SAHRDAYALOKA
[ Thought-currents in Indian Literary Criticism]
[Vol. I, Part 2]

L. D. Series : 142

General Editor
Jitendra B. Shah

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Publisher's Note

We feel pleasure to place before the learned “SAHRDAYÄLOKA” OR “Thought-currents in Indian Literary Criticism” - (Vol. I) by Prof. Tapasvi Nandi. The author hardly requires any introduction to the learned working in the area of Sanskrit Alamkārarśāstra or Literary Aesthetics. The work attempts to cover the basic thought-currents prevalent in Sanskrit Literary criticism, trying to unearth the origin and development of each topic beginning with the “Definition and scope of poetry, Sanskrit semantics, the theories of Dhvani, Rasa etc.” The author has taken care to record and accept the views of his predecessors in his area of research and has very gratefully acknowledged the honourable acceptance of their views and has also tried to discuss modestly differences of opinion if any, at various places. The whole work presents the material in an historical, critical and comparative perspective. We feel sure that the learned will appreciate his efforts in an unbiased way. Prof. Nandi's observations on Dhvani and Rasa deserve special mention as he has made a special effort to explain how these thought currents which form a special contribution of Indian Literary Aesthetics are relevant even to-day and how they can be applied to the most modern patterns of literature world over, including absurd poetry and absurd theatre as well.

The author also proposes to bring out Vol. II covering the area of literary criticism that is not discussed in the present volume, of course, god willing.

We are thankful to Prof. Nandi for agreeing with us to publish the present work. We are also thankful to the Swaminarayan press, and all our colleagues in seeing this work through. Hope this work will stand the test of the learned and will fill a gap left out by earlier experts. It may be noted that for the sake of convenience, this work is presented in three parts such as, Part I - chs. I-VII (pp. 1-575); Part II - chs. VIII-XIII (pp. 576-1195) and Part III - chs. XIV - XVIII (pp. 1196-1843), with select Bibliography (pp. 1844-1850) appearing at the end of Part III. The Publisher's note, the author's preface - Namaskaromi, contents, detailed contents and abbreviations appear in all the three parts.

Jitendra Shah

L. D. Institute Of Indology,
Ahmedabad.
“Namaskaromi....”

Salutations to the Divine!
Salutations to my three Mahā-gurus;
Salutations to my parents,
Salutations to all the sources
consulted by me

And, Salutations to all of you, who are all all sparks of the Divine!

“Aum pūrṇam adāh, pūrṇam idam
pūrṇat pūrṇam udacyate
pūrṇasya pūrṇam ādāya
pūrṇam evāva śisyate.”

“That [Source, which has been drawn upon by me is respectable and] is perfect,

This [Work, which is presented before you in this respectable shape] is perfect.

Perfect (material-; ideas, inspiration) has been drawn from perfect
(respectable, reliable source). After drawing upon perfect (material) from perfect
(and respectable source), only the perfect is left behind (before you).”

This, in short, is the story of my spiritual endeavour that started on 7th Aug.
2000 A.D. and reached its completion on 20th July, 2003 A.D.

The great yogin said, “In the stillness of the night, the eternal speaks.” And
yes; I do not know when, in the stillness of the night, my eyes kept wide open
staring in the darkness around me, and when these thought-currents sneaked into
my inner consciousness from various sources-first like light ripples of the quiet and
dignified flow of the sacred Gaṅgā, and then like the mighty billows of the stormy
Atlantic, dashing against the shores, washing them clean. They settled into my
mind and then sank deep into it. I do not know when my eyes were closed and
I was overpowered by sleep, as if embraced by the Divine Grace! I feel floating in the wide stream, rich in currents and cross-currents, whirls and pulls; deep, full fathom five; quiet and dignified. I feel dragged and dragged, up and down, and then I slip towards the bottom, like in the womb of the mother earth, with a hundred thousand daffodils, red and pink, green, blue, white, violet and golden - on top of the surface!

So, as suggested in the beginning, I have accepted, with gratitude, of course after verifying with the original, the material, - line by line, paragraph by paragraph, at times, - from the works of my predecessors, who I thought are most reliable, and for whom I have tremendous respect and love in my heart, - from their works, dealing with the topics of word and meaning as discussed by the ancients - the Mimāṃsakas, the Naiyāyikas and above all the great Vaiyākaranas, - the “prathame hi vidvāṃsah” as Ānandavardhana would call them. I take these works as starting points, and as absolutely reliable sources and they are authored by great scholars such as Dr. P. C. Chakrawarty, Prof. Devasthali and Prof. Dr. K. Kunjunni Raja, Dr. Sri P. Ramchandrudu and some others. At every step, wherever I have sought inspiration and help from these master works, I have clearly indicated my indebtedness.

My work has grown both in size and dignity due to this, like the sacred flow of the Gangā growing vaster and vaster with the waters from the innumerable springs, rivulets and rivers mixing with the main stream; and shooting out from the bosom of the great Nagādhirāja Himalaya. Those who have undertaken the “caturdhāma yātrā” are a witness to this. By accepting everything from various springs the Gangā has carved out its own identity, sanctity and dignity. Same is the case with this work. I owe a lot to the great modern rṣi-trayi-i.e. Dr. P. V. Kane, Dr. S. K. De and Dr. V. Raghavan, in particular, who has shaped my views on Bhoja. But it may also be noted that, without showing disrespect, I have ventured to dispute their results, and this happens quite often with Dr. Raghavan, when I feel, on verifying with the original words of Bhoja, that I am on firmer ground. This, the discreet will find out for himself, and there is no doubt about it. But this does not minimize their greatness and my adoration for their lotus-feet. They are the great thinkers spreading light and bearing the torch of Indian Literary Aesthetics for the modern scholars, both in east and west alike.

Over and above this, I owe everything, - i.e. beginning from my initiation into this ancient lore of Sāhitya-śāstra to whatever I have done till day, in serving its
cause, to my great gurus - the three of them, the ‘guru-śikhi-trayi’ of professors R. C. Parikh, R. B. Athavale, and Dr. V. M. Kulkarni and especially Dr. Kulkarni; for it is he who even to-day, at the age of 85+ yrs., inspires me, guides me and blesses me and in my moments of personal despondency fills me with warmth, love, guidance and inspiration.

I am also indebted to the works of some of my senior contemporaries and to most of them personally also when I have met them, such as Dr. Rama Rañjan Mukherjee, Dr. Mukund Madhava Sharma, Dr. Pratap Bandopadhyāya, Prof. Dr. Satyavrata Shastri, Prof. Rasik Vihari Joshi and my most respected and learned friends such as Prof. Dr. Rewaprasad Dwivedi, Prof. Dr. Kamalesh Dutta Tripathi, the late Prof. Ramcandra Dwivedi (Jaipur), the late Prof. Biswanath Bhattacharya (Shantiniketan), the late Prof. K. Krishnamoorthy, Prof. N. P. Unni, Prof. Dr. K. K. Chaturvedi, and prof. Dr. S. D. Joshi, and some very brilliant young friends such as Prof. Dr. Sarojaben Bhave, Dr. C. Ramchandran, Prof. Dr. V. N. Jha, Dr. G. C. Tripathi, Dr. Radhavallabh Tripathi, Prof. M. M. Agrawal Dr. Goparaju, Rama, Dr. Jagannātha Pathak, and the rest. I have met all these dignitaries personally and I stand benifitted. I also will show my respect for Prof. Sri. Ramchandrudu for his great work on Jagannātha. True, my Guru Prof. Athavale taught me some portion of the great R. G., and his work on Pundit Jagannātha is monumental.

So, I am made of all these stalwarts. But kindly note that with all this I remain myself, i.e. I have carefully carved out and preserved my identity. If at all I have accepted their ideas and views as sacred mantra, it is because I feel convinced about the same. I feel convinced first about their reliability and integrity, and then their output; their great reputation apart. Believe me, and I am honest, that I have practically verified every source in the original, before putting the stamp of my humble acceptance of their thoughts and writing. It is never a blind acceptance. In the words of Rājaśekhara - “tad etad svākaraṇam, na tu haraṇam.” I have accepted them, for I have found them acceptable, like the great Vāgdevatāvatāra Mammatā or the great Kalikāla-Sarvajñā ācārya Hemacandra accepting the dictates of Abhinavagupta-pādācārya, or like the latter himself accepting the ruling of his seniors when he says:

“ūrdhvo’rdhvam āruhya yad artha-tattvam
dhiḥ paśyati, śrāntim avedayanti,
phalaṁ tad ādyaiḥ parikalpitānāṁ
viveka-sopāna-paramparānām.”
However, the discreet will find out that my acceptance ends with the field covering the ancient literature laying down the thoughts of the Mīmāṃsakas, the Naiyāyikas and the Vaiyākaraṇas. With our entry into the wide and open field of Alamkāraśāstra proper, i.e. with the works of Bharata, Bhāmaha and down to Jagannātha, of course including Ānandavardhana, Abhinavagupta and Mammaṭa, I have tried to project some original line of thinking that may prove to be of great value to the adhikārins. This is a modest claim but a sure one. I have accepted ideas and also drafting from Gnoli, Masson, Patwardhan, K. Krishnamooothy, and the rest, but with a touch of my own original contribution. I feel I am on absolutely sure and safe ground when I travel through this area of alamkāra-śāstra proper, converying nearly two thousand years of creative thinking. My work will surely guide the adhikārī aspirant who wants to have a glimpse of the greatness of the Indian ācāryas, who have left behind their foot-prints on the sands of literary aesthetics. It may be noted that I have presented the rasa theory in a new perspective, and believe me, this is what I claim for sure, - a perspective which acknowledges the catholicity of rasa theory as it seems to serve the cause even of what they term ‘absurd theatre’ or ‘absurd poetry’. I am sure the discerning will take note of all this and try to evaluate this work in an unbiased way. At the same time may I remind the learned of the words of Jayanta who said, “kutōsti nūtanaṃ vastu ?”, or of the words quoted as above of Abhinavagupta suggesting that all fresh results follow the achievements of the earlier masters, i.e. after climbing the ‘viveka-sopāna-paramparā’ one gets into something fresh. So, I invite the sensitive and thoughtful adhikārins to have a soft corner for me and extend their helping hand. The great Mahimā observes : (Vyakti-viveka) -

“yuktōyam ātmasadṛśān prati me prayatno
nā'sty eva taj jagati, sarva-manoharam yat,
kecij jvalanti, vikasanyt, apare nimilanty
anye yad abhyudayabhāji jagat-pradipe.”

The discerning are requested to read every line, before pronouncing a judgement.... I wish that only those, through whose arteries and veins alamkāra-śāstra flows, should venture to review this work. No lesser soul should attempt it.

So, we humbly say -

“adya pratyayate’smābhih
viduṣām prītaye mudā
aṣṭādaśādhihkarini
mīmāṃsā kāvya-vartmani.”
This forms only the first volume of my “Saḥṛdayā"loka” or “Thought-currents in Indian Literary Criticism.” The proposed second volume will try to study the concepts of guṇa, doṣa, alaṃkāra, lakṣaṇa, aucitya, rīti, vṛtti, kaviśiksā and some modern writers on Sanskrit poetics, such as Dr. Rewaprasadjee etc.

I sincerely thank the publishers and Shri. Dr. Jitendra Shah the Director, L. D. Institute of Indology, Ahmedabad, for seeing this work through. I also thank his colleagues, and also Principal Kanjibhai Patel for kindly co-operating with us. The press - Shri Swaminārāyaṇa Mudraṇa Mandir, of course deserves full praise and thanks for doing its job so carefully.

I also thank, Smt. Harsha Nandi, my wife, Smt. Chinmayee M. Rali, my beloved daughter, M. Pharm., Dr. Mayur S. Rali, M.D., D.G.O., my son-in-law, and our two grandsons - Parth who studies medicine, and Mit, doing physiotherapy bearing with me through all the inconveniences caused due to my sādhanā, and providing love and inspiration through out the course of these three years when this work was carried out. I also thank the Divine, and our Sadguru Raja-yogī Shri Narendrajee for his blessings and who has also suggested that even after this polite achievement, I have to travel further, through the woods, dark, deep and lovely, before I rest and lay down my pen. Aum mā Aum. iti Śivam...

19 Aug. 2004
Āsopālava,
4, Professors' Colony,
Navrangpura,
Ahmedabad-380009.
(Gujarat State)
India.

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### Abbreviations

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<td>Abhidhāvṛttta-Mātrkā of Mukula.</td>
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<td>Alaṃkāra-śekhara-Keśava;</td>
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<td>B.</td>
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<td>Dha</td>
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<td>Dhv. L.</td>
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<td>J.</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Kāvyālaṃkāra, Bhāmaha.</td>
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<td>K. P.</td>
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<td>Mī-Sū.</td>
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<td>Mbh.</td>
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<td>Mammaṭa.</td>
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<td>Nāṭaka-Lakṣaṇa-Ratna-Koṣa</td>
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<td>Sā-Sāyana (in Vedic context)</td>
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<td>S-D.</td>
<td>Sāhityadarpaṇa-Viśvaṇātha</td>
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<td>SP.</td>
<td>Sanskrit Poetics, S. K. De.</td>
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<td>Vātsyāyana</td>
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SAHṆDAYĀLOKA

[Thought-currents in Indian Literary Criticism]

Part-II

In part I of this work, topics such as definition and scope of poetry and śabda-vyāpāra-vicāra, have been discussed in a thread-bare analysis. It may be noted that the topic of definition has been considered in its under connotation and thus while dealing with the ancients such as Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin and the rest, an attempt is made to include not only direct references to the definitions attempted by these masters as such, but a closer look at all characteristics covered up in defining individual types such as the sarga-bandha etc. are also taken into consideration, thus leading us to a wider, richer and comparatively more critical concept of poetry as imagined by the masters. Similarly all functions of the poetic word such as abhidhā or the direct power of expression and lakṣanā or Indication etc. are approached in a broader and more critical view-point touching also in between the topic of ‘pratīyamāṇa’ or implicit sense as seen by pre-Ānandavardhana literary critics.

With vyañjanā or the power of suggestion part II continues its investigation onwards in the realm of thought-currents in the field of literary criticism in ancient India.
Chapter VIII

‘Vyañjanā’

‘Vyañjanā’ or suggestion as a word-power, over and above the powers of expression (abhidhā) and indication (lakṣaṇā) was promulgated and established, first, so far as available written documents are concerned, by Ānandavardhana in the context of kāvya or literature. We have seen how Bhāmaha, and other earlier ālāmķārikas have taken care of the implicit sense - ‘pratiyamāna artha’ in their own way without going into the details concerning the topic of śabda-vṛttis in a formal way. Ānandavardhana as a literary critic could not abstain from a theoretical treatment of vyañjanā, though of course he also did not make an attempt to define various śabda-vṛttis as done by later ālāmķārikas such as Mammaṭa and the rest. Ānandavardhana is clear that his theory of vyañjanā-dhvani-rasa is modelled on the thinking of the great grammarians, the first among the learned. Abhinavagupta strongly supports him and so also Mammaṭa and the rest. But before looking into Ānandavardhana, Abhinavagupta and Mammaṭa and others, we will to try to trace the origin of the concept of vyañjanā in earlier literature beginning with the the vedas. Clear references to ‘rasa’ in the aesthetic sense are also available in ancient literature, but for the concept of vyañjanā we have to strive harder to locate clear references.

The Vedic sages, being poets - ‘ṛṣi-kavi’ - had grasped the fact that the face meaning of a given utterance is only a part of its total meaning. People attempting to analyse the literal meaning only are likely to miss the real significance of speech. A beautiful hymn from the Rgveda reads as - (8/2/23/4) -

“utá tvāḥ pāśyaṁ na dadarśā váca-
mutá tvāḥ śṛṇvāṁ na śṛṇoty enām,
uto tvasmāi tanvam ṭ visasre
jáyéva patya uśatī suvāsāḥ.”
Durga comments: “artha-parijñānakalā hi vāg ity abhiprāyāḥ.
Another hymn also lauds the collection of meaning - (R.G. 8/2/24/4)
“utā tvam sakhyē sthirāpitam āhur
nāinam hinvanty āpi vājinesu,
adhenvā carati māyāyaisā
vācam śusruvāṃ aphalām aṇuṣpām.”

Durga has - artham vācaḥ puspaphalam āha. etc. These hymns are read in Nirukta also, and therefore Durga is referred to.

There is yet another hymn (R.G. X. 71.2), wherein it is observed -
“saktum iva titauṇā punanto
yatra dhīrā manasā vācam akrata.
ātra sakhāyā sakhyāni jānate
bhadraīśāṃ lakṣmīri nihitādhi vāci.”

“Winnowing away the chaff from the grain” the poets select their words. Only men of equal scholarship and literary taste can fully appreciate their poems.

Thus the vedic poet is aware of the inner significance of language.

**Coming to the grammarians. Mimāmsakas and Naivāvikas it may be observed that they were concerned only with the scientific use of language and certainly not the emotive use of it. Hence, it is natural that we do not come across any clear reference to or appreciation of the vyaṇγya or suggested sense.** We will quote from Dr. Saroja Bhide who observes in her paper on, “vyaṇjanā as reflected in the formal structure of language” (Ref. “Glimpses of Ancient Indian Poetics”, pp. 91-96, Edited by Sudhakar Pandey and V. N. Jha, - Shri. Garib Dass Oriental Series, No. 166, Sri Sadguru Publications, A division of Indian Book Centre - Delhi-India) - certain facts.

But prior to this, let us see what Yāska has to say about vyaṇjanā or dyotana.

Talking about upasargas Yāska observes: (Nirukta I. i) “na nirbaddhāḥ upasargā arthān nirāhur iti śakatayano, nāmā”khyātayos tu karmōpasamyogādyotakā bhavanī, uccāvacāḥ padārthā bhvantittī gārgyas tad ya eṣu padārthāḥ prāhur ime, tan nāmārthhayor artha-vikaraṇam.”
Yāska's position as to the nature of upasargas may be debated but what is of supreme importance here is that he quotes Śākaṭāyana who is his predecessor, and who maintains that upasargas (are meaningless), being unable to convey meaning separately or independently taken as word-units. Śākatayana therefore observes that they are only ‘dyotakas’ - i.e. revealers or say manifestors or manifesting agency only, of the relation of nāma and ākhyāta with a special meaning. They are like torches that reveal a relation, without having any meaning of their own. Now this ‘dyotakatva’ or power to manifest something is with the nipātas, according to Śākaṭāyana. It is to be debated - whether this ‘dyotakatva’ can be equated with the ‘vyañjana’ or manifestation of sphaṇa of the grammarians or, with the dyotana/vyañjana i.e. suggestion of the ālamkārikas. We know that Ānandavardhana was clear that vyañjana as a word-power is seen in kāvya, but vyañjanā goes even beyond kāvya and is more than a word-power and is seen even in gestures, musical notes having no dictionary meaning, in colours with reference to the art of painting, in mudrās of dance, and in fact in all art-forms other than literature. Vyañjanā as a word-power is seen, as is accepted by Ānandavardhana in our normal use of language in the work-a-day world also. Thus, ‘dyotakatva’ of Śākaṭāyana could be equivalent to the vyañjakatva of sphaṇa, as well as to the more liberal meaning of suggestion, given to it by Ānandavardhana. Thus, we may not be very far, off the target, if we observe, that roots of vyañjanā are as old as Śākaṭāyana, who was earlier than Yāska, and perhaps as old as the, not so clear acceptance of the same, by the vedic poets, who knew that Vāk is gifted with an inner meaning revealed only to the ‘adhikārin’.

Now, again we will proceed with Dr. Saroja Bhāte's observation (pp. 93-95, ibid) - “The point to be noted in this connection is that it is implied by all the rhetoricians that the dhvani is purely subjective or intuitive. It flashes in the heart of the reader as soon as he reads a particular sentence, word or a word-element. The question, that arises therefore is, do all readers comprehend the same ‘dhvani’ from a certain linguistic expression? Or does it change from reader to reader? Even if it is admitted that it is only the sahrdayas, the connoisseurs that have the ability to grasp the suggested meaning, do all the aesthetes agree in their understanding of the same ‘dhvani’ from an expression?

Generally they do not. The suggested meaning is thus a purely subjective matter. Two readers may not read the same meaning between the lines of poetry. And more subjective is the appreciation of a literary piece, the less theoretical it
turns out to be. This leads to the lack of uniformity, precision and accuracy that is essential to make a system a formal science. It is precisely for this inconsistent and obscure character of the 'dhvani' that the naiyāyikas 'logicians', like Jayantabhaṭṭa vehemently attacked the dhvani theory and rejected vyañjanā as a separate function.


"etena śabda-sāmarthya-mahimnā
so'pi vāритaḥ,
yam anyaḥ paṇḍitaṃ manyaḥ
prapede kañcana-dhvanim."]

This aspect of the doctrine of dhvani and vyañjanā seems to lead poetics away from a formal science. It tends to be more intuitive than theoretical.

One therefore wonders if some kind of uniformity can be brought about in the literary evaluation, based on dhvani, of a piece of poetry. Apparently diverse emotive and attitudinal meanings cannot be tied down to any linguistic factors, although some of them have been found to be associated with accent and intonation.

More than two thousand years ago, Pāṇini, the foremost grammarian of sanskrit, analysed the Sanskrit language and successfully handled the suggested meaning at the level of the structure of language. In his aśṭādhyāyī he showed at least in 200 rules that many emotive and attitudinal meanings were relevant to the form of language. The attitudinal meaning is associated not only with intonation and accent, but also with different linguistic elements such as suffixes, prefixes and even augments. A few illustrations will make the point clear.

The preposition 'api' in the expression 'api stuyād vṛṣalām' - 'he may praise even an outcaste', conveys disgust in the mind of the speaker, according to p. I. 4.96.*

*[Foot-note : 9, p. 96 ibid read -

P. I. 4.96 : ‘apiḥ paḍārtha-śaṃbhāvanāṃvaya-sarga-garhā-śaṃuccayeṣa.’ - 'Api' is called when it conveys the meaning of a word, - possibility, permission, censure or collection.’]

- When, however, disgust is not intended the speaker says, 'apiṣṭuyād vṛṣalām', 'one may' praise an outcaste.*
*[Foot-note 10, p. 96 - reads -

Here ‘S’ in the beginning of the form ‘stuyād’ changes into Š because it is preceded by ‘api’ which is an ‘upasarga’ and not a ‘karma-pravacaniya’.] - Thus the status of ‘api’ and the consequent phonological change (s - Š) are directly connected with the emotive meaning suggested by its use.

Impatience or urgency is conveyed by the kṛt suffix Namul according to p. 3.4.52.*

*[Foot-note no. 11, pp. 96, reads -

p. 3.4.52, ‘apādāne parīpsāyām’ - ‘the suffix Nam UL is added after a root preceded by an ‘apādāna’ (a word in the ablative) when impatience is to be conveyed.] - The illustration given in the commentaries is, ‘śayyōttthāyam dhāvati’ - ‘(he) runs straight away from the bed.’ The undertone is that he is so impatient that he does not care even to dress up after getting out of the bed and runs towards something. If no hurry or impatience is to be conveyed, the expression would be, ‘śayyāyā utthāya dhāvati’, ‘(he) runs after having got up from the bed.’

The feeling of appreciation is transmitted through secondary suffixes. The suffix ‘rūpa’ added after the word ‘Vaiyākaraṇa’ in the form, ‘Vaiyākaraṇarūpāḥ’, ‘a praiseworthy grammarian’, conveys the speaker’s appreciation of the grammarian.*

[* Foot-note 12, pp. 96, reads -

p. 5.3.66 - ‘praśaṃsāyām rūpam’. ‘The suffix rūpap is added after a stem to convey appreciation.’] - If there is no appreciation, the speaker uses the form, ‘vaiyākaraṇaḥ’, ‘grammarian’.

These are just a few of the many examples available in Pāṇini’s grammar. These illustrations show how minutely Pāṇini has observed the nuances and their correspondence with the formal structure of Sanskrit language. He has linked many other feelings such as anger, jealousy, love, hatred, insult, etc. with diverse linguistic elements such as primary and secondary suffixes. His treatment of quite a large number of word formations which are linked with the ‘dvani’ indicates that the emotive and attitudinal meanings can be formalised at least to a certain extent. Thus vyañjanā which often expresses speaker’s intention or presupposition towards an object or a situation, plays a crucial role in the derivational system of Pāṇini. It is incorporated in the formal analysis of the sanskrit language. In this structural approach the suggested meaning of linguistic expression is fixed and does not vary from listener to listener. The
vyāñjanā theory developed by the poeticians fails to explain this correlation between the linguistic forms and the emotive meanings, which is clearly pointed out by Pāṇini’s grammar.

The question that emerges from the foregoing observations is, can the dhvani language of the poets, which is deliberately rendered ambiguous to create a charming effect, be put to a uniform objective analysis, at least to a certain extent, as Pāṇini did? Is it possible to bring about uniformity in the comprehension of dhvani by all readers by establishing correlation between emotive meanings and the formal structure of the language? Can such formalization render poetics more theoretical than intuitive? Is it really expected to be so?

One has to admit that the structural approach to vyāñjanā has its limitations. The meaning of poetry is not a fixed thing and is open to interpretations. The true sahṛdayas, people of taste, always consider that poetry the best which, like a veiled beauty, conceals its grace and charm and allows the aesthetes to discover it in their own way. The intuitive communication cannot be fastened to the rules of grammar. Nevertheless, a preliminary claim can be made on the basis of the observations made above that linguistic analysis carried in the Pāṇinian way may provide some insights for the exploration of dhvani and bring about uniformity at least on the initial level in the applied criticism related to Sanskrit Poetry.

This rather long quotation from Dr. Bhaté proves many points. (i) That Pāṇini is not totally averse to vyāñjanā (ii) Dr. Bhaté has observed that Pāṇini goes to accept vyāñjanā at the ground level, i.e. in common parlance. We may name it as “rūḍha vyāñjanā” as is the case with ‘rūḍha laksanā’ seen in the language of daily usage.

From this we have to take a leap further. As is the case of local usage, so also in case of poetic usage we can imagine Pāṇini’s approval, of course silent, as he had no business to include this aspect for he was dealing only with the limited goal of providing a structure for a scientific use of language. As was the case with the Naiyāyikas and Mīmāṃsakas, and we should not care for voices of a Jayant Bhatta here, even grammarians, and here Pāṇini in particular, were dealing with only the scientific use of language and not with total use of language and therefore this context did not allow Pāṇini to go all out for vyāñjanā. As to Dr. Bhāte’s observation of non-unanimity among aesthetes concerning the emotive meaning of dhvani of a given line of poetry, we may say that actually all vyāñjanās, like the anekārthas of a word with multiple sense,
prop up simultaneously and it is due to the limitation of an individual asthete that he does not grasp a particular suggested sense which others have grasped. Thus an objective evaluation of emotive meaning may not logically fail us, given all conditions being satisfied simultaneously. In the famous illustration, viz. “gatóstam arkaḥ” Mammaṭa explains how various suggested senses are grasped by various agents. But this is because of individual limitations. Thus, in a way, we can attempt a uniform objective analysis in case of vyanjanā also. This is another way of approaching this problem. Or, this non-unanimity may be taken as a bhūṣaṇa and not a duṣaṇa of poetic language.

It may also be noted that if Dr. Bhatere wants to suggest that a scientific approach to language is the only thing which should happen to men who are a thinking animal, and if she feels that it was this approach only that was acceptable to Pāṇini, Patanjali and the rest of thinkers, then we feel she is off the mark. But hopefully she does not mean it. She only attempts to point out to the limitations of poetic use of language, when put to test by scientific principles. Actually this scientific approach in our estimation, is considered only so far as the various disciplines - sāstras-are concerned. Even the grammarians, Mīmāṃsakas and Naiyāyikas perhaps know it. Otherwise the famous saying viz.

“tarkēśu karkaśadhiyaḥ
vayam eva nā’nye,
kāvyēśu kolamadhiyaḥ
vayam eva nā’nye.”

would not have been floated and no Bhāmaḥa or Vāmana would have ever thought of contemplating how vyākaraṇa and nyāya (= kāvyanyāna) operate in a special way in the realm of poetry. We may quote in our support from Dr. Rajā (pp. 280. Indian theories of Meaning, Ed. ’69 Adyar Madras), who quotes J. Borough (pp. 176, Some Indian Theories of Meaning) : “Most philosophic discussions of meaning confine themselves to a relatively small portion of language behaviour, namely, statements which describe or report a state of affairs- the propositions of the natural sciences, or, more generally, such statements as are traditionally handled by logic.” We may add that this observation pertains only to the use of language in sāstras i.e. scientific use of language, or, language in popular usage, but that does not negate the possibility of the thinkers concerned, of accepting the emotive use of language in the field of poetry i.e. literature proper. We also do not
agree with a remark from Bertrand Russel quoted by Dr. Raja, who observes: (pp. 282, ibid) ... (even) 'music may be considered as a form of language in which emotion is divorced from information.' (Human knowledge, its scope and limits, p. 73). No asthete of ancient India will accept Russell's observation when he takes music as a form of language. When we talk of language, we accept that the word used in a language, has a primary meaning, a dictionary meaning, an expressed sense. Then it may have an indicated and/or suggested meaning. But, music has 'word' meaning 'sound', - 'dhvani' of the grammarians - conveying only an emotive or suggested meaning and it certainly does not have a primary expressed sense. If we talk of 'language' of music, we can talk of 'language' of dance, painting, sculpture, architectural edifice, etc. also. But here the word 'language' is used only in a metaphorical sense.

So, returning to Pāṇini, Patañjali and Bhartṛhari, we strongly advocate our position that they were not only not unaware of the fact of vyañjanā, even in the scientific use of language, they also were inclined to respect the same in local usage and poetic use of language as well. The following discussion will support our observation.

In the Mbh. (= Mahābhāṣya) we have noted elsewhere clear references to abhidhā and guṇavṛtti. Clear references to vyañjanā, without naming the same, are also seen as will be discussed below. This will strengthen our observation as above that because such great minds as Yāska, Pāṇini; Patañjali, Jaimini, Śabara, Gotama, Kañāda and the ancient thinkers belonging to the JAINA and Baudhā darsānas, had no direct business to deal with poetic or emotive use of language in their works on various disciplines, they abstain from making any direct allusion to either vyañjanā or vyañgyārtha. But this should not be interpreted as either their complete ignorance of, or absolute non-acceptance of vyañjanā with reference to the usages in ordinary parlance or in poetry of their times. Pāṇini, we know, on the authority of Ānandavardhana, was a great poet also who had composed even mahākāvyas. Now, such a great mind, who revels both in kāvya and śāstra alike, cannot be absolutely ignorant of, or at logger heads with the poetic use of language, involving vyañjanā. They do not allude to or discuss vyañjanā, it is safer to conject, because they had no business to do it in their śāstra works. There are clear references in the Mbh., which almost go to prove that Patañjali, and therefore Pāṇini also, knew and accepted vyañjanā, so far as emotive use of language was concerned with reference to poetry. We may hold that all such reference where
terms such as ‘gamayati’, ‘gamayataḥ’, ‘adhi-gamayati’, ‘adhi-gamanye’, ‘gamaka’, ‘gamakarva’, etc. are used in the Mbh. do not take us anywhere near vyañjanaḥ, because all these usages are in the sense of, “is understood” - only. Nowhere, we have the sense of ‘is suggested’.

But clear references to the concept of what we know as vyañjanaḥ could be read at,

(i) “abhivyakta” - at Pā. 8.2.46; Mbh. pp. 407, (Ref. to Keilhom edn.) line 21 - as in - “nirdesād eva idam abhivyaktam dīrgnāsyā grahaṇām”; the term ‘abhivyaktam’, has a clear bearing on the sense, viz. ‘is suggested’

(ii) vyañjanam : Similarly, at Pā. 8.2.48, Mbh. on Vārttika 3, pp. 408, 409 we read - aṅjera aṅjanam, aṅjanam ca prakāśanam. aṅkōkṣīni ity ucyate yat tat sitam cāsitam cittat prakāśayati. tathāṅjera vyañjanam, vyañjanam ca prakāśanam. yat tat snehena, madureṇa ca jādikṛtānām indriyānām svasmin ātmani vyavasthāpanam, sa rāgas, tad vyañjanam. anvartam khalvapi nirvacanam. vyājyate anena iti vyañjanam.

This is a clear reference to vyañjana or vyañjanā meaning ‘suggestion’.

(iii) ‘vyakti’ or ‘vyakta’ in the sense of manifestation is seen as below : ‘vyakti’ at Pā. I. i. 57, line 26; pp. 145 Mbh. and at Pā. I. 2.52 line 23, pp. 228, Mbh.; etc.

There are also numerous references such as ‘vyakta’ at pā. I. i. 27 13/14 line p. 86; I. i. 57 line, Page 145; i. 65 11/171; I. iii. 1; 8/256; I. iii. 48; 10/10 283; I. iv. 110; 2/358; II. i. 1; 24/26; 362; II. ii. 19; 15/417; II. iv. 77; 13/415; III. i. 26; 24/32; IV. iv. 67; 2/356; VIII i. 51; 10/377; VIII 2.48; 13/13/408; etc.

All these references carry the sense of manifestation which could be suggestion, or which could not be suggestion.

(iv) But clearest references to vyañjanā can be read ih usages of dyut, in verbal forms such as “dyotyate”, “dyotita”, and “dyotya”. They are as under :

“dyotyate” - at Pā. II. iii. 20; 11/13/14 page 453 The sutra is : “yenaṅgavikārah” - Mbh. has - aṅgāt vikṛtatṛtiyā vaktavyā tenaiva ced vikāreṇa aṅgī dyotata iti vaktavyam... yenāvayoṣam samudāyoṅgi dyotate ċasmin bhavatavyaṁ na caitenāvayaṁ samudāyo dyotyate.”

The sense of “is suggested” is very clear in this passage and this is a pure allusion to vyañjanā.
“dyotya” - we have ‘dyotya’ at Pā. II. i. 10; 19/379; III. i. 7; 2/13 & III. i. 125; 13/88.

The references read as - ‘dyotya’ - Pā. III. i. 10; 19/379 - “ayathājātiyake dyotye”. Pā. III. i. 7; 2/13 - “ina yo višëṣa upādhir vopādiyate, dyotye tasmin tena bhavitavyam.” Pā. III. i. 125; 13/88 is - “āhosvid āvaśyate dyotya iti. Then we have vārttika, such as -

“āvaśyaka upapada iti ced dyotya upasamkjyānam.” (i)

The M.bh. reads - “āvaśyaka upapada iti; ced dyotya upasamkjyānam kartavyam, lātavyam, pāvyam astu tarhi dyotye.

Then we have vārttika - 2

“dyotya iti cet svara-samāsā’nupapattih” - M.bh. reads - ‘dyotya’ iti cet samāsā’nupapattih.” Here the sense is of suggestion.

Again, we have the usage of the word ‘rasa’ in a very very clear aesthetic sense of the term as in ‘rasika’ at Pā. V. ii. 95: 21/394. The sutra reads as - “rasādibhyaś ca”. Rasa in the sense of physical taste such as the salty (i.e. lavana) etc. is of course seen here. But on Vārttika - “rasādibhyāḥ punar vacanam anya-nivṛttyartham” (1), the M.bh. has - “rasādibhyāḥ punar vacanam kriyate’nyesāṁ matvarthiyānām prathiśedhārtham. matub eva yathā syādyeyne matvarthiyāḥ, prāpnuvanti te mā bhuvan iti. naitad asti prāyojanam. dṛṣyante hy anye rasādibhyo matvarthiyāḥ, rasikō naṭaḥ, urvaśī vai rūpinī apsarāsām, sparśiko vāyur iti.”

‘rasa’ in ‘rasiko naṭaḥ’ has a clear reference to the aesthetic fact, which is collected by vyañjanā in poetry.

Thus Pāṇini as explained by Patañjali, and therefore both of them, were aware of vyañjanā as a śabdā-vṛtti, though they had no business to discuss it with reference to the sāstra of grammar.

We know on the authority of Anandavardhana and his followers, Abhinavagupta and Mammapa and the rest, that they have derived inspiration for the Dhvanivāda from the sphaṭavāda of the grammarians. We will therefore involve ourselves here to examine the concepts of sphaṭa and dhvani as held by the grammarians first, and then as applied to the theory of vyañjanā-dhvani-rasa by the ālaṃkārikas. We will also consider as to how far the writers on poetics are exactly indebted to the Viṣyākaraṇas in upholding their theory of vyañjanā and dhvani.

The discussion that follows will take further care of Patañjali and then Bhartṛhari to evolve any further positive observation in this respect. The
grammarians are held in very high esteem by the ālamkārikas. Ānandavardhana, under Dhv. I. 13 observed: “sūribhiḥ kathitaḥ iti vidvad upajñeyam uktih; na tu yathā-katañcit pravṛtteti pratipādyate. prathame hi vidvāmsaḥ vaiyakaranāḥ, vyākaranamūlatvāt sarva-vidyānam. te ca śrūyamāṇeṣu varṇeṣu dhvanir iti vyavaharanti. tathaivaṇyaś tanmatāṇusāribhiḥ sūribhiḥ, kāvyatattvārtha-darsibhiḥ vācyā-vācaka-sammiśraḥ, sabdātmā kavyam iti vyapadesyo vyañjakatva-sāmyād-dhwaniḥ ity uktāḥ.”

“The expression, ‘is designated by the learned’, brings out the fact that this designation was first devised by the learned and that it has not gained currency in a haphazard fashion. The formost among the learned are grammarians because grammar lies at the root of all studies. They indeed refer to articulate letters by the term ‘DHVANI’ or ‘suggester’. In the same way, since the element of suggestion is common (to both), not only the word and its meaning, but its essential verbal power and also that which is usually referred to by the term poetry, has been given the same designation, viz. DHVANI by other learned men whose insight into the fundamental truth about poetry is profound and who are followers of principles laid down by grammarians.” (Trans. K. Kri. pp. 27, 29, ibid)

On this, Abhinavagupta in his Locana, elaborates with apt quotations from Bhartrhari. He observes: (pp. 75, 76, Edn. Nandi) śrūyamāṇeṣv iti. śrōtraśaśkulīṃm santāṇena āgatā antyāḥ sabdāḥ śrūyante iti prakriyāyām sabdajāh sabdāḥ śrūyamāṇā iti uktam. teśāṃ ghaṇṭānaraṇāna-rūpatvam tāvad asti, te ca dhvanisabdena uktāḥ. yathā āha, bhagavān bhartṛhariḥ -

“yāḥ samyoga-vibhāgābhyāṃ
karaṇair upajanyate,
sa sphoṭaḥ, sabdajāh sabdāḥ
dhvanayónyair udāḥrtaḥ.” - iti.

evaṃ ghaṇṭā-nirhāda-sthānīyo’ nukaraṇā”tmopalakṣito vyāngyopyartho dhvanir iti vyavahṛtaḥ. tathā śrūyamāṇā ye varṇāḥ nāda-sabdā-vācyā antya-buddhi-nirgrāhya-sphoṭabhivyājakās te dhvaniśabdena uktāḥ. yathā’ha bhagavān sa eva -

“pratyayair anupākhyaṭair (anupākhyeyaiḥ)
grahāṇānuṇaṁ tathā,
dhvanī-praṇāṣite śabde
svarūpam avadhāryate.” - iti.
tena vyañjakau śabdārthāv apiha dhvanīsabdēna uktau. kaśca varṇeṣu tāvanmātra-parimāneṣvapi satu. yathoktam -

"alpiyasā'pi yatnena
śabdām uccāritam matih,
yadi vā naiva grhnāti
varnām vā sakalam sjuṭam." - iti.

tēsu tāvatv eva śrūyamāneṣu vaktur yo'nyo dṛta-vilambitā”di-vṛtti-bhedā”tmā prasiddhād uccāraṇavyāpārād abhyadhikāḥ sa dhvanir uktaḥ. yad āha, sa eva -

"śabdasyordhvaṃ abhivyakteḥ
vṛttibhede tu vaikṛtāḥ,
dhvanayaḥ sam-upohante
sphoṭā”tmā tair na bhidyate.” - iti.

asmābhīr api - prasiddhebhyah śabda-vyāpārebhyaḥ abhidhā-tātpara-lakṣānā-rūpebhıyotirikto vyāpāro dhvanir ity uktaḥ. evam catuṣkam api dhvanīḥ. tad yogāc ca samastam api kāvyam dhvanīḥ. tena vyatirekā'vyatiraka-vyapadeśo'pi na na yuktah. vācyā-vācaka-sammiśraḥ iti. vācyā-vācaka-sahitah, sammiśra iti madhyamapadaloḥ samāsah. “gāṃ asvam puruṣam paśum” iti-vat samuccayo'itra ca-kāreṇa vinā'pi. tena vācyo'pi dhvanīḥ, vācakopī śabdo dhvanīḥ, dvayor api vyañjakatvaṃ ‘dhvanati’ iti kṛtvā. sammiśryate vibhavānubhāva-saṃvalanayā iti vyaṅgypo'pi dhvanīḥ, dhvanyata iti kṛtvā. śabdanaṃ śabdaḥ, śabda-vyāpāraḥ, na cāsāv abhidhā”dirūpah, api tv ātmabhūtaḥ, so'pi dhvananam dhvanīḥ, kāvyam iti vyapadeśyāca yorthaḥ sōpi dhvanīḥ. ukta-prakāra-dhva-caṭuṣṭaya-mayarvāt. ata eva sādhāraṇa-hetum āha-“vyañjakatva-sāmyād” iti. vyaṅgya-vyañjakabẖaḥ sarvesu pakṣeṣu sāmāṇya-rūpah sādhāraṇa ity arthah.”

(Trans.) ‘śrūyamāneṣu’ means those which are heard. We hear, in our ears, last sounds that reach us through a stream of chained sounds. In that process “words or sounds born of sounds (i.e. last sounds) are heard. The hearing (of these words) is like this resonance of a bell. This is clear. They are designated by the word ‘dhvani’. As is said by Bhagavān Bhartṛhari -

“That which is caused by conjunction and disjunction (= saṃyoga/vibhāga), is sphaṭa; words (or sounds) born of words (or sounds) are termed ‘dhvani’ by others.”
Thus vyānyārtha or suggested sense characterised by resonance in the fashion of the ringing of a bell is also termed ‘dhvani’. In the same way the letters that are being heard, and are termed as nāda - i.e. sound, are termed dhvani as they are suggesters of the sphaṭa which is collected by the hearing of the last letter (antya-buddhi-nirgrāḥya). The same Bhagavān Bhartṛhari has stated -

"In a word, by the terminations, that can not be described and that are conducive to the apprehension of (sphaṭa), which are revealed by sound, the form of (sphaṭa) is determined." Thus the vyāñjaka i.e. suggester word and meaning are also termed ‘dhvani’; eventhough the letters are of that much duration (or measure) only. As is said,

"Buddhi - i.e. intelligence either does not catch the word, articulated by very little effort, or apprehends the whole of a letter in its manifested form. In the same letters that are being heard, the speaker’s special effort - different from the effort known to all, and which is qualified by difference (in pronunciation) such as fast and slow, - (this special effort of the speaker) is termed ‘dhvani’. As is stated by him-

"After the manifestation of a word, no difference is brought about in the soul (i.e. original nature) called sphaṭa, even when vaikṛta-dhvanis bring about difference in vr̥tti."

By us also, the function (vyāpāra) (called vyāñjanā) other than the all accepted abhidhā, tārtparya and lakṣaṇā, is termed ‘dhvani’. Thus all these four are termed ‘dhvani’. By association with these, the whole of a poem is also termed ‘dhvani’. Thus, the mention of difference and also non-difference (as in “kāvyasya ātma dhvanih ityā”dau bheda-vyapadesāh, kāvyā-viśeṣaḥ sa dhvanir ityā”dau abhedavya-padesāh ca ity arthaḥ - bālapriyā p. 35) is not irrelevant. ‘vācyavācaka-sammiśraḥ’ is a madhyama-pada-lopi-samāsa. Without any mention of ‘ca-kāra’, the assemblage (samuccaya) takes place as in case of the expression - “gām aśvam puruṣam, paśum”. So, vācyā (= expressed sense) is ‘dhvani’ and vācaka śabda - i.e. expressive word is also termed ‘dhvani’; on the etymology of “dhvanati iti dhvanih” - that which makes sound is dhvani.’ To produce noise (śabdānaṃ) is termed ‘śabda’. This means the ‘function’ of a word. This is not of the form of abhidhā and the rest. But it is of the form of itself. This is also termed ‘dhvani’ on account of ‘dhvanana’ - i.e. suggestion. As all these four (word, meaning, the function and the suggested sense) reside in a poem, it is also termed ‘dhvani’. So, the common factor (to all these) is ‘suggestivity'; the function of suggestion is common to all these. This is the crux of our saying.
Mammata also echoes this in his K.P.

One thing that emerges clearly from this discussion is that the term ‘dhvani’ was first used by the grammarians in a peculiar sense (i.e. of ‘sound’ only), and the alamkārikas applied it to their principle of poetry by extending its connotation.

We now turn once again to Patañjali to decipher the concept of dhvani-vyāñjanā-as held by the grammarians. In the Paśpasāhnikā we come across the following observation: “When one says ‘gauḥ’ what is śabda? Is it the object which has dewlap, tail, hump, hoof, horns, etc.? ‘No’, he says, “it is called ‘dravya’ (i.e. substance). Is it then its gesture, movement, or winking?” ‘No’, he says, ‘it is called ‘kriyā’ or action.” Is it then the whiteness, blueness, brownness, or greyness?” ‘No’, he says, “it is called ‘guna’ or colour.” Is it then the sum total of the qualities like ‘sattā’, (i.e. being which always exists even when the individuals are broken or destroyed)?” “No”, he says, “It is called, ‘ākṛti’ i.e. figure. Then, what is śabda? śabda is that on the manifestation of which, the correct knowledge of the object which has dewlap, tail, hump, hoof, horns, etc. is produced; or the sound which has a decisive meaning is said to be ‘śabda’ in the world... Hence ‘dhvani’ is ‘śabda’: (“athavā pratīta-paryāyako loke dhvaniḥ śabda ucyate... tasmād dhvaniḥ śabdaḥ”)- -

When a word like ‘gauḥ’ is pronounced, the following concepts appear in the mind of the hearer; - the individuality cow, her action, her qualities, genus cow, the shape of the cow, and also the word made up of ‘g’ ‘au’ and ‘ḥ’ - the visarga. The hearer wants to make out the exact connotation. Individuality cow, her qualities, etc. are seen by the eyes and the word ‘gauḥ’ is heard by the ears. So, it is absurd to take this for the exact connotation. But since the relation of śabda and artha, guṇa and guṇin, kriyā and kriyāvān - is that of identity according to the grammarians, as there is a rule viz. - ‘tad-abhinnā’bhinnasya tad-abhinnatvam’ - it is quite natural to think so. The Mahābhāṣyakāra says that the ākṛti, guṇa, etc. are not the true connotations of the śabda, but the true connotation is sphoṭa - (the eternal word), which when manifested, enables the hearer to have a clear knowledge of the object cow.

The ālamkārikas equate this manifestation with suggestion of vyāñjanā vyāpāra. Whether they are right in doing so is open to debate.
The Sanskrit grammarians hold that the śabda is not the sound-units that we
hear, but it is manifested in the mind after the whole word is pronounced. It may
be noted that according to sanskrit grammarians, śabda is of four phases viz. parā,
paśyantī, madhyamā and vaikhari. Śabda Brahman, when manifested at the
mūlā’dhāra or the sacral plexus, it is called parā vāk; when manifested at the
naval, it is paśyantī, at the heart, madhyamā and Vaikhari is that phase which is
manifested out of the vocal organs as the articulated sound. (Mbh. I. i. 1 & V.P.
144; etc.)

In the IX’th āhnika, Patañjali discusses the tapara-sūtra (pā. I. i. 70) There are
two points to be examined : (i) Is ‘tat-kālasya’ a correct expression or not ? and
(ii) Is this sūtra an apūrva-vidhi or a niyama-vidhi ? While discussing the latter
point the another talks about sphaṭa and dhvani. At the end of some technical
discussion, it is stated :

“evaṁ tarhi sphaṭāḥ śabdaḥ, dhvaniḥ śabda-guṇaḥ.” If so, sphaṭa is the word
and dhvani i.e. sound is its quality.

katham ? how ? bhery āghāravat. Like the beater of a drum. - tad yathā bhery
āghāto bheriṁ āharya kaścid viṃśati padāni gacchati, kaścid trimśat, kaścit
caturviṃśat.

This may be illustrated as follows - One beater of drum goes twenty steps at the
time when the sound by beating the drum lasts, another thirty steps, and still other
forty steps. Beating is the same. The increase is due to the sound production by
beating -

It is observed -

“dhvaniḥ sphaṭaś ca śabdānāṁ
dhvaniś tu khalu lakṣayet,
alpo mahīyāṁś ca, keśāṁcit
ubhayāṁ tat-svabhāvataḥ.”

With reference to śabdas there are dhvani and sphaṭa. Of them dhvani alone is
cognisable to the sense of hearing. It is short, it is long, and it is by nature both
(long and short), at the hands of some.

Thus in Patañjali ‘dhvani’ is sound only, the word that is pronounced. Sphaṭa
is revealed through this dhvani or sound, and it is śabda in the real sense of the
term, which is united with meaning.
Bhartrhari -

We come across a fuller treatment of dhvani and sphota in the Vākyapadiya I.

It may be noted that we discuss ‘dhvani’ in the grammarians here only because it is relevant to the origin of vyañjanā also and as Abhinavagupta has explained, for the ālamkārikas the term ‘dhvani’ covers the concept of vyañjanā also as the etymology - “dhvanyate anenā” is broad enough to cover the ‘vyāpāra’ called vyañjanā. Abhinavagupta has observed in his Locana on Dhv. I. 13 that : tenā vācyopī dhvanīḥ vācakōpi śabdō dhvanīḥ, dvayor api vyañjakatvam ‘dhvanati’ iti kṛtvā. saṃmiśryate vibhāvānu-bhāva-samvalanayā iti vyañgyōpi dvaniḥ, dhvanyate iti kṛtvā. śabdanaṃ śabdaḥ, sabda-vyāpāraḥ, na cāsāv abhidhā“dirūpah, api tvā”umabhūtah, sōpi dhvanananām dhvanīḥ, kāvyam iti vyapdeśyaś ca yōrthāḥ sōpi dhvanīḥ. ukta-prakāra-dhvani-catuṣṭāmayatvāt.”

Earlier (on Dhv. I. 13) Abhinavagupta had noted that : “asmābhir api prasiddhe-bhavyah śabda-vyāpārebhyah abhidhā-tātparya-lakṣanā-rūpebhyyah atirikto vyāpāro dhvanir ity uktaḥ. evaṃ caraṣkam api dhvanishah....” etc.

Thus understanding of what grammarians meant by dhvani is quite relevant here.

So, according to the grammarians, śabda and artha are both identical. Bhartrhari, in an interesting discussion, anticipates an objection to the following effect :

Whatever is śabda is artha and whatever is artha is śabda. Then naturally the question arises, as to why do we not come across the same achievement by śabda as that by artha ? If, e.g., the word ‘madhu’ and the artha-object-madhu be identical, we should have been able to have the taste of honey by just pronouncing the word. But that is not the case. We should get a burn while speaking, ‘agniḥ’, i.e. ‘fire’. But it does not happen like that.

To this, the Vaiyākaraṇas would say that, there is no external meaning as such of any word, but all things external reside in a particular way in our heart i.e. ‘antaḥkaraṇa’. It is this ‘ākṛti’ which is known as ‘jāti’.“ākṛto jāti-pada-vācyā; this ‘ākṛti’ is the real meaning of a word. This is known as ‘bauddhārtha’. Both śabda and artha reside in the mind and thus we achieve their identity. In this respect, the grammarians come very close to the Vedāntins. The non-dualistic vedantins regard the external world as a mere appearance. By knowing Brahma, the delusion is
removed in such a way, that the world seen without melts away in the fashion of a dream. All the objects in the world are seen as different from one another. But they all become one in Brahman. If we go on accepting the ‘kārāṇa-sattā’ by rejecting the kārya, we will realise this identity. Thus we come to the element called earth, by removing the forms such as stone, iron, etc. Thus by rejecting the kārya-tattva, we will come to the fundamental kārāṇa-tattva called Brahman. In the same way, in the heart this same Brahmatattva (i.e. the śabda Brahman) is known as parā-vāni. Just as all the objects such as ghaṭa, paṭa, etc. are one and identical, in the same way, the śabda-tattvas in form of ‘ka’, ‘kha’, ‘ga’, etc. do not have separate forms. Thus the sanskrit grammarians state that śabda has four phases, as observed already in Patañjali, viz. parā, paśyantī, madhyamā, and vaikhari. Śabda-brahma when manifested at the nasal is paśyantī, at heart madhyamā, and vaikhari is that which is manifested at the level of vocal organs, as the articulated sound. The M.bh. reads the following to this effect -

"catvarī vāk parimitā padāni
tūriyam vāco manusyaḥ vadnati..."

Thus, when the sound-unit with the help of sthāna and prayatna, is manifested as separate ‘ka’, ‘kha’, etc., it is known as vaikhari. The word manifested with the help of sthāna, prayatna and vāyu-samyoga is called ‘dhvani’ by the grammarians. So, the śabda is analysed into two parts, - (i) The sphaṭa or the artha bhāga and (ii) dhvani which is vāyu-samyogatmaka or characterised by contact with air. Sphaṭa is void of difference. It is supposed to be non-different, one, etc., and is free from any upādhi. Dhvani is having difference, is many, and is of the nature of effect, etc. It is because of this that dhvani produced by different people seems to be different. Hence, we get difference in dhvani when produced by a newly married girl, or by a hero, or others. But there is no difference to be seen in the śabda-brahma called sphaṭa. At the same time, this sphaṭa is manifested through dhvani alone. Dhvani thus, though not intrinsically connected with artha, alone causes artha to get manifested. Thus when there is a gathering of a large number of people, e.g. at a fair, we hear some noise, but no meaning flows from that, people say, “what a big noise is made ?” The idea is, as the world, jagat, by anirvacana-khyāti, is the vivarta of Brahma, in the same way, all vānmaya and its vācyārtha are the vivarta of śabda-brahma. Hence, dhvani is that word which suggests the śabda-Brahma, called sphaṭa. There is difference to be seen in dhvani but not in
sphoṭa. Just as the soul remains unaffected by the qualities of the body such as fatness and the like, or just as the face is seen as though different when reflected in different objects such as oil, sword, etc., in the same way, though there is aupādhika-dhvani-bheda or difference in dhvani due to upadhis or external factors, sphoṭa is just one and identical. The point is that the grammarians take dhvani or word as the vyañjaka of sphoṭa. Thus according to them, dhvani may be defined as “dhvanatīti dhvanīḥ”, i.e. it sounds, gives expression to sphoṭa, i.e. it rings, reverberates, suggests sphoṭa.

The writers on poetics extended the connotation of the word dhvani. They took the quality of dhvanitva, and included all that was related to this in dhvani. Thus, rīti, vṛtti, guṇa, alamkāra, śabda, pada, padāṃśa, varṇa, vākya-racanā, kāvyā, vyāpāra, etc. all this is placed in the fold of dhvani. When one meaning suggests another, it is also called a vyañjaka or a suggester. This suggester may be both the conventional meaning (i.e. vācyā) and/or the indicated sense (lakṣyārtha). Or, it may even be a vyangyārtha, i.e. suggested sense, giving rise to a further suggested sense. Having regard to a karma-sādhanav-yuṭpatti of dhvani, even the meaning that is suggested - ‘vyajyamāna-artha’ - is also called dhvani. And this becomes three-fold, such as vastu-dhvani, alamkāra-dhvani and rasā”di-dhvani. By bhāvasādhanav-yuṭpatti, the term dhvani would refer to the process of vyañjanā i.e. suggestion itself. Finally, the whole collection, called kāvyā is also included in the comprehensive fold of dhvani. (See Locana on Dhw. I. 13, quoted above).

When it is said that the grammarians mean by dhvani those sound-units which become the object of hearing, the idea is that the word reaches the ear through krama-paramparā i.e. sequence, and the last sound-unit i.e. antima śabda-is caught by the ear. Thus, it is only the śabdaja-śabda that is heard by us. This is explained on the analogy of ghanṭā-nāda or the ringing of a bell. Bhartṛhari puts it as follows - “yah samyoga-vibhāgābhyām” ... etc. (as quoted in Locana on Dhw. I. 13). In view of the popular belief regarding both plurality and order (i.e. krama) of śabda, he makes his position absolutely clear by suggesting that no question of order such as priority and posteriority and that of plurality can be logically raised in relation to sphoṭa which is essentially one and eternal. It is sound, he observes, that passes through successive stages in case of articulation and appears to be either long or short, in proportion to the exertion required for the utterance of a word. So, it is particularly due to varying modulations of voice, as caused by local apparatus, that ‘ka’ sound seams to be difference from ‘kha’ sound, and the like.
But sphoṭa remains unaffected. Thus the Sun, a fixed body, seems to be quivering when reflected in an agitated pool of water:

“pratibimbaṁ yathānyatra sthitam toya-kriyāvāsat,
tat-pravṛttim ivāṅveti, sa dharmaḥ sphoṭa-nādayoh.” (V.P.I. 49)

Order and difference, pertaining to sound, are falsely attributed to sphoṭa. The dual aspects of śabda as observed already imply that śabda has the potency of expressing itself as well as its meaning that is associated with it by inseparable connection -

“grāhyatvam grāhakatvam ca
dve śaktau tejaso yathā,
tathaiva sarva-śabdānām
ete pṛthag avasthite.” - V.P.I. 55.

The grammarians maintain that there are two different aspects of words, viz. ‘kārya’ or the popular form and ‘nitya’ or the permanent form. The former is usually produced by the exercise of the vocal apparatus and serves to give a reflection of internal consciousness, and the latter is what represents the ultimate germ of speech. Sphoṭa is to be identified with the latter aspect of speech.

The three views regarding the cognition of sound and sphoṭa are (i) sound when produced is heard by the auditory organs and becomes the positive instrument whereby sphoṭa is comprehended. (ii) After having assumed the material form through the medium of sound, sphoṭa is capable of being heard, and (iii) sound acts upon the organ concerned and serves to manifest sphoṭa.

Bhartṛhari supports the third view. Sound serves as an outer garment of sphoṭa. Though incomprehensible and inconceivable in itself, sphoṭa reveals its existence through the medium of sound.

Sound and sphoṭa are intimately related. As to how sound and sphoṭa, that are related to each other as the indicative and the indicated, are to be comprehended, Bhartṛhari refers to four different views. Some hold that sphiṭta is recognised as identical with sound, just as crystal looks red when in contact with japā-kusuma: Observes Punyarāja, on V.P. I. 82 - “yathā japā-kasuma-rūpānuṣaktam eva sphātikā’dīnām grahanām, tathā dhvanirūpānuṣakta eva sphiṭtas tad avibhāgena upalabhyate, iti keśāṃ cin-matam...” - Others say that sound (though not cognisable by itself) is indicative of sphiṭta. Still others maintain that the exact nature of sphiṭta is too subtle to be determined and it is sound only that comes under comprehension; and finally, according to some, sphiṭta is really manifested
‘Vyañjanā’

but is indistinct and unintelligible on account of distance from where it is evolved.

While referring to the ide ntellectual process involved in the comprehension of śabda, Bhartrihari holds that the cognition of śabda practically follows from the last sound, together with the impression made by the preceding ones. We may try to understand this, ‘varṇōccāra-prakriyā’ or the process of pronouncing the sound units.

There are three options as to the nature of a word - (i) The word is not eternal, i.e. it is ‘a-nitya’. The words are created and destroyed. They have a jāti or a class, in keeping with other objects. This view is held by the Nyāya-vaiśeṣika systems. (ii) Varṇas or sound units are nitya or permanent and are the cause of śabda. These letters have a relation with meaning and this relation is called śakti. This view is held by the Mimāmsā, Vedanta, Sāmkhya and Yoga schools. (iii) Third is the opinion of Sphoṭavāda or the akhaṇḍatāvāda of the grammarians. The grammarians believe in the identity and indivisibility of letters. On account of the contact of air and the like, the varṇas or sound-units are manifested as different. These manifested letters are known as ‘nāda’. They suggest the sphaṭa which is collected by antimabuddhi i.e. final cognition. As suggested above, Patañjali has already made this thing clear, when he talks of the four forms of vāk, such as parā, paśyanti, etc. These are four stages through which sphaṭa (= nāda-bindu) receives manifestation. Both parā and paśyanti are too subtle and delicate to be comprehended by the sense-organ. Parā resides in the mūlā’dhāra or the sacral plexus in the form of a motionless bindu :

“parā-vān mūlacakraśthā
paśyanti nabhī-samsthitā,
hṛdisthā madhyamā jñeyā
vaikhari kaṇṭha-deśa-gā.”

Paśyanti comes up to the naval region pushed up by the internal wind. Of the four forms, it is madhyamā that indicates sphaṭa. All these are more or less mysterious in nature. Vaikhari is the popular form and it is what is uttered by the vocal organ, and is capable of being heard by others. It is again held that nāda is simultaneously produced by madhyamā and vaikhari, but there is a lot of difference between the two :

“yugapadena madhyamā-vaikharībhīyāṃ nāda utpadyate.” (maṇjūśā). - The nāda produced by the madhyamā is slightly cognized by us either at the time of counting japa, or when the ears are shut up. - “madhyamā nādasya kāraṇapidhāne japā”dau ca, sūṣmatara-vāyu-vyaṅgyā - (maṇjūśā). This nāda, manifested by madhyamā is what we precisely know by the name of Sphoṭa. It
stands for Brahman and is eternal, one, without division, etc. According to this view, it is one and the same indivisible sphiṣṭa, that is represented by varṇa, pada, and vākyā, in the same way as one and the same face appears to be long and round when seen through stone, sword, and looking glass, or as a piece of stone, taking reflection from red, or blue flowers, seems to be either red or blue: “yathā ca mukhe, mani-kṛpaṇa-darpaṇa-vyaṇjakāpādhivaśāt dairghyavartulatvā”dibhānaṁ, tadvat.” The difference between ‘ka’ and ‘ga’ is not on account of the diversity of sphiṣṭa, but points to the peculiarities of sound that serves to manifest sphiṣṭa. : “vyāṇjaka-dhvanī-gataṁ ‘ka’-ṭva-’ga’-tvā”dikaṇḍaṃ sphiṣṭe bhāṣate.” - The unity and indivisibility of sphiṣṭa are brought about by its comparision with the sky and consciousness, which though one and not admitting of fractions, are said to have such attributive difference as ghaṭākāśa, māthākāśa, and jīva, īśvara, etc. respectively. Thus, those who take pada and vākyā to be similarly indivisible units, say as follows: “just as letters are devoid of parts, so too, no letters are comprehended in padas. :

“pade na varṇā vidyante
varṇeṣvavayavaḥ ēva.
vākyāt padānām ānandyaṁ
praviveko na kaścana.” - V.P. I. 77.

Strictly speaking, it is not admissible to take words separately by splitting up a sentence. To those who advocate the divisibility of both pada and vākyā, it is the last letter that indicates sphiṣṭa, and each preceding letter serves to make for a cognition of the intended sense - “pada-vākyayos tu sakhaṇḍatvā-pakṣe anitamvarṇa-vyaṇgaya-sphiṣṭa eka eva. pūrva-pūrva-varṇas tu tātprāyagrāhakaḥ” (Maṁṣṭa).

Taking into consideration the difference between madhyamā and Vaikharī, sound can be divided into two, viz. original or eternal (i.e. inexhaustible) and artificial (i.e. derived) or momentary. - “dhvanis tu dvividhaḥ - prakṛto vaikṛtaḥ ca.

“sphiṣṭasya grahaṇe hetuḥ
prakṛto dhvanir iṣyate,
vṛttibhede nimittatvam
vaikṛtaḥ pratipadyate.” (V.P. I. 77)

The natural sound only, which is generated by madhyamā, suggests sphiṣṭa. The unnatural - (“a-prakṛta-dhvanī”) sound is so termed because it rises from prakṛta dhvanī and undergoes an amount of modification in the form of long and short sound. Sphiṣṭa which is essentially one and beyond any modification is not in the
least effected by the quick utterance of sound which practically refers to Vaikṛta dhvani. Another point that should be noted down is that it is sphaṭa alone, as is evident from its derivative meaning, that is really associated with the expressiveness of sound (sphuṭati arthaḥ asmād iti sphaṭaḥ). For the sake of convenience alone, we regard word as having meaning. A closer examination of both the internal and external facts will show that sphaṭa alone is finally the significant element of speech. Moreover, Bhartrhari holds that sphaṭa is practically one and the same but it is only the indicator of sphaṭa viz. sound that differs:

*sphaṭe vyañjaka-dhvani-gatakatvā” dibhānāt ‘ka’kāro buddhah, ityaupādhiko bhedavyavahārah.”* - Mañjusā.

How is sphaṭa manifested? The answer is that it is practically from the last letter that the cognition of the entire word is derived together with the impressions produced by preceding letters - “pūrva-pūrva-dhvan-utpāditā”bhivyakti-janita-saṃskāra-parampara-parinako”ntyabuddhi-nirgrāhya ity arthaḥ”-kaiyata. - And it is evidently an intellectual operation which enables us to retain recollection of the entire structure of a word, even when we hear the last letter alone. “Manifested by sound”, implies that sphaṭa, though permanent, is not always comprehensible, but comes under the cognition only when the vocal organs are engaged in operation for its manifestation.

Thus sphaṭa is regarded as ‘antima-buddhi-nirgrāhya’. There is a rule that śabda, buddhi and karma are “dvi-kṣaṇa-sthāyi” (i.e. they last for two moments). They come into existence in the first moment, exist in the second, and die out in the third. For example, we may take the word ‘gхаṭa’. There are four letters in it, viz. ‘gh’, ‘a’, ‘ṭ’ and ‘a’. First ‘gh’ is created. It continues to stay in the second moment. In this very moment, ‘a’ is created. In the third moment ‘gh’ is destroyed but ‘a’ continues to exist and ‘ṭ’ comes into existence. Now, when ‘ṭ’ continues in the next moment the last ‘a’ comes into existence. In the sixth moment, the last ‘a’ also disappears. Now for those who regard letters to be eternal, ‘utpatti’ means ‘abhivyakti’. So the whole word ‘gхаṭa’ - the varṇa-saṃghāta or the collection of letters never comes into existence at a single given moment. Then how is the meaning collected? The answer is that though varṇa i.e. sound-unit-is destroyed, it gives rise to some saṃskāra or impression. This saṃskāra or impression stays on and is united with the next letter. Thus the assemblage of saṃskāras unites with the last ‘a’ and we get the word ‘gхаṭa’. This happens in case of ‘yajñādikārya’ - i.e. sacrificial rite - which gives rise to the fruit in form of heaven i.e. svarga. Sphaṭa also is ‘antima-varṇa-grāhya’ - in this very sense.
The gist of the above discussion is that external and indivisible sphaṭa is manifested in the form of letters through dhvani or sound.

So, dhvani is two-fold, prākṛta or natural and vaikṛta or unnatural as already observed. The prākṛta-dhvani is qualified by the qualities such as 'ka-tva', 'hrasvatva', 'ādy udāttātva', etc. Even though sphaṭa is self-manifested, it is as though obstructed by the accumulated vāyusaṃyoga or, contact with air. By removing this obstruction, the prākṛta-dhvani manifests sphaṭa. This manifested sphaṭa is different from the dhvani and so sphaṭa is said to be one, eternal, all-pervading and manifested by different dhvanis and it gives meaning when it becomes 'antya-buddhi-nirgrāhya' - i.e. when collected at the last moment. This prākṛta-dhvani is the same as varṇas i.e. sound-units and sphaṭa is never manifested unless through them. Vaikṛta-dhvani has a different function. It creates vṛtti-bheda e.g. dṛta-vilamba-ādi, in the letters gathered by prākṛta-dhvani. Thus even if there is vaikṛta-dhvani-bheda, we have no prākṛta-dhvani-bheda. So, we get the uniformity in form i.e. ekarūpata of ākāra and the like.

Thus, the term ‘dhvani’ is used in three different ways:

(i) ‘Dhvani’ is used for ‘śabda-ja-śabda’ of the Naiyāyikas. On the basis of this, the ālaṃkārikas call ‘vyaṅgyārtha’ to be dhvani, the sādharmya being ‘pratiyamānatva’ or ‘utpādyatva’.

(ii) According to Vaiyākaraṇas, sphaṭa is ‘vyaṅgya’ or suggested and prākṛta-dhvani is vyaṅjaka or suggester. Dhvani is thus “vyaṅjaka”. On the basis of this, the ālaṃkārikas call the ‘vyaṅjaka śabdārthau’ to be dhvani.

(iii) And the vaikṛta-dhvanis make for vṛtti-bheda. Hence the vyaṅjakatva-vyāpāra is termed as dhvani.

So, for the grammarians, the relation between sphaṭa and dhvani is that of vyaṅgya-vyaṅjaka.

We have also noted that the grammarians use dhvani to mean (i) ‘nāda-mātra’ i.e. ‘sound’ only, and (ii) śabda or word. So ‘gṛha’ the dhvani which is just sound - ‘nāda-mātra’ by itself, has no relation with the object ‘gṛha’ i.e. a pot, which is seen, touched etc. - i.e. which is ‘sparsa-kṣama’. The sound ‘gṛha’ is something quite different from the object ‘gṛha’ which can be seen, touched, etc. still, it should be noted very carefully that the sound ‘gṛha’ indicates something, which it is not, i.e. which is other then itself, viz. the ‘object’ gṛha. This idea of one thing indicating something else, which it is not, becomes, so to say, the distinguishing
characteristic of dhvani. So, in all cases of expression, where one thing indicates something which it is not, it is, so to say, taken as a case of dhvani. It is this mode of expression, both to be found in ordinary conversation as well as in poetic use of language, that in sanskrit tradition, is studied as a particular linguistic mode of expression, here vyañjanā. Therefore, dhvani is that which suggests something other than itself, and which is known to be separate from itself, and by this common point of suggestion, - vyañjakatva-sāmyāt-the vyāpāra, i.e. ‘function’ is also called ‘dhvani’. According to the Valyākaraṇas, the world is artha-rūpa i.e. of the form of meaning, and is derived from sphoṭa, the śabda-brahma. In the like fashion, we derive the ghāṭārtha from the word ghāta.

This dhvani is identified with word in our day to day affairs. So kāvyā is also termed as dhvanikāvyā. Every sound is suggestive of the śabda-brahma, which is sphoṭa-rūpa. The artha of this śabda-brahma is world. The whole process is as follows - dhvani-śabda, śabda-brahma, - i.e. sphoṭa, and vivartita artha. Here we may note that even in the process of gathering the conventional meaning from the word, an element of suggestion or vyañjanā is involved. Vyañjanā is that process by which something not manifested becomes manifested. Dhvani or śabda first suggests sphoṭa and as sphoṭa is eternally connected with the meaning, we derive meaning from dhvani. Morover, it may be noted that vyañjanā is that process of manifestation through which something already existing is manifested. Vyañjanā does not create new objects.

Sphoṭavāda and Vyañjanā - we will be able to make a note of certain marked parallelisms between the sphoṭavāda of the grammarians on the one hand and the vyañjanavāda on the other. The points of comparision are as below :

(i) As observed earlier, for the grammarians, dhvani is explained as, ‘dhvanati iti dhvanih’. Dhvani is so termed because it sounds or rings or reverberates sphoṭa, i.e. suggests it. The word ghāta, for example, is used for the object-artha-ghāta, which is seen, touched etc. This idea of one thing indicating something else, which it is not, becomes, so to say, the distinguishing charactertistic of dhvani. So, all cases of expression, where one thing expresses something which it is not, becomes, so to say, the distinguishing characteristic of dhvani. The writers on poetics extend this connotation of the word dhvani. Taking the quality of ‘dhvanitva’ into consideration, they include all that was related to this in dhvani. Thus, guna, alamkāra, rīti, vṛttī, pada, padāṃśa, vārna, vākyārtha, - all these become vyañjakā, i.e. suggestive of the vyānāya.
(ii) In the philosophy of the grammarians the sound ‘ghaṭa’ for example, does not give the meaning directly. It does so through sphaṭa which in its turn is suggested by the sound ghaṭa. Thus what we ordinarily call meaning is arrived at by an indirect process. For the ālambkārikas, the process of vyāngyārtha-grhaṇa is not direct but indirect. We arrive at the suggested sense either through abhidhā or through laksanā.

(iii) The grammarians believe in vākyā-sphaṭa. They do not accept the separate existence of padas, i.e. individual words, and much less of letters or varṇas. But common experience of ordinary people misleads many to believe that the meaning is derived from individual words or padas and thus through letters or varṇas. The Mīmāṃsakas accept this position. It seems, however, that here ordinary people, and so also the Mīmāṃsakas, do not seem to pierce the veil of delusion and mistake the nature of condition for the nature of the contents. The nature of the condition is multiplicity of letters; the nature of the contents is the unity of word, the vākyā-sphaṭa.

Similar is the case with some ālambkārikas; abhidhā and laksanā form the nature of condition and vyaṅjanā or dhvani is the nature of the contents. Those who fail to distinguish between ends and means, seem to confuse abhidhā and laksanā with vyaṅjanā.

(iv) To put it otherwise, for the grammarians the letters may be taken just as what we may call the object of knowledge, i.e. jñānasya viśayaḥ, while the word-whole is jñānasya phalam, the result or the fruit of knowledge. For the ālambkārikas also, abhidhā and laksanā can be equated with jñānasya viśayaḥ, while vyaṅjanā may be taken as jñānasya phalam. These two are never ever to be confused.

(v) The grammarians believe in vākyā-sphaṭa. So, they would avoid the contingency faced by the padavādin, viz. that of recognising parts even of letters or varṇas. Similarly, those ālambkārikas who want to arrive at vyāngyārtha with the help of laksanā, will have to go for a second laksanā, and a third, and a fourth ad infinitum, involving further and further prajñānas.

(vi) Sphaṭa is a distinct entity by itself, not to be identified with dhvani i.e. the sound of a word. The vyāngyārtha is also a separate entity, not to be confused with abhidhārtha or laksyārtha.

(vii) For the grammarians, there is a krama, a sequence, in the process of gathering meaning from a word. From word to sphaṭa and from there to meaning - this is the sequence. In the same way, with the ālambkārikas also, there is a sequence, perceptible or imperceptible, between vācyārtha and vyāngyārtha.
(viii) It is non-discrimination that makes for the acceptance of letters for the word-whole. In the same way, it is non-discrimination that results in our recognising vyañjanā as either ‘abhidhā’ or ‘bhakti’.

(ix) For the Vaiyākaraṇas, there is a gradual and clearer revelation of the sphiṭa. Each sound-unit reveals the whole of sphiṭa and not a portion of it. The revelation gets clearer and clearer by each succeeding sound-unit. The sphiṭa revelation is a gradual process and the mind acquires progressively greater and greater aptitude for receiving further glimpses. With the utterance of the last sound-unit the process comes to a close. By itself, there is neither qualitative nor quantitative difference in word-essence, but there may be difference in its grasping by the mind. Thus the degrees of difference are purely subjective and not objective.

For the ālaṃkārikas also, the gathering of vyañgyārtha is a gradual revelation in the sense that it comes only after the apprehension of either abhidhārtha, and/or lakṣyārtha as the case may be.

The writers on ālaṃkāra i.e. literary aesthetics, are also partly indebted to other darśanas such as the sāṃkhya, vedānta, and śaiva-darśanas, for their concept of vyañjanā. Vyañjanā for these literary critics manifests, i.e. it brings to light that which is not present before us. The Dhvanyāloka suggests the analogy of ‘ghaṭa-pradīpa-nyāya’ to explain the fact of expressed and implicit senses.

But we will have to point out to a very very basic difference also between the sphiṭa-vāda and vyañjanāvāda. It is clear that sphiṭa for the grammarians is one and eternal and it pre-exists. Vyañgyārtha, or say, rasa, for the dhvanivādins does not pre-exist before the realisation of vibhāvā’dis. We will make this point clearer when we discuss the problem of rasa later. In short the abhivyakti of the dārsanikas and the abhivyakti of the dhvanivādins are not one and the same thing, for ‘rasa’ is said to be ‘tārkālika’ and not ‘pūrva-siddha’.

Now we will proceed to consider vyañjanā as accepted by Ānandavardhana and his followers. As for Bhāmaha and others who preceded Ānandavardhana, we have discussed earlier in a separate chapter their attitude towards vyañjanā when we discussed the topic of ‘śabda-vṛttis in earlier ālaṃkārikas’. Dhvanyāloka is first available written document that talks of vyañjanā systematically, though of course, traces of vyañjanā were seen, not only in Bhāmaha and other ancients but even in the Nātyaśāstra of Bharata, and even in the vedas prior to him. We have seen Yāska’s attitude towards vyañjanā and it will be interesting to try to read the origin of the concept of vyañjanā in the ancient literature of the vedas and then through
Bharata we will come to the Dhvanyäloka and his followers. Among the posterior writers vyañjanā was challenged by many but this voice of dissent was crushed by the powerful juggernaut rolled by Abhinavagupta, Mammaṭa, Hemaçandra and Viśvanātha. We will discuss vyañjanā-virodha in a separate chapter. For the present we begin with the vedas.

It may be noted in the beginning that we picked up discussing Yāska, Pāṇini, Patañjali and Bhartrhari prior to dealing with the still ancient literature, because we knew that with them we were on a more solid ground and that their acquaintance with vyañjanā was closer and surer. As for the vedic literature, it is all, 'of the air airy'. Certainly there is no mentioning of vyañjanā there, but we have use of different forms of the roots vāñj, vi+ vāñj, and root vādhvan and the word dhvani in the vedas. The shades of meaning as seen in these occurrences could have started inspiring theorists to think about the word-power that is vyañjanā. Thus, we may hold the vedas to be a very very distant “gaṅgotrī” - from where the vyañjanā-gaṅgā could have descended as a thought-current to the planes of alamkāra-sāstra. We will try to cover as many occurrences as possible. First of all we will take up the Ṛgveda - “aṅkte” - Ṛv. I. 124.8. is -

“svásā svásre jyāyasyai yo'nimāraigāpaitasyaśāh pratīcāksyeva,
vyucchánti raśmi'bhiḥ sū'jasyāṅjyaṅkte samanagā' iva vrāḥ.”

Sāyana explains - aṅji vyañjakam tejah, yad vā aṅji vyaktam jagat, aṅkte, anakti, prakāśayati. i.e. anoints, brings into light, displays, causes to appear, reveals; Griffith explains it as, 'decks'.

Ṛv. V. i. 3 :

“yādīṁ gaṇāsyā raśanāmājīgaḥ,
śucir aṅkte śucibhirgobhir agnih,
āddākṣinā yuyjate vājayāntyut-
tānāmūrdhvō adhayajjuhū'bhīḥ.”

Sāyana - aṅkte = vyanakti, viśvaṇ jagat = anoints;
Griffith - “is anointed.”

Ṛv. VIII. 29.1

“babhrūreko viṣunāḥ sūnāro
yuvāṅjyaṅkte hiranyāyam,...
Sāyana-aṅji, abhivyajyate, prakāśyate anena ity aṅji ābharaṇam.
abhivyaktisādhanam kunḍala-mukutā dikaṁ svaśārīram. ankte abhivyāñjayaṭi. = adorns, causes to appear, brings to light, reveals, displays, decks; Griffith - ‘decks’.

“anakti”

Rv. I. 153.2 :

“prāstatirvāṁ dhāma na práyuktirāyāmi
mitrā-varunā suvṛktiḥ,
anakti yād vāṁ vidathesu hōtā
sumnām vāṁ surīr vrśanāviyakṣan.”

Sāyaṇa-anakti = vyañjayati, = manifests; displays, brings into light, reveals; Griffith - “decks”.

Rv. IV. 6.3.

yatā sujūrṇi’ rāti’ni ghṛtācī,
pradaṅgṣi’dd devātātātimurāṇaḥ,
ūdu svārurnavajā’ nākrāḥ paśvō anakti
sūthitaḥ sumēkah."

Sāyaṇa - anakti = gacchati;
yad vā, sudhītaḥ svasureva
ūdu utkṛṣṭaḥ paśvāḥ paśūn anakti.
svaṇā paśum anakti iti śruteḥ, = anoints; Griffith - ‘anoints’.

Rv. X. 68.2 -

“sam gōbhīrṇāṅgirasō nāksamāṇo
bhāgaivēdaryamānaṁ nināya,
jāne mitrō na dāṁpati anakti
bṛhaspate vājāyāśumṛivāyau.”

Sāyaṇa - anakti = saṁgamayati, = brings together, unites;
This seems to be an unusual meaning; may be metaphorical;
Griffith - ‘decks’.


“etā u tyā uṣāsah ketumakrata
pūrve ārdhe rájaso bhānúmañjate.
nīkṛṣṇvāṇā āyudhānīva dhṛṣṇāvah
prāti gāvōruṣīryante mātaraḥ.”
Sāyāṇa - bhānaṃ prakāśam añjate = vyaktikurvanti, = displays, causes to appear, brings into light, manifests, reveals;
Griffith - spread (shining light) i.e. causes to appear, display, reveal.

Rv. I. 151.8 :

“yuvāṃ yajñaiḥ prathamā góbhirāñjata
rūtāvānā mánaso nā prayuktisu,
bháranti vāṃ mánmanā girōdrpyatā
mānasā revádāśāthe.”

Sāyaṇa - añjate = vyañjayanti yajamanāḥ, = display, cause to appear; Griffith - ‘deck’.

Rv. VIII. 72.9 -

pāri tridhāturadhvaram jūrśireti nāviyasi
mádhvā hótāro añjate.
Sāyaṇa-añjate = ajyante = saṃskriyanta ity arthaḥ, = anoint, adorn;
Griffith - ‘deck’.

Rv. IX. 102.7 -

samīcinē abhi tmānā yahvī rtāsyā mātārā,
tanvānā yajñāmānuṣāgyāda añjate.

Sāyaṇa-añjate, somāṃ miśrayanti, tadā svayam abhigacchanti. = mix; (i.e. anoint). Griffith - ‘adorn’.

Rv. IX. 86 43 -

“añjate vyañjate sāmañjate krátum riḥanti
mádhunābyañjate,
sindhor ucchvāsē patāyantam uksāṇam
hiranyapāvāḥ paśūmāsu grbhnate”,
Sāyaṇa-añjate (gobhiḥ); anoint;
vyāñjate - vividham añjanti;
and madhunā gavyena, abhyañjate = well anoint; Griffith - ‘balm’. (= anoint);
aṇjanti - Rv. I. 95.6 :

“ubhē bhadrē jośayete nā mene
gāvo na vaśrā iva īpa tashthur ēvaḥ,
sā dākṣaṇām dākṣapātirbhabhūvānājānti yāṁ
dakṣiṇatā havi'rőbhīḥ.”

Sāyaṇa-aṇjanti = ardirikurvanti; tarpayanti, (i.e. anoint),
Griffith - 'balм'.

Rv. III. 8.1 -

aṇjānti tvāmadhvarē devayánto
vānaspatē mádhunā daivyena,
yadūrdhvaśtiśthā drāvinehā
dhattādyādvā kṣāyo mātrūrasyā upāsthe.”
Sāyaṇa-aṇjānti = tvayi gṛḥtaṁ
siṅcanti ity arthāḥ; (i.e. they anoint)
Griffith - ‘anoint’.

Rv. III. 14.3 -

“drāvatāṁ ta uṣāsā vājāyanti
āgne vātyasya pratyābhirāccha,
oātśīmaṇjānti pūrvyāṁ havi'rōbhīrā
vandhūreva tathatraunduroṇē.”
Sāyaṇa-aṇjānti = siṅcanti=anoint (and adorn),
Griffith - ‘adorn’.

Rv. V. 3.2

tvāmaryamā bhavasi yātkanīnāṁ nāma
svadhāvānghuhyāṁ bibharsi,
aṇjanti mitvāṁ śudhitāṁ na gobhir
yāddāmpati sāmanasā kṛṣṇōṣi.”
Sāyaṇa - go-vikāraiḥ kṣirādibhīḥ aṇjānti
= anoint; Griffith, ‘balм’;
Rv. V. 43.7.

“añjánti yāṁ pratháyanto ná vipra
vapāvantām nāgninā tápantaḥ.
pitúrṇa putrá upási preśṭha ā
dharmó agniṁrtáyannasādi.”
- Śāyaṇa-añjanti = anoint,
  Griffith - ‘deck’.

Rv. IX. 109.20 -

añjántyenaṁ mádhvo rasénendrāya
vṛṣṇa indum mádāya,
sāyaṇa-añjanti = saṁyojayanti,
  = (mix, i.e. anoint);
  Griffith - ‘balm’ (= anoint).

aṇḍhve - Rv. X. 100.10 -

“ūrjam gāvo yávase pṛvo attana ṛtasya yāḥ.
sádane kóse aṇḍhve,
tanū'revá tanvo bheṣajāmā sarvátātimáditim vṛṇimahe.”
Śāyaṇa-aṇḍhve = vyāṇjayatha, = cause to appear; manifest, display; Griffith -
  “are balmed”.

ajmah - Rv. IX. 45.3
  Griffith - ‘balm.’

aṅgdhi - Rv. X. 156.3

“āgne sthūrāṁ rayiṁ bharā prthūṁ
gómantamaśviṅnam,
aṅgdhi’ kham vartāyā paṇīṁ.”
Śāyaṇa-aṅgdhi = vṛṣṭyudakahī sīnca = anoint; Griffith - oil, (i.e. anoint),

anajyāt - Rv. X. 31.4 -

“ni'tyas'cākanyāt svāpatirdāmūnā
yāsmā u devāḥ savitā' jajāna,
bhágo và góbhíravyamémanajyåtsó asmai
cáruśchadayad utá syåt.”
Sáyaña-anajyåt = vyaktikuryåt
= to cause to appear; reveal, manifest,
Griffith - ‘may appear to him’.

anajan - Rv. III. 19.5 -
yatvå hótåramanájanmiyédhe
nisádåyanto yajáthåya devå, 
sá tvåm no agnévitësa bodhyådhi
şråvåmsi dhehi matsanåsu.”
Sáyaña - anajan; grštå”hutibhir aukåsan
= anointed;
Griffith - ‘anoint’.

ānaje - Rv. I. 102.1.
imåm te dhiyam prå bhare maho mahåmasyå
stotré dhiånså yåtta ånaje,
tåmutrsavé ca prasavé ca sásahe’mi’ndram
devå’såh śåvasåmadånnå nuo.
Sáyaña - ânaje = aktå śåmsiśåsit = anoint;
and adds - ånju vyakti-mraksåñagåtiåstu-

Rv. VIII 63.1.
så pûrvyó mahånåm venåh ſtubhirånaje,
yasya dvårå mànuśpitå devësu dhiya ånajê.
Såyaña, ånaje=ågacchati; or pråpa, ånajiå prapåkårminå;

ajyate - Rv. VIII. 20.8
“góbhírvåño åjyate sóbhåriåñåm
råthe kóse hiranyåye,
góbandhåvaåh sujåtášåh ise
bhujé mahånto nañ spårgse nù.”
Såyaña-åjyate, vyåjyate, pratåkriåyate=revealed; Griffith - ‘balmed’.
Rv. VIII. 51.9 -

yasyā yāṃ viśvāryo dáśaḥ śevadhipā ariḥ,  
tirāscidaryé rūśame pāviravi tūbhystsó ajyate rayih.”
Sāyāṇa - ajyate = prakṣipyate, (vālakhilyabhāṣya);
Griffith - 'is brought off'.

‘ajyate’ at Rv. IX. 32.3 -

Sāyāṇa, ajyate = sicyate, or snigdhikriyate = anointed;
Griffith - 'annointed'.

Rv. IX. 76.2, Rv. X. 118.3 -

Sāyāṇa, - ajyate - sicyate = anointed;
Griffith - 'balms'.
Sāyāṇa-ajyate gobhīh = anointed
Griffith - 'balmed'.

ajyase - Rv. III. 40.6 -

girvaraḥ pāhi nah sutāṃ madhordharabhirajyase,  
indra tvādātamidyāsah.
Sāyāṇa-ajyase-sicyase; “(you) are anointed.”
Griffith - “art bedewed” (i.e. anointed).

Rv. IX. 66.9 -

mrjānti tvā sāmagrūvóvyo jirā’vadhī śvāṇi,  
rebhō yadajyāse váne -  
Sāyāṇa-ajyase aktāh sikto bhavati-anoint; Griffith - ‘deck thee’.  
also at Rv. IX. 85.5; Sāyāṇa, - ajyase = sikto bhavasi; anointed;
Griffith - ‘balmed’ with milk.

also at Rv. IX. 78.2

sāyana-ajyase = preryase
Griffith - ‘balmed’.

aktāḥ, aktā, aktāḥ, occur at
Rv. IV. 3.10; sāyāṇa-sikto bhavati,
‘sprinkled with oil’, - Griffith.
VI. 4.6 - Sāyaṇa, sams'īṣṭaḥ;
Griffith - ‘decked’.
VI. 5.6 - Sāyaṇa - samsiktaḥ, ‘decked with brightness’ - Griffith;
IX. 96.22 - sāyaṇa - siktaḥ; Griffith - ‘decked’.
aktam - a*, Rv. II. 3.4. Sāyaṇa, ājyena aktam, Griffith - ‘bedewed with’;
IV. 27.5. - Sāyaṇa, siktaṁ; Griffith- ‘filled with a shining liquid’;
IX. 74.8. - Sāyaṇa, samprktam; ‘shining, milk anointed’, Griffith
X. 177.1 - Sāyaṇa - vyaktam; abhyvyaktam, ‘adorned with’, Griffith.

ajyamānāḥ - occurs at,
Rv. IX. 97.35; Sāyaṇa-gobhiḥ sicyamānāḥ; ‘is purified’, Griffith;
X. 31.9. - Sāyaṇa, vyajyamānāḥ,
vyaṅktibḥavan; = caused to appear, revealed, displayed;
Griffith - ‘balmed’;

ajyamāna - occurs at,
Rv. X. 31.10; Sāyaṇa, ‘niściyamānaretaskā’.

āṇjat, āṇjian, at Rv. I. 92.5.

āṇjan, āṇjanti, Sāyaṇa; = display, Griffith ‘deck’.

In the yajurveda -

anaktu - occurs of VI. 2, XXVII. 12, XXXVII. 11; āṇjantu - at, XXIII. 8; anaje -
XXXIII. 29; āṇaṅja - VIII. 30, ājyate - XXXIII. 82, aktam-II. 16; āṇjat - XXIX. 1; 2;
and sāmaṇjan occurs at XX. 37 - anaktu - yv. VI. 2 -

“agrenirasi svāveṣa unnetrṇāmetasya vītādadhī tvā, sthāsyati devastvā avitā,
madhvāṇaktu supippalābhyaśtvausadhibhyah” - dhyāmagrenasprksa āntariksam
madhenāprāh prthivīmuparenādṛṁhiḥ.” Uvaṭa-anaktu = mrakṣayantu, i.e. ‘anoint’

Yv. XXVII. 12 -
tanuṇāpāḍāsuro viṣvāvedā devodevēṣu devāḥ, pathō anaktu mádhvā grtēna.
anaktu = anoint, uvaṭa;

Yv. XXXVII. 11,
yamāya tvā makhāya tvā sūryasya tvā tápase,
devástvā savitā mádhvānaktu.
prthivyāḥ samsprśaspāhī
arcirasi sōciيرا sāpāsi.
madhva anantu = anoint, Uvāṭa;
limputu-, Mahīdhara;
añjantu - Yv. XXIII. 8.
vāsavastvāñjantu gāyatreṇa
cchāndasā rudrāstvañjantu traiṣṭubhena cchāndasā dityā stvāñjayantu
jāgātena cchāndasā bhūrbhuvaḥ svārtājiśīcchāciśnyavye gāyve etādānammatta
deva etādānammaddhi prajāpate.
añjantu = anoint; snigdhaṁ kurvantu-anoint - Mahīdhara.
ānaje - occurs at, Yv. XXXII 29 and is Rv. I. 102.1;
ānañja -, at Yv. VIII. 30

"purudasmóviṣurūpa īndurantārmahimā nājīdhīraḥ, ekapadīṁ dvipadīṁ
tripadīṁ catuspadīṁ aṣṭāpadīṁ bhāvaṇānu prathantaṁ svāhā." ānañja - añjater
vyaktikaranārthasyaitad rūpam. = vyaktikaroti, (Uvāṭa); = brings into light,
displays, causes to appear, etc. etc.

ajyate - Yv. XXXII. 82.
It is the same as Rv. VIII. 51.9
Uvāṭa observes : ajyate, dhātūnām anekārthatvāt añjir dānārthaḥ,
vikaranavyātyayaśca, anakti dadāti rayim, dhanam.

aktam - Yv. II. 16
vāsubhyastvā rudrēbhhyastvā“dityēbhhyastvā sāṁjānātham dyāvāprthivī mitrā
vārunau tvā vrṣṭyāvatām,
vyanuvāyoktam riḥāṇā marūtāṁ prṣatīr gaccha vasā prśnirbhūtvā divāṁ
gaccha tāto no vrṣṭīmāvaha.
cakṣuspā agnēśi cākṣsurme pāhi.
aktam - drutam eva (uvāṭa).

samañjan - Yv. XX. 37
"naraśāmasah prāti śūro mīmāsanānunāpat prātiyajñāsya dhāma,
gobhirvapāvānmādhunā samañjan hiraṇyai śchandrī yajati prācetāḥ."
samañjan = anointing;
añjana - Yv. XXIX 1 & 2,
añjana = vyaktīkurvan (Uvāṭa) = revealing, displaying; and añjana =
samañjan = anointing, grītena (Uvāṭa);
'Vyañjanā'

In the Sāmaveda we have,

ajyase - I. 195;
afijate - I. 564; II. 1121, 964; 1755
vyajyate - I. 564;
samāñjate - I. 564,
ajyate - II.770, 1099, 1609;
añjānāḥ - II. 1080, 1209;

Now - Sv. I. 195 is Rv. III. 40.6
I. 564 = Rv. IX. 86.43
II.1121 = Rv. IX. 10.3
II. 1755 = Rv. I. 92.1;
II. 770 = Rv. IX. 32.3.

Sv. II.1099 is

sam vatsa iva mātrabhīrindurhinvāno ajyate. devāvirmado matibhiḥ pariśkṛtaḥ.
ajyate = 'is sent' - Griffith.
The root may be aj or añj.
Sv. II. 1609 is Rv. VIII. 51.9
Sv. II. 1080 is,

"punāno vāre pavamāno avyaye vr̥ṣo acakridayavan devānāṃ soma pavamāna
niskṛtam gobhirāṇjāno arṣasi." añjānāḥ = 'balmed with'; Griffith;
i.e. anointed;

Now we may examine the occurrences in the AV. (= Atharva-veda).

anakti - Av. V. 27.2
devo devesu deveḥ patho anakti madhva gṛhtena = anoints, - Whitney;
afijate - Av. XVIII 3.18, is Rv. IX. 86.43; anajmi - Av. IV. 14.6
"ajāmanajmi payasā gṛhtena divyāṁ payasām suparnāṁ bṛhántam,
tena gemma sukṛtáṣya lokām svārārohanto abhi nā'kamuttamām."
anajmi = abhidhārayāmi, Sāyaṇa; = anoint - Whitney;
anaktu - Av. V. 28.3;
"trāyāḥ pōsastrīvīti śrayantāmanāktu pūṣā payasā gṛhtena,
ānasya bhūmā pūruṣasya bhūmā bhūmā paśūnāṁ tā ihā śrayantām."
anaktu = anoint; - Whitney;
añjantu - occurs at Av. XVIII. 3.10, & III. 22.2.

Av. III. 22.2 - is
“mitrásca várūṇaścendo rudráśca cetatu,
devásso viśvádhāyasasté māñjantu várcaśā.”
añjantu = aktaṃ āśliṣṭam kurvantu; Sāyaṇa; = anoint; Whitney;
Av. XVIII. 3.10-2, is
várcaśā māṃpitāraḥ somyāso añjantu devā mádhunā ghrēna,
cākṣuṣe mā pratarāṃ tārāyanto jārāse mā jarādāstīṃ vardhantu.
añjantu = anoint, Whitney;
anktam - Av. VI. 69.2 & IX. 1.19

Av. VI. 69.2 is -
“āśvinā sāraghēṇa mā mádhunāṅktam śubhaspatī,
yāthā bhārgasvatīṃ vācamāvādāṇi jānāṃ dnu.”
anktam = abhiṣiṇcatam, Sāyana;
= anoint, Whitney;
Av. IX. 1.19 is the same as above.
We read herein “varcasvatīṃ” for “bhārgasvatīṃ.”
Thus, the root vaṅj seems to carry principally the meaning -
(i) to anoint, and in consequence thereof,
(ii) ‘to shine’. Its use with the prefix ‘vi’ is in the sense of ‘to shine forth’, ‘to
glitter’, etc. The idea seems to be to enhance the glitter of something by application
of some ingredient.

Grassman, Roth, and Bothlingk also have vaṅj in the following senses; -
(i) to anoint, to rub the ointment, to embalm; (salben) -
(ii) to emit, (sputzen);
(iii) to shine, to glitter; (glänzend);
(iv) to shine forth (erscheinem);
(v) to decorate (schmücken);
(vi) to embellish; to attire, dress (zünsten).

“Vi +vaṅj” - we come across different forms of the root vi+vaṅj in the Vedas.

We will first take up the Rgveda. We may take note of the fact that vi+vaṅj
occurs more frequently in what are known as later maṇḍalas of the Rv. we will try
to study all these references carefully and will try to find its sense or senses in their various occurrences.

‘vyajyante’ : occurs at

Rv. I. 64.4 -
“citrairañjibhirvapüse vyañjate váksaḥsu rukām ádhi yetire śubhē,
amśesveśām ni’mimrksur rṣṭāyah sākām jajñire svadhāyā divó nāraḥ.”

vyāñjate = vyaktam kuvranti, aḷaṃkuvravantīyarthāḥ, Sāyana;
i.e. bring to light, cause to appear, display, reveal, decorate, and añjibhiḥ is explained by Sāyana as “rūpābhī-vañjana-samarthaiḥ āharaṇaiḥ” Griffith explains as, “they deck”; ‘añjibhiḥ’ as ‘glittering ornaments’.

Rv. VII. 79.2

vyāñjate divó antesvaktū’nviśonā yukta uṣāso yatante,
saṃ te gā vastāma ā vartayanti jyótiyacchanti savitēvā bāhu.
Sāyana explains as ‘vyaktikurvanti’.
i.e. cause to appear, reveal, etc.

Griffith - ‘paint’ (= anoint)

Rv. IX 86.43 is the same as seen above.(see añjate);
Sāyana-añjate = vividham añjanti,
and samañjate = samyag añjanti;

= anoint, well anoint;

Griffith - ‘balm’ - (i.e. anoint).

vyajyate - Rv. X. 85.28;
“nīlahalitāṁ bhavati kṛtyāsaktīr vyajyate,
edhante sayā jñātāyah pātirbandhasa badhyate.”

vyajyate = tyajyate, Sāyana;
= driven off, Griffith;

The root here is √vi+aj and not √vi+aṅj. It should be noted that this is the same as Av. XIV 1.26.

Whitney observes that the root is √vi+aj.

Rv. IX. 71.7 : reads as,
“pārā vyakto arusō divāḥ kavivṛśā tripṛṣṭhō anavista gā abhi,
sahasraṇitiryaṭiḥ parāyāti rebhōna pūrviruṣāso vi rājati.”
Sāyāna observes - “somāḥ vyaktāḥ vispaṣṭadhārāyuktaḥ yad vā vasativaribhirviśeṣe-ṇāktaḥ siktaḥ san.”

i.e. clearly manifested, displayed, or well anointed; Griffith - ‘shines’.

vyaktam - at Rv. X. 14.9, X. 127.7;

Rv. X. 14.9 -
ápeta vīta vīca sarpatātōśmā etāṁ pitāro lokāmakran,
áhobhiradbhiraktūbhīrvyaktam yamō dadātyavasānamasmai.”

Sāyāna - vyaktam = samgatam;
= accompanied with, (i.e.) adorned with, Griffith - ‘adorned with’.

Rv. X. 127.7 -
úpa mā pépiśattāmaḥ krṣṇam vyaktamasthit, úṣa ṛṇeva yātaya.

Sāyāna observes : vyaktam viśeṣeṇa svabhāṣā sarvasyāṇjakam spaṣṭarūpaṃ vā; i.e. that which well anoints everything with its own light, or that which is clearly manifested.

Griffith (that which) decks, (i.e. adorns); ‘vyaktā’ occurs at Rv. VII. 77.3 -, VIII. 56.4, and X. 86.5 -

Rv. VII. 77.3 - is,
“devānāṃ cākṣuḥ subhāgā vāhantī śvetāṁ nāyantī sudṛśikamāṃśvam,
uscā adarśi rāsmibhirvyaktā citrāmahā viśvamanu-prābhūtā.”

Sāyāna does not wait to explain ‘vyaktā’, but it means here, ‘clearly manifested’.

Griffith - (that which) ‘shines apparent’ i.e. ‘clearly shines’.

Rv. VIII. 56.6 - is,
“tātro api praṇīyata pūtākratāyai vyaktā, āśvāṇā minnā yūthyām.”

There is no Sāyāna-bhāṣya on this. We get Vālakhilya-sūkta-bhāṣya which explains it as, ‘vividham gantā, nāṉāpradeṣešu pracalan.’

Rv. X. 86.5 - is
priyā taṣṭāṇi me kapirvyaktā vyadūduṣat,
śīro nvasya rāviṣam nā sugāṃ dūskīte bhuvam viśvamād indra uttaraḥ.”

Sāyāṇa explains as vyaktā = vyaktāṇājyai.
viśeṣeṇāktāṇi, i.e. well adorned;
'Vyanjanā'

Griffith - vyakta = beauteous things, (i.e. well adorned).

vyaktāḥ - occurs at Rv. VII. 56.1, which is - 'kā' iṁ vyaktā nāraḥ sanīlā rudrasya máryā ṛdhā svāsvāh.'

Sāyaṇa - kāntiyuktāḥ, i.e. 'beautiful'; 'lustrous', 'radiant';
Griffith - 'radiant'.

'vyaktam' occurs at Rv. X. 85.21, which is -
udīrśvātaḥ pātvati sreṣṭhā viśvāvasum namasā āabhiriṣe,
anyāmiccha pitṛśadām vyaktam sásate bhāgō janūśa tāsyasya viddhi.'
Sāyaṇa explains as - vyaktam anūdheti pariṣṣuṛām vigatānjanāṃ vā.
i.e. 'clearly manifested'; or that whose añjana is removed.
Griffith - 'fair' (i.e. beautiful).

vyānjata - occurs at Rv. VIII. 7.25, which is -
"vidyūdhaṭṭa abhī'ḍyavaḥ sūprāḥ sīrṣāhiranyāiḥ,
sūbhṛā vyanjata s'Iryē."
Sāyaṇa - vyanjata vyānjayanti, vyaktīkurvanti, dhārayaṁty arthaḥ, i.e. -
'display'; 'bear';
Griffith - 'deck'.

We have seen as many as thirteen occurrences in which we come across different forms of the root vi+vaṇj in the Rv. These thirteen occurrences from the Rv. bear the general sense of opening up something hidden and bringing it to light, embellishing, decorating, adorning and the like.

Thus we can say that the root vi+vaṇj in the Rv. has these two connected meanings (i) revealing, (ii) adorning.

The Yajurveda has,
'vyaktaḥ' at XIX. 87, and 'vyaktam' at XXXV. 1.
Yv. XIX. 87 reads as -
kumbhō vaniṣṭhūrjanitā śācībhīryāsminnāgre yonyaṃ gārtho antāḥ,
plas'Irvyaktaḥ s'atādhāra útsa duhē nā kumbhāi svadhām pitṛbhyaḥ.'

Uvaṭa explains, vyaktaḥ = spaṣṭaḥ, i.e. - clearly manifested or displayed;
Mahīdhara has vyaktaḥ = spaṣṭaḥ.
Yv. XXXV - 1, is -

apeto yantu pañayōsumnā devapīyāvaḥ,

asyā lokāḥ sutāvataḥ dyubhirāhobhiraktubhir vyaktāṁ yamō
dadāvivasānamasmai."

The second half is almost identical with Rv. X. 14.9. b, and Uvaṭa has vyaktam = spaṣṭikṛtaṁ, clearly displayed, = manifested.

Mahidhara also has a similar explanation.

Sāmaveda (= SV.) has,

‘vyāñjate’ at SV. I. 564, which is Rv. IX. 86.43, and ‘vyaktāḥ’, at Sv. I. 433, which is the same as Rv. VII. 56.1.

Atharvaveda (= AV.) has,

‘vyāñjate’ at Av. XVIII. 3.18 which is the same as Rv. IX 68.43; Whitney explains it as, ‘they anoint out’ (vi);

‘vyajyate’ - at Av. XIV. 1.26 = Rv. X 85.28 Whitney explains - it from the root vi+aj and not vi+ānī.

‘vyaktam’ - occurs at Av. XVIII. 1.55, which is Rv. X. 14.9, and vyaktā at AV. XX - 126.5.

Thus we see that the Av. has here practically everything borrowed from the Rv.

The survey of the occurrences of the root vi+ānī in the vedas shows two connected meanings: viz. to bring out something hidden by applying or enhancing something, to bringten, to embellish, to decorate, to adorn.

Thus putting together the result of our survey, we get -

(i) to deck, to adorn,
as in Rv. I. 64.4. (Sāyaṇa and Griffith),
Rv. X. 14.9. (sāyaṇa and griffith)
Av. XVIII. 1.55., Whitney.

(ii) to manifest clearly; display; cause to appear, as in
Rv. I. 64.4 . (Sāyaṇa),
Rv. VII. 79.2. (Sāyaṇa),
Rv. VII. 77.5 (Sāyaṇa),
Rv. IX. 77.7. (Sāyaṇa) & Griffith),
Rv. X. 85.21 (Sāyaṇa),.
'Vyañjanā'

Yv. XIX. 87 (Uvaṭa & Mahidhara),
Yv. XXXV. 1, (Uvaṭa & Mahidhara),
Rv. X. 14.9. (Śaśyana)
Av. XVIII. 1.55.

(iii) to paint (i.e. to anoint), (Griffith) as in Rv. VII. 79.2;
(iv) to balm (i.e. to anoint), (Griffith) Rv. IX. 86.43
SV. I. 564;

(v) to anoint, as in
Rv. IX. 86.43 (Śaśyana)
Av. XVIII. 3.18 (Śaśyana) and also whitney
Rv. X. 86.5 (Śaśyana).

(vi) to shine forth; - Rv. VII. 77.3 (Griffith),
(vii) 'beautiful', (vyaktā), Griffith, as in Rv. X. 86.5, and also 'kāntiyuktāh' according to Śaśyana, at Rv. VII. 56.1.; 'radiant' - Griffith; Rv. VII. 56.1. and also SV. I. 433 (Griffith) 'fair' - Rv. X. 55.21, (Griffith).

We may also note the occurrences of the root 'dhvan' or the word 'dhvani' in the Vedas as under:

We come across,

'adhvanīt' - at Rv. VIII 6.13,
'adhvānayat' at Rv. VI. 18.10,
'dhvanyīt' at Rv. I. 162.15,

and 'dhvani', 'dhvanayāh', at Av. V. 20.7.

Rv. VIII. 6.13. is,

"yādasya manyúrādhaninād vivṛtāṁ parvasō rujān,
apāh samudrāṁ airayat."

Śaśyana - stanaśya nīsamulukṣaṇām śabdāṁ akarot; Griffith - 'thundered'.

Rv. VI. 18.10 is,

agnirna śūṣkam vānamindra heti kākṛo ni dhakṣayanaśānirṇā bhīmā,
gambhirāya rṣvāya yō rurōjādhvānayad duritā dambhāyaccha."

Śaśyana - yuddha garjanalakṣaṇām śabdam karoti.
Rv. I. 162.15 -

mā tvāgni'rdhvanayiddhumā gandhir Sāyaṇa - 'to make noise'. mókhā, etc.
Griffith - 'make thee cracle'.

Av. V. 20.7 is

antareme nabhasī ghoso astu prthak te dhvanayo santu śibham,
= 'let there be noise; Whitney.

Thus the root vāhvan and the word 'dhanj' carry the sense of 'to make noise',
and 'noise' respectively.

The occurrences of the root vi+vāñj in different forms might have proved to be
a remote source of inspiration for the theory of 'vyañjana' in times to come; first
in the vaiyākaṇanas and other darśanas and then in the alaṃkāraśāstra.

Now, we will examine the occurrences of vāñj, and vi+vāñj in the Nighantu
and the Nirukta, (cir. 700 B.C. to - 300 B.C.), and then in Rk-prātiśākhya,
Aṣṭādhyāyī of Pāṇini (Cir. 300. B.C.), and the Mahābhāṣya of Patañjali (Cir. 150.
B.C.) (The last two sources are looked into earlier in this chapter but here we will
once again look into the same to establish the correlation with our earlier
observations) -

The Nighantu has no word like 'vyañjana', nor any other form of the roots vāñj
and vi+vāñj.

The Nirukta - (Cir. 700 B.C. to 500 B.C.) :- In the Nirukta we come across certain
occurrences of vāñj in different forms, wherein it seems to carry the sense of 'to
anoint'. We have thus, 'aṅjate' at Nirukta 12.7., and it is the same as Rv. I. 92.1.

aṅjan - at 3.20, (i.e. Rv. I. 92.5),
aṅjanti - at 8.18 (i.e. Rv. III. 8.1),
and also, 'aṅkte, vyakte, vyaktatāre (Ch. I); aksini 'kasmāt, ankteḥ, ...etc. in the
sense of 'clearly manifested'.
and also, 'anakti' at 8.10.

Yāska explains - 'uṣāsānaktā.'

He observes : uṣā vyākhyātā, nakteti rātrīnāma; anakti bhūtānyavaśyāyena, api
vā naktā avyaktavarṇā, tavoreśā bhavati.

anakti = anoints,
avyaktavarṇā = not of distinct colour; (i.e. having no clearly manifested
colour).
vi+vañj is seen in the sense of ‘manifestation’.

We have P.P. of vi+vañj, in vyaktavācaḥ, at 11.29, in the sense of ‘distinct speech’. (vi+vañj = to manifest clearly). We read - “deviṃ vācaṃ ajanayanta devāh, tāṃ sarvarūpāḥ paśavo vayanti. vyaktavācaścāvyaktavācaḥ ca.”

At 7.13, we come across the word ‘vyañjanamātram’ in the sense of ‘mere indication’. We read -

‘iti imā devatā anukrāntāḥ-sūktabhbajāḥ, havirbhājaḥ, ṛgdbhajāscā, bhūyiṣṭhāḥ, kaścinnipātabhbajāḥ, - atha uta abhidhānaiḥ saṃyujya haviścodayanti, indrāya vṛtraghe, indrāya amhomuce, iti. tāny api eke samāmananti, bhūyāmsi tu samāmnānāt, yātu saṃvijñānabhūtaṃ syāt prādhānyastuti tat samāmane. - atha uta karmabhīṛṣiḥ devatāḥ stauni vṛtrahā purandaraḥ iti. tāny api eke samāmananti, bhūyāmsi tu samāmnānāt. vyañjanamātraṃ tu tat tasyābhidhānasya bhavati, yathā brāhmaṇāya bubhuksirāya odanam dehi, snātāya anulepanam, pīpāsate pāṇīyam, iti. (Nirukta 7.13).

Laxman Sarup (pp. 120) translates as -

“Moreover, a seer prays deities with regard to their activities, as (Indra) the vṛtra-slayer, or the city-destroyer, and so on. Some make a list of these also, but they are too numerous to be collected together in a list. These epithets are mere indications of (a particular aspect of the proper) appellations, just as ‘give food to, a Brāhmaṇa, who is hungry, or unguents to one who has taken a bath, or water to one who is thirsty.” (Incidentally here we may also note efforts in the direction of abhidhana-kosa i.e. laxicons. And applying perfumes after a bath also may be noted from the point of view of a social scientist).

We may say that the above is a very interesting occurrence. ‘Vyañjana’ here means ‘an indicator’. This seems to be the earliest occurrence of ‘vyañjana’ in the sense of ‘indication’. In a similar sense, we have noted earlier an occurrence, wherein we find another root viz. ṣdyut. In Ch. I. Yāska cites the opinion of Gārgya who holds that upasargas are not meaningful by themselves, but they serve to suggest or indicate the relation of nāma and ākhyāta, with a special meaning. Gārgya observes : “na nirbaddhāḥ upasargāḥ arthān nirāhuḥ. nāmā”khyātayos tu karmopasamyoṣa-dyotakāḥ bhavanti.”

Thus, it seems, as already observed by us earlier, Yāska comes very near to the power of ‘dyotana’, or ‘suggestion’ of words, though, he does not mention it by name. We know that in the kāvyāśāstra, the word ‘dyotana’ is used as an equivalent of ‘vyañjana’. ‘Vyañjana’ in the sense of ‘indication’ in Yāska, as noted above, is also
an important occurrence of \(\text{vi}+\text{vañj}\). We do not come across any occurrence of dhvan, or \(\text{v'dhvani}\) in either the Nighaṇṭu or the Niruktra of Yāska.

We will now turn to the Rk-prātiśākhya, Aṣṭādhyāyī of Pānini (Cir. 300 B.C.), and the Mahābhāṣya of Patañjali (Cir. 150 B.C.), again to supplement our observations done in the earlier part of this chapter where we had sought help from some observations of Dr. Saroja Bate. This is to supplement the same further.

In the Rk-prātiśakhya, it may be noted at the outset, we do not come across words such as vyañjanā, dhvani, etc. The word ‘vyañjana’, however, in the technical sense of a ‘consonant’ occurs at several places.

The Rk-prātiśākhya has,

‘vyañjana’ at - XVIII (paṭala) 32 (Sūtra;) (and, at sūtra 42, 43)

vyañjanam - I. 5; 22; II. 8; VI. 14;
vyañjanasya - XIV. 15;
vyañjanāt - XIV. 47; XVIII. 44;
vyañjanānām - XIV. 16;
vyañjanāni - I. 6.23; IV.1; XVIII. 33;
vyañjane - VII. 1.
vyañjanena - III. 17;
vyañjanesu - VIII. 48;
vyañjana-saṃgamam - XVIII. 40;
vyañjana-sannipātaḥ - I. 37;
vyañjanodayam - VII. 33;
vyañjanodayāt - VI. 46.

All these carry the sense of a ‘consonant’.

In the Aṣṭādhyāyī of Pānini. (Cir. 300. B.C.) We get

vyañjana, occurs at II. i. 34; IV. iv. 26, and II. iv. 12. In the last two occurrences it is seen in the sense of a ‘consonant’. At II. i. 34, we have, ‘vyañjanair upasikte’ which is explained as - “dādhnā upasiktam dādhiḥkam”, - Anything that is used to enhance the relish of a principal object of eating is called a ‘vyañjana’, e.g. curd, in the case of rice.

Thus ‘vyañjana’ is that which serves to enhance the relish. We come across the same use of the term ‘vyañjana’, in the Nāṭya śāstra of Bharata wherein the Muni
cites the analogy of śāḍavaḍi-rasa (Ch. VI. Nā. sā). This can have an important bearing on the vyañjanāvāda of the ālāṃkārikas, wherein, vibhāva, anubhāva, etc., cause to enhance the sthāyin to the capacity of rasa.

It should also be mentioned that Pāṇini does not mention ‘dhvani’, nor does he refer to sphaṭavāda. He does mention one, “sphaṭāyana”, without referring to the theory of sphaṭa (Ref. Pā. VI. i. 121). We, also come across the word ‘vyakta’, meaning ‘distinct’, ‘clear’, - in the sūtra I. 3.48, e.g. - ‘vyaktavācāṁ samuccāraṇe’. Also at I. ii. 51, we read, ‘vyaktivacanah’, and at VI. i. 123, we have ‘avañ sphaṭāyanasya’. These occurrences have no direct or indirect bearing on the theory of vyañjana or dhvani. Some important references where Dr. Bhaté has suggested that Pāṇini has directly touched vyañjana, and we have called the same as “ruḍha-vyañjana”, have been noted earlier in this chapter. They form a bridge between grammar and sāhitya śāstra.

In the Mahābhāṣya of Patañjali (Cir. 150. B.C.), - we come across many occurrences of different forms of the roots vañj and vi+vañj, and also of the words vyañjana, sphaṭa etc. We have recorded earlier some of these that seem to have a direct bearing on the theory of vyañjana of the ālāṃkārikas. But we supplement our effort here by citing some more references as under.

We find ‘vyajyante’ at Pā. VIII. i. 70, line 15, pp. 381. The reference reads as - ihāpi tārhi mandrasādhanā kriyāṅgā vyajyate. - The context is that in the illustration, “mandrair indra haribhir yāhi mayiruromabhiḥ” the word ‘mandra’ being not an indicative of ‘gati’ or ‘action’, does not get an anudātta svara. While discussing this particular illustration, the author says that here also, a particular action - kriyā - which has ‘mandra’ for its kāraka is suggested by the upasarga ‘ān’. Thus we get ‘vyajyate’ in the sense of ‘suggestion’.

We find ‘vyajyante’ at pā. I. 3.1 line 19-20, pp. 258; the author says that without ‘kriyā’ or ‘action’, the kālās such as bhūta, vartamāna, etc. are not suggested vi+vañj occurs in the sense of ‘suggestion’ here. : “athavā nāntareṇa kriyāṁ bhūtabhāvīṣya-vartamāṇāḥ kālāḥ vyajyante” - and also, “astyādhibhiścā’pi bhūta-bhāvīṣya-vartamāṇāḥ kālāḥ vyajyante”; at pā. I. iii. 1; 19, 20/258 also carries the sense of suggestion.

Again at Pā. III. i. 67 14/57 we read - “tiṇabhāhihitena bhāvena kālapuruṣopagrahā abhivyajyante kṛd-abhāhihitena punar na vyajyante.” We have ‘vyajyante in the sense of ‘suggestion’. The author says that the meaning of ‘bhāva’ or ‘action’ is suggested by both ‘tin’ and ‘kṛdanta’. But there is some difference in
these two. Whatever is suggested by kṛd-anta is in the form of a 'dravya', while by ‘tin’, kāla, puruṣa and upagraha (i.e. parasmai or ātmane), are suggested.

Moreover, at Pā. VIII. ii. 48; 23/23/408, we have, “aṅjer aṅjanam; aṅjanam ca prakāśanam; tathā aṅjer vyaṅjanam, vyaṅjanam ca prakāśanam. The context is that when vañij is in the sense of ‘prakāśana’, we do not change ‘ta’ into ‘na’, in case of a P.P.P. Thus, we get vañij in the sense of ‘prakāśana’. Later on he says that vañc is also seen in the same sense - “aṅcitaḥ gacchati” - means, “prakāśayati ātmānaṁ iti gatyate.” In our popular usage, ‘aṅcitaḥ gacchati’ means, “being alert he goes”, i.e. ‘samāhito bhūtvā gacchati’. The author here uses terms such as, ‘iti gamyate’, and this usage brings us very close to the vyaṅjanā-vāda.

Thus we see that vañj, vaṅc, and vi+vañj are all used in the sense of ‘prakāśana’ i.e. ‘manifestation’, or revealing, or bringing something into light, or displaying something etc.

‘Vyaṅjanā’ occurs normally in its technical sense of a consonant, but at Pā. VIII. ii. 48; 24/24/408, however, we get it in the sense of ‘prakāśana’, as noted above. Thus, vañj and vi+vañj, seem to occur in the same senses as in the earlier literature. Vi+vañj in the sense of suggestion is also noted as at Mbh. VIII. i. 70; 15/381; or Mbh. I. iii. 1; 19/20/258, etc., as noted above.

This ends our investigation in the fields of grammar and philosophic literature of the ancient times, to find the roots of the theory of vyaṅjanā-dhvanī-of the ālamkārikas and the results are positive. The thought-current of vyaṅjanā-dhvanī was very much present even in the earliest vedic literature also, and even a theory of vyaṅjanā is clearly traced in early grammatical and philosophical literature and we are happy to note that Ānandavardhana is very right when he observes that ‘dhvani’ was ‘samāmnāta-pūrvaj’.

We will now try to trace the germs of vyaṅjanā-dhvanī even in the works of earlier literary masters such as Bhāsa (Cir. 300 A.D.), Aśvaghoṣa (Cir. 100 A.D.) and Kālidāsa (Cir. 400 A.D. - if not Ist cen B.C.) Our investigation in the works of these literary artists is motivated by the fact that it is always great literature which gives birth to great literary cannons and it is great criticism which in its turn influences the shaping of literature that follows. So, perhaps the works of these poets might have an indirect influence in the shaping of literary criticism. That Bhāsa was a name to remember with respect even for Kālidāsa is clear from the latter's reference to Bhāsa in his Mālavīkāgnimitram. It is one thing whether the so called Trivendrum plays are from this same Bhāsa or not, and frankly speaking
after reading more and more from our learned friend Dr. N. P. Unni, our faith concerning Bhāsa's authorship of all the thirteen Trivendum plays has disappeared, but we have quoted here some passages from plays concerning which our faith has not completely evaporated.

As noted earlier, we have traced the earlier occurrences of the words connected with vyañjanā-dhvani-theory in the vedic literature. We do not claim that the vedic poets had a conscious recognition of this theory in their minds. But we do find germs of this theory in their use of certain terms. This is enough to trace something. We also tried to link ancient grammatical and philosophical thinking with this theory and the findings were more positive and encouraging. Now we turn to ancient classical literature as represented in the works of earlier poets such as Bhāsa, Āśuaghoṣa and Kālidāsa. Perhaps we will tread on more solid grounds in our efforts to trace the origin of the thought-current of vyañjanā-dhvani. That Kālidāsa clearly mentions in his Vikramorvaśiya, a Bharata who staged a play with eight rasas and instructed the divine damseis in its performance, clearly suggests that even before Kālidāsa there was literature concerning literary aesthetics. He observes: “muninā bharatena yaḥ prayogah, bhavatiṣy asa rasāśrayo niyuktah...” etc. This does not necessarily mean that Kālidāsa refers to whatever is available as ‘nātyaśāstra’ of Bharata, to-day. It may or it may not be. But one thing is certain that literature and literary or art-criticism influence each other in turn and make for advancement in either. So, our effort to find traces of vyañjanā-dhvani theory in the works of the earlier poets is thus certainly justified. It may be noted that as for Bharata's Nātya-śāstra as now available, and its connection with vyañjanāvāda, we will have a separate detailed discussion at a suitable place later, when we will discuss the origin and development of the concept of “rasa”. For the present we will keep off from Bharata's Nātya-śāstra as is available to us in its present form.

That criticism follows literature does not require proof. That practice precedes theory and is in turn guided by theory is well proved in the history of literature and art, world over. So, before we proceed with Bharata or Bhāmaha, let us take note of the usage of vyañjanā, rasa, etc. in earlier classical literature, be it, please note, either conscious or even unconscious. For the present we begin with Bhāsa, who is mentioned by Kālidāsa, and here too with some of his so called plays that are included in the thirteen Trivendum plays.

Bhāsa - In the so called thirteen Trivendum plays ascribed to Bhāsa, we come across words like, ‘vyaktam’, ‘vyaktih’, ‘su-vyaktam’, ‘vyaktikṛtam’, etc. in the sense of ‘clearly manifested’. We also come across terms such as, ‘sūcayati’,
sūcayitavyah', 'sūcayanti', etc. in the sense of 'indicating' or 'suggesting'. As noted earlier we have no absolute faith in the authenticity of all these plays, and even when we choose to accept some from Bhāsa's pen, following Dr. Unni's observations, we have reservations about their present form; i.e. we feel that even the so called authentic or near-authentic plays are stage-adaptations and are not in their original form as drafted by Bhāsa. However, as a prima facie view, we go along with these plays as Bhāsa's creations.

To begin with, in the Svapnavāsavadattam, we have the following:
sarpavyakti-at Svapna. V
& vyaktam - svapna V. 7; VI 14,
In the Pratijñāyaugandharāyaṇa, we have 'vyaktam' atmahite kṣamam' - (Act. I, Introduction); and also -
Yau. - “vyaktikṛtam a-sāmarthyam...” etc.
and, “vyaktam balam...” etc.
Then, kāncukīyaḥ - ‘suvyaktam...’ (Act. II)
rāja - vyaktam... (Act II).
& yau. - “vyaktam bharatarohako...” etc. (Act. IV)
The Avimāraka has -
kauñjāyanaḥ - vyakta-hima-mūrtiḥ... etc. (Act. I)
The Cārudatta has -
Nāyakaḥ - sarvathā suvyaktam gitam (Act. III)
and also, - Sajjalakaḥ - dīpa-prabhā-vyaktikṛtam dṛṣyate (Act. III).
The Pratimānāṭaka has -
Rāmaḥ - “suvyaktam prabhavāmīti...” etc. (Act. I. 11)
and also, Bharataḥ - “bahumāna-vyākṣiptenamanasā suvyaktam nāvadhāritam...
(Act. III).
The Abhiśekanāṭaka has -
Aṅgadaḥ - “vyaktam utsṛjya deham”, etc. (II. 25); and also,
Rāvanaḥ - “vyaktam indrajitā...” (V. 10) and also,
“Rāmaḥ - vyaktam daiva-gatim... etc. (VI. 34)
The Dūtavākya has -
Duryodhanah-suvyaktāṃ prāpta eva keśavaḥ.
and also, sudarśanaḥ-avyaktādīr acintyātmē etc.
The Dūta-ghaṭotkaca has -
Dhṛtarāṣṭrāḥ 'suvyaktāṃ nihatam'. etc. I. 26
and, 'suvyaktāṃ dhanuṣi...' I. 28.
The Pañcarātra has -
Bhiṣmaḥ - "suvyaktāṃ bāhuśālinaḥ..." I. 50,
and also, Bhṛhannalā - 'yena suvyakta-kārinā...' II. 65
The Madhyama has -
Bhimaḥ - suvyaktāṃ rākṣasījo... I. 26,
The Ûrubhaṅga has -
trīyaḥ-avyaktīkṛtā dinakarograkaraḥ... and also, Aśvatthāmā. — vyaktāṃ
norjita eva. I. 21 (I. 58d)
The Bālacarita has -
vasudevāḥ - vyaktāṃ ghoṣa-samīpe... etc.
However, the most noteworthy passages are as follows:
In the second act of Avimāraka, the prince is sitting all alone, lost in the
thoughts of Kuruṅgi. Meanwhile, two maid servants of Kuruṅgi arrive there with
some message. The dialogue proceeds as follows -

Dhāṛī - ārya! kim cintyate?

Avimārakaḥ - Bhavati, śāstraṃ cintyate. Dhā. - kim nāmaitad śāstraṃ viviktē
cintyate?

Avi. - Bhavati! yogaśāstraṃ cintyate.

Dhā. - (sa-smitam) - pratigrhītāṃ maṅgala-vacanam. yoga-śāstraṃ eva
bhavatu.

Avi. - (ātmagatam) - ko nu khalu vāyārthāḥ? anyad apy abhilāṣavaśād
anyathā śaṁkalpayāmi! (prakāśam) - kim abhipretaṃ bhavatyāḥ?

Dhā. - yogam icchantyāv āgate svāḥ. anumata āryena yogah, iti nanu niṣṭhitam
kāryam asmākam rājakule vivikta avakāse. tatrāpi kópi jano'dhikarām yogam
cintayann asti. tena saha tatraiva āryena suṣṭha yogavidhānaṃ cintyatām iti.
This passage leaves no doubt that the author is not only conversant with the 'abhipreta' artha, or implied sense, but also seems to be conversant with the verbal function of vyañjanā. Of course, Prof. Dr. Rewaprasad Dwivedi will argue here in favour of kavyānumiti. - In the Cārudatta, act II, we have the following dialogue:

Gaṇikā - samvāhaka āryaḥ. sukumārā kalā śikṣitā āryenā.
Saṃvāhakaḥ - kaleyū śikṣitā. ājīvikā idāniṃ samvṛttā.
Gaṇikā - nirveda-sūcakam iva vacanam āryasya; tatas tataḥ !
Thus a sentence becomes sūcaka - suggestor of a 'bhāva' called 'nirveda'.

Again, in the act III we have - Brāhmaṇī - hā dhik! (niśkrāntā). vidūsakaḥ -
esā vācā duḥkham rakṣitvā aśrubhiḥ sūcayitvā gataḥ bhoḥ, idam !
Here also tears - āśru - an anubhāva, become suggestive of the feeling of unspoken grief.

Again, in the act I, we have-Gaṇikā - (pravārakaṃ gṛhītvā sa-harsam) -
"an-udāśīnam yauvanam asya
paṭavāśa-gandhah sūcayati."

The fragrance is said to reveal that his youth is ‘an-udāśīna’ i.e. not indifferent to the joys of life. Though of course, we may be prompted to consider here a rasa
doṣa where we have ‘vyaṅgyasya kathamān’ i.e. where the suggested sense is almost given away by a plain statement. Or, we may read ‘anumiti’ here.

In the Pratimānātaka, act V, we have Rāmaḥ - ... ‘aye imāni khalu prayagrābhisiktāni vrksa-mūlāni, adūrgatām maithilim sūcayanti. tathā hi... etc.

Here, one fact, viz. that Sītā has not moved away much farther, is said to be suggested by yet another fact viz. that the roots of trees that are seen to be recently sprinkled. But here again, we may read the process of reasoning or inference on the part of the hero. The word ‘dhvani’ occurs in the usual sense of ‘sound’ only. We may now turn to Aśvaghoṣa.

Aśvaghoṣa (Cir. 100 A.D.) : It may be observed that the Saundarananda has vi+vaṇj at II. 38; XIII. 41; and XVIII. 11; and the Buddhacarita has vi+vaṇj at IV. 58; IV. 84; IX. 64; XII. 18; XII. 22; XII. 40; XVI. 73; and XVI. 130; and ‘dhvani’ at IV. 51; V. 80; VIII. 72.

Buddha-carita IX. 64, XII. 18, XII. 22; and XII. 40 have ‘vyakta’ and ‘a-vyakta’ having a philosophical connotation of ‘the manifest’ and ‘the unmanifest’. Saundarananda II. 38 and XIII. 41 have vi+vaṇj in the sense of ‘to indicate’, ‘to manifest clearly’. Buddha-Carita XVI 130 has vi+vaṇj in the sense of ‘to the letter’ i.e. ‘clearly’ as opposed to ‘artha’ or ‘spirit’. 
Saundarananda XVIII. 11 reads as -

“maitrī-stanīm vyañjana-cāru-sāsnāṁ
saddharma-duṇghāṁ pratibhāna-srīngām,
tavāsmi gām sādhu nipīya tṛptaḥ
tṛseva gām uttama-vatsa tṛptaḥ.”

Here, the word ‘vyañjana’, is in the sense of alamkāra or a source of decoration, as perhaps in the Nātya-śāstra where Bharata describes a recipi rich by ‘vyañjana’ sprinkled on the same.

At Buddha-carita XVI. 73, we have ‘vyañjana’ in the same sense. It reads as -

“sarva-kleśābhividdhānāṁ kleśa-sālya-samuddharāḥ,
sarva-lakṣaṇa-sampannah sarva-vyañjana-maṇḍitaḥ.”

‘Vi+vañj’ in the sense of ‘to manifest clearly’ or ‘to suggest’ occurs at Buddha-carita IV. 84 -

“upapannam idam vākyam sauhārdā-vyañjakam rvayi,
atra ca tvā’numesyāmi yatra mā duṣṭhu manyase.”

Here again, a ‘vākya’ is said to be ‘sauhārdā-vyañjakam’, i.e. suggestive of friendship. The sentence i.e. a group of words, suggests the bhāva of ‘sauhārdā’. It may be noted that this passage is specially interesting and useful from the point of view of our investigation.

The occurrence of the word ‘vyañjana’ meaning embellishment is also noteworthy in the passages quoted as above. We know that in Vāmana the term ‘alamkāra’ has two senses viz. (i) that of ‘saundarya’ i.e. beauty in general and (ii) that of a figure of speech. It is not unlikely that the word vyañjana had also a sense similar to alamkāra or a beautifying agent and also the sense of suggestion. The first sense of alamkāra seems to have gone out of usage but the second sense seems to have prevailed in later poetics.

We also come across some occurrences of ‘dhvani’ in the sense of ‘sound’ only in the present sources. This can not have any bearing on the theory of vyañjanā-dhvani.

Kālidāsa : (Cir. 400 A.D.) -

In Kālidāsa, we come across vi+vañj in its different grammatical forms as seen below:

Kumāra- II. 11, V. 62; VI. 23; VI. 51; VII. 91; VIII. 37; VIII. 71; and IX. 6;
Meghadūta has - vi+vañj at VS. 12; 29; & 55 (pūrva-megha.) and at 21 (uttaramedha).

Raghu. - I 10; IV. 68; V. 16; VI. 12; VII. 58; XI. 41; XIII. 12; XIV. 26; XVI. 23; XVII. 40; XIX. 30; XIX. 41.

Vi+vañj seems to occur in the sense of ‘to manifest’.

In the Abhi. śā. somewhere in act V and at VII. 8; VII. 17 we read vi+vañj. 

vēdhvan or ‘dhvani’ occurs at Rūsamhāra - V. 10 (prāvṛd-varṇanam),
V. 15 (prāvṛd-varṇanam)
& V. 21 (prāvṛd-varṇanam)

Kumāra samābhava - I. 56; VIII. 24; VIII. 71; XI. 36; 38; XIV. 27, 39, 45.
Meghadūta (pūrva) VS. 42, 56
& (Uttara) VS. 3, 36.

Raghuvaṁśa - II. 72; IV. 73; VI. 56, VII. 41, and XVI. 13.

We will discuss some noteworthy occurences:

All the occurrences of vi+vañj in the Kumāra. except at II. 11, are in the sense of ‘to manifest’, ‘to display’, ‘to bring to light’, etc. At II. 11, we have ‘vyaktra’ and ‘vyaktetara’ having the philosophical connotation of ‘the manifest’ and the ‘unmanifest’. But, Kumāra VII. 91 is more interesting. It reads as -

“tau sandhiṣu vyañjita-vṛtti-bheḍam
rasāntaresu pratibaddha-rāgām,
apaśyatām apsarasām muhūrtam
prayogam ādyam lalitāngahāram.”

Here, we have ‘vyāñjita’ in the sense of ‘manifested’, ‘revealed’, ‘suggested’. There is also mentioning of (pañca) samādhis, vṛttis and rasas. This suggests an advanced stage of literary and dramatic criticism.

In the Megha. (pūrva) V. 12, we have ‘sneha-vyakti’ i.e. suggestion or manifestation of love : “snehavyaktiś ciravirahajām”. Megha. 29 (purva) is very interesting and it reads as -

“veṇībhūta-pratanyu-salilā-sāvatītasya sindhoh-
pāṇḍucchāyā tātāruhataru-bhramśibhirjīna-parṇaḥ,
saubhāgyāmte subhaga virahāvasthaya vyañjavyantī
kārsyam yena tyajati vidhinā sa tvayaivopapādyah.”
That the nāyaka-nāyikā-bhāva is suggested here is clear. Mallinātha explains it fully. ‘vyaṇjayanti’ is explained as ‘prakāśayanti’, i.e. ‘suggesting’. The river Nirvindhyā is said to suggest, by her condition in separation, the good fortune of the cloud, the lover. This is, an instance of vipralambhaśrṅgāra and could well have an important bearing on the theory of vyaṇjanā in sāhitya-śāstra, wherein something else is suggested with the help of something else.

In the Raghu also, very often, vi+vānj in various grammatical forms appears in the sense of manifestation. But Raghu. XIII. 12 and XIV. 26 are more interesting. They read as below:

Raghu. XIII. 12 -

“velānilāya prasṛṭā bhujāṅgā
vahormi-visphūrjathu-nirviśeśāḥ,
sūryāṃśa-samparka-samṛddha-rāgair
vyajyanta ete maṇḍibhiḥ phaṇasthaiḥ.”

Mallinātha explains ‘vyajyante’ as ‘unmiyante’; i.e. ‘are suggested’.

Raghu. XIV. 26 reads as -

athādhihka-snipdha-vilocanena
mukhena sītā śarapāṇḍureṇa,
ānandayitrī pariṇeturāṣid-
anaksara-vyaṇjita-dohādena.”

“anaksara-vyaṇjita” is explained by Mallinātha as “avāg-vyāpāram yathā bhavati tathā vyaṇjitam.” This is a clear reference to vyaṇjanā.

In all the three plays, vi+vānj seems to carry the sense of ‘to manifest’.

Thus we have observed that in Bhāsa, Āśvaghoṣa and Kālidāsa, we come across certain occurrences of vi+vānj in the sense of ‘to suggest’, that might have paved the way to the formation of the theory of vyaṇjanā in sanskrit poetics, or if it was already formed and not recorded in any known document, it is adhered to by these ancient literary masters.

We will now pick up the known available documents beginning with the Dhvanyāloka and the Locana on the same. We will also take the opportunity to discuss the views of Agnipuraṇa later in this chapter and we are of the firm opinion that this puraṇa was later than Bhoja as the rasa-dhvani thinking in the alamkāra portion of this puraṇa is clearly under Bhoja’s influence.
It may be noted that Ānandavardhana, a great protagonist of the vyañjanā-
dhvani-rasa theory, does not attempt to define either vyañjanā or rasa in his
Dhvanyāloka, but the whole of his work is permeated by discussion of vyañjanā or
the power of suggestion, and vyangyārtha or the suggested sense, termed dhvani
when adjudged to be the principal source of charm in poetry and such poetry is also
termed dhvani-kāvyā.

Prof. Dr. K. Krishnamoorthy writes (pp. XXVIII - Introduction to his Dhv. Edn.
'74, Dharwar): “Ānandavardhana is the first writer in Indian poetics to attempt an
enquiry into semantics. As a preliminary to his exposition of the essence of poetry,
he distinguishes between the two well-known usages of language, viz. use of
language outside poetry on the one hand and the unique usage exclusive to poetry
on the other. The first referential usage is a gift of convention and is well within
the reach of everyone who knows the language. The second is the indirect use of
language wherein the meaning may be either metaphorical or implicit. Ānandavardhana notes that meaning at this second level too is not very far from
the first or conventional level. The first level of meaning is characterised as
vācyārtha and the second as bhākta. Poetry too starts from these two levels of
meaning only. But it does not stop there as in common parlance or scientific
discourse. It uses them as a jumping-off ground to convey an entirely new meaning
which is different not only in degree but often in kind also. This third meaning
which is unique and exclusive to poetry is alone characterised as the essence of
poetry. And it has its parallels in fine arts like music.

Combining in himself the triple rare attainments of poetic genius, impeccable
scholarship, and immaculate literary taste, Ānandavardhana succeeded not only in
laying his finger on ‘rasa’ as the soul of poetry, but also in offering a scientific
explanation of it as Dhvani. The theory was so formulated that it could assimilate
the essence of all the traditional aesthetic categories while emphasising the claims
of rasa.”

Ānandavardhana begins his exposition with a solemn declaration that ‘dhvani’
- or suggestion is the soul of poetry though of course he admits the opposition to
this theory. For this reason he wants to define and explain the same elaborately.
This he does in the course of the whole of his work. But he begins modestly. He
observes: “tatra dhvamer eva lakṣayitum ārabdhasya bhūmikāṃ racayitum idam
ucyate - “yórthah sahṛdayaśālāghyah...” etc. Dhv. I. 2. He observes that, ‘the following
is meant to serve as a ground work for the theory of suggestion which has been
taken up for detailed study.
‘Vyañjana’

That meaning which wins the admiration of refined critics is decided to be the soul of poetry. The ‘explicit’ and the ‘implicit’ are regarded as its two aspects.” (Trans. K. Kris. pp. 7, ibid).

Ānandavardhana is very clear that poetic meaning, which is charming and is admired by men of taste is both the expressed i.e. vācyā and the implicit i.e. pratīyamāna. It may be noted very carefully that Ānanda does not rule out the charm at the expressed level. On the otherhand it seems to be his humble opinion that whatever is poetry’s area has got to be charming, be it the level of the expressed only. He does not rule out the charm of expression in poetry, though of course his preference lies with the un-expressed or the implicit meaning. Poetry has to be charming, whatever the level be. But he has a bias towards the unexpressed - the implicit - the pratīyamāna. He observes - (Dhv. I. iv) : “pratīyamānāṃ punar anyad eva...” etc. “But the implicit aspect is quite different from this. In the words of first-rate poets it shines supreme and towers above the beauty of the striking external constituents even as charm in ladies.” (Trans. K.Kris. pp. 7, ibid). Ānandavardhana then explains how the expressed and the implicit differ in nature with a number of poetic illustrations. The implicit which is three-fold appears as bare statement or idea, of course basically poetic, i.e. vastu, figures of speech or turns of expression i.e. alamkāras, and as rasā”di or emotive stuff, or, aesthetic delight in general-this third variety is available only at the suggested level. This actually is more basic than the the other two varieties of implicit sense. This is seen illustrated in the Rāmāyaṇa of Vālmīki. This implicit sense is not within the grasp of only those who have excelled in the science of grammar but is felt only by those who are conversant with the essence of poetry, the true significance of poetry.

Ānandavardhana then i.e. after establishing the existence of the implicit sense as distinct from the expressed, demonstrates the over-riding superiority of that implicit meaning over the expressed. He observes that the prime activity of a first-rate poet should be directed in scrutinising that meaning, i.e. the implicit sense, and that rare word which possesses the power of conveying it : “yatnataḥ pratyabhijñeyau tau śabdārthau mahākaveḥ.” (Dhv. I. 8b).

Without defining or even attempting to define vyañjana or the suggestive power that yields the implicit sense, he again glorifies the importance of the power of expression of a poetic word. Thus he refers to both vyañjana and abhiddhā in the same breath. He observes : “ālokārthi yathā dipta-śikhāyām yatnavānjanaḥ, tad-upāyatāyā, tad vad arthe vācyē tad-āḍṛṭaḥ.” (Dhv. I. 9) - “Just as a man interested in perceiving objects (in the dark) directs his efforts towards securing a lamp since
it is a means to realise his end, so also does one who is ultimately interested in the suggested meaning proceed by first evincing interest in the conventional meaning.” (Trans. K.Kris. PP. 17, ibid)

He establishes that vācyārtha i.e. the conventioned expressed sense collected at the level of abhidhā, being instrumental in arriving at the implicit sense, resulting from the operation of the suggestive power i.e. vyañjanā, is equally important for both the poet - pratipādaka kavi, and also the reader i.e. pratipādya. True, vācyavācaka-bhāva, i.e. abhidhā is basic to poetry and even a poet having his ultimate interest in suggestion, has to pay respect to it, but the ultimate goal for a first-rate poet is suggested sense according to Ānandavardhana. Or, we may say Ānandavardhana’s criticism has a bias for the suggested sense and suggestivity of poetic words. This perhaps was not wholly acceptable to Kuntaka, and there were others in Mahimā and Dhanika who rose against the theory of vyañjanā. This we will see later. But Ānandavardhana with this introduction proceeds to define what he calls ‘Dhvani’ or principal suggested sense and also ‘Dhvanī kāvyā’, or variety of poetry with the charm of suggested sense principally. He gives a definition at Dhv. I. 13. which covers both ‘dhvani’ and ‘dhvani-kāvyā’ alike, though with all his tilt towards this suggestion-oriented-criticism, he never shows enthusiasm to brand ‘Dhvanikāvyā’ as ‘uttama’ as done by Mammaṭa and the rest. He proceeds to discuss this variety of poetry throughout the course of his second chapter and right upto Dhv. III. 33, wherein he successfully assimilates, or better say shows the culmination or merger of all other prevailing thought-currents into his all-pervasive theory of dhvani. The essence, for him, of great poetry, is rasa-dhvani and all other factors subserve this prime object of delineation of rasa i.e. aesthetic pleasure in poetry. Even the expressed sense and the expressive word (vācyavācaka) has to be an instrument in the suggestion of rasa. Actually he declares that, the main task of a great poet is the proper marshalling of all the contents and the expressions in the direction of rasa-realisation which is necessarily experienced at the level of suggestivity and never at the level of expression or abhidhā. He observes :

“vācyānām vācakānām ca
yad aucityena yojanam,
rasā”diviṣayeṇaṇītăt
karma mukhyāṃ mahākaveḥ.” (Dhv. I. 32)

He observes : “The main business of a first-rate poet is none other than the proper marshalling of both contents, i.e. plots, and expressions used in setting them
forth, in the direction of sentiments etc. In other words the main function of the poet lies only in making one sentiment principal throughout the poem and in employing both words and senses only in such a way that the sentiment is suggested clearly.” (Trans. K.Kris. pp. 189, ibid)

He proceeds to suggest that this course is observed even by Bharata when he talked of śrītis i.e. modes. Ānandavardhana here meets with some objections. Before proceeding to consider this, he establishes that between ‘rasādī’ (vyaṅga/dhvanī) and plots - itivṛttā”di - etc. in poetry, there is jīva-śarīra-vyavahāra i.e. life-body relation and not guṇa-guṇi-vyavahāra or the relation of quality-substance. He rejects the plea that rasā”dis may be taken as some speciality such as preciousness in diamonds discernible only to experts. He says that in this case, there will be another difficulty. For, if it were correct, just as the preciousness in diamonds of quality as not being different from the very nature of their being diamonds, so also rasā”dis would have to be discerned as not being different from the nature of the expressed situations, emotional responses, etc. But it is not so. No one gets the idea that the setting, the emotional responses and passing moods are themselves rasā”dis. The apprehension of the setting, etc. is only an invariable condition of all apprehension of rasā”dis etc. So, we may imagine a cause-effect relation to exist between these two apprehensions. So, there is bound to be some temporal sequentiality also between the two. But this sequentiality is not perceptible as it is very minute. Thus, observes Ānandavardhana, that it is mentioned that rasā”dis are suggested only through undiscerned sequentiality : “ata eva ca vibhāva”di-pratitya-avīnabhāvini rasā”dīnām pratitir iti tat-pratītyoḥ kārya-kāraṇa-bhāvena vyavasthānāt kramovāsyaṃbhāvī. sa tu lághavān na prakāsata iti “alakṣyakramā eva santo vyāṅgya rasā”dayāḥ” iti utkām. Dhv. Vṛtti. III. 33. He establishes this point forcefully and suggests that even in musical notes, the sequence, though not noticed, still remains between the hearing of notes and experiencing of various feelings. He observes : “yesām api svarūpa-pratiti-nimittam vyāṅjakatvam yathā gitā”di-śabdānāṃ teśām api svarūpapratitēr vyaṅga-pratīteś ca niyamabhāvī kramah. tat tu śabdasya kriyā-paurvāpyam ananya-sādhya-tat-phala-ghatanāsv āśubhāviniśu vācyena avirodhīni abhidheyāntara-vilakṣaṇe rasā”dau na pratiyate. kvacit tu lakṣyate eva, yathā anuraṇāna-rūpa-vyaṅga-pratītiṣu.” (Vṛtti, Dhv. III. 33) - “But even there we do have, invariably, temporal sequentiality between the apprehension of the nature of sounds and the apprehension of suggested sentiments. But this temporal sequentiality in the two functions of sounds cannot be noticed when sentiments are suggested; because sentiments are neither opposed
to the expressed sense nor appear as similar to the other senses; they are not capable of being conveyed by aught else and all their accessories work together with lightening quickness.

But in some contexts, the sequentiality is noticeable also; instances where we find apprehension of resonance-like suggestion may be cited as examples.” (Trans. K.Kris. pp. 193-5, ibid)

This sequence is noticeable even in the variety of dhvani called ‘a-vivakṣīta-vācyā’ or wherein the expressed sense is not intended.

Thus, for Ānandavardhana there is a sequence between the expressed and the suggested sense in all varieties of dhvani.

Now Ānandavardhana tackles the māhā-pūrva-pakṣa i.e. the main objection against suggestivity. It is here that we can underline his concept of vyañjanā, though of course, no definition is attempted even here. The objection reads as follows.

- tad evam vyañjaka-mukhena dhvani-prakāresu nirūpīteṣu kaścid brūyāt-kim idam vyañjakatvam nāma? vyañgyārtha-prakāśanam hi vyañjakatvam. tad vyañjakatvam cārthasya vyañjaka-siddhy adhīnām; vyañgyāpekṣāyā ca vyañjakatva-siddhiḥ iti saṃśrayād a-vyavasthānam.nanun vācyā-vyatiriktaśya vyañjakatvasya siddhiḥ prāg eva pratipāditā, tat siddhy adhīnā ca vyañjakatva-siddhir iti kaḥ paryanuyogāvasaraḥ?

satyaṃ eva etat; prāg ukta-yuktiḥbhir vācyā-vyatiriktaśya vastunāḥ siddhiḥ krta; satv artho vyañgyātyaiva kasmād vyapadiśyate? yatra ca prādhānyena avasthānam tatra vācyatayā eva asau vyapadesṭuṃ yuktah. tatparatvat vākyasya. ataś ca tatprakāśino vākyasya vācakatvam eva vyāpārhaḥ, kim tasya vyāpārānta- kalpanayā?


“Some might object as follows to our procedure of dividing suggestion into various kinds from the stand-point of suggestiveness - “what is this suggestiveness? The power of conveying the implied sense need not be designated by the name “suggestiveness” at all. The existence of the suggested sense is dependent upon the existence of the suggestive word, so also the existence of the suggestive word is dependent upon the existence of the suggested sense. As the definition thus moves in a vicious circle, nothing definite will have been established about either.”
We would put them a counter-question: When we have already established the existence of suggested sense as distinct from the expressed (by other arguments), what scope for objection is there if suggestiveness were made to follow from the existence of the suggested?

The objector might argue as follows: ‘It is true that the existence of the suggested sense as distinct from the expressed has been established by arguments already given. But why should that sense be called by the name “suggested” alone? It is right that we should designate it as “expressed” itself, wherever it happens to be primarily important, since it is primarily intended to be conveyed by the sentence as a whole. Thus the sentence which conveys that sense has only one function and that is denotation. What is the use of attributing a new function to it? Thus the sense which happens to be the main purport of a sentence can only be primarily “expressed”. Apprehension of other senses from the sentence prior to the apprehension of word-meaning is only a means to the knowledge of sentence-purport.”

Now onwards Anandavardhana clearly and logically establishes the difference between abhidhā and vyañjanā, between lakṣaṇā and vyañjanā, the inevitableness of accepting vyañjanā even for the Mimāmsakas and also the Naiyāyikas by clear exposition of the nature and scope of vyañjanā. He begins with abhidhā.

Abhidhā and vyañjanā are not identical. The nature and scope of either are different. Anandavardhana continues as follows. He says, let us first take an illustration where a word conveys another meaning after having conveyed its primary meaning i.e. vācyārtha, earlier. Anandavardhana asks if there is any difference or no difference between the two functions of the word, viz. the denotation of primary meaning and the implication of another sense. The view that there is no difference between the two is simply not acceptable; for says he - “yasmāt tau vyāpāraj bhinnaviṣayau bhinnara-ṛpau ca pratīyete eva” - i.e. the two functions clearly depict a difference between them from the point of view of both nature and scope. To illustrate - the scope of the function of denotation in a word is confined to its primary sense, while the scope of the function of implication includes a sense other than the primary sense: tathā hi vacakatva-lakṣaṇo vyāpāraḥ śabdasya svārtha-visayāḥ, gamakatva-lakṣaṇasrav arthāntara-visayāḥ”. - It is not possible to deny that the expressed sense is ‘its own’ sense of a word, while the implied sense is, ‘one belonging to another.’ - na ca sva-para-vyavahāro vācyaviṣṇayor apanynotum śakyah, ekasya sambandhitvena pratīpateḥ, aparasya sambandhi-sambandhitvena.” (vṛtti, Dhv. III. 33. pp. 198. Edn. K. Kris.)
Ānandavardhana further says that it is not possible to deny that the expressed is ‘its own’ sense of a word, while the implied is ‘one belonging to another.’ The apprehension of the implied will be remotely related to the word through the medium of the expressed sense. While the vācyārtha or the expressed sense is directly related to the word, the implied sense is related to that which in its turn is related to the word since it is implied by the power of the expressed sense. If the implied sense too were directly related to the word, then there would be no need at all for referring to it as another sense. - “yadi ca sva-sambandhitvam sākṣād tasya syāt tadā arthāntaratvav-yavahāra eva na syāt.” (vṛtti, Dhv. III. 33, ibid; p. 198). Thus the difference in scope between the two functions is clear.

Ānandavardhana says that: “rūpabheda-prasiddha eva” - i.e. their difference in nature too is obvious. The function of denotation itself cannot be the same as the function of implication as we find suggestiveness of sentiments etc. even in words of music. It is well known too that gestures etc., which are not even sounds, possess the function of suggesting specific ideas. In the illustration viz.: vṛādyogān nata-vadanayā etc. i.e. ‘with her face bent down’, etc., the specific gesture (of sidelong) of the heroine has been described by the great poet in a way suggestive of unique charm. Since the scope and natures of the two functions are thus quite different, it is clear that the denotative function of words and the implying function of words are quite different from each other - “tasmāt bhinnavisayatvāt bhinnarūpatvac ca svārthābhidhāyitvam arthāntarāvagamaheturvam ca sābdasya yat. tayoh spaṣṭa eva bhedah.” (vṛtti, pp. 198, ibid).

viṣeṣaḥ cen na tarhi idānim avagamanasya abhidheya-sāmarthyā”ksiptasya arthāntarasya vācyatva-vyapadesyatā. (vṛtti, ibid, p. 198) - “When the separate individuality of the two functions is accepted, it will not be possible to give designation of “the expressed”, to that other meaning which is only implied by the power of the expressed sense.” (Trans. K.Kris. pp. 200, 201, ibid).

Ānandavardhana however accepts, and this is very important assertion, that the other sense too comes within the powers of words. - ‘śabda-vyāpāra-gocaratvam tu tasya asmābhir isyata eva” (vṛtti, Dhv. III. 33. pp. 200, ibid). “tat tu vyāngyatvena na vācyatvena”. This clear acceptance of vyaņjanā is a signal to the opponents of vyaņjanā, especially the logicians who subsume all sense other than the expressed under inference, yes, poetic inference. But Ānandavardhana says in clear terms that - “prasiddhabhidhānāntara-sambandhayogātvam ca tasyārthāntarasā prātīte śabdāntareṇa svārthābhidhāyinā yad viśayīkaraṇām tatra prakāśaṇoktir eva yuktā.” - “If a word which is capable of denoting only its primary meaning
directly, is also seen actually conveying another meaning, directly denoted not by this word but by some other word only, then we would be right in regarding it as an instance of suggestiveness of word.” (Trans. K.Kris. pp. 201, ibid).

Thus if the word ‘gangā’ which has its power of expression limited to convey to the sense of the stream of the gangā only, conveys the sense of coolness and purity i.e. śāitya and pāvanatva, which concepts can be conveyed directly i.e. expressed only by the particular words viz. ‘śaitya’ and ‘pāvanatva’ - then we have to accept that the word ‘gangā’ conveys these senses only through the power of suggestiveness i.e. vyañjanā, which is other than vācakatva or abhidhā.

The Locana on this observes : (pp. 418, 419, edn. with Bālapriyā, Kashi, skt. series, Varanasi, 1940) : “nānu gīṭā” dāu mā bhūd vācakatvam, iha tu arthāntare śabdasya vācakatvam eva ucyate; kim hi tad vācakatvam samkocayata ity āṣāṅka āha - “prasiddhīti”- śabdāntareṇa tasya arthāntarasya yad visayikaranam tatra prakāśanoktir eva yuktā, na vācakatvokti śabdasya, nāpi vācyatvokti arthasya tatra yuktā; vācakatvaḥ hi samaya-vaśād a-vyavadhānena pratipādakatvam, yathā tasyaiva śabdasya svārthe; tad āha - ’svārthābhidhdhāyinaḥ’ iti. vācyatvam hi samaya-balena nirvyavadhānena pratipādyatvam yathā tasyaiva arthasya śabdāntaram prati, tad āha - “prasiddha” iti. prasiddhena vācakatayā abhidhāntarenā yaḥ sambandho vācyatvam tad eva tatra và yad yogyatvam tena upalaksitasya. na ca evam vidhām vācakatvaṁ artham prati śabdasya asti, nāpi tam śabdam prati tasyārthasya uktarūpaṁ vācyatvam. yadi nāsti tārthī katham tasya visayikaranaṁ uktaṁ ity āṣāṅka āha - pratītīt iti. atha ca pratiyate sōrtho, na ca vācyā-vācaka-vyāpāreṇa iti vilaksāṇa eva asau vyāpāra iti yāvat.”

At 1. 10. Dhv. Ānandavardhana had advocated padārtha-vākyārtha-nīyāya between the expressed sense and the suggested sense. That was only to emphasise the instrumentality of the expressed sense in bringing about the suggested sense. The analogy otherwise was not sound because when sentence-sense dawns upon our mind, the individual word-sense is effaced. This is not so in case of the expressed and the suggested sense. The expressed sense does not get terminated when the suggested sense flashes forth. So, Ānandavardhana says that we should not accept the ‘padārtha-vākyārtha-nīyāya’ between the two, but actually “ghaṭa-pradīpa-nīyāya” should be accepted here. Just as when a torch is held, a jar which was wrapped up in darkness is manifested and both the torch or lamp and the object jar continue to exist simultaneously, similarly when the suggested sense is manifested, the expressed sense, like a lamp, continues to manifest itself also side
by side; the Dhvanikāra observes: “na ca padārtha-vākyārtha-nyāyo vācyavāngyayoh. yataḥ pūdārtha-pratītiḥ asatyā eva iti kaiścid vidvadbhiḥ āsthītaṁ. yaiḥ api asatyatvāṁ asyāḥ na abhyupeyate, tair vākyārtha-padārthayor ghaṭa-tad-upādānakāraṇā-nyāyopgyh upagantavyah. tathā hi ghaṭaṁ nispanne tad upādānakāraṇāṁ na pṛthag upālambhah, tathaiva vākye tad arthe vā pratīte pada-tad-arthānāṁ; tēśāṁ tādā vibhaktatayopalambhe vākyārtha-buddhir eva dūribhavet. na tu esa vācyavāngyayor nyāyāḥ. na hi vyaṅgye pratīyamīne vācyabuddhir dūribhavati, vācyāvabhāsāvinābhāvena tasya prakāśanāt. tasmād ghaṭapradīpīnyāyas tayoḥ; yathaiva hi pradīpa-dvāreṇa ghaṭa-pratītāv utpānṇāyaṁ na pradīpaprakāśo nivartate, tadvad vyaṅgya-pratītau vācyāvabhāsah. yat tu prathamodyote ‘yathā padārtha-dvāreṇa’. ity ādy uktān tad upāyatva-mātrāt sāmya-vivakṣayā.” (Vṛtti, Dhv. III. 33, pp. 200, ibid)

“The analogy of word-import and sentence-purport too does not quite apply to the expressed and suggested senses, since in the opinion of some philosophers, the very apprehension of sense from individual words is unreal. Even those who do not hold that it is unreal will have to agree that the analogy of the relation between the pot and its material cause will explain better the relation between sentence-purport and word-import. Just as the material causes of a pot cannot be recognised separately after the pot has come into being, so also word and its sense are not recognised separately after the sentence and its purport have been apprehended as a whole. If they could be recognised separately, the very apprehension of the whole sentence-purport would have to be driven away to a distance. But this principle does not hold good with reference to the expressed and suggested senses. When the suggested sense is apprehended, the expressed sense is not driven away to a distance since the apprehension of the suggested is inseparably occasioned by the apprehension of the expressed. Hence the analogy of the pot and the lamp would fit them best. Just as the light of the lamp will not recede as soon as the perception of the pot is brought home to the observer, so also, the expressed sense will continue to shine out even after the apprehension of the suggested sense has been achieved. In the light of these considerations, it should be understood that the remark made in the first flash - “Just as the purport of a sentence...” etc. (No. I. 10) - aims only at pointing out the similarity between the two in respect of their being means to some other and (and that the analogy) is not intended to be pursued to the last detail.” (Trans. K.Kris. pp. 201, ibid)

The Locana further elaborates the point as below: “nānu evaṁ mā bhūd vācaka-saktis tathāpi tātparya-saktir bhavisyatī iti āśaṅkya āha - na ca iti. kaiścid
'Vyañjanā'

iti vaiyākaranaḥ, yair api iti bhaṭṭa-prabhṛtibhiḥ. tam eva nyāyaṃ vyācaṣṭe - yathā hīti. tad upādāna-kāraṇānām iti. samavāyi-kāraṇāni kapālāni anayoktyā nirūpitāni. saugata-kāpalikamate tu yady apy upādātavya-gaṭa-kale upādānānām na sattā ekatra kṣaṇasthāyitvena, paraṇa tirobhūtavena, tathā'pi prthak-tayā nāsty upālambha ity anśe drśṭāntaḥ. dūrībhaved iti. arthaikatvasya abhāvād iti bhāvah."

Locanakāra explains the argument as below. It was explained earlier that for the senses of coolness and purity to be derived from the word ‘gaṅgā’, we will have to accept a function over and above the power of expression. But even if a power other than ‘abhidhā’ is accepted, the question still remains that why should we designate this other power by the name of vyañjanā? As for the apprehension of the sentence-sence which is different from word-sense and which is not obiterated by the same, we accept tātparya-vṛtti i.e. sentence-purport, in the same way this sentence-power, i.e. tātparya-vṛtti will cause to apprehend this sense of coolness and purity. So, it is futile to imagine a separate power called suggestiveness or vyañjanā.

To this it can be said that here the ‘padārtha-vākyārtha-nyāya’ is not applicable. We know that only the abhīhitānvayavādin-mimāṃsakas accept the tātparya-vṛtti. Even the anvitābhidhāna-vādin mimāṃsakas do not approve of it. The Vaiyākaraṇas take the apprehension of word-sense as totally false i.e. mithyā, for they believe only in akhaṇḍa sphoṭa, thus taking the concepts of varṇa, pada etc. as illusory only. So, for them, when the hypothesis of pada and padārtha is unacceptable, how can, following the same, be vyañjanā taken as useless by including it in tātparya? Some others do not accept this mithyātva-vāda of the grammarians and hold that the hypothesis of pada-padārtha is not false but true. But for them also this point will be explained differently. For them vākyā-vākyārtha stand as kārya - i.e. effect and pada-padārtha stand for kāraṇa i.e. cause. Here ‘kāraṇa’ is to be taken as upādāna-kāraṇa i.e. material cause, i.e. samavāyi-kāraṇa. Now as for cause-effect relation there is a general rule that, of course the apprehension of a samavāyi-kāraṇa precedes an effect, but it disappears when the effect follows or comes into existence. Both are not co-existent at a given moment. As the two halves of separate mud does not continue to exist when an actual pot takes shape, same is the case here. The pada-padārtha-apprehension disappears when there is cognition of vākyā-vākyārtha-(buddhi). If the pada-padārtha-apprehension continues then how can vākyā-vākyārtha-bodha take shape at all? For, in that case it will be futile to
designate it as vakya-vakyārtha. So, we will have to admit that as with cause-effect relation, vakya-vakyārtha-bodha takes shape only when the former, i.e. pada-padārtha-bodha melts away. This explanation follows the mimāṃsaka-ideology.

The Baudhās believe in momentary existence of things, i.e. they are kṣanikatā-vādins. For them every object goes on changing from moment to moment. So, this being the case, in the moment of effect being generated, the existence of samavāyi-cause can never be accepted. Similarly for the sāṁkhya-s and the kāpālikas also at the moment of 'kāryotpatti' - i.e. effect taking shape, the kāraṇa-sattā or the existence of cause-material disappears. Thus when effect is apprehended the apprehension of cause has ended beforehand.

The idea is that, whether we accept padārtha-kalpanā as false, following the grammarians, or whether we accept cause-effect-relation and hold that the cause disappears when the effect takes place, or accept the buddhist view of momentariness and accept the unavailability of cause at the moment when effect comes into existence, or following the kāpālikas believe the disappearance of cause into effect, one thing is certain that, even if we follow any principle mentioned above, padārtha-bodha cannot continue when vakya-bodha arrives. As against this both vācyā or expressed and the vyaṅgya i.e. suggested continue to co-exist. We know that the apprehension of the expressed sense is not terminated when the suggested sense is also apprehended. On the contrary it is a speciality of the suggested that the earlier apprehension of the expressed continues even in the time of the apprehension of the suggested. So, the padārtha-vakyārtha analogy cannot be made applicable to vācyā vyāngya-apprehension. But pradīpa-ghata analogy will work here. The lamp gets lighted first by itself and then illumines the substance such as jar etc., and while doing so it continues to shine by itself also. Similarly the expressed sense comes into existence first and while continuing to exist manifests the suggested sense also. The apprehension of the expressed sense is not terminated when that of the suggested sense dawns. Both are simultaneously apprehended. Thus if we accept after grammarians that the pada-padārtha hypothesis is illusory, or accept kārya-kāraṇa-bhāva like the Mimāṃsakas, or accept the momentariness following the Baudhās, or like kāpālikas accept the non-continuence of kāraṇa after kāryotpatti, we cannot arrive at the simultaneous apprehension of the expressed and the suggested senses. Thus, pada-padārtha-analogy is inapplicable here. So, it is safe to accept vyaṅgya-vyaṅjaka-bhāva between the two apprehensions. So, the analogy of pada-padārtha-nyāya cited at Dhv. I. 10, only
means that the vācyārtha is instrumental only - upāyamātra - in bringing about the vyaṅgyārtha. No further similarity is meant here.

Now the Lokana discusses a fresh point. The objector says that when you recommend ghaṭa-pradipa-nyāya for the two apprehensions of the primary and the suggested senses, you accept simuraneity with regard to both of them. Now in this case the very ‘vākyatā’ of the sentence will disappear. For, ācāryas have laid down that a sentence is that group of words which is having a single sense at a given moment. The Jaimini-sūtra lays down that, “arthaikatvād ekam vākyam, sākāṅksam ced, vibhāge syāt.” It means that if a sentence is cut or divided into parts, each of its part i.e. pada, will be having expectancy of one another = sākāṅksam., but when taken together it has a single sense. If it is asked as to what will be the situation in case of words that have paronomasia - i.e. in case of ‘sliṣṭa pada’, the reply is that even if more than one sense is derived from a statement in case of paronomasia, the sentence is said to have only a single sense, for one sense is established - i.e. ekarūpatā is accepted - by fusion of the two senses. This is explained in the following way. Suppose a word with a multiple-sense is pronounced. Now senses more them one follow from one and the same word and in case of each meaning being grasped the convention- saṅketa-smarana is remembered each time. Now the point to be considered is how do we derive all the conventional meanings from one and the same word. Do we arrive at these senses one by one or do we get all the senses at a time, i.e. simultaneously ? We cannot arrive at the senses one by one in order because the activity of the word cannot proceed by stops and gaps and this is an accepted rule - The abhidhā vyāpāra is terminated after giving a single sense. Once it is over it cannot be revived. Nor can we accept a simultaneous apprehension of all senses at a time for remembering of convention is a condition which has to be there for arriving at a given expressed sense. Thus all senses remaining present in human intellect simultaneously is also ruled out. Thus from either way, the hypothesis of difference in meaning does not stand. The word is neither heard again and again, nor is remembered again and again. So, the question of its multiplicity of senses does not arise at all. So, the definition of a sentence, viz. that it can have a single sense remains protected. Now, in this case, the objector asks, if a set of words, i.e. a sentence, is said to have one expressed sense and another suggested sense, where will the accepted definition as said above stand? Thus, the accepted definition will have to be sacrificed and that is not a welcome situation.
To this, the siddhāntin's answer is that the expressed and the suggested senses are to be taken as principal and subordinate. Thus, the definition of a sentence having a single sense will not be vitiates. At times the suggested sense with be principal, at other times the expressed will be principal. When the suggested sense is principal, it is termed ‘dhvani’, and is termed ‘gūṇī-bhāta-vyaṅgya’ when the expressed sense predominates. So, the net outcome of this discussion is that even if the word is suggested-sense-oriented i.e. is vyaṅgya-paraka, and even if it be taken as ‘vācyā’ only following the (false interpretation of the) dictum ‘yatparaḥ śabdaḥ sa śabdārthah’, then also, vyaṅgyārtha is not rendered out of place by abhidhā-vṛtti but we will have to postulate vyaṅjanā-vṛtti for the same.

Ānandavardhana further argues that in instances where the suggested is not intended as principal, the objector will not be able to regard it even as expressed, since the word does not intend it at all. This also adds support to the conclusion that there is some definite scope for suggested sense of words. And where it happens to be intended as principal, why should its existence be gainsaid? - “yatṛapiro tasya prādhānyam tatra’pi kim iti tasya svarūpaṁ apahnūyate?” (Vṛtti, ibid, pp. 202). Hence suggestiveness is positively different from denotation. Another reason which supports the same conclusion is this - Denotation is based upon words only, while suggestiveness is based not only upon words but also upon senses; since suggestiveness, as already shown, relates to words as well as senses: “evaṁ rāvad vācakatvād anyad eva vyaṅjakatvam; itaś ca vācakatvād vyaṅjakatvasya anyatvam, yad vācakatvam śabdaikā”śrayam itarat tu śabdā”śrayam arthā”śrayaṁ ca, śabdārthayor dvayor api vyaṅjakatvasya pratipāditvāt.” (Vṛtti, pp. 202, ibid).

Ānandavardhana now proceeds to establish that vyaṅjanā and guṇavṛtti i.e. a-mukhyā-vṛtti are also different from each other from the point of consideration of nature and scope i.e. svarūpa and visaya.

It may be noted that Ānandavardhana reserves the word mukhyā for abhidhā, while what normally is termed two-fold lakṣaṇā i.e. śuddhā and gauṇī by followers of Mammaṭa, is termed ‘guṇavṛtti’ by him. ‘Guṇavṛtti thus is a-mukhyā i.e. not-abhidhā’ for him and is said to be two-fold i.e. through upacāra i.e. guṇa-sāmya and lakṣaṇā i.e. one which is ordinarily taken as śuddhā by followers of Mammaṭa.

Locana puts it this way - “evaṁ viṣayabhedāt svarūpabhedāt kāraṇabhedac ca vācakatvāt mukhyāt prakāṣakatvasya bhedam pratipādyu ubhayatvāviśeṣāt tarhi
vyañjakatva-gaññatvayoh ko bheda ity āsāṅkya amukhyād api pratipādayitum āha-guñavṛtti api. - etc......

The point is, those features that are marked in suggestiveness are also seen in gauṇī-vṛtti also. In the former both śabda and artha stand as āśraya and so is the case with guñavṛtti also. Then what is the difference between the two? This problem is discussed here.

It may be noted that laksanā is two-fold viz., śuddhā and gauṇī and Ānandavardhana uses the terms laksanā and upacāra for the same respectively as noted above. For both these varieties taken together, the term is ‘guñavṛtti’ or npradhāna-vṛtti or a-mukhyā-vṛtti. Now this guñavṛtti of either variety rests both on word and sense. But even in this case it can not be said to be identical with suggestiveness for there is difference from the point of view of both nature and scope. Svarūpa-bheda is explained as follows. :- Guñavṛtti is so termed because the function of the word operating there is subordinate. First there is vācyārtha-bodha i.e. collection of the expressed sense. Then on account of lack of apprehension of speaker’s intention, i.e. because of tātparya-anupapatti, the expressed sense is contradicted i.e. there is vācyārtha-bādha. Thus the word becomes skhald-gati i.e. the expressed sense becomes incompatible, and another sense through some relation is brought in place of the expressed sense. Hence it is called guñavṛtti or laksanā, or a-mukhya-vyāpāra. On the other hand no one can say that the suggested sense is necessarily subordinate. On account of camatkāra-paryavasāna, rasa, vastu or alaṃkāra when suggested are never subordinate. Laksanā is always a-mukhya and vyañgyārtha is principal. Vyañjanā is not necessarily bādha-sāpeksa, while guñavṛtti is necessarily bādha-sāpeksa.

Ānandavardhana points out another svarūpabheda between guñavṛtti and vyañjakatva. He observes : “aṅga ca anyah svarūpabhedaḥ - yad guñavṛttir amukhyatvena vyavasthitam vācakatvam eva ucyate. vyañjakatvam tu vācakatvād atyantam vibhinnaṃ eva.” - The idea is there is another difference in nature between the two. Indication is practically denotation itself, with this difference that it is a subordinate verbal function. While, suggestion, on the other hand is proved to be quite different from denotation. A further difference between the two is this. When another sense is conveyed by a sense through indication, argues Ānandavardhana, the first sense merges itself with the second and becomes one with it, as for example in the statement, “There is hamlet on the Gaṅgā.” But when one sense conveys another through suggestion, the first retains its individuality
while conveying the other, just like a lamp. The instance here is, “lilakarnala-patran ganayamsa parvati.” If the name indication were to be given to such instances also where one sense conveys another sense without losing its importance or identity, then it would be tantamount to saying that indication itself is the primary verbal function. For, it is generally observed that any given sentence possesses the power of conveying a purport over and above the expressed sense of individual words.

Thus there is three-fold distinction underlined between gunavratti and vañjanan. (i) In vañjanan the word is never skhalad-gati, while in gunavratti there is skhalad-gatitva of a word. (ii) In vañjanan samketa is never utilized while lakshanai.e. gunavratti is necessarily sakyarth-bodha-sapekshi i.e. it necessarily stands in need of sakyarthajna. (iii) Vañjanan gives vyangyarthalong with the sakyarthai.e. primary sense, while in lakshanai.e. the apprehension of laksyarthai.e. not separately cognized but is seen with the sakyarth - upalakṣaṇiyārthā”tmanā pariṇata eva i.e. both are not independently cognised.

Ānandavardhana further observes : “nanu tvat-pakṣe’pi yadā’rtho vyangyatrayam prakāśayati tadā śabdasya kīdrīśo vyāpārah ? ucyate - prakaraṇādy avacchinna-śabda-vaśena eva arthasya tathāvidham vyānjakatvam iti śabdasya tatrōpayogah katham apahṇuyate.” (pp. 204, vr̥tti, ibid).

“The following question may be put to us - well, even granting the truth of what you say, what is the precise verbal function involved when a sense conveys the three-fold suggested content ?” Here is our reply - the sense therein acquires the said suggestiveness only because of the words aided by context etc. Hence how can anyone deny the use of words in such suggestion ? (Trans. K.Kris. pp. 285, ibid)

After thus explaining the svarupa-bheda between gunavratti and vañjanan Ānandavardhana now proceeds to explain visaya-bheda i.e. difference in scope, between these two. He observes : visayabheda’pi gunavratti-vyañjakatvayoh spaṣṭa eva.” (vr̥tti, ibid, pp. 204). The difference in scope between indication and suggestiveness is also clear. The scope of vyañjakatva i.e. suggestiveness is three-fold viz. (i) rasā”dayaḥ i.e. sentiments etc., (ii) specific figures of speech or turns of expression, and (iii) suggested ideas or matter. Of these three, none will or can say that the apprehension of rasā”dis is identical with indication. The same is true of the suggested figures also. So, far as the third variety, i.e. suggested idea is concerned, that alone is suggested therein which is especially intended to be conveyed by the poet by a process other than the denotation, when he finds that the
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beauty he want's to furnish to the idea or matter on hand cannot be achieved by
means of denotation itself: “vastu cārutva-pratītyaye sva-sabda-anabhidheyatvena
yat pratipādayitum isyate tad vyāngyam.” (Vṛtti, PV. 204, ibid). - All this cannot be
included in the scope of indication since we can see examples of indication
based merely on convention or usage - “prasiddhy anurodhābhyām api gaunānāṁ
śabdānāṁ prayoga-darśanāt” - (pp. 204, vṛtti). This has been already explained. If
at all there is any element of beauty seen in indication, it will be entirely due to
association with suggestive element therein. Hence indication and suggestiveness
are widely different from each other. The truth is that suggestiveness not only
differs from denotation on one hand and indication on the other; on the contrary
it is actually based upon each of them also: “vācakatva-guṇavṛtti-vilakṣaṇasyā’pi
ta tasya tad-ubhayā”śrayatvena vyavasthānam.” (vṛtti, Dhv. III. 33. pp. 206, ibid) -
The Locana on this reads - “na kevalam pūrvokto hetukālāpo yāvat tad
ubhayāśrayatvena mukhyopacārā”śrayatvena yad vyavasthānanām tad api vācaka-
guṇavṛtti-vilakṣaṇasya eva iti vyāpti-ghaṭanam.”

Anandavardhana further elaborates this subtle observation, as follows. - At
times suggestiveness rests on denotation, e.g. in cases of vivakṣitānya-para-
vācyā-dhvani i.e. suggestion with intended but further extending expressed
sense. In case of suggestion with unintended expressed sense, i.e. a-
vivakṣitavācyā dhvani, it rests on indication. In order to support this resting on
both these powers, i.e. expression and indication, basically two-fold suggested
sense was explained in the beginning i.e. in the first chapter of the Dhv. itself. As
suggestiveness is assisted by both vācakatva and guṇavṛtti, it is impossible to
identify it with either of them - “tad ubhayā”śrītatvāc ca tad ekarūpapatvam tasya
na śaktyate vaktum.” (vṛtti, Dhv. III. 33, pp. 206, ibid) - As it at times seeks
assistance from indication, it cannot be identified with denotation alone, and as
it is supported by denotation at times, it cannot be identical with indication
alone. Thus it cannot be comprehended by either as it partakes of the
characteristics of both - “na ca ubhaya-dharmatvenaiva tad ekaika-rūpaṁ na
bhavati” (vṛtti, pp. 206, ibid). Over and above this, it has the characteristic of
sound only - śabda-dharma. Which is devoid of both verbal powers of denotation
and indication - “yad vācakatva-lakṣaṇā”di-rūpa-rahita-śabda-dharmatvenā’pi.”
(vṛtti, pp. 206, ibid). Thus the sounds of music do possess suggestiveness with
reference to rasā”di, but they are never associated with either the power of
expression or indication.
Again, as we can see suggestiveness in instances which are not even sounds (as in case of gestures etc.), it is wrong to consider it as a form of verbal functions such as denotation, etc. Though suggestiveness is thus different from the well-known functions, i.e. expression and indication of words, yet if it should be regarded as another form of verbal function itself, why should it not be regarded as a form of word itself?

Thus, concludes Ānandavardhana, there are three-fold functions of words viz. (i) denotation, (ii) indication and (iii) suggestiveness. When in case of the third the suggested sense is principal, it is termed ‘dhvani’, which is basically laid down as two-fold such as (i) a-vivakṣitānya-para-vācya-dhvani i.e. that with un-intended expressed sense, and (ii) vivakṣitānyapara-vācya-dhvani or that with intended expressed sense. These two have been elaborately treated also.

It may be noted that Ānandavardhana has used the term ‘prakāratva’ in the sense of ‘dharma’ only, in the remark viz. “yadi ca vācakatva-lakṣaṇā”dīnāṃ śabda-prakāraṇāṃ prasiddha-prakāra-vilakṣaṇatve’pi vyāñjakatvam prakāratvena parikalpyate, tad cchabdasya eva prakāratvena kasmāna parikalpyate ?” (vṛtti, Dhv. III. 33, pp. 206, ibid). Thus vyāñjanā also, like abhidhā and lakṣaṇā is a ‘dharma’ of sound i.e. word or-śabda. But the Locanakāra has taken ‘prakāra’ in ‘śabda-prakāraṇāṃ’ as meaning ‘dharma’, and in ‘prakāratvena’ as meaning ‘bheda’ or variety. Thus the explanation advanced by Locana here is as follows: “On the strength of many pramāṇas, or proofs, the distinction of vyāñjanā from both abhidhā and lakṣaṇā is established. It has also been shown that vyāñjanā also is a function of word like abhidhā and lakṣaṇā. It has been also further pointed out that vyāñjanā seeks support at times of abhidhā or at times of lakṣaṇā. With all this if the objector believes in identity of vyāñjanā with abhidhā and lakṣaṇā, and if he insists on taking vyāñjanā as a synonym for abhidhā then he should have no objection in holding śabda and vyāñjanā to be identical and taking śabda and vyāñjanā also as synonyms. One can cherish any desire without control. But the fact is that, vyāñjakatva is proved to be absolutely different from all these. And if one’s desire or personal belief is allowed to run riot, any system will topple. Normally we infer fire from smoke on a mountain. But if such a riot of personal belief is allowed to run amuck then one will argue that the smoke is not because of fire but is due to something else!” - Locana reads - vyāñjakatvanāṃ vācakatvam iti yadī paryāya kalpyete, icchāyāḥ avyāhatavat. vyañjakatvasya tu viviktāṃ svarūpaṁ darśitaṁ, tad-visayāntare katham
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viparyastām ? evaṁ hi parvatagato dhūmónagnijópi syād iti bhāvah.” (on vṛtti, Dhv. III. 33).

There is still further objection projected. It is like this. - It is true that there is no element of indication in vivaksitā-nyapara-vācyadhvani. For, it is not possible to think of indication where a second meaning is apprehended over and above the apprehension of the expressed sense. But in the case of two-fold indication viz. (i) when the primary meaning is entirely concealed as in case of ‘agnir māṇavakah’, and (ii) when the primary meaning is partly retained as in case of ‘gaṅgāyām ghoṣaḥ’, - the primary meaning is not intended in full. In case of both these varieties, with unintended primary sense, how will you distinguish between indication and suggestion, “a-vivakṣitavācyas tu dhvaner guṇavṛtti-dvaya-rūpatā laksyata eva yataḥ”(vṛtti, pp. 208, ibid). The idea is that indication and suggestion cannot be separated in case of the arthāntara-samkramita-vācyā-dvani and aryaṇa-tiraskṛta-vācyā-dhvani.

To this Ānandavardhana’s reply is that, “ayaṁ api na doṣaḥ”. The reason is that (both the varieties of) avivakṣitavācyā-dhvani, of course, operate through the passage of indication, but because of this, the two should not be taken as identical. Thus here, the suggestion might operate in the wake of indication, but it does not assume the form of indication. Guṇavṛtti or indication can be shown to proceed even completely devoid of suggested context - “guṇavṛttir hi vyañjakatva-śūnyā’pi dṛṣyate” (vṛtti, pp. 208, ibid). While suggestiveness can not function without suggested content which is a source of beauty. This has been already explained. The first type of indication, viz. metaphorical attribution of identity, takes its stand in the characteristics of the expressed sense, e.g. “agnir māṇavakah”, wherein Māṇavaka is said to be fire because of his extremely short temper. Similarly the face of a heroine is said to be moon itself, because of its pleasing nature. The second form of indication, viz. secondary sense - laksanā-rūpā guṇavṛttih, - also is possible if there is just a connection with the secondarily indicated sense, though there is no apprehension of suggested content full of beauty; e.g. in ‘maṁcāḥ kroṣanti’ - “the cots make noise”.

It is true, in some cases, indication becomes a source of the apprehension of the suggested content full of beauty, but this beauty is caused entirely due to its touch of suggestiveness, as in case of denotation. In case where we have a treatment of improbable events, e.g. in ‘suvarṇa-puspāṁ pṛthivīm...” etc., the treatment can be justified only in view of the apprehension of suggested beauty; and so it is
reasonable to hold that we should regard them as instances of suggestion only, though indication might just be present therein. Thus in both the varieties of suggestion with unintended expressed sense, - i.e. avivaksitavacya - we will find indication tinged with a colouring of suggestiveness, which will not appear identical with indication, but will appear quite separate from it and bringing delight to the men of refined taste.

Ānandavadhāna further says that the indisputable fact is that the suggestive power of words follows only in the wake of wellknown convention : “api ca vañjakatvalakṣaṇo yaḥ śabdārthaḥ dharmaḥ sa prasiddha-sambandhānurodhi iti na kasyacid vimativasyatām arhati.” (vṛtti, pp. 210, ibid) The suggestive power of words follows the track of the well-known conventional relation of word and meaning, which is given the designation of denoter-denoted relationship - (vācyavācaka-bhāva). But it becomes tainted by its association with other adventitious circumstances - “sāmagryantara-sambandhād aupādhikāh pravartate.” That is where suggestiveness differs from denotation. The denotation vācakatva-of every word is constant - ‘niyata ātma’, because right from childhood when one picks up language, the meaning of each word remains quite the same, i.e. unchanged throughout one’s life. But the suggestiveness of words is not constant - ‘sa tu aniyaṭāḥ’, - aupādhikatvāt.” Its apprehension takes place only when all circumstances such as context etc. combine to convey the same. It can be argued : What is the use of examining the nature of such adventitious concept ? - “nānu yadi aniyaṭaḥ, tat kim tasya svarūpaparīkṣayā ?” - The answer is that there is no defect in this - naiṣa doṣah. - The adventitiousness is seen only from the point of view of the ‘śabdā”tma’ (i.e. its being the soul of word), not in its own province. The Locana observes : “aniyatavād yathāruci kalpyeta, pāmārthikam rūpam nāsti iti; na ca a-vastunāḥ parikṣā upapadyate iti-bhāvaḥ. śabdā”tmanīti - sanketā”spade pada-svarūpacātma ity arthaḥ.” The idea is that in saying that vācyavācaka-bhāva is ‘niyata’ or fixed and vyāṅgya-vañjaka-bhāva is a-niyata or ‘not fixed’, the idea is only this much that as in case of abhidhā there is a fixed conventional meaning of a given word, in the same way in vyāñjana, there is no fixed conventional vyāṅgyārtha of a given word. This uncertainty or a-niyatatvā is with reference to the śabda-ātmā i.e. with reference to a given word taken in centre. But this uncertainty does not prevail so far as its own independent province is concerned. Vyāṅgyārtha or suggested sense is fixed in its own area. The idea is that vyāṅgyārtha is divided into three types such as vastu or idea, alamkāra, or a figure of speech and rasā”di or emotive stuff. Now the area of all
these three varieties is individually absolutely fixed and it is a no-nonsense matter in which we should direct our thoughts. To understand that vyañjakatva is an- niyata or un-fixed with reference to śabdā”tma but fixed in its own area, an illustration is given by Ānandavardhana who observes: “liṅgatva-nyāyaś ca asya vyañjaka-bhāvasya lakṣyate, yathā liṅgatvam āśrayeṣu a-niyatāvabhāsam, icchā”dhinatvāt; sva-viśaya-a-vyabhicārī ca. tathā eva idaṃ yathā darśitam vyañjakatvam. śabdā”tmani a-niyatatvād eva ca tasya vācakatva-prakāratā na śakyā kalpayitum. yadi hi vācakatva-prakāratā tasya bhavet tacchabdā”tmani niyatatā’pi syād vācakarva-vat.” (vṛtti on Dhv. III. 33, pp. 210, 212, ibid). “The analogy of probans in an inference is well applicable to suggestiveness. Since inference is dependent upon one’s desire, when there is no such desire to infer on a person’s part, the existence of the quality of probans in anything is far from constant from the man’s point of view of the probandum. Suggestiveness is also exactly like this. Though from the standpoint of word, it might be inconstant, one should not rush to the conclusion that it is a variety of denotation. If it were really a variety of denotation, it too should have been as constant as denotation itself, in respect of a word.” (Trans. K.Kra. pp. 210, 212, ibid).

The net outcome of this discussion is that just as ‘liṅga’ i.e. probans is not ‘not-constant’ in its own ‘sādhya’ - or that which is to be inferred or proved, the probandum; in the same way the sphere of vyañjanā is also constant in itself. But as the inference of ‘sādhya’ through ‘liṅga’ is not a universal matter, i.e. as it is not ‘sārva-kālika’, in the same way, the apprehension of vyañjanā is also “āupādhika” i.e. adventitious. When you apprehend the upādhis, the vyaṅgyārtha is also apprehended, but in the absence of these upādhis, the suggested sense also is not apprehended. Thus with ‘śabd-ātma’ i.e. a particular word in centre, its expressive power is fixed, but its suggestivity is not fixed. It is for this reason that we cannot equate vyañjakatva with vācakatva, for in that case the former would be only a variety of the latter.

Ānandavardhana now trains his guns on the Mīmāṃsākās and then on the Naiyāyikas. He proves to the satisfaction of all that when you are dealing with poetry, even the Mīmāṃsākās and Naiyāyikas have got to accept the power of suggestiveness or vyañjakatva.

Ānandavardhana first turns to the Mīmāṃsākās. He observes: “sa ca tathāvidha aupādhika dharmah śabdānāṃ autpattika-śabdārtha-saṃbandha-vādinā vākya-tattva-vidā pauruṣā’pauruṣeyayor vākyārthayor višeṣam abhidadhatā
niyamena abhyupagantavyah, tad anabhyupagame hi tasya sabdartha-sambandha-nityatve sati, api, a-pauruseya-pauruseyayor vakyayor artha-pratipadane nivisesatvam syat.” (pp. 212, ibid)

The idea is this. A Mimamsaka will have to accept perforce the conclusion that words have an adventitious power of the nature of suggestiveness. For a Mimamsaka believes in the theory that not only there is a natural and eternal relation between word and its sense, but also that there is a difference between sentences uttered by men and those revealed in the Vedas. If the Mimamsaka is averse to accepting this adventitious power of words, the outcome will be that human utterance and divine revelation would be treated as on par, since the relation of word and sense is accepted to be eternal in both the cases. But when he accepts this adventitious power, he can easily count for the possible falsity of human utterances. For, though one might hold that the relation between sentences and their purport is eternal, there will also be scope left to attribute falsity and such other adventitious drawbacks such as delusion due to the fleeting desires of the speaker.

Effects opposite to the nature of objects are marked at times due to contact with adventitious circumstances though their original nature is not completely lost on that account. “drsyate hi bhavananam aparityakta-svabhavanam api sammagry-antara-sampata-sampaditaupadhika-vyaparantaranaṁ viruddha-kriyatvam.” (vrtti, Dhv. III. 33, pp. 212, ibid).

Anandavardhana explains that even the cool-rayed moon and such other cool objects which reduce the heat of the entire universe by their refreshing coolness, are seen to cause intense pain to onlookers who are afflicted by the burning pangs of separation from their beloveds. One who likes, therefore, to uphold the doctrine that the relation of word to its meaning is natural or eternal, will have to accept obviously some adventitious element at least, which belongs to words and which is distinct from denotation, if he should properly explain the falsity of human utterances. And this cannot be anything other than suggestiveness, which is the same as the communication of what is suggested. All human utterances primarily communicate the intention of the speaker - “pauruseyan ca vakyani pradhanyena purusabhtriprayam eva pyakasyayanti.” (vrtti, Dhv. III. 33, pp. 214, ibid) That intention is suggested but not denoted, since the relation of vacya-vacaka-or denoter-denoted does not apply at all to intention and the word - “sa ca vyangya eva, na tu abhidheyaḥ, tena saha abhidhanasya vacya-vacaka-bhava-laksana-sambhandhaḥbhavat.” (pp. 214, ibid, vrtti, Dhv. III. 33).
The objector may argue that at this rate all sentence in the world have to be taken as suggestive as all sentences have suggestiveness with reference to the intention of a particular speaker. This objection is true in a way. The fact remains that suggestiveness has to be accepted with reference to the individual speaker's intention. But this sort of suggestion does not differ from denotation itself - "tat tu vācakatvāt na bhidyate, vyañgyam hi tatra nāntariyakatayā vyavasthitam, na tu vivakṣitatvena" (vṛtti, Dvh. III. 33) The suggested and the expressed are almost chemically mixed up with each other in all sentences in ordinary parlour and suggestion here is not intended as exclusively important. If it were exclusively intended then only the suggested content is entitled to receive the stamp of 'dhvani': "yasya tu vivakṣitatvena vyañgyasya sthitiḥ tad vyañjakatvam dhvanivyavahārasya prayojakam." So, only that suggested element, which is intended to be conveyed principally, alone is termed 'dhvani' and whatever is suggested by way of the speaker's intention is not so termed as it is unlimited. Thus Ānandavardhana concludes that: "tathā ċa darśita-bheda-traya-rūpaṁ tātparyena dyotyamanam abhiprāya-rūpaṁ anabhiprāyarūpaṁ ca sarvam eva dhvani-vyavahārasya prayojakam iti yathoktra-vyañjakatva -višeṣe dhvani-lakṣane na ativyāptir na ca avyāptih. tasmād vākya-tattvavidāṁ matena tāvad vyañjakatvalakṣanāno śābdō vyāpāro na virodhi pratyutānunugūṇa eva lakṣyate." (vṛtti, Dvh. III. 33, pp. 214, ibid)
- "Hence the conclusion is established that whether it be of the nature of speaker's intention or not, if the three-fold suggested content should be principally manifest, it will provide sufficient ground for the designation of suggestion. This definition of suggestion which takes into account suggestiveness as explained above cannot be tainted by the fallacies of 'too wide' or 'too narrow'. Thus the verbal power of suggestiveness will be found to be in agreement with the views of the experts on the theory of sentences (i.e. Mīnāṃsakas) far from conflicting with their doctrine.” (Trans. K. Kris., pp. 215, ibid).

Ānandavardhana, turning towards the grammarians observes that so far as the system of grammar is concerned, the question whether the theory of suggestion is compatible with that system or not, does not arise at all, because this very expression 'dhvani/suggestion' is inspired by the system of grammar, i.e. the term 'dhvani' has been borrowed by the dhvani-vādins from the grammarians who maintain that sound in its eternal form of 'sphoṭa' is identical with ultimate reality itself (and this is always suggested and never expressed). - "pariniścita-nirapabhramśa-śabda-brahmanāṁ vipaścitāṁ matam āśrityaiva pravṛttōyam
dhvanivyahahara iti taih saha kim virodha-virodha cintyete.” (vṛtti, Dhv. III. 33, pp. 214, ibid). On this see also Locana: “evaṁ mīmāṁsakānāṁ nātra vimatir yuktā iti pradarśya vaiyākaraṇānāṁ naivātra sāṣūti darṣayati. “pariniścita” iti. paritaḥ niścitaṁ pramāṇena sthāpitam nirapabhramśaṁ galita-bhedā-prapāñcatayā avidyā-samśkāra-rahitaṁ śabdā”khyāṁ prakāśa-parāmarśa-svabhāvaṁ brahma vyāpakatvam bṛhad- viśeṣa-sakti-nirbhāratyaḥ ca bṛhmītaṁ viśva-nirmāṇa- saktīsvaratvac ca bṛhmhaṇam ‘yair iti’, etad utkāṁ bhavati - vaiyākaraṇās tāvad brahmāpade nānyat kiśicid icchanti, tatra kā katha vacakatva-vyañjakatvayoh; avidyāpade tu tair api vyāpārantaram abhyupagatam eva. etac ca prathamodyote vitatya nirūpitam.”

Now onwards, Āṇandavardhana turns his attention towards the Naiyāyikas, or logicians, who seem to be the main opponents or ‘pradhāna-malla’. Āṇandavardhana observes that so far as the logicians are concerned they cannot have any difference of opinion with reference to suggestiveness i.e. vyañjakatva, though of course, there may be difference of opinion so far as the relationship between word and meaning is concerned. They may hold it either as conventional or man-made. But for vyañjakatva they should not have any difference, for they also admit that suggestiveness is within our experience and that it is seen not only in meaning but also in words. So, their view needs no refutation: “vācakatve hi tārkitkāṇāṁ vīpratipattayaḥ pravartantāṁ, kim idāṁ svābhāvikam śabdānām āhosiṣi śāmyikam ity ādyāṁ. vyañjakatve tu tat-prṣṭha-bhāvini bhavāntarasaḍhāraṇe loka-prasiddha evaśnugamyamāne ko vimatānām avasaraḥ?” (vṛtti, Dhv. III. 33, pp. 214, 216, ibid). The logicians do hold divergent views as far as vācakatva or denotation is concerned as to whether this is a natural power or man-made. But as far as suggestiveness or vyañjakatva is concerned, which follows the power of expression or denotation, and which is found to be present even in other places where denotation is not found, and whose experience is almost universal, the logicians cannot have difference of opinion. Objects of common and doubtless perception such as, ‘This is black’, or ‘This is sweet’, do not inspire any conflicting views in the minds of the logicians. When one logician perceives an object as black and calls it to be so, and when there is apparently no association of contradictory circumstances, another logician does not come forward and challenge him with the words that, “No, this is not black, but it is yellow.” In such a way, suggestiveness is found by experience to exist in words, which are denotative, or in sounds of
music that are not denotative, or in gestures and so forth, which are not even words/sounds. No one can deny the same, i.e. no one can deny the existence of suggestiveness which is a matter of common experience: “alaukike hy arthe tārṇikāṇāṃ vimatayo nikhilāḥ pravartante, na tu laukike. na hi nila-madhura”diś vaśeṣa-lokendriya-gocare bādhārahite tattve pariparam vipratipannā drṣyante. na hi bādhārahitaṃ nilaṃ nilaṃ iti bruvan apareṇa pratiṣidhyate naitannīlāṃ pītam etad iti. tathaiva vyaṇjakatvam vācakānāṃ śabdānāṃ a-vācakānāṃ ca gūtadhvanīnām a-sabdā-rūpānāṃ ca ceṣṭā”dīnāṃ yat-sarveṣāṃ anubhava-siddham eva tat kena apahūyate?” (vṛtti, Dhv. III. 33, pp. 216, ibid).

Ānandavardhana says that only somebody who would choose to be a butt of ridicule, would dare challenge vyaṇjakatva.

To this the logicians have the following to say. The objection runs as follows: It is true to say that in all the cases quoted above, one does experience the element of implicit sense. There is no doubt about it. But in fact this suggestiveness is none other than implication and this implication is the same as the state of inferential probans - The apprehension of the suggested idea is thus not different but identical with the inferential knowledge of the probandum. Thus if we put it in other words, the relation of suggester-suggested is none other than the relation of probans-probanum. There is also another reason to support this. The Siddhāntin had himself explained just now that words possess suggestiveness directed to the speaker’s intention, and it is our conviction that the speaker’s intention is only inferable. - “atha brūyāt, -asti atisandhānāvasarah, vyaṇjakatvam śabdānāṃ gamakatvam, tac āṃ lingatvam atāś ca vyaṅgya-pratītīr lingī-pratītīr eva iti liṅga-liṅgi-bhāya eva, teṣāṃ vyaṅgyavyaṇjakabhāvo nāparaḥ kaścit. atāś ca etad avaśyaṃ eva boddhayam yasmād vaktrobhiprāyāpekyayā vyaṇjakatvam idānīṃ eva tvayā pratipāditāṃ vaktṛ abhipṛayaś ca anumeya-rūpa eva.” (vṛtti, Dhv. III. 33, pp. 216, ibid). - Locana reads - “vyaṇjakatvam nāpahūyate, tat tu atiriktaṃ na bhavati, api tu liṅga-liṅgi-bhāva evāyam-idānīṃ eva jainimyamatopakṣepe.”

It is clear that in this mahā-pūrva-pakṣa Mahimā’s view is foreshadowed. It is surprising that though Mahimā had read the Dhvanyāloka so carefully he refused to accept the arguments as laid down by Ānandavardhana in this portion, where he successfully silences the logicians.

Ānandavardhana observes that even if the alleged view is true there is nothing to lose for him, for his sole intention was to establish the fact that suggestiveness is a verbal power, over and above two other powers such as denotation and
indication. This position will not suffer even if the objection of the logicians be accepted. It might be named as suggestiveness or inferential probans or by any other name. Whatever the name be given, the fact remains that there is no dispute between the objector and the siddhāntin. For this something else is admitted by both as a special power over and above the normally accepted powers of denotation and indication. But the fact is that suggestiveness is not identical with inferential probans and all the apprehension of suggested idea is not identical with inferential knowledge: “tad hi vyāṇjakatvāṃ līṅgatvam astu, anyad vā. sarvathā prasiddhā-śābda-prakāra-vilakṣaṇatvāṃ, śābda-vyāpāra-viśayatvāṃ ca tasyāsti iti nāsti āvavor-vivādaḥ na punar ayāṃ paramārtho yad-vyāṇjakatvāṃ līṅgatvam eva, sarvatra vyāṇgya-pratitiśca līṅga-praṭitiś eva iti.” (viṃśi, Dhv. III: 33, pp. 218, ibid)

Mahimā’s objection is that there is no power of word except abhidhā or denotation and whatever meaning follows is only through a loose-inference which he calls kāvyānumiti. He even takes the indicated sense or lakṣyārtha as anumeya or inferred. But then he has to accept that this process of inference has to be based on words, and is not identical with the normal inference of fire from perceiving smoke through naked eyes. It is to distinguish between the two that he calls this as “kāvyānumiti” and the other “tarkānumiti”, at the same time freeing the former from the rigorous limitations or rules of the latter. It is to distinguish and defend this stand of Mahimā that Dr. Rewaprasad observes in a personal letter to us, dt. 24-11-01 after returning from Canada, that “jo doṣa diye hain, un se anumānakā nahīn, anumāna-gata-prāmaṇatā-kā khaṇḍana sambhava hai, jiski kāvyamen āvāsyakatā hī nahīn.” i.e. “The faults (that are perceived by Mammaṭa and others in Mahimā’s thinking) do not refute the process of inference, or the fact of inference, but only its acceptability or, validity, or reliability, which is not at all expected here.” But our argument still holds good, even against Rewaprasadjee that the very fact that Mahimā calls it as “kāvyānumiti” - proves that this ‘anumiti’ is related with poetic word, i.e. it is a word-power and is other than denotation or indication. Thus Ānandavardhana, to us, looks irrefutable. He proceeds as follows:

The objector has indeed made a clever use of the siddhāntin’s words in support of his position. The objector remarked that the speaker’s intention is certainly implied and added that such implication is the same as the state of an inferential probans. To this Ānandavardhana, the Siddhāntin, has the following to say. - The scope of words is two-fold, (i) inferable and (ii) denotive. Of these the inferable is always of the nature of the speaker’s intention, and again, is two-fold viz. (i) the
desire to utter words for their own sake, and (ii) the desire to convey meaning through words. Between these, the first type of speaker's intention does not play any part in verbal discourse. It only establishes that the speaker is a living animal different from a non-living-object. But the second type of speaker's intention plays part of a proximate cause in verbal discourse though it is rendered rather remote due to several other intervening factors between the utterance of the word and the apperance of the word and the apprehension of its meaning. Both these types of speaker's intention are inferable from words:

"dvividho hi visayah sabdānam. anumeyāḥ, pratipādyāscā. tatrā'numevo vivaksā-laksanāḥ, vivaksā ca sabda-svarūpa-prakāśanecchā, sabdena artha-prakāśanecchā ca iti dviprakārā. tatrā"dyā na sabda-vyavahārāṅgam. sā hi prāṇitvā-mātra-pratipatti-phaḷā. divūyā tu sabda-visēśavadharāṇā-vasita-vyavahitā'pi sabda-karaṇa-vyavahāra-nibandhanam. te tu dve api anumeyo visayāḥ sabdānām. pratipādyastu prayoktur artha-pratipādana-samihā-visayīkṛtormah" - sa ca dvividhaḥ vācyo vyāngyaśca. "But the denotative scope of words relates to meaning itself which happens to be the aim of the speaker's intention to convey meaning. It is also two-fold (1) The expressed and (2) the suggested. The speaker may use words with a view to conveying his meaning directly by means of them (and then we have the expressed meaning), or he may use words which do not directly convey his meaning, with a view to achieving some purpose (and then we have suggested meaning). Both these aspects of the denotative scope of words are far from appearing as probandum of any inference based on words. On the other hand, the relationship between word and such denotative content is one other than inference, whether it be a conventional or an unconventional relationship. It is only the aspect of intention on the part of the speaker to employ words or meaningful words that is inferable, and not the meaning itself conveyed by his words. If it were true that the meaning itself could form the probandum of an inference having words for its probans, there should be no scope for doubts at all whether any meaning is right or wrong. For instance, when the probandum viz. fire, is inferred from the probans, viz. smoke, there is indeed no room for any doubt about the existence of fire. Since the suggested meaning is conveyed by the power of the expressed itself, it, too, is related to the word just as the expressed meaning is related to the word. Directness or remoteness is not the differentiating condition of a relationship. That suggestiveness is related to denotation has been already shown. The conclusion is thus indisputable that words will have the state of an inferential probans only while implying the intention of the speaker and that the meanings themselves which are
signified by the words are due to the verbal power of denotation and not inference. Now we may take instances of meanings which are suggested by a word. These may be of the nature of intention and may not be as well. Can we say that all such meanings are conveyed by the power of denotation alone in words? Or should we postulate some other function? It has been already shown that the power of denotation alone cannot explain the suggested meaning. Hence we will have to admit another function and that function itself is called suggestiveness by us. The nature of suggestiveness is not co-extensive with the nature of an inferential probans, since the former exists in objects like light where the latter is absent. Just as the denoted content of words is not identical with the probandum of an inference, so also the suggested content is not identical with it. Contrariwise, that which becomes the object of an inferred probandum as shown above, does not constitute what is denoted, but constitutes only an adventitious attribute of what is denoted. If the denoted meaning too were to be inferable as probandum, there could be no occasion at all for any differences of opinion regarding it in the world. But such differences are within our common knowledge and this has also been explained already.” (Trans. K. Kris., Dhv. pp. 219, 221, 223, ibid).

To quote Ānandavardhana’s words, we read: “sa ca dvividhāḥ, vācyo vyaṅgaṣcā. prayokta hi kadācit sva-sabdenā’rtham prakāśayitum samihate kadācit-sva-sabdā’nabhidheyatvena prayojanāpeksayā kayācit. sa tu dvividho’pi pratipādyo visayaḥ sabdānāṃ na līngitaya svarūpeṇa prakāśate, api tu kṛtrimenā’krtrimena vai sambandhāntarena. vivakṣā-visayatvam hai tasyārthasya sabdair līngitayā pratiyate, na tu svarūpam. yadi hi līngataya tatra sabdānāṃ vyāpāraḥ syāt tacchabdārthe samyaṅ-mithyā”di-vivādā eva na pravarteran dhūmā”di-lingānumitānumeyāntaravat. vyaṅgaṣcārtho vacyasāmarthya”kṣiptatayā vacyavacchabdasya sambandhi bhavaty eva. sāksād-asāksād-bhāvo hi sambandhāṣyā'prayojakah. vācyā-vācaka-bhāvā”śrayatvam ca vyaṅjakatvasya prāg eva darśitam. tasmād vaktrabhāpṛyā-ṛūpa eva vyāngye līngataya sabdānāṃ vyāpāraḥ. tad-visayikṛte tu pratipādyatayā. pratiyamāne tasminnabhāpṛyā-ṛūpe-anabhāpṛyārūpe ca vācakatvenaiva vyāpārah sambandhāntareṇa vai. na tāvad vācakatvēna yathoktam prāk. sambandhāntarena vyaṅjakatvam eva. na ca vyaṅjakatvam līṅgatvarūpam eva, aḷokādiṣu anyathā drṣṭatvat. tasmāt pratipādyo visayaḥ sabdānāṃ na līṅgitena sambandhi vācyavat. yo hi līṅgītvēna teṣām sambandhi yathā darśito visayaḥ sa na vācyatvēna pratiyate, api tu upādhitvēna. pratipādyasya ca visayasya līṅgītvē tad-visayaṇāṃ vipratipattināṃ laukikair eva kriyāṇāṃ abhāvāḥ prasajyeta iti. etac ca uktam eva.” (pp. 220, 222, vṛtti, Dhv. III-33, ibid)
'Vyañjanā'

Ānandavardhana further observes that at times even the expressed meaning is tested by instruments of knowledge such as direct perception etc. But this does not come in the way of its being a meaning collected through verbal power of denotation. Same is the case with suggested sense also. As a matter of fact the question of logical truth or falsity with reference to the suggested sense is totally out of point and futile. So the question of applying instruments of knowledge (pramāṇa-parīkṣā) is in itself ridiculous. So, concludes Ānandavardhana - “tasmāl lingī-pratīti eva sarvatra vyāngya-pratīti iti na śakya vaktum.” - It is not possible to identify the apprehension of the suggested sense, with that of the inferred probandum in every case. Though of course, it is equally true that the aspect of implicit sense in words in form of the speaker’s intention, is inferable, and that it can also pass under the name of suggestion, but it can never be given the designation of ‘dhvani’/poetic suggestion of words.

Thus Ānandavardhana establishes vyañjanā as a separate power over and above abhidhā and laksana, and also confirms that so far as poetry is concerned, the Mīmāṃsakas, and the Naiyāyikas will stand to gain if they accept the same, and accept they must. The grammarians have supplied the original inspiration for vyañjanā and dhvani and therefore Ānandavardhana holds that there is no basic divide between the vyañjanā/dhvani vādins and grammarians. After thus successfully establishing vyañjanā/dhvani doctrine firmly, he declares:

“vimāti visayo ya āśīnmanīśiṇām
satatam avidita-satattvāh,
 dhvani-sañjītaḥ prakāraḥ
kāvyasya vyañjītaḥ sóyam.”

“The variety of poetry designated as suggestion, which had become a source of controversy for long, because its real nature had eluded even persons of the best intellect, has now been explained.” (Trans. K. Kris.)

Thus Ānandavardhana, without making any attempt to define vyañjanā, is the first known ālaṃkārika who takes pains to establish vyañjanā as a separate and independent power over and above abhidhā, tātparya and laksana. Thus vyañjanā is a turīya vṛtti, the designation given to it by the great Abhinavaguptapāda in his Locana on the Dhv. It may be noted that even Abhinavagupta has not attempted a clean definition and classification of vyañjanā, but under Dhv. I. iv, he has tried to defend and establish vyañjanā and has silenced vyañjanā/dhvani-virodha, which
also reverberates through the works of great ācāryas such as Mammaṭa, Hemacandra, Vidyādhara, Vidyānātha, and Vīśvanātha, to mention some few. We will deal with vyaṭjanā/dhvani-virodha in a separate chapter but for the present we will look into the efforts of ācāryas beginning with Mammaṭa who have tried to define and classify vyaṭjanā and later dhvani also. For the present we will engage ourselves with discussion concerning vyaṭjanā only. We once again take note of the fact that neither the great ālamkārikas beginning with Bhāmaṭa to Rudraṭa have tried to give a systematic exposition of śabdavṛttis, nor the illustrious immediate followers of Anandavardhana such as Mukula, Kuntaka, Mahimā, Bhoja and Dhanika have done anything with reference to vyaṭjanā, except perhaps subsuming or opposing the same. It falls to the lot of Mammaṭa, the follower of Anandavardhana and Abhinavagupta to attempt definition and classification of the concept of vyaṭjanā. He has done it both in his śabda-vyāpāra-vicāra a small independent treatise on śabda-vṛttis and in his Kāvyapraṅkāśa also. We will now proceed to what Mammaṭa has to say.

Mammaṭa - In the Śabda-vyāpāra-vicāra we read the same words verbatim that are read in the K.P. So we will stick to the K.P. for Mammaṭa's concept of vyaṭjanā. Again, the classification as seen in the K.P. III is also missing in the former.

After dealing with laksanā Mammaṭa proceeds with vyaṭjanā. He has suggested that laksanā which is six-fold is again three-fold from the angle of the prayojana which is suggested. It is either without suggested sense, or with a concealed suggested sense, or with a non-concealed suggested sense: “a-vyaṭgyā gudhā-'gudhā-vyaṭgyā ca.” The abode of that laksanā is said to be the indicative word: tad-bhūr laksanikaḥ śabdāḥ. But there in the indicative word, the function is in the form of suggestion: tatra vyāpāra vyaṭjanā”tmakaḥ.

Now, Mammaṭa seems to attempt a definition of vyaṭjanā. He observes (K.P. I. 14bcd & 15 ab.)

“tatra vyāpāro vyaṭjanā”tmakaḥ, yasya pratītim ādhātuṃ laksanā samupāsyate - 14 phale śabdaiika-gamyētra vyaṭjanānāparā kriyā.” This of course is a semblance of a definition.

Jhalkikar (pp. 58) has the following observation -

vācaka-lakṣanikau śabdau lakṣayītvā vyaṭjanā-mukhena vyaṭjakam śabdam lakṣayītum vyaṭjanā-svarūpaṃ āha. ‘tatra’ - ity ādinā.

Then he observes that, or it may be said that, to define vyaṭjaka word, to silence the arguments of the objector concerning the ‘upādhi’-adjunct of the suggestive
word, i.e. vyañjanā, Mammaṭa starts with the word ‘tatra’ - etc. Jhalkikar proceeds to observe : tatra pāvanatvā"di-prayojane viṣaye vyāpārah śabdasya vr̥ttiḥ, vyañjanā"tmakaḥ vyañjana-svarūpaḥ iti tīkākāraḥ.

"atha vyañjaka-sabda-lakṣaṇāya vyañjana nirūpanīya. sā ca dvedhā. śabda-niśṭha’rtha-niśṭha ca. tatra antyā śabda-lakṣaṇe anupayukte agre (= tr̥ttiyoḷāse) Vivecanīyā. ādyā tu dvedhā. abhidhāmūla lakṣaṇa-mūla ca. tatra yady api abhidhāyāḥ prāthamyaḥ upaṃjyavatvāc ca tamūla prathamam nirūpayitum ucitā, tathā’pi suprasiddharvāt lakṣaṇayaḥ prākṛtvavāc ca tamūla eva prathamam nirūpayati tatreyu ādinā. tatra lākṣaṇike sabde vyañpāro vyañgya-prakāśānukūlaḥ" - iti pradvipakāraḥ.

Thus Mammaṭa seems to begin with lakṣaṇāmūla vyañjanā first. But as observed earlier this can not be taken as a general definition of vyañjanā, though there is a semblance even of a general definition. It is said here that, there, i.e. in the lākṣaṇika or indicative word, the function is in the form of vyañjanā or suggestion. The reason is, that in respect of the outcome, i.e. motive or fruit, observes Mammaṭa, which is known from the indicative word alone, and for whose apprehension the indication is resorted to, there is no other power of function except suggestion. We have observed that Mammaṭa does not attempt a general definition of vyañjanā but starts his treatment of vyañjanā with lakṣaṇāmūla vyañjanā. We will see later that Viśvanātha in his Sāhitya-darpaṇa attempts the definition of vyañjanā and as in case of lakṣaṇa, so in case of vyañjanā also, he attempts a more scientific and minute classification of vyañjanā. We will examine this later. We have seen in the quotation from Jhalkikar’s commentary that Pradīpa cites two reasons for Mammaṭa’s treatment of lakṣaṇa mūla first. The reasons are that (i) lakṣaṇa is the matter in hand, because Mammaṭa is actually dealing with the topic of lakṣaṇa here, and prayojana is explained to be two fold. viz. gudha and a-ghudha. Again (ii) lakṣaṇa-mūla vyañjanā is more well-known than the other viz. abhidhāmūla. Again the thread is picked up as a natural corollary to the topic of prayojanavati lakṣaṇa and prayojana in an indicative word is conveyed through vyañjanā, i.e. lakṣaṇa-mūla vyañjanā in this case.

As seen above in kārikā 14, he observes that the abode of that lakṣaṇa is the lākṣaṇika or indicative word. tadbhus tadāśrayaḥ ‘The abode of that’ means the support of that. We have seen above that in II. 14.b, the author says that there, i.e. in indicative word, the function is in the form of suggestion. If it be asked ‘why ?’, the answer is -(14 cd; 15 ab.). “In respect of the motive which is known from the indicative word alone, and for whose apprehension the indication (i.e. lakṣaṇa) is
resorted to, there is no other function except suggestion.” Mammaṭa explains in the vṛtti, that when a word is used indicatively, with the intention to convey a certain motive there its apprehension is not from any other ground but from that word alone. And in such a case there is no other function except suggestion. The words viz., “yasya pratīṭim ādhātum... vyaṇjanān nā'parā kriyā” (14 cd, 15 ab.) thus give the definition of lākṣaṇāmūlā vyaṇjanā. As Prof. Gajendragadkar explains, the definition is given in a somewhat ‘fighting mood’, with the object of proving the necessity of vyaṇjanā for understanding the purpose of lākṣaṇa. When we resort to lākṣaṇa, e.g. in ‘gaṇgāyām ghosah’, we do so with the specific purpose of conveying something special-prayojana-pipādayiṣayā-and that special purpose is to convey the sense of coolness and holiness etc. that prevail in the hamlet : yasya śītavaya-pāvanatvā”dirūpasya phalasya pratīṭim jīānam ādhātum, janayitum. In the words of Mammaṭa - “prayojana-pipādayiṣayā yatra yatra lākṣaṇā-śabdā-prayogah, tatra, nānyatas tatpratīṭiḥ, api tu tasmād eva śabdāt. na cātra vyaṇjanād rtēṇyo vyaṇpāraḥ - i.e. when a word is used indicatively with the intention to convey a certain purpose, there its apprehension is not from any other ground, but from that word alone. And in such a case, there is no other function than suggestion. Mammaṭa here used the words ”phale śabdāikagamyē”, with a specific purpose to suggest that the purpose in form of the qualities of coolness and holiness prevailing in the hamlet, is arrived at only through the lākṣaṇika word alone, i.e. here through the word “gaṇgāyām”. The idea is that here the suggestiveness is based on lākṣaṇā i.e. it is rooted in lākṣaṇika word and certainly the suggested idea is not arrived at with the help of anything else but the power of word alone which operates here through indicative word. The suggested purpose is not apprehended through any other means of knowledge such as anumāna or inference which operates through the circumstances of vyāpti-smṛti, and the like : The Pradīpa observes: “tat phalam tasmād eva śabdād gamyate, na tu pramāṇāntarāt. vyāpti-smṛtyāder anapekṣaṇāt. So, Mammaṭa asserts that here there is no other pramāṇa, nor any other function of the word accept, vyaṇjanā - “atra vyaṇjanānāparā kriyā”. By ‘na aparā kriyā’ is meant, ‘na anyā vṛttiḥ, abhidhā-rūpā lākṣaṇā-rūpā va’. Read Jhalakikar (pp. 58, ibid) in this context - “yasya ity ādinā arthā”-pattirūpa-pramāṇam pradarśītan. atra lākṣaṇā iti padam lākṣaṇayā lākṣaṇika śabdā-param. lākṣaṇayā śabdā-prayogah; iti vṛtti-grantha-sva-rasāt. tathā ca yasya śaitya-pāvanatvā”di-rūpā-phalasya pratīṭim anubhavarūpām ādhātum janayitum lākṣaṇā, lākṣaṇikā śabdāḥ samupāsyate āśriyate, satyapi vācaka-śabdē tam vīhāya ādriyate ity arthāḥ. śabdāik-gamyē lākṣaṇika-śabdā-mātra-gamyē (na tu anumānā”di-gamyē) atra
Vyanjanā
tasmin phale, (saitya-pavanatva”di-prayojana-visaye) vyañjanat vyañjanam vihāya, (vyañjanam vinā) aparā kriya anyo vyāpāro na ityarthah. kimtu vyañjanā”tmaka eva vyāpāraḥ iti bhāvah. atra “śabdaika” ity ekapadena anumāna”di-vyudāsah. śabdasya saṁbhrta-sāmagrikatvād anumānasya vyāptyaśi-pratisandhāna”di vilambena vilambitattvāt na anumānagamyam prayojanam. kiṃca tathā sati gangā”dyartham eva lingam sat śaitya”dikam anumāpayati iti svākāryam. na ca tate gangātvam siddham. ratpada-prayoga-visayatve ca na vyāpti-grāhakam pramanam asti. tat kathā asya lingārā. kathām vā gangādharmasya śaitya”des tate bādhāvadhāraṇāt sādhyātā. kathām vā śaityā”dāv ekasya avacchedakasya abhāvāt sādhyatāvacchedakaikyam. tāvataṃ viśeṣanām ekadānupasthiter na samuḥālarbanānumithi. vyañjanāyāṃ ca bādhāder apratibandhakatvāt ‘atyantā’saty api hy arthe jñānam śabdah karoti hi iti nyāyāt vyaṅgyaṭāvavacchedakaṇupasthitā’pi pānaka-rasa-nyāyena vyaṅgya-bodhakatvāc ca na kāpy anupapattih. kiṃ ca. vyāptyādi-prati-saṁdhānasya aniyatattvāt śaitya”dibodhasya ca niyatattvāt na anumātī vyañjanā”nyathāsiddhiḥ iti bhāvah.” - iti narasimha-m aniśā-visorastu paṁcamollāse draṣṭavyah.

Viśvanātha has a clearer definition of vyañjanā and its varieties which we will pick up later.

It has been observed that neither abhidhā nor lakṣaṇā conveys the prayojana for which lakṣaṇā is resorted to. Mammaṭa now establishes this with cogent arguments. He observes : tathā hi,

“nābhidyā samayābhāvāt” (II. 15 c.)

gangāyāṃ ghoṣa ity”dau ye pāvanatvā”dayo dharmāḥ taṭā”dau pratīyante na tatra gangā”disabdāḥ saṅkṛetitāḥ.” - i.e. “It is not denotation, on account of the absence of convention.” The words Gaṅgā and the like have no convention with reference to those properties, like holiness etc., which are apprehended as belonging to the bank and the like in cases such as, “A hamlet on the Gaṅgā”. The Sampradāya-prakāśini (pp. 39, edn. Dwivedi) explains - “nānu katham nā’parā kriya īty ata āha nā”bhidhetyādi. saṃyāha saṃketaḥ. tadbhāvaḥ vivicya darśayati-gangyām īty ādi. dharmāḥ mukhyārtha-samaṇvāyinaḥ. na hi pāvanatvā”di-srotodharmānām taṭa-gatatarena pratiṇapttau gaṅgā”disabdāḥ saṃkṛetitāḥ.” The idea is that the purpose of lakṣaṇā in ‘gaṅgāyāṃ ghoṣah’ is the properties of holiness and others, which are understood as belonging to the bank. These properties cannot be expressed by abhidhā, because no convention of the word ‘gaṅga’ has been made with reference to those qualities. What is meant is that the conventional meaning of the word ‘gaṅga’ is the stream of that river and not the properties such as
holiness and others. Therefore abhidhā cannot express these qualities. Mammaṭa at K.P. II. 15d observes: “hetvābhāvān na lakṣaṇā.” - mukhyārthā-bādhā”di trayam āhu.” i.e. Nor is it indication for want of the (three fold) cause. The cause means the triad beginning with incompatibility of the primary sense.” Lakṣaṇā cannot convey the prayojana. What is meant is this that, in ‘gaṇgāyāṃ ghoṣāḥ’, abhidhā gives the meaning of stream. This meaning is unsuitable and so lakṣaṇā is resorted to and it indicates the sense of bank. This lakṣaṇā is ‘prayojanaavati’ and the prayojana or purpose is “pāvanatvā”dayo dharmāḥ.” How is this prayojana arrived at? To this question one may say that after the indicated sense viz. ‘gaṇgā tāte ghoṣāḥ’, a second lakṣaṇā should be resorted to and it should be supposed to indicate the sense viz. the apprehension of the properties of holiness and coolness. But Mammaṭa holds that this is not possible, as resorting to second lakṣaṇā will invoke mukhyārthā-bādhā etc. i.e. āhu. As there is no ‘āhu’ present here, there cannot be lakṣaṇā. The word ‘hetvābhāvā’ is a collective singular. It stands for the three conditions viz. mukhyārthā-bādhā, tadyoga and rūḍhi-prayojanānyatarat. Jhalkikar (p. 59, ibid) observes: “nānu prayojana-pratipādane abhidhā”dir eva kalpito vyāpārōstu, kim vaṇjanayā ity ata āha-nābhidheti; na śatkin ityarthāḥ. pāvanatvādi-pratipādane iti šēṣāḥ. samayābhāvād iti. samketābhāvād ityarthāḥ gaṇgā”dipadasya saitya-pāvanatvā”dau samketābhāvād iti yāvat. ‘saktir atiriktaḥ padārthaḥ. tadgrāhakaḥ saṅketa iti na sādhyāviśeṣo hetor iti bodhyam.’ iti udyote spaṭam. uktam idāṃ ‘sa mukhyārthaḥ’ iti 11 sūtre. “hetu-sādhyayoḥ sāmāṇḍhikaranyābhāvāc anumity anupapattir ato vyācaṣte ‘gaṇgāyām’ ity ādi. tathā ca pāvanatvādikam prayojanam na gaṅgā-padābhidhāpratipādyam gaṅgā-pada-nisṭha-saṅketa-visayatvād ity evānumānam iti bhāvaḥ” it narasiṃhamanāsīyām spaṭam.

In K.P. II. 16, Mammaṭa further observes that the indicated sense is not the primary one; neither is there lack of compatibility i.e. bādhā, nor any connection with the fruit; there is no motive herein; and the word (gaṅgā) does not fail in its expressive power.

“laksyaṃ na mukhyaṃ, nāpy atra bādho
yogaḥ phalena no;
na prayojanam etasmin, na ca śabdāḥ
skhalī-gatiḥ.” (K.P. II. 16)

In the vṛtti Mammaṭa further elaborates the argument thus. - Just as the word Gaṅgā indicates bank because it is incompatible in (its primary sense of) the
stream, so also if it were incompatible with reference to the bank also, then it would further indicate the purpose. But the bank is not the primary meaning of the word ‘gaṅgā’, nor is there any incompatibility, and there is no connection of the bank, which is the indicated sense of the word ‘gaṅgā’, with the holiness, coolness, etc., which are to be further indicated. Nor is there any purpose with reference to the purpose which is supposed to be indicated. Besides, the word Gaṅgā, unlike the word bank, is not unable to convey the purpose. The sampradāya-prakāśini observes : “(pp. 40, Edn. R. C. Dwivedi, ibid)” - tam eva hervabhāvaṁ hitatya darśayati - ‘lakṣyaṁ na mukhyāṁ’ ity ādi. mukhyārtha-sambandhāḥ prayojanaṁ skhält-gatitvām ca iti iyati laksanāyām yā sāmāgrī sā vākya-paṅcakena paripāṭyā nirastā.

tad etad vyācaśte-yathā gaṅgā-śabda ity ādinā. prayojane hi lakṣye taṭasya mukhyārthavām bādhaś ca nyāyaḥ na ca tad ubhayam api sambhavati. samāyādbhūvat na mukhyārthata ghośādikaranatva-sambhavāṃ na bādhāḥ. na ca gaṅgā-śabdābhidheyatvena abhimātasya srotō-dharmaiḥ pāvanatvā” dibhir lakṣya-sammatais sambandhāḥ. nā’pi prayojanāntaram prayojanatvena sambhavati. nā’pi gaṅgā-śabdasya taṭa iva pāvanatvā ādau skhält-gatitvāṃ, svārtha-samavāyitvāt. itthām na laksanāyāḥ śaṅkāṅkurasyā’py avakāśāḥ.

Mammatā further observes : (K.P. II. 17 ab.) -
“evam apy anavasthā syād
yā mūla-kṣaya-kāriṇi.”

evam api, prayojanaṁ cel lakṣyate tat prayojanāntareṇa, tad api prayojanāntareṇa, iti prakṛtāpratītiṁ anavasthā bhavet.” The sampradāya-prakāśini on this has - (pp. 40, 41, ibid) : athā’pi ced abhyupagamyeta, tadā prathamalaksanāyā mūlocchēdi durantam dosāntaram āpate ity āha - ‘evam api’ iti. prakṛtāpratītiṁ iti mūlakṣaye tyāṣyā tyāṣyā vivrītiḥ. prakṛtalaksanāyā jñāptic- pratibandha-kāriny anavasthā prasajet. utpatti-jñāpyor anyatara-pratibandhakatvābhāve hi na anavasthādoṣaḥ, yathā-bijāṅkura’dau.”

Mammatā thus argues that even in this way there would be ad infinitum which will strike at the very root.

“Even in this way”, means if the purpose were to be indicated it would be indicated by another purpose, that too by yet another purpose, and thus would result a ‘regressus ad infinitum’, causing the non-apprehension of the matter in hand.

Mammatā further meets with an objection such as -, the bank as possessed of
the qualities, such as holiness, is itself indicated by the word Gaṅgā; and the purpose for such indication is the cognition of an additional meaning than what is obtained by saying - ‘A hamlet on the bank of the Gaṅgā’, thus the indication is in the qualified object. Then what is the need of suggestion?”

“nanu pāvanatvā”di-dharma-yuktam eva tataṁ lakṣyate. gaṅgāyās tate ghoṣa ity atodhikasya arthasya pratipattiś ca prayojanam iti visiṣṭe lakṣaṇā. tat kiṁ vyañjanā, iti āha.”

To this the author replies -

“prayojanena sahitam lakṣaṇīyaṁ na yuyate.” (17cd)

kuta iti āha -

“jñānasya viṣayo hyayaḥ phalam anyad udāḥṛtam.” (II. 18 ab)

The idea is that the indicated sense, qualified by the purpose is not proper to be admitted because, the object of cognition is indeed different, and the result is declared to be different. Mammaṭa observes that the object of perception etc. is a blue and the like. But the result is revelation or consciousness. Thus there is no indication with reference to the qualified object. The Sampradāyaprakāśini has this remark (pp. 42, ibid) : “prayojana-sahitasya tatā”der lakṣyatvā’bhypagamo na yukta ity arthaḥ, and also read - “guṇena guṇī lakṣyate, bāhyendriya-gocaratvārūpa-viśeṣa-prathanāya, ghaṭā”dir iti. phalam jñāna-prayojanam, prakatata samvittir vā iti vikalpo vyavatiṣṭhate. bhāttā”dayo hi prakaṭibhāva-lakṣaṇaṁ jñeya-dharmaṁ jñāna-phalam āhuḥ. vaiṣeṣikā”dayas tu samvitti-rūpaṁ jñātṛ-dharmaṁ. samvittir anu-vyavasāyaḥ. ghaṭa-jñānam jānāmi ity ādi jñāna-visayam jñānam, iti yāvat. prakatata eva astu jñānapalāmaṁ, samvittir vā, na tu phalaviṣayayoh sarvatha tādātmyaṁ upapadyata iti nīkarsaḥ.”

In the above discussion we have noticed Mammaṭa’s words in the vṛtti under II. 16 that : “nā’pi gaṅgā-śabdaḥ tataṁ iva prayojanam pratipādayitum samarthah.” meaning, “Besides the word Gaṅgā, unlike the word bank, is not unable to convey the purpose.” Here commentators notice the reading ‘samarthah’ for ‘a-samarthah’. With ‘samarthah’, the vṛtti is explained as, “yathā gaṅgā-śabdaḥ mukhyārtha-bādhādikam apekṣya eva tataṁ pratipādayitum samarthah, tathā prayojanam pratipādayitum samarthoh na iti punar api vyatirekena drṣṭāntah. ayaṁ bhāvah-gaṅgā śabdaḥ tatal prayojanaṁ ca pratipādayati. param asti bhedaḥ etyor dvayoḥ pratipādane. tata-pratipādane gaṅgā-śabdasya mukhyārtha-bādhā”di-hetu-trayasya asti apekṣā. na tāḍrśi apekṣā prayojana-pratipādane. yat-karaṇam gaṅgā-śabdaḥ prayojanaṁ vyañjanayā pratipādayati.”
As for the words “evaṁ api anavasthā syāt yā mūlakṣaya-kārini” - also note “anavasthā avasthāyāḥ sthairyasya antavattvasya abhāvah. upapādyā-upapādakayor a-viśrāntiḥ ity arthaḥ. upapādyam prathamam prayojanam. upapādakam dvitiyam prayojanam. punar api upapādyam dvitiyam prayojanam, upapādakam tṛtiyam prayojanam. ity anena kramena prayojana-parmparāyā anantatvam.”

‘mūlakṣayakārini’ means mūlasya prathama-prayojanyasya ksayaḥ nāśah anavabodhaḥ ity arthaḥ, tasya kāriniḥ, utpādayitrī. The anavasthā or endless series of purposes would produce non-apprehension of the first purpose. ‘mūlakṣayakārini’ is paraphrased by ‘prakṛta-a-pratiti-kṛt’, which means, ‘prakṛtam yat prathama-prayojanam tasya a-pratitiḥ anavabodhaḥ, tāṃ kartoti iti.” There is another kind of ‘anavasthā’, which is based on ‘bijāṅkura-nyāya’. That ‘anavasthā’ is not regarded as a fault. ‘mūlakṣayakārini’ excludes that ‘anavasthā’. The udyota reads : ‘etena bijāṅkurāḍivad anavasthā na dūṣaṇam iti apāstam. ‘mūlakṣayakārinīm cāhur anavasthām hi dūṣaṇam’ ity ukteḥ.

At K.P. II. 18 bcd. Mammaṭa observes :

viśiṣṭe laksanā naivaṁ
viśeṣāḥ syus tu laksite.

“There is no indication with reference to the qualified object. But there would be (found) qualities in the indicated object.” He observes in the vṛtti - “tataḥ”dau viśeṣāḥ pāvanatvā”dayaḥ. te ca abhidhā-laksanā-tātparyebhyo vyāpārāntareṇa gamyāḥ. tac ca vyañjana-dhvanana”di-sābda-vācyam-avaśyāṃ esitavyam. evam laksanāmūlāṃ vyañjakatvām uktam.” This means that the qualities of holiness etc. which are found in the bank etc., are apprehended by some other function than denotation, purport and indication. And that (function) which is designated by the terms suggestion, reverberation, and illumination, and the like, must necessarily be admitted. Thus has been explained the suggestiveness based on indication.

Before we end this part of the discussion it will be interesting to read Prof. Gajendragadkar’s observations (pp. 318-22). On ‘prayojanena-sahitam laksanīyam na yuyāte’ etc., he observes : This contains Mammaṭa’s reply to the view of the viśiṣṭa-laksanā-vādin. A lakṣyārtha or an indicated sense (laksanīyam) such as ‘tataḥ’, qualified (sahita = viśiṣṭa) by the purpose such as the properties, holiness and others, (prayojanena = pāvanatvādinā), is not proper, that is, it is not proper to hold that a laksanā indicates a sense (= laksanīyam) qualified by purpose. This amounts to saying that it is not proper to regard “pāvanatvā”di-viśiṣṭa-taṭa” as the lakṣyārtha. Hence it follows that ‘viśiṣṭa-laksanā’ is not proper.
We must here note that the word ‘prayojana’ has been used in two senses. In the passage “nanu viśīṣṭe lakṣanā, which explains the view of the viśīṣṭa-lakṣanāvādin, the purpose is declared to be ‘adhiṣṭaya arthasya (= pāvanatvā”deḥ) pratipatīḥ; i.e. pāvanatvā”di-pratipattīḥ. On the other hand, in Mammaṭa’s reply to the viśīṣṭa-lakṣanāvādin contained in the kārikā-“prayojanena sahitām lakṣanīyām na yujyate”, prayojana means ‘pāvanatvā”di’. These two senses of prayojana must further be explained in somewhat technical terms in order to enable a student to grasp accurately the two interpretations which the kārikā-viz. “jñānasya viṣayo hy anyāḥ phalam anyad udāhṛtam” yields.

The prayojana viz. pāvanatvā”di-pratipattīḥ is laksyārtha-jñāna-janya (= laksyārthasya pāvanatvā”diviśīṣṭa-taṭasya jñānena janyā. laksyārthe pāvanatvā”diviśīṣṭa-taṭe jñāte sati pāvanatvā”di pratipattīḥ jāyate.) i.e. produced by, or arising from, the knowledge or cognition of the indicated sense viz. the bank as qualified by the properties, holiness and others. For, when we know the laksyārtha viz. pāvanatvā”di-viśīṣṭa-taṭa, we obtain the cognition of ‘pāvanatvā”di’. Thus the prayojana pāvanatvā”di-pratipattīḥ is laksyārtha-jñāna-janya, which is abbreviated into jñāna-janya, or ‘janya’.

On the other hand, the prayojana pāvanatvā”di is laksyārtha-janya-jñāna-pratīti-viṣaya (= laksyārthasya pāvanatvā”di viśīṣṭa-taṭasya jñānena janyā ya pāvanatvā”di-pratītiḥ, tasyāḥ viṣayaḥ, arthāt pāvanatvā”dir eva.) i.e. the object of cognition (viz. pāvanatvā”di-pratītiḥ), which is produced by the knowledge of the indicated sense, (= laksyārthasya pāvanatvā”di-viśīṣṭasya taṭasya jñānena janyā). When we know the laksyārtha viz. the bank as qualified by the properties, holiness and others, we get the cognition of those properties. The object of this cognition is naturally those properties themselves. So the prayojana, is ‘laksyārtha-janya-pratīti-viṣaya’, which is shortened into ‘jñāna-janya-pratīti-viṣaya’, or ‘janya-pratīti-viṣaya’ or jñāpya.”

Prof. Gajendragadkar also takes great pains to explain the cryptic remark, viz. “jñānasya viṣayo hy anyāḥ phalam anyad udāhṛtam.” He observes (pp. 318, ibid) - This kārikā has given quite an amount of trouble to interpreters, whose expectations have very often served to confuse the student rather than to enlighten him. This is because the logical connection between the two interpretations, which this line is intended to convey according as ‘phala’ and ‘prayojana’ (Mamaṭa uses these two words as synonyms) is understood in one or the other of the two senses given above, is not properly grasped.
This line contains Mammaṭa’s reason why viṣiṣṭa-lakṣanā can not be admitted. It enunciates a general rule or proposition and thereby it is suggested that if viṣiṣṭa-lakṣanā were accepted, this proposition would be violated. Therefore, viṣiṣṭa-lakṣanā should not be admitted.

Before we proceed to see what this general proposition is, certain other matters must be explained.

‘jñāna’ in the kārikā stands for ‘pramāṇa’. So, when ‘jñānasya’ is paraphrased by ‘pratyakṣā’deh’, ādi refers to anumāna, upamāna and śabda. Note - ‘tāni ca pramāṇāni catvāri. tathā ca nyāyasūtram. pratyakṣā-anumāṇopamāṇa-śabdāḥ pramāṇāni. iti’ Tarkabhāṣā, section 14. We are here not concerned with pratyakṣa, anumāna and upamāna, but only with śabda. For, when we understand from ‘gaṅgāyāṃ ghoṣaḥ’ the sense of the hamlet situated on the bank of the Ganges, which (bank) is characterized by the properties, holiness and others, it is really a case of ‘āpta-vākyā’. For, there is no question here of our going to the Ganges and seeing with our own eyes the hamlet on its bank. Mammaṭa, however, illustrates the general proposition, which is applicable to all the four pramānas, by adducing an example of pratyakṣa.

When we cognize a blue thing such as a ‘nīla-kamala’, we obtain ‘nīla-vastu-jñāna’. The fruit of this cognition can be viewed from two points of view, viz.: objective and subjective. Objectively the fruit of the cognition is that the blue thing that we have cognized has obtained ‘jñātata’ or ‘known-ness’ or ‘prakaṭaratā’ or manifestness. It now differs from other blue things, because while it possesses ‘jñātata’ the others do not, i.e. while it is known, the others are not. Jñātata or prakaṭaratā, which is thus produced in a thing, when it is known, is a vastu-darma. This is the view of the Bhāṭṭa-Mīmāṃsakas or the followers of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa. Read - “ghaṭaḥ”di-visaye jñāne jāte ‘mayā jñātōyaṃ ghaṭaḥ’ iti ghaṭasya jñātata nāma kāścid dharmo jātāḥ iti anumīyate. sa ca jñānāt pūrvam a-jāratvāt jñāne jāte ca jñātatvāt, anvaya-vyatirekābhyaṃ jñānena janyate iti avadhāryate.” - Tarkabhaṭṭa, Section 42.

Subjectively, the fruit of the above cognition is the consciousness in the form, “ahaṃ nīla-vastu jānāmi”, that arises in us when we cognise the blue thing. It is this consciousness in us that distinguishes the known blue thing from others that are not known. Mammaṭa distinguishes this consciousness by the term ‘samvittih’ or self-consciousness. It is termed ‘anu-vyavasāyah’ or after-operation or after-
consciousness. ‘Samvitti’ or ‘anuvyavasaya’ is an ‘atma-dharma’. This is the view of the Prabhâkara Mîmâṃsakas or the followers of Prabhâkarabhaṭṭa and the Naiyâyikas.

In ‘aham nilam jânâmi’ jñâna-viṣaya or viṣaya is nila-vastu, and jñâna-phala or phala is either ‘prakaṭatâ’ or ‘samvittiḥ’. Here it will be seen that jñâna-viṣaya is different from ‘jñâna-phala’. “nilam aham jînâmi iti atra ‘jñâna-phalam’. “nilam aham jînâmi iti atra jñâna-viṣaya-jñâna-phalayor bhedaḥ pratiyate. - Then again, it may also be said that here viṣaya and phala are both different from ‘jñâna’. ‘atra jñâna-viṣayayor bhedaḥ jñâna-phalayos ca bhedaḥ pratiyete.” There are really two senses which the line under explanation yields.

We can now proceed to see what general propositions “jñânasasya... udâhīrtam” lays down, i.e. what its two interpretations are and how they are logically connected.

(1) According to the first interpretation the general proposition here laid down is

“jñâna-viṣayāt jñâna-phalam anyat” e.g. jñânaviṣayāḥ = nila-vastu, jñâna-phalam = prakaṭatā (or jînâtata) or samvittiḥ (this) in the illustration “nilam aham jînâmi”.

Applying the general proposition to the present case of viśiṣṭa-lakṣaṇā, where we first understand prayojana in the sense in which it occurs in the kārikā, “prayojanena sahitam...”, i.e. in the sense of ‘janya-pratiti-viṣaya’ or ‘jñâpya viz. pâvanatvâ”di, we get the following -

jñânam = pâvanatvâ”di-viśiṣṭa-taṭa-jñânam; jñâna-viṣayâḥ=pâvanatvâ”di-viśiṣṭa-taṭaḥ; jñâna-phalam : pâvanatvâ”di.

Here we find that jñâna-viṣaya and jñâna-phala are not different. For jñâna-viṣaya., viz. pâvanatvâ”di-viśiṣṭa-taṭa includes ‘pâvanatvâ”di’, in accordance with the general rule that the viśiṣṭa includes the viśeṣaṇa. Thus, as the general proposition ‘jñâna-viṣayât jñâna-phalam anyat’ is here violated, we cannot admit viśiṣṭa-lakṣaṇā.

An objection from the viśiṣṭa-lakṣaṇa-vādin (may be raised as follows) : In the above application of the general proposition to the present case, jñâna-phala is taken to be pâvanatvâ”di i.e. jñâna-phala is understood to be jñâna-janya-pratiti-viṣaya or jñâpya. In his vṛtti on this line Mammâṭa points out that the phala is prakaṭatā or samvitti. This phala is prakaṭatā or samvitti. This phala is
not jñāna-janya-pratīti-viśaya, but jñāna-janya. For, both 'prakaṭatā' and 'saṃvittiḥ', are produced by nīla-vaṣṭu-jñāna. This means that 'phala' in 'jñānasya viśayō hy anyaḥ phalam anyad udāhrtam' is intended by Mammaṭa to be taken as jñāna-janya and not as 'jñāna-janya-pratīti-viśaya'. Pāvanatvā"di is not jñāna-janya-pratīti-viśaya'. Pāvanatvā"di is not jñāna-janya, because the properties are not produced by pāvanatvā"di-viśaya', because it is the object of pratīti viz. pāvanatvā"di-pratīti, which is produced by jñāna viz. pāvanatvā"di-

viśiṣṭa-taṭa-jñāna. The jñāna-janya-prayojana or phala in this case is 'pāvanatvā"di-pratītiḥ', or 'pāvanatvā"di-jñānam', because we obtain the knowledge pāvanatvā"di from the jñāna i.e. from 'pāvanatvā"di-viśiṣṭa-taṭa-

jñāna'. Prayojana in this sense occurs in 'adhikasya arthasya pratipattiḥ ca prayojanam'. With this jñāna-janya-phala we get the following:

jñānam = pāvanatvā"di-viśiṣṭa-taṭa-jñānam; jñānaviśayaḥ = pāvanatvā"di-

viśiṣṭa-taṭaḥ; jñāna-phalam = pāvanatvā"di-jñānam.

Here we find that jñāna-visaya and jñāna-phala are different. For, while jñāna-

visaya is a dravya, or substance, jñāna-phala is jñāna, which is a 'guṇa'. So, the general proposition 'jñāna-visayāt jñāna-phalam anyat' is not violated and hence there is no objection to admit viśiṣṭa-lakṣaṇā.

The answer from Mammaṭa (could be as follows) - If taking your clue from the vṛtti you want to understand 'phala' as 'jñāna-janya', we also desire to interpret the line in a different way.

(2) We now say that the general proposition which the line lays down is

'jñānāt viśayāḥ anyaḥ, jñānāt phalam ca anyat.'

What is thus established here is the distinction of viśaya from jñāna (jñāna-

viśayayor bhedaḥ) and the distinction of phala from jñāna (jñāna-phalayor bhedaḥ). This is the second interpretaion of the line under discussion. This double distinction is found true in the case of 'nīlam aham jānāmi', thus -

jñānam = nīla-jñānam

viśayaḥ = nīlam

phalam = prakaṭatā or saṃvitti.

Here as nīlam (= viśayaḥ) and prakaṭatā or saṃvitti (phalam) are different from nīla-jñānam, the general proposition which lays down jñāna-visayayor bhedaḥ and jñāna-phalayor bhedaḥ is satisfied.
Now according to the second interpretation of 'phala' the present case yields the following:

\[ \text{jñānam} = \text{pāvanatvā}^{\text{di-viśiṣṭa-tata-jñānam}} \]
\[ \text{viṣayah} = \text{pāvanatvā}^{\text{di-viśiṣṭa-tataḥ}}, \]
\[ \text{phalam} = \text{pāvanatvā}^{\text{di-jñānam}} \]

Here, we note that while viṣaya is different from jñāna, phala is not. For phala (= pāvanatvā^{di-jñānam}) is really included in jñāna (= pāvanatvā^{di-viśiṣṭa-tata-jñānam}), according to the rule which says that ‘viśiṣṭa-jñāna (e.g. daṇḍi-jñāna) includes viśeṣaṇa-jñāna (e.g. daṇḍa-jñāna). Therefore, that part of the general proposition which says that there should be jñāna-phalayar-bhedah is violated in viśiṣṭa-lakṣaṇā. Consequently, viśiṣṭa-lakṣaṇā cannot be accepted.

It will thus be seen that the line “jñānasaya viṣayo hy anyah phalam anyad udāhrtam”, yields two interpretations, which have reference to the two senses in which Mammaṭa uses the word prayojana. Both the interpretations serve to show in their respective sphere that viśiṣṭa-lakṣaṇā is not possible. This is exactly the purpose for which the line under discussion is intended. Therefore, there can be no question as to which is more natural, or more correct interpretation. Both are evidently intended, whether natural or unnatural, in as much as Mammaṭa uses the word ‘prayojana’ in two different senses. That he should have thus used ‘prayojana’ with different senses and at places so near each other is an indication of his loose writing."

[We beg to differ with Prof. Gajendragadkar. Actually this clever use of ‘prayojana’ in two senses silences all opposition and takes out air from any argument.] [Prof. Gajendragadkar to his satisfaction, however goes on pointing the loose use of ‘prayojana’ and ‘phala’ by Mammaṭa at other places in the K.P. as under] -

"Such loose use of prayojana or phala is found in other places also. Thus prayojana or phala in the sense of ‘lakṣyārtha-jñāna-janya’ or ‘jñānajanya’ or ‘janya’ occurs in the following passages : (i) ‘teśām śaitya-pāvanatvā’dīnām dharmānām tathā pratipādanā’tmanāḥ prayojanācca” vṛtti, on II. 9; (ii) “atra gaṇaṇa-bhedayor bhede’pi tādrūpya-pratitiḥ sarvathaivābhedāvagamaśca prayojanam”, - vṛtti, II. 12 abc., (iii) adhikasya arhasya pratipattiśca prayojanam”, vṛtti, II. 17 ab;

(iv) phalam tu prakatatā saṁvittir vā. vṛtti, II. 18 ab. (Ref.s to kārikās follow Dr. R. C. Dwivedi’s Edn.)
Prayojana or Phala in the sense of ‘jñāna-janya-pratīti-viśaya’, or janya-pratīti-viśaya or jñāpya is met with in (i) prati-pipādayiśīta-prayojana-sampratyayaḥ; vṛtti, II. 10; (ii) śuddha-bhedayos tu anya-vailaksanyena a-vyabhicārena ca kārya-kārītvā”di; vṛtti., K.P. II. 12 abc.; (iii) “prayojanam hi vyañjana-vyāpāra-gamyam-eva’; vṛtti. II. 13 ab; (iv) phale śabdaika-gamyetra, karikā, II. 15 a; (v) prayojana-prati-pipādayiśīyā yatra laksanayā śabda-prayogah-vṛtti, on II. 15a; (vi) yogah phalena no; karikā, II. 16. b; (vii) tadā prayojanam lakṣayet, vṛtti on II. 16 b; R. C. Dwivedi has ‘tat’ for ‘tadā’. (viii) nā’pi prayojane laksye kiñcit prayojanam nāpi gangā-śabdās-tatam-iva prayojanam pratipādayitum a-samarthāḥ, vṛtti, II. 16b; (ix) evam api iti prayojanam cet lakṣyate, vṛtti, on II. 17 ab; Dwivedi does not read ‘iti’ after ‘api’. (10) ‘prayojanena sahitam laksanīyam na yujyate’ - kārikā II. 17. cd.”

This long quotation from Prof. Gajendragadkar explains Mammata’s position on vyañjana at the same time points out some looseness in the style of Mammata. We will proceed with the K.P. as follows - The K.P. concludes that thus, there is no indication with reference to the qualified object.

“viśिte laksanā naivam” (II. 18.C). Here ‘viśिte laksanā’ should mean that a laksanā which indicates an object qualified by ‘prayojana’ viz. “pāvanatvā”deviṣiṣṭa-taṭā”, i.e. a ‘viśिṣṭa-laksanā’ is not possible. ‘evam’ means in this manner, i.e. because, as has been explained, a viśिṣṭa-laksanā involves violation of the general proposition as laid down in “jñānasya... phalam anyad udāhṛtam”.

Mammata adds in II. 18d, “viśesāḥ syus tu lakṣite” - i.e. “But properties or qualities would be found in the indicated object.” The idea is that the qualities of holiness etc., which are found in the indicated sense, i.e. bank, are apprehended by some other function than denotation, purport, and indication. And that function which is designated by the terms Suggestion, Reverberation, and Illumination, and the like, must necessarily be admitted. Thus Mammata ends his treatment of suggestiveness based on indication. The words read in the K.P. are : (vṛtti, on K.P. II. 18d) - “taṭā”dau viśesāḥ pāvanatvā”dayaḥ. te ca abhidhā-laksanā-tātparyebhyah vyāpārāntaraṇa gamyāḥ. tacc ca vyañjana-dhvananā”di-śabda-vācyam avaśyam esitavyam. evaṃ laksanā-mūlaṃ vyañjakatvam uktam.”

The sampradāya-prakāśini (pp. 42, ibid) reads as - “viśesāḥ syur iti. laksanāyam hi dvidhā prayojana-sampratyayaḥ. yadā dharminā dharmyantaram lakṣyate tadā mukhyārtha-dharmāḥ lakṣya-gataatvena caturtha-kakṣāyam pratiitāḥ prayojanam bhayeyuh, tadā phala-visayayor bhedāt viśiṣṭe laksanā iti śaṅkā’pi nōdita, iti. yadā tu mukhyārtha-dharmena a-mukhyārtha-dharmo lakṣyate,
tadā prajyojanatvena dharmāntaram na bhavatītī tasyaiva sātiṣayatva-pratītiḥ prajyojanam. tadāpi na viśeṣe laksanā, sātiṣayatva pratītiḥ api caturthā-lakṣayoīkāgocaratvād iti."

It may be noted that the function viz. vyañjanā is known by three terms such as 'vyāñjanam' (= suggestion), 'dhvananam' (= reverberation), and 'dyotanam' (= illumination). Other terms that are also used are noted as avagamana (= implication), pratīyana (= apprehension) and prakāśana (= manifestation). It may be interesting to note that though this third or fourth (= turiyā vṛtti) function is generally known as 'vyāñjanā', (and though symmetrically 'vyāñjanā', naturally better corresponds with 'abhidhā' and 'laksana'), Mammaṭa does not seem to have used the term 'vyāñjanā' even once. He seems to prefer 'vyāñjanam' as read in, 'vyāpāro vyāñjanā"tmakah" (perhaps here we may read vyāñjanā for vyāñjana); 'vyāñjanānāparā kriyā', 'vyāñjanād ṛte'nyo vyāpāraḥ', 'tat kim vyāñjanena', 'aṇjanam vyāñjanam eva vyāpāraḥ', and also 'tad-yukto vyāñjana-yukto'.

It may again be noted here that in 'laksanā-mūla-vyañjanā' by 'laksanā' is meant 'prajyojanavati laksanā'. For only such a variety of laksanā has a purpose for understanding which vyāñjanā is resorted to. The udyota points out that 'laksanā-mūlatvam' means 'laksanānvaya-vyatirekānuvidhāyitvam' i.e. laksanā-mūla-vyañjanā follows the presence and absence of [prajyojanavati] laksanā. Wherever prajyojanavati laksanā is present, 'laksanā-mula-vyañjanā' is also present. Wherever the former is absent, the latter is also absent. It may be noted that in the second variety that we will go to consider, viz. 'abhidhā-mūla-vyañjanā', this particular sense is not seen. Thus, in 'abhidhā-mūla-vyañjanā, the expression, 'abhidhā-mūla' does not mean "abhidhānvaya-vyatirekānuvidhāyitvam". For, we know that abhidhā-mūla-vyañjanā is not necessarily present where 'abhidhā' is present Abhidhā is present in every vācaka-word i.e. in all denotative words. But every 'vācaka' is not necessarily a 'vyāñjaka'.

Mammaṭa now starts dealing with the second variety of vyañjanā, viz. abhidhā-mūla-vyañjanā. After first giving Mammaṭa's view in full on this, we will look into some other views also as found in Locana, The Rasagaṅgādhara and also in Appayya's writing. First we will see what Mammaṭa has to say. It may be noted that normally the followers, such as Hemacandra, Viśvanātha and others choose to follow Mammaṭa's lead, but Jagannātha, and also Appayya have different views as ideas, having the source of their thought-current read in one of the three views as read in the Locana.
Mammaṭa observes:

"abhidhāmūlam āha -
anekārthasya śabdasya vācakatve niyantrite,
saṃyogā"dyair a-vācyārtha-dhī-krd-vyāprṛtir aṅjanam."

i.e. "When expressive power of the homonymous word is restricted to (one
meaning) by conjunction etc., then the function that causes the apprehension of a
non-expressed meaning is suggestion."

Mammaṭa here quotes from the Vākyapadīya of Bhartrihari, two kārikās (V.P. II.317-318) which read as -

"saṃyogo viprayogaś ca sāhacaryam virodhitā
arthāḥ prakaraṇam liṅgaṃ śabdasyā'nyasya sannidhiḥ,
sāmarthyam auciti desah kālo vyaktiḥ svarā"dayaḥ'
śabdārthasyānacchchede viśeṣa-smṛti-hetavah."

"Conjunction, disjunction, association, antagonism, motive, context, characteristic, proximity of another word, efficacy, propriety, place, time, gender, accent and the like-are the causes of the recollection (i.e. apprehension) of a particular
meaning, when there is no determination of the meaning of a word." (Trans. R. C. Dwivedi, pp. 45, ibid)

Mammaṭa illustrates in his vṛtti as follows. In 'Hari with conch-shell and
discuss, and Hari without the conch-shell and discuss', (the word Hari is restricted)
to Acyuta (by means of saṃyoga and viprayoga). In 'Rāma and Laksmaṇa' (the
meaning is restricted) to the sons of Daśaratha (due to sāhacarya). In, 'their
behaviour is as between Rāma and Arjuna' (the meaning is limited) to the sons
of Bhṛgu and Kṛtvārya (due to antagonism). In 'Be devoted to sthānū, for the
destruction of worldly existence', (the meaning, by means of motive i.e. artha, is
restricted) to Śiva. In 'Deva knows all', (the meaning of 'Deva', by context) (is
restricted) to 'the sense of 'you'." In "Makaradvajā - (one who has shank for his
banner) is angry", (the meaning, by the sign of 'makara' is restricted) to the God
of love. In, "Of God, the enemy of cities", (the word god, through proximity -
śabdasya anyasya sannidhiḥ' refers) to Śiva. In 'the cuckoo intoxicated by 'madhu'
(through sāmarthya, 'madhu' means the 'spring'. In, "May the 'mukха' of the
beloved protect you", (the meaning of 'mukха', through auciti, is restricted) to
propitiousness (or favourableness). In, "Here shines Parameśvara", (Parameśvara
has its meaning restricted, through, desa i.e. place in form of capital) to king. In
‘Citrabhānu shines’ (the word citrabhānu has its meaning restricted) to the Sun during the day and to the fire by night (through ‘time’, or kālāḥ). (Due to gender, linga, the meaning of) ‘mitra’ is restricted to ‘suhrd’ i.e. friend (in neuter gender) and to sun (in masculine gender of the word). In ‘Indra-satriḥ’ and the like the accent does not produce as it does in the veda, the apprehension of a particular sense in poetry. By the use of ādi (in the phrase ‘svarāḥdayāḥ’), gestures etc., as illustrated in the verse given below, are included. He observes : “Itham samyoga-dibhir arthāntrāḥ-bhidhāyakate nivāritēpy anekārthasasya śabdasya yat kvacid arthāntara-pratipādanaṁ tatra na abhidhā, niyamanat tasyaḥ, na ca lakṣaṇā mukhyārtha-bādhāḥdyabhāvāt, api tu aṅjanaṁ vyaṅjanām eva vyāpāraḥ. yathā, “bhadrā”tmano.” etc. - “When by conjuction etc. the power to signify another sense has been prevented and if still at places a word, having more than one meaning, conveys another sense, there is no denotation on account of its being restricted. There is no indication either owing to the absence of incompatibility of the primary meaning etc. But it is ‘aṅjana’ i.e. ‘vyānjana’ or suggestion which alone operates.” (Trans. R. C. Dwivedi - pp. 47, ibid).

Mammatā also observes that a word possessed of the power of suggestiveness is called the suggestive word - “tad yukto vyaṅjakaḥ śabdāḥ.” - II. 20. a. At II. 20. bcd Mammatā observes :

“yat sōrthāntarayuk tathā, arthopi vyaṅjakas tatra sahakāritayā mataḥ.” -

“Since that (word) is so (i.e. suggestive) when connected with another sense (i.e. either expressed or indicated sense) the (other) sense also is considered to be suggestive owing to its co-operation therein.” (Trans. Dwivedi, pp. 47, ibid).

We have seen that Mammatā has, so far, dealt with vācaka, lākṣaṇika and vyaṅjaka words, vācyā, laksya and vyaṅga senses, and abhidhā, lākṣaṇā and śābdī-vyaṅjanā.

Vyaṅjanā is divided into śābdī and ārthī. But it may be argued that this division is not reasonable. Śabdā and artha are inseparably connected together. So, it is not proper to separate them and make them the basis of two types of vyaṅjanā viz. śābdī and ārthī. The verse, viz. bhadrā”tmano. etc. which illustrates abhidhā-mūla vyaṅjanā, is an example of dhvani-kāvya. Now a kāvya is made up of “śabdārthau”. If the words in the particular verse, viz. bhadrā”tmano. etc. are regarded as ‘vyānjaka’ or suggestive, what about the senses therein? Are they not suggestive? If so, there is no point in dividing vyaṅjanā into śābdī and ārthī. Again, in ‘gaṅgāyāṁ ghoṣaḥ’, which is an illustration of lākṣaṇā-mūla-vyaṅjanā, the word
‘Vyañjanā’

‘gaṅgā’ is suggestive. But what about its ‘laksyārtha’? Is it also not suggestive? If so, why again is vyañjanā divided into śabdā and ārthī?

Such objections are met with by Mammaṭa in the kārikā II. 20, as quoted above. Mammaṭa observes that a word (saḥ = śabdāḥ) is said to be suggestive (tathā = vyañjakaḥ), when it is “arthāntara-yuk” i.e., “connected with another sense”. Now this expression viz. “arthāntarayuk”, has two senses, according as it refers to the vyañjaka word in abhidhā-mūla-vyañjanā and in lakṣaṇā-mūla-vyañjanā. In abhidhā-mūla-vyañjanā a word becomes suggestive, when it is ‘arthāntarayuk’ in the sense of vācyārtha-yuk (= anyaḥ, vyaṅgyārthād anyaḥ arthaḥ, arthaṇāram, vācyārthaḥ ity arthaḥ, tena yuk, yuktaḥ). For example, in the verse, ‘bhadrā’itumano’, ‘kara’ is suggestive of the trunk. But it is so suggestive, when joined with the vācyārtha, i.e. hand. What is meant is that ‘kara’ suggests the trunk only after it has expressed the hand. Thus, here the vācyārtha-hand-is also suggestive. Similarly, in the other variety, viz. lakṣaṇā-mūla-vyañjanā, a word is suggestive, when it is ‘arthāntara-yuk’, in the sense - ‘laksyārtha-yuk’. E.g. in ‘gaṅgāyam ghosah’, ‘gaṅgā’ is suggestive of pāvanatvā”di. But this suggestion is made only after the laksyārtha i.e. ‘tata’ is indicated. So, the laksyārtha tata is also suggestive. Thus, in abhidhāmūla-vyañjanā, arthaṇā means vācyārtha and in lakṣaṇāmūla-vyañjanā, it signifies laksyārtha. The sāhitya-cūḍāmaṇi observes “arthāntarayuk abhidheyena laksyānā vā yathocitena kenacid arthena yuktobhūtvā, tathā vyañjako bhavati.” The Sampradāya-prakāśini has - atha yena nayena śabdā vyañjakas tenaiva nayena’rthōpi ity āha - ‘yat sōrthāntarayug iti’. tathā hi arthaṇā-yogitvācchabdo vyañjakas tathārthōpi tad-yogitvād vyañjaka ity arthaḥ. nanu ubhayasya api vyañjakatve śabda-sakti-mūlōyam artha-sakti-mūlōyam iti kathāṃ vyavasthā ity ata āha-“tatra sahakāritayā mata” iti. yatha śabdāḥ arthaḥ prāmukhyena vyañjana-vyāpāra-pratitiḥ, dhvanis tanmūla iti vyapaddiyate. pradhānena hi vyapadesā bhavanti. tad itarat tu tatra sahākāriti iti upapannā eva vyavasthā iti bhāvaḥ.”

We had observed earlier that Mammaṭa explains abhidhā-mūla-vyañjanā in such cases where the vācyārtha being restricted to a particular sense with the help of such factors as samyogā”di, in case of a word having multiple sense, the other sense is arrived at with the help of vyañjanā alone. This view is accepted by majority of ālamkārikas of the dhvani school. But there are differences also as we had suggested above. We will go into further discussion as below.

We know that a poet very often uses such words as may have a multiple sense. He tries to achieve beauty in poetry by the application of this device. In case of the
use of such words having a multiple sense, one particular sense is fixed as 'prākaraṇīka artha' or the contextual sense. When this primary meaning is once collected, the other sense, if any, springs up, or is negated. How this happens is a problem which touches both psychology and semantics. As an illustration, we may cite the words of Bāṇa in the Harṣacarita, wherein he describes the advent of summar or 'grīṣma' in the following words:

"tatra kusuma-samaya-yugam upasamharan... mahākālaḥ." Words such as 'mahākāla' and the like are used here to convey a multiple sense. The poet tries to imagine some similarity between the summer season and Lord Śiva on the strength of the common quality such as ferociousness (= bhiṣanatā). He has not described this similarity in clear terms, but has only suggested it. Thus poetic beauty in this illustration is manifested through upama-dhvani or the suggestion of simile. This suggestion or dhvani here is based on such word as, 'mahākāla', and the like; and hence is termed as, 'śabda-śakti-mūla-dhvani', i.e. suggestion based on the power of word.

The problem of śabda-śakti-mūla-dhvani or suggestion based on the power of the word is discussed by ālāmkārikas right from the time of such earlier ones as Ānandavardhana, Abhinavagupta and the like. With this is correlated the problem as to how the sense, other than the primary one, in case of a word having a multiple sense, is derived. Thus, when in case of a word having its sense been fixed through abhidhā, or the power of expression, yet another sense (the a-prākaraṇīka i.e. non-contextual sense) flashes upon the mind; is this apprehension of the non-contextual sense arrived at through the agency of vyañjanā or the suggestive power of word, or not? We come across two distinct lines of thinking with reference to this problem. The first is the line of thinking as adopted by Mammata and his followers who explain the appearance of the non-contextual sense through the agency of vyañjanā or the suggestive power of word. Jagannātha and also Appayya, hold that the non-contextual sense is also collected through abhidhā or the power of expression itself. We have noted this view of Jagannātha in the chapter on abhidhā. According to him, vyañjanā or the suggestive power of word has a separate field to operate in. When the yaugikārtha or the meaning derived through etymological explanation comes up on the surface once again, after first having been defeated by the primary sense, or abhidhārtha, it becomes an object of vyañjanā, or the suggestive power of word, according to Jagannātha.

The roots of both these lines of thinking are to be found in the discussion on the nature and scope of śabda-śakti-mūla-dhvani, or suggestion based on the power
of word, as seen in Ānandavardhana (i.e. Dhvanyāloka) and in Abhinavagupta (i.e. in Locana on the Dhw.).

Ānandavardhana, in Dhw. II. 2 observes that the soul of suggestion, 'with meant expressed sense (i.e. vivakṣitābhidhheya) is two-fold, (i) of 'unnoticeable sequence' (i.e. asāṃlakṣya-krama) and (ii) of 'noticeable sequence'. (i.e. saṃlakṣya-krama). This saṃlakṣya-krama-dhvani or suggestion with noticeable sequence is further sub-divided into (i) śabda-śakti-mūla, or 'that which is based on the power of word, and (ii) artha-śakti-mūla or, 'that which is based on the power of sense.' (Dhw. II. 20). In Dhw. II. 21, the author observes that with the acceptance of śabda-śakti-mūla-dhvani, or suggestion based on the power of word, the scope of the figure, 'double entendre' or śleṣa would not be completely robbed off. For both operate in separate fields. The author says -

"Only that instance wherein is present a figure that is not expressed directly by any word, but conveyed solely by the suggestive power of the word itself, should be regarded as suggestion based on the power of word."

For, only a figure which is conveyed by the power of the word is intended by us to form an instance of suggestion based on the power of the word and not that all ideas so conveyed are instances of this suggestion. If two ideas are manifested (simultaneously) as a result of the power of word, we have only an instance of double entendre. Thus Ānandavardhana distinguishes clearly between the scope of śabda-śakti-mūla-dhvani or suggestion based on the power of word, and that of śleṣa, or double entendre. He then tries to suggest that in fact, Bhaṭṭa Udbhata has pointed out that the name double entendre can apply to such instances too wherein we get the idea of another figure through the particular figure present there. And, in view of this, one might again doubt whether suggestion based upon the power of word (i.e. śabda-śakti-mūla-dhvani) can be left with any independent scope at all. To remove such a doubt, the word 'suggestive' has been used in the text. So, the idea is - All instances wherein, through the power of sound, only an expressed figure is conveyed by another expressed figure, should be brought under the province of double entendre. But such instances where a new figure which appears thus to be quite different from an expressed one, will come under the scope of suggestion based upon the power of word... Even a suggested figure will not become an instance of resonance like suggestion based on the power of word, if it also gets expressed at the same time by other expressions. In such instances, we will find only expressed figure like evasive speech (vakrokti). He observes : (vṛtti, Dhw. II. 21) (pp. 72, ibid) : tad ayam arthaḥ - yatra śabda-śaktyā sāksād
ālamkārāntaram vācyam sat pratībhāsate sa sarvāḥ ślesa-viśayāḥ; yatra tu śabda-śaktīyā sāmarthyā"kṣiptam vācyā-vyatiriktaṁ vyāṅgyam eva ālamkārāntaram prakāśate sa dhvaner viśayah.... sa ca ākṣipto'alamkāro yatra punah śabdāntareṇābhiiha-svarūpas tatra na śabdaśakty udbhavānurāṇanarūpa-vyāṅgya-dhvanī-vyavahāraḥ. tatra vakroky ādi-vācyālamkāra-vyavahāra eva."

After thus explaining the nature and scope of śabda-śakti-mūla-dhvanī or suggestion based on the power of word, and furnishing a clear-cut definition Ānandavardhana supplies illustrations, such as, "atrāntare kusumā-samaya-yugam upasaṁharaṇaṁ mahākālaḥ", and, "unnataḥ prolasad dhāraḥ... etc."

Ānandavardhana adds: "In all these examples, an extraneous meaning is conveyed by the power of the word and in order that the two meanings might not appear as entirely disconnected, we will have to postulate the relation of the standard of comparison and the object compared as existing between the two since there is justification also for doing so. Thus the double entendre we see here is not grounded on words only, as is the case when it happens to be an expressed figure only. But it is a figure suggested by the special suggestive power of the word. Thus the examples of double entendre and resonance-like suggestion are entirely different from one another. He says: "eṣu udāhanena śabda-śaktīyā prakāśamane sati a-prākaraṇike'rthāntare vākyasya a-saṁbandhaḥrā-bhidhāyitvam mā prasāṅkṣid ity aprākaraṇika-prākaraṇikārthayor upamāno-pameyabhāvaḥ kalpayitavyaḥ sāmarthyād ity artha"-kṣiptoyam śleśo, na śabdopārūḍha iti vibhinnaṁ eva ślesā'nusvānopa-vyāṅgyasya dhvaner viśayāḥ." (Vṛtti, Dhv. II. 21, pp. 78, ibid)

Ānandavardhana further observes that other figures such as virodha or paradox, vyatireka or poetic contrast etc. are also possible in the suggestion based on the power of word or śabda-śakti-mūla-dhvanī.

The following points emerge from Ānandavardhana’s presentation:

(i) He seems to accept only the suggested figure as the object of this variety of dhvani or suggestion. He does not accept the possibility of vastu-dhvanī or suggestion of an idea in this variety of dhvani. This observation on his part can be disputed as we know that Māṇḍana does accept the case of vastu-dhvanī also, as part of śabda-śakti-mūla-dhvanī.

(ii) Ānandavardhana here does not involve himself in the discussion of a topic which seems to be naturally correlated with the topic on hand, and is therefore unfailingly discussed by later writers. This is the topic concerning the collection of
an additional sense in case of word having multiple sense, when its expressed sense i.e. vācyārtha is restricted to one sense, i.e. the primary sense having been determined by abhidhā or the power of expression, through operation of such factors as samyoga or conjunction, viprayoga, or disjunction, prakarana or context and the like. We have observed above that Mammaṭa treats this collection of an extra sense as a case of abhidhā-mūla-vāyaṇjanā.

(iii) A third point to be noted is also very interesting. Out of the illustrations supplied by Ānandavardhana, the first one is most note-worthy. Thus, in the illustration viz. “antrāntare kusuma-samaya-yugam...” etc. what actually happens is that the etymological sense seems to emerge out forcibly on the surface after defeating the conventional sense. The word ‘mahākāla’ has the conventional sense i.e. rūḍhyartha, of Lord Śiva. The meaning of “the terrible time” is arrived at through the agency of etymology (i.e. yogabala, yaugika). The other two illustrations are not sufficiently clear when examined from this point of view. Though of course in the illustration viz. unnataḥ prollasad dhāraḥ...” etc. also, if we take the word ‘payodhara’, then even here, the other meaning of ‘a cloud’, seems to follow on the strength of etymology.

Before we pass over to Abhinavagupta, we will try to consider the second point as noted above. We have seen that Ānandavardhana does not treat the question, viz. as to how we arrive at the apprehension of the non-contextual sense, in case of a word with multiple sense. But at Dhv. II. 31, the author observes : “Having thus explained the varieties of suggestion, the following is said in order to distinguish between suggestion and its semblance... It will be pointed out in the sequel that examples like the above illustrate subordinate suggested poetry, (i.e. guṇī-bhūta-vyaṅgya). But, on the other hand, resonance like suggestion is present in instances where, even after determining all the implications of the expressed sense in view of the context and so forth, we find that the expressed appears only as subsidiary to the suggested :

“yatra tu prakaraṇā”di-pratipattyā nirdhārita-viśeṣo vācyārthaḥ punah pratiyamāṇāṅgatvena eva avabhāṣate sōṣyāva anuranantarūpa-vyaṅgyasya dhvane mārgaḥ.” (vṛtti, Dhv. II. 31, pp. 102, ibid). On this Abhinavagupta observes : “prakaranam ādir yasya śabdāntara-sannidhāna-sāmarthya-liṅgā”des tad avagamād eva yatārthaḥ niścita-samasta-svabhāvaḥ.” (pp. 187, Edn. Dr. Nandi),

Herein, we may find a reference to the fact of the expressed sense or vācyārtha
being determined by factors such as ‘prakaraṇa’ or context and the like; but the question as to how the non-contextual sense is conveyed, is not touched at all.

Abhinavagupta discusses the illustration viz. “atrântare kusuma-samayayugam” etc., as given by Ānandavardhana as an instance of suggestion based on the power of word. Here he gives his own views along with three other views on the question as to how the non-contextual sense is collected in case of a word having multiple sense, after its expressed sense is fixed by factors such as conjunction, or samyoga, disjunction, or viprayoga, etc. He discusses whether this non-contextual sense is gathered by vyañjanā or the power of suggestion or not. We have noticed the view of Mammatā in this case and he seems to favour vyañjanā here giving rise to abhidhā-mūlā-sābdi-vyañjanā.

In order to explain the above quoted instance the Locanakāra observes: “In this illustration, the words such as ‘mahā-kāla’ and the like, whose power of expression is limited through the context (= prastāva) of the description of the season, and therefore who defy the dictum viz. ‘avayavaprasiddheḥ samudāya-prasiddhiḥ baliyasī’, i.e. the conventional sense is stronger than the etymological sense, - have their goal achieved by conveying this very sense (i.e. with reference to the season.) After this, the other sense is derived through suggestion based on the power of word, i.e. śabda-śakti-mūla-dhvani.”

Thus it is clear that according to Abhinavagupta, in the illustration cited above, the etymological sense - yaugikārtha-defies the conventional sense, and is itself apprehended through suggestion based on the power of word. Locana reads as: “evaṁ ślesālāṃkārasya viṣayam avasthāpya dhvaner āha, ’yatra tv iti’. kusumasamayā’tmakaṅ yad yugam māśa-dvayam tad-upasamharan. dhavalāni hṛdyāni aṭṭāni āpanā yena tādrk phulla-mallikānām hāso vikāsāḥ sitimā yatra. phulla-mallikā-eva dhavalāṭṭhāsósya iti tu vyākyāne ‘jalada-bhujagajaṁ’ ity etat tulyam etat syāt. mahān ścā’sau dina-dairghya-durita-vāha-yogāt kālaḥ samayaḥ, atra ṛtu-varṇana-prastāva-niyantaritābhidhāsaktayaḥ ata eva avayava-prasiddheḥ samudāya-prasiddhīr baliyāsi iti nyāyam apākuvanto mahākāla-prabhṛtayaḥ śabdāḥ etam evāṛttham abhidhāya kṛta-krtyā eva. tad anantaram arthāvagatir dhvanana-vyāpārād eva, śabda-śakti-mūlatvād. (pp. 154, Edn., Dr. Nandi).

It may be noted that the above discussion follows the illustration viz. atrântare, and the like. So, it becomes clear that according to Abhinavagupta, only in such instances alone, i.e. instances wherein the etymological sense - yaugikārtha - emerges once more on the surface by defeating the conventional sense -
rūḍhyarthā; vyañjanā or the suggestive power of word operates. We will go to
observe later in due course that Jagannātha also holds this view. Abhinavagupta
does not say that in all cases of words having a multiple sense, the additional non-
contextual sense is conveyed through vyañjanā or the suggestive power, as held by
Mammaṭa and his illustrious followers. Probably Mammaṭa goes astray in
interpreting Abhinavagupta’s words, or he consciously begs to differ from his
master. We will try to corroborate our observation by examining the other views
as put forth by Abhinavagupta.

Abhinavagupta cites the view of somebody else who tries to explain how the
additional non-contextual sense is collected in a poem, when a word having a
multiple sense has its primary sense fixed through the agency of context and the
like. He observes: (pp. 154, Locana, Dhw. II. 21, Edn. Dr. Nandi) : “atra kecīn
manyante - yata eteṣāṁ śabdānāṁ pūrvam arthāntare abhidhāntaram dṛṣṭaṁ
tatas tathāvidhērthāntare dṛṣṭa-tad-abhidhā-śaktē eva pratipattu nyantritābhidhā-
śaktikebhya etebhya pratipattir dhvanana-vyāpārād-evā itī śabda-śakti-mūlakatvam
vyāṅgyatvam ca itī a-viruddham iti.”

“Here, some are of the opinion that these words had their second power of
expression observed with reference to the other meaning by somebody. So for him,
who might have seen this abhidhā or power of expression with reference to some
other meaning, these words, now with their power of expression delimited to a
certain sense alone, convey the meaning through the suggestive power alone. Thus
the fact of being based on the power of word (śabda-śakti-mūlakatvā) is not
opposed to suggestive power (i.e. vyañjanā).”

We may try to elaborate the idea as below. When we use a particular word in
a particular sense, - the word whose power of expression (abhidhā) with reference
to another sense is already noted by us earlier, - the other sense is already in our
mind in the form of a latent impression when we use the word in a particular sense
at some time. In such cases, abhidhā or the power of expression becomes limited
to a particular sense through the agency of context, and the like. So, it becomes
clear that the poet or writer wants to convey that particular sense there. After this,
through the force of latent impressions, an additional non-contextual sense dawns
upon our mind in case of words having a multiple sense. This additional sense
obviously is the primary sense or abhidheyārtha which is already
determined through factors such as context i.e. prakaraṇa and the like. So, this
additional sense can be explained only through suggestion. It is termed śabda-śakti-
mūla because of the word being one having a multiple sense, and it is also called
'dhvani', as it is gathered through suggestion. Here, there is no contradiction between its being 'śabda-śakti-mūla' and its being 'dhvani' simultaneously. It seems that Mammaṭa follows this view. But for Abhinavagupta it does not seem to be acceptable as he uses the words such as: "atra kecin manyante". It seems Mammaṭa has failed to notice the illustration viz. "atrāntare..." and the like, carefully, with reference to which Abhinavagupta has earlier cited his views. So, Mammaṭa seems to have confused Abhinavagupta's view with this view which on the authority of the Lōcanakāra himself is, owned by 'some others' i.e. 'kecin manyante'. Jagannātha in his discussion, cites a prima facie view which seems to be one held by Mammaṭa. Or, perhaps Mammaṭa knowingly begs to differ from Abhinavagupta. Thus, it becomes clear that for Abhinavagupta, who seems to follow the hint dropped by Anandavardhana as noticed by us earlier, vyañjanā or suggestive power of word seems to operate only when the etymological sense (i.e. yaugikārtha) comes up in the forefront after defeating the conventional sense, i.e. 'rūdhyañcatha'. On the other hand, Mammaṭa as we have noted above seems to accept abhidhā-mūlā-sabdi-vyañjanā in case of gathering of every non-contextual sense, in case of a word having a multiple sense, whose primary sense is already determined by operation of such factors as context and the like.

Abhinavagupta further discusses other views as below: "anye tu - sā abhidhaiva dvitiya artha-sāmarthyaṃ grīṃmasya bhiṣaṇa-devatā-viśeṣa-sādṛśyā”tmakaṃ sahakāritvena yato’valambyate tato dhvanana-vyāpāra-rūpo’cyate’ iti.

"Others hold that it is a second power of expression - abhidhā. This (second power of expression) is called suggestion (dhvanana-vyāpāra-rūpa), because it takes recourse to the meaning of similarity, between the summar season and the terrible God, as an accessory (sahakāri)." (pp. 154, ibid)

The purport of this view may be put as follows: In fact, all the functions such as expression or abhidhā and the like, have 'conveying of sense' as their prime concern. These powers get different labels on the strength of difference in accessories. Thus abhidhā or expression is one which depends upon convention or saṃketa. Laksanā or indication is one that resorts to mukhyārtha-bādha or the contradiction of primary sense, and the like, as its basis.

Vyañjanā or suggestive power is one that operates on the strength of context and the like to arrive at the desired sense (i.e. prayojana). In the illustration quoted above, what is in fact abhidhā or expression only, is termed vyañjanā or suggestion on the strength of the difference in accessories, in form of similarity with the terrible God such as Śiva. We may also note in passing that Kuntaka also considers
'Vyañjanā'
laksyārtha, dyotitārtha and vyañgyārtha to be just abhidhārtha, on the same analogy.

So, according to this view, the non-contextual sense is gathered through abhidhā or expression itself, which is termed differently on account of difference in accessories.

Abhinavagupta quotes the third view which is as follows: "According to some, both in śabda-śleṣa or double entendre based on word and artha-śleṣa, or that based on sense, another word is brought in; in the former, there is a clear distinction between the two words, and in the latter another word is imagined on the strength of the difference in meaning. This bringing in of another sense occurs, at times, through the power of expression or abhidhā, as when an answer is given to two questions simultaneously, e.g. ‘śveto dhavati’ (i.e. the white one runs, or dog runs from this place to that - śvā ito dhāvati) or as when an answer is furnished by the question itself. In all these cases, we have an expressed figure. i.e. vācyālāṃkārata (i.e. such cases are instances of double entendre or śleṣa). But, where another word is brought about, through the medium of the power of suggestion only, there, though the second meaning is collected on the strength of the second word, it is to be taken as implied only (for the second word by itself is gathered by virtue of the suggestive power only) - eke tu, “śabda-śleṣe tāvad bhede sati śabdasya, artha-śleṣépi śaktibhedat śabda-bheda iti darśane dvitiyāḥ śabdas tatra āniyate. sa cā kadācid abhidhā-vyāpārāt, yathōbhayötttaradānāya ‘śveto dhāvati’ - iti, prāśnottarā”dau vā, tatra vācyālāṃkārata, yatra tu dhivanana-vyāpārād eva śabda ānītah, tatra śabdāntara-balād api tad arthāntaram pratipannāṃ pratiyamānānām mūlatvāt pratiyamānām eva yuktam.” iti. (Locana, pp. 154, ibid) -

We may analyse this view as follows : śabda-śleṣa or double entendre based on word occurs when there is difference in words. In artha-śleṣa also we have to accept difference in words on the strength of the maxim viz. that we have difference in words on account of difference in function i.e. śakti-bheda. Now, at times, in such cases, the other word is dragged in through the power of expression or abhidhā as when two questions are asked viz. (i) who runs from here ? and (ii) the substance that runs possesses which colour ? - and the answer is furnished : “śveto dhāvati”, which comes as a reply to both the questions. Abhidhā or expression also operates, when a reply is furnished by the question itself, e.g. when a question is placed in the mouth of a cave (i.e. ‘darī’) asking, ‘say, who am I ?” - and the reply given is, “how is it that you do not recognise that which is already
spoken, and how is it that you harass like this? The second sense being 'ka' and 'tha' that are spoken are to be cancelled, and the rest forms the reply: (ka-tham-uktam na jānāśi kadhthayasi yat sakhe). In all these cases, only the expressed figure, called double entendre, operates.

But, when vyāñjanā or the suggestive power is involved in bringing in the other word itself, then the other sense, though it follows directly from the other word and therefore should be termed as expressed only, is to be termed as suggested, because of the word itself being brought in through suggestion power.

Abhinavagupta discusses one more view which is as follows: Others hold that the other function, operating on the strength of the accessory in the form of meaning, referred to in the second view, is nothing else but a second power of expression (i.e. abhiddhā) alone, which is brought back to life through (the accessory in form of meaning). So, the second sense is only expressed, and not suggested. On gathering this second sense, the comparision between the two senses flashes forth; and this comparision (i.e. rūpaṇā) is not brought about by another word, but through suggestive power alone. As we cannot imagine abhiddhā or expression of any variety here, only suggestive power or vyāñjanā-vyāpāra is acceptable (in this case). So, it is quite justifiable to call it 'alaṃkāra-dhvani' or suggestion of a figure: "itare tu, - dvitiya-pakṣa-vyākhyāne yad artha-sāmarthyaṃ tena dvitiya-abhidhaiva prati-prasūyate, tataś ca dvitiyo'rtho 'bhidhiyata eva, na dhvanyate; tad anantaram tu tasya dvitiyārthasya pratipannasya prathamārthena prākaraṇikena yā rūpaṇā, sā tāvad bhavaty eva, na cāṇyataḥ śabdād iti, sā dhvanana-vyāpārā. tatra abhiddhā-sakteḥ kasyāscid apy anāśaṅkanīyatvāt. tasyaṃ ca dvitiyā śabdā-śaktir mūlam. tayā vinā rūpaṇāyāḥ anuṭhānāt. ara eva alaṃkāra-dhvani ayam iti yuktam." (pp. 156, ibid).

The purport of the fourth view seems to be that while considering the second view, it was suggested that abhidhā or expression itself, being based on the accessory in the form of meaning, is a suggestive operation (i.e. dhvanana-vyāpāra). Here, it is stated that in fact this second power is not at all the suggestive power. It should be directly labelled as abhidhā or the power of expression only. Thus, the gathering of the non-contextual sense, in case of a word having a multiple sense, with its primary sense already determined through factors such as context and the like, is done through abhidhā or the power of expression itself. But the sense of comparision between the two is brought about through suggestion. Thus, alaṃkāra-dhvani or the suggestion of a figure takes
place here. The second sense itself is gathered only through abhidhā or expression. It is termed śabda-śakti-mūlaka or one having word at its base, because in case of such a comparision or superimposition, the second sense is brought about through the agency of word alone.

Now, if we put together this fourth view, and the view held by Abhinavaguptā himself, we will reach the position taken by Jagannātha. He has discussed the question elaborately. But before we move on to Jagannātha, we will move on presently with Mammaṭa, who is the author on hand, and his followers first.

As observed earlier, Mammaṭa considers vyañjanā or the suggestive power of word as two-fold, i.e. one based on word, or śābdī, and the other rooted in sense, or ārthī. We have noted above under what conditions śābdī vyañjanā operates. As for, śabda-śakti-mūla-dhvani, Mammaṭa, unlike Ānandavardhāna and Abhinavaguptā, accepts the possibility of a suggested idea i.e. vastu also, and not a suggested figure only, as done by the former. Thus, he seems to expand the scope of ‘śabda-śakti-mūla-dhvani’.

As for ārthī vyañjanā, or suggestion based on meaning, Mammaṭa observes the following in the beginning of ullāsa III. K.P. He observes that the meanings of these words have already been mentioned, which are three viz. expressed, indicated and suggested. Now the suggestiveness-vyañjakata of these three meanings is explained by Mammaṭa, who observes:

kīdrīty āha -
  "vaktr-boddhavya-kākūnām vākya-vācyānya-sannidheḥ.
  prastāva-deśa-kālā"der vaiśiṣṭyāt pratibhājuṣām,
  yārthasyānyārtha-dhī-hetur
  vyāpāro vyaktir eva sā.” III. 22.

"Of what nature is it? To this the author replies - (21 cd. 22).

The function of the (three-fold) meaning, which, on account of the speciality of (i) the speaker, (ii) the person addressed, (iii) the intonation, (iv) the sentence, (v) the expressed sense, (vi) the presence of another (vii) occasion (viii) place, (ix) time and the like, causes the awareness of another meaning to persons endowed with poetic faculty, is nothing but suggestion.

The person addressed means one who is communicated with. Intonation means modulation of voice. Occasion means context. “Of the meaning - arthasya” means
of the nature of the expressed, the indicated and the suggested.” - (Trans. R. C. Dwivedi, pp. 51, ibid)

Mamaṭa supplies illustrations for all these. Jhalkikar (pp. 72, 73) observes: "atra vaisiṣṭya iti paṇcamiyarthah sahakāritva-rupam heturvam. ta ca tad abhāve vyaṇjanā’nudayād bodhyam. evaṃ ca vaktrādi-vailakṣanya-hetukā ya pratibhānaśālinām anyārthadhīḥ taddhetu-vyāpāratvam asyāḥ svarūpam iti bodhyam iti udyote spaṣṭam. pratibhājuśām iti anena jaḍā”dīnāṃ vyudāsāḥ. tathā ca uktam, “sa-vāsanānāṃ nātyā”dau rasasyā’nubhavo bhavet. nirvāsanās tu raṅgāntar veśma-kudyā’sma-sannibhāḥ.” iti. arthasya ity anena śabda-vaṇjanā-nilāṣāḥ eva-kāreṇa abhidhā-lakṣāṇā”dīnāṃ nirāṣāḥ saṃketa”dy abhāvena nābhīdhā ity uktāṃ prāk (II. 15.C) anumāṇā”dikāṃ tv agre nirasisyate. vaktrādīnāṃ ca saṃkare yasya udbhāṭataḥ (pradhānyam) tanmūlako vyavahāraḥ.

It may be observed in passing that even though ārthī vyaṇjanā is three-fold as it is based either on abhidhārtha or lakṣyārtha or vyaṇgyārtha, the illustrations supplied by Mamaṭa follow the factors that give rise to the suggested sense. They āge, so to say, of the mixed type, as abhidhā-mūla-vyaṇjanā, lakṣāṇā-mūla-vyaṇjanā and vyaṇjanā-mūla-vyaṇjanā are not separately pointed out.

Mamaṭa, at the end of ullāsa III observes:

“śabda-pramāṇa-vedyūrtho
vyanakty arthāntaram yataḥ,
arthasya vyaṇjakaṭve tat
śabdasya sahakāritaḥ.” (III. 23) (pp. 56, ibid)

“śabdeti, na hi pramāṇāntara-vedyo. vyaṇjakaḥ.”

"Since a meaning, cognised through the means of a word, suggests another meaning, there is co-operation of the word in the suggestiveness of the meaning.” (The expression) śabda etc., means a meaning cognized through any other means is not suggestive.

This remark is very important as it rules out inference of fire through smoke as being dubbed as identical with vyaṇjanā, for smoke is no word. In vyaṇjanā the instrumentality of word, so far as poetry is concerned, is a must. Hence, we call it a process of suggestion i.e. we name it as vyaṇjanā as against inference or reasoning. Thus, Mahimā’s position does not seem to be sound. Inference arises from a ‘ingga’ which is not a ‘śabda’ of poetry. Jhalkikar observes (pp. 81, ibid): -
tathā ca artho śabda-sāhāyyam apekṣate, evaṃ śabdopy artha-sāhāyyam apekṣate
'Vyañjanā'

iti śabdārtha-yugala-rūpa-kāvyasya vyañjakatvam nirbādham iti bhāva iti udyotasudhāsāgarayoh spaṣṭam.

The Saṃpradāyaprakāśinī also supports vyañjanā and rules out other pramāṇas such as pratyakṣād i.e. direct perception and the like from the sphere of vyañjanā. By ‘ādi’ obviously inference, etc. are meant: “yo hy ayam artho dhvanati sa hi śabdaika-pramāṇakah, na punah pratyākṣād i.e. pramāṇakah. atāḥ śabdasya sahakāritvam. pramāṇāntara-vedyasya arthasya laukikatvād a-vyañjakatvam prasiddham.”

Thus it is clear that aestheticians are normally of the opinion that whatever results from art - i.e. rasa - is a-laukika, and ‘art’ being the medium, here poetic art, the outcome is branded as “suggested” i.e. ‘vyāñjita’. This function, exclusive to art is called ‘vyāñjanā’, only to distinguish it from other pramānas in loka, or work-a-day world, as they give rise to ‘laukika’ or worldly apprehension. It is precisely for this that Ānandavardhana and his followers have named it as vyañjanā-vyāpāra which is a-laukika, i.e. not worldly, but exclusive to art of any form only.

Hemacandra in his kāvyānusāsana follows Mammaṭa, and under kā. śā. I. 20 speaks of the four śabda-vṛttis. He observes:


He tries to furnish the definition of vyañjanā as -

“tat śakty upajanita-arthāvagama-pavitrita-pratipatṛ-pratibhā-sahāyārtha-dyotana-śaktir vyañjakatvam.”

Vyañjakatva or suggestive power is that power which suggests a meaning, through the agency of the meaning born of that power (i.e. abhidhā, gauṇī, and lakṣāṇā) and due to the strength of pratibhā i.e. poetic imagination or genius of the person to whom everything is communicated (i.e. pratipattā).

Hemacandra observes that he has not mentioned the tātparya-śakti and the tātparyārtha (i.e. purport) as they are considered only with reference to a ‘vākya’ i.e. sentence and therefore do not strictly go with ‘a word’ or ‘śabda’. Hemacandra, though does not specifically indulge in classification of vyañjanā, but implies two-fold classification when he says: “vaktrādi-vaiśiṣṭyād arthasya api vyañjakatvam.”

i.e. ‘artha’ is also suggestive through the speciality of the speaker and the like. By ‘api’ be accepts śabdasya vyañjakatvam. Thus both śābdī and ārthī vyañjanās are accepted by Hemacandra, following Mammaṭa. He also presents illustrations
of the speciality of the speaker etc. in like fashion. But he goes a step further and
gives specific illustrations of abhidhā-mūla-vyañjanā and lakṣaṇā-mūla-vyañjanā.
We know that Mammata had not done this though of course he knows about it.
Mammata had simply stated that “In this way suggestiveness of the indicated
and the suggested sense should also be illustrated.” “anena kramaṇa lakṣya-vyaṅga-
yoṣ ca vyañjakatvam udāhāryam.” Hemacandra fills in the gap left out by
Mammata and gives illustrations of a-mukhyasya (arthasya) (vyañjakatvam), and
vyaṅgyasya (vyañjakatvam) also. It may be observed that by ‘a-mukhya’ he seems
to cover both gauṇī-mūlā and lakṣaṇā-mūlā vyañjanā. But his illustration viz.
sāhenṭī sahi. etc. covers only lakṣaṇā. So, we may say that his acceptance and
projection of gauṇī as a separate word power other then lakṣaṇā is not justifiable
otherwise at every step, even in classification of dhvani he should have given
separate illustrations for both.

We will now move to Jayadeva, who has compared the three powers of a word
to the Gaṅgā having three streams - “tripathagā gaṅgā.” The ‘gambhirā-pravāha’ is
vyāñjanā. The Ramā commentary observes :

“śakya-lakṣyāntara-pratīti uttara-pratīti-janakatvam gambhiratvam.”

Thus by gambhiratva or depth (of meaning) is meant that apprehension which
follows the śakya i.e. expressive and lakṣya i.e. indicative apprehensions. Obviously
for Jayadeva thus vyāñjanā is based either on abhidhā or lakṣaṇā. He tries to
furnish a definition of vyāñjanā as -

“sāmmukhyam vidadhānāyāḥ
sphuṭam arthāntare giraḥ,
kaṭākṣa iva lolākṣyāḥ
vyāpāro vyañjanā”tmakah.” (Candrāloka, VII. 2.)

This perhaps is not a scientific definition of vyāñjanā but is only a metaphorical
description of the same. It means -

Just as a heroine, to draw the attention of the hero casts a side-glance clear in
its meaning, in the same way the poet’s muse presented before a sensitive person
resorts to a power that presents a meaning other than the expressed, indicated or
of the form of purport. This power is the suggestive power of a word. Trilokinātha
Dwivedi explains in his sanskrit commentary (pp. 332, ibid) : “nāyakasya
sāmmukhyam sammukhatāṁ vidadhānāyāḥ dhārayantyāḥ, nāyaka-sāmmukhaṁ
garāyāḥ lolākṣyāḥ capala-nayanāyāḥ tasyāḥ arthāntare praṇaya-rūpa-vyāpāre
prayerantyāḥ katākṣaḥ sāṅkoca-calanā”tmako netrayoh vyāpāro bhavati, katākṣenaiva nāyikā nāyakam prati svābhīpṛetam prastauti, tathaiwa giro vānyāh, samyogā”dibhih ekasmin prākaraṇike arthe abhidhāyām niantritīyāṁ arthāntare pratiti-visayatāṁ gateṣu a-prākaraṇikesv api artheṣu sahṛdayānāṁ sāṃmukhyāṁ vidadhānāyāḥ sahṛdayān prayerantyāḥ kavivāco vyaṇjanā”tmako vyāpāro bhavati.”

Clearly, Dr. Dwivedi tries to read Mammata in Jayadeva.

The Paurnamāsi also (pp. 234, 235) has a similar approach - “vyaṇjanā-svarūpam āha granthakārah-sphutam spaṣṭam arthāntare vācyas-lakṣyārtha-bhinne sāṃmukhyāṁ pratitim. vācyas-lakṣyārtha-bhinnārtha pratiti-visayatāṁ iti yāvat. visayatvam saptamyaśartham vidadhānāyāḥ girah kurvataḥ śabdasya. pumṣi sāṃmukhyāṁ abhīlasam kurvantyāḥ lolākṣyāḥ ca nīcalākṣyāḥ katākṣa iva netravikṣepa iti. vyaṇjanaiva ātmā, svarūpam yasya tādṛśo vyāpāro bhavati. ... The Paurnamāsi goes on quoting from Āśādhara Bhāṭṭa, and Laghumāṇjusā, and gives a three-fold classification as vyaṇjanā based on abhīdāḥ, lakṣaṇā or vyaṇjanā. Illustrations given are based on both K.P. and the S.D. of Viśvanātha. Jayadeva then proceeds to classify dhvani and leaves vyaṇjanā at VII. 2. only. 

In Ramā tiṅkā Vaidyanāthajee observes that ‘rasa’ is apprehended through vyaṇjanā alone and hence Jayadeva has treated it in the beginning. He observes that vyaṇjanā is a sāṃskāra-viśeṣa born of the poetic inclination-pratibhā-(of the poet and the reader), and also born of the knowledge of the speciality of the speaker etc. It has, a prasiddha - i.e. known or a-prasiddha i.e. unknown meaning as its object. This power of word does not stand in need of such conditions as mukhyārtha-bādha etc. and yields a meaning which is either connected (i.e. sambaddha) or not directly connected (i.e. a-sambaddha) with the primary sense. All this is not directly stated by Jayadeva but obviously the commentators try to read Mammata’s ideas in Jayadeva and may be they are not off the target.

Vidyādhara in his Ekāvalī does not give a separate treatment to vyaṇjanā but while noting the nature of word-and meaning he passes some remarks. Here he has discussed the case of a word having multiple sense, but whose expressed sense is decided by factors such as samyogā”di i.e. conjunction and the like. He explains on Ekāvalī II. 13, how vyaṇjanā vyāpāra differs from abhīdāḥ, lakṣaṇā and tātparya. The whole discussion is based on the kāvyaprakāśa of Mammata. Vidyādhara observes :

“śabdāṃ vyaṇjakaṃ āhur vyāpāro vyaṇjanam bhaved yasya.” II. 13 ab. vyaṇjana-vyāpāravān śabdō vyaṇjakah, atra ca arthasya api sahakārītvam. vācyo lakṣyo vyāṅgyas tesāṃ artho yathā kramaṃ vedyaḥ.” (II. 13. cd).
kāvyaprakāśakāreṇa punar eśām arthānām api vyañjakatvam uktam. yathā - "vakra-boddhavya-kākūnām ..." - Vidyādhara thus follows the K.P. Mallinātha in the Taralā tikā has given everthynig that is left out by Mammaṭa in the text.

Keśava Misra has also followed the Kashmere tradition, in the third Marici i.e. chapter of his Alakāra-śekhara (Edn. N.S. '26) (Bombay). He observes (III. i)

padānāṃ vṛttayas tīsraḥ
vicitra-sahakāriṇām
vyañjanārtha-traye’pi ca.

He further observes: “tisro vṛttayah padānām bhavanti, śaktir lakṣaṇā
vyāñjanā ca iti. ... tṛtiyā vṛttir vyañjanā, yathā-niḥṣeṣacyuta.” - atra adhamapadena rantum gataśīti vyañjate. - All this follows Mammaṭa. Keśava also does not attempt any definition of vyañjanā. He has a remark in between: “nānu ‘ravir āstaṁ gataḥ’ ity ādau tāny eva padāni kathaṃ śroṭṇām vicitra-budhir utpādayanti ity ata āha - “vicitra-sahakāriṇām”. Here he enumerates the factors such as context, - prakaraṇa - and the like. He says: ‘tad eva hi padaṁ sva-rasa-samabhivyāhāra-prakaraṇa-tātparya-jānā”dirūpa-sahakāri-bhedāt tat tad dhiyam utpādayati, daṇḍa iva gavābhyaśjana-gatau.”

He also discusses vyañjanā based on ādi and anta of a single pada, suggesting that all this was possible because of the inherent beautiful nature of ‘padas’ - “svabhāva-vaicitryajuṣām”. He further observes, citing illustrations that śakya’ i.e. expressed sense, ‘lakṣya’ i.e. indicated sense and even ‘vyaṅgya’ i.e. suggested sense - all these three - can be suggestors i.e. vyañjakas. All this is done in keeping with Mammaṭa.

Prior to this, Vidyānātha and Viśvanātha also follow the lead of Mammaṭa.

Vidyānātha in his Pratāpa-rudra-yaśobhūśaṇa, kāvyā-prakaraṇa (pp. 38) accepts vyañjanā as a power of word and observes:

“anvīteṣu padārtheṣu vākyārthopaskārārtham arthāntara-visayaḥ śabda-vyāpāraḥ vyañjanā-vṛttih.” - i.e. vyañjanā is that power of word which gives a different meaning - arthāntara-which imparts beauty to the sentence-sense, when word-meanings (in a sentence) are correlated.” This he says is three-fold viz. (i) that based on śabda, (ii) that based on artha and (iii) that, based on both word and meaning - i.e. śabdārthōbhaya-śakti-mūlā. He illustrates them.
'Vyañjanā'

Kumāraswāmī, the commentator of Vidyānātha furnishes details in his Ratnāpana, following Mammaṭa. He observes: (pp. 38, ibid, Edn. Madras, 1914 A.D.)

vyāñjanāvṛtter lakṣaṇam āha: - anvitesv iti. padārtheṣu padair abhiiheṣu. anviteṣu ākānksā"divivaśan mithāḥ sambadheṣu satsu. samanvaya-śaktyā vākyārthe pratita ityarthaḥ. yad vā, artha-prakaranaḥ"dīna prākaranikārthe-paryavesiteṣv ity arthaḥ. etena abhiddā-"nvaya-śaktyoḥ sati sambhave lakṣaṇāyās ca anantarabhāvi vyañjanā-vyāpāra iti sūcitam. lakṣaṇā tu samanvaya-śakti-samarpitānvaya-vidhurīkaraṇa-dhurīnatvāt anvaya-śakty-anantara-bhāviny eva ity avocauḥ abhinavaguptācārya-pādāḥ,


Viśvanātha, in his Sāhityadarpana (I. 12 cd, 13) tries to define vyāñjanā as - (12 cd) "vīrataśv abhidhādyāsu yaya'rtho bodhyate parah." i.e. (vyāñjanā is that power of a word) by which, when the power of expression (i.e. abhidhā) and the like are over, a (further) meaning is apprehended.

(I. 13 ab) - That power of word is called vyāñjanā, and it is of both word and sense etc."

In his vṛtti here, Viśvanātha observes: 'śabda-buddhi-karanāṁ viramya vyāpārābhāvaḥ' iti nayena, abhidhā-lakṣaṇā-tātparyā"khyāsu tīrṣu vṛttiṣu, svam svam arthām bodhayitvā upakṣiṇāsu, yayā aparor-"nyortho bodhyate, sā, śabdasya, arthasya, prakṛti-pratyayā"deśca, saktir vyāñjana-dhvanana-gamana-pratyayanā"di vyapadesa-violayā vyāñjanā nāma.'

Thus vyāñjanā rests on both word and sense and also on parts of a word. All this follows what Ānandavardhana and Mammaṭa have clarified and illustrated to the point.
Viśvanātha proceeds to give classification in S.D.I. 13 cd as - "abhidhā-lakṣanā-
mūlā śabdasya vyañjanā dvidhā."

He follows Mammaṭa when he observes that abhidhā-mūlā vyañjanā occurs, when a word having a multiple sense has its expressed sense fixed with reference to one meaning by factors such as sāmyoga or conjunction etc. and yet over and above this ascertained primary sense, another (= non-contextual) meaning props up. Viśvanātha quotes the two famous kārikas also as read in Mammaṭa, and illustrates all factors such as ‘sāmyoga’ etc. accordingly.

He has some interesting discussion concerning “svarā”dayāḥ”. Viśvanātha is also of the opinion, following Mammaṭa that ‘svara’ etc. are considered only so far as veda is concerned and not with reference to kāvyā or poetry and therefore it is not illustrated. Says he : (vṛtti, S.D. II. 13) - “svaras tu veda eva višeṣa-pratiti-kṛṇ na kāvyā iti tasya viṣayyo na udāhältah.”

But then he considers an objection here. The objector holds that even in kāvyā ‘svara’ in form of ‘kāku’ i.e. intonation makes for a special apprehension. Following Bharata Muni’s observation, concerning ‘pātha’ i.e. recitation, these (i.e. svarā”di) make for special apprehension of rasas such as the śṛṅgāra and the like. So, says the objector, it would have been better if illustration was supplied to this effect.

To this Viśvanātha says that the objection cannot be sustained because svaras, either in form of ‘kāku’ or ‘udāṭta’ and the like, make for the apprehension of a special form of the suggested sense only. They do not make for the apprehension of a special sense other than the expressed as in case of a word having a multiple sense, which is a matter under discussion. For, if in case of words having multiple sense (anekārtha) due to absence of delimiting factors such as context and the like, if some restriction is found due to svara, then in such cases there will arise a contingency of non-acceptance of śleṣa or double entendra. It is precisely for this that someone (= Mammaṭa) has observed, “kāvyamārge svaro na ganayate.” By ‘ādayāḥ’, he adds, the gestures by hand etc. are meant.

Viśvanātha’s original words are : “idaṁ ca képy asahamānāḥ āhuḥ - ‘svarópi kākv ādirūpaḥ kāvye višeṣa-pratiti-kṛḍ eva. udāṭtā”di-rūpōpi muneḥ pāthokta-diśā śṛṅgārā”di-rasa-višeṣa-pratiti-kṛḍ eva’ iti tadvisaye udāharaṇam ucitam eva, iti, -
tanna; tathā hi, svarāḥ kākv ādayāḥ, udāṭtā”dayo va vyāṅga-rūpaṁ eva višeṣam pratyāyanti, na khalu prakṛtktam anekārthasya śabdasya ekārtha-niyantrana-rūpaṁ višeṣam. kińca yadi yatra kvacid anekārtha-śabdānāṁ prakaraṇā”di-
niyamābhāvād-anīyantritayor apy arthayor anurūpa-svara-vaśenai-katra-niyamanāṁ
vācyām, tadā tathāvidha-sthale śleṣā-ṇaṅgīkāra-prasaṅgah; na ca tathā, at eva āhuḥ, śleṣanirūpaṇa-prastāve - "kāvyā-mārge svaro na gaṇyate' iti ca nayaḥ, iti alam upajīvyanāṁ manvānāṁ vyāhīṁeṣu kaṭākṣa-nikṣepena."

He then illustrates abhidhāmūlā vyañjanā, as in, “durgālaṁghita.” etc.

For lakṣaṇāmūlā vyañjanā, Viśvanātha observes (S.D. II. 15)

“lakṣaṇopāsyate yasya
kṛte, tattu prayaṇam,
yayā pratyāyyate sā syād
vyañjanā laksāṇā”sraya.”

i.e. lakṣaṇā-mūlā-vyañjanā is that by which the prayaṇa or object, for which indication is resorted to, is collected. The stock illustration cited is “gaṅgāyāṁ ghoṣaḥ”.

After thus dealing with the śabdī-vañjanā Viśvanātha takes care of the ārthī variety in a like fashion as done by Mammaṭa. At S.D. II. 16 he cites the same factors such as vaktṛ, boddhavya, etc. which are instrumental in giving shape to this variety of vyañjanā. He cites appropriate illustrations. Then he says that the vyañjanā - ārthī here - is again three-fold on account of the sense being three-fold such as vācyā, lakṣya and vyaṅgya, (S.D. II. 17 ab). Following Mammaṭa he also observes that both in śabdī and ārthī the co-operation of both artha and śabda respectively is very much there. Here ends Viśvanātha’s treatment of vyañjanā in which he has chosen to follow the lead of Mammaṭa, who is his ‘upajīvya’ and ‘mānya’.

As for Appayya Dīxīta, we may say that his vṛtti-varttika is available only upto his treatment of lakṣaṇā, so his full concept of vyañjanā can not be traced but as he was a dhvanivādin, we can say for sure that he supported vyañjanā as an independent and supreme śabda-vyāpāra. His ideas concerning Mammaṭa’s concept of śabdī-vyañjanā are noted by us in his treatment of abhidhā, wherein he rejects the view of those who hold that in case of a word having a multiple sense with its expressed meaning fixed by such factors as saṁyoga i.e. conjunction etc., the other meaning is apprehended through vyañjanā. No, says he. He is not inclined to take vyañjanā at all these places. This view was voiced by Abhinavagupta in his Locana as noticed by us earlier and is supported by Jagannātha as we will go to see now. In the Locana with reference to śabda-śakti-mūla-dhvani Abhinavagupta had cited different views out of which one line of thought was accepted by Mammaṭa, Hemacandra, Viśvanātha etc., while a different line of thought was
accepted perhaps by Ānandavardhana himself, then Ācārya Abhinavagupta also and later certainly by Appayya and Jagannātha. We will pick up Jagannātha now in due course, which we had left mid-way earlier. But we may take note of the fact before hand that, though Jagannātha has come down heavily on Appayya at a number of places, he has also followed the latter's line of thought, though not confessed expressly. This, the case of śabdīvyaṇjanā, and śabda-śakti-mūladhvani is an instance in point that may be revealed in the following discussion.

Jagannātha - As observed earlier, Māmmana holds that śabda-śakti-mūladhvani or the suggestion based on the power of word is possible when a word having a multiple sense has its non-contextual sense gathered through vyaṇjanā or suggestive power.

Now, as to whether the additional non-contextual sense (i.e. a-prākaranikārtha) of a word having a multiple sense is collected through vyaṇjanā or suggestivity or not, Jagannātha first cites the prima facie view as below:

Some people are of the opinion that the knowledge of convention (i.e. saraketa-jaṇa) resides identically in all senses of a word having a multiple sense. So, people understand all the meanings of a word having a multiple sense, identically. They do not take any of the senses as either inevitable or not. Thus, when men hear words having a multiple sense, immediately on hearing them, they are reminded of all senses at a time. Then, the problem arises as to what is the exact intention or import of the speaker? Or, what is the exact meaning meant to be conveyed by the speaker when he uses a particular word. Thus doubt arises as to the exact import of the speaker. This doubt is removed with the help of the context and the like. The hearer considers the context and the like - prakaranā"di - and tries to arrive at the sense intended by the speaker. Say, for instance, someone says, "surabhi-māmsam bhaksayati". Now, the word ‘surabhi’ has a multiple sense. It gives the meanings of ‘a cow’, and also, ‘fragrant’, simultaneously. Resorting to context and the like, the hearer comes to the conclusion that the speaker intends to convey the second sense, viz., ‘fragrant’.

Thus, in the case of a word having a multiple sense, the knowledge of import (i.e. tātparya-jaṇa) is arrived at on the consideration of the element of context and the like, and by that, expression i.e. abhidhā becomes limited to one particular sense. After gathering the individual meaning of separate words, - padajāna - with the help of the knowledge of import, - tātparya-jaṇa-, the correlated sense - avaya-jaṇa-follows. So, at the time of the first gathering of the word-sense i.e. pada-jaṇa, all the senses of a word having a multiple sense pop up simultaneously.
But when the knowledge of the import (tātparya-jñāna) dawns, with the help of the contexts and the like, only one meaning is remembered. So, it should be accepted that the sense of a word having a multiple sense, is presented twice; once when all the senses pop up simultaneously, and once more when only one sense out of many, is remembered.

Now, the question is why the second time also, all the senses do not come to mind, as happens when we hear the word for the first time? How is it that the second apprehension consists of just one sense alone? In order to explain this fact, we will have to accept the determination of the import i.e. tātparya-nimaya-arising out of the knowledge of the context and the like - prakaranā”di -, as a restrictive factor - i.e. pratibandhaka tattva; - or else, the verbal apprehension or śābda-bodha also will tend to be with reference to the multiple sense. Only on account of this the ancients such as Bhartrhari have stated that - “anavacchede viśeśa-smṛtihetavah”. Jagannātha explains : “anavacchede tātparya-samdehe, viśeśa-smṛtiḥ ekārtha-mātra-viṣaya-smṛtiḥ.” i.e. by ‘anavacchede’ is meant the doubt regarding the exact import of a word. ‘Viśeśa-smṛti’ means the memory with reference to one single sense only. Thus, when there is doubt regarding the intention of the speaker, the context and the like (i.e. saṃyogā”di) bring about viśeśa-smṛti i.e. ekārtha-mātra-visaya-smṛtiḥ, i.e. memory with reference to a single sense only.

Now, the problem that arises is as follows. In the case of ‘surabhi-māmsam’ the abhidhā or expression has been restricted to the sense of ‘fragrant’. But the husband of the sister, i.e. brother in law, is in a position to cut a joke at his wife’s brother. So, when he says that, ‘you are eating surabhi-māmsam’, the other meaning of the term viz: ‘beef’ comes in through vyañjanā or suggestive power alone, in the absence of a cow. - itthañ ca, surabhi-māmsam bhakṣayati ity āder vākyāj jāyamāṇā dvitiyā pratitir gavādy upasthīter abhāvāt katham syād iti tad upasthity artham vyañjanā-vyāpāro”bhuyupeyahi” (R.G. pp. 2, ibid).

It cannot be urged here that a word having a multiple sense has many powers of expression (abhidhā) and that once the contextual (i.e. prakaranānika) sense is settled through one power of expression, (i.e. abhidhā), the other senses are arrived at through other powers of expression (= other abhidhās). The reason is that the knowledge of context and the like, that is taken as a restrictive factor (= pratibandhaka) in the case of other senses, will continue even here, i.e. at the time of the second abhidhā also. For, if we do not accept the knowledge of context (i.e. prakaranā”di-jñāna) as restrictive (i.e. pratibandhaka), then the non-contextual
sense (= a-prākaraṇikārtha) will also stand to follow along with the knowledge of the contextual sense (i.e. prākaraṇika-jñāna). So, no need for a second abhidhā or second power of expression will arise. It is needless to suggest that the restrictive factor loses its force, once it is utilized. In fact, till the restriction lasts, the act of limiting continues. And, in fact, to imagine a second power of expression is itself unwarranted. This restriction also, does not obstruct the gathering of the second sense, through vyañjanā or suggestive power. For, vyañjanā or suggestive power is resorted to in the case of expression such as “surabhi-māmsaṃ” and the like, only to bring in the non-contextual sense alone. If the restrictive factor (i.e. pratibandhaka) can restrict even this gathering of the non-contextual sense through suggestive power or vyañjanā, then wherein lies the importance of vyañjanā or suggestive power? The operation of the suggestive power will itself become meaningless. So, the restrictive factor (pratibandhaka) operates only with reference to the deriving of the second sense through abhidhā or the power of expression alone, and not through vyañjanā or suggestive power also. Or, it may be thus stated, that if the restrictive factor (pratibandhaka) has the capacity to restrict the gathering of a non-contextual sense in any case, then vyañjanā or suggestive power should be deemed as potent to stimulate the existence of the non-contextual sense in all cases - (vyakti-jñānasya uttejakatva-kalpanād vā). Then only such knowledge of context and the like will be taken as restrictive, which is qualified by the absence of a stimulant in the form of suggestive power of vyañjanā. So, when the suggestive power or vyañjanā dawns, i.e. when the absence of suggestive power is over, the restriction that rests solely on the absence of suggestive power will itself disappear, and then who will be able to restrict the flashing forth of the non-contextual sense? It is because of this that Mammaṭa has said, “anekārthasya śabdasya...” etc. (K.P. II. 19). After this Jagannātha proceeds to discuss the next view.

Others do not accept the view stated above. Though, even according to this second view, the second non-contextual sense is collected through vyañjanā or suggestive power only, we find brevity i.e. lāghava i.e. absence of cumbersome, observed in this view, to a certain extent. This view holds that in ‘śābda-bodha’ or verbal apprehension of a word having a multiple sense, the determination of import (i.e. tātparya-nirṇaya) should inevitably be taken as the cause. So, in the case of a word having a multiple sense, even though many senses tend to follow, the gathering of import (tātparya-jñāna) being done through context and the
like, the correlation of only that sense will be apprehended with reference to which, the import has been determined (i.e. tātparya-nīscaya); no other sense will be apprehended. Thus even though many senses are presented in the beginning, correlation takes place only with reference to a single sense, with reference to which import has been determined. If we proceed with this line of thinking, we will not have to accept the position that in case of a word having a multiple sense, memory with reference only to a single sense persists; or that the occurrence of the second sense is retarded: “apare tu āhuḥ-nānārtha-sabdaja-sābda-buddhau tātparya-nirnaya-hetuṭāyā avaṣya-kalpyatvāt prathamaṁ nānārtha-sabdād anekārthopasthānēpi prakaraṇā” dibhis tātparya-nirnaya-hetubhir upādite tasmin yatra tātparya-nirnayaḥ tasyaiva arthasya anvaya-buddhir jāyate, nānyasya iti saranau āśrītyāṁ naika-mātra-gocara-smṛty apekṣā, nā’py arthopasthānā-pratibandhakatva-kalpanam.” (R.G. pp. 2, ibid)

Even from the point of view of this second viewpoint, vyañjanā or suggestive power is inevitable. When import-determination (i.e. tātparyānirnaya) is taken as the cause of verbal apprehension, (sābda-bodha), in instances such as, ‘surabhi-māmsam bhakṣayati’, and the like, the hearer gathers through the knowledge of the context that the speaker intends ‘fragrant meat’, and that the term, ‘surabhi-māmsam’, is used for that only. After this sort of determination of the intention of the speaker, verbal apprehension with reference to the intended sense alone is done through abhidhā or the power of expression, and not with reference to the non-contextual beef. But, however through practical experience, it is gathered that the sense of beef is also apprehended through that very word viz. ‘surabhi-māmsam’ alone. Now, in order to explain this apprehension, which other means is possible, except vyañjanā or suggestive power? Thus, even from the second method of verbal apprehension also, the non-contextual sense is collected, in case of a word having multiple sense, through suggestive power i.e. vyañjanā alone: “evaṁ ca prāg upadārśita-nānārtha-sthale, prakāraṇā” di- jānāḥ”dhīna-tātparya-nirnayaḥ prākaraṇikārthā-sābda-buddhau jātāyāṁ a-tātparya- viṣaya’pi sābda-buddhis tasmād eva sābdāj jāyamānā, kasya vyāpārasya sādhvatāṁ avalambatāṁ ěte vyañjanāt?” (R.G.)

Abhidhā or the power of expression fails in this case, because import-determination is the cause with reference to the sense apprehended through abhidhā or the power of expression but not with reference to the apprehension of the sense through vyañjanā or suggestive power. So, the non-contextual sense, in
the case of a word having a multiple sense, is arrived at only through suggestive power alone. The apprehension born of abhidhā or the power of expression, stands in need of the knowledge of import. While, the apprehension based on the suggestive power-vyañjanā - does not always stand in need of the same.

So, this second view-point also welcomes suggestive power, or vyañjanā. According to this view, the Hari-kārikā viz. “samyogo viprayogas’ ca.” etc., and Mammaṭa’s kārikā, viz. “anekārthasya śabdasya.” etc. are adequately explained in the following way:

According to the prima-facie view, the element, viz. ‘viṣeṣa-smṛti-hetavaḥ’, becomes meaningful only from the point of the first view-point: It is so, because in it a second memory is accepted with reference to the contextual sense alone. Even the element of ‘vācakatva-niyamtraṇa’, or the restriction of the power of expression, as stated by Mammaṭa, also will be adequately explained only when viewed from the first view-point, because in it the method of restricting the memory of the non-contextual sense, with the help of restriction in the form of the knowledge of the context and the like, has been accepted. Now, from this second view-point, the above quoted element of the Hari-kārikā as well as that of Mammaṭa’s kārikā, will become meaningless, because, not only that in it, is not accepted the fact of a second memory in form of a single sense alone, but also the importance of the pratibandhya-pratibandhaka-bhāva or the relation of the restriction and the restricted, is not accepted.

This prima-facie view is refuted as below: In the said Harikārikā, the word ‘smṛti’ should not be taken as meaning ‘memory’ i.e. smarana, but as ‘ascertainment’ i.e. ‘niścaya’. Thus, viṣeṣa-smṛti-hetavaḥ would mean ‘the hetus or causes that bring about ascertainment of the import i.e. tātparya-nirṇaya, with reference to the particular i.e. ‘viṣeṣa-viṣayaka’. This element does not become redundant in the second view-point, because even gathering of import through context and the like, is accepted. When Mammaṭa speaks of the limitation of the expressed sense, what he means is that when through the knowledge of the context and the like, the import is determined regarding a single sense, the power of expression which is capable of conveying a multiple sense, becomes favourably inclined to the state of a verbal apprehension with reference to a single sense alone. This explanation also fits in with the second view-point, because the verbal apprehension born of the power of expression, is said to be in respect of a single sense alone. So, according to the second view, the element viz. ‘a-vācyārtha-dhī’, in Mammaṭa’s kārikā, would mean ‘a-tātparyārtha’, i.e. ‘that meaning which
is not intended.' And this is exactly so, because in the case of a word having a multiple sense, the non-contextual sense which is suggested only, never becomes an object of import.

The objector advances a further objection: The ‘pada-jñāna’ or apprehension of the word is held to be a cause even with reference to an apprehension through suggestive power as in case of an apprehension through expression. Now, when this apprehension of a word exists, or continues, how according to the second view, can there be an apprehension of the non-contextual sense through vyañjanā or suggestive power?

The reply is given as follows: According to the second view, first of all the word is apprehended through hearing; then the meaning of the particular word follows; then there is ascertainment of the import; then follows the verbal apprehension of the contextual sense arrived at through the power of expression; and the last step is the apprehension of the non-contextual sense through the suggestive power. Now the point is that the knowledge of the word - pada-jñāna lasts for the first two moments and dies out in the third moment when the import is determined (i.e. tātparya-nirṇaya). Thus when pada-jñāna or the apprehension of the word does not continue even in the moment after the collection of the contextual sense, what to talk of its being present in the moment when there is apprehension through suggestive power (vyañjanā-janya-bodha)? So, how can the apprehension of the non-contextual sense through suggestive power follow? The reply is that, when there is apprehension through suggestive power in the third moment, import-gathering is not done directly in the same moment. But, we find the function of import-gathering in the form of apprehension through primary sense, in the second moment, and this function continues even in the third moment. Through this relation, import-ascertainment (i.e. tātparya-nirṇaya) will also continue in the third moment and the difficulty mentioned above will not occur.

Others hold that in verbal apprehension, like the limiting agent of the primary sense, the word also manifests itself as a qualifier of that sense; hence the apprehension of the primary sense itself is the knowledge of the word.

It is for this reason that Bhartṛhari had stated: ‘na sōti pratyayo loke...’ etc., i.e. there is no apprehension of meaning whatsoever in this world, which is not backed up by a word.

Practically, all the apprehensions of meaning are intermixed with the element of word. So, apprehension of the sense caused by the primary function - abhidhā-
janya-, which occurs prior to the apprehension due to suggestive power, - vyañjanā-
janya-bodha-, is itself of the form of pada-jñāna or apprehension of the word. Still
others feel that by the repetition of the word having a multiple sense, apprehension
of word-pada-jñāna will follow. So, the second view, which according to
Jagannatha follows the Dhvanikāra, holds that in the case of a word having a
multiple sense, there is resonance-like suggestion based on the power of word (i.e.
śabda-śakti-mūlaka-anu-rānāniya vyañgya). It is termed as ‘one based on the
power of word’ or śabda-śakti-mūla, because the words used do not allow any
alteration (i.e. a-parivṛtti-saha). This view is held by Mammaṭa, the follower of
Dhvanikāra : “tad ittham nānārtha-sthale anukaraṇīyaṃ vyañjanam śabda-śakti-
mūlam, śabdasya parivṛttya-sahatvāt, iti dhvani-kārānuyāyino varṇayanti.” (R.G.)

Jagannātha does not accept the two views as stated above. He refutes both of
these and establishes his own view. The first view is refuted as follows :

In the first view, it is stated that in the case of a word having a multiple sense,
in order to get the apprehension of the contextual sense, what is required is only
the existence of the contextual sense. So, even though for the first time all the senses
pop up, we accept the presence of the contextual sense alone at the second time.
But in reality, it does not seem to be like this. The objector wants to prove that there
can be correlation only with reference to the contextual sense alone and not the
non-contextual sense also. This very purpose of the objector, is served only by
accepting as the cause, the import determination, based on the knowledge of the
context and the like, with reference to verbal apprehension caused by a word
having a multiple sense. Thus, import determination, tātparya-nirṇaya due to
knowledge of the context and the like, will cause only the apprehension of the
contextual sense, and not of the non-contextual sense. So, for that, there is no
necessity to recognise the second presentation with reference to the contextual
sense alone. Further, even if the second presentation - upāsthiit - be accepted, then
also, how could one say that it would be in respect of a single sense alone
‘ekārtha-mātra-visayaka’? Because, when the material in form of pada-jñāna or
knowledge of the word which causes the apprehension of the multiple sense is
already present, how is it that such an apprehension of a multiple sense does not
follow? So, in view of this, even if we accept the second presentation, even then,
the apprehension of the multiple sense can be avoided only when import-
determination is held to be the cause with reference to verbal apprehension (śabdab-
bodha), caused by the word having a multiple sense. Thus, all talk about the second
presentation, is baseless.
Further, it cannot be stated that, in case of a word having a multiple sense, import-determination is not a cause in respect of the apprehension of the correlation of the non-contextual sense; i.e. the second recollection of sense is with reference to the contextual sense alone, and therefore, apprehension of the correlation anvaya-bodha-with reference to the non-contextual sense does not follow: and that when in the case of the recollection of the second sense, eventhough the material in form of the knowledge of the word-pada-jñāna-is there, the non-contextual sense does not become its object, the secret is that the knowledge of the context and the like, or the import-determination based on it, acts as an obstructive factor (prati-bandhaka) in respect of the recollection of the non-contextual sense. This cannot be held, because when impression born of experience, and all the material that causes that impression exists, it is difficult to understand how the particular recollection does not take place. This means that when at the time of gathering the primary sense (śakti-jñāna), both contextual and non-contextual senses are at once known, and when impressions caused by them persist in the mind, then, even in the presence of the stimulant in the form of pada-jñāna or knowledge of the word, how is it that only one sense, and not all the senses, follows? Thus, all that the objector talks about the obstructive factor - 'pratibandhaka' and the like, fails to impress us: "na ca prakaraṇā'vi-jñānam, tad-adhīna-tātparya-jñānam vā paraśāpasthāne pratibandhakam iti śakyam vaktum. samśāra-rad-udbobdhamāyoh sattve, smṛteḥ pratibandhasya kvāpy a-drśṭatvāt." (R.G. II. pp. 334, edn. Athavale).

Further, it is meaningless to say that this relation of the obstruction and the obstructed (pratibadhya-pratibandhaka-bhāva) is imagined only in the case of the recollection in regard to the occurrence of a multiple sense alone, and that it is not applicable to any other case. Such a talk is baseless and it goes against our practical experience. It disagrees with practical experience in the sense that leaving apart persons who do not have the full knowledge of the multiple sense in the particular case, in the case of those who have the full knowledge of all the meanings in the case of a multiple sense, (e.g. in the case of 'payo ramaṇiyam'), and whose impressions of that are firm, when the words viz. 'payo ramaṇiyam' are uttered, both the senses, viz. those with reference to water or milk, come to the mind. This is supported by practical experience. The hearer, who knows the context explains to the new comer that the speaker's intention is here in respect of milk and not water. So, if in reality, the knowledge of the context stops the gathering of the non-contextual sense in case of word having multiple sense, then how can the hearer,
in the absence of the knowledge of the non-contextual sense, forbid the new-comer from taking the other sense with reference to water? Thus, the apprehension of the non-contextual sense cannot be negated. Thus, the knowledge of the context and the like, cannot be taken as an obstructive factor (i.e. pratibandhaka), with regard to the non-contextual sense.

Having thus refuted the first view, Jagannātha takes up the refutation of the second view. According to this view, with the help of the knowledge of context and the like, the import of the speaker is ascertained as being in respect of the contextual sense. Through this cause in the form of the import-ascertainment, the apprehension of correlation of the expressed sense, takes place with regard to the contextual sense alone, and the apprehension of the non-contextual sense which follows, is through suggestive power (i.e. vyañjanā). Now, the point is whether vyañjanā or suggestive power is accepted at all places where the non-contextual sense is to be gathered in case of a word having a multiple sense, or at some places only. The first alternative is not acceptable, for if at all places the apprehension of the non-contextual sense is ascertained through suggestive power, it will be futile to accept import-ascertainment to be responsible for the apprehension of the correlation of the expressed sense in the case of a word having a multiple sense. It cannot be taken as a cause only in the apprehension of the expressed sense, and not with reference to the apprehension through vyañjanā or suggestive power. For, if once the apprehension of the non-contextual sense is accepted, then what harm is there if we accept it as caused through abhidhā or the power of expression? So, in the case of a word having a multiple sense, if the non-contextual sense is intended at all places, then, whether it is collected through the power of expression (abhidhā) or through the power of suggestion (vyañjanā), makes no difference: “a-tātparyārtha-bodhasya sārvatrikatve tasya śakti-jātāyām api bāḍhakābhāvāt." (pp. 334, ibid, R.G. II).

The objector’s view may be put as follows: In the case of a word having a multiple sense, after the meaning is presented the verbal apprehension is done with reference to the contextual sense alone and not the non-contextual sense, the import-ascertainment being done with reference to the same i.e. the contextual sense. This is supported by normal experience. To abide by this observation, only import-ascertainment is to be taken as the cause in respect of the apprehension through expression (abhidhā) in case of a word having multiple sense. Or else, verbal apprehension with reference to the non-contextual sense also will tend to follow along with that of the contextual sense, from the very beginning. Once the
import-ascertainment takes place, even the verbal apprehension of the non-contextual sense is welcome, it being supported by practical experience. So, the cause, viz. import-ascertainment has apprehension of the expressed sense (abhidhā) as its result, and not the apprehension through vyañjanā or suggestive power. So, if the apprehension of all the senses, in the case of a word having a multiple sense, be held to follow through the cause in the form of import-ascertainment, then the apprehension of the non-contextual sense through the suggestive power, done later, will also possibly not follow. And even this is a matter of experience. So, it is better to hold import-ascertainment as the cause in respect of apprehension through the expressed sense alone. It is not advisable to accept import-ascertainment as the cause, even in respect of the unexpressed sense, because it is a matter of experience that through the power of expression, the non-contextual sense, which is not the import, is not gathered.

Jagannātha refutes this objection as follows:

It is not a happy situation that the objector is obsessed with the view that abhidhā or the power of expression can give the contextual sense alone, and not the non-contextual sense also. For, as in the instance of poetry with double entendre-such as, “sóvyād iṣṭa-bhujānta. ...” etc., wherein both the senses are derived through the power of expression (abhidhā) alone, in the same way, there is nothing which restricts us from gathering both the contextual and the non-contextual senses with the help of abhidhā or the power of expression, in the case of a word with multiple sense. : mā evam; sóvyād iṣṭa-bhujānta-hārā-valayas tvāṃ sarvado mādhavah’ ity ādau ślesa-kāvyā iva prakṛtēpi prakṛtā-prakṛtayor arthayor bodhasya svikāre bādhakābhāvāt.” (pp. 335, ibid, R.G. II.) - To say that, in the said instance of double entendre, both the senses are contextual, while it is not so in this case (i.e. dārṣṭāntika), and therefore, import-ascertainment is done in respect of only one sense, i.e. the contextual alone, and it is advisable to hold that only contextual sense is gathered through the power of expression (abhidhā) - is not proper. For, the mentioning of an instance of double entendre is only meant to convey that when the simultaneous apprehension of senses through the power of expression is possible, it should be possible here also in case of a word having multiple sense, whose primary sense has been fixed by context such as conjunction and the like. In the case of double entendre, both the meanings are simultaneously the object of import-ascertainment, while here only one sense becomes an object; but the difference in these two cases would arise only if import-ascertainment itself is held to be the cause of apprehension through the power of expression. But in fact,
this is not the case, i.e. import-ascertainment cannot be deemed as the cause of apprehension through expression. Thus, being contextual or non-contextual is not a factor of serious concern causing difference. Both can be simultaneously, directly expressed: “tātparaya-jñāna-kāraṇatāyā eva a-siddhatvena yugapad artha-dvaya-bodhā-nupapattivācayukter aramanīyatvat. tādṛśa-jñāna-hetutā-siddhau nu śakyeta api ittham vaktum.” (R.G. II. pp. 335, ibid)

If it is asked, viz. what then, is the use of the knowledge of import? - then, the answer is - it is useful in determining the facts such as, “this particular word is proper with reference to this particular sense, and that this particular sense alone is the authentic sense of this particular word.” This becomes helpful in (pravrtti) activity or (nivrtti) i.e. cessation from the same, when in the case of a word having a multiple sense, the hearer is baffled as to the activity or cessation by the fact of so many senses coming up at a time, import-ascertainment comes to his rescue and the hearer is activated exactly as desired by the speaker: “tarhi tātparya-jñānasya kutrōpayogaḥ iti cet, asmīnī arthe ayaṁ śabdāḥ pramāṇam ayaṁ arthaḥ pramāṇa-vedya ity ādi-nīrṇaye pravrṣty ādyupayoginī iti grhāṇa.” (pp. 335, ibid)

In the case of a word having a multiple sense, at least, at times, there is scope for suggestive power or vyaṇjanā, though not always. Jagannātha discusses this point as below:

There is no reason why suggestive power should operate only at certain places and not at all places. It cannot be said that, a particular word is used by the speaker to convey the suggested sense, and that this type of apprehension of the speaker’s intention itself proves the occasional occurrence (kvācītkatā) of suggestive power; because, when we do not hold at all the apprehension of import as the cause of apprehension of the suggested sense, then how can the above be acceptable to us? Even if you wish, you cannot take the knowledge of the import to be the cause in respect of the apprehension through suggestive power. For, this sort of a cause-effect relationship is faulty on account of the fault of vyatireka or logical discontinuance, and therefore it is impossible or asambhava. The idea is that a meaning eventhough not intended by the speaker, follows through vyaṇjanā or suggestive power e.g. in instances such as “prasasāra śanair vāyuḥ vināše tanvi te tadā” - and the like, the sense of passing of the wind that goes down-wards in the body (i.e. apāna-vāyu), as well as the sense of the death of the heroine, is gathered through suggestive power, by all aesthetes. So, it is held that in such instances, there is a fault called obscenity (i.e. aśīlātā). Now, can we accept the import of the poet with reference to such a sense? Of course not! : “nāpi dvitiyāḥ, hetor abhāvāt. vyaṇgyārtha-viṣayaka-kavi-tātparya-jñānam, tathā iti cet, na. vyakti-ja-bodhe,
It cannot be held that the intelligence of the hearer is the cause in respect of the occasional occurrence of suggestive power or vyañjanā. It is necessary to hold that, in the case of a word having a multiple sense, the intelligence of the hearer, apprehends even the non-contextual sense through the power of expression alone. In its absence, the restricted power of expression will ever remain so.：“atha śrotuḥ śakti-viśeṣo vyaktre ullāse heruḥ, sa ca phala-balāt camatkārīnye-vārthe vyaktim ullāsayati na a-camatkārini, iti siddhaṃ vyañjanollāsasya kvācitaṃvam iti cet : na. hanta evam sa niyantrita-śaktera eva ullāsakōśtv iti kṛtam nānārtha-sthale vyaktikalpanayā.” (pp. 335, R.G. II., ibid)

Jagannātha thus accepts the apprehension of the non-contextual sense, in the case of a word having a multiple sense, through the power of expression (i.e. abhidhā) alone. He says that, in the case of a hearer who has not forgotten the other (i.e. non-contextual) sense, both the senses will follow in instances, such as, “ullāsyā kāla-karavāla. ...” etc. For one, who has forgotten the expression with reference to the other sense, even suggestive power will fail to help : ‘kiṃ ca, “ullāsya kāla-karavāla-mahāmbuvāham”, ity ādi nānārtha-vyañjakasthale a-grhita-dvitiyārtha-śaktikasya grhīta-vismrta-dvitiyārtha-śaktikasya vā puṃsah sarvathāiva vyañjanayā dvitiyārtha-bodhā-‘nudayāt tatra tayā tadāpattis tava durvārā’ (pp. 335, R.G. II., ibid)

Further, it cannot be held that suggestive power (i.e. vyañjanā) takes place with reference to only that word, the primary sense of which is gathered by the hearer. For, in that case, the instances such as : niḥśeṣa-cyuta-candana. etc., and the like, the suggested sense of dalliance will not follow, because nobody has known the power of expression with reference to the sense of dalliance in the case of the word, ‘adhama’. However, if the objector insists upon the fact that there is the knowledge of the meaning of dalliance through abhidhā or expression in the case of the word viz. ‘adhama’, then the siddhāntin says that in that case the meaning of dalliance will be collected through the power of expression itself and to imagine vyañjanā or suggestive power in this respect, will be useless.

Jagannātha holds that ‘gaurava-doṣa’ or, the fault of cumbrousness would occur if the apprehension of the expressed sense is held to be the cause of the occurrence of suggestive power. It has been already proved that the apprehension of the non-contextual sense is done through the knowledge of the expressed sense,
which is held to be the cause of the occurrence of suggestive power by the prima facie view. The idea of restriction (to the contextual sense alone) has already been discarded earlier. Jagannātha explains this on the analogy of - ‘tad hetor eva tad astu, kim tat-kalpanayā’ - i.e. when an effect is explained by the cause, why imagine an additional cause in between? Thus, Jagannātha repudiates the idea of the apprehension of the non-contextual sense through suggestive-power, based on the apprehension of the expressed sense. He accepts the apprehension of the non-contextual sense through the power of expression (śakti) itself: na ca nānārtha-vyañjana-sthale eva evamjātiyakah kārya-kāraṇa-bhāvaḥ kalpyate, tatra ca śakter niyantritatvena, tad-grahasya-prayojakatayā vyakti-kalpanaucityād iti vācyam; navīna-kārya-kāraṇabhāva-kalpane gaurava-prasaṅgāt. niyantraṇasya pūrvam eva dūṣitatvena tad hetor eva iti nyāyāvatārāc ca.” (pp. 335, 6, R.G. II, ibid).

The objector puts forth one more argument to defend his position. He says that the view of the siddhāntin viz. that even the gathering of the non-contextual sense is also through expression alone (i.e. abhidhā) can be accepted only under certain circumstances. As for example, when the non-contextual sense is totally sublated or contradicted (bādhita) as in the case of: ‘jaiminiyam alam dhatre rasanāyām. ...” etc., and the like; how can it be arrived at through abhidhā or the power of expression? The ascertainment of contradiction (bādhya-niścaya) in the form of its being characterized by its absence (tad-abhāva-vattā), acts as a restriction (pratibandhaka) in the knowledge of its being characterised by the same (tadvattā-jñāna). In this case, abhidhā or the power of expression will not serve the purpose as in instances like - vahninā sīncati - i.e. he sprinkles with fire. While, vyañjana or suggestive power can apprehend even the sense which is contradicted (bādhitārtha). So, at least in such instances, the siddhāntin will have to take recourse to suggestive power: “atha astu aprākaraṇikopy arthaḥ śaktivedyāḥ - eva anvaya-dhī-gocarah; paramtu yatra na bādhitah syāt. yatra tu bādhitas tatra “jaiminiyam alam dhatre rasanāyām ayam dvijaḥ” ity ādau, jugupsitórtho, ‘vahninā sīncati’ ity ādau vahni-karaṇa-seka iva a-bodhopahata eva syāt. bādhya-niścayasya tad-vattā-jñānam prati pratibandhakatayāḥ sarvajana-siddhatvāt. vyaktes tu bādhitārtho-bodhakatvaṁ dharmi-grāhaka-māna-siddham iti vyakti-vādinūm adoṣa iti.” (pp. 336, R.G. II, ibid)

Jagannātha refutes this by advancing proper arguments. He says that in the instances such as “gām avatīrṇā satyaṁ sarasvatīyaṁ patañjali-vyājāt”, or “sauḍhāṇaṁ Nagarasyaśya milanty arkena maṇelaya”, etc. the abhidhārtha or the expressed sense, though contradicted, i.e. bādhita, is yet apprehended. Here also,
this same analogy is applicable. The case of a word having a multiple sense, should be treated on a par. If we do not accept this, then we will have to accept vyañjanā or suggestive power in case of practically all the figures wherein the direct sense is mostly contradicted. On the other hand, general opinion is that the alamkāras or figures are expressed only, and not suggested.

Jagannātha, at the end of the discussion declares that, “tasmāt nānārthasya aparākāranike’rthe vyañjanā iti prācāṁ siddhāntaḥ śīthilā eva.” (pp. 336, ibid) yet, he seems to accept one point made by the ancients, and it is that the comparision between the contextual and the non-contextual is always suggested: mā evam; ‘gām avatīrṇā satyam sarasvatīyam patañjali-vyājāt’, “saudhānāṁ nagarasyā’sya milanta arkeṇa maulayaḥ’, ity ādau vācyārthaṁvayópapādanāyāṁusaraniyena yatnena nānārtha-sthālepi bādhitrātha-bodhāsyopapattiḥ syāt, anyathā prāyaśaḥ sarvasv apyalamkāreṣu vācyārtha-bodhāyopapattaye vyañjanāṅgikaraniyā syāt. (pp. 336 - ibid, R.G. II).

Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta have also accepted this. Jagannātha clarifies his position as to when exactly suggestive power operates, in the words viz.- evam api yoga-rūḍhisthale rūḍhi-jñānena yogā’paharaṇasya sakala-tantra-siddha-tayā, rūḍhy anadhi-karaṇasya yogārthā”liṅgītasya arthāntarasya vyaktim vinā patītur durupapādā (pp. 347, R.G. II, ibid). - i.e. when through one and the same ‘yoga-rūḍha’ word, when once the rūḍhyartha or conventional sense is gathered, we have a later apprehension of the yogārtha i.e. etymological sense, also. This is not done through abhidhā or the power of direct expression, because in that apprehension, the yoga-śakti or the power of etymology which acts as an accessory has been already once contradicted by the force of convention - rūḍhi-śakti. So, in the absence of any other alternative, we will have to resort to suggestive power, in order to explain this later apprehension of the etymological sense. This is the field for the suggestion based on the power of word, i.e. śabda-śakti-mūla-dhvani, e.g. -

“abalānāṁ śriyaṁ hṛtvā
vārivāhāḥ sahaṁniśam,
tiṣṭhanti capalāḥ yatra
sa kālāḥ sam upā’gataḥ.”

So, observes Jagannātha–
“yogarūḍhasya śabdasya
yoge rūḍhyā niyangtrite,
dhiyam yoga-sprśorthasya
yā sûte vyañjanaiva sā.” (pp. 348, ibid)

He accepts both the varieties viz. alamkāra-dhvani or the suggestion of figure, and vastudhvani i.e. the suggestion of an idea - in the case of śabda-śakti-mūla-dhvani or suggestion based on word. He does not accept suggestive power or vyañjanā in order to derive non-contextual sense in case of a word having a multiple sense but as noted above, he accepts vyañjanā or suggestive power only when there is later apprehension, of the etymological sense which was once suppressed by the conventional sense.

To conclude, we may observe that Ānandavardhana has not discussed the problem of how the non-contextual sense in case of a word having multiple sense with its primary sense fixed by factors such as conjunction and the like, is collected. But from one of his illustrations, as observed earlier, it becomes clear that probably Ānandavardhana favours the line accepted by Jagannātha and accepts vyañjanā or suggestive power, when etymological sense-yaugikārtha - comes once more to the foreground, after defeating the conventional sense. He accepts that in case of suggestion based on the power of word or śabda-śakti-mūla-dhvani, the comparision between the contextual and the non-contextual senses is derived through vyañjanā or the suggestive power of word. Further, he accepts only the alamkāra-dhvani or the suggestion of a figure as a variety of śabda-śakti-mūla-dhvani or suggestion based on the power of word. He does not welcome the case of vastu-dhvani or suggestion of an idea as a variety in this case.

Abhinavagupta also accepts all this, as he follows Ānandavardhana. He has also cited different views as to how a non-contextual sense of a word having multiple sense, is collected. One of these views is accepted by Mammapā, Hemacandra, Vidyādhara and Viśvanātha. Another line of thought gains ground with Appayya and Jagannātha.

Mammapā also accepts vastu-dhvani or suggestion of an idea in case of śabda-śakti-mūla-dhvani and thus expands its scope which is supported even by Appayya and Jagannātha.

Appayya and Jagannātha accept sābdī-abhidhā-mūla-vyañjanā only in cases where yaugikārtha, once defeated by the vācyārtha, fixed by sāmyoga”di in case of a word having a multiple sense, once again is preferred. This is the scope of abhiddhā-mūla-sābdī-vyañjanā for Appayya and Jagannātha.
Thus, vyañjanā supported by Ānandavardhana as an independent šabda-śakti in his Dhvanyāloka, the first available written document on this topic, passes through several phases and is finally established by Mammaṭa, following the lead of Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta and also by his illustrious supporters beginning with ācārya Hemacandra, down to Appayya Dixit and Jagannātha, the latter two of course differing from Mammaṭa with reference to abhidhāmula-ārthi-vyañjanā. We have seen how challanges came from Mukula, Kuntaka, Mahimā and Dhanañjaya and Dhanika in a way. We will discuss the challanges to vyañjanā in the following chapter. These challanges in a way cover the challanges to the concept of dhvani in general also.
Chapter IX

Vyañjanā-virodha
or, opposition to suggestive power

We have observed in the earlier chapter that Ānandavardhana establishes vyañjanā as an independent word-power by distinguishing it first from abhidhā and then lakṣaṇā. He also sees to it how vyañjanā is at the root of the thinking of the grammarians and that the Mīmāṃsakas have to accept vyañjanā in worldly context to safeguard their own theoretical position. The author of the Dhvanyāloka also goes to establish how the Naiyāyikas can not afford to challenge the concept of vyañjanā. Thus, in a way Ānandavardhana has started giving a thought to, and silencing the opposition to vyañjanā. But it is more in the Locana of Abhinavagupta that we come across a more pronounced opposition to suggestive power and therefore also a greater effort to silence, the same. We have seen that the dāṛśanikas, - Mīmāṃsakas, Vaiyākaraṇas and Naiyāyikas had no business to deal with vyañjanā in their śāstric context and therefore no vyañjanā-virodha raises its head in their works. But while dealing with the worldly use of language in the ordinary parlance, as well as in the poetic use of language, there was a scope of difference concerning the acceptance and operation of this fourth-turīya-power of word, i.e. vyañjanā-vṛtti. We have seen how certain ālaṃkārikas as Mukula and Mahimā later challenge this concept of vyañjanā and subsume it under abhidhā/ lakṣaṇā and anumiti. There could have been some forgotten ālaṃkārikas also who might have taken recourse to the śāstrīt position held by various dāṛśanikas and without caring to imagine the possible response to the poetic use of language, must have tried to oppose the fact of vyañjanā in poetry, i.e. kāvya. It is such imagined opposition which is being taken care of, scrutinized and ultimately rejected by the Locanakāra, i.e. Abhinavagupta, especially under Dhv. I. iv. The whole thing is placed more methodically later by Mammaṭa and his followers such as Hemacandra, Vidyādharā, Vidyānātha and most effectively by Viśvanātha. We will
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look into this very carefully as follows:

Abhinavagupta: Under Dhv. I. iv. commenting on the illustration of pratiyamāna i.e. implicit sense, such as "bhrama, dhārmika." - etc. the Locanakāra establishes vyañjanā as a separate and independent word power, after silencing all possible opposition. He deals with various possible objections, the first being the "abhihitānvaya-vādins" - or Mimāṃsakas who follow the lead of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa and accept a tātparya-vṛtti and tātparyārtha i.e. 'purport' and 'import' respectively. The objection raised by the abhihitānvayavādins, or tātparya-vādins reads as follows: (pp. 26, Edn. Dr. Nandi, ibid):

"nanu tātparya-śaktir a-parvavasitā vivakṣayā drptā-dhārmika-tad-ādi-padārthānānvaya-rūpa-mukhyārtha-bādha-balena virodha-nimittaya v_api_tā_ lākṣaṇāyā ca vākyārthībhūta-nilādhī-pratītim abhihitānvaya-dṛśā karotīti śabda- śakti-mūla eva sōráthā. evam anenōktam iti hi vyavahārah. tan na vācyātirikto

nyōrthāḥ iti."

i.e. "Here (= in this illustration) the tātparya-śakti or purport is not terminated in form of import of the speaker. (i.e. the intention of the speaker is not fulfilled). There is 'mukhyārtha-bādha' i.e. contradiction of primary meaning in case of words such as 'drpta', 'dhārmika' and 'tāt', etc., on account of the speakers intention. Thus v_api_rna-lākṣaṇā on the strength of virodha occurs here and the sense of negation follows as sentence-sense, which is according to the abhihitānvaya-vāda. Thus the meaning is śabda-śakti-mūlaka. The normal course of behaviour takes the form of, "Thus, he said." So, there is no meaning (such as suggested) over and above the expressed sense." The idea can be elaborated as follows: It can be said here that the termination of tātparya-śakti is not in bhramaṇa-vidhi - i.e. the positive sense of free movement: Words are used in such a form that free movement is not at all intended. (i) 'Dhārmika' here means you are a pious person, a holy man and how can you ever face a lion physically? (ii) In 'tena drptā-sīṃhena', the pronoun 'tena' means that there is no doubt of the existence of lion. Its existence is well-known and even you, a holy man, must have heard about the same. (iii) 'drpta' means that the lion is no ordinary animal, but is very ferocious and dangerous. Thus due to the usage of these special words, there is opposition to free movement. Thus following the lead of abhihitānvaya-vāda, through v_api_rna-lākṣaṇā or indication based on contradiction, the sense tends to yield a negative sense. Thus, the sense of negation is derived through śabda-śakti i.e. word-power itself. In normal usage it is always said, "He said this, or he spoke thus." Nobody says, "He suggested this." Thus, here also the ultimate sense is not different from the expressed sense.
Abhinavagupta does not accept this: We know that in the abhīhitāṃvayavāda, we have abhidhā yielding the individual word-sense, in a given sentence. Then on account of expectancy-ākāṅksā, compatibility i.e. yogyatā and sannidhi or proximity the words form a sentence and word-senses give a sentence-sense. The abhidhā-vṛtti or the word-power of expression by itself does not give the sentence-sense, or vākyārtha. This is so because if otherwise, we arrive at ānantya-doṣa. Abhidhā has the power to yield word-meaning on the strength of sāṅketa or convention. There cannot be convention with reference to a whole sentence, for if abhidhā is accepted with reference to a sentence then we will have to accept innumerable powers. Thus the contingency-doṣa-of ānantya’ or accepting innumerable powers follows. Again if we accept abhidhā with reference to a given sentence, then, in case of common words found in another sentence having a different abhidhā, we will have to accept convention to the same effect. Thus, there will be ‘vyabhicāra-doṣa’. Thus, if we accept different convention with two different sentences as “gām ānaya” and “gām naya”, there will be ānantya-doṣa. If we accept ‘sāṅketa’ only with reference to the first sentence, then we will have to let go this principle viz. that, ‘only that meaning is congnised with reference to which, a convention is fixed.’ This is vyabhicāra or niyamātikramaṇa. Thus, it has to be accepted that through abhidhā-śakti only a word-meaning is apprehended. The sentence-meaning is never apprehended through the agency of abhidhā-śakti. We will have to accept tātparya-śakti or purport to collect what we call a ‘sentence-sense’. In a statement such as “gām ānaya” - the word ‘gām’ means ‘a cow’, and by ‘ānaya’ is meant, “bring”, i.e. the process of bringing i.e. ānayanānukūlavāyāpāraḥ. In the word ‘gām’ there is no meaning of “ānayanānukūla-vyāpāra-nirūpita-karmatva”. So, this sense is the meaning of a whole sentence and the power of a sentence is termed tātparya-vṛtti, which yields the sentence-sense. It is stated, “sāmānyāni anyathā-siddhe viśeṣam gamayanti hi.” i.e. when an individual meaning can not be apprehended by other means, the general meaning itself yields the individual meaning.” Thus, according to the abhīhitāṃvayavādins two functions viz. abhidhā and tātparya become instrumental in bringing about the sentence-sense. When the tātparya-vṛtti is over, a third power called lakṣaṇā or indication is also imagined. After the sentence-sense is collected, if the intention of the speaker is not conveyed, - i.e. in case of ‘tātparya’nu-papatti’, the primary meaning is contradicted and another meaning connected with it (sambaddha) is apprehended. This third stage is called lakṣaṇā or indication. Thus in abhīhitāṃvayavāda there are three stages viz. abhidhā, tātparya and lakṣaṇā. Abhidhā gives the individual word-
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meaning, tātparya-vṛtti gives the correlated (anvita) sentence-sense, through ākāṅkā’ḍi factors. If there is some difficulty in these factors, the sentence-sense does not follow. Then, given fulfilment of the conditions of lakṣaṇā, such as mukhyārtha-bādha etc., lakṣaṇā follows, e.g. in statements such as “gangāyām ghoṣaḥ”, “simhaḥ ayaṁ bālaḥ”, etc. But, says Abhinavagupta, in the illustration on hand viz. “bhrama dhārmika.” etc., there is no contradiction in correlation; i.e. the ‘anvaya’ is not ‘bādhita’, and hence there is no scope for what the objector calls, “vīparīta-lakṣaṇā.” or indication based on contradiction. There is neither mukhyārtha-bādha nor vīparīta-lakṣaṇā.

Abhinavagupta says that even if some how we accept contradiction of primary sense, then also it does not happen at the second stage: “bhavatu vā asau. tathā’pi dvitiya-sthāna-samkrāntā tāvad asau na bhavati.” The position is this. Lakṣaṇā is imagined to be there (i.e. its ‘kalpanā’ is done) when there is contradiction of primary sense. This happens when there is sense of opposition i.e. virodha, which could be two-fold. The virodha can occur with reference to the inherent quality of words used (i.e. svātmāni) or with reference to the correlation (i.e. anvaya). The present statement is that, “the dog is killed by a lion. So, you can move freely.” Here too there is no inherent contradiction of words used. So, we have to accept it with reference to the anvaya i.e. co-relation. But correlation is never contradicted before its being apprehended. Now the apprehension of correlation is never brought about by abhidhā or primary function, which is consumed only in giving the primary individual word-sense. Thus it cannot proceed intermitantly. So, correlation has to be apprehended by what we called purport i.e. tātparya-vṛtti alone. The idea is that even in case of a lakṣaṇā, such as in statement as ‘simhōyam batuḥ’ - the anvaya or correlation between ‘simha’ and ‘batu’ is first established by ākāṅka, the form of which is the apprehension of the identity between ‘simha’ and ‘batu’. After this correlation is once established, then only there is apprehension of contradiction: “na ca a-pratipanne anvaye virodha-pratitiḥ. pratipattisca anvayasya na abhidhā-śaktyā; tasyāḥ padārtha-pratiti-upaksitāyā viramya vyāpārabhāvāt, iti tātparya-śaktyā eva anvaya-pratipatiḥ.” (pp. 26, ibid).

The objector says that if you accept correlation in places of contradiction then in statements like, “āṅgulyagre kavivara-satam”, you will have to accept correlation i.e. anvaya. The answer to this is that when ‘sā”kāṅksatva’ and ‘padārthopasthitī’ are present what stops us from ‘anvaya’ being apprehended even here? In words having no expectancy - i.e. nirākāṅka - there is no correlation-anvaya-as in case of ‘daśa dādimāni, śad apūpāḥ, daṇḍam, aśājnām...’ etc. The illustration is read in
the Mahābhāṣya. There is no avayā of these padas merely by the being read
together - i.e. by saṅkalana-mātra. But in case of our illustration, ‘avayā’ is bound
to take place. But in such cases as ‘sinho baṭuḥ’, inspite of avayā, the sentence
is rendered false - i.e. a-pramāṇika, by pratyakṣa-pramāṇa or direct perception. If
it is asked that in that case, will a statement such as, “sinho baṭuḥ” be false? The
answer is that such statements are of course contradicted by pratyakṣa-pramāṇa,
and directly perception, but lakṣaṇā comes to the help and saves the situation, and the
falsity of the statement is removed.

The objector now says, “In case of prayojanavatī lakṣaṇā” i.e. indication with
motive, you accept vyaṇjanā in the apprehension of motive. This happens in case
of “sinho baṭuḥ” where the exceptional bravery of the child is apprehended through
suggestivity. Now, if you accept ‘dhvanana’ suggestion, which is the soul of poetry
- ‘kāvya-ātma’, then you have to accept such statements as “sinho baṭuḥ” also as
poetry because of the presence of suggestion.

The answer is that soul is omni-present. That way it is present in a pot also. But
how is it that we do not take a pot as a living being? In the same way though
suggesting is present, ‘sinho baṭuḥ’ is not poetry. If the objector says that soul is
said to be present in a body having hands, feet etc., i.e. where special parts of a
body are seen, then we also say that ‘kāvya’ is said to be there which has a body of
word and sense properly decorated by guṇas or excellences and alamkāras i.e.
figures of speech etc. and with such a body and suggestion as soul, we use the term
poetry: guṇālaṅkāra-aucitya-sundara-śabdārtha-śarīrasya sati dhvanananā"khyā”māni
kāvya-rūpātā-vyavahārāh.” (Locana, pp. 28, ibid). Thus, as in case of the soul being
omni-present, on account of absence of consciousness, the soul does not become
a useless entity in case of a pot, in the same way even in the presence of
suggestivity, in the absence of poetry, the soul called dhvanna does not become
useless. “na ca ātmanósāratā kācid iti samānam.” (pp. 28, Locana, ibid). observes
Abhinavagupta.

So, now what remains to be discussed is whether ‘dhvani’ can be said to be
covered in the third stage called lakṣaṇā or not? The short answer to this is that
bhakti’ or ‘lakṣaṇā’ rests with the third stage, while dhvanana-vāpāra rests in the
fourth stage: “na ca evam bhaktir eva dhvanih; bhaktir hi lakṣaṇā vyāpāras tṛtiya-
kakṣya-niveśī. caturthyām tu kakṣyāyām dhvanana-vyāpārah.” (pp. 28, ibid).
“surely, metaphorical expression or logical implication is not suggestion. The
former is indication resting in the third stage. The suggestive function rests in the
fourth stage.” The supporters of indication accept that lakṣaṇā or indication occurs when three conditions are fulfilled. Here mukhyārtha-bādhā i.e. contradiction of primary sense depends on means of knowledge such as direct perception and the like. Even what is called ‘nimitta’ is also collected through other means of knowledge. But in case of “gaṅgāyāṁ ghoṇaḥ” the extreme sanctity of the hamlet, its extreme coolness, etc. which are qualities in form of motive - i.e. prayojana - can not be conveyed by other words and this prayojana is also not apprehended by other means of knowledge, but is apprehended through the efficacy of word itself. So, it cannot be said that there is no use of word element : yat tu idam ghoṣasya atipavitratva-sītalatva-sevyatvā”dikam prayojanaṃ, a-sabdāntara-vācyam, pramāṇāntara-apratipannam, bāṭor vā parākramātiṣaya-sālitvam, tatra śabdasya na tāvan na vyāpāraḥ.” (Locana, pp. 28, ibid) : Abhinavagupta clearly implies that the motive is collected only through the instrumentality of word alone, and not through any other means of knowledge i.e. smṛti, anumāti, etc., as done later by Mahimā and others.

Abhinavagupta elaborates his argument as follows - In lakṣaṇā, the first condition is contradiction of the primary sense i.e. mukhyārtha-bādhā. Now this becomes clear with the help of direct perception or pratyakṣa, the other condition is ‘sākyārtha-sambandha’. i.e. relation with the primary sense. These relations are manifold such as sāmīpya i.e. closeness, sādrṣya i.e. similarity etc. This relation is also supported by direct perception or such other means of knowledge. The third condition of prayojanavatā lakṣaṇā or indication based on motive, is apprehension of motive - ‘prayojana-pratipatti’. In the sentence ‘gaṅgāyāṁ ghoṇaḥ’, the extreme holiness of the village and its coolness, and its being habitable make for the prayojana or motive. So also in the sentence viz. “simho batuh”, the great valour of the child is the motive. Abhinavagupta argues that you cannot say that the apprehension of this motive is not through the agency of the power of word-tatra śabdasya na tāvan na vyāpāraḥ. For, if you do not accept the power of word as a means to the realisation of motive in these cases, then you have to admit either inference i.e. anumāna or smṛti i.e. recollection or memory as a means of knowledge.

In case of an anumāna or inference, the procedure will be like this - The bank, i.e. the bank of the Gaṅgā is having qualities of extreme holiness, purity etc., as it is close to the Gaṅgā. The vyāpti - i.e. invariable concomitance will be like this - “whatever is close to the Gaṅgā is pure, holy, as are the ascetics near the Gaṅgā.” But this vyāpti is not all-pervasive (i.e. it is a-vyāpta), as we find skulls, bones etc.
also scattered near the Gaṅgā and they are not accepted as holy. Thus there is “an anaikāntikatā hetu-doṣa” i.e. logical fallacy of being unsteady, or variable. (i.e. the fallacy of undistributed middle) - The inference therefore will be a-prāmāṇika i.e. invalid. In the same way in ‘simho batuh' the inference will proceed as, “This child is gifted with the qualities of a lion, because he is named as such (i.e. he is called simha). Whatever is named by the term lion - (yo yo simha-śabda-vācyayaḥ), is gifted with the of qualities of a lion, as is a real lion. The boy is as such, therefore he is gifted with the qualities of a lion. But this inference carries the fallacy of being ‘sva-rūpā'siddha’ - i.e. contradicted by its own external form or appearance. (i.e. a sort of non-proof). The baṭu or child is a ‘pakṣa’ and ‘simha-śabda-vācyatā’ is a hetu. Now for an inference to be valid, the ‘hetu’ must be residing in ‘pakṣa’ and it should not be contradicted by other means of knowledge such as direct perception and the like. But here the calling of a human child by the name of a lion is contradicted by direct perception. So, the inference is invalid.

Now, in both these cases, we may form a different vyāpti such as, “wherever there is usage of metaphorical or indicative words, there is necessarily the yoga or presence of the qualities represented by such words. Well, the ‘sādhyā-siddhi’ or realisation of intended motive is possible, but for this vyāpti, some other ‘pramāṇa’ has to be pointed out. For vyāpti is formed only on actual seeing of a number of illustrations. Now, in the new vyāpti imagined as above, there is no pointing out of a similar illustration in its support. Thus, in both these cases, observes Abhinavagupta, there can not be apprehension of purpose through inference. He observes : “tathā hi, tat-sāmipyat taddharmatvānumānam anaikāntikam, simha-śabda-vācyatvam ca baṭor asiddham. atha yatra yatra evam-śabda-prayogaḥ, tatra tad-dharma-yoga iti anumānam, tasyā'pi vyāpti-grahakāle maulikam pramāṇāntaram vācyam; na ca asti.” (pp. 28, Locana, Edn. Dr. Nandi).

Abhinavagupta then proceeds to suggest that there is no chance for smṛti i.e. recollection also, in these instances. For, recollection is possible in a case where we have experienced the same happening earlier. Again, here there is no rule as such that merely by the usage of certain words we have recollection of the qualities of the thing expressed by the same word. This means that we do not recollect the qualities of holiness etc. simply by the use of words such as ‘Gaṅgā’ and the like. Again there can be qualities and qualities. How is it that we will be reminded only of such qualities as are expected to be conveyed by the speaker? Thus, we may be reminded, if at all, of the quality of fearfulness or farociousness when we use the term ‘simha’ and not just the quality of bravery. Thus the apprehension of motive
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in such instances can neither be arrived at through inference nor recollection - “na ca smṛtir iyam, an-anubhūte tad a-yogāt, niyamā’pratipatter vaktur etat vivaksitam ity adhyavasāyābhāva-prasāṅgāc ca, iti asti tāvad atra sābdasya eva vyāpāraḥ.”

Abhinavagupta categorically says that in the apprehension of the motive there cannot be the agency of either inference or recollection but it can be the result only of the power of word alone, and it has to be vyañjanā.

It may be noted that Abhinavagupta while rejecting the case of inference, takes into account the ‘śāstriya’ form of anumiti, i.e. he rejects the case of ‘tarkānumiti’. But we have seen that Mahimā says that here we have what we may say, a case of ‘kāvyānumiti’ and not ‘tarkānumiti’. He pooh-poohes the efforts of those who are seeking the shelter of tarkānumiti here. For him, even in ordinary parlance there is a sort of inference, working at popular level, which is not absolutely scientific. When a child arrives late after playing in the evening and when, for example he sees the shoes of his father, he realises through popular inference that his father has arrived. Or, when we hear a sort of noise in the water tap, we know through inferential process of the popular brand, that water will soon flow through the tap; or through a special sound, we imagine that a compartment of a train is either joined or disjoined from the other one. These are popular instances of inference. So also in poetry, “tatraiva rantum eva gatā’si” is apprehended through what Mahimā calls “kāvyānumiti” which is a loose form of anumiti accepted in our practical life at every stage. Dr. Rawaprasadjee is a staunch supporter of this kāvyānumiti. The only point is that whether we accept this “loose anumāṇa” or call it by some other name such as ‘tātparya’ of Dhanañjaya or ‘vyañjanā’ of Ānandavardhana. The fact is that there is ‘śabda’ involved and hence it has to be a śabda-vyāpāra as pointed out by Abhinavagupta in case of poetry or any use of language. Of course, when we hear a sound from the water-tap, or when we see the shoes of a father, or when we hear a noise of joining or disjoining of a compartment, we may or, even may not, accept the case of a loose anumāṇa, but in case of poetry which is the province of a use of word, a meaningful word by a poet, we have to name it differently such as vyañjanā to distinguish it from tarkānumiti, or pratyaksa, or smṛti, etc. Even kāvyānumiti is certainly not tarkānumiti or scientific inference of the logicians. So, it is just a quarrel over naming. The rose, is a rose, is a rose and will smell as sweet; call it by any other name! So, for the present, and on our part, we will choose to travel with Abhinavagupta and call it vyañjanā, a word-power.

Abhinavagupta observes in favour of vyañjanā as follows: “asti tāvad atra śabdasyaiva vyāpāraḥ. vyāpāraś ca nābhidhā”tmā, samayābhāvāt, na tātparya”tmā,
tasya anvaya-pratitav eva parikṣayat, na lakṣaṇā"tmā, uktād eva hetoḥ, skhalitagtivābhāvād; tatrā'pi hi skhaladgatitvye, punar mukhyārtha-bādho, nimittvam prayojanam ity anavasthā iti nāma kṛtam, tad-vaśasanāmātram. tasmād abhidhihā
tātparyā-lakṣaṇā-vyatiriktasa' caturthosau vyāpāro dhvanana-dyotana-vyañjana-
prayāyana-avagamanā"di sódara-vyapadeśa-nirūpito-'bhyupagantavyah'. (Locana,
pp. 28, ibid)

In this famous passage, Abhinavagupta declares that the apprehension of
prayojanas is only through word-power. And that word-power is not abhidhā or the
power of expression, nor it is tātparya, for it is over only at the stage of correlation
(i.e. at the stage of giving a correlated meaning of words in a single sentence), nor
lakṣaṇā, due to reasons suggested as above. Again the words do not fail here in their
expressive power, (i.e. there is no skhalad-gatitva, while deriving the suggested sense
of holiness etc. from the word 'gangāyām', as is the case in deriving the indicated
sense). For, if we accept failure of expressive sense in this case, then mukhyārtha-
bādha, nimita, and prayojanas will have to be imagined again and again, and again,
and thus there will be 'anavasthā' i.e. total confusion. So, when one postulates
lakṣita-lakṣaṇā here, it is a wild goose chase only. So, this is the fourth power
of word, totally different from abhidhā, tātparya and lakṣaṇā, and is termed by
synonyms such as dhvanana, dyotana, vyañjana, prayāyana, avagaman, etc.”

Abhinavagupta thus precludes the case of ālaṃkārikas such as Mukula and
perhaps also Kuntaka, who project a wider concept of abhidhā embracing in its
fold, vyañjana, and also the case of the likes of Dhanañjaya and Dhanika who have
a broader concept of tātparya, beyond just a sentence-power of presenting a
correlated sense, and also of Mahimā who argues for a loose inference taking shape
in poetry. When you play a game, there are rules of a game and you have to abide
by the same. Abhinava therefore insists that the normally all-acceptable concepts of
abhidhā, lakṣaṇā, tātparya and anumiti are not wide enough to cover suggested
sense arrived at by the word-power called vyañjana.

He quotes in his support a kārikā from the Dhvanyāloka, (I. 17) such as :

"mukhyām vṛttim parityajya
   guṇa-vṛttyārtha-darśanam,
   yad-uddiśya phalam, tatra
   śabdo naiva skhalad-gatiḥ."

i.e. “If one gives up the primary denotative power of a word and understands
a sense (secondary, conveyed by it), through its indicative power, it is because of
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a purpose. In conveying this purpose, the word does not move falteringly at all, (as it moves falteringly when indicating a meaning secondary)." (Trans. K.Kris. pp. 33, ibid).


Abhidha is the power of expression which yields primary meaning on the basis of convention. Lakṣaṇā is that power which yields meaning on the basis of mukhyārtha-bādhā, i.e. contradiction of primary sense etc. Tātparya śakti or purport is one which yields correlated meaning not derived through the power of expression. This is a sentence-power yielding the sentence-sense. The fourth power is called vyañjanā. There is a meaning different from meanings arrived at through abhidhā, tātparya and lakṣaṇā. By repeated connection with this meaning, the pratibhā or genius or imagination of those who resort to this becomes sanctified : Thus a vṛtti which renders the imagination pure is termed vyañjanā or suggestion. This word-power renders the other three as subservient and installs itself as principal. Then it is termed 'Dhvani', which is the soul of poetry. In the illustration viz. "bhrama dhārmika," etc., negation is the indicated sense of positive instruction, such as "bhrama", i.e. move about. The motive is to protect the place of secret meeting, which is arrived at through vyañjanā or suggestive power. So, the objector raises a question that here, how is it that the āloka-kārā i.e. Ānandavardhana said that the pratiśedha-rūpa meaning i.e. the sense of negation is arrived at through suggestive power? The answer is that this sense of negation is principal and only through its agency the protection of the place of meeting is suggested. Therefore 'nīśedha' is said to be the meaning. But, Abhinavagupta says that this solution is suggested only in case we accept lakṣaṇā in the illustration concerned. In fact here in this specific illustration such as 'bhrama dhārmika', etc. there is no scope for lakṣaṇā at all as the conditions of indication or lakṣaṇā are not fulfilled here. There is no contradiction of the primary sense. The primary sense is neither totally discarded (atyanta-tiraskṛta) i.e. not completely lost, nor merged into another sense - i.e. arthāntara-
śāmkramita, here. This verse is a case of artha-śakti-mūla-dhvanī, where there is no scope for lakṣaṇā.

Again there is something further. In all sorts of knowledge, some ancillary factors are expected to operate. E.g. in direct perception or pratyakṣa, the contact of sense-organs with the object (indriyārtha-sannikāraṇa) is expected. The direct perception is either sa-vikalpa or nir-vikalpa. The indriyārtha sannikāraṇa is expected in both the cases and this is said to be six-fold in the Vaiśeṣika darśana. In the same way, in anumiti or inference, vyāpti-smṛti and pakṣa-dharmatā serve as causes. Those who consider śabda-śakti i.e. word-power as derived through anumiti-i.e. inference, for them when a word is used to convey a meaning, there has to be vyāpti-smaraṇa and the like, to call the process by the name of ‘anumiti’. The process will proceed like this: A speaker wants to convey this meaning, because he has used this particular word. Wherever this word is used invariably this particular meaning is intended to be conveyed. It is so here. Therefore here also this particular meaning is intended to be conveyed. In the same way in ‘upamāṇa’ means of knowledge, sādṛṣya-jñāna or knowledge of similarity etc. serves as condition. So also, in śabda-prāmāṇa, in case of abhidhā, the knowledge of convention - i.e. samketa-jñāna, and tātparya-vṛtti serve as condition, in case of lakṣaṇā, śakyaṅṛtha-bādha etc. serve as condition and in case of vyañjana certain factors such as enumerated by Mammaṇa, viz. vaktṛ-vaśiśṭya, bodhṛ-vaśiśṭya or speciality of the speaker etc. serve as conditions.

Thus according to the Locanakāra, for abhihitānvaṇavāda there is no escape from vyañjana to convey the intention of the speaker. Now Abhinavagupta takes up anvītaśbhidhānvaṇāda and proves to his satisfaction that even for this way of thinking, vyañjana has to be recognised as an independent śabda-vṛtti.

Anvītaśbhidhānvaṇāda and Vyañjana -

Before we proceed with the presentation in Locana, we may note that later ālaṃkārikas beginning with Mammaṇa have based their line of argument only on this portion of the Locana, which reads, to begin with, as follows: (pp. 30, Edn. Dr. Nandi, ibid.):

“yópy anvītaśbhidhānvaṇādi, “yatparaḥ śabdaḥ sa śabdārthaḥ”, iti hrdaye gṛhītvā śāravād abhidhāvyāpāram eva dirgha-dīrgham icchati, rasya yadi dirgho vyāpāras tad ekōśāv iti kutah ? bhinnā-visayatvāt. athā’py anekōsau tad-visaya-sahakāri-bhedād a-sajātiya eva yuktaḥ. sajātiya ca kārye viramya vyāpāraḥ śabd-karma-buddhy ādīnām padārthavidbhīh niśiddhaḥ. a-sajātiye ca asman naya eva.”
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"The Anvitābhidhānavādī takes the dictum, viz. "whatever is intended to be expressed by the word, that is the meaning of the word", (literally) to his heart and expects the function of a word to last longer and longer like an arrow. To him our question is, "if the function is long (and longer), how can it be a single function; for the scope (i.e. object) is non-identical. If you accept that it is (not a single function, but it is) many, then with the consideration of its object and accessories, it has to be non-identical (with one another). If the function is said to be identical, then the function will not continue after once it is over as the function of a word, idea and activity, does not continue further once its object is realized. This is the opinion of those who know about the word-meaning (i.e. Naiyāyikas and the rest). If you accept this longer and still longer function to be (many and therefore) non-identical, then our principle (of vyañjanā as a separate, independent and fourth word power) stands."

Before we discuss the refutation of anvitābhidhānavāda by Abhinavagupta, we may take note of the fact that Mammaṭa, and therefore practically all of his followers, - have treated anvitābhidhāna-vāda, and dirghadīrghatara-vyāpāra-vāda as independent views of opponents. Of course, the latter are also a section of the former but both are treated and refuted separately. Abhinavagupta has taken them to be identical because in fact the latter are only a section of the former. Mammaṭa, of course, has tried to dig deeper.

Abhinavagupta proceeds as follows : The anvitābhidhānavādins cite two principles such as, "yatparaḥ śabdaḥ sa śabdārthaḥ", and "sōyam ṣor iva dirgha-
dīrghatara vyāpāraḥ", and include vyañjanā in the scope of abhidhā itself. Some experts explain this to be the view held by Lollata's followers. We do not know, but we have seen that later Mukula tries to cover up vyañjanā under abhidhā. For these theorists the word-power extends further and further. Like a shaft, discharced by a mighty person, cuts through the armour of the enemy, pierces his limbs and takes away his breath, similarly, a word used by a great poet, through its power called abhidhā i.e. expression, gives the expressed meaning, then the anvita-arthā i.e. the correlated meaning, and also gives the suggested sense. The idea is that after giving the primary sense, the word-power does not rest till it yields the final intended sense. So, that is considered to be the real meaning of a word, with which the speaker's intention is concerned.

To this, the Lōcanakāra asks that when the objector talks of this longer and still longer word-power yielding different senses in its course, is this power one or many? How can we take them as one and identical? For, in fact their object
changes from stage to stage. There is thus vișaya-bheda and there is sahakāri-bheda also noticed. [In abhidhā samketa-grahaṇa is the sahakārin, in laksanā it is mukhyārtha-bādhādi-traya, and in vyaṇjanā it is speciality of the speaker etc. i.e. vakṛ-ādi-vaiśiṣṭya.] Now, in view of this, the powers concerned will have to be taken as non-identical or different. For, those who know the secret of word and sense have formed a principle that, “śabda-buddhi-karmanām viramya vyāpāraḥ bhāvah” - i.e. word, idea and activity do not continue after once having stopped on achieving their goal, so far as one and identical vyāpāra i.e. function is concerned. Once you (i.e. the objector) accept difference or non-identity in case of functions, our position, that different word-powers yield different meanings, is vindicated.

The objector does not give up easily. He observes that by this dīrga-dīrghata-ra vyāpāra, what is meant is that what you call as vyānghyārtha residing in the fourth stage, is grasped very fast and immediately by the sentence. Then our answer is (i.e. the Siddhāntin’s position is) that when no convention is fixed with reference to the same (i.e. the suggested sense), how can it be immediately or directly apprehended?

To this, the objector would say - well, the śakyaṛtha i.e. the expressed sense is a ‘nīmitta’ i.e. ‘cause’, in the apprehension of the vyānghyārtha or the suggested sense. Thus vyānghyārth is said to be, “naimittika” and vācyārtha is “nīmitta”. When the naimittika i.e. resultant suggested sense is immediately cognized, later when critically scrutinized, the śakyaṛtha i.e. expressed sense is also apprehended. Samketa-graha i.e. fixing of convention is done with reference to the śakyaṛtha i.e. expressed sense, which is a nimitta - i.e. cause in the vyānghyārthabodha. Thus naimittika-vyānghyārtha is also derived on the same basis.

Abhinavagupta passes a sarcastic remark in reply to this. “paśyata śrotriyasya uktri-kuśalam” - “see, the expertise of the Mīmāṃsaka, with reference to the (art of) speaking!” - The meaning that is cognized at the end is said to be apprehended first and the direct meaning (which aught to come first is placed later and it) follows (the last one) and again is said to be the cause. Thus for the Mīmāṃsaka, his fatherhood is first with reference to his grand son and then with reference to his own son! The Locanakāra observes : “arthā yosau caturthānakṣā-nivīṣṭorثhaḥ, sa eva jhaṭtī-vaṇya-bhādhiyata, ity evam vidham dīrgha-dīrghatvam vivakṣitam, tarhi tatra samketā’karanat katham sāksāt pratipattih ? nimitteṣu samketāḥ, naimittikastu asau arthās samketānaṇekṣa eva, iti cet, paśyata śrotriyasya ukti-kuśalam yo hy asau paryanta-kakṣa-bhāgy arthaḥ, prathamam pratiti-patham avatīrṇaḥ, tasya paścattannāḥ padārthavagamāḥ.
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nimittabhāvaṃ gacchanti iti nūnaṃ mīmāṃsakasya prapautram prati naimittikam abhimatam.” (pp. 30, Edn. Dr. Nandi, ibid)

Abhinavagupta further elaborates as follows. He observes that the objecter can contend this much here, that saṃketa-grahaṇa or convention was formed earlier. After that on listening to a sentence, we apprehend the sentence-sense. Thus nimitta-naimittika-bhāva takes shape between word-sense (i.e. the expressed sense), and the suggested sense. But in this case, argues the Locanakāra, which process will the objector resort to in apprehending the suggested sense? There is no convention formed with reference to the suggested sense, so how can the objecter say that the suggested sense is apprehended through abhidhā or the power of expression? Again, the next point is that in the opinion of the objecter himself, the saṃketa-grahaṇa with reference to an individual word-sense is itself not possible because you, the anvitābhidhānayādins, hold expressive power only with reference to the ‘anvita’ or correlated sense. If the objecter says that yes, convention is of course formed with reference to the correlated sense alone, but by avāpaudvāpa i.e. removal and substitution, this fixing of convention - saṃketa-grahaṇa is with reference to a word only, then Abhinavagupta’s submission is that even in this case a meaning related to the particular - i.e. višeṣa-artha-will necessarily be cognized still later (because the mīmāṃsakas believe in jāti-viṣayaka-saṃketa). Thus, the anvitābhidhānayādins also will have to resort to the tātparya-vṛtti or purport, and thus your principle will be negated.

To this, the objecter may submit that, whether nimitta-naimittika bhāva is established between padārtha and vyāṅgyārtha, but one thing is certain that the moment a sentence is spoken, import i.e. ‘tātparya-rthā’ is apprehended, and how can anyone reject this? To this, Abhinavagupta says that we do not negate this fact that vyāṅgyārtha in form of the intention of the speaker is immediately apprehended: atra ucya te dṛṣṭaiva jhāṭiti tātparya-rthā-pratipattiḥ. kim atra kurmaḥ, iti. tad idam vayam api na nāṅgikurmaḥ.” (pp. 30, ibid). He quotes from Ānandavardhana Kārikā (Dhv.) 1. 12 - viz. “tadvat sacetasām.” etc. “So also that suggested meaning flashes suddenly across the truth-perceiving minds of perceptive critics, when they turn away from literal meaning.” (Trans. K.Kris. pp. 19, ibid).

But the Locanakāra adds that this does not mean that in the truth-perceiving minds of the perceptive critics, the suggested sense flashes forth even without the apprehension of the primary sense. There is always this possibility of a sequence of first the dawning of the literal sense and then the flashing of the suggested sense.
But these cultured critics have read, tasted and enjoyed poetry so often, that due to practice formed by the repeated reading of poetic works, the sequence between primary meaning and the suggested meaning is as it were not cognized, even though it is very much there as an undeniable fact. For an expert logician, the moment he sees smoke, he infers fire immediately and eventhough the steps, such as vyāptisramaṇa and the like, are very much there in his inference they are as it were not noticed. Thus, even if a sequence is not cognized, it has to be very much there and therefore the nimitta-naimittika-bhāva between the primary and the suggested senses stands.

It may be noted that the Kāvyaprakāśakāra i.e. Mammaṭa takes even these nimitta-vādins, who are part of anvita-bhidhānavādins, also as a separate group of objectors. Mammaṭa digs deeper and attempts a thread-bare analysis at every stage, of course, following the lead of Abhinavagupta. We will examine the same in due course.

Abhinavagupta sums up his treatment of vyañjanā-virodha by as it were, patching up the differences if any, with the grammarians. He observes: “yépi a-vibhaktaṁ sphoṭaṁ, vākyaṁ, tad-arthaṁ cā”huḥ, tair apy a-vidyā-pada-patitaiḥ, sarvā iyaṁ anusaraṇīyā prakriyā. tad uttirṇatve tu sarvaṁ parameśvarā”hvayaṁ brahma ity asmac chāstra-kāreṇa na na viditaṁ tatvālokaṁ grantham viracayatā ity āstām.” (pp. 30, edn. Dr. Nandi, ibid) - “Even those who speak of un-divided sphoṭa, (whole) sentence and its meaning (without parts), have to accept all this (our) line of thinking, while dealing at the ordinary parlour (i.e. at the popular level where a-vidyā i.e. nescience prevails). Having crossed this level of ordinary parlour (in which a-vidyā prevails), everything is brahma, one with the Highest Godhead, - and this fact was not unknown to our sāstrakāra (i.e. Ānandavardhana) (= our theorist) who (also) drafted the work called “Tattvāloka”. So, let this be left here only.”

Even for the grammarians the acceptance of pada-prakṛti-pratyaya etc. i.e. diversity of words and sentences and their meanings - has to be accepted at worldly context and once this scheme is accepted the variety of vācyārtha, tātparyārtha, laksyārtha and vyañgyārtha, also has to be accepted even by the grammarians and so for them acceptance of vyañjanā as a fourth independent word-power, becomes a necessity. So, even for these akhaṇḍatāvādins, language at popular level is divided into letters, words, word-meanings, and sentences and sentence-meanings and even words are divided into roots and stems. This fact of language stays for ever at the level of worldly usage; concludes Abhinavagupta.
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It has been thus successfully established by Abhinavagupta that vyañjanā as a fourth and independent word-power has to be accepted. Vyañjanā cannot be rejected by taking recourse to the other accepted śabda-vṛttis such as abhidhā, or lakṣaṇā or even tātparya which is a vākya-vṛtti for some. Even anumāṇa or inference, a means of knowledge along with pratyakṣa or direct perception, can not serve the cause of vyañjanā. Even akhaṇḍatāvāda of the vedantins and grammarians is not a substitute for vyañjanā. Vyañjanā cannot be discarded even with the help of other means of knowledge. In, say for example, pratyakṣa-pramāṇa or direct perception, the organs of senses become instruments and the knowledge arrived at by the sannikārsas or contact of sense organs with the objects of knowledge is termed pratyakṣa-jñāna. In the particular illustration viz. “bhrama-dhārmika”, etc., the lion is not present on the spot and so the direct käṣuṣa-pratyakṣa i.e. directly seeing the lion with physical eyes - is not possible. The heroine also can not say to the holy man that, “O sir, please do not go for a stroll on the bank of the Godāvari as there will be a disturbance in our lovesports.” So, here, it is not a case of śravaṇa-pratyakṣa i.e. direct perception due to hearing also. In the means of knowledge called ‘upamāṇa’ i.e. similarity, the base of knowledge is similarity or comparision, which has no scope here. So, the object of the Nāyikā’s utterance can not be served through upamāṇa-pramāṇa. The apprehension of rasa - aesthetic pleasure, or suggested idea i.e. vastu-vyañgya or suggested figure, i.e. alaṁkāra-vyañgya, can never take place through arthāpatti, i.e. implication, or presumption, or inference based on circumstances. Arthāpatti takes place only where the ‘artha’ is not self-sufficient, as in case of “pīno devadattaḥ divā na bhūṅkte, tasmād rātrībhojanam.” Here the fatness of Devadatta is not justified by his taking no food at all by day. But in case of rasa-experience, the sentence-sense does not stand unjustified, or un-supported, i.e. it is not that it can not hold on its own without any apprehension of rasa or dhvani or other variety. Thus vyañjanā cannot be wished away by arthāpatti. Nor, is the apprehension of rasā”di a matter of imagination, i.e. rasā”di-pratītī is not kālpanika or illusory. For all men of taste, may not undergo rasa-experience if it were not a real fact but only an imaginary thing. Thus, in the present illustration, viz. bhrama-dhārmika, etc., resorting to vyañjanā is a must to collect the special meaning called the vyāgyārtha.

Abhinavagupta rejects Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka’s observation here. The latter observes that in the specific illustration viz. “bhrama-dhārmika.” etc., actually what happens is like this. “Here in this verse, special adjective such as ‘uddhata’ i.e. drpta =fierce
is used with the lion. The person concerned is addressed as a ‘dhārmika’ i.e. a holyman, a religious man. On the strength of these two words, there is apprehension of the ‘bhayānaka-rasa’. Through this there is an apprehension of ‘niśedha’ i.e. negation. For, without knowing the person’s tendency of either being a brave person or a timid one, the ascertainment of negation only is not at all possible. So, only the strength of a meaning - ‘kevalam artha-sāmarthyam’ - can not be the cause of the apprehension of negation.” To this Abhinavagupta’s reply is as follows: Even we also do not contend that without knowing the speciality of the speaker and the listener, and without realising the power of suggestion of a word, the apprehension of the suggested sense is possible. On the contrary, we hold that only the genius - pratibhā-of the cultured person-sahṛdaya-is taken as the decider in case of vyañjanā “pratipattṛ-pratibhā-sahakāritvam hy asmābhir dyotanasya prāṇatvena uktam.” (pp. 32, ibid). We do not object to the apprehension of bhayānaka rasa in the illustration concerned. But this horrible condition can inspire fear only in the heart of the dhārmika person concerned. We can expect fear to rise to the status of bhayānaka-rasa, only if it is tasted by all men of taste. The relish of rasa is possible only when it is tasted. Even Bhaṭṭa-Nāyaka does not accept that rasa can be tasted by simply naming it. Thus, it is only suggested and even for the person who enjoys it, the enjoyment is not personal or limited, but is of an unlimited nature and the enjoyer is not equal personally to the timid religious person. Here practically ends Abhinavagupta’s defence of vyañjanā.

It is clear that such great as Mammaṭa and the rest accepted the lead of Abhinavagupta in dealing with vyañjanā-virodha. We will now move on to what Mammaṭa has to say, and we have already observed that Mammaṭa has tried to dig deeper and has tried to lay the whole topic threadbare.

Mammaṭa -

Actually, while dealing with what he calls ‘guṇī-bhūta-vyaṅgya’ or poetry of subordinated suggestion, Mammaṭa picks up the topic of refuting the objection to vyañjanā and trying to establish vyañjanā and vyaṅgyārtha as independent entities by fresh arguments.

In the beginning of Ch. V of his Kāvya-prakāśa Mammaṭa cleanly enumerates, explains and illustrates eight-fold guṇībhūta-vyaṅgya-kāvya and observes that the varieties of these (eight kinds of subordinated suggestion) should be understood, as far as applicable, in the manner of the former case i.e. of the suggestive-dhvani-poetry, which for him is “uttama” kāvya, and the guṇībhūta-vyaṅgya being the
"madhyama" variety. He observes: (K.P. V. 46 cd):

esāṃ bhedā yathāyogam
veditavyāś ca pūrvavat." - 46 cd.
yathāyogam iti,

"vyajyante vastumātreṇa..." (Dhv. II. 2a). iti dhvanikāroka-diśā vastumātreṇa yatra alamkāra vyajyate, na tatra guṇībhūta-vyaṅgyatvam." Thus for Dhvanikāra, suggestion of an alamkāra by vastu or idea never gives a guṇībhūta-vyaṅgya kāvya.

Mammaṭa observes that innumerable varieties and sub-varieties can be thought out in case of this variety i.e. guṇībhūta-vyaṅgya-kāvya also, by considering the possibilities of intermingled and collected varieties (yogāḥ samsrṣṭi-saṃkaraḥ). By natural permutation-'anyonya-yogāt'-the number of its varieties would be very large.

With this Mammaṭa banks upon the following observation:

"samkalanena punar asya dhvaneḥ trayo bhedāḥ, vyaṅgyasya tri-rūpatvāt." (vṛtti, K.P. v. 47)

"However, in brief, there are three kinds of this Dhvani (suggestive poetry) on account of the suggested sense being of three types (i.e. vastu, alamkāra and rasa)." Mammaṭa takes the opportunity to explain that 'rasa'-dhvani is necessarily suggested only-vyaṅgya eva-while the other two varieties can be an object of direct expression also.

Mammaṭa proceeds to explain how vyaṅgyārtha/vyaṅjanā are inevitable in different types of dhvani.

In both the varieties of dhvani based on lakṣaṇaṁ, i.e. in arthāntara-saṃkramita-vācyā, and atyanta-tiraskṛta-vācyā varieties of dhvani, lakṣaṇaṁ or indication is itself not possible without consideration of 'vastu-vyaṅgya' i.e. suggestion of an idea. Thus, vyaṅjanā has to be there in these varieties.

In case of śabda-śakti-mūla-dhvani i.e. suggestion based on the force of words, the denotation (i.e. abhidhā) being restricted (as it can not proceed after it has yielded its contextual meaning), any other idea, which cannot be the denoted one, as well as the upamā and other figures, are undoubtedly suggested.

In case of artha-śakti-mūla-dhvani also, owing to the inapplicability of the convention in a particular individual, it is the word-meanings of universal character, being mutually co-ordinated by the force of expectancy, compatibility and juxta-position (of words), that give rise to the meaning of a sentence which is particular and different from the meaning of individual words. How can the suggested sense, based on the power of meaning, can be spoken of as
denoted according to this theory of Abhiritānvyaya (held by Bhātta school of Mīmāṃsā)

The words in the K.P. read as: “artha-sakti-mūle viśeṣe saṃkertaḥ kartum na yuyjate, iti sāmānyarūpānāṁ padārthānām ākāṅkṣā-sannidhi-yogyatā-vaśāt parasparam samsargye yatra a-padārtho viśeṣa-rūpo vākyārthah, tatra abhiritānvyayā kā vārtā vyaṅgyasya abhidheyatāyām?” (vṛtti on K.P. v. 47)

So, here Māmaṭa picks up the abhiritānvyavādins first:

For these Mīmāṃsakas who follow the lead of Kumārila Bhātta ‘saṃketa’ or convention is not done with reference to a particular individual to avoid the blemishes of ‘ānantrya’ and ‘vyabhicāra’, but is accepted with reference to ‘sāmānyā’ or universal. For them the ‘vākyārtha’ in form of a viśeṣa or ‘special’ or ‘particular’ is also not arrived at by abhidhā, but by a separate power called tātparya. Now, when their abhidhā does not reach at collection of particular sense, and also the sentence-sense, what to talk of vyaṅgyārtha or suggested sense which comes still later. So, for them vyaṅjanā has to be accepted to arrive at the suggested sense, their abhidhā being consumed in giving universal padārtha, and tātparya being exhausted in giving vākyārtha only! Jhalkikar puts it as: (pp. 219, ibid): “yanmate vācyārthabodha-viśayīkṛtam api saṃsargam śakyopasthāpaparikṣiṇa-saktir abhidhā nāvabhāṣayati iti tadarthan tātparya-vṛttīr avalambya, tanmate vācyārtha-bodhottara-kālikāyām vyaṅgyopasthitau naiva abhidhā-prabhāva iti kimu vaktavyam iti. tattvam uktam pradīpōdyoteṣu - “artha-sakti-mūle api evam angikartavyam. yataḥ padebhyaḥ prathamam padārtha-smṛtih, attha padārthe-viśesānām anvaya-viśeṣa-rūpasya pratayah, tato vyaṅgyapratītir iti trīyā-kakṣāyām kutō ‘bhidhāyāḥ prasaraṇam ? dvitiya-kakṣāyām eva rād-anapekṣanāt. yatobhiritānvyā-vāde asakya eva anvayaḥ, ākāṅkṣā”di-vaśena pratiyate. śabda-buddhi-karmaṇām viramyā vyaṅpārābhāva iti ca sarva-siddham”, iti prādiṣṭaḥ.

The Sampradāya-prakāśini observes: (pp. 158, Edn. Dwivedi R.C., ibid) : “viśeṣa-rūpaḥpādārthahtirikto vākyārtho yatrabhyupagatas tatra abhiritānvyayā vākyārthānantara-kaksyābhāvino vyaṅgyasya vācyatāyām vārtā eva kā, yāvatā dvitiya-kaksyāpātī vākyārthotōpyanabhidheyā, iti upālambha-niśkarṣāḥ.”

The crux of the discussion is that when for the abhiritānvyavādins, their abhidhā is powerless to travel even upto the sentence-sense, for which they have to invoke a separate power called tātparya, what to talk of covering vyaṅgyārtha or suggested sense which follows even the sentence-sense? So, for them acceptance of vyaṅjanā to collect the suggested sense, is a must.
Vyañjanā-virodha or, opposition to suggestive power

Now Mammata turns his guns towards the other section of the Mīmāṁsakas, known as “anvitābhidhānavādins”.

Mammata holds that even for the anvitābhidhānavādins, acceptance of vyañjanā for collecting the suggested sense, is unavoidable. He first begins with the fuller explanation of the anvitābhidhāna view-point. He observes:

And some others expound (the process of denotation) as follows:

“The word, the elderly men, and the object denoted are directly perceived here, (i.e. in the process of learning) by a child.” “The listners understanding of it is deduced (by the child) through inference and action. The two-fold power (of the word to denote and of the object to be thus denoted by that particular word) is cognised by presumption based on ‘otherwise inexplicability’. Thus the relationship (between word and its meaning) is known through three means of cognition (i.e. perception, inference and presumption).”

According to what is stated above when a sentence, such as ‘Devadatta, bring the cow’, is uttered by an elderly man, the younger man is seen to bring from one place to another an object with the dew-lap etc., the child then infers from this action that such and such meaning has been understood by the younger man from such a sentence. Thereupon, the child makes out the denotative relationship between the above sentence and its meaning as one indivisible whole, and thus the child himself comprehends its meaning. Later on when sentences such as, “Caitra, bring the cow: “Devadatta, bring the horse”; “Devadatta, take away the cow”, are used, he makes out a particular meaning from a particular word on the basis of positive and negative considerations. From this it follows that a sentence alone, that makes a man act or refrain from it, is fit for being used. Hence, the denotative convention is apprehended from the connected words occurring in sentence only with the meanings of words (generally) connected with one another. To conclude, only the correlated meanings of words are the meaning of a sentence; it is not that there is correlation of (unconnected) word-meanings.

Though the individual words, found to be used in other sentences, are regarded to be the same by reproductive apprehension (i.e. pratyabhijñā-balena) and thus convention of the word-meaning is found as connected with the other words (i.e. the denotative convention is comprehended as connected with particular word-meaning), yet, that particular form itself is comprehended as qualified by generic character because the inter-mixed word-meanings are of the said (i.e. of particular and not generic) character. (Since the particular and the generic cannot be divided
the comprehension of the particular form is not without the apprehension of its generic character). This is the view of the theorists of correlated denotation (anvitābhidhāna-vāda).” (vṛtti, K.P. V. 47, pp. 158, 160, Edn. R. C. Dwivedi; Trans. by Prof. R. C. Dwivedi).

Mammaṭa after carefully explaining the view of the anvitābhidhānāvādins, explains how for them also in poetry, what is termed as suggested sense can be comprehended only through the agency of vyañjanā i.e. the power of suggestion alone. We will try to elaborate the argument as follows : In Prabhākara’s anvitābhidhānāvāda, though through abhidhā directly the co-related - anvita-meaning is conveyed and hence there is no need to project ‘tātparya’ sakti, but even for this view abhidhā yields a correlated meaning only in a universal-sāmānya-form. There is no trace of a meaning with reference to particularity because one and the same word is used with a number of other words in different forms.

If convention, argue these theorists, is accepted with reference to a particular meaning or object, it will not get correlated with other particular meanings. As in case of abhīhitānvaṇavāda, so also here, if convention is held with reference to, an individual object the contingencies of ‘ānantya’ and ‘vyābhisēra’ will walk in. Thus even anvitābhidhānā-vāda allows saṁketa only with reference to a general meaning.

But the fact is that a sentence sense is of the form of correlation of particular meanings, so for that this vākyārtha also cannot be arrived at through abhidhā, technically. Now, when their abhidhā cannot reach directly the particular vākyārtha i.e. viṣeṣa-rūpa-vākyārtha, then how can we expect that their abhidhā will go as far as vyāṅgyārtha which is ‘ati-viṣeṣabhuṭa’ or which is of an extremely particular nature! So, even from the point of view of anvitābhidhānāvāda, in the illustration viz. “niḥsēṣa-cyuta.” etc., the apprehension of the positive -vidhirūpa-suggested sense, derived from the expressed negation, has to be explained through vyāñjanā or suggestive function only. Thus for anvitābhidhānāvāda, to explain the apprehension of the suggested sense, acceptance of vyāñjanā is a must. But before explaining this inevitability of accepting vyāñjanā even for the anvitābhidhānāvādins, Mammaṭa starts the argument by first explaining the full implication of this view theoretically with the words, “iti anvitābhidhānāvādinaḥ”. The presentation can be understood in two parts. The first part completes with the words - “iti viṣiṣṭā eva padārthāḥ vākyārthāḥ, na tu padārthānām vaiśiṣṭyam.” The second part starts after that. In the first half it is explained that only a meaning concerning generality-
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sāmānya is arrived at by individual words. It ends with “viśistā eva padārthāḥ vākyārthaḥ”, where ‘viśistāḥ’ means ‘avaya-viśistāḥ’ i.e. ‘correlated word-meanings’ form a vākyārtha, through abhidhā. This is broadly the position of this view. After that “na tu padārthānām vaiśistīyam” - is a note, which explains that, we have not to understand that ‘first an-anvita i.e. not-correlated-individual word-meanings are presented and then their ‘avaya’ i.e. co-relation follows.”

This note is to denounce the abhīhirānvaya-vāda. Then follows the subtle analysis of the anvitābhidhāna-vāda, which ends with the word, “ity anvitābhidhāna-vādinaḥ.” The main point that even this view has to accept vyañjanā to apprehend the so called suggested sense, begins with the words “teṣām api mate...”.

Mammatā starts to explain this view with two kārikās, viz. śabda-vṛddhābhidheṣu, etc., taking us to the conclusion that convention is made with reference to the correlated sentence-sense only. Now, as to, “this particular sense has to be collected from this particular word”, normally the following means are suggested such as :

śaktigraham vyākaraṇopamāna-
kośā"pta-vākyād vyavahārataḥ ca.
vākyasya sēṣād vivṛtṛer vadanti
sānnidhyataḥ siddha-padasya vṛddhāḥ.”

i.e. According to the seniors, convention is maid with the help of the following sources such as - vyākaraṇa, i.e. grammar, upamāna or similar object, kośa i.e. a lexicon, āpta-vākyā i.e. the instruction by a reliable person, vyavahāra i.e. worldly usage, vākyāsēsa or the remainder of a sentence, vivṛti i.e. vyākhyā i.e. explanation, and by proximity with a word whose meaning is known - i.e. siddha-pada. Out of all these vyavahāra i.e. popular usage is the principal source. While in all other means we stand in need of the actual usage and collection of meaning to understand ‘śakti-graha’, these are reserved for elderly people. But for children, ‘vyavahāra’ or local usage is the ultimate source to understand the conventional sense. The child at an early age collects convention with reference to a particular word yielding a particular sense only through actual practice by his seniors, such as uttma-vṛddhas and the madhyama-vṛddhas. Here the former stand for those who issue instructions and the latter stand for those who carry our the instructions; as in case of the sentences, “gām ānaya, gām badhāna, āsvaṃ ānaya”, etc. etc. The child first cases the whole meaning of a whole sentence and later is enlightened as
to the specific meaning of individual words. We have seen about how different means of knowledge such as pratyakṣa or direct-perception, anumāna or inference, and arthāpatti or presumption are involved in the simple act of collecting the expressed sense only. This is done is an effortless and natural way for a child. Mammaṭa uses terms such as (i) sāmāṇya, (ii) sāmāṇya-viśeṣa and (iii) ati-viśeṣa-meaning "correlated in a general form", then, "karmatva"dīrūpeṇa-anvitatva", and "vyakti-rūpeṇa anvitatva". The vyañjanāvādins argue that if we accept anvitābhidhāna-vāda, sāmketa takes us only to "anvita-artha" in form of a "sāmāṇya" only. But this is not enough. For example you want a pot. Now in place of "ghaṭam ānaya" if it is said, "vastu ānaya", - this will not serve the purpose. Only a word 'ghara' which has a viśeṣa-rūpa has to be used. Thus sāmketa with reference to "sāmāṇya-rūpeṇa anvita", will not do.

If it is argued that on the strength of the maxim, "nirviśeṣam na sāmāṇyam", we will arrive at a "sāmāṇya-viśeṣa" i.e. a viśeṣa qualified by a sāmāṇya, then to this the answer is that here the convention is with reference to a 'sāmāṇya-viśeṣa' qualified by 'karmatva' or objectivity. Thus in "gām ānaya", the word 'gām' is an object - karmabhūtasāmāṇya-viśeṣa. Thus the word 'ānaya' gets correlated with this karma-bhūtasāmāṇya-viśeṣa, which is 'gām'. 'gām' is called 'sāmāṇya-viśeṣa', because 'ānaya' is correlated with it. But here too the 'anvaya' is with 'karmatva' staying in a 'sāmāṇya' form. As the 'sa-karmaka' word 'ānaya' is in need of a karma/object, 'gām' gets correlated with it in form of a 'karma' i.e. object. Here, 'gām', 'āsvam' etc. though having a particular form or viśeṣa-rūpa, are correlated only through 'karmatva' which is of the sāmāṇya type. Hence, Mammaṭa here uses the term 'sāmāṇya-viśeṣa' to distinguish it from 'sāmāṇya'. Thus the terms 'sāmāṇya' and "sāmāṇya-viśeṣa" are explained.

The third term used by Mammaṭa is "ati-viśeṣa". By this is meant the individual cow or horse. Gotva, aśvatva are the 'sāmāṇya', karmatva is the sāmāṇya-viśeṣa, and individual cow or horse - is the ati-viśeṣa-meaning. This meaning is derived in practice from the statement. But theoretically this meaning cannot follow for the fear of ānantya and vyabhicāra. So, when the ati-viśeṣa meaning remains asamketa, vācyārtha will be impossible. This 'ati-viśeṣa' meaning will have to be collected by a power beyond abhidhā. This means that even the anvitābhidhāna view will have to go for an additional power called either tātparya or any other name. Now, when, argues Mammaṭa, even for the apprehension of a simple sentence-sense an additional word-power will be required, it is senseless to suggest that abhidhā will be able to deliver the suggested meaning!
So, Mammaṭa observes that the whole argument boils down to this much that whether you go for abhīhitānvayavāda or opt for the anvitābhidhānavāda, even the ‘ati-viṣeṣa-rūpa vākyārtha’ is not apprehended by abhīdhā, so what to talk of collecting what is termed the vyaṅgyārtha or suggested sense which comes still later? He observes:

“anavītorthobhīhitānvaye, padārthāntara-mātrenānvitastvānviτābhidhānē, anvitāviṣeṣasa tu a-vācyay eva, ity ubhayānaye’pi apadanāthay eva vākyārthah.” i.e. “The meaning is not correlated according to the theory of ‘the connection of the expressed (i.e. abhīhitānvaya-vāda), and according, to the theory of ‘connected meaning’ (anvitābhidhāna), it is correlated to the other meaning generically but the correlated particular (meaning) is never denoted, hence in both the above theories the sense of a sentence cannot be taken as the object of direct denotation by a word.” The sampradāya-prakāśini here takes ‘vākyārtha’ as suggested meaning - “vākyārthahvyāngyārthah”tmakah.” (pp. 162, ibid). Jhalkikar explains ‘vākyārthah’ as ‘samsargah’. He observes (pp. 224, ibid) : “ayam bhāvah-

vasturvena vastupada-
vācyopi ghaṭo yathā ghaṭatvena tad avācyah, tathā aparapadārthānvitā

nayanatvenā (abhīhitānvayavāde kevalena ānayanatvena) ānaya-pada-vācyam api
gavā”nayanam, gavā”nayanatvena tad a-vācyam eva ity asiṃkete tasmin vākya-
gamyeyāpratībodha-visayikṛte api nābhidhāvyāpāra iti nitārām eva

anantara-bhāvini vyāngya-bodhe abhīdhā-virāma, iti vivaraṇe spaṭam.”

We had observed that Abhinavagupta had considered the view of the nīmittā-vādins as part of the Mīmāṃsaka view. Mammaṭa, on the other hand, takes up this view of “nimitta-vādins” separately.

We know that the Mīmāṃsakas hold veda as the only authority and therefore veda is normally equated as ‘prabhu’ i.e. master, and in the vedic injunction only abhīdhā has scope. Even lakṣaṇa in which there is deviation, is a doṣa for the Mīmāṃsakas and so far as the śāstra or discipline in concerned, vyaṅjanā has not even a ghost of a chance for any consideration. So, Mukula, a great Mīmāṃsaka probably, in his work establishes only abhīdhā as a sole power of word and lakṣaṇa is treated by him only as an extension of abhīdhā, but never as an independent word-power. So, here Mammaṭa, after considering the abhīhitānvayavāda and anvitābhidhānavāda and explaining their necessity to accept vyaṅjanā, now picks up the views of yet another section of the anvitābhidhānavādin-mīmāṃsakas, - who hold that, “nai-mittikānusārena nimittaṇi kalpyante.” Let us first see how he puts it:

“yad apy ucyaṭe - ‘nai-mittikānusārena nimittaṇi kalpyante” iti, tatra nimmittatvam kārakatvam jnāpakkatvam vā. śabdasya prakāśakatvān na kārakatvam. jnāpakatvam tu a-jñaṭasya katham? jñaṭatvam ca saṃketena eva. sa ca anvita-
mātre. evañ ca, nimittasya niyata-nimittatvam yāvan na niścitam, tāvān
naimittikasya pratītir eva katham iti "naimittikā'husāreṇa nimittāni kalpyante" iti
a-vicāritā'bhidhānam." -

"It is also said that "causes are ascertained on the bases of their effects." (To this
we reply) that to be a cause is either to be a generative (kāraka) or to be an
indicator (jñāpaka). The word on account of its being illuminator, cannot be of the
nature of a generative. And how can it be an indicator of the unknown? Knownness comes from the denotative convention only, which pertains to the
correlated only. Therefore, so long as a cause is not determined to be precisely a
cause, how can the cognition of the effect (i.e. meaning) arise from it (i.e. the
word)? Hence the view that, "the causes are ascertained on the basis of the effect,
(i.e. meaning)", is a thoughtless statement."

The Saṃpradāya-prakāśinī observes: (pp. 164, ibid): "uktena prakāreṇa
vyaṅgyārtha-pratītā, nimittatvena abhyupagatasya śabdasya nimittatvam eva
yāvan niyataśya na niścitam, tāvād, "naimittikā'husāreṇa nimittāni kalpyante" ity
etad a-vicāritā'bhidhānam.

The idea is as follows: This view holds that what the supporters of vyañjanā call
vyañgyārtha is also derived through the instrumentality of words alone. Beyond
'sabda' there is no other 'nimitta' i.e. cause for the vyañgyārtha. Hence 'word' is the
only 'cause'. To this, Mammaṭa says that 'nimitta' or 'cause' can be two-fold only,
i.e. it can be either a 'kāraka' nimitta i.e. a generative cause or a 'jñāpaka' nimitta,
i.e. indicative cause. Now a word cannot be a generative cause but it can only be
an indicator i.e. 'jñāpaka'. But its being an indicator i.e. 'jñāpaka' i.e. its
'jñāpakatvā' depends on its being known. It should be known that such and such
a word carries convention with reference to such and such a meaning. Thus the
bodhya-bodhaka-bhāva between a suggested meaning and a word would rest only
if the particular word's convention with reference to a particular suggested sense
is known to and accepted by all, through its power of expression or abhidhā. But
it is known that abhidhā in case of a word gives only a particular conventional
sense only which does not go to cover the suggested sense. So, even the jñāpakatvā-
rūpa-nimittatvā of a word with reference to a given suggested sense will not be
possible here for according to the nimittavādin the abhidhā gives only a sāmānyarūpa artha, i.e. meaning pertaining to generality alone, and that too in a correlated
form only. So, the point is that a word, which the objector holds as a 'nimitta' for
vyañgyārtha has no fixed (niścayena) (i.e. conventional) relation with the same, i.e.
the vyāgyārtha, thus the apprehension of the latter in form of 'naimittikā pratītī'
will not follow at all! When for the objector the abhidhā is powerless even to travel
to a meaning concerning particularity, then, without convention, how can it yield the suggested sense? So, for this nimittavādin also, acceptance of vyañjana is unavoidable, says Mammaṭa. And to say that “naimittikānusāreṇa nimittāni kalpyante” is foolhardy.

Jhalkikar (pp. 225, ibid) observes: “ayaṁ bhāvaḥ. itara-vyavahāra-
asānaiva vyutpannasya loṣṭhā”dy anvittānayaṇa-vyavahāraṃ kadā’py
adrṣṭavatōpi ‘lostham ānaya’ iti vākyād bodha-sthale loṣṭhā”dy anvittānayanā”der
viśeṣasyopasthāpakāntarābhāvena śabdādevopasthitir vācyā. tathā ca tatra
sāṃketa-graha śabdāt tadupasthithiḥ. śabdāc ca tad upasthitau sāṃketa-grahah ity
anyonyā”śrayaḥ syāt. na ca vyañjanaṃ pī ādāvad durgrahaḥ iti vācyam. abhidhā
lakṣaṇaḥ vā jñātāvopayogini iti sātyam. dharmī-ghrākha-māṇa-siddhā vyañjana tu
ajñāta eva bodhikā. na cātiprasaṅgah. vakrādi-vaśisṭya-pekṣanār. phalavatvena
tathaiva kalpanād iti dik. tasmāt “naimittikānusāreṇa nimittāni kalpyante” ity
avicāritābhidhānamitī” iti udyota-sudhāsāgarayoh spaṣṭam.”

Jhalkikara further adds - “ayaṁ atra siddhānta-sāraḥ. vyaṅgyopasthitau
sādasya jñāpakatva-rūpaṃ nimittatvam asambhir api sammataḥ. tatra
nāsmākam vivādah paramtu vyañjanaṃ asvīkāre tanna sambhavati. sādasyārtha-
nimittatvam vyāpārasāpekṣam eva niyatam. yathā vācyārtha-lakṣyārthayor
abhidhālaksanaḥ vyāpārau tathā ihā’pi kōpi vyāpaṟvāsyaṃ aṅgikāryaḥ. anyathā hi
sādasya nimittatvā‘niṣcayena naimittiko vyangyārtha ity eva bhavad abhimatōpi
na siddhyati. yadi tu vyāpaṟaṃ vinā’pi sādasya nimittatvam syāt tadā abhidhā-
laksanēpi datta-jalāṇalī syātām ity asambhir ucayate ity abhiprayam a-buddhvā
abhidhānāṃ avicāra-vijṛmbhitam eva iti vivarane’pi spaṣṭam.”

We had seen earlier that Abhinavagupta has taken this nimittavādin also along
with anvittābhidhāna-vāda and he is not unjustified in it. But Mammaṭa has taken
it as a separate group of objectors even though broadly falling in the company of
the anvittābhidhānavāda as even this objector believes in abhidhā giving a correlated
meaning concerning generality only. Same is the case with the dirghatara-vyāpāra-
vādins, who are taken as a separate group by Mammaṭa, though actually forming
only a section of the mīmāṃsakas as suggested by Abhinavagupta. It may be noted
that Jhalkikara suggests that this view was postulated by Mīmāṃsakas such as
Lollāta and the like, who chose to follow the abhihitānvayavāda.

We do not know whether we are justified in associating Lollāta’s name with this
view and also with abhihitānvayavāda. In the Abhinavabhāraṇī also the views of
Lollāta are quoted and discussed at a number of places but we have no conclusive
evidence to suggest that Lollāta, if at all a mīmāṃsaka, belonged positively to the
group of the abhihitánvayavádins. But for the sake of convenience we will get along with Jhalikar, and Pandit Viśveśvara following him, and consider Lollata to be an abhihitánvayavádin supporting the dirgha-dirghatara-vyāpāra.

It may be noted, before we proceed to discuss what Mammata has to say, that among the known commentaries it is only kavya-pradīpa which labels this view as, “bhaṭṭa-matopajīvinah” (pp. 1300, edn. Nāga-publishers, ’98, Delhi), and then the Sudhāsāgara clearly states, “bhaṭṭa-lollatā”dy abhimatam paksam” (pp. 1301, ibid). Then we have Madhumañi observing, “bhaṭṭalollatā”dyabhimatam matam āśaṅkate...” (pp. 1298, ibid). The Bālacittānurañjani has, “eka-deśyantara-matam”, (pp. 1294, ibid), the Darpana has, “tad ekadeśantarānām”, (pp. 1296), the Sāhityacudāmanī has “atha’tra ketc tatparyam avalambya prayavatiśthante” (pp. 1296), the Sampradāyaprakāśini has (pp. 1297, ibid) : ‘ekadeśyantaramatam’; Vistārika offers no comment on this issue, while Sārabodhinī (pp. 1299, ibid) has, “matāntaram avatārayati”. The Sāradipikā of Guñaratnagani (edn. K.P. with Sāradipikā, Dr. T. S. Nandi, pub. Guj. Uni., Ahd. ’76); pp. 246 (Vol. I) also calls it, “eka-deši-matam”. Only Sudhāsāgara and Madhumañi candidly come out and associate this view with Bhaṭṭa Lollata and Jhalikar seems to follow them. But for the time being we will choose to keep our fingers crossed.

Mammata puts the whole thing as follows:

(Trans. R. C. Dwivedi, pp. 165, 167, ibid) : There are others who say : “The function (of the word or denotation), like that of an arrow, lasts for long” - and “whatever is intended to be expressed by the word, that is the meaning of the word;” accordingly the positive sense itself is the denoted meaning here - (i.e. in the verse, ‘The slope of your breasts has its sandal completely washed off’ etc.). They (who have advanced the above view) also do not understand its real import, they are foolish in that they indulge in the argument of purport (i.e. the theory that whatever is intended to be expressed by the word is its meaning). To make it explicit : When the accomplished thing and what is to be accomplished are mentioned together, the accomplished is meant to subserve the one which is to be accomplished. Thus, the substantive meanings, on their being correlated to the verb-meaning, acquire the character of what is to be accomplished, on account of their being related to their own action which helps the principal action. Thus following the maxim of burning the unburnt, that alone is predicated which has not been already accomplished. For example, when the walking about of the priests is establisned through other injunction in a case like, “the priests with red-turbans are walking about”, the wearing of red turbans alone becomes the object of injunction (i.e. Redness alone of the turban is enjoined upon by this sentence - foot note, pp. 167, ibid)
Vyañjanā-virodha or, opposition to suggestive power

In cases like “He offers libation of curd”, the offering of the libation being (known as) accomplished elsewhere, the means alone is prescribed here. Sometimes the injunction applies to two things and still in other cases the injunction applies to three things. For example, in cases like, “weave the red garment”, it may be the injunction for one or two or three.

Thus whatever is prescribed there alone is the purport (of the word), therefore the purport relates to the given word only, and not to what is merely implied. If it were so, then in cases like “the former runs”, the purport could be related to the sense of the latter also. - “tataścā yad eva vidheyaḥ, tatraiva tātparyam, ity upāttasyaiva śabdasya arthe tātparyam, na tu pratītā-mātre. evaṁ hi ‘pūrvo dhāvati’ ity ādāv aparāḥ dy arthēpi kvacit tātparyam syāt.’ (pp. 166, vṛtti, K.P. V, ibid).

Mammata refutes the views of those who want to do away with vyañjanā and invest abhidhā, with a longer and longer efficacy of yielding the padārtha, then vākyārtha and then the vyañgyārtha or intended sense also. These opponents take recourse to the Mīmāṃsā principle viz. “yatparah śabdah sa śabdārthah.” - i.e. ‘a word-meaning is that for which it is used’. Mammaṭa says that these foolish Mīmāṃsakas do not understand the meaning of their own discipline. The real purport of this statement is that a word means only that for which it is used and when one thing is already prescribed it is not repeated, if any, comes with the use of a new word, the meaning of which is the newer intention of the speaker for this fresh injunction. At times one, or two or three things can be newly enjoined and for each newly enjoined item, a fresh word, meaning exactly the same thing, is used in a fresh injunction. This is the real purport of the words, “yatparah śabdah sa śabdārthah”. Mammaṭa explains the position by seeking illustrations from vedic ritual as well as common practice. He also quotes the maxim, “bhūta-bhavya-samuccārane bhūtam bhavyāya upadiśyate”, to bring home his point. It is very clear that, compared to Abhinavagupta, Mammaṭa has dug deeper and presented the whole matter with absolute clarity. (The translation of the original passages is by Prof. R. C. Dwivedi).

Mammaṭa then, perhaps turns his guns towards his immediate predecessors, Dhanañjaya and Dhanika, who come up with the advocacy of tātparya-vṛtti and rejected vyañjanā. It may be said here that Dhanañjaya-Dhanikas’ tātparya-seems to be something else than the normal tātparya of the Mīmāṃsakas. For the Mīmāṃsakas ‘tātparya’ was only a vākya-vṛtti, yielding a sentence-sense, as against the abhidhā which was only a pada-vṛtti and yielded only the padārtha or individual word-sense. The correlated sentence of all words in a sentence was apprehended by a vākyārtha-vṛtti called ‘tātparya’, for the abhihitānvayavādins. But for Bhoja
and then for Dhaṇjaya and Dhanika tātparya went further. Whatever was intended to be conveyed by a speaker by the use of words, or partial use of words, was covered up by tātparya. Actually this tātparya, as Viśvanātha discloses, is only a new name for vyānjana. It is not the theoretically accepted tātparya of the Mīmāṃsakas. So, when Mammaṭa rejects tātparya, he rejects something not exactly intended by the opponents. As in case of ‘anumiti’ also, with reference to Mahimā, this ‘tātparya’ is not the same traditionally accepted tātparya in Mīmāṃsā discipline. It is broader and therefore, perhaps only a new name of vyānjana.

Actually in rejecting the earlier view, Mammaṭa had suggested that ‘tātparya’ or purport can be with reference to the word actually used a fresh, in a newer injunction. But the objector here says tātparya can be with reference to an-upātta word or unspoken word also as in case of “viṣam bhūṅkṣva”. The Sudhāsāgara, Sārabodhini, Sampradāyaprabhāsini, Sāhitya-cūḍāmani and other commentaries make this thing clear. The Sāhitya-cūḍāmani observes (pp. 1305, Edn. Nāg publishes) - “nanu ‘anupāttasyā’pi śabdasya arthe kvacic tātparyam paśyāmah” ... etc. No commentary makes a clear reference to the Daśarūpākāvaloka of Dhanika which specifically discusses this in connection with the famous words where he declares: “tātparyam na tulādhṛtam”. (DR. Avaloka on IV. 36). Dhanaṇjaya observes: “na ca apadārthasya vākyārthavam nāśṭiti vācyam - kārya-paryavasāyitvāt tātparya-śakteḥ.” - But one thing should be considered. We go along with Dr. De and others (i.e. Dr. Kane) when we take both Dhanaṇjaya and Dhanika as predecessors of Mammaṭa. In that case for sure, Mammaṭa discusses the illustration viz. “viṣam bhaksaya” etc. after Dhanika’s Avaloka. But as no commentator worth the salt mentions Dhanika here, could it be that Mammaṭa could have just continued his discussion concerning “yat-parah śabdah sa śabdārthah” and refuted some imagined objector’s view who might have supported the case of “anupāttasyā’pi śabdasya arthe kvacic tātparyam” ? May be then following Mammaṭa once again Dhanika took up the same illustration of a tātparya-vṛtti with a broader connotation? We are not clear about this and leave it to the discerning experts. For the present we will proceed with Mammaṭa:

(Trans. R.C.D., pp. 167, 169; ibid):

“It is also stated that, ‘eat the poison, but do not eat at his house’, - here the purport is that “you should not eat in his house”; hence this alone is the meaning of the sentence. To this we reply - Here the conjunctive particle ‘ca’ (= and) is meant for the unity of the (two) sentences.
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Since there is no relation of the principal and subordinate between the two sentences having independent verbs ('eat' and 'do not eat' because the first verb gives the positive command and the other negative, these two verbs cannot be principal and subordinate) the sentence asking for taking the poison should be imagined to be subordinate by making it derivative (i.e. instead of 'eat', or 'bhūṅkṣva', the word should be taken here as a derivative, 'eating' or 'bhakṣaṇa'. The former sentence is thus made subordinate to the second sentence. The meaning of the two sentences taken together would be that) : “Eating in the house of this man is worse than eating poison, therefore, you should never eat in the house of this man.” It follows from this that the import is in the meaning of a given (word) only.”

Mammata further presents fresh argument in defence of vyañjanā when he observes that if, on hearing a word, any meaning obtained were under only denotative function - 'śabdaśruter anantarāṃ yāvān arthāḥ avagamyate, tāvati śabdasya abhidhā eva vyāpāraḥ...’, then why not joy and despair and the like be taken as directly expressed meanings respectively in cases of such utterances as, “O Brahmaṅa, a son is born to you”, or “your unmarried daughter is pregnant?” etc... Why even to admit lakṣaṇa or indication at all-kasmāc ca lakṣaṇa ? For in cases of indicated meaning also the apprehension could be accomplished by the far-reaching function of direct expression - “dirgha-dirgha-abhidhā-vyāpārenaiva pratiitī-siddheḥ.” We know that for deciding the exact meaning of an injunction in case a conflict is noticeable between one and another injunction, the Mīnāmā has given a six-fold scheme such as śṛti, or Direct declaration, liṅga i.e. indicative power, vākya or syntactical connection, prakaraṇa or context, sthāna or position and samākhya or the name, and these have each preceding factor stronger than the immediate next. The Sampradāya-prakāśiṅī explains it as : tad etat para-daurbalyaṃ katham utpadyatāṃ, parādurbalatve hetur yāṛtha-viprakaraṇaḥ, maheśuvad dirgha-dīrghe tavāsminnaḥbhidhāvyāpāre jīvati, tasyaivaṃ saṃbhavat. The idea is that these factors which go to prove the higher and lower authority of various injunctions conflicting with one another would be of no use because even from the lowest placed type the meaning of the highest placed variety will be derived on the strength of dīgha-dirgha-tara-vyāpāra theory. Thus, Mammata triumphantly declares - iti anvitaḥbhidhānavāde'pi vidher api siddham vyaṅgyatvam, i.e. even according to the theory of 'connected meaning', also the affirmation (i.e. tāṭraiva rantuṃ eva gata'si iti) (in the verse, 'the slope of your breasts has its sandal completely washed off, etc.) must be regarded being of the nature of suggested.
Mammaṭa, as observed earlier has not only drawn from both Abhinavagupta and Ānandavardhana, but has placed all arguments very systematically and has also added some fresh arguments of his own in view of the tough opposition to vyañjanā advanced by the great opponents such as Mahimā, even Bhoja to an extent, and the Mālava-school also represented by Dhanañjaya and Dhanika. Of course, Dhanika, as we tried to put above, could be posterior to Mammaṭa. But this is an unsupported conjecture based on only internal evidences. We will look into this later after first convering the full discussion as presented by Mammaṭa.

It is interesting to note that the Sampradāya-prakāśini tries to distinguish between the mīmāṃsakas, and the literary critics who seem to follow the lead of the mīmāṃsakas. Śrī-Śrīvidyācakravartin passes a remark (pp. 1341, ibid) - such as: “iyatā sandarbheṇa sāhitya-saranī-parisilana-parāmukhatayā pasu-prāyāḥ śuṣka-mīmāṃsavaḥ prayavatiśthamānāḥ niskāśitāḥ. samprati tu ye anvitābhidhānadarśanānusārināḥ sāhitya-saranīm anupravīṣṭāḥ sacetanammanyāḥ tān prati sannahvate. The mīmāṃsakas were dry as dust and therefore pasu-prāyā almost beasts for total lack of sensitivity, while the literary critics who follow their lead at least have cultivated some sensitivity and those who consider themselves as ‘those with conscience’ - ‘sacetanam-manyāḥ’ - the pseudo-sensitive lot. Of course, other commentators such as the Viveka of Śrīdhara, the Kāvyādarsa, and the Bālacittānuraṇjanī take the opponents here only as anvitābhidhānavādins. Jhalkikar also takes them to be the same, but perhaps the remarks of Śrī-Śrīvidyācakravartin are directed towards Dhanañjaya-Dhanika and the like.

So, Mammaṭa proceeds to demolish the opposition to vyañjanā as follows: “And again, why should the inverted order or ‘kuru rucim’, appearing in a poem, be regarded as a piece of blemish? Here the indecent meaning is not connected with meanings of other words so it should remain un-denoted (according to those who admit only one power of word, abhidhā) and thus there will be no reason to avoid such expression.” Śrīvidyā-Cakravartin observes: (pp. 169, Edn. Dwivedi): “kuru rucim” iti pade yadi vyatyayena kāvyāntara-vartini syātāṃ tadā duṣṭatā yā iyaṃ aśśīlata-lakṣāṇa sammatā, sā anvitaḥ bhavyupagame katham vā upapadyatāṃ? na hi pada yor anyor anyā”dy aksara-sannikarṣa-mātrād abhāsamāno laukiko grāmyōrthōrthāntarena anvitaḥ śabdārtha eva bhavati. tataḥ a-sabdārthasya doṣatve ati-prasaktih syād ityevama”dy apari-tyāyāṃ syāt. ayaṃ anvitaḥbhidhānadārśana-aśrayane doṣo bhavatām.”

Mammaṭa further observes: “And if the reality of the suggester and the suggested, as distinct from the reality of the expressive and the expressed is not
accepted, then the classification of grammatical mistake (i.e. a-sādhutva-dośa) and the like into permanent poetic blemish and that of harshness (= kaśṭatva) etc. into impermanent poetic blemish would be rendered unjustifiable.” (Trans. pp. 171, edn. Dwivedi, ibid). The idea is that literary critics have accepted certain poetic blemishes as all-time blemishes, and others as only occasional. This classification argues Mammaṭa, stands justified only if it stands on the basis of the recognition of vyaṅga-vyaṅjakabhāva. Mammaṭa observes that this classification of blemishes into permanent and impermanent is not unjustified as it shines distinctly to every body. If the reality of the suggester and the suggested is accepted as distinct from the reality of the expressive and the expressed, the suggested meaning being manifold, some meaning alone may be regarded as appropriate in a certain case, and thus the system of classification would be quite justified.” (Trans. Dwivedi, pp. 171, ibid).

The Saṃpradāya-prakāśini observes that when a grammarian is a speaker, such usages as involving harsh letters or consonants e.g. “varvaṣṭi.” will not make for the blemish of śrītikaṭutva or kaśṭatva even in a poem, but will be on the contrary taken as an excellence: “yo hi “varvaṣṭih” ity ādyā”tmakah kaśṭatvā”di-doṣaḥ sa vaiyākaranaḥ”dau vaktari tava’pi guṇarvena smamatāḥ, anyathā doṣatvena. soyam vibhāgo vāyavācaka-bhāva-mātrā”śrayane na upapadyate tasya sārvasya ekārūpavat; tad atireki-vyaṅga-vyaṅjakabhāva.”śra-yane tu śrūtikāṭuttvam api prakriyā-mātra-vyavasthitasya vaiyākarāṇasya varākasya na kāka-kalpataṁ āviṣkaroti, pratyuta guṇa eva iti vibhāgo’yam upapadyata eva.” (p. 170, ibid).

Mammaṭa further observes that in such poetic illustrations as, “dvayam gatam.” etc. - i.e. “Both these have now become pitiable due to their desire for association with the Holder of the begging bowl.” (i.e. kapālin, or Śiva), why should the words as ‘kapālin’ - or ‘the Holder of the begging bowl’, and the like, be regarded as poetically appropriate? And again, the denoted meaning is one and the same for all cognisers so why ‘kapālin’ is taken as more poetically charged in comparison to ‘pinākin’ or ‘wielder of the pināka bow’?

The denoted meaning or vācyārtha is one and uniform for all cognisers in illustrations such as, ‘gato’ stam arkaḥ” - i.e. “The sun has set.” But the suggested sense, argues Mammaṭa, in such expressions, varies and becomes manifold by accessory conditions, such as, the particular context, the speaker, the person addressed and the like. Innumerable suggested senses arise in different situations from one and the same expression as, “gatośtam arkaḥ”, such as : This is the time
to invade the enemy; you should start to meet your lover; your lover is about to reach; we are going to stop our work; let us begin the twilight rite; do not go very far; bring the cows to their shed; there is now no heat; let us pack up the merchandise; the lover has not come even to-day."

There is distinction between the vācyā and the vyaṅgya in point of character e.g. in nihśeṣa-cyuta. etc. the expressed is of negative nature and the suggested is of positive character. In verses such as, “mātsaryam uṣṭāya.” etc., the expressed sense poses doubt, while the suggested is of the nature of definiteness in the choice between the śānta and the śṛṅgāra-rasa.

In poetic illustrations such as, “katham avanipa darpo...” etc., the expressed meaning is of the nature of reproach i.e. nindā, and the suggested is of the nature of praise i.e. stuti.

The vācyā and the vyaṅgya are distinct in point of time also, because of antecedence and sequence of the cognition; in point of media : The word is the medium (for the expressed), while the word, its part, its meaning, letters, and their peculiar composition are the media for the suggested in form of instrumentality i.e. nimitta; the expressed is known by the knowledge of grammar, while the suggested is known with its help, as also with the help of context, and other auxiliary conditions and with transparency of discriminative intellect; in point of effect : the expressed produces a mere comprehension in one who knows the meaning of words, while the suggested produces charm in men of taste alone; in point of number as it has been shown in the instance, “gatóstam arkaḥ”.

In instances such as, “kassa vā ṇa hoi. ...” etc. there is difference in point of person addressed because the expressed relates to the companion of the speaker i.e. sakhī, the suggested relates to her husband, her lover, the onlooker etc.

Mammatā concludes that even when being distinct on so many points, if the expressed and the suggested are taken as one, there could never be any difference even between the blue, and the not-blue and the like. It is said, “The apprehension of the opposite attributes and the difference of cause, this, in fact, constitutes difference or the ground of difference.”- ukrama hi- ayaṁ eva hi bheda-bheda-hetur vā yad-viruddha-dharmādhyāsaḥ kāraṇa-bhedaś ca.”

We know that Mammatā has systematically arranged all arguments scattered in the Dhvanyāloka and the Locana, and has also added a few to silence the vyañjanā-virodha as seen in the successors of Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta.
Mammata further states that the expressive words require the object of denotation but the suggestive ones do not require that. The idea is that in lakṣaṇā-mūla-dhvani of the atyanta-tiraskṛta-vācya, the primary sense is totally discarded and therefore not required at all.

In illustrations of guṇībhūta-vyaṅgya such as vānīra-kudaḥ" etc. i.e. in illustrations of subordinate suggestion such as 'on hearing the twitter of birds on the vetasa-bower..." etc., where the expressed sense having delivered the suggested meaning rests within itself - 'vācyāṃ svarūpa eva yatra viśrāmyati' - even unintended meaning, not denoted by words, appears in our range of cognition. Under what function of words would such a meaning be included?

The objector may argue, says Mammata, that, in instances such as, "rāmōsmi sarvam sahe", "rāmeṇa priya-jīvitenā." etc. even the indicated (i.e. lakṣya) artha also becomes manifold, and the cause of a particular nomenclature, its composition is also based on both words and their meanings, and requires the help of the context and the like (as in case of the suggested or vyaṅgya artha), so, why should we admit this new kind of meaning, namely the suggested meaning? The reply to this is - "lakṣaṇiyasya arthasya nānārve api anekārtha-sabdābhidheyavat niyatatvam eva." - i.e. Even though indicated sense is manifold, yet just like the denoted meaning of homonymous words, its number is definite (and limited).

Moreover, a meaning (under indication) which has no definite relation with the primary sense, cannot be indicated. But the suggested one, due to the context and other individual conditions, (i) may have a definite relation, (ii) may not have a definite relation or (iii) may be only related to what is directly related (to the expressed sense). - "pratīyamānas tu prakaraṇādi-viśeṣa-vaṣena niyata-saṃbandhah, a-niyata-saṃbandhah, saṃbaddha-saṃbandhasca dyotyate."

There is no mukhyārtha-bādha i.e. the expressed sense is not contradicted in instances of vivakṣitānyapara vācya-dhvani, such as “attā ettha niṃajjai.” etc. So, how can there be indication or lakṣaṇā at all? And again, it has already been shown that in lakṣaṇā also, the suggestion has to be resorted to, to arrive at theprayojana or intention of the speaker. Just as denotation-vācakatva-rests on convention, indication-lakṣaṇā-rests on mukhyārtha-bādha etc. - i.e. the three conditions. It is therefore described as an extention - literally 'tail' - 'pucchabhūtā' of abhidhā or expression.

Mammata in an immaculate fashion sums up what Ānandavardhana had stated while establishing vyaṅjanā as an independent power of word, other than
abhidhā, lakṣanā and even tātparya. He says - (pp. 178, edn. Dwivedi, ibid) :

"na ca lakṣanā"tmakam eva dhvananaṁ, tad anugamena tasya darśanāt. na ca tad anugatam eva, abhidhāvalambana api tasya bhāvāt. na ca ubhayāṇusār yeva, a-vācaka-varṇānusāreṇa api tasya drṣṭeḥ - na ca sabdānusāreyeva, a-sabdā"tmaknetra-trībhāgāvalokanā"di-tātparya-lakṣanā"tmaka-vyāpāra-trayātivartī vyañjana-dhvanana"di paryāyo vyāpāropahnavaniya eva." - i.e. "And the suggestion is not verily of the nature of indication, because it (i.e. suggestion) is seen to follow that (i.e. indication). Nor does it invariably follow that (i.e. indication), because it may arise on the basis of denotation also. Nor again does it invariably follow both (i.e. denotation and indication), because it is seen on the basis of inexpressive letters also. The suggestion is not based on words (as also on letters and syllables) either, because it is known to be related to the side-long glance and the like, which are non-verbal in their character. Thus the function, which has many synonyms such as suggestion, reverberation, and which is beyond the three functions of the nature of Denotation, Import, and Indication, cannot be denied." (Trans. R. C. Dwivedi, ibid) -

It may be noted that the synonym ‘dhvanana’ as used by the dhvanivādins for vyañjana could mean more than it appears at the upper level. We had above discussed the point and we will also go to elaborate still further while dealing with Mahimā, that such sounds as thundering of clouds carries a meaning of on coming rains. Now the anumiti-vādin may argue that this again is an instance of laukika-anumāna or “loose inference”. But this thing is perhaps rejected by Ānandavardhana and his followers by taking ‘dhvanana’ as meaning suggestion. There is no ‘anumāna’ here, be it loose as taken by the opponent, but surely there is suggestion. In the same way in various media, such as colour in the art of painting, gestures in dance, acting in drama, musical notes in music, carving in sculpture and the like, we have to read vyañjanā and not loose ‘anumiti’. The joining or disjoining of a railway compartment, the peculiar sound of arriving or disappearing of the flow of water in a water tap, the sound of a vehicle, or of the walking and foot-steps of a dear one or an animal—all these are therefore suggestors and certainly there is no scope for inference which is a dry exercise in intellect. Abhinavagupta squarely puts it as : “laukikānumāne tu kā rasatā ?”. So, this may be taken as the final triumph of vyañjana over anumiti. - Yes, even loose inference !

We may again place the point squarely. The dragon of anumitivāda had raised its head much earlier than even Ānandavardhana. Even Bhāmaha contended with it when he dealt with “kāvya-nyāya”. The author of the Dhvanyāloka was very
Vyañjanā-virodha or, opposition to suggestive power

specific when he explained that the province of anumiti and that of word are distinct from each other. When the former ends, the latter starts. It can be understood as follows. Supposing you are in a place, the language of which land is not known to you. Suddenly you hear someone talking to you loudly or rudely or in a polite tone. You do not understand the meaning of a language foreign to you. But you can infer something. That someone has an intention to convey something is understood by you through inference. But what exactly he wants to convey can be understood only, if through an interpreter you come to know the meaning of spoken words. Thus, to get at the meaning you have to have an understanding of the convention of a particular word of that language with reference to a particular meaning. Thus Āṇandavardhana has made this absolutely clear that the ‘anumeya visaya’ of words and the ‘pratipādyya visaya’ of words are different. When someone speaks, you may infer that he is a sentient being and that through his language, known or unknown to you, he wants to convey something. Thus the intention to convey through use of words on his part, is a matter of inference. But actually whatever is conveyed through use of words is the denotative aspect: “pratipādyas tu prayoktavrtha-pratipādana-samihā-visayikrta’rthah” - i.e. “The denotative scope of words relates to meaning itself which happens to be the aim of the speaker’s intention to convey meaning.” Nothing can be clearer than this. So, after Bhāmaha’s effort to pacify the anumiti-vādins, Śāṅkuka or the likes of him or his predecessors must have once again raised the bogie of inference and Āṇandavardhana directed his efforts to pacify these voices by partly accepting and wholly explaining as to where anumiti should end. But the voice was not silenced for ever and perhaps it had a tendency to take shape like the phoenix from ashes.

Hence Abhinavagupta also had to tackle it very carefully. In presenting Śāṅkuka’s views and in its refutation by his teachers, the author of Abhinavabhārati makes a plea that, “laukikānumāne tu kā rasatā” - what aesthetics can be derived from “popular” anumāna or inference at worldly parlour? It seems he refers to two categories here. One is the scientific i.e. śāstra or tarka-anumāna which is rejected out right. Later even Mahima, the avowed supporter of inference, also concedes that ‘tarkānumiti’ or scientific inference is never sought after by the anumiti-vādins. But he evolves a third category called kāvyānumiti, over and above the tarkānumiti and the laukikānumāna as suggested earlier. Āṇandavardhana rejected the tarkānumāna of the tārkikas or logicians, but tried to accommodate some element of it in what he called, “anumeyo visayā śabdānām”. Abhinavagupta went a step further and accepted that ‘rasānubhava’ or aesthetic
experience is possible only in case of such sensitive aesthetes who are experts in worldly inference - “tatra loka-vyavahāre kārya-kāraṇa-sahacārā”tmaka-līnga-
darśane sthāyyā”tmaka-cittavṛtty anumānābhyaśa-pāṭavād...” - i.e. the aesthete or
the man of taste has to be fully armed with expertise in inference at local level. In
short he has to be an expert in the art of inferring the feelings of others at the
worldly level.

Mammaṭa almost echoes these words when he says : (K.P. IV) : “loke
pramadā”dibhīḥ kāraṇā”dibhīḥ sthāyyanumāne abhyāsa-pāṭava-vatām...” i.e. “In
common life, the men of taste are possessed of proficiency, by repeated observation
in inferring the basic emotion through women and the like, i.e. through causes,
etc.” (Trans. R. C. Dwivedi, pp. 69, ibid). But beyond this the vyāñjanāvādins cannot
concede. Mahimā having seen this much comes up with a third type of anumiti over
and above the ‘tarkānumiti’ and ‘laukikānumāna’, and it is what he terms
kāvyānumiti. If laukikānumāna is having no ‘rasātā’, this poetic inference is all full
of rasa.’ Dr. Rewaprasad, the greatest modern exponent of kāvyānumiti also says
that when Mammaṭa and his followers refute ‘anumāna’ in illustrations such as
“bhrāma dhārmika. ...” etc., they refute the process of inference, but not the fact
of inference. Even Mahimā shielded his kāvyānumiti by saying that this, what he
calls a poetic inference, is beyond the scrutiny of perfectionists - ‘saryāsatuva-vicāranā’
or examination concerning its validity or otherwise is an object of laughter ! This
effort is misdirected and therefore looks like a crude joke !

But our humble submission is that if you use the term ‘anumiti’ and remove all
its basic qualities, then you may call it by any other name. Why insist on such an
inference which is beyond an examination of its validity or otherwise ? Actually
inference is an intellectual process and art-experience or kālānubhūti or
rasānubhūti transcends even intellect. It covers intellect, volition and also
imagination and goes beyond all these - atytiṣṭhad daśāṅgulam. Art experience is
like the three and a half strides of Viṣṇu in form of Vāmanā-virāṭ. To label this rasa
experience by names such as perception, or inference or presumption or any
worldly or śāstriya means of knowledge is to devalue it. It is precisely for this
reason that Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta and the thought-current
represented by them choose to call it ‘vyāṅgya’ or suggested and make it an object
of the power of suggestion. Thus, vyāñjana, dhvanana, prayāyana, avagamana are
synonyms acceptable to the supporters of vyāñjana/dhvani/vesa. Thus perhaps the
war is won by vyāñjanāvādins though at times the anumitivādins stole some
advantage in small battles.
Vyañjanā-virodha or, opposition to suggestive power

Mammata, while winding up his discussion on vyañjanā observes, like Ānandavardhana, that, “others (= the grammatico-philosophers) have held that it is the sentence-meaning alone which, grasped through a single indivisible cognition, is the expressed sense (vācyā), and it is the sentence alone that is expressive (vācakā). But these (theorists) also, when descending down to the realm of practical reality (avidyā), must make the assumption of the word and the word-meaning; so that even according to their view, the idea of affirmation and the like, in the instances such as cited above (i.e. the slopes of your breasts have its sandal completely washed off, etc.), should necessarily be considered as the suggested.” (Trans. Dwivedi, pp. 181, ibid). Thus even the grammarians have to accept vyañjanā.

Mammaṭa, at the end of his discussion on vyañjanā tackles the anumitivādins. He first presents the arguments of the logicians and then refutes the same. He observes: (Trans. Dwivedi, pp. 181, 183, ibid):

“It may be urged (by the logicians) that what is not connected with the expressed is not suggested, because in that case there would be contingency of cognition of any meaning from any word. Thus, the relation being essential, the state of being the suggester and the suggested is, undoubtedly, not possible in the absence of a definite relation, therefore, on account of invariable concomittance (between the expressed i.e. suggester, and the suggested) and due to the existence in the definite subject, characterised by mark, the suggestiveness turns out to be of the character of inference, which is the cognition of the subject, characterised by the threefold mark.” To explain the same, in the illustration viz. bhrama dharmika etc., Mammaṭa observes that in this particular illustration, the roaming about in the house, which is enjoined upon due to removal of the dog, leads to inference of not roaming about because of the presence of the lion on the banks of Godāvari. Every case of the coward’s roaming about is a case preceeding from the knowledge of disappearance of the cause of fear. But on the banks of the Godāvari there is the presence of the lion; so what is found is contrary to what is invariably concomitant.

This is what an anumitivādin would present in support of his theory of anumāṇa. But Mammaṭa and a host of his followers find fault with this process of reasoning as follows. He observes that even a coward, by the order of his preceptor or the master, or due to love for his beloved, or by some such cause, roams about even when the cause of fear is present; hence the probans (= hetu) is non-conclusive (= anaikāntiko), i.e. literally it is not unfailing in its association with the ‘sādhya’ or probandum. Even though afraid of the dog, he may not, being brave,
fear the lion, hence the probans is diverse (= viruddha) also. The presence of the lion on the banks of the Godāvari is not ascertained either by perception or by inference but merely from the words of a woman. Again, there is no validity of her words as they might not be related to fact, hence the probans is unestablished also. Then how, such a defective probans can prove the existence of the probandum?

Mammatā goes on to explain that in case of the illustration viz. nīṭhēṣa-cyutacandana.” etc. also the marks that are mentioned as going with a ‘bath in a step-well’ could be due to some other reasons also, such as love-sport etc. So, the marks - i.e. probans - are discrepant.

For those who support vyañjanā, on the other hand, such marks with the aid of the word ‘wretch’, are described as suggestive. Again, here when the wretchedness is not established by valid reason. (na pramāṇa-pratipannam), how can there be inference?

Thus, to his satisfaction Mammatā puts a final nail in the coffin wherein the body of anumiti rests.

But we may say that all this exercise on the part of Mammatā and his followers to nail anumiti is futile as Mahimā or any of his predecessor that might be, has never suggested that what they call ‘kāvyānumiti’ is ‘tarkānumiti’. As Dr. Rewaprasad observes, here there is refutation of the reliaability of anumiti, or the validity of inference, but not of the fact of inference. True, but our argument is that with all looseness why stick to the name of “anumiti”? To be vary candid, we do not find ‘anumiti’ in colours, or musical notes, or gestures or any other medium of a given fine art, yes; not even a ‘loose’ or ‘artistic’ anumiti. So, why not accept a wider term called ‘vyañjanā’ in place of a ‘laukika’ or ‘kāvyamaya’ anumāṇa? We may therefore hold that by this the final victory of vyañjanā and defeat of anumiti is absolutely established. Vyañjanā is so wide as to accept in its fold a meaning that may be related (= saṃbaddha), or un-related (= a-sambaddha) or related with the related (= saṃbaddha-saṃbaddha).

Mammatā had a numer of vyañjanā virodhins before him. In the course of our discussion of Mammatā’s views, we had suggested that even after the able establishment of vyañjanā by Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta, we had voices of descent. Thus as seen in the earlier chapter Mukula, prior to Abhinavagupta tried to put even lakṣāṇā and also vyañjanādhvani under abhidhā. In his Laghuvyṛtti, a commentary on Uḍbata’s kāvyālaṃkāra-sāra-saṃgraha, Pratīhārendurāja, who also is held as a predecessor of Abhinavagupta, pays a great
tribute to his guru, Mukula in the words:

“mimamsa-sara-meghat, pada-jaladhi-vidhos tarka-manikya-kosat,
sahitya-sri-murarer budha-kusuma-madhoh sauri-pada-bhrngat,
shrutva saujanya-sindhor dvija-vara-mukulat kirti-vallyalavalat,
kavyalamkara-sare laghu-vrrtim adhat kauankaah srdndurajah.”

On his A.V.M. - 11 and 12a, Mukula writes: (pp. 66, Edn. Dr. Rewaprasad, Varanasi, '73) ... “etac ca sarvaṃ bahu-vaktavyatvād īha na nirūpyate lakṣaṇā-
mārgāvagāhitvaṃ tu dhvaneḥ sahṛdayair nūtanatayo-pavarṇitasya vidyata iti
dīśam unmiṣayītum idam atra uktam. etac ca vidvādbhiḥ kusāgriyayā buddhyā
nirūpanīyam, na tu jhagity evāsūtyitavyam iti alam ati-prasaṅgena.”

“All this requires great elaboration and hence is not discussed here fully. We
have said only this much, only to point to the fact that some men of taste have
laid down afresh, as dhvani, is contained only in the province of lakṣaṇā (which
thus covers vyañjanā also in its fold). The learned with their razor-sharp intellect
have to expound this (secret). They should not discard (our point) (as trash)
immediately, through prejudice.”

We may point out exactly where Mukula has rejected the views of
Ānandavardhana. For example, the latter has taken rasa as ‘vyāņgya’ or suggested
and principal. Mukula has laid down the apprehension of rasa through “ākṣepa”
which may mean either lakṣaṇā, or arthāpatti i.e. presumption, and anumāna, or
inference. Mammaṭa and others take ‘ākṣepa’ in the sense of ‘implicit sense’ also
and therefore ‘vyāņjanā’ also. Mukula takes ‘ākṣepa’ only as lakṣaṇā i.e. indication,
and arthāpatti i.e. presumption.

We know that for Ānandavardhana, ‘rasa’ falls into that section of ‘dhvani’
which is abhidhāmula or vivakṣitāyapara-vācyya. Now, there is no scope of lakṣaṇā
into this variety, which goes with what is termed, “a-vivakṣita-vācyya-dhvani”. But
for Mukula, even in vivakṣitāyana-para-vācyya also there is scope of lakṣaṇā and he
illustrates it by, “mahatī samare śatrughnas tvam”.

For Ānandavardhana, arthāntara-saṃkramita-vācyatva was not admissible in
what we term as ‘lakṣaṇa-lakṣaṇa’. But Mukula holds that in the illustration viz.
“gaṅgāyāṃ ghosah”, the vācyārtha in form of gangātva, terminates (= saṃkṛanta)
in the meaning of ‘taṇa’ (i.e. tāṭarūpa-artha). Of course Ānandavardhana also did
not say that the vācyārtha here is “atyanta-tiraskṛta” or wholly abandoned, but at
the same time he does not clearly name it as, “arthāntara-saṃkramita” also.
Änandavardhana took 'gunaś' or excellences as qualities of rasa; Mukula keeps quiet over this as he discusses only abhidhā in his work.

Änandavardhana, over and above abhidhā accepts 'guna-vṛtti' and vyañjanā as word-powers; Mukula on the other hand accepts only abhidhā which is broad enough to cover lakṣanā also in its fold, while vyañjanā for him does not exist at all. Even lakṣanā is an extension of abhidhā and it has no independent existence. While for the Mīmāṃsakas 'guna-vṛtti' and lakṣanā were not identical, for Änandavardhana they are identical. Mukula also places both guna-vṛtti and lakṣanā under a single title i.e. lakṣanā, which again is not independent of abhidhā, of which these two are sub-varieties.

Mammapaṭa had to face this music of Mukula also and also of Mukula's pupil, Pratīhārendurāja. He also has no faith in vyañjanā and passes a remark, following his teacher Mukula, (pp. 100, N.S. Edn. 1928) - “evam etad vyañjakatvāṃ paryāyoktā”diśv antar bhāvitām. etac ceha bahuvaktavyātānam na vaitatyena prapañcitam. kuśāgrīya-buddhīnām hi dīnmātra eva upadiśyate sati buddhi-valli pratāna-satair nānā-dig-vyāpitvena viṣṭāram āsādayati.” On pp. 58, (under ‘rasavat’, in varga IV) he observes : “rasānāṃ bhāvānāṃ ca kāvia-sobhātīśaya- hetuvāt kim kāvyālāṃkāratvam uta kāvia-jīvitvām iti na tāvad vicāryate grantha-gauravabhayāt. rasa-bhāva-svarūpaṃ cātra na vivecitam a-prakṛtavād bahu-vaktavyātvāc ca. He does not name vyañjanā and by avagamana-vyāpāra purhaps he wants to take anumiti or arthāpatti. So, ‘paryāyokta’ is defined by Udbhaṭa as : (pp. 60, ibid) -

“paryāyoktam yad anyena
prakāreṇā’bhidhiyate,
vācya-vācaka-vṛttibhyam
śunyena’avagamanatmanā.”

Pratīhārendurāja here explains :

vācakasya abhidhāyakasya sva-saṅdasya vṛttir vyāpāro vācyārtha-pratyāyanam. vācyasya tu abhidheyasya vyāpāro vācyāntarena saha ākāṅkṣā-sannidhi-yogyata- māhātmyat samśarga-gamanam. evamvidhaś ca yo vācya-vācakayor vyāpāras tam antareṇa api prakārāntarena artha-sāmartyā”tmanā avagama-svabhāvena yad avagamyate tatparyāyena sva-kaṇṭhā’nabhīhitam api sāntarena śabda-vyāpārena avagamyamānatvāt paryāyoktam vastu. tena ca sva-saṃśleṣa-vaśena kāvyārtholāṃkriyate.”
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Let us make this clear. What Pratīhārendurāja wants us to believe is that Udbhata accepts paryāyokta as an alamkāra wherein something is abhidhiyate - i.e. 'conveyed' differently, by resorting to a vyāpāra known as 'avagamana' which is vācya-vācaka-vṛtti-sūnya i.e. which is different 'antareṇa' from what we call vācaka-vṛtti, explained by Pratīhārendurāja as 'vācyārthha-pratyāyana' i.e. apprehension of primary meaning which is the function of a 'vācaka' i.e. expressive word. It is also different from vācya-vṛtti i.e. the function of the direct-meaning. For him this function of the expressed meaning - 'vācyasya abhidheyasya vāpāra' is its correlation with other word-meanings in a sentence and this arriving at the correlated meaning is brought about by expectancy (= ākāṅkṣa), proximity (= sannidhi) and appropriateness (= yogyatā). Thus, 'samsarga-gamanam' or 'arriving at a correlated meaning or vākyārtha' is termed as vācya-vṛtti i.e. function of a meaning, against yielding vācyārtha itself which is a vācaka-vṛtti or śabda-vṛtti. Now, 'avagamana' is different from both these. It is yielding a sense by a different device - in which the directly expressive word is not used - 'sva-kantha-anabhihita'. It is 'sāntara'-vyāpāra. Now we know that Mammata has called lakṣaṇā a "sāntarārtha-niṣṭha-śabda-vyāpāra." So, perhaps like Mukula, Pratīhārendurāja here tries to cover up 'avagamana' vyāpāra by lakṣaṇā. Or, it could be even 'anumiti' as the illustration given by him, viz. "yena lambālakah." etc.-may suggest. He observes : "atra lambālakatvā"dayāḥ kārya-rūpavār kāraṇabhitam gajāsura-vadham vācya-vācaka-vyāpāra-a-sprṣṭam api gamayanti." This means that this inferring of cause from effect is 'avagamana'. Whatever it is. It is either lakṣaṇā, or anumiti but certainly not tātparya i.e. purport, which is termed vācya-vṛtti here, nor abhidhā, a 'vācaka-vṛtti', and not 'vyañjunā' which is not at all alluded to. Mammata had to face the music of all this, Mukula being the most important opponent as Mammata's śabda-vyāpāra-vicāra was modelled on, and of course directed against the Abhidhā-vṛtti-mātrkā of the former.

We know that 'dhvani' in the vyākarana discipline has relevance only upto the vaikhari vāc. But Ānandavardhana used it with reference to the pratiyamāna or implicit sense as well. Mammata of course followed Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta in accepting "vyañjanā-dhvani-rasa". But in between we have vyañjanā-dhvani-antarbhāva/virodha as seen in Mukula, Pratīhārendurāja, and to an extent in Kuntaka, Bhoja, Mahimā, Dhananjaya and Dhanika. Abhinavagupta and Mammata use the word 'dhvanana' also as a synonym for 'vyañjanā'. Mammata used the word 'dhvani' only for vaikhari-vāc in his Śabda-
vyāpāra-vicāra, and used the term ‘vyāṅgya’ for ‘pratīyamāna’ meaning. But he also used the term ‘dhvanana’ for vyāñjanā also.

Mukula’s abhidhā is a power which reaches upto the last intended meaning. Perhaps it is identical with the tātparya of the Mīmāṃsakas and also supported by Dhanika in his Avaloka on the Daśa-rūpaka. Of course the tātparya of the Mīmāṃsakas went only upto the actual word-upātha-sābda-mentioned in an injunction, while Dhanika’s tātparya covered even the sense of such words that were not at all mentioned in a given statement. Thus, when Mammaṭa denounced the dīrgha-dīrhatara-vyāpāra, it was aimed against Dhanika who arrived at the qualities of coolness and holiness through tātparya only. Mammaṭa had to contend with all this.

Kuntaka, we know talks of ‘vicitra abhidhā’. Now this ‘vicitra abhidhā’ is nothing but poetic expression. Actually Kuntaka has not bothered to evolve any clear scheme of semantics and so for him anything charming and poetic, be it at the level of abhidhā, lakṣaṇā or vyāñjanā, is covered up by ‘vicitra-abhidhā’.

Bhoja presents abhidhā in different forms and in different contexts. But he does not take lakṣaṇā as different from abhidhā, or what he terms mukhyā. For Bhoja, abhidhā is a power that stays in a word and renders meaning. For Bhoja, this abhidhā has three functions viz. mukhya, gauna and lakṣaṇā”tma. His ‘mukhyā’ is the normal ‘abhidhā’ of the Kashmir school. But it may be noted that he should not be taken as an anti-vyāñjanā-vādin, for in Ch. VII of his Śr. Pra. while treating ‘vivakṣā’, he almost covers vyāñjanā and certainly while treating tātparya and dhvani he just shakes hands with Ānandavardhana. At least we should not dub him as an anti-dhvani-or anti-vyāñjanā theorist.

We have carefully looked into Mahimā on an earlier occasion and that he was an avowed anti-dhvani, anti-vyāñjanā theorist is borne out by the very title of his work viz. ‘vyakti-viveka’ wherein he clearly denounces vyāñjanā. Mammaṭa took special care to show logical falacies in Mahimā and prove that the latter’s projection of ‘anumiti’ in place of vyāñjanā was a myth. Actually the very fact that Mahimā calls it a special brand of inference, called ‘kāvyānumiti’ and tries thereby to take shelter under what may be termed as loose inference and therefore no inference, exposes the hollowness of his postulation. An ‘anumiti’ is either an anumiti hundred percent, or no anumiti at all. It is safer to call it vyāñjanā than oppose the concept of vyāñjanā for the sake of it. It is nothing else but malice as was the case with Bhatta Nāyaka, who postulated what he called ‘śāvakatva’ and ‘bhōjakatva’ or
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bhogīkarana, - the two functions in place of one, the vyañjanā. Abhinavagupta in his Abhinavabhāratī has refuted these two functions which are partly only abhidhā and partly vyañjanā in a new name. To postulate two powers in place of one in itself was tantamount to go for ‘gaurava-doṣa’. Actually Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka's bhāvakatva was equivalent to accepting guṇas and alaṃkāras which operated at vācyā-vācaka-bhāva level, and his bhojakatva had no identity of its own to differ from the age-old concept of vyañjanā. Thus, as in case of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, so also with Mahimā, it was malice and malice alone which prompted him to oppose vyañjanā. Perhaps Mahimā is conscious of his malicious intentions, and also of the over zealous activity on his part when he says:

"iha sampratipattitonyathā vā
dhvanikārasya vaco-vivecanaṃ naḥ,
niyatam yaśase prapatsyate yan
mahatāṃ saṃstava eva gauravāya.”  - I. 2

and also,

"sahasā yaśōbhisartum
samudyatādṛśta-darpaṇā mama dhīh,
vālamkāra-vikalpa-prakalpane
vetti katham iva a-vadyam.”  I. 3.

Perhaps same is the case with Dhanika, the commentator of Dhanañjaya.

The Daśarūpaka cancells ‘nirveda’ as a sthāyin and therefore rejects sānta-rasa at DR. IV. 36. Where it it is observed:

“nirveda”dir a-tādrūpyād a-sthāyi, svadate katham
vairasyāya eva tat-poṣas tenāṣṭau sthāyino matāh.”

When ‘nirveda’ can not stand the onslaught of favourable and unfavourable feelings and emotions, it can not be admitted as a sthāyin and therefore, observes the Avaloka on it, the sānta-rasa also does not deserve a recognition - “tato rasatvam api na teśāṃ ucyate, ato a-sthāyitvād eva eteṣaṃ a-rasatā.”

Then, the Avaloka embarks upon a basic discussion as to what then can be the relation of rasas etc. with kāvyā or poetry (and also nāṭya/drama) ?

“kaḥ punar eteṣāṃ kāvyena api sambandhaḥ ?”  - First of all he presents the view of the Dhvanivādins. Dhanika holds that the relation of bāhvas and rasas with kāvyā cannot be of the type of vācyā-vācaka i.e. expressed and expresser.
- na tāvad vācy-vaćaka-bhāvaḥ, sva-śabdair anā’veditavat.

- The rasāḍi are not mentioned through sva-śabda i.e. they are not conveyed by simple mentioning of their names. We do not hear such terms as śṛṅgāra, or raty ādi and the like in poetry charged with these particular emotions and feelings. So, we cannot accept direct expression of these śṛṅgāra”di or ratyādi or of their full nourishment. - (tēṣām tat-paripoṣasya vā). Wherever such directly expressive terms such as raty ādi or śṛṅgāra”di are used, there also the nourishment of an emotion is caused not by these terms only, but by the respective ‘vibhāva”dis’ - i.e. determinants etc.

Here we may note that Dhanika seems to argue on the line of Dhvanikāra Ānandavardhana. He presents it in form of a primā-facta view. On the same line of argument as advanced by the dhvanivādin Dhanika also rejects the case of lakṣya-lakṣakabhāva between rasā”di and kāvya i.e. word and sense used in poetry.

Dhanika observes : nā’pi lakṣya-lakṣakabhāvaḥ, i.e. the relation of indicator and indicated is also ruled out in case of rasā”di and kāvya. Poetry is neither lakṣaka, nor are rasā”di lakṣa. Perhaps here the reference is to Mukula who in his Abhidhāvṛttta-mātrkā suggests that - “tātparyā-locana-sāmarthyaḥ ca vipralambhaśṛṅgārasya ākṣepa iti upādānā”tmikā lakṣaṇa.” Thus suggesting that the collection of rasā”di is through lakṣaṇa.

Dhanika rejects lakṣaṇa in the apprehension of rasā”di, because in lakṣaṇa a term indicating a class is used to convey a particular sense, but in case of rasā”di this relation is not observed. So, there is no case for lakṣita-lakṣaṇa also. He observes : tat sāmānyābhidhāyinas tu - lakṣakasya padasya a-prayogāt. The Avaloka observes that in rasa-realization there is no skhalad-gattiva of words expressing vibhāva”dis such as nāyikā and the like. As in ‘gaṅgāyām ghosah’, so also in this case the words used are not powerless to convey what they want to. There is neither ‘nimitta’ i.e. relation, nor prayojana or objective in case of rasā”di as seen in cases of lakṣaṇa. Hence, there is no chance of even ‘gaṇa-vṛtti’ as seen in “simho māṇavakaḥ”. We may note that ‘gaṇa-vṛtti’ is used here in Avaloka, in keeping with the Mālava tradition seen in Bhoja, as meaning lakṣaṇa based on similarity and this was later fixed as gauni-lakṣaṇa in the Kāvya-prakāśa, though Ānandavardhana has a wider connotation of gauni meaning an ‘a-mukhya-vyāpāra’. We have noted above while dealing with lakṣaṇa-gauni, that the Prabhākaraś hold ‘gauni’ as a separate vṛtti or an independent word-power, while the Bhāṭṭa-Mimāṃsakas and also later vyañjanāvādins such as Māmata, take gauni as a sub-variety of lakṣaṇa which is either upacāramiśrīta or upacāra-a-
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miśrita, i.e. based on identification (due to similarity) or not based on identification. We have noticed that Vidyānātha had observed that: “gauna-vṛttir api lakṣaṇa-prabheda eva. sambandhānupapatti mūlakatvāt. yathā agnir maṇavaka iti.” (pp. 33, Edn. S. Chandrasekharā Satrīgal, Madras, 1914) - On this Kumāraswami observes: “gauna-vṛttir lakṣaṇāto bhinnā iti prabhākaraḥ. tad-ayuktam. tasyā lakṣaṇāyām eva antarbhāvāt.” (pp. 33, ibid)

Dhanika continues in the vein of the Dhvanikāra, and suggests that if the apprehension of rasā”di were to take place through direct expression (i.e. yadi vācyatvena rasa-pratipattih syāt), then this apprehension should have occurred in case of even those who are not cultured and who are initiated only with reference to the province of direct-expression only – kevala-vācyava-vācaka-bhāva-mātra-vyutpanna-cetasām api a-rasikānām rasā”svādo bhavet. But this is not the case.

So, the dhvanivādins suggest that for apprehension of rasa, etc. vyañjanā has to be accepted: “ataḥ kecid abhidhā-lakṣaṇa-gauṇībhyo vācyāntara-parikalpita-śaktibhyo vyatirikītaṃ vyañjakatva-lakṣanāṃ śabda-vyāpāram rasālaṃkāra-vastu-viṣayam icchanti.” Dhanika gives a summary of the views of the Dhvanivādins who postulate a separate word-power called vyañjanā and cites three illustrations from the Dhvanyāloka in support of vyañjanā. “vivṛṇvati śaila-sutā’pi” is an illustration of rasā”di apprehension, while “bhama dhammia...”, and “lāvanya-kānti-paripūrita.” etc. are illustrations of vastu-dhvani and alaṃkāra-dhvani respectively.

Avaloka further observes that for the vyañjanāvādin, this apprehension of threefold suggestion of rasā”di, vastu, and alaṃkāra can not be the result of arthāpatti i.e. presumption. - “na ca asau arthāpatti-janyā, anupapadyamānārthāpeksābhāvāt. - i.e. This is not a case of presumption, for there is no apeksā or expectancy of a part of meaning and hence it is not a case of ‘arthāpatti’.

Nor is rasapratīti congruent with sentence-sense : nā’pi vākyārthatvam vyaṅgyasya, for suggested sense is a matter of third stage of realization : “ṛṣṭīya-kaksā-vaṣayatvāt”. First comes the vācyārtha, the second stage is that of sentence-sense and the suggested falls in the third stage.

Here onwards, Dhanika’s rejoinder to the vyañjanāvāda starts. -

Before we start analysing Dhanika’s view, it may be recalled that Mammaṣa, while dealing with the dirgha-dirghathara-vyāpāravādin’s views, had contended that the purport of a sentence has to be found with reference to words actually used in a sentence and not with reference to words not read actually in a sentence. This was the exact meaning of the injunction ‘yatparah śabdah sa śabdārthaḥ’,
according to Mammaṭa. The author of the K.P. then explains that even in statements such as ‘visām bhunḵṣva’, the purport is with reference to the words actually used in a sentence as, the ‘ca’ in the next statement viz. “mā ca asya grhe bhunḵthāḥ”, suggests that both these statements make for a compound sentence connected with the particle ‘ca’. So, even in ‘visām bhunḵṣva’ the idea of not taking food at the other person’s house, which is the purport of saying, is also seen as meaning of words actually used in a sentence.

The general impression is that here Mammaṭa has not only taken care of dirgha-dīrghatara-vyāpāravādin who believes that the purport of a sentence can be with reference to words not actually used in a statement, but also has refuted Dhanika’s views, who has taken the same illustration as, “visām bhunḵṣva”, to support tātparya-vāda.

But our humble submission is that perhaps this Dhanika, who also was a son of a ‘visnu’ is later than Mammaṭa and he wants to condemn Mammaṭa’s refutation of the theory that the purport of a sentence can not lie in words not actually used in a statement. Dhanaṅjava, the author of DR, was also a son of ‘visnu’ but this ‘visnu’ may not be the same as the father of Dhanika also. This means that Dhanika was a son of some Viṣṇu who was other than Dhanaṅjava’s father. Our hypothesis that this Dhanika is later than Mammaṭa is borne out by the fact that in his argument he cites one more illustration as we will go to see, viz. “dvāraṁ dvāram” which means ['please close, or open,] the door.” Actually the purport of the speaker is with reference to either ‘open’ or ‘close’, the meanings, for which no actual words are used. So, he wants to bring home a point that the purport of the speaker can rest with the meaning of words not actually used in a sentence. And Mammaṭa has not discussed this illustration which has no usage of such conjunctive particles as ‘ca’ etc, as seen in case of “visām bhunḵṣva, mā cāsya grhe bhunḵthāḥ.” So, the point is clear that may be this Dhanika, the author of Avaloka, was posterior to Mammaṭa and once again he tried to establish tātparyaavāda while rejecting the vyaṅjanāvāda. We will now examine Dhanika’s views in details:

The upholder of the view that vyaṅjanā is covered by tātparya places the following arguments before the dhvanivādin -

The tātparyaavādin says let us examine the sentence viz. ‘visām bhunḵṣva.’ Now in this statement in the sense of word-meaning we have a positive instruction viz. “Eat or take poison”. But the purport is in the sense of negation, viz. “Never take
food at the place of this enemy." So, this particular statement, viz. 'visāṁ bhuṅkṣva' is to be taken as an illustration of such sentence-sense (= vākyārtha) which is of the form of purport (i.e. tātparya) realized at the third stage: "nau ca ṭṛtiya-kakṣā-vaśayatvam a-śrūyaṁna-padārtha-tātparyēṣu, 'visāṁ bhuṅkṣva' ityādi vākyēṣu niśedhārtha-vaśayēṣu pratiyāta eva vākyārthasya."

If someone says that here the negative sense is not the direct sentence-sense, then this will be accepted even by the supporters of vyañjanā-, as for him dhvani i.e. suggested sense is different from the purport of a sentence: "na cātra vyañjakatvavādīna'pi vākyārthatvam nēṣyate, tātparyād anyatvād dhvaneḥ." So, even the vyañjanāvādin will accept that there is a particular sentence-sense here, which is 'tātparya'. In this illustration, we apprehend separate word-sense of the words 'visāṁ' and 'bhuṅkṣva', at the first stage. In the second stage the sentence, through correlation, gives the contextual (= prakarana-sammata) sense. This contextual correlated sense only is to be taken as sentence-sense. In this particular illustration, the second stage does not end at the apprehension of "Take poison". Till the sentence is not rested fully i.e. is not viśrānta in the second stage, the question of third stage does not arise at all. The point is that the context does not rest only at the sense of "Eat poison". As the positive sense-vidhirūpa artha - is not the full sentence sense, the expectancy of further sense is very much there. So, the second stage does not end here but is set to rest only when the negation in form of sentence-sense, viz. "do not eat at the enemy's house", is realized. So, the sense of negation is apprehended at the second stage only. So, when the second stage is not over, it is useless to accept the third stage in form of negation. Actually there is total absence of this so called third stage. For, when we take into account the context, we come to know, that the sentence is directed by a father to his own son. In the second stage when we apprehend the sentence-sense, we perceive that no father will wish that his son should take poison, and that here with the action 'bhuṅkṣva', the agent (viz. 'tvam') and the object (karma, visāṁ) do not get properly correlated. For we know for certain that a father would never instruct his own son to take poison, but the real instruction pertains to the fact of not taking food at the place of an enemy. Thus, the full sentence-sense is only the object of the second stage only: "...svārthasya dvitiya-kakṣāyām a-viśrāntasya ṭṛtiya-kakṣā-a-bhāvāt, saiva niśedha-kakṣā. tatra dvitiya-kakṣā-vidhau kriyā-kāraka-samsarga-anupatteḥ, prakaranaṁ pitari vaktari, putrasya viśabhāksaṁa-nilogābhāvāt."

And the rule is that 'rāṣādi-vyañgyā'ṛtha' always rests in the third stage. This is for certain. The apprehension of rasa never occurs at the second stage when
there is apprehension of vibhāvā"dis. In a sentence charged with rasa, we know that the sentence-sense rests at the apprehension of the vibhāva i.e. determinants etc. only. Thus vibhāvas etc being only the instrument to bring home rasa-apprehension, they necessarily have to be the fore-runners of rasa-apprehension. In the second stage there can never be rasa-pratīti, along with the apprehension of the determinants etc.

As such, it is said,

"a-pratiṣṭām a-viśrāntam
svārthe, yat-paratām idām,
vākyām vighāhate tatra
nyāyā tatparatā'sya sā."
yatra tu svārtha-viśrāntam
pratiṣṭhām tāvad āgataṃ,
tat-prasarpati tatra syāt
sarvatra dhvaninā sthitīḥ."

Dhanika quotes these two kārikās on behlaf of the vyañjanāvyādī objector who refuses to include vyañjanā-dhvanī in tātparya. The meaning is as follows –

When a sentence is not stable (a-pratiṣṭhita) and when it does not rest (a-viśrānta) in its own sense, it is said to be ‘tat-paraka’ i.e. ‘that-sense-oriented’, in which (yat-paratā) it indulges. This is the nyāyā or right position.

But when a sentence is resting in its own sense (i.e. svārtha-viśrānta), and has attained stability, i.e. when the sentence-sense is fully apprehended, the further sense is called ‘dhvanī’.

So, with reference to these two kārikās, it is clear that with the sentence-sense in form of the meaning of determinants etc. (= vibhāva"di), having attained full rest (= viśrānta), the rasa-apprehension which follows has to be taken as a suggested sense and not as a sentence-sense. In case of idea (i.e. vastu), and a figure of speech (i.e. alaṃkāra), the story is different as they can be, at places suggested, or at other places even directly expressed through abhidhā. But rasa is necessarily only suggested. In the case of suggested idea and figure, dhvanī will be there only if they are principally suggested; for in other case of there being either equal status, or the vācyārtha being comparatively more prominent, it will be a case of the guṇībhūta-vyāngya-type of poetry. For, the Dhvanikāra himself has said, "yatārthath śabdo vā..." etc. (Dhanika here quotes the Dhv. I. 13). Dhanika further explains that
gunaḥṣūla-vyaṁgya is seen as in case of the illustration viz. “upodha-rāgeṇa”, etc. He also further explains, after Ānandavardhana the main divisions of dhvani such as vivakṣita-vācyā and a-vivakṣita-vācyā, etc. and their subvarieties also.

After establishing the prima-facie view or pūrva-pakṣa in form of the vyaṁjanā-dhvanī-vādin, Dhanika attempts its refutation under DR. IV. 37, which reads as -

“vācyā prakaraṇa”dibhyo
buddhistā vā yathā kriyā
vākyārthaḥ, kārakair yuktā,
sthāyi-bhāvas tathetariaḥ.” (DR. IV. 37)

“Just as the action, along with the kārakas (= agent, etc.) concerned, whether stated directly or grasped mentally is the real sentence-sense, in the same way the permanent emotion (i.e. sthāyi bhāva), accompanied by others (i.e. vibhāvādis) makes for a sentence-sense.”

Avaloka explains this kārikā as follows :


“As in the sentences used in daily usage with verb or action expressly stated such as “take away a cow”, etc., or in sentences where activity is not heard (i.e. where words expressing action are not directly used), such as “the door,... the door”, etc., either (respectively) by the acceptance of the expressive word, or through context, the activity which is mentally understood and which is accompanied by other kārakas (such as agent-kartā, object-karma) etc., (is the real sentence-sense); in the same way, even in poetry (i.e. poetic statements), at times by direct mentioning through expressive words as in case of “prītyai navodhā priyā” (i.e. the newly married girl is liked due to love), where the word directly expressive of the feeling of love such as ‘prītyai’ is used, or in cases when through context and through vibhāvā’dis which are necessarily directly stated, the stāyin or permanent emotion such as ‘rati’ and the like - which is always present in the mind of the cultured person, which is enhanced through mental impressions brought about in
succession through vibhāvā”dis stated directly through their respective words, - is the sentence-sense (itself).

In Avaloka, Dhanika further observes that -

"na ca a-padratha-sya vākyārthatvam nā'sūti vācyam-kārya-paryavasāyitvāt tātparya-saktēḥ. tathā hi-pauruṣeyam a-pauruṣeyam vākyam sarvam kārya-param, a-tatparatve anupaśeyatvād unmaṭtā”di-vākya-vat. kāvyā-sabdānāṃ ca anvaya-vatirekābhyaṃ niratiśaya-sukhā”svāda-vatirekena pratipādyya-pratipādakayoḥ pravrṣṭi-viṣayayoḥ prayojanāntara-anupalabdheḥ svā”nandodbhūtīr eva kāryatvena avadḥaryate; tad udbhūtī-nimīttatvam ca, vibhāvā”di-samsṛṣṭasya sthāyin eva avagamyate, aro vākyasya abhidhānasaṁkataḥ tena tena rasena ākṛṣyamāṇā tat tat svārhā’peksita-avāntara-vibhāvā”di-pratipādana-dvārā sva-paryavasāyitām ānīyate, tatra vibhāvā”dayaḥ padā”rtha-sthānīyāḥ, tat-samsṛṣṭo ratyādīr vākṛyārthaḥ. tad etat kāvyā-vākyam yadiyam, tāv imam padārtha-vākṛyārthau.” Dhanika argues that it can not be held that something which is not a word-meaning, i.e. which does not flow as a meaning from a word (directly stated), cannot be held as a sentence-sense. Thus the objector can not say that we cannot take something as a sentence-sense, when certain words are actually not heard in a given sentence (= āsrūyamāṇa-padas). Thus, the objector cannot say that in the specific illustration viz. “bhrama dhārmika.” etc. the meaning pertaining to negation, i.e. “mā bhrama” cannot be taken as a sentence-sense, as the latter is only the sum-total or correlated sense of the word-senses of words actually found used and therefore heard clearly in a given sentence. This view of the objector cannot be sustained and therefore ‘rasa’ or aesthetic relish which is not of the form of a word-sense, does not cease to be the sentence-sense. For, the termination of tātparya śakti or purport extends upto the realisation of the ‘prayojana’ or purpose.

As the abhidhā or power of expression, argues Dhanika, has the word-sense as its sādhya or intended purpose, and just as lakṣanā or indication has lakṣyārtha or indicated sense as its ‘sādhya’ or object to be proved or established tātparyaśakti or purport has the object or intention i.e. kārya of the speaker as its goal. The tāparya thus makes for the establishment of the speaker’s intention. Thus tātparya will extend to that limit till the speaker’s intention is realized.

Now, before we proceed with Dhanika’s argument along with the lines of Dhanaṇjaya, it should be made absolutely clear that the very concept of tātparya as seen here in the DR., and the concept of tātparya available in the traditional Mīmāṃsā school of the Bhaṭṭas and also therefore acceptable to the Kashmir school of thought of Ānandavardhana, Abhinavagupta and Mammaṭa and his followers
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differ in their nature and scope. The traditionally accepted concept of tātparya-sākti is that it is a sentence-power that yields the sentence-meaning i.e. the purely correlated word-senses of a given sentence. But the tātparya of Dhanāñjaya-Dhanika extends beyond this and ends only after realizing the full intention of the speaker. Thus, the latter takes into account also such factors as context, - such as the speciality of the speaker, or hearer, or time, place etc. etc. Now these are factors which are responsible for what the kashmere school of literary aesthetics takes as suggestors - vyañjakas - leading to the postulation of a turiyā vr̥tti or a fourth power called vyañjanā which emanates, not only from words of a given sentence, but also from parts of words, and takes into its orb in even a sentence, a part of a composition i.e. prakarana, or even a whole composition giving rise to prabandha-vyañjanā or prabandha-dhvani. Thus, we will go to observe with Viśvanātha that Dhanika's tātparya is nothing else but vyañjanā and Anandavardhana deserves greater credit for he has given a perfectly cut-out system of word-meaning and word-powers based on viṣayabheda and svarūpa-bheda i.e. difference in scope and nature. Dhanika's tātparya is both the normal tātparya of the Bhātta-school, and also the extended tātparya branded as vyañjanā by others. This confusion, perhaps deliberate, continues in Bhoja also who takes both as almost identical when he declares: 'tātparyam eva vacasi dhvanir eva kāvye', with the only difference that on one hand he admits the extended tātparya of Dhanāñjaya-Dhanika at the ordinary worldly level of communication, but calls it 'dhvani' when seen in the poetic or beautiful i.e. a-laukika-context. With this clear perspective we will continue with Dhanika's further arguments as follows:

So, we saw above that Dhanika has an extended tātparya which terminates only when the speaker's goal, kārya-or intention is fully grasped from the given context. So, tātparya's field covers that area for Dhanika, which falls under the full realization of the speaker's intention or object or kārya. If the speaker's object is the sense of negation such as "mā bhrama" i.e. "do not move around", then the tātparya operates upto that limit when this negation is realized even from a positive assertion such as "bhrama" i.e. "move around". Dhanika argues that in the worldly context, a statement, be it either from the Vedas or used at an ordinary parlour, is used only to bring about a purpose or object i.e. kārya: "paurasseyam apaurasseyam sarvam kārya-param", asserts Dhanika. Realization of this kārya or purpose is the objective - laksya of any sentence used any where. If a sentence is used without any purpose, it will be equivalent to the talk of an insane person. Thus it will be useless from the worldly point of view. It will fail the hearer in
making him apprehend any sense from it. The utterance with no purpose in mind, will be meaningless sound for the listener. It will not be a sentence that conveys this or that particular sense. Thus, argues Dhanika, it is clear that any statement be it from the veda or used at ordinary parlour, has to be purpose-oriented, i.e. it has to be “kārya-paraka”.

Coming to the field of poetry, Dhanika observes that words in poetry make for the apprehension of vibhāvā”di i.e. determinants and the like, which in their turn lead to the apprehension of rasa. Thus, the words in poetry are related to the meaning in form of vibhāvā”di through anvaya-vyatireka-sambandha i.e. through the positive and negative relation. If in poetry words that are capable of mentioning the vibhāvā”dis are used, we will have the apprehension of vibhāvā”dis accordingly. If they are not used, we will have no apprehension to this effect. Thus only the words actually used in poetry make for the apprehension of the vibhāvādis. But, it may be noted that a mere use of vibhāvā”dis does not make for the supreme bliss experienced through poetry. This supreme bliss - “niritiśayā”nanda” is resulted through ‘rasa’ i.e. relish only, which is the objective of these vibhāvā”dis. Thus ‘svā”nandodbhūti’ or realisation of supreme bliss is the ‘kārya’ i.e. purpose or objective of words in poetry that lay down proper vibhāvā”dis. ‘Rasa’ is the ultimate ‘pratipādyya’ or goal of a kāvya-vākyā. When we take stock of a given piece of poetry, the words actually used in it, the vibhāvā”dis narrated through these words, etc. and the consideration of the sthāyin and rasa - all this leads to the supreme goal - kārya - of poetry viz. the experience of highest joy by the reader or listener in form of a man of cultivated taste : “svā”nandodbhūtir eva kāryatvena avadhāryate.” This supreme bliss is caused only by a sthāyin accompanied by proper vibhāvā”dis or determinants etc. Thus, observes Dhanika, we see that the power of conveying sense i.e. denotation, (i.e. tātparya here), gets active or operates, being dragged by the pratipādyya rasa i.e. by the object of apprehension of rasa. The kārya-rūpa rasa, i.e. aesthetic pleasure which is the ultimate goal or result i.e. kārya of poetic activity, causes that power i.e. tātparya to operate. Thus the sentence-sense results from tātparya-sakti which stands in need of such agents as vibhāvā”dis for conveying ‘rasa’. Through the delineation of these determinants etc. i.e. vibhāvā”dis rasa-realisation results. In this process of rasa-realisation, vibhāvā”dis make for the wordsense of the words used in poetry, and the meaning in form of rati etc., correlated with these vibhāvā”dis is the vākyārtha of kāvya. Thus Dhanika asserts : “tatra vibhāvā”dayaḥ padā”rtha-sthāniyāḥ, tat-samsrśto ratyādir vākyārthāḥ.” Thus in a kāvya-vākyā, or sentence in form of poetry, the vibhāvā”dis make for padārtha or
word-sense, and the sthāyin in form of ratyādi makes for the sentence-sense. It is clear therefore, that the apprehension of rasa is not of the nature of suggestion but is only of the form of sentence-sense which falls under the scope of tātparya or purport and certainly not vyañjanā or the so called power of suggestion.

Dhanika further observes that the objector can not hold that on listening to music we do experience joy through vācya-vācaka-bhāva. But these ‘gītā’di’ i.e. musical notes are not the expressor; nor the joy, the expressed. Same can be projected in case of poetry and the resultant bliss, i.e. rasa which is of the form of bliss beyond comparision. Thus with reference to poetry and rasa there is no vācya-vācaka-sambandha or relation of expressed and expressor. This position advanced by the objector is not acceptable to Dhanika. He holds that the illustration of musical notes and the resultant joy is not applicable in form of poetry. For, we see that through poetry one and all do not experience bliss. Bliss is experienced only by those cultured ones who have the full grasp of the vibhāvā’dis or determinants and the like. This bliss is experienced only by the cultured whose conscience is coloured bhāvita, i.e. who are accompanied by the ‘bhāvanā’ of the particular ratyādi. Only such blessed sa-hrdayas experience bliss or rasa, of a particular variety, on hearing the poetic words. It is clear therefore that this rasa-realisation or experience of bliss or aesthetic pleasure occurs only in case of men of cultivated taste and it does not occur in case of those who are bereft of the knowledge of vibhāvā’dis and who are bereft of the ‘bhāvanā’ or say, impressions, of particular ratyādi bhāvas. Thus rasa-experience does not occur in case of ‘a-rasikas’, or the non-cultured.

Before we proceed to understand Dhanika’s line of through, it may be stated that even he is conscious of Ānandavardhana’s wider concept of vyañjanā which traverses not only the field of poetic art, but takes in its fold all art-forms. He therefore carefully keeps the illustration of musical notes out of the field of discussion, for his tātparya cannot travel to the musical art where sound-dhvanī-without expressed sense or vācyārtha makes for rasa-experience. In fact all other art-forms with their particular medium make for rasa-experience and everywhere else we do not find word accompanied by sense as is the case of poetry. On the contrary there are art-forms such as dance, painting and the like, where ‘dhvani’ or sound has no scope at all. Dhanika perhaps is aware of the limitations of his tātparya which can operate only in the field of poetry which has language i.e. word and sense as its medium. Dhanika’s tātparya cannot travel to the realms of ākāra, iṅgīta i.e. to the area of forms and signs which are covered by what we know as vyañjanā. With this limitation, Dhanika further argues as below.
Dhanika as seen above holds that the illustration of musical notes having no expressive power but having suggestive power does not suit poetry, for poetry causes bliss only with reference to the sa-hṛdayāyas. But we may say that same is the case with reference to any art including music.

But Dhanika almost fanatically asserts that rasa is ‘vākyārtha’ and vibhāvā”di-vācaka-padas make for ‘padārtha’. These powers such as abhidhā and the like, i.e. also lakṣaṇā and tātparya make for the apprehension of all words directly heard (śrūyamāṇa) or not directly heard (= a-śrūyamāṇa) in a given sentence. So, for him postulating a separate function called vyañjanā is of no use. This, Dhanika says, he has elaborately explained in his other work named “Kāvyā-nirṇaya”, which is for the present lost to us :

“na ca evaṃ sati gitā”divat sukha-janakatve’pi vācya-vācaka-bhāvānupayogah viśīṣṭa-vibhāvā”di-sāmagrīviduṣāṃ eva tathāvidha-ratyā”di-bhāvanā-varāṃ eva svānandōdbhūteḥ, tad anena atiprasaingo’pi nirastah, idṛṣṭi ca vākyārtha-nirūpaṇe parikalpitābhidhā”di-sakti-vaśena eva samasta-vākyārthāvagateḥ, sāktyantara-parikalpanam prayāsah, yathā avocāma kāvyānirṇaye -

In his, now not available work called ‘kāvyā-nirṇaya’, Dhanika observes that -

“tātparyā’natirekācca
vyāñjanīyasya na dhvaniḥ,
kim uktaṃ syād a-śrutārtha-
tātparye’nyokti-rūpiṇi ? - 1
viśaṃ bhakṣaya pūrvo yaś
caiyam para-sutā”diṣu,
prasajyate pradhānātvaḥ
dhvaniṁ kena vāryate ? - 2
dhvaniś cet svārtha-viśrantaṁ
vākyam arthāntaraḥ”śrayam,
tat paratvaṁ tv avīrāntau,
tan na viśrānty asambhavat. - 3
etāvarty eva viśrāntis
tātparyasy eti kim kṛtam,
yāvat-kārya-prasāritvāt
tātparyaṁ na tulā-dhṛtam. - 4
bhrama dhārmika viśrabdham
iti bhrami-kṛta”spadam,
nirvyāvṛtti katham vākyam
niśedham upasarpati. - 5
pratipādyasya viśrāntir
apekṣā-pūraṇād yādi,
vaktur vivaksitā’prāpter
a-viśrāntir na vā katham ? - 6
pauruṣeyasya vākyasya
vivaksā-paratantratā,
vaktrābhipreta-tātparyam
ataḥ kāvyasya yuyjate. - 7

ato no rasā’dīnāṃ kāvyena saha vyāṅya-vyāṅjaka, bhāvah; kim tarhi ?
bhāvyā-bhāvaka-saṃbandhah. kāvyam hi bhāvakaṃ, bhāvyā rasā’dayah. te hi svato,
bhavanta eva, bhāvakeṣu viśiṣṭa-vibhāvā”di-matā kāvyena bhāvyante.”

So, Dhanika explains citing seven kārikās from his now not available work
called “Kāvyā-nirṇaya”, that there is no need to postulate a special word-power
called vyāṅjanā as ‘tātparya’ does everything expected of the former. We have
quoted these kārikās in full. Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 5 present the vyāṅjanāvādin’s prima-
facie view, while kārikās 4, 6 and 7 present the siddhānta view of Dhanika. This can
be elaborated as under :

In the first kārikā the vyāṅjanāvādin suggests that his opponent (i.e. the
tātparyavādin, who is ‘siddhāntin’ here) holds that as the implicit sense i.e.
pratīyamāna sense or suggested sense i.e. vyāṅjaniya artha is covered up under
tātparya or purport, there is no need to postulate the word-function called
suggestion nor the entity called ‘Dhvani’ or principally suggested sense. But the
vyāṅjanāvādin (i.e. prima-facie here) asks the tātparyavādin (kārika view 1, cd)
that in such cases where the speaker’s import is not directly heard, i.e. where in a
piece of poetry the tātparya is not directly stated, but still due to ‘anyokti’ i.e.
concealed statement the implicit sense is suggested through vyāṅjanā, in such cases
how can purport or tātparya be accepted with reference to the word-sense not directly heard? For example in a verse like “kas tvāṁ bhoḥ? kathayāmi daivahatakam māṁ viddhi sākhoṭakam...” etc., the poet actually describes the dispair or detachment (i.e. nirveda) of a tree named sākhoṭaka. Now actually this dispair can be the poet’s feeling and not that of a tree as it is not capable of possessing this sensitivity. This vyaṅgyārtha in form of the poet’s dispair cannot be included in the purport or tātparya of the poetic utterance. As vyaṅjanā or suggestive power is here expected, naturally dhvani or suggested sense also stands proved by the acceptance of the former.

The vyaṅjanāvādin further argues (= kārikā 2) that in such utterances as, “Eat poison”, directed towards a son or a friend, the positive meaning of actually taking poison does not suit the context and therefore, “to take food at an enemy’s house is worse than taking poison”, is a meaning derived through vyaṅjanā alone. [We know that Mammaṭa has argued differently], How can you reject ‘dhvanitva’ in apprehension of the latter sense?

In the third kārikā the view of the vyaṅjanāvādin covers first three parts i.e. a, b & c of the kārika and the fourth i.e. ‘d’ part belongs to Dhanīka. So, we have the vyaṅjanāvādin’s words first, such as:

“dhvaniṣ cet svārtha-visrāntaṁ
vākyam arthāntarā”śrayam,
tat-paratvaṁ tv-aviśrāntau.”

i.e. ‘dhvani’ is said to be there when a sentence having complete sense in itself, conveys some (extra)other sense also. If it is a-visrānta, i.e. if it does not rest in the sense it conveys, then tātparya will extend upto its limit where it will rest completely.

But Dhanīka replies, “tan na”, it is not so. For no sentence can reach rest before it conveys fully what is ultimately intended by the speaker. ‘Visranti’ or ‘rest’ takes palce on realisation of ‘kāvyā-prayojana’ alone. In the next i.e. IVth kārikā also, Dhanīka’s siddhanta pakṣa continues. In the Vth kārikā again we have the prima-facie view of the Dhvani-vyaṅjana-vādin which is silenced in kārikās VI & VII giving Dhanīka’s Siddhānta.

In the IVth Kārikā Dhanika goes ‘ga ga’ over tātparya and declares : “That tātparya or purport is rested only in this much and that it cannot travel beyond
Vyañjanā-virodha or, opposition to suggestive power

this, - is a myth ! who has decided this ? In fact tātparya or purport travels till that end when the final intention is realized. Thus it extends till the intention travels further and further and rests only when the intention is served. Actually 'tātparya' or purport is a power which is not balanced in a weighing machine. It is not held in a balance." Thus the vyañgyārtha of the pūrvapakṣin is covered up by our tātparya.

But once again in Kārikā no. V, the Dhvanivādin argues that in the particular illustration viz. bhrama dhārmika. etc., the sentence-sense coveys the positive act of free movement by the holy man. The Nāyikā asks the person concerned to “moov at will, freely.” Thus the purport is a positive injunction. There is no word used to negate this movement. So, the sense of negation is not identical with the purport or tātparya of this sentence. For us, this sense other than tātparya is suggested sense or vyañgyārtha, apprehended through the power of suggestion or vyañjanā.

To this Dhanika replies in kārikās VI & VII. His argument proceeds as below. Dhanika says that if rest or viśrānti of intended sense is said to be only when the intention is fulfilled, then in that case, in the absence of the apprehension of the speaker's intention, why should we not say that this is the case of incompletaion or a case where there is “absence of rest” -a-viśrānti ?

Actually, kārikā VII suggests that a human utterance, pauruṣeyya-vākya, is dependent upon the intention of the speaker : “pauruṣeyasya vākyasya vivakṣā-paratantratā.” So, it is absolutely advisable that a poetic statement has its purport in the sense of the speaker's intention alone. As in ordinary parlance so also in poetry, a sentence for its completion or rest, is dependent upon the intention of the speaker and the sentence rests only when the speaker's intention is fully realized.

Therefore, concludes Dhanika, rasā“di are not related with poetry through the relation of suggestor and suggested. What then can it be ? Dhanika's answer is that between rasā“di and kāvyā there is “bhāvyā-bhāvaka-saṃbandhā”. i.e. the relation of revelation and revealed - or the relation between emotive function (bhāvakatva) and emotive stuff realised (bhāvyā).

Poetry is revelator and rasas are revealed. Therefore rasa is born of its own in the heart or consciousness of a man of taste, and is revealed through the agency of poetry : “kāvyamī hi bhāvakam, bhāvyāḥ rasā”dayah, te hi svato bhavanta eva.
bhāvakesu viśiṣṭa-vibhāvā’di-matā kāvyena bhāvyante.” The poetry that reveals rasa should have been adorned with proper determinants, consequents and ancillary feelings.

Dhanika further argues that this bhāvya-bhāvaka-sambandha i.e. the relation of revealer and revealed between poetry and rasa should not be denied as it is not seen in other i.e. common worldly use of words. For even the Mīmāṃsakas have accepted this bhāvanā-vyāpāra in case of vedic injunctions such as “svarga kāmo yajeta” etc. We may take a note of the fact that Abhinavagupta while elaborating on the special apprehension - adhikā pratipattiḥ - to a man of taste or adhikārin i.e. the special person who deserves, had cited an illustration from vedic ritual and stated that on listening to such statements as “rātrīṃ āsata” or “tāṃ agnau prādāt”, a special apprehension follows in case of an adhikārin and this special apprehension is not limited by such factors as time, space, person concerned etc. Perhaps Hemacandra also supporting this furnishes an illustration from popular or local context when he suggests that a devotee gets inspired to repeat a particular stotra on hearing the success in case of other person. He quotes in his viveka (pp. 98, Edn. Parikh & Kulkarni) the following verses:

“ārogyaṃ āptavān śāmbaḥ
stuvā devam aharpatim,
syād arthāvagatiḥ pūrvaṃ
ity ādi vacane yathā.
tataścōpattā-kālā”di-
nyakārenopajāyate,
pratipattur mansy evaṃ
pratipattir na samśayah.
yaḥ ko’pi bhāskaram statuti
sa sarvo’py agado bhavet
tasmād aham api staumi
roga-nirmuktye ravim.”

evaṃ kāvyā”tmakād api śabdāt sahaṣḍayasya adhikā asti pratipattih.”
Vyañjanā-virodha or, opposition to suggestive power

Dhanika also seems to have been inspired by Abhinavagupta’s remarks as explained above. He observes: “na cāṇyastra śabdāntaretu bhāvya-bhāvaka-sambandha-abhāvāt kāvyā-sabdesvapi tathā bhāvyam iti vācyam - bhāvanākriyāvādibhihs tathā angīkṛtatvāt. kiṃ ca mā cāṇyastra tathāṣtu, anvaya- vyatirekābhhyam iha tathā avagamāt -

In poetry where rasa-bhāvaka-words are used we experience rasa, and when it is not so, we do not experience rasa. Thus, there is a positive (anvaya) and negative (vyatireka) relation between poetry and apprehension of rasa.

Dhanika here quotes the famous words of Bharata N.S. VI. 34a), which read as -

“bhāvābhīnaya-sambandhaṁ
bhāvayanti rasāṁ imān,
yasmā tasmād amī bhāvā,
vijñeyā nātṛya-yoktṛbhīḥ.”

Dhanika, after thus rejecting vyañjanā to his satisfaction further argues:

The objector may raise the following objection, says Dhanika. (objection): This (special) bhāvya-bhāvaka-sambandha or relation of the revealer and the revealed is not seen between word and meaning elsewhere. Words in poetry are also like words used in daily usage, so there should be absence of bhāvya-bhāvaka-sambandha between words and rasa”di in case of poetry also.

To this Dhanika’s reply is that this ‘bhāvana’ relation is also recognised by the ancient Mīmāṃsakas. The bhāvya-bhāvaka-relation is accepted thereby. We know that Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka also supported this bhāvya-bhāvaka-relation between rasā”di and kāvyā. Abhinavagupta also seeks support for vyañjanā-sādharanā-karana-from Mīmāṃsā. The Mīmāṃsakas resort to bhāvanā kriyā with reference to sacrificial ritual and the result such as obtaining heaven i.e. svargā”di-phala. Yāgā”dikriyā is bhāvaka and svargā”di-phala is bhāvya. Thus the postulation of bhāvya-bhāvaka-sambandha between rasādi and kāvyā-sabda is supported by Mīmāṃsā darśana. But this special relation here is exclusive to poetic use of word-sense only. This bhāvya-bhāvaka relation is not seen in daily usage. This observation is supported by positive and negative arguments i.e. anvaya-vyatireka, only in case of kāvyā and rasā”di. If in poetry there is absence of rasā”di-bhāvaka-padas, then there will be
no bhāvanā or carvanā of rasa, and this is vyatireka argument. If there are rasā"di-bhāvaka-padas in poetry there will be rasa-bhāvanā or relish. This is anvaya or positive argument. Dhanika quotes from the NS. of Bharata to support his thesis of bhāva-bhāvaka relation between rasā"di and poetry. "The knowers of dramatic art, know these as bhāvas (i.e. feelings, emotions etc. i.e. revealers) (i.e. determinants), as they (i.e. bhāvas) reveal (= bhāvayanti) the rasas i.e. aesthetic pleasure (or sentiments etc.), as connected with the bhāvas (or emotions as depicted by words in poetry) (or) as connected with acting."

Dhanika further establishes bhāva-bhāvaka-relation in place of vyañjanā as follows:

"katham punar agrhita-sambandhebhyah padebhyah sthāyyā"di-pratipattir iti cet, - loke tathāvidha-ceṣṭā-yukta-strīpumsā"disu ratyādy avinābhāvadarsanād ihā'pi tathopanibandhe sati raty ādyavinā-bhūta-ceṣṭā"di-pratipādakā-śabda-śravaṇād abhidheyyāvinābhāvena lākṣanikī ratyādi-pratitiḥ yathā ca kāvyasya sābhāvakatvam tathā agre vaksyāmah."

Dhanika observes: The objector may raise an objection here. It proceeds like this : The words used in poetry have no direct relation with ratyādi bhāvas, as between them there is no direct relation or vācya-vācaka-bhāva based on sāmketa or convention. So, in the absence of sāmketa how can words in poetry i.e. kāvyasābda make us apprehend rasā"di ? The reply from Siddhāntin i.e. Dhanika follows like this - In our day-to-day world, we perceive directly people making love etc. and we apprehend that these lovers are in love. This is done through direct perception of love-making, an activity which, through avinābhāva relation i.e. through invariable concomittance makes us apprehend the rati-bhāva or śṛṅgāra in case of the love-making couple. In the same way when love-making activity is directly mentioned through words in poetry we apprehend śṛṅgārarasa i.e. ratyādi-bhāva promoting the activity actually directly described by words in poetry. Thus on listening or reading such poetic words we apprehend the bhāvas behind the activity actually described, i.e. through vācya-ceṣṭānirūpaṇa. The ratyā"di-bhāva-pratiti is thus lākṣanikī or secondary in case of kāvyasābda, describing rati-ceṣṭā. How the vācyārtha of poetry reveals i.e. makes for the bhāvanā of rasa will be explained by Dhanaṇjaya and Dhanika later in due course.
Vyañjanā-virodha or, opposition to suggestive power

It is observed by Dhanañjaya (DR. IV. 38, 39, etc.) that rasa is so called because it is tasted - svādyatvāt - like physical tastes available in food. But this taste of aesthetic pleasure or relish i.e. rasa is possible in case of the men of taste (rasika, sahṛdaya) only and not in case of the anukārya or object of imitation such as Rāma, Sītā, etc. i.e. the characters described in poetry or presented in drama on the stage. If rasa is accepted with reference to 'anukārya' such as Duṣyanta and the like, then the sāmājikas will not have a taste of rasa, but, on the contrary they will feel lajjā or shame, irṣyā i.e. jealousy etc. as in ordinary life. Thus argues Dhanañjaya, the rasa-experience should be accepted only in case of the sāmājikas or the cultured men of taste and not in case of nāyaka i.e. hero etc., the anukāryas.

Dhanika observes that of course, the nāyakā"di such as Rāma, or Duṣyanta etc., being object of description by words, are believed to be as it were present, though actually they are not present. This sort of apprehension is welcome to both the poet and the sāmājika, in view of rasa-experience. But though this illusory apprehension of the hero being actually present is with reference to the poet and the sāmājika, the fact is that from the point of rasa-experience they i.e. Rāma, Duṣyanta, etc. - the anukāryas, are incapable of it. Poetry is not written by the poet for Rāma's rasānubhūti, but only to delight the man of taste or sa-hṛdaya : Thus the description of Rāma etc., as though they are present, is only in form of vibhāva i.e. determinant which makes for rasa-apprehension of the sāmājika.

If, in case it is accepted that, the anukārya such as Rāma and the like also experience śrīngāra, then as in real life the outlookers, looking at love-making in public, will either feel disgusted, or jealous, or angry etc. as the case may be. A man of low culture will even feel like running away with a beautiful heroine. All sort of carnal physical expressions could follow. So, rasa-experience in case of the anukārya is ruled out.

Dhanika also flatly discards, – and here comes the vyañjanā-virodha-the case of rasa being vyaṅgya or suggested. Perhaps taking a plea from the Hṛdayadarpaṇa of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, Dhanika also argues that rasa can not be held to be vyaṅgya or suggested for in that case rasa has to be an entity like a ghaṭa or pot that pre-exists in a dark room before it is revealed through light. The pūrva-sattā of rasa is not acceptable for we do not taste it prior to the curtains being raised on a stage or poetry being read.
Dhanika reads: evaṁ ca satī, rasānāṁ vyañjakatvam apāstam, anyato labdhāsattākam vastu anyenā'pi vyajyate, pradīpena iva ghaṭā"di; na tu tadānim eva abhivyāñjakatvābhimatair āpādyā-svabhāvam. bhāvyante ca vibhāvā"dibhiḥ preksakesu rasā iti āveditam eva."

That rasas are only revealed (bhāvyante) with the help of vibhāvā"di is acceptable to Dhanañjaya and Dhanika who categorically reject the case of vyañjanā.

But we will go to observe when we will discuss the nature of rasa-experience in a separate chapter, that both Bhāṭṭa Nāyaka and Dhanañjaya-Dhanika who reject the case of vyañjanā in both drama and literature, have taken a mistaken view of vyañjanā. Their understanding of vyañjanā or suggestivity is faulty. Actually this vyañjanā or suggestivity is not absolutely identical with the dārsanika abhivyakti or manifestation as explained in various disciplines such as grammar and dārsanās or philosophy: vyañjanā is not ‘abhivyakti’ of the śāstras as kāvyānumiti is not anumiti of the tārka-śāstra, or as Dhanañka’s tātparya also is also not the same as tātparya of the Mimāmsakas. Virtually these - vyañjanā, kāvyānumiti or Dhanika’s tātparya-are names exclusive to art i.e. it is “sui generis”. It has nothing to do with ordinary worldly existence or also with the various disciplines of philosophy. Thus all ‘vyāñjanā-virodha’ based on this argument as advanced by Dhanika, Mahimā, or Bhāṭṭa Nāyaka or any for that matter, fall flat as they refuse to accept this very special feature of vyañjanā, which is above any laukika pramāṇa as Abhinavagupta explains.

We will go to see how, on the lines advocated by Abhinavagupta and Mammatā, their followers such as Hemacandra, Vidyādhara, Vidyānātha and Viśvanātha discuss the views of the vyañjanā virodhins and reject the same.

Hemacandra in his Kāvyānuśāsana and Viveka on the same, discusses this topic at length after Abhinavagupta and Mammatā. At K.śā. I. 20, Hemacandra talks of the powers of words such as mukhyā or abhidhā and the like. Here he mentions abhidhā, gaunī, lakṣaṇā and vyañjanā as four word-powers, while tātparya he reserves as a vākya-viśayā śakti. At Kā. Śā. I. 21, he defines vyañjakatvam as - “vaktṛādi-vaiśityād arthasyā'pi vyañjakatvam”, and in Alamkāracūḍāmanī. i.e. gloss in the text on his sūtras he illustrates the varieties such as vaktṛ-viśesāt, pratipādyā-viśesāt, etc. There is no special discussion on the
nature of vyañjanā or opposition to it in either the text portion or even in Viveka commentary thereon.

But actually in Viveka under Kā. Śā. I. 19 which attempts to define dhvani, we come across a full discussion of the views of the objection (pūrva-pakṣa) against vyañjanā and its rejection. Hemacandra has reproduced not only the arguments but also actual words of Mammaṭa and has silenced all vyañjanā-virodha in like fashion. (pp. 47-53, viveka, Edn. Parikh, Kulkarni, ibid). Hemacandra rejects the views of Abhihitāvvyavādins, Anvitrābhidhānavādins, Nimittavādins Dirghadirghatara-vyāpāravādins, tātparya-vādins, and anumitiyādins following Mammaṭa. He even establishes vyañjanā also in like manner after Mammaṭa.

Vidyādhara does not discuss vyañjanā-virodha when he talks of vyañjanā in the second unmeṣa of his Ekāvalī, but while discussing the nature of rasa in the third unmeṣa he observes that rasa is not abhidheya i.e. object of abhidhā or direct statement : ayām ca svapne’pi pariharati’ vācyatām (pp. 89, Edn. Trivedi). The arguments advanced follow Anandavardhana and Mammaṭa. Then he rejects tātparya : “uta yadi tātparya-gocaratāmavatarsi rasa iti bhavan manasi niviṣate, tadapi na vicāra-cāru. rasasya abhidheyatvānadhikaranatvād abhihite ca tātparyasya pragalbhanāt.” He further argues following Mammaṭa and citing the same illustration as “lohitosṇiśā ṛtvijāḥ pracaranu”, etc., that tātparya has no scope here. All this thinking is similar to that of the lead given by Abhinavagupta and Mammaṭa. In a similar vein he rejects the case of lakṣaṇā : atha yadi lakṣaṇīyo rasas tadapi na kṣodakṣaṃam” (pp. 90, ibid). He accepts vyañjanā in case of rasa. He further discusses the nature of rasa after the kashmir school and this we will pick up in our chapter on rasa later.

The Taralā-ṭīkā discusses vyañjanā at length and accepts all the views as advanced by Mammaṭa in favour of vyañjanā.

Vidyānātha also has nothing special to offer. We will therefore turn to Viśvanātha for a fuller examination of demolishing anti-vyañjanā views. In the third paricccheda of his Sāhityadarpana, Viśvanātha (S.D. III. 2.3), while discussing the nature of rasa observes :

“sattvodrekād akhaṇḍa-
svapraḳāśānanda-cinmayāḥ,
vedyāntara-sparśa-śūnyo
brahma”svāda-sahodaraḥ” (III. 2 S.D.)
lokottara-camatkara-prāṇaḥ
kaiścit pramāṭṛbhiḥ
svā”kāravad-abhinnatvena
ayam āsvādyate rasaḥ.” (S.D. III. 3)

In the vṛttti he further observes: "yady api ‘svādaḥ kāvyārtha-sambhedād
atmānanda-samudbhavaḥ’ ity uktadiśā rasasya āsvāda-anatiriktatvatam, tathā’pi
‘rasaḥ svādyate’ iti kālpaniκaṁ bhedam urarikṛtya, karma-kartari vā prayogah.

Thus Viśvanātha holds rasa not as an object of aesthetic apprehension, but as
identical with such aesthetic apprehension or relish, and suggests that all talks such as “I enjoyed rasa, or I tasted rasa”, as only metaphorical.

Now he meets with an objection such as: “nānu etāvatā rasasya a-jñeyatvaṁ
uktam bhavatī. vyaṇjaṇāyaś ca jñāna-viśeṣatvād dvayor aïkyam āpatitam. tatas ca -
“sva-jñānenaṁnyadhīhetuḥ
siddhe’rthe vyaṇja ṭaka mataḥ,
yathā dipo’nyathābhāve
ko viśeṣo’sya kārakāt ?”

iti uktadiśā ghaṭa-pradīpavat vyaṇgya-vyaṇjakayoḥ pārthakyam eva iti katham
trasya vyaṇgyataḥ iti cet - satyam uktam” - etc.

The objection is as follows: Rasa is said to be relish (= āsvāda) itself, and not
something āsvādyya i.e. object of relish. Whatever expression talks about its being
tasted or its being an object of relish, is only metaphorical.

Now, if the above is true, the objection is that in that case rasa will have to
be accepted as something beyond apprehension. It will not be ‘jñēya’ but will be
‘jñāna’ itself. Jñāna or apprehension is something different from its object such
as ghaṭa or pot. Thus rasa which is itself of the form of āsvāda and prakāśa
cannot be an object of the same. In that vein, apprehension caused by vyaṇjaṇā
or suggestion and rasa will tend to be identical because any apprehension caused
by vyaṇjaṇā is only of the form of knowledge itself and as observed already rasa
is said to be a form of apprehension or knowledge itself and not its object. Thus
rasa will tend to be identical with vyaṇjaṇā. It will not be an object of
apprehension caused by vyaṇjaṇā.
Vyañjanā-virodha or, opposition to suggestive power

Thus, observes the objector, rasa will not be an object of the apprehension caused by vyañjanā. In that case how can the siddhāntin call rasa to be ‘vañgya’ or ‘suggested’, i.e. an object of apprehension caused by the power of suggestivity? The objector says: “nānu etāvatā rasasya ajñeyatvam uktam bhavatī. vyañjanāyāś ca jñāna-viśesatvat dvayor aikyam āpitam tam tataś ca -

“sva-jñānena anya-dhihetuḥ
siddhérthe vyañjako mataḥ,
yathā dipo’nyathābhāve;
ko viśeṣo’sya kārakāt.”

ity ukta-diśā ghaṭa-pradīpavat vyañgya-vyañjakayoḥ pārthakyam eva iti katham rasasya vyañgyatā, iti cet... satyam uktam -

The objector suggests that rasa cannot be vyañgya i.e. vyañjanā-grahya. For ‘vyañjaka’ or suggestor is that which causes something else to be cognized by first itself getting cognized, as is a lamp with reference to a pot. Vyañgya-vyañjaka-bhāva holds good when two entities are different from and not identical with each other. If it is not so, how shall we distinguish, a jnāpaka-cause or revealer from a ‘kāraka’ cause i.e. an actual cause which creates something else?

To this Viśvanātha’s reply is that this is well said. But the process of relish-svādānā”khyāḥ vyāpāraḥ - is said to be different from kṛti and jñāpti i.e. ordinary causation and manifestation. It is just to distinguish it from abhidhā and the rest that we have said that ‘rasas are suggested’. After all some name was to be given. So, this vyañjanā is not equivalent to manifestation i.e. abhivyakti of the śāstras. This is special to art - sui generis.

In the Viś paricchedha of his Sāhityadarpaṇa, Viśvanātha has established vyañjanā as an independent word-power refuting all objections against the same.

At S.D. V. 1, he says -

“atha keyaṁ abhinavā vyañjanā nāma vṛttir ity ucycate -

“vṛttīnāṁ viśrānter
abhidhā-ṭātparya-lakṣaṇākhyānām,
aṅgikāryā turyā vṛttir
bodhe rasā”dīnām.” (S.D. V. i)
“When the functioning of word-powers such as abhidhā (or expression), tātparya (or purport), and lakṣaṇā (or indication) are over, a fourth vṛtti i.e. word-power has to be accepted for the apprehension of rasā”di i.e. aesthetic relish.”

Viśvanātha goes to observe further that as abhidhā or the power of expression is exhausted on yielding only the conventional sense, it has no power to further apprehend the suggested idea (= vastu), figure of speech (= alaṃkāra) and aesthetic relish (rasā”di). Rasā”di or aesthetic relish is not the conventional sense of a word. For the direct expression of determinants etc. (i.e. vibhāvā”di-vācakapada) can not be held as the direct expression of rasā”di, as both are not said to be identical. On the contrary when there is direct expression of rasā”di by such words as śṛṅgāra etc. which name a particular rasa, it is considered to be a blemish. When for example it is stated that, “This is śṛṅgāra-rasa”, there is no apprehension of the rasa because rasa is said to be self-evident and of the nature of bliss (sva-prakāśā”nanda-svarūpāt).

Viśvanātha then proceeds to explain that tātparya or purport as advocated by the abhihitānvyāvādins gets exhausted only in giving a correlated sentence-sense. It cannot deliver the suggested sense. Some people have suggested the abhidhā function to proceed on and on - “dīrgha-dīrghatara”, but it cannot be accepted.

Viśvanātha also quotes Dhanika who advocates tātparya and sarcastically observes that tātparya is not something held in a balance i.e. na tulādhiḥram.

Both these opponents, i.e. the dīrgha-dīrghatara-vyāpāravādin and also the tātparyavādin can be silenced by only one argument viz. “śabda-buddhi-karmanāṃ viramya, vyāpārābhāvah.”

- i.e. word, sense or intelligence and action once exhausted cannot travel further.”

This is Viśvanātha’s reply to both the objectors. For, argues Viśvanātha, if abhidhā can travel further and further, i.e. if it is held to be dīrgha-dīrghatara, why accept even lakṣaṇā ? But to this it can be said that for alaṃkārikas such as Mukula, lakṣaṇā is only a part of abhidhā and that it is not cognised as a separate word-power. Viśvanātha says that if we accept a dīrgha-dīrghatara-abhidhā, then why should we not hold that in such expressions as, “O brāhmaṇa, a son is born to you”, or “O brāhmaṇa, your unmarried daughter is pregnant” as expressive of joy or sorrow ?

Viśvanātha also takes care, in fashion of Mammaṭa, of the view of those who quote the Mīmāṃsā doctrine viz. “yatparaḥ śabdaḥ sa śabdārthaḥ” and under the
shelter of this try to make out that poetic words, not being redundant like the talks of an insane person, have a 'kārya', a goal viz. that of creating bliss and that the poetic activity ends only in the realization of this ecstatic joy - niratiśaya sukhā"svāda-and therefore a word-power in poetry extends upto this good being served. To this Viśvanātha has the following rebuff:


Viśvanātha asks the objector as to what does he mean by 'tat-partva'? - i.e. by "used to serve that objective?" Is it "tad-arthatva" - i.e. should tatparatva be taken to mean 'having that objective or that meaning?', or does it mean apprehending that sense through tātparya vṛtti or purport? If by 'tatparatva' is meant "having that sense" i.e. tad-arthatva then even by vyañjanā we can arrive at 'that sense'. So, the first alternative is beyond dispute. As for the second, Viśvanātha asks the objector about his concept of purport or tātparya-vṛtti. If the tātparya of the opponent is the same as that of the abhihitānvayavādins then it is ruled out, for it has been observed that this tātparya is capable of rendering only the correlated sense of words in a sentence i.e. it yields only the bare sentence-sense which is the sum total of its individual componants. But if by tātparya is meant somethings beyond this, - and here Viśvanātha has Dhanika's tātparya in mind - then it is only another name given to vyañjanā and the quarrel patters out into only a quarrel of nomenclature, because even in this case a fourth power of words stands accepted.

Now having discarded the tātparya of Dhanika, Viśvanātha further argues for the recognition of vyañjanā, as follows. The objector may say that let there be a simultaneous apprehension through tātparya or purport of both the vibhāvā"dis and rasā"di. The answer is "No." The simple reason is that a cause-effect-relation is accepted between these two apprehensions and therefore prima facie simultaneity between the two stands automatically rejected. Had these two apprehensions been simultaneous like two horns of a bull how can there be a cause-effect-relation which stands on paurvā-parya-bhāva i.e. of the state of cause being earlier and effect being later?

Viśvanātha further says that in case of such instances of laksānā as 'gaṅgāyāṃ ghōṣah', the indication ends on apprehension of the meaning of a
bank, and thus how can indication deliver the suggested sense in form of coolness and purity? Thus, acceptance of a fourth power - an independent vyañjanā-vṛtti is beyond dispute.

Viśvanātha then proceeds to distinguish vyañgya or suggested sense (S.D. V. 2) from the expressed sense on the basis of boddhṛ, svarūpa, etc. - the factors which tend to give different meanings.

Viśvanātha observes that as the meaning in form of rasā"di is not pre-existent (prāg-a-sattvāt), its apprehension can not be arrived at either through abhidhā or lakṣanā, and as the apprehension of rasā"di does not stand in need of contradiction of the primary sense in all cases, lakṣanā has no chance at all. Lakṣanā has anupapatti - non-apprehension of primary sense-as a pre-condition.

Viśvanātha rejects the arguments of those who want to take the prayojana such as coolness and the like as indicated. For if we resort to lakṣanā here, we will stand in need of another prayojana and thus ad infinitum. Even prayojanavatī lakṣanā is also ruled out for the simultaneous apprehension of viṣaya and prayojana is not possible. Mammaṭa has ably explained this and Viśvanātha follows Mammaṭa here. Viśvanātha rules out inference also in the apprehension of rasa (S.D. V. 4) and holds that smṛti i.e. remembrance is also out of question. He comes down hard on Mahimā's anumiti and rejects the same taking a number of illustrations. He candidly déclares:

“tad evam anubhava-siddhasya tat-tad-rasā"di-lakṣaṇasyā'rtīhasya asakyāpalaṁpatayā tat-tad-chabdādyanvaya-vyatireka-anuvidhāyitāya ca, anumāna"di-pramaṇa-a-vedyatayā ca, abhidhā"di-vṛtti-traya-abodhyatayā ca turīya vṛtti upāsyā eva iti siddham. iyam ca vyāpytā"dy anuṣamdhānam vinā'pi bhavati ity akhilam nirmalam.”

Thus Viśvanātha meets with all vyañjanā-virodha in a very systematic way and perhaps his is the last nail - and very emphatic too - in the coffin wherein lies - and for ever-any vyañjanā-virodha whatsoever. We feel that Dr. Revaprasādjee should have no reservations in this case for as in case of Dhanika's tātṛarya, so in case in the kāvyānumiti of Mahimā supported by this learned modern āśamkārika, we find only acceptance of vyañjanā in a new garb.
Chapter X
Classification of Poetry
(form-oriented)

Literary aesthetes have attempted the classification of poetry i.e. Kāvya i.e. literature in general, both from the point of view of form and content, and also from the point of view of its literary evaluation i.e. criticism. The first, we will term as 'formal' or external, which of course takes care of content also, and the second will be placed under criticism-oriented classification such as from the point of view of the suggested meaning i.e. roughly speaking 'dhvani', or from the angle of vakrata, and the like.

It may be noted at the outset that the types of poetic composition as illustrated by the Rāmāyaṇa and the Mahābhārata, - the so called 'itiḥāsa' variety are out of question here. For the later Mahākāvyas or kathā and ākhyāyikā could hardly be taken as portions of these two epics which are a class by themselves. Actually not only the content of these two epics but their divisions in kāndas and parvans and sub-divisions also inspired various types of literature that was written by such greats as Kālidāsa and the like. Actually various forms of performing art beginning with drama proper i.e. nāṭaka and such other forms that were meant for both actual presentation on the stage and also for reading as 'prabandhas' or longer compositions, are also included by critics as forms of poetry such as dṛṣṭya-kāvyas. We will have to take care of all these types of composition which were dṛṣṭya and śravya. It is perhaps Hemacandra, who was of course influenced by Bhoja, who attempts a most scientific classification of poetry by first bisecting it as preksya and śravya i.e. poetry to be viewed as represented on the stage and poetry to be heard (and read). But we will come to Hemacandra much later but as is the case with other thought-currents so also here, we will begin with Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin, etc. the earlier ālamkārīkas and will go down to Viśvanātha. It may be observed in the beginning that the earliest documentary evidence available is the Nātya-śāstra of Bharata that treats of the varieties of drama i.e. rūpaka and the sub-varieties or upa-rūpakas also. But as Bharata's work concerns itself directly with dramaturgy we will consider the same only when we deal with dṛṣṭya type of poetry i.e. that
variety which is to be presented and visualized on the stage. We will first concern ourselves with what Hemacandra calls śravya type of poetry i.e. literature meant for reading and hearing only.

We are treating this topic of classification of poetry in sequence to the consideration of definition of poetry as word and sense and then after consideration of the nature of word and sense, powers of word etc. So, after broadly understanding the nature of literature as understood by Sanskrit critics, we go for the classification or consideration of types of compositions.

We have observed earlier that this classification is attempted from the point of view of literary criticism also and has resulted into poetry as classified into dhvani, guṇibhūtavyāṅgya and citra, or as one with vakrokti as its life-force etc. Thus thought-currents concerning dhvani, vakratā, etc. and the other allied topics such as guṇa, doṣa, alaṃkāra, vakrokti, rīti, aucitya etc. will be taken up in due course. But prior to that, after classification of poetry, we will also have to discuss the topic concerning the types of heroes, heroines, their friends and enemies, their helpers, servants etc. also. In short we will also have to deal with the topic concerning the nature and varieties of various characters in literature both dramatic and poetic. Works on dramaturgy such as those of Bharata and others modelled on these such as the Daśa-rūpaka, Nāṭya-darpana and portions from Hemacandra’s or Viśvanāthas works, deal with these topics. We will take into account all this as and when the context arises. We will begin with the classification of poetry first.

Earlier ālaṃkārikas such as Bhāmaha to Rudraṭa have the following forms to offer.

Bhāmaha in his Kāvyālaṃkāra (I, 16) attempts the definition of poetry and goes on to suggest that poetry is basically two-fold, i.e. prose and verse - gadyaṃ padyaṃ ca. We may observe to begin with that Bhāmaha has attempted classification from four angles such as - (i) external form viz. prose and verse. This angle is basically an attempt in the direction of supplying a basically formal classification. Thus we have two basic forms such as gadya i.e. prose and padya i.e. verse i.e. metrical composition. (ii) Now there is second angle which we may call the linguistic angle. So, from this linguistic angle, which also is basically a formal approach, we have kāvya divided into sanskrta, prakṛta and apabhrāṃśa. This may be termed linguistic classification but, this can also be both prose and verse. Thus we arrive at six basic formal types of poetry. From the point of view of contents i.e. (iii) varṇya-vastu, again poetry can be classified into four sub-varieties such as (a) वृत्त 'vrutta' i.e. poetry dealing with historical theme describing the story or history of past
kings or gods of the purāṇas. (b) ‘urpādyā vastu’ - i.e. poetry dealing with imaginative theme as against the historical or purāṇika or mythical theme. This variety has imaginatively created stories as its descriptive stuff. (c) poetry dealing with various kalās or fine arts as its subject-matter and (d) poetry having topics of various disciplines as its subject-matter i.e. śāstraśraya-kāvya. Bhāmaha does not provide illustrations but we can imagine that the śāstraśraya variety could have included such works as are later illustrated by Bhaṭṭī-kāvya dealing with vyākaraṇaśāstra and Dvyāśraya-kāvyas of Ācārya Hemacandra. These are types of poetry dealing with various disciplines and systems of philosophy. We do not know whether technical and scientific treatises were included under this variety for we have vast literature in form of law-book or smṛtis, works on metres, piṅgala-śāstra, and works on vāstu-silpa etc. all composed in metre. Even works on alaṃkāra, drama, and even grammar were composed in metres and sūtra-style. Whether all this scientific literature was brought under the banner of śāstra-kāvya or not is not known but at least Bhoja in his very very wide concept of literature as word and sense of twelve types, brings everything under the banner of kāvya. But we do not know the limits of Bhāmaha. The variety of poetry dealing with various fine arts or kalās is also not illustrated by Bhāmaha, But in general Bhāmaha’s observation viz. “kalā-śāstraśrayaṃ ceti” could be taken as referring to poetic compositions such as Bhaṭṭīkāvya, Dvyāśrayakāvya, or Vidagdha-mukha-maṇḍana etc. The poetic compositions such as Vidagdhamukha-maṇḍana can be taken as such which are viewed as citra-kāvyas which illustrate śabda-citras, prahelikās etc. This variety is termed citra-kāvya from a different angle of classification which may be taken as criticism-oriented variety. It may be observed, that literary feats as prahelikā, are mentioned among the 64 kalās enumerated by Vātsyāyana in his kāma-sūtra I. iii. 16. The (iv) fourth classification also is based on outward form, both prose and verse and includes such five types as sargabandha i.e. mahākāvya, abhinayārtha i.e. drama, ākhyāyikā and kāthā, the prose-romances, and a-nibaddha i.e. muktaka or stray verses. (pp. 202, 609)

Bhāmaha explains the sargabandha as a mahākāvya. The definition or description of this variety proceeds as -

"sargabandho mahākāvyam
mahatām ca mahac ca yat,
a-grāmya-sābdam arthyam ca
sālaṃkāram sadāśrayam - (I. 19)"
mantra-dūta-prayānā"ji- 
ñayakābhyudayaśca yat 
pañcabhiḥ sandhibhīr yuktam . 
nātivyākhyaṃ āddhimat. I. 20 
caturvargābhidhāne'pi 
bhūyasā'rthopadesa kṛt, 
yuktam lokasvabhāvena 
rasaiś ca sakalaiḥ prthak. I. 21

The composition, arranged into sargas or chapters, is called mahākāvyya which deals with the great-names (such as those of Vālmīki and Kālidāsa) (or, which is mahat or great among all great efforts of poets), and which is itself mahat i.e. vast in form. It is free from blemishes pertaining to word (and sense) and is rich with meaning (and is also free from blemishes concerning sense, such as 'apārtha' and the like). It is rendered beautiful with alaṃkāras (i.e. turns of expression, or figures of speech concerning word and sense), and is having a theme connected with a lofty person (sad-āśrayam) (This means that this composition is not vowed around the theme of a lowly person). It describes mantra i.e. political details, sending of emissary, march of an army, war, or fights, the victory of the hero, and is having the five junctures (such as mukha and the rest that are discussed by Bharata and others with reference to drama). It should avoid theoretical discussions of any sort to a larger proportion - nātivyākhyaṃ. Long discussions tend to make the composition less attractive i.e. nīrasa. It is supposed to be 'āddhimat' i.e. rich in description of seasons, sunrise, sunset, night, moon-rise, marriages, love-sports, picking up of flowers, water-sports, birth of a son etc. etc. [āddhimat ṛtu-sandhyā- 
rātri-candrodayā"dīnām vivāha-saṃbhoga-puspāvacaya-kriḍā-rati-putra- 
jananā"dīnāṃ ca varṇanaiḥ pracuram - Tatacarya, pp. 10]. This composition aims at the four-fold pursuits i.e. caturvarga viz. dharma, artha, kāma and mokṣa. But principally it deals itself with artha: "bhūyasā artha-kṛt". By 'artha' is not meant activity concerning collection of wealth but Tatācarya explains it as "artha hitam". i.e. it aims at solidarity both of individual and society. The most important characteristic of a big literary composition is that it is gifted with a subject or theme which concerns itself with normal life. : yuktam loka-svabhāvena. Nothing abnormal is to be attempted. All description should look normal and natural. It should be rich in all rasas or sentiments or, we may put it otherwise as follows. It should abound in situations that take care of all human emotions and feelings and
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should cater to different tastes. By ‘prthak’ is meant “a-saṁkīraṇa-vṛttibhiḥ”, as explained by Tātacarya (pp. 10, ibid). He puts it as: “a-saṁkīraṇa-vṛttibhiḥ ity arthah. ekatra yasya-kasya-cid ekasya prādhānyam itaresām aṅgatvam ity avirodhena mitha upakāryopakāraka-bhāvena viniveśitaiḥ na tu punar ekatra eva sama-prādhānyena dvābhyām bahubhir vā viniveśitair iti.” - i.e. it is to abound in different styles and dictions but these should be practiced in a way in which only one style dominates at a time and the rest should look subordinate. All styles should not be used having equal predominance at a time. The idea seems to be that the styles should vary with the moods and emotions depicted in a given situation. The total impression that emerges from this description/definition of the large composition is that it should treat such theme and in such a style that it caters to the taste of the cultured. The hero has to be kept in centre and his triumph over his enemies or opposing forces should be the central effect.

It may be noted that the concepts of saṁdhīs or junctures and rasa or relish are central to dramaturgy also. But we cannot say on oath whether dramaturgy preceded literary criticism for even though the earliest available document is the Nātya-sāstra of Bharata which deals with the art of acting, it cannot be said that concepts in dramaturgy necessarily preceded the same in literary criticism because Bharata, at a number of places recommends the use of different devices such as guna or excellence, laksana or marks, alamkāra or figures of speech etc., in view of “kāvyā-rasa” i.e. with reference to the ‘rasa’ or aesthetic value prevailing in kāvyā i.e. poetic composition. So, it is safe not to make bold statements, as is done by the great scholar such as G. T. Deshpande and others, suggesting that poetics or literary criticism was only an off-shoot of dramaturgy.

Having discussed the nature of a big literary composition in verse, Bhāmaha picks up prose compositions such as ākhyāyikā and kathā (I. 25, and I. 28). But prior to this he also mentions, what he calls as compositions for representation on stage through acting - i.e. abhineyārtha, and the varieties enumerated are ‘nāṭaka’, ‘dvī-padi’, ‘samyā’, ‘vāsaka’, ‘skandhaka’, etc. He leaves aside discussing the nature of these varieties that are meant for acting on the stage, with the words - “tukto‘nyais tasya vistarah” - the varieties and sub-varieties of these compositions made for acting, are discussed by others (elsewhere). Obviously Bhāmaha seems to keep away from considering what may be called “dṛṣya-kāvyā” i.e. poetry to be seen or represented on the stage, and suggests that others - may be Bharata and his likes - have discussed the same and he is in no mood to discuss the same. Perhaps he wants to keep away from dramaturgy though of course, drama also for him, is a variety of ‘kāvyā’.
Bhāmaha picks up the thread and defines ‘ākhyāyikā’ or a major prose composition, or a prose romance, at Kā. I. 25-27, in words:

“saṃskṛtā’nākula-śravya-
śabdārtha-pada-vṛttinā,
gadyena yuktōdāttārthā
soc-chvāsā ākhyāyikā matā.” - I. 25

“vṛttam ākhyāyate tasyāṁ
nāyakena sva-ceṣṭitam,
vaktram cā’para-vaktram ca
kāle bhāvy artha-śaṃsi ca.” - I. 26

“kaver abhisprāyakṛtair
ānkanaiḥ kaiścid ankitā,
kanyā-harana-saṅgrāma-
vipralambhōdayānvitā.” - I. 27

Thus an ākhyāyikā is a major prose composition cut into chapters called uchvāsas having verses in their beginning composed in vaktra and/or aparavaktra metres, which go to suggest future happenings. This composition is written in sanskrit in a style which is not affected and which abounds in words and meanings having felicity of expression. The theme is lofty and the hero himself narrates his own story. The composition also carries certain marks special to the poet and the narration is full of incidents such as eloping a girl, fight, love in separation etc.

This form, viz. ākhyāyikā differs from kathā, also a major prose composition which has no parts or chapters in form of uchvāsas, with suggestive verses at the head written in vaktra or aparva-vaktra metres. Kathā is written either in Sanskrit or in other language (= a-samkṛtā i.e. prākritā) and is also in apabhramṣa. (Kā I. 28) In Kathā the story of the hero is narrated by others and not by the hero himself. The idea is that how can a person who is nobly born would sing songs of his own valour and merits.

Anibaddha i.e. single unconnected verses include such minor compositions as individual gāthā, śloka and the like. Bhāmaha does not elaborate over this variety. But what is of utmost importance to Bhāmaha is that all types of compositions have to be necessarily accompanied by beautiful expression - “tat punaḥ
yuktam vakra-svabhavoktya
sarvam eva etad isyate.  (Kā. I. 30)

"Expression carrying beautiful features", Tātacaryya explains as: "tad
anibaddham punah vakroktya svabhavoktya ca yuktam eva bhavati." bhinnam
dvidhā svabhāvoktīr vakrōktī ca iti vāṃmayam." tad vakṣyate. yadi punar na
vakrōktī syat, na vā svabhāvoktiḥ tan na kāvyam. vārtā tu sā, yathā - "bhojanam
dehi rājendra..."

We do not agree with Tātacaryya's explanation. By 'sarvam eva' we mean all
poetry, both major and minor types including. Bhāmaha wants all poetry, i.e. poetry
worth its name, - be it a large composition or an individual verse - to be adorned
by an expression of the beautiful type - vakra-svabhāvasya-uktīḥ. The idea is that
there is no charm in local expressions as seen in normal usage. A poetic expression
has to be worth its name i.e. it should carry a stamp of its own charming nature,
normally missing in worldly expressions of ordinary usage. Again, we believe that
Bhāmaha (Kā. II. 93) does not seem to favour svabhāvokti as an artistic expression
or alamkāra as again Tātacaryya would expect us to believe. "The expression 'ke-cit'
in "svabhāvoktīr alamkāraḥ iti kecit pracaṅkṣate" - suggest Bhāmaha's disagreement
with the views of others who take svabhāvokti as an alamkāra. Or at least, he does
not show any enthusiasm for the same, even while giving a casual illustration at II.
94, which describes the activity of a child trying to ward off cows from entering a
field full of ready crops, all the time himself, shouting, waving a stick, crying and
calling for help. So, "yuktam vakra-svabhāvoktyā" for Bhāmaha is a condition
necessary for any type of literature. Poetry in any variety, has to be charged with
expression of beautiful qualities, i.e. it has to be beautiful.

Bhāmaha's concept of true poetry is laid down in kārikās that follow, but these
may not deter us here as we are concerned here only with the types of poetry. Or,
perhaps, Bhāmaha suggests that poetry is divided into two such as vaidarbhā and
gauḍa. These are only styles and any form major or minor can be laid into either
of these two. Bhāmaha is open to both the styles, provided the basic characteristic
of poetry being 'sa-vakrōkti' i.e. poetry having inherent charm - is seen. For
Bhāmaha, the alamkṛtī or charm or beauty of language i.e. poetry or poetic
language is the quality of "vakraḥbidheya-śabdōkti" - i.e. expression of beautiful
sense and beautiful word. (Kā. I. 36)

Dāṇḍin begins with a three-fold classification of poetry such as 'padya' i.e.
verse, 'gadya' or prose and misra i.e. mixed, as against Bhāmaha's basic two-fold
classification. Padya i.e. verse has four padas or lines and is again either in vṛttta i.e. metres based on aksara-yojana such as mālinī, harinī, sragdhara and the like, or in ‘jāti’ i.e. such composition where mātrās of short and long letters are taken into consideration. K.D. I. 11 observes:

“padyaṃ gadyaṃ ca miśraṃ ca
tat tridhaiva vyavashtitaṃ,
padyaṃ catuṣpadī tac ca
vṛttam jātir iti dvidhā.” (I. 11)

The prabhā commentary (pp. 13, B.O.R.I. Edn. Poona, ’70) explains that the emphasis - “eva-kāra” is to rule out any other variety. “evam tri prakārakaṃ eva tad vyavashtitaṃ prācīna-sūribhir nirūpitam. evakāro bhedāntara-vyavacchedārthah.” Prabhā further observes: caturnāṃ padānāṃ samāhāraś catuṣpadī. dvigor iti sūtraṇa ādantarvat nip. pāda-catuṣṭayā”tmakam padyam ity arthah. dvi-tri-pāda-parimitānāṃ cchandasāṃ vedeśv eva darśanāc catuṣpadīti kathanām laukika-vṛttānurodhena iti kacit. anye tu catuṣpadīty upalaksanam etat. tena pañca-śat-pādanāṃ vṛttānāṃ api saṃgrahaḥ. tac ca padyaṃ vṛttam jātir iti dvi-prakārakam. tatra aksara-saṃkhyātaṃ vṛttam, mātrā-saṃkhyātā jātih. tad uktam cchandaomāṇjaryām -

padyaṃ catuṣpadī tac ca
vṛttam jātir iti dvidhā,
vṛttam aksara-saṃkhyātaṃ
jātir mātrakṛtā bhavet.” - iti.

tatra samārdha-sama-visamāni vṛttāni krameṇa sragdhara-puspitagra-vaitāliya”dini. āryā-gūty ādayo jātayaś ca.”

Daṇḍin observes that in cchandoviciti - i.e. such works viz. cchandaḥ - sāstra as laid down by Piṅgala-muni, as explained in Prabhā (pp. 14, ibid), the fuller discussion is available.

Daṇḍin is more logical and cancels the fifth class in the fourth set as given by Bhāmaḥa viz. anibaddha or stray verse. Daṇḍin observes that these, viz. the stray verse and its smaller or bigger collection are forms derived from sarga-bandha i.e. Mahākāvyya and therefore need not be separately mentioned. Thus K.D. I. 13 says:
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“muktakaṁ kulakaṁ koṣaḥ
saṁghāta iti tāḍrśaḥ,
sarga-bandhāṁśa-rūpatvād
anuktāḥ padya-vistaraḥ.”

But we may say that though as a unit or form muktaka and the like figure as portions of a bigger composition, they could have been separately mentioned. As independently also, such as the subhāṣīta and the like, they have their own identity. We will go to observe later that the Agnipurāṇa and the Sāhitya-darpaṇa of Viśvanātha define or describe these minor compositions. The Agnipurāṇa (337/36) suggests that a ‘muktaka’ is an individual verse capable of causing camatkāra or poetic effect:

“muktakaṁ śloka ekaikaś
camatkāra-kṛṣamaḥ satām.”

and the S.D. VI. 314-315 read as -

“dvābhyaṁ tu yugmakaṁ
sandānitakaṁ tribhir isyate,
kalāpakaṁ caturbhiś ca
pañcabhiḥ kulakaṁ matam.”

We may say that these small groups of two, three, four of five individual verses have a common subject of narration and they may form part of a ‘sarga’ of a mahākāvyā, or, even a laghukāvyā, but they can be independent of them, i.e. even out of a mahākāvyā or, a larger composition as well. ‘Koṣa’ is said to be a ‘koṣa’ i.e. collection of individual verses having no expectancy of one another, “koṣaḥ śloka-samūhaḥ syād anyonyā’napekṣaka” iti. Saṁghāta is defined as,

“yatra kavir ekam arthaṁ
vṛttena ekena varṇayati kāvye,
saṁghaṁ sa nigadito
vṛndāvana-meghadūtā”dīḥ.”

Prabhā quotes Harinātha who in a separate commentary (on K.D. ?) gives the definitions of these varieties as (pp. 15, ibid):

“ṭikāntare harināthena pradarśitāni lakṣanāni yathā - anyā’napekṣa eka-ślokanibandho muktakam. aneka-padyenaika-kriyānvitena eka-vākyārtha-kathanaṁ
kulakam. a-samhatárthānām eka-kaver anekakavinām vā nibandhaḥ kośaḥ. yathā āryā-sapta-satītyā”dih. kalpita-vastuḥ eka-cchando-nirvyūḍhah samghāto meghadūtā”di.” The Prabhā observes that these verse-groups are but portions of a mahākāvya. The first two viz. muktaka and kulaka (K.D. I. 13) are direct portions of a mahākāvya while the latter two are to be found out if they are incorporated in a mahākāvya. They are to be identified in view of their definitions - But we have observed that these verse-groups or minor forms can have independent existence out of a mahākāvya also and can have their separate identity also. They could be parts of a major composition as well. Kāvyādarśa (I.) kārikās 14-22 define Mahākāvya or a major composition in verse. The characteristics are almost common to those enumerated by Bhāmaha with some more details. Before we go through the same it may be observed with Dr. S. K. De that these features which appear as part of the so-called definition of a mahākāvya actually deal with accidents rather than with essentials. We further observe that before Bhāmaha and Dāndin laying down definitions, some brilliant illustrations such as the compositions of Kālidāsa, Āśvaghoṣa, and Bhāravi and some others not known to us were present. These literary critics tried to find out the features that earned these compositions tremendous popularity as well as poetic excellence. They tried to underline some common features observed in actual practice by the earlier literary masters. The sum total of these features was laid down as definition of a mahākāvya or any other type of poetic composition either verse or prose, as the case may be. It is in view of this that, we will go to observe that Dāndin at the end says that even if some of these features enumerated by us are not found in a given composition they do not cease to be a mahākāvya etc. Thus the accidental presence of these features was apparent to earlier critics also.

Dāndin observes (K.D. I. 14) that mahākāvya is a major composition divided in ‘sargas’ or chapters : sargabandho mahākāvyam. In its beginning is a blessing, i.e. āśirvāda, or a salutation (to a personal deity) i.e. nāmas-krīyā, or it may just start straight away with direct narration of the story. Vastu-nirdeśa is explained by prabhā (pp. 16, ibid) as direct naming of the hero or metaphorically that of somebody connected with the hero. Or, ‘vastu’ is portion of narration which is referred to either directly or through suggestion. “vastu-nirdeśaḥ, vasati prastutavṛttāntosmin iti vastu, kathānāyakaḥ lakṣanayā aparopī tar-sambandhi pradhānapuruṣaḥ. tasya nirdeśaḥ nāmoccaranapūrvakā upanīyāsaḥ. athavā vastu, vārya-kathābhāgaḥ tasya nirdeśaḥ. sāksād, vyañjanayā vā sücanam. etat trayañām
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madhye kenā’py ekena sargabandhasya prārambho vidhiyate ity arthaḥ. (Prabhā, pp. 16, on K.D. I. 14).

The theme of a mahākāvyya is dependent on either itihāsa (such as the Mahābhārata; “itihāso bhāratam, upalakṣāṇam; prabhā, pp. 16, ibid Prabhā also says : tena rāmāyaṇaḥ”di kavyāṇāṃ purāṇāṇāṃ ca samgrahaḥ) - i.e. dependent on historical or semihistorical source or it could be an independent theme also. But it has to have a lofty theme - sadāśrayam. This was observed by Bhāmaha also. The theme is either dependent on historical sources or not. But it has to be a real story and not merely imagined. Prabhā observes : itarad vā, itihāsā”disu a-vidyamānaṁ kathānakaṁ upajīvya nibaddham. kimtu sadāśrayam. sat satya-bhūto vṛttānta āśraya ādhāro yasya tat. anena kalpitasya vastuno mahākāvyye varṇaniyatayā svākāre niśedhaḥ sūcitaḥ. athavā sat satpuruṣaḥ āśrayo yasya. tene buddha-caritā”dīnāṃ aśvaghoṣā”dibhiḥ pranītānāṃ samgraha iti kacit.” (pp. 17, ibid on K.D. I. 15). But we feel that if by ‘sad-āśrayam’ we include the possibility of a lofty and yet imaginary theme, the definition will tend to be wider in its scope and will include such poetic compositions as “The Paradise lost”, and, “The Paradise Regained” by Milten and such other master poets also. The theme should rest on the four objectives of life such as dharma, artha etc., the hero should be an intelligent person from a lofty lineage and a noble one. It should abound in descriptions of city, ocean, mountain, seasons, sun, moon, with their rise and setting, gardens, water-sports, drinking bouts, love-sports etc. etc. The incidents of narration should describe situations of love in separation, wedding, birth of a prince, political meetings, sending of an emissary, fights, the rise of the hero, etc. (K.D. I. 15-17). Daṇḍin gives by far greater details as compared to Bhāmaha. It may also suggest a more developed stage of literary criticism. But as both Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin had before them a great literature by way of illustration, written by such masters as Kālidāsa, Bhāravi and the rest, these definitions are modelled on them. If either in Bhāmaha or in Daṇḍin we come across any criticism of ideas found in the other, that may not prove priority or posteriority of either, but they should be taken to point to different traditions accepted by either. That these definitions as given by Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin could also have a shaping influence on later poets also cannot be disputed.

Thus it is obvious that poets prior to Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin, while creating excellent poetry must be leaning more towards descriptions of external and accidental items. Daṇḍin also observes, like Bhāmaha, that this major type of
composition i.e. a mahākāvyā should be:

alamkṛtam a-saṃksītaptam
rasa-bhāva-nirantaram,
sargair anari-vistirṇaiḥ
śravya-vṛttaiḥ susaṃdhibhiḥ. (I. 18)
sarvatra bhinna-vṛttāntair-
upetām loka-rañjanam,
kāvyam kalpāntara-sthāyi
jāyate sad-alamkṛti.” (I. 19)

This means that the mahākāvyā should abound in various figures of speech (and such other devices), should be of a large proportion, or that it should be decorated, (alamkṛtam) by descriptions of cities, seasons etc. as noted above, in abundance. It should be rich in narration of emotions and feelings that are object of relish. The sargas should be of reasonable length i.e. containing verses in a reasonable number. The metres should be pleasing to the ear. This means that they should be in keeping with the rules laid down in works on metrics such as suvṛttatilaka and the rest. In short, the metrical composition should not be technically faulty and should be having excellences such as mādhurya. The mahākāvyas should also be graced by pleasing junctures (= susaṃdhibhiḥ yuktam). Also, the idea is that end of the earlier sarga should be well-knit with the beginning of the next, as observed in the S.D. VI. 321 viz. “sargānte bhāvi-sargasya kathāyāḥ sūcanaṃ bhavet.” The Prabhā observes that by some ‘samdhī’ is explained as connection of vowels and consonants also. This also should be pleasing to ears and should not sound harsh. Read Prabhā (pp. 22, ibid, on K.D. I. 18):

“kecit tu samdhī-padam aj-jhal - samdhī-param vyākhyāyanti. tena -
“urvya asāv atra tarvāli
marvante cārv avasthitih,
nātrarju yuyjate gantum
śiro namaya tan-manāk.” - ityādi śruti-kaṭu-samdhī-parihārah kriyate.”

End of a sarga has to be drafted in a metre other then the one attempted in the whole of the sarga. Normally one metre is followed in a sarga, but Prabhā observes that at times in a single sarga a poet attempts different metres also, as in the fourth sarga of Śīśupālavadha or the fifth sarga in Kirātārjuniya.
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Such a composition lives for ages and it is necessarily decorated by poetic devices such as figures of speech both of word and sense. We may add that other devices such as excellences, styles and dictions, etc. are also covered by, “sada-alamkṛti”. All these should promote the central effect i.e. rasa or relish, i.e. aesthetic delight. The composition may not have all these features, i.e. it may have only some of these, and yet it does not cease to be a mahākāvyā.

After describing the major or minor compositions in verse, Daṇḍin banks upon prose-compositions. But before that he observes that in verse-compositions there are two styles of narration. At times the poet refers to the high qualities of the hero and describes the humiliation of his enemies by such a hero. This is a naturally beautiful method adopted by poets. But at times, even such description pleases the men of taste, in which first the lineage, adventure, learning or culture of the enemy is described and the victory of the hero over such a qualified enemy is described.

Daṇḍin starts with the discussion of prose compositions with kā. I. 23 which reads as:

“a pādaḥ pada-santāno
gadyam, ākhyāyikā kathā,
iti tasya prabheda-duvau
rāyor ākhyāyikā kila...” (K.D. I. 23)

Prose is collection of padas or words nor arranged in a ‘pāda’. By ‘pāda’ here is meant, according to Prabhā (pp. 25, ibid) : pādo gaṇa-mātrā-nibaddho gadya-turiyāṃśas taccūnyāṇaḥ apādaḥ.” That writing which does not follow the dictates of ‘gaṇa’ such as ya-gaṇa, ma-gaṇa etc., and ‘mātrā’ such as one-mātrā in short vowel, two in a long vowel etc. - is ‘gadya’ or prose. Pada-santānaḥ means ‘sup-tiṅ-anta-pada-cayāḥ - i.e. collection of words giving verbs, nouns etc. The prose writing is classified into two such as kathā and ākhyāyikā. Daṇḍin seems to mention these two types simply because they were prevalent in literature but in fact he does not seem to have any faith in the distinction resorted to. For Daṇḍin, whether the hero himself narrates his own story or somebody else does it, is of no telling effect. As in an ākhyāyikā, so also in a kathā, Daṇḍin feels that we may come across poems written in vaktra and aparvaktra metres and also a division into ucchāvasas. So, for Daṇḍin both kathā and ākhyāyikā are two names of a single type. : rat kathā'khyāyikety ekā jātiḥ samjñīā-dvayāṅkātā.” All other types of prose writing, for Daṇḍin, are included in either of these two (K.D. I. 28a). It is possible that Daṇḍin represents a tradition of literary criticism which was less honoured by Bhāmaha and vice versa. Daṇḍin observes that even in prose writing of either variety we have
the same theme as is read in sargabandha, i.e. we also read elopement of a girl, fights, love in separation, etc. even here. (K.D. I. 29) -

"kanyāharaṇa-saṃgrāma-
vipralambhodāya"dayāḥ
sargabandha-samā eva
naite vaiśeṣikā guṇāḥ." -

These discriptions are not exclusive to verse-compositions only. They can be part of major compositions both in prose and verse. Even the special marks woven by a poet in a mahākāvya such as the word ‘śri’ in Śiśupālavadha, or ‘lakṣmi’ in Kirātārjunīya, etc. could be found in major prose works also, according to Dandin, who suggests that for the masters any special mark can serve as a means to achieve their goal.

K.D. I. 31 observes :

"miśrāṇi nāṭakā”dini
teṣam anyatra vistaraḥ,
gadaya-padya-mayi kācic-
campur ity abhidhiyate.”

Thus like Bhāmaha, Dandin also avoids discussion concerning nāṭaka etc. which are ‘miśra’ for Daśāṇ and ‘abhineyārtha’ for Bhāmaha. It may be noted that Dandin looks at nāṭaka etc. perhaps from the angle of the style of writing which is both prose and verse, while Bhāmaha has looked at them from the angle of their being enacted on the stage. Dandin refers to another form of mixed type such as ‘campū’, which of course is not to be enacted on the stage. Dandin then observes (K.D. I. 32) :

"tadetam vāṅmayāṃ bhūyaḥ
samskrata, prākṛtaṃ tathā,
apabhramśaś ca miśram ca
ity āhūrāryaś caturvidham.” -

Literature as a whole could be written in Sanskrita, Prākṛta, Apabhramśa and a mixture of all three. When written in sanskrit a major verse writing is called sarga-bandha, skandhaka is in prākṛta and osara in apabhramśa. Daṇḍin says that sanskrita is God’s language, while prākṛta is three-fold such as tad-bhava, tat-sama and deśi. For him (K.D. I. 34) mahārāṣṭri is the best prākṛta dialect. ‘Setubandha’ is written in this dialect. Śaurasenī, gaudī, lāṭī and such other dialects (such as
māgadhi, avantijā, prācyā, according-to prabhā, pp. 34, ibid) come under Apabhramṣa. From the point of view of śāstra, says Daṇḍin, anything else than Sanskrit is termed ‘apabhramṣa’. Sargabandha etc. (by ‘etc.’ are meant khaṇḍa-kāvya or minor compositions, : prabhā, pp. 35, ibid), are in Sanskrit. Skandhaka is also the name of a metre. A composition in this metre has to be in Prākṛta language. The upa-rūpaka called saṭṭaka adds Prabhā (pp. 36, ibid) is also woven in Prākṛta. Osara is also a special metre. Anything attempted in this metre has to be in Apabhramṣa. The chapter or pariccheda in such a composition is called ‘kaḍava’. The Prabhā (pp. 37, ibid) observes :

tad uktam तिकांते-

“apabhramṣa-nibandhēśmin
sargāḥ kaḍavakābhidhāḥ,
tathāpabhramṣa-yogāṇī
cchandāṃsi vividhāni ca.” - iti.

etad udāharaṇaṃ karṇa-parākramā”di iti prema-candra-sarmāṇah.

Daṇḍin (K.D. I. 38) holds that ‘kathā’ is written in all prākṛta dialects and also in Sanskrita. By Kathā he seems to include ‘ākhyāyika’ also. Kādambarī is an instance of kathā written in Sanskrita, observes Prabhā. But Daṇḍin himself notes Brhārkathā written in bhūta-bhāṣa i.e. paśācī dialect, a variety of Prākṛta.

K.D. I. 39 observes that lāśya, cchalita and śampā are to be enacted on the stage. We know that Bhāmaha also refers to such varieties of literature that are to be enacted on the stage such as dvipadi, śampā, rāsaka, skandhaka etc. Actually these are taken as upa-rūpakas. The Prabhā (pp. 37, ibid) explains that lāśya is a form of dance performed by ladies and it abounds in śṛṅgāra-rasa : “stṛ- jana-kṛtam śṛṅgāra-rasa-pradhānam nṛtyam lāsyam.” Prabhā also quotes from Premacandra Tarkavāgīśa, and also from Hṛdayamgamā to this effect. ‘Chalita’ is said to be a variety of dance performed by the males. Śampā is an item presented by instruments as part of pūrva-rānga. Prabhā explains : śampā pūrva-rāṅgāntargato vādyā-prayoga-viśeṣah. (pp. 38, ibid). Prabhā quotes Nāṭyasāstra (v. 62) here. ‘Salyā’ is a variant which is also explained by Prabhā. - “bhāle hastāṃ samāvesya nṛtyam sālyeti kūritam.” Whatever that be, these are varieties of performing arts and are enacted on the stage but all these are taken as varieties of miśra-kāvya by Daṇḍin, of course when viewed from the point of view of the written script. By ‘ādi’ Prabhā holds that such varieties of performing art as
‘tāṇḍava’, ‘hallisaka’, ‘rāsa’ etc. are included. We do not know whether Daṇḍin knew all these varieties or not but certainly by ‘ādi’ he means some of them not mentioned by him. These varieties that go by the name of upartūpakas were known to Bhoja, Hemacandra, Rāmacandra and Guṇacandra and the rest and some of them are counted in Bharata’s N.S. and Abhinavabhāratī as well.

Daṇḍin says that all these viz. lāsya, chalita etc. are ‘prekṣārtham’ - i.e. to be viewed, while the rest as counted earlier such as prose and verse compositions both major and minor are only ‘śravya’, i.e. to be heard (and also ‘read’), K.D. I.-39 observes:

“lāsya-cchalita-śampā”di
prekṣārtham, itarat punah,
śravyam eva, iti saiśā’pi
dvayī gatir udāhṛtā.”

Bhoja in his Sarasvatīkaṇṭhābharana (II. 152) makes a subtle distinction even between those art-forms which are to be ‘viewed’ only and also those that are represented on the stage through acting.

The Prabhā (pp. 39, ibid) quotes from Bhoja:

“uktam bhojarājena sarasvatī kaṇṭhābharane
“śravyam tat kāvyam āhur yan
nekṣyate nābhīnīvate,
śrotrayor eva, sukhadam
bhavet tad api śad-vidham.” (II. 152)

So, ‘śravya’ is that which is ‘neither viewed nor represented (through acting).’

It is clear from the types enumerated by Daṇḍin that a number of art-forms, both ‘only written’ i.e. “only to be heard-pāthya”, and also ‘dṛṣṭya - i.e. to be viewed and also represented through acting on the stage’, - had emerged by the time Daṇḍin wrote. Actually these art-forms are seen even in Bharata, of course the names given to them may differ. All this suggests a rich history of documents both written and presented on the stage both through dance and acting. The richness and vastness of this literature prior to Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin and even Bharata are unfathomable. Unfortunately much of it is lost for us for the present at least. Art-forms in literature and drama suggest a highly cultured and educated society that lived in India at least before nearly two thousand years, or even earlier.
Classification of Poetry

Vāmana deals with the topic of types of literature in brief. At Kā. Sū. vr (= K.S.V.) I. iii. 21 he classifies literature into two i.e. gadya or prose and padya or verse. He observes in the vr̥tti that ‘gadya’ or prose is mentioned first as it is both difficult to grasp and also difficult to create : “gadyasya pūrva-nirdeśo durlakṣya- viṣeṣatvena durbandhavat.” He quotes a saying that ‘verily, prose is the touch-stone of poets.” - “gadyaṁ kavīnāṁ nikaśam vadaṇti.” Prose, Vāmana suggests is three-fold such as “gadyaṁ vr̥ttā-gandhi, cūrṇam, utkalikā práyaṁ ca.” (K.S.V. I. iii. 22).

This means that ‘vr̥ttā-gandhi’ prose is that which, in portions, carries passages that could be identified as this or that metre used in verse-formation. This could be said to be lyrical prose with sonorous effect or musical effect. Next is ‘cūrṇa’ or one - which is plain writing not abounding in compounds. ‘utkalikāprāya’ is explained by Kāmadhenu in a quiver way. It suggests that ‘utkalikā’ is the same as utkaṇṭhā or longing. Such prose writing which abounds in delineation of human longing, such by which the listener’s utkaṇṭhā or longing is aroused or promoted is said to be ‘utkalikāprāya’. This amounts perhaps to sentimental writing or such writing as arouses feelings and emotions ending in rasa-experience. Kāmadhenu suggests that by lakṣaṇā or indication utkalikā stands for ‘ruharuhikā’ i.e. horripilation. We may say that this is also an ‘anubhāva’ - consequent, caused due to rasa-camatkāra. When a style of writing - “pada-sandarbha-parippāti” - shines forth like a branch flowering in all its part, it is said to be utkalikāprāya. But, we may say that this explanation of Kāmadhenu is not convincing for we except something other than ‘cūrṇa’ in this third type. It should mean such writing which abounds in long and longer compounds, or one having rising billows and billows of long compounds as is seen in some parts of Kādambarī and such other works. Actually the Prabhā tikā (pp. 25, ibid) refers to the Sāhityadarpaṇa VI. 330, 331 which gives a four-fold division of prose writing such as - muktaka, vr̥ttagandhi, utkalikāprāya and
cūrnaka. The first is without a compound. The second is without portions of metrical formation vowen into it. The illustration is: “vrītagandhi yathā mama samara-kaṇḍūla-nibida-bhuja-ḍanda-kaṇḍalikṛta-kotanda-śīnjini-ṭāṅkārōjjagartava-nagara.” Viśvanātha observes that in this illustration in the portion viz. “kaṇḍalikṛta-kotanda”, we have a portion of anuvṛtubh metre, again in samara-kaṇḍūla, etc. we have the same, if the first two letters are removed. ‘Utkalikāprāya’ is one which abounds in long compounds as illustrated in ‘anīsa-vaśmara-nisidasara-visara-vidalita-samara-parigada-pavara-para-bala.” (Skt. = anīsa-visrmanarianisatasara-visara-vidalita-samara-parigata-pravara-para-balāḥ.”). The Chando Mañjarī also defines utkalikā as - bhaved utkalikāprāyaṁ samāsā”dhyām drṛḍhāksaram - ‘Cūrnaka’ is having small compounds as in ‘gunaratna-sāgara’, ‘jagadeka-nāgara’, etc. Thus, Viśvanātha has classified prose-writing on the basis of presence or total absence of short or long compounds. This sounds logical. Kāmadhenu’s explanation of utkalikā does not appeal to us, because any type of writing, be it with or without compound can generate emotions or utkanṭha or ruha-ruhikā and thus there will be overlapping in types. Actually Vāmana himself contradicts Kāmadhenu’s observations when he observes:

“padya-bhāga-vad vṛtta-gandhi” - (I. iii. 23) i.e. vṛtta-gandhi is that which contains portions of metrical formation, as in ‘pātāla-tālu-tala-vāsiṣu dānaveṣu”, wherein we can read portion of vasanta-tilaka metre.

In I. iii. 24, Vāmana says, “anāviddha-lalita-padaṁ cūnnam” - ‘anāviddhāni adirgha-samāsāni lalitāni anuddhatāni padaṇī yasmin - i.e. such formation as having un-involved formation i.e. smooth and without long compounds and not harsh letters makes for ‘cūrna’ variety.

Then, at I. iii. 25, Vāmana gives the ‘utkalikāpraya’ as ‘viparītam utkalikāprāyaṁ’, and explains it as : “āviddhōddhata-padaṁ ’with involved and harsh construction.’ ‘yarha-kulīsa-sikhara-khara-nakhara-pracaṇḍa-capetā-pāṭita-matta-mātanga-kumbha-sthala-galan-mada-ccaṭā-cchurita-caru-kesara-bhāra-bhāsura-mukhe kesarini. This involves a long and arduous compound. Thus Kāmadhenu’s explanation is contradicted by Vāmana himself and we feel we are right in taking ‘utkalikāprāya’ as such prose as abounds in, and longer compounds.

‘Padya’ i.e. verse is divided by Vāmana in many types. “padyam aneka-bhedam”. (I. iii. 26). It is subdivided into sama, ardha-sama, viṣama etc. By ‘ādi’, Kāmadhenu explains that such metres as depend on mātrā, such as vaitāliya, āryā, etc. are meant.
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The Kāmadhenu quotes verses from Bhāmaha (?; we do not find these in Bhāmaha) — such as —

samam ardhasamam vṛttam
viṣamaṃ ca tridhā matam,
aṅghrayo yasya catvāras
tulya-lakṣaṇa-lakṣitāḥ,
tacchandaḥ śāstra-tattvajñāḥ
sama-vṛttam pracakṣate
prathamāṅghri samo yasya
ṛtiyaścaraṇo bhavet
dvitiyasturyavad vṛttam
tadārdhasamam ucyate.
yasya pāda-catuṣke’pi lakṣma-bhinnam parasparam
tadāḥur-viṣamaṃ vṛttam chandah śāstra viśāradāḥ.”

Vāmana then further divides both gadya and padya into two such as a-nibaddha and nibaddha i.e. one with a smaller expanse or one seen in a small unit, the minor type, and the other, the major type or one seen in longer expanse.

But once again in the Kāmadhenu, we have a note: muktaka-lakṣaṇam uktam Bhāmaheṇa —

“prathamam muktakā”dīnām
ṛju-lakṣaṇam ucyate,
yad eva gāmbhiryaudārya-
śaurya-nītim atiśprśā.
bhaven muktakam ekena
dvikām dvābhyaṃ, trikāṃ tribhiḥ.”

Now once again, we do not find these words in the available Kāvyālāmkāra editions of Bhāmaha. We do not know if a larger version of the same was available to Gopendra Tripurhara (or Tippa) Bhūpāla or to anyone else earlier.

Vāmana observes (I. iii. 28) that these two varieties i.e. minor and major of both gadya/prose and padya/verse are to be mastered in sequence. This means that after having mastered the minor variety one has to work for the major one, like after preparing a garland first one prepares the crest-garland. But Vāmana does not
prefer composition of single verses or minor type only; for he observes: “nā' nibaddhaṁ cakāsti ekatejaḥ paramāṇur iva” (I. iii. 29) - Like a single spark, a minor composition does not shine forth. He gives a verse in support, which reads as -

"a-saṅkalita-rūpānāṁ
cāvyaṁ nā'sti cārūtā,
na pratyekā prakāśante
taijasāṁ paramānavaḥ."

i.e. Poetry of minor forms is not charming. Individual sparks (from fire) do not shine forth (brilliantly).

But Vāmana has preference for certain types even when major compositions (= nibaddha kāvya) are presented. He observes: (I. iii. 30)

"sandarbheṣu daśarūpakāṁ śreyāḥ."

i.e. - even in major compositions the ten types of rūpakas i.e. drama etc. - are the best. He says:

sandarbheṣu prabandheṣu daśarūpakāṁ nāṭakā”di śreyāḥ. Here ‘śreyāḥ’ means “atiśayena prasiddham”.

If it is asked why this preference for nāṭaka and the like, then the answer is (I. iii. 31)

“tadd hi citram citra-paṭavad-visēṣa-sākalyāt.” - i.e. as the daśa-rūpaka is associated with special features, it is like a picture of many colours. The commentary explains that:

"visēśaṁ bhāsābhedā”di-rūpānāṁ kathā”khyāyikā”dinaṁ mahākāvyabhedānāṁ asmād eva vāstu-vīnyāsa-kalpanāṁ iti prakārāntareṇā’pi śreyatvam asya pratipādayītum āha -

tato’nyabheda-klāptih - I. iii. 32 This argument of Vāmana is not convincing as we cannot imagine that other forms of descriptive literature originated from drama - “daśa-rūpakasya eva hi idam sarvam vilasitam.” Vāmana holds that citing definitions of kathā, ākhyāyikā, and mahākāvyā will not prove to be interesting and so he cancels the same. It has to be collected from other sources. But at the same time he does not exert even to define daśa-rūpaka which according to him is the source of all other literary art-forms, both prose and verse, major and minor types including.
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With this note ends what is termed as 'śārīra' adhikarana in the KSV. of Vāmana. Thus, we see that Vāmana was perhaps satisfied by the definitions of all types of literature - that which was to be enacted on the stage or was meant for hearing or reading only - given by his predecessors such as Bharata, Bhāmaha and the like.

Rudrata, in the XVIth chapter of his Kāvyālaṃkāra discusses various forms of literature. He wants the poets to write compositions to persue the four-fold goal such as dharma, artha, etc. in a style juicy because of rasa. He observes:

“jagati caturvarga iti khyātir
dharmārtha-kāma-mokṣāṇām,
samyak tān abhidadhyād
rasa-sammiśrāṇ prabandheṣu.” (Kā. XVI-1)
(Edn. Cowkhamba Vidya Bhavan, Varanasi, '66, Sri R. Shukla)

Rudrata further states (XVI-2) that compositions are two fold such as verse-compositions and prose-compositions viz. kathā and ākhyāyika, with original or (historical) or non-original theme, both major and minor in size. - Rudrata XVI-2 reads:

“santi dvidhā prabandhāḥ
kāvyā-kathā”khyāyikā”dayaḥ kävye,
uptādyānuptādyā
mahallaghutvena bhūyo/pi.”

Bhāmaha also had a two-fold division such as one having a plot with an old i.e. historical story or with story created newly by the poet. As noted above again, from the point of view of scope and size poetic creations are major or minor i.e. ‘mahat’ or ‘laghu’. Rudrata also expects that even nāyaka or hero could be a poet’s imagination only (XVI-3b). Namisādhu notes that here Tilakamaṇjari and Bāna’s Kādambarī could serve as illustrations where the hero is either imagined or from some other source.

The ‘anuptādyā’ - i.e. not created newly by the poet is one, wherein the whole of the composition has its theme borrowed from history or its part, but the poet narrates it in his own expression. Namisādhu explains as - (on Rudrata, XVI. 4) pāṇjaram iti. teṣu kathā”di-madhya te’nuptādyāḥ, yeṣāṁ pāṇjaram kathāśāriṇām
akhilaṁ sarvaṁ itihāsā”di-prasiddham rāmāyanā”di-kathā-prasiddham kaviḥ
svavācā paripūrayet. vaded ity arthaḥ. yathā arjuna-carite. athavā tad ekadesāṁ vā,
ithiṣā"dy ekadeśam vā svavācā yatra pariśūrayet tad api anupādyam. yathā kirāṭārjunīyam kāvyam.

'Arjunacarita' mentioned by Namisādhu is supposed to be Ānandavardhana's creation.

In XVI. 5, 6 Rudraṭa says that major compositions are those that have a larger scope-vitateṣu-and therein all the four pursuits of life such as dharma, artha, kāma and mokṣa are clearly treated (abhidhiyate), and the poet presents all the rasas as well as all the 'kāvyasthānas'. By 'kāvyasthāna's are meant such activities as picking up of flowers, water-sports etc. according to Namisādhu : ("kāvyasthānāni pūṣpoccaya - jalakriḍā"dīni bhānyate", pp. 415, ibid, on Rudraṭa, XVI. 5).

The minor compositions are those with a narrower canvass-and they have only one of the four pursuits of life delineated in them. Again all the rasas are not there but only some of them ('a-samagrā'nekarasāh'), or there may be minor compositions having only one fully developed single rasa -

"In minor/minor compositions based on known historical theme, the poet starts narration only with a salutation, observes Namisādhu, as the theme requires no special introduction it being known to all. : te meghadūta"dayo laghavāh. mahāntastu śiśupālā"dayaḥ. atha anupādyēṣu purāṇā"di-kramaṇa eva itivṛtti-nibandhah, kevalāṁ tatra kaviḥ svavācā caturvarga-rasa-kāvyasthāna-varṇanam namaskāra-pūrvakaṁ karotiti na tadviṣaya-nibandhōpadeśo jāyate.

ye punar utpādyās tatra katham nibandha ity anupadiṣṭam, na jāyate iti tannibandha-kramopadeśam āha. (Namisādhu, pp. 416, ibid).

Before we continue with this, it may be noted that Rudraṭa is careful at every juncture that a poetic creation has to be charged with rasa or rasas. This means that it has to be a successful creation causing aesthetic delight.

Actually in Kārikās XVI. 7-19 Rudraṭa discusses the type called Mahākāvyā with 'utpādyā' i.e. original theme. He says that in this variety. The poet has to give a description of a beautiful city to begin with and this has to be followed by the eulogy of the lineage of the hero, in the same -

"tatrōtpādy e pūrvaṁ san-
nagarīvarṇanam mahākāvye,
kurvita, tad anu tasyaṁ
nāyaka-vamśa-praśaṁsāṁ ca.” (XVI. 7)
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This is to be followed by the description of the hero gifted with three powers, such as those of mantra or, power of good counsel, i.e. polity, prabhu i.e. the power of eminence, authority and strength and koṣa i.e. treasure. Even ‘utsāhaśakti’ is counted here which makes for the power of energy. The hero has to have attachment for the three pursuits of life (i.e. trivarga-sakta). He is expected to be adorned by all excellences or guṇas, has to be dear to the subject and is one desirous of conquering (vijigīṣu) the enemy -

“tatra trivarga-saktaṃ
samiddha-śakti-trayam ca sarvagunām,
rakta-samasta-prakṛṭim
vijigīṣum nāyakaṃ nyaset.” (XVI. 8).

The poet has to indulge into description of seasons such as the autumn and the like. With reference to the hero it is stated that he is protecting his kingdom according to the set accepted procedure, and observes the accepted royal behaviour also. Rudraṇa observes (XVI. 10) that for the hero who observes dharma etc. for one’s own sake or for his friends, an enemy of high lineage and one who is meritorious has also to be described. The poet (XVI. 11) also indulges in describing the speech and mind spurred by anger, of his hero who in his court listens to the doings of an enemy either through his own spy, or through the agency of the enemy’s emissary. Then (XVI. 12) having discussed with his advisors of and deciding upon the vulnerability of enemy through infliction, the hero should stage a march (over the enemy) or send a messanger who can put things through effective talk -

“sammantrya samaṃ sacivaḥ
niścitya ca danda-sādhyatāṃ śatroḥ,
taṁ dāpayet prayāṇam
dūtaṁ vā preṣayen mukharam.” (XVI. 12)

In case the nāyaka decides to march, the poet should describe (XVI. 13) the absence of uneasiness of the subject (nāgarika-akṣobha), the countryside, mountains, rivers, forests and grooves, lakes, dīrgh land, oceans, islands and different worlds, camping of the hero, sports of young people, sunset and evening twilight, darkness and evening twilight, darkness and moon-rise etc. (XVI. 14). He should also describe the night and the gathering of youngsters (yūnāṃ samājām), music, drinking bouts, love-sports and such other things on occasions and thus should expand the story or theme. (XVI. 15).
The poet should also describe the opponent of the hero in like fashion advancing without thinking towards the hero, the poet may describe the besieging of the (enemy's) city also. The poet should describe messages to soldiers suggesting that they have to fight in the morning and suggesting also their death (in the fight) and therefore invitations to drinking bouts with ladies by night. XVI. 18 says that in the end the poet should describe the rise of the hero after facing great difficulty and fighting of both (i.e. the hero and his enemy and their armies) causing wonder and forming a plan or a military array, after making all preparations:

"sannahya kṛta-vyūhaṁ
sa-vismayam yudhyamānayor ubhayoḥ,
kṛcchreṇa sādhu kuryād
abhyyudayaṁ nāyakasya ante." (XVI. 18)

Rudraṇa suggests (XVI. 19) that the construction of this major poem has to be done in chapters called ‘sargas’, with properly related junctures on account of their inter-relation.

It seems Rudraṇa gives greater details concerning accidental events to be woven in the main theme of a mahākāvyya with original story. Perhaps he had a vaster literature and also a number of ālamkāra-granthas before him to seek guidance from.

Then Rudraṇa turns to kathā, or mahā-kathā. The (XVI. 20) concepts seem to be modelled on available famous compositions of Bāṇa and others. Rudraṇa observes that in a major prose composition, i.e. in a mahākathā, the poet pays homage to his personal deities and preceptors in the beginning in some verses and then describes, as an author, his own lineage and himself in brief:

"ślokair mahākathāyām
iṣṭān devān gurūn namaskṛtya,
saṃkṣepeṇa nijāṁ kulam
abhidadhyāt svam ca kartṛtayā." (XVI. 20)

By ‘ca’ after ‘svam’, observes Namisādhu, (pp. 419, ibid) the untold details are covered. “svam ca iti ‘ca’kāro'nukta-samuuccaye. tena sujana-khala-stuti-nindā”dikāṁ
cā ahbidaddhyād iti sūcyate.” It is thereby suggested that such matter as praise of people of merit, and censure of the evil-minded etc. should be woven by the poet.
Rudrata (XVI. 21) wants the poet to start the kathā with descriptions of cities and the like in prose with light consonants arranged in alliteration or (XVI-22), he may weave a sub-plot in the beginning and come down soon to the main theme. Both the themes should have a light and natural connection - "laghutāvat-samdhānam." Namisādhu illustrates this by naming Kādambarī. Or (XVI-23), the poet may go for a kathā in Sanskrit in which the object is in form of winning a bride and the narration is charged with all the sub-tleties of śṛṅgāra - "samyaśvinyastā - sakala - śṛṅgārām". This can be done through the medium of language - i.e. prākṛta etc., which is other than sanskrit (= anyena) and which is rendered in verse (= a-gadyena). Namisādhu says that the poet could use prose also in other languages and Rudrata accepts this by adding ‘ca’ in the main kārikā-(a-gadyena ca anyena). “anyena prākṛtā”di-bhāṣāntareṇa tv agadyena gāthābhh prabhūtam kuryāt.” Thus there was no rigid rule regarding language, or metrical or prose forms, in kathā.

Rudrata (XVI. 24) then discusses the ākhyāyikā form in which also he expects the poet to make the beginning with salutations to preceptors or deities and also with other characteristics observed as in kathā but only after first introducing earlier poets also :

"pūrva-vad eva namaskṛta-
deva-gurur nótsaher sthīteśv esu,
kāvyam kartum iti
kaviṁ śaṁsed ākhyāyikāyāṁ tu."

Naturally Rudrata must have looked into the practice followed by Bāna and others and he must have a number of works on literary criticism also before him.

Then (XVI.-25) the poet should point out some immediate cause of his creation such as his devotion to his king or insistence for singing the merits of others or such other cause. This narration of his motivation should be done in a lucid way - 'akṣam abhidadhyāt.' Rudrata has kept Bāna for his inspiration and hence he expects kavi-prāśamsā in verse, story completely and necessarily in prose, suggestive aparavaktra verse or verses in other metres also, and divisions into chapters called ucehvāsas.

Rudrata expects that the poet should draft ākhyāyikā in prose only, as is the case with kathā. He has to introduce his own lineage as well as himself also not in verse, that means in prose only. (XVI. 26). Like sargas in a mahākāvyā he has
to arrange the material in chapters called ucchvāsas having two āryās at the beginning of each chapter. The āryās should be well-knit and expressive of normal information.

Rudraṭa (XVI.-28, 29) further observes that on the occasion of voicing any doubt concerning past or future time, the poet has to arrange for recitation (by some agency) in form of either one or two of devices such as anyokti, samāsokti or ślesokti, to remove any doubt i.e. to establish something finally. This recitation should suit the context. The poet has to frame poems in āryā, aparavaktra or puśpitāgrā metre, or even mālinī metre that may suit the theme, also could be used (XVI. 30):

"tatra cchandaḥ kuryād
āryā'para-vaktra-puśpitāgrānām,
anyan mālinī-prāyam." (XVI. 30)

Rudraṭa observes that in those three forms (i.e. (mahā)kathā, ākhyaṅkā and mahākāvyya), subordinate themes and narrations of opposite nature but necessarily purposeful and well-knit with the main theme and story, also could be woven by a poet:

"sābhiprayam kiñcid viruddham iva
vastu sat-praśaṅgena,
antah kathāś ca kuryāt
triṣv api eṣu prabandheṣu." (XVI. 31)

In all these major art-forms, both in verse and prose, Rudraṭa well-comes a complex nature of theme and story decorated even by sub-plots having an opposite colouring and nature. But the whole should create an impression of total unity of purpose. Thus loss of kingdom of the hero, till kingship is regained by him, or under the pretext of an ascetic such theme as deals with pursuit of liberation or mokṣa, could be delineated by the poet (Rudraṭa, XVI. 32).

Rudraṭa then turns his attention towards minor compositions. He observes (XVI.-33) that in a minor (verse) composition or in a khaṇḍa-kathā i.e. a minor prose composition, the hero is to be pictured as a happy go lucky man who comes to grief. Other characters such as a brahmin, or a (royal) servant or a businessperson, etc. should also be painted quite often.
“kuryād kṣudre kāvye,
khaṇḍa-kathāyām ca, nāyakaṁ sukhinam,
āpad-gatam ca bhūyo
dvija-sevaka-sārthavāhādim.” (XVI. 33)

Rudraṭa wants that in such compositions the principal emotive context should be that of tragic or of love in separation due to journey -

“atra rasam karuṇam vā
kuryād athavā pravāsa-śṛṅgāram.”

Or, the theme portrayed (XVI.-34 ab) could be that of the first or fresh love of the hero with the hero’s rise delineated at the end. This means the end has to be happy.

“prathamānurāgam athavā
punar ante nāyakābhyadayam.” (XVI. 34-cd).

Rudraṭa is very clear that all these various features which have been enumerated with reference to minor or major works in both verse and prose cover only those which have an invented theme and not those having historical theme, for in the latter the narration has to follow the original source and this instruction does not touch them.

“naitad anutpādyesu tu,
tatra hy abhidhiyate yathāvṛttam,
alpeṣu mahatsu ca vā
tadviṣayō nāyam upadesah.” (XVI.-35)

This means that Rudraṭa is not prepared to give liberty to such creative works as have historical or semi-historical theme. But we feel that here Rudraṭa adopts a rather narrow outlook for his near and immediate followers such as Ānandavardhana and Kuntaka seem to be more liberal when they allow such changes even in a historical theme that promote rasa. For them rasa-ananugunashiti, i.e. such situations which go to thwart the process of rasānubhūti, have to be either omitted or altered.

In XVI. 2. Rudraṭa used such words as - “kathā”khyāyikā”dayāḥ.” Namisādhu recounts this in the beginning of XVI. 36 and observes that now Rudraṭa proceeds to discuss that which was implied by “ādi.” - “atha kāvyā”khyāyikā”daya ity atra ādi-grahaṇa-samgrhītaṁ darśayītum āha -
Rudraṭā (XVI.-36) observes:

"anyad varṇaka-mātram
prasasti-kulakā’di-nātakā’dy anyat,
kāvyam tad bahubhāsam
vicitram anyatra cābhhihitam."

"Only for discursive purpose such (sub) varieties of verse formation as prāṣasti, kulaka etc. (are enumerated). Nāṭaka etc. (i.e. the rūpakas) are different forms of kāvyā as they are (written) in many languages and a lot of other beautiful features are acknowledged with them. They are discussed in other sources (on dramaturgy). Rudraṭa also mentions prāṣasti, not taken note of by his predecessors. Prasasti is a eulogy on kings and also contains praises of deities. These are said to be varied or beautiful in nature and in various languages also. Nāṭakas also have many sources of beauty and have many languages spoken by different characters.

Namisādhu elaborates over Rudraṭa’s observation in the following way:

“anyad iti. sugamaṃ na varam. tatra yasyāṃ īśvara-kula-varṇanam yaśórtam
kriyate sā prāṣastih. yatra ca pañcā”dīnāṃ caturdaśāntānāṃ ślokānāṃ vākyārthāḥ
pariśamāpyate tat kulakam. ‘ādi’graḥanaād ekasmin chandasī vākya-samāptau
muktakam, dvayoḥ sandānitakam. triṣū viśeṣakam, caturṣu kalāpakam. tathā
muktakānāṃ eva praghāṭākopaṇiṃbandhaḥ paryāya-yogaḥ kośāḥ. tathā bahūnāṃ
chandasāṃ ekavākyatve, tad vākyānāṃ ca samūhavasthāne parikathā. bhūyo’pyaḥa-
nāṭakānyad iti. atra bharaṭādy abhihitam. nāṭakā”dīty atra ādi-sabdāt nāṭaka-
prakaraṇa-ihāṃṛga-samavakāra-bhāṇa-vyāyoga-dīma-vithi, ‘prahasanaā’di-
samgrahāḥ. tad bahubhāsam ca, bahvibhiḥ bhāsābhir nibadhhyate. vicitram ca.
nāna-saṃdhi-samaḥyaṅga-abhinayaā”di yukṣতvāt.

Namisādhu is pleased by Dr. De in roughly 1059 A.D. Thus he was almost a
contemporary of Mammaṭa and therefore surely posterior to Anandavardhana and
Bhoja. So, perhaps in explaining various minor art-forms in verse such as kulaka
etc. Namisādhu was influenced by Bhoja and for sure by earlier writers such as
Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin Ānandavardhana, Abhinvagupta and the rest. We will now see
what Namisādhu has to explain-

Prāṣasti is explained as one in which ‘īśvara-kula-varṇana’ is presented. By
‘īśvara’ Namisādhu perhaps means the king i.e., master, and ‘kula’ is his clan. Poets
were given to glorify their masters who took care of their proteges. Or, perhaps
‘īśvara’ may mean ‘god’ and then ‘kula’ does not become clear. ‘Kulaka’ is a cluster
of verses from five to fourteen that carry a sentence-sense, i.e. they together deal with a single topic of description. By ‘ādi’, Namisādhu covers up such cases as of a single verse in a given metre called a muktaka, and two of them make for a sandānitaka, three a viśeṣaka, and four verses make for a ‘kalāpaka’. From five to fourteen centred round a single subject as seen above, was a ‘kulaka’. We know that Anandavardhana has also in some context as we will go to see after Rudraṭa, has mentioned some of these types. But Namisādhu wants us that Rudraṭa also knew them and there is no reson to deny this assertion. Actually a group of verses describing a single topic, say the body of a deity or a given charater as read in the greater epics or the earlier Mahākāvyas, was nothing new for a discerning reader or critic. Namisādhu further states that these individual verses when collected together are said to be a ‘koṣa’. Parikathā is perhaps one which is something that covers up from all sides (= pari) some topics. So, when many verses are placed together they make for a ‘parikathā’. Namisādhu explains that when Rudraṭa says, “nāṭakā”dy anyat” - he seems to refer to what Bharata has laid down. By ‘ādi’ in ‘nāṭakā”di’, such types of rūpakas as ‘prakaraṇa’, ‘īhārnga’, ‘samavakāra’, ‘bhāṇa’, ‘vyāyoga’, ‘dima’, ‘vitiḥ’, ‘prahasana’ and the rest are to be taken. These are written with the help of many languages or dilects. They are charming also as they are adorned by a variety of saṃdhis i.e. junctures, saṃdhaṅgas or parts of junctures, (four-fold) acting etc.

One thing is certain that literary critics from Bhamaha to Rudraṭa and even later, include the dramatic compositions under literature or kāvyā, perhaps because they all have to have a written script. Actually Bharata also is favourably inclined to this idea and he discusses such topics as guṇa, dośa, alamkāras and lakṣaṇas only from the angle of they being devices that make for the charm in poetic compositions; of course ‘dośa’ harms the same. But we should also note that for the discerning in India a drama was primarily composed for presentation on the stage and thus, though being a literary art as well, had its own identity with acting as its special mark or ‘linga’. It is therefore that excepting some later alamkārikas as Hemacandra and Viśvanātha, other literary critics avoided discussing this variety of what is termed as “ḍṛṣya kāvyā”.

After dealing with defining a number of types of literature, Rudraṭa tries to impart some practical instructions to poets suggesting what they should not do. This is perhaps to make the writing look more sensible and acceptable. Perhaps we may say that one can read the beginning of a topic called kavi-samaya or poetic convention or kavi-sīksā or training of a poet here in a wider sense.
We know that this topic flowers in Rājaśakhara and then in Hemacandra and we have a number of special manuals written on such topics that are connected with successful writing. Even when Bhāmaṇa denounces the imitation in case of dūta-kāvyas or devices like artificial elephant in Vatsarāja episode, or use of only some grammatical usages in poetry or some verbs limited to certain senses only even if they carry other dictionary meanings, etc., this could be taken as topics directly or indirectly connected with poetic conventions or, kavi-śikṣā in a wider sense only. This is seen in Vāmana also and Rudraṭa also gives some golden advice to poets. Thus, Rudraṭa suggests:

"kula-śailāṁbunidhīnāṁ
na brūyāl laṅghanaṁ manusyaṁ,
ātmīyāya eva śaktyā
sapta-dvipāvani-kramaṇam. (XVI. 37)

The poet should not describe crossing of kula-parvatas i.e. principal mountains, by a mortal being. The kula-parvatas are said to be seven such as -

"mahendro malayaḥ sahyah
śuktimān yaka-parvataḥ,
vindhyaś ca pāriyātraś ca
saptaite kula-parvatāḥ."

A normal human being crossing such huge mountains on his own sounds stupid and Rudraṭa is not prepared to tolerate anything stupid even in the realm of poetry which is full of fancy and imagination. It is again foolish for the poet to describe such feats by a human being as moving on his own on the whole of earth having seven dvīpas or islands. We know that a dvīpa is a division of the terrestrial world and the numbers of these dvīpas vary according to different authorities. They are four, seven, nine or thirteen and are all situated round the mountain Meru, like petals of a lotus flower, and each being separated from the other by a distinct ocean. In Naiṣadhiyacarita I. 5 the dvīpas are said to be eighteen but seven appears to be the usual number. Raghu I. 65, and Śākuntala VII. 33 have seven. The central one is Jambudvīpa under which is included Bharata-khaṇḍa i.e. India.

Rudraṭa XVI. 38 has something further. But to introduce this kārikā, Namisādhu has the following remark - "nanu bharata-hanūmat-prabhirūnāṁ sarvam etat cchṛuyate, tataś ca teśāṁ tathā'nyasyāpi bhavisyatīti ko doṣa ity āha."
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Namisādhu suggests that someone may argue that well, all this (= crossing of kula-parvatas or sapta-dvīpa-avanī etc.) is said to have taken place with reference to Bharata, Hanumat etc., and so, as in case of these, so also in case of any other also this can be narrated and what harm is there? - To this, Rudraṭa XVI. 38 says:

“ye’pi laṅghitavanto
bharataprāyā kulācalā’mbunidhīn,
teṣaṃ surā”di-mukhya’śe
saṅgādāsan vimānāni.”

That Bharata and the rest (i.e. Hanumān etc.) crossed the kula-mountains and oceans by themselves was a feat carried out by them as they had vimānas or heavenly cars or air-crafts or divine vehicles due to their company of the principal deities going with them. Namisādhu explains that by ‘ādi’ in ‘surā”di-mukhya’śe, is meant: “siddha-vidyādhara-kinnara-gandharvā”di-saṅgrahaḥ."Rudraṭa thus seems to be a critic given to a rationalistic approach like Bhāmaha, a rare intellectual not to toterate all non-sense painted by poets. Here we have an opportunity to probe in the mind of Rudraṭa who seems to be bold enough even to refuse the legend of a Hanumān crossing an ocean by a physical jump and seems to suggest a rational explanation of even a Hanuman accomplishing his superhuman feat with the help of some sort of an air-craft or a vehicle. That could travel through air made available to him through some scientist, here called a divine agency.

Namisādhu further raises a possible objection such as: (pp. 436, ibid, Rudraṭa, XVI. 39) “naṇu ca sattva-cittā”di-hīnativā manusyaṇāṁ kathāṃ surā”dibhiḥ saha saṅgo’pi ity āha - i.e. “The objector may argue that a normal human being is not gifted with a conscience full of sattva i.e. pure quality and in its absence how can he have contact with any divine agency?" To this the answer is (Rudraṭa - XVI. 39)

ṣaktiś ca na jātv eśāṁ
a-surā”di-vadhe’dhikā, surā”dibhyāḥ,
āśīt te hi sahaya
niyante sma amaraśiḥ samiti.”

The answer is, true, these individuals (who have superhuman feats to their credit) did not have power great enough to kill the demons, but they were helped by divine agencies and were led in the battles virtually by the immortals.”
The idea is that Rudraṭa, the rationalist refuses to accept any superhuman power in case of normal human beings. But some of those, who have a pure heart, and thus, perhaps like Arjuna, choose to be instruments in the hands of the will Divine, by total surrender, accomplish such feats through Divine grace. For, Rudraṭa wants us to believe that these humans do not fight nor conquer wars against the titanic evil forces, but they become the chosen instruments in the hands of the Divine and accomplish the impossible. So, such feats, Rudraṭa advises the poets, are not to be described with reference to normal human heroes, for this would look foolish. We know that Ānandavardhana, without naming Rudraṭa talks about the same thing while dealing with theme of bigger compositions and Rāmacandra and Guṇācandra do mention such exceptional cases of Sātavāhana and the like. These remarkable feats are to be described not in case of all heroes in common.

Rudraṭa also asks poets not to describe such conditions as poverty, disease, old age, miseries caused due to extreme cold or heat, and all that is causing disgust or aversion leading to bibhatsa (rasa) or the disgusting sentiment outside Bhāratavarṣa, perhaps meaning the context of the planet called earth.

Namisādhu says that Rudraṭa explains as to why in regions beyond earth such as ilāvṛtta and the like, such things as poverty, disease etc. are not to be described. It is so because in other regions beyond earth there is land studded with gold and jewels, where whatever is intended is easily achievable, and the life-span of beings is of lakhs of years i.e. of hundred thousand years free from old age. Rudraṭa, an intellectual curbing supernatural feats being described with normal human heroes, falls to this sort of belief which accepts the existence of regions beyond earth where people live happily for a hundred thousand years enjoying youth for ever!

But, this also forms part of the poetic convention acceptable to Rudraṭa, whose basic approach is that of a rationalist but who is also inclined to accept something beyond earth and something beyond the capacity and imagination of ordinary humans, when it comes to be covered by the realm of divine grace and divine agency! Thus, perhaps in Rudraṭa we find a combination of a rational mind and also a mystic who rises beyond the limits and scope of rationality.

Thus we see that among the ancients, it is only Rudraṭa who mentions praśasti, i.e. eulogy on kings and praises of deities. These are said to be in various languages and beautiful and varied in nature as noted above. We will go to see that in later Alāmkāra works this panegyric appears with a number of sub-divisions.
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We also took notice of such minor-types as mukraka, sandānitaka, kalāpaka, kośa and parikathā mentioned by Namisādhu who believes that Rudrata means these by "ādi.", though not actually counted by Rudrata, but read in Ānandavardhana with reference to the discussion on samghatānā.

Ānandavardhana, (Dhv. III. 7) observes:

viśayāśrayam apy anyad
aucityam tām niyacchati,
kāvya-prabhedaśrayataḥ
sthitā bhedavati hi sā. (Dhv. III. 7)

i.e. “Another consideration which governs the usage of texture is its decorum with regard to the literary medium adopted. Texture thus becomes different in different forms of literature.” (Trans. K.Kris. pp. 129, ibid)

He further observes in the āloka that: vakṣr-vācya-gataucitye saty api viśayāśrayam anyad aucityam samghatānām niyacchati. yataḥ kāvyasya prabhedaḥ - muktakam saṃskṛta prākṛtā'pabhraṃśa-nibaddham, sandānitaka-viśesaka-kalāpaka-kulakāni, paryāyabandhaḥ, parikathā, khanda-kathā-sakalakathe, sarga-bandho'bhineyārtham ākhyaśikā-karthe ity evam ādayaḥ - tad āśrayeṇā'pi samghatānā viśesavatī bhavati. tatra muktakesu rasa-bandhābhīvinivesināḥ kaves tad āśrayam aucityam. tac ca darśītam eva. anyatra kāmacāraḥ.

etad yathoktam auityam
eva tasyā niyāmakam,
sarvatra gadya-bandhe’pi
cchando-niyama varjite. (Dhv. III. 8)

- "In addition to decorum of speaker and the spoken, decorum of literary medium also governs the choice of texture. Literature in Sanskrit, Prakrit and Apabhramśa has various forms such as ‘pearls’ (= muktakas, i.e. single stanzas forming a self-contained unit) or run-on verses of two, three, four or more stanzas in the same metre forming a single unit, stanzas in one or more metres describing a single topic, diadectic stories in verse, full-fledged fiction in verse, short stories in verse, epics, dramatic works, historical novels in prose and romantic novels in prose. Texture becomes varied due to differences in their literary forms also. Of these, a poet who is intent on delineation of sentiment in pearls will be guided by the considerations of decorum relating to sentiment. This decorum has already been explained. In pearls where the poet has no such intent he is free to employ any texture he likes.

Poets are, however, mostly seen to be intent on delineating sentiment even in pearls, as in full-fledged literary works. Thus the pearls of the poet Amaru are famous for their profusion in Erotic sentiment, and they are regarded as good as full-fledged works in point of charm. In run-on verses of two stanzas etc., affected and involved construction itself becomes proper, and therefore we will have textures of medium-sized and long compounds. But if these run-on verses occur as parts of another whole poem, then the decorum towards a whole poem, indicated already, will apply to it. In works dealing with a single theme, and containing verses in one or more metres, the textures to be employed should be only those without compounds and with medium-sized compounds. Sometimes though the texture of long compounds might occur in view of decorum of context, ‘harsh’ and ‘pallid’ dictions will have to be avoided therein. But there is no such rule so far as diadectic stories in verse are concerned. The reason is that there will just be a narration of story and no intention of delineating sentiment. Full-fledged stories and short-stories in verse are common only in prakrit language and they abound in run-on verses upto more than five stanzas. Therefore, the use of texture with long compounds also will not be wrong in them. The decorum of diction should always be decided in view of the sentiments to be delineated. If an epic should be intent upon delineating sentiments, the decorum of sentiment will govern its use of texture. Otherwise, it is left to the free choice of the poet. We can see writers of epics who have composed works in both these ways; but of the two, the works that are intent upon sentiment
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should be regarded as superior. In dramatic works, anyway, there should be a sole intent of delineating sentiment. So far as historical novels (ākhyāyikā) and romantic novels [kathā] are concerned, they are found mostly in prose only and their method differs from that of metrical works. Since the ancients have not given any specific rules concerning these, we shall frame them here in brief.

“The considerations of decorum detailed above will also govern all prose works which are not governed by the rules of metre.” (Dhv. III. 8)

Though prose works are not governed by rules of metre, the considerations of decorum mentioned above, viz. that of speaker, the spoken, and the literary medium, govern them.” - (Trans. K.Kris. pp. 131-133, ibid)

It may be noted that though Ānandavardhana has not defined various types. Prof. K. Krishnamoorthiy through his translation has suggested the same. Prof. K. Krishnamoorthiy while giving english equivalents seems to explain the forms on the authority of perhaps Abhinavagupta, or, Namisādhu. He takes muktakas as ‘pearls’, i.e. single stanzas. He takes sandānitaka, viśeṣaka, kalāpaka and kulaka as run-on verses of two, three, four or more stanzas, paryāyabandha as stanzas in one or more metres describing a single topic, didactic stories in verse is ‘parikathā’, while sakala and khaṇḍa-kathās are full-fledged fiction in verse and short-stories in verse. Sargabandha is epic for Prof. Krishnamoorthiy, and Kathā and ākhyāyikā are romantic novels and historical novels in prose. Saṃghaṭanā is texture of writing. Now, Abhinavagupta in his Locana on Dhv. III 6 does explain these types. So, Prof. K. Krishnamoorthiy has either relied on him or Namisādhu or perhaps Bhoja. Perhaps even Namisādhu relies on Bhoja, or even Abhinavagupta, for no other known alamkāra works preceding Namisādhu excepting the Locana attempt definitions of all types of poetry.

One more important point to be noted with Ānandavardhana is that not only does he mention types of poetry based on their external form, but he also attempts to furnish what we may call criticism-based classification of poetry in which he mentions three types such as dhvani, guṇībūta-vyāngya and citra, based on the absolute prominence or subservience or near absence of what he called “pratīyamāna artha” or implicit sense. He of course is careful not to call these types as ‘uttama’, ‘madhyama’ and ‘avara’ as suggested by Abhinavagupta and picked up by Mammaṭa. Varieties and sub-varieties of dhvani and guṇībūtavyāngya and citra are also seen in the Dhvanyālokā Locana and Mammaṭa, which we will pick up while dealing with dhvani separately. But one thing is certain that Ānandavardhana
launched upon a new perspective to classify poetry based on an internal measure and not just an external form. Now viewing from this criticism-based classification, even a muktaka or a single stanza as of Amaru Kavi, or a prabandha or major composition such as a mahākāvya like say Raghuvamśa or a Kathā or ākhyāyikā, the major prose compositions such as Kādambarī and Harśacarita or even a nāṭaka such as Abhijñāna-sākuntala could fall under the class of ‘dhvani-kāvya’. But for the present we will continue with the Kāvya-prabheda as seen in Ānandavardhana’s successors, though of course Abhinavagupta is primarily interested only in the varieties and sub-varieties of dhvani, guṇibhūta-vyaṅgya and citra.

As noted earlier, though Abhinavagupta is primarily interested in criticism-based classification, he does attempt to explain under Dhv. III. 6. (Locana) some of the types beginning from Muktaka onwards, based on external form only. He observes: (pp. 225, Edn. Nandi, Ahd. ’97-’98) - muktakam iti - muktakam anyena anāśāyam iti - muktakam anyena anāśāyam kam. - Abhinavagupta unlike Dandin is careful in observing that ‘muktaka’ is that single stanza which is totally independent i.e. not embraced or touched (through context) by any other stanza. Thus, for him a single verse independent in itself, but taken from a given ‘sarga’ of a mahākāvya and or such other type of poetry, is not to be designated as ‘muktaka’. It is an independent unit, by itself, first and last: “tena svaṭantratayā pari-sāmāpta-nirakāṅksārtham api prabandha madhyavarti na muktakam iva ucyate.” muktaksyaiva višeṣaṁ saṁskṛtyā ādi. This does not tally with Dandin.

He explains ‘sandānitaka’ as a unit of two stanzas which give a complete sense: “dvābhyaṁ kriyāsaṁāptaud sandānītakam.” Three stanzas forming a unit are ‘viṣeṣaṁkāyam’, ‘tribhīr viṣeṣaṁ’ and four make for ‘kalāpaka’ - ‘caturbhiḥ kalāpakam’. ‘pañca-prabhṛtibhiḥ kulakam.’ - ‘Five roll-on stanzas forming a unit make for a kulaka.’

‘Paryāyabandha’ is that group of stanzas which covers up a topic, such as one which describes for example the spring season (perhaps in Kumāra-saṁbhava). Locana observes: “iti kriyāsaṁāptikṛṭa bheda dvandvena nirdiṣṭāḥ. avāntara-kriyā saṁāptāv api vasanta-varṇanāḥ dir eka-varṇaniyoddeśena pravṛttāḥ paryāya-bandhah.”

It may be observed that according to Locana, the four types viz. muktaka, sandānitaka, viṣeṣaka and kalāpaka are based on ‘completion of one activity.’ They are therefore mentioned by a dvandva compound. All these four varieties are available in all languages also. We will go to observe that Hemacandra also suggests that these four varieties are seen in all languages i.e. Sanskrit, Prakrit and Apabhramśa with all their sub-varieties.
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With 'pariyāyabandha' are enumerated those types which are formed due to coming together of many sentences and therefore whose canvas is broader or larger. As noted above subordinate activities are led to completion and not just one activity as in the first four types. But all these activities have one goal such as, say the description of the spring season.

'Parikathā' is explained as: evam dharmā' di-puruśārtham uddhiyā prakāra-
vaicitryena ananta-vṛttānta-varnana-prakārā-parikathā. Thus, parikathā is one in which one of the four chief pursuits of life such as dharma, artha, kāma and mokṣa, is picked up and through prakāra vaicitrya i.e. variety in beautiful expression, a number of stories are glued together.

Khaṇḍakathā is narration of one part of a kathā, and it is termed khaṇḍa-kāvya as well. We will go to see that the Sāhitya-adarpanas defines khaṇḍa-kāvya as that which imitates one part of the kāvya. Sakalakathā contains the description of many themes all of which extend up to the 'phala' i.e. the final objective or motivation. In the vṛtti both khaṇḍa-kathā and sakalā-kathā are related through a dvandva compound. This is to suggest that these two sub-varieties were prevalent in Prakrit only, observes Abhinavagupta. Prior to these all the types that are enumerated beginning with muktaka, have no restriction to any particular language.

Sargabandha, observes Locana, is of the form of a mahā-kāvya; has one puruśārtha or pursuit of life as its phala or motivation, is only in Sanskrit and is a big composition having for its description the whole theme i.e. the canvas covers the whole life as such.

The type that is to be represented on the stage includes ten types of drama -daśa-rūpaka such as nāṭaka, prakaraṇa, etc. It is written in many languages and has sub-varieties such as nāṭikā, troṭaka, rāsaka, prakaraṇikā, etc. They are termed upa-rūpakas by later theorists. We will go to observe later that there are names as many as eighteen such as nāṭikā, troṭaka, gosthi, sattaka, nāṭya-rāsaka, prasthāna, ullāpya, kāvya-prenikhaṇa, rāsaka, samplāpaka, sri-gadita, śilpaka, vīlasika, durmallikā, prakaraṇi, haliṣa and bhānikā. Viśvanātha discusses these. But some of them were seen as early as in Bharata, Bhāmaṇa, Daṇḍin etc. also, while Hemacandra and also Rāmacandra and Guṇacandra discuss them following of course Bhoja. We will look into these later.

The ten types of major plays and all the sub-varieties such as nāṭikā and the rest are said to be “abhineyārtha kāvya” i.e. poetry to be enacted or represented on stage through acting. Many languages or dialects are used in these types. Some special characters are expected to speak in a special language or dialect and there are observations concerning these which are discussed in works on dramaturgy.
Locana talks of two major types of prose compositions such as the ākhyāyikā and kathā. The former is arranged in chapters called ucchvāsas and contain verses in vaktra and aparā-vaktra metres. The kathā has none of these qualifications. The Agnipurāṇa gives five types of prose composition which have khandakathā, parikathā and kathānikā over and above the two enumerated above. The vṛttikāra Ānandavardhana has used a dvandva compound for kathā and ākhyāyikā, to suggest that both these types are available in prose compositions. The use of ‘ādi’ is to include a variety called ‘campū’. The Locana quotes Daṇḍin suggesting the form of Campū mixed with both prose and verse: “gadya-padyamayī kācic campur ity abhidhīyate.” We may add that by ‘ādi’ all newer and newer forms of literary writing i.e. kāvya or sāhitya that are being practiced even to-day in various languages all over the world could be included. Thus assured theatre and absurd poetry also could be included by ‘ādi’.

Thus the Dhv. and the Locana name a number of types of major and minor compositions both in prose and verse. All these forms could be primarily subdivided into gadya, padya and abhineya. The types beginning from muktaka to sargabandha fall under padya i.e. verse formation. In these types the five beginning from muktaka to kulaka are not rich in story element (i.e. kathā-tattva), or narration. So, types other than these are long narratives-while muktaka and the rest may be taken as śuddha-bhedas. We may arrange these types in a tabular form as under -

\[
\begin{array}{c|c}
\text{kāvya} & \\
\hline
\text{śuddha (padya) (minor compositions in verse)} & \text{prabandha (major compositions)} \\
\hline
\text{muktaka sandānitaka kalāpaka kulaka padya abhineya gadya} & \\
\hline
\text{verse (to be enacted) (prose)} & \\
\hline
\text{paryāyabandha parikathā khandakathā sakalakathā sargabandha rūpakas uparūpakas} & \\
\hline
\text{kathā ākhyāyikā} & \\
\end{array}
\]

Next to Ānandavardhana. We have Bhoja who discusses literary forms in great details.
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In the third chapter of his śrṅgāra prakāśa (= sr. pra), after discussing the topic of vākya and prakaraṇa, Bhoja picks up ‘prabandha’, which he defines as “vidhi-niṣedhāvagatihetuḥ mahāvākyam prabandhah.” i.e. Prabandha or a major composition is a ‘mahāvākya’ having injunction or negation as its objective. It is said to be three-fold viz. padya i.e. verse, gadya or prose and mīśra i.e. a mixture of both verse and prose. Padya or verse is also three-fold viz. akṣara-cchahdas - i.e. vedic verses, mātrā-cchandas and gana-cchandas. All these three are again each three-fold such as sama, ardha-sama and visama. Bhoja illustrates all these varieties (pp. 121, Edn. Josyer). He says that all these three types of verse are seen in mahākāvyā, itiḥāsa, śruti, etc.

‘gadya’ or prose is defined as collection of words not arranged in a metre : a-cchandah pada-santāno gadyam. This is three-fold viz. vrutta-gadhi, cūrṇam and utkalikāprāyam. The first one is such which is sprinkled by verse formation-padya-gandha-vad vrutta-gandhi. This we had seen in Vāmana also. This is again three-fold such as sama-ardhasama-visama-bhedāt. In the same way mātrā-kṣara-cchanda also can be traced in vrutta-gandhi.

Cūrṇa is explained as : (pp. 122, ibid) : anāviddha-lalita-padam cūrṇam - It is that type of prose writing which has words that are not of involved construction and are charming. This again is three-fold viz. one having ‘guru’ letters to a greater extent i.e. gurubahulam, or laghu-bahulam and mīśra having both guru and laghu equally divided.

Utkalikāprāya is : “a-lalitā”viddham” i.e. one having harsh letters and involved construction. This again is three-fold : “lalitāviddha-pada-vākya-bhedāt” i.e. one intercepted by lalita letters or by a-viddha i.e. non-involved pada, or by non-involved vākya. Bhoja observes that all these varieties of prose are seen in ākhyaikās, kathās and madhu-mallikā etc. : tad etat trividham ākhyaikāsū, kathāsū, madhumallikā”dīṣu drśyante (pp. 122, ibid).

Mīśra is defined as-gadya-padya-vyāyogo mīśram (pp. 122, ibid). ‘Mixed’ has both verse and prose in it. It is three-fold such as padya-pradhāna or having a major portion in verse, gadya-pradhāna or having a major portion in prose and tulyarūpa or having both verse and prose in an equally balanced proportion. Padyapradhāna is again three-fold as due to sajātiya (padya), vijātiya (padya) and ubhābhyām (i.e. by both sajātiya and vijātiya padya. The first is seen as in itiḥāsa, subhāsita and kośa etc. the vijātiya is seen as in prasthāna, setu-bandhana, vivaraṇa etc., and the third is as in Bharata’s ten types or rūpakas.
gadya-pradhāna is also three-fold like-wise e.g. sajātiya (gadya) as in Pañcatantra, vijātiya as in Kātyāyana's or Pāṇini's prākṛta-lakṣaṇa etc., the third variety is seen as in the speech of mayūra, śuka, mārjāra etc. Tulya-rūpa is again three-fold with sajātiya-vijātiya and both types of letters seen therein.

In the XIth prakāśa or chapter in the Śr. pra. Bhoja discusses various types of prabandhas or compositions. He gives two basic types of a prabandha or a major composition viz. preksya or that which is to be viewed (on the stage) and śravya or that which is to be heard (and read). He observes (pp. 461, ibid) : "prabandhas' ca iha dvidhā : preksyāḥ, śravyaś ca. tayor abhineyah preksyāḥ, i.e. that which is presented through acting is preksya. Each of it is of 24-types, the preksya - is such as nāṭaka, etc. sa ca nāṭakā"dibhedāc catur viṁśati prakāro bhavati. He enumerates these types of plays such as : nāṭakaṁ, prakaranaṁ, vyāyogaḥ, ṭhāmrgaḥ, samavakāraḥ, ḍīmam, uṭṛṣṭikāṅkam, bhāṇam, prahasanaṁ, vīthī, - and nāṭikā, śrīgaditam, durmallikā, prasthānām, kāvyam, bhāṇakam, bhāṇikā, goṣṭhi, hallisakam, nartanakam, preksanakam, nāṭyam, and rāsakam.

That which is not to be represented on the stage is 'śravya'. This again is 24-fold such as - ākhyāyikā, upākhyaṇa, ākhyāna, nidārśana, pravahlikā, manḍhullikā, maniṣkulyā, kathā, parikathā, khaṇḍa-kathā, upakathā, bṛhat-kathā, campūḥ, parva-bāndhaḥ, kāṇḍabāndhaḥ, sarga-bāndhaḥ, āśvāsabāndhaḥ, sandhiba-bandhaḥ, avaskandha-bandhaḥ, kāvyā-sāstram, sāstra-kāvyam, koṣaḥ, saṃghāṭaḥ, saṃhitā, and sāhitya-prakāśa.

It may be noted that twelve kinds of preksya such as nāṭaka, prakarana, ṭhāmrga, vyāyoga, samavakāra, ḍīmam, uṭṛṣṭikāṅka, bhāṇa, prahasana, vīthī, and nāṭikā and sattaka fall under vākyārthābhinhaya.

Padārthābhinhaya is seen in the other 12 types such as śrīgadita, durmallikā, prasthāna, kāvyam, bhāṇaka, bhāṇikā, goṣṭhi, hallisaka, nartana, preksanaka, rāsaka, and nāṭya-rāsaka.

All these each are defined and illustrated with mention of many rare and lost works. But Bhoja had an access to the same. On the first ten types of major preksya rūpakas, Bhoja cites the definitions as given by Bharata. He observes (pp. 465, Vol. II, ibid)

"iti daśarūpakam etad
bharata"cāryānusarato gaditam."
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It may be noted that out of the 24 types of śravya i.e. ‘an-abhineya’ - or that which is not to be presented on the stage 13 types viz. upākhyāna, nidarsāna, pravahlikā, manyullikā, manikulyā, upakathā, bṛhatkathā, parvabandha, kānda-bandha, āsvāsaka-bandha, sandhi-bandha, samhitā and sāhitya-prakāśa - are newly enumerated. The others are known to us through earlier sources. So, we will try to get an idea of these new types of śravya-literature.

‘Upākhyāna’ is small narrative episode sandwiched between two bigger episodes: This is promoted to illustrate an idea and thereby to instruct somebody. The upākhyānas, sixteen in number as read in the Mahābhārata, narrating the account of Nala, Sāvitrī, etc. are the illustrations in point. Bhoja observes (pp. 469, Śr. Pra. Vol. II. ibid) -

\[
\begin{align*}
nala-sāvitrī-ṣoḍāsa- \\
rājopākhyānavat prabandhāntaḥ, \\
anya-prabodhanārthaḥ \\
yad upākhyāti tad-upākhyānam.
\end{align*}
\]

With reference to the upākhyāna itself, Bhoja describes ‘ākhyāna’ and observes that when an artist presents a theme along with acting, recitation and singing, it is said to be ākhyāna or ākhyānaka - (pp. 469, ibid)

\[
\begin{align*}
“ākhyānaka-saṃjñāṁ tallabhate \\
yady abhinayan pāthan gāyan, \\
granthikāḥ ekaḥ kathayati \\
govinda-vad avahite sādasi.”
\end{align*}
\]

The artist is called ‘granthika’. This is illustrated by “govindā”khyāna”. In Gujarat the ākhyānas by Kavi Premananda are very famous. Such artists as Shri. Dhārmikalāla (the Māṇa-bhaṭṭa) keep this tradition alive even to-day. We will go to observe that Hemacandra also draws upon Bhoja in this respect and feeds us information about these rare types. Bhoja mentions as examples of mixed compositions in prose and verse the ākhyānas of Māra (= cupid), Sāmba (= Kṛṣṇa’s son), and Govinda. Dr. Raghavan observes : (pp. 620, ibid) : “Bhoja’s description of this type makes this composition a variety of the Drśya class, involving as it does song and gesture. This is really a form of the Indian theatre. The granthika here is a narrator of the story and an actor and a musician. This is more or less a monologue and survives in the Kathaka dance of the North, in the kathā-kālakṣepa of the south and in the Prabandha-Kutta of the Cākyāras of Kerala.
There has been much controversy over the nature of the granthhika mentioned, along with śaubhika, by Patañjali. Bhoja’s Śr. Pra., elsewhere in the early chapters on grammatical chapters, mentions the Kathaka as the person involved in the expressions “kamsanā ghatayati” and “balim bandhayati.”


From the words “ākhyānaka-samjñāṃ tat labhate” in Bhoja’s definition of the Ākhyāna, one may doubt whether there was such an Ākhyāna literature and whether the Ākhyāna was not the Upākhyānas found in epics themselves, sung and interpreted through gesture. But that there existed texts for Ākhyāna by Granthikas, separate from and different in respect of form from the text of the upākhyānas in the epics is known from two evidences. Firstly, Bhoja refers to these three Ākhyānas of Māra, Sāmba and Govinda as examples of compositions in prose and verse of an equal measure and of a varied nature in an earlier context (p. 232, Vol. I. see under Ākhyānas in the chapter on works and Authors Quoted in the Śr. Pra.). Secondly, the growth of prabandha literature in Kerala would point to the existence of a tradition of a special class of composition for Ākhāna exposition.”

This rather long quotation from Dr. Rāghavan exerts to prove ‘Ākhāna’ literature as a type independent of the Upākhyānas in the epics. We agree to this and in support we refer, once again to our reference cited above, of a poet called Premānanda from Gujarat, famous for his ‘Ākhyānas’, based on Nala-damayanti-kathā (or upākhyāna) etc., which are even to-day very popular when presented with music, singing, and eloquence by such great artists as Māna-bhaṭṭa Dhārmikalaljee, who provides excellent performance on stage with the help of an empty “māna” i.e. brass pot, with his fegers with rings playing upon it.

‘Nidarśana’ - is defined by Bhoja (Śr. Pra. XI, pp. 469, ibid) - as “niściyate tiraścāṃ a-tiraścāṃ vā yatra ceṣṭābhīḥ, kāryam a-kāryam vā tannidarśanāṃ paṇcatantra”di.”

Paṇcatantra and such other compositions are illustrations of nidarśana, wherein through activities of birds or other (i.e. animals, etc.), right activity or wrong one is decided. Thus, nidarśana is also a story but with a didactic purpose. It is a fable, an allegory or a parable. It may be noted however, that all nidarśanas are not animal stories. Persons who can be cited as examples of greatness are also created and described in nidarśanas to serve as models for teaching what is good or bad. Bhoja observes:
Classification of Poetry

“dhūrta-viṣā-kuṭṭanīmata-
mayūra-mārajīrikā”di yalloke
kāryākārya-nirūpana-rūpam
ihā nidarśanaṃ tad api.”

Thus, Dhūrta-viṣa-sanvāda, Kuṭṭanīmata and also stories of a cat or a peacock etc. are also illustrations of nidarśana. Bhoja had mentioned examples of Pañcatantra, Mayūra, Mārjāra and Śuka on an earlier occasion while illustrating mixed compositions in verse and prose. Dr. Raghavan suggests that here ‘Śuka’ may refer to ‘Śuka-saptati’. (pp. 620, ibid).

Pravahlikā is explained by Bhoja (pp. 439, ibid) as,

“yatra dvayor vivāda(h),
pradhānam adhikṛtya, jāyate sadasi,
sārdha-prākrṭa-racita-
pravahlika-ceṭaka-prabhṛti.”

Bhoja is the first to point out this variety of śravya-kāvya. The illustration cited is “ceṭaka”, etc. It is supposed to be written partly in prākrta : “sārdha-prākrṭa-racita.” It is perhaps a eulogy on a king or some other hero. This is done by a device of a discussion between two persons in an assembly - “sadasi; dvayor vivādaḥ” and is with reference to a principal character - ‘pradhānam adhikṛtya’. Hemacandra also refers to this variety. The Śr. Pra. Ch. III describes this type as a composition mixed with prose and verse and thus it seems to come closer to ‘Campū’. Dr. Raghavan remarks, (pp. 621, ibid) - “The pravahlikā has a history going upto Vedic times; certain verses in the Atharva Veda (XX. 133) are given the name Pravahlikā in Aitareya (vi. 33), and Kauśitakī, (* * * 7) Brahmaṇas; see also Śāṅkh. Śr. Sūtra, XII. 22; Khila V. 16. The Bṛhaddevatā (I. 35) gives it as the name of one class of mantras; and in these places, Pravahlikā has been taken as a riddle. (ft. n. see vedic Index, II. p. 40).” Dr. Raghavan has given some more interesting information in this context (pp. 622, 623, ibid) which could be read in his work.

Manthulli [kā] : Bhoja observes - (pp. 469, ibid) :

kṣudra-kathā manthullī
yā iha mahāraṣṭrabhāṣaya bhavati,
gorocanena kāryā
sā anaṅgavatīva vā kavibhiḥ.”
Then, he further observes:

\[
\begin{align*}
yasyāṁ upahāśaḥ syāt \\
purohitāmātya-tāpasā"dīnām, \\
prārabdha-a-nirvāhe \\
sāpi hi manthullikā bhavati."
\end{align*}
\]

We will go to see that Hemacandra reads ‘Matallikā’. In the quotations cited as above, Bhoja seems to record two different concepts of Manthulli, current in literary criticism. According to one view, it is a short story written in Mahārāstrī Prakṛta and illustrations cited are ‘Gorocanā’ and ‘Anāṅgavati’, now, only names to us. The second view regards Manthullikā to be a type with ‘ḥāṣya’ or laughter as the dominant sentiment. In this the purohitas or (royal) dharma-gurus, amāyas or ministers, tāpasas or ascetics are made a butt of laughter as they do not complete an act they have started i.e. for, “prārabdha a-nirvāha.” Bhoja does not cite any illustration for this, but the Śr. Pra. Vol. I. pp. 122 also refers to this as: “tad etad (gadyaṁ) trividham api ākhyaśikāsu, kathāsu, madhu-mallikādiśu (= matta-mallikāsau) drśyate. We will go to see that Śāradātanaya takes this type as identical with an upa-rūpaka called ‘durmallikā’. He actually places the verses of Bhoja concerning Manthulli under durmallikā.

Maṇikulyā is defined by Bhoja as:

\[
\begin{align*}
&\text{“maṇikulyāyāṁ jalam iva} \\
&\text{na laksyate yatra pūrvato vastu,} \\
&\text{paścāt prakāśate,} \\
&\text{sā maṇikulyā, matsya-hasitā‘di.”}
\end{align*}
\]

So, this is a type in which actually the story or theme is not clear in the beginning but comes to light at a later stage as in “Matsya-hasita”. Actually no independent work under this title is known to the world of scholars, but in verses 16-28, in Lambhaka I, tarāṅga V, of the Kathā-sarit-sāgara, there is a story at subordinate level which is termed “Matsya-hasita”. The Śukasaptati has a longer story of the same motif of the laughter of the dead fish.

Parikathā, as seen above, was mentioned by Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta. The Locana’s concept is placed by us as above. But Bhoja defines it as:
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"paryāyena bahūnām
yatra pratiyoginām, kathākuśalaih,
śrīyante śūdravaj
jigisubhiḥ parikathā sā tu." (pp. 469, ibid)

For Bhoja also this type is a series of stories told by expert story-tellers to overcome one-another (in the art of story-telling). The illustration is "Śūdraka". For Bhoja 'paryāya' means "one by one".

Bhoja is of the opinion that expert story-tellers vie with one another in narration of a story, each. Abhinavagupta says that on a given theme, one of the puruṣārthas is narrated in parikathā, in diverse manner.

'kathā' for Bhoja is :

"yā niyamita-gati-bhāṣā
divyā-divyobhayeti-vṛttavatī,
kādambarīva lilāvatīva
vā, sā kathā kathitā." (pp. 469, ibid)

The description of kathā almost follows Daṇḍin. For Bhoja 'kathā' is having its 'gati' and 'bhāṣā' fixed. This means that it is either in prose or verse and the language could be any. The character of either a divine or a-divya i.e. mortal is portrayed. Kādambarī is an illustration of kathā in Sanskrit and Lilāvatī is one in Prākṛta. As for Parikathā Bhoja does not suggest any particular language while Abhinavagupta also does not insist on any one language. Ratneśvara, on Sarasvatīkāntā"bharana (II. 6) notes that both khaṇḍa-kathā and Parikathā are necessarily in Prākṛta, and this could be Bhoja's idea also as in the XXVIIIth chapter of the Śr. Pra., the illustration cited from Śūdraka-kathā is, in prākṛta.

'Khaṇḍakathā' is a short episode from a bigger work, as illustrated by 'Indumati'. Thus for Bhoja it is a portion of a story picked up from either the middle or the end portion of another larger work. Bhoja is not insistent on any particular language here. But for Ānandavardhana, Abhinavagupta and Ratneśvara khaṇḍakathā is in Prākṛta only. Ānandavardhana wants it to be in verse only, like sakalakathā. Bhoja does not allude to sakalakathā.

'Upakathā' for Bhoja is -

"yatra"śriya kathāntaram
ati-prasiddham, nibadhyate kavibhiḥ,
caritāṁ vicitram anyat
sópakathā, citralekha"di." (pp. 469, ibid)

When a poet portrays a beautiful character based on a very famous another kathā we get ‘upakathā’. The illustration is “Citralekha”. It is not clear whether Citralekha is a separate composition or a chapter or a section of another work, notes Dr. Raghavan. But the way Bhoja has drafted the definition of upakathā, we carry an impression that it is supposed to be an independent type concentrating just on a sigle character portrayed in a famous larger work. This type seems to come closer to ‘upākhyāna’ as seen in the Mahābhārata.

Bṛhatkathā for Bhoja is an independent type of literature but both Bhāmaha and Dāṇḍin take it as identical with ‘kathā’ only. For Bhoja Bṛhatkathā is divided into ‘lambhas’, has for its theme something extraordinary and is written in Paisāchī. The theme is on a very broad canvas. (mahā-viṣayā) :

“lambhāṅkitādbhutārthā
piśāca-bhāṣāmayī mahā-vaṣayā,
naravāhanadattā"desvācaritam iva
bṛhatkathā bhavati." (pp. 470, ibid)

Bhoja seems to accept “adbhutārtha”, a feature from Dāṇḍin I. 38. Dāṇḍin names the chapters either as laṁbha or ucchvāsa, but Bhoja has only “lāṁbha”.

‘Campū’ is defined by Bhoja as,

“ākhyāyikaiva sāṁkā
socchvāsa divya-gadya-padya-mayī,
sā, damayantī vāsavadattā"di
iha ucyate campūḥ.”

Campū is in prose and verse and is the same as i.e. is like ākhyāyikā. Thus campū also has divisions into ucchvāsas and is having an ‘ānka’ or ‘mark’. Perhaps this is like the ‘śrī’ - mark in Māgha. Hemacandra supports this explanation : (pp. 366, Edn. Dr. Nandi, Ahd. Pub. L. D. Inst. of Indology, Jun. 2000) - gadya-padyamayī sāṁkā socchvāsa campūḥ. (Kā. śā. VIII. 9) : saṃskṛtābhyaṁ gadya-padyābhyaṁ racitā, abhiprayena yāṇy āṅkāni sva-nāmnā para-nāmnā vā kaviḥ karoti, rair yuktā, ucchvāsa-nibaddhā campūḥ.

yathā vāsavadattā, damayantī vā. Hemacandra also offers the same illustrations as Bhoja. Obviously he is under Bhoja’s influence.
Classification of Poetry

Parva-bandha, for Bhoja is a very major work and is illustrated by the great Mahābhārata having divisions designated as 'parvans'. In such a work the topics of history are wowed in verse and in Sanskrit:

“yasmin itihāsārthas’
cchandobhīs saṃskṛtena badhyante,
bahavah, parvabandho bhavati,  
mahābhārata-prabhṛtih.”

It may be noted that literary critics call the Mahābhārata an ‘itihāsa’, but the Mahābhārata itself says that it is a kāvyā. It contains a great number of stories.

‘Kāṇḍa-bandha’ - is for Bhoja, one which is divided into kāṇḍas, and is a major work in verse. The illustration is the Rāmāyaṇa. Actually Bhoja has given three independent types for three major works such as Bṛhatkathā, Mahābhārata and Rāmāyaṇa. Bhoja observes:

“yatṛtihāsam akhilat
yathāsthitaṃ caikam eva bhāṣante,
ṛṣayas sa kāṇḍa-bandho
Rāmāyaṇa-sannibho bhavati.”

Dr. Raghavan (pp. 627, ibid) observes:

“Before taking leave of the kathā-varieties, we may take note of the information on this topic found in Jain works. The Jain writers mention quite a large number of kathās: the Vāsudevahindi broadly classifies kathā into historical (carīta) and the imaginative (kalpīta) and each again as dealing in main either with a man or a woman (Lambha X, pp. 208-9, Bhavanagar, Edn.). The Kuvalayamālā of Uddyotanasūri classifies kathās by the Puruṣārthas, Dharmakathā, Arthakathā, and saṅkīrṇa, giving each some sub-varieties; besides these, Uddyotana speaks of a five-fold classification, in which besides the Sakalakathā and Khaṇḍakathā met with elsewhere, we find three new classes, Ullāpakathā, Parihāsa-kathā and Varakathā, and calls his own work a Saṅkīrṇa-kathā combining features of all these. The Lilāvati which is a prākṛta kathā in verse, gives a two-fold classification, on the basis of the characters being divine, human or mixed (Divya, Mānuṣa, Divya-Mānuṣa), and of the language, saṃskrta, Prākṛta and Saṅkīrṇa (gāthā, 35, 36). In his Samarāditya kathā, Haribhadra mentions the classifications found in the Kuvalayamālā and Lilāvati, and in the Niryukti on the Daśavaikālika (III. 194 ff), besides the Puruṣārtha varieties noted above a type called Vikathā is mentioned. (ft. n. 1, see A. N. Upadhye, Lilāvati, Singhi, Jain Series, Notes, p. 328)
We have to note here one point: While illustrating these three classes, the Bṛhatkathā, the Parvabandha and the Kāṇḍabandha, Bhoja says: 'Story like that of Naravāhanadatta and others,' Mahābhārata and the like', and 'Compositions like the Ramāyana.' - “naravāhanadattā”deḥ caritam iva bṛhatkathā, “mahābhārata-prabhṛti”, and “rāmāyaṇa-sannibhavo bhavat.” From this we have to suppose that Bhoja had in mind other Bṛhatkathās, other Bhārata-like-works and other Rāmāyaṇas or Rāmāyaṇa-like works. He might have meant that such other works existed or that they are possible, or, as it is most likely, might have used the words ‘iva’, ‘prabhṛti’, ‘sannibha’, conventionally and for the sake of uniformity.”

- No., Bhoja did mean works like the Rāmāyaṇa etc., for we know about the Jain Version of the Rāmāyaṇa for sure, through the efforts of Dr. V. M. Kulkarni, our guru. Being closer to Gujarat, Bhoja must have been conversant with such works by Jain authors. But these works hardly depicted any originality in the field of poetry, they being mostly unimpressive imitations of the famous works of Vyāsa or Vālmīki, or any writer of eminence.

'Sargabandha' is not defined here by Bhoja, as perhaps it is a famous type. But he says:

“yasminn itihāsārthān
apeśalān peśalān kaviḥ kurute,
sa hayagrīvavadhā”di-prabandha
iva, sargabandhah syāt.”

Wherein historical theme which is not beautiful, is rendered as if beautiful by poets, such is a sarga-bandha as is hayagrīva-vadha and such other works. Elsewhere Bhoja has defined this type, the sargabandha or a mahākāvya in a like fashion as Daṇḍin (pp. 480, ibid, Sr. Pra. XI. (End. portion)

Āśvāsaka-bandha is, according to Bhoja, a prākṛta composition in verse such as 'Setubandha' etc. Daṇḍin calls this 'skandhaka-bandha', because the metre employed is the māṭrā-cchanda such as “skandhaka”. Bhoja says:

“yaḥ sargabandhatulyo
nibadhyaḥ prākṛttena śuddhena,
āśvāsaka-bandho'sau
vijñeyah setubandhā”dīḥ.”

Bhoja, for certain, had a vast literature in Sanskrit, Prakrita and Apabhramśa before him.
Classification of Poetry

Sandhi-bandha, for Bhoja is also a prākṛta mahākāvya. It is in apabhramśa language and mātrācchanda verses. Divisions in ‘Sandhi-bandha’ are termed Sandhis and Bhoja cites ‘Abdhimathana’ as its illustration:

“yo’pabhramśa-nibandho
mātrā-cchandobhir, abhimato’padhiyām,
vācyas sa sandhibandhas’
caturmukhóktābdhimathana”di.”

Men of light intellgence relish this. The last line is not clear. Could it be “caturmukhokto ?” - i.e. it is said to be having four facets i.e. the four purusārthas as its goal? - As read in the present text - “caturmukhóktābdhi etc,” perhaps is meant to be “abdhi-mathana, as spoken (or written) by (some) caturmuka (or Brahmā himself?)

Avaskandhaka-bandha is,

“ya iha dvicārikāvāg
grāmyagirā giyate, gabhīrótakaḥ,
sóvaskandhaka-bandhaḥ
abhidhiyate bhīmakāvyā”di.” (pp. 470, ibid)

This is a major verse composition in a low variety of apabhramśa, i.e. grāmya variety. The divisions are termed avaskandhakas and ‘ Bhīmakāvya’ is an illustration. The reading “bhīma-kāyā”di” seems to be faulty. Hemacandra has: “grāmyā’pabhramśa-bhāśā-nibaddhā-vaskandhabandhaṃ (bhīma-kāvyā”di).

This is read in the Kā. Śā., pp. 461, Edn. Parikh & Kulkarni, ’64, Bombay.

Kāvyasāstra is defined by Bhoja (pp. 470, ibid) - as

“yatrārthaḥ śāstrāṇāṃ
kāvye vinivesyate mahākavibhiḥ,
tad bhaṭṭi-kāvya-mudrārāksasavat
kāvyasāstraṇ syāt.”

When the theme of various disciplines is presented in poetry by great poets as e.g. bhaṭṭikāvya, or mudrārāksasa, it is termed kāvya-sāstram.

Bhoja gives two illustrations, one each from padya and nāṭaka. Thus, this variety is wide enough to touch both śrāvya and preksya types.

Śāstra kāvya is defined by Bhoja as -
“śāstraṃ yatra kavināṃ rahasyam
upakalpayanty analpa-dhiyāh,
tad rati-vilāsa-kāmanda-kīyavac
chāstrakāvyam tu.” (pp. 470, ibid)

When discourses of śāstra or discipline are presented through poetry, we get śāstra-kāvyas, kāmanda-kīya niti-śāstra and Rativilāsa which is lost to us for the present, are illustrations of this type. Technical subject presented through poetry makes for śāstra-kāvyas. Dr. Raghavan observes : (pp. 626, ibid)

“Under the śabdālamkāra Adhyāya, Bhoja mentions Six Varieties one of which is Kāvyā-Śāstra, ‘śāstre kāvyā-viniveśah kāvyā-śāstraṃ’. Kāvyā-śāstra in that place is the śāstra-kāvyas mentioned here. See S.K.A. pp. 260. Other varieties mentioned there are śāstra, which is the kāvyā śāstra (e.g. Bhaṭṭikāvyas) here mentioned, itihāsa, kāvyētihāsa, and śāstrētihāsa.”

We feel that Bhoja wants to underline that kāvyā-śāstra and śāstra-kāvyas are different from each other. In the former the theme of śāstra is covered in Kāvyas, in the latter śāstra itself is presented as kāvyas. If we find beautiful poetry in the upaniṣads, or the Bhagavad geetā, they illustrate śāstra-kāvyas. We feel some of the kārikās in the Dhv. such as Dhv. IV. 4.

“dṛṣṭapūrvvā api hy arthāḥ
kāvyey rasa-parigrāhāt,
sarve navā ivābhānti
madhumāsa iva drumāḥ.”
and, Dhv. IV. 10,
“vācaspāti-sahasrānāṃ
sahasrair api yatnataḥ
nibaddhā sā kṣayaṃ naiti
prakṛtir jagatām iva.”

could be taken as illustrations of Kāvyā-śāstra while the famous verse quoted also in the Dhv., from the Bhagavad Geetā viz.

“yā niśā sarvabhūtānāṃ...” etc. could be taken as illustration of śāstra-kāvyas. Actually the description of Aśvattha tree, or say, most part of the B.G. is śāstra in the garb of poetry.
Classification of Poetry

Rājaśekhara has also talked about a śāstra-kavi who is 'of three types such as : tāra tridhā śāstra-kaviḥ, yah śāstram vidhatte, yaśca śāstre kāvyam samvidhatte, yo'pi kāvye śāstrāthām vidhatte.’ We can illustrate these. The first is one who lays down śāstra and yet his style is such which may earn him the title of a poet. Thus, Śaṅkara’s śārīraka-mīmāṁsā-bhāṣya is a lyrical gem by itself. So is Šābara’s prose. Ānandavardhana, Kuntaka, Mahimā and Hemacandra also write beautiful prose. They are all writing a śāstra. Thus, they are śāstra-kavis. The second variety is illustrated by poetic passages as read in the Bhagavad-geetā or the upaniṣads. The third type is illustrated as in Bhaṭṭikāvyā, or Dvāsraya-kāvyas of Hemacandra.

Dr. Raghavan observes: (pp. 629, ibid) - “Bhoja has defined prabandha or kāvya of all kinds as vidhi-niśedha-vyutpādaka, from the point of view of vyutparī. And Mahimabhaṭṭa expressly says that, from this point of view, kāvya also is śāstra. Hence all Kāvya is śāstra; the conception is a very old one that the kāvya coats with sugar the ideas of śāstra. Cf. Bhāmaha - V. 3 :

“svādu-kāvya-rasōnmiṣraṁ
śāstramapya upabhuṅjate,
prathamā”īḍha-madhavaḥ
pibanti katu bheṣajam.”

Koṣa for Bhoja is (pp. 470, ibid) -

“kośa iva yas subhāṣita-
ratna-samūhā”tmakah samuddhriyate,
mahataḥ kāvyāmbhodheḥ
sa kośa iva sapta-śatikā”di.”

Daṇḍin (I. 13) also refers to this type. For Bhoja it is a selection and collection of best verses from a whole literature. It is like collecting subhāṣita-ratnas and making a samuha of it; e.g. ‘sapta-śatikā’ or ‘gāthā-sapta-śatī’, of Hāla. Taruṇavācaspati on Daṇḍin (I. 13) explains it as selections made from different authors -

“kośa nānākārtṛka-subhāṣita-ratna-samudāyāḥ.” But Vādījангhāla, yet another commentator on Daṇḍin takes it to be a string or collection of stories too, besides ideas : kośo’pyaneka-bhinnārtha-kathā-grathihīḥ kathā-kośaḥ; kṛṣṇasārāḥ, tārāgana iti.” - Daṇḍin also talks of samghāta (I. 13), which for Taruṇavācaspati is a single-author-creation having theme of varied nature. Prabhā (pp. 15, ibid) gives different opinions which may be read there.
‘Samghāta’ is defined by Bhoja as,

eka-praghaṭtake yasṭv
eka-kr̥to bhavati sūkṣti-samudāyāḥ,
samghātas sa nigaditaḥ
vṛndāvana-meghadūtā”di.

For Bhoja also, samghāta is one-man-creation, having theme of varied nature. He cites ‘vṛndāvana’ or ‘meghadūta’ as illustrations. Dāndin (I. 13) also mentions samghāta. Tarunā-vacaspatai explains that its subject matter is one continuous theme (ekārtha) and the author is one. Bhoja has the same characteristics with illustrations cited as above. Vādijāṅghāla gives the Meghadūta and Śūrya-sātaka as illustrations. Thus sātaka-literature seems to be covered under the title of samghāta.

We agree with Dr. Raghavan when he observes that how a poem like Meghadūta can be called a samghāta is not understandable. If it is a mere description of the cloud, Dr. Raghavan observes, we can understand it being called a samghāta. Tarunavācaspati seems to be correct when he illustrates the samghāta by two collections, the Sarat-samghāta and the Dramiḍa-samghāta. The latter perhaps refers to the collections in which early Tamil literature is preserved.

‘Samhitā’ (pp. 470, ibid) is defined by Bhoja as,

“yasyāṁ sandhiyante maniśibhir
viprakīrṇa-vṛttāntāḥ,
sā saṃhiteti gaditā
yaduvaṃśa-dilīpa-vamśādi.”

It is a type in which accounts scattered in different sources are placed together. The illustrations cited by Bhoja viz. Yaduvaṃśa and Dilīpa-vamśa are lost to us for the present. This type seems to be closer to a mahākāvya.

‘Sāhityapraṇāsa’ is a type illustrated by Śrīgāra-prakāśa, wherein all vidyāsthaṇas i.e.-sources of learning are covered up in a single work :

“yasmīn aśeṣa-vidyāsthaṇārtha- 
vibhūtayaḥ prakāśante
saṃhṛtya, sa sāhityapraṇāsa
etādṛśo bhavati.”
All branches of knowledge are brought together in this type, under a single banner, the illustration being Bhoja's own Śr. Pra. Bhoja observes (pp. 470): -
etasmin śṛgāra-prakāśe suprakāśam eva. aśeṣa-śāstrārtha-sampad upaniṣadām
akhila-kalā-kāvyaucitya-kalpanā-rahasyānām ca sanniveṣo dṛṣyate.”

Dr. Raghavan observes : (pp. 630, ibid) : "In a way it can be said that Bhoja's
claims are not vain. He has spoken of the tenets of every system of thought in this
'magnam opus' of his. This can be realised fully by turning to the chapter in this
thesis on Bhoja's śāstraic Discussions and Bhoja and the Śāstrakāras.”

Dr. Raghavan further observes (pp. 630, ibid) : "Bhoja could have easily
multiplied the number of śāstra-kāvyā varieties, had he not bound himself to the
number 24, to be in symmetry with the twentyfour Dṛṣya varieties. We do not find
the osara Apabhrāmsa Kāvyā found in Daṇḍin I. 37. Daṇḍin I. 37 is quoted by Bhoja
at the end of the chapter, but the third quarter of the verse - "Osarādīr
apabhrāmsaḥ” is changed to by him into “avaskandhāvya (dyā) pabhramśah”
(p. 449, Vol. II. Śr. Pra. = here. pp. 480, Josyer). We do not know whether Daṇḍin's
Osara and Bhoja's avaskandha-bandha are identical, Osara referring to the metre,
(ft. n. - pp. 630 Raghavan : Osara is taken by Taranavacapsati as the name of this
type of composition in Apabhrāmsa.) and Avaskandha to the chapter-division. He
omits the Anibaddha in this context; we do not meet here with the Muktaka,
Sandānitaka, Viśeṣaka and Kulaka. But he mentions them in chapter VIII under the
head 'ekārthībhāva'. Here he mentions the Muktaka or the single verse with a unity,
the Yugalaka which is a unit in two verses, the Sandānitaka in three verses and the
Pra). Here Bhoja mentions also the Saṃghāta which is a collection on a single
theme and the Kośa which is a collection of verses on various themes. “ekāpraṅgāṭtakopanibbandhānām subhāṣītānām saṃuḥaḥ saṃghātaḥ.
anekāpraṅgāṭtakopanibaddhānām tu kośaḥ.” - Bhoja also omits the Kālāśraya-kāvyā
mentioned by Bhāmaha in I. 17. It is unnecessary for Bhoja to include here, his own
theoretical treatise Śr. Pra., for he is dealing here with varieties of poetic
composition. The Śr. Pra. is not a kāvyā. He is considering here varieties of Lakṣya
and not with Lakṣana. Śr. Pra. is a Lakṣana. Śāstra-Kāvyā, though Lakṣana,
partakes of the nature of lakṣya, and hence can be included here. But works like
the Śr. Pra. have no place here. If it is to be included, Bhoja might well have
included here other types of śāstra-granthas like sūtra, vṛtti, Bhāṣya, Vārtika,
Pañcikā, Sāmīkṣā, Tīkā, etc. which Rajaśekhara mentions and defines in his K.M.
I. ii. p. 5.
At the end of the XIIth Chapter of Śr. Pra., Bhoja gives some Anuṣṭubhs, in which he makes some general remarks on all these compositions, mentioning the number of Saṃdhhis in each of them. (pp. 448-449, Vol. II; here pp. 480, Vol. II, Josyer)."

**Uparūpakas:**

We will now consider Bhoja’s treatment of ‘prechṣya’ or ‘abhineya’ types under which are placed rūpakas - and Uparūpakas. Ten types of rūpakas, beginning with nāṭaka and ending with vithi, are defined after Bharata’s Nāṭya-śāstra. Bhoja observes: (pp. 461, Vol. II, Josyer): prabandhaś ca iha dvidhā: preksyaḥ śravyaś ca. tayor abhineyāḥ preksyaḥ, sa ca nāṭakā” dibhedāt caturvimśati-prakāro bhavati. nāṭakam, prakaraṇāṃ, vyāyogaḥ, ṣāṃṛṣrāḥ, samavakāraḥ, dimam, utṣrṣṭikāńkam bhāṇam, prahasanaṃ, vithi; - nāṭikā, sāṭṭakah, śṛgaditaṃ, durmillikā, prasthānaṃ, kāvyam, bhāṇakaṃ, bhāṇikā, gośṭhi, hallisakaṃ, nartanakaṃ, preksanakaṃ, nātyam, rāsakam iti.” Out of these the first 12 types are kinds of vākyārthābhinaya and the other twelve from śṛgadita to rāsaka are kinds of padārthābhinaya.

Nāṭaka is defined by Bhoja as (pp. 461, ibid):

"prakhyātavastu-visayaṃ
prakhyātoddatta-nāyakaṃ caiva,
rājarṣi-carita-vaṃśānucarita-
divyāḥśrayopetam.
sarvābhīr-bhāṣābhīḥ samanvitarum
gadya-padya-miśrābhīḥ,
sarvāścālaṃkārair
lakṣāṇa-ṣaṭ-triṃśatā ca samyuktaṃ. (pp. 462, ibid)
nānā-vibhūti-samyuktaṃ
ṛddhi-vilāsā” dibhir-guṇair yuktām,
anika-praveśakā”dhyāṃ
rūpakam iha nāṭakam nāma.
ṛupatnīm yac caritam
nānā-rasa-bhāva-saṃmiśram bahudhā
sukhā-duḥkhotpattikram
vācyāṃ tannāṭake bhavati... etc. etc.
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It may be noted here that the prekṣya varieties are first given by Bharata, so far as available documents are concerned. Normally Bharata is followed by all, including Bhoja. We have Abhinavabhārati on the Nātya-śāstra, and then Dhanañjaya’s Daśarūpakā (974-995 A.D.), and the Kāvyānuśāsana of Hemacandra (11th Cen. A.D.) which gives ten types of rūpakas following Bharata exactly and then Hemacandra and following him Rāmacandra and Guṇacandra, the authors of the Nātyadarpana give us some uparūpakas also which are found in Bhoja also. After this we have Śārdadātanaya (1175-1250 A.D.), Vidyānātha, Śiṅgabhūpāla, Viśvanātha and Sāgaranandin (13th Cen. A.D.). They all follow Bharata.

So, the ten principal types of drama, the daśa-rūpakā have their characteristics laid down by Bharata and followed by all dramaturgists later without any shift in the basic approach. We therefore will not pick up here any discussion regarding these ten principal types of drama but we will draw the attention of scholars to the fact that when Bharata in centuries prior to Christ or parallel to Christ, churns out theory followed so religiously by later theorists, one thing emerges for certain that there must have been a vast store-house of dramatic literature covering the entire span of life both in its success and failures, merits and demerits, victories and defeats, joys and sorrows, love and hatred and what not. The ten varieties taken together present theme that covers everything presentable and worthy of imitation for world solidarity and also that which is to be avoided for fear of fall. Actually as Bharata states in his earlier chapters, the nātya i.e. the dramatic art is the medium to represent entire existence: śrīpān ṣvaśa sarvasya nātyam bhāvānuṅkaṁ. “Abhinavagupta elaborates on what is exactly meant by ‘anukīrtana’ which is not bare imitation, but artistic re-creation. Beyond these types, and the technical discussion concerning the selection of the theme, the presentation through scenes, situations and acts, etc. Bharata has also mentioned ‘nātaṇā’ taken as an ‘uparūpakā’.

There were other varieties of such ‘uparūpakas’ also not taken care of by Bharata but handed over to later theorists by unknown sources of both dramaturgy and actual practice. Some of them are discussed by Bhoja, Hemacandra Śaradātanaya, Sāgaranandin and Viśvanātha. It may be noted at the outset that Bhoja calls them ‘preksya’ which is ‘abhineya’: The idea is that these varieties are items of “performing art” in general. They need not be just ‘drama’ where an artist plays the role of a given character. There are certain art-forms, we may call them folk-art-forms popular even to-day in say, Rajasthan, Gujarat, Maharashtra, Madhya-pradesh, Bengal, Orissa and different parts of India which owe their origin to these ‘preksya’ minor varieties of performance which go generally under the name of upa-rūpakas. We will discuss the nature of these as seen in Bhoja,
Hemacandra and the rest, leaving aside the major ten types of rūpākas with all their characteristics and technicalities, structure-analysis, etc.

Bhoja enumerates in such a category, such art-forms as: nāṭikā, sattakā, śrigaditam, durmallikā, prasthānam, kāvyam, bhānakam, bhānikā, goṣṭhi, hallisakam, nartanakam, prekṣanakam, nātyam, and rāsakam. We will take care of some other art-forms if seen in Hemacandra and the rest. So, we begin with these fourteen first as imagined by Bhoja.

Nāṭikā - For Bhoja Nāṭikā is a mixture of both prakaraṇa and nāṭaka. He is satisfied with one such mixed variety while the Nāṭyadarpaṇa has “prakaraṇī” also, over and above nāṭikā. Bhoja observes. (pp. 465, ibid) -

sarva-rasa-lakṣanā”dhyā
samanvitāṅgair iyam trayodāśabhiḥ,
prathamōttama-madhyamābhir yuktaḥ,
syāt prakṛtibhis tiszbhīḥ.
iti daśarūpakan etad
bharata”cāryānusārato gaditam,
prakaraṇa-nāṭakabheda
rūpakan iha nāṭikā bhavati.”

Bhoja goes on to define nāṭika (pp. 466, Vol. II. Josyer, ibid) - as follows :

“striprāyā caturāṅkā
lalitābhinayā”tmikāsu vihitāṅgī,
bahu-gīta-nṛtya-vādyā
rati-saṁbhogā”tmikā caiva,
rājopacāra-yuktā, śrīgārābhinaya-bhāva-samyuktā
nāyaka-devi-parijana-samanvitā nāṭaka-prakṛtih,
prakaraṇa-samudbhavā
punar utpādyam vastu, nāyakāṁ nrpatim.
antaḥpura-saṅgītaka-kanyāṁ adhikṛtya kartavyā.”

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It is one of the most popular forms of minor plays. It has a number of female characters. The hero is necessarily a king of the dhūra-lalita type. The motif of the action is love and acquisition of kingdom. The chief interest centres round the element of marvel, the means and ends connected with the same are peculiar and strange. The plot is not of historical nature but is invented, and is spread over four stages of action. The result is that nāṭikā has only four junctures with the omission of vimarśa sandhi. Kaiśikī-vṛtti is predominant. The hero has connection with more than one spouse. The queen is an impressive character having a sway over her lord. In all other respects the Nāṭikā closely resembles the nāṭaka.

Before we proceed with other forms of upa-rūpakas, we will look into the history of these art-forms as given by Dr. Raghavan (pp. 535, etc. ibid). Dr. Raghavan observes that the derivative types of drama, including nāṭikā, were increasing and the next stage of codification was reached in Kohala's work, which is lost for us now, but to which Abhinavagupta often refers. Perhaps next to Bharata, Kohala was the greatest writer on dramaturgy. Actually in the Kāśi. Edn., at XXXVI. 65, it is stated in the N.S. by Bharata, that the rest of the subjects would be dealt with by Kohala in his Uttarakāṇṭha:

"śeṣam uttaratantreṇa
kohalaḥ kathayiṣyati."

We do not find this verse in the critical edn. G.O.S. Vadodara, which in XXVII-24 mentions Kohala. Dr. Unni's edn recently published also does not contain the above quoted reference but he has covered the 37th Ch. of the G.O.S. Edn. in the 36th extended Ch. only and we have the same reference to Kohala in Unni's Edn. Ch. XXXVI - verse 74.

But Dr. Raghavan has accepted Kāśi Edn. reading, and observes (pp. 536) that Bharata's work represents something like pūrva-tantra and that Kohala's work supplements it. But on the face of it this sounds improbable because how can we have a reference to 'Uttaratantra' in a pūrva-tantra? It is clear that Bharata's text has incorporated parts of earlier and later works. Dr. Raghavan himself suggests that till we unearth the valuable work of Kohala, we cannot decide the extent of accretion into Bharata's text from Kohala.

Dr. Raghavan further observes that in Bharata we have the ten rūpakas and the Nāṭikā. But by the time of Kohala's codification, we find that many minor varieties came into being. Kohala was the first to codify and describe these new types of dramas and dramatic presentations. This, Dr. Raghavan says, is proved by Abhinavagupta's statement -
“uktā-vyākhyāne tu kohalā”di-laksita-totaka-sattaka-rāsakā”di-samgrahah.” (p. 441, Vol. II. A. bh. Mad. Ms.). A. bh. Vol. I. G. O. S. pp. 173, line 3 quoted by Dr. Raghavan also says: “kohalas tu braviti...” etc. But p. 410, G. O. S. Edn. Vol. II. A. bh. also observes: teṣam param kohalādibhir nāma-mātram prānitam.” This means Kohala simply enumerated these varieties and did not discuss in full. We do not know also what is meant by ‘ādi’ in A. bh.’s expression ‘kohalādi’. Dr. Raghavan suggests that the earliest work now known which mentions some of the upārūpakas types is the Kāmasūtra of Vātsyāyana which mentions Hallisaka, and Nātya-rāsaka. - II. 10. śl. 25, pp. 175, Chowk. Edn. :

“hallisaka-kriḍānakaiḥ
gāyanair nātya-rāsakaiḥ.”

The Kāmasūtra of Vātsyāyana (which is later than Bharata) also mentions Preksanaka. This may mean drama or dance in general or a special type of upārūpaka, as described by Bhoja later.

It is for the first time at A. bh. Vol. I. G. O. S. pp. 183, N. S. Ch.-IV - that we come across anustubh verses describing some upārūpakas with the words “tad uktam cirantanaiḥ”, but of course we have no knowledge as to who these ancients were. (Actually the verses are on pp. 183, in the second revised edition.) The verses read as :

\begin{verbatim}
ccchannānurāga-garbhābhīr uktibhir yatra bhūpateḥ
āvarjyate manah sā tu, maśṛṇā dombikā matā :
nṛsiṅha-sūkara”dīnāṁ varṇanā jaḷpayed yataḥ,
nartaki tena bhāṇaḥ syād uddhatāṅga-pravartitah;
 gajā”dīnāṁ gatiṁ tulyāṁ kṛtvā pravasanam tathā,
alpā”viddham su-maśṛṇam tat-prasthānam vṛttam ucye,
maśṛṇam ca kvacid-dhūrta-caritam śidgakaṁ tu saḥ.
bālakriḍāniyuddhā”di tathā sūkara-simhajā
dhvajādinā kṛtā kriḍā yatra sā bhāṅikā matā.
hāsya-prāyam preraṇam tu syāt prahelikayā’nvitam,
ṛtuvarṇana-samyuktaṁ rāmākriḍām tu bhāsyate.
maṇḍalena tu yannṛṇtam hallisakam iti smṛtam,
ekas tatra tu netā syād-gopasṛṇam yathā hariḥ.”
aneka-nartakīyojyaṁ citra-tāla-layānvitam
ā-catussaṣṭi-yugalād rāsakam maśṛṇoḍdhatam.”
\end{verbatim}
Dr. Raghavan observes that whether these verses are from Kohala or not we do not know. Śrī Harṣa’s Vārttika on N.S. must have dealt with upa-rūpakas, as on pp. 174, G.O.S. Vol. I., the A.bh. quotes from the Vārttika an āryā on Rāga-darśanīya, i.e. Rāga-kāvyā, which is one of the upa-rūpakas.

Dr. Raghavan has not quoted the same but we quote it as read on pp. 171, Vol. I. G.O.S. (A.bh.) second Edn. ‘56. yad-vārttikam -
evam avāntara-vākyair
upadeśo rāga-darśanīyesu,
simhā”di-varṇanair vā
kvacid apy arthāntaranyāsāt.”

The quotation follows a discussion in the A.bh. that ‘nṛtta’ is not ‘nātya’.

Dr. Raghavan further observes that some ancient writers had dealt with upa-rūpaka varieties can be made out from Bhāmaha I. 24 wherein besides nāṭaka, there is mention of dvipadi, śamyā, rāsaka and skandhaka (= a dance in which songs in skandhaka metre figure - ft. n. pp. 537, ibid). All these are intended for abhinaya and Bhāmaha says that they are taken care of at length by others: “uktónyais tasya vistarāh.” - an obvious reference to Bharata and others known to Bhāmaha. It may be noted that we do not know the source of the explanation of skandhaka, as cited by Dr. Raghavan. Danḍin also mentions (I. 39) ‘lāśya’, ‘chalita’, ‘śamyā’ as ‘preksārtha’ i.e. meant for viewing (on stage). Kumārila’s Tantra-vārttika also mentions Dvipadi and Rāsaka (p. 205. Benares Edn.)

It may be noted that the Daśarūpaka divides nātya into major type i.e. rasāśraya comprising of the ten types of drama, and the minor type which takes care of bhāva i.e. which is bhāvā”śraya. The former is called rūpaka and the latter “nṛtya” which is bhāvā”śraya and is of the form of padārthābhinaya, the former being rasāśraya and of the form of vākyārthābhinyaya. Dhanika in his Avaloka on DR. 1. 9 (pp. 8, 9, Edn.) (The Adyar Library Series, Vol. 97, T. Venkatacharya ’69 - Madras) observes: “rasā”śrayān nātyād bhāvā”śrayaṁ nṛtyam anyad eva. tatra bhāvā”śrayam iti viṣaya-bhedān nṛtyam iti nṛter gātra-vikṣepārthārtenā’ṅgika-bhulyāt tat-kāriṣu ca nartaka-vyapadesāllokepi range preksanīyakam iti vyavahārān nāṭakāder anyan nṛtyam. tadbhedātvāc chirgaditā”der nāvadhāraṇā’nupapattih. nāṭakā”di ca rasa-viṣayam. rasasya ca padārthībhūta-vibhāvā”di-samsargā”tmaka-vākyārtha-rūpavād vākyārthābhinyaya”tmakatvaṁ rasā”śrayam ity anena darśitam. nātyam iti ca ‘nāṭa avaspadane’ iti nāreḥ kīncic calanārthatvāt sāttvika-bhulyām. ata eva tat-kāriṣu nāṭa-vyapadesāḥ. [loke’pi ca
rainge nātyam iti vyapadeśaḥ. etad uktaṁ bhavatij yathā ca gātra-viksepārthatve samāne'pyanukāra"tmatvena nṛtyād anyan nṛttam, tathā vākyārthābhinayā"tmakān nātyat padārthābhinayā"tmakam anyad eva nṛtyam iti."

The difference here is brought out by Dhanika who holds that nṛtya is "āṅgikabahula" and nātya is sāttvika-bahula; the former has concern more with physical movements and only some feelings, the latter has more psychological activity and is rasa-based. Rasa for Dhanañjaya-Dhanika is collected through tātparya šakti and is therefore here termed as vākyārthābhinaya-rūpa or perhaps by padārthābhinayanrūpa is meant a minor type and vākyārthābhinayarūpa suggests the major type. Thus rūpaka and uparūpaka could be understood here. Dr. Raghavan observes (pp. 538, ibid) - "Therefore, the tātparyavādin, and mainly the Daśarūpaka and the Avaloka on it, are responsible for introducing this new nomenclature and terminology to distinguish the major and the minor dramatic varieties. Vākyārthābhinaya and padārthābhinaya are not phrases born in the Kashmirian tradition represented by Abhinavagupta." Dr. Raghavan here gives a foot-note in which he concedes that even Abhinavagupta uses such terms as padārtha and vākyārtha, but observes that they are not in the sense used by the Avaloka. But we feel that even the Dhv. uses these terms with a shade of meaning closer to major and minor senses quite often when rasa is described as 'vākyārtha' at many places and bhāvas as padārtha.

Be it as it is, but the DR. and the Avaloka use these terms to distinguish between major and minor forms of stage performances. We have called them art-forms in general with the former having anukarana and therefore rūpana as its soul with acting as its medium, and the latter having primarily the suggestive movements of limbs i.e. dance as its medium, with some impression of acting also. There is no imitation like as it is in drama proper. So the upa-rūpakas are art-forms, varieties of performing art and not rūpaka or drama proper.

Bhoja also seems to follow the phraseology of the DR. and Avaloka to distinguish between major and minor art-forms, i.e. the rūpakas and the upa-rūpakas. But Bhoja does not suggest that he accepts the views of the DR. in this respect. This strengthens our earlier observation that these terms viz. padārthābhinaya and vākyārthābhinaya need not be taken as trade-marks of the DR. and Avaloka only as Dr. Raghavan suggests, but actually their roots and practice were still older, perhaps even older than Ānandavardhana. Even Ānandavardhana (pp. 170, Edn. K. Kris.) observes : na ca raseṣu vidhy anuvādavyavahāro nā'stiti śakyaṁ vaktum, teṣām vākyārthatvena abhyupagamāt....
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evamvidha-viruddha-padārtha-vișayah katham abhinayah prayoktavya iti cet, anūdyamānaivaṃvidha-vācya-vișaye yā vārtā sā'trā'pi bhavisyati... etc.”

Thus padārthavișaya-abhinaya, and therefore also vākyārtha-vișaya-abhinaya are not absolutely new terms.

For Bhoja, the ten rūpakas and also nāṭikā and saṭṭaka are rasāśraya varieties and thus they make for twelve major types.

As for ‘Nāṭikā’, though Dhanañjaya calls his work “daśa-rūpaka” and says that rūpakas are only ten in number, he yet defines nāṭikā in DR. III, after defining nāṭaka and prakaraṇa. Bharata also does exactly the same as for Bharata, and therefore also for Dhanañjaya, Nāṭikā is a form derived from both nāṭaka and prakaraṇa.

Bharata observes : (pp. 435, 5 Vol. II. G.O.S. Edn. ’34, O. I. Baroda) -

anayośca bandha-yogād
anyo bhedāḥ prayokṭirbhṛḥ kāryaḥ, (XVIII. 57 ab)
prakaraṇa-nāṭakabhṛhedād
utpādyam vastu, nāyakam nrpatim. (XVIII. 58 ab.)

A discussion is read as to whether nrṭta and nāṭya are identical or not in the A.bh. (pp. 170, 171, etc. Vol. I. G.O.S. Edn. ’56). Here we read names such as dombikā, prasthāna, sidgaka, bhānaka, bhāṇikā, rāga-kāvya, etc. One thing is certain that these art-forms were perhaps forms accepted from folk-art and were even older than Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin and certainly predecessors of Bhoja knew them all. A.bh. has an expression viz. “Kohala tu braviti” (pp. 171, ibid), and also “kohalā”dyaiḥ” - which proves that these art-forms were perhaps even older than Bharata, who mentions only nāṭikā, for reasons best known to him only. A.bh. even quotes a name - “cudāmaṇi-dombikāyām...” with reference to one dombikā.

We know that Dhanañjaya also, after Bharata, takes nāṭikā as a sāmkīrṇa or mixed form. The DR. III. 43 observes :

“laksyate nāṭikā’py atra
sāmkīrṇānya-nivṛttaye,
tatra vestu prakaraṇāt
nāṭakān nāyako nrpaḥ.”

by ‘rejection of other mixed forms’ or ‘anya-nivṛttaye’ is meant that Dhananjaya was not inclined to accept many mixed forms like these, the prakaraṇī being the
chief one. *The Avaloka* (pp. 156, Edn. Adyar, ibid) observes: "anayar nātaka-
prakaranayoḥ bandhayogān nāṭisamjñayā āśrite āvērā dvē kāvye stāh. tayor evaḥ
prabandhabhedāḥ prakhyātaḥ. itarasv aprakhyāta iti tam bhāratiyām ślokaṃ
vācaekṣānāh nāṭikā-vyatirekena ketcit prakaraniṃ api manyaṃte. ... etc. But
A.Bh. mentions it and Vāgbhata (II) in hīs Kāvyānuṣāsana (pp. 18) mentions it as:
"evam prakaranabhedāt prakaraniṃ api vijñeyā. "sattra kaiścid uktāh."
The N.D. (= Nātyadarpaṇa of Rāmacandra and Guṇacandra) and the S.D.
(of Viśvanātha) also mention this art-form. The Viṣṇudharmottara-pūrāṇa, III. 17.
mentions 'prakaraṇi' with 'nāṭikā', thus making the total number of rūpakas
as twelve.

Vardhamāna (A.D. 1140) in his Guṇaratna-mahōdādhi takes Bharata's āryā as
allowing two derivative types, a prakhyāta type called nāṭi and an aprakhyāta type
called 'prakaraṇi'.

"nāṭi-samjñayā dvē kāvye. eko bhedaḥ prakhyāto nāṭikā'khyāḥ. itaras tva-
prakhyātaḥ prakaraniṃ-samjñāḥ. tathā ca -

"anayoś ca bandhayogād
eko bhedaḥ prayoktrābhīr jñeyāḥ,
prakhyātas tv itaro vā
nāṭi-samjñā'śrīte kāvye." (N.S. XX. 60-61, kāśi Edn.)

There is no Abh. on this verse. Perhaps Abhinavagupta did not read this verse
in the ms. of the N.S. he had before him, observes Dr. Raghavan. The G.O.S. Edn.
(O. I. Vadodara N.S. : II. '34) pp. 434 reads this verse as (XIX. 57) -

"anayośca bandhayogād
* anyo bhedaḥ prayoktrābhīh* kāryāḥ
* prakhyātastv itaro vā
* nātakayoge prakarane vā."

The footnote supplies following alternate readings respectively:

* eko; * jñeyāḥ; * pratyākhyātastvitaro and * nāṭi-samjñā'śrīte kāvye. The first,
second and fourth readings are seen in Dr. Raghavan's quotation. But
"pratyākhyātastv itaro" is not read. It means, "the other one which is rejected." Perhaps
Bharata did not welcome 'prakaraṇi' as a sub-variety.

Abhinavagupta, however in his Locana suggests his knowledge of 'prakaraṇikā'
when he observes: "abhineyārtham daśarūpakāṃ nāṭikā-toṭaka-rāsaka-prakaraṇikā
avantara-prapañca-sahitam anekabhāṣā-vyāmiśra-rūpam.” In the A.bh. also in the above quoted passage he refers in detail to the view of some who would argue for two sub-varieties called nāṭikā and prakarañikā. (A.bh. G.O.S. Vol. II. pp. 434, ibid).

Saṭṭaka : The DR. does not mention this but Bhoja mentions it. Bhoja has treated nāṭikā as the eleventh rūpaka-prakāra, no doubt as derived from both nāṭaka and prakarana.

“prakarana-nāṭaka-bhedha
rūpakam iha nāṭikā bhavatī.”

But Bhoja does not create prakarānīkā. On the other hand he holds that there is a variety similar to nāṭikā but it is not prakarānīkā. It is called Saṭṭaka and it differs from nāṭikā in the fact that it has no viṣkambhaka and pravesaka and that it is throughout only in one language:

“viṣkambhaka-pravesaka-rahito
yastv eka-bhāṣayā bhavati,
a-prākrīta-saṃskṛtayā
sa saṭṭako nāṭikā-pratimah.” (pp. 466, Śr. Pra., ibid)

Dr. Raghavan tries to explain “a-prākrīta-saṃskṛtayā as (a-prākrīta) saṃskṛtayā.” But we do not feel that this rendering makes the meaning clearer. Perhaps a-prākrīta (bhāṣayā) and a-saṃskṛta-bhāṣayā is meant here. This means it is either in prākrīta or in sanskrit language. Hemacandra (pp. 444, Edn. Parīkh & Kulkarni ’60 reads :

“viṣkambhaka-pravesaka-rahito
yastv eka-bhāṣayā bhavati
a-prākrīta-saṃskṛtayā
sa saṭṭako nāṭikā-pratimah.”

The Viveka does not elaborate on this.
The Nātyadarpana also reads :
viṣkambhaka.... a-prākrīta-saṃskṛtayā
sa saṭṭako nāṭikā [pratimah].
[pratimah] is to be added.

Toṭaka is found in Abhinavagupta as defined by Kohala along with saṭṭaka, but is not found in Bhoja. Of course Śāradātanaya reads toṭaka along with nāṭikā and
saṭṭaka as derived from nāṭaka and prakaraṇa. He of course takes them as covered by nāṭaka and prakaraṇa and hence nāṭikā, saṭṭaka or toṭaka does not deserve independent recognition for him. Read, Bhāva-prakāsana (VII. 3, 4, etc.) (pp. 260, 261 Edn. Agrawal, Chowkamba Surbharati Prakashan-Varanasi - second Edn. '83)

"rasāśrayā yady api syur
nāṭikā-toṭakā"dayah,
nāṭa kā"disvathaitesām
antarbhāvān na te prthak.

nāṭake ca prakarane
nāṭikāyāḥ purātanaih,
antarbhāvāḥ kṛtasasyāṃ
toṭakasyā'pi darśitaḥ."

Here the mention of saṭṭaka which is 'nāṭikā-pratima' is read following Bhoja. The A.bh. merely mentions Kohala as having defined the saṭṭaka, and Bhoja's Śr. Pra. is the first available document which attempts the definition of saṭṭaka. Abhinavagupta has cited the Karpūra-maṇjarī of Rāja-śekhara as an instance of saṭṭaka (in prākṛta only). This he does when he explains the lāsyāṅgya called saindhava, which has to be in prākṛta. Prākṛta, Abhinavagupta explains there, is best suited to Śṛngāra rasa and hence Rājaśekhara wrote a whole saṭṭaka-type drama, the Karpūra-maṇjarī in Prākṛta. 

\. tathā hi śṛngāra-rase sātiṣayōpayogini (nī) prakṛtahbhāṣā iti saṭṭakah karpūra-maṇjaryākhyāḥ rājaśekhareṇa tan-mātra eva nibaddhāḥ. Rājaśekhara in his prologue to this play defines saṭṭaka as similar to nāṭikā but devoide of praveśaka and viśkambhaka.

kim saṭṭakam? kathitam eva vidagdhaiḥ-

"tat saṭṭakam iti bhānyate
dūrāṃ yo nāṭikā anuharati,
kīṃ punar api praveśaka-
viśkambhakau na kevalaṃ bhavataḥ."

Rājaśekhara however does not suggest that this type has to be in prākṛta. He suggests through sūtradhāra that prākṛta is accepted here as it was softer than samskṛta, as the author being a Kavirāja is master of both Samskṛta and Prākṛta alike. Dr. Raghavan suggests that on the strength of this sūtradhāra's remark we can attempt amending of Bhoja's text defining saṭṭaka as "prākṛtayā saṃskṛtayā sa (here we suggest 'vā') saṭṭako nāṭikā-pratimah."
We have noted above that Hemacandra reproduces Bhoja’s words on Saśṭaka and so also we read the same in the Nātya-darpaṇa; and Vāgbhaṭa (II) also reads the same in his Kavyānuśāsana (II. pp. 18, N.S. Edn. 1915 A.D.) : saśṭako’pi kaścid uktah. tad yathā -

“viśkambhakas tveka-rahito
sa tv eka-bhāṣayā bhavati,
a-prakṛta-saṃskṛtaya
sa saśṭako nāṭikā-pratibhah.”

Vādijāṅghāla on Daṇḍin I. 37 calls it as ‘saśṭikā’ and describes it as an apabhramśa composition. Thus, we have at least three names available such as, saṭṭaka, sāṭaka and saśṭikā. As noted by Dr. Raghavan Prof. Chintaharan Chakravarti accepts the reading a-prakṛta-saṃskṛtaya and explains it as neither sanskrit nor prakrit. Perhaps Vādijāṅghāla therefore has called it to be in apabhramśa. The Nātyadarpaṇa also calls it “sāṭaka”. In the Karpūramaṇjari the prakṛta name reads saṭṭaya and sanskrit rendering reads as sāṭaka. It may prove interesting to note that Śāradātanaya, at B.P. VIII. 158 (pp. 359, Edn. Agrawal, ibid) - observes :

“saiva (= nāṭikā eva) praveśakenā’pi
viśkambhena vinā kṛtā,
aṅka-sthāniya-vinyasta-
catur yavanikāntarā
prakṛṣṭa-prakṛta-mayī
saṭṭakaṃ nāmato bhavet.”

This means that for Śāradātanaya the nāṭikā itself is known to be saṭṭaka when there is absence of either ‘praveśaka’ or ‘viśkambhaka’. In place of ‘aṅka’ there is provision of four yavanikās and this type of art-form is laid in the best of prakṛta only. Now this goes against the view of Vādijāṅghāla and Prof. Chakravarti as seen above. In place of acts we have four ‘yavanikāntaras’. This is not clear to us, but perhaps they are minor divisions of a single scene conducted with the help of curtains to be held and shifted by actors as and when required. Bhoja does not mention this characteristic. He also does not insist that saṭṭaka has to be in prakṛta only, of course the best (prakṛṣṭa) of it.

Elsewhere Śāradātanaya observes about saṭṭaka (pp. 393, Edn. Agrawal, ibid; B.P. IX. 57) :
sāṭṭakāṁ nāṭikābheda
nṛtya bhedā"unakāṁ bhavet,
kaśiṇī-bhārati-yukta-
hīna-raudra-rasā"dikam
sarva-sandhi-vihīnam ca
nāṭikā-prati-rūpacām,
śūrasena-mahārāstra-
vācyā-bhāṣā-vikalpitam.
aṅka-sthānīya-viccheda-
catur-yavanikā’ntaram,
cchādana-skalana-bhrānti-
ennava"der a-sambhavāt
na vade prākṛtīm bhāṣāṁ
rājeti katicij jaguḥ,
māgaddhyā sāurasenya vā
vaded rājeti ke-cana
nāṭikā-pratirūpaṁ yad
viśeṣo rūpakasya tat,
saṭṭakāṁ, tena tasyā’huḥ
bhāṣāṁ tāṁ prākṛtīm pare.
rājaśekharakṛptam tad yathā karpūra-mañjari.

So, for Śāradātanaya, saṭṭaka is a form of rūpaka (viśeṣo rūpakasya) which is closer to nāṭikā (nāṭikā-pratirūpa) or, it is a sub-variety of nāṭikā (nāṭikā-bhedah), and also a type of nṛtya (nṛtya-bhedā”maka). Śārdātanaya is perhaps not clear or perhaps wants us to realise the complex nature of saṭṭaka which is an art-form closer to the (major) rūpaka, and also closer to both nāṭikā and nṛtya i.e. dance. It is an art-form which to Śārdātanaya seems to be a mixed form of the dramatic art, as well as a performing art such as dance. Again, it is said to be sarva-sandhi-vihīna and once again nāṭikā-pratirūpaka. Now whatever form of dramatic art which is presented on the stage, be it major or minor, has to have at least two sandhis or junctures viz. mukha and nirvahaṇa as the theme, the plot that weaves out the theme, have to have a beginning and an end. So, this remark puzzles us.
Again it is either in śurasenī or mahārāstrī, and is illustrated by Rājaśekharas Karpūramaṇjarī which is in prakṛta. But this apart, its structure is not made up of acts but is cut into four by yavanikā. This means it is a spectacle of continuous show wherein parts are concealed and revealed when required by curtains-yavanikā-held by artists. Thus, perhaps, it has more of dance and spectacle then of drama. Śāradātānayā is not clear about the use of language also as he records different views. According to him some hold that the king, who is the hero, should not speak prakṛta as it may not be possible for him to cover (chādana) what he wants to cover from some other, or he may falter (skhalana) in prakṛta (perhaps he being accustomed to talk in Sanskrita ?), or perhaps he may create bhṛanti-or deception in the minds of others (? again through inapt use of prakṛta ?) or for fear of not concealing (niḥnava) his intention. Some believe that the king should speak in māgadhi or śurasenī, as Śāradātānayā himself has said earlier. Still others hold that as this art-form is a sub-variety or is something closer to nāṭikā, the king has to speak prakṛta and this seems to be acceptable to Śāradātānayā also as Karpūramaṇjarī is said to be an illustration of saṭṭaka. Dr. Raghavan also seems to accept this when he observes : (pp. 542, ibid) : “The final view recorded by him is that the saṭṭaka is, again and again, mentioned as a replica of the nāṭikā, its differentia as a separate rūpaka is to be fixed somewhere, and this difference is none else than the prakṛta language that it adopts, as for instance in the Karpūramaṇjarī of Rājaśekhara.”

Dr. Raghavan observes that Sāgaranandin adopts this last mentioned view. He quotes from N.L.R.K. (nāṭaka-laksana-ratna-koṣa) (p. 133, lines 320) - 4, where the text is corrupt according to Dr. Raghavan. He also quotes NLRK p. 90 lines 2156-7. Dr. Raghavan quotes as follows :

“saṭṭake strī-pradhānatvāt
rūpakasyā’nudhataḥ,
nṛpaḥ strīvat patheđ esa
pāthasya niyato vidhiḥ.”

This means that saṭṭaka is an art-form having many female characters (as in nāṭikā). The king also speaks like a female character i.e. he should use prakṛta. This rule is formed regarding speech (in saṭṭaka).

Dr. Raghavan observes that the other quotation is corrupt. But we place it as is read in chawkhamba skt. samsthan Edn. Varanasi, ’72, Babulal Shastri, as follows : (pp. 304, ibid)
sāṭṭakam - atha sāṭṭakam. tac ca nāṭikā-pratirūpakam, kaiśikī-bhārati-pradhāṇam, raudra-vīra-bībhatsam, avamārśa-sāṃdhi-śīṇyam. yathā - karpūra-mañjāri. antaryavanikāntam. yathāṅke yavanikayā avacchedā bhavanti tathā'atra'pi. śaurasenī-pracā-mahārāṣṭrī-yuktam. strīvad rajāo'pi prākṛta-pāṭhāḥ kāryāt samskṛta-pāṭhāḥ. tatra rūpakam eva idam kāryam iti rājā'pi prākṛta-pāṭhāḥ kartavyāḥ.”

This means that sāṭṭaka is an art-form which is imitative of nāṭikā. The Kaiśikī (as female characters abound in it, like nāṭikā), and bhārati are major vṛttis. In it we have raudra, vīra, bhayānaka and bībhatsa rasas. But here we feel the reading seems to be corrupt. We suggest that we should emend the text as “raudra-vīra-bhayānaka-bībhatsa-[varjams].” This being a graceful art-form having female characters in majority and having kaiśikī in predominance, it has to be like nāṭikā śṛṅgāra-prāya and so, raudrā”di have to be absent from this art-form, which again has graceful dancing in it. The Karpūra-mañjāri as an illustration supports our emendation. This is supported by Śāradātanaya’s remark viz. hina-raudra-rasā”dikam. But in Śāradātanaya we have sarva-sāṃdhi-viḥīnām, which we had objected to earlier. So, there we can emend the text as “avamārśa-sāṃdhi-viḥīnām” in view of Sāgaranandin, who also says that in a sāṭṭaka we have parts or divisions of theme presented through the device of “yavanikā”. NLRK as quoted above in prose, says that as in an act there are divisions by the device of yavanikā, so also here we have the same in sāṭṭaka. The NLRK is clear that the king-hero has to speak in prākṛta but “kāryāt” i.e. due to special reason he may resort to samskrēta also.

Dr. Raghavan further observes that having once dealt with the sāṭṭaka amidst the rasā”śraya rūpaka varieties, close upon the nāṭikā, of which it is a prakṛta counterpart, Śāradātanaya contradicts himself later, when he defines it as a bhāvā”śraya variety, a nṛtyabheda, among upa-rūpakas. But perhaps we may assist Dr. Raghavan’s effort here. As observed earlier by us this art-form viz. sāṭṭaka seems to be a special mixture of some drama and more dance and hence we should not find any contradiction in Śāradātanaya’s presentation. Actually the B.P. IX. 4 (pp. 375, Edn. Agrawal, ibid) reads as :

“nāṭikāyās toṭakasya
sāṭṭakasya ca lakṣaṇam,
amśatvān nāṭakasyā’pi
tathā prakaraṇasya ca.
ānuṣaṅgikam eteśām
lakṣaṇam tatra darśitam.”
Classification of Poetry

The B.P. observes that as the nāṭikā, toṭaka and saṭṭaka share the characteristics of nāṭaka as well as prakaraṇa in parts, their definitions were cited there (tatra, i.e. along with nāṭaka, prakaraṇa etc. the rūpakas, i.e. in Chs. VII and VIII also.)

Ch. VII. B.P. (pp. 260, Edn. Agrawal ibid) reads:

“rasāśrayā yady api syur
nāṭikā-toṭakā”dayāh
nāṭakā”diśv athaiteśām
antarbhāvān na te prthak.”

As nāṭikā, totaka (and saṭṭaka) are ‘rasāśraya’ varieties (- This division follows the DR.) -, they are included in nāṭaka etc. (the major forms of drama).

It is further observed that (VII. 5, 6; pp. 261, ibid)

“nāṭikāyā nāṭakasyā-
bhedaḥ prakaraṇasya vā.
saṭṭakas toṭakasyaiva
bheda ity abhidhiyate.
toṭakasyócyate sadbhir
antarbhāvo’pi nāṭake,
nāṭakā”der ayaṃ bhedo,
nāṭikā rūpakaṃ bhavet
nāṭikā-pratimatvāc ca
saṭṭako’pi tathāvidhāḥ.”
nāṭake toṭakasyāntar
bhāvād-rūpakam eva saḥ.
divya-mānuṣa-saṃyogas
toṭakaṃ nāṭakānugam,
navāṣṭā-sapta-paṅcāṅkam,
divya-mānuṣa-saṅgamam.
toṭakaṃ nāma-tat prāhur
bhedo nāṭaka-saṃbhavaḥ.
We have quoted these verses here again only to bring home a point that being rasā"śraya and therefore vākyārthābhinaya-rūpa from one angle, nāṭikā, totaka (some call it troṣaka and the illustration cited is Vikramorvaśīyam) and saṭṭaka are varieties of major types i.e. rūpakas and therefore do not deserve separate recognition beyond the ten types of drama. Or, at the most the saṭṭaka, being almost imitative form of nāṭikā, is included in the same. Saṭṭaka has majority of female characters and kaiśikī-prādhānya as in nāṭikā and hence it is so to say, nāṭika-pratirūpaka, and hence a sub-variety of nāṭikā and so included in it. But in the VIII Ch. (Verses 1-3) Śāradātanaya observes that ten types of rūpakas and other twenty types (of upa-rūpakas) are also enumerated. Then he says: (VIII/3) (pp. 321 ibid) -

rasā"tmakā daśaiteśu, 
vimśad-bhāvā"tmakā matāḥ. 
tēṣāṁ rūpaka-saṃjñā'pi 
prāyo drśyatayā kvacit. 
trīṃśad rūpaka-bhedāś ca 
prakaśyante'tra lalāṇaiḥ.

As all thirty are to be viewed on stage, they are rūpakas also. Thus, for Śāradātanaya, the twenty (minor) art-forms which mention toṭaka, nāṭikā, and saṭṭaka also among them, are bhāvā"śraya forms as against rasā"śraya forms the daśa-rūpakas. These twenty are padārthābhinayātmaka as they have more of dance than of drama in them. Hence they are mixed art-forms. Śāradātanaya observes (Ch. IX./2, pp. 374, edn. Agrawal ibid) :

daśarūpeṇa-bhinnānāṁ 
rūpakāṇāṁ atikramāt 
avāntarabhidāh kāścit 
padārthābhinayātmikāḥ 
te nṛtya-bhedāḥ prāyenā 
svākhyayā vimśatirmatāḥ, 
toṭakam... pārijātakam ity api. 
etā nāmāntaraḥ kaiścid 
ācāryaiḥ kathitā api
sanvīdhāna-kramas tāsāṁ
na kadācana bhidyate.

Thus saṭṭaka is a nāṭikābheda and is also a nṛtya-bhedā. Thus saṭṭaka is an art-form which inherits the characteristics of both drama and dance. Perhaps it was a form of folk-art.

Dr. Raghavan observes (pp. 548) that Bahurūpa Miśra, a late commentator on Dhanañjaya, who draws upon Śāradātanaya and is acquainted with Bhoja's Śr. Pra. also, says on this subject that Bhoja includes the Saṭṭaka in the Nāṭikā, as if Bhoja considers it unnecessary to accept a separate type called Saṭṭaka. He observes: "bhoja-rājena nāṭikāyāḥ prakaranaṇaṭakayor antarbhāvah uktaḥ." (p. 4, Mad. MS. R. 367). We may add that totaka is included in nāṭaka in the same vein. Bhoja described saṭṭaka as similar to nāṭikā and counted it as the twelfth varieté of vākyārthābhīnaya.

Thus we have observed that there is no contradiction anywhere in the presentation of any theorists so far as the art-forms of nāṭaka, nāṭikā, totaka and sattaka are concerned. Saṭṭaka seems to be both a dance-form and a drama-form, closer to nāṭikā. Bhoja, Hemacandra, Śāradātanaya and Sāgarnandin discuss the same in their own way. Hemacandra (pp. 444, Edn. Parika, Kulkarni) at the end of the definitions of ten rūpakas and nāṭikā, quotes Bhoja and defines sattaka after him. He adds: "adiśabdāt kohalā"di-lakṣitās totakā"dayo grāhyāḥ." This is under Abhinavagupta's observation. But Hemacandra does not elaborate. But it is certain that many folk art-forms were included in the twenty odd uparūpakas which are mixed art-forms having elements of drama and dance interwoven beautifully in them.

Thus it is clear that Bhoja described saṭṭaka as similar to nāṭikā and took it as the twelfth type of vākyārthābhīnaya.

Bhoja in Ch. XI of his Śr. Pra. follows Bharata in introducing the ten major rūpakas and nāṭikā in āryā verses. He hardly makes any verbal change.

Bhoja also quotes Bharata's general observations on nāṭaka, given at the end of Ch. XXI. N.S. (Kāśi Edn.) according to Dr. Raghavan. But actually while comparing Josyer's Edn. and the G.O.S. Edn. of N.S., we read some verses in the beginning of Ch. XII of the Śr. Pra. quoted from N.S. Vol. II. Ch. XIX. We do not know which text of Bhoja is looked into here by Dr. Raghavan. Of course, some half verses from Bharata (Ch. XIX) are also read at the end of Ch. XI. Śr. Pra. Edn. Josyer.
Bhoja seems to be closer to Dhanañjaya and Dhanika also. Prekśya-prabandhas or dramatic performances are classified into those depicting a complete theme and a complete principal rasa with other rasas as subordinate, the major rūpakas of the type of vākyārthābhinaya, and other minor rūpakas of the padārthābhinaya type depicting only a bhāva and not a fully developed rasa. The nāṭaka and other major types represent vākyārthābhinaya and minor types make for, padārthābhinaya. He says: (pp. 466, Śr. Pra. Ch. XI. Vol. II. Josyer)

“vākyārthābhinayo’yaṃ
dvādaśa-vidha-padārthābhinayam
prakīrtito nāṭakā”di-bhedena,
atha yathāśthitaṃ vakṣye.”

Bhoja does not mention tōtaka, (or tōtaka) which is illustrated by some commentators by Kālidāsa’s Vikramorvaśiyam. We know that Abhinavagupta holds that tōtaka was defined by Kohala and others.

Abhinavagupta also says that Kohala and the rest also discussed sāṭṭaka, illustrated by the Karpūra-mañjarī of Rājaśekhara. Bhoja mentions sāṭṭaka and is of the opinion that sāṭṭaka resembles nāṭikā in some respects as observed earlier. Bhoja’s definition of Saṭṭaka carries impressions of Rājaśekhara’s verse on sāṭṭaka (= sāṭṭaka) in the Karpūra-mañjarī as noted above.

Bhoja differs from the DR. and Avaloka wherein only ten major rūpakas are taken as of the form of vākyārthābhinaya. Bhoja adds two more, viz. nāṭikā and Saṭṭaka to the ten major types and takes these twelve to be of the form of vākyārthābhinaya and he reserves twelve minor types for padārthābhinaya separately.

We also observed that Śāradātanaṇa draws upon a lot from Bhoja for ten major types of drama and his treatment of twenty uparūpakas goes beyond Bhoja though similarities can be traced to some extent in common varieties accepted by both. The N.D. also has twelve major types including nāṭikā and prakaraṇī and thirteen uparūpakas.

The Uparūpakas thus make an interesting study. We will first enumerate the varieties as recognised by Bhoja, Hemacandra, Rāmacandra and Gūpacandra, Śāradātanaṇa, Sāgaraṇandin, Śīgabhūpāla and Viśvanātha.

Prior to Bhoja, as noted above, it is the Abhinavabhārati which mentions some upa-rūpakas along with their characteristics. We have quoted passages from A.bh.
in the foregoing pages which read as: “ukta-vyākhyāne tu kohalā”di-lakṣita-toṭaka-saṭṭaka-rāsaka”di-samgrahah.” We have quoted all these passages above with clear references. So, one thing that emerges is that Abhinavagupta knows all the names quoted by Kohala and others and also by Śri Harṣa in his Vārttika. He is also supposed to know the types mentioned by Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin. So, we will not be away from truth if we conclude that Abhinavagupta knew the following uparūpakaḥ, viz. (1) toṭaka (3) saṭṭaka (3) rāsaka (4) kāvya (5) rāga-kāvya (6) dvipādi (7) śamyā (8) skandhaka (9) lāsya (10) chalita (ka). These are through Kohala and others and Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin. Perhaps through Vātsyāyana’s Kāmasūtra he also knew (11) Hallisaka, (12) Natyarāsaka and (13) Prekṣanaka. Through Kumārila again Dvipādi and Rāsaka are known which were read in earlier documents also. Again Abh. mentions further uparūpakaḥ (Ch. IV. N.S.) such as - (14) Dombikā (15) Prasthāna (16) Śīlpaka or śidgaka (17) Bhānaka (18) Rāgakāvya (19) Bhānikā (20) Prerāṇa (21) Rāmakṛīḍaka, with Rāsaka and Hallisaka already enumerated. Avaloka also was perhaps available to Abhinavagupta and there we find seven varieties of nṛtya such as dombī, (= dombikā), (22) Śrīgadita, and bhānaka, bhānī, prasthāna, rāsaka and kāvya-all noted above.

Bhoja was perhaps acquainted with all these names and also their features through different sources prior to him. But actually Bhoja enumerates the following twelve types of uparūpakaḥ such as - (1) Śrīgadita (2) durmilikā (or tā), (3) prasthāna (4) Kāvya (or citra-kāvya), (5) bhānaka (śuddha, citra and sammilita), (6) bhānikā (7) gōśṭhi (8) hallisaka (9) nartanaka (10) prekṣanaka (11) rāsaka and (12) nātya-rāsaka or carcarī.

The Uparūpakaḥ as noted above are closer to dance than drama and could be representative of folk-art also. Many of these are performed by a single artist i.e. ‘ekahārya’.

Hemacandra following Bharata, gives nāṭika after treating the ten major types. He classifies kāvya=literature into preksya and śravaṇa. Preksya again is pāṭhya and ‘geya’. Pāṭhya varieties are the ten rūpakaḥ and nāṭikā and among geya varieties, - which are also preksya and therefore enacted on stage and make for visual art-forms belonging to the class of performing art in general, - he enumerates (1) dombikā (2) bhānaka (3) prasthāna (4) śīngaka (5) bhānikā (6) prerana (7) rāmakṛīḍa (8) hallisaka (9) rāsaka (10) gōśṭhi (11) śrīgadita and (12) rāga-kāvya, etc. He says that details for these which he has only defined should be sought from - “brahma-bharata-kohala’di-śāstrebhyaḥ avagantavyah.”
The Nātyadarpaṇa of Rāmacandra and Guṇacandra talks of other varieties of rūpaka at the end of the fourth chapter when it is stated: tad evaṃ nāṭakā"dīni vīthyaṁtàni dvādaśa rūpāṇi sa-prapaṇcam laksitāni. anyāny api rūpakāni dhṛṣyante. The N.D. does not call these as Upa-rūpakas, or geya etc. but simply states that there are other forms of drama also. But when the N.D. describes them in brief and separates them from the first twelve it follows that they are taken as minor varieties. They are enumerated as: (1) sattaka (2) śrīgadita (3) durmilitā (4) prasthāna (5) goṣṭhi (6) hallisaka (7) śamyā (8) preksanaka (9) rāsaka (10) nātya-rāsaka (11) kāvya (12) bhāṇa and (13) bhāṇikā. The N.D. enumerates nāṭikā and prakarani as major types.

For Śāradātanaya (Ch. IX), the minor types are ‘padārthabhinayā’tmaka’ and are twenty such as (1) toṭaka (2) nāṭikā (3) goṣṭhi (4) sallāpa (5) śilpaka (6) dombī (7) preksanam (8) nātya-rāsaka (9) rāsaka (10) ullāpyaka (11) hallisaka (12) durmaliṅkā (13) kalpavalli (14) malliṅkā (15) pārijātaka (16) lāsaka (17) śrīgadita (18) bhāna-bhāṇī (19) prasthāna and (20) kāvya.

For NLRK of Sāgaranandin, the uparūpaka types are (1) goṣṭhi (2) sallāpa (3) śilpaka (4) prasthāna (5) kāvya (6) hallisaka (7) śrīgadita (8) bhāṇikā (9) bhāṇi (10) durmaliṅkā (11) preksanaka (12) rāsaka (13) nātya-rāsaka and (14) ullāpyaka. Nāṭikā and Trotaka are enumerated with the major types.

Vāgbhaṭa II mentions nāṭikā and satṭaka and the ‘geya’ varieties after Hemacandra, such as -(1) dombikā (2) bhāṇa (3) prasthāna (4) bhāṇikā (5) preraṇa (6) śīṅgaka (7) rāmākrida (8) hallisaka (9) śrīgadita (10) rāsaka (11) goṣṭhi (and the rest).

Śīṅgabhūpāla in his Rasārvava-sudhākara speaks only of nāṭikā and takes it only as a mixed variety of nāṭaka and prakaraṇa which does not deserve a separate recognition for him (Rs. III. 218-222). He does not talk of other upa-rūpakas.

Vidyānātha does not mention anything beyond the ten major types (Pra. Ru. Nāṭaka-prakaraṇa, pp. 73-74, Edn. Madras, '14, ibid).

Viśvanātha enumerates (SD. VI. 4-6) (1) nāṭikā (2) troṭaka (3) goṣṭhi (4) satṭaka (5) nātya-rāsaka (6) prasthāna (7) ullāpyaka (8) kāvya (9) preṅkhaṇam (10) rāsaka (11) sallāpaka (12) śrīgadita (13) śilpaka (14) vilāsikā (15) durmaliṅkā (16) prakaraṇi (17) hallīṣa and (18) bhāṇikā. They are eighteen in all.

We will now start with Bhoja’s minor types. We will go on adding newer types only as seen in the authors that follow Bhoja, but will also take note if the concept of a given upa-rūpaka differs in later authors. Though with a slight
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change in the name the features are almost identical. We have seen that Bhoja has enumerated 12 types.

Actually before starting with Bhoja we will notice the total varieties of uparūpakas amounting to 44 or 45, as recognised by all theorists. We feel that some uparūpakas are named slightly differently by this or that theorist, but actually the types may be identical. The result of our analysis may be roughly placed as under - But we may say that we will treat our theorists in their chronological order beginning with Bhoja as he is the first author who deals with this topic systematically and perhaps more seriously. After Bhoja, we will discuss only those forms which appear as new forms in later theorists. The result of our analysis roughly gives the following picture, which shows different art-forms discussed by different authorities or at least known to them.

(1) Nāṭikā : This form is discussed by practically all beginning with the N.S. of Bharata. So we have Bharata (B); Dhanaṇjaya/Dhanika (Dha); Bhoja (Bho); Hemacandra (H. or H.C.), Rāmacandra and Guṇacandra, i.e. Nātyadarpana (ND.), Vāgbhaṭa II (Vāg.), Śīngabhūpāla in Rasāṛṇava Sudhākara (RS.), Sāgarandī - Nāṭaka-lakṣaṇa, ratna-kosa-(NLRK), Viśvanātha (Sāhitya-darpana) (SD./Vis.) and Śāradātanaya (= śā).

(2) Dvipadi - Bhāmaha (= Bhā.); Abhinavagupta (A.bh.) Kumārila (Ku.),
(3) Rāsaka - Bhā., Abh.; Ku.; ND; NLRK; Vāg.;
(4) Skandhaka - Bhā. Abh.;
(5) Lāsya - Daṇḍin (Da.); Abh.;
(6) Chalita - Da; Abh.;
(7) Śamyā - Da; Abh.; ND.; / Sampā-Bhoja.
(8) Saṭṭaka - Abh.; ND; Vāg.; Bho; Viṣ.
(9) Toṭaka OR Troṭaka - Abh.; Śā., Viṣ.;
(10) Kāvyā - Abh.; ND.;
(11) Rāgakāvyā - Abh., H.
(12) Hallisaka - Vātsyāyana; Abh.; Bho; H.; ND; Śā.; NLRK; Vāg.; OR Halliśa - Viṣ.
(13) Nāṭya-rāsaka - Vātsyā.; Bho.; ND.; Śā., OR Carcarī NLRK; Viṣ.;
(14) Prekṣaṇaka - Vātsyā.; Bho; ND., NLRK;

OR
Peṅkhaṇaka - Viṣ.;
(15) Rāsaka - Abh.; Dha.; Bho.; H.; ND.; Śā.; Viś.

(16) Ullopyaka - Śā.; OR Ullāpyaka - NLRK; Viś.

(17) Prekṣaṇa - Śā.;

(18) Dombikā OR Dombī - Abh.; Dha; Bhoja H.; Śā.; Vāg.;

(19) Prasthāna - Abh.; Dha.; Bho.; H.; ND.; Śā.; NLRK; Vāg.; Viś.

(20) Silpaka - Abh.; Śā; NLRK; Viś.

OR

śidgaka

(21) Bhāṇaka - Abh.;

(22) Bhāṇikā - Abh.; Bho.; H.; ND.; NLRK.; Vāg.; Viś.

(Here Dha. = DR. = Dhaṇjaya's Daśarūpaka. A. = Avaloka on DR.)

(23) Prerana - Abh.; H. Vāg.;

(24) Rāmākrīḍaka - Abh.; H.; Vāg.

(25) Śrigadita - Dha.; Bho.; H.; ND.; Śā.; NLRK.; Vāg.; Viś.


(Bhāṇa/Bhāṇaka; Bhāṇi/Bhāṇikā could be identical. But we have mentioned them separately as their names appear differently. Similarly, dombi/dombikā, ullopyaka/ullāpyaka, perhaps kāvyā/rāga-kāvyā sallāpa-samlāpaka - could be one and the same.)

(27) Bhāṇi - Dha.; Śā.; NLRK.;

(28) Kāvyā (citra-kāvyā) - Dha; Bho.; ND.; Śā.; NLRK.; Viś.

(29) Durmālikā OR Durmīlikā - Bho; Śā.; NLRK; Viś.

(30) Goṣṭhī - Bho.; H.; ND.; Śā.; NLRK.; Vāg.; Viś.

(31) Nartanaka - Bho.;

(32) Śīṅgaka - (OR śidgaka ? silpaka ?) H. Vāg.

(33) Durmīlitā - ND.; (same as 29 above ?)

(34) Prekṣaṇa - Śā.;

(35) Pārijātaka - Śā.;

(36) Kalpavallī - Śā.;
We will now proceed with examining the special features of these uparūpakaśas, given by Bhoja, - to begin with - First, we will introduce this topic with a quotation from Dr. Raghavan (pp. 546, ibid).

"The Uparūpaka chapter of Sanskrit Nātyaśāstra treatises is very important for students of the history and development of Indian dance and minor representations belonging to the vast indigenous Indian theatre. The uparūpakaśas are, as distinguished by Bhoja and Dhanañjaya emotional fragments, compared to rūpakaśas which present a major theme with the unity of a single rasa running through and fed by other subsidiary rasas. Although ancient Indian drama or Sanskrit drama as envisaged by Bharata is of the nature of a dance-drama, with music and dance-movements, it is the uparūpaka class of performances that is so par excellence; for in them music and dance predominate; most of them are merely dances accompanied by songs, interpreting through abhinaya or gesture the emotional contents of the song. Many are, like the Bhāṇa among the daṣarūpakaśas, done by one person: eka-patra-hārya; in fact, the verse cited in the Daśa-rūpakāvaloka (I. 8) makes all the seven varieties, Domāti etc., ‘eka-hārya’. Whatever definitions early works like that of Kohala might have given to each of the forms in this class, we do not have now; and except for stray references and discussions in the Abhinavabhāratī, as at the end of Ch. IV., the Śr. Pra. of Bhoja is the earliest treatise available to us which fully describes them. It is from the Śr. Pra. that Śāradātaneya borrows his descriptions of many of the Uparūpakaśas in Ch. IX. of his work." - With due respect to Dr. Raghavan, we will not use the term "borrows". Perhaps Śāradātanaya also had a living tradition before him and he gives some more types also. It is better to use the term "accepts" in place of "borrows", for both Hemacandra and Śāradātanaya and later Viśvanātha. These authors "accept" what is found to be "acceptable". This is a better expression, which does justice to the efforts of later writers. We now begin with the uparūpakaśas as seen in Bhoja and also as accepted by later theorists.
(1) Śṛigadita -

(pp. 466, Šṛ. Pra. ibid) - Bhoja defines it as,

“tatra śrīr iva dānava-satror
yasmin kulānganā patyuh;
varṇayati śaurya-dhairya-prabhṛti-γuṇān agrataḥ sakhyāh,
patyā ca vipralabdha
gātavye tāḥ kramād upālabhante.
śṛigaditam iti maniśibhir
udāhṛto’ṣau, padābhinayaḥ.”

This Uparūpaka is concerned with moments of separation and hence there is vipralaṃbha-śṛṅgāra depicted in it. The person concerned is a kulānganā, a lady from a respectable family, and she describes her feelings to a friend, a second character here. The description is centred round the husband’s high qualities of vælour, firmness or fortitude, etc. If she is deceived by her lover husband, she is a vipralabdha and she in turn admonishes (him). The theme is presented in song. This is a variety of padārthābhinaya as against vākyārthābhinaya. Bhoja does not cite any illustration of this type. The name ‘śṛ-igadita’ is explained by Bhoja as due to the fact that the kulānganā, a heroine belonging to a noble family, describes (gadita) her husband’s qualities like goddess Laxmi or Śrī, describing those of her lord, Nārāyana. The ‘śṛigadita’ of Bhoja can be placed with the śidgaka or śilpaka of Abhinavagupta. In this a separated heroine relates to her friend the bad and unruly conduct of her husband. Śidgaka represents only a complaint and therefore a negative aspect of the narrator lady’s husband, the Śṛigadita first describes the good qualities and then after being deceived, the lady finds fault with her husband. Dr. Raghavan tries to place this variety with the modern ‘kuṇavaṇci’ art-form prevalent in Tamil.

We have noted above that this art-form is known to Dhanika, Hemacandra, the Nātyadarpāna, Śāradatanaya, the NLRK., Vāgbhata II., and Viśvanātha.

Dhanika simply mentions śṛigadita by name, under DR. I. 8., in a verse along with dombi, bhāṇa prasthāna, rāsaka, and kāvyā - a total of seven art-forms in all, over and above the ten major types and also nāṭikā.

Hemacandra (Kā. Šā. VIII. vs. 69, Edn. Parikh/Kulkarni, pp. 449) has -

“yasmin kulānganā patyuh
sakhy agrė varṇayed γuṇān,
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upālambham ca kurute,
geye śrigaditam bhavet."

This is the same as Bhoja. This is 'geya'/preksya. - It is an art-form where song (geya) and also dance predominate. H. accepts Bhoja.

The Nātyadarpaṇa has (ND. IV. Sūtra 299/1, 2) : śīr iva dānavaśatror
yasmin kulāṅganā patyuh

... etc. This is accepted from Bhoja without any change. No illustration is cited.
Śāradātanaya has - (BP. IX. 13, pp. 378, Edn. Agrawal, ibid) -

"atha śrigaditam vidyāt
prasiddhōdātta-nāyakam,
bhāratī-vṛtti-bahulam
udātta-vacanānvitam.
garbhāvamarṣa-sanḍhindhyāṁ
śūnyaṁ, prakhyāta-nāyakam,
ekāṅkaṁ vipralambhākhya-
-rasa-prāyaṁ kvacit kvacit.
yasmin kulāṅganā patyuh
śaurya-dhairyā”dikān guṇān,
sakhīnām agrato vakti,
tān upālabhate’tha vā.
vipralabdha ca tenaiva,
yadi, tatasāngamā”sayā
āśinā, yatra lalitaṁ
priyābhoga-vibhūṣitam
utkāntaṁ pathed-gāyet
pāthyaṁ vā gitam eva vā,
evamvidham śrigaditam
rāmā”nandaṁ yathā kṛtam."

Śāradātanaya has something more to say, than the earlier writers. He cites an example viz., Rāmā’nandam. For Śāradātanaya, this art-form is not just all dance and music but is a play, a type of drama, with one act and three samādhis such as
mukha, pratimukha and nirvahana, with garbha and avamaśa absent from it. It has a famous and nobly born hero and is decorated with lofty expression - udātt vacanānvitam. There is prominence of bhārati-vṛtti and this suggests that the physical action may be on a low key with descriptive element thriving. Because of this we have a lot of talks, wherein a lady from a noble family describes before her friends (= sakhihām agrato vakti) (and this is against a single friend as described by Bhoja, Hemacandra and the ND.), the high qualities of her husband, or she rebukes him or runs down these qualities in case if she is deceived by him. She sits there with a hope of getting united with him and dresses herself in beautiful attire and ornaments. This is also the vāsakasajjā avasthā. Perhaps after getting ready and waiting for him for long she feels frustrated and finds faults with him. She is utkānthitā also, and getting very eager she either recites or sings. Thus, there is lot of love in separation here. But what is important for Śāradātanaya is that he calls it an art-form to be staged in a single act. The nāyikā appears in three stages as Vāsaka-sajjā. Utkāntitā and Vipralabdha. The nāyaka is also a famous character 'prasiddhōdāta' and 'prakhyāta', which perhaps gives some historicity to the story or theme.

The NLRK has the following: atha śrīgaditam. yatra strir āsinā karunam paṭhati. ekāṁkam. udātt-vacana-kṛtam, bhārati-vṛtti-pradhānam, prakhyātavastu-nāyakam, yathā-krīḍā-rasātalām.

Obviously the NLRK has the definition of Śrī-gadita modelled on Śāradātanaya. Dr. De (SP.) (pp. 310) observes that Sāgaranandin’s date is uncertain but Bahurūpa Miśra (later then 1250 A.D.) knows him. So, he could be somewhere between 1150 A.D. - 1200 A.D. Śāradātanaya is placed by Dr. De (pp. 238, SP. ibid) between 1100-1300 A.D. So, either Śāradātanaya was Sāgaranandin’s near predecessor or was his contemporary or perhaps even his junior contemporary. But looking at NLRK’s style and treatment, it seems its author tries to give prose summary of authentic works. Hence, we are inclined to place Śāradātanaya earlier than Sāgaranandin. But this is only a personal impression. It could be otherwise also. But for the sake of convenience we will place NLRK after BP. Or, both of them must be imbibing a common tradition, perhaps seen earlier in Bhoja - What we may call the Mālava tradition.

So, for NLRK also, as seen in BP., this minor art-form has one act, is having bhārati vṛtti as predominant diction, is having a famous theme and a famous hero, and is full of lofty expressions and the female character here is engaged in woes - karunam paṭhati - perhaps because she is deceived by her husband whose great
qualities have proved to be otherwise in her case personally, especially where love-matters are concerned. The illustration cited is Krīḍā-rasātālam. The BP. has a more elaborate and more methodical presentation which thus could be, possibly an improvement on NLRK.'s presentation and therefore later. Whatever it may be, for our methodology we have preferred to place the BP. earlier than the NLRK. Both, however can claim the same status over each other.

Vāgbhaṭa (II), naming his work and also modelling it after the Kavyānuśāsana of Hemacandra, calls śrīgadita as 'geya' art-form. Hemacandra divides 'preksya' i.e. abhineya as pāthya and geya, but Vāgbhaṭa does not indicate that he takes geya also as abhineya. But we may conclude that as he chooses to follow Hemacandra, for him also the 'geya' art-forms are part of abhineya also. He observes: (pp. 18, ibid)

"ekasūtraṁ tu netā syād
gopastrīṇāṁ yathā hariḥ,
yasmin kulāṅganā pariḥ
sakhy agre varṇayed gunān,
upālbhāṁ ca kurute,
geye śrīgaditaṁ tu tat."

As is Hari of gopis so there is one netā i.e. nāyaka and in this 'geya' art-form, the heroine, a nobly born lady, describes before her friend the qualities of her husband, and also passes admonition.

In the Sāhityadarpana (S.D.) Viśvanātha observes: (S.D. VI. 293/295):

"prakhyātavṛttam ekāṅgāṁ
prakhyātōdatta-nāyakāṁ,
prasiddha-nāyikāṁ,
garbha-vimarśābhyāṁ vivarjitaṁ. (VI/293)
bhārati-vṛtti-bahulaṁ
śrī-ti-sabdena saṅkulaṁ,
matāṁ śrīgaditaṁ nāma
vidvadbhir uparūpakaṁ. (VI/294)
śrīr (strīr) āśīnā śrīgadite
gāyet kiñcit pañheda api,
ekāṅko bhāratiprāya
iti kecit pracaṅkṣate. (VI. 295)

Obviously this is modelled after the BP. But there is something more. Viśvanātha does not cite an illustration, which he does quite often in other art-forms. Here he says - ūhyam udāharaṇam. Then, he says that this art-form is “śrī”-iti sabdena saṅkulaṁ.” Perhaps he came across illustrations where ‘śrī’-śabda was read invariably. In vs. 295, he says śrī āśīnā... meaning wherein śrī or Lakṣmī, while sitting either sings or speaks. But our suggestion is that in place of ‘śrī’ we can read ‘śrī’, for it is so in other definitions also. The NLRK read-yatra strī āśīnā karuṇam paṭhati, wherein we do not have a reference to ‘geya’. Here we have “gāyet” and “paṭhet”. So, perhaps in Viśvanātha’s time this art-form had both song and recitation also. Again, the S.D. expects the nāyikā also to be prasiddha i.e. famous. The S.D. clearly calls it an “upa-rūpaka”. But its having one act is an opinion held by ‘some’ - ‘kecit pracaṅkṣate’. So, for Viśvanātha also this is an art-form with dance, eloquence and acting also, as its special features. Like the B.P. this act has neither ‘garbha’ nor ‘vimarśa’ juncture.

Durmiḷikā (or, .tā) is the next art-form, Bhoja discusses at śr. Pra. XI. pp. 466, ibid. He observes:

“caurya-rata-pratibhedaṁ
yūnor anurāga-varṇanaṁ vā’pi,
yatra grāmya-kathābhiḥ
kurute kila dūtikā rahasi,
mantrayati ca tadviṣaye
nyag-jāṭitvena yācate ca vasu,
labdха’pi labdhum icchati
durmilitā nāma sā bhavati.

This art-form is also discussed later by ND., BP., NLRK. and also SD. ND. calls it Durmilitā. BP. calls it Durmallikā. SD. calls it “Durmallī”.

For Bhoja, its theme concerns itself with a secret love-intrigue or it is sometimes a description of love between two young persons. This secret love affair is described before the audience by a female servant, a dūtikā, in vulgar language. The male or female lover whose love is being described makes an appearance and makes a plan (in secret !) with the messanger who being a lowly-born asks for money (to
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do the work and also to keep the mouth shut). After getting money tries to get more
(as if by blackmail). No illustration is cited by Bhoja.

The ND. (IV./3) accepts Bhoja’s definition verbatim. The name given to this art-
form is “durmallitā”.

BP. of Ṣāradāranaya has both “durmallikā” and also “mallikā”, which we will
take up later. Bhoja’s durmillikā and ND.’s durmillitā is “durmallikā” in BP., which
observes - (pp. 391, Ch. IX/51, 52, 53; Edn. Agrawal, ibid) :

“atha durmallikā nāma prauḍha-
nāgara-nāyikā caturāṅkā catussamdhir,
garba-saṃdhi-vinā-kṛtā
viṭo vilasati svairam,
prathamāṅke (tri) nāḍikāḥ.
viduṣako dvitiyēṅke
vilasat pañca-nāḍikāh,
pitāmardo viharati
trīye saptā-nāḍikāḥ,
vitā”di-tritaya-kṛiḍā
caturthe daśa-nāḍikāḥ. - IX/51
caurya-rati pratibhedam
yūnor anurāga-varṇanaṃ kvā’pi,
yatra grāmya-kathābhiḥ
kurute kila dūrikā rahasi.
mantrayati ca tadvisayan -
nyag-jātitvena yācate ca vasu,
labdhvā’pi labdhum icchati
yā sa durmallikā nāmnā.
enāṃ durmallikāṃ
anye pṛahur matta-mallikāṃ iti. IX./52
yasyām udbhāvyah syāt
purohitā’mātya-tāpasa”dīnāṃ,
prārabdha’-nirvāh,
sā'pi ca matta-mallikā bhavati.
kṣudrakathā matta-mallikā
yeha mahāraṣṭra-bhāṣayā bhavati,
gorocane ca kāryā
anaṅgavatī bhāva-rasa-vidyā.

Śāradātanaya is both lucid and exhaustive in his treatment. He says that some call durmaliṅkā by the name of ‘matta-mallikā’ also. Even though he is acquainted with Bhoja and also perhaps with the ND., he does not notice the titles viz. durmiliṅkā or durmiliṅtā read in the above two sources respectively.

The BP. observes that this art-form has a heroine who is mature (both in age and experience) and is a cultured lady of cultivated taste, i.e. ‘nāgarā’. So, perhaps she resides in an urban place. Again, durmaliṅkā has four acts. All four samādhìs, except the ‘garbha’-samādhī are visible in this. The first act has the free activity of a ‘vītā’ and it lasts upto three nāḍīkās. Thus, the first act has a duration of 3 nāḍī = 6 ghaḍīs (one ghaḍī = 24 minutes); so 6 ghaḍīs = 24 x 6 = 144 minutes. This comes to two and a quarter hour and nine minutes more. The second act is longer with 5 nāḍīkās i.e. ten ghaḍīs equivalent to 240 minutes i.e. four hours. In this act we have the free activity of the Vidūṣaka. The pīṭhamardā has his free role in the third act which has the duration of seven nāḍīkās i.e. 14 ghaḍīs = 14 x 24 = 336 minutes, i.e. Five hours and a half roughly. The fourth act comprises of ten nāḍīkās i.e. 480 minutes equivalent to 8 hours! So, the whole show takes up 2 hr. 24, 4 hrs. minutes, 5 hrs., and 30 minutes and 8 hrs. i.e. a total of 19 hrs. and 45 minutes. Perhaps the show was staged by the end of the day in a make-shift theatre in a temple at the outskirts of a village and it went on upto nearly a week in a leisurely fashion! Again these art-forms were also folk-art-forms and had a lot of dance, music and drama in them. The expression ‘vītā”di-tritaya’ is explained by Dr. Agrawal (pp. 291, ibid) as “three-fold”, thus taking it to mean the three-fold activity of vītā. But we may choose to take “tritaya” as a ‘group of three’, meaning the fourth act here abounds in the activity of the three taken together, i.e. of vītā, vidūṣaka and pīṭhamardā.

Śāradātanaya further (IX./52) makes observations that are read in Bhoja also. Here a maid-servant, a lady messenger or dūtikā describes the love affair of two young people in vulgar language. Then enters into a secret deal (with the lovers). Here ‘rahasi’ of the second line is to be read with the third line as “rahasi mantrayati” - she makes a plan, enters into a deal concerning ‘tadviṣaya’ i.e. the secret love affair. She being a woman lowly born, i.e. she being a woman of low
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culture and low taste, asks for money (in return). After grabbing some amount she becomes avaricious and asks for more money. This durmallikā is also named matta-mallikā by others.

That also is termed matta-mallikā in which imaginary lack of activity in case of a project on hand of the office-bearers such as a minister or a purohita-a preceptor - or tāpasa i.e. an ascetic etc. is delineated. A trivial story kṣudrakathā related in Mahārāstra-bhāṣā is also termed matta-mallikā.

The line

“gorocane ca kāryā
anaṅgavati bhāva-rasa-vidyā”

is not clear. But ‘gorocana’ is explained by Monier-Williams, pp. 366 as, “a bright yellow orpiment prepared from the bile of cattle (employed in painting, dyeing, and in marking Tilaka on the forehead; in med. used as sedative” ... etc.) Thus perhaps ‘anaṅgavati’ is an illustration of a trivial story narrated on the occasion of preparing ‘gorocana’ (or. nā.). Again ‘bhāva-rasa-vidyā’ also is not very clear. ‘rasa-vidyā’ could have something to do with rasāyana-vidyā, i.e. medicine. Anaṅgavati is said to be ‘bhāva-rasa-vidyā’, which is a clumsy expression. May be it is full of bhāva, rasa and rasa-vidyā ! or, “having predominance of bhāva and rasa-vidyā.” We are not very clear about this.

The NLRK. has the following on this art-form - (pp. 302, 3, Edn. Babulal Shastri, ibid)


Obviously this seems to be the summary of Śāradātanaya’s writing. But according to the NLRK., the fourth act is full of sporting activity of a nāgaraka, or a cultured citizen. Thus it is going to be grace and culture. Again the further details as read in BP. are also omitted here. They were seen in Bhoja and ND. also. The illustration cited is “bindumati”. - The Sāhitya-darpaṇa of Viśvanātha has the following :

S.D. calls it ‘durmallī’

S.D. VI. 303-305 read as,
“durmallī caturaṅkā syāt
kaiśī-bhārati-yutā.
a-garbhā, nāgara-narā,
nyūna-nāyaka-bhūṣitā. - VI. 303. S.D.
trināliḥ prathamōṅkōsyāṃ
viṭa-kriḍāmayo bhavet
pañcanālir dvitiyoṅkaḥ
vidūṣaka-vilāsavān. - VI./304
snālikas tṛtiyāḥ tu
piṭhamardā-vilāsavān
caturtho dasanāliḥ syād
aṅkaḥ krīḍita-nāgaraḥ.”

Here also, - a maid messanger talking about the secret love of someone and trying to exploit the situation and getting money for it etc. - , the vulgarity going with this narration etc. - all these features are missing. As for the duration of acts, there is some difference in all these accounts. But that it was a spectacle in four acts is almost common. The S.D. suggests that the hero is a lowly-born "nyūna-nāyaka", and other male characters are urbane. 'Bindumati' is cited as an illustration and this could be from the NLRK. Thus, the description of this art-form differs not only in name but also features. But that it is more of drama, and of course also of song and music, is proved by its having four acts and its having the predominance of bhārati vṛtti.

Prasthāṇa is the next art-form mentioned by Bhoja. But it may be noted that this type of upa-rūpaka is also mentioned by Abhinavagupta, and Avaloka and then Bhoja, Hemacandra, the ND., Śā., NLRK., Vāg. II and Viśvanātha.

Abhinavagupta, in the name of Cirantana’s (pp. 181, N.S. Vol. I. Abh. on Ch. IV - ‘5b, G.O.S. Edn.) says -

“gajā’dinām gatim tulyāṃ
kṛtvā pravasanam tathā,
alpāviddhāṃ su-masṛṇāṃ
tat-prasthānam pracāksate.”

This uparūpaka is alpāviddhā and also su-masṛṇa, i.e. both partly violent and
also very delicate in nature. This means that it treats of love and such graceful movements but it is also described as imitating the gait of elephants and other beasts and thus some rough or wild movements also get in as a result. We will see that Bhoja describes pravāsa or travel of the lover as its theme. Here also the idea of ‘pravāsa’ is seen in “kṛtvā pravasanaṁ tathā.” Dr. Raghavan observes (pp. 549 ibid) that, ‘the nature of this type as defined here, and how, where and why imitation of the gait of elephants is introduced is not clear. Probably, as the lover going on pravāsa would go by elephant or horse or by a bullock-cart, the representation of the gaits of these animals are included here.” But our understanding is that in literature a fair lady with graceful movement is described as “gaja-gāmini” i.e. one having her gait like that of an elephant. So, here also perhaps the same is intended. The word ‘tulyām’ supports our understanding. The prasthāna is carried out in an elegant style of the gait of an elephant which by itself is awe-inspiring as well as graceful to look at.

Dr. Raghavan further explains (pp. 549, ibid) that, ‘an observation of Abhinavagupta in a different context however, would ask us to take the animals depicted as the central theme, and understand them as “anyāpadesa” or something like edificatory animal fables in dance. (Abh. I. p. 174) We have it perhaps on pp. 172 (Abh. ibid) Abhinavagupta observes : “simha-sūkara-bhallūka-kāśara”di-varṇanena’pi bhāna-prerana-bhānikādāv aprastuta-praśamsārthāntaranyāsa-drṣṭāntā”dinā puruṣārthasya eva upadeśa-darśanād iti prayaōjana-bhedādapi na bhedah.”

The idea is that perhaps through animals depicted on stage-perhaps through imitation only-some advice, through anyāpadesa is given. The medium is of course dance. This also could be prasthāna.

Again, under NS. iv. 253, pp. 166 (Abh.) Abhinavagupta observes : tathā hi - gitam eva taḍānyārtham taḍanyagatatvena nṛttā”di, yathā dombikā”dau. tatra hi parikramaṇādy api sukumāreṇaiva āṅgena. tatrā’pi vaṛṇanāṅga-prādhānyām kvacīt. yathā prasthānā”dau. Thus he seems to give another feature of prasthāna here.

But Bhoja has a clearer definition of prasthāna -

He says (pp. 466, Śr. Pra., ibid)

“prathamānurāga-māna-pravāsa-
śṛṅgāra-samśrayaṁ yat syāt,
prāvṛd-vasanta-varṇana-param
anyad vā’pi sotkanṭham,
ante vīra-rasā”dhyair
nībaddham etat caturbīr apasārāiḥ.
prasthānam iti bruvate
pravāsam upalakṣayet, sudhiyāḥ.

Bhoja observes that this art-form is called prasthāna because it narrates or indicates (upalakṣayet) the going away of the lover on travel as its theme and thus pravāsa-vipralamḥa is the dominant emotion. But in prasthāna are also depicted other aspects of love such as first meeting of lovers, pining due to first love, māṇa or mis-understanding, separation through travel etc. All this brings in also the descriptions of rains, spring, etc. At the end ‘ante’, this art-form is decorated with feelings and emotions concerning the vīra-rasa or heroic sentiment. Perhaps the lover while travelling and (also returning ?) performs heroic deeds and thus heroic has a chance here. Vīra-rasa at the end is introduced through four ‘apasāras’ - “apasārāiḥ caturbīḥ”. As for an explanation of an ‘apasāra’, we may turn to the Aḥ. (N.S. Vol. I. G.O.S. pp. 188, ibid, on N.S. IV. 280) : “paribhāṣāntaram āha - “piṇḍim baddhvā.” iti. tasyāpasāритasya nṛttā-prayogam kṛtvā sarvās tā niśkrameyur apasareyuḥ. ata eva etatsthānopaṭīvibhir eva śrī rāṇakā”di-kavibhir dombikā”dau caturaprasārakah prayogah.”

N.S. IV. 280 reads :

“tāvat paryastakah kāryo
yāvat piṇḍi na badhyate,
piṇḍiṃ baddhvā tataḥ sarvā
niśkrameyuḥ striyās tu tāḥ.”

This has concern with ‘piṇḍibandha’ in a nṛttā-performance, after doing which the ladies move away, of course with a graceful movement. The prasthāna also ends with these graceful exists by four (ladies, of course). The reference is to a ‘dombikā’ piece of kavi Rāṇaka wherein this ‘exit of four’ was enacted. This has a clear reference to the element of dance and music in prasthāna also. However, Dr. Raghavan does not seem to be very convinced about the explanation he gives, even after quoting from the ND. He observes : (pp. 548, ibid) :

“The words ‘ata eva’ refer to the last word in the previous sentence “niśkrāmeyuḥ, apasareyuḥ.” Apasāra, therefore seems to mean exit. In a further paragraph Abhinavagupta uses apasāra along with praveṣā and means exit. “evaṃ prthak praveṣaḥ... tad anantarataḥ apasāraḥ.” But it is not possible to deduce fully
the details of music and dance in these four exists or how they depicted Vira-rasa - 'Vira-rasa"dhya-catur apasāra', as obviously the technique of it was handed down in practice and not recorded. However, Rāmacandra who borrows the definition from Śr. Pra., adds something to our knowledge of this Apasāra. He interprets Apasāra as interludes of dance, "nrtya-ccinnâni-khaṃdâni apasâraḥ." (p. 214, N.D.). The Kuṭṭanînâtâ, refers to Apasârâka in dance in śl. 87."

Dr. Raghavan should feel convinced about the nature of 'Vira-rasa"dhya-apasâra', which are graceful movements of dance with final exits from the stage, after depicting the heroic acts, during pravâsa, of the hero. Abhinavagupta also calls it "alpâ"viddhâm su-masrṇam" meaning the same mixture of forceful and graceful movements of dance in this art-form.

Hemacandra defines prasthāna after A.bh. as -

"gajâ"dīnām gatiṃ tulyām
kṛtvā pravasanaṃ tathā,
alpâ"viddhâm su-masrṇam
tat prasthānaṃ pracaksate."

We have discussed the implications of this definition above. The only point to be noted is that H. takes it as a "preksya"/"geya" variety of art-form. For him, preksya is abhineya and 'sravya' is an-abhineya. But the preksya is again two-fold such as pâthya and geya (Kā. Śâ. VIII/2) (pp. 432, ibid). It may be noted that in pâthya he includes all major ten types of rûpakas along with nātikâ and saṭṭaka. This we have seen above also. But he accepts DR.'s observation also along with his loyalty towards Bharata and Abhinavagupta, when he says - (pp. 432, ibid) : tathâ ca nātakâ"dīni vîthyañtāni vâkyârthābhinaya-svabhâvâni bharata-muninôpadarśîtâni saṭṭakaś ca kaiścir."

He calls them 'pâthya' meaning perhaps thereby that these major rûpakas have dialogues in prose (= pâthya) and are totally rasa-oriented. The 'geya', - which he enumerates as at least twelve and also remains open to other varieties by adding 'ādi' at the end of kā. śâ. VIII. 4, - are of the nature of padârthâbhinaya. He observes :

(Kā. śâ. VIII. 4) pp. 445, ibid

"geyaṃ dombikâ-bhâna-prasthâna-
śîngaka-bhâñikâ-prerâṇa-râmâkrîḍḍâ-hallisaka-râsaka-goṣthi-śrigadita-
râgakâvyâ"di."
"padārthābhinaya-svabhāvāni dombikā"dini geyāni rūpakāṇi cirantarair uktāni."

He accepts these art-forms as 'rūpakā' as well as calls them 'geya' variety suggesting that these popular art-forms are a curious mixture of some drama and more music, dance and song and are padārthābhinaya rūpa, i.e. as is meant by the DR., they are minor art-forms which have 'bhāva' at the centre and not 'rasa'. Again, in his Viveka (pp. 445, ibid), H. makes it clear that the performance or presentation of geya-kāvyā is three-fold such as maṣṇa or gentle, uddhata or high-pitched and miśra or mixed : "trividho hi geya-kāvyasya prayogaha, maṣṇah, uddhato, miśraḥ ca. Dr. Raghavan could have benefited had he looked into Viveka on it. H. further states (pp. 446, ibid) - "tathā hi dombikāsū narapati-cātuka-pradhānyena prapyttāsu sukumāram eva suddham rūpam. bhāṇakṣeṣu nṛṣimha"dīcarita-varṇane uddhatam eva. yat punar maśrse'py uddhatam praviśati tad uci tam eva. tatrāpy-alpatva-bahutva-kṛto bhedāḥ. pūrvaḥ prasthāna-prabandhaḥ uttaraḥ śīṅgatakabhedaḥ. uddhate tu maṣṇānupravesād bhāṇikābhedaḥ anyad api pṛerana-rāmākriḍa-rāsaka-hallisakādīm alpatva-bahutva-vaicitrya-kṛtam ihaiva praviśtam veditavyam."

We will discuss all this in greater details when we take up H. separately later but for the present we may note that H. has not only understood the essence of various art-forms but he has explained it so clearly that there does not remain any doubt about the nature or features of various art-forms. We repeat here that Dr. Raghavan would have definitely benefited had be looked into the Viveka of H. Actually H. suggests that the acting in these minor art-forms is three-fold and could be manifold by the fusion of these elements of acting in different proportions.

So, for H., as for Abhinavagupta, 'prasthāna' is an art-form in which the acting is less hot and more soft. H. here has accepted Abhinavagupta's lead and not that of Bhoja. Prior to this, under DR. I. 8 Dhanika mentions 'rūpakāntara' such as : (pp. 8, Adyar Edn. ibid).

"dombi śṛgaditam bhāno,
 bhāṇi-prasthāna-rāsakāh,
 kāvyam ca, sapta nṛtyasya
 bhedā syus te'pi bhāṇavat."

The Avaloka mentions seven art-forms but distinguishes them from the major art-forms, the rūpakas, on the ground that the nātya (= major rūpakas) are rasā"śraya i.e. rasa-oriented while these seven minor art-forms, which are termed 'nṛtya' are 'bhāvā"śraya'.
It is clear that H. has accepted this line of thinking. The Avaloka observes (pp. 8, ibid):

"rasā”śrayāṃ nātyāḍ bhāvāśrayāṃ nṛtyam anyad eva. tatra bhāvā”śrayam iti viśayabhedān nṛtyam iti nṛter gātra-vikşēpārthatvenāṅgika-bāhulyāt tatkāriṣu ca nartaka-vyapadesāl loke'pi ca range prekṣaṇiyakam iti vyavahārān nāṭakā”deranyan nṛtyam. tadbhedavācchṛigadita”der nā’vadhāranānupapattih. nāṭakā”di ca rasaviśayam rasasya ca padārthibhūta-vibhāva”di-saṃsargatmaka-vākyārtha-rūpaṃ vākyārthaḥbhīnayā”tmakatvaṃ rasā”śrayam iti anena dārśitaṃ. nātyam iti ca ‘nāta avasparāṇe’ iti nateḥ kiśiccalanārthatvāt sāttvikābhūtayam. ata eva tatāriṣu nāta-vyapadesāh. [loke’pi ca range nātyam iti vyapadesāh etad uktam bhavati] yathā ca gātra-vikṣēpārthatve samāne’pyanukārātmakatvena nṛtyād anyan nṛttam, tathā vākyārthaḥbhīnayātmakān nāṭyāt padārthābhīnayā”tmakam anyad eva nṛtyam iti.”

On this read Laghuṭīkā by Bhaṭṭa Nṛsimha (pp. 9, ibid) - “viśayabhedāt, svarūpabhedaḥ, kartṛbhedaḥ, saṃjñābhedaḥ ca bhedaḥ.”

tatra bhāvā”śrayam ityanena viśayabheda dārśitaḥ. āṅgika-bāhulyād ity anena svarūpa-bheda dārśitaḥ. tatkāriṣu nartaka-vyapadesād ity anena kartṛbheda dārśitaḥ. prekṣaṇiyam ity anena saṃjñābheda dārśitaḥ.”

nanu nāṭakā”des tato bhedaḥ kena dārśitaḥ. tatra”ha-rasā”śrayam ity anena iti

catham aneya dārśitaṃ ity apekṣāyam uktam - “nāṭakā”di ca rasa-viṣayam ity ādi. yady api vibhāva”dayas tair atīśayokty ādibhiḥ pratipadyamāna vākyārthā eva na padārthāḥ. tathā’pi tesāṃ samyogad rasotpatteḥ, te taṃ prati padārthibhāvaṃ bhajante. raso’pi tad utpadyo vākyārthibhavati. ato vākyārthi-bhūta-rasa-viṣayam nāṭakā”di.

tenātra’pi rasaviśayam iti viṣayabhedaḥ, sāttvika-bāhulyena svarūpabhedaḥ, tat-

kāriṣu ca naṭa-vyapadesād ity anena kartṛ-bhedaḥ, loke’pi ca range nātyam iti vyapadesād iti saṃjñābheda’pi dṛṣṭavyah.”

The ND. defines prastāhāna exactly after Bhoja, (ND. IV. 4 pp. 405, Edn. Viśveśvara, ibid) - such as -

“prathamānurāga-māna-pravāsa-
śṛṅgāra-samśrayāṃ yat syāt,
prāvṛd-vasanta-varañanaparam
anyad vā’pi sotkaṇṭham.
ante vīra-rasā”dyair
nibaddham etac caturbhīr-apasāraih
prasthānam iti bruvaite
pravāsam upalakṣayat sudhiyaiḥ."

We have discussed this definition under Bhoja. It may be noted that though Rāmacandra and Guṇacandra are H.ś's disciples, they choose to follow Bhoja and not Abhinavagupta as done by their master here.

Śāradātanaya, at BP. (IX. 27, pp. 384, ibid) observes :

“prasthānam kaiśikīvṛtti-yutam
hīnōpanāyakam,
ā-pāna-keli-lalītam
laya-tāla-kalānugam.
dāsā”dīnāyakam dvyaṅkaṃ,
vīṭa-ceṭā”di-nāyakam,
mukhanirvahaṇōpetam,
śrīṅgaratilakam yathā.”

“Prasthāna has Kaiśiki vṛtti - It is having a lowly born as upa-nāyaka i.e. subordinate hero. It has the grace of drinking bout and sport (connected with the same). It is rich with harmony and rhythm and art (or art with harmony and rhythm prominent in it). The hero is in form of a servant and it has two acts. Or, the hero is vīṭa, cēṭa etc. There are two junctures viz. mukha and nirvahaṇa. It is illustrated by Śrīṅgaratilaka.”

Śāradātanaya's prasthāna does not share the features as described by either Abhinavagupta or Bhoja. Prasthāna for him is primarily musical - 'laya-tāla-kalānugam'. The theme is erotic with kaiśiki diction and vīṭa or cēṭa as its hero. Scenes of drinking and marry-making abound in it. It is having two acts and two junctures.

But while discussing rāsaka at IX. 37 BP., Śāradātanaya first gives the first three lines from Bhoja's definition of 'prasthāna' and the fourth-line has -

“mukha-nirvahaṇa-sametaṃ
prasthānam bhavati caikāṅkam.” (pp. 388, ibid)

Perhaps these lines are misplaced here through the mistake of some copyist, or, as Dr. Raghavan thinks, Śāradātanaya means to bring together other definitions of
some of the uparāpākas here in the anustubhṣ read here, as read originally in the Adbh. also.

The NLRK. has the following - (pp. 298, ibid):

"atha praśṭhānakam, ghaṭa (?) cērya” dinayikam, kaiśiki-vṛtti-bhulaṃ, bahutāla-layā”śrayaṃ, surāpāna-rājitaṃ, viṭopanāyakaṃ, dāsā” dinayakañca. yathā-śṛṅgāra-tilakam."

The presentation seems to go after Śāradātanaya or the tradition represented by Śā. But here ‘nāyiṇī’, a woman of low status, (such as dāsī, cēṭī, etc.) is mentioned and the element of two acts and two-saṃdhis is not read. The illustration is the same as read in the BP.

Vāgbhaṭa II. (pp. 18, ibid, Kā. śā. II) mentions ‘praśṭhāṇa’ as a geya variety along with dombikā, bhāṇa etc. This is read as -

“dombikā-bhāṇa-praśṭhāṇa-bhāṇikā-preraṇa-śīṅgaka-rāmākrīda-hallisaka-śṛṅgadita-rāsaka-gośṭḥi-prabhṛtīni geyāṇi.”

This is modelled on the Kā. Śā. of Hemacandra. Vāgbhaṭa II also defines praśṭhāṇa after H., who follows Abhinavagupta:

“gajā” dinām gatīṃ tulyāṃ
kṛtvā pravasanāṃ tathā,
alpa(ā)viddham su-maśṛṇāṃ
tat-praśṭhānāṃ pracakṣate.”

The Sāhityadarpāṇa (VI. 280, 281, S.D.) observes:

prasthāne nāyako dāso
hīnaḥ syād upanāyakah,
dāsi ca nāyikā, vṛttiḥ
kaiśiki bhārati tathā. - VI. 280 S.D.
surāpāna-samāyogād
uddiṣṭārthaṣya saṃḥṛtīḥ,
aṅkau dvau, laya-tālā”dir
vilāso bahulas tathā.” VI. 281. S.D.

Thus Viśvanātha holds that ‘praśṭhāṇa’ has ‘dāsa’ for its hero. The person subordinate to the hero is still less blessed - “hīn-uperāyaka”. Maid-servant is the heroine here. This was noted in the NLRK. The diction is both kaiśiki and bhārati.
The latter is added by Viśvanātha. The intended thing is accomplished by the practice of a drinking bout. 'Two acts', as noted by the BP., are also seen here. Marry-making is seen in excess in this variety which is chiefly musical in its nature, being qualified by tāla and laya.

Thus 'prasthana' seems to have two traditions. The first as seen in Abhinavagupta and also perhaps Bhoja where the theme is that of a travel by a love-lorn hero, with the descriptions of monsoon, spring etc. adding the element of poetry, and the other as seen in Śā. and others with two acts, hero and heroine of lower status, etc. But in both the traditions, this uparūpakā is described as having a lot of dance and music.

'Kāvyā' and Citra-kāvyā; rāgakāvyā;

We will take up Kāvyā, (Rāga) kāvyā and (citra) kāvyā together. We read them in Abh., DR./A., H., ND., Śā., NLRK., and S.D.

Abh. refers to this variety in the name of rāga-kāvyā on four occasions with a specific illustration. Before we look into this, it may be noted that this art-form is studied both with music and dance on one hand and also 'abhinaya' on the other. The 'abhinaya' part of it is invariably taken note of by Abhinavagupta. The references are:

- caturvargopadesasya rāghava-vijayā"dikarāga-kāvyesu dṛṣṭatvāt -

This suggests that the theme of rāgakāva, as illustrated in rāghava-vijaya, concerned itself with the four-fold pursuits (i.e. dharma, artha, kāma and mokṣa) of life.

(pp. 172, ibid) (ii) yadā yato'rthānāṃ prayojana"dīnāṃ prāpty artham tajñair anuvā"dibhiḥ (r-nṛtānurāgibhiḥ) kavibhiḥ abhinayaḥ ity abhiniyamāno rāgakāvyā"dīḥ kṛtaḥ.

This shows that rāgakāvyā had to be enacted through acting. (pp. 172, ibid) (iii) athocye (rāghava-vijayā"di) rāga-kāvyā"di-prayogo nātyam eva.

This is clearly taken as 'nātya' here. (pp. 181, ibid) (iv) ete prabandhāḥ nṛttā"tmakāḥ na nātyā"tmaka-nātakā"di-vilaksanāḥ. rāghava-vijaya-māricavadhā"dikāṃ rāga-kāvyam. etac ca grantha-vistāra-bhityā bahutaram yathāsaṃbhavaṃ na likhitam anupayogāc ca yat tu upayogi tad yathāvasaram varṇayisyaṃah.
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Rāghava-vijaya and Mārīca-vadha are mentioned as illustrations. Eventhough the rāgakāvya and other varieties of art-forms as enumerated by the Cirantanas are necessarily of the form of ‘nṛtta’, they are said not to be different (essentially) from nāṭaka etc., which are said to be ‘nāṭyā”tmaka’ i.e. acting-oriented art-forms. (pp. 182, ibid) (v) eṣa eva tu prakāraḥ kalāvidhinā nibadhyamāno rāghava-vijaya-mārīca-vadhā”dikam rāga-kāvyabhedaṁ udbhāvayati-itī.

That this art-form is rendered through artful expression is underlined here. Abhinavagupta here goes on to quote from Kohala, and elaborates further the nature of rāgakāvya, which though it involves acting, is primarily an art-form devoted to rāgas (i.e. vocal music) and also dance. Abhinavagupta observes -

(pp. 182, ibid) yathōktam Kohalena -

“layāntara-prayogena
rūgaiś cā’pi vivecitam,
nānārasam, sunirvāhya-kathām
kāvyam iti smṛtam -

Thus for Kohala ‘kāvya’ is presented through rāgas, wherein layāntara-prayoga is seen, i.e. the rhythm or time in music can change. It is full of different rasas and is having a story which is well presented su-nirvāhya-katham.

Abhinavagupta further informs that - “layataś ca asya gīty ādhāratvena aprādhānye, gīte eva prādhānyam iti na kāvyārtha-viparyāsa-vaśena rāga-bhāsa”di-viparyāso nātya iva.

Because of the ‘laya’ element, this art-form depends on ‘gīt’ i.e. song and music, which is the principal feature here. Again, as in nātya or drama proper, here on account of change in kāvyārtha (i.e. ‘rasa’ ? or, situation ?), there is no change in rāga and bhāsa i.e. music and language. The idea seems to be that as the range of this art-form is limited, it has no frequent changes following rasas or situations and therefore it is presented through the medium of one language and identical tunes. What follows in Abh. drives us to this. Read Abh. (pp. 182, ibid) :

tathā hi rāghavavijayasya hi ṭhakka-raģeṇa eva, vicitra-varṇaniyatvēpi nirvāh. - i.e. though the matter to be communicated is of varied interest (or is beautiful), the specific rāghavahāvya is presented through ‘ṭhakka’-rāga alone. Similarly, mārīca-vadhasya kakubha-grāma-raģeṇa eva. ata eva rāgakāvyāṇi iti ucyaṇte etāni.
Rāghavavijaya, or Mārīca-vadha or whatever else - is called ‘rāga-kāvya’ only because the presentation is carried out in this or that special rāga alone and therefore all other features such as acting (nātya) and description (kathā), though present, are rendered subordinate to the principal feature which is ‘song and music’ alone.

Abhinavagupta explains further that ‘rāga’ is that which has singing as its soul and this kāvyā as it depends on rāga, is therefore (rāga) kāvya. He observes : (pp. 182, ibid) - “rāgo gity ātmakaḥ. svarasya tad ādhārabhūtaṃ kāvyam iti.”

He further adds : “evam idam ca nṛttam sapta-kṛti-prakārāir bhagavata eva prasṛtam. tathā hi-śuddhaṃ eva nṛttam recakāṅghāra”tmakāṃ. (= śuddha form of nṛta is of the form of recaka and āngahāra) - tato gitakādy abhinayōnmukham. (= the next type is furnished with abhinaya that goes with gitaka-music dominating). - tato gāna-kriyāmātrānusāri vādyā-tālānusāri ca - (i.e. the next variety of ‘nṛta’ is one which follows only vocal music accompanied by beats of instruments). This is seen as in - “bāhu-prenkhanorah kampa-pārśva-namamōnamana-carana-saraṇa-sphurita-kampita-bhrūtāra-parispanda-karticchedāṅgavalana-mātra-rūpam.” yac coktam -

tāṇḍunā’pi tataḥ samyag-
gāna-bhāṇḍa-samanvingaḥ
nṛttā-prayogāḥ...” ityādi. (N.S. IV. 260)

Then Abhinavagupta adds - gitir gānam iti hy atra vyutpattir uktā. tatōpy uddhatasukumāra-miśrā”tmaka-bheda-catuṣṭaya-bhinna-kāvyārthānusāritaya caturvidham. - i.e. it becomes fourfold due to the type being either high-pitched (uddhata), or soft (sukamāra) or miśra (i.e. mixed, of two types in which either of the first two is in greater degree). etc.

The rāga-kāvya is an art-form dominated by song and music and dance and also acting to some extent. That the element of abhinaya is of course there, is underlined by Abhinavagupta when he observes (pp. 198, ibid) :

yat tu rāghava-vijaya”dau sītāmūrcchā”di-vyāvaranāntam tāṇḍavam. na ca tatra tādṛśe tat-sukumārāṅghāhāra”tmaka-nṛttā-yojana. api tu gitakārthā-bhāvanānyāyena, “raudrasyaiva ca yat karma sa karuṇa” iti prasaktyā tatra tathāvīdhābhinayayoga, ity alyām bahunā.

Dr. Raghavan (pp. 550) also explains the same as -

“The Abhinavabhārati gives a better and clearer idea of kāvya which it
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sometimes calls more descriptively Rāga-kāvyā. From the name we can see, that kāvyā or Rāga-kāvyā is a musical composition covering a complete story, i.e. a whole kāvyā in the shape of songs. It might have been something like a south-India Harikathā-Kālakṣepa where one definite theme is chosen for exposition, the songs of the theme are sung and an exposition in prose is given. Since the Rāga-kāvyā is said to be a nṛtya-prabandha it must have comprised the singing of songs of a continuous theme in one Rāga or in various rāgas (if citra-kāvyā), and the interpretation of the contents of songs by a single dancer through abhinaya. The following facts about the rāga-kāvyas are found in the Abhinavabhaṅgṛāti. On p. 174, there are two observations which prove that the whole musical theme of Rāga-kāvyā was rendered into gesture.

- “ityabhinīyamāno rāgakāvyā”dīḥ kṛtah.” (pp. 174)
- “rāghava-vijayā”di-rāga-kāvyā”di-prayogo nātyam eva, abhinaya-yogāt.” (p. 174)
- “rāghava-vijaya-maricavadhā”dikam rāga-kāvyam” (p. 183).

esa eva kalāvidhīnā nibadhymānāḥ rāghava-vijaya-marīcavadhā”dikam rāga-kāvyā-bhedam udbhāvayaūti (p. 183). yathōktam kholena - “layāntara-prayogeṇa rāgaiścā’pi vivecitam, nānārasam su-nir-vāhyakathām kāvyam iti smṛtām.” (p. 184)

From these observations it is plain that Kāvyā means just what the word means while applied to śravya-kāvyā, but is written not exactly in mere metres, vṛttas, but in the form of songs which are sung and gesticulated by a single individual. Abhinavagupta mentions the names of two specimens both on the theme of Rāmāyana, the Rāghavavijaya and the Marīcavadhā. Both of these belong to the class of Kāvyā sung throughout in one Rāga, the first variety of Bhoja. For Abhinavagupta says that, though the rasas and situations differ, the tune and the time-measure do not change in a rāga-kāvyā, as in drama proper. The Rāghavavijaya is throughout sung only in ṭhakka-rāga and the Marīcavadhā in the grāma-rāga called kakubha.


The Kāvyā described by Kohala in the verse given above as quoted by Abhinavagupta is Bhoja’s citrakāvyā, for it has more than one rāga and tāla.
Though sung and represented through Abhinaya by only one, though the theme is descriptive as in a śravyakāva and not written in form of dramatic dialogue, the citra-kāvya employs various rāgas and Tālas at different places to suit the varying Rasa and idea. The Gīta-govinda is thus a citra-kāvya uparūpakā. It is well known that it was intended for Abhinaya and that Jayadeva’s wife herself rendered it in Abhinaya. In south India it is even now being sung and till recently rendered in Abhinaya in the bhajana tradition of the Bhāgavatas. In the Tanjore Sarasvati Mahal Library there are two copies, unfortunately incomplete, of a commentary on the Gīta-govinda giving Abhinaya for the text, word for word."

Dr. Raghavan here explains how Kohala’s concept of Kāvya (or Rāga-kāvya) was picked up by Bhoja, whose view we will now examine.

Bhoja mentions ‘Kāvya’ as having another variety called citra-kāvya. He defines each in an āryā, which read as -

Śr. Pra. (Vol. II. Josyer, pp. 466):

"āksiptikā’tha varṇo mātrā
dhruvakōtha bhagnatālaś ca.
vardhatikāccha-dhvanikā
yatra syus tad iha kāvyaṃ iti."
"yuktam layāntarair yac ca
dhvanikā-śhāna-nirmitaih bhavati,
kāvyaṃ iti vividha-rāgam
citram iti tad ucyaite kṛṭibhiḥ."

This description is full of “obscure musical terms relating to Rāga”, observes Dr. Raghavan (pp. 549, ibid). The musical composition and tāla referred to are equally obscure.

Dr. Raghavan here reads two varieties as mentioned by Bhoja. The first is pure ‘kāvya’, which is in one rāga, and the other is ‘citra’ kāvya, full of many - (vividha) rāgas.

DR./Avaloka under DR. I. 8 mentions ‘Kāvya’ as one of the seven types of varieties of nṛtya. But nothing further is discussed by Dhanika.

Hemacandra has the following (Kā. Śā. VIII. (70), pp. 449, ibid-Edn. Parikh and Kulkarni) :
“layāntara-prayogena
rāgaīścā'pi viciritam,
nānā-rasaṁ sunirvāhyakatham
kāvyam iti smṛtam.”

This is according to Kohala as quoted by Abhinavagupta. The only difference is that H. reads “viciritam” for “vivecitaṃ” in the Abh. (pp. 182, ibid). But perhaps as at many other places, so also here, Hemacandra seems to present a better, and even original reading. ‘Viciritam’ here means “rendered beautiful”. So, ‘Kāvyā’ is said to have different and many ‘layas’ and ‘rāgas’ and is also ‘nānā-rasaṁ’ i.e. having different rasas (in various situations); and is having a story element which is presented easily or gracefully. Perhaps Bhoja also means this. We do not feel like Dr. Raghavan that Bhoja intends two separate varieties such as kāvyā and citra-kāvyā. On the contrary, perhaps when more than one rāgas or laya are introduced, it becomes more charming or ‘citra’, according to Bhoja. Dr.Raghavan’s own submission that Gīt-govinda is an illustration of citra-kāvyā shows that ‘kāvyā’ which carries more rāgas and layas becomes more charming and is therefore ‘citra’. Actually, in sūtra 4, Adhyāya VIII (pp. 445) when H. mentions varieties of ‘geya’, he calls it ‘rāga-kāvyā’. Read : geyaṁ dombikā-bhāṇa-prasthāna-śingaka-bhāṇikā-
prerana-rāmākrida-hallīsaka-rāsaka-goshti-śīri-gadita-rāga-kāvyā”di. These are twelve in all. When H. defines them one by one he, as seen above, calls it “Kāvyam”. This means rāga-kāvyā and kāvyā are one and the same for H. and both are ‘viciritā’, i.e., rendered beautiful by ‘layāntara-prayoga’ and ‘rāgaiḥ’. Thus citra-kāvyā need not be taken as a different variety as done by Dr. Raghavan. Even Abhinavagupta while quoting from Kohala does not seem to intend it to be a separate variety.

The ND. has the following:

“āksiptikā’tha varṇo
mātrā-dhruvako’py abhagnatālaś ca
paddhatikā chardanikā yatra syus
tad iha kāvyam iti.” (N.D. IV. 11; pp. 408)

This is the first verse from Bhoja’s definition. Dr. Raghavan (ft. n. 1, pp. 54a) observes that, “The Nātyadarpāṇa, p. 215, which gives only the first of these two (= of the verses from Bhoja), reads ‘a-bhagha-rālaśca’ which is wrong, and ‘paddhatikā’, ‘chardanikā’ which seem to be correct. The text of the Bhā. Pra. (p. 265) however, reads the words mostly as found in the MS. of the Śr. Pra.”
Actually in Śā., (pp. 388) under false title ‘rāsaka’, Bhoja’s definition of Kāvya is read. There we read, “ākṣiptikāpavarno” and not “ākṣiptikā’tha varṇo”, which is also retained in the ND. Then, we have “kāvyam vicitrarāgam” in place of Bhoja’s “vividha-rāgam”. We do not find any logic in Dr. Raghavan’s rejecting ‘abhagnatāla’ of the ND. and accepting ‘paddhatikā’ and ‘chardanikā’. Actually the writers from Gujarat in those days had a better access to the original mss., thanks to the efforts of king Jaisimhadeva who conquered Malwa and thanks to Ācārya Hemacandra for whom the king either collected mss. not only from Bhoja’s library but also from different parts of India or got them copied. Dr. Kulkarni V.M., my guru has successfully reconstructed the lost portion of A.bh. on NS. VII, the Bhāvādhyāya, and many readings from H.’s Viveka have been accepted in the critical editions of the A.bh. on NS. VI. (The rasa-sūtra portion) by eminent editors such as Gnoli, Masson & Patwardhan and the rest. So, readings from authors from the land of Gujarat seem to be more reliable. In that case, accepting two readings as correct and rejecting the third for no reason is not logical on the part of Dr. Raghavan. On the contrary we would accept the ND. readings and correct the text as read both in Bhoja’s Śr. Pra. and the B.P. of Śā. Even in the SD. we can emend the text as “khaṇḍamātrā-dvipadikā - ‘bhagnatālaiḥ alaṃkṛtāṃ.”

Śāradātanaya defines kāvya (BP. IX. 28, pp. 384, Edn. Agrawal, ibid) as :

“kāvyam sa-hāsyā-śrṅgāraṃ
sarva-vṛtti-samanvitam,
sa-bhagnatāla-dvipadi
khaṇḍa-mātrā-pariśkṛtam.
garbhāvamarśa-sandhibhāyāṃ
hīnāṃ, ekāṅkam eva ca.
kvacil lāsyayutam vā syāt
viṣa-ceṭi-samanvitam.
kulāṅganāveśa-yutam
lalitōdātta-nāyakaṃ
evam prakalpayet kāvyam
tad gauda-vijayo yathā.”

Before we explain this, it is clear from the face of it that ‘kāvya’ is, no doubt, ‘nātya’, as stated by Abhinavagupta, though with song and music as
predominant. This does not agree with Dr. Raghavan’s observation of taking 
Gītā-govinda as ‘kāvya’ or ‘rāga-kāvya’, for it is not having ‘one act’, and 
‘garbhāvamarśa-sandhibyām hinam’ i.e. not having garbha and avamarśa 
sandhis. Again it is having a number of characters and even this also goes 
against Dr. Raghavan’s description of kāvya being presented only by one person, 
such as the wife of Kavi Jayadeva.

So, for Śāradātanaya, Kāvya is endowed with hāsa and śṛṅgāra rasas and is 
gifted with all the vṛtti (such as kaiśkī, ārabhaṭī, etc.) This art-form is rich in 
bhagna-tāla, dvipadī and khanḍamātrā. These terms are not clear to us but we 
know that Bhāmaḥa (I 24) had mentioned ‘abhineyārtha’ such as nāṭaka, dvipadī 
and śamyā. Tatacārya in his commentary does not explain (pp. 11) this term 
vipadī. For Śāradātanaya this ‘kāvya’ is a one-act presentation and it has 
mukha, pratimukha and nirvahaṇa sandhis. It has viṭa, ceti, kulāṅganā nāyikā, 
and nāyaka of the ‘lalitōdātta’ variety. Śāradātanaya further adds: (BP. IX. 29 
-p. 385, ibid).

“viprāṃtya-vanik-putra-
nāyikā-nāyakōjjivalam
mudita-pramadā-bhāṣā-
caṣṭitair antarā’ntarā.
grathitam, viṭa-cetā”di-
veṣa-bhāṣābhīr eva va,
evaṃ vā kalpayet kāvyam
yathā sugrīva-kelanam.”

A second form of Kāvya is described with “sugrīva-kelanā” as an illustration, the 
first form being illustrated by “gauḍa-vijaya”.

This variety of Kāvya has in it characters such as a brahmin-vipra, a vanik 
putra, is beautified by nāyikā and nāyaka (in form of a brahmin or a vanik-putra). 
This form is interwoven in the middle at places by women who are joyous, and their 
language (expressing joy), and the joyous activities of such ladies. It is again gifted 
with the costumes and language of viṭa, ceta and such other characters. The 
illustration is “sugrīvakelanā”. This variety has traits of the prakarana type. Though 
Śāradātanaya does not mention the number of acts or sandhis, we can imagine 
that they remain the same as in the first variety.
One thing is clear that it is a form of dramatic spectacle with beauty of song, music and costumes added to it.

True, Śāradātanaya also quotes from Bhoja (pp. 388, BP.). But perhaps Dr. Rāghavan is again off the track when he says that Śāradātanaya quotes it under ‘wrong leading of rāsaka’. (pp. 550) Actually even in Agrawal’s edition also this portion is printed under the title “rāsaka”. But we feel that these verses, which start with Bhoja’s definition of prasthāna and move on to describe other varieties of uparūpakas, follow actually the completion of the definition of rāsaka. ... “so’yaṁ mato rāsakaḥ.” - Perhaps in the ms. of BP. some copyist must have added the title “rāsakam” after this, through mistake. Actually verses or portions; 37-46 as read on pp. 388, 389 of BP. are given as definitions of various art-forms and after these are over, other art-forms such as Ullopyaka etc. are described. So, perhaps they are wrongly read here through a scribe’s mistake. There is no logic in reading Bhoja’s definitions in between. Or, perhaps the scribe concerned must be copying Bhoja’s Śr. Pra. also simultaneously and through genuine error he copied this portion from Bhoja or Abhinavagupta as the case may be. This portion is totally out of context and need not be taken as one intended by Śāradātanaya and also from his pen. Actually these verses, excepting the two for kāvyya, are all from the Abhinavabhāratī (pp. 181, Vol. II. N.S. G.O.S.), describing the view of the ‘cirantanas’. **Surely these verses are mis-read here and misplacèd here and the editors of the BP. should have seen to this. These could have been either dropped as scribal mistake or read at the end of BP.’s treatment of uparūpakas.**

The NLRK. has the following (pp. 299, ibid) :


Though the NLRK. has not talked about the various characters, it is clear from the illustration cited, viz. utkāṅhita-mādhavam, that the hero is of the lalitodātta type.

The S.D. (VI. 284) defines ‘Kāvyya’ as -

“kāvyāṁ ārabhatihīnam
ekāṅkam hāsya-sāmkulam,
khaṇḍa-mātra-dvipadikā-
bhagnatālair alaṁkṛtam.”
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He carries impressions of his predecessors. We have here three वृत्तिः, the अरब्धति being omitted. Like NLRK., only one act is expected by SD. SD.'s definition is in a way closer to the NLRK.

The SD. (VI. 285) adds,

"वर्ण-मात्रा-चागानिकायुतां,
श्रव्गारा भाषितां, नेताः, stri
कायुदात्रा,
सन्धिः अयातू तत्त्वांतिमाः."

Obviously 'chagaṇikā' can be emended as 'Vardhanikā' (N.D.), The hero and heroine both belong to the noble family as suggested in the BP. of Śā. Sandhis are three with garbhā and vimarṣa cancelled as suggested by BP. and NLRK. One act is retained as in NLRK.

Bhāṇa, Bhāṇaka, Bhāṇi, Bhāṇikā -

All these four art-forms are discussed by various authorities as seen below, but quite often the difference is either thin, or in name only. Because of this closeness in both features and nomenclature, we take up all these four art-forms together for discussion.

'Bhāṇa' is mentioned by Abh., DR/A., Bhoja, H., ND.; Vāg. II.

Bhāṇaka - is mentioned by A.bh. alone.

Bhāṇi is read in DR./A., Śā., NLRK.;


Bhāṇa - The Abh. (pp. 181, N.S. Vol. I. G.O.S., N.S. IV/268) quotes the definition of Bhāṇa from the Girantanas - , with the words - "तद उक्तं चिरांतानाः". It reads as -

"न्रसिम्हा-सुकरांदिनामं
वर्णनांम जलपये यतात
nartaki, tena bhāṇaḥ syād
uddhatānta-pradarśitaḥ."

on pp. 181 (ibid) the A.bh. reads -

bhaṇakesu nṛṣimhā"di-carita-varṇanam uddhatam eva.

This suggests that for both 'bhāṇa' and 'bhāṇaka', the Abh. has the same illustration and similar description. We may therefore conclude that
for Abhinavagupta these two art-forms, viz. bhāṇaka and bhāṇa are one and the same. Perhaps bhāṇikā also comes closer, as the theme seems identical, in the A.bh.

The bhāṇa, as quoted from ‘cirantanas’ - the ancients, and read in the Abh. (pp. 181, ibid) has the following features -

Nartakī, a female dancer narrates - ‘jalpayet’, in a style which is forceful - ‘uddhatāṅga-pravartita’, the description of nṛsimha, sūkara etc. The idea is that the nartakī presents through dance with forceful karaṇas the narration of nṛsimha, sūkara, etc. Dr. Raghavan here thinks that there is description of wild animals and so the theme is in the nature of parables and fables, anyāpadeśa, arthāntaranyāsa, and dṛṣṭānta, inculcating advice to man through description of the acts of wild animals; something like a bit of the Pañcatantra cast in a semi-dramatic form. Actually Abh. says (pp. 172, ibid NS. Vol. II) - “simha-sūkara-bhallūka-kāsara”divarṇanena’pri bhāṇa-prerana-bhāniṅka”dāv-aprastuta-prasamsārthāntaranyāsa-dṛṣṭāntā”dīnā puruṣārthasyaiva upadeśā-darśanāt.”

This means that through the descriptions of animals such as lion, boar, bear, buffalo, etc., in art-forms such as bhāṇa, prerana, bhāṇikā, etc. and - through the device of figures of speech such as aprastuta-praśamsā, arthāntaranyāsa, dṛṣṭānta etc., only the basic pursuits of life (= puruṣārtha; dharma, artha, etc.) are promulgated.

But the other explanation which Dr. Raghavan talks of (pp. 554, ibid) is more acceptable. It is possible that the A.bh. here refers to the avatāras of Viṣṇu such as Nṛsimha, Sūkara, etc. This way, the art-form becomes both didactic and also devotional in keeping with what we will find in Bhoja and the rest.

Abhinavagupta also says (pp. 181, ibid) - “bhāṇakesu nṛsimhā”di-caritavarananaṃ uddhatam eva.” This precedes (pp. 187) the list, with definitions, of the art-forms as given by the ancients, one of which is “bhāṇah” -

It seems, perhaps Abhinavagupta does not distinguish basically between bhāṇa and bhāṇaka and even bhāṇikā. These art-forms differ slightly only from the point of view of the technique of presentation of the theme which involves either the faster or rougher or forceful aspect of dance (= tāṇḍava) in a greater or smaller degree as compared to the graceful, slower and gentler aspect (= lāsya) of dance used as the medium. The theme, perhaps is common to all these three, being of the nature of didactic or devotional story.
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The Abh. further notes (pp. 181, NS. Vol. II G.O.S.) “yat-punar masṛṇépy uddhatam praviṣāti, tat taducitam eva. tatopy alpatva - bahutva-kṛto bhedaḥ. pūrvah prasthānabandhaḥ. uttaraḥ śidgakabhedaḥ. uddhate tu masṛṇānupraveśād bhāṇikā-bhedaḥ anyad api prerana-rāmākrīda-rāsaka-hallisakā”dikam alpatva-bahutva-vavidhyakṛtam ihaiva praviṣṭam veditavyam.” We know that H. has quoted this in his Viveka.

These were all dance-forms with forceful or graceful styles, with an element of drama and a lot of song and music (both vocal and instrumental). They were taken as upa-rūpakas, or semi-dramatic forms.

Abhinavagupta (pp. 181, ibid) talks about bhāṇikā as an art-form which is -
“bālakrīḍā-niyuddhā”di
tathā sūkara-simhāja,
dhvajā”dinā kṛtā krīḍā
yatra sā bhāṇikā matā.”

Bhāṇikā contains the sports of children and also the fights of youngsters and sports of lions, pigs etc. Here also ‘sūkara’ and ‘simha’ are mentioned perhaps referring to the exploits of viṣṇu in the avatāras of nṛ-simha and sūkara. “dhvajā”dinā kṛtā” is not clear to us. Perhaps a game with flags is meant. All this of course is in dance. The art-form is termed ‘bhāṇikā’, as against ‘bhāṇa’ and both are separately treated by the ancients (= cirantanas) and also perhaps by Abhinavagupta. It is not clear whether what Bhoja intends as difference between bhāṇa and bhāṇikā is also intended by both the ancients and Abhinavagupta alike.

DR./A. on I. 8 simply mentions both bhāṇa and bhāṇi. It reads as (pp. 8, ibid) :

“dombī śrīgaditam bhāṇo
bhāṇi-prasthāna-rāsakāḥ,
kāvyam ca sapta nṛtyasya
bhedaḥ syus té pi bhāṇavat.”

Thus these art-forms are closer to the bhāṇa-which is a major rūpaka (bhāṇavat). Beyond this nothing is noted in the Avaloka.
Bhoja has the following on bhāṇa and bhāṇikā - (pp. 466, 467, śr. Pra. Vol. 1, ibid) -

“hari-hara-bhānu-bhavāni-
skanda-pramathādhīpa-stuti-nibandhah,
uddhata-karana-prāyas
-stri-varjo varṇanāyuktaḥ.”

Then Bhoja further elaborates -

“dhavala-guṇa-kīrtanaparair
gāthā"rambhā"di-stuti-nibandhah,
gāyana-sahokti-yuktaḥ
dattena vibhūṣīta-prāyaḥ.
tri-catuh-paṅca-vitālaiḥ
viśrāmaiḥ saptabhiḥ paricchinnaḥ,
ardhod-grāha-nivāraṇa-saṃkhātaīḥ
kutracin niyataḥ.
sama-viśrāmaiv dvipathair
vibhūṣītaḥ paṅcame viparivarte
gāthāmātrād vipathaka
pāṭhyenālaṁkṛto bhavati,
varaṇātha matta-pāli
sabhagnatālā tv anantaram gāthā.
anubhagna-tāla-mātre
prathame syād-bhadra-tālaś ca
mātra nu ca mārgaṇikā
mātra'tha tatónubhagnatālāḥ ca.
gāthā-dvipada-vahanto
viśrāme syād dvitiye tu
mātra viśama-cchinnā
sa-bhagnatālā'tha bhavati radhvā ca.
mārgaṇikety evaṇ syāt
tālavidhānāṃ tṛṭiye tu,
mātrā-dvipatha-vahanto-
radhvāvasthāpanam caturtthe syuḥ."
radhvātha-bhagnatālo
mārgaṇikā dvipatha-viṣamaśca,
paṇcamake saṣṭhe'py atha
radhvā nu ca bhagnatālah syāt.
dvipathaka-mārgaṇike ca
syātāṃ atha saptame śrṇutha,
radhvā’tha bhagnatālaś śudbodhe
bhāne kramah pradiśṭōyam.

This is Śuddha-bhāṇa, for Bhoja. Then follow saṃkīrṇa and citra varieties.
saṃkīrṇa-bhāṇa-bhaṇitiḥ kāryā
syād ubhaya-saṃyogāt,
kiṃcid anuddhata-bhāvāt
tāla-krama-varjanāc ca, citróyam.
iti śuddhas saṃkīrṇaḥ
citraś ca matas tridhā bhāṇaḥ,
yadi veṣa-śuddha-vācaḥ
śuddhaḥ, saṃkīrṇayā’tha saṃkīrṇaḥ.
sarvābhāṣ bhāṣābhīṣ'
citraś ca vīceṣṭitaiś citraḥ,
ayam uddhatōtha.
lalito bhāṇo, lalitōddhataś ca saṃbhavati.
arthānāmauddhatyāl
lālityād ubhayabhāvāc ca,
yad duṣkaram abhineyāṃ
citraṃ cāty udbhataṃ ca yad bhavati.
tad-bhāṇakēbhidheyaṃ
yutam anutaḷair vitālaś ca,
sōtraivaṃtar bhāvyo
yo bhāṇo nandīmāli-nāmā syāt.
bhinnaha' kaiścit kathito
bharatamataṁ samyag a-viditvā,
ākāśa-puruṣam uddīśya
vastu yat paṛhyate 'thavā kriyate.
viśīṣṭodbhaṭa-bhāva-prayogam
iḥa nandī-mālī saḥ,
prāyo haricaritam idaṁ
svīkṛta-gāthā"di-varṇa-mātraśca.
sukumārataḥ prayogād
bhāṇopi hi bhāṇikā bhavati, (This is important)
dīvyābhīṣcārībhir varjītā
lalita-karana-samyuktā.
tālāntarāla-nṛttā
kvacid api radhvādi-saṁkalitā,
ardhod grāha-nivāraṇa-gāyana-
saha-vacana-matta-pālībhīḥ.
viśrāmaś ca vihinā
strī-yojyā varjitaśa tālaiḥ,
vastūni bhāṇikāya
nava dasa vā niyamato vidhiyante.
nava-mādya-paṅcamesu
sthaṇesu ca bhagnatālaḥ syāt,
sthānāntaresu cāsyāṁ
laya-tāla-vidhir yadṛcchayā kriyate.

The description is very long and contains certain terms that are not clear to us.
Śā, reproduces the whole passage at BP. IX. 14-23 (pp. 380, 381). We will compare
the readings which are better at places in Śā. But after that (on pp. 381, BP. IX. 23
Cont.) i.e. after the line "viśīṣṭodbhaṭa-bhāva-prayogam iha nandimālī saḥ" - we
have some more verses read in Śā., who once again after 40 lines in which the three
types of Bhāṇa are discussed in greater details, once again picks up the thread from
Bhoja and continues with 'bhāṇikā' (on pp. BP. IX. 382).
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This covers up Bhoja's description of Bhāṇikā with some difference in readings at places that we will notice in due course, and Śā. proceeds to read beyond Bhoja's line viz:

"vividhavaco-vinyāsais sabhyajanōtsāha-sampattih" - and adds six more lines. We will have to take a comparative approach and decide whether these added lines by Śā. actually seem to be originally from Bhoja or not and therefore whether these lines should be added in Bhoja's Śr. Pra., while attempting a critical edition. For the sake of convenience we will discuss Bhoja and Śā. together.

The first verse viz. "Hari hara.... varanāyuktaḥ" reads identically in Bhoja and Śā. It means that the Bhāṇa is made up of 'stuti' i.e. praise or laudation of Hari, Hara, Sūrya, Bhavāṇi, Kārtikeya and Pramathādhipa i.e. Lord of Pramathas i.e. Śiva. We do not know what difference between 'Hara' and 'pramathādhipa' is intended. Mostly it is having "uddhathakaranaś", i.e. forceful style of dancing and is without female characters (i.e. stri-varjaḥ) and is narrative in nature i.e. 'varanāyuktaḥ'. It is full of praises in form of gāthās, lauding the merits or good qualities of kings and is having 'uktis' i.e. speeches accompanied by songs - gāyana-sahokti - and is connected with lofty qualities (yuktodatta). In Bhoja we have "dhavala-guṇa-kirtana parair gāthā"rambhā”dibhis stuti-nibandhaḥ." Śā. reads : "guṇa-kirtana-prakāśana-gāthābhir" which seems to be the paraphrase of Bhoja's expression. As guṇas, in kavisamaya are said to be 'dhavala' or white, Śā. seems to have omitted this expression and for Bhoja's 'kirtana-paraiḥ', Śā. has 'guṇa-kirtana-prakāśana' as an adjective of 'gāthās'. One thing is clear that these praises were composed in gāthās, perhaps because they, by nature, tend to be more musical. For Bhoja's expression viz. "gāyana-sahokti-yuktodattenā", Śā. offers a better reading as, "gāyana-sahokti-yuktodattena", suggesting that the context of these gāthās present a lofty idea and expression. Śā. here seems to read better, and Bhoja's text in our opinion could be emended.

Next two lines read identically in both Bhoja and Śā. The meaning is that Bhāṇa, at places (= kutracit) is vested with three, four, or five vitālas, seven viśrāmas and "arthaḍgrāhaṇa-saṃkhyā." Dr. Raghavan observes (pp. 551, ibid) : "The description is full of details pertaining to Tāla which seems to vary at every step. Seven sections are mentioned - viśrāmaiḥ saptabhiḥ paricchinnah (Śā. has "sāchinnah") - and Tāla details are given for each of these seven parts. No rāga-detail is however given though the gāthā is often mentioned as the type of song employed. There is no doubt on the point that it is completely musical but the man who sings the song of the theme seems to add to the songs some speech also. For
Bhoja says gāyana-sahókti-yukta. That this type has dance also is plain from the words “uddhata-karaṇa-prāya”. The dance is generally ‘tāṇḍava’ i.e. having karaṇas and aṅgahāras which are forceful.”

The next verse viz. “sama-viśrāmair dvipathair...” etc. is read in BP, with a little difference. For “viśrāmair dvipathair”, Śā. has “viśramair vividhaiḥ” - ‘Vividhaiḥ’ seems to be better as in the third foot of the stanza in both Bhoja and Śā. We have, “gāthāmātrā-dvipathaka-pāṭhyenālamkṛto lalitah.” Thus if ‘dvipathaka’ is read in the third foot of the stanza., it is better to read ‘vividhair’ in the second. The idea is that ‘lalita’ or graceful bhāna is decorated by ‘identical (sama), viśrāmas’ of many types (= vividhaiḥ), in the fifth ‘parivartana’. It is also beautified by ‘gāthā’, ‘mātrā’ and ‘dvipathaka-pāṭhya’. We had noted that there are seven viśrāmas’ i.e. seven sections in a bhāna. Details concerning these are now given by Bhoja and Śā. Bhoja has ‘sabhagnatālā tvanantaram gāthā.’ But Śā. has “sabhagnatālāvanantaram” (lau+ana.); meaning with two bhagnatālas followed by gāthā. The meaning in Bhoja seems to be that in the first viśrāma (i.e. section), we have varṇa, matta-pāḷi, with bhagnatāla, (bhagnatāla is an adjective of matta-pāḷi) followed by gāthā, then (anu)-bhagna-tāla and mātra, and also a bhagnatāla.

In the second section, (dvitiye viśrāme), it has gāthā, dvipathaka (Bhoja has “dvipada), and vasantaka used. Śā. reads : “gāthā-dvipatha-vasantā viśrāme syur dvitiye tu.” But Bhoja reads, “gāthā-dvipada-vahanto” (for, vasantāḥ of Śā.). Śā. reads better. Again for Bhoja’s “mātrā-viṣama-cchinnā sa-bhagnatālātha bhavati radhvā ca” we may observe that the end of this line is not clear. But Śā has, “mātrā-viṣama-cchinnā sa-bhagnatālā bhaved vṛddhyā.” The idea seems to be that in the second section (dvitiye viśrāme), there is use of gāthā, dvipathaka, and vasantaka. Through ‘vṛddhi’ i.e. extention or addition, from viṣama mātrā, ‘vicchinnā sa-bhagna-tāla’ is derived. We do not know much about this but ‘vṛddhiyā’ seems to make sense in place of Bhoja’s ‘radhvā’.

Then Bhoja reads - “mārganiḥketa evaṃ syāt tāla-vidhānam tṛṭiye tu.” Śā. reads - “māgdhikā sādhyā syāt tāla-vidhāne tṛṭiye tu.” Bhoja means - “In the third section there is this mārganiḥkā, as formation of tāla.” BP. seems to suggest that in the third composition of tāla, ‘māgdhikā’ is to be achieved. What this ‘māgdhikā’ (= a musical effect popular in Magadh ?) is, we do not know.

The next half of the verse reads differently in both Bhoja and Śā. Bhoja has : “mātrā-dvipathaka-vahanto radhvāsthāpanam caturthe syuḥ.” BP. has “rathyā dvipatha-vasantaka-rathyā-tālās caturthe syuḥ.” The meaning here is clear and it is
that in the fourth section the bhāṇa has rathyā, dvipatha, vasantaka and rathyātāla. The difference between rathyā and rathyātāla is not clear to us. But Bhoja's line is absolutely un-intelligible.

Where Bhoja reads 'radhvā' Śā. in BP. reads 'rathyā', a variety of tāla, which seems to be more sensible. Thus for Bhoja's 'radhvāthā bhagnatālo' Śā. has rathyātha bhagnatālo. So, in the fifth section we have tālas such as rathyā, bhagnatāla, mārganikā, dvipatha and viśama according to Śā. Bhoja has the same with 'radhva' in place of rathyā. For Bhoja's "mārganikā-dvipatha-viśamaś ca", Śā. has, "viśamaś ca". The plural is correct. The next line in Bhoja reads : "pañcamake śaṣṭhēpy artha radhvā nu ca bhagnatālah syāt." This is faulty. Śā. has - "pañcamakē- pyatha śaṣṭhe, rathyā-navabhagnatālah syuh." i.e. "rathyā and nine bhagnatālas." This makes better sense. In the seventh section there are dvipathaka and mārganikā tālas. In Bhoja we read “saptame śrṇutha” for Śā.'s, “saptame ca viśrāme" - The meaning does not differ, in the end. The next line says that “thus in śuddha bhāṇa the sequence of rathyā and bhagnatāla is indicated.” For ‘kramaḥ pradiṣṭōyam’ of Bhoja, which is correct; the BP. text is “krama-pradiṣṭo”, which seems to be only a printing mistake.

The next verse speaks of a mixed-saṅkara-type and also a ‘citra’ type of Bhāna but the readings in Bhoja and Śā. are not identical though they drive at an identical result. Bhoja reads :

“saṅkīṛṇa-bhāṇa-bhanitih kāryā
syād, ubhaya-saṃyogat.
kiṃcid anuddhata-bhāvāt
tāla-krama-varjanāc ca, citro'yaṃ.”

Śā. (in BP. IX. 21, pp. 380) reads as -

“saṅkīṛṇa-bhanitih-bharitaḥ
saṅkara-nāma'yaṃ ubhaya-saṃyogat,
kiṃcid anuddhata-bhāvāt
tāla-krama-varjitaś citro'yaṃ.”

Śā. names the ‘saṅkīṛṇa’ as ‘saṅkara’. Bhoja does not name it but means the same. Both have ‘citra’ as third variety. This means that in Bhāna, involving complex expression (saṅkīṛṇa-bhaniti), and due to a mixture of both, we arrive at ‘saṅkara’ or mixed type. Again, when bereft of forceful (uddhata) bhāva and when tāla-krama is absent, we have the ‘citra’ variety.
The next two verses observe, both in Bhoja and Šāradātanaya that bhāna thus is three-fold viz. śuddha, saṅkīrṇa and citra. When it is having a ‘śuddha’ bhāṣā (meaning perhaps one language) it is śuddha, when it is saṅkīrṇa or mixed, there is mixture of two languages and it is ‘citra’ when it abounds in many languages and also multiple activities (viceṣṭitaiḥ citraih). Further, it is noted by both Bhoja and Šā. that Bhāna is again three-fold such as uddhata (= forceful), lalita (= graceful) and lalitōddhata (= a mixture of both forceful and graceful) due to varieties of artha, i.e. theme; - “arthānāṁ auddhatyāllālītyād ubhaya-bhāvāc ca.” This expression is identical in both i.e. Śr. Pra. and BP.

Thus we arrive at a threefold division of bhāna both from the point of view of language i.e. linguistic expression, and also from the point of view of content or theme i.e. artha.

Dr. Raghavan’s remark does not fall in line with the above explanation which clearly follows the text and which is preferred by us. Dr. Raghavan (pp. 552, ibid) observes : “From the point of view of this dance, it has three varieties, uddhata, lalita and lalitōddhata.” He quotes “ayam uddhato... arthā(nā)m auddhatyāt....” But ‘artha’ should mean here ‘theme’. Of course, three-fold classification is possible from the angle of ‘viceṣṭita’ which means “dance performance” which could be forceful (tāṇḍava or uddhata), graceful i.e. lāśya or lalita and mixed. But this is a third angle. We again do not know, whether Bhoja, as is his practice elsewhere, also admits of further sub-varieties of the mutual permutation and combination of these three-fold each factors of language (bhāṣa), theme (artha) and viceṣṭita (nṛtya-dance). This also is possible. Of course Dr Raghavan does take note of the language factor also, and further observes (pp. 552, ibid) : “From the nature of the language employed, the bhāna is distinguished into śuddha, saṅkīrṇa and citra, written respectively in one language, in two, and more then two.”

DR. Raghavan quotes a verse from Bhoja viz.

“yadi vaiṣa śuddha-vācā
śuddhaḥ, saṅkīrṇayā saṅkīrṇaḥ,
sarvābhīr bhāṣābhīḥ
citraś ca viceṣṭitaiḥ.”

He quotes this to support his above observation that bhāna is three-fold due to three types of usage of languages. But he misses out “citraś ca viceṣṭitaiḥ”, which means from the point of ‘viceṣṭita’ or acting through dance also bhāna
becomes three-fold. This could mean that we can have a variety of śuddha viceṣṭita in either tāndava alone or lāsya alone, and a mixed viceṣṭita of both tāndava and lalita, i.e. lāsya.

DR. Raghavan further observes, and we agree with this, that the saṅkīrṇa and citra varieties seem to be distinguished on other grounds also, such as actions involved - citraiś ca viceṣṭitaiḥ. This we have noted above. But we have equated ‘viceṣṭita’ with the style of performance i.e. the variety of dance through which the bhāna is presented.

Bhoja reads further :

“yad duśkaram abhineyam,
citrama, cātyudbhataṃ ca yad bhavati
tad-bhānakebhidheyam
yutam anutālair vitālaś ca.”

Śā. also reads the same excepting that in the first line also, he (i.e. BP) has “abhidheyam”, as in the third line. We feel “abhidheya” (= theme) should be preferred at both the places. The idea is that, when the abhidheya i.e. theme to be presented is difficult, it makes for ‘citra’ variety. When the abhidheya (= theme) is forceful (i.e. udbhata) in a ‘bhānaka’, it is accompanied by anutala and vitala. It may be noted that the term used here is “bhānaka” for “bhāna”. Earlier we had noted that these words look like synonyms and our observation is borne out to be true. Here, Dr. Raghavan observes, (pp. 552, ibid) - “Bhoja says that in Bhāna, things very difficult for Abhinaya and intricate rhythms also must be introduced.”

Then an interesting verse is read slightly differently, but with identical effect in Bhoja and Śā. Bhoja reads -

“sōtraivāntarbhāvyah
yo bhāno mandi-māli-nāmā syāt.
bhinnaḥ kaiścit kathito
bharata-matam samyag a-viditvā.”

and Śā. reads,

“tasyāntarbhāvo yo bhāṇēsa
nandimāli-nāmā syāt,
bhinnaḥ kaiścit kathito
bharata-matam samyag a-viditvā.”
Dr. Raghavan (pp. 553, ibid) observes: "There is a variety of Bhāṇa called Nandi-mālī, which Bhoja says, some writers consider as a separate upa-rūpaka. Bhoja says that it has to be included under this Bhāṇa. The Nandimālī is chiefly characterised by a feature borrowed from bhāṇa of the Daśa-rūpaka class viz. Ākāśa-bhāṣita. Does this Nandimālī then suggest a stage of transition of the Daśarūpaka-bhāṇa into an upa-rūpaka bhāṇa?"

Dr. Raghavan then quotes two verses from Bhoja, the first of which viz. "sōtraivāntarbhāvyah...” etc. is quoted above. The second verse is read by Bhoja as,

“ākāśa-puruṣam uddhiṣya
vastu yat paṭhyate’thavā kriyate,
viśīṣṭōdbhātā-bhāva-prayogam
iha nandimāli saḥ.”

Śā. reads the second half as -

“viśīṣṭōdbhāvyā-bhāva-prayogavān nandimāli saḥ.”

Dr. Raghavan further observes (pp. 553, ibid) - “Bharata here referred to as misunderstood by other writers who gave a distinct type called Nandimālī does not mean Sage Bharata but any later writer on the art of Bharata, for Bharata speaks neither of uparūpakas nor of a Nandimālī.”

It seems Dr. Raghavan is at times carried away and makes sweeping statements. Who the hell here says that by 'bharata' in the expression 'bharata-mata' is meant the 'sage bharata', the author of the available N.S. ? Actually it means "Bharata's tradition”. There is no doubt and there can not be any doubt about this either in any humble follower of Indian Aesthetics. Again, there were a number of nāṭya-sāstras, and perhaps different version of even our NS. of Bharata. So, such bold statements indicate misadventure. We have edited the N.S. (G.O.S.) afresh, with 'N' ms., not available so far. Dr. Krishnamoorthy edited the first Volume in the G.O.S. series and Dr. Kulkarni and Dr. Nandi worked on the Vol. II, III & IV (with Vol. II through the press to-day i.e. 27-4-02 and Vol. III also through the press (Aug. 04), and Vol. IV now in the press, (27-3-04). with ms. 'N', being in centre. Now this ms. N. has only 33 chapters as against 36 or 37 of printed editions available. A number of extra verses are also noted. So, it will not be a surprise if in future a fresh ms. of the N.S. is found out and it contains the upa-rūpaka portion also. Actually without naming, the NS. does treat of nāṭikā and also hints at prakaraṇī. In short no sweeping statements should be entertained.
Classification of Poetry

The second verse is read in Bhoja as - (pp. 467, Edn. ibid)

“ākāśa-puruṣam uddiśya
vastu yat paṭhyate’thavā kriyate,
viśiṣṭodbhāta bhāva-prayogam
ihā nandimāli saḥ.”

Śā. reads (BP. pp. 380, ibid):

ākāśapurūṣam uddiśya
vastu yat paṭhyate’thavā kriyate,
viśiṣṭodbhāavya-bhāva-prayogavān
nandimāli saḥ.”

Both have the form ‘nandimāli’, meaning the original word is “nandimālin”.

The fourth line is read as “viśiṣṭodbhāta-bhāva-prayogam” in Bhoja, and “viśiṣṭodbhāvyā-bhāva-prayogavān” in Śā. Śā. means that nandimālin is furnished with presentation of bhāvas that are imagined specially (for this presentation). Bhoja means “having the prayoga or presentation of bhāvas that are “specially correlated and forceful; viśiṣṭa is taken by us as ‘višeṣeṇā sliṣṭa’ “mixed in a special way.” The special feature of this variety is that here the theme or action is presented addressing it to ākāśa-puruṣa or a character which is not actually present on the stage but is imagined to be present.

Dr. Raghavan again makes a bold surmise when he tries to suggest that this variety could be a link between bhāna, the major type and an upa-rūpaka bhāna. We again call this a bold statement not founded on logic. For nowhere in the history of Indian art it is observed that there was a “stage of transition” from rūpakas to upa-rūpakas. Actually the major and minor types could have co-existed of yore in India and the minor types could have represented regional popular folk art-forms. Both were actually accepted and equally respected.

Now Bhoja speaks of Bhāṇikā (pp. 467, ibid):

prāyo hari-caritam idaṁ
svikṛta-gāthā”di-varṇa-mātraś ca,
sukumārataḥ prayogad
bhāṇopi hi bhāṇikā bhavati
divyābhiś cāribhir vivarjītā
lalita-karaṇa-saṃyuktā
tālāntarāla-nteṭṭā
kvacid api radhya (thyā ?) di samkalitā
ardhodgrāha-nivāraṇa-
gāyana-saha-vacana-mattapālibhiḥ,
viśrāmaiś ca vihīnā
strī-yojyā varjitaś tālaiḥ.
vastūni bhāṇikāyā
nava daśa vā niyamato vidhiyante
navamādyā-paṇcamesu sthānesu
cā bhagnatālaḥ syāt.
sthānāntaresu cāsyāṃ
laya-tāla-vidhir yadṛcchayā kriyate.
vividha-vaco-vinyāsaiḥ
sabhya-janótsāha-sampattih. (pp. 468, ibid)

Dr. Raghavan’s reading (pp. 552, ibid) is not satisfactory. It reads as – “prāyo haricaritayutānviktā (yutaḥ strikṛta) gāthā”di varna-mātrās ca, sukumārataḥ prayogād bhāṇōpi bhāṇikā bhavati.” Thus, bhāṇikā contains mostly Hari’s behaviour (or narration), and it contains gāthās and varṇamātrās recited by a female character. The performance is graceful. With this basic difference bhāṇa itself is bhāṇikā. Again in bhāṇikā, the movements called divyā-cāris are not performed. These are movements involving jump and swaying of limbs above ground. Lalīla-karaṇas, i.e. graceful movements are executed in bhāṇikā. Female characters are seen in bhāṇikā. The women sing the gāthā, etc. i.e. the libretto. Nine or ten vastus or feet or parts are marked in bhāṇikā. Those who sing also speak or narrate - (gāyana-saha-vacana). Through a variety of expressions, the energy or determination, or firmness of cultured men is increased in this art-form. Thus both bhāṇa and bhāṇikā have a lot of speech element. They differ from bhāṇa-the major type of rūpaka, as they contain more of dance, song and music and less of drama and abhinaya.

Hemacandra has the following for bhāṇa, and bhāṇikā. He seems to accept Abhinavabhārati’s cirantanas with reference to the concepts of bhāṇa and bhāṇikā.
Classification of Poetry

H. observes: (pp. 446, ibid) -

“nṛśimha-sūkarā”dināṃ
varnamāṃ jalpayed yatah,
nartakī tena bhaṅgha śyād
uddhatāṅga-pravartitaḥ.”

Thus the contents are the narration of nṛśimha and sūkara, the avatāras of Viṣṇu, accomplished by a female dancer with forceful movements of the limbs. We know that H. calls all these “geyāṇi rūpakāṇi cirantarair uktāṇi.” He carefully distinguishes between “pāthyasya geyasya rūpakasya” difference. We will discuss this in detail at the end of all uparūpakas or geya-rūpakas in view of what H. observes in the Viveka (pp. 446, 447, etc. ibid).

Bhānikā, read after A.bh. in H. is:

bāla-kiṃdā-niyuddhā”di
thānā sūkara-simhajā
dhavala’dikṛtā kiṃdā,
yatra sā bhānikā matā.

In the Abh. we have “dhvajā”dinā kṛtā kiṃdā”. We do not understand the reading in Abh., nor this one in H. As suggested earlier, perhaps the performance carried banners or flags. The rest is as observed earlier under Abh.

The ND. has the following: Bhāna is threefold -

“hari-hara-bhānu-bhavānī-
skanda-pramathā”dhipa-stuti-nibaddhaḥ
uddhata-karaṇaprayāh
strī-varjo varṇanā-yuktāḥ.
yadi caiva suddhavācā
suddhah, saṅkīrnatayā ca saṅkīrṇah,
sarvābhīr bhāṣābhiś citraś ca
viçeṣṭaiś citraḥ.
ayam uddhato lalito bhāṇo
lalitőddhataś ca sambhavati,
arthānām uddharyāl-
lālirād ubhaya-sattvāc ca.
yad duṣkaram abhīneyaṁ
citraṃ cātyudbhātām ca sambhavati,
tad bhānakebhīneyaṁ
yutam anutālaṁ vitālaś ca.

It may be noted that the ND. has accepted some lines from Bhoja and has left out some portion. In both, the Śr. Pra. and the ND., we read terms such as ‘bhāna’ and ‘bhānaka’ as synonyms. The ND. has followed Bhoja while the Kā. Śā of H. has chosen to follow the A.bh. In the N.D. we have stuti-nibaddhaḥ for ‘nibandhah’ in Bhoja. The N.D. has a better or original reading as compared to the printed Śr. Pra. edn. of Josyer. Again, ‘caiva’ in N.D. is better that Josyer’s edn., which gives “yadi veṣa-śuddha-vācaḥ śuddhah.” - We can emend to advantage, the text of Bhoja’s Śr. Pra. with the text as preserved either in H. or the N.D.

N.D. also quotes from Bhoja and observes that Bhāna becomes bhānī, when -

“prāyo hari-carita-yutah
strīkṛṭa-gāthā”di-varṇa-mātras ca.
sukumāraṁ pravogād
bhāṇopī hi bhānikā bhavet.”

In bhānī the performance is graceful, the narration is mostly of Hari’s exploits, and a female character is the narrator using gāthās and varṇa-mātrās. Bhoja is the inspiration behind ND.

Vāgbhaṭa II describes bhānikā after H. and the A.bh. It reads as -

“bāla-krīḍā-niyuddhā”di
tathā śūkara-simhajā,
dhavalā”di-krā [krīḍā]
yatra sā bhānīkā matā.”

We have supplied [krīḍā] from H. and A.bh. Here also, following H., we read ‘dhavalā”di-krā’ in place of ‘dhvajā”dina krā’. For, us, Both are equally not very clear.

For Bhāna, Vāgbhaṭa has,

“nṛsīmha-sūkarā”dinaṁ
varnanam jalpayeḥ yataḥ,
nartākī tena bhānaḥ syād
uddhatāṇga-pravartitaḥ.”
Classification of Poetry

This follows H. and A.bh. - Thus Vāgbhaṭa also has both bhāṇa and bhāṇikā.

Śāradātanaya once again quotes elaborately from Bhoja and he also has both bhāṇa and bhāṇikā. He uses the term bhāṇaka also for bhāṇa as is seen elsewhere in Bhoja. Bhāṇa is described (pp. 379, 380, 381, 382 and 383) very elaborately. He has something more than Bhoja. The source is unknown to us. Or, in his times, these art-forms must have collected additional features as read in BP. Bhāṇa for Śā. is -

"hari-hara-bhānu-bhavānī-
skanda-pramathādhīpa-stutī-nībaddhah"

('nībaddhah' follows ND. This is a clearer reading and Bhoja’s text should be emended to this effect).

Śā. proceeds -

guṇa-kirtana-prakāśana-
gāthābhir bhūbhṛtām stutinibandhah.

Bhoja had - dhavala-guṇa-kirtana-parair gāthā”rambhā”dibhis stutinibandhah.

In place of ‘gāthā”rambhā”dibhiḥ’, Śā. has ‘gāthābhir bhūbhṛtām’. Here ‘gāthābhiḥ’ is of course better than ‘gāthā”rambhā”dibhiḥ’. But ‘bhūbhṛtām’ is a fresh feature. By the time of Śā., this art-form must have cultivated this additional feature also. Along with the praises of hari, hara, etc. the eulogies of kings also must have crept in.

Again, BP. observes -

“gāyana-sahókti-yuktō-
dāttena vibhuṣitatprāyāḥ.

“yuktōdāttena” is better as compared to yukto dattena’ in Bhoja. The Śr. Pra. text could be emended to advantage. Then, BP. reads,

“tri-catura-pañca-vitālaiḥ
viśrāmaiḥ saptabhiḥ paricchinnaḥ
arhdōd-grāha-nivāraṇa-
saṃkhyaṭaiḥ kutracin niyataḥ.”

Bhoja has ‘paricchinnaḥ’, which seems better. This means that Bhāṇa is covered up by three, four or five vitālas, seven viśrāmas and arhdōdgrāha-nivāraṇa-saṃkhya. We do not know what “ardho...” is.
Then, we have in BP, -

sama-viśrāmair-vividhair
vibhūṣitaḥ pañcame viparivarte,

(Bhoja has - 'dvipathair', and 'viparivarte'; obviously wrong.)

"gāthāmātrā-dvipathaka-pāṭhyenālaṃkṛto lalitah."

i.e. In the fifth 'viparivarta', it is beautified by a variety of sama-viśrāmas. Again, the lalita bhāṇa is decorated by gāthā, mātrā, and 'dvi-pathaka-pāṭhya'. For Śā., this is the description of 'lalita' i.e. graceful variety of bhāṇa. In Bhoja we read "bhavati" for 'lalitah'.

Now, like Bhoja, Śā. also describes the seven parts giving tāla-details in each one of them. This portion reads as follows:

'verṇōtha matta-pāli
sabhagnatālav anantaram gāthā

(Bhoja has - 'sa-bhagnatāla tvanantaram'. This is not a happy reading. Śā. has 'sa-bhagnatālaun anantaram gāthā', which reads better and should be accepted in Śr. Pra. also.) -

abhughnatāla-mātre
prathame syād bhagnatālaś ca.

(Bhoja reads "bhadratālaś ca" which should be corrected as 'bhagnatālaś ca."

This means in the first part, after varṇa, mattapālli, and bhagnatāla, we have the use of a-bhughnatāla, mātrā and bhagnatāla.

In the second part,

'gāthā-dvipatha-vasantā
viśrāme syur dvitiye tu
mātrā-viṣama-cchinnā
sa-bhagnatālā bhaved vṛddhā."

Bhoja has 'vahanto', which should be emended as 'vasantā'. Then, for 'syād' it should read "syur dvitiye", as in BP. In the fourth line Bhoja has, 'sa-bhagnatālā'tha bhavati radhvā ca'. This should be read as in BP. viz. "sa-bhagnatālā bhaved vṛddhyā." This means that in the second part, there is use of gāthā, dvipathaka and vasantaka. Through vṛddhi, there has to be sa-bhagna-tāla, which is cut (cchinnā) by viṣama-mātrā.
Classification of Poetry

In the third part, according to Śā., we have -

\[
\text{‘māgadhikā sādıhyā syāt}
\]
\[
\text{tāla-vitāne tr̥̥tiye tu’}
\]

i.e. māgadhikā has to be achieved in the third part. In Bhoja we read, “mārgaṇikety evaṁ syāt tālavidhānam trutīye tu. BP. reads “māgadhikā” for Bhoja’s ‘mārgaṇikā.’ Later in BP. in the fifth part, we read ‘mārgaṇikā.’ So, perhaps ‘māgadhikā’ of BP. should be read as “mārgaṇikā” of Bhoja. This observation means that in the third part māgadhikā (or mārgaṇikā ?) has to be sought. In the fourth part, the BP. has -

\[
\text{“rathyā dvipatha-vasantaka-}
\]
\[
\text{rathyātālās’ caturthe syuh.”}
\]

i.e. In the fourth part, there are rathyā, dvipatha, vasantaka and rathyā-tāla. Bhoja reads as -

\[
\text{“mātrā-dvipatha-vahanto}
\]
\[
\text{radhvā-sthāpanaṁ caturthe tu.”}
\]

In BP. we have ‘rathyā’ at two places. The first ‘rathyā’ should be corrected as ‘mātrā’, as read in Bhoja. Then Bhoja’s ‘vahanto’ has to be read as ‘vasantaka’ as in BP. So also ‘radhvā’ in Bhoja should read as ‘rathyā’ in Śā. Thus, the fourth part should have mātrā, dvipatha, vasantaka and rathyā-tāla. The next two verses (pp. 380, vs. 19, 20, ibid). read in BP. as -

\[
\text{“rathyā’tha bhagnatālo}
\]
\[
\text{mārgaṇikā dvipatha-viṣamaś ca.}
\]
\[
\text{paṇcamakēpy atha śaṣṭhe}
\]
\[
\text{rathyā-navabhagna-tālāḥ syuh. (vs. 19)}
\]
\[
\text{dvipatha-mārgaṇike ca}
\]
\[
\text{syatām atha ca viṣrāme,}
\]
\[
\text{rathyā’tha bhagnatālaḥ}
\]
\[
\text{śuddhe bhāne krama-praviṣṭóyam.” (vs. 20)}
\]

This means that according to Śā., in the fifth part, rathyā, bhagnatāla, mārgaṇikā, dvipatha and viṣama tāla are seen. In the sixth part, there are rathyā and nava-bhagna-tāla. Bhoja’s text is currupt and it has to be emended in the
light of BP., which offers sensible reading. In the seventh part, there are dvipathaka and mārgaṇikā tālas. Thus, in śuddha-bhāṇa the krama of rathyā and bhagnatāla is indicated.

It is very clear that Bhoja’s text has to be emended in view of the BP. at all these places.

After describing the śuddha-variety of Bhāṇa, the BP. proceeds to cover the saṃkīrṇa variety of Bhāṇa as is done by Bhoja. Here also we will see if Śā. reads better at places then Bhoja.

BP. (pp. 380, vs. 21 ibid) reads -

“saṃkīrṇa-bhanīti-bharītah
saṃkaranāmāyam ubhayasamyoγāt,
kīcīcān-anuddharabhāvah
ṭāḷakrama-varjitaś ca citro’yaṁ.”

With speech-expressions of mixed type, this variety is called ‘saṃkara’ by name. It is the result of a mixture of two (types of expressions). When associated with some gentle expressions (also) to an extent, and is bereft of sequence of tāla, it is beautiful. (= citra) (or is called ‘citra’- bhāṇa.)

Thus following Bhoja Śā. also has three types of bhāṇa. The BP. observes :

‘iti śuddhaḥ saṃkīrṇas’
citra’yaṁ iti tridhā bhaved bhāṇah.
yadi vaiśa śuddha-bhāsah,
saṃkīrṇo’tho saṃkīrṇah :
sarvābhir bhāsābhīs’
citraś ca viceṣṭitai’ citraḥ, syāt.
ayam uddhato’tho lalito bhāṇo
lalitōddhataś ca bhinnah syāt.
arthaṇām uddhatyā-llālityād ubhaya-bhāvāc ca.

Thus, bhāṇa is three-fold viz. śuddha, saṃkīrṇa and citra. If it is gifted with śuddhā bhāṣa (= a single language), it is śuddha.

If it is having saṃkīrṇa or mixed languages, it is saṃkīrṇa and if it is having all the languages it is called ‘citra’. The actions are also of all sorts in ‘citra’. This bhāṇa is thus (also) three-fold, viz. uddhaṭa, lalita and lalitōddhata.
Classification of Poetry

That in which the artha, i.e. meaning (or theme) is forceful is uddhata, if the artha is gentle or lalita, it is lalita type, and if it is both (i.e. if the artha/theme) is both forceful and gentle, it is of the lalitoddhata variety.

Śā. further observes, (pp. 380, para 23, ibid) -
yad duṣkarābhidheyam
citraṁ cāty udbhataṁ ca bhavati,
tad-bhāṇakebhidheyam
yutam anutālāi vitālaiś ca.

That is ‘citra’ where the meaning [or ‘abhinaya’ (Śr. Pra) = matter to be presented] is difficult, it is called ‘citra’ (type). In the udbhata (= forceful) type, the abhidheya (= meaning, or matter) is associated with anutāla and vitāla. This variety which is included in bhāṇa is termed ‘nandi-mālin’ by name. This is said to be a separate variety by some who do not know clearly the tradition of Bharata.

That is called nandi-māli, wherein something is addressed to, or is performed with reference to ākāṣapuruṣa (i.e. a character not actually present on the stage but is imagined to be present). This variety is having presentation of such feelings which are presented through special effort.

All this follows Bhoja. In both Śā. and Bhoja, we see the use of the terms “bhāṇa” and also “bhāṇaka”.

Śā. once again repeats in anusṭubh verses the details which Bhoja has given earlier for Bhāṇa.

He says -
uddhata-prāya-karanaḥ
kvacit-stri-varja-varṇanaḥ,

This (i.e. bhāṇa) has mostly forceful karaṇas i.e. movements. At times it is bereft of the description of a woman. Then it is glued with praises of kings through gāthās.

gāthā”di-rāja-stutibhiḥ
nibaddho guṇa-kirtanaḥiḥ.

and it is beautified by good songs, sahōktis and yuktōdātta -
“su-gāyana-sahōktyaiva
yuktōdattena bhūsitah.”
This (i.e. bhāna) is mostly associated by praises of Brahman, Rudra, Indra, Skanda etc. It is having five or three or four vitālas. It is having seven viśrāmas or parts. In between the number (saṃkhyā) of ardhōdgrāha is also ascertained.

(ardhōdgrāha)di-saṃkhyānair
niyataś ca kvacit kvacit).

In the fifth part, it is decorated by sama-viśrāmas. At times it is adorned by gāthā, mātrā and dvipathaka-pāṭhya.

In the first part, we find varna or mattapāli, gāthā in bhagnatāla, and also abhugnatāla or mātrā, and also there is bhaghatāla.

In the second part, there are gāthā, dvipathaka, and vasantaka. (Bhoja reads ‘vahanto’, for ‘vasanto’.) In the third part, there are mātrā which is viṣama-cchinnā, bhaghatāla, rathyā and māgadhī. (Bhoja reads ‘radhvā’ as noted above). In the fourth part, there are rathyā, dvipathaka, and vasantaka tāla with rathyā in due order. In the fifth, rathyā, bhaghatāla, marganikā and viṣama-dvipatha. In the sixth, rathyātāla, and navatāla, followed by bhaghatāla, dvipathaka, followed by bhaghatāla, dvipathaka, and mārganikā are presented. In the seventh part there are rathyā and bhaghatāla. This is the sequence shown by experts of nātya in śuddha-bhāṇa -

“evam kramaḥ śuddha-bhāṇe
nātya-vidbhir udāhṛtaḥ.”

In the 24th para, on pp. 382, BP. (Edn. G.O.S.) again discusses the varieties of Bhāṇa in anuṣṭubh verses. The matter is already once discussed. We do not find any logic in this repetition as well as the same seen above concerning seven parts. Perhaps someone, for personal understanding must have written these verses in anuṣṭubh which seem to have crept in the original text through scribal mixtake. The details covered are as below : - “That which is imagined through śuddha bhāṣa is called śuddha-bhāṇa, ‘miśra’ is one with mixed languages (bhāsa-saṃkara). Bhāṇa is called ‘citra’ if it is adorned by all languages. Śuddha-bhāṇa is that which is - ‘ukta-tāla-kramā”sliṣṭa’ i.e. associated with sequence of said tālas. Saṅkiraṇa is one born of the saṅkara-mixture-of two or three tālas. That which is bereft of the order of said tālas is called ‘citra’. That in which the theme is forceful, is said to be uddhata. Where artha or theme is graceful, we have lalita bhāṇa. Where we have both force and gentleness of theme, it is ‘lalitōdhdhata’ type. Where the narration (abhidheya/abhineya) is difficult and forceful, it is called ‘citra’. This abhidheya in bhāṇa is associated with anutāla and vitāla.
Classification of Poetry

In para 25, pp. 383, BP (ibid), Śā observes that the (extra =) ‘atideśya’ part, i.e. the sandhi, anka, etc. are not described here in case of the bhāṇa, the rūpaka-viśeṣa which is described here:

“yad-rūpaka-viśeṣasya
bhāṇasyóktam sva-lakṣaṇam,
atideśyam ihā’nuktam
ānka-saṁdhyādi kalpanam.”

Śā. also says that the one which is called nandi-mālī is also included in this. Nandimālī is said to be so by experts wherein in dialogue (or recitation), song and action, there is context of an imagined character (= ākāśa-puruṣa) and wherein special emotion is presented through special effort.

“bhāṇo yo nandi-mālī ākhyāḥ
sóntarbhūto’tra lakṣyate.
pāthye-gīte-kriyāyām yad
uddisy ākāśa-pūrusam,
viśiṣṭōdbhāvyabhāvā”tmā
prayogo yatra drśyate,
bhāṇaḥ sa nandimalīti
nāmnā kavibhir ucyate.”

With this the treatment of Bhāṇa, or Bhāṇaka is over in Śā. But Śā also discusses, after Bhoja, the variety called Bhānikā, along with this.

Śā. almost identically describes bhānikā following Bhoja with minor changes in readings. Thus BP. has, ‘rathyādi-saṅkalitā’ for ‘rādvādi.’ of Bhoja. For Bhoja’s, “...gāyana-saha-vacana-matta-pālibhiḥ.” Śā. reads, “gāyana-vasanta...” For ‘varjitottālaiḥ’ of Śā. Bhoja has “varjitaś tālaiḥ”.

The last two verses in Śā. read as:

“navamādi-paṅcameṣu
sthāneṣu ca bhagnatālaḥ syāt.
sthānāntaresu tasyā layakā(ta)lo
yadṛcchayā kriyate.
vividha-vaco-vinyāsaiḥ
sabhya-janotsāha-sampattīḥ.”
These lines do not differ much from Bhoja but the next six lines are not at all read in Bhoja. They are -

lasyāṅga-sandhi-niyamo
bhāṇavad evātra bhāṅkāyāṃ syāt.

i.e. In bhāṅkā also, as in bhāṇa, there are laṣyāṅgas and sandhis. Śā. observes further that in bhāṅkā, the principal rasa is śrṅgāra, and heroine is covered up in beautiful dress. Without garbha and avamarśa, the three sandhis viz. mukha, pratimukha and nirvāhana are seen in bhāṅkā. Its theme is short (svalpa-vṛttta). The characters are viṭa, and pītha-marda along with vidūṣaka. There are ten laṣyas in it. (i.e. laṣyāṅgas). It is graced by pāncāli-ṛiti. The illustration is ‘Viṇāvati’. The verses read as -

"atha bhāṇy angi-śrṅgārā
ślakṣṇa-naipathya-nāyikā
garbhāvamarśa-hīnā ca
mukhā’di-traya-bhūṣitā.
svalpa-vṛttta-prabandhā ca
pītha-marda-viṭānvitā
vidūṣaka-sahitā
daśa-lāṣyā-samanvitā
bhaved viṇāvati yathā.” (pp. 384, ibid)

The NLRK. has both bhāṅkā and bhāṇi.

Bhāṇi is briefly described (pp. 302, ibid), which seems, to be the shortest summary of Śā.’s bhāṅkā. The illustration is also identical. The NLRK reads as - atha bhāṇi. ekāṅkā, viṭa-vidūṣaka-piṭhamarda-śobhitā śrṅgāra-rasā, svalpa-citra-kāvyā, daśa-lāṣyāṅga-śobhitā. yathā viṇāvati.

Bhāṅkā in NLRK. again shares some features of bhāṇa-bhāṅkā as seen in Bhoja and Śā. But we fail to understand why bhāṅkā and bhāṇi are mentioned as separate varieties. Normally, bhāṇa and bhāṅkā are mentioned separately but bhāṇi and bhāṅkā are not. NLRK. describes bhāṅkā as (pp. 300, ibid) :

atha bhāṅkā. udātta-nāyikā, sukṣma-nepathya-bhūṣitā (we have ślakṣṇa in Bhoja/Śā.), ekāṅkā. kaiśiki-bhārati-vṛtti-pradhānā, manda-puruṣā ca. yathā kāmadattā.

Then seven aṅgas of bhāṅkā are described such as - asyāḥ saptāṅgāni-vinyāsāḥ, upanyāsāḥ, virodhaḥ, anuvṛttiḥ, sādhvasaṃ, samarpanaṃ, saṃhārasaṃ ceti.
vinyāsa is explained as ‘nirvedavākyam’, as in “grha-vātiṅkā” upanyāsa is, “prasangatāḥ kāryanivedanam” as in the same work viz. gruha-vātiṅkā.

virodha is “bhrānti-nivṛttiḥ”. The illustration is from ‘anutāpaṅka’. (This is from Act. VI Abhi. Śā. which it termed ‘anutāpa-āṅka’ here).

‘anuvṛtti’ is “nidarśanopanyāsah”. - Again illustrated from Abhi. Śā. ‘sādhvam’ is ‘adbhutasya sādhvasena bhūtōdāharanām.’ Illustration is drawn from Abhi. Śā. Here an awe-inspiring or impossible event is described as happened, through bhaya or fear.

‘samarpana’ is upālambha i.e. taunt or censure through distress, as in (Nāgānanda II) candanalatā-grha.

‘samhāra’ is wellknown. It means ‘summing up’ or ‘covering up’ or ‘completion’ (= samāpana).

Views of Vāgbhaṭa II have been recorded along with H.’s as he follows H. strictly.

S.D. of Viśvanātha has enumerated 18 uparūpikas, the bhāṅkā being the last one. It is explained as -

“bhāṅkā-ślaksṇa-nepathyā
mukha-nirvahanāntikā
kaisikī-bhārati-vṛtti yuktā
ekāṅka-vinirmitā.
udātta-nāyikāmanda-puruṣa-pātrā aṅga-saptakam,
upanyāsōtha vinyāso
vibodhaḥ sādhvam rathaḥ,
samarpanaṁ nivṛttiś ca
samhāra iti saptamaḥ.

Viśvanātha seems to have been inspired by Bhoja, Śā. and also NLRK. Sādhvasa is explained by him as ‘mithyā’khyānam”. Viśvanātha at the end of this observes: “etesāṁ sarvesāṁ nātaka-prakṛtikatve’pi yathauṣṭyam yathālabham nātakokta-viśeṣa-parigrahaḥ. yatra ca nātakoktasa api punar upādānaṁ tatra tat-sadbhāvasya niyamaḥ.” - i.e. All these uparūpikas are basically of the nature of nātaka. But, as required, the aṅgas or parts of nātaka should be included in these. So, wherever in the definitions these features (aṅgas) of nātaka are repeated, they should be taken as un-avoidable features of the same.”
Goṣṭhī is the next art-form in Bhoja. It is described by H., ND., Śā., NLRK., Vāgbhaṭa II & S.D. It may be noted that any earlier mention of goṣṭhī prior to Bhoja is not seen among available documents. So, we have to start with Bhoja, who observes:

(Śr. Pra. pp. 468, ibid) -

goṣṭhe yat tu viharataḥ
ceṣṭitam iha kaitabha-dviṣaḥ kiṃcit,
riṣṭāsura-pramathana-prabhṛti
 tad icchanti goṣṭhīti.

This is a single āryā describing goṣṭhī. As Dr. Raghavan observes, this definition seems to be inspired by the word ‘goṣṭha’ meaning a hamlet of cowherds. It is described as representation of the sports of young Kṛṣṇa in the Gokula of Nanda. It presents the killing of demons or asuras by Kṛṣṇa.

Śāradātana has the following on ‘goṣṭhī. (B.P. pp. 375, ibid).

“athotpādyakathakānkā-
goṣṭhi śṛṅgāra-mantharaḥ,
rūpa-saundarya-lāvan’yopeṭa-
śaṭ-paṇca-nāyikā.
prākṛtair navabhīḥ pumābhīḥ,
daśabhīr vāpy alanīkṛtā,
garbhadvamarśa-sandhibhyāṁ
śūnyā, nōdāttā-vāk-kṛtā,
atra syāt kaiśiki vṛttih
mṛdvī nānyarasāśrayā.
na kunjara-ghaṭā”ghāta-
pātraṁ bhavati kandali;
gopi-pater-viharato
goṣṭhābālasya ceṣṭitam,
yatru, yamalārjunā”di-
dānava-nidhana-kṛtam
tat tu goṣṭhī syāt.
Classification of Poetry

The last verse - "gopi-pater... syāt" seems o reproduce Bhoja’s idea of goṣṭhī. In this, the exploits of child krishna are narrated. The killing of demons such as yamalarjuna etc. is described.

But, Śā. has something else also. We do not know the source of this thought-current. Śā. holds that in goṣṭhī there is imaginary story or theme. Śṛṅgāra is of low class. There are five to six heroines who are beautiful and graceful. They are adorned by rustic males who are nine or ten in number. This is bereft of garbha and vimarśa junctures. No lofty words are used. The soft kaiśikī vṛtti predominates here. It is not having other rāsas (except low type of śṛṅgāra). The banana tree cannot bear the dashing by a group of cemphants. This description of goṣṭhī as a one-act imaginative piece, with love theme, with five or six beautiful heroines and nine or ten male characters of low status, is a sort of gathering justifying its name, and it abounds in vulgar talks. As suggested above, we cannot trace the origin of this thought current from any available earlier source.

Hemicandra accepts Bhoja’s description of goṣṭhī. We have seen that normally H. chooses to follow Abh., but when he deals with a variety not read in the A.bh., he accepts only Bhoja’s authority. We discussed Śā. prior to H. & ND., because his was a special case where Bhoja’s tradition, as well as an unknown tradition were both accepted.

The ND. also accepts Bhoja’s tradition and describes goṣṭhī identically. Same is the case with Vāgbhaṭa II. Thus, the jain acāryas from Gujarát accept the lead of Bhoja in this respect.

The NLRK. as seen above quite often, follows Śā. in part. There is no following of Bhoja also as seen in the BP. The NLRK. (pp. 287, ibid) reads :

atha goṣṭhī. ekāṅkā, kaiśikī-vṛtti-yuktā, garbhāvamarśa-saṃdhī-śūnyā ca.
yathā-satyabhāmā.

The NLRK. gives an illustration. Thus ‘goṣṭhī’ was a living tradition till the times of NLRK.

The S.D. of Viśvanātha has - (SD. VI. 274, 275).

“prākrītair navabhīḥ pumābhīr
daśabhīr vāpyalamkṛtā,
nōdāttavacanā goṣṭhī
kaiśikī-vṛtti-sālinī.
hīnā garbha-vimarśābhyāṁ
paṅca-śad-yoṣid anvitā
kāma-ṣṭhānā-saṁyuktā
syād ekāṅka-vinirmitā.”

This follows Śā. Viśvanātha does not seem to accept Bhoja’s tradition. Thus, in
case of goṣṭhī two traditions seem to run parallel, though perhaps the one
represented by Bhoja could be earlier.

Hallīsaka - This art-form is read in Vātsyāyana, A.bh., Bho.; H., N.D., Śā,
NLRK., Vāgbhaṭa II, and S.D. Viśvanātha reads the name as ‘Hallīśa’ for Hallīsaka.

The A.bh. (pp. 181, N.S. Vol. I. G.O.S., ibid) - has the following -

“maṇḍalena tu yannṛttam
hallīsakam iti smṛtam,
ekas tatra tu netā syād
gopastraṇāṁ yathā hariḥ.”

Thus, hallīsaka, acc. to A.bh., is a sort of dance - or rythmic bodily movements,
in circle, where there is one leader (of the group), like Hari of gopa-ladies. It seems
that there is one man in the middle, like Kṛṣṇa and a circle of girls come round him
dancing. The verse quoted in A.bh. is quoted by Bhoja also while he defines ‘hallīsā’,
as one of the six varieties of the Śabdālaṃkāra called Preksya in the śabdālaṃkāra
section. in the S.K.Ā. (pp. 309, N.S. Bombay ‘39) Hallīsaka is defined as -

“maṇḍalena tu yat strīṇāṁ
nṛtyam hallīsakam tu tat,
tatra netā bhaved eko
gopa-strīṇang harir yathā.”

This is from the A.bh. Dr. Raghavan (pp. 555, Śr. Pra. ibid) observes : “The
Hallīsaka and Rāṣa of the Sanskrit Nāṭya literature are almost identical with the
‘garba’ of Gujarat and the Kummi and Kudiccuppāṭu of Tamilnad and the
Kaiḵottikkali of Malabar. The only difference in the South Indian varieties seems to
be in the Tāla or rhythm kept by the palms as the dancers go around.”

Bhoja (Śr. Pra. pp. 468, ibid. Ch. XI) observes :

“yan maṇḍalena nṛttam
strīṇāṁ hallīsakam tu yat-prāhuḥ,
tatraiko netā syād
gopastraṇam iva murāriḥ.”
Classification of Poetry

This is like A.bh.’s description. It may be noted that the definitions in both the A.bh. and the Śr. Pra. make hallisaka, a mere dance, giving us no idea of the nature of literary composition involved in it. Probably some songs could be understood as meant here.

Śā., of course, has something special to observe. But H. and the ND. follow A.bh. verbatim.

Śā. (BP. IX. para 49, pp. 390, ibid) observes:

“atha hallīsakāṃ saptanavāṣṭādaśa-nāyikam,
sānudātōkti caikāṅkaṃ
kaiśīki-vṛtti-bhūṣitam.
ekāṅkaṃ vā bhaved dvyaṅkaṃ
vimarśa-mukha-saṁdhimat.
sa-geya-lāsyam yatimat
khaṇḍa-tāla-layānvitam
eka-vīrāma-sahitaṃ
yathā syāt pela-raivataṃ.”

First thing to be noted in Śā. is that he illustrates hallisaka by “keli-raivatam”. This means there was a living tradition in his days. For Śā., hallisaka is not a mere dance form, but is something more. In hallisaka there are seven, eight or nine heroines or female characters. It is characterised by an expression (ukti), which is not noble or lofty (= anudātta). There is a single act in it and the diction is kaiśīki. At times it may have even two acts and it has mukha and vimarśa sandhi. Now this is strange, for when you have vimarśa also, perhaps other samdhis also walk in naturally as nirvahana is a must for all and vimarśa has to be preceded by pratimukha and garbha junctures. Along with a song (= sa-geya), we have, in hallisaka, lāsya (i.e. graceful dance), yati, khaṇḍa-tāla, laya and one vīrāma (i.e. division). 'Keli-raivata' is an illustration cited.

Śā. has some further description also (para 50, Ch. IX. pp. 360, ibid):

lalitā daksīṇā khyātā
nāyakā pañca-sā api,
vipra-kṣatra-vanik-putrās
sacivā”yatta-siddhayāḥ."
dvyañke mukhāvamarśau stah,
   ekāñke, garbha-nirgamaḥ."

Thus, it has five to six nāyakas, i.e. heroes or male characters who are lalita (= graceful), daksīṇa (= courteous), and famous (= khyātāḥ). They are brahmīns, kṣatriyas or Vaiśya-putras, whose achievements depend on their advisers (i.e. sacivas). If (it has a second act, then) in that type there are mukha and avamarśa junctures. And in the variety having a single act, (even) garbha-saṃdhi is absent. This means it has only mukha and nirvahana, and prati-mukha, if at all.

Vāgbhaṭa II follows Bhoja, H. and the N.D., when he observes : (pp. 18, ibid) :
   "maṇḍalena tu yan nṛttam
   hallisakam iti smṛtam,
   eka-sūtram tu netā syād
   gopa-strīnām yathā hariḥ."

The NLRK. has - (pp. 299, ibid) :
   atha hallisakam-saptāśta-navayosid-bhūśitam, kaiśiki-vṛtti-prāyam, bahu-tāla-
   layā”tmakam, ekāṅkam, eka-puruṣa-pradhānaṃ anudāta-vacana-kṛtam. yathā
   keli raivatakam.

This is under the influence of Śā. But the NLRK. does not give the two-act -
variety also seen in Śā. Again, the NLRK. recommends one central hero as is the
tradition in Bhoja and A.Śh. Thus NLRK. has a mixed tradition. The illustration is
the same as read in Śā. but here we have ‘keli-raivatakam’, for ‘keli-raivatam’.

The S.D. has ‘hallīśa’ for ‘hallisaka’, read at S.D. VI. 307, and it has -
   "hallīśa eka evāṅkaḥ
   saptāśtau dāsa vā striyaḥ,
   vāgudāttaka-puruṣaḥ,
   kaiśiki vṛtti ujjvalā.
   mukhāntimau tathā sandhi,
   bahutāla-laya-sthitih.
   yathā-keli-raivatakam.

The S.D. is clear in that the hallīśa has just one act, seven-eight or ten female
characters. There is a single hero with noble expression in speech. The vṛtti is
kaiśiki. There are only two saṃdhis viz. mukha and nirvahana, termed as “antima”
i.e. ‘the last one’, here. There are many tālas, and layas (in the song) in hallīsaka.
Classification of Poetry

‘Nartanaka’ is read in Bhoja only but it has a wider scope and in parts it is touched by various authorities. **Bhoja** (pp. 468, Śr. Pra. ibid) defines it as -

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yasya padārthābhinaṇam
lalitalayaṃ saddāi nartakī kurute,
tan nartanakaṃ, śamyā
lāṣya-ecchālita-dvipadyādi-
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Dr. Raghavan (pp. 555, ibid) observes that this is dance like ‘nautch’. A danseuse sings and renders through gesture the contents of the songs. This nartanaka has varieties in śamyā, lāṣya, chalika, and dvipadi. In the śabdālankāra section Bhoja mentions taṅḍava, lāṣya, chalika, sampa, hallisaka, and rasa, the six prekṣya types (S.K.A. pp. 309, ibid). Lāṣya will be examined by us separately later. Nartanaka is lāṣya itself. Bhoja seems to suggest that the lāṣya with the ten angas as described by Bharata can be presented by a single dansense i.e. nartakī, and this will then be termed ‘nartanaka’.

Mālavikāgnimitra, Act. I. mentions ‘chalika’ which princess Mālavikā was learning from Gaṇḍāśa, the dance teacher. In act I. Paṇḍitā Kauśiki observes : “deva śarmiṣṭhāyāḥ kṛtīṁ catuspadōdbhavaṃ chalitaṃ dusprayogam udāharanti.” This has a reference to a composition by some lady called śarmisṭhā. This dance composition consists of four parts (catuspadam). It is difficult to perform - ‘dusprayogam’. One of the four parts is chalita which Mālavikā is to perform. It looks like a love-piece in prakṛta. Kāṭayavema, a commentator, quotes a definition of ‘chalika’ which seems to be inspired by Kālidāśa’s Mālavikāgnimitra. According to this definition, chalita is the dance of a damsels, who reveals her own love through the pretext of doing ‘acting’ or abhinaya, for an old composition. This definition seems to be based on the word ‘chala’ i.e. deceit. It may be noted that ‘chalika’ and ‘chalita’ are synonyms. The definition reads as -

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tathā cóktam -
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tad eva chalikaṃ nāma
sāksād yad abhiniyate,
vyapadiśya purā-vṛttam
svābhiprāya-prakāśanam."
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Another definition of unknown source is also quoted by Dr. Raghavan (pp. 556, ibid). According to that, ‘chalita’ is a sort of dance, depicting love, anger, and heroism, which hardly adds anything fresh to what we know. It runs as -
chalita-lakṣaṇam yathā-"rati-krodhótsāha-bhāva-pradhānāṁ chalikāṁ smṛtam.
iti." The Kathāsaritsāgara (III. iii. 20) mentions it as ‘chalita’, a dance-variety,
performed by Rambhā in heaven.

We have seen above that Daṇḍin’s Kāvyādarśa I. 39, mentions some upa-
rūpakas which are preksya-prabandhas. His words are: “lāsya-chalika-śamyā”di
preksyārthaṁ, itarat punah...” Still earlier, Bhāmaha also while dealing with the
classification of kavya, speaks of rūpaka class as represented by nāṭaka and some
upa-rūpaka-compositions, such as dvipadi, śamyā, rāsaka, and skandhaka. He
observes (I. 24):

nātakam dvipadi-śamyā-
rāsaka-skandhakā”di yat,
uktam tad abhineyārthaṁ
ukto’nyais tasya vistarah.”

Bhoja seems to be inspired by both Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin. Daṇḍin’s chalika
is explained by Bhoja in the śabdālaṃkāra section (S.K.A.) as - “idam tu
śṛṅgāra-vīra-rasa-pradhānatavāt chalikam.” Dr. Raghavan (pp. 556, ibid)
observers that chalika is tāṇḍava and lāsya taken together. Thus it is a dance
having vīra and śṛṅgāra rasas. Bhoja (S.K.A. pp. 308) illustrates chalika by a
prakṛta gātha. The Sanskrit rendering is :

“niśamya paścāt turagaravam
śūkri hiṃsārthaṁ hasati,
nija-kāntam daṁśtrā-yugalena
punaḥ punar na ca daśati.”

This is a picture of a she-pig, though hounded by hunters, still laughing and
sporting with her mate. Actually technically this is an illustration where emotions
or feelings of animals other than humans are described and we may take it as
rasā”bhāsa rather than rasa ! Taruṇavācaspati and as suggested by Dr. Raghavan,
his son Keśava explain ‘chalika’ as “chalikāṁ chadmanā vṛttam.” This explanation
is similar to the one given by Kāṭayavema. Taruṇavācaspati also adds - “mardala-
chalikā”di-vādyaviśeṣāṅāṁ ekasmin kāle viramaṇa - prakramanāṁ chalikam ity
ucyate.” Which explain ‘chalika’ as simultaneous stopping and sounding of drums
and other musical instruments. Chalika is thus like ‘mardala’, the name of some
instrument and also an aspect of instrumentation in dance-music.
Classification of Poetry

Dr. Raghavan observes (pp. 557, ibid) : "The variant chalita seems to be later; having been definitely inspired by the effort to understand it on the basis of the word chala. Chalika is the correct and old name in which it occurs in some valuable but tantalisingly obscure references to it in Harivamśa. In Book II. Viśṇuparvan, Ch.s 88, 89 and 93, (chitrarasala press Edn.) Chālikya is mentioned more than once. In Ch. 88, the yādavas go to the waterside for sport and there, they indulge in music and dance, gīta, vādyā, nṛtya, and abhinaya (vs. 37, 38, 42); Ch. 89 itself is called chālikya kṛḍā; at the behest of Kṛṣṇa and Balarama, the Apsaras-damsels sing and dance to the music of the voice and instruments (vs. 5); they gesticulate and dance Rāsa, singing songs in the different local dialects, wearing manifold local costumes, and keeping the rhythms by beat of palms -

"cakrur hasanyāś ca tathaiva rāsam

tad deśa-bhāṣā-kṛti-veṣa-yuktāh,

sa-hastatālam lalitam sālīlam

varāṅganā maṅgala-sambhrāṅgyah."

They then sing songs on the exploits of Kṛṣṇa and Balarama at Gokula, and represent those acts in dance (vs. 8-15). Then Balarama, along with Revati, begins to dance with clap of hands (sa-hasta-tālam), and Kṛṣṇa, with Satyabhāmā and other couples follow suit. In vs. 22, which concludes the description of this section, the dance is referred to as Rāsa; in the succeeding verses again, mentioning sage Nārada joining the merriment, the dance is called Rāsa (see especially vs. 24, 30). The party then jumps into water, indulge in water-sports, singing and playing on water as on, drum (jala-vādita and jala-dardura, vs. 45). Eating and drinking follow after which again music and dance begin (vs. 66). Kṛṣṇa suggests that they may do chālikya. Chālikya is also referred to as a song -

"chālikya-geyaṁ bahusannidhanāṁ

yad eva gāndharvam udāharanti."

Nārada takes up the Vina, and Kṛṣṇa and Arjuna, the flute and Hallīsaka, implying thereby that Hallīsaka, found also with variants Jhallīsaka and Bāllīsaka, is a musical instrument (v. 68); the Apsaras play Mrdaṅga and other instruments, now follows Āsārita music (on the instruments) after which Rambhā makes her appearance and dances with Abhinaya of the song (69, 70).

Then, after a respite, chālikya-gāndharva is again begun (73) and Rukmini's son is said to perform it. (74)
Now apart from the instrument accompaniment mentioned above, there are a few more details also comprised in this chālikya, the full meaning of which however, is not clear; at the end of the first course of chālikya is mentioned what is called Tāmbūla-yoga; again Rukmiṇī’s son is said to have done Chālikya with Tāmbūla:

\[
\text{tāmbūla-yogāś ca varāpsarībhiḥ. (72)} \\
\text{prayojyāmāsa sa raukmineyāḥ. (74)} \\
\text{chālikya-gāndharvam udārabuddhiḥ} \\
\text{tenaiva tāmbūla-mayam prayuktam. (75)}
\]

From Chālikya are then said to have been derived two varieties, called ‘sukumāra-jāti and Gāndharva-jāti. (78, 79)

“tataḥ pravṛttā sukumārajātiḥ
gāndharvajātiṣ ca tathā’parā’pi.”

Chālikya is then said to be very difficult to understand and perform, without it, proper intonation of even the mūrcchanās and the six grāma-rāgas are not possible: the sukumāra variety of it mentioned above is called leśa and is said to be most difficult.

\[
\text{śakyam na chālikyam, ṛte tapobhiḥ,} \\
\text{sthāne vidhānāny atha mūrcchanāsu.} \\
\text{ṣad-grāma-rāgeṣu ca tatra kāryaṃ} \\
\text{tasyaika-deśā-vayavena rājan} \\
\text{leśābhidhānāṃ sukumārajātiṃ} \\
\text{niṣṭhāṃ suduḥkhhena narāḥ prayānti. (81, 82)}
\]

Later in Ch. 93, in connection with the ruse employed for killing the demon Vajranātha, and Pradyumna marrying Prabhāvatī, the enactment of the story of the Rāmāyaṇa is described; when the orchestra had been set and played, it is said the women-singers sang the sweet Devagāndhāra Chālikya, after which the Nāndi and a verse on the theme in the Gaṅgāvataraṇa was sung; from this it would seem that Chālikya formed part of pūrva-raṅga and it is the name of a song and a dance accompanying that song. Then they enacted the theme of Rambhābhīsāra:

“rāmāyaṇaḥ mahākāvyam 
uddeṣyaṃ nāṭakikṛtam, 
tato ghanam sasuṣīraṃ
murajānaka-bhūṣītam.
tantrisvaraganaṁ viddhān
ātodyān anvavādayan.
tātas tu devagāndhāram
chālikyaṁ śravaṇāṃrtam.
bhaumas striyaḥ prajagire
.............................
.............................
nāndinī ca vādayāmāsa...
nāndyante ca tadā ślokaṁ
gangāvatarānāṁ śrītām
rambhābhisāram kanyerāṁ
nātakaṁ nanṛtus tadā.”

So, this long quotation from Dr. Raghavan is just to explain ‘chalika’, a part of nartanaka. He has elaborately thought over ‘chālikya’ also which is closely related with ‘chalika’.

One point is clear that whether ‘chalika’ as mentioned by Bhoja is a part of Nartanaka or otherwise, its independent existence is read in earlier documents of Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin and thus it is an art-form of earlier tradition.

Śamya - Bhoja mentions this in alamkāra section as ‘sampā’. Daṇḍin and the ND. also have śamya.

Daṇḍin (I. 39.a) has -

“lasya-chalita-sampādi (śamya’di) prekṣārtham.”

The Prabhā ṭikā (pp. 38) explains it as : Śampā pūrvaraṅgāntargato vādya-prayoga-viśeṣaṁ. tad uktam nātya-śāstre -

“śampā tu dvikalā kāryā
tālo dvikala eva ca,
punaś caika kalā śampā
sannipātah kalā trayam.” (V. 62)
śalyeti pāthe śālyā -
bhāle hastam samāvesya
nṛtyam śalyeti kirttam. - iti
ṭīkāntare krta-lakṣāṇa.
śamyeti pāthe -
"śamyeti savayoh pātaḥ
satālaḥ-kara-pādayoh
ubhayoh karayoḥ pātaḥ
sannipāta iti smṛtaḥ."

iti ṭīkāntare. 'Śāmya' iti pāthe gīta-vādyā-samaya-nṛtyam anyai rāsakanāmnā
paṭhitam. ādiśabdena tāṇḍava-hallisaka-rāsānāṁ grahaṇam. uktam ca - .
"tallāyaṁ tāṇḍavaṁ ceti
cchalitaṁ sampayā saha,
hallisakam ca rāsaṁ ca
saṭ prakāraṁ pracaksate." (S.KĀ. II. 143)

Sampā (pp. 308, SK. ibid) is illustrated as - vihesi harimuihi... etc. The Sanskrit
rendering is -

"vibheṣi harimukhi api bhava
māṁ ca gale gṛhaṇa sadā,
krandati riṣṭāsura-māritaḥ
kaṇṭha-valito na patih."

tad idaṁ chalikam eva kinnara-viśayāṁ sampā.

The Abh. (p. 227, Vol. I. ibid) on N.S. V. 62, (quoted above) has - śamyā
tvityādi. - dvikala-caṅcar-puṭasya śamyā"deḥ svarūpaṁ anena darṣitat. sāpi sa-
sabḍapāta-gata-hasta-nirvartyā eva. The A.bh. (pp. 228, Vol. I, ibid, G.O.S.) goes
on to quote -

"samyā daksīṇa-pātas tu
tālo vāmena kirtitaḥ,
ubhayoh sannipātaḥ saḥ
sannipāta iti smṛtaḥ." (N.S. XXXI. 38)

One thing emerges clearly that śamyā or sampā is a performance with musical
instruments and it formed part of the pūrva-raṅga as noted by one commentator.

In the S.KĀ. it is explained by Bhoja as : 'tad idaṁ chalikam eva
kinnaraviśayāṁ sampā.'
In the Śr. Pra. (Vol. II. p. 283, Dr. Raghavan) this reads as “lāsyam eva deva-kinnara-visayāṁ śamyā”, adding Devas to Kinnaras. Vādi-janghāla on K.D. I. 39 seems to borrow partly from Bhoja when he observes that lāsyā is love-dance of humans, śamyā of Kinnaras and Chalika of celestial damsels. Taruṇa Vācaspati quotes Bhoja, but the Hṛdayam-gamā explains it as a term related to the motion of hands for keeping time.

“śamyā tu savayayoḥ pātaḥ
sa-tāla-kara-pādayoḥ,
ubhayoḥ karayoḥ pātaḥ
sannipāta iti smṛtaḥ.”

The Hṛdayamgamā further observes: aratnimātra-prāya-nānāvarṇa-racira-yaṣṭi-hastaih, bahubhiḥ bahvibhir vā tair eva tālahastaiḥ ca tālayaṣṭiṇāṁ ekāvasare sannipāto vā, tālaṁ vinā yaṣṭiṇāṁ ekāvasare sannipāto vā, tālaṁ vinā yaṣṭhastair eva yaṣṭiṇāṁ sannipāto vā śamyā ucyate.”

Dr. Raghavan (pp. 559) observes: “This makes śamyā, the sanskrit name for the dance called in Tāmīl Kol-aṭṭam, in which a number of boys and girls or the latter only form themselves into two rows or into more complicated patterns, striking tāla with two coloured sticks (kol) of a span’s length in both their hands. They may strike the two sticks in their own hands, as also spin around, turn and execute many movements striking the sticks of those that cross them in movements. It is this that came to be called Danḍa-rāṣaka.” We may say that in Saurashtra and Gujarat, this is known as ‘Danḍiyā rāśa’, now popular in other parts of the contry also, especially in Mahasashtra and is performed on auspicious occasions such as marriage etc., now a days, but necessarily in the nava-rātra-mahotsava in honour of mother Ambikā or Durgā.

But as observed earlier there is a term connected with Tāla, called śamyā which is mentioned in the Tāla-Adhyāya of Bharata, i.e. Nā. Śā. XXXI, (vs. 31) (pp. 167, G.O.S. Vol. IV). The Abh. (pp. 166, ibid) also quotes from Ch. 28, aṣṭā vimśatī adhāye.’ (N.S. XXVIII. 18) (pp. 9, ibid). The word ‘sannipāta’ is also of similar connotation. ‘Śamyā’ occurs at N.S. XXXI. 171, (pp. 226), vs. 173, (pp. 227), vs. 175, 176, N.S. XXXI. 17 (pp. 158), again at pp. 177, 229, 479, 217, 158, 183, 255, 178, 170, 9, 255, 307, 248, 167, 258, 243, 157, 216, 253, 157, 159, 177 & 251 in various forms (Vol. IV).

The Hṛdayamgamā on śamyā quotes the word sannipāta:

“śamyā tu savayayoḥ pātaḥ satāla-kara-pādayoḥ,
ubhayoḥ karayoḥ pātaḥ sannipāta iti smṛtaḥ.”
This can be compared with Bharata’s observation in the Tālavādvya, which reads as,

“savya-hasta nipātaḥ syāc
chamyā tālasya vāmataḥ
hastayos tu samaḥ pātaḥ
sannipāta iti smṛtaḥ.” (N.S. XXXI. 37, G.O.S.)

Dr. Raghavan quotes from, perhaps Kāśi edn. It reads as - “śamyā
dakṣiṇahastasya tālaḥ pātas tu vāmataḥ.”

This is read in the ft-note no. 1. (pp. 171, G.O.S. Edn.). Thus Śamyā is a
movement of the right hand to keep time; the beating of both the palms to keep
time is “sannipāta”. Dr. Raghavan observes (pp. 559, ibid) : “From this, it can be
inferred that śamyā, as the name of a dance, is derived from the original meaning
of that word, viz. striking for keeping time; for keeping time in a dance with palms,
as in Tamil Kummi and the Kerala Kaikottikkali (or, as in Gujarati ‘garbā’, or
‘dandia rāsa’; we may add), it might have got extended to dance in which the time
is kept by striking the small sticks, and to those time-keeping sticks themselves. In
the Rāmāyaṇa, the expression śamyā-grāha occurs in the sense of time-keepers
dance; when at the desire of sage Bhāradvāja, the sylvan surroundings turned
festive in a miraculous manner, the trees turned into dancing troupe, Bilvas
became drummers, Vibhītakas, the time-keepers and Āsvatthas dancers :

bilvā mārdāṅgiḥ āsan
śamyāgrāha vibhītakāḥ,
āsvattha nartaṅgaḥ cā”san,
bhāradvājaḥ ca śāsanāt.” (II. 91, 48)

The word śamyā in Sanskrit also means a short stick of the length of a span,
i.e. nine inches, or two (sticks) used in the holes of yokes of bullock carts. The
Amarakośa observes :

“Śamyā strī, yuga-kīlakah.” (II. 14)

Dvipadi - This is mentioned by Bhāmaha, Abh., and Kamārila and ND.

Bhāmaha (I. 24) simply mentions ‘dvipadi’ and ‘Śamyā’, ‘rāsaka’ and
’skandhaka’ along with nātaka, and observes that all these are meant for stage-
representation, i.e. are objects of acting (= abhineyārtham) the detailed
discussion on which is done by others (“ukto’nyais tasya vistarāḥ”). There is
nothing special in the quotation from A. bh. which mentions this art-form, as quoted above. The ND. has the following: “kinnara-visayam āsyam nṛttam śamyā, śṛṅgāra-rasa-pradhānam āsyam, śṛṅgāra-vīra-raudrā”di-pradhānam chalitam. dvipady ādayaḥ chandobhedāḥ. Obviously the metres sung in śamyā etc. are dvipadi etc. according to the ND.

Dr. Raghavan (pp. 560, ibid) explains that ‘dvipadī’ as the name of a song, refers to the nature of the composition as well as a time measure, a ‘laya’. This can be seen from Act. IV, Vikramorvaśiyam. Dvipadi is taken as a song by Raṅganātha Dīxīt and there is also a composition called dvipadikā. It is a natural practice to name a dance after the song featuring in it. In the prabandhādhyāya of music works, there are many such instances. Yakṣagāna, an old kannada drama is named after the songs pertaining to it. Dvipādi is also a kind of ‘laya’ in ‘gati’ or gait, of the character on the stage. The actors have to move about on the stage in gaits and steps that are in harmony with their mental moods. Swift or slow movements or gaits suggest this or that rasa. This swiftness or slowness of gaits is the ‘laya’ meant here. This laya is manifold such as dvipadikā, khandadhārā, carcarī, etc. In the Vikramorvaśiya, act IV, the dvipadi-laya is given as the movement for parikramaṇa, i.e. moving round to another part of the stage and for wheeling to see around i.e. ‘diṣṭa-valokyā’. ‘Sitting down’ or ‘upaviṣya’, is done in carcarī laya - “carcarikayā upaviṣya aṇjaliṃ baddhāvā.” Kuṭṭanīmata’s modern commentator, Shri. T. M. Tripāthi, interprets ‘dvipadikā’ on pp. 340, as “layaviśeṣa”, though Raṅganātha Dīxīt takes it, and other similar names, as names of songs; i.e. ‘giti-viśeṣa’. Actually there is hardly any difference between these two views, for the songs must be in certain ‘laya’, - i.e. druta, madhya, and vilambita or fast, medium, and slow time-measures. On the song of the Naṭī, in the prastāvanā of Abhijñānasākuntala, Rāghava Bhaṭṭa observes that the verse on summer season, sung by the naṭī is a dvipadī, and calls this dvipadī a ‘laya’. It means that the song is in that ‘laya’. Dvipadi is also the name of a song is borne out by Rāghava Bhaṭṭa’s quotation from the text called Ādibhārata. The observation reads as -

“vilambitalayā yatra gurave dvipadī tu sā,
śṛṅgāre karune hāsyē
yojyā, hy uttama-madhyamaiḥ.
avasthāntaram āśādya
gātavyā sā’dhamair api.”
Dvipadi is also the name purely of a manner of walking on the stage a gati-laya, in certain other contexts. This is clear from a remark of Jagaddhara in his comment on a verse in act I, Mālatimādhava, viz. “gamanam alasam”, etc. Jagaddhara explains that Mādhava must enter in ‘dvipadikā’ i.e. a slow and dragging gait, “gamanam alasam”. Here Jagaddhara quotes an authority,

“śoka-vibhrama-yukteṣu
vyādhi-cintā-samā”śrite,
śruti-vārtā”di-vairūpye,
yojya dvipadikā budhaiḥ.”

Thus the term ‘dvipadī’ had a semantic extention from laya or gait, to the song (sung with a particular gait), and from the song to the dance: The dance was also termed dvipadī, which is an art-form now.

Dr. Raghavan (pp. 561, ibid) also observes that the Saṅgīta-ratnākara mentions dvipadī as a musical composition. This is read in the Ch. IV, dealing with prabandhas. It is of four kinds and is sung in Karuṇa tāla.

As observed earlier, the N.D. calls dvipadī and such other terms to be ‘chando-viṣeṣa’ i.e. particular metres in which songs are composed. Dr. Raghavan notes that dvipadikā metre is seen in Telugu even to-day, and there are also Tamil songs, called ‘dvipadikai’.

Prekṣaṇaka or Penkhaṇaka or prekṣaṇam is mentioned by Vātsyāyana, Bhoja, N.D., Śā, NLRK., and the SD. of Viśvanātha.

Śā. calls it Prekṣaṇam.

Bhoja defines Prekṣaṇaka as : (pp. 468, Śr. Pra. ibid) -

“rathyā-samāja-carvara-
sukhā(rā)layā”dau pravartyate bahubhiḥ,
pātra-viśeṣaiḥ yat tat
prekṣaṇakam kāma-dahanā”di.”

Bhoja illustrates it by ‘Kāmadahana’. We do not read this variety of art-form in the A.bh. It consists of a simple representation of such episodes as the burning of cupid by Lord Śiva, and is presented on the streets (= rathyā), in cultured gatherings (= Samāja), at road-crossing (= carvara) (= nukkaḍa, - Hindi) (or, cautā, gujarati), or in temples. This art-form seems to be a popular type, perhaps similar to street-plays of to-day. The theme seems to be mythological or paurāṇika. It is presented by many artists or characters. Dr. Raghavan observes (pp. 561, ibid)
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"It seems that this is identical with the South Indian counterpart of the North Indian Holi Festival, named in Tamil as 'Kāman-ti' i.e. Kāma-dahana, in which Kāma is burnt and two parties of songsters contend in songs that Kāma is dead and that Kāna continues to be alive. The songs are called Lāvaṇī, which is a Marathi mode. The Holi is a very old festival and is mentioned by Vātsyāyana in his Kāma-Sūtras 1. iv. 42, as Holakā (Holikā)." We beg to differ. The Holikā festival is associated with Prahlāda episode and not Kāmadahana episode. The Prahlāda-Hiranya-kaśipu-episode is famous in the Purāṇas. The prekṣaṇa as observed by us earlier, seems to be a popular form of street-play with religious theme.

Dr. Raghavan also observes that in this instance also, Śāradātanaya shows his confusion. He gives Bhoja's Nartanaka, calls it Prekṣaṇaka on pp. 263, and clubs together the verses on both under the single head of Prekṣaṇaka. We will see what Śā. does. But before that we should note that the ND. has Preksana (N.D. IV. para 8) defined after Bhoja. The ND. reads 'Surā"laya' for Bhoja's 'Sukhā"laya' in Josyer Edn. This has to be emended as 'Surā"laya' in the light of ND., which Dr. Raghavan does without mentioning the ND. Or, 'Sukhā"laya' could mean a public place of rest, such as an 'inn', where this performance was held. The ND. has -

"rathyā-samāja-catvara-
surā"layā"dau pravartyate bahubhiḥ,
pātra-viśeṣair yat tat
prekṣaṇakam kāma-dahanā"di."

Śā. at B.P. IX. para 30, (pp. 385) defines 'prekṣaṇaka' and quotes from Bhoja's Nartanaka. On IX. para 2 (pp. 374, ibid) where the art-forms are enumerated, we read "kāvyān ca prekṣaṇam, nātyarāsakam rāsakam tathā". We read 'prekṣaṇam' and not 'prekṣaṇakam' and in the definition Bhoja's 'nartanaka' is covered up. Dr. M. M. Agrawal (pp. 21, Introduction to his BP.) observes that Bhoja has discussed two varieties of prekṣaṇaka and has called them separately by names such as 'prekṣaṇaka' and 'nartanaka'. But Śā. takes them as one. He has given the title "prekṣaṇaka" and used the term 'nartanaka' in the definition. Dr. Agrawal has then explained the definition of 'nartanaka' but is silent over the features of 'prekṣaṇa'ka' which is read in the title only but no features of which are discussed by Śā. He has also noted that the S.D. has called it "preṅkhana". We will come to the S.D. later. But one thing is certain that Śā. has discussed only 'nartanaka' under "prekṣaṇaka", which is only a name in the BP. Our guess work is that perhaps the copyist who copied from Śā.'s autograph might have missed the portion on prekṣaṇaka and
inadvertently, must have started copying from the nartanaka portion. Later copyists might have followed these older copies blindly. So, perhaps for Śā., both prekṣānaka and nartanaka were different art-forms and he must have followed Bhoja here as is done elsewhere. The misunderstanding is caused perhaps by the mistake of the first scribe who prepared a copy from the autograph.

The **NLRK.** has - (pp. 303, ibid) - atha prekṣānaka - aśeṣa-bhāsopāsobhitam, śauraseni-pradhānām, garbha-vimāraśa-sūnyam tallakṣana-yuktaṇca, sarva-vṛtti-nispannam. pratimukha-sandhi-praveśaka-viśkambhakā atra na kartavyāḥ. parivartaka-yuktaṁ prayatnatah kāryam, niyuddha-sphetayutaṁ, vipad anucintā bahulaṃ ca. atra sūtradhāra na vidheyāḥ. nāndī upakṣepaś ca vidheyāḥ. yathā vālivadhaḥ - In prekṣanaka according to the **NLRK.**, there is use of all languages, but Śauraseni is principal. It is bereft of garbha and vimāraśa junctures but some features of the activities in these two junctures are seen here. There are all vṛttis in this art-form. There is absence of prati-mukha juncture and also of intertudes called praveśaka and viśkambhaka. Thus, we may say that only two, i.e. mukha and nirvahaṇa remain here at the end. The item ‘parivartaka’ from the pūrva-raṅga has to be placed here with skill and effort. There is bāhu-yuddha i.e. ni-yuddha or individual combat, and there is also speech with anger (sampheta). There is a lot of thinking devoted to future possible calamities. There is absence of sūtradhāra here but ‘nāndi’ and ‘upakṣepa’ are very much there. The illustration is Vāli-vadha.

The **NLRK.** has based its definition on the BP. of Śā., but it has something more and something less of it.

The **S.D.** has the following :

“garbhāvamāraśa-rahitaṁ
preṅkhaṇaṁ hīna-nāyakam,
a-sūtradhāram ekāṅkaṁ
a-viśkambha-praveśakam.” (S.D. VI. 286)
niyuddha-sampheta-yutaṁ
sarva-vṛtti-samāśritam
nepathyē giyate nāndī
tathā tatra prarocanā.” (S.D. VI. 287) yathā Vālivadhah.

The **BP.** illustrates it by “Tripura-mardana” and it has uttama or adhama hero according to Śā., but the S.D. recommends only a lowly born as a hero - hīna-nāyakam. The rest follows Śā. and NLRK. But Bhoja’s prekṣānaka is different.
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Rāsa, Rāsaka and Nātyarāsaka. Rāsaka is read in Bhāmaha, A.bhā., Kumārika, Dhanañjaya, Bhoja, Hemacandra, N.D., Śā; NLRK. Vāg. II, and the S.D.

We have seen the quotations from the A.bh. above and also looked into what Kohala had to say about various art-forms.

The Abh. defines rāsaka (pp. 181, ibid) as:

"aṇeka-nartakī-yojyaṁ
   citra-tāla-layānvitaṁ,
   ā-catuḥ-śaṣṭi-yugalād
   rāsakaṁ masṛṇōddhatam."

Thus according to the A.bh., the Girantanas took rāsaka as an art-form which is of the form of a dance in various tālas, which is delicate (masṛṇa) and also forceful (uddhata) and which is performed by many ladies. There are 64 pairs in it.

Dhanañjaya simply names it. Bhoja defines Rāsaka as - (pp. 468, ibid)

śoḍaśa dvādaśaśťau vā
yasmin nṛtyanti nāyikāḥ,
piṇḍibandhā”di vinyāsaiḥ
rāsakaṁ tad udāḥṛtam.

Nātyā-rāsaka is defined as,
piṇḍanāt tu bhavet piṇḍi,
gumphanāc chankhalā bhavet,
bhedena bhedyako jāto
latā-jāḷāpanođanaḥ.
ete nṛtā”tmnā kāryā
nātyavantaḥ kriyāvidhau
sukumārōddhatair āṅgair
gāyikābhir vilakṣaṇā.
vākyasthā vidhayo hy ete
piṇḍā”dyā daśa-jātayaḥ,
na padair abhidhīyante
anukāryānurūpiṇāḥ,
kāminibhir bhavo bhartus'  
cestitam yat tu nṛtyate,  
rāgād vasantam āsādya  
sa jñeyo nātya-rāsakaḥ.  
tatrā'pi pūrvavan nṛttam  
kāmatas tu layakramaḥ,  
kathito rāsaka-prānte  
śobhārtha vacana-kramaḥ.

citrā”todya-padakramair layayuto bheda-dvayālaṅkṛtāḥ  
cārikhaṇḍa-sumanḍalair anugataḥ, sōyāṃ mato rāsakaḥ... (pp. 469, ibid)

For Nātya-rāsaka, this is the longest and most-detailed description of an uparūpaka (= 12 verses, pp. 468-469, Śr. Pra. ibid) in Bhoja. Accordingly we make out that Nātyarāsaka is a dance performed by lady-dancers, nartikās, in spring time, and as such it is also called - carcarī -

“carcarī ca tām āhur  
varnatālêna tatra tu,...” (pp. 468, ibid)

It is pure dance of the pīṇḍi, bhedyaka and other group-movements and patterns. Bhoja observes that these patterns shall be performed in Lāṣya (= softer variety) and in Nātyarāsaka. First of all, one pair enters, places flowers, dances and leaves. (puspāṇjali-prayogam tu, mātratālēna yojayet.) -

Then two others enter, and thus groups are formed which display ‘gulma’ - ‘śṛṅkhalā’, etc.

“ubhayoh pārśvayoh paścāt  
pāṭrāṇi praviśanti ca...”

Then there is a recital of rhythmic syllables by musicians, instrumental accompaniments and songs. There is drum-beating, together with recital or rhythm - syllables, -

“murajākṣaravādyaiś ca  
hanyād daṇḍam tu daṇḍakaiḥ.”

Bhoja also gives details concerning tāla. The whole function is to end with a maṅgala-s’loka which says that this rāsaka, full of pīṇḍi, śṛṅkhalā, etc., and danced to the accompaniment of various instruments, was originated by devas when they
danced in joy on securing Amṛta i.e. nectar in the churning of kṣīra-sāgara or dugdha-mahodadhi -

"labdhwā dugdha-mahodadhau suragaṇaiḥ pitvā'ṁrtam yas tadā,
pīṇḍī-śrṅkhalikā-विशेष-विहि
yukto latā-bhedayakaíḥ..." (pp. 469, ibid)

The B.P. completes the verse, with these last two lines -
"citra"todyapakramaiḥ layayuto bheda-dvayā'laṁrtaih,
cārikhandā-sumanḍalaiḥ anugataḥ s/oṣam mato rāsakah."

Bhoja observes,

"evam nṛta-krameṇā'nyo
hy apasaāras samāpyate."

and adds,

"apasāratrayam cānyat
kalpyate sāmpratam mayā."

We can imagine that Bhoja must have observed actual innovations introduced by artists but perhaps not mentioned in theory till his time. So, he seems to suggest that “three more varieties of ‘apasāra’ are imagined by me.”

Dr. Raghavan observes that (pp. 563, ibid) the Sangita-ratnākara gives a musical composition called ‘rāsa’ as one of the eight sūda-prabandhas. (IV. 175-8). It is also so called because it is sung in Rāsa-tāla. Śāraṅgadeva holds that this composition was not in vogue even in his times.

We have observed earlier that Bhoja calls the nāṭya-rāsaka by the name of ‘carcarī’ also. The meaning of ‘carcarī’ can be understood with the help of Harṣa’s Ratnāvalī and also Rājaśekhara’s Karpūra-maṇjarī. In Ratnāvalī, a nāṭikā, which is more of an entertainment (i.e. raṅjanā-pradhāna), we find more of dance and music. Here, we have a spring-dance called “carcarī” by name, introduced in Act I. Yaugandharāyaṇa informs of the vasanta-festival being held outside. He hears the ‘carcarī’ of vasanta, sung and danced by the citizens. Then the dance is introduced on the stage. At this point, it is not the carcarī song but another called dvipadikhaṇḍa. We see three gāthās on spring which are sung and performed through acting-abhinaya-by two maid-servants or ‘cetis’ of Vāsavādattā. Dāmodaragupta in his Kuṭṭani-māta gives part of this abhinaya, in which acting of Ratnāvalī is described (śl. 897).
By T. M. Trivedi, in his commentary on the Kuṭṭani-mata (pp. 345), observes Dr. Raghavan, carcarī is explained as a Tāla, a kind of Vādyya, a kind of song, a kind of metre, exhilarating sport, etc. etc. In the Ratnāvalī itself, ‘carcarī’ is used both as a song and as a name of a type of playing on the Mrdaṅga, over and above its being used as the name of dance of the spring festival:

paurānām sam uccarati carcarī-dhvanīh, - suvṛtta-mardalōddāma-carcarīśabda
- tataḥ praviśataḥ madanaliśām nātayantyau dvipadi-khaṇḍam gāyantyau cetyau.

“māṃ apy etaṁ carcarikam śīkṣayatha”, and see also, “na khaly esā carcarī, dvipadikhaṇḍam khaly etat.”

A spring-time dance with reference to cupid’s festival is seen here. This shows drinking and merrymaking by citizens in couples, and ladies dancing and striking their lovers with water.

We have noticed elsewhere that the Saṭṭaka, which is similar to Nāṭikā, has a lot of dance and music in it. The carcarī is seen in the Karpūra-maṇjarī-saṭṭaka of Rājaśekhara. The act IV introduces a vata-sāvitrī-vrata celebration in the summer season. Various kinds of dances are performed by women in this celebration. Lāsya is mentioned along with another dance viz. daṇḍa-rāsaka performed by thirty two nartakīs. This can be placed with the ‘tippanī’ dance prevelent in Saurashtra, Gujarat. Another dance is one wherein girl-dancers divide themselves into two rows facing each other. There is also a variety of comic dance and also a dance by women dressed as hunters over and above the graceful lāsya dance-varieties. Also part of dance is the terrible dance of the anubhāvas or consequents of the raudrarasa, with human flash - ‘nara-māmsa’ in hand. This is termed śmaśānābhijnaya. There are also facial masks of demonesses as part of such a dance. Vocal and instrumental music also accompanies this dance and also ‘hudukkās’ and mrdaṅgas, both tālavādyas - are mentioned. Viṇā is placed and then an additional dance called yogini-valaya-nartana-keli is also seen here for the first time. Śāradātanaya has taken note of daṇḍa-rāsaka (Ch. X), a variety of lāsya, perhaps seeking inspiration from Rājaśekhara’s drama. Besides this daṇḍa-rāsaka, we have two more rāsakas such as maṇḍala-rāsaka and nātya-rāsaka, mentioned by Śāradātanaya, without clearly describing the same.

Dance with a ‘carcarī’ is thus introduced by the Karpūra-maṇjarī:
(tataḥ praviśati carcarī)

“mukṭāphalā”bharaṇoccaayaḥ
lāsya-vasāne calitaṃsukāḥ,
siṃcaty anyonyam imāḥ paśya
yantrajālaḥ maṇibhājanaiḥ.”

Then, the danda-rāsaka is described as -
paribhramayantyaḥ vicitra-bandhaiḥ,
imā dvi-śoḍaśa-nartakyāḥ
helanti tālānugatapadāḥ
tavāṅgane dvṛṣyate danda-rāsah.

This dance is performed by 32 nartakīs, wheeling round and forming wonderful
patterns. Dr. Raghvan (pp. 565, ibid) notices that in the sanskrit-Tamil text called
Śuddhananda-prakāśa, the danda-rāsaka is described in a quotation given therein as
the śamyā or kolāṭta which is given under śamyā by Dr. Raghvan. It reads as -

kṛṣṇena nirmirāṃ nṛttam
‘danda-rāsaka-saṃjñitam,
cāruveṇidharāḥ candra-
bimbāsyāḥ ramya-bhūṣanāḥ.
dhārayanti karāgrena
śubhra-dāru-vinirmītān,
daṇḍān vicitrān ślaksān
dvyāṅgula-sthaulya-nirmītān.
śoḍaśāṅgula-dirgāṇśca
laghūn lāghava-saṃyutān
parasparam tāḍayantyāḥ
daṇḍān nṛtyeyur aṅganāḥ.” (See also B.P.)

This obviously is the dandiya-rāsa popular and prevalent even to-day in Gujarat
during nava-rāṭri festival and now also on occasions such as marriage etc.

After this some patterns which the dancers execute are mentioned which
include designs such as piṇḍi-bandhas, and hexagonal and octagonal designs.

“ṣaṭkoṇāir aṣṭakoṇaiś ca
piṇḍibandhair manoharaḥ.”

The dance includes Komala (delicate) Karaṇas and Cāris.

Dr. Raghvan (pp. 565) quotes from Saṅgīta-samayasaṅra which says of Daṇḍa-
rásaka (VI. 237-245) as follows:

“tālaś ca jaya-tālaś ca
ghaṇṭikā jaya-pūrvikā
paṭahaś ca haḍukkā ca
mṛdaṅgaḥ karatā tataḥ.
ity ādi vādyā-sandoho
vādyate daṇḍa-rāsaṇe...
pātradvayaṁ samārabhya
dve dve pātre vivardhayet
bhaveyur aṣṭa-dvandvāṇi
yāvat, tāvad yathā-ruci.
anyonyābhimukhāṃ vā’pi
parāvrttā-mukham tathā,
mukho daṇḍā-nuviḍḍhāṃ ca (?)
vādyā-tāla-samanvitam.

sthānaka[i]ḥ (karaṇair) hasta-tāḍanaɪr vartanaɪr yutaṃ.
nānābandhāiḥ samāyuktam,
laya-traya-samanvitam,
daṇḍa-rāya(sa)m iti proktam
nṛttabheda-vicasanaiḥ” - (T.S.S. Edn.)

According to Pārśvadeva, observes Dr. Raghavan, daṇḍa-rāsaṇa is a dance in which all tāla-vādyas are played. Dancers in pairs enter and make eight pairs and they either face each-other or stand back to back. They beat their palms or sticks in unison with rhythm and they execute various poses and dance. The modern Gujarati daṇḍia-rāsa comes very close to this except that the pairs at times are not limited to a certain number and this performance is accompanied by song and music. We do not know the date of the sources consulted by Dr. Raghavan.

Rājaśekhara also describes a dance called ‘calli’ which looks like a division of nartakis in two rows facing each other:

“samāmsa-śīrṣā sama-bāhu-hasta rekhā viśuddhā aparāś ca dadati, paṅktibhyāṃ
dvābhyaṃ laya-tāla-bandham parasparam sābhimukhāḥ callim.”

See also,
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kā'pi vādita-kārāla-huḍḍukā ramya mardala-raveṇa mṛgākṣī, bhrūlatābhyaṁ pariṣṭi-calābhyaṁ calli-karma-karāṇe pravṛttā.

The Abh. mentions ‘cilli’ or ‘calli’ as occurring in dombikā, along with the playing on the hudukkā. Rājaśekhara also associates huḍukkāvādana with ‘calli’.

So, ‘calli’ or ‘cilli’ is a dance, nṛtta, with a nartakī playing on a drum or huḍukkā. The Abh. (Vol. I. G.O.S. Edn. pp. 166-7) reads -

“kvacin nṛtta-prādhānyam yathā dombikā”di-prayogānantaram huḍukkāvādyāvasare.” ata eva tatra loka-bhāṣayā cillumārga (vi. ‘callimārga’ ft. n. 1, pp. 167) iti prasiddhiḥ.

Calli or Cilli is thus a dance i.e. nṛtta, with a drum, hudukkā, being played by a nartaki.

Rājaśekhara also describes ‘śmaśānābhinaya’ and it is ‘raudra-rasa-abhinaya’ with masks of demoness-faces, terrible sounds of humkāra, pheṭkāra etc., and with mahāmāṁsa. Another set of damsels does the hunter’s dance and produces laughter - ‘hāsyā-rasa-abhinaya’. Again, another kālā-veṣa or dark make-up and a hāṣya dance are described at the end. The ‘yogini-valaya-nartana-keli’ is then next described as being done with vocal music and accompaniment of tāla, by nartakis with small bells or kīkiniś at their feet.

So, carcari is mentioned by Saṅgīta-ratnākara as a name of a musical composition originally composed to a tāla called ‘carcari’ which is defined as -

“virāmānta-druta-dvandvān
yaṣṭau laghu ca carcari.” (Tālādhyāya, 235).

Subsequently, it came to be composed in other tālas also. According to Śāṅga deva, this Carcari is composed in Hindolā-rāga (i.e. a Tāla associated with a swing), and tāla-carcari, a composition having many feet, is composed in sixteen mātrās, with alliteration, and in prākṛta. It is sung in spring festival. According to others, it is a song in ‘carcari’ metre and in kriḍā-tāla or in ghuttā and other metres.

Read Saṅgīta-ratnākara, IV. 292-3 -

“rāgo hindolakah tālas’
carcari bahavōṅghrayaḥ,
yasyāṁ sodasa-matrāḥ syuh
dvau dvau ca prāsa-samyutau.
sā vasantotsave geyā
carcarī prākṛtaiḥ padaiḥ,
carcarī-chandasety ante
kriḍātālena vety api.
dhuttā”di chandasā vāsya
chandolaksmoditā bhidāḥ.” (S.R. IV. 292-3)

Rājānaka Ratnākara, in Hara-vijaya mentions this rāsaka or nātya-rāsaka as rāsakāṇka, through śleṣa, at XVIII. 108. Alaka, the commentator explains that rāsakāṇka is a type of dance described by Kohala in which eight, sixteen or thirty-two nartakīs participate and perform pīṇḍi-bandhas. He observes:

“rāsakāṅkaś ca kohalōkto nātyaprakāraḥ
uktam ca -

aṣṭau śoḍāsa dvātrimśat
yatra nṛtyanti gāyikāḥ,
pīṇḍibandhānusārena
tan nṛtyam rāsakam viduḥ.”

In the Nāṭya-darpaṇa, the authors quote Bhejjala’s ‘rādhā-vipralambha’ as a rāsakāṅka. Read ND I. (Sūtra 116, Kārikā 65):

“evam angatrayena’pi. yathā bhejjala-viracite rādhā-vipralambhe rāsakāṅke parikara-parināyasyavor-upaksepeṇaiva gataṭvān na tan nibandhah. evam parasparāntarbhāve catur aṅgopī kvā’pi sandhir bhavat.”

Abhinavagupta and Bhaṭa quote this work. Bhoja mentions it simply as a rāsakāṅka. It may be noted that this rāsakāṅka is different from the rāsaka dance, observes Dr. Raghavan (pp. 567, ibid)

We will now look into what Hemacandra, the ND., Śā., NLRK., Vāg. II and the S.D. have to say about this art-form.

Hemacandra has the following : (pp. 446, ibid)

“aneka-nartaki-yojyaṃ
citra-tāla-layāṅvitam,
ā-catuḥ śaṣṭi-yugalāt
rāsakam masīṇōddyhatam.”

This is from the Abh. (pp. 181, N.S. Vol. I. G.O.S. edn. ibid).
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There is a mention of 'many' - 'aneka' nartakīs. These may be eight, sixteen, thirty-two etc. The number is not mentioned as seen in later texts. But Sixty-four pairs are mentioned. It is both masṛṇa - light and uddhata i.e. fast.

The Nātyadarpaṇa has both rāsaka and nātya-rāsaka.

Rāsaka is (N.D. IV. 9):

"sodasa dvādaśāśtu vā
yasmin nṛtyanti nāyikāḥ,
pindi-bandhā"di vinyāsaiḥ
rāsakaṁ tad udāḥṛtam."

This means 'rāsaka' is that art-form in which sixteen, twelve or eight nāyikās i.e. women (i.e. nartakīs), dance with pindi-bandha and such other gestures.

It may be noted as explained by Pandita Viśveśvara (pp. 407, ibid), that when lady-dancers form a group, it is termed pindi. When they get inter-mixed (gumpha) and dance, it is termed śrīkhalā, Bhedyaka is one when latā-jāla (or Śrīkhalā) is disturbed and nartakīs get separated. The ND. observes :

“pindiṇāt tu, bhavet pindiM ḍī,
bhedanād bhedyako jāto,
latā jālāpa-nodataḥ.” - (N.D. IV, 63)

Then, the N.D., treating the Nātya-rāsaka as a separate art-form from rāsaka, observes (N.D. IV. 64):

kāminibhir bhuvo bhartuḥ
cēṣṭitam yat tu nṛtyate,
rāgād vasantam āsādyā
sa jñeyo nātya-rāsakaḥ -

i.e. at the advent of spring season, ladies due to fervour of love, exhibit through dance the king's activity. This is nātya-rāsaka.

Nātya-rāsaka is introduced by Śāradātanaya at B.P. IX. 31-36 (pp. 386, 387, 388, ibid). Rāsaka also is described along with this. It reads as :

sodasa dvādaśāśtu vā
yasmin nṛtyanti nāyikāḥ,
pindi-bandhā"di vinyāsaiḥ
rāsakaṁ tad udāḥṛtam-
piṇḍanārttu bhavet piṇḍī,
gumphanāc chṛṇkhalā bhavet,
bhedanād bhedyako jāto
latājālōpanāhatah (ōpanodataḥ N.D.)

This follows the ND. as above, which again continues the tradition of Hemacandra and Abhinavagupta.

The B.P. IX. 33 (pp. 386) adds:

ete nṛttā’”tmanā kāryā
nātyavantaḥ kriyā vidhau,
sukumārōḍdhatair aṅgaiḥ
gāyikābhīr vilakṣaṇāḥ.
vaḵasyā (nātyasyā) vadhayo hy ete
piṇḍā”dyā dṛśya-jātayah,
nava-bhedā vidhīyante
hy anukāryānu-rāgīṇaḥ -

i.e. By the lady-dancers having gentle and forceful limb-movements, in a special performance, these, which are of the form of nṛttā are to be rendered in form of nātya. These varieties that are seen dṛśya-jātayas, which are piṇḍa etc., are believed to be the varieties or limits of nātya. Nine varieties are rendered showing the love of the person imitated.” Dr. Raghavan is also, not clear here. These remarks follow Bhoja.

After this the B.P. adds:

kāminībhir buhu bhartiḥ
ceṣṭitam yatra nṛtyate,
rāgād vasantam ālokya
sa jñeyo nātya-rāsakah.

This follows the N.D. which reads ‘vasantam āsādyā’.

Then a verse from A.bh. is read here; with slight change in the reading -

“carcarīm iti tāṁ prāhur
varṇatālenā tatra tu,
praviśet kāminī-yugmaṁ
samacaryādi śīkṣitam.”
This follows Bhoja. - Śā also calls it 'carcari'. The B.P. further reads, following Bhoja -

vāma-dakṣiṇa-saṅcārār
aṅgais tat tat pariṣkṛtam,
(Bhoja has, 'aṅgais tena pariṣkṛtam) -
colikābhidrum tālaṁ
vādacānāṁ pradarśayet
pañca-ghātaka-saṃjñārthajanas
tasmāt pravartate.

Bhoja has - “choṭikābhir”, “saṃjñārthaschatas tasmāt pravartate.”

Dr. Agrawal (pp. 387) explains - Trained in 'sama-carya' with the help of varṇa and tāla, and adorned with limbs graced with vāma and dakṣiṇa-samcāra, wherein ladies in twos are made to enter, it is called 'Carcari'. And that is termed 'varṇānta' which is mixed with two rāgas called 'āliṣha', and in which there is exhibition of instrument players encouraged by colikā. So, it is activated by pañca-ghātaka samjñā.” We do not know what Dr. Agrawal explains by this. For us, all this is not clear. Dr. Raghavan has also not attempted any explanation.

After this Śā. (p. 387, para 35) reads:

nṛttena vibhajet khaṇḍaiḥ
caturbhīs tribhīr eva vā,
anyonyāṅgika-saṅcāraiyāḥ
hastatālair mithaḥ kṛtaiḥ
parikramya ca niśkrāmeta
tatōya-dvītayaṁ viśet.
ekakālas tu nissandhiḥ
praveśo nirgamas tayoḥ
puṣpāṇjali prayogam tu
mātrātālena yojayet.
ubhayoh pātrayoh paścāt
pātrāṇi praviśanti hi,
baddhāpanāvarataśeṇa
rathyāvarṇādīvaraṇakaiḥ
śuṣka-gīta-prayogena
tato gāyanti gāyakāḥ,
latābhir bhedyakair gulmair
nānāvṛtta-pradarśakaiḥ.
pātraś caikatra samyuktam
piṇḍībandhas tu kārayet,
tato mallābhidham tālam
śuṣkavarna-prayogataḥ,
maurajāksara-vādyantu
hanyād dāṇḍa-dvidāṇḍakaiḥ
evam nṛtta-krameṇā"dya
hy apasārah samāpyate.
apasāratrayaṁ cānyat
evam eva prakalpayet,
tatrāpi pūrvava nṛttam
kāmatas tu laya-kramaḥ.
kathayed rāsakasyānte
subhārthām vacana-kramam.
“labdhvā dugdha-mahodadhau
suraganaṁ pītvāṁrtaṁ yas tadā
sōyāṁ mato rāsakah.”

(This verse follows Bhoja verbatim pp. 469, ibid).

Verses beginning with “nṛttena vibhajet khaṇḍaiḥ...” also follow Bhoja (pp. 468, ibid) with minor changes. For Bhoja’s ‘ekakālam’, we have ‘ekakālastu’, for ‘pārśvayoḥ’ in Bhoja, Śā. has, ‘pātraṇoḥ’, for ‘yaddārpaṇakatālena’, we have here, “baddhāpaṇavatālena” in BP., then Bhoja’s ‘tu’ is not read in BP.; for ‘latākhyair, bhedaika’ we have, ‘latābhir bhedyakaiḥ’, BP. has pātraś caikatra’, for Bhoja’s ‘pātraṇ ekaṭra’, for Bhoja’s ‘bali-nīkā tālam’, BP. has ‘tato mallābhidham tālam, for ‘hanyād dāṇḍa tu dāṇḍakaiḥ’ in Bhoja, we have, ‘hanyād dāṇḍa-dvidāṇḍakaiḥ’. For Bhoja’s, ‘apasāratrayaṁ, cānyat kalpyate sāmpratanaṁ mayā’, BP. has - ‘apasāratrayaṁ cānyad evam eva prakalpayet.’ Thus we see that the BP. has minor and at
times more sensible variants worth accepting while critically editing Bhoja's Śr. Pra. Actually the BP. could prove to be more helpful in preparing a critical text of Bhoja's Śr. Pra.

Prof. Agrawal explains passage no. 35 (pp. 387) beginning with "nṛttena vibhajet..." etc., as follows -

With the help of dance, it (i.e. rāsaka) (or nātya-rāsaka) should be divided into three or four parts. (The dancers) should move out with the help of physical movements in tune with one another and with mutual clashing of palms. After that, second unit has to make entry. Their (i.e. of both units) meeting, entry and exit should be simultaneous. With mātrā and tāla they should present 'puspānjali' also. After the entry of the two characters, others enter. Then the singers sing with baddhāpanava-tāla, varṇakas such as rathyā-varṇa etc., and śūṣka-gīta. Then with dancers showing lata, bhedyaka, gulma, and various devices of dance, pīndī bandha dance is performed at one place. After that, with the help of śuska-varṇa-prayoga, the tāla called 'malla' has to be presented. The drum (murajākṣara-vādya) is to be beaten with a stick, and then two sticks. Thus, in order of the dance, first 'apasāra' is completed. This 'apasāra' is three-fold. Here also, as before, the dance and layakrama have to be observed. In the end of 'rāsaka' performance benediction - śubhārtha-vacana-krama-has to be presented.

All this explanation of rāsaka is as clear to us as it is to Dr. Agrawal.

The NLRK., Vāgbhaṭa II and the SD. have the following observations:

NLRK. (pp. 304 & 305) has both 'rāsaka' and 'nātyarāsaka' explained as below:


The fact that NLRK. describes 'rāsaka' having 'one act', proves that it is not just a dance performance but is an upa-rūpaka, a minor type of drama. For the NLRK., the rāsaka is having a famous heroine. All languages are used in it, the hero is 'dhiródatta'. There are five characters in this art-form. It is having discourses on various arts. Soft and lofty feelings and emotions are delineated. In the dialogues, there is arrangement of gradual rising (of emotions). There is one act, and sūtradhāra is absent from this art-form. All the limbs-āṅgas-of vīthi are woven in it. The illustration is 'Madanikā-kāmuka'.
Nātya-rāsaka according to NLRK is - “bahutāla-layā”tmakam, hāsa-śṛṅgāra-
maṇḍitam, ekāṅkam, daśa-lāsyāṅga-bhūsītam, udātta-nāyaka-piṭhamardōpanā-
yakam, vāsakasaḷjā-nāyikam; yathā ‘vilāsavatī’.

Thus a nātya-rāsaka has abundance of music decked with rythm or pause and
tāla, i.e. beating time, or beats. It is adorned with the sentiments of hāsya and
śṛṅgāra. It is having a single act. It is bestowed with ten lāsyāṅgas. The hero is an
udātta type, piṭhamarda is hero’s assistant, an upanāyaka, and the heroine is of the
vāsaka-sajjā type. The illustration is Vilāsavatī.

Vāgbhaṭa II has accepted H.C., and Abhinavagupta’s concept when we read :
   “aneka-nartakīyojyam
   citra-tāla-layāṇvitam,
   ā-catuhṣaṣṭi-yugalād
   rāsakāṃ maṣṭ oddhate.”

   The S.D. has some further details as we will go to see, but one suggestion made
by Prof. Babulal Śukla Śāstri, in a ft. note 1, on pp. 305, of his NLRK, edn. is
acceptable to us. It is that it is through some scribe’s mistake that we read ‘mūrkha-
nāyakam’ in place of ‘mukhya-nāyakam’. This is a reasonable suggestion, not only
taking into account the absence of an autograph, but also taking a scribe’s
innocence into consideration, and also other definitions that preceded Viśvanātha,
not mentioning a ‘mūrkha’ nāyaka. The S.D. reads as - (S.D. VI. 288-290) -
   rāsakāṃ paṇca-pātraṃ
   syān-mukha-nirvahaṇāṇvitam,
   bhāṣā-vibhāṣā-bhūyīṣṭham,
   bhārati-kaśīki-yutam. 288
   a-sūtradhāram ekāṅkaṃ
   sa-vīthyaṅgaṃ kalāṇvitam,
   śīṣṭa-nāṇḍīyutam
   khyātanāyikāṃ mūrkha (mukhya) nāyakam. 289
   udāttabhāva-vinyāsa-sapṣritam,
   cóttarōttaram,
   iḥa pratimukha-sandhim api
   kecit pracakaṣate.”
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The S.D. has slightly elaborated upon the NLRK. It observes that rāsaka has mukha and nirvāhana junctures and adds that some expect even pratimukha-juncture also. S.D. also observes in continuation to rāsaka being bestowed with major and minor languages/dialects, it abounds in bhāratī and kāśīki vṛttis. Again rāsaka has a ‘nāndi’ in śliṣṭa words. Thus the S.D. elaborates or adds some minor features.

Dombī Dombikā or Dombalikā. This art-form is mentioned by Abh. Dhanika, Bhoja, H.C. Śā., and Vāg. II

Abhinavagupta (pp. 181, N.S. Vol. I. G.O.S.) observes:

“channānurāga-garbhābhīr
uktibhīr yatra bhūpateh
āvarjayati manaḥ sā tu
masrṇā dombikā maṭā.”

With verbal expressions carrying concealed love, where the mind of a king is influenced, that (art-form) is called dombikā, which is of a graceful nature.

We have seen above that in a verse from Dhanika’s Avaloka on D.R. I. 8, ‘dombī’ is mentioned. Dhanika reads -

“dombī śrīgaditaṁ bhāno
bhāṇi-prasthāna-rāsakaḥ,
kāvyam ca; sapta nṛtyasya
bhedāḥ syus te’pi bhāṇavat.”

Dhanika called it ‘dombī’ and takes is as a form of dance. But he also calls it a ‘rūpaka’, when he immediately observes: ityādinā rūpakāntarāṇam api bhāvād avadhāranānupapattir ity āśāṅkya āha” - etc. He does not elaborate.

Bhoja observes in his Śṛ. Pra. (pp. 381, Vol. II): “prekṣā-nimittaṁ vācikādy abhinaya-rahitam āṅgikākā-nirvartyam prasthāna dombalikā”di-vākyam prekṣyam.” This Bhoja does when he classifies his śabdālamkāra called ‘prekṣya’ into six types. He further observes: “tat śoḍhā - lāṣyāṁ, tāṇḍavaṁ, chalikāṁ, śamyā, hallisakāṁ, rāsakāṁ ca iti.”

Dr. Rāghavan (pp. 567) observes that the S.KĀ. does not have the above-quoted passage in the corresponding place, i.e. while treating the six-fold śabdālamkāra. Dr. Raghavan further observes, “If these are varieties of prekṣya, how does Bhoja leave them and classify prekṣya into lāṣya, tāṇḍava, chalika, śamyā, hallisaka and
rāsa?” Obviously, we note that Bhoja once calls them - i.e. ‘prasthāna, dombalikā, as ‘preksya’, which is one of the śabdālāṃkāras that are 24 in number, ‘preksyatva’ being one of those. On the other hand, when Bhoja considers ‘preksya’ (pp. 381, ibid), which is bereft of vācika, sāttvika and āhāra types of abhinayas and is graced by only the āṅgika abhinaya (= āṅgika-kā-agam and the same as “prasthāna-dombalikā”vi-vākyam”, i.e. which is of the form of vākya (i.e. vākyārthābhinaya ?) such as ‘prasthāna’ and “dombalikā”.

Now, we have seen that Bhoja, (pp. 468, Śr. Pra. Vol. II) has called ‘nartanaka’ such as, śamyā, ‘lasya’, chalita, ‘dvipadi’ etc. as varieties of graceful (lalita-laya) rhythm, which are ‘padārthābhinaya’.

So, perhaps here, Bhoja mentions ‘dombalikā’ and ‘prasthāna’ which are ‘vākya’ (= vākyārthābhinaya) varieties of ‘preksya’, a śabdālāṃkāra. But then he does not elaborate. Prasthāna as noticed earlier is an upārūpaka (Ch. XI. Śr. Pra) but ‘dombalikā’ is left out. Perhaps, as suggested by Dr. Raghavan (pp. 567, ibid), Bhoja takes his dombalikā as identical with the ‘dombikā’ mentioned by Abhinavagupta as quoted above. Abhinavagupta has mentioned ‘cūdāmanī’ dombikā twice, with its author, some Rāṇaka. We will go to observe that H. also mentions dombikā in the words of Abhinavagupta. But he is clear that these are “padārthābhinaya-svabhāvāni dombikā”dini geyāni rūpakāni cirantanair (i.e. by Abhinavagupta and his seniors) uktāni. Why Bhoja calls it as, “prasthāna-dombalikā”vi-vākyam” is not clear to us. Could it be, as suggested by us earlier, that he takes it as a ‘vākyārthābhinaya-svabhāva’ art-form ? A.bh. - NS. Vol. I G.O.S. Edn., mentions dombikā on pp. 171, 172, 173, 174, 177, 178, 179 and 183 also.

Elaborating A.bh.’s discussion on ‘dombikā’, Dr. Rāghavan (pp. 568, ibid) further observes that on p. 173 (actually p. 171, G.O.S. Edn. ’56 revised edn.) (or, p. 169, Edn. ’92, K.Kris.) the cūdāmanī dombikā is quoted but the meaning looks obscure to him. We will try to discuss this in the light of Madusūdanī - (Edn. NS. first part. B.H.U. ’71, Madhusūdan Shastri) But first we will quote from the A.bh. - which reads as (pp. 171, G.O.S. Edn. ’56) : “dombikā-prasthāna-śidgaka-bhānakabhaṇikārāgakāvyā”der dasā-rūpaka-laksanena-asamgrahān nātyād bheda iti cet, tad ai(anai.-Madhusūdanī) kāntikam. toṭaka-prakāraṇikā-rāsaka-prabhṛtes tad a-samgrhītasya’pi nātyarūpatvāt.” - The context is clear that A.bh. wants to suggest that eventhough these upārūpakas are not included in ten types of drama, they do not cease to be drama. Abhinavagupta goes to explain how the three types of acting or abhinaya, i.e. vācika, āṅgika and sāttvika - is seen in these art-forms and so
though they may look like more of ‘nṛtta’, they are very much ‘nārya’ also. This is seen as in cūḍāmāni-dombikā. A.bh. (pp. 171, ibid) observes - “ata eva ca cūḍāmāni-dombikāyām prati-jñātām” bindugunām vami sahi ihodivaco amiduṇādham mahasārakaḥ gete um (?) -

- at eva sahṛdayāḥ smaranti “vadha (sa) ma-cūḍāmāniā” (iti). tasmān nṛtaṁ nāryād abhinanam, talaṅkṣaṅopetavāt. Pundit Madhusūdanajee in his Sanskrit Commentary (pp. 413, ibid) refers to this view as - “dombi śṛgadītaṁ bhāṇo bhāṇi prasthāna-rāsakaḥ kāvyam ca sapta nṛtyasa bhedāḥ syustē’pi bhāṇavat; nātyād bhinnāḥ. dombi dombikā ekaiva. bhāṇi bhāṇikā na. ime nṛtyasa bhedāḥ. kvacid etāni uparūpakāni iti samgrhitāni kintu tesām daśa-rūpaka-lakṣanasya abhāvān mukhya-rūpakasya va-saṃgrahe’pi uparūpakātvaṁ kathaācida iti matam.” But in the end Abhinavagupta holds that these are only upa-rūpakas which are indirectly connected with nātya or drama proper. Then he quotes the view of the ancients - tad uktam cirantanaṁ and gives the definitions of various art-forms as envisaged by earlier thinkers (pp. 181, bh. N.S. Vol. I. G.O.S.)

So, we feel that we cannot agree with Dr. Raghavan’s remark (pp. 568, ibid) that, “On pp. 173, the Cūḍāmāni dombikā is quoted but the meaning of the context in the quotation is obscure.” It is not obscure. Dr. Raghavan goes to observe that on p. 174 (pp. 172, edn. ’56, revised Edn.), clandestine love is said to be the thing in the dombikā. A.bh. observes : dombikā”dau tu kāmasyaiva prachanna-rāga-parama-rahasyopadesāt.” Dr. Raghavan thinks that this art-form is more like south Indian ‘Nautch’. One dombikā i.e. a class of female dancer is supported by dombagāyanas - musicians and she dances and others sing. Dr. Raghavan feels that the extensive discussion on the exact nature and extent of dramatic representation in a dombikā (pp. 177-179 A.bh.) is obscure. The obscurity, he thinks, is aggravated by the corruptions in the text. But the fact is that Krishnamoorthy’s third revised edn. and Madhusūdanī clear almost all doubts. The topic concerns mainly with the fact whether dombikā etc., the uparūpakas can be taken as drama or mere dance forms. The A.bh. seems to finally favour the view that indirectly (i.e. parmparayā) these art-forms also have an element of abhinaya and therefore could be taken not as drama proper but as ‘upa-rūpakas’ or art-forms having an element of drama for sure. Dr. Raghavan observes : (pp. 568, ibid) - “The Dombi’s art consisted mainly of Nrītta or pure dance movements which by reason of their grace and appropriateness, gave an overall impression of the theme and as aid to such a general kind of action, the Dombi showed a few movements of hands, brows, eyes, etc., elements such as are concomitant when one speaks. Abhinavagupta mentions

Abhinavagupta goes to observe that because of the nature of the theme, the ḍombi is always maśṛṇa or sukumāra i.e. delicate or graceful: “tathāhī-ḍombikāsū narapati-cāṭukaprādhānyena pravrṭtasu sukumāram eva sūddhaṁ rūpam. bhāṇakesu nṛsimhādicarita-varṇanam uddhatam eva.” (pp. 181, A.bh. ibid). Then he quotes from the cirantanas - tad uktaṁ cirantanaṁ (pp. 181) - “channānurāga-garbhaṁ...” etc.

Dr. Raghavan observes: (pp. 568, ibid): A Domba music party called Domba-Mandala with one Domba Gāyana named Raṅga and his two daughters, Haṁsī and Nāga-latā, called Domba-Gāyikās, is described at some length in the Rāja-taraṅgini V. 354-380. The Kathā-sarit-sāgara gives a Domba as a player of the drum. II. 96.”

Bhoja, we saw, defines twelve uparūpakas i.e. padārthābhinaya types. They are śṛṅgadita, Durmilikā, Prasthāna, Kāvyā, Bhāṇaka, Bhāṇikā, Goṣṭhī, Hallīsaka, Nartanaka, prekṣaṇaka, Rāsaka, and Nātya-rāsaka. He only mentions Dombalikā. He gives an illustration of Prekṣaṇaka such as Kāmadahana. But he does not illustrate any other variety. Dr. Raghavan thinks that it is not certain that all these twelve varieties had set, written texts in form of musical compositions and involved word for word Abhinaya for the content of the song. We beg to differ. We have seen that these art-forms were even older than Abhinavagupta and perhaps had their roots in folk-art, almost parallel to the ten types of classical dramatic patterns. Perhaps they were as ancient as the latter. So, in the absence of specific illustrations coming down to artists, either orally or in written form, it was not possible to evolve theory out of the same. Thus, it is immaterial whether Bhoja illustrates them all individually or not; they did exist.

Dr. Raghavan further suggests that such compositions must have been for Śṛṅgadita, Durmilikā, Prasthāna, Kāvyā, Bhāṇaka and Bhāṇikā. From Goṣṭhī onwards we have a different type. Now this again is an observation of Dr.
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Raghavan who seems to contradict his own earlier observation as quoted above that it is not certain in case of all twelve types that they had a written text. Now, if some had, why not others? And his further assertion that perhaps even goṣṭhī also did not have a written text and was perhaps only a representation which was a dumb imitation of Kṛṣṇa’s sport, or had some composition singing the sports of Kṛṣṇa which was rendered into action. But we humbly suggest that it is perhaps safer to imagine that there existed written texts of all art-forms, without which they could not evolve their individual identity and if Bhoja did not illustrate them, it was part of his style. For, we see illustrations in B.P., NLRK. and S.D. They could not have shot up all of a sudden. There did exist a living tradition of written scripts which unfortunately are lost for us. Dr. Raghavan accepts that the Nartanaka is definitely musical composition rendered through gesture. But hallisaka, rāsaka, and nāṭya-rāsaka contained minimum abhinaya and maximum ‘nrīṭta’ or pure rhythmic dance. Even here, we may add, we do not rule out a living written tradition. As we saw above under dombilika in the A.bh., a discussion concerning the nature of these art-forms as to whether they are only pure dance and music or also drama already caught the attention of art-critics and the general impression is that they do contain some dramatic element in them, good enough to be named as upa-rūpakas. So, even here Dr. Raghavan should accept this thing first and last and then only discuss their nature. Dr. Raghavan (pp. 569, ibid) suggests that in the rāsaka and nāṭya-rāsaka, there were a few songs intended for gesture. He suggests, and it looks again not a sound suggestion, that the description of prekṣaṇaka is too megre for us to decide whether it was a mere gestureless imitation of some events like the burning of kāma, or had compositions on theme like kāmadahana which were rendered into abhinaya. Once again, when Bhoja mentions ‘kāmadahana’ as an illustration, there is no ground to doubt the same. The dombī he says, had songs but no word for word abhinaya. This again, is not acceptable for abhinaya has to be imagined as interwoven when a bhāva such as that of love has to be conveyed. Though of course, we agree with Dr. Raghavan’s observation that the Śr. Pra. is the first oldest document treating the topic of upa-rūpakas.

We have seen that in the A.bh. (pp. 181, Vol. I G.O.S. ’56; or p. 179, G.O.S. Edn. ’92) there is mention in the name of Cirantanas, of some art-forms.

Some of them are not mentioned by Bhoja. They are śīdgaka, rāmākrīḍa and prerāṇa. Dr. Raghavan suggests that perhaps śīdgaka is śīrgadīta. Rāmākrīḍa is not
read elsewhere he thinks. Dr. Raghavan’s this observation also has to be improved because Hemacandra in his kā. śā VIII. iv (pp. 445, Edn. Kulkarni & Parikh) mentions the same and quotes also from A.bh. and discusses further in his Viveka on it (pp. 446), as we will observe later in details. Prerana, as Dr. Raghavan notes, is defined in Saṅgīta-ratnākara and also by Kārayavema, in his commentary on the Mālavikāgnimitra. But the latter, according to Dr. Raghavan, wrongly identifies the Pañcāṅgabhīnaya which Mālavika learns, with Prerāṇa defined by Śāṅgadeva. The name exactly read in both the Saṅgītaratnākara and Saṅgīta-samara-sāra is Perana and not ‘Prerāṇa’. The former, like gōṇḍali is given as a dance of karnatic variety of Deśi class. Abhinavagupta’s ‘prerāṇa’ seems to be a comic piece as his words read: “hāsyaprayam prerāṇam tu syāt, prahelikāyā anvitam.”

We will now turn to Hemacandra. H. in Kā. Śā. VIII. i. divides kāvyā into preksya and śrāvyā. The former is ‘abhineya’ and the latter is ‘an-abhineya’. Preksya is further subdivided (Kā. Śā. VIII. 2) into ‘pāṭhya’ and ‘geya’. Pāṭhya (VIII. 3) consists of the ten types or rūpakas to which are added nāṭika and sāṭika etc. The definitions are from Bharata. For ‘Saṭṭaka’ H. relies on the Śr. Pra. (Ch. XI) of Bhoja. We will deal with forms of major rūpakas later but for the present we discuss the upa-rūpakas. At VIII. iv, H. further classifies ‘geya’ (which is basically ‘preksya’) into, (1) dombikā (2) bhāna (3) prsthāna (4) śīṅgaka (5) bhānikā (6) prerana (7) rāmākrīḍa (8) hallīsaka (9) rāsaka (10) gōṣṭhi (11) śrīgadita (12) rāgakāvyā etc.

Here gōṣṭhi, śrīgadita and kāvyā seem to have been defined after Bhoja’s Śr. Pra., though we do not read a word for word similarity. But these are not read in the A.bh. The rest follow the A.bh. We will examine these definitions in details as below. But prior to this we may note that H., like Bhoja calls them ‘padārthābhinaya-svabhāvāni’, but quotes from Cīrantanas as read in the A.bh. H. (VIII. iv. pp. 445 ibid) reads ‘dombikā’ first. We saw above how Bhoja deals with ‘dombalikā’ very briefly under śabdālakāra, “preksya” (pp. 381, Ch. X. Śr. Pra., as quoted above)

H. quotes from A.bh., wherein (pp. 181, ibid, NS. Vol. I, G.O.S.) the views of the ‘Cīrantanas’ are quoted. In his Viveka H. further elaborates on the nature of these Uparūpakas, which are primarily defined after, as noted above, the Cīrantanas as quoted in the A.bh. and also Bhoja. It is in his Viveka that this further analysis is given. But here H. accepts the lead of the A.bh. He has accepted Abhinavagupta’s observations which are read at different places but H. has woven them together, and created a clean statement. We feel that the editors of A.bh. (Vol. I. Ch. IV)
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should look into H. carefully. Even Dr. K. Krishnamoorthy has not done it. Our
gurus Prof. Parikh and Kulkarni have also not compared the two texts word for
word. This has to be done sometime. But for the present we will proceed with H.
on dombikā and other art-forms. At least Dr. Raghavan has certainly not looked
into H. and his Viveka carefully, when Dr. Raghavan observes that śidgaka of
Abhinavagupta could be Śrīgadita of Bhoja he seems to be quite off the mark.
Actually, śidgaka of the A.bh. is read as Śīṅgaka by H. who again reads ‘Śīṅgataka’
in Viveka (pp. 446, ibid). This śidgaka of Abh., is the same as śīṅgaka/śīṅgataka of
H. and is certainly not the śrīgadita of Bhoja as Dr. Raghavan observes (pp. 569,
ibid). The picture emerges that Dr. Raghavan has not paid due attention to H.,
and this is very very sad. After completing the topic of ‘geya’ varieties, which H.
has not named as ‘upa-rūpaka’, H. observes : “ādigrahaṇat śampā-chhalita-
dvipadyādi parigrahah prapaṇcas tu brahmabharaṇa - kohalā”di-
śāstrebhyo’vagantavyah.” (p. 449, ibid).

As said above, so far as the definitions of these uparāpakas are concerned, H.
has accepted the lead of the A.bh. and Bhoja, but in his Viveka he has culled out
the ideas as laid down in the A.bh. Here as observed above he has accepted quite
often words, phrases and sentences from the A.bh. and has evolved a clear design,
not seen in the A.bh. clearly. We will quote and explain the portion from H.’s
Viveka. First we will give the substance from the Viveka, and then the actual
quotations.

H. explains as follows :

The province of ‘geya-kāvyā’ is three-fold such as masṛṇa or graceful, uddhata
or forceful and miśra or mixed. In ‘dombikās’, which are promoted primarily to
flatter a king, the form is graceful. In bhānakas, such as in the description of the
behaviour of Nṛṣimha etc., the form is only forceful. That even in pure graceful
there is some element of the forceful, is appropriate. Here the difference is based
on the proportion of forceful or graceful. (there is higher or lower degree of either
in the artistic mixture). The first (i.e. in which masṛṇa is in higher degree as
compared to the forceful) is seen in śīṅgataka. When forceful is predominant and
the graceful is mixed therewith in a lower degree we get bhānikā. The other
varieties of geyakāvyā such as prerana, rāmākṛīḍa, rāsaka, hallīsaka etc. are graced
with the beauty of the mixture of these two in higher or lesser degree.

A prima facie view is now considered. The objection is that in cases of
dombikā, śīṅgataka etc. the statements are found not to be exactly relevant with
one another. Now, in this case how can these are-forms be pleasing to the taste? The answer is "No". H. says that in prayers to the deities, which are conceived either as males or females, śṛṅgāra is seen to be delineated everywhere. But we do not find any contradiction here. Same is the case with these art-forms which carry only apparently contradictory statements. We may observe that H.'s words here are from the A.bh. (pp. 171, NS. Ch. IV. G.O.S. ibid). H. quotes directly from the A.bh. and observes that the description in male or female form depends on the prayer to the deity concerned. It is therefore, that in Cūḍāmaṇi ḍombikā we read: "he devi ḍombi etc. etc.

In such art-forms as rāga-kāvyas e.g. rāghava-vijaya there is a message of the four-fold aims of life. (caturvargopadesa). Actually H. defines 'kāvyā' but here the term 'rāga-kāvyā' is read as in Abh. After A.bh. again H. suggests that in ḍombikā and the rest, the prominent emotion is that of clandestine love. Once again H., quoting from A.bh. (pp. 172, ibid), observes that in case of such art-forms as Bhāṇa, preraṇa, bhāṇikā etc. the theme is in the nature of parables and tables, ānyāpadesa, arthāntaranyāsa and nidarśanā (in A.bh. we read 'drṣṭanta' for nidarśana), inculcating advice to man through description of the acts of wild animals; and this is something like a bit of the pañca-tantra, cast in a semi-dramatic form. We may observe that H. chooses to follow Abhinavagupta in suggesting the nature of bhāṇa to be diadectic as against Bhoja's bhāṇa which is devotional and it extols gods.

After this observation, H. discusses the difference between pāṭhya-rūpakā and geya (upa-rūpakā). He suggests that in 'pāṭhya' variety (i.e. in major ten rūpakas) both 'aṅga' movement of limbs and 'gīta' are not certain. This means that in these drama-forms to dance with movement of limbs is not obligatory. 'Kāṭa', 'karaṇa', 'cārī', 'maṇḍala' etc. which are useful for 'aṅga', are uncertain in nature because of irregular rhythm, in case of rūpakas. These are practiced with the dominance of 'rasa' in focus, and hence this uncertainty in rūpakas. But, observes H., in geya (upa-rūpakas) movement of limbs i.e. aṅga and gīta (= song) are of fixed nature in themselves. This means that as in case of a 'mantra' or charm there is no change of letters, similarly here in case of these minor art-forms, the pattern of laya (rhythm), yāti (stop), etc. is fixed as per the special type of art-form concerned. Of course, at times 'aṅga' (or movement of limbs) is predominant as in 'prasthāna', or at times 'vāda' speech is central as in bhāṇaka when there is practice of bhagnatāla or parikramana. Or, as in case of śīṅgaṭaka we have predominance of the narration which is presented through song (gīyamāṇa-rūpakābhidheya-prādhānyam).
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At times, the nrīta (i.e. dance form with limb-movement as principal and not an emotion) is chief as in case of ḍombilikā presentation. Because of this variety, such performance is termed ‘valli-mārga’ i.e. a street-performance with variety, in common-parlance. But with all this, one point emerges and it is that ‘geya’ is qualified chiefly by the playing of instruments along with songs. In case of rāga-kāvyas the presentation is mainly through song alone. For example, Rāghava-vijaya (a rāga-kāvy) is sung only in ‘ḍhakkā’ rāga alone, and Mārica-vadha in the grāma-rāga called kakubha. Here, it may be noted that H. has overlooked one remark from the A.bh. wherein it is stated that, though the rasas and the situations differ, the tune and the time-measure (laya/tāla) do not change in a rāga-kāvyas as in drama proper.

In pāṭhya i.e. drama proper, observes H., for bringing about a feeling of direct experience, the fixation of the use of language or dīlect with reference to a given character, the use of metre and figures of speech, etc. are fixed. Now that which is sung (giyamāna) (as in an upa-rūpaka) is not always presented through acting, for fear of non-congruousness. But here (i.e. in upa-rūpakas) some sāttvika form of acting, which is meant for conveying this or that meaning along with a certain tune or rhythm and time-measure, is interwoven, in view of the predominant rasa. The intended object is filled in with the help of ‘dhruvā-geeta’ here. As the cooks add required ingredients in item under preparation, so in ‘geya’ form also, some such element (of acting) is added. But in such art-forms as ḍombikā and the rest, there is no presentation as in case of an actor, of rūpa (i.e. of the form of character such as Rāma, Duṣyanta, etc.), which is of an extra-ordinary nature.

In ḍombikā and the rest, the beauty of letters seen in use of special letters, is principal and there is no possibility at all of acting here, as it is primarily of the form of nrīta or limb-movements. In ḍombikā, the lady dancer speaks some sentence of common-usage, and when this speech of hers is presented in form of a song, how can there been an experience of direct-feeling (kaḥ sāksatkāra-kalpaṁthah ? pp. 448, ibid). On the other hand an experience such as direct is the main object in pāṭhya variety. So, what happens in ḍombikā or kāvyas (i.e. rāgakāvyas) art-forms is like a local dance or song performance that carries away the heart of people through the device of giving an advice indirectly or by suggesting an idea through some means.

In illustrations such as, “heṭhe vi ḍombī”, etc. there is an effort to please a king in a ḍombikā-prayoga, throug a song or playing of instrument, or dance, an effort
to convey such meaning that is cherished by the king. There is, in between, a type
of presentation of the activity of a paramour, or an expert messenger, etc. which
pleases the mind of a prince. In the end, the performance of dombikā ends after the
lady dancer making suggestive gestures to a king or prince as if he is somebody
else, cleverly acts for extracting money from him. This is seen as in Guṇamālā
(dombikā). All this, H. seems to accept from the A.bh. (pp. 175, NS. Vol. 1. G.O.S.
'54 Edn.) In Guṇamālā, the dancing artist gets involved in pleasing songs
suggesting, - "I say this to you" - etc. and tries to convey the secret love for the
prince in her own heart and she dances in co-ordination of tune, rhythm and time-
factor (tālā/laya). The outward form is of course of popular dance. The dancer also
exhibits such physical gestures as raising of eye-brows, horripilation, casting of
glances etc. to show that the theme of her song enters into the king's heart. Thus
by principally providing entertainment through song, and presenting physical
gestures that go with the same, the dances, catching the heart of the king through
dance, renders the song subservient and presents body-movements in keeping with
the emotion concerned.

This dombikā art-form is not of the type of direct-experience as in case of a
drama. For in this art-form, there is no concealment of the dancer's own self (as
in case of the actor) through the medium of āhārya-abhinaya i.e. costumes, set-up
etc. Thus the presentation does not carry an effort of direct experience, but the
dancer presents a dance-theme, with some acting, to a near similar effect. So, there
is no manifestation, as in case of a rūpaka (i.e. major type of drama) of an extra
ordinary form here. In geya variety there is no attempt to impart advice or
information (vyutpatti-anusamdhānam), but in pāṭhya variety, i.e. major rūpaka,
proficiency is a principal goal. This is so ordained by Bharata Muni with reference
to the pāṭhya. Here ends H.'s discussion.

H. thus discusses elaborately the different impressions created from artistic
point of view, between pāṭhyarūpakas and geya-upa-rūpakas. On one hand such
types as nāṭaka and the rest are of the form of direct experience, while dombikā
and the rest do not have this strength, but through elements of dance and music
there is a chance of suggesting the inner feelings of heart, of course, to some extent
only. Ācārya draws from the A.bh. but makes the presentation clearer and to the
point, which is not seen in Bhoja and the rest. Of course in the Avaloka or the Daśa-
rūpaka, we get an idea of the difference in the arts of dance, (nṛtya), nṛtta (or
rhythmic bodily movements) and nāṭya or drama proper. Nṛtta is an art-form
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depending solely on tāla and laya i.e. time-measure and rhythm, which is similar to modern dance patterns in the west with thrusts, both horizontal and vertical, in principal. This can be placed with 'break' or 'twist' dance. Nṛtya is a classical dance-form with emotive content. Nātya is rasa-oriented drama proper. It may be noted that when H. enumerates 'saṭṭakā'ḍi’ as forms of rūpakas, which were taken only as upa rūpakas by ancients such as Kohala and the like, it is clear that these art-forms must be involving a lot of the element of acting proper, and therefore these must be capable of the dramatic effect. A close examination of the A.bh. suggests that the limits of rūpakas and upa-rūpakas were not water-tight, but H. has specified the basic difference in these two art-forms more clearly and candidly. One thing emerges that these upa-rūpakas were perhaps evolved as forms of folk-art and the difference in their types and their number expanded with the passage of time. That H. has accepted ḍombikā, bhāna, prasthāna, śṅgaka, bhāṅikā, prerāṇa, rāmākrīḍa, hallisaka and rāsaka from A.bh. and the ancients, and three art-forms such as goṣṭhi, śṛgadita, and kāvyā from Bhoja is clear. Bhoja also derived inspiration from both Abhinavagupta, and also ancients like Kohala. An intereconnection between Mālava and Gujarat also can be imagined in the field of folk-art. For Bhoja there are 12 upa-rūpakas such as śrī. gadita, durmilikā, prasthāna, kāvyā (i.e. citra-kāvyā), bhāna (three-fold; suddha, citra and saṅkirna), bhāṅikā, goṣṭhi, hallisaka, nartanaka, prekṣaṇaka, rāsaka and nātya-rāsaka (also termed 'carcari').

If we accept difference in an art-form going by difference in the name given to the same, though of course in a single name also we come across difference in definition by different authorities, we can count in H. such art-forms as additional ones e.g. ḍombikā, śṅgaka, prerāṇa, rāmākrīḍa, and (rāga) kāvyā as compared to Bhoja. Bhoja's durmilikā, (citra) kāvyā, nartanaka, prekṣaṇaka, and nātya-rāsaka are missing in H. Durmilikā seems to be a vulgar art-form, not read in Abhinavagupta, but also read later in the Nātyadarpana and Śāradātanaya's Bhava-prakāśana. As 'prasthāna' is noted in the A.bh., we read it in H. also and this art-form is true to its name because in it a lover undertakes a journey. Rāmacandra, later, accepts the definition from Śr. Pra. For Śāradātanaya 'prasthāna' is not identical conceptually with that of Abhinavagupta or Bhoja. We do not know the source of his concept.

The concept of (citra) kāvyā in Bhoja is not clear and it has contexts of music. We read notations of rāga, tāla, and choreography but the meaning is not clear to us. In uparūpaka called 'kāvyā' there is one rāga, in citra-kāvyā, however there are many rāgas. Bhoja has an elaborate discussion on Bhāna, which is accepted by
Śāradātanaya who places it in anuṣṭubh verses. For him, as in Bhāna, so also in Bhānikā, lāṣyāṅgas are presented. For Bhoja nartanaka is four-fold such as śamyā, lāṣya, chalika and dvipadi. Bhoja, while discussing śabdālamkāras mentions six-fold prekṣyālamkāra such as tāṇḍava, lāṣya, chalika, sampā (i.e. śamyā), hallīsaka and rāsa.

Bhoja has ‘prekṣaṇa’ also, which is missing in the A.bh. and H. Śāradātanaya presents it in a clumsy way. Nātya-rāsaka is not read in H., but is seen in Bhoja, Rāmacandra and Śāradātanaya. Thus, so far as uparūpakas are concerned H. mainly accepts the lead of A.bh. and then of Bhoja.

H.’s pupils, Rāmacandra and guṇacandra, the joint authors of the Nātyadarpaṇa (ND.) however, though perfectly aquainted with the A.bh. and H., choose to follow the lead of Bhoja while treating the uparūpakas, the definitions of which are from the Śr. Pra. On rūpakas the authors seem to side with Bharata, A.bh. and therefore also with H. they accept twelve varieties of rūpaka including the ten major rūpakas added by nāṭikā, which is accepted by Bharata and also prakaraṇī. About Saṭṭaka they suggest that Kohala and others have treated the same. The definitions of śamyā, lāṣya and chalita are accepted in the ND. from Bhoja’s definitions as cited in his S.K.Ā. and Śr. Pra. in the alaṃkāra section.

Śāradātanaya in his B.P. deals with the topic of upa-rūpakas in a very elaborate fashion. He accepts ideas, or even definitions or part of the same, from Abhinavagupta, Dhanañjaya, Bhoja and also from a source not identified by scholars as yet. As stated earlier, we take Sāgarnandin (NLRK.) as the successor and not the predecessor of Śāradātanaya. Viśvanātha, of course, is the last to join this list of honourable writers on uparūpakas.

In the beginning of VIIIth chapter which deals with the ten major types of drama, he observes that these ten alone are rasā”tmaka. This view is in harmony with the observations of Bharata, Abhinavagupta, Dhanañjaya, Bhoja and Hemacandra. In fact nobody has a voice against this. The bhāva-pradhāna varieties are the twenty uparūpakas that he mentions including in them toṭaka, nāṭikā and saṭṭaka which other authorities put with major rūpakas. Śāradātanaya observes in his B.P. VIII 1-3 :

kathāśarīram kāvyasya lakṣaṇaṃ cópapādītam,  
bharata”dibhir ācāryaiḥ darśitenaiva vartmanā.  
prāthamīyān nāṭakasyāśya tat samyag abhidhiyate.  
nāṭakaṃ sa-prakaraṇam bhānah prahasanaṃ ċimāḥ,
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vyāyoga-samavakārau vīthyaṅkeḥāmrgā iti
toṣakaṁ nāṭikā goṣṭhī sallāpaḥ śilpakaṁ tathā.
dombī śrīgaditaṁ bhāṇī prasthānam kāvyam eva ca,
prekṣakaṁ sattakaṁ nātya-rāsakaṁ lāsakaṁ tathā
ullopākaṇca hallīsam atha durmālikā’pi ca,
mallikā kalpavallī ca pārijātakam ity api.
rasātmakā daśaite tu, viṃśad bhāvātmakā maṁḥ,
teṣaṁ rūpaka-saṁjñā’pi, prāyo dṛṣyatayā kvacit.
trīṃśadd rūpakabhedāḥ ca prakāsyante’tra laksanaṁah.

Thus, though ‘bhāvā”tmaka’, the twenty enumerated as above by Śā. are in his opinion, ‘rūpakas’ also, i.e. they could be subsumed under ‘rūpakas’ because they are also dṛṣya - i.e. to be seen on the stage, to be enacted, with an element of abhinaya. Actually, we know that they are classed as ‘upa-rūpakas’ for this reason only. They are ‘upa’ or ‘not principal’ in the sense that they involve a lot of dance and music, both vocal i.e. song, and instrumental i.e. vādyā along with thin abhinaya. Again, as seen in H., such art-forms as dombi and the rest are not full-fledged rūpakas as in these there is no ‘rūpaṇa’ i.e. superimposition of the characters such as Rāma etc. as in drama, and the self of the lady dancer or anyone is not concealed. If Śā. calls them ‘rūpaka’ also, he means precisely this.

In the beginning of the next chapter i.e. Ch. IX, Śā. again enumerates twenty uparūpakas as :

“daśarūpena bhinnanāṁ rūpakāṇām atikramat,
avāntarabhidāḥ kāscit padārthabhinayā”tmikāḥ.
te nṛtya-bhedāḥ prāyena sankhyaya viṃśatir maṭāḥ,
toṣakaṁ nāṭikā goṣṭhī sallāpaḥ śilpakaṁ tathā.
dombi śrīgaditaṁ bhāṇo bhāṇi prasthānam eva ca,
kāvyān ca prekṣanāṁ nātya-rāsakaṁ rāsakaṁ tathā.
ullopākaṇca hallīsam atha durmālikā’pi ca,
kalpavallī mallikā ca, pārijātakam ity api.
etā nāmāntaraṁ kaiścid ācāryaiḥ kathitā api,
saṁvidhāna-kramas tāsāṁ na kadācana bhidyate.
nāṭikāyāstotākasyā’pi sattakasya ca lakṣaṇam,
amśatvān nāṭakasya’pi tathā prakaraṇasya ca.
ānuṣaṅgikam eteṣām lakṣaṇaṁ tatra darśitaṁ.
ḍombi śrīgaditaṁ bhāno, bhāṇi-prasthāna-rāsakāh,
kāvyam ca sapta nṛtyasya bhedāḥ syus te’pi bhāṇavat
ītyāhuḥ kecid anye tān sarvān nṛtyā”tmakāh viduḥ.”

Śāradātanya suggests that the definitions of nāṭikā, sāṭṭaka and ṭoṭaka are discussed in Ch. VIII as they seem to be partially imbibing the characteristics of nāṭaka and prakaraṇa. Thus, for Śā., these three are singled out almost as rūpakas with abhinaya-prādhānaya. He gives the list of uparūpakas but adds that some acāryās give different names to this or that art-form, but virtually their structure remains the same. He also notes the opinion of some others - ‘kecid anye’, who feel that ḍombi, śrīgadita, bhāna, bhāṇī, prasthāna, rāsaka and kāvyam are but varieties of nṛtya, but are virtually similar to ‘bhāṇa’. Still others hold that all these twenty types should be taken as ‘nṛtyā”tmaka’, i.e. not nāṭyā”tmaka. They are more of dance-forms and not types of drama according to some. Śā. neither approves nor disapproves this opinion but seems to be closer to the view that takes these as uparūpakas, having an element of ‘abhinaya’ also. But they are ‘padārthā- bhinayā”tmikāh’, as suggested by Dhanaṅjaya and Bhoja. This means they are not drama proper, though involving an element, may be prominent at times, of ‘abhinaya’ or acting also.

Dr. Rāghavan (pp. 570, ibid) observes: “At the beginning of the next (i.e. IXth) chapter whose first part deals with the upa-rūpakas, Śāradātananaya again mentions twenty uparūpakas. Here the sāṭṭaka is left out and in its place, we have a bhāṇa, a masculine companion to the feminine bhāṇī, added. Immediately are mentioned the nāṭikā, ṭoṭaka, and sāṭṭaka, as derivatives from nāṭikā, and he says that they are already described under nāṭaka. Ṭoṭaka is defined along with nāṭaka, and sāṭṭaka along with nāṭikā, in Ch. VIII (pp. 238, 244) (pp. 359, edn. Agrawal). (The Vikramorvasīyaṁ is given as an illustration of a nāṭaka as well as ṭoṭaka. See. pp. 237-8). Śāradātananaya calls the nāṭikā, ṭoṭaka and sāṭṭaka both as rūpaka and upa-rūpaka. He contradicts himself when he says that these three are rasā”śraya like nāṭaka on pp. 180-1, Ch. VII, and then counts them as the first three among the list of twenty upa-rūpakas which are nṛtya-varieties and are bhāva”śraya. On p. 181, he restricts the name nṛtya and bhāva”śraya to those beginning with ḍombi and similarly on p. 256 says that while some writers consider ḍombi and the rest only as upa-rūpakas and nṛtya,
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thereby omitting nātikā, totaka and saṭṭaka, there are writers who consider even them as nṛtya. He himself seems to have no view to offer.

\[
\begin{align*}
&\text{dombī śrigaditam bhāṇah} \\
&\text{bhāṇi-prasthāna-rāsakāḥ,} \\
&\text{kāvyam ca, sapta nṛtyasya} \\
&\text{bhedāḥ syus te/pi bhāṇavat} \\
&\text{ity ahuḥ kecid, anye tān sarvān} \\
&\text{nṛtya"tmakān viduḥ. (p. 256)}
\end{align*}
\]

It is said in the above lines that some consider only the seven varieties as nṛtyas. What about the rest? There are ten more. Śāradātanaya further says that writers differ also on the names of these types

\[
\begin{align*}
&\text{etā nāmāntaraīḥ kaiścit} \\
&\text{ācāryaiḥ kathitā api,} \\
&\text{saṃvidhāna-kramaḥ tāsāṃ} \\
&\text{na kadācana bhidyate. p. 255.}
\end{align*}
\]

While the statement in the first line is correct, that in the second line is not borne out by the text. In the very beginning of his work, Śāradātanaya says that he himself saw actually all the thirty types, that is, ten rūpakas and twenty uparūpakas, played by the nātya"cārya named Diwakara in a Saraswatī temple during a festival (p. 2). But the chapters on rūpakas and uparūpakas, 8th and 9th, do not justify this claim. These chapters show the author’s indebtedness to certain earlier texts from which widely differing descriptions are simply pulled out and heaped together in a haphazard manner.

In the uparūpaka section, saṭṭaka is again defined at the end of p. 269. Under the name of rāsaka, on pp. 265-266, Bhoja’s description of kāvyā and citrakāvyā and the Anuṣṭubh definitions of dombī etc., quoted in the Abhinavabhāratī, are clubbed together. In the description of all the uparūpakas the first part is generally from some earlier work, which consistently describes all of them as regular dramatic compositions, with the mention of the number and number of sandhis, nāyakas, vṛttis etc. To these definitions are added the definitions borrowed from Bhoja. The first part and the second part differ very widely. E.g., according to the first part, even the Hallisaka is a play of one or two acts, with Brahmānas, Kṣatriyas, Vānikputras, - all dependent on ministers for their success and so on!"
This rather long quotation from Dr. Raghavan is not for nothing. We humbly and honestly feel that Dr. Raghavan has been harsh and also perhaps bold in his observations on Śāradātananaya. We will explain our position as follows.

To begin with, Dr. Raghavan observes that Śāradātananaya himself saw actually all the thirty types... played by the nātyā"cārya named Divākara. The actual words from the B.P. read as: (pp. 2, 3 Edn. Angrawal)

“adhīta-veda-vedāngo
vardhamānah piturgṛhe,
kadācic chāradāṁ devīṁ
upāsitum upāyayau,
upāsyā savanaṁ tasyāś
caitra-yāṭrā-mahotsave,
āśīnāṁ nartanā”gāre
tāṁ devīṁ prekṣakaiḥ saha,
pranamya, tair anujñātas
tasyāḥ pārśvaṁ upāviṣat.
trimśat-prakāra-bhinnāni
rūpakāni prthak prthak
nāṭaiḥ prayujyanānāni
bhāvābhina-yakovidaiḥ.
dīśtvā, sa devīṁ varadāṁ
nāṭyavedam ayācata,
nāṭyāśālāpatiḥ kaścid
divākara iti dvjaḥ.
tayaiva nāṭyavedasya
niyukto'dhyāpane tadā.
pṛītas so'pi sadāśīvasya
śivayorgauryā mataṁ vāsuker
vāgdevyā'api nāradasya ca
muneḥ kumbhodbhava-vyāsayoḥ,
śiṣyāṇāṁ bharatasya yāni ca
matāny adhyāpya tāny añjana-
sūnor apy atha nātyavedam
akhilaṁ samyag adhyāpayat.
sāradātanayo devyās
tānyadhītya ca sannidhau,
ādāya sāram etebhyo
hitārtham nātyavedinām.
bhāva-prakāśanaṁ nāma
prabandham akarat tadā.

This account clearly says that Sarasvati suggested the name of an expert teacher Divākara, who was appointed to teach Śāradātanaya and he taught the whole of nātyaveda with details concerning the views of various authorities. Nowhere it is mentioned that Divākara played these thirty types of rūpakas. Dr. Raghavan, it seems has not cared to read Śā.'s words carefully.

Next point is that Dr. Raghavan feels that in dealing with the three types viz. nāṭikā, toṭaka, and saṭṭaka, Śā. contradicts himself by calling them once 'rasā’śraya' and then taking them as bhāvā’śraya nṛtya-types. Here also Dr. Raghavan’s approach is less charitable. It may be noted that on an earlier occasion we had discussed following A.bh. whether these art-forms can be taken as rūpakas or not. A.bh. is less conservative about this. It is suggested that as an element of ‘abhinaya’ is involved in all these types, they can be called ‘nātya’. But, since there is an added dose of dance and music in the so called uparūpakas, they may be taken as a different variety of art-forms, perhaps ‘nṛtya’ varieties, as the element of ‘abhinaya’ is very thin. We have seen how H. has suggested, and even Bhoja following Dhanika said the same thing by calling them padārthābhinnaya types, that there is absence of rūpaṇa in these and hence they are lesser drama. The individual self of the dancer is not concealed by the character. So, they may not be rūpakas. But with all these, in some varieties of these upa-rūpakas acting and ‘rūpaṇa’ are predominant. It is because of this that even Bharata mentions and discusses nāṭikā along with the ten major types. Saṭṭaka and toṭaka also come very close. So, if Śāradātanaya even while calling them uparūpakas, picks them out and treats them separately, heavens have not fallen!
In yet another quotation, Dr. Raghavan takes objection to Śā. 's calling dombi and seven other types as "nṛtyasya bhedāḥ", and omitting the three viz. nāṭikā, totaka and saṭṭaka. Once again we may refer to our argument as above and say that the three are more of drama as explained above and less of dance. Śā. is clear about these art-forms. Dr. Raghavan's objection that "samvidhānakramāḥ tāśām na kadācana bhidyate" is not a sound observation on the part of Śā. We feel exactly opposite. Yes, they differ in names quite often but by and large the type, technique and structure is the same as something having "less of abhinaya and more of dance and music." Thus, they may be 'rasāśraya' in the end, but primarily their capacity ends in evoking a bhāva only as they are padārthābhvinaya-rūpa as against the major types which are vākyārthābhvinaya-rūpa. We can explain these terms differently also. As 'padārtha' is but a part of 'vākyārtha' and therefore less important, so also these upa-rūpakas are lesser art-forms as compared to the ten major art-forms of drama, so far as evoking of rasa is concerned. If out of the twenty, three are almost close to major types, and if out of the rest seven are nṛtya forms, the other ten are to be imagined as mixed forms. If Śā. has called some as 'nṛtya', they surely have the dance element as most prominent. Dr. Raghavan need not get scarred about such observations and finally these are not rules of physical sciences, like the law of gravitation. Opinion's concerning their nature can differ from the viewer's or expert's angle of vision!

Again, Śāradātānaya is very clear in taking them as uparūpakas with a bias towards dance and music. So, if he counts sandhis and acts in these varieties, there is nothing wrong for he had viewed the actual performance of all the thirty types and certainly not I or not even Dr. Raghavan could lay such a claim of viewing these art-forms being presented on the stage!

Our contention is that when we talk about these authorities such as H. or Śā. or Sāgaranandin or any, we have to be very careful about not doing any injustice to them by rash observations. They are all respected and honourable art-critics and had living traditions of art before them. They, yes all of them, are greater than modern scholars or art-critics.

We have discussed all art-forms from Śā. which are shared by him with either Abhinavagupta or Bhoja or any of his predecessor. But there are six types viz. Sallāpaka, Silpaka, Ullopyaka, Mallikā, Kalpavalli and Pārijāta not mentioned by Bhoja. We will discuss their special features as explained by Śā.

B.P. IX. 8, 9 (pp. 376) defines Śilpaka as -

śilpakaś caturaṅkaḥ syāc
caturvṛtti-virājitāḥ,
hāsyam vinā rasaiḥ pūrṇaḥ
svato, brāhmaṇa-nāyakaḥ.
hīnōpanāyakaḥ kvā'pi
śmaśānā"di-samākulaḥ,
ūdha punarbhūḥ kanyā vā
tāḥ syuh saciva-viprajāḥ.
mālatī mādhavasyēva
kamalasya kalāvatī.
āṅgāni saptavimśat syur
utkaṇṭhā"dīni ca kramāt,
utkaṇṭhā cávahitthaḥ ca
prayatnā"sāṃsane api,
tarkaḥ ca samsayas tāpayā
udvego maurkhyā(ḍhyā ?)meva ca.
ālasya-kampāgati-vismayāsādhanam tathā
ucchvāsāḥ ca tathā"taṅkaḥ śūnyatā ca pralobhanam.
nātyaṃ sampheta āśvāsaḥ
santośā'tisayās tathā,
pramaṇaḥ ca pramaṇaḥ ca
yuktiś cāpi pralocanā.
praśastiḥ ceti kathitāny
āṅgānyatraiva śilpake
udāharaṇametyeṣām
parastād eva vakṣyate.” (pp. 376, 7 ibid)

This means that śilpaka has four acts and four vṛttis. It has all rasas but for the hāsya. The hero is a bramin and the assistant of the hero is a lowly born person. At times we come across descriptions of the burning ghat etc. The heroine is a widow married for a second time, or a girl. They are daughters of a minister or a brahmin as is Mālatī of Mādhava, and Kalāvatī of Kamala.

There are 27 aṅgas or features such as utkaṇṭhā, avahitthā, prayatna, etc. We cannot trace these aṅgas at a single place. Some of them look like vyabhicārins
such as ālasya, avahitthā etc., some are nātyālakāras such as āśāmsā etc. The NLRK. has counted these under Śilpaka. (IX, 47-48) (pp. 390, ibid) Ullopyaka is defined as:

ullopyakaṁ syād ekāṁkam
avamarśa-vinā-kṛtam,
nispravṛtti-vidhānañca,
śilpakāṅga-vibhūṣitam.
hāsyā-śṛṅgāra-kāruṇya-
yuktam ujjvala-veśavat,
bahupustaṁ ca caturōjjvala-
nāyaka-nāyikam.
yathā devi-mahādevam
yathā códātta-kuṇjaram. 47
yasminn ullopyakaṁ nāma
tryāṅgyam gītām pravartate.
tālakṣaṇam ca gāndharva-
nirṇaye spaṭam Ģritam. 48

Ullopyaka has one act and is without avamarśa juncture. In it, cessation from activity is recommended. The parts or aṅgas of śilpaka are seen in this art-form also. It has hāsyā, śṛṅgāra and kāruṇa rasas. The characters have blazing attire and a number of ‘pusta’ i.e. masques (or working in clay, modelling anything made of clay or wood etc.) or masks, are used. The heroes and heroines are intelligent and brilliant. The illustrations are “devi-mahādeva”, or “udātta-kuṇjara”, etc. In it a song called ‘ullopyaka’ with three parts, is placed. This gītā or song is explained clearly in “gāndharvanirṇaya”.

Sallāpaka (IX. 7; pp. 376, ibid) is defined in B.P. as:
sallāpakasyéti-vṛttam yat
khyātam cótpādyam eva ca.
misrām vā; tatra śṛṅgārahāsya
naivārhataḥ kvacit.
śabalo vīra-raudrāḥbhīyām,
aṅgāny anye rasāḥ smṛtāḥ,
prāyaḥ sapatna-sāntaś ca
kṛddha-pāsaṇḍa-nāyakaḥ
daivārijanya-kapata
yuddha-sthānoparodhavān,
sāṭtvaty ārabhatī-vṛtti-
sahitaś ca, sa-vidravaḥ.
aṅkāś trayo, dvitiyeṅke
tāla-prācurya-yug bhavet,
tṛtiyōṅkah sa-kapataḥ
prathamōṅko sa-vidravaḥ.
catussandhiḥ, pratimukha-śūnyaḥ
sallāpako bhavet.”

Thus, Sallāpaka has its theme either historical, or imagined or a mixture of these two. There is total absence of śṛṅgāra and hāsya, and veera or raudra are principal rasas. The rest are subordinate rasas. The hero is an angry person or a hypocrite and the enemy is sānta i.e. a quiet and composed person. Kapata i.e. fraud caused by either destiny or enemy, fight, taking position, and uparodha i.e. blocking (the city, castle) are seen in this art-form. It is graced by sāṭtvati and ārabhaṭi vṛttis. It is sa-vidrava i.e. having panic or flight. There are three acts and in the second act, there is predominance of tāla i.e. time-measure. The third act is with fraud and the first is marked by vidrava i.e. panic or running away. There are four samdhis with pratimukha juncture absent. This art-form can be compared with the major type called “samavakāra”.

Mallikā (B.P. IX, 54, p. 392) is defined as:

mallikā bhoga-śṛṅgāra-
kaśikī-vṛtti-mantharā,
eka-dvyaṅka-kramā”śliṣṭa-
vidūṣaka-vīta-kriyā,
gāthā dvipathakōpetā
rathyā-vāsaka-tālayuk,
anālakṣyakathā pūrvaṃ
paścādālakṣya-vastukā,
garbhāvamarsa-hīnā ca
sandhi-traya-samanvitā.
manikulyāyāṃ jalam iva
na lakṣyate yatra pūrvato vastu,
pāscāt prakāśate yā sā
manikulyā'pi mallikā jñeyā.

In mallikā, love in union is the principal sentiment. It is graced by kaiśikī vr̥tti. It has either one or two acts and we find activities of a vidusaka or a viṭa in them respectively.

It is accompanied by gāthā (= metre of that name), and dvipathaka (or dvipathikā ?) (a prakṛta metre), and it has tāla i.e. tempo such as rathyā and vāsaka. The theme is not clear in the beginning and later it is clearly understood. There are three saṃdhis with garbha and avamarśa absent from it.

Śā. here quotes an āryā verse from Śr. Pra. of Bhoja, describing manikulyā which is given by Bhoja as a variety of śravya-kāvyā or non-dramatic Composition. Śā. observes that as water, the theme in a manikulyā is not marked in the beginning, so also in Mallikā the theme is not clear in the beginning but is seen or grasped at a later stage. So, this manikulyā is also mallikā.

Dr. Raghavan observes that, “It is Śāradātanaya’s description of the Mallikā that takes one’s breath away.” We do not know why Dr. Raghavan is so scared. Actually we find common names in different lists. Bhāṇa is read both in rūpaka and upa-rūpaka. So, if manikulyā is another name for mallikā, nothing is lost. Or, if that literary composition called manikulyā has some remote capability of being staged, it is equivalent to Mallikā as in both the theme is not transparent in the beginning and becomes clear in the end. Thus in Bhoja also, we can see an indirect reference to mallikā.

Similarly at the end of durmallikā in B.P., Bhoja’s manthulli, a type of literary composition is described. The kā. śa of H. reads matallikā for manthulli. B.P. also reads matallikā. The second characteristic of manthulli as described by Bhoja, discussed by us earlier, is capable of dramatic presentation also and therefor Śā. could have read it along with durmallikā. Dr. Raghavan need not get alarmed over this.

Kalpavalli (B.P. IX. 55, pp. 392 ibid) is yet another art-form not seen in Bhoja. It is defined as -

kalpavalli bhaved-dhāsyasrāgāra-rasa-bhāva-yuk,
udāṭta-nāyakopetā
piṭhamardopanāyakā.
asyāṁ vāsakasajjā syān-
nāyikā'ṭhā'bhīṣārikā,
dvipadi-kanda-geyā'ḍhyā
rathyā-vāsaka-tāla-yuk.
layatraya-yutā lāsyā-
daśakena samanvitā.
īḍrśī kalpavallī syād-
yathā 'māṇikya-vallikā'.
mukhasandhi-pratimukha-
sandhi-nirvahanair yutā.
udāṭta-varṇanōtkarṣā
lalitōdāṭta-nāyakā.

Kalpavallī is having the rasa and bhāva concerning śṛṅgāra and hāṣya. The hero is a dignified person (udāṭta). Pithamardarā is the assistant or friend of the nāyaka. The heroine is either a vāsaka-sajjā type or an abhisārikā. This art-form is graced by dvipadi, khaṇḍa-gīta, rathyā and vāsaka tempos, three types of laya (rhythm), and ten types of lāsyā. The illustration is “Māṇikya-Vallikā”. It has mukha, pratimukha and nirvahanā junctures. It has lofty descriptions and the hero is udāṭta and lalita also.

Pārijātaka (B.P. IX. 56, pp. 393, ibid) is yet another art-form not read in Bhoja. It is defined as -

pārijāta-lataikāṅka-
mukha-nirvahanānvitā,
varṇa-mātra-khaṇḍa-tāla-vatī,
gāthā-samanvitā.
viśva-śṛṅgāra-bhūyisṭhā
deva-ksattrā"di-nāyakā,
kalahāntaritāvasthā-
nāyikōdāṭta-nāyakā.
athavā bhoginī-svīyā-
ganikā-nāyikā’nvitā,
tāḥ syur aṣṭau catasrah
syur danta-rāsaka-nartanaḥ.
sāpasāratrayā citra-
kathā-geya-samanvitā,
kvacid vidūṣaka-krīḍā-
parihāsa-manoḥara.
pārijātalatā sēyaṃ
yathā gaṅgā-taraṅgikā,
pārijātakam ityeva
kaiścid eṣā’bhidhiyate."

‘Pārijāta-latā’ is having a single act, and mukha and nirvahanā junctures. It is having varṇa, mātrā, khaṇḍa-tāla and gāthā (metre). The rasas are vīra and śṛṅgāra. The heroes are gods or ksatriya. The heroine is a kalahāntaritā type, the hero is udāpta person, or the nāyikā is either a bhogini, svīyā (= one’s own wife), or a gaṇikā i.e. a harlot. There are four or eight dancers with danda. There are three types of apasāra, a pleasant story and song in it. At times it is rendered charming by the activity or talks of vidūṣaka. This is called pārijāta-latā, the illustration being “gaṅgā-taraṅgikā”. Some call it “pārijātaka” also.

Dr. Raghavan (pp. 571, ibid) observes: “Regarding the sallāpa, we know it is mentioned as one of the ten types derived from nāṭaka and prakaraṇa, in the prologue to the Bhagavadajjukīya (7th Cen. A.D.). The ullopya is known to us as the name of a Mārga music composition which is mentioned in ancient music treatises, in Yājñavalkya śṛṇu, in the music sections in the vāyu, Mārkaṇḍeya and Viṣṇudharmottara purāṇas, and in Bharata, along with other compositions of a similar nature, Aporāntaka, Madraka, Ovaṇaka, Rovinda, etc. It is from Śaradātanaya, and Sāgaranandā, who also mentions the ullopyaka as an upārūpakā, that Viṣvanātha gives it in his Sāhitya - darpana under Uparūpakas.”

We may add that the mention from Bhagavadajjukīya need not be taken seriously as it is a prahasana wherein characters are given to put things in a light, cross and humorous way. As for the other evidences concerning ullopyaka taking it as a mārga music composition, etc. we may add that this strengthens ullopyaka’s position as an upārūpakā, as all upa-rūpakas by nature have less of acting and an excess of dance and music.
Now we turn to Śāgaranandin’s NLRK., which we have taken as posterior to BP. and anterior to the SD. of Viśvanātha. The NLRK. mentions all varieties of Uparūpakas as read in the B.P. accepting ḍombi, kalpavalli, mallikā and pārijātaka. Śāgaranandin gives illustrations for all types. He seems to give a short summary of BP. We have taken comparative notes of all the varieties at end when we discussed Bhoja’s types.

The SD. of Viśvanātha has over and above nāṭikā and troṭaka, goṣṭhi, saṭṭakam, nāṭya-rāsakam, prasthānakam, rāsakam, sāṃlāpakam, śrīgaditam, śilpakam, vilāsikā, durmallikā, prakaranikā, hallīsa and bhāṅikā. It is clear that V. has sought major inspiration from Śr. Pra., B.P. and NLRK. He takes nāṭikā, troṭaka and saṭṭaka as uparūpakas (S.D. VI. 269-276). He also mentions prakaranikā, perhaps under the influence of N.D. Following NLRK. and also B.P., he takes them as dramatic compositions also by describing their sandhis, vṛttis, anka etc. The original inspiration for taking these uparūpakas which are primarily dance-forms, as drama also, seems to have been supplied by the long discussion on their true nature in the A.bh. itself. V. also takes rāsaka, nāṭya-rāsaka and hallīsa also as drama, though they are primarily dance forms. The preṅkhaṇa, which will be looked into further later, seems to be just the preṅkhaṇaka of earlier sources. Vilāsikā is a new type mentioned by the S.D. we will take it up later.

Dāṇḍin’s commentator Vādijanghāla mentions ‘prastāra’, which Dr. Raghavan suggests, could be a mistake. Perhaps he means ‘prasthāna’. A new variety called ‘pavaṭikā’ is also mentioned by him which again Dr. Rāghavan feels (pp. 572) to be ‘pajjhaṭikā’ a pārkṛta metre which could have given this name to the musical composition.

Dr. Raghavan also suggests (pp. 572, ibid) that in Vānmaya-viveka of Cintāmaṇi Miśra of Orissa (A.D. 1574), some strange names appear along with the rūpakas and uparūpakas. He feels that the view presented is queer. This writer first gives ten types of rūpakas which he calls to be ‘nāṭya’. This is followed by ten mārgas such as nāṭikā, prakaraṇi, bhāṅikā, hāṣikā, đima, vyāyogini, kalā, uṣāhavatī, citrā, vicitrā and jugupsitā. The first six, Prof. Raghavan suggests, are diminutives of nāṭaka, prakaraṇa, bhāṇa, prahasana, đima, and vyāyoga.

Then Cintāmaṇi gives sixteen deśya varieties such as saṭṭaka, troṭaka, goṣṭhi, vṛṇdaka, śilpaka, hallīsaka, ullāsaka, rāsa, śrīgadita, nāṭya(?), lāsaka (?), prastāva, lāsikā, sāṃlāpaka, preṅkhaṇa, and sāṃbhavya (?).
It may be noted that Dr. Raghavan finds things to be ‘queer’ and ‘strange’ when
he finds names of art-forms not mentioned in Bhoja or his predecessors. Like forms
of literature, even newer art-forms also were added to the list by later writers as
they perhaps witnessed them being presented on the stage in various parts of India,
as time rolled on. Dr. Raghavan is ill at ease with Šāradātanaya when he claims to
have witnessed the performance of all the thirty types of art-forms. Why should we
doubt Šā.’s integrity. Why should we call the approach of Šā., NLRK, S.D., and
Vāṁmaya-viveka as either strange or queer ? Why ? Newer and newer desi types
could have envoloped in course of time and some of them might have received new
names though carrying some traits of an old known art-form. The point is we
should remain open and go for a careful historical, critical and exhaustive study of
all art-forms recorded or known to-day in various parts of modern India. The
‘bhavā’ from Gujarat also deserves a special notice. Why should we feel shy of
recognising various newer forms ? On the other hand we should feel proud of the
vast repertoire or reservoir of art in India, both classical and desi. No use getting
either alarmed or nervous about the same.

We will now discuss the new names as seen in the S.D. and also see what Dr.
Raghavan has to note about the same.

Preňkhaṇa in the S.D., is -

garbhāvamarśa-rahitam
preňkhaṇaṁ hīna-nāyakam,
a-sūtradhāram ekāṅkam
a-viškambha-praveśakam. - VI. 286.
niyuddha-sampṛthe-yutaṁ
sarva-vṛtti-samāśritam,
nepathyē gīyate nāndī
tatā tatra prarocanā. VI. 287
yathā, vālivadhaḥ.

This means that the ‘preňkhaṇa’ is having a single act, with no garbha and
vimarśa junctures, a hero of a lowly status, is without a sūtra-dhāra and there is
absence of either viškambhaka or praveśaka.

It is having individual fight and quarrel among people, and all vṛttis. Nāndī is
sung behind the curtain and so also is prarocanā presented from the back of the
curtain. ‘Vālivadhaḥ’ is an illustration.
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Dr. Raghavan feels that this is a misreading for prekṣaṇa as seen in the BP. and NLRK.

The BP. has prekṣaṇaka (pp. 385, BP. IX. 30) defined as -

"padārthābhinayam yasya
lalitañca layānvitam,
kurute nartakā yatra
so'pi nartanakah punah.
lāsyam dvidhā syācchalikāṃ
sama-rathyā-samanvitam,
sutāla-caturaśrabhyāṃ
yatā kartam pravartate.
garbhāvamarśa-rahitam
sarva-vṛtti-samanvitam,
prabhūta-māgadhī-saurusenikāṃ
rasa-bhāva-yuk.
dvisandhiti vadanty etat
uttamādhamanāyakam
bhāratayārabhatī yuktam,
kvacit syāt tasya sāttvatī.
yathā vālivadhākyaśca
nṛsīṃha-vijayo yathā
pūrṇa-nepathyā-pāṭhair vā
nāndī tasya vidhiyate.
kvacid garbhāvimarśau staḥ
kvacid vṛtti-catuṣṭayam
kvacin nepathyā-vākyā"dhyāṃ
na kadācana sūtra-dhīrt
evāṃ prekṣaṇakāṃ vidyād
yathā tripura-mardanam."
We have discussed this type fully earlier when we looked into Bhoja's prekṣaṇaṅka (pp. 1532).

Vilāsikā is a new type seen in the S.D. (VI. 301, 302). It is defined as -
- śṛṅgāra-bahulaikāṅkā
daśa-lāsyāṅga-saṃyutā
vidūṣaka-viṭābhyaṃ ca
piṭhamardena bhuṣitā. - VI. 301, S.D.
hinā garbha-vimarsābhhyām
sandhibhyāṁ hīnanāyakā,
svalpa-vṛttā suṇepathyā
vikhyātā sā vilāsikā. - VI. 302, S.D.

kecit tatra vilāsikā-sthāne vināyiketi paṭhanti. taṣyās tu ‘durmallikāyāṁ antarbhāva’ ityanye.

- This means that for Viśvanātha vilāsikā is having śṛṅgāra as a predominant rasa. It is having a single act. It has all the ten āṅgas of the lāṣya. (Thus it is having graceful presentation). It is having vidūṣaka, viṭa and piṭhamardā in it. Garbha and vimarsā sandhis are missing in it and the hero is a lowly born. The theme is meragre, and the costumes are rich.

S.D. informs that some name it as vināyikā, and some put it under ‘durmallikā’. Actually we know that durmallikā has four acts with one each devoted to viṭa, vidūṣaka, and piṭhamardā, the fourth according to S.D. is devoted to the activity of a nāgaraka or a cultured person. May be vilāsikā looks like a shorter version, a one-act show, of this durmallikā, which shares a number of features read in the former.

Vilāsavatī can also be compared to some description of bhāṇīkā in the BP., which has Viṇāvatī as an illustration. We have discussed this earlier. DR. Raghavan (pp. 572, ibid) observes that - “If Śāgaranandandin made two separate varieties named bhāṇī and bhāṇikā, corresponding evidently to the bhāṇa and bhāṇikā of Śāradātanaya and others, Viśvanātha gave an altogether new name Vilāsikā in the place of bhāṇī.” But we see that Vilāsikā is also closer to durmallikā in the S.D. Now about Śidgaka-Śīṅgaka-Śilpaka-

Śidgaka is mentioned by A.bh. in the list of art-forms recognised by the Cirantanās. H. has śīṅgaka, so also Vāgbhaṭa II has śīṅgaka, but Śā., and NLRK. have śilpaka, with Viśvanātha also going for śilpaka.

We discuss these art-forms together because may be they are different names of one and the same variety.
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The Cīranṭanas as quoted in the A.bh. (pp. 181, Ch. IV. NS. G.O.S. ibid) describe śīḍgaka as -

“sakhyāḥ samakṣaṁ bhartur yād
uddhatam vṛttam ucyate,
masṛṇaṁ ca kvacīd,
dhūrtā-caritam, śīḍgakas tu saḥ.”

Śīḍgaka is one in which before a friend there is description (by nāyikā) of the uddhata-vṛttta i.e. rough behaviour or infidelity of the husband. At times there is description of the graceful behaviour also of a dhūrtā nāyaka. Nothing beyond this is given regarding śīḍgaka.

H. has śīṅgaka or śīṅgatāka. ‘Śīṅgaka’ is described as above from the A.bh. In his Viveka (pp. 445, ibid) H. has -

“trividho hi geyakāvyasya prayogah; masṛṇaḥ, uddhato mīśraś ca.
H. says that in dombikā we have ‘sukumāram eva sūddhām rūpaṃ.’

This means that the presentation is of the graceful type in dombikā. It is said to be forceful or uddhata as in bhānakā such as Nṛsimhādīcarita-varṇana. It is possible H. says that even in graceful some element of forceful also enters. In such a mixed variety-mīśra form-there is difference as to the more or less proportion of either. ‘Prasthāna’ has major portion of masṛṇa, and śīṅgatāka has major portion of uddhata i.e. forceful. H. notices such mixtures in other varieties also. He follows some hints from the Abh.

Vāgbhaṭa II has śīṅgaka defined after H. and follows śīḍgaka of the Cīranṭanas in the A.bh.

Śāradātanaya has śīlpaka defined as seen earlier. The NLRK. also seems to follow BP. Śīlpaka in NLRK (pp. 287, ibid) runs as -


‘utkanṭhaḥ’ is - tatra ramanīya-vastu-visaye abhilāśah - i.e. aspiring for a beautiful thing. as in Śākuntala, “sūddhānta-durlabham. idaṁ vapur... (śā. I. 15).
avahittham - is, “prabuddhasya samvaraṇam avahittham. i.e. concealing that which is revealed. Yathā-vṛksavāṭikāvyām - rajanikā... etc. (vṛksavāṭikā’ is the name of the second act in Puspadūtika.

prayatnāḥ - anivṛttaye yatnāḥ prayatnāḥ, yathā prāvṛddhaṅke... etc. Prayatna is an extra effort to obtain something.

gṛthanam - anyonya-nirṇayātpanna-paricaya-pallavita-vibhramābhīrāmōrtha-viśeṣo gṛthanam, yathā bṛhad-bakula-viṭhiśāyām, etc. (bṛhad. is the first act of MM.)

On account of acquaintance caused by talking to each other or by some decisions (on the part of both) conveying a message by special meaningful gestures full of softness and beauty, is ‘gṛthana’ or ‘getting locked or glued together.’

āṣaṁśā - ipsisasya durlabhasya āṣaṁsaṇam āṣaṁśā. yathā śmaśānāṅke, - idam eva tāvat prārthaye... etc.

Aspiring for something intended, which is very difficult to obtain, is āṣaṁśā. As in the śmaśānāṅka, etc. (This is also from MM.)

tarkāḥ - ātmā-viśarā”dhīnōrthāvāgrahās tarkāḥ-yathā nandayanti-śañhāre (i.e. in the last act of puśpadūtika) -

Tarka means self-observation to examine some fact.

Sāṁśaṁyaḥ - koṭiḍvayāvalambano’ṛtha śaṃśaṁyaḥ, yathā viddha-śālabhaṅjīkāyām... etc.

Sāṃśaṁya or doubt is that fact that is balanced between two alternatives.

tāpaḥ-anuśaya-viśeṣas tāpaḥ, yathā kulapatyāṅke...

Torture is a special type of torment. Udvegaḥ - bandhujana-viyoga-janita-udvegaḥ. Anguish is born of the separation from a near one.

maугdhyām - sri-svabhāva-viśeṣo maugdhyaḥ - over simplicity is a special quality of a lady’s nature.

ālaśya (languidness) - mārgā”di-kheda-janyā śramaḥ - Fatigue, born of getting tired due to (travelling long) on road, etc.

apratiṃpattiḥ - pratipatti-mūḍhataḥ apratiṃpattoḥ yathā kośalaṅge.

absence of knowledge or perception is apratiṃpattiḥ.

vilāpaḥ - śoka-samuttham āpadi paridevanāṁ vilāpaḥ - lamentation i.e. distress born of sorrow or grief is ‘vilāpa’.

vāmya - prasādāne vyuṭthanam i.e. behaviour that goes against cheerfulness, is vāmya.

anugamnam-prasthitasya harsād anuyānam - i.e. going after a master, who has left, with joy.
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vismayāḥ - akṛtārtha-dārśanōdbhavo'ṛtha-viśeṣo vismayāḥ - when a thing is not accomplished, the resultant mental feeling is ‘vismaya’.

sādhanam - vyāhāra-viśeṣaḥ sādhanam - To mention a special process (to acquire something) is sādhana. (= Special instrument to secure something.)

uĉchvāsāḥ - The condition of regaining consciousness by a person who was fainted, is uĉchvāsa.

camatkāraḥ - loka-prasiddha eva. This i.e. absolute astonishment due to something exceptional and it is known in worldly parlance.

śūnyatvam - is ‘vismaraṇa śūnyatvam’. It is that mental state caused due to forgetting something.

pralobhaḥ - prayojanārtham arthā”dibhiḥ pralobhanam - i.e. bribing to acquire some intended object.

vaiśāradyam - ātmanāḥ pauruṣa-pratipādanam. i.e. stating once valour or feat.

samphetāḥ - krodhena atikramaḥ i.e. Crossing the boundary due to anger.

āśvāsanam - śokā”panodanam - i.e. relieving (someone) from grief.

bodhanam - kārya-prativacanena pratibodhanam - i.e. to suggest the action to be taken in future.

praharṣaḥ - ca lokaprasiddhaḥ eva.

over-joy is known to all.

praśastiḥ - deva-dvijā”di-kalyāṇavadhāraṇam praśastiḥ - i.e. To wish well for gods or brahmins., (i.e. to prey)

These angas or features of śilpaka are enumerated by Śā. also with some difference in name.

Ullāpyaka in NLRK is --gitamayaṁ tryaṅkam. asya lakṣaṇam - udāra-nāyakam, ujjvala-veṣā”tmakam, bahupusta-pradhānam, divya-caritam, śilpakāṅga-vibhūṣitam, hāsya-kāruṇya-śrīgāra-pūritam.

Sāgaranandin expects three acts in ullāpyaka, while his mentor Śā. mentions only one act as seen above. NLRK. wants it to be gitamaya i.e. full of music and song. The rest follows Śā. Viśvanātha has ‘ullāpyam’ and he follows Śā. and expects only one act. He also quotes the opinion of some (i.e. NLRK) that ‘ullāpya’ has three acts.

With this we end our discussion on the classification of poetry from an external or formal point of view. Of course, the ten major types of drama, universally recognised as ‘preksya’ type of kāvyaa will be discussed later in a separate chapter, suggesting all minute details concerning the plot or theme, structure, character etc. of the drama and the rest.
Chapter XI
Classification of Poetry
(Criticism Oriented)

(Criticism Oriented; - i.e. dhvani, guṇībhūta-vyaṅgya, citra, or uttama, madhyama, avara - etc.)

It has to be clearly understood in the very beginning that, taking into account the available documents, it is Ānandavardhana's Dhvanyālōka, which is the very first of its type in attempting the classification of poetry into what is termed 'dhvani', 'guṇībhūta-vyaṅgya', and 'citra' form purely criticism point of view. Thus any piece of poetry, be it a single independent verse, a muktaka, or a very large composition a prabandha, both in verse and prose such as the mahākāvyā or a kathā or an ākhyāyīrā, or a campū etc. can be put under 'dhvani', or the other two as well. This is classification based purely on criticism and that too from a very very special angle.

Looking at oldest available documents, it was Ānandavardhana, who was the first to apply the measure of implicit sense, or 'pratīyamāna artha', in evaluating and classifying poetry. This approach of evaluating and classifying poetry from the angle of the pratīyamāna or implicit sense, was perhaps a revolutionary movement in poetic criticism. Ānandavardhana does not flout or discard classification of poetry from the angle of external form such as gadya or prose, padya or verse, or mixed, and also 'that which is to be presented on the stage, i.e. preksya', or otherwise, etc. He accepts all these formal types and mentions a number of them as seen in the earlier chapter. But his implicit-sense-biased thrust is having totally new dimensions and being lucky in having followers such as the great Abhinavagupta, and Vāgdevatāvatāra Mammaṭa, and a host of talented critics of literary aesthetics ending with the greatest viz. Punditarāja-Jagannātha, Āhandavardhana was successful in establishing, i.e. promoting, a
new school of thought called the "dhvani school", better acknowledged as "vyañjanā-dhvani-rasa" school of thought. It may be observed to his credit that he was not just lucky to have these great minds on his side. But the fact is he is very, very, very sound and convincing till day in his thinking and logic. Thus, he, so to say, added a new dimension in this direction, though of course he does not claim that this thought current was originated with him. On the contrary he claims that this thought-current was as old as hills and has been handed over to him through the ingenious thinking of the ancients. His humility apart, there is more than just a grain of truth also in this.

He tries to promulgate this dhvani-oriented thought-current and classification of poetry based on this new angle, first with the establishment of the implicit or pratīyamāna sense as something different both in nature and scope from the normally accepted expressed or vācyā sense, of course, including the indicated sense, i.e. lakṣyārtha. The whole presentation has made the Dhvanyāloka, an epoch-making work in Indian Literary Aesthetics. It may be noted at the outset, and we will go into the details later that Ānandavardhana has not rejected any concept prevalent in literary criticism but has attempted to give a fool-proof all embracing scheme with (rasā"di) dhvani as the 'soul' of poetry i.e. keeping 'dhvani' in the centre, he has accommodated all thought-currents such as alaṁkāra, guṇa, rīti, vṛtti, dośa and what not, in his scheme. We will examine this as we proceed later.

We know that Ānandavardhana took notice of the implicit sense, i.e. the sense not directly expressed in poetry, and also held that this implicit sense is grasped by a separate and independent word-power, śabda-śakti, called vyañjanā or suggestion. But prior to him the ancients such as Bhāmaha and the like had also noticed and recognised in their own way this element of the un-expressed or implicit sense in poetry but of course, they did not come out openly for vyañjanā as a separate and independent word-power for their own reasons. Perhaps they had incorporated the implicit sense in different guṇas or excellences, or alaṁkāras i.e. figures of speech or turns of expression, or in rīti or style, vṛtti or diction etc. They did not realise the importance of recognising a separate śabda-śakti called vyañjanā. We have noticed in the earlier chapters how they not only subsumed the implicit or suggested sense or dhvani in various categories, but also never attempted any independent investigation in the nature of various word-powers. It is Ānandavardhana, and following him the great Abhinavagupta and Mammatā who try to discuss separately the topic of semantics proper as in their opinion, this implicit sense which they hold higher than the expressed sense from the point of
view of beauty in poetry, is arrived at through the agency of vyañjanā or the word-
power of suggestivity which is separate and independent of abhidhā or the word-
power yielding directly expressed sense, and also lakṣanā, yielding the indicated
sense. Perhaps the ancients did not do this as the heritage they received from
dārśanika or philosophical writings, or grammar, did not care to brood over vyañjanā. We have seen in earlier chapters how the Mīmāṃśā, Nyāya and
Vyākaraṇa disciplines concerned themselves only with abhidhā and lakṣanā. But we
have also tried in our own humble way that these philosophers or dārśanikas did
not take notice of vyañjanā and implicit sense, because they had no business to deal
with the same. They were out to interpret vedaṇa, śruti, and direct and
unambiguous expression was the soul virtue in contention. But we have seen traces
of recognition of or consciousness concerning the implicit sense and even
suggestive power in earliest documents such as the Vedas, and the various
disciplines connected with the same. Whatever it may be, but for us, for the present,
we begin the talk of ‘pratīyamāna’ sense i.e. implicit sense in poetry or kāvya and
its apprehension through the agency of vyañjanā or suggestive power of the word,
only with Ānandavardhana’s Dhvanyāloka (Dhv.), so far as available documents
are concerned. It is he who has recommended the use of the technical term ‘dhvani’
or suggested sense which is held to be principal as compared to other possible
categories, from the point of view of poetic beauty. We will go to see how he tries
to define the same and also classify it. For him this dhvani is of three kinds, i.e. of
the form of ‘vastu’ or suggestion of an idea, theme or matter, ‘alamkāra’ or
suggestion of a figure of speech i.e. a turn of expression and ‘rasā”di’ or suggestion
of emotive stuff such as a feeling or a sentiment etc. It may be observed, as we will
go to see, that the term ‘rasa’ has a wider connotation meaning aesthetic delight,
which goes beyond emotive stuff only. It has to be clearly understood that this
three-fold implicit sense is technically termed ‘dhvani’ only when it is held as the
principal or supreme source of causing poetic beauty. Then, extending the scope of
this technical term ‘dhvani’ further, Ānandavardhana holds that the poetry graced
by this supreme beauty of dhvani is also termed ‘dhvani kāvya’, irrespective of its
external form such as either prose i.e. gadya, or verse i.e. padya or mixed, or that
which is written in form of a dramatic piece to be presented on stage. It could be
a single verse i.e. sloka or a huge composition-prabandha. Thus, that class of poetry
or kāvya is termed ‘dhvani-kāvya’ which is having dhvani or suggested sense as the
highest or principal source of poetic beauty, or aesthetic experience in general. So,
calling a given piece of poetry by the name ‘dhvani’ is a criticism based approach,
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once and for all. All external forms of poetry, either nibaddha, or a-nibaddha, gadya, padya, mśra, abhineya, anabhineya, geya or whatever, can be classed as ‘dhvani’ from the point of view of criticism, or to be more precise, vyañjanā-biased criticism.

Ānandavardhana is not blind to other possibilities in poetry and is charitable enough to accept other ‘types’ or ‘class’ of poetry called the guñībhūta-vyañγya or poetry of subordinated suggestion and also ‘citra-kāvyā’, a type where this suggested element is either negligible or of no value, or is totally absent. But he for himself does not brand these types respectively as ‘uttama’ or the best or highest type of poetry, ‘madhyama’ or second-rate poetry and ‘adhamā’ of the lowest i.e. third-rate poetry. It is Mammaṭa who makes bold to make these terms current and his posterity accepted this terminology without question. However, the basic fact remains that classification of poetry into ‘dhvani’, ‘guñībhūtavyaṅγya’, and ‘citra’, or ‘uttama (even ‘uttamottama’ with Jagannātha), ‘madhyama’ and ‘avara’ is absolutely criticism based, is vyañjanā-biased and is irrespective of its external form or size.

We humbly believe that the oldest available, and therefore to be taken as first written document on Dhvani, is the ‘Dhvyāloka’ which is a composite unit in itself written by a single author, the great Ānandavardhana, who wrote down the kārikās, the vṛtti or gloss and also adorned his arguments by apt quotations from the vast poetic literature spread before him in the form of works of the great poets viz. Vyāsa, Vālmīki, Kālidāsa, Bāna, and scores and scores of others who have engrammed their names in golden letters in the history of Sanskrit poetry.

Of course, some scholars are of the opinion that the kārikās were authored by some unknown person, and had come down to Ānandavardhana as an oral legacy and that the latter wrote only the vṛtti portion or gloss. But we have absolutely no faith in such useless talks. For us the whole work known as the Dhvanyāloka or Kāvyāloka is a single composite unit written by only Ānandavardhana. We follow in this regard the lead of Prof.s Dr. K. Krishnamoorthy, D. R. Mankad, and the rest. We believe that this theory of single authorship receives strength not only from various observations in the A.bh., as pointed out by Dr. K. Krishnamoorthy, but also from the tradition current among literary critics in Sanskrit who unequivocally declare Ānandavardhana to be “The dhvanikāra”, and also from a quotation from the Locana of Abhinavagupta who observes that this tradition of dhvani was handed over to posterity only orally without being put in a book form. So, the Dhv. is the first composite unit of its type written by Ānandavardhana himself, who is
also the ‘joy’ or ‘ānanda’ of the connoisseurs. He observes: (Locana, Dhv. I. i.): “a-vicchinnena pravāheṇa tair etad uktaṁ vinā’pi viśiṣṭa-pustakeṣu viniveśanād ity abhiprāyah.” Thus no book - even in form of written kārikās or collection of the same was known to Abhinavagupta. Only thought-currents travelled from centuries to centuries. Thoughts and thoughts only, in whatever from, but that of anything concrete. There is yet another observation to this effect. The Locanakāra observes: “ānanda iti ca granthakṛto nāma. tena sa ānandavardhanā”cārya etac chāstreṇa sahṛdaya-hṛdayeṣu pratiṣṭhām devatāyatanā”divad anaśvarīṁ sthitīṁ gacchatu iti bhāvah.” (on Dhv. I. i.). This is in explanation of the author's i.e. Ānandavardhana’s veiled claim of having authored the whole of the Dhv. in the words: “tasya hi dhvanēḥ svarūpaṁ, sakala-kavi-kāvyōpaniṣadbhūтаṁ, aṭi-rāmaṇīyaṁ, anīyasibhir api cirantana-kāvyā-lakṣaṇa- vidhāyinām buddhībhir an-unmūlītapūrvaṁ, atha ca, rāmaṇya-mahābhārata-prabhṛtini laksye prasiddha-vyavahāraṁ lakṣayatāṁ sahṛdayānam ānando manasi labhatāṁ pratiṣṭhām iti prakāṣyate.” (vṛtti, on Dhv. I. i.)

But, it should be noted that before Ā. (= Ānandavardhana) put his golden heritage of literary criticism on a sound and irrevokable footing, in a book-form, in form of a theory to be accepted and followed by a host of rare intellectuals spread over centuries, he also could make out some dissenting voice, some resistance or opposition to this new theory of dhvani and he voices the same in the very first kārikā of his famous work. Ā. observes:

kāvyasyā”tmā dhvanir iti budhair
yaḥ samāmnāta-pūrvas,
tasyā’bhāvaṁ jagadur apare,
bhāktam āhus tam anye,
kecid vācām sthitam avisaye
tattvam ūcus tadiyaṁ
tena brūmaḥ, sahṛdaya-manaḥ-
pritaye, tat svarūpam.” (Dhv. I. i.)

“Though the learned men of yore have declared time and again that the soul of poetry is suggestion, some would aver its non-existence, some would regard it as something (logically) implied and some others would speak, of its essence as lying beyond the scope of words. We propose, therefore, to explain its nature and delight to the hearts of perceptive critics.” (Trans. K. Krish.)
The learned men, meaning those who know the truth about poetry, have taught, through an unbroken tradition, that the soul, i.e. essence of poetry has been named ‘dhvani’ i.e. suggestion. This they have confirmed by an all round examination and then declared as such. But although it is felt so by cultured critics in their minds, there are others who affirmed the non-existence of dhvani. These are the different views of the non-believers in Dhvani.

We will examine this dhvanirodha or views of anti-dhvani theorists later in a separate chapter, but for the present we attempt to explain the form and varieties of dhvani as laid out by Ā. After suggesting the opposition to the concept of dhvani, Ā. (= Ānandavardhana) observes: “tena evamvidhāsu vimatīṣu sthitāsu, sahrdaya- manāḥ prītaye tat-svarūpam brūmah.” “In view of the prevalence of so many conflicting opinions, we propose to elucidate the nature of suggestion for the delight of the perceptive critics.” (Trans. K. Krish. pp. 7, ibid)

Ā. observes: (Dhv. I. i.; vṛtti) - “tasya hi dhvaneḥ svarūpam sakala-kāvyāṃ pañcāḥ-dhūtam, ati-ramanīyam aniṣṭānābhīr api cīvantana-kāvyā-laksānā-viśhāyināṃ buddhiḥbhir anunmilītāpūrvarm, atha ca rāmāyaṇa-mahābhārata-prabhūtini lakṣye sarvatra prasidāh-vyavahāraṃ laksāyatām sahrdayānāṃ anand manasi labhatāṃ pratiṣṭhām iti prakāṣyate.” - i.e. “Suggestion itself is both the quintessence of the works of all first-rate poets and the most beautiful principle of poetry though it remained unnoticed even by the subtlest of the rhetoritions of the past. However, refined critics are certainly alive to its primary presence in literary works like the Rāmāyaṇa and the Mahābhārata; and with a view to placing their delight on a secure footing, we shall explain its nature (in detail).”

(Trans. K. Kris.; p. 7, ibid)

For preparing the base or ground work for his theory, Ā. (Dhv. I. 2, 3, 4 & 5) observes that, “That meaning which wins the admiration of refined critics is decided to be the soul of poetry. The ‘explicit’ and the ‘implicit’ are regarded as its two aspects. (Dhv. I. 2) (Trans. K. Krish., p. 7, ibid)

“Of these, the explicit is commonly known and it has been already set forth in many ways through figures of speech such as the simile by other writers, hence it is not to be discussed here at length.” (Dhv. I. 3, pp. 7, ibid)

“But the implicit aspect is quite different from this. In the words of the first-rate poets it shines supreme and towers above the beauty of the striking external constituents even as charm in ladies.” (Dhv. I. 4. pp. 7, ibid)

“That meaning alone is the soul of poetry; and so it was that, of yore, the sorrow
of the first poet (i.e. Vālmīki) at the separation of the curlew couple took the form of a distich.” (Dhv. I. 5. pp. 13, ibid) (Trans. K. Kris.)

While elaborating this in his vṛtti on the above kārikās, Ā. observes that the meaning which wins the admiration of perceptive critics or men of taste, and which is of the very essence of poetry has two aspects, viz. the explicit or external and the implicit or internal.

The implicit aspect, which is quite different from the explicit, is found in the words of great first-rate poets. It is closer to the minds of the cultured critics and it shines forth as being over and above the, ‘striking external constituents’, which includes not only the element adorned with or of the form of figures of speech, but also that which is ‘perceptible to senses’. Charm in the ladies is the simile in point. Just as this charm exceeds the beauty of all the individual limbs observed separately, and delights like ambrosia, the eye of the admirer in a most unique fashion, so also does this meaning having various divisions such as bare idea (vastumātra), figures and sentiments. In all these varieties it will be shown as differing from the explicit -“sa hyartho vācyā-sāmarthy ā”kṣiptam vastumātram alamkāra rasā”dayaś ca ity anekaprabhedaprabhinno darśayiṣyate. sarveṣu ca tesa prakāresu tasya vācyād anyatvam.” (vṛtti. on Dhv. I. 4). Dr. K. Kris. translates “rasa” as “sentiment” only. But for us it is more than just that. It is “total aesthetic experience” also.

The vastu-rūpa-vyaṅga or suggestion in form of an idea is different from the expressed in the sense that at times when the expressed is of the positive nature, i.e. vidhi, the suggested takes the form of a negative nature or prohibition as in case of the verse such as, “bhrama dhārmika”, etc. At times when the expressed is prohibitory the suggested is positive e.g. in, “śvaṣrūr atra śete”, etc. At times the expressed is of the form of vidhi i.e. a positive proposal, the implicit is neither positive nor negative in nature, as in, “vraja, mama eva ekasyāḥ.” etc. or, at times when the expressed is a prohibitive proposal, the implicit is neither positive nor prohibitive (i.e. an-ubhaya), as in, “prārthaye tāvat prasīda.” etc. At times, the implicit is related to something entirely different from that to which the explicit is related as in case of, “kasya vā na bhavati.” etc. Ā. observes that besides these there are various other forms in which the varieties of the implicit appear distinct from the explicit : “anye ca evamprakārāḥ vācyād vibhedinaḥ pratiyamāna-bhedāḥ sambhavanti.” (vṛtti., Dhv. I. 4). Only some of them have been illustrated here. Bhoja and following him H.C., illustrate other possibilities also.

Then Ā. observes that the next variety, viz. the suggested figure, also differs from the explicit sense. But this he says, will be discussed later.
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But the third variety of the implicit viz. the sentiments etc., shines forth due to the latent power in the expressed: "trīyastu rasā"di-lakṣaṇaḥ prabheda vācyavāyāpāra-visaya iti vācyād vibhinna eva" (vṛtti, Dhw. I. iv). Thus, this variety of the implicit viz. rasā"di, never becomes an object of direct verbal denotation and hence it is necessarily distinct from the explicit or expressed.

Before we proceed to examine how Ā, explains this point, we will pay attention to what the Locana kāra i.e. Abhinavagupta has to say. He observes (Locana, Dhw. I. iv) that the implicit sense is primarily two-fold such as "laukika" i.e. that which is also met with in ordinary parlance, and the other one, "which is exclusively the object of poetic effort." Out of these two, the first, viz. the 'laukika' is, at times, also conveyed by placing its own name, i.e. it be comes sva-sābda-vācya, i.e. it is capable of being denoted by its proper name. It is manifold, taking the form of 'vidhi' or positive proposal, or 'niśedha' i.e. prohibition etc., and is termed 'vastu' or 'idea'.

This 'laukika prātiyamāna' is two-fold such as (i) that which formerly in ā given sentence sense has enjoyed the status of a figure of speech such as a 'simile' or upamā and the like, but for the present (being principally implied or suggested) not being subservient to anything else has lost its status of (an expressed) figure of speech, but as it was formerly designated as a figure, is now termed as 'alamkāra-dhvani' or (principally) suggested figure of speech, on the analogy of the "brāhmaṇa-śramaṇa-nyāya". (ii) the second as noted above is a bare 'idea' or vastu. Thus 'laukika prātiyamāna' is fully explained.

The other suggested sense viz. 'alaukika', is such that it can not ever be conveyed by its own proper name, even in a dream, and is certainly not an object of worldly context. This type of suggested sense is an object only of the poetic function. Its nature is of the highest divine bliss. The fact is that all individuals have the emotions such as 'rati' and the like engraved in their conscience from times immemorial. When they see something being enacted on the stage, or listen (or read) certain words in poetry, they experience in their hearts such vibhāvā"dis i.e. determinants, consequents and ancillary feelings, that being congenial to their taste and mental attitude, look beautiful and cause to arise their emotions such as 'rati' and the like which are there in the heart as permanent latent impressions. At this moment, the connoisseur has a feeling of divine bliss. This experience of divine bliss is termed 'rasa', i.e. 'rasā"di-dhvani'. Pratically, says Abhinavagupta, in reality only this variety viz. rasā"di-dhvani is "dhvani" proper, in the real sense, and only this is the "soul" of poetry (or any art in general), and the other two, viz. vastu-dhvani and alamkāra-dhvani ultimately terminate into rasa-dhvani, which alone is therefore, the 'soul' of poetry. Locana (on Dhw. I. iv) reads as :
“tatra pratīyamānasya tāvad dvau bhedaḥ; laukikaḥ, kāvya-vyāpāraikagocaraś ca, iti. laukiko yaḥ sva-sabda-vācyatāṁ kadācid adhiśete, sa ca viḍhi-niṣedhā”dy aneka-prakāro vastu-sabdenōcyate. sōpi dvividhāḥ. yaḥ pūrvaṁ kvāpi vākyārthe alāṃkārabhāvam upamā”di-rūpatāṁ anvabhūt, idānim tv analāṃkārarūpa eva, anyatra guṇībhāvabhiḥvāt. sa pūrva-pratīyabhiñāṇa-balād alāṃkāra-dhvanir iti vyapadiśyate, brāhmaṇaśramana-nyāyena. tad rūpatābhāvena tūpalakṣitam vastumātram ucyate. mātragrahaḥena hi rūpāntaram nirākṛtam. yas tu svapne’pi na sva-sabda-vācyo na laukika-vyavahāra-patitoḥ kintu śabda-samrpamānaḥ \-dṛdaya-sāṃvāda-sundara-vibhāvānubhāva-samucita-prāgvinivīṣṭa-ratya”di-vāsanānūraṇa-ṣukmāra-sva-sāṃvid-ānanda-carvanā-vyāpāra-rasaniya-rūpo rasah, sa kāvya-vyāpāraikagocarasaś”dhvanir iti, sa ca dvanir eva iti, sa eva mukhyataya ātmā iti.”

That this ‘rasa’di’ dhvani is absolutely different is explained by Ā. as follows: “It never becomes an object of direct verbal denotation and hence it is decidedly distinct from the explicit. If at all, it could be an object of the explicit, it might be so alleged either as being directly denoted by its proper names or as being denoted through the delineation of characters in a setting, etc. If the first alternative were true, there would be no possibility of an experience of sentiments etc., in instances where their proper names are not employed. Never are they so denoted directly by their proper names. Even when proper names are present, the experience of sentiments etc., is not due to them but only due to delineation of characters in a proper setting etc. The experience of sentiments etc. is only given a designation by the proper name, is not at all conditioned by it. In fact we do not have the experience (of sentiments etc.) in all the instances where proper names are used. Indeed, there is not even the slightest experience of the presence of sentiments in a composition which contains only their proper names such as the Erotic and which is destitute of all delineation of the characters in a setting and so forth. Since we can have the experience of sentiments etc. only through the characters in a setting etc. irrespective of their proper names, and since we cannot have the experience only by the use of proper names, we may conclude on the basis of these considerations, both positive and negative, that sentiments etc. are only implied by the latent power of the explicit and in no way denoted explicitly. Thus it is established that even the third class of the implicit meaning is quite distinct from the explicit. It will be shown in sequel, however, that its experience will appear to be almost simultaneous with the explicit.” (Vṛtti, on Dha. I. IV; Trans. K. Krish. pp. 11, 13, ibid)
We may add that even by taking the proper names also, if we had the experience of rasa, then in that case we could have experienced all the eight sentiments, when we recited the famous kārikā of Bharata enumerating the eight sentiments, such as: "śṛṅgāra-vīra-karuṇa." etc. But this is not so.

It may be noted that in these three varieties of dhvani i.e. implicit sense, it is only the ‘rasā’di’ type which is the ‘soul’ of poetry, though theoretically Ā. places all the three on a par. Ā. suggests that only rasā”di-dhvani is the ‘soul’ of poetry in the real sense when at Dhv. I.V. he suggests that in Rāmāyaṇa of Ādi kavi Vālmiki, it is the ‘śoka’ born of the separation of the curlew couple which is principle in form of karuṇa rasa. It is only the karuṇa-rasa which is principally suggested in Rāmāyaṇa and thus only that is the object of the whole composition. It may be noted here that in this famous kārikā (i.e. Dhv. I.V) we do not have to construe “Vālmikeḥ śokaḥ”, but we have to take it as “generalized śoka has become the object of Vālmiki’s śloka, i.e. composition. - śokaḥ vālmikeḥ śokatvaṁ āgataḥ.” - Ā. observes that though the implicit is having three forms, the illustration of Rāmāyaṇa is cited only to bring home a point that in fact, virtually, it alone (i.e. ‘rasā”di alone) is the principal variety. By mentioning ‘rasa-bhāva”di’, explains the Locanakāra, Ā. here includes all varieties such as rasā”bhāsa, bhāva”bhāsa, bhāvodaya, bhāva-saṁdhi, bhāva-sābalatā, bhāva-praśama etc.

Read Ā.: (vṛtti, Dhv. I. 5): pratīyamānaśya ca anyabheda-darśanēpi rasa-bhāva-mukhena eva upalakṣaṇam; prādhānyāt.”

On this read Locana: “tena rasa eva vastutaḥ ātmā. vastvalaṁkāra-dhvani tu sarvathā rasam prati pāryavasyete iti vācyād utkṛṣṭau tāv ily abhiprāyeṇa “dhvaniḥ kāvyasya ātmā’ iti sāmānyena uktiḥ” ... etc.

It may be noted that Abhinavagupta is exactly echoing Ā.’s views. He is not adding anything of his own when he observes as above that in reality rasa-dhvani alone should be considered as the ‘soul’ of poetry. This is borne out by observations from the Dhv. at a number of places as we will be pointing out from time to time. But for the present we quote from vṛtti, on Dhv. I. 6. Ā. observes: “pratīyamānaśya ca anyabheda-darśanēpi rasa-bhāva-mukhena eva upalakṣaṇam, prādhānyāt.” Though one can discern other sub-species of the implicit, they can all be understood by the synecdoche of sentiments and emotions since these happen to be the most important representatives of the rest.”

Abhinavagupta further observes (on Dhv. I. 6): “evaṁ itihāsa-mukhena pratīyamānaśya kāvyā”tmatāṁ pradarśya, sva-saṁvit-siddham apy etad iti darśayati -
“Thus after establishing that the implicit is the soul of poetry by referring to a historic (factual) illustration (such as the Rāmāyana), now the author, (i.e. Ā.) shows that it is self-evident also.” Ā. here observes at Dhv. I. 6:

“sarasvatī svādu tād artha-vastu
nisyandamānā mahatām kavinām,
aloka-sāmānyam abhivyanaụti
cira-sphurantaḥ pratibhā-viśeṣaṃ.”

“The speech of the first-rate poets streaming forth that sweet content reveals clearly their extra ordinary genius, which is as unearthly as it is ever bright.” (Trans. K. Kris. pp. 15, ibid)

“The speech of first-rate poets which streams forth such subjects as are full of the said meaning will reveal most clearly the extraordinary genius of the poets; a genius which not only appears unearthly but also ever bright. Hence it is that though the world of traditionally accepted poets is wide and varied, only two or three, or at the most five or six amongst them such as Kālidāsa, are counted as first-rate poets.” (Trans. K. Kris. p. 15, ibid, vṛtti on Dhv. I. 6)

One more evidence to prove the existence of the implicit sense is given by Ā. at Dhv. I. 7 in which he observes that this fact of implicit sense is not understood merely by knowing grammar and dictionary alone. But it is understood only by those who have an insight into the true significance of poetry.

By mere learning the rules of grammar and meanings shown in the lexicons, that implicit sense cannot be grasped. Only those who have a real insight into the true significance of poetry will be able to grasp the same. In case this implicit sense too were the same as the expressed or explicit sense, then merely by the knowledge of grammar and lexicon, and through it by the knowledge of the explicit, one and all could have been able to fix the implicit also. But the fact is that this implicit sense remains beyond the grasp of those who have mastery only on grammar and lexicon, i.e. on the science of meanings and words alone, but who are averse to aesthetic contemplation ("vācyā-vācaka-lakṣana-mātra-kṛta-śramāṇām, kāvyatattvārtha-bhāvānā-vimukhānām" - vṛtti, Dhv. I. 7, pp. 14, ibid) - of intrinsic significance of poetry. This is like the fact that true appreciation of notes and tones of music remains beyond the reach of scholars in the science of music, if they are themselves not good musicians.
Thus, after establishing the separate and independent existence of the implicit sense in poetry, Ā. comes to establish that only this implicit sense alone is, or should be, principle (source of charm) in poetry. He observes at Dhv. I. 8:

-evam vācyā-vyatirekiṇo vyaṅgyasya sadbhāvam pratipādyā prādhānyam tasya eva iti darśayati -

sōrthas tadvyakti-sāmarthya-yogī
śabdaś ca kaścana,
yatnataḥ pratyabhijñyau
tau śabdārthau mahākaveh.”

sa vyaṅgyórthaḥ tad-vyakti-sāmarthya-yogī śabdaś ca kaścana, na sarvaḥ, tāv eva śabdārthau mahākaveh pratyabhijñeyau. vyaṅgya-vyaṅjakābhyām eva hi suprayuktābhyāṃ mahākavitva-lābhho mahākavināṃ, na vācyā-vācaka-racanā- mātreṇa.”

“Thus after establishing the existence of the implicit meaning as distinct from the explicit, the over-riding superiority of that meaning is demonstrated in what follows:

That meaning, and that rare word which possesses the power of conveying it, only these two deserve the careful scrutiny of a first-rate poet. (I. 8)

‘that meaning’ refers to the implicit and ‘that rare word which possesses the power of conveying it’ points out that it is not any and every word (recorded in the dictionary). Such a word and such a meaning, only these two, deserve the careful recognition of a first-rate poet. The status of first-rate poets is achieved only by the effective employment of suggested meanings and suggestive expressions and not by a mere use of conventional meanings and conventional words.” (Trans. K. Kris. pp. 15, 17, ibid)

Ā. of course is careful to add that even though the relation of the suggested-suggestor is of prime importance, the poet, to begin with, directs his efforts to the expressed and the expressor, i.e. conventional meaning and conventional word. This is explained by an analogy. Just as a man in quest of light for perception of objects, first takes care to secure a lamp, in the same way, a poet having regard for and ultimate interest in the suggested sense, first directs his efforts towards the conventional meaning. Ā. (Dhv. I. 10) suggests that just as the purport of a sentence is collected through the meaning of its individual components i.e. words in a sentence, similarly, the apprehension of that (= suggested) sense follows the
same of the conventional sense, i.e. the directly expressed sense. The ‘vyaṅgyārtha-pratīti’ is necessarily, “vācyārtha-pratīti-pūrvikā”. At the same time Ā. adds a warning that though the apprehension of the expressed sense necessarily precedes the same of the suggested sense, the principal status lies with the latter, i.e. the apprehension of the suggested sense only. “Ā. observes (vṛtti, prior to Dhv. I. 11) : “idānīṁ vācyārthapratīti-pūrvakarvēpi tat-pratīter vyaṅgyasya arthaśya prādhānyaṁ yathā na vyālupya tathā darśayati :

sva-sāmarthya-vaśenaiva
vākyārtham prathayann api,
yathā vyāpāra-nispartau
padārtho na vibhāvyate (Dhv. I. 11)

- yathā sva-sāmarthya-vaśenaiva vākyārtham prakāśayannapi padārtho vyāpāra-nispartau na vibhāvyate vibhaktatayā -

- “tadvat sacetasāṁ sōrtho
vācyārtha-vimukhātmānāṁ,
buddhau tattvārtha-dārsīnyāṁ
jhaṭity evāvabhāsate.” (Dhv. I. 12)

“Now, even though the knowledge of the suggested sense is thus invariably preceded by a knowledge of the conventional sense, it is shown below how its importance does not grow less on that account :

Though by its own power the word-import is responsible for conveying the sentence-import, just as it escapes notice once its purpose is served (Dhv. I. 11).

While it is true that word-import itself conveys sentence-import through its own power, just as it does not at the same time appear as distinct from the sentence-import once this latter has been conveyed :

so also, that suggested meaning flashes suddenly across the truth-perceiving minds of perceptive critics, when they turn away from the literal meaning. (Dhv. I. 12) (Trans. K. Kris. pp. 17-19, ibid)

Now this is a very interesting situation. We know that technically Ā. accepts the position of “guṇībhūta-vyaṅgya” i.e. ‘subordinated suggestion’, but his inner bias towards the supremacy of the suggested meaning, of course as a source of ultimate poetic charm, is very much clear in such utterances. Elsewhere this guṇībhūta vyaṅgya i.e. the suggested content being subordinated to the expressed i.e. vācyā
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content is compared to a king joining the vara-yātrā or bridegroom’s procession. Here of course the bridegroom is no doubt most important from the contextual point of view, because it is he who is going to marry the bride, but the king who has joined this procession of a bridegroom who happens to be the son of His Majesty’s minister or any other senior officer, is virtually the centre of attraction and even the bridegroom’s importance sky-rockets because the king, as a guest, has chosen to follow him. This shows that in the heart of his heart Ā.’s preference lies with the suggested sense, in any context. It is precisely this vyaṅgya-biased attitude which has prompted his arch rival Mahimā to reject the category of the so called guṇībhūta-vyaṅgya and accept the supremacy only of the ‘other’ sense, i.e. ‘anumeya’ for him, in place of Ā’s ‘vyaṅgya’. This our observation deserves special notice of the learned.

In the third Udyota, of course, Ā. improves upon this analogy of padārtha-vākyārtha-nyāya between vācya-vyaṅgya, and instead, projects the “ghaṭa-pradeepa-nyāya”. This is guided by the consideration of saving vyaṅjanā being branded only as laksanā, wherein there is clear mukhyārtha-bādha. In vyaṅjanā, especially rasādi-vyaṅjanā, the vācya-pratiti is not totally efaced. Actually the two apprehensions co-exist.

Thus, after establishing the existence of the suggested meaning which is superior to i.e. more charming than the expressed or conventional sense to his satisfaction, Ā. proceeds to define this principal suggested sense (i.e. the sense which is the principal source of poetic charm) in poetry at Dhv. I. 13:

Ā. observes:

“yatrārthah śabdo vā
tam artham upa-sarjanīkṛta-svārthau
vyaṅkraḥ, kāvyaviśeṣaḥ sa
dhvanir iti sūribhiḥ kathitatḥ.”

“That kind of poetry, wherein the (conventional) meaning renders itself secondary or the (conventional) word renders its meaning secondary and suggests the (intended or) implied meaning, is designated by the learned as ‘Dhvani’ or ‘Suggestive poetry.” (Trans. K. Kris. p. 19, ibid)

This definition is applicable simultaneously to both the principally suggested sense in poetry, as well as that type of poetry which is having suggested sense as the principal (source of charm). He observes that by this definition it is shown how
the province of suggestive poetry is absolutely different from that of the sources of charm to explicit or expressed sense, such as the figure simile i.e. upamā, on the one hand, and from that of the sources of charm in distinctive sound such as the figure ‘anuprāsa’ or alliteration on the other: “yatārtho vācyā-viśeṣaḥ, vācaka-viśeṣaḥ śabdō vā tam arthaṁ vyāṅktadh sa kāvyā-viśeṣo dhvanir iti. anena vācyā-vācaka-cārūṭva-hetubhyaḥ upamā”dibhyah anuprāsaḥ dibhyas ca vibhakta eva dhvaner viśaya iti darśitam.” (vr̥tti, on Dhv. I. 13)

Abhinavagupta observes in his Locana (on Dhv. I. 13) here that by the dual form “vyāṅktaḥ”, it is suggested that, be it that dhvani is either ‘śabda-sakti-mūlaka’ or ‘artha-sakti-mūlaka’, but in either case, virtually there is instrumentality of both word and sense together in bringing about the intended suggestion. (Thus the use of dual form is justified). So, as seen earlier in vyāṅjanāvīrodha, the objection raised by Mahimā is utterly baseless. But Abhinavagupta’s remark is certainly directed against Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka (perhaps in his Hṛdaya-darpaṇa) who was followed in this regard by Mahimā - “yad bhaṭṭanāyakena dvi-vacanaṁ dūṣitam tad gaja-ṇimilikāya eva.” (Locana, on Dhv. I. 13)

After this Ā. takes up the refutation of those who did not accept the existence of dhvani i.e. those who were dhvany-abhāva-vādins. We will take this up separately later. But for the present we continue with his further observation. Ā. says that by “sūribhiḥ kathitaḥ” is meant that dhvani has been established or discussed by the learned. It is not established in a haphazard way therefore it is intended that this principle is reliable. Ā. observes the grammarians are the first among the learned. They refer to articulate letters by the term ‘dhvani’ or ‘suggestion’. In the same way, the element of suggestion being common (to both), the same designation, viz. ‘dhvani’ is given to word, meaning, the essential verbal power, and also poetry which contains all these : (vr̥tti, on Dhv. I. 13) - “prathame hi vidvamśo vaiyākaraṇāḥ, vyakaraṇa-mūlatvāt sarva-vidyānām. te ca śrūyamāṇesu varṇeṣu dhvanir iti vyavaharanti. tathaivaṁśa tanmatānusāribhiḥ sūribhiḥ kāvyata-tattvārtha-darśibhiḥ vācyā-vācaka-sammiśraḥ śabdātmā kāvyam iti vyapadeśyo vyaṅjakatva-sāmyād dhvanir ity uktaḥ.”

Abhinavagupta (Locana, Dhv. I. 13) reads as follows: “asmābhīr api prasiddhebhhyāḥ śabda-vaipārebhhyāḥ abhidhā-tātparya-lakṣaṇā-rupebhhyāḥ atiriktaḥ vaippāraḥ dhvanir ity uktaḥ. evaṁ catuskam api dhvanīḥ. tad yogāc ca samastam api kāvyam dhvanīḥ. tena vyatirekā-vyatireka-vyapadesōpi na na yuktaḥ. vācyā-vācaka-sammiśra iti. vācyā-vācaka-sahitaḥ sammiśra iti madhyamapadalopī samāsaḥ.”
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‘gām āsvaṁ puruṣaṁ paśum’ iti vat samuccayótra, ca-käreṇa vinā’pi.

tena vācyópi dhvaniḥ, vācākópi śabdo dhvaniḥ, dvayor api vyañjakatvam
‘dhvanati’ iti kṛtvā. śabdahām śabdaḥ, śabda-vyāpārah, na cāsau abhidhādi-rūpaḥ
api tu ātma-bhūtaḥ, sópi dhvananaṁ dhvaniḥ. kāvyam iti vyapadeśyaḥ ca yóṛtaḥ,
sópi dhvaniḥ. ukta-prakāra-catuṣṭayamayatvāt; ata eva sādhāraṇaḥherum āha -
vyañjakatvasāmyād iti. vyaṅgya-vyañjakabhāvah sarvesu pakṣeṣu sāmānyarūpaḥ
sādhāraṇa ity arthah.”

Ā. further observes that a treatment, then, of such a wider or comprehensive
concept as suggestion, with all its divisions and sub-divisions which are yet to be
explained in the sequel, is certainly not at all on a par with the enumeration of the
well known, specific figures of speech, and hence the enthusiasm of persons
imbued in their minds with the value of suggestion is quite proper. Nobody should
display jealousy to show that they are all men of deranged minds.

Thus it is not proper to subsume dhvani under either an alamkāra or a guṇa.
The effort of those who seek to establish the same is absolutely in the right
direction. Thus dhvani does exist and is basically two-fold, viz. avivaksita-vācya and
vivaksitānypara-vācya i.e. (i) with un-intended literal sense and (ii) with intended
but further-extending literal import.

Thus after first establishing dhvani as a principal and separate entity by
advancing logical arguments, Ā. in the second and third udyotās, discusses all
related topics also. We will look into the divisions and sub-divisions of dhvani later.
But it may be noted beforehand that Ā. thought of a fool-proof scheme of
“vyāñjanā-dhvani-rasa” which was catholic or broad enough to correlate the
concepts such as guṇas or excellences, alamkāras or figures i.e. turns of speech, rīti
or style, vṛtti or diction, doṣa or poetic blemishes, samghaṭanā or texture etc. as
advanced by earlier ālamkārikas. He correlated all these concepts with the central
concept of rasa-dhvani. Guṇas were the ‘dharma’ or attributes of rasa-the soul, and
alamkāras and the rest as the suggesters of rasa secure their birth. Here lies the real
greatness of the Dhv.

This all-encompassing scheme of ‘vyāñjanā-dhvani-rasa’ which, as Ā. records
was promulgated since times immemorial but received a full support from him,
was strongly established by Ā.’s great followers such as Abhinavagupta, Mammata
and then the great writers such as Hemacandra, Vidyādhara, Vidyānātha,
Vīśvanātha, Appayya Dīṣit and Jagannātha. But prior to Ā.’s efforts and after Ā.’s
efforts this thought current of vyāñjanā-dhvani had to face stiff opposition, by a
number of unknown writers and though the concept of ‘rasa’ was acceptable to one and all, the concepts of dhvani and especially vyañjanā were challenged by such great names as Kuntaka, Dhanañjaya. Dhanika, and Mahimā, who followed the lead of Mukula and Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka. Of course Kuntaka could be labelled as a “praccchanna-dhvani-vādin”, but Mahimā was the greatest challenger whose inspiration perhaps came from both Śrī Śaṅkuka and also Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka who drafted his “Hṛdaya-darpaṇa” with “dhvani-dhvaṃsa” - demolition of dhvani-theory being his sole target. Then we also come across such opponents as recorded in the Locana and the K.P. of Mammaṭa, viz. the dīrgha-dīrghatara-vyāpāra-vādin mīmāṃsakas, the lakṣaṇāvādins or bhaktivādins etc. We have taken care of these under vyañjanā-virodha, for their thrust was greater against vyañjanā, then against the implicit sense or ‘pratiyamāna artha’ as such. We will take care of pure dhvani virodha as recorded in the Dvh. I. later, in a separate chapter but for the present, as noted above, we proceed with the divisions and sub-divisions or types or varieties and sub-varieties of ‘dhvani’ proper.

Dhvani-prabheda: Actually this topic of the varieties of dhvani is absolutely congruent with the three-fold criticism-based classification of poetry into dhvani, guṇībhūtavyāngya and citra, or in the words of Mammaṭa, uttama, madhyama and avara.

In the second udyota of the Dvh., the sub-divisions are enumerated from the point of view of ‘vyaṅgya’ i.e. suggested sense, and in the third udyota there is enumeration of the types of dhvani from the point of view of ‘vyañjakā’ or suggester. We will calculate the basic divisions here with the help of first, the Locana and then we will compare Locana’s scheme with that of Mammaṭa and Viśvanātha and then of course Jagannātha. We will also mention other authors of repute in between. We have already noted that basically Ā. has given a three-fold scheme of dhvani, guṇībhūtavyāngya and citra, with reference to the supreme importance of the suggested sense in dhvani, its lesser status as compared to the expressed sense as in guṇībhūtavyāngya and its absence or lack of any importance from the point of poetic charm in ‘citra’. This classification of poetry is “criticism oriented”, as against the one based on consideration of external form as noted by us.

First we will take up ‘dhvani’ (kāvya) for consideration.

Ā. informs us that in poetry there is what is called the ‘implicit’ or ‘pratiyamāna’ sense which is different from the explicit or conventional sense, i.e. ‘vācyā’ artha.
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At Dhv. I. 4, he says -

"pratīyamānaṃ punar anyad eva
vastv asti vāniṣu mahākāvīnām,
yat-tad-vibhaktāvayavātiriktaṃ
vibhāti ṭāvanyam ivānganāсу."

i.e. “But the implicit aspect is quite different from this. In the words of first-rate poets it shines supreme and towers above the beauty of the striking external constituents even as charm in ladies.” (Trans. K. Kris. pp. 7, ibid)

This implicit sense is three-fold such as bare idea (or matter), figures and sentiments etc., all implied by the inner power of the explicit : (vṛtti, on Dhv. I. 4) : “sa hyartho vācyā-sāmarthyā”kṣiptaṃ vastu-mātraṃ alaṃkārā rasā”dayaśca ity aneka-prabheda-prabhinno darśayisyate. sarveṣu ca teṣu prakāreseṣu tasya vācyād anyatvam.”

Now, after showing the importance of the implicit sense in poetry, Ā. attempts the classification of poetry which is three-fold such as dhvani, guṇi-bhūta-vyaṅgya and citra, as noted above. This classification has nothing to do with its external form, but is based on the consideration of the implicit sense being the principal source of charm or otherwise. In short, it is criticism based, so to say. All dhvanivādins beginning with Abhinavagupta and Mammaṭa accept this three-fold classification, with Jagannātha bringing a slight variation by making it four-fold, beginning with ‘uttamottama’, as we will go to see later.

To begin with, dhvani-kāvyā being vyaṅgyārtha-pradhāna has vyaṅjanā at its root. This vyaṅjanā is either based on abhidhā or laksāṇā. Thus dhvani, to begin with is two-fold, (i) abhidhāmūlaka and laksāṇāmūlaka. The first is termed -vivakṣitānyapara-vācyā-dhvani or suggestion with intended but further extending literal import, and (ii) a-vivakṣita-vācyā or dhvani with unintended literal import or unintended primary sense. This is laksāṇā-mūla-dhvani and is taken up first as it has a limited scope.

Normally as abhidhā comes first, we would expect that dhvani based on abhidhā or primary sense should have been considered first. But all alaṃkārikas beginning with Ā., followed by Mammaṭa, and down to Viśvanātha, have treated laksāṇāmūla-dhvani first as it has a very limited field. The abhidhāmūla or vivakṣitānyaparavācyā-dhvani has a very wide field. So on the analogy of “sūci-
kaṭāha-nyāya”, the avivaksita-vācya-dhvani-is taken up first for consideration. Thus, observes Ā. (vr̥tti, Dhv. I. 13) : “asti dhvaniḥ. sa ca asau avivakṣītāvācyo vivakṣītānyapara-vācyas ca iti dvividhaḥ sāmānyena.”

The term ‘avivakṣītāvācyas’ is explained by the Locanakāra (on Dhv. I. 13) as follows:

sa ca iti - pañcadhā’pi dhvani-śabdārthe yena, yatra, yato, yasya, yasmai iti bahu-vṛ̥tyartham”śrayena yathōcītam sāmānādhikaranam suyojyam. vācyérthe tu dhvanau vācyaśabdena svā”tmā tena a-vivakṣītaḥ apradhānīkṛtṛ̥thaḥ svā”tmā yena ityavivakṣītāvācyo vyañjakortheḥ. evaṃ vivakṣītānyaparavācyēpi.

yadi vā karmadhārayena arthapakṣe avivakṣītaḥ ca asau vācyaśca iti. vivakṣītānyaparaḥ c’auśa vācyas ca, iti. tatrārtheḥ kadācid anupapadyāmānatvā”dina nimittena a-vivakṣīto bhavati. kadācid upapadyāmāna iti kṛtvā vivakṣīta eva, vyāṅgya-paryantām tu prātiṣṭ, sva-saabhāgya-mahimnā karoti. ata eva’rtho’tra prādhānīyena vyāṅjakaḥ, pūrvarā śabdāḥ. nanu ca vivakṣā c’aṇyapararvam ca iti viruddham. anyaparitvena eva vivakṣānāt ko virodhaḥ? sāmānyena iti. vastv alamkāra-rasā”tmā hi tribhedo’pi dhvanir ubhāḥhyāṃ eva ābhīyāṃ samghītā iti bhāvāḥ nanu tanniśā-prētī the etannāmanivesānasya kim phalam? ucyate-anena hi nāmadvayena dhvananātmanā vyāpāre pūrva-prasiddhā’bhidhā – tātparyā-laksanā”tmaka-vyāpāra-śrataya’vagatārthaprātiṣṭ, pratipratgatāyāḥ prayoktrabhigpā-yaṛūpāyāḥ ca vivakṣāyāḥ saha kāritvam uktaṃ iti dhvani-svarūpam eva nāmabhīyāṃ eva prajjīvitam.”

Locanakāra wants to explain that the term ‘avivakṣītāvācyas’ can be understood by either resorting to the bahuvrīhi compound, or the karmadhāraya compound. From the point of view of five meanings of the term ‘dhvani’, we can accept the possibility of bahuvrīhi in the sense of tṛtiyā, saptamī, pāṇcami, śaṣṭhi and caturthi cases such as (i) that by which (= tṛtiyā) one’s own soul is rendered redundant i.e. a-vivakṣīta, i.e. vācya artha, (ii) that in (= saptamī) which vācya is ignored, i.e. vyaṅjanā-vyāpāra, (iii) that by which vācya becomes redundant, i.e. the hetus of vyaṅjanā-vyāpāra such as vācya-sāmarthya, etc., (iv) that whose vācya is not intended i.e. vācya śabda (= śaṣṭhi) and (v) that for which (= caturthi) vācya is made un-intended, i.e. vyaṅgyārtha.

Resorting to karmadhāraya, the term ‘avivakṣīta-vācya-dhvani’, will mean, “that which is a-vivakṣīta i.e. not intended and also vācya i.e. expressed directly. Locana holds that the term ‘vivakṣītānyapara-vācya-dhvani’ also can be explained in a
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similar fashion. The meaning of this term, taking karma-dhāraya, would mean, “that which is intended (vivakṣīta) eventhough being anya-paraka (or, subservient) to some other sense, and is also ‘vācyā’.

While accepting vyañjanā, two situations arise with reference to the directly expressed (vācyā) sense. The vācyārthā not looking compatible with the context, becomes un-intended. Or, the vācyārthā suits with the context, and hence the speaker does intend to convey the same by the word used in such a special way so that something very special creeps in that word, and this results in suggesting a fresh meaning. Out of these two apprehensions of the suggested sense, in the first the directly expressed sense, i.e. vācyārthā is not intended i.e. it becomes un-intended or a-vivakṣīta, and hence it is termed a-vivakṣīta-vācyā-dhvani. In the second apprehension of the suggested sense, the vācyārthā or directly expressed sense is intended - vivakṣīta-along with the suggested sense. Hence, it is termed “vivakṣītānyapara-vācyā-dhvani.” The illustrations cited by Ā. are, “suvarṇapuspāṃ prthivīm.” etc. and, “śikharini kva nu nāma.” etc., respectively. One noteworthy point is that eventhough, Ā. has talked of three-fold dhvani such as vastudhvani, etc., here only two divisions are underlined. Thus it is suggested by Ā., that the three-fold dhvani is fully covered up and contained in these two varieties. Actually, the three-fold scheme gives an idea of ‘what’ matter is suggested, while the two-fold scheme deals with ‘how’ whatever is suggested. Thus the two classifications are made from different angles. In the two-fold scheme the three-fold scheme is covered up. The intention behind this is that ‘dhvani’, which in itself is a ‘vyāpāra’ or function, has ‘sabda’ and ‘artha’ as ‘karaṇa’ or ‘cause’ at its root. In the ‘vivakṣītānyapara-vācyā-dhvani’ one ‘artha’ or meaning suggests another ‘artha’ or meaning. Thus the ‘artha’ becomes the suggester here. While on the otherhand in ‘avivakṣītānyapara-vācyā-dhvani’ the ‘artha’ is ‘avivakṣīta’ i.e. not intended and hence primarily the sabda or word is said to be the suggester here. When a word is heard, we collect meaning through the formerly known powers of a word, viz. abhidhā or direct expression yielding the expressed or conventional sense, laksanā or indication yielding the indicated sense, laksyārtha, and tātparya or purport. With this simultaneously the intention of the speaker, i.e. abhiprāya is also understood. For the realisation of this intention these two terms, viz. a-vivakṣīta-vācyā-dhvani, and vivakṣītānyapara-vācyā-dhvani are used. Thus the form of dhvani is rendered clear.

We will now show in a tabular form the divisions and sub-divisions of dhvani, as explained by Abhinavagupta in Locana, and as envisaged by Ā. in the Dhv. The
A table can be presented as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>dvāni</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>avivakṣitavācyā</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(i.e. lakṣānā-mūla)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>arthāntara-saṃkramita</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>atyanta-tiraskrtavācyā</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a-saṃlaksyakrama-vyaṃga-dhvani</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>saṃlaksyakrama-dhvani</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>śabda-saṃtīmula-dhvani</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>artha-saṃtīmula-dhvani</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>svataḥ saṃbhavi;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kavi-prauḍhoktisiddha;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kavi-nibaddha-vaktr- prauḍhokti-siddha;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>alamkāra &lt; vastu &lt; alamkāra &lt; vastu &lt; alamkāra &lt; vastu &lt; vastu;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| alamkāra; vastu; alamkāra; vastu; alamkāra

padagata vākyagata + 3 varieties of a-saṃlaksyakrama i.e. varṇa, saṃghaṭanā and prabandha (gata) = 35 śuddha-bhedāḥ

Thus following the explanation of the Loçanakāra, i.e. Abhinavagupta, Ā. has enumerated 35 basic varieties of dhvani. Taking into consideration saṃkara i.e. intermingling and saṃsṛsti i.e. collocation etc. the total will tend to grow in a manifold way. We will go to see later how Mammaṭa and Viśvanātha enumerate these varieties.

For the present we may again note the fact that (i) lakṣānā-mūla and (ii) abhidhāmūla are two basic varieties of dhvani and Ā. has given two basic subdivisions of these two. Thus Dhv. II. 1 explains:

“evaṃ avivakṣitavācyā-vivakṣitānyā-paravācyatvena dhvanir ādi-prakāraḥ prakāṣitaḥ. tatra a-vivakṣita-vācyasya prabheda-pratipādanāya idam ucyate -

arthāntare saṃkramitam
atyantaṃ vā tiraskṛtam,

a-vivakṣita-vācyasya

dhvane vérāṃ dvidhā matam. (Dhv. II. 1)

“So far, two varieties of suggestion, viz. “that with un-intended literal import”, and “that with intended but further-extending literal import” have been mentioned. Now the sub-varieties of the first are set forth in what follows :” (Trans. K. Kris.)
i.e. -

"Merged in the other meaning" and "completely lost", these are the two kinds of the expressed in, "suggestion with un-intended literal import." (Trans. K.Kris. pp. 39, ibid) (Dhv. II. 1)

These two sub-varieties being laksanā-mūlaka, i.e. based on indication, the mukhyārtha-bādha or non-acceptance of the primary sense is established here as a precondition. So, where in the apprehension of the suggested sense, laksyārtha is taken into account and vācyārtha becomes un-intended, i.e. it is found to be absolutely incongruous with the context, or is not intended even if found congruous with the context and therefore merges into another sense, at both these places avivakṣita-vācyā-dhvani is said to be there. Locana (on Dhv. II. 1) explains these two sub-varieties as follows: (In the term "arthāntara-saṃkramita) - "saṃkramitam iti ničā vyañjanā-vyāpāre yaḥ sahakārvārgas tasyāyam prabhāva ity uktam, tiraskṛta-sabdena ca. yena vācyena a-vivakṣitena satā avivakṣitavācyo dhvanir vyapadīsyate tad vācyam dvidhā iti sambandhaḥ. yōrthaḥ upapadyamānōpi tāvatā eva anupayogāt dharmāntara-samvalanayānyatām iva gato laksyamānō nugatadharmī sūtra-nyāyena āste, sa rūpāntara-parināta uktaḥ. yas tvanupapadyamāna upāyatāmātreṇa arthāntara-pratipattim kṛtvā - palāyata iva, sa tirskṛta iti.

nanu vyaṅgyā"tmano yadā dhvaner bheda nirūpyate, tadā vācyasya 'dvidhā' iti bhedakathanam na saṅgam ity āsaṅkya āha - "tathāvidhābhyyām ca" iti. caḥ yasmād arthe. vyaṅjaka-vaičītryād hi yuktam vyaṅgya-vaičītryaṃ iti bhāvah vyaṅjake tvārthe yadā dhvani-sabdās tadā na kaścid dosa iti - bhāvah.

In the term, "arthāntara-saṃkramita", 'nic' affix is seen in "saṃkramita". (This means it is not in the sense of "śuddha-kriyā-saṃkrānta") It is here in the sense of "praraṇa". The idea is that meaning owing to its own speciality does not proceed or pass (saṃkrānta) of its own, by being a companion or associate of vyaṅjanā-function or suggestivity it passes into the suggested sense with the help of suggestive power. The - kta-suffix in "tiraskṛta" also carries the same meaning. Thus the factors that associate with the suggester (or vyaṅjaka) become the cause in completely discarding the primary or conventional sense. The original kārikā has to be understood as follows: That vācyā or primary sense, when it becomes un-intended, dhvani is also said to be a-vivakṣita-vācyā, and this un-inteded vācyā is two-fold - (i) one, where the meaning is not in
conformity with the context; is not perfect in itself, and where it merges with other meanings for its complete sense and is apprehended as some other sense; and all these other qualities (which tend to give perfection) are suggested. All these attributes or qualities (i.e. dharmas), pass over in one substratum (i.e. dharmin) in a way such as different flowers are stringed in a single string or sūtra. This first variety of a-vivakṣita-vācyā-dhvani is said to be arthāntara-saṃkramita i.e. ‘merged in other meaning’. The illustration is the verse, viz., “snigdha-śyāmala-kānti.” etc.

(ii) The second is the a-vivakṣita-vācyā-dhvani, in which the expressed primary sense looks absolutely un-intended or out of context. The primary sense is absolutely non-congruent and thus gives rise to this second variety of dhvani. Here the primary sense becomes only instrumental (i.e. upāyabhūta) in the apprehension of the indicated sense i.e. ‘lakṣyārtha’. After this apprehension of the indicated sense, the primary sense is totally wiped out. Thus, as it is completely discarded, the dhvani (based on such a vācyā) is said to be “atyanta-tiraskṛta-vācyā-dhvani”. The illustration is, “ravi-saṃkrānta-saubhāgya.” etc.

With Dhv. II. 2. Ā. starts explaining the divisions and sub-divisions of the second variety of dhvani i.e. dhvani based on abhidhā or power of primary denotation. Ā. suggests that abhidhā-mūla-dhvani is two-fold, to begin with, i.e. (i) a-saṃlakṣyakrama-dhvani and (ii) saṃlakṣyakrama-dhvani. Ā. observes:

“a-saṃlakṣya-kramādyotaḥ
kramaṇa dyotāḥ paraḥ,
vivakṣitābhidheyasā
dhvaner ātmā dvidhā mataḥ.” (Dhv. II. 2)

“The nature of suggestion “with inteded literal import”, is also two-fold : (i) “of discernible sequentiality”, and (ii) “of undiscernible sequentiality.” - (Trans. K.Kris. p. 41, ibid)

These two types depend on the position where the sequence between the primary expressed sense and the suggested sense, is noticeable or not. Ā. observes:

“mukhyatayā prakāśamāno vyāṅgyōrtho dhvanerātmā. sa ca vācyārthāpekṣayā kaścid alaṅkṣya-kramatayā tulyam prakāśate, kaścit kramaṇa iti dvidhā mataḥ.”

“The nature of suggestion is the implied sense which is communicated predominantly. A variety of it is grasped simultaneously with the expressed, since the sequentiality existing between the two is not discernible. Another variety of the same comes
about when the sequentiality is discernible.” (Trans. K.Kris. pp. 41, ibid) The first variety is ‘a-samlaksyakrama dhvani’ and the second variety is termed, ‘samalaksyakrama-dhvani’.

At the root of both these varieties, lies abhidhā, i.e. the power of direct expression. There is neither any ‘bādha’ or contradiction of meaning, nor any disregard (tiraskāra) of vācyārtha, or its merging (samkramaṇa). Thus the literal sense is neither ‘completely lost’ nor ‘merged in the other meaning’. So, here, in both these varieties vyañjanā or suggestion is based on abhidhā i.e. the power of expression.

The two varieties of abhidhā-mūla or ‘vivakṣitānyaparavācyā’ are explained in the Locana (on Dhv. II. 2) by resorting to the bahuvrīhi compound in the term, “a-samlaksya kramodyota” and it observes that, “one whose function is such-where the sequence is not clearly noticed is said to be ‘a-samlaksyakrama’ : ‘samyaṅ na lakṣayitum śakyaṅ kramah yasya, tādṛśāḥ udyotana-vyāpārōsyā iti bahuvrīhiḥ.’ The other, viz. “kramaṇa dyotitaḥ samlaksyakramah” is clear in itself.

Continuing the discussion on a-samlaksya-krama-dhvani, Ā. observes at Dhv. II. 3 -tatra,

“rasa-bhāva-tadābhāsa-
tat-praśānty ādir akramah,
dhvaner ātmāḥgibhāvena
bhāsamāno vyavasthitah.”

“Sentiment, emotion, the semblance of sentiment, or mood and their (rise and) cessation etc., are all of “undiscerned sequentiality”. It is decided that when we have prominent presence of this variety, we are having the very soul of suggestion.” (Trans. K.Kris. pp. 41, ibid)

Such categories as sentiment and the like are apprehended as it were simultaneously with the expressed literal sense. And when they are apprehended as principal (source of charm) we arrive at the very soul of suggestion. Ā. observes : rasā”dir artho hi saha iva vācyena avabhāsa-te. sa cāṅgitvena avabhāsamāno dhvaner ātmā. (vṛtti. on Dhv. II. 3)

This variety of rasā”di-dhvani is imagined to be bereft of any sequentiality. This does not mean that there is no sequence whatsoever between the apprehension of determinants, consequents and ancillary feelings, i.e. the vibhāva”dis and the actual apprehension of ‘rasā”di’ i.e. sentiments, emotions etc. - i.e. in short the emotive stuff. But the point is that the sequence being absolutely minute is not noticed at
all, i.e. it remains a-saṃlaksya. On the other hand the two viz. vastu-dhvani i.e. suggestion of idea or matter, and alaṃkāra-dhvani i.e. suggestion of a figure have a clearly marked sequence - saṃlaksya-krama between the first apprehension of the primary sense and the next apprehension of the suggested sense. Thus these two are termed ‘saṃlaksya-krama-dhvani’ varieties. But Ā. and Abhinavagupta do accept the possibility of sequence even in this rasā”di-dhvani which is normally said to be without sequence. When such ‘saṃlaksya-kramarva’ of rasā”di-dhvani is accepted it is included in the variety called the “artha-śakty-udbhava-saṃlaksyakrama dhvani.”

As a matter of principle, Ā. accepts three-fold dhvani, but in reality he attaches supreme importance only to the variety called ‘rasa-dhvani’ i.e. “rasā”di-dhvani”. Only to underline the fact of rasā”di-dhvani as the “soul”, Ā. seems to accept the ultimate merging of the other two varieties i.e. vastu-dhvani and alaṃkāra-dhvani in this supreme dhvani called rasa-dhvani. We have noticed earlier how Locana on Dhv. I. 4 explains that the implicit sense is basically two-fold viz. laukika or one which is also met with in ordinary parlance, and ‘alaukika’ or that which is never met with in ordinary parlance but is met with only in poetry i.e. kāvyā-vyāpāraika-gocaraḥ, or in the field of art in general, we may add. This ‘laukika’ form is represented by vastu-dhvani and alaṃkāra-dhvani. We will go to see later that actually Ā. has taken care of the intellectual or rational and also volitional aspect of the total personality of the art-enjoyer or cultivated reader here, when he accepts this variety of vastu-dhvani. By alaṃkāra-dhvani he accepts the poet’s immense capacity to experiment in poetic expression and not using figures of speech only. Thus it consumes the whole of practiced and unpracticed modes of poetic expression, i.e. ‘vyāñjaka-vaividhya’ in literature. Thus we feel that by vastu-dhvani and alaṃkāradhvani Ā. reaches out to cover the most modern literary art-forms ever practiced to-day or that will ever be practiced in near or distant future by good poets (i.e. mahākavi). The so called abstract poetry, or absurdism seems to have its place in this fool-proof catholic scheme of Ānandavardhana and thus this Indian theory of art, i.e. the theory of rasa-experience covers the total personality of the enjoyer of cultivated taste. By total we mean the emotive, intellectual and volitional aspects of his personality taken together. We will discuss this catholicity of rasa-experience in a greater measure later. But for the present, the first two i.e. vastu-dhvani and alaṃkāre-dhvani, the saṃlaksya-krama types also, ultimately merge into rasa-dhvani in Ā.’s opinion and here rasa-dhvani is to be taken not as enjoyment of sentimental
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stuff only but as the genuine aesthetic rapture which results from the enjoyment of any peace of art, here of course, literary art.

In reality this 'rasa-experience' or aesthetic rapture is the real 'soul' of poetry according to both Ā. and Abhinavagupta. Ā.'s preference in taking only 'rasa-dhvani' as the real soul of poetry is self-evident from his general treatment throughout the Dhv. Abhinavagupta does not invent it, nor does he superimpose his ideas on Ā.'s finding. No; he, i.e. the Locanākāra is true to his words when he says in the beginning of his Locana that he is simply "echoing" and making clear the original ideas of Ā. as read in the "kāvyāloka" -

"yad kiñcid apy anurañan
sphuṭayāmi kāvyā"lokam..." -

Ā. himself has noted that eventhough the other varieties of pratīyamāna-artha or implicit sense are observed, the illustration cited is that of rasā"di-dhvani, for that alone is principal. He observes (ṛṣti, on Dhv. I. 5) : "pratiyamānasya ca anyabheda-darśanēpi rasa-bhāva-mukhena eva upalakṣanām; prādhānyāt." Locana on this observes : "tena rasa eva vastutah ātmā. vastrv-alamkāra-dhvani tu sarvathā rasam prati paryavasyete iti vācyād utkrṣṭau tāu ity abhiprayena. "dhvanīh kāvyasya ātmā" iti sāmānyena uktam."

Ā. is of the opinion that in figures such as 'samāsokti' or 'condensed metaphor' etc. we do have an element of implicit or suggested sense. But as this implicit element is not marked as principal, such figures illustrate only the second variety of poetry such as the 'gūṇāhūta-vyaṅga' or poetry with subordinated suggested sense. Of course Abhinavagupta accepts the position of 'rasa' even in such cases only at the ultimate level of consideration. Even the variety called vastu-dhvani also is categorised in form of vibhāva"di's i.e. determinants etc. and ultimately merge in rasā"di-dhvani. This rasa-realisation through vibhāva"di-sāmagri was discussed by Bharata and explained later by ācāryas such as Lollāta and the like in their own way. Ā. does not discuss here this process of rasa-nīṣpati i.e. the rasa-nīṣpati-prakriyā in his Dhv. This of course speaks volumes of Ā.'s great self-control. He simply takes note of the fact that only rasā"di-dhvani is the principal fact in a dhvani-kāvyā. In fact this 'rasa' is the principal category labelled as the 'soul' of poetry, but at times its ingredients such as bhāva, or different aesthetic categories of bhāva or feelings, such as bhāvodaya, bhāva-samādhi etc. also, when principally suggested in their states of exhuberance, result into bhāva-dhvani etc. These possibilities are covered up by "ādi" in "rasā"di"-dhvani.
We may have to note one more point here. The vibhāvas and anu-bhāvas are necessarily sva-śabda-vācyā i.e. expressed directly by their own names. Hence, there is no possibility of vibhāva-dhvani and anubhāva-dhvani. If at all they are suggested they are included in vastu-dhvani or the suggestion of ideas or matter. Again the carvanā i.e. aesthetic chewing or relish of vibhāvas and anubhāvas results in a mental feeling or citta-vṛtti and its relish is also of the form of ‘rasa’ or ‘bhāva’.

Locana (on Dhv. II. 3) further notes that bhāva-dhvani etc. are also of the form of the dripping fluid (niṣyanda) of rasa-dhvani. But they are named separately just to underline the special feature causing the same: “yady api ca rasena eva sarvasm jīvati kāvyam, tathā'pi tasya rasasya eka-ghana-camatkāra”tmanōpi. kutaś cid āmsāt prayojakibhūtād adhikōsau camatkāro bhavati. tatra yadā kaścid udriktāvasthām pratipanno vyabhicārī camatkārātiśaya-prayojako bhavati, tada bhāva-dhvaniḥ, yathā, “ṭiṣṭhet kopavaśāt.” etc.

After explaining the three-fold implicit sense, Ā. explains that all these three are different from the directly expressed primary sense i.e. vācyārtha. Keeping aside the first two types of vastu-dhvani and alamkāra-dhvani, the third type viz. rasā”di-dhvani is seen to shine forth as a result of the latent power in the expressed sense, i.e. it is necessarily implicit. It never becomes an object of direct verbal denotation and hence it is decidedly distinct from the expressed. That this variety called the rasā”di-dhvani is necessarily distinct from “rasā”di alamkāra” also, will be discussed later.

After thus explaining the first variety of vivakṣitānyapara-vācyā-dhvani, viz. a-saṃlakṣya-krama, Ā. turns his attention to the second variety viz. saṃlakṣya-krama, i.e. one in which the sequentiality between the expressed sense or vācyārtha and the implicit-suggested sense or vyaṅgyārtha is clearly discernible. The Dhv. II. 20, reads as :

“krameṇa pratibhāty ātmā
yōsyā'nusvāna-sannibhaḥ,
śabdārthā-sakti-mūlatvāt
sōpi dvedhā vyavasthitāḥ.” (Dhv. II. 20)

“The other element of this suggestion manifests itself in the same way as resonance and the temporal sequentiality of the two meanings will be discernible. It is also two-fold - ‘that which is based on the power of word’, and ‘that which is based on the power of sense.’ (Trans. K.Kris. pp. 71, ibid)
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Ä. observes in his vr̥tti thereon: “asya vivakṣitānyapara-vācyasya dhvaneḥ samālakṣya-kramavyāṅgyatvā’nuraṇana-prakhyo ya ātmā sópi śabda-sākti-mūlortha-sākti-mūlaḥ ca iti dvi-prakāraḥ.”

“This suggestion ‘with intended but further extending literal import’ contains an element which is similar to resonance in so far as it is suggested in such a way that one can notice temporal sequentiality (between the expressed and the suggested senses). It is further subdivided into, that which is based on the power of the word, and, ‘that which is based on the power of sense.’ (Trans. K.Kris. pp. 71, ibid)

Ä. has also attempted to explain how śabda-sākti-mūla-dhvari has a different scope from that of śleṣa or paronomasia - or ‘double entendre’. He observes that (Dhv. II. 21)

“āksipta evālamkāraḥ
śabda-sāktā prakāśate
yasmin, anuktaḥ śabdena
śabda-sāktī udbhavo hi saḥ.”

“Only that instance, wherein is present a figure that is not expressed directly by any word but conveyed solely by the suggestive power of the word itself, should be regarded as suggestion based on the power of word.”

Ä. further clarifies in his vr̥tti on Dhv. II. 21, that, “yasmād alanakāro, na vastumātram, yasmin kāvye śabda-sāktā prakāśate sa śabda-sākti-udbhavo dhvanir asmākaṃ vivakṣitaḥ. vastudvaye ca śabda-sāktā prakāśamāne śleṣāḥ.”

“For only a figure which is conveyed by the power of the word is intended by us to form an instance of suggestion based on the power of the word, and not all ideas so conveyed are instances of suggestion. If two ideas are manifest (simultaneously) as a result of the power of the word, we have only an instance of ‘double entendre’.
(Trans. K.Kris. pp. 73, ibid)

It may be noted that here the term, ‘śabda-sāktā’ does not stand for ‘abhidhaya’ or ‘by the expressed power of the word’. Normally we take abhidhā, laksanā and vyāñjana as śabda-saktis. But here it is to be understood as “śabda-eva-saktiḥ” or ‘śabda-rūpā saktiḥ”, i.e. where ‘word’ itself is the power, and not “word’s power”, or “power of the word”.

After explaining that śabda-sākti-mūla-dhvari occurs when some other alanakāra is suggested, Ä. explains that though Bhaṭṭa Udhaṭṭa has stated that śleṣa occurs also when some other alanakāra is understood, but here, i.e. in Ä.’s
explanation only “ākṣipta” or implied figure of speech is taken as dhvani, while Udbhata’s “alamkārāntara” is vācyā or expressed directly. So, the outcome of this discussion is that, in places where, through ‘śabda-śakti’, another ‘vācyā alamkāra’ is collected, it may be taken as ‘śleṣa’ following Udbhata. But when this ‘alamkārāntara’ which is collected with the help of śabda-śakti, is only at the implicit or suggested level, then it becomes the province of śabda-śakti-mūla-dhvani in the opinion of Ā. He also adds that if, by chance, this implicit figure, also becomes explicit, i.e. if it is directly expressed through any other device later, then it looses its status of dhvani and there we do not mention it as “śabda-śakti-mūla-dhvani”, but becomes only an object of such usage as ‘vakrokti’, etc. which is a variety of a directly expressed alamkāra. Ā. observes (vṛtti, on Dhv. II. 21): “tad ayam arthaḥ, yatra śabda-śaktyā sākṣad alamkārāntaram vācyam sat pratibhāsate, sa sarvāḥ śleṣa-viśayāḥ yatra tu śabda-śaktyā sāmartyāḥ” “kṣiptam vyaṅgyam eva alamkārāntaram prakāsate sa dhvaner viṣayāḥ.” and Ā. further observes: sa ca ākṣipta-lamkārā yatra punah śabdāntarenā abhihita-svarūpaḥ tatra na śabda- śakty-udbhavānuraṇana-rūpa-vyaṅgya-dhvani-vyavahāraḥ. tatra vakroktā ādi- vācyālamkāra-vyavahāra eva.”

Ā. further observes: “yatra tu sāmartyāḥ” “kṣiptam sad alamkārāntaram śabda- śaktyā prakāsate sa sarva eva dhvaner viṣayāḥ.” yathā, “atraṁtare kusumasamayayugam.” etc. “But passages where another figure is conveyed only by the suggestive power of the word deserve to be regarded only as instances of suggestion. As for instance: “In the meanwhile appeared....” etc. (Trans. K.Kris. pp. 79, ibid). In this instance drawn from Bāna, describing the summer season (i.e. grīsa-varṇana), simile (i.e. upamā alamkāra) with ‘mahākāla’ i.e. Lord Śiva, is suggested. Another illustration runs as, “unnataḥ prollasad dhāraḥ.” etc. Third one is, “dattā” “nandāḥ prajānām...” etc.

Ā. observes in the vṛtti that - “eṣu udāharanēṣu śabda-śaktyā prakāsāmanaśa sarī, aprākaranike arthāntara vākyasya a-sambaddhāṛthābhidhāityvam mā prasāṅkṣid ity aprākaranike-prākarankayor arthayor, upamānōpameyabhāvaḥ kalpayitavyaḥ, sāmartyāḥ, ity artha” “kṣiptoyam śleṣo na śabdopā” “rūḍha iti vibhinna eva śleṣaḥ anusvānopama-vyaṅgyasya dhvaner viṣayāḥ.”

“In all these examples, an extra meaning is conveyed by the power of the word and in order that two meanings might not appear as entirely disconnected, we will have to postulate the relation of the standard of comparision and the object compared as existing between the two, since there is justification also for doing so.
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Thus the double entendre we see here is not grounded on words only as it is the case when it happens to be an expressed figure. But it is a figure suggested by the special suggestive power of the word. Thus the examples of double entendre and resonance like suggestion are entirely different from one another." (Trans. K.Kris. pp. 79, ibid)

Ā. also suggests that figures other than upamā/simile are also possible in this variety of dhvani. : “anye'pi ca alamkārāḥ śabda-sakti-mūlānusvāna-rūpavyaṅgye dhvanau saṃbhavanti eva.” He illustrates the cases of virodha (i.e. paradox), vyatireka etc. and the like. He leaves it to the men of taste to find out such illustrations, which for want of space he avoids: “evaṃ anye'pi śabda-sakti-mūlānusvāna-rūpa-vyaṅgya-dhvani-prakārāḥ santi, te sahṛdayair svayaṃ anusartavyāḥ. iha tu grantha-vistara-bhayān na prapañcāḥ kṛtah.” (vṛtti, Dhv. II. 21)

We may take note of some points here:

(i) Ā. accepts only ‘suggested another figure’ i.e. vyaṅgya-alamkārāntara’, as object of śabda-sakti-mūla-dhvani. He never thinks about covering the cases of ‘vastu-dhvani’ i.e. suggestion of ideas or matter under its scope. We know that Mammaṭa accepts this possibility. But Ā. is firm on this point as he uses the words - “yasmād alamkāro, na vastu-mātrarṇa, yasmin kāvye śabda-saktyā prakāsate sa śabda-sakty-uddbhavo dhvanir ity asmākam vivaksitāḥ.” Ā. rarely uses such an expression. In case of ‘rasā’di’ alamkāra also, he uses such terms as “iti me matiḥ.” This means he rejects the case of vastu-dhvani here.

(ii) With reference to the above, Ā. does not bring in here, as is done by other ālāmkārikas, the discussion concerning how the non-contextual sense is collected in case of a word having multiple sense, i.e. whether it is through the agency of vyaṅjanā or abhidhā. This discussion is however found in Locana and the debate is carried on till Appayya and Jagannātha, who opt for abhidhā here. We have covered this discussion in an earlier chapter and thus it need not detain us here.

(iii) In the illustration cited by Ā., viz. “ātrāntare kusuma-samaya...” etc., it so happens that it is a case where suppressing the directly expressed sense, the ‘yaugika’ artha is principally suggested. The other two illustrations are however not so clear on this point. This point is not, of course, directly discussed by Ā., but at Dhv. II. 31, Ā. observes that now that the varieties of dhvani are explained, the following is said in order to distinguish between suggestion and its semblance: (vṛtti, preceding Dhv. II. 31) : “evaṃ dhvaneḥ prabhedān pratipādyad tad ābhāsa-
vivekaṁ kartum ucyeate”. - Under Dhv. II. 31, Ā. observes that, “yatra tu prakaraṇa”di-pratipattyā nirdhārita viśeṣo vācyorthaḥ punah pratīyamānāṅgatvena eva ababhāsate, sōsyāva anuraṇana-rūpa-vyaṅgyasya dhvaner mārgaḥ.” - i.e. “But on the other hand, resonance-like suggestion is present in instances, where, even after determining all the implications of the expressed sense in view of context and so forth, we find that the expressed appears only as subsidiary to the suggested.” (Trans. K.Kris. pp. 103, ibid).

Abhinavagupta also observes that with the help of ‘prakaraṇa’ and the rest, i.e. context in general, the primary expressed sense is fixed. But in the given context in the Dhv., and the illustrations cited, the problem of the apprehension of a sense other than the primary, in case of a word having multiple sense, is not discussed here. Looking carefully at the discussion concerning the example viz. “mahākālah...”, where the yaugika-artha throws aside the conventional sense and comes to the fore, the meaning is collected through suggestive power, i.e. śabda-śakti-mūla-vyañjanā. We have seen earlier how Mammaṭa, Appayya and Jagannātha have discussed this topic in a thorough way.

Abhinavagupta also accepts the suggested another figure of speech (alamkārāntara) as the field for śabda-śakti-mūla-dhvani. This is in conformity with Ā.’s view.

Ā. then picks up what is termed artha-śakti-mūla-dhvani at Dhv. II. 22. He observes:

“artha-śakty-udbhavas tv-anayaḥ
yatrārthaḥ saṃprakāsate
yas tātparyena vastv anyad
vyanakty uktiṁ vinā svataḥ.” (Dhv. II. 22)

“The other variety of suggestion is based upon the power of sense and it is instanced in places where the second meaning is conveyed only by way of implication by the first meaning and not by the expressed words at all.” (Trans. K.Kris. pp. 83, ibid).

Ā. adds in the vṛtti, “yatrārthaḥ sva-sāmarthyād arthāntaram abhivyanaṅkti, śabda-vyāpāṛaṁ vinaiva, sūrtha-śaktyudbhavo nāma anusvānōpama-vyaṅgyo dhvaniḥ.”

“That instance where one meaning gives rise to another through its own power of implication and not through the denotative power of words, becomes an
example of suggestion based upon the power of meaning and similar to resonance.” (Trans. K.Kris. pp. 83, ibid). The illustration cited is “evaṁvādini devarṣau.” etc.

It is two-fold, viz. (i) svataḥ-sambhavī and (ii) prauḍhokti-siddha. Dhv. II. 24 observes:

“pauḍhoktimātra-nispanna-
śarīraḥ, sambhavi svataḥ,
arthōpi dvividho jñeyah
vastuno’nyasya dipakaḥ.”

arthā-saktyudbhavānuraṇana-rūpa-vyaṅgye dhvanau yo vyaṇjako’rtha uktas
tasyā’pi dvau prakārau - kaveḥ kavi-nibaddhasya vā vaktaḥ prauḍhokti-mātra-
nispanna-śarīra ekaḥ svatas sambhavī ca dvitiyāḥ.”

“The sense which suggests another sense is also two-fold : (1) Existing only in ornate expression and (2) Naturally existing.” (Dhv. II. 24)

“The sense which has been pointed out as the suggester of a second sense in suggestion (of the form of resonance based upon the power of sense) is also of two kinds. The first is that whose existence is real only in the ornate expression either of a poet himself or of a character created by the poet. The second exists naturally.” (Trans. K.Kris. pp. 87, 89, ibid)

We will go to see that Hemaśandra and some others do not take these two as separate varieties. All these three suggesters could be of the form of vastu or idea or alampāra i.e. a figurative expression. The vyaṅgya which is suggested also could be likewise two-fold. Thus in all twelve varieties are possible in artha-saktyudbha-dhvani.

At Dhv. III. 1, Ā. observes that, - “evaṁ vyaṅgya-mukhena eva dhvanem pradarṣite sa-prabhede svarūpe, punar vyaṇjaka-mukhena etat prakāśyate :

“a-vivakṣita-vācyasya
pada-vākya-prakāśatā,
tad anyasya anuraṇana-
rūpa-vyaṅgyasya ca dvaneḥ.”

“So far the nature and varieties of suggestion have been pointed out in detail from the stand-point of the suggested. Now the same shall be set forth from the standpoint of the suggester.
Both the varieties of suggestion with un-intended literal import and resonance-like suggestion are suggested by individual words and by whole sentences.” (Trans. K.Kris. pp. 107). Thus the 17 varieties of dhvani (= 2, lakṣaṇāmūlaka +1 rasā”didhvani +2 śabdaśaktīmūlaka +12 arthaśaktīmūlaka) are both pada-gata and vākyā-gata. Thus in all 34 varieties are available. Though ‘dhvani’ has been defined as ‘kāvyā-viśeṣa’, it can also be said to be ‘pada-prakāśya’, because in the dhvani-kāvyā which is of the form of a beautiful sentence, we can further distinguish the beauty of an individual pada or word also. In his vṛtti on Dhv. III. 1. Ā. further observes to this effect :


ucyate-syād esa doṣaḥ yadi vācakatvaṃ prayojakam dhvani-vyavahāre syāt. na tv evam; tasya vyañjakatvena vyavasthānāt. kiṃ ca, kāvyānām śarīrānām iva saṃsthāna-viśeṣā-vacchinna-samudāya-sādhyā’pi cārutva-pratīti anvaya-vyatire-kābhyaṃ bhāgesu kalpyata iti padānām api vyañjaka-mukhena vyavasthito dhvani-vyavahāro na virodhi.

aniṣṭasya śrutir yad vād
āpādayati duṣṭatām,
śruti-duṣṭā”disu vyaktaṃ
tad-vad iṣṭa-śrutir gunam.

padānām smārakatvépi
pada-mātrāvabhāśinaḥ,
tena dhvaṇeḥ prabhedaḥ
sarveṣv eva asti ramyatā.
vicchitti-śobhinaikena
bhūṣaṇena iva kāmini
pada-dyotyena sukaver
dhvaṇinā bhāti bhāratī.
iti parikara-ślokāḥ.” (vṛtti, on Dhv. III. 1)

“One might raise the following objection at this juncture : ‘Suggestion has been defined earlier as a species of poetry.’ How can such a species be suggested by a word? A species of poetry can mean only that composition of words which enables
one to understand a specific meaning. This fact will be inapplicable to it when it is held that it is suggested by a word, for words are only reminders of such a suggested meaning and not at all denoters.

Here is our answer to the objection: the alleged defect would have tainted our assertion if it were true that denotation was the criterion for deciding the existence of suggestion. But it is not true. It has already been established that suggestiveness alone is the criterion in question. In life also, we often speak of the presence or absence of beauty in the individual limbs of persons though in fact it is only the combined beauty of all the graceful and symmetrical limbs that can really be present or absent in a person’s body as a whole. In the same way, there is no contradiction involved in one’s regarding the individual words also as suggesters of beauty which is really occasioned by the combination of different words and in referring to them by the word suggestion. These ideas are summed up in the following aphorisms:

1. Just as reminiscence of something undesired clearly becomes a blemish in defects like "Indelicacy", so also the reminiscence of something desired should be regarded as an excellence.

2. Though words are only reminders, there is certainly charm therefrom, in all the varieties of suggestion that manifests itself through the individual words.

3. Just like a damsel who appears charming by just a single ornament full of beauty, so also the work of a good poet will appear to advantage when adorned by suggestion even in one word.” (Trans. K.Kris. pp. 113, 115, ibid)

In Dhv. III. 2 it is explained that suggestion with sequentiality not noticed, will flash forth in letter, word, etc., sentence, composition and finally the work as a whole.

Dhv. III. 2 - reads as -

"yas tv alaksya-krama-vyaṅgyo
dhvanir varṇa-padā”dīṣu,
vākye, saṃghaṭanāyāṁ ca
sa prabandhe’pi dīpyate.”

Thus in all thirty-five varieties of dhvani are enumerated.

Locana on III. 43 observes that along with these thirty-five basic types of dhvani, and the same number of varieties of guṇībhūta-vyaṅga, and also taking all alaṃkāras together in account, we arrive at 71 types. When we consider the
'saṃkara' and 'samsrṣṭi', we arrive at 71 x 4 = 284, and these when multiplied by 35, we get 7420 types. Actually the figure comes to 9940. Again, it is not correct to count the same number of varieties for the guṇībhūta-vyaṅgya also, for following Dhv. II. 29, the nine varieties that we arrive at of alaṃkāra-vyaṅgya through vastu, cannot be taken as sub-varieties of guṇī-bhūta-vyaṅgya, for, according to Ā., where alaṃkāra is suggested through 'vastu', we necessarily have varieties of dhvani only and not that of guṇī-bhūta-vyaṅgya - "dhruvaṃ dhvanyāṅgata" are Ā.'s words.

Dhv. III. 43 reads as:

"sa-guṇī-bhūta-vyaṅgyaiḥ
sālaṅkāraiḥ saha-prabhedaiḥ svaiḥ,
śaṅkara-samsṛṣṭibhyāṁ
punar apy udyotate bahudhā."

tasya ca dhvaneḥ sva-prabhedaḥ guṇībhūta-vyaṅgyena vācyālaṃkāraiśca śaṅkara-samsṛṣṭi-vyavasthāyāṁ kriyamāṇāyaṁ bahuprabhedatā lakṣye drśyate. tathā hi, sva-prabheda-saṃkīraṇaḥ sva-prabheda-saṃsṛṣṭaḥ, guṇī-bhūta-vyaṅgya-

śaṅkīraṇaḥ, guṇībhūta-vyaṅgya-saṃsṛṣṭaḥ, vācyālaṃkāraṁtara-saṃkīraṇaḥ, vācyālaṃkāraṁtara-saṃsṛṣṭaḥ, saṃsṛṣṭiālaṃkāra-saṃkīrauḥ, saṃsṛṣṭiālaṃkāra-

saṃsṛṣṭaḥ, ca iti bahudhā dhvaniḥ prakāśate."

"It shines in diverse ways with its several varieties of subordinated suggestion, figures, its own-sub-varieties, their intermingling and collocation." (Dhv. III. 43)

(vṛtti.) - If one should take into account the permutations and combinations of the different types of dhvani itself, and the varieties of subordinated suggestion and figures of sense, their resulting number would be many. Thus to name some of the major manifestation of dhvani - (i) merged with its own varieties, (ii) co-existing with its own varieties, (iii) merged with subordinated suggestion (iv) co-existing with subordinated suggestion, (v) merged with other figures of sense, (vi) co-existing with other figures (vii) merged with other co-existing figures (viii) co-existing with other mutually co-existing figures. (Trans. K.Kris. pp. 253, ibid)

Read also Locana, on Dhv. II. 31: "avivakṣita-vācyo vivaksīrānaparavācyoṣ ca

iṁ dvaṁ mūla-bhedau. ādyasya dvaṁ bhedaṁ, atyaṁ-tirakṣṛta-vācyo arthāntara-

saṃkramitavācyoṣ ca. dvitiyasya dvaṁ bhedaṁ, alaṅkāramah anuranana-rūpaḥ

ca. prathamāṇanta-bheḍaḥ, dvitiyo dvividhaḥ, śabda-sāktimulaḥ artha-sāktimulaḥ

c. paścimas trividhaḥ, kavi-praṇḍhokti-kṛta-sārīraḥ, kavi-nibaddha-vakṛt-praṇḍhokti-
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śrīmānta śārīraḥ, svataḥ śambhavi ca. te ca pratyekam vyāngya-vyānjakayor utkabheda-nayena caturdhā iti dvādasā-viḍhāh artha-śakti-mūlaḥ. ādyās’ catvāro bhedā iti sōdaśa mukhya-bhedāḥ. te ca pada-vākyā-prakāśakatvena pratyekam dvividhā vākyante. alaksya-kramasya tu varṇa-pada-vākyā-saṁghaṭanā-prabandha-prakāśyatvena paṇca-trimśad bhedāḥ.”

Read also Locana on Dhv. III. 43: “evaṁ śloka-dvayena saṁgrahārthan abhidhāya bahuprakārata-pradarśikāṁ pathati - “sa guṇi”. iti. saha guṇībhuṭa-vyāngya sahālaṁkārair ye vartante sve dhvaneḥ prabhēdās tāiḥ saṁkīrṇatāya saṁśrṣṭyā vā ananta-prakāro dhvānir iti tātparyam. bahuprakārataṁ darśayati - “tathā hi” iti. svabhēdair guṇībhuṭa-vyāngya saṁkāraṁ prakāśyate iti trayo bhedāḥ. tatrā’pi pratyekam saṁkārena saṁśrṣṭyā ca iti śat. saṁkarasyā’pi trayaḥ prakārāḥ anugrahāṇaṁ bhāvena, saṁdehāḥ spadatvena, ekadāṇupraveṣaṇa iti dvādaśa bhedāḥ. pūrvaṁ ca ye paṇca-trimśad bhedāḥ uktāḥ te guṇībhuṭa-vyāngyasya’pi mantavyāḥ. svaprabhedās tāvanto lamkāra iti eka-saptaṭih. tatra saṁkāra-trayena saṁśrṣṭyā ca guṇāne dve śate caturśaṁty adhike. tāvata paṇca-trimśato mukhya-bhedānam guṇane sakta-sahasraṁ catvāri śatāṁ viṁśatī adhikāṇi (= 7420) bhavanti. alamkāraṇāṁ ānantyaṭ tu a-saṁkhyatvam.”

In due course, we will go to see further how Mammaṭa and Viśvanātha count the varieties.

We will now go to examine how Ā. distinguishes rasā”di-dhvanī from rasavad ādi alamkāra, and also upamā”di alamkāra. Ā. has carefully distinguished between the nature and scope of rasā”di-dhvanī on one hand and the same of rasavad ādi alamkāra, and also upamā”di (vācya) alamkāra on the other hand.

Under Dhv. II. 2 Ā. enumerates the two varieties of vivakṣitanyā-para-vācyadhvani. They are a-saṁlaksya-krama-dhvani and saṁlaksya-krama-dhvani. Under Dhv. II. 3 Ā. suggests different varieties that are subsumed under asamlaksya-krama-rasā”di-dhvanī. They are rasa, bhāva, rasā”bhāsa, bhāvaśānti, bhāvādaya, bhāva-śabalanā, etc. They are all placed under rasā”di dhvani.

Now the question that arises is that what exactly is the difference (in scope and nature) between this rasā”di-dhvanī, and the ‘rasavad ādi’ alamkāras as imagined by the ancients. If the concept of rasavad ādi alamkāras as designed by the pūrva-ācāryas is not acceptable to Ā., then what new concept concerning these has Ā. evolved, and also how both these, i.e. rasā”di-dhvanī and rasavad ādi alamkāras are to be distinguished from the figures such as upamā and the like? We will look into
this in greater detail as below:

Under Dhv. II. 3, Ā. observes:

"rasa-bhāva-tad ābhāsa-tat-praśāntyādir akramaḥ,
dhvaner ātmāḥ ōngi-bhāvena
bhāsamāno vyavasthitah."

rasā”dir artho hi saha iva vācyena avabhāsate. sa ca aṅgitvena avabhāsamāno
dhvaner ātmā.

idānām rasavād-alaṃkārād a-lakṣya-krama-dyotonā”tmāno dhvaneḥ vibhakto
viṣaya, iti pradarśyate.”

- “Sentiment, emotion, the semblance of sentiment or mood, their (rise and) 
cessation etc., are all of, “undiscerned sequentiality”. It is decided that when we
have the prominent presence of this variety, we are having the very soul of
suggestion.”

Categories like sentiment shine forth along with the literal import. If they shine
also with prominence we have the very soul of suggestion.

It will be shown in what follows that the sphere of this suggestion ‘of
undiscerned sequentiality’ is quite distinct from that of the figure of speech called
rasavād-alaṃkāra or “figurative sentiment”. (Trans. K.Kris. pp. 41, ibid)

It is to be noted that when Ā. observes that “that rasā”di is the very soul of
dhvani, which is suggested as principal - i.e. ‘aṅgitvena’,” this also implies that these
rasā”di categories, can be suggested at times, as ‘aṅga’ or subordinate also. Ā. suggests that when ‘rasā”di’ is not principally suggested, but is suggested in a
subordinate way (i.e., a-pradhāna), it is known as “rasavād ādi alaṃkāra”.

Distinguishing between rasā”di-dhvani and rasā”di alaṃkāra, Ā. observes:

"vācyā-vācaka-cārutva-
-hatūnāṁ vivdhātmanāṁ,
rasā”di-paratā yatra
sa dhvaner viṣayo mataḥ.” (Dhv. II. 4)

rasa-bhāva-tad ābhāsa-tat-praśāma-lakṣaṇam mukhyam artham anuvartamānā
yatra śabdārtha”-laṃkāra guṇaṣ ca parasparam dhvany apekṣayā vibhinna-rūpāḥ
vyavasthitās tatra kāvye dhvanir iti vyāpadeśaḥ.
"pradhānēnyatra vākyārthe
yatratāngaṁ tu rasā"dayah,
kāyve tasmin alaṁkāro
rasā"dir iti me matih." (Dhv. II. 5).

yady api rasavad alaṁkārasya anyair darśito viṣayas tathā'pi yasmin kāyve pradhānatayā anyórtho vākyārthibhūtas rasya ca anīgabhūtā ye rasā"dayas te
rasā"der alaṁkārasya viṣaya iti māmakīnāh paksāh, tad yathā catuṣṭu
preyoalāṁkārasya vākyārthatvēpi rasā"dayo āṅgabhūtā drīṣyante.

"Only that, wherein all the several beautifiers of the expressed sense and the
expression exist with the single purpose of conveying sentiment and so on, is to be
regarded as coming under the scope of suggestion." (Dhv. II. 4)

The poem in which the chief category is of the nature of sentiment, emotion,
their semblance, or cessation and wherein all figures, both of sound and sense, and
qualities come in only as hand maids of the chief category and remain as much
distinct from what is suggested as from one another, gets the designation of
suggestive poetry.

"But if in a poem the chief purport of the sentence should relate to something
else, and if sentiment and so on should come in only as auxiliaries to it, it is
my opinion that sentiment and so on are figures of speech in such a poem."
(Dhv. II. 5).

Although others have explained the scope of Figurative sentiment (in quite a
different way), still it is my view that only such sentiments etc. as become
auxiliaries to some other purport of the sentence which happens as figures. For
instance, one can easily see how in hymns of praise, sentiments etc., appear as
auxiliaries though they are generally regarded as instances of the figure of
Affectionate praise." (Trans. K.Kris. pp. 43, ibid)

Alaṁkāras such as rasavat, etc. are enumerated to be four such as rasavat,
preyas, ӯrjasvi, and samāhita. For Ā. here the apprehension of sentiment, emotion,
etc. is done in a subordinate way. So, we get ‘dhvani’ when ‘rasā"di’ are ‘āṅgi” i.e.
principal, and we have ‘rasavat’ etc., the alaṁkāras, when ‘rasā"di’ are subordinate.
When rasa is subordinated we have rasavat alaṁkāra, when bhāva is subordinated,
we have ‘preyaḥ’, and when ‘rasā”bhāsa’ and ‘bhāvā”bhāsa’ are subordinated we
arrive at ‘ӯrjasvi’, and ‘bhāvasānti’ gives rise to ‘samāhita’, when itself gets
subordinated. This is Ā.’s clear understanding and he insists on this being so.“iti me
matih".
But, prior to this, the ancients such as Bhāmaha, Dandin etc. also gave a thought to these four alamkāras. The basic approach of these ancient masters towards poetry and its beauty was different. For them the 'sāhitya', (of course 'sundara'), i.e. combination of sound and sense was poetry or kāvya, and whatever was instrumental in causing beauty in this poetry, was taken as “kāvya-saundarya” or “alamkāra” by them. Thus the word ‘alamkāra’ in its wider connotation was poetic beauty or kāvya-saundarya for these earlier ālambārikas. Vāmana went to the extent of even framing sūtras such as, “kāvyam grāhyam ālambkārāt.” “saundaryam ālambkāraḥ”. In view of these ancient masters, the beauty caused by the categories such as rasa, bhāva, etc. did not escape attention and in their broad scheme of “kāvya-saundarya is ālambkāra”, these categories of rasa, bhāva, and their other states, also settled as “ālambkāras”, and as a result they embarked upon such ālambkāras as, rasavat, preya, ūrjasvi, samāhita, bhāvika, udātta etc. - the emotion-based ālambkāras. They never bothered to discriminate between two positions such as when rasā”di are either principal or subordinate. Thus, rasā”di even when they appeared as principal were subsumed by them as “rasavad ālambkāra”, “ālambkāra” understood in a wider connotation. But this was not acceptable to Ā.

So, when ‘rasā”di’ was placed as principal, Ā. called it rasa-dhvani. When it was, by being subordinate itself, was serving the cause of some other sentence-sense which was held to be central or principal in poetry, Ā. called it ‘rasādi’-alamkāra. Thus Ā. exhibits subtlety of criticism and discernment.

To make his view-point absolutely clear, Ā. has given two kārikās as read above, viz. Dhv. II. 4 and Dhv. II. 5. In Dhv. II. 4, we have come across the use of the words: “vācyā-vācaka-cārutva-hetūnām”, i.e. “several (vividha) beautifiers of the expressed sense and the expression,” which is to be understood as a dvandva compound such as “vācyāma ca vācakām ca, tac cārutva-hetavaś ca.” Ā. had suggested in the vṛtti in udyota I, that vastu-dhvani can not be incorporated in such ālambkāras as samāsokti and the like. Here it is suggested that rasā”di-dhvani cannot be subsumed under rasavad-ādi-alamkāras.

What then is exactly the scope of rasā”di ālambkāra is laid clear in Dhv. II. 5 as seen above. We have to mark the words ‘iti me mathiḥ, ‘iti māmakānah paksah.’ Ā. seldom uses such a forceful expression, but when he does bring in his ‘I’ in any opinion, that has to be respected as a final word of authority ending all controversies.

Ā. had to carefully discriminate between two possibilities causing poetic beauty and in both of which ‘rasā”di’ of course suggested, were involved. So after clarifying
the concept of dhvani-kāvya or rasa-dhvani-kāvya with rasā”di predominantly suggested, he had to take care of such cases where suggested rasā”di were subordinate to some other central sentence sense and thus used their own beauty in rendering something else more charming. The earlier ālaṃkārikas had not shown this discrimination and Ā. had to fill in the gap, which he did admirably, silencing all futile discussion.

Ā. observes that in the particular illustration viz. “kṣipto hastāvalagnah.” etc., the main purport of the sentence is the extraordinary glory of Śiva. The sentiment of love-in-separation due to jealousy is conveyed by ślesa i.e. double entendre, and this is made subordinate to the praise of Lord Śiva. Only such instances are proper examples of Figurative Sentiment i.e. rasā”di ālaṃkāra. And on account of this, says Ā., though the sentiments of love-in-separation due to jealousy and that of pathos or Karuṇa, though opposite to each other, i.e. mutually opposite, come together in the same place as they are both rendered auxiliary i.e. subordinate to the principal emotion of devotion to Lord Śiva. Ā. further says that in cases where rasa itself happens to be the principal or main purport, how can it be a figure? It has to be a case of ‘rasā”di-dhvani”. A figure, it is well known, is only an enhancer of charm of some other central entity. It is impossible that a thing can become an enhancer of its own charm. - The vṛtti (on Dḥv. II. 5) here reads as : “saṅkīrṇo rasā”dir āṅgabhūtaḥ, yathā “kṣipto hastāvalagnah.” (etc.) - ity atra, triprutaripuriprabhāvatīśayasya-vākyārthatve īrṣyā-vipralambhasya ślesa-sahitasya āṅga-bhāva iti, evanvidha eva rasavad ālaṃkārasya nyāyyo viṣayah. ata eva ca īrṣyā-vipralambha-karunā-yor āṅgatvam vavasthanat samāveśo na doṣah. yatra hi rasasya vākyārthībhāvah tatra katham ālaṃkāratvam? ālaṃkāro hi cārutvahetūḥ prasiddhah, na tv asāv ātmaivā”tmanah cārutvahetūḥ.”

The substance of the argument is that when ‘rasa’ itself is the principal sentence-purport, how can it be called an ālaṃkāra, as suggested by the ancients? In short how can it be rendered to the position of a beautifier i.e. ālaṃkāra? It being central, is “ālaṃkārya” or that which is beautified by other agents. ‘Ālaṃkāra’ is only a means to an end, a beautifier causing beauty of something else. So, when ‘rasa’ which is central and when it is ‘ālaṃkārya’, can never be termed ālaṃkāra, for this is self-contradiction pure and simple. One cannot be one’s own beautifier or ‘beautifying agent’. So, the pūrvā”cāryas seem to be mistaken here. But in defence of the earlier masters it can be argued that their concept of ‘ālaṃkāra’ was a fluid one i.e. nebulous enough to cover both the ‘ālaṃkārya’ and also ‘ālaṃkāra’. Their ‘ālaṃkāra’ was both “saundaryya” itself, and ‘an agent causing saundarya”.

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Explaining the whole discussion in a nut-shell Ā. observes:

“rasa-bhāvā”di-tātparyam
āśritya viniveśanam,
alamkṛitīṇāṁ sarvesāṁ
alamkāraratva sādhanam.”

i.e. “It is only the employment of figures, one and all, in view of the main purport of sentiment, emotion, etc., that really justifies their being regarded as sources of charm.” (Trans. K.Kris. pp. 45, ibid).

Ā. observes: “tasmād yatra rasā”dayo vākyārthībhūtāḥ, sa sarva na rasā”der alamkārasya viṣayah, sa dhvaneḥ prabhedaḥ, tasya upamā”dayo’alamkārāḥ. yatra tu prādhānyena arthāntarasya vākyārthībhāve rasā”dibhiś cārūtva-niśpattih kriyate, sa rasā”der alamkāratāyā viṣayah-evam dhvaneḥ rasavad alamkārasya ca vibhakta-viṣayata bhavati.”

“Therefore, none of those cases where sentiments etc. happen to be the main purport, become instances of figurative sentiment. On the other hand they will only form a species of suggestion. Simile etc., are all enhancers of its charm alone. But in cases where the main purport happens to be some other meaning and when its beauty is enhanced by sentiment etc., we get proper instances of figurative sentiment.

Thus understood, the distant spheres of suggestion, figures like simile and figurative sentiment becomes clearly demarcated.” (Trans. K.Kris. pp. 45, 47, ibid)

Ā. discusses yet another opinion regarding the rasā”di alamkāras. Some critics are of the opinion that rasā”di-alamkāra has for its scope the treatment of sentient objects alone. But, argues Ā., in that case very little or no scope at all will be left for figures such as upamā and the rest. For even when the theme happens to be the behaviour of an insentient object, there has to be superimposition of the behaviour of a sentient object in one way or the other. Now, if it is held that even if such a superimposition is present, it will not be the sphere of rasavad-ādi alamkāras, for the object described is itself insentient. But this would be tantamount to assert that the vast bulk of literature which happens to be really the golden treasury of sentiments will have to be taken as ‘nirasa’, or one having no sentiment (for sentiment is the pre-requisite of the sentiments - alone). Thus the best verses from Kālidāsa, such as, “tarāṅga-bhrū-bhaṅgā.” etc. and “tanvī megha-jalā”rdra-pallavatayā.” etc. will have to be treated as being without sentiment, for the central thing described is non-sentient. But in these examples, though insentient objects happen to be themes of description, the attribution of sentient behaviour to them
is quite obvious. But here, if one argues that as there is attribution of sentient behaviour, let it be the province of figurative sentiment i.e. rasavad alamkāra, then no scope will be left for upamā and other figures. For there is no such sentient theme at all in poetry, in which attribution of sentient behaviour is wholly absent; it will be found at least in form of vibhāva (= ālambana) i.e. the setting or situation for the delineation of rasa. Hence the fact stands that when sentiments etc. are treated as subordinate it is the case of rasa“di alamkāra, and when rasa is predominant, anī, and is ‘alamkārya’, it is the soul of dhvani : (vṛtti, on II. 5) - "tasmād anīgatvena ca rasa“dīnām alamkāratā. yah punar anī raso vā bhāvo vā sarvākāraḥ alamkāryaḥ sa dhvaner ātmā iti."

We will see later in the following chapter how Ā.’s ‘vyañjanā-dhvani-rasa” scheme assimilates in its catholic fold all other thought-currents such as alamkāra, guṇa, doṣa, rīti, vṛtti, etc. that were already prevalent in the field of poetics and how ‘dhvani’ is capable to render such concepts as tātparya, anumiti and aucitya also as having no value. But for the present we will continue with Ā.’s further treatment of classification of dhvani and his treatment of rasa and some problems connected with rasa-vyañjanā as treated by him in udyota III. of the Dhv.

Ā. starts the IIIrd udyota with the words :

“evam vyañgya-mukhena dhvaneḥ pradarśite sa-prabhede svarūpe, punar vyañjaka-mukhena etat prakāsyate -

“avivaksita-vācyasya
pada-vākya-prakāśatā,
tad anyasya anuraṇana-
rūpa-vyaṅgyasya ca dhvaneḥ.” (Dhv. III. 1)

So far the nature and varieties of suggestion have been pointed out in detail from the standpoint of the suggested. Now the same shall be set forth from the standpoint of the suggester :

“Both the varieties of suggestion with unintended literal import and the resonance-like suggestion are suggested by individual words and by whole sentences.” (Trans. K.Kris. pp. 107, ibid)

Ā. also discusses which ‘varnas’ or letters are favourable in case of which particular rasa, the form and types of construction, the factors that fix this or that type of samghañā or construction for this or that type of rasa or sentiment, etc. He also discusses how a whole composition or prabandha suggests rasa. This involves topics such as consideration of factors that do not
promote the delineation of rasas - i.e. 'rasa-virodhi' factors, and also treatment of rasas of an opposite character such as śrṅgāra and karuṇa, vīra and bhayānaka etc., as a big composition is likely to serve a number of rasas in given situations. Ā. tends to suggest that the arrangement of words and meanings conducive to rasa - "rasānugṛṇa-śabdārthhayojana", is the prime task of a poet. This shows that for Ā. 'rasa-dhvani' was the be-all and end-all of good poetry. So, when Abhinavagupta brings rasa-dhvani into greater prominence, he does not do it, as some modern scholars want us to believe, on his own. Abhinavagupta does not thrust his rasa-theory on Ā.'s dhvani theory. But, on the other hand the message, to take rasa-dhvani as the real 'ātmā' of poetry is writ large in Ā.'s treatment throughout the whole of the Dhv. We have also looked into Ā.'s śabdavyāpāra-vicāra earlier wherein he treats vyañjanā as the supreme power of word. After treating the nature and scope of rasa-dhvani in very great detail as we will go to observe here, Ā. turns to the other two types of poetry viz. the guṇībhūta-vyaṅga-kāvya and the citra-kāvya. We will end this chapter with a full treatment of all these types by a number of writers on poetics, beginning with Ā. here and ending with Jagannātha later.

The highest common factor of the treatment of rasa in the ancients is that they have not discussed, or even mentioned, the famous rasa-sūtra of Bharata and have abstained from discussing the various views on rasa-realisation or "rasa-nispatti-prakriyā". Of course Daṇḍin and others perhaps had a leaning towards the "utpatti-upaciti-vāda", as suggested by Abhinavagupta. But nothing beyond this can be read there. Ā. also does not engage himself in the "rasa-sūtra-mūmāṃśā". But he projects 'rasa' as one type of his three-fold dhvani and this, he observes, is arrived at in poetry or literature through the agency of vyañjanā or suggestive power of a word. This 'rasa-dhvani' is projected as the 'real soul' of poetry by Ā., and Abhinavagupta takes it further for a clearer exposition. It has to be noted again and again, that Abhinavagupta has never over-stepped while discussing rasa-dhvani and he absolutely toes Ā.'s line in doing whatever he does.

We know that Ā. took 'dhvani' as the 'soul' of poetry and classified it in a three-fold scheme of vastu-dhvani, aḷaṃkāra-dhvani and rasā"di-dhvani. However, the fact stands that out of the three types, only rasa-dhvani occupies the central place as "dhvaner ātmā". This is very much meant by Ā., for the Locanakāra, given an opportunity, has always tried to make things very clear. For example, on vṛtti, Dhv. I. i, "ānandaḥ manasi labhatāṁ pratiṣṭhāṁ..." Abhinavagupta observes: "ānanda iti. rasa-carvanaḥ"tmanaḥ prādhānyaṁ darṣayan rasadhvaner eva sarvatra
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mukhyabhūtam atmatvam iti darśayati.” On Dhv. II. 2, Vṛtti, viz. “lalitócita-sanniveśa-cārunāḥ...”, Locana has the following - “ucita-sabdena rasa-viśayam eva auctityam bhavati iti darśayan rasa-dhvaner jivitarvam sūcyayati. tad-abhāve hi kim apekṣayā idam auctityam nāma sarvatra udghoṣyata iti bhāvah.” Again, on Dhv. I. 4, the Locana has - “yas tu svapne’pi na laukika-vyavahāra-patitaḥ, kintu śabda-samarpyamāṇa-hṛdaya-saṃvāda sundaraḥ vibhāvānubhāva-samucita-prāg-vinivistaryādi-vāsanānurāga-sukumāra-sva-saṃvid-ānanda-carvāṇā-vyāpāra-rasaniya-rūpo rasaḥ; sa kāvyā-vaśāraika-gocaraḥ, rasa-dhvanir iti; sa ca dhvanir eva iti, sa eva mukhyatayā ātmā, iti.” Locana further notes - “vastv alamkāra-dhvanyoḥ rasa-dhvani-paryantarvam eva iti vayam eva vāksyāmas tatra tatra iti āstāṃ tāvat.”

Thus the ultimate termination of vastu-dhvanī and alamkāra-dhvanī in rasa”di-dhvani is very much suggested by Ā. himself as noted by Abhinavagupta. And he is very right and within bounds in observing this. Under Dhv. I. 4, in his Vṛtti, Ā. has denounced the ‘sva-sabda-vācyatva’ of rasa”di dhvani and has underlined the situation that rasa”di-dhvani can be delineated only through the presentation of vibhāvā”di i.e. determinants, etc., and thus rasa”di-dhvani as only implied through vyañjanā. Ā. underlines that his talk of rasa”di dhvani as the soul of poetry is supported by the great illustration of Vālmiki’s ‘Rāmāyaṇa’. In this great epic, ‘Śoka’ has become an object of Vālmiki’s ‘Śloka’ i.e. description i.e. poetry. The examples of dhvani are scattered all over the Rāmāyaṇa according to Ā. He explains this by pointing out to karuṇa-rasa, which has ‘śoka’ as its basic emotion. On this, Locana observes : “tena rasa eva vastutah ātmā. vastvalamkāra dhvāni tu sarvātih rasam prati paryavasyete iti vācyād utkṛṣau tau, ity abhipyayena “dhvanih kāvyasya ātmā” iti sāmānyena uktaḥ.” Ā. himself has noted that though other varieties (i.e. ‘vastu’ and ‘alamkāra’) of the implicit sense - pratīyamāṇasya - are observed, the illustration cited is that of ‘rasa-bhāva’, and this is only to underline the fact that rasa-dhvanī alone is principal. - “pratīyamāṇasya ca anā-hbheda-dārśanēpi rasa-bhāva-mukhēna eva upalaksanē prādāhṇyāt.” (vṛtti, Dhv. I. 5).

Thus, after establishing the supremacy of rasa”di-dhvani, Ā. has placed rasa-tattva on the highest pedestal in literature. Actually Ā. has placed ‘rasa’ in the centre of his scheme by saying that ‘guṇas’ or ‘excellences’ are the qualities or rasa, that alamkāras, if ‘apṛthag-yatna-nirvartya’ in poetry, are not external to poetry, and that the thought-currents of rītī, vṛtti, saṃghātanā etc., are all ‘suggesters’ of rasa, and that the ‘doṣas’ i.e. blemishes are blemishes only if they are found to be detrimental to rasa. All this shows that Ā. has placed ‘rasa’ in the centre of his scheme and Abhinavagupta only faithfully echoes - anurānan - Ā.’s ideas. Ā. has placed rasa as “aṅgī” or ‘principal’ in poetry.
When we scanned the varieties and sub-varieties of dhvani, we had observed that Ā. has established rasā"di-dhvani in form of ‘abhidhāmula-a-sanālaksya-krama-vyaṅgya-dhvani.” This variety is suggested through varṇa/letters, pada/words, vākyā/sentence, sanghatana/construction and prabandha/i.e. the whole composition. At Dhv. III. 2 he says:

“yas tv alaksya-krama-vyaṅgyo
dhvanir varṇa-pada"disu,
vākye sanghatana'yāṁ ca
sa prabandhépi dipyate.”

This Ā. explains citing apt illustrations. That under the fact of rasa-vyañjanā lies “aucitya” or “appropriateness” is also made clear by Ā.

Explaining the rasa-vyañjakatā of a prabandha or a whole composition, Ā. observes at Dhv. III. 10-14 that,

“vibhāva-bhāva-anubhāva-
saṅcāry aucitya-cāruṇaḥ,
vidhiḥ kathā-śarīrasya
vr̥ttasya utpreksitasya vā. (III. 10, Dhv.)
itivr̥tta-vasāyatam,
tyaktā an-anugunāṁ sthitim,
utpreksya-apy-antarabhiṣṭa-
rasocita-kathōnnavah (Dhv. III. 11)
“sandhi-saṅdhyāṅga-ghatanaṁ
rasābhivyakty apekṣayā
na tu kevalatā sāstra-
sthiti-sampādanecchayā.” (Dhv. III. 12)
uddipana-śāmane
yathāvasaram antarā,
rasasy-ārabdha-viśrānteḥ
anusandhānam aṅginaḥ, (Dhv. III. 13)
alamkritināṁ saktāv apy-
ānurūpyena yojanam,
prabandhasya rasā”dīnāṁ
vyañjakatve nibandhanam. (Dhv. III. 14)
"Construction of only such a plot, either traditional or invented, as is charming with its decorum (of accessories of sentiment, viz.) stimuli of setting, abiding emotions, emotional responses, and passing moods.” (III. 10)

"If, in a theme, adapted from a traditional source, the poet is faced with situations conflicting with the intended sentiment, his readiness to leave out such incidents and inventing in their place even imaginary incidents with a view to delineating the intended sentiment." (III. 11)

"The construction of divisions and subdivisions of the plot only with a view to delineating sentiments and not at all with a desire for mere conformity to rules of poetics.” (III. 12)

"Bringing about both the high tide of sentiment and its low ebb appropriately in the work; preserving the unity of the principal sentiment from beginning to end.” (III. 13)

"A discreet use of figures of speech even when the poet is capable of using them in any number; such are the conditions which underlie the suggestiveness of a whole work of literature in regard to sentiments, etc.” (III. 14)

(Trans. K.Kris., pp. 135, 137, ibid)

Thus Ā. suggests that for a whole composition to be suggestive of rasa, the first requirement is delineation of a theme which is furnished with appropriate determinants, consequents etc. The theme can be either historical or imaginary. In case it is historical, such facts of history as are not conducive to rasa, have to be omitted and even newly imagined factors have to be introduced that go to promote rasa, which is principal. Junctures and parts of them are to be introduced with rasa in focus. They are not to be introduced because the śāstra (such as the N.S. of Bharata) has so ordained. Ā. has here severely criticised Bhaṭṭa Nārāyaṇa, the author of 'Veṇīsamhāra'. The rise and fall of the sentiments in keeping with situations is recommended but never, the principal rasa, is to face an ebbing. In case if the impression is that the principal rasa has started fading away, the anusaṃdhāna - preserving the unity of principal rasa-has to be effected. Even if the poets are capable of introducing figures of speech of their sweet will, the figures have to appear only in keeping with the principal rasa in centre. Only such figures as are conducive to rasa, whose creation is done in a very spontaneous way have to be used in a composition. The poet has not to make any extra or special effort to form a figure, over and above his normal effort to delineate rasa. In short an alamkāra has to be - “a-prthag-yatna-nirvartya.” (Dhv. II. 16)

It is thus that the whole composition becomes suggestive of rasa.
Ā. is of the firm opinion that vṛtti i.e., employment of word and sense - mode - vṛtti, - and rītis or style or diction also follow the same discipline, i.e. they are being employed by a great/good poet in view of ‘rasa’. Dhv. III. 33 observes:

"rasādy anugunatvena
vyavahārórtha-sabdayoḥ,
aucityavān yas tā etā
vṛttayo dvividhāḥ sthitāḥ”,

i.e. “vṛttis (lit. modes) are said to be of two kinds only because they relate to appropriate employment of senses and sound in keeping with sentiments etc.” (Trans. K.Kris., pp. 189, ibid) Read also, Dhv. III. 46-47

“asphuṭa-sphuritaṁ kāvyā-tattvam
etad-yathoditam,
a-śaknuvadbhir vyākartum
ritayah sampravartitāḥ.” (III. 46)

“śabda-tattvā”śrayāḥ kāścid
artha-tattva-yujo’parāḥ,
vṛttayōpi prakāśante
jñātēsmin kāvyā-lakṣāne.” (III. 47)

"Those who were unable to explain properly this essential principle of poetry as they had only a glimmer of it (and nothing more) have brought into vogue the theory or styles.” (pp. 261, ibid)

“once this theory of poetry is fully understood, even the so-called “Modes”, relating to the nature of sounds as well as to the nature of meaning will become intelligible.” (Trans. K.Kris. pp. 26, ibid)

Thus Ā. has established rasa on the highest pedestal. This vyañjanā-dhvani-rasa-scheme of Ā. was accepted and further established by such great names as Abhinavagupta, Mammaṭa, Hemacandra, Vidyādharā, Vidyānātha, Viśvanātha, Appayya Dīxit and Jagannātha. But, even after accepting the highest position of ‘rasa’, the process of arriving at it through ‘vyañjanā’ in literature and also in other arts, was challenged by such greats as Śrī. Śaṅkuka, Bhāṭṭa Nāyaka, Mukula Bhāṭṭa, Mahimā, Dhanafiṭaya/Dhanika etc. Kuntaka, though he did not openly challenge vyañjanā, remained reticent about the same and though not welcoming the same whole-heartedly, accepted, its influence in his “vicitrā-abhidhā”. So, for sure, he was a “pracchanna dhvani-vādin”. Even he has accepted, not unlike Bhoja, the supremacy of ‘rasa’ in kāvyā.
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A. had observed that ‘varnas’ i.e. letters are also conducive to “rasa”. In this respect he observes at Dhv. III. 3-4.

“śa-ṣau sa-refa-samyogaḥ
dha-kāraṇ ca api bhūyasā,
virodhinaḥ syuh śṛṅgāre
teh na varṇā rasa-scuyutah.” (III. 3)

and,

“ta eva tu niveśyante
bībhatsā”dau rase yadā,
tadā tam dipayanty eva
tehna varṇāḥ rasa-scuyutah.” (III. 4)

“The (sanskrit) letters "ś" and “ṣ”, letters conjunct with ‘r’, and ‘ḍh’, - all these become deterrents of the erotic sentiment. Hence, these letters are not conducive to a particular sentiment.” (Dhv. III. 3)

“When these very letters are employed in relation to the sentiment of disgust and so forth, they will only intensify them. Hence also letters suggest sentiments.” (Trans. K.Kris. pp. 115, ibid)

A. adds - “śloka-dvayena anvaya-avyatirekābhyaṃ varṇānāṃ dyotakatvāṃ darśitaṃ bhavati.” “The above aphorisms show negatively and positively that letters do possess suggestiveness.” (Trans. K.Kris. pp. 115, ibid). We would add in this sentence “(two)” before ‘aphorisms’ and place “positively” prior to “negatively”, of course, with due respect for Prof. Dr. K. Krishnamoorthy.

After, ‘varnas’ i.e. ‘letters’ A. comes to ‘padas’ i.e. individual words in poetry. ‘Suggestivity’ in a ‘pada’, or by a ‘pada’ is illustrated as in, “ur-kampiniḥ” etc. The pada “te” in “te locane”, in this illustration, is clearly suggestive of rasa, in the opinion of the aesthetes. Locana explains that this pada, “te”, becomes suggestive of many qualities of the heroine’s eyes. The beauty of those eyes as remembered for the moment becomes the ‘vibhāva’ i.e. stimulus for the suggestion of karuṇa, i.e. “śoka”vesa.” Of course rasa-realisation is brought about by the whole vibhāva”di complex, but when these vibhāvas are apprehended in an extra-ordinary way, through a special ‘pada’, ‘rasa’ becomes ‘pada-dyotya’ here. A. also dwells on parts of a pada, i.e. “padāvayava.” as suggestive of rasa. Parts of a compound as in, “cakita-harini-hari-netra-tribhāgah”, or at times a termination, or use of singular, plural, or a gender etc. also become suggestive of rasa. A. gives illustrations for all these.
At Dhv. III. 16, Ā observes:

sup-tiñ-vacana-sambandhais
tathā kāraka-saktibhiḥ,
kṛt-taddhita-samāsaiś ca
dyotyolakṣya-kramaḥ kvacit.

"Case-terminations, conjugational terminations, number, relation, accidence, these become primary affixes, secondary affixes, and also compounds, all conveyers of suggestion with undiscerned sequenciality." (Trans. K. Kris. pp 147, ibid)

For Ā. a 'sentence' or "vākyā" also is a suggestive unit for rasa. This vākyā-rūpa-a-samlakṣya-krama-dhvani, is also either 'śuddha' i.e. pure in itself, or "sānkirṇa" i.e. mixed with figures of speech. Ā. provides proper illustrations for the same. He also says that 'construction' - or 'samghatana' in poetry becomes conducive to rasa. (Dhv. III. 6). We will discuss this in a separate chapter later when we will show, how in Ā.'s opinion different thought-currents are incorporated in his scheme of vyañjanā-dhvani-rasa.

Keeping the supreme variety of rasa-dhvani in focus, Ā. also discusses how rasa is impeded in poetry, i.e. which are rasa-virodhi-tattvas or deterrents to rasa in poetry and how to avoid the same. "Rasa-virodhi-tattva and its parihāra" is thus an important topic with reference to rasa-dhvani-kāvyā. We will discuss this, in view of Ā.'s opinion; as under.

At Dhv. III. 17, Ā. observes:

"prabandhe muktakā vā'pi
rasādīn bandhum icchatā,
yatnaḥ kāryaḥ sumatinā
parihāre virodhinām."

"prabandhe muktake vā'pi rasa-bhāva-nibandhanam prayty ādṛtamanāḥ kaviḥ virodhi-parihāre param yatnam ādadhāti-anyathā tu asya rasamayaḥ ślokaḥ ekopi samyāḥ na sampadyate."

kāni punas tāni virodhini yāni yamataḥ parihartavyāni-ity ucyate..."

"Whether it is the whole work or a single stanza, a good poet, who is desirous of incorporating sentiments etc., in what he writes should take pains to avoid hindrances to them." (Dhv. III. 17).

'A poet who is intent upon incorporating sentiments and emotions in his works, whether they be big or small, should turn all his efforts towards avoiding
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impediments. Otherwise he will not succeed in composing even a single verse full of sentiment. The following verses answer the question, "What, then are these impediments which deserve to be carefully avoided by the poet?"

Dhv. III. 18, 19 read as :

"virodhi-rasa-sambandhi-
vibhāvā"di-parigraha,
vistareṇa anvitasya'pi
vastunónyasya varnanam." (III. 18)
"akānda eva vicchittir,
akānde ca prakāśanam,
paripoṣañ gatasya'pi
paunaḥ-punyena dipanam
rasasya, syād virodhāya
vr̥ty anaucityam eva vā." (III. 19)

"Sketching the setting etc., of an opposite sentiment, describing something whose connection with the subject on hand is only very remote." (IV. 18)

"Stopping the delineation of sentiment abruptly, as also elaborating it when not required; over-elaborating it again and again, though it has already received sufficient elaboration, and indecorum in respect of behaviour—all these hinder the course of sentiment." (III. 19) (Trans. K.Kris., pp. 161, ibid)

Ā. further elaborates in his vṛtti as follows: He observes that the first impediment to sentiment is delineating the vibhāvā"dis i.e. determinants, consequents and transitory feelings of a rasa, which is opposite to the contextual rasa. For example, the taking of the determinants or vibhāvas of the opposite rasa, is seen when first a poet describes a person who is the substratum of śānta-rasa or tranquillity and then immediately (anantaram eva) the same person is described as a substratum of love in union, i.e. he is described as a hero in the setting of erotic sentiments, i.e. as a lover. Thus the originally intended sentiment of tranquillity or śāntarasa is hindered.

Describing the basic emotion (= bhāva) of an opposite rasa is seen when the hero tries to humour his beloved who is angry through love-quarrel, by telling stories of renunciation of worldly pleasures. In the same way opposite consequents or anubhāvas are seen being portrayed, when a hero gets wild and shows real anger when his beloved is feigning love-anger, and does not yield to his approaches.
The second impediment to sentiment is the lengthy description of a subject whose connection with the sentiment on hand is only a very distant one: (vastunāḥ anyasya, kathāṇcid anvitasya api, vistaraṇa kathanam). This is seen when a poet who starts with describing his hero tormented by love in separation, goes off astray, and gives very lengthy descriptions of mountains, etc. i.e. nature.

The third impediment to sentiment is an abrupt stopping of the delineation of a contextual sentiment, and also unwarranted elaboration of the same at the wrong place. The example of unwarranted stoppage is seen when, after portraying the rise of mutual love between the hero and the heroine, instead of describing their efforts to get united, the poem continues to dwell upon their other irrelevant activities. Elaboration at the wrong place is seen when a god-like hero, such as Rāma is, for no reason whatsoever, shown as getting interested in activities of love, when actually a terrific battle is raging at its climax, meting out death to the great heroes (as at the time of universal destruction), though there has been absolutely no previous occasion leading up to even the sentiment of love-in-separation at that time. Such a procedure can not be justified even on the ground that the character is shown there only as a victim of delusion due to Destiny. For it is proper that the poet should write only with a view to delineating sentiment. The plot is just a means to an end as noticed in Dhv. I. 9 and so forth.

Poets commit such blunders when they keep the description of plot only in the centre; i.e. when they are less focussed on rasa and delineate the same without discrimination between what is principal and what is subordinate. Hence it is made absolutely clear here, observes Ā., that the poets have to be only rasa-focussed in their works. This alone is the thrust of our effort says Ā., and not merely to establish the doctrine of dhvani alone: "ata eva ca, itivṛttā-mātra-varṇana-prādhānye aṅgāṅgi-bhāva-rāhita-rasa-bhāva-nibandhane ca, kavīnām evaṁ-vidhāṇi skhalitāṁ bhavanti iti rasa"dīrīpa-vyaṅgya-tātparyam eva esāṁ yuktam iti yatno'smābhir ārabdhaḥ, na dhvani-pritipādana-mātrābhiniveśena." (vṛtti, Dhv. III. 19).

The fourth or next impediment to rasa is its over-elaboration, time and again, though it has already received full elaboration in the shape of a description of its various constituents. Such a description will itself look like a faded flower if it is pressed far too much, again and again.

Lack of decorum in respect of behaviour (vṛtti-anaucitya) is yet another impediment to sentiment. For example, if the heroine, putting aside all sense of decorum, conveys openly to the hero her desire to make love, we come across this defect. Or, the word 'vṛtti' may mean the vṛttis i.e. dictions such as kaiśikī (or, the graceful), etc., which are discussed by Bharata, or the upanāgarikā (i.e. the urban)
etc., laid down by other writers on poetics: “yadi vā vṛttināṁ bharatapasiddhanāṁ kaiśiky ādī, kāvyālaṅkārāntara-prasiddhanāṁ upanāgarikā”dyānāṁ vā, yad anaucityam, a-visaye nibandhanam, tad api, rasa-bhaṅga-hetuh.” (vṛtti, Dvī. III. 19) - The delineation of these vṛttis at places where it is not appropriate also causes impediment to rasa.

Indecorum in respects counted above, or such others as imagined afresh by other critics, also have to be avoided by poets, keeping focussed on the central theme of rasa-delineation - “evam esāṁ rasa-virodhanāṁ anyesāṁ ca anayā diśā svayam utprekṣitānāṁ pariḥāre satkavibhir avahitair bhavatavyam.” (vṛtti, Dvī. III. 19)

Good poets, suggests Ā., have to be centrally focussed in steering clear of these impediments to sentiment, and also of similar hindrances imagined afresh by them. The following verses, sum up the points, observes Ā.:

“mukhyā vyāpāra-viṣayāḥ
sukavīṇāṁ rasā”dayāḥ,
teśāṁ nibandhane bhāvyāṁ
taiḥ, sadaiva a-pramādibhiḥ.
nīrasas tu prabandho yaḥ
sōpaśabdo mahān kaveli,
sa tena a-kavir eva syāt
anyena a-smṛta-laksanah.
pūrve viśr̥nkha-la-girāḥ
kavayaḥ prāpta-kūrtayaḥ,
tān samāśritya na tyājyā
nītir eṣā maniśina.
vālmiki-vyāsas-mukhyāś ca
ye prakhyātā kaviśvaraḥ,
tad-abhiprāya-bāhyōyaṁ
nā’smābhir darśito nayah.” - iti.

“Sentiments etc., are the most important ends for the activity of poets; hence poets should always be very attentive in delineating them.

A work, devoid of sentiment, is the the most unpardonable solecism on the part of the poet. It will brand him as a poetaster, with nothing but oblivion in store for him.
Time was, when poets could win fame by their words unfettered by any rule; but the wise should not take them as their models and depart from the principles laid down above:

As a matter of fact, we have shown nothing here which is against the opinions of the most-celebrated first-rate poets like Vālmīki and Vyāsa.” (Trans. K.Kris., pp. 165, ibid)

After this, Ā. dwells upon the possibility of how even ‘virodhin’ - i.e. hindrances can be accommodated in a composition. He observes : (Dhv. III. 20)

“vivakṣite rase labdha-pratīṣṭhe
tu, virodhinām,
bādhyānām āṅgabhāvam vā
prāptānām uktir acchalā.”

“After the intended sentiment has been established on a secure footing; there will be no defect in including even hindrances, provided that these come either as foils, or as ancillaries.” (Trans. K.Kris. pp. 165, ibid)

Ā. is of the opinion that once that intended sentiment is fully developed with the help of its required accessories, to portray even the hindrances, in case they serve only as foils or ancillaries of the intended sentiment, will not be a defect. Hindrances will serve as foils only if they are positively overshadowed by the intended leading sentiments, not in any other way. Thus portrayed, the presentation of virodhins only enhances the development of the intended leading sentiment. Ā. observes : “āṅgabhāvam prāptānām ca teṣām virodhitvam eva nivartate.” (vṛttī, Dhv. III. 20) i.e. if hindrances are portrayed as ancillaries, they will have lost their very hindering power.

Ā. further suggests how hindrances can come in as ancillaries. Either they come as ancillaries in a natural way, or in an imagined way. In a description of natural ancillaries, there is no chance of any hindrance. Say, for example, in describing ‘vyādhi’ i.e. disease and the like, it will not create hindrance while developing the sentiment of Love in separation, for disease is its natural ancillary. But such things as death, which are not natural ancillaries, if described, will create hindrances, for sure. If it is argued that death is also a natural ancillary in case of the leading vipralambha, then also, Ā. observes, it should not be brought in, simply because when the substratum (here nāyaka or nāyikā) dies, there is going to be an invariable rupture in the development of the leading vipralambha-ṛśīgāra : “āśraya-vicchede rasasya atyanta-vicchedā”patteḥ.” (vṛttī, Dhv. III. 20) If it is
argued that in that case Karuṇa or pathos will be developed, this is not acceptable
to Ā., for, Karuṇa is not relevant to the context, and that which is contextual here,
i.e. vipralambha will be broken up, or damaged. If pathos is the intended leading
sentiment, then there is no objection to death being portrayed. Or, in a rare case
death will not hinder vipralambha, in case, this separation by death comes to an
immediate end by reunion in another form: (a-dīrgha-kāla-pratyāpatti-saṃbhave).
But if a long time-gap passes between death and such reunion, it will surely create
hindrance. Thus, such episodes should be avoided by a poet intent upon delineating
rasa predominantly.

Ā. gives an illustration where hindrances do not appear as blemishes, i.e. when
they are portrayed as foils. The example is: “kvākāryaṁ īṣa-laṅkṣaṁaṇaṁ” etc. Or,
when Puṇḍarīka is advised by a friendly ascetic.

Again, when a hindrance is placed as an ancillary, it creates no blemish in the
delineation of intended sentiment e.g. in, “bhramim aratīṁ.” etc. There is no
blemish also, when the ancillary position is even superimposed or imagined -
“saṃāropita api”, as in “pāṇḍu-ksāmam.” etc.

Ancillary position of a hindrance can be secured in yet another way also such
as when two sentiments or emotions, opposed mutually, may both be made
ancillary to another idea which happens to be the principal import in a sentence by
force of its contextual importance: “iṣṭam ca āṅga-bhāva-prāptaṁ anyā, yad
ādhikārikatvāt pradhāna ekasmin vākyārthe, rasayor bhāvayor vā, paraspara-
virodhinor, dvayor āṅga-bhāva-gamanam, tasyām api na doṣāḥ.” (vṛtti, Dhv. III.
20) E.g. in the verse, “kṣipto hastāvalagnah.” etc. If it is asked why the opposition
in such case melts away, the reply that Ā. gives is that, it is so because both of them
are definitely subordinate to the main import. The natural opposition will appear
as such and would lead to defect only if it is a positive statement and not a mere
quotation as in the verse “ehi, gaccha, pata, uttiṣṭha.” etc. There is no real
opposition though both positive injunctions and prohibitions are found side by side,
because they are only quotations: “vidhau viruddha-saṃāvesasya duṣṭatvam, na
anuvāde.” (vṛtti, Dhv. III. 20). Ā. also suggests that: “na ca raseṣu vidhy anuvāda-
vayavahāro nāsti iti sākyam vaktum, teṣāṁ vākyārthatvena abhyupagamāt.” It is not
possible to say that the procedure of ‘vidhī’ i.e. direct assertion, and ‘anuvāda’ or
indirect assertion is not found in sentiments. When purport of sentence and
expressed sense can both contain this procedure of direct assertion and indirect
narration, how can you prevent the sentiments from containing these, because
sentiments are also suggested by the same: “vākyārthasya ca vācyasya yau
vidhyanuvādau tau tad-ākṣiptāṇāṃ rasāṇāṃ kena vāryete?" (vṛtti, Dhv. III. 20). Even those who do not accept that rasā”di are the direct import of poetry (sāksād rasādīnāṃ kāvyā”rthatā”), will have to accept the instrumentality of the kāvyārtha in bringing about rasa, i.e. the position that rasā”di are conveyed by kāvyārtha or main import will have to be admitted. Ā. observes : (vṛtti, Dhv. III. 20) - “yasmād anūdyamānāṅga-nimittōbhayarasavastusahakārino vidihiyamānāṃśād bhāva-viśesa-pratītir utpadyate tataś ca na kaścid virodhaḥ. dṛṣṭyate hi viruddhābhaya-sahakārīnaḥ kāraṇāt kāryā-viśeṣotpattaiḥ. viruddha-phalotpādana-hetuvam hi yugapad ekasya kāraṇasya viruddhānaṃ na tu viruddhābhaya-sahakārītvam. (vṛtti, Dhv. III. 20) - “That particular effects are produced by the agency of two causes opposed to each other, yet co-operating in the production of effect, is a matter of common observation. Opposition would be there only when it is held that the same cause gives rise to two opposite effects simultaneously and not when it is said that two causes opposed to each other are contributing simultaneously towards the production of a single effect.” (Trans. K.Kris. pp. 171, ibid)

Ā. concludes : “tasmād vākyarthābhūtasya rasasya bhāvasya vā virodhi rasa-virodhi iti vaktum nyāyyah, na tu aṅgabhūtasya kasya cic.” “Therefore, only that sentiment deserves to be termed as a hindrance to sentiment, which hinders either a sentiment or an emotion that happens to be the main import of the sentence in question, and not at all the one which hinders only another ancillary sentiment or emotion.” (Trans. K.Kris. pp. 173, ibid)

Ā. gives a special concession to śrīṅgāra which can serve as favourable to the delineation of even karuṇa, when it is presented in a charming device. For example, all occurrences of śrīṅgāra recollected in hours of pathos, give a greater fillip to karuṇa. Thus, says Ā. the more and more we think about such escapes the greater is the possibility of avoiding an opposition. Thus, Ā. says, we have explained the distinction where sentiments can be delineated side by side with the sentiments that are opposed to them, and where they cannot be thus delineated : “evaṃ tāvad rasa”dīnāṃ virodhi-rasā”dibhiḥ samāveṣa-a-samāveṣayor viṣaya-vibhāgo darśītaḥ.” (vṛtti, Dhv. III. 20)

Now Ā. suggests how the delineation of such various sentiments is to be done in one and the same work -

Dhv. III. 21 reads :

“prasiddhēpi prabandhānāṃ
nānā-rasa-nibandhane
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eko rasöŋīkartavyas
tesāṁ utkārṣam icchatā.”

“Though there is convention that more than one sentiment should find a place in entire works of literature, one of them alone should be made principal by the poet who aims at greatness of his works.” (Trans. K.Kris. pp. 175, ibid).

Ā. observes in his vr̥tti, on Dhv. III. 21: “prabandheṣu mahākāvyā”diṣu nātakā”diṣu vā viprakīrṇatayā aṅgāngi-bhāvena bahavo rasāḥ upanībadhyanta ity atra prasiddhau satyām api, yaḥ prabandhānāṁ chāyātiṣaya-yogam icchati, tena tesāṁ rasānāṁ anyatamaḥ kaścid vivākṣito rasōṅgitvena viniveśayitaśya ity ayam yuktataro mārgaḥ.”

“Though in fact the convention is that, in epics etc., as well as in dramas etc., several sentiments should be delineated with either equal importance to each other or differing importance, the better procedure is that a poet who is intent upon adorning his work with abundant beauty should make it a rule to give principal importance to only one intended sentiment amongst them.”

(Trans. K.Kris. pp. 175, ibid),


Ā. answers an objection here. The opponent raises a point to the following effect. He argues that when actually several sentiments have been developed to their climax, how can any single, rasa or sentiment can be said to be ‘aṅgīn’ or principal ? The answer to this is given in Dhv. III. 22, and vr̥tti thereon. Ā. argues that the importance of the intended sentiment, which is shining through out the work abidingly, i.e. which looks like the vary basis of a composition - “sthāyitvena avabhāsīnah”, cannot be marred by the inclusion of other sentiment. The ‘vr̥tti’ here goes to observe that when a rasa is intended to be principal or primary in a work, and is kept constantly in focus by being delineated again and again, its importance cannot be marred by the inclusion of other passing sentiments because it underlies all the rest. The reason for this is explained in Dhv. III. 23, where it is observed that
just as one plot is made to stay as principal or major in a given composition as a whole, so also one sentiment can be made to stay as principal and this will never lead to any blemish or discrepancy: (Dhv. III. 23)

"kāryam ekaṃ yathā vyāpi
prabandhasya vidhīyate,
tathā rasasya api vidhau,
virodho naiva vidyate."

The vṛtti on this observes that just as one plot consisting of several parts or junctures is made to progress uniformly and pervade the whole work, and just as it never gets mixed up with minor parts, and even if it gets mixed up its prominence is not shrouded i.e. it does not suffer, so also, when a single sentiment among several other minor ones is made as principal or major one in the whole work, there is no discrepancy at all involved here. On the other hand, such a procedure will bring abundant delight to the cultured critics or men of taste, whose power of discrimination is even sharp and whose appreciation is wide enough.

A possible objection also is put to rest here by Ā. It may be argued for example, that the relation of major and minor or principal and subordinate may hold good at best, in case of such sentiments which are not opposed to each other, such as, the vīra or heroic, and the śṛṅgāra i.e. erotic, the erotic and the adbhuta i.e. marvellous, the vīra/heroic and the furious/raudra, and the pathetic/karūṇa, etc.

But, argues the opponent, how can this relationship of major/minor be ever possible in case of sentiments that are mutually absolutely opposed to each other, such as the erotic/śṛṅgāra and the disgusting/bībhatās, the heroic/vīra and the terrible or bhayānaka, or the quietude i.e. śānta and the furious/raudra or śānta and śṛṅgāra?

To this, Ā.'s answer is read in Dhv. III. 24:

"a-virodhi virodhī vā
rasōṅgini rasāntare,
paripoṣam na netavyas
tathā syād a-virodhitā."

i.e. "When a sentiment is delineated in a work as the principal one, no other sentiment, whether unopposed or opposed to it, should be treated elaborately. This will ensure one that no opposition between them will remain any more."

(Trans. K.Kris. pp. 177, ibid)
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So, when any single rasa, say śṛṅgāra, happens to be principal in a work, no other sentiment, whether unopposed or opposed, should be treated fully or elaborately at the same time. Ā. holds that elaborate treatment of other rasas can be avoided in different ways. He observes (vṛtti, Dhw. III. 24) : "āṅgini rasāntare śṛṅgārā"dau prabandha-vyaṅgye sati, a-virodhi, virodhī vā rasaḥ, paripoṣam na netavyah. tatra a-virodhino rasasya, āṅgi-rasāpeksaṇā atyantam ādhikyaṃ na kartavyam iti ayam prathamaḥ paripoṣa-parihāraḥ. utkarsa-sāmye/pi tayor virodha-a-sambhavat. yathā-"ekato roditi priyā" etc. yathā vā, "kaṇṭhāt cchitvā." etc., ity atra. - etc.

Here, Ā. observes that even an un-opposed sentiment should not be shown greater importance as compared to the principal sentiment. Even if both of them get equal prominence, there will be no chance of any opposition between them; as in "ekato roditi." etc., or "kaṇṭhāt cchitvā." etc.

The next device suggested by Ā. is that ancillary feelings or passing moods, i.e. vyabhicārins, which are opposed to the major rasa, should not be delineated at length, and even if described at all, it should be immediately followed by the description of the passing moods of the principal rasa. Ā. further adds that even when a minor or subsidiary rasa is being treated fully, it should be at all events treated only as a subsidiary one by special attention. Its status of a subsidiary rasa has to be kept in focus by the poet. Ā. suggests that other devices on these lines can be invented by poets or readers.

If the subsidiary rasa happens to be a virodhin i.e. opposite to the main rasa, it should be carefully delineated only as being lesser than the major rasa - "virodhīnas tu rasasya, āṅgirasāpeksaṇā kasyacin nyūnatā sampādanīyā." (Vṛtti, Dhw. III. 24). For example, when śānta is the major rasa, śṛṅgāra should be comparatively less developed, i.e. it should be attached lesser importance. So also, vice versa, when śṛṅgāra is a major rasa, śānta should be given lesser prominence. If it is argued that in the absence of fuller treatment, there can be no rasa at all, the answer is, "uktam atra, āṅgi-rasāpeksaṇā" i.e. we are talking of comparatively lesser prominence. The subordinate opposite sentiment thus will receive less fuller treatment as compared to the 'āṅgi' or principal rasa. The same degree of full treatment will not go by the way of what is meant to be a minor rasa. But by this, the development of even a minor rasa, in its own course is not denied : "āṅgino hi rasasya yāvān paripoṣas tāvān tasya na kartavyah, svataḥ-tu-sambhavī paripoṣaḥ kena vāryate ?" (vṛtti, on Dhw. III. 24).
A. further adds that “etac ca āpekṣikāṁ prakarṣa-yogitvāṁ ekasya rasasya bahuraseṣu prabandheṣu rasānāṁ āṅgāngi-bhāvam anabhyupagaçchhatāpy aśakya-pratikṣepam ity anena prakāreṇa a-virodhināṁ virodhināṁ ca rasānāṁ āṅgāngi-bhāvena samāveṣe prabandheṣu syād a-virodhah.” (vṛtti, Dhv. III. 24)

“Thus no one - not even those who do not accept the principal and subsidiary relation of sentiments - can ever deny that a single sentiment will have principal importance, in spite of the fact that, the work may contain several sentiments also alongside of it. Thus too, the opposition of sentiments can be avoided in works by portraying such unopposed or opposed sentiments with due deference to the principal and subsidiary relationship.” (Trans. K.Kris., pp. 179, ibid)

After explaining the general rules concerning opposition to sentiments, A. comes to discuss specific means of overcoming opposition between two opposite sentiments. He observes : (vṛtti, before Dhv. III. 25) - “evaṁ a-virodhināṁ virodhināṁ ca prabandhasthena anginā rasan samāveṣe sādhāraṇam avirodhopāyaṁ pratipādyā, idāṇīm virodha-visayam eva tāṁ pratipādayituṁ idam ucye.”

Now follows Dhv. III. 25, which reads as :

“viruddhaikā”śrayo yas tu
virodhī sthāyino bhavet
sa vibhinnāśrayāḥ kāryas
tasya pośeṇy adosātā.”

“If a sentiment opposed to the principal one happens to occur in the same substratum as that of the latter itself, the opposed sentiment should be given a different substratum; (once this is done) there will be no defect even if it should be treated in full.” (Trans. K.Kris., pp. 181, ibid)

A. further adds that the ‘virodhī’ i.e. opposite sentiments could fall into two types - (i) ekādhikaraṇya-virodhī or opposite of another, when in the same āśraya or substratum, and (ii) nairantarya-virodhī - i.e. opposition, when absolutely juxtaposed, i.e. opposition of another coming by its side. Now, as far as the major or principal rasa is concerned, if another sentiment also is found in the same substratum, i.e. if it acquires the same amount of importance with it, say, for example when vira or heroic is the principal rasa and is developed with reference to hero, and in the same breath, and in the same substratum i.e. in the hero, the ‘bhayānaka’ or the terrible is also deployed, we will have an illustration of the first
type of opposition. Now in such cases the opposition can be removed if the substratum of the opposition is varied or changed. The bhayānaka should be delineated, say, with reference to the enemy of the hero who is himself the substratum of the viṣa-rasa. When the poet arranges the design this way, no blamish will be seen even in the development of an opposite rasa. By describing that the enemy is terrified, actually the special glory of the hero will be all the more established. Ā. suggests that this is well illustrated in his own composition called "arjuna-vijaya", wherein Arjuna, the hero enters the nether-world. As for the second type of opposition, Ā. observes:

"evam ekādhiharkanya-virodhīnaḥ prabandhasthena stāyinaḥ rasena aṅga-bhāva
gamane nirvirodhītvam yathā tathā darśitam. dvitiyasya tu tat-pratipādayitum
ucyate -

"ekāśrayatve nirdoṣo
nairantarye virodhavān,
rasāntara-vyavadhinā
raso vyāṅgyaḥ sumedhasā." (Dhv. III. 26)

The manner of avoiding the opposition caused by a conflicting sentiment in the same substratum and of making it subsidiary to the principal sentiment in the work has been pointed out in the above text. The same is pointed out below with reference to opposite of the second variety:

"A sentiment which has no opposition due to the sameness of substratum, but which becomes an opposite of another (i.e. principal) sentiment coming closely beside it, should be so conveyed by the intelligent poet that a third sentiment will intervene between these conflicting ones." (Trans. K.Kris., pp. 181, ibid)

Though there may not be any opposition between two rasas residing in the same substratum, but if the opposition is seen only when they are juxtaposed in the same substratum, then such two sentiments should be so introduced in a composition, that a common friendly third rasa is placed in between the two. The illustration is seen in the delineation of both śānta and śṛṅgāra in the same substratum, viz. the hero Jimūtavāhana, but not at one and the same time, but with an interval, so to say, of adbhuta rasa, placed between the two.

Ā. here takes an opportunity to recommend an independent place for śānta-rasa even in a drama, for he and his follower Abhinavagupta are great
supporters of śānta-rasa. We will discuss this point later in this chapter when we consider the topic of the number of rasas accepted by various authorities and especially the position of śānta-rasa as an independent rasa.

For the present we will proceed with Ā. who illustrates the removal of second type of rasa-virodha by mentioning the case of Nāgānanda. To further support his position, Ā. observes: (Dhv. III. 27) -

"rasāntarāntaritayor
eka-vākyasthayor api,
nivartate hi rasayoḥ
samāveśe virodhitā."

"By the intervention of another sentiment even the opposition of two sentiments in the same sentence will disappear." (Trans. K.Kris., pp. 183, ibid)

There is no doubt that the opposition between two sentiments in a work will disappear by the intervention of a third rasa. For, it is observed that even the opposition between two sentiments in the same sentence also is seen to be removed when this principle of putting a common third rasa between the two is observed. Thus, in the illustration viz. "bhūreṇu-digdhān nava-pārijāta. etc. from the Mahābhārata both śṛṅgāra and bhībhasa are delineated in the same sentence, of course, with an interval of viḥra-rasa in between.

Ā. further suggests (Dhv. III. 28) that poets should solve the problem of opposition or otherwise in their composition. They have to be more watchful while treating śṛṅgāra, for it is a very very delicate rasa. Even, the slightest error with reference to śṛṅgāra is widely noticed immediately by experts. - “tatraiva ca rase, sarvebhyo'pi rasebhyaḥ sauśumāryātiśaya-yogini kavir avadhānavān, prayatnavān syāt. tatra hi pramādyatas tasya sahariya-madhye kṣipram eva avajñā-viśayatyā bhavati. śṛṅgāra-raso hi saṁsāriṇo niyamena anubhava-viśayavrāt sarva-rasebhyaḥ kamanīyatayā pradhānabhūtaḥ." (vṛtti, Dhv. III. 29)

"The poet should be very attentive in regard to that sentiment as it is more delicate than every other sentiment. If he should carelessly falter in this sentiment, he will at once become a butt of contempt in the circle of refined critics. Erotic sentiment is invariably within the experience of all persons, it is not only the most charming but also the most important sentiment." (Trans. K.Kris., pp. 187, ibid)
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Thus, Ā. seems to establish the supremacy of ‘rasa’ in poetry and suggests that all other thought-currents promulgated in the field of literary criticism should have ‘rasa’ in the centre and that a poet has to be rasa-oriented in his efforts. Ā. observes

“evam rasā”disu virodhā-virodha-nirūpaṇasya upayogitvām pratipādyya vyañjaka-vācyā-vācaka-nirūpaṇasyā’pi tad-viṣayasya tat-pratipādyate -

“vācyānām vācakānām ca
yad aucityena yojanam,
rasā”di-viṣayeṇaḥ
karma mukhyāṃ mahākaveḥ.” (Dhv. III. 32)

vācyānām iti-vṛttā-višeṣaṇām vācakānām ca tad-viṣayeṇām rasā”di-viṣayeṇa aucityena yad yojanam etan mahākaver mukhyāṃ karma. ayaṃ eva hi mahākaver mukhya vyāpāro yad rasā”dīnāṃ eva mukhyataye kāvyārthi-krtya tad vyakty anuṣṭhiteṃ arthānāṃ ca upanibandhanam.”

“The usefulness of the treatment of opposition and non-opposition of sentiments has been explained above. In the following, the usefulness of the treatment of the expressed and the expressions also as are suggestive of sentiment is indicated :

“The main task of a first-rate poet lies in a proper marshalling of all the contents and the expressions in the direction of sentiments etc. (Dhv. III. 32)”

The main business of a first-rate poet is none other than the proper marshalling of both contents, i.e. plots, and expressions used in setting them forth, in the direction of sentiments, etc. In other words, the main function of the poet lies only in making one sentiment principal throughout the poem and in employing both words and senses only in such a way that the sentiment is suggested clearly.” (Trans. K.Kris. pp. 189, ibid)

We have suggested that we will deal with the problem of the number of rasas and the status of śānta-rasa by the end of this chapter. We will also take care of how different concepts such as those of guṇa, alāṃkāra, rīti, vṛtti, doṣa, lākṣaṇa, etc. are also correlated to the pivotal concept of rasa in the Kashmirian school of thought in particular and Indian literary criticism in general. This we will do in the chapter that follows. But for the present, after having dealt with the first variety of criticism based classification in Ā. viz. dhvani kāvyā, and there too rasa-dhvani in particular, now we will first proceed to deal with the other two types viz.
gunībhūta-vyaṅgya and citra kāvya, in Ā., to begin with. We propose to pick up this thread of three-fold criticism-based classification in other writers of the Kashmir School of thought, beginning with Mammatā and ending with Jagannātha, next. First, we will see as below, how Mammatā and others treat the first variety viz. dhvani kāvya.

Mammatā, as we have seen earlier defines kāvya at K.P. I. 4 ab, and talks of dhvani (kāvya) at K.P. I. 4 cd as under:

“tad adोśau śabdārthau
sa-guṇāvanalamkṛtī punah kvā’pi,
idam uttamam atiśayini vyaṅgye
vācyād, dhvanir budhaiḥ kathitaḥ.”

(4 ab) - “It (i.e. poetry) consists of word and sense, which are without blemishes, possessed of excellences, and are, rarely, devoid of figures.” (Trans. R. C. Dwivedi, K.P., pp. 9, ibid)

(4 cd) - “This is best when the suggested meaning far excels the expressed sense; it is called ‘dhvani’ by the learned.” (Trans. R. C. Dwivedi, pp. 11, ibid) - The vṛttī on K.P. I. 4 reads as: “idad iti kāvyaṃ, budhair vaiyākaraṇāh pradhāna-bhūta-sphoṭa-rūpa-vyaṅgya-vyaṅjakasya śabdasya dhvanir iti vyavahāraḥ kṛtaḥ, tatas tanmatānusāribhir anyair api nyagbhāvita-vācyā-vyaṅgya-vyaṅjana-kṣamasya śabdārtha-yugalasya.”

“This means a poem. By the learned i.e. the grammarians, the designation ‘dhvani’ is given to a (non-eternal, physical) word, suggestive of the suggested sense in form of ‘sphoṭa’ (i.e. the eternal ideal form of word), which is the principal. Hence by others also, who follow their theory, (the designation ‘dhvani’ is given) to the pair of word and sense such as are capable of suggesting a sense that has subordinated the expressed sense. (Trans. R.C.D. pp. 11, ibid)

With reference to the predomination of the suggested sense, Mammatā (= M.) goes for a three-fold classification on the lines suggested by Ā. and not only names them as dhvani, gunībhūta-vyaṅgya and (citra or) avara, but calls them as ‘uttama’ - the best, ‘maḍhyama’-the mediocre or second rate, and ‘avara’ or the other, the last. In the ullāsa IV, he deals with the classification of dhvani, and in ullāsa V and VI, with that of gunībhūta-vyaṅgya and citra respectively.

It seems that as compared to his mentor, i.e. Ā., M. has given a comparatively more scientific classification of dhvani. In the K.P. also, 2 varieties of lakṣaṇā-mūla-
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dhvani and 16 varieties of abhidhāmūla-dhvani make a total of 18. Now out of these, ubhayaśāktimūla is available in a sentence only i.e. vākyā-gata, and the rest are both pada-gata and vākya-gata, thus giving 34 more. Total reaches to $34 + 1 = 35$ types. Now, the artha-śākty-uttha is available with reference to a whole composition, i.e. prabandha-gata also and this takes us to $35 + 12 = 47$ types. The a-sāmlakṣya-krama is also available in padāmśa, rācanā, varṇa and prabandha, thus giving, 4 more and taking us to 51 types of śuddha-dhvani. Now on account of three-fold sāmkara and one variety of sāmṛṣṭi, they reach a figure of 10404 and when 51 śuddha types are added, the total comes to 10455. In Ā, following locana, we have 35 śuddha-bhedas which swell to 51 in M. Thus there are 16 more. These are possible in the sub-varieties of abhidhā-mūla-dhvani i.e. vivakṣitānyaparavācyadhvani. On the one hand, the Locana explained 12 types of artha-śāktyudbhava amounting to 24 when taken as both pada-gata and vākyagata. But M. adds 12 more of prabandha-gata to these 24. Again, when the Locana, takes the śabda-śāktyutttha to be pada-gata and vākya-gata only, M. takes it to be ubhaya-gata also. M. also takes śabda-śāktyutttha-dhvani to be vastuvyaṅgya and alaṃkāravyaṅgya, and these two again both pada-gata and vākya-gata. Thus we have 5 more, i.e. $12 + 2 + 1 = 15$. These 15 more are with reference to the sāmlaksya-krama-vyaṅgya. Locana takes rasā”di-dhvani to be pada-gata, vākya-gata, varṇagata, saṃghaṭtanā-gata and prabandha-gata, but M. adds one more i.e. padaika-deśa-gata. Thus M. has 16 more types making the total of śuddha-dhvani-bhed to be thus 51, as against 35 of Locana.

Hemacandra and Jayadeva follow the suit of M., though Jayadeva has a longer discussion on varieties and sub-varieties. Jayadeva has given certain new names also. Vidyādhara in the third ummeṣa (= chapter) of his Ekāvalī discusses dhvani-prapaṇica in details. Normally rasā”di-dhvani is held to be of a single type, but Vidyādhara takes it to be eight-fold. Vidyānātha just refers to the 51 varieties as given by M. While M. arrives at 10455 varieties through multiplication method, Vidyānātha and Viśvanāta restrict the number to 5355, through sāmkalana-method. It may be noted that Viśvanātha totally rejects the citra-kāvya, as it is bereft of rasa according him. He supports M. by saying that it is necessary to take kavi-praṇḍhokti-siddha and kavi-nibaddha-vaktpranaṇḍhokti-siddha as two separate varieties, but Jagannātha takes this as useless or ‘a-kiñcit-kāra.’ Keśavamiśra following the dhvani-tradition, taking the principal status of vyāngya, or otherwise into consideration, gives a three-fold classification of poetry such as uttama, madhya and adama. This is acceptance of M.’s thinking. Appayya Dixit has
given a very subtle discussion on only ‘citra’ varieties, i.e. of alaṅkāras only, in his Citra-mīmāṁsā, but he was basically a dhvanivādin to the core. He, in available documents therefore does refer to the other two types of poetry such as ‘dhvani’ and ‘guṇībhūta-vaṅgayya’ also.

For Jagannātha (= J.), in place of the threefold classification of Ā. and M., we come across a four-fold scheme such as uttamottama, uttama, madhyama and avara.

Uttamottama is one (R.G. pp. 9) - in which both śabda/sound and artha/meaning get subordinated and suggest a charming meaning: “śabdārthau yatra guṇībhāvitā”tmānau kam apy artham abhi-vaṁktaḥ, tad ādyam.” This is almost similar to the definitions given by Ā. and M. It may be noted that J. takes the condition of “Camatkāra” or “Surprise” i.e. the feeling of extraordinary, as the major decisive factor and mentions the same in the definition. By ‘kam-api’ he exactly means this. J. observes (R.G. pp. 31, Edn. RBA): “kam-api iti. camatkṛtiḥbhumim | tena ati-ghūḍha-sphuṭa-vyaṅgyayor nirāsaḥ. aparāṅga-vācyasiddhyāṅga-vyaṅgyasya api camatkāritayā tad vāraṇāya guṇībhāvitā”tmānau iti sväpekṣayā vyaṅgya-prādhānyābhiprāyatam. Thus ‘kam-api’ means “source of camatkāra” and this excludes ‘atighūḍha’ or too much concealed suggestion, or indistinct, and also ‘sphuta i.e. non-concealed or distinct suggestion. These two types of suggestion are devoid of charm. Now, argues J. further, if ‘chmatkāra’ alone is taken as the characteristic of uttamakāvyya, then ‘vācyasi-dhyāṅga’ i.e. suggestion that is subservient to the establishment of the expressed meaning, and ‘aparāṅga’ or that which is subservient to another (sense), also would walk in the field of ‘uttamottama.’ as these two varieties have a suggested sense which are gifted with ‘camatkāra’ or ‘surprise’. All dhvanis of rasa, rasā”bhāsa, bhāva, bhāvā”bhāsa etc. fall under this type of poetry. We can equate J.’s ‘uttamottama’ roughly with the ‘uttama’ of M. and the Kashmir School of thought in general.

Actually his second and third types attract close observation. ‘Uttama’ is the second type of poetry which according to J. has the ‘vyaṅgya’ i.e. suggested sense no doubt charming but is in itself subordinate to śabda or artha or both. J. observes, (pp. 53, ibid): “yatra vyaṅgyam apradhānam eva sac camatkāra-kāraṇam, tad dvitiyam. - vācyāpekṣayā pradhānibhūtam, vyaṅgyántaram ādāya guṇībhūtam vyaṅgyam ādāya ati-vyāpti-vāraṇāya avadhāraṇam. tena tasya dhvanitvam eva. līna-vyaṅgya-vācyā-citra-tiprasaṅga-vāraṇāya ‘camatkāra’ ity ādi.”
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Thus, for J. We have “uttama” type of kāvyā, when vyaṅgya, though subordinate in itself, is the cause of ‘Camatkāra’ or surprise. J. feels that in the special variety of guṇībhūta-vyaṅgya viz. aparāṅga-vyaṅgya, the (first) vyaṅgya is principal so far as it is compared with the expressed sense, but is subordinate when placed against the second suggested sense, and hence it should be taken as ‘dhvani’ kāvyā. Now to avoid ‘ati-vyāpti’ of ‘uttama’ in such illustrations, J. has used “eva” or emphasis in the definition. If may be noted that in illustrations of alamkāras such as rasa-vat and the like, the ‘vyaṅgya’ is principal as compared to the expressed sense but subordinate as compared to the other suggested rasa. The ‘camatkāra’ caused by the first vyaṅgya is not as great as the one caused by the second vyaṅgya.

J. has included the term ‘camatkāra-kāraṇam’ in the definition of uttama-kāvyā. Now this condition is meant to exclude līna-vyaṅgya i.e. very feeble suggested sense, i.e. one where vyaṅgya is almost fainted. Such a condition prevails in ‘vācyā-citra’ type i.e. the illustrations of “arthālamkāras”. Now J. criticised M.’s definition of ‘guṇībhūta-vyaṅgya’ type, which runs as : “a-tādṛśi guṇībhūta-vyaṅgyam, vyaṅgye to madhyamam” - i.e. “But when the suggested meaning is unlike that (i.e. is not principal), it (poetry) is called “mediocre” wherein the suggested becomes subordinate.” By ‘atādṛśi’ i.e. “unlike that” means “not far excelling the expressed sense.” (Trans. R.C.D. pp. 13, ibid)

Now it may be observed here that J. strikes to distinguish between the fact of a subordinated suggested sense which in itself is superior to the expressed on one hand, and a subordinated sense which is inferior from the point of charm to the expressed sense. In the first variety fall all emotion-based alaṅkāras such as rasavat, preya, ūrjasvi and samāhita and in the second fall such alaṅkāras as samāsókti, aprastuta-praśamsā, paryāyokta etc. For M. both of these were guṇībhūta-vyaṅgya, for in them a suggested sense, viz. rasa-bhāvā”di in the first, and any suggested sense viz. rasa, vastu or alaṅkāra - becomes subordinate to another sense, be it again vyaṅgya or vācyā. M. explains ‘aparāṅga-vyaṅgya’ variety of guṇībhūta-vyaṅgya i.e. madhyama kāvyā as, “aparasya rasā”der vācyasya vā vākyārthībhūtasya aṅgaṁ rasā”di anuraṇana-rūpaṁ vā.” i.e. “To another i.e. to rasa and the like or the expressed meaning which has become the purport of the sentence, is subservient the rasa and the like, or the reverberation.” (Trans. R.C.D. 141, ibid). Prof. Dr. R. C. Dwivedi adds in a foot-note here (pp. 141, ibid) - “In ‘Aparāṅga’ the term ‘apara’ refers to ‘rasā”di’ and the expressed meaning principally denoted by a sentence. The term ‘aṅga’ refers to the rasā”di and the expressed
meaning principally denoted by a sentence. The term ‘aṅga’ refers to the rasa”di and the reverberating suggestion. Thus ‘aparāṅga’ is that wherein ‘rasā”di’ or the reverberating suggestion becomes subservient to rasā”di and the expressed sense, principally denoted by a sentence.”

But J. seems to be clearer here. He observes that if one rasa, say śṛṅgāra is subordinate to another rasa which is principle, say karuṇa (as in the illustration viz. “ayaṃ sa raśanotkarśī” etc.), ultimately some rasa-or suggested sense is principal and hence this should be taken as “dhvani” of the ancients. In fact we have ‘karuṇa-dhvani’ in this example. But the charm of suggested śṛṅgāra also can not be denied. So, such examples should be taken out as a separate class from others such as the arthālāṃkāras-paryāyokta and the rest—where suggested sense is subordinated to an expressed sense, i.e. the charm of the expressed is rated higher as compared to whatever suggested sense is apprehended. In the first variety (i.e. in rasavad ādi alaṃkāras, illustrated by the example viz. “ayaṃ sa raśanotkarśī.” etc.), the expressed sense is not at all more charming then both the subordinated and the principal suggested emotive sense or rasā”di. These should not be therefore clubbed together as done by Mammaṭa and others. So, J. gives ‘uttama’ as second variety of kāvyā, and ‘guṇibhūta-vyaṅga’ as the third.

We can argue that here also from the ultimate point of view some rasā”di make for the principal suggested sense, then why not call it “uttamottama” ?. But J. feels that, of course, here the principal suggested sense in form of some rasā”di is charming enough to be designated as “dhvani-kāvyā” of the ancients, but in this variety, it is the subordinated suggested rasā”di, which is superior to the expressed steals the thunder as compared to the principal suggested rasā”di. It is like Sachin Tendulkar’s double century, even when his side, i.e. the India XI, looses a test match. Now, this sort of an experience of the refined and cultured critics cannot be denied. It is therefore that J. splits the original guṇibhūta-vyaṅga of the dhvani-vādins into two, i.e. ‘uttama’ and ‘madhyama’.

J. tries to draw a line of distinction between uttamottama and uttama by observing that the camatkāra caused by the former is greater than the one caused by the latter, for ‘vyaṅga’ is pradhāna in one, and a-pradhāna in another, both being ‘camatkāra-kāri’ in their own way.

The point is that when M. says that one rasa is subordinated to another rasa as in ‘aparāṅga’ variety, he does not name which rasa is the ultimate source of charm. If in the example, ‘ayaṃ sa raśamotkarśī’, the karuṇa is believed to be the
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ultimate source or principal source of charm, the example should be placed under ‘dhvani’, and if ‘śṛṅgāra’ is said to be also charming or equally or more charming then we feel there is contradiction. Ultimately a poetry is to be classed as this or that by the position of principal source of charm. If this lies with the expressed and not with the vyāngya it has to be termed guṇībhūta-vyāngya. For J. the problem arises when both the subordinated and the principal senses are ‘vyāngya’ in themselves. Then one variety gives uttamottama and another gives ‘uttama’. But, be sure his uttamottama is not absolutely identical with ‘dhvani’ of the ancients in the sense that his ‘uttama’ also is ‘dhvani’. In a way even J. is confusing things. But we have given an example from practical life where we see Sachin’s best innings studied with a double century goes in vain when his side loses the match. On his part, M. also is not clear when he does not point out which one, i.e. the subordinated śṛṅgāra or the finally suggested karuṇa - is a greater source of charm; so, both J. and M. are in a way confusing. Actually J. observes about these two types i.e. uttamottama and uttama, that (pp. 54, R. G. Edn. Athavale, ibid) : “anayor bheda yok anapahnvaniya-camatkāryor api prādhānyāprādhānyābhyām asti kaścit sahṛdaya-vedyo viśeṣah” - i.e. here the phrase “prādhānyāprādhānyābhyām” should be taken to mean “camatkārasya prādhānyāprādhānyābhyām” and not vyāngyasya-prādhānyāprādhānyābhyām.” True, so far so good. But what if we say that whatever causes highest camatkāra is to be taken as “pradhāna.” or principal. In this case J.’s uttama also will become uttamottama, for the ‘vyāngya’ causing highest camatkāra can never be taken as ‘subordinated’. But, one point goes in favour of J., and it is that, like Sachin’s century in a losing side, though subordinated from the point of view of victory of the other side, is a source of delight for the refined observes; so also here there is “kaścit sahṛdaya-vedyo viśeṣaḥ.”

It may be observed that our argument is somewhat akin to Badrināth Jhā’s Comm. ‘Candrikā’.

Jha (p. 66, Candrikā; R.G. (Edn. ’55)) suggests that there is some kind of difference like what may be called pradhānībhūta-vyāngya and ‘guṇībhūta-vyāngya, between the uttamottama and the uttama types. Shri Jhā feels that J.’s observation goes against the opinion of Ā. who wrote : “cāruttvōtkarsa-nibandhānā hi vācya-vyāngyayoh prādhānya-vyavasthā. We have also observed to the same effect as above. Jhā’s words are read as : “idam punar atra vicāraṇijyam - ‘cāruttvōtkarsa-nibandhanā hi vācya-vyāngyayoh prādhānya-vivakṣā’ iti dhvanikārānuśāsane jāgrati, vyāngyasya yadi iha vācyāpekṣayā camatkārōtkarsaḥ,
Sahrdaya Lokā
tarhi na aprādhānyam, atha ca aprādhānyam, tarhi na camatkārōtkarṣah. yadi ca vyaṅgyasya camatkārōtkarṣēpi vācyopapādakatayā āṅgatvam isyate, tadā tad āṅgatvam api a-kiñcitkaram, camatkārōtkarṣa-nibandhanasya śīṣṭa-paripāti-sammata-prādhānyasya tathā'pi a-vyāhatavāt.


"harstu kiñcit parilupta-dhairyaś
candrodaya"rambha ivāmburāśiḥ,
umāmukhe bimba-phaḷadharoṣṭhe
vyāpārayāmāsā vilōcanāni."

- ityanayoś camatkāra-apalāpa-anarhatvena, madhyama-kāvyatāyāḥ sarva sammata-tvāt."

- The Candrikākāra has made an additional point in raising a question as to how J. will deal with those varieties of guṇībhūta-vyaṅgya of the Kashmir School of M., wherein both vācyā and vyaṅgya have equal-sama-prominance, or wherein the prominence of either is in a doubtful state?

The best course was laid perhaps by the, we may use the term, "logician-ālāṃkārika" - Mahimabhaṭṭa who was very clear that between vācyā and vyaṅgya (or 'anumeya' as he calls it), the latter is necessarily more charming and therefore no question ever arises of a "guṇībhūta-vyaṅgya" Viśvanātha goes half way when he rejects 'citra' as a type of poetry at all, for according to him poetry without any charm whatsoever of a suggested sense is no poetry at all. This is, in a way recognising half-heartedly the ever-supreme-status of vyaṅgya as advocated by Mahimā.

So, the crux of the problem results into this viz. that either you classify poetry on the basis of the position of vyaṅgya only, or on the basis of camatkāra-prādhānya only. But there is bound to be some confusion if your concept of 'prādhānya' is not clear.

Prof. Dr. P. Sri. Ramachandrudu (pp. 72, ibid) observes - "But what all PR. (Pundita-Rāja) wants to show here is a kind of sama-vyāpti between 'vyāngya-prādhānya-prādhānya' and 'camatkāra-prādhānya-prādhānya' (wherever there is camatkāra-prādhānya, there is vyāngya-prādhānya and vice-versa.). That he gives ultimate importance to camatkāra is evident from his incidental remark (while explaining the verse, "śayitā savidhe." etc.) : "camatkāro na syāt ity asyaiva
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badhakatvā” (R.G. p. 11). Moreover, the scope of Camatkāra is wider because it can be associated with vācyā and śabda etc. also, and applying this only as a measuring rod, he excludes the śabda-citra from the scope of kāvyā.” Actually, we feel that even this defence also cannot save J. from the confusion he has landed himself in. Again, by arguing that the scope of camatkāra is wider, Ramachandrdru seems to accept it even at the śabda-citra level, as done by, of course implicitly, Kuntaka, whose vicitrā abhidhā theoretically covers even śabda-citra.

Now, let us see what J. has to say about madhyamakāvyā. For J. madhyama-kāvyā is that type of poetry, where the expressed sense (vācyārtha) alone is charming inspite of the presence of negligible vyāngya. J. observes : “vyāngya-camatkāra-asamānādhi-karaṇo vācyā-camatkāras triyam.” - i.e. the third type of poetry (i.e. madhyama) is that wherein ‘vācyārtha-camatkāra’ i.e. surprise (on account of beauty) caused by the expressed sense does not stay on equal footing (i.e. in the same location). (i.e. in itself it is placed higher) as compared to vyāngya-camatkāra.

All the instances of poetry with expressed figures of speech such as utprekṣā and the like, fall under this variety. In this context J. observes that even in such figures, there is a touch of some vyāngya, of course negligible, and only its presence makes the vācyā charming. J. observes : “yathā yamunā-varṇane – ‘tānaya maṁkā-gaveśaṇa-lambikṛta-jaladhi-jaṭhara-praviṣṭa-himagiri- bhujāyamānāyā bhagavatyā bhāgīrathyāḥ sakhī” - iti.


Thus, for J., madhyama kāvyā is that wherein the expressed sense-vācyārtha-alone is charming eventhough there is almost negligible presence of some vyāngya- i.e. suggested sense also. All examples of poetry with figures of speech such as utprekṣā and the like fall under this class. J. observes that even in all such alaṁkāras there has to be some touch of ‘vyāngya’, though very faint. But it is the presence of even such negligible vyāngya that makes the vācyā charming. Thus, instead of placing all figures of sense i.e. arthāalaṁkāras under one group of ‘avara’
or 'adhma' class as done by Mammaṭa, J. chooses to promote some of these, with a faint but clear touch of vyāngya sense, to the class of 'madhyama' or guñībhūta-vyaṅga. Thus for J., samāsōkti, paryāyokta, and such other arthālaṃkāras with a distinct fragrance of vyāngya, are part of madhyama kāvyā.

J. makes a subtle distinction of absolutely clear presence (jāgarūka-guñībhūta-vyaṅga) of a distinct subordinated suggested sense and also indistinct or hazy presence of a subordinated suggested sense (i.e. a-jāgarūka.) The former is seen in 'uttama' class and the latter in the 'madhyama' class. But J. is very clear that these - both classes - are never placed in the 'adhma' class. J., it seems, is generous as compared to M. and Viśvanātha (= V.) in recognising the merits of both emotion-based alaṃkāras, i.e. rasavad etc., and alaṃkāras gifted with the fragrance of subordinated suggested sense. M., V. and a host of others had placed them all under 'adhma' variety, not doing justice to their special charm and status. M. had called both arthālaṃkāras and śabdālaṃkāras as ‘arthā-citra’ and ‘śabda-citra’, and branded them as ‘adhma’ or ‘avara’ due to the predominance of vācyā i.e. expressed sense.

J. defines the ‘adhma kāvyā’ as - “yatra artha-camatkṛtir upaskṛtā śabda-camatkṛtih pradhānam, tad adhamam caturtham.” i.e. where the charm caused by śabda i.e. sound aided by the charm caused by sense (artha) is principal, we have the fourth type of poetry.”

We know that M. has placed both artha-citra and śabda-citra in the same class, viz. ‘adhma-kāvyā’. J. observes that to place both these in the same class is not proper and hence for him adhana kāvyā is seen where the charm of words, graced by the charm of meaning or sense, is principal. For J. only śabda-camatkṛti, totally divorced of artha-camatkṛti does not make for kāvyā at all.


(pp. 59, Athavale Edn. R.G. ibid) -

J. suggests that some feel that a class of poetry where there is charm of sound only, without the charm of sense which remains as a common factor, should be
added as a fifth variety of poetry viz. adharmadhama: But J. does not accept this. Such type of poetry as illustrated in say, ekāksari śloka, or verse having only one letter all through the poem, or in ardhaavṛtti yamaka, or padma-bandha or such other varieties, is no poetry at all, for the general definition of poetry framed by Ḫ., such as - "ramaṇīya-artha-pratipādaka-sabdah kāvyam" is violated here. Even though ancient great poets (such as Bhāravi and Māgha, and some others) who followed ancient traditions which they inherited, did write such poetry, but Ḫ. has not respected the tradition, following of course the basic fact of 'ramaṇīya-artha' being very much there as indispensable for real poetry.

J. also criticises M. and some others when he observes that some people do not accept the four-fold classification as given by him and give only a three-fold classification. But for these critics, observes J., both śabda-citra and artha-citra are supposed to be without any suggested sense - "śabda-citram vācyā-citram a-vyaṅgyam tv avaraṁ smṛtam". But J. feels that both of these should not be clubbed together as 'we do observe in citra-kāvyas the position of superior or inferior quality. J. puts a question as to which man of taste worth his salt, will place at the same level the two illustrations such as - "vinirgatam mānadam ātma-mandirat", and "svacchandocchadal." etc. ? And, asks J., when there is a marked difference observed between these two, if one were to place them in the same class, then why should we unnecessarily press for the separateness of dhvani and guṇībhūti-vyaṅga which have a slight difference between them ? J. concludes that in illustrations of poetry, where we find both the charm of word and sense together, there one has to decide about their major or minor position and take decision about their class, and name them accordingly. But where the two types of charm are absolutely equal, it has to be taken as 'madhyama' type of poetry.

J. further classifies dhvani as follows : (pp. 64, R.G., Edn. Athavale, ibid) - "tatra dhvaner uttarmottamasya a-samkhya-bhedasya api sāmānyataḥ ke'pi bhedāh nirūpyante : dvividho dhvanini, abhidhāmulo lakṣaṇāmūlas' ca. tatra ādyas trividhaḥ rasa-vastv-alamkāra-dhvanibhedat. rasa-dhvanir ity-alakṣya-kramōpa lakṣaṇāt rasa-bhāva-tadābhāsa-bhāvaśānti-bhāvodaya-bhāvasamādhi-bhāva-śabaltvānm grahaham 1. dvitiyaśca dvividhaḥ, arthāntara-samkramita-vācyo'ntyā-tiraskṛta-vācyas ca. evam pañca"tmake dhvanau parama-ramaṇīyatayā rasadhvanes tadātmā rasas tāvad abhidhīyate."

Thus J. does not go further beyond the basic types of dhvani as enumerated by Ā. But he goes like M., a step further also in quoting various theories regarding the rasa-niszpatti-prakriyā, as done by M., following of course Abhinavagupta.
J. has given eleven different views concerning the topic of rasa-realisation.

In the beginning he has clarified his position concerning the nature of rasa, as experienced in poetry and drama. For this, he seems to have given like M., a summary of what Abhinavagupta has to say in his commentary on the NS. Abhinavagupta, before arriving at his own view has summarized the views of some of his predecessors. J. has given all this with greater depth. We will pick up J.'s views on rasa-realisation in a separate chapter on rasa when we will exclusively deal with the topic of rasa. For the present we will just quote some of his words and conclude this chapter on classification of poetry from the point of view of criticism i.e. by suggesting criticism-oriented three-fold classification. J. observes (pp. 64, ibid) "samucita-lalita-sanniveśa-cāruṇā kāvyena samarpitaiḥ, sahṛdaya-
ḥrdayaṁ praviṣṭaiḥ, rāḍiya-sahṛdayata-saha-kṛtena, bhāvānā-viśeśa-mahimnā
vīgalita-duṣyanta-ramaṇītvā"dibhir alaukika-vibhāvānubhāva-ālaṃbana-kāraṇaiḥ,
asrūpātā"di-kāryaiḥ, cintā"dibhiḥ sahakāribhiśca sambhūya prādurbhāviteṇa
alaukikena vyāpāreṇa raktāla-nivartitā"nandāṃśa-varaṇājñānena ata eva pramuṣṭa-
parimita-pramāṇītvā"di-nijadharmena pramāṇā sva-prakāṣatayā vāstavena nija-
svarūpā"nandena saha gocarīkriyamānaḥ prāg-vinivṛṭta-vāsānārūpo ratyādir eva
rasaḥ."

"Poetry rendered charming by beautiful construction offers the vibhāvā"dis to
the cultured critics. These vibhāvā"dis enter the heart of the critics, and by an
aesthetic chewing-bhāvanā-aided by their refined taste, these vibhāvā"dis shun their
local individuality. Thus, Śakuntalā, for example ceases her status of being an
individual wife of some king Duṣyanta. Thus Śakuntalā, the heroine and Duṣyanta,
the hero come out of their individual colouring and context and become a woman
and a man, not qualified by limitations of the form of personal relationships. Thus
their form turns into a de-individualised form. These factors, i.e. the hero and the
heroine etc. who are normally termed as causes of love etc. are now termed as
'vibhāva' or determinant, 'anubhāva' or consequents and 'vyabhicārins' or ancillary
feelings in kāvyya (or nātya, i.e. in the field of art in general). Now, with the help
of these ālaṃbana-vibhāvas i.e. basic causes such as Duṣyanta, Śakuntalā and the
like, uddīpana-vibhāvas i.e. promoting causes such as moon-light and the like, and
ancillaries such as brooding over the other person-cintā-and the like, - i.e. with their
judicious combined presentation in poetry or drama, through the power of
suggestion which is an extra-worldly function i.e. alaukika-vyāpāra, the lid of
avidyā or ignorance that covers the foundation of supreme bliss (ānandāṃśa) of
the enjoyer (i.e. the cultered critic, or reader or spectator as the case may be), is
immediately removed and the enjoyer whose limitations of local worldly personality are removed, i.e. whose personalised factors are removed (maryādita-pramāṭṛtvā thus being removed), he grows into a higher self and enjoys the self-evident and real aspect of his own self and along with this joy he chews the impersonalised emotions such as rati and the like; – this basic emotion, of unconditioned bliss is rasa - and this has been implanted in his own self since times immemorial i.e. from an unlimited number of previous births. This impression-vāsanā-which is the object of relish-is rasa.

We will go into the theoretical discussion on rasa later, in separate chapters when we will deal with the concept of rasa in the works of Bharata, Bhāmaha and other ālāmārīkas who preceded Ā. and also in the works of those who followed Ā., such as Kuntaka, Dhanañjaya and the rest and then M. and others. For the present we come to the end of criticism-based classification of poetry; here the first variety. Naturally, this sort of classification, which does not take into account the fact of external form such as prose or verse, etc., also has to evolve a convincing design wherein, with dhvani or rasa-dhvani in the centre, other concepts such as guṇa, doṣa, alamkāra, riti, vṛttī and the rest are also accommodated in the field of literary criticism. We will go into this consideration later. But in the chapter that follows we will deal with the attitude of Kuntaka, Bhoja etc. towards dhvani and also pick up the other two varieties of criticism-based classification such as the gunībhūta-vyaṅgya and cītra-kāvyā.
Chapter XII

Dhvani in Kuntaka, Bhoja and others, and Guṇībhūta-vyaṅgya and Citra-Kāvyā.

We have examined the concept of dhvani-rasa-dhvani in Ā. and his followers belonging to his Kashmir School of thought. These writers included the Locanakāra Abhinavagupta to begin with, followed by Mammaṭa, Hemacandra, Vidyādhara, Vidyānātha, Viśvanātha, Jayadeva. Appayya and Jagannātha to name some of them. The approach of these writers is identical and is in keeping with what Ā. laid down.

But among the successors of Ā. there were some who were the predecessors of M., such as Kuntaka, Dhanañjaya-Dhanika, Bhoja and Mahimabhaṭṭa, who were of course posterior to Abhinavagupta, yet declined to follow the dictates of Ā. and Abhinavagupta. They tried to treat dhvani in their own way. They had the heritage, not only of Ā. and Abhinavagupta, but that of the earlier masters such as Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin, Udbhaṭa, Vāmana and Rudraṭa also. They had before them the thought-currents of guṇa, alaṃkāra, lakṣaṇa, rāti, vṛtti etc. before them. Some of them overlooked vyaṅjanā or even opposed the same, tooth and nail. It will be very interesting to study their approach to the fact of dhvani-rasa-vyaṅjanā, and then to see how Ā. had tried to keep space for all the thought-currents in his catholic and almost all pervasive approach, followed by great thinkers such as Mammaṭa, Hemacandra, Viśvanātha and Jagannātha. This we will discuss in the next Chapter i.e. in Ch. XIII. The voice of the four viz. Kuntaka, Dhañjaya/Dhanika, Bhoja and Mahimā along with the humdrum advanced by Mukula and Pratīhārendrāja drowned deep into the larger music of the followers of Ā. We have seen the views of the earlier ālaṃkārikas such as Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin, Udbhaṭa, Vāmana and Rudraṭa, in an earlier chapter (i.e. Ch. IV) in which we discussed the approach of these ancient writers towards dhvani, or better say, implicit sense - “praṭīyāmānārtha” in general. So, we will not repeat the same over here. However, we will take a brief resume of their views here also as they serve as the background for the thoughts seen in Kuntaka and Bhoja.
Dhvani in earlier ālaṃkārikas such as Bhāmaha and the rest:

We have noticed (Ch. IV above) that the concept of dhvani, though not named as such in clear terms, is seen in the works of earlier ālaṃkārikas and we have treated it as an element of implicit sense or pratīyamāṇa arthe, as lying hidden in some of the ālaṃkāras or guṇas as treated by the earlier masters. Thus, in Bhāmaha II. 34, there is mentioning of ‘guṇa-sāmya-pratīti’ - i.e. apprehension of similarity in qualities, which is stated implicitly and is not directly expressed. Thus, there is ‘gamyamāna-aupamyā’ i.e. suggested similarity referred to here. At II. 79, Bhāmaha discusses ‘samāsokti’ as a figure in which through direct expression, some other sense, is implied. He observes, “yatrōkte gamyate’nyorthah.” Bhāmaha says that an idea, totally different, though similar, (tatsamāna-viśeṣaṇaḥ) is suggested by saying something. In paryāyokta, at III. 8; 9, Bhāmaha mentions instances of expressions that are obviously meant to give a different meaning. The direct expression or abhidhāna contains a meaning not sought to be conveyed directly - “yad anyena prakāreṇa abhidhīyate.” In apahnuṭi also, at III. 21, the idea of similarity is only implied - “kimcid antargatopamā.”

In the Kāvyādārsa of Daṇḍin also, the author reads a guṇa called udāra, which in the first variety has the suggestion of a quality by description which is suggestive:

Kā I. 76 and I. 78 are read as -

\[
\text{utkāraśvān guṇah kaścit}
\]
\[
yasmin ukte pratiyate - I. 76-a
\]

and,

\[
\text{iti tyāgasya vākyēsmin}
\]
\[
\text{utkāraśaḥ sādhu lakṣyate. I. 78.}
\]

The element of implicit sense is clearly read here. We have gone into greater details in the Ch. IV as noticed about. However, at II. 303, Daṇḍin observes:

“pūrvatrā”śaya-māhātmyam
atrābhhyudaya-gauravam,

su-vyañjitam iti vyaktam
udātra-dvayam apy adah.”

Daṇḍin here almost knocks on the doors of vyañjanā-dhvani, though of course not theoretically giving a chiseled terminology as coined by Ā. We have seen in Ch. IV how in various ālaṃkāras, earlier ācāryas such as Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin etc. have incorporated perhaps not knowingly, the element of implicit sense. Most
noteworthy is the instance of paryāyokta in Udbhāta where an ‘avagama’ prakāra, which is beyond the power of direct expression, is clearly mentioned, and most probably this takes us to the fringes of vyañjanā-dhvani, though of course the followers of Mahimā may try to read ‘anumiti’ here. Udbhāta observes:

“paryāyoktaṃ yad anyena
prakāreṇaḥbhidhīyate,
vācyavācaka-vṛttibhyāṃ
śunyena avagama”tmanā.”

We may say, perhaps this is an under-current of vyañjanā pure and simple, and Mammaṭa’s concept of paryāyokta is dangerously close to the one read in Udbhāta.

Rudraṭa’s bhāvālamkāra also seems to contain implicit sense and so also his samāsokti, anyokti and the rest, in keeping with his predecessors’ concepts of such alamkāras. Anandavardhana clearly states that Udbhāta was conversant with implied rūpaka and other alamkāras: “anyatra vācyatvena prasiddho yo rūpakādir alamkārah, sonyatra pratiyamānatayā pradarśitaḥ tatrabhavadbhīḥ bhattōdbhata”dibhiḥ.” ‘ādibhiḥ’ here obviously covers Udbhata’s predecessors such as Bhāmāha, Daṇḍin and the like.

The Locana also observes: tad ayam arthaḥ - vācyālamkāra-viśeṣa-viśayēpi anyōlamkāra-viśeṣaḥ bhāṭi ity udbhata”dibhiḥ uttam, ity artha-saktyā alamkāro vyajyata iti tair upagatam eva. kevalaṃ te alamkāra-lakṣāna-kāravād vācyālamkāra-viśeṣa-viśayatvena āhuḥ, iti bhāvāḥ.”

There were some who consciously or unconsciously tried to subsume dhvani, or rasa-dhvani under various heads such as some alamkāras as noticed above, and also under rasavad-ādi alamkāras, i.e. the group of emotion-based alamkāras. Pratihārānduraśa, as we will go to observe while treating dhvani-virodha, is consciously fighting against the acceptance of dhvani when he observes in his commentary on Udbhāta that - sa (= pratiyamānāḥ) kasmād iha na upadiṣṭaḥ? ucyate, eva alamkāresu antarbhāvataḥ.” Vastudhvani is incorporated under paryāyokta alamkāra. He even goes for a pada-gata-paryāyoktālamkāra i.e. paryāyokta read in a single word and subsumes such illustrations of dhvani as illustrated in “rāmōsīm sarvāṃ sabe”, under this type.

We have noticed earlier that Ā. refers to some of his pūrvā”cārayas who perhaps subsumed dhvani under guṇavṛtti or secondary power of a word. He observes: “tathā’pi guṇa-vṛttyā kāvyeṣu vyavahāraṃ darśayatā dhvani-mārgo manāk
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sprṣṭāḥ...”, but it was not ‘lakṣitaḥ’, i.e. they did not supply a logical definition of dhvani though they, perhaps tumbled upon unknowingly the fringes of dhvani while treating the secondary usage of language. Here, the Locana observes : (Dhv. I. i) - “bhaṭṭōdbhaṭa-vāmanā” dinā. bhāmahenōkram, ‘sabdās’ chandóbhidhānārthāh...” ity abhidhānasya sabdād bhedam vyākhya tumult bhaṭṭōdbhaṭo babhāse - “sabdānām abhidhānam abhidhā-vyāpāraḥ, mukhyo guṇavyṛttiś ca” - vāmanāpi “sādrśyāllaksanā vakroktiḥ” - iti. manāk sprṣṭa iti, tais tāvad dhvani-dig unmīlītā.”

We have examined the treatment of pratiyāmāṇa artha in the pūrvācāryas and also their acquaintance with various sabda-vṛttis in greater details in earlier chapters, viz. Ch.s III and IV. So, we will not go further here.

We will look into Kuntaka and Bhoja here, especially with reference to their attitude towards dhvani. Kṣemendra, the protagonist of the so called aucitya-school was a disciple of Abhinavagupta and therefore he is a dhvani-vādīn to the core.

Actually even Kuntaka is taken as a pracchanna-dhvani-vādīn and therefore ācāryas of the dhvani school, beginning from Abhinavagupta and Mammaṭa onwards, spare him the brunt of their attack on dhvani-virodhin. We may choose to call Kuntaka a “mānasaputra” of Ā., and though perhaps he was a senior contemporary of Abhinavagupta, we do not read much in Abhinavagupta to suggest convincingly that he did know Kuntaka. This we say with the full knowledge of what our respected senior friend Prof. K. Krishnamoorthy has suggested. One thing for sure is that Kuntaka is spared in their attack on opponents, by dhvanivādins later. So, Kuntaka’s vakrokti-vicāra has much in common with dhvani theory. We will try to critically examine the theories of vakrokti and dhvani and try to find out the areas of agreement and disagreement. Actually, it is an attempt, so to say, at Kuntaka’s reappraisal.

We start with a query viz. “was Kuntaka a dhvani-vādin or not ? Was he an opponent of Dhvani ? The answer to the first question is both ‘yes’ and ‘no’. The answer to the second question is ‘no’, pure and simple !

It may be noted that Kuntaka (= K.) refers to ‘Dhvanikāra’ directly and also to his theory of dhvani indirectly at VJ. II. 9 while illustrating ‘rūḍhi-vaciṭrya-vakratā as in “tālā jāanti guṇā.” etc., an illustration accepted from Ā. (It may be noted that all our references to the Vakrokti-jīvita i.e. VJ. are to the edn. of Dr. K.Krishnamoorthy, pub. Karnataka Uni. Dharwad, Dec. ’77). Here K. observes - “yasmat dhvanikāreṇa vyāṅgya-vyaṅjaka-bhāvo‘tra sutarām samarthis tat kim punaruktyena ?” The reference speaks for itself. This makes him almost a disciple
of Ā. The whole text of his VJ. is replete with references to Ā.'s views. At places where he explains a number of varieties of vakratā, he seems to give a new name to the varieties of dhvani, say it is old wine in new bottles, and he illustrates these, very often, with instances accepted from the Dhv. At all these places, he does not choose to refer to or mention 'vyañjanā' by name, a term itself never used by him, though of course, he uses terms such as, "pratīyate", "lokottarātīsrayādhyāropam garbhikṛtya" (Under I. 19, pp. 29) etc. Instead, he has, what he calls, "vicitrā abhidhā, and we had earlier an occasion to observe minutely what exactly is meant by K. by this terminology in our Ch. V on abhidhā. This 'vicitrā abhidhā' for K., seems to include in its wider fold all śabda-vṛttis viz. abhidhā, laksanā and vyañjanā. He seems to concern himself with kavi-vyāpāra i.e. poetic effort taking shape through 'vicitrā abhidhā' or beautiful poetic expression in general. This causes a sort of ambiguity, if not also on his part, at least on the part of those scholars, for whom a very clearly defined scheme of śabda-vṛttis based on their inherent difference in nature and scope i.e. viṣaya-bheda and svarūpa-bheda, is inherited from the writings of Ā. and Abhinavagupta, followed by Mammaṭa and a host of brilliant writers belonging to the dhvani school of thought. So, perhaps this concept of 'vicitrā-abhidhā' may place K. on par with the "dīrgha-dīrghatara-vyāpāra-vādin". But, to be fair to K., we may observe that his vicitrā-abhidhā is certainly not the dīrgha-dīrghatara-vyāpāra of the Mīmāṁsaka opponent, but we may agree with Dr.K.Krishnamoorthy in his general observation that K.'s was an act of pragmatic criticism and from a wider point of view whatever gave birth to genuine poetry, that expression was "vicitra abhidhā" or beautiful poetic expression for him. This has nothing to do with the accepted norm of abhidhā-vṛtti which yields the connotated meaning only through direct expression. Here, we may observe that if vyañjanā, as envisaged by Ā. and Abhinavagupta, were the only differentia, 'the sine quonon' of a true dhvanivādin, then in that sense K. is not a dhvanivādin. But we know that even for the die-hard opponents of Ā. or dhvani-school in general, such as Mahimā, the acceptance of implicit sense i.e. pratīyamāna artha' is very welcome. What these anti-dhvani theorists discard and take upon themselves to dinounce is the concept of vyañjanā-vṛtti, but not the fact of implicit sense. So, an ālaṃkārika, in our consideration, should be deemed as dhvanivādin in the true sense of the term, only if he accepts the implicit sense or pratīyamāna artha, arrived at through the agency of vyañjanā and vyañjanā alone and in no other way. The mere acceptance of the suggested sense, either as principal or as subordinate also, does not make one a true dhvanivādin, worth the name. Viewed thus, and also
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along with the meticulous care K. takes in not mentioning ‘vyāñjanā’ or ‘dhvani’ in so many terms, should we call him a dhvanivādin? 

To add to this, K. seems to use the terms such as dyotya/vyaṅga and dyotaka/vyañjakajava (vṛtti, VJ. I. 8, p. 14, ibid) without showing proper discrimination. We wonder how Prof. K.Krishnamoorthy translates dyotaka/vyañjaka as ‘indicative/suggestive’ respectively (see pp. 300, Edn. ibid). If by dyotaka K. really means ‘lakṣaka’ (as Prof. K.Kri.’s translation, ‘indicative’ would prompt us to believe), then he creates further confusion with reference to the normally accepted pattern. Ā. had a neat scheme of three or four śabda-vṛttis based on difference in nature and scope, i.e. svarūpabheda and viṣayabheda, including of course the tāparya-vṛtti which is a vākyavṛtti, or power of a sentence giving tātparyārtha or correlated sentence-sense as a whole. K. as it were, seems to flout this near perfect superb scheme of word/sentence/powers and seems to make a mess of it, when he makes his ‘vicitrā abhidhā’, at times refer to abhidhā, pure and simple, and at other times to refer also to either lakṣanā, or vyañjanā, without any rhyme or rhythm. All this is unpardonable from the point of view of a true dhvanivādin.

To his credit, we may say, goes the fact of many more varieties of vakrata or poetic expression, and a special mention may be made of the varieties grouped under ‘prakaraṇa-vakrata’ i.e. artistic beauty relating to incident or episode (VJ. IV./5, 6). But on the other hand, it is also equally true that Ā. nowhere puts a limit to the innumerable possible varieties of dhvani, and is open enough to further admit in his fold any number of newer and newer varieties that may prop up due to the nature of vyañjaka to be enumerated afresh by the critic with his resourceful and imaginative approach. In the recognition of some very charming newer varieties of vakrata, K. perhaps fills some gap left out by Ā., and further elaborates the theory, giving it a different name and thereby just serves new wine in old bottles. His approach to the problems of svabhāvokti and rasavat also deserves further and fuller discussion. If K. were thoroughly a dhvanivādin, as Prof. K. Krishnamoorthy would like us to believe, he need not have written a treatise, the way in which he has done. He would have perhaps chosen to follow a track such as one followed by the great Vāg-devatāvatāra Mammaṭa, or by the greater still, Pundita-raja Jagannātha. But with a full awareness on his part of his inability to do away with vyañjanā totally, he chooses a different track of the so-called ‘vicitrā-abhidhā’, and the so called ‘vakrōkṣi’ which drags him into deeper waters never to be pulled out from. If later writers pay him any attention, it is so to the extent he falls in line with Ā.
All this, and perhaps also a tendency to verbocity in his otherwise lucid and flowing style, makes him a lesser name to be ranked below the great names of Ā., Abhinavagupta, Māmata, Hemacandra, Appayya and Jagannātha, and perhaps even Ruyyaka, who though he treats of only alamkāras in his Alamkāra-Sarvasva, is otherwise every inch a dhvanivādin. True, K. is loaded, perhaps even infatuated with Ā., whom he follows at so many places, now borrowing phrases after phrases, or now accepting illustrations after illustrations from the Dhv., to explain his varieties of Vakrokti, which are very often, but new labels given to some varieties of dhvani. Actually, in his special moments, he refers to vyañjanā, but without making a direct mentioning of the term. But he errs only when he equates some charming illustrations of vyañjanā with those of abhidhā, perhaps equally exquisite from his point of view, and dumps them all on equal footing under the banner of ‘vakrokti’. For him, varna-vinyāsa-vakratā and rūḍhi-vaiścitra-vakratā stand on the same footing and this sounds rather fantastic to a devout follower of dhvani. But all the same, virtually he turns out to be, so to say, a super-dhvanivādin, like a newly convert, in the sense that he seems to be all “Ā. - drunk”. At times he is only re-echoing what the great master has said earlier - “vad kiñcid apy anuranan sphutayati kāvyā” lokam...”, as it were, in the same way as is done by the great Abhinavagupta. He perhaps makes an effort to liberalise poetry from the network of vyañjanā. For him vyañjanā is only a cog in the wheel, a part of his wider scheme of vakratā, or beautiful poetic expression, which embraces in its fold, abhidhā, lakṣaṇā, and vyañjanā, at the poetic level, all alike. His vicitrā abhidhā is a precondition for poetry and for this, he is prepared to sacrifice the well-defined scheme of Ā., resulting in the recognition of dhvani, guṇībhūta-vyaṅgya and citra types of poetry. Perhaps he refuses to accept a casteist approach of the dhvanivādin, wherein abhidhā, lakṣaṇā and vyañjanā remain in a way strictly separate. His vicitrā abhidhā is a field where all vṛttis mingle and merge with one another. Thus, he fills up gaps left out by Ā., and perhaps goes ahead of him. But to class all vakratā on the same footing is something a true dhvanivādin can never either tolerate or forgive, and for this he may be placed outside the loyalist class of dhvanivādins. True, he has gone into subtler details and has labelled many charms exclusive to the fold of so-called abhidhā alone, but to equate a charm belonging to the vācyāvācaka level with the one operating at the vyāngya-vyanjaka level is a crime in the eyes of a dhvanivādin and the crime can never escape punishment. The whole point is unthinkable, and hence unpardonable, from the point of view of a true dhvanivādin. There are aesthetes and aesthetes who may pick up a never-ending
quarrel over this, but by and large, K. may be taken as a "pra-siṣya" of a "mahā-guru", whom he forsakes for an untrodden track of his own! And for exactly this, we may not blame K., but love him all the more, for he is a lone traveller, uncompromising in a way, trying to get out of the vyañjanā-inhibition, and arriving at a more practicable, more pragmatic solution of literary beauty.

Thus, Ā. suggested a three-tier system, a tri-varga-vyavasthā, so to say, or perhaps a catur-varga-vyavasthā as suggested by Jagannātha, which is smashed and put aside by K., to promote a 'class-less' or 'caste-less' pattern, so to say, in the field of literary criticism. But alas, the 'cāturvarṇya' of the dvānīvādin, as it was firmly saddled on the 'guna' - (Karma/alamkārā"dī) vibhāga, held out firmly in the minds of many aesthetes and K.'s voice is lost into wilderness without finding followers, and he dies a martyr's death as a lone champion of his cause, both unheard and unsung. He does not seem to be a leader cast in the mould of Ā., the greatest, but a path-seeker guided by the torch of his inner conviction.

All this is spelt out here in all details with necessary references from the VJ. as follows:

We will now try to examine K.'s views on various aspects of poetry with an eye to his treatment of Ā.'s dhvani. We will follow in this discussion, the natural sequence of topics as read in the VJ. In the VJ. I. 2, (pp. 2, ibid) he promises to offer, "a fresh study of poetry, like an added ornament to it." Needless to say, that he uses the word alamkāra in a wider context to designate the whole work itself, wherein topics, like simile and the like, form its subject matter. Actually, a critical appreciation of poetic beauty is his goal. For him, the word, 'alamkāra' in this wider context signifies 'poetic beauty', and 'kāvya' or 'poetry' for him is 'alamkārya', i.e. that which is to be adorned. He observes - (vṛtti, on I. 2. VJ.) (p. 2, ibid) : alamkāro vidhiyate, alamkaranāṃ kriyate. kasya ? kāvyasya. kaveḥ karma kāvyam; tasya." For him, 'kāvya' i.e. poetry is 'kaveḥ karma', i.e. poetic activity. So, whatever carries the stamp of being a poet's activity is poetry for K. K. thus places the concept of poetry on a very broad base, perhaps intending to include everything beginning with abhidhā and ending with vyañjanā under the same banner, provided it turns out to be a genuine 'kavi-karma'. So, for him, 'Kāvya' is a solid, compact whole in itself, an abstraction revealed through the medium of signs called letters. It is, so to say, "akanda-buddhi-samāsvādyā". It is incapable of any analysis, because it is of the nature of synthesis. So, when you discuss 'poetry' and 'poetic beauty', it is a discussion of academic matter only. The supreme reality is that poetry is gifted with an innate poetic beauty which can not be thought of separately. He observes:
(vr̥tti, VJ. I. 6, pp. 6, ibid) "tad ayam atra paramārthaḥ, sālaṃkārasya alaṃkāra- sahitasya sakalasya nirastāvayavasya sataḥ, samudāyasya kāvyatā, kavi-karmavatam tena alaṃkṛtasya kāvyatvam iti sūhitam na punah kāvyasya alaṃkāra-yogah, iti. - "The truth is this. Poetry is the work of a poet, wherein the undivided whole of ‘adorned’ and the ‘ornament’ is the reality. Therefore, it is clear that poetry is the name of what is adorned and the question of super-adding ornaments to pre-existing poetry, does not arise." (Trans. K.Kris., pp. 292, ibid). We can compare this with Ā.’s observation on alaṃkāras when he says that when properly delineated, alaṃkāras are never extraneous (to poetry) - vr̥tti on Dhv. II. 16 reads as - tasmān na teṣāṃ bahiraṅgatvam rasā’bhivyaktau.” (pp. 60, edn. K.Kris., ibid)

K. seems to follow Ā. in his broad concept of poetry when he observes that poetry is both word and sense taken together, enshrined in a style revealing the artistic creativity of the poet on one hand, and giving aesthetic delight to man of taste on the other (VJ. I. 7). He wants that both word and sense are to be of a peculiar nature. The expression or word and context or thought or meaning should both be charming and so to say, ‘made for each other’. Thus, K. observes : (vr̥tti, VJ. I. 7 - pp. 13, ibid) : tathā ca arthaḥ samarthavācaka-asadbhāve svātionā, sphurannapi mṛtakalpa eva avatiṣṭhate. śabdopī vākyopayogivācyā sambhave vācyāntara-vācakāḥ san vākyasya vyādhibhūtaḥ pratibhātā ity alam atiprasāṅgena.” - “Thus, thought, though striking in itself, will be no better than a corpse, when it is not embodied in an adequately striking word. In the same way, a word which does not have an adequate thought-content, but which expresses something irrelevant, is to be deemed as a disease of the poem.” (Trans. K. Kris., pp. 299, ibid). This again smells of Ā.’s observation on Dhv. I. 8, wherein he holds that only the implicit sense and word having capacity to suggest the same deserve the careful recognition of a first-rate poet. Ā. observes : (vr̥tti, Dhv. I. 8) (pp. 14, 16, Edn. K.Kris. ibid) :

“vyanāgyorthe tad-vyakti-sāmarthyayogi śabdaś ca kaścana, na sarvaḥ; tāv eva śabdārthau mahākaveḥ pratyabhijñeyau.”

K. almost follows Ā., without conditioning his ‘word and sense’ by vyañjanā alone. He seems to develop an independent approach which is not vyañjanā-biased or better say, vyañjanā-oriented. But he does not go further as we will go to observe, and all his tall talk about vakratā paters out into this or that variety of dhvani based on vyañjanā alone. By mere throwing away an accepted terminology, or just by replacing an old one by a new one, we do not stand to gain much. Exactly this happens in case of K., who can not totally tear himself away from Ā.'s
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terminology, and at times seems to confuse the original clear concepts of Ā. For example, he makes a mess of things when he observes that words are both ‘dyotaka’ and ‘vyañjaka’, without drawing a line of demaracation between the two: (vṛtti, VJ. I. 8; pp. 38, ibid): “nunau ca dyotaka-vyañjakāv api śabdau sambhavataḥ... etc. evaṃ dyotya-vyaṅgyaor arthayoh prayeyatva-sāmānyāt.” We have observed earlier that we are not satisfied with Dr. K.Krishnamoorthy’s translation (on pp. 300, ibid) in this respect, when he writes - “one might object that the indicative and suggestive words too, which have their own signification, may yet be termed ‘word’, and the above statement would illustrate the fallacy of “too narrow”. Our reply is that they are expressive words by implication, the metaphorical application being based on their similarity with denotative words. Similarly, the meanings alluded to...” It is clear that for all those who understand sanskrit poetics, the words ‘dyotya’ and ‘vyaṅga’, and the words “dyotaka” and “vyañjaka” are synonyms, and K. cannot mean ‘laksya’ and ‘laksāka’ by them. So, it is clear confusion on K.’s part.

It is one thing, not to accept Ā., but it is quite another not to understand, or misquote, or misrepresent Ā. K. here seems to do the latter.

K. can also be charged for an added crime when he extends the connotation of ‘vācakatva’, so as to include even the vyāñjakatva of Ā. Normally, one can choose a different track. But in case of K., who almost looks a disciple of Ā., this looks quite unworthy. He does this when on I. 9, he observes that: (vṛtti, I. 9, V.I. pp. 16, ibid): “kavi-vivakṣita-viśeṣābhidhana kṣamatvam eva vācakatva-lakṣānom. vivakṣā-vidheyatvena abhidheyatā-padavim avatarantas tathā-vidha-viṣeṣa-pratipādana-samarthenābhidhiyamānās cetaścamatkāritām āpadyante.” i.e. “the proper definition of ‘signification’ is that capacity to convey the particular shade of thought intended by the poet” (Trans. K.Kris., pp. 302, ibid). This is criminal if one chooses to call oneself a follower of Ā. Actually the whole paragraph here is only a sort of paraphrase of Ā.’s “tau śabdārthau mahākaveḥ”, but not in the way Ā. does. And all this, with the full knowledge of the terminology made current by Ā., looks unpardonable. K. knows what ‘dyotayanti’ means, when he observes on verse no. 28 (pp. 16, ibid), viz. “sāmrabhāh karikātkaiḥ.” etc., that, (vṛtti, on I. 9, VS. 28, pp. 16) - “hevākasya leśa-śabdābhidhānena alpatā-pratipādīt ity ete vivakṣātaikārthavācakatvam dyotayanti.” i.e. “the adjective ‘trivial’ qualifying ‘enterprise’ reinforces the low stature of the common lions and thus adds to the force of the intended thought.” (Trans. K.Kris., pp. 303, ibid). Similar is the use of the word ‘vyakti’, when on verse no. 29, under VJ. I. 9, K. observes that “tasya ca tad āhārā-sāmarthyaṃ sāmbhāvyate yena kācid eva svabhāva-mahattā rasa-paripośāṅgatvaṃ vā vyaktim
āsādayati.” Here also, K. does not mention ‘vyañjanā’ by name. In a similar vein K. explains the suggestivity of the word ‘muniḥ’ in illustration no. 31, under VJ. I. 9 (pp. 18) : “atra kósau munir iti paryāya-padam atra vaktavye, parama-kāruṇikasya nisāda-nirbhinna-sakuni-sandarśana-mātra-samutthitaḥ ślokavam abhajata yasyai ti tasya tad avasthā janaka-rāja-putrīdaśa-darśana-vivāsa-vṛtter antaḥ-karāṇa-parispandaḥ karuṇa-rasa-paripoṣāṅgateyā sahṛdaya-hṛdayā”hlādakāri kaver abhipretaḥ.” Here also vyañjanā is not alluded to. On verse 32, he offers some criticism wherein words such as “dyotyate” and “dyotayanti” are used only in the normally accepted sense of ‘suggestion’, but here too he overlooks the mentioning of vyañjanā-vṛtti. He observes (pp. 18, ibid, on VS. 32, VJ. I. 9) : “hṛdaya-nihitād iti suhṛttva-vihiitam sāvadhānatvam dyotyate... ambuvāham. ity ātmanas tat-kāritābhidhānam dyotayati.”

He uses even ‘bhanyate’ in the sense of ‘dyotyate’ or ‘vyajyate’ here : (vṛtti, VJ. I. 9, VS. 32, pp. 19) - ‘abalā-śabdenātra tat-preyasī-viraha-vaidhuryā-sahatvam bhanyate.” K. is out to smash the perfectly evolved terminology of Ā. He explains the suggested sense of the whole expression with the words : “tad ayaṁ atra vākyārthah.” (pp. 19). This ‘vākyārtha’ is ‘vyaṅgyārtha’, pure and simple, without being designated as such.

K. raises a fresh problem at VJ. I. 10 (pp. 20, ibid), when he observes : (vṛtti, pp. 20) -

“ubhāv etāv alaṁkāryau, tayoḥ punar alaṁkrtiḥ
vakroktir eva, vaidagdhya-bhaṅgi-bhanitir ucyate.”
...tad idam atra tātparyaṁ yat śabdārthau pṛthag avasthitau na kenā’pi vyatiriktena’laṁkaraṇena yojyete, kintu vakratā-vaciṭrya-yogitayā abhidhiṇaṁ eva anayor alaṁkāraḥ, tasyaiva śobhātiṣaya-kārītvāt, etac ca vakratā-vyākhyānāvasara eva udāharisyate.” - i.e. “Both these are ‘adorned’. Their adornment consists in the poetic process known as ‘artistic turn of speech’... Let us sum it up once again : apparently, words and meanings both have their distinct existence in poetry and come to be adorned by something different from themselves. The fact of the matter is that the very process of poetic utterance is constituted by the artistic turns assumed by words and meanings. The poetic process itself, in this sense is the real ornamentation. For, it is extremely delighting in itself. This shall engage our attention more when we consider, the concept of artistic beauty further, on.” (Trans. K.Kris., pp. 306). True; even Ā. suggested that no ornamentation could be “bahirāṅga” or “external”, if properly executed by the
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poet. Poetic beauty is inherent in poetry, and the ‘whole’ is born and enjoyed. But when you analyse the poetic beauty, you must have a scheme to support your observations, and the whole analogy of ‘śarīra’ or ‘body’, and ‘soul’ or ‘ātman’ of poetry walks in. For Ā., it is easy to explain when he regards ‘dhvani’ - particularly ‘rasa-dhvani’-as the soul of poetry, and ‘word and sense’ - i.e. ‘śabdārthau’, forming its body. At Dhv. III. 33, Ā. discusses this “jīva-śarīra-vyavahāra”. And, in a way, this scheme is very helpful in understanding poetic beauty, which in itself is only ‘a-mūrta’ i.e. abstract or conceptual. For K., the position becomes rather difficult when, at this stage, if a question is raised as to the exact position of ‘rasa’ in his scheme. True, he has, as we will go to observe, tried to incorporate the innumerable shades of rasa and bhāva in his different types of vakratā, but then these vakratās seem to get mixed up with one another, rather then shine out independently as clear sub-varieties. And once again, if ‘śabdārthau’ are ‘alamkāryau’, should we call him a ‘dehā”tma-vādin’? We may not grudge it, and it is surely not a bad name either!

One more question. If only ‘vakrokti’ is an alamkāra, of course inherently connected with a poem, then what about ‘svabhāvōkti’? Is not ‘svabhāvōkti’, if taken in the normal connotation of the term given to it by practically all the alamkārikas, in itself a variety of K.’s vakrōkti? K.’s own concept of svabhāvōkti seems to refer to the basic subject-matter as it is, i.e. to a local normal fact or expression. But the ‘svabhāvōkti’ as devined by others is not a bare statement, the ‘vārtā’ of Bhāmaha, but a poetic expression of an object or its very normal activities. Actually no bare statement of fact has ever earned any entry in the realm of genuine poetry. And, a poetic expression, say charged with K.’s vakrōkti, concerning such objects as an activity of a child and the like, could as much be taken as an alamkāra in the limited sense of the term; e.g. the limited sense in which an expression describing similarity or upamā is designated an alamkāra. So, it seems that the whole criticism of K. against ‘svabhāvōkti’ being taken as an alamkāra is misdirected. If for the sake of an argument we accept either ‘samkara’ or ‘samsṛsti’ (VJ. I. 14, 15, pp. 22, ibid) as argued by K., even then the case for ‘svabhāvōkti’ is not ruled out. Any other alamkāra can also find an entry in a ‘samkara’ or a ‘samsṛsti’ without losing its independent status as an alamkāra. This patters out only in an effort by K. to look smart in the eyes of others.

Under VJ. I. 16, K. takes great pains to carve out the exact nature of ‘sāhitya’, which is not just the mere coming together of word and sense, which is found to be even in the ordinary walk of life. Says he, : (vṛtti, VJ. I. 16, pp. 23, ibid) : satyam
etat, kintu na väcya-väcaka-lakṣaṇa-sāśvata-samañbandha-nibandhānam vastuṭaḥ sāhityam ity ucyate." - "The point, however, is that here in poetry, we are not alluding to the well-known intimate relationship invariably characterising word and meaning." (Trans. K.Kris., pp. 310, ibid). Perhaps the same point is hinted at by Ā. in his Dhw. I. 8, and vṛtti thereon, where it is observed that a first-rate poet has to strive for that particular meaning and that rare word only. Ā. observes: (vṛtti, Dhw. I. 8, pp. 14 Edn. K.Kris., ibid) "sa vyaṅgyorthe tadb-vyakti-sāmarthya-yogi śabdaś ca kaś cana, na sarvaḥ, tāv eva śabdārthaḥ mahākaveḥ pratyabhijñeyau." "that meaning", refers to the implicit and "that rare word, which possesses the power of conveying it, points out that it is not any and every word (recorded in dictionary). Such a word and such a meaning - only these two deserve the careful recognition of a first-rate poet." (Trans. K.Kris., pp. 15, ibid). K. unlike Ā., has no special bias for the 'suggested' only, but the whole approach carries an influence of his great predecessor Ā. Ā.'s position is safer with his three-fold classification of poetry into 'dhvani', 'guṇībhūta-vyaṅgya' and 'citra', which becomes 'uttama', 'madhyama' and 'adhama' later in M., the terms which Ā. has carefully refrained from using, but his illustrious follower, vāg-devatā'-vātārā' Mammaṭa has managed to make current and popular. But for K., poetry is either genuine poetry or no poetry at all! Perhaps Mahimā also was partially influenced by this, though he carries the impressions of Ā. also. But for K., you cannot classify poetry or poetic effort into various categories. But the exprience of aesthetes world over, and for centuries, has something to say more in favour of Ā. than K. For, in the absence of any classification based on quality, the very fact of the recognition of the difference between a kavi and a 'mahā-kavi'/great poet, would have been defeated and we would have been forced to place Vyāsa, Vālmīki, Kālidāsa, Shakespeare, Tolstoy, Dostoevski, Romain Rolland, Aurobindo and such greats and poets of, of course, some ranking, but not of the same stature, on the same footing. We know we do not do it, and more, cannot do it.

Here, and perhaps at many other places, K.’s style becomes prolix or verbose and we need not quote instances to prove this point. We will quote only one passage : (vṛtti, VJ. I. 16, pp. 24) : "tad adya sarasvatī-hrdayāravinda-makaranda-bindu-sandoha-sundarāṇāṁ sat-kavi-vacasāṁ antarāmoda-manoharatvena parisphurad etat sa-hṛdaya-ṣaṭ-carana-gocaratāṁ niyate.” Ā. never does it; never. K. seems to have passionately fallen in love with the words ‘spanda’ and ‘parispanda’, which are very often left out in translation by Dr. K.Kris. (see for example, K.Kris. translation of verse no. 36, on pp. 312. The whole paragraph can
be read with interest). Quoting illustrations need not detain us further, as they are in abundance and also self-evident. K. once again seems to refer to Ā.’s ‘vyāgyārtha’, when in verse no. 38, (pp. 26, ibid, under VJ. I. 17) K. observes:

“vācyāvabodha-nispattau pada-vākyārtha-jīvitam (varjita) 
yat kim apy arpayaty antaḥ pānakā”svādavat satām.”

- “that which is relished in its entirety without distinction of word and sentence import, after the initial grasp of primary-meanings, even like the unique savour of a sweet drink by men of taste.” (Trans. K.Kris., pp. 313, ibid) - The other reading. “pada-vākyārtha-jīvitam” would mean, “that (sense) which is the very life (or soul) of word-meaning and sentence-meaning.” Obviously the reference could mean “dhvani”, or principal suggested sense.

K.’s classification of vakratā is broadly hinted at in I. 18, as six-fold, each having many sub-varieties. We will go to observe critically that these varieties of vakratā carry an undisputable stamp of Ā.’s classification of dhvani.

K. enumerates the first three varieties of vakratā as varṇa-vinīṣa-vakratva, pada-pūrvārtha-vakratā and pratyaya-vakratā in VJ. I. 19 (pp. 26, ibid). (K.Kris. translates it as - “Art in the arrangement of syllables”, “art in the base-form of substantives”, and “art in their inflection forms” (pp. 313, ibid)). We will go to observe that whatever charm is pointed here is due to the suggested sense alone, and we may say, “nāmāntara-karaṇena tu khyād idam pāṇḍityam ?”. Simply by giving a new name, the thing in itself does not change. A rose, is a rose, is a rose even if we call it by any other name ! We may observe that these varieties of vakratā and many more are under the direct influence of Ā.’s observation at Dhv. III. 16, which reads as:

sup-tiṁ-vacana-sambandhais
tathā kāraka-saktibhiḥ
kṛt-taddhita-samāsaiś ca
dyotyo’lakṣya-kramāḥ kvacit.” (pp. 146, ibid)

“case-terminations, conjugational terminations, number, relation, accidence, primary affixes, secondary affixes, and also compounds - all these become conveyers of suggestion with undiscerned sequentiality.”

(Trans. K.Kris. pp. 147, ibid)

K. has relied so much on Ā., that very often, and this is seen in Mahimā also, - he borrows words and phrases from his master, i.e. Ā. The word “prasiddha-
prasthāna-vyatireki", in the vr̥tti on VJ. I. 18, is an instance in point. On VJ. I. 19, in his vr̥tti while explaining varṇa-vinyāsa-vakratā, K. observes: (pp. 27, ibid) atra varṇa-vinyāsa-vakratā-mātra-vihitaḥ śabda-śobhātiśayaḥ sutarām samun-militaḥ. etad eva varṇa-vinyāsa-vakratvam cirantaneṣu anuprāsa iti prasiddham.” - “Here, we see a perfect instance of abounding verbal beauty brought about, solely by the poet’s skill in arrangement of syllables. This skill in verbal arrangement itself is well recognised even by the ancient theorists under the term ‘Alliteration’. (Trans. K.Kris., pp. 314, ibid). It reflects but poorly on K.’s thinking, if he tries to equate this variety of vakratā, a mere śabda-citra, with another vakratā which may look charged with the suggested sense; and this variety also he recognises. It is unthinkable to put all varieties of vakratā on the same footing. But perhaps it is exactly at this point that K. like Casca of Julius Cæsar, has drawn his dagger to stab his master, Ā.

K. proceeds to explain pada-pūrvārdhavakratā (on pp. 27) under I. 19, VJ. He observes - (vr̥tti, on VJ. I. 19, pp. 27) : pada-pūrvārdha-vakratā padasya subantasya tīṇgantasya vā vakra-bhāvo, vinyāsa-vaicītryam. tatra ca bahavaḥ prakārāḥ sambhavanti. yatra rūdhīsabdasyaiva prastāva-samucitatvena vācyā-prasiddha-dharmāntarādhyāropa-garhatvena nibandhah, sa pada-pūrvārdha-vakratāyāḥ prathamaḥ prakāraḥ, yathā, “rāmōsni sarvāṃ sahe” “Art in the base form of substantives”. Words may be nouns or verbs. Their crude form will be either base or root. In their usage by the poet there is scope for artistic skill.

In fact, this admits of various forms. When a word in common usage is employed so as to include an attribution of associate meanings other than the primary one, we have the first variety, e.g. “Rāma I am, and bear every mishap.” (Trans. K.Kris. pp. 314, ibid). Then he illustrates the second variety where a proper noun is employed in such a way that it involves an attribution of the extraordinary speciality of the feature under description in the sentence primarily. Art i.e. beauty in the use of synonym is also illustrated. All these instances are accepted from Ā. without an open acceptance of vyañjanā. And therefore all this sounds less convincing.

Again, in the illustration, viz. “rāmo’sni sarvaṃ sahe”, K. observes that here there is attribution of associate meanings other than the primary one : “vācyā-prasiddha-dharmāntarādhyāropa-garhatvena nibandhah.” This observation is also far from exact. Here what happens is not the attribution - i.e. adhyāropa-of another meaning which is not the primary one, for in that case it would be just laksanā. Actually here the second sense arrives even when the primary sense continues. They
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co-exist like an object and a lamp that illuminates it. Ā. has ruled out the case of a mere secondary sense or lakṣyārtha, which seems to be hinted at by K. M. (= Mammita) has utilized the same illustrations for the establishment of vyañjanā, independent of lakṣaṇā here. So, K., while citing the second illustration, viz. “rāmo’sau...” etc., (verse no. 43, pp. 27, ibid), when he observes that this involves an attribution of the extra-ordinary speciality of the feature under description, - “lokottaraṭiśayādhyāropam garbhikṛtyōpanibandhaḥ,” - he almost suggests that there is the suggested meaning or the ‘vyāṇgẏārtha’ concealed in a given statement. And for this, Ā. has vyañjanā-vṛtti, while K. gropes in darkness in flouting this clear-cut scheme as laid down by. Ā. K. again has no fixed and clear expression, for in one case he has, “lokottaraṭiśayādhyāropam garbh-krtyā”, and in the next breath he has, “lokottara-śauryā”di-dharmāṭiśayā”dhyāropa-paratvena.”

K. goes to illustrate further how out of a number of synonyms possible, only that is chosen which is especially significant in the context, e.g. “vāmanḥ kajjalavat...” etc. (verse, 44, pp. 28, ibid). Now this illustration runs parallel to the one in which “kapālinaḥ” is preferred and “pinākinaḥ” is rejected by Kālidāsa. Here also there is a charm caused by vyañjanā, without mentioning the same. Again, it is unthinkable to put “varaṇa-vinyāśa-vakratā” and this “paryāya-vakratā” on the same footing. K. observes that, (vṛtti, VJ. I. 19, pp. 28) : etac ca paryāya-vakratvam vācyā-sambhavi-dharmāntara-garbhaṁkārenā’pi paridṛṣyate.” - “this artistic use of synonyms is also found to include hints of even features which are conceivably no parts of literal meanings.” (Trans. K.Kris., pp. 315, ibid). This again is vyañjanā, pure and simple. Needless to say that the illustrations, such as “āṅgarāja, senāpate...” etc. (verse, 45; pp. 28, ibid), also contain ‘vyāṇgẏārtha’, which is the only source of charm.

The upacāra-vakratā variety of prabandha-pūrvārtha-vakratā, wherein the charm is caused by metaphor, is nothing else but lakṣaṇa-vilasita : vṛtti, on VJ. I. 19; pp. 28 - “yatṛāmūrtasya vastunaḥ mūrta-dravyābhidhāyinā śabdenābhidhānaṁ upacārāḥ...” Thus here the charm is caused by lakṣaṇa or indication. In ‘nikāra-kaṇikā’, ‘haftāvaceyaṁ’, etc. the charm lies in lakṣaṇa or indication, and then in the ultimate suggestion of “stokatra”, or “slightness” ‘bahutva’, etc. Similarly, expressions like, “billowy” which primarily apply to liquids, when they are serging with waves, are often found in poetic tradition to apply even to solids, only on the basis of general similarity.

“Viśeṣaṇa-vakratva” or “beauty in epithets” is also a variety of ‘pada-pūrvārda-vakratā’, or “art in the base form of substantives”, wherein art or beauty springs
from the significance of epithets only. This again, we may say, is a charm due to vyaṇjanā. The illustration viz. “vriḍāyogān nata-vadanatayā...” etc. seems to have been accepted from Ā. (Dhv. Vṛtti. on III. 4)

‘Samvṛti-vakratā’ or “beauty of concealed expression’ is also a variety of “pada-pūrvārdha-vakratā”, wherein the nature of an object endowed with a unique loveliness in its peculiar setting, which cannot be conveyed clearly in a direct way, is conveyed by a concealed expression rich in suggestive force. (vṛtti, on VI. I. 19, pp. 30, ibid) : “ayam aparāḥ pada-pūrvārdha-vakratāyāḥ prakāro yad ivam samvṛti-vakratvam nāma, yatra padārtha-svarūpaṃ prastāvānugunyena kenā’pi nikarṣenōtikarseṇa vā, yuktaṃ vyakta-tayā sākṣād abhidhātum āsakyam samvṛtisāmarthyopayogitayā śabdeṇābhidhiyate.” This is pure vyaṇjanā. K. calls it “vicitrā abhidhā” in both the cases such as those of “sākṣāt abhidhā” and “a-sākṣād abhidhā.” This perhaps may lead us to brand him as a “dirgha-dirghataraśabhidhāvādin’, or a ‘tātparya-vādīn’ like Dhanaṇjaya, who is posterior to him. But after studying Ā. it is unthinkable not to accept difference in śabda-vṛttis, even in the presence of ‘visayabheda’ and ‘svarūpabheda’ i.e. difference in nature and scope.

The illustration, viz., “nīdrā-nimīlīta-dṛśah.” etc. (verse no. 51, pp. 30, ibid) has a word viz. “dhvananti”, which means “vyaṇjayanti” pure and simple, but K. does not explicitly accept it. In the absence of a clear acceptance of vyaṇjanā, how can we call K., a dhvanivādin ? We may call him a “vicitrābhidhāvādin”, or this, that and everything else, but a dhvanivādin, for he does not openly accept the scheme of Ā. We will go to observe that under VI. II. 9, while discussing rūḍhi-vaicitraya-vakratā (on pp. 83, ibid) K. clearly refers to the Dhvanikāra and his vyāngya-vyaṇjaka-bhāva, and adds that it is duly and ably established there and therefore need not be re-established here : (vṛtti, on VI. II. 9, pp. 83) : “yasmād dhvanikāreṇa vyāngya-vyaṇjaka-bhāvotra sutarāṃ samarthitas tat kim punaruktyena ?” This shows he works under Ā.’s spell and is fully conscious of it, and yet tries to cut a new track and evolve new terminology. But he lands himself in a hopeless situation when he equates all types of vakratās, which are almost all but different names for titles given by Ā., under one banner and on equal footing and thereby believing the experience of aesthetes.

That K. is absolutely conscious about Ā.’s theory is very clear when he uses terms such as ‘pratīyate’, ‘pratipadyate’, ‘prakāśyate’, etc., in the sense of ‘vyajyate’ only. Then why does he grudge the use of ‘vyajyate’ or ‘vyaṇjanā’ or ‘dhvani’ ? If he is a clean follower of Ā., he should have made a clear statement to this effect, as
is done by the great Mammata and Ācārya Hemacandra who follow the track of Abhinavagupta who himself in his turn does not make a secret of his being a follower of Ā. And in that case, K. need not have attempted this sort of a treatise at all.

It has been noticed earlier that K.'s use of 'pratiyate' is equivalent to 'vyajyate'. When he deals with "vṛtti-vaicitrya vakratā", once again in a further variety of pada-pūrvārdha-vakratā (pp. 31, ibid), he finds beauty in the speciality of linguistic structure like compounds, their speciality, etc. : (vṛtti, VJ. I. 19, pp. 31) : "yatra samāśa"di-vṛttināṁ kāśāṃcīd vicitrānāṁ eva kavibhiḥ parīgraḥ kriyate." The illustration reveals a mixed beauty of expression, pure and simple, and also suggestion. Similar is the case with his yet another variety of "pada-pūrvārdha-vakratā", viz. "linga-vaicitrya-vakratvam", wherein we have speciality in gender. (vṛtti; VJ. I. 19, pp. 31) : - "aparam linga-vaicitryam nāma pada-pūrvārdha-vakratāyāh prakārāntaraṁ dhṛṣyate. yatra bhinnā-lingānāṁ api śabdānāṁ vaicitryāya samānadhirakanyāpanipandhaḥ." At times the poet pitches upon only the feminine form of a word, because of its tenderness, though it admits of other genders. (Trans. K.Kris., pp. 318, ibid). All this is beauty of pure expression coloured with beauty of suggestion. Similarly, his "kriyā-vaicitrya-vakratva" is beauty in speciality of verbs, where poets offer usage, full of charm, brought about by artistic expression while describing the speciality in verbs. All this is beauty of pure expression tinged with that of suggestion as well. The illustration cited is, "rati-keli..." etc. (verse No. 58, pp. 32, ibid), wherein the verb "jayati" occurs. K. observes that here, the verb 'jayati' i.e. 'triumphs', has a striking beauty. Then he quotes an illustration which forms the famous maṅgala-śloka of the Dhv., viz. "sveccā-kesarinaḥ..." etc., in which observes K., the poet has attributed a unique activity, viz. the cutting away of woes of devotees, which is so different from their cutting activity well-known to the people. Vṛtti on VJ. I. 19, pp. 32, ibid - "atra nakhānāṁ sakala-loka-prasiddha-cchedana-vyāpāravyatireki kim apy apūrvam eva prapannā"rti-cchedana-laksanāṁ kriyā-vaicitryāṁ upanībaddham" - could K. have-read Locana ?

But here also, the charm is caused by the suggestion it contains. So also, in the illustration drawn from Ā., and also in the illustration, viz. "karnōtpala-dala..." etc., (pp. 33 ibid), the charm caused is the result of suggestivity. At all these places, K. avoids any mention of vyañjanā directly.

After this, K. treats "pratyaya-vakratā". (pp. 33, ibid) with all its varieties. It is clear that in many of these, the special charm results from suggestivity. K. illustrates them and tries to bring out the source of beauty which for him is either
due to “saṅkhya-vācitrīya” or, “kāraka-vācitrīya”, or “purusa-vācitrīya”. It is needless to say that all these charming expressions look all the more charming by virtue of the touch of suggestivity in them. Otherwise, if pure expression is equated with and placed on the same footing as an expression containing charms of suggestion, then this certainly is no doing of a true dhvanīvādin, and it is in this sense that K.’s position can be questioned.

After discussing these varieties, K. goes to observe that only a few important forms of artistic beauty have been presented here to serve as examples. But thousands of them are possible in the plentiful usage of master-poets and they may be discovered by men of taste on their own. Ā. also had passed a remark to the same effect. Vṛtti, on VJ. I. 19 (pp. 35) reads as - “etac ca mukhyatayā vakratā-prakāraḥ katicin nidarsaṇārthām pradarśitāh. śiśṭās ca sahasṛṣaḥ saṃbhavanti iti mahākavi-pravāhe sahṛdayaḥ svayam eva utpreksaṇīyaḥ.”

Under I. 20 VJ. (pp. 35, ibid), K. treats vākya-vakratā and tries to subsume all alamkāras here-under. Ā. has placed them under guṇibhūta-vyaṅgya type, but in K. all vakratā is of an identical nature, and therefore has to be placed on the same footing. This is exactly where he violates the fundamentals of the dhvanīvādins. The vākya-vakratā is illustrated (verse No. 70, pp. 36), in “upasthitam pūrvam upāṣya...” etc. Actually, this can very well serve as an illustration of vastu-dhvanī which is not named as such by K. On the contrary, K. wants to put this under the same banner which also corners all the figures of sense, i.e. arthālamkāras.

K. treats of prakaraṇa - vakratā or ‘beauty of section’ and ‘pralandha vakratā’ or beauty of a whole work or composition, at VJ. I. 21. We know that Ā. has already discussed “prabandha-vyañjaṅkāva’ and has screened the case of both the Rāmāyaṇa and the Mahābhārata, and it is clear that here too, K. derives his inspiration from Ā. K. promises to discuss in greater details the six-fold vakratā in due course. But here, we will repeat once again, that the ‘prakaraṇa-vakratā’ and ‘pabandha-vakratā’ are but shades of Ā.’s vyāñjanā. The illustration from Kirāta. is an instance in point : (vṛtti, VJ. I. 21, pp. 37, ibid) - “yathā vā kirātārjunīye kirātapurusākṛtiṃ vācyatvena sva-mārgaṇa-mārgaṇa-mātram eva upakrāntam. vastutah punar arjunena saha, tātparyārtha-paryālocanaya vigraho vākyārthatām upaṇītah...”.

“Similarly, in the Kiratārjunīya also, we find only the seeking of his own arrow by the hunter plainly stated in the hunter’s words. But, as a matter of fact Arjuna who takes the purport into account (and) understands rightly that the hunter’s meaning is a challenge for fighting.” (Trans. K.Kris., pp. 323, ibid)
Then K. proceeds to discuss the nature of ‘bandha’ or ‘diction’ under VJ. I. 22 (pp. 38, ibid). While dealing with “sukumāra-mārga”, (VJ. I. 25-29), K. observes that this style is such which master poets follow like bees roving along the grove of full-blown blossoms (Trans. K.Kris., pp. 329). He further observes that by this simile the author intends to suggest elegance about the style which is comparable to the natural loveliness of flowers. (Trans. K.Kris., pp. 330, ibid). The word used here is “dyotyate” - (Vṛtti, VJ. I. 29, pp. 44, ibid) - “vikasita-kusuma-kānana-sāmyena tasya kusuma-saukṛmārya-sadṛśam ābhijātyam dyotyate.” Here ‘dyotyate’ should mean ‘vyajyate’. The illustration viz. “pravṛddhatāpah...” etc., (pp. 44, ibid), has an element of suggestivity. He observes : (vṛtti, VJ. I. 29, pp. 44, ibid) : tathā ca pravṛddha-tāpah “tanvi”, iti vācakau sundara-svabhāvamātra-samarpaṇa-paratvena vartamāṇau arthāntara-pratīty-anurodha-paratvena pravṛttiṁ na sammanyete, kavi-vyakta-kauśala-samullasitasya punaḥ prakārāntarasya pratītāv ānuṅguṇya-mātreṇa tad-vid-āḥlāda-kāritām pratipadyete.” “The words, “heated up”, and “slender”, are so used as to bring out essentially the charming nature of the two and cannot directly signify any other shade of meaning. But the poet’s artistic skill has succeeded in making them fit for signifying the other meaning also by keeping them in tune with it; and this compels admiration from critics.” (Trans. K.Kris., pp. 330). All this comes very close to cases wherein multiple meaning is restricted to one particular meaning and later on with the help of vyañjanā the suppressed meaning again comes to the surface.

K.’s concept of “lāvanya” (VJ. I. 32, pp. 49, ibid), and “ābhijātya” (VJ. I. 33, pp. 50, ibid), could hardly be distinguished from pure varnadharmas and śabdadharmas; i.e. qualities of letters or syllables and of words. It is just that, pure and simple. Under VJ. I. ’33, (pp. 51, ibid) we have a cross-reference to Ā., wherein K. suggests that when Ā. equates “pratīyamāna” or implicit sense, with the beauty of limbs in a lady, i.e. ‘lalanā-lāvanya’, he only wants to convey that this beauty is something quite different from the normal limbs such as hands, feet, etc. Here, K. does not criticise Ā., who according to K. here wants to emphasise that the implicit sense is quite different, from the explicit one. - (vṛtti, VJ. I. 33, pp. 52, ibid) : “na eṣa doṣaḥ. - yamād anena dṛṣṭāntena vācyav-vācaka-lakṣāna-prasiddhāvayavavyatiriktaḥ vena astitvamātram sādhyan pratiyamānasya; na punaḥ sakala-loka-loca-samvedasya lalanā-lāvanyasya.” - “This is not at all wrong. All that the analogy establishes is the independent existence of the implied aspect of meaning as distinct from the purely conventional and secondary meanings of words.” (Trans. K.Kris., pp. 338, ibid).
K. defines “vicitra-mārga” in VJ. I 34-43 (pp. 52, 53, ibid). This is one in which “artistic beauty appears to be radiating brilliantly from within, in respect of both word and meaning.” (Trans. K.Kris., pp. 338, ibid) (Vṛtti, VJ. J. 34-43, pp. 53, ibid) - “kiḍṛśaḥ sa mārgaḥ - yatra yasmin śabdābhidheya-vayor abhidhānā’bhidhiya-mānayor antaḥ svarūpānupraveśini vakratā bhaṇitī-viccittīḥ spurātīva praspandamānā iva vibhāvyate, lakṣyate.” This comes to the beauty caused by word and meaning - śabdā’bhidheyayoḥ” (VJ. I. 34) (pp. 52, ibid). This is also a style, “wherein the adorned is made to acquire brilliance by virtue of the tropes brilliant in themselves, and reflecting it through their own excessive beauty.” (Trans. K.Kris. pp. 339, ibid) :

“yatra tad-vad alamkārāiḥ
bhṛajamānair nijā”tmanā,
sva-s’obhātiśayāntahsthām
alamkāryaṁ prakāśate.”

This is again a style (VJ. I. 40, pp. 53, ibid)

“pratīyamānataḥ yatra
vākyārthasya nibadhyate,
vācyā-vācaka-vṛttibhyāṁ
vyatiriktasya kasyacit.”

“Wherein further, the intended purport of the whole is communicated by a suggestive use of language which is distinct from the two well-known uses, viz. “the communicative use of meanings and the denotative use of words.” (Trans. K.Kris., pp. 339, ibid). We have quoted the whole kārika above. What harm is there, we may ask, if direct mention is made of vyañjanā, which alone for a dhvanivādin, is capable of conveying the implicit sense? Surely, K. cannot admit “anumiti” here. If he does not accept ‘vyañjanā’ should he accept ‘lakṣanā’ or ‘dirgha-dirghata-vyāpāra” or “tātparya” ? And, in all these cases we refuse to call him a dhvani-vādin. But perhaps he also accepts vyañjana at heart, but whatever appeals to his sense of beauty in poetry, he calls it ‘vakratā’, a broader term to designate all poetic beauty. We will discuss this when we come to the end of his assessment.

While dealing with the vicitra-mārga, i.e. the brilliant style, K. refers to the striking aspect of beauty both in words and meaning which will appear as natural and not involving a special effort on the part of the poet, as in, “kóyaṁ bhāti”, etc., (verse no. 89, under VJ. I. 43, pp. 54). He goes to observe that - (vṛtti, VJ. I. 43;
Dhvani in Kuntaka, Bhoja and others, and Guṇībhūta-vyaṇgya and Citra-Kāvya. 1063

pp. 54, ibid) - “atra aprastutapaśaṃsā-lakṣaṇo’lakmāraḥ prādhiṃnya eva vākyārthaḥ, pratiyamāna-padrāthāntaratvena prayuktavat, tatra ca vicitra-kavi-saktisamullikhita - vakra-sabdārtho’panibandha-māhātmyat. prakrama eva pratibhāsāmanatvān na cārthaṇtara-pratīti-kāritvāna padāṇaṃ ślesa-vyapadesah Śakyate kartum, vācyasya sama-pradhāna-bhāvena anavasthānāt. arthāntara-pratīti-kāritvam ca padāṇaṃ pratiyamānārtha-sphūtātavabhāsanārtham upanibandhyānam ativa-camatkāritām pratipadyate.” “The main purpose of this verse is ‘vicarious reference’, a figure of speech. The whole passage is designed by the author to convey a suggested meaning, other than the referential one. Further more, as a result of the effective use of artistic words and meanings due to the inventive genius of an accomplished poet, even the suggested meaning is made to appear as if it were the directly denoted meaning. Since it is grasped at the first instance itself, no paronomasia can be said to be involved, merely because the words convey a double meaning; in fact both the meanings retain equal importance. Such a usage of words with double meaning with a view to illuminating a clear, suggested meaning will carry an extremely delightful effect.” (Trans. K.Kris., pp. 340, ibid).

This is nothing else but ‘vyañjanā’, not expressly admitted by K., who again equates ‘pratiyamāna’, and ‘vācyā’, in ‘apraṣṭuta-praṣaṃsā’, which then caeses to be an alaṃkāra, and is included in the fold of dhvani.

In the same vein, K., without an express mentioning or acceptance of vyañjanā-vṛtti, continues to explain one more illustration, viz. “he helājita-bodhisattva.” etc. (verse, No. 90, pp. 54, ibid). K. holds that, (vṛtti, VJ. I. 43, pp. 55 ibid) - “atra atyanta-garhanīya-caritam padārthāntaram pratiyamānātaya cetasi nidhāya tathāvidha-vilasītah salīla-nidhir vācyatayopākṛntah, tad etavad eva alaṃkṛter aprastuta-praṣaṃsāyaḥ svarūpam-garhanīya-pratiyamāna-padārthāntara-paryavasānam api vāyaṃ śrutyapakrama-rāmanīyataya upanibandhyānam tadvādaḥ lādakāritām āyati. tad etad vyājastuti-prati-rūpaka-prāyaṃ alaṃkaraṇāntaraṃ aprastuta-praṣaṃsāyaḥ bhūṣanatvena upāttam. na cātra samkarālāṅkāra-vyavaḥāro bhavitum arhati, prthag ati-paripṣhūtavena avabhāsanāt. na cāpi saṃsṛṣṭi-sambhavaḥ sama-pradhānabhāvena anavasthīteḥ. na ca dvayor api vācyālaṃkāratvam, vibhinna-visayatvāt.”

“Here also, keeping in mind a different meaning altogether, i.e. of a person whose character is most censurable, as his implicit meaning, the poet has explicitly described the ocean whose conduct is similar. This, in essence, is of the nature of the figure of speech, viz. ‘Vicarious reference’. (or Indirect narration). Further, the
sentence which implicitly conveys even a censurable idea becomes capable of causing delight to the connoisseurs when it is couched in a language which is explicitly beautiful. Hence, ‘vicarious reference’, may be reckoned as a figure of speech which is, in its turn, adorned by another figure, viz. “veiled praise”. Neither is there any scope here for the conjoint merger of both the figures since the two do not have an equally important status. The two are not to be classed as independent figures of expressed sense, because their scope is really different (and not identical)” (Trans. K.Kris., pp. 340, 341, ibid)

K. refers to ‘alaṃkāra’ and ‘alaṃkārya’ while explaining an illustration of vicitramārga. He observes : (vṛtti, VJ. I. 43, pp. 56, ibid) : “tad idam atra tātparyaṁtad, alaṃkāra-mahimā eva tathāvidhātra bhrājate, tasyā’tyantōdrikā-vṛtteḥ sva-śobhātiṣayāntargatam alaṃkāryaṃ prakāśate.” The upshot is this - The efficacy of the figure of speech itself, when it is at its best, is responsible for the impression of beauty surrounding the subject described.” (Trans. K.Kris., pp. 342, ibid). It is clear that here the ‘alaṃkārya’ is of the form of ‘vastu-vyāngya’ only, but K. does not refer to vyañjanā. Under verse no. 95, (pp. 57, ibid) K. observes : (vṛtti, VJ. I. 43, pp. 57, ibid) : “etac ca vyājastuti-paryāyokta-prabhūtinām bhūyasa vibhāvyate.” “And this fact is instanced in many a figure of speech such as “veiled praise” and “euphamism”. (Trans. K.Kris., pp. 343, ibid).

We know that Ā. had observed implicit sense preserved in these figures. He had also observed that if the connoisseur feels that the implicit element is predominantly charming, as in the case of ‘paryāyokta’, such instances should be classed under dhvani, and if it is felt the expressed sense is comparatively more charming, they should be styled as “guṇī-bhūta-vyāngya”. But K. seems to hold that the implicit is always more charming in all these figures. This leads us to Mahimā. But here also, he does not make any reference to vyañjanā, through which, for Ā., the implicit sense is arrived at. Of course K. does not oppose vyañjanā as is done, rather vehemently by Mahimā, K.’s successor.

At VJ. I. 38. K. observes that ‘vicitramārga’, or the brilliant style is (vṛtti, VJ. I. 38. pp. 57, ibid) - “yad api vastu vācyam a-nūtanōllekham anabhinnavatvena ullikhitam, tad api yatra, yasmin alam kām api kāṣṭhām niyate, lokottaratiṣayakotim adhi-ropyate, katham ? ukti-vaiṣictrya-mātreṇa, bhaṇīti-vaidagdhyaenaiv ēty arthaḥ.” : Wherein all things existing in their own way are transformed into new shapes at the poet’s will. The whole order of nature is made to appear in a new perspective altogether. K.’s observation is influenced by Dhv. I. 4. K. accepts everything at times from Ā., and yet fights shy of openly mentioning vyañjanā and
recognising it as a separate independent function of a word; yes, independent of abhidhā and the rest. On illustration no. 97, (pp. 57-58, ibid), viz. "uddeśo'yam sarasa-kadali..." etc. K. observes: (pp. 58, ibid) : "bhaṇīti-vaicitrya-mātram eva'tra. kāvyārthaḥ, na tu nūtānōllekhaśāli vācyā-vijṛmbhitam. etac ca bhaṇīti-vaicitryaṁ sahasra-prakāraṁ saṃbhavati iti svayam eva utprekṣaṇīyam." Needless to say that K.'s 'bhaṇīti-vaicitrya' of a thousand-fold nature is nothing else but Ā.'s dhvani. Ā. observes at Dhv. IV. 2 (vṛtti):

"ato hy anyatamenā'pi
prakāreṇa vibhūṣitā,
vāṇī navatvam āyāti
pūrvārthānvaṇya-vaty api." (Dhv. IV. 2)

ato dhvaner ukta-prabheda-madhyād anyatamenā'pi prakāreṇa vibhūṣitā satī vāṇī; purātanakavi-nibaddhārtha-sāṃsparśavaty api navatvam āyāti."

"By a mere touch of even a single variety of suggestion (among the many that have been enumerated), the poet's expression will acquire novelty though it might perhaps embody only a trite idea." (Dhv. IV. 2)

The expression of a poet will appear quite novel though it might embody an idea already found in an earlier poet, if it is adorned by at least a single variety of suggestion from among the many varieties that have been mentioned." (Trans. K.Kris. pp. 265, ibid). K. brings out the implicit sense in verse no. 99 (pp. 58, 59, ibid), without mentioning vyaṅjanā by name.

At VJ. I. 40, (pp. 53, ibid) K. almost accepts vyaṅjanā. He observes:

"pratīyamānātā yatra
vākyārthasya nibadhyate,
vācyā-vācaka-vṛttibhyam
vyatiriktasya kasyacit"

"Wherein, further, the intended purport of the whole is communicated by a suggestive use of language, which is distinct from the two well-known uses, viz. The communicative use of meanings and the denotative use of words." (Trans. K.Kris., pp. 339, ibid)

K. goes on to observe (vṛtti, VJ. I. 40, pp. 59) : “vicitram eva prakārāntareṇa unmīlayati-pratīyamatā ityādi-yatra, yasmin pratīyamānātā, gamyamānātā vākyārthasya, mukhyatayā vivaksitasya vastūnaḥ kasya cid anākheyasya nibadyate.
kayā yuktyā-väcya-väcaka-vṛttiibhyāṃ śabdärtha-saktibhyāṃ vyatiriktasya tad atirikta-vṛtté anyasya vyāṅgya bhutasya abhivyaktih kriyate." - “The mainly intended purport therein, is conveyed by force of implication (i.e. suggestion), only in as much as it defies direct denotation. What is the exact process involved? The process involved is implication (or suggestion) which is distinct from the two well-known uses of language, viz. the communicative use of meanings and the denotive use of words. The word process is used here in the sense of the latent power in words and meanings towards signification.” (Trans. K.Kris., pp. 345, ibid)

This directly leads K. into the camp of Â. and at his feet too! Precisely because of this we may call him a dhvani-vädin eventhough here also, he does not name ‘vyāñjanā’ clearly. Perhaps because of this also, K. who looks to be a “pracchanna-dhvani-vädin”, is spared the onslaughts of Â.’s great followers such as Mammaṭa and the like, and he is hardly heard of and quoted in later works because he has nothing fresh to offer. He is almost neglected, for he wrongly tries to project his ‘vicitra abhidha’ - theory which proposes to subsume even vyāñjanā under it. K. says that this ‘pratiyamāna-vyavahāra’ will be elucidated while dealing with väkya-vakratā lateron : “eṣa ca pratiyamāna vyavahāro vākya-vakratā-vyākhya-vasare sutarāṃ samumīlyate.” (vṛtti, pp. 59, ibid, VJ. I. 40)

Illustration no. 100, (pp. 59-60, ibid) viz. “vakraṇdor na haranti...” etc. is also explained in it, which is ‘other then the expressed’ - “...iti väcyā-vyatirikta-vṛtti dūtyukti-tåtparyāṃ pragyate.” K. holds that ‘vicitra-mārga’ also operates when an object’s real nature is so described as to be brimming with the intended flow of sentiments - (vṛtti, VJ. I. 41; pp. 66, ibid) : yatra yasmin bhāvānāṃ svabhāvah, parispandah, sa-rasā”kītāḥ, rasa-nirharābhhiprayeṇa padārthānām nibadhyate, nivesyate; kīdrśāḥ ?...” etc. This is clearly under the influence of Dhv. IV. 4.

K. then comes to what he calls the “madhyama-mārga” (VJ. I. 49-51, pp. 68, ibid). He discusses the qualities of “aucitya” or propriety and “saubhāgya” or “splendour” under VJ. I. 55, 56, and 57 (pp. 69/70, ibid). In I. 56, he holds that this ‘saubhāgya’ is “the only life of poetry” - “kavyaika-jīvita”. This is rather surprising. K. is not so clear as is Â., in exactly defining the relation between ‘guna’ and ‘rasa’.

K. speaks of second variety of “vāṇa-vinyāsa-vakratā” at VJ. II. 2 (pp. 75, ibid), which is three-fold. The letters used are - “prasūtauczitya-sobhinaḥ” - i.e. they shine by their harmony with the theme, which necessarily is not of the type of rasā”di. We know that Â. had insisted on letters being conducive to ‘rasa’ only, (Dhv. III. 3, 4, - “tena vāṇā rasacyutāḥ”). As compared to that, K.’s approach is wider and
Dhvani in Kuntaka, Bhoja and others, and Guṇībhūta-vyaṅga and Citra-Kāvya. 1067

therefore commendable. By this, K. tries to cover the concept of guṇas, rītis, and vṛttis, as advanced by others. However, Ā.'s over all stamp continues as in VJ. II. 4 (pp. 78, ibid). K. observes that this particular vakratā concerning letters should not be brought about by any extra effort on the part of the poet. By “effected without extra effort”, what is implied is the unmerited and excessive craze of poets: (vṛtti, on VJ. II. 4, pp. 78) : nātinirbandha-vihita - “nirbandha” śabdótra vyaasanitāyām vartate. tena atinirbandhena punah punar āvartanavyasanitayā na vihitā, ‘a-prayatna-viracita’ ity arthah." Ā. hints at the same point at II. 16/17; etc., and wants an ‘alamkāra’, including a śabdālakāra to be, “a-prthag-yatna-nirvartya”, and wants the poet to restrict himself - “náti-nirvahanaśītā”. At VJ. II. 5, K. correlates varna-vinyāsa-vakratā with the concept of guṇas and vṛttis of the ancients. He observes:

“varṇa-cchāyānusāreṇa
guṇa-mārgānuvartini,
vṛtti-vaicitrya-yuktēti
saiva proktā cirantanaih.” (VJ. II. 5)

...cirantanaih punah saiva svātantryena vṛtti-vaicitrya-yuktēti proktā. vṛttinām upanāgarikādinām yad vaicitryaṁ vicitra-bhāvaḥ sva-nīśtha-samkhya-bheda-bhinnatvaṁ tena yuktā samanvita iti cirantanaih pūrva-sūribhiḥ abhīhitā.”

“The ancients spoke of it in their own independent way as characterised by, “beauty of literary mode”. (Trans. K.Kris., pp. 367, ibid). K. thus deals with anuprāsa, the first variety, of his varna-vinyāsa-vakratā. The second variety, viz. ‘yamaka’, is dealt with at VJ. II. 6, 7. Here also ‘aucitya’ or ‘propriety’ is broad-based as it touches the best manifestation of the subject, which goes beyond rasā”di.

After having dealt with ten varieties of varṇa-vinyāsavakratā, K. picks up what he calls “pada-pūrvārdha-vakratā”, i.e. beauty concerning the usage of the first part of words i.e. base form of substantives (Trans. K. Kris. pp. 369, ibid). He talks of it at VJ. II. 8, 9 and vṛtti thereon. The first variety is “rūḍhi-vaicitrya-vakratā”.

The definition contains words such as “garbhatā” and “garbhavara”, showing direct relation with the implicit sense, but without any mention of vyañjanā. K. observes that: (vṛtti, VJ. II. 8, 9; pp. 82, 83 ibid) : “kena hetunā-lokottara-tiraskāra-sāghyotkarsābhhidhītasayā. lokottarāh sarvāṭiśāyāyi yas tiraskārah khalikaranam śāghyas ca sprhaṇyo ya utkarsah, śatiśayatvaṁ tayor abhidhītas abhidhātum icchā vaktukāmatā, tayā: kasya, vācyasya. rūḍhi-sābdasya vācyo yobhidheyōrthas tasya sōcyate kathaye kāpyalaukiki rūḍhi-vaicitrya-vakratā. rūḍhi-sābdasya evam-
vidhena vaicītryena vicitrabhāvena vakrātā vakra-bhāvaḥ." “An intention to shower extra-ordinary belittlement or extra-ordinary glorification of the theme.” The poet might desire to present his subject for too less or for too more than it actually is. The 'subject' here meant is the one denoted by the conventionally used word. Such an art is designated as 'art in beautifying conventional sense', because a denotative word gets artful extension of sense in all this. (Trans. K. Kris., pp. 370, ibid).

All this is full of Ā.'s implicit sense. The first illustration cited viz. “tālā jāanti...” etc., is also from Dvh. (pp. 38, ibid). And it is here that K. clearly mentions the 'Dhvanikāra’ and “vyāṇya-vyānjaka-bhāva”. K. observes : (vr̥tti, VJ. II. 9, pp. 83, ibid) : “pratīyata iti. kriyāpada-vaicītryasya ayam abhiprāyo yad evaṁvīdhe viṣaye śabdānāṁ vācakatvena na vyāpāraḥ, api tu vastvantaravat-pratītikārītvam-mātreṇa iti yuktum api etad īha na atipratanyate. yasmād dhvanikāreṇa vyāṇya-vyānjaka-bhāvotra sutarāṁ samarthitas tat kim paunaruktyena” “The predicate, ‘is seen to expand’, in the Kārikā, has special significance. In all such instances the verbal function involved is not ordinary denotation but suggestion which can signify a world of extending connotative meanings. This conclusion is indeed reasonable, but we are not concerned with that question here. So refrain from devoting space to its consideration. The learned author of the Dhvanyāloke has established at length the relation of word and meaning in such instances to be that of ‘suggestor’ and ‘suggested’; there is no point served in our repeating the same.” (Trans. K.Kris. pp. 371, ibid).

K. is so much under the spell of Ā., that very often he turns to him even for illustrations. He illustrates rūdhīvaicītrya-vakrātā, which is here two-fold and seems to be modelled on Ā.'s “arthāntara, saṁkramita-vācyā-dhvanī, with the help of an illustration accepted from Ā., viz.” snigdha-śyāmala-kānti...” etc. (pp. 83-84, ibid). The same beauty of ‘rāma'-pada is brought out, but is branded here as a particular type of vakrātā. But once again, what can we say to K. who equates ‘varṇa-vināyāsavakrātā’, having the charm of varṇas, i.e. expression only, with “rūḍhi-vaicītrvyavakrātā” having the charm of pure vyāṇjanā, and places them on the same footing? We are reminded here of the famous verse :

“kācaṁ maṁiṁ kāṁcanam
ekasūtre, mūrkhā nibadhantí,
kímatra citram ? vicāravān
pāñinir eka-sūtre śvānaṁ yuvānaṁ maghavānam āha.”

Illustrations after illustrations prove the supreme dominance of vyāṇjanā. In
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“ājñā śakra-śikhāmani prañayinī...” etc., (verse, 29, pp. 84, ibid), we have, “syāc ced eṣa na ravaṇaḥ,” an expression charged with vyaṅjanā. Ā. would call it “arthāntara saṃkrāmita-vācyā-dhvani.” Same is the case with the next illustration, viz. “rāmāsa bhuvanesu vikrama-guṇaḥ...” etc., an illustration also read in Ā., and the still next, and the still next. K. says that this “rūḍhi-vaiśitrīya-vakratā” has many varieties on account of the implicit sense in it : (vṛtti, VI. II. 9; pp. 85) - “eṣā ca rūḍhi-vaiśitrīya-vakratā pratīyāmaṇa-dharma-bāhulyaḥ bahuprakāra bhidyate.” Even here, K. keeps silent over whether this implicit sense is arrived at through vyaṅjanā or not.

K. then proceeds to deal with what he terms as paryāya vakratā” (at VI. II. 10-12) i.e. “Superior art in the use of synonyms” (K.Kris.; pp. 373, ibid), which is six-fold. We can easily see through these and stamp them only as, “vyāñjanā-nilasita”. He almost mentions ‘vyāñjanā’ when he observes : (vṛtti II 10-12, pp. 86, ibid) “yasmāt paryāya-śabdāt ve saty apy antaraṅgatvāt sa yathā vivakṣitam vastu vyanakti tathā nānyah kaścid iti.” Though other synonyms exist, one alone among them can achieve closest approximation with the shade of meaning that is sought to be conveyed (= suggested ?) and not the rest.” (Trans. K.Kris., pp. 374, ibid).

The illustrations no.s 32, 33, etc. (pp. 86-87, ibid) prove the point. Our point is that if all this is ultimately the charm caused by vyāñjanā, what purpose is served by just giving it a new name ? What’s in a name ? Call it “vyāñjanā-dhvani” or call it by any other name.

The next variety of paryāyavakratā is illustrated by the verse no. 35, (pp. 88, ibid), viz. “ittham jade...” etc. K. clearly exhibits his knowledge of Ā.’s theory and his scheme of śabda-vṛttis while discussing this illustration. We may also find here a tacit acceptance also of Ā.’s scheme. He observes : (vṛtti, VI. II. 10, pp. 88, 89, ibid) : “atra ‘mātanga’ śabdaḥ prastute vārana-mātre pravartare. śilṣṭayā vṛttīyā candāla-laksanasya a-prastutasya vastunaḥ pratītum utpādayan rūpakālaṃkāra-ccḥāyā-sparśad gaur vāhikah ity anena nyāyena sādṛṣya-nibandhanasya upacārasya sambhavat prastutasya vastunas tattvam adhyāropayan paryāyavakratāṃ puṣṇāti. yasmād evamvidhe visaye prastutasya a-prastutena sambhandhopanibandho rūpakālamkāra-dvāreṇa kadācid upamā-mukhena vā. yathā sa evāyaṃ sa ivāyam iti vā. eṣaeva ca śabda-śaktimāla'nuraṇaṇa-rūpa-vyaṅgyasa pada-dhvaner visayaḥ, bahuṣu caivaṃvidheṣu satsu vākya-dhvaner vā.”

“The word ‘mātanga’ in this context directly refers only to the elephant. Paronomistically it can also denote the non-contextual meaning, viz., ‘butcher’; the two came to be metaphorically identified, after the analogy of ‘the punjabi is a
bull', because here also there is similarity justifying metaphorical identification. Thus, we have here a new aspect of beauty in the use of a synonym. In all such places the relation between the direct (lit. contextual) and the indirect, (lit. non-contextual) meaning may be either one of metaphor or of simile. One might say “that is this” or, “this is like this”. This itself has been spoken of (by Ā.) as an instance of suggestion in word coming under the class - “śabda-śakti-mūla-anurāṇana-rūpa-vyaṅgya”, wherein there is a paranomastic power in the word giving rise to two as metaphor etc., and resembling resonant sound.” (Trans. K.Kris., pp. 376, ibid)

K. clearly mentions ‘vākya-dhvani’ also and draws illustrations viz. “kusuma-samaya-yugam.” etc. and “vṛtte’smin...” etc. from the Dhvanyāloka (pp. 78, and pp. 110, Edn. ’74, K.Kris.) We fail to understand his effort in naming Ā.’s dhvani differently. Only point to his credit is that he has specifically mentioned and illustrated many varieties, or say, sub-varieties of dhvani left out by Ā. But thereby K.’s work becomes only supplementary to the Dhvanyāloka. It may be called a useful appendix, at the most, to Ā.’s great Dhvanyāloka. K.’s effort to name it differently is just quibbling. Yes, just so, and nothing more. For, he has to admit that, in the particular illustration viz. “vṛttēsmin mahāpralaye...” etc., (pp. 89, ibid) : (vṛtti, VJ. II. 10; verse 37, pp. 89 - ibid) : “atra yugā”dayah śabdāḥ prastutābhidhāna-paratvena prayuyamānāḥ santōpya-aprastuta-vastu-pratīti-kāritayā kām api kāvyā-cchāyāṁ samunmīlayantaḥ pratīyamānālāṃkāra-vyapadesa-bhājanam bhavanti.” “Though the word ‘yuga’ (= ‘era’, ‘twin months’) etc., are used overtly to refer to the subject on hand, they are capable of suggesting another meaning indirectly and reveal a special kind of poetic charm which has been designated by the name, ‘suggested figure of speech’ by Ā.” - (Trans. K.Kris., pp. 377, ibid).

What pains us is not just his naming the things differently, but it is only when K. places different varieties of vakrātā on the same footing, we feel that he violates the basic principles of aesthetics in general and dvānī in particular and renders confusion worse confounded. For example, his fourth variety of ‘paryāya-vakrātā’ viz. “sva-cchāyōtkarsa peśala” (pp. 89, 90, ibid) i.e. (which by itself contributes to a new lease of excellence - Trans. K.Kris., pp. 377) - at the most comes closer to what we call ‘parikara-ālāṃkāra’. Surely this can never be equated with other ‘vakrātā’ as above, which is dhvani, pure and simple.

K. then treats (pp. 90, ibid) yet another variety, wherein, “ayam aparaha pada-pūrvārdha-vakrātābhidhāyi-asambhāvyartho-pātratva-garbhah yaścābhidhīyate” - i.e. ‘which hints at a meaning having inconceivable elements.’ (Trans. K.Kris. pp.
378, ibid). After citing apt illustrations (viz. verses no.s 40, 41, pp. 91, ibid) K. makes the following observation: (vṛtti, VJ. II. 12, pp. 91, ibid): "tad evaḥ yady api suspaṣṭa-samanvayōyam vākyārthas tathāpi tātparyāntaram atra pratiyate." "...apart from this surface meaning, there is also the hint of another intent."

The variety called, "alāmkārōpaṃsāṃkāra-manohāra-nibandhanah" - "that which contains embellishing figurative elements conducive to beauty" (pp. 379, ibid, Trans. K.Kris.) - has beauty caused by figures. The compound is to be treated as both 'ṭṛtiyā-samāsah' and 'śaṣṭhi-samāsah' - i.e. 'both as an instrumental compound and as a genitive compound' (K.Kris., pp. 380, ibid). While dealing with the latter, K. cites an illustration of 'utprekṣā' which is only suggested. Thus he jumbles up, once again, contrary to the expectations of a pure dhvani-vādin, the two different charms resulting from the use of normal figures of speech and others that are only suggested. The particular illustration, viz. "devi, tvan muhka-pankajena..." etc. (verse, No. 42, pp. 42, ibid) may be classed as one of 'alāmkāra-dhvani', wherein 'utprekṣā' is only implicit. K. observes: (vṛtti, VJ. II. 12, pp. 92): "tvan-mukha-pankajena punaḥ saśinaḥ śobhātiraskārinā nyāyato nirjītaḥ santi vicchāyatām gacchanti iva iti pratiyamānasya utpekṣā-lakṣaṇasya alāmkrārasya śobhātīśayāḥ samullāsya." Now K. comes to treat "upacāra-vakratā" "beauty of metaphorical expression" (K.Kris.), under VJ. II. 13, 14 (pp. 93, ibid). It is clear that he intends to cover up all usages having metaphor at its root. Alāmkrāras such as rūpaka, and all such usages having 'lakṣaṇā' as their basis, and also such other figures of speech which belong to the 'expressed' class are also taken up here. K. also covers up what the dhvani-vādin would call "lakṣaṇā-mūla-dhvani." Thus without discrimination worthy of a true follower of Ā., he puts on par both the 'expressed' and the "principally suggested." He herein includes also cases which a dhvanivādin would designate as, "atyanta-tiraskṛta-vācyā-dhvani". Anyoktis are also covered up under this vakratā.

We come across an illustration of anyōkti in verse no. 50 (pp. 96, ibid), viz. "anarghaḥ kopy antah..." etc. K. observes: (vṛtti, VJ. II. 14, pp. 96, ibid): tathā ca kim api padārthāntaram pratiyamānatayā cetasi niḍhāya, tathāvidha-lakṣaṇa-sāmya-samanvayaṃ saṃśrityo padārthāntaram abhidhiyamānatām prāpayantah, prāyaścāḥ kakayo drśyante." "Furthermore, poets are often seen describing outwardly objects different from the ones that they have in mind, primarily because of some fancied similarity in the qualities of the two." (pp. 383, ibid, Trans. K.Kris).
K. does not seem to bother whether the implied sense is principal or subordinate in relation to the expressed. He seems to hold that the implicit is principal in ‘a-prastuta-praśamsā’ as against rupaka in which the expressed is principal: (vr̥tti, VJ. II. 14, verse 50; pp. 96, ibid) - “tathā ca etayor dvayos tulye’pi upacāra-vakratā-jīvitve, vācyatvam ēkatra, pratiyamānatvam aparasmīn svarūpabhedasya nibandhanam.” - “Thus in these two figures of speech i.e. ‘metaphor’ and ‘irrelevant reference’, though there is similarity in regard to the vital presence of “beauty in metaphorical expression”, difference between the two can be brought out by explaining the one as suggested and the other as denoted.” (Trans. K.Kris.; pp. 384, ibid).

This idea regarding a-prastuta-praśamsā goes against the normally accepted notion as represented by M., Ruyyaka, Appayya and Jagannātha.

At VJ. II. 15, (pp. 96, ibid) K. deals with “viśeṣaṇa-vakratā”, which is three-fold, and is itself the fourth variety of pada-pūrvarādhva-vakratā. He observes: (VJ. II. 15, pp. 96, ibid):

“viśeṣaṇasya māhātmyāt
kriyāyāḥ kārakasya vā,
yatrāllasati lāvanyām
sā viśeṣaṇa-vakratā.”

“If as a result of the excellence of epithet, beauty is added to the verb or noun, (in a sentence), it is to be classed as “beauty in epithet”. (Trans. K.Kris., pp. 384, ibid).

This comes close to normal ‘parikara-alāṃkāra’, and seems to be more a charm connected with pure expression, i.e. “abhidhā-vilasita” only. VJ. II. 16 (pp. 98, ibid) talks of “saṃvṛti-vakratā” - “beauty of concealment,” which is manifold and has an element of implied sense which is either principal or subordinate source of charm. In short, it could be placed either with ‘dhvam’ or “guṇibhuta-vyaṅgya”, as the case may be. K. observes:

“yatrasaṃvṛyāte vastu
vaicitryasya vivakṣayā,
sarva-nāmā”dibhiḥ kaiścit
sóktā saṃvṛti-vakratā.” (VJ. II. 16, pp. 98, ibid)

“In order to achieve excellence of expression, when the subject of description is screened as it were by the use of pronouns and so forth, we have, what is
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designated as, “beauty of concealment.” (Trans. K. Kris., pp. 385 ibid). We feel that Ā.'s vastu-dhvani can be accommodated in second, third, fourth, fifth and sixth varieties of 'sāṃvṛti-vakratā'. The illustration for example, viz. “tāt pitary atha parigraha...” etc. (verse, no. 58, pp. 99, ibid) is explained by K. as, (vṛtti, VJ. II. 16, pp. 99, ibid). “atra sadācāra-pravāhatayā gurubhakti-bhāvitāntaḥkaraṇo lokottaraudārya-guṇa-yogād-vividha-visayopabhoga-vitṛṣṇamanā nijendriya-nigraham a-sambhāvanīyam api śāntanavo vihitavān ity abhidhātaṃ śakyaṃ api sāmānyābhidhāyinā sarva-nāmnā'chādyā uttarārdhena kāryāntarābhidhāyinā vākyāntareṇa pratiti-gocaratām āniyamānām kām api camatkāritām āvahati.”

"In this example, it was, certainly possible for the poet to state that Śāntanu's son (= Deva-vrata, alias Bhiṣma) displayed incredible self-restraint in foreswearing all sensual allurements because of his extra-ordinary magnanimity, his devout good behaviour and boundless regard for elders. But the poet has avoided this straight-forward statement; he has allowed it to be concealed by a pronoun (= he), with general significance. In the second half of the verse, he proceeds to give us a relative clause, which describes some other action and yet succeeds by this manoeuvre in suggesting it strikingly and forcefully.” (Trans. K.Kris., pp. 388, ibid). This is just vastu-dhvani. The next illustration, viz. “yātē dvāra-vatīṃ...” etc., (verse 59, pp. 99, ibid), also prove the point when K. observes : (vṛtti, VJ. II. 16, pp. 99, ibid) - “atra sarvanāmnā sāṃvṛtam vastu rat-kāryābhidhāyinā vākyāntareṇa samumnilya sahrdaya-hṛdaya-hāritāṃ prāpitam.” “Here what she sang is concealed by the pronoun 'that' (in the original) and at the same time the concealed idea is revealed by another clause which wins the hearts of critics with taste.” (Trans. K. Kris., pp. 387, ibid).

The next variety of 'pada-pūrvārđha-vakratā' is “pada-madhyaṁtart-bhūta-pratyaya-vakratā” - (i.e. the affix in the middle of a word adds to the beauty of decorum in subject described - K.Kris.; pp. 388, ibid) - which is taken up at VI. II. 17, (pp. 101, ibid) K. observes : (vṛtti, VJ. II. 17, pp. 101 ibid) - “kaścit pratyayah kṛd ādiḥ, pada-madhya-vṛttr anyām apūrvām vakratām ullāsayeri vakrabhāvam uddīpayati. kim kurvan ?

prastutasya varṇyamānasya vastuno yad auctityam ucitabhaivas tasya vicchittim upaśobhāṃ vikāsayan, samullāsayan; kena ? sva-mahimnā, nijotkarṣena.”

"The affix in the middle of a word often adds to the beauty of decorum in the subject described, by virtue of its own excellence. This may be regarded as another type of poetic beauty. Some affixes like ‘kṛt’ occurring in the middle of words are
seen enhancing the unique poetic beauty in the passage. They serve to increase the beauty of decorum in respect of the subject described. This increase is brought about by its own excellence.” (Trans. K.Kris., pp. 386, ibid).

These are charms of both expression and suggestion. For example, in “snihyat katākṣe dṛṣṭau.” (verse no. 68, pp. 101). K. observes here (vṛtti, VS. II. 17, pp. 102, ibid) : “atra vartamāna-kālābhidhāyī śatr-pratyayaḥ kām apy atīṭaṅgata-vibhrama-virahitāṃ tātkālika-parispanda-sundarīṃ prastutacitya-vicchittīṃ ullāsayan saḥṛḍaya-hṛḍaya-hārīṇīṃ pratyaya-vakratāṃ āvahati.”

“The affix forming the present participle brings out beautifully the speciality of the subject shining in its present splendour and devoid of graces attached to it in the past and attributable to it in the future. This charm of the affix is indeed very appealing to the mind of sensitive critics.” (Trans. K.Kris., pp. 389, ibid) - This has charm operating at the level of abhidhā only. Once again, K. places all varieties of beauty-vakratā - on the same footing without caring in the least for what Ā. would feel about it. The illustrations, viz. verses, Nos., 69, 70, 71, on pp. 102, ibid, prove this point. K. observes : (vṛtti, VJ. II. 18, pp. 102, ibid) - “atra subhagam-manyā-bhāva-prabhṛtiṣu śabdeṣa, mumādi-parispanda-sundarāḥ sanniveśa-cchāyā-vidhāyināṃ vācaka-vakratāṃ pratyayaḥ puṣṇanti.” - “The augments ‘mum’ in the words ‘subhagam-manya’, ‘prasrītīm-paca’, and so forth, add extra-ordinary stylistic charm showing off the linguistic construction to best advantage.” (Trans. K.Kris., pp. 389, ibid). Then follows ‘vṛtti-vakratā’, at VJ. II. 19 (pp. 103, ibid), which takes note of beauty revealed through various types of compounds, and also taddhita, and sub-vṛttis. This includes charm caused due to the pure expression i.e. abhidhā, and also ‘upacāra’, or metaphorical expression, and then vyañjanā also. The illustrations go to prove this. However, the main source of charm is only abidhā. The illustration viz., “ā svar-lokād uraga-nagaram” etc. (verse, ’73, pp. 103, ibid), has the word “pāṇḍīmānan” which contributes to a unique beauty of vṛtti, a beauty which would be missed if its synonym like ‘pāṇḍutva’, ‘pāṇḍutā’ and ‘pāṇḍu-bhāva’ were used.

Then comes ‘bhāva-vakratā’, a further variety of ‘pada-pūrvārdha-vakratā’. K. takes it up at VJ. II. 20, (pp. 108, ibid). K. makes the point clear when he suggests that here pure expression at abidhā level makes for the charm, regardless of any acquaintance with the implicit element. Ā. would refuse to equate it with vyañjanā. VJ. II. 21 has ‘linga-vacitrya-vakratā’, also a charm, at the abhidhā level. VJ. II. 22 (pp. 106, ibid) observes that
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“sati liṅgāntare yatra
strī-liṅgam ca prayuṣyate,
śobhā-nispattaye yasmān
nāmnaiva strīti peśalam.”

“Even when other genders could be used, if the feminine is preferred, it contributes to beauty; since even the name of a woman is pleasing.” (Trans. K. Kris.; pp. 392, ibid) - It may be noted in passing that Dr. K. Kris. (pp. XV, Introduction to his edn. of VJ.) tries to suggest here that this observation shows K. as a predecessor of Abhinavagupta. We feel that this could be debated. VJ. II. 23 (pp. 106, ibid) also continues the same argument. VJ. II. 24, 25 (pp. 108, 109, ibid) give the eight variety of pada-pūrvārdha-vakratā. This has “kriyā-vaicitrya-vakratā” of five varieties, which has charm caused due to abhidhā, as well as ‘upacāra’, but all this is placed on the same footing. There is a touch of vyāñjanā also, as in the illustration viz. “prapannā”rti-cchido-nakhāḥ” (verse No. 88., pp. 110, ibid), from Ā. In the variety viz. ‘sva-viśeṣaṇa-vaicitrya”, (pp. 110, ibid) also, there is an element of vyāñjanā, when an attribute causes charm. K. does accept charm due to vyāñjanā, eventhough he does not name it so. But he includes it in his wider scheme of kavi-vyāpāra-vakratā, without distinguishing between beauty caused by abhidhā, laksanā (or upacāra), and vyāñjanā. This would be a difficult pill to swallow for a pure dhvanivādin. He talks of ‘upacāra-manojñatā” (on pp. 111, ibid) which proves the above observation. Then he talks of ‘karmā”di-saṃvyṛti’ wherein ‘karma’ i.e. action remains ‘vyāṅga’. (pp. 112, ibid).

After discussing ‘pada-pūrvārdha-vakratā’ in case of both ‘subanta’ and ‘tinganta’ padas in eleven varieties, K. now proceeds to discuss “pada-parārdha-vakratā”, i.e. ‘pratyaya-vakratā” with reference to the same. First is taken up “kālavaicitrya-vakratā” at VJ. II. 26 (pp. 113). The illustrations reveal the beauty of vyāñjanā only. K. gives only a different lebel. The ‘kāraka-vakratā’ at VJ. II. 27, 28 (pp. 115 ibid) speaks of vakratā - i.e. beauty - caused due to reversal of status in ‘instruments in action.’ Some of the illustrations reveal the charm caused by direct expression, pure and simple, as in, “yāṭām dainya.” etc. (verse no. 97, pp. 116, ibid), while there is a tinge of vyāñjanā also somewhere. Similar is the case of ‘saṃkhyā-vakratā’ (VJ. II. 29, pp. 116, ibid), or “transposition of numbers.” K. observes (vṛtti, VJ. II. 29, pp. 117 ibid) tad ayam atrārthaḥ - yad ekavacane, dvivacane prayoktavye vaicitryārthaṃ vacanāntaraṃ yatra prayuṣyate, bhinnavacanayor vā yatra sāmāṇādhiṣṭhakarṇyaṃ vidhiyate.
“The upshot is this - when either the singular or the dual number should have been used in a context, if we find that another number is used, or if we find that two different numbers are brought into relation with an identical case-termination, we have this type instanced.” The illustration is, “kapole patālī.” etc. The verse is from Amaru-śataka (no. 85), and is also quoted by Ā., under Dhv. II. 16c, (pp. 58 line 10, Edn. ’74, ibid). He quotes it to illustrate proper use of alaṅkāra as a ‘rasāṅga’. K. deals with what he calls ‘puruṣa-vakratā’ i.e. “oblique beauty of person”, at VJ. II. 30 (pp. 118, ibid). He observes : (vṛtti, VJ. II. 30, pp. 118, ibid) - “tad ayam atrārthaḥ. yad anyasmin uttame madhyame vā puruṣe prayoktavye vaicitryāya anyāḥ kadācit prathamaḥ prayujyate. tasmāc ca puruṣaika yogakṣematvād asmadādeḥ prātipadikamātrasya ca viparyāsāḥ paryavasyati.” “The purport is as follows : In a literary context where the first or second person is required to be used, the poet may prefer to use the third person instead. For the same reason, since pronouns are as good as nouns, the transposition of a noun (i.e. the third person) in place of a pronoun also becomes proper example of this type of oblique charm.” (Trœns. K.Kris., pp. 404, ibid).

Ā. has practically hinted at all these varieties of so called vakratā, under Dhv. III. 16 (pp. 146, lines 7, 8, ibid), when he observes :

“sup-tiṅ-vacana-sambandhis
tathā kāraka-śaktibhiḥ,
kṛt-taddhita-samāsaiś ca
dyotyōlakṣya-kramah kvacit.”

“Case-terminations, conjugal terminations, number, relation, accident, primary affixes, secondary affixes and also compounds - all these become conveyers of suggestion with undiscerned sequentiality.” (Trans. K.Kris., pp. 147, ibid)

The essence of suggestion with undiscerned sequentiality, i.e. sentiment etc., is conveyed even by the speciality in case-terminations and conjugal terminations, in number, relation and accident, in primary affixes, secondary affixes, and compounds. The conjugation ‘also’ in the text indicates that even propositions and tenses might become suggestive.” (Trans. K.Kris., pp. 147, ibid) The vṛtti, on Dhv. III. 16 (pp.146, ibid) reads as : “alakṣyakramo dhvaner ātmā rasā”dhiḥ, sub-viśeṣaiḥ, tiṅ-viśeṣaiḥ, vacana-viśeṣaiḥ, sambandha-viśeṣaiḥ, kāraka-śaktibhiḥ, kṛd-viśeṣaiḥ taddhita-viśeṣaiḥ, samāsaiś cā iti, ‘ca’ śabdān nipātōpasarga-kālā”dibhiḥ prayuktair abhivyājyamāno dṛṣyate.”
K. seems to accept from Ä., of course without openly recognising the same. K. seems to cover some more sub-varieties such as “upagraha-vakratā” (VJ. II. 31, pp. 118, ibid), and “pratayāntara-vakratā” (VJ. II. 32, pp. 119), i.e. beauty due to verb-affix, and also unique beauty of affix.” This pertains to charm caused by pure expression at abhidhā level. K. equates this without discrimination, with other varieties involving vyañjanā. This can not be accepted by a dhvanivādin.

K. then comes to yet another variety of pada-vakratā at VJ. II. 33 (pp. 120, ibid). This is very interesting, for he says,

“rasā”di-dyotanaṁ yasyām
upasarga-nipātayoḥ,
vākyaika-jivitatvena
sā’parā pada-vakratā.” (VJ. II. 33, pp. 120, ibid)

“In a poem where the prepositions and indeclinables are employed only to suggest rasas as the sole essence of a poem as a whole, we have what may be called another type of “word-beauty”. (Trans. K.Kris., pp. 406, ibid). K. speaks of ‘dyotana’ in the sense of ‘vyañjana’ of rasa, and here he accepts it, but without being vyañjanā-biased. Similarly, he accepts “pratiyamāna” through ‘vyañjana’, but he would not hesitate to put the ‘abhidhārtha’ and ‘pratiyamānārtha’ in the same category as he himself is not ‘pratiyamāna-biased’. He cites illustrations which are read also in the Dhv. Like Dhv. III. 16, as quoted above, K. also suggests in VJ. II. 38 (pp. 122, ibid), that many sub-varieties can be found together at a single place, as in “tarantīva.” iti, etc. (pp. 122, ibid, verse no. 113) Actually, K. does not seem to be an opponent of vyañjanā, i.e., he is not a “vyañjanā-virodhin”, but perhaps, he can be said to be an “antar-bhāva-vādin”. Vyañjanā forms but an aspect of ‘kavi-vyāpāra’ or “vicitrā-abhidhā”. He also mentions “vyañjakatva” by name, while dealing with VJ. II. 35 (pp. 123, ibid), wherein he observes : (VJ. II. 35, pp. 123) :

“vāg-valiyāḥ pada-pallavā”spadatayā yā vakratōdbhāsini
vicchitriḥ sarasattva-sampad-ucitā kāpy ujjvalā jīmbhate,
tāmāloca vidadgha-ṣaṭ-pada-gaṇair vākya-prasūnāśrayaṁ
sphārāmoda-manoharam madhu navotknṇthā”kulaṁ piyatām.”

“Poetic speech is a veritable creeper, with words as leaves, forming the bases for (symmetrical) beauty striking with artistic turn adding to the wealth of feelings and sentiments in a most striking manner. May the bee-like connoisseurs appreciate it
and collect the profusely fragrant and sweet honey, from the sentence blossoms, and enjoy it with ever-increasing zest.” (Trans. K. Kris. pp. 409, ibid) K. goes to add, (ṛṣṭi, VJ. II. 35, pp. 124, ibid) - “atraikatra sarasatvam sva-samaya-sambhavi-rasa”rdratvam anyatra śṛngārā”di-vyañjakatvam.” - “Such is the purport. The juiciness alluded in the verse has two connotations: The first relates to the luscious exuberance manifest in creepers seasonally during spring. In the second place it suggests erotic feelings and so forth.” (Trans. K. Kris., pp. 410, ibid) K. dealt with vācaka-vakratā in the second chapter. He proceeds with vākyā-vakratā, beginning with vācaka-vakratā in the next chapter.

K. observes - (VJ. III. 1, pp. 125, ibid)

“udāra-sva-parispanda-
sundaratvena varṇanam,
vastuno vakra-śabdaīka-
gocaratvena vakratā.”

“¬When the subject matter is described in a way conducive to beauty by virtue of its own infinite natural charm, and by means of exclusively artistic expressions, we may take it as an instance of creative beauty relating to content.” (Trans. K.Kris., pp. 411, ibid). He seems to touch both abhidhā and vyañjanā here by the term “vakra-śabdaīka-gocaratvena”, i.e. “by means of exclusively artistic expression.” The artistic expression may not be either abhidhā or vyañjanā alone. It could be both. He goes to observe further: (ṛṣṭi, VJ. III. 1, pp. 125, ibid): “varṇanam pratipādanam. katham? vakra-śabdaīka-gocaratvena. vakro yo’sau nānāvidha-vakratā-viśiṣṭah śabdaḥ kaścid eva vācaka-vīśeṣo vivakṣitārtha-samarpaṇa-
samarthas tasyai-vaiksasya kevalasya gocaratvena pratipādyatayā viṣayatvena. vācyatvena iti nōktam, vaigyatvena’pi pratipādana-sambhavāt. tad ‘idam aparāṃ bhavati-yad evamvidhe bhāva-svabhāva—saukumārya-varṇana-prastāve bhūyasāṃ na vācyālāṃkārāṇām upamādinām upayoga-yogyatā saṃbhavati, svabhāva-
saukumāryā’tīṣaya-mlānatā-prasaṅgāt.”

“The description intended is poetic treatment. Its manner is conveyed by the epithet - ‘by means of exclusively artistic expressions.’ That is to say out of a number of charming expressions, only that particular one will be selected, which is capable of yielding the intended content as designed by the creative poet as his main subject-matter. The word ‘yielding’ is used instead of ‘signifying’, because communication of meaning is possible in a suggestive way also. The sum and substance is this: In all such cases involving the natural charm of the content
described, there will not be much scope for the use of plain figures of speech, simile and so on, because their use would spoil their exquisitely delicate natural charm.” (Trans. K.Kris., pp. 411, ibid).

This shows that K. is not apethetic to vyañjanā and is at times prepared to accept the charm caused by the same. What he seems to do is that he gives a larger connotation to Ā.’s expression; viz. “tau śabdārthau mahākaveḥ.” (Dhv. I. 8.) For Ā. these ‘śabdārthau’ were exclusively “vyañgya-samañjakau”. For Ā. specifically observes at I. 8 (Dhv. pp. 14, ibid).

“evaṃ vācya-vyatirekino vyañgya sadbhāvaṃ pratipādyā prādhānyaṃ tasyaiva darśayati -

“sōrthas tad-vyakti-sāmarthya-
yogi śabaś ca kaścana,
yatnataḥ pratyabhijñeyau
tau śabdārthau mahākaveḥ.” (Dhv. I. 8)

sa vyañgyōrthas tad-vyakti-sāmarthya-yogi śabaś ca kaścana, na sarvaḥ tāv eva śabdārthau mahākaveḥ pratyabhijñeyau. vyañgya-vyañjakābhyaṃ eva hi suprayuśābhyaṃ mahākavitva-lābho mahākavināṃ, na vācya-vācaka-racanā-
mātrena.” (pp. 14, 16, ibid).

“Thus after establishing the existence of the implicit meaning as distinct from the explicit, the over-riding superiority of that meaning is demonstrated in what follows:

That meaning, and that rare word which possesses the power of conveying it, only these two deserve the careful scrutiny of a first-rate poet. (Dhv. I. 8)

“that meaning” refers to the implicit and ‘that rare word which possesses the power of conveying it’ points out that it is not any and every word (recorded in the dictionary). Such a word and such a meaning-only these two deserve the careful recognition of a first-rate poet. The status of first-rate poets is achieved only by the effective employment of suggested meanings and suggestive expressions, and not by a mere use of conventional meanings and conventional words.” (Trans. K.Kris., pp. 15, 17, ibid)

Not that Ā. on his part does not recognise the charm of the expressed content, but he feels that this charm of the expressed content will shine out only in the association of sentiment which is necessarily suggested. Says Ā. : Dhv. IV. 7, (pp. 282, ibid) and vṛtti, thereon:
"na cārthā'nantyaṁ vyaṁgyārthā'pekṣayā eva, yāvad vācyārthā'pekṣayā api iti pratipādayitum ucyate -

"avasthā-deśa-kālā"di-
viṣeṣaṁr api jāyate,
ānantyaṁ eva vācyasya
śuddhasya'pi svabhāvataḥ." (Dhv. IV. 7)

..... darśitam eva ca itad viṣama-bāṇalilāyāṁ -
na ca teṣāṁ ghaṭate'vadhiḥ,
na ca te dṛṣyante katham api punar uktāḥ
ye vibhramāḥ priyānām
arthaḥ vā sukavi-vāṇīnām."

"This infinitude of poetic themes is brought about not only by way of suggested content but also by way of expressed content. This is set forth in the following:

Infinitude is achieved by the expressed content also even when it remains in its pure and natural state by reason of the considerations of circumstance, place, time, etc. (Dhv. IV. 7) (pp. 283, ibid, Trans. K.Kris.)

...This has indeed been strikingly declared in my work, viṣama-bāṇa-lilā:
There is no limit to them
And they will never look like repetitions;
The graces of sweet-hearts
'And the meanings of the words of good poets.”

(Trans. K.Kris., pp. 285, ibid)

But Ā. further adds : (Dhv. IV. 7, pp. 292, ibid)

"avasthā"di-vibhinnanāṁ
vācyānāṁ vinibandhanam,
yat pradarśitam prāk, —
bhūmnaiva dṛṣyate lakṣye,
na tacchakyam apohitum-
tat tu bhāti rasā"śrayam.” (Dhv. IV. 8) .

(pp. 292, ibid)
Dhvani in Kuntaka, Bhoja and others, and Guṇībhūta-vyāngya and Citra-Kāvyā. 1081

“We find in plenty examples of utilising the expressed content with variations of circumstances etc. But it will shine out only in the association of sentiment.” (Dhv. IV. 8).

The phrases ‘as has been shown already’ and, ‘it cannot be denied that’ should be understood in the text in the latter and former half respectively of the first sentence.” (Trans. K.Kris., pp. 293, ibid)

It is very clear that what very large-hearted Ā. grants by way of concession, has been seized upon by K., making an issue out of it. He is out to destroy the vyañjanā-bias of Ā. We may call K., a part-dissident. For he does not totally negate vyañjanā; and that he cannot do, but he is not prepared to accept its supremacy either. He does not leave the party of the dhvanivādins, but he creates a separate block in the party itself: a party within party, so to say.

K. holds that such use of alaṃkāras as would mar the beauty of ‘artha-vastu-vakrata’ - is unwelcome. This is done in the fashion of Ā. But Ā. recommends the use of alaṃkāras only as conducive to rasa-experience. The ‘aucitya’ is with reference to ‘rasa’ in case of Ā. Here K. does not expressly accept this position, though he also speaks of rasa-experience through proper delineation of vibhāvā"dis alone. K. observes : (vr̥tti, VJ. III. i., pp. 127, ibid) : višeṣatas tu - rasa-paripoṣa-peṣalāyāḥ pratīter vibhāvānubhāva-vyabhicārya-aucitya-vyatirekeṇa prakārāntareṇa pratipattiḥ, prastuta-śobhā-pariḥāra-kāritām āvahati.”

“In particular we have to note this : An experience becomes aesthetic only by reason of beauty due to promotion of sentiments through the only means available, viz. a proper mingling of the constituents, ensuants and accessories. Any other extraneous element therein would become detrimental to natural beauty.” (Trans. K.Kris., pp. 413, ibid)

We may observe that K. partially submits to Ā.’s dictates. He also cites illustrations read in the Dhv.

K. talks of ‘vākya-vakrata’ at VJ. III. 3, 4 (pp. 133, ibid). This artistic beauty of a sentence touches the field of alaṃkāras also. K. observes : (verse, 20, in vr̥tti on VJ. III. 3-4, pp. 136, ibid) - tad idam uktam.

“vākyasya vakrabhāvo’nyo
bhidyate yaḥ sahasradhā, yatrā’laṃkāravargo’sau
sarvo’py antar bhavisyati.”
“An art in a whole sentence admits of a thousand varieties. In it is included the whole lot of figures of speech.” (Trans. K. Kris., pp. 422, ibid). We know that Á. would include the figures under what he calls the “guṇībhūta-vyaṅgya”. Not so with K., who seems to include even instances of rasa also under “vākyā-vakratā.” This is defiance, pure and simple.

K. proceeds to give ‘svabhāvōdāharaṇa’ and ‘rasōdāharaṇa’ in verses, nos. 21, 22 (pp. 136, ibid), under vākyā-vakratā. Verse No. 21, viz. “taśāṁ gopa-vadhu…” etc. is read in the Dhv. (pp. 48) also. K. does all this without any direct mention of vyaṅjanā. On rasōdāharaṇa (verse, no. 22), viz. “loko yādṛśaṁ āha…” etc. (pp. 136, ibid), K. observes (vṛtti, VJ. III. 4, verse 22, pp. 136-7, ibid):


“Here the abiding emotion is heroism. The poet is concerned with endowing beauty to the appropriate person who happens to be the abode of that emotion. He is portrayed therefore as a great conqueror. Now the artistic mode of the sentence used raises the emotion to its highest point, so that it comes to be felt as the sentiment of valour. This reveals the poet’s art in respect of composing a forceful and artistic sentence. The several examples already given in the previous section wherein artistic beauty relates to construction of such sentences should also be reconsidered in this light by the connoisseurs as further instances. (Trans. K.Kris., pp. 423, ibid)

K. discusses ‘vākyā-vakratā’ with reference to “abhidhāna-’bhidheya”, and “abhidhā”, and then proceeds to classify the thing described: (vṛtti, prior to VJ. III. 5; pp. 137, ibid):

“evam abhidhānaḥ’bhidheyā’bhidhā-lakṣaṇasya kāvyopayoginas tritayasya svarūpam ulikhya varṇaniyasya vastuno viṣaya-vibhāgaṁ vidadhātī.”

“We have so far discussed the nature of the three entities associated with poetry, namely word, content and the process of communication. Now the author proceeds to classify the things described.” (Trans. K.Kris., pp. 423, ibid)

K. does this under VJ. III. 5, 6, 7 (pp. 137-138, ibid). He classifies ‘vastu’ or things into ‘cetana’ i.e. sentient and ‘jaḍa’ i.e. insentient, and again either into
Dhvani in Kuntaka, Bhoja and others, and Guṇībhūta-vyaṅgya and Citra-Kāvyā. 1083

‘mukhya’ or ‘principal’ and ‘a-mukhya’ i.e. subordinate. He says (vṛtti, VJ. III. 7, pp. 138, ibid) that, “the description of principal sentient, gods, demons, etc., should be natural. It is made beautiful by a spontaneous presentation of emotions like love.” The word spontaneous is used to indicate that the emotions like love should be free from banality and very striking by their fresh flavour. When so treated, the emotions are raised to the level of sentiments like the erotic, for the well-known rule states that the dominant emotion itself gets transformed into sentiment. Now this becomes very appealing to heart.” (Trans. K.Kris., pp. 424, ibid). The vṛtti, VJ. IV. 7, pp. 138, reads as -

“mukhyam yat pradhānāṃ cetana-sūrā’sūrā”di-sambandhi svarūpaṃ tad evamvidham sat kavināṃ varṇanāspadāṃ bhavati sva-vyāpāra-gocaratām pratipadyate. kidṛṣaṃ? aksiṇa-ratyādi-paripoṣa-manoharam. aksiṇa-kadarthanā-virahitah prayagratā-manoharo yo ratyādiḥ sthāyībhāvas tasya paripoṣaḥ srṅgāra-prabhoṣṭi-rasaṭvā”pādanam, ‘sthāyīyeva tu raso bhaved” iti nyāyād. tena manoharam hṛdayahārī.”

The second is rendered lovely by a description of the animals etc., in a way natural to their species. This rasa is arrived at through vyaṅjanā alone. This is a commitment of a confirmed dhvanivādin. But K. does not make such a categorical commitment. To that extent K. is far from being a pure dhvanivādin. He gives instances of rasa such as ‘vipra-laṃbha-śṛṅgāra’ (V. 25, pp. 138, ibid), and ‘karuna rasa’ (VS. 27, pp. 139, ibid). He holds that (vṛtti, VJ. III. 7, verse, 27, pp. 139, ibid) - “atra rasa-paripoṣa-nibandhana-vibhāva”di-sampat-samudāyah kavinā sutarāṃ samujjṛmbhitāh.” Here the poet has fully displayed all the stimulants for the rise of the sentiment of pathos. But he never says that these stimulants evoke rasa through the process of vyaṅjanā.

K. is fully aware of the fact of rasa-realisation through vibhāvā”dis. But he keeps quiet about the method of operation of these vibhāvā”dis. He observes : (vṛtti, VJ. III. 7, verse no. 29, pp. 140, ibid) : “evamvidhōddipana-vibhāvaikajīvitavena karuna-rasāḥ kāśṭhādhirūḍha-ramanīyatāṃ āniyate. evam vipratāmbha-śṛṅgāra-karuṇayōnuḥ saukumāryād udāharaṇa-pradarśanaṃ vihitam. rasāntarāṇāṃ api svayam eva utprekṣanīyam.”

In short, he does not clearly mention the relation of vyaṅgya-vaśajaka between the vibhāvā”dis and rasa. Thus far, K. has described how ‘pradhāna-cetana’ or the principal sentient object becomes the subject of poetical description. Now onwards K. discusses how the subordinate sentients such as birds, beasts, etc., are described by the poet (pp. 180, ibid). K. observes (vṛtti, VJ. III. 7, pp. 140, 141, ibid) : “evam
dviṭṭyam a-pradhāna-cetana-simha"di-sambandhi yat-svarūpaṃ tad itthaaṃ kavinam varṇana”spadam sampadyate. kīḍrāṃ? - svajāty ucitahevāka-samullekhojjvalam. svā pratyekam ātmiyā sāmānya-lakṣaṇa-vastu-svarūpaḥ ya jātis tasyāḥ samucito yo hevākah svabhāvānusāri parispandas tasya samullekhāḥ samyag ullekhanaṁ vāstavena rūpēṇa upanibandhās tenōjjvalāṃ bhrājisnu, tad-vid-āhālādakāri iti yāvat.” - “In the same way the second category also mentioned above, viz. relating to the behaviour of secondary sentiments such as lion and so on, comes in for a poetic treatment under certain conditions. One condition is that only such nature as is appropriate to each species should be imagined brilliantly by the poet. Each species has its own individual character though coming under the genus which is a class. The behaviour described should be actually part of the nature, of the specific animal in question. Description of such a natural quality in a realistic way itself conduces to brilliance, i.e. contributes to the delight of the connoisseurs.” (Trans. K.Kris., pp. 426-427, ibid). He cites two instances, one of which is, “grīvā- bhangābhīramam.” etc., from the Abhijñāna-sākuntalam, giving harīṇa-svabhāvōkṭi. We use the term ‘svabhāvōkṭi’ here on purpose.

K. elsewhere (VJ. I. 11, 12) had discarded ‘svabhāvōkṭi’ which in his opinion is ‘alaṃkārya’ and not, ‘alaṃkāra’. But we may ask, what else is “a-pradhāna-cetana-simha”di-sambandhi-svarūpa-varṇana’ discussed by K. under VJ. III. 7? For other alaṃkārikas it is just ‘svabhāvōkṭi’ alaṃkāra pure and simple. Whatever K. puts by way of arguments disproving the case of ‘svabhāvōkṭi’, as an alaṃkāra, is just quibbling. K. should know that the ‘svabhāva’ is ‘alaṃkārya’ and its ‘uktī’ i.e. ‘svabhāvōkṭi’, as imagined by other alaṃkārikas, is very much an alaṃkāra. K. very often starts from the wrong end and is himself misled and causes others also to be mislead. Similar is the case when he argues against the concept of rasā”di alaṃkāras, so clearly established by Ānandavardhana.

K., at VJ. III. 8 (pp. 141, ibid) observes:

"rasōḍḍipana-sāmarthya-vinibandhana-bandhuran,
cetanānām a-mukhyānām
jadānāṃ cāpi bhūyasā."

"The secondarily sentient ones and non-sentient ones become sources of delight when they are so described that they promote rise of sentiments.’ (Trans. K.Kris., pp., 427, ibid) This exactly echoes the views of Ā., expressed in Dhv. IV. 8, wherein
he observes (Dhv. IV. 8, pp. 292, ibid) -

“avāsthā”di-vibhiṁnāṁ
vācyānāṁ vinibandhanam,
bhūmnaiva drṣyate lakṣye
tat tu bhāti rasā”śrayāt.”

“We find in plenty examples of utilizing the expressed content with variations of circumstances etc. But it will shine out only in association of sentiment. (Trans. K. Kris., pp. 293, ibid). It should be noted that such descriptions as referred to at VJ. III. 8, by K. are expected to promote rasa, but it is not made clear whether they promote rasa through vyañjanā or otherwise K. simply observes : (vṛtti, VJ. III. 8, pp. 141, ibid) - “rasāḥ śṛṅgārā”days teśām uddipanam ullāsanam paripoṣas tasmin sāmarthyam śaktis tayā vinibandhanam niveśas tena bandhuram hṛdayahāri.” -

“Sentiments are the erotic and so forth. Their rise is nothing but their elaboration. Their capacity in this regard is dependent on the creative art of the poet and it leads in its turn to the delight of the connoisseurs.” (Trans. K.Kris., pp. 427, ibid). He also observes : (vṛtti, VJ. III. 8, pp. 142, ibid) “jadānām a-chetanānāṁ salīla-taru-kusuma-samaya-prabhṛtiṇāṁ evam-vidham svarūpam rassāddipana-sāmarthya-vinibandha-bandhuram varṇanīyatām avagāhate.” The treatment of non-sentients should also conform mostly to the kindling of sentiments.” (Trans. K.Kris., pp. 428, ibid) K. holds that this body of content or subject-matter of description should be deemed worthy of adoption by the poets. This is described through ‘abhidhā-vyāpāra’ (vṛtti, VJ. III. 9, pp. 142, ibid) : kavīnām etad eva yasmād varṇanāsādham abhidhā-śāmabāragocaram.” He further reads : “evamvidhasya asya svarūpa-śobhātīśaya-bhrājīṣṇor vibhūṣaṇāni upa-śobhāntaram ārabhante.” This abhidhā is K.’s ‘vicitrā-abhidhā’, K. observes that, when the content is thus endowed with natural beauty, it becomes worthy of embellishments, which, when they are added, give rise to a fresh type of ‘beauty’ (upa-śobhā) of their own.

He further observes : (vṛtti, VJ. III. 10, pp. 143, ibid) : “tad evamvidhaṃ svabhāva-prādhānayena, rasa-prādhānayena ca dviprakāraṃ sahaja-saukumārya-rasam svarūpam varṇanā-vasaya-vastunah śaṅram eva alaṃkāryatām eva arhati, na punar alaṃkāraṇatvam - “Thus what is beautified and can be regarded as the body of all descriptive art can be only two-fold, containing either the prominence of naturalness or regarded as an ornament.” (Trans. K.Kris., pp. 429, ibid)

With this he picks up the discussion concerning the nature of what Ā. and others have designated as ‘rasā”di alaṃkāras’. He rejects the case of alaṃkāras such
as rasavat and the like, at the outset. K. observes: (vṛtti, VJ. III. 10, pp. 143, ibid) : tatra svābhāvikam padārtha-svarūpam ālāmkaraṇam yathā na bhavati tathā prathamam eva pratipāditam. idānim rasā”tmanāḥ pradhāna-cetana-parispanda-varṇyamānavṛtter ālāmkārakārāntarāḥbhimatām ālāmkāratāṁ nirākaroti.” - “Of the two, how the first i.e. naturalness of subject cannot be regarded as ornament has already been established earlier. Now how the second also, i.e. the subject involving sentiments of primarily sentient beings in their actions, cannot be ever regarded as an ornament is taken up for consideration. The position of the other writers who declare that it is also an ornament is refuted.” (Trans. K.Kris., pp. 429-430, ibid)

K. holds that ‘rasavat’ is not an ornament ‘because there is nothing palpable apart from it which is adorned by it, and because the literal meaning of that word itself is contradicted.’ (Trans. K.Kris. pp. 430, ibid) : (VJ. III. 11, pp. 144) :

“ālāmkāro na rasavat
parasyā’pratibhāsanāt
svarūpād atiriktya,
śabdārtha’saṅgater api.”

K. holds that ‘rasā”di’ can never be an ornament for it is never observed as a separate entity apart from all the subject matter described. He observes: (vṛtti, VJ. III. 11, pp. 144, ibid) : “tad idam atra tātparyam, yat sarveṣām eva satkavi-vākyaṁ idam ālāmkāryam ity apoddhāra vihito viviktabhāvaḥ sarvasya yasya kasyacit pramātuś cetasi parispurati. rasavad ālāmkāravad ity asmin vākya punar avahita-cetasāpi na kīcidd etad eva budhyāmahe.” - “The upshot is this: Whatever the instance of poetry chosen, one and all the connoisseurs have a clear distinction in their minds regarding the two divisions, the “adorned” and the “ornament”. But in the expression, “a poem with rasavat ālāmkāra”, we cannot understand this fundamental distinction itself, despite our best attention and endeavour.” (Trans. K.Kris., pp. 430, ibid)

K. continues: (vṛtti, VJ. III. 11, pp. 144, ibid) : tathā ca-yadi śrṅgāra”dir eva prādhānyena varṇyamānolāmkāryah, tatas tad anyena kenacid ālāmkaraṇena bhavitavyam. yadi va tat-svarūpam eva tad-vidāhāda-nibandhanatvad ālāmkaraṇam ity ucyate, tathā’pi tad vyatiriktm anyad ālāmkāryatayā prakāśaniyam. tad evamvidho na kaścid api vivekaś cirantarālāmkāra-kārābhimate rasavad ālāmkāra-lakṣaṇādāharana-mārge manāg api vibhāvyate.”
Further more, if the adorned is regarded as the primarily described sentiment itself, like the erotic, then reason demands that something else should be present there as adornment. If perchance its (= of the adorned) own nature is described as adornment because it causes delight to critics, in such a contingency too, the onus of indicating another adorned apart from it lies on the rhetoritian. Such a clear-cut discrimination is not to be had at all even slightly, either in the way the ancient rhetoritians have defined rasavat alamkāra, or in the way they have illustrated them.” (Trans. K.Kris., pp. 430, ibid) :

K. discusses the whole topic to his satisfaction. Actually the whole discussion looks like unnecessary quibbling, especially when he takes up Ā.’s case, whom he refers as an “abhiyukta”. (pp. 189, ibid). K. tries to refute Ā., but theoretically what he achieves, is just a semblance of refutation, to his satisfaction, only of an illustration cited by Ā.

K. believes that in both the illustrations cited by Ā., viz. “kṣipto hastāvalagnah...” etc. (VS. no 43 on pp. 150, ibid), and “kim häsyena...” etc. (VS. no. 44, pp. 151, ibid), we have karuṇa as the principal rasa and there is no chance of its being subordinate and acting as an ornament as imagined by Ā.

Be it as it is. One point clearly emerges and it is that here K. does not refute the theoretical position as advanced by Ā. Moreover, it is here that we become all the more aware of the fact that between the two, it is Ā. who seems to be more open, catholic and pragmatic. Ā. is clear-headed enough to accept that the whole analogy of rasa or dhvani being the soul, and gunas or excellences being “qualities” and simile and the like being alamkāras or ornaments, and ‘śabdārthau’ or “word and sense” or “form and content” being a ‘śāriṣu’ i.e. ‘body’ of poetry is just a working hypothesis, an instrument so to say, a way of understanding poetic charm, or poetry, which, by itself, is an “amūrta” or an ‘abstract’ phenomenon, to be grasped only ‘as a whole’, i.e. “akhaṇḍa-buddhi-samāsvādyā” or dhvani or rasa or any other entity for that matter is a means to the end, viz. ‘grasping of - experiencing - poetic beauty’. “Dhvani” is dubbed as “soul” only metaphorically. Actually the whole metaphorical use of terminologies is not an end in itself. And therefore, Ā. was catholic enough to accept a position, when even rasa could play the role of an alamkāra. He shows that theoretically this is possible. K. on the other hand, takes up an orthodox stand, we may say, a comparatively narrow approach, much closer to the one taken up by Mahimā, that rasa, which is only ‘vyāṅgya’ or ‘suggested’, could only be principal and never subordinated.
Actually Ā. had very critically and carefully stream-lined the whole issue and K.'s gesture of opposing the case of rasavat etc., as imagined by Ā., falls flat and sounds unconvincing. However, one good point emerges and it is that K. too accepts that 'rasa' could be always and only, 'suggested', i.e. 'vyañγya'. Thereby he accepts the ruling of Ā. and recognises the force of vyañjanā. K.'s treatment of this topic requires a fuller discussion, which for want of space, we avoid in the present context. For the present, we will once again underline the orthodox and narrow approach of K., who observes with regard to the two illustrations, that, - (vṛtti, VI. III. 11, pp. 152, 153 ibid) : "yadi vā preyasāḥ prādhānaye tad angatvāt karuṇa-rasasya alam-karanatvatvam ity abhidihiyate, tad api na niravadyam, yasmād dvayor apy etayor udāharaṇayor mukhya-bhūto vākṣārthhaḥ karuṇā"tmanāiva vivartamāna-vṛttir upanibaddhaḥ. paryāyoktānyāpadeśa-nyāyena väcyatā'vyatiriktyoḥ pratiya- mānatāya, na karuṇasya rasatvād vyañγyasya sato vācyatvam upapannam. nā'pi guṇībhūta-vyañγyasya visayah, vya(ncyasya prādhāṇyena ka)ruṇā"tmanā eva pratibhāsamanāt. na ca dvayor api vyañγya-tvam, anāṅgi-bhāvasya anupapatteḥ. etac ca yathāsambhavam asmābhir vikalpitam. na punas ta (nnyāyam atra prayejakam ity alam vi) stareṇa." “or else, it might be alleged that eulogy of the hero alone is primary; and since pathos is calculated to serve that end as a means, it is designated as an ornament. That statement again, is not without fault. For, in both the above examples, the import primarily intended is pathos alone in its variagated manifestations. As in the case of the figures of speech 'paryāyokta' (euphemism), and 'anyāpadeśa' (indirect statement) those meanings which are other than referential, i.e. suggested, will be such that they too could be plainly stated if one wished to do so; and pathos, being a rasa, can in no wise be reduced to a referential meaning, once we accept that it exists. Nor can it be taken as an example of subordinated suggestion (guṇībhūta-vyañγya), because the rasa of pathos is felt as primarily suggested. The two rasas cannot both be regarded as suggested because then they cannot have relation of primary and secondary between themselves (since both would have to be equally primary). All these alternative explanations of 'rasavat-alamkāra' in the given examples have been imagined by us and refuted; the analogy of the said figures (viz. paryāyokta and aprastuta-praśaṃsā) does not hold good here. With these words we close the discussion." (Trans. K.Kris., pp. 440, ibid)

As already observed above, K. seems to take a position that whatever is 'vyañγya' can never be subordinate, and rasa, which is always vyañγya, is necessarily 'pradhāna' or 'principal'. This is as good or bad as the view taken by Mahimā also.
The entire approach, when compared with Å’s much too catholic approach, is basically narrow. Similarly K.’s concept of ‘parāyokta’ is also narrow in the sense that for him ‘parāyokta’ occurs only when a different statement is used for something which can be conveyed normally in a different way. So, for K., here it is a different statement at ‘vācyā’ level conveyed by yet another statement at ‘vācyā’ level only. It is not ‘vyaṅgya’ that is conveyed differently as imagined by Å. Mammaṭa, Jagannāṭha and others. The hollowness of K.’s arguments is brought about in the last remark, regarding ‘rasavat’ when he observes: (vṛtti, VJ. III. 11, pp. 153, ibid) : “kim ca ‘kāye tasmin alaṃkāro rasā”dir iti rasa eva alaṃkāraḥ kevalah, na tu rasavat iti matup pratayasya jīvitam na kiṃcid abhīhitam syāt. evam sati śabdārtha-saṅgater abhāvād anavasthaiva tiṣṭhati ity etad api na kiṃcit.” - “Furthermore, the declaration that rasa etc., itself constitutes an adornment in such poems virtually designates ‘rasa’ itself by the term ‘alāṃkāra’ and not ‘rasavat’ or that which possesses rasa. And once again, the incongruity between the term ‘rasavat’ and the meaning connoted by it stares us in the face as before and leaves us in endless confusion.” (Trans. K. Kris., pp. 441, ibid) - Yes, we may say, confusion for K. alone!

K. finally seems to explain and accept the concept of ‘rasavat alaṃkāra’ in his own unique way which seems to be quite useless and elementary when compared with the consideration of various alaṃkāras by such masters as Ruuyaka, Śobhākaramitra, Appayya and Jagannāṭha. After citing such illustrations as, “lagna-dvirephānjana…” etc., (verse, No. 77, 16, verse 71, pp. 169, ibid) : “atra samāropita-nāyikā-vṛttāntasya śleṣa-cchāya-sahāyasya rūpa(kasya) (tadvadā) caraṇāt rasavad alaṃkāravam.”

“Here also the metaphor (rūpaka) involving the attribution of the behaviour of a lady in love to spring with the assistance of paronomasia should be regarded as ‘rasavat alaṃkāra’ because it closely imitates the behaviour of sentiments with love.” (Trans. K.Kris., pp. 459, ibid) All this causes instantaneous and hearty laughter.

While dealing with rūpaka, K. talks of ‘pratīyamāna-rūpaka’ at VJ. III. 24, pp. 179-180, ibid. This is a virtual acceptance of vyaṅjanā (and, perhaps alaṃkāra-dhvani). Similarly, he talks of ‘vyājastuti’ at VJ. III. 28, pp. 185, ibid, having “stutih vyāṅgyatayā”, and “pratīyamānāḥ vyatirekah” at VJ. III. 48, pp. 220, ibid. All this amounts to his virtual acceptance of vyāṅjanā, without of course, clearly naming it as such. In verse No. 183, pp. 221, 222, ibid, viz. “prāptaśrīr eṣa kasmāt.” etc. K. feels that here ‘vyatirekha’ is suggested and not ‘rūpaka’, as observed by Å. All this is quibbling which virtually ends in direct acceptance of the all powerful vyaṅjanā.
K. quotes (pp. 222, ibid) the definition of "dhvani" viz. "yatatrthaḥ śabdo vā..." etc. (Dhv. I. 13) to no purpose.

In the fourth unmesa of the VJ., K. deals with 'prakaraṇa-vakratā' - i.e. 'beauty of incident or episode in a poem.' This is six-fold. At VJ. IV. 1, 2 (pp. 245, ibid), he deals with the first variety which is having the charm of abhidhā. So also is the case with the second variety as explained at VJ. IV. 3 and 4 (pp. 248, ibid). Third variety as explained at VJ. IV. 5 and 6, on pp. 252, ibid, has its charm caused due to vyañjanā also. VJ. IV. 7 and 8, pp. 255 ibid, have the fourth type consisting of newer and newer description, which has a mixed charm of abhidhā and vyañjanā, while the fifth variety at VJ. IV. 9, pp. 262, ibid, has mostly the charm of abhidhā. VJ. IV. 10 (pp. 266, ibid) talks of a new variety which has the charm of pure vyañjanā. VJ./IV. 11-14, have further varieties (i.e. no. 7, 8, 9) of mixed charm. All told, the different varieties of 'prakaraṇa-vakratā' exhibit the charm of vyañjanā to a greater or lesser extent. This becomes clear as we rush through kārikās nos. VJ. IV. 10-26.

With this, we come to the end of our prolonged consideration of the problem as to whether we should call K. a dhvanivādin or not. The answer, as suggested in the beginning, is both in the affirmative and negative. Thus we are back to square one. He is a dhvanivādin without naming dhvani as dhvani. He accepts vyañjanā without naming it as such. But it should be clearly stated that he never rejects vyañjanā as is done by Mahimā and the like. He is neither a tātparyavādin, nor an anumitivādin, nor a pure abhidhāvādin. He tries to place poetic criticism on a wider and more pragmatic canvass, but ends, as shown earlier, in a miserable condition resulting in contradictions at times, as seen in case of rasavat alamkāra. He does not have a heart to accept the whole scheme of śabda-vṛttis as suggested by Ā., though he seems to hold the latter in very high esteem. K.'s was a half-hearted approach which caves in, when pitched against the giants who followed, upheld and established the sovereignty of Ānandavardhana. He is a lone traveller, who gets lost in the desert of his own creation. He is neither much remembered, not much taken seriously and therefore not much respected by posterity, and is pitied and forgiven for his misadventure, simply because he is a dhvanivādin at heart, at least a 'sa-gotra'. He was, in a way, a dissident in the camp of the dhvanivādins, a martyr for no great cause. He is almost buried and forgotten and only remembered at times as a weak follower of the great Ā. In trying to look a more pragmatic and liberal critic with his 'vicitṛa-abhidhā', which is neither pure abhidhā, nor laksana, nor tātparya, nor vyañjanā alone, he chooses to be less scientific.
Dhvani in Kuntaka, Bhoja and others, and Guṇībhūta-vyaṅgya and Citra-Kāvya. 1091

Bhoja, as Dr. Raghavan observes takes a position of compromise between tārparyavādins and Ānandavardhana, i.e. dhvanivādins (pp. 152, śr. Pra. ibid). We will continue to voice our humble differences with Dr. Raghavan, but by and large, he is the greatest and the safest interpreter of Bhoja and contemplating on his efforts in that direction, we have to say, “Hats off to Dr. Raghavan.”

Before we go in for a detailed analysis concerning Bhoja, we will make some preliminary remarks. It is quite well-known among scholars that Bhoja enumerates (1) “guṇā’lāmkāra-yoga, i.e. presence of or union with guṇas or excellences and alāmkāras or figures of sound and sense, (2) ‘doṣa-hāna’ i.e. absence or removal of poetic blemishes and (3) rasa-avīyoga i.e. non-separation, i.e. permanent union, (= no-divorce) - with ‘rasa’ i.e. aesthetic pleasure at the root of poetic beauty. The important point to be noted is how he accepts ‘dhvani’ and where he places the same. To begin with we may observe that this great ācārya of what we have termed Mālava-paramparā as against the Kashmir-paramparā, chooses to take ‘dhvani’ as ‘alāmkāra’ in a wider sense. He seems to respect the tradition of the ancient ācāryas prior to Ā. and advocates the cause of “kāvya-saundarya” or “kāvyā’lāmkāra” in a wider sense. In keeping with the ancient masters such as Bhāmaha, Dāndin and the rest, he does not discuss ‘vyāñjanā’ as an independent word-power. At the same time his two great works viz. the Sarsvatī-kaṇṭhā”bharaṇa and the Śrīgāra Prakāśa are studded with a number of quotations from the great Ā.

The S.K. Ā. (sarasvatī-kaṇṭhā”bharaṇa), Ch. V. Bhoja talks of ‘rasālāmkāra-saṃkara’ (pp. 724, Edn. NS. Bombay, A.D. 193-4) and quotes Ā. as follows :

“rasavanti hi vastūni
sālāmkārāṇi kānicīt,
ekenaiva prayaṭṭena
nirvartyante mahākaveḥ.”

This is a parikara-śloka read on pp. 60 (Edn. K.Kris., ibid) in udyota II. Then, we read a kārikā (Dhv. II. 16) in Bhoja :

“rāksīptatayā yasya
bandhaḥ śakya-kriyo bhavet
a-pṛthag-yaṭna-nirvartyah
so’lāmkāraḥ prakṛṣyate.”

The last line is read as “so’lāmkāro dhvanau mataḥ” in editions of the Dhv., now available.
Third Kārikā is also a parikara-śloka read under Dhv. III. 42. Bhoja reads it as:

“rasa-bhāvā”di-viṣaya-
vivakṣā-virahe sati,
alāṃkāra-nibandho yah,
sa kavibhyo na rocate.”

Again the fourth line read in Dhv. editions is: “sa citra-viṣayo bhavet.”

Dr. Raghavan explains Bhoja’s position concerning guṇas and rasas. In certain cases of guṇas which are inherently fused with rasas there is no place of saṃkara or mixture of guṇa and rasa. Bhoja observes: (pp. 720, S.K.A. ibid): yatra citra-varṇavan-narasimhatvam-pāṃśūdakavac ca avayavāvayavi-nyāyena jāti-vyakti-
nyāyena ca a-prthak-prayatna-nirvartyānāṃ guṇa-rasānāṃ vākye saṃnivesāḥ
tatra saṃkara-vyavahāro na pravartate, - tad yathā,

madhurāṃ rasavad vāci
vastūny api rasa-sthitiḥ,
yena mādyanti dhīmanto
madhuneva madhuvratāḥ.”

(This is from Daṇḍin; I. 51;)

Now follows a quotation from the Dhv. wherein Bhoja quotes four Kārikās such as Dhv. II. 7, 8, 9, & 10. It is here that we read four kārikās from Ā. and not where Dr. Raghavan had suggested earlier. The Kārikās are read in Bhoja (S.K.A. pp. 720, 721, ibid) as -

“śrṅgāra eva madhurahī
paraḥ prahlādano rasah,
tanmayāṃ kāvyam āsrītya
mādhurye prati-tiṣṭhati.” (Dhv. II. 7)

“śrṅgāre vipralaṃbhā”khye
karūṇe ca prakarṣavat,
mādhuryam ārdratāṃ yāti
yatas tatra’dhiṃkamaḥ manah.” (Dhv. II. 8)

“raudrādayo rasā dīptyā
lakṣyante kāvyavartinaḥ,”
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tadvyaktihetū śabdārthāv-
ojo’dhīṣṭhāya tiṣṭhate.” (Dhv. II. 9)

But the fourth line is read differently in available edn.’s of the Dhv. It reads as-
“āśrityaujo vyavasthitam.”

Then we have Dhv. II. 10 read slightly differently in Bhoja as -
“samarthakatvam vākyasya
yat tu sarva-rasān prati,
sa prasādo guṇo jīneyah
sarva-sādhāraṇa-kriyāḥ.” (Dhv. II. 10)

The first line read in Dhv. editions reads as :
“samarpakatvam kāvyasya.” Perhaps Bhoja had some mss. not available to us.

It is here that Dr. Raghavan observes that on the subject of rasa and alamkāra Bhoja utilises three verses from udyota, II, two of them being parikara ślokas and one kārikā. We have quoted the same earlier.

Dr. Raghavan explains that these two sets of citations from Ā. occur also in the same places in the Śr. Pra. Ch. XI, Vol. II. He observes : (pp. 453, Edn. Josyer, ibid) :
“...atra’pi brūmah avayavāvayavi-nyāyena cāprthak-prayatna-nirvartyānāṁ guṇar- 
rasānāṁ vākye sannivesaḥ, tatra samkara-vyavahāro na pravartate, tad yathā 
“madhuraṁ rasavad...” śṛṅgāra eva madhuraḥ...” etc.

Here also we have the reading “ojo’dhīṣṭhāya tiṣṭhate.” But in place of
‘samarthakatvam’, we read ‘samarpakatvam’, but for ‘kāvyasya’, Bhoja has
‘vākyasya’.

Again on pp. 457 (Edn. Josyer, ibid); while treating rasālamkāra-saṅkaraḥ, we get the three quotations as read in the S.K. Ā., as quoted above. In the Śr. Pra. We also get one more quotation from Ā. such as, “śṛṅgāri cet kaviḥ kāvye...” etc. In the S.K. Ā. (pp. 555, ibid) Bhoja places this quotation at the beginning of Ch. V. as kārikā no. 3, with a slight change in the reading of the second half which reads as :
“sa eva ced a-śṛṅgāri, nīrasaṁ sarvam eva tāt.”

But Bhoja cites further from Ā. when he treats ‘dhvani’. Dr. Raghavan, after taking stock of what Dr. S.K. De writes in his Sanskrit Poetics, observes (pp. 153, ibid) : “These remarks (= Dr. De’s observations as quoted by Dr. Raghavan) are of course based upon what one can know from Bhoja’s S.K. Ā. One cannot write like this after seeing Śr. Pra. Even in the S.K. A. the concept of Dhvani is not entirely
absent. Bhoja accepts Dhvani in the S.K. Ā. as well as in the Śr. Pra. But he follows Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin and Vāmana in bringing everything under alamkāra or guna; under alamkāra ultimately, for guna also is Alamkāra.”

In the light of Dr. Raghavan’s remarks we will try to judge the exact position of Bhoja concerning dhvani. But let us make our impression very clear in the beginning itself that like Kuntaka, Bhoja has not clearly accepted ‘Vyañjanā-dhvani-rasa’ scheme and to that extent he can not be held as a “dhvanivādin”. Bhoja, as observed by Dr. De, has, “The prominence of rasa” and shows, “the absence of the dhvani-theory”. Absence of dhvani theory means absence of clear acceptance of the scheme of vyañjanā-dhvani-rasa. Both Kuntaka and Bhoja can not be held as ‘anti-vyañjanā’ theorists, but neither of them comes out openly and with warmth and admiration for the scheme of “vyañjanā-dhvani-rasa”, which for us is the trade mark of a genuine dhvanivādin. So, our position is that though Bhoja knows both vyañjanā and dhvani, and though he never, refutes any concept openly, he is not a true dhvanivādin, he being the protagonist of what we term as the “Mālava school of thought” as against the Kashmir school of thought of Ānandavardhana, Abhinavagupta, Mammatā and their followers.

Let us see how Bhoja deals with the problem of dhvani. The first thing that strikes us in this respect is that Bhoja tries to strike a balance between “tātparya” and “dhvani”. The famous quotation from Bhoja reads as “tātparyam eva vacasi dhvanir eva kāvye”. (Śr. Pra. Vol. I., pp. 1, ibid). Here, it may be pointed out that Bhoja, as observed by us earlier when we discussed the concept of Tātparya-vṛtti (Ch. VI) above, seems to take “tātparya” in a special sense. When he deals with ‘kevala-śabda-sambandha-śakti’, he takes a broader meaning of the term ‘tātparya’ and covers up what he calls “abhidhiyamāna-tātparya”. He does not mention the traditional Mīmāṃsaka’s Tātparya-vṛtti which works for, yielding the sentence-sense. But perhaps by “abhidhiyamāna-tātparya” he aims at that exactly. Again it seems that he has imagined the presence of this “abhidhiyamāna-tātparya” not only in ordinary worldly utterances used in normal walk of life, but also in the kāvyā-vākyas i.e. poetic utterances which operate at pure abhidhā level also. This is like Kuntaka’s ‘Vicitrā abhidhā’ covering pure normal abhidhā-expressions but of course gifted with poetic beauty. But Bhoja uses the term “tātparya” for “dhvani” also, as seen in the quotation cited above. So, when he says “tātparyam eva vacasi”, this “vacasi”
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should stand for expressions at worldly and śāstriya level. In that case it is, i.e. tātparya itself, is called “dhvani” in ‘kāvyā’ or poetic expression. The expression should mean, “yad vacasi arthāt loke śāstre ca, tātparyam, tad eva (ramaniyatve sati) kāvye dhvaniḥ, iti ucyate.” But as observed by Kuntaka a poetic expression - vicitrā abhidhā- may operate at pure denotative level, i.e. abhidhā, or at the level of indication or lakṣaṇa or even at the vyañjanā level, Bhoja also seems to accept “abhidhiyamāṇā tātparya” at the level of poetic expression. Thus a part of ‘vicitrā abhidhā’ gets admission in Bhoja’s” kāvye abhidhiyamāṇa tātparya. If tātparya is concerned with kāvyā-vākyārtha, then it is termed dhvani. But vākyā in a kāvyā can operate at pure abhidhā level or lakṣaṇa-level or even vyañjanā level. Thus for Bhoja ‘dhvani’ as tātparya of a kāvyā-vākyā seems to cover abhidhiyamāṇa as well as pratiyamāṇa tātparya, the first being inclusive also of lakṣya-lakṣya as well. Dr. Raghavan has not thought of this possibility and hence he seems to equate kāvyā-vākyā-tātparya with Ānandavardhana’s ‘dhvani’. But this is not the case. ‘Dhvani’ in Bhoja here seems to have a broader connotation covering the import of any poetic expression, operating at any level. Bhoja introduces knowingly a sort of looseness in the technical terms when he says that “tātparya” is the term with reference to worldly expressions and “dhvani” is said to be with reference to a poetic expression but the substance is the same. Just as ‘Cairtra’ and ‘Vaiśākha’ are termed as ‘madhu’ and ‘mādhaba’ in a different context, in the same way sentence-sense, i.e. the import of a sentence is termed tātparya at ordinary parlance and “dhvani” at the level of poetry. Thus ordinary tātparya at lokaśāstra-level is termed as tātparya and the same at poetic level is termed ‘dhvani’. But this ‘dhvani’ covers abhidhiyamāṇa tātparya at poetic level also. This is as noted above, like Kuntaka’s vicitrā abhidhā. This ‘dhvani’ is wider and of course covers Ānandavardhana’s dhvani operating at vyañjanā level. Here, it is pratiyamāṇa tātparya in a kāvyā-vākyā, according to Bhoja.

Bhoja thus has a wider connotation for both ‘tātparya’ and ‘dhvani’. In the wider context, the abhidhiyamāṇa-tātparya at poetic level covers ‘dhvani’ in a special sense. This refers to the ‘ramaṇiya’ meaning of kāvyā-vākyā at abhidhā level, and also tātparya of the guṇībhūta-vyāngya type and then also ‘dhvani’ at the principally suggested level.

Thus Bhoja is not averse to the fact of dhvani. We may not call him an anti-dhvani theorist but we may certainly brand him, like Kuntaka, as an “antar-bhāva-vādin” or one who tries to subsume dhvani under various heads.
Bhoja has in his own way accepted dhvani but as is the case with the ancient ācāryas such as Bhāmaha, Dāṅḍin and the rest, so also with him, he has tried to put dhvani under guṇa and alāmkāra and ultimately under alāmkāra only as even guṇa is, in a way, alāmkāra for Bhoja. He has accepted rasa, which is part of rasa-dhvani for Āhandavardhana, as ‘artha-guṇa’ called “kānti”, and also as ‘rasa-vat’ alāmkāra in Bhāmaha’s fashion. Or, he has accepted rasa as alāmkāra or what he terms “rasóṭi.” He has triferated kāvyā or literature as ‘svabhāvókti’, ‘vākrókti’ and ‘rasókti.’

To begin with, for Bhoja, ‘dhvani’ is a śabda-guṇa called “gāmbhīryam.” Says he: “dhvanimattā tu gāmbhīryam.” i.e. gāmbhīrya stands for a quality of ‘having dhvani’, or say, the presence of dhvani is termed ‘gāmbhīrya’ (S. K. A. I. pp. 64, ibid). The illustration is, “maulau dhārāya.” etc. It is observed here : “atra nābhyām pundarīka-dhāranam parimita-vikramatvam cakrānkitaka-raravam, damśrayā vasudhōoddhāranam, vakṣahsthala-nīvesita-lakṣmikarvam indrāvarajatvam ca dhvanayati iti gāmbhīrya." Rasa being a beautifying agent is, an alāmkāra called ‘rasavat,’ and so also ‘dhvani’ is a guṇa embellishing an expression. That which is a vákyārthópaskāraka is either a guṇa or an alāmkāra. Rasa was ‘rasavat’ alāmkāra for Bhāmaha and Dāṅḍin and for Vāmana it was a guṇa called ‘kānti.’ In the same way dhvani is also a guṇa for Bhoja. Beyond ‘gāmbhīrya’, ‘gati’ is also a guṇa which contains ‘dhvani.’ Gati (pp. 84 S. K. Ā, ibid) is - “gatiḥ sā syād avagamo yō ‘ṛthād arthāntarasya tu.’”-The collection of another meaning through a (contextual) meaning is gati.”-The illustration is-“subhage ko’yaṁ vṛddho...” etc. “atra praśnād artham avagamyam uttarād arthāntarāvagamaḥ.” On this Ratnāśvara Mīśra observes : “tena yatra sahṛdaya-hṛdayamgamād arthāt kāṃsyatālánusvāna -nyāyena tādṛṣām arthāntaram avagamyate sā gatir iti lakṣaṇārthāḥ.”- On the analogy of kāṃsy-tāla-anunāda i.e. reverberation caused due to striking a dish of kāṃsy metal, a further meaning following the original meaning which moves the heart of a connoisseur is collected. This is ‘gati’, the ‘artha-guṇa.’ Now Dr. Raghavan sees ‘dhvani’ here. But we may say that this could be perhaps guṇibhūta-vyaṅgya or subordinated suggested sense, because Bhoja is not clear about the subordination or “upa-sarjani-kṛtavā” of the first meaning which is the life breath of ‘dhvani.’ Again, following Ratnāśvara Dr. Raghavan seems to find ‘anuraṇana-rūpa-vyaṅgya-dhvani’ here. Even he i.e. Ratnāśvara could have gone astray if we take into account our argument concerning ‘absence of the clause, viz. ‘upasarjaniṅkṛta-svārtha.’
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Ratnēśvara also observes: “dhvanana-vyāpārónmesaḥ ca guṇatva-lābhah.” Here “dhvanana-vyāpāra” of course stands for vyājana-vyāpāra. At the same time whether it operates at principal level or subordinate level remains to be screened. Here, taking into account Bhojaś closeness with the ancient ācāryas, if we opt for the second option, we may not be off the mark. Or, it can be the first option also. Dr. Raghavan should have considered both the options before reading “dhvani” here.

A number of other ‘śabdagata’ alamkāras in the S. K. Ā. also suggest affinity with implied element, thus leading us to the acceptance of dhvani-vicāra by Bhoja. When you get at ‘dhvani’, not through abhidhā, there is inevitably the possibility of some element of meaning remaining concealed. This concealment i.e. ‘saṃvṛti’ gives birth to many an alamkāra. In Bhojaś ‘mudrā’, ‘uktī’, ‘bhāṇīti’ (pp. 166, 170, 177 respectively, S. K. Ā., ibid) we have this element of ‘concealment.’

mudrā occurs (S. K. Ā., II. 40; pp. 166 ibid) when-

“sābhiprayasya vākye
yad vacaso viniveśanam
mudrām tām mut-pradāyīvāt
kāvyā-mudrā-vido viduh.”

uktī is (S. K. Ā., II. 42, pp. 170, ibid)

“vidhidvāreṇa vā yatra
niśedhenaḥ vā punaḥ,
pratīyate viśiṣṭo’rthah
sōktir atrā’bhidhiyate.”

bhāṇīti is (S. K. Ā. II. 52; pp. 177, ibid)

“uktī-prakāro bhāṇitiḥ
sembling-asambhave ca sā,
viśeṣa-saṃvṛttyā āscaryas-
kalpanāsū ca kalpyate.”

In these alamkāras, there is an element of the implicit sense. We will not name it as “dhvani”, as done by Dr. Raghavan.

Explaining ‘kalpanā-bhāṇīti’ of Bhoja, Ratnēśvara observes: “sēyaṃ bhāṇītir vidhi-nīsedha-prasānge nīsedha-ghātaka-dvārā vidhīrūpā bhavati iti āstāṃ vistarāḥ.”-(pp. 180, S. K. Ā., ibid.). We can recount here the arguments advanced
by Ānandavardhana (Dhv. I. 4, vṛtti) for establishing the existence of the implicit sense (or, vastu - vyaṅga).

In the section on figures of sense, i.e. arthālamkāras also, we can see the presence of the implicit sense. Bhojaś śūkṣma alamkāra is just the second name given to ‘rasa-dhvani’ arrived at through the description of consequents i.e. anubhāvas alone. ‘śūkṣma’ is read at S. K. Ā. III. 21, 22, pp. 334, ibid as-

“iṅgita”kāra-laksyōrthaḥ
śūkṣmāḥ śūkṣma-guṇāt tu saḥ,
śūkṣmāḥ pratyaśkataḥ śūkṣmaḥ
a-pratykaśa iti bhidyate.” (II. 21)
“vācyah pratīyamānas ca
śūkṣmótra dvividho mataḥ,
iṅgita”kāra-laksyatvam
laksya-sāmānyam etayoḥ.”-(II. 22, S. K. Ā.)

Thus there are two varieties of śūkṣma: (i) that in which rasa is suggested through iṅgita-gesture. When rasa is suggested through horripilation and such other sāttvika bhāvas, it is suggestion through ‘ākāra’ or appearance. The first variety is illustrated by the verse, viz. “tām pratyaḥbhivyakta-manorathānām...” etc. Bhoja observes (pp. 334, ibid) : “atra svayamvara-militānāṁ rajñāṁ rājaputrīṁ prati prāṇi-laksāṇasya manorathasya abhidhiyamānasya śṛṅgāra-ceṣṭā”tmakena iṅgītena vyāṅgyatvāt ayam iṅgita-laksyaya abhidhiyamāhāḥ śūkṣma-bhedāḥ.” Bhoja has given a two-fold śūkṣma, the abhidhiyamāna and the pratīyamāna. The latter is illustrated by the verse viz. “śvāmāyāḥ śvāmalatayā...” etc. When rasa is collected through the agency of anubhāva-vaṇṇa or sāttvika-vaṇṇa, it is termed ‘vācyā’ i.e. “abhidhiyamāna-sūkṣma.” When rasa is arrived at through the description of vyābhicārins, it is termed “pratīyamāna-sūkṣma.” Now, the question that stares in our eyes is that weather by ‘abhidhiyamāna’ Bhoja means abhidhāna or direct naming of anubhāvas or sāttvika-bhāvas or not. For, even through the description of anubhāvas, we can not hold that ‘rasa’ is ‘abhidhiyamāna’ i.e. directly stated. For such a possibility of rasa being directly stated is ruled out not only by Ānandavardhana but even by his die-hard opponents such as Mahima-Bhaṭṭa also. Or, may be Bhoja accepts a possibility when rasa is not always and necessarily suggested only and never directly conveyed. Perhaps he accepts conveying of rasa through abhidhā also. Or, perhaps he favours the sva-śabdā-vācyatva or direct
naming of the basic emotions and ancillary feelings, or even at times, of rasa also. All this deserves further scrutiny.

Bhojaś ‘anyónyálamkāra’ (pp. 346, ibid, S. K. Ā. III. 27, 28) is three-fold such as ‘vācya’ or ‘expressed’, ‘pratīyamāna’ i.e. ‘implied’, and ‘ubhaya’ i.e. both expressed and implied :

“anyonyam upakāro yas
tad anyonyam, tridhā ca tat,
vācyam, pratīyamānam ca,
trātyam ubhayā”makam.” (S. K. Ā. III. 27)
“anyonya-cūlikā’nyónya-
bhrāntir anyonyam ekatā,
anyonyālāmkṛter antas
trayam etad iha iṣyate.” (S. K. Ā. III. 28)

The implicit i.e. pratīyamāna variety is illustrated by the famous verse where in a prapā-pālikā offers water to a traveller. Bhoja observes : (pp. 347, ibid) :

“atra pathika-prapā-pālikayor mithónurāge yad ekasya viralāṅgulinā kareṇa pāṇīyapānam anyasyāḥ sutarām vārīdhāra-tanukaraṇam tena parasparam upakāryōpakāraka-bhāvāt pratīyamānam idam anyonyam.”

‘Vyatireka’ with implicit similarity is just alamkāra-dhvani. Actually Bhojaś concept of vyatireka involves implicit element as it is defined as :

“śabdopātte pratīte vā
śādṛṣṭye, vastunor dvayoh,
bhedābhidhānam, bhedaś ca
vyatirekaś ca kathyte.” (S. K. Ā. III. 32 pp. 355, ibid)

‘Sāmbhava’ (S. K. Ā. III. 25, pp. 342 ibid) in Bhoja rules out ‘anumiti’ or inference in this figure, between collection of the rasa on one hand and its vyabhicārin or anubhāvas on the other. Bhojaś upamā is also both abhidhiyamāna and pratīyamāna.

In the Śr. Pra. Bhoja goes beyond this. Apart from the direct or indirect references to dhvani or pratīyamāna, Bhoja talks of the supremacy of dhvani-
vāpāra in poetry along with quotations from Ānanandavardhana in his Śr. Pra. We will examine this as below.

At the end of Ch. VI of the Śr. Pra. we come across Bhojaś views concerning dhvani/pratīyamāna. Due to ‘avidyōpādhi-nescience, ‘artha’ is explained either as
'adhyāsa' or superimposition or 'vivarta' i.e. transfiguration of the śabda-brahma. Bhoja observes: (Śr. Pra. Vol. I. pp. 220, ch. VI, ibid);

"tataś ca na jñāyate kim ayam arthopādhi-nibandhanaḥ rthasya anyathāva-
bhāsaḥ uta śabdopādhi-nibandhana iti. ciraṁ jiva, yad avatirna iva pratipādya-olds-
apadavim drśyase; prccāmy āyuṣmantam ka eṣaḥ artho nāma ? kim braviṣ ? yaḥ
śabdena pratipādyate; atha gauḥ ity atra kaḥ śabdā"rthaḥ ? kim āttha ?
sāsnādimiṇi piṇḍa iti ? katham śvarūpam api ātṛtaḥ śabdena eva vyapadiṣati. kim
avocaṭ ? śabdā"khyā-viśeṣaṇānuraktasya kasya śvarūpaṁ anyathākhyātum na
śaknomi ? śabda-a-pari-tyāga-labdha-prakāśayaiva ca tad anubhūtyānubhavāmi.

tarhi, śabdāḥ prthag artha-tattvasya vyapadesṭum anubhavītum ca a-sākyatvāt
śabdasya eva ayaṁ adhyāyōso vivarto vipaṛināmo vā artho nāma. nānyāḥ-kāścid iti
niścīyatyāṃ; yuktam caicit, na hi nīrūpayanto 'pi śabdād vibhinnam artha-
tattvam upalabhāmahe....etc. etc.

Thus on account of avidyā, 'artha' is either 'adhyāsa' or 'vivarta' of śabda-brahma.
But this applies to meaning which is primarily related to śabda, i.e. to that which we
designate as 'abhidhīyamāna' or expressed sense. But Bhoja says that there is yet
another meaning which is implicit or pratiyamāna. How is this implicit sense related
to śabda-brahma? Can it be explained through 'adhyāsa' or 'vivarta' also?

Bhoja here quotes Dhv. I. 4 viz. "pratiyamānam punar anyad eva..." etc. Bhoja
also observes that this implicit sense i.e. pratiyamānārtha appears after the
collection of sentence-sense, i.e. vākyārtha. So, how can it be accommodated either
in 'adhyāsa'-pakṣa or 'vivarta-pakṣa'? Bhoja observes: "tasya ca vākyārtha-
bhāvanāttarakālam avagateḥ adhyāsapakṣe, vivarta-pakṣe vā katham iva upapattir
bhavati?" (pp. 221, ch. V. Śr. Pra., Vol. I., ibid).

Bhoja believes that the pratiyamāna artha appears after the collection of
vākyārtha i.e. sentence-sense: "vākyārtha-bhāvanottara-kālam avagateḥ." This is
a different or another 'state', i.e. avasthāntara of śabda. It is termed as
vipaṛināma of śabda-brahma. Bhoja thus rejects both 'adhyāsa', and 'vivarta'
and accepts 'vipaṛināma' or 'transformation' theory, as it explains both the
abhidhīyamāna as well as the pratiyamāna. For Bhoja, the pratiyamāna is also
a 'vyāpāra' of śabda as much as is the 'abhidhīyamāna.' Bhoja suggests that he will
talk of this at length later: (pp. 221, Śr. Pra., ch. VI, ibid): "ucyate, vipariṇāmād
bhaviṣyatī; vastunāḥ avasthāntara-gamanāṁ vipariṇāmāḥ." tatra yathā mṛd
ādayo ghaṭā"dirūpeṇa, kṣīrādayo dadhyā"di-rūpeṇa, caitra"dayo yuvā"dirūpeṇa
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viparīṇamante tathā idaṁ śabda-brahma api, avidyōpādeḥ tena tena rūpeṇa tathā tathā viparīṇamate tad yathā-santi me paṁca putrāḥ, mātaram pitaram śusrūṣitavān asmi, yōhaṁ yuва dramīda-deśe dramīda-kanyābhīḥ saha avsāṁ, sóham idānīṁ paścime vayasi gaṅgā-tīre tapaś carāmi, iti.-atra ca śabdārthayoh pṛthag avabhāsād vākyārthasya abhidhiyāmānataṁ pratiyāmānataṁ vā na anupapattih; na ca etāvatā śabda-vyāpāro viramsyati. yatas tātparyam asya hi agrato viśēṣaṁ vāksyāmānāṁ āste.

Bhoja seems to accept three categories of meaning: (i) Expressed i.e. abhidhiyāmāna, (ii) Implied i.e. pratiyāmāna (3) tātparya or dhvani which is even beyond this. This is illustrated by citing a verse viz. “prāpta-śīr eṣa...” etc., which is also read in the Dhvanyāloka. Bhoja suggests that from the expressed sense, the sense of the king being taken as an avatāra of Viśnu is implied–pratiyāmāna’ and from this ‘pratiyāmāna’ sense, a further sense of this king-avatāra taken as superior to other avatāras is suggested which for Bhoja is the final ‘tātparya’ or ‘dhvani’. Actually we may observe that the dhvani theorists have already suggested that dhvani rests either on vācyārtha, or laksyārtha or even ‘vyaṅgyārtha’ at times. So, if at all there is further suggestion in this verse it is just a vyāṅgyārtha based on vyāṅgyārtha and nothing beyond that. The fact remains that ‘principal suggested sense’ is termed ‘dhvani’ by the dhvani theorists and if this basic condition is overlooked than it is a case of not grasping the dhvani theory properly. By just coining new terms, as was the case with Kuntaka, we do not alter the basic facts. ‘Vācyā-vyaṅgya-further vyaṅgya’ is a three tier scheme already accepted by the dhvanivādins. The basic point is whether the suggested sense, whatever it is at the final level, should be principal. Bhoja seems to feel that ‘dhvani’ is only that ‘tātparya’ in kāvyā which is of the form of suggestion based on suggestion. No, we can not accept it. The real heart of the technical terminology called “dhvani” lies in a meaning being suggested as principal through any agency, be it word or sense, and either vācyā, or laksya or vyaṅgya; and in case of the latter, being rendered subordinate to the finally suggested sense which is deemed as ‘principal’, it being the highest source of highest beauty. Dr. Raghavan should have clarified this point.

So, when Bhoja observes what he does, we take it as a futile exercise. He says: (pp. 221, Śr. Pra. Vol. I, Ch. VI-ibid) : “atra varṇaṁya-rāja-visēṣasya digvijayinoḥ yathāsruta-vākyārthaḥ bhidhiyā-mānas ‘tvayi’ iti pade vīśvetraḥsvāvataraḥ samastiti pratiyāmānas tad avatārāntaraṁ mānas nirāśaṁ tātparyaṁ vyaṅgyaṁ asya ca tad vyuṣaṁ tato vaisīṣṭa-pratipādanāṁ tātparyaṁ, yasya
Let us try to analyse these two verses. Bhoja suggests

(i) ‘tātparyam eva vacasi
dhvanir eva kāvye.’

This could be understood as,” yad vacasi (= loke ca sāstre ca vacas) ‘tātparyam’ (kathyate) tad eva kāvye (= kāvyā vākya) dhvanīḥ (iti arthah) If we understand this passage as above then here we take ‘tātparyā’, as co-related vākyārtha in the sense of the Mīmāṃsā doctrine. This means that ‘vākyārtha’ which is collected from the vākya through tātparya-ṣakti is termed ‘tātparya’ at ordinary worldly level, or at the level of an expression in scientific literature i.e. śāstra. Thus the meaning of a given sentence-expression as a whole is tātparya at work-a-day level. But when it is the case of a poetic expression i.e. kāvyā-vākya, for which Bhoja uses the term ‘kāvye’ i.e. ‘in poetry’, the same vākyārtha or sentence sense is termed ‘dhvani’ in the language of literary criticism. Now in this case, we have to consider what shaping influences were active in Bhoja’s assertion also.

We will refer to Dr. Raghevan’s explanation later but for the present let us try to understand how Bhoja’s text reveals itself before us.

We knew that Bhoja had some great predecessors who intervened between Ānandavardhana and himself. They were Kuntaka on one hand, then Mahima-Bhaṭṭa and of course Dhanaṅjaya and Dhanika who were in the court of Munja, not to mention the greatest Abhinavagupta. Dr. Raghavan is clear that Bhoja did not know Abhinavagupta, i.e. he had no access to the latter’s works on the Nāṭyaśāstra and the Dhvanyālōka. Now this is unthinkable for if for the sake of argument we accept what Dr. K. Krishna-moorthi says, though we have no faith in it that Kuntaka preceded Abhinavagupta, then also the latter being prior to Bhoja and Mahimā was closer to Bhoja and we cannot imagine that Bhoja being so well-read and an expert in understanding Ānandavardhana,
Dhvani in Kuntaka, Bhoja and others, and Guṇībhūta-vyāngya and Citra-Kāvya.

could have missed Abhinavagupta totally. Actually the atmosphere in the literary world in India in those centuries was humming sweetly with the name of Abhinavagupta; he being only the second side of a coin which had its first side stamped in the name of Ānandavardhana. Thus to know Ā., was to know Abhinavagupta who only faithfully echoed Ā.'s ideas-- “anuranan sphuṭayāmi Kāvyālokaṃ” as he vows in the beginning of the Locana. So to know Ā. was to know Abhinavagupta. We therefore do not accept that Bhoja did not know Abhinavagupta through his works on literary criticism. Again, eventhough Bhoja quotes from Ā., he does not seem to accept everything that Ā. has to say in the same way as explained by Ā. himself. The concept of “dhvani” is a glaring instance in this conclusion. we will go in it further later.

Bhoja also had before him Kuntaka whose influence is very clear on him. When Bhoja suggests that “kāvyā-vākye tātparyaṃ dhvaniḥ kathyate,” he seems to be under Kuntakaś influence. Here ‘tātparya’ is taken in the sense of ‘vākyārtha’ as done by the Mīmāṃsakas. The total sentence-sense of a poetic expression, ‘tātparya’ is termed ‘dhvani’ by Bhoja. This could mean that even a ramaṇiya or beautiful expressed sense, ‘vācyārtha’ of a poetic sentence, kāvyavākya, can be termed ‘dhvani.’ Thus Bhojaś dhvani covers the poetic vācyārtha, the poetic lakṣyārtha and of course the poetic vyaṅgyārtha of a given poetic utterance or kāvyā-vākya.’ Dr. Raghavan has not noticed this possibility of ‘vācyārtha’ of a kāvyā-vākya, being ‘tātparya’ as also termed dhvani by Bhoja. This seems to be directly under the influence of Kuntaka for whom ‘vicitra abhidhā’ or ‘poetic utterance’ covered everything in poetry beginning with a beautiful expression at abhidhā level to an expression at the level of beautiful suggestion also. Actually Bhojaś expression comparing “tātparya-dhvani” with “saubhāgya” and “lāvanya” suggests that he attempts a synthesis between Kuntaka and Ānandavardhana/Abhinavagupta. Bhojaś dhvani is not only Ānandavardhanaś dhvani, but it is ‘vakratā’ of Kuntaka at abhidhā level also, and it is “tātparya” of Dhanaṇjaya-Dhanika also. Thus Bhojaś dhvani is “Dhvani ++” as compared to Ānandavardhana. Now we know that Dhanaṇjaya/Dhanika must surely have inflinced Bhoja, who was their junior contemporary in the court of Mālava king Muṇja. These two had declared that “tātparyam na tulā-dhṛtam”, violating the Mīmāṃsaka norm of tātparya, it being only a correlated sentence sense, on one hand, and thwarting Ānandavardhanaś vyaṅjanā-dhvani on the other side. So, if we take “tātparyam dhvaniḥ,” an equation sponsored by Bhoja, then this extended sense of ‘tātparya’ covering what Bhoja takes as suggested sense beyond the pratiyamāna sense, has
an impression of Dhananājaya / Dhanika over it. In case of Kuntakaś beautiful vācyārtha (vicitrā-abhidhā at pure abhidhā level) being branded as Dhvani, we have a different sense of dhvani, perhaps broader, because Ānandavardhana had ruled out such cases from his dhvani; and in taking ‘tātparya’ as ‘dhvani’ the normal connotation of tātparya is also extended like the one seen in the Daśarūpaka / Avaloka, when it covers the suggested sense also in its fold.

Thus Bhojaś ‘dhvani’ is not absolutely congruent with Ānandavardhanaś dhvani. As suggested earlier the condition of ‘upasarjanī-kṛta-sva” also is not observed by Bhoja as a basic fact of dhvani.

Let us see how Bhoja further explains and elaborates his concept of ‘Dhvani’. He observes (pp. 221, Śr. Pra.; Vol. I. ibid) :- kaḥ punaḥ kāvyā-vacasoḥ dhvani-tātparyayoḥ viśeṣaḥ?

ucyate —

"yad a-vakram vacah śāstre loke ca, vaca eva tat,
vakram yad arthavādā”dau tasya kāvyam iti smṛtih.”
yad abhiprāya–sarvasvam vaktur vākyāt pratiyate tātparyam; arthadharmas tat; śabda-dharmah punar dhvaniḥ. saubhāgyam iva tātparyam āntaro guṇa isyate vāgdevatāyā lávanyam iva bāhyas tayor dhvaniḥ. aḍūra-viprakārsāt tu dvayena dvayam ucyate yathā surabhi-vaisākhau madhu-mādhava sanjñayā.” iti.

Bhoja observes that a statement in either śāstra or loka which is only a bare statement, i.e. which is not beautiful, i.e. ‘a-vakra’ is simply given the name of ‘vacah’ i.e. ‘a statement, a sentence.’ But when in the act of beautiful praise or eulogy–‘arthavāda’- i.e. beautiful poetic exaggeration of the merits of a given thing, this
Dhvani in Kuntaka, Bhoja and others, and Guṇībhyta-vyaṇgya and Citra-Kāvyā.

statement is called 'Kāvyā'. This is supposed to be 'vakra' i.e. 'beautiful'; first and last. It is termed 'poetry.' Bhoja thus distinguishes between a statement in ordinary parlance and a poetic utterance. The former is 'a-vakra' while the latter is necessarily 'vakra.' These terms 'a-vakra' and 'vakra' are directly under Kuntaka’s influence, as are the terms 'saubhāgya' and also 'lāvanya' seen earlier, they being 'gunaś or excellences recognised by Kuntaka as qualifying this or that 'mārga', or poetic practice. We also remember here Bhāmaha's expression, viz., “vākrābhidheya-sabdārthau”.

In the second verse Bhoja seems to explain what is 'tātparya' for him. He uses the term “abhiprāya–sarvasva”-i.e. the essence of the intended sense. Now this cannot be just the tātparya of the mīmāṃśā, which gives only the correlated sentence sense as tātparya, or the sumtotal of all padārthas as vākyārtha, which is termed 'tātparyārtha.' Bhoja's tātparya is the essence-'sarvasva'-of the 'abhiprāya' i.e. intention of the speaker. Thus Bhoja's tātparya goes beyond the traditional mīmāṃśā sense. It covers the suggested intention also as is done by Dhanañjaya / Dhanika, for whom 'tātparya' is not limited to sentence–sense only. “tātparyaḥ na tulādhrtim.”

But when he says 'śabdadharmah punar dhvanih” he echoes only the grammatical connotation of the term, meaning 'sound' only, which is the quality of a word. Of course Bhoja ‘dhvani’ in the context of poetry goes beyond this grammatical sense as is the case with Ānandavardhana also, who goes beyond the grammatical connotation of the term ‘dhvani.’

‘Dhvani’ in this narrow sense of śabdadharmā i.e. ‘sound’ only is external to both ‘saubhāgya’ and ‘lāvanya’ which are said to be internal qualities of Vāg–devatā. The poetic tātparya, which is also termed ‘dhvani’ is different from this grammatical concept of ‘dhvani’ which is 'sound' only, and therefore only an external quality of a word. Even Ānandavardhana had also suggested the same and the whole idea was beautifully elaborated by Abhinavagupta in his Locana. All this literature is before Bhoja when he dwells upon tātparya–dhvani–synthesis.

‘adūra–viprakarṣa’ means ‘not a long distance’, i.e. closeness. Bhoja holds that on account of closeness between śabda i.e. dhvani and tātparya in the ordinary sentence, the same pair, is termed poetic tātparya and dhvani in the context of poetry, like the months caitra and vaiśākha being called ‘madhu’ and ‘mādhava’ in a different context. Dhvani–tātparya i.e. śabda and vākyārtha in ordinary parlance are termed ‘dhvani–tātparya’ or poetic–import of a statement in poetry. Just as Ānandavardhana says that he being the follower of the grammarians extends the
connotation of the term dhvani, so also Bhoja takes ‘dhvani’ of the grammarian and ‘tātparya’ of the mīmāṃsaka in a further extended sense.

In the Ch. VII of his Śr. Pra. Bhoja deals further with the concept of Dhvani. Bhoja had divided sāhitya’ in twelve types. The first four are vr̥tti, vivakṣā, tātparya and pravibhāga and the second set of sāhitya consists of vyapeksā, sāmarthya, anvaya and ekārthibhāva.

In ‘vr̥tti’ we have Bhojaś abhidhā, lakṣaṇā and gauṇī, and in ‘tātparya’ he accommodates both ‘tātparya’ and ‘vyañjanā’. The third set of four relations of śabda and artha consists of doṣahāna, guṇo-pādāna, alamkāyoga and rasa-a-viyoga. This third set is exclusive to poetic use of language while the first two sets of components four each, go with both popular usage including scientific usage of language and also poetic use of language.

Now Bhoja could have placed both ‘vr̥tti’ and ‘tātparya’ under a single head of ‘vr̥tti’ alone, but Bhoja seems to take abhidhā, lakṣaṇā and gauṇī as powers of word i.e. pada-śaktis, while tātparya and dhvani or vyañjanā as vākya-śakti.

Bhojaś close study of the Dhvanyāloka (and this implies in our opinion the study of Locana also) is clearly depicted in the Ch. VII of his Śr. Pra. In the sixth chapter Bhoja had stated that the acceptance of the implicit sense, i.e. pratīyamānārtha and its apprehension i.e. bodha take place after ‘vākyārtha’ or sentence—sense is collected. Elaborating on ‘tātparya’ and ‘dhvani’ in this Ch. VII. Bhoja accepts much from Ānandavardhana. He has quoted Ānandavardhanaś definition of dhvani and also illustrations given by him. He accepts dhvani in his own way and equates it with tātparya.

According to Bhoja, the intended meaning of a word is its import i.e. ‘tātparya’. It is wider in scope and is also manifold. It is basically threefold such as ‘abhidhiyamāna’, ‘pratīyamāna’ and ‘dhvani-rūpa’. Whatever is collected by way of ākānśa, yogyatā and samnidhi, i.e. the sentence—sense is the abhidhiyamāna tātparya. Once the individual word—sense is collected by word—powers, this abhidhiyamāna tātparya follows by way of ‘vākyārtha’ i.e. import of a statement.

Bhoja feels that on account of factors such as ‘prakaraṇa’ i.e. context and the like, when the abhidhiyamāna artha is acceptable or otherwise, an extra sense comes up and it is ‘pratīyamāna tātparya’. In Ch. VII Bhoja seems to take a position in conformity with Ānandavardhana, concerning ‘dhvani’. He observes that after the collection of the expressed sense, i.e. ‘abhidhiyamāna artha, the word or sense, making oneself subordinate conveys another meaning which is principal and is
Dhvani in Kuntaka, Bhoja and others, and Guṇībhūta-vyāngya and Citra-Kāvyā. 1107
termed dhvani. The suggestor is subordinate and the suggested is principal, and it
arrives either in form of ‘anunāda’ i.e. resonance as in case of the bronze metal
struck by an instrument, or like an ‘echo’ i.e. pratiśabda as in case of a cave,
‘kandarā’ resounding our call. Bhoja also talks of a number of varieties of dhvani
which is primarily artha-dhvani and śabda-dhvani. Dr. Raghavan is at sea when he
tries to find out what exactly Bhoja has in his mind to distinguish between
‘pratiyāmāna’ and ‘dhvani’. Our suggestion is that perhaps the former is a
suggested sense which is subordinate, gauṇa, to the expressed sense and the
latter is the suggested sense which is principal. This is one explanation.
However, Bhoja himself is silent over this point. Dr. Raghavan feels that perhaps
the pratiyāmāna tātparya is vastu-dhvani, which comes as first suggestion, and then
the expressness of the heroine, as suggested in the verse “bhrama dharmika’ etc. is the
suggestion at second stage which comes as a principal dhvani. So, pratiyāmāna’
forms the first stage and ‘dhvani’ forms the second stage. Dr. Raghavan observes (pp.
159–160, ibid) : “It we examine Bhoja’s explanations of his own illustrations of the
several varieties of Dhvani, we shall see that, in each and every case, Dhvani passes
through ‘pratīti’ or the ‘pratiyamāna artha’ and the suggested, Dhvanyamāna, always
arises at the back of or through ‘pratiyamāna’. “etat pratyāyayam idaṃ dhvanati” is
the phraseology in all cases. We can say that the two do not differ accept in the fact
that the ‘pratiyamāna’ is the first-risen Dhvani and Dhvani itself is the subsequent
Dhvani. Almost all the gāthās given as illustrations for the varieties of the
pratiyamāna are taken up in the Dhvani section and the suggested idea or Dhvani
is pointed out in all of them. As regards these, Bhoja says that the Dhvani is the
suggestion of how clever the lover or the lady or her friend is, how much one loves
the lady and so on. In the verse, ‘śikharini kva nu nāma...” etc. all non-expressed
implied ideas are called pratiyamāna and as for the suggestion of Dhvani, Bhoja
says, it is the love of the man for the lady described in that verse. In the gāthās
“bhama dhammia...” etc., Bhoja assigns all implied ideas, arthas or vastus, to the
class of pratiyamāna and gives the ‘Vaidagdhya’ of the nāyikā or her cēti as the
suggested, Dhvani : ‘nayavyaś vaidagdhyaṃ dhvanati. prārthana–vaidagdhyaṃ
dhvani. s–skhalita–gopanaś sakhi–vaidagdhyaṃ dhvanati. varṇaniyāyaḥ
cāruttvātkāra–pratītim dhvanati. varṇaniyāyaḥ svānurāgam prakāśayati...” and so
on. Thus, the first-risen suggestion is pratiyamāna; it is of the nature of vastu–dhvani
only, to adopt here Ānandavardhanaś phraseology and classification. The
subsequent or the final suggested idea is described as Dhvani proper. It is mostly of
the nature of Bhāya, that is, sthāvin like Anurāga or Rati as in the case of, ‘śikharini
kva nu nāma...” etc. which forms the Rasā”di-dhvani of Ānandavardhana or
Anubhāvas etc., like vaidagdhya, Rūpōtkarśa (uddīpana–vibhāva) and the like, which are guṇas of the Nāyaka and the Nāyikā, and similar things which however come more and more under the category of vastu–dhvani. If however, Bhoja had really pursued such distinction or made some such clear classification that Vastu–ālamkāra–dhvanis for the pratīyamāna and that Rasa–bhāva–dhvani is the parama–tātparya and Dhvani, it would have been interesting. Or, if he had emphasised ‘upa–

sarjanī–kṛta–svārtha–tva’ in the definition of Dhvani, he could have separated the pratīyamāna as gunibhūta–vyāngya or cases of Alāmkāras where dhvani is not pronounced. As different from this, he could have given Dhvani as cases where it dominates over the subordinated vācya. He must then have defined and illustrated both differently. As it is, we must say that Bhoja has not made out any point to distinguish the Pratīyamāna and Dhvani. A distinction into vastu–Alāmkāra Dhvanis and Rasā”di–dhvani, Bhoja did not hit upon at all; he found the parama–tātparya of the form of vastu also and so he vaguely left the question, leaving it to us to define his position systematically. Hemaeandra who reproduces the text of the Śr./Pra. on the varieties of the Pratīyamāna, considers the whole text as referring to what Ānandavardhana distinguishes as vastu–dhvani. See Kāvyānusāsana, pp. 26–34.

At best, we can say from Bhojaś text only this much that the Pratīyamāna is ‘Avāntara-garmyamāna–artha’, or ‘Abhidhiyamāna–avyavahita–dhvani’ and ‘Dhvani is ‘parama–tātparya.’

For all practical purposes, we must ignore his vague distinction into Pratīyamāna and Dhvani. Tātparya must be described as having only two kinds, the expressed and the non-expressed or the extra–sense that is implied or suggested. It would have been enough if Bhoja had given Tātparya as being two–fold, Abhidhiyamāna and Pratīyamāna. While explaining the relation of the non–expressed, An-abhidhiyamāna or Abhidhiyamāna-atirikta, with the Śabda-Brahman as one of Vipariṇāma, Bhoja mentions only the Pratīyamāna, though immediately, he cites a verse and points out in it a set of implied ideas, the former part of which he calls ‘pratīyamāna’ and the latter part Tātparya or Dhvani.”

Now this shows that even Dr. Raghavan can not clear his way through the jungle of ideas presented by Bhoja. Yes, Dr. Raghavan is right when he says that Bhoja should have mentioned only a two-fold, and not a three-fold tātparya. Actually we have tried to give a better explanation of what Bhoja had in his mind about the distinction between pratīyamāna and Dhvani. The former is the suggested sense and the latter is the suggested sense based on the suggested sense.
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The former is a case of abhidhā/lakṣaṇā-vyaṅjanā, the latter is the field of abhidhā/lakṣaṇā -> vyaṅjanā -> vyaṅjanā; a three tier system. Actually Bhojaś love for three and the multiple of three at all stages must have prompted him to this three-fold tātparya.

Again, when Dr. Raghavan suggests that perhaps the distinction between vastudhvani / Alamkāra-dhvani on one side and rasa-bhāvā’di-dhvani on the other side can explain Pratīyamāna / dhvanyamāna-tātparya, he is only echoing Abhinavaguptaś views in Locana where he declares that “vastvalaṃkāradhvani rasa-dhvanīṃ prati paryavastete,” and this shows that Bhoja had seen Abhinavaguptaś works and was also indebted to the same. But Dr. Raghavanś suggestion of ‘vaidagdhyā’ as anubhāvadhvani is not convincing, for Ānandavardhana or Abhinavagupta or Mammatra or any dhvani-vādīn worth his name never mentions “anubhāva-dhvani”, for virtually it is ‘vastu-dhvani’ itself, and even Dr. Raghavan admits this to be so. Hence, only two reasons, which we feel are convincing, as suggested by us project themselves before us and they are– (i) Bhojaś penchant for the number three and its multiple and (ii) Bhojaś special attraction for singling out ‘vyaṅga based on vyaṅga’ as of special charm, could have driven him to offer abhidhiyamāna–pratīyamāna–and dhvanirūpa–three-fold tātparya. For our close reference we will quote from Bhoja, who begins with an explanation of tātparya, perhaps in the fashion of Dhanājīaya / Dhanika, or in the fashion of a dirgha-dīrghhatara-abhidhāvādin as one pūrpakṣa projected by Mammatra, seems to hold. Bhoja observes : (pp. 246, Ch. VII. Śr. Pra. ibid):

“yatparaḥ–śabdah sa śabdārthah iti tātparyam. tac ca vākya eva upapadyate. padamātrēna abhiprāyasya prakāśayitum āsakhyavat. tac ca vākya–pratipādyam vastu tri-rūpam bhavati. abhidhiyamānāṃ, pratīyamānāṃ, dhvanirūpaṃ ca.”

Before continuing with this quotation we have to take note of an interesting fact that Bhoja talks of tri-rūpa abhiprāya derived from sentence-sense only and rejects out right the possibility of an ‘abhiprāya’ / tātparya to be had from a single word i.e. pada. This assertion on Bhojaś part rules out pada-dhvani and thereby dhvani derived from padāṁsa. Theoretically thus the scope of dhvani is restricted to vākya only. We continue with Bhojaś words :

“yatram upāṭta–śabdesu mukhyā-gaunī-lakṣaṇābhiḥ śabda–saktibhiḥ svam artham abhidhāya uparanat–vyāpāresu ākāṅkaśa-sannidhi-yogyatā’ dibhir vākyārthamātram eva abhidhiyate tad abhidhiyamānam. yathā gaur gacchati iti vākyārthāvagateḥ uttarakālam vākyārthah upapadyamāno nupapadyamāno vā
artha-prakaraṇaṇucityā”di-saha-krtau yat pratyaśayati tat pratiyamānām. yathā, viśaṃ bhūṅksva, mā ca asya grhe bhūṅkthāḥ, ity ukte varāṃ viśaṃ bhākṣitaṃ, na punar asya grhe bhuktam iti pratiyate.

arthā-sabdopāyād, upasaranikṛta-svārtho vākyārthāvagater anantarāṃ anunādarūpaṃ pratiśabda-rūpaṃ vā abhivyājayaḥ tad dhvani rūpaṃ. tac ca na sārvatraikam. tathā hi; yathā nīvṛtte abhighāte kasyacid eva kāṃsyā”der dravyasya anunādo jāyate, kasyacid eva kandarādeḥ pratiśabdaḥ. yathā kasyacid eva vākasya pratiyamāṇa-abhidhiyamāṇa-vākyārtha-pratīte anantarāṃ dhvanir upalabhyate iti. – ‘nimiṣati esā’ ity ukte aksor nimeṣo’ bhidhiyate, devi na bhavati iti pratiyate. rūpātiśayaś ca dhvanirati. artha esāṃ prayogaḥ, tatra abhidhiyamānāṃ caturdhā-vidhirūpaṃ, niśedha-rūpaṃ, vidhi-niśedha-rūpaṃ a-vidhi-niśedha-rūpaṃ ca.

After giving illustrations, Bhoja once again says something further concerning ‘dhvani’ : (pp. 248; Śr. Pra., pp. 248, 249 etc.) :

“pratiyamāṇā”bhidihiyamāṇa-vākyārthānām ānantaṃ dhvanirūpaṃ apy aneka-prakārāṃ eva.

dhvaniś ca dvidhā; artha-dhvanīḥ śabda-dhvanīś ca. tayor artha-dhvanir anunādarūpaḥ pratiśabda-dhvanirūpas’ ca.

....kāṃsyā-dhvanirūpeda anunādo dhvanim pratiśabdayan anunāda-dhvanivyapadesam aśādayati iti. yaḥ punar abhidhiyamāṇa-vākyārthāḥ prthag bhūta iva guhā“di-pratiśabdā” nurūpaṃ arthāntaraṃ pratyāyayan pratidhvanati sa pratiśabda-dhvanīḥ- ..... evam śabda-dhvanir api dvidhā eva.” (pp. 250, ibid).

After illustrating all these varieties, Bhoja concludes (pp. 251, ibid) :

“evam anye’pi mahākavi-prayogesu dhvani-viśeṣā gavesaṇīyā iti; yad uktam-, “tātparyam eva vacasi dhvanir eva kāvya” ity ādi.

Here, Bhoja repeats the verses, quoted above, which he read at the end of Ch. VI. Śr. Pra. (Vol. I)

-such as :

“yad avakram vacaḥ śāstre
loke ca, vaca eva tat....
..... yathā surabhi-vaiśākhau
madhu-mādhava-saṃjñayā...” iti.
Dhvani in Kuntaka, Bhoja and others, and Guṇībhūta-vyaṅga and Citra-Kāvya.

Read in a tabular form, Bhojaś dhvani would read as-

Tātparya

\[
\text{abhidhiyamāna} \quad \text{pratīyamāna} \quad \text{Dhvani}
\]

\[
\text{śabda-dhvani} \quad \text{artha-dhvani}
\]

\[
\text{anunāda-dhvani} \quad \text{pratiśabda-dhvani} \quad \text{anunāda-dhvani} \quad \text{pratiśabda-dhvani}
\]

We know how Ānandavardhanaś scheme proceeds:

\[
dhvani
\]

\[
\text{lakṣanāmūla} \quad \text{abhidhāmūla}
\]

\[
\text{-avivakṣita-vācyā} \quad \text{vivakṣita-vācyā}
\]

\[
\text{arhántara-saṃkramita.} \quad \text{atyanta-tiraskṛta}
\]

\[
\text{-vācyā}
\]

\[
\text{a-saṃkālṣya-krama} \quad \text{saṃkāṣyakrama}
\]

\[
\text{(rasā”di-dhvani)} \quad \text{-anuraṇana-rūpa}
\]

\[
\text{śabdaśakti-mūla} \quad \text{artha-śakti} \quad \text{ubhaya-mūla} \quad \text{śakti-mūla}
\]

Now, Bhojaś anunāda-rūpa- can be placed with Ānandavardhanaś anuraṇana-rūpa–vyaṅga, on the face of it.

Looking at the illustrations given by Bhoja, his scheme is not absolutely congruent with that of Ānandavardhana, which is more methodical and more convincing. The very fact that he illustrates ‘pratīyamāna’ tātparya from such sentences as ‘viṣam bhuṅkṣya,” etc., proves that all sentences do not have this
variety. Thus, Bhojaś ‘pratiyamāna’ may convert itself into dhvani, but for arriving at dhvani ‘pratiyamāna’ is not an inevitable and unavoidable stage. Therefore he observes that Dhvani has ‘artha’ and ‘sabda’ as instruments, i.e. upāyas, which are necessarily subordinated to the ‘vyangya’ which is suggested as principal sense. Perhaps by ‘anu-nāda’, he suggests that the original nāda and the resultant nāda are not opposite in nature, but the anu-nāda is only a sort of reverberation of the original. Thus, it could be equated with Ānandavardhanaś abhidhāmāla, anuranana-rūpa dhvani, or saṃlakṣya-krama-dhvani.

By, ‘pratisadā’ he perhaps suggests that the ‘ghoṣa’ and ‘pratigoṣa’ do have a sequence, but the same is not noticed. The moment a man shouts, there is resounding from the caves, almost as if covering the sound. Thus perhaps here Bhoja wants to cover “a-saṃlakṣya-krama-dhvani” or rasā”di-dhvani of Ānanda-vardhana. For prati-sabda-dhvani Bhoja says : (pp. 249, 250; Ch. VII. Śr. Pra; Vol. I, ibid)

“yaḥ punar abhidhiyamāna-vākyārthāt
prthag-bhūta iva, guhā”di-pratisabdānurūpam
arthāntaram pratyāyān pratidhvanāti, sa pratisabdā-dhvaniḥ.”

We have to carefully read in between the lines here. Bhoja observes that “that which is other than (= prthag bhūta) the expressed sentence-sense, such as the echo from the original”, is pratisabdha-dhvani. Perhaps he wants to suggest, following Ānanda-vardhana that “rasā”di dhvani is through the agency of vibhāvādis -i.e. vibhāvāvādibhīṣ, but is not identical with ‘vibhāvā’di”- “na tu vibhāvāvādī-rūpa eva.” Thus, pratisabda-rūpa dhvani is almost simultaneous, but different from the original. This could be rasā”di-dhvani.

The illustration of this pratisabda-dhvani, as read in Bhoja, is (pp. 250; ibid) : “lāvanya-sindhur aparāiva...” etc. Now, Ānandavardhana (Dhv. III 34, pp. 224-225, ibid) has cited this illustration as one of guṇībhūta-vyaṅgya. He observes.

“prakāro’nyo guṇībhūta-
vyaṅgyaḥ kāvyasya drṣyate,
yatra vyaṅgyānvaye vācyā-
cārtuvam syāt prakārśavat.”

-vyaṅgo’rtho lalana-lāvanya-prakhyo yaḥ pratipāditas tasya prādhānye dhvanir ity uktām tasya tu guṇībhāvena vācyā-cārtvā prakārṣe guṇībhūta-vyaṅgyo nāma kāvyā-prabhedaḥ prakālpade. tatra vastumātrasya vyāṅgasya tiraskrta-vācyebhīṣyaḥ pratiyamānasya kadācid vācyā-rūpa-vākyārthāpeksayā guṇībhāve sati guṇībhūta-
vyaṅgyatā; yathā, “lāvanya-sindhur aparāiva...” etc.
Dhvaní in Kuntaka, Bhoja and others, and Guṇībhūta-vyaṅgya and Citra-Kāvyā.

Bhoja does not talk of guṇībhūta-vyaṅgya at all. So for him this is dhvanī', pure and simple. But even he stops at explaining only the vastu-dhvanī when he observes: (pp. 250, ibid) - "tatra iha ca yathā śṛyāmāṇānām utpalādīnāṁ arthah abhidhiyamānās tasya locanā"dyarthaiḥ saha sadṛṣyam prayāyayad vāṃsaniyayāḥ cāruttvokarṣa-pratītīr dhvanatī. sā tataḥ prthag iva upalabhyamānā pratiṣabdha-dhvanīḥ."

But in fact Bhoja has taken this as an illustration of dhvanī on two counts; (i) he has no place for guṇībhūta-vyaṅgya, and here he seems to side with Mahimā for whom 'vyaṅga' is always more charming than 'vācyā'; and (ii) perhaps under Abhinavaguptaś influence, Bhoja also goes beyond "cāruttvokarṣa-pratītī." He says "sā, tataḥ prthag iva upalabhyamānā, pratiṣabdha-dhvanīḥ." i.e. the exceptional beauty makes the lady all the more exceptional and thus she being the uddīpana-vibhāva makes for nāyakaś rati or love for her. Thus the whole expression terminates into śṛngāra-dhvanī, though Bhoja does not mention rasa by name here. Abhinavagupta in his Locana observed: "ata eva iyati yady api vācyasya prādhānyam, tathā'pi rasa-dhvanau tasyā'pi gūnatā iti sarvasya guṇībhūta-vyaṅgyasya prakāre mantavyam." The Locanakāra says that of course the expressed sense is beautiful here, but it becomes a vibhāva (= uddīpana) for 'abhilāśā' (on the part of the lover.). Thus, we feel that perhaps Bhoja had full knowledge of Abhinavagupta and his Locana, though Dr. Raghavan thinks otherwise. For Bhoja, 'anunāda' is stretching in the same direction and 'pratighoṣa' is soothing back. He does not show special concerns for vastu / alamkāra / rasa"di dhvanis and perhaps shatters the well-knit scheme of Ānandavardhana. Ānandavardhana is order; Bhoja, disorder.

Bhoja also explains that even in laukika statement there is possibility of abhidhiyamāna and pratiyamāna tātparya. He admits a mixture also of laukika vacas and kāvyā. He observes (pp. 253, ibid): "evam laukike'pi vacasy abhidhiyamānām pratiyamānām tātparyaṁ ca paryālocaniyam. etena kāvyavacasor dhvanī-tātparyaśo ca kuvaś samplāvo'pi vyākhyātah; tad yathā, "acchinna-mekhalam alabdha-dṛṣṭhāpā gūḍham" ity ādi.

Dr. Raghavan has (pp. 166, 167,...ibid) explained how Śāradātātanaya summarises Bhojaś treatment of dhvanī in the light in which he understands the same. Before we look into Dr. Raghavanś account, we will look into the original references from BP. of Śā. BP. Ch. VI, vs. 102-121 (pp. 209-214, ibid):
vākyārthaṃ prati śeṣatvam
yat syād uccāranasya tu-
tat tātparyam tridhā tat syāt
vākyārtha trividhatvataḥ

103 kārakā”di-viśīsto yah
so”bhidheyaḥ kriyā”dikah.

104 yathā”bhidhiyamānārthād
anyathā’ nupapattitaḥ
pratiyamāno vācyārthathā
sa pratyāyya īritaḥ.

105 viṣam bhūṅkṣveti vākyā”dau
esa tāḍṛk - pratiyate,

106 dhvanir dvidhā sa caikaḥ syād
arthataḥ śabdo ‘parah.

107 yatrārthathā śabdo vā
tam artham upasarjanikṛta-svārthau
vyāṅktah kāvyā-viśeṣaḥ sa
dhvanir iti sūribhiḥ kathitah.

108 śabde dvividho dhvanir
ayam anunāda-rūpah ekaḥ syāt,
pratisabda-rūpa ekas
tayor viśeṣo vivicyate’ smābhīḥ.

109 tatra koṇāhati-sphūrjāt
kāṃsya-kenkāra-nādavat,
arthāntaraṃ pratitānusyūtam eva
vyanakti yat.
sōnunāda-dhvanir iti
kathyate dhvanikovidaḥ.

110 pratīṭārtham tyajan yatra
guhā”di-pratisabda-vat
prthag eva upalabhate,
sa eva syāt prati-dhvanih.

111 pratyyāyas tat tad artham
tatra tatra dhvanim dhvanih.
śāntyai vōstu kapāleti
vākyā"dāv ādimo dhvanih,
kapāla-dāma-likhitāṃ
srakṣyatī ādi-pada"tmiṃkām
lipīṃ ganāṃ pathanti iti.
vākyārthō yōbhidhiyate,
tena srṣṭyādi-kartṛnāṃ
dēvānāṃ dāma gamyate.
pratitena pratitā syāc
chambhor, devā"di-saṃśrīti,
tayāsya / nityātā-ekatva-svātāntyā"di pratiyate.
tat tatrōnusyūtām eva
dhvanan yatrāvāsiyate,
sōnunāda-dhvanir nāma,
tasyodāḥtrīr īdrī.

bhama dhāmmia visattho
ityādir vānunādabhāk,
bhrameti vidhirūpo yo
vākyārthō bhiihītaḥ puraḥ.
na gantavyā ca godēti
niśedhōnaṃ gamyate,
tena saṅketabhūṁīs tād
anusyūtāṃ pratiyate.

lāvānya-sindhor ity ādi
pratiśabda-nidarsanam,
yataḥ sindhūtpalā"dy arthān
anusyūtaḥ svanann api.
tat tat samānāvayavavān
rūpaṭiṣaya-bodhakān
prthag eva upalabhate
sa eva syāt pratidhvaniḥ.

bhakti-prahvayadēt yādāv
anunādaḥ pratiyate,
viśeṣaṇānāṃ tulyavāt
sāmarthyāt kuru śabdajāt.
kriyāsur iti vākyārtho
hastānusyūtam eva yat,
anunādam prajanayānupaih
(netre) puruṣa-rūpatām,
tejasvitañca dhvanayaty
anunādo tra dṛṣyate,
dattā"nandétī vākyā"dau
pratināda-dhvanir yathā
vīśeṣānānāṃ tulyarvāt
sāmarthyād api yo giraḥ,
pratiśadbam prajanayan
dhenuṣu sva-vīšeṣanaih.
māhātmyaṃ dhvanayaty
āśāṃ pratinīdo bhavet tataḥ.
śabda-dhvanir dvidhā-bhūtaḥ
śabdād eva avagamyate.
dhvanī-tātparyayoḥ kaiścit
prthaktvam kathyate budhaih.

apratiśthām a-viśrāntaṃ
svārthe yat paratām idam,
vākyāṃ vigāhate tatra
nyāyyā tatparatāsyā sā,
yatra tu svārtha-viśrāntaṃ
pratiśthāṃ tāvad āgatam.
tat prasarpati tat tasmāt
sarvatra dhvaninā sthitīḥ.”

dhvanī-tātparyayor bhedaṃ
ekcin necchanti, tanmate,
samāna-lakṣaṇatvāc ca
tayor na ca prthak-sthitih,
uktaṃ ca tikākāraīś ca
tayor aikyaṃ prati kvacit.
We may try to put this in English as follows:

In view of the sentence-sense, whatever is the remaining portion left behind, i.e. extra sense, after the words are pronounced, is called ‘tātparya’ or ‘import.’ On account of the three-fold sentence-sense, the ‘tātparya’ or ‘import’ is also three-fold. (102)

That which is qualified by the kārakas i.e. agent etc., and is of the form of action or, etc., cc., is said to ‘MP’abhidheya’ or expressed (tātparya). (103)

After the expressed sense is made clear, because of there being no further explanation, i.e. due to ‘arthāpatti’ i.e. presumption, that meaning which is implied, is said to be ‘pratyāyā’ or ‘meaning through implication.’ (104)

This ‘pratyāyā’ tātparya is illustrated in statements such as, “Eat poison...” etc. (105)
'Dhvani' is said to be two-fold such as (i) derived from meaning or sense and (ii) derived from the word.— (106)

"That kind of poetry, wherein the (conventional) meaning renders itself subordinate, or the (conventional) word renders its meaning secondary and suggests the (intended or) implied meaning (as principal), is designated as 'dhvani' by the learned. (The suggested sense is 'dhvani' or that kind of poetry where this occurs is dhvani-kāvyā).— (107)

With reference to a word (i.e. śabda) this 'dhvani' is two-fold such as (i) of the form of 'anunāda' i.e. resonance and (ii) of the form of 'prati-śabda' i.e. echo. These two are further discussed by us. (108)

That dhvani (or sound,) which like striking on a drum, or like noise caused by striking a bronze plate, conveys the related meaning, is termed as 'anu-nāda' by experts.— (109)

But that which gives a different meaning than the one conveyed primarily, like an echo from a cave resounding the original sound, is termed 'prati-dhvani.'—(110)

Meaning thus conveyed (in two different fashions) are termed that particular dhvani (i.e. (i) anunāda-dhvani and (ii) pratiśabda-dhvani) (Again both are either through the agency of meaning and therefore “ārtha” or through the agency of word, and therefore “sābda.”

(The illustration of ārtha-anunāda-dhvani follows, as in)

“sāntyai vōstu kapāladāma...” etc.

In this sentence we have “ārtha-anunāda-dhvani.” The script written by 'kapāladāma' which has words such as “strākyatai” etc., is read by the group (of Śivaś attendants, i.e. gaṇas.). This is the sentence-sense. Through this the samsāra’ or ‘dāma’ of the deities which make for the creation, is known. Through this apprehension, Śivaś ‘samsṛti’ i.e. continuation with reference to gods is implied. Through that eternity, oneness, independence, etc. are implied. The dhvani is termed anunāda-dhvani where this chain of implications ends. This is its illustration— (112)

‘Bhama dhammia. etc.’ is an instance of ārtha-anunāda-dhvani. The sentence-sense, such as “Move around” which is positive in nature, implies or suggests that “do not move on the banks of Godāvari.” Through this is conveyed the secret meeting-place of somebody. Thus the expressed sense here is positive but the implied sense is negative.— (113).
(ārtha-prati-śabda-dhvani is illustrated, as in) "lāvanya-sindhu...." etc. In this verse pratiśabda-dhvani’ is illustrated. The meaning though connected with sindhu-uptpala, etc. gives a fresh sense of the extreme beauty of the limbs. This is prati-dhvani (as the sense is different) (114).

(śabda-anunāda-dhvani)

In the verse vīg. “bhakti-prahvāya dātum.” etc. (sūrya-śataka, vs.3), pratiśabda-dhvani is illustrated (-śabda-variety). On account of common adjectives (i.e. qualities) through implication from the word ‘kuru’, ‘kriyāśuh’ is the sentence-sense concerning ‘kara’ or hand; and this is causing ‘anu-nāda’ i.e. reverberation and suggests the brightness and good form of the ‘puruṣa’. Thus it is a case of anunāda-dhvani. (115)

(śabda-pratidhvani)

The illustration vīz. “dattā”nandāḥ...” etc. is for ‘śabda-pratināda-dhvani.’ On account of common adjectives, and due to sāmarthya i.e. capacity to convey, the spoken words, cause echo in the cows and suggest the importance. (māhātmya).

It is prati-nāda-dhvani. (116)

śabda-dhvani is two-fold, and is collected from śabda or word only.

Some learned people hold that ‘dhvani’ and ‘tātparya’ are not identical, (as is suggested by the dhvanikāra). – (117)

Till the sentence is not having a complete sense, till it is not well substantiated or till it does not rest completely, the sentence-sense is supposed to continue. When it rests in its sense, when it achieves completion till that point the sentence-sense is supposed to extend. But when at a point a sentence is completed by reaching its sense, thus when a meaning is completely conveyed, and still it moves further to convey an additional sense, then this additional sense is the field of ‘dhvani.’– (118)

Some people do not accept any distinction between ‘dhvani’ or ‘suggestion’ and ‘tātparya’ or import. They feel that on account of common qualities these two do not exist independently of each other. Some commentators (i.e. Dhanika in his Avaloka on the Daśa-rūpaka of Dhanañjaya) have observed to this effect and said that– (119)

"Who the hell has decided that purport i.e. tātparya extends only upto this point and not further ? For virtually tātparya extends till the ‘kārya’ i.e. speaker’s intention is clearly conveyed. Thus ‘tātparya’ is not held in a balance."– (120)

Actually the difference between dhvani and tātparya is like the one between a
'brahmin' and a 'brahmacarin' (i.e. a student). The sub-division of the same i.e. tātparya is said to be different.”

(Bhoja says) “Tātparya or ‘import’ is said to be with reference to expressions in common parlance or sentences in works on various disciplines (=vacasi), but ‘dhvani’ is said to be there with reference to ‘poetic expression (Kāvyā) only, like the qualities of ‘saubhāgya’ with reference to a nāyaka i.e. hero, and ‘lavanya’ which is tasted with reference to the figure of a ‘nāyikā’ or heroine, or like ‘śṛṅgāra’ i.e. “highest pitch of aesthetic experience” with reference to a cultured critic with self-identity.”

Thus, as ‘tātparya’ (in poetic expression) of the form of dhvani being conveyed on its own (i.e. it being self-evident) in poetry the sentence-sense takes the form of ‘rasa’, ‘alaṃkāra’ etc. Thus this three-fold tātparya (i.e. one each as explained by Ānandavardhana, Dhanika and Bhoja), as explained by respective knowers, is ultimately the quality of a sentence i.e. it pertains to the speech, as spoken by a speaker.”— (121)

Dr. Raghavan (pp. 166, 167, etc., ibid) has neatly given the substance of Śāś views. We will try to place them here with our comments, if any. It man be noted that his references are to an edition of BP. which is not used by us. So, we will not mention the page-numbers given by him but of course, the chapter number is the same.

In the Ch. VI of his BP., Śā. tries to explain the concept of Dhvani in Bhoja, “in the light in which he (=Śā.) understood them.”

‘Tātparya’ is defined by Śā. as “Vākyārtham prati śeṣatvam uccāraṇasya”, and is divided, as is done by Bhoja, into three classes: “sa ca abhidheyaḥ, pratyāyyaḥ, dhvanirūpaḥ iti tridhā.”

It may be noted that Dr. Raghavan has not rendered in English, the Sanskrit expression of Śā. as, “vākyārtham prati śeṣatvam uccāraṇasya.” we have tried to put it as, “In view of the sentence-sense, whatever is left behind as extra-sense after words are pronounced, is called ‘tātparya’ or ‘import.’” Thus Śā. wants to drive at a wider sense of tātparya, over and above the correlated sense as advocated by the Mīmāṃsakas. We will go to see that Śā.Ś ‘tātparya’ is three-fold, viz. the abhidhiyamāna i.e. the correlated sentence-sense, the pratīyamāna i.e. implied sense as seen in statements which are qualified by some special context, and the ‘dhvani’ or suggested sense.
Dhvani in Kuntaka, Bhoja and others, and Guṇībhūta-vyañgya and Citra-Kāvyā. 1121

Dr. Raghavan continues to explain as follows. After quoting the three-fold import, at the stage of defining the ‘pratyāyya’ or implied purport, he makes a change. Dr. Raghavan rightly observes that Śā. differs from Bhoja so far as the understanding of the concept of ‘pratyāyya’ import is concerned. Dr. Raghavan observes that Śā. finds it, as we (i.e. Dr. Raghavan, and also Dr. Nandi now), also found, impossible to distinguish Bhojaś ‘pratiti’ (i.e. implied sense) and dhvani’; and also ‘pratīyamāna’ and ‘dhvanyamāna’. So, he made the distinction that such meaning as is called forth to explain a statement whose obvious expressed sense is clearly incompatible (i.e. what we have called to be a “qualified statement,” Yes, ‘qualified’ with reference to its special context of the speaker, the listener, etc. etc.), i.e. ‘anupapanna’, is called ‘pratīyamāna’. The example is, ‘viṣam bhūṅksva’. This, Dr. Raghavan observes, is partly faithful but not wholly to Bhojaś text.

“yathā’bhidhiyamānārthaḥ
anyathā’nupapattitah,
pratīyamāno vākyārthaḥ
yas sa pratyāyya ucyate.”

“viṣam bhūṅksva’ iti vākyādāv
esa tādṛk pratīyate.”

Bhoja, Dr. Raghavan observes, does not restrict ‘pratīyamāna-tātparya’ to cases of ‘anyathā-anupapatti’ of the abhidhiyamāna. For Bhoja clearly states:

“vākyārthaḥ, upapadyamānah, anupapadyamāno vā.” (śr. Pra. Vol-II. Ch. VII), though he illustrates only the latter with the example, ‘viṣam bhūṅksva.’

In other respects, Dr. Raghavan observes that Śā. faithfully summarises the whole text of Bhoja on dhvani.

At the end of the section, Dr. Raghavan observes, Bhoja takes up the question of the difference between Dhvani and Tātparya. We may add that, and Dr. Raghavan does not explain it in such a clear way, that Śā. here gives three views on tātparya-dhvani divide. The views are of Ānandavardhana, Dhanāṇjaya-Dhanika and Bhoja. We have clearly explained above the distinction between these three.

Dr. Raghavan observes that Śā. quotes the Kārikās on dhvani, viz. “a-pratiṣṭham...” etc. quoted in the Avaloka on the Daśarūpaṇa and says this view is wrong. Dhvani and tātparya are not separate but are identical. Dhvani or the suggested idea is got at only through the tātparya-śakti of a sentence. The suggested idea is also part of a speaker’s intention and everything coming within the
speakers' intention, is tātparya. There is no rule which lays down that the speakers' intention, beyond a certain stage, ceases to be tātparya and needs a new name (such as 'dhvani.') Here, Śā. quotes Dhanikaś Kārikā from his lost 'Kāvya-nirṇaya' which his Avaloka quotes:

"etāvataiva viśrāntiḥ
tātparyasyeti kim kṛtam,
yāvat-kārya-prasāritvāt
tātparyam na tulā-dhṛtam."

Śā. does not quote Bhojaś verses on the difference between tātparya and dhvani which bring in the similes 'saubhāgya' and 'lāvanya'. Instead Śā gives a single analogy. He says that 'dhvani' is a class of 'tātparya', an avāntara-bheda, even a brahmacārin is a kind of Brāhmaṇa, i.e. the first āśrami brāhmaṇa.

Here, Dr. Raghaven quotes from Bhojaś Śr. Pra. as under:

"dhvani-tātparyayor bhedo
brāhmaṇa-brahmacāritvat,
tad avāntara-bheda hi
prāyena prthag ucye."  
tātparyam eva vacasi
dhvani eva kāvye..." etc. from Bhojaś Śr. Pra.

Dr. Raghavan then quotes from the BP. as –

ato dhvanyākhya-tātparya-
gamyamānatvataḥ svataḥ,
kāvye rasālaṁkriyā"dir
vākyārtho bhavati sphyata.
evam trirūpaṁ tātparyaṁ
tat tat tātparya-vedibhiḥ,
vaktv-dvārā vākyadharma
eva iti, parikīrtaye."

Dr. Raghavan has not clarified, 'tri-rūpaṁ tātparyaṁ, tat-tad-vedibhiḥ'. We have explained this as three explanations of tātparya as given by Āanandavardhana, Dhanañjaya-Dhanika, and Bhoja.
Dhvani in Kuntaka, Bhoja and others, and Guṇībhūta-vyaṅga and Citra-Kāvyā.

Dr. Raghavan continues further and suggests (pp. 167, ibid) that Bahurūpa-Miśra in his commentary on the Daśarūpakā, follows Śā. closely and puts in prose Śā.'s summary of Bhoja on Dhvani. He ends thus: "ataḥ tṛtiya-kaksā-rūpēṇā dhvani-nāmnā tātparyena gamyamānatvāt rasālāṃkārā"di vākyārthāḥ. + + + evaṃ triprākāram api tātparyam vaktṛ-dvārā vākyadharna eva iti,

Bahurūpa-miśra follows also Śā.'s own modification of Bhojaś 'pratīyamāna'. Śā. and following him, Bahurūpa also, say that 'tātparya' pertains to speech through the speaker, "vaktṛ-dvārā vākya-dharmah," but Kumārasvāmin asserts that it pertains purely to the speaker and not to the speech.

"uddeśo nāma vakṛt-dharmah, na mīmāṃsakānām iva vākya-dharmah." (pp. 33).

Dr. Raghavan further observes that it is not clear what Bhojaś ideas are on the description of rasa as 'vākyārtha'; we do not find him discussing the subject in the section on tātparya and dhvani. But while describing the varieties of composition, dṛśya and śravya prabandhas, he says that the nāṭaka and the other nine rūpakas as well as nāṭkā and saṭṭaka (on the whole twelve) form 'vākyārthābhīnaya' and the rest, twelve uparūpakas, śrīgadita etc., form padārthābhīnaya.

"vākyārthābhīnayōyaṃ
prakīrtito nāṭakā"di-bhedena
dvādaśa-vidha-padārthābhīnayam
atha yathā-sdhitām vakṣye." (Śr. Pra. Vol. II Ch. XI)

Dr. Raghavan says that this by itself cannot lead us far, but we feel that by these terms Bhoja and also others (see, DR. Avaloka) who use such terms should only mean 'major' and 'minor' types.

Dr. Raghavan proceeds to note that in this same ch. (XI) we find Bhoja saying regarding rasa: "na hi vibhā"vādayōłamkārāḥ, api tu bhāva-rasa-tadābhāśanām alamkārānām abhinispattī-hetavaḥ artha-viśeṣāḥ.

nanv evam api artha-guṇatvāt amiṣām apy alamkāratvam prápnoti, satyam etat; kintu anyaparatayā na upādiyamānā- pratītān padārthāḥ prthak sphuranti iti. – (Vol.II).

Bhoja states here clearly that vibhāvas etc. are similar to padārthas in vākyārtha, Rasa, bhāva and their ābhāsa form vākyārtha, while the padārthas are described as having no more purpose to serve than the manifestation of the vākyārtha. The vibhāvas etc. do not separately exist by themselves and are not ends
in themselves; their ultimate aim is the manifestation of ‘rasa’. Dr. Raghavan observes (pp. 168 ibid) that padártha-vákyárttha-nyáya between vibhává”di- vácyavácaka and dhvanyamána rasá”di could only be an analogy which emphasises the fact that vibháva, etc. are rasa-para and the former are upáyamátra, the means for the latter. Ánandavardhana also, we know, has a similar approach. Even he holds that though padárthas are real, they are not independently cognised when the sentence-sense is cognised. Similarly the apprehension of the vibhává”dis lead to that of rasá”di in such a quick fashion, that the sequence between the two is not apprehended, observes Ánandavardhana. (Dhv. I. 10-12). Rasa therefore is the vákyárttha, so to say, with the apprehension of vibhává”dis forming the padártha. Dr. Raghavan observes that here the vákyárttha i.e. rasá”di must naturally be apprehended through ‘tātparya’, otherwise called ‘dhvani’ by Bhoja, and as such, Bhoja contradicts neither Ánandavardhana nor Dhanika.

Dr. Raghavan tries to defend his observation here that Bhoja contradicts neither Ánandavardhana nor Dhanika by suggesting that in Dhanikaś Avaloka we find a clear mention of rasa being vákyárttha, those that manifest it i.e., vibhávas, etc., being padártha, and the vákya being the Kávyá : “tatra vibháva”dayaḥ padártha- sthāniyāḥ, tat-samsrsto rasá”dih vákyártthāḥ, tad eva kāvyā-vākyam yadiyau tāv imau padártha-vákyártthau.” D. R. Avaloka.

Here, once again, we beg to differ from Dr. Raghavan. For Ánandavardhana padártha-vákyárttha-nyáya is just an analogy to be abandoned later in favour of ghaṭa-pradipa-nyáya between the first apprehension of vibhávádi and the next apprehension of rasá”di that follows. This second ‘nyáya’ takes us to vyāñjanā. But this is not so for Dhanañjaya / Dhanika for whom a dīrgatārta-tātparya, which is for them “a-tulādhrṭam” is more welcome then vyāñjanā-dhvani. So, if Bhoja calls his tātparya by the name of ‘dhvani’ he has to side either with Ánandavardhana or with Dhanika. Our impression is that Bhoja does not discard vyāñjanā and thus leans towards Ánandavardhana, though he equates dhvani with tātparya. For him ‘tātparya’ is thus the ‘ultimate principal sense’ and just not the sum total of padárthas. So, for all practical purposes, Bhoja should not be taken as an anti-vyāñjanā-dhvani theorist like either Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, or Dhanañjaya / Dhanika or Mahimā, but should be placed along with Kuntaka, or even above Kuntaka for Bhoja names dhvani and accepts it in his own way. By and large, Kuntaka and Bhoja are not anti-dhvani theorists but their acceptance of dhvani has a wider area than just vyāñjanā. Both may, be termed “antarbhāva-vādins” so far as ‘dhvani’ is concerned.
While dealing with their anti-vyanjanā stand, we have talked (see chapters on vyanjanā, tātparya, etc.) a lot on the approach of Bhaṭṭa nāyaka, Mahimā, Dhanaṇḍaya, Dhanika, Mukula, and Pratīhārenduṇḍa, hence we do not have to add anything fresh about them. They were all die-hard anti-dhvani theorists, and anti-vyanjanā theorists though of course they advocated the supremacy of ‘rasa’ in poetry and ‘rasa’ for them was apprehended by means other than vyanjanā, and ‘rasa’, though “kāvyā”tmā for them, was never termed ‘dhvani’ by these theorists. But they were taken care of and denounced very ably by Mammāṭa, Viśvanātha and the rest. After this the dhvani-thought-current flows smoothly and Ruyyaka, Šobhākara Mitra, Vidyādhara, Appayya and Jagannātha have chosen to go with the same.

We know that Ānandavardhana had talked about three-fold dhvani. Hence our next topic for a fuller discussion naturally could be rasa-dhvani and certain questions pertaining to its realisation in literature and drama, or in fact all fine-arts. Some other topics such as those concerned with the nature of rasa, bhāva, rasā”bhāsa, etc. rasa-bhāva-relationship, rasas deemed as prakṛti-rasas and viṇṇa-rasas, the number of rasas, the problem of Šantarasa, treatment of rasa beginning with Bharata, earlier ālamkārikas, Ānandavardhana down to Jagannātha, and even at the hands of Rūpa and Jīva Gosvāmī, i.e. the vaisnava ālamkārikas, and of course rasa in the hands of Kuntaka, Bhoja and even anti-dhvani theorists,— all this will hold us later. With this rasa-mimāṃsā will be over but prior to that we will see how Ānandavardhana, in his catholic vyanjanā-dhvani-rasa theory has correlated such thought-currents as ālamkāra, guṇa, riti, vṛtti, samghaṭanā, doṣa, anumiti etc. with rasa-dhvani. This will be done in the very next chapter that follows and then of course, after dealing with dhvani-virodha, we will pick up consideration of the types of major dramatic forms, which we had avoided on the earlier occasion. With this part I. of this Sahāradvāloka will be completed, to be followed by part II with individual chapters on guṇa, doṣa, ālamkāra, riti, vṛtti, laksana, vākrokti, auctiya, kaviśīkṣā, kavyaharaṇa, etc. ending with consideration of modern writers on Ālamkāra and general concluding remarks.

It may be noted before we end this chapter that these writers, i.e. Kuntaka, Dhanaṇḍaya, Dhanika. Mahimā, and Bhoja had hardly anything to say about the other two varieties of criticism based classification, viz. the guṇībhūta-vyaṃgya and the citra variety of kavya. But at least Ānandavardhana and his followers down to Jagannātha did recognise these varieties and it will be very interesting to look into the same before we close this chapter.
We knew that aesthetes of poetic art, when they enjoy poetry or literature, undergo an experience of supreme joy. A particular poem or piece of poetry makes an appeal to their heart and they are moved by it. Normally the piece, taken as a whole, as an indivisible organic unity, creates a particular response in the heart of the connoisseur. But when a second thought is given to a particular poem, in moments of tranquillity, the critic is in a position to discern different modes of appeal. These different modes can be held to be responsible for this or that type of classification of poetry in the hands of Sanskrit theorists. Ālaṃkārikas headed by Ānandavardhana have, as suggested earlier, classified poetry into dhvanikāvya, guṇībhūta-vyaṅgya-kāvya and citra-kāvya from the point of view of literary criticism. Ānandavardhana, and also Abhinavagupta, go to observe that even the so-called guṇībhūta-vyaṅgya variety, i.e. poetry with subordinated suggested sense, also can be classed as dhvani kāvya, when viewed from the particular angle of resā”di-vyaṅjanā in it. Thus, in a way, they seem to reject the idea of a watertight classification of poetry and probably from this point of view also, Ānandavardhana wisely avoids naming this or that type as ‘uttama’ i.e. excellent, ‘madhyama’ i.e. mediocre and ‘adhamā’ or ‘avara’ i.e. third-rate or low type of poetry. Poetry, if at all it creates any response in the heart of a connoisseur, does it only when taken as a single effort by the poet, one and indivisible, a complex unity. However, in moments of tranquillity or rest, the faculty of subtle analysis starts operating and it divines out different modes of appeal in poetry. Probably this gives rise to a broad form of three-fold classification as above. Divisions an sub-divisions of this or that type of poetry can simply be dubbed as an instinct for either going into the root cause of pleasure or even hairsplitting, so close to the Indian mind in general.

First, we will try to look into illustrations of all the three types of poetry. The ‘dhvani-kāvya’ or suggestive poetry is one in which, as noted earlier, the suggested sense, particularly of the form of sentiment, emotion etc. i.e. rasā”di, becomes the principal source of charm. Of course Ānandavardhana also accommodates here vastu-dhvani and ālaṃkāra-dhvani as well. “śūnyaṃ vāsagṛham vilokya....” etc. is an instance in point where śṛṅgāra-rasa is predominantly suggested. Ālaṃkārikas are of the opinion that here, the source of poetic appeal lies in the suggestion of the sentiment of love.

But in yet another poem, viz. “anurāgavatī sandhyā....” etc. the expressed sense, i.e. the bare description of sunset by itself is very touching to a responsive heart.
However, the sensitive critics also feel an underrurrent of suggested sense in which there is a faint realisation of the fact of a loving lady, with her heart full of love, trying to pursue an unyielding hero. This undertone enhances the beauty of this expressed sense in form of a lovely description of sunset.

Yet another type of poetry, The citra-kāvya, is taken notice of by Ānandavardhana and his followers. It is a type in which there is practical absence of any undercurrent of suggestion of the subordinated type, which could add to the charm of the expressed. Here only the expressed carries all grace and moves the cultured critics. The illustration is, “vinirgataṃ mānadam ātma-mandirāt,” etc.

In this illustration, the bare description of Amarāvatī causes poetic charm. Thus, we observe that an effort in analysing poetic experience has given rise to a three-fold, criticism based classification, of poetry.

We have seen that Kuntaka, Dhanika, or Mahimā and the rest were not interested in Ānandavardhana’s scheme and hence they do not discuss these two varieties. But for us it will be interesting how Ānandavaredhna treats and elaborates this topic of guṇībhuta-vyaṅgya and citra kāvya and how later ālāṃkārikas who follow his dictate, build a grand edifice on what Ānandavardhana has laid down as a base. It may also be noted that even the earlier ālāṃkārikas such as Bhāmaha, Dandin etc. the predecessors of Ānandavardhana also did not indulge in this criticism based classification but were satisfied with one based on external form only.

In the Dhvanyāloka, Ānandavardhana discusses the nature and scope of what he calls dhvanikāvya with all its divisions and sub-divisions upto Dḥv-III. 33. He concludes with the words: (Dḥv. III. 33) (vṛtti: (pp. 224, ibid):

"vimativiśayo ya āśīn
manisīṇām satatam a-vidita-sa-tattvah,
dhvani-samjñitāh prakārah
kāvyasya vyaṅjītāḥ sōyam."

“The variety of poetry designated as suggestion, which had become a source of controversy for long, because its real nature had eluded even persons of the best intellect, has now been explained.” (Trans. K. Kris-, pp. 225, ibid).

Ānandavardhana then comes to the second variety of poetry of subordinated suggestion, and observes: (Dḥv. III. 34, pp. 224, ibid).

“prakārónyo guṇībhūtavyaṅgyāḥ
kāvyasya dṛśyate
yatra vyañgyänvaye väcyay-cärutvam syät prakarśavat.”

“We can see another variety of poetry viz. poetry of subordinated suggestion, wherein the artistic excellence of the expressed is greater than that of the suggested, though the latter also happens to be present alongside of the former.” (Trans. K. Kris., pp. 225, ibid). Ānandavardhana adds that when the suggested sense which is compared to the charm of a damsel is predominant in poetry it is said to be ‘dhvani’. And when it is rendered subservient and in itself lends charm to the expressed sense, it is said to be poetry with subordinated suggestion.

Ānandavardhana then tries to give some further varieties of this type of poetry. We have seen elsewhere that fundamentally dhvanikāvyā is sub-divided into one in which the suggestive power, i.e. vyañjana is either based on abhikāra or denotation or on lakṣanā i.e. indication. In the same way, observes Ānandavardhana that the first variety of guñībhūta-vyañgya is obtained when a bare idea, conveyed by such words as have lost their conventional denotation might be the suggested element and it might become secondary to the purport of the sentence as a whole got at by its component denotative words. Thus, this is the case of ‘atyanta-tiraskṛta-vācyarūpa-vyañgya’, which is of the form of ‘vastu’ i.e. ‘idea’, being subordinated to the expressed sense. The illustration is:– “lāvanya-sindhur -aparaiva hi kéyam atra...” etc. Here, by the word ‘sindhu’, or ocean, is suggested fullness; by ‘utpala’, the side-glances of the eyes; by ‘śaśin’, the face; by ‘dvirada-kumbha-taṭi, the two breasts; by ‘kadalikāṇḍa’, the two thighs etc. are suggested The primary meaning of these words is totally brushed aside (= atyanta-tiras-kṛta) and the secondary sense is resorted to, which helps the suggestion of the vyañgya or the suggested sense, which ultimately becomes subservient and renders charm to the expressed sense.

Second variety of this type is seen when words with their expressed sense not concealed (i.e. a-tiraskṛta) give rise to a suggested sense which is subordinated to the whole expressed sense of the sentence : (vṛtti Dhv. III 34, pp. 224, and 226 reads as) – tatra vastu mātrasya vyañgyasya-tiraskṛta-vācyebhyah pratiyamānasya kadācid vācyarūpa-vākyārthāpeksāyā guñībhāve sati, guñībhūtavyānga-yatā yathā lāvanya-sindhur-aparaiva... etc., atiraskṛta-vācyebhyōpi sabdebyah pratiyamānasya vyañgya-sya kadācid vācyā-prādhānyena kāvyā-cāruttāpeksayā guñībhāve sati guñībhūta-vyañgyatā yathā udāhṛtam-’anurāga-vati sandhyā...” ity evam ādi.”– The illustration of this second variety is “anurāga-vati sandhyā” etc.
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Third variety is illustrated, as in “saṅketa-kāla-manasam viṭam.” etc., wherein the vyaṅgya is subordinated by its own expression through some other words: “tasyaiva svayam ukṭya prakāśikṛta vṛtvat,gunībhāvah, yathā udāhṛtam, ‘saṅketa-kāla-manasam,” ityādi. (Vṛtti, Dhv. III. 34, pp.226).

It may be noted that this variety depends more on the mode of conveying the suggested sense, rather than the type of suggested sense itself.

The fourth variety occurs when suggested sense in form of sentiment and the like is subordinated to another principal rasa or sentiment and the like. Actually this is the field of alaṃkāras such as rasaṭvat and the like: (vṛtti, Dhv. III 34, pp. 226, ibid): “rasā”di-svarūpa-vyaṅgyasṛga gunībhāvo rasavad alaṃkāre darśitaḥ; tatra ca teṣām ādhikārika-vākyāpeksayā gunībhāvo vivahana-pravṛttas-bhṛtyānuyāyi-rājat.” “The subordination of sentiment, etc., to the main purport of the sentence in such instances can be likened to the circumstantial subordination of a king who has to walk behind his own servant when the latter is a bridegroom taken in procession.” (Trans. K. Kris., pp. 227, ibid).

It may be noted that in this particular variety; illustrated as above by the stalk illustration viz. “ayaṃ sa raṣaṅṅoṭkarśi...” etc., we find that the fields of ‘rasavad ādi’ alaṃkāras and “guṇībhūta-vyaṅgya” mix and merge into each other. Ānandavardhana does not attempt to draw a clear-cut line of demarcation between the spheres of both. We will go to observe that even Mammaṭa has also failed to do the same, while as noted earlier in the classification of poetry attempted by Jagannātha we find a clear line of demarcation laid down between the areas of dhvani, guṇībhūtavyaṅgya of a special type. and guṇībhūta-vyaṅgya covering a number of figures based on sense. i.e. arthālaṃkāras.

Fifth variety is said to be there, when a suggested figure is subordinated as in case of the figure “dipaka” and the like: (vṛtti, Dhv. III 34; pp. 226, ibid): “vyāngyaḷaṃkārasya gunībhāve dipakā”dir viṣayah”. On finding out the special charm of the above mentioned fifth variety, Ānandavardhana becomes so jubilant, that he declares: (Dhv. III. 35, and vṛtti thereon, pp. 226, ibid):

“prasanna-gambhirapadāh
kāvyabandhāḥ sukhaṃvahāḥ,
ye ca teṣu prakārōyam eva
yojyaḥ sumedhasā.” (Dhv. III. 35).
ye ca ete a-parimita-svarūpāḥ api prakāśamānaḥ tathāvidhvārtha-ramaniyāḥ santo vivekināṁ sukhāvahāḥ kāvyā-bandhās teśu sarvesu ayam eva prakāra guṇībhūtavyāngyo nāma yojaniyāḥ yathā, "lakṣmīr duhitā, jāmātā hariḥ, etc."

"In all poetic compositions that look delightful by reason of their lucid and elegant words, only this variety of poetry should be recognised by the intelligent critic." (Dhv. III. 35)

Despite the fact that poetic compositions which look lovely and bring delight to discriminating critics appear unlimited, this very variety, viz. poetry of subordinated suggestion should be recognised in all of them. For example, "Lakṣmī is his daughter" etc. (Trans. K. Kris. pp. 227, ibid).

Ānandavardhana further adds:

(Dhv. III. 36, and vṛtti thereon; pp. 228)
"vācyālaṃkāra-vargöyaṁ
vyāngyāṃśānugame sati,
prāyenāvva parām cchāyāṁ
bibhral lakṣye nirīkṣyate." (Dhv. III. 36)

vācyālaṃkāra-vargöyaṁ vyāngyāṃśāsyā alaṃkārasya vastumātrasya vā yathāyogam anugame sati cchhyātiśayaṁ bibhral lakṣanakāraṁ ekadesena darśitaḥ. sa tu tathārūpaḥ prāyenā sarva eva parīkṣyamāno lakṣye nirīkṣyate." – "The whole lot of figures is seen in many an instance to put on a new charm when it is brought into touch with the suggested element." (Dhv. III. 36) – The earlier writers on poetics have themselves shown how a few of the figures of sense acquire a new charm, when they get into touch with the suggested element consisting of either a figure or a bare idea. But a scrutiny of instances will reveal that this is true of all the figures." (Trans. K. Kris, pp. 229, ibid).

Ānandavardhana further observes that as in the case of dipaka (i.e. Ellipsis) implying a simile, and samāsōkti (i.e. condensed metaphor), all other figures also seem to be containing the touch of another figure or another idea. For example, the touch of the figure atiśayokti (i.e. exaggeration) can be said to be there in case of practically all the other figures of speech. Bhāmaha has also said as such. Other alaṃkāras also follow the suit, though they cannot be seen to be contained in all the rest, as is the case with ‘atiśayokti.’ Ānandavardhana points out that in some figures, the said scope is limited to suggestion of certain figures only, e.g., ‘preyas’ is invariably seen in ‘vyājastuti’, and the like. In other figures, the said scope is
Dhvani in Kuntaka, Bhoja and others, and Guṇībhūta-vyaṇga and Citra-Kāvyā.

further limited to suggestion of figures only, as against ideas, e.g. there is upamā' in ‘samdeha’ and the like. Yet other figures are found to be mutually involved, e.g. ‘dīpaka’ and ‘upamā.’ Ānandavardhana then declares that—(vṛtti, Dhv. III. 36. pp. 228, ibid) : “tad evam vyā̄gyāṁśa-saṁsparṣa sati cāruttvaśīṣaya-yogino rūpaka”dayolamkārāḥ sarva eva guṇībhūta-vyaṇgyasya mārgaḥ.” “All figures, then, which contain a touch of suggestion at the same time owe their expressive charm due to that touch, deserve to be bought within the compass of poetry of subordinated suggestion.” (Trans. K. Kris. pp. 231. ibid). He adds (vṛtti, Dhv. III. 36, pp. 232, ibid) : “tad ayaṃ dvānu-niṣyanda-rūpo dvitiyópi mahākavi-viṣayō lakṣāṇīyaḥ sahardayaiḥ. sarvathā nasty eva sahrdaya-hṛdaya-hārīnaḥ kāvyasya sa prakāro yatra na pratīyamānārtha-saṁsparṣena saubhāgyam. tad idaṃ kāvyārahaṣyāṃ param iti sūribhir bhāvanīyam.”–

—“Therefore, this second manifestation of suggestion too should be recognised by refined critics as a beautiful avenue for first-rate poets. Certainly, there is not a single variety of poetry holding out an appeal to the hearts of refined critics which does not attain artistic excellence by the slightest touch of suggested sense. The learned should deem this as the greatest secret of poetry.” (Trans. K. Kris., oo. 233, ibid).

Ānandavardhana suggests (Dhv. III. 37, pp. 232, ibid) :

“mukhyā mahākavi-girām
alamkṛti-bhṛtām api,
pratīyamāna cchāyaisā
bhūṣā lajjeva yoṣitām.”

“anayā suprasiddhópy-arthaḥ kim api kāmanīyakam āniyate.”

—“Even for such expressions of poets as are already adorned by figures, this shade of suggestion will be a most important ornament even as bashfulness will be for women.” (Dhv. III. 37)

—“By this shade, even a common-place will be invested with unique charm.” (Trans. K. Kris., pp. 233, ibid)

Sixth variety of the guṇībhūta-vyaṇga-kāvyā arises when another sense is suggested with the help of kāku, or ironic tone, i.e. intonation, e.g. in, “svasthā bhavantu mayi jīvati dhārtrarastraḥ,” etc.

Ānandavardhana holds that instances which can reasonably be brought under this class of poetry should not be classed under dhvani by cultured critics (Dhv. III.
40). For instance, in “patyuḥ śiraścandrakālam anena...” etc., the suggested sense seems to be subordinated by the expression, viz. “nirvacanam jaghāna.” So, this should fall under guṇibhūta-vyaṅgya and not dhvani kāvyā. Ānandavardhana, winds up the discussion with the words (Dhv. III. 40)

“prakārōyaṁ guṇibhūta-vyaṅgyōpi dhvani-rūpatāṁ,
dhatte, rasā’di-tātparya- paryālocanayā punah.”
guṇibhūta-vyaṅgyōpi kāvyā-prakāro rasa-bhāvā”di-paryālocane punar dhvanir eva sampadyate.” – “This class of poetry, viz. that with subordinated suggestion also assumes the form of Dhvani or that with principal suggestion, if one views it from the standpoint of exclusive purport of sentiments, etc.” (Dhv. III. 40)

When viewed from the standpoint of purport, viz. sentiment, etc., even poetry with subordinated suggestion will become poetry with principal suggestion itself.” (Trans. K. Kris. pp. 237, ibid).-

Thus it seems that from Ānandavardhana’s point of view, one and the same illustration can serve for both dhvani and guṇibhūta-vyaṅgya types of poetry, when viewed from different angles. This position, however, seems to be a little bit confusing and we miss a clear line of demarcation between these two types of poetry, Or-perhaps Ānandavardhana did not wish that such water-tight compartments be imagined in case of poetry which refuses to be enclosed in just this or that groove. Any way, we have to wait for Jagannātha for a comparatively clearer and well-defined idea of the two, or perhaps, as noticed above, even he is also not very rigid. Poetry itself being an abstract art does not entertain any labels of a permanent nature and this drives Kuntaka or, even Mahimā to do what he has done.

So, we see that in the Dhvanyāloka, we come across only six clear sub-divisions of the guṇibhūta-vyaṅgya kāvyā, though Ānandavardhana has suggested the possibility of innumerable sub-varieties on account of the infinite variety of suggested sense. Out of these six, one consists of the ‘rasavad ādi’ alaṃkāras. First two varieties are based on the suggestion of an idea based on either abhidhā or lakṣaṇa, and one variety depends on the subordinated alaṃkāra-suggestion. The rest depend, as noted earlier, more on the mode of conveying the subordinated suggested sense; one on a faulty way of conveying wherein the suggested idea is as it were punctured by a direct expression, and the other on being conveyed through intonation (i.e. kāku).
Dhvani in Kuntaka, Bhoja and others, and Guṇībhūta-vyaṅgya and Citra-Kāvya.

Abhibavaguptaś attitude in this respect is quite characteristic of his general approach to poetry. For him, as noted at many places in his Locana, both vastudhvani and alamkāra-dhvani ultimately terminate into rasa-dhvani which alone, virtually is the soul of poetry. So, in all the varieties of guṇībhūta-vyaṅgya, according to the great Abhinavagupta, what happens is that first of all some suggested sense is subordinated to an expressed sense, which in its turn ultimately terminates into some other rasa-vyaṅja. Thus for him all guṇībhūta-vyaṅgya is ultimately nothing else but dhvani-kāvya itself: “ata eva iyati vācyasya prādhānyam, tathā’pi rasa-dhvanau tasyā’pi guṇatā iti sarvasya guṇībhūta-vyaṅgyasya prakāre mantavyam. ata eva dhvaner ātmatvāti ity uktataram bahuṣaḥ.”—Locana, Dhw. III. 34.

In Mammaṭa, however, we come across a more systematic classification and division. He defines guṇībhūta-vyaṅgya poetry as: “a-tādṛśī guṇībhūta-vyaṅgyam vyaṅgye tu madhyamam” (K. P. I. 5ab):—“But when the suggested meaning is unlike that, (i. e. is not principal), it (poetry) is called mediocre wherein the suggested becomes subordinate.” (Trans. R. C. Dwivedi, The Poetic Light; Kāvyaprakāśa of Mammaṭa; Pub. Motilal Banarasidass, Edn. 67, Delhi). (pp. 13, ibid). He starts the ullāsa V, K. P. with an eight-fold division of guṇībhūta-vyaṅgya poetry, wherein the following varieties are mentioned: (K. P. V. 45, 46 ab-pp. 138, ibid): evam dhvanau nirṇīte guṇībhūta-vyaṅgyasya prabhedaḥ āha:—

“agūḍham aparasyāṅgaṃ
vācyasiddhaṅgaṃ a-sphuṣtam,
sandigdha-tula-prādhānye
kākvā”kṣiptam a-sundaram- (V. 45)
vyaṅgyam evam guṇībhūta-
vyāṅgyasyā’stau bhidāḥ smṛtāḥ.”

“Thus having determined the dhvani (the best type of poetry), the author now states the varieties of the poetry of subordinated suggestion.

(V. 45) (i) Non-concealed, (ii) subservient to another, (iii) subservient to the establishment of the expressed meaning, (iv) indistinct, (v) of doubtful prominence, (vi) of equal prominence, (vii) implied by intonation, and (viii) non-striking.” (Trans. R. C. Dwivedi. pp. 139, ibid).

As noted above, he calls this type of poetry to be ‘madhyama’ i.e. ‘mediocre,’ ‘dhvani’ being ‘uttama’ or ‘excellent’ and ‘citra’ being ‘adhama’ or ‘low-class poetry.’
This sort of labelling is not to be met with in Ānanandavardhana or Abhinavagupta, though, of course, in a way perhaps implied in the latter.

Mammaṭa introduces the first sub-variety viz. 'agūḍha' with the words: “kāminī-kuca-kalaśavad guḍham camatkaroti. agūḍham tu sphiṭatayā vācyāyamānām iti guṇībhūtam eva. aghūḍham yathā- “yasyāsuhṛt-kṛta.”... etc.

"The hidden (meaning) produces charm in the manner of the jar-like breasts of damsels. But the one not hidden, being obvious, becomes as if directly expressed. Hence it is subordinate only. To illustrate the non-concealed (i.e. explicit): “yasyāsuhṛt... etc.” (Trans. R. C. Dwi., pp. 139).- In this example the word ‘jīvan’ has a suggested sense, based on indication or lakṣaṇā, with the arthāntara-saṃkramita-vāvyā. The word ‘jīvan’ or ‘living’ loses its original sense and acquires the sense of ‘hated existence’. Yet another illustration is supplied which is based on atyanta-tiraskṛta-vācyā-dhvani being subordinated. In this illustration, the word ‘cumbi’ means ‘touching’ and not ‘kissing’. In both these examples, the suggestion which is subordinated is itself “a-gūḍha” : e. ‘not cocealed’ and therefore not a source of any charm. So, we may say that this variety depends not only on the formal classification of dhvani, but also on the mode of conveying that particular dhvani or suggestion. Third illustration, viz. “atrā”sit phaṇīpāsa.” etc. also gives “a gūḍha” variety, in which resonant-like suggestion based on the power of sense (artha-sakti-mūla-anuraṇana-rūpa) is subordinated to the expressed sense.

In Aparāṅga-bhūta variety, Mammaṭa incorporates all the alaṃkāras that fall under the rasavad-ādi-class. This may be taken as an advance so to say, on Ānanandavardhana, who seems to take them as both ‘alaṃkāra’ and guṇībhūtavyāṅγya also.

Mammaṭa also extends the scope of this variety, when he herein incorporates the subordinated sense of the type of suggested figure based on the power of the word, i.e. śabda-sakti-mūla-alaṃkāra-dhvani. The next illustration is for the saṃlaksya-krama-vastu-dhvani being subordinated -vācyāṅga-to the expressed sense. The former is illustrated by the verse, viz. “jana-sthāne bhṛāntam...” etc., in which the suggested figure upamā based on the power of word becomes subservient to the expressed element mentioned through the words viz. “mayā”ptam rāmatvam... etc., in which the behaviour of the hero which is suggested, rests on the expressed sense viz. the behaviour of the Sun and the lotus plant.

Thus we have in all ten examples of this variety, eight of which are concerned with subordinated rasā”di dhvani or the suggestion of sentiment and the like, and
the last two are concerned with subordinated alaṃkāradhvani and vastudhvani respectively.

The difference between the second and the third varieties of the guṇībhūta-vyaṅga type of poetry should be carefully noted. The second variety, viz. 'vācyāṅga' and the third variety viz. 'vācy-a-siddhy-aṅga' differ in the fact that while in the former the suggested sense becomes subordinated to an expressed sense, which is complete in itself, and does not stand in need (i.e. is 'nir-apekṣa) of the support of the suggested sense; in the latter, however, the expressed remains incomplete till it gets the support of the suggested sense.

'vācy-a-siddhy-aṅga' is illustrated by two verses. In the verse viz. “bhramim aratīm alasa-hṛdayatām...” the suggested sense in form of “hālāhala” or “poison”, i.e. the suggestion of ‘vastu’ or bare idea or fact, is subservient to the expressed sense in form of a serpent.

The fourth variety viz. ‘asphuṭa’ can be contrasted with the first one. While in the first one, i.e. the a-guḍha-variety, the fault lies in the suggested sense being too exposed, i.e. being not properly concealed, in this variety, the fault lies in the fact of its being too much concealed. The illustration is, “a-drṣte darśanōtkaṃtā, drṣte...”, in which the subordinated suggested sense is too much concealed : “atra adṛṣṭa yathā na bhavati, viyoga-bhayam ca yathā na utpadyate tathā kuryāḥ iti kliṣṭm.” (K. P. V.) (pp. 150, ibid). This variety also can be said to depend not as much on the nature of the suggested sense, as on the faulty mode of conveying the suggested sense, as in case of the first variety. This is also the case with the following three varieties also.

In the “samadgḍha-prādhānya” variety, there is, as the name suggests, a doubt as to the preponderance of either the suggested sense, or the expressed sense; e.g., in the verse, viz., “haras tu kičit parivṛttā-dhairyaḥ...” etc., The suggested sense in form of the desire to kiss and the expressed sense in form of the directing of eyes, seem to be equally powerful. : “atra paricumbitum aicchad iti kim pratiyāmānam, kim vā vilocana-vyapāraṇam vācyam pradhānam iti samdehah.” (K. P. V) (pp. 150, ibid).

Tulya-prādhānya the sixth variety occurs when the suggested sense and the expressed sense carry equal weight. The illustration is, “brāhmaṇāṭi-krama tyāgo bhavatām eva bhātaye....” In this verse, The suggested sense, viz. that Jāmadajñā will destroy all the demons in the same way as he destroyed the kṣatṛiyas, is equally powerful. : “atra jāmadajñāḥ sarvesāṃ kṣatṛiyānām iva rakṣasāṃ kṣaṇāt-kṣayaṃ kariṣyati iti vyaṅgyasya vācyasya ca samam prādhānyaṃ.” (K. P. V, pp. 150, ibid).
The seventh variety is one based on the subordinated suggested sense, depending on intonation, i.e. kāku. The illustration is: “mathnāmi kauravaśaṭam...” etc. Herein, the suggested sense viz. that, “I will kill”, stands with the negation of the expressed sense: “atra mathnāmy eva ity ādi vyāṅgyam vācyā-niṣedha-sahabhāvena sthitam.” (K. P. V. pp. 152, ibid).

The eighth variety, called ‘a-sundara’ depends, as is implied by its name, on the indecent suggested content. Thus we come across a fresh principle of morality and the like. The example is: “vāṇīrakudāṅguḍḍaṇa...” etc. The idea is that some paramour with whom an appointment was fixed, has entered the bower, and through this suggested fact, the expressed fact, viz. that of the house-wife feeling nervous, is rendered more charming: “atra datta-saṅketah kaścit latāgahanam praviṣṭaḥ iti vyāṅgyāt, ‘śidanty aṅgāni’ iti vācyam sa-camatkāram.”

Actually we wonder why this variety is given the name “a-sundara.” For, a number of other illustrations elsewhere, such as, “kassa vā na ha rosi...”, such illicit relations are suggested. So, it is futile to bring in a “moral consideration;” for in love and war everything is fair and this variety could have been named ‘sundara’ where the expressed is rendered more charming by the un-expressed.

Mammata further goes into the sub-divisions of guṇībhūta-vyāṅgya-poetry. He observes that:

“eṣāṁ bheda yathāyogam
veditavyāś ca pūrva-vat. (K. P. 46 cd, pp. 152, ibid)

He further observes:

“vyajyante vastumātreṇa
yadā’laṁkṛtayas tada,
dhruvaṁ dhvanyaṅgatā tāsāṁ
kāvyva-vṛttes tadaśrayād” (Dhv. II. 29)

iti, dhvanikāroka-diśā vastumātreṇa yatrālaṅkāro vyajyate, na tatra guṇībhūta-
yāṅgyatvam. (K. P. V. pp. 152. ibid)

“The varieties of these (=eight kinds of subordinated suggestion) should be understood, as far as applicable, in the manner of the former case, (of the suggestive poetry).

‘As far as applicable’ means—when figures are suggested only by the matter itself, then they are invariably the part of suggestion; for the very procedure of poetry rests upon those, i.e. the suggested poetic figures.
In the manner thus shown by the author of Dhvani, wherever the poetic figure is suggested only by the matter itself, there is no sub-ordination of suggestion.” (Trans. R. C. Dwí., pp. 153, ibid).

Thus, instead of the fifty-one principal sub-divisions of dhvani or suggestive poetry, we have only 42 principal sub-divisions of guṇībhūta-vyāngya or poetry with subordinated suggestion. The alamkāra, suggested by the three-fold vastu i.e. idea or matter, viz. svataḥ-sambhāvī, kavi-prauḍhókti-siddha, and kavi-nibaddha-vaktṛ-prauḍhókti-siddham which again is threefold each, viz. pada-gata, vākya-gata and prabandha-gata—is never subordinated to the expressed sense and thus does not give rise to the guṇībhūta variety of poetry. Mammaṭa further adds that by saṁsṛṣṭi and saṁkara (i.e. by inter-mixture and collocation) with the other sub-divisions of dhvani and alamkāra, the total mounts to a very great extent:

“sālamkārair dhvanes
taiś ca, yogah saṁsṛṣṭi-saṁkaraiḥ,
--(K. P. V. 47) (pp. 1 54, ibid).
tad uktam dhvanikṛtā-
“sa-guṇībhūta-vyāngyaiḥ
sālamkāraiaḥ saha prabhedaιḥ svaiḥ,
saṁkara-saṁsṛṣṭi-bhyām
punar apy udyotate bahudhā” iti.
“anyonya-yogā evam syād
bheda-saṁkhyā’ťibhūyasi.” (K. P. V. 47 cd).

evam anena prakāreṇa avāntara-bheda-gaṇane ati-prabhutatarā gaṇanā. tathā hi śṛṅgārasyaiva bheda-prabheda-gaṇanāyām ānantaṃ, kā gaṇanā tu sarveśām.”
(K. P. V. pp. 154, ibid).

Thus, it seems that Mammaṭa has tried to treat the problem in a more systematic way as compared to Ānandavardhana.

Hemacandra, in a style so characteristic to him, reduces the divisions and sub-divisions and accepts fundamentally only three varieties of guṇībhūta-vyāngya-kāvya, which he styles as ‘madhyama’ after Mammaṭa. He observes: “When (the suggested sense) is not (principal), when the predominance is doubtful or equal, ‘madhyama’ is three-fold:
"asat-sandigdha-tulya-prādhānye
madhyamaṁ tredhā."

Kā. śa. II. 58- (pp. 152, Edn. Parikh Kulkarni, 64, Bombay)

'a-sat-prādhānya' i.e. absence of predominance of the suggested sense at times results from either its being not more charming than the expressed sense e.g. in "vāṇīra-kuḍam..." etc., or at times when the suggested sense is part of the expressed sense, (parāṅgatratvena) as in, 'ayaṁ sa raśanōtkarṣi...' etc. He observes : (pp. 152, ibid) : "asati, sandigdhe, tulye ca prādhānye vyaṅgyasya madhyamaṁ kāvyam. tatra a-sat-prādhānyam, kvacid vācyād an-utkāreṇa, yathā-"vāṇīra-kuḍam..." atra 'datta-saṅketaḥ kaścil latāgahaṇam praviṣṭaḥ' iti vyaṅgyāt 'śidanti aṅgāni' iti vācyam eva sātiṣayam.

kvacit parāṅgatvena, yathā, "ayaṁ sa raśano..." etc. -atra śrīgarah karuṇasya aṅgam. (Kā. Śa. vṛttī. on II. 58, pp. 152, 153):
yathā ca, "janasthāne-bhrāntam" etc. etc. (pp. 154, 155, ibid)

Hemacandra further observes (pp. 155 ibid), "kvacid a-sphuṭatvena, yathā, "ahayaṁ ujju-a-rūā..." etc. and also, "kvacid ati-sphuṭatvena, yathā,

"śrī-paricayāj jaḍā api...".
and then, "sandigdha-prādhānye yathā,
'mahīlā-sahassa-bharie..."
and, "tulya-prādhānye yathā
"brāhmaṇāṭikrama-tyāgaḥ..." etc. (pp. 156, ibid).

Thus for Hemacandra, the suggested sense becomes subservient to the expressed through 'a-sphuṭatva' or 'ati-sphuṭatva' i.e. by being very much concealed or being over-exposed. Hemacandra includes kākvādi-kṣipta variety under "tulya-prādhānya."

It may be noted that Hemacandraś treatment is even more precise and systematic as compared to his masters i.e. both Mammaṭa and Anandavardhana. We feel happy that he has avoided giving such names as "a-sundara."

Visvanātha closely follows Mammaṭa and Anandavardhana in defining the guṇībhaṭa-vyaṅgya-kāvya, and in giving the principal eight sub-divisions. He also quotes Anandavardhana and says : that when the suggested vastu (i.e. idea, matter), alaṃkāra (figure), or rasa (sentiment etc.) is subordinated to some other principal rasa, this should be recognised as dhvani-kāvya and not guṇībhūta-
Dhvani in Kuntaka, Bhoja and others, and Guṇībhūta-vyaṅgya and Citra-Kāvyā.

vyaṅgya. : kiñ ca, yatra vastv-alāmkāra-rasā"dirūpa-vyaṅgyānām rasā"bhyantare guṇībhāvas tatra pradhāna-kṛta eva kāvyā-vyavahārah - tad uktam tenaiva-


This in a way, may be taken as an advance on Anandavardhana, in the sense that while Anandavardhana is inclined to give two names to one and the same piece of poetry when viewed from different points of view, Viśvanātha makes up his mind and calls such poetry to be ‘dhvani’ only and not guṇībhūta-vyaṅgya. He further quotes the opinion of Candīdāsa who seems to hold that when one enjoys poetry, the experience is total in itself and is grasped by ‘akhanda-buddhi’ i.e. cognition which admits no parts, or by undivided mind, i.e. by the whole of the psyche. Only at a later stage, when one thinks of the context and the like, one realises the difference in type such as ‘dhvani’, guṇībhūta-vyaṅgya, etc., and eventhough this difference dawns upon one’s mind at a later stage, one’s former experience is not retarded, for it rests solely on taste : (vyākhyā, S. D. IV. 14 ab; pp. 291, ibid) “tad uktam asmad-gotra-kavi-pandītaṁ-mukhya-śrī-candīdāsa-pādaih-vākyā (vī. kāvyā) rthasya akhaṇḍa-buddhi-vedayatāṁ tanmayibhāvena āsvādādāsāyaṁ guṇa-pradhāna-bhāvabhāsas-tāvan na unuṇbhūyate, kālāntare tu prakaraṇā”di-paryālocanāya bhavan api asau na kāvyā-vyapadeśam vyāhantum īṣāḥ; tasya āsvādamātṛā"yattatvāt,” iti.

Jagannātha offers a four-fold scheme of division of poetry in which he mentions uttamottama, uttama, madhyama and adhama as we saw earlier. What the Kashmir School takes to be ‘guṇībhūta-vyaṅgya’ is perhaps taken by him as ‘uttama’, which he defined as : “yatra vyāngyam a-pradhānam eva sac camakāra-karanam tat dvitiyam.” But we have faced certain difficulties in agreeing with this as observed earlier, for we are not agreeable to the idea of something to be designated both ‘apradhāna’ as well as ‘camakāra-karaṇa’ in the same breath. The stock illustration of a king joining the Vara-Yātrā of his minister’s son does underline the importance of the bride-groom and not of the king. Of course, Jagannātha observes that the “eva-kāra” in the definition is there to exclude such instances of poetry in which the suggested sense is at last principal (pradhāna) with reference to the expressed (vācyā) sense, but is rendered subordinate to yet another suggested sense : “kāvyā‘peksayā pradhānibhūtam vyāngyāntaram adhaya guṇībhūtam vyāngyam adhaya ativāpyti-vāranāya avadhāraṇam. tena tasya dhvanitvam eva.” (R.G.).
Jagannātha also, like Viśvanātha discourages the application of double standards to such cases as, “ayaṁ sa raśanātkarṣ” etc. But we feel that Ānandavardhana and those who agree with him seem to have a more flexible mind and they are open to consider various angles. Jagannātha further adds that by the use of the word ‘camatkāra’ or Charm in the definition, he excludes instances of what may be called ‘tīna’ or “too much concealed” suggestion, and also “vācyacitra” or poetry with figures of word and sense, as the only source of charm as ‘adhama kāvya’. As observed earlier, we fail to agree with Jagannātha when he observes that while both in ‘uttamottama’ variety and the ‘uttama’ variety, ‘vyāṅgya’ or suggested sense becomes the source of charm, yet there is a difference between the two brought about by the fact of the ‘vyāṅgya’ being principal or subordinate. He also goes to include certain figures of sense such as ‘samāsōkti’, ‘paryāyōkta’, etc. into ‘uttama’ variety, because the source of charm lies in the subordinated suggested sense and not the expressed sense. Thus for him, there is a distinction between a figure and a figure. For Jagannātha, perhaps eventhough all the figures have some implicit element in them, as noted by Ānandavardhana earlier, all cannot be included in this “uttama” variety. It has to be admitted that even if we agree with Jagannātha or not, this sort of a clear perception of the difference in the source of charm, and therefore a clear line of demarcation between ‘dhvani’ or ‘uttamottama’ and guṇībhūta-vyāṅgya of his ‘uttama’ variety on one hand, and arthālaṃkāres or ‘madhyama’ type and also ‘citra’ or ‘adhama’ type on the other, may be taken as an original contribution of Jagannātha, for even Ānandavardhana and Mammaṭa have not perceived this.

Thus we may observe that in Ānandavardhana, there is no clear line of demarcation between ‘dhvani’, ‘guṇībhūtavyāṅgya’ and ‘artha-citra’, and the subdivisions of guṇībhūta-vyāṅgya also are less systematic and do not carry this or that special names. But this is one way of looking at things. The other way is that perhaps the author of the Dhvanyāloka was more charitable in his approach and by neither naming them as ‘uttama’ ‘madhyama’ or ‘adhama’, nor by giving any specific names to the different types of guṇībhūta-vyāṅgya Ānandavardhana has evolved a more catholic approach to the enjoyment of poetic art as is perhaps noticed in the view of Candīdāsa, the forefather of Viśvanātha.

Mammaṭa as we saw, gave a name and location to a certain taste, but Hemacandra again shows a better balanced approach by showing less enthusiasm regarding tendency of hair-splitting so common to Indian literary criticism in general. Hemacandra sides with his masters in case of the evaluation of such verses
Dhvani in Kuntaka, Bhoja and others, and Gunibhūta-vyaṅgya and Citra-Kāvyā. 1141

as “aṃ sa raśanōtkari” etc., but Viśvanātha is inclined more towards taking the same as ‘uttama’ kāvyā. Jagannātha as seen above has his own approach.

Before we consider the variety of poetry called the ‘citra’ kāvyā, we may observe that, putting aside the approach of Kuntaka and Mahimā, different types of appeal to taste in poetry, give rise to the tendency to classify poetry into this or that type and then to give divisions and sub-divisions which tend to become pedantic and mechanical. Ānandavardhana also has counted such sub-divisions. But later critics become a sort of prey to mechanical system of naming divisions and sub-divisions from, what we have termed as “criticism” point of view. Ānandavardhana was wiser when he did not name the three types as “uttama”, “madhyama” and “adharma”. But Mammata does this and he is followed by a host of other critics. Hemacandra shows some discretion in cutting down the number of these mechanical divisions and sub-divisions, which again later critics, even Jagannātha including, seem to revive with greater force.

It may be noted that Ānandavardhana is inclined to be more charitable when he shows his preparedness to accept one and the same illustration of poetry as both ‘dhvani’ and ‘gunibhūta-vyaṅgya’ and thereby indicate the nebulous and complex nature of poetry which is basically an abstract art. If at all we find some discrepancy in this, it is tolerable, for he errs on the safer side by allowing a wider scope to poetry. Jagannātha, when he tries to be more systematic in order to avoid the above mentioned contingency of calling one and the same piece of poetry by two names such as “dhvani” and also “gunibhūta-vyaṅgya,” he seems to fall into yet another trap as discussed by us above. As already seen by us, for Jagannātha, both in the “uttamottama” variety and “uttama” variety, ‘vyaṅgya’ i.e. the suggested sense becomes the source of charm and yet there is a difference between the two brought about by the fact of the suggested sense being either “principal” or “subordinate.” However, we know that in poetry, a particular sense is called either ‘principal’ or ‘subordinate’ only from the point of view of its capacity to become a soure of charm. So his definition seems to involve a sort of self contradiction.

Before we move on to consider ‘citra’ kāvyā, it may be noted that Jayadeva in the eighth mayūkha (VIII.1) observes:

“yat vyajyamānam manasaḥ
staimityāya, sa no dhvaniḥ
anyathā tu gunibhūta-vyaṅgyam
āparitaṃ tridhā”–
"That suggested (sense) which causes delight to the mind, is ‘dhvani’ for us. If it is not so (i.e. if the suggested is not more charming than the expressed), it is ‘guṇībhuṣa-vyaṅgya’ for us. It is three-fold.” Jayadeva gives three types of guṇībhuṣa-vyaṅgya but virtually accepts all the eight types of Mammatā. Jayadeva seems to talk of ‘prakāṭa-vyaṅgya’, ‘a-cāru-vyaṅgya’ and ‘cārutarā-vācyā-vyaṅgya’ He observes (VIII. 2) :

(Candrā"lōka VIII. 2)—

“vyakta eva kvacid vyaṅgyaḥ
kvacid artha-svabhāvataḥ,
kvacic cārutarasyā'gre
sa vimūṅcati cārutām.”

The suggested sense is ‘vyakta’ clearly at places. At places it is not charming and at other places it looses its beauty before ‘vācyā’ which is more beautiful. The ‘Paurṇamāsī’ commentary (pp. 258, Edn. Chawkhawba skt. series, Varanasi, '64) pp. 258, observes : “guṇībhuṣa-vyaṅgyasya traivedhyam lakṣayati—"vyakta" iti. kvacid vyaktaḥ prakataḥ vācyā eva vyaṅgyaḥ. kvacid arthasya svabhāvai svabhāvikād arthāḥ iti bhāvaḥ. vyaṅgyo na cāruḥ. kvacit sa vyaṅgyaḥ, cārutarasya vācyasya agre cārutarām ramaṇiyatam vimūṅcati, tyajati. prakata-vyaṅgyam ekam, a-cāru-vyaṅgyam dvitiyam, cārutarā-vācyā-vyaṅgyam tṛtiyam iti trayo bhedāḥ.

śaradāgama-kr̥nmate tu iyam yojanā—"vyaktir eva" iti pāṭhaḥ. kvacid vyaktir eva, vyaṅjanā eva cārutarām muṇcati iti ekāḥ prakāraḥ. kvacid vyaṅgyorthaḥ svabhāvata eva cārutarām muṇcati ity aparāḥ, kvacic cāruḥ apy arthaḥ cārutarā saṇniḍhānād acārur ity aparāḥ, iti. atra mate ‘arthaḥ svabhāvataḥ” iti bhinnam padam.” (pp. 258, ibid).

Thus for Jayadeva the suggested sense is at times ‘spaṣṭa’ or exposed, at times it is not beautiful by nature, and at times compared to an extremely charming expressed sense, it leaves its own beauty. He mentions all the eight varieties as mentioned by Mammatā and correlates each one with the corresponding variety of dhvani. He is very clear however, with reference to ‘asundara’ which he rightly explains as :

“a-sundaram yadi vyaṅgyaṃ
syād vācyād a-manoharam.” (VIII.9ab pp. 262, ibid)

Thus if the suggested sense is “less charming” than the expressed sense, it is the case of ‘a-sundara” variety.
Dhvani in Kuntaka, Bhoja and others, and Guḍībhūta-vyaṅgya and Citra-Kāvya.


‘Vidyānātha’ also with a quotation from the K. P., does the same. We have seen earlier what Viśvanātha does. For him even more varieties than eight are possible as dipaka, etc. which have ‘upamā’ suggested are also part of this type.

It may be noted that whatever was respected by earlier ālaṁkārikas under the guise of an ālaṁkāra, is accepted by the dhvani-vādins as part of guṇībhūta-vyaṅgya. Ānandavardhana has clearly stated at Dhv. III. 36 (pp. 228, ibid) that

“vācyālaṁkāra-vargóyaḥ
vyaṅgyāṁśānugame sati,
prāyenaiva paraṃ chāyāṁ
bihrala lakṣye nārikṣyate.”

“The whole host of figures is seen in many an instance to put on a new charm when it is brought into touch with the suggested element.” (Trans. K. Kris., pp. 229, ibid)

Keśavamīśra also follows the same tradition and Appayya in his “Citra-mīmāṁsā” (pp. 23,) also echoes the same view. We have seen above the views of Jagannātha, who has a four-fold scheme of criticism-oriented classification.

Citra-kāvya is the third type of poetry enumerated by Ānanda-vardhana, After explaining the first two varieties of poetry on the basis of the suggested sense being either principal or subordinate with reference to the expressed sense, and naming them respectively as “dhvani” and “guṇībhūta-vyaṅgya”, Ānandvardhana proceeds to discuss ‘citra’ kāvya, which is different from these two, and is two-fold such as ‘śabdā-citra’ and ‘artha-citra’, He observes : (Dhv. III. 41; 42; pp. 244, ibid).

“pradhāna-guṇa-bhāvābhhyāṁ
vyaṅgyasyaivaṁ vyavasthite,
kāvye ubhe; tatōnyat tat
citrām ity abhidhīyate.” (Dhv. III. 41)

“citrām śabdārtha-bhedena
dvividhāṁ ca vyavasthitam,


		
tatra kīcič chabda-citram
vācyā-citram atāh param.” (Dhv. III. 42).

—“These two classes of poetry are decided thus on the principal of importance or unimportance of the suggested content. That which is other than both is given the name of Portrait (citra).”— (III. 41)

“Portrait-like poetry is also seen to be two-fold inasmuch as it is based either on word or on meaning. The first variety is word-portrait and the second, meaning-portrait.”—Dhv. III. 42.)

(Trans. K. Kris., pp. 245, ibid).

Ānandavardhana observes: (vṛtti, Dhv. III. 42) (pp. 244, 246, ibid) :-

“If the suggested content is all important, we get the class of poetry called ‘dhvani’ or poetry with principal suggestion; if the same is subordinate, we get the second class of poetry called, ‘guṇībhūta-vyaṅgya’, or poetry with subordinate suggestion; that class of poetry which is seen to differ from either, and which is destitute of purport relating to sentiments and emotions etc., which is devoid of the power to reveal any suggested content and which owes its construction only to the strikingness of the expressed meanings and expressions denoting them gets the name of ‘Citra’ or portrait. It is not poetry at all, strictly speaking. It is only an imitation of poetry. One of the sub-divisions of this poetry of portraiture is word-portrait such as rhyming repetition, and so on, whose employment involves much labour. The second sub-division differs from word-portrait and may be called meaning-portrait. It will also be devoid of the suggested content and will be wanting in the purport of sentiments etc. Poetic fancy and such other figures are illustrations of this.” (Trans. K. Kris. pp. 245, 247, ibid).

Before we proceed further with Ānandavardhanaś views we may observe that it is Ānandavardhanaś observation that, “na tan ūkhyām kāvyam. kāvyānukāro hy asau”– which prompted Viśvanātha to reject ‘citra’ as a variety of kāvyā. But the very fact that Ānandavardhana has mentioned and discussed this variety shows that
this was something which could not have been totally rejected. We will go to see that he almost concedes that there is nothing on earth, no description whatsoever, which could not have even distant relation with rasā”di i.e. aesthetic relish, in the sense that even bare descriptions make for uddīpana-vibhāva in someway or the other. It is exactly this possibility which promotes Ānandavardhana to accept, however tacitly, this variety of poetry as poetry, may be only for the beginners.

Ānandavardhana further continues the discussion. He raises a question as to what is this ‘Citra’ kavya, and answers for himself that it is that variety where there is no touch of suggested content. Actually the suggested content is said to be three-fold. The objector says that of these three types the absence of two viz. vastu vyāngya and alamkāra-vyāngya could be taken as the area of citra kavya. But in fact, no class of poetry is possible in which there is no involvement of rasa or bhāva, etc.—“yatras tu rasā”dīnām avyāyatvaṃ sa kavya-prakāra na sambhavaty eva.” For there can be no poetry without theme or content or vastu : “yasmād a-vastu- saṃsparsitā kāvyasya na upa-padyate.” All the subjects in the universe become connected with some sentiment or emotion, at best in form of stimuli: “vastu ca sarvam eva jagad-gatam avaśyam kasyacid rasasya bhāvasya vā aigatvam pratipadyate, antato vibhāvatvena.” Sentiments are indeed so many states of mind; and nothing in the world can be imagined which does not bring about a particular state of mind in man. We may say that this is a great observation concerning human psychology. If anything is possible, which has no mental effect as its consequence, such a thing, then, can not be a poet’s concern at all. Now, when something does become a subject of the poet’s activity, how can one speak of it as ‘citra’ or bare portrait ? :”cittavr̥tti-viṣeṣā hi rasā”dayah; na ca tad asti vastu kīṇcid yan na citta-vr̥tti-viṣeṣam upajanyati; tad anutpādane vā kavi-viṣayata eva tasya na syāt, kavi-viṣayaś ca citratayā kaścin nirūpyate” It is possible that some poetic content takes the form of ‘citra’.

We may observe that it is this inherent beauty of any content which becomes the subject of a poet’s activity, and also the beauty itself of a poet’s efforts that have prompted Kuntaka to accept ’Vaktratā as the ‘Jivita’ i.e. soul of poetry in place of the suggested content.

Ānandavardhana knows that he cannot totally reject this approach to poetry. So, he accepts the fact that there is nothing on earth which is totally divorced from the cause of rasa-bhāva etc. But, he came across many trivial efforts on the parts of pseudo-poets “kaviṃ manyamānāḥ”, who placed there worthless pieces as poetry. Perhaps Ānandavardhana was sick of such efforts and we may say, quite
justifiably. Even we feel the same way when we read a lot of “trash” served in our mother tongue, Gujarati or Hindi or any, and denounce it as ‘no poetry.’ Thus, Ānandavardhana, being more cultured and tolerant as compared to us, suggests that even if no species of poetry exists which absolutely does not convey sentiment, but all the same, if the poet is seen to have no exclusive intention to convey sentiments, emotions, etc. and if he is more keen on employing laboured figures only, either of sound or sense, we may take it to be having some content which is devoid of sentiments whatsoever. Such a poet has keenness of deploying figures only. The content of words in poetry is based only upon the poet’s intention. Actually, Ānandavardhana concedes, though some sort of apprehension of sentiments etc. is possible by force of the expressed sense itself even in instances wherein no such keen intention towards them is present on the poet’s part, still it will be negligibly slender and from this point of view also, one might justify the existence of a scope for ‘Citra’ type, (with apparent absence of rasa-bhāvā”di in it).

Ānandavardhana sums up the discussion in two verses :

“rasa-bhāvā”di-viṣaya-
vivakṣā-virāhe sāti,
alaṃkāra-nibandho yaḥ
sa citra-viṣayo mataḥ.”
rasā”diṣu vivakṣā tu
syāt tātparyavatī yadā,
tadā nāsty eva tat kāvyam
dhvaner yatra na gocarāḥ.” (pp. 248, ibid).

“The employment of figures in the absence of intention towards the purport of sentiments, emotions etc., should be regarded as an illustration of Portrait-like poetry.

If on the other hand, there exists a sole intention towards sentiments, etc., no poetry can remain outside the sphere of dhvani or poetry of principal suggestion.” (Trans. K. Kris. pp. 249, ibid).

Ānandavardhana observes that: “etac ca citraṃ kavināṃ viṣṇukhala-girāṃ
rasā”di-tātparyam anapecśya eva kāvya-pravṛtti-darśanād asmābhīḥ parikalpitam.
idāiniṇānāṃ tu, nyāyān kāvya-naya-vyavasthāpanā kriyamāṇe, nāsty eva dhvani-
vyatārikāḥ kāvya-prakāraḥ. yataḥ paripāka-vatāṃ kavināṃ rasā”di-tātparya-virāhe
vyāpāra eva na śobhate. rasādi-tātparye, na ca nāsty eva tad vastu yad abhimata-
Dhvani in Kuntaka, Bhoja and others, and Guṇībhūta-vyaṅgya and Citra-Kāvyā.

rasāṅgatāṃ niyāmānaṃ pragunībhavati. acetāna api hi bhāvā yathāyatham ucitra-rasa-vibhāvatayā cetana-vṛttānta-yojanayā vā na santhy eva te, ye yānti na rasāṅgatām. tathā ca idam ucyate—“apāre kāvya-saṃsāre... ... ...”-

tasmān nāsty eva tad vastu yat sarvā’tmāna rasa-tātparyavataḥ kaves tad icchayā tad abhimata-rasāṅgatām na dhatte. tathopānibadhyamānaṃ vā na cārutvāciṣayaṃ puṣnāti. ... tad evaṃ idānīntana-kavi-kāvyanayopadeśe kriyamāne prāthamikānāṃ abhyāsārthināṃ yadi parama citreṇa vyavahāraḥ, prāpta-parinatīnāṃ tu dhvanir eva kāvyam iti sthitam etat.”

(vṛtti, Dhv. III. 42, pp. 248, 250, ibid)—

“This class of poetry, i.e., portrait like poetry, has been noted at all by us, because of the practice of poets who recognise no laws in their usage of words and who go about composing poems without any intention of incorporating sentiments, etc. therein. But if we should strictly apply the new principle of poetry laid down here, there can be no class of poetry other than ‘dhvani’ or poetry with principal suggestion. For, in the absence of whole-hearted intention towards sentiments etc., the very activity of poets will not appear charming; and contrariwise, in the presence of whole-hearted intention towards sentiments etc., there will be no subject which will not attain exceeding charm by being made an accessory of the intended sentiment. Even amongst insentient objects, there are none which will not become accessories of sentiment either by acting as stimuli towards the intended sentiment or at least by a metaphorical application of the behaviour of objects to themselves. Hence it is that we say -

“In the boundless realm of poetry, the poet alone is the creator, and as it pleaseth him, so doth this world revolve...” etc. .... Thus it is clear that there is absolutely no such subject which does not become an accessory of the intended sentiment by the poets desire, so long as his concern is solely with sentiment. Nor does it ever fail to acquire exceeding charm when so handled. All this is seen in the works of first-rate poets. In our own poetic compositions too, we have tried to illustrate these principles as far as possible. Thus viewed, all classes of poetry will come only within the sphere of ‘Dhvani’ or poetry with principal suggestion. From this stand-point of sentiment etc., on the part of the poet, even the class designated by the name of ‘poetry of subordinated suggestion’ will come only under the sphere of dhvani, as we already said. It has also been said that in quatrains of affectionate praise and devotional hymns, if sentiments etc. are regarded as subordinate and that in Prakrit verses known as Ĥṛdayavatis and in some gnomic verses of
worldlywise men, if the expressed sense itself with an under-current of suggested sense strikes us as important, the reason is to be sought in the fact that the poetry of subordinated suggestion too, is a derivative of 'dhvani' itself. Thus, when we strictly apply the new principle of poetry enunciated here, we can speak of Portrait-like poetry only in a loose way, only as an aid to the understanding of beginners in the study of poetry. So far as persons, with well developed intellects are concerned, ‘Dhvani’ or poetry with principal suggestion alone will deserve the title of poetry.” (Trans. K. Kris. pp. 249, 251, etc. ibid).

Ānandavardhana sums up the discussion with the words- (pp. 250, ibid) :

“tad ayam atra samgrahaḥ-
yasmin raso vā bhāvo vā
tātparyena prakāśate,
saṃvṛttyaḥ bhihitam vastu
yatālaṃkāra eva vā.
kāvyādhvani dhvanir
vyaṅgya-prādhānyaika-nibandhanaḥ
sarvatra tatra viśayi
jñeyah sahṛdayair janaīh.”–

“Refined critics should understand that ‘dhvani’ whose sole condition is the principal nature of the suggested content embraces all instances of poetry, wherein is found a purposively conveyed sentiment or at least an idea or figure conveyed in a covert fashion.”– (Trans. K. Kris., pp. 251, ibid).

That Ānandavardhana in his own way accepts citra-kāvyā but, eventhough he has given a three-fold criticism-oriented classification of poetry, his preference for ‘dhvani’ with predomiance of rasa, bhāva etc., is absolutely clear.

Among his posteriors, Mahimā had shown a very strong and biased attitude supporting only that poetry as poetry wherein there is ‘rasānumiti’ or “inference of rasa” alone. So for him, let alone ‘citra’, even the so called ‘guṇābhūta-vyaṅgya’ was unacceptable as whatever was inferred (i.e. suggested in the view of the dhvanivādin) was necessarily superior, i.e. more charming and therefore principal, as compared to the expressed or vācyā, for him. Thus for him only the ‘dhvani’ kāvyā of Ānandavardhana was acceptable. We have suggested earlier in detail Kuntakaś approach also which was too wide as against this too narrow attitude of Mahimā.
Mammaṭa, we will go to observe, uses the term “adhama” or “low-class” i.e. worst type of poetry for this so called ‘citra’ kāvya. This for him (K. P. I. iv) is “avara” and is two-fold such as “śabda-citra” and “artha-citra” as suggested by Ānandavardhana. Mammaṭa also observes that (K. P. VI).

“yadyāpi sarvatra kāvye antato vibhāvā”dirūpatayā rasa-paryavasānam, tathā’pi sphpuṭasya rasasya anupalāṃbhād a-vyaṅgyam etat kāvya-dvayaṃ uktaṃ. atra tu śabdārthālaṃkāra-bhedād bahavo bhedāh, te ca alaṃkāra-nirṇaye nirṇesyeante.” (K. P. VI., pp. 192, End. R. C. Dwivedi, ibid).

“Though everywhere in poetry, ultimately the character being that of the determinant and the rest, there is culmination in the rasa (i.e. all poetry delineating the vibhāvas etc., is ultimately posited in rasa). Yet these two kinds of (portrait-) poetry, because of the absence of distinct sentiment, are devoid of suggestion. But of this (portrait-poetry) there are many varieties on account of the divisions of the poetic figure into that of the word and the sense. These will be taken up at the time of elucidation of the figures.”

(Trans. R. C. Dwivedi, pp. 193, ibid).

Vidyānātha has something else to say about ‘citra’ kāvya. While others take ‘asphuṭa-vyaṅgya’ as variety of guṇībhuṭa-vyaṅgya, Vidyānātha takes it to be ‘citra-kāvya’. He observes (pp. 51, Pratāparudriya, Edn. Madras, 1914 A. D., C.-Chandrasekhara Sastrigal) :-

“vyaṅgyasya prādhān yāprādhān yābhhyām a-sphpuṭatvena ca, trividham kāvyam, vyaṅgyasya prādhānye uttamam kāvyam dhvanir iti vyapadiśyate. a-prādhānaye madhyamam guṇībhuṭa-vyaṅgyam iti giyate. vyaṅgyasya a-sphpuṭatve adhamaṃ kāvyam citram iti giyate.” ... (pp. 52, ibid).

“citram trividham śabda-citram artha-citram ubhayacitram ca iti.”

Thus for him, even in guṇībhuṭa-vyaṅgya the ‘vyaṅgya’ or suggested sense has to be “sphuṭa” or clear. ‘asphuṭa-vyaṅgya’, for him, gives rise to ‘citra’ which is ‘adhama’. Thus he adopts the terminology of both Ānandavardhana and Mammaṭa, but with a difference that his ‘citra’ or ‘adhama’ is not “a-vyaṅgya” i.e. it is not “without suggested sense totally.” Thus the prima facie view, advanced in the Dhv. and practically accepted by Ānandavardhana that no poetic content worth its name could be totally bereft of suggestivity as, in one way or the other, even as a stimuli, it is connected with the mental states (cittavṛtti) and therefore with ‘rasa’, which in itself is “mānasa-cittavṛtti-rūpa”, is acceptable to Vidyānātha.
Viśvanātha is clear when he accepts only ‘dhvani’ and ‘guṇībhūta-vyaṅgya’ as varieties of kāvyā and rejects the third type—‘citra’ as it is without a touch of suggestivity. He has an interesting discussion: He observes: (S. D. with Laksṇī, Edn. ’85, Chowkhamba SK-Samsthan, Varanasi) (pp. 291, ibid):

“keci citra” khyāṃ tṛṇīyaṃ kāvyā-bhedam icchanti. tad āhuḥ:—“śabda-citraṃ vācyā-citram a-vyaṅgyam tv avaraṃ śṛtāṃ” iti. tan na; yadi hi a-vyaṅgyatvena vyaṅgyābhāvas tadā tasya kāvyatvam api nāsti, iti prāg eva uktaṃ. iṣad-vyaṅgyam iti cet, kim nāma iṣad-vyaṅgyam? āsvādyā-vyaṅgyatvam, anāsvādyā-vyaṅgyatvam vā? ādye prācīna-bhedayor eva antaḥpātah; dvitiye tv akāvyatvam. yadi ca āsvādyatvam tadā a-kṣudratvam eva, kṣudratāyām anāsvādyatvāt. tad uktaṃ dhvanikṛtā-

“pradhāna-guṇabhāvabhāyāṃ
vyaṅgyasyaivaṃ vyavasthite
ubhe kāvye tatonyat tac
citram ity abhidhiyate.” iti. —

“Some want a third variety of poetry called ‘citra’. They have said, “Poetry without suggestion is said to be of low type—(≡avaram), and it is two-fold such as that portrait-like which is based on sound (i.e. word) and the other which is based on sense (i.e. artha).

This cannot be accepted. If by ‘a-vyaṅgyatva’ i.e. absence of suggestion is meant (total) absence of suggestion, then it ceases to be poetry at all. This we have made clear even before. If (by a-vyaṅgya) it is meant to be “having slight suggestion”, then also we ask, “what is this having slight suggestion?” Is the suggested sense (present here) an object of relish or not? If the first alternative is accepted, (this type) falls within the area of the first two varieties (i.e. dhvani or guṇībhūta-vyaṅgya) as suggested by the ancients. If the second alternative is accepted (i.e. of ‘vyāṅgya’ not being relished) it ceases to be poetry. If it is an object of relish then it (=suggested sense) ceases to be feeble, for if it is feeble it cannot be relished. It is said (by Dhvanikāra)—“When suggested sense is determined to be either principal or subordinate, (we get) two types of poetry. Anything else than that is said to be citra.”—

Thus Viśvanātha does not favour recognition of citra and also seems to argue that Ānandavardhana held the same view. One thing is certain that Ānandavardhana has placed his arguments in such a way that we may or may not take him to support ‘citra’; both these interpretations being seemingly right.
Dhvani in Kuntaka, Bhoja and others, and Guṇībhūta-vyaṅgya and Citra-Kāvyā.

Keśavamiśra (pp. 11, Alāṅkāra śekhara, Edn. N. S. Bombay, '26;)- Observes:

Keśava, accepting the terminology viz. “adhamam” does not use the word ‘citra’. He does not go into its two or three types either. He gives an illustration and observes that here whatever be the suggested sense, it is not tādrśa’ i.e. ‘camatkṛti-hetu’ i.e. that which causes ‘camatkṛti’ or instantaneous joy. He further observes, and perhaps he echoes Ānandavadhīnaś word, “tātparya” i.e. primary intention of the speaker—that here everywhere (i.e. in all the three types) the import of the speaker is the deciding factor (i.e. if he intends that the suggested sense be taken as principal, it is termed dhvani, if subordinate then it is guṇībhūtavyaṅgya, and if the suggestion is not causing any camatkāra, it is ‘adhama’ kāvyā). Thus the knowledge (of the import) is the cause of apprehension (in the form of a particular poem being taken as either uttama or madhyama or adhama).

Thus in the absence of (such a) (suggested sense), it is said to be ‘adhama.’

Appayya Dīksita has an independent work called “Citramīmāṃsā”. Even though he was a great supporter of dhvani, by writing an independent treatise on ‘citra’-kāvyā, he has presented great scientific thinking which has impressed and inspired even the great Jagannātha to devote much space to the consideration of alāṅkāras. The Citra-mīmāṃsā (pp. 27), observes: “yad a-vyaṅgam api cāru tac citram”, i.e. that which is without suggestion and yet charming is said to be ‘citra’. Thus Appayya seems to accept the possibility of there being poetry even in the absence of suggestion’. Here ‘a-vyaṅga’ is to be understood as “that type of poetry having ‘a-sphuṭa’ i.e. ‘not clear’ suggestion. This is the explanation of some commentators. So, the variety of poetry having charm caused by guṇa and alāṅkāra, is said to be ‘citra’. One thing is clear that Appayya wants ‘apprehension of beauty’-‘cārutva-pratīti’ as a condition for ‘citra’ also. He gives three sub-varieties such as ‘śabda-citra’, ‘artha-citra’, and ‘ubhaya-citra’. He observes that śabda-citra being practically ‘nirasa’ i.e. without ‘rasa’, is not honoured by poets. Or, perhaps there is nothing in it which stands serious thinking. Therefore Appayya does not go in any detailed discussion on śabda-citra and goes ahead with ‘artha-citra’.
It may be noted that the dhvanivādins have practically treated all figures of both, sound (=śabda) and sense (i.e. artha) as ‘citra’ or ‘avara’ kāvya in general. It is only Jagannātha who picks up some alamkāras under what he terms ‘uttama’ and some others under ‘madhyama’. For Jagannātha, who offers a four-fold scheme of classification, ‘artha-citra’, is not placed on a par with ‘śabda-citra’, which for him is lesser poetry. For him where the beauty (camatkāra) of the expressed is not on equal footing—“a-samānādhikarana”—with the suggested or ‘vyāṇgya’, is the third type of poetry. This means that when we have the beauty of the expressed placed higher than that of the suggested it makes for the third type of poetry, i.e. ‘madhyama’ kāvya. But when we have the beauty of the sound—śabda—as principal and that of sense is subordinated to it we have a fourth type of poetry, which is termed ‘adhma’ by Jagannātha. It may be noted that here Jagannātha expects that the beauty caused by word is necessarily enhanced by the subordinated beauty caused by sense. He suggests that in this variety also there is at least some presence of the suggested sense, but it certainly does not cause beauty in any way and is therefore not at all intended—‘avivakṣita’—and so subordinating-‘a-pradhāna’—also. For him, in ‘adhma’ variety of poetry, the artha-camatkṛti or beauty caused by sense is necessarily absorbed in śabda-camatkṛti, i.e. beauty caused by word. But in a case, where there is total absence of any beauty caused by sense i.e. where only śabd-camatkṛti’ prevails, i.e. such illustrations of poems as “ekākṣara-padya’, “ardhā”vṛtti-yamaka”, etc.—this type has to be taken as no poetry at all. This can not be taken as a fifth variety called “adhamā-dhama” i.e. ‘worse than the worst’, because it can never fulfill the basic condition of poetry viz. “ramanīyārtha-pratipādakatva’, i.e. “that which brings up beautiful meaning.” When there is no “kāvyatva” at all in such a composition as “ekākṣara-padya”, it is useless to call it a fifth variety, for it will be equivalent to follow a blind tradition. Jagannātha ends the topic by supporting his four-fold scheme by observing that the difference between śabda-citra and ‘artha-citra’ being self-evident, it is useless and illogical to brand them equally as “adhma”. Even in the absence of any equality if both are taken as identical, then we should put aside our opinion taking ‘dhvani’ and ‘guṇībhūta-vyaṇgya’ as separate.

With this ends the classification of poetry, that we term as “criticism-based.”
Chapter XIII

‘Dhvani’ and other thought-currents such as guṇa, alaṃkāra, saṃghaṭanā, rīti, vṛtti, etc. etc., and also Dhvani-virodha

It has been already noted by us at a number of places that Ānandavardhana had offered a most catholic theory of poetic criticism viz. the theory of dhvani which tried to absorb and accommodate all other thought-currents prevalent in the field of literary criticism. In fact he was opposed to no concept whatsoever floated by any earlier school of alaṃkārikas, but actually welcomed them all, embraced them with love and made room for each concept in his all-absorbing vyañjanā-dhvani-rasa theory of literary criticism. May be, he tried to give a definite shape to certain concepts that were hazy or nebulous, or with an authority silenced all conflicting notions concerning this or that concept and brought about a chiseled concept regarding the same. He tried to fix a sort of final terminology concerning various concepts and his opinion was by and large respected and accepted by majority of critics who followed him with exceptions of only a few. In the present chapter we will try to examine how his catholic theory brought about a sort of harmony in the field of literary aesthetics. Thus he ably harnessed all the concepts of guṇa, alaṃkāra, etc. and put them under the supreme control of ‘dhvani’ or better say “rasa-dhvani” as the commander-in-chief. Let us see how tactfully he proceeds with this job. But it should be made clear that in this regard he had the able support of Aphinavagupta, Mammaṭa, Hemacandra and the whole galaxy of writers ending with Appayya Dixit and Jagannātha. With all this there was some opposition to dhvani and we will take care of it by the end of this chapter.

At Dhv. II. 6 he starts with the concepts of guṇa and alaṃkāra and their exact place in his wider scheme. But prior to that he had successfully dealt with the concept of what was termed as “rasavad ādi alaṃkāras.” He had made a clear distinction between what he terms ‘rasa-dhvani’ and what should be taken as
“rasā”di-alaṃkāra”. The earlier writers such as Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin etc. could not
distinguish between the two but Ānandavardhana accepted either and
distinguished clearly between their areas of operation. When rasa is central how
can it be termed an alaṃkāra? This was his main argument. But when rasa
performs the act of an alaṃkāra, i.e. when it serves to decorate some other central
idea, it is to be taken as an ‘alaṃkāra’. Thus ‘alaṃkāras’ are beautifying agents and
add to the beauty of the central idea i.e. rasadhvani in poetry. This act of rendering
beauty or enhancing the beauty of a central idea makes for the very life breath of
an alaṃkāra. Says he (vr̥tti, Dhv. II., 5, pp. 44, ibid) :- tathā ca ayam atra
saṃkṣepah—

“rasa-bhāvādi-tātparyam
āśritya viniveśanam,
alaṃkṛtīnām sarvāsām
alaṃkāratva-sādhanam.”

i.e. “It is only the employment of figures, one and all, in view of the main
purport of sentiment. emotion, etc., that really justifies their being regarded as
sources of charm.” (Trans. K. Kris..., pp. 45, ibid).

With ‘Dhvani’ or, say, rasa-dhvani as the soul of poetry, i.e. it being in the
centre, all other concepts become suggestors or vyañjaks of rasa-dhvani, thus
creating a harmonious design where everything falls in its place so rightly. True, it
required the genius of Ānandavardhana to evolve such an all-embracing scheme
and of course, those who did not fall in line with him by rejecting vyañjanā, i.e. the
alaṃkārikas such as Mahimā, Dhanañjaya and Dhanika, or others such as
Kuntaka, Bhoja, or even Mukula or Pritehārendurāja, fell in line in accepting ‘rasa’
as the central idea in poetry, with everything rotating around that.

So, for gunas or excellences and alaṃkāras or beautiful turns of expression or
figures of speech, Ānandavardhana observes: (Dhv. II. 6., pp. 48, ibid)—

“tam artham avalambante
yeṅginam te guṇāḥ smṛtāḥ,
aṅgā”śrītās tv alaṃkārāh
mantavyāḥ kaṭakā”divat.”

ye tam artham rasā”dilakṣaṇam aṅginam santam avalambante te guṇāḥ,
śauryā”divat. vācyā-vācaka-lakṣaṇānāny aṅgāni ye punarāśrītās te’alaṃkārāh mantavyāḥ
kaṭakā”divat.
“Those which inhere in this principal element are regarded as qualities (=excellences). And figures are to be known as those that are associated with its parts even like ornaments such as the braeclet.” (II. 6)

Those that ever inhere in the principal element (of poetry) viz. sentiment etc., are qualities like the quality of valour and so forth (in the world). On the other hand, those that relate to its component parts only, viz., the expressed sense and the expression, are to be regarded as figures or ornaments like the bracelet and so on (in the world).” (Trans. K. Kris., pp. 49, ibid),

Ānandavardhana clearly observes that ‘guṇas’ or excellences are primarily connected with ‘rasā”di’, the soul like bravery or other quality of a person, and figures are like ornaments placed on a human body. Now, we have to be very careful in understanding this metaphorical use of language. Actually poetry itself is an abstract art, it is abstraction, and so there is nothing physical about it in the sense in which we understand physicality. It is foolish,—and some of the so called self-anointed experts of sāhitya-sāstra who write in Hindi, or any other modern Indian language such as Gujarati, or even some of those who write in English today look absolutely foolish when they hold that ālaṃkāras or figures of speech are “external” to poetry like external ornaments put on physical body. No; it is never like that. Actually beauty in poetry takes various shapes and forms some of which are grasped by even those who are not capable of digging deep into the matter, while others are grasped only by those who can interpret subtle experiments by a good poet, i.e. a real mahā-kavi. Ālaṃkāras or figures are those forms of poetic beauty which are easily understood and therefore enjoyed by readers of mediocre calibre also. It does not require deeper sensitivity to discern an ālaṃkāra. Thus, metaphorically speaking, poetic figures are like ornaments external to our body and such things which could be sighted by almost all. So, this form of poetic beauty is as easily discernible as an ornament placed on a human body. This does not make it as external as the physical ornament which can be taken off, changed, sold, replaced and even put into a bank-loker when not required. An upamā of Kālidāsa is not that way replaceable or something which can be removed from his poetry without harming the inherent poetic beauty. Thus an ālaṃkāra is as inherent as any other source of beauty in poetry, Ānandavardhana will explain this later but for the present by resorting to this metaphor he only wants to suggest that poetic beauty has various forms, some of which are easily discernible, while others are comparatively more subtle to be grasped only by men of highly cultivated taste. Here, ‘guṇa’ is held to be subtler than ‘ālaṃkāra’. This way only we have
to understand the various concepts of literary criticism as laid down by all ālāṃkārikas, known or unknown, beginning with say, Bhāmaha, down to Jagannātha or even someone posterior to him.

With this clear understanding of the basics of ālāṃkāraśāstra we will proceed to see how Ānandavardhana accommodates various concepts in his wider scheme.

Ānandavardhana, while discussing, the concept of samghatañā almost concedes the position that guṇas or qualities or excellences belong to word and sense. But then it is metaphorically so. Primarily in his opinion guṇas reside in rasas, i.e. they are qualities of soul, while ālāṃkāras are primarily the attributes of sound and sense. Here, we discuss only the theroretical position that he allots to various concepts. We do not go into the details of which guṇas he accepts and also their individual definitions. This we propose to do later in a separate chapter in Vol. II. For the present, we underline only one point that for Ānandavardhana rasa-dhvani is the central theme in poetry; the pivot round which all other concepts evolve with the relation of vyānga-vyañjaka, i.e. suggestor and suggested.

It is therefore that while dealing with the central theme of rasa-dhvani with its innumerable possible divisions and sub-divisions, he takes care to supply instructions to poets as to how they should entertain ālāṃkāras in kāvya. The basic condition that he lays down is that ālāṃkāras are welcome to poetry and are as much 'internal' i.e. 'antarāṅga' to poetry as any other concept, given the condition that they, i.e. ālāṃkāras should find place in poetry in an effortless or natural way, i.e. they should be 'a-pṛthag-yatna-nirvartya'. They should take shape naturally while the poet is concentrating on 'rasa' as the central theme. It is because of this, i.e. because such figures of sound as 'anuprāsa' or 'yamaka', which require a special effort on the part of a poet, that Ānandavardhana does not encourage their presence in poetry. Especially when the erotic sentiment is in the centre, alliteration i.e. anuprāsa, not being conclusive to it, has to be avoided (Dhv. II. 14). He gives some concession to 'anuprāsa' when 'śṛṅgāra'-rasa is not principal in a given literary piece. But 'yamaka' i.e. assonance has to be carefully avoided when there is any context of śṛṅgāra-(Dhv. II. 15), and more so in case of 'vipralambha-śṛṅgāra' i.e. love-in-separation. This, i.e. discouragement of 'anuprāsa and yamaka' is recommended only because these figures command a special attention of the poet for their formation and therefore the poet has to deviate from the path of 'rasa-nirūpāna'. With this Ānandavardhana embarks upon providing general principles guiding delineation of figures in poetry, He must have observed that many a poet goes astray and falls in love with delineation of ālāṃkāras, having the
central objective of rasa-realisation in poetry. So, he gives certain instructions. He observes: (Dhv. II. 16, 17, 18, 19)

utra yukter abhidhiyate

"rasā"ksiptatayā yasya
bandhaḥ śakyakriyo bhavet,
a-prthag-yatna-nirvartyaḥ
sūlaṃkāro dhvanau mattaḥ—(Dhv. II. 16)
"dhvanyātma-bhūte śṛṅgāre
samīksya vinivesitaḥ
rūpakā"dir alaṃkāra-varga
eti yathārthatām."— (Dhv. II. 17)
"vivakṣā tat-paratvena
nāṅgitvena kadācana,
kāle ca grahaṇa-tyāgau
nātinirvahāṇaśītā " (Dhv. II. 18)
"nirvyūḍhāv api cāṅgatve
yatnena paryavekṣanam,
rūpakā"der alaṃkāra-
vargasyāṅgatva-sādhanam." (Dhv. II. 19)

"Only that is admitted as a figure of suggestive poetry, whose employment is rendered possible just by the emotional suffusion of the poet and which does not require any other extra effort on his part." — (Dhv. II. 16)

"The galaxy of figures like metaphor becomes truly significant (i.e. will be real ornaments) when they are employed with great discrimination in instances of the Erotic sentiment which is intrinsic to dhvani" (i.e. when the Erotic is in the centre of suggestive poetry). (Dhv. II, 17)

"The sole consideration that it is only a means to the delineation of sentiment and never an end in itself, the necessity of employing it at the right time and of abandoning it at the right time; the absence of over-enthusiasm on the poet’s part in pressing it too far, and finally, his keen watchfulness in making sure that it remains a secondary element only—these are the various means by which figures like metaphor become accessories (of suggested sentiment." (Dhv. II. 18, 19)
(Trans. K. Kris. pp. 59, 61, 63, ibid)—

In his vr̥tti on Dhv- II. 16 Ānandavardhana clearly states that “rasmān na teṣām bahīraṅgatvam rasaḥbhīvyaktau.” (pp. 60, ibid)—“Hence they are never extraneous to the delineation of sentiment.” (Trans- K. Kris., pp. 61, ibid).

After giving a number of illustrations to prove his point, Ānandavardhana at the end of the discussion observes : (Vṛtti, Dhv. II. 19, pp. 70, ibid):

“sa evam upanibadhyaṁanō-laṁkāro rasaḥbhīvyakti-hetuḥ kaver bhavati. uktraprakārāṭikrame tu niyamena eva rasa-bhaṅga-hetuḥ sampadyate. lakṣyam ca tathāvidhām mahākavi-prabandhēṣv api dṛṣyate bahuṣāḥ, tat tu, sūkti-sahasradyotitā”manāṃ mahātmanāṃ dosodorehāraṇam ātmana eva dūṣanām bhavati iti na vibhajya darśitam. kim tu rūpakā”der alamkāra-vargasya yā īyam vyaṅjakatve rasa”di-visaye lakṣaṇa-dig-darśitā tām anusmaran svayam ca anyal lakṣaṇam upreksaṁaṇo yady alakṣya-krama-pratibham anantaroktam enam dhvaner ātāmaṇam upanibadhanāti sukaviḥ samāhita-cetāḥ, tasya ātmalābhō bhavati mahīyān iti.”—

“A figure of speech thus utilized by a poet will succeed in revealing sentiments. In case the conditions laid down be transgressed, it invariably becomes a destroyer of sentiment. Even this is seen amply illustrated in the works of great poets. But it has not been shown in detail here, since a loud exposure of the defects of great men who have the bright light of a thousand good sayings about them, would amount to a censure of the critic himself. But it deserves to be reiterated that the poet will have best fulfilled his purpose only when he exercises concentration in infusing his work with the soul of suggestion ‘with undiscovered sequentiality’ described above, follows faithfully the mentioned ways in which the galaxy of figures like metaphor can be harmonised with delineation of sentiment and imagines for himself the other details left unsaid herein.” (Trans. K. Kris., pp. 71, ibid),

In Dhv. II. 2,3,4, Ānandavardhana goes to suggest how rasadhvani is arrived at in poetry through the agency of letters, words, sentence, construction or composition and the work as a whole. He observes : (Dhv. III. 2,3,4) :—

yas tv alakṣya-kramavāyaṅgyo
dhvanir vāmapadā”diṣu,
vākye samghaṭanāyaṁ ca
sa prabandhe’pi diṣyate. (Dhv. III. 2)
'Dhvanī' and other thought-currents such as guṇa,......  

tatra varṇānām anarthaḥatrīd dyotyayām asaṁbhavi ityāśaṅkya idam ucyate—
"śaṣau sa-refa-samyogo
ḍhakāraś cā'pi bhūyasā,
virodhinaḥ syuḥ śrṅgāre
te na varṇā rasaś cyutah." (Dhv. III. 3)
"ta eva tu niveṣyante
bīhatsā"dau rase yadā,
tadā tam dīpayanty eva
tenā varṇā rasaścyutah." (Dhv. III. 4)

"suggestion with undiscerned sequentiality will flash forth in letter, word etc.,
sentence, composition and finally the work as a whole." (Dhv. III. 2.)

The objection that letters cannot be suggestive because they are meaningless by
themselves is answered below - "The (sanskrit) letters 's' and 'ś', letters conjunct
with 'r', and 'ḍh', – all these become deterrents of the erotic sentiment. Hence those
letters are not conducive to a particular sentiment." (Dhv. III. 3)

"When these very letters are employed in relation to the sentiment of disgust
and so forth, they will only intensify them. Hence also letters suggest sentiments." (Dhv. III. 4)

The above aphorisms show negatively and positively that letters do possess
suggestiveness.

Next, Ānandavardhana illustrates how a word becomes suggestive of rasa. He
also shows through illustrations how a part of a word and also a sentence are
capable to suggest rasa. He explains that the suggestivity of a sentence is twofold,
i.e. pure and mingled as when it either carries a figure of speech in it or not. All
this is duly illustrated.

After this he comes to Šaṁghaṭanā' or construction of a sentence (Dr.
Krishnameorthly translates 'saṁghaṭanā' by the term 'composition.' We feel that this
word 'Composition' should be reserved, for a whole work. Later, he gives the word
texture. Which is acceptable to us.)

Prior to explaining how a 'saṁghaṭanā' becomes 'suggestor' of rasa,
Ānandavardhana dwells upon the full explanation of the concept of saṁghaṭanā and
its relationship with guṇas. This we will look for in a separate chapter later (in vol.
II) but for the present we are concerned only with the fact that for Ānandavardhana,
the concept of samghatanā, which has its boundaries somewhat mixed up with those of riti or vr̥tti, is also suggestive of rasa in poetry and is therefore welcome as a suggestor or suggestive element i.e. vyāfi jaka, in poetry.

Ānandavardhana observes that the threefold samghatanā, residing in gunas, becomes suggestive of rasa in poetry and the conditions that control this suggestivity are said to be propriety-i.e. aucitya—of the speaker and the thing described. He observes: Dhv. III. 5,6, pp., 6 ibid) :-

"a-samāśā samāśena
madhyamena ca bhūsitā
tathā dirgha-samāséti
tridhā samghatánóditā." (Dhv. III. 5)
tām kevalam anūdyya, idam ucya-te-
"gunān āśritya tīṭhanti
mādharyādīn; vyanakti sā
rasān,
tan niyame hetur
aucityam vaktṛ-vācyayoḥ."— (Dhv. III. 6)

"Texture" is said to be of three kinds : (1) Without compounds (2) With mediumsized compound and (3) With long compounds."— (Dhv. III. 5)

"Composition or texture is grounded in qualities like sweetness and suggests sentiments.

The propriety or decorum of the speaker and the spoken is the consideration which governs it." (Dhv. III. 6)

(Trans. K. Kris., pp. 119, 127 ibid).

He further observes at Dhv. III. 7 that,

"viṣayā"śrayam apy anyad
aucityam tām niyacchati,
kāyya-prabhedā"śrayataḥ
sthitā bhedavatī hi sā." (pp. 128, ibid)

"Another consideration which governs the usage of a texture is its decorum with regard to the literary medium adopted. Texture thus becomes different in different forms of literature."— (Trans. K. Kris; pp. 129, ibid)
'Dhvani' and other thought-currents such as guṇa,......

Ānandavardhana holds that in literature in general, be it prose or verse, texture or construction takes its own shape following the central theme of rasa-dhvani and thus serves as a vyañjaka i.e. suggester of rasa. It varies even with the subject-matter or theme. He observes:

"rasa-bandhóktam aucityaṁ
bhāti sarvatra samśritā
racanā visayāpekṣaṁ
tat tu kiñcid vibhedavat." (Dhv. III. 9) (pp. 132, ibid)

"Texture with decorum in the delineation of sentiments will shine out wherever it might be found. It will, however, assume a shade of variation coupled with decorum of literary medium." (Trans. K. Kris; pp. 133, ibid)

Thus, after considering pada i.e. a word, padāṁśa (=part of word), vākya (=sentence) and samghaṭāna (i.e. sentence-construction or texture) in a relation of vyañgya-vyañjaka, Ānandavardhana turns his guns towards 'prabandha' i.e. a major composition, both prose and verse in relation to rasa-dhvani, and suggests that a major composition has to be rasa-centred and for bringing about this result, Ānandavardhana suggests a number of conditions, which when observed make such a composition rasa-centred and therefore successful. How a whole work of a greater magnitude becomes a suggester of rasa is explained by Ānandavardhana at Dhv. III. 10-14, with apt illustrations and explanations with elaboration in the vṛtti or gloss concerned. We will not go into all the minute discussion here but will concern ourselves with what basics he expects for a whole work to become suggestive of rasa. He observes: (Dhv. III. 10-14; pp. 134; 136 ibid)-

"idānīṁ a-laksya-krama-vyañgyo dhvanīḥ prabandhā"tmā rāmāyana-mahā-bhārata"dau prakāśamānah prasiddha eva. tasya tu yathā prakāśanāṁ tat pratipādyate.

"vibhāvānubhāva-
sañcāryaucitya-cāruṇaḥ,
vidhiḥ kathā-śarīrasya
vṛttasyotprekṣitasya vā." (Dhv. III. 10)

"iti-vṛttā-vaśāyātāṁ
tyaktvā' nanugoṇāṁ sthitim.
utprekṣyā’py antarā’-
bhiṣṭa-rasōcita-kathönnayah." (Dhv. III. 11)
“sandhi-sandhyaṅga-ghaṭanaṁ
rasā’bhivyakty apekṣayā
da tu kevalayā śāstra-
sthiti-sampādanecchayā.” (Dhv. III. 12)
“uddīpana-praśamane
yathāvasaram antarā
rasasyārabdha-viśrānter
anu-samdhānām aṅginaḥ.”— (Dhv. III. 13)
“alamkrītīnāṁ śaktāvapy
ānurūpyeṇa-yojanam.
prabandhasya rasā”dīnāṁ
vyāñjakatve nibandhanam.” (Dhv. III. 14)

“suggestion with undiscerned sequentiality relating to a whole work is quite well known in such works as the Rāmāyaṇa and the Mahābhārata. How it is suggested therein is explained below :

Construction of only such a plot, either traditional or invented, as is charming with its decorum of (the accessories of sentiment, viz.) stimuli of setting, abiding emotions, emotional responses, and passing moods; (Dhv. III. 10)

If, in a theme, adapted from a traditional source, the poet is faced with situations conflicting with the intended sentiment, his readiness to leave out such incidents and inventing in their place even imaginary incidents with a view to delineating the intended sentiment : (Dhv. III. 11)

The construction of divisions and sub-divisions of the plot only with a view to delineating sentiments and not at all with a desire for mere conformity to rules of poetics; - (Dhv. III. 12) (pp. 135, ibid)

Bringing about both the high tide of sentiment and its low ebb appropriately in the work; preserving the unity of the principal sentiment from beginning to end; (Dhv. III. 13)-

A discreet use of figures of speech even when the poet is capable of using them in any number;— such are the conditions which underlie the suggestiveness of a whole work of literature in regard to sentiments. etc., - (Dhv. III. 14) (Trans. K. Kris.; pp. 137 ibid).
‘Dhvani’ and other thought-currents such as guṇa,...

Thus Ānandavardhana has harnessed all forms of literature in whatever style, with the central concept of rasa-dhvani.

After explaining fully dhvani in all its divisions and sub-divisions, Ānandavardhana, at Dhv. III. 44 (pp. 258, ibid) observes:

“evam dhvaneḥ prabhedaḥ
prabheda-bhedās ca, kena śakyante
saṁkhyātaṃ diṁ-mātram teṣām
idam uktam asmābhiḥ.”
anantā hi dhvaneḥ prakārāḥ, saḥdayānām
vyutpattaye teṣāṃ diṁmātram kathitam.
ity ukta-lakṣaṇo yo dhvanir
vivecyāḥ prayātyataḥ sadbhīḥ.
satkāvyāṃ kartum vā
jñātum vā, samyag abhiyuktaiḥ.” (Dhv. III. 45) (pp. 260, ibid)

ukta-svarūpa-dhvani-nirūpaṇa-nipuṇā hi satkavayaḥ, saḥdayāś ca niyatam
eva kāvyā-viṣaye parāṃ prakārśa-padavīṃ āsādayanti.”— (vṛtti, Dhv. III. 45, pp. 260, ibid)

—“Such are some of the different ways of principal suggestion and some of the minor classes of the major ways. Who can ever count them exhaustively? We have just indicated therefore, their direction only.” (Dhv.II. 44)

The ways of principal suggestion are indeed limitless. We have only pointed out their direction with a view to educating refined critics.

“Principal suggestion which we have defined hitherto should be attentively studied not only by all the poets who aspire after writing good poetry, but also by all critics who aspire after understanding it well.” (Dhv. III. 45).

It is only by their skill in recognising principal suggestion defined above that good poets and good critics attain abiding glory in matters relating to poetry.” (Trans. K. Kris., pp. 259, 261, ibid).

Ānandavardhana now proceeds to suggest that the concepts of ‘rīti’ (=style) and “vṛtti” (=modes, diction) propagated by earlier ālaṁkārikas are also welcome to him and that these could also be suggesters of rasa-dhvani. Thus they have a sure place in his catholic scheme of literary aesthetics, viz. in his scheme of ‘vyañjanā-dhvani-rasa.’ He observes: (Dhv. III. 46; pp. 260, ibid) :-
“a-sphûta-sphuritam
kâvyâ-tattvam etad yathôditam,
a-śaknuvadbhir vyâkartum
rîtâhaḥ sampravartitâḥ.”–

etad-dhvani-pravartanena nirûtam kâvyâ-tattvam a-sphûta-sphuritam sad a-śaknuvadbhîh pratipâdayitum vaidarbhi, gauḍî, pâñcâli ca iti rîtayâh pravartitâh. rîti-lakṣâna-vidhâyinäm hi kâvyâ-tattvam etad a-sphûtatayâ manâk sphuritam âsîd iti lakṣyate, tad atra sphûtatayâ sampradarshitam ity anena rîti-lakṣânaṇena na kiñcit.

“sabda-tattvâ”śrayâḥ kâscid
artha-tattva-yujóparâḥ,
vrîttyópi prakâsânte
jñârēśmin kâvyâ-lakṣâne.” (Dhv. III. 47) (pp. 260, ibid)

asmin vyaṅgya-vyaṅjaka-bhâva-vivecana-maye kâvyâ-lakṣâne jñâte sati, yâḥ kâscit prasiddhâ upanâgarikâ”dyâḥ sabda-tattvâ”śrayâ vrîttyo, yâś ca arthatattva-sambaddhâḥ kaiśikyâ”dayas tâḥ, samyag rîti-padavîm avatarânti.anyathâ tu tâsâm a-drâṣṭârthânâmiva vrîttinâm a-śraddheyatvam eva syân nâ’nubhava-siddhatvam. evam sphûtatayâiva lakṣâniyam svarûpam asya dhvaneḥ.”– (vrîtti, pp. 260, ibid).

“Those who were unable to explain properly this essential principle of poetry as they had only a glimmer of it (and nothing more), have brought into vogue the theory of styles.”– (Dhv. III. 46)

We have explained above the fundamental principle of poetry by using the term ‘Dhvani.’ Since only vague glimmerings of this principle were had by ancient writers, they could not explain it exhaustively and thus did they bring into vogue flashes of this very principle of poetry, we have very clearly demonstrated it in all its bearings and hence there is nothing for us to consider seriously about the theory of styles.

“Ohce this theory of poetry is fully understood, even the so-called “Modes” (=dictions) relating to the nature of sounds as well as to the nature of meanings, will become intelligible.” (Dhv. III. 47).

When this theory of poetry involving a discrimination of the suggested-suggester relationship is grasped, other categories like literary modes, viz. those relating to sound such as “upanâgarikâ”, as well as those relating to sense such as “Kaiśikâ” will become quite intelligible (even in the same way as the styles). Otherwise, modes
will remain only incredible like unseen objects, and will not come within the range of personal experience (though there might be testimony of the ancients to that effect).

Therefore, the nature of principal suggestion should be understood clearly.”

(Trans. K. Kris., pp. 261, ibid).

On ritis and vṛttis, the Locana has the following to offer (pp. 370, 372, Edn. Nandi, Ahd. ’97-‘98). “ritis hi guṇesv eva paryavasītā. yad āha-viśeṣo guṇā”tmā. guṇās ca rasa-paryavesāyina eva, iti hy uktam prāg guṇa-nirūpaṇe “śṛṅgāra eva madhurāh” ity atra iti.”–

With reference to vṛttis, the Locana observes (pp. 372, ibid):

“prakāśanta iti.” anubhava-siddhatāṃ kāvyā-jīvitave prayānti ity arthaḥ, ‘ritipadavīm’ iti. tad vad eva rasa-paryavesāyitvāt. ‘pratīti-padavīm’ iti vā pāthaḥ. nāgarikāyā hy upamītā ity anu-prāsavṛttīḥ, śṛṅgārā”dau viśrāmyati. parusā iti dipeṣu raudrā”diṣu. komalā iti hāsā”dau. tathā “vṛttayaḥ kāvyā-mātrakāḥ” iti yad uktam muninā tatra rasocita eva cēṣṭā-viśeṣo vṛttīḥ yad āha–

“kaiṣkī ślokṣṇa-nepathyā
śṛṅgāra-rasa-sambhavā.” ity ādi.

iyātā ‘tasyā’bhāvam jagadur apare’ ityādāv abhāva-vikalpeṣu, “vṛttayo rītayaḥ ca” gatāḥ śravaṇa-gocaram. tad atiriktāḥ koyam dhvanir” iti; tatra kathaṇcid abhyupagamaḥ kṛtaḥ kathācic ca duṣaṇam dattam ‘aphuṭa-sphuritam’ iti vacanena. (pp. 372, ibid, on Dhv. III. 47; Locana).–

Abhinavagupta on Dhv. I. i, had stated (pp. 8, ibid):

“nau vṛttayo rītayaḥ ca yathā guṇālamkāra-vyātiriktaḥ cārutva-hetavaḥ ca tathā dhvanir api tad vyātiriktaḥ ca cārutva-hetuḥ ca bhaviṣyati ity asiddho vyātireka ity anena abhiprayena āha–” tad anitirikta-vṛttayaḥ” iti. naiva vṛtti-ritināṃ tad-vyātiriktavatāṃ siddham. tathā hy anuprāsānām eva dīpta-maṇḍhāya-varnaniyāpayogītyāh paruṣatvā-lalitatva-madhumatva-svarūpa-vivecanāya varga-traya-sampādanārthaṃ tisrōnuprāsa-jātayo vṛttaya ity uktāḥ, vartantēnuprāśa-bhedāḥ āsv iti, yad āhuḥ–

“sarūpa-vyaṇjana-nyāsan
tisṛṣvetāsu vṛttiṣu,
pṛthag pṛthag anuprāsam
uṇanti kavayaḥ sadā.” iti.
prthak-prthag iti, parusānuprāsā nāgarikā. maśrānuprāsa upanāgarikā lañitā. nāgarikayā vidagdhyā upamitā iti kṛtvā. madhyama-komala-parusāṁ ity arthaḥ ata eva vaidagdha-vihāna-svabhāva-asukumāra-apañiṣṭa-grāma-śānāyā-sādṛśyād ityāṃ vṛttīr grāmāyā iti. tatra trutīyaḥ komālānaprāsa iti vṛttayonuprāsa-jātaya eva. na cēha vaiśesikavād vṛttīr vivaksitā yena jātāu jātimitato vartamānāvatvam na syāt, tad anugraha eva hi tatra vartamānāvatvam. yathā"ha kaścit "lokottare hi gāmbhīrye vartante prthivibhūjāh." iti. 

tasmād vṛttayonuprāsā"dibhyo nātirikta-vṛttayo nābhyaadhiḥ-vaśīkārāḥ, ata eva vyāpāra-bhedābhāvān na prthag anumeyā-svarūpā api iti vṛtti-sābdasya vyāpāraavicinōbbhiprāyāḥ. 

anatiriktatvād eva vṛtti-vaśyavahāro bhāmahā"dibhir na kṛtāḥ. udbhātā"dibhiḥ pratyukte pi tasminn ārthāḥ kaścid adhiko hṛdayapatham avatirṇa ity abhiprāyena āhā "gatāḥ śravāna-gocaram" iti. rityās ca iti. tad anatirikta-vṛttayopī gatāḥ śravanagocaram iti sambandhaḥ. tace chabdena atra mādhuryā"dayo guṇāḥ, teṣāṁ ca samucita-vṛttayarpane yad anyonya-melana-kṣamatvena pānaka iva, gudāmaricā"di-rasānām saṃghāta-rūpa-tāgamanam dīpta-lalita-madharya-varṇaniyā-visayam gaudīya-vairarbha-pāṃcāla-desa-hevāka-pracurya-dṛśā tad eva trividham rītīr ity uktā. "jātiścā jātimitato nā'nyā samudāyaś ca samudāyino nānya iti vṛttī- rityāo na guṇālaṃkāra-vatiriktā iti sthita evā'sau vyatirekī hetuḥ."—

(pp. 9, 10, ibid, Locana, Dhv. I. i). 

It may be noted that by accepting all the current concepts that prevailed in literary criticism and assigning them the role of a suggester in poetry, Ānandavardhana had nearly nailed the coffin of opposition to dhvani, i.e., dhvanivirodha, but with the best of his efforts and also those of his great lieutenants, there was some opposition, however feeble, to the great victory march of dhvani. But before we look into this, we will see how those who sided with Ānandavardhana sang in the same tunes and tried to establish a sort of harmony of concepts that had emerged from different quarters.

Thus, Māmāṭa (K. P. VIII. i) also suggests that guṇas are rasa-dharmas, and alāṃkāras subserve rasa through the body of poetry i.e. word and sense to which they primarily belong. He observes:

ye rasasyā' āṅgīna dharmāḥ
śauryā"daya ivā"tmnāḥ,
uttarṣa-hetavas te syuḥ
acala-sthitayo guṇāḥ." (K. P. VIII. i. pp. 324, Edn. R. C. Dwivedi)
'Dhväni' and other thought-currents such as guṇa,...

In the वृत्त thereon he further observes: (pp. 324, ibid): ātmana eva hi śauryā”dayo na ākārasya yathā, tathā rasasyaiva mādhuryā”dayah, na varṇāṇām. kvacit tu śauryā”di-samucitasya ākāra-mahattvā”der darśanād ‘ākāra eva asya śūraḥ’, ity āder vyavahārād, anyatra a-sūrēpi vitata”kṛtitva-mātreṇa śūra iti, kvā’pi sūrēpi mūrti-lāghava-mātreṇa a-śūra iti, a-viśrānta-pratitayah yathā vyavaharanti, tad-vad madhurādi-rasa-vyānjaka-sukumārā”di-varṇāṇāṃ mādhuryā”di-vyavahāra-pravṛtтеḥ, a-madhurā”di-rasāṅgānāṃ varṇāṇāṃ saukmārāryā”di-mātreṇa mādhuryā”di, madhurā”di-rasopakaranānāṃ teṣām a-saukumārāryā”der a-mādhuryā”di ca, rasa-paryanta-pratiti-vandhyā vyavaharanti. ata eve mādhuryā”dayo rasa-dharmāḥ samucitair varṇair vyajyante, na tu varṇa-mātra”śrayāḥ, yathaisāṃ vyānjakatvān tathā udāharisyate.”

66- “Those attributes of the rasa which is essence (principal), that are like the heroism of the soul, that cause its exaltation and have an unceasing existence, are (known to be) excellences.”

Just as the heroism etc. belong to the soul only, not to the form, similarly sweetness etc. belong to ‘rasa’ only, not to the letters (=varṇas). However, in some cases on perceiving the tall figure which is appropriate for heroism and the like, ‘his form alone is heroic,’ such a usage prevails and in others even when some one is not brave, he is called brave only on the ground of his large form; and in certain other cases even a brave man is called not-brave only because his form is short. Just as such usages are done by those who don’t know for definite, similarly the use of sweetness etc. being prevalent (figuratively) for soft letters suggestive of tender ‘rasas’ (the Erotic) and others, those who are devoid of the knowledge that excellences extend as far as rasas, use ‘sweetness’ etc. for the letters suggestive of rasas which are not tender (for example the Herioc) and the like. and speak of untenderness of these letters which (in fact) help the tender rasa and the like. To conclude, the sweetness etc. are attributes of ‘rasas’ which are manifested through the choice words (varṇas); and (these) do not depend simply on the letters. The way these letters become suggestive (of the rasas) will (now) be illustrated.” (Trans. R. C. Dwivedi, pp. 325, ibid).

As for the position of alamkāras, Mammata observes (VIII. 67) (pp. 326, ibid):

“upakurvanti taṃ santam
yēṅga-dvāreṇa jātucir;
hārā”divad alamkārās
tēnu-prāsāpamā”dayaḥ.”
ye vācaka-vācya-lakṣaṇāṅgatiśaya mukhena mukhyam rasam sambhavinam upakurvanthi, te kanthā’dy angānām utkarsā”dhāna-dvāreṇa śaririnōpi upakārakā hārā”daya ivālāṃkārāḥ. yatra tu nā’sti rasas tatrōktri-vacitrya-mātra-paryavasitāḥ....”

67- Those that help occasionally that existent (Rasa) through its parts, are the figures alliteration, simile and others like the necklace etc. (K. P. VIII. 67)

Those that help the principal rasa when it exists, through exaltation of the parts in the form of expressive words and their meanings, are ornaments (figures) like the necklace and others which embellish the soul also by producing excellence in the parts of the body such as neck.

Where, however, ‘rasa’ is not present there these (figures) are rendered into a mere fanciful expression. And in some cases the figures don’t help the ‘rasa’ which exists.”— (Trans. R. C. Dwivedi, pp. 327, ibid).

Mammāṭa furnishes proper illustrations to justify his observations. It may be noted that while Ānandavardhana though clear was slightly influenced by a viewpoint that took guṇās to go with external word and sense also, and this he almost conceded while discussing the position of guṇās with reference to samghāṭanā, Mammāṭa goes flat out in declaring categorically that guṇās have everything to do only with the rasas and have practically nothing to do with expressed and external word and sense. This he does with an almost gross illustration of a brave man possessing a large body or not or a timid person possessing a large body and therefore going under the name of a brave man. The illustration, of course, is too gross, but brings home his point of view very clearly and so also he does with reference to figures of speech by apparently placing them parallel to ornaments put on our bodies. No doubt Mammāṭa knows the grossness of his metaphor, but at the same time he draws a clear line of demarcation between the areas of influence of both guṇās and alāṃkāras.

He therefore further observes (K. P. VIII, 67, vṛtti, pp. 328, ibid) :-

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“svargapraśṭir...” ity ādau, viśeṣokti-vyatirekau guṇa-nirapekṣau kavya-vyavahāra-pravartakau.” (pp. 328, 330, ibid)

—“This is indeed the difference between excellences and figures. Therefore, the following statement is invalid. “The heroism etc. subsists by ‘inherence’ but the necklace etc. (the ornaments) exist by conjunction; this be (the empirical) distinction between excellences and ornaments. (But in poetry) Floridity (ojas) etc. (i.e. excellences) and alliteration and the like (i.e. the figures) both of these subsist by inherence; any distinction (between these two in poetry) would be blind following of others like a flock of sheep. (This is said to be Udbhataś view).

And again the statement : “Excellences are attributes which produce the poetic beauty, but the figures heighten it,” is equally untenable. Because the question would arise : “Is poetry regarded as such due to the presence of all the excellences or due to a few of them? If due to (presence of) all, then how the ‘gaudi’ and ‘pāncāli’ dictons (=styles), which do not possess all the excellences, constitute the soul of poetry? If due to a few, then — “Here in the hill... (vs.no. 338)” — such examples may be designated poetry when the excellences Floridity etc. are present.

“The woman of ....” (vs. 339) — In such examples višeṣokti (peculiar allegation) and vyatireka (contrast by dissimilitude) are responsible for the use of poetry even in the absence of excellences.” (Trans. R.C. Dwivedi; pp. 329, 331, ibid).

Prof. Dr. Dwivedi (pp. , ft. note adds : “In this verse i.e. svarga-prāptir anena. etc.), there are no letters which may suggest sweetness; floridity. (ojas) is out of context and perspicuity is absent. In the absence of all the excellences the poetic beauty will not be produced, to heighten which, the figures are admitted by Vāmana. But the above is a case of good poetry.”

Now Mammata in our opinion has overplayed his cards in writing these lines in refutation of Udbhata and Vāmana. Certainly Āhārdavardhana has never engaged himself in the refutation of views expressed by individual ālamkārikas. On the contrary, he has positively refrained from doing this and just so, very very wisely. For, it is better, he thinks, to express one’s views in a positive way, rather than getting engaged in verbal squibbles and negatively denounce individual views, as done by such authors as Mahimā for example or even by Mammata and his followers, especially Viśvanātha to some extent and even by Jagannātha to a greater extent. Here what Mammata has argued is explained by a number of his commentators sush as Śrīvidyā Cakravartin who in his Saṃpradāya-prakāśini
explains the passage as:” (pp. 328, 329, 330 ibid):–

“itthāṁ sidduṁ guṇālāmkāra-pravibhāgam nigamayati-eva eva ca iti, na tu vākyāmāṇo vāmanaḥ”dy upadarśita iti yāvat. itthāṁ vibhāga-siddhau yoyaṁ abheda-vādināṁ upahāsat, sa tān eva sprāsatīty āha-evaṁ ca samavāya-ṛttyevy ādi. astu guṇālāmkāraṁ iti. tattvād ringam vibhāgam upagacchāma ity arthah. kāvyagunālāmkāraṁ tv abheda eva ity āha–“ojah-prabṛṭīnāṁ ity ādi. iti hetau. yata ubhayeśāṁ api samavāya-ṛttyā sthitih, ato bhedābhidyāman gaddārikā-pravāhena bakara-prayāṇa-nayena. ekasyāṁ gaddārikāyāṁ artha-paryālocanam vinaiva purah prayāṭāyāṁ sarvaiva pañktis tam eva panthānam pramāṇikṛtya pravartate. prakṛte'pyetad eva abhāñkakam āyātam iti yāvat. iti svarupaścchedah. iti yad etat sūpahābhidyānam tad asat. tat paśutvam teśāṁ eva syāt. bhedasāmyag vivecitvāt, iti bhāvaḥ. itthāṁ guṇālāmkārayor apiyam nirākṛtya yad vāmanā”dibhir bhedonyathā darśitas tad uddalayitum āha–“yad api uktaṁ ity ādina.” yad idam kāvyasobhā- kartṛtvena kāvyaa-vyapadeśa-hetavo guṇāḥ, labdha-tathā-vyapadeśasya tv atiśaya-hetavo laṃkārā iti vibhāga ucyate, na tad yuktam vibhāga-asahatvāt. tathā hi–“kim samastair guṇāḥ kāvyavayavahāraḥ kriyate. uta kātipayaḥ, nā”dyah; a-samasta-guṇayor gauḍī-pāncāloḥ kāvyā”mtvata-abhyapagama-virodhāt. na dvitiyah–“adrāvatre” tyādaya ojah-pramukha- kātipaya-guṇa-sambhavāt, kāvyaa-vyapadeśa-prasakteh. itthāṁ tavan nāsti kāvyaa-vyapadeśa-hetutā guṇānāṁ iti avyaptīr doṣah. ativyāptīr api.tathā hi-svarā-ṣyaptīr ity ādau pūrvāpa-vākyārthibhūta-vīṣeṣokti- vyatirekālāmkārābhyyāṁ eva guṇa-nairapeksyena kāvyaa-vyapadeśa -darśanāt. nānvalaṭā-pī śrīgārānugatamadhura-guṇa-sāpeksaḥ eva anayoḥ kāvyaa-vyapadeśa-hetutā iti cet, madam idam. abhivyāṇjaka-lalita-varnābhāvān madhura-guṇa-vyaktir eva nāsti. dūre tad vyapeksa, nis sapatna-camatkarāṭiśaya kārīnor viṣeṣokti-vyatirekayoḥ, atōsmābhir upadarśita eva vibhāgaḥ śreyān.”

All faithful commentators of great reputation have explained and vindicated zealously Mammaṭaś observations. The above quotation from Sampradāya-prakāśini is just an instance in point.

But we stick to our observation that not unlike Ānandavardhana, even Mammaṭa and the rest should have avoided entering into such controversies. Actually even Ānandavardhana recommends that poetry and poetic beauty are all abstraction and there is nothing physical about the same. Poetic beauty, if revealed in the right fashion, takes shape even through figures of speech which under such circumstances are not ‘bahiraṅga’ i.e. ‘not external’ to poetry. This is Ānanda-vardhana’s observation. In this sense both guṇas and alāṃkāras when
they become instrumental in causing poetry beauty are intrinsically, or inherently connected (samavāya-vṛttyā) to poetry. Thus viewed Udbhata's view can be defended.

In the same way when Vāmana observes 'guṇas' as 'viśeṣa' or special mark of 'ṛiti' or style, which is said to be the 'soul'of poetry, in a metaphorical language not to be taken literally as already noticed by us, what Vāmana expects here is the "guṇatva" type of beauty. Individual guṇas are only various external presentations of this quality of excellence. It is all abstraction and there is nothing physical about it. So when 'ṛiti' graced by this excellence is said to be the soul by Vāmana, what is meant is that only such subtler form of poetic beauty is more acceptable to Vāmana as is 'dhvani' with Ānandavardhana. Alamkāra being less subtle form of beauty in his opinion is therefore metaphorically said to be "atiśayahetu" as against "kāraka-hetu" that goes with guṇas or subtler form of poetic beauty. Two or three styles, that are bestowed with this 'guṇa'-tattva, are said to be the 'soul' metaphorically. Individual forms of expression, such as three, four, five or ten or even more guṇas are only an accident; the presence of 'guṇatattva' is fundamental. Thus Mammaṭa's approach is biased and more physical which goes to disrespect the essence of what either Udbhata or Vāmana wants to underline. It is therefore that Ānandavardhana, having a better understanding of things, avoids condemning these views. - our observations are applicable to all followers of Mammaṭa who likewise fail to appreciate the spirit behind Udbhata or Vāmana's observations.

Mammaṭa's approach to the problem of rītis and vṛttis also follows the tradition of dhvanivādins such as Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta. Though not specified by the former the latter in his Locana takes vṛttis only as types of anuprāsa (; vṛttayaḥ anuprāsa-jātayaḥ), and rītis are not different from the concept of guṇas. But Mammaṭa slightly differs. He of course takes vṛttis as types of anuprāsa, but he adds that some people call vṛttis by the name of rītis. Thus he identified both vṛttis and rītis which was not done by either Ānandavardhana or Abhinavagupta. It is clear that in course of centuries, literary criticism also takes slightly different expression at the hands of theorists even belonging to the same school of thought. This sure is an illustration where we find complete identification of the cocepts of rīti and vṛtta as enunciated differently by earlier ālamkārikas such as Vāmana and Udbhata and also accepted as such by early promoters of dhvani such as Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta. Of course Mammaṭa seems to follow the basic guideline promoted by the Dhvanikāra that vṛttis and rītis are also suggesters or vyañjakas of rasa in poetry.
While talking of anuprása, i.e.-alliteration, a śabdā'lamkāra, Mammaṭa defines it as similarity of letters and this figure is said to be two-fold. He observes:

(K. P. IX. 79, 80, pp. 346, 347, ibid):

“varṇa-sāmyam anuprāṣaḥ
cheka-vṛtti-gato dvīdhā,
sonekasya sakṛt pūrvaḥ,
ekasyā'py asakṛt paraḥ.” (K. P. IX. 79)
mādhurya-vyāñjakaı̄r varṇair
upanāgarikesyate,
ojaḥ prakāśakais tais tu
paruṣa, komalā paraı̄h.” (K. P. IX. 80)

(79a) Alliteration is the similarity of letters. (79b) It is of two kinds; as pertaining to ‘cheka’ and ‘vṛtti’ (79c) That former one is the repetition of the several (consonants) only once. (79d) the latter is (the repetition) of even the one (consonant) more then once.”–

(80abc) By the letters suggestive of sweetness the diction (=mode) is held to be upanāgarikā; but by the letters suggestive of floridity it is called Paruṣā. (=harsh).

(80d) By others is Komalā (soft) (Trans. R. C. Dwivedi, pp. 347, 349, ibid).
Mammaṭa further observes “keśaṅcid eśā vaidarbhi-pramukhā
ritayo matāḥ.” (K. P. 81, ab, pp. 350, ibid) i.e. (81ab) - Accordıng to others, these diction are called styles, vaidarbhi and the rest. (pp. 351, Trans. Dwivedi, ibid).

Mammaṭa observes: “etās tisro vṛttayaḥ vāmanā”dīnām mate vaidarbhi-gauḍī-
pāncālyākhyā rītayaḥ ucyante.”–i.e. “These three diction are called vaidarbhi, gauḍīyā and pāncālı̄ respectively, in the opinion of Vāmana and others.” (Trans. Dwivedi, pp. 351, ibis);

Upanāgarikā, paruṣā and komalā of Udbhata are vṛttis advanced by Udbhata and his fore-runners. Vaidarbhi, gauḍīyā and pāncālı̄ are ritis advanced by Vāmana and his fore-runners. Bharata refers to both. The Dhvanikāra and his followers accept these as suggesters or vyāñjaka of rasas.

Hemacandra explains the common characteristic of both guṇa and alamkāra at Kā.śa. I. 12. He observes: “guṇa-doṣayoḥ sāmānya-lakṣaṇam āha–
‘Dhvani’ and other thought-currents such as guṇa,......

“rasasyōtkarsāpakarṣahetū guṇa-doṣau, bhaktyā śabdārthayoh.”

Thus for him guṇas are primarily connected with rasas, and only metaphorically to word and sense. This is the position suggested by Ānandavardhana. Hemacandra covers doṣa also here with reference to rasas only. He observes that guṇas and doṣas are said to rest primarily in rasas and only metaphorically in word and sense and again doṣas and guṇas are said to be ‘anitya’ with reference to individual rasas, though they reside permanently in ‘rasa’ taken in a general sense. This is a very clever observation. Hemacandra further observes that alaṃkāras primarily reside in word and sense and through them they become conducive to rasa, i.e. ‘rasópakāraka’. In his Viveka (pp. 34, edn Parikh, Kulkarni, ibid) Hemacandra seems to follow the line of Mammaṭa and seems to agree with him in denouncing Udbhata and Vāmana. But the general approach of the Dhvanikāra of correting guṇas and alaṃkāras with rasa-dhvanī continues in Hemacandra also. Hemacandra observes (pp. 34, 35, Kā śā. Edn. Parikh, Kulkarni.):

guṇa-doṣayoh sāmānya-lakṣaṇam āha- “rasasyōtkarṣā pakarṣahetū guṇa-doṣau, bhaktyā śabdārthayoh.” (Kā. śā. I. 12)

raso vakṣyamaṇa-svarūpah tasyōtkarṣahetavō guṇāh, apakarṣa-hetavas tu doṣāh. te ca rasasyaiva dharmāh, upacārena tu tad-upakārinō śabdārthayor ucyante. rasā”śrayatvarāṃ ca guṇa-dosayor anvaya-vyatirekānuvidhānāt. tathā hi, yatraiva doṣās tatraiva guṇāh, rasa-višeṣe ca doṣā, na tu śabdārthayoh-yadi hi tayoh syus tad bibhatsā”dau kāstvā”dayo guṇa na bhaveyuh. hāsyā”dau cāśīlītvā”dayah, anityāś caite doṣāḥ. yato yasyāṅginas te dosās tad abhāve na doṣas tadbhāve tu dosā ity anvaya-vyatirekābhyāṃ guṇa-doṣayō rasa eva āśrayah.

alaṃkārāṇāṃ sāmānya-lakṣaṇam āha - “aṅgāśrīta alaṃkārāḥ” (Kā. śā. I. 13)-rasasyāṅgino yad aṅgām śabdārthau tad āśrīta alaṃkārāḥ. te ca rasasya stātā kvacid upakārīnaḥ, kvacid anupakārīnaḥ rasābhāve tu vācya-vācaka-vaiṣcitrya-mātra-paryavasītā bhavanti.”

Hemacandra under Kā. śā. IV. 8 (pp. 292, ibid) quotes from Mammaṭaś K. P. (VIII. K. P. as above) and follows him with reference to vṛtti and riti. He also mentions these while quoting definitions from the N. S. of Bharata while discussing various forms of rūpakas. In short. Hemacandraś approach is in tune with the general approach of the Dhvanikāra and with that of Mammaṭa in particular.

Jayadeva also being a dhvanivādin accepts riti and vṛtti as suggesters of rasa-dhvanī. But he attaches greater importance to riti when he defines kāvyā or poetry,
at Candrāloka I. vii (pp. 11, Edn. Bharatiya vidya Prakāśana. Varaṇasi, '92 Edn.)
when he observes:

“nirdoṣā lakṣaṇavatī
sa-rītir guṇa-bhūṣanā,
sālaṃkāra-rasā’neka-vṛttir
vāk, kāvyā-nāma-bhāk.” – (Candrāloka, I.vii)

Thus for Jayadeva, poetry is that beautiful language which is free from blemishes, is gifted with ‘lakṣaṇas’ i.e. marks, is ‘having rītis’ and is also decorated by guṇas i.e. excellences. It is accompanied by alaṃkāras, rasas and many vṛttis. Jayadeva has both ‘rīti’ and ‘guṇas’ separately mentioned. So for him they are not identical. We will look into greater details when we go for topics of guṇa, doṣa, alaṃkāra, lakṣaṇa, rīti, vṛtti, etc. individually in Vol. II of this work. For the present we just take notice of the fact that Jayadeva also is a dhvanivādin and accepts rasadhvani to be central to poetry and this rasadhvani is suggested by different suggesters-vyañjakas, rīti and vṛtti being two of them.

Vidyādāra is also a dhvanivādin and shares the same attitude. He also, like Jayadeva seems to take the concept of rīti as one connected with presence and type of ‘samāsas’ in poetry. We will go into individual attitude later but at the end of Ch. V, Vidyādāra has this remark— “dārśanāntare tv etā vaidarbhi-pañcāli-gauḍiyā cēti tisro rītayō madhura-madhyama-paruṣa-varṇā”rabdhatvan madhura madhyama paruṣā cēti vṛttayo, rasa-viṣaya-vyāpāravena kathyante. yad uktam alaṃkāra-sarvasva-kāreṇa, “vṛttis tu rāśaviṣayo vyāpāraḥ” iti.

Vidyānātha in his Prātāparudriya (Edn. Madras, ‘14. with ‘Ratnāpaṇa’ comm.) explains the concept of poetry (pp. 31, 32, ibid) and following the dhvani dictate, takes-rītis, vṛttis, guṇas, alaṃkāras, śayyā etc.– all concepts to be conducive to rasadhvani. He observes : (pp. 31 ibid)

“atha kāvyā-prakaraṇam”
“atha kaya-svarūpa-nirūpaṇam.”
“guṇālaṃkāra-sahitau
śabdārthau doṣa -varjitau,
gadya-padyōbhaya-mayaṃ
kāvyam kāvyā-vida- viduḥ.”— 1.

(pp. 32, 33, 34, 35...)
'Dhvanī' and other thought-currents such as guṇa,......

śabdārthau mūrtir ākhyātau
jīvitam vyāṅgya-vaibhavam,
hārādivad alāṅkārās
tatra syur upamā”dayaḥ -2
śleṣā”dayo guṇās tatra
śauryā”daya iva sthitāḥ,
ātmotkarsā”vahās tatra
svabhāvā iva rītayaḥ. -3
śobhām āhāryikīṃ prāptā
vṛttayo vṛttayo yathā,
padānugūṇya-viśrāntīh
śayyā sayyéva saṃmatā. - 4
rasā”svāda-prabhedāḥ syuḥ
pākāḥ pākā iva sthirāḥ,
prakhyātā lokavad, iyāṃ
sāmagri kāvya-sāmpadaḥ.” -5.

...(p. 34, 35) .....
Sāhityadarpana (=S. D.) I. iii (pp. 20-25, Edn. ibid, with Lakshmi-tīkā) observes—
“vākyam rasā”tmakaṁ kāvyam
dośas tasyāpakaṁrakṣakaḥ
utkaraḥ-hetavaḥ proktāḥ,
guṇa-lāmkāra-rūtayaḥ.”

Viśvanātha observes in the vṛtti on S. D. I. iii. (pp. 25, ibid)- “guṇāh śauryā”divat, alamkārāḥ kaṭaka-kundalā”divat, rītayaḥ avayava-saṁsthaṇa -
viśesavat, deha-dvāreṇa śabdā”rtha-dvāreṇa, tasyaiva kāvyasya ātmabhūtam rasam
utkarṣayantāḥ kāvyasyotkarṣakā iti ucyante. Thus, the wider scheme introduced by
Ānandadvardhana continues in the dhvani-school of literary aesthetics.

Jagannātha of course is a dhvanivādin to the core, but he has his own ideas
which at times do not conform absolulley with the traditional views of the
dhvaniādins. Thus, for example he discusses the rasa-vyañjakatva of letters, words,
racanā (i.e. rīti/vṛtti etc.) sentence and a whole composition etc. in his own way.
He has certain reservations. He begins with the traditional view and then gives his
own observations. He observes (pp. 368-372, CH. I. Edn. Chowkhamba
Vidyābhavam, Varansi, ’55; and pp. 316-317, Edn. Prof, Athavale, ibid) : tad ittham
nirūpitasya asya rasā”di-dhvani-prabandhaiḥ padaika-deśāv avarṇa”tmakai
rāgā”dibhiṣca abhivyaktim ānanantī... varṇa-racanā-visoṣāṇāṁ mādhuryādi-
guṇābhivyājñakatvam eva na rasābhivyājñakatvam, gauravān mānābhāvāca...”

We will see how Jagannātha proceeds :

Jagannātha observes that the rasa-bhāvā”di-dhvani discussed so far is said to be
suggested by pada, varna, racanā, vākya, prabandha, padaika-deśā i.e. parts of a
pada and also by rāga etc. which are not part of a pada. (a-varṇā”tmakair dhvani-
rūpair gīta-vādyā”di-sambandhinibhiḥ rāgaiḥ, ādi-pada-grāhyābhīṣceṣṭā”dibhiṣca –
(pp. 366, Candrikā tīkā). This is the view of some ālamkārikas. He holds that when
a vākya or sentence is said to be suggester, virtually only that pada or word which
is not dissociated from suggestivity is in reality a suggester and not all words
therein. But the whole activity of suggestion proceeds on the analogy of ‘danḍa-
caṅkra-nyāya’. Just as daṅḍa, i.e. handle, caṅkra i.e. wheel etc. jointly make for ghaṭa
or pot, in the same way here also pada, vākya and racanā-each of these can be
taken as rasa-vyañjaka.

Now he proceeds to give the view of the “nayyas”. According to this view, the
‘racanā’ (or style/diction) which consists of employment of special letters, is
'Dhvani' and other thought-currents such as guṇa,......

suggestive only of guṇas or excellences and that it should not be taken as suggestive of rasā"di. For, if we accept 'racanā' to be suggestive of rasa, it involves 'gauravadaṣa', for in that case we will have to go for two types of racanā or construction, one each suggesting guṇas and rasas. Again there is no 'pramāṇa' for accepting this situation. Again, there is no rule that a racanā cannot suggest 'guṇa' without suggesting guṇī(-i.e. rasa) first. For if we accept this rule then, this rule will stand violated with reference to sense-organs such as those of smell, taste and hearing. For these three sense-organs are suggestive of guṇas but not guṇīs in form of ākāśa, prthvī, etc. Thus, as the independent guṇīs such as prthvī etc. are suggested by their own sense-organs and as guṇas such as smell etc. are suggested by their own independent set of organs, and after that getting united they become object of pratyakṣa or direct perception, in the same way here, both rasa and mādhuryā"di guṇas are suggested by their own agents and then either jointly or severally they are tasted :-"itthāṁ ca sva-sva-vyaṇjakākāraṁ guṇināṁ guṇānāṁ udāśīnāṁ ca yathā parasparōpaślesena audāśīṇyena vā tat tat pramiti-gocaratā, tathā rasā"dīnāṁ tad-guṇānāṁ ca abhivyakti-viśayatā iti tu navaṁā.

Candrikā (pp. 371, ibid) explains as follows :-"sva-sva-vyaṇjakākāraṁ vartā"dibhiḥ, upaṁitānāṁ bodhitānāṁ, guṇināṁ prthivyā ādīnāṁ, guṇānāṁ gandhā"dīnāṁ, udāśīnānāṁ guṇa-guṇa-bhāvena mithośambaddhānāṁ padārthānāṁ ca, pramiti-gocaratā, pramāṃmaka-pratyakṣa-viśayatā, kadācit upanyāsena, guṇānāṁ guṇināṁ mithāḥ sambaddhatvena, kadācit punar audāśīṇyena mithośambaddhatvena ca yathā bhavati, tathā guṇināṁ rasānāṁ guṇānāṁ mādhuryā"dīnāṁ ca bhivyakti-viśayatā, āsvāda-gocaratā, kadācin militatvena, kadācic ca pārthakṣyena bhavati iti vyavasthāyā, rasā"dy a-vyaṇjakatve'pi mādhurya"di-vyaṇjakatā vartādīnāṁ na a-sambhavīḥ iti tu navaṁā vandanti ity arthah.

So, Jagannātha has his own interpretation and independent view-point.

Ānandavardhana presented his scheme only to silence all opposition to dhvani. We will look into this below.

It may be noted that samghatāna is a concept which in this name, appears only in the Dhvanyāloka and then disappears. Later perhaps it is identified with guṇas or with vyṛtti based on the presence or absence of the types of samāsas or compounds, wedded perhaps also with the type of consonants -vyaṇjanas–such as harsh or soft or mixed. Whatever it may be, the ground reality is that after Ānandavardhana’s effort in the field of literary aesthetics, rasa, say rasa-dhvani remained in centre and all concepts floated by various authorities were woven together in a well-knit carpet and not a single concept was dishonoured or denounced.
Dhvani-virodha:

However, there still continued some opposition to the Dhavikāraś absolute supremacy. Voices were raised against dhvani in different quarters and Āṇandavardhana himself tried to answer some objections before presenting his scheme. But the fact is that the opposition was more to the concept of vyañjanā rather than the fact of implicit sense, whether it was named ‘Dhvani’ or otherwise. Actually nobody had any objection to the fact of the implicit sense-pratīyamāna artha -in poetry and it was accepted by all either in the garb of a faint undertone or a powerful overtone. But the process of arriving or apprehending it in poetry created debate and Āṇandavardhanaś projection, or favour of vyañjanā as a separate and independent word-power caused many an eyebrow to rise with the result that in place of vyañjanā a number of alternatives were pushed forward. We have taken care of all this in Ch. IX on “vyañjanā-virodha” and there is no point in going through all that again. Actually ‘dhvani-virodha’ is more ‘vyañjanā-virodha’ and of course the terminology viz. ‘dhvani’ was also ridiculed to a great extent. We will look into the same here in a nut shell.

Jayadeva in his Vimarśinī commentary alludes to the so-called dhvanivirodha in a well-known verse. He observes:

“tātparya-śaktir abhidhā
lakṣaṇānumiti dvidhā,
arthāpattih,kvacit tantram
samāsókrtyādy alamkṛtih,
rasya kāryatā, bhogaḥ,
vyāpārāntara-bādhanam,
dvādaśettham dhvaner asya
sthitā vipratipattayaḥ.”

Opposition to dhvani is twelvelong, says Jayadeva. They are that dhvani is negated by or is covered up by devices such as (i) tātparya-śakti, i.e. the sentence power of purport, (ii) abhidhā or the word-power of direct expression, i.e. denotation, (iii) (iv) two-fold lakṣaṇā or the power of indication operating in two ways, (v) (vi) anumiti or inference, which is again two-fold-, (vii) arthāpatti or presumption i.e. argument or inference based on circumstances; (viii) tantra, i.e. double entendre (ix) alamkāras such as ‘samāsókṛi’ and the like, (x) the fact that
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rasa follows as a result (kāryatā), (xi) bhogāḥ i.e. rasa is tasted (by bhāvakatva/ bhojakatva), (xii) Or that any other power is negated-vyāpārāntara-bādhanam, i.e. it is a-nirvācyā. These twelve are doubts raised against ‘dhvani.’ These objections display the graph of opposition to dhvani at different stages or in different periods of time. Kuntaka is examined by us very carefully and has been given the benefit of doubt but the arch enemies of dhvani-vyañjanā were Mahimā, the protagonist of inference-theory in poetry i.e. Kāvyānumiti, and then Dhanañjaya and Dhanika, the supporters of tātparya. Bhoja, of course supported tātparya but he was not averse to vyañjanā/dhvani and like Kuntaka he secures the benefit of doubt. We have examined all these authors earlier while dealing with vyañjanā-virodha. For the present we will look into only the dhvani-virodha as listed and explained by Dhvanikāra in Dhv. I. i, and vr̥tti theron and also as explained by Abhinavagupta in his Locana. It may be noted that we have dealt with vyañjanā and opposition to it separately so whatever Āṇandavarhdava has to say on the difference between abhidhā, lakṣaṇā, anumiti, etc. on one side and vyañjanā on the other, has been duly discussed by us and therefore will not be repeated here.

Same will be the case of ālaṃkārikas of the dhvani-school beginning with Mammaṭa and down to Jagannātha, taking in the sweep of course, Hemacandra, Vidyādhara, Vidyānātha and Viśvanātha, -whose views are already discussed by us in Ch. IX. The views of dirgha-dirghatara abhidhāvādin, nimitavādin etc. are carefully analysed by us and so also Makulaś position, along with Pratīhāreṇdurājaś view-point, has been critically discussed by us. So, for the present we will take care of only the relevant portion of the Dhv. and some comments on the same at places by Abhinavagupta in his Locana.

Āṇandavarhdana, in the very first Kārikā of his Dhvanyāloka refers to some opponents of dhvani. He observes:

“kāvyasyā”tmā dhvanir iti budhaiḥ
yāḥ samāmnāta-pūrvāḥ
tasyā’bhāvam jagadur apare
bhāktam āḥus tam anye,
kecid vācāṃ sthitam aviṣaye
tattvaṃ ucus tadiyam
tena brūmaḥ sahrdayamanaḥ-
prītaye tat-svarūpam.” (Dhv. I. i.) (pp. 1, ibid).
“Though the learned men of yore have declared (time and again) that the soul of poetry is suggestion, some would aver its non-existence, some would regard it as something (logically) implied and some others would speak of its essence as lying beyond the scope of words. We propose, therefore, to explain its nature and bring delight to the hearts of perspective critics. (Dhv. I. i.) (Trans. K. Kris. pp. 2, ibid).

We had quoted above what Jayaratha had to say about opposition to dhvani. It contained a reference to some who took two-fold laksanā as equivalent to dhvani. Here a view holding dhvani as “bhākta” i.e. ‘bhakti grāhya’ is mentioned in Dhv. I. i. This is identical with Jayaratha’s reference. Under Dhv. III. 33; Ānandavardhana has distinguished vyañjanā from abhidhā, laksanā, anumiti and also tātparya. All these opponents are mentioned by Jayadeva. It was Bhaṭṭa-nāyaka who supported “rasasya-bhogāḥ”, perhaps in his, now not available work viz. “Hṛdayadarpana” specifically drafted by him for demolition of dhvani i.e. ‘dhvani-dhvamsa.’ He rejected vyañjanā in favour of two powers such as “bhāvakatva” and “bhojakatva”. (i.e. the power of revelation and enjoyment). Ānandavardhana has considered the views of the Mīmāṃsakas and the same is referred to by Jayaratha as those who prefer tātparya over vyañjanā. The view with two-fold anumiti is the same as the view of the Naivyikas considered by the Dhvanikara under Dhv. III. 33, where also abhidhā/vyañjanā are carefully distinguished. ‘Kvacet tantram’ is taken care of under śabda-śakti-mūla-dhvani and śleṣa in the Dhv. We will take the refutation of arthāpatti under anumāna (Dhv. III. 33). ‘rasasya kāryatā’ is the view of Lollaṭa and the “vyāpārāntara-bādhana’ of Jayaratha is the same as “vācām avīṣayaḥ” view, referred to in Dhv. I. i.

We will now proceed with what Ānandavardhana has to say under Dhv. I. i. He observes that the learned critics have, from times of yore, had recognised ‘dhvani’ as the ‘soul of poetry’. We know that, as Abhinavagupta explains, this ancient tradition was inherited by Ānandavardhana. The tradition was orally floated and at least Abhinavagupta knows no written document discussing dhvani, prior to the Dhvanyāloka. So this thought-current which was critically examined and promulgated by unknown ancients must have had to face rough weather in form of opposition, the first view being of those who flatly rejected dhvani—“tasya abhāvaṃ jagadur apare.” We will look into the same as blow :-

First of all we will take notice of what the Locana has to say in the beginning. The Locana observes (under Dhv. I. i., pp. 86, Edn. Nandi, ibid) : “yasya adhi-gamāya prayuta pravartanīyaṃ kā tatra abhāva-saṃbhāvanā ? atāḥ kim kurmaḥ ?
apāram maurkhyam abhāvavādinām iti bhāvaḥ—That, to know which, on the contrary we should make an effort, (is denied by the opponents), where can be the possibility of its non-existence. The foolishness of those who deny (dhvani) is beyond measure. So, what can we do about it?”—

Ānandavardhana observes that the following are the types of arguments of the abhāvavādins:

(vṛtti, Dhv. I. i; pp. 1, Edn. K. Kris. ibid) -
“tad abhāvavādinām ca amī vikalpāḥ saṃbhavanti. tatra kecid ācaksīran-
śabdārtha-śaśrīram tāvat kāvyam .... tadvayatiriktaḥ kōyaṃ dhvanir nāma iti ?”—
“According to some (of the objectors): “Poetry is but that whose body is constituted by sound (or word) and meaning. Sources of charm through sound such as ‘alliteration’ are well-known; and so are the sources of charm through meaning such as ‘simile’. Merits or qualities of composition (=excellences) like “sweetness” are also familiar to us. Also we have heard of dictons (=vṛttiś) such as the ‘cultured’ propounded by some, though in truth their features are not different from qualities of style. We have further heard of styles (rītyah) like ‘vaidarbhi’. But what could this concept of Dhvani (suggestion) be which is different from any of these?”—(Trans- K. Kris., pp. 2, ibid).

Abhinavagupta observes that the use of aorist in ‘jagaduḥ’ suggests that the types of the views of the objectors are imagined by the author and then are refuted. In reality such views of the objectors are not noticed in written works.

He observes that (Locana, Dhv. I. i.; pp. 6, Edn. Nandi, ibid)- “tatra samayā’pekṣeṇa śabdārtha-pratipādayakāḥ iti kṛtvā vyācya-vyatiriktaṁ nāśti vyāgyam; sad api va tad abhidhā-vṛttī-ākṣiptaṁ śabdāva-gaṭārtha-balād ākrṣtam, tad anākṣiptaṁ api va na śakyam, kumārīśv iva bhārtrī-sukham atadvitsu iti traya eva etc. prādhānā vipratipatti-prakārāḥ—” “With reference to convention, the word is expressive of meaning. So, there is nothing called ‘the suggested’, beyond the expressed sense. Even if it exists, it is implied by abhidhā-vṛtti i.e. denotation, and is arrived at through the force of the expressed sense and therefore it can be said to be ‘bhāktā’ i.e. implied, at the most. And if it is not derived by the force of expressed sense, then it remains undefinable like the happiness of the company of a husband in case of the unmarried girls. Thus these three are the main types of objections.”

Introducing further the view of Ānandavardhana, the Locana observes: (pp. 6, on Dhv. I. i, ibid)-
“tatra abhāva-vikalpasya trayāḥ prakārāḥ; śabdārtha-guṇālambkāraṇam eva śabdārtha-śobhākāritvāt loka-śastrārītika-sundara-śabdārtha-rūpasya kāvyasya na śobhāhetuḥ kaścid anyōsti yōśmabhīr na gaṇita ity ekaḥ prakāraḥ. yo vā na gaṇitaḥ sa śobhākāry eva na bhavati iti dvitiyāḥ. atha śobhākāri bhavati tarhy asmad ukta eva guṇe vālakāre vāntarbhavati, nāmāntarakaraṇe tu kiyad idaṁ pāndityam? athāpy ukteṣu guṇesv alāmkāreṣu na antarbhāvaḥ, tathā’pi kinicid viśeṣa-lesam āśritya nāmāntara-karanaṁ, upamā-vichittī-prakārāṇām a-saṃkhyatvāt. tathā’pi guṇālambkāra-a-vyatirikta-vābhāva eva. tāvan mātreṇa ca kim kṛtam? anyasyā’pi vaicitryasya śakyōtpreksyatvāt. cirantanair hi bharata-muni-prabhitibhir yamakopame eva śabdālambkāratvena iste. tat-prapaṇca-dik-pradarśanam tv anyair alānkāra-kāraṇāḥ kṛtam. tad yathā- “karmani an’ ity atra kumbhākāra”dy udāharaṇam śrtvā nagarākārā”di śabdā utpreksyante, tāvatā ka ātmānaḥ bahumānaḥ? evam prakte’pi iti trtiyāḥ prakārāḥ. evam ekas tridhā vikalpāḥ annyau ca dvāv iti paṇca vikalpāḥ iti tātparyārthāḥ”

“"There are three types of abhāva-vikalpa i.e. (total) denial of dhvani (such as), only guṇas or excellences and alāmkāras i.e. figures are the devices of beauty with reference to word and sense. So, for kāvyā which is of the form of beautiful word and sense apart from (word and sense in) common parlance or in scientific usage,-there is no other beautifying device beyond this (=guṇas and alāmkāras, with reference to word and sense), which is not considered by us;– this is the first variety of objection. Or, (the second type of objection is that), that which is not considered by us is not at all a beautifying agent. This is the second type of abhāvavādins. Now, if it is said, that it is very much there and is also the cause of beauty, then in that case it has to be included in (either the list of) guṇas or that of alāmkāras. What is the big in giving a special name (i.e. coining a special term) for it? Now, if it is said that this new device cannot be included in either guṇas or alāmkāras enlisted before, then with reference to its special feature let it receive a new name (i.e. let it be taken as an additional new guṇa or alāmkāra), for there are innumerable varieties of the beauty caused by similitude. So, even if a new name is given, basically it surely is not different from a guṇa or an alāmkāra, and just for this only, i.e. just for being floated as a new guṇa or a new alāmkāra, nothing big is achieved. We can also imagine some other new devices causing beauty (that are basically either a guṇa or an alāmkāra). Ancient authority such as Bharata muni had mentioned only two figures such as ‘yamaka’ and ‘upamā’, as figures of word and sense respectively. Other alāmkārikas showed the way to expansion of these. Pāṇini, for example, gave the sūtra viz. “karmani an”. With this the word
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‘kumbhakāra’ is generated. Keeping this in view other words such as “suvarṇa-kāra”, “nagara-kāra” etc. also can be generated, (by anybody with help of Pāṇiniś sūtra). So, why brag around by such a small achievement (as calling a guna or alāṃkāra) by the name ‘dhvani’) for this is similar to the instance given above (of wider application of Pāṇiniś sūtra). This is the third type of objectors. Add to these three, the two (viz. bhāktavādins and aśakya-vaktavāya-vādins) and we arrive at a total of five types of objectors. This is the substance (of what Ānandavardhana has laid down).”

We have seen how Ānandavardhana has presented the first type of objectors, (which is three fold in itself).

Abhinavagupta here further observes that by the use of “tāvat”, it is suggested that nobody is basically opposed to the idea that poetry is both word and sense taken together. For there is no merit is just giving a name to a thing. ‘Kāvya’ is the name given to the union of śabda and artha. Now, if the new name ‘dhvani’ is given to the same (i.e. union of word and sense, having the name of ‘kāvya), nothing new is to be served. So, perhaps ‘dhvani’ is not of the form of the union of word and sense, but is its (=union’s) beauty. Thus dhvani is just the beauty of word and sense taken together. Now this beauty can be twofold. Either it rests on its form only (i.e. it is sva-rūpa-mātra-niṣṭha) or it rests on the construction (of word and sense, i.e. samghātanā-niṣṭha). The beauty resting on svarūpa or form is arrived at by śabdālaṃkāras or figures of sound, and the beauty arrived at by construction (i.e. samghatanā-niṣṭa-cārutva) results from śabda-guṇas (i.e. excellenas based on word). Similarly the two-fold beauty residing in artha or meaning results from upāmi’di alāṃkāras and excellences such as sweetness etc. (i.e. mādhuryā’di guṇas) respectively. Thus there is nothing beyond this (i.e. nothing beyond śabārtha-guṇa’laṃkāra). So, ‘dhvani’ is not at all a basically new concept. For, whatever is else than either guṇa or alāṃkāra can never claim to be a cause of beauty, like the blemishes both permanent or impermanent such as ‘a-sādhu’ or ‘duḥ-śrava’ etc. respectively. Now your dhvani (which is not poetry itself, and therefore) is a device of beauty and hence it can not be other than that (i.e. either guṇa or an alāṃkāra). This is argument in negation (i.e. vyatirakīhetu) Now, says the objector, even if some people argue that just as dictions (i.e. vṛttis) and styles (i.e. rītis) are different from guṇas and alāṃkāras and still are (independent) devices of beauty, in the same way dhvani also can be an independent device of beauty, the answer (from the original objector to dhvani) could be this.– In fact vṛttis and rītis are not basically different from alāṃkāras such as alliteration (or,
anuprāśā"di) or excellences such sweetness (i.e. mādhuryā"di) respectively. Vṛttis have no independent power beyond anuprāśā"di. Because they are non-different Bhāmaha and other ancients have not taken their separate cognition. Eventhough the vṛttis are made current by ālāmkārikas such as Udbhata and the like, there is no substance in vṛttis which deserves to be taken as independent of anuprāsa etc. Same is the case with styles, i.e. ritis with reference to gunas. Thus vṛttis and ritis are not substantially different from anuprāśā"di and mādharyā"di respectively. Thus, the argument that dhvani, like vṛttis and ritis, should be cognised as a source of beauty independent of gunas and ālāmkāras, falls flat. Thus poetry, which is relished by a cognition which is one in itself and not comprising of parts (i.e. akhandha-buddhi-samāsvādyā), if at all is analysed from the point of artificial analysis, will fail to yield an independent entity called ‘dhvani‘: “-tena akhandabuddhi-samāsvādyam api kāvyam apoddhārā-buddhyā yadi vibhajyate, tathā'pyatra dhvani-sabda-vācyo na kaścid vyatiriktortho labhyate iti ‘nāma’-σabdēna āha.” (Locana, Dhw. I. i., pp. 10, end. Nandi, ibid).

- The view of the second type of objectors is placed by Ānandavardhana inthe following words - (Dhv. I. i.,vṛtti, pp. 1,3, Edn. K. Kris, ibid)- “anye brūyuḥ- ‘nāsty eva dhvaniḥ, prasiddha-prasthāna-vyatirekīṇaḥ kāvyā-prakārasya kāvyatva-hāneḥ. sahṛdaya-hṛdayā”hlādi-sabdārtha-mayatvam eva kāvyā-lakṣāṇam. na ca ukta-prakārātirekino mārgasya tat sambhavati. na ca tat samayāntaḥ pātinaḥ sahṛdayān kānicī parikalpya tat-prasiddhyā dhvanau kāvyatva-vyapadesaḥ pravartitīopi sakala-vidvan-manogrāhitām ālāmbe.”

-“Others assert thus :” Suggestion does not exist indeed; for a species of poetry opposed to all well-known canons will necessarily cease to be poetry. Poetry can only be defined as that which is made up of such words and meanings as will delight the mind of the critic. This will not be achieved by a route which excludes all the well-known canons mentioned. Even if the designation of poetry were to be accepted as applying to ‘dhvani’ on the unanimous support of a coterie of self-styled critics, it would fail to win the acceptance of all the learned.” (Trans. K. Kris. pp. 3,5, ibid).

Abhinavagupta places the argument of the objector beautifully. It is like this (Locana, Dhw. I. i.; pp. 10, Edn. Nandi, ibid)- “tathā hi khadga-lakṣānaḥ karomi ity uktvā, ātāna-vitāna”uṇā, prāvriyamāṇaḥ, sakala-dehā”chādakah, sukumāras citra-tantu-viracitarā, samvartana-vivartana-sahiṣṭur acchedakah, succedeyah, utṛṣṭa-khadgah iti bruvānaṁ paraṁ pataḥ khalv evamvidho bhavati, na khadga iti yuktyā paryānuṣuyamāna evam brūyāt īḍrśa eva khadgo mama abhimata iti tādv vē etat. prasiddham, hi lakṣaṇam bhavati, na kalpitam iti bhāvaḥ.”
‘Dhvani’ and other thought-currents such as guṇa,......

“If someone says, ‘I will define a sword,’ and then starts saying, “that which can be stretched or shortened, which covers the body, which is delicate and made of beautiful fibres, that which can be folded or unfolded, that which can be easily torn (is a sword). Now, if somebody else stops him intervening with a remark that, ‘Such a definition fits with a piece of cloth and not a sword.’ then that person would say, “No, only such a definition of sword is acceptable to me,” (then how can we prevent him? Same is the case with those who defy dhvani). The idea is that only the well-known qualities can make for a definition.

Ānandavardhana further gives a third view of the dhvany-abhāva-vādins. He observes : “punar apare tasya abhāvam anyathā kathayeyuḥ.’ na sambhavaty eva dhvanir nāma apūrvah kaścit. kāmanīyakam anativartamānasya tasya ukteṣv eva cārutva-hetuṣv antarbhāvāt. teṣām anyatamasyaiva vā apūrva-samākhya-mātrakaṇe yat-kiñcana kathanam syāt.” (vṛtti, Dhv. I. i.; pp. 4, ibid) :- "Yet another opinion about its non-existence is: “It is indeed impossible that ‘suggestion’ can be something unknown before. Since it is not distinct from a source of charm, it gets naturally included in the causes of charm already enunciated. By coining a novel designation to just one of them nothing profound will have been stated.” (Trans. K. Kris.; pp. 5, ibid).

The objector says that as the ways of speech are endless, an insignificant element could have been left out unexplained by the famous framers of the rules of poetry. This is possible. So, it is surprising that persons should close their eyes under the self-assumed illusion of being ‘perceptive critics’ and dance about with joy saying, that they have discovered ‘dhvani’ in some hitherto unnamed element causing beauty. Thousands of other great men have expounded, and are still expounding, figurative elements of poetic speech. Such an over excitement is not noticed here. So, dhvani is but a fabrication; and it will not be possible for the supporters of dhvani to demonstrate any element of truth about it which can bear scrutiny. –Ānandavardhana observes : (vṛtti on Dhv. I. i.; pp. 4, ibid) :- tasmāt pravāda-mātram dhvaniḥ. na tv asya kṣodaksamaṃ tattvam kiñcicd api prakāśayitum śakyam.” Ānandavardhana quotes a caustic remark against dhvani, which could be from some Manoratha Kavi, his contemporary, as suggested by Abhinavagupta in the Locana. The Dhvanikāra observes (pp. 4, vṛtti, Dhv. I. i, ibid) –

“tathā ca anyena kṛta eva atra ślokaḥ-
yasminn asti na vastu kiñcana
manaḥ-prahlādi sālaṃkṛti
vyutpannair racitam na caiva
vacanair vakroki-śunyam ca yat,
kāvyam tad dhvaninā samanvitam iti
prītyā prāsaṃsañ jadāh,
no vidmōbhiddhāti kiṃ sumatinā
prṣṭaḥ svarūpaṃ dhvaneḥ.”—

“In fact, a gentleman has already composed a verse to this effect—

-Poetry, wherein there is nothing to delight the mind and no embellishment, which is destitute of felicitous words and artful turns, is praised so warmly by the dunce as being endowed with dhvani (suggestion). But we are at a loss to imagine what answer he would give when faced with a straight question by an intelligent critic about the nature of ‘dhvani’ itself!” (Trans- K. Kris., pp. 5, ibid).

Abhinavagupta suggests (Locana, Dhv. I. i.; pp. Edn. Nandi, ibid) :

“granthakṛt-samāna-kāla-bhāvinā manoratha-nāmnā kavinā.”—

After taking note of the three dhvany-abhāva-vādins Ānandavardhana proceeds to refer to two more such views viz. the one, bhāktavādins, i.e. those who try to include dhvani under ‘bhakti’ or ‘lākṣaṇā’ and the rest who feel that dhvani, inspite of its being an inependent catagory cannot be defined ‘an-ākhyeya-vādins.’

To explain ‘bhakti’ the Locana has the following : (on Dhv. I.; pp. 14, Edn. Nandi, ibid)— “bhajyate sevyate padārthena, prasiddhatayā utpreksyate iti bhaktir dharmobhidheyena sāmīpyādiḥ. tata āgato bhākto lākṣaṇikörtthaḥ. yad āhuḥ—

“abhidheyena sāmīpyāt (sāmbhandhāt)
sārūpyāt samavāyataḥ,
vaiparītyāt kriyāyogāt
lākṣaṇā paṃcadhā maṭa.”

guna-samudāya vrteḥ śabdasya arthabhāgas taikṣṇyā”dīr bhaktih, tata āgato gauṇorthe bhāktaḥ. bhaktih pratipādye sāmīpya-taikṣṇyā”dau śraddhātiṣayāḥ. tām prayojanatvena uddiṣya tata āgato bhākta iti gauṇo, lākṣaṇikaśca. mukhyasya cārthasya bhaṅgo bhaktir ity evam mukhyārtha-bādha- nimitta-prayojanam iti upacārabijam ity uktam bhavati.”—

“That which is resorted to by the word-meaning, that which is imagined in form of a well-known meaning, is ‘bhakti’ i.e. the relation such as ‘nearness’ etc. with the
denoted sense. The meaning derived from 'bhakti' is termed 'bhākta'. It is also 'gaṇa' i.e. subordinate, or derived from guṇa/quality, or it is called 'lakṣaṇa' or 'indicated sense' also. It is said-

"due to relation with the literal meaning, such as closeness etc.; or similarity, or association (samavāya), or contrariety (vaiparītya), or association with some action (kriyāyoga), lakṣaṇa or indication is said to be five-fold."

'Bhakti' is that portion of meaning which is such as 'pointedness' etc. The meaning derived through that is 'bhākta' or 'indicated.' Absolute faith in 'closeness', pointedness or sharpness (as in agnir mānavakah), which are supposed to be conveyed, is 'bhakti'. (i.e. the speaker should have conviction that by such and such a usage, he will convey his intended sense). This is taken as the prayojana i.e. purpose for resorting to indication, and the meaning arrived at through this process is called 'bhākta' or 'gaṇa' or 'lakṣaṇa' i.e. secondary or indicated. The breaking or dismissal of the primary sense is also termed 'bhakti'. Thus the seed of metaphorical expression (i.e. upacāra) is said to be the presence of three factors such as 'contradiction of the literal sense', 'the cause' (i.e. relation etc.), and 'the motive' (prayojana, for resorting to such a usage).

On Ānandavardhana's observation that, "anye tam dhvani-saṃjñitam kāvyā"tmānaṃ guṇavṛttir. ity āhuḥ", the Locana observes that (the first three varieties) of 'abhāvavāda' was only an imagined objection. In reality whether these objectors existed or not is not known. It is precisely for this uncertainty the use of "jagaduh"– an aorist form, was preferred by the Dhvanikāra. But 'lakṣaṇāvāda' i.e. supporters of lakṣaṇā, disfavouring dhvani, are read in works in a continuous link. So, (āhuḥ) the use of present tense is seen here :– "abhāva-vādasya saṃbhāvanā- prānavatvena bhūtatvam uktam. bhāktavādas tv avicchinnaḥ pustakesv ity abhiprayenā āhur iti nitya-pravartamānāpeksayā abhidhānam." (Locana, Dhv. I. i., pp. 14, Edn. Nandi, ibid).

This statement of the Locanakāra is important. In fact a verse written by a contemporary, identified as "Manoratha Kavi" by the Locanakāra, was quoted by Ānandavardhana himself, So, the 'abhāvavāda' also, it seems, had known supporters. Or, perhaps Manoratha was a lakṣaṇa-vādin.

As for lakṣaṇāvāda, Ānandavardhana has following observation.– (Dhv. I. i.; vṛtti, pp. 4, ibid) :– "bhāktam āhūs tam anye. anye tam dhvani-saṃjñitam kāvyā"tmānaṃ guṇa-vṛttir ity āhuḥ. yadyapi ca dhvani-sabda-sāṅkīrtanena kāvyā- lakṣaṇa-vidhāyibhir guṇavṛttir anyo vā na kaścit prakāraḥ prakāśitāḥ, tathāpi
amukhya-vṛttyā kāvyeṣu vyavahāreṃ darśayatā dhvanimārgo manāk-sṛṣṭopī na laksita iti pariṇalpya evam uktam, ‘bhaṅktam āhus tam anye iti’—“Some others mention it as something (logically) implied. (To put it differently,) others declare that the soul of poetry, designated by the term suggestion, is the same as a secondary usage of words. Although it is true that no literary theorist has ever shown any element like a secondary usage of words as being specially identical with suggestion by mentioning the word ‘suggestion’ itself, we have noted here such a view because we can conclude that one who points out the secondary usage of words in poetry has slightly touched the fringe of the doctrine of suggestion, though one does not define it.”—(Trans. K. Kris., pp. 5, ibid)

On this, the Locana observes (pp. 16, Edn. Nandi, ibid): “darśayatā iti. bhaṭṭodbhaṭa-vāmanā”dīnā. bhāmahaṇa uktam—“sabdāscandobhidhānārthāḥ” iti. abhidhānasya sābdād bhedaṃ vyākhyaṭum bhaṭṭodbhaṭa babhāse—sabdānām abhidhānam abhidhāvyāpēraḥ, mukhyo guṇavrātiś ca, iti. vāmanopī ‘sādrśyāllakṣanā vakroktūr’ iti. manāk sṛṣṭa iti. tais tāvad dhvani-dīg-unmīlitaḥ, vathālikhitapāthakais tu svarūpa-vivekam kartum a-saknuvadbhīh tat-svarūpaviveko na kṛtaḥ, pratyuta- upālabhyate, a-bhagna-nārikelavat, vathā-śruta-tad-granthādgrahana-mātrena iti.”

—“By pointing out”—(is meant that) by Bhaṭṭodbhaṭa and Vāmana etc. Bhāmaha observed: “sound, metre, word (with meaning),” etc. “Bhāṭṭa Uddbhāṭa, while explaining (these words of Bhāmaha, in his Bhāmaha-vivaraṇa) observes”—By ‘abhidhāna’ of sounds is meant ‘abhidhā-vyāpāra’ or the power of expression, both principal and subordinate. Vāmana also observed: “Indication on the strength of similarity is termed ‘vakroktu’. By “just touched” is meant that they opened the path (=direction) to ‘dhvani’. But those who revelled only in reading that much which was written on face (i.e. those who had no ability to read between the lines), i.e. those who were incapable to discriminate the (exact nature of outward) form, did not go for (proper) discrimination of the form, and they are on the contrary finding fault (with dhvanividins). This is like an unbroken cocoanut (fruit). They have understood the works (of the ancients) only as they have heard (outwardly) (i.e. without going into the inner meaning).”

This shows that perhaps Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta are of the opinion that the ancients, i.e. Bhāmaha, Vāmana etc., though did not mention dhvani expressly but were not averse to it and had accepted dhvani under different heads. We have tried to discuss the position of the ancients in an earlier chapter, i.e. Ch. V.
Finally, Ānandavardhana records the view of those who do not deny dhvani but feel that it cannot be defined. They are the “aśakya-vaktavya-vādins.” They do not reject ‘dhvani’ as an independent concept, but hold that it eludes all attempts to define. Ānandavardhana observes: (pp. 6, vṛttī, Dhv. I. i., ibid).

“kecit punaḥ lakṣaṇa-karaṇa-sālīna-bhuddhayaḥ dhvanes tatvam girām agocaram sahṛdaya-hṛdaya-sāmvedyam eva samākhyaatavatāḥ.”—“Still others not astute enough to frame a definition, rest content with saying that the true nature of suggestion is beyond all words and that it is discernible only to the minds of perceptive critics.”—(Trans. K. Kris.; pp, ibid).

The Locana observes: (on Dhv. I. i.; pp. 16, Edn. Nandi, ibid)—“ete ca traya uttarottaram bhavya-buddhyah. prācyā hi viparyastā eva sarvathā. madhyamās tu rad-rūpaṃ jānanā api sandehena apaḥnuvathe. anṛyas tv anapaḥnavā api lakṣayitum na jānata iti krameṇa viparyāsa-sa-saṃdeha-ajñāna-prādhānyam eteśām.”

These three (i.e. the three abhāvavadins, the lakṣaṇāvādins, and the a-vākhyeyatāvādins) are having brighter intellect in sequence. The ancients (who deny dhvani totally, the first three views) are absolutely inverted (in their understanding) (i.e. they are totally deluded). The middle ones (i.e. the bhaktivādins) know its nature but due to doubt (in their mind, i.e. due to lack of clarity), are negating the same (or, are covering it up). The last ones do not reject (dhvani), but they do not know how to draft the definition. Thus in sequence these are dominated by opposite (view), doubtful apprehension and ignorant understanding.”

Ānandavardhana says that as there are so many different opinions concerning dhvani, he takes upon himself to lay down the true nature of dhvani. We have noted that he is of the opinion that:—“tasya hi dhvaneḥ svarūpaṃ sakala-satkavi-kāvyōpaniśad bhūtam atiramaṇīyaṃ, anīyasibhir api cirantana-kāvyā-lakṣaṇa-vidhāyināṃ buddhībhīr anunmīlita-pūrmam; atha ca rāmāyaṇa-mahābhārata-prabhartini lakṣye sarvatra prasiddha-vyavahāram, lakṣayatām sahṛdayānām ānando manasi labhatām pratiṣṭhām iti prakāṣyate.”—“(vṛttī, Dhv. 1. i; pp. 6, ibid) :“suggestion itself is both the quintessence of the works of all first-rate poets and the most beautiful principle of poetry though it remained unnoticed even by the subtlest of the rhetoricians of the past. However, refined critics are certainly alive to its primary presence in literary works like the Rāmāyaṇa and the Mahābhārata; and with a view to placing their delight on a secure footing, we shall explain its nature (in detail).” (Trans. K. Kris.; pp. 7, ibid).
It is in answer to the objections as explained above, Ānandavardhana writes the whole of his Dhvanyāloka in which he presents a scheme which has a place for all thought-currents floated in the field of literary criticism, of course, with dhvani, i.e. rasa-dhvani remaining in the centre.

To begin with, Ānandavardhana establishes the implicit sense i.e. pratiyamāna artha-as independent of the denoted sense i.e. vācyārtha. We have seen how this implicit sense when principal, is termed ‘dhvani’ by him. He defines dhvani at Dhv. I. 13 and explains how its scope falls apart from that of the various devices of beauty at the expressed level such as figures of both sound and sense. Similarly, the excellences such as sweetness etc. and the styles and dictions (rīti, vr̥tti) are also but suggesters of dhvani, the supreme rasa-dhvani in particular. The concepts of alamkāra, guṇa, rīti, vr̥tti etc. are all based on the relation of the expressed and the expressor (i.e. vācyā-vācaka-bhāva) while dhvani rests exclusively on what he terms as “vyāṇgya-vyaṇjaka-bhāva” i.e. the relation of the suggester and the suggested. Thus the scope of both these are different, i.e. ‘vibhakta’. The view of the supporters of the known track only i.e. “prasiddha-prasthāna-vādins” does not stand scrutiny. They said that no definition of dhvani should be attempted for the earlier masters have not done it, as it is absent in known works of literature (i.e. lakṣya-granthas). But the main argument is that not to attempt a definition because the ancients have not attempted, is in itself self-defeating. It contains hetvābhāsa called ‘viruddha’, because actually it becomes logically more pertinent to attempt a definition if nobody else has tried it. Again to say that this dhvani-tattva is not noticed in great works of literature (=lakṣya-granthas) is rooted in hetvābhāsa called “a-siddha”, as in reality this dhvani-tattva is seen predominantly present in great works such as the Ramāyaṇa or the Mahābhārata. Again some opponents had stated that even if dhvani exists, it has no relation with poetry. To this the answer is that it can be understood if it is said that dance and music have no intrinsic relation with the art of drama, but ‘dhvani’ is said to be the very soul of poetry and so such an observation that it has no relation with poetry is absolutely thoughtless.

The third type of dhvani-abhāvavādins wanted to include dhvani in other sources of beauty such as guṇa, alamkāra etc. as dhvani also is the cause of beauty (=ramanīyatā). But this is not correct as the tradition which these people advocate is based on vācyā-vācaka-bhāva, while dhvani sails only on vyaṇgya-vyaṇjaka-bhāva and thus there is no chance of the latter being covered up by the former. The guṇālāmḍkāras are but parts or limbs (aṅga) and ‘dhvani’ is said to be ‘aṅgī’ i.e. the
‘Dhvani’ and other thought-currents such as guṇa,.......

full-limbed species of poetry. Ānandavardhana, in a detailed exposition, explains how dhvani, which is principal, cannot be subsumed under alamkāras such as samāsōkti, ākṣepa etc. which are charged with subordinated implicit sense. He concedes this much that if in paryāyokta or in some variety of aprastuta-praśamsā the critic feels that the implicit sense is more charming than the expressed, than it can be included in dhvani having a wider scope (mahā-visāya). Thus dhvani cannot be subsumed under any known literary concept. He observes : (vr̥tti, Dhv. I. 13) : tasmān na dhvaner anyatra antarbhāvaḥ, itaś ca nāntarbhāvaḥ, yataḥ kāvyam-visēsōngi dhvanir iti kathitaḥ tasya punar aṅgāni-alamkāraṁ guṇāḥ vr̥ttayaḥ cēti pratipādayiṣyate. na ca avaya eva pr̥thag bhūtaḥ āvayoḥ iti prasiddhaḥ ap-r̥thagbhāve tu tad aṅgatvaṁ tasya, na tu tattvam eva. yatrat’pi vā tattvaṁ tatrā’pi dhvaner mahāviṣayatvāt na tan niṣṭhatvam eva." It is thus established that suggestion cannot be subsumed under other heads.

Another reason why it cannot be so subsumed is the statement that, ‘it is only the full-limbed species of poetry which gets the designation of ‘dhvani’ or ‘suggestive poetry.’ It will be explained hereafter that the limbs (of poetry) are figures, qualities (=excellences), and varieties of diction. Looking upon each component part as the whole itself is quite unheard of. When considered collectively, it will be but a part of the whole and never identical with the whole. Even if identity were possible in some instances, suggestive poetry can not be looked upon as conditioned by its limbs mentioned, since its sphere is very extensive. (Trans. K. Kris. pp. 27, ibid).

Ānandavardhana further observes : “sūribhiḥ kathitaḥ” iti vidvadapajñāṁ iyam uktiḥ, nā tu yathākathaṁcit pravṛttā iti pratipādyate. prathame hi vidvāmśo vaiyākaraṇaḥ, vyākaraṇa-mūlatvāt sarva-vidyānām. te ca śr̥yaṁāṇeṣu varneṣu ‘dhvanir’ iti vyavaharante. tathaiva anyais tanmatānusāribhiḥ sūribhiḥ, kāvyatattvārtha-darsībhiḥ vācyā-vācaka-sammiṣṭāḥ śabdātmā kāvyam iti vyapadeśya vyaṅjakatva-sāmyād dhvanir ity ukṛtaḥ, na ca evamvidhāsa dhvaner vaskyaṃāṇa-prabheda-tadbheda-sāṅkalanayā mahāviṣayasya yat prakāśanam tad a-prasiddha-alamkāra-visēṣamātra-pratipādanena tulyam iti tad-bhāvita-cetasāṁ yuktā eva samrāmbhaḥ. na ca teṣu kathāṇcid iṁśayā kaluṣita-śemūṣikatvam avīṣkaraṇīyam."

tad evaṁ dhvanes tāvad abhāvavādinaḥ pratyuktāḥ. asti dhvanih."


―"The expression," is designated by the learned” brings out the fact that this designation was first devised by the learned and that it has not gained currency in a haphazard fashion. The foremost among the learned are grammarians because grammar lies at the root of all studies. They indeed refer to articulate letters by the
term 'dhvani' or 'suggester'. In the same way, since the element of suggestion is common (to both), not only the word and its meaning, but its essential verbal power and also that which is usually referred to by the term poetry, has been given the same designation, viz. 'Dhvani' by other learned men whose insight into the fundamental truth about poetry is profound and who are followers of the principles laid down by grammarians. A treatment, then, of such a comprehensive concept as suggestion, with all its divisions and subdivisions yet to be explained in the sequel, is not at all on a par with the enumeration of the well known, specific figures of speech and hence the enthusiasm of persons imbued in their minds with the value of suggestion is quite proper. None need display jealousy to show somehow that they are all men of deranged minds.” (Trans. K. Kris.; pp. 27, 29, ibid)—

The Locana has the following observation: (pp. 76, Locana, Dhv. I. 13, Edn Nandi, ibid): “tena vācyopi dhvaniḥ, vācakāpī śabdo dhvaniḥ, dvayoḥ api vyaṇjakratvam ‘dhvanat’ iti kṛtvā. sammiśryate vibhāvānubhāva-samvalanayā iti vyaṇgyopi dhvaniḥ, ‘dhvanyate’ iti kṛtvā. śabdanaṁ śabdāḥ, śabda-vyāpāraḥ, na cāśāv abhidhādirūpāḥ, api tv ātmabhūtaḥ, sūpi dhvananam dhvaniḥ. kāvyam iti vyapadeśyaś ca yóṛthaḥ sūpi dhvaniḥ. ukta-prakāra dhvani-catuṣṭaya-mayatvāt.”—

Thus Ānandavardhana refutes the abhāvavādins to his satisfaction. We have seen how the Locana on Dhv. I.iv. and then Mammaṭa and the rest support the case of vyaṇjanā following Ānandavardhanaś lead under Dhv. III. 33. We have examined all this under “vyaṇjanā-virodha” and hence no need to repeat the same over here.

After refuting the opponents of Dhvani Ānandavardhana proceeds to suggest that basically dhvani is two-fold viz. avivakṣita-vācyā and vivakṣitānyapara-vācyā i.e. laksāṇāṁśula and abhiddhāmśula respectively suggesting of course that vyaṇjanāśakti, with reference to poetry or literature has to take its seat either on laksana or abhiddha. 'Bhakti' or laksana may be at the root of the first type of dhvani but it is not identical with the same. Between the two there is difference in nature. Ānandavardhana observes, (Dhv. I. 14): (pp. 28, ibid)

“bhaktāyā bibharti naikatvam
rūpabhedād ayaṁ dhvaniḥ,
atīvyāpter athā'vyāpter
na cāśau lakṣyate tayā.” (Dhv. I. 14)

“Suggestion does not bear identity with indication because there is difference in nature between the two. Nor is this a differentiation of that as both the fallacies of Too
‘Dhvani’ and other thought-currents such as guṇa,......
wide and Too Narrow would result (if one were to hold such a view).”


Dhvani which is explained and defined at Dhv. I. 13, etc. does not bear identity with logical implication or indication because of difference in nature between the two. Suggestion i.e. dhvani is the “unidirectional communication” (K. Kris. pp. 29, ibid) of a sense else than the expressed, both by the expressed sense or the expression itself (=vācyavācaka), while at the same time the implicit sense will be exclusively, important (i.e. tātparyena prakāśanam). ‘Bhakti’ or indication is merely a metaphorical expression (upacāramātra). Again ‘dhvani’ or suggestion does not have ‘bhakti’ as its invariable mark (chihna) i.e. it is not determined by ‘bhakti.’ For, if it is so held the fallacies of “too wide” and also “too narrowō will follow as the case may be, argues Ānandavardhana (vṛtti, Dhv. I. 14). There is possibility of ‘bhakti’ or metaphorical expression in places where there is absence of dhvani. This is ati-vyāpti. Again with the presence of dhvani at times we have no semblance of bhakti as in case of abhidhā-mūla-dhvani, which brings in the avyāpti-doṣa.

Again, observes Ānandavardhana : (Dhv. I. 17, 18, 19) (pp. 32, 34, ibid).

“mukhyāṁ vṛttim pariyajya
guna-vṛttyārtha-darśanam,
yad-uddiśya phalam, tatra
śabdo naiva s-khalad-gatiḥ. (Dhv. I. 17)
vācakatvāśrayenaīva
guṇavṛttir vyavasthitā,
vyāfjakatvaika-mūlasya
dhvaneḥ syāl lakṣaṇam katham. (Dhv. I. 18)
“kasyaciḥ dhvanibhedasya
sā tu syād upalakṣaṇam,
lakṣaṇe’nyaiḥ kṛte cā’sya
pakṣa-samsiddhir eva nah.”

(Dhv. I. 19)

“If one gives up the primary denotative power of a word and understands a sense (secondarily conveyed by it) through the indicative power, it is because of a purpose. In conveying this purpose, the word does not move falteringly at all (as it moves falteringly when indicating a meaning secondarily.” (Dhv. I. 17).
"The fact is that indication is grounded on the primary denotative force of words. How can it ever be a definition of suggestion whose sole support is suggestivity?" (Dhv. I. 18)

At the most, it might serve as a pointer to one of the species of suggestion.

If one were to say that the definition of suggestion has already been propounded by others, it would only substantiate our own position." Dhv. I. 9). (Trans. K. Kris. pp. 33, 35 ibid).

In the end, Ānandavardhana refutes the anākhyaeya vādins also and observes that even those who hold that the nature of dhvani is within the experience of sensitive critics only and that it defies all attempt to form a definition. Then these people betray only their lack of discernment. For, observes Ānandavardhana, dhvani has not only been defined, i.e. the general definition is not only propounded, but even definitions of some of its varieties are also to be satisfactorily given. Now, if with all this if dhvani is thought of as “in-expressible” then of course this would be true of all things in the world. And if these people through dhvanisī so called “in-expressibility” want to emphasise the all-surpassing nature of dhvani by means of exaggeration, then even they can be regarded as stating the truth-(Vṛtti, Dhv. I. 19, pp. 36 ibid) : “yadi punar dhvaner atiśayoktyā anayā kāvyāntarātisāyitaiḥ svarūpam ākhyaāyate, tat tépi yuktā’bhidhāyina eva.”

Ānandavardhana thus refutes the views of dhvani-virodhins. We have seen earlier how Mukula, a near contemporary of the Dhvanikāra tried to incorporate dhvani under lakṣaṇā, which in itself was but a variety of his wider abhidhā. We have seen how his commentator Pratihārendurāja tried to support him. Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka wrote an independent treatise to demolish dhvani; his work “Hṛdayadarpaṇa” now not available. It was meant for “dhvani- dhamṣa”. But in the absence of its availability now, we cannot talk much about it but we will go to see later how the Abhinavabhāratī on rasa-sūtra (N. S. VI) goes to refute the two powers viz. bhāvakatva and bhojakatva projected by Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka in preference to vyañjanā. Kuntaka, as seen earlier was a “pracchanna dhvani-vādin” or say, a “mānasa-patra” of Ānandavardhana and this we have examined in the earlier chapter. Actually the quarrel is in name only and his ‘vicṛā abhidhā’ or ‘vakrokti’ does not defy the ruling of vyañjanā. Mahimā had a scathing attack on vyañjanā as discussed by us earlier, but he had no supporters as his was perhaps a clash of ego only. His ‘rasānumiti’ is just “rasa-dhvani”
under a different label. Dhanañjaya-Dhanika denounced vyañjanā in favour of 'tātparya' which as Viśvanātha ably explains is just another name of vyañjanā and thus their opposition is also having elated ego at its root. Bhoja, as we have seen has in his own way accepted dhvani under different heads and has not rejected vyañjanā either. Actually Ānandavardhanaś great followers beginnin with Abhinavagupta, Mammata, Hemacandra and ending with Jagannātha kept the flag of dhvani-vyañjanā flying and the opposition to dhvani was condemned and silenced for all time-

As 'rasa-dhvani' is central to the theory of dhvani we will discuss the concept of 'rasa' in detail, beginning with the next chapter.
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