and also -

“bhāvanānugatād etad
āgamād eva jāyate,
āsatti-viprakarṣābhyām
āgamas tu viśiṣyate.” V.P. II. 53

This pratibhā again, is six-fold, as arising from nature, exercise, repeated practice, concentration of mind, actions done in previous lives and special efficiency or aptitude :

“svabhāva-ācaraṇa-abhyāsa-
yogāt dr̥ṣṭā upapāditā,
viśiṣṭopahitā ceti

pratibhām ṣaḍvidhām viduḥ.” V.P. II. 54

It is really difficult to define precisely a sentence. From the logical point of view, it is not merely a group of words as Jagadīśa remarks rightly. The words that constitute a sentence should be having ākāṅkṣā/expectancy, योग्यता/compatibility and āsatti or sannidhi i.e. proximity. These are indispensable for the making of a sentence. Proximity pertains to the formal closeness of words and has very little to do with meaning. Expectancy and Compatibility refer, on the other hand, to the logical aspect i.e. consistent correlation of meaning : The Laghumāñjuṣā (pp. 497) observes : “ayam arthóarthāntara-sākāṅkṣa iti vyavahārāt.” Āsatti or sannidhi implies the extreme proximity of words, without which the very idea of combination becomes impossible - The S.D. of Viśvanātha puts it in this way : (S.D. II. i. vṛtti) - “yogyatā padārthānām paraspara-saṁbandhe bādhābhāvaḥ. padoccayasya tad abhāvēpi vākyatve, ‘agninā’ siñcati” ity ādy api vākyam syāt. ākāṅkṣā pratīti-paryavasāna-virahaḥ. sa ca śrotur jijñāsārūpaḥ. nirākāṅkṣasya vākyatve, ‘gaur aśvaḥ puruṣo hasti’-ity ādīnām api vākyatvam syāt. āsattiḥ buddhyavacchedaḥ. buddhi-vicchede’pi vākyatve idānīm uccaritasya devadatta-śabdasya, dīnāntoccaritena gacchati iti padena saṅgatiḥ syāt. atra ākāṅkṣā-yogyatayor ātmārthadharmatve’pi padoccaya-dharmatvam upacārāt.” Thus, a mere combination, i.e. inconsistent group of words, whether subanta or tiṅanta, is not competent to be a sentence : “sup-tiñ-cayo naivam, ativyāptā”di doṣataḥ” - observes ś. ś. pra. pp. 13.

This is why Jagadīśa rejects the definition given by Amarasimha as ativyāpta and avyāpta or too-wide and too-narrow. There is some peculiarity in the logical conception of a sentence. Sometimes, a single inflected word (pada) is as good as a sentence. To the Naiyāyikas, the form ‘ghaṭam’ is as good as a sentence, as it conveys karmatva, or the status of being an object, pertaining to a pot : ‘ghaṭa-vṛtti-karmatva’. Thus, according to this view, ‘ghaṭam karoti’ should therefore be regarded as a mahāvākya or a compound-sentence.

Mīmāṃsakas : According to the Mīmāṃsakas, a sentence is a combination of words, with oneness of sense : “arthaikatvād ekaṁ vākyam, sākāṅkṣam ced

vibhāge syāt.” - Mī. Sū. II. 146 and also see SB. on Mī. Sū. II. 146 - “ekārthaḥ pada-samūhaḥ vākyam.” Here, oneness of sense is an important condition. It implies that a sentence in its synthetical form yields only one sense or a single idea, though on analysis it is found to be made up of words that are mutually expectant : V.P. II. 4 observes :

“sākāṅkṣāvayavaṃ bhede
parāṅkāṅkṣa-śabdakam,
karma-pradhānaṃ guṇavad
ekārthaṃ vākyam ucyate.”

A combination of words, though capable of being split up into many significant parts, is considered by the Mīmāṃsakas as a single sentence, provided it is found to express only one connected idea. Not only is there a formal combination, but the meanings too are related to one another in such a way to produce one coherent idea resulting from the association of the meanings. The dictum that a sentence signifies either difference or association does not render the oneness of the meaning inconsistent, because a sentence as a whole is generally used for the purpose of conveying an idea that is complete in itself. : See SB. on Mī. Sū. II. i. 45, - “bhedaḥ saṃsargo vā vākyārtha itī yad ucyate.” - The Mīmāṃsakas attach the greatest importance to the verbal form i.e. ‘kriyā-pada’ in a sentence. So, according to them, the verb ‘yajeta’ is the most predominant element in the sentence viz. ‘svargakāmo yajeta’, in as much as the force of the object of the whole sentence i.e. ‘attainment of heaven’, is particularly determined by the verb. ‘Apūrva’ or the unseen result, to which the action ultimately leads, is said to be conveyed by the verb and not by any other word in the sentence : Read SB. on Mī. Sū. II. i. 4, - “tasmāt tebhyaḥ pratiyeta aścitarvāt prayogasya.” and also, “apūrvasya ākhyātapada-pratipādyatvam”, and also - “bhāva-śabdā eva apūrvasya codakāḥ.” - SB. ibid.

Constitution of a sentence :

Different Views :

We come across a number of views with reference to the constitution of a sentence as noted down by Bhartṛhari in the V.P. Nearly eight views are counted by him.

“ākhyātaṃ-śabdasaṃghāto
jātiḥ saṃghāta-vartinī,
ekōnavayaḥ śabdaḥ

kramo buddhyanusamhṛtiḥ.
 padam ādyam, pṛthak,
 sarvampadam sā”kāṅkṣam (sāpekṣam) ity api,
 vākyam prati matir bhinnā
 bahudhā nyāyavādinām.” - V.P. II., 1-2, (nyāya-darśinām)

From the point of view of linguistic studies, the first view is of great importance. It is - “ākhyātaśabdo vākyam iti.” -

“ākhyātaśabde niyatam
 sādhanam yatra gamyate,
 tad apy ekam samāpti artham
 vākyam iti abhidhīyate.” - V.P. II. 327

It is said here that a verbal form - ākhyātaśabda is alone sufficient to constitute a sentence. This will remind us of the vārtika that defines a sentence as “tiṅ anta” or verbal form - eka tiṅ. The verb ‘varṣati’ may be used with the same significance as that expressed by “varṣati devo jalam”, - both the subject and object being understood from the very association of ideas. So, according to this view, the essence of a sentence is necessarily action i.e. ‘kriyā’. Puṇyarāja observes on V.P. II. 1, - “ākhyātaśabdo vākyam iti pakṣe, kriyā vāk्यārthaḥ.” The definition enunciated by the vārtika-kāra has also put emphasis on the predominance of the verb : Vārtika-9 on pā. II. i. i. reads : “ākhyātam sāvyaya-kāraka-viśeṣaṇam vākyam.” For Kātyāyana, a verb is efficient enough to constitute a sentence in combination with either an indeclinable, a kāraka, an adjective or an adverb, as the case may be, e.g. ‘uccaiḥ paṭhati’, where ‘uccaiḥ’ is an indeclinable, i.e. avyaya. In ‘odanam pacati’, ‘odanam’ is a kāraka, etc. Those who look upon indeclinables, cases (= kārakas), and adverbs, as virtually the same as qualifying adjuncts in relation to the verb, are likely to reduce the above definition to a much simpler form such as that a verb with its possible adjuncts is competent enough to make a sentence : “apara āha-ākhyātam sa-viśeṣaṇam iti eva. sarvāṇi hi etāni kriyā-viśeṣaṇam iti eva. sarvāṇi hi etāni kriyā-viśeṣaṇāni. - Mbn. on Vārtika 9, (cited as above). (pp. 367, Vol. I. The Vyākaraṇa Mahābhāṣya of Patañjali Edn. Keilhorn; third Edn. Abhyankar K.V. ‘62, Poona). The next vārtika says that a sentence is just ‘tiṅ-anta’ or ‘eka-tiṅ’. : “ekatiṅ vākya-samjñam bhavati iti vaktavyam. brūhi, brūhi” - (pp. 367, ibid). These two vārtikas lead to the assumption that a sentence should contain one and only one verb. But if there are more than one verb in a sentence, e.g. - ‘pūrvam snāti, pacati,

tato vrajati.’, we find it difficult to determine whether it is a single sentence or a number of sentences put together. The V.P. II. 6 observes :

“yathānekam api kvāntam
tiṅantasya viśeṣakam,
tathā tiṅ-antam tatrā”hus-
tiṅantasya viśeṣakam.” - (V.P. II. 6)

Following the second vārtika, we will find herein, at least three sentences as constituted by different verbs. But the śāstrakāra does not accept it. According to him ‘vrajati’ is the main verb with which the sense is completed and the rest are only subordinate to it, or are just qualifying attributes of the same-Puṇyarāja on V.P. II. 6 observes : “nāsti atra vākyabhedah, ‘vrajati’ iti etat prādhānyena ekam kriyāpadam atra sthitam anyāni kriyāntarāṇi tiṅ-viśeṣaṇāni eva., see also - “bahuṣvapi tiṅ-anteṣu, sākāṅkṣeṣu ekavākyatā.” V.P. II. 450.

For others, the full import of a sentence lies in the inflected word i.e. pada. Not only the verbal form as seen above, but also an inflected word is found capable of receiving the designation of a sentence, provided it is one that retains in itself the action usually denoted by a verbal root : V. P. II. 326 observes -

“vākyam tad api manyante
yatpadam carita-kriyam,
antareṇa kriyāśabdam
vāky āder dvitva-darśanāt.”

We find certain sentences in which, some words seem to be so predominant by their very nature, as to denote the entire meaning by themselves, without the help of others. The meaning of the sentence, “gāyako gāyati”, can be collected by a single word, “gāyakaḥ” the verbal form ‘gāyati’ being unnecessary. Only in such cases, a single inflected word is found to stand for the whole sentence, even independently of the verbal form. But, so far as the grammatical conception of a sentence is concerned, one can not just do away with ‘vyāpāra’ i.e. action. We can easily notice here that a sentence, whether consisting of a single word (i.e. either a nāma or an ākhyāta), or a combination of words, must be, as a rule, indicative of some action, either expressed directly, or understood. To the grammarian, a sentence without a verb is an impossibility.

The Naiyāyikas, however, have a different idea. Jagadīśa maintains that a sentence is a combination of mutually expectant and consistent words, but he does not put much emphasis on the inclusion of a verb. It is not necessary that the verb should be explicitly mentioned, especially when kriyā i.e. action is easily understood from the context. So, Jagadīśa rejects the notion of the grammarians that there can be no sentence, without a verb - Read Śa. śa. pra. on Kā. 13 - “kriyārahitaṃ na vākyam asti iti prācāṃ pravādo niryuktikatvāt a-śraddheyah.” - Jagadīśa bases his contention on popular usage, such as, “kuto bhavān ?”. This is an instance which is a combination of words having no verbal form and yet it is a perfect sentence. So, it is not correct to say, observes Jagadīśa, that a sentence without a verb is practically incomprehensible. For, the grammarian, herein also, a verb viz. “āgacchat”, is implied and without it neither the sense is complete nor is the proper kāraka (i.e. apādāna) determinable.

We have noticed that Bhartṛhari has referred to as many as eight different views on the constitution of a sentence. These views, generally speaking, fall under two distinct categories viz. akhaṇḍa-pakṣa and khaṇḍa-pakṣa. The sphoṭavādins, who take the sentence as an indivisible unit, support the akhaṇḍa-pakṣa, and the Mīmāṃsakas and Naiyāyikas, who take the sentence to be a combination of word-units, favour the latter view, i.e. khaṇḍa-pakṣa.

Prof. K. Kunjunni Raja (ref. Indian Theories of Meaning, Edn. '69) observes (pp. 6, 7, ibid) : “In Indian thought, we find two main approaches to the study of the problem of meaning; the ‘khaṇḍa-pakṣa’, and the ‘akhaṇḍa-pakṣa’, which are roughly analogous to the Association theory and the Gestalt theory in psychology. According to the Khaṇḍa-pakṣa, or the analytical method, a word is considered as an autonomous unit of thought and sense, and language studies are made on the basis of words, and the sentence is taken to be a concatenation of words. In the early stages of linguistic studies in India, as elsewhere, attention is found focused on individual words and their isolated meanings; the idea that an individual word possesses an individual word-meaning is generally current in all schools of Indian Philosophy in ancient times, and in the case of nouns the word is taken as a ‘name’ of the ‘thing’. Thus, the regular philosophic term for a ‘thing’ viz. ‘padārtha’ is literally ‘the meaning of a word, that which a word means.’ (J. Borough, ‘Some Indian Theories of Meaning’, TPS. 1953, p. 163) - The Sanskrit term ‘nāma-rūpa’ which stands for the world of things also suggests the view that objects can be comprehended by means of their names or their visible shapes, and that the name and shape constitute the essence of a

thing. The Nyāya-sūtras discuss the nature of the individual words only : The discussions about the factors necessary for the understanding of a sentence are found only in later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika works. Grammarians like Pāṇini, Kātyāyana and Patañjali are mainly concerned with the derivation of the correct forms of words; and Yāska and his followers deal with the etymological study of word-meanings. It is the Mīmāṃsā school that started a detailed study of sentences and developed elaborate canons of interpretation (Hence Mīmāṃsā is called the Vākyaśāstra. - ft. n. 1, pp. 7); but even this study was mainly on the basis of words and word-meanings, and consequently, the relationship between word and sentence, between word-meaning and sentence-meaning, remained a central problem."

We have observed above, that to the sphoṭavādin, sphoṭa represents the real word, i.e. the eternal word, sound being only a quality of it. Puṇyarāja observes : (on V.P. II. 1) - "sphoṭaḥ śabdaḥ, dhvaniḥ śabda-guṇaḥ, iti." Sphoṭa is two-fold, viz. external and internal - "sphoṭaś ca dvidvidhaḥ; bāhyaḥ ābhyantaraś ca" - observes Puṇyarāja on V.P. II. 1. The external sphoṭa admits of further division into class and individual : "bāhyōpi jāti-vyakti-bhedena dvidvidhaḥ." Those who support the indivisibility of a sentence, are likely to take a sentence as forming either a class - jāti-sphoṭa-pertaining to a combination-saṃghāta-vartinī-, or an individual-vyakti-sphoṭa-, that is to say that a sentence is one without parts - 'eko'navayavaḥ' - or an intellectual assimilation - "buddhy-anusamhṛtiḥ". Puṇyarāja on V.P. II. 1 observes : "tatra akhaṇḍapakṣe jātiḥ saṃghāta-vartinī, ekōnavayavaḥ śabdaḥ buddhy-anusamhṛtiḥ iti trīṇi lakṣaṇāni." These three definitions according to the sphoṭa-vādins are duly noticed and explained by Bhartrhari. According to sphoṭavāda, a sentence that is expressive of sense is one and not dissolvable into parts. - "evaṃ nir-aṃśaṃ eva vākyaṃ vācakam iti eva yuktam.", observes Puṇyarāja on V.P. II. 12. It represents either vyakti-sphoṭa or jātisphoṭa, i.e. an individual or a class, in so far as the outward manifestation of sphoṭa is concerned. The formal difference seen in these various types of sentences is said to be simply due to upādhi viz. the operation of vocal organs employed in production of sound and so on. - Puṇyarāja observes, on V.P. II. 19, : "yas tu pratibhāsaḥ sōśāv upādhi-kṛta eva ity arthaḥ." Sphoṭa has its internal aspect or vital side and in that it is not at all verbal but purely intellectual. The intellectual assimilation as showing the internal form of a sentence means that a sentence, so far as it is related to the *internal world of thought, remains essentially intellectual in its origin, before it is materialized into audible sound*. It is 'nāda' or 'sound', says Bhartrhari, that turns

such intellectually assimilated ideas into concrete expression of a sentence : V.P. II. 30 observes :

“yadantaḥ-śabda-tattvaṃ tu
bhāḡair ekaṃ prakāśitam,
taṃ āhur apare śabdaṃ
tasya vākye tathaikatām.”

For the khaṇḍa-pakṣa, a sentence is either an action, a kind of order, or succession, a collection of words, the first inflected word, i.e. pada, or inflected words i.e. padas having mutual expectancy with one another. For those who regard the sentence as a 'krama', the word 'krama' is used in the following way. Though usually the word 'krama' implies a property of time such as 'paurvyāparya' - i.e. priority and posteriority - 'krama hi dharmāḥ kālasya, tena vākyam na vidyate' - V.P. II. 51 - its particular use in grammar is explained by Bhartṛhari and Puṇyārāja as below. Every inflected word in a sentence has got some special significance as that of karmatva, kartṛtva, etc., which come to our notice in a successive or well-marked order, together with similar meanings (viśeṣa) conveyed by other words -

“santa eva viśeṣā ye
padārtheṣu vyavasthitāḥ,
te kramād anugamyante
na vākyam abhidhāyakam.” - V.P. II. 50.

For example, if we want to bring out the sense of a sentence like, 'devadatto grāmaṃ gacchati', in a strictly grammatical method, we are apt to express it in the following way - "the act of moving, which has devadatta as the agent, and the village as its object". Here, the idea of 'karmatva' which as a special feature to the meaning obtained severally from each inflected word, is called 'viśeṣa' that becomes comprehensible in a fixed or definite order - Read Puṇyārāja on V.P. II. 50 - "karmatvaṃ ity ādayo viśeṣāḥ santa eva padebhyaḥ krameṇa pratītebhyo'vagamyaṇa iti krama eva vākyam." This definite order is regarded as the main factor of a sentence. Again, it is stated that there can be no sentence made up of words alone, if it happens to be devoid of such an order : Puṇyārāja observes - "kramavyatirekeṇa śabdātmakam na vākyam abhidhāyakam asti iti ucyate." Thus, a sentence is intrinsically a particular order, in which words are combined together in such a way as to express an intended sense : Puṇyārāja, on V.P. II. 52, observes - "krama eva vākyam iti pada-kramo vākyam uktam."

These definitions of a sentence that are acceptable to the khaṇḍa-pakṣa, can be classified into two classes on the basis provided by the two well-known schools of the Mimāṃsā system viz. Bhaṭṭa (i.e. of Kumārila) and 'guru', (i.e. of Prabhākara Bhaṭṭa.) Kumārila and his followers uphold the 'abhihitānvaya-vāda', as against the 'anvitābhīdhāna-vāda' of Prabhākara and his supporters.

According to Kumārila, therefore, a sentence should be explained either as a combination of words (saṃghāta), or as an order-krama-, and according to Prabhākara, it is a verbal form (ākhyāta), or the first inflected word (ādyam padam), or inflected words possessing mutual expectancy - sarvapadam sākāṅksam - that make for a sentence. - Puṇyārāja or V.P. II. 1 observes : "atrā'pi saṃghātaḥ kramaḥ iti abhihitānvayapakṣe, sarvapadam sākāṅksam iti anvitābhīdhāna-pakṣe lakṣaṇa-trayaṃ iti vibhāgaḥ."

These two views, then, refer to the meaning expressed by a sentence. There is a great difference of opinion as to the meaning or the significance of a sentence. For the sphoṭavādin it is pratibhā, to one who defines vākya as a verbal form, it is action (kriyā), for the abhihitānvaya-vāda it is association-saṃsarga, meaning that a sentence acquires some special feature, or import (tātparyārtha) when it conveys the intended sense : See Puṇyārāja - "tatra akhaṇḍa-pakṣe triṣv api lakṣaṇeṣu pratibhā vākyaṛthaḥ (on V.P. II. 1), - and also, "ākhyāta-śabdo vākyaṃ iti asmin pakṣe kriyā vākyaṛthaḥ, (on V.P. II. 1), "saṃghāta-pakṣe kramapakṣe ca saṃsargo vākyaṛthaḥ" (on V.P. II. 1) - and also read, "padānāṃ parasparānvaye padārthavaśād ādhikyaṃ saṃsargaḥ sa vākyaṛthaḥ. (on V.P. II. 41) and also read V.P. II. 42 -

"saṃbandhe sati yat tu anyat
ādhikyaṃ upajāyate,
vākyaṛthaṃ eva taṃ prāhur
aneka-pada-saṃśrayam."

It means that when the meanings of different words in a sentence are correlated with one another, there arises invariably some additional significance, distinct from those of the constituents. Thus, the sense that evolves out of such 'anvaya' or correlation of meaning is something more than a mere sum-total of them : Mammāta explains - (K.P. II. 7) - "padānāṃ samanvaye tātparyārtho viśeṣavapur apadārthōpi vākyaṛthaḥ samullasati iti abhihitānvayavādināṃ matam. - Jagadīśa calls it, "vilakṣaṇo bodhaḥ" i.e. special significance that results from the correlation of meanings. For the anvitābhīdhānavādin, on the other hand, the

meaning of a sentence is for all purposes the same as signified by its component parts : “padārtha eva vākyārthaḥ” - observes Puṇyārāja., see also - “vācya eva vākyārthaḥ iti anvītābhīdhānavādinah” - K.P. II. 27, vṛtti. - Thus the import or the tātparyārtha of the anvītābhīdhānavādins is nothing more than the meaning given by individual words themselves” - pūrvam ete yo vākyārthaḥ sa vācyaṅtargata eva ity arthaḥ” - Puṇyārāja.

As to what forms the ‘Nimitta’ of the vākyārtha, there are different views. Vācaspati Mishra in the Tattvabindu refers to these views and establishes the Bhāṭṭa view as siddhānta. The views as recorded in the Tattvabindu are as below :

(i) According to the sphaṭavādin the nimitta of the vākyārtha is akhaṇḍavākya, the pada-varṇa-vibhāga being only the result of avidya :

“anavagataṃ eva vākyaṃ anādy avidyopadarśita-alīka-pada vibhāgasya nimittaṃ iti kecit. Tattvabindu, pp. 6.

(ii) According to some Mīmāṃsakas and Naiyāyikas, the nimitta for the vākyārtha is the knowledge of that last letter, which is accompanied by the saṃskāras or impression of the experience of the meaning of the preceeding padas - “pāramārthika-pūrvapūrvapada-padārtha-anujanita-saṃskāra-sahitaṃ antya varṇa-vijñānaṃ iti eke.” - Tattvabindu pp. 6.

(iii) According to some other Mīmāṃsakas, it is the varṇa-mālā i.e. series of letters, that is reflected in the mirror of memory, accompanied by the expression or ‘anubhava-bhāvanā’ or ‘tat-tad pada-padārtha’, = those words and those letters - which is the nimitta. - “pratyeka-varṇa-pada-padārthā-nubhava-bhāvitā-bhāvanā-nicaya-labdha-janma-smṛti- darpaṇā”rūḍhā varṇamālā iti anye.” - Tattvabindu, pp. 6.

(iv) or, Vākyārtha is just the expressed meaning - abhidheyārtha -, of the words correlated with other words on account of expectancy, compatibility and proximity. Thus anvīta i.e. correlated pada or words make for the expression of vākyārtha. This is according to Prabhākara - “padaḥ eva samabhivyāhāravadbhīḥ abhihitāḥ svārthāḥ ākāṅkṣa-yogyatā-āsatti-sadhrīcinā vākyārtha-dhī-hetavaḥ ity- ācāryāḥ.” - Tattvabindu, pp. 8.

(v) The padārtha, which is accompanied by ākāṅkṣā, yogyatā and sannidhi, and expressed by the words used, makes for vākyārtha. Thus, first of all the padas give padārthas and then with the help of ākāṅkṣā, yogyatā, etc., they give vākyārtha. This is the anvītābhīdhānavāda of Kumārila. Vācaspati Miśra also accepts this view. On this abhihitānvayavāda is based the Tātparya Vṛtti.

Vācaspati takes up other views for further consideration and refutation. The first view is held by the sphoṭavādin, who holds that, if it be held that the varṇas or letters in the 'vyasta' form make for the vākyārtha, then the other letters become redundant - "sa na tāvat pratyekam, anupalambha-virodhāt, varṇāntaroccārāṇa-ānarthakya-prasaṅgāt" - Tattvabindu, pp. 25, ibid. If it is held that all the letters i.e. samastavarṇas make for the vākyārtha, then again, there are two alternate possibilities viz. (a) do you consider this correlation - samūha - as genuine or 'vāstavika' or (b) artificial - i.e. aupādhika ? - "nā'pi militāḥ, tathābhāv-ābhāvāt. tathā hi vāstavo vā samūha eteṣāṃ āśrīyate, anubhavopādhiko vā ? - (Tattvabindu, pp. 25). The idea is that whether the varṇas i.e. letters are naturally - vastutaḥ i.e. genuinely, correlated to one-another or not, we have the experience that they are correlated and thus as they are thus accompanied by the experience of the hearer they become related. But as the varṇas are nitya and vibhu, they cannot be correlated to one another as we have the experience of these letters gathered at different times, the experience also cannot be correlated. - "tatra sarveṣāṃ eva varṇānāṃ nityatayā vibhutayā ca vāstavī saṃgatir iti prasaṅgini keṣāṃ cid eva pada-vākyabhāvaṃ na upapādayitum arhati. anubhūyamānā nava-navānubhava-sāriṇī tat paryāyeṇa paryāyavatī na samūhabhāg bhavati. na khalu eka-deśa kālā'nvacchinnā samūhavanto bhavanti bhāvāḥ, atiprasaṅgāt." pp. 25, ibid -

The sphoṭavādin also refutes the view of those who held the view, that 'pūrva-pūrva-saṃskārayukta antimavarṇa' makes for the vākyārtha. The sphoṭavādin asks as to what do the varṇavādin's mean by the word 'saṃskāra' or 'impression'. It is either the smṛtibīja or something like the purification of rice etc. by chaffing etc. - "ko nu khalu ayaṃ-saṃskārōbhimateḥ, āyuṣmateḥ ? kim smṛti-bijaṃ anyo vā prokṣaṇā" dibhya iva vṛhi ādeḥ ?" pp. 25, ibid. - Certainly the second alternative is not meant here. So, here the saṃskāra stands for smṛti-bīja. But smṛti itself being just a vāsanā or impression, which is of the form of power of the soul, the vākyārtha-pratīti thus becomes the result of not the saṃskāra but that of the power of the soul. Again, the sphoṭavādin says that even though we have identical letters in words such as nadī, dīna, sāra, rasā, etc., we have different meanings. So, letters in their akhaṇḍa form only, make for sense. Thus, akhaṇḍavākya should be accepted by the varṇavādin. - "tasmāt sva-siddhānta-vyāmohaṃ apahāya abhyupeyatām anu-saṃhārabuddher ekapada-vākya-gocaratā." (pp. 35, ibid). The sphoṭavādin cites the illustration of the word 'gauḥ' and says that the experience of the word 'gauḥ' suggests that there is ekatā or oneness - and akhaṇḍatā-or wholeness in this word. For, if we take the different letters to be objects of our

experience, it runs contrary to our day to day experience : “gauḥ iti ekaṃ idaṃ padaṃ iti eka-padābhāsiniṃ dhir asti, laukika-parīkṣakāṇām.” (pp. 49, ibid). If it is argued by the varṇavādin that just as the individual soldiers make for the army, or just as individual trees make for the forest, similarly different varṇas make for a pada and thus ‘pada’ is aupādhika; to this we ask as to what is meant by this upādhi ? Upādhi or attribute can be two-fold viz. (i) eka-jñāna-viśayatā i.e. becoming the object of one and the same experience, or (ii) ekābhidheya-pratyaya-hetutā i.e. becoming the cause of the experience of one and the same bhāva. Now, if the upādhi is meant as (i), then we will have to accept the pada-jñāna even before varṇa-jñāna which goes against the varṇa-vādin; and if by upādhi is meant as (ii), then, there is ‘īteretara-āśraya-doṣa’. As artha-bhinnatā or difference in meaning - is the cause of the distinction between one pada and another, and as pada bhinnatā is gathered with the help of artha-bhinnatā, the fault of ‘īteretarā’śraya’ arises. Thus, the vākyārtha should be connected only with the akhaṇḍa-sphoṭa. This is the view of the sphoṭa-vādin which forms the pūrva-pakṣa or prima facie view in the Tattva-bindu.

After explaining the first view held by the Sphoṭavādin in detail, Vācaspati goes on refuting it. Vācaspati argues thus - Do the sphoṭavādins establish their view on the foundation of our (i) normal experience, or (ii) on the difference of senses of pada and vākya ? : “sa khalv ayaṃ eko vākyārtho vākyārtha-dhī-hetuḥ anubhavād vā vyavasthāyate, artha-dhī-bhedād vā anyathā anupapadyamānāt ?” pp. 9, ibid. - If the first alternative is accepted, then again two alternatives prop up therein according as - (a) you accept vākya to be avayavī, i.e. having avayavas or parts in form of padas, or (b) you do not accept any avayavas or parts with reference to the vākyārtha. Now (a) cannot be accepted as ‘pada’ is held to be ‘vibhu’ or all-pervasive even by the objector, and in that case, it is not possible to dream of an avayavī vākya which is ‘vibhu-tara’ or more pervasive, for the very concept of ‘vibhu-tara’ is illogical. : na tāvat pūrvaḥ kalpaḥ, avayavi-nyūna-parimāṇatvād avayavānām. parama-mahatām ca varṇānām tad anupapatteḥ.” (pp. 9, ibid) Again, the Naiyāyikas take śabda to be the quality of ākāśa, and quality or ‘guṇa’ is avibhājya, i.e. incapable of division, and it cannot be the ‘samavāyī-kāraṇa’ of anything else, it being always ‘dravya’ itself. Thus, padas cannot be the ‘aṅgas’ or factors of the vākyārtha : “gagana-guṇatve ca adravyatayā samavāyīkāraṇatva-abhāvena avayavabhāva-abhāvāt.” (pp. 10, ibid)

Now if you accept the second alternative, i.e. (b), viz. that there is no ‘avayava’ in a vākya, then it follows that the sentence as a whole makes for the

sense, and neither the 'varṇa', nor the 'pada', is important and therefore 'varṇa', or 'pada' has no independent existence in a language. Well, it will be true that only the sentence exists in a language, and that this akhaṇḍa pakṣa is manifested by 'dhvani', but all this is putting aside the reality, and is like the face reflected in a jewel, sword, or a mirror. Again, we ask that if the first dhvani reveals the sense, what would be the use of other dhvanis? Again, your 'antima-dhvani' also fails to reveal the sphoṭa fully. So, this sphoṭa and akhaṇḍa-vākya is a wrongly postulated hypothesis. The final dhvani reveals the sense only if it is aided by the impression of the preceding dhvanis. So, they cannot be held as useless. Just as a jeweller gives his opinion about a particular stone after looking at it repeatedly, in the same way, the hearer decides the vākyārtha, with the help of the final dhvani, aided by the impression of the preceding dhvanis. It is because of this, that we, the padavādins, accept the last letter, aided by the impression of the preceding letters, to be the cause of vāhyārtha : "pūrva-pūrva-abhivvyakti-saṃskāra-sacitra-uttara-uttara-abhivvyakti-krameṇa tu anyo dhvaniḥ sphuṭa-taraṃ viśiṣṭa-sphoṭa-vijñānaṃ ādhatte, iti na vaiyārthyam dvitīyā" di-dhvanīnām. nā'pi pūrveṣāṃ, tad abhāve tad-abhivvyakti-janita-saṃskāra-abhāvena anyasya dhvaner asahāyatayā vyakty-avabhāsa-vākyadhī-hetu-bhāva-abhāvāt." (pp. 20, ibid) -

The varṇa-vādin refutes the theory of sphoṭa, for according to him, for vākyārtha-grahaṇa i.e. collection of the sentence-sense, there is no necessity to postulate the hypothesis of sphoṭa. The varṇas i.e. letters themselves, used in a pada, make for artha-pratīti or apprehension of meaning. When they are in a particular order, say - 'saraḥ', they give a particular meaning, and when they are in a different order say - 'rasaḥ', they give a different meaning. Thus the pada gives a particular meaning with the help of 'krama'/sequence, nyūnātiriktatva, swara, vākya, śruti, smṛti, etc. If different letters of the same pada are produced by different people, we do not get the meaning. If I say, for example, 'sa' and you say, 'raḥ', we do not get the idea of 'saraḥ'. Thus, it is necessary that a pada should be pronounced by one and the same man, at one and the same time. Thus, 'eka-kartṛtva' is an important factor in arthānubhava, and is the jñāpaka-hetu of it. So, the vākyārtha-jñāna is the result of varṇa-samūha, and it is no use postulating the hypothesis of an 'an-avayava' vākya. : "tat siddham etad arthāpatter anumānasya vā nivṛttis tad-ekagocara-pada-vākyā-vasādhani itī sthitam na-anavayavam ekam vākyaṃ vākyārthasya bodhakam itī." (pp. 76, ibid)

It may be noted that Maṇḍana Miśra in his sphoṭa-siddhi finally establishes the sphoṭavāda in an admirable way after refuting the views of Kumārila and his supporters. We do not go into these details here.

Vācaspati then considers the second view held by some Mīmāṃsakas and Naiyāyikas. This view is slightly better according to him than the first view as there is no postulation of any adr̥ṣṭa like sphoṭa herein. This view takes letters and words to be the cause of vākyārtha-pratīti. We get some trace of this view in the Nyāyabhāṣya of Vātsyāyana. According to Vātsyāyana, when letters are spoken, the hearer listens to them. These letters are not correlated in form of words-padas and therefore the hearer first of all correlates them and through the agency of words, (= pada-vyavasāyena), and with the help of memory, he correlates different words also, and gathers thereby the sentence-sense, i.e. vākyārtha. : Read Vātsyāyana bhāṣya on Nyāya-sūtra III. 2.62 - “vākya-sthaleṣu khalu varṇeṣu uccaratsu tāvat śravaṇam bhavati śrutam varṇam ekaṁ anekam vā padabhāvena pratisandhate, pratisandhāya padam vyavasyati, pada-vyavasāyena smṛtvā padārtham pratipadyate, pada-samūha-pratisandhānāc ca vākyam vyavasyati, sambaddhānśca padārthān grhītvā vākyārtham pratipadyate.”

So, according to this view, we do not hear any sentence fully at a given moment. The speaker speaks letters one by one. As the letters perish immediately, (āśu-nāśitva) and in a moment (kṣaṇikatva), every first letter disappears when the next one is uttered. Thus when the sentence - whole is completed, the listener hears only the last letter at the moment. But he undoubtedly gathers the whole sentence. The solution to this situation is that even though the preceeding letter or letters die out the moment they are uttered, they leave behind them their impression in the minds of the listeners. With the hearing of the last letter, this impression comes up in form of memory and produces the sentence-sense, i.e. vākyārtha-dhī. - “sa khalu ayam antyo varṇaḥ pūrva-pūrva-varṇa-pada-padārtha-vijñāna-janita-vāsanā-nicaya-saciva- śravaṇendriya-samādhigata-janma-grahaṇa-smaraṇa-rūpa-sad-asad-varṇa-nirbhāsa-pratyaya-parivarti-pada-vākyārtha-dhī hetur upeyate.” (Tattvabindu, pp. 77, ibid)

The siddhāntin, viz. the Abhihitānvayavādin refutes the above view as below : Is it so that the last syllable explains the vākyārtha after causing the memory of the correlation of the meaning of itself and the vākyārtha ? Then, we say that when the mental impression exhibits its strength viz. the remembering of padārthas, the pada-pratyakṣa etc., at this moment, the cause viz. impression, does not exist. At the same time, when a listener remembers the correlation of pada and padārtha he

cannot clarify the position of the final syllable of a pada or vākya. So, the hearing of the last letter, accompanied by memory of the preceeding letter etc., cannot make for the vākya-dhī. : “na antya-varṇa-śrutiḥ, smṛtyā nītā vākyaṛtha-bodhini.” - pp. 76, ibid.

The third view is supposed to be held by some other Mīmāṃsakas. According to the commentator of the Tattva-bindu, this view is not held by any particular ācārya, but both this and the preceeding one are just placed as prima-facie views by Vācaspati Miśra. : “etat tu mata-dvayaṃ sambhāvanāmātreṇa upanyastam iti kecit.” - (Tattabindu ṭikā, Tattva-vibhāvanā, pp. 7) - According to some, this view is held by the earlier Mīmāṃsaka Upavarṣa, who is older than Śabara : “varṇā eva tu śabdā iti bhagavān upavarṣaḥ.” Mīmāṃsā bhāṣya, on I. i. 5, and also see, “gaur ity ayaṃ kaḥ śabdaḥ ? gakāra-aukāra-visarjanīyā iti bhagavān upavarṣaḥ” - yoga-sūtra-bhāṣya on III. 17. So according to Upavarṣa, ‘gauh’ is constituted of ‘g’, ‘au’ and ‘h’ i.e. visarga.

These varṇavādins hold that we gather the meaning of a word or a sentence in the same way in which it is used by the elderly people. Now, these elderly people, in their regular affairs, do not use single letters of words, but use sentence to convey meaning. But a sentence cannot be without parts (an-avayava). So, the sentence is just the correlation of letters - varṇa-samūha-left in memory. This varṇa-mālā or dhvanimālā is the cause and vākyaṛtha-dhī is the effect. The knowledge of pada-padārtha is held to be instrumental only - i.e. nimitta-mātra, while the vākyaṛtha-dhī follows genuinely from the varṇamālā or a group of letters or phonemes or syllables : Read Tattvabindu :

vṛddha-prayogā”dhināvadhāraṇo hi śabdārtha-sambandhaḥ. na ca padamātram vyavahārāṅgaṃ prayuñjate vṛddhāḥ, kimtu vākyam eva, tat ca anavayavaṃ nyāṣedhi iti. smṛtisamā”rūḍhā varṇamālā pariśiṣyate... naimittikaṃ vākyaṛthabodhaṃ ādhatte. pāramārthikas tu pada-rad-artha-bodho nimitta-mātreṇa avatiṣṭhate... tad eva vākyaṛthadhī-hetuḥ, iti. - Tattvabindu. pp. 83, 84, ibid.

also read,

“gauravād viṣayābhāvāt
tad-buddher eva bhāvataḥ,
vākyaṛtha-dhiyaṃ ādhatte
smṛtisthā nākṣarā”valiḥ.” - Tattvabindu, pp. 84.

The Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas do not accept this view. They find two faults with this viz. those of ‘gauravadoṣa’ and ‘viṣayābhāva-doṣa’. - “iti aṣṭānāṃ vākyaṇāṃ aṣṭau

śaktayaḥ kalpanīyāḥ tava iti kalpanā-gauravam. pada-vādinā tu saptānām saptaiva śakyate iti kalpanālāghavam. śuklām iti pada-prakṣepaṇena padavādinōṣṭānām padānām aṣṭau śaktaya iti. tava tu ṣoḍaśāparā iti mahad gauravam āpannam. (pp. 84, 85, ibid)

Another fault that is seen in this view is that of viśayābhāva. The varṇa-mālā in a vākya can cause vākyārthadhīḥ only when there is first padārtha-dhīḥ. Padārtha-jñāna is a must before vākyārtha-jñāna. It is only when the padārthas are correlated, that the vākyārtha flashes upon our mind. Thus, padārtha-jñāna is necessary before their correlation i.e. ‘anvaya’. In this case, how can we take varṇa-mālā as the cause of vākyārtha-dhī ? Again, when we listen to a sentence, we cannot remember the syllables of even five or six words in a sentence, then what to talk of a long sentence, full of many words ? - “api ca tri-catura-paṇca-pada vākya-vartinī-padārtha-pratyaya-vyavahitā’pi kleśena varṇamālā smaryeta api, tad-abhyadhika - padavati tu vākya sā ati-duṣkarā.” pp. 89, ibid - Thus, this (i.e. the third view) cannot be accepted.

The fourth view is the one held by Prabhākara and his followers, who are known as ‘anvitābhīdhānavādins’. For them, the words used in a sentence, on account of expectancy, compatibility and juxta-position, are first correlated and then they yield the vākyārtha, through the power called abhidhā. : “padāni ākāṅkṣitā”sanna-yogyatāntara-saṃgatān, svārthān abhidadhanti iha vākyaṃ vākyārtha-gocaram.” (pp. 90, ibid) The Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas or the abhihitānvaya-vādins object against this view. Their objections are as below - when the anvitābhīdhānavādin says that the abhidhā power of a word is able to convey its meaning as well as correlation i.e. anvaya, is it so that the vākyārtha is gathered through all the padārthas together or not ? If they (i.e. the anvitābhīdhānins) hold that all the words together do not convey the vākyārtha, then for them only the first word-pada-will convey the vākyārtha. So, the use of other padas becomes redundant as the vivakṣā i.e. intention of the speaker will be conveyed by just one word alone - “tatra anabhihita-svārthāntara-anvita-svārthābhīdhāne padād ekasmād eva uccaritād vivakṣā-pratīteḥ vaiyarthyaṃ itareṣāṃ.” (pp. 93, ibid)

Or, if it be said that other words also convey vākyārtha, then in the sentence, “hariḥ gām badhnāti”, wherein we get these words, the meaning of the action ‘badhnāti’ will not become clear until it is connected with ‘hariḥ’, the agent, and ‘gām’, the object. The same is the case with the other words. Thus, there arises the contingency of itaretara-āśraya. The illustration cited by Vācaspati Miśra is ‘ukhāyāṃ paced’.

Anvitābhīdhānavādin may argue as follows :

If we do not accept the anvitābhīdhānavāda, then, in that case, we will have to postulate two 'abhidhā-śaktis, viz. the one that conveys the sense of individual words, and the other that conveys the sense of the whole sentence, after correlating the word-sense. Again, there is no blemish in anvitābhīdhānavāda. Even though every word in a sentence with abhidhā-śakti conveys the correlated meaning, still the sense of the sentence is not gathered just by the first word alone. So, it should be held that a word, by abhidhā, conveys its own meaning and correlation, and not the meaning of other words. The anvitābhīdhānavādins again put the following question to the abhihitānvayavādins, viz. that when we get some knowledge from the words, what type of knowledge is it ? The śāstra speaks of four types of knowledge viz. pramāṇa, saṃśaya, viparyaya and smṛta. Now, artha-pratīti cannot be taken as a pramāṇa, because pramāṇa occurs only with reference to that which is already existent. Padārtha cannot be supposed to be exmstent before pada-śravaṇa i.e. learning of a word. Nor cen we take padārtha-jñāna as either saṃśaya or viparyaya i.e. mithyā-jñāha. As there is no fifth type of jñāna, we should take pedārtha-jñāna as smṛta only. - "na ca pañcamī vidhā samastīti smṛtiḥ pariśiṣyate" - (pp. 100, ibid) Thus, a pada depends on saṃskārōdbodha and they make for the smṛti in form of padārtha-jñāna.

The fifth view is held by abhihitānvayavādins or by Kumārila and his followers. According to them, the padas first convey their meaning separately, and then after getting correlated, they convey the vākyārtha.

Vācaspati Miśra in his Tattvabindu refutes Prabhākara's anvitābhīdhānavāda and establishes abhihitānvayavāda as the siddhānta. The siddhāntin i.e. anvitābhīdhānavādin says that unless a contrary evidence arises, usually, for any effect, we consider the immediately preceeding factor as the cause of it. - "evam tāvad autsargiko nyāyo yad asati balavad-bādhakopanipāte saha-kāriṇi kārye ca, pratyāsannam hi kāraṇam. sati tad-bhāva-bhāvite tathā cārtha-smṛtiḥ padāt." - (pp. 111, ibid). Whenever there is vākyārtha-jñāna, it is preceeded by padārtha-jñāna-smṛti, which should be then recognised as its cause. Again, this padārtha-smaraṇa alone is not sufficient for bringing about the sentence-sense, but their correlation is also important. Thus the smarāṇa of the padārthas in mind, qualified by ākāṅkṣā, yogyatā and sannidhi, makes for the vākyārtha-dhī. : "tad amūṣaṃ eva (mānasīnām) svārtha-smṛtīnām ākāṅkṣā-yogyatā-āsatti-sahakāriṇīnām kāraṇatvaṃ vakyārthapratyayam pratyadhvasyāmaḥ." (pp. 112, ibid) - Again, the

abhihitānvayavādin holds that the mental impression (= manovāsana) by itself does not create the smṛti or memory of the objects of experiences that were known or unknown earlier. It just makes for the remembrance of the padārthas of a given pada-samūha qualified by ākāṅkṣā, yogyatā, etc., Thus, padārtha-smṛti goes with (i.e. is shakṛtā) ākāṅkṣā”di, and thus only (i.e. ākāṅkṣā”di-traya-sahakṛta) makes for the knowledge of the vākyārtha.

As for the argument that if padārtha-jñāna is caused by smṛti, which is different from padas, then, in that case, it will not be capable of causing knowledge of the vākyārtha, for in case, if it is held capable of this, then we will have to accept this as the seventh pramāṇa over and above the six held by the Mīmāṃsā darśana, or the śabda-pramāṇa will have to be included in this novel pramāṇa, and this is not noticed by Śabara and others, who have not accepted padārtha as a separate pramāṇa because they have already mentioned āgama-pramāṇa which could have been only a sub-variety of the new padārtha-pramāṇa., - “nanu uktam na mānāntarānubhūtānām artha-rūpāṇām vākyārtha-dhī-prasava-sāmarthyam upalabdham, upalambhe vā saptama-pramāṇa-prasaṅgaḥ, āgamasya vā tatraiva antarbhāvaḥ. tad eva pratyakṣā”dibhiḥ saha tulya-kakṣyatayā upanyasaniyam, na tu āgamaḥ tadbhedah.” - (tattvabindu, pp. 120) - and also that if āgama-pramāṇa is a sub-variety of padārtha, then, padārtha should be mentioned along with other five pramāṇas, and this means casting aspersions on the scholarship and omniscience (i.e. vidvattā and sarvajñatva) of Bhagavān Bhāṣyakāra. Moreover, if we take padārtha-jñāna as the nimitta of vākyārtha-jñāna, then we will have to accept either three vṛttis or two such as (i) the first śakti that helps the pada to give its individual meanings and (ii) the second that causes its memory and (iii) the third that correlates, or at least the two that give padārtha-jñāna and vākyārtha-jñāna respectively, while on the part of the anvitābhīdhāna-vāda, only one śakti is required and thus there is no kalpanā-gaurava or the contingency of imagining many vṛttis : “tathā ca tisraḥ śaktayaḥ, dve vā. padānām hi tāvad artha-rūpābhīdhāna-rūpā śaktiḥ, tad artha-rūpāṇam anyonyānvaya-śaktiḥ, tad-ādhāna-śaktiś ca aparā padānām eva iti. smāraakatva-pakṣe tu uktam śakti-dvayam. anvitābhīdhāna-pakṣe tu padānām ekā eva śaktiḥ, tat kalpanālāghavāt - etad eva nyāyyam.” (pp. 123, ibid) -

Vācaspati gives the following reply : The abhihitānvayavādin holds that only one śakti as mentioned by the Prābhākaras cannot be connected with the anvaya or correlation. For thus, as anvaya or correlation is just one and identical with reference to different padas, we will have to accept the position in which all the

padas stand for one another as synonyms : “tanmātra-viṣaye tasya a-viśeṣāt sarva-śabdānāṃ paryāyatā-prasaṅgaḥ.” (pp. 123, ibid)

The abhihitānvayavāda again asks the following question to the anvitābhidhānā-vādin - viz. - ‘Is it so that a pada by its śakti conveys only the meaning as such (padārthasvarūpa) and not the correlation (anvaya) also, which makes for the vākyārtha-dhī ?, or, is it so that it conveys both its meaning and the correlation, both of which help to bring about the vākyārtha-dhī ? The knowledge of the correlation of one padārtha with another padārtha is born of some other pada, either known (i.e. spaṣṭa) or unknown (i.e. aspaṣṭa), and not by the padas themselves. Those who are learned in the vedas also hold this view, and according to them, kriyā or action, by abhidhā, cannot convey the kartā or agent. : “ananyalabhyaḥ śabdārthaḥ iti trividya-vṛddhāḥ. ata eva ākhyātā”dau karmā”dyabhidhāyitām nā”driyante.” (pp. 131, ibid).

Thus, the abhihitānvayavādin accepts another śakti, different from abhidhā. And it is termed as lakṣaṇā-śakti. For them in laukika and vaidic sentences, the vākyārthadhī is caused by lakṣaṇā. Vācaspati Miśra clarifies the stages which the śrotā i.e. listener has to pass through while going from hearing of a sentence i.e. vākya-śravaṇa to apprehension of sentence-sense - i.e. vākyārtha-jñāna. It is as follows - an individual listens to the sentences spoken by elderly people and thereby become conscious of activity i.e. pravṛtti or inactivity i.e. nivṛtti, joy or sorrow i.e. harṣa and śoka, etc. Thus, he records these sentences as the cause of pravṛtti or nivṛtti, etc. As the elderly person goes on using one word (i.e. pada) after another, he collects newer and newer meaning (i.e. an-upajāta), and this new i.e. an-upajāta meaning dawns upon the mind only after listening to some particular words (i.e. viśeṣa-pada) even though the words already spoken are very well there. This knowledge is only with reference to the padārtha alone and as such it can not make for pravṛtti/nivṛtti etc. But when the whole sentence sense is gathered, then only it causes pravṛtti, nivṛtti, etc. This viśiṣṭa artha goes with the whole sentence. The words used in vṛddha-vyavahāra have this conveying of the viśiṣṭa-artha i.e. specific sense, as its object, but by abhidhā they convey only the individual padārtha alone. Thus, as in the case of laukika vākyas i.e. sentences used in worldly context, so also in the case of the vaidika vākyas, the words convey the sentence-sense through lakṣaṇā alone : “tathā hi, vṛddha-prayukta-vākya-śravaṇa-samanantaram pravṛtti-harṣa-śoka-bhaya-sampratipatteḥ vyutpannasya vyutpitsu-tad-hetu-pratyayaṃ anumīyate. tasya satsu api anekeṣu anupajātasya pada-jāta-śravaṇa-samanantaram sambhavataḥ tad-hetubhāvam avadhārayati. na caiṣaḥ pratyayaḥ

padārtha-mātra-gocarah, pravṛttyādi-bhyaḥ kalpyate iti viśiṣṭārtha-gocarobhyupeyate, tad-viśiṣṭārthaparatā avasitā vṛddha-vyavahāre padānām... tasmāt lokānusāreṇa vaidikasya api pada-saṃdarbhasya viśiṣṭārtha-pratyaya-prayuktasya aviśiṣṭārthābhīdhānamātreṇa, lakṣaṇayā viśiṣṭārtha-gamakātvam.” - pp. 153, ibid.

It becomes quite clear that for the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsaka, the grasping of the meaning of a sentence i.e. the vākyārtha-grahāṇa, is achieved with the help of lakṣaṇā. Kumārila himself notes in his vārtika that - “vākyārtho lakṣyamāṇo hi sarvatraiveti naḥ sthitiḥ.”

Pārthasārathi Mishra in his ‘Nyāya-ratna-mālā’ refutes the anvitābhīdhānavāda and establishes that even though in a single sentence, we get many padas, still, with the help of ākāṅkṣā^{di} we gather the correlation between different padas” -

“sānnidhya pekṣā yogyatvaḥ

upalakṣaṇa lābhataḥ

ānanye’pyanvitānām syāt

saṃbandha-grahāṇam mama.” - Nyāya-ratna-mālā,

Vākyārtha-prakaraṇa, pp. 78

Neither the sentence, nor the words by themselves make for vākyārtha-dhī. First of all, from the pada-svarūpa we arrive at the padārtha through abhīdhā, and then vākyārtha becomes indicated i.e. lakṣita. : “tasmāt na vākyam, na padāni sāksāt vākyārtha-buddhiṃ janayanti, kintu, padārtha-rūpābhīhitaiḥ padārthaiḥ, saṃlakṣyate asau iti siddham etat.” - pp. 79. In a sentence, there are many words, but when there is vākyārtha-dhī, all the padārthas are united, just as all types of pigeons get together for picking up grains -

“vṛddhā yuvāṇaḥ śiśavaḥ kapotāḥ

khale yathā’mī yugapat patanti,

tathaiva sarve yugapat-padārthāḥ

parasparaṇānvayino bhavanti.” - pp. 79, ibid.

Vācaspati has made it quite clear that the power that correlates the word-senses in a sentence, is quite different from abhīdhā, and it is lakṣaṇā. But this lakṣaṇā is different from lakṣaṇā of the ālaṃkārikas and thus we come across at least four vṛttis viz. abhīdhā, lakṣaṇā, gaunī and padārthānvaya-śakti. In order to avoid the gaurava of recognising so many vṛttis, the padārthānvaya-śakti is also termed as lakṣaṇā. : “evam ca, na ced iyaṃ pada-vṛttir lakṣaṇā-lakṣaṇam anveti,

bhavatu tarhi caturthī, dṛṣṭatvāt. astu vā lakṣaṇā eva. - (Tattvabindu, pp. 157, ibid) - This lakṣaṇā or padārthānvaya-śakti is different from lakṣaṇā of the ālaṃkārikas and probably because of this, others might have named it differently as Tātparya śakti -

Ālaṃkārikas : As seen above some of the later Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas called it Tātparya vṛtti in order to distinguish it from lakṣaṇā as such. It is suggested by some scholars that probably the Mīmāṃsakas in kashmir followed this tradition which was mentioned by Abhinavagupta and Mammata. These two have also placed gaunī under lakṣaṇā though of course Hemacandra revives gaunī as an independent vṛtti. So, for the ālaṃkārikas of the kashmir school in general, following the lead of Abhinavagupta and Mammata, tātparya is an additional vṛtti, with vyañjanā as the fourth or turīyā vṛtti. Abhinavagupta observes : (Locana on Dhv. I. 4) : “tena samayāpekṣā vācyāvagamaṇaśaktir abhidhāśaktiḥ, tad anyathā-anupapatti-sahāyārthāvbodhanaśaktis tātparya-śaktiḥ, mukhyārtha bādhā”disahakaryapekṣārtha pratibhāsana-śaktis lakṣaṇā-śaktiḥ. tat-śakti-traya-upajanitārthā’vagama-mūla-jātātpratibhāsa-pavitrita-pratipatṛ-pratibhāsa-sahāyārtha dyotana-śaktir dhvanana-vyāpāraḥ, sa ca prāgvṛtitaṃ vyāpāratrayaṃ nyakkurvan pradhānabhūtaḥ kāvyā”tmā iti āśayena niśedha pramukhatayā ca prayojanaviśayo’pi niśedha-viśaya iti uktam.

Viśvanātha in his S.D. observes :

“tātparyākhyāṃ vṛttim āhuḥ
padārthānvayabodhane,
tātparyārthaṃ tad arthaṃ ca
vākyam tad-bōdhakam pare.” (II. 20, S.D.)

and also,

- abhidhāyāḥ ekaika-padārtha-bodhana-virāmād vākyārtha-rūpasya padārthānvayasya bodhikā tātparyaṃ nāma vṛttiḥ. tad arthaś ca tātparyārthaḥ. tad bodhakam ca vākyam iti abhihitānvayavādinām matam. - (vṛtti on II. 20)

and also, read K.P. II

- ākāṅkṣā-yogyatā-sannidhivaśād vakṣyamāṇa-svarūpānām samanvaye tātparyārtho viśeṣavapuḥ a-padārthōpi vākyārthaḥ samullasati iti abhinitānvayavādinām matam.

We will go to see in detail the nature of tātparya-vṛtti and its acceptance or otherwise by different ālaṃkārikas as below.

Before we proceed, it may be noted that both Abhinavagupta and Mammata also accept the view of the abhihitānvayavāda. This becomes clear when we read the Bālabodhinī of Jhalkikar on the K.P. of Mammata, (pp. 27), which reads as - “abhihitānvayavādinām iti bahuvacanena ayaṃ eva pakṣaḥ prāmāṇikaḥ (granthakṛt-sammataḥ) [na tv anvitābhidhānavādi-pakṣaḥ] iti sūcitam iti sarasvatitīrtha-kṛta-ṭīkāyām spaṣṭam. ata eva mūlakāro’sminnevollāse 31 sūtra-vṛttau, pañcamollāse vyañjanāsthāpanāvasare ca yathākramam vakṣyati. “te ca abhidhā-tātparya-lakṣaṇābhyo vyāpārāntareṇa gamyāḥ.” iti. “abhidhā-tātparya-lakṣaṇā”tmaka-vyāpāratrayātivarti dhvananā”di-paryāyo vyāpāro’napahnvaniya eva” iti ca. bahuvacana-nirdeśasya sva-sammatatva-pradarśana-paratvād eva caturthollāse 83 sūtra-vṛttau “iti śrīmad abhinavaguptā”cāryapādāḥ” ityanta-granthena upapādītasya abhinavaguptā”cārya-sammatapakṣasya ‘bahuvacana-śrīmad-pādā”cārya padaiḥ sva-sammatatvam uktam’ iti ṭīkākārāiḥ sarvaiḥ uktam iti dik.”

We will go to see that lateron, certain dhvanivādins rejected this tātparya-vṛtti and Vidyānātha in his Pratāparudrīya includes it in vyañjanā and mentions tātparyārtha as indential with vyaṅgyārtha. In the same way perhaps, the view viz. “so’yaṃ iṣoriva dīrgha-dīrghataro-bhidhā-vyāparaḥ...” etc. supposedly mentioned by Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa, considers tātparya-vṛtti as just a part of abhidhāvṛtti. Mahimā chooses to arrive at the so called tātparyārtha with the help of anumāna i.e. poetic inference. He does not recognise tātparyavṛtti in collecting the sense of ‘niṣedha’ from the sentence viz. “bhrama dhārmika... etc.” or niṣedha from the statement, viz. “viṣaṃ bhakṣaya, mā cā’sya grhe bhukthāḥ...” etc. For him, the niṣedhārtha or sense of negation does not fall in the province of śābda-bodha or verbal cognition, but is gathered by the process of anumiti where the vācyārtha becomes the hetu. For him, here we have an ārthī prakriyā and not śābdī prakriyā. He observes : (V.V. I. 67, 68) (pp. 133, ibid)

“viṣa-bhakṣaṇād api parāṃ
etad-grha-bhakṣaṇasya dāruṇatām,
vācyād ato’numinute
prakaraṇa-vakṛt-svarūpajñāḥ.” - I. 67
viṣabhakṣaṇam anumanute
na hi kaścid akāṇḍa eva suhr̥di sudhīḥ,
tenātrārthāntaragatir ārthī
tātparya-śaktijā na punaḥ.” - I. 68 (V.V.)

The Nature and scope of Tātparyavṛtti-

As noted above the tātparyavṛtti is instrumental in giving the sentence-sense and is therefore connected with the sentence-unit and not a word unit. Words in a sentence, to give a coherent meaning have to have three features such as 'ākāṅkṣā' i.e. expectancy, 'yogyatā' i.e. compatibility and 'āsatti' or 'sannidhi' i.e. proximity or juxta-position. It is observed by Dr. K. Kunjunni Raja (pp. 151, Indian Theories of Meaning, Edn. '69, Madras) that, "Next to the sphoṭa theory of linguistic symbols advocated by Bhartrhari stressing the importance of taking the sentence or complete utterance as an integral and indivisible symbol conveying its meaning in a flash, the most important contribution of ancient Indian to general linguistics is the concept of "ākāṅkṣā". The Mīmāṃsaka school brought forward this concept to explain, from the analytical and associationistic standpoint, how syntactic unity is effected among the various isolated words which comprise the sentence. If the word is taken as an autonomous unit of sound and sense, it is necessary to point out the cementing factors which unite the different words, with their individual meanings, when they form a single sentence. The Mīmāṃsakas first enunciated, and the other schools of thought later accepted with slight modifications, the three factors of phonetic contiguity or sannidhi, logical consistency or yogyatā, and syntactic expectancy or ākāṅkṣā among the parts of a sentence as constituting the bases of syntactic unity. Of these three, ākāṅkṣā is all-comprehensive and the most important."

We have noticed earlier the simple definition of a sentence which takes it as a collection of words : "pada-saṃghātaṃ vākyam" as the Bṛhaddevatā, II. 117, puts it. The Mī. Sū. II. i. 46, as noticed earlier puts it on a real scientific basis when it observes : "arthaikatvād ekaṃ vākyam, sākāṅkṣam ced vibhāge syāt." Thus words taken together and yielding a single meaning form a sentence. These words when taken separately are characterized by expectancy or ākāṅkṣā. The Mīmāṃsakas evolved this scientific approach to get at the exact sense of a given sentence in the yajurveda dealing with sacrificial ritual. Thus a single yajus-mantra was expected to be a single 'syntactical unit', giving a single sense : Here 'arthaikatva', as Śabara explains, means "serving a single purpose." - "eka-prayojanatvād upapannam." (SB. on Mī. Sū. II. i. 46) - Bhartrhari accepts this concept and states :

"sākāṅkṣāvayavam bhedo
parānākāṅkṣa-śabdakam,

karma-pradhānam guṇavad
ekārtham vākyam iṣyate.”

V.P. II. 4 (pp. 9, Edn. 92 Dr. Bhate Saroja) - Delhi Eastern Book Linkers)

Kumārila Bhaṭṭa also was prepared to apply śabara's idea to ordinary sentence also and not the yajus mantra alone. Ganganath Jha, [trans. Tantravārttika, pp. 586 f; (p. 190)] observes : “It must be concluded that those words on hearing which we are clearly cognizant of a single idea must be regarded as one sentence... either ordinary or of the ‘mantra’ and ‘brāhmaṇa’. As explained above, this understanding follows if we take the note, viz. “arthaikatvād” as meaning, ‘because of its having a single sense.’ Pārthasārathimiśra follows Śabara and takes ‘arthaikatva’ to mean ‘having a single purpose’, but Someśvarabhaṭṭa in his Nyāyasudhā interpretes it liberally so as to cover a sense in ordinary worldly usage also.

Prabhākara observes that ‘artha’ stands for both ‘meaning’ and ‘purpose’. Śabara insists on purpose, so Prabhākara also says that the words of a sentence must be related to purpose which is the most important factor in a sentence. When sentences are independent of one another they form distinct sentences and are therefore ‘nir-ākāṅkṣa’. Thus ‘ākāṅkṣā’ or expectancy among words is an essential condition to form an independent sentence. The Kātyāyana-śrauta-sūtra (I. 3.2) also lays stress on mutual expectancy among words to form a single sentence and describes a sentence as a whole as ‘nir-ākāṅkṣa’. This is supported even by Satyāśādhā-śrauta-sūtra (Anandashrama skt. series, 53. part I, pp. 38) as observed by Dr. Raja. The Mīmāṃsakas thus were perhaps the first to recognise this quality viz. ākāṅkṣā among words as a basic one to form a sentence. But the necessity for independence of words to give a unified sense, as in a compound word or a sentence, was recognized even earlier by the grammarians as observed by Dr. Raja (pp. 154, ibid). Pāṇini observes at II. i. 1 : “samarthaḥ pada-vidhiḥ.” Thus for him, words can form a compound word only if they have ‘sāmarthya’ i.e. ‘capacity’. Now ‘sāmarthya’ is explained differently by various commentators. Some take it as ‘vyapekṣā’ or ‘mutual connection pertaining to the meaning.’ - The Mbh. pp. 365 notes : “paras-para-vyapekṣām sāmarthyam eke icchanti. kā punaḥ śabdayor vyapekṣā ? na brūmaḥ śabdayor iti. kim tarhi ? arthayoḥ. This ‘vyapekṣā’ seems to be closer in sense to the ‘ākāṅkṣā’ of the Mīmāṃsakas. The Vārttika, under Pā. II. i. 1 observes - “prthag arthānām ekārthībhāvaḥ samartha-vacanam.” (pp. 361 Mbn.) Thus, for some, sāmarthya’ is ‘ekārthībhāva’ i.e. unification of meaning. Thus words having independent meanings are made to signify a united sense, when taken together. Jaimini also recognizes this quality of a sentence when he mentions

'arthaikatva' of a sentence. Dr. Raja observes (pp. 155, *ibid*) : "Pāṇini discusses compound words, whereas Jaimini deals with a sentence, still the conditions referred to seem to be similar." We support this observation of Dr. Raja for on Vārttika 4, Pā. II. i. 1, pp. 365, the Mbh. discusses the point with reference to the compound word 'rāja-puruṣa'. Patañjali observes : "iha rājñah puruṣa iti ukte rāja puruṣaṃ apekṣate mamāyaṃ iti, puruṣo'pi rājānaṃ apekṣate, ahaṃ asya iti." Patañjali explains these two views as mutually exclusive and accepts 'ekārthībhāva' view-point as the correct one. This 'ekārthībhāva' means that the words when united give up their individual meanings and acquire a special signification. The other view maintains that the individual members retain their original meanings but they are mutually related. P. C. Chakravarti in his 'philosophy of Sanskrit Grammar', pp. 293, observes that for Haradatta both 'vyapekṣā' and 'ekārthībhāva' are necessary in a compound word, for in the absence of mutual connection of meanings, words are not allowed to form a compound. Kaiyaṭa in his M.bh-pradīpa, under Pā. II i. 1, observes that : "iha vyapekṣāyāṃ samāso na bhavati, ekārthībhāve vākyam neti." i.e. he seems to take them as conditions for a sentence and a compound only respectively.

To this quality of 'ākāṅkṣā' were added 'yogyatā' or compatibility and 'āsatti' or 'sannidhi' i.e. Juxta position or proximity as qualities of a sentence. The Mimāṃsakas were the first to promulgate these three conditions for a sentence to explain the correlation of words in a given sentence. Kumārila in his Tantravārttika Vol. I. pp. 455 observes - "ākāṅkṣā sannidhānaṃ ca yogyatā ceti ca trayam, sambandha-kāraṇatvena kṛtaṃ nānantarāsrutiḥ." Thus for Kumarila, mere immediate sequence or 'anantarāsruti' is not enough in the making of a sentence, but these three, i.e. mutual expectancy among words used in a given sentence, their compatibility and their proximity are all basic to form a given sentence. Other systems of thought later picked up these conditions with minor changes. To these some have later added a fourth condition viz. the knowledge of intention of the speaker or 'tātparya-jñāna', which also means the general purport of a sentence.

'Ākāṅkṣā' as observed earlier, consists in a word not being able to convey a complete sense in the absence of another word. Thus, it is the desire on the part of the listener to know the other unspoken words or their meanings to complete the sense. A word is said to be 'sā'kāṅkṣa' i.e. having 'ākāṅkṣā' for another word, if by itself, it cannot, without the help of the latter, produce full sense or knowledge of its inter-connection in a given utterance. The Tarkasaṃgraha pp. 30 observes : "padasya padāntara-vyatireka-prayuktānvayānanubhāvakatvaṃ ākāṅkṣā." Vedānta-

paribhāṣā IV. 3 has - “tatra padārthānām paraspara-jijñāsā-viśayatva-yogyatvaṁ ākāṅkṣā, kriyāśravaṇe kārakasya, kāraka-śravaṇe kriyāyāḥ, karaṇa-śravaṇe iti-kartavyatāyāśca jijñāsā-viśayatvāt.” Stray collection of words such as “gauḥ aśvaḥ puruṣo hasti”, or ‘daśa dāḍimāni ṣaḍ apūpāḥ kuṇḍam ajājinam palala-piṇḍaḥ adharorukam etat kumāryāḥ sphaiyakṛtasya pitā pratiśīnaḥ” - as observed in the Mbh. pp. 1, and 38, do not make for a sentence.

Dr. Raja (pp. 157) observes that the Mīmāṃsakas are not quite clear in distinguishing between syntectic expectancy and psychological expectancy and Bhartṛhari actually criticises their definition of a sentence on the ground that the ‘ākāṅkṣā’ of the Mīmāṃsaka, would imply that a passage of several grammatical sentences would have to be considered as one sentence. (V.P. II. 3) - Bhartṛhari observes :

“nighātā”di-vyavasthārthaṁ
śāstre yat-paribhāṣitam,
sā”kāṅkṣā-vayavaṁ tena
na sarvaṁ tulya-lakṣaṇam.” V.P. II. 3
and he further observes :
“sā”kāṅkṣā-vayavaṁ bhede
parānākāṅkṣa-śabdakam,
karma-pradhānaṁ guṇavad
ekārthaṁ vākyaṁ ucyate.” - V.P. II. iv.

Śālikanātha, the follower of Prabhākara, holds that ‘ākāṅkṣā’ being the curiosity on the part of the listeners has to be explained by some on the basis of invariable association such as an action necessarily implying an agent, a place, an instrument etc. and an agent or an instrument implying an action to complete its sense. But this view is criticized on the ground that there is no end to the curiosities of the listeners through such associations. The Vākyārtha-mātrkā-vṛtti (pp. 5) observes : “kā punar iyaṁ ākāṅkṣā ? pratipattur jijñāsā. kiṁ nibandhanā punar asau ? avinābhāva-nibandhanā iti kecit. kriyā hi kārakā’vinābhāvinī iti tām pratītya kārakaṁ jijñāsate. evaṁ kārakaṁ api buddhvā kriyāṁ iti. tad ayuktaṁ iti manyante. jijñāsā tathā tādīya-janaka-tat-kriyā-tat-kārakāntarā”di-jijñāsām api āpadyate.” Newer and newer expectancies are caused due to newer and newer and newer associations coming in the minds of listeners. This could be endless. So, only those curiosities that are essential for the accomplishment of the intended purpose

need be taken as true requirements. The omission by the speaker of a particular nature of the instrument, place, etc., for the action recommended suggests that he is indifferent about it. Thus, “gām ānaya” is a complete sentence even though the instrument viz. ‘daṇḍena’ - ‘with a stick’ is not mentioned. It is added only if it is intended. Thus the scope of ‘ākāṅkṣā’ depends on the intention of the speaker. In case of an elliptical sentence like, “the door, door”, - i.e. “dvāraṃ dvāraṃ”, this requires some verb such as ‘pidhāna’ or ‘close’ for syntactic completeness. But in case of, “gām ānaya” it is not so.

For Advaita Vedāntins this ‘ākāṅkṣā’ is two-fold viz. utthita-ākāṅkṣā and utthāpya-ākāṅkṣā. The former takes place when it is actual or natural, i.e. when there is natural expectancy of one word for the other to complete sense. The other one is seen when there is potential expectancy which could be roused in case it is required. Thus, when one utters, “gām ānaya”, the listener may think of the cow being white, red, black and so forth. The possibility of such potential adjectives of a cow, is limitless. According to this view therefore, the ākāṅkṣā that exists between words in a sentence, must be mutual and not one sided. For instance “dhavalām gām ānaya”, the adjective ‘dhavalā’ has a direct and natural expectancy for the substantive “gām”, whereas the latter i.e. the cow has only a potential expectancy for the adjective ‘dhavalā’ i.e. white.

The Mīmāṃsakas explain ākāṅkṣā also on the basis of psychological incompleteness of an idea. The Vākyārtha-māṭṛkāṇṭhi, p. 7 has -

“anvitasābhidhānārthaṃ
uktārtha-ghaṭanāya vā,
pratiyogini jijñāsā
yā sā”kāṅkṣeti gīyate.”

- abhidhānā’paryavasānaṃ abhidheyārtha-paryavasānaṃ ca jijñāsodaya-nibandhanam.”

We may add that, if ākāṅkṣā is with reference to artha-grahaṇa, then necessarily it has to include the psychological aspect concerning the listener and perhaps even Bhartṛhari goes astray in his attack on the definition of a sentence as noted above. Actually a group of sentences strung together are ruled out from the scope of being a single sentence as the ākāṅkṣā of the Mīmāṃsakas does take care of the psychological requirement of a listener.

As to the nature of ākāṅkṣā the two schools of Mīmāṃsā, viz. the Prābhākara and the Bhāṭṭa seem to differ. Of course both are concerned with the interpretation

of vedic injunctions, but they differ with reference to the exact meaning or interpretation of an injunction. For the Prābhākaras every vedic injunction is a command - a *niyoga* - to be followed without considering the outcome i.e. the beneficial result. Neither fear of punishment nor greed for benefit should guide one to follow the injunction which is a command just to be followed - “There is not to reason why” is the spirit behind it. So, for the Prābhākara school of thought, the three essential psychological *ākāṅkṣās* are for ‘*viṣaya*’ i.e. the act enjoined, for ‘*niyojya*’ i.e. the person who is enjoined to perform an act, and for ‘*karaṇa*’ or the means to perform. Thus in a passage, say, “*viśvajitā yajeta*”, there is no mentioning of the ‘*niyojya*’ or the person who is expected to perform a particular sacrifice, and so to complete the meaning we add the word “*svargakāmaḥ*” - a person desirous of heaven and arrive at complete sense.

But for the Bhāṭṭa school of thought, the content of the injunction is the realization that the action enjoined will bring some special benefit. Kumārila, in his *Śloka-vārttika*, p. 653, observes :

“*prayojanaṃ anuddiśya*
na mando’pi pravartate.”

- even a man with less than ordinary intelligence also does not proceed to do anything without keeping a purpose in mind. The *ākāṅkṣā* of a vedic injunction therefore, is for the ‘*iti-kartavyatā*’ of the act enjoined, for the *sādhana* or *karaṇa* i.e. means, and also for the ‘*phala*’ or the result of the action. There is no ‘*ākāṅkṣā*’ for the ‘*niyojya*’ or a person who is to perform an act. Anyone who has interest in a particular fruit or result, has to perform a particular action enjoined by the veda. So, in “*viśvajitā yajeta*”, the word ‘*svargakāmaḥ*’ is meant to satisfy the expectancy concerning the fruit of the action.

We may find an extension of this psychological expectancy in the Mīmāṃsā definition of a compound sentence i.e. a ‘*mahāvākya*’, with reference to the mutual expectancy of clauses that make for the whole compound sentence. This interdependence of sentences makes up for a ‘*prakaraṇa*’ i.e. topic, in which sentences are related by *aṅga-aṅgin-bhāva*, i.e. one principal sentence and the rest being subordinate. When these - i.e. main clause and sub-clauses serve a single purpose, they are taken as a ‘*mahāvākya*’. (Mī. Sū. III. 7.4). Here we see syntactic unity or ‘*eka-vākyaatā*’ based on a two-fold relation viz. “*padaika-vākyaatā*” i.e. that of a word to a sentence and *vākyaika-vākyaatā*, i.e. that of a sentence to another sentence. For the Mīmāṃsakas, only the injunctive sentences carry direct

significance and the others are mere 'artha-vādas' i.e. only corroborative or eulogistic utterances, which are therefore dubbed as subordinate. The arthavādas carry their meanings only as syntactically connected with the principal injunctive statement. Just as a word is related to a sentence, an arthavāda-vākya is related to the injunctive sentence i.e. vidhi-vākya. This is termed as 'padaika-vākyatā', in a single sentence, and 'vākyaika-vākyatā', in a compound sentence with individual subordinate clauses that carry individual self-sufficient meaning. Kūmārila in his Tantravārttika pp. 366 reads :

“svārthabodhe samāptānām
aṅgāṅgitvā”dy apekṣayā,
vākyaṇām ekavākyaṛtvaṃ
punaḥ saṃhatya jāyate.” -

This is acceptable to the Vedāntins also.

But the ākāṅkṣā that rests between words in a sentence is a grammatical one and therefore 'śābdī' and not merely psychological. It is the exact need for the syntactic completeness of a given statement. Later on the Naiyāyikas clearly distinguished between the grammatical and psychological 'ākāṅkṣā'. They define ākāṅkṣā as a kind of syntactic need which one word has for another in a given sentence, to convey interrelation of the words. It is therefore, the ākāṅkṣā which causes the knowledge of the syntactic relation of words in a sentence. The Naiyāyikas hold an opinion that even in case of a word there should be mutual expectancy between root or stem on the one hand and the verbal or nominal suffix on the other.

Nāgeśa in his Parama-laghu-mañjuṣā, ākāṅkṣā section, observes that - (pp. 33)

- “sā ca ekapadārthajñāne tad-arthānvaya-yogyārthasya yaj jñānaṃ tad viśayecchā; asyānvayy arthaḥ ka iti evaṃ-rūpā puruṣa-niṣṭhaiva, tathā'pi tasyāḥ svaviśaye'rthe āropah.”

This means that for Nāgeśa, ākāṅkṣā is the desire on the part of listeners on hearing a word in a sentence, to know the idea which can be related to its meaning in order to get a complete sense; and thus the expectancy is on the part of the listeners and not on the part of words or their meanings. Thus it is a psychological one. For him, only metaphorically this ākāṅkṣā has a concern with words and their meanings.

Yogyatā : This means logical compatibility of words with one another in a given sentence. This quality makes for mutual association. The Tarka-saṃgraha,

pp. 30 observes - arthā'bādho योग्यता. Nāgeśa, in his parama-laghu-mañjuśā puts it as (p. 36) - “parasparā' nvyaya-prayojaka-dharma-vattvam.” The Tattvacintāmaṇi, Vol. III, śabda section, p. 262 - has - “bādhaka-pramā-virahaḥ” (Nyāyakośa, p. 675). This quality actually makes for the judgement concerning a sentence as to whether it is sense or non-sense. When the meaning of a sentence is not contradicted by experience it is said to have ‘योग्यता’ or compatibility between its words. Śālikanātha in his Vākyārtha - mātṛkā-vṛtti, p. 9, observes : “kiṃ punar idaṃ योग्यत्वम् नāma ? yat saṃbandhārhatvam. saṃbandhārham itī katham jñāyeta ? saṃbandhitvena dṛṣṭavāt.” This means that योग्यता demands the words in a sentence to have mutual compatibility for their connection. This compatibility is known from experience. Thus, ‘agninā siñcati’, he wets (the plants) with fire carries no sense as ‘agni’ is not compatible to the idea of sprinkling. But, “jalena siñcati” makes sense as ‘jala’ or water has a sense compatible with the idea of sprinkling or wetting.

However, as Kuppuswami Shastri observes, in his ‘A primer of Indian Logic, p. 257, there is difference of opinion about the exact function of ‘योग्यता’ in the comprehension of meaning from a given sentence. Some Naiyāyikas are of the opinion that a decisive knowledge of ‘योग्यता’ is a pre-requisite for verbal cognition, while others suggest that since a decisive knowledge of incompatibility prevents verbal cognition, only the absence of such a counteracting agent is the real requirement. - The Nyāyakośa p. 676 has - “bādha-niścayābhāvo योग्यता itī navyāḥ āhuḥ.” For the former, it is a positive entity, for the latter it is only the absence of an impediment in verbal cognition.

Dr. Raja (p. 165) observes that it is necessary to distinguish between such inconceivable combinations like, “the circular square”, and the conceivable combinations such as, ‘a rabbit’s horn.’ Kumārila suggests in a vārttika quoted in Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khāḍya p. 168, that,

“aryantā'saty api hy-arthe
jñānam śabdaḥ karoti hi,
abādhāt tu pramāṃ atra
svataḥ-prāmānya-niścālām.”

This means that incompatibility with actual facts does not prevent verbal comprehension, but only the validity of knowledge prevents the same - So, not the lack of co-relation with actual facts but the inconceivability of the mutual association of word-meanings renders the whole sentence nonsensical. The

impossibility of connecting the word-meanings stands in the way of verbal comprehension. This other condition of 'yogyatā' therefore, is not for mere verbal knowledge but for a valid judgement.

At times lack of 'yogyatā' is only apparent and is explained in metaphorical expressions such as 'simho māṇavakah', 'mañcāḥ krośanti', etc. by explaining the metaphorical sense. Actually, this apparent incompatibility or 'yogyatā-abhāva' is the essence of lakṣaṇā.

Samnidhi - or proximity or 'āsatti' is a condition having reference to the time of pronouncement of words in a sentence. These words should be pronounced continuously at a given time. The Tarkasaṃgraha, p. 30 has - "padānāṃ avilambena uccāraṇaṃ samnidhiḥ." The Vedāntaparibhāṣā puts it as (IV. 10)

"āsattīścāvyavahānena pada-janya-padārthopasthitih" - Thus āsatti or juxtaposition is the un-interrupted utterance or unbroken apprehension of words. Words pronounced at long intervals cannot produce the knowledge of any interrelation among them, even if there be 'ākāṅkṣā' and 'yogyatā'. If words are separated by the intervention of irrelevant words, then also the connection of meaning is not grasped.

Kumārila Bhaṭṭa in his Tantra-Vārtika, p. 455 observes :

"ākāṅkṣā samnidhānaṃ ca
yogyatā ceti ca trayam,
sambandha-kāraṇatvena
klptaṃ nānantaraśrutiḥ."

Thus, he distinguishes between samnidhi and mere "immediate sequence of utterance." i.e. "anantara-śruti". Samnidhi is explained by him as the continuous moving about of the words or their meanings in the mind - "buddhau viparivṛttiḥ", Śālikanātha in his Vākyārtha-māṭṛkā-vṛtti, pp. 8, gives a similar explanation. According to the Bhaṭṭa school of Mīmāṃsā, the lack of samnidhi is of two types - (i) not being uttered together, and (ii) not being signified by words. Mānameyodaya, p. 99 has - "saṃnihitatvābhāvāt śabda-bodhitatvābhāvāt ca dvedhā samnidhiy abhāvo bhavati." No syntactic relation is possible in case of words pronounced at distant time-gaps such as for instance "bring" is pronounced to-day and "the cow" is pronounced the day-after, no relation can be established. Again, a sentence such as "gāṃ badhāna" cannot have syntactic affinity with the word "aśvam", even though the horse is also seen in front requiring to be tied up. Mānameyodaya

observes - pp. 100 - “gām badhāna” - ity atra bandhanāpekṣayā dṛśyamānasya aśvasya śabdā’bodhitatvāt eva ananvayaḥ.” - Thus syntactic relation is possible only for what have been comprehended through words - see also, “śabda-pratipannānām eva anvaya itī niyamaḥ siddhaḥ” - (in Mānameyodaya). (Dr. Raja; p. 167, ibid)

The Prābhākara school, on the other hand holds that saṃnidhi is only the contiguity of cognition of the sense and not necessarily of words actually uttered - The Vākyaṛtha-mātrkā-vṛtti, p. 9. observes -

“saṃnidhiḥ śabda-janmaiva
vyutpattau nopalakṣaṇam,
adhyāhrtenā’pi arthena
loke saṃbandha-darśanāt.”

Thus in case of elliptical sentences the syntactic relation is known by supplying the necessary meaning. But the Bhāṭṭa school rejects this view and insists that even in elliptical sentences, the syntactic relation is known only by supplying the missing words themselves. The Mānameyodaya p. 101, observes in this connection, viz. “śabdādhyāhāra eva syād ity evaṃ mādrśām matam.”

According to the Prābhākara school, saṃnidhi does not mean simultaneous mental comprehension of the words; as in case of ākāṅkṣā it goes step by step, in order of sequence, in which they are cognized. The Vākyaṛtha-mātrkā-vṛtti p. 9 observes : ākāṅkṣāvac ca saṃnidhau api saṃnidhāpaka-krameṇa eva kramo veditavyaḥ.” The mutual connection of the meanings of words is comprehended step by step with the knowledge of ākāṅkṣā, योग्या and saṃnidhi.

For the early Naiyāyikas, the recollection of the meanings of words is simultaneous. It is transient like perception and so, it is not possible to recollect the meanings of individual words one by one and then have a collective cognition. Simultaneous comprehension is explained on the analogy of ‘khale kapota nyāya’ i.e. pigeons on the threshing floor. The Siddhānta muktāvali p. 305 observes :

“vṛddhā yuvānaḥ śīśavaḥ kapotāḥ
khale yathā’mī yugapat patanti,
rathaiva sarve yugapat padārthāḥ
paraspareṇānvayino bhavanti.”

Like pigeons, young and old come down together to pick up grains, similarly, in a sentence, the meanings of words become interrelated simultaneously.

But we feel that analogy is not necessarily a sound argument. For there are others, some Naiyāyikas among them, who seem to explain differently. For them, in a sentence viz. “gām ānaya, śvetām, daṇḍena”, first of all, the word ‘gām’ is known as related to the verb ‘ānaya’. Then this connected sense gets related to the meaning of “śvetām” or ‘white’, and then with the instrument viz. ‘daṇḍena’. This has the anvitābhīdhāna theory at its basis. The Siddhāntamuktāvali, pp. 306 puts it as -

“yad yad ākāṅkṣitam योग्यं
samnidhānam prapadyate,
tena tenānvitaḥ svārthaḥ
padair evā’vagamyate.”

The Navya Nyāya school defines samnidhi or āsatti as an immediate recollection of meanings of words through their expressive power or lakṣaṇā, and even though the words are separated, as in case of a verse at times, there is āsatti if the meanings of the words are recollected without any interruption. The Nyāya-siddhāntamañjarī, quoted in Nyāyakośa p. 135, observes - “vṛttyā padajanya-padārthopasthitiḥ.” This ‘āsatti’ is the cause of verbal apprehension, and not the knowledge of ‘āsatti’ as believed by early Naiyāyikas : sā ca “sva-rūpasatī śabda-bodha-hetuḥ, na tu jñātā.” observes the same source. This recollection is explained to be collective cognition viz. ‘samūhā’ lambana-jñāna’. Thus, the perception of every single word leaves its impression on the mind, and when the last word is uttered, its last letter serves as a stimulus to bring in collective recollection. It is thus, a single cognition arising out of the contact of senses with a collection of objects.

Dr. Raja has at length discussed the problem of elliptical sentences also, giving a full record of the views of the various schools of Mīmāṃsā and also that of Bhartṛhari at the end. Dr. Raja (pp. 169-176) has also considered the view of Bhoja the author of Śrṅgāraprakāśa. We feel it would have been more advisable to discuss the views of ālaṃkārikas only at the end of the discussion concerning the topic as contained in the darśana and grammar sources. We are gratefully repeating the views concerning a word, its sense, a sentence, sentence-sense, various śabdavṛttis etc., as laid bare by our great predecessors such as Dr. P. C. Chakravarti, Dr. K. K. Raja, Prof. Devasthali and the rest, only to explain the heritage of thought currents that shaped the views of ālaṃkārikas. This heritage as explained by these savants is most important for us to grasp and fully understand then to further understand and explain the various thought-currents concerning word, sense, sentence and śabda-vṛttis and other

concepts of literary criticism in India. I have therefore fully accepted the discussion concerning these thought-currents from works of very reliable scholars of great repute whom I honour and love. I have done it for it is absolutely required to grasp the same for an introduction to the understanding of thought-currents in literary criticism. But in all honesty I will confess, that I have personally varified and looked into practically all original material as far as possible, before accepting the same as laid down by these masters. One thing is clear, as suggested above that very often I have felt that something is lacking in the methodology adopted even by these great scholars for, without caring for the chronological aspects, I feel Dr. P. C. Chakravarty drags in the views of Gadādhara, Jagadīśa and the rest while discussing the views as read in ancient scriptures. Similarly Dr. Raja quotes from Nyāyakośa, Māna-meyodaya, Vedāntaparibhāṣa, Siddhānta-muktāvali, Vākyārtha-mātrkā-vṛtti, and also the Mahābhāṣya, Jaimini, Śābara, Bhartṛhari and Mīmāṃsā and Nyāya-sūtras - all in a single breath. However, I feel this is pardonable because the later writers on Nyāya and Vyākaraṇa and also Mīmāṃsā are absolutely faithful to the original sources and therefore the whole of it, - i.e. the earliest sources as well as near-modern interpretation of the same by stalwarts - forms a unitary whole which is indivisible and one. My accepting from Dr. Chakravarti, Dr. Raja, Prof. Devasthali and the rest therefore is justified in the same vein as I want to give all this at one and the same place, to be scaled at a glance for whatever follows as my humble contribution and interpretation of various alaṃkāra sources beginning with Bharata and Bhāmaha, down to Jagannātha. My work therefore belongs to the same type of effort, if not of the same class in terms of merit, to the one put in by Ācārya Hemacandra in his Viveka on the Kāvyaṇuśāsana, or the one put in the great Bāla-bodhinī by Jhalkikar on the Kāvyaaprakāśa of Mammata. The sincerity and honesty of effort are the same, if not the class.

Tātparyajñāna :

Some of the later Naiyāyikas believe that the knowledge of the intention of the speaker i.e. tātparya-jñāna is most essential while arriving at any verbal comprehension. Some Naiyāyikas giving great importance to the speaker's intention in fixing the meaning of an utterance hold that even in ordinary sentences like, “ghaṭaṃ ānaya”, the intention of the speaker gives the meaning of ‘pot’ to the word ‘ghaṭa’. Given a different intention of the speaker, they say, that even the word ‘ghaṭa’, through lakṣaṇā, would yield the sense of ‘paṭa’. The Nyāyakośa p. 327, reads -

“pare tu ghaṭā”di-sābda-sthale’pi ghaṭa-padam kumbhaparam, lakṣaṇayā paṭa-param veti samśraye ghata-sābda-bodhā’bhāvāt sarvatra tātparya-niscayaḥ kāranaṃ ity āhuḥ.” - They also feel that the compatibility of the expressed sense with the intention of the speaker prompts the listener to interpret a passage by resorting to indication or lakṣaṇā. Thus in an expression viz. “gaṅgāyāṃ ghoṣaḥ”, it is the speaker’s intention that gives the meaning of ‘gaṅgātata’ to the word ‘gaṅgā’. If it was intended by the speaker differently, perhaps ‘goṣa’ would have yielded the meaning of a ‘mahā-mīna’ i.e. a big fish, and the ‘gaṅgā’ would have retained its original meaning of the flow of a river. But then, driven to such extreme, this view flagrantly overlooks the status of language as an objective instrument of communication. Dr. Raja correctly observes that (pp. 177, *ibid*) linguistic discourse would be absolutely impossible if normal signification of words, independent of the speaker’s intention is totally disrespected.

It is therefore, that the Vedāntins reject this extreme view. When a parrot, or say a recorded material, repeats the speech of an original speaker, there is no personal intention on the part of this second speaker or recorder. The Vedānta-paribhāṣā IV. 38 explains it this way. But the Naiyāyikas hold that intention of the actual speaker is the same as that of the original speaker and in Vedic utterances there is always the intention of God. But the Vedāntins and Mīmāṃsakas suggest that all people do not believe in God. So it is not advisable to accept the view that (Nyāyakośa, p. 326) : “śukavākye bhagavad icchaiva gatiḥ.” They therefore feel that every word has an inherent capacity to express its meaning and even a sentence has a natural capacity to produce cognition of a unified sense in form of mutual association of the word-meanings (Vedānta-paribhāṣā, IV. 38-43). The primary meaning of a word therefore, is an innate power in the word itself which is there on the basis of the natural and permanent relation that exists between the word and the thing meant by it. The Vedāntins of course acknowledge that the knowledge of the speaker’s intention does play an important role in the comprehension of meaning in case of ambiguous expressions. So, in case of a double-meaning expression, the meaning is restricted to just one sense only, in the absence of the speaker’s intention to convey another sense also. The Vedāntaparibhāṣā IV. 41 observes that ‘tātparya’ has to be defined as : “tad-anyā-pratīti-icchayā anuccāritatvam.” This qualification is a must before, “tat-pratīti-janana-yogyatvam.”

Dr. Raja (pp. 179, *ibid*) observes that we have to keep in mind the fact that the difference in the views of the Naiyāyikas on one hand, and Mīmāṃsakas and Vedāntins on the other, concerning the part played by the speaker’s intention in

determining the meaning of a sentence is ultimately due to the difference in their views as to the nature of the knowledge derived from language. For the Naiyāyikas, śabda as a means of knowledge is valid verbal testimony which consists in the statement of a trustworthy person, an āpta-jana. The Nyāyasūtra I. i. 7 reads : “āptopadeśaḥ śabdaḥ.” The agent may be either human or divine. But for the Mīmāṃsakas and Vedāntins the verbal testimony has self-evident validity i.e. “svataḥ-prāmāṇya”, i.e. it is irrespective of the speaker’s intention. For the Mīmāṃsakas, in case of word-meanings also, the significative power is inherent in the words themselves and for the Naiyāyikas it is injected into the words by God’s will or by that of the speaker. The Naiyāyikas call this meaning intended by the speaker by the name ‘tātparya’, but the Mīmāṃsakas and the Vedāntins use the term ‘tātparya’ for the meaning conveyed by the capacity of the words themselves. We will go to see later that Ānandavardhana while establishing vyañjanā as a vṛtti independent of abhidhā or lakṣaṇā, uses the term ‘tātparya’ to mean the intention of the speaker.

Even for the Naiyāyikas opinions differ regarding the importance of the speaker’s intention as a factor in the understanding of the meaning of a given passage. Some are of the opinion that as the intention of the speaker is already covered up by ‘ākāṅkṣā’, it need not be taken as an independent condition of verbal comprehension. Others hold that the knowledge of the meaning intended by the speaker is essential for verbal comprehension only in cases of equivocal terms and ambiguous expressions. For the former, in a statement such as “ayaṃ eti putro rājñaḥ puruṣo’pasāryatām” the knowledge of the speaker’s intention only can decide whether the word ‘rājñaḥ’ is to be construed with either ‘putraḥ’ or ‘puruṣaḥ’, for the satisfaction of its ākāṅkṣā. But for the latter only equivocal expressions such as, “saindhavaṃ ānaya” require the knowledge of the intention of the speaker as ‘saindhava’ would mean both ‘salt’ as well as ‘a type of horse’. The Nyāyakośa p. 327, observes : “kecit tu “saindhavaṃ ānaya” ityādaṃ nānārtha-sthala eva tātparya-saṃśaya”deḥ saṃbhavena tatratya-śabda-bodha eva tātparya-niścayo hetuḥ... ity āhuḥ.” The Siddhāntamuktāvali, p. 316 also passes a similar observation. Nāgeśa the grammarian, also accepts the importance of knowing the speaker’s meaning in such equivocal expressions : The Laghumañjuṣa p. 524, has - “nānārtha-pada-sthale padaviśayo’pi sa tathā. tad-grāhakaṃ ca prakaraṇā”dikam.”

Gaṅgesa and Viśvanātha take knowledge of tātparya as the fourth requisite over and above ākāṅkṣā, yogyatā and saṃnidhi, for verbal comprehension. For the Naiyāyikas, “vaktur icchā tu tātparyam” i.e. tātparya is the meaning intended

by the speaker (Siddhāntamuktāvali. pp. 315, as quoted in, 'A History of Indian Logic' by S. C. Vidyabhusana). Other Naiyāyikas consider that tātparya is an all-embracing factor and that it has an important part to play in the functioning of the first three factors viz. ākāṅkṣā, yogyatā and saṃnidhi. The Siddhānta muktāvali pp. 303 observes - "tātparyagarbhā cā"sattiḥ".

Even though, a speaker's intention is subjective, contextual factors can reasonably ascertain the speaker's intention. This intention is roughly termed 'tātparya' which for the Naiyāyikas means what is intended to be conveyed, while for the Mīmāṃsakas it means what is actually conveyed. It is only in the former sense that Ānandavardhana uses the term while meeting with the pūrvapakṣa in form of Mīmāṃsakas and Naiyāyikas while establishing vyañjanā. Many ancients believe that the contextual factors should be taken as decisive in fixing the meaning of an utterance. Thus for them, these contextual factors are the causes of verbal comprehension. The Naiyāyikas do not agree with this. The Siddhānta Muktāvali p. 35, observes : "na ca tātparya-grāhakāṇām prakaraṇā"dīnām śābda-bodhe kāraṇatvaṃ iti vācyam." They maintain that the contextual factors are not directly helping in the understanding of an utterance but they only indirectly show the meaning intended by the speakers.

All philosophical systems accept the importance of getting at the speaker's intention in understanding a sentence. The difference lies in the proportion of importance they attach to this. Both viz. intention of the speaker as well as the objective strength of language are important in conveying the meaning.

The Mīmāṃsakas use the term 'tātparya' for the purport of a passage dealing with a topic and refer to six indications or 'līṅgas', by which we can arrive at the 'tātparya' of a given expression, objectively without reference to the speaker or author. These six līṅgas are - (i) upakramó-pasaṃ-hārau, i.e. 'upakrama' or introduction or beginning and 'upasaṃhāra' or conclusion, (ii) 'abhyāsa' i.e. repetition of the main topic, (iii) 'apūrvatā' or novelty of the theme or subject matter, (iv) 'phala' or the result intended, (v) 'arthavāda' or eulogistic remarks, and (vi) 'upapatti' i.e. arguments in favour of the main theme -

The Nyāyakośa p. 714 observes :

"upakramópasamhārau
abhyāso'pūrvatā phalam,
arthavādópapattī ca
līṅgaṃ tātparya-nirṇaye."

The Mīmāṃsakas hold that the real purport or tātparya of a given sentence can be studied objectively without reference to the subjective element, viz. intention of the speaker. Not unlike the Naiyāyikas, the Mīmāṃsakas also analyse the sentence into two parts such as the uddeśya and the vidheya or roughly the subject and the predicate. The first part i.e. uddeśya carries a sense which is siddha i.e. it is already existent and is known from other sources - The Nyāyakośa p. 34, observes - “pramāṇāntara-siddhasya kiṃcid dharmāntara-vidhānārthaṃ punar upanyāsyatā.” - The second part consists of meanings that are brought into existence i.e. which are ‘sādhya’. They are also termed as ‘bhūta’ and ‘bhavya’ or ‘anuvādyā’ and ‘vidheya’ respectively. We know that Mammata while dealing with a pūrva-pakṣa against vyañjanā uses these terms such as ‘bhūta’ and ‘bhavya’. For the Mīmāṃsakas the tātparya or real import of a sentence lies in the ‘vidheya’ element. Mammata has put it as - “bhūta-bhavya-samuccāraṇe bhūtaṃ bhavyāya vyapadiśyate...” etc. The anuvādyā - i.e. subject element is that which discloses to the listener what any utterance is about and is not always indispensable, and is used in a sentence only to help the listener to grasp the meaning clearly. It is actually ‘vidheya’ which is something newly stated and is to be known by the listener and from the standpoint of the speaker it is enough if the ‘vidheya’ alone is uttered.

Normally in sanskrit the order of sequence of words indicating either subject or predicate is not fixed as a rule, but writers on Mīmāṃsā and even literary critics want the subject to be mentioned first i.e. ahead of the predicate or vidheya. A well-known maxim reads as-anuvādyam anuktvā ca na vidheyam udīrayet. This is supposed to be from Kumārila but is not actually found in the Śloka-vārtika, Hemacandra (viveka, p. 244, Edn. Parikh and Kulkarni, '64, Bombay) also quotes it without mentioning the source. This is quoted by Mahimā also (pp. 432, Kārikā 94, vya. vi. II. Edn. Rewaprasad). The violation of this untold subject-predicate-sequence-rule makes for ‘vidheya-avimarśa’-doṣa or a poetic blemish in view of the ālaṃkārikas. It is also called a-vimṛṣṭa-vidheyāmrśa-doṣa.

The Mīmāṃsakas and the Naiyāyikas take the sentence to be a chain of individual words and so they have necessarily to depend on the power of tātparya to explain how a connected meaning is collected from a sentence. Thus for them a sentence necessarily conveys something over and above the meanings of individual words that go to form a sentence. The whole i.e. the sentence sense is always something more than the sum total of individual word-meanings. Some Naiyāyikas explain this by resorting to the function of vṛtti called tātparya-vṛtti.

Normally we use language to convey some sense. When words are used in juxtaposition viz. samabhivyāhāra, it is understood that the speaker wants to convey a connected sense. The Tattvabindu p. 131, has - “pratipitsitam khalu etad iti pratipādayisyantaḥ padāni uccārayanti.” Kumārila also has - “viśiṣṭārtha-prayuktā hi samabhivyāhṛtir jane” i.e. samabhivyāhṛti or use of words in juxtaposition is done with a special meaning (in mind). The anvitābhidhāna theory holds that the intention or tātparya makes the primary significative power i.e. abhidhā convey the additional significance of a sentence. According to the abhihitānvaya theory, abhidhā or the power of expression has a limited capacity to yield only the saṃketita artha of a word. Thus, abhidhā is restricted to word-meanings alone. These word-meanings convey the additional significance through the power of ‘lakṣaṇā’ based on the strength of tātparya along with the other three such as ākāṅkṣā, yogyatā and āsatti or saṃnidhi. This function of the sentence to convey the sentence-sense on the basis of the speaker’s intention is called tātparyavṛtti by some ancient Naiyāyikas and is termed ‘saṃsarga-maryādā’ by later Naiyāyikas. We come across these terms in the R.G. of Jagannātha also.

Anvitābhidhānavāda and Abhihitānvayavāda :

We will now go into a detailed understanding of the two principal ways of thinking among the Mīmāṃsakas and others who attempt to explain the fact of a correlated sentence-sense. These are termed as the anvitābhidhānavāda and the abhihitānvayavāda. For that we will have to begin with the relation of words in a sentence. The basic problem discussed by indian thinkers is that if every word in a sentence has its own specific meaning, how does a sentence, which is only a collection of these words, has a unified meaning ? This problem has relevance with compound word also having units with individual senses. For Vājapyāyana, like the Mīmāṃsakas, the meaning of a word is ‘jāti’ i.e. a class or a universal, and that of a sentence is the saṃsarga or mutual relation of the word-meanings. Helārāja (on V.P. III Jāti-samuddeśa) observes - “jātivādinō vājapyāyanasya tu mate saṃsargo vākyārthaḥ, sāmānyānām saṃśleṣamātra-rūpatvāt vākyārthasya.” Kumārila (Tantravārtika, p. 446) says - “saṃsargo’pi padārthānām anyonyenā’nurañjanam... gotve śuklarva-saṃsargaḥ, śuklatve vā gotva-saṃsargaḥ.” - Thus, an expression ‘śuklā gauḥ’, means the association of cowness and whiteness. As this association is one, words make for a syntactic unity.

For Vyādi the meaning of a word was any particular i.e. dravya of a class. It is a concrete thing and not a quality. Thus Vyādi holds that the function of a word

is to distinguish the thing it stands for, from all similar objects. Kumārila observes at the same source that, “bhedo nāma padārthānām vyavacchedaḥ parasparam... Vyakti-padārtha-pakṣe sarvavyaktīnām śuklā”dibhiḥ kṣṇā”di-vyavaccheda-mātram vaktavyam.” Helārāja also observes (there only) - “vyādi-mate bhedo vākyārthaḥ, padavācyānām dravyānām dravyāntara-nivṛtti-tātparyeṇa abhidheyatvāt.” Thus a ‘cow’ means not that object which is characterized by cowness, but that which is distinguished from a horse. Thus in a sentence words are not expected to signify things not having certain attributes but as excluding some. Vyādi’s view can be understood to contain the germs of the Apoha theory of the Buddhists, provided Vyādi is taken as earlier.

Anvitābhīdhānavāda : Prabhākara and his followers held that words convey a meaning only in the context of a sentence even though for them words are real and actual constituents of language. Each word, though having its only meaning, serves only as part of a sentence. When we hear a sentence, we collect a unitary sense which follows as the sentence-sense. The basic problem is whether this sentence-sense or the unitary sense arises directly from the collection of words or whether it is arrived at indirectly through the recollection of the meanings of individual words that make for a sentence. The anvitābhīdhāna-vāda opts for the former while the abhihitānvaya-vāda supports the latter option.

For the anvitābhīdhānavāda, the meaning of a sentence is made up of individual word-meanings and their mutual correlation, and these two i.e. individual word-meanings and their mutual relations are conveyed by the words themselves. For the abhihitānvaya theory, words convey only their individual meanings and the mutual relation is conveyed by these word-meanings and not the words themselves. Prabhākara and his followers emphasise the natural method by which children learn individual meanings of individual words. Mammaṭa puts it brilliantly in his K.P. (V), when he observes :

“ye’py āhuḥ-
śabda-vṛddhābhīdheyāṁś ca
pratyakṣeṇā’tra paśyati,
śrotuś ca pratipannatvam
anumānena ceṣṭayā. - 1
anyathā’nupapattyā tu
bodhet śaktiṁ dvayā”tmikām,

arthāpatyā'vabodheta
 sambandham tri-pramāṇakam. - 2
 iti pratipādita-diśā,

devadatta 'gām ānaya' ityādi uttama-vṛddha-vākya-prayogāt deśād deśāntaram
 sasnādimantam artham madhyama-vṛddhe nayati sati, 'anena asmād vākyaḥ ayam
 arthaḥ pratipannaḥ' iti tacceṣṭayā anumāya, tayoṛ akhaṇḍa-vākya-vākyaarthayor
 arthāpatyā vācya-vācaka-bhāva-lakṣaṇam sambandham avadhārya bālas tatra
 vyutpadyate.

parataḥ, 'caitra, gām ānaya, devadatta aśvam ānaya, devadatta gām naya' ity
 ādi vākya-prayoge tasya tasya śabdasya tam tam artham avadhārayati iti anvaya-
 vyatirekābhyām pravṛtti-nivṛtti-kāri vākyaḥ eva prayoga-yogyam iti vākya-
 sthitānām eva padānām anvitaiḥ padārthaiḥ anvitānām eva samketo grhyate iti
 viśiṣṭā eva padārthā vākyaṛtho, na tu padārthānām vaiśiṣṭyam.

yady api vākyaṅtara-prayuktāni api pratyabhiññā-pratyayena tāni eva etāni
 padāni niścīyante iti padārthāntara-mātreṇa anvitaḥ samketa-gocaraḥ tathāpi
 sāmānyāvacchādito viśeṣa-rūpa eva asau pratipadyate, vyatīśaktānām padārthānām
 tathābhūtatvād iti anvitābhīdhānavādinah."

"And some others expound (the process of denotation) as follows :

The word, the elderly men and the object denoted are directly perceived here
 (i.e. in the process of learning) by a child. The listener's understanding of it is
 deduced (by the child) through inference and action. The two-fold power (of the
 word to denote and of the object to be thus denoted by that particular word) is
 cognised by presumption based on 'otherwise in-explicability'. Thus the relationship
 (between word and its meaning) is known through three means of cognition (i.e.
 perception, inference and presumption).

According to what is stated above when a sentence, such as, "Devadatta bring
 a cow", is uttered by an elderly man, the younger man is seen to bring from one
 place to another an object with the dewlap etc., the child then infers from this
 action that such and such meaning has been understood by the younger man from
 such a sentence. Thereupon the child makes out the denotative relationship
 between the above sentence and its meaning as one indivisible whole, and thus the
 child himself comprehends its meaning. Later on when sentences such as, "Caitra,
 bring the cow", "Devadatta, bring the horse", "Devadatta, take away the cow", are
 used, he makes out a particular meaning from a particular word on the basis of
 positive and negative considerations. From this it follows that a sentence alone, that

makes a man act or refrain from it, is fit for being used. Hence, the denotative convention is apprehended from the connected words occurring in a sentence only with the meanings of words (generally) connected with one another. To conclude, only the correlated meanings of words are the meaning of a sentence; it is not that there is correlation of (unconnected) word-meanings.

Though the individual words, found to be used in other sentences, are regarded to be the same by recognitive apprehension, and thus convention of word-meaning is found as connected with the other words (i.e. the denotative convention is comprehended as connected with particular word-meaning), yet, that particular form itself is comprehended as qualified by generic character because the intermixed word-meanings are of the said (i.e. of particular and not generic) character. (Since the particular and the generic cannot be divided, the comprehension of the particular form is not without the apprehension of its generic character). This is the view of the theorists of correlated denotation (anvitābhīdhāna).” - (Trans. R. C. Dwivedi, K.P. pp. 159-161).

The anvitābhīdhāna theory thus stands for ‘conveying the meaning of the correlated words’ i.e. “anvitānām abhīdhānam”.

Normally, the injunctive sentences produce a visible reaction in a listener. So, only from such sentences in the imperative (or potential) mood, that the meanings of words can be naturally collected. For the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas and Naiyāyikas, listener’s reaction can be noted even in case of indicative sentences such as, “putras te jātaḥ” or “kanyā te garbhīṇī”, producing joy or shock in the listener respectively. The Mīmāṃsaka’s preoccupation with vedic injunctions led to the view that a typical sentence should be in an imperative mood, since the whole direct denotation of the veda, according to them, must lie in enjoining something to be done. (codanā-lakṣaṇo dharmah). If such an interpretation is not seen in some cases, then the comprehension of meaning has to depend on something indirectly connected with the injunction. But for the Vedāntins, the direct denotation of the important vedic texts is seen in pointing out some well-established facts, and not in commanding something. Thus for them, the importance lies in indicative sentences. Later Indian logic also deals with such indicative sentences. Prabhākara, however, is of the opinion that even in case of indicative sentences, the comprehension of the denotation of words can be obtained only by observing the usage of elders, and that this can be known only from injunctive sentences as seen in the passage quoted from Mammaṭa as above.

But, if the meanings of words can be known only when they occur in injunctive sentences, it follows that every word must express its meaning only as related to the other factors of injunction. Word expressing a verb involving a command would be taken as the principal word in a sentence. So, the Prābhākaras are of the opinion that no word can be comprehended as having an independent meaning when isolated from a sentence. The meaning of words for them, is to be understood only as related to something which has to be done i.e. kārya. For Prabhākara the guiding maxim is - 'vākārthena vyavahārah' i.e. all usage is through a sentence and its meaning. For Prabhākara the relation of a sentence with its meaning is the only permanent entity (Ref. Brhati, pp. 135, 188 etc.). Śālikanātha elaborating on this observes that the word alone, by itself, never expresses any meaning; it is only the sentence that does it; and this is clear from the fact that we learn individual word-meanings later after observing the usage of older people. This usage is necessarily in form of sentences. So, only sentence has to be accepted as expressive of meaning and never a word by itself. This does not mean that the followers of Prabhākara totally deny the existence of individual word-meaning. But they only insist that gathering of individual word-meanings is rendered possible only as part of the correlated sentence-sense alone. Collecting of isolated word-sense is impossible except from its relation with the sentence-sense. Words do yield their sense separately, but they do not end there. The listener knows the general meaning of words, but his experience leads him to believe that words are meaningful only when they are connected in a sentence, and certainly not when they are isolated. Thus words themselves convey their meanings only as related to one another on the strength of expectancy, compatibility and juxta-position. Words convey, thus, not only their individual meanings but also their syntactic relation. So, the sentence-meaning is directly conveyed by the words themselves. We may, say that for these theorists 'abhidhā' or the power of expression is vested in a sentence only. The Vākārtha-mātrkā-vṛtti, pp. 5 observes -

“ākāṅkṣā-saṃnidhi-prāpta-
yogyārthāntara-saṃgatān,
svārthān āhuḥ padānīti
vyutpattiḥ saṃśritā mayā.”

It seems that the ancient Mīmāṃsakas held this 'anvitābhidhāna' theory. The Mī. Sū. I. i. 25 seems to support this when it declares - “tad-bhūtānām kriyārthena samāmnāyaḥ, arthasya tan-nimittatvāt.” Dr. Raja, however observes (pp. 199, ibid)

that the Śābarabhāṣya passage explaining the comprehension of the sentence-sense seems to go against this. He observes - (Śābarabhāṣya on Mī. Sū. I. i. 25) - “padāni hi svam svam arthaṃ abhidhāya nivṛtta-vyāpārāṇi, athédānīm padārthā avagatā santo vākyārthaṃ gamayanti.” Prabhākara and his followers explain this passage as supporting their theory for according to them what is brought about by the meaning of a word is the notion of a qualified thing - the meaning of words as qualified by one another. For this we can consult Br̥hatī on this passage and also Vākyārtha-mātrkāvṛtti p. 21. This interpretation however, is criticised in the Nyāyaratnamālā in its Vākyārthanirṇaya section. However, we feel like going with the Prabhākara-school-explanation and not find contradiction for as Dr. Raja himself concedes that the ancient Mīmāṃsakas were inclined towards anvitābhidhāna theory.

It will be interesting to quote from prof. G. V. Devasthali here, when he observes, (pp. 213 - in his, “Mīmāṃsā the Vākyaśāstra of Ancient India” - Vol. I, - Booksellers’ publishing Company, - Bombay-4, ’59) - as follows -

15 - “From this discussion we thus arrive at another point which has been expressly stated by Śābara at Mī. Sū. III. 2.1. There it is in clear terms declared by Śābara that a padārtha, if it is not connected with another padārtha, can’t give rise to vākyārtha. - “sāmānyavṛtti hi padam, viśeṣa-vṛtti vākyam. sāmānyena-abhipravṛttānām padārthānām yad viśeṣe avasthāpanam sa vākyārthaḥ. tad etad uktaṃ-tad bhūtānām kriyārthena samāmnāyo’rthasya tan-nimittatvāt, iti. tatra pratyakṣataḥ padārtho, vākyārthaḥ punar ānumānikaḥ. tad etad avagamyatām. kevala-svārtha vṛtti padam anupadeśakam iti padāntareṇa samnihitena ekavākyatām abhyupaiti, nā’nyathā iti.” - This is obviously so because in the absence of any such connection the pada by itself will yield only the ‘sāmānya’, which is its signification, and not the ‘viśeṣa’, which is the vākyārtha, since there is no reason why it should do so. For, as we have already seen above, it is only to avoid ‘ānarthakya-prasaṅga’ that a sāmānya-vāci pada is made to yield some viśeṣa artha; while as long as the word stands by itself there is no such prasaṅga at all.”

Abhinavagupta in his Locana on Dhv. I. 4 (pp. 30, Edn. Dr. T. S. Nandi ’97-’98, Ahmedabad) refers to this theory as the dīrgha-dīrghatara-vyāpāra-vāda which holds that there is no limit to the extent of the meaning of a given expression. For these theorists abhidhā power can extend itself to any limit and even cover the collection of an implicit sense as well. Bhartr̥hari - V.P. II. 329 also refers to this

when he has -

“apare tu padasyaiva
 taṃ arthaṃ pratijānate
 śabdāntarābhi-saṃbandhaṃ
 antareṇa vyavasthitam.”
 and also, V.P. II. 330 -
 “yasmin uccarite śabde
 yadā yóρθaḥ pratiyate,
 taṃ āhur arthaṃ tasyaiva
 nānyad arthasya lakṣaṇam.”

This theory therefore chooses to explain the subtle implications and suggestions - the whole of pratiyamāna artha i.e. implicit sense, as seen in poetry, also by this extended abhidhā power. So, for the anvitābhidhāna theory though there are many words in a sentence and therefore many word-meanings, they are meaningful only in the context of the total sentence-sense and therefore, through unity of purpose they give rise to unity of sentence - sense.

This theory has been strongly criticized by the Bhāṭṭa-school of Mīmāṃsakas. They argue as follows : Tattvabindu p. 93 - “padāntarasya vaiyarthyaṃ asrutānvayabodhane.” If it is held that the first word or any word in its full sense means the unitary sense of the sentence itself, the other words in the sentence will be superfluous. This argument is similar to the one raised against the sphoṭa theory also. It may be said that the subsequent words repeat the same sentence-sense and makes it clearer, or it can also be said that the other words are used to restrict the meaning indicated by the first word. Yet another objection against the anvitābhidhāna theory is that it involves the fallacy of interdependence - (p. 93, ibid) :

“śrutānvitābhidhāne tu
 vyaktaṃ anyonya-saṃśrayam.”

Thus, if one of the words, say the first, in a sentence, is to convey its own meaning as well as its relation to the other words, the full meaning of the word can be collected only after understanding the other words; and in the same way, the meanings of the other words depend on this word. If it is suggested that the individual word-meaning and its relation to other words are not conveyed simultaneously, but gradually, the individual word-meaning being conveyed first, and the relation later, then there will not be the fallacy of interdependence, but in

this case, this explanation will involve the unwarranted assumption of two separate functions for the primary power called abhidhā - (pp. 94, ibid) -

It is therefore that the anvitābhidhānavādins hold that there is only one potency for words to express the meaning as related to the rest of the words. It is through recollection that we remember the meanings of words, and this is by rousing the mental impressions of previous experiences of the use of the words. As a matter of experience, normally we never come across words except as related in a sentence and that isolated words have no existence in normal speech-activity. The word-meaning and the relation to other words are both known through abhidhā.

The Bhāṭṭa school has objection to this position also (Tattvabindu, p. 95). They hold that eventhough we observe words functioning in different contexts of situations, in all of which they occur as related to a sentence, still we are able to understand the isolated senses of the individual words separately also. Otherwise, a word learnt through from its use in one context, cannot be applied in another context. Again, the very principle of recognition is based on our capacity to recognize something isolated from a given context. We are able to recognize a person in a place and time different from those when we had met him first. (Tattvabindu, pp. 116). It can be argued here, that we do recognize a person, may be for a second time, also in some given time and place, and not as isolated of all situations.

A further objection raised against the anvitābhidhāna theory is that the meaning of a sentence can be known from the meanings of the words remembered eventhough the words might have been forgotten. Our experience says that in a long sentence we forget the earlier words used, but we remember their meanings and yet we arrive at the full sentence-sense. The Śāstradīpikā p. 153, observes :

“pūrvabhāgeṣu vākyasya
vismṛteṣv api dṛśyate,
vākyārthāvagatiḥ puṁsām
padārtha-smṛtiśālinām.”

The relation of the words in a sentence is not the same as that of the letters in a word; for in case of a word we do not arrive at word-sense if we forget the initial letters.

Abhihitānvaya-vāda :

The Bhāṭṭa-school of Mīmāṃsakas and some Naiyāyikas support this theory. The Vākyārtha section of the Nyāyaratnamālā and the Tattvabindu, Mānameyodaya

and the śabda section of the Siddhānta-muktāvali suggest the acceptance of abhihitānvayavāda by some Naiyāyikas also. For these theorists the meaning of a sentence is a correlated meaning of individual word-senses. From the sentence, first we collect individual word-meanings one by one and then we correlate these meanings with the help of ākāṅksā, yogyatā and saṃnidhi.

Śabara on Mī. Sū. I. i. 25, refers to this theory when he observes : “padāni hi svam svam arthaṃ abhidhāya, nivṛtta-vyāpārāṇi, arthedānīm padārthā avagatāḥ santo vākyārthaṃ gamayanti.” - Thus in a sentence the words make for their individual senses and stop at that. So the meanings of the words thus known make for the meaning of a sentence. But the Prābhākara explain this passage differently by taking ‘artha’ in the sense of ‘anvaya’ i.e. syntactic relation. Śālikanātha thus explains in the Vākyārtha-mātrkā-vṛtti, pp. 22 that by the word ‘artha’ the bhāṣyakāra means ‘anvaya’ - “artha-śabdena bhāṣyakāro’nvayaṃ āha.” But Kūmārila in his Tantravārttika, p. 445 has -

“padārthaiḥ padavijñatair,
vākyārthaḥ pratipadyate.”

- i.e. the meaning of a sentence is collected with the help of word-senses expressed through individual words. The sentence, like words, does not have a meaning of its own independently. It is observed - “pṛthag-bhūtair eva padair itaretara-nirapekṣaiḥ sveṣu padārtheṣu ukteṣu tatsaṃsargād eva padavyāpāra-anapekṣo vākyārtha-pratyayo bhavati.” - Thus, the meanings of words having been conveyed by each word, independently of one another, it is exclusively from the connection among word meanings, that there follows the apprehension of the sentence. The correlated meaning is brought about by the three factors such as ākāṅksā, yogyatā and saṃnidhi.

Tantravārttika, pp. 455 has -

“ākāṅksā saṃnidhānaṃ ca
yogyatā ceti ca trayam,
saṃbandha-kāraṇatvena
kṛtaṃ nā’nantara-śrutiḥ.”

We know that the grammarian Vājapyāyana held that the sentence-sense is the ‘saṃsarga’ or mutual correlation of individual word-senses expressed by words. The theory of Vyāḍi, as observed earlier, was a later one which held that the sentence-sense is a mutual exclusion of word-meanings. This developed into Apoha theory.

As to the nature of cognition produced by a word there are two views. The first one holds that by observing the contexts of situations we arrive at the word-sense. Thus a word indicates its meaning only by rousing the mental impressions of such contexts. So, ultimately, the knowledge of a word is only a kind of recollection. This view is held by the anvitābhīdhāna school of Prābhākaras and also by some from the abhihitānvaya school such as Cidānanda, the author of Nīti-tattvā”virbhāva. The Mānameyodaya observes - (p. 93) “śabda’pi saṃskārodbodhana-dvāreṇa eva padārthaṃ bodhayati iti saṃsargaṃ eva padārthajñānaṃ iti cidānanda-prabhṛtayaḥ (Nītitattvā”virbhāva, p. 233). Kumārila also refers to this view when he says that a word is nothing more than a reminder of the meaning - Ślokavārtika, p. 432, śabda-section observes :

“padaṃ abhyadhikābhāvāt
smārakaṃ na viśiṣyate.”

The Vākyārtha-mātrkā-vṛtti, p. 15, quotes a vārttika -

“te’pi naivāsmṛtā yasmād
vākyārthaṃ gamayanti naḥ,
tasmāt tatsmaraṇeṣv eva
saṃhateṣu pramāṇatā.”

Vācaspatimiśra also says that, the relation between the word and its meaning is, strictly speaking, that between a recollector and the recollected, and that a word does not produce the cognition of the meaning directly and independently, but by rousing the mental impressions of the things previously known. The Tattvabindu, p. 160 has - “vācya-vācakatvaṃ ca pratyāyya-pratyāyakatvaṃ tat ca vicāryamānaṃ smārya-smārakatvaṃ eva.” also see p. 159 - “na céyaṃ sāksād artha-dhiyaṃ ādhatte, yena na tat sādḥikā syāt, api tu saṃskārodbodhana-krameṇa.” - The Yogasūtra-bhāṣya III. 17. also has - “saṃketas tu pada-padārthayor itaretarādhyāsa-rūpaḥ smṛtyā”tmakaḥ.” But according to Pārthasārathimiśra and some others also, the meaning of a word is conveyed by the primary significative potency of the word i.e. by abhidhā. The Mānameyodaya pp. 93 has - “padaiḥ padārtha-bodhanaṃ śabda-śakti-janyatvāt abhidhānaṃ eva iti pārthasārathi-miśrā”dayaḥ.” Our experience suggests that the meaning is conveyed directly by a word and not indirectly through remembering the various contexts of situations in which a word was used. Again, it is easier to assume that the meaning flows directly from a given word through its power of expression, rather than to accept that it reminds us of our former experiences of situations when a particular word was used and thus gives us the meaning. The Nyāya-ratna-mālā, p. 107, has - “śabdāntaram artha-

pratyaya-darśanāt tasyaiva tatra kāraṇatvaṃ kalpayitum yuktaṃ, na tu śabdāt saṃskārōdbodhaḥ, tataś ca artha-pratitir iti yuktaṃ; prañālyāṃ pramāṇā'bhāvāt. tasmāt abhidhāyakam eva padaṃ, na smārakam."

According to the Abhihitānvayavādins, when we hear a sentence, we first of all collect the individual meanings of words in a sentence. This we do one after the other. Then these word-meanings are cor-related on the basis of expectancy, consistancy and juxta-position. Thus we collect the unified meaning of a given sentence - as a whole. The expression of individual meanings comes before the knowledge of the logical connection among them. The collective memory - samūhā"lambana-smṛti-puts the isolated ideas together. The individual word-meanings are remembered separately till all the words are heard. This is followed by the simultaneous cognition of the sentence meaning in which all word-meanings are properly cor-related to one another on the strength of ākāṅkṣā"di i.e. expectancy, etc. For the anvitābhidhāna theory, as we know, each word in a sentence, when spoken, contributes to the meaning of the sentence which is thus gradually revealed, leading to its full grasping at the end. This revelation of sentence-sense is getting clearer and clearer with the utterance of each subsequent words.

But for the abhihitānvayavāda, the sentence-sense is something plus, i.e. something more than the sum total of individual word-meanings. This additional sense arises after the word-meanings get inter-related through ākāṅkṣā"di. : "tātparyārtho viśeṣa-vapuḥ, apadārtho'pi vākyārthaḥ samullasati"—observes Mammata in the K.P. II. This unified sentence-sense is termed differently as 'vākyārtha', i.e. sentence-sense, or 'saṃsarga' or association of word-meanings, or tātparyārtha or purport or intention of the speaker. Where this speciality of signification comes from is difficult to explain. Some call it vākya-śakti or the power of a sentence. Others term it as 'saṃsarga-maryādā' or the 'law of association'. Still others advance a power called tātparya-śakti i.e. purport, the power of a sentence to convey the intended sense in form of a related and unified meaning. The V.P. II. 42 observes :

"saṃbandhe sati yattv anyad
ādhikyam upajāyate,
vākyārtham eva taṃ prāhur
aneka-pada-saṃśrayam."

Pṇṇyarāja observes on this - “padānām parasparānvaye padārtha-vaśād yad ādhikyam, saṃsargaḥ, sa vākyārthaḥ”. See also M.bh. I. p. 462 - on Vārttika 2 - on Pā. 2.3.46

“na vā vākyārthatvāt.”

- na vā vaktavyam. kiṃ kāraṇam ? vākyārthatvāt. yad atra ādhikyam vākyārthaḥ saḥ.

But how is this association or saṃsarga conveyed ? This is perhaps not satisfactorily explained. The individual words have completed their function of conveying their individual meaning. They cannot convey their inter-relation also and thus make for the sentence-sense. Words cannot convey their mutual relation directly because between the words and the sentence-sense, lie the individual word-senses. Thus, it is only the word-meanings that can be held responsible to convey the sentence-sense and this also in their mutually related form. This is the view of the anvitābhīdhānavādins. There is a slight difference between the Naiyāyikas and the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas regarding as to how this mutual relation is conveyed. For the Naiyāyikas the sentence-meaning is only the mutual relation of word-meanings. But the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas hold that the sentence-sense is always conveyed by the secondary power of words :

Tattvabindu p. 153 quotes Kumārila Bhāṭṭa -

“vākyārtho lakṣyamāṇa hi sarvatraiveti naḥ sthitiḥ.”

The two conditions of lakṣaṇā viz. mukhyārtha-bādha or incompatibility of the expressed sense, and ‘tadyoga’ i.e. relation between the primary sense and secondary intended sense are present here also. But this should not mean that the sentence-sense is not derived from words. Kumārila Bhāṭṭa observes that though the letters of words do convey the word-senses directly, but they do not stop at that. The knowledge of word-senses only is useless for the hearer. The conveying of individual meanings by the words has to be there for the cognition of the sentence-sense, as is the case of the generating of fire by fuel for cooking meals. The Śloka-vārttika, p. 943, and also the Tattvabindu p. 153 which quotes the same, has -

“sākṣād yady api kurvanti
padārtha-pratipādanam,
varṇās tathā’pi naitasmin
paryavasyanti niṣphale.”
vākyārthamitaye teṣāṃ
pravṛtttau nāntarīyakam,

pāke jvālēva kāsthānām
padārtha-pratipādanam.”

S. C. Chatterjee in his 'Nyāya Theory of knowledge', Uni. of Calcutta, 1939, explains as shown by Kunjunni Raja (p. 211, *ibid*) that the abhihitānvaya theory gains support for the following reasons : “If the words of a sentence have no separate meanings of their own, then the classification of words into nouns, adjectives, verbs, etc., becomes meaningless. Further, in every case in which we are to understand the meaning of a sentence, we must first understand the meaning of its component words. Without a previous understanding of words no one can understand the meaning of a sentence. Moreover if the meaning of a sentence were quite independent of the meaning of its constituent words, then any sentence could convey any meaning. Lastly, when we understand the meaning of a new verse, we do so obviously on the basis of our knowledge of words and their separate meanings. This cannot be explained by any understanding of the sentences, since they are new and unintelligible to us. So it is concluded that the meaning of a sentence is just the synthesis of the separate meanings of its words.”

Perhaps the anvitābhīdhānavāda is an advance over this. The fact is that the sentence-sense is more useful to both the speaker and the hearer. Later writers such as Mukula Bhaṭṭa tried to reconcile these two views. For him both these theories contain partial truth. He holds that if we look at from the point of view of a sentence, the anvitābhīdhānavāda stands to gain. He therefore suggests a combination of these views and calls it a theory of samuccaya. He also discusses the abhāva of these two. We have discussed in detail these views while dealing with abhidhā in Mukula's Abhidhāvṛtta-mātrkā (Ch. V).

Ālamkārikas - Tātparya : Abhinavagupta is perhaps the first Ālamkārika, who names tātparya as a separate vṛtti or function of words accepted by abhihitānvayavāda. He speaks of four distinct functions of words such as abhidhā, tātparya, lakṣaṇā and vyañjanā. Locana reads as follows : (under Dhv. I. 4, pp. 26, 28 Edn. Nandi) : ... “trayo hy atra vyāpārā samvedyante. padārtheṣu sāmānyā” tmasu abhidhāvvyāpārāḥ, samayāpekṣayārthāvagamana-śaktir hy abhidhā. samayaś ca tāvaty eva, na viśeṣāṁśe, ānantyād vyabhicārāccaikasya. tato viśeṣarūpe vākyārthe tātparyaśaktiḥ parasparānvite, “sāmānyāny anyathāsiddher viśeṣaṁ gamayanti hi” iti nyāyāt. na caivaṁ bhaktir eva dhvaniḥ. bhaktir hi lakṣaṇāvyāpāras trīyakakṣyā-niveṣi. caturthyāṁ tu kaksāyāṁ dhvana-vyāpārāḥ.... tena samayāpekṣā vācyāvagamana- śaktir abhidhāśaktiḥ. tad anyathā'nupapti-sahāyārthāvabodhanaśaktis tātparya-śaktiḥ. mukhyārtha-bādhā” di-sahakārya apekṣārtha-pratibhāsana-śaktir lakṣaṇāśaktiḥ. tat-śakti-trayopajanitārthāvagama-

mūlajāta-tat-pratibhāsa-pavitrita-pratipattṛ-pratibhā-sahāyārthādvadyotanaśaktir dhvanavyāpāraḥ. sa ca prāgvṛttaṃ vyāpāratrayaṃ nyakkurvan pradhānabhūtaḥ kāvyā”tmety āśayena niṣedhapramukhatayā ca prayojana-viśeṣopi niṣedha-viśaya ity uktam.”

Thus, abhidhā is the power of the words to signify the primary meaning which refers only to the class-jāti and not viśeṣa or the particular. In a sentence the individual words give only the isolated word-meaning with the help of abhidhā. The correlation or syntactic relation of these is conveyed by the tātparya-śakti of the words. The intention of the speaker, which is the general purport of a sentence is of course the unified sentence-sense. So, the words are considered to have a power to convey the syntactic relation among the various isolated word-meanings. This power is tātparyaśakti. Lakṣaṇā, the third power, comes in only when the primary word-meanings are not compatible with one another : “mukhyārtha-bādhāyāṃ lakṣaṇāyāḥ prakṛtiḥ. bādhā ca virodha-pratītiḥ eva.” (Locana).

Ānandavardhana does refer to ‘tātparya’ or intention of the speaker while dealing with the Mīmāṃsakas where he explains the difference in nature and scope of abhidhā and vyañjanā. But he never directly mentions or discusses the tātparya śakti as a power of word or sentence. He has an occasion to mention the ‘vākyārtha-padārtha-nyāya’ also. But here also he does not talk of the tātparya-vṛtti. He observes (pp. 312, ibid, under Dhv. III. 33) : “tad evaṃ śābdavyavahāre trayāḥ prakārāḥ. vācakatvaṃ guṇavṛttiḥ vyañjakatvaṃ ca. tatra vyañjakatve yadā vyaṅgyaprādhānyaṃ tadā dhvaniḥ...” We will deal with Ānandavardhana’s views in greater detail when we will look into Dhanika, later.

We have seen how Mukula has no business to talk about tātparya, however he has a detailed discussion concerning the abhihitānvayavāda and the anvitābhidhānavāda under his all encompassing abhidhā, as noted above. Kuntaka also had no business to talk of tātparya-vṛtti for his broader concept of vicitrā abhidhā covers everything.

It is interesting to note that Dhanāñjaya and Dhanika pick up the case of tātparya against vyañjanā or dhvani of Ānandavardhana. Dr. Raghavan (pp. 181-183) (Śr. pra) gives the text of Dhanika’s avaloka as read by Prof. Mm. S. Kuppaswami Sastri. It reads as : “nā’pi vākyārthatvaṃ vyaṅgyasya, tṛtīya-kakṣā viśayatvāt. tathā hi - ‘bhrama dhārmika’ ityādaḥ padārtha-viśayābhidhālakṣaṇa-prathama-kakṣātikrānta-kriyākāraka-samsargātmakavidhiviśaya-vākyārtha kakṣātikrānta-tṛtīya-kakṣātikrānto niṣedhā”tmā vyaṅgya-lakṣaṇarthāḥ vyañjaka-śaktyadhīnaḥ sphuṭam evāvabhāṣate. ato nā’sau vākyārthaḥ. nanu ca tṛtīya-kakṣā

viṣayatvaṃ aśrūyamāna-padārtha-tātparyeṣu 'viṣaṃ bhuñkshva' ityā"divākyeṣu niṣedhārthaviṣayeṣu pratiyate eva vākyārthe; na cātra vyañjakatvavādinā'pi vākyārthatvaṃ neṣyate, tātparyād ananyatvād dhvaneḥ. tanna; svārthasya dvitīyakakṣyāyāṃ aviśrantasya tṛtīyakakṣābhāvāt, saiva niṣedha-kakṣā tatra dvitīyakakṣā; vidhau kriyākāraka-saṃsargā-nupapatteḥ; prakaraṇāt pitari vaktari putrasya viṣabhakṣaṇa-niyogābhāvāt. rasavad-vākyeṣu ca vibhāva-pratipattilakṣaṇa-dvitīyakakṣāyāṃ rasānavagamāt. tad uktam -

apraṭiṣṭhaṃ aviśrantaṃ
svārthe yat paratām idam,
vākyam vigāhate tatra
nyāyyā tatpartāsya sā.
yatra tu svārtha-viśrantaṃ
praṭiṣṭhaṃ tāvad āgatam,
tat prasarpati tatra syāt
sarvatra dhvaninā sthitiḥ.

atrocyate -

“vācyā prakaraṇādibhyo
buddhisthā vā yathā kriyā,
vākyārthaḥ kārakairyuktaḥ
sthāyibhāvas tathetaraiḥ.”

yathā laukika-vākyeṣu śrūyamānakriyeṣu 'gām abhyāja' ityā"diṣu aśrūyamānakriyeṣu ca “dvāraṃ dvāraṃ”, ityā"diṣu sva-śabdopādānāt prakaraṇā"divaśād' buddhisanniveśinī kriyéva kārakópacitā vākyārthaḥ, tathā kāvyeṣvapi sva-śabdopādānāt kvacit, “prityai navodhā priyā” ityevaṃ ādau, kvacit ca prakaraṇā"di-vaśāt niyata-vihita-vibhāvā"dyavinābhāvād vā, sāksād bhāvaka-cetasi viparivartamānaḥ ratyā"diḥ sthāyī sva-sva-vibhāvānubhāva-vyabhicāribhiḥ tat-tat-śabdopanītaiḥ saṃskāra-paramparayā parāṃ praudhīm ānīyamānaḥ ratyā"divākyārthaḥ. na ca apadārthasya vākyārthatvaṃ nāstīti vācyam. kārya-paryavasāyitvāt tātparya-śakteḥ. tathā hi pauruṣeyaṃ a-pauruṣeyaṃ vākyam sarvaṃ kārya-param, a-tatparatve'nupādeyavāt, unmattā"di-vākyavat. kāvyasābdānāṃ ca anvaya-vyatirekābhyāṃ niratīśaya-sukhā"svāda-vyatirekeṇa pratipādyā-pratipādakayoḥ pravṛtti-viṣayayoḥ prayojanāntarānupalabdheḥ svādódbhūtir eva kāryatvena avadhāryate. tad udbhūtinimittatvaṃ ca vibhāvā"di-saṃsrṣṭasya sthāyina eva avagamyate. ato vākyasya-abhidhānaśaktiḥ tena tena rasena ākrṣyamānā tat-tat-

svādā'pekṣitāvāntara-vibhāvā”di-pratipādana-dvārā sva-paryavasāyitām āñiyate. tad etad vibhāvā”dayaḥ padārtha-sthāñiyāḥ tat-samsrṣṭo rasā”dir vākyārthaḥ, tad etad kāvya-vākyam, yadiyau tāv imau padārtha-vākyārthau. na ca evaṃ sati gītā”divad vācya-vācaka-bhāvā’nupayogaḥ, viśiṣṭa-vibhāvā”di-sāmagrī-viduṣām eva tathā-vidharatyādi-bhāvanāvatām eva svādhodbhuteḥ. tad anena atiprasaṅgo’pi nirastah. idrṣi ca vākyārtha-nirūpane parikalpitābhīdāśakti-vaśenaiva samstavākyārthā-vagateḥ śaktyantara-parikalpanam prayāsaḥ. yad avocāma kāvyanirṇaye -

tātparyānatirekāc ca vyañjakatvasya na dhvaniḥ,
kim uktam syād aśrutārtha-tātparye’nyokti rūpiṇi.
‘viṣaṃ bhakṣaya’ vākye yac caivaṃ pitṛ-sutā”diṣu,
prayujyate pradhānatvāt dhvanitvaṃ kena vāryate.
dhvaniś cet svārtha-viśrāntam vākyam arthāntarāśrayam,
tatparatvaṃ tv aviśrāntau, tanna, viśrānty asaṃbhavāt.
etāvatyeva viśrāntis tātparyasyēti kim kṛtam,
yāvat kārya-prasāritvāt, tātparyam na tulādhr̥tam.
bhrama dhārmika viśrabdhām iti bhrami-kṛtā”spadam,
nirvyāvṛtti katham vākyam niṣedham upasarpati.
pratipādyasya viśrāntir apekṣāpūraṇād yadi,
vaktur vivakṣitāprāpteḥ aviśrāntir na vā katham ?
pauruṣeyasya vākyasya vivakṣā-paratantratā
vaktrabhipreta-tātparyam ataḥ kāvyasya yujyate.” iti -

-ato na rasā”dīnām kāvyena saha vyañgya-vyañjakabhāvaḥ. kim tarhi ? bhāvya-bhāvaka-saṃbandhaḥ. kāvyam hi bhāvakaṃ, bhāvyaḥ rasā”dayaḥ. te hi svato’bhavanta eva bhāvakeṣu viśiṣṭa-vibhāvā”dimatā kāvyena bhāvvyante. na cānyatra śabdāntareṣu bhāvya-bhāvaka-lakṣaṇa-saṃbandhā’bhāvāt kāvya-śabdeṣvapi tathā bhāvyaṃ iti vācyam. bhāvanā-kriyāvādibhiḥ tathāṅgīkṛtatvāt. kiñca mā cānyatra tathā’stu anvaya-vyatirekābhyām iha tathāvagamāt.

tad uktam -

“bhāvābhinaya-sambaddhān
bhāvayanti rasān imān,
yasmāt tasmād amī bhāvāḥ
vijñeyā nāṭya-yokṭṛbhiḥ.” (N.S. VII. 4)

iti. katham punar agrhīta-saṃbandhebhyah padebhyah sthāyā”di-pratipattir iti cet, tathāvidha-ceṣṭā-yukta-strī-pumsādiṣu ratyādyavinā-bhāva-darśanāt ihā’pi tathopanibandhe sati ratyādyavinābhūta-ceṣṭā”di-pratipādaka-śabda-śravaṇād abhidheyāvinābhāvena lākṣaṇikī ratyādi-pratītiḥ. yathā ca kāvyārthasya rasa-bhāvakatvaṃ tathā agre vaksyāmaḥ.”

We will now look into this view. We know that for Ānandavardhana the two senses viz. vācya and vaṅgya are related to each other as subordinate and principal respectively when it is a case of dhvanikāvya. The two senses being not of equal merit do not harm the principle of eka-vākyatva or ‘vākyaikārthya’. But it is only when the suggested sense is principal, that the tātparyaavādin would hold that it naturally comes under the intention of the speaker and as such it should be labelled as ‘tātparya’ or purport and not dhvani. Dhanañjaya and Dhanika are advocates of the tātparya-śakti or purport and challenge the dictates of Ānandavardhana. Dhanika first gives a brief exposition of dhvanivāda. He observes that the suggested sense cannot be the sentence-sense, as it falls in the third stage. Thus ‘dhvani’ cannot be ‘tātparya’ of a sentence. In such examples as, “bhrama dhārmika...” etc. the first stage is padārtha i.e. word-sense, which is derived by abhidhāśakti or power of expression. The second stage is that of vākyārtha i.e. sentence-sense, i.e. tātparya in form of an injunction i.e. vidhi such as ‘bhrama’ or ‘move around’. The suggested sense appears in the third stage and is different in nature, it being negation or niṣedha. This ‘niṣedha’ is arrived at with the help of a śakti or power called vyañjanā or suggestion. This forms the view of Ānandavardhana as presented by Dhanika in his Avaloka, as a prima facie view. Dhanika further argues as follows. He observes that all cases of tātparya are not cases of the second stage. In expressions such as, “viṣaṃ bhuṅkṣva” addressed by a father to his son, the meaning is exactly the opposite. The expressed sense is an injunction viz. “eat poison”. But the father’s intention seems to be that his son should know that it is better to eat poison than to eat at the (enemy’s) house. The sense is, “do not eat at his house; better eat poison than eat in his house.” In this expression, viz. “eat poison”, there are three stages wherein vidhi-injunction and niṣedha/prohibition appear as second and third stages. Even the third stage here is only vākyārtha and tātparya. So the vyāpti or rule or invariable concomitance that vyaṅgya is the third stage does not hold good. The reply to this is that a father’s injunction to his own son to eat poison appears absolutely absurd. So, the sentence obviously would mean something else. The real meaning of this expression, viz. prohibition of eating at the enemy’s place is also at the second stage only and not at the third stage. The rule that vyaṅgya comes after

the second stage therefore stands. In case of rasa-realization, there is only the knowledge of vibhāvā^{dis} at the second stage. Only in the third stage the rasa is realized. It is proper to hold tātparya in those cases where there is no completeness of sense or exhaustion of expressed sense and the words tend to mean something else and stop only at that. But in such cases where words stop with conveying their expressed sense, and where no incompleteness or unintelligibility is noticed and yet from this complete expressed sense arises another meaning the case is one of dhvani.

The point of discussion is this. The tātparyavādin presses that tātparya is not exhausted with collection of the first expressed sense. It is a-viśrānta. For the dhvanivādin it is viśrānta, with the collection of the expressed sense. The further sense is arrived at through vyañjanā. For the tātparyavādin this further meaning is also tātparya and projection of vyañjanā is meaningless. For the tātparyavādin, there is no limit to tātparya. It is not the sum total of individual word-senses only. Tātparya for him extends over the whole range of the speaker's intention and covers all implications coming up with the directly expressed sense. ‘tātparyaṃ na tulādhṛtam’. You do not have to hold tātparya in a balance.

In the illustration viz. ‘bhrama dhārmika, etc.’ the stopping of the religious person from going to the banks of the river Godavarī is the chief intention of the speaker and is therefore included in the tātparya. There is no need to postulate vyañjanā/dhvani : “tātparya-anatirekāc ca vyañjakatvatya, na dhvaniḥ.” The dhvanivādin may argue as follows : If it is held by the tātparyavādin that the intention of the speaker is the indication of extent of the tātparya of his utterance, and therefore the implied and suggested matter is also tātparya, the answer of the dhvanivādin is that the tātparya of a vākya, like abhidhā of a pada is limited in its scope and can give only the bear meanings of all the words put together in a grammatical order, and that the suggested ideas are not invariably associated through convention or samaya, that dhvani exists also in sounds which do not convey dictionary meaning (i.e. which are a-vācaka), and that dhvani or suggestion is possible even in tunes of music and is conveyed by gestures also where there is no sound at all : Again dhvani must be accepted for cases of realization of rasas which cannot be experienced through abhidhā or mention of the name of a particular rasa. If suggestion/dhvani is not accepted says the dhvanivādin, and if only tātparya is accepted, then the tātparyavādin will have to accept that rasa is realized by abhidhā and tātparya also. Thus for the tātparyavādin ‘sva-śabda-vācyatva’ of rasa will not only have to be discarded as a poetic blemish, but will have to be accepted as a possible way of rasa-experience.

To this Dhanika says 'yes'. He says that ordinarily we speak two types of sentences such as one in which a verb is directly mentioned and the other one in which a verb is not mentioned. The instance of the first is, "gām abhyāja". i.e. drive away the cow. The verb is clearly mentioned in this. In the other instance, viz. "dvāraṃ dvāraṃ", meaning "door... door", the speaker wants to convey that the listener may please shut the door. Thus through context alone, the action of closing the door, which is at the mental level, is conveyed - "yathā laukika-vākyeṣu śrūyamānakriyeṣu, 'gām abhyāja' ityādiṣu, a-śrūyamānakriyeṣu ca 'dvāraṃ dvāraṃ' ityādiṣu, sva-śabdopādānāt, prakaraṇā" divaśāt buddhi-sanniveśinī kriyaiva kārakopacitā vākyārthaḥ..." The case of rasa-realization is akin to this. Mostly in poetry 'rasa' is not directly expressed and rasa is arrived at through vibhāvas etc. which have an invariable concomitance with rasa-experience. But at times, even in poetry there is mentioning of rasa through its name also e.g. in "prītyā navoḍhā priyā".

All sentences such as 'gām abhyāja' or 'dvāraṃ dvāraṃ', terminate in some activity. Similarly all poetic expressions end in a 'kriyā' called 'svādodbhūti' or rasa/ taste-experience, i.e. the manifestation of relish which is the sthāyin nourished to that extent. Towards this end, i.e. relish, all poetry is addressed. Thus vibhāvāḥ dis form the word-units i.e. padārthas leading to the sentence-unit or vākyārtha, the sthāyin. This sthāyin is enjoyed by the bhāvaka. This is ābhidhānikī-ratyādi-pratītiḥ. Now Dhanika holds that if this apprehension does not clear the issue, then the understanding of the sthāyin from the vibhāvas etc. may be held as arriving through lakṣaṇā, i.e. lākṣaṇika-ratyādi-pratītiḥ, i.e. apprehension or rati etc. through secondary usage. This could resemble Kumārila's position which takes 'ākhyātārtha' as 'lakṣya'. Dhanika, in order to make the process less prosaic, calls it bhāvya-bhāvaka-saṃbandha like Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka. He quotes Bharata "bhāvayanti rasān yasmāt tasmād bhāvāḥ", (N.S. VII. 4) in his support.

He says : "ato na rasā" dīnāṃ kāvyena saha vyaṅgya-vyañjaka-bhāvāḥ kim tarhi ? bhāvya-bhāvaka-saṃbandhaḥ. kāvyam hi bhāvakam, bhāvyaḥ rasā" dayāḥ.

We know that for obvious difficulties in accepting this broader concept of tātparya, it could not hold good before vyañjanāvāda. The fourfold division of word powers into abhidhā, tātparya, lakṣaṇā and vyañjanā by Abhinavagupta was so logical that Dhanañjaya/Dhanika's onslaught could not stand. Actually if tātparya is inclusive of vyaṅgya, over and above the sum-total of word-senses in a sentence, then it is another name of vyañjanā. We will go to see how Viśvanātha removes all air from the sail of tātparya later.

We will now turn to Bhoja.

‘Tātparya’ in Bhoja :

We will first go along with Dr. Raghavan who has ably explained Bhoja’s position. After that we will try to see if we can differ from or supplement the efforts of Dr. Raghavan. We will quote the full text in the beginning. (pp. 246, Śr. Pra. Edn. Josyer) :

yatparaḥ śabdaḥ sa śabdārthaḥ iti tātparyam. tac ca vākya eva upapadyate. padamātrena abhiprāyasya prakāśayitum āśakyatvāt.

tac ca vākya-pratipādyam vastu trirūpaṃ bhavati; abhidhīyamānam, pratiyamānam, dhvanirūpaṃ ca. yatra yad upātta-śabdeṣu mukhya-gauṇī-lakṣaṇā”dibhiḥ śabda-śaktibhiḥ svaṃ arthaṃ abhidhāya uparata-vyāpāreṣu ākāṅkṣā-sannidhi-yogyatā”dibhir vāk्यārtha-mātram abhidhīyate, tad abhidhīyamānam. yathā-gaur gacchatīti vāk्यārthāvagater uttarakālam vāk्यārthe upapadyamāno’nupapadyamāno vārtha-prakaraṇaucityā”di-sahakṛtau yat pratyāyayati tat pratiyamānam. yathā ‘viṣaṃ bhuṅksva, mā cāsya grhe bhuṅkthāḥ”, ity ukte varam viṣaṃ bhakṣitam, na punar asya grhe bhuktaṃ iti pratiyate. artha-śabdōpāyād upasarjanikṛta-svārtho, vāk्यārthāvagater anantaram anunādarūpaṃ pratiśabdarūpaṃ vā abhivyañjayati tad dhvanirūpaṃ.

tac ca na sārvaśrīkam. tathā hi, yathā nivṛtte abhigāte kasyacid eva kāmṣyā”der dravyasya anunādo jāyate, kasyacid eva kandarā”deḥ pratiśabdaḥ., yathā kasyacid eva vāk्यasya pratiyamānā”bhidhīyamāna-vāk्यārtha-pratīter anantaram dhvanir upalabhyate iti. ‘nimiṣati eṣa’ ityukte akṣnor nimeṣo”bhidhīyate, devī na bhavati iti pratiyate. rūpātīśayaś ca dhvanati. atha eṣaṃ prayogaḥ -

tatrābhidhīyamānam caturdhā - vidhirūpaṃ, niṣedharūpaṃ, vidhi-niṣedharūpaṃ, a-vidhi-niṣedharūpaṃ ca. ...

pratiyamānam punar anekadhā

kvacid vidhau niṣedhaḥ.....

kvacinniṣedhe vidhiḥ,.....

kvacid vidhau vidhyantaram.....

kvacinniṣedhe niṣedhāntaram.....

kvacid vidhi-niṣedhe niṣedhaḥ.....

kvacid a-vidhi-niṣedhe niṣedhaḥ.....

kvacid vidhi-niṣedhayor vidhyantaram.....

kvacid vidhi-niṣedhayor niṣedhāntaram.....

kvacid vidhau an-ubhayam.....

kvacin niṣedhe anubhayam.....

kvacid vidhiniṣedhayor anubhayam.....

kvacid a-vidhi-niṣedhe anubhayam.....

..... pratīyamāna-abhidhiyamāna-vākyaṛthānām ānantyād dhvanirūpaṃ api aneka-prakāram. dhvaniś ca dvidhā. artha-dhvaniḥ, śabdadhvaniś ca. taylor artha-dhvanir anunāda dhvanirūpaḥ pratiśabda-dhvanirūpaś ca. (pp. 253). evaṃ laukike'pi vacasi abhidhiyamānaṃ pratīyamānaṃ tātparityaṃ ca paryālocanīyaṃ iti. etena kāvya-vacasor dhvani-tātparityayoś ca kvacit samplavo'pi vyākhyātaḥ. -

On pp. 251, 252 we read “evaṃ anye'pi mahākaviprayogeṣu dhvani-viśeṣā gaveṣaṇīyāḥ, iti yad uktam, tātparityaṃ eva vacasi, dhvanir eva kāvye, ityādi :

kaḥ puṇaḥ, kāvya-vacasor dhvani-
tātparityayor viśeṣaḥ ? nanūktaṃ purastāt;
yad avakraṃ vacaḥ śāstre
loke ca, vaca eva tat,
vakraṃ yad arthavādā”dau
tasya kāvyaṃ iti smṛtiḥ.
yad abhiprāya-sarvasvaṃ
vaktur vākyaṭ pratiyate,
tātparityaṃ arthadharmas
tacchabdadharmaḥ punar-dhvaniḥ,
saubhāgyaṃ iva tātparityam
āntaro guṇa iṣyate,
vagdevatāyā lāvanyamiva
bāhyas taylor dhvaniḥ.
adūra-viprakarṣāt tu
dvayena dvayam ucyate,
yathā surabhi-vaiśākhau
madhu-mādhava-saṃjñayā.” iti.

Now we will first quote at length from Dr. Raghavan (pp. 161, Śr. pra) along

with our observations. He observes -

“What is Bhoja’s Tātparya ? The tātparya-śakti refuted by Ānandavardhana is the Mīmāṃsaka’s. Upholding it, Dhanika says that it is not necessary to recognise a new function called dhvani.”

We may add that it could be true that Ānandavardhana discarded tātparya of the Mīmāṃsakas, without of course naming the same. We know that Ānanda uses the term ‘tātparya’ meaning ‘intention of the speaker’ and not the ‘tātparya-vṛtti’, though of course Abhinavagupta mentions it in the strict Mīmāṃsaka sense of the Abhihitānvayavādins and takes it to be the second śabda-vṛtti, counted after abhidhā and before lakṣaṇā, vyañjanā being the tūriyā. So, Dr. Raghavan’s observation seems to be slightly off the mark. Actually ‘tātparya’ is used in various senses by Ānandavardhana as quoted by Dr. Raghavan himself and we will go to see it later.

Dr. Raghavan (pp. 161, *ibid*) proceeds, “Bhoja follows in the gap between the two and greets both with both his hands.” We know that Dhanika’s tātparya is more extended than that of the Mīmāṃsakas. For Dhanika tātparya comes after abhidhā and lakṣaṇā and it includes the whole meaning of a given sentence, be it only abhidhārtha, or one with lakṣyārtha, or one charged with even vyaṅgyārtha on top of both these, i.e. abhidhārtha and lakṣyārtha. Thus Dhanika’s and so also Dhanañjaya’s concept of tātparya is unique and it crosses the limits of mīmāṃsaka’s traditional tātparya, not acceptable to the dhvanivādins as a vehicle of the suggested sense.

Dr. Raghavan is perhaps near the truth when he observes that ‘Bhoja greets both’ i.e. the dhvani-vādin and also Dhanika simultaneously. His observation is near the truth because Bhoja talks of both ‘tātparya’ and ‘dhvani’ in the same breath. Dhanika totally discards dhvani but Bhoja has a place for it. But we will have to carefully read between the lines and try to underline the exact difference between these two concepts of ‘tātparya’ and ‘dhvani’ as advocated by Bhoja. We will go to see further how we beg to differ from Dr. Raghavan. But for the present, a fuller quotation from Dr. Raghavan who observes... (pp. 161, *ibid*).

“He accepts Ānandavardhana’s Dhvani and his adversaries’ Tātparya. Tātparya is used by Bhoja in two meanings, one larger and another a more restricted one. While he speaks of tātparya as a one of the four kevala-śabda-sambandha-śaktis, (vṛtti, vivakṣā, tātparya, and pravibhāga), he uses tātparya in a larger sense. Under it comes the Abhidhiyamāna vākyārtha, which Ānandavardhana urges must be the

proper meaning of tātparya. But Bhoja brings under it Ānandavardhana's dhvani, as Dhanika and other earlier critics of Ānandavardhana urged. The abhidhīyamāna is not called exactly tātparya. A special śakti like that is not called forth by Bhoja for the primary import of a sentence, as by the Mīmāṃsakas. The primary sense of a sentence he says, is got by ākāṅkṣā, sannidhi, yogyatā etc., when the words themselves deliver the meaning of each through abhidhā, lakṣaṇā, or gaunī, śakti. Or, as Kumārasvamin puts it, the very sentence in proper grammatical build gives its vākyārtha by its own inherent nature. : “tarhy atra saṃsarga-rūpo vākyārthaḥ katham pratiyata iti cet, tārkkikāṇām iva vākyamahimnā, na punaḥ tātparyeṇa mīmāṃsakāṇām iva iti brūmaḥ. ata eva te varṇayanti ākāṅkṣā”dimatve sati padānām padārthānām vā samanvayaśaktiḥ vākyam. tad balā’yāto vākyārthaḥ.” (pp. 32-33 Pratāparudrīya vyākhyā, Bālaṃanorama Edn.).”

Now here we have to scrutinize this observation of Dr. Raghavan as supported by Kumārasvāmin on the Pratāparudrīya.

Dr. Raghavan's two remarks above need attention. As quoted above we read - “While he speaks of Tātparya as one of the four kevala-śabda-sambandha-śaktis, he uses Tātparya in the larger sense. Under it comes the Ābhidhīyamāna vākyārtha which Ānandavardhana urges must be the proper meaning of Tātparya. The Abhidhīyamāna is not called exactly tātparya.”

Now these two statements seem to contradict one another. Bhoja's words as quoted above read - (pp. 246, Edn. Josyer, Śr. Pra) -

“yatparaḥ śabdaḥ sa śabdārtha iti tātparyam. tac ca vākya eva upapadyate padamātreṇa abhiprāyasya prakāśayitum aśakyatvāt.

tac ca vākya-pratipādyam vastu tri-rūpaṃ bhavati. abhidhīyamānam, pratiyamānam, dhvanirūpaṃ ca. yatra yad-upātta-śabdeṣu mukhya-gauna-lakṣaṇā”dibhiḥ śabda-śaktibhiḥ svam artham abhidhāya uparatavyāpāreṣu ākāṅkṣā-sannidhi-yogyatā”dibhir vākyārthamātram abhidhīyate tad abhidhīyamānam.”

Thus for Bhoja there is clear recognition of what he calls abhidhīyamāna-tātparya arrived at as vākyārtha. True, he has called tātparya to be “kevala-śabda-sambandha śakti”, thus we can equate it - at least so far as ‘abhidhīyamāna tātparya’ goes, - with the ‘tātparya’ of the Mīmāṃsakas. That Bhoja also calls, it a ‘śabda-śakti’ is absolutely clear. So Dr. Raghavan's remarks as quoted above do not explain exactly what is intended by Bhoja. Even Kumārasvāmin on Pratāparudra as quoted by Dr. Raghavan (pp. 161, ibid) also seems to be off the mark. Bhoja clearly calls the four viz. vṛtti, vivakṣā, tātparya and pravibhāga as “kevala-śabda-

sambandha-śaktayah”. The ‘Vākyamahimā’ of the tārīkikas is at least a recognition of the Mīmāṃsakatātparya, be it not an overt one. But Bhoja has his own tradition and his own terminology.

It should be very clear in our minds that Bhoja accepts three-fold tātparya viz. abhidhīyamāna, pratīyamāna and dhvani. The first one is purely the tātparya of the Mīmāṃsakas. The second is reserved for implicit sense in sentences used in ordinary parlance, such as ‘viśaṃ bhukṣva...’ etc. Pratīyamāna thus should be equated with the unspoken intension of the speaker, not directly expressed- i.e. abhidhīyamāna-in a statement. The word ‘dhvani’ is reserved by Bhoja for ‘poetic intention’ covered by poetic expression. ‘Dhvani-tātparya’ for Bhoja is met with only in the domain of what we call poetry or literature and never in ‘loka’ - worldly context or in discourses of various disciplines, i.e. śāstra. “tātparyam eva vacasi dhvanireva kāvyē” would mean only this. By ‘vacas’, Bhoja means language as used in loka and śāstra alone, and ‘kāvyā’ is absolutely different from this ‘vacas’. So, poetic intention of a kāvyā-vākya is ‘dhvani-tātparya’ for Bhoja. But we should again very carefully note that Bhoja never mentions ‘vyañjanā’ in this context. So, his dhvani-tātparya i.e. poetic intention would equate with ‘vicitrā abhidhā’ of Kuntaka which embraces in its fold every poetic expressions at all levels such as abhidhā, lakṣaṇā and also vyañjanā. Bhoja’s ‘pratīyamāna’ is a special term clubbed with intention of a speaker at worldly parlance. It is all implicit sense in ordinary conversation. It is anything but poetic. Everything that is poetic is all ‘dhvani-tātparya’ for Bhoja. This is clear thinking.

In view of the above, I would venture to observe with due respect for Dr. Raghavan that his observation, viz. “He even goes so far as to restrict the name tātparya to the suggested, that is, to Dhvani, within which we can include his Pratīyamāna also. Therefore, Bhoja’s position is a compromise and at a later stage, it deserts Dhanika and others to follow Ānandavardhana and makes Tātparya a name for dvani” - (pp. 162) - is off the mark. Bhoja’s ‘pratīyamāna’ is implied sense i.e. sense not directly expressed in sentences used at ordinary parlance. This can never be identical with, or this can never be included in ‘Dhvani’ of Bhoja, which is for him “implicit sense in a poetic expression, i.e. kāvyā alone.” Dr. Raghavan further discusses Vidyānātha’s view which we will pick up in due course later.

Dr. Raghavan himself partly comes to realize what we have observed above when he says, (pp. 163, ibid) -

“Both the sections on Dhvani in the 6th and 7th chapters of the Śr. Pra (pp. 221, and pp. 251-2 Edn. Josyer) close with the following verses - (Actually the Ch. 7 does

not close with these verses) -

“tātparyam eva vacasi, dhvanir eva kāvye
saubhāgyam eva guṇa-saṃpadi vallabhasya.
lāvaṇyam eva vapuṣi svadate’ṅganāyāḥ
śṛṅgāra eva hr̥di mānavato janasya.”

and,

yad-abhiprāya-sarvasvaṃ vaktur vākyāt pratiyate
tātparyam, artha-dharmas tat, śabda-dharmaḥ punar dhvaniḥ.
saubhāgyam iva tātparyam āntaro guṇa iṣyate
vāgdevatāyā lāvaṇyam iva, bāhyas tayor dhvaniḥ,
adūra-viprakarṣāt tu dvayena dvayam ucyate,
yathā surabhi-vaiśākhau madhu-mādhava-saṃjñayā.”

In ordinary speech and writing, the purport is called Tātparya; but the purport in poetic expression is called Dhvani. It is even as the same Caitra and Vaiśākha months are called, from another point of view, Madhu and Mādhava, or to add a further illustration, the Kāraṇa, Kārya and Sahakārin of the world are called in kāvya, the Vibhāva, Anubhāva, and Sañcārin. And what is the difference in the nature of the ordinary utterance and the poetic utterance, that the purports in the two cases must be called by two different names, Tātparya, and Dhvani ? Ordinary talk and writing is ‘a-vakra’ not beautiful; poetic expression is ‘vakra’, beautiful -

“yad avakram vacaḥ śāstre
loke ca vaca eva tat
vakram yad arthavādātau
tasya kāvyam iti smṛtiḥ.”

Dr. Raghavan further observes - (pp. 164) - “Therefore a more graceful name for tātparya is dhvani; this is the idea we get from the two verses of Bhoja, ‘tātparyam eva vacasi’ etc. and, ‘yad avakram... etc.’ But suddenly he turns the statement the other way and says that the Abhiprāya, the entire intended idea, is a quality of artha. That is, Tātparya is artha-dharma; Dhvani on the other hand is śabda-dharma. What does Bhoja mean by this ? Does he mean that, looked at from the point of view of the śabda it is Dhvani and, from that of artha, Tātparya ? Or that Dhvani is the name of the vyañjaka-śabda and that Tātparya is the name of vyaṅgya-Artha ? That Dhvani is the vyañjanā śabda-vyāpāra and

Tātparya is its result ? Or, does he mean that śabda-dhvani is Dhvani and artha-dhvani is tātparya ? The last is clearly impossible; for he speaks of Dhvani as pertaining to both śabda and Artha. Again, there is more poetry than scientific analysis when Bhoja says that Tātparya is internal, is the saubhāgya of vāk or speech, and Dhvani is external, the lāvaṇya of vāk. Another attempt, Bhoja makes to clarify the issue; he says in conclusion that you can call either by either name; they are identical; just as the months of Caitra and Vaiśākha, so called from an astronomical point of view, are called Madhu and Mādhava from another point of view, by two other names, so also purport of an expression can be called Tātparya or Dhvani. To sum up :

(1) Bhoja accepts Ānandavardhana's Dhvani (2) He first calls it a department of Tātparya, but finally says that the two are identical. In the latter stage, Tātparya does not include Abhidhīyamāna-Vākyārtha, but is a name of the pratiyamāna and the Dhvanyamāna Arthas.

(3) Bhoja makes an artificial division of the suggested element to pratiyamāna and the Dhvanirūpa, which is unnecessary.

(4) The distinction into Dhvani of Alamkāra, Vastu and Rasā'di found in Ānandavardhana is absent from Bhoja.

(5) 'Upasarjanīkṛta-svārthatva' is mentioned by Bhoja as part of the definition of Dhvani, but its implications are not realized and worked out. "Dhvanikāvya where Dhvani is predominant, Guṇibhūta-vyaṅgya and citra-kāvya or Avyaṅgya" is other classification of Ānandavardhana, missed in Bhoja."

We will now try to discuss Dr. Raghavan's observations at length. Before we start analysing his observations, we may express our hunch, and perhaps the observation may be nearer the truth, that when Bhoja talks of "saubhāgya" and "lāvaṇya" in the above quotation, he borrows these terms and their connotation as seen in Kuntaka first.

We know that Kuntaka talks of three mārgas such as sukamāra mārga, vicitra mārga and madhyama mārga. In both sukamāra and vicitra mārgas we find lāvaṇya with different connotation. 'Madhyama' as the name itself suggests is a pleasing mixture of the two having a separate identity of a mixed variety. But Kuntaka later adds 'aucitya' and 'saubhāgya' as excellences common to the three mārgas. The 'aucitya' puts stress on fitness of words and ideas, while 'saubhāgya' arises out of the realization of all the resources of a composition. We will examine this with apt quotations from Kuntaka as follows :

'lāvanya' as manifested in the sukumāra mārḡa is defined as - (pp. 49, Edn. K. Kris.)

“evaṃ prasādaṃ abhidhāya lāvanyaṃ lakṣayati -
 “varṇa-vinyāsa-vicchitti-
 pada-saṃdhāna-saṃpadā,
 svalpayā bandha-saundaryam
 lāvanyaṃ abhidhīyate.” (V.J., I. 32)

bandho varṇa-vinyāsaḥ, tasya saundaryam rāmaṇīyakam lāvanyaṃ abhidhīyate, lāvanyaṃ ity ucyate. kīdrśam ? varṇānām akṣarāṇām vinyāso, vicitraṃ nyasanam, tasya vicchittiḥ, śobhā vaidagdhya-bhaṅgī, tayā lakṣitam padānām sup-tiṇ-antānām saṃdhānam saṃyojanam, tasya saṃpat, sā'pi śobhaiva, tayā lakṣitam. kīdrśyā ? ubhaya-rūpayā'pi svalpayā manān mātrayā nāti-nirbandha-nirmittayā. tad ayaṃ atra arthaḥ-śabdārtha-saukumārya-subhagaḥ sanniveśa-mahimā lāvanyarūpo guṇaḥ kathyate -

(Trans. K. Kris. pp. 335, 336) - “After perspicuity, grace is explained -

When even a little beauty in respect of alleterative syllables and in the choice of diction results in the charm of syntax and contributes to the strikingness of style, we have the excellence called 'grace'. (32)

Syntax refers to effective sentence-construction. Its charm is designated 'grace'. It is characterised by the beauty of alleterative syllables on one hand and in the choice of striking diction on the other. But both these contributory elements remain only in the background and do not attract forced attention as they are created by the poet effortlessly. The idea is the charm in syntactic construction with striking edge and tenderness in words and meanings is regarded as excellence called 'grace'.

The 'lāvanya' as revealed in vicitra-mārḡa is defined by Kuntaka at V.J. I. 47 - as

“atrāluṭpa-visargāntaiḥ
 padaiḥ protaiḥ parasparam,
 hr̥svaiḥ saṃyoga-pūrvaiś ca
 lāvanyaṃ atiricyate.” (I. 47)

- asminn evaṃvidhaiḥ padair lāvanyaṃ atiricyate, paripoṣaṃ prāpnoti.

kīdrśaiḥ ? parasparam anyonyaṃ protaiḥ saṃśleṣaṃ nītaiḥ. anyac ca kīdrśaiḥ ?

alupta-visargāntaiḥ, alupta-visargāḥ śrūyamāṇa-visarjanīyā antā yeṣāṃ tāni tathoktāni, taiḥ. hr̥svaiś ca laghubhiḥ. samyogebhyaḥ pūrvaiḥ. atiricyate iti sambandhaḥ. tad idaṃ atra tātparyam - pūrvokta-lakṣaṇam lāvaṇyam vidyamānam anena atiriktatām nīyate.

(Trans. K. Kris. pp. 348, 349, ibid) -

“By words without elision of the final aspirates and in euphonic combination with each other, and by syllables which precede conjuncts, ‘grace’ is enriched.” (I. 47)

In the ‘brilliant’ style, the quality of ‘grace’ gets enriched by the use of the following : words which mutually coalesce in harmonious combination; which contain final aspirate sounds without elision, i.e. with fully intonated aspirates at the end, and with short syllables preceding conjunct consonants. The idea is that besides the features already noted of ‘grace’ under the ‘elegant’, these new additions will enrich it in the ‘brilliant’.

‘Aucitya’ and ‘Saubhāgya’ go with all the mārgas. ‘Saubhāgya’ is defined at V.J. I. 55 as - (pp. 69, ibid)

“evaṃ aucityam abhidhāya saubhāgyam abhidhatte -

‘ity upādeya-varge’smin

yad artham pratibhā kaveḥ,

samyak samrabhate tasya

guṇaḥ saubhāgyam ucyate.” (I. 55)

- ity evaṃvidhe asmin upādeyavarge śabdā”dyupeya-samūhe yad artham, yannimittam kaveḥ sambandhinī pratibhā śaktiḥ samyak, sāvadhāntayā samrabhate, vyavasyati, tasya vastunaḥ prastutatvāt kāvyābhidhānasya yo guṇaḥ sa saubhāgyam iti ucyate bhanyate.

tac ca na pratibhā-samrambha-mātra-sādhyam, kintu tad-vihita-samasta-sāmagrī-sampādyam, iti āha -

“sarva-sampat-parispand-

sampādyam sarasā”tmanām,

alaukika-camatkāra-kāri

kāvyaika-jīvitam.” (I. 56)

sarva-sampat-parispanda-sampādyam sarvasyopādeyarāśer yā sampattir-
anavadyatā-kāṣṭhā tasyāḥ parispandaḥ sphuritatvam tena sampādyam nispādanīyam.

anyac ca kīdrśam ? sarasā"tmanām ādracetāsām alaukika-camatkāra-kāri, lokottarā"hlāda-vidhāyi. kiṃ bahunā ?, tac ca kāvyaika-jīvitam, kāvyasya paraḥ paramārthaḥ, ity arthaḥ - [Trans. K. Kris. pp. 354, 355, ibid]

"In the wide-ranging material before the poet, that which is pitched upon by the genius of the poet for its activity endows the whole with the quality of 'splendour'. (I. 55)

The poet has before him a lot of raw material like words and so on, awaiting to be picked up. Now the poet's genius selects only one amidst them to show its wonderous capacity and since that becomes most relevant to the poetic activity as a whole, there arises a quality which is designated as 'splendour'.

In fact it is a quality which can not be achieved merely by the activity of creator genius either; one and all the different constituents will have to co-operate in bringing it about :

'It is something attained by the full co-operation of all the constituent elements and it is something which surely results in an extra-ordinary aesthetic effect in the mind of the connoisseurs; in short, it is the whole and sole essence of poetry.' (I. 56)

The first epithet explains how each and every constituent in the vast raw material available to the poet, should shine at its best without a single flaw. It is only then that the over-all literary quality of 'splendour' is achieved. The second epithet points out that its appeal to the sensitive tastes of connoisseurs is unfailing and extra-ordinary. In a word it deserves to be the life-essence or 'sine quanon' of poetry."

Perhaps here lies Bhoja's original inspiration of his treatment of - 'prabandha-guṇas'. Dr. Raghavan observes about these (pp. 314) : "Bhoja gives here a list of features which go to make up the best poem. It is almost a statement of the criticism of work as a whole. śabda-guṇas are the physical or formal features; Artha-guṇas pertain to the content and theme; the ubhaya-guṇas embrace both." ... (pp. 315 ibid) "These features of the Prabandha are called guṇas by Bhoja because they contribute to the beauty of the poem".

Though Bhoja does not directly name 'lāvanya' and 'Saubhāgya' as guṇas, he does mention them here while treating 'tātparya'. Let us see it once again.

He observes that, that which is 'tātparya' or purport in ordinary speech is termed 'dhvani' in poetry. Here we may say that Bhoja's 'dhvani' is not 'principal suggested sense' alone. But whatever is the puport of a beautiful poetic-expression, whatever

may be labelled as ‘aesthetic’ in poetry at any level - expressed, indicated and also suggested - is ‘dhvani’ ‘principal purport of a beautiful poetic expression.’

Then Bhoja explains this ‘dhvani’ in ‘kāvyā’ as

“saubhāgyaṃ eva guṇa-sampadi vallabhasya
lāvaṇyaṃ eva vapuṣi svadatēṅganāyāḥ
śṛṅgāra eva hr̥di mānavato janasya.”

Among the treasure of guṇas only ‘saubhāgya’ is tasted, (both) in case of a vallabha i.e. beloved person (as well as in the person of a kāvyā-puruṣa). Now ‘saubhāgya’ as seen in Kuntaka above is everything in poetry. It is this, that and everything. It is pratibhā, it is pratibhā’s launching pad, it is suggested meaning, + + + ... Among the wealth of guṇas of a lover, ‘Saubhāgya’ is the most praiseworthy. In case of a lady ‘lāvaṇya’ is the quality which is tasted by the aesthetes. Abhinavagupta in his Locana mentions “lāvaṇya-candrikā” - “na ca avayavānām eva nirdoṣatā vā bhūṣaṇāyogo vā lāvaṇyam. prthaṇ-, nirvarṇyamāṇa-kāṇā”di-doṣa-śūnya-śarīrā’vayavayoginyām api alaṃkṛtāyām api ‘lāvaṇya-śūnyā iyaṃ’ iti, a-tathābhūtāyām api kasyāñcil, ‘lāvaṇyāmṛta-candrikā iyaṃ’ iti sahr̥dayānām vyavahārāt.’ (pp. 24, Edn. Dr. Nandi, ibid; Locana on Dhv. I. 4)

Bhoja also equates this ‘dhvanireva kāvyē’ with ‘aṅganāyāḥ lāvaṇyam’, which for Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta was not a physical quality but something over and above mere physicality, a quality emerging from the total personality of a lady. Beauty is thus abstract, though revealed by physical and other features alike.

Bhoja further gives one more explanation. He says - and this is by implication - that as is the quality of ‘Śṛṅgāra’ - “rasóbbhimāno’hamkāraḥ śṛṅgāra iti gīyate” - the highest quality of an aesthete, so is this ‘dhvani’ in kāvyā. It is not just the ‘dhvani’ of Ānandavardhana and it is not the charm of vyañjanā alone, a name (= vyañjanā) Bhoja is never enthusiastic to mention. But this quality is that which emerges from ‘total poetry’. This can be equated with Kuntaka’s ‘Saubhāgya’.

Now we will be able to explain the other observations of Bhoja in a more satisfactory fashion. He says,

“yad abhiprāya-sarvasvaṃ
vaktur vākyāt pratiyate,
tātparyam; artha-dharmas tat,
śabda-dharmaḥ punaḥ, dhvaniḥ.”

We may add ‘kāvyā’ before ‘vākyāt’ to mean ‘kāvyā-vākyāt’. The essence (abhiprāya-sarvasva) which is understood from a poetic statement, that (we may

add 'tat' before tātparya) is tātparya, which is artha-dharma and also śabda-dharma, and is termed 'dhvani' (śabdadharmah punaḥ, sa dhvaniḥ iti ucyate)

Then Bhoja further observes that this (poetic) tātparya (which is 'dhvani') is like the quality of saubhāgya (of a beloved person, 'vallabhasya'), an internal quality (of poetry). It is like the 'lāvaṇya' or abstract beauty of the goddess of speech (like 'lāvaṇya' of a beautiful lady.) This is an external quality-bāhya guṇa. It is something manifested at external level like 'having beautiful eyes' - 'sulocanātva' of a lady, - we may add.

The fact is that this poetic tātparya i.e. dhvani is beauty both internal and external, for Bhoja.

Both, observes Bhoja, are explained by both - 'dvayena dvayaṃ ucyate'. The idea is that if we dig deeper we will realise that poetry or kāvyā itself being an abstract - amūrta - entity, there is hardly anything which can be stamped as 'external' or 'internal' in the literal sense. Actually both are both, for both are beyond physicality. Just as caitra and vaiśakha are also termed madhu and mādharma, similarly the artha-dharma and śabda-dharma both make for the supreme beauty of poetry.

So, this, we feel explains Bhoja's concept of tātparya satisfactorily and had he been alive, perhaps Dr. Raghavan would have accepted this explanation.

Now we will see how Mammaṭa and his followers deal with tātparya.

Mammaṭa in his K.P. II (pp. 25 observes that : Edn. Jalkikar '21)

'krameṇa śabdārthayoḥ svarūpaṃ āha.

"syād vācako lākṣaṇikah

śabdo'tra vyañjakas tridhā." (Sū. 5)

atra iti kāvyē. eṣāṃ svarūpaṃ vakṣyate. (Sū. 6) - "vācyā"dayas tad arthāḥ syuḥ." vācyā-lakṣya-vyañgyāḥ.

(Sū. 7) "tātparyārtho'pi keṣu cit." ||6||

ākāṅkṣā-yogyatā-sannidhi-vaśād vakṣyamāṇa-svarūpāṇāṃ padārthānāṃ samanvaye tātparyārtho'pi vākyārthaḥ samullasati iti abhihitānvayavādināṃ matam. vācyā eva vākyārthaḥ iti anvitābhidhānavādināḥ." Translation, Dr. R. C. Dwivedi - The Poetic Light - pub. Motilal Banarsidass, second Edn. '77, pp. 17, Vol. I) :

"Now the author states the nature of word and sense in order :

6ab - Word, here would be of three kinds -expressive, indicative and suggestive.

‘Here’ means in poetry. The characteristic of these (three kinds of words) will be described later.

6c - The expressed and others would be their sense.

That is, expressed, indicated and suggested.

6d. There is also the purport - sense in the opinion of some.

When owing to the force of expectancy, compatibility and proximity, after the word-meanings, whose nature will be explained later, have been correlated, there springs up the purport-sense, which possesses a special form and which, though not the sense of (individual) words, is yet the sense of the sentence - this is the view of these who hold that the correlation is of the expressed words (abhihitānvayavādins). The primary sense itself is the sense of the sentence - thus hold the theorists of, ‘expression of the correlated meaning.’ (anvitābhidhāna).”

All this follows Abhinavagupta’s explanation and the Mīmāṃsaka view-points.

Jhalakikar (pp. 26, ibid) has the following -

“nanu padārtha-vākyārthasyā’pi vyañjanā-vṛtṭyā”śrayatayā bhāṭṭa-mīmāṃsakamatasiddha - tātparyā”khyā-vṛtṭi-pratipādyatayā ca tad vibhāgo’pi kartum ucita iti tad-akaraṇān nyūnatā iti ata āha - “tātparyārtho’pi iti”. tātparyā”khyāvṛtṭi - pratipādyo’rtha ity arthaḥ. samullasati iti adhyāhāraḥ, keśucid iti. śaṣṭhyarthe saptamīyam. abhihitānvayavādinām ity arthaḥ. mate iti śeṣaḥ. “abhihitānvayavādinām matam” iti vṛtṭi anurodhād iti bodhyam. ayam bhāvaḥ - vṛtṭim vinā arthabodhane’tiprasaṅga iti anvaye (vākyārtharūpe samsarge) śabdasya tātparyākhyā vṛtṭir abhyānugantavyā. tatpratipādyórtas tātparyārtha iti cakravartī-kamalākarabhaṭṭa - naraśimha ṭhakkura-kṛta-ṭikā-śv aṃśataḥ spaṣṭam.

Vidyādhara follows Mammāṭa. He has a very brief remark : (Ekāvalī unmeṣa II, with Malinātha’s Taralā; Edn. Trivedi K.P. Bombay Sanskrit Series, Bombay, 1903) - “anuvādyānām arthānām vidheyārthaparatvaṃ tātparyam iti vyāpārāntaram parair abhyupagatam. yathā -

“umām sa paśyam-ṛjunaiva cakṣuṣā
pracakrame vaktum anujjhita-kramaḥ.”

ity atra darśanasya cakṣuḥkaraṇakatvā’vyabhicārāt tad upādānam tadviśeṣaṇārtham tad eva cātra vidheyam tatpartvam eva tātparyam.”

We have seen earlier that Mukula had incorporated tātparya in abhidhā and Mahimā takes it to be of no use as it is covered by inference, i.e. anumiti. He has discussed the same illustration viz. “viṣam bhukṣva...” etc. as given by Dhanika.

Vidyānātha in his *Pratāparudra-yaśobhūṣaṇa* (Edn. with Ratnāpaṇa of Kumārasvāmin, S. Chandrasekhar Sastrigal, Madras, '14) equates *tātparyārtha* with *vyāṅgyārtha* and thus incorporates *tātparya* in *vyāñjanā*. We will look into this as below.

Vidyānātha observes : (pp. 31, 32, Edn. *ibid*)

atha kāvya-svarūpa-nirūpaṇam.

“guṇālaṃkārasahitau
śabdārthau doṣavarjitau.
gadya-padyóbbhayamayam
kāvyam kāvya-vido viduḥ.” - 1

a-doṣau sa-guṇau śālaṃkārau śabdārthau kāvyam iti kāvya-sāmānya
lakṣaṇam.

“śabdārthau mūrtir ākhyātau
jīvitam vyaṅgya-vaibhavam,
hārā”divad alaṃkāras
tatra syur upamā”dayaḥ.” - 2

“śleṣā”dayo guṇās tatra
śauryā”daya iva sthitāḥ,
ātmotkarṣā”vahās tatra
svabhāvā iva rītaḥ. - 3

śobhām āhāryikim prāptāḥ
vṛttayo vṛttayo yathā
padānugunya-viśrāntiḥ
śayyā śayyeva sammatā. - 4

rasā”svāda-prabhedāḥ syuḥ
pākāḥ pākā iva sthitāḥ,
prakhyātā lokavad iyaṃ
sāmagrī kāvya-sampadaḥ. - 5

vācaka-lakṣaka-vyañjakatvena trividham śabda-jātam. vācya-lakṣya-vyaṅgyatvena
arthajātam api trividham. tātparyārthōpi vyaṅgyārtha eva. na punaḥ prthak
bhūtaḥ. abhidhā-lakṣaṇa-vyañjanākhyās tisraḥ śabda-vṛttayaḥ.”

It is clear that Vidyānātha, coming after Vidyādhara and of course Mammāta, almost accepts the tenets of the dhvani-school, the kashmir tradition. Here, we will see his treatment of tātparyārtha and tātparyavṛtti -

Kumāraswamin in his Ratnāṇa observes : (pp. 32, ibid)

nanu caturthe tātparyārthe jāgrati katham artha-traividhyoktir iti āśāṅkya tasya trīṣṭe antarbhāvaḥ. ity āha. tātparyārtha iti. atra vakṛ-buddhi-sannidhāpito vākyāvagamyo vākyārtho rasā”dirūpas tacchabdena ucyate. tasmin parās tatparās tadāsaktāḥ tadvisayā ity arthaḥ. teṣāṃ bhāvas tātparyam. nanu abhidhitānām padārthānām arthābhidhāyinām vā padānām viśiṣṭārtha-pratyāyanaśaktis tātparyam iti matabhedena mīmāṃsakaḥ varṇayanti. atas tanmate, ‘devadatta gām ānaya’ ity ādau devadatta-kartṛka-daṇḍa-karaṇaka-go-karmakā”nayana-rūpo viśiṣṭārtha eva vaṅgyatva-vidhuraḥ tātparyād avagatatvāt tātparyārtha ity ucyate, katham asya vyaṅgye antarbhāvaḥ, iti cet, satyam.

na hi tāvanmātre kavisaṃrambha-viśrāntiḥ. kāvya-śabdānām anvaya-vyatiṛekābhyām pravṛtti-nivṛtti-viśayabhūtasya pradhānasya prayojanāntarasya asaṃbhavāt. kiṃ tu tad artha-nyakkāreṇa pratiyamāne sāmājikā”nandā”svādaphale rasā”dāv arthāntare. ataḥ sa eva tātparyārthaḥ. tatpratyāyaka-padārtha-śaktir eva tātparyam, kavisaṃmaye...”

After this Kumāraswamin tries to suggest that this special tātparya is neither abhidhā, nor lakṣaṇā and says -

“ato vakṣyamāṇa-lakṣaṇasya vyañjanasya eva idaṃ nāmāntara-karaṇam iti tad arthasya vyaṅgyārthatvam eva.”

Now this is extending the original scope of tātparya. Kumāraswamin himself says that in “devadatta, gām ānaya’, the tātparya is what it is, because it is an expression of the ordinary worldly level. But in case of a poetic expression, the intention is higher and ends in rasa-experience. So, that should be taken as tātparya. But it is here exactly that Vidyānātha and Kumāraswamin are mistaken. The thought currents of Abhidhā, Tātparya and Lakṣaṇā were inherited from shastric literature and the sanctity of any inherited thought-current had to be preserved. It is exactly this scientific approach which characterizes the thinking of Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta. Any liberty with the original concept would be unscientific. It is exactly such an erroneous approach which is pointed out in Locana when Abhinavagupta observes at one place that, “yad āha, khaḍga-lakṣaṇam karomi ity uktvā ātāna-vitānā”tmā, prāvriyamāṇaḥ, sakala-dehācchā”dakaḥ sukumāras’ citra-tantu-viracitaḥ saṃvartana-vivartanasahiṣṇur acchedakaḥ

succhedyaḥ utkr̥ṣṭaḥ khadgaḥ, iti bruvāṇaḥ, paraiḥ paraḥ khalu evaṃvidho bhavati na khadga iti uktatayā paryanuyujyamāṇaḥ evaṃ brūrāt īdr̥śa eva khadgo mayā abhimata iti tādṛg eva etat.” (Locana on Dhv. I. i., pp. 10, Edn. Nandi)

So, this insistence on equating tātparya with vyañjanā is like the above unscientific approach.

Bhoja, as observed earlier called tātparyārtha as ‘dhvani’ with reference to poetic expressions, but if we search with a microscope, it will be clear that here Bhoja’s ‘dhvani’ is not identical with Ānandavardhana’s dhvani and he too, like Vidyādhara and Kumāraswāmin commits the same blunder of expanding or narrowing the accepted connotation of a given word used as ‘terminology’ or ‘paribhāṣā’. The crime is lesser in case of Bhoja because he is not wedded to vyañjanā, while it is greater in case of Vidyādhara and Kumāraswāmin who vow in the name of dhvanivāda and take liberty with the accepted terminology. We feel that flirting with age-old accepted terminology is a crime. Abhinavagupta has wisely called vyañjanā to be a ‘tūriyā’, ‘fourth’ vṛtti.

Again, when Ānandavardhana tries to silence the Mīmāṃsakas by suggesting that the intention of the speaker of a worldly statement or ‘pauruṣeya vākya’ is ‘suggested’ or ‘vyaṅgya’, he knows the limitation of his own argument which he clears while silencing the Naiyāyikas. Vidyādhara and Kumāraswāmin, like Virocana, caught hold only of a portion of Ānandavardhana’s argument and tried to jump in. This is sad and unscientific.

Now we will turn to Viśvanātha, the author of Sāhityadarpaṇa. He clearly followed the lead of the kashmir school of thought and takes tātparya as a power delivering the sentence-sense. He accepts three powers of a word such as abhidhā, lakṣaṇā and vyañjanā, but by the end of the first pariccheda, after talking about the three-fold classification of words also into vācaka, lakṣaka, and vyañjaka, he observes. (- S.D.I. 20, pp. 67, Edn. Chawkhamba Sanskrit Samsthāna, Varanasi, 4th Edn. ’85) -

“tātparyā”khyāṃ vṛttiṃ āhuḥ
padārthānvaya-bodhane,
tātparyārthaṃ tad arthaṃ ca
vākyaṃ tadbodhakaṃ pare.” - (S.D.I. 20)

“abhidhāyā ekaika-padārtha-bodhana-virāmād vāk्यārtharūpasya padārthānvayasya bodhikā tātparyaṃ nāma vṛttiḥ. tad arthaś ca tātparyārthaḥ. tad-bodhakaṃ ca vākyaṃ iti abhihitānvayavādinām matam.”

The Lakṣmī (pp. 67, ibid) on this passage reads -

“ayam āśayah - “ghaṭam karoti” ity ādau ghaṭa-vṛtti-karmatānukūlā kṛtir ity artho bodhyate, tatra ca ghaṭa-śabdasya kambu-grīvā”dirūpa-ghaṭo’rthaḥ, ‘am’pratyayasya ca karmatā, vṛttitā tu na kasyāpy arthaḥ, tat tadartham pratipādyā viratāyā abhidhāyāḥ punar utthānāsambhavāt, tat-tat-śabdena punar vṛttitā-rūpo’rtho’padārthopī pratipādayitum śakyate. ato vṛttitā-rūpārtha-bodhikā tātparyam nāma vṛttir avāśyam aṅgikarāṇīyā. iyaṁ eva tātparya-vṛttir ādhunikaiḥ samsarga-maryādā ucyaṭe. abhihitānvayavādināṁ padair upasthitānāṁ arthānāṁ anvaya itī vādināṁ bhaṭṭa-mīmāṃsakānāṁ prācīna-naiyāyikānāṁ ca matam...”

Viśvanātha’s position is clear and he mentions tātparya as a vākya-vṛtti in keeping with the second tradition that he has inherited. But he knows that Dhanika had tried to incorporate vyañjanā under tātparya, and so also a section of the Mīmāṃsakas who were dīrgha-dīrghatara-vyāpāravādins wanted to place vyañjanā under abhidhā. He controverts the views of both these prima facie views in his chapter on vyañjanā-sthāpana. He does not care for Vidyādhara, it seems. But his arguments to distinguish tātparya from vyañjanā are very interesting and they proceed as follows :

(S.D. V. pp. 296, 297, 298, Edn. ibid) : yac ca kecid āhuḥ - ‘so’yaṁ īṣor iva dīrgha-dīrghataro ‘bhidhā-vyāpārah’ iti. yac ca dhanikena uktam -

“tātparyā-vyatirekāc ca
vyañjakasya na dhvaniḥ,
yāvat-kārya-prasārittvāt
tātparyam, na tulādhṛtam.”

iti. tayoṛ upari ‘śabda-buddhi-karmanāṁ viramya vyāpārābhāvaḥ’ iti vādidbhir eva pātaniyo daṇḍaḥ. evaṁ ca lakṣaṇā’pyupāsyā ? dīrgha-dīrgha-abhidhā vyāpāreṇa api tad artha-bodha-siddhiḥ. kim iti ca, ‘brāhmaṇa putras te jātaḥ, kanyā te garbhīṇī’ ity ādāv api harṣa-śokā”dīnāṁ api na vācyatvam.

yat punar ‘pauruṣeyaṁ a-pauruṣeyaṁ ca vākyaṁ sarvaṁ eva kāryaparam, a-tatparatve anupādeyatvād unmatta-vākyavat. tataś ca kāvya-śabdānāṁ niratiśaya-sukhā”svāda—vyatirekeṇa pratipādyā-pratipādakayoḥ pravṛttyaupayika-prayojana-anupalabdher niratiśaya-sukhā”svāda eva kāryatvena avadharyate. ‘yatparaḥ śabdaḥ sa śabdārtha’ itī nyāyāt’ iti.

tatra-praṣṭavyam; kim idaṁ tātparatvam nāma ? tad arthatvam vā, tātparya-vṛttyā tad-bodhakatvam vā ? ādye na vivādaḥ, vyaṅgyatve’pi tad-arthatā-anapāyāt.

dvitiye tu - keyaṃ tātparityākhyā vṛttiḥ ? abhihitānvayavādhīr aṅgīkṛtā tad anyā vā ? ādye dattaṃ eva uttaram.

dvitiye tu-nāmamātre vivādaḥ, tanmate'pi turīya-vṛtti-siddheḥ.

nanu astu yugapad eva tātparitya-śaktyā vibhāvā"di-saṃsargasya rasā"deś ca prakāśanam - iti cet ? na; tayoṛ hetu-phala-bhāvāṅgīkārāt. yad āha muniḥ - 'vibhāvānubhāva-vyabīcāri-saṃyogād rasa-niṣpattiḥ', iti. saha bhāve ca kutaḥ savyetara-viśāṇayor iva kārya-kāraṇa-bhāvaḥ ?, paurvāparya-virahāt. 'gaṅgāyāṃ ghoṣaḥ' ity ādau tatā"dy artha-mātra-bodha-viratāyā lakṣaṇāyās' ca kutaḥ śītarva-pāvanatvā"di-vyaṅgya-bodhakatā ? tena turīyā vṛttiḥ ūpāsya eva iti nirvivādam etat."

So, any extention of the traditionally accepted connotation of 'tātparitya-vṛtti' is not acceptable to Viśvanātha, it being unscientific.

We did not mention Hemacandra after Mammāta, because he follows the footsteps of Mammāta and observes : (pp. 58, Edn. 2nd '64, Dr. Kulkarni and Prof. Parikh, Bombay, and pp. 28, Edn. Nandī, L. D. Insti. publication, Ahmedabad A.D. 2000) : "abhidhānāntaram ca yady api anvaya-pratipatti-nimittam tātparitya-śaktir apy asti, tadviśayas tātparitya-lakṣaṇo'rtho'pi, tathā'pi tau vākya-viśayāv eva iti nā'tra uktau."

In the 'Viveka' he adds only this much - "tāv iti" - sā ca sa ca, tau. atrēti śakti-madhye arthamadhye ca". This suggests Hemacandra's absolute clarity concerning both the tātparitya-śakti and the tātparityārtha, which he is not in a mood to discuss because they concern themselves with a sentence only. Tātparitya is for Hemacandra, a vākya-śakti and tātparityārtha is vāk्यārtha arrived at with the help of a sentence. So, these two - tau i.e. sā (= tātparitya-śakti) and 'sa' (i.e. tātparityārtha) were not to be considered when only word-powers and word-senses were discussed. But even for Hemacandra vyañjanā continues to be a turīyā = fourth power, because he accepts 'gauṇī' as a separate vṛtti over and above lakṣaṇā.

Jayadeva and Keśava have nothing to say about tātparitya-vṛtti.

It will be interesting to end this chapter with a long quotation from : Dr. K. Kunjunni Raja, who in his 'Indian Theories of Meaning' observes (pp. 217, ibid) -

"It is well known that the Bhāṭṭa-Mīmāṃsakas who followed Kumārīlabhaṭṭa are staunch supporters of the abhihitānvaya theory of verbal comprehension; as a result of this whenever the term is found, there is a tendency among commentators to associate it exclusively to the Bhāṭṭa school, without waiting to inquire whether the theory explained is the same as that adopted by the Bhāṭṭas. Some of the commentators, and modern scholars following them, have thus associated 'tātparitya-vṛtti' with the Bhāṭṭa-school of Mīmāṃsā.

[In a foot-note no. 1 Dr. K. Kunjuni Raja (pp. 218, *ibid*) to support his finding mentions the names of Māṇikyacandra, Govinda Thakkur, Jhalakikar, P. V. Kane, K. C. Pandey, S. S. Sukthankar, - we may add even Gajendragadkar. We can add other names also.] [Dr. Raja then proceeds] -

“But there is one difficulty in such an assumption; which many of the scholars have not noticed. All the great authoritative writers on Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā like Kumārīlabhaṭṭa, Pārthasārathi Mishra, Vācaspati Miśra, Candidāsa and Nārāyaṇabhaṭṭa have unequivocally stated that according to the abhihitānvaya theory advocated by them, the syntactically unified sentence-meaning is to be conveyed through the secondary power, lakṣaṇā.” [in foot note 2, pp. 218, 219, Dr. Raja quotes names of those who hold this view].

“Even critics like Śālikanātha who tried to refute this theory have described it in that way. Nārāyaṇabhaṭṭa says that tātparya is not a separate factor in conveying the syntactic relationship of the word-meanings.”

But, one thing is certain that this ‘lakṣaṇā’ is not held as identical with normal lakṣaṇā of the ālaṃkārikas. This is for certain. So, this special lakṣaṇā becomes so to say, another name of tātparya-vṛtti itself.

Dr. Raja (pp. 219) proceeds - “It may be pointed out here that Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, the great Naiyāyika scholar of the tenth cen. A.D., who wrote the Nyāya-mañjarī, was the first to bring forward the theory of tātparya being a separate vṛtti. The abhihitānvaya theory is not the monopoly of the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas; we have seen that the Association theory of the grammarian Vājapyāyana, that saṃsarga is vākyaṛtha, is a kind of abhihitānvaya theory. Bhartṛhari has also referred to such views. Early Naiyāyikas like Gautama and Vātsyāyana have not discussed the problem of a sentence; they discussed only the exact import of words. Jayanta says that their silence is eloquent as it shows that they believed that the sentence is only a collection of words, and that the sentence-meaning is only the mutual association of the word-meanings. After discussing in detail the various theories about verbal comprehension held by various schools, Jayanta advocates a modified form of abhihitānvaya theory. The words express their isolated word-meanings by the power of abhidhā; they have another power, the tātparya-śakti which indicates the mutual relationship among the word-meanings. The function of this power is to reveal the meanings of the words contained in a sentence as being mutually related. This power belongs to all the words in common and lasts till the independent judgement is produced.

[foot-note 5 : “abhidhātṛī matā śaktiḥ padānāṃ svārtha-niṣṭhatā, teṣāṃ tātparya-śaktis tu saṃsargāvagamāvadhiḥ.”]

It may be noted that this tātparya-śakti is the same as the saṃsarga-maryādā accepted by the later Navya Nyāya school. [Gadādhara's Vyutpatti-vāda p. 1. : śābdabodhe caika-padārthéparapadārtha-saṃsargaḥ saṃsargamaryādāyā bhāsate.] - ‘The additional element conveyed by a sentence, over and above the separate concepts conveyed by separate words, is the intended relation of the concepts - (padārtha-saṃsarga), and this additional element, which is the distinctive feature of verbal judgement (vākyārtha) is conveyed through the particular juxtaposition of words (saṃsarga-maryādā), and not through a primary or secondary significative power of words (abhidhā or lakṣaṇā).’ (S. Kuppaswami Sastri - A primer of Indian Logic, p. 258).

What prompted Abhinavagupta to accept Jayanta's modified form of Abhihitānvaya theory and not that of the real followers of the Bhāṭṭa school seems to be the fact that the Ālaṃkārikas of the dhvani school could not accept lakṣaṇā to explain the syntactic relation among the word-meanings, since they accepted it only in cases of ‘anvayānupapatti’ and not in cases of ‘tātparyānupapatti’.

[Here, before we proceed further, we may ask a question as to who were these ‘ālaṃkārikas of the dhvani school’ who preceded Abhinavagupta and prompted him to accept whatever he accepted ?. Actually ‘tātparyānupapatti’ in such illustrations as “kākebhyo dadhi rakṣyatām” has also been discussed by dhvanivādī ālaṃkārikas.]

Some of the discerning commentators of the ālaṃkāra texts have already pointed out that the view about tātparya-vṛtti being responsible for conveying the syntactic relation of the word-meaning does not refer to the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsaka theory, but only to the concient Naiyāyikas, who were also abhihitānvayavādins. In the Sudhāsāgara commentary of the Kāvyaaprakāśa Bhimasena Dixita explains this point in detail. He says that for all practical purposes this tātparya-vṛtti may be identified with the lakṣaṇā of the Mīmāṃsakas and that it is the same as the saṃsarga-maryādā of the Navya-nyāya-school. (kindly refer to our remarks above, before citing Dr. Raja's words on his page 219).

The distinction between lakṣaṇā and tātparya in this case is very subtle. Mere juxtaposition of isolated words, giving out a string of unconnected separate concepts, is of no use in linguistic discourse. It is certain that the co-utterance of words is with the intention of conveying a connected unified meaning. It is this apparent contradiction between the juxta-position of words in a sentence and their

not being related to serve some purpose that gives the power to the words to resort to lakṣaṇā, through inference of the arthāpatti type, and convey the syntactically related sentence meaning. The speaker's intention, taken in a general sense, is at the back of resorting to lakṣaṇā. According to the Prābhākaras, on the other hand, the tātparya makes the primary significatory power, itself capable of conveying not only the individual word-meanings, but their mutual connection as well. Thus even when tātparya is not taken as a separate vṛtti, it could be referred to as the motive force conveying the syntactic relation; in fact Pārthasārathimiśra himself refers to the function of tātparya; and Jayanta quotes Kumārila-bhaṭṭa in support of his theory that tātparya is a separate vṛtti of the words which conveys the syntactic relation of the word-meanings.

Professor S. Kuppuswami Sastri says that the ‘saṃsarga’ or mutual relation of the word-meanings is conveyed by a process of suggestion, and quotes Jespersen's views that, ‘suggestion is impression through suppression’. A kind of suggestion has to be accepted by all schools of thought; the individual words give only their own individual isolated meanings, leaving the saṃsarga or the mutual relation of the meanings to be conveyed by suggestion. The Naiyāyikas may call it tātparya-vṛtti or saṃsargamaryādā, the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas may call it lakṣaṇā, and the Prābhākaras may take it to be the extension of the primary power abhidhā itself. Tātparya, the speaker's intention or the general purport of the utterance, has to be accepted as a motivating factor in verbal comprehension; but there is no need to assume a separate function of words called Tātparya-śakti. That is why it has not been accepted as such by later writers.”

We beg to differ and would like to follow the lead of Abhinavagupta and Maṃmaṭa. We have seen how Hemacandra has dubbed it as a vākya-śakti, but actually the concept of vākya cannot be formed in the absence of words and hence it is all right if we call it as a power of words, i.e. one of the four, the fourth being vyañjanā.



Chapter : VII

‘Lakṣaṇā’

‘Lakṣaṇā’ is broadly a metaphorical use of language. When a word in a sentence is not seen to carry its normal expressive meaning that we are accustomed to, through usage, dictionary etc., it adopts a secondary sense, of course given certain conditions. This is called lakṣaṇā. Another power of a word called ‘gauṇī’ is also mentioned by sanskrit theorists and some ālaṃkārikas take it as a separate power, independent of lakṣaṇā or secondary usage. But the normal tendency is to incorporate ‘gauṇī’ into lakṣaṇā, as a sub-variety. We will look into this in greater detail as below.

We know that secondary usage is common to all languages spoken by humans, even in worldly use of language. When ‘X’ addresses someone as ‘a donkey’ for example, the person addressed, we know, being a human being is not a donkey. So, when he is addressed as a ‘donkey’, the word can not convey its normal expressed meaning of a special four-legged animal. It has to be understood not literally but figuratively in a different sense. This makes for ‘lakṣaṇā’. Poets also resort to lakṣaṇā in poetry. When a word, in ordinary parlance is used in a secondary sense, it excites special attention, interpretation and understanding. The purport of the speaker has to be understood in a proper context. This secondary sense has to be related to the primary sense in one way or the other. We come across terms such as ‘upacāra’, ‘amukhyā vṛtti’, ‘gauṇī’ and ‘bhakti’ alternatively used for lakṣaṇā, the secondary or indicative function. It is termed ‘indication’ also.

Normally **three conditions** are accepted for the operation of lakṣaṇā or indication by ālaṃkārikas. They are (i) The primary meaning, under given context, looks inapplicable or unsuitable. (ii) as a result of (i), another meaning is resorted to and this meaning has to have some relation with the primary sense. This relation is of different types, as will be seen later. (iii) This secondary meaning should be based either on normal usage, i.e. rūḍhi, or a special motive - ‘prayojana’. This third

condition, viz. of there being a motive behind resorting to such a usage, was not underlined by earlier writers and this is so with some later writers also who belong to different schools of thought. The ālaṃkārikas however, are by and large unanimous in accepting these three conditions.

The normally served example of lakṣaṇā is “gaṅgāyāṃ ghoṣaḥ”, i.e. ‘a village on (the stream of) the Gaṅgā’. The word ‘gaṅgāyāṃ’ in sanskrit is to be understood as ‘in the stream of the river Gaṅgā’. But we know that a village cannot be located on the stream and hence we have to resort to the secondary sense viz. ‘on the bank of the river Gaṅgā’. The primary meaning is thus unsuitable and hence the secondary meaning is resorted to. This secondary sense is not the dictionary meaning of the given word, i.e. it is not the directly expressed sense, but is understood only indirectly as somehow related to the primary sense. With this secondary sense the incompatibility so to say, is removed from the expression. Now the motive behind resorting to such apparently incompatible use of language remains vague and it depends mainly on contextual factors. Here the motive is perhaps to suggest that the qualities of coolness and sanctity prevalent in the Gaṅgā are also experienced in the village situated on its bank. The relation is that of nearness. Another stark illustration is “gaur vāhikāḥ” meaning ‘the ‘Vāhika’ (a resident of Bālha;) is a bull.’ But ‘vāhika’ being a man cannot be a ‘bull’. So, through the relation of similarity in qualities such as laziness etc., the Vāhika is called a bull, meaning he is similar to a bull on account of his laziness.

As for the grammarians, we come across usages of terms such as ‘gauṇa’ in Pāṇini and Patañjali as follows : The word ‘gauṇa’ occurs at Pā. 1.1.15, pp. 71, M.bh (= Mahābhāṣya, Edn. Keilhorn, Edn. 3rd ‘72); Pā. 1.4.108, pp. 354; Pā. 6.3.46, pp. 161; and Pā. 8.3.82, pp. 445. We will examine these occurrences. Under Pā. 1.1.15 - ‘Or’, we have a vārttika viz. “Otaśvīpratiśedhaḥ”. The M.bh. on it reads as : “odanto nipāta ity atra cvyantansya pratiśedho vaktavyaḥ. anadaḥ adaḥ abhavat adóbhavat. niróbhavat. na vaktavyaḥ. lakṣaṇa-pratipadoktayoḥ pratipadoktasyaivaty evaṃ na bhaviṣyati. evaṃ apy agaur gauḥ samapadyata go’bhavat atra prāpnoti. evaṃ tarhi gaunamukhyavor mukhye kārya-sampratyaya iti. tad yathā. gaur anubandhyo ‘jo’ gñīṣomīya iti na vāhiko’nubandhyate. katham tarhi bāhike vṛddhyattve bhavataḥ. gaus tiṣṭhati. gām ānayeti. arthāśraya etad evaṃ bhavati. yaddhi śabdāśrayaṃ śabdāmātre tadbhavati. śabdāśraye ca vṛddhyattve.

Under Pā. 1.4.108, pp. 354, we read - (M.bh.) “...gauṇa-mukhyavor mukhye sampratyayo bhavati. tad yathā. gaur anubandhyo’jo’gñīṣomīya iti na vāhiko’nubandhyate. kat am tarhi vāhike vṛddhyattve bhavataḥ. gaustiṣṭhati, gām

ānayeti. arthāśraya etad evaṃ bhavati. yaddhi śabdāśrayaṃ, śabdamātre tad bhavati. śabdāśraye ca vṛddhyāttve.

Under Pā. 6.3.46, pp. 161, we have : “pradhānato vā yato vṛttiḥ” - 4. The M.bh. on this reads - “athavā gaṇamukhyayor mukhye kārya-sampratyaḥ. tad yathā gaur anūbandhyo’jo’gnīsomīya iti na vāhiko’nubadhyate... etc.

Under Pā 8.3.82, on ‘itarathā hyaniṣṭa-prasaṅgaḥ-2, The M.bh. reads...

“itarathā hyaniṣṭam prasajyeta. agnisomau mānavakāviti. tat tarhi vaktavyam. na vaktavyam. gaṇa-mukhyayor mukhye sampratipattiḥ. tadyathā. gaur anubandhyo jo’gnīsomīya iti na vāhiko’nubadhyate.... etc. etc.

The occurrences show that the primary and secondary - i.e. mukhya and gaṇa or a-mukhya meanings were known to the ancient grammarians.

In the Vākyapadiya (Edn. Bhate)

We have ‘gaṇa’ at,

- V.P. II. 84 - prasajya-pratiṣedhōyaṃ
paryudāsōyaṃ atra tu,
idaṃ gaṇaṃ idaṃ mukhyaṃ
vāpīdaṃ guru laghvidaṃ.
- V.P. II. 264 - artha-prakaraṇāpekṣau
yo vā śabdāntaraiḥ saha,
yuktaḥ pratyāyayaty arthaṃ
taṃ gaṇaṃ apare viduḥ.
- V.P. II. 267 - svārthe pravartamāno’pi
yasyārthaṃ yo’valambate,
nimittaṃ tatra mukhyaṃ syāt
nimittī gaṇa ucyate.
- V.P. II. 273 - jāti-śabdo’ntareṇā’pi
jātiṃ yatra prayujyate,
saṃbandhi-sadṛśāddharmāt
taṃ gaṇaṃ apare viduḥ.
- V.P. II. 274 - viparyāsād ivārthasya
yatrārthāntakatām iva,
manyante sa gavādis tu
gaṇa ity ucyate kvacit.

- V.P. II. 278 - śrutimātreṇa yatrāśya
sāmarthyam avasīyate,
tam mukhyaṃ artham manyante
gaṇam yatnopapāditam.
- V.P. II. 281 - agni-somā"dayaḥ śabdā
ye svarūpa-padārthakāḥ,
saṃjñibhiḥ saṃprayujyante
aprasiddheṣ teṣu gaṇātā.
- V.P. II. 257 - ekatvam tu sarūpatvāt
cchabdāyor gaṇa-mukhyayoh
prāhur atyanta bhede'pi
bheda-mārgānudarśinaḥ.

We have 'gaṇa-mukhya-prakalpanā', at V.P. II. 263d, and 'gaṇārthābhīniveśin' at V.P. II. 266d.

We have 'lakṣaṇā' at V.P. III. I. 50a, and III. 1.70d

V.P. III. 1.50 reads as -

"lakṣaṇā śabda-saṃskāre
vyāpārah kārya-siddhyaye,
saṃkhyā-karmā"di-śaktīnām
śrutisāmyēpi dṛṣyate.

- V.P. III. 1.70 - "saṃmārgasya vidheyatvāt
anyatra vihite grahe,
vidhivākye śrutā saṃkhyā
lakṣaṇāyām na bādhyate.

We have 'lakṣaṇārtha' at V.P. II. 384a, III. 14. 452d, etc.

These occurrences prove that the ancient grammarians were fairly conversant with the concepts of a secondary sense and a secondary power of word, of course at worldly usage level. They were not concerned with the poetic usage of secondary power as they were not out to discuss the poetic use of language. But gaṇī or lakṣaṇā is as old as hills.

We have also noted earlier that Patañjali not only knows about the primary and secondary senses, but is fairly conversant with the various relations they may have between them. Thus, under Pā. 4.1.48, pp. 218 (Vol. II), Patañjali reads - “katham punar atasmin sa ity etad bhavati ? caturbhiḥ prakāraiḥ a-tasmin sa ity etad bhavati, rātsthyāt, tāddharmyāt sāmīpyāt sāhacaryād iti. tātsthyāt tāvat mañcāḥ hasanti, girir dahyate, tāddharmyāt, jaṭinaṃ yāntaṃ brahmadatta ity āha, brahmadatte yāni karmāṇi, jaṭiny api tāni kriyante ity ato jaṭi brahmadatta ity ucyate. tat-sāmīpyāt gaṅgāyāṃ ghoṣaḥ, kūpe garga-kulam, tat sāhacaryāt kuntān praveśaya, yaṣṭiḥ praveśaya.”

Thus the discipline of grammar was fairly conversant with the secondary use of language. We will now turn to the **Nyāya discipline**.

Gautama in his Nyāya sūtras applies the term ‘upacāra’ to this secondary usage and holds it to be quite common. He also knows the various relations between the primary and the secondary senses. The Nyāya-sūtra, II. 2. 62 reads as : sahacaraṇa-sthāna-tādarthyā.-vṛtta-māna-dhāraṇa-samīpyayoga-sādhana-”dhīpatyebhyo brāhmaṇa-maṅca-kaṭa-rāja-saktu-candana-gaṅgā-śātakā’nna-puruṣeṣv atadbhāve’pi tad upacāraḥ. -

The relation of ‘sahacaraṇa’ or association is illustrated as in ‘yaṣṭikāṃ bhojaya’. i.e. feed the stick. Now here by ‘stick’ a brahmin with a stick is meant for he is normally always associated with a stick which he carries in his hand while walking. Similarly in, ‘kuntāḥ praviśanti’ by ‘kuntāḥ’ or lances are meant the lance-bearers.

‘Sthāna’ or location is illustrated as in ‘mañcāḥ krośanti’, i.e. the beds (or cradles) are making noise or crying. The term ‘mañca’ is used for children sleeping in a cot or a cradle.

‘Tādarthyā’ or purpose is illustrated as in ‘kaṭaṃ karoti’ - ‘he makes a mat’, when actually he collects reeds for the preparation of a mat. Here the reeds used for making a mat are called a mat.

‘Vṛtta’ or behaviour is illustrated as in ‘yamo rājā’, i.e. the king is the God of death. Here the term ‘yama’ is used in the sense of a king who acts like yama i.e. who strikes terror among people.

‘māna’ or measure is illustrated as in ‘ādhaka-saktavaḥ’ - i.e. one ādhaka (= say, a pound, or kg.) of floor. Here the term ‘ādhaka’ signifying a measure, is used to mean ‘that which is measured’. i.e. ādhakena mitāḥ saktavaḥ.

‘dhāraṇa’ or weighing, as in ‘tulā-candanam’ meaning one tulā of candana. Here tulā or balance stands for that which is weighed in a balance : ‘tulāyāṃ

dhṛtam candanam’. Dr. Raja (pp. 234 *ibid*) observes in a foot-note (no. 1) and we agree with this fully that, “(e) [i.e. māṇa] and (f) [i.e. dhāraṇa] are similar; the former refers to the measurement of volume, and the latter to the measurement of weight. Ādhaka primarily means the measure and secondarily the volume measured by it; tulā primarily means the balance which gives a particular weight, and secondarily that which is weighed in it. According to Pāṇini such shifts of meaning are included in the primary sense itself. See Pāṇini II. 3.46.”

‘Proximity’ - or sāmīpya is illustrated as in ‘gaṅgāyāṃ gāvaḥ caranti.’, meaning the cows are grazing on the Gaṅgā. Here ‘gaṅgā’ stands for the bank of gaṅgā.

Inherent connection or ‘yoga’ is seen as in ‘kṛṣṇaḥ śāṭakaḥ’ or the black cloth. The word ‘kṛṣṇa’ or black primarily means blackness, but here it means ‘the thing having blackness’. Here the term suggesting quality is used for the thing qualified.

Cause or ‘sādhana’ is seen as in ‘annaṃ prāṇāḥ’ i.e. food is life. In the Sāhityaśāstra the illustration favoured is ‘āyur gṛham’. In ‘annaṃ prāṇāḥ’ ‘anna’ or food which is the cause of life is itself said to be life or breath itself.

Prominence or ādhipatya is illustrated as in ‘ayaṃ kulam’, meaning ‘He is the family’. Here ‘kula’ is used in the sense of highest authority in a family. A prominent person in a family is himself said to be ‘kula’ or family.

Gautam has cited all illustrations of figurative usage from common usage. Again the list is supposed to be only illustrative and not exhaustive. At Nyāyasūtra II. 2. 64, he also refers to the Mīmāṃsaka view that the primary meaning of any word is the class or universal i.e. jāti and that the particular or vyakti to which it refers in a given statement is arrived at through the secondary function i.e. upacāra. Gautam does not accept this because for him a word means jāti, ākṛti and vyakti at a time.

The Mīmāṃsakas are primarily concerned with the basic rules of interpretation of Vedic injunctions. Among vedic passages, naturally there are some with metaphorical expressions. So, ‘in the Mīmāṃsā sūtras, Jaimini enumerates six bases for metaphorical description which are explained in Śabara’s bhāṣya in greater detail. The Mīm. Sū. I. 4, 23 states - “tat-siddhi-jāti-sārūpya-prasāṃsā-bhūma-līṅga-samavāya - iti guṇāśrayāḥ. (Ref. Prof. Devasthali’s work; “Mīmāṃsā, or the Vākya-śāstra of ancient India)”.

First we will get at these six bases in brief and later we will deal in greater detail about the Mīmāṃsaka’s general attitude towards gaṇa or secondary sense and lakṣaṇā as a whole.

'Tat-siddhi' or accomplishment of purpose is seen as in, "yajamāṇaḥ prastaraḥ" - i.e. the grass-bundle or a grass-bed is the yajamāṇa or sacrificer. Another illustration is, 'yajamāṇo vā eka-kapālaḥ', i.e. the puroḍāśa cake prepared in a single pan is the sacrificer. These vedic sentences do not make any sense when taken in the primary meaning. So, a figurative sense has to be resorted to. The grass-bed and the cake accomplish the purpose served by the sacrificer and hence are indicated by the term 'sacrificer'.

'Jāti' means 'same origin. Kumārila Bhaṭṭa in Tāntravārttika (p. 362) explains : 'Jātir iti cātra janmopādānaṃ vivakṣitam.' The illustration cited is - "āgneyo vai brāhmaṇaḥ". This Brahmin is Āgneya. This figurative usage is based on the fact that both the Brahmin and Agni are born of a common origin viz. 'prajāpati'.

'Sārūpya' or similarity is also a base of figurative expression as in, "āditya yūpaḥ", - 'the sacrificial post is āditya i.e. sun.' This metaphorical expression is based on the similarity of the post to the sun in brightness and height and this statement is meant to eulogize the post.

'Praśamsā' i.e. praise as a base of a figurative expression is illustrated as in, 'a-paśavo vā anye go-aśvebhyaḥ'. - i.e. 'Those other than cows or horses are not animals'. Again, 'yan malinaṃ avāsaś tat' - 'That which is dirty is not clothing', and, 'yad aghṛtaṃ abhojanaṃ tat', - 'that which is without purified butter is no food', etc. are expressions of figurative usages based on praise. In these illustrations words such as paśu, vāsaś, bhojana etc. are meant only for genuinely praiseworthy animals, clothing and food.

'Bhūma' means preponderance. This is illustrated as in 'sr̥ṣṭir upadadhāti' - 'The sr̥ṣṭi-bricks are placed'. Here the word 'Sr̥ṣṭi' stands for the bricks that are associated with a group of vedic hymns with or without the word 'sr̥ṣṭi'.

'Līṅga-samavāya' i.e. presence of indicative sign, is illustrated as in, 'chatrīṇo yānti', i.e. people with umbrellas are going. Here the reference to the umbrella is just to indicate the people, not to describe them and even if there be few umbrellas such a statement can be used. Another illustration is, 'daṇḍīṇo gacchanti', 'people with sticks are going'.

Actually we know that the Mīmāṃsakas were aware of both the 'mukhya' or primary sense and the 'gauṇa' or secondary sense, and their relative strength. Śābara actually begins with the question as to whether this division of arthas into two classes such as 'mukhya' and 'gauṇa' can reasonably be admitted. With this

object in view, he first takes up the definitions of the terms ‘mukhya’ and ‘gauṇa’, saying that ‘mukhya’ or primary is that which is perceived from the word directly, and is so called because as it were it is the face of the word itself. On the other hand, that signification, the perception of which follows from the primarily perceived signification, on the strength of some connection, is said to be ‘jaghanya’ as it is, as it were, the hinder part of the śabda. This latter is also called ‘gauṇa’, owing to its being connected with some guṇa or quality. Śabara observes : “kaḥ punar mukhyaḥ ko vā gauṇa iti. ucyate. yaḥ śabdād eva avagamyate, sa prathamor’rtho mukhyaḥ. mukhaṁ iva bhavati iti mukhya ucyate. yastu khalu pratīd arthāt kenacit-saṁbandhena gamyate, sa paścād-bhāvāt jaghanaṁ iva bhavati iti jaghanyaḥ. guṇa-saṁbandhāc ca gauṇa iti.”

These definitions of ‘mukhya’ and ‘gauṇa’ are not completely free from faults. It can be argued, for example, that all the senses are perceived from śabda only and hence this division into primary and secondary is futile. Say, for example, statements such as ‘agnir jvalati’, and ‘agnir māṇavakaḥ’. In both of these, the sense of ‘fire’ in the first illustration, and the sense of ‘māṇavaka’ i.e. his ‘paingalya’ or yellowness, the common source is the word ‘agni’ itself. So, as both the senses follow from the same word, viz. ‘agni’, both will have to be termed ‘mukhya’ i.e. primary or principal : “yady evaṁ sarva eva mukhyaḥ. sarvo hi śabdād gamyate. yathaiva hi ‘agnir jvalati’ iti ukte jvalana-saṁpratyayaḥ, evaṁ eva ‘agnir māṇavaka’ iti śabda eva uccārite māṇavakasampratyayaḥ.” - But such a conclusion can not be admitted for we know for certain that only one of these viz. the idea of fire is the mukhya artha, and the other is ‘gauṇa’.

To remove this defect, the above definitions may be revised by saying that ‘mukhyārtha’ is that sense, which is perceived from the word independently of any attributive adjunct; while ‘gauṇa’ is that which is perceived from the word accompanied and aided by a qualifying adjunct. For, if not accompanied by qualifying adjuncts, a word is not supposed to convey a sense which it has no direct power to convey. So, if a word conveys a sense, even when accompanied by any adjunct, we will have to take that sense to the conveyed by the word itself, and the adjunct will be taken as a ‘sahakāri kāraṇa’. Thus the presence or absence of a qualifying adjunct can not give us ground enough to distinguish the mukhya sense from the gauṇa sense, for in either case the sense will be perceived from the same source, i.e. word itself ! It is the śabda which is the nimitta of artha jñāna and as soon as the nimitta is there, whether accompanied by a qualifying adjunct or not,

the naimittika i.e. the perception of artha follows from it. Thus there cannot be any distinction between the 'sopapada' and a 'nirupapada' śabda, which, therefore, in the light of the definitions under discussion, amounts to saying that there is no distinction between mukhya and gaṇa artha at all - "atha uchyeta yasmin nirupapadāt śabdād sampratyayaḥ sa mukhyaḥ, yasmin sopapadāt śabdāt sa gaṇa iti. naitad yuktaṃ. yasya hi śabdasya rūpaṃ kasyacid arthasya nimittaṃ, sopapadasyā'pi tad eva rūpaṃ, nirupapadasyā'pi. na ca śakyam nimitte sati naimittikena na bhavitum. kim ato yady evam. idaṃ śaktate vaditum upapadād ṛte na sōrtho bhavati, upapade tu sañjāte sōrthaḥ sañjaniṣyate iti. -

An attempt to distinguish between the two by pointing out that the idea of fire is obtained from śabda, while the idea of māṇavaka is obtained from the samudāya viz. of both the words agniḥ and māṇavakaḥ, would be of no use for the simple reason that 'agniḥ' and 'māṇavakaḥ' can't be taken as a 'samudāya' in the same sense in which the word 'aśva-karṇa' is called by the name. In case of 'agni' and 'māṇavaka' we realize the individual senses separately and not jointly as in case of 'aśva' and 'karṇa' in 'aśva-karṇa'. Again, it cannot be a vākyārtha. In a sentence say 'nīlaṃ utpalam' the ideas of nīlātva and utpalatva are conveyed by two words 'nīlaṃ' and 'utpalam'. These are the attributes of one and the same individual. In 'agniḥ' and 'māṇavakaḥ' however the attribute's agnitva and 'māṇavakatva', are quite distinct and separate from each other and normally they abide in two different individuals. Thus there is no plausible ground to distinguish between mukhyārtha and gaṇārtha and the best course is to admit that agni expresses both fire as well as Māṇavaka and that there is no distinction between mukhya and gaṇa arthas : "na cāsau samudāyārthaḥ śaktyate vijñātum. anvaya-vyatirekābhyāṃ hi vibhāgōvagamyate. atha vākyārtho 'yam ity ucyate. naivaṃ śakyam. na hi ananvitaḥ padārtho bhavati vākyārthaḥ. tad evaṃ dṛśyatām. agni-śabda evāyaṃ jvalanavacanāḥ. agni śabda eva māṇavakasya abhidhātā iti. tasmān na mukhyo gaṇa iti kaścid viśeṣaḥ."

It can be argued here that the distinction between the two arthas may be based on 'prasiddhi', so that the sense which is well known is taken to be 'mukhya'. The less known is gaṇa. But this argument is not at all strong. 'Prasiddhi' is nothing but 'prajñāna' or knowledge, or the quality of being well known. It is not possible to distinguish between one prajñāna and another. 'Prajñāna' is knowledge, whether extensive or limited i.e. suṣṭhu or manāk. There is no difference in its character. Again, we should not argue that 'suṣṭhu prasiddhi', and 'manāk prasiddhi', are used

by us to singify frequency or otherwise of the use of expressions. - “atha ucyate, yaḥ suṣṭhu prasiddhaḥ sa mukhyaḥ, yo manāg iva sa gaṇaḥ iti. idam api nōpapadyate. prasiddhir nāma prajñānam. na ca prajñāne kaścid viśeṣoṣṭi.” - Even this explanation is unsatisfactory, for the very fact that a ‘śabda’ conveys an ‘artha’, is enough to show that it has the potentiality - the sāmārthya to convey it; and so long as there is sāmārthya, it does not matter whether its prayoga - practice - is ‘suṣṭhu’ or ‘manāk’. This ‘alpatva’ or ‘bahutva’ of ‘prayoga’ does not make any difference between the senses from the point of view of the sāmārthya of the word to convey a particular sense. In any case the sense will be conveyed by the word and so, will have to be branded as ‘mukhya’ only - “athocyeta, yasya bahuśaḥ prayogo’ ṣti sa mukhyaḥ, alpaśaḥ prayujyamāno gaṇaḥ iti. naitad evam. alpaśōpi prayujyamāno nāṣati sāmārthyē pratyāyayet. ataḥ sōpi śabdāt praṭīyata iti mukhya eva.” [SB. pp. 748] So, unavoidable conclusion follows that ‘artha’ is always mukhya - and thus there is only one type of meaning and that is ‘mukhya’ only. It is no use, therefore to talk of ‘mukhya’ and ‘gaṇa’ artha. [Mahimā seems to follow this logic.]

This pūrva-pakṣa or prima facie view is not totally unsound. For, we find that the idea of fire is conveyed by the word ‘agni’ but the idea of ‘māṇavaka’ is not conveyed by it. This is clear from the general rule that one word conveys one sense and when the word ‘agni’ conveys the meaning of ‘fire’, it can not convey the meaning of ‘māṇavaka’. Now if it can be said that why should we not accept the idea of māṇavaka as directly conveyed by the word agni ? Why should we insist on the sense of fire being conveyed by the word ‘agni’ ? The answer to this lies in our own day-to-day experience. We find people perceiving the idea of fire from the word agni without any reference to the idea of māṇavaka, and not vice versa. This is confirmed by usage. Again there is not even a popular usage supporting the use of the word agni to denote persons having similarity to fire. The pravṛtti-nimitta is agni-sādṛśya in such cases. But how can this agni-sādṛśya be perceived if the thing in itself viz. fire is not perceived ? Thus, we have to conclude that the idea of fire is first perceived from the word ‘agni’ and then is perceived the idea of ‘sādṛśya’ or similarity. Thus the word ‘agni’ is primarily the means to perceive the idea of fire and not of ‘māṇavaka’. Thus we have to conclude that the word ‘agni’ primarily applies to fire and not to māṇavaka, to which it may apply only secondarily. In the same way, the word ‘barhiḥ’ primarily applies to ‘tṛṇa’ or grass, and not to tṛṇa-sādṛśa things. Thus it is unreasonable to say that there can be no distinction between one type of artha and another type of artha. - “SB. pp. 748 :

atra ucyate. asti atra viśeṣaḥ. māṇavako na agni-śabdāt pratiyate. katham avagamyate ? uktam, anyāyaścānekārthatvam. katham na viparyayaḥ ? ucyate. anādr̥tya eva māṇavaka-pratyayaṃ jvalanaṃ agni-śabdād pratiyanto dr̥syante. na tu anādr̥tya jvalana-pratyayaṃ māṇavakaṃ agni-śabdāt pratiyanti. kuta etat . yo yo agni-sadr̥śo vivakṣyate, tatra tatra agniśabdo niyata iti. ata eva agni-gata-sadr̥śyād ayaṃ tu dr̥syate. ataḥ agni-sadr̥śyaṃ asya pravṛtttau nimittam. na ca jvalane a-pratīte tat-sadr̥śyaṃ pratiyate. tasmāt jvalanasya agniśabdo nimittam, na māṇavakasya. tasmāt jvalane mukhyo, na māṇavake. evaṃ eva tṛṇēty asya barhiḥ śabdo nimittam, na tṛṇa-sadr̥śa-pratyayasya.

From this discussion, it is now clear that all arthas or senses are not alike. Some are mukhya while the rest are jaghanya or gaṇa. Mukhya artha is that which is primarily conveyed by a śabda, while the gaṇa artha is that which of course is conveyed by the word but only through the mukhyārtha. After establishing the two-fold division of artha, we will now go to decide as to which of these arthas should be understood as regularly conveyed by the word.

This problem is discussed by Jaimini and Śabara in an adhikaraṇa called by the name, “barhir nyāya”. This is so named due to the circumstance that the word they have chosen for theoretical consideration is “barhiḥ”, which occurs in the mantra, viz. “barhir deva-sadanaṃ dāmi”. The question raised by them is connected with the vedic mantra. The purpose of the mantra portion of veda is to bring to mind the enjoined act, at the time of ritual performance. This can be done by the mantra by yielding the artha. But when there are two types of arthas which one is to be understood as being conveyed by the words of the mantras ? Do we have to accept the mukhya or the gaṇa or both the arthas ?

The prima facie view is that as both the mukhya and gaṇa arthas are perceived by a word, both should to be accepted. Again, there is nothing to prevent this position of both being accepted. There is no restrictive factor that limits our perception to only one and not the other artha. - SB. pp. 749 - “tad evaṃ dvaite sati mukhyaparatā śabdasya, uta gaṇōpi iti yukto vicāraḥ. kim tāvat prāptam ? mukhye gaṇe ca viniyogaḥ. kutaḥ ? ubhayasya śakyatvāt ubhayaṃ api barhiḥ śabdena śakyate pratyāyayitum tṛṇaṃ ca, tṛṇa-sadr̥śaṃ ca. tṛṇaṃ sāksāt, tṛṇa-sadr̥śaṃ tṛṇa-pratyayena. yac ca nāma darsapūrṇamāsayoḥ sādhanabhūtena barhiḥ śabdena śakyate pratyāyayitum tat-sarvaṃ pratyāyayitavyam. vinigamanāyāṃ hervabhāvāt.”

The Siddhāntin does not accept this and shows that it is not possible to hold that the words of the mantras would convey both the arthas simultaneously inspite of the assertion of the pūrvapakṣ'in to that effect. Since the mantras occur in some context, it is natural therefore to assume a syntactical unit with the main sentence i.e. the vidhi vākya which lays down a particular act, so that ultimately the idea to be derived from the mantra comes to be that one should accomplish by the mantra whatever one is capable of accomplishing thereby. But for want of any other possibility it has to be admitted that the mantras help in the performance of an act by bringing to mind its several details which they can do only because they are endowed with an ever ready power to express an artha. But because, on account of context, and eka-vākyatā with vidhi-vākya, it must convey the mukhya artha, and because it cannot convey both the arthas simultaneously, it is clear that the mantras are to be employed in their primary and not their secondary signification. - "SB. pp. 749 - "evaṃ prāpte brūmaḥ - mukhya eva viniyoktavyo mantro na gaṇa iti. kutaḥ ? ubhayasya śakyatvāt. prakaraṇe hi samāmnānāt pradhānenaika-vākyatām upaiti. tatraitad āpatati, yat śaknuyād anena mantreṇa sādhayitum tathā sādhayed iti. sa cāsāv arthābhīdhāna-samyogāt śaknoti upakartum, na gaṇam artham śaknoti abhīdhātum. tasmān na gaṇe viniyogaḥ.

Prof. Devasthali (pp. 68) further elaborates, as follows. But, it may be argued, that the gaṇa artha is also conveyed by the mantra, after first conveying the mukhyārtha. So, there is nothing wrong in holding that the mantra is also conveying the gaṇa artha, and is also employed in that sense also, for the gaṇa sense is also connected with it. But the point is that when the purpose of the mantra is served by conveying just the mukhyārtha there is no need to proceed for the gaṇārtha. The conveying of meaning, i.e. arthābhīdhāna serves the purpose of proving that the mantra is not futile and this purpose of 'ānarthakyparihāra' is served by conveying the primary meaning. Thus there is no motivation for further conveying the secondary sense also. So, it has to be concluded that 'mukhyārtha' alone is conveyed by the mantra, and not the gaṇārtha also - SB. pp. 750 reads - "nanu mukhyapratyayā cchakyate gaṇaḥ pratyāyayitum. satyam etat. mukhya-pratyāyanena eva asya prayojanavattā nirvṛtā iti na gaṇam prati viniyoge kiñcit pramāṇam asti. mukhye viniyogena tu ānarthakyaṃ parihṛyate. parihṛte ānarthakye na gaṇābhīdhānam āpatati. na hy anabhīdhāya mukhyaṃ gaṇam abhivādati śabdaḥ. ataḥ pramāṇābhāvāt na gaṇe viniyujyeta."

Over and above this, there are many different means by which the gaṇārtha can be conveyed, and if mantra is invariably accepted as one of these, it naturally means that the other ways of conveying the same have to be overlooked. But where shall we find a pramāṇa for doing so ? Mantrāmnāna could not have the power to exclude the other means of arriving at the gaṇārtha, for fear of parisamkhyā, which has no motive. Of course, it can be asked as to on what ground or pramāṇa do you take the mantra to be the means of conveying the mukhyārtha ? The reply to this is that we do so to save the mantras from being meaningless i.e. anarthaka. For, if the mantra is not used even in its mukhyārtha, then it will not be able to be of any help in the main sacrificial ritual and therefore will consequently be rendered totally useless. Thus the conclusion forces upon us that the mantras are to be employed in their primary signification only. - SB. pp. 750, “api ca. gaṇasya pratyāyane sāmartyād bahavo’bhyupāyāḥ prāpnuvanti. sāmartyam ca śabdaikadeśe ityukram. arthād vā kalpanaikadeśatvād iti. tatra mantre niyogato gaṇam prati viniyuḥyamāna upāyāntaram vinā pramāṇena bādhyeta. mantrā”mnānam pramāṇam iti ced, na tasya upāyāntara-nivṛttau sāmartyam asti. nanu mukhyēpi viniyuḥyamānasya eṣa eva doṣaḥ. na iti ucyate. yadi mukhyēpi na viniyuḥyeta naiva pradhānasya upakuryāt. tatra tasya utpattir anarthikā eva syāt. tasmād asti gaṇe mukhye ca viśeṣaḥ.”

It can be further asked, why does the mantra convey its mukhyārtha at all, if its gaṇārtha alone is to be ultimately employed ? If it is argued that the mukhyārtha has to be conveyed since the gaṇārtha can not otherwise be understood, then the reply is that, there do exist other means of getting at the gaṇārtha such as arthāpatti etc. and mukhyārtha of a given mantra is not the only means to it. Again, if it be argued that mukhyārtha is to be accepted as one of the several alternative remedies for arriving at the gaṇārtha, the reply is that in this case, mantrāmnāna does not become compulsory for our object is to convey the gaṇārtha and it necessarily may not be through the mantra, so the mantra may easily be neglected. But this goes against practice. On the other hand, if once the mantra is admitted as necessary for conveying the gaṇārtha by accepting a ‘niyama’, then there remains no purpose for the mantra to convey the gaṇārtha after it has once conveyed the mukhyārtha. The purpose, viz. ānarthakya parihāra is served by the mukhyārtha itself, as noted above. -

SB. pp. 750 - api ca yo gaṇe mantram viniyunkte sa vaktavyaḥ - kim artham mukhyam pratyāyasīti. sa ced brūyād -

nānyathā gaṇa-pratyayo'stīti. pratibrūyād enam anye'pi gaṇapratyayasya abhyupāyāḥ santīti. artha sa evaṃ abhiyuktaḥ pratibrūyāt mukhya-pratyayo'pi pākṣiko'bhyupāyāḥ iti. brūyād enam, na tarhi niyogato gaṇe viniyojanīyaḥ. yadā gaṇapratyayāya mukhyaṃ upādatte, tadā etad āpatitaṃ bhavati mukhya eva viniyoga iti. arthena ca pratītena prayojanaṃ na pratyāyakena mantreṇa. ato'nyenāpyupāyena gaṇaḥ pratyāyayitavyaḥ. na sa eva mantra ādartaṃ. athā'pi mantreṇa pratyāyakena prayojanaṃ syāt tathā'pi mukhya - pratyāyanenaiva nirvṛttaṃ prayojanaṃ iti natarāṃ gaṇe viniyuḥyeta." (SB. pp. 750).

The outcome of this discussion is that of the two senses viz. mukhya and gaṇa, it is only the mukhya which is to be accepted as being conveyed by the mantra and it is the mukhya alone which has to be connected with the enjoined act - "SB. pp. 751 - tasmān mukhya-gaṇayor mukhye kārya-sampratyaya iti siddham" - Thus, words, as far as possible must be understood as conveying their mukhyārtha alone, which as will be discussed later, supplies us with one of the pre-conditions of lakṣaṇā, as held by the Mīmāṃsakas.

Thus as seen above, the Mīmāṃsakas are fairly conversant with the primary and also the secondary sense of words in a sentence. We will now go to see their attitude towards lakṣaṇā.

As noted above, the mantra, according to the Mīmāṃsā discipline, has to be taken in its mukhya or primary sense rather than in the secondary sense or gaṇārtha or lakṣyārtha. For the Mīmāṃsakas there are only two powers of a word, i.e. they recognize only two śabda-vṛttis i.e. abhidhā or the power of expression and lakṣaṇā or the power of indication which makes for the secondary sense. We will look into this problem in greater details as it is this central issue which forms the common heritage for the ālaṃkārikas or aestheticians to start with. It may be observed that the mīmāṃsaka means abhidhā only when he uses the term śabda-śakti; but there are cases where even he has to pay attention to the fact that at times the sense rendered by abhidhā does not serve the purpose and that he has to travel further. At this juncture he resorts to what he calls gaṇi-vṛtti or bhakti or lakṣaṇā or the secondary power or function of a word.

The mīmāṃsaka has noted, as already discussed by us earlier, various means of determining the mukhyārtha. It has also been noted that for the Mīmāṃsaka, as

a rule, it is not right to assume one word as having more than one senses. The Mīmāṃsaka is generally, inclined to believe that where a word appears to have more than one senses, only one is the mukhyārtha and the rest are conveyed only through sādṛśya or other relations by lakṣaṇā. So then, the word 'barhiḥ' primarily means 'grass in general' and is applied to "sanctified grass" only secondarily through sādṛśya. Yet another illustration is the word 'parvan' which is used in the sense of 'kāla' as well as of 'samudāya' (i.e. of the two sacrifices called 'darśa' and 'paurṇamāsa'). But the context and derivation suggest the right view viz. that the word primarily denotes the samudāya and is only secondarily used in the sense of 'kāla', owing to samudāya-sambandha - The SB., on Mī. Sū. IX. 2.53, pp. 1739 - reads as - "nāyaṃ ubhayatra parvaśabdo vartate. yadi kālavacanas tatsambandhāt samudāye gamyate. yadi vā samudāyavacanas tat-sambandhāt kāle. anyataravacano nōbhaya-vacanaḥ. tatra samudāya vacane kalpyamāne prakaraṇam anugrhitam bhavati. api ca pṛṇāteḥ parva-śabdaḥ. pṛṇātiś ca dāne prasiddhaḥ. dānāni ca samudāyāḥ. tasmāt samudāyā"bhījyā. evaṃ śabdāvayava-prasiddhir anugrhitā bhavati."

Same is the case with the word 'caru', which on the authority of the smṛti texts is declared to convey primarily 'odana', and the 'sthālī' only secondarily. (See. Mī. Sū. X. i. 34-43, and SB on the same). The case of the word 'mātā' is, however, different. It means both, "mother" and, "one who measures (corn)." Both these are the vācyārthas of the word 'mātā'. - The SB. on Mī. Sū. X. 1.14 pp. 1810 reads - "anekasyāpy ekaḥ śabdo bhavati vācakaḥ. tad yathā māteti mātaram api vadati, mātaram api. mātā ca paramaṃ daivatam samā ca putreṣv ity etair upabaddhamāno jananīvacano'vagamyate. mātā samaḥ kṣipraścetyebhir anubudhyamāno dhānyasya mātur vācakaḥ." In such cases, the context becomes helpful in deciding the exact meaning of a word in a given passage : SB. on Mī. Sū. VI. 8.35, pp. 1519 reads - "chāgopakaraṇam asya upadarśitam. yad upadaṃśane paśu-śabdaś chāgābhiprāya iti gamyate. yathā yugavastra upadaṃśita īṣācakraḍi-sannidhāne ced akṣamānayetv ucyate, tadā yānākṣam adhikṛtya brūte iti gamyate, na tu videvanākṣam iti."

Actually, though such a word appears to be one, it is not one but two.

But what does our first perception refer to when we use or hear a word ? Does the form come first or its sense ? This problem is discussed by the Mīmāṃsakas when the meaning of the text viz. 'rathantaram uttaryor gāyati.' is discussed. The conclusion is that words are meant to convey primarily their senses and not only their forms. It is also observed that words primarily denote 'jāti' and 'vyakti' is

conveyed only by implication, when action cannot be correlated with 'jāti'. At times we come across words that convey two senses e.g. words such as 'aśvakarṇa', 'kuśala', or 'praviṇa'. Such words give two sets of meanings, one by etymology and the other by usage. So, these arthas are called 'yaugika artha' and 'rūḍhy artha'. Now, the question is, which one will be taken as primary meaning ? It can be said that as the etymological meaning is conveyed by the constituents it must be accepted as primary meaning and the rūḍhy artha which sets aside these meanings should be taken as gaṇa artha. But this is not the correct view. 'Prasiddhi' is the decider and here samudāya-prasiddhi is held higher than avayava-prasiddhi. Thus the mīmāṃsakas conclude that rūḍhy artha is to be preferred to the yaugikārtha. Śābara has made this clear at many places and Jaimini does the same while discussing the meaning of the term 'rathakāra' in the adhikaraṇa when he has discussed the text - 'varṣāsu rathakāra ādadhīta'. Jaimini suggests that the term 'rathakāra' must be taken to mean, 'a person of mixed caste called rathakāra'. This rule is very often referred to as 'rathakāra nyāya'. (Mī. Sū. VI. 1. 44-50). Śābara also opines that words must be so construed as to convey only their natural meaning and not any other signification that the interpreter may find it necessary to assign to them. Thus for Śābara even sāmānya-vācī śabda can not denote viśeṣa, at least not by abhidhā : SB on Mī. Sū. X. 8.16, p. 2073 reads - "na hi sāmānyavācī śabdo viśeṣān abhivadati. yadi ca abhivadad adya-jāte gavi nāvakalpeta. pūrva-darśanābhāvāt. sāmānye ca dr̥ṣṭapūrvatvāt avakalpate. tasmān na sāmānyam viśeṣān abhivadati ... abhivadan vā na mukhyayā vṛtṭyā abhivadet. katham tarhi ? lakṣaṇayā. lakṣaṇā ca śrutyā bādhyate.

This is how lakṣaṇā comes up for consideration. First, let us see how Jaimini and Śābara interpret the text, "saptadaśaratnir vai vājapeyasya yūpo bhavati." The purva pakṣa view here favours lakṣaṇā on the word 'yūpa' and would choose to mean it to be ṣodasipātra; for he argues that vājapeya has no 'yūpa' at all. But the siddhāntin suggests that even if vājapeya has no yūpa directly, it can be said to have yūpa as its 'aṅga', for it is an 'aṅga' of paśu yajña, which itself is again the aṅga of vājapeya. The genitive ending applied to vājapeya expresses the sambandha with yūpa and this is understood without resorting to lakṣaṇā. Lakṣaṇā is after all a dosa, a blemish, because to resort to lakṣaṇā we have to put aside the natural expressed sense, and take up an indirect sense. So, it is only as a last resort that lakṣaṇā has to be admitted. The S.B. on Mī. Sū. III. i. 18 - "ānarthakyāt tad aṅgeṣu" - reads as follows - yaś ca yasyopakāriṇa upakaroti bhavati sa tasya sambaddho mukhyena eva sambandhena. na caikāntaritam iti kṛtvā a-sambandho bhavati.

yathā devadattasya napteti putreṇa cā'sāvantaritaḥ. atha devadattena mukhyena eva sambandhena sambandhyate. tasmād eṣa eva pakṣa āśrayaṇīyaḥ. na hi etasmin pakṣe kaścīd api lakṣaṇāśabdo bhavati iti.

But at times, the primary meaning of a word is inapplicable in some context. This results in 'ānarthakya' of a vedic-text. This is seen quite often in laukika vākyas but for vedic texts ānarthakya is an intolerable position. Veda is never a-pramāṇa and hence not even a syllable, not to talk of a word, can be said to be 'anarthaka' i.e. bereft of meaning. Ānarthakya is a-nyāya, and arthavattva is nyāya as emphasized at all places by both Jaimini and Śābara. So, when a literal sense is not found to be applicable, to avoid this greater ānarthakya blemish, a lesser evil called lakṣaṇā is admissible in special cases for the Mīmāṃsaka. So, the figurative meaning is at times permissible. In a sentence, say, "siṃham ālabheta" there is no need to resort to the secondary sense as the primary sense is quite applicable. But in statements like, "siṃho devadattaḥ" or "agnau tiṣṭhati", or 'chatrīṇo gacchanti', the vāc्यārtha looks irrelevant in case of 'siṃhaḥ', 'agnau' and 'chatrīṇaḥ' respectively. So, to avoid 'ānarthakya doṣa' we find another sense that would be congruous with the context on hand, and which sense of course could be indirectly conveyed by the words concerned. So, for the Mīmāṃsakas, lakṣaṇā is resorted to only to avoid the greater evil of 'ānarthakya' in case of a vedic text which is always a highest 'pramāṇa' or authority. Thus lakṣaṇā is resorted to only if the literal sense is found to be unsuitable to the context, and this too only as a last resort. Read SB. p. 488 - "yadāñjasyena śabdārtho nā'vakalpate, tadā lakṣaṇayā'pi kalpyamānaḥ sādhu bhavati. yathā 'agnau tiṣṭhati', 'avate tiṣṭhati', 'agni-samīpe tiṣṭhati', 'avata-samīpe tiṣṭhati', iti bhavati samvyavahāraḥ.", again SB. p. 1485 - "śruty asaṃbhava lakṣaṇayā'pi vyavahāro bhavati. yathā'gnau tiṣṭhaty avate tiṣṭhati. iti.", SB. p. 1551 - asati śruty arthe lakṣaṇārtho grāhyaḥ., SB. p. 1280 - 'śrutyasaṃbhava lakṣaṇā'pi nyāyaiva."; SB. p. 1437 - "mukhyā'bhāve gaṇo grhyate."; SB. p. 1560 - "saṃbhavati śrutyarthe lakṣaṇayā'pi śabdārthaḥ; SB. p. 2021 - tritvaṃ hi catuṣṭvā'dīni sāhacaryācchaknoti lakṣayitum. lakṣaṇā tvāśritā bhavati. kiṃ kriyatām. agatyā'srīyate. satyāṃ gatau nāśrayitavyā.; SB. on IX. 1.13, pp. 1660 - "vrīhīn prokṣatīti, vrīhī-jātir nirdiśyate. vrīhī-drava-lakṣaṇārthā vā, apūrva-sādhana-viśeṣa-lakṣaṇārthā vā."

Prof. Devasthali (pp. 79, ibid) observes : "The first and the foremost principle to be borne in mind, in this connection is that between the two powers of a word, viz. śruti (or Abhidhā) and lakṣaṇā, the former being more conventional or direct is certainly stronger and hence preferable."

Śabara insists on this principle at different places in varying expressions. - See SB. p. 134 - śruti-lakṣaṇāvisāye śrutiṃ jyāyasī; SB. pp. 565, 1244, 1262 - śrutilakṣaṇā-visāye ca śrutiṃ nyāyyā; SB. p. 1210, 1222, śrutiśca lakṣaṇāyā gariyasī. SB. p. 1260; śrutiśca lakṣaṇāyā gariyasī; SB. p. 1278 - śrutiśca lakṣaṇāyā baliyasī; SB. p. 1556 - śruti-lakṣaṇāyoś ca śrutiṃ nyāyyā; SB. p. 2243 - śrutiśca lakṣaṇāto nyāyyā;. Thus lakṣaṇā has some scope against śruti or abhidhā, which is clearly favoured by the Mīmāṃsaka. Lakṣaṇā is admissible only as a strong weapon against 'ānarthakya doṣa'. So, 'śruty asaṃbhava' or "mukhyābhāva" is therefore, laid down as the most important pre-requisite of lakṣaṇā.

But this inapplicability of 'vācyārtha' is not the only basis for lakṣaṇā. There is yet another basis for resorting to lakṣaṇā. In a statement such as, for example, 'vedaṃ adhītya snāyāt', meaning, "one should take a bath after studying the veda", the primary sense is not impossible. But the point is that if one takes a bath on the completion of vedic studies, what purpose can be served by this bath ? Perhaps, it can be said that here, 'snāna' or bath serves an 'adṛṣṭa' purpose - an unseen reason. But as far as there is dṛṣṭa-hetu we should not imagine an adṛṣṭa-hetu. Prof. Devasthali notes that, "It is for avoiding this 'adṛṣṭārthatā' that in the text under consideration, we resort to lakṣaṇā and take it to mean, "As soon as one finishes his vedic studies one should relinquish the vows of 'asnāna' and others, but remain with his guru and prosecute the dharma-jijñāsā." (pp. 80, ibid). - The SB. p. 7, on Mī. Sū. I. i. 1, reads - "na vā idaṃ snānaṃ adṛṣṭārthaṃ vidhiyate. kiṃtu lakṣaṇāyā asnānā"di-niyamasya paryavasānaṃ vedādhyaṇa-samakālaṃ āhuḥ. vedaṃ adhītya snāyād gurukulān mā samāvartita itī, adṛṣṭa-parihārāya eva." The Mīmāṃsaka is of the opinion that - "dṛṣṭe sati" i.e. when a 'dṛṣṭa' reason can be imagined, the assuming of a-dṛṣṭa, i.e. - 'adṛṣṭa kalpanā' makes for a more serious draw-back than lakṣaṇā. 'dṛṣṭe sati adṛṣṭa-kalpana' involves an assumption unwarranted by our experience, but lakṣaṇā is comparatively a more acceptable thing, it being a matter of everyday experience and sanctioned by daily usage. - SB. pp. 324 has - "lakṣaṇe ced varam lakṣaṇā kalpitā na yāgābhidhānam. laukikī hi lakṣaṇā, haṭho'prasiddha-kalpanā. - again, "lakṣaṇā hi adṛṣṭa-kalpanāyā jyāyasī. pramāṇād hi sā bhavati; and also, "lakṣaṇā cā'dṛṣṭa-kalpanāyā jyāyasī." - Then, (pp. 80, ibid) - "Avoidance of conflict or contradiction between the several words of the text itself, or between several texts of scriptures affords yet another basis for resorting to lakṣaṇā, as is seen in the case of text like, 'aditir dyaur aditir antarikṣam', or, 'tvam eva mātā, tvam eva pitā', etc. - See SB. on Mī. Sū. I. 2.39 - "guṇād a-vipratishedhaḥ syāt." Again, lakṣaṇā is welcome in view of the context. For

example, the word 'sarva' in texts like, "pūrṇāhutyā sarvān kāmān avāpnoti", has to be taken to mean only those desires - i.e. kāmās as intended at the time when the sacrifice is started - The Mī. Sū. I. 12-16 reads, "sarvatvaṃ ādhikārikam", and the SB. p. 129, has, "sarva-kāmāpti-vacanam gaṇam. a-sarveṣu sarva-vacanam adhikṛtāpekṣam."

Thus, resorting to lakṣaṇa is permissible under four different circumstances, which makes it impossible to avoid lakṣaṇā. We have to let go the vācyārtha and accept lakṣaṇā if by sticking to vācyārtha we find that (i) a vedic text, or any part thereof, is rendered useless or meaningless. This is a case of ānarthakya, or (ii) Vācyārtha yields a sense which is not congruent with the sense conveyed by other parts, or (iii) if vācyārtha is found to no visible purpose and to support the same we have to resort to a-dṛṣṭa-kalpanā or assuming an invisible purpose, or (iv) if it is so required by the preamble, if we may so translate the word 'adhikāra'. We may add that these conditions in general make for the 'mukhyārtha-bādha' and also, 'rātparya-anupapatti', of the later thinkers.

After having decided the Mīmāṃsaka approach as to under which circumstances lakṣaṇā has to be resorted to in case of a word or words the question that comes up before us is that (i) what sense or senses are conveyed by lakṣaṇā and (ii) how are they conveyed ? The latter, i.e. the manner in which the lakṣyārtha is conveyed has been fully answered and discussed by Śabara at several places. On Mī. Sū. VIII. 3. 34, Śabara lays down that though the direct sense of a word is found unsuitable to the context, the word can't yet abandon it for good. For, if the primary sense, vācyārtha, is totally abandoned, how can the lakṣyārtha be conveyed at all ? - SB. on VIII. 3.34 Mī. Sū. reads - 'svārthe vartamānaḥ sādṛśyam gamayati. svārtham jahat katham gamayet ? - Thus even this lakṣyārtha has to be śabdārtha. We can observe that the condition of 'tad-yoga' finds acceptance here. A word, Śabara observes, even by lakṣaṇā, has no power to convey 'a-śabdārtha', i.e. some sense, which has no connection whatsoever with the śabda : SB. on Mī. Sū. VIII. iii. 24, pp. 1622 reads - "na ca lakṣaṇayā prayoge a-śabdārthaḥ paricchidyate. yat-kāraṇam svārthe vartamāno'rthāntaram lakṣayati. svārtham jahan naiva lakṣayet." And if the word has to have any connection with the indicated sense or lakṣyārtha, it can have it only through its vācyārtha. So, if the word does not first express its vācyārtha, there is no possibility of its going further and conveying lakṣyārtha. If stated simply, it means that the lakṣyārtha must be connected with the mukhyārtha in one way or the other, and this we can suggest in the words of later ālamkārikas, by the term 'tad-yoga' i.e. "relation with that (= vācyārtha)". This fact is beautifully

explained by Śābara, under Mī. Sū. I. iv. 23. Śābara observes - (pp. 357, 360) *katham nu svārthābhīdhānena pratyavasthā iti cet, artha-sambandhāt. simha iti nirjñāte prasahya-kāritā tatra prāyeṇa iti prasahyakāriti gamyate, artha-pratyaya-sāmarthyāt. yo hi manyate prasahyakāriṇaṃ pratyāyaye yam iti, sa yadi simha-śabdaṃ uccārayati siddhyati asya abhipretam. simhārthaḥ pratītaḥ, sambandhāt itaraṃ arthaṃ pratyāyayati.* evaṃ svārthābhīdhāne tad-guṇa-sambandhaḥ pratīyate.”

Now we come to decide the exact nature of the secondary sense that we arrive at with the help of lakṣaṇā. So, we will examine the different kinds of ‘tad-yoga’ which make lakṣaṇā possible. In this context, it may be noted that, in general, a word may figuratively convey (i) the sense of the possessive suffix, i.e. - *matvartha-lakṣaṇā*, (ii) the place - i.e. *deśa-lakṣaṇā*, (iii) the dharma or guṇa, i.e. *dharma-lakṣaṇā* or *guṇa-vāda*, (iv) the time or *kāla-lakṣaṇā*, (v) the action, i.e. *karma-lakṣaṇā*, (vi) the *kārya* or the *sādhya* (vii) the *karāṇa* or *sādhana*, (viii) some *sajātiya* or (ix) the *liṅgin*. Which of these is conveyed in a given illustration, depends on the will of the speaker, though some general indications regarding these can be pointed out with some amount of certainty.

“Udbhidā yajeta” is an illustration, which the *pūrva-pakṣin* holds to be one of ‘*matvarthīya lakṣaṇā*’. This means that that the sentence can be put as : *udbhīdā yāgena svargaṃ bhāvayet.* - But how can we explain the apposition between ‘*udbhīdā*’ and ‘*yāgena*’ ? The *pūrva-pakṣin* seeks explanation in *matvartha-lakṣaṇā* and takes ‘*udbhīdā*’ to mean ‘*udbhīdvatā*’. The argument is that lakṣaṇā is a common-place matter, *laukikī*, and hence it has to be preferred to a-*prasiddha-kalpanā* or assuming an uncommon thing such as taking the word ‘*udbhīd*’ as the name of a sacrifice. For the *siddhāntin* the word ‘*udbhīd*’, on the strength of etymology can signify the *yāga*, and hence no question of a-*prasiddha kalpanā* ever arises. The apposition can be satisfactorily explained by the ‘*vācyārtha*’, or, say, the ‘*yaugikārtha*’ only. So, for the *siddhāntin* there is no scope for lakṣaṇā in the text under discussion. Read SB. pp. 323, on Mī. Sū. I. iv. 2 : *yāgena kuryād iti ‘yajeta’ ity asyārthaḥ. karaṇam hi yāgaḥ. udbhidādy api hi tṛīyā-nirdeśāt karaṇam. tatra udbhidā yāgena iti karma-nāma-dheyatvena sāmānādhikaranyā’sāmāñjasyam. dravyavacanatve matvartha-lakṣaṇayā sāmānādhikaranyam syāt.... lakṣaṇeti ced varam lakṣaṇā kalpitā na yāgābhīdhānam. laukikī hi lakṣaṇā, aṭho’aprasiddha-kalpanā iti.... anuvādā hy udbhidādayaḥ. kutaḥ prāptir iti cet, tato’bhīdhīyate. ucchabda-sāmarthyād bhicchabda-sāmarthyāt ca udbhid-śabdaḥ kriyāvacanah. udbhedanam prakāśanam paśūnām anena kriyate ity udbhid yāgaḥ... evaṃ sarvatra.*

The pūrvapakṣa is silenced but the observation that resorting to lakṣaṇā is better than a-drṣṭa-kalpanā is a sound one. The illustration of matvarthīya lakṣaṇā is, “somena yajeta”, where the text is explained as, ‘somavatā yāgena iṣṭam bhāvayet’. It is possible to explain the apposition i.e. sāmānādhikarānya between ‘somena’ and ‘yāgena’ only through lakṣaṇā.

Deśa-lakṣaṇā is illustrated by such popular expressions as, “agnau tiṣṭhati” or, ‘avate-tiṣṭhati’. A vedic illustration is seen in the text, viz. “kavatiṣu rathantaram gāyati”. Here the vāc्यārtha of ‘kavatiṣu’ is a mis-fit. The pūrvapakṣin suggests that by resorting to lakṣaṇā ‘kavatiṣu’ should be taken as ‘kavati-deśe’. The siddhāntin rejects this idea. He says that the word ‘rathantaram’ is not a saṃskāra śabda and so there is no difficulty if we accept even the vāc्यārtha of ‘kavatiṣu’. So, for want of mukhyārthabādha, there is no scope for lakṣaṇā at all in this text. However, the type of lakṣaṇā suggested by the pūrva-pakṣin is noteworthy. Śabara has given another illustration of this variety in ‘gaṅgāyām gāvaḥ’, which, comes closer to our ‘gaṅgāyām ghoṣaḥ’. This, for the ālamkārikas is “śuddhā lakṣaṇa-lakṣaṇā”.

The pūrva-pakṣin suggests another alternative. He says that the word ‘rathantaram’ should be taken to mean ‘rathantara-dharmāḥ’ : SB. p. 1545 reads - “dharma-lakṣaṇā vā syāt. rathantaradharmā vā kavatiṣu rathantara-śabdena atidiśyante. yathā rathantare prastūyamāne pṛthivīm manasā dhyāyed ity evamā”dayaḥ. yathā ācārye proṣite ācāryānī bhavatām ācārya iti ācārya-śusrūṣā “cāryānyām atidiśyate”.

But this proposal of dharma-lakṣaṇā is also rejected by the siddhāntin who refuses to accept any lakṣaṇā in the said text. Sentences like ‘simho devadattaḥ’ and ‘agnir māṇavakaḥ’ are popular illustrations of this type of dharma-lakṣaṇā. : SB. p. 755 - reads - “guṇād vā’py abhidhānam syāt...” (Mī. Sū. III. ii. 4) - guṇa-samyogāt gaṇam idaṃ abhidhānam bhaviṣyati. bhavati hi guṇād apy abhidhānam. yathā simho devadattaḥ, agnir māṇavaka it.” - Here the words ‘simha’ and ‘agni’ stand for their qualities. This type can be placed with ‘gaṇī sārōpā lakṣaṇā’ of the ālamkārikas, normally illustrated by, “gaur vāhikāḥ”. For the ālamkārikas, however, the lakṣyārtha is ‘vyakti’, but for the mīmāṃsakas, it is dharmas. Śabara here observes : ‘para-śabdaḥ paratra prayuktas san dharmān atidiśati. (on Mī. Sū. VII. iv. 8). Śabara also observes, under Mī. Sū. VII. 3.17, that, “śruty arthasambhavāt ca lakṣaṇāyā dharmāṇām grāhaka ucyate.

Jaimini, under Mī. Sū. I. ii. 10, calls this dharma-lakṣaṇā as guṇavāda. SB. p. 213 has - “guṇavādas tu. gaṇa eṣa vādo bhavati yat-sambandhini stotavye

sambandhy antaram stūyate.” So, “stenam manah”, is given as an example of guṇa-vāda, and Śabara explains the sentence as - “yathā stenah pracchanna-rūpa evaṃ ca mana it gaṇah śabdaḥ.” But we should note that the word ‘guṇa-vāda’ is used by Jaimini and Śabara in a sense much wider than dharma-lakṣaṇā. It means ‘upacāra’ or secondary usage in general. This is borne out by the fact that, ‘anṛtavādinī vāk’ is given as yet another example of guṇavāda where lakṣaṇā does not convey dharma or guṇa but ‘bāhulya’ or ‘prāsastya’. Śabara observes - (on Mī. Sū. I. ii. 11, pp. 127) : “guṇavādas tu rūpāt. yathā stenah pracchannarūpāḥ evaṃ ca mana it gaṇah śabdaḥ. prāyāc ca anṛtavādinī vāg iti.” - Thus, it seems, Jaimini lays down ‘rūpa’ and ‘prāya’ as two possible grounds for guṇavāda, among others - “Mī. Sū. I. ii. 11, - “rūpāyat prāyāt”.

Next variety of lakṣaṇā is “kāla-lakṣaṇā” Quite often time is indicated by an incident which normally occurs at a particular hour. The popular illustration, is, “go-rajā-muhūrta”. Śabara gives another illustration while commenting on Mī. Sū. VI. iv. 42. A friend invites his intimate person with the words, “śaṅkha-velāyām āgantavyam”, though in fact a conch may not be blown in the village where both of them are staying. But the other person knows that actual blowing of conch is not meant but only the particular hour of blowing is meant. Śabara observes : (on Mī. Sū. VI. iv. 42, pp. 1454) - “yathā śaṅkha-velāyām āgantavyam iti. yasminn api grāme śaṅkho nā’dhmāyate tasminn api sa tathā kālo’sṭiti nā”gamanam parihāsyate.”

We may observe that even Śabara has not provided illustrations from vedic texts only for all sub-varieties of lakṣaṇā which the Mīmāṃsakas accept. So, in fact the difference between language patterns as seen in the veda and, in the popular usage are identical.

Karma-lakṣaṇā is opposite in nature to kāla-lakṣaṇā, which occurs when a word expressive of an incident or an act is used to indicate time. Karma-lakṣaṇā requires that a word expressive of time is used to indicate an incident or act. In the text viz., “amāvāsyāyām niśi”, the word amāvāsyā primarily expressing time is proposed to be understood as secondarily indicating sacrifice called ‘darśa’. : SB. on Mī. Sū. XII. ii. 14, pp. 2243 reads - “nā’māvāsyā-śabdaḥ karma-vacanah. kiṃ tarhi ? kāla-vacanah. kāle śrutiḥ karmani lakṣaṇā.” Read also SB. on Mī. Sū. IV iv. 19 - pp. 1278 - “atra kāla evāyam mukhyaḥ śabdo na karmani, karmani lakṣaṇā.”

Next comes a variety of lakṣaṇā, where a word expressive of the sādhyā or kārya is used to indicate the sādhana or the kāraṇa, and vice versa. In the vedic

text, viz. “prsthair upatiṣṭhate”, the word ‘prsthā’ is to be understood to signify, not the sacrificial act called ‘prsthā’, but the mantras which are used during the performance of that act. Read Mī. Sū. VII. iii. 36 and SB on it - “abhidhānopadeśād vā vipratīṣedhāt dravyeṣu prsthā-śabdaḥ syāt.” In the text, viz. “atha yat triṣṭubhā paridadhāti nāntam gacchati”, the word ‘triṣṭubh’ stands for “uṣṇik-kakubhau”, on which Śabara observes - “kāraṇe kāryavad upacāraḥ kṛtaḥ.” He observes : (pp. 1323, on Mī. Sū. V. iii. 6) - “triṣṭubham evāyaṃ uṣṇik-kakubhāv iti brūte. katham? triṣṭubho vīryaṃ ity evaṃ ante samstuteḥ. triṣṭubho vā etad vīryaṃ yad uṣṇik-kakubhāv iti. kāraṇe kāryavad upacāraḥ kṛtaḥ.”

We come across a similar type of lakṣaṇā in texts like, ‘yajamānāḥ prastaraḥ yajamānāḥ ekādaśa-kapālaḥ’. It is clear that this apposition of the two words ‘yajamāna’ and ‘prastara’ or ‘yajamāna’ and ‘ekādaśa-kapāla’, can not be adequately explained by sticking to the vāc्यārtha of these words. So, by lakṣaṇā, the word ‘yajamāna’ has to be taken to mean ‘yajamāna-siddhi-kara’. Thus the apposition between two words can be explained by adopting ‘siddhi-karatva-lakṣaṇā’, which is explained by Śabara citing popular illustration viz. “rājā pattigaṇakaḥ”. - Read SB. on Mī. Sū. I. 4, pp. 360 : “iha tu yajamānaḥ prastaraḥ, yajamānaḥ eka-kapāla iti kīdrśo guṇa-sambandhaḥ pratiyate. tat-siddhikara iti. sarvo hi ātmanaḥ kārya-siddhiṃ karoti. anyo’pi yas tasya kārya-siddhiṃ karoti sa tasmin uccarite hṛdayaṃ āgacchati. yathā rājā pattigaṇaka iti. patti-gaṇako rājāḥ kāryaṃ sādhayati. sa rāja-śabda uccarite pratiyate. evaṃ ihā’pi yajamāna-kāryaṃ prastaraika-kapālau sādhayataḥ. tasmāt tau yajamāna-śabdena pratyāyete.”

Bhūmā or bāhulya is one more principle underlying lakṣaṇā. There is a vedic expression viz. “sr̥ṣṭir upadadhāti”. The literal meaning of this text is, ‘sr̥ṣṭi-mantrakā upadadhāti iṣṭakāḥ’. All the mantras required for ‘iṣṭakā-cayana’, are normally given beforehand, and the text has to be understood as referring to them only. But, some of these mantras are, “a-sr̥ṣṭi-līṅga” - (i.e. not containing the word sr̥ṣṭi or √sr̥j, in them). Yet they are to be in the sr̥ṣṭi-mantras with the help of a-jahallakṣaṇā based on bhūmā. Read SB. pp. 363, Mī. Sū. I. iv. : bhūmā; katham tu asr̥ṣṭiṣu ca sr̥ṣṭi-śabdaḥ iti. bhūmnā. bahavas tatra sr̥ṣṭi-līṅgā mantrā, alpaśo vi-līṅgāḥ.”

‘Līṅga-samavāyāt’ is a sūtra in which, Jaimini notes a type of lakṣaṇā having a widely different process involved. The text, by way of illustration is, “prāṇa-bhṛta upadadhāti”. If taken in its primary sense, it would mean, “prāṇabhṛnmantrakā upadadhāti iṣṭakāḥ.” This will not include the ‘a-prāṇabhṛn-mantras’ and lead to

the ‘ānarthakya’ of such other mantras. Thus the word ‘prāṇabhṛu’ is to be taken in its secondary sense so as to contain all other mantras which are ‘a-prāṇabhṛn’ and which are placed in the same group of mantras, one or two of which are ‘prāṇabhṛn-mantraka’. This is known as chatrī-nyāya, and the popular illustration is, “chatrīṇo yānti”, or ‘chatrīṇo gacchanti’. Here the underlying principle is not ‘bhūmā’ or ‘bāhulya’, but the ‘prādhānya’ or principality of the expressed sense. The basis then, in such cases of lakṣaṇā is some peculiar or prominent mark or ‘līṅga’. See Mī. Sū. I. 4 - and Śabara on it - “līṅga-samavāyāt”. - līṅga-samavāyāt para-śabdaḥ paratra vartate. yathā ‘chatrīṇo gacchanti’ iti ekena chatrīṇā sarve lakṣyante. na cāyaṃ prāṇabhṛcchabdaḥ sṛṣṭi-śabdaś ca jahatsvārtham mantra-gaṇam lakṣayet. yad-gaṇe ca sṛṣṭi-prāṇabhṛcchabdau samavetau tau api parigrhyete. yathā chatrī-śabdena svārtha-lakṣaṇārthena so’pi chatrī grhyate.” Thus, this ‘līṅga’, the basis of this type of lakṣaṇā, is noticed in any part or portion, of what is to be indicated. But this ‘līṅga’ has to be pradhāna or principal among all.

The last variety of lakṣaṇā as explained by the Mīmāṃsaka theorists is ‘praise’ or praśamsā-lakṣaṇā. The illustration is the vedic text viz. “a-paśavo vā anye go-aśvebhyaḥ, paśavo vā go-aśvāḥ.” Other animals, excepting cows and horses are here said to be no animals at all. But this statement surely does not mean what it says. So, Śabara explains it as, “gósṡvān praśamsitum anyeṣām paśūnām nindā.” (SB. on Mī. Sū. I. 4 - praśamsā.). This praśamsā lakṣaṇā comes closer to dharma-lakṣaṇā for naturally the praise intended is addressed to some quality. At Mī. Sū. VIII. ii. 6, Jaimini clearly says that the word ‘soma’ is used for praśamsā. Śabara takes one more illustration to explain this variety by taking, ‘yathā siṃho devadatta iti’ as an example. Śabara concludes with a remark that, “tasmāt nāma ayaṃ dharmātideśaḥ.”

All these varieties share some common traits such as, (i) there is mukhyārthabādha, (ii) lakṣyārtha is conveyed by the word through its vācyārtha and (iii) the lakṣyārtha accepted meets the need of the context. Any meaning cannot be taken up as lakṣyārtha. Śabara has a clear statement to this effect, viz. “yena ca tatra prayojanam sa lakṣyate.” Thus the three conditions for lakṣaṇā as laid down by the ālankārikas are met with here. But Prof. Devasthali makes an interesting observation (pp. 90, ibid) that, “prayojana (the third condition) spoken of by the Mīmāṃsakas is not the same as the prayojana of the rhetoricians mentioned in connection with lakṣaṇā. For the latter is ‘vyāṅgya’ i.e. conveyed by vyāñjanā which certainly can’t find any place in the mīmāṃsā view, which refuses

to accept vyañjanā as a śabda-śakti at all. Thus prayojana as spoken of by the Mīmāṃsakas as a condition for lakṣaṇā is not a technical term, but has the ordinary sense viz. the purpose in view. It is but natural therefore, that the Mīmāṃsaka does not recognize 'rūḍhi' as one of the pre-requisites of lakṣaṇā as the rhetoricians do it as an alternative for prayojana; for he does not accept rūḍhi-lakṣaṇā at all. As we have already seen above, 'kuśala' and 'pravina' which are given as illustrations of rūḍhi-lakṣaṇā by the rhetoricians are only cases of abhidhā according to the Mīmāṃsakas." (SB. on Mī. Sū. VI. iv. 42).

Prof. Devasthali's remarks are sound but we may add something to supplement the same. We know that there are some ālaṃkārikas who also do not accept 'rūḍhi' in case of lakṣaṇā. Ācārya Hemacandra (kā. śā. pp. 22, Edn. Dr. Nandi) observes - "kuśala-dvirepha-dvikā" dayas tu sāksāt-saṃketa-viśayatvāt mukhyā eva iti na rūḍhir lakṣyasya arthasya hetutvena asmābhir uktā." We feel that even 'gaunī' which Hemacandra recognises as a separate vṛtti from lakṣaṇā, also does not seem to be 'rūḍhi-mūlā'. This apart, we feel that Prof. Devasthali's observation that for the Mīmāṃsaka, the term 'prayojana' does not carry the 'technical sense' of the ālaṃkārikas, but means just, "the purpose in view" - an 'ordinary sense', is debatable. He himself has quoted Śabara (pp. 89) saying "go-aśvān praśaṃsitum anyeṣāṃ paśūnāṃ nindā". - Now this 'praśaṃsā' is not directly stated and even 'nindā' is also, we may add, not directly stated. Even in ordinary speech, and also in scientific documents you come across the unmistakable undertone of vyañjanā. Our humble argument is that the thinkers of various disciplines such as grammar, nyāya or logic, and Mīmāṃsā did not talk about vyañjanā because they were dealing with śāstra - or discipline - in which only the scientific use of language mattered. They did not concern themselves with aesthetic and the poetic use of language because they had no business to do it while discussing the śāstra. Or else, if praśaṃsā or dharma is taken as 'vyaṅgya', we are sure, the Mīmāṃsaka would not commit suicide !

Prof. Devasthali further continues that the circumstance about lakṣaṇā gives us another fact about it, viz. that it would be wrong, after taking up a lakṣyārtha we are again required to resort to lakṣaṇā for a second time in case of one and the same word. So, Prof. Devasthali here rules out what may be termed a case of lakṣita-lakṣaṇā. Lakṣaṇā once resorted to, will satisfy the purpose and there would be no question of resorting to lakṣaṇā for a second time. We know that ālaṃkārikas also reject this. Śabara on Mī. Sū. X. iii. 23, and X. V. 58, gives two examples of lakṣita-lakṣaṇā. The point is as to what exactly is indicated by the word agni, when it is used to enjoin the devatā of a 'haviḥ' i.e. - offering. If the word is taken to stand for the

meaning i.e. artha i.e. fire, and not for the śabda i.e. its form only, we find that the purpose of the passage remains unserved. As is known to us, it is by its verbal form, rather than its physical form, that a deity serves the purpose of sacrifice. So, if the word agni is accepted to stand for its artha, i.e. fire, we will have to put this position aside, it being not relevant for the purpose and we will have to go for lakṣaṇā and get at the ‘verbal form’ as something indicated. Thus, we travel first from śabda to artha, and then again resort to śabda. But then it will be simpler to hold that the form of the word is itself directly expressed by the word and it is futile to get engaged in lakṣaṇā. Another instance given by Śabara is exactly of the same type as is seen from Śabara’s remark in that connection. He observes - “anyathā rathantara-sāmāni adhyavasiya antareṇa padam lakṣyate padena sāma, saiśā, lakṣita-lakṣaṇā syāt.” (SB. on Mī. Sū. X. v. 58, ‘dvitīya-varṇakam’.)

One more point to be noted concerning lakṣaṇā is a natural outcome of the fact that lakṣaṇā is laukikī. We notice that before we arrive at the lakṣyārtha, we are acquainted with the requirement of the sentence in question. This shows that the lakṣyārtha is already known. Now, it is obvious that what is already known can’t be the concern of a ‘vidhi’. It must be only, ‘anuvāda’. So, we come to the finding that lakṣaṇā is possible in an ‘anuvāda’ only, and never in ‘vidhi’. This fact is differently stated when it is observed that a sentence where we have to resort to lakṣaṇā shall not be construed as a ‘vidhi’ and that it must be taken as an ‘anuvāda’ only. Śabara observes : (pp. 1278), “anuvāde hi lakṣaṇā nyāyyā, na vidhau.” and (pp. 364) nā’nuvādapakṣe lakṣaṇāyām doṣaḥ; and also (pp. 1201) - yajñā’yudhaśabdaśc ā’nuvādapakṣe nyāyyo, na vidhi-pakṣe. gaṇo hi sa āyudhaśabdaḥ sphyādiṣu.; and (p. 141) - vidhau hi na paraḥ śabdārthaḥ pratiyate.” Śabara refers to this point at many places but at one place (Mī. Sū. X. ii. 47) he has very clearly explained the truth behind this observation. The text concerned is - “tataḥ saṃvatsare asthīni yājayet.” The question is with reference to the sense of the word ‘yājayet’. The observation is that as this is a ‘vidhi’, it is not allowed to resort to lakṣaṇā, and take the term ‘yājayet’ to stand for something else. Śabara clearly says that a figurative signification is not perceived from a vidhi-śabda. He says that a figurative word is connected with a sense which is determined on the strength of some other thing i.e. laukika-pramāṇa. - Read SB. on Mī. Sū. X. ii. 47, pp. 1847 - “na ca gaṇo’rtho vidhi-śabdād avagamyate. anyena hi pramāṇena paricchinnérthe gaṇaḥ śabdaḥ saṃbadhyate. yathā gaur anubandhyaḥ iti go-jāti-viśiṣṭaḥ paśur anubadhyate, na vāhikaḥ. gaurayaṃ vāhika iti tu saṃvāde vāhike gaṇaḥ śabdaḥ pravartate.” What is meant is that ‘vidhi’ is ‘svataḥ-pramāṇa’ so the sense perceived

through vidhi will have to be perceived from the words of the text only and from no other source beyond that. But the metaphorical sense is known from pramāṇa other than the śabda i.e. words of the text. This shows that lakṣyārtha cannot be the purport of a vidhi-vākya. This clearly amounts to say that lakṣaṇā is not admissible, or it has no scope, in an injunctive statement. This rule is limited to vedic injunctions and it is not applicable to statements in ordinary parlance, wherein an injunction also can be laid down in a metaphorical style.

All this discussion pertains to one single fact that as a discipline, the Mīmāṃsā concerns itself only with direct statements where clear vāc्यārtha predominates and where there are no overtones of senses to be countered. This is so because all such metaphorical expressions are likely to cause confusion as to the intention of a vedic text concerned. Precisely because of this that lakṣaṇā is looked upon as a 'doṣa' - a blemish. Setting aside the natural and direct mode of interpretation and resorting to an unnatural or indirect mode is a 'doṣa', simply because, the latter involves 'gaurava' and is, as such, slow in its functioning. Any mode or construction, which yields us the required sense in a shorter span of time and with less trouble is certainly to be preferred and therefore we reject the other as being more elaborate and therefore faulty. Lakṣaṇā thus involves a lengthier process than abhidhā and is therefore a doṣa when scientific literature is concerned. It is only to avoid a greater eventuality of 'ānarthakya' that lakṣaṇā is permitted by the Mīmāṃsā.

'Anarthakya' is termed as a greater evil. To save a text from being stamped as nugatory, lakṣaṇā is admitted. And naturally in a scientific use of language where things are expected to be placed only in the straightest way possible, it is 'abhidhā' or direction expression which scores over the figurative way of presentation. But lakṣaṇā is preferable to ānarthakya per se, or ānarthakya caused by vipratishedha. Adrṣṭa-kalpanā is another evil which is also accepted to be greater than lakṣaṇā. So, lakṣaṇā is ever preferred here. For, lakṣaṇā, after all, is laukikī and sanctioned by normal usage, while adrṣṭa-kalpanā or aprasiddha-kalpanā has no such sanction behind it. Śābara also points out 'vyavadhāna' and 'vākyabheda', as two other evils taken as worse than lakṣaṇā which is to be preferred over them. In the text, viz. "khalevālī yūpo bhavati", there is a question regarding the construction of the word "khalevālī". Is it to be construed with 'yūpa' or 'bhavati'? If it is construed with the word 'yūpa', we shall have to take the word 'yūpa' as indicating 'yūpa-kārya' by resorting to kārya-lakṣaṇā. In this case, the construction of the word with 'bhavati' is vitiated by 'vyavadhāna'. Thus we have to choose between two evils. We opt for a lesser evil by accepting the former construction. Here lakṣaṇā is taken as

a lesser evil, as Śābara suggests that ‘vākya’ is ‘pratyakṣa’ in ‘lakṣaṇā’, but it is ‘parokṣa’ in vyavadhāna. - Read SB. on Mī. Sū. X. ii. 69, pp. 1861 - “khalevālyā yūpatā vidhīyate na yūpasya khalevālītā. tathāvyavahitena bhavatinā sambandhāt pratyakṣam vākyaṃ. itarathā vyavahitena parokṣam syāt. khalevālīśabdaś ca yaḥ khale vāraṇe pravartate tasya vācakaḥ. tathābhūtaś ca yūpakārye viniyuḥyate. yaḥ khalevālī sa yūpa iti. śakyate ca yūpakārye viniyoktum. yat tu yūpa-śabdaḥ kārya-lakṣaṇārtha iti. vyavadhānāllakṣaṇā api jyāyāsī. pratyakṣam vyavadhāne vākyaṃ.”

What Śābara aims to explain here is that in the former though we have to resort to lakṣaṇā, yet the ‘ekavākyatā’ we protect is direct, and does not involve any reshuffle of the constituent words. In the latter case, there is absence of ekavākyatā if we do not re-arrange the words in a different way. Thus the ekavākyatā in the latter case is only indirect i.e. parokṣa, while in the former it is direct or pratyakṣa. Śābara suggests while commenting on Mī. Sū. XI. ii. 2, that lakṣaṇā is preferred to vākyabheda, where while discussing the meaning of the text - viz. “same darśa-pūrṇa-māsābhyam yajeta....” etc., he points out that the word viz. ‘darśa-pūrṇa-māsābhyām’ in the text, must be understood as indicating the whole group of sacrifices like the ‘āgneya’, so that the text may be construed as one vākya. If we do not do this, we will have to admit the text as being ‘anekārtha’ and thus admit ‘vākyabheda’ here. Here again two evils prop up, and we have to choose the lesser evil called ‘lakṣaṇā’, as, ultimately, it being ‘laukikī’ will yield good sense. ‘Anekārthatva’ of what surely is one vākya, will positively lead to confusion - SB. on Mī. Sū. XI. ii. 2; pp. 2136 - “nanu evaṃ api lakṣaṇā”śrītā bhavati. varam lakṣaṇā naika-vākyasya anekārthatvam. anekārthatve a-gamakatvam. lakṣaṇānugamikā, laukikatvāt.”

Thus for the Mīmāṃsakas, anekārthatva or vākyabheda is a greater blemish as compared to lakṣaṇā. This fact can be put in a different way also. Lakṣaṇā, as is clear, is only a pada-doṣa, i.e. it has reference to pada or śabda only to which it does some injustice by putting aside its vācyārtha. But anekārthatva or vākyabheda is a blemish of a vākya, as we are doing injustice with the whole sentence in it. Thus vākyabheda is a doṣa of a more serious nature as compared to lakṣaṇā, and therefore, it should be considered as worse.

Thus, lakṣaṇā, a doṣa in itself is preferred only as a last resort to avoid greater doṣas. So, every acceptance of lakṣaṇā has to be defended or justified by itself. It is not correct to hold that if one word is metaphorically used in a given text, it is so everywhere. This is so even in ordinary usage where the word ‘gaṅgāyām’ does not mean ‘gaṅgā tate’ in all expression. For the Mīmāṃsaka, a lakṣaṇā, only if

justified, is admissible. The word 'simha' is lākṣaṇika in an expression like, 'simho devadattaḥ', but it is not so, holds Śabara, in statements like, 'simhaṃ ālabheta'. Śabara observes under Mī. Sū. II. 22, pp. 531, -

“tasmin vākye sa yatra samprayukta iti gamyate pramāṇāntareṇa, na śabdena, yatra tu tat pramāṇāntaram nā'sti na tatra vartitum arhati. yathā simho devadatta iti devadatta-vacanāḥ pramāṇāntareṇa, na tu simhaṃ ālabheta iti yatra. tatra tu pramāṇāntaram nā'sti.”

So, another natural outcome of this thinking is stated very consisely in the statement, viz. “guṇe tu anyāya-kalpanā.”

This then is the thought-heritage as obtained from various schools of thought such as the vyākaraṇa, nyāya and mīmāṃsā, that shaped the concept of lakṣaṇā with reference to the aestheticians i.e. ālaṃkārikas.

Ālaṃkārikas by and large accept the three vṛttis, viz. abhidhā, lakṣaṇā and vyañjanā and also refer to the tātparya vṛtti casually. We have seen how 'abhidhā' is taken in a broader or narrower connotation by different ālaṃkārikas. We have also noted that Ānandavardhana's predecessors did not take up the problem of śabda-vyāpāra-vicāra in greater details but it was perhaps the demand of situation that Ānandavardhana took upon himself the establishment of vyañjanā as a separate and independent śabda-Śakti over and above the much heard of, of course in his times, śabdavṛttis such as abhidhā and lakṣaṇā and also tātparya. But we know that even he does not spend time in defining clearly any śabda-vṛtti and was perhaps not much interested in the classification and varieties of this or that śabdavṛtti. He did not wait for this because perhaps it was not his prime concern or perhaps also because by his time an all acceptable formula was evolved. It was only after the great challenges to vyañjanā surfaced in the works of some of his great successors that Mammaṭa and some of his illustrious successors thought it pertinent to exactly define and differentiate and even classify the various śabdavṛttis. So, the actual task of defining and describing fully various śabdavṛttis, given available documents, begins with Mammaṭa; but prior to him, as seen in case of abhidhā, a discordant note was heard as early as in Mukula. We have treated Mukula's approach in his famous Abhidhā-vṛtta-mātrkā earlier while dealing with abhidhā. However a short resume here also will be able to freshen up our impressions about how Mukula moves about with his task.

We know that for Mukula lakṣaṇā is part of abhidhā. Mukula quotes Bhartṛmītra suggesting five relationships that exist between the primary and the

indicated meaning. As noted earlier, they are :

“abhidheyena saṁbandhāt
sādrśyāt samavāyataḥ,
vaiparītyāt kriyāyogāl
lakṣaṇā pañcadhā matā.” (quoted in AVM.)

We will catch up with what exactly is meant in brief as follows :

Abhidheyena saṁbandha : means some kind of relationship with the primary meaning - e.g. 'dvirepha' - primarily meaning having two 'r'-s, indicates 'a bee', through the word 'bhramara'. Yet another example is, "turaṅga-kāntā"-nana-havyavāha" meaning 'agni', through its relation to the word - vaḍavā-mukhā'gniḥ - This sort of lakṣaṇā is accepted only if it has the backing of popular usage, or if we can find a special motive in resorting to such involved expression. Else than this, it is a blemish, called 'neyārtha'. Mukula considers that all cases of arriving at some other meaning through the agency of the primary sense, make for lakṣaṇā. Thus, for Mukula, the so called arthāpatti as illustrated in such an expression as, "pīno devadattaḥ divā na bhuṅkte", which leads to the understanding of his eating by night, also is a case of lakṣaṇā. This is a far fetched application of "abhidheyena - saṁbandha", which is not acceptable to other thinkers.

Actually we may say that 'abhidheyena-saṁbandha' is nothing else but the condition of 'tad-yoga' and this tad-yoga as we know from later ālamkārikas is of various types such as sādrśya, samavāya, vaiparītya, samīpya, sva-svāmibhāva, ādhārā"dheyabhāva and what not ? So, actually Bhartṛmītra's kārikā harps upon this condition of tad-yoga only and broadly speaking the first condition may be taken as covering up the rest also, which hardly deserve separate mentioning.

'sādrśya' is illustrated as in, "siṁho māṇavakaḥ", samavāya as in 'gaṅgāyām ghoṣaḥ', vaiparītya as in, "brhaspatir ayam mūrkaḥ"; kriyāyoga, as 'samare śatṛghnaḥ tvam', and we may say that here through association with some action, someone is described to be 'śatṛghna' - the killer of foes, as well as the great hero of the Rāmāyaṇa.

Such other lists of conditions that make for lakṣaṇā are also advanced by later writers. Nāgeśa, for example, in his Parama-laghu-mañjaśā (p. 7) names five such relations adding 'tādarthyā' to the list of four as given by Patañjali earlier. They are -

“tātsthyāt tathaiva tādḍharmyāt
 tat-sāmīpyāt tathaiva ca,
 tat-sāhacaryāt tādarthīyāt
 jñeyā vai lakṣaṇā budhaiḥ.”

We will go to see how actually Mammaṭa, Hemacandra, Viśvanātha and some others also mention these. Broadly speaking these relations between the primary sense and the indicated sense can be classified into two categories such as (i) sādṛśyamūlaka and (ii) sādṛśyetara-mūlaka relations. Kumārila clearly distinguishes between one based on similarity and the other based on anything else than that. He calls the former as ‘gauṇī’ and the latter as ‘lakṣaṇā’, but as we will go to see later that eventhough Mammaṭa has subsumed these two under lakṣaṇā, Hemacandra has once again raised the bogie of an independent ‘gauṇī’ which is not just based on similarity but which is something else. So, the traditionally accepted division of lakṣaṇā into gauṇī or upacāra lakṣaṇā and śuddhā based on relations other than similarity is not seen in Kumārila and some Mīmāṃsakas for whom gauṇī is a separate vṛtti. We will talk of this later.

We have seen how Kuntaka in his ‘vicitrā abhidhā’ meaning just ‘poetic expression’ and not just either abhidhā, or lakṣaṇā or vyañjanā, covers up even lakṣaṇā. We have also noted how Bhoja also, in his wider concept of abhidhā, covers up both gauṇī and lakṣaṇā. Mammaṭa in his Kāvya prakāśa quotes Kumārila Bhaṭṭa saying,

“abhidheyā’vinābhūta-
 pratītir lakṣaṇocyate,
 lakṣyamāṇagaṇairयोगāt
 vṛtter iṣṭā tu gauṇatā.”

(K.P. II. pp. 50, Edn. Jalkikar), (Tantravārttika I. iv. 22)

He adds, - “avinābhāvo’tra sambandha-mātram, na tu nāntarīyakatvam. tattve hi, ‘mañcāḥ krośanti’ ityādaḥ na lakṣaṇā syāt. avinābhāve cā”kṣepeṇa eva siddher lakṣaṇāyā nopayoga ity uktam.” (Tr. Prof. Dwivedi.)

“Indication is said to be the cognition of what is connected with the primary sense. It is but desirable to admit the process to be qualitative on account of the connection (of the expressed sense, viz. bull) with the qualities of what is under indication. (viz. vāhika).”

Here, ‘the state of not being without’ (avinābhāva) means connection in general, but not an invariable relation. For, if it were so, there would be no indication in such cases as, “the cots cry”; and if invariable relation were to exist then the assumption (or inference) alone will do, there will be no use of indication.” Mammāṭa explains that if the relation is that of similarity, the transfer is qualitative (gauṇī); and if it is any other relation as for instance of cause and effect, owner and owned, measure and measured, part and whole, etc. etc., it is pure lakṣaṇā.

So, the secondary meaning is resorted to when the primary meaning is found to be incompatible with the context. However, we will go to see later that not only mukhyārtha-bādha but even ‘tātparya-anupapatti’ or non-realization of (the speaker’s) intention is also taken to be at the root of lakṣaṇā by later thinkers. The fact, however, remains that the indicated sense, or secondary meaning is arrived at, not directly from the word itself but only through the primary meaning.

We have seen the position of lakṣaṇā in general in the thinking of various schools of philosophy such as the Vyākaraṇa, Nyāya, Mīmāṃsā etc. We have also clearly, seen the treatment of lakṣaṇā under Śabara : Now, following Śabara, Kumārila discusses some of the theories about the real nature of secondary usage based on qualities, i.e. gauṇī in instances such as “simho devadattah”. What follows is in the light of Dr. K. K. Raja’s presentation.

(i) The first theory holds that the word ‘lion’ is denotative of the whole aggregate of the class, its qualities and actions. Though, of course, all the elements of this meaning are not applicable to the individual called ‘devadatta’, the word is applied to him indirectly on the basis of some elements found in him. - Tantravārttika, p. 356 observes - “anyeṣāṃ tu darśanaṃ sarva eva hi simhā”di-śabdā jāti-guṇa-kriyā-samudāya”diṣu katipaya-guṇa-kriyāyogat upacaryanta iti.” Śabara had rejected this view on the ground that an aggregate cannot refer to one part separately. Kumārila also notes that the term ‘hundred’ cannot refer to ‘fifty’ even if the latter is part of the total aggregate :

“samudāyārtha-vācitrve
naikadeśe bhaved gatiḥ,
śataśabdān na pañcāśan
mukhya-rūpeṇa gamyate.”

The Mīmāṃsakas again hold that, the primary meaning of a word is the class or universal, and not actions or qualities.

(ii) Kumārila discusses another theory also. It holds that in a secondary usage based on quality, i.e. in qualitative metaphor, the character of one is imposed on another. - “kaścit punar āha, samāropita-tadbhāvo gaṇa iti.” In the illustration viz., ‘siṃho devadattaḥ’, the full nature of the lion is imposed on ‘devadatta’ on the basis of actions and qualities of this individual called ‘devadatta’, which are found to be similar to those of the lion. Śabara and following him Kumārilaḥṭṭa criticize this view on the ground that such an identity is totally impossible, since the man and the lion have distinct characteristics. Only under some delusion on the part of the speaker, or the hearer, or both, that the characteristics of one object can be superimposed on the other. Thus, for example, there is imposition of water on mirage. But in case of the secondary usage, there is no delusion, as both the speaker and the listener are aware of the difference between a man and a lion, and hence none can have the power to impose the character of the lion on the body -

Tantravarttika p. 358 has -

“dvāv api pratipadyete
siṃha-puṃsor viviktatām,
nādhya”ropayitum śaktis
tenaikasyā’pi vidyate.”

(iii) The Mīmāṃsakas hold that a qualitative metaphor is based on the existence of some common qualities between the primary and the actual. They argue that all significations of a word are, in one way or the other, connected with its primary sense and that we should not assume any other potency in a word, if it is possible to explain the secondary meanings also as derived from the primary meaning. In the illustration, viz. siṃho devadattaḥ, the word siṃha, conveys the universal siṃhatva which indicates such qualities as courage, and the presence of such qualities as courage in ‘devadatta’, justifies calling him a lion :

Tantravarttika, p. 354 reads :

“vahnitva-lakṣitād arthād
yad paiṅgalyā”di gamyate,
tena māṇavake buddhiḥ
sādṛśyād upajāyate.”

The Buddhist view : In Sthiramati’s commentary on the Triṃśikā of Vasubandhu, there is some discussion on the metaphorical expression such as, “agnir māṇavakaḥ”. Three conditions for such a figurative expression are given as

(i) the primary thing referred to, (ii) the actual thing resembling the primary one and (iii) a common quality existing between the two. In the illustration on hand, the primary meaning of the word ‘agni’ is fire; the actual thing referred to is the boy Māṇavaka, who resembles the fire and the qualities common to both are the quality of brightness, tawny colour and fiery nature.

A prima-facie view is presented. The point is that this figurative description cannot be applied to the boy either on the ground of universal common attribute of “fire-ness”, nor on the basis of the qualities a particular fire. The colour or fiery nature is not the essential quality of fire, as, on that ground, ‘fire-ness’ will be present in the boy also and no need will arise for a figurative transfer. Again, it cannot be applied to the boy on the basis of qualities in a particular fire, for as the quality is inseparably linked with the substratum, the brightness of the boy is essentially different from that of the fire. What, at the most we can say is that the quality of the fire is similar to that of the boy and hence the quality can be figuratively applied to that of the boy, but not to the boy himself : Read - vijñāna mātratā-siddhi, pt. I. pp. 17 - “upacāro hi triṣu bhavati, nānyatamābhāve, mukhyapadārthe tatsadṛṣe tayoṣca sādṛṣye. tad yathā mukhye’gnau tatsadṛṣe māṇavake tayoṣca sādḥāraṇadharme kapilatve, tīkṣaṇatve vā saty agnir māṇavaka ity upacāraḥ kriyate...”

and also - avinābhāvitve cōpacārābhāvo’gnāv iva māṇavake’pi jātisadbhāvāt. tasmān na māṇavake’pi jātisadbhāvāt. tasmān na māṇavake jāty upacāraḥ sambhavati. nā’pi dravyopacāraḥ, sāmānyadharmā’bhāvāt. na hi yo’gnes tīkṣṇo guṇaḥ, kapilo vā, sa eva māṇavake... evaṃ agniguṇasyaiva māṇavake... evaṃ agniguṇasyaiva māṇavakaguṇe sādṛṣyād upacāro yuktaḥ.”

Again, for the Buddhist logicians, there is no primary referent of a word, for the essential nature of an object transcends the pale of all forms of knowledge as noted by Prof. K. K. Raja (pp. 247, ibid). Each word, according to them, is applied to its object only indirectly by a sort of transfer or upacārā. The thing-in-itself-i.e. - svalakṣaṇa-can never be directly denoted by a word. Read - “mukhya-padārtho nāsti, tasya sarvajñānā-bhidhāna-viṣayātikrāntatvāt... api ca sarva evā’yaṃ gaṇa eva, na mukyo’siti.”

The same view is read even in Vighraha-vyāvartanī of Nāgārjuna, a buddhist writer again : Read, there on p. 1,

“sarveṣāṃ bhāvānāṃ sarvatra na vidyate svabhāvas’cet, tvadvacanam a-svabhāvaṃ na nivartayitum svabhāvaṃ alam.” There, an objection is raised to the

effect that, if the words are themselves devoid of essential nature, it should not be possible to apply them to refute that essential nature. Non-existent fire does not burn; then how could words which have no reality be used to prove that very unreality ? - Read pp. 2, ibid - “na hy asad agninā śakyam dagdhum, ... evaṃ asatā vacanena na śakyāḥ sarvabhāva-pratiṣedhaḥ kartum”. The answer is to be found in the Buddhist view that even though words have no direct connection with the ultimate reality, they have the power of practical utility - artha-kriyā-kāritva -, as they can refer to objects indirectly through figurative transfer i.e. upacāra.

We may also note that among the schools of thought which are opposed to the Buddhists and which accept the primary meaning of words to be a class, there are some mīmāṃsakas who also accept that words denote the particular objects in a sentence, through the secondary power. For them the primary meaning of a word is universal which is the essential quality common to all the particular instances of the class. But when the word is used in a sentence, it has to refer to the particulars. Some are of the opinion that the particular comes from the universal because of invariable connection between the two, and still others explain it as being due to the secondary significative power i.e. transfer : Read - Vedāntaparibhāṣā, IV. 17 - “katham tarhi gavāḍipadād vyakter bhānam iti cet, jāter vyaktisamāna-saṃvit-saṃvedyatvāt iti brūmaḥ... athavā vyaker lakṣaṇayāvagamaḥ.”

So, according to Buddhists of the Yogācāra school, and also according to some Mīmāṃsakas, there is an element of transfer of meaning even in ordinary sentences. So, the normal cases of transfers like ‘agnir māṇavakaḥ’, have to be taken as transfers of the second degree. Such metaphors based on quality are termed gaunī by the Mīmāṃsakas. But for the Buddhists, the first type of ordinary usage is a metaphorical expression from the absolute point of view (i.e. pāramārthika), whereas ordinary metaphors are metaphorical expressions from the worldly (vyāvahārika) point of view, observes Dr. K. K. Raja (pp. 249, ibid).

We will continue to follow the lead of Dr. Raja till we start with ālamkārikas, one by one, in their individual capacity, reviewing their esteemed works on poetics.

Dr. Raja observes (pp. 249), that in all cases of metaphorical transfer of meaning, there has to be some intimate relation between the primary and the actual referents. Keeping in view the degree of intimacy to which the primary meaning is retained in the actual meaning, it is possible to note three types of lakṣaṇās. Though of course, the primary meaning of the word cannot be totally excluded in a transfer, we can observe its retention to a greater or lesser extent.

- Śaṃkara, in *Brahma-sūtra-bhāṣya* on IV. 1.6, observes : “lakṣaṇā ca yathāsaṃbhavaṃ saṃnikṛṣṭena viprakṛṣṭena vā svārtha-saṃbandhena pravartate”. Kumārila also observes - *Tantravārttika*, pp. 356 - “ajahatsvārthāḥ sarvāḥ śabda-pravṛttayah”.

The three kinds of lakṣaṇā, generally accepted are - (i) Jahallakṣaṇā, or jahat-svārthā lakṣaṇā, (ii) ajahallakṣaṇā or ajahat-svārthā lakṣaṇā, and (iii) jahad-ajahallakṣaṇā.

(i) **Jahallakṣaṇā** - In a sentence like ‘gaṅgāyāṃ ghoṣaḥ’, the primary sense of the word ‘gaṅgā’, is abandoned and the secondary meaning, ‘the bank of the ganges’, is resorted to. This is called ‘jahallakṣaṇā’. In this variety, there will be non-intelligibility of the syntactical relation between the terms, if we take the primary meaning of the word. So, the primary sense has to be rejected to a great extent and another sense having some connection with the primary has to be accepted that can go with the context. We will go to see that Mammaṭa calls it lakṣaṇa-lakṣaṇā.

(ii) **Ajahallakṣaṇā** occurs when the primary sense is not completely rejected. The *Tatvabindu* p. 155, observes - “na ca sarvatra svārtha-parityāgena eva lakṣaṇā iti aikāntikam. lakṣaṇīyānurodhenaiva hi sarvatra parigraha-parityāgau.” - At times, the primary sense is not substantially modified, but only specified by context, or is restricted by the function of the syntax, or is extended by the inclusion of another sense. In all such cases, the primary sense is not rejected but is included in the secondary sense. In the illustration, viz. “kuntāḥ praviśanti”, the word kuntāḥ - meaning lances, - indicates, through indication, the lances themselves, and also the men who carry them. In the same way ‘chatrīṇo yānti’ - i.e. people holding umbrellas are going’, - indicates through lakṣaṇā, a group of people, some with and others without umbrellas. We have seen above when we discussed the view of the Mīmāṃsakas, that in the vedic text, viz.: sṛṣṭir upadadhāti’, i.e. the sṛṣṭi-bricks are placed, the word ‘sṛṣṭi’ means by lakṣaṇā, the bricks that are associated with a group of hymns with and without the word ‘sṛṣṭi’. This type of metaphorical transfer is called a-jahallakṣaṇā. We will go to see that Mammaṭa will name it as ‘upādāna-lakṣaṇā’. According to the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas however, the primary meaning of a word is universal, and its power is exhausted in delivering this general sense only. So, for them, the sense of the particular has to be arrived at through lakṣaṇā of the ‘ajahat’ type. Mammaṭa however, has no faith in this as we will see later. He seems to follow the prābhākaras in holding that, on account of the invariable connection between the universal and the particular, the latter is cognized as implied in the former.

(iii) 'Jahad-a-jahad-lakṣaṇā' is the third variety accepted by the Vedāntins, in cases where only a part or an aspect of the primary meaning is retained while the rest stands rejected. In, illustrations such as 'paṭo dagdhaḥ' (i.e. the cloth is burnt), or, 'grāmo dagdhaḥ', (i.e. a village is burnt), it is only a part of the cloth or village that is actually meant as burnt. Only a part of the primary meaning of the word 'paṭa' and 'grāma' is retained. In a sentence, for example, 'so'yaṃ devadattaḥ', the term 'saḥ' refers to 'devadatta' as determined by the past time and space, and the term 'ayaṃ' refers to the same person as determined in the present time and place. Here, 'saḥ' and 'ayaṃ' meaning 'that' and 'this' are two incompatible determinants and the sentence does not mean their identity. The sentence further does not mean also that the person as determined by 'this' is identical with the person determined by 'that'. It simply means this much that there is identity of the substantive 'devadatta', by rejecting the elements that are incompatible. The two qualified entities, though not identical refer yet to the same substantive, viz. 'devadatta'. Thus the identity has relevance to the individual 'devadatta', who is not related to time, either past or present. The vedāntins are keen on this type of lakṣaṇā as they have to explain expressions like, 'tat tvam asi', 'ahaṃ bhrama asmi', etc. In the first sentence, 'tvam' does not mean 'Śvetaketu the son of Uddālaka', but it refers to one who is stripped of all individual attributes such as limited intelligence etc. Again, 'tat' means 'universal soul', free from all qualifications such as omniscience etc. It is only the pure consciousness in the individual soul that is identified with the universal soul. Such instances, where a word signifying a qualified entity gives up a portion of its primary meaning and keeps up another portion, are taken as 'jahad-ajahad-lakṣaṇā'. Mallinātha, in his commentary on Ekāvali observes :

“svārthaikāṃśa-tyāgād
 aṃśāntaram eva lakṣyate yatra,
 sā jahad-ajahatsvārthā
 'tat tvam asi' ty ādiviṣaya-dṛśyeyam.”

Sadānanda in Vedāntasāra calls it, 'bhāgalakṣaṇā'. - (p. 95). Vedānta-paribhāṣā, IV. 26 - has - “yatra hi viśiṣṭavācakaḥ śabdaḥ svārthaikadeśaṃ vihāya, ekadeśe vartate, tatra jahadajallakṣaṇā. Appayya Dixit in Siddhāntaleśa-saṃgraha (p. 55) calls it to be - “bhāga-tyāga-lakṣaṇā”. The ālaṃkārikas and the Naiyāyikas have nothing to do with this third variety of lakṣaṇā.

All systems of philosophy have interest in lakṣaṇā, as they try to define and explain the highest reality which in itself is beyond any explanation and our

language always falls short, or say fumbles in trying to explain the Supreme reality. Ordinarily speaking the word ‘absolute’ in the expression, say, ‘absolute reality’, is beyond definition. Sentences such as, “aḥam brahma asmi”, “tat tvam asi”, “sarvaṃ khalu idaṃ brahma”, “vijñānaṃ brahma”, etc. are imperfect efforts to define the absolute and we see that first, second and third person-pronouns are all used to define, or say, explain the absolute. All this is metaphorical expression. Śaṅkara observes in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka-upaniṣad-bhāṣya, that, - “nāma vā rūpaṃ vā, karma vā, bhedo vā, jātir vā, guṇo vā, tad dvāreṇa hi śabda-pravṛttiḥ bhavati; na caiśaṃ kaścid viśeṣo brahmany asti, ato na nirdeṣṭum śakyate.” (Śaṅkara, on Br. Up. II. 3.6) - This means that words denote things through one or other of the following : name, form, action, distinction, genus and quality, but in Brahman there is none of these differences and hence, It is beyond any description. But, to an extent, metaphorical expression, lakṣaṇā becomes helpful in going beyond the limits of primary sense in matters concerning philosophical truths. Vyañjanā has scope in poetry and also in worldly context to an extent, but is of no use in philosophical discourses and for this reason only the ancient thinkers have not talked of vyañjanā in their writings concerning scientific disciplines.

(iv) ‘Lakṣita-lakṣaṇā’ is a fourth variety of figurative expression mentioned as accepted by some thinkers, but totally rejected, as we will go to see later, by ālaṃkārikas of the eminence of Maṃmata and others. This occurs when the relation between the primary sense and the actual thing referred are not directly related, but have an indirect relation through some other word as in case of, say the word ‘dvirepha’ meaning, ‘a word having two ‘r’-s’, indicating the word ‘bhramara’ giving ‘bee’ as its primary meaning. According to the modern Naiyāyikas, this can be subsumed under jahallakṣaṇā itself, and the Vedānta-paribhāṣā is inclined to take even gaṇī lakṣaṇā under this type, the relation being two referents being only indirect and brought about through the agency of the common qualities only.

This then is the intellectual heritage with which ālaṃkārikas start. We have noted that the earlier ālaṃkārikas did not find it necessary, or perhaps compelling to define, describe and classify individual śabda-vṛttis in their works, for reasons, perhaps best known to them. We have tried to screen their efforts and tried to suggest their know-how concerning the śabda-vṛttis. Even Ānandavardhana does not take upon himself the task of clearly defining the nature and scope of different śabda-vṛttis, but while establishing vyañjanā under Dhv. III. 33, in his Āloka, he distinguishes between vyañjanā on one hand and abhidhā and lakṣaṇā, which he

calls by the name of 'guṇavṛtti', on the other. This portion of Ānandavardhana's thinking will be taken care of by us when we deal with vyañjanā. In the same way, Abhinavagupta's brooding over śabda-vṛttis also will be subsumed under our general discussion on vyañjanā. For the present, we will also note that we have dealt with even Mukulabhaṭṭa's treatment of lakṣaṇā, under his wider concept of abhidhā. However, being the first ālamkārika after Ānandavardhana to discuss the problem of Śabda-vṛttis Mukula's views will be repeated here by way of a resume of the earlier lengthy discussion.

Mukula, in his Abhidhāvṛtta-mātrkā has given a three-fold classification of lakṣaṇā, such as (i) śuddhā, (ii) sārōpā and (iii) sādhyavasānā.

In śuddhā both the objects appear to be clearly distinct from each other, while in sārōpā, there is superimposition of one over the other, and in the third variety, the closeness between the two objects being so great, the difference is almost not apprehended. The object of superimposition is completely eclipsed or is swallowed by the object superimposed. The former i.e. the object of superimposition is not mentioned by a word, but only the other, the latter, i.e. the object superimposed is mentioned by a word. We have discussed Mukula's views on lakṣaṇā on an earlier occasion, so we will now begin with Mammaṭa, who, as available written documents suggest, is the first great ālamkārika, who clearly defines and classifies individual śabdavṛttis in a very scientific way.

Mammaṭa :- In his K.P. II. 9 he observes :

“mukhyārthabādhe tad yoge
rūḍhito'tha prayojanāt,
anyo'rtho laksayate yat sā
lakṣaṇā”ropitā kriyā.” (Trans. R. C. Dwivedi)

“Indication is that superimposed function whereby another meaning is conveyed either through usage or motive, when there is incompatibility of the primary meaning as well as its interconnection.” (Trans. R.C.D.; pp. 27, ibid)

Thus, lakṣaṇā or indication, or secondary usage, or metaphorical transfer in general takes place under certain conditions such as 'mukhyārthabādha' or incompatibility of the primary sense, tad yoga i.e. interconnection with the primary sense of the other sense dragged in, and finally rūḍhi i.e. usage or prayojana' i.e. motive make for the secondary usage coming into action.

Mammaṭa further elaborates in his vṛtti that - “karmaṇi kuśala ity ādau darbha-

grahaṇā”dy ayogāt, gaṅgāyām ghoṣa ity ādau ca gaṅgā”dīnām ghoṣā”dy adhikaraṇatvā’sambhavād mukhyārthasya bādhe, vivekatv ādau sāmīpy ādau ca sambandhe, rūḍhitāḥ prasiddheḥ, tathā gaṅgātaḥ ghoṣa ity ādeḥ prayogād yeṣāṃ tathā na pratipattis teṣāṃ pāvanatv ādīnām dharmāṇāṃ pratipādanā”tmanāḥ prayojanāc ca, mukhyenā’ mukhyrtho lakṣyate yat, sa āropitaḥ śabda-vyāpāraḥ, śāntarārtha-niṣṭho lakṣaṇā.” (Trans. R. C. Dwivedi pp. 27, ibid) - “When owing to the absence of (logical) connection with the fetching of the grass etc., as in the cases like, ‘expert in work’, and owing to the impossibility of Gaṅgā and the like being the site of a hamlet and the like in cases such as, ‘a hamlet on the Gaṅgā’, there is the incompatibility of the primary meaning, and when there is the connection such as discrimination and proximity (respectively in the above cases), through usage i.e. through universal apprehension (in the first case), similarity through motive in the form of conveying in that manner those properties of coolness and holiness etc., which would not be so conveyed by the use of, ‘a hamlet on the bank of the Gaṅgā’, (in the second case), that superimposed function of a word abiding in the intermediate sense is indication, conveying the secondary meaning through the primary.”

Govinda Ṭhakkura (pp. 37, Edn. Anandashram SKT. Granthāvaliḥ - Pune, A.D. 1911, or pp. 256, Edn. Nag Prakashan, Dr. Jyotna Mohan, ’95, Delhi) - in his Pradīpa observes : “rūḍhiḥ prasiddhiḥ. prayojanaṃ vyaṅgyārtha-pratipādana-rūpam. kriyā vyāpāraḥ. atra, ‘anyo’rtho yal lakṣyate sā lakṣaṇā iti lakṣaṇam lakṣyate pratipādyate ity arthaḥ. ato nā”tmā”śrayaḥ. mukhyārthabādhāḥ śakyārtha-sambandho rūḍhiprayojanānyatarac ceti hetutraya-vacanaṃ vyañjanāyām śakti-smṛtau jāti-vyāpti-vāraṇāya tadyoga iti lakṣaṇēpi praveśanīyam. yogasya ca hetutvaṃ vivakṣitam. ato na mukhyārtha-sambandhi-vyañjanāyām ativyāptiḥ. mukhyasya abhidhārūpa-mukhyārtha-sambandhena pratipādyam sambhavati iti tadvāraṇāyānya ity uktam. anyo’ mukhyaḥ. yad iti guṇibhūta-lakṣaṇa-kriyā-mātra-parāmarśaḥ. tena, “śakya-sambandhena a-śakya-pratipattir lakṣaṇā iti prācīnamatena etal lakṣaṇam. ‘tad-hetuḥ śakya-sambandho lakṣaṇā’ iti paramārthaḥ.” - pratipattiḥ hetur hi vṛttiḥ., na tu pratipattir eva. yat tu ‘yad’ ity asya ‘yata’ ity arthakatayā sambandha-paratayaiva sūtravyākhyānam tad ayuktam. ‘nā’bhidhā samayābhāvāt hetvābhāvānna lakṣaṇā’ity atra ‘mukhyārtha-bādhā’di-trayaṃ ‘hetuḥ’, iti vyākhyānavirodhāt, na hi sambandha-rūparve lakṣaṇāyāḥ sambandho hetur ghaṭate. nanu pratipādanam cel lakṣaṇā tarhi śabda-dharmaḥ. gaṅgā”di-śabdānām nīrā”dikam upasthāpya virāme, nīrā”dy arthenaiva sambandhena tīrā”dy artha-pratipādanād ity ata āha, - ‘āropitā kriyā’ iti. śakya-vyavahita-

lakṣyārthā-viṣayatvācchabde āropita eva sa vyāpārah. vastuto'rthanisṭha eva ity arthaḥ. tad etad uktam, 'sāntarārtha-nisṭhaḥ' iti." -

The idea is that, 'yat anyah arthaḥ lakṣyate sā kriyā lakṣaṇā' is the definition of lakṣaṇā. "mukhyārthabādhe tadyoge rūdhito'tha prayojanāt" - talks about the three conditions under which lakṣaṇā operates. "āropitā" is descriptive part. "yah anyah arthaḥ lakṣyate sa lakṣyārthaḥ" is the definition of lakṣyārtha that is indicated. This means that for Govinda Thakkura, according to Mammata, mukhyārthabādha etc. are the three factors placed in the 'nimitta' portion of lakṣaṇā, while 'that by which another meaning is indicated', - is the only portion placed in the definition part of lakṣaṇā. So, Mammata has not incorporated the 'tadyukta' pada in it, which is necessary. For, if this is not added in the definition, the definition will be wide enough to include even vyañjanā in the fold of lakṣaṇā. Thus the definition will be too-wide or "ati-vyāpta". We will go to observe that Viśvanātha has taken greater care in defining lakṣaṇā.

It may be noted here that 'yat' means 'yayā kriyayā ity arthaḥ'. 'yayā' ity arthe luṭta-karaṇa-trṭīyāntam avyayam. 'lakṣyate' means 'pratipādyate', and not 'lakṣaṇayā pratipādyate'. For, if lakṣyate were to mean 'lakṣaṇayā pratipādyate', there would be the blemish called 'anyonyā'sraya-doṣa'. The presence of the word 'lakṣaṇā' in the definition of lakṣaṇā makes it impossible for us to understand the definition and thus leads to the blemish of 'mutual dependence'.

Jhalkikar (pp. 40, ibid) observes : - 'yad' iti 'yayā' ity arthe luṭta-karaṇatrṭīyāntam avyayam. yayā (vrṭtyā) anyo'rthaḥ arthāntaram (mukhyabhinnaḥ) tatā'di-rūpa iti yāvat, lakṣyate pratipādyate sā (vrṭtiḥ) lakṣaṇety ucyate ity arthaḥ. yad vā, 'yad' iti lakṣaṇa-kriyā-viśeṣaṇam. anyor'tho yat lakṣyate, yat pratipādyate sā lakṣaṇety anvayaḥ lakṣyate iti ṇijantād ākhyātam. ṇijartho hetu-vyāpārah. hetuśca śabda iti anyārtha-pratipatti-hetuḥ śabda-vyāpāro lakṣaṇetyārthaḥ. sā ca lakṣaṇā śakyatāvachchedakā"ropa-rūpā, śakya-saṁbandha-rūpā vā, vaktṛtātparyarūpā vā iti anyad etat. 'āropite'ti, 'kriye'ti ca na lakṣaṇa-ghaṭakam. kintu lakṣaṇā-svarūpa-kathana-param. sā hi āropitā mukhyārtha-vyavahita-lakṣyārtha-viṣayatvāt śabde kalpitā. sāksāt-saṁbandhena mukhyārthanisṭhā, paramparā-saṁbandhena tu śabda-nisṭhā ity arthaḥ. kriyā vyāpāra-rūpā ca iti sūtrārthaḥ. yattv atra 'yad' iti kriyā-viśeṣaṇam. tathā ca yat lakṣyate yat pratipādyate sā pratipattir eva (jñānam eva) lakṣaṇā iti kaiścid vyākhyātam, tad ajñāna-vijṛmbhitam. lakṣaṇayā abhidhā-vyañjanayor iva vrṭti-rūpatayā vrṭti-janyāyāḥ pratipatter lakṣaṇārva-a-saṁbandhāt. na hi vrṭter-vyāpāratve kaścid vivādaḥ. asmāt padād ayam artho boddhavya ity ākārikā śvarecchā'pi preraṇāgarbhatvena sādhyarūpā eva iti pratibhāvadbhiḥ

sūkṣmadṛśā avadhātavyam - na ca “pratītir lakṣaṇocyate”iti agrima-grantha-virodhaḥ iti vācyaṃ. tasyaika-deśimatottāṅkana-mātra-paratvāt. pratīti-padasya karaṇa-vyutpannatvād vā iti dik.”

It is clear that Jhalkikar explains ‘yat’ by ‘yayā vṛttyā’, the power with which the secondary meaning is conveyed. ‘yat lakṣyate’ means that which is established, i.e. the power of words that is instrumental in conveying the secondary sense is ‘lakṣaṇā’. This ‘lakṣaṇā’ is said to be an “āropitā kriyā” by Mammata and this can be explained as follows : It is ‘śakyatāvachchedakā’ropa-rūpā’ - śakya-sambandha-rūpā vā. The first attribute explains the fact that the meaning of ‘vyakti’ is implied by the meaning of ‘jāti’. The other explains that a meaning associated with śakyārtha or mukhyārtha is forced in as in ‘gaṅgāyām ghosaḥ’. This lakṣaṇā is also said to be ‘vakṛt-tātparya-rūpā’, i.e. where the intention of the speaker is taken care of; as in case of ‘viparīta-lakṣaṇā’. As Jhalkikar (pp. 40) clearly notes, the terms ‘āropitā kriyā’, are not part of the definition of lakṣaṇā, but they merely describe its form. The idea is that through ‘sākṣāt’ i.e. direct relation, it resides only in the ‘mukhyārtha’ or ‘primary meaning of a word’, but through ‘paramparā-sambandha’ through a chain-relation or indirect relation, it sticks with the word itself and hence it is termed ‘āropitā kriyā’, ‘a superimposed function’. Here ‘kriyā’ stands for ‘vyāpāra’ or ‘function’, ‘activity’. Mammata terms lakṣaṇā as ‘kriyā’ i.e. ‘vyāpāra’. Some people take ‘yatra’ as a ‘kriyā-viśeṣaṇa’; an ‘adverb’. They define lakṣaṇā as - “yat lakṣyate, yat pratipādyate sā pratipattir eva (= jñānam eva) lakṣaṇā.” i.e. the apprehension itself is lakṣaṇā. But this is not correct, as lakṣaṇā is of the form of vyāpāra, a function. It is a ‘vṛtti’, and ‘jñāna’ or apprehension is ‘vṛtti-janya’ entity, i.e. that which is born of a ‘vṛtti’. It may be said that this will be in contradiction to the statement viz. “pratītir lakṣaṇocyate.”, but this can be understood as follows. Here by ‘pratīti’ we understand the activity leading to cognition - “pratīyate anayā iti pratītiḥ”. That function by which a meaning is cognised is termed as ‘pratīti’.

Before we move to the topic of the varieties of lakṣaṇā, here is something interesting from Dr. K. K. Raja (pp. 258 etc.) -

Regarding the condition, viz. mukhyārtha-bādha or incompatibility of the primary meaning, it is observed that without this, lakṣaṇā is an impossibility. The moment a word is heard, its primary meaning flashes in our mind, it having a direct and natural link with a given word. Only due to unsuitability of context, a resistance to our understanding of sentence-sense is caused and then to remove this resistance we resort to the secondary sense. Śabara, as seen above in detail, repeatedly points out that the secondary signification is to be resorted to only when

the direct primary sense of a given word is inapplicable under a given context. He insists that whenever the direct statement and implied meaning are in conflict, the former has to be given preference. For this See Śābara-bhāṣyā on Mī. Sū. I. iv. 2, “śruti-lakṣaṇā viśaye ca śrutir jyāyāsi; Mī. Sū. IV. III-26 - “śrutis’ ca lakṣaṇāyā garīyasī”; Mī. Sū. VI. i. 51 - “śruti-lakṣaṇā-viśaye ca śrutir nyāyyā, na lakṣaṇā, Mī. Sū. VII. ii. 13 - agatis’ caisā yā lakṣaṇā”śrayaṇam.”

According to the Mīmāṃsakas and the Vedāntins, the secondary signification of a given word is apprehended through reasoning of the ‘arthāpatti’ type, which makes for the postulation of a fact to explain two known facts which are apparently unaccountable. In the famous illustration viz. *pīṇo devadattaḥ divā na bhukṣte*, - (The fat devadatta does not eat by day), the two known facts viz. of devatta being fat and his not eating by day, look to contradict each other if we do not postulate one more fact that he eats by night ! In the case of lakṣaṇā, we have to find a way to reconcile two known facts, viz. the primary meaning of a given word known through remembrance and popular usage, and the intention of the speaker inferred from the context. When we here a boy being spoken of as lion, the primary meaning of the term lion looks impossible and the secondary meaning is known through immediate inference of the ‘arthāpatti’ type and it is of the form of “the boy is similar to a lion in qualities such as courage, etc.” This secondary meaning is related to the primary meaning and it can remove the apparent conflict between the primary and contextual meanings.

Dr. Raja then tries to elaborate the exact meaning of ‘mukhyārthabādha’ or incompatibility of the primary meaning. According to ancient Naiyāyikas and later ālaṃkārikas (ref. pp. 259, ibid, Dr. Raja) - it is only the impossibility of the logical connection in the sentence. The Mīmāṃsakas of the Prābhākara School also think alike. Śālikanātha defines lakṣaṇā as, “that which is resorted to for conveying a new sense which can be related to the sentence-meaning through the cognition of its primary sense, when that primary sense of the word has no logical connection with the sentence-meaning.” See, *Vākyārtha-māṭṛkā-vṛtti*, pp. 13 -

“vācyasyārthasya vākyārthe
saṃbandhān upapattitaḥ,
tat-saṃbandha-vaśa-prāptasya
anvayāl lakṣaṇā matā.”

But for the later Naiyāyikas and the Vedāntins, as well as later grammarians, the incompatibility of the primary sense lies not merely in the difficulty of

establishing the logical connection in the sentence, but in the unsuitability of the primary sense with the intended sense in the context - “tātparyānupapatti”. The Siddhānta-muktāvalī, p. 285, observes -

“lakṣaṇā śākya-sambandhas
rātparyā’nupapattitaḥ”, -

The Laghumañjuṣā, p. 114, has - “vastutas tu tātparyānupapattir eva tad-bījam.” - See also, Vedānta-paribhāṣā, IV. 30.

Dr. Raja proceeds to inform (p. 260, *ibid*) that the Mīmāṃsakas of the Bhāṭṭa-school also favour this view. In the Tattvabindu, Vācaspati criticizes Śālikanātha’s definition of lakṣaṇā and suggests that any kind of incompatibility of the primary sense should be taken as the condition of lakṣaṇā and not merely its incompatibility with the sentence-meaning.

We know that in all cases of jahallakṣaṇā, where the primary meaning of a word is not retained, the primary sense is unsuitable in establishing logical connection with the sentence sense. But in cases of a-jahallakṣaṇā, where the primary sense is not completely rejected, the sentence meaning can still be comprehended if the word is taken in the primary sense, and hence there will be no ‘lakṣaṇā’, if the first condition of mukhyārtha-bādha is strictly applied. Thus the sentence, say, “chatrīṇo yānti”, can mean a group of people with or without umbrella is marching, eventhough the literal sense refers only to people carrying umbrellas. Similarly in instances such as, ‘kākebhyo dadhi rakṣyatām’ (i.e. protect the curd from crows), the primary meanings of the term ‘kāka’ is not impossible in the context, but it is clear that the intension is to protect the curd from all curd-eating birds and beings ! To include all such instances under lakṣaṇā we have to take incompatibility with the intended sense as the condition of lakṣaṇā. Again, all the cases of impossibility of establishing logical connection with the sentence-sense, can be explained by the incompatibility of the literal sense with the intention of the speaker or purport of a sentence.

Those who hold impossibility of establishing a logical connection with the sentence meaning as the condition of lakṣaṇā explain such instances by taking the words to be the upalakṣaṇa for the actual referents. Thus in ‘kākebhyo dadhi rakṣyatām’, the word ‘kāka’ is an upalakṣaṇa for all animals that might eat the curd i.e. for all ‘dadhy upaghātakas’. ‘Upalakṣaṇa’ is the act of implying any analogous object where only one is specified. The word ‘kāka’ is an indication for the animals which might eat the curd; the word is a means of referring to the whole

group including the crow to which the literal meaning of the word refers - (Nyāyakośa, p. 172).

Now here we will stop for a while and try to discuss a point raised by Dr. Raja in the foot-note no. 3, on pp. 241 wherein he seems to argue against 'tātparyānupapatti'. There he observes : pp. 241 (text) - "It is clear that the various ~~must be some kind of relation between the primary and the actual referents.~~" Then in the foot-note no. 3 he observes : "Hence it seems strange that some of the later writers should have overlooked this fundamental point in the course of their arguments. Thus to show that the condition for a transfer is not the impossibility of the literal sense in the context, but its incompatibility with the intention of the speaker, it is argued that in the well-known example of 'gaṅgāyām-ghoṣaḥ', it is the intention of the speaker that gives the meaning, the bank of the Ganges', to the word Gaṅgā, and that if the intention were otherwise, the implied meaning of the term 'ghoṣa' might be 'fish', since even by resorting to that sense the impossibility of the literal sense in the context could be removed. See Siddhānta Muktvāli, p. 287 - yadi cānvayānupaputtir-lakṣaṇābijaṃ syāt, tadā kvacid gaṅgā-padasya tīre, kvacid ghoṣapadasya matsyāḍau lakṣaṇeti niyamo na syāt." Also Laghumāñjuṣā, p. 114. In this argument, they forget that there is no conceivable relation between the village and fish and that such a transfer of meaning is not at all possible."

Now we have to apply ourselves to Dr. Raja's remark. For once, to begin with we can not agree that there is no relation - tadyoga - whatsoever between the primary meaning of 'village' and 'fish'. Actually, just as on account of sāmīpya-saṃbandha we can derive the meaning of 'gaṅgā-tāṭa' from the word 'gaṅgā', similarly on account of "sādṛśya"-saṃbandha, i.e., relation of similarity we may be able to derive the sense, of 'mahāmīna' or 'a very big fish', from the meaning of a village. The fish in the Gaṅga is so big, that the speaker's intention goes to suggest, that as if a whole village is afloat on the flow of the Gaṅga ! So, Dr. Raja's remark is not acceptable. Again, even in instances of jahallakṣaṇā we cannot rule out the condition of 'tātparya-anupapatti', which occurs also in case of 'a-jahallakṣaṇā' such as illustrated in 'chatriṇo yānti'. Or, we may put such instances as 'kākebhyo dadhi rakṣyatām', under what the Vedāntins recognized as, 'jahad-ajahad-lakṣaṇā ! Of course, this is open to critical discussion.

Dr. Raja (p. 261, ibid) then proceeds to observe that 'yogyatā' or congruity of sense is accepted to be one of the conditions of a sentence, the others as we know, being 'ākāṅkṣā' and 'āsatti'. Thus a statement, say, 'agninā siñcati' observes Dr.

Raja, is not a sentence, there being a breach of the condition of ‘yogyatā’. He then raises a point, (p. 262) “If there is any incompatibility of the primary sense, as we find in all cases of lakṣaṇā, how can there be ‘yogyatā’ in a sentence ? The explanation is that in the case of lakṣaṇā, the incompatibility of the sense is only for the sense when taken literally, and not real. This could be removed by resorting to the secondary meaning of the word. Even in cases like ‘agninā siñcati’, if the incongruity could be explained by resorting to a secondary meaning, the sentence would be regarded as correct.”

This remark also has to be supplemented by us. Yes, if by ‘agninā siñcati’, we mean, “he is wetting by a highly, inflammable liquid or petrol, we can explain the incompatibility. To sprinkle such highly inflammable liquid, say kerosene, on an object, may be said to be ‘agninā siñcati’. But here also, it may be noted that by conceding such cases Dr. Raja accepts “tātparyānupāpatti” as more basic to lakṣaṇā. In all cases making sense, non-sense or half-sense involving lakṣaṇā, we have to pay greatest importance to the condition of ‘tātparyānupapatti’, which in our opinion is a more fundamental ‘lakṣaṇā-beeja’.

We have seen that for Mammaṣa lakṣaṇā has to be rooted either in local usage - rūḍhi-or a motive-‘prayojana’.

The first i.e. lakṣaṇā based on rūḍhi or usage is termed rūḍhi-mūlā or nirūḍhā lakṣaṇā, i.e. faded metaphor. The writers in various disciplines paid more attention to this element of popular usage, and did not pay much respect to the factor of motive behind lakṣaṇā as primarily they were concerned with scientific use of language and perhaps not at all with the poetic use. We have seen the position of various disciplines concerning lakṣaṇā. For Śabara, lakṣaṇā is based on usage in everyday life. Dr. Raja explains it as an arbitrary assumption of a sense by society, and, he adds, at times the newly assumed sense becomes so prominent through usage, that the primary, original sense of a word remains unnoticed, except by the grammarians. Read SB. on Mī. Sū. I. iv. 2 : lakṣaṇā iti ced varaṃ lakṣaṇā kalpitā, na yāgābhidhānam. laukikī hi lakṣaṇā haṭho’prasiddha-kalpanā. We have already observed this point in greater details and the net outcome is that for the Mīmāṃsaka lakṣaṇā is a blemish, a ‘doṣa’, resorted to only as a lesser evil, to avoid any greater evil such as ānarthakya or a-prasiddha-kalpanā. In certain cases the secondary sense is accepted as the primary sense itself while the original sense is treated only as a gimmick of etymology.

Kumārila is of the opinion that old and deep-rooted lakṣaṇās express the secondary sense as if it were the primary sense itself, and in case of modern and

newly made lakṣaṇās, some are possible, but some are impossible as they are disallowed by usage : Read Tantravārttika, pp. 683 -

“nirūḍhā lakṣaṇāḥ kāścīt
sāmarthyād abhidhānavat,
kriyante sāmpratam kāścīt
kāścīn naiva tv aśaktitaḥ.”

Mammaṭa also accepts this broad classification - Read, Śabda-vyāpāra-vicāra, p. 7.

“nirūḍhā kācanānyā tu
kāryā sā kācid anyathā...”

In case of nirūḍhā lakṣaṇās, the actual meaning is as good as normal meaning itself, and there is no need for incompatibility of the original meaning or any special motive for its usage. In the case of these faded metaphors, the association of the word with the original i.e. primary meaning has almost disappeared and the word becomes an ordinary name for the actual thing referred with any cognitive or emotive association.

Mukula is of the opinion that such cases of nirūḍhā lakṣaṇā are acceptable, as they are established by the usage of the ancients, and that analogous cases must also be warranted by usage, as otherwise any word will go to have any meaning. If there is a special clear motive, metaphors can be resorted to. For example on the analogy of the word ‘dvirepha’ for a bee, we cannot coin a word such as ‘dvika’ (= having two ‘ka’-kāras) for a ‘cuckoo’ (= kokila).

Hemacandra dismisses nirūḍhā lakṣaṇā as abhidhā only and so also, Viśvanātha, the author of Sāhityadarpaṇa has a different note. Viśvanātha says that such illustrations as given by Mammaṭa, e.g. ‘kuśala’, need not be taken as cases of nirūḍhā lakṣaṇā for, he argues, it is no use taking the etymological meaning as an original meaning - “anyac ca śabdānām pravṛtti-nimittam, anyac ca vyutpatti-nimittam”. In case we accept ‘kuśala’ as an illustration of nirūḍhā lakṣaṇā, then we will have to admit, on the same logic, lakṣaṇā in case of expressions such as ‘gauḥ śete’ - the cow (or bull) sleeps, because here also by resorting to the etymology of the word ‘gauḥ’, we will have a sense such as, “that which goes, sleeps”. Precisely because of such possibilities perhaps, as noted above, Hemacandra was inclined to take all cases of nirūḍhā lakṣaṇā as cases of abhidhā only and thus he dismisses ‘kuśala’, and ‘dvirepha’ etc. as pure cases of abhidhā. Read - Kā. Śā. (pp. 22, Edn.

Nandi), - under I. 18 : kuśala-dvirepha-dvikā”dayas tu sāksāt-samketitarvāt mukhyā eva iti na rūḍhir lakṣyārthasya hetutvena asmābhir uktā.

Later critics, that is those who followed the ancients such as Bhāmaha and others, stressed the importance of prayojanavatī lakṣaṇā, or the one with a motive in appreciating instances of poetic beauty. But even the ancients such as Daṇḍin and Vāmana had also accepted the poetic beauty of prayojanavatī lakṣaṇā, though without naming or classifying it as the same. We have thoroughly screened the approach of these ancient masters towards the problem of various word-powers or śabda-vṛttis and this includes even vyañjanā, which is perhaps not even mentioned by name. We have seen that various disciplines such as those represented by Vyākaraṇa, Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā had, for their own reasons, not shown any interest in this motive-oriented-prayojanavatī-lakṣaṇā. We will discuss in greater detail the opinions of Ānandavardhana, Maṃmaṭa and the rest, regarding the actual understanding of the motive or prayojana, which for them by and large, is accepted to be suggested, i.e. is collected by a separate function of the word, a function, called by the name of ‘vyañjanā’.

An interesting case deserves attention. It is the case of compound-words. According to Naiyāyikas and the Mīmāṃsakas, no special function may be accepted in case of compound words. They explain all cases of compounds where the intended sense is not arrived at directly from the members of the compound themselves as cases of lakṣaṇā. So, in case of a Bahuvrīhi compound such as ‘citra-guḥ’ (a person possessing brindled cows), they accept lakṣaṇā to obtain the sense of owner. But the grammarians go for a special power to explain the new meaning distinct from those of its members, because in their opinion, lakṣaṇā with reference to either ‘citra’ or ‘go’, is not enough to bring about the signification of the owner of brindled cows. Read Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇa, p. 177, - “citragur ity ādau svāmy ādi-pratītaye śaktir āvaśyakī, na ca lakṣaṇayā nirvāhaḥ.” (Also, the Mbh. under Pā. II. i. 1, may be referred - pp. 359, Vol. I., etc.) The word ‘citra’ cannot indicate the owner of brindled cows, and if we take the word ‘go’ to indicate this meaning, the meaning of ‘citra’ will not be compatible with that of the owner, as it is not the owner who is brindled. See Tattvacintāmaṇi, śabda-kāṇḍa, pp. 732 - na ca citra-padaṃ citra-go-swāmi-lakṣakam; tatra ‘go’ padārthā’nanvayāt. nā’pi ‘go’ padam lakṣakam go-swāmini citra-padārthā’nanvayā”patteḥ. The grammarians assign the power of expressing such additional senses to the compounds, taking the whole as an indivisible unit of speech - “samāse khalu bhinnaiva śaktiḥ” - Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇa, V. 31. The Mīmāṃsakas explain this difficulty by taking the whole sentence as

lakṣaṇā. In a tat-puruṣa compound like rāja-puruṣa, (the king's man, officer), for rājñah puruṣah, the relation denoted by the genitive is known through lakṣaṇā. The Naiyāyikas resort to lakṣaṇā only in case of one word, i.e. either in case of 'citrā' or 'go'; and take the other as suggestive of the purport - i.e. tātparya-grāhaka' : Read - śabda-śakti-prakāśikā, p. 238 - "na hi bahuvrīhau samasta-padānām lākṣaṇikatvāt, ... eka-pada mātra-lakṣaṇayā'pi bahuvrīher vyavasthāpyatvāt." The tatpuruṣa compound has lakṣaṇā for the first word only; in the case of 'karmadhāraya' compound, there is no necessity to resort to lakṣaṇā, as the sense of identity of members is obtained from the relation of the meaning themselves. The Vaiyākaraṇa-bhūṣaṇa observes : (p. 157) - "karmadhāraye ca na śaktir na vā lakṣaṇā padārthayoḥ padābhyām abhedasya ca saṃsargatayā lābhāt."

The Mīmāṃsakas are of the opinion that since the natural relation of a word is to its primary meaning, no recourse should be taken to the secondary function of words, if it possible to explain the passage concerned by recourse to the primary meaning itself. This they observe under the discussion concerning the term "niṣāda-sthapati". (See. Mī. Sū. VI. i. 51, 52), If it is taken as a karmadhāraya compound, it means, 'a king who is a niṣāda'; but if it is taken as a tat-puruṣa compound, it means, 'king of the niṣādas'. The Mīmāṃsakas thus come to a conclusion that this word has to be taken as a karmadhāraya compound, in which case the members retain their primary senses, and not as a tat-puruṣa compound, since that involves resorting to lakṣaṇā.

The Mīmāṃsakas and the Vedāntins accept that there can be lakṣaṇā not only for words, but also for, sentences as well. The eulogistic portions of the Vedic texts containing 'arthavāda' are taken as illustrations of sentence-lakṣaṇā. Read Vedānta-paribhāṣā - IV. 31-4; "lakṣaṇā ca na padārtha-mātra-vṛttiḥ, kiṃ tu vākya-vṛttiḥ api... evaṃ arthavāda-vākyaṇām praśaṃsārūpāṇām prāśastye lakṣaṇā; The śabda-śakti-prakāśikā, pp. 140 - also refers to this view. It is really not easy to explain say statements full of irony by assuming lakṣaṇā for only a particular word in it. It is not a single word, but the whole passage that gives the implication. This is observed by Dr. Raja (pp. 269, ibid). But we feel that such cases of ironical statements, such as those exemplified by the famous speech of Vāsantī in the Uttare-rāma-carita, such as, "tvam jīvitam, tvam asi me"...etc. are more instances of lakṣaṇā, and we would rather make bold to assert that we may find traces of actually vākya-vyañjanā, rather accept lakṣaṇā, even in cases of sentences involving the vedic texts containing arthavāda.

The Naiyāyikas, however, do not admit lakṣaṇā for sentences, but they accept lakṣaṇā only for words. In case, in some passages if there is difficulty in

understanding them, they consider that some other word is indicative of the intention of the speaker - i.e. ‘tātparya-grāhaka’. Thus in the example, say, “gaṃbhīrāyāṃ nadyāṃ ghoṣaḥ”, (the village is on the deep river), the term ‘nadi’ or ‘gaṃbhīrā’ is said to indicate through lakṣaṇā, the bank of the deep river, the other word being taken as indicative of the intention of the speaker. The Śabda-śakti-prakāśikā observes, pp.143 - “gaṃbhīrā-padaṃ naḍī-padaṃ vā tatra gaṃbhīrā-nadi-tīra-lakṣaṇam, padāntaram tu tatra tātparya-grāhakaṃ iti siddhānta-vidah.”

We have noted earlier, in the beginning of this chapter the views of the grammarians, particularly of Bhartṛhari concerning lakṣaṇā. For Bhartṛhari, the unit of speech is a sentence and it is indivisible. So, the meaning of a sentence cannot be grasped from the knowledge of the meanings of individual words. We have seen that he does refer to the primary and secondary meaning and to distinguish between the two he cites different views.

Thus, for those who accept multiplicity of the meaning of a word, the distinction between the primary and secondary meaning is based on the relative frequency of usage - Read V.P. II. 263 - (Edn. S. Bhate, word Index to... Ed. '92 Delhi) -

“anekārthatvam ekasya
yaiḥ śabdasyā’nugamyate,
siddhy asiddhi-kṛtā teṣāṃ
gauṇa-mukhya-prakalpanā.”

Those who hold that a word can have only one meaning consider that the word having primary sense and the word having secondary sense, are different, though they sound alike - V.P. II. 257 (Edn. Bhate)

reads : “ekatvaṃ tu sarūpatvāt-
chabdayor gauṇa-mukhyayoḥ,
prāhur atyantabhede’pi
bheda-mārgā’nudarśinaḥ.”

Puṇyarāja suggests that according to Vyāḍi, the primary meaning of a word is that which is well known and which depends only on its form. Secondary meaning is that which, with the help of context, is established with some effort. The primary is conveyed by the word itself, the secondary, whereas, is different from it and depends on the other words in the sentence on the context.

Read, V.P. II 264, 265 (Edn., ibid) - and V.P. II. 278 (Edn. ibid) -

“artha-prakaraṇāpekṣo
yo vā śabdāntaraiḥ saha,
yuktaḥ pratyāyatyartham
taṁ gaṇam apare viduḥ.”
śuddhasy óccāraṇe svārthaḥ
prasiddho yasya gamyate,
sa mukhya iti vijñeyo
rūpamātra-nibandhanaḥ.” (V.P. II. 264, 265)

and, V.P. II. 278 -

“śrutimātreṇa yatrā'sya
sāmṛthyam avasīyate,
taṁ mukhyam artham manyante
gaṇam yatnopapāditam.”

Still next view considers the words to refer to the qualities. That object which possesses these qualities to a greater degree is the primary one and the other is termed secondary. Bhartṛhari does not accept this view as, according to him, it is against usage.

Read V.P. II. 272 -

“naivādhikatvaṁ dharmāṇām
nyūnatā vā prayojikā,
ādhikyam api manyante
prasiddher, nyūnatām kvacit.”

There are also others, who consider that the secondary usage is based on similarity, ‘siṃho devadattaḥ’ only means that ‘devadatta’ possesses some qualities similar to those of the lion. Or, may be it is based on some confusion between the two because of similarity. V.P. II. 273-274 read as :

“jātiśabdo'ntareṇā'pi
jātiṁ yatra prayujyate
sambandhi-sadrśād-dharmāt
taṁ gaṇa apare viduḥ.”

and, “viparyāsād ivā'rthasya
yatrārthāntaratām iva,
manyante sa gavādis tu
gaṇa ity ucyate kvacid.” - (Edn. Bhate)

For Bhartṛhari the sentence has to be considered as a whole and in the particular context in which it is uttered. Therefore, it is meaningless to discuss the primary and secondary referents of an individual word. Bhartṛhari says that when, for example, a mother tries to stop her child from crying, by saying, “the tiger eats children who cry”, she really does not mean it. When a traveller says to his friend, “we must go, look at the Sun”, he simply means that it is getting late and that he does not insist on actually looking at the sun. When it is said, “kākebhyo dadhi rakṣyatām”, it is implied that it is to be protected from dogs etc. also. Again, when it is said, “brāhmaṇa-kambala”, there is nothing special about ‘brāhmaṇa’. Thus, such usages cannot be explained by resorting to lakṣaṇā. As seen earlier, ironic or sarcastic expressions carry a sense entirely different from the expressed one. Some later writers try to read lakṣaṇā in these expressions but ‘Bhartṛhari has clearly shown the imperfectness of the theory depending on word meanings, eventhough he recognizes the usefulness of the discussion of word-meanings. Read the references for all this from V.P. as follows :-

“vyāghrā”divyapadeśena
yathā bālo nivartyate,
asatyō’pi tathā kaścit-
pratyavāyo’bhidhīyate.” (V.P. II. 321)

“gantavyaṃ dṛśyatām sūrya
iti kālasya lakṣaṇe,
jñāyatām kāla ity etat-
sōpāyam abhidhīyate.” (V.P. II. 310)

“kākebhyo rakṣyatām sarpir
iti bālo’pi coditah,
upaghātapare vākye
na śvādibhyo na rakṣyati.” (V.P. II. 312)

“brāhmaṇārtho yathā nā'sti
kaścīd brāhmaṇa-kambale,
devadattā”dayo vākye
tathaiva syur anarthakāḥ.” (V.P. II. 14)

“stuti-nindā-pradhāneṣu
vākyeṣv artho na tādrśaḥ,
padānām pravibhāgena
yādrśaḥ parikalpyate.” (V.P. II. 247), (Edn. Bhate)

We will now proceed with Mammaṭa's classification of lakṣaṇā as follows :
kārikās 10-12 K.P. II read as -

“svasiddhaye parā”kṣepaḥ
parārthaṃ sva-samarpaṇam,
upādānaṃ lakṣaṇam ca
ity uktā śuddhaiva sā dvidhā.” (II. K.D.)

“sāropā'nyā tu yatrōktau
viśayī viśayas tathā,
viśayyantaḥ kṛte'nyasmin
sā syāt sādhyavasānikā.” (K.P. II. 11)

“bhedāv imau ca sādṛśyāt
saṃbandhāntaratas tathā,
gaṇau śuddhau ca vijñeyau
lakṣaṇā tena ṣaḍ vidhā.” - (K.P. II. 12)

We will have to go into greater details as to how the six-fold lakṣaṇā is explained differently by different commentators, but for the time being we will follow the text of the K.P. - i.e. the kārikās (II. 10-12) and the vṛtti thereon.
Mammaṭa observes : (Trans. R. C. Dwivedi, ibid, pp. 29-37)

10 - “Assumption of another (i.e. secondary meaning) to establish itself (i.e. primary meaning) and the surrender of itself (i.e. primary meaning) are ‘inclusive indication’, and ‘exclusive indication’ (respectively). Thus, that pure indication alone is two-fold.”

In cases like ‘Lances enter’ and, ‘Staffs enter’ the (words) lances and others point to persons connected with them in order to make their own entrance possible. Therefore, this indication is by inclusion (of the primary meaning).

In cases like, “A bull should be immolated”, the individual (bull) is implied by the universal (bullness) for the reason, “how can the immolation, enjoined by the Veda, be possible in my case?”. But (the individual bull) is not denoted by the word, on account of the rule - “Denotation would not go to (express) the qualified, when its power has been exhausted in (expressing) the qualification.” But this (viz. a bull should not be immolated) should not be quoted as an example of inclusive indication. For, there is no motive here. Nor is this inclusive indication. Nor is this usage. The individual is implied by the universal on account of the universal being invariably connected with the individual. As for example, an agent is implied in, “Let (it) be done”, and the object is implied in, “Do”. And in cases like, “Enter”, “Sweet-ball”, etc. words like, “a house” and “eat” are understood.

And in example, “The fat Devadatta does not eat by day” the eating at night is not indicated. For that (example) is a case of verbal presumption or factual presumption.

In the example, “A hamlet on the Gaṅgā”, the word ‘Gaṅgā’ surrenders its meaning in order to establish the bank as the location of the hamlet. Thus, in such cases the indication is by exclusion. And this two-fold (indication) is pure, as it is not mixed with fancied identification founded on resemblance.

In these two divisions (of indication), there is no separateness amounting to distinction between the indicated (sense) and the indicative. For, when the words like Gaṅgā and the like convey (the sense of) the bank and the like, the apprehension of the motive while is sought to be established is obtained only after the comprehension of the identity (of the Gaṅgā with the bank). If (by the use of indication) merely a relation with Gaṅgā (viz. stream) were to be apprehended then what difference would there be of indication and a direct mode of expression - “A hamlet on the bank of the Gaṅgā” ?

11 ab - “But another (variety) is the superimponent indication wherein are expressed the object superimposed (viṣayin) as also the substratum of superimposition (viṣaya).

Where the object superimposed and the substratum of superimposition are stated in the same case-ending with their distinction non-suppressed - that indication is-superimponent.

11 cd - Wherein the other, (viz. the substratum of superimposition) is swallowed by the thing superimposed - that would be introsusceptive (indication).

When the other, namely, the substratum of superimposition, is put within, or swallowed by the object which is being superimposed, that would be introsusceptive (indication).

12 - abc. And these two divisions (of indication), arising from resemblance and from some other relation, should be known as qualitative (i.e. as divisions of Gauṇī lakṣaṇā) and pure (i.e. - divisions of Śuddhā lakṣaṇā).

These two divisions (of Gauṇī lakṣaṇā), characterized by the superimposition and introsusception and caused by resemblance, are (respectively) instanced in, "Vāhika is a bull", and, "This is a bull".

Here, for instance, the qualities like dullness and stupidity, associated with the primary sense, though indicated, serve the purpose of using the word 'Gauḥ' to express the other meaning (i.e. vāhika)-thus hold some. Owing to their identity with the qualities associated with the primary sense, the qualities belonging to the other object (i.e. Vāhika) alone are indicated, but the other object is not expressed - so say others. On account of being the substratum of common qualities, the other object itself is indicated-thus maintain others.

And it is said elsewhere - "Indication is said to be the cognition of what is connected with the primary sense. It is but desirable to admit the process to be qualitative on account of the connection (of the expressed sense, viz. bull) with the qualities of what is under indication (viz. Vāhika)."

(Tantravārttika. I. iv. 22)

Here, 'the state of not being without' (a-vinābhāva) means connection in general, but not an invariable relation. For, if it were so, there would be no indication in such cases as, 'The cots cry'; and if invariable relation were to exist then the assumption (or inference) alone will do, there will be no use of indication.

In cases such as, "Ghee is life", "This is life itself", there is a relation other than similarity, like the relation of cause and effect. And in such cases the superimposition and introsusception are based on relations such as the one found in cause and effect.


Here in the two varieties of qualitative (indication), cognition of identity despite difference in substratum and the cognition of complete identity (respectively), is the purpose. But in the two varieties of pure (indication), the capability of bringing about the result in a way distinct from others and without fail (is the purpose).

In some cases the secondary application is owing to subserviency; for example, sacrificial post for Indra is called Indra. In some cases (it is) owing to relation of oneself with one's master; for example, an officer of a king is (called) the king. In some cases (it is) owing to the relation of the parts with the whole; for example, in the foremost hand (i.e. palm). Here the word 'hand' stands for its foremost part only. In some cases (it is) owing to the sameness of occupation, for example, a non-carpenter (by caste) is, owing to carpentry, called carpenter.

12 d. Indication, therefore, is six-fold. - Along with the first two divisions (viz. śuddhā upādāna lakṣaṇā and śuddhā-lakṣaṇa-lakṣaṇā.) indication is of six kinds."

This makes for the basic classification of lakṣaṇā, according to Mammata. But commentators differ in interpreting the expression viz. "lakṣaṇā tena sad-vidhā". We will try to examine this in details, very carefully as below :

It must be carefully noted in the beginning that 'rudhi' and 'prayojana' make for the conditions and not the divisions of lakṣaṇā and hence, it is only the latter i.e. prayojanavati lakṣaṇā, that is sub-divided into six varieties. Before we resort to the views of different commentators, a simple table can be seen expressing this six-fold division, and it is like this -



The illustrations respectively are - (i) gaurvāhikāḥ, (ii) gaur evā'yam, (iii) kuntāḥ praviśanti, (iv) gaṅgāyāṃ ghoṣaḥ (v) āyurghṛtam, & (vi) āyur eva idam.

Before we proceed with the views of different commentators on the classification of lakṣaṇā, we will quote Prof. A. B. Gajendragadkar's views (pp. 297 onwards, Edn. K.P., Bombay). The Numbers of kārīkās differ in Dwivedi and Gajendragadkar. He observes :

"There is not the slightest doubt in our mind that the above represents the classification of lakṣaṇā intended by Mammata. But commentators of the

Kāvya-prakāśa, guided more, it seems to us, by extraneous considerations than by natural construction of Mammaṭa's words, have advanced two other divisions, which they regard as intended by Mammaṭa. That is why some discussion about this problem becomes necessary.

We regard the above as Mammaṭa's classification for three reasons, which are as follows -

(1) This is the only classification that naturally and directly follows Mammaṭa's words. In Kārikā 5, Mammaṭa treats of two divisions, viz. upādāna and lakṣaṇa, which he states are, 'śuddha'. Kārikā 6 gives two more divisions viz. 'sāropa' and 'sādhyavasāna', which are declared to be both 'gauṇa' and 'śuddha'. From this it follows that śuddha has four varieties viz. upādāna, lakṣaṇa, sāropa, and sādhyavasāna, and gauṇa has two viz. sāropa and sādhyavasāna. The above classification gives the divisions exactly in this manner.

(2) In kārikā 7 abc, four varieties of lakṣaṇā are mentioned and in kārikā 7d, lakṣaṇā is stated to be six-fold. The vṛtti explains this statement by pointing out that the six varieties are made up by adding previously mentioned two (ādyā-bhedābhyām saha) viz. śuddha upādāna and śuddha lakṣaṇa to the four referred to in kārikā 7 abc. From this it is clear that the previously mentioned two varieties viz. śuddha-upādāna and śuddha-lakṣaṇa, are on the same level as the four now mentioned viz. gauṇa sāropa and gauṇa-sādhyavasāna, śuddha-sāropa and śuddha-sādhyavasāna. In other words the explanatory addition, 'ādyā-bhedābhyām saha', shows that upādāna and lakṣaṇa are the final divisions of śuddha and not merely intermediate divisions, which are each to be further divided into sāropa and sādhyavasāna, as the Pradīpa understands and gauṇa two, viz. sāropa and sādhyavasāna.

(3) kārikā 7 abc - ("bhedāvimau ca sādṛśyāt sambandhāntaratas tathā | gauṇau śuddhau ca vijñeyau.") - corroborate the above view. From this it is clear that Mammaṭa intends 'sāropa' and 'sādhyavasāna' to be different divisions of both gauṇa and śuddha. It would therefore, not be correct to regard, as the Pradīpa does, 'sāropa' and 'sādhyavasāna' as the direct divisions of only 'gauṇa' and as the indirect divisions of 'śuddha' through the medium of 'upādāna' and 'lakṣaṇā'. There is no justification whatsoever for making a distinction between 'gauṇa' and 'śuddha' in the matter of their subdivision into 'sāropa' and 'sādhyavasāna'.

Thus we feel sure that the above is the classification of Mammaṭa.


It must, however, be remarked that Mammaṭa's classification given above is not logically accurate, because the divisions are not mutually exclusive, but overlap.

For example, ‘āyur ghṛtam’ and “āyuh pibati”, which are given as ‘śuddha sārōpa’ and ‘śuddha-sādhyavasāna’ respectively, may well be regarded as ‘lakṣaṇa-lakṣaṇā’, because in both these illustrations ‘āyuh’ completely gives up its mukhyārtha. Similarly, ‘gaur-vāhikah’, and ‘gām āhvayati’, which illustrate “gauṇa sārōpa” and “gauṇa sādhyavasāna” respectively, can again be ‘lakṣaṇa-lakṣaṇā’ also, because ‘gauh’ completely sacrifices its primary sense for the sake of the secondary. Then again, it is pointed out that in ‘gaṅgāyām ghoṣah’, which is given as an illustration of ‘lakṣaṇa-lakṣaṇā’, there is an element of sādhyavasāna lakṣaṇā also. For, here the viṣayī (gaṅgā) swallows the viṣaya (tataḥ). Similarly, in ‘kuntāḥ praviśanti’, which illustrates upādāna-lakṣaṇā the viṣayī (kuntāḥ) swallows the viṣaya (kuntinaḥ puruṣāḥ). Thus, these two viz. ‘upādāna’ and ‘lakṣaṇa’ can also be looked upon as ‘sādhyavasāna’.

Though Mammata’s classification of lakṣaṇā is thus logically inaccurate, it is simple and useful from the practical point of view. Any example of lakṣaṇā that we may come across can be classed under one or the other of his six divisions. To give a logically accurate and simple division is almost an impossibility. (we do not agree).

With a view perhaps to remove the overlapping involved in the above classification, the Pradīpa (p. 33) says : “lakṣaṇā tāvad dvividhā. śuddhā gauṇī ca. tatra ādyā dvividhā. upādāna-lakṣaṇā lakṣaṇa-lakṣaṇā ca; te api pratyekaṃ sārōpā sādhyavasānā ca iti dvividhe. iti śuddha-bhedās’ catvāraḥ. gauṇī tu dvedhā, sārōpā sādhyavasānā ca. iti śadvidhatvaṃ lakṣaṇāyāḥ.

This will give us the following classification



This classification is unsatisfactory for the following reasons : (1) The idea that ‘upādāna’ and ‘lakṣaṇa’ are intermediate and not final divisions of śuddha finds no support in the text of the Kāvyaaprakāśa. It seems to have been introduced by Pradīpa in order to get rid of the overlapping which is involved in what we regard as Mammaṭa’s classification. (we feel Pradīpa is right). (2) Though this classification removes overlapping from ‘śuddha sārōpa’ and ‘śuddha sādhyavasāna’, still overlapping continues in gaṇa-sārōpa and gaṇa-sādhyavasāna. So this classification also is not logically accurate. (3) Expressions like ‘kuntāḥ kuntinaḥ praviśanti’, and ‘gaṅgāyām taṭe ghoṣaḥ’, which illustrate śuddha-upādāna-sārōpa and śuddha-lakṣaṇa-sārōpa in this classification, are such as are never used in the language. (We add, the expression ‘kuntāḥ kuntinaḥ praviśanti’ sounds senseless to us). (4) If this classification be supposed to represent the one intended by Mammaṭa, we shall have to believe that Mammaṭa forgot to give an illustration for one variety viz. śuddha-upādāna-sārōpa and gave two illustrations for another viz. śuddha-lakṣaṇa-sādhyavasāna, separating them by a long interval.”

Prof. A. B. Gajendragadkar proceeds, (p. 300) - “Mukulabhaṭṭa in his Abhidhāvṛtti (tta) mātrkā (pp. 6-9) speaks of the classification of lakṣaṇā thus -


“śuddhōpacāra-miśratvāt
lakṣaṇā dvividhā matā.”

2 “upādānāllakṣaṇāc ca
śuddhā sā dvividhōditā.”

... “āropā’dhyavasānābhyām
śuddha-gaṇōpacārayoḥ,
pratyekaṃ vidyamānatvād
upacāraś caturvidhaḥ.”

4. eṣā ca lakṣaṇā tri-skandhā, śuddhatvāt, adhyāropāt, adhyavasānāc ca. tatra śuddha-skandhasya dvaividhyam upādāna-lakṣaṇābhyām uktam. adhyāropā’dhyavasāna-skandhayor api pratyekaṃ dvi-prabhedatā. śuddha-gaṇōpacāra-miśratvāt.

His scheme of division may be represented as follows :



The ancient commentators Māṇikyacandra and Jayanta think that Mammāṭa follows Mukulabhaṭṭa in his classification of lakṣaṇā. Consequently they interpret Mammāṭa's words in such a way as to support the above classification. We think that this view is incorrect for the following reasons :

(1) Mammāṭa has nowhere stated, neither in any of the kārīkās nor in vṛtti, that 'upacāramiśrā' forms a primary division of lakṣaṇā, along with śuddhā. We have shown above that the natural and direct conclusion from his kārīkās and vṛtti is that the primary divisions of lakṣaṇā are 'śuddha' and 'gauṇa'.

The primary division upacāramiśrā is, however, deduced from the words, "ubhayarūpā ceyam śuddhā, upacāreṇa a-miśratvāt." But this deduction is unwarranted. What these sentences tell us is that śuddha-lakṣaṇā is upacāreṇa a-miśritā, i.e. possesses no admixture of upacāra. The whole question here is what other division of lakṣaṇā Mammāṭa has in view, when he says that śuddha-lakṣaṇā, is upacāra-a-miśritā or what other division of lakṣaṇā is excluded by the characteristic "upacāreṇa a-miśritatvam" of śuddhā-lakṣaṇā or what other division of lakṣaṇā Mammāṭa regards as "upacāreṇa miśrita". On the answer that we give to this question, will depend the meaning in which the word 'upacāra' must be understood to have been used by Mammāṭa.

In this connection kārīkā 7abc (i.e. bhedāv imau ca sādṛśyāt, saṃbandhānta-

ratas tathā. gaṇau śuddhau ca vijñeyau...”) appears to us to be decisive. There ‘gaṇa’ and ‘śuddha’ are mentioned together, from which we conclude that here the other division intended by Mammaṭa is ‘gaṇa’. ‘Gaṇa’ then is ‘upacāra-miśrita’, and is, therefore, vyāvṛtta or excluded by the characteristic ‘upacāreṇa a-miśritatvam’, which belongs to śuddha-lakṣaṇā. Note - ‘ubhaya-rūpā ceyam udāhṛtā śuddhā, na tu gaṇī. Upacāramiśrā hi gaṇī ity ucyate.” Pradīpa. This being so, ‘upacāra’ here evidently possesses its restricted sense, viz. “sādrśya-saṃbandhena pravṛttiḥ”, for it is only in this sense that ‘upacāra’ can distinguish ‘gaṇa lakṣaṇā’ from ‘śuddha’. Thus the sentences ‘ubhaya-rūpā ceyam śuddhā, upacāreṇa a-miśritatvat’, read along with kārikā 7 abc, show that ‘śuddha’ and ‘gaṇa’ are the primary divisions of lakṣaṇā, according to Mammaṭa.

On the other hand the passage ‘ubhaya-rūpā ceyam śuddhā. upacāreṇa a-miśritatvāt’ is understood to imply, that while these two varieties viz. ‘upādāna’ and ‘lakṣaṇa’ are ‘upacāra-miśra’, the other four, to be presently mentioned, are ‘upacāra-miśra’. Thus, it is held that śuddhā, covering ‘upādāna’ and ‘lakṣaṇa’, is one division of lakṣaṇā, and ‘upacāramiśrā’ covering the other four, is another. If this be so, ‘upacāra’ must mean, ‘atacchabdasya tacchabena abhidhānam’ or ‘the identification of one thing with another generally’. Only in this sense, upacāra can be present in all four remaining divisions viz. śuddha sārōpa, śuddha-sādhyaśāna, gaṇa sārōpa and gaṇa-sādhyaśāna. But as the division upacāramiśrā has not been mentioned by Mammaṭa anywhere, the above implication cannot be accepted.

(2) It is clear that in the passage “ubhaya-rūpā ceyam śuddhā, upacāreṇa a-miśritatvāt”, the characteristic ‘upacāra-amīśritatvam’ is intended to be vyāvartaka i.e. to distinguish śuddha-lakṣaṇā from some other. If we understand that other to be ‘gaṇa-lakṣaṇā’, upacāra in the sense of ‘sādrśya-saṃbandhena pravṛttiḥ’ will distinguish ‘śuddha’ from ‘gaṇa’ all right. For, while ‘upacāra’ in this sense is absent in ‘śuddha’, it is present in ‘gaṇa’. But if, as is supposed to be the implication, ‘upacāra-a-miśritatvam’ be ‘vyāvartaka’ of the other four kinds of lakṣaṇā, it will be found that ‘upacāra’ does not serve this purpose. We saw above that with this implication ‘upacāra’ must be understood in its general sense viz. ‘a-tacchabdasya tacchabdena abhidhānam’. But ‘upacāra’ in this sense is not absent in (from ?) śuddha. For in ‘kuntāḥ praviśanti’, and ‘gaṅgāyām ghoṣaḥ’, we have ‘a-tacchabdasya tacchabdena abhidhānam’, in the words ‘kuntāḥ’ which stands for ‘kuntinah’, and ‘gaṅgāyām’, which stands for ‘tate’. In other words, even in śuddha lakṣaṇā we have ‘upacāra’ in its general sense, viz. the identification of one thing


(kuntāḥ and gaṅgā) with another (kuntināḥ and tāṭaḥ). Consequently ‘upacāra’ cannot distinguish the two varieties of śuddha lakṣaṇā from the four others, as it is supposed to do in the interpretation, which follows from the above implication. This is enough to show that the interpretation of the passage, “ubhaya-rūpā ... a-miśritatvāt”, which sees in it an implied reference to ‘upacāra-miśrā’, distinguished from ‘śuddhā’ on the ground of its being mixed with upacāra, is incorrect. But this point does not seem to have struck any interpreter.

(3) If the lead of Māṇikya-candra and Jayanta be followed in the matter of classification of lakṣaṇā, we shall have to suppose that the words ‘gaṇau’ and ‘śuddhau’ in the kārīkā ‘gaṇau śuddhau ca vijñeyau’ are used in the sense of ‘gaṇopacāra-miśrau’, and ‘śuddhupacāra-miśrau’. Similarly, the word ‘gaṇa-bhedayoḥ’, and ‘śuddha-bhedayoḥ’, will have to be understood as standing for ‘gaṇopacāra-miśra-bhedayoḥ’, and ‘śuddhupacāra-miśra-bhedayoḥ’. This appears to us to be highly improbable. Mammāṭa nowhere speaks of any divisions like ‘gaṇopacāra-miśrā’, and “śuddhupacāra-miśrā”.

(4) In the classification of Mukula-bhaṭṭa the division of ‘upacāra’ into ‘śuddha’ and ‘gaṇa’ plays an important part. It is the principle on which ‘upacāra-miśrā’ is further divided. But Mammāṭa nowhere speaks of this division of upacāra into ‘śuddha’ and ‘gaṇa’. He cannot, therefore, be regarded as subscribing to Mukula-bhaṭṭa’s classification of lakṣaṇā. It is true, as we have already noted, that Mammāṭa uses the word ‘upacāra’ in its general as well as its restricted sense. But this cannot be supposed to imply that he wanted to divide ‘upacāra’ into ‘śuddha’ and ‘gaṇa’ in the manner of Mukula-bhaṭṭa. If he had intended to do so, he would have specifically made that division and not left it to be understood by implication.

(5) The word ‘anyā’ in ‘sāropā’nyā tu yatrōktau’ (kārīkā 6a) is supposed to refer to ‘upacāra-miśrā’ and the particle ‘tu’ to imply that ‘upacāra miśrā’ alone is ‘sāropā’, but not ‘śuddhā’. This supposition is not correct. Upacāra-miśrā has not been mentioned anywhere before, neither in kārīkā 5, nor in the vṛtti thereon. Therefore, ‘anyā’ cannot refer to it. ‘anyā’ just means another variety, different from the two mentioned in the preceding kārīkā. ‘tu’ suggests that a new topic viz. ‘sāropā lakṣaṇā’ is commenced. Mammāṭa uses ‘tu’ in the sense of such suggestion several times in the tenth ullāsa. See kārīkā X. 6C, 10b, 14a, 15d, 34d, etc. Or, ‘tu’ may suggest that the divisions ‘upādāna’ and ‘lakṣaṇa’, which have been mentioned in the preceding kārīkā are possible in ‘śuddhā’ only and not in ‘gaṇa’. “śuddhaiva upādāna-lakṣaṇābhayaṃ bhidyate, na tu gaṇyā api iti ‘tu’-śabdārthaḥ”.

(6) Mammāṭa apparently did not hold Mukulabhaṭṭa in very great esteem. (We beg to differ.) We have already seen that he controverts Mukulabhaṭṭa's views in two places (= in case of gaur anuvandhyaḥ, and on Mukula's views on, "tatasthe lakṣaṇā śuddhā" etc.). In his treatment of lakṣaṇā he does not seem to follow Mukula. As a matter of fact, Mukula himself is not quite consistent in his classification of lakṣaṇā. In his kārīkās he begins by dividing lakṣaṇā in two ('śuddhopacāra-miśratvāt lakṣaṇā dvividhā matā) viz. 'śuddhā' and 'upacāramiśrā'. But in his vṛtti, on pp. 9 he says that lakṣaṇā is primarily three-fold (eṣā ca lakṣaṇā tri-skandhā). The classification given above is according to kārīkā. The classification according to his vṛtti, quoted above (on p. 300, Gadkar's Edn.) would be as follows :



Mammāṭa does not follow Mukula either in his two-fold primary division of lakṣaṇā into śuddhā and upacāra-miśra, or in his three fold primary division of the same into śuddhā, sāropā and sādhyavasānā. It is therefore not proper, to discover in Mammāṭa's words unintended implications so as to bring his classification of lakṣaṇā in line with Mukula's.

For these reasons, we think that the view of Māṇikyaçandra and Jayanta that Mammāṭa's classification of lakṣaṇā is the same as Mukula's can not be accepted."

Narahari Sarasvatīrtha in his Bālacittānurañjanī has the following remark : lakṣaṇeti. lakṣaṇā prayojana-lakṣaṇetyarthah. tena uktaprakāreṇa, anantarōktaṃ bhedacataṣṭayam eva pratiyate, katham ṣaḍvidhā iti āśaṅkya vyavahitaṃ bhedadvayaṃ smārayati ādyeti. tena ṣaḍbhedā upādānalakṣaṇā (lakṣaṇa-lakṣaṇā), gauna-sāropā, gauna-sādhyavasānā, śuddha-sāropā, śuddha-sādhyavasānā ceti. vyaṅgyarahitā rūḍhi-lakṣaṇā ekā. ukta-ṣaḍvidhā prayojana-lakṣaṇā gūḍhāgūḍhavyaṅgyatvena dvādaśa-vidhā. evaṃ lakṣaṇāyās trayodaśa-vidhatvaṃ darśayati." (p. 322, Edn. Nag. Pub., 95)

Narahari counts thirteen varieties of lakṣaṇā including the six varieties of prayojanavatī or one with motive which become twelve due to the concealed (i.e. gūḍha) suggested sense or the non-concealed suggested sense and the thirteenth is


the one based on usage and therefore which has no suggested sense. The six-fold classification goes as upādāna-lakṣaṇā, lakṣaṇa-lakṣaṇā, gaṇī sāropā and gaṇī-sādhya-vasanā, śuddhā-sāropā and śuddhā-sādhya-vasanā.

Ruyyaka in his saṃketa has not discussed this point but Māṇikyacandra's saṃketa has the following : "tena iti upasaṃhāre. ādyabhedābhyāṃ saha saṅkalanena ṣoḍhā. saṃkṣepenaivātra lakṣaṇā-vicāraḥ kṛtaḥ, vistareṇa tu mukulā"di-viracitābhidhā-mātrkā"di-granthebhyaḥ jñeyaḥ - Thus, Māṇikyacandra also cuts the discussion short, and refers it to Mukula.

Someśvara's saṃketa or Kāvyaḍarśa has a brief observation : (pp. 22, Edn. Parikh) - tena iti upasaṃhāre. ādyabhedābhyāṃ iti upādāna-lakṣaṇābhyāṃ sāropā-sādhya-vasanāyośca gaṇa-śuddhabhedāt pratyekaṃ dvaividhyaṃ iti. saṃkalane ṣoḍhā." Thus with upādāna and lakṣaṇa, and with gaṇa-and śuddha varieties each of sāropā and sādhya-vasanā, Someśvara counts six varieties.

The Viveka of Śrīdhara has - "ṣadvidheti. upādhi-saṃkalanam idam. tatrānantaram caturṇāṃ eva prakāraṇam abhidhānāt dūrāntaritam prakāra-dvayaṃ smāritam. ādyeti-upādāna lakṣaṇā-lakṣaṇa-lakṣaṇābhyāṃ saha iti. tad ayaṃ paramārthah - lakṣaṇādvayī rūḍhā ca arūḍhā ca. pratyekaṃ upādāna-lakṣaṇa-lakṣaṇa-lakṣaṇābhyāṃ catvāro bhedaḥ. tatrā'pi prabhidyā sāropa-sādhya-vasanābhyāṃ aṣtau. tatrā'pi sādṛśya-saṃbandhāntarābhyāṃ ṣoḍaśeti.

Thus Śrīdhara has sixteen varieties



So, for him the expression ṣad-vidhā points not to the six varieties only but to the basics of classification. This means rūḍhi, prayojana, upādāna, lakṣaṇa, sāropa

and sādhyavasāna are six basics which explain the expression sad-vidhā. Thus the base of classification is six-fold giving rise to sixteen varieties.

Dipikā of Jayanta-Bhaṭṭa has the following - ṣaḍbhir upādhibhī rūḍhi-prayojanópādāna-lakṣaṇā-āropa-adhyavasānair vidhāḥ prakārāḥ kalpanīyā asyā iti sadvidhā. na tu ṣaṭ-pakāra prakārāntara-sambhavasya pratipāditatvāt. bhidyate ābhyām iti bhedaḥ, upādānalakṣaṇe rūḍhi-prayojane-vā ādyaḥ bhedaḥ, tābhyām prakṛtābhyām āropā'dhyavasānābhyām prathamam uktatvāt tābhyām ādyabhedābhyām saha iti grantha-saṃgatiḥ -

Jayanta seems to follow Śrīdhara. He says that by sadvidhā it is not suggested that lakṣaṇā is six-fold only - na tu ṣaṭ-prakārā. But actually these six are the upādhis, the attributes, which are at the base of the classification of lakṣaṇā which are rūḍhi, prayojana, upādāna, lakṣaṇa, āropa and adhyavasāna.

The Kāvya-prakāśa - darpaṇa of Viśvanātha has the following : eṣāṇca ṣoḍaśānām lakṣaṇā bhedaṇām iha a-darśitāni udāharaṇāni mama Sāhityadarpaṇe avagantavyāni. -

sadvidhā iti. - rūḍhi - prayojana-upādāna-lakṣaṇa-āropa-adhyavasānair ṣaḍbhir upādhibhir dvidhā uktā. ṣoḍaśa-prakāra yasyāḥ sā sadvidhā na tu ṣaṭ-prakārā.

Viśvanātha also follows the lead of Śrīdhara and Jayanta, who as noted above take the six as the attributes or principles of classification. They do not take 'six' as the number of varieties, which for them is sixteen and not six.


Viśvanātha observes that illustrations which are not furnished by Mammaṭa have to be sought from his Sāhitya-darpaṇa. He also adds -

ādyabhedābhyām prathamóktópādhibhyām rūḍhi-prayojanābhyām saha, yad vā prathamam rūḍhi-prayojanābhyām sāmānyata uktam lakṣaṇādvayam bhidyate. ādya-bhedābhyām iti. bhedaḥ upādāna-lakṣaṇa - [lakṣita] lakṣaṇe. tābhyām saha iti grantha-saṃgatiḥ.

The Sāhitya-cūdāmaṇi of Bhaṭṭa Gopāla has -

nigamayati - lakṣaṇeti. - nanu sāropā sādhyavasānā iti dve gaṇau, dve ca śuddhe iti tāscatasraḥ, tat katham vā sadvidhyam iti atra āha-ādyeti. prāg uktau bhedaḥ upādāna-lakṣaṇa-lakṣaṇau tābhyām saha iti.

Thus, he follows the earlier pattern as suggested by Prof. Gajendragadkar.



The Saṃpradāyaprakāśinī of Śrī Vidyā Cakravartin has -

“atha lakṣaṇōpasamhārah. ‘lakṣaṇā tena’ iti vyavahitaṃ bheda-dvayaṃ smārayati, ādya-bhedābhyāṃ iti. upādāna-lakṣaṇā, lakṣaṇa-lakṣaṇā gaṇa-sārōpā, gaṇa-sādhyavasānā, śuddha-sārōpā, śuddha-sādhyavasānā ca iti. lakṣaṇā-praghaṭṭako’yaṃ asmābhir laghuṭīkāyaṃ vitatya vivecita iti tataḥ avadhāryaḥ. ihā’pi yathā yogaṃ uktaḥ.

Śrīvidyacakravarti also follows the lead of Sāhityacūḍamaṇi. He observes that he has discussed the topic of lakṣaṇā in greater details in his ‘laghuṭīkā’ but here also whatever is useful is discussed.

The Vistārikā of Śrī Vatsalañchana Bhaṭṭācārya has the following observation -

nanu sārōpādhyavasānāyor gaṇa-śuddhatā ca, tāvad upādānādiyogenā’pi bhedaṅtaraṃ sambhavati, tat katham nōdāhrtam ityata āha-lakṣaṇā tenēti. śaḍvidhā śaḍbhedaḥ, sārōpādānādaḥ upādānādyasamkarasya darśitatvāt.

nanu gaṇa-śuddhabhedena cāturvīdhye katham śaḍvidhyāṃ ity āha-ādyeṭi upādāna-lakṣaṇābhyāṃ saha ityārthaḥ-tayor eva ādyatvāt. na ca rūḍha-prayojane eva ādye, tayor lakṣaṇā-svarūpa-nirvāhakayor bhedaṭvābhāvāt.

He seems to follow the traditional line taking śaḍvidhā as six-fold. This approach was set in vogue by Narahari Sarasvatitīrtha.

Govinda Thakkura’s explanation in the Kāvyaṭīkā is seen above while quoting from Prof. A. B. Gajendragadkar. Govinda in Pradīpa reads as -

lakṣaṇā tena śaḍvidhā. - upādāna-lakṣaṇa-rūpaśuddha bhedaḥ saha. rūḍhi-prayojanābhyāṃ bhede sambhavatyapi na te vibhājakatvena ukte, kintu heturvena, iti na tatkr̥to bhedaḥ gaṇitaḥ ata eva ca paścād ‘vyāṅgyatvena rahitā’ ityādinā tatkr̥taṃ bhedaṃ darśayīṣyati. anyathā punarukti-prasaṅgāt. evaṃ ca yathokta-vyākhyānena śaḍvidhatve nirvyūḍhe yat ‘śaḍvidheri rūḍhi-prayojana-upādāna-lakṣaṇa-āropā-adhyavasānarūpāḥ śaḍbhiḥ upādhibhiḥ kalpitāḥ vidhāḥ

prakāra yasyām iti śadvidhā' iti caṇḍidāsa-vyākhyānam, tat, "śuddhaiva sā dvidhā. sāropā'nyā tu' iti 'eva-tu-śabdayor anālocana-vijṛmbhitatvād anādeyam." ādyabhedābhyām upādāna-lakṣaṇa-lakṣaṇā-bhyām ityarthah."

Govinda criticizes the trend of thought set by Caṇḍidāsa and others taking 'śadvidhā' as 'having six attributes'. He seems to follow Narahari's line of thinking which seems to accept 'śadvidhā' as 'śad-prakāra' i.e. six-fold. Thus there are two distinct approaches in interpreting the term 'śad-vidhā', and we are affraid, both are right !

Sudhāsāgara of Bhīmasena Dixit has :

"atra ca sphuṭā eva lakṣaṇāḥ. tena śadvidhā. ślokaś chandah. upādāna-lakṣaṇa-rūpa-śuddha-bhedābhyām saha. atropādāna lakṣaṇābhyām arthāntara-saṁkramita-aryanta-tiraskṛta-vācyau, vivakṣita-vācyā-dhvanibhedau gaunībhyām sāropā-sādhyavasānābhyām rūpakāṭīśayoktī, śuddhābhyām tābhyām hetvalaṁkāraṁ nirūpayiṣyati, iti śadvidha-nirūpaṇa-phalam iti dik."

He also takes śadvidhā as six-fold and tries to connect various varieties with various types of dhvani and various alaṁkāras as the case may be !

Jhalkikar, (pp. 54, ibid) has the following observation -

lakṣaṇām upasaṁharati-lakṣaṇeti - tena uktaprakāreṇa. śadvidhēti-śuddhā-gaunī-sāropā-sādhyavasānā-upādāna-lakṣaṇaiḥ śadbhedā ityarthah." Thus he seems to follow the line of Pradīpa and he likes to take 'śadvidhā' - as six-fold. Jhalkikar Continues -

nanu 'sāropā'nyā ru' ityādinā prabheda-catuṣṭayam eva uktaṁ atah katham śadvidhety ata āha-ādyabhedābhyām saha iti. upādāna-lakṣaṇā-lakṣaṇa-lakṣaṇābhyām saha ity arthah.

lakṣaṇā prathamato dvidvidhā, śuddhā-gaunī ca. śuddhā'pi punas' caturdhā. upādāna-lakṣaṇā, lakṣaṇa-lakṣaṇā, sāropā-sādhyavasānā ceti. gaunī api sāropā-sādhyavasānā ceti dvidvidheti śadvidheti bhāvaḥ.

vastutastu lakṣaṇā tāvad dvidvidhā. śuddhā gaunī ca. tatrā'dyā dvidvidhā. upādānalakṣaṇā-lakṣaṇa-lakṣaṇā ca iti. upādānalakṣaṇā-lakṣaṇa-lakṣaṇe api pratyekam sāropā-sādhyavasānā ceti dvidvidheti śuddhāyā bhedās catvāraḥ. gaunī tu dvēdhā. sāropā-sādhyavasānā ca.

tatrōpādānasāropā yatha 'kuntāḥ puruṣāḥ praviśanti' iti. upādāna-sādhyavasānā yathā "kuntāḥ praviśanti" iti. lakṣaṇa-sāropā yathā "āyur ghṛtam", iti. lakṣaṇa-sādhyavasānā yathā "āyur eva idam" iti, 'gaṅgāyām ghoṣa' iti ca. gauna-sāropā

yathā ‘gaurvāhikāḥ’ it. gaṇa-sādhyavasānā yathā ‘gaur ayam’ iti, iti pradīpadyotayoḥ spaṣṭam.

nanu śuddhatvā”dibhiḥ ṣaḍbhir upādhibhir lakṣaṇāyāḥ ṣaḍvidhatvopavarṇanam ayuktam nirūḍhātva-prayojanavattvaṃ ādāya aṣṭavidhatvasyā’pi sambhavād iti cet śrṇu -

nirūḍhā-prayojanavatī ceti prathamato lakṣaṇāyāḥ vibhāgaḥ. tataḥ prayojanavatyāḥ śuddhatvādy upādhibhiḥ ṣoḍhā vibhāga iti vibhakta-vibhāgo’yaṃ iti na anupapattiḥ. ‘lakṣaṇā tena ṣaḍvidhā’ iti atra lakṣaṇāpadam prayojanavatī yā lakṣaṇā tatparam iti narasiṃha-ṭhakkurā”di matam. vastutas tu rūḍhi-prayojanābhyāṃ bhedādhikeyaṃ tu nāsty eva tatkr̥tabhedasya iha anukteḥ. “vyaṅgyena rahitā rūḍhau” ityādinā 18 sūtrenāgre eva vaksyamānatvāt. yady api “rūḍhi-prayojanāt” ity anena rūḍhi-prayojane ukte tathā’pi na te vibhājakatvena ukte, kintu heturvena. anyathā punaruktiprasaṅgaḥ syād iti pradīpodyotayoḥ spaṣṭam.”

Ācārya Hemacandra, the author of Kāvyaṇuśāsana revives a forgotten or let us say forsaken tradition of taking ‘gaunī’ and ‘lakṣaṇa’ as independent word-powers, separate and distinct from each other. We had seen earlier how Bhoja had clubbed ‘gaunī’ and ‘lakṣaṇā’ as part of abhidhā. We will have to refer once again to Bhoja in brief because Hemacandra seems to come closer to Bhoja in his concepts of ‘gaunī’ and lakṣaṇā, though of course Bhoja did not give these two any status independent of abhidhā. Bhoja first of all enumerates 12 relations of word and sense.

Bhoja (pp. 223, Josyer Edn.) observes : “tatra abhidhā-vivakṣā-tātparya-pravibhāga-vyapekṣā-sāmarthya-anvaya-ekārthibhāva-doṣahāna, - guṇopādāna - alaṃkārayoga-rasa-aviyoga-rūpāḥ śabdārthayor dvādaśa samarthāḥ sāhityaṃ iti ucyate.”

teṣu śabdasya arthābhidhāyinī śaktir abhidhā. tayā svarupa iva abhidheye pravartamānaḥ śabdaḥ vṛtti-trayeṇa vartate, tās ca mukhyā, gaunī, lakṣaṇās tisraḥ. tatra sāksād avyavahitārthābhidhāyikā mukhyā gamyamāna-śauryā”diguṇayoga-vyavahitārthā gaunī. svārtha-avinābhūtārthāntaropalakṣaṇā tu lakṣaṇeti.”

Bhoja (pp. 226, ibid) continues - “gaunī dvidhā, guṇanimittā, upacāra-nimittā ca.

We have discussed these observations of Bhoja on an earlier occasion but here we will once again go through Bhoja’s writing for attempting a comparative study of Bhoja and Hemacandra. Bhoja’s abhidhā is ‘that power of word that expresses

meaning and is termed *abhidhā*; Now here '*śabdasya arthābhidhāyini śaktir*' can be one which directly expresses the meaning or indirectly also. When it directly expresses the meaning it is termed as '*mukhyā*' i.e. principal. Bhoja observes that a word operates in its meaning (this is strange, because we normally say that a meaning stays in a word) - "*svarūpe iva abhidheye pravartamānaḥ śabdaḥ*" - in three-fold way. Thus there are three functions-'*vr̥tti-traya*' of a word where in his '*mukhyā*' which directly and without any interference gives a meaning is the first sub-variety of '*abhidhā*', which is our normal *abhidhā* of the *ālaṃkārikas* of the Kashmir school, Abhinavagupta, Mammata and Hemacandra including.

Bhoja's '*gauṇī*' is peculiar. He observes : "*gamyamāna-śauryā*"di *guṇayoga-vyavahitārthā gauṇī*." So, for Bhoja '*gauṇī*' is that variety of *abhidhā* which has connection with a meaning which is '*gamyamāna*' - implied, and not *sākṣāt* - or directly connected. Again this meaning is of the nature of such qualities as '*śaurya*' i.e., bravery and the like. Thus this variety of *abhidhā* is connected with implied quality. Bhoja does not term it as subordinate but it is '*a-mukhyā*' in the sense that his *mukhyā* variety of *abhidhā* yields a direct meaning and his '*gauṇī*' yields *gamyamāna* i.e. implied meaning. On the other hand we will go to see that for Hemacandra and even for the earlier *Mīmāṃsā* thinking which talked of '*gauṇa*' function, '*gauṇī*' was a secondary function i.e. '*a-mukhya*' in the etymological sense, i.e. not-principal function. Again, Hemacandra's concepts of '*gauṇī*' and '*lakṣaṇā*' are not absolutely identical with those of Bhoja and this will be clear from the following discussion. But for the present we continue with Bhoja who observes : (pp. 226, *ibid*) : "*gauṇī dvidhā. guṇa-nimittā, upacāra-nimittā*."

Thus '*guṇa*' and '*upacāra*' are distinct entities with Bhoja. For the Kashmere tradition normally we have a division between *sādharmya-mūla* identification and *sādharmyetaramūla* i.e. *upacāra-mūla* identification. But Hemacandra, as we will go to analyse his concepts of *gauṇī* and *lakṣaṇā* does not base his classification on similarity i.e. *sādharmya* on non-similarity. He has some other base of distinction. So, his '*gauṇī*' thus viewed comes closer to that of Bhoja who has a '*guṇa-nimittā*' and '*upacāranimittā*' *gauṇī*. Bhoja observes that in his *gauṇī*, words are placed either in '*sāmānādhikaraṇya*' or '*vaiyadhikaraṇya*', and on account of the *viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣyabhāva* which is not understood otherwise - "*anyathā-anupapattyā*" there emerges a sort of relation between two words through implied and stated quality. This relationship which is promoted or caused by *guṇa* and hence is termed *guṇa-nimittā gauṇī*.

Bhoja explains ‘upacāra’ (pp. 229, *ibid*) as that state of things where someone else’s quality is superimposed on someone else. This ‘upacāra’ for Bhoja takes place at both the levels i.e. at mukhya and gaṇa level : “mukhyayā gaṇyā vā anya-viśeṣaṇasya sato’nyatra āropanaṃ upacārah.” “sā tu gaṇa-vyavahitārthatvāt gaṇī bhavati.” Qualities of say a solid substance, if superimposed on an abstract thing it is upacāra for Bhoja. Basically anya-dharmasya anyatra-āropana may be or may not be inspired by similarity. As noted above in ‘gaṇanimittā gaṇī’ two words either in sāmānādhikarāṇya or vaiyadhikarāṇya are brought together and there has to be established a relationship of viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣyabhāva, which as there is no other choice-anyathā anupapattyā-has to be substantiated through the qualities these two words convey, in one case implicitly conveyed and in the other directly conveyed. So, a sort of similarity between these qualities is expected by Bhoja. In upacāra there is no comparison but superimposition of say ‘A’s qualities on ‘B’. It may be noted that ‘B’ has nothing of it, or say, ‘B’, is incapable of having these qualities. Thus, in “bhavatu ruṣi kaṭhora, kiṃtu ramyā mrgāksī” or, in, “tālaiḥ śiṅjad-valaya-subhagaiḥ nartitaḥ kāntayā me” - the qualities of “kaṭhora” and “subhaga” go with a physical entity-mūrtimad-dravya and prāṇi-viśeṣa, but they are superimposed on anger (roṣa), and tinkling bangles (śiṅjad-valaya).

Now in this ‘upacāra’ the meaning is secondarily imposed and hence it is ‘upacāra-nimittā-gaṇī for Bhoja.

Lakṣaṇā for Bhoja is also two-fold viz. lakṣaṇā and lakṣita-lakṣaṇā. When for the realisation of meaning of a given word, on account of there being no other instrumentality available, a meaning indicates another meaning which is having a relation of ‘a-vinābhāva’, it is a case of lakṣaṇā which is six-fold. “taylor (i.e. between lakṣaṇā and lakṣita-lakṣaṇā)” yasyāṃ upātta-śabdasyārthasya kriyā-siddhau sādhanatvā’yogāt svārtho’vinābhūtam arthāntaraṃ vyavahitam eva lakṣayati sā lakṣaṇā, tadvyatiriktā tu vaksyamāṇā’neka-rūpā lakṣita-lakṣaṇā, iti. Bhoja says that the ‘arthāntara’ which is having a close-connection (= avinābhāva) such as closeness or sāmīpya, comes up in lakṣaṇā. The illustrations are ‘gaṅgāyāṃ ghoṣaḥ’, ‘mañicāḥ krośanti’ etc. Sāhacarya lakṣaṇā is seen in ‘kuntān praveśaya’, ‘chatrīṇo gacchanti’, etc. Bhoja’s concept of lakṣita-lakṣaṇā is hazy. It is certainly not lakṣaṇa mounted on lakṣaṇa - which is rejected by Mammaṭa. Whatever is not guided by sāmīpya, sāhacarya, saha-carita, hetu, tādārthya, and pariṇāma - is lakṣita-lakṣaṇā, which includes rūḍha-lakṣaṇā as in dvirepha-which is only abhidhā for Hemacandra, and pratika-lakṣaṇā, viruddha-lakṣaṇā, tad-anya-lakṣaṇā, prakīrṇa-lakṣaṇā etc. But for Hemacandra, ‘gaṇī’ and ‘lakṣaṇā’ are clearly distinct.

Hemacandra at Kā. Śā. I. 17 explains 'gauṇa' artha and at I. 18 explains 'lakṣya' artha and at Kā. Śā. I. 20 he enumerates the functions of a word. We will examine 'gauṇī' and 'lakṣaṇa' that tend to deliver 'gauṇa' and 'lakṣya' meanings respectively as follows.

Kā. Śā. I. 17 talks of 'gauṇa' meaning as : "mukhyārthabādhe, nimitte, prayojane ca bhedābhedābhyām āropito gauṇaḥ." This 'gauṇa' meaning for Hemacandra is caused when (i) primary meaning is contradicted, (ii) when there is 'prayojana' i.e. motive. This 'gauṇa' is superimposed either through non-identity or 'bheda', or through identity i.e. 'a-bheda'.

Hemacandra explains in his vṛtti - 'gaur vāhikāḥ', 'gaur evā'yam' ity ādau mukhyasya arthasya sāsna'dimattvā'deḥ pratyakṣā'dinā pramāṇena bādhe, nimitte ca sādṛśya-saṁbandhā'dau, prayojane ca sādṛśya-tādrūpya-pratīpatti-rūpe sati, āropya-āropa-viśayayor bhedābhedenā ca samāropito'tathābhūto'pi tathātvenā'dhyavasito, guṇebhya āyatatvād gauṇaḥ, tadviśayaḥ śabdo'pi gauṇaḥ, upacarita iti cōcyate."

This meaning and the word conveying this meaning are both designated as 'gauṇa'. It is also called 'upacarita'. The illustrations are 'gaur vāhikāḥ' and 'gaurevā'yam'. The first clearly mentions both 'gauḥ' the object superimposed, and the person - vāhika - The subject on whom the object is superimposed. Thus 'viśaya' and 'viśayin' are clearly mentioned - 'bhedenā'. In the other illustration only the 'viśayin' figures and so this is 'a-bhedenā āropa'. The direct meaning of 'gauḥ' - an animal having dewlap, etc. - is contradicted by direct perception or pratyakṣa-pramāṇa as we can see that 'vāhika' is a human being and not a bull. This superimposition is caused due to 'nimitta' - others call it tadyoga-in form of similarity in qualities possessed by both the vāhika and the bull. The qualities are those of dullness and stupidity. They are similar in both the viśaya and the viśayin. The motive is to suggest the extreme similarity or one-ness between the subject through 'guṇa' and is therefore termed 'gauṇa'. The relation was that of sādṛśya.

But when the relation is that of kārya-kāraṇa, i.e. anything other than sādṛśya, then also 'gauṇī' takes place, says Hemacandra. Thus kāryakāraṇabhāva is at the base of the illustration viz. 'āyur ghṛtam' (bhedenā) and 'āyur eva idam' (abhedenā); tādarthya is illustrated in 'indrāḥ', for 'indrārthā sthūṇā', sva-svāmibhāva is in, 'rājā' for rājākīyaḥ puruṣaḥ, or 'grāmaḥ' for 'grāma-svāmī', agramātre avayave 'agraḥ' etc. Here, it may be noted that we have all cases of

abhedena-āropaḥ as ‘viśaya’ is not separately mentioned. These illustrations are in a way dubious. This will be seen when we discuss Hemacandra’s ‘lakṣya’ artha and ‘lakṣaṇā vṛtti’.

Kā-Śā I. 18 says -

“mukhyārtha-saṃbadhas tattvena lakṣyamāṇo lakṣyaḥ.”

This means that the connected meaning which is indicated as identical with the primary meaning is called ‘lakṣya’. While in ‘gauṇī’ for Hemacandra there is superimposition of one object over another one either through complete identification i.e. a-bheda or through difference i.e. bheda, in ‘lakṣaṇā’ there is superimposition of ‘one meaning’ over ‘another meaning’ through a-bheda or complete identity only. The two meanings denote two objects but they are derived from one and the same word. Say for example “gaṅgāyāṃ ghoṣaḥ”, wherein there is identity between two objects viz. the current of the ‘gaṅgā’ and the bank of the gaṅgā. But these two objects are not separately or inseparately mentioned as in the case in ‘gaur vāhikaḥ’ or ‘gaur eva ayam’. From the word ‘gaṅgā’ these two are understood and there is superimposition, through absolute identity, of the meaning of the current of gaṅgā on the meaning of the bank of ‘gaṅgā’, both of which are expressed through one and the same word i.e. ‘gaṅgāyāṃ’. Hemacandra observes in his vṛtti - (pp. 45, Edn. Kulkarni & Parikh)

“mukhyārtho gaṅgādisabdānām srotāḥ-prabhṛtiḥ, tena sambaddhaḥ tatādir arthaḥ tattvena abhedena lakṣyamāṇo lakṣyaḥ. tattvena lakṣyamāṇa iti vacanād bhedābhedābhyāṃ āropita iti na vartate. śeṣaṃ tu gauṇa-lakṣaṇaṃ anuvartate eva. tadviśayo śabda lakṣakaḥ yathā-gaṅgāyāṃ ghoṣaḥ, kuntāḥ praviśanti. atra gaṅgāyāṃ ghoṣādhikaraṇatvasya, kuntānām praveśasya ca asaṃbhavāt mukhyārtha-bādhaḥ. sāmīpyaṃ sāhacaryaṃ ca nimittam. gaṅgātaṭa iti kuntavanta iti ca prayogāt yeśaṃ na tathā pratītiḥ teśaṃ pāvanatva-raudratvā”dīnām dharmānām tathā-pratipādanam prayojanam.”

Thus, the difference between gauṇī and lakṣaṇā for Hemacandra is that in gauṇī there is superimposition one object over another object; i.e. one thing over another thing. This is realised either through complete identification or through a state where both are separately mentioned. On the other hand in lakṣaṇā there is also superimposition. But it takes place at meaning level. There is superimposition of the meaning of something over the meaning of another thing but both are mentioned through one and the same word. Again this superimposition is through absolute identity, ‘gaṅgā-taṭa’ and ‘gaṅgā-pravāha’ are not separately mentioned as

in gaur-vāhikāḥ, but their meanings are identified through a common expression viz. 'gaṅgā'.

We observed that some illustrations of 'a-bhedena gaṇārtha' such as 'indrah'; 'takṣā', 'ādhakāḥ', 'raktaḥ', 'grāmaḥ', seem to be 'in a way dubious'. This is so because here also the meanings of two separate objects not directly and separately mentioned are taken as one. The colour is 'raktaḥ', the cloth is 'red cloth' or 'raktaḥ paṭaḥ', but only one word is used for two meanings. Even in lakṣaṇā this happens. Two meanings of two different words are identified through a common expression. Thus the sacrificial post for Indra is said to be Indra. This is gaṇī. But here also meanings indicated by an identical word are identified through complete identity - 'a-bhedena'. It would have been better if like Mammaṭa and many others Hemacandra also had mentioned 'gaṇī' as a subvariety of lakṣaṇā, based on similarity, the rest being śuddhā lakṣaṇā. Thus the classification of lakṣaṇā into gaṇī and śuddhā as presented by Mammaṭa seems more natural. Hemacandra's effort to distinguish between two śabda-vṛttis such as gaṇī and lakṣaṇā which for him are independent of each other, appears to be unnatural or acquired. May be Hemacandra was guided by one criterion. It can be this. In all illustrations of gaṇī of two varieties, the two objects were different from each other. In lakṣaṇā the object is the same but two things connected with the same object are identified e.g. 'ghoṣa' and 'pravāha' - both belong to gaṅgā. But this is also not applicable in kuntāḥ praviśanti. So, it seems there is no logic in his approach. He finally observes (pp. 46). "yatra ca vastvantare lakṣya iti-vastvantaram upacaryate sa gaṇaḥ arthaḥ, yatra tu na tathā sa vivekaḥ." The only point of difference is that in lakṣaṇā the meaning indicated is 'tattvena lakṣyamāṇaḥ', i.e. is indicated through identity, while in 'gaṇī' it is either through identity or through difference also i.e. 'bhedābhedena'. But the thin line demarketing "abhedena gaṇī" and "tattvena lakṣaṇā" remains undefined clearly. For Hemacandra himself says "śeṣam tu gaṇa-lakṣaṇam anuvartata eva." At the same time one thing, for sure, is clear that Hemacandra's 'gaṇī' is not the same as 'gaṇī' variety of lakṣaṇā as conceived by Mammaṭa.

Jayadeva, as seen earlier accepts three powers of a word and he treats vyañjanā first (VIIṭh Mayūkha) and then lakṣaṇā (IXṭh Mayūkha) and abhidhā (Xṭh mayūkha). These three functions are compared with the three currents of Gaṅgā at Candrāloka VII. 1. Jayadeva observes :

“vṛttibhedais tribhir yukṭā
 srotobhir iva jhāhnavī,
 bhārati bhāti gambhīrā,
 kuṭilā saralā kvacit.”

Lakṣaṇā then is termed ‘kuṭilā’. Ramā ṭīkā explains ‘kuṭilatva’ as : śakyārthasya tyāgena atyāgena arthāntara-pratīti-janakatvaṃ kuṭilatvaṃ - ‘kuṭilatva’ i.e. deviation is apprehension of another sense with the primary meaning being either left out or not left out. Jayadeva defines lakṣaṇā (IX. i) as -

“mukhyārthasyā’vivakṣāyāṃ
 pūrvā’rvācī ca rūḍhitāḥ,
 prayojanāc ca sambaddhaṃ
 vadantī lakṣaṇā matā.”

“When ‘mukhyārtha’ i.e. primary sense is not intended, lakṣaṇā is that power which yields a sense which is related (to the primary). It is either (rūḍhitāḥ) based on usage and is termed ‘pūrvā’ or is based on motive, and is called ‘arvācī’.

It may be noted here that Jayadeva lays down - “mukhyārthasya a-vivakṣā” as the basic condition of lakṣaṇā. This means that when the speaker’s intention is different from the one appearing from the primary sense, lakṣaṇā is resorted to. So, Jayadeva here seems to differ from the traditionally accepted thinking concerning lakṣaṇā which, according to Mammata and many others, takes ‘mukhyārtha-bādha’ i.e. contradiction of the primary sense as the basic condition of lakṣaṇā. Here Jayadeva seems to replace ‘mukhyārthabādha’ by ‘tātparyā-anupapatti’, as we had observed while treating the views of early Mīmāṃsakas though of course, there, in the Mīmāṃsā thinking ‘mukhyārtha-bādha’ was not totally ruled out. The Ramā commentary observes : “mukhyārthasya a-vivakṣāyā lakṣaṇābījatvaṃ vadatā mukhyārtha-bādhasya lakṣaṇā-bījatvaṃ nirastam.”

The ‘Paurṇamāsī’ (pp. 270, Edn. Chawkhamba Sk. Sr. - Varānasi - Haridas Skt. Granthamālā, ’64) observes : “anvayā’nupapattis tātparyā’nupapattis ceti dvau lakṣaṇāvakāśahetū prācīnā manyante. tanna. ‘kākebhyo rakṣyatāṃ annam’ ity atra anvayā’nupapater abhāvāt. tātparyā’nupapater eva ca kārya-siddheḥ.”

Dr. Trilokinath Dwivedi (Edn. Candrālōka, Bharatīya Vidyā Prakashan, Varanasi, Delhi, ’92) pp. 373 observes in his sanskrit commentary -

“mukhyas’ cāsāv artho mukhyārthaḥ vācakena śabdēna mukhyayā abhidhayā śakṛyā pratipādito’rtho mukhyārthaḥ. tasya avivakṣāyāṃ vastutātparyā’viśayī-

bhūtāyām, arthād yatra śabdasya mukhye arthe vaktus tātparityam na bhavati, api tu mukhyārtha-bhinne mukhyārthatāvaccchedakā'-tirikta-dharmāvacchinnatvarūpe'rthe eva vaktus tātparityam bhavati, idaṃ eva anyaiḥ mukhyārtha-bādha ity uktam. tātparityābhāva-rūpa-mukhyārthabādhe sati iti bhāvaḥ."

We do not agree. 'Tātparityābhāva' can never be equated with 'mukhyārtha-bādha', and 'intention of the speaker with reference to another sense' is not 'mukhyārtha'. It is clear.

The Ramā Tīkā explains that Jayadeva seems to accept 'mukhyārtha-bādha' or contradiction of the primary sense through 'anvaya-anupapatti' i.e. when the correlation of words in a sentence is damaged. But Jayadeva seems to take 'tātparityā'nupapatti' - 'not realizing the motive' as 'mukhyārtha-avivakṣā' i.e. 'lack of motive of (promoting) the primary sense'. Ramā observes that even though there is absence of anvaya-anupapatti - i.e. even when the correlation of words in a sentence does not suffer, in varieties (of dhvani) such as 'arthāntara-saṃkramitavācya' i.e. when the primary sense is merged in another meaning, there is tātparitya-anupapatti-non-realization of motive - in form of mukhyārtha-avivakṣā i.e. 'the primary sense being not intended'. Thus, only tātparitya-anupapatti or 'non-realization of motive' is to be taken as the basis of lakṣaṇā, i.e. 'lakṣaṇā-bijam'. Ramā observes that in all types of verbal cognition - i.e. in śabda-bodha-mātra', - there is no causality vested in tātparityajñāna or knowledge of motive. But only in "lākṣaṇika-śābdabodha" i.e. in verbal cognition of words charged with lakṣaṇā alone, there is requirement of the knowledge of motive, because it stands as a cause - "ata eva na śābdabodha-mātre tātparityajñānasya hetutā, kimtu lākṣaṇika-śābdabodha eva." (Ramā on Candrālōka IX. 1)

Jayadeva's two varieties of lakṣaṇā such as pūrvā and arvācī are respectively rūḍhi-mūlā and prayojanamūlā varieties only; observes Ramā :

"sā dvividhā, pūrvā arvācīnā ca. tayorḥ pūrvā nirūḍha-lakṣaṇā, prayojana-pratīty anuddeśikā; arvācīnā prayojanavatī, tātparitya-viśaya-prayojana-pratīty uddeśyikā ity arthaḥ." (on IX. 1)


Jayadeva (IX. 2) further classifies lakṣaṇā into -

"lakṣaṇīya-sva-śabdasya
mīlanā'mīlanād dvividhā,
lakṣaṇā, sā tridhā siddha-
sādhya-sādhyaṅgabhedataḥ."

When, the 'sva-śabda' of the implicit sense is mixed or not-mixed we have two-fold lakṣaṇā.

The idea is that when in a word which is lakṣyārtha-bodhaka i.e. one which gives the implicit sense the lakṣya-vācaka-pada is merged or not merged we get two varieties.

By 'lakṣaṇīya' is meant the meaning intended to be indicated by lakṣaṇā. Now the word giving that meaning is either merged or not merged. The idea is that at times in the indicated sense given by 'lakṣaka' word, the primary meaning of the lakṣaka is merged. Thus the indicative word totally leaves behind its primary sense and brings into light only the indicated sense. This is said to be lakṣaṇa-lakṣaṇā by others. At times the primary meaning continues along with the indicated sense. This is termed as upādāna-lakṣaṇā by others. Thus for Jayadeva the two are rūḍhi and prayojanavātī. Both these are again three-fold on account of siddha, sādhyā and sādhyāṅga-bhedas. Thus, for Jayadeva we have



Jayadeva further says (IX. 3) that the prayojana may be sphuṭa and asphuṭa. So we get a-gūḍha-vyaṅgyā and gūḍha-vyaṅgyā. The sphuṭa prayojana is tatastha and artha-gata, i.e. two-fold. Thus prayojanavātī is divided into tatastha-prayojanā and artha-gata-prayojanā. Similarly asphuṭa-vyaṅgya is also two-fold i.e. artha-niṣṭha

and tatastha. So, gūdhavyaṅgyā is also two-fold. (IX. 4a). Again artha-gata-sphuṭa and asphuṭa vyaṅgya is also either lakṣya-niṣṭha or lakṣaka-niṣṭha (IX. 4b) thus the prayojanavatī is 36-fold !

When sphuṭa-prayojana is in 'lakṣaka' we get one variety. While giving three more varieties Jayadeva takes note of 'a-sphuṭatva' etc. The prayojana is either a-sphuṭa, sphuṭa, or tatastha, giving rise to three-fold lakṣaṇā. Ramā observes further that, lakṣaṇā "which is different from śakti is four-fold" is intended here. As 'prayojana' is not apprehended by 'śakti', so lakṣaṇā has to be accepted as four-fold. This seems to be the ultimate idea.

Ramā (pp. 113, ibid) observes that in counting the varieties of lakṣaṇā in Jayadeva there is some irregularity either due to 'bhraṣṭa-pāṭha' i.e. corrupt reading, or due to pāṭha-bheda i.e. different reading. Even Paurṇamāsī also feels that the portion beginning with "a-sphuṭatvam" and ending with "sā caturvidhā" - is useless as it is additional and unnecessary. In short, even the commentators find the printed text difficult to explain.

Jayadeva has furnished illustrations of different varieties of lakṣaṇā. He has also indicated the various relations that are taken as the basis of lakṣaṇā i.e. "lakṣaṇā-bīja". The relations that make for lakṣaṇā bīja are 'ābhimukhya', 'sannidhi', 'ākāra-pratīti', kāryakāraṇa-bhāva, etc. Jayadeva observes :

ābhimukhyāt sannidhānāt
 rathā"kārapratītiḥ. (IX. 8b)
 kāryakāraṇabhāvāt sā
 vācyavācakabhāvataḥ,
 ity evaṃ ādeḥ sambandhāt
 kiñcānyasmāt catuṣṭayāt. (IX. 9)
 sādrśyāt samavāyāt-sā
 vaiparītyāt kriyānvayāt,
 sārōpā'dhyavasānā"khya
 gaṇa-śuddhe prthak prthak." (IX. 10)

After this Jayadeva talks about the accepted varieties of lakṣaṇā, furnishing almost the stock illustrations. He speaks of sārōpā, sādhyavasānā, these again are seen as gaṇī, and śuddhā. Two Varieties of śuddhā sārōpā and śuddhā sādhyavasānā are termed as upādāna-lakṣaṇā and arpaṇa-lakṣaṇā. Thus, for

him, prayojanavatī becomes six-fold. These are illustrated but not defined by Jayadeva.

After this Jayadeva gives some other varieties of the speciality-vaiśiṣṭya - of lakṣya and lakṣaka-padas. They are termed as viśeṣaṇavatī siddhā, and viśeṣaṇavatī sādhyā. The illustrations furnished are 'sarasaṃ kāvyam amṛtam', and "sā ca mūrtimatī ratiḥ". He also talks of varieties of lakṣaṇā based on 'ādhāra' i.e., substratum, for example in words, word-sense, vākyārtha, saṃkhyā, kāraka and in līṅga we find lakṣaṇā. This rather sounds funny. Or perhaps Jayadeva overdoes this under the influence of Ānandavardhana who read dhvani in sūp, tiṅ, vacana, sambandha, etc. (Dhv. II 16) and also Kuntaka who explained vakrokti in pada-pūrvārdha, pada-parārdha, vākya, etc.

Jayadeva observes in the end that a number of the varieties of lakṣaṇā are seen as the basis of many a alamkāra. He says :

śabde padārthe vākyārthe
saṃkhyāyām kārake tathā,
līṅge ceyam alamkāra-
ṅkura-bījatayā sthitā. (IX. 16).

Vaidyanātha in Ramā observes that the word 'alamkāra', is an 'upalakṣaṇa' and therefore even 'rasā"di' are covered by the same. Thus lakṣaṇā is at the root of rasā"di also, according to Jayadeva.

It may be noted that when Jayadeva, putting aside the current and accepted titles of the varieties of lakṣaṇā, floats new names such as 'pūrvā' and 'arvācī', perhaps either he is reviving an old forgotten tradition, or being a poet by temperament also, goes for these terms, which of course nobody of his successor accepted and promulgated. May be, at places, either through faulty reading-bhraṣṭa-pāṭha-or some inexplicable variant, Jayadeva looks clumsy, but he has explained lakṣaṇā with precision and beautiful illustrations. It is perhaps his treatment which inspires Viśvanātha to explain an 80-fold lakṣaṇā later. Perhaps a platform is built for the deep and thoughtful dilectics as seen in Appayya and Jagannātha later, through the efforts of Jayadeva.

Vidyādhara in his Ekāvalī, Unmeṣa II. Observes that lakṣaṇā is the function of a lākṣaṇika-word. He observes :

“śabdo'yaṃ lakṣaṇiko
vyāpāro lakṣaṇā bhaved yasya,
etallakṣaṇam asyāḥ
sāmānyaṃ lakṣyate pūrvam.” (Ekāvalī II. 4)

He proceeds,

‘mukhyārthā'nupapattau
tadyoge rūḍhito'thavā phalāt,
anyo'rtho yadi lakṣyo bhavati
tadā lakṣaṇā'bhimatā.” (II. 5, ibid)

“mukhyasya arthasya bādhaḥ, tena sambandhaḥ, prasiddhiḥ prayojanaṃ vā lakṣaṇāyāṃ upayujyate. tataś ca mukhyārthasya bādhe tenaiva sambandhe mukhyena arthena a-mukhyārtho yaḥ lakṣyate, sa āropitaḥ śabda-vyāpāraḥ, sāntarārtha-niṣṭho lakṣaṇā. tatra kuśala ity ādau rūḍhito lakṣaṇā, gaṅgāyāṃ ghoṣa ity ādau tu prayojanāt.

It may be noted that Vidyādhara uses the term “mukhyārthā-nupapattau” for ‘mukhyārtha-bādha’ which of course he mentions in his vṛtti. Again he resorts to the titles such as jahat-svārthā and a-jahat-svārthā and later observes that the same are termed lakṣaṇa-lakṣaṇā and upādāna-lakṣaṇā. Vidyādhara observes (II. 6, 7, Ekāvalī)-

“śabdōrpayati parārtham
yady ātmānaṃ tadā jahat-svārthā” (II. 6a)

... iyaṃ eva aprastutā”der alaṃkārasya bījam. iyaṃ tu lakṣaṇa-lakṣaṇeti parair abhidhīyate.

‘sā viparītā yasyāṃ
lakṣayati padaṃ sva-vācya-viparītam.” (II. 6B)
iyaṃ eva vyājastuter bījam.
“siddhi nija-kriyāyāḥ
kartuṃ yasyāṃ parasya śabdena,
ākṣepaḥ kriyate'sāv-
ajahat-svārthā samākhyātā.” (II. 7)

... iyaṃ eva samāsokty āder bījam. iyaṃ punar upādāna-lakṣaṇeti matāntare gīyate...

More important point Vidyādhara makes is that he talks of jahad-ajahad-variety of lakṣaṇā also. Dr. K. K. Raja (pp. 251, 252 *ibid*) mentions this variety as accepted by the vedāntins who want to explain passages such as, "tat tvam asi" etc. But Dr. Raja has not suggested that even Vidyādhara, a later ālamkārika also talks of this variety. Vidyādhara observes :

amśenaikena punar jahāti
na jahāti cānyena,
śabdaḥ svārthaṃ yadi
jahad-ajahat-svārthā samākhyātā. (Ekāvalī. II. 8)

The illustration given is beautiful. It reads as -

"yatkarṇatāla-prabhavaiḥ samīraiḥ
pratāpadīpāḥ śamitā ripūṇām,
śoṇam tava nyakkṛta-dikkarīndra-
līlāyito vīra kareṇurājaḥ."

He reads this variety in the expression "śoṇam" which he explains as - "śo'yaṃ'ityatra tattāmśe jahāti svārthaṃ idantāmśe tu na jahātīti' jahad-ajahat-svārthā iyaṃ".

The general impression is that Vidyādhara accepts Mammaṭa as his master. He also mentions sāropā lakṣaṇā which is both gaunī and śuddhā. In gaunī 'similarity prevails in form of super-imposition of qualities, while śuddhā is 'upacārayuktā', 'upacāra' being that identification which is not based on similarity in qualities. So śuddhā is sādṛśyetara-saṃbandha-mūlā, for Vidyādhara. This upacāra is five-fold. Vidyādhara observes : (pp. 70, *ibid*, under Ekāvalī. 2.8) - "śuddhā punar upacāravatī. ... upacāraśca kārya-kāraṇa-bhāvā"der nimittasya pāñcavidhyāt pāñcadhā bhavati. He mentions (i) kāryakāraṇabhāva, (ii) tādārthya (iii) svasvāmibhāva-saṃbandha (iv) avayavāvayavibhāva & (v) tātkarmya among the five-fold upacāras. He says (II. 10, pp. 72, 73 *ibid*) -

"ity asmābhir bhidāḥ sapta
lakṣaṇāyāḥ pradarśitāḥ,
saṃkareṇa tri-rūpeṇa
samsrṣṭyā caika-rūpayā (II. 10)

asyāḥ saṃkalaneniyōnyam
 astāvīmśatir īritāḥ,
 pañca-trimśat samākhyātāḥ
 śuddha-bhedaiḥ samam punaḥ." (II. 11)

Thus according to Vidyādhara, lakṣaṇā is basically seven-fold which multiples into 28 Varieties due to three-fold saṃkara and one type of saṃsr̥ṣṭi and if we add the seven śuddha varieties, we arrive at 35 varieties of lakṣaṇā.

Vidyānātha in his Pratāpa-rudra-yaśobhuṣaṇa, pp. 36 (Edn. S. Chandrasekhara Sastrigal, Madras, '14) observes :

"vācyārthā'nupapattyā tat-saṃbandhinyāropitaḥ śabda-vyāpāro lakṣaṇā" - Thus when the primary meaning is unacceptable lakṣaṇā operates as 'āropita', 'śabdavyāpāra' - with reference to the primary one. This function is 'āropita' in the sense in which Mammaṭa has called lakṣaṇā an "āropitā kriyā". The fact is that lakṣaṇā is not basically a śabda-vyāpāra but is an artha-vyāpāra and hence is described metaphorically as a function of a word. The Ratnāṇa of Kumāraswamin explains it as - (pp. 36, ibid) - "vācyārthā'nupapattyā mukhyārthā-bādhena hetunā, tatsaṃbandhini mukhyārtha-saṃbandhe viṣaye āropitaḥ śabdavyāpāro lakṣaṇety arthah. atra yady api svārtham prattyāya uparata-vyāpārasya śabdasya punar vyāpārāntara-ayogād artha eva lakṣakaḥ, iti arthavyāpāro lakṣaṇā tathā'pi vācyadharmo vācaka upacryate iti lakṣaṇāyāḥ śabdavṛttitva-vyavahāra iti vijñeyam."

He talks of jahallakṣaṇā and ajahallakṣaṇā, without defining the same. He provides illustrations. Then he enumerates sāropā lakṣaṇā with an illustration and a remark later such as (pp. 37, ibid) -

viṣaya-viṣayinor abhihitayor abheda-pratipattir āropaḥ. viṣaya-nigaraṇena abheda-pratipattir adhyavasāyah. - He illustrates sādhyavasāya lakṣaṇā also. Vidyānātha's lakṣaṇā is both sādṛśyanibandhanā and (sādṛśyetara) saṃbandhanibandhanā. These two are sub-divided into sāropā and sādhyavasānā. It may be noted that by and large Vidyānātha follows Mammaṭa but as he does not notice the two - i.e. sāropa & and sādhyavasānā as sub-varieties of śuddhā, he has four varieties of lakṣaṇā in place of Mammaṭa's six.

Viśvanātha in his Sāhityadarpaṇa meets out a fuller treatment of lakṣaṇā. He has tried to furnish a comparatively better definition of lakṣaṇā and has also counted 80-varieties of the same, thus furnishing a more scientific attempt at

classification. While defining lakṣaṇā, he has also tried to improve upon Mammata. In his Sāhityadarpaṇa II. 5, (pp. 35, Edn. with Lakṣmī ṭīkā, Chawkhamba, Skt. Samsthāna, Varanasi, '85, Ācārya Kṛṣṇamohan śāstri) -

Viśvanātha defines lakṣaṇā as -

“mukhyārthabādhe tadyukto
yayā'nyorthaḥ pratīyate,
rūḍheḥ prayojanād vā'sau
lakṣaṇā śaktir arpitā.” (S.D. II. 5) -

Lakṣmī (pp. 35, ibid) observes : “mukhyārthasya abhidheyārthasya bādhe, anvayā'nupapattigrahe, tādrūpyeṇa, tātparyāviśayatve vā sati, rūḍheḥ anādi-vṛddha-vyavahāra-prasiddhi-vaśāt, prayojanād uddeśya-viśeṣād vā, yayā śaktyā, tadyuktaḥ mukhyārtha-saṃbandha-yuktaḥ, anyah, mukhyārthatāvaccchedakā'tirikta-dharmāvacchinno'rthaḥ pratīyate, buddhyate, asau sā, arpitā āropitā, mukhyārtha-vyavahita-lakṣyārtha-viśayakatvād arvācīnaiḥ śabdeṣu kalpitā ity arthaḥ, śaktir vṛttiḥ, lakṣaṇā lakṣyate, jñāyate anyā iti tādrśī ucyate iti śeṣaḥ. tathā ca abhidheyārthā'nvayā'nupapattigraharve sati rūḍhi-prayojanānyatara-prayojya-mukhyārtha-saṃbandhavat tad atiriktārthe-pratipādaka-śaktitvam lakṣaṇātvam. kārikākṣareṇa tu, “yayā'nyorthaḥ pratīyate'sau lakṣaṇā” iti lakṣaṇāyā lakṣaṇam. mukhyārtha-bādhaḥ, mukhyārtha-yogaḥ, rūḍhi-prayojanānyatarac ceti trayam lakṣaṇāyā hetuḥ. ādyayor daṇḍa-cakrā”di-nyāyena militayor eva kāraṇatvam, rūḍhiprayojanayos tu tṛṇāraṇi-maṇi-nyāyena pratyekam eva kāraṇatvam.”

But we feel we cannot agree fully with Lakṣmī's observation, for, if 'yayā'nyorthaḥ pratīyate sā lakṣaṇā' is to be taken as the definition part, then, we are afraid, it can be made applicable to vyañjanā as well. Even the word 'arpitā' also cannot exclude vyañjanā. So, the whole, - along with the conditions such as 'mukhyārthabādhe tadyuktaḥ' and 'rūḍheḥ prayojanād vā', - has to be taken as definition. Roughly, of course, we can say that, “yayā'nyorthaḥ pratīyate” is the definition, the three nimitta-hetus are rūḍhi/prayojana, preceded by mukhyārthabādha and tad-yoga. 'arpitā śakti' is the description of lakṣaṇā. It cannot form part of the definition.

Viśvanātha goes to observe that 'mukhyārtha-bādha' i.e. the fact of the primary sense being contradicted is the first condition for lakṣaṇā i.e. secondary or metaphorical usage. When the primary sense becomes inapplicable, either there is lack of correlation i.e. 'anvayā'nupapatti' in a sentence, or there is tātparyā'nupapatti' i.e. non-realisation of the speaker's intention as in case of,

“kākebhyo dadhi rakṣyatām”. So, Viśvanātha includes ‘tātparyā’nupapatti’ also as condition of lakṣaṇā, but he subsumes it under ‘mukhyārtha-bādha’ itself.

It may be noted that some take ‘bādha’ to mean ‘tātparya-bādha’ only. For, if only ‘anvaya-bādha’ is held as the cause of lakṣaṇā, then instances such as “kākebhyo dadhi rakṣyatām” will cease to be illustrations of lakṣaṇā. In reality this condition of “tātparyā’nupatti” seems to be more basic to lakṣaṇā. Jayadeva has tried to bring home this point. Jagannātha, we will go to observe, has discussed this point in greater details. ‘Rucirā’ commentary on the Sāhitya-darpaṇa observes (pp. 43, ibid) that it has to be noted that anyathā’nupapatti i.e. saṃbandhā’nupapatti, meaning absence of apprehension, is either detected in form of ‘absence of direct relation’, or by ‘absence of gathering the intention i.e. ‘tātparyā’nupapatti’. Jīvānanda Vidyāsāgar, the author of Vimalā, a commentary on the Sāhitya-darpaṇa observes that, “it is because of this only that it is stated that lakṣaṇā is a ‘śākya-saṃbandha’ i.e. ‘relation with a meaning’ brought about by non-realisation of tātparya-i.e. ‘tātparyā’nupapatti’ - “anvayasya saṃbandhasya anupapattiḥ upapatti abhāvaḥ, sa ca kvacit sāksāt saṃbandhābhāva-mukhena, kvacit punaḥ tātparya-viśaya-gata-tayā vā iti bodhyam.” says Rucirā, (pp. 43).

At times ‘anvayabādha’ i.e. contradiction of correlation, as well as ‘tātparyabādha’ i.e. contradiction of motive-both these are seen together as, for example, in - “gaṅgāyām ghoṣaḥ”. It is clear that there is no correlation established. Again there is tātparya i.e. motive concerning the coolness and piousness of the hamlet. This is also important. Jīvānanda Vidyāsāgar observes in ‘Vimalā’ (pp. 37, ibid) - “ata eva āhuḥ, śākya-saṃbandhas tātparyā’nupapattitaḥ” and also - “tad āhuḥ-yadi vā anvayā’nupapattir, lakṣaṇābījaṃ syāt tadā ‘gaṅgāyām ghoṣaḥ ity ādau kvacid gaṅgādīpadānām nīrādau, kvacid ghoṣa’dīpadānām matsyādau lakṣaṇeti niyamo na syād iti.” If lack of correlation alone would be the cause of lakṣaṇā, says, Vimalā, then in case of ‘gaṅgāyām ghoṣaḥ’, there will be the contingency of taking ‘gaṅgā’ to mean the stream of water but ‘ghoṣa’ will be taken to mean ‘a big fish’. In that case the piousness and coolness of the hamlet, which is the motive, will not be realised. Thus, by ‘mukhyārtha-bādha’ both anvaya-bādha and tātparya-anupapatti must be understood. In the two basic divisions of lakṣaṇā viz. rūḍhi-mūlā and ‘prayojana-mūlā’, only in the first one, i.e. rūḍhimūlā there is only ‘anvayā’nupatti’ as there is no motive in it. But in prayojanavati variety there has to be ‘anupapatti’ or contradiction with reference to both i.e. correlation as well as motive.


If, observes Viśvanātha, ‘mukhyārthabādha’ is not held as the pre-condition of lakṣaṇā, then there will be overlapping-ativyāpti-of lakṣaṇā in instances of meanings collected through vyañjanā or suggestivity of words as in case of e.g. ‘rājati umā-vallabhah’. Then he explains the utility of the second condition viz. ‘tadyoga’. It is not proper if the secondary sense is having no connection at all with the primary sense. In the absence of ‘tad-yoga’, for example, we will have the apprehension of ‘yamunātata’ in place of ‘gaṅgātata’, from the word, say, “gaṅgāyām”. This is absurd. This way also there will be over-lapping - ativyāpti - of lakṣaṇā. It is precisely to do away with this contingency that Viśvanātha has placed the term ‘tad-yuktaḥ’ in the definition of lakṣaṇā. By this, the defect in Mammāṭa’s definition is removed and the definition sounds more scientific.

The third prerequisite of lakṣaṇā is that it is based either on ‘rūḍhi’ i.e. usage, or ‘prayojana’ i.e. motive. Even in the presence of ‘mukhyārthabādha’, and ‘tadyoga’, lakṣaṇā will be able to indicate a secondary sense other than the primary one only if it based either on usage or motive. It may be asked that the apprehension of motive is done through vyañjanā or suggestivity of words when the power of indication -i.e. lakṣaṇā is exhausted. In that case how can this ‘prayojana’ which is realized only after the power of indication or lakṣaṇā is over, be the ‘cause’ of lakṣaṇā ? To reply to this prima facie view, the commentator on the Sāhityadarpaṇa, Tarkavāgīśa observes in his ‘Vivṛti’ commentary that, “a-vācaka-śabda-prayogaḥ sa-prayojanakah, iti sāmānyataḥ prayojana-jñānād vā” - i.e. A sound which is a-vācaka i.e. having no dictionary meaning (say, for example blowing the horn of a vehical) is produced only with a motive (in one’s mind).” The horn is blown with a motive to suggest the people on road that a vehicle is arriving. The motive appears first in mind as a cause and the signal follows. Same is the case with lakṣaṇā which is practiced first with a motive already present in the mind, eventhough the motive itself is realized later through vyañjanā based on lakṣaṇā in case of ‘sāhitya’. Thus knowledge of ‘prayojana’ precedes the actual result. So, in lakṣaṇā the fact of there being a ‘prayojana’ precedes the actual process of lakṣaṇā. Many commentators tend to explain the use of fifth conjugation (= pañcamī vibhakti) in the word ‘prayojanāt’ as, “prayojanam uddīśya” i.e. “taking into consideration the motive”. But Udyotakāra (pp. 37, ibid) explains it as “prayojakābhisaṃdhi-pūrvakam”, i.e. “being connected with a motive”, i.e. “with reference to the motive”. From this point of view, a ‘prayojana’ or motive is the ‘prayojaka’ - sponsoring agency of the definition. Thus all the three i.e. “mukhyārthabādha, tadyoga, and rūḍhi or prayojana” - are unavoidable preconditions for

lakṣaṇā. The first two causes operate hand in hand through 'daṇḍa-cakra-nyāya', and the last one through "ṛṇāraṇi-maṇi-nyāya". Again this last condition suggests the basic two-fold classification of lakṣaṇā also. The term "anyóρθaḥ" should not be taken to mean "mukhyārtha-bhinnóρθaḥ". In this case the definition will be too broad as observed earlier and will take even vyañjanā in its fold. But by 'anyóρθaḥ' what is intended is "śakyatvāvacchedakātiriktadharmāvacchinnaṭva-rūpóρθaḥ". This is precisely 'lakṣyārtha'. If 'mukhyārtha-bhinna' is understood as the meaning of 'anyóρθaḥ', then in instances such as, 'kadali kadali', lakṣaṇā will not operate and thus the definition, will be too narrow. So, by 'anyóρθaḥ' should be understood "that meaning which is having the quality different from the quality of the primary sense."


By the term 'arpitā' is meant that lakṣaṇā is not a natural function of a word and hence it is said to be 'else than abhidhā' and therefore, "svābhāvīketarā" - or 'else than natural'. If some take abhidhā to be one created by God, "īśvarodbhāvitā", then lakṣaṇā, being artificial, is 'not' created by 'God', i.e. 'īśvarā'nudbhāvitā'. As the term 'arpitā' is merely a descriptive term, it may not be feared that due to calling lakṣaṇā as 'arpitā śaktiḥ', it will cover even vyañjanā in its fold !

Viśvanātha has carefully divided, lakṣaṇā into 80 varieties. This is not 'love for hair-splitting' as commented by some scholars, but it is scientific and clean thinking. The table showing 80 sub-divisions of lakṣaṇa runs as below :




The Prayojanavati has (32) varieties. When we add (8) varieties of rūḍhimulā we arrive at (40) varieties which, all of them are either (i) padagata or (ii) vākyagata, thus taking to (80) sub-divisions in total.

The (32) varieties of Prayojanavati are



and



All these 8 are two-fold, i.e. guḍha-vyaṅgyā and a-guḍha-vyaṅgyā. This makes for 16, which are again either (i) dharma-gatā or (ii) dharmi-gatā, making (32) in all. + 8 rūḍhimulā = 40. These are (i) pada-gatā or (ii) vākyagatā making a total of (80).

Keśavamīśra in his Alampkāra-śekhara, (pp. 9, Marīci III Edn. N. S. Bombay, '26) talks of lakṣaṇā as 'śakya-saṃbandhaḥ'. He observes that lakṣaṇā operates due to 'tātparyā'nupapattyā' and 'mukhyārtha'nupapattyā' - "sā ca tātparyā'nupapattyā mukhyārtha'nupapattyā vā pravartate." This is clearly Viśvanātha's influence. He gives an illustration such as, "nirmālyaṃ nayanaśriyaḥ" etc. The word 'nirmālya' is charged with lakṣaṇā. He does not go beyond this and is not interested in giving any classification. From this very brief delineation, it is clear that Keśava is not greatly in favour of 'only mukhyārtha-bādha' as the condition of lakṣaṇā. He also does not talk of 'either rūḍhi or prayojana' as the condition here. Perhaps for him the concept was so firmly and cleanly established that he does not care to discuss it in any detail.

Appayya Dixit has discussed the topic of śabda-vṛttis viz. - abhidhā, lakṣaṇā and also vyañjanā in his brilliant work named “Vṛtti-vārttika”, which unfortunately is available till day only upto the portion containing discussion on abhidhā and lakṣaṇā only. Though Appayya did recognize vyañjanā, the portion containing vyañjanā is not available. We will deal with his concept of lakṣaṇā as below :

For Dixit lakṣaṇā is that power of a word wherein, through the relation with the primary sense, the word becomes a conveyer (of meaning) : “sā ca mukhyārtha-saṁbandhena śabdasya pratipādakatvam” (pp. 50, Edn. Avasthi; Induprakāśana, Delhi, '77). It may be noted that for Dixit also lakṣaṇā is exactly the same as that defined by Mammata but the latter's definition is clearer and so also is Viśvanātha's. While Mammata has laid down three causes of the secondary function called lakṣaṇā i.e. indication, such as mukhyārtha-bādha, tad-yoga, and either rūdhi or prayojana remaining at the base, and all these three connected to one another through the daṇḍa-cakrā"di-nyāya i.e. analogy of the rod and the wheel (of a potter), Appayya on the other hand has not taken care to discuss mukhyārtha-bādha etc. - the factors being much debated by earlier authors. This means that he starts with the acceptance of these three basic factors which for him are clear to an advanced student.

Appayya Dixit, like Mammata, takes lakṣaṇā to be basically two-fold such as śuddhā and gaunī. He has denounced the opinion of those who hold 'gaunī' as an independent śabda-vṛtti. He believes that as in both lakṣaṇā as well as gaunī, the meaning apprehended is that only which is connected with the primary sense, it is futile to take these two vṛttis, i.e. gaunī and lakṣaṇā as separate and independent of each other as is done by Mukula and Hemacandra. He feels that this relation with the primary sense gives rise to a secondary sense in both these vṛttis, which therefore do not deserve independent reckoning : “atha lakṣaṇā nirṇīyate. sā ca mukhyārtha-saṁbandhena śabdasya pratipādakatvam. tat-sādrśyena pratipādakatvarūpā gaunī api lakṣaṇā-prabheda eva, tat-sadrśepi tannirūpita-sādrśyādhi-karaṇatva-paramparā-saṁbandha-sattvāt.” (pp. 50, ibid)

Mukula, as seen earlier accepts gaunī as an independent power of word, separate from lakṣaṇā. He is indebted to some Mīmāṃsaka thinkers for this approach. Kumārila, as seen earlier, observes :

“abhidhayāvinābhūta-
pratītir lakṣaṇocyate,
lakṣyamāṇa-guṇair yogāt
vṛtter iṣṭā tu gaṇatā.” (Tantravārttika I. IV. 22)

"Indication is said to be the cognition of what is connected with the primary sense. It is but desirable to admit the process to be qualitative on account of the connection (of the expressed sense, viz. bull) with the qualities of what is under indication." (Trans. R. C. Dwivedi, pp. 34, *ibid*)

For Mammāṭa *gauṇī* is a variety of *lakṣaṇā* in which 'upacāra' or metaphor takes place due to similarity, while in other variety of *lakṣaṇā* there is absence of this 'upacāra', based on similarity and hence is termed 'śuddhā'. Mukula was of the opinion that 'upacāra' is a broader term and it includes relations both based on similarity or any other factor else than similarity. Dixit accepts Mammāṭa's verdict while his predecessor and Mammāṭa's successor Hemacandra has a different attitude. We have seen above that Hemacandra accepts *gauṇī* as an independent śabda-śakti and the difference between *gauṇī* and *lakṣaṇā* for him is so thin that it is hardly traceable. For Hemacandra 'gauṇārtha' is that secondary meaning which is superimposed, either through identity or otherwise, when contradiction of primary sense, (*nimitta* i.e.) *tadyoga* and motive are (as causes). - "mukhyārthabādhe nimitte, prayojane ca, bhedābhedābhyam āropito gauṇaḥ." (Kā. śā. I. 17, pp. 44, Edn. 2nd, Prof. Parikh & Dr. Kulkarni, Bombay, '64).

Now this 'āropita' artha or superimposed sense is brought about by 'nimitta' i.e. 'tadyoga' or relation with the primary sense, such as "sādrśya-saṁbandhā" dau" - i.e. through the relation of similarity and others. This is for the apprehension of similarity or identity etc. This is the motive, or 'prayojana'. The crux of the point is that this superimposition is, "āropya-āropa-viśayayor bhedābhedena" i.e. through either identity or difference between the subject of superimposition and the object (*viśayin*) superimposed. Hemacandra independently of this 'gauṇa' meaning, also accepts 'lakṣyārtha' which is also connected with the primary sense (*mukhyārtha*) but is indicated through identity only. - "mukhyārtha-saṁbaddhas tattvena lakṣyamāṇo lakṣyaḥ." (Kā. Śā. I. 18). He says that by 'tattvena' is meant that it is not superimposed either through difference or identity (as in the case with *gauṇa* artha). The rest of *lakṣyārtha* is the same as *gauṇārtha*. "tattvena lakṣyamāṇa iti vacanād bhedābhedābhyam āropita iti na vartate. śeṣam tu gauṇa-lakṣaṇam anuvartata eva." (pp. 45, *ibid*. vṛtti on kā. śā. I. 18).

Though of course Hemacandra has not illustrated *sādrśya-mūlaka-lakṣyārtha*, but he has not ruled it out either. The illustration is 'gaṅgāyām ghoṣaḥ' in which both the meanings of 'gaṅgā-taṭa' and 'gaṅgā-pravāha' are in absolute identity (*tattvena*). But in case of 'gauṇa' meaning as illustrated by him in 'Indraḥ' for 'indrārthā sthūṇā', or in 'grāmaḥ' for 'grama-svāmī' - etc. the same thing appears viz.

(tattvena). Of course Hemacandra does mention, that in 'gaunārtha' both 'bhedā' and 'abheda' are seen, but the point is that how are we to distinguish between abheda-mūlaka gaunārtha and lakṣyārtha which is necessarily abheda-mūlaka. The only difference obvious is to believe 'gauṇa' as that meaning which is based on similarity of qualities. But then we arrive at a more logical presentation of Mammāṭa and Appayya who take superimposition based on similar qualities, i.e. sādṛśya as 'gaunī', a variety of lakṣaṇā, the other being sādṛśyētara-saṁbandha-mūlā 'śuddha' lakṣaṇā. So, Appayya is very right when, like Mammāṭa, he also observes that - "tat-sādṛśyena pratipādakatva-rūpā gauṇy api lakṣaṇā-prabheda eva." - i.e. as in case of śuddhā lakṣaṇā in gaunī also, because the meaning is apprehended through the primary meaning being discarded and through the relation of similarity, gaunī also has to be taken as a variety of lakṣaṇā, (over and above śuddhā).


Appaya further observes that the objector may argue that, in places such as, 'simho māṇavakaḥ', and 'gaur vāhikāḥ', there is no apprehension of the sādṛśya but in 'simha-sadrśaḥ māṇavakaḥ', there is apprehension of a similar object i.e. 'sadrśa' only, and in this case how can we call it 'sādṛśya-mūlaka-gaunī-lakṣaṇā' here ? The reply to this is that even in 'a similar object', i.e. 'sadrśa', the idea of similarity or 'sādṛśya' is inherent. Thus in the expression "Māṇavaka is similar to a lion or 'simhasadrśaḥ māṇavakaḥ', the similarity is also between 'simha' and 'māṇavaka', through paramparā or indirectly. The objector may argue that can such an indirect or 'paramparā' relation be taken as a cause in gaunī lakṣaṇā ? The answer is 'yes'. Appayya here cites an illustration. Between the eye and a pot there is 'pratyakṣa sannikarṣa' or direct relation, i.e. saṁyoga-saṁbandha. Now the 'neela-varṇa' or colour in the pot is related to eye through indirect relation or paramparā saṁbandha such as 'saṁyukta - samavāya-saṁbandha. Similarly in simha-sadrśamāṇavaka, the relation of sādṛśya is paramparā-siddha. Appayya Dixit observes : (pp. 50, ibid) : na hi, 'sākṣāt saṁbandhe viśiṣṭa-buddhi-yogya-saṁbandhe vā saty eva lakṣaṇā' iti niyamah, cakṣurāder ghaṭanailā"diṣu saṁyukta-samavāyā"divad-viśiṣṭa-buddhi-yogyasya paramparā-saṁbandhasyā'pi pratyāsattivōpapatteh."

Appayya Dixit also observes that in what he calls a vyatireka-lakṣaṇā also, such a paramparā relation i.e., indirect relation exists. In Instances such as, "upakṛtaṁ bahu tatra..." etc., the relation of opposition with reference to both the opponents is collected only indirectly. The objector may argue that as in case of an illustration viz. "daṇḍī devadattaḥ" i.e. 'Devadatta is having a staff' there is apprehension of a

qualified sense-*viśiṣṭa-buddhi*-such as ‘*daṇḍa-viśiṣṭa-devadatta*’ i.e. *devadatta* qualified by a staff, - in the same way there is no apprehension of such qualified sense - *viśiṣṭa-buddhi*-in case of *sādrśya* or similarity. For if there is cognition of such a qualified apprehension in ‘*siṃho devadattaḥ*’, then the words such as ‘*siṃhavān devadattaḥ*’ should have been used. But there is no such use. So, ‘*sādrśya*’ cannot be taken as causing a qualified cognition i.e. *viśiṣṭa-buddhi*.

Appayya refutes this argument in the following way - Through the indirect relation, i.e. *paramparā sambandha*, even *sādrśya* makes for a qualified cognition - i.e. *viśiṣṭa-buddhi*. Thus, in ‘*siṃho māṇavakaḥ*’, we can say that the similarity qualified by *siṃhatva* (i.e. *siṃhatva-viśiṣṭa-sādrśya*) qualifies on its part a similar object. *Māṇavaka* is non-different (*abhinna*) from such a qualified similar object. Dixit thus comes to the conclusion that though *sādrśya*-relation may not control the *viśiṣṭa-buddhi* or qualified cognition directly, but it causes such a cognition through *paramparā* i.e. indirect relation, which also is a relation in itself. *Lakṣaṇā* based on such a relation is therefore said to be *gauṇī-lakṣaṇā*. He observes : (pp. 50, *ibid*) - “...vyatireka-lakṣaṇā-sthale, tannirūpita-virodhā’dhikaraṇatvā”di-*paramparā-sambandha* - *mātreṇa tādrśena lakṣaṇā kṛptes*’ ca. *etena-’sādrśyam na sambandha iti gauṇī lakṣaṇāto bhinnā, viśiṣṭa-dhī-yogyasyaiva sambandhatvāt. saṃyoge sati-’daṇḍī devadatta’ itivat saty api sādrśye ‘siṃhavān devadattaḥ’ iti viśiṣṭabuddher adarśanāt*’, *iti nirastam; viśiṣṭa-buddhi-niyāmaka-paramparā-sambandha-mātrasya pratyāsattitvōpapatteḥ tāvatā lakṣaṇā-kṛptes*’ ca *darśitatvāt.*” - *tasmāt sādrśya-garbha-tad-anya-sambandha-nimittatayā gauṇī śuddhā ca iti lakṣaṇāyā eva dvaividhyam.*” (pp. 50, 51, *ibid*) -

Appayya Dixita then attempts the classification of *lakṣaṇā*. He basically gives nine varieties of *lakṣaṇā*. First of all *lakṣaṇā* is divided into *sādrśya-garbha*-(*gauṇī*) and *tad-anya* i.e. *śuddhā*. These two are again two-fold such as *nirūḍha-lakṣaṇā* and *phala-lakṣaṇā* (i.e. *prayojanavātī*). That which is based on *rūḍhi* or usage is ‘*nirūḍha-lakṣaṇā*’, while that based on motive i.e. ‘*prayojana*’ is *phala-lakṣaṇā*, which is defined as that, “which has a motive, the apprehension of a sense other than the primary one.” This *phala-lakṣaṇā* is sub-divided into seven varieties such as (i) *jahallakṣaṇā*, (ii) *a-jahallakṣaṇā*, (iii) *jahad-ajahallakṣaṇā*, (iv) *sāropā* (v) *sādhyaśāṇā* (vi) *śuddhā* and (vii) *gauṇī*. *Rūḍha-lakṣaṇā* is two-fold i.e. *śuddhā* and ‘*gauṇī*’. Thus Dixit gives a nine-fold classification against *Mammata*’s six-fold, though in case of the latter, commentators differ in explaining the term ‘*ṣaḍ-vidhā*’ as explained earlier. The table for Dixit’s varieties can be read as under :



expressive word gives a meaning different from its primary sense. But it can be argued against this, that there is no clear apprehension in jahallakṣaṇā of the fact that only some portion of the primary sense is to be left out while some other is to be carried forward. Again, in sentences such as ‘tat-tvam asi’, this third variety is accepted by tradition and therefore also it does not deserve any repudication.

Appayya Dixit has tried to establish ‘gaunī lakṣaṇā’ as a variety of lakṣaṇā with special arguments. This speaks of his logical thinking. He has also mentioned nine sub-divisions as against the six advanced by Mammaṭa. His establishment of jahad-ajahallakṣaṇā is also original. He has also contributed originally while discussing sārōpā and sādhyavasānā varieties.

In his Vṛtti-vārttika, in the very beginning he includes (śuddhā) sādhyavasānā variety in śuddhā jahallakṣaṇā. For him it is useless to take (śuddhā) sādhyavasānā as independent of and separate from (śuddhā) jahallakṣaṇā. The obvious reason behind this is that in both these varieties, the ‘lākṣaṇika pada’ - i.e. word charged with lakṣaṇā, gives up its primary meaning for apprehending some other sense. For example, in the illustration viz. ‘gaṅgāyāṃ ghoṣaḥ’, an instance of śuddhā-jahallakṣaṇā, the word ‘gaṅgā’ leaves its primary sense of ‘gaṅgā-pravāha’ or the stream of the gaṅgā, in order to convey ‘parārtha’ or some other sense in form of ‘gaṅgā-tāra’ or the bank of the gaṅgā. In the same way in śuddhā sādhyavasānā as in ‘ayaṃ rājā’, where on sighting a king’s officer, such a statement as, “Here is the king” is issued, the meaning viz. “king’s man/officer” i.e. ‘rājakiya-puruṣa’, is swallowed up. Thus in both śuddhā jahallakṣaṇā and ‘śuddhā sādhyavasānā’ variety, the primary sense i.e. svārtha is given up (= samarpita) for realizing another sense i.e. parārtha. Thus, for Dixit, śuddhā jahallakṣaṇā and śuddhā sādhyavasānā are identical with each other.

It may be asked here that when śuddhā sārōpā and śuddhā jahallakṣaṇā are held as different what harm is there in differentiating śuddhā sādhyavasānā and śuddhā jahallakṣaṇā also ? For this Appayya says that in both śuddhā sārōpā and śuddhā sādhyavasānā the fact of non-difference i.e. a-bheda is one and the same, due to samāna-vibhaktikṛtva i.e. apposition. But at the same time there is some speciality of this sort of a superimposition. This fact of speciality of superimposition distinguishes śuddhā sārōpā from śuddhā jahallakṣaṇā while there is no such distinction available with reference to superimposition that is taking place with both śuddhā sādhyavasānā and śuddhā jahallakṣaṇā. So the former should be included in the latter.

Again in writing off the variety called śuddhā sādhyavasānā Appayya argues that if someone holds that in śuddhā sādhyavasānā as illustrated by, “āyur eva idam”, there is the relation of cause and effect i.e. kārya-kāraṇa-sambandha, while in śuddhā jahallakṣaṇā, as in gaṅgāyām ghoṣaḥ, the relation is that of nearness i.e. sāmīpya-sambandha which is different from the kārya-kāraṇa-sambandha, this argument is not valid. For if the difference is with reference to the kārya-kāraṇa-relation, then due to such other relations as sva-svāmibhāva, tādārthya, tātkarmya, etc. also any number of varieties of lakṣaṇā will prop up and in this case our basic stand that (phalavatī) lakṣaṇā is seven-fold will be vitiated. Due to this also it is not advisable to accept difference between śuddhā sādhyavasānā and śuddhā jahallakṣaṇā. Appayya observes - (pp. 56-57, ibid) -

“atrēdaṃ pratibhāti. - ‘śuddhāsu sādhyavasāyabheda-kathanam ayuktam, parārtha-sva-samarpaṇasya a-viśeṣeṇa tasya jahallakṣaṇā’-natirekāt. na hi tad a-viśeṣēpi sārōpa-lakṣaṇāyām viśaya-vācaka-sāmānādhikarāṇya-kṛta-vaicitryāntaram asti, yena tad-vad eva jahallakṣaṇātaḥ prthag udāhriyeta.

nanu-‘kārya-kāraṇa-bhāva-sambandhena vṛttih ity ata eva prthaktvaṃ astu, kāryakāraṇa-bhāvātiriktena gaṅgā-tīrā”di-gata-samyogā”di-sambandhena vṛttau jahallakṣaṇā’ ity asaṃkaropapattēh’; - mā evam - ‘rājakīyaḥ puruṣo rājā’ ‘indrārthā sthūṇā indrah’, ‘a-takṣā’yam takṣā’, ‘agra-hasto’yam hastah’, iti sva-svāmibhāva-tādārthya-tātkarmya-avayavāvayavi-bhāveṣv api kārya-kāraṇa-bhāva iva sārōpā’dhyavasāya-lakṣaṇayor ākara-grantheṣu udāharaṇād, āśrayāśrayibhāva-sambandhe api alaṃkāra-sudhā-nidhau udāharaṇāc ca, vaicitryāntarābhāvēpi vidhāntaropagame sambandha-bhedāntaram avalambyāpi vidhāntaropavarṇanasya pratyākhyātum a-śakyatayā sapta-vidhatva-niyama-a-sāmañjasya-prasaṅgāc ca.”

Now, says Appayya Dixita, that if it is argued that in śuddhā sādhyavasānā the apprehension of suggested sense is preceded by that of identification, while it is not the case in śuddhā jahallakṣaṇā, and hence both are different on account of this speciality of suggested sense brought about by identification preceding it, then this also is not a sound argument. Appayya says that even in śuddhā jahallakṣaṇā also there is apprehension of suggested sense with the apprehension of identity preceding it. In ‘gaṅgāyām ghoṣaḥ’, only after the apprehension of identity between the stream-pravāha-of gaṅgā and the bank-taṭa-of gaṅgā, the phala in form of the suggestion of coolness and piousness is apprehended. For this Dixit has quoted illustrations from ‘Kāvya-saraṇī’, ‘kāvyā-prakāśa’ and also ‘Ratnākara’. It may be said, observes Prof. Dr. B. D. Pandya (Ref. Appayya Dixita, kavi ane ālaṃkārika - in Gujarati - pp. 216. doctoral thesis, published by Guj. Unī. ’74, Ahd.) that the

presentation of Dixitajee is ‘revolutionary and original’. But the fact is that Appayya’s views on lakṣaṇā also are challenged and almost blasted at so many places by Punditarāja Jagannātha and this is not taken care of by Dr. B. D. Pandya but nicely presented by Prof. P. Ramacandrudu in his “The Contribution of Panditarāja Jagannātha to Sanskrit Poetics” (Vol. I. Edn. Nirajana publishers Delhi - 7, ’83). This we will examine in due course.

For the present we will continue with Appayya Dixit, when he comes to discuss sāropā lakṣaṇā. The famous illustration of sāropā lakṣaṇā is, ‘mukhaṃ candraḥ’. Here ‘mukha’ is said to be ‘viśaya’ or ‘upameya’, and ‘candra’ is ‘viśayī’ or ‘upamāna’. The relation between these two is that of similarity i.e. sādṛśya-saṃbandha. On the basis of this relation it is imagined that ‘the face is itself the moon’. Thus identity is brought about between the two. This identification shows the relation of ‘tādrūpya’ between ‘mukha’ and ‘candra’. This relation of identity i.e. tādrūpya-saṃbandha is impossible to be established by the primary senses of ‘mukha’ and ‘candra’, because both these things are absolutely different from each other. So, to bring out the apprehension of identification, we have to resort to lakṣaṇā or indication with reference to ‘candra’, and through lakṣaṇā we have to arrive at a meaning viz. ‘candra-sadṛśa’ i.e. ‘similar to the moon’. The motive or prayojana behind this lakṣaṇā is to suggest the ‘tādrūpya’ abheda between ‘mukha’ and ‘candra’.

Now, Appayya holds that to begin with, in instances such as, ‘mukhaṃ candraḥ’, there is no need to resort to sāropā lakṣaṇā at all ! In Vṛttivārttika as well as in the portion on rūpaka alaṃkāra in his Citra-mīmāṃsā, he has vociferously argued to denounce sāropā lakṣaṇā in such cases. The gist of his argument is that the word ‘candra’ through its indicated sense of ‘candra-sadṛśa’ i.e. ‘similar to the moon’, is incapable of the expression of ‘mukhatva’, because ‘mukhatva’ can never be found to be present in ‘candra’. Even if you say that, the word ‘candra’ indicates the sense of one having kānti or beauty, through the sāmānya (i.e. class) in form of ‘kāntimattā’ or ‘the quality of having beauty’, the apprehension of tādrūpya or identity will not take place. Again, in ‘mukhaṃ candraḥ’, if it is said that there is scope for lakṣaṇā on account of similarity residing in the moon, then as this meaning of similarity is dawned, this illustration viz. ‘mukhaṃ candraḥ’, will have to be taken as an illustration of upamā i.e. simile. This being the situation in place of rūpaka alaṃkāra, the position of sāropā (gaunī) lakṣaṇā becomes impossible.

Again, in the illustration viz. ‘mukhaṃ candraḥ’, for the identification between the face and the moon, indication on the word candra giving the meaning candra-

sadrśa - i.e. 'similar to moon', is resorted to and the motive or prayojana here is said to be tadrūpya i.e. abhedha or identification between 'mukha' and 'candra'. The ancients hold that this 'tadrūpya' is the 'phala' i.e. 'prayojana', of lakṣaṇā here. But Dīxīt strongly objects to this 'phala' or 'prayojana' also. Appayya observes : (pp. 61, ibid) - "tasmāt sārōpa-lakṣaṇōdāharaṇeṣu sādharāṇa-dharmā"di-mukena lakṣaṇā' ity uktam. tathā-'tadrūpya-pratītir atra phalam' ity api uktam. sāmānya-dharma-mukhena sādṛśyamukhena vā lakṣaṇopagame tadrūpyābhividyakty ayogāt, tathā hi 'kāntiman mukham', 'candra-sadrśam mukham', ity ādir arthaḥ sampadyate.

Appayya has also objected to Mammata's illustration of śliṣṭa-paramparita-rūpaka, such as 'vidvan-mānasa-haṁsa.' etc. in which according to Mammata lakṣaṇā is resorted to. Appayya is of the opinion that in the illustration viz. 'vidvan mānasahaṁsa...' etc., according to the ancients there is at the first stage, sārōpā lakṣaṇā due to sādṛśya or similarity in form of 'mānasa-vāsitva', i.e. staying in 'mānasa' (i.e. both mind and mānasa-lake). Then according to the ancients at the next step, when identification between the swan and the king is realized there is the figure of speech called 'rūpaka' i.e. metaphor. Here while realizing the metaphor of the swan in the king, in this illustration, viz. vidvan-mānasa-haṁsa. etc., first comes the śleṣa i.e. paronomasia in form of "mānasa is mānasa" - 'mānasam eva mānasam'. This śleṣa gives two meanings of the word 'mānasa'. Thus here similarity is based on śleṣa. Without the realisation of this śleṣa, the similarity in form, of 'stay in mānasa' or 'mānasa-vāsitva', can not be realized. And so the rūpaka based on this realization also becomes impossible.

But Appayya opposes this view of the ancients. He is of the opinion that in the illustration viz. vidvanmānasa, there is no sequence such as first comes śleṣa and next comes rūpaka. Here, actually the rūpaka takes place first, because the word 'mānasa' itself, through the medium of rūpaka or metaphor, is able to suggest the motive or intention of the poet. Thus in the apprehension of śleṣa through the agency of rūpaka, śleṣa comes later than rūpaka, thus it cannot be accepted that śleṣa is either instrumental in bringing about rūpaka or in that of the similarity which is at the base of lakṣaṇā : tallaṁbhakasya śleṣasya rūpakōtthāpyatayā rūpakā"pekṣa-lakṣaṇā-daśāyām tasya buddhipathānārohaṭ. - (pp. 62, ibid),

To substantiate his view Appayya quotes from ācārya named Cakravartī.

"rūpakam pūrva-saṁsiddham

śleṣam tajjñāpayed yadi,

tadā rūpakam eva syāt

anyathā śleṣa ucyate." [alaṁkāra-sarvasva-nikṛṣṭārtha kārīka - 21]

- iti śleṣa-rūpakayor vibhāgaṃ vyavasthāpitavatā cakravartinā'py asminnudāharaṇe rūpakopavarṇanena'tra śleṣa-pāścāttiyasya sphuṭikaraṇāc ca.” (pp. 62, ibid)

In the illustration viz. “vidvan-mānasa.” etc., there is no requirement of resorting to lakṣaṇā to realize the identity between ‘rājā’ and ‘haṃsa’ i.e. the king and the swan, because it takes place through ‘saṃsarga-maryādā’ or apposition i.e. ‘sāmānādhikarāṇya’ itself. There is a rule that if two ‘nāmārthas’ - names have come together, they are correlated through the relation of identity only. Following this rule, the two words such as ‘rājā’ and ‘haṃsa’ which are placed in the same case (i.e. vibhakti), have their abheda-or identity realized through apposition or vākyaṛtha itself and hence there is no need to resort to ‘sāropā lakṣaṇā’. Appayya observes - (pp. 62, ibid) : “atra idam tattvaṃ, - ‘vidvan’-mānasa-haṃsa’. - ityādaḥ ‘haṃsā’di padānāṃ varṇye rājani lakṣaṇā nā'ngīkartavyā, sāmānādhikarāṇyena varṇyasya rājñah prasiddha-haṃsa-jātiyā”dibhir abhedasya vākyaṛtha-vidhayaiva pratīty upapatteḥ.” If it is argued against this that let there be identity-abheda-realized between ‘rājā’ and ‘haṃsa’, but the apprehension of ‘tādrūpya’ or identity based on similarity or sādrīya also cannot be prevented which occurs to the aesthetes. So, lakṣaṇā is a necessity here. To this Dixit’s reply follows like this. Rūpaka takes place, at places of apposition even where there is intention of mere identity. He quotes a verse from Varadarāja-stava to illustrate this point. The verse is, “ūrdhvaṃ viriñcibhavanāt tava nābhi-padmāt...” etc. In this verse, observes Appayya that, in the intention of conveying identity between “uraḥ-sthala” the viṣaya and ‘paramaṃ padam’ the viṣayī, their similarity-tādrūpya-is underscored. And yet there is ‘rūpaka’ here, and that only identity-abheda-is intended by the poet is brought out by the words ‘eva’ and ‘sākṣāt’. Now here, if there is apprehension of ‘abheda’ or identity then, on the strength of the fact that rūpaka takes place due to similarity - i.e. tādrūpye rūpakam’, or that rūpaka takes place when there is apposition between the viṣaya and the viṣayin - “viṣaya-viṣayi-sāmānādhikarāṇya-sthale rūpakam” - then here we will have rūpaka. The ancients also think that, when there is apprehension of identity there is ‘atīśayokti’ - “abhede atīśayoktiḥ”, i.e. “viṣyabhedā-mātra-nirdeśa-sthale atīśayoktiḥ”, i.e. atīśayokti takes place when there is delineation of only the identity of viṣayī. So, in that case, in the illustration viz. “vidvan-mānasa-haṃsa”, etc., as abheda or (total nigaraṇa) is seen between viṣayin-haṃsa and viṣaya-rājā, we will have to go for atīśayokti here. But Dixit first of all finds fault with the observation of the ancients itself. For, according to this rule, we will start apprehending ‘atīśayokti’ in the illustration of rūpaka, such

as 'vidvan-mānasa'. etc., as there is only identity between 'haṃsa' and 'rājā' and there is no 'tādrūpya' or similarity observed. So, to denounce the belief of the ancients concerning the difference between rūpaka and atīśayokti, Appayya cites the illustration viz. "hr̥tpañkajāni." etc. The meaning of this illustration is this - "O lord, the light - jyotsnā - (of the form of lustre of your nails) oozing out from the moon in form of your nails, acquires another nature as it blossoms the lotuses in form of the hearts of your devotees, and it dries up the ocean in form of worldly existence." In this illustration the viṣayi-pada in form of 'jyotsnā' completely swallows up - (nigaraṇa) the viṣaya-in form of nakha-kānti i.e. lustre of the nails - and hence there should be atīśayokti in this illustration. But the ancients believe that there is rūpaka when there is similarity - 'tādrūpye rūpakam' and there is 'atīśayokti' when there is (total) identity, 'abhede-atīśayoktiḥ : Here, even if there is mentioning of only 'jyotsnā' which is a viṣayi-pada, this 'jyotsnā' or moon-light is special as it blossoms the lotuses and hence this viṣayin jyotsnā is different from nakha-kāntin-the luster of the nails, which is 'viṣaya' here. So, we will acquire apprehension of similarity or 'tādrūpya' between the two and hence there will be realization of 'rūpaka' here. So, it is advisable, argues Dixit, to dispense with the view of the ancients taking "tādrūpye rūpakam", and "abhede'tīśayoktiḥ". We should go for a new belief. Appayya here suggests this new arrangement such as - "viṣaya-viṣayi-pada-asāmānādhikarāṇye rūpakam" - i.e. rūpaka takes place when viṣaya-pada and viṣayi-pada are clearly mentioned as separate entities. And, when there is mentioning of only the viṣayi-pada, there is atīśayokti - "viṣayimātra-nirdeśe atīśayoktiḥ". If we accept this new arrangement there will not be any mix-up, because in the illustration viz. "vidvanmānasa." etc. as there is separate mentioning of 'rājā' and 'haṃsa' clearly, it is a case for rūpaka, and in "jyotsnā tvad-aṅghri." etc. only the viṣayi-pada, viz. 'jyotsnā' is clearly mentioned, it is a case for atīśayokti only. Says he, (pp. 63, ibid) : "tathā ca, yadi 'tādrūpye rūpakam, abhede'tīśayoktiḥ', iti vyavasthāṃ parityajya 'viṣaya-viṣayi-pada-sāmānādhikarāṇye rūpakam, viṣayī-pada-mātra-nirdeśe'tīśayoktiḥ' iti vyavasthā ādriyate, tadā, "vidvan-mānasa-haṃsa." ityādaḥ abheda-pratitau satyām api rūpakam sambhavati iti na kācid anupapattiḥ."

Thus in case of rūpaka, Appayya has established a new norm in dispensing with sārōpā lakṣaṇā, and also in rejecting the belief of the ancients that we have 'tādrūpye rūpakam' i.e., rūpaka in case of tādrūpya, and 'abhede-atīśayoktiḥ'.

With this we come to the end of Appayya's treatment of lakṣaṇā. Jagannātha (R.G. pp. 464, Edn. Prof. Athavale, ibid) observes : "atha keyaṃ lakṣaṇā,

yanmūlaścaramaṃ nirūpito dhvaniḥ, ucyate, śakya-sambandho lakṣaṇā.” i.e. what is the form of lakṣaṇā based on which is enumerated dhvani which is lakṣaṇāmūla ? It is said, “The relation of the primary sense with other sense is lakṣaṇā i.e. indication.” Here ‘śakyārtha’ is itself ‘mukhyārtha’ or vācyārtha.

We have seen earlier that the Vaiyākaraṇas, Mīmāṃsakas and Naiyāyikas also discuss lakṣaṇā and the ālaṃkārikas also hold their own position in this case. As observed earlier, it was Mukula, so far as available written documents go, the first among ālaṃkārikas who dealt with the topic of śabda-vṛttis seriously and Mammaṭa followed him in this respect. Though without dealing with the topic of śabda-vṛttis separately Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta also have considered this topic. Mammaṭa is followed in this respect later by almost all ālaṃkārikas beginning with Hemacandra down to Viśvanāthā, but Appayya and now Jagannātha have a special word on lakṣaṇā.

We have seen that many vaiyākaraṇas have accepted lakṣaṇā as a separate śabda-vṛtti, but there are some who take it only as an aspect of abhidhā, as done by Mukula. Kaunḍa Bhatta - the author of Vaiyākaraṇa-bhūṣaṇa-sāra is thus against lakṣaṇā to be reckoned as a separate and independent śabda-vṛtti. It is only an aspect, or an extension of abhidhā for him. But majority of the grammarians are in favour of accepting lakṣaṇā as an independent word-power as is evident from Nāgeśa’s Vaiyākaraṇa Laghu-Mañjuṣā (pp. 94-133), where he finally takes up a stand in favour of lakṣaṇā defining it as - ‘śakyatāvacchedakarūpā. (pp. 112).

The Naiyāyikas take lakṣaṇā as ‘śakya-sambandha’ (see Muktāvalī, pp. 3-5) and Jagannātha seems to follow this. Jagannātha observes : “tasyāśca arthopasthāpakatve mukhyārthatāvacchedake tātparyaviśayānvayitāvacchedakatāyā abhāvo na tantram. śakyatāvacchedaka-rūpeṇa lakṣyabhānasya svikārāt. kimtu tātparya-viśayānvaye mukhyārthatāvacchedaka-rūpeṇa mukhyārtha-pratīyogikatāyā abhāvo rūdhi-prayojanāyor anyatarac ca tantram. mukhyārthānvayā-‘nupapatteḥ tantratve tu, ‘kākebhyo dadhī rakṣyatām’ ity atra lakṣaṇotthānaṃ na syāt. ‘gaṅgāyāṃ ghoṣaḥ’ ity atra sāmīpyam, ‘mukhaṃ candraḥ’, ity ādau sādṛśyam, vyatireka-lakṣaṇāyāṃ virodhaḥ, ‘āyur ghṛtaṃ’ ity ādau kāraṇatvādayas’ca sambandhā yathā yogaṃ lakṣaṇā-śarīrāṇi.” (pp. 464, R. G. Edn. ibid) -

Through lakṣaṇā we arrive at lakṣyārtha, a secondary sense, which is other than the primary sense. But here the reason is not this that the quality of speciality of the primary sense i.e. mukhyārtha avacchedaka dharma - is not present in the correlation (anvaya) with lakṣyārtha or the secondary sense, which is the object of

the motive - 'tātparya-viṣayānvayitā'vacchedakatāyā abhāvaḥ na tantram'. - because lakṣyārtha or secondary sense is realized through the avacchedaka dharma of the primary sense or through the form of the avacchedaka-dharma. This is accepted by all.

We will try to make this clear as follows. We have observed that Jagannātha following the Naiyāyikas, and also the Vedāntins, defines lakṣaṇā very simply as, 'śakya-saṃbandho lakṣaṇā'. The Saralā commentary (pp. 185, R.G.) explains it as an expression, by a word, of a secondary sense, as is related to the primary sense. As Prof. Athavale explains, (pp. 486, ibid) in instances like 'gaṅgāyām ghoṣaḥ' the primary meaning of 'gaṅgāyām' i.e. on the stream of gaṅgā, is inapplicable and hence we have to resort to another meaning such as, 'on the bank of gaṅgā'. The primary meaning of 'stream of Gaṅgā' is discarded but there is some relation of the primary sense with the newly accepted meaning of 'the bank of Gaṅga.' If there is no relation whatsoever between these two senses, then any meaning will start to flow from the word 'gaṅgāyām'. Thus the unavoidable condition for resorting to lakṣaṇā is to show some relation between the primary sense and the secondary sense. Thus, Jagannātha terms such fixed relation only as lakṣaṇā. In this illustration this relation is that of nearness or 'sāmīpya'. Such other relations are also possible between the primary and the secondary sense.

Now there is a subtle point to be considered. The point is whether, over and above such relations as sāmīpya etc., is there any relation absolutely common to all, between the primary sense and the secondary sense ? With regard to this, there are two views, which may be put as follows : Some are of the opinion that - between the primary and the secondary sense there is no other relation beyond those such as sāmīpya, etc., which are wellknown. The primary sense is completely negated and in its place the secondary sense is resorted to. The special dharma or quality - avacchedaka dharma - of the primary sense is not seen at all in this new secondary sense. Thus it is in fitness of things when there is no relation between the special quality of the primary sense with the secondary sense, the relations between the primary and the secondary senses must be totally different. This view is held by earlier ālamkārikas.

Jagannātha holds the view held by Mammaṭa, which forms the second opinion. This view believes that it is not necessary that the special characteristics - avacchedaka darma - of the mukhyārtha and the lakṣyārtha have got to be necessarily different. It is not so that the avacchedaka-dharma of the primary sense

is never observed in the secondary sense. On the contrary, this view holds that the special characteristic of the mukhyārtha and that of the lakṣyārtha should be one and the same. This means that there should be a relation of identity - abheda-saṃbandha-between these two. Mammaṭa and the like hold that between, mukhyārtha and lakṣyārtha there is no ‘bheda-rūpa-tāsthya’ - i.e. difference. Jagannātha observes : “śakyatāvacchedaka-rūpeṇa lakṣyabhānasya svikārāt.” He further adds - “kiṃ tu, tātparya-viśayānvaye mukhyārthatāvacchedaka-rūpeṇa mukhyārtha-pratiyogikatāyā abhāvo rūdhi-prayojanayor anyatarac ca tantram. mukhyārthānvayā’nupapatteḥ tantratve tu ‘kākebhyo dadhi rakṣyatām’ ity atra lakṣaṇōtthānam na syāt. ‘gaṅgāyām ghoṣaḥ’ ity atra sāmīpyam, ‘mukha-candraḥ’, ity ādau sādrśyam, vyatireka-lakṣaṇāyām virodhaḥ, ‘āyur ghṛtam’ ity ādau kāraṇatvā”dayasca saṃbandhā yathāyogaṃ lakṣaṇā-śarīrāṇi.”

When the earlier ālamkārikas counted the sāmīpya, sādrśya and other relations, they held that these relations are of the form of non-identity or ‘bheda’. For them, between the mukhyārtha viz. ‘stream of Gaṅgā’ and the lakṣyārtha viz. ‘the bank of Gaṅgā’, the relation was only of nearness i.e. sāmīpya. Mammaṭa pointed out a mistake in this view that if this bheda-saṃbandha is held in sāmīpya etc., the qualities of coolness - śaitya - and piousness i.e. pāvanatva will not appear in the bank while the chief purpose of lakṣaṇā is to make one apprehend these qualities in the bank also. Thus, it is inevitable to accept, in any variety of lakṣaṇā, this relation of non-distinction or a-bheda between the primary and the secondary senses. If the apprehension of śaitya and pāvanatva does not occur in the bank through lakṣaṇā, then the whole process becomes futile, as the speaker can use a sentence such as “gaṅgātīre ghoṣaḥ”, in place of ‘gaṅgāyām ghoṣaḥ’. But one resorts to lakṣaṇā only with a special motive in mind and in this case it is the apprehension of śaitya and pāvanatva and this motive can not be realized without accepting non-distinction i.e. ‘a-bheda’ between mukhyārtha and lakṣyārtha.

Though Jagannātha has not pointedly criticized Hemacandra here, but this discussion explains the futility of holding ‘gauṇī’ as a separate vṛtti from lakṣaṇā, for in the latter, i.e. in lakṣaṇā for Hemacandra the relation between the two senses is that of absolute identity, ‘tattvena’, while in the former i.e. gauṇī, it is through ‘bheda’ and ‘a-bheda’. Hemacandra’s thinking and therefore his keeping ‘gauṇī’ as a separate word-power, distinct from lakṣaṇā, are both faulty.

It so happens that in some instances of lakṣaṇā there is absence of a motive. This is termed rūdhi-lakṣaṇā, or one based on popular usage, for example the word, ‘kuśala’ primarily means ‘kuśān lāti’ i.e. one who cuts the kuśa grass, and

secondarily it means 'an expert in any activity', and it is in this sense only that the word is fixed through usage. Any person who uses this word, uses it in the sense of 'an expert' only and there is no motive behind this usage. But it has to be borne in mind that there has to be some relation between the primary and the secondary senses as it is the first condition of lakṣaṇā. Even in 'kuśala' there is a relation of 'expert handling of any task'. It is precisely for this end in view that Jagannātha defines lakṣaṇā as 'śakya-saṃbandhaḥ lakṣaṇā." Thus relation between the two senses is very important. He goes a step further and says, as noted above, that in 'prayojanavatī lakṣaṇā, there has to be an apprehension of the special quality - avacchedaka dharma - of the mukhyārtha in the lakṣyārtha; and the relation between the two meanings has got to be that of non-difference or 'abheda' only. Without this the speaker's motive can never be realized.

So, the view of the ancients that between the two senses any relation whatsoever will do is thus negated by both Mammaṭa and Jagannātha alike.

Jagannātha, however points out a defect in Mammaṭa's definition of lakṣaṇā. While Mammaṭa has introduced 'mukhyārtha-bādhā' as one of the basic conditions for lakṣaṇā, this is not so in Jagannātha's view. The obvious reason is that if we accept this i.e. mukhyārtha-bādhā as a pre-condition for lakṣaṇā, then such instances as, "kākebhyo dadhi rakṣyatām" will fall out of the scope of lakṣaṇā as there is no difficulty in correlating (anvaya) the words in this sentence. But it is clear that the purport of this statement is that curd is to be protected not only from crows but also from all agency that may foul it and cause disturbance. So, we have to resort to lakṣaṇā in the word 'kākebhyaḥ' and arrive at the secondary sense such as - "dadhyupaghātakaprāṇinaḥ."

In the Kāvya prakāśa, Mammaṭa observes : "anayor lakṣyasya lakṣakasya ca na bhedarūpaṃ tāṭasthyam. taṭā" dīnāṃ gaṅgādiśabdaiḥ pratipādanē tattva-pratipattau hi pratipādayiṣita-prayojana-saṃpratyayaḥ. gaṅgāsaṃbandha-mātra-pratītau tu gaṅgātate ghoṣaḥ iti mukhya-śabdābhidhānāl lakṣaṇāyāḥ ko bhedaḥ." (vṛtti; K.P. II)

"In these two divisions (of indication) there is no separateness amounting to distinction between the indicated (sense) and the indicative. For, when the words like Gaṅgā and the like, convey (the sense of) the bank and the like, the apprehension of the motive which is sought to be established is obtained only after the comprehension of the identity (of the Gaṅgā with the bank). If (by the use of indication) merely a relation with Gaṅgā (viz. stream) were to be apprehended,

then what difference would there be of indication and a direct mode of expression - “A hamlet on the bank of Gaṅgā ? (Trans. R. C. Dwivedi, pp. 31, *ibid*)

The point is that to say that in the two varieties of śuddhā lakṣaṇā such as ‘upādāna’ and ‘lakṣaṇa’, there is apprehension of ‘bheda’ or separateness, but in gaṇī lakṣaṇā there is ‘a-bheda’ or no apprehension of separateness, is not proper. On the contrary, the apprehension of motive in prayojanavati lakṣaṇā takes place only if we apprehend a-bheda between mukhyārtha and lakṣyārtha, observes Mammāṭa. This is acceptable to Jagannātha also but the condition of mukhyārtha-bādha is not acceptable as seen above as it keeps out such statements as ‘kākebhyo.’ etc. out of the scope of lakṣaṇā. Similar is the case of a statement such as, “nakṣatram dr̥ṣtvā vācam viṣṛjet.” Thus, ‘tātparyā’nupapatti’ or ‘non-apprehension of motive’ should be recognized as ‘lakṣaṇā-bīja’ or the condition for lakṣaṇā. But even this ‘tātparyā’nupapatti’ can be explained in two ways -, either as - “mukhyārthatā’vacchedakā’dhikaranakaḥ tātparya-viṣayānvayitā’vacchedakatāyāḥ abhāvaḥ”, or as, “tātparya-viṣayānvayā’dhi-karaṇakaḥ mukhyārthatā’-vacchedakarūpeṇa mukhyārtha-pratiyogitāyā abhāvaḥ.” (candrikā commentary, pp. 150, Edn. Chowkhamba Vidyābhavan, Benares, ’55). The idea is that what is meant by tātparya in these cases ? By ‘tātparyā’nupapatti’ is it meant that lakṣaṇā takes place only when the two conditions - viz. ‘mukhyārthāvacchedaka’ and ‘tātparya-viṣayānvayitā’vacchedaka’ - are present ?

Or, is it meant that in the correlation - anvaya - meant by the speaker there is absence of the state of being ‘mukhyārtha-pratiyogikatā’ i.e. of being ‘mukhyārthīya’ in what we know as mukhyārthāvacchedaka ?

The substance is that by ‘tātparyā’nupapatti’ is it meant that the correlation of anvaya (which is the motive of the speaker) by its own form is not of the primary meaning ? Explaining the views in Candrikā, Dr. Ramacandrudu (pp. 250, *ibid*) puts it as - “In simple language it may, be said that the ‘mukhyārthāvacchedaka (i.e. gaṅgātva etc.) should not be the same as ‘tātparya-viṣayānvayitā’vacchedaka’, and then only lakṣaṇā arises. Or it may be explained that the mukhyārtha, in its capacity of being mukhyārtha should not be associated with the intended ‘anvaya’ while giving rise to lakṣaṇā. But the first explanation of tātparyā’nupapatti is against the accepted theory of Ālankārikas, because in places like ‘gaṅgāyām ghoṣaḥ’, etc., they accept, in order to facilitate the suggestion of pāvanatva etc., that the cognition of the taṭa is only ‘gaṅgātva-rūpa’. Thus, ‘tātparya-viṣayānvayitā’vacchedakatā’ rests with ‘gaṅgātva’ itself. Therefore, the second explanation of the tātparyā’nupapatti can be accepted, because, in the above

example, we get the cognition of the 'tīra' only, though in form of 'gaṅgātva', and so 'tāṭa' only (but not gaṅgā) is the pratiyogin in the ādhārā'dheya-bhāva. Thus the tātparyā'nupapatti is one of the lakṣaṇā-hetus, according to Panditarāja, the other being rūḍhi or prayojana. It is to be noted, Pandita-rāja does not take mukhyārtha-yoga as one of the lakṣaṇāhetus, because, as explained above, it is the lakṣaṇā-svarūpa but not its hetu."

Following closely the discussion in Candrikā (pp. 150, 151) Sri Rāmachandrudu observes (pp. 252, ibid) -

"The above contention of the ālamkārikas as presented by PR. (= Panditarāja) that the cognition of the lakṣyārtha is 'śakyārtha-prakāraka', is objected to by some critics on the following ground. In the verse -

"kacatas trasyati vadanam
 vadanāt kucamaṇḍalam bibheti,
 madhyād bibheti nayanam
 nayanād adharah samadvijati."

The words 'kaca', 'vadana', 'kuca', 'madhya', 'nayana' and 'adharah', are used to mean by lakṣaṇā, rāhu, moon, lotus, lion, dear and sprout respectively. But if the 'śakyatāvachchedaka' i.e. kacatva etc., also were to be included in the lakṣya-sābda-bodha, the statement that the vadanam etc. are afraid of 'kaca' etc. would be improper. Such statement can be justified only when the 'kaca' etc. are taken completely as 'rāhu' etc., without any tinge of 'kacatva', 'vadantva', etc. in them. This objection is voiced in the Darpaṇa commenting on the following lines of Vaiyākaraṇa-bhūṣaṇa-sāra - "lakṣaṇāyām ālamkārikānām śakyatāvachchedaka-prakāraka eva bodhaḥ." (p. 65)

While repeating the above objection, Candrikā shows another objection also. In 'kākebhyo dadhi rakṣyatām' the word 'kākebhyah' means by lakṣaṇā, 'dadhyupaghātakebhyah', and according to the contention of PR., the lakṣyārtha 'dadhyupaghātakebhyah' will be 'śakyatāvachchedakaprakāraka'. Now 'kāka' also being one of the dadhyupaghātakas, comes under the general lakṣyārtha which is kākavaprakāraka. Thus the mukhyārtha (= kāka) is the pratiyogin (saṁbandha) in the 'tātparyā-viśayānvaya' (i.e. avadhyavadhi-mad-bhāva in the present context) and this pratiyogitā of the mukhyārtha is mukhyārtha-pratiyogitā'vacchedaka-rūpa (i.e. kākātva) only. Thus in the absence of such pratiyogitā, how can it be accepted as an instance of lakṣaṇā ? After posing this question, Candrikā itself suggests a method to avoid this trouble. If it is said that the mukhyārtha alone should not be

pratiyogin in such sambandha, the above objection can be got over, because in the present case 'kāka' only is not the pratiyogin of such sambandha, but the 'bidālā"di' also. But even if this objection is met, Candrikā contends, the first objection stands unanswered. (Candrika pp. 150-151)

It may be pointed out here, this objection is not so formidable as is opined to be by Candrikā. Even if the rāhu and candra etc. are cognised in their kacatvā"dyavacchinna-rūpas, importance is to be given to their rāhutvā"di only, in view of the vidheya i.e. trāsa, and the śakyatāvachedaktā fades into insignificance. Thus there is nothing wrong in accepting the above theory. Moreover the same objection can be raised in the well-known example of lakṣaṇā, 'gaṅgāyām ghoṣaḥ', etc., because even after the tīra-lakṣaṇā, how can it be taken as the ādhāra of ghoṣa when the 'gaṅgātva' is lurking in the mind of the hearer ? Whatever answer is found to meet this objection, can be applied in this case also, because it is against the common experience that the kacā"di rūpārtha would completely disappear from the mind of the hearer when he cognises the lakṣyārtha.

In fact it is doubtful if this comes under lakṣaṇā at all. There is a possibility of taking it as an instance of gaṇī-lakṣaṇā only; but even this does not seem to be justified here. For, it cannot come either under the sārōpā or sādhyavasānā, because there is no mention of both the, viśaya and the viśayin as in 'mukhaṃ candraḥ', etc., or of the viśayin alone as in, 'vāpī kā'pi sphurati gagane', etc. (kuvalayā"nanda, p. 38), and the mention of viśaya does not come under either category. Therefore it may have to be taken as 'bhrāntimad alaṃkāra-dhvanī'.

It is interesting to note, Nāgeśa meets this objection in an altogether different way. In the Vaiyākaraṇa-laghu-mañjuṣā, in the context of explaining lakṣaṇā as 'śakyatāvachedaka', he states that there is nothing wrong in the 'kacataḥ trasyati' etc., because kacatva is ascribed to rāhutva etc. Though Nāgeśa does not say like this directly, (he says that 'rāhutvā"di-viśiṣṭa' is expressed with kacatvā"di) it should be the purport of his statement, in view of the context of his definition of lakṣaṇā.

"atra sarvatra tat-tad-dharma-viśiṣṭe śakyatāvachedaka-dharmā"ropah. ata eva 'kacatas trasyati vadanam' ity ādinā kacatvā"daḥ rāhutvā"di-viśiṣṭasya bodhāt na trāsā"dyanvayā'nupapattiḥ." (Parama-laghu-mañjuṣā - p. 122).

Nāgeśa's statement appears to be self-contradicting, because when there is āropa of the śakyatāvachedaka on the lakṣyatāvachedaka, the possibility of anvayā'nupapatti is more, for the rāhuvā"di would be cognized in kacā"dirūpa only. Even the commentary, Ratnaprabhā, on the above passage does not try

to give proper explanation. It simply says - 'rāhutva-viśiṣṭe kacatvā"ropāt rāhutva-viśiṣṭatvāt trāsopapattih, kacatva-vaiśiṣṭyena camatkāra-siddhir iti na doṣaḥ." (pp. 125)

Jagannātha then proceeds to mention some relations following the famous kārikā of Bhartṛmītra, as quoted by Mukula, viz. "abhidheyena saṁbandhāt, sādṛśyāt, samavāyataḥ, vaiparītyāt kriyāyogāt, lakṣaṇā pañcadhā matā." Jagannātha observes (pp. 464, Edn. Athavale, ibid) - "gaṅgāyām ghoṣaḥ ity atra sāmīpyam, "mukhaṁ candraḥ" ity ādau sādṛśyam, vyatireka-lakṣaṇāyām virodhaḥ, 'āyurghṛtam' ity ādau kāraṇatvā"dayas' ca saṁbandhā yathāyogaṁ lakṣaṇā-śarīrāṇi."

But, it may be noted that Jagannātha is not inclined to confine the number of relations to just five only. Jagannātha discards 'samavāya' and 'kriyāyoga' for which Mukula has cited illustrations such as 'chatrīṇo yānti' and 'śatrughnaḥ'. Jagannātha's understanding is that in what Mukula takes 'samavāya' as group and illustrates with 'chatrīṇo yānti' it is better to take 'sāmīpya' or nearness as the relation as those without umbrellas i.e. 'a-chatrīṇaḥ' are near by or close to those having umbrellas and in the same way thinks Jagannātha that 'kriyāyoga' can be discarded in favour of 'sādṛśyā' and therefore 'śatrughna' - the destroyer of enemies is a king who can be compared with 'śatrughna', Rāma's brother as he had also destroyed the enemies.

We have noted that Jagannātha calls these 'saṁbandhas' to be 'lakṣaṇā-śarīrāṇi'. We know that perhaps Nāgeśa is dissatisfied with Jagannātha's, "śakya-tāvaccchedaka-lakṣyārtha-bodha" and therefore has this comment, viz. "lakṣaṇā-jñāna-kāryatāvaccchedakaṁ tādṛśa-śakya-saṁbandha-prakāraka-viśeṣyaka-śabda-buddhitvam iti prācīnālaṁkārika-matam. tad anantaraṁ vyañjanayā tādṛśa-śakyāvaccchedaka prakārabodhaḥ iti ca. (pp. 146, N.S. Edn. 1888) This means that lakṣyārtha-bodha would consist of śakya-saṁbandha only but not śakyatāvaccchedaka. But, the vyañjanā that follows lakṣaṇā would produce the śabda-bodha consisting of śakyatāvaccchedaka also. This statement of Nāgeśa is approved and quoted by Candrikā with a note (pp. 152, ibid) - etena śakyatāvaccchedaka-rūpeṇa lakṣyamānaṁ mūloktam kaṭākṣitam.


Dr. Ramacandrudu observes (pp. 254, ibid) that it is not known, the views of which 'prācīna-ālaṁkārika-Nāgeśa is referring to. Mammaṭa is favourable to accepting lakṣaṇā-sthala, 'gaṅgātvā"di-prakāraka-tīrā"di-bodha for the purpose of vyaṅgyārtha, for only such lakṣyārtha can suggest 'pāvanatvā"di' which stand as a prayojana. Mammaṭa observes, as quoted above that, "taṭā"dinām gaṅgā"di-

śabdaiḥ pratipādane tattva-pratītau hi pratipipādayiṣita-prayojana-sampratyayah.” “For, when the words like Gaṅgā and the like convey (the sense of) the bank and the like, the apprehension of the motive which is sought to be established is obtained only after the comprehension of the identity (of the Gaṅgā with the bank).” (Trans. R. C. Dwivedi, pp. 31, ibid)

Here, it is clear that by ‘tattva-pratīpattau’ we mean ‘gaṅgātva-pratīpattau’ which then means ‘gaṅgātva-prakāraka-bodha, which is required for the establishment - prati-pipādayiṣā - of the prayojana motive - which is vyaṅgya. In this respect how can this apprehension of motive be attained through vyañjanā - i.e. how can it be called, ‘vyañjanā-vṛtti-sādhya’ ? Pradīpakāra Govinda observes - “tatra gaṅgātva”di-pratītir-eva bījam, na tu tīratvā”di-pratītir eva. tire ghoṣa ity atrā’pi tat-pratīti-prasaṅgāt.” (pp. 44, Edn. Poona, Ānandāśrama, Skt. Granthāvaliḥ. 1911 A.D.). This supports the above understanding of Mammaṭa’s words. So, at least Nāgeśa is not supported by Mammaṭa. Then who are these prācīna - ālamkārikas is yet not clear.

Jagannātha proceeds with the classification of lakṣaṇā with the words : “iyam tāvad dvividhā, nirūḍhā prayojanavati ca. tatrā’pi dvitīyā dvividhā, gaunī, śuddhā ca tatra ādyā sārōpā sādhyavasānā ca iti dvividhā antyā caturvidhā - jahatsvārthā, ajahatsvārthā, sārōpā, sādhyavasānā ca iti prayojanavati ṣadvidhā sampadyate.” (pp. 464, Edn. Athavale, ibid)

So, his classification goes like this



The illustrations are cited as follows. Words such as anukūla, pratikūla, anuloma, pratiloma, lāvanya etc. are examples of nirūḍhā lakṣaṇā. In expressions like - ‘dharmasya ayaṃ anukūlah’ the word ‘anukūla’ cannot have its primary

meaning of 'following the bank', it being unsuitable to context. Through usage this word means 'anu-guṇa', as there is similarity of 'eka-vastu-pravaṇatva' in both the meanings. Same is the case with 'anuloma', 'pratiloma' etc. Thus the sense such as 'anuguna' is apprehended through nirūḍha-lakṣaṇā. Jagannātha observes : (pp. 464, ibid) : "tatra nirūḍha-lakṣaṇāyā anukūla-pratikūla-anuloma-pratiloma-lāvanyā"daya udāharaṇaṃ nīlā"dayaśca. "dharmasyā'yam anukūlaḥ" ity ādau mukhyārthasya kṛlānugatātvā"der bādhāt anādi-prayoga-pravāha-vaśād eka-vastu-pravaṇā"tmanā kṛlānugatā"dirūpa-śakyasya sādṛśyena saṃbandhena anukūlā"di śabdair anugunā"dayo lakṣante. ... tatra ādyavarge sādṛśya-saṃbandhena dvitīyavarge ca tad itara-saṃbandhena lakṣaṇāyāḥ pravṛtter nirūḍhāyām api gaunīva-śuddhatvābhyāṃ dvaividhyam āmananti." (pp. 464-465, ibid).

Such words as 'nīlaḥ', 'raktaḥ' originally stand for 'blue' or 'red' colour, but are used in expressions such as, "nūlaḥ ghaṭaḥ" etc. Here, through lakṣaṇā, 'nīlaḥ' stands for the thing having that particular colour, and the relation between the primary and the secondary senses is that of 'samavāya'. Thus there are two types of nirūḍha-lakṣaṇā, the first being represented by such words as anukūla, pratikūla, etc., and the second by words suggesting quality as 'nīlaḥ', 'raktaḥ' etc. In the first type the relation between 'mukhyārtha' and 'lakṣyārtha' is that of sādṛśya or similarity, in the latter such relations as 'samavāya' etc., are located, which are other than 'sādṛśya'.

Jagannātha then proceeds to explain next varieties. He observes that places, where both 'viśaya' and 'viśayin' are clearly and separately mentioned, are places of 'āropa' i.e. superimposition. When they are not separately mentioned, it is case of 'adhyavasāna' (or nigaraṇa) i.e. 'swallowing'. The lakṣaṇā with 'āropa' is 'sāropā', while with 'adhyavasāna' is termed 'sādhyavasānā'. Jagannātha then proceeds to give illustrations. Gaunī sāropā is illustrated by examples such as 'mukhaṃ candraḥ', while the other variety, viz. 'gaunī' - sādhyavasānā is illustrated by, 'pure'smin saudha-śikhare candra-rājī virājate', etc. He does not illustrate the four varieties of śuddhā-lakṣaṇā which are to be taken from other sources, they being commonly acceptable. Thus, 'kuntāḥ pravṛsanti' 'gaṅgāyām ghoṣaḥ', 'ayur ghṛtam', 'āyuh idam', could serve as illustrations of ajahallakṣaṇā, jahallakṣaṇā, śuddhā sāropā and śuddhā-sādhyavasānā varieties respectively.

Jagannātha's classification seems to be completely in tune with that of Mammāṭa with difference in naming only. Mammāṭa's śuddhā is two-fold such as upādāna and lakṣaṇa, which are termed as ajahat-svārthā and jahat-svārthā by Jagannātha. Mammāṭa's sāropā and sādhyavasāna are both gaunī and śuddhā.

Thus Mammaṭa has śuddhā-upādāna-lakṣaṇā equivalent to a-jahatsvārthā, then śuddhā-lakṣaṇa-lakṣaṇā which equates with jahatsvārthā in the Rasa-gaṅgādhara. Śuddhā-sāropā, śuddhā-sādhyavasānā, gaunī-sāropā and gaunī-sādhyavasānā are found in common.

As already discussed earlier, Jagannātha also accepts, following Mammaṭa, the existence of a special relation over and above that of sādṛśya, etc. between the mukhyārtha and lakṣyārtha.

Jagannātha then proceeds to discuss the verbal explanation or ‘śābda-bodha’ that is seen in example of sāropa-lakṣaṇā, such as ‘mukhaṃ candraḥ’, which illustrates ‘gaunī sāropā’, and ‘pure’smin saudha-śikhare...’ etc. which illustrates ‘gaunī-sādhyavasānā. He says that in gaunī-sāropā the śābda-bodha is of the form of ‘candra-sadṛśā’bhinnam mukham ! He says that in gaunī-sāropā-lakṣaṇā, there is secondary meaning collected from the viśayi-pada viz. ‘candra’ and it means ‘candra-sadṛśa’. The relation between the two is that of ‘abheda’, or identity. The direct perception of ‘bheda’ or non-identity cannot obliterate this perception of identity arrived at through vyañjanā. Thus the bādha-buddhi is not ‘pratibandhaka’ of ‘abheda-bodha’. Thus ‘lakṣyārtha’ is correlated through abheda sambandha with objects such as ‘mukha’ which are characterized by such qualities as ‘mukhatva’ etc., brought about by words such as ‘mukha’. Jagannātha observes that here, if we go for the lakṣyārtha such as ‘candrasādṛśya’ or ‘similarity with moon’, which is expressive of quality - i.e. dharma-vācaka, in place of the dharmi-vācaka-lakṣyārtha viz. ‘candra-sadṛśa’ i.e. ‘similar to the moon’, then, that lakṣyārtha (i.e. ‘indicated sense which is dharma-vācaka’) will not be correlated with ‘mukha’, i.e. correlation will not be possible here. The reason is that ‘sādṛśya’ and ‘mukha’ can have only abheda-relation between them. Now if we resort to the lakṣaṇā of sādṛśya-dharma then it will have only one relation with ‘mukha’ such as that of viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya-bhāva, which in its turn is necessarily ‘bheda’-rūpa. The idea is that as in a sentence viz. ‘candra-sadṛśam mukham’ ‘sadṛśam’ and ‘mukham’ being in aposition or same vibhakti, there is ‘a-bheda’ relation between them and between ‘candra-sādṛśyam’ and ‘mukham’, there can not be the same relation. So, ‘sādṛśyābhinnam mukham’ is a śābda-bodha which is not possible here as between these two there is no ‘abheda’-relation.

Dr. Ramachandrudu (pp. 262, 263 ibid) puts it as follows : “Here the upamānavācaka (candraḥ) expresses by lakṣaṇā the sense ‘candrasadṛśaḥ’, and the word ‘mukha’ expresses the sense ‘face’ by abhidhā only. Ultimately there will be an abhedānvaya between the lakṣaṇāpāsthitartha (candra-sadṛśa) and the sense

expressed by abhidhā (mukha) according to the well-known rule - “nāmārthayor abhedanānvayaḥ.” Thus the final śābda-bodha of the sentence ‘mukhaṃ candraḥ’, will be ‘sādṛśyābhinnam mukham’. Now, the question arises, what is then the difference between rūpaka which gives the śābda-bodha ‘candra-sadṛśābhinnam mukham’ and upamā in ‘candra-sadṛśam mukham’? It may be argued that there is slight variation in the ultimate śābda-bodha of the rūpaka and upamā’lāmākāra which makes all the difference. While the śābda-bodha of rūpaka is ‘candra-sadṛśābhinnam mukham’, as explained above, the śābda-bodha in upamā-sthala like ‘candra-sadṛśam mukham’, is ‘candrā’bhinnam yat sadṛśam tad abhinnam mukham’. The reason for the difference is this - According to the rule that only the ‘saṃsarga’ (relation) of the two padārthas expressed by two different words would appear in śābda-bodha by saṃsarga-maryādā. ‘Candra’ in ‘candra-sadṛśam mukham’, expresses the sense ‘moon’, and ‘sadṛśa’ by lakṣaṇā expresses ‘candra-sadṛśa’. Now ‘candra’ and ‘candra-sadṛśa’ being expressed by different words, there will be ‘abhedānvaya’ between them (by saṃsarga-maryādā). Thus the ultimate śābda-bodha will be, ‘candrā’bhinna-candra-sadṛśā’bhinnam mukham’. But in ‘mukhaṃ candraḥ’ (rūpaka-sthala) ‘candraḥ’ itself conveys the meaning of candra-sadṛśa by lakṣaṇā and there is no possibility of abhedā-saṃsarga between ‘candra’ and ‘sadṛśa’ because both of them are expressed by one word only and therefore the ultimate śābda-bodha is - ‘candra-sadṛśābhinnam mukham’. Thus there is a difference in the śābda-bodhas of upamā and rūpaka. But the objector suggests that such a slight difference in the final śābda-bodha is not sufficient to distinguish between the two alāmākāras. For, if it were so, due to difference in śābdabodha, two expressions viz. ‘mukhaṃ candra iva’, and ‘mukhaṃ candra-sadṛśam’ should be taken as separate alāmākāras. So, the original position that there is absence of difference between rūpaka and upamā remains as it is - “bodhasya vailakṣanyena prthag alāmākāratāyā a-siddheḥ. anyathā ‘mukhaṃ candra iva’ ity atra candra-sadṛśam ity etadgatāt prthag alāmākāratāpattir iti cet.” (pp. 465, ibid).

In reply to this objection, some are of the opinion that, though there is no difference in the śābda-bodha of these two alāmākāras, there is difference in the ultimate result - ... lakṣaṇā-phalībhūta-tādrūpya-samvedanam ādāya vailakṣanyam nirbādhām. (pp. 465, ibid). As the viśayitāvachhedaka (i.e. candratva etc.) is ascribed to viśaya (i.e. mukha), there is a tādātmya-jñāna in the rūpaka-sthala which is not observed in the upamā-sthala. As pointed out above, the word ‘candra’ in ‘mukhaṃ candraḥ’, conveys the sense of candra-sadṛśaḥ by lakṣaṇā and thus, as in śleṣa-sthala, there will be apprehension of identity i.e. abhedā-saṃpratyaya between

the candra and sadṛśa expressed by the same word. This abhedā or tādātmya-sampratyaya can not be obstructed by the bheda-jñāna, because its antidote vyañjanā also is present in the lakṣaṇā-sthala, which is not found in the upamā-sthala : “śleṣasthala ivā’tṛāpyekasabdōpādānōtthasya vyañjanasya upāyātvād vaiyāñjanika-bodhasya bādha-buddy apratibadhyattvāc ca.” (pp. 465, ibid). Once the ‘candrābhinnā-candra-sadṛśābhinnatva’ is accepted in mukha, ‘candrābhinnatva’ also follows automatically, according to the maxim, ‘tadabhinnābhinnam tad abhinnam’. In view of this, expressions such as, ‘vaktre candramasi, sthite kim aparāḥ śītāṁśur ujṛmbhate’ etc., that express tādātmya between the viśaya and viśayin are to be supported. Thus, this view of some ālaṁkārikas maintains the difference between the rūpaka and upamā because of the difference in their phala.

Jagannātha used such words as, “atra kecit”, in the beginning of the above view. This shows that he feels that there is no need of bringing in the difference of phala, when we can show the difference in śābda-bodha itself.

Jagannātha then gives the view of still others. He says, ‘anye tu, candrā”di-padebhyah lakṣaṇayā candra-sadṛśatvenā’pi rūpenōpasthitānām mukhā”dīnām candratvena rūpenaiva mukhā”dipadōpasthāpitaiḥ saha abhedānvayabodho jāyāte...” (pp. 466, ibid).

These ‘anye’ or others hold that inspite of the general rule that the cognition of the meaning of the words - padārthopasthiti and the śābda-bodha that follows should be of similar form, it is suggested that, on the strength of the experience that lakṣyānvaya-bodha in the lakṣaṇā-sthala will be having śakyatāvachchedaka (i.e. gaṅgātva) as its prakāra; to be put in otherwise, the cognition of the lakṣyārtha will be more in form of mukhyārtha itself - “tat-tat-pada-lakṣaṇā-jñānasya tat-tat-pada-śakyatā’vacchedaka-prakāraka-lakṣyānvaya-bodhatvāvacchinnaṁ prati hetutāyāḥ, padārthopasthiti-śābdabodhayoḥ samānā”kāratvasyā’nubhava-sāksika-vailakṣanyaka-lākṣaṇika-bodhā’tirikta-viśayatāyāśca kalpanāt.” (pp. 466, ibid).

Thus in places like ‘gaṅgāyām ghoṣaḥ’, though the ‘tata’ (lakṣyārtha) is first cognised with only tatatva, the final anvayabodha will be ‘gaṅgātva’ to make it possible to suggest the śaitya, pāvanatva, etc. - ‘ata eva gaṅgāyām ghoṣa ity atra tatatvenā’pyupasthitasya tatasya gaṅgātvenā’nvayabodhas tatprayojoyāḥ śaitya-pāvanatvā”di-pratyayaś ca saṁgacchate.” (pp. 466, ibid). By applying this principle in ‘mukhaṁ candraḥ’, the apprehension of identity-abhedā-bodha-between the face that is conveyed by ‘candra’ by lakṣaṇā (as candra-sadṛśa) and the face that is expressed by the word ‘mukha’ (by abhidhā) will be restricted by

the 'mukhyārthatā'vacchedaka' i.e. candratva, and this kind of abheda-bodha will be helpful in bringing about the realisation of the guṇas or qualities of moon in the face. Thus the second view explains that the distinguishing factor between rūpaka and upamā is not only the ultimate result i.e. phala, but also the intermediary śābda-bodha. "itthaṃ kṛtaś co'pamāto rūpakasya bhedaḥ sphuṭa eva." iti vadanti.

Yet another view of the ancients is put by Jagannātha as follows : "apare tu bheda-karambitaṃ sādṛśyaṃ upamā-jīvātu-bhutaṃ bheda-karambitaṃ ca gaṇa-sāropā-lakṣaṇāyā iti sphuṭe bhede kṛtaṃ phala-kṛta-vailakṣaṇya-paryantā'nudhāvanena.. etc." (pp. 466, ibid). This view holds that there is difference in sādṛśya associated with both upamā and rūpaka. Upamā is based on sādṛśya which is embraced by 'bheda' i.e. non-identity, while rūpaka has sādṛśya rooted in 'a-bheda' or identity. Thus it is suggested here that there is no need to rest on the ultimate result i.e. phala. Jagannātha says that, "tad itthaṃ prācāṃ āśayaḥ matabhedena varṇitaḥ." (pp. 466, ibid).

Now he considers the views of the 'Navyāḥ', the group of modern ālaṃkārikas. Candrikā says - "appayya dīkṣitā"dayaḥ". Here, the view held by such ālaṃkārikas as Appayya Dixit is presented. These 'navyas' hold that there is no need of accepting lakṣaṇā at all, in places such as 'mukhaṃ candraḥ' and 'vāhiko gauḥ' : "navyās tu - 'mukhaṃ candraḥ', 'vāhiko gauḥ' ity ādau candrā"ḍinām mukhā"ḍibhiḥ saha sambhavati, lakṣaṇām vinaiva, abheda-saṃsargaṇa anvayabodhaḥ." (pp. 466, ibid). In these illustrations the abheda-saṃsarga between the 'candra' and 'mukha', 'go' and 'vāhika' can be effected by the general rule, viz. "nāmārthayor abhedenā'nvayaḥ", without resorting to lakṣaṇā. If it is argued that such abheda-saṃsarga cannot take place due to some confirmation of incongruity - i.e. bādha-niścaya in the form that the moon and the face cannot be indetical with each other, according to the rule-tadvattā-buddhiṃ prati tadabhāva-vattā"tmaka-bādha-niścayaḥ pratibandhakaḥ."

But the Navyas argue that this general rule can have exemption in the case of the śābda-jñāna, as there was exemption granted in case of the 'āhārya jñāna', or intentional cognition. It is accepted, that 'bādha-niścaya' cannot obstruct the 'tadvattā-jñāna' when a man has an intention to have such jñāna'. In the same way, Navyas suggest that the śābda-jñāna also can not be obstructed by the bādha-niścaya. So, the improved version of the above rule could be, as Candrikā puts it (pp. 165, ibid) - "laukika-sannikarṣājanya-doṣa-viśeṣājanya-anāhārya-śābdānya-

buddhitvāvacchinnam prati bādha-niścayaḥ pratibandhakaḥ.” The Navyas also claim that their theory is supported by the well-known observation, viz. ‘atyantāśatyapi hy arthe jñānam śabdaḥ karoti hi’, according to which such expressions as ‘śaśa-sṛṅgaṃ paśya’ etc. can also produce a śabda-jñāna like ‘go-sṛṅgaṃ paśya’, etc.

Now somebody may argue that according to this observation, expressions such as ‘vahninā siñcati’ will also produce ‘śabda-bodha’. The answer is ‘No’. Navinas say that such expressions cannot produce śabda-bodha because there is no ‘yogyatā-jñāna’ or knowledge of compatibility. But in case of ‘mukhaṃ candraḥ’, ‘gauḥ vāhikāḥ’, etc. there is no lack of yogyatājñāna, at least the āhārya one, on account of the strong intention to have such śabda-jñāna for the ultimate camatkāra from such bodha or apprehension. Such āhārya-yogyatā-jñāna can not be accepted in the case of ‘vahninā siñcati’, as there is no such desire. This thinking of the Navyas has the support of the Prācinas also, who have gone for the general rule that yogyatā-jñāna is the cause for the śabda-jñāna : “mukhaṃ candraḥ’, ‘gaur vāhikāḥ’ ityā”dau tviṣṭa-camatkāra-prayojakatā-jñānā”dhīnāyāḥ icchāyāḥ sattvād āhārya-yogyatā-jñāna-sāmrājyam ata eva śābdabodhe yogyatā-jñānasya kāraṇatvoktiḥ prācām saṃgacchate.’ (pp. 467, ibid).

The Candrikā has (pp. 166 ibid) : “śabda-buddhitvāvacchinne yogyatājñānam kāraṇam” iti kārya-kāraṇa-bhāvaḥ prācīnābhimataḥ...

This rule would have been useless because the śabda-bodha in ‘vahninā siñcati’ etc. can be averted by the bādha-jñāna itself, if the ‘śabdanāyatva’ were not to be included in the ‘bādha-niścaya-prati-bandhyatā’vacchedaka-koṭi’. When the ‘śabdanāyatva’ is added, it justifies the above rule related to ‘yogyatā-jñāna’. Because the bādhajñāna is not powerful enough to obstruct the śabda-bodha in ‘vahninā-siñcati’, this rule comes in to stop this undesired bodha. Dr. Ramachandradu observes (pp. 266, ibid) - ‘Even if the ‘śabdanāyatva’ is not added in the ‘pratibaddhyatāvacchedaka-koṭi, the Navinas contend, the abhedānvaya in ‘mukhaṃ candraḥ’, etc., will be taken as āhārya-jñāna, and so cannot be obstructed by the ‘bādha-niścaya’. Thus there is no need of accepting the āhārya-jñāna to facilitate the śabda-bodha in ‘mukhaṃ candraḥ’ etc. In fact, the rule ‘śabda-buddhitvāvacchinne yogyatājñānam kāraṇam’ is itself not necessary because the śabda-bodha in ‘vahninā-siñcati’ etc., can be prevented by the bādha-niścaya itself. It is baseless to say that āhārya-jñāna can be accepted only in pratyakṣa-jñāna, because we come across the āhārya-śabda-jñāna also in many places like atīśayokti.”

The result of the discussion as above is that, in the illustration of sāropā lakṣaṇā, such as 'mukhaṃ candraḥ', there is no harm in accepting 'abhedānvaya' directly between the vācyārthas of the words 'mukhaṃ' and 'candraḥ'. There is no need to accept abhedānvaya between the expressed sense of 'mukhaṃ', and the indicated sense of 'candraḥ'. It is safe to accept 'abhedānvaya' between two vācyārthas only. For, if this is not done, i.e. if we do not accept the 'anvaya' between two vācyārthas, then there will be difficulty in accepting on one hand the alaṃkāras viz. rūpaka and upamā respectively in illustrations such as, "rāja-nārāyaṇaṃ lakṣmī...", and "pādāmbujaṃ bhavatu..." etc., and the 'abhedānvaya' accepted between the vācyā and lakṣya artha on the other. To remove this difficulty we have to accept anvaya between two vācyārthas themselves.

We will try to understand this point in details. In the two illustrations we have upamā and rūpaka respectively, depending on the upamita-samāsa and the viśeṣaṇa-samāsa. Now if we accept these compounds, we will have to face some 'a-saṃgati' such as the embrace by Lakṣmī to the king, when upamita-samāsa such as 'Nārāyaṇa-like-king', is resorted to. The discrepancy arises when we say that Lakṣmī embraces the king and not Nārāyaṇa. In the upamita-samāsa the prādhānya is given to 'rāja' the pūrva-pada. In the other illustration we have a rūpaka-samāsa in 'pādāmbuja' with 'ambuja' the uttarapada being principal. Now the 'manohāritā' or loveliness caused due to the sweet tinkling of the anklet cannot go with 'ambuja' and hence discrepancy will be there. So, if abhedānvaya is accepted with reference to vācyā and lakṣya arthas, we will have difficulty in accepting 'upamā' and 'rūpaka' in the said illustrations. So, ultimately we have to accept rūpaka and upamā respectively, as done by Mammaṭa, in the said illustrations. So only vācyārthābhedānvaya has to be accepted in the so called sāropā lakṣaṇā illustrations.

Jagannātha observes that even when there is no compound this fact operates. In 'kṛpayā sudhayā siṅha...' etc., if vācyābhedā is not resorted to, importance cannot be given to 'sudhā', to make it suitable for the act of sprinkling - i.e. seka-kriyā. In case lakṣaṇā is accepted, importance would go to 'kṛpā' in the śābda-bodha which follows.

The crux of the matter is that in the illustration viz. 'rāja-nārāyaṇaṃ...' etc., for those who accept lakṣaṇā, the śābda-bodha in form of, "the king is like Nārāyaṇa", is identical even if either upamita or viśeṣaṇa-samāsa is resorted to. Now if 'upamā' is accepted the embrace by Lakṣmī cannot be explained but it can be explained if rūpaka is accepted. So the an-upapatti resulting from the upamā alaṃkāra is decisive in favour of accepting rūpaka. This is observed by Mammaṭa. But this will

not be found tenable if the śābda-bodha remains identical, and it remains so if lakṣaṇā is resorted to. Mammata did accept difference in the śābda-bodha here, and so the śābdabodha such as ‘nārāyaṇa-saḍṛśa’ as seen in rūpaka, through resorting to lakṣaṇā, was not acceptable to Mammata, the obvious reason is that it is only by taking into account the anvaya of vāc्यārtha that the upapatti or otherwise of anvaya is considered, and not by taking the anvaya of lakṣyārtha into consideration. Because the vāc्यārtha of upamita samāsa is not congruent here, therefore only the vāc्यārtha of rūpakasamāsa has to be accepted here. So, lakṣyārtha has no business at all here. In the second illustration also, for the lakṣaṇāvādins, if lakṣaṇā is resorted to, or if rūpaka is accepted, in both the cases, the śābdabodha will be of the form of ‘ambuḡa-saḍṛśa-pāda’ only. So it will be futile to suggest any anupapatti such as absence of anvaya between the anklet and the foot, and therefore ruling out of rūpaka in the end.

The lakṣaṇāvādin objector may now argue as follows. He may say that perhaps it is possible to arrive at the upapatti of śābda-bodha without resorting to lakṣaṇā in such illustrations as ‘mukha-candraḡ’ which is a compounded construction. But when there is no samāsa (such as in mukhaḡ candraḡ) there cannot be any objection to lakṣaṇā. But the siddhāntin says that even this observation is incorrect. For, in illustrations such as, “krpayā sudhayā siṇca...” etc. which has non-compounded single words, the ‘upapatti’ of the correlation (anvaya) of ‘artha’ does not take place. The idea is that if lakṣaṇā is resorted to in case of words such as ‘sudhā’, and if it is taken to mean ‘sudhā-saḍṛśa’, then also the ‘secana’ or ‘sprinkling’ of sudhā-saḍṛśa-krpā will not be possible. So, the śābdabodha caused by lakṣaṇā will not be of any use. On the other hand, the Navīnas believe in the abhedānvaya and tādrūpya-pratiti between krpā and sudha and hence the sprinkling of krpā in form of sudhā or nectar will give a meaning which will be congruent to the śābda-bodha.

Now if the supporters of lakṣaṇā here say that, if by resorting to lakṣaṇā, the congruence of the śābda-bodha of lakṣyārtha is not seen, then in that case, take the dhārtvartha of ‘siṇcati’ as viṣayin, and through this viṣayin, let there be swallowing nigaṇa - of ‘kuru’ (= viṣayārtha), and now the upapatti i.e.-justification of the śābdabodha of lakṣyārtha will be accomplished. The idea is that with ‘siṇcana’ as viṣayin, as it happens in case of ‘atīśayokti’, let there be nigaṇa of the meaning of ‘kuru’. So, the meaning of ‘sprinkling with nectar’ - will be, ‘shower grace like sprinkling of nectar’. Thus the ‘anvaya’ will hold good. This is the argument in self-defence by the lakṣaṇā-supporters.

But against this, the navīnas observe that, putting aside certain alaṃkāras such as utprekṣā and the like, in alaṃkāras such as atīśayokti, apahnuti etc., merely on the strength of acquired knowledge - i.e. 'āhāryajñāna', the śābda-bodha can be justified (= upapatti). In the same way in rūpaka also this key is applicable and hence there is no compulsion to resort to lakṣaṇā here (bījābhāva). To accept lakṣaṇā at such places goes against common experience also.

The idea is this. When the Navīnas say that, 'utprekṣādy atirikta-atīśayokti-apahnattva-ādiṣu iva āhārya-jñānena upapattau, lakṣaṇāyāṃ bījābhāvād anubhava-virodhāc ca (R.G. pp. 467, ibid) - it becomes clear that in such alaṃkāras as utprekṣā, sa-saṃdeha, etc. there is no escape from lakṣaṇā even according to the Navīnas. The reason behind this is that in āhāryajñāna there should be the quality of certainty according to the normal opinion of the Naiyāyikas, who define āhāryajñāna as - "bādhakālinecchājanyam jñānam." (Nyāyakośa, pp. 36). This means that, it is āhārya-jñāna, when we hold a clearly contradicted matter as not contradicted, through our desire or intelligence. For example the cognition such as 'the lake is on fire' - 'hrdo vahnimān iti jñānam'. Now even in the absence of fire in a lake, if we hold that there is fire in it, this sort of belief is only acquired - āhārya-jñāna. From this point of view, the figures such as utprekṣā, sa-saṃdeha, etc. are purely āhārya-jñāna, because when one says that, 'the darkness is like smoke', one knows that darkness is not smoke. But he knowingly imagines the darkness to be smoke. But the fancy in utprekṣā is not of the form of a certainty and in āhārya-jñāna what is required is certainty-or niścaya, according to the Naiyāyikas. Keeping this in mind the Navīnas have suggested that it is advisable to accept lakṣaṇā in utprekṣa.

Jagannātha further argues that in rūpaka alaṃkāra such as 'mukhaṃ candraḥ', according to the lakṣaṇāvādins there is lakṣaṇā on the upamāna-vācaka word, viz. 'candra' in the sense of 'candra-saḍṛśa'. This is the opinion of the prācīnas : 'api ca upamānavācakasya candrā" dipadasya rūpake, upamānasadṛśe lakṣaṇā iti hi prācāṃ samayaḥ - (R.G. pp. 467, ibid). Now, continues Jagannātha, in the lakṣyārtha viz. candra-saḍṛśa, the avacchedaka dharma - i.e. speciality in quality is sādṛśya : 'tatra lakṣyatāvachchedakam sādṛśyam'. It is of the form of 'common quality' naturally - 'tac ca samāna-dharma-rūpam'. This is so because if 'sādṛśya' which is an avacchedaka-dharma is not explained as 'samāna-dharma', then the rūpaka alaṃkāra based on 'common qualities' - 'or 'sādharmya', will not take place at all.

Now, here, the point is - "sa ca lakṣyāṃśe sundaratvā" dinā viśeṣa-rūpeṇa pratiyate uta āho sāmānya-rūpeṇa ?" - i.e. is that samāna-dharma of the form of sādṛśya apprehended here in the special form of particularity of beauty-sundaratva - or in a general form ? These two options prop up here. The first alternative, viz. that sādṛśya is apprehended in form of particularity such as 'sundaratvā'di', is untenable. Because in such a case, there will be paunaruktyadoṣa in, 'sundaram mukhaṃ candraḥ', for saundarya, the sādḥāraṇadharmā of a particular nature, is expressed by the word 'candra' itself by lakṣaṇā, and is again mentioned by the word 'sundaram'. To avoid this blemish, it may be said, that in such cases where the sādḥāraṇa-dharma is mentioned, some other dharma, i.e. other than what is mentioned, should be taken as 'lakṣyatā'vacchedaka-dharma'. But, even if 'paunaruktya' doṣa can be avoided by this argument, it goes contray to the common experience, because we do not generally understand any other dharma except saundarya in the expression 'sundaram mukhaṃ candraḥ'. Again, in some instances, there may not be any possibility of an additional dharma over and above the one mentioned in a given illustration. "na caivam ādāv upātta-dharmake rūpake tad dharmā'tirikto dharma eva lakṣyatā'vacchedakībhūta-sādṛśyarūpa iti vācyam. anubhava-virodhāt. (pp. 467, ibid). As for example in the verse, "aṅkitāny akṣasaṃghātaiḥ..." etc. We do not find any other sādḥāraṇa-dharma, over and above those based on śleṣa, i.e. 'akṣa-saṅghatāṅkitatva' and 'sarogatva'. Thus the first alternative is unacceptable. In case, now, if the second alternative is accepted, it would be an illustration, not of rūpaka, but of upamā because the sādṛśya is mentioned by śabda. It is not proper to hold that upamā would arise only when the sādṛśya is vācyā, because in that case, in instances such as 'nalina-pratipakṣaṃ ānanam', where sādṛśya is not vācyā but lakṣya, will cease to be illustrations of upamā.

Again, if lakṣaṇā be accepted in rūpaka, in the example of śliṣṭa-paramparita-rūpaka such as, 'vidvanmānasa-haṃsa' etc., where we know that 'sādṛśya' will be apprehended only when śleṣa is accomplished first, and due to the abhedādhyavasāya brought about by śleṣa, sādṛśya between the king who dwells in mānasa (= mind) and the swan who dwells in mānasa lake, will be apprehended and then only the rūpaka - "rājahaṃsa" - will take shape based on sādṛśya-mūlakalākṣyārtha. Then only we will be able to say that here is an instance of rūpakālaṃkāra. As against this, when rūpaka is derived as based on the lakṣaṇā in 'haṃsa-sādṛśa', - i.e. when rūpaka is formed with a lakṣaṇā in form of haṃsa-sādṛśa at its base, then only the śleṣa on "mānasa" meaning (i) mānasa lake and

(ii) mind - will come into existence. Thus, by accepting lakṣaṇā, there will be “anyonyā”śraya-doṣa”. Now this can be avoided by accepting āhāryābheda-jñāna between the king and the ‘haṃsa’ for which we need not depend on śleṣa. This abheda-jñāna would ultimately be justified by accepting śleṣa. Thus the śleṣa depends on rūpaka but the rūpaka does not depend upon śleṣa and there will be no ‘anyonyā’śraya-doṣa’. Therefore, it is better to apply the general rule of abhedānvaya in rūpaka-sthala also.

Again, the Navīnas hold that the argument of the contenders of lakṣaṇā, viz. that the phala of lakṣaṇā, which indicates lakṣyārtha in form of ‘sadṛśa’, is the ultimate tādrūpyapratīti or apprehension of identity in rūpaka, - is also not acceptable, for, if we accept this, then, as in the expression ‘tat-sadṛśa’ also there is apprehension of similarity, i.e. even in cases of upamā such as, ‘candra-sadṛśam mukham there will be tādrūpyapratīti, or apprehension of identity even here (i.e. even in upamā). Thus, the Navīnas hold that there is no requirement for acceptance of lakṣaṇā in the śābda-bodha of rūpaka, - “ato nāmārthayor abhedānvaya-saranir eva rūpakasthale ramaṇīyā. sadṛśa-lakṣaṇāyāḥ phalaṃ rūpake trādrūpya-pratyaya ity api na hrdayaṅgamam. tat-sadṛśa iti śābdāt-sadṛśya-pratyaye saty api tādrūpya-pratyayā”-patteḥ” - ity āhuḥ.” (pp. 468, ibid)

Now Jagannātha proceeds to discuss the view of the Navīnas also. Says he - “atra idaṃ vicāryate”. (pp. 497, ibid)

He refutes the view of the Navīnas with some very important arguments supported by common sense and general experience. He observes : ‘yat tāvad ucyate nāmārthayor abhedānvaya-bodhena eva upapattau rūpake nāsti lakṣaṇā iti, tatra camatkāri-sādhāraṇa-dharmā’nupasthiti-daśāyāṃ upamā’laṃkārasya iva rūpakālaṃkārasyā’pi nāsti niṣpattis’ camatkāro vā iti sakala-hrdaya-siddham.” The general experience goes, argues Jagannātha, that there can be no existence of either upamā-alaṃkāra or rūpaka-alaṃkāra, till the ‘camatkāri’ or lovely sādhāraṇa-dharma is cognised. If at all there is such an instance in the absence of a beautiful sādhāraṇadharma, the alaṃkāra does not take shape, as there is no charm in it. This is common experience. If we do not hold that rūpakālaṃkāra does not take shape in the absence of a beautiful sādhāraṇa-dharma, then such example as, “bhāratam nāka-maṇḍalam” i.e. the Mahābhārata is heaven”, or ‘nagaram vidhumaṇḍalam’ i.e. this city is the orb of moon’, will not cause the apprehension of rūpaka, but this apprehension is surely caused when we hear such words as “suparvālaṃkṛtam”, and “sa-kala-kalam”, respectively. What can be the reason behind this ? Same is the case with reference to the famous illustration of rūpaka, such as

‘mukhaṃ candraḥ’. There is however, some difference between the two śliṣṭa-rūpakas, and this simple illustration viz. mukhaṃ candraḥ. It is that in the two instances of śliṣṭa rūpakas, the sādharma dharma being not known, i.e. a-prasiddha, it is pertinent to express it in so many words. But in the illustration viz. ‘mukhaṃ candraḥ’ the sādharma dharma is well known and hence need not be expressed in so many words. But if abhedānvaya is held to be the cause of the apprehension of rūpaka, and if we do not place sādharma in form of sādharma dharma, i.e. if we hold that the ‘dharma’ is not mentioned, we do not get rūpaka. How do we explain this ? Or, where the ‘sādharma dharma’ is not present there is no experience of camatkāra in such rūpakas. How do we explain this also ? On the contrary from the objector’s point of view this should not happen, because at such places, the āhārya-abhedā-jñāna between upamāna and upameya, without having expectancy of anything else, stays here independently on its own in a perfect form. So, accordingly here rūpaka also should take place and also the camatkāra resulting therefrom. Now those who believe in the ‘abhedānvaya’ of nāmārthas may say that, “for the apprehension of the abhedā-jñāna between two padārthas, or for the camatkāra caused thereby, it is required that there is an apprehension of a special or particular sādharma-dharma. But this also can not be held.

For, in the verse, viz. “yady anuṣṇo bhaved vahnir...” etc., even in the absence of the apprehension of the sādharma-dharma, the āhārya-abhedā or identification between ‘anuṣṇa’ and ‘vahnir’, and aṣṭa and ‘jala’ is apprehended. Thus you cannot say that the apprehension of sādharma-dharma is a must for āhārya abhedānvaya. Now, if you say that the special mark of the requirement of the apprehension of sādharma-dharma is only where it is a case of upamānōpameya, i.e. when there is āhārya-abhedā only, but then this is untenable since there is no authority in suggesting that the apprehension of that particular sādharma-dharma is a must in case of upamānōpameya only, when elsewhere there is apprehension of āhārya-abhedā independent of this. Again, in the absence of a sādharma-dharma, all ālambikāras accept the apprehension of abhedānvaya between ‘mukhaṃ’ and ‘candraḥ’, in the illustration viz. “mukhaṃ yadi candraḥ syāt tadā bhūmy avasthitam na syāt.” (In this sentence, there is no escape from accepting abhedānvaya because the rule of vyutpatti-śāstra suggests that the anvaya between two nāmārthas is always through abhedā-sambandha).

You may suggest that if it is accepted that there is only sādharma-lakṣaṇā in rūpaka, there will be no identity (i.e. tādātmya) between viśaya and viśayin, because, the abhedā that is expressed in rūpaka, is only between the upameya and upamāna-

sadrśa i.e. mukhaṃ and candra-sadrśa. In the absence of such identity, statements like “simhena sadrśo nā'yaṃ, kintu simho narādhipaḥ”, which are focussed on conveying abheda between the upameya and the upamāna would be meaningless. But this argument does not stand because such tādātmya is acceptable even to the lakṣaṇāvādins as explained while discussing the second and third views of the prācīnas.

It may again be held that according to the lakṣaṇāvādins, sādṛśya also is included in rūpaka and as such, it may be wrong to deny the sādṛśya (= simhena sadrśaḥ nā'yaṃ) while having rūpaka in 'simho narādhipaḥ'. This argument is rejected by saying that the negation meant here is only of the upamā based on bheda-ghaṭita-sādṛśya, while favouring rūpaka based on a-bheda-ghaṭita-sādṛśya.

Jagannātha now rejects an objection raised in case of “rāja-nārāyaṇam”, and ‘pādāmbujam’, etc., as follows. As suggested above, the lakṣyānvayabodha will be only ‘śakyatāvachedaka-prakāraka’ and thus by accepting rūpaka in ‘rāja-nārāyaṇa’, the ‘rājan’ would be understood only in form of ‘nārāyaṇatva’ so there will be nothing wrong in his having the embrace of Laxmī. In the same way if rūpakālaṃkāra is to be accepted in ‘pādāmbujam’, the pāda-jñāna will be ambujatvaparakāra and thus ‘mañjira-śiñjita-manoharatā’ in it will be incongruous. That is why upamā is to be accepted here in order to give importance to ‘pāda’ because the pāda-jñāna then, will be ‘pādatvāvacchinna’. “pādāmbajam’ ity ādau api rūpakasya svikāre pradhānibhūtottara-pādasyā'rthasyā'mbujatvenaiva pratīter mañju-mañjira-śiñjita-manoharatāyā anupapatteḥ. upamita-samāsā'yattópamāyāṃ tu pradhānasya pādasya pādatvenaiva pratītasya nā'sti tasyā anupapattir iti, na kōpi doṣaḥ.” (R.G. pp. 498, ibid)

Again, it is incorrect to hold that there would be no difference between upamā and rūpaka, on the ground that in both of them, the sādṛśya is being expressed by śabda (though of course by lakṣaṇā in rūpaka); because the sādṛśya in rūpaka is abheda-ghaṭita while in upamā it is bheda-karambīta, and J. explains the difference between the two. - “bheda'karambīta-sādṛśya-viśiṣṭasya rūpake lakṣyatvād upamā-vyapadeśasya a-prasakteḥ” (R.G. pp. 498, ibid). If it is argued that there can be an instance where the speaker makes a lakṣaṇika-prayoga like ‘mukhaṃ candraḥ’, etc., with the specific intention of conveying bheda-ghaṭita-sādṛśya, and this will have to be accepted as upamā, because sādṛśya is bheda-karambīta, but Jagannātha says that there cannot be any scope, in such places, for lakṣaṇā at all, as the main purpose of lakṣaṇā is to convey tādātmya which promises negation of bheda :

“nanu yatra bheda-ghaṭita-sādrśyavati vaktrā lakṣaṇayā mukhaṃ candra iti prayuktaṃ, tatra tathā’pyupamālaṃkāṛā”pattiḥ sthitaiveti cet, bheda-ghaṭita-sādrśya-pratipipādayiśākāle lakṣaṇayā tadvati śabda-prayogasya viruddhatvāt. lakṣaṇāyās tād rūpya-pratipipādayiśā”dhīnatvāt, na hi prayojanaṃ anuddiśya rūḍhi-vyati-riktayā lakṣaṇayā’rthaṃ pratipādayanty āryāḥ bheda-tādrūpyayor vipratīśiddhatvena yugapat-pratipatṛ-buddhyupārohā’sambhavāc ca.” (R.G. pp. 498, ibid).

The objector here raises a point as follows. In words like ‘puruṣa-vyāghra’, which are instance of upamā, in the sense of ‘tiger-like man’, the uttara-pada has to be taken to mean ‘vyāghra-sadrśa’ by lakṣaṇā, because there is no other word which expresses sādrśya. The acceptance of lakṣaṇā results in the acceptance of tādātmya-pratīti also as its prayojana; and this tādātmya-pratipatti makes it as an instance of rūpaka and not upamā. Now, when the position is like this, how is it that it is taken by the ancients as an instance of dvi-luptopamā ? Jagannātha answers this question in two ways. According to the grammarians who accept śakti in the whole of a samāsa, the word puruṣa-vyāghra itself conveys the meaning viz. “vyāghra-sādrśya-viśiṣṭa-puruṣa”, where the sādrśya is bheda-ghaṭita, or the upamāna-śabda, i.e. vyāghra, expresses by nirūḍha-lakṣaṇā, ‘bheda-ghaṭita-sādrśya-viśiṣṭa’ and this ‘bheda-ghaṭitatva’ will explain how it has been taken as an example of upamā by the prācīnas. - “atrocitate-upamita-samāsasya bheda-ghaṭitopamāna-sādrśya-viśiṣṭopameye śaktes tad-ghaṭakībhūtopamāna-śabdasya bheda-ghaṭita-sādrśya-viśiṣṭe nirūḍha-lakṣaṇāyā vā svikārād adosaḥ.” (R.G. pp. 499, ibid).

The anyonyā’śrayadoṣa which is raised in ‘vidvan-mānasa-hamṣa’ etc., holds Jagannātha, is of no consequence because everything in a poem, or say in art, being mainly based on fancy i.e. kalpanā or pratibhā, it is not a serious defect if one thing is dependent on another. In this connection Jagannātha gives an example of the beautiful construction by a mason, where the bricks are supported by each other. This is done in the discussion on rūpaka alaṃkāra later.

Jagannātha now takes care of the last objection raised by the Navīnas. It was suggested that the tādrūpya-pratyaya or cognition of tādrūpya-can not be the phala of sādrśya-lakṣaṇā in rūpaka, lest it should be accepted, in places like ‘candra-sadrśaṃ mukhaṃ’ also - “yad api uktaṃ, rūpake sadrśa-lakṣaṇāyāḥ phalaṃ tādrśya-pratyayo na yujyate. tat-sadrśa iti śabdaja-bodhā-nantaram api tathā-pratyayā”pattiḥ iti, tan na (R. G. pp. 499, ibid). Jagannātha holds that there is no

fear of such tādṛpya-pratyaya in the case of the latter, because there is no lakṣaṇā in it; and tādṛpya-pratyaya is only the phala of lakṣaṇā. Jagannātha concludes that the contention of the ancient writers has thus to be accepted on the authority of the Mahābhāṣya and such other works. In the Mahābhāṣya, while commenting on Pā. IV. i. 48, viz. 'pumyogād ākhyāyām', Patañjali raises a question viz. how can abheda exist between two distinctly different things ? In reply he contends that the abheda is being ascribed on four grounds; viz. 'tātstya' (i.e. being on a particular thing), 'tāddharma' (i.e. having the quality of a particular thing), 'tat-sāmīpya' (or being closer to a thing), and 'tat-sāhacarya', (or being associated with a particular thing), and he furnishes four examples to illustrate these respectively. Here, the sentence, "tādrūpyam āropyate na tu mukhyam", indicates that also in 'mukham candrah', the tādātmya is being ascribed by lakṣaṇā. All this goes against the Navīnas. Jagannātha thus defends the view of the ancients by refuting the views of the Navīnas such as Appayya Dixita, of course here, without naming him - "tat-saḍśa ity atra lakṣaṇāyā abhāvena tādrūpya-pratyayasyā'pādanā'yogāt. tādrūpya-pratyayo lakṣaṇāyāḥ phalam iti prācāṁ samayaḥ. mahābhāṣyā'di-granthānām asminnevā'nukūlatvāc ca. navyamate tu teṣāṁ ākulībhāvaḥ syād iti dik" - (R.G. pp. 499, ibid). See also Candrikā (pp. 189), on this - "navya-mate vācyayor evā'bhedo, 'caturbhiḥ prakārais tādrūpyam āropyate na tu mukhyam', ityāder asaṁgatiḥ spaṣṭā eva iti sārāṁśaḥ."

After dealing with śābda-bodha of sārōpā-lakṣaṇā, Jagannātha picks up the topic of śābda-bodha in sādhyavasānā lakṣaṇā. Here he discusses two views. In the illustration, viz. "candra-rājī virājate", where the upameya is completely omitted, the 'candra' śābda expresses the 'mukha' with its 'dharma', viz. 'mukhatva', but the ultimate śābda-bodha will be 'candratvaparakāra' only. The idea is that here, the 'mukha' will be cognized in the guise of 'candra', and not as 'mukha', and this difference between the padārthopasthiti and, śābda-bodha, as seen above, is the result of 'lakṣaṇā-jñāna.' : "sādhyavasānāyām ca 'candra-rājī virājate', ity ādau, candrā'diśābdaiḥ lakṣaṇāyā mukhyatvenōpasthāpitasyā'pi mukhā'deḥ śābda-bodhas candratvā'dinā bhavati, lakṣaṇā-jñānasyaiva mātmyāt" iti eke. - (R.G. pp. 699, ibid).

The other view is - "lakṣaṇāyā mukharvena mukhā'deḥ śābda-bodhe vṛtte, vyañjanayaika-śābdōpāttatva-prādurbhūtayā candratvena bodhaḥ" ity apare. (R.G. pp. 499, ibid) - This second view holds that even after the lakṣaṇā-jñāna the śābda-bodha will be mukhatva-prakāra-bodha, which is brought about by one vyañjanā, caused by 'eka-padōpāttatva'.

According to both these views, there will be the apprehension of 'mukhatva' and candratva directly, where as in sārōpa-sthala the candratva is cognised indirectly through 'candra-sadrśa', which is taken as the differentiating factor between sārōpā and sādhyavasānikā. - "matadvaye'py asmin mukhā"ḍau candratvabhāna-sāmagryā, mukhatvā"deḥ svadharmasya bhānam na nivāryate. itthaṃ caikasmin dharminī candratvā"ḍinām mukhatvā"ḍinām ca sāksād bhānam eva sārōpāto'sya vicchedakam" - (R.G. pp. 499, ibid) - Thus the śābda-bodha in 'candra-rājī', is "candratvavān mukhatvavān ca mukha-padārthaḥ". But for the ālaṃkārikas, the 'mukhatva' is completely concealed by 'candratva' just like the śuktitva at the time of the apprehension of silver in the mother of pearl, and so there can be no cognition of the same in the śābda-bodha. Accordingly, therefore, the difference between sārōpā and sādhyavasānā is that mukhatva is cognized in the former while it is totally hidden in the latter.

Thus, the discussion on lakṣaṇā which started with the śāstrakāras such as the Vaiyākaraṇas, Mīmāṃsakas and Naiyāyikas, and for whom it was only applied to the problem of language, takes a marvellous turn when discussed by the ālaṃkārikas who discuss lakṣaṇā from the point of view of a poetic expression. Lakṣaṇā which started as a doṣa with the Mīmāṃsakas becomes a source of beauty with the poets, and later giants like Appayya and Jagannātha maintain the balance between śāstra and aesthetics, while discussing the śābdabodha on one hand of some varieties of lakṣaṇa, of course as evidenced in poetic illustrations, and the poetic beauty capped by the prayojana on the other, maintaining the aesthetic analysis.



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