

# SAHRDAYĀLOKA

[ Thought-currents in Indian Literary Criticism ]  
[ Vol. I, Part 3 ]

**L. D. Series : 143**

**General Editor**  
**Jitendra B. Shah**

**TAPASVI NANDI**



**L. D. INSTITUTE OF INDOLOGY**  
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**Published by**

Jitendra B. Shah

Director

L.D.Institute of Indology

Ahmedabad

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**First Edition : 2005**

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**ISBN 81 - 85857-25-3**

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**Price : 700/-**

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**Typesetting**

Swaminarayan Mudranalaya Press

Shahibaug,

Ahmedabad.

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**Printer**

Navprabhat Printing Press

Gheekanta Road, Ahmedabad

Tel. 25508631

## Publisher's Note

We feel pleasure to place before the learned "SAHRDAYĀLOKA" OR "Thought-currents in Indian Literary Criticism" - (Vol. I) by Prof. Tapasvi Nandi. The author hardly requires any introduction to the learned working in the area of Sanskrit Alamkārasāstra or Literary Aesthetics. The work attempts to cover the basic thought - currents prevalent in Sanskrit Literary criticism, trying to unearth the origin and development of each topic beginning with the "Definition and scope of poetry, Sanskrit semantics, the theories of Dhvani, Rasa etc." The author has taken care to record and accept the views of his predecessors in his area of research and has very gratefully acknowledged the honourable acceptance of their views and has also tried to discuss modestly differences of opinion if any, at various places. The whole work presents the material in an historical, critical and comparative perspective. We feel sure that the learned will appreciate his efforts in an unbiased way. Prof. Nandi's observations on Dhvani and Rasa deserve special mention as he has made a special effort to explain how these thought currents which form a special contribution of Indian Literary Aesthetics are relevant even to-day and how they can be applied to the most modern patterns of literature world over, including absurd poetry and absurd theatre as well.

The author also proposes to bring out Vol. II covering the area of literary criticism that is not discussed in the present volume, of course, god willing.

We are thankful to Prof. Nandi for agreeing with us to publish the present work. We are also thankful to the Swaminarayan press, and all our colleagues in seeing this work through. Hope this work will stand the test of the learned and will fulfil a gap left out by earlier experts. It may be noted that for the sake of convenience, this work is presented in three parts such as, Part I - chs. I-VII (pp. 1-575); Part II - chs. VIII-XIII (pp. 576-1195) and Part III - chs. XIV - XVIII (pp. 1196-1843), with select Bibliography (pp. 1844-1850) appearing at the end of Part III. The Publisher's note, the author's preface - Namaskaromi, contents, detailed contents and abbreviations appear in all the three parts.

**Jitendra Shah**

L. D. Institute Of Indology,  
Ahmedabad.





## **“Namaskaromi....”**

Salutations to the Divine !  
Salutations to my three Mahā-gurus;  
Salutations to my parents,  
Salutations to all the sources  
consulted by me

And, Salutations to all of you, who are all all sparks of the Divine !

“Aum pūrṇam adaḥ, pūrṇam idam  
pūrṇāt pūrṇam udacyate  
pūrṇasya pūrṇam ādāya  
pūrṇam evā'va śiṣyate.”

“That [Source, which has been drawn upon by me is respectable and] is perfect,

This [Work, which is presented before you in this respectable shape] is perfect.

Perfect (material-; ideas, inspiration) has been drawn from perfect (respectable, reliable source). After drawing upon perfect (material) from perfect (and respectable source), only the perfect is left behind (before you).”

This, in short, is the story of my spiritual endeavour that started on 7<sup>th</sup> Aug. 2000 A.D. and reached its completion on 20<sup>th</sup> July, 2003 A.D.

The great yogin said, “In the stillness of the night, the eternal speaks.” And yes; I do not know when, in the stillness of the night, my eyes kept wide open staring in the darkness around me, and when these thought-currents sneaked into my inner consciousness from various sources-first like light ripples of the quiet and dignified flow of the sacred Gaṅgā, and then like the mighty billows of the stormy Atlantic, dashing against the shores, washing them clean. They settled into my mind and then sank deep into it. I do not know when my eyes were closed and

I was overpowered by sleep, as if embraced by the Divine Grace ! I feel floating in the wide stream, rich in currents and cross-currents, whirls and pulls; deep, full fathom five; quiet and dignified. I feel dragged and dragged, up and down, and then I slip towards the bottom, like in the womb of the mother earth, with a hundred thousand daffodils, red and pink, green, blue, white, violet and golden - on top of the surface !

So, as suggested in the beginning, I have accepted, with gratitude, of course after verifying with the original, the material, - line by line, paragraph by paragraph, at times, - from the works of my predecessors, who I thought are most reliable, and for whom I have tremendous respect and love in my heart, - from their works, dealing with the topics of word and meaning as discussed by the ancients - the Mīmāṃsakas, the Naiyāyikas and above all the great Vaiyākaraṇas, - the “prathame hi vidvāṃsaḥ” as Ānandavardhana would call them. I take these works as starting points, and as absolutely reliable sources and they are authored by great scholars such as Dr. P. C. Chakrawarty, Prof. Devasthali and Prof. Dr. K. Kunjunni Raja, Dr. Sri P. Ramchandrudu and some others. At every step, wherever I have sought inspiration and help from these master works, I have clearly indicated my indebtedness.

My work has grown both in size and dignity due to this, like the sacred flow of the Gaṅgā growing vaster and vaster with the waters from the innumerable springs, rivulets and rivers mixing with the main stream; and shooting out from the bosom of the great Nagādhirāja Himalaya. Those who have undertaken the “caturdhāma yātrā” are a witness to this. By accepting everything from various springs the Gaṅgā has carved out its own identity, sanctity and dignity. Same is the case with this work. I owe a lot to the great modern ṛṣi-trayī-i.e. Dr. P. V. Kane, Dr. S. K. De and Dr. V. Raghavan, in particular, who has shaped my views on Bhoja. But it may also be noted that, without showing disrespect, I have ventured to dispute their results, and this happens quite often with Dr. Raghavan, when I feel, on verifying with the original words of Bhoja, that I am on firmer ground. This, the discreet will find out for himself, and there is no doubt about it. But this does not minimize their greatness and my adoration for their lotus-feet. They are the great thinkers spreading light and bearing the torch of Indian Literary Aesthetics for the modern scholars, both in east and west alike.

Over and above this, I owe everything, - i.e. beginning from my initiation into this ancient lore of Sāhitya-śāstra to whatever I have done till day, in serving its

cause, to my great gurus - the three of them, the 'guru-śikhi-trayī' of professors R. C. Parikh, R. B. Athavale, and Dr. V. M. Kulkarni and especially Dr. Kulkarni; for it is he who even to-day, at the age of 85+ yrs., inspires me, guides me and blesses me and in my moments of personal despondency fills me with warmth, love, guidance and inspiration.

I am also indebted to the works of some of my senior contemporaries and to most of them personally also when I have met them, such as Dr. Rama Rañjan Mukherjee, Dr. Mukund Madhava Sharma, Dr. Pratap Bandopadhyāya, Prof. Dr. Satyavrata Shastri, Prof. Rasik Vihari Joshi and my most respected and learned friends such as Prof. Dr. Rewaprasad Dwivedi, Prof. Dr. Kamalesh Dutta Tripathi, the late Prof. Ramcandra Dwivedi (Jaipur), the late Prof. Biswanath Bhattacharya (Shantiniketan), the late Prof. K. Krishnamoorthy, Prof. N. P. Unni, Prof. Dr. K. K. Chaturvedi, and prof. Dr. S. D. Joshi, and some very brilliant young friends such as Prof. Dr. Sarojaben Bhate, Dr. C. Ramchandran, Prof. Dr. V. N. Jha, Dr. G. C. Tripathi, Dr. Radhavallabh Tripathi, Prof. M. M. Agrawal Dr. Goparaju, Rama, Dr. Jagannātha Pathak, and the rest. I have met all these dignitaries personally and I stand benefitted. I also will show my respect for Prof. Sri. Ramchandrudu for his great work on Jagannātha. True, my Guru Prof. Athavale taught me some portion of the great R. G., and his work on Pundit Jagannātha is monumental.

So, I am made of all these stalwarts. But kindly note that with all this I remain myself, i.e. I have carefully carved out and preserved my identity. If at all I have accepted their ideas and views as sacred mantra, it is because I feel convinced about the same. I feel convinced first about their reliability and integrity, and then their output; their great reputation apart. Believe me, and I am honest, that I have practically verified every source in the original, before putting the stamp of my humble acceptance of their thoughts and writing. It is never a blind acceptance. In the words of Rājaśekhara - "tad etad svīkaraṇam, na tu haraṇam." I have accepted them, for I have found them acceptable, like the great Vāgdevatāvatāra Mammaṭa or the great Kalikāla-Sarvajña ācārya Hemacandra accepting the dictates of Abhinavaguptapādācārya, or like the latter himself accepting the ruling of his seniors when he says :

“ūrdhvo’rdhvam āruhya yad artha-tattvaṃ  
dhīḥ paśyati, śrāntim avedayanti,  
phalaṃ tad ādyaiḥ parikalpitānāṃ  
viveka-sopāna-paramparānāṃ.”

However, the discreet will find out that my acceptance ends with the field covering the ancient literature laying down the thoughts of the Mīmāṃsakas, the Naiyāyikas and the Vaiyākaraṇas. With our entry into the wide and open field of Alampkāraśāstra proper, i.e. with the works of Bharata, Bhāmaha and down to Jagannātha, of course including Ānandavardhana, Abhinavagupta and Mammāṭa, I have tried to project some original line of thinking that may prove to be of great value to the adhikārins. This is a modest claim but a sure one. I have accepted ideas and also drafting from Gnoli, Masson, Patwardhan, K. Krishnamoorthy, and the rest, but with a touch of my own original contribution. I feel I am on absolutely sure and safe ground when I travel through this area of alampkāra-Śāstra proper, converging nearly two thousand years of creative thinking. My work will surely guide the adhikārī aspirant who wants to have a glimpse of the greatness of the Indian ācāryas, who have left behind their foot-prints on the sands of literary aesthetics. It may be noted that I have presented the rasa theory in a new perspective, and believe me, this is what I claim for sure, - a perspective which acknowledges the catholicity of rasa theory as it seems to serve the cause even of what they term 'absurd theatre' or 'absurd poetry'. I am sure the discerning will take note of all this and try to evaluate this work in an unbiased way. At the same time may I remind the learned of the words of Jayanta who said, "kutósti nūtanam vastu ?", or of the words quoted as above of Abhinavagupta suggesting that all fresh results follow the achievements of the earlier masters, i.e. after climbing the 'viveka-sopāna-paramparā' one gets into something fresh. So, I invite the sensitive and thoughtful adhikārins to have a soft corner for me and extend their helping hand. The great Mahimā observes : (Vyakti-viveka) -

“yuktóyam ātmasadrśān prati me prayatno  
nā'sty eva taj jagati, sarva-manoharam yat,  
kecij jvalanti, vikasanty, apare nimīlanty  
anye yad abhyudayabhāji jagat-pradīpe.”

The discerning are requested to read every line, before pronouncing a judgement.... I wish that only those, through whose arteries and veins alampkāra-śāstra flows, should venture to review this work. No lesser soul should attempt it.

So, we humbly say -

“adya pratanyate'smābhīh  
viduṣāṃ prītaye mudā  
aṣṭādaśā'dhikariṇī  
mīmāṃsā kāvya-vartmani.”

This forms only the first volume of my "Sahṛdayā"loka" or "Thought-currents in Indian Literary Criticism." The proposed second volume will try to study the concepts of guṇa, doṣa, alaṃkāra, lakṣaṇa, aucitya, rīti, vṛtti, kaviśikṣā and some modern writers on Sanskrit poetics, such as Dr. Rewaprasadjee etc.

I sincerely thank the publishers and Shri. Dr. Jitendra Shah the Director, L. D. Institute of Indology, Ahmedabad, for seeing this work through. I also thank his colleagues, and also Principal Kanjibhai Patel for kindly co-operating with us. The press - Shri Swaminārāyaṇa Mudraṇa Mandir, of course deserves full praise and thanks for doing its job so carefully.

I also thank, Smt. Harsha Nandi, my wife, Smt. Chinmayee M. Rali, my beloved daughter, M. Pharm., Dr. Mayur S. Rali, M.D., D.G.O., my son-in-law, and our two grandsons - Parth who studies medicine, and Mit, doing physiotherapy bearing with me through all the inconveniences caused due to my sādhanā, and providing love and inspiration through out the course of these three years when this work was carried out. I also thank the Divine, and our Sadguru Raja-yogī Shrī Narendrajee for his blessings and who has also suggested that even after this polite achievement, I have to travel further, through the woods, dark, deep and lovely, before I rest and lay down my pen. Aum mā Aum. iti Śivam...

19 Aug. 2004

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# Contents

Ch. No.	Title	Page No.
I	"Definition and scope of poetry." (Introduction p. 1-12)	1-125
II	Śabda-vyāpāra-vicāra;	126-203
III	Śabdavṛttis; recognised in the works of earlier ālaṃkārika-s such as Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin, Vāmana Udbhaṭa and Rudraṭa [i.e. Ānandavardhana's pūrvā"cārya-s]	204-229
IV	'Pratīyamāna artha' or Implicit sense, as seen in the earlier ālaṃkārika-s such as Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin, etc.	230-248
V	Śabda-vṛttis, the nature of; "Abhidhā"	249-368
VI	Tātparya	369-453
VII	Lakṣaṇā	454-575
VIII	Vyañjanā	576-709
IX	Vyañjanā-virodha or Opposition to suggestive power	710-778
X	Classification of Poetry (form - oriented)	779-967
XI	Classification of Poetry (contd.) (criticism oriented;) dhvani, guṇībhūta-vyaṅgya, citra; or uttama, madhyama, avara, etc.	968-1041

Ch. No.	Title	Page No.
XII	Dhvani in Kuntaka, Bhoja and others and Guṇībhūta-vyaṅgya-kāvya and citra-kāvya	1042-1152
XIII	Dhvani and other thought- currents such as guṇa, alaṃkāra, saṃghatanā, rīti, vṛtti, etc. and also Dhvani-Virodha.	1153-1195
XIV	The Concept of 'Rasa', as seen in veda and ancient literature and then in Bharata and earlier ālaṃkārikas from Bhāmaha to Rudraṭa	1196-1277
XV	Concept of 'Rasa' as seen in Ānandavardhana and others posterior to him.	1278-1490
XVI.	Rasa-niṣpatti-vicāra in Abhinavagupta	1491-1593
XVII	Rasa-niṣpatti-vicāra in Mammāṭa, some others and Jagannātha.	1594-1629
XVIII	Daśa-rūpaka-vicāra	1630-1843
●	Detailed Contents	





## Detailed Contents

- Ch. I Introduction, p. 1-12; Definition and scope of poetry, p. 12-14; Bhāmaha, p. 14; Daṇḍin, p. 24; Vāmana, p. 30; Udbhata, p. 36; Rudraṭa, p. 37; Ānandavardhana and his followers, p. 39; Rājaśekhara, p. 42; Kuntaka, p. 42; Kṣemendra, p. 60; Bhoja, p. 60; Agnipurāṇa, p. 63; Mahimabhaṭṭa, p. 64; From Mammaṭa to Viśvanātha, p. 81; Mammaṭa, p. 81; Hemacandra, p. 86; Vāgbhaṭa I, p. 86; Vāgbhaṭa II, p. 87; Jayadeva, p. 87; Viśvanātha, p. 91; Vidyādhara, p. 88; Vidyānātha, p. 89; Keśava Miśra, p. 97; Jagannātha, p. 101; J.'s criticism of Mammaṭa's definition of poetry, p. 109; J.'s definition of poetry, p. 114, later challenges to J.'s definition of poetry, p. 115; Kāvya-hetu and Kāvya-prayojana, p. 119;
- Ch. II Śabda-vyāpāra-vicāra or Powers of a word; general introduction, p. 126; ancient background, p. 129; word meaning relationship, p. 132; the vākya paḍīya, p. 134; Mīmāṃsakas, p. 137; artha-jñāna or determination of śabdārtha, p. 142; pravṛtti-nimitta of śabda, p. 146; Naiyāyikas, p. 148; how is saṅketa apprehended, p. 148; Bhartṛhari, p. 150; word and its import, p. 153; the vaiyākaraṇas \* patañjali \*; mīmāṃsakas; p. 157 different views as mentioned in the V.P., p. 164 Naiyāyikas; p. 164 Bhartṛhari's V.P.; p. 165 Ālankārikas; p. 171 Etimologists; p. 175; Short Summary of total heritage; p. 175 Śabda-vṛttis as seen in different schools of thought such as the vaiyākaraṇas, mīmāṃsakas etc. p. 181; mīmāṃsakas; p. 192 naiyāyikas; p. 198 Navya-Naiyāyikas, p. 200
- Ch. III. Bhāmaha; p. 205 Daṇḍin p. 217 Vāmana; p. 220 Udbhata; p. 225 Rudraṭa p. 226
- Ch. IV p. 230; Bhāmaha; p. 232 Daṇḍin; p. 242 Vāmana, p. 247; Udbhata, p. 247; Rudraṭa; p. 247
- Ch. V General Introduction; p. 250 Abhidhā; p. 252 classification p. 252; Jagannātha, Mahā-siddhāntin; p. 253; Bhoja p. 276; Mukula and others p. 285; Kuntaka; p. 300; Mahimā; p. 306, rethinking p. 332 Mammaṭa p. 333 Mammaṭa's definition of abhidhā p. 345;

Hemacandra; p. 347; Jayadeva p. 349; Vidyādhara, p. 358, Vidyānātha, p. 358; Viśvanātha p. 359; Keśava, p. 359; Appayya Dixit p. 360.

Ch. VI General Introduction, p. 369; Vākya, its import; p. 370; Vākya; definition p. 371; Patañjali, p. 371; naiyāyikas p. 371; The grammarians p. 372; what is vākyārtha ? p. 374; Mīmāṃsakas p. 377; constitution of a sentence, different views; p. 378; Naiyāyikas p. 381; nimitta of vākyārtha p. 385; Prabhākara p. 391; ālaṃkārikas; p. 396 the nature and scope of tātparya-vṛtti; p. 398 tātparyajñāna p. 409; anvitā'bhidhānavāda and abhihitā'nvayavāda p. 414; anvitābhidhānavāda p. 415; abhihitānvayavāda p. 421; tātparya p. 426; dhanāñjaya/dhanika p. 427; tātparya in Bhoja p. 433; Mammāṭa and his followers p. 444;

Ch. VII three conditions p. 454; grammarians p. 455; Patañjali, Gautama p. 458; mukhya, gaṇa, mīmāṃsakas, p. 459; ālaṃkārikas 482; Mukula 482; Kuntaka 484; Kumārila 485; types of lakṣaṇā 489; Mukula 492; Mammāṭa 492; gaṇi, compound words, sentence-lakṣaṇa, Bhartṛhari p. 503; Hemacandra p. 521; Bhoja p. 521; Jayadeva p. 526; Vidyādhara p. 531; Vidyānātha p. 534; Viśvanātha p. 534; Keśava 539; Appayya p. 540; Jagannātha p. 550;

Ch. VIII vedic sages p. 576; grammarians, mīmāṃsakas, naiyāyikas, yāska p. 577; dr. Saroja Bhate p. 578; Pāṇini, patañjali p. 589, Bhartṛhari, p. 591; Sphotavāda and vyañjanā p. 599; vyañjanā as accepted by Ānandavardhana and his followers p. 601; sources; veda p. 602; The Nirukta p. 618; Rk Prātiśākhya p. 620; Aṣṭādhyāyī p. 620; Mahābhāṣya p. 621; germs of vyañjanā in Bhāsa, Aśvaghoṣa, Kālidāsa etc. p. 622; Ānandavardhana; (with Locana); p. 630; Mahimā p. 654; Ānandavardhana p. 656; Mammāṭa p. 658; abhidhāmūlā-vyañjanā, 659; Abhinavagupta; p. 680; Mammāṭa p. 685; Hemacandra p. 687; Jayadeva p. 688; Vidyādhara p. 689; Keśava, p. 690; Vidyānātha p. 690; Viśvanātha p. 691; Appayya p. 693; Jagannātha p. 694;

Ch. IX. Abhinavagupta p. 711; Mammāṭa p. 726; Mukula p. 748, Kuntaka p. 752, Bhoja p. 752; Mahimā p. 752; Dhanika p. 753; Hemacandra p. 772; Vidyādhara p. 773; Vidyānātha p. 773; Viśvanātha p. 773;

## Detailed Contents

- Ch. X. Bhāmaha p. 780; Daṇḍin p. 785; Vāmana p. 795; Rudraṭa p. 799; Ānandavardhana p. 811; Abhinavagupta p. 814; Bhoja p. 816; Bhoja nāṭaka etc., p. 818; nidarśanam p. 820; manthulli p. 821; maṇikulyā p. 822, kathā, khaṇḍa-kathā, upakathā, p. 822; br̥hatkathā, campū, p. 824; parva-bandha, kāṇḍabandha, p. 825; sargabandha, āśvāsaka-bandha, p. 826; sandhibandha, avaskandhaka-bandha, kāvyā-śāstra, p. 827; kośa, p. 829; saṃhitā, sāhitya-prakāśa, p. 830; Abhinavabhārati p. 836; uparūpakas nāṭikā p. 834; Hemacandra p. 851, Nāṭyadarpaṇa 852; Śārādātanaṇya, NLRK. 852, Vāgbhaṭa II, Śingabhūpāla, Vidyādhara, Vidyānātha Viśvanātha p. 852; individually considered from Bhoja onwards 853.
- Ch. XI p. 968; dhvani, dvanyāloka; locanakāra p. 975; dhvani-prabheda p. 984; table showing varieties of dhvani p. 988; vyañjaka-mukhena bhedaḥ, p. 999; alaṃkāras, rasavat etc. p. 1006; vyañjaka-mukhena bhedaḥ, 1009; prabandha as rasavyañjaka p. 1012; suggestivity of vṛtti, rīti, p. 1014; varṇas as suggestive of rasa p. 1015; padas - rasavyañjaka, p. 1015; rasa-virodhi, its parihāra p. 1016; virodhi-samāveśa p. 1020; supremacy of rasa in poetry p. 1029; Mammaṭa p. 1030; Hemacandra and Jayadeva p. 1031; Vidyādhara, Vidyānātha Viśvanātha, p. 1031; Jagannātha p. 1032; uttamottama, etc. 1032; further classification of dhvani by J. p. 1032;
- Ch. XII. Dhvani in earlier ālaṃkārikas, Bhāmaha and others p. 1043; Kuntaka p. 1045; Bhoja p. 1091; Bhoja-Tātparya, p. 1111; guṇibhūtavyaṅgya and citra kāvyā p. 1125; citra kāvyā p. 1127; guṇibhūta - vyaṅgya, Ānandavardhana 1127; Abhinavagupta's attitude 1133; Mammaṭa madhyama kāvyā, etc. p. 1133; Hemacandra, p. 1137; Viśvanātha p. 1138; Jagannātha, four-fold scheme p. 1139; Jayadeva p. 1141; Vidyādhara; Vidyānātha; Keśava; citra-kāvyā p. 1143; Ānandavardhana and others p. 1144; Mammaṭa p. 1149; Vidyānātha, p. 1149; Viśvanātha p. 1150; Keśava p. 1151; Appayya Dīkṣita p. 1151; Jagannātha p. 1152
- Ch. XIII. dhvani and alaṃkāra p. 1154; saṃghaṭanā p. 1156; rīti, vṛtti, p. 1163; Locana, p. 1165; Mammaṭa p. 1166; Hemacandra p. 1172; Jayadeva p. 1173; Vidyādhara, p. 1174; Vidyānātha p. 1174; Viśvanātha p. 1175; Jagannātha p. 1176; Opposition to dhvnikāra's

supremacy, p. 1178; Vimarsinī, opponents of dhvani p. 1178; Locana p. 1180; refutation, dhvani-twofold- p. 1192;

Ch. XIV Rasa in RV. p. 1196; Rasa in Yv. p. 1199; Rasa in Sāmaveda p. 1199; Rasa in AV p. 1200; Amara, Hemacandra on word 'rasa'; p. 1202; Rasa, various meanings in vedic literature, conclusion p. 1203; NS. I. 7; rasān ātharvaṇād p. 1207; Hymns of AV.; love lyrics p. p. 1217; Rasa in the Upaniṣads p. 1219; Rasa in the Nirukta; 'Rasa' in Bṛhaddevatā p. 1221; Rasa in Pāṇini and Patañjali p. 1221; Rasa in Aśvaghoṣa, Bhāsa, Kālidāsa, p. 1224; Rasa in Bharata Muni, NS. p. 1240; Bharata on Bhāvas p. 1248; Bhāmaha p. 1256; Daṇḍin p. 1262; Vāmana p. 1267; Udbhaṭa p. 1268; Rudraṭa p. 1271;

Ch. XIV \*; Rasa in Ānandavardhana p. 1278; asaṃ'aksyakrama-vyaṅgya (= rasā"di dhvani) with reference to varṇa etc. p. 1285; and saṃghaṭanā; types p. 1285; prabandha-suggestive of rasa; p. 1286; rasā"di-dhvani suggested by case-terminations, etc., p. 1287; obstacles in rasa-vyañjanā; p. 1288; rasa as aesthetic relish for all art-critics p. 1290; virodhi-rasa-vyavasthā; opposite sentiments p. 1291; overcoming opposition between two rasas p. 1293; other concepts, vṛtti, etc. and rasa p. 1294; alaṃkāra, guṇa, doṣa and rasa 1298; Mukula and rasa p. 1300; Kuntaka p. 1302; Dhanañjaya and Dhanika p. 1310; Mahimabhaṭṭa p. 1310; Bhoja p. 1317; Agnipurāṇa p. 1330; Mammaṭa p. 1334; Hemacandra p. 1339; Vāgbhaṭa I p. 1340; Vāgbhaṭa II, p. 1341; Jayadeva p. 1341; Vidyādhara p. 1342; Vidyānātha p. 1343; Viśvanātha II p. 1348; Bhānudatta p. 1363; Keśava Miśra p. 1364; Jagannātha p. 1367; Rasa in works on dramaturgy; Daśrūpaka; p. 1373; Nāṭya darpaṇa; Rāmacandra and Guṇacandra; 1388; Bhāva-prakāśana, p. 1401; Śāradātanaya; bhāva p. 1402; Śāradātanaya on rasa; p. 1426; Nāṭaka-lakṣaṇa ratna koṣa; Sāgaranandin p. 1459; Rasārṇava-sudhākara of Śiṅgabhūpāla p. 1465; Bhāva and rasa in Rs. 1465.

Ch. XVI. rasa-sūtra p. 1492; Lollāṭa 1493; Lollāṭa's view; Locana; refutation of Lollāṭa by Śrī. Śaṅkuka; as read in Locana; in Abh. p. 1500; Śrī. Śaṅkuka's views on rasa-nispatti, Abh. p. 1502; Tota Abh. on Śaṅkuka's view p. 1507; sāmkhya view in Abh. p. 1516; śaṅkuka's view in

Locana p. 1516; Bhaṭṭanāyaka's view in Abh. and then in Locana; p. 1518; Abhinavagupta's view on rasa-niṣpatti; p. 1527; seven obstacles; rasa-vighnas; Abh.; p. 1542; Explanation of rasa-sūtra by Abhinavagupta p. 1554; Locana; rasa-niṣpatti p. 1563; All rasas, bliss-giving p. 1578; Śānta rasa p. 1578; catholicity of rasa-theory p. p. 1583;

Ch.XVII rasa-niṣpatti-vicāra; Mammata to Jagannātha \*; Mammata p. 1594; Jagannātha p. 1601;

Ch. XVIII Nāṭaka 1632; Daśarūpaka p. 1646; Itivṛtta p. 1652; artha-prakṛti-s p. 1654; five avasths p. 1658; Sandhis and Sandhyaṅgs p. 1661; artho'pakṣepakas p. 1666; sandhis and sandhyaṅgs, further discussion p. 1670; Nāṭya-darpaṇa p. 1676; Bhāvaprakāśana \*; NLRK. p. 1682; Sāhityadarpaṇa \*; Rasārṇava Sudhākara p. 1696; Sandhyantaras p. 1702; Comparative and critical study of sandhi-s and sandhyaṅga-s p. 1705; Dr. V. M. Kulkarni's view; sixty four sandhyaṅgas p. 1714; conclusions concerning sandhyaṅgas p. 1736; Bhoja p. 1749; A comparative and critical table of sandhyaṅgas p. 1749; Types of drama; nāṭaka p. 1795; five special types of drama in Bāva prakāśana 1800; Prakaraṇa p. 1807; Samavakāra p. 1811; īhāmṛga p. 1821; Dīpa 1825; Vyāyoga p. 1828; Utsṛṣṭikā'ṅka; p. 1830; prahasana p. 1831; Bhāṇa p. 1834; Vithī p. 1836;



## Abbreviations

<b>AVM.</b>	—	Abhidhāvr̥tta-Mātr̥kā of Mukula.
<b>A-bh</b>	—	Abhinavabhāratī
<b>AG.</b>	—	Abhinavagupta
<b>A-Śe.</b>	—	Alaṃkāra-śekhara-Keśava;
<b>Ā.</b>	—	Ānandavardhana
<b>Bhā</b>	—	Bhāmaha
<b>B. P.</b>	—	Bhāva Prakāśana
<b>B.</b>	—	Bharata
<b>Bho.</b>	—	Bhoja
<b>DR.</b>	—	Daśa-rūpaka-
<b>Da.</b>	—	Daṇḍin
<b>Dha</b>	—	Dhanañjaya - Dhanika
<b>Dhv.</b>	—	Dhvanyāloka.
<b>Dhv. L.</b>	—	Dhvanyāloka-Locana-Abhinavagupta's.
<b>H. (or. H. C.)</b>	—	Hemacandra.
<b>J.</b>	—	Jagannātha
<b>K. Kris.</b>	—	K. Krishnamoorthy, Prof.
<b>Kā.</b>	—	Kāvya'laṃkāra, Bhāmaha.
<b>Kā.Sū.Vṛ.</b>	—	Kāvya'laṃkāra-Sūtra-vṛtti-Vāmana's
<b>Kā-Śā</b>	—	Kāvya'nuśāsana, Hemacandra.
<b>KD.</b>	—	Kāvya"darśa-Daṇḍin
<b>K. P.</b>	—	Kāvya Prakāśa.
<b>Ku.</b>	—	Kumārila-
<b>K.</b>	—	Kuntaka,
<b>Mī-Sū.</b>	—	Mīmamsā-Sūtra.

<b>Mbh.</b>	—	<b>Mahābhāṣya</b>
<b>M.</b>	—	<b>Mahimabhaṭṭa;</b>
<b>M.</b>	—	<b>Mammāṭa.</b>
<b>NLRK.</b>	—	<b>Nāṭaka-Lakṣaṇa-Ratna-Koṣa</b>
<b>N. S.</b>	—	<b>Nāṭyaśāstra, Bharata;</b>
<b>P.</b>	—	<b>Pāṇini</b>
<b>PR.</b>	—	<b>Punditarāja-Jagannāth.</b>
<b>RS.</b>	—	<b>Rasā'rṇavasudhākara.</b>
<b>R. G.</b>	—	<b>Rasa-Gaṅgādhara</b>
<b>Śā</b>	—	<b>Śāradātanaya</b>
<b>Śr.Pra.</b>	—	<b>Śrīṅāra-Prakāśa; Bhoja</b>
<b>Ś.B.</b>	—	<b>Śīṅabhūpāla</b>
<b>Sā</b>	—	<b>Sāgaranandin</b>
<b>Sā</b>	—	<b>Sā-Sāyaṇa (in vedic context)</b>
<b>S-D.</b>	—	<b>Sāhityadarpaṇa-Viśvaanātha</b>
<b>SP.</b>	—	<b>Sanskrit Poetics, S. K. De.</b>
<b>S.K.Ā.</b>	—	<b>Sarasvati-Kaṇṭhā"- bharṇa.</b>
<b>Vāg.</b>	—	<b>Vāgbhaṭa II</b>
<b>Vātsyā</b>	—	<b>Vātsyāyana</b>
<b>V. J.</b>	—	<b>Vakrokti Jīvita; Kuntaka</b>
<b>V.</b>	—	<b>Viśvanātha</b>
<b>Vya.V.</b>	—	<b>Vyakti-Viveka</b>



# SAHRDAYĀLOKA

[Thought-currents in Indian Literary Criticism]

## Part-III

Part II of this work takes care of the topic of 'vyañjanā', followed by vyañjanā-virodha. Then classification of poetry, both outer-form oriented and what we term as criticism based such as dhvani, guṇībhūta-vyaṅgya and citra, is taken care of. It may be noted that daśarūpaka-vicāra is not considered at this juncture but is reserved for part III. The concept of Dhvani was either included in some other concept advanced by some post-Ānandavardhana literary critic, or was denounced by some who tried to cut at the root of the very concept of vyañjanā-vṛtti. But it has been observed that none of these so-called anti-dhvani theorists could over-rule the fact of an implicit sense and the greater fact of 'rasa' in poetry and drama. It has been suggested that the wider and more liberal and perhaps more catholic scheme of vyañjanā-dhvani-rasa as advanced by Ānandavardhana, Abhinavagupta and their followers down to Jagannātha finally prevailed as the most rational and acceptable doctrine of literary criticism. We do not agree with the vehement attempts by such stalwarts as Dr. Revaprasādjee to denounce vyañjanā-dhvani. In fact Ānandavardhana, Abhinavagupta and their followers look more humble and genuinely critical in their exposition. Even Mahimā and Dhanañjaya/Dhanika his predecessors were very polite even while disagreeing with the great Dhavanikāra. We stand by the most catholic scheme of vyañjanā-dhvani-rasa which has the grace and strength to cover in its embrace such attempts as absurd theatre or absurd-poetry.



## Chapter XIV

### The concept of “Rasa”

[as seen in the Vedas and Vedic literature. Yāska, Pāṇini, Patañjali; Rasa in earlier poetic works; Bharatamuni and earlier Ālaṃkārikas from Bhāmaha to Rudraṭa.”]

An attempt is made in this chapter first to examine the semantic history of the word ‘rasa’ in the earliest available literature of the world, viz. the vedas and then the literature going with the same such as the vedāṅgas, particularly Yāska’s Nirukta and the Aṣṭādhyāyī of Pāṇini, followed by Patañjali’s bhāṣya over the same, and then after searching for the special connotation of the word ‘rasa’ in its aesthetic context, to examine Bharata’s Nāṭya-śāstra (N. S.) and also the works of the ālaṃkārikas such as the ancients, Bhāmaha and the rest, who preceded Ānandavardhana. This will serve as a background for the theory of ‘rasa’ as seen in works of Indian literary aesthetics. Of course, with Bharata onwards we find ‘rasa’ in the aesthetic sense of art-experience in general and Ānandavardhana onwards it remains a matter of discussion whether ‘rasa’, the supreme aesthetic-experience accepted by one and all, is conveyed through the medium of vyañjanā or something else, both in drama and poetry. We will begin with the vedas first. We will also examine the use of the term ‘rasa’ in actual literature of earlier Masters beginning with Aśvaśoṣa.

‘Rasa’ is a word of frequent occurrence in vedic and early classical Sanskrit literature. We have the following observation—

‘Rasa’ occurs in the RV. (=RigVeda) as below :

Rv.I. 23.23, “rasena”-	According to Sāyaṇa jala-sāren	According to Griffiths, “essence”
37.5 “rasasya”	go-kṣīra-rūpasya;	‘rain’
71.5 “rasam”	prthivyāḥ sārabhūtaṃ haviḥ;	‘juice’.
105.2, “rasam”	‘puruṣasya sārabhūtaṃ vīryam;	‘bliss of love’
187.4 : “rasāḥ”	śad rasāḥ, svādv-amlādi;	juices
187.5; “rasānām”	svādv amlādīnām; ṣaṇṇām	savours of juice

Rv. V, 43.4;	'rasam'- somasya;	juice
44.13;	'rasavat'- sāravat (payah)	sweet-flavoured
44.21,	'rasah'- 'rasanīyah praśasyo rasavān rasā"tmako vā (induh) (somah)	juice pleasant
63.8	rasāh, soma-rasāh	libations
Rv. VII, 104-10	rasam sāram	essence
Rv. VIII 1.26	rasinah rasa-vat	savoury
3.1	rasinah rasavatah	savoury juice
3.20	rasah rasā"tmakómṛtamayah	juice
53.3	rasam - ātmīyaṃ dravam	essence
Rv. IX. 6.6.	rasam - (somam)	juice
16.1	rasam - (somasya)	juice
23.5	rasam - (somasya)	Sap
39.5	rasah - (soma-rasāh)	juice
61.17	rasah -	
61.18	rasah -	"
62.6	rasam (somasya)	"
62,13	rasam ( ,, )	"
64.24	rasam ( ,, )	"
65.15	rasam ( ,, )	"
	According to Sāyana	According to Griffith
Rv. IX 67.8	rasah; (somamayah)	juice
67.15	rasam (somasya)	"
67.31	rasam veda-rasa-bhūtaṃ sāram	essence
67.32	rasah sūkta-saṃghaṃ, vedasāraṃ sūkta-saṃghaṃ	essence
74.9	rasah (somasya)	juice
76.1	rasah (rasā"tmakah somah)	juice
77.5	rasah (rasā"tmakah somah)	"
79.5	rasam somam	"
84.5	rasah rasa-rūpaḥ somah	"
85.1	rasasya svāmśaṃ pītvā	"
86.10	rasah rasa-rūpaḥ (somah)	"

96.21	rasaḥ	(somasya)	„
97.1	rasam	ātmīyaṃ rasam	juice
97.12	rasena	(ātmīyena)	„
* 97.14	rasāyyaḥ	<u>rasena āśvādyāḥ</u>	abounding in sweet flavours
97.57	rasena	-	essence
109.11	rasam	-	juice
109.20	rasena	(gavyena)	„
113.2	rasam	-	„
113.5	rasāḥ	-	juices
113.5	rasinaḥ	rasavataḥ	of juicy
Rv. X 9.2	rasaḥ	(sva-bhūtaḥ)	Sap
9.9	rasena	(sva-rasena)	moisture
76.5	rasam	(somasya)	Sap

‘Rasā’ occurs in the RV. as below :-

		<u>Sāyana</u>	Griffith
Rv.I. 112.12	rasām	rasā, nadī bhavati rasataḥ, śabda-karmaṇaḥ (Nir. 11-25)	‘rasā’
Rv. IV 43.6	rasayā	(rasane)	wave
Rv. V. 41.45	rasā	sārabhūtā bhūmih	rasā
53.9	rasā	nadī-nāma etat	river
Rv. VIII. 49.2	rasāḥ	jalāni	water-brooks
72.13	rasā	rasa ājaṃ payasi	river
Rv. IX 41.6	rasā	nadī rasā	
Rv. X 75.6	rasayā	(nadī) rasā	
108.1	rasāyāḥ	śabdāyamānāyāḥ rasā antarikṣe nadyāḥ	
108.2	rasāyāḥ	nadyāḥ rasā	
121.4	rasayā	raso jalam, tad-vatī, rasā rasā nadī;	

'Rasa' occurs in the śukla Yajurveda as below :

Yv.	I. 21	rasena	piṣṭākhyā-rasena acc-to Uvāta and Mahīdhara	
	II. 32	rasāya	rasabhūtāya	” vasantāya
	IX. 3	rasaḥ	rasaḥ, sārāḥ	
	IX. 3	rasam	apām, rasam, sāram,	
	XI. 51	rasaḥ	apām sārāḥ;	
	XVIII. 9	rasaḥ		tatratyaḥ sārāḥ
	XIX. 35	rasinaḥ	rasavataḥ somasya	
	XIX. 75	rasam	sāram	
	XIX. 79	rasam	-	
	XIX. 83	rasam	-	
	XIX. 94	rasena	(apām) rasena	
	XX. 22	rasase	rasena	(a-jena)
	XX. 27	rasaḥ	soma-rasaḥ	
	Yv. XXV. 9	rasena		vīryeṇa
	XXV. 12	rasayā		nadyā
	XXXI. 17	rasāt		adbhyaḥ sambhṛtaḥ
	XXXIII. 21	rasāḥ		nadī
	XXXVI. 15	rasāḥ		(somaḥ)
	XXXIX. 4	rasaḥ		(annasya) rasaḥ sārāḥ-

The Sāmaveda (SV.) has 'Rasa' at.

SV. I. 239	rasinaḥ
526	rasam
558	rasaḥ
561	rasasya
II. 162	rasāḥ
240	rasā

241	rasaḥ
360	rasam
371	rasena
381	rasaḥ
428	rasam
578	rasaḥ
627	rasaḥ
648	rasam
649	rasam
650	rasaḥ
693	rasam
743	rasinaḥ
749	rasam
771	rasinaḥ
807	rasāyyaḥ
1188	rasaḥ

**The Atharvaveda (AV.) has 'rasa' as below :**

AV. I. 5.2	rasaḥ (sāyana)	Whitney
	sārabhūtaḥ amśaḥ	savour
I. 28.3	rasasya asṛg ādirūpasya	- Sap
	śarīragatasya	
AV. II. 4.5	rasebhyaḥ auśadhi-sāra-	juices
	bhūta-kāṣṭhebhyaḥ	
26.4	rasam udakaṁ ca balakaraṁ -	Sap
	rasam eva	
26.5	rasam dhānyaṁ rasam	Sap of grain
29.1	rase sārabhūte-	Sap of what
	manthódake	is earthly
AV. III. 13.5	rasaḥ apāṁ rasaḥ	Whitney
		(pp. 109) observes
		that the description
		in pada (almost)

makes us fancy some kind of mineral water to be had in view)

AV. III. 28.4	rasaḥ	kṣīrājyādirūpaḥ -	Sap
31.10	rasena	auśadhīnām rasena	Sap of herbs
AV. IV. 2.5	rasām	nadī - rasā	(The ocean is the atmospheric one and rasā, the heavenly river).
4.5	rasaḥ	apām, amṛtā"tmakaḥ-	Sap
15.2	rasāḥ	udakānām -	juices of the waters, sap (see Av. I. 28.3)
27.2	rasam	vṛṣṭāyudaka - lakṣaṇam	Sap
27.3	rasam	dravam (lakṣaṇam)	Sap of herbs
35.3	rasena	svakīyena or auraṇa i.e. anna	Sap
AV. V. 13.2	rasam	(poison of the serpent)	juice
13.3	rasam	( „ )	„
AV. VI. 16.1	rasaḥ	(tailātmakaḥ)	juice
78.1	rasena	dadhi-madhu-ghṛtādinā	essence
124.1	rasena	udakānaḥ binduḥ - svakīyena rasaḥ	essence
AV. VII. 94.1	rasena	(apām)	Sap
AV. VIII 4.10	rasam	(śarīra-sāram)	<u>taste</u>
AV. IX 4.5	rasaḥ	apām auśadhīnām	Sap
8.2	rasam	apām auśadhīnām	Sap
AV. X 4.18	rasaḥ	(poison)	Sap
5.46	rasena	( „ )	„
6.2	„	„	„
6.22	„	„	„
8.44	„	(some mystic sense)	„
AV. XII. 6.4	rasaḥ	-	Sap
A XIV. 5.28	rasaḥ	-	„

AV. XVIII 1.48	rasavān somah, bahurasópetah-	full of Sap
XVIII. 2.24	rasasya deha-saṁbandhinaḥ rasasya, rudhirādeḥ	Sap
4.23	rasavān -	rich in sap
4.81	rasāya -	sap
AV. XIX 31.4	rasāḥ (plural) -	(savours (connected with food)
31.5	rasam -	-
AV. XX. 51.2	rasāḥ -	sap of herbs

We have listed the occurrences of the word 'rasa' in the vedas. Some more perhaps could be added if they are not mentioned here. It is clear that the word 'rasa' is derived from *√ras* which occurs in the *pāṇiniya dhatupāṭha* and is explained as having the senses of 'to make sound', 'to taste', and 'to be oily'; 'rasa śābde' (*bhvādi*) and 'rasa' āsvādana-snehanayoḥ' (*curādi*).

The root *√ras* has thus three different meanings as noted above. In the first sense it is associated with the river 'rasā' according to Yāska (*Nirukta* 11.25- *rasā nadī bhavati, rasteh, śabdanakarmanah.*) The word *rasā* is used as a name of a particular river or sometimes a river in general. One may say that here too the word may be connected to the sense of being liquid. *Rasa* in the sense of something liquid is associated with many things like juice or the sap of plants or the milk of the cow or the virile semen of the human body etc. In fact, we find lexicons giving all these various meanings. *Amara* for example has-

"rūpaṁ śabdo gandha-rasa-sparśāc ca  
viṣayā amī" (line 291,); and also,  
"śṛṅgārā"ḍau viṣe vīrye  
guṇe rāge drave rasāḥ." (line 2789)  
and also the six-fold tastes- (line 295)-

**Hemacandra** adds the following senses :

"gr̥he dhātau (i.e. humours of the body), pārade (i.e. mercury), premṇi, bhāve, ātmani, and also in the sense of 'sukha.'

Thus the word 'rasa' has a very interesting semantic history. We are interested here in finding out how the sense in the physical context gets transmuted into the sense of aesthetic experience i.e. the flavour, or a sentiment or emotion.

In the vedic saṃhitās, as we will go to observe, we find not only the physical sense of something liquid, but also the liquid (i.e. drava) or sap that flows in the plants, animals etc., and also the juice that can be pressed out or extracted. To the later sense of the word, viz. kāvya-rasa or nāṭya-rasa (equivalent to kalā-rasa), we do not find any clear reference in the vedas. But in one context, we do find it associated with things literary. Let us therefore, take a summary view of the different meanings of ‘rasa’, first in the vedic saṃhitās.

In the Rv., the word occurs for about fifty-one times. ‘Rasā’ occurs for about eleven times. The Yv. has nineteen and two occurrences of the words ‘rasa’ and ‘rasā’ respectively. The Av. has about thirty-eight occurrences. In the so-called later saṃhitās some of the mantras are repeated from the Rv.

The word ‘Rasā’ is used for a river, or a flow in general. At Rv. (VIII. 49.2 (vāḷakhilya sūktā) we have ‘rasāḥ’ explained as ‘jalāni’ by the commentator. Waters are termed as the “rasas” of the mountains. Here we see, that the waters of the springs that flow from the mountains are regarded as the sap of the mountains which is extracted from them by Indra and which becomes water. The mantra runs as-

“śatānikeva prā jigāti dhuṣṇuyā’  
hanti vrtrāṇi dāśūse,  
girériva prā rāsa pinvire  
dātrāṇi purubhojasah”-

Thus, we have the double sense of the extracted sap and also water.

At Yv. 9.3, we have ‘apāṃ rasah’ and also ‘apāṃ rasasya yo rasah’. There are explained by both Uvaṭa and Mahīdhara as ‘Vāyu’ and ‘Prajāpati’ respectively. We may add that here the word ‘rasa’ seems to carry the sense of “essence” of soul, and consequently the presiding deity. The mantra reads as below :

“apāṃ rasamúdvayasam  
sūrye śantaṃ samāhitam,  
apāṃ rāsasya yo rasas tām vo  
grhṇāmyuttamām upayāma  
grhītósīndrāya tvā jūṣtam  
grhṇāmyeśā te yonirīndrāya  
tvā juṣtatamam.”



The same sense is repeated at Yv. 19.44, 20.22, and 31.17.

Then, thirdly, we have 'rasa' in the sense of the "rasa of herbs". This may be in form of an extracted juice as in case of some, or be just the sap in some plant.

In the IXth Maṇḍala of the Rv., it is mostly seen in these senses e.g. at Rv. IX. 66,

"tām gobhirvṛṣaṇam rāsam  
mādāya devāvītaye,  
sutām bhārāya sām srja."

'Rasa' is extracted juice.

And also Rv. IX. 23.5-

"sómo arṣati dharmāsīr  
dadhāna indriyām rasām,  
suvíro abhiśastipāh."

'rasa' means 'Sap'.

Fourthly, we have 'rasa' in the sense of the tastes. Rv. I. 187, 4, & 5 have 'rasāḥ' explained by Sāyaṇa as the six tastes such as sweet, sour, etc. Rasāḥ i.e. tastes become in the philosophical darśanas the sense-quality of taste.

Rv. I. 187.4 - is

"tāva tyé pito rāsā rájāmsyānu víṣṭhitāḥ,  
divi' vāta iva śritāḥ."

So also, Yv. 39.4 has 'rasa' in the same sense and is explained by Mahīdhara as "svādutvam".

Yv. 39.4 is-

"mánasaḥ kāmamākutiṃ  
vācāḥ satyām aśīya  
paśúnām rūpamānnasya  
ráso yásāḥ śrīḥ śrayatām máyi svāhā."

Fifthly, we have 'rasa' with reference to the animals such as a cow, horse etc. With reference to the cow it means milk as at Rv. I. 37.5 :

"praśamsā goṣvaghnyam kriṣam  
yacchardho mārutam,  
jambhe rasasya vavṛdhe."  
'rasasya gokṣīra-rūpasya'-Sāyaṇa.

At Rv. VII. 104.10 -, we have 'rasa' with reference to food, horses, cows and body. Now what exactly is the meaning of 'rasa' in all these cases is not made clear by Sāyaṇa, but it may mean "essence". The mantra runs as-

yó no rásam dípsati pitvó agne,  
yó áśvanām, yo gávām, yás tanúnām,  
ripúḥ stenāḥ steyakṛd da bhrámetu ni  
śá hīyatām tánvā tánā ca."

Rasa of the serpents obviously means poison as at AV. V. 13.2, and 30  
Av. V. 13.2 is-

"yát te ápodakam viśám  
tát te etāsvagrabham,  
grhñāmi té madhyamám uttamam  
rásam utāvamám bhiyāsā neśadādu te."

Av. IV. 27.3 has 'rasa' of a horse. It is explained as speed of the horse by the commentator. This also may be the sense in Rv. VII. 104. 10, as read above.

Sixthly, we have 'rasa' of the human body as seen in Rv. VII. 104. 10 above. Rv. I. 105,2 has 'rasa' in the sense of virile semen. It runs as-

"árthamídváu arthína á  
jāyáyuvate pátim,  
tuñjāte vṛṣṇyam páyaḥ paridāya  
rásam duhe vittām me asyá rodasī."

We also come across occurrences in which 'rasa' appears as an independent entity e.g. rasāḥ, used in plural, means tastes as explained by Sāyaṇa (Rv. I. 187-4, and 5) (see above).

In the Yajurveda also, one occurrence is noteworthy. Yv. 18.9 reads as-

úrka me, sunṛtā me,  
payaśca me, rásaśca me, ghṛtaṃ ca  
me, madhu ca me, ságdhiśca me,  
sápitiśca m, kṛśīśca me, jai'traṃ  
ca me, aúdbhidyam ca me yajñena kalpantām.

(This is from the Ch. VIII of the famous Rudrāṣṭādhyāyī) Mahīdhara explains 'rasa' as "tatratyaḥ sārāḥ"- i.e. 'essence.'

In the above quoted mantra, several things are asked for through sacrifice. The occurrence between 'payaḥ' and 'ghṛtaṃ' may signify the juice of something edible or drinkable. Here, it may be noted however, that rasa is mentioned by itself and not as 'of something'. It may also be noted that it figures along with 'ūrj', 'sunṛtā', and 'payas', wherein 'ūrj' may mean strength or vigour either of speech and 'payas' may mean any fluid or juice or vital spirit, power, etc.

It might also mean taste, charm, pleasure, delight.

Av. X. 8.44 has 'rasena tṛptaḥ' This is a mystic hymn and 'rasa' may mean the essence of the universe. The mantra runs as :-

“akāmó dhīre amṛtaḥ svayambhū  
 rāsenā tṛptó na kútaś canonaḥ,  
 táme vávidvān na bibhāya  
 mṛtyórātmānam dhīram ajāram  
 yúvānam.”

Here, it may be noted that the sense of satisfaction or fulfilment or even ecstasy is associated with 'rasa'; 'rasa' as causing fulfilment or joy.

The eighth interesting use of 'rasa' is seen at Rv. IX. 67.31 and 32, which run as below :-

“yāḥ pāvamānīradhyétyṛṣibhiḥ  
 sām̐bhṛtaṃ rāsam,  
 sārvaṃ sá- pūtámaśnāti svaditām mātariśvanā.”

and also,

“pāvamānīryo adhyétyṛṣibhiḥ  
 sām̐bhṛtaṃ rāsam,  
 tasmai sárasvatí duhe  
 kṣīráṃ sarpímádhūdakám.”

Sāyaṇa explains 'rasam' as “veda-sāra-bhūtaṃ sāraṃ sūkta-saṃgham” in the first quotation, and as 'veda-sāraṃ sūkta-saṃgham' in the next one. This is applied to pāvamānī sūktas which are studied by the ṛṣis. It is possible here to see a meaning similar to the later meaning in kāvya-rasa, i.e. “essence causing joy.”

Lastly, it will be interesting to note which feelings are associated with ‘rasa’. Usually we come across qualities of exhilaration, joy-giving, taste, flavour, etc.

Rv. IX. 6.6. as quoted above speaks of the quality of exhilaration caused by rasa; “madāya”.

Rv. IX. 97.14 has -

“rasā’yyaḥ páyasā pinvamānā  
īrayanneṣi mādhumantam amśum,  
pávamānaḥ santanimesi kṛṇvānn  
i’ndrāya somo pariṣicyāmānaḥ.”

‘rasāyyaḥ’ is ‘āsvādyah’, i.e. tasteful, having flavour, etc.

The same context associates ‘rasa’ as causing joy, exhilaration, ecstasy or intoxication. Thus ‘rasa’ is said to be ‘madirah’ at Rv. IX. 96.21, as read below :

“pávasvendo pávamāno mähobhiḥ  
kánikradat pári vārānyaṣa,  
krīlañcamvorā’ viśa pūyamāna  
i’ndram te rāso madiró mamattu.”

Thus in the vedas, we get ‘rasa’ not only in the physical sense, but we find the qualities of joy-giving, tastefulness, exhilaration, being the essence of the vedas, being the essence of the universe, etc. also attached to ‘rasa’. Thus ‘rasa’ in the vedas becomes an object of relish, a joy-yielding essence. These senses make it very easy for the aesthetes to utilise the word for the aesthetic flavour of sentiments and emotions as found in literary and dramatic literature.

Here, we may refer to that famous verse of the N.S. (Nāṭya-śāstra; Bharata, Edn. G.O.S.) Ch. I., vs. 17, whose purpose is to show relationship of the nāṭyaveda with other vedas and thereby give it vedic prestige. Taken in this light, one may not bother oneself with finding any real basis for the statement. The verse runs as below :

“jagrāha pāthyam ṛgvedād  
sāmabhyo gītam eva ca,  
yajurvedād abhinayān  
rasān ātharvaṇād api.” (N.S. I. 17)

The verse prior to this (N.S. I. 16) reads as -

“evam saṃkalpya bhagavān  
sarva-vedān anusmaran,  
nātyavedaṃ tataś cakre  
catur-vedāṅga-saṃbhavam.” (N.S. I. 16)

Abhinavagupta (pp. 14, A.bh. on N.S., G.O.S., Edn. Vol. I., 2nd Edn. '56) explains :

evam saṃkalpya iti - saṃkalpa-vyāpāra evā'yaṃ buddhyā vedāṅgaikīkāra-lakṣaṇo brahmaṇo nātya-vedōtpādanam. nanu vedasmaraneṇa tatra katham hetutā labdhā. āha. caturvedāṅga-saṃbhavam, iti. catvāro vedāḥ. aṅgānāṃ pāthyā'dīnāṃ saṃbhavo yasya. saṃbhavaty asmād iti saṃbhavaḥ. ata eva veda-catustayam api yatrāṅgāni praty upakaraṇībhūtaṃ iti (sa tathōktaḥ) (14-16).

On this, read Madhusūdanī (Sansk. Comm. by Madhusūdana Shastri, pp. 57, Edn. B.H.U. Varanasi, '71) - (Madhusūdanī covers the N.S., as well as the Abhinavathārati on it. We have quoted the A.bh. on N.S. I. 16. read Madhusūdanī on it as below.) : (pp. 57, ibid)

“nanu ity anena sarvavedān anusmaran nātyavedaṃ cakre” ity uktaṃ smaraṇaṃ tatra nātya-veda-karaṇe katham hetur iti saṃmayitum āśaṅkya samā'dhatte - “āha” iti. iha paṭha dhātau uktaṃ vyaktatvam. viśeṣaprakāreṇa vaktuḥ kathaneccchā prayuktasya svasya pāthyasya arthārpaṇe arthabodhane kṣamatvaṃ samarthanam.

kākv adhyāye svarāḥ sapta, alaṃkārah ṣaṭ. ādigrahaṇād dvividhā kākuḥ. ṣaḍ aṅgāni. tasyā prayojanena tādrśa-kṣamatvaṃ bhavati iti hetoḥ tayā sāmagryā upaskṛtaṃ śobhitam pāthyam kathyate.

tac ca pāthyam ca nātye prādhānyāt caturbhyo vedebhyo nātya-vedasya nirmāṇasamaye prathamam upāttam.

“caturvedāṅga-saṃbhavam” iti. catvāro vedāḥ. aṅgānāṃ saṃbhava utpattisthānam yasya iti caturvedāṅga-saṃbhavaḥ. ||16||.

A.bh. on N.S. I. 17 (pp. 14, 15, 16, Edn. G.O.S., ibid) reads as :

kuṭrāṅge kasya vedasya upayoga iti darśayati - “jagrāha pāthyam ṛgvedād iti. iha paṭha vyaktāyāṃ vāci uktaṃ vyaktatvaṃ vivakṣā-viśiṣṭasvārthārpaṇa-kṣamatvam. tac ca kākva-dhyāy avakṣyamāṇasvarā'laṃkāradī-sāmagrī-yojanena bhavati iti tayōpaskṛtaṃ pāthyam ucyate. tac ca prādhānyāt prathamam upāttam.

tathā hi vakṣyati -

"vāci yatnas tu kartavyo  
nātyasyaiṣā tanuḥ smṛtā,  
aṅga-naipathya-sattvāni  
vākyārtham vyañjayanti hi." iti. (N.S. XIV. 2)

ata eva abhinayāntar bhūtatve'pi prthag upāttam. tad ṛgvedād gṛhītam. tasya traisvarya-pradhānasya stotra dvāreṇa yāgopakāritvāt. pāṭhyam api traisvaryópetam. aika-svārye kākvaḥbhābhābhyām ca svasvādau (caika-svabhāvācca svarā"dau) gīta-rūpā"patter iti hi vakṣyāmaḥ (N.S. 17).

pāṭhya-gata-svara-prasaṅgāt tad anantaram sāmabhyo gītam jagrāha ity uktam. uparañjakatvena hi paścāt tasya abhidhānam nyāyāyā ity kecit. "gītam prāṇaḥ prayogasya" iti vakṣyamānatvāt tad āyattatvād rasa-carvaṇāyāḥ samucitam asya atraiva abhidhānam ity asmad upādhyāyāḥ. cakāreṇa etat tulya-kakṣyatām āha. evakāreṇa gītamātram tato gṛhītam "gītiṣu samākhyā" (jaimini - 2/1/36) iti nyāyāt. tad ādhāra-dhruvāpada-yojanam ṛgvedād eva iti darśayati. tata eva dhruvā'dhyāye vacanād atraiva saṁgṛhitam (?)

ghanāva-naddha-sāma-gāna-kriyā-prāṇabhūta-kāla-sāmyātmaka-tāla-sāmānya-svīkṛtam atraiva praviṣṭam (?). ādhvāryakarma-pradhāne tu yajurvede aṅga-karmaṇām pradakṣiṇa-gamanā"di-krama eva prathamam. paṭhiṣyati "yā ṛcaḥ pāṇikā" (32/2) ityādi. tata suśīrātmakam cā'pyātodyam svaraprādhānyāt.

ātharvaṇa-vede tu śāntika-māraṇādi karmasu tasya ṛtvijāḥ prāṣṭudavaiṣuṇṇādy anubhāvānām prajā-śatru-prabhṛtinā avadhāna-grahaṇādinā lohitoṣṇiṣāder nepathyasya teṣu teṣu ca karmasu viśiṣṭa-prayatna-puruṣa-sampādyam-manovaṣṭambhātmanāḥ sattvasya saṁbhavāt tataḥ abhinayānām grahaṇam. vācīkastv abhinayaḥ pūrvam eva uktaḥ. prādhānyād vibhāvānām dhṛti-pramodādi-vyabhicāriṇām ca paramārthasatām samāharaṇam pradhānam iti vibhāvādi-sāmagrī-rūpa-rasātmaka-carvaṇā-saṁbhava iti tatas tad-grahaṇam iti na tatasthā evaite. ata eva rasyante. tatraiva ca rasyanta iti vakṣyāmaḥ.

tad evam nāṭyā"di-rūpakopakramam gītā"todya-prāṇābhīnaya-varga-paripuṣyad-rasa-carvaṇā"tmakam para-prīti-mayam eva nāṭyam. tatas tad vyutpatir iti nāṭyam eva veda iti kramaṇa pradarśitam, tena upakramya yojanā"tmaka-niyoga"tmaka-śāsana-prāṇa-śāstra-vailakṣyeṇa svayam upārūḍha-jñānābhīdhāna-vidāḥ prāṇa-veda-rūpatā nāṭyasya eva iti siddham."

Pundit Madhusundanjee reads slightly differently. His reading is (without, of course revealing his source) : (pp. 66, ibid) - "ātharvaṇa-vede tu śāntika-

māraṇā"di-karmasu natasya iva tasya rtvijah prāstuda-vaishuṇādy anubhāvānām prajā-śatru-prabhrtiṣu avadhāna-grahanādinā, pradhāna-vibhāvānām, dhrti-pramodā"di-vyabhicāriṇām ca paramārthasatām samāharaṇam pradhānam iti vibhāvādisāmagrīrūpa... vaksyāmaḥ.

tad evaṃ kṛīḍanīyaka-upakramam gītātodya-prānābhinaya-varga-paripuṣyad-rasa-carvaṇā"tmakam para-prītimayam eva nāṭyam... pradarśiam."

We have indicated where Madhusūdanajee differs from the G.O.S. reading. The source of his reading is not known. Perhaps like Kavi of the G.O.S. at places, this is a personal attempt of Madhusūdanajee to explain the text but that portion is given as part of the original A.bh.

But (pp. 68, ibid) in his Madhusūdanī Sanskrit Commentary he observes something which is not the source of his reading but which can be taken as his justification. We will look into this, but one thing is clear that perhaps he was not happy with the original G.O.S. reading which he normally follows, and therefore tried to emend the text in his own imaginary fashion. He reads in his Madhusūdanī (pp. 68, ibid) : "kṛīḍanīyakam iti pāṭhaḥ. sukhita-duḥkhite irsyādi-vaśage loke, yakṣa-rakṣaḥ-prabhrtibhiḥ jambudvīpe samākrānte sati mahendra-pramukhaiḥ pitāmahaḥ uktaḥ-"kṛīḍanīyakam icchāma iti." aparaṃ vedam sṛja, iti. sasmāra caturo vedān, iti. nāṭyākhyam pañcamam vedam setihāsam karomyaḥam iti. nāṭyavedam tatas' cakre iti.

nāṭyam upakramāṇam, tasya ādih, prāthamyam ākhyātum iṣyate atah kṛīḍanīyakopakramam nāṭyam iti siddhantabhūtaḥ pāṭhaḥ..." etc.

In his Hindi explanatory commentary called 'Bālakṛīḍā' (pp. 57-70) Śrī Madhusūdanajee explains fully the whole portion of the Abh. We will give its summary as follows :

From which veda as a source which portion was accepted is explained as follows - Pāṭhya portion was received from the Rgveda. Here, √pāth is in the sense of articulated language. This 'pāṭhya' has a sense of 'conveying something special.' Thus the portion (of nāṭya) called 'pāṭhya' is capable of conveying its (own) meaning (clearly). This capacity of 'pāṭhya' to convey its own meaning clearly is supported by the discussion of the material connected with 'svara' and 'alamkāra' in the chapter on 'kāku'. Thus pronouncement qualified by that material is said to be "pāṭhya". Now this portion called 'pāṭhya' i.e. 'that which is to be spoken, recited' - is principal and hence it is taken up first for consideration. i.e. it is mentioned first in the verse, viz. "jagrāha pāṭhyam ṛgvedād..." etc. So, in creating the portions that make for nāṭya, pāṭhya was attempted first by Brahman. This will be supported by

Now 'pāṭhya' is said to be principal in 'nāṭya' or drama, and a special effort is to be directed towards the same. It is with this in mind, that in the four-fold acting (abhinaya), eventhough 'pāṭhya' was included in vācika-abhinaya, yet it is mentioned specially separately. This is just to underline its importance. This 'pāṭhya' element was borrowed from Ṛgveda, which has the three svaras viz. udātta, anudātta and svarita as special characteristic. It is therefore that the ṛgveda helps the cause of sacrifice through (ṛks in form of) 'stotra' and 'śāstra'. Pāṭhya is also adorned not with just three but seven svaras.

“hāsyā-śṛṅgārayoḥ kāryau  
svarau madhyama-pañcamau,  
ṣaḍjaṣabḥau tathā caiva  
vīra-raudrādṛbhuteṣu tu.  
gāndhāraśca niṣādaś ca  
kartavyau karuṇe rase,  
dhaivataścaiva kartavyo  
bībhatse, sa-bhayānake.”  
evam etat svara-yutam  
kalā-tāla-layānvitam,  
daśarūpa-vidhāne tu  
pāthyam yojyam prayoktrbhiḥ.

“udāttaś cā’nudāttaś ca  
svaritaḥ kampitaś tathā,  
varṇāś’ catvāra eva syuḥ  
pāthya-yoge tapodhanāḥ.”



“tatra hāsya-sṛṅgārayoḥ svaritódāttaiḥ, vīra-raudrā’abhuteṣu udātta-kampitaiḥ, karuṇa-bībhatsa-bhayānakeṣu udātta-svarita-kampitaiḥ varṇaiḥ, pāṭhyam upapādayed iti.”

Thus ‘pāṭhya’ is of the form of articulated expression and is different in type with reference to children, young people, old men and ladies. It cannot have identity of form or expression in these four types. Following the śāstra (or scripture on it), seven svaras are counted in pāṭhya and same is the situation with reference to ‘gīta’ i.e. song also. Thus, both ‘pāṭhya’ and ‘gīta’ have an identical nature. So, on account of the absence of ‘eka-svarya’ i.e. ‘ekatva’ (virtually) and because of identical nature of svaras both pāṭhya and gīta will be taken as identical, because svaras will be said to be of the form of gīta later.

So, there is predominance of svaras in gīta, and there is reference to svaras in pāṭhya. So, on account of these ‘svaras’ being connected somehow with pāṭhya, Bharata has mentioned ‘gīta’ after pāṭhya and said, “gīta is derived from sāmaveda.” Some explain this by suggesting that gīta is mentioned after pāṭhya because gīta makes for the colouring i.e. beautifying of pāṭhya. For later it will be stated that “gīta is the life-breath (prāṇa) of abhinaya or acting.” It is said - (N.S. XXXII. - 436) -

“gīte prayatnaḥ prathamam tu kāryaḥ  
śayyā hi nāṭyasya vadanti gītam,  
gīte’pi vādyépi ca samprayukte,  
nāṭyaprayogo na vipattim eti.”

Our Upādhyāya (says Abhinavagupta) observes that, rasa-experience (rasa-carvaṇā) depends on ‘gīta’ and thus with reference to svara in connection with pāṭhya, talking about gīta comes next and is proper too.

(Now this importance of gīta with reference to rasa-carvaṇā is challenged but the importance of gīta is proved in a different way as follows.) - This view, viz. that gīta is at the basis of rasa-experience is not accepted by the Upādhyāya and hence after ten lines rasa-pratīti is said to follow the presentation of vibhāvā”di sāmagrī. Now this presentation of vibhāvā”di sāmagrī is done through the agency of pāṭhya, gīta placed in several rāgas, abhinaya i.e. acting and (āhārya in form of) citra or painting etc. So, it is not whole truth to say that rasa-realisation depends on ‘gīta’ only. ‘Ca’ and ‘eva’ in “sāmabhyo gītam eva ca” are explained as follows. - By ‘Ca’, it is explained that the sequence of ‘pāṭhya’ and ‘gīta’ is proper. Both are useful and both are equally important. For the “Kṛīḍanīyaka” is both ‘dṛśya’ (= to be viewed

or seen) as well as 'śravya' (= to be heard) also. This quality of 'being heard' is common between pāṭhya and gīta. So, both are equal in importance. By 'eva' is meant that only 'gīta' is borrowed from Sāmaveda. For 'sāma' is the name of gīti. "Gītiṣu sāma-ākhyā" is what Jaimini has to say at Mī. Sū. II. i. 36. This 'gīti' is dependent on 'dhruvā', which again is borrowed from the ṛgveda. In the dhruvādhyāya which will follow in due course (in the N.S.), here also the same is suggested. Here also 'eva' in 'atraiva' (in the A.bh.) means "api". The term 'saṃgrhīta' means acceptance in form of 'Saṅketa'. Madhusūdanjee adds that the reading in the A.bh. here should be (pp. 62, ibid, Bāla-kṛiḍā) : "ghanāvanaddha-rūpaṃ tata-suṣirā"tmakaṃ cāpi ātodyaṃ svara-prādhānyāt sāma-gāna-prābhūtaṃ. kriyā-māna-bhūtakāla-rūpa-tāla-tatsāmyā"tmaka-sāmānya-svīkṛtaṃ vastu atraiva praviṣṭhaṃ."

'ghana' is the name of tāla which is caused by bronze metal. That which is covered by leather is called 'avanaddha', such as drum etc. 'Tata' is the name of musical instruments such as vīṇā or lute etc. 'Suṣira' is an instrument with holes in it, e.g. 'vaṃśī'-flute etc. These four types of musical instruments are the life of sāma-gāna. Hence, they are associated with 'gīta'. That they are included in gīta suggests that vādyā is of the form of some activity i.e. they are 'kriyā'tmaka'. It is said, "dṛḍha-hastas-tu tatra syād aṅgulīm tatra yojayet." and this is of the form of activity of the body. Singing also is a form of speech where effort is involved.

"yaṃ yaṃ gātā svaram gacchet  
taṃ ātodyaiḥ prayojayet." N.S. XXXIV. 34

The musical instruments are thus associated with vocal music. It is also said,

"gītaṃ caturvidhād vādyāj  
jāyate cōparajyate,  
prīyate ca tato'smābhir  
vādyam adya nigadyate."  
"tat tataṃ suṣiraṃ cāvanaddham  
ghanam iti smṛtaṃ,  
caturdhā tatra pūrvābhyām  
śrutyādi-dvārato bhavet  
gītaṃ, tatv avanaddhena  
rajyate, mīyate ghanāt."

In the sixth chapter, the Vādyādhyāya of Sangeeta-ratrākara, it is suggested that from the four-fold musical instruments such as “tata, suṣira, avanaddha and ghana”, through the medium of ‘tata’ and ‘suṣira’ instruments, ‘gīta’ is born with the help of śrīti, svara, etc. The people are entertained through ‘avanaddha-vādyā’ and ‘ghana’ helps in measuring the ‘gīta’. Thus the association of ‘vādyā’ i.e. musical instruments is necessary along with ‘gīta’.

‘Tāla’ is said to be that in which rest all the three viz. gīta, vādyā and nr̥tta : “talyate pratiṣṭhīyate gītaṃ, nr̥ttaṃ, vādyam ca, yatra. Tāla is the measure such as the activity which is laghu, guru, pluta and druta, ‘Laya’ is similarity between time and activity concerning singing. ‘Laya’ is the repose or viśrānti that follows the said activities. Thus ‘kriyā’ and ‘kāla’ are rendered similar. The Sangeeta-ratnākara observes :

“tālas tala-pratiṣṭhāyāṃ  
iti dhātor ghañ, smṛtaḥ,  
gītaṃ vādyam tathā nr̥ttaṃ  
yatas tāle pratiṣṭhitam.”  
kālo laghv ādi mitayā  
kriyayā sammito mitim,  
gitā”der vidadhat tālaḥ  
sa ca dvedhā budhaiḥ smṛtaḥ” iti.  
“kriyā’nantara-viśrāntir  
layaḥ sa trividho mataḥ.” iti.

Thus it is that even tāla and laya also enter into the activity of ‘gīta’.

In the Yv., there is predominance of the activity of the adhvaryu. So in enjoining the activity which is part of a yajña i.e. sacrifice, at times going in to the right - ‘pradakṣiṇa-gamana’ is also enjoined. At times it is with reference to the north. At times only standing is enjoined or at times going east or west is also enjoined. This is suggested by the term ‘ādi’ that is read in both the terms “pradakṣiṇā”di” and “gamanā”di”. Thus ‘krama’ means laying of foot i.e. “pāda-vikṣepa”.

Thus on account of different activities enjoined the ṛtviks move around either with or without a red turban (= lohitośṇiṣa). And mind has to be concentrated with a special effort, with this or that act which is enjoined. Only a concentrated (samāhita) mind makes for the outcome of “sattva”. (i.e. manasaḥ sattvam,

ekāgratā). It is therefore that acting or abhinaya is said to be accepted from the yajurveda. We know that pāṭhya and gīta fall under 'vācika-abhinaya'. Pāṭhya and gīta are explained in the beginning and thus vācika-abhinaya is also taken as explained in the beginning.

The AV. includes such activities that are termed 'śāntika', 'pauṣṭika', 'māraṇa' and 'mohana'. The ṛtvik, like an actor or naṭa, is carefully engaged in activity concerning the peace and nourishment of people. They exhibit happiness such as "prāṣṭuda" or "prāṣṭuca". In acts connected with the annihilation of enemies, they catch hold of the enemies and the enemies get frustrated - i.e. 'viṣaṇṇa'. Here the reading we get alternatively is "viṣuṇṇa" also, observes Madhusūdanjee (pp. 66, ibid). In this reading the dissolution is - "viṣu nānā añcati" and with the help of the vārtika viz. "viṣvag ity uttarapada-lopas' cā-kṛta-sandheḥ", no sandhi or joining is caused between "ṣu" and "a" and there is no "yaṇ". Thus prior to sandhi 'añcati' is dropped and we get "ṇa" suffix. Because of "ṇa-tva" we derived "viṣuṇa" and with 'aṇ'-suffix we arrived at "vaiṣuṇa". A man whose mind runs about in different directions, i.e. whose mind is not concentrated, is said to be "viṣaṇṇa". 'Prasāda' and 'viśāda' are said to be two anubhāvas or consequents-dhṛti, dhairya, pramoda etc. are said to be vyabhicārins or accessories. In poetry the collection of vibhāva, anubhāva and vyabhicārins from real world is welcome, for the rasa-carvaṇā - resulting from the combination of the vibhāvā"di material results therefrom only. So, the vibhāvā"dis are mentioned.

Now, if it is asked that in the statement "rasān ātharvaṇād api", 'rasa's are mentioned, then why here collection of vibhāvā"dis is recommended ? To this the answer is that these vibhāvā"dis do not stand independent of the rasas concerned. The context is of rasa only. Thus for aesthetic tasting they i.e. vibhāvā"dis become instrumental. Ālambana, āśraya is expected to be there for any relish. There is pāṇini-sūtra such as -

"upajñōpakramaṃ tad ācikhyāsāyām." - Here following the lexicon - upajñā jñanam ādyam syār' - the beginning (of any activity) is termed "upakrama". When 'prāthamya' i.e. the state of being first is to be recommended with any object or activity, then "upajñānta tatpuruṣa" compound is placed in neuter gender. This is with 'upajñāyamāna-vastu.' In the same way, with the same object in view, "upakramyamāna-vastu", then 'upakramānta-tatpuruṣa' should be placed in neuter gender. The illustrations are, "pāṇiny upajñam granthaḥ" for Aṣṭādhyāyī, and "nandōpakramaṃ droṇaḥ" for droṇa or measure first used by 'Nanda'. Here the upa-kramyamāna-viśaya is nāṭya and it was projected as a toy for pleasure -

“krīḍanīyakam”. So, “krīḍanīyakópakramam nāṭyam” is a grammatically correct usage. Hence this reading is correct, argues Madhusūdanjee. He prefers this reading to “nāṭyā”dirūpópakramam” of the G.O.S. (pp. 16, *ibid*)

The gods, such as Indra and others who were tired after killing the demons etc. prayed to Brahmā for a “krīḍanaka” which is both ‘drśya’ and ‘śravya’. For their benefit to make for a krīḍanaka, the Pitāmaha derived the first knowledge for nāṭya from all the four vedas, and made the first beginning. Thus ‘nāṭya’ is ‘pitāmahópajña’ and the meaning of “krīḍanīyakópakrana” is also made clear.

Just as it is stated that ‘saujanya-vyavahāra’ - decent behaviour-started first with you, so it is termed “bhavad upakrama-saujanya-vyavahāra”, in the same way, nāṭya for first was desired as a play-thing, krīḍanīyaka and hence was termed “krīḍanīyakópakrama”. This nāṭya is the cause of highest joy, i.e. it is “para-prīti-maya” is of the form of highest happiness, and hence ‘pāṭhya’ and ‘pāthyóparañjaka gīta’, and its tools such as instruments - ‘ātodya, vādyā’ etc., are said to be the life “prāṇa” of “nāṭya” and this nāṭya is nourished by four-fold acting i.e. caturvidha-abhinaya and its soul is rasa-relish. Thus from nāṭya is derived the knowledge or information concerning pāṭhya etc. and so nāṭya is termed “veda” i.e. ‘jñāna’ itself. This is shown in due sequence in which pāṭhya, gīta, abhinaya and rasa figure respectively. This is the full meaning of the verse viz. “jagrāha pāthyam ṛgvedāt...” etc. i.e. N.S. I. 17.

Thus, the substance of this very famous verse can be read as follows in brief, that it is possible to find some connection with the vedas, (of nāṭya), without streaching the meaning too far, e.g. the mantras of the ṛgveda are essentially pāṭhya i.e. to be recited or are recitable. This according to Abhinavagupta is due to ‘tri-svara’ character (i.e. udātta, anudātta and svarita) of ṛgvedic mantras. This point has been elaborated by Bharata in chapters on vāg-abhinaya (i.e. Ch. XVI. G.O.S. Edn.). The relation of gīta with the sāmans of the sāmaveda (= S.V.) is obvious. Yajurveda (= Yv.) is, as Abhinavagupta observes, “adhvarya-karma-pradhāna”, i.e. in the Yv. the activities of the advaryu, such as the movement towards the right (daksina) etc. are predominant. Essentially, the movements of the different parts of the body have a particular significance in the different ritual activities. So the abhinayas are related to the Yv. As to the relation of rasas with the hymns of the Atharvaveda (Av.), we do not find any obvious relationship. The text of the A.bh. on this point is quoted below and we have attempted to explain the same, perhaps not very satisfactorily, with the help of the Madhusūdanī and

Bālakrīḍā of Pundit Madhusūdanjee as above. The A.bh. text reads as : (pp. 15, Vol. I.N.S.; G.O.S., ibid) : "ātharvaṇe tu śāntika-māraṇā"di-karmasu naṭasya iva tasyartvijāḥ prāṣṭuda-vaiṣuṇṇādy anubhāvānām prajā-śatru-prabhṛtinā avadhāna-grahaṇādīnā lohitośṇīṣā"der nepathyasya teṣu teṣu ca karmasu viśiṣṭaprayatna-puruṣa-saṃpādyā-manóvaṣṭambhātmanāḥ sattvasya saṃbhavāt tataḥ abhinayā nām-a-grahaṇam. vācikastv abhinayaḥ pūrvam evóктаḥ. prādhānyāt vibhāvānām dhṛti-pramodā"di-vyabhicāriṇām ca paramārtha-satām samāharaṇam pradhānam iti vibhāvā"di-sāmagrī-rūpa-rasā"tmaka-carvaṇā-sambhava iti tatas tadgrahaṇam uktam iti, na taṭasthā eva ete. ata eva rasyante. tatraiva ca rasyanta iti vakṣyāmaḥ."

The idea seems to be that priests in the various rituals of AV. such as those of śāntikarma, māraṇakarma, etc., put on costumes consisting of red turbans and such other things. Through anubhāvas they express certain feelings. There is a sort of mental avaṣṭambha or resoluteness brought about by special efforts, and therefore there is the exhibition of such a "sattva" or mental disposition. According to Abhinavagupta, this seems to be the connection of rasas with AV. One may imagine a scene in which one of such magical ritual is performed when everybody would be tense with emotion pertaining to a particular act. Abhinavagupta seems to have taken some such performance of the ātharvaṇa ritual as a source of emotional ecstasy in rasa.

We have seen earlier that though the word rasa occurs at several places in the A.V., we have no clear case of the later meaning of nāṭya-rasa or kāvya-rasa. From another point of view, however, we may say that **several hymns of the AV., taken by themselves are very impressive love lyrics.** The number of such hymns is about thirty-three. They are : AV. I. 34; II. 3; VI. 8; III. 25; VI. 8, 9, 82, 89, 102, 130, 131, 132, 139; VII. 36, (37), 37 (38); 38 (39), etc. etc.

A few lines from these may be quoted as below : e.g. AV. VI. 8.

"yāthā vṛkṣām lībujā samantām pariśasvaje' evā' pāri svajasva mā'm yāthā kāmīnyaso yāthā mánna'pagā ásaḥ

and also,

yāthā suparṇāḥ prapátan pakṣáu nihánti bhūbhyaṃ evā' nihanmi te, máno yāthā mā'm kāmīnyáso yāthā mánna'pagā ásaḥ.

and also,

yāthā mé dyā'vāpṛthivī' sadyāḥ paryéti sūryaḥ, evā' pā'ryemi te máno yāthā mā'm kāmīnyaso yāthā mánna'pagā ásaḥ."

“As the creeper embraces the tree on all sides, thus do thou embrace me, so that thou, shalt love me, so that thou shalt not be averse to me ?”

“As the eagle when he flies forth presses his wings against the earth, thus do I fasten down thy mind, so that thou, woman, shalt love me, that then shalt not be averse to me.” (2)

“As the sun day by day goes about this heaven and earth, thus do I go about thy mind, so that thou, woman shalt love me, so that thou shalt not be averse to me.” (3)

(Trans. Maurice Bloomfield - “Hymns of the AV.” SBE. Vol. XLII.)

AV. VI. 131 is a charm to arouse the passionate love of a man, e.g. AV. VI. 131.3 reads as -

“yád dhāvasi triyojanám pañcayojānamāśvinam, tatastváṃ punarā'yāsi putrā'ṇām na asaḥ pitā.”

“If thou dost run three leagues away (or even) five leagues, the distance coursed by a horseman, from there thou shall again return, shall be the father of our sons.” (Trans. Bloomfield).

The same note of a passionate woman's longing is heard also in AV. 132. We quote the first mantra that runs as -

“yám devāḥ smarámásiñcan napsvantaḥ śósucānaṃ sahā'dhyā, tám te tapāmi váruṇasya dhármaṇā.”

“Love's consuming longing, together with yearning, which the Gods have poured into the waters, that do I kindle for thee by the Law of Varuṇa.” (Trans. Bloomfield).

AV. VII. 36 is a love-charm spoken by a bridal couple. It runs as -

“aksyaú nau mādhusaṃkāśe  
ánikaṃ nau samārjanan,  
antáh kṛṇusva mām hṛdí  
māna īnnau sahā'sati.”

“The eyes of us two shine like honey; our foreheads gleam like ointment. Place me within thy heard; may one mind be in common to us both.” (Trans. Bloomfield).

And also, AV. VII. 37 -

“abhí tvā mánujātena dádhāmi máma vā'sasā, yáthā'so máma kévalo nányāsāṃ kīrtáyāścaná.”

“I envelope thee in my garment that was produced by Manu (the first man), that thou shalt be mine alone, shalt not even discourse of other women.” (Trans. Bloomfield).

Instances can be multiplied. It should be noted that scholars are in agreement when they say that these hymns, their ritualistic application apart, should be taken as individual pieces viewed in this light, and away from the ritualistic background; the above quoted instances can serve as beautiful love lyrics. They become the passionate expressions of love, i.e. śṛṅgāra-rasa primarily in its vipralambha aspect (e.g. Av. VI. 8). There are a few hymns in the RV., such as the dialogues of Purūravas and Urvaṣī, Yama and Yamī, etc. which contain such passionate expressions. But comparatively, speaking, the AV. has more of them. Other bhāvas or feelings such as those of bhaya, utsāha, śoka etc. also can be found in several other hymns of the AV. One may say, therefore, that the attempt to relate the later rasa-vicāra with reference to kāvyā and nāṭya, to AV. is not unjustified.

**Rasa in the Upaniṣads** - We come across several occurrences of the word rasa or the different forms of the root √ras, in the upaniṣads. Primarily they are to be seen in two or three different senses. The meaning of a liquid seems to be common to all of them. In the objects of five sense-organs, that which is gathered by the tongue is called ‘rasa’. We come across this sense in the Praśnopaniṣad (4, 8) which observes : “rasaś ca rasayitavyam” i.e. “when there is taste, it is to be tasted.” So also in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, (4.5.13). We read “sa yathā saindhava-ghanóntaro bāhyaḥ, kṛtsno rasaghana eva.” “Just as a piece of saindhava salt has nothing like internal or external, but the whole of it is full of taste.” In the above-mentioned occurrences, rasa is seen in the sense of (physical) taste. In the Praśnopaniṣad (1.4), we read, “eṣa hi dṛṣṭā... rasayitā”, the word ‘rasayitā’ is in the sense of one who tastes. There are many more occurrences to this effect. In the Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad, “ataś ca sarva oṣadhayo rasaś ca” (2.1.9.), we have ‘rasa’ in the sense of “sap”.

Then still further, rasa is seen in the sense of the juices of the trees out of which honey is formed as in the Chāndogya Upaniṣad - (6/9/1) :

“yathā somya madhu  
madhukṛto niṣṭiṣṭanti,  
nānātyayānām vṛkṣāṇām  
rasān samavahāram ekatām  
rasam gamayanti.”



Then we come across more and more references in the sense of “essence of things”, e.g. in the Tittirīyopaniṣad (1/12) : “eṣa bhūtānām pṛthvī rasah, pṛthivyā āpo rasah, apasām oṣadhayo rasah, oṣadhīnām puruṣo rasah, puruṣasya vāg rasah, vācām ṛg-rasah, ṛcah sāma rasah, sāmno udgītho rasah.”

Now, it may be noted that, along with the sense of “essence”, there seems to be other subtle shades of meanings also with reference to rasa in the above quotation. It should be noted, that here, the number of rasas is eight. This is rendered clear in the sentence that follows : “sa eṣa rasānām rasatamaḥ, paramaḥ, parārdhyoṣṭamo yad udgīthaḥ”, i.e. out of these, the Udgītha is the highest and the eighth rasa. Thus the eighth rasa is the ‘parama’, the highest and it is “udgītha”. Very often “aum” in the Upaniṣads suggests this ‘udgītha’, the rasa of “sāman”. We may also take note of the following from the Taittirīya Upaniṣad -

“asad vā idam agra āsīt  
tato vā sad ajāyata,  
tad ātmānaṁ svayam a-kuruta  
tasmāt tat sukr̥tam ucyate.”

iti. yad vai sukr̥tam. raso vai saḥ rasam hy evāyam labdhvā ānandī bhavati.” (2/7)., i.e. “verily, in the beginning was this ‘asar’ (i.e. jagat). From it, verily, was ‘sat’ born. It made itself the ātman. So, it is termed ‘su-kr̥ta’. Verily, it is sukr̥ta, verily, it is ‘rasa’. On the attainment of rasa, this, verily, becomes joyous.”

In this famous quotation, also read later by Jagannātha in his Rasa-gaṅgādhara, Sukr̥ta is rasa, and that ‘rasa’ is a joy-giving factor. This becomes quite clear. But with all this one may feel sceptical in saying that ‘rasa’ occurs in the upaniṣads in the same sense of aesthetic rapture as in Bharata. But it is quite close. And to a certain extent, the use of rasa at one place in the Jaiminiya Upaniṣad seems to come closer to the sense as seen in Bharata.

We will later go to observe that rasa in Bharata has in its meaning the shades of the qualities of taste, essence, etc. as seen in the upaniṣads. We also see, as in the chāndogya Upaniṣad, that rasa is the combined taste of several ingredients like honey, which is a “samavahāra”, i.e. a combination or a collection of the juices of many trees. Possibly the eight rasas in the Chāndogya might have inspired theorists to imagine eight nārya-rasas also. Finally, it may be observed that the above quoted utterance of the Taittirīya-Upaniṣad, in which ‘rasa’ is said to be the soul and by its attainment one is said to attain highest joy, may be taken as an original inspiration for the later theorists.

**"Rasa" in the Nirukta is read as at,**

rasateḥ - from √ras (= to make sound), at Nirukta - VI. 21, IX. 11, XI. 25;

rasa-dharaṇam = "holding of juices" - at VII. 11;

rasam - "juice", at IX. 53; XI. 29;

rasa-haraṇāt - "from extracting juice" - at III. 16; XI. 5;

'rasā' - name of a river; at XI. 25;

'rasāḥ' - 'juices', at IV. 27, VI. 19, VII. 23.

rasādānam - "drawing of juices", VII. 11;

rasān - juices; II. 14; IV. 27, XI. 23;

rasānām - 'of juices'; X, 10;

rasāni - 'roaring', at XI. 25;

'rasānudānam' - "to release the juices", VII. 10;

'rasānupradānena', "by giving juice" at X. 34; 'rasena', 'with juice', VI. 15; XII. 1.

Thus in Nirukta of Yāska, (circa 700-500 B.C.), we come across as many as thirteen occurrences in different forms of root √ras, or word 'rasa', appearing either independently or in a compound. We also come across 'rasā' in the sense of the name of a particular river or a river in general. In all these occurrences, √ras, or the word 'rasa' seems to carry the same sense, as that of, 'to make sound', or 'juice', etc.

**'Rasa' in the Brhad devatā occurs as follows :**

rasa - I. 68; II. 33; VII. 127

rasādāna - II. 6;

rasāpāra-nivāsin; VIII. 24. (Here 'rasā' is a river).

Thus in the Brhad devatā of Śaunaka we have 'rasa' occurring either independently, or in a compound. In all these instances, the usual sense of fluid, juice, sap or sense-quality are to be seen. Rasā occurs in the sense of a river.

**We will now turn first to Pāṇini and Patañjali and then the earlier poets such as Āśvaghoṣa, Bhāsa and Kālidāsa.****Rasa in Pāṇini (Circa 350 B. 6. Keith) and Patañjali (Circa 150 B.C., Keith).**

With Nirukta and Brhad devatā we come to the close of discussion concerning the meanings of rasa in the vedic literature. With Pāṇini begins our discussion of the meanings of rasa in what we may now call classical sanskrit. There is one reference to 'rasa' in Pā. V. 2.95 - "rasā" dibhayaś ca." We cannot be sure as to the senses which Pāṇini might have had in mind when he used the term "rasā"di".

In the dhātupāṭha also, √ras is explained as having the senses of “(rasa) ‘śabde’, and, “āsvādana-snehanayoḥ”, i.e. “to make sound”, and “to taste”, “to liquify” or ‘to make something oily”, respectively.

In Patañjali we have several occurrences of the √ras, and also of the word ‘rasa’, either occurring independently, or in a compound. We also come across words such as ‘rasa-vācitra’, ‘rasa-vācin’, ‘rasāt(d)’ and “rasika”. Excepting only one occurrence that we will take up in detail as below, in all other cases the usual senses of, ‘to make sound’, or ‘to taste’, etc. are seen and also the one of “sense-quality” or ‘juice’ is also seen.

In Patañjali (Edn. Dr. Keilhorn) we have the following occurrences :

√ras - Pā. Sū. II. 4.85; line no 16, 17, 17, 17, 20, (pp. 500)

√ras - Pā. Sū. I. 3.10; line 8, 8, page 268; I/4/269; 2.4.85; 17, 18, 19, 22 (p. 499)  
5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 18; 24 (p. 500); 2, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 10; pp. 502

‘rasa’ - I. 4.110; 18/p. 356; 3, 9/p. 357; IV. 3.155; 9, 15/325

‘rasa’ - I. 2.64; 5; p. 246; IV. 1.3.7, p. 198

‘rasa’ I. 2.64; 3.4; p. 246; IV. 1.3, 4, 6/p. 198; V. 1.9; 24, p. 366;

‘rasa-vācitra’ IV. 4.24; line 18, p. 330;

rasa-vācin - IV. 4.24; 18, 19; p. 330; V. 2.107, 5, 5, 6 p. 397;

rasādi - V. 2.95; 19, 21; p. 394;

rasika - V. 2.95; 21; (p. 394);

We will try to look into this data. While commenting on Pā. Sū. V. 2.95, as quoted above, Patañjali, referring to the previous sūtra i.e. Pā. V. 2.94; ‘tad asyā’ty asminn iti’, asks the question as to why this sūtra (i.e. V. 2.95) is added, in as much as complete sense is covered by the previous sūtra. A possible answer is that this sūtra is mentioned in order to exclude the use of other matup suffixes. But this is not accepted by the Bhāṣyakāra. According to him, there are examples of the use of other ‘matvarthīya’ suffixes in “rasiko nataḥ”, “urvaṣī vai rūpiṇī apsarasām”, “sparsīko vāyur iti.” The passage from the M.bh. (= Mahābhāṣya) reads as follows :

“rasā”dibhayaś ca.” (Pā. Sū. V. 2.95) kim artham idam ucyate, na tad asyā’ty asminn ity eva matup siddhaḥ. rasā”dibhyaḥ punarvacanam anya-nivṛttyartham rasā”dibhyaḥ punar vacanam kriyate’nyeṣām matvarthīyānām pratiṣedhārtham.

matubena yathā tyādyēnye matvarthīyāḥ prāpnuvanti te mā bhūvann iti. maitad asti prayojanam, dr̥ṣyante hy anye rasādibhyo matvarthīyāḥ. rasiko nataḥ, urvaṣī vai rūpiṇī apsarasām, sparsīko vāyur iti.” (M.bh. on Pā. Sū. 2.95; pp. 394; Edn. Geilhorn).

Kāśikā explains this by saying that the matup suffix is to be used in the qualities grasped by senses. But in the case of rūpiṇī, rūpika etc., the idea is to suggest not merely rūpa grasped by the eye, but beauty. Similarly, in ‘rasiko nataḥ’ the meaning is not that nata possesses juice tasted by the tongue, but he possesses an emotion or sentiment - “bhāva-yogaḥ”. The passage from the Kāśikā runs as below :

“rasā”dibhyas’ ca prātipadikebhyo matup pratyayo bhavati, tad asyā’sty-asminn ity etasmin viṣaye. rasavān, rūpavān. kim artham ucyate, na pūrva-sūtreṇa matup siddhaḥ ? rasā”dibhyaḥ punarvacanam anya-nivṛttyartham; anye matvarthīyā mā bhūvann iti. katham rūpiṇī kanyā, rūpiko dārakaḥ ? prāyikam etad vacanam; iti karaṇo vivakṣārthónuvartate. athavā guṇā”di yatra paṭhyate, tena ye rasanendriyagrāhyā guṇās teṣām atra pāṭhah iha mā bhūt; rūpiṇī, rūpika, iti - śobhāyogaḥ gamyate. rasiko nataḥ ity atra bhāvayogaḥ. rasa, rūpa-gandha-sparśaś śabdā snehaguṇāt ekācaḥ guṇa-grahaṇam rasā”dīnām viśeṣaṇam, rasā”dīḥ.”

This point is made more explicit by the Tattvabodhinī on the Siddhānta Kaumudī. The author Jñānendra-sarasvatī observes : “anya-mattvarthīya iti. katham tarhi rūpiṇī kanyā, rasiko nataḥ iti. atrā”huḥ rasā”digane guṇāt iti paṭhyate. tena guṇa-vācibhya eva anya-mattvarthīyasya niśedha-rūpiṇī ity atra tu rūpa-śabdena saundaryam grahyate, tac ca na guṇaḥ; rasikam ity atra tu rasa-śabdena bhāvo grhyate, na tu rasanāgrāhyo guṇa iti. (pp. 303, Edn. ’33, N.S. press).

From the above discussion we cannot say whether Mahābhāṣyakāra wants to confine the use of matup suffix to the sense-quality of taste only. This is however the distinction made by Kāśikā and later commentaries. But this much is certain that the Mahābhāṣyakāra uses the word ‘rasa’ in ‘rasiko nataḥ’ in the sense of ‘bhāva’ i.e. emotion or sentiment. So, we may say that it is in the Mahābhāṣya that we meet, perhaps for the first time a clear use of the word ‘rasa’ in the aesthetic context, i.e. in the sense of “nātyarasa” also.

Other references in the M.bh., on Pā. III. 1.26, show familiarity of the Mahābhāṣyakāra with dramatic performance or something akin to that. This would suggest that the word rasa in the aesthetic sense must have become current before Patañjali. How long before, we do not have at present the means to indicate. Sources reveal that Pāṇini wrote a mahākāvya also and if so, Patañjali must surely have known that and this brings both of them closer to aesthetic rasa.

We will now look into the use of 'rasa' and related words if any, in the works of great literary artists such as Aśvaghoṣa (Cir. 100 A.D. Keith), Bhāsa (Circa 200 A.D. Keith; and Kālidāsa (Cir. 400 A.D.; Keith). (We do not have absolute faith in these dates after reading the works of such great scholars as our friend, the late, Prof. Biswanāth Bhattacharya of Shantiniketan, (W.Bengal)).

From our search thus far, for the use of the word rasa in the aesthetic sense, we may conclude that in the early vedic literature as such, there is no clear indication of it, though there are certain usages as we noted above, which associate 'rasa' with literary works, where the meaning is of 'flavour' as such and the joy incidental to it. But when we come to Pāṇini and Patañjali, particularly the latter, we have a very clear use of the word 'rasa', in the aesthetic sense. Whether this specific use of the word 'rasa' was known to Pāṇini or not, we cannot say. But if the interpretation given by Patañjali also represents the view of Pāṇini, we can say that Pāṇini also had in his mind the aesthetic sense of "rasa", to be distinguished from the sense of 'sense-quality' of 'rasa', i.e. literary taste as distinguished from physical taste of an eatable. We can therefore assume that this specific aesthetic sense of the word rasa must have become current in the literary world of Patañjali or even Pāṇini and then writers that followed them. To be frank, as was pointed out by us under the discussion on vyañjanā, even here, Pāṇini and Patañjali while dealing with 'śāstra' had no business to talk of 'rasa' in the aesthetic sense and even with this, something positive in that direction has crept in. And if Pāṇini himself also was a writer of a mahākāvya, it is not safe to assume that he was totally ignorant of the word 'rasa' taken in its aesthetic context. With this, we will move on to earlier poets and dramatists.

We will try to see now from the works of earlier literary artists like Aśvaghoṣa, Bhāsa and Kālidāsa, whether there is any material for the formation of rasa-theory in the famous rasa-sūtra read in the N.S. (Nāṭyaśāstra) of Bharata. It may be noted that we have no absolute faith in the priority of Aśvaghoṣa to Kālidāsa but we go by the generally accepted sequence and in doing so, we do not stand to lose for both of them were at least prior to Bharata, the author of the present available N.S. Again, we do not have faith, and surely so after the findings of our friend Prof. Dr. N.P. Unni., - in the fact that all thirteen plays, known as Trivendram plays were penned by Bhāsa. But if at all something concrete follows, and we do hope that this will be the outcome of our present attempt - we will just go to suggest how works of these great ancient giants might have guided Bharata or his predecessors in the field of literary and dramatic theory to go for i.e. to formulate what we know as "rasa-theory" to-day.

As the normally accepted date of the now available N.S. of Bharata falls between sometime before A.D. to second century A.D., or to still later times after Christ, the authors under consideration can be said to fall in a period of fluidity regarding the formation of the said rasa theory. We cannot say of these authors that they keep before them and follow rasa-theory in the same way or sense as done by Harśa, the author of Ratnāvalī, Priya-darśikā and Nāgānanda. By this study we mean just to indicate how works of great poets lying before Bharata or his predecessor, might have influenced or guided him in the formation of the theory of dramatic art, or art in general, i.e. the rasa-theory. The works before Bharata were necessarily those of Aśvaghoṣa, Kālidāsa and Bhāsa for sure, and also of many literary masters whose works along with names also, are for the present lost to us.

It is almost an accepted fact that literary theory draws upon literary practice and in turn influences the same as grammar does upon linguistic usages. That the definitions of Mahākāvya and other literary forms as found in the works on poetics by Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin and the like, were formulated in view of the master-pieces of Aśvaghoṣa, Kālidāsa etc., is an accepted fact. On the same analogy we may say that probably the formation of the famous rasa-sūtra in Bharata also might have been guided by the same fact as that of the careful observation and study of the actual practice of the literary giants who might have preceded him. In view of this, we may try to study the works of Aśvaghoṣa, Bhāsa and Kālidāsa. We will try to find out if there is any mentioning or clear usage of the so called śāstric terms such as 'vibhāva', 'anubhāva', 'sāttvika', 'vyabhicārin', or 'sthāyin' etc., which make for actual rasa-realisation in their particular literary work, and which might have thus paved the way in the formation of a theory of rasa, both in nāṭya and kāvya, or any fine art in general.

#### Aśvaghoṣa -

In the Buddha-Carita (= Bu. Ca.) of Aśvaghoṣa, at III. 7, We have the description of Śuddhodana bidding farewell to his son Sarvārtha-siddha who was starting for his first excursion. The verse reads as : (Edn. Cowell, 1893 A.D.)

“atho narendrah sutam āgatāśruḥ

śirasy upaghrāya ciraṃ nirīksya,

gacchéti cā”jñāpayati sma vācā

shehān na cainaṃ manasā mumoca.” (Bu. Ca. III. 7)

The Sāhityadarpaṇa has discussed vatsala rasa with 'Sneha' or 'Vatsalatā' as sthāyin, putra i.e. son and the like, the ālambana vibhāva, the ceṣṭās, vidyā, śaurya of the son etc., as the uddīpana-vibhāva, ālīngana i.e. embrace, aṅga-sparśa or

touching the limbs, śirasā cumbana, i.e. kissing the head, āśru or tear's, etc. as the anubhāvas, anīṣṭā"śaṅkā or imagining the calamity, harṣa i.e. joy, etc. as the sañcārins or vyabhicārins. We have practically all this in the stanza quoted as above.

Bu. Ca. III. 13-22 describe the feelings of women eager to see the prince. Particularly the vyabhicārin called 'āvega' or haste or uneasiness i.e. love-torment, is seen prominently depicted in these verses. Bu. Ca. IV. 25 describes the anubhāvas that accompany the śrṅgāra-rasa in the following words -

“tā bhrubhiḥ prekṣitair hāvair  
hasitair laḍitair gataiḥ,  
cakrur ākṣepikāś ceṣṭāḥ  
bhīta-bhītā ivāṅganāḥ.”

Bu. Ca. IV. 54-61 describe the state of the prince who did not respond to the gestures of the beautiful ladies. We find therein the delineation of 'śama'-sthāyin and the realisation of śānta-rasa. Bu. Ca. IV. 54 reads as :

“evam ākṣipyamāṇo'pi  
sa tu dhairyā"vṛténdriyaḥ,  
martavyam iti śodvego  
na jaharṣa na vivyathe.”

His friend Udāyī finds him thus lost in contemplation, and in order to deviate him from it, starts addressing the prince -

“iti dhyāna-paramaṁ dṛṣṭvā  
viśayebhyo gata-sprham,  
udāyī nīti-śāstrajñas  
tam uvāca suhṛttayā.” (Bu. Ca. IV. 62)

The feeling of 'nirveda' or despondency finds a beautiful expression in the words of Buddha who says :

“jarā-vyādhiś ca mṛtyuś ca  
yadi na syād idaṁ trayam,  
mamā'pi hi manojñeṣu  
viśayeṣu ratir bhavet.” (Bu. Ca. IV. 86).

Bu. Ca. V. 29, describes the anubhāvas of vatsala-rasa as read below :

“iti tasya vaco niśamya rājā  
kariṇévā'bhihato drumasā cacāla,

kamala-pratime'nalau grhitvā  
vacanam cédam uvāca bāṣpa-kaṇṭhaḥ.”

Bu. Ca. V. 45 describes the uddīpana and ālambana vibhāvas of śṛṅgāra-rasa as follows :

“tata uttamam uttamāṅganās taṃ  
nīśitūryair upatasthur indrakalpam,  
himavacchirasīva candragaure  
draviṇendrā”tmajam apsaro gaṇaughah.”

Bu. Ca. VII. 1-10, describe the effects on human beings, beasts, etc. when the prince makes an entry into the forest. We come across a beautiful delineation of the sthāyibhāva viz. ‘vismaya’ giving rise to ‘adbhuta rasa’.

Bu. Ca. VII. 7, reads as -

“kaccid vasūnām ayam aṣṭamaḥ syāt  
syād aśvinor anyataraś cyuto vā,  
uccerur uccair iti tatra vācaḥ  
tad darśanād vismayajā munīnām.”

Bu. Ca. VIII. 21, 22, provide all the required factors that make for the Karuṇa-rasa.

“vilambakeśyo malināambarās’ ca  
nirañjanair bāṣpa-hatekṣanair mukhaiḥ,  
striyo na rejur mṛjayā vinākṛtā  
divīva tārā rajanīkṣayā’ruṇāḥ. (VIII. 21)

Bu. Ca. VIII. 22 is -

“arakta-tāmraiś caraṇair a-nūpuraiḥ  
a-kuṇḍalair ārjava-kandharair mukhaiḥ,  
svabhāva-pīnair jaghanair a-mekhalair  
a-hāra-yoktrair muṣitair iva stanaiḥ.”

‘Āvega’, born of calamity is beautifully illustrated in Bu. Ca. VIII. 20, read as below :

“ati-praharṣād atha śoka-mūrcchitāḥ  
kumāra-sandarśana-lola-locanāḥ,  
grhād viniścakramur āśrayā striyaḥ  
śarat-payodād iva vidyutaś calāḥ.”

(Bu. Ca. VIII. 20)



The sāttvika-bhāvas such as stambha, vaivarṇya etc. that go with the karuṇa rasa are to be seen in the following verse -

hatatviṣo'nyāḥ śithilāṃsa-bāhavaḥ  
striyo viṣādena vicetanā iva,  
na cakrasur nā'sru jahur na śaśvasur  
na celurāsuri likhitā iva sthitāḥ." (Bu. Ca. VIII. 25)

We are reminded of, "citrārpitā"rambha ivāvatasthau."

The anubhāva of karuṇarasa, such as daiva-nindā (i.e. censure of fate), bhūpāta (= falling on earth), krandita (= weeping), etc. are seen in yaśodharā-vilāpa in Bu. Ca. VIII. 31-42.

Bu. Ca. VIII. 31 reads as -

"tatas tu roṣa-pravirakta-locanā  
viṣāda-saṃbandhi-kaṣāya-gadgadam,  
uvāca niśvāsa-calat-payodharā,  
vighāḍha-śokāśrudharā yaśodharā."

Bu. Ca. VIII. 70 reads as -

"itīha devi pati-śoka-mūrcchitā  
rorodha dadhyau vilalāpa cā'sakṛt  
svabhāva-dhīrā'pi hi sātī śucā  
dhr̥tiṃ na sasmāra cakāra no hriyam."

Falling on the earth due to grief is described in the Bu. Ca. VIII. 73, and the wailing on the part of king Śuddhodana is described in Bu. Ca. VIII. 75-80. Jaḍatā (= stupour), the sāttvika-bhāva finds expression in Bu. Ca. VIII. 81, which reads as -

"iti tanaya-viyogajātaduḥkhaḥ  
kṣiti-sadr̥śaṃ sahaḥ sahaḥ viḥaya dhairyam,  
daśaratha iva rāma-śoka-vaśyo  
bahu vilalāpa nṛpo viśaṃjñā-kalpaḥ."

(Once again we feel that all this is modelled on Kālidāsa).

Krodha, the sthāyibhāva of raudra and the anubhāvas that go with that, are described in Bu. Ca. XIII. 28-30.

Bu. Ca. XIII. 30 reads as -

“mahībhr̥to dharma-parāśca nāgā  
mahāmuner vighnam a-mṛṣyamāṇāḥ,  
māraṃ prati krodha-vivṛtta-netrā  
niḥśaśvasuḥ caiva jajṛmbhire ca.”

The material for bībhatsa-rasa is supplied in the description of hell in Bu. Ca. XIV.

Bu. Ca. XIV. 14 reads as -

“kecit tikṣṇair ayo-damṣṭrair  
bhakṣyante dārūṇaiḥ svabhīḥ,  
kecid dhṛṣṭair ayas-tuṇḍair  
vāyasair āyasair iva.”

So also in canto V, wherein the charms of ladies are described as being ineffective, bībhatsa is suggested.

Bu. Ca. V. 61 -

“vivṛtā”syapuṭā vivṛddha-gātrī  
prapatad-vaktra-jalā, prakāśa guhyā,  
aparā mada-ghūrṇiteva śīśye  
na babhāse, vikṛtaṃ vapuḥ pupoṣa.”

Śṛṅgāra finds beautiful expression in Sau. (= Saundarananda, Edn. Haraprasad Shastri, Bibliotheca Indica, 1910) - IV. 36 -

“athā’pyanāśyāna-viśeṣakāyāṃ,  
mayy eṣyasi tvaṃ tvaritaṃ tatas tvām,  
nipīdayiṣyāmi bhuja-dvayena  
nirbhiṣaṇenā”rdra-vilepanena.”

The vyabhicārin called ‘vitarka’ finds beautiful expression in Sau. IV. 42 -

“taṃ gauravaṃ buddha-gataṃ cakarṣa  
bhāryā’nurāgaḥ punar ācakarṣa,  
sóniścayān nā’pi yayau na tasthau  
turaṃ staraṅgeṣviva rājahaṃsaḥ.”

(We are reminded of the famous expression from Kālidāsa - “śailādhirāja-tanayā, na yayau na tasthau.”)

The anubhāvas of Karuṇa are found in Sau. VI. 4 -

“sā kheda-saṃsvinna-lalāṭakena  
niḥśvāsa-niṣpīta-viśeṣakena,  
cintā-calākṣeṇa mukhena tasthau  
bhartāram anyatra viśaṅkamānā.”

And also Sau. VI. 5 reads as -

“tataś cirasthāna-pariśrameṇa  
sthitaiva paryaṅkatale papāta,  
-tiryak ca śīṣye pra-vihīṇahārā  
sapāḍukaikārdha-vilambha-pādā.”

Āvega, is seen in the verses that follow. Vilāpa or wailings are seen in verses 12-19 in Sau. VI. So also the anubhāvas such as kṣobha, krandaṇa, etc. are seen in Sau. VI. 24-25.

Sau. VI. 35 describes vividly all the anubhāvas that go with karuṇa-rasa, as below -

“rurōda mamlau virurāva jaglau  
babhrāma tasthau vilālāpa dadhyau  
cakāra roṣaṃ vicakāra māyāṃ  
cakarta vaktraṃ vicakarṣa vastram.”

Thus, in Aśvaghoṣa we come across the actual description of different vibhāvādis that give rise to different rasas, thus providing enough material for the theorists to draw their own conclusions.

Again ‘rasa’ in various forms is seen in Aśvaghoṣa, as at, Bu. Ca. II. 8; III. 51; V. 52 (sa-rasaḥ) Thus, we have rasa and sa-rasaḥ. V. 5 has ‘rasa’.

Sau. has ‘rasa’, at -

V. 24 - prajñārasaḥ.... rasebhyah,

IX. 48 - ‘rasa’; XI. 2 ‘rasa’, XI. 49 - rasan (= making sound); XVI. 93 ‘rasena’.

Now we will turn to the dramatic works of Bhāsa and Kālidāsa. Before examining the employment of different emotions, we will look into, the various forms in which the words ‘rasa’ occurs. Thus, the Trivendrum plays ascribed to Bhāsa (Edn. Prof. Deodhar, Poona) - have -

rasanā; pra-you, (pratijñā-yaugandharāyaṇa) bhaya-rasaṃ pp. 84; Avi (= Avimāraka), pp. 110; I. 2 adhika-rasaḥ - Avi.; pp. 168 (verse V. 4) guṇā rasajñasya; Cāru. (cārudatta-or daridra-cā. I. 2; pp. 197)

krīḍā-raseṣu-cā. III. 1; pp. 223; etc. In Bhāsa's Svapnavāsavadattam (= Svapna.), we have the vyabhicārin called smṛti illustrated in V. 5, 6; which read as -

"smarāmy avantyādhipateḥ surāyāḥ  
prasthānakāle svajanaṃ smarantyaḥ,  
bāṣpaṃ pravṛttaṃ nayanānta-lagnaṃ  
snehān mamaivórasī pātayantyaḥ."

and also,

"bahuśópy upadeśeṣu  
yayā mām īkṣamāṇayā,  
hastena srasta-koṇena  
kṛtam ākāśa-vāditam."

So also, read the following -

Rājā -

"śrutisukhaninade kathaṃ nu devyāḥ  
stana-yugale jaghana-sthale ca suptā,  
vihaga-gaṇa-rajo-vilagna-daṇḍā  
pratibhayam abhyuṣitā'sy aranya-vāsam."

api ca -, asnigdhā'si ghoṣavati, yā tapasvinyā na smarasi,

"śroṇisamudvahana-pārśva-nipīditāni kheda-stanāntara-sukhāny upagūhitāni  
uddiśya mām ca virahe paridevitāni vādyāntareṣu kathitāni ca sasmitāni." (Svapna.  
VI. 1 & 2)

Also read Avi. II. i, which runs as -

"adyā'pi hasti-kara-śīkara-śītalāṅgīm bālāṃ bhayā" kula-vilola-viśāda-netrām,  
svapneṣu nityam upalabhya, punar vibodhe, jātismaraḥ prathamajātīm iva smarāmi."

All these instances evoke vipralambha śṛṅgāra.

We may be able to read the material for karuṇa-rasa in the speech of Daśaratha (in Pratimānāṭaka, Act. II,) for whom Rāma is lost for ever.

Rājā : bhrātaḥ ! sumantra !

"kva me jyeṣṭho rāmaḥ,

na hi na hi yuktaṃ abhihitam mayā....

kva me jyeṣṭho rāmaḥ

priyasuta, sutaḥ sā kva duhitā

videhānām, bhartur niratiśaya-bhaktir guruḥjane,  
 kva vā saumitrir mām  
 hata-pitrkam āsanna-maraṇam,  
 kim apy āhuḥ kim te sakala-jana-  
 śokārṇava-karam."

The vibhāva, anubhāva etc. of hāsyā are seen in the speech of Vasantaka in Svapna. V, where he starts telling a story to Udayana.

Vidūśakaḥ - bhoḍu, aṇṇaṃ kahaissam atthi naaram bamhadattam nāma. tahiṃ kila rāā kāmṇillo nāma.

Rājā-kim iti, kim iti ?

Vidūśakaḥ - (punas tad eva paṭhati)

Rāja - mūrkhā, rājā brahmadattaḥ nagaram kāmṇilyam ity abhidhīyatām.  
 Vidūśakaḥ - kiṃ rāā bamhadatto naaram kāmṇillam ?

Rājā - evam etat.

vidūśakaḥ - tenna hi muhuttamam  
 padivelledu bhavam, jāva oṭṭhagaam

karissam. rāā bahamadatto naaram kāmṇillam (iti bahuśaḥ tad eva paṭhivā)  
 idāṇim suṇodu bhavam... etc.

Raudra, with krodha as its sthāyin and the enemy as its ālambana, the activity of the enemy as its uddīpana etc. is seen in the following passage of the Madhyama Vyāyoga (= Ma. Vyā.) -

Bhīmaḥ-atha kōyaṃ bhīmo nāma ?

"viśvakartā śivaḥ kṛṣṇaḥ  
 śakraḥ śaktidhara yamaḥ,  
 eteṣu kathyatām bhadra  
 kena te sadṛśaḥ pitā ?"

Ghaṭotkacaḥ - sarvaiḥ. Bhīmaḥ - dhig aṇṭam etat. Ghaṭotkacaḥ-katham katham aṇṭam ity āha ? kṣipasi me gurum ? bhavatv imaṃ sthūlaṃ vṛkṣam utpāṭya praharāmi (utpāṭya praharati) katham anenā'pi na śakyate hantum ? kim nu khalu kariṣye ? bhavatu, dṛṣṭam, etad girikūṭam utpāṭya praharāmi.... etc.

Or, as in Dūta-ghaṭotkaca, wherein we have -

Gaṭotakacaḥ - (sa-roṣam) kiṃ dūta iti mām pradharṣayasi ? mā tāvad bhoḥ, na

dūtóham -

“alam vo vyavasāyena, praharadhvam samāhatāḥ, jyāchedād durbalo nā’ham  
abhimanyur iha sthitāḥ. mahān eṣa kaiśorakóyaṃ me manorathaḥ, api ca,

“daṣṭṣto muṣṭim uddyamya  
tiṣṭhaty eṣa ghaṭotkalāḥ,  
uttiṣṭhatu pumān kaścid  
gantum icched yamā”layam.” etc. etc.

Vīra-rasa, with ‘garva’ as its vyabhicārin is beautifully illustrated in Dūta-vākya,  
I. 24, wherein Duryodhana says -

bho dūta, na jānāti bhavān rājya-vyavahāram.  
“rājyaṃ nāma nrpātmajaīḥ sahrdayair jītvā ripūn bhujiyate,  
tal loka na tu yācyate, na tu punar dīnāya vā dīyate,  
kāṅkṣā cen nrpatitvam āptum acirāt, kurvantu te sāhasam,  
svairam vā praviśantu śāntamatibhir juṣṭam, śamāyā”śramam.”

Or, in the following; read -

Duryodhanāḥ - āḥ kasya vijñāpyam ? mad vacanād eva sa vaktavyaḥ -

“kiṃ vyartham bahu bhāṣase  
na khalu te pāruṣya-sādhyā vayam,  
kopān nārhasi kiṃcid eva vacanam  
yuddham yadā dāsyati,  
niryāmy eṣa nirantaram nrpaśatacchatrāvalībhir vṛtas  
tiṣṭha tvam saha pāṇḍavaīḥ prativaco dāsyāmi te sāyakaiḥ.”

(Dūta-ghaṭotakala I. 15).

Dharma-vīra can be read in the following; Śalyaḥ - bho aṅgarāja, vañcitaḥ  
khalu bhavān. Karnaḥ - kena ?

śalyaḥ - śakreṇa,  
karnaḥ - na khalu; śakraḥ khalu vañcitaḥ mayā  
aneka-yajñā’huti-tarpito dvijaiḥ kirītimān dānava-saṃgha-mardanaḥ,  
sūra-dvipā”sphālana-karkaśāṅgulir  
mayā kṛtārthaḥ khalu pāka-śāsanāḥ. (Karna-bhāra, I. 23)

and also,

Śalyaḥ - aṅgarāja, na dātavyam.

**Karṇaḥ** - Śalyarāja, alaṃ alaṃ vārayitum. paśya -  
 “śikṣā kṣayam gacchati kāla-paryayāt  
 subaddha-mūlā nipatanti pādapāḥ,  
 jalam jalāsthāna-gataṃ ca śuśyati  
 hutam ca dattam ca tathaiva tiṣṭhati.”  
 tasmād grhyatām. (niṣkṛtya dadāti) (karṇabhāra I. 22)

Bhayānaka is illustrated in the following; Dāmódaraḥ -

“etā matta-cakora-śāva-nayanāḥ  
 prodbhinna-kamra-stanāḥ,  
 kāntāḥ prasphuritā-dharoṣṭa-rucayaḥ  
 visrasta-keśa-srajaḥ,  
 sambhrāntā galitottarīya-vasanās  
 trāsākula-vyāhṛtāḥ,  
 tuṣṭā mām anuyānti pannagapatiṃ dṛṣṭvaiva gopāṅganāḥ.”  
 (Bālacarita, IV. 1)

Bibhatsa is evoked in Ūrubhaṅga I. 11, as below :

“ghṛdhrā madhūka-mūkulónnata-piṅgalākṣā  
 daityendra-kuñjara-naṭāṅkuśa-tikṣṇa-tundāḥ  
 bhānty ambare vitata-lamba-vikīrṇa-pakṣā  
 māmsaiḥ pravāla-racitā iva tāla-vṛkṣāḥ.”

Thus, in the Trivendrum plays, we come across illustrations that might have been a source of inspiration to the theorists, of course, in case they are from Bhāsa's pen, a fact in which we have only that much faith as has my friend Dr. N. P. Unni.

In Kālidāsa also we have the same encouragement for the theorists to form their theory. Of course Kālidāsa himself seems to be in the know of the eight-fold rasas and their delineation through dramatic art as we will go to observe below. His reference to Bharata is whether to the present available N.S. of Bharata or some older work of an older Bharata; if kālidāsa is placed before christ, a theory we have greater faith in; is not very clear.

We come across the delineation of different bhāvas, anubhāvas, etc. that are associated in theory with particular rasas. We find them here also, in the same

context. Thus 'avahitthā', the vyabhicārin going with śṛṅgāra-rasa finds expression in Ku-Sam. (Kumāra-Saṃbhava) VI. 84 : (References to all the works of Kālidāsa are from the second critical Edn. of 'Kālidāsa-Granthāvalī, Dr. Rewaprasad Dwivedi, Varanasi)

"evamvādinī devarṣau  
pārśve pitur adhomukhī,  
līlā-kamala-patrāṇi  
gaṇayāmāsa pārvatī." (Ku. Sam. VI. 84)

'Matī' is a vyabhicārin read in Abhi. Śā. I. 21, as'-

"a-saṃśayaṃ kṣātra-parigraha-kṣamā  
yad āryaṃ asyām abhilāṣi me manah,  
satām hi sandeḥa-padeṣu vastuṣu  
pramāṇam autah-karaṇa-pravṛttayaḥ."

"Svapna" is a vyabhicārin that is associated with vipralambha-śṛṅgāra and is marked at Megha. (Uttara, 49) :

"mām ākāśa-praṇihitabhujam nirdayā"ślā-heroh,  
labdhāyās te katham api mayā svapna-sandarśaneṣu,  
paśyantīnām na khalu bahuśo na sthālī-devatānām  
muktā-sthūlās tarukisalayeṣv aśrulesāḥ paranti."

All the peraphernelia of vipralambha śṛṅgāra is supplied in the Megha. (Uttara, 47) :

"tvām ālikhya praṇaya-kupitām dhāturāgaiḥ ślāyām,  
ātmanam te carana-patitam yāvad icchāmi kartum,  
asrais tāvan muhur upacitair drṣṭir ālupyate me,  
krūras tasminn api na sahate saṅgamaṃ nau kṛtāntāḥ."

The heroine is the ālaṃbana-vibhāva here, 'tat-praṇaya-kopa' is the uddīpana-bhāva, the desire followed by activity in a dream to fall at her feet is the anubhāva, censure of destiny is the vyabhicārin, and rati is the sthāyin.

The uddīpana-vibhāva for śānta is met with in the Abhi. Śā. in I. 7 :

"nīvārā śuka-garbha-kotara-mukha-  
bhaṣṭās tarūṇām adhaḥ... etc."



Unmādā'tisaya, a vyabhicārin of vipralambha is seen in the Vikramórvaśīyam (= vikramo.) act IV as read in the famous verse, viz. "tiṣṭhet kopa-vaśāt prabhāva-pihitā." etc.

Instances can be multiplied as we find the vibhāvā'dis of karuṇa in ajavilāpa and rati-vilāpa etc. Vīra finds expression in Raghu. III. 51.

"tataḥ prahasyā'pabhayaḥ purandaram  
punar babhāse turagasya rakṣitā,  
grhāṇa śāstram yadi sarga eṣa te  
na khalv anirjitya raghum kṛtī bhavān."

Dharmavīra is seen in Raghu. II. 57 -

"kim apy ahiṃsyāḥ tava cen mato'ham,  
yaśaḥ-śarīre bhava me dayāluḥ,  
ekānta-vidhvamśīṣu madvidhānām  
piṇḍeṣv anāsthā khalu bhautikeṣu."

Thus, such clear practices in the works of the ancients could have inspired the theorists to build up a theory in the form we are familiar with. Actual practice of the great poets could have paved the way to formulation of literary principles, and these in turn could have influenced the posterior literary artists.

We will now look into the actual occurrences of the word 'rasa' in Aśvaghoṣa, Bhāsa and Kālidāsa and we will try to see if there is a clear reference to the aesthetic sense in any occurrence.

In the Bu. Ca. of Aśvaghoṣa we come across two occurrences of the word 'rasa' and one of rasā. Rasā at Bu. Ca. V. 5 means "the earth". However, Bu. Ca. V. 62 is noteworthy. It reads as -

"iti sattva-kulānurūpaṃ  
vividhaṃ sa pramadājanaḥ śayānaḥ,  
sarasaḥ sadṛśaṃ babhāra rūpaṃ  
pavanāvarjita-rugṇa-puṣkarasya."

'sarasaḥ' here is obviously in the sense of 'charged with śṛṅgāra-rasa'.

In the Sau. V. 24, we read 'rasebhyah'; and 'rasah' -

śraḍdhā-dhanam śreṣṭhatamam dhanebhayaḥ, prajñā-rasaḥ tṛptikaro rasebhyah."

‘Rasa’ in prajña-rasa does not carry the technical sense of aesthetic rapture, but ‘rasa’ in ‘rasebhyah’ i.e. ‘among all rasas’ - may refer to the eight or nine nāṭya/kāvya rasas, or tastes in general.

Sau. XI. 2 has, “aniṣṭanaīṣkarmya-rasaḥ”, i.e. “one who has no interest in ‘naiṣkarmya’ i.e. inaction. The same verse has ‘virasaḥ’ in the same sense of “having no interest”.

Sau. IX. 49 has ‘rasan’ in the sense of “making noise”. Sau. XVI. 93 has ‘rasān’ meaning tastes.

Thus in Aśvaghōṣa, we do not come across ‘rasa’ in the technical sense of kāvya/nāṭya-rasa, excepting perhaps at Bu. Ca. V. 62 as seen above.

In the Trivendrum plays that are associated with the name of Bhāsa we have rasanā - pra. yau. III. pp. 84; Edn. ibid  
bhayarasam-Avi. I. 2 (pp. 110); Edn. ibid  
adhika-rasaḥ - Avi. V. 4 (pp. 168); Edn. ibid  
and, krīḍā-raseṣu-Cā. III. i. (pp. 223).

None of these seems to carry the technical sense of kāvya/nāṭya-rasa.

In Kālidāsa we have several references of the word ‘rasa’ and some of them are definitely referring to the aesthetic context.

Thus, Kālidāsa has -  
rasam Raghu. I. 18;  
sama-rasā-Raghu. IV. 18;  
rasān - Raghu. IV. 66  
rasavat - Raghu. VIII. 68  
rasakhaṇḍana-varjitam - Raghu. IX. 36;  
abalaika-rasāḥ - Raghu. IX. 43  
rasāntarāṇi-eka-rasam - Raghu. X. 17  
krīḍārasam - Kum. Sam. I. 29  
rasāt - Kum. Sam. III. 37  
rasātmakasya - Kum. Sam. V. 22  
bhāvaika-rasam-manah - Kum. Sam. V. 82

rasāntareṣu - Kum. Sam. VII. 91,  
 jātarūpa-rasa - Kum. Sam. VIII. 36  
 mūla-seka-sarasaiḥ - Kum. Sam. VIII. 38  
 dhātu-rasa - Kum. Sam. VIII. 58  
 prabhā-rasam - Kum. Sam. VIII. 70;  
 anaṅga-rasa-prasaṅge Ku. Sam. IX. 1  
 rasena - Kum. Sam. IX. 41, X. 136  
 rasān, virasam - Kum. Sam. XVI. 12  
 sarasam - Ritu. SC. I. 2 (grīṣma-varṇana)

The Abhi. śā. has -

sadayam sundari gr̥hyate raso'sya - Act. III lāksārasaḥ - IV. 4;  
 (bhavaneṣu) rasādhikeṣu - VII. 20

The Vikramo. has -

śṛṅgāraika-rasaḥ - I. i

aṣṭa-rasāśrayaḥ - II. 18

rasād r̥te - II. 22

Mālavikā. has -

nānārasam - I. 4

raseṣu - II. 8

rasajñam - IV. 1

Megha. has

rasā"bhyantarāḥ - I. 28 (pūrva.)

sarasa-kadalī. - II. 36 (uttara)

The most striking occurrences are as below :

Ku. Sam. VII. 91 reads as -

"tau sandhiṣu vyañjita-vṛttibhedam

rasāntareṣu pratibaddha-rāgam,

apaśyatām asparasām muhūrtam

prayogam ādyam lalitāṅgahāram."

Here ‘sandhi’ refers to the five sandhis. ‘Vṛtti’ refers to kaiśikī and the rest. ‘rasāntareṣu’ has a clear reference to nāṭya-rasas. Actually a full-fledged theory of nāṭya-śāstra is referred to, as it were.

Ku. Sam. V. 82 is also especially noteworthy. It has “bhāvaika-rasaṃ manasā” obviously in the sense of śṛṅgāra-rasa.

The Mālavikā. has the following occurrence in a clear technical sense :

Mālavikā. I. 4, reads as -

“devānām idam āmananti munayaḥ  
krāntaṃ kratuṃ cākṣuṣaṃ,  
rudreṇedam umākṛta-vyatikare  
svāṅge vibhaktam dvidhā,  
traiguṇyódbhavam atra loka-caritaṃ  
nānārasaṃ drśyate,  
nāṭyaṃ bhinna-rucera janasya  
bahudhā’py ekam samārādhanaṃ.”

Mālavikā - II. 8 - is

“aṅgair antar-nihita-vacanaiḥ  
sūcitaḥ samyag arthaḥ,  
pāda-nyāso layam anugatas  
tanmayatvaṃ rasesu.  
śākhāyonir mṛdur abhinayas  
tadvikalpā’nu-vṛttau  
bhāvo bhāvaṃ nudati viśayād-  
rāga-bandhaḥ sa eva.”

Mālavikā. IV. is

“tām āśritya śrutipathagatām  
āśayād-baddha-mūlaḥ,  
hasta-sparśair anukulita iva  
vyaktra-romodgamatvāt  
kuryāt kāntaṃ manasija-tarur  
mām rasa-jñāṃ phalasya.”

In all these occurrences 'rasa' carries the technical sense of nāṭya-rasa.

In the Vikrama. We have 'rasa' in its technical sense. at I. 8. :

asyāḥ sargavidhau prajāpatir abhūt candro na kānti-pradaḥ,  
śṛṅgāraika-rasaḥ svayaṃ nu madanaḥ māso na puṣpākaraḥ,  
vedā'bhyāsa-jadaḥ kathaṃ nu viśaya-vyāvṛtta-kautūhalaḥ  
nirmātum prabhaven manoharam idaṃ rūpaṃ purāṇo munih."

at III. 118 -

"muninā bharatena yaḥ prayogaḥ  
bhavatiṣv asta-rasāśrayo niyuktaḥ.  
lalitābhinayaṃ tam adya bhartā  
marutāṃ draṣṭumanāḥ sa loka-pālaḥ."

and at act III -

dvitīyaḥ - "tasmin punaḥ sarasvatī-kṛtakābandhe lakṣmī-svayaṃvare, tesu tesu  
rasāntareṣu tanmayy āsīt."

Thus, in Kālidāsa we have very clear occurrences of the word 'rasa' in the technical aesthetic sense of kāvya/nāṭya-rasa.

**"Rasa" in Bharatamuni.**

The earliest discussion in the technical sense of aesthetic pleasure or art-experience of the term "rasa" is to be met with in the Nā. Śā. attributed to Bharata (Cir. 200 B.C. - 200 A.C.). In fact, the Nā. Śā. is also our earliest available written document that discusses such topics of Sanskrit alamkāra-śāstra as alamkāra, guṇa, doṣa, vṛtti, rīti, etc. It may be noted that the textual criticism of this monumental work is not yet fully carried out. This much however is clear that it contains several strata belonging probably to different ages and probably also to different schools of thought. The major part of this work is in verse. There are however, a few prose passages containing the famous rasa-sūtra which may be taken as an early discussion on the subject. However, whatever that may be, we are inclined to take the whole portion, i.e. both prose and verse, as one single harmonious unit, for our discussion here. The ānuvaṃśya āryās and ślokaḥ quoted in support of the main text in prose and verse, clarify what is said in the main body of the text.

Having described in the first five adhyāyas of the Nā. Śā., the mythical origin of the science of dramaturgy, its first production, the construction of the different types of theatre buildings, the ceremonial worship of the theatre, the different aspects of pūrva-raṅga, the difference between abhinaya, nṛtta and the different

varieties of nr̥tta etc., Bharata comes to some of the main themes relevant to the art of dramaturgy.

In the sixth adhyāya the sages ask Bharata five questions. Of these the first and the foremost are :

“ye rasā iti paṭhyante nāṭye nāṭya-vicakṣanaiḥ  
rasatvaṃ kena vai teṣāṃ etad ākhyātam arhasi.” (S.VI. 2, Nā. Śā.)

and, (VI. 3a) -

“bhāvāś caiva katham proktāḥ  
kiṃ vā te bhāvayanty api.”

Thus, the understanding of the rasas and the bhāvas occupy prominent place in the Nā. Śā. The eight rasas and the sthāyin, sañcārīn and sāttvikabhāvas are enumerated in NS. 16-23, of Ch. VI. Lateron, after having enumerated abhinayas, vṛttis, pravṛttis, siddhis, four types of musical tones, four types of musical instruments, five types of singing and three types of theatre building, the author proceeds to explain the subject of rasa in prose.

First, we will quote the full passage and its translation (by Dr. G. K. Bhat, Bharata-Nāṭya-Mañjarī, pub. B.O.R.I., Pune, 1975, pp. 82-93). Then we will try to understand it critically. The text reads as follows : (pp. 266 - etc. 4<sup>th</sup> Edn. G.O.S., - Vol. II; 1992) (Edn. K.Kris.)

(i) (rasa-vidhānam) - These sub-titles are cited from Bharata-Nāṭya-mañjarī, Edn. Dr. Bhat)

“tatra rasān eva tāvad ādāv abhivyākhyāsyāmaḥ. na hi rasād ṛte kaścid arthaḥ pravartate.

atrā”ha-rasa iti kaḥ padārthaḥ ? ucyate - āsvādyatvāt. katham āsvādyate rasāḥ. yathā hi nānā-vyañjana-saṃskṛtam annam bhuñjānā rasān āsvādayanti sumanasāḥ puruṣāḥ harsā”dīnścā’dhigacchanti tathā nānābhāvābhinayavyañjitān vāgaṅga-sattvōpetān sthāyibhāvān āsvādayanti sumanasāḥ prekṣakāḥ harsādīnścā’dhigacchanti tasmān nāṭya-rasā ity abhivyākhyātāḥ.

atrā’nuvaṃśyau ślokaḥ bhavataḥ.

(32) yathā bahu-dravya-yutair  
vyañjanair bahubhir yutam,  
āsvādayanti bhuñjānā  
bhaktaṃ bhakta-vido janāḥ.

- (33) bhāvāḥbhīnaya-sambaddhān  
sthāyibhāvāns tathā budhāḥ  
āsvādayanti manasā  
tasmān nāṭyarasāḥ smṛtāḥ."

(rasa-bhāvayoh anyonya-sambandhaḥ) - atrā"ha - kim rasebhyo bhāvānām abhinirvṛttir utā"ho bhāvebhyo rasānām iti. keṣāñcin matam paraspara-sambandhād eṣām abhinirvṛttir iti. tan na. kasmāt. dṛśyate hi bhāvebhyo rasānām abhinirvṛttir na tu rasebhyo bhāvānām-abhinirvṛttir iti.

bhavanti cā'tra ślokāḥ -

- (34) nānāḥbhīnaya-sambaddhān  
bhāvayanti rasān imān,  
yasmāt tasmād amī bhāvāḥ  
vijñeyā nāṭya-yokṛbhiḥ.
- (35) nānā-dravyair bahuvidhair  
vyañjanam bhāvyate yathā,  
evam bhāvā bhāvayanti  
rasān abhinayaīḥ saha.
- (36) na bhāvahīnōsti rasāḥ  
na bhāvo rasa-varjitaḥ,  
paraspara kṛtā siddhis  
taylor abhinaye bhavet.
- (37) vyañjanausadhi-samyogo  
yathā'nnam svādutām nayet,  
evam bhāvā rasās' caiva  
bhāvayanti parasparam.
- (38) yathā bījād bhaved vṛkṣaḥ  
vṛkṣāt puspam phalam tathā  
tathā mūlam rasāḥ sarve  
tebhyo bhāvā vyavasthitāḥ

tad eṣām rasānām utpattir-varṇa-daivata-nidarśanāny abhivyākhyāsyāmaḥ  
teṣām utpatti-hetavaś catvāro rasāḥ tad yathā sṛṅgāro raudro vīro bībhatsaḥ, iti.

- (39) śṛṅgārād hi bhaved hāsyo  
 raudrāc ca karuṇo rasah,  
 vīrāc caivā'dbhutōtpattir  
 bībhatsāc ca bhayānakah."
- (40) śṛṅgārā'nukṛtir yā tu  
 sa hāsyas tu prakīrtitaḥ  
 raudrasyaiva ca yat karma  
 sa jñeyah karuṇo rasah.
- (41) vīrasyā'pi ca yat karma  
 sōdbhutaḥ parikīrtitaḥ  
 bībhatsa-darśanam yac ca  
 jñeyah sa tu bhayānakah.

atha varṇāḥ -

- (42) śyāmo bhavati śṛṅgārāḥ  
 sito hāsyah prakīrtitaḥ,  
 kapotaḥ karuṇas caiva  
 rakto raudraḥ prakīrtitaḥ.
- (43) gauro vīras tu vijñeyah  
 kṛṣṇas caiva bhayānakah,  
 nīla-varṇas tu bībhatsah  
 pītas caivā'dbhutaḥ smṛtaḥ."

atha daivatāni -

- (44) śṛṅgāro viṣṇu-devatyō  
 hāsyah pramatha-daivataḥ,  
 raudro rudrā'dhi-daivaryah  
 karuṇo yama-daivataḥ
- (45) bībhatsasya mahākālāḥ  
 kāladevo bhayānakah,  
 vīro mahendra-devah syād  
 adbhuto brahma-daivataḥ."



(Trans. Dr. G. K. Bhat pp. 83).

“Now (in connection with the contents of the sūtra-work) we shall first of all explain the rhetorical sentiments. (Rasas)

No (literary) import can ever proceed without rhetorical sentiment and aesthetic relish.

Now, Rasa arises from a (proper) combination of the stimulants (vibhāva), the (physical) consequents (anubhāva) and the Transient Emotional states.

What is the illustrative case ? There we say; Just as by a proper combination of different spicy food-stuffs (vyañjana), leafy vegetables (auṣadhi), and other articles of food (dravya), there is a flavour and taste (rasa) produced, in the same way when different emotional states come together, aesthetic flavour and relish are produced. Just as again, on account of such articles of food as molasses and spicy and vegetable stuff, the six (food) flavours and tastes are produced, in the same way, when various emotional states reach the abiding mental conditions, the latter attain the quality of rhetorical sentiment (or become aesthetically relishable)

Now, one may ask, : what is this thing that you call ‘rasa’ ? We way : (it is so called) because it is capable of being tasted (or relished). How is rasa tasted ? Just as people in a contented state of mind (sumanasah), eating the food prepared well (saṃskṛta) with various spicy things taste the (various) flavours (enjoy the various tastes) and obtain delight and satisfaction (harṣādīn), in the same manner spectators, in the right [receptive] frame of mind (sumanasah), taste the permanent mental conditions, suggested (vyañjita) by the representation (abhinaya) of various emotional states, (the abhinaya) carried out by speech-delivery (vāc), physical gestures and movements (aṅga), and by the physical acting of psychical impacts (sattva), and they obtain pleasure and satisfaction. It is for this reason that they have been explained as “nāṭya-rasa” aesthetic contents and their relish arising from dramatic representation.

In the context there are two traditional couplets :

(32) Just as connoisseurs of cooked rice (or food, bhakta) when they eat it as prepared with many articles of food with many different spicy things enjoy the flavour and taste,

(33) in like manner, the wise (spectators) taste and enjoy in their mind the permanent mental conditions rendered through (lit. well-connected with) the acting of emotional states (bhāvābhinaya),

(Inter-relation as Bhāva and Rasa.)

One may ask : Are the emotional states turned out from the rhetorical sentiments, or is it that the sentiments are turned out of the emotional states ? Some opine that they arise from mutual contact. But this is not so. Why ? Because, it is a matter of actual perception that the rhetorical sentiments are turned out of the emotional states and not the emotional states are turned out of the sentiments.

There are traditional couplets about this.

(34) The emotional states are so known by the designers of dramatic art because they (the bhāvas) bring to the spectators (imān) an emotional awareness (bhāvayānti) of the sentiments as connected with various modes of acting or dramatic representation.

(35) Just as, by many articles of food (dravya) of various kinds, the spicy food-stuff (vyañjana : like vegetables, meat, fish) is brought to a (distinct) flavour (bhāvya), in the same way, the emotional states bring the sentiments to the level of (actual) experience when helped by different kinds of acting (or histrionic representation : abhinaya).

(36) There can hardly be (the experience of) sentiment without (the previous presentation of) an emotional state; nor can there be an emotional state which does not lead to (the experience of a sentiment). During the process of histrionic representation the two (bhāva and rasa) accomplish (their status and function) by (dual) interection.

(37) As the combination of spicy food-stuffs and vegetables leads the (main) cooked food to a (distinct) relishable taste (svādutā), in the same way, the emotional states and sentiments lead each other to the (distinct) level of an experience.

(38) As from a seed a tree grows, and from the tree flower and fruit, so all the sentiments stand as the root; the emotional states have their settled position for the sake of (tebhyaḥ : i.e. for the purpose of manifesting) the sentiments.

Now we will expound the origin, colours, (presiding) deities and illustrations of these Rhetorical Sentiments. The sources of origin of these (sentiments) are the four (basic) sentiments : these (are) as follows : the Erotic, the Furious, the Heroic and the Odious.

Here [the following verses occur] :

(39) The Comic Sentiment becomes possible from the Erotic, and the Pathetic from the Furious; the origin of the Marvellous (is) from the Heroic, and of the Terrible from the Odious.

(40) A mimicry (or imitation) of the Erotic is fittingly (tu) described as the (sentiment of) Laughter. And the consequence of the Furious should be known as the Pathetic Sentiment.

(41) In the same way the consequence of the Heroic is properly described as the Marvellous. And the presentation of the odious is to be known likewise as the Terrible.

Now the colours :

(42) The Erotic (sentiment) is light-green (śyāma), the comic is described as white (sita), Pathetic is grey (kapota) and the Fearful is described as (rakta).

(43) The Heroic is to be known as yellow red (gaura); the Terrible as black, the Odious on the contrary is blue (nīla) and the Marvellous (is) Yellow.

Now the Deities -

(44) The Erotic (Sentiment) has Viṣṇu as its presiding deity; the deity of the Comic is Pramatha; the deity of the Furious is Rudra; the Pathetic has Yama as its deity.

(45) The deity of the Odious is Mahākāla; the Terrible has Kāla as the God; the Heroic, the god Mahendra; the Marvellous has Brahmā as its deity."

The rest of the Chapter VI. N.S. gives detailed description of the eight Rhetorical sentiments, the emotions and consequents connected with them, their divisions, if any, their provenance and modes of acting them.

It may be noted that in the translation as attempted by Dr. G. K. Bhat, he has used the term "rhetorical sentiments" for sentiments in general. The latter in our opinion is quite proper and generally accepted. For the sake of a comparative view, we also quote the translation of the same passage by our friend Dr. N. P. Unni as is given below. The discerning reader will go for his own preference. We however choose to be closer to Gnoli in translating the technical terms. Dr. Unni has the following : (Trans. pp. 158 onwards, N.S. Edn. Nag Publishers, '98, Delhi) - (Tatra rasān eva. etc.)

"Among these I shall deal with the sentiments at the outset. There could be nothing without the relish of sentiments. The conjunction of Vibhāvas (Determinants), Anubhāvas (consequents) and Vyabhicāribhāvas (Transitory moods) causes the production of Rasas (Sentiments) (in dramatic works and poems).

Where is the instance in this connection ? One may ask. Here one may say, - "Just as a good taste is produced by the mixing together of different spices,

medicinal herbs and other articles; just as a confectionary taste (literally six kinds of tastes) is produced by the processing of molasses and other articles along with spices and herbs; the different sthāyibhāvas (the permanent moods) become rasas (sentiments) when they combine with the different Bhāvas (determinants, consequents and transitories).

Here is a question - "What is meant by the word Rasa ? The answer is (given as)" Because it can be relished", "How does one relish the sentiment ?" Just as the noble-minded people taste the Rasas when they eat the food prepared with different spices and become joyful, similarly the noble-minded spectators enjoy the sthāyibhāvas in combination with the representation of speech, limbs and internal faculty suggesting different emotional moods and find extreme happiness. Hence we call them as Nāṭyarasas - sentiments pertaining to dance and drama.

Here there are two conformable stanzas : Just as people who have a special liking for the food enjoy the meals prepared using different materials and spices, the scholars appreciate by their mind the sthāyibhāvas (permanent moods) combined with the gestural representation of the moods. Hence these are called sentiments relating to dramatic performance.

Here is a question - Do the sentiments give rise to the emotions or the emotions produce the sentiments ? The answer is - some hold that both are the cause and effect due to their close relations. But it is not so. Why ? We notice that the emotions culminate in the production of sentiments and not the other way, the sentiments generating the emotions.

Here are some stanzas in this regard. The authorities on Nāṭya call the emotional fervour as Bhāvas since they help to realise the Rasas connected with the various types of representation. As the spices in combination with the different articles help to produce the dish, the Bhāvas help the production of Rasa with proper gesticulations and representations. There is no Rasa without the accompaniment of Bhāva, nor there is any Bhāva devoid of Rasa. In the matter of representation both of them render mutual help to bring about the achievement. As the spices and herbs give rise to good taste for food, Bhāvas and Rasas contribute to their mutual development. As a tree grows out of the seed and as flower and fruits are produced by the tree, Rasas form the basis from which the Bhāvas are originated. Thus these sthāyibhāvas are known by the names of Rasas and they should be realised as such.

Hence we shall explain the origin, colour, deities, and examples of the various sentiments. There are four sentiments which are considered as basic. They are :

Śṛṅgāra (the Erotic), Raudra (the Furious), Vīra (the Heroic) and Bībhatsa (the Disgusting). From Śṛṅgāra the sentiment of Hāsyā (the comic) is generated and from Raudra is produced the sentiment of Karuṇa (the Pathetic), Vīra gives rise to Adbhuta (the Marvellous) and Bībhatsa generates the the sentiment of Bhayānaka (the terrible).

Hāsyā consists in the imitation or Śṛṅgāra and Karuṇa is the resultant of the sentiment of Raudra. Vīra results in the production of Adbhuta and the sight of Bībhatsa transforms into the sentiment of Bhayānaka.

The colours assigned to the sentiments are : Śṛṅgāra is green and Hāsyā is white. Karuṇa is dove-coloured while Raudra is red. Vīra is distinguished by the wheatish brown colour while Bhayānaka is black. The blue colour is assigned to Bībhatsa while Adbhuta is considered to be yellow in colour.

The presiding deities of the sentiments are : Śṛṅgāra has Viṣṇu as its deity and Hāsyā has the attendants of Śiva. The deities for the other sentiments are Rudra for Raudra, Yama for Karuṇa, Mahākāla for Bībhatsa and Kāladeva for Bhayānaka, Mahendra for Vīra and Brahmā for Adbhuta."

Both Dr. Bhat and Dr. Unni have done a nice job in translating the original passage, however, it is for the experts to choose. We will deal with the topic of Rasā-niṣpatti i.e. Rasa-realisation in a separate chapter as it also involves a critical study of the views of different interpreters of the famous sūtra. But for the present, we will pick up what Bharata has to say concerning the bhāvas in the Ch. VII. N.S. (G.O.S. Edn.). After that we will look into the approach of post-Bharata and pre-Ānandavardhana ācāryas i.e. Bhāmaha to Rudraṭa on the topic of Rasa and Bhāva. With this we will end this chapter, picking up the thread in the next chapter with the theory of rasa-realisation, beginning with Abhinavagupta and the ācāryas he quotes, down to Jagannātha, of course catching up with Kuntaka, Dhanañjaya/Dhanika, Mahimā, and Bhoja in the middle.

**The Ch. VII N.S. (G.O.S.) deals with the topic of Bhāvas.** But before we deal with the topic of Bhāvas, it should be noted that Bharata has mentioned eight rasas and as for the portion or readings concerning the ninth i.e. śānta rasa opinion among scholars is divided with reference to the authenticity of that portion. So, we will consider the topic of śānta-rasa separately at the end of this chapter while dealing with the number of rasas recognised by various authorities. As for rasā-niṣpatti also, beyond the rasa-sūtra Bharata does not elaborate over it and it is left to his commentators to deal with the topic of rasa-realisation and rasa-svabhāva in greater details later. We will deal with all this in due course.

Ch. VII (N.S.) has the following note concerning the *bāvas* which include eight *sthāyi-bhāvas*, eight *sāttvika-bhāvas* and thirty-three *vyabhicāribhāvas* making a total of 49. Here also later theorists add some more *bhāvas*. This will be discussed later. For the present let us see what Bharata has to say as read below :

“bhāvān idānīm vyākhyāsyāmaḥ. atra āha-bhāvā iti kasmāt ? kiṃ bhavanti iti bhāvāḥ ? kiṃ vā bhāvayanti iti bhāvāḥ ? Ucyate. vāg-aṅga-sattvopetān kāvyārthān bhāvayanti iti bhāvā iti. bhū karane dhātuḥ. tathā ca bhāvitam vāsitaṃ kṛtam ity anarthāntaram. loke'pi ca prasiddham-aho hy anena gandhena rasena vā sarvam eva bhāvitam iti. tac ca vyāptyartham.” (pp. 185, Edn. Unni., *ibid*)

“Now we shall explain the *bhāvas* (emotions). Here it is asked : why are they called *bhāvas* ? Are they called *bhāvas* since they “happen to exist ?” OR, they are called so since they “cause to exist ?” The answer is : They are *bhāvas* since they convey (to the audience) the theme of the poem by means of speech, physical action and mental feelings. The root ‘bhū’ means ‘to become’. Thus words like ‘manifested’ ‘pervaded’, ‘performed’ etc. are synonymous. It is well known in common parlance that “everything is pervaded by this particular ‘smell’ or ‘taste’”. Here the meaning is pervasion.” (Trans. Unni., pp. 185, *ibid*)

We prefer Dr. Unni's rendering to that by Dr. Bhat (Ref. 'Bharata-Nāṭya-Mañjarī'; B.O.R.I. pub., Poona, '75)

Bharata further has - “Ślokās'cā'tra -

“vibhāvair āhr̥to yo'rtho hy anubhāvais tu gamyate  
vāg-aṅga-sattvābhinayaīḥ sa bhāva iti saṃjñitaḥ.”

“vāg-aṅga-mukha-rāgeṇa sattvenā'bhinayena ca,  
kavē antargataṃ bhāvaṃ bhāvayan bhāva ucyate.”

“nānā'bhinaya-sambaddhān bhāvayanti rasān imān,  
yasmāt tasmād amī bhāvā vijñeyā nāṭya-yoktr̥bhiḥ.” (pp. 186, *ibid*).

(Trans. Unni., pp. 186, *ibid*) : There are some related stanzas : “The meaning brought about by the *Vibhāvas* (excitants) is suggested by *anubhāvas* (ensuants) by means of production of speech, bodily movements and mental feeling and hence it is termed as *bhāva* (emotion). It is termed as *bhāva* since the intention of the poet is conveyed through the representation of speech, facial expression and depiction of mental feelings. The various sentiments related to the vivid representation are conveyed and hence should be understood by dramatists that they deserve the name of *bhāvas*.”

[It may be noted that at times Dr. Bhat's English rendering seems to be richer but by and large we have a gut feeling that Bharata has found a natural abode in Unni's heart who has rendered the whole of N.S. in English along with some notes from A.bh. So we go with Unni. However, for vibhāva, anubhāva and vyabhiṇibhāva, we prefer Gnoli's rendering such as 'determinant', 'consequent' and 'ancillary feeling'.]

Bharata continues - (pp. 186, Unni, ibid) : "atha vibhāva iti kasmāt ? ucyate - vibhāvo nāma vijñānārthaḥ. vibhāvaḥ, kāraṇaṃ, nimittaṃ, hetur iti paryāyāḥ. vibhāvyaṭe anena vāg-aṅga-sattvābhinaya iti vibhāvaḥ yathā vibhāvitaṃ vijñātaṃ ity anarthā'ntaram.

(pp. 187) atra ślokaḥ -

"bahavo'rthā vibhāvyaṭe  
vāg-aṅgā'bhinayā"śrayāḥ,  
anena yasmāt tenā'yaṃ  
vibhāva iti samjñitaḥ."

(Trans. Unni.-ibid pp. 186, 7) : "Why is it called vibhāva (exitant) ? The answer is - Vibhāva (knowledge) Kāraṇa (reason), nimitta (instrumental or efficient cause) and hetu (logical reason) are synonyms. Vibhāva is called so since through it the representations of speech, bodily gestures and mental feelings are expatiated. (Dr. Bhat renders it as (pp. 97, ibid). Vibhāva, Kāraṇ (cause), nimitta (instrument), hetu (reason) are synonyms. As words, physical gestures and the psycho-physical acting [connected with the representation of stable and transitory mental states] are specifically determined by this (vibhāvyaṭe), it is therefore called vibhāva.) (Unni) - Vibhāvita (conceived) and vijñāta (comprehended) are of the same connotation.

Here is a stanza : This is called Vibhāva since many ideas are represented by the employment of speech and gesticulations of limbs through this.

"atha anubhāva iti kasmāt ? ucyate - anubhāvyaṭe anena vāg-aṅga-sattvākṛto'bhinaya iti. atra ślokaḥ -

"vāgaṅgā'bhinayenēha yatas tv artho'nubhāvyaṭe  
śākhāṅgopāṅga-saṃyuktas tv anubhāvas tataḥ smṛtaḥ."

(Trans. Unni.) : Why is this termed anubhāva (ensuant) ? The answer is - it helps the representation of speech, bodily gestures, and mental feelings (in performances). Here is a stanza - This is called 'anubhāva' since the ideas are

represented by speech, bodily gestures and other ancillaries (through these ensuants)."

Bharata further suggests that thus the bhāvas along with vibhāvas and anubhāvas have been expatiated. Thus their existence is established. He further discusses the characteristics of these bhāvas (= emotions) along with their vibhāvas and anubhāvas providing illustration where required.

Bharata observes that vibhāvas and anubhāvas are loka-prasiddha i.e. wellknown in the world. He does not define them to avoid prolixity as they follow the human nature : "loka-svabhāvā'nugatarvāc ca tayoṛ lakṣaṇaṃ nocyate'tiprasaṅga-nivṛttyartham."

Bharata now comes to discuss 49 bhāvas. Of them eight are basic emotions i.e. permanent moods, thirty three are transitory feelings and eight are internal feelings (or-psycho-physical emotions). Thus 49 feelings and emotions are to be understood as factors that help to suggest poetic sentiment. By these, through proper combination, rasas are caused.

There is a stanza -

"yo'rtho hṛdaya-saṃvādī  
tasya bhāvo rasódbhavaḥ,  
śarīraṃ vyāpyate tēna  
śuṣkaṃ kāṣṭhaṃ ivā'gninā."

That meaning which is endearing i.e. closer to heart gives rise to emotions that result in production of sentiment, which pervades the whole body as fire engulfs the dry wood.

Bharata explains that it is true that through the proper combination of vibhāvas, anubhāvas and vyabhicārins as presented through kāvyārtha i.e. poetic content, make for the production of sentiments, but it is generally stated that the sthāyins or basic emotions attain the status or rasa i.e. poetic relish. This is so, Bharata observes, because this is so observed in normal worldly context also. This is explained by an example. Just as, Bharata observes, among men having common characteristics such as having equal hands, feet, bellies and other limbs only some attain to royal position on account of noble birth, habit, education, cleverness in arts and crafts, while others are rendered to the position of their followers because of meagre intellect, in the same way, vibhāvas, anubhāvas and vyabhicārins become subservient to the sthayibhāvas. Sthāyins attain the status of masters as



others are dependent on them, and vyabhicārins are like subordinates. Thus other bhāvas becoming subordinate to respective sthāyins which are principal subserve the latter which attain to the status of rasa. If it is asked if there is any example here, it is stated that, a man having many followers and attendants attains the position and nomenclature of a king, but not others who also possess many servants, however great they may be. Similarly only the sthāyin coming in conjunction with vibhāvas, anubhāvas, and vyabhicārins, gets the name of rasa - "atrā"ha-ko dr̥ṣṭānta iti. yathā narendro bahujana-parivāro'pi san sa eva nāma labhate, nā'nyaḥ sumahān api puruṣas tathā vibhāvānubhāva-vyabhicāri-parivṛtaḥ sthāyī bhāvo rasa-nāma labhate." (pp. 189, ibid)

A śloka is quoted to the effect that like king among men, and teacher among pupils, the sthāyin is always superior among different bhāvas.

Bharata observes that the characteristics of the bhāvas that become rasas have been already stated with illustration. He will now enumerate the general features of the various bhāvas, beginning of course, with the sthāyibhāvas first.

Bharata then considers the eight sthāyibhāvas such as rati and the like, individually with reference to the factors that cause and express them. After this, Bharata takes up the vyabhicārins. He observes : (pp. 196, 197, Unni., ibid) :

"vyabhicāriṇaḥ idānīm vyākhyāsyāmaḥ atrā"ha - vyabhicāriṇa iti kasmāt ? ucyate - 'vi' 'abhi' ity etāv upasargau. cara iti gatyartho dhātuḥ. vividhaṁ ābhimukhyena raseṣu caranti iti vyabhicāriṇaḥ. vāg-aṅga-sattvōpetān prayoge rasān nayantī'ti vyabhicāriṇaḥ. atrā"ha-kathaṁ nayantī'ti. ucyate-loka-siddhānta eṣaḥ. yathā sūrya idaṁ diṇaṁ nakṣatraṁ vā nayatīti. na ca tena bāhubhyāṁ skandhena vā nīyate. kintu loka-prasiddham etat yathēdaṁ sūryo nakṣatraṁ diṇaṁ vā nayatī'ti. evaṁ ete. prayogaṁ nayantī'ti vyabhicāriṇa ity avagantavyā nāma. ta eva saṁgrahābhīhitās trayastriṁśad vyabhicārino bhāvāḥ. tān varṇayiṣyāmaḥ."

(Trans.) - "Now we shall deal with the transitory feelings. Here it may be asked why do we call it as "vyabhicārī" ? The answer is - 'vi' and 'abhi' are prefixes. Root 'car' means to 'move'. Hence those which lead different objects or ideas towards rasa or sentiment are called "vyabhicārins". Here it may be asked - How do they lead ? The answer is : It is well-known from the world that "the sun leads this 'day' or 'star'. He does not carry by his arms or by his shoulders. Still it is said in this world that the sun leads the star or the day. Thus these carry forward the performance and are to be designated as vyabhicārins. In the synoptic digest these are enumerated as thirty-three (in number). We will explain them in detail."

Bharata then deals individually with 33 vyabhicārins such as nirveda and the rest.

Bharata observes : "evam ete trayas triṃśad vyabhicāriṇo bhāvā deśa-kālā'-vasthā'nurūpyeṇa ātmagata-paragata-madhyasthā uttama-madhyamā'dhamaiḥ strī-puṃsaiḥ sva-prayogavaśād upapādyā iti." (Trans. Unni) "These thirty-three vyabhicārins (transitories) should be represented by people of three types such as superior, middle and lower, in accordance with the suitability of place, time and situation in their actions." (pp. 222, ibid)

With this remark Bharata ends his discussion on vyabhicārins and then takes up the consideration of sāttvika-bhāvas. It may be noted that our respected guru Dr. V. M. Kulkarni (Ref. "outline of Abhinavagupta's Aesthetics." Pub. '98, Ahmedabad) has considered the problem of the nature of Sāttvika-bhāvas in great detail.

Bharata observes (pp. 223, ibid, Unni) : atrā"ha - kim anye bhāvāḥ sattvena vinā'bhinīyanta yasmād ucyante ete sāttvikāḥ iti ?

atrócyate-evam etat. kasmāt ? iha hi sattvaṃ nāma manah-prabhavam. tac ca, samāhita-manastvād ucyate. manasaḥ samādhau sattva-nīspattir bhavati iti. tasya ca yo'sau svabhāvo romāñcā'sru-vaivarnyyā"di-lakṣaṇo yathābhāvópagataḥ, sa na śakyónyamanasā kartum iti. loka-svabhāvā'nukaraṇāc ca nātyasya sattvaṃ īpsitam. ko dr̥ṣṭāntaḥ ? iha hi nātya-dharma-pravṛttāḥ sukha-duḥkha-kṛtā bhāvās tathā sattva-vīśuddhāḥ kāryā yathā sarūpā bhavanti duḥkham nāma rodanā"tmakam. tat katham a-duḥkhitena, sukham ca praharṣā"tmakam a-sukhitena abhinayet ? etad eva asya sāttvikatvam. a-duḥkhitena a-prahr̥ṣtena vā'sru-romāñcau pradarsitavyāv iti kṛtvā sāttvikā bhāvā ity abhivyākhyātāḥ."

(Trans. Unni.) - "Here one may ask-Is it so that the other emotions are represented without the presence of mind, that these are called 'sāttvika-bhāvas' - the internal feelings that are self-manifested ?

The, answer is : yes; it is so. Why ? 'Sattva' means 'a state of mental disposition', or 'originating from the mind'. And that is evolved through the concentration of the mind. By the concentration of mind sattva is originated. Its natural characteristics are made evident by romāñca (horripilation), āsru (tears) and vaivarnya (change of colour) (following due emotion), - which could not be evidenced by absent-mindedness. Since the nature of the dramatic performance is an imitation of the worldly actions, mental presence is definitely sought for. What is the evidence for this ? Here the emotions like pleasure and pain are to be represented (in dramas) following certain theatrical conventions in such a mentally purified or affected manner so that they may become true to life. Pain or misery calls for crying and

how can it be represented by one who does not feel sorrow ? Pleasure is of the nature of excessive joy and how can it be represented by one who does not feel happiness ? So this is what is stated as its mental or internal status. These are called sāttvika-bhāvas-external manifestations of internal feelings and explained so since feelings like tears and horripilation can be represented (on the stage) by persons who are not at all happy or worried.

The eight sāttvikas are :

“stambhaḥ svedótha romāñcaḥ  
svaraḥ svedótha vepathuḥ  
vaivarnyam-aśru-pralaya  
ity aṣṭau sāttvikāḥ matāḥ.”

Bharata then individually takes up each sāttvika bhāva and explains how it can be performed.

Bharata also explains which vyabhicārins and sāttvika bhāvas would go with which rasa :

“ekóna-pañcāśad ime yathāvat  
bhāvās tryavasthā hy uditā mayéha,  
bhūyaś ca ye yatra rase niyojyās  
tāñśrotum arhanti tu vipra-mukhyāḥ.”

(pp. 226, ibid, Trans., Unni) -

“Thus I have shown here forty nine emotions divided into three divisions. Oh best of Brahmins, now it is upto you to listen to the explanation as to which of these pertain to the particular sentiments in its delineation.”

Bharata then explains and names the vyabhicārins and sāttvikas that go with this or that rasa.

Bharata ends the chapter with some special observations concerning bhāvas and rasas. He observes (pp. 228, 229, Unni. ibid; and also trans) -

na hyeka-rasajam kāvyam kiñcid asti prayogataḥ,  
“bhāvo vā'pi raso vā'pi pravṛttir vṛttir eva vā.,  
bahūnām samavetānām rūpam yasya bhaved bahu,  
sa mantavyo rasaḥ stāyī, seṣāḥ sañcāriṇo matāḥ,  
dīpayantaḥ pravartante ye punaḥ sthāyinaḥ rasam.  
vibhāvā'nubhāva-yukto hyaṅga-vastu-samāśrayaḥ

sañcāribhis tu saṃyuktaḥ sthāyyeva tu raso bhavet."  
 na hyeka-rasajam kāvyam naika-bhāvaika-vṛttikam,  
 vimarde raṅgam āyāti prayuktaḥ hi prayatnataḥ  
 "nānābhāvārtha-sampannāḥ sthāyisattva-vicāriṇaḥ  
 puṣpāvakīrṇā kartavyāḥ kāvyeṣu hi rasā budhaiḥ.  
 evaṃ rasānām bhāvānām vyavasthānam iha smṛtam,  
 ya evam etān jānāti sa gacchet siddhim uttamām."

(Trans. Unni. pp. 228, 229, ibid) :

"But then there is no such poem which depends on a single sentiment alone.

A bhāva (emotion) or a rasa (sentiment), a pravṛtti (dress) or vṛtti (style) join together to enhance a particular feeling which then attains the position of a sthāyin-permanent mood developing into the status of Rasa, while relegating others to the position of transitories. These enhance the permanent mood to make it a rasa. The permanent mood (sthāyī) alone can in conjunction with vibhāvas (determinants), anubhāvas (ensuants) and vyabhicārins (transitories) transform itself into the state of rasa (sentiment).

The actors should bestow particular case to stress the mental involvement in the delineation of the sthāyin - the permanent mood, whereas in representation of sañcārins-transitories, gestures and posture suffice. There is no poem dealing with a single sentiment, nor dealing a single bhāva (emotion) or a vṛtti (style); though all of them combine to produce the desired sentiment; permanent moods, internal feelings and transitories possessing different thematic qualities should be arranged in a poem in such a way that they appear as flowers strewn all over to raise them to the position of sentiments. Thus the relative positions of rasas (sentiments) and bhāvas (emotions) are explained here. He who understands this properly is sure to achieve supreme success (in performances)."

Here ends Bharata's discussion on bhāvas, i.e. vibhāvas, anubhāvas, 33 vyabhicārins and eight sāttvikabhāvas. In the earlier chapter he had dealt with eight rasas. As suggested by us, Abhinavagupta has gone into greater details concerning the problem of rasa-niṣpatti, a discussion sparked by different interpretations of Bharata's rasa-sūtra by different authorities, and also concerning the subtle nature of sāttvikabhāvas, as discussed ably by Dr. V. M. Kulkarni. We will pick up this thread in due course, but for the present we will try to examine what earlier ālaṃkārikas from Bhāmaha to Rudraṭa have to say on rasa, bhāva and such related topics.

It may be noted beforehand that the concepts of rasa and bhāva and the theories concerning their relish had a hoary past even prior to Bharata and Bharata talks of “kāvyā-rasa” at innumerable places suggesting that the theory of rasa, that originated perhaps as a theory of art in general was made applicable to dramatic as well as poetic art much earlier than Bharata. So far as his NS. is concerned we find some concepts of literary criticism such as guṇa, ālaṃkāra, lakṣaṇa and doṣa also being considered in a separate chapter to take care of literary value which any normally good written script of a play should possess. Thus, long before Bhāmaha, we find literary criticism seen flowered in circles of critics that cared for art in general and literary art in particular. We do not know whether Lollata and the rest who discussed the birth of rasa had which predecessors who shaped their thinking; but one thing is clear that all this had a telling effect on ālaṃkārikas such as Bhāmaha and other ancients whose works have come down to us. **The general theory of art was made applicable to various literary forms as well and no doubt Bhāmaha wanted kāvyā to be graced by rasa/bhāva etc.** The vibhāvādis for sure, as Abhinavagupta is to explain later, were presented in form of words (i.e. śabda-rūpa) in poetry and all ālaṃkārikas even prior to Ānandavardhana were aware of it. With this clear understanding we will move to Bhāmaha.

**Bhāmaha** - As observed earlier, the comparatively simple rasa theory or say art-theory in general presented by Bharata in the NS. becomes the subject matter, later, of fine-analysis and recondite discussion in the hands of writers adept in various darśanas and śāstras. Perhaps different dārśanika views entered into the discussion of art-theory also and rendered some colour of their own and made the matter quite complicated and subject of intellectual exercise. Abhinavagupta has recorded such views and later ālaṃkārikas and commentators on works on poetics and dramaturgy have added to this bulk with Jagannātha perhaps at the end presenting nearly eleven views on rasa-realisation. Abhinavagupta does it both in his A.bh. and also in his Locana on the Dhv. But before we come to study this treatment of rasa-theory given by later writers, we will first move to Bhāmaha and other known writers upto Rudrata, who were prior to Ānandavardhana and see what they have to say in this regard.

Bhāmaha of course had his predecessors, yes, many of them, and we hardly know anything about their works or views except some names such as ‘Medhāvin’ that he mentions. This perhaps may not be a proper noun. It may be just a reference to some “intelligent” authority. Whatever it may be, Bhāmaha, for sure looked into many works of his predecessors, now lost to us. He observes (Bhāmaha, V. 69) :

"iti nigaditās tās tā vācām alamkṛtayo mayā  
 bahuvidha-kṛtair dṛṣṭvā'nyeṣāṃ svayaṃ parikīrtya ca,  
 pariprathita-vacasāḥ santóbhijñāḥ pramāṇam ihā'pare  
 gurutaradhiyām asvārādhaṃ manókṛta-buddhibhiḥ."

He also observes at VI. 64 -

"vyalokya matāni satkavinām  
 avagamyā svadhiyā ca kāvya-lakṣma,  
 sujanāvagamāya bhāmahena  
 grathitaṃ rakrila-gomi-sūnunedam."

Thus it is clear that Bhāmaha inherited, admired, accepted and then presented in his own way the rich heritage of literary criticism from his predecessors and surely Bharata must have been one of those. He also mentions by name some 'Rājamitra' (Bhāmaha, II. 45) Kāvya, and also of "śākhāvardhana", and some 'Rāmaśarman' (Bhāmaha, II. 58). Medhāvī finds mention at "ityevam upamādoṣā sapta medhavinóditā", and at "saṅkhyānam iti medhāvī", etc.

Thus a rich heritage of literary criticism came down to Bhāmaha. Now we will try to investigate Bhāmaha's attitude towards rasa/bhāva etc. At the outset it may be noted that in the earlier ālaṃkārikas such as Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin etc. we do not come across any theoretical discussion on rasa-realisation. These earlier writers on poetics had their own concept of kāvya as word and sense taken together in general. All that rendered charm to poetry was termed "ālaṃkāra" in the wider sense of the term. Thus they thought of poetry first, and then 'beauty' in poetry, i.e. 'ālaṃkāra'. Bhāmaha names this as "vakrokti" in general, at II. 85 -

"saiṣā sarvaiva vakróktir  
 anayā'rtho vibhāvyate,  
 yatnósyaṃ kavinaḥ kāryaḥ  
 kōlaṃkāronayā vinā."

This is in tune with his expression viz. "vakrā'bhidheya-śabdoktir iṣṭā vācām alamkṛtiḥ." Thus expression of 'vakra' i.e. beautiful word and 'vakra' i.e. beautiful sense makes for poetry in Bhāmaha. This 'vakrokti' or expression of beauty is the same as 'atīśayókti' or expression of 'atīśaya' i.e. 'lokóttara' i.e. something special in poetry which distinguishes it from ordinary speech. This is a wider sense given to "ālaṃkāra". Later Abhinavagupta in Locana explains 'vibhāvyate' as 'that which is turned into a 'vibhāva' i.e. 'determinant', which causes 'rasa'. Daṇḍin also, we will

go to see, refers to this wider sense of the term 'alaṃkāra' when he says that all factors that make for poetic beauty are called alaṃkāras - "kāvyā-śobhākarān dharmān alaṃkāraṇ pracakṣate." (Kāvya-darśa, II. i.). Vāmana also takes the term 'alaṃkāra' in a wider sense when he observes that 'oetry is to be distinguished by alaṃkāra', and 'beauty is alaṃkāra' - (Kā. Sū. Vṛ. I. i. 1, 2) 'kāvyam grāhyam alaṃkārat' and 'saundaryam alaṃkārah.' Thus whatever is a source of charm in poetry is broadly termed 'alaṃkāra' by the ancients. These writers, as observed earlier, could not have been unaware of the concepts and theory of rasa/bhāva as propounded by Bharata and his predecessors, as can be ascertained by the definition of 'mahākāvya'. It seems they tried to approach this problem of rasa, and its position in poetry, by taking it as 'alaṃkāra' in the wider sense of the term, i.e. as a source of beauty in poetry. This explains the appearance of the whole group of what we may term - "emotion-based alaṃkāras", such as rasavat, preyas, ūrjasvi, samāhita etc. Thus it may prove interesting to study the treatment of these alaṃkāras by these earlier ālaṃkārikas in order to trace their attitude towards the concepts of rasa-bhāva etc. in poetry.

Bhāmaha (I. 21b) describes a mahākāvya to be gifted with various rasas : "yuktaṃ loka-svabhāvena, rasaiś ca sakalaiḥ prthak." Thus not only Bhāmaha knows of rasa, but he knows of many rasas - perhaps eight, nine or even more.

That kāvyā should inherently describe 'loka-svabhāva' also seems to take Bhāmaha closer to Bharata who wanted 'nāṭya' as one that concerned itself primarily with 'loka-svabhāva', i.e. 'worldly context.' in general. Bhāmaha treats the alaṃkāras such as preyas, rasavat, ūrjasvi and samāhita in the third pariccheda of his Kāvya-ālaṃkāra. His approach to 'rasa/bhāva'-concepts is clearly discernible in this treatment of emotion-based alaṃkāras.

Rasavat is defined by Bhāmaha at III. 6. In this chapter he treats 23 alaṃkāras. He mentions these alaṃkāras in III. 1-5 and begins with 'preyo rasavad ūrjasvi, paryāyoktaṃ samāhitam' (III. I. 9). Preyaḥ is taken up at III. 5 but no definition is attempted. Instead, only an illustration is given. Bhāmaha observes (III. 5 a, b, c) -

"preyo-grhā"gateṃ kṛṣṇam  
avādīd viduro yathā -  
adya yā mama govinda  
jātā tvayi grhā"gate,  
kālenaiśā bhavet prītis  
tavaiv āgamanāt punaḥ."

"Preyólaṃkāra (is seen as when) - Seeing Kṛṣṇa reaching his place, Vidura said, "O Govinda, the pleasure or joy that I experience to-day on your arrival (at my residence), will be experienced again at a time of your arrival (again at my place) - This clearly is an illustration of a 'bhāva', i.e. 'ratir devā"di-gatā' i.e. an expression of love towards a divinity or personal god.

Vidura's love for Kṛṣṇa is the object of description in this poetry. Kṛṣṇa is the ālaṃbana vibhāva, his arrival is the uddīpana vibhāva, the poetic expression is an anubhāva and all this is spurred by due vyabhicārins. Thus the whole complex of bhāva-dhvani is narrated in this illustration. Of course no theory is laid down by Bhāmaha, but he knows the technical difference between 'rasa' and 'bhāva' as explained clearly by later ālaṃkārikas and also by his predecessors such as Bharata and whoever else there might have been. But this 'bhāvokti' is termed to be 'preyólaṃkāra' - i.e. an 'alaṃkāra' i.e. a 'source of poetic beauty' by Bhāmaha. He may call it this or that, but the fact remains that he is aware of and also appreciative of the presence of what is termed 'bhāva' in literary criticism.

'Rasavat' follows similarly at III. 6. again only illustrated and not defined. If III. 5 took care of 'bhāva' or 'bhāvas' in poetry, III. 6. refers to the presence and due recognition of 'rasa' or 'rasas' in poetry III. 6, reads as -

"rasavad darśita-spaṣṭa-  
śṛṅgārā"di-rasaṃ, yathā  
devī samāgamad dharma - (or, cchadma)  
maskariṇy atirohitā (or - 'hite.')."

'Rasavat' is an ālaṃkāra, not defined by Bhāmaha but only explained by pointing out to a context or an incident. The clear reference is to the incident described in Kumāra-Sambhava of Kālidāsa when Pārvatī was taken over by love, shell-shocked at the revelation of the original form of Lord Śiva, whom she wanted to be her husband, who threw aside the artificial covering of a mendicant.

Bhāmaha's words are to be understood as below : "Rasavat occurs as when Devī i.e. Pārvatī came across (samāgamat) (an expression; āvirbhāvam), graced by clear suggestion of sentiment of love and the like. The 'ādi' in 'śṛṅgārā"di' should refer to the pleasant surprise - 'vismaya' leading to 'adbhuta-rasa' as an accompanying or 'gauna' rasa, with love i.e. śṛṅgāra for Lord Śiva as principal i.e. in centre. This happened when the artificial covering of an ascetic arguing against Lord Śiva was suddenly forsaken by the Lord and who appeared in His true form.



Again here Bhāmaha does not define the ālaṃkāra but merely presents the full context and its effect, thereby suggesting that 'rati' the basic emotion and 'śṛṅgāra' the resultant sentiment are but a matter of suggestion through the vibhāvā"dis. Here Lord Śiva is the ālaṃbana vibhāva for Pārvatī and throwing away of the covering is the uddīpaka. Lajjā, avahitthā etc. are the accessories and sudden dazed expression and tremour-vepathu are the anubhāvas. As truly explained by Tatacarya (Edn. Tiravadi, '34, pp. 64, ibid) there is a clear reference to the Kumārasambhava incident. Tātācārya reads :

“cchadma-maskariṇy atirohite'iti tv atra pāṭhena bhāvyam.

“svarūpam āsthāya  
ca tām kṛta-smitaḥ,  
samālalambe  
vṛṣarāja-ketanaḥ.”  
“tam vīkṣya vepathumatī  
sarasāṅga-yaṣṭir  
nikṣepaṇāya paḍam  
uddhṛtam āvahanī  
mārgā'cala-vyatikarā”  
kuliteva sindhuḥ  
śailādhirājatanayā  
na yayau, na tasthau.”

iti mahākave rasa-syandinī sūktir atra granthakārasya hṛdaye sthitā.

'Ūrjasvi' is again (Bhāmaha, III. 7) not defined, but as in case of the earlier appreciation of bhāva and rasa, here also a bhāva - “garva” suggesting a bhāva-dhvani or even vīra-rasa later, is only illustrated by citing an incident. The context is that Karna took an aim at Arjuna by placing 'sarpāstra' on his bow. The serpent left alive after khāṇḍava-vana-burning also seeking revenge took his position on this arrow without being noticed by Karna. Lord Kṛṣṇa saw all this and saved Arjuna and the aim with that special arrow failed. The serpent now appeared before Karna and requested him to take the aim with the same type of arrow i.e. 'sarpāstra' again. Śalya also advised Karna to repeat the adventure. But Karna dismisses the serpent and the proposal to take a similar aim with the words.” Does Karna take an aim, O Śalya, for a second time ?' (No; go away !)

Thus in this verse also Bhāmaha does not attempt any definition but describes the vibhāvā”di complex that suggests the feeling of self-respect or pride on the part of the hero. Emotion here is purely suggested. The speech of Karna displays a lofty emotion of valour or śaurya, perhaps not developed to the capacity of rasa. Thus ‘ūrjasvi’ like ‘preyas’ is a bhāva-based ālaṃkāra as against rasavat having a fuller expression concerning the suggestion of a sentiment.

‘Samāhita’ (Bhāmaha, III. 10) is explained as, “Samāhita is illustrated in Rājamitra (a poetic composition); - when kṣatriya ladies were going to appease Paraśurāma, Nārada appeared before them.” Here Bhāmaha refers to a situation wherein the kṣatriya ladies, being terrorised by the wrath of Paraśurāma, who was out to kill their husbands, were making an effort to appease him. Nārada arrives and helps them in their cause. Thus the whole incident has some reference to the quelling of the emotion of Paraśurāma’s anger and also to the quelling of the fear on part or the ladies. Thus it is “bhāva-śānti” or suggestion of the quelling of an emotion. In later ālaṃkārikas, the element of chance on the part of Nārada’s sudden accidental appearance is given greater importance and this makes for the later ālaṃkāra or figure of speech called ‘samādhī’. The elements of the quelling of emotion seems to have been ignored. But not so in Bhāmaha, who hereby suggests his acquaintance with what is termed as “bhāva-śānti” in Bharata, and also in later ālaṃkārikas. But this for Bhāmaha, is only an “ālaṃkāra”, a source of beauty in poetry.

This observation makes it clear that Bhāmaha is not unfamiliar with the idea of rasa/bhāva in general, though, he nowhere indulges in any theoretical treatment of the same. He thus subsumes the fact of rasa, under what may be termed as ‘emotion-based’ ālaṃkāras. But it may be noted that Bhāmaha’s use of the term ‘vibhāvate’ at II. 85, is explained later by Abhinavagupta in his ‘locana’ as “vibhāvana” i.e. ‘sādhāraṇīkaraṇa’ and ‘āsvāda-yogyī-karaṇa’ taken together. Thus we see that the fact of rasa is here treated under the general category of ālaṃkāra. We however find that Bhāmaha, while describing mahākāvya, as observed earlier, certainly draws upon the N.S., and refers to the five sandhis - “pañcabhis sandhibhir yuktam” and also to all rasas - “rasaiś ca sakalaiḥ prthak” (I. 20, 21), as characterising a mahākāvya. So, eventhough he has not incorporated or adopted discussions on rasa as read in the NS., he is definite in his view that as in the case of a nāṭaka, the body of a mahākāvya, a major composition in poetry, also consists of five sandhis and is pervaded by various rasas. As to nāṭaka (I. 24) he has referred to other works, obviously those on dramaturgy beginning with NS. and any other that may not have come down to us. He observes (I. 24)

“nātakam dvipadī-śamyā-  
rāsaka-skandhakā”di yat,  
uktaṃ, tad abhineyārtham  
uktōnyais tasya vistaraḥ.”

He has here taken note of not only nāṭaka but other minor art-forms also as discussed by us in an earlier chapter.

**Daṇḍin :** From the theoretical point of view, Daṇḍin's position seems to be identical with that of Bhāmaha, with reference to the topic of rasa and bhāva. He also incorporates rasa/bhāva etc., under such figures as rāsavat, preyas, etc. He speaks of rasa elsewhere also. At I. 51, Kāvyaḍarśa he defines 'mādhurya' guṇa as, “mādhuryam rasavat, vāci vastuny api, rasasthitiḥ.” i.e. - “that which is having rasa, is mādhurya. Rasa resides both in vāk i.e. word and sense and also; in 'vastu' i.e. 'content'. We do not go deeper in analysing his understanding of where 'rasa' stays, i.e. what exactly is the abode of rasa. But one point is clear that he seems to hold that in poetry both form and content contribute to rasa. 'Rasa in word and object' - should mean this. At - II. 292, again he explains 'mādhurya' as 'a-grāmyatā' i.e. 'lack of or absence of vulgarity'. Daṇḍin, II. 292 reads as :

“vākyasyā'grāmyatāyonir  
mādhuryam (VI. .ye) darśito rasaḥ,  
iha tv aṣṭarasā”yattā  
rasavattā smṛtā girām.”

Taruṇa-Vācaspati explains as : “evaṃ śṛṅgārā”dibhiḥ aṣṭabhiḥ, pūrva-darśitena ca a-grāmyatārūpeṇa rasena navadhā rasatvam iti rasavad alaṃkāraṃ upasaṃharati; vākyasyeti.” - This is not very clear. Or, perhaps Taruṇa Vācaspati does not know the secret of rasa. Hr̥dayaṃgamā is perhaps clearer when it observes - “mādhuryaguṇe pradarsitaḥ śabdārthayor agramyatayā jātaḥ rasaḥ vākyasya bhavati. alaṃkāratayā nirदिष्टam rasavatvam aṣṭarasā”yattam eva.” But even this does not ring sound. By 'agrāmyatā' of 'śabdārthau', perhaps grammatical correctness or 'sādhutva' of 'vāk' is implied. Bhāmaha had called it to be “supāṃ tiṇām ca vyutpattim” which was taken by some as 'alaṃkāṛti', but not so by Bhāmaha who called it only to be “sau-śabdyā”. At least a sort of grace descends on language which is grammatically chaste and this may be taken as having a sort of beauty-natural beauty - or 'rasa' - in a figurative way. Perhaps these commentators drive at this. Daṇḍin perhaps does not seem to take 'rasa' in its 'NS.-

sense' i.e. technical sense, but only in the general sense of say, 'kāvyā-rasa' or 'poetic beauty' in general; in all such occurrences. Hemacandra says the same when he observes : "śruti-varṇā'nuprāsābhyāṃ vāg-rasam, a-grāmyā'bhidheyatayā tu vastu-rasaḥ. Māṇikyacandra also agrees to this (pp. 180, K.P. ānandāśram edn.) when he observes : "śruti-varṇā'nuprāsābhyāṃ vāgrasaḥ, a-grāmyatayā tu vasturasaḥ. itthaṃ raso dvedhā. At III. 149, (Daṇḍin) again "girāṃ rasaḥ" is explained by Taruṇavācaspati as 'sādhutvam' only as explained by us above. At. I. 62, (Daṇḍin) which reads as :

"kāmaṃ sarvōpy alaṃkāraḥ  
rasam arthe niṣiñcati,  
tathā'py agrāmyataiv enaṃ  
bhāraṃ vahati bhūyasā."

'rasa' does not seem to carry any technical connotation, but that of 'beauty of content and expression'.

Daṇḍin like Bhāmaha, incorporates rasa-bhāvā"di under emotionbased alaṃkāras such as preyaṣ, rasavat, and ūrjasvi. II. 275 reads as :

"preyaḥ priyatarā"khyānaṃ  
rasavad rasa-peśalam,  
ūrjasvi rūdhā'haṃkāraṃ  
yuktótkarṣaṃ ca tat trayam."

Daṇḍin treats of these figures at II. 275, 294. It may be noted that the 'prabhā' commentary (Edn. Poona, B.O.R.I. '70) explains Daṇḍin with full knowledge and application of the rasa-theory in NS., as well as in the context of Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta's views on dhvani. Thus 'prabhā' (pp. 257, under II. 275 as quoted above) observes - "trayāṇāṃ asaṃlakṣyakramatva-rūpaika-dharmavāt ekatra nirdeśaḥ." Now whether Daṇḍin knew rasā"di-dhvani to be 'a-saṃlakṣyakrama' and vastu-alaṃkāra-dhvani as "saṃlakṣya-krama" or not, is a position not very clear to us. The fact that Daṇḍin was a predecessor of the Dhvanyāloka suggests that he could not have this technical terminology before him, but on the other hand we cannot even rule out this possibility because Ānandavardhana had suggested that 'dhvani' tradition was 'samāmnāta-pūrva' and Abhinavagupta had made it clear that this tradition was not caught in 'book-form, prior to the Dhvanyāloka' - 'vinā'pi viśiṣṭa-pustakesu viniveśanāt.' Thus an oral tradition cannot be ruled out. Perhaps Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin and other ancients knew it for sure but did not choose to elaborate 'dhvani' or 'vyañjanā' in their works.

In Kāvyaadarśa II. 275-292 at the end of which we find a note such as “iti rasavaccakram” in Prabhā-edn., we find the following observations on the part of Daṇḍin :

“By preyaḥ is meant a more beautiful or lovelier expression. [‘priyatarā’khyāna’ is explained by ‘prabhā’ (pp. 257, ibid) as - ‘priyataram bhāvā’bhivvyaktyā boddhavyasya prītyatiśayakaram, vaktur vā prītyā’dhikyā-sūcakam preyaḥ preyo nāmā’laṃkāraḥ] ‘rasavad’ is that which is delightful on account of rasa. (i.e. tender due to rasa). [‘prabhā’ observes : (pp. 257, ibid) : tathā ca rasa-peśalam rasena ratyā”di-sthāyibhāva-rūpeṇa peśalam, sahrdayā”nanda-janaṇam ākhyānam rasavad alaṃkāraḥ]. ‘Ūrjasvi’ is that where ‘garva’/pride or self-respect is conveyed, [prabhā, pp. 257, ibid observes : tathā rūḍhaḥ abhivvyaktaḥ ahaṃkāro garvaḥ yatra tādrśam ākhyānam, ūrjasvi.]. These three are having ‘utkarṣa’ or blossoming (of language) and hence deserve to be stamped as ‘alaṃkāras’. Prabhā (pp. 257, 258, ibid) observes - “yuktaḥ alaṃkāra-vyapadeśopayuktaḥ utkarṣaḥ vācyaśobhā yasmāt tat. tat trayam teṣaṃ preyaḥ-prabhṛtīnāṃ trayam alaṃkāra-vyapadeśārham bhavati ity arthaḥ. sādṛśyā”dayo vācyārtha-śobhā-janakatvād yathā upamālaṃ kārā”dayo bhavanti, tathā bhāvā”dayopī tenaiva kāraṇena alaṃkāra-vyavahāryā bhavitum yuktā ity arthaḥ.”

II. 276 cite the illustration viz. “adya yā mama govinda...” etc. This expression contains the ‘bhagavad-viśayaka-rati-bhāva’ i.e. ‘love for God’ on the part of Vidura. As it is conveyed through an artful sentence-structure, it strengthens the beauty of expression towards conveying love for God. II. 277 says that Hari was absolutely pleased - ‘su-prītaḥ’ - listening to Vidura’s apt expression. God is ‘bhakti-mātra-samārādhyā’ i.e. to be propitiated by devotion alone. II. 278, 279 also express love for God on the part of king Rātavarmā when Lord Śiva presented Himself before the king. This expression is also ‘prīti-prakāśanam’, an illustration of ‘bhāva-dhvanī’.

With II. 280, Daṇḍin turns to ‘rasavar’ and illustrates all the ‘rasas’ as ‘rasavad alaṃkāra’. II. 280 is an illustration of saṃbhoga-śṛṅgāra. This is supposed to be an expression of Udayana at the sight of Vāsavadattā whom he had taken as dead. Daṇḍin observes (II. 281) that the ‘prīti’ that was expressed in earlier illustrations has reached the status of ‘Śṛṅgāra’ -

“prāk prītir darśitā séyam  
ratiḥ śṛṅgārtām gatā.”

Thus Daṇḍin, following Bharata, knows the differences between 'bhāva' and 'rasa'. Rati with reference to 'deva' i.e. god and the like reaches to the level of bhāva (dhvani), but love for the beloved scales the heights of 'śṛṅgāra-rasa'. Daṇḍin calls it to be 'rasavad vacaḥ (= alaṃkāraḥ)' on account of 'rūpa-bāhulya-yoga' - "rūpa-bāhulya-yogena tad idaṃ rasavad vacaḥ" (II. 281 b). Prabhā (pp. 265, ibid) explains it as - "rūpa-bāhulya-yogena rūpasya svarūpasya bāhulyaṃ vibhāvā'nubhāva-vyabhicāri-bhāvā'dibhiḥ paripoṣas tasya yogena sambandhena śṛṅgāra-rasatvaṃ prāptā." - In VS. II. 282-291 Daṇḍin illustrates and explains raudra-rasa, and then vīra, karuṇa, bibhatsa, hāsyā, adbhuta and bhayānaka. With this he completes the discussion on eight rasas as acceptable to him. Perhaps he was not inclined to accept the śānta-rasa. He observes at the end of "rasavac cakram", VS. II. 292 :

"vākyasyā'grāmyatā-yonir  
mādhurye darśito rasaḥ  
iha tv aṣṭa-rasā'yattā  
rasavattā smṛtā girām."

'agrāmyatā' is explained at I. 62-67, 68. Perhaps obscenity concerning theme is not welcome to Daṇḍin. But even grammatical irregularities also should walk in as 'agrāmyatā', for faulty use of language never pleased Bhāmaha.

Ūrjasvi (VS II. 293-294) for Daṇḍin, is suggestion of a bhāva called 'pride' or 'garva.' Prabhā observes : (pp. 272) - "darpaśālinā ahaṃkāravatā kenā'pi puṃsā, vīreṇa, evaṃ uktvā yuddhe niruddhaḥ parājitaḥ paraḥ śatruḥ, muktaḥ, gantum anujñātaḥ. tat tasmād ayam ūrjasvy alaṃkāro jñeyāḥ. evaṃ ādikaṃ yathā atra vīra-rasā'vyabhicārī garva ūrjasvitvenóktas tathā anya-rasā'vyabhicārī ūrjasvī bhavati ity arthaḥ."

Thus for Daṇḍin preyaḥ, rasavat and ūrjasvī cover the emotion-based alaṃkāra as in case of Bhāmaha. For both Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin the instances of rasa and bhāva are 'alaṃkāra' of 'vāk' i.e. poetry, in the broader sense of the term.

It may be noted however, that Abhinavagupta, (pp. 272, A.bh., N.S. Vol. I. G.O.S. 2nd Edn.), while explaining Lollata's view on rasa being "caused" by the vibhāvā'di milieu, observes that earlier writers such as Daṇḍin also held a similar view. "cīrantanānāṃ ca ayam eva pakṣaḥ. tathā hi daṇḍinā svā'laṃkāra-lakṣaṇe abhyadhāyi-"ratiḥ śṛṅgāratāṃ gatā, rūpa-bāhulyoyogena" (iti kāvyādarśe ii. 281), "adhiruḥya parāṃ koṭīm kopo raudrā'tmatāṃ gataḥ", ityā'di ca.

'rūpabahulya-yogena' is explained by Taruṇa-vācaspati as 'by coming together of determinants, etc.' - "tad idaṃ rasavat. rūpa-bāhulya-yogena vibhāvā'nubhāva-vyabhicāriyogena ity arthaḥ."

The Hṛdayaṃgamā adds - "raty abhidhānaḥ eṣa sthāyī bhāvaḥ mṛtety ādinā vāg āraṃbhā'nubhāvena anumīyamānaiḥ harṣa-dhṛti-smṛti-vitarka-prabhṛtibhiḥ vyabhicāribhiḥ saṃsṛjyamānaḥ karuṇānantarāṃ śṛṅgārā"khyāṃ labhate. tena anvitam etat rasavat.

We have seen that for Daṇḍin 'preyas' is 'priyatarā"khyān.' i.e. felicitous expression (VS. II. 275) and 'rasavat' is where rasa abounds - 'rasapeśalam'. Ūrjasvi has pride or garva, a bhāva as dominant or that expression which has 'appropriate excellence - 'yuktótkarṣa'. We have seen from the illustrations cited by Daṇḍin that it becomes clear that for him, preyas occurs in case of the suggestion of some bhāvas. Taruṇa-vācaspati observes : "deva-guru-pitrā"di viṣayaḥ prīti-prakāśaḥ preyaḥ." In the same way, ūrjasvi exhibits a bhāva of 'garva' or 'pride'. Thus actually 'rasavat' is concerned with what is later termed as rasa-dhvani, while both preyas and ūrjasvi have a concern, with what is later termed as 'bhāva-dhvani', though we keep our fingers crossed and suggest that this later classification was perhaps not fully known to Daṇḍin. Of course Ānandavardhana holds that 'dhvani' was "samāmnāta-pūrva", but we may not fully endorse Raṅgacārya Reddī's views expressed in Prabhā that rasavat, preyas and ūrjasvi for Daṇḍin are grouped together because all of them form the varieties of what is called "a-saṃlakṣya-krama-dhvani" - i.e. dhvani with sequence not noticed in it. He observes : "trayāṇaṃ a-saṃlakṣya-kramarūpaika-dharmatvāt ekaṭra nirdeśaḥ." On the contrary we may take these early writers as those who had just, unknowingly, touched the fringes of dhvani - "dhvani dig unmīlitā api na lakṣitā." Prabhā does not identify 'saṃlakṣyakrama'dhvani' elsewhere.

But at the same time, we feel that Dr. S. K. De (pp. 212, SKT. Poetics) is surely off the mark when he observes : "But the Rasa in these figures is subordinate to the expressed figure itself which it serves as a means of embellishment, "alaṃkāratayā smṛtam"; in other words, the rasa is developed not for its own sake, but as increasing the beauty of expression." We fail to agree with this. Nowhere Daṇḍin suggests that 'rasā"di' make only for what is technically termed later as "guṇībhūtavyaṅgya." By "alaṃkāratayā smṛtam", what Daṇḍin actually means is that here (i.e. in this illustration) karuṇa rasa becomes the 'alaṃkāra' of kāvyā. Rasa-bhāvā"di are accepted - 'smṛta' - by Daṇḍin as only alaṃkāra of poetry. The term alaṃkāra is to be taken in the wider sense, as already

noted by us, as a "kāvyā-śobhākara dharma" i.e. that characteristic of poetry which makes for poetic beauty. For otherwise, if we follow Dr. De here, we fail to trace any other alaṃkāra either of sound or sense in these illustrations, to which a particular rasa or bhāva can be subordinated. Again, Daṇḍin calls 'rasavat' to be that which is "rasa-peśala" i.e. that which causes delight due to rasa" (II. 275).

It may also be understood that for both Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin 'preyas' and 'Ūrjasvi' are concerned with a bhāva (or, what may be termed 'bhāva-dhvani' in later context). In that case there is no point in counting two alaṃkāras one each going with 'bhāva' of rati with reference to deva, nṛpa, guru, or garva-ahamkāra-going with vīra-rasa. For us, there is no logic in naming one bhāvadhvani as 'preyas' and the other as 'Ūrjasvi'. Or, perhaps there can be traced some degree in ascendance, of these bhāvas. Perhaps ūrjasvi illustrates 'bhāvodaya', as termed in later parlance and preyas has 'bhāva-saṃdhi' as its goal, with bhāvas such as rati, and vyabhicārins as harṣa etc. join hands here. We are not very sure about this.

Daṇḍin also, like Bhāmaha, while describing the characteristics of a mahākāvya wants it to be (VS. I. 14-20) "rasa-bhāva-nirantaram" (I. 18). (i.e. rasaiś ca bhāvaiś ca nirantaram, paripūrṇam-Prabhā, pp. 21), and that it should also possess well-defined saṃdhis. He also, like Bhāmaha refers to other works for a discussion on the nature of drama - (miśrāṇi nāṭakā"dīni, teṣam anyatra vistaraḥ VS. I. 31 ab) -

Vāmana does not treat these alaṃkāras. He, however, has tried to incorporate rasa in his own way in the 'artha-guṇa' - i.e. excellence concerning sense, viz. 'kānti', which he defines at III. 2-15 as, "dīpta-rasatvaṃ kāntiḥ." Now, by 'dīpta-rasa' Vāmana does not refer only to vīra, or raudra rasa but any rasa which is "fully aroused". For, he observes :

"dīptāḥ rasāḥ śṛṅgārā"dayo yasya sa dīpta-rasāḥ. tasya bhāvo dīpta-rasatvaṃ kāntiḥ." - (vṛtti, on III. 2.15). Scholars observe that Vāmana seems to make an advance over his predecessors in subsuming rasa under guṇas, which for him, form the 'essential' characteristic of poetry. 'Guṇas' for Vāmana are 'nitya-dharmāḥ', as compared to alaṃkāras that are accidental or impermanent - 'anitya', a distinction, which does not seem to have been either even made or even acceptable to Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin alike. We have no great faith in the observation of these scholars, for the predecessors of Vāmana had a more catholic concept of alaṃkāra, which was the invariable characteristic of poetry. For them 'guṇas' were special alaṃkāras of this or that 'mārga' or style but upamā etc. were 'sādhāraṇaṃ alaṃkārajātam' i.e. beautifying agents common to both the mārgas or all the mārgas i.e. poetic styles.



**Udbhaṭa** : In the fourth varga of his Kāvyaśāṃkārā, he mentions emotion-based figures in the first kārīkā. He defines, what he calls 'preyasvat' in IV. ii as -

“ratyā”dikānām bhāvānām  
anubhāvā”di-sūcane  
yat kāvyam badhyate sadbhis  
tat preyasvad udāhṛtam.”

When great poets compose poem in which 'rati' and such other bhāvas are indicated (or suggested) by anubhāvas or consequents it is said to be having 'preyas' - i.e. it is 'preyasvat'. The Vivṛti (Edn. G.O.S., '31) suggests that here 'rati' is to be understood with reference to god, preceptor, king etc. “ratir iha deva-guru-nṛpā”di-viśayā grhyate.

Pratīhārendurāja also explains that this viz. preyasvat is a 'bhāvakāvya'. The N.S. Edn. Bombay, 1928, pp. 56 has -

“evam ete bhāvānām avagati-hetavaś carvārah yad uktaṃ bhaṭṭodbhaṭena - “catūrūpā bhāvā”.

tad eṣāṃ ratyā”dikānām bhāvānām pañcāśat-saṃkhyānām yāny anubhāvā”dibhiś catur saṃkhyaiḥ samastatvena vyastatvena ca yathāyogam sūcanāni sva-lakṣaṇa-svarūpāṇām sāmānyāvasthā”pāditānām pratipādanāni taiḥ kāvyam, upanibadhyamānam preyasvat. 'preyaḥ'-śabdavācyena priyatareṇa ratyā”lambanena vibhāvanena ratir upalakṣyate. tayā ca sāhacaryād ratyā”dayo bhāvāḥ pañcāśad avagamyante. evam ca bhāva-kāvyaṣya preyasvad itī lakṣaṇayā vyapadeśaḥ. atra ca bhāvānām alaṃkāratā, kāvyam alaṃkāryam.”

'Preyas' is alaṃkāra and 'preyas-vat' kāvyā is alaṃkārya for Udbhaṭa as explained by Pratīhārendurāja.

Vivṛtikāra (on IV. 2 pp. 32), is also clear that - “kāntā-viśayāyās tu rateḥ sūcane rasavad alaṃkāro vakṣyate.” When love is narrated with reference to the beloved it is the province of 'rasavat' alaṃkāra. Actually the more we read of Vivṛti and also of Laghu-vṛtti, we feel that both the Vivṛtikāra as well as Pratīhārendurāja are not great ālaṃkārikas and they do not have a very clear grasp of the basics of aesthetics as explained at the highest level by both Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta, who are a class by themselves.

'Rasavat' is the next alaṃkāra discussed by Udbhaṭa at IV. 3 (or 4) as -

“rasavad darśita-spaṣṭa-  
śṛṅgārā”di rasād ayam,

sva-śabda-sthāyi-sañcāri-  
vibhāvābhīnayā"spadam."

"that in which the development of sentiments such as śṛṅgāra and the like is clearly shown, and in which are included (the indicators such as) a verbal statement of the sentiments, the stāyin, the sañcārins, vibhāvas and abhinaya."

Now 'rasavat' is that 'having rasa'. This is different from the earlier ālaṃkāra which centres round 'bhāva' and not 'rasa'. But Udbhaṭa seems to believe that 'rasa' can be 'sva-śabda-vācya' and this is absolutely against the dictum of Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta and their followers. Jagannātha gives a number of views on rasa, where even sthāyin, sañcārin, vibhāva, abhinaya (i.e. anubhāva) etc. are also individually taken as rasa or indicators, or suggestors of rasa. So, this theory also is ancient, though immature. Udbhaṭa also mentions nine rasas, with 'śānta' clearly mentioned as a separate rasa. Poetry as substratum of rasa is said to be 'rasavat' as explained by Vivṛtikāra (pp. 34) : "teṣāṃ āspadam yat kāvyam badhyate tat kāvya-bandhanam rasavat." Pratīhārendurāja also observes (pp. 58, ibid) : "eteṣāṃ ca sva-śabdā'dīnāṃ pañcānāṃ samasta-rūpatayā śṛṅgārā'di-rasā"virbhāvo darśyate tat kāvyam rasavat, rasāḥ khalu tasya ālaṃkārah."

Dr. De, as we had quoted earlier seems to be under the influence of these commentators.

Pratīhārendurāja is himself perplexed as he knows both Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta. He can not explain the ancient ālaṃkārikas in their proper context. So, he observes : (pp. 58, ibid) - "rasānāṃ bhāvānāṃ ca kāvya-śobhā'tisaya-hetutvāt kim kāvyā'laṃkāratvam uta kāvya-jīvitatvam iti na tāvad vicāryate grantha-gaurava-bhayāt. rasa-bhāva-svarūpam cā'tra na vivecitam a-prakṛtatvād bahuvaktavyatvāc ca."

'Ūrjasvi' is explained by Udbhaṭa in a way which has nothing to do with what Bhāmaha or Daṇḍin had to say. For Udbhaṭa, what is later termed rasā"bhāsa or bhāvā"bhāsa is said to be 'Ūrjasvi'. He observes : (IV. 9. pp. 59)

"anaucitya-pravṛttānāṃ  
kāma-krodhā'di-kāraṇāt,  
bhāvānāṃ ca rasānāṃ ca  
bandha ūrjasvi kathyate." i.e.,

Ūrjasvi is "the delineation of sentiments (= rasas), and feeling (= bhāvas) which hurt the sense of propriety in their depiction, or which are expressed in

passion, anger, etc.” This is an entirely novel explanation of Ūrjasvi. It may also be noted that the use of such terms as, “kāma-krodhā”di-kāraṇāt” perhaps suggests that ‘rasa’ according to Udbhaṭa as in case of Daṇḍin, is ‘caused’ by factors such as vibhāvā”dis. Abhinavagupta had tried to read Lollaṭa’s view in Daṇḍin. This can be extended to Udbhaṭa also.

‘Samāhita’ (IV. 7 or 14 ?) is defined as :

“rasa-bhāva-tad ābhāsa-vṛtteḥ  
praśama-bandhanam  
anyā’nubhāva-niḥśūnya-rūpam  
yat tat samāhitam.”

i.e. Samāhita is, “the description of the quelling of sentiments (rasa), feelings (bhāva) or their semblances (ābhāsa), quite unmixed with other accessories (such as anubhāvas).

Vivṛti (pp. 36, ibid) explains this as - “anaucitya-pravṛttā rasa-bhāvā rasā”bhāsa-bhāvā”bhāsa-śabda-vācyāḥ. tena śāstra-viruddhānām a-śāstra-viruddhānām vā rasa-bhāvānām yā praśāntir nibadhyate tat parihārarūpatvāt samāhitam. na ca rasāntara-prādurbhāvo’treṭy uktam anyasya rasasya anubhāvair niḥśeṣeṇa śūnyam.”

The last remark is interesting. The commentator explains that not only there is quelling of emotion or sentiment both authorised and unauthorised makes for samāhita, but there should not be the possibility of enhancement of any other rasa also and to guarantee this it is stated that “no other anubhāva (or anubhāva of no other rasa) should be present here.”

It may be stated that Udbhaṭa has fully grasped the NS. of Bharata and he knows what Bharata has to say about rasā”bhāsa and bhāvā”bhāsa. He also knows about bhāva-praśama i.e. quelling of emotion.

Pratīharendurāja (pp. 60, ibid) also observes : “iha rasa-bhāvānām śāstra-samaya a-viruddhena tad-viruddhena ca rūpeṇa dvaividhyam uktam. tatra ye śāstra-samayā’-viruddhā rasabhāvā te rasa-bhāva-śabdenā’ta vivakṣitāḥ. tad-viruddhās tu tadābhāsāḥ. teṣāṃ rasa-bhāvānām ca yā vṛttiḥ svāśraya-sambandhātmikā, tasyāḥ praśame nibadhyamāne samāhitālaṅkāro bhavati. tatra hi, teṣāṃ rasa-bhāvānām samādhānam samādhīḥ pariharo bhavati. Samāhitam iti bhāve ktaḥ.”

Thus it appears that Udbhata treats of rasa as a part of alaṃkāra. But he has made a sort of an advance in discussing rasa, eventhough as an alaṃkāra, as can be seen in the definitions of preyasvat and the like. He mentions terms such as 'anubhāva' and refers to the 'sva-śabda-vācya' of rasa. Thus he seems to have more closely applied Bharata's theory to poetry though even the earlier masters were throughly conversant with Bharata when they described the 'sarga-bandha' as graced by "su-sandhis" and "vividha-rasas". But for Udbhata rasa can be sva-śabda-vācya, which is not acceptable to Ānandavardhana and his followers though a stray mention of a vyabhicārin or sāttvika, or even a sthāyin is tolerated as such instances are met with in creations of such greats as even Kālidāsa, Bhāravi and the rest. Udbhata also mentions 'śānta-rasa' which is advocated very passionately by Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta.

**Rudraṭa :** Coming to Rudraṭa, we find a still greater advance in the incorporation of ideas pertaining to rasa. The first point to be noted is that he does not include rasavat, preyas, ūrjasvi etc. in his treatment of alaṃkāras. At I. 4, in his kāvyālaṃkāra, he characterises 'kāvyā' as 'sa-rasa' i.e. blessed with aesthetic relish or rasa. He observes (I. 4, pp. 4, Edn. Chowkhamba Vidyabhavan, Varanasi, '66 - Sri. Ramdev Shukla) -

“jvalad-ujjvala-vāk-prasaraḥ  
sarasam kurvan mahākaviḥ kāvyam,  
sphuṭam ākalpam analpam  
pratanoti yaśaḥ parasyā'pi.”

Surely, this applies not only to a mahā-kāvya but any good composition by a great poet, or a first-rate poet, a mahākavi. It can begin with a muktaka and end with an epic in metrical compositions and anything drafted in prose that bears the charm of poetry, i.e. literature, belles - letters, in general.

In the later adhyāyas, i.e. Chs. XII-XVI, we find the topic of rasa discussed along with the discussions on the nāyakas, nāyikās i.e. heroes and heroines etc. Actually Rudraṭa seems to be the first known ālaṃkārika who seems to include topics treated in greater details in the NS. Of Bharata, in his work on literary aesthetics. This trend flowers in Hemacandra and later in Viśvanātha. His justification for bringing in this topic of rasa is as follows : He observes that poetry should incorporate rasas because those who have an aesthetic bent of mind are frightened by the dry teachings of the śāstras. They can learn wisdom about the four ideals or ends of life i.e. 'puruṣārthas' from poetry which is full of rasas.

Rudraṭa, XII. 1.2, read as -

“nanu kāvyena kriyate  
sarasānām avagamaś caturvarge,  
laghu mṛdu ca nīrasébhyaste  
hi trasanti śāstrebyaḥ.”  
tasmāt tat kartavyam  
yatnena mahīyasā rasair yuktam,  
udvejanam eteṣām śāstravad  
eva anyathā hi syāt.” (XII. 1, 2)

Namisādhū observes (on Rudraṭa, XII. 2) (pp. 373, ibid) that rasas are not considered while dealing with the figures of sense, because poetry has word and sense for its body and vakrokti, vāstava, etc. as literary embellishments, while rasas are like beauty, the natural quality (sahajāḥ guṇāḥ), and therefore are excluded :

“atha alaṃkāra-mādhyā eva rasāḥ api kiṃ nōktāḥ. ucyate-kāvyasya hi śabdārthau śarīram. tasya ca vakrokti-vāstavā”dayaḥ kṛtaka-kuṇḍalā”daya iva kṛtrimā alaṃkārah. rasās tu saundaryā”daya iva sahajā guṇāḥ iti bhinnas tat prakaraṇā”rambhāḥ.

Thus, as noted earlier, rasas are treated by Rudraṭa with reference to (kāvyaphala) (i.e.) the object of poetry, as derived by connoisseurs. He then directly proceeds with the enumeration of rasas such as - śṛṅgāra, vīra, karuṇa, bībhatsa, bhayānaka, adbhuta, hāsyā, raudra, śānta, and preyaḥ i.e. ten in all.’ (XII. 3) He reads as -

“śṛṅgāra-vīra-karuṇā  
bībhatsa bhayānakādbhutā hāsyāḥ,  
raudraḥ śāntaḥ preyaḥ iti  
mantavyā rasāḥ sarve.”

The order of rasas has hardly any rhyme or rhythm. We know that Bharata has given a particular order which is logically explained by Abhinavagupta. At XII. 4, Rudraṭa suggests that rasas are so termed because they are relished as such - “rasanād rasatvam eteṣām” :

“rasanād rasatvam eteṣām  
madhurā”dinām ivōktam ācāryaiḥ,

nirvedā"diṣv api tan nikāmam asti iti  
te'pi rasāḥ."

This means that Rudraṭa accepts a position that even, the 33 vyabhicārins such as 'nirveda' and the like, are also capable of being relished in the same fashion as are the sthāyins and therefore the number of rasas may not be limited to just eight, or nine or ten etc.

Namisādhu on Rudraṭa XII. 4, quotes from Bharata and explains Rudraṭa's stand : "sthāyi-bhāvānām eva rasanam bhaviṣyati ity āha - nirvedā"diṣv api tad rasanam nikāmam asti'ti hetos tēpi rasā jñeyāḥ. yasya tu paripoṣam na gatās tasya bhāvā eva te, ayam āśayo granthakārasya - yad uta nā'sti sā kā'pi cittavrttir yā paripoṣam gatā na rasī-bhavati. bharatena sahrdayā"varjakatva-prācuryāt samjñām cā"śrityāstau nava vā rasā uktā iti."

Namisādhu explains that on account of greater number of sahrdayas enjoying eight or nine rasas, and by resorting to the samjñā i.e. specific term given to it, Bharata has counted eight or nine rasas. But in fact even Bharata accepts as many rasas as are bhāvas that are capable of being fully relished.

Thus, this discussion again suggests that Rudraṭa here treats of rasa-nispatti as seen in Bharata and correlates it with the sahrdaya who relishes rasa as a kāvya-phala. Perhaps this prepares the background for Ānandavardhana and then Abhinavagupta who connect rasa-enjoyment with the connoisseur and that too as a kāvya-phala, 'phala' for Rudraṭa being equated with 'prayojana' in the A.bh. - which explains the famous-expression, "kāvyārtho rasah" as "kāvyasya prayojanam rasah", wherein the, term 'artha' is not 'abhidheyavācī' but 'prayojanavācī'.

Rudraṭa then proceeds to give two varieties of śṛṅgāra viz. 'saṁbhoga' and 'vipralambha' and then proceeds with different types of nāyakas i.e. heroes and his companions. XII. 6 onwards, Rudraṭa describes the different types of nāyikās. The XIIIth chapter is devoted to saṁbhoga-śṛṅgāra and the XIVth chapter treats of the other variety viz. the vipralambha śṛṅgāra. In the XVth chapter Rudraṭa describes the other rasas viz. vīra, bībhatsa, bhayānaka, adbhuta, hāsyā, raudra, śānta and prayān. After Udbhata, Rudraṭa is the next known ālamkārika who openly accepts the Śānta, and is even more generous when he talks of prevān and then the basic possibility of each bhāva, sthāyin or otherwise flowering into the position of full-fledged rasa.

At the end of Ch. XIV he also suggests (XIV. 36) that when either of the two lovers is not interested in the other, it becomes the case of śṛṅgārā"bhāsa.

Namisādhū introduces XIV. 36 with the remark viz. : anyonyā'nurakta-puṁ-nāryoḥ śṛṅgāro'nyathātve tu śṛṅgārā"bhāsa ity āha -

“śṛṅgārā"bhāsaḥ sa tu yatra  
virakte'pi jāyate raktaḥ,  
ekasminn aparo'sau  
nā'bhāsyēṣu prayoktavyaḥ.” (XIV. 36)

i.e. śṛṅgāra takes place when both a man and woman are involved in love. Otherwise it is 'śṛṅgārā"bhāsa' or only false imitation of love. Says he (i.e. Rudraṭa) - “When the other one is in love eventhough the first one is not in love, it is the case of false appearance of love (i.e., śṛṅgārā"bhāsa). This (i.e. śṛṅgārā"bhāsa) is not to be practised in case of noble characters (such as king etc.).” Rudraṭa taking hints from Bharata, then describes rītiḥ and vṛttiḥ appropriate to different rasas - (XIV. 37)-

“iha vaidarbhī rītiḥ  
pāñcālī vā vicārya racanīyā,  
madhurā-lalite kavīnā  
kāvyē vṛtti tu śṛṅgāre.”

Namisādhū observes : athā'tra rītinām anuprāsa-vṛttinām cā'vasare viṣayā-viṣaya-vibhāgam āha-(this is followed by the verse quoted as above). This shows that all other thought-currents such as rīti, vṛtti etc. where supposed to be correlated with rasa in the centre even by Bharata and the early tradition he inherited and also by Rudraṭa and other ancients who followed Bharata. So, when Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta in the Dhv. and Locana follow this scheme, it is only a clearer application of Bharata's theory as followed even by the ancients. Rudraṭa (XIV. 38) also observes :

“anuserati rasānām rasyatām asya nānyaḥ  
sakalam idam anena vyāptam ābāla-vṛddham,  
tad iti viracanīyaḥ samyag eṣa prayatnād  
bhavati vīrasam evā'nena hīnam hi kāvyam.”

The central position of śṛṅgāra-rasa is neatly brought out by Rudraṭa, and Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta also prescribe this. It is also suggested by all these authorities that delineation of Śṛṅgāra requires great care as it is very delicate in nature. The last adhyāya is devoted by Rudraṭa to different types of prabandhas.

It should be noted as already seen by us above, that in the light of the remarks of Namisādhū, Rudraṭa is inclined to take rasa as "sahaja guṇa" i.e. 'natural quality' of kāvyā i.e. poetry, as against alaṃkāra which is an artificial (kr̥trima) device and therefore an external ornament. Vāmana was the first to say that guṇas are "nitya dharma" i.e. 'permanent quality' of kāvyā, as against 'alaṃkāra' or ornaments i.e. figures of speech that are 'anitya-dharma' or 'impermanent characteristic' of kāvyā. Vāmana incorporated rasa in what he termed "kānti guṇa" which formed one of the essentials of poetry, as compared to alaṃkāra, which is for him, 'external' to poetry. Thus we see that the tendency to make rasa as something essential to poetry rather than an alaṃkāra which is 'external', first originated in Vāmana and seems to have been carried on in Rudraṭa. Of course, we may say in favour of Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin that, in their own way they never took 'alaṃkāra' i.e. 'atīśaya', i.e. 'vakratā' as external to poetry. The individual forms or shapes this 'vakratā' takes can be different. What Vāmana and later ālaṃkārikas including the dhvanivādins did was that they mistook the variety for the substance; and therefore the impermanency of a particular expression of vakratā as 'alaṃkāra' and therefore, taking it in a limited sense of the form it takes, took it to be 'a-nitya'. In fact as re-insisted by Kuntaka, it is the 'vakratā', or 'atīśaya' or 'alaṃkāratva' of an alaṃkāra which was favoured by Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin. But then Vāmana, Rudraṭa and the Dhvanivādins later had their own way of presentation of poetic beauty and virtually there was nothing different in their views.

Rudraṭa, as noted above, in the last chapter of his work treats of the various types of prabandhas or literary compositions. He observes that the four aims of life (= puruṣārthas) should be treated in prabandhas with rasas intermixed in them :

Rudraṭa XVI. i. observes :

"jagati caturvarga iti khyātir  
dharmā'rtha-kāma-mokṣānām,  
samyak tām abhidadhāt  
rasa-sammiśrān prabandhesu."

"In the world, the four viz. dharma, artha, kāma and mokṣa are said to be the ends of life. They should be narrated carefully in literary compositions in a way intermixed with rasas."

Thus, for Rudraṭa 'rasa' is the central characteristic of poetry in general which serves the purpose of attainment of the four aims of life. With this, he further notices the varieties of prabandhas in poetry viz. (mahā) kāvyā, and kathā, ākhyāyikā etc. Thus major compositions accordings to Rudraṭa are either in verse



or in prose. These two basic types are again subdivided into works having plots imagined by the poets or based on tradition. These again could be mahat i.e. long or laghu i.e. short. Thus by laghu-prabandha he seems to cover any form that can go under 'minor' composition.

Rudraṭa (XVI. 5) observes that the major compositions are such that treat of all the four ends of life in a wider scale, wherein also all the rasas find place with varieties of descriptions (kāvyasthānāni) in-built in them.” :

“tatra mahānto yeṣu ca  
vitateṣv abhidhīyate caturvargāḥ,  
sarve rasāḥ kriyante  
kāvyasthānāni sarvāṇi.”

by 'kāvyasthānāni', according to Namisādhū is meant the stuff described such as “puṣpocchaya-jalakrīḍā”dīni.” But we can take Rudraṭa's expression to mean, “sarve rasāḥ kāvyasthānāni kriyate”, i.e. “all rasas are made to be the base of poetry.”

The minor compositions deal with any one out of the four ends of life, and not all rasas are delineated in it but just one rasa, or failing if many rasas are delineated they do not individually dominate the whole composition, i.e. they occupy portions of the poetic composition or are not fully delineated. Rudraṭa observes (XVI. 6) :

“te laghavo vijñeyāḥ  
yeṣv anyatamo bhavet caturvargāt,  
a-samagrā'nekarasā ye ca  
samagraikarasa-yuktāḥ.”

It may noted that Rudraṭa perhaps does not insist on the size, bigger or smaller of the composition but on the fact that such laghu-prabandhas are laghu because they pursue only one end of life. May be large or small size is taken as inherent in these, or perhaps only smaller compositions are intended. Again delineation of all rasas not to their fullest possibility or a single rasa to its fullest possibility are the options. But 'a-samagra' and 'samagra' may have reference not to the complete or incomplete delineation of rasa but to the part of the composition. Thus a prabandha is laghu if it delineates many rasas of equal prominence in various portions of its theme, or is one in which a single rasa emerges as a total effect. These are options which can be thought over while interpreting Rudraṭa's words.

But one thing that emerges as supreme is that for him, no poetry of whatever form is welcome without ‘rasa’.

While dealing with smaller or minor compositions Rudraṭa suggests (XVI. 33.34) that in such compositions in prose (or even in verse), the ‘karuṇa rasa’ or ‘pravāsa-śṛṅgāra’ i.e. vipralambha should be delineated :

“atra rasam karuṇam vā  
kuryād athavā pravāsa-śṛṅgāram,  
prathamānūrāgam athavā  
punar ante nāyakābhyudayam.”

(XVI. 34, Rudraṭa).

With this ends our investigation in the concept of rasa as seen in sources beginning with the Vedas and Vedic literature, down to earlier ālaṃkārikas ending with Rudraṭa. In the next chapter we will take care of the attitude of the ālaṃkārikas of the Kashmir School of thought, beginning with Ānandavardhana and ending with Jagannātha.



## Chapter XV

# “Concept of Rasa” as seen in Ānandavardhana and others posterior to him.”

Two points have to be borne in mind that, in this chapter, we will not discuss the theory of rasa-ralisation as read in different works such as those of Abhinavagupta, Mammaṭa and the rest, and that we will cover up writers on dramaturgy beginning with Dhanañjaya/Dhanika and the rest. For the theory of rasa-realisation and the nature of rasa, number of rasas and śānta-rasa we will devote the next two chapters. With Ch. XVIII - ‘nāṭakanirṇaya’ will end the part I of this huge project.

As noted earlier, with Ānandavardhana, we enter, as it were, into a new era of sanskrit literary criticism.

He seems to have fully realised the importance of rasa both in poetry and drama, and tries to give rasa a prominent place while incorporating it in his general scheme of “vyañjanā-dhvani-rasa” as applied to poetry in particular. Before we start with any further discussion we have to bear a major point in mind very clearly that, ‘rasa’ is not equivalent only to presentation of emotive stuff only, but it involves the total personality of the aesthete, including his intellectual and volitional aspect translated in worldly activity also. Rasa is both ‘sui-generis’ and ‘pari-passu’ with any art in general including poetry and drama and the chief distinguishing characteristic of rasa-experience is ‘vigalita-vedyāntaratva-anubhūti’, i.e. an experience where anything else than the art presented falls out of the scope of the enjoyer’s consciousness for that moment. This was known to Bharata and his predecessors and successors and is very much known to Ānandavardhana, Abhinavagupta and a host of other writers in India, who have written with authority on any art-form. With this remark, which we will discuss further in Ch. XVII, we continue our investigation with Ānandavardhana.

For Ānandavardhana then, the soul of poetry is ‘dhvani’ ‘i.e. principal suggested sense’, arrived at through the verbal function of vyañjanā. This ‘dhvani’ or the

principally suggested sense is for him three-fold viz. vastu-dhvani or suggestion of an idea or matter of fact, alaṃkāradhvani or suggestion of a poetic figure or a descriptive device, and rasa-dhvani or suggestion of sentiment or emotive stuff in general. It may be borne in mind that suggestion of emotive stuff is not congruent to ‘rasa’, but is one of the aspects of rasa. This rasa-dhvani-both in its emotive context and in its wider context - is regarded as the highest type of dhvani by Ānandavardhana (= Ā.). For him, this ‘rasa’ as seen by us under his treatment of Dhvani (Ref. Ch. XI) is never the object of direct statement i.e. it is never ‘sva-śabda-vācya’, meaning it is never realised just by naming it or using its proper name. Rasa is always realised indirectly, i.e. it is suggested through the delineation of proper vibhāva, anubhāva and vyabhicāribhāva i.e. determinants, consequents and ancillaries, of course described through words, as Abhinavagupta explains in Locana - i.e. śabda-samarpyamāna-in poetic art. These vibhāvā”dis are visually presented in dramatic art. They take different forms through different media in various different arts as dance, music, painting, sculpture and the rest. Thus Ā. seems to have achieved a great point while harmonising the concepts of rasa as seen in the dramatic art or art in general and that of the verbal power, the vyañjanā function in poetry.

We have underlined two streams of thought viz. the one pertaining to śabda-vṛttis, with particular reference to vyañjanā and dhvani in literature, and the other pertaining to the origin and development of the concepts of rasa and cognate ideas. In the Dhvanyāloka, we find these two currents meeting and merging with each other in a clear scheme not read as such in the ancient ālaṃkārikas from Bhāmaha to Rudraṭa or others not known to us. Ā. seems to bring forth, to the best of our knowledge and also to the knowledge of Abhinavagupta, for the first time, a harmonious and integrated theory or vyañjanā-dhvani-rasa.

We will try to analyse Ā.’s integrated theory in greater detail. In earlier chapters on vyañjanā and dhvani (i.e. Chs. VIII & XI) we have outlined Ā.’s theory. Ā. himself states that he had to lay down clearly the theory of dhvani as its form was negated by some of his antecursors. But, it may be noted that, as we have not been able to find the earlier theorists who propagated dhvani (as stated by Ā. in his remark - “samāmnāta-pūrvah”), in the same way, we do not know exactly who opposed dhvani prior to him, which prompted him to write his monumental work. We have however, found theories about the two functions of the word viz. primary and secondary i.e. bhākta, without of course putting it systematically, and we have found the seeds of vyañjanā in these. We also looked into the various darśanas for

different theories of word and meaning that served as a rich heritage and inspiration for Ā. and his followers.

Considering however, Ā.'s arguments and illustrations to prove the independent verbal function of vyañjanā, we cannot deny the possibility that there might have been a tradition among the teachers of poetics or literary critics, which embodies affirmation and denial of vyañjanā. These teachers might have been (as seen in the Ch. on vyañjanā-virodha, i.e. Ch. IX) his contemporaries or near or earlier predecessors. Ā. quotes, without naming a verse, with a remark - "rathā ca anyena kṛta evātra ślokaḥ." This verse ridiculed the fact of dhvani. The Locanakāra identifies the author of this verse as some 'Manoratha kavi' who was Ā.'s contemporary, i.e. 'samāna-kāla-bhāvin'. If Abhinavagupta is right in this identification, and we have no reason to denounce it, we may conclude that amongst the contemporaries of Ā., the theory of 'vyañjanā-dhvani-rasa' must have been propounded, denounced and also stoutly defended. But as to teachers earlier than this, of dhvani, we have no independent corroborative evidence.

With this general resume we will consider Ā.'s views. We find that Ā., by three progressive stages comes to regard rasa as the ātman or soul of poetry. The first stage is found in the second kārīkā of the first udyota of the Dhvanyāloka, wherein Ā. asserts that -

“arthah sa-hṛdaya-ślāghyaḥ  
kāvyā”tmā yo vyavasthitaḥ,  
vācya-pratīyamānā”khyau  
tasya bhedaḥ ubhau smṛtau.”

“That meaning which wins the admiration of refined critics is decided to be the soul of poetry. The ‘explicit’ and the ‘implicit’ are regarded as its two aspects.” (Trans. K. Kris. pp. 7, ibid) -

So, to begin with, for Ā., the meaning that is commended by the cultured critics is the ‘soul of poetry’ in the first stage. Thus poetry has to have beautiful meaning. But the ‘vācya’ or expressed aspect of the poetic meaning is not investigated by Ā. saying that it has been explained, i.e. taken care of by many ālaṃkārikas in the form of various figures of speech like simile and others (kārīkā I. 3) (“bahudhā vyākṛtaḥ sōnyaiḥ). But the other aspect of beautiful poetic meaning is explained to be ‘implicit’ or pratīyamāna and this is explained on the analogy of ‘beauty in fair-sex’ - “lāvaṇyam iva aṅganāsu” (Dhv. I. 4). This implicit sense, like lāvaṇya, is over and above the several parts of the body. He seems to suggest that beauty is

something which emerges as is were, as totality of effect, as abstraction coming out of the whole and not individual parts. The ‘pratiyamāna’ or implicit sense also emerges as such an effect. This is the second stage in which the importance of the pratiyamāna is established.

This is followed by a discussion in the gloss i.e. vṛtti on Dhv. I. 4, establishing the difference between ‘vācya’ and ‘pratiyamāna’. This discussion, as we note from the vṛtti, pertains to, of course, with what is technically known as vastu-vyaṅgya, or suggestion of an idea. The second variety of vyaṅgya that he refers to is alaṃkāra-dhvani. It may be noted that this covers not only the field of figures of speech not directly conveyed, but we may say that this can cover all possible newly invented ‘vyañjakas’ i.e. turns of expression as practiced by modern writers as say, images and symbols and all devices that are practiced in absurd poetry or absurd theatre to-day by most modern writers in various languages including English, French, German and what not.

The third variety of ‘pratiyamāna’ is what he labels as “rasā”di-lakṣaṇaḥ” i.e. rasa, bhāva, etc.

About this variety it is said that it is absolutely different from the ‘vācya’ i.e. expressed. This third variety of ‘pratiyamāna’ viz. rasā”di-dhvani is presented as the soul of poetry in Dhv. I. 5, which reads as -

“kāvyasyā”tmā sa evārthas  
rathā cā”dikaveḥ purā,  
krauñca-dvandva-viyogótthaḥ  
śokaḥ ślokatvam āgataḥ.”

We have noted what Abhinavagupta had stated in his Locana on this. For him it is not Vālmīki’s individual sense of sorrow, that is referred to here, but generalised sorrow that becomes the object of Vālmīki’s poetry.

This is the third stage. Thus in the kārikās (Dhv. I) 2-4, and the vṛtti thereon, we find the philosophy of Ā., regarding the soul of poetry, in a nut-shell. Charming meaning, appreciated by cultured critics is the soul of poetry, but there too the ‘pratiyamāna’ i.e. implicit sense is more important. This is, we may note, Ā.’s personal bias. In the three varieties of this ‘pratiyamāna’ i.e. implicit sense, the ‘pratiyamāna rasa’ is the soul of poetry, or better say it is the ‘soul of soul’ dhvaneḥ ātmā.” This ‘rasa’ is explained in the vṛtti thereon as “kāvyasya sa eva arthaḥ sārābhūtaḥ.”, thus carrying forward the traditional meaning of rasa as the essence in poetry. The implicit sense in general, i.e. the three-fold implicit sense is something

quite different from the direct meaning of words. This point he proves by giving illustrations and explains that the expressed and the implicit are different from each other both in nature and scope. We have seen this in greater details earlier in our chapter on dhvani (i.e. Ch. XI). He has illustrated and explained vastu-dhvani in verses such as “bhama dhammia.” etc. It may be noted here, that Ā. clarifies the point that vastu and alamkāra dhvanis can be presented by vyañjanā as well as direct statement, i.e. abhidhā. Thus they can be both, direct meaning i.e. vācyārtha as well as indirect i.e. suggested meaning i.e. vyañgyārtha. But in case of rasa-dhvani, however, there is a complete break with abhidhā.

We have suggested that the field of alamkāra-dhvani is capable of covering up certain modern devices used in poetic language such as poetic images and symbols, as well as absurd use of language as seen in absurd poetry or theatre. We have dealt with the illustrations of this variety earlier (Ch. XI). We will also repeat that Abhinavagupta has stated that ‘alamkāradhvanī’ is so termed on the analogy of ‘brāhmaṇa-śramaṇa’. We will now proceed to Ā.’s discussion on rasa-dhvani and the general position of rasa in poetry.

Coming to the principal variety of vyañjanā i.e. rasa-vyañjanā, we have first to note that in the implication of rasa, there is no room for the direct use of terms such as śṛṅgāra, karuṇa, etc. - i.e. directly naming any rasa, or of terms such as rati, hāsa, śoka, etc., i.e., naming directly any sthāyibhāva i.e. basic emotion. What is emphasised here is that merely by repeating these words, the sentiment or emotion which is experienced through poetry, is not evoked. Even in cases where such words as hāsa, śoka, etc. are used, the sentiment concerned has to be evoked by some other means. The delineation of factors that suggest rasa, are technically termed as vibhāva, anubhāva and sañcāri-or vyabhicāri-bhāva as we have learnt from Bharata and his tradition. The doctrine of vibhāva, anubhāva and vyabhicāri-bhāva is contained in the famous rasa-sūtra of Bharata in his N.S. Ānandavardhana, not quoting this sūtra directly, discusses this point in the following way.

The third variety of the implicit sense viz. rasā”di-dhvani can never be expressed directly in words, i.e. it can never be ‘sva-śabda-vācyā’, and it never enters the field of worldly experience, i.e. loka-vyavahāra or ordinary parlance as well. It can be the object of art only, as Abhinavagupta explains - “rasas tu nāṭya eva, na loka” (A.bh. on rasa-sūtra).

This third type of the implied sense viz. rasa-bhāvā”di-dhvani is seen to shine out as a result of the power of implication based on the expressed i.e. “ākṣipta-tayā.”

It never becomes the object of direct verbal expression and hence it is necessarily distinct from the the expressed sense. If at all it could be the object of the expressed, it might be so alleged either as being denoted by its proper name, or as being expressed through the delineation of setting and the like. If the first alternative be true, there would be no possibility of an experience of sentiments in instances where their proper names are not employed.

Never are they so expressed directly by their proper names. Even when the proper names are present, the experience of sentiments, emotions etc., is not due to them but due only to the delineation of a proper setting and the like. The experience of sentiments, emotions etc. is only given a designation by the proper name and are not at all conditioned by it. Ā. observes : (Dhv. I. iv. Vṛtti) - “yatrā'pyasti tat tatrā'pi viśiṣṭa-vibhāvā”di-pratipādana-mukhenaiva eṣaṃ pratītiḥ. sva-śabdena sā kevalam anūdyate na tu tat-kṛtā, viṣayāntare tathā tasya a-darśanāt.” Thus, in fact we do not have the experience of sentiments, emotions, etc. in all the instances where only proper names are used. Indeed there is not even the slightest experience of the presence of sentiments in a composition which contains only their proper names such as śṛṅgāra and the like, and without the delineation of vibhāvā”di at all. That means, on the strength of both positive and negative argument in favour of vibhāvā”di, the sentiments emotions etc., are exclusively evoked by the latent power of the expressed, and in no way mentioned directly i.e. explicitly. Thus it stands that rasa-dhvani or the third variety of the implicit sense is quite distinct from the expressed sense and is conveyed only through vyajanā (Trans. K.Kris.). Its cognition, adds Ā., however, may appear to be almost simultaneous with the expressed : “yataśca svā'bhidhānam antareṇa kevalebhyo'pi vibhāvā”dibhyo viśiṣṭebhyo rasā”dīnāṃ pratītiḥ, kevalāc ca svā'bhidhānād a-pratītiḥ, tasmād anvaya-vyatirekābhyām abhidheya-sāmarthyā”kṣiptatvam eva rasā”dīnāṃ, na tv abhidheyatvam kathañcid iti tṛtīyopi prabhedo vācyād bhinna eva iti sthitam. vācyena tv asya sahéva pratītir ity agre darśayisyāmaḥ.” (vṛtti, Dhv. I. 4, pp. 12, ibid)

Here, Abhinavagupta (Locana on Dhv. I. 4) (pp. 24, Edn. Nandi, ibid) - observes : “yas tu svapnépi na sva-śabda-vācyo na laukika-vyavahāra-patitaḥ, kintu śabd-samarpyamāṇa-hṛdaya-saṃvāda-sundara-vibhāvā'nubhāva-samucita-prāg-viniviṣṭa-ratyādi-vāsanā-nurāga-sukamāra-sva-saṃvid-ānanda-carvaṇā-vyāpāra-rasaniya-rūpo rasaḥ, sa kāvya-vyāpāraika-gocaraḥ rasadhvanir iti, sa ca dhvanir eva iti, sa eva mukhyatayā ātmā iti.”



Abhinavagupta seems to suggest that this experience of sentiments and the like, or say, aesthetic pleasure, is of the nature of supreme joy. In the minds of all the individuals, there are certain permanent impressions such as rati, hāsa etc. engrained from past life and born of the experience of everyday life. When one looks at some dramatic performance, or reads a poem, one experiences the vibhāva, anubhāva etc., and the permanent fixed emotions are roused to the status of rasa or a sentiment, and the cultured man experiences supreme joy. This rasa then, is of the form of relish and is recognised as the soul of poetry and only this, in reality, is 'dhvani', and is basically the 'soul'.

Thus rasa is the subject of vyañjanā par excellence.

Ā. treats this third variety of rasā"di-dhvani under the subdivision called a-samlakṣya-krama-dhvani i.e. suggestion with imperceptible sequence. This variety is placed under vivakṣitānyaparavācya-dhvani or abhidhāmūladhvani, the second variety being samlakṣya-krama-dhvani or suggestion with perceptible sequence. The former, i.e. one with imperceptible sequence includes cases of rasa-dhvani, bhāvadhwani, tad-ābhāsa-dhvani, bhāvodaya, bhāva-saṁdhi, and bhāva-śabalatā. (Dhv. II. 3). These have innumerable sub-divisions, but all these are placed under a common head of a-samlakṣya-krama-dhvani. The fact of unnoticibility of the sequence of the expressed and the implicit sense is interpreted in another way by saying that both are as if grasped simultaneously. Rasā"dis rise to the status of dhvani only when they are suggested as principal sense. But when rasa, bhāva etc. become subservient to the expressed sense, it becomes the province of the alaṁkāras such as rasavat and the like, according to Ā. (Dhv. II. 5) and are termed "guṇibhūtavyaṅgya" poetry.

Ā. is of the opinion that the a-samlakṣya-krama-vyaṅgya i.e. rasā"di-dhvani is to be found with reference to varṇa i.e. a letter or syllable, pada or word, vākya or sentence, saṁghaṭanā or construction or texture, and prabandha i.e. whole composition.

Dhv. III. 2 observes :

“yas tv alakṣya-krama-vyaṅgyo  
dhvanir varṇa-padā"diṣu,  
vākye saṁghaṭanāyāṁ ca  
sa prabandhe'pi dīpyate.”

Abhinavagupta explains that it is to be seen with reference to a part or fraction of a word - “padaikadeśa” or two words i.e. ‘pada-dvitya’ also : “ādi-śabdena padaikadeśa-dvityānāṁ grahaṇam.” (pp. 206, ibid, Locana, Dhv. III. 2.).

The varṇa or syllables also suggest rasa and the like. Ā. explains this by saying that letters such as ś, ṣ, r, yukta varṇas, dh, etc. do not promote śṛṅgāra-rasa, while they are conducive to bibhatsa and the like. (Dhv. III. 3, 4). The suggestion of rasa through pada or a word is illustrated in the verse - “utkampinī bhaya-pariskhalitāṃśukāntā.” etc. In this illustration, the word ‘te’ makes for the suggestion of the karuṇa-rasa. Abhinavagupta observes : “iti tadīyaṃ saudāryam idānīm sātīśaya-śokāveśa-vibhāvatāṃ prāptam iti.” Suggestion through a fraction of a word is seen as in the verse viz. vṛḍāyogān nataavadanayā...etc. wherein, ‘tribhāgaḥ’, a fraction in the word “cakita-hariṇī-hāri-netra-tribhāgaḥ” is suggestive. “kṛtaka-kupitaiḥ bāspāmbhobhiḥ.” etc. is an illustration where a sentence or vākya becomes suggestive.

This is an illustration of vipralambha-śṛṅgāra. At times this suggested sense of the type of rasa is mixed with some alaṃkāra also as in the verse, “smara-nava-nadī-pūrenódhāḥ.” etc.

Ā. mentions three types of “saṃghaṭanā” or ‘texture’ viz. asaṃāsā, madhyamasamāsā and dīrgha-samāsā, and he adds that these three varieties rest on guṇas i.e. excellences such as sweetness-mādhurya-and the like, and make for the suggestion of rasas, the limiting factor with them being the propriety of the speaker and the subject-matter and also the literary medium adopted, and form of literature. Dhv. III. 5, 6 27 read as -

“a-samāsā samāsena  
madhyamena ca bhūṣitā  
tathā dīrgha-samāséti  
tridhā saṃghaṭanóditā. (Dhv. III. v)  
guṇān āśritya tiṣṭhantī  
mādhuryādīn, vyanakti sā  
rasān; tanniyame hetur  
aucityaṃ vakṛt-vācyayoḥ.” (III. 6 Dhv.)  
viśayāśrayam apy anyad  
aucityaṃ tāṃ niyacchati,  
kāvyā-prabhedāśrayataḥ  
sthitā bhedavatī ca sā.” (Dhv. III. 7)

Ā. further points out by way of elaboration that in case of karuṇa and vipralambha, 'asamāsā' - samghaṭanā i.e. texture having absence of compounds is favourable. In 'raudra' however, it can be either 'madhyama-samāsā' or 'dīrgha-samāsā' i.e. texture having compounds of two, three, four words i.e. middle-sized compounds, or texture having very long compounds is recommended. He also underlines that in all types of texture, the presence of 'prasāda-guṇa' or excellence called perspicuity is a must - "sarvāsu ca samghaṭanāsu prasādā" khyo guṇo vyāpī." For it is said to be common to all rasas and all types of textures - "sa hi sarva-rasa-sādhāraṇaḥ sarva-samghaṭanā-sādhāraṇaś'ca." Ā. observes that samghaṭanā or texture may vary with reference to the form of literature such as 'muktaka' or a single independent stanza and the like; or a prose composition etc.

'Prabandha' or a whole composition also becomes suggestive of rasa as illustrated by the Rāmāyaṇa or the Mahābhārata. The theme could be either historical or imagined as the case may be. But it should be properly beautified by the propriety of vibhāva anubhāva and sañcāri-bhāva. Ā. (Dhv. III. 10) observes :

"idānīm alakṣya-krama-vyaṅgyo dhvaniḥ prabandhā"tmā rāmāyaṇa-mahābhārata"ḍau prakāśamānaḥ prasiddha eva. tasya tu yathā prakāśanam tat pratipādyate -

vibhāva-bhāvā'nubhāva-  
 sañcāry aucitya-cāruṇaḥ  
 vidhiḥ kathāśarīrasya  
 vṛttasyōtprekṣitasya vā. (Dhv. III. 10)  
 iti vṛtta-vaśāyātām tyaktvā-  
 ananugūṇām sthitim,  
 utprekṣyā'pyantarā'bhiṣṭa-  
 rasōcita-kathōnnayaḥ, (Dhv. III. 11)  
 sandhi-sandhyaṅga-ghaṭanam  
 rasā'bhivyaaktyapeksayā  
 na tu kevalayā śāstra-  
 sthiti-sampādanecchayā. (Dhv. III. 12)  
 uddīpana-praśamane  
 yathā'vasaram antarā,  
 rasasyā"rabdha-viśrānter  
 anusandhānam aṅginaḥ. (Dhv. III. 13)

“alaṃkṛtīnām śaktāv  
apyā”nurūpyeṇa yojanam,  
prabandhasya rasā”dīnām  
vyañjakatve nibandhanam.” (Dhv. III. 14)

(Trans. K.Kris., pp. 135, 137 ibid)

“Construction of only such a plot, either traditional or invented, as is charming with its decorum (of the accessories of sentiment, viz.,) stimuli of setting, abiding emotions, emotional responses, and passing moods. (III. 10)

“If in a theme, adapted from a traditional source, the poet is faced with situations conflicting with the intended sentiment, his readiness to leave out such incidents and inventing in their place even imaginary incidents with a view to delineating the intended sentiment : (III. 11)”

“The construction of divisions and subdivisions of the plot only with a view to delineating sentiments and not at all with a desire for mere conformity to rules of poetics” : (III. 12)

“Bringing about both the high tide of sentiment and its low ebb appropriately in the work; preserving the unity of the principal sentiment from beginning to end : (III. 13)

A discrete use of figures of speech even when the poet is capable of using them in any number; such are the conditions which underlie the suggestiveness of a whole work of literature in regard to sentiments etc.” (III. 14) (Trans. K. Kris.)

Ā. has supplied illustrations of all these practical observations. According to him, a whole composition thus not only by itself suggests rasa, but successively by degrees also, through instances of “saṃlakṣya-krama-dhvani” contained in it. : “na kevalam prabandheṇa sākṣād vyañgyo raso, yāvat pāramparyeṇā’pi iti darśayitum upakramate”, observes the Locanākāra, on Dhv. III. 15. Ā. illustrates this in the speech of Pāñcājanya in Madhu-mathana-vijaya or as in “Viṣama-bāṇa-līlā”, when Kāmadeva meets his friends. Abhinavagupta explains fully how these speeches of Pāñcājanya, Yauvana, etc., ultimately help the evocation of the principal rasa. It is also found illustrated in the famous “gṛdhra-gomāyu-saṃvāda” in the Mahābhārata. Abhinavagupta (Locana, Dhv. III. 15) observes that the śāntarasa is fully realized here : “sa cā’bhiprāyo vyaktaḥ śāntarasa eva pariniṣṭhitatām prāptaḥ” - Ā. observes that the rasā”di dhvani is also suggested by case-terminations (= sup), conjugational terminations (= tiṅ) number (= vacana), relation (= saṃbanha),

accidence (= kāraka śakti), primary and secondary affixes (= kṛt, taddhita-pratyaya), and also compounds (= samāsa). (At all places, the translation either follows K.Kris. directly, or is under his influence.)

Dhv. III. 16 reads as -

“sup-tiṅ-vacana-sambandhais-  
tathā kāraka-śaktibhiḥ  
kṛt-taddhita-samāsaś ca  
dyotyólakṣya-kramañ kvacit.”

Upasargas or prepositions and nipātas or indeclinables also make for suggestion of rasa according to Ā. who illustrates the same with instances from Kālidāsa.

The next topic that is taken up for discussion concerns with obstacles in rasa-vyāñjanā. Ā. proceeds to mention certain factors that tend to obstruct the realisation of rasa. He says that a good poet should take pains to avoid such factors as may obstruct the rasa being realised in a big composition or even in a single stanza.

Dhv. III. 17 runs as :

“prabandhe muktake vā’pi  
rasādīn bandhum icchatā,  
yatnaḥ kāryaḥ sumatinā  
parihāre virodhinām.

“prabandhe muktake vā’pi rasa-bhāva-nibandhanam praty ādṛtamanāḥ kavir virodhi-parihāre param yatnam ādadhīta. anyathā tv asya rasamayaḥ ślokaḥ ekópi samyaṅ na sampadyate.” (vṛtti, Dhv. III. 17).

The factors that may cause obstruction in rasa-realisation are enumerated as below :

- (i) sketching the setting and the like of a sentiment that is of the nature quite contrary to the one in hand;
- (ii) giving a very lengthy description of something even though it is connected with the main sentiment;
- (iii) abruptly cutting off the delineation of the sentiment or its untimely evocation;
- (iv) frequent delineation of a sentiment even if it is fully roused; and
- (v) impropriety with reference to behaviour.

Dhv. III. 18 & 19 read as :

“virodhi-rasa-sambandhi-  
vibhāvā”di-parigrahaḥ  
vistareṇā’nvitasyā’pi  
vastuno’nyasya varṇam;  
akāṇḍa eva vicchittir  
akāṇḍe ca prakāśanam,  
parīpoṣaṃ gatasyā’pi  
paunaḥ punayena dīpanam;  
rasasya syād virodhāya  
vṛtty anaucityam eva ca.”

Ā. elaborates in his vṛtti as below :

(i) as for example, after delineating the hero and the setting with reference to śānta-rasa, if the same person and setting are immediately thereafter described with reference to śṛṅgāra-rasa, the first blemish occurs. The above is an illustration of vibhāva-parigraha with reference to an opposite type of rasa. Vyabhicāri-parigraha of the opposite type of rasa is seen when anger of a young beloved is being pacified by words that may promote renunciation. Anubhāva-parigraha of the opposite type of sentiment is seen when, in case the beloved has picked up a love-quarrel, the hero is described to exhibit expressions-anubhāvas pertaining to raudra-rasa by getting angry and bashing the beloved and the like.

(ii) The second blemish takes place e.g. when a poet wants to describe a situation with reference to say, the vipralambha śṛṅgāra i.e. love in separation, and gets lost into a very lengthy description of mountains, forests etc., on account of his love for ‘yamaka’ and the like.

(iii) Abrupt cutting off of the delineation of a contextual sentiment is a fault, said to occur when, e.g. a poet, instead of finding out the way to unite the hero and the heroine, who have come to know each other’s longing for each other, describes something else. This occurs, e.g. in Ratnāvalī, when on coming of Bābhravya, Ratnāvalī is temporarily forgotten !

Untimely evocation of sentiment occurs when e.g. eventhough the battle is on, Rāmacandra is described to be suffering due to separation from Sītā. Or, it is seen in the delineation of śṛṅgāra on the battle field in the second act of Venīsaṃhāra.

Ā. observes that in the instances cited above, there is a clear breach of propriety and it can not be saved by pointing out that the hero is eclipsed by ill fate. ! : “na ca evaṃ vidhe viṣaye daiva-vyāmohitatvaṃ kathāpuruṣasya pariḥāro, yato rasabandha eva kaveḥ prādhānyena sva-pravṛttinibandhanam yuktam.” (vṛtti, Dhv. III. 19)

Ā. says that the poets should be solely devoted to the suggestion of sentiment and the like. We have taken pains for all this and not merely for the establishment of dhvani alone !

“rasā”di-rūpa-vyaṅgya-tātparyam eva eṣāṃ yuktam iti yatnósmābhir ārabdho, na dhvani-pratipādana-mātrā’bhiniveśena.”

It may be carefully noted that not only for Bharata, his illustrious predecessors and for Ānandavardhana/Abhinavagupta and all the followers of the Kashmir school of poetic criticism, but even for literary and art-critics belonging to schools of thought, apparently not in conformity with Ā. and Abhinavagupta, ‘rasa’ means not only sentiment such as śṛṅgāra, karuṇa, etc., but it has a wider connotation of aesthetic relish, born of chewing i.e. contemplation on the object of art, getting merged into it, i.e. laya, samāpatti, niveśa and what not; i.e. total art-experience which removes all consciousness of anything else than the object of art, during the time of its experience (i.e. tātkālikatva), or we may say, it is an art-experience which is “vigalita-vedyāntara”. This is acceptable to all Indian art-critics, including Kuntaka, Dhanañjaya/Dhanika, Mahimā, Bhoja, Śāradātanaya and all the rest. The discerning will realise Ā. also uses the term ‘rasa’ in both these senses; the ‘linga’ i.e. determining characteristic of this experience being “vigalita-vedyāntaratva”.

(iv) The fourth difficulty arises when rasa that is already fully aroused is repeatedly described as such. Rasa, after being fully aroused by its constituents and after being relished, tends to fade away in the fashion of a fading flower, if evoked repeatedly.

(v) Vyavahāra-anaucitya i.e. vṛtty anaucitya occurs e.g. when a heroine directly talks about her desire to the hero, and not indirectly through proper gestures and the like. Or, it happens when vṛttis - dictions - such as kaiśikī and the like, as laid down in Bharata, are described not with reference to their proper conditions or context.

Ā. cites some ‘parikara’ i.e. ‘summing-up’ verses to support his statements and observes that whatever is laid down by him is in harmony with the opinion of great poets such as Vālmīki and the like.

He further elaborates the topic and gives instruction as to how to delineate factors as are connected with sentiments of the opposite type, i.e. ‘virodhi-rasas’. He observes : (Dhv. III. 20) -

“vivakṣite rase labda-pratiṣṭhe  
tu, virodhinām  
bādhyānām aṅgabhāvaṃ vā  
prāptānām uktir a-cchalā.”

Trans. K.Kris. pp. 165, *ibid*) : “After the intended leading sentiment has been established on a secure footing, there will be no defect in including even hindrances provided that these come either as foils or as ancillaries.”

Ā. is of the opinion that after the intended rasa is fully realised, the hindrances can be delineated in a two-fold way as said above. The ‘bādhyatva’ - i.e. serving as foils of the hindrances is said to be there when they are positively over-come by the intended sentiment and not otherwise. Thus delineated they only tend to enhance the intended sentiment or, these factors cease to be hindrances when they are subordinated. They can be subordinated either in a natural way or in an imagined way. In case of natural subordination, there is no case for hindrance e.g., in the description of disease with reference to the vipralambha-śṛṅgāra. But if one describes things that are not natural ancillaries e.g. death with reference to love in separation it will create hindrance. Ā. is of the opinion that even if a poet thinks that death can be possibly described in case of love in separation, he should not do so. For, if the substratum of sentiment is lost, sentiment itself will be totally blasted. And you are not up to promote karuṇa here. If the poetry is centred round karuṇa-rasa, such description is unobjectionable. Or, at times, description of death, in case of śṛṅgāra, becomes unobjectionable, if there is a chance for an immediate reunion. In case of a prolonged reunion, the evocation of proper sentiment is retarded. The poet should avoid this.

Ā. illustrates the case of “bādhyatvena-ukti” i.e. narration as foils of the hindrances in the verse, viz. “kvā’kāryaṃ śaśa-lakṣmaṇaḥ...” etc., or as in case of the advice given by the other sage, when Puṇḍarīka is lost in love for Mahāśvetā. The natural subordination is illustrated as in, “bhramim a-ratim alasa-hṛdayatām”, etc., superimposed subordination is seen as in, “pāṇḍu-kṣāmaṃ vadanam”; etc., or as in, “kopāt komala-bāhu-lola-bāhu-latikām...” etc.

**Opposite Sentiments.** - Ā. then proceeds to explain how opposite sentiments are to be delineated in a whole composition. He is of the opinion that eventhough



it is accepted that the whole work of poetic composition should abound in different sentiments, the poet, desirous of achieving the greatness of his works, would delineate only one sentiment as the principal one.

Dhv. III. 21 - observes :

“prasiddhépi prabandhānām  
nānā-rasa-nibandhane,  
eko rasōṅgikartavyah  
teṣam utkarṣam icchatā.”

(Trans. K.Kris., pp. 175, *ibid*) : “Though there is a convention that more than one sentiment should find a place in entire works of literature, one of them alone should be made principal by the poet who aims at greatness in his works.”

The Vṛtti on Dhv. III. 22 reads as : “prabandheṣu prathamataram prastutaḥ san punaḥ punar anusamdhīyamānatvena sthāyī yo rasas tasya sakala-bandha-vyāpino rasāntarair antarāla-vartibhiḥ samāveśo yat sa nāṅgitām upahanti.” - “When a sentiment happens to be intended as primary in a work and is kept up constant by being delineated again and again, its importance cannot be marred at all by the inclusion of other passing sentiments since it underlies all the rest.” (Trans. K.Kris., pp. 175, *ibid*)

Ā. explains it further. He says that just as there can be principal action or plot of a composition even if it gets mixed with other sub-plots, in the same way there can be one principal sentiment (Dhv. III. 23). Ā. holds that not only sentiments such as vīra and śṛṅgāra or śṛṅgāra and adbhuta can be correlated as principal and subordinate, but also opposite type of sentiments such as śṛṅgāra and bībhatsa, vīra and bhayānaka, śānta and raudra, or śānta and śṛṅgāra also can be correlated as such, if when one sentiment is principal, the other one is not fully aroused :

Dhv. III. 24 observes -

“a-virodhī virodhī vā  
rasōṅgini rasāntare,  
paripoṣam na netavyas  
tathā syād a-virodhitā.”

(Trans. K.Kris., pp. 177, *ibid*) : “When a sentiment is delineated in a work as principal one, no other sentiment, whether un-opposed or opposed to it, should be treated elaborately. This will ensure one that no opposition between them will remain anymore.”

Thus, a rasa not of the opposite type as in case of śṛṅgāra and hāsyā, need not be fully aroused as compared to the main sentiment. Even if they are equally developed, there is no contradiction, e.g. in the verse, viz. “ekato roditi priyā, anyato samara-tūrya-nirghoṣaḥ...” etc., or as in kaṇṭhāt cchitvā’kṣamālām...” etc.

Or, the vyabhicāribhāvas with reference to a rasa opposite to the main sentiment, should not be described at length. And in case they are so described, there should be an immediate reversion to the vyabhicāribhāvas of the principal sentiment. Or, when a subordinate sentiment is treated fully, it should be, at all events, kept only as a subordinate by constant attention; such other escapes should also be imagined.

In case, the subordinate sentiment is of the opposite type, it should be slightly less developed as compared to the main sentiment e.g. in case of śānta and śṛṅgāra.

Ā. then proceeds to lay down the specific means of overcoming opposition between two opposite sentiments. Dhv. III. 25 observes -

“viruddhaika”śrayo yas tu  
virodhī sthāyino bhavet.  
sa vibhinnā”śrayaḥ kāryas  
tasya poṣe’py a-doṣatā.”

i.e. if an opposite sentiment is delineated with reference to the same substratum as that of the principal one, the opposite sentiment should be given a different substratum and thus even if the opposite sentiment is fully treated, there will not be any contradiction, e.g. in case of vīra and bhayānaka. If vīra is delineated with reference to the hero, bhayānaka should be delineated with reference to the enemy. The opposition between sentiments arises in a two-fold way e.g. one as already seen above, such sentiments as vīra and bhayānaka cannot reside in the same substratum, or, the opposition between sentiments may arise when certain sentiments come side by side in the same substratum. Now, in such cases, some other sentiment, not opposite to either, should intervene in between, i.e. it can be sandwiched between the two opposite type of sentiments, (Dhv. III. 26) e.g. in Nāgananda, śānta and śṛṅgāra are delineated with adbhuta intervening in between. Dhv. III. 26 reads as :

“ekāśrayatve nirdoṣo  
nairantarye virodha-vān,  
rasāntara-vyavadhinā  
raso vyaṅgyaḥ sumedhasā.”

(Trans. K.Kris., pp. 181, ibid) - "A sentiment which has no opposition due to sameness of substratum, but which becomes an opposite of another (i.e. principal) sentiment coming closely beside it (= i.e. if juxtaposed), should be so conveyed by the intelligent poet that a third sentiment will intervene between these conflicting ones."

The vṛtti on this reads as : "yaḥ punar ekā'dhikarnatve nirvirodho, nairantarye tu virodhī, sa rasāntara-vyavadhānena prabandhe niveśayitavyaḥ. yathā śānta-śṛṅgārau nāgānande niveśitau."

Thus, the contradiction between two sentiments in one and the same sentence also can be remedied e.g. in the expression, "bhūreṇu-digdhān navapārijāta...." etc. (vṛtti. Dhv. III. 27) : "rasāntara-vyavahitayor eka-prabandhasthayor virodhitā nivartata ity atra na kācid bhrāntiḥ. yasmād eka-vākyasthayor api rasayor uktayā nītyā viruddhatā nivartate."

Ā. is of the opinion that these instructions should be carefully observed more in case of śṛṅgāra which is the most delicate type : (Dhv. III. 28) :

"virodham avirodham ca  
sarvatrēttham nirūpayet,  
viśeṣatas tu śṛṅgāre  
sukumāratamo hy asau."

If the poet is slightly negligent in respect of the delineation of śṛṅgāra, it is immediately noticed and therefore he has to be very attentive in this task.

**Other concepts :** Having thus disposed of the main topic of rasa-dhvani, Ā. has to find place for other concepts of literary criticism as discussed by his predecessors. This he does under his wider and catholic scheme of 'vyāñjanā-dhvani-rasa'. For example, he treats the topic of vṛttis such as lalitā , parusā, upanāgarikā etc. as given by Udbhaṭa, Rudraṭa, etc. and rītis such as gaudī and vaidarbhī, as given by Daṇḍin, Vāmana etc., in the following way : Ā. holds that the main task of a great poet lies in a proper marshalling of all the contents and the expressions in the direction of the sentiments and the like. Dhv. III. 32 observes :

"vācyānām vācakānām ca  
yad aucityena yojanam,  
rasā"di-viṣayenaitat  
karma mukhyaṃ mahākaveḥ."

vācyānām itivṛtta-viśeṣānām vācakānām ca tad viṣayānām rasā”di-viṣayeṇa aucityeṇa yad yojanam etan mahākaver mukhyaṃ karma. ayaṃ eva hi mahākaver mukhyo vyāpāro yad rasādīn eva hi mukhyatayā vākyārthīkṛtya tad-vyakṛy-anugunatvena śabdānām arthānām ca upanibandhanam.” (vṛtti, Dhv. III. 32) : (Trans. K.Kris., pp. 189)” - “The main business of a first-rate poet is none other than the proper marshalling of both contents, i.e. plots and expressions used in setting them forth, in the direction of sentiments, etc. In other words, the main function of the poet lies only in making (one) sentiment principal throughout the poem and employing both words and senses only in such a way that the sentiment is suggested clearly.”

Ā., relating the concept of vṛtti as seen in Bharata and others to his main thrust of vyañjanā-dhvani-rasa, further observes :

“etac ca rasā”di-tātparyeṇa kāvya-nibandhanam bharatā”dāv api suprasiddham eva iti pratipādayitum āha :

rasā”dy anugunatvena  
vyavahāro’rtha-śabdayoḥ,  
aucityavān yas tā etā  
vṛttayo dvidvidhāḥ sthitāḥ.” - Dhv. III. 33

(Trans. K.Kris.; pp. 189, ibid) : “The following text shows how this idea of writing a poem only with the main intention of suggesting sentiments etc., is a well-known concept even in ancient treatises such as that of Bharata -

Vṛttis (lit. Modes) are said to be of two kinds only because they relate to appropriate employment of senses and sound in keeping with sentiments, etc.” (Dhv. III. 33)

The vṛtti on this further observes : “vyavahāro hi vṛttir ity ucyate. tatra rasā’nuguna-aucityavān vācyā”śrayo yo vyavahāras tā etāḥ kaiśiky ādayo vṛttayaḥ. vācakāśrayaś cōpanāgarikā”dyāḥ. vṛttayo hi rasā”di-tātparyeṇa sanniveśitā kām api nātyasya kāvyasya ca cchāyām āvahantri. rasā”dayo hi dvayor api taylor jīva-bhūtāḥ, iti-vṛttā”di tu śarīrabhūtam eva.”

(Trans. K.Kris., pp. 189, ibid) : “Modes of employment are themselves given the designation of “Mode”. The mode of employing senses in conformity to sentiment as well as to the consideration of decorum underlies the various (dramatic) modes such as ‘Kaiśiki’ etc. Similarly, that which relates to sounds underlies the (figurative) modes such as Upanāgarikā (the urban) etc. Thus mode, properly

employed with the soul intention conveying sentiments etc., will lend charm to dramatic as well as poetic works. Sentiments etc., constitute the life-essence of both these modes; plots, etc. serve only as the body."

Ā. clearly states further that, once this theory of poetry is fully understood, even the so called 'modes' relating to the nature of sounds, as well as to the nature of meanings will become intelligible. He adds that when this theory of poetry involving a discrimination of the suggested-suggester relationship is grasped, other categories like literary modes like *kaiśikī* and *upanāgarikā* will become quite intelligible. Otherwise modes will remain only incredible like unseen objects, and will not come within the range of personal experience. He observes, 'at Dhv. III. 46 (pp. 260, Edn. K.Kris.)

“asphuṭa-sphuritaṃ  
kāvyā-tattvaṃ etad yathōditaṃ,  
a-śaknuvadbhir vyākartaṃ  
rītaḥ sampravartitaḥ.”

(Trans. K.Kris., pp. 261, *ibid*) - “Those who were unable to explain properly this essential principal of theory as they had only a glimmer of it (and nothing more), have brought into vogue the theory of styles. The *vṛtti* (pp. 260, *ibid*) observes : “etad dhvani-pravartanena nirṇītaṃ kāvyā-tattvaṃ a-sphuṭa-sphuritaṃ sad a-śaknuvadbhiḥ pratipādayitum vaidarbhī, gauḍī, pāñcālī ca iti rītaḥ pravartitaḥ. rīti-lakṣaṇa-vidhāyināṃ hi kāvyā-tattvaṃ etad a-sphuṭatayā manāk sphuritaṃ āsīd iti lakṣyate, tad atra aphuṭatayā sampradarśitaṃ ity anyena rīti-lakṣaṇena na kiñcit.” (Trans. K.Kris. pp. 261, *ibid*) - “We have explained above the fundamental principle of poetry by using the term ‘dhvani’. Since only vague glimmerings of this principles were had by ancient writers, they could not explain it exhaustively and thus did they bring into vogue the theory of three styles, viz., *Vaidarbhī*, *Gauḍī*, and *Pāñcālī*. While the theorists of style show only vague flashes of this very principle of poetry, we have very clearly demonstrated it in all its bearings and hence there is nothing for us to consider seriously about the theory of styles.

Ā. further observes : (Dhv. III. 47, pp. 260, *ibid*) :

“śabda-tattvāśrayāḥ  
kāścid artha-tattva-yujo'parāḥ,  
vṛttayópi prakāśante  
jñāte'smin kāvyā-lakṣaṇe.”

(vṛtti, on this reads as) - “asmin vyaṅgya-vyañjaka-bhāva-vivecanamayē kāvyā-lakṣaṇe jñāte sati, yāḥ kāścīt prasiddhā upanāgarikā”dyāḥ śabda-tattvā”śrayā vṛttayo, yāśca artha-tattva-sambaddhāḥ kaiśiky ādayas tāḥ samyag rīti-padavīm avataranti. anyathā tu tāsām a-drṣṭārthānām iva vṛttinām a-śraddheyatvam eva syān na anubhava-siddhatvam. evaṁ sphuṭatayaiva lakṣaṇīyaṁ svarūpam asya dhvaneḥ.”

(Trans. K.Kris., pp. 261, ibid) - “Once this theory of poetry is fully understood, even the so-called “Modes” relating to the nature of sounds as well as to the nature of meanings will become intelligible.” (III. 47)

“When this theory of poetry involving a discrimination of the suggested-suggester relationship is grasped, other categories like literary modes, viz. those relating to sound such as upanāgarikā, as well as those relating to sense such as ‘Kaiśiki’, will become quite intelligible (even in the same way as the styles). Otherwise, Modes will remain only incredible like unseen objects, and will not come within the range of personal experience (though there might be testimony of the ancients to that effect). Therefore, the nature of principal suggestion should be understood clearly.”

It may be noted here that Dr. K.Kris. translates ‘vṛtti’ as ‘modes’ and so we have kept the term as it is when we quote from him. Elsewhere, we use the term ‘diction’ for vṛtti. ‘Vṛtti’ remains ‘vṛtti’, even when called as ‘mode’ or ‘diction’.

When Ā. observes that ‘the nature of principal suggestion ‘svarūpam asya dhvaneḥ’ is to be understood clearly, he obviously refers to his scheme of vyañjanā-dhvani-rasa first and then to ‘rasa-dhvani’ as principal suggested sense, when the term stands not only for suggestion of emotive-stuff i.e. rasa-bhāvā”di but also for ‘rasa’ - the ultimate aesthetic pleasure, the ‘art-sense’ - at the base of all art. Ā. always expects us to keep in mind this wider connotation even when he talks of rasa as śṛṅgāra-vīra, etc. i.e. sentiments. It is precisely for this purpose that he emphatically establishes “śānta-rasa” and he is vehemently supported by Abhinavagupta in both Locana and the Abhinavabhāratī. By śānta-rasa as a ‘mahā-rasa’ what is meant is only the ‘highest aesthetic experience’ or ‘art-experience’ and not just evocation of a particular emotion.

Ā. also correlates the concepts of alaṃkāra, guṇa and doṣa with rasa - both in the emotive sense, or in the wider sense of art-experience in general, through his scheme of vyañjanā.

It may be noted that in the concepts of alaṃkāra, guṇa, vṛtti and rīti we can include all newer and newer experiments by literary artists in the direction of what

is termed 'symbols' or 'images' or even what is termed as purely 'absurd' in literary or dramatic contexts. Ā. has kept his doors open for all this but for the present he observes that figures like metaphor and the like, become truly significant, (i.e. will be real ornaments) when they are employed in instances of śṛṅgāra which is the soul of suggestion, with great discrimination. Again by śṛṅgāra we should understand not only the emotive stuff but also the soul of poetry i.e. art-experience, the wider sense of śṛṅgāra as taken by Bhoja-rājā also - 'raso'bhimāno śṛṅgārah'. Ā. observes at Dhv. II. 17 -

“dhvanyātmabhūte śṛṅgāre  
samīksya viniveśitaḥ,  
rūpakā”dir alaṃkāra-varga  
eti yathārthatām.”

For in his earlier kārikā (i.e. II. 16) he has observed that -

“rasā”kṣiptatayā yasya  
bandhaḥ śākya-kriyo bhavet,  
a-prthag yatna-nirvartyaḥ  
sōlaṃkāro dhvanau mataḥ.” - i.e.

(Trans. K.Kris. pp. 59, ibid) - “Only that is admitted as a figure of suggestive poetry whose employment is rendered possible just by the emotional suffusion of the poet and which does not require any other extra effort on his part.” - We may say that for Dr. K.Kris.'s use of words such as “the emotional suffusion of the poet”, we would like to read, “the art-experiment of the poet.” This will include all amazing experiments such as done by modern literary artists in any language spoken to-day. For, this is hinted at by Ā., when he observes in his vṛtti on Dhv. II. 16, when he says - “niṣpattāv āścarya-bhūto'pi yasyā-'laṃkārasya rasā”kṣiptatayaiva bandhaḥ śākya-kriyo bhavet sōsminn alaṃkāra-krama-vyaṅgye dhvanāv alaṃkāro mataḥ. tasyaiva rasā'ṅgatvaṃ mukhyam ity arthaḥ.” (Trans. K.Kris., pp. 59, ibid) : “Though in the result it might appear very amazing, that figure, whose employment is due only to the poet's over-mastering emotion (i.e. 'art-sense, experience), is regarded as a figure of 'suggestive poetry of undiscerned sequentiality.' The idea is that it alone serves as the best vehicle of sentiment.”

Ā. then lays down some guide lines for the use of alaṃkāras or we may say figurative style or diction in poetry. He holds that the sole consideration is that it is only a means to the delineation of sentiment, or say to bring about art-

experience and that it is never an end in itself. The alaṃkāra should be employed at the right time and should be given up also at the right time. The poet should not feel over enthusiastic in pressing an alaṃkāra too far, even when it is employed. Again, the poet should be keenly watchful in making sure that it remains a secondary element only. These are the various means by which figures like metaphor and the like, become accessories of the suggested sentiment, or better of say, the art-effect attempted. Ā. observes at Dhv. II. 18-19 :

“vivakṣā tat-paratvena  
nā’ṅgitvena kadācana,  
kāle ca grahaṇa-tyāgau  
nāti-nirvahaṇaiṣitā.  
nirvyūdhāv api cāṅgarve  
yatnena paryavekṣaṇam,  
rūpakā”dir alaṃkāra-vargasya  
aṅgarva-sādhanaṃ.”

Ā. duly illustrates all this.

He also correlates guṇas or excellences and saṃghatanā or structure and holds that both should be employed in poetry as to suggest sentiment i.e. to bring home aesthetic pleasure or art-effect (Dhv. III. 6).

Ā. also correlates the topic of doṣa or blemishes in poetic art to the general concept of rasa or art-experience, i.e. rasa-vyañjanā. He observes at II. 11, that

“śruti-duṣṭā”dayo doṣā  
anityā ye ca darśitāḥ  
dhvanyātmany eva śṅgāre  
te heyā, ity udāhṛtāḥ.”

anitya-doṣāś ca ye śruti-duṣṭā”dayaḥ sūcitāḥ tépi na vācye artha-mātre, na ca vyaṅgye śṅgāra-vyatirekiṇi, śṅgāre vā dhvaner anā”tmabhūte. kim tarhi ? dhvanyātmany eva śṅgāre aṅgitayā vyaṅgye te heyā ity udāhṛtāḥ. anyathā hi teṣāṃ anitya-doṣatā eva na syāt.”

(Trans. K.Kris., pp. 53, ibid) - “Defects like ‘indelicality’ which have been shown to be impermanent (by ancient writers), have been in fact illustrated as blemishes only with references to the erotic sentiment when its nature is suggestion.” (Dhv. II. 11).



(Vṛtti) - 'Impermanent defects like 'indelicality' which have been mentioned by earlier writers do not become defects at all when they are found in instances of expressed sense only, or even in instances of suggested erotic sentiment, if suggested sentiment is also not of the utmost importance therein, or in instances of sentiments other than the erotic. That the defects are to be avoided as such only when the erotic happens to be principally suggested, becomes clear by the illustration given (by ancient writers themselves). If this were not so, they would not at all be impermanent defects.'

Thus the concept of blemishes is also correlated to the central concept of art-experience or 'rasānubhūti'.

In the treatment of saṃghaṭanā or 'construction' the appropriateness of certain types of compounds and that of certain consonants with certain rasas is mentioned, e.g. it is suggested that the use of certain consonants as would be found appropriate i.e. effective for the art-effect of vīra, or raudra or bhayānaka, would not prove to be appropriate for the art-effect of say, śṛṅgāra and karuṇa. In fact such inappropriate use would amount to a doṣa or blemish, with reference to guṇa, rīti or saṃghaṭanā concerned.

Thus, Ā. integrates the theories of vyañjanā and rasa i.e. art-effect into a whole and gives us a complete theory of poetry. He does not discard any concept floated by his predecessors but finds place for them in the wider embrace with his 'rasa' i.e. art-experience in the centre. Ā. keeps rasa-experience, i.e. art-experience as central and emotive experience for him is part of his wider scheme of vyañjanā-dhvani-rasa. Viśvanātha however insists only on rasa-dhvani and ridicules other art-forms that take care of stylistic and content-based central thrusts, as seen perhaps with the modern artists of to-day practicing 'absurdism' in art.

Ālaṃkārikas of the Kashmir school i.e. followers of Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta, beginning with Mammata down to Jagannātha do not differ basically from Ā. in their treatment of rasa, but for Mukula, Kuntaka, Mahimā, Dhanañjaya/Dhanika and Bhoja the central importance of art-effect remains the same, there is quarrel as to the realisation of this effect. They challenge Vyañjanā and not 'rasa', or art-experience. We will try to see how they differ.

**Mukula Bhaṭṭa** - We are dealing here, it may be noted in advance with some of the posterior writers to Ā., whose works have come down to us and not with those such as Lollaṭa, Śrī Śaṅkuka, and Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka whose works have not reached us, but whose views on rasa-ralisation have reached us through

Abhinavabhāratī. We will take care of these when we deal with the theory of art-experience in the next chapter. So, for the present we begin with Mukula.

For Mukula, the author of *Abhidhāvṛtta-mātrkā* the whole *rasa-bhāvā*’di complex was not unacceptable as he is posterior to Bharata and even Ā. A number of illustrations that he has cited for this or that variety of *abhidhā/lakṣaṇā* are read in different context in the Dhv. also. What he opposed was the fact of *vyāñjanā* and therefore also the whole edifice of *dhvani* that rested on *vyāñjanā*. He asserted that all the varieties of *dhvani* can be understood through the functioning of *lakṣaṇā* and hence this talk of *vyāñjanā/dhvani* made no sense to him. This he asserted even while accepting such terminology as “*vivakṣita-anyapara-vācya* and *atyanta-tiraskṛta-vācya*, and also *śabda-śakti-mūlatā*” and the rest. Actually he twice uses the term ‘*vyāṅgya*’ while treating “*sambandha-nibandhanā-lakṣaṇā*. He observes : (pp. 63, edn. Dr. Rewaprasad Chawkhamba Vidyabhavan, Varanasi, 73) -

“*lakṣaṇā*”tmikayos tu tayor vācyasya a-vivakṣitatvam, na tv atyantam tiraskāraḥ, lakṣyamāṇa-dvāreṇa kathamcit kārye anvitatvāt. tatra, sambandha-nibandhanāyām lakṣaṇāyām avivakṣita-vācyaṭve udāharaṇam, “*rāmo’smīti.*” atra hi rāma-śabda-vācyaṃ dāśarathi-rūpaṃ vyāṅgya-dharmāntara-pariṇatatvāt svaparatvena anupāttam, tasmād a-vivakṣitam, na tv atyantam tiraskṛtam vyāṅgya-dharma-dvāreṇa vākyaṛthe kathamcid anvitatvāt...”

Mukula thus unconsciously accepts Ā.’s ruling though consciously he rebels against him by not accepting *vyāñjanā* and therefore ‘*dhvani*’. He observes : (pp. 66, *ibid*) : “*etac ca sarvaṃ bahuvaktavyatvād iha na nirūpyate. lakṣaṇāmārgāvagāhitvaṃ tu dhvaneḥ sahrdayair nūtanatayōpavarṇitasya vidyate iti diśam unmilayitum idam atrōktam. etac ca vidvadbhiḥ kuśāgrīyayā buddhyā nirūpaṇīyam, na tu zagity evā’sūyitavyam ity alam atiprasaṅgena.*”

The difficulty with Mukula was that he could not see beyond the *śāstras*. We have all through our presentation maintained that the grammarians and the *dārśanikas*, while treating their *śāstras*, had no business to talk about or even mention *vyāñjanā*. They had to deal with only the directly expressed sense with a slight chance of deviation (*lakṣaṇā*) if any, which in itself is a ‘*doṣa*’ - a blemish - in the eyes of the *Mīmāṃsakas*. But this does not mean that they rejected *vyāñjanā* in poetry. Even Pāṇini is said to have written a *mahākāvya* and no poetry on earth in any age, any language, could be without *vyāñjanā* and *vyāṅgyārtha*. The *śāstra* had concern with the scientific use of language only while the poetic use of language cannot but involve an emotive stance which falls in the ambit of *vyāñjanā* alone.

So, the net outcome is that Mukula seems to be an innocent soul. Actually he has tried to improve upon Ā.'s observations at times to no good result. For example, Ā. takes 'rasa' to be 'vyaṅgya' or suggested only and also as principal. Rasa is never conveyed through its own naming even in a dream - svapnépi na sva-śabda-vācyaḥ. This is Ā.'s assertion. Mukula on the otherhand accepts rasa as arrived at through 'ākṣepa' i.e. implication. Now this term 'ākṣepa' is used both in the sense of lakṣaṇā, or implication i.e. 'arthāpatti' or even 'anumāna' i.e. inference. Mammaṭa uses, this term, and this, not against Ā.'s own use, in the sense of 'vyañjanā' also. But Mukula uses 'ākṣepa' only either as lakṣaṇā or arthāpatti, he being a dire opponent of vyañjanā.

Again, for Ā., 'rasa' is part of a variety of dhvani which is termed 'vivakṣitānyaparavācya'. This variety is totally away from lakṣaṇā, and the 'vācya' or expressed meaning in this variety does not change. For Ā., the variety in which lakṣaṇā has a role to play is called "a-vivakṣita-vācya", in which the 'vācya' or directly expressed sense changes either partially or wholly. For Mukula, however, lakṣaṇā is also possible in what he terms 'vivakṣita-vācya' as well. The illustration he cites is, "mahati samare śatrughnas tvam." He observes : (pp. 65, ibid, under 'kriyāyoganibandhanā lakṣaṇā') : "yatra tu nimittasad-bhāvād vācyérthe vivakṣita eva tasya arthāntarasya śabda-śaktyantara-mūlatayā vyavasthitasya a-vyavāyaha kriyate, tatra tad-viparītatayā vācyārtha-tiraskriyā-vaiparītyam. na khalv atra vācyasya arthasya tiraskriyā, api tu vivakṣitatvam eva, yathā 'mahati samare śatrughnas tvam' iti."

Actually he could not see beyond the physical limitations of the śāstras, which in themselves were never against vyañjanā so far as poetry was concerned. Mukula, pleased with his own presentation, at the end of his work declares :

"daśavidhena anena abhidhā-vṛttena samagrasya vāk-parispandasya vyāpyatvād anena vyākaraṇa-mīmāṃsā-tarka-sāhityā"tmakeṣu caturṣu śāstreṣu upayogāt tad-dvāreṇa ca sarvāsu vidyāsu sakala-vyavahāra-mūla-bhūtāsu prasāraṇād asya daśavidhasya abhidhā-vṛttasya sakala-vyavahāra-vyāpītvam ākhyātam.

Thus, Mukula does not reject the fact of rasā"di, but he is averse to vyañjanā. It may be noted that Mukula has not engaged himself in any theoretical discussion either on the theory of rasa-realisation or on the discussion concerning the nature or number of rasas.

**Kuntaka** : We have examined Kuntaka's general approach to vyañjanā and dhvani in earlier chapters. His vicitrā-abhidhā did not exclude vyañjanā and his

‘vagrókti’ included both ‘dhvani’ and ‘rasa’. So, he is neither a die-hard vyañjanā-virodhin nor an anti-dhvani theorist. In this light it will prove to be very interesting how he accomodates the fact of rasa in his theory.

Kuntaka’s (= K.) approach to the fact of rasa is noteworthy. For him, rasa is the highest factor in the poetic art which is of the form of vagrókti. Vagrókti is related to rasa in the same way in which it is related to dhvani. Thus, just as for the dhvanivādin, dhvani is the soul of kāvya, and rasa-dhvani is the highest form of dhvani, in the same way, vagrókti is the soul of poetry and rasa is the most important aspect of vagrókti.

K. seems to pay great importance to the fact of rasa. He wants poetry to be ‘tad-vid-āhlāda-kāriṇī’ i.e. such as would delight the critics : VJ. I. I reads as (Edn. K.Kris. Karnatak Uni., Dharwad, ’77, pp. 6)

“śabdārthau sahitaū  
vakra-kavi-vyāpāra-śālīni  
bandhe vyavasthitaū  
kāvyam, tadvid-āhlāda-kāriṇī.”

(Trans. K.Kris., pp. 292, ibid) - “Poetry is that word and sense together enshrined in a style revealing the artistic (lit. ‘out-of-the-way’) creativity of the poet on the one hand and giving aesthetic delight to the man of taste on the other.”

At VJ. I. 5, while dealing with ‘kāvya-prayojana’ he refers to rasa. He observes :

“caturvarga-phalā”svādam  
apy atikramya tad-vidām,  
kāvyāmṛta-rasenā’ntaś  
camatkāro vitanyate.” (pp. 5, ibid)

(Trans. K.Kris., pp. 291, ibid) - “Apart from the enjoyment of the benefits of the four-fold values, there is the immediate sense of delight produced in a reader as a result of his enjoying the nectar of poetry.” Again, while talking about sukumāra mārga, he says that a ‘sahṛdaya’ or a ‘tad-vid’ is “rasā”di-paramārtha-jña.” He observes :

“bhāva-svabhāva-prādhānya-  
nyakkṛtā”hārya-kauśalah,  
rasā”di-paramārthajña-  
manah-samvāda-sundarah.” (VJ. I. 26)

(Trans. K.Kris., pp. 329, ibid) : 'Where studious technical skill is superseded by the prominence given to the inner nature of things, where beauty is felt due to sympathy by men of taste who are experts in enjoying sentiments etc..."

The vṛtti (pp. 46, ibid) reads as : "anyac ca kīḍṣaḥ ? rasā"di-paramārtha-jñāmanah-saṁvāda-sundarah. rasāḥ śṛṅgārā"dayaḥ. tad ādigraheṇa ratyā"dayōpi grhyante. teṣāṁ paramārthaḥ paramarahasyam." (Trans. K.Kris., pp. 332, ibid) : "Further, the style is characterised as that 'where beauty it felt due to empathy by men of taste who are expert in enjoying the essence of sentiments and the like. Sentiments are erotic and so on. By 'and the like', are meant dominant moods such as 'love'. Their essence is their highest secret." While dealing with 'saubhāgya' guṇa, the critics are described as 'sarasā'tma' i.e. ārdra-cetas. VJ. I. 56 reads as - (pp. 69, ibid) -

"sarva-saṁpat-parispanda-  
saṁpādyam sarasā"tmnām,  
alaukika-camatkāra-kāri  
kāvyaika-jīvitam."

(Trans. K.Kris., pp. 355, ibid) : "It is something attained by the full co-operation of all the constituent elements and it is something which surely results in an extraordinary aesthetic effect in the mind of the connoisseurs. in short it is the whole and sole essence of poetry."

K. also seems to take rasa as the soul of poetry. He declares it categorically that prabandha-vakratā is the highest form of vakrókti. In an antar-śloka i.e. a mnemonic verse, under IV. 26, K. observes : (pp. 283, ibid)

"vakratóllekha-vaikalyam  
a-sat-kāvyē vilokyate,  
prabandheṣu kavīndrāṇām  
kīrti-kandeṣu kiṁ punaḥ."

(Trans. K.Kris., pp. 577, ibid)

"Absence of literary beauty may be found only in bad literature. How can it even have place in the great works of master-poets, works which are the shining-shoots of their immortal glory ?"

These Prabandhas or compositions on which the fame of great poets rests, are full of 'rasa', they are (under IV 4, antarā śloka-13) : (pp. 252, ibid)

“nirantara-rasódgāra-  
garba-sandarbhā-nirbharāḥ  
giraḥ kavīnām jīvanti  
na kathāmātram āśritāḥ.”

(Trans. K.Kris., pp. 544, ibid) :

The words of great poets come to life only - “when they contain incidents which are bubbling with sentiments : not when they merely follow the story as found in the source.” We can replace the term “sentiments” for ‘aesthetic rapture’, for this exactly is meant by K., not just the emotive stuff.

Thus for K., ‘rasa’ is the soul of ‘prabandha’ or a composition and is one of the aspects of vakrōkti. K. thus seems to cover rasadhvani of the asaṃlakṣya-variety also under his larger concept of ‘rasa-vakratā’.

Rasa for K. is not vācya or expressed. While dealing with the problem of the alaṃkāras such as ‘rasavat’ and the like, K. laughs at Udbhaṭa’s assertion that ‘rasa’ can be ‘sva-śabda-vācya’. Under V.J. III. 11, in his vṛtti, K. observes : (pp. 146, ibid) - “yad api kaiścit -

“sva-śabda-sthāyī-sañcārī-vibhāvābhīnayā” spadam” - ity anena pūrvam eva lakṣaṇam viśeṣitam, tatra sva-śabdā”spadatvaṃ rasānām a-parigata-pūrvam asmākam. tatas ta eva rasa-sarvasva-samāhita-cetasah tat-paramā’rthavido vidvaṃsa evaṃ praṣṭavyāḥ-kiṃ sva-śabdā”spadatvaṃ rasānām uta rasavata iti. tatra pūrvasmin pakṣe-rasyanta iti rasās te sva-śabdā”spadās tesu tiṣṭhantaḥ śṛṅgārā”diṣu vartamānāḥ santas taj-jñair āsvādyante. tad idam uktaṃ bhavati-yat sva-śabdair abhidhīyamānāḥ śrutipatham avatarantas’ cetanānām carvaṇa-camatkāraṃ kurvanti ity anena nyāyena gṛhta-pūra-prabhṛtayaḥ padārthāḥ sva-śabdair abhidhīyamānās tad āsvāda-saṃpadam saṃpādayanti’ty evaṃ sarvasya kasyacid upabhoga-sukhārthīnas tair udāra-caritair ayatnena eva tad abhidhāna-mātrād eva trailokya-rājya-saṃpat-saukhya-saṃrddhiḥ prapādyeta iti namas tebhyaḥ.”

(Trans. K.Kris., pp. 432, ibid) - “Another writer has added to the afore-said definition another qualification, namely,

“And which is brought forth by its designation, the dominant emotion, the passing mood, the excitant and gesture.” (37) (Udbhaṭa, IV. 3) -

Of these, that rasas can be evoked by their designation is something unknown to us so long. Hence these very celebrated specialists on rasa, who claim to know everything of ‘rasa’ might be asked these questions : Do rasas admit of being

designated by their names or does the poem having rasas admit of being so designated ? If the first alternative is accepted by them, the following is our difficulty : Rasas are those which are 'tasted' and these are again contained in their designations such as the word 'erotic', and only as such they become the sources of delight to connoisseurs. To explain further, when words denoting rasas are mentioned, as soon as they fall on the ears of sentients, they should start yielding aesthetic delight. By the same token, words like - "ghee-dish", as soon as they are uttered, should be enough to produce the taste of that dish. That way, whatever be the sense-delight desired by a person, that could be easily procured without any effort by those great souls merely uttering the concerned words. They could thus attain without trouble all the joys of an emperor of the three worlds. We take leave of them with a big salutation."

While considering the nature of kāvya-vastu or poetic theme, K. takes rasa to be very important. Thus at VJ. III. 10, (vr̥tti) he observes that 'rasa-nirbharatā' or the condition of being drenched in rasa is the principle aspect of poetic context : (pp. 143, ibid) - "tad evaṃvidhaṃ svabhāva-prādhānyena rasa-prādhānyena ca, dvi-prakāraṃ sahaja-saukumārya-sarasam svarūpaṃ varṇanā-viśaya-vastunaḥ śarīram eva alaṃkāryatām eva arhati, na punar-alaṃkāraṇatvam." (Trans. K.Kris., pp. 429, ibid) - "Thus what is beautified and can be regarded as the body of all descriptive art can be only two-fold-containing either the prominence of naturalness or sentiment, both having their own beauty. Neither can ever be regarded as an ornament." K. divides 'kāvya-vastu' i.e. poetic context as two-fold, 'cetana' or sentient and 'jaḍa' or insentient, and takes the first one as principal and for that 'rasa-paripōṣa' or the enhancement or rasa is inevitable. See VJ. III. 7 - and vr̥tti thereon : (pp. 138, ibid) -

"mukhyam a-kliṣṭa-ratyā"di-  
pari-poṣa-manoharam,  
sva-jāty ucita-hevāka-  
samullekhōjjvalam param."

- mukhyam yat pradhānam cetana-surā'surā"di-saṃbandhi svarūpaṃ, tad evaṃvidhaṃ sat kavīnām varṇanā"spadam bhavati sva-vyāpāra-gocaratām pratipadyate. kiṃśam ? a-kliṣṭa-ratyā"di-paripōṣa-manoharam. a-kliṣṭaḥ kadhathanā-virahitaḥ pratyagrata-manoharo yo ratyā"diḥ sthāyibhāvas tasya paripōṣaḥ śṛṅgāra-prabhṛti-rasatvā-"pādanam, "sthāy yeva tu raso bhaved" iti nyāyāt. tena mahārham, manohāri."

(Trans. K.Kris., pp. 424, ibid) -

“The first, i.e. the primary kind, is made beautiful by a spontaneous presentation of emotions like love. The second is rendered lovely by a description of the animals etc. in a way natural to their species.” (III. 7)

(Vṛtti) - The primary subject-matter which relates, as we saw, to the sentients like gods and demons, comes within the purview of the poetic activity in the way suggested below. The method is one of spontaneous presentation of emotions like love. The word spontaneous is used to indicate that the emotions like love should be free from banality and very striking by their fresh flavour. When so treated, the emotions are raised to the level of sentiments like the erotic; for the well-known rule states that the dominant emotion itself gets transformed into sentiment. Now this becomes very appealing to the heart.

After this K. gives many illustrations of vipralambha and karuṇa rasas and leaves other rasas to the readers. : (vṛtti, VJ. IV. 7) : “evaṃ vipralambha-śṛṅgāra-karuṇayoh saukumāryād udāharaṇa-pradarśanam vihitam. rasāntarānām api svayam eva utprekṣaṇīyam.” (pp. 140, ibid).

For K., the description of ‘jāda’ or ‘insentient’ object becomes interesting on account of its ability to evoke rasa - (vṛtti, VJ. III. 8, pp. 142, ibid) - “jadānām acetanānām salīla-taru-kusuma-samaya-prabhṛtīnām evaṃvidhaṃ svarūpaṃ rasōddīpana-sāmarthyā-vinibandhana-bandhuram varṇanīyatām avagāhate.” (Trans. K.Kris., pp. 428, ibid) - “The treatment of the non-sentients should also conform mostly to the kindling of the sentiments. Objects such as water, tree, spring, etc. are seen serving this purpose.” In the same way and for the same purpose, i.e. to evoke rasa, the description of the unimportant sentient objects such as birds and the like, is also welcome. VJ. III. 8 reads as - (pp. 141) :

“rasōddīpana-sāmarthyā-  
vinibandhana-bandhuram,  
cetanānām a-mukhyānām  
jadānām cā’pi bhūyasā.”

K. adds (vṛtti, VJ. III. pp. 143, ibid as quoted above) that ‘kāvyā-vastu’ or poetic context is two-fold, on account of its being ‘svabhāva-pradhāna’ or, ‘rasa-pradhāna’, and that both should be embellished, on account of both of them being “sahaja-saukumārya-sarasa” or full of rasa on account of natural beauty.



While discussing different mārḡas also, K. refers to rasa. The sukumāra mārḡa is charming (V.J. I. 26) on account of its being favourable to the mental aptitude of those who know the highest object called rasa :

VJ. I. 26 reads as (pp. 43, ibid) -

“bhāva-svabhāva-prādhānya-  
-nyakkṛtā”hārya-kausālah,  
rasā”di-paramārtha-jña-  
manah-samvāda-sundarah.”

(Trans. K.Kris., pp. 329, ibid) -

“Where studious technical skill is superseded by the prominence given to the inner nature of things, where beauty is felt due to sympathy by men of taste who are experts in enjoying sentiments etc.” We can read ‘enjoying aesthetic relish-‘rasa’ for just ‘sentiments’ etc.

The vicitra-mārḡa is also ‘sarasā”kūta’ i.e. accomplished by ‘rasa-nirbharābhiprāya’.

V.J. I. 41 (pp. 53, ibid) reads as -

“svabhāvaḥ sa-rasā”kūto  
bhāvānām yatra bandhyate,  
kenā’pi kamanīyena  
vaicitrenōpabṛmhitah.”

and also read - VJ. I. 40 (pp. 53) -

“pratiyamānatā yatra  
vākyārthasya nibadhyate,  
vācya-vācaka-vṛttibhyām  
vyatiriktasya kasya cit.”

(Trans. K.Kris., pp. 339, ibid)

(VJ. I. 40) - ‘Wherein, further, the intended purport of the whole is communicated by a suggestive use of language, which is distinct from the two well-known uses, viz. the communicative use of meanings and the denotative use of words;

(VJ. I. 41) - ‘Wherein the real nature of things pregnant with sentiments is augmented with a novel-beauty which is unique.’

The madhyama mārḡa, being a combination of these two, must be necessarily charged with rasa-“rasa-puṣṭa”.

Thus we see that with his theory of ‘Vakrókti’ or a striking mode of speech, differing from and transcending the ordinary everyday mode of speaking about a thing, and such that charms by the skill of the poet, K. seems to cover up all the sources of charm in poetry, beginning with alamkāra, or artistic turn of expression and ending up with dhvani and rasa. As already noted earlier, even ‘dyotaka’ and ‘vyañjaka’ words, on account of their quality of the ability to render meaning, - i.e. ‘artha-pratīti-kāritva’, are termed ‘vācaka’ i.e. ‘expressive of meaning’, metaphorically. For him also ‘rasa’ both in the sense of a suggested sentiment as well as the supreme purpose of poetry, aesthetic delight, is the highest goal a poet has to reach.

Dr. K.Krishnamoorthy in his learned introduction to “Vakrókti-jīvitā of Kuntaka” (Pub. Karnatak Unī., Dharwad, Edn. ’77) has some special remarks on ‘Kuntaka’s idea of Rasa in relation to Alamkāra’ (pp. XXX-XXXIX, ibid, Intro.). On pp. XXXVIII Dr. K.Kris. has interesting note as follows :

“As prof. Daniel H. H. Ingalls observes penetratingly, “The word ‘rasa’ possesses an ambiguity of denotation”; a particular ‘rasa’ is said to lie in a given literary work as a sweet taste or a bitter taste may lie in a given food or drink. The connoisseur of poetry is also said to have a ‘rasa’ (a taste) for the poetry he enjoys, much as a wine-taster has a taste of wine.” (ft. note - Daniel H. H. Ingalls : An Anthology of Sanskrit court Poetry, Cambridge, Mass, 1956, p. 14, note). - After Abhinavagupta the two meanings have been confounded so often that it is difficult to determine what exactly is meant by any writer in a given context. But Kuntaka is blissfully free from this ambiguity. He restricts his usage of the word ‘rasa’ to the first meaning only unlike post-Abhinavagupta writers. He invariably uses other words like ‘āhlāda’ to mean the second. But he is second to none in his insistence on a sensitive literary taste in the reader and always describes them with epithets like ‘Sahrdaya’ or ‘radvid’. And Kuntaka himself reveals a literary taste of the first order among sanskrit literary critics. A careful perusal of the fourth chapter will show how Kuntaka always is concerned with the opt-repeated question - “What has the poet tried to express and how has he expressed it ?” It is the only possible method open for practical criticism. The other side of criticism, viz. judicial evaluation is also represented by Kuntaka in his observations on the failures of even master poets. Like a modern literary critic, he covers all the parts of poetics which deal with plot, character, and thought in his observations involving ‘aucitya’ and ‘an-aucitya’. He not only asserts a new doctrine, but disengages a new essence which men of taste can relish from the vast riches of Sanskrit literature. The only value he upholds is the aesthetic value of ‘vicchitti’.”

We have stated our position in the chapters dealing with vyañjanā and dhvani and have tried to evaluate K.'s achievements. Ingalls as quoted by Dr. K. Kris. as above seems to display a lack of the basic understanding of the meaning of 'rasa'. Bharata and all the ālamkārikas posterior to him never take 'rasa' in any physical sense at all. When he gives the illustration, Bharata knows that he has to explain the fact of aesthetic relish by citing from day to day experience and it is here that he is very clear that the taste from food or drink is only "mānasa" and those who taste it are termed as "bhuñjānas" and not gluttons. We have made it very clear and will make it clearer when we deal with the nature of rasa in greater detail, that 'rasa' is more an experience both exclusive to art - 'Sui generis' and also 'pari passu' with art-experience. It is extra-ordinary in its nature and the most important aspect of it is that it is an experience which is said to be 'exclusive', - 'vigalita-vedyāntaratva' being its differentiating mark. The whole tradition of Indian art-critics, including literary critics have no illusion about this, be it a Bharata, or a Bhāmaha or Ānandavardhana or any. 'Rasa' is a 'total' experience which involves the emotive, imaginative or intellectual and the practical aspect of the personality of a genuine enjoyer. So, 'rasa' is not only a sentiment, but also 'Supreme delight' born of the art-experience. It is in both these senses that the term is known to all art-critics in India and Kuntaka, of course, is one of those. If he defied Ānandavardha to some extent, it was because as Dr. K.Kris. observes, he was a predecessor of Abhinavagupta. Had he been posterior to the latter, there would not have been any difficulty for him in accepting 'vyañjanā-dhvani-rasa' scheme. To that extent, we take him to be unfortunate. We feel we do not have to controvert Ingall's misunderstanding. Dr. K.Kris. is a name whom we hold in very high esteem and when he seems to go rather over-jubilant regarding Kuntaka's achievement, we take it only as an "artha-vāda".

**Dhanañjaya and Dhanika :-** Whether these two were predecessors of Kuntaka or posterior to him is immaterial here. One thing is certain that these two also challenge the concept of vyañjanā-dhvani but certainly they accept the fact of 'rasa'. The fourth flash of the Daśa-rūpaka is devoted to 'rasa', the realisation of, and its nature. The Avaloka by Dhanika has all the venom against vyañjanā and dhvani and both the DR. and its Avaloka advocate the bhāvya-bhāvaka-saṃbandha between vibhāvādis and rasa. We have discussed this in full under tātparya and also under vyañjanā-virodhā. The fact of the supremacy of rasa is welcome to these authors.

**For Mahima Bhaṭṭa** also 'rasa' is as much welcome as it is to Bharata, Ānandavardhana, Kuntaka, Dhanañjaya or any ālamkārika worth his salt. 'Rasa'

both in the sense of an emotive response and also as the highest aesthetic goal that covers up the former also, is acceptable to Mahimā also, howsoever an avowed anti-vyañjanā and anti-dhvani theorist he may be.

Mahimā hails ‘rasa’ in poetry to such an extent that poetry without rasa is no poetry at all for him. He supports a definition of poetry, as a description of vibhāvā”dis adorned by music and the like : (pp. 102) Edn. Dr. Rewaprasad : yad āhuḥ -

“anubhāva-vibhāvānām  
varṇanā kāvyam ucyate,  
teṣāmeva prayogat tu  
nāṭyam gītā”di-rañjitam.”

Nāṭya i.e. drama is the representation on stage, of poetry which contains description of vibhāvā”dis. This representation, Mahimā accepts, is one which is adorned by music and the like.

Mahimā further observes : (pp. 102, ibid) : “evaṇ ca, ye sukurāmatayaḥ, śāstra-śravaṇā”di-vimukhāḥ, sukhino rāja-putra-prabhṛtayaḥ pūrvatra adhi-kṛtāḥ, ye ca atyantatōpi jada-matayaḥ, tāvatā vyutpādayitum aśakyāḥ, strī-nryā”todyā”di-prasaktā ubhaye’pi tēbhimata-vastu-puraskāreṇa guḍa-jihvikayā rasā-”svādasukhaṁ mukhe datvā tatra kaṭukōṣadha-pānādāv iva pravartavitavyāḥ. anyathā pravṛttir eva eṣāṁ na syāt, kim uta vyutpattiḥ. kāvyā”rambhasya sāphalyam icchatā tat-pravṛtti-nibandhana-bhāvena rasā”tma-katvam avaśyam upagantavyam tanmātra-prayuktaśca dhvani-vyapadeśaḥ.

na ca rasānām vaiśiṣṭye tad ātmanah kāvyasya viśiṣṭatvam iti yuktam vaktum, a-vyāpteḥ. evaṁ hi pratiniyata-rasā”tmana eva tasya dhvanitvam syāt, na anyasya anya-rasā”tmanah, vaiśiṣṭyā”bhāvāt. iṣyate ca tatrā’pi ity avyāptir lakṣaṇa-doṣaḥ.”

Mahimā hereby wants to suggest that kāvyā, of course adorned by vibhāvā”dis and therefore codusive to rasa, is meant primarily for the happy-go lucky people such as princes and the like, who are of mediocre intellect and who are averse to listening (or studying) the Śāstras. They are the first among those for whom poetry is created. The next come those who are absolutely dull-witted and are incapable of even receiving or enjoying poetry. To activate them, i.e. to guide them to some activity, nāṭya is required, for these people are by nature tuned more towards women, dance and the like, which form part of drama. Both of these are to be activated by placing something they like, i.e. by placing some form of art which is

sweet because of its being rasa-oriented. It is like men who are given bitter medicine by coating the same with sweet covering. If this practice is not resorted to, then such people will not be guided to any useful activity at all. And, Mahimā underlines, those who want that the poetic activity should be fruitful, have to see to it that poetry is charged with rasa - “rasā”tmakatvam avaśyaṃ upagantavyam”.

It may be very interesting here to note that when Mahimā insists of poetry being ‘rasā’tmaka’, he wants us to understand that ‘rasa’ here stands for the highest relish, as art-meaning, as the objective of any art. This is as explained by Abhinavagupta who wants us to believe that Bharata when he observes - “kāvyārtho rasaḥ” means that ‘rasa’ i.e. highest aesthetic pleasure is the supreme objective of poetry, or any art. As noted by us, all ālaṃkārikas worth their name, know that ‘rasa’ is not just the emotive experience brought about by a particular set of vibhāvā”dis ending in the realisation of sentiments, individually known as śṛṅgāra, hāsyā, karuṇa etc. ‘Rasa’ is beyond sentiments. Mahimā holds that if an individual sentiment only is taken as ‘rasa’ then the term ‘kāvyā’ applied to a poetry with śṛṅgāra, will not be applicable to kāvyā charged with karuṇa or any other rasa. Thus there will be ‘a-vyāpti-dosa’, or the fault of the definition being too narrow. Only poetry charged with this wider concept of ‘rasa’ is said to be ‘dhvani’ i.e. art of sound.

Mahimā further notes (pp. 103, ibid) : “ata eva ca na guṇā’laṃkāra-saṃskṛta-śabdārtha-mātra-śarīraṃ tāvat kāvyam, tasya yathókta-vyaṅgyārthópanibandhe sati viśiṣṭatvam iti śakyam vaktum. tasya rasā”tmatā’bhāve mukhya-vṛtṭyā kāvyavyapadeśa eva na syāt, kim uta viśiṣṭatvam.”

Mahimā here strongly objects to the view of the dhvanivādins that poetry derives its speciality through the suggested sense (i.e. in form of vastu-dhvanī and ālaṃkāra-dhvanī) over and above by its being qualified by guṇas and ālaṃkāras, i.e. its body being made of word and sense graced by excellences and figures of speech. Mahimā seems to hold that anything less than ‘rasa’ will not do and so poetry primarily ceases to be poetry if it does not have rasa for its soul. For Mahimā the function of poetry is instruction through entertainment and for this, the presence of rasa is unavoidable. Poetry without rasa is useless as it cannot serve any purpose.

It may be noted that Mahimā is not concerned with any theoretical discussion concerning rasa-realisation, but his views seem to be closer to Śrī. Śaṅkuka who regarded rasa as inferred i.e. ‘anumeya’. For Mahimā even ‘vastu-dhvanī’ and ‘ālaṃkāra-dhvanī’ of Ānandavardhana are cases of inference. For Mahimā the spectator’s apprehension of rasa is a clear case of inference. In this inference, the

sthāyibhāva is inferred from the combination of vibhāvas, anubhāvas and vyabīcārins. He observes : (pp. 83, ibid) - “na ca rasā”disvapi vibhāvā”dī-prakāśana-sahabhāvena prakāśanam upapadyate. yatas tair eva kāraṇā”dibhiḥ kṛtrimair vibhāvā”dy-abhidhānair asanta eva ratyā”dayaḥ prati-bimbakalpāḥ sthāyibhāva-vyapadeśa-bhājaḥ kavibhiḥ pratipatr-pratīti-patham upanīyamānā hrdaya-saṁvādā”svādyatvam upayantaḥ santo rasā ity ucyante. na ca kāraṇā”dibhiḥ kāryā”dayaḥ pratibimbakalpāḥ sahaiva prakāśayitum utsahante, kārya-kāraṇa-bhāvā’vasāyasyaiva avasādaprasaṅgāt. yatra tu tal lakṣaṇam mukhyatayā sambhavati tat kāvyam eva na bhavati kuta tad-viśeṣa-dhvani-rūpatā syāt.”

The language of Mahimā carries impressions of Abhinavagupta, but the conclusion is not indential. He seems to suggest that if vibhāvā”dis are kāraṇa, then their simultaneity-sahabhāva- is out of question and so the ghaṭa-pradīpa-nyāya is not acceptable for it will violate the very nature of vibhāvā”dis as ‘cause’ element. Thus ‘dhvani’ can not be a ‘kāvyā-viśeṣa’ either.

Mahimā further observes that the manifestor-prakāśaka-is two-fold, viz. of the form of an adjunct i.e. upādhi-rūpaḥ, or ‘svatantra’ i.e. independent. Jñāna i.e. knowledge, śabda i.e. sound (or word)and pradīpa i.e. lamp are of the former type, i.e. they are ‘upādhirūpa’. ‘Dhūma’ i.e. Smoke is a manifestor of an independent type i.e. it is ‘Svatantra’. In case of rasa-realisation, the first type i.e. upādhirūpa will not suit the purpose, for in that case poetry will be restricted only to such objects as are ‘pratyakṣa’ i.e. directly apprehended or ‘abhidheya’ i.e. directly stated. The other i.e. ‘svatautra’ is nothing else but of the form of ‘līnga’ i.e. unfailing mark. It is not a ‘vyāñjaka’ i.e. suggester for the notion of suggestion does not apply to this case at all. Even the dhvanikāra does not accept, observes Mahimā, the simultaneity of the manifestor and the manifested in case of all the three types of dhvani including rasa. If the objector (i.e. dhvanivādin) goes for such a definition of dhvanikāvya which may not necessitate the simultaneity of vyaṅgya and vyañjaka, then also there will be over-lapping i.e. ati-vyāpti in anumāna. Thus Mahimā raises two objections to the ‘abhivyakti’ theory of rasa. ‘Abhivyakti’ or manifestation implies simultaneity of illumination of the manifestor and the manifested. This is not the case with rasa-apprehension because it takes place only after the apprehension of vibhāvā”dis. This is accepted by Ānandavardhana himself, observes Mahimā. Again, he argues further, that manifestation does not require any cognitive relationship like invariable concomittance. A lamp and a pot do not stand in need of a relationship of smoke and fire, related through invariable concomittance. So the acceptance of abhivyakti would mean that rasa is cognised

by each and every person, because as in case of lamp and pot, the revelation of rasā”di by vibhāvā”di does not require any pre-requisites such as knowledge of invariable concomitance. This fails to explain the fact that rasa-pratīti does not occur to one and all but only to the accomplished person, the sa-hṛdaya, who know the relation between vibhāvādis and sthāyin concerned. It may be noted that the thrust of Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta also, in a way would tend to take us to gamya-gamaka-bhāva between vibhāvā”dis and rasa. But the main objection against anumāna theory is that anumāna is an intellectual process which is totally different in nature from the realisation of aesthetic pleasure. Abhinavagupta therefore observes that if it is a case of anumāna, then why not we experience rasa even in ordinary parlance - “laukikēpi kiṃ na rasatā ?” The second objection to anumāna theory is that anumāna or inference yields indisputable meaning. But there is no certainty concerning the suggested meaning. Again, anumāna being a means of valid knowledge the inferred meaning ought to be valid and real, as such the disputes about its validity would be out of question. This is not the case with the suggested meaning.

But Mahimā has refuted, to his satisfaction the view that aesthetic pleasure cannot be explained by inference. He seems to refer to Abhinavagupta’s dissatisfaction towards inference.

He begins with giving the summary of Ānandavardhana’s views when he had suggested that the two apprehensions of vibhāvā”di and rasā”di naturally occur in sequence and not simultaneously. Again, Ā had suggested that when the second apprehension of rasā”di occurs, the first apprehension is not negated but it also continues like the apprehension of lamp along with the apprehension of jar.

To this Mahimā’s reply is as follows - Actually the vyaktivādin when he accepts the sequential apprehensions of the vācya i.e. expressed and the vyaṅgya i.e. suggested, accepts our view-point that there is ‘gamya-gamaka-bhāva’ between the two. Ā. himself has said in so many terms that the vibhāvā”dis themselves are not rasa. So, the apprehension of rasā”di is invariably connected with the prior apprehension of vibhāvā”di, thus the sequence between the two is incontrovertible and is there for sure. That this sequence is not noticed as it is very subtle is a fact and it is therefore that rasā”di are termed “a-samlakṣyakrama by Ā. Mahimā then quotes words from Ā. which almost take us to believe that even he was not against gamya-gamaka-bhāva between these two apprehensions. Mahimā quotes Ā.’s words such as - “punaś ca, ‘tasmād abhidhānā”bhi-dheya-pratītyor iva vācya-

vyāṅgya-pratītyor nimitta-nimitti-bhāvād niyamabhāvī kramah. sa tu ukta-yukteḥ kvacil lakṣyate kvacit tu na lakṣyate'iti. - “The apprehension of the setting, etc. is only an invariable condition of all apprehension of sentiments etc., hence we might posit a cause-effect relation to exist between the two apprehensions. There is therefore, bound to be some temporal sequentiality also between the two. But this sequentiality is not noticed since it is minute. Hence it is that we mentioned above that sentiments are suggested only through undiscerned sequentiality.” (Trans. K.Kris., pp. 191, *ibid*) It may be noted that the readings in Dr. K's Edn. and in Mahimā are slightly different and it will be interesting to study Mahimā's quotations from the Dhv. from text-criticism point of view. Of course Mahimā does not seem to misquote or twist the text to his advantage.

Here of course, Mahimā quotes from the vṛtti on Dhv. III. 33. (pp. 196, Dr. K's Edn., *ibid*). The english rendering by Dr. K. Kris. renders it as (pp., 197, *ibid*) : “It is clear therefore, that even as the apprehensions of denotative word (= abhidhāna) and denoted sense (= abhidheya) involve a cause-effect relation and consequently temporal sequentiality, so also the apprehensions of the expressed and the suggested involve a cause-effect relation as well as temporal sequentiality. As already illustrated, sometimes it is noticed and sometimes it is not.”

Mahimā, after quoting the words of Ā., concludes that in view of this he will establish in due course the “līṅga-līṅgi-bhāva” i.e. a cause-effect relation between the two apprehensions. Thus all varieties of dhvani can be subsumed under inference. (pp. 67, *ibid*) : “tad evaṃ vācya-pratīyamānāyor vakṣyamāṇa-krameṇa līṅga-līṅgi-bhāvasya samarthanāt sarvasyaiva dhvaner anumānā'ntarbhāvaḥ samanvito bhavati, tasya ca tad apekṣayā mahā-viśayatvāt.” The inference or anumāna has a wider scope and it covers up, holds Mahimā, even such cases of guṇībhūta-vyāṅgya as illustrated in figures such as ‘paryāyokta’ and the like. This ‘anumāna’ or inference is of the form of expression and hence we have to understand ‘parārtha’ anumāna by it. The mention of three-fold reason or līṅga is ‘parārthānumāna’. People of dull intelligence do not grasp this point. (pp. 6, 7, *ibid*) - “tacca vacana-vāpāra-pūrvakatvāt parārtham ity ava-gantavyam. tri-rūpa-līṅgā”khyānaṃ parārthānumānam iti kevalam ukta-naya-anubhijñatayā tan na lakṣyaty avicakṣaṇo lokah.”

Mahimā wants to drive at the conclusion that poetic inference is made of aesthetic delight. We do not experience pleasure when we infer feelings like grief in actual life. But, the same causes, effects etc., termed as vibhāvas, anubhāvas etc. in poetry make for inference of rasa, a blissful experience. Causes in ordinary life



and vibhāvā”dis in poetry are not of identical nature. He quotes the substance of theory which he has inherited. He observes (pp. 71, ibid) - “na ca loke vibhāvā”dayo bhāvā vā sambhavanti, hetv ādīnām eva tatra sambhavāt. na ca vibhāvā”dayo hetvā”dayaśca ity eka evārtha iti mantavyam. anye hervā”dayōnya eva vibhāvā”dayaḥ. teṣāṃ bhinna-lakṣaṇatvāt. tathā hi.”

Mahimā talks the language of tradition and it includes Ā. and Abhinavagupta also who claim to interpret Bharata. Mahimā holds that the set of causes etc. in ordinary parlance and the vibhāvā”dis in art not identical. Abhinavagupta had also explained that these are called vibhāvas etc. on account of their strength of rendering their object as enjoyable : ‘vibhāvayan’ is explained by him as “āsvādayogī-kurvan.” Mahimā quotes from Bharata to explain ‘vibhāva’ and also ‘anubhāva’ and also ‘vyabhicārins’. The quarrel lies in the fact that the vyaktivādins call this process of relish by the name of vyañjanā, while Mahimā insists on ‘anumiti’. To be fair, as Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka pointed out ‘abhivyakti’ is not pure abhivyakti, and Mahimā’s anumiti is also not pure anumiti. It is just a poetic function which renders the object of its description relishable. Call it by any name, ‘vyañjanā’ or ‘anumiti’. Mahimā holds that the vibhāvā”dis have existence in the realm of inference only and are not objects of reality, as they exist only in poetry or any art-form. They are artificial while causes etc. are real. Only vibhāvā”dis make for relish i.e. rasa as it is the essence of their nature. They are therefore pratiyamāna i.e. implied or ‘gamyā’ i.e. ‘inferred’ only. Their apprehension is called ‘rasa’ - relish, which is natural to them. He observes : “(pp. 74, ibid) : “tad evam vibhāvā”dīnām hervā”dīnām ca kṛtrima-a-kṛtrimatayā, kāvya-loka-viśayatayā ca svarūpabhede viśayabhede ca avasthite sati ekatva-a-siddher yadā vibhāvā”dibhir bhāveṣu ratyā”diṣv eva pratītir upajanyate tadā teṣāṃ tanmātra-sāratvāt pratiyamānā iti, gamyā iti ca vyapadeśā mukhya-vṛttyā upapadyanta eva. tat-pratīti-parāmarśa eva ca rasā”svādaḥ svābhāvika ity uktam.” He further adds (pp. 75) : “sōpi ca teṣāṃ na tathā svadate, yathā tair evā’numeyatām nīta iti svabhāva evā’yam, na paryanuyogam arhati. tad uktam -

“nā’numito hervā”dyaiḥ  
svadatēnumito yathā vibhāvā”dyaiḥ  
na ca sukhayati vācyóorthaḥ  
pratiyamāna sa eva yathā.” iti.

He quotes from the Dhv. in his support. Mahimā tries to explain the pleasure in the aesthetic context on the basis of the imaginative existence i.e. the fictiveness of

the emotion and not its being a part of real life, and also on the basis of the unexpectedness of its cognition. Dr. C. Rajendran (pp. 122) quotes in support from Dr. V. K. Chari who observes that, “it is the fictive nature of the poetic representation that makes it possible for us to enjoy it with detachment and without the impingement of ‘arthakriyā’ or ‘causal efficiency.” All this is stated clearly by Ā., Abhinavagupta, Kuntaka and all Indian aestheticians who maintain the extraordinary bliss as the outcome of art-experience. Again the suddenness (‘sadyaḥ para-nirvṛti’ as Mammata would coin the word) of rasa-experience is in itself a source of delight i.e. Camatkāra. Mahimā (pp. 59) observes : “tad hi mukhye citra-pustakā”dau vyakti-viṣaye paridrṣtam eva.” Ruyyaka explains (pp. 60, ibid) as - “ālekhyā-prakhyā”dau santam asā’vasthite pradīpādīnā prakāśite jhaṭity adbhutārtha-prakāśanāc camatkāro jāyate. tadvad rasā’dāv ity upacāra-‘prayojanam’. When a picture is placed in darkness and when suddenly a flash of light reveals it, the result is ‘Camatkāra’ or sudden absolute joy. In the same way rasā”di-prakāśana yields instantaneous bliss. The use of the term ‘vyakti-viṣaye’ by Mahimā may suggest his tacit acceptance of the theory of vyañjanā. But actually this is not so, and it is only an appearance. Here ‘vyakti’ stands for ‘manifestation’ and not ‘suggestion’.

It is clear that Mahimā has explained the fact of rasa-experience to his own satisfaction. We will not choose to call it “far from satisfactory” as observed by Dr. Rajendran (pp. 122, ibid) : For, as observed earlier, if Mahimā’s anumiti is not ‘anumiti’ of the darśanas, then Ānandavardhana’s ‘abhivyakti’ is also not the abhivyakti of the darśanas. Thus both are different from their original and hence both are ‘half-truth’ or both are “new truth”.

**Bhoja :** We will try to examine Bhoja’s position concerning rasa, with reference to both his Saraswati Kaṇṭhābharāṇa (i.e. SKĀ) and also his Śṛṅgāraprakāśa (Śṛ. Pra), of course under the shadow of the valuable research of Dr. V. Raghavan.

For Bhoja, in poetry which is free from blemishes and is having excellences and figures of speech, there has to be ‘rasa-a-viyoga’ i.e. “not the absence of rasa.” Śṛ. Pra. XI, pp. 429 has - “nirdoṣasya guṇavato’laṃkṛtasya ca kāvya-śarīrasya kāmīnī-śarīrasya iva saubhāgyātīśaya-niṣpattau rasā’viyoga eva prakṛtaḥ upāyaḥ gīyate.

Bhoja has discussed the topic of rasa in his own way. From a wider angle as done by Daṇḍin, rasa is also for Bhoja, a ‘kāvya-śobhākara-dharma’ i.e. an attribute causing beauty in poetry and hence is an ‘alaṃkāra’.

Bhoja, has included ‘rasa’ in what he terms ‘rasókti’. For him literature is divided into three basic components such as vakrókti, rasókti and svabhāvókti. Here,

'rasókti' is the best expression. The SKĀ. V/8 reads as :

"vakróktis' ca rasóktiś ca  
svabhāvóktiś ca vāṇmayam,  
sarvāsu grāhīṇīm tāsū  
rasóktiṃ pratijānate." (pp. 555, Edn. NS. Bombay, '34)

'Vakrokti' for Bhoja is having predominance of alaṃkāras. 'Svabhavākti' has guṇas as predominant feature while 'rasókti' abounds in 'rasa'. It may be noted that Dr. Rewaprasad Dwivedi in his Sanskrit work viz. "Kāvyaśāstraśikṣā" takes exception to the term 'rasókti' with an argument that 'rasa' and 'ukti' are self-contradictory for 'rasa' is never 'ukta' or directly expressed. But we may, in defence of Bhoja here suggest that even Bhoja does not suggest that 'rasa' is ever 'ukta' or an object of 'abhidhā'. What he means by 'rasókti' is only this much that it is a sort of poetic expression with 'rasa' as its predominant feature, i.e. an 'ukti' charged with rasa. We should not over-read things. For Bhoja is very clear about the importance and the nature of rasa. He observes that like 'presence of excellences' i.e. 'guṇa-yoga', 'rasa-aviyoga' i.e. 'absence of separation from rasa' is a 'nitya'/'must' feature of poetry : "nityo hi kāvyē guṇa-yoga iva rasā'viyogaḥ." (pp. 437, Śr. Pra.)

This 'rasa-a-viyoga' is brought about by two factors, (i) depending on vākya i.e. vākya-aiśvarya and (ii) depending on prabandha i.e. prabandha-aiśvarya. The Śr. Pra. (pp. 431) observes, (Ch. XI) : "tāyā vākya-aiśvarya-śīla-a-maṅgala-ghṛṇāvad artha-grāmyaṃ ity ādi doṣahānena, dīpta-rasatvaṃ kāntir ityādi guṇopādānena, kaiśikī-vaidarbyādy alaṃkāra-yogena ca." i.e. The first variety is arrived at by remaining free from blemishes such as aśīla, a-maṅgala, ghṛṇāvad, artha-grāmya etc., and by accomplishing excellences such as kānti etc. and also by such embellishments as kaiśikī and vaidarbhī, etc.

Bhoja holds that 'rasa-aviyoga' is brought about by many factors operating together. He gives illustrations from food, dress, cosmetics, music, love etc. He observes : (Śr. Pra.) pp. 431, Ch. XI) : "tataś ca bhojana iva madhurā'mla-lavaṇa-ṣāḍavānām, veśa iva vastrā'nulepana-mālya-vibhūṣaṇānām, dhūpa iva candanā'guru-karpura-sidhrakānām, saṅgīta iva nṛtta-vādyā-pāthyānām, premanī iva kopā'nunaya-prasāda-saṅgama-sukhādīnām, gārhaṣṭhya iva dharmārtha-kāma-mokṣa-sādhana-nuṣṭhānānām kāvyā-śarīrēpi rūpakā'dīnām saṃsṛṣṭir eva viśeṣataḥ svadamāno rasā'viyoga-hetur bhavati. He adds (pp. 435, ibid) that even 'rasa' is alaṃkāra in a wider sense as it makes for poetic beauty - "tatra alaṃkāra-saṃkaraḥ saṃsṛṣṭir ity eva vaktavye nānā-grahaṇaṃ guṇa-rasā'dīnām apyalaṃkāratā-pratipattiyartham. teṣāṃ api kāvyā-śobhā-paratvena alaṃkāratvāt.

On pp. 437, Ch. XI Śr. Pra., Bhoja observes that rasa-aviyoga is ‘nitya’ dharma for poetry. “nityo hi kāvyē guṇa-yoga iva rasā’viyogaḥ. guṇavato rasavataś ca niścitā eva asya praśamsā.” From his guṇa-vicāra it follows that he even tries to place rasa in kānti-guṇa, as done by Vāmana. But as read above (pp. 431) he feels that - “guṇā’laṃkāra-sanniveśa-viśeṣa-janyarvān nānā-laṃkāra-saṃsr̥ṣṭāv eva prakṛṣṭatvam labhate.”

Rasā’viyoga of the type called ‘prabandha-viśayaka’ is also arrived at by the same factors such as ‘doṣa-hāna’. It seems that Bhoja favours an observation that ‘rasa’ is a total effect of all poetic devices taken together.

In short, rasa-aviyoga, is termed as a constant feature - ‘nitya’ - in poetry and ‘rasa’ is also in a wider sense an ‘alaṃkāra’. To support this Bhoja quotes Daṇḍin 2/275 such as -

“preyaḥ priyatarā”khyānam  
rasavad rasa-peśalam,  
ūrjasvi rūdhā’haṃkāraṃ  
yuktótkarṣaṃ ca tat trayam.”

Daṇḍin has termed these three alaṃkāras as “yuktótkarṣa”, a term that is explained by Bhoja in his own way. Bhoja’s understanding or explanation of the term ‘yuktótkarṣa’ runs as follows :

“yuktótkarṣaṃ ca tat trayam ity anena a-yuktótkarṣāṇām apy ūrjasvi-rasavat-preyasāṃ guṇatvam eva, na alaṃkāratvam iti jñāpayati.” (Śr. Pra. XI, pp. 437, ibid). These three viz. preyas, rasavat and ūrjasvi, in a state wherein they are subdued i.e. in a-yuktótkarṣā”vasthā are taken as preyas-guṇa, bhāvika-guṇa and aurjitya-guṇa. Thus when the three are ‘yuktótkarṣa’ i.e. roused to their fullest capacity, they are termed rasas. Dr. Raghavan also is perturbed by this remark and is ill at ease while explaining this (sec. pp. 431, Śr. Pra. Raghavan). Perhaps it is that Bhoja is inclined to take the same as either ‘rasa’ or ‘guṇa’ as when they are roused to the full capacity (of course by due vibhāvā”dis) - i.e. yuktótkarṣa, or when they are a-yuktótkarṣa. The discussion needs greater attention.

Seeking inspiration from Daṇḍin, Bhoja describes three stages or ‘koṭis’ of Śṛṅgāra-rasa acceptable to him. These, are “pūrvākoṭi” i.e. primary stage, ‘madhyamā koṭi’ i.e. the middle position, and ‘uttamā koṭi’. i.e. the highest stage. Pūrvā-koti occurs when ‘rasa’ arises in mind in form of ‘māna-maya-vikāra’, and

this is the “rūdhāḥmkāratā of ūrjasvi.” Daṇḍin has termed ‘rasavat’ as ‘rasa-peśala’. This is the second stage wherein ratyā”di bhāvas reach their highest expression through the proper delineation of vibhāvā”dis. This is the ‘madhyamāvasthā’ of rasa. The third i.e. ‘uttarā koṭi’, i.e. the highest stage is the stage of ‘alaṃkāra’ as suggested through the ‘priyatarā”khyāna’ called ‘preyas’. : “Śr. Pra. XI. pp. 436, ibid) : “tatra ūrjasvi rūdhā”hamkāram ity anena ātma-viśeṣa-niṣṭhasya utkr̥ṣṭa-adr̥ṣṭa-janmanóneka-janmā’nubhava-saṃskārā”sādita-dradhimnaḥ samagrā”tmaḡa-saṃpad-udayātisayahetor ahaṃkāra-viśeṣasya upasaṃgrahād-ahaṃkāra”bhimāna-śr̥ṅgārā”dyapara-nāmnō rasasya māna-maya-vikāra-rūpeṇa abhimānināṃ manasi jāgrataḥ pūrvāṃ koṭim upavarṇayati.... rasavad rasa-peśalam ity anena vibhāvānubhāva-vyabhicāri-saṃyogād rasanispattir iti ratyā”di-rūpeṇa anekadhā”virbhavato”bhivardhamānasya para-prakarṣa-gāmināḥ śr̥ṅgārasya madhyamām avasthām avasthāpayati.

.... preyaḥ priyatarā”khyānam ity anena ca samasta bhāva-mūrdhābhiṣiktāyā rateḥ para-prakarṣā”dhigamād bhāvanāpathā”tikrame bhāva-rūpatām ullāṅghya premarūpeṇa pariṇatāyā upādānād bhāvāntarāṇām api para-prakarṣā”dhigame rasa-rūpeṇa pariṇatir iti jñāpayan ahaṃkārasyōttamām koṭim upalakṣayati.”

Perhaps by these three stages Bhoja refers to bhāva-dhvani, rasa-dhvani i.e. wherein all the 49 bhāvas are raised to the status of rasa, and the highest stage, that we have discussed above as aesthetic pleasure which is supreme, which is ‘kāvyārtha’ of Bharata, which is ‘śānta’ of Ānandavardhana and Mahārasa Abhinavagupta. The third stage is the final stage of art-experience wherein differences of labels such as śr̥ṅgāra, karuṇa, vīra etc. that depend on particular set of vibhāvā”dis mingle and merge into a total art-effect.

Thus the madhyamā’vasthā can be equated with the enhanced stage of bhāvas such as rati and the like. Or, perhaps these are only bhāvas and are termed rasas metaphorically. But we feel that the explanation of the threefold koṭis as suggested by us above suits more not only to Bhoja but to all art-experience. It is suggested by some scholars that this three-fold scheme is inspired by Daṇḍin’s treatment of preyaḥ, rasavat, and ūrjasvi, and that Bhoja also seems to opt for the enhanced stage of a primary feeling being called rasa, and thus getting closer to Lollaṭa also. Or, perhaps this also is not a true interpretation of Bhoja’s theory wherein the three stages actually should harmonize, as suggested earlier, with bhāva-dhvani, rasa-dhvani, and ultimate kāvyārtha i.e. total art-experience or ‘Śānta’rasa’ or ‘Mahārasa’ of Abhinavagupta.

Or perhaps when Bhoja takes ‘preyaḥ priyatarā’phyāna’ as pūrvā-koṭi of rasa he seems to cover up alaṃkāra-dhvani or vakrōkti of Kuntaka covering all beautiful expressions leading to both vastu-dhvani and alaṃkāra-dhvani. We keep this point open to debate. But perhaps Bhoja, by his pūrvā-koṭi, as Ā. by vastudhvani and alaṃkāra-dhvani, keeps the doors of art-experience open for the inclusion of all modern-most-modern techniques of expression terminating into ‘absurd’ poetry and ‘absurd theatre’ also. This point is open to debate.

The explanation of the rasa-sūtra according to Bhoja falls in the madhyamā-koṭi. Here, he has also explained vibhāva, anubhāva and vyabhicāribhāva. How the combination of vibhāvā”dis yields rasa is explained by Bhoja as under -

Bhoja informs that as the juice comes out of the suger-cane, as oil is squeezed out from the seeds of mustard or rapeseeds, as gold is brought out from raw minerals, as is iron derived from stones, butter from curd, fire derived from a set of special wood, or a machine or friction, in the same way special rasas are born of special emotions such as rati and the like, with the help of special set of vibhāvā”dis. Thus enhanced emotion such as rati etc., i.e. enhanced with the help of vibhāvā”dis becomes rasa.

Explaining this process of enhancement or upacaya Bhoja observes that as salts when they get mixed up with earth etc. turn other substances into salt, i.e. make them ‘ātma-rūpa’, and thus get enhanced, in the same way, the sthāyins such as rati etc., turning the vibhāvā”dis into their own form - ātmarūpa-get enhanced and are termed rasa.

It is suggested by some that Bhoja’s idea of rasa-niṣpatti here is closer to the upacativāda supported by Daṇḍin and Lollaṭa. But its peculiarity is that at the root of this thinking lies the sat-kārya-vāda of the Sāṃkyas accordings to which kārya i.e. effect is believed to be inherently present in a dormant or un-manifest condition in the cause itself. The expression of the un-expressed, the ‘vyakta’ phase of the ‘a-vyakta’ is the essence of rasa-niṣpatti-prakriyā. Thus rasas inherently dwell in vibhāvā”dis, of course in an unexpressed form, or un-manifested form, but when these vibhāvā”di-s combine with the sthāyin they get manifested. Bhoja’s ‘prakarṣa’ may be equated with Lollaṭa’s ‘Upacaya’.

It may be noted here that by taking sthāyin, vibhāva, anubhāva, and vyabhicārin as rasa in their enhanced stage, Bhoja removes the line of demarcation that divides them. He holds that all 49 bhāvas beginning with rati etc., by getting combined with vibhāvā”di-s, and thereby getting enhanced deserve to be termed

“rasa”. He observes : (pp. 444, Śr. Pra., Ch. XI, ibid) - “ratyā”dīnām ekōna-  
pañcāśatōpi vibhāvā’nubhāva-vyabhicāri-samyogāt para-prakarṣā’dhigamo rasa-  
vyapadeśārhatā rasasyaiva madhyamā’vasthā, preyah priyatarā”khyānam ity  
upalakṣaṇena yathā rateḥ prema-rūpeṇa pariṇatis tathā bhāvāntarāṇām api  
parama-paripāke pramāṇa-rūpeṇa pariṇatau rasaikā”yanam iti rasasya paramā  
kāsthā iti pratiṣṭhitam bhavati.”

Bhoja’s explanation of rasa-sūtra pertains to the madhyamā’vasthā of rasa  
wherein not only the basic emotions, i.e. ratyā”di eight sthāyins, but all the forty-  
nine bhāvas enumerated by Bharata are said to be enhanced to the capacity of rasa.  
But as suggested by us earlier, perhaps this could be equated with the bhāva-dhvani.

How through the combination of vibhāvā”dis the bhāvas are enhanced to the  
capacity of rasa is explained by Bhoja by citing many illustrations. His words are  
: (pp. 444, Śr. Pra. Ch. XI, ibid) :

“katham punar vibhāvā’nubhāvavyabhicāri-samyogād rasa-nispatīḥ ? ucyate,  
yathēndu-sannidheś candrakāntaḥ syandate, yathā arka-sannidheś sūryakāntaḥ  
jvalati, yathā karpūra-sannidheḥ sphaṭiko vilīyate, tathā tebhyaś ālambana-  
vibhāvebhyas tadākāra-pariṇatēndriya-buddhy-upādhi-yogino”bhimāni-manasas te  
rati-krodha-śokā”dayo bhāvāḥ samutpadyante.

This explains the role of the ālambana-vibhāvas. The role of the uddīpana-  
vibhāvas is explained as (pp. 444, Ch. XI. Śr. Pra., ibid) - “yathā indūdāye samudraḥ  
kṣubhyati, yathā’pathyasevanayā vyādhir abhivardhate, yathā anārya-sannidher  
asādhuḥ sutarām duḥkhīkaroti, tatha tebhyaś tebhyaḥ uddīpana-vibhāvebhaḥ, tat-  
tad-anubhava-saṁkāra-yogino manasas tat-tat-bhāvā”bhivṛddhaye te te vikāra  
upajāyante.”

He explains the role of anubhāvas and vyabhicārins in the words (pp. 445, Śr.  
Pra., Ch. XI., ibid) :

“atha yathaikasyā’pi bhūruhā”deḥ kāṇḍa-skandha-śakhā-viṭapādayaḥ prakārāḥ,  
pallava-patra-puṣpa-phala-sampad ādayo vikārāḥ, ekasyā’py ambhasaḥ pavāhā”varta-  
budbuda-taraṅgā”dayo vivartā, muktāphala-phena-lavaṇa-karakā”dayo vipariṇāmāḥ,  
ekasyā’pi dhvaneḥ tāra-madhya-mandra-kṛṣṭā”dayo bhedāḥ, varṇa-pada-vākya-  
kūjirā”vaha-parivahā”dayaḥ skandhāḥ, prāṇā’pāna-vyānā”dayo’nubandhās tebhyaś  
tebhya upādhibhyo jāyante, tathaikasyā’pi rati-krodha-śokādes tebhyaś tebhya  
upādhibhḥ te te anubhāvā vyabhicāriṇaś ca ābhyanterā bāhyāśca vyavasthā-  
saṁbhavābhyām upaplavante-tatrā’bhyantarā vyabhicāriṣu cintaṭsukyā”vega-  
vitarkā”dayaḥ bāhyāḥ sveda-romāñcā’sru-vaivarṇyā”dayaḥ anubhāveṣvā”byantarāḥ

smaraṇecchā-dveṣa-prayanāṇāḥ bāhyā mano-vāg-buddhiśarīrā”rambhāḥ ta ubhayépy anu kriyamāṇā sāttvikā”ṅgika-vācika-citra-sāmānyā”bhinaya-vyapadeśaṃ labhante.

On pp. 445, he concludes - “atha yathékṣubhyo rasaḥ, sarṣapebhyas tailaṃ dhātubhyo hiranyam, aśmabhyo lohaṃ, dadhno navanītaṃ kāṣṭhatógnis tebhyas tebhyo yantrā’gni-mantha-samyogebhyo niṣpatati tathā svebhyah svebhyo vibhāvā’-nubhāva-vyabhicāri-samyogebhyah rati-krodha-śokā”dibhyas te te rasā niṣpadyante.”

Bhoja has some further interesting observations concerning rasa. He observes (pp. 446, Śr. Pra., Ch. XI., ibid) : “atha yathā lavaṇa-rasā”dayaḥ sva-samyogino mṛdvikādīn apyātma-rūpatāṃ nayanta upacīyante, tathā ratyā”dī-janmāno rasāḥ ratyādīn iva vibhāvādīn apy ātma-rūpatāṃ nayanta upacīyante.” Also read -

“atha yathā sarpir-jatu-madhūcchiṣṭā”dīnāṃ pāṛthivānāṃ ghana-tuhina-karakā”dīnāṃ āpyānāṃ trapu-sīsa-rajatā”dīnāṃ taijasānāṃ agni-samyogāt dravatāṃ adhis sāmānyam bhavati tathā vibhā’vanubhāva-vyabhicāriṇāṃ rasa-samyogād rasatā, rasena eva sāmānyam bhavati.”

Bhoja suggests that during the moments of art-experience the sensitive enjoyer has no cognition of vibhāvā”dī-s as something separate or independent of the total rasa-experience.

He also endorses particular taste from particular combination, though as rasa-sāmānya this event partakes of the total experience. He observes : (pp. 446, ibid) - “yathā iṅsu-rasebhyo madhu-niṣpattir yathā madhurā”dibhyo śāḍavótpattir yathā guḍā”dibhyoḥ āsavótpattis tathā tebhyas tebhyo rasa-sāmānyebhyah rasa-vīśesā”bhinirvṛtiḥ.

He believes in a fundamental rasa which has varieties such as rasā”bhāsa, bhāva, bhāvā”bhāsa etc. He observes; (pp. 446, ibid) :

“atha yathaikasyā’py agner bhaumadivyaudaryā”dayo jātibhedāḥ dāhā”loka pākā”-dayo’rthakriyāḥ (= causal effects), dhūmārcir-aṅgārā”dayóvasthāḥ saṃdrśyante tathā ekasya apī rasasya bhāva-rasa-tadābhāsā”-dayo jātibhedāḥ utkaṇṭhā”bhiṣaṅga-nirvṛtyādayó’rthakriyā’utpā’dābhivṛddhi-sthairyā”dayo’vasthās samupalabhyante.”

Thus for Bhoja ‘rasa-sāmānya’ is the highest art-experience and in the moments when this experience operates, the distinction between sthāyin, anubhāva, vyabhicārin, etc. melts away. All 49 bhāvas deserve to be reckoned as rasa, when enhanced, as they are all ‘rasyamāna’ or ‘āsvādyamāna’. Rudraṭa (XII. 4) as we know had also taken note of this and had suggested “rasanād rasatvam” of all the 49 bhāvas. Bhoja also terms the abhinayas such as vācika, āṅgika, sāttvika, āhārya and even sāmānya to be rasa which is wide enough to include even ‘nepathya’.



Now, a big number of individual rasas prop up and they being “kāvyā-śobhā-kara” are also termed as ‘aṃkāra’ in the end. It may be noted that thus rasa-experience in its wider sense is art-experience in general for Bhoja and it is not restricted to mere emotive experience only. This is the case with Ā. and Abhinavagupta also. Thus ‘rasa’ is not just the experience of śṛṅgāra and the like alone, but is total art-experience and the result is ‘Camatkāra’ or say ‘divine surprise’.

Whatever art-expression may be, if it leads to this final stage it is ‘rasā’nubhūti’ for Bhoja.

So, ultimately Bhoja seems to favour one rasa. Innumerable rasas are perhaps only bhāvas, or just aspects of a rasa-sāmānya, and when portrayed in poetry or drama, only one rasa-śṛṅgāra - which is of the form of bliss - ānanda-results. This only is ‘rasa’. It results from the tasting of words and meanings portrayed in poetry and drama (or any art). For Bhoja the highest stage or limit of rasa-experience is only one and identical and is termed ‘śṛṅgāra’ by him. In S.K.Ā. (V. i) Bhoja observes :

“rasóbhīmānóhaṃkāraḥ  
śṛṅgāra iti gīyate,  
yórtas tasyā’nvyāt  
kāvyam kamanīyatvam aśnute.”

Thus the blissful state that results as an ultimate outcome of any number of rasas experienced, is termed ‘śṛṅgāra’ by Bhoja. This final stage of bliss - “ānanda-rūpatā” - is Bhoja’s śṛṅgāra - “eka eva śṛṅgāraḥ”. This bliss is experienced by the soul adorned by ‘I’-ness i.e. ahaṃkāra and therefore is not equal to the parama-ānanda i.e. spiritual bliss of the highest rank. It is slightly lesser and hence ‘rasa’ is placed along with “ahaṃkāra-abhimāna-śṛṅgāra.”

In his Śr. Pra. (I. 3, pp. 1, Vol. I. Śr. Pra. ibid) - Bhoja observes -

“ātmasthitam guṇa-viśeṣam  
ahaṃkārasya, śṛṅgāram āhur iha  
jīvitam ātmayoneḥ,  
tasyā’tma-śakti-rasanīyatayā rasatvam,  
yuktasya yena rasiko’yam iti pravādaḥ.”

Dr. Raghavan (pp. 452) observes : “It is called śṛṅgāra not only as one that takes man to the acme of perfection, but also because it is Love, it is the very life of Ātma-yoni or Kāma. Kāma is not meant here as sexual love, even as śṛṅgāra is

not used by Bhoja here in the sense of love between man and woman and even as Bhoja's Ahaṁkāra here is not egotism.”

Bhoja, as we have seen, has observed : “śṛṅgāro hi nāma viśiṣṭeṣṭa-drṣṭa-ceṣṭā'bhivyañjakānām ātma-guṇa-sampadām utkarṣa-bījaṃ buddhisukha-duḥkhecchā-dveṣa-prayatna-saṁskārā'-tiśaya-hetuḥ ātmano'haṁkāra-viśeṣaḥ sa-cetasā rasyamānaḥ rasa ity ucyate-yad astitve rasikaḥ anyathābhāve nīrasa iti.”

Thus for Bhoja, the 'ahaṁ'-tattva, i.e. I-ness, i.e. its evocation is the very life of 'ātma-yoni' or kāma, and it takes its birth from the soul.' This self-manifested kāma is termed 'śṛṅgāra', the taste of which is apprehended by the self in the self itself. This taste is rasa.

For Bhoja the enlightened cultured person, rasika, with pure conscience does not enjoy the bliss born of the taste of poetry. But this is experienced by the 'ahaṁkāra' - the sense of I-ness that stays in the cultured person. The bliss enjoyed by this I-ness qualified by Abhimāna, is higher than worldly pleasure and when it reaches its highest limit of enhancement i.e. when it touches the peak, it is termed śṛṅgāra : “Śṛṅgaṃ rīyate.” There is only one point of this highest bliss and hence Bhoja says : “eka eva śṛṅgāraḥ”, The highest art-experience is just one and identical. He observes : (Śr. Prā. I. 6) that he calls only one i.e. Śṛṅgāra, as rasa, of course in his special sense :

“śṛṅgāra-vīra-karuṇādbhuta-raudra-hāsyā-bībhatsa-vatsala-bhayānaka-śānta nāmnaḥ, āmnāsiṣur daśa-rasān sudhiyo; vyaṃ tu śṛṅgāram eva rasanād rasam āmanāmaḥ.”

Thus the taste of I-ness - ahaṁkāra - in the soul is the pūrvā-koṭi and śṛṅgāra is the utimate i.e. paramā koṭi. Bhoja, almost echoing the words of Abhinavagupta saying 'nirvighnā saṁvit' as the highest state of rasa-consciousness, imagines what he terms as “Śṛṅgāra”. 'Rasika' for Bhoja is then a cultured person whose I-ness has developed to the extent of rasa-experience. The term 'rasa' attains its true connotation when viewed thus from the point of the 'rasika'.

Dr. Raghavan explains that Bhoja has brooded over the concept of rasa keeping in view the 'rasika' in the centre. He explains the term 'rasika' as “rasaḥ asya asti iti”, thus 'rasa' is taken as 'guṇa' i.e. excellence of an individual. Bhoja believes that this rasa-dharma in the 'rasika' is itself “ahaṁkāra”. This rasa-ahaṁkāra is seen in individual connoisseur, poet, character, naṭa or artist and also the spectator. Of course, rasa which is of the form of citta-saṁvāda (i.e. hṛdaya-saṁvāda) does not happen with all people with reference to all rasas. It is on account of this that in

the works of Bharata and others the characters are classified as *uttama*, *madyama* and *adhama*. Over and above the eight *rasas* as read in Bharata, Bhoja adds four more such as *udātta*, *uddhata*, *preyas* and *śānta*. Bhoja considers these *rasas* with reference to the four types of *nāyaka* or hero. The types are *dhīrōdātta*, *dhīra-lalita*, *dhīra-śānta* and *dhīrōddhata*.

Bharata has talks of four *prakṛti-rasas* or basic *rasas* and four *vikṛti-rasas* i.e. those born of the earlier four. Bhoja does not accept this. He discusses this problem in his own way but it may be observed, as noted by us already, that Bhoja's *śṛṅgāra* i.e. *abhimāna-śṛṅgāra* is very special and is not identical with the traditional concept of *śṛṅgāra* as seen in Bharata and the rest.

We will try to discuss further the difference between the traditional concept of *śṛṅgāra* and Bhoja's special *śṛṅgāra*, as below :

Bhoja makes it clear that the *śṛṅgāra* as imagined or explained by him is only basically the real *rasa*, and that the *śṛṅgāra* as explained in other works is no *rasa* at all. It is merely of the status of a 'bhāva' only; i.e. it is only 'rati'. In the same vein, the so called *vīra-rasa* or any other *rasa* is only a *bhāva*, a basic emotion such as *utsāha*, or whatever else as the case may be. The so called *rasas* are only *sthāyi-bhāvas*. When the cultured person, a *rasika*, relishes these different *sthāyins*, then of course the *sthāyin* concerned is in an enhanced stage with the help of the *vibhāvā*"dis, but all of them necessarily do not reach the status of a *rasa*, i.e. they do not attain to 'rasatva'. They are simply the basic emotions in an enhanced state. Now these enhanced basic emotions jointly merge into a stage called "*ahaṃkāra-abhimāna-śṛṅgāra*." Only this is *rasa*, one and only one ! It is enjoyed with the quality of the *rasika*, that is termed as *ahaṃkāra*, or his special excellence called 'abhimāna'. As the poetic emotion, i.e. *bhāva* in poetry, is caused by *bhāvanā* (i.e. it being *bhāvanā-bhāvita*) it is termed "*bhāva*". This 'bhāva' when it reaches its most enhanced stage, it is termed 'rasa'. Bhoja observes :

(Śr. Pra. I. 10) :

“ā-bhāvanodayam ananya-dhiyā janena  
yo bhāvyate manasi bhāvanayā sa bhāvaḥ,  
yo bhāvanāpatham atītya vivartamāna  
sōhaṃkrtau hr̥di paraṃ svadate rasōsau.”

Again, the *ratiyā*"di *sthāyi-bhāvas*, and *harṣa-ādi vyabhicārins* are also not different from one another in their basic nature. All *bhāvas* are of the form of the

flames of fire, and they tend to give shape of fire in form of śṛṅgāra, to rasa which basically stays as a spark i.e. sphuliṅga. Just as the flames are many but the fire is one and identical, in the same way emotions such as ratyādi which are enhanced are many, but rasa is only one and is termed ‘śṛṅgāra’. He observes (pp. 431, Śr. Pra., ibid) -

“sa śṛṅgāraḥ, śóbhimānaḥ, sa rasaḥ tata ete. ratyā”dayo jāyante. taiś cāyaṃ prakarṣa-prāptaiḥ saptārcir arcīścayair iva prakāśamānaḥ, śṛṅgāriṇām eva svādata iti.”

Bhoja treats all bhāvas on equal footing. He observes : (pp. 430, Śr. Pra., ibid) : “nanv aṣṭau sthayino’ ṣṭau sāttvikās tyastrimśad vyabhicāriṇa iti bruvate. na tat sādhu. yatómīśam anya-tamasyai tena eva parasparam nirvartyamānatvāt kaścit kadācit sthāyī kadācit tu vyabhicārī. atóvasthānāt sarvépy amī vyabhicāriṇaḥ, sarvépi sthāyinaḥ, sāttvikā api, sarva eva manaḥprabhavatvāt. anupahataṃ hi manassattvaṃ ity ucyate.”

We may observe that in the A.bh. on the śāntarasa, we read the same thought as expressed by Abhinavagupta also that even sthāyins also become vyabhicārins and vice-versa. A.bh. reads as (pp. 150, Edn. Nandī. NS. Chs. I, II, III & VI) : “jugupsām ca vyabhicāritvena śṛṅgāre niṣedhan munir bhāvānām sarvesām eva sthayitva-sañcāritva-cittajatvā-’nubhāvatvāni yogyatayópa-nīpatitāni śabdārtha-balākṛṣṭāny anujānāti.” (The reading is seen in Masson-Patwardhan).

Thus Bhoja presents his own rasa-vicāra and accepts virtually the ‘rasatva’ of only ‘śṛṅgāra’ which is certainly not in the traditionally accepted sense. His śṛṅgāra is not identical with the delineation of śṛṅgāra as seen in literature, i.e. rati-prakarṣa, but is the total effect of a literary work, i.e. it is “kāvyārtha”.

In Ch. XI. of his Śr. Pra. Bhoja explains that the termination of rasa i.e. his śṛṅgāra-rasa is in ‘prema’. Śṛṅgāra-rasa as depicted in poetic works has ‘rati’ as its basic emotion. This means love between the hero and the heroine. This love is not restricted to man and woman alone but is of the nature of a wider relation such as love for war, love for parihāsa i.e. laughter, love for the surprising theme - adbhuta, etc. Now due to the delineation of these variety of love-feelings the general love-feeling that takes shape in the heart of the cultured person, is termed śṛṅgāra when it is raised to its highest status. The śṛṅgāra of the form of rati-prakarṣa is different from this. This is borne out by Bhoja’s explanation of the four-fold śṛṅgāra such as dharma-śṛṅgāra artha-śṛṅgāra, kāma-śṛṅgāra and mokṣa-śṛṅgāra.

As observed by us earlier there are three koṭis or stages of Bhoja's śṛṅgāra. The taste in form of I-ness or ahaṁkāra is the pūrvā-koṭi, and the ratyādi-bhāva-prakarṣa is the madhyamā koṭi of rasa. In the final stage Bhoja incorporates all rasas and all bhāvas that give rise to different rasas. This is the stage of "rasa" i.e. "prema-rasa". This is the highest stage, termed "Uttarā koṭi". Bhoja says that this 'rasa' is itself termed 'prema' and the ratyā"di bhāvas are imagined to terminate in such expressions as rati-priya, raṇa-priya, etc. Bhoja (pp. 429, Śr. Pra., ibid) observes : "rasaṁ tv iha premāṇam eva āmananti. sarveṣāṁ api hi ratyādi-prakarṣānāṁ rati-priyaḥ, amaṛṣa-priyaḥ, pariḥāṣa-priyaḥ, iti premaṇi eva paryavasānāt." Abhinavagupta also has a similar observation when he says : "Sarva-rasānāṁ śānta-prāya eva āsvādaḥ.", suggesting thereby a 'mahā-rasa'.

The 'bhūmā' i.e. the highest peak of 'rati', 'hāsa', etc. is not rasa for Bhoja, but it is only his 'śṛṅgāra' that is 'rasa'. For Bhoja 'rasa' is not just a kāvya-rasa but it is an experience which terminates into 'prema' and 'self-realisation'. In short it is divine bliss.' Thus only one rasa, the śṛṅgāra that Bhoja accepts ultimately becomes 'prema-rasa', which can be bracketted with Abhinavagupta's 'mahārāsa'. Even Bhoja could have named it as 'mahārāsa'. But the difficulty is that while Abhinavagupta has equated his 'mahārāsa' with 'sat-cit-ānanda' of Paramātman, and while Jagannātha has called this ānanda to be one with the cid-ānanda of Paramātman, Bhoja begs to disagree on this count. Bhoja's śṛṅgāra is of course of the form of, 'paramānanda', but it is not exactly the 'sat-cit-ānanda' form of paramātman, but it is of the form of paramānanda which is born of the sattvaguna of the rasika who is blessed with 'ahaṁkāra-abhimāna'. Precisely for this, he terms it as, "sarvātma-sāmpad-udayā'ti-śāyaka-hetuḥ.", i.e. his śṛṅgāra drives the rasika to achieve the highest peak of ātma-guṇas or qualities of soul.

Bhoja thus takes his 'eka eva śṛṅgāra' as a synonym for 'ahaṁkāra"nanda'. We can read Bhaṭṭanāyaka's influence here, for he also called 'rasa' to be, "brahmā"svāda-sahodara" and not identical with the same. Bhoja also like Bhaṭṭahāyaka accepts rasa-carvaṇā as taking shape with the help of bhogavyāpāra.

Bhoja's rasa-vicāra thus is a new "prasthāna", so to say. Though of course, his presentation is not very neat and tidy in the sense that he gives a number of similes, i.e. resorts to metaphorical language to bring home his points. The basic fact about rasa-experience is, as the Kashmir school of thought underlines, that 'rasa' is a "lokóttara" phenomenon and therefore no worldly illustrations can explain the same. Even Bharata, when he quotes the illustration of 'śāḍavā"dirasa' is careful in bringing home this point when he insists that rasa-experience is not a physical taste but a 'mānasa-bodha'.

Bhoja's commentator Nṛsiṃha-bhaṭṭa observes that the śṛṅgāra in kāvya results in the relish of bliss only because of a favourable consciousness dawning in the heart of the rasika, and even unhappiness i.e. duḥkha turns into 'sukha' or happiness. Through its taste, the 'aḥamkāra' of the rasika is aroused and when it reaches, the highest peak it is termed 'śṛṅgāra'. Read, Śr. Pra. pp. 429 ibid : “kim tarhi śṛṅgārah ? śṛṅgāro hi nāma viśiṣṭeṣṭa-drṣṭa-ceṣṭābhivyañjakānām ātma-guṇa-saṃpadām utkarṣa-bijam, buddhi-sukha-duḥkhecchā-dveṣa-prayatna-saṃskārādyatīśaya-hetur-ātmanóhamkāra-guṇa-viśeṣaḥ sacetasā rasyamānaḥ rasa ity ucyate.” -

Nṛsiṃha observes : “yena rasyate, yena anukūla-vedanīyatayā duḥkham eva sukhatvena abhimanīyate, yena rasikāḥ aḥamkriyate, yena śṛṅgam ucchrayo rīyate sa khalu tādrśaḥ (śṛṅgāra-rasaḥ).”

From this śṛṅgāra-rasa are born all rasas and bhāvas. Bhoja observes that from a single and only element, aḥamkāra, are born vivartas in form of bhāvas : “tad astitve rasiko, tad anyathātve nīrasaḥ iti. tad āvirbhāva hetavaś ca tatprabhavā eva bhāvāḥ. For Bhoja only 'aḥamkāra' is sthāyin and hence is termed 'rasa'. From this one aḥamkāra-rasa the bhāva-prakarṣas are born and are termed 'rasa' only metaphorically. Bhoja observes (pp. 430, Śr. Pra., ibid, Ch. XI) :

“tatra kecid ācakṣate. ‘rati-prabhavaḥ śṛṅgārah’ iti. vyaṃ tu manyāmahe ratyādīnām ayam eva prabhava iti. śṛṅgārīṇo hi ratyādayo jāyante, na a-śṛṅgārīṇaḥ. śṛṅgārīṇo hi ramante, smayante, utsahante, snihyanti’iti. te tu bhāvya-mānatvād bhāvā eva, na rasāḥ. yāvat sambhavaṃ hi bhāvanayā bhāvya-māno bhāva eva ucyate. bhāvanā-patham atītas tu rasa iti. manónukūleṣu hi duḥkhādiṣv api sukhānubhavābhīmāno rasāḥ. sa tu pāramparyeṇa sukha-heturvāt ratyādi-bhūmasu upacāreṇa vyavahriyate. ato na ratyādīnām rasatvam, api tu, bhāvanā-viśayatvād bhāvatvam eva.”

These upacāra-rasas are three-fold viz. prakṛṣṭa, bhāvarūpa and ābhāsa. Whatever it may be, the bhāva remains a bhāva only and only metaphorically, due to the entrance of aḥamkāra in it, it is accepted as rasa, it being rasya-māna i.e. relished.

Bhoja increases the number of rasas when he accepts many rasas being born of one fundamental rasa. When these many rasas come together, we arrive at the rasa-saṃkara. Bhoja observes (pp. 446, ibid) : “atha yathekṣurasebhyo madhu-niṣpattir, yathā madhurādibhyaḥ śāḍavótpattir yathā guḍādibhya āsavótpattis tathā tebhyaḥ tebhyo rasa-sāmānyebhyaḥ rasa-viśeṣābhinirvṛttiḥ.” He also mentions

'jātibhedas' or types of rasas such as bhāva, rasa, tadābhāsa etc. He also talks of three stages of these such as utpāda or janma, abhivṛddhi or expansion and sthairyā or staying and also takes note of 'phala' such as 'utkaṇṭhā' and the rest. He observes (pp. 446, ibid) : "atha yathaikasyā'pyagner bhauma-divya-audaryā"dayo jātibhedah dāhā"loka-pākā"dayor'rhakriyāḥ dhūmārcir-aṅgārā"dayóvasthāḥ saṃdṛśyante tathaikasyā'pi rasasya bhāva-rasa-tadābhāsādayo jātibhedā utkaṇṭhā'-bhiṣaṅga-nirvṛttyādayórtha-kriyāḥ utpā'dābhivṛddhi-sthairyā"dayo'vasthās samupalabhante."

The many rasas as imagined by Bhoja are finally acceptable to him as "alaṃkāra", which for him is basically three-fold such as "vakrókti, svābhāvókti and rasókti." He has incorporated all discussion concerning rasa, under 'rasókti'. Under vakrókti and svābhāvókti Bhoja has covered up discussions concening 'alaṃkāra-s' and 'guṇa-s'. Thus for Bhoja, guṇa, alaṃkāra, rasa etc., being kāvya-śobhākara are basically 'alaṃkāra' in the wider sense of the term. Thus the whole poetic canvass is created through 'alaṃkāra' and through these alaṃkāras, 'rasa-aviyoga' is established in poetry.

**Agni-purāṇa** - The author of A.P. (= Agnipurāṇa; references are to "Agni-purāṇóktam kāvyālaṃkāra-śāstram"; Edn. Sampūrṇānanda SKt. Uni., Dr. Paras Nath Dwivedi, Varanasi, A.D. 1985); is positively under Bhoja's influence but he has absorbed some ideas from Abhinavagupta also. Ch. IV (Edn. ibid., pp. 71; original ch. 339, Ref. Raghavan) VS. 1-4 begin with the explanation of what is meant by 'rasa'. A.P. (Ch. IV., 1-4) reads as :

"akṣaram paramam brahma  
sanātanam ajam vibhum,  
vedānteṣu vadanty ekam  
caitanyaṃ jyotir īśvaram. 1  
ānandaḥ sahajas tasya  
vyajyate sa kadācana,  
vyaktiḥ sā tasya caitanya-  
camatkāra-rasā"hvayaḥ. 2  
ādyas tasya vikāro yaḥ  
sa mahān iti tu smṛtaḥ,  
tato'bhimānas tatrēdam  
samāptam bhuvana-trayam. 3

abhimānād ratiḥ sā ca  
paripoṣam upeyuṣī,  
vyabhicāryā”di-sāmānyāc  
chṛṅgāra iti gīyate. 4

Para-brahama or the Highest Divine is non-perishable, eternal, beyond birth and all-pervading. It is said to be one and only in the Vedānta, is of the form of consciousness, light and is the Supreme Lord.

The natural i.e. in-born bliss of that (Supreme Spirit) is manifested only at times. This manifestation (of bliss) is termed ‘caitanya’, ‘camatkāra’ and ‘rasa’. The first change (of form, from the Supreme) is termed “mahat” (tattva). From this proceeds ‘abhimāna’ and in it are covered up the three worlds. From this ‘abhimāna’ springs ‘rati’, and when this ‘rati’ is fully enhanced, with the help of accessories or vyabhicārins, it is termed “śṛṅgāra”.

It may be noted that the A.P. takes ‘rasa’ to be of the form of ‘highest bliss’ or ‘paramānanda’. Brahmāsvāda is the same as camatkāra which again is identical with ‘rasa’, according to the A.P. This is in conformation with Abhinavagupta. Bhoja on the other hand takes ‘rasa’ as paramānanda-rūpa, but for him, this joy is slightly of an inferior type when compared to the joy of consciousness, i.e. cid-ānanda of the Supreme Spirit i.e. paramātman. He places it as “aḥamkāra-abhimāna-śṛṅgāra” in a sort of a composite form. Bhoja believes that from this ‘aḥamkāra’ itself all 49 bhāvas beginning with rati arise. The A.P. on the other hand, accepts only ‘rati’ as being caused from this original source and not the other sthāyins as well. But when he attaches importance only to śṛṅgāra, he seems to follow Bhoja.

Again, A.P. believes that from śṛṅgāra other rasas emerge as off-shoots. It is observed (VS. 4-6) -

tad-bhedāḥ kāmam itare,  
hāsyā”dyā’py anekāśaḥ,  
sva-sva-sthāyiviśeśāc ca  
paripoṣā”di-lakṣaṇāḥ  
sattvā”di guṇa-santānāḥ  
jāyante paramātmanāḥ- 5  
rāgādr bhavati śṛṅgāro  
raud as taikśnyāt prajāyate,



vīrovaṣṭambhajāḥ  
saṃkocódbhūr bībhatsaḥ. 6

It is observed that ahaṃkāra-śṛṅgāra has many off-shoots such as hāsyā and the like. These are born due to the peculiarity of individual sthāyins raised to the peak, i.e. enhanced. They are born of the extension of the quality of sattva and the like of the paramātmān.

Thus, śṛṅgāra (in the ordinarily accepted sense) is born of 'rāga' or attachment, 'raudra' from fierceness, vīra from avaṣṭambha i.e. courage or pride or determination, bībhatsa from 'saṃkoca' i.e. shrinking. Like Bharata, the A.P. then observes that from śṛṅgāra, raudra, vīra and bībhatsa are born (the vikṛti-rasas, such as) hāsyā, karuṇā, adbhuta and bhayānaka respectively. The A.P. observes out of their special bhāvas are thus born the nine rasas such as śṛṅgāra, hāsyā, karuṇā, raudra, vīra, bhayānaka, bībhatsa, adbhuta and śānta.

The application of these rasas (in poetry, drama or any art-form) is said to take place, according to A.P., with the help of 'abhimāna', without which all these are of no consequence.

Dr. Raghavan (pp. 495, ibid) observes that A.P. in its Ch. 343, holds rati-śṛṅgāra as enhanced due to dharma, artha, kāma and mokṣa. But here he seems to follow Bharata who has discussed with reference to the ten types of drama, the three-fold śṛṅgāra such as based on darma, artha and kāma. He has also taken note of darma-kāma, artha-kāma, kāma-kāma and mokṣa-kāma while treating what is termed, "sāmānyābhīnaya". On the same footing, A.P. also talks of four-fold 'upaciti'-enhancement of rati-śṛṅgāra. The A.P. seems to accept rasa as the 'soul' of poetry. It seems there is a special and harmonious combination of both the Kashmir and Mālava schools of thought.

It may be noted that for the A.P. 'abhimāna' is but identical with 'ahaṃkāra'. The term 'abhimāna' does not carry the usual sense of 'ego', but is a sort of state wherein the emotions of ordinary world which yield happiness or unhappiness as the case may be, are found to be only relishable, and therefore "abhi-mata" i.e. acceptable. The sukha-duḥkhātmaka worldly experiences become of the nature of bliss and therefore acceptable due to this "abhimāna" quality, of the Supreme, i.e. a quality which is 'ātma-sthita-guṇa-viśeṣa'. It is termed rasa because it is "raṣyamāna" i.e. 'relished'. It is 'śṛṅgāra' because it takes the enjoyer to the highest peak. Thus the śṛṅgāra of A.P. is not the lust-born love of male and female, but is 'prema' or, 'ātmaniṣṭha-rati'.

The A.P. also discusses the nature of bhāvas and their relation with rasa. For the A.P. the kāvya-saṃsāra is created by the prajāpati named ‘kāvi’. If he is sensitive-sa-hṛdaya - he creates ‘sa-rasa’ kāvya, and if he is ‘vi-rāgī’ or ‘nī-rasa’, his poetry also will be without rasa. Like Bharata, A.P. also observes (Ch. IV., 28 pp. 89, Edn. ibid) -

“na bhāvahīno’sti raso  
na bhāvo rasa-varjitaḥ,  
bhāvayanti rasān ebhir  
bhāvyante ca rasā iti. 28

We cannot imagine a position when rasa is without bhāva or bhāva is without rasa. The bhāvas cause rasas, and the rasas (in turn) cause the bhāvas (i.e. as Abhinavagupta explains, it is with reference to rasas that the bhāvas are termed bhāvas). The A.P. talks of eight sthāyi-bhāvas, eight sātṭvika-bhāvas and 33 vyabhicārins. The causes of the sthāyins are termed ‘vibhāvas’ and these are two-fold such as the ālambana and uddīpana-vibhāvas. The anubhāvas are explained as - (Ch. IV. VS. 60-61, etc.) (pp. 104, ibid)

“ālambana-vibhāvasya  
bhāvair udbuddha-saṃskṛtaiḥ,  
mano-vāg-buddhi-vapuṣāṃ  
smṛtīcchā-dveṣa-yatnataḥ,  
ārambha eva viduṣāṃ  
anubhāva iti smṛtaḥ,  
sa cā’nubhūyate ca  
anubhāva iti nirucyate.”

i.e. With the help of the enhanced feelings of the ālambana-vibhāva (i.e. nāyaka, nāyikā, etc.) through the effort of smṛti, icchā, dveṣa and yatna going with mana, vāñī, buddhi and śarīra respectively, that which is born or effected is termed anubhāva. We know that Śāradātanaya, as we will go to record later, also speaks of these anubhāvas such as mana-ārambha-vāg-ārambha, and buddhyārambha., Thus these anubhāvas are prompted as physical actions promoted by mana, buddhi, or Vāk. They are placed as this or that variety on account of the part played in majority either by manas, or vāg, or buddhi. The buddhyārambha anubhāvas are

caused by the activity of buddhi and are said to be three-fold such as rīti-vṛtti and pravṛtti. A.P. (IV. 70, pp. 108, ibid) observes :

“bauddho’padeśa-vyāpārah  
sa buddhy-ārambha ucyate,  
tasya bhedās trayas te ca  
rīti-vṛtti-pravṛttayah.”

The variants available for ‘bauddho.’ and ‘buddhyā’rambha’ are, “vācopadeśa-vyāpāra” and “bauddhāya eṣa’, respectively.

Thus predominance of mental activity - mānasika-vyāpāra - is mana-ārambha-anubhāva. This is again two-fold such as pauraṣa and straiṇa. The first consists of śobhā, vilāsa etc. the eight qualities. Hāva, bhāva, helā etc. are straiṇa. The narration of speech is vāg-ārambha anubhāva. It is twelve-fold such as ālāpa, pralāpa, vilāpa, etc. The activity promoted by buddhi i.e. intelligence is of three types such as rīti-vṛtti and pravṛtti. The activity based on bodily gestures is termed śarīrārambha-anubhāva. This is twelve-fold such as līla, vilāsa, vicchitti, etc. etc. The A.P. has correlated these four vyāpāras with the four-fold abhinaya i.e. acting. The mana-ārambha is connected with sāttvika abhinaya, vāg-ārambha with vācika-abhinaya, buddhyārambha and pravṛtti are part of this. The śarīrārambha is connected with āngika-abhinaya. The activities of limbs and parts of limbs fall under this.

We have seen above how Mahimā, Dhanañjaya and Dhanika treat the topic of rasa. After Bhoja and A.P., we will pick up the thread as seen in Mammata, down to Jagannātha wherein the Kashmira School of thought has an upper hand with some minor straying away as seen in the Nāṭyadarpaṇa of Rāmacandra and Guṇacandra, whose ideas carry some impressions from different sources. Similarly, Śāradātanaya, Sāgaranandin and Rasā’ṛṇava-sudhākara of Śiṅga-bhūpāla, and then Rūpa and Jīva-Goswamin also carry some different traits. We will discuss this as under :

**Mammata** discusses ‘rasa’ following absolutely the lead of Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta. Actually we may say that the works of these three form the real “prasthāna-trayī” of alaṃkāraśāstra.

**Mammata** (= M.) observes that the basic emotion, i.e. sthāyin suggested by vibhāvā”di-s, is rasa. K.P. IV. 27, 28 (pp. 62, 64, Edn. R. C. Dwivedi, pub. Motilal

Banarasidass, Delhi, '67) read as :

“kāraṇāny atha kāryāṇi  
sahakārīṇī yāni ca  
ratyādeḥ sthāyino loke  
tāni cen nāṭya-kāvyayoḥ - IV. 27,  
vibhāvā anubhāvaś ca  
kathyante vyabhicāriṇaḥ,  
vyaktaḥ sa tair vibhāvādyaiḥ  
sthāyī bhāvo rasaḥ smṛtaḥ.” IV. 28

“Now, if the causes, effects and auxiliaries of the basic mental state, such as love, in the world are (found) in poetry and drama, they are spoken of as determinants, ensuants and transitories (respectively). The basic emotion, manifested (= suggested) through these determinants etc., is known as ‘rasa’.” (Trans. R. C. Dwivedi, pp. 63, 65, *ibid*).

Following his masters Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta M. is also clear regarding the fact that the vibhāvā”di-s in themselves are not rasa, but they make for rasa. Rasa is suggested in an unnoticeable sequence by these vibhāvā”di-s. This rasa is not identical with alaṃkāras such as rasavat and the like.

M. observes (vṛtti, K.P. IV. 25, pp. 60, 61, *ibid*) : “na khalu vibhāvā’nubhāva-vyabhicāriṇa eva rasaḥ, api tu rasas tair ity asti kramaḥ. sa tu na lakṣyate.

tatra ca,  
rasa-bhāva-tad ābhāsa-  
bhāva-śāntyādir akramaḥ,  
bhinno rasādy alaṃkāṛād  
alaṃkāryatayā sthitaḥ.” (K.P. IV. 26)

ādi-grahaṇāt bhāvodaya-bhāva-saṃdhi-bhāva-śabalarvāni. pradhānatayā yatra sthito rasā”dis tatra alaṃkāryaḥ, yathódāharīsyate. anyatra tu pradhāne vākyārthe yatrāṅgabhūto rasā”dis tatra guṇibhūta-vyaṅgye rasavat-preya-ūrjasvi-samāhitā”dayō laṃkārah. te ca guṇibhūta-vyaṅgyā’bhidhāne udāharīsyante.”

(Trans. R. C. Dwivedi, pp. 61, 63, *ibid*) : “ ‘Without perceptible’, etc., implies - it is not at all that the determinant - ensuant, and the transitory (vibhāva, anubhāva, sañcāribhāva) by themselves are rasa, but rasa is (manifested) through these, hence there is sequence but it is not perceived (owing to its quickness).

And there,

(K.P. IV. 26) The non-sequential (i.e. a-samlakṣya-krama-vyaṅgya) consisting in rasa, emotion, their semblance, pacification of the emotion and the like - is different from the figures, such as rasavat, and stands as one to be adorned.

By the use of 'and the like', are meant the 'rise of emotion', the 'co-existence of emotions', and the 'variegation of emotions'. Where 'rasa' etc. stand out prominently there it is the object to be adorned as will be illustrated later on. Otherwise, when the meaning of a sentence is prominent and rasa, etc. are subordinate, – there is the subordinate, suggested sense (i.e. mediocre poetry) are the figures rasavat, preyas, ūrjasvi, samāhita and others. And these will be illustrated later under the description of the 'subordinate suggested sense'.

For M., the worldly basic emotion i.e. laukika or loka-gata sthāyin is different from the 'suggested' i.e. 'vyakta'-sthāyin. Thus 'rasa', which is of the form of "suggested sthāyin", is different from worldly emotion, i.e. it is "sthāyī-vilakṣaṇa."

In view of this M. quotes the rasa-sūtra of Bharata and furnishes all explanations of this sūtra as advanced by Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa, Śrī. Śaṅkuka, Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka and Abhinavagupta and proceeds to get engaged in the epistemological consideration of the nature of rasa. All this we will discuss later when we take up the topic of rasa-realisation and the nature of 'rasa'.

M. further explains that in the rasa-sūtra there is mention of "vibhāva-anubhāva-and vyabhicārin", the three of them to bring home a point that the mixture of these three taken together, i.e. the whole "sāmagrī" is the cause of rasa, with which it is associated in an invariable relationship. The idea is that individual vibhāva, anubhāvas or vyabhicārin can stay away separately of a given rasa, but when they are combined in a given form, they make only for a given rasa. The 'Sāmagrī' as a whole is invariably connected with this or that rasa. Yes, poets are masters of themselves and so if in their poetry we come across the delineation of only a particular vibhāva, or a particular anubhāva or a particular vyabhicārin alone, then the other respective missing members of the combination or sāmagrī are to be imagined by a sa-hṛdaya. This means the other factors are implied if not stated directly in a given piece of poetry. Individual vibhāvas are likely to go with more than one rasa, but a given combination suggests only a given rasa alone. M. observes (Vṛtti, K.P. IV. 28, pp. 72, ibid) :

“vyāghrā”dayo vibhāvā bhayānakasya iva vīrā’dbhuta-raudrāṇam, aśrupātā”dayo’nubhāvāḥ śṛṅgārasya iva karuṇa-bhayānakayoḥ, cintā”dayo vyabhicārīṇaḥ śṛṅgārasya iva vīra-karuṇa-bhayānakānām iti prthag anaikāntikarvāt sūtre militā nirdiṣṭāḥ.”

(Trans. R. C. Dwivedi, pp. 75, ibid) :

“The determinants, tiger and the like, belong to the Heroic, the Wonderful and the Furious, as to the Terrific; the ensuants like the fall of tears belong to the Pathetic and the Terrific, as to the Erotic; the transitories like anxiety to the Heroic, the Pathetic and the Terrific, as to the Erotic. As these are not exclusive (to any particular rasa), they have been mentioned together in the aphorism (of Bharata).

M. mentions the eight rasas as read in Bharata and also mentions śānta, the ninth, half-heartedly. M. observes (K.P. IV. 35 a) (pp. 88, ibid)

“nirveda-sthāyibhāvā”khyah  
śāntópi navamo mataḥ.”

“Quietism also is the ninth rasa with detachment as its basic emotion.” This M. does perhaps under the influence of the DR. of Dhanañjaya.

Hemacandra follows the lead of the great three i.e. Ānandavardhana, Abhinavagupta and Mammata. His disciples Rāmacandra and Guṇacandra beg to differ in some respect from the Kashmir School of thought.

It may be noted that Hemacandra (= H.) in his learned commentary termed ‘Viveka’ on his own Kāvyañuśāsana, has virtually paraphrased the whole of Abhinavabhāratī on the rasa-sūtra and other portions connected with rasa, bhāva etc. He has therefore preserved very reliable readings from the original A.bh. that was available to him. It is therefore that Gnoli, and even Masson and Patwardhan have preferred readings from the A.bh. as presented by H. in his Viveka. Actually my Guru Dr. V. M. Kulkarni has given the reconstructed text of the missing portion of the A.bh. on the Bhāvādhyāya i.e. Ch. VII of the N.S. Actually H.’s viveka is the most reliable research tool for fixing up of actual readings from various sources which include not only the great works on Alampkāra such as the Vyaktiviveka of Mahimabhaṭṭa, but also the great literary works such as those of Kālidāsa. Actually in separate research papers read at various venues we have tried to fix up the variants as read in the works of

Kālidāsa with the help of H.'s viveka. But this apart, H. has the genius of presenting the most difficult topics in a lucid way and his style and presentation in this respect deserve to be placed with the greatest masters of Sanskrit prose such as the great Ādi Śaṅkarācārya and the great Ānandavardhana.

We will deal with all theoretical points concerning rasa-realisation and the like in the chapters 16 and 17 of this volume, and of course H.'s name will figure therein, but for the present we look into only that portion from the text of the Kā. Śā. wherein he discusses the topic of rasa (Ch. II. Kā. Śā. Edn. Parikh and Kulkarni, Bombay, '64. All references are to this edn.)

In the second chapter of his Kā. Śā. (pp. 88, *ibid*) he starts with the topic of rasa for consideration. He observes :

(sūtra. 26) rasa-lakṣaṇam āha-

“vibhāvā'nubhāva-vyabhicāribhir abhivyaktaḥ sthāyī bhāvo rasaḥ. (1)

vāgādy abhinaya-sahitāḥ sthāyi-vyabhicāri-lakṣaṇās citta-vṛttayo vibhāvante viśiṣṭatayā jñāyante yais tair vibhāvaiḥ kāvya-nāṭya-śāstra-prasiddhaiḥ ālambanōddīpana-svabhāvair lalanōdyā-nā'dibhiḥ, sthāyi-vyabhicāri-lakṣaṇam citta vṛtti-viśeṣam sāmājika-janōnubhavan anubhāvante sākṣātkāryate yais tair anubhāvaiḥ katākṣa-bhujā"ksēpā"dibhiḥ, vividham ābhimukhyena caraṇa-śilair vyabhicāribhir dhṛti-smṛti-prabhṛtibhiḥ, sthāyibhāvā'numāpakatvena loke kāraṇa-kārya-sahacāri-śabda-vyapadeśyaiḥ, mamaivaite parasyaivaite na mamaite, na parasyaite iti sambandhi-viśeṣa-svīkāra-parihāranīyama-anavasāyāt sādharmaṇyena pratītair abhivyaktaḥ, sāmājikānām vāsanā-rūpeṇa sthitaḥ sthāyī ratyādiko bhāvo niyatapramāṭṛgatvena sthitōpi sādharmaṇōpāyabalāt sahrdaya-hṛdaya-saṃvāda-bhājā, sādharmaṇyena gocarī-kriyamāṇas carvyamāṇataika-prāṇo, vibhāvā'di-bhāvanā-vadhir alaukika-camatkāra-kāritayā para-brahmā'svāda-sodaro, nimīlita-nayanaiḥ kavi-sahrdayai rasyamāṇaḥ sva-saṃvedana-siddho rasaḥ.”

After this in the Viveka follows the discussion on rasa-niṣpatti-prakriyā, wherein the text of the A.bh. containing the views of Lollata and others is preserved with purest of pure readings. This takes up pp. 89-102 (text, *ibid*), and then follows in the body of the text the epistemological consideration of the nature of rasa as read in the A.bh. and the K.P., (pp. 103, *ibid*). This we will pick up later.

The portion as quoted above explaining the fact of rasa also contains full impressions of what we read in the A.bh. and also in the K.P. The substance of this paragraph can be explained as follows :

Hemacandra (= H.) following Mammaṭa (= M.), Abhinavagupta and Ānandavardhana (= Ā.) is very clear that suggested basic emotion “abhivyaktaḥ sthāyī bhāvaḥ” is “rasa”. This is done with the help of ‘vibhāvā’di’s. He further explains the terms vibhāva etc. as follows. Vibhāvas or determinants are so called because through them are caused to be known the sthāyin or basic emotions in a very special way : “vibhāvyante viśiṣṭatayā jñāyante yaīḥ taiḥ vibhāvaiḥ” says H. These vibhāvas cause the mental states such as sthāyins or permanent or basic emotions and vyabhicārins or transitory mental states be known in a very special way. This “very special way” i.e. ‘viśiṣṭatayā’ means these mental states, though residing in individual ‘sāmājika’, are not known or are not brought to light as individual mental states. This means they cease to be personal. There is no cognition such as “these are my feelings or emotions, or these are not my feelings or emotions, or that these are or are not somebody else’s feelings and emotions.” Actually the cognition of the emotions is so very special that it is cleared of any relation whatsoever with anyone, present or past or even future. This is the magic of the ‘vibhāvas’ or determinants. The power of these vibhāvā’di’s gets rid of any personal relationship between the emotion manifested and any individual. The vibhāvas, explains H., are two-fold such as ‘ālambana’ and ‘uddīpana’ i.e. the substrate and the stimulating causes, known both in poetry and drama, such as the hero, heroine etc. and garden etc. These two types of vibhāvas are the causes so to say. The ‘anubhāvas’ or consequents or ensuants are factors that cause to apprehend the feelings and emotions. These anubhāvas are so to say ‘effects’, such as the side-glance, and the tossing of arms etc. that cause the feeling of, say love, to apprehend. The sāmājika is caused to apprehend various emotions and feelings by the physical expression of feelings. The third factor is the vyabhicārins or transitory feelings that go hand in hand with the basic emotions and as explained by M., and these cause to enhance the basic emotions. These three i.e. vibhāvas, anubhāvas and vyabhicārins are known in ordinary parlance as kārana, kārya and saha-cārins respectively. They stand as factors that help the inference of a particular feeling or emotion in a given person in worldly context. Here, in the context of poetry and drama or art in general, these three factors are revealers or suggesters so to say and not causes that lead to inference. The feelings suggested are not personal feelings of a given person or character. The emotions and feeling thus evoked are so to say de-individualised i.e. “sādhāraṇyena pratīta.” They are collected in a non-personal form. Emotion thus



evoked or suggested by impersonalised vibhāvā”dis is termed “rasa”. The acting in case of drama, or description of acting in case of poetry helps the cause of the vibhāvā”dis. These abhinayas are four-fold such as acting connected with speech, body, mind and external apparatus, such as stage-decoration, costumes, make-up, etc. This generalised suggested or evoked emotion is enjoyed by the sāmājika, who himself is also placed beyond personal relationship. The sāmājika has attained a status wherein he acquires aesthetic sympathy - “sahrdayahrdaya-samvāda”, and thus is beyond personal hates and likes, preferences and prejudices. The emotion thus evoked actually stays in the heart of the sāmājika as a result of impressions of past births, observes H. But these generalised emotions when suggested by generalised vibhāvā”dis are free from personal bindings. They are therefore relished, become the object of aesthetic delight. ‘Relishing’ is its life-breath. This relishing lasts till the presentation of vibhāvā”dis lasts. This relish is of the nature of a-laukika i.e. extra-worldly bliss or camatkāra. This enjoyment of suggested basic emotion through means of art i.e. vibhāvā”dis, is termed “rasa” which is ‘sva-samvedana-siddha’ i.e. object of extraordinary self-experience. It is located in art only, i.e. it is “sui generis” or exclusive to art. H. observes that the enjoyment called ‘rasa’-experience is similar to the taste of ultimate reality - i.e. “para-brahmā”svāda-sahodara”.

H. as noted earlier, accepts ‘śānta’ as the ninth rasa without any reservation as seen even in M. we will discuss the problem of śānta-rasa, the number of rasas etc. in the next chapter.

We will discuss the concept of rasa as seen in the Nāṭyadarpaṇa (= ND.) of Rāmacandra and Guṇacandra later when we pick up works on dramaturgy. Though of course chronologically the N.D. should follow the Kā. Śā., but we will pick up this work along with other works on dramaturgy. We could have taken even the DR. of Dhanañjaya separately. But on account of the anti-vyañjanā stance, and on account of its earlier date we considered that work earlier. The other works on dramaturgy more or less follow the lead of vyañjanā-dhvani-vādins. Even Śāradātanaya is not anti-vyañjanā-theorist. So, we will now move on to Vāgbhaṭa (I), the author of Vāgbhaṭāṭamkāra or kāvyā’lāmkāra.

Vāgbhaṭa (V. i) is of the opinion that, even if it is perfectly cooked, food is not palatable without salt, in the same way poetry without rasa is not enjoyable.

He seems to belong to the tradition of those, including Śaṅkuka perhaps, who hold that the basic emotion i.e. sthāyin enhanced by anubhāvas, vibhāvas, sāttvikas and vyabhicārins is rasa :-

“anubhāvair vibhāvaiś ca  
sāttvikair vyabhicāribhiḥ,  
āropyamāṇa utkarṣaṁ  
sthāyī bhāvo bhaved rasaḥ.”

It is interesting to read ‘sāttvika bhāvā over and above the three viz. vibhāva, anubhāva and vyabhicārins.

The ND. of Rāmacandra and Guṇacandra also observe, as we will go to see later that “śrītótkarṣaḥ sthāyibhāvaḥ rasaḥ.” It may be interesting to note further that Vāgbhaṭa (I), at V. 3, enumerates the sthāins which go to include ‘śama’ also. Thus he supports the case of śāntarasa, as is done by Udbhṭa. At I. 4, he mentions nine rasas along with śānta and observes that these nine are supported by the wise : navaite niścītā budhaiḥ.” He proceeds to deal with two-fold śṛṅgāra and then with nāyaka. He talks of nine rasas individually also. He does not enter into any theoretical discussion concerning rasa-realisation.

Vāgbhaṭa (II) follows M. and the Kashmir tradition. He observes (V; pp. 53, Edn. NS., 1915) : “tatra vibhāvānubhāvair vyabhicāribhis’ cābhivyaktā rati-hāsa-śoka-krodhótsāha-bhaya-jugupsā-vismaya-śamāḥ sthāyino bhāvāḥ, krameṇa śṛṅgāra-hāsya-karuṇa-raudra-vīra-bhayānaka-bībhātsa-adbhuta-śāntā nava rasā bhavanti.

He proceeds to discuss each rasa along with its vibhāvā”dis. Then he describes the thirty three vyabhicārins, and eight sāttvikas. He then talks of rasābhāsa and bhāvābhāsa born of ‘an-aucitya’. Then he talks of rasa-doṣas and their exceptions, three-fold prakṛti or nature, four-fold nāyakas, three-fold nāyikā, the eight avasthā or states of nāyikās, etc.

**Jayadeva, in Candrāloka (VI 1-3) talks of rasa as follows :**

ālambano’ddīpanā”tmā  
vibhāvaḥ kāraṇaṁ dvidhā,  
kāryo’nubhāvo bhāvaśca  
sahāyo vyabhicāry api.” (VI. i)  
galad-vedyāntarod bhedaṁ  
hṛdayeṣv a-jaḍātmanām,

milan-malayajā"lepa-  
 iva"hlādaṃ vikāsayan (VI. ii)  
 kāvyē nāṭye ca kārye ca  
 vibhāvya"dyair vibhāvitaḥ,  
 āsvādyamānaika-tanuḥ  
 sthāyibhāvo rasaḥ smṛtaḥ." (VI. iii)

Here Jayadeva (= J.) uses the term 'vibhāvita' in the sense of 'abhi-vyakta'. The rest follows the lead of the Kashmir tradition. He had also noticed, while defining poetry, that the poetic expression has to be accompanied by rasa. He does not go for any theoretical discussion on the nature of rasa. He goes on to deal each rasa individually. He also accepts śānta and observes at VI. 13 -

"nirveda-sthāyikaḥ śāntaḥ  
 satsaṅgā"di-vibhāva-bhūḥ,  
 kṣamādikā'nubhāvo'yam  
 stambhādi-vyabhicāraḥ."

Then he talks of sthāyins and vyabhicārins, rasābhāsa and bhāvābhāsa, bhāvaśānti, bhāvodaya, bhāva-śabalatā and bhāva-saṃdhi etc. and then rītiḥ.

Vidyādhara in his Ekāvalī (III. i) following the Kashmir tradition accepts rasa to be collected by vyañjanā and he denounces, after M., the tātparyavāda. He also discusses the nature of rasa after M. He establishes that rasa is not inferred, nor recollected (smṛti), nor effected (i.e. kārya), but is of an extra-ordinary nature. He accepts all rasas including the karuṇa, to be of the nature of bliss or ānanda, and is of the form of happiness and is an experience wherein all consciousness of anything but itself is melted away - 'vigalita-vedyāntara'. He takes rasa to be that taste which is born of the perception i.e. suggestion of 'kāvyārtha' and is born of the bliss of self :

"svādaḥ kāvyārtha-saṃbhedād ātmānanda-samud-bhavaḥ."

The taste is four-fold with reference to the position of the conscience such as vikāsa, vistara, vikṣobha and vikṣepa. The 'Vikāsa' is explained on the analogy of the blossoming of flowers. Vistāra is the expansion like that of a tree. Vikṣobha or disturbance is like that of an ocean and vikṣepa is like the hustling due to wind. We may read the impression of the DR. here. The four upādhis of citta of the form of vikāsa, vistara etc. are respectively called śṛṅgāra, vīra, raudra and bībhatsa.

‘Upādhi’ is explained by Vidyādhara as bhūmikāśraya - i.e. The basic. The four upādhis are also to be counted respectively in case of hāsyā, adbhuta, karuṇa and bhayānaka. All this follows Bharata. Vidyādhara's presentation is clean and lucid.

**Vidyānātha** : The rasa-prakarāṇa, in the Pratāpa-rudrīya (= PR.) begins with this observation : (pp. 155, Edn. '14, Madras, Chandrasekhara Shastrigal) - atha sarveṣāṃ prabandhānāṃ jīvitabhūtasya rasasya svarūpaṃ nirūpyate - “vibhāvānubhāva-sāttvika-vyabhicāri-sāmagrī-samullāsita-sthāyibhāvo rasaḥ.”

It may be noted that Vidyānātha calls ‘rasa’ to be the very life of all poetic compositions. But he is clearer in forming the rasa-sūtra with the mention of sāttvika-bhāvas in the ‘sāmagrī’ i.e. combination that makes for the blossoming (“samullāsita”) of the sthāyi-bhāva, termed rasa (in its ‘samullāsita’ state). He seems to be under the influence of the school of thought as represented by the Agni-purāṇa which also mentions “sāttvika-bhāva” separately.

Kumārasvāmin in his “Ratnāpaṇa” (pp. 155, 156, ibid) observes :

vakṣyamāṇa-lakṣaṇā vibhāvādāya eva sāmagrī, tayā sarasa-kāvya-saṃgrī hītayā, nipuṇa-naṭa-pradarśitayā vā, sāmājika-bhāvya-mānayā samullāsita āsvādyamāno nirbharā”nandaḥ saṃvid-rūpatāṃ nīyamānaḥ sann ity arthaḥ. tad uktam bhāva-prakāśe - “prakāśānanda-cid-rūpāṃ rasatāṃ pratipadyate, prakṣyamāṇo yo bhāvaḥ sa sthāyīti nigadyate”, iti. evaṃvidhaḥ sāmājika-niṣṭho ratyā”disthāyibhāvo, rasyate āsvādyate iti vyutpattyā rasa ity ucyate. tad uktam - “rasateḥ svādanārthatvād rasyanta iti te rasāḥ.”

Kumārasvāmin seems to suggest that the combination i.e. sāmagrī which is of the form of vibhāva, etc., - which is presented either by poetry or by the expert actor (in case of dramatic art), - and the sāmagrī which is relished by the sāmājika gives rise or causes to sprout, the highest joy which is made of consciousness. The Bhāvaprakāśana is quoted as saying that - “That is called sthāyi-bhāva which is enhanced and is relished (rasatāṃ pratipadyate) in form of consciousness made of light and bliss.” Thus, this type of ratyādi-sthāyin, based in the self of the sāmājika, when enjoyed, or tasted is termed rasa, because of its being “tasted”. He quotes a source suggesting that because it is tasted or enjoyed it is termed ‘rasa’; the √ras is in the sense of ‘being tasted’.

One thing is clear that Vidyānātha, perhaps under the influence of the mālava school of thought, uses the terms “samullāsita-sthāyibhāvo rasaḥ”. He could have clearly stated “abhivyaktaḥ” or “vyaktaḥ”, as he himself, as observed earlier, does accept ‘vyaṅgyārtha’, ‘vyañjanā’ and “dhvani”. But his loyalty towards the Mālava

school of thought is also clear when he quotes from the DR. (pp. 157, *ibid*) :

“tathā coktaṃ daśa-rūpake -  
 “vibhāvair anubhāvaiś ca  
 sāttvikair vyabhicāribhiḥ,  
 ānīyamāṇaḥ svādutvaṃ  
 sthāyī bhāvo rasaḥ smṛtaḥ.”

He goes on to explain ‘sthāyī-bhāvaḥ’, after the DR. He observes that ‘sthāyī-bhāva’ is so termed because it is not over-powered by similar or dissimilar feelings or emotions in the moments of the rasa being experienced. Again he quotes the DR. (pp. 158, *ibid*) -

“sa-jātiyair vijātiyair  
 a-tiraskṛta-mūrtimān,  
 yāvad rasaṃ vartamāṇaḥ  
 sthāyī bhāvaḥ udāhrtaḥ.”

Then he mentions nine rasas including the śānta and also mentions ‘śama’ the sthāyīn of śānta, along with the other eight, viz. rati hāsa, etc. Here he seems to accept the lead of Ā. and Abhinavagupta in accepting ‘śānta’ - rasa clearly as an independent rasa.

Vibhāva (pp. 158, *ibid*) for him is the cause of the birth of rasa - “rasotpādana-kāraṇam”, and is said to be two-fold such as the ālambana and uddīpana. The ālambana-vibhāva is said to be “rasa-samavāyi-kāraṇa” (pp. 159) - Thus it is the inseparable or material cause of rasa. The separable or a-samavāyi-kāraṇa is the uddīpana-vibhāva. “itarat kāraṇajātam uddīpana-vibhāvaḥ.” (pp. 159, *ibid*). He quotes here from “śṛṅgāra-tilaka”.

‘Anubhāva’ is explained as effect - “kārya-bhūto’nubhāvaḥ” (pp. 159, *ibid*)

The sāttvika-bhāvas are explained (pp. 159, *ibid*) as - “atha sāttvika-bhāvāḥ” - paragata-sukhā’dibhāvanayā bhāvirāntaḥ-kāraṇatvaṃ sattvaṃ. tato bhavaḥ sāttvikāḥ.” ‘Sattva’ is that state of mind which is pervaded by imaginary feelings of happiness or unhappiness as actually experienced by others. Through this mental state i.e. ‘sattva’, are born the sāttvika bhāvas. This means the exhibition of sāttvika-bhāvas on the part of an expert actor rests on his capacity to identify his mental state with the mental state of someone else, and this requires concentration of mind. Vidyānātha simply enumerates the thirty-three vyabhicārins (pp. 161, *ibid*). He does not define the same but quotes the K.P. IV - viz. “kāraṇāny atha kāryāṇi... vyabhicārīṇaḥ.”

He draws a line of distinction between rasa and rasā”bhāsa, when he observes (pp. 162, ibid) -

“loke kārya-kāraṇa-sahakāri-śabdavācya nāyikā-nāyaka-kaṭākṣa-bhrūkṣepa-nirvedā”dayaḥ, kāvya-nātyayos tu vibhāvānubhāva-vyabhicāri-śabda-vyapadeśyā bhavanti. śṛṅgāra-vīra-raudrā'dbhutānām lokottara-nāyakā”śrayatvena paripoṣātiśayaḥ ata eva śṛṅgārasya mlecchā”di-viṣayatve tv ābhāsatvam.”

He further observes : (pp. 162, 3 ibid) - tathā cōktam -

ekatraivā'nurāgaś cet  
tiryāṅ-mleccha-gato'pi vā,  
yoṣito bahu-saktiś ced  
rasā”bhāsas tridhā mataḥ.”

Thus one-sided feeling (ekatra-eva-anurāga, as in case of Rāvaṇa's infetuation for Sītā), or love with reference to unsophisticated or uncultured people, or love with many ladies (or males also ?) at a time, gives rise to three-fold rasā”bhāsa.

He also talks of the four viz. bhāva-śānti, bhāvodaya, bhāvasaṁdhi and bhāvaśabalatā with reference to the four states of the vyabhicārins.

Then he goes for the explanation and definition of the ratyādi sthāyins. He ends here with śama. Śama is defined as 'nirvikāra-cittatva' due to 'vairāgyā”di', wherein 'ādi' implies “īśvarānugraha, satsaṅga”, etc. Then he picks up the eight sāttvikas. (pp. 171, ibid). Thirty-three vyabhicārins are the next to be defined and illustrated. (pp. 173-186 ibid).

Then he observes (pp. 187, ibid) that as the sāttvikas and the vyabhicārins are individually associated with many rasas, no illustration with reference to just one rasa is given. For example all are associated with śṛṅgāra - “tatra sāttvikānām vyabhicāriṇām ca anekarasa-sādhāraṇatvān na viśeṣam apeksya udāharaṇam kṛtam. tathā hi śṛṅgāre sarveṣām anupraveśaḥ sambhavati.”

Then Vidyānātha discusses śṛṅgāra-ceṣṭā such as bhāva, hāva, helā, etc. which are eighteen in number. Then twelve states - 'avasthāḥ' of śṛṅgāra such as cakṣuḥ-prīti etc. ending with 'maraṇa' are described with reference to the four-fold expression such as 'aṅkuritatva', 'pallavitattva', 'kusumitatva' and 'phalitatva'.

Then he talks of two-fold śṛṅgāra such as saṁbhoga and vipralambha (pp. 199, ibid) following again the lead of 'Śṛṅgāra-tilaka'. The four sub-varieties of the latter, such as abhilāṣa, īrṣyā, viraha and pravāsa are also discussed. Then rasā”bhāsa, bhāvodaya, bhāvasāma, bhāva-saṁdhi and bhāva-śabalatā are

illustrated (pp. 201-203, *ibid*). Rasa-saṃkara is taken up next and illustrated. He means by this the co-existence of rasas in a single verse or composition.

He then talks of the substratum of rasa. Here he talks perhaps of worldly rasa as staying in the hero : (pp. 205, *ibid*) : “atra raso nāyakāśraya eva”. But he talks of sāmājika-gata-rasa also. We feel that in taking rasa to be anukārya-rāmā”dināyakā”śraya, Vidyānātha is under some misconception of rasa. For the followers of the Kashmir School, rasa always resides in art and never in real life. “rasas tu nāṭya eva, na loke” (A.bh. NS. Ch. VI). But Vidyānātha observes : (pp. 205, *ibid*) :

“atra raso nāyakā”śraya eva. yadi param nipuṇa-nāṭa-ceṣṭayā tathāvidhakāvya-śravaṇa-balena ca sāmājikaiḥ sāksād bhāvyate, tadā paragatasyāpi rasasya samyag-bhāvanayā paratra niratiśayā”nanda-jananam a-viruddham.” i.e. For Vidyānātha, rasa primarily resides in the original nāyaka. But looking at the imitation by an expert actor, or by listening to poetry describing feelings of others, when men of taste (sāmājikas) enjoy rasa, it is said to be ‘para-gata’ also i.e. residing elsewhere and not in the original hero.

Then he talks of the rasa, i.e. a-laukika-rasa as residing in the sāmājikas also on the strength of sādharmaṇīkaraṇa. But whatever Vidyānātha writes, as we quote below, suggests only his primary understanding of ‘rasa’. Even his commentator Kumāraswāmin also, as observed by us elsewhere also, depicts an immature understanding of the fact of rasa. Vidyānātha observes (pp. 205, *ibid*)

“atra raso nāyakā”śraya eva. yadi param nipuṇa-nāṭaceṣṭayā tathāvidha-kāvya-śravaṇa-balena ca sāmājikaiḥ sāksād bhāvyate tadā paragatasyāpi rasasya samyag bhāvanayā paratra niratiśayā”nanda-jananam a-viruddham.” The commentator Kumāraswāmin observes (pp. 205, *ibid*) here - “tair (= if by the sāmājikas) yadi param sāksād bhāvyate, kevalam svasambandhitvena anu-saṃdhīyate ced ity arthaḥ. tarhi putrā”dyā”nanda-darśane pitrā”di-vad atrāpyā”nanda udetīti bhāvaḥ.” - All this seems childish.

Then says Kumāra-swāmin, Vidyānātha explains the a-laukika-rasāśraya : “atha alaukika-rasasyā”śrayam āha.” “athavā iti...” Vidyānātha observes : (pp. 205, *ibid*) - “athavā mālaty ādi-śabdebhyaḥ yoṣinmātra pratitau, rāvaṇā”di-śabdebhyaḥ śatru-mātra-pratitau ca smṛty ārūdhena tat-tad-yosidviśeṣeṇa anukāryeṇa sāmājikāśrayatvam na viruddham.

The N.D. of Rāmacandra and Guṇacandra also exhibits immature understanding concerning rasa, in like fashion as done by Vidyānātha. We will consider it later.

Vidyānātha rules out the case of ‘naṭa’ experiencing rasa, for he simply imitates : (pp. 206, *ibid*) - “naṭasya anukarāṇa-mātra-paratayā naiva rasāśraya-yogyatā.” But gives some concession as is done by the ND., such as when the naṭa becomes a ‘bhāvuka’ or a sympathiser like a sāmājika, he may experience rasa - “tasya bhāvukatvābhīyupagame’pi sāmājikatvam eva” - Thus as a sāmājika he is entitled to enjoy rasa !

Vidyānātha holds, following Bharata and the rest, that the manifestation of anubhāvas (on the part of the actor) depends on expertise due to training, practice etc.

He discusses rasa-virodha smoothened by poet's expert handling. He talks of ‘rasād rasōtpatti’, again following the lead of Śṛṅgāra-tilaka. He talks of vyabhicārins that go with this or that rasa, again following Śṛṅgāra-tilaka.

He observes that (pp. 208, *ibid*) : “bhāratīyōkta-prakriyayā yady apy eka eva rasas tathāpi mahākavi-prasiddhayā rasa-saṃkaraḥ svīkriyate.”

We do not know what he is aiming at by ‘bhāratīyōkta prakriyā’. But he seems to recommend that basically there is one rasa but rasas are said to be many with reference to the practice of the great good poets. Here perhaps he shows impressions of both Abhinavagupta and Bhoja.

Then talking about rasavad ādi alaṃkāras, Vidyānātha proceeds to observe (pp. 208, *ibid*)

“tatra rasā”der a-prādhānye rasavad ādy alaṃkāraḥ bhavanti. anyāṅgatvena rasa-nibandhane rasavad alaṃkāraḥ, bhāva-nibandhane preyo’laṃkāraḥ. rasābhāsa-bhāvābhāsa-nibandhane ūrjasvi alaṃkāraḥ. bhāva-śānti nibandhane samāhitā’laṃkāraḥ. tathā bhāvodayo’pi.”

He seems to follow here the lead of Alaṃkāra-sarvasva. He observes : (pp. 208, *ibid*) : “etad alaṃkāra-sarvasve prapañcena uktam.” He says that these will be illustrated in the chapter on alaṃkāras.

At the end of the chapter on rasa, he tries to give a sort of summary that helps in apprehending the nature of rasa : All this is mostly under the influence of the Mālava School of thought. He observes (pp. 208, 211, *ibid*) :

“guṇā’laṃkāraśrī-kṛta-parikaro bhāvavibhavaḥ sphurat-prādurbhāvaḥ kramagalita-vedyāntarasukhaṃ vā duḥkhaṃ vā nibīdayaty yūnoḥ sahrdaye tvamandānandātmā pariṇamati pūrṇo rasabharāḥ” raso vākyārthaḥ san vilasati



padārthāḥ punaramī vibhāvādyā yasmin kila dadhati viśrāntim ucitām, ato bhāvā eva krama-samuditānyonya-vibhavā rasībhāvaṃ bibhraty atha ca paṭatām tantavarvaiva. bhāve sthāyini vardhamāna vibhave ratyādike sindhuvat kallolā iva sambhavanti vilayaṃ cā'yānti bhāvā muhuh, nirvedādy upabhoga-bhāvita-nijāśvādātireko raso loka syād anukārya eva kathito nātye tu sāmājike."

The commentator takes pains to explain that a-laukika rasa is necessarily with reference to the sāmājika in the opinion of Vidyānātha. He quotes Śāradātanaya and Naraharisūri to support his observation.

It is clear that both Vidyānātha and his commentator Kumāraswāmin are equally not clear about the basic nature of rasa.

Viśvanātha (= V.) the author of Sāhityadarpaṇa is crystal clear in his understanding of the nature of rasa. He accepts the supreme importance of rasa and holds it to be the very soul of poetry : "vākyaṃ rasā'tmakam kāvyam"- is his famous definition of poetry. Of course, he recognises rasa as form of dhvani, the 'a-samlakṣya-krama' variety as done by Ā., but he devotes an entire chapter to rasa (= S.D. III.), wherein he has presented the summary and significance of rasa-theory as advocated by the great Ā. and also Abhinavagupta, followed by Mammāṭa. Actually V. has a thorough grasp of the essence of the theory of rasa as against the immature understanding on the part of such followers of the Mālava School of thought as Vidyānātha, Kumāraswāmin and the rest. Actually, Kuntaka Dhanañjaya, Dhanika, Mahimā and also Bhoja were never in doubt regarding the basics of the nature of rasa. Only such theorists as Rāmacandra, Guṇacandra, Vidyānātha, Kumāraswāmin, or even the handsome jain monk Siddhicandra had some misconceptions concerning the true nature of rasa. For the present we will consider what V. has to say on this topic.

V. begins the Ch. III. of his S.D. with the words :

atha kōyaṃ rasa ity ucyate -

"vibhāvenā'nubhāvena  
vyaktaḥ sañcārīṇā tathā,  
rasatām eti ratyā'diḥ  
sthāyibhāvaḥ sa-cetasām."

This is clearly after M. (K.P. IV. 28). Viśvanātha observes that "vyaktaḥ" i.e. suggested basic emotion such as 'rati' - love, and the like, attains to the status of being 'rasa', through the agency of the determinants, the consequents and the

accessories or accompanying subordinate feelings. This rati and other basic emotions stay in the cultured enjoyer (= reader or spectator)

V. observes that the “sāttvika bhāvas” being of the form of anubhāvas, are not separately mentioned. We know that this is done by Dhanañjaya and some of his followers.

V. knows that this suggestion of rasa is not ‘manifestation’ which is technically of an object which has its independent existence even prior to its moment of manifestation. It is precisely for this reason that Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka had objected to “abhi-vyakti” as advocated by Ā. So, to be theoretically clearer, V. suggests that in case of rasa, this abhivyakti is to be understood on the analogy of the formation of curd through milk. Here the sthāyin, when ‘vyakta’ attains to a new form as that of ‘curd’ which is not ‘milk’. Actually Ā., Abhinavagupta and M. meant exactly this when they talked of the “abhivyakta sthāyin” being ‘rasa’. Suggestion is not manifestation. ‘Suggestion’ is unique to art. It is “sui generis”; it is exclusive to art, and therefore it is ‘lokóttara’ - Abhinavagupta had observed that as such a thing is not to be seen in the worldly context, it is therefore that it is termed “a-laukika”. But sadly Bhaṭṭa-Nāyaka had not grasped this point and therefore he levelled a criticism on the ‘abhivyakti of rasa’, which he should not have done.

But V. has resorted not to the ‘Vivarta-vāda’ or the theory on illusory change, but to pariṇāma-vāda to explain this fact of abhivyakti. He observes : (S.D., Vṛtti, III. i; pp. 70, Edn. Chowkhambha SKT. Saṁsthān, Varanasi, '85; with Lakṣmī Comm.) “vyakto dadhyādi-nyāyena rūpāntara-pariṇato vyaktīkṛta eva rasah. na tu dīpena ghaṭa iva pūrva-siddho vyajyate.” He quotes Locana to support his observation : “tad uktaṁ locanakāraiḥ - “rasaḥ pratīyanta iti tv odanam pacati iti-vad vyavahāraḥ.” The idea is that when we say that a cook is cooking rice, it is only a metaphorical expression, because the rice-corns when they are cooked are termed rice. Thus ‘sthāyī’ is “abhivyakta” - is only a metaphorical expression for the very process is to be understood as rasa-enjoyment. There is no distinction here between the process and object of suggestion. This is a unique phenomenon. So, V. says that ‘rasa’ is not pre-existent as is the case with a jar lying in darkness and manifested by a lamp. The process of abhivyakti of sthāyin is itself rasa. We may add here that the transformation of worldly objects that cause happiness or unhappiness in a form which offers only supreme bliss is also, so to say, “rūpāntara-prāpti”.

It may be noted that this observation on the part of V., may be taken as his original insight in the nature of rasa. Even Abhinavagupta was at pains to explain this ‘abhivyakti’ which is not strictly in the philosophical sense i.e. “dārśanika” sense

as is taken generally. That 'abhivyakti' has to be taken in a loose sense prompted the great Abhinavagupta to concede that rasa may be said to be of course in a loose sense, 'kārya' or 'effected', or 'pratyeya' i.e. 'inferred'. Actually no dārśanika terminology is perfect enough for its being applied to this fact and process of rasa. It is for this that 'rasa' is termed to be 'a-laukika' i.e. 'extra-worldly'.

Viśvanātha then proceeds to explain the secret of the word "sthāyin" as read in this sūtra. He says that in the expression "ratyādiḥ sthāyibhāvaḥ", the term "sthāyibhāvaḥ" is already covered up by the mention of "ratyādiḥ", but it is separately mentioned precisely to bring home the fact that 'ratyādi', which are 'sthāyin's in one context may become vyabhicārins in another context also. We know that Abhinavagupta had noted this fact while discussing the śānta-rasa in his A.bh. The substance is that whatever attains to the position of rasa is only to be taken as 'sthāyin'. - "atra ca ratyā"di-padópādānād eva prāpte sthāyitve, punaḥ sthāyi-padópādānaṃ ratyā"dīnām api rasāntareṣv a-sthāyitva-pratipādānārtham." (vṛtti, S.D. III. i., pp. 71, ibid)

V. then proceeds to observe (pp. 71, ibid) : "asya svarūpa-kathana-garbha āsvādana-prakāraḥ kathyate." i.e. The mode of enjoyment, which is having the narration of its nature inherent in it, is being stated." The Laxmī ṭīkā explains (pp. 71, ibid) - "svarūpa-kathanaṃ garbhe yasya saḥ, āsvāda-prakāraḥ anubhavā"kāraḥ āsvāda-prakāra ity aupacārikaḥ prayogaḥ, āsvādābhinnatvāt."

Viśvanātha observes : (S.D. III. 2, 3, pp. 71, ibid)

"sattvódrekād a-khaṇḍa  
svaprakāśānanda-cinmayaḥ,  
vedyāntara-sparśa-sūnyo  
brahmā"svāda-sahodaraḥ - 2  
lokóttara-camatkāra-prāṇaḥ  
kaścit pramāṭṛbhiḥ  
svā"kāraavad abhinnatvena  
ayam āsvādyate rasaḥ." - 3

Rasa is relished as non-different from one's own self, according to some connoisseurs. It has extra-worldly supreme delight - camatkāra as its life breath. It is akin to the taste of Brahman the supreme spirit. When it is being tasted, the consciousness concerning other worldly objects evaporates for the time being. On account of the exuberance of 'sattva', rasa, of the form of consciousness, supreme

joy, light and having no parts, is enjoyed by the connoisseurs. Rasa is said to be of the nature of boundless bliss - ‘nirbharā’nanda’, and hence while its being experienced, there is no knowledge of the difference between knowledge and the object of knowledge. Hence it is termed ‘vedyāntara-sparśa-śūnya’, and also “brahma” - ā-svāda-sahodara.”

V. observes further in the vṛtti that mind when not in contact with ‘rajas’ and ‘tamas’, is termed “sattva”. Thus ‘sattva’ is an internal quality which takes one away from objects that are externally cognised. The exuberance of ‘sattava’ stifles ‘rajas’ and ‘tamas’ and manifests itself. The cause behind this happening is the study of poetry of extra-ordinary nature.

By ‘akhaṇḍa’ or ‘one not admitting parts’, is meant that it is one cognition offering happy experience wherein the cognition of vibhāvādis and ratyādi form an identical unit, an integral whole. They are not cognised in parts. It is ‘svayamprakāśa’ in a sense, says V., to be explained later. When it is said to be ‘cin-maya’, the suffix ‘mayat’ is indicative of its own form; i.e. it is of the form of consciousness itself.

‘Camatkāra’ is said to be the life of rasa. It is extra-worldly, i.e. lokóttara. Abhinavagupta has given the name of ‘camatkāra’ to a cognition-samvit-which is free from all obstacles - “sakala-vigna-vinirmukta-samvit.” Viśvanātha explains that the expansion of consciousness of the sāmājika, which is ‘vismaya’ or exceptional delight full of extra-ordinary surprise, is termed ‘camatkāra’. That only is the life of rasa-experience. - (vṛtti, S.D. III. 3, pp. 72 ibid) : “camatkāras’ citta-vistāra-rūpo vismayā’para-paryāyah.” To support this he quotes an expression of one Nārāyaṇa, his fore-father. Accordingly ‘camatkāra’ is the essence of rasa. At the centre of this, therefore stands ‘adbhūtarasa’ or ‘wonderful’ rasa. Hence Nārāyaṇa accepts only the ‘wonderful’ as ‘rasa’ :

“rase sārāś camatkāraḥ  
sarvatrā’py anubhūyate,  
tac camatkāra-sāratve  
sarvatrā’py adbhute rasaḥ.  
tamād adbhutam evā”ha  
kṛtī nārāyaṇo rasam.”

By ‘kaiścīt’ - “by someone” is meant by those who have accumulated merits in past births. Explaining “svādaḥ kāvyārtha-sambhedād ātmā’nanda-samudbhavaḥ,”

V. observes that by this it is suggested that rasa is identical with the fact of relishing. So when it is said that “rasa is enjoyed”, it is only a metaphorical expression for the difference between the object of relish and the activity of relish is only imaginary. The Laxmī commentary observes that the metaphor here is to be understood as in case of the expression viz. “the head of Rāhu”. (pp. 74, ibid)

Viśvanātha has suggested that rasa is “svākāra-vad abhinna.” Mammaṭa, while explaining the views of Abhinavagupta uses the same terminology. In the ‘vivṛti’ commentary, explaining this point, Tarkavāgīśa (pp. 73, ibid) observes that though the soul and body are different and yet their oneness is mentioned in such expressions that, “I am fat”, in the same way, rasa is relished in the absence of the basic difference between the enjoyer and the enjoyed and yet it is said, “rasa is enjoyed (by me)”, etc. As in case of the perception of a jar, the difference is projected when it is said, “I know (a jar)” etc., here in rasa-consciousness this difference is not projected because there is non-difference between ‘rasa’ and its apprehension. This is the essence of the expression “svā”kāra-vad abhinna.”

Or, it can be explained in a different way also. It is like this. Just as the philosophers who uphold ‘pariṇāma-vāda’, do not accept difference between knowledge and its object, in the same way ‘rasa’ and its “āsvāda” or tasting are non-different, i.e. are absolutely identical.

Viśvanātha presents the epistemological observation concerning the nature of rasa, under the influence of Abhinavagupta and Mammaṭa.

S.D. III. 20-28 discuss this point. They read as :

“nā'yaṃ jñāpyaḥ, sva-sattāyāṃ  
 pratīty avyabhicārataḥ,  
 yasmiād eṣa vibhāvā”di-  
 samūhā’lambanā”tmakaḥ. (III. 20 S.D.)  
 tasmān na kāryaḥ,  
 no nityaḥ, pūrva-saṃvedanójjhitaḥ,  
 a-saṃvedana-kāle hi  
 na bhāvópy asya vidyate.\* (S.D. III. 21)

(\* pp. 88, ibid has this foot-note here :

"na cā'nādir anantōyam  
anityaḥ sambhaved rasaḥ,  
asya bhānam a-bhānañ ca  
carvaṇā-vaśataḥ param."

carvaṇāyāṃ satyāṃ nivṛttāyāṃ ca, rasasya "tadā bhānam a-bhānañ ca a-  
viruddham." ity api mūla-pāṭhaḥ kvacit kvacid upalabhyate.)

nā'pi bhaviṣan, sāksād-  
ānandamaya-sva-prakāśa-rūpatvāt,  
kārya-jñāpya-vilakṣaṇa-bhāvān  
no vartamānōpi. (III. 22, S.D.)  
vibhāvā"di-parāmarśa-  
viśayatvāt sacetasām,  
parā"nanda-mayarvena  
saṃvedyartvād api sphuṭam. (III. 23 S.D.)  
na nirvikalpaṃ jñānam  
tasya grāhakam iśyate,  
tathābhilāpa-saṃsarga-  
yogyatva-virahān na ca. (III. 24 S.D.)  
savikalpaka-saṃvedyaḥ  
sāksātkāratayā na ca,  
parokṣas tatprakāśo  
nā'parokṣaḥ śabda-sambhavāt. (III. 25)  
tasmād alaukikaḥ satyaṃ  
vedyaḥ sahrdayair ayam,  
pramāṇam carvaṇaivātra  
svābhinne viduṣāṃ matam. (III. 26 S.D.)  
niṣpattyā carvaṇasyā'sya  
niṣpattir upacārataḥ,  
a-vācyaṛvā"dikaṃ tasya

vakṣye vyañjana-rūpaṇe. (III. 27 S.D.)  
 ratyā"di-jñāna-tādātmyād  
 eva yasmād raso bhavet,  
 atósya sva-prakāśatvam  
 a-khaṇdatvaṃ ca siddhyati." (III. 28 S.D.)

(pp. 86-93, ibid) -

The substance of the above nine kārīkās is understood as follows. But prior to that it may be noted that as compared to M. or Abhinavagupta himself, V. has admirably summarised the wisdom of the Kashmir School of thought in flowing and lucid kārīkās, the substance of which proceeds as -

Rasa is not an object of knowledge, i.e. it is not knowable or jñāpya, as it is never absent from its own cognition. When rasa is there it is invariably cognised. This is not so with reference to physical objects such as a jar and the like, which, in the absence of light or revealer, ceases to be an object of cognition. In short, rasa is 'pari-passu' with its apprehension. It does not exist beyond the existence or scope of its own apprehension. Physical objects such as a jar, even though existing, may not be apprehended.

Rasa can not be said to be of the nature of physical effect i.e. it is not 'kārya' or 'caused' either. Rasa can not be said to be 'caused' or kārya, because it is cognised along with the cognition of the combination of the vibhāvā"dis. If rasa were caused by the vibhāvā"dis then its cognition would continue even after the cognition of vibhāvā"dis is over. But this is not so. As Abhinavagupta has put it, rasa is "vibhāvā"di-jīvitā'vadhiḥ" - i.e. rasa is apprehended neither a moment before or after the cognition of vibhāvā"dis. Thus if it were "kārya" or caused, during the apprehension of rasa, the cognition of vibhāvā"dis should cease. The kāraṇa-jñāna and kārya-jñāna are never simultaneously cognised. The knowledge of the application of sandal-paste and the knowledge of the feeling of happiness that results from the former are sequential and never simultaneous. But rasa is simultaneously cognised in the same breath as when the vibhāvā"dis are also cognised. Thus rasa-bodha has no 'vibhāvā"di-jñāna' as its cause.

Rasa, says Viśvanātha, can not be said to be 'nitya' or eternal, which is 'anādi' and 'ananta' i.e. which has neither beginning nor end. Rasa can not be 'nitya' for we do not apprehend it in moments prior to the apprehension of vibhāvā"dis. Thus as it is 'bereft of prior cognition' - "pūrva-saṃvedanójjhita", it can not be said to be

nitya. Actually when vibhāvādi-s are not cognised, rasa is not experienced as such, i.e. it does not seem to exist in the absence of the cognition of vibhāvādis. If a thing is 'nitya', it continues to exist even in the absence of our apprehending the same.

Again, rasa can not be said to be a future entity i.e. that which is to come into existence in future or that which is to be apprehended in times to come. This is not so because rasa is of the nature of an entity made of bliss and light to be experienced directly at a given moment. - “sākṣād ānanda-maya-prakāśa-rūparvāt.”

Rasa, thus, being neither 'kārya' nor 'jñāpya' can not be said to be 'vartamāna' i.e. present at a given moment. Rasa can not be said to be existing at a given moment like a jar or a piece of cloth (ghaṭa or paṭa). The *Lakṣmī ṭikā* (pp. 88, *ibid*) explains this point as under : “nanu tarhi rasasya vartamānatvam eva aṅgikriyatām ity āśaṅkya samādhatte - “kārya-jñāpyety ādi.” raso nāpi ghaṭa-paṭādivad vartamāno vidyamānarūpaḥ siddha iti bhāvaḥ. kāryaṁ janyaṁ, jñāpyaṁ janyabodha-viśayābhūtaṁ, tayoṛ vilakṣaṇa-bhāvād apūrvatvāt. vartamānasya vastuṇaḥ, kārya-jñāpyānyataratva-niyamād iti bhāvaḥ. itaḥ prāg eva kāryatvaṁ jñāpyatvaṁ ca rasasya na ity uktam. evaṅ ca, janyo ghaṭaḥ jñāpyopīti vartamānatvaṁ tatra, a-janyo'pyākāśo jñāpyaś ca iti vartamānatvaṁ; tatrāpi raso na janya uta na jñāpya iti no vartamāno'pi iti kārīkāśayaḥ.”

The apprehension of rasa, observes Viśvanātha, is neither 'nir-vikalpa' nor 'sa-vikalpa'; i.e. its apprehension is neither non-determinate nor determinate. In nir-vikalpajñāna or non-determinate perception, there is no knowledge of any relation whatsoever. In Rasa-cognition, however, the collection of vibhāvādis or 'vibhāvādi-parāmarśa' is cognised. The viśiṣṭa-vaiśiṣṭya-sambandha is cognised. Nirvikalpa-jñāna is said to be such where any relation is not noticed. In case of rasa-cognition, the apprehension of vibhāvādis and its relation with rasa-bodha are cognised. Lakṣmī ṭikā observes (pp. 89, *ibid*) - “nirvikalpakaṁ jñānaṁ saṁsarga-anavagāhi-jñānaṁ, tasya rasasya grāhakaṁ viśayatānirūpakam neṣyate; raso nirvikalpa-jñāna-viśayo na iti bhāvaḥ. tat sādhayati hetu-dvayena-vibhāvādināṁ parāmarśo viśiṣṭa-vaiśiṣṭyāvagāhi-jñānaṁ sambandha iti yāvat, viśayo viśeṣya-rūpeṇa jñeyo yasya tasya bhāvas tasmāt.” The idea is that rasa which is 'sva-prakāśa-rūpa' is the object of itself only - “sva-prakāśa-rūpasya svena eva viśayīkaraṇād, iti bhāvaḥ.”

Another point is that nirvikalpaka-jñāna is “niṣprakāraka”. No 'dharma' is cognised here in form of “prakāratā”. But as rasa is of the nature of highest-bliss, - “paramānandmaya”, 'ānanda-mayatva' is cognised in it as 'prakāratā'. So, rasa-bodha can not be held to be 'nir-vikalpaka', or non-determinate.



Rasa can not be termed to be 'sa-vikalpa-saṃvedya' i.e. an object of determinate knowledge either because there is absence of the suitability of contact with abhilāṣā - The Lakṣmī tīkā explains (pp. 89, ibid) : "hi tathā hi sa-vikalpaka-saṃvedyānām ghaṭa-paṭā" dīnām vacana-prayoga-yogyatā - 'ayaṃ ghaṭa' iti, abhilāṣa-vyavahāra-yogyatā, tat kāvyastha-śabdaṇa asti iti śeṣaḥ. vyaṅgyatvena rasasya tu na tathā ity arthaḥ." The idea is that whatever are the objects of determinate knowledge are capable of being expressed through words directly such as 'ghaṭa' or a 'jar', 'paṭa' or a piece of cloth etc. But in case of 'rasa' this sort of capacity of being expressed directly by words is absent, 'Rasa' cannot be named. It is indescribable or "a-nirvacanīya".

It can not be said to be 'parokṣa' i.e. 'in-direct' as it is directly felt, "sākṣātkāratayā". It is neither 'a-parokṣa' i.e. 'direct' because rasa-pratīti is caused directly by words in poetry.

It is precisely for this situation, observes Viśvanātha, that rasa-apprehension has to be classed as 'a-laukika' i.e. extra-worldly. It is in fact apprehended by men of taste. The proof-pramāṇa-for this is the relish-carvaṇa-of rasa by the experts. This 'carvaṇā' is 'sva-abhinna' i.e. not different from its self, i.e. the object. In short in this process of relish or enjoyment there is no virtual difference between the process of relishing and the object of relishing. 'Carvaṇā' itself, is 'āsvādana'. 'Rasa' and its 'āsvāda' are absolutely one and the same.

Now, the problem is that if rasa is held to be 'sva-prakāśānanda-saṃvit-maya', then how is its 'anubhūti' brought about ? How is it that the rasa-sūtra of, Bharata talks of its 'niṣpatti' i.e. of its being 'caused' as an effect ?

The answer is that it is said to be 'niṣpatti' on account of the process of relishing being caused. Actually 'rasa' is said to be 'niṣpanna' or 'caused' only metaphorically. Viśvanātha observes : (vṛtti - S.D. III. 27, A, pp. 92, ibid) : "yady api rasā'bhinnaṭayā, carvaṇasyā'pi na kāryatvaṃ, tathā'pi tasya kādācitkatayā upacaritena kāryatvena, kāryatvaṃ upacaryate." Viśvanātha says that rasa 'being indescribable' will be shown while discussing vyañjanā -

"a-vācyaṭvā" dīkaṃ tasya

vakṣye vyañjana-rūpaṇe." (S.D. III. 27B)

By "ādi", 'lakṣyatva' i.e. its (not) being an object of lakṣaṇā or indication also will be discussed there only.

Viśvanātha then picks up yet another point raised by the prima-facie view. The objection could be placed as follows : The objector says that if rasa is said to be the combination of rati etc. and vibhāvā”dis, then how can we accept ‘sva-prakāśatva’ i.e. self-manifestation of rasa, or also its a-khaṇḍatva i.e. non-divisibility ? - “nanu yadi mīlitā ratyā”dayo rasas tat katham asya sva-prakāśatvaṃ, katham vā a-khaṇḍatvaṃ - ity āha.” -

“ratyādi-jñāna-tādātmyād  
eva yasmād raso bhavet,  
tato'sya sva-prakāśatvaṃ  
a-khaṇḍatvaṃ ca siddhyati.”

(S.D. III. 28, pp. 93, *ibid*)

As ‘rasa’ is said to be absolutely identical with the knowledge or apprehension of ratyā”di, its ‘sva-prakāśatva’ or the state of being self-evident and its indivisibility - ‘a-khaṇḍatva’ stand proved. If the apprehension of ratyā”di were different from the fact of manifestation, then only its sva-prakāśatva can be challenged. But it is not so, for the apprehension of ratyā”di combination is itself the apprehension of rasa. Viśvanātha observes (Vṛtti, on S.D. III. 28, pp. 93) - “yad uktam - yady api rasā'nanyatayā carvaṇā'pi na kāryā, tathā'pi kādācitka-tayā kāryatvaṃ upakalpya tad ekā”tmani anādivāsanā-pariṇati-rūpe ratyā”dibhāvēpi vyavahāra iti bhāvaḥ.” - Eventhough carvaṇā or the process of relishing also itself not being different from rasa, cannot be said to be of the form of an effect or kārya, but as it happens occasionally, i.e. as it happens only when poetry or art-form is presented and in itself is not a routine occurrence in this work-a-day world, and hence only metaphorically it is said to be a “kārya” i.e. ‘caused’. ‘Ratyā”di’ being ‘a-bhinna’ or non-different from ‘carvaṇā’, is also said to be ‘kārya’ metaphorically. This ‘ratyādi’ is the result of the impressions or vāsanā having no beginning. Therefore also it is said to be ‘kārya’ only metaphorically. Viśvanātha quotes from the A.bh. and observes : “abhinno'pi sa pramātrā vāsanāpanīta-ratyādi-tādātmyena gocarīkṛtaḥ.” Those who do not accept the sva-prakāśatva of jñāna or ‘bodha’, observes Viśvanātha, will be punished by the Vedāntins. As ‘rasa’ is identical with its apprehension - tādātmyād eva - its non-divisibility or ‘akhaṇḍatva’ also stands proved. Rati or other basic emotions and the vibhāvādis connected with them are collected by different cognitions individually to begin with, but later they are all fused into one and are cognised as identical and rise to the status of rasa.

Viśvanātha here quotes some saṃgraha-kārikā :

“vibhāvā anubhāvāśca  
sāttvikā vyabhicārīṇaḥ,  
pratīyamānāḥ prathamam  
khaṇḍaśo, yanty akhaṇḍatām.”

He further observes :

“paramārthatas tv akhaṇḍa eva ayam vedānta-prasiddha-brahma-tattva-vad  
veditavyaḥ” iti ca.

Viśvanātha also discusses one subtle point in his vṛtti on. S.D. III. 3 (pp. 74, ibid) :-

He observes : “nanu etāvatā rasasya ajñeyatvam uktaṃ bhavati iti  
vyañjanāyāśca jñāna-viśeṣatvād dvayor aikyam āpatitam -

“svajñānenā'nya-dhīhetur  
siddher'the vyañjako mataḥ,  
yathā dīpōnyathābhāve  
ko viśeṣosya kārakāt ?” -

ity ukta-diśā, ghaṭa-pradīpavad vyaṅgya-vyañjakayoḥ pāṛthakyam eva iti  
katham rasasya vyaṅgyatā ? - iti cet... (pp. 74, 75, ibid) -

The idea is how is rasa experienced when its āsvāda is said to be sva-  
prakāśānanda-saṃvit-maya ? Vyañjanā is also a type of knowledge or  
apprehension and so it has to be deemed as identical with rasa-bodha. So, how can  
rasa be said to be suggested or vyañjita ? Vyaṅgya-vyañjaka-bhāva is possible only  
between two different i.e. non-identical objects as in case of a 'ghaṭa' and 'pradīpa'.  
The lamp by revealing itself also reveals the jar, which exists prior to revelation.  
Hence, lamp is said to be the revealer or vyañjaka or manifestor. If this is not held  
so, i.e. if the difference between the manifestor and manifested is not accepted, how  
can we distinguish between the manifestor and a “kāraka” hetu or “cause” ? In  
short there will not be any difference between a vyañjaka-hetu and a kāraka hetu.

In reply to this objection, Viśvanātha quotes from A.bh. viz. “vilakṣaṇa evāyam  
kṛti-jñāpti-prabhedebyaḥ svādanā”khyāḥ kaścīd vyāpāraḥ.” (pp. 75, ibid)

i.e. “This process of relish is totally different from both causation and  
manifestation.” Precisely for this, it is termed ‘rasana’, ‘āsvādana’, ‘camarkaraṇa’  
etc.; terms which are exclusive by themselves. Viśvanātha observes that as we are  
intent upon the usage of terms other than abhidhā etc. (i.e. lakṣaṇā also), we have  
called it to be ‘suggested’ :

“abhidhā”di-vilakṣaṇa-vyāpāra-mātra-prasādhana - grahilair asmābhī rasā”dīnām vyaṅgyatvam uktaṃ bhavātīti.” (pp. 75, ibid)

Viśvanātha observes that rasa is not ‘vācya’ i.e. directly stated, not is arrived at by purport i.e. ‘tātparya’. He has discussed this while treating vyañjanā and we have examined it in our chapter on vyañjanā. He also, following Abhinavagupta holds rasa to be of the nature of pure bliss i.e. ‘ānanda’ and rejects the talk of unhappiness following ‘karuṇa’ etc. In short, he does not believe in the ‘duḥkhamayatva’ of Karuṇa. As for the substratum of rasa also, he follows Abhinavagupta and holds that only the sāmājika i.e. a cultured critic or man of taste is the substratum of rasa. The sthāyin in a sahrdaya attains to the position of rasa with the help of vibhāvā”dis. Rasa is not acceptable to him with reference to ‘anukārya’ or ‘anukartā’ i.e. the original character or the actor. If for the sake of argument, it is said that the actor enjoys rasa, then for that moment the actor is to be deemed as the sāmājika or enjoyer, observes Viśvanātha. The Sāmājika i.e. the man of taste, while enjoying art, has no consciousness of the difference between ‘anukārya’ and ‘anukartā’, and for this reason also rasa cannot be said to be enjoyed by either the anukārya or the anu-kartā. Viśvanātha explains that the rasa-experience derived by the ‘sāmājika’ is due to the process of ‘sādhāraṇīkaraṇa’ i.e. ‘generalisation’ or better say, ‘de-individualisation’.

He observes (S.D. III. 9-10, pp. 79, ibid) :

“vyāpāro’sti vibhāvā”der  
nāmnā sādharāṇī-kṛtiḥ,  
tat-prabhāveṇa yasyā”san  
pāthodhi-plavanādayaḥ. (S.D. III. 9)  
pramātā tad abhedena  
svātmānaṃ pratipadyate,

nanu katham manuṣya-mātrasya samudra-laṅghanā”dau utsāhodbodha, ity ucyate -

utsāhā”di samudbodhaḥ  
sādharāṇyā”bhimānataḥ,  
nṛṇām api samudrā”di-  
laṅghanā”dau na duṣyati. (S.D. III. 10)

ratyādayo'pi sādharanyenaiva pratīyanta ity āha -  
 sādharanyena ratyādir  
 api tadvat pratīyate."

Viśvanātha explains that there is a power of vibhāvā"dis called 'sādharanī-kṛti' by name. By the strength of it, the crossing of an ocean, or controlling an ocean etc. becomes possible. With the help of this, the sāmājika or pramāta identifies himself with Rāma etc.

To a question that how can any (i.e. all) human-beings afford to have the zeal to cross an ocean etc., the answer is that such an 'utsāha' or zeal for a super-human feat such as crossing an ocean becomes possible in case of anybody through the power of this 'sādharanya' i.e. generalisation. Thus, if men, i.e. ordinary human beings deem themselves as capable of crossing an ocean, it does not incur any blemish because all are charged or transformed by this 'sādharanya'. Love etc., i.e. ratyā"di of the original character such as Rāma and the like are also experienced by all spectators or enjoyers of art, by the force of "sādharanya".

Viśvanātha observes that the feeling of love etc., taken personally i.e. svātma-gatatvena, i.e. taken as referring to an individual, will cause shame, uneasiness etc. with reference to individual culture of the enjoyer. If it is held that ratyā"di i.e. love etc. are with reference to someone else - "paragatatvena", then no relish will result - "a-rasyatā"pātaḥ". It is through this power, of 'sādharanya' that all are, as it were involved in whatever is presented and the result is rasa or enjoyment.

The vibhāvā"di-s, he observes, are also experienced in a generalised form, to begin with. The enjoyer - sāmājika-does not experience the vibhāvā"dis as connected or not connected personally with him, or with someone else, and in the enjoyment of rasa, there is no determination concerning the nature of the vibhāvā"dis, i.e. it can be said with precision that they either belong to or do not belong to the self of the enjoyer or someone else. Viśvanātha observes : (S.D. III. 12, pp. 81, ibid) :

"parasya na parasyéti  
 maméti na maméti ca,  
 tadā"svāde vibhāvā"deḥ  
 paricchedo na vidyate." (S.D. III. 12)

If it is asked that how can these vibhāvā”dis be held as ‘a-laukika’ or extra ordinary ?, then it is stated - (S.D. III. 13, pp. 81, ibid) -

vibhāvanā”di-vyāpāram  
alaukikam upeyuṣām,  
a-laukikatvam eteṣām  
bhūṣaṇam na tu dūṣaṇam.

‘ādi’śabdād anubhāva-sañcāraṇe. tatra vibhāvanam ratyā”der viśeṣeṇa āsvādāṅkuraṇa-yogyatā-nayanam. anubhāvānam evambhūtasya ratyā”deḥ samanantaram eva rasā”di-rūpatayā bhāvanam. sañcāraṇam, rathābhūtasyaiva tasya samyak cāraṇam.” - (pp. 83, vṛtti, S.D. III. 13)

These vibhāvā”dis attain to a power called ‘vibhāvana’ - i.e. “āsvāda-yogyī-karaṇa” or making themselves suitable of being relished. This vibhāvana-vyāpāra- is a-laukika i.e. extra-ordinary, i.e. it is seen in the context of art only. This attainment of ‘vibhāvana’-vyāpāra is, so to say, an ornament a “bhūṣaṇa”, and not a blemish i.e. ‘dūṣaṇa’. By ‘ādi’ in the term “vibhāvanā”di” is meant ‘anubhāvana’ with reference to ‘anubhāvas’ and ‘sañcāraṇa’ with reference to vyabhicārins. ‘Vibhāvana’, as explained already, is ‘making itself an object of relish’, and this goes with the basic emotions such as ‘ratyā”di’. ‘Anubhāvana’ is experiencing such ‘vibhāvita’ - ratyā”di in form of rasa, simultaneously. ‘sañcāraṇa’ is supporting and enhancing - ‘paripuṣṭi-karaṇa’ of the basic emotions.

Viśvanātha takes an interesting note that worldly cause, effect and assessories are termed vibhāva etc., with reference to the apprehension of rasa, and they are all taken as “causes” - “kāraṇāny eva” only. The three taken together are to be understood as “cause” for ‘rasa’-bodha. He observes : (pp. 82, ibid) : (vṛtti, S.D. III 13; and S.D. III. 14)

“vibhāvā”dīnām yathā-saṁkhyam kāraṇa-kārya-sahakāritve katham trayāṇām api rasōdbodhe kāraṇatvam ity ucyate -

“kāraṇa-kārya-sañcāri-  
rūpā api hi lokataḥ,  
rasōdbodhe vibhāvā”dyāḥ  
kāraṇāny eva te matāḥ.” (S.D. III. 14)

If it is asked that in the rasa-experience if vibhāvā”dis are ‘kāraṇa’-cause, then how is it that there is identical cognition of vibhāvā”dis and rasa simultaneously ?

the answer is -

“pratiyamānaḥ prathamam  
pratyekaṁ hetur ucyate,  
tataḥ saṁvalitaḥ sarvo  
vibhāvā”diḥ sacetasām.”  
prapānaka-rasa-nyāyāc,  
carvyamāṇo raso bhavet.” (S.D. III. 15)

yathā khaṇḍa-maricā”dīnām sammelanād apūrva iva kaścīd āsvādaḥ prapānaka-  
rase sañjāyate, vibhāvā”di-sammelanād ihā’pi yathā ity arthaḥ.

The idea is that prior to rasa-apprehension all vibhāvā”dis are said to be “cause”, with reference to ratyā”di. After this prior individual cognition, through the power of vyañjanā they get inter-mixed. On the analogy of “pra-pānaka-rasa” i.e. a beverage made of suger, black pepper etc. and other ingredients, the whole complex becomes such in which particularity of these factors melts into one homogeneity and the whole is relished as one indivisible unit. This relish is such in which even the separate identity of the process of relish and the object of relish is not preserved.

To a question that if the three - i.e. vibhāva, anubhāva and vyabhicārin - taken together cause rasa then how is it that we have instances of poetry with rasa, where only one or two of these are seen ? The answer is that whatever is seen apparently missing is implied and thus is imagined to be there.

The sāmājika experiences rasa on account of the ratyā”di planted in him in form of impressions. This ‘vāsanā’ is two-fold viz. ‘idānīntanī’ i.e. “present” and ‘prāktanī’ - belonging to past birth. In the absence of the former, even the Mīmāṃsakas will be able to enjoy rasa, and in the absence of the latter even the sāmājika - the cultured - will fail to enjoy rasa : S.D. III. 8b reads as : “na jāyate tadā”svāo vinā ratyā”di-vāsanām.” - vāsanā ca idānīntanī prāktanī ca, rasā”svāda-hetuḥ; tatra yady ādyā na syāt tadā śrotṛiya-jaran-mīmāṃsakādīnām api sa syāt. yadi dvitīyā na syāt tadā yad rāgiṇām api keṣāñcid rasōdbodho na dṛśyate, tanna syāt. uktañ ca, dharmadattena -

sa-vāsanānām sabhyānām  
rasasyā”svādanam bhavet  
nirvāsanās tu raṅgāntaḥ-  
kāṣṭha-kudy’āśma-sannibhāḥ.”

(S.D. III. 8, & Vṛtti, pp. 78, 79, ibid).

Thus Viśvanātha has explained the essence of rasa-experience in a neat and lucid fashion, following the lead of the three greats - viz. Ānandavardhana, Abhinavagupta and Maṃmaṭa.

**Bhānudatta in his Rasa-taraṅgiṇī** (Edn. Grantha Ratna Mālā, 1987-'88; also with Hindi Intro. Trans. etc.) deliberates over the process of rasa-realisation. For him, the sthāyibhāva attained to perfection, with the help of vibhāva, anubhāva, sāttvika-bhāva and vyabhicāri-bhāvas, is rasa. Or, that where the mind reposes with the help of sthāyin and vibhāvādis, is rasa. Or, the impression - ‘vāsanā’ of the enhanced ‘prabuddha’ - sthāyin, is rasa : (pp. 103, ibid) - “vibhāvā'nubhāva-sāttvika-vyabhicāri-bhāvair upanīyamāna-paripūrṇaḥ sthāyibhāvo rasyamāno rasaḥ. bhāva-vibhāvā'nubhāva-vyabhicāri-bhāvair mano-viśrāmo yatra kriyate, sa vā rasaḥ. prabuddha-sthāyibhāva-vāsanā-vā rasaḥ.” The mention of sāttvikabhāva, perhaps under the influence of the DR. and the Mālava school of thought could also be due to the fact that for him rasānukūla-vikāra or bhāva is two-fold. Accordingly two types of ‘vikāra’ are accepted by him; one ‘āntara’ and the other “śārira” or external. The internal change refers to sthāyin and vyabhicārin and the external vikāra or change covers the ‘sāttvika’ and ‘anubhāva’.

Bhānudatta has attempted a threefold explanation of rasa. According to the first explanation the sthāyin raised to perfection with the help of vibhāvādis is rasa. This could be under Lollaṭa's influence. In the other explanation, he has called, ‘rasa’ to be ‘the poise, mental-poise’ i.e. ‘mano-viśrāma’. We know that Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka and Abhinavagupta have used terms such as “laya, samāpatti, bhoga, viśrānti”, etc. This could have influenced Bhānudatta here. According to the third explanation, rasa is the impression or vāsanā of the prabuddha-sthāyin or enhanced basic emotion. We know that Lollaṭa has suggested that the sthāyin staying in form of permanent impression, when enhanced, is termed ‘rasa’. But Bhānudatta has something else to be conveyed here. ‘Vāsanā of sthāyin and its enhancement’ is the order in Lollaṭa. Here the order is reversed. So, Bhānudatta's approach is different. But it is clear that attempting three definitions or explanations suggests that Bhānudatta follows nobody's lead, but goes for his own separate identity, which to us looks rather confused. ‘Confusion’ is no identity for us; whereas ‘logical fusion’ could be one. Again, Bhānudatta uses the term “upanīyamāna” and not “vyajyamāna”. He also talks of eight rasas, following Bharata, and also of the nīṣpatti or birth of (vikṛti) rasas from (prakṛti) rasas.

Bhānudatta perhaps sides with those confused thinkers like the authors of the Nāṛya-darpaṇa, and Siddhicandra, the authors of “Kāvya-prakāśa-Khaṇḍana”, who



accept 'rasa' at both the levels i.e. at the "laukika" or worldly context, and also at the "a-laukika" or extra-ordinary i.e. art-context. We know that the Kashmir tradition accepts rasa only at the art-context : "rasas tu nātya eva, na loke" - observes Abhinavagupta, ruling out any possibility of rasa experience at the gross i.e. worldly level. For Bhānudatta, rasa born of worldly context or "laukika-sannikarṣa" is 'laukika' i.e. worldly. Rasa born of 'alaukika-sannikarṣa' is a-laukika. This latter is of the form of knowledge - jñāna-only and the former i.e. laukika is six-fold. But for us all this suggests a basic ignorance of the essential nature of 'rasa' which is beyond any physicality. 'Sāksāt jñāna' or 'direct knowledge', for Bhānudatta follows from the experience of vibhāvādis and the apprehension of knowledge - "jñānabodha" - is accepted to result from the saṃskāras i.e. impressions left behind by past births. The a-laukika-rasa is again said to be three-fold such as, "svāpnika", "mānorathika" and "aupanāyika". Now this third variety is experienced in the camatkāra brought about by word and sense in poetry, and also is visualised in drama. However, for him, both laukika and a-laukika rasa are blissful or "ānand-rūpa" for him. This involves contradiction. For, those who accept rasa at laukika level, have got to take it as 'sukha-duḥkhātmaka'. Of course, the N.D. of Rāmacandra and Guṇacandra attempt an equilibrium between the two ends by saying on one hand rasa to be 'sukha-duḥkhātmaka', but taking it to be "blissful" on the other, taking into account the effect resulting from the expertise of the poet and the actor - "kavi-naṭa-gata-kausāla." But all this, to us involves clean contradiction and an unsuccessful attempt to patch up two ends which are opposite to each other in nature as light and darkness - "tamaḥ-prakāśavad-viruddha-svabhāva."

Thus Bhānudatta's attempt, like that of Rāma-candra and Guṇacandra to attempt a fusion of two approaches to the nature of rasa, finds no takers after him, doomed as it was in its very birth, being logically and aesthetically unacceptable. He has also talked of eight rasa-dṛṣṭis with reference to eight rasas, but this point gains importance only from the point of view of acting i.e. abhinaya. In his other work viz. "rasa-mañjarī", we get only the analysis of the vibhāvādis of the eight śṛṅgārādi rasas that he accepts.

**Keśava Miśra** in his *Alaṃkāra-śekhara* (A-śe) while giving the definition of poetry observes that poetry is vākya or sentence, having rasa and it has to be 'śṛta' and such which causes special happiness. - "kāvyāṃ rasādimad-vākyam, śrutam, sukha-viśeṣa-kṛt." - (pp. 2, 2nd NS. edn. Bombay, 1926, A.D.) By 'ādi' in 'rasādi' he suggests the presence of 'alaṃkāra'. In the second marīci, (pp. 6, Edn. ibid) he calls

‘rasa’ to be the “soul” — ātmā of poetry. He observes :

“rītir uktis tathā mudrā  
vṛttiḥ kāvyasya jīvitam,  
trividhasyā’pi doṣās tu  
tyājyāḥ ślāghāya dvaye guṇāḥ. (II. i)  
alaṃkāras tu śobhāyai  
rasa ātmā, pare manaḥ.”  
tat tad rasopakāriṇyas  
tat tad deṣa-samudbhavāḥ.” (II. ii) (pp. 61, ibid)

In the 20th Marīci, Keśava discusses the topic of rasa (pp. 68-77, ibid). He observes (pp. 68) - “rasa ātmety uktam. tasya yathā-ātmānaṃ vinā śarīram a-prayojakaṃ tathā rasaṃ vinā kāvyam.” As is body useless without soul, so is poetry of no purpose without rasa. He observes -

“sādhu-pāke vina svādyam  
bhojyaṃ nir-lavaṇaṃ yathā,  
tathaiva nīrasaṃ kāvyam,  
syān no rasika-puṣṭaye.” (pp. 69, ibid)

“Tasty-food without proper cooking, or food without salt, so is poetry without rasa; not for the pleasure of the man of taste.”

He further observes (pp. 69, ibid) : “tatra rasatvaṃ aṅgāṅgi-bhāvā”panna-sakala-vibhāvā”di sāksātkāratvam. ‘aṅgā”ṅgi’ iti samūhā”lambanavāraṇāya. rasatvaṃ api jātir iti vyaṃ.

Thus for Keśava, ‘rasatva’ i.e. the class of rasa is the fact of experiencing directly the total admixture or causal stuff made of all vibhāvā”di - i.e. vibhāva etc., which are related as principal and subordinate. He observes that the last feature is to avoid (equal) mixture of vibhāvā”dis. - This is to be understood as follows. The idea seems to be that the sthāyin is principal and the rest, i.e. vibhāvā”di are subordinate and ‘rasa’ results from this combination of principal and less important stuff. ‘Rasa’ is said to be ‘jāti’ or class, in view of the total number of eight or more individual rasas. Thus for Keśava, perhaps like Abhinavagupta ‘rasa’ basically is only one, a single unadulterated aesthetic effect, being called many in view of the different types of combinations brought about by various vibhāvā”dis i.e. determinants, consequents etc.

He seems to summarise the view of Mammata when he says : (pp. 69) -  
kecit tu -

“kāraṇenā'tha kāryeṇa  
sahakāribhir eva ca,  
vyaktatvaṃ nīyamānas tu  
sthāyi-bhāvo rasah smṛtaḥ.”

'Kāraṇa' is such as aṅganā, i.e. a lovely lady (the ālambana), yauvana or youth (again, uddīpana), etc.

'Kārya' is explained by sāttvika-bhāvas such as stambha, sveda etc. kāryāṇi -

“stambhaṃ svedo'tha romāñcaḥ,  
svara-bhaṅgo'tha vepathuḥ,  
vaivarṇyam aśru-pralaya  
ity aṣṭau sāttvikā matāḥ.”

Sahakāriṇaḥ - udyānā"dayaḥ (These are the uddīpana-bhāvas).

Vyabhicāriṇo glānyā"dayaḥ. He quotes almost from the DR. when he observes : (pp. 69, ibid) :

“vibhāvair anubhāvais' ca  
sāttvikair vyabhicāribhiḥ,  
āropyamāṇa utkarṣaṃ  
sthāyī bhāvo rasah smṛtaḥ.”

Then he goes to mention nine rasas such as :

“śṛṅgāra-hāsyā-karuṇa-  
raudra-vīra-bhayānakāḥ,  
bībhatsādbhuta-śāntā"khyāḥ  
kāvyē nava rasāḥ smṛtāḥ.” (XX. i.) (pp. 69, ibid)

He further divides śṛṅgāra as 'saṃbhoga' and 'vipralambha'. The first is graceful union of two lovers. It is illustrated as based on the heroine as in “sūnyaṃ vāsagrhaṃ.” etc. Keśava (pp. 70) then proceeds to give a four-fold classification of nāyikā. Saṃbhoga based on hero-nāyakāśraya is illustrated as in, “tvam mugdhākṣi vinaiva kañculikayā...” etc. The hero though manifold is basically four-fold such as anukūla, dakṣiṇa, śaṭha and dhr̥ṣṭa.

Vipralambha is two-fold such as pūrvānurāga, māna, pravāsa and karuṇa (XX. 11, pp. 71). He goes on to discuss hāsyā, karuṇa etc. also. He also discusses, after tradition, the virodha and a-virodha of rasas (pp. 75, ibid)

Then he picks up nine sthāyins, the ninth being nirveda. (XX. 31, pp. 76, ibid)

The sthāyin is defined exactly after the DR. Keśava observes (pp. 76, ibid) :

viruddhair a-viruddhair vā  
bhāvair vicchidyate na yaḥ,  
ātmabhāvaṃ nayaty anyān  
sthāyī bhāvaḥ sa ucyate.”

The DR. has “sa sthāyī lavaṇā”karaḥ.” He then explains each sthāyin. He also explains ‘anubhāva’ as “vikāras tu bhāva-saṃsūcanātmakaḥ.” He goes on to explain sāttvikas and vyabhicārins etc. all after the DR.

The vyabhicārīn is explained as -

viśeṣeṇā’bhitaḥ kāvye  
sthāyinaṃ bhāvayanti ye,  
anubhāvā”di-hetūn tān  
vadanti vyabhicārīṇaḥ.” (XX. 36, pp. 72, ibid)

Thus vyabhicārins make for a special support of sthāyin in poetry and are the cause of the effects called anubhāvas. They are enumerated as thirty three after tradition. He talks of bhāva-śābalatā also, but observes that each of these individually portrayed in poetry also are praiseworthy.

With this ends Keśava's treatment of rasa.

**Jagannātha :** In the first ānana of his R.G., Jagannātha (= J.) enumerates five-fold dhvani (pp. 64, R.G.; Edn. Prof. R. B. Athavale, Pub. Uni. Book. Production Board, Guj., Ahd.; pp. 64). Dhvani for J. is basically two fold such as (i) abhidhāmūla and (ii) lakṣaṇāmūla. The first one is again three-fold such as rasa, vastu, and alaṃkāra-dhvanī. The next one is two-fold such as arthāntara-saṃkramita vācya and atyanta-tiraskṛta-vācya. Rasa-dhvanī includes the sub-varieties such as bhāva-dhvanī, tad-ābhāsa, bhāvaśānti, bhāvodaya, bhāva-saṃdhi and bhāva-śābalatva.

After thus making a brief introduction he straight away begins to discuss the topic of ‘rasa’, which he terms to be the soul of rasa-dhvanī, it being extremely charming (pp. 64, ibid) - “evaṃ pañcā”tmake dhvanau parama-ramaṇīyatayā rasa-dhvanes tad ātmā rasas tāvad abhidhiyate.”

It may be observed that like Viśvanātha and Mammaṭa, his predecessors, J. also accepts the lead of Abhinavagupta in explaining the nature of rasa, though of course, he presents a discussion of other views also as presented by Abhinavagupta, and also adds some fresh views concerning rasa. Basically following Abhinavagupta, perhaps he has a fresher presentation and he not only explains the process of rasa-realisation, he goes on to present like Mammaṭa, Hemacandra and Viśvanātha, the whole discussion concerning the sthāyins, vyabhicārins, etc., the numbers of rasas, etc. all after Bharata and the Kashmere School of thought that he upholds. In short he treats all aspects concerning the so-called rasa-theory. In fact we are devoting a separate chapter on the process of rasa-nispatti and rasa-svabhāva, in which we will try to analyse the views of Abhinavagupta, both with reference to his Locana and the Abhinavabhārati and the views of Mammaṭa, and Jagannātha in this connection. So, for the present we will stop with only quoting J.'s concept of rasa as read in his R.G. (pp. 64, ibid)

“samucita-lalita-sanniveśa-cāruṇā kāvyena samarpitaiḥ, sahrdaya-hrdayaṃ praviṣṭais tadīya-sahrdayatāsaḥakṛtena bhāvanā-viśeṣa-mahimnā vigalita-duṣyanta-ramaṇītvā”dibhir alaukika-vibhāvānubhāva-vyabhicāri-śabda-vyapadeśyaiḥ śakuntalā”dibhir ālambanakāraṇaiḥ, candrikā”di-bhir-uddīpana-kāraṇaiḥ, āsrupātā”dibhiḥ kāryaiḥ, cintā”dibhiḥ saḥakāribhiś ca, sambhūya prādurbhāvitena alaukikena vyāpāreṇa tatkāla-nivartita-ānandāṃśā”varaṇā’jñānena ata eva pramuṣṭa-parimita-pramāṭṛtvā”di-nija-dharmaṇa pramāṭṛ sva-prakāśatayā vāstavena nija-svarūpā”nandena saha gocarīkriyamāṇaḥ prāg-viniviṣṭa-vāsanā-rūpo ratyā”dir eva rasaḥ.”

The substance of the above passage can be collected as follows : To begin with poetry is rendered beautiful by the presentation in it of the whole context material which is proper and beautiful.

The piece of beautiful poetry presents vibhāvā”di to rasikas. This material enters the heart of the cultured readers or rasikas. They are aided by the quality of sympathy i.e. sa-hrdayatā - of the rasikas. This results in a bhāvanā - a special feature - the power of which sees to it that the object described such as Śakuntalā, the wife of Duṣyanta, leaves its identity of being the wife of a particular king. In short the ‘bhāvanā’ removes particularity of objects described. In short Duṣyanta, or Śakuntalā leave their individual identity when presented in poetry and when they become objects of a special bhāvanā or poetic power or happening. Now these objects that are described in poetry on account of their transformation whereby they lose their identity of being particular man, woman etc., are termed and

acknowledged as vibhāvas, anubhāvas and vyabhicārins. These are special terms which are not used in common parlance. They are a-laukika, so to say. Now these objects, originally particular Duṣyanta, Śakuntalā etc., and now termed ālambana-vibhāva, along with moon-light etc. serving as uddīpana-kāraṇas or enhancing factors, and with kārya, termed anubhāvas such as aśru-pāta or shedding of tears etc., and vyabhicārins or enriching subordinate feelings such as cintā, or brooding over the lover, etc., combine into a complete complex. With the help of vyañjanā i.e. a laukika power of poetry, the material stands to remove the ignorance of the sa-hṛdaya. This ‘ajñānāmśa’ or layer of ignorance used to cover the ānanda-amśa or the basic element of bliss in the consciousness of the enjoyer or sa-hṛdaya. This results in the removal on the part of the enjoyer, of the parimita-pramāṭṛtva i.e. his limited ego (with all personal worldly limitations). Such a pramātā or enjoyer of poetry whose limitation of particularity are removed becomes conscious of the basic emotions such as rati etc. located in him in form of impressions engrained from previous births, along with the bliss of his own self which is self-manifest at that moment. This consciousness of de-limited emotions which are part of his pure self is termed rasa.

J. here quotes M. who has already stated : “vyaktaḥ sa tair vibhāvā”dyais sthāyi-bhāvo rasaḥ smṛtaḥ.” - i.e. Rasa is basic emotion suggested with the help of vibhāva, anubhāva, etc. J. observes that by ‘vyaka’ is meant ‘that which is the object of the process of ‘vyakti’ i.e. suggestion. This process of suggestion is of the form of consciousness with its cover of ignorance removed. : “vyaktaḥ vyakti-  
viṣayīkṛtaḥ. vyaktiś ca bhagnā”varaṇā cit.” (pp. 64, ibid). J. goes to explain further that just as a lamp which is covered, enlightens the objects and itself when the cover is removed, in the same way the self-consciousness of the rasika or the cultured man of taste, causes to manifest ratyā”di basic permanent emotions vested as part of his self, along with the vibhāvā”dis. This self-consciousness not only manifests or suggests these emotions along with the vibhāvādis but it also manifests itself. (pp. 64, ibid) :

“yathā hi śarāvā”dinā pihito dipas tan nivṛttau sannihitān padārthān prakāśayati, svayaṁ ca prakāśate, evaṁ ātma-caitanyaṁ vibhāvā”di-saṁvalitān ratyādīn.” J. holds that ratyādi sthāyins being of the form of vāsanā or impressions, are attributes of the self i.e. antaḥkaraṇa. The attributes of the antaḥkaraṇa are manifested directly by self-consciousness and hence these ratyādi are called “sākṣi-bhāsyā”. This is accepted by all ālamkārikas and also the vedantins. - “antaḥkaraṇa-dharmāṇāṁ sākṣibhāsyatva - abhyupagateh.” (R.G., pp. 64, ibid).

Vibhāvā"dis are also taken along with ratyādi to be manifested by self-consciousness, i.e. the sāksibhāsyatva of vibhāvā"dis is also accepted though they are not part of individual consciousness, but are external. But they are also said to be sāksi-bhāsyā along with ratyā"di on the analogy of physical objects such as horse etc. seen in a dream that become part of consciousness, or like the illusion of silver in mother of pearl.

J. further attempts an alternate explanation. In the first explanation it was explained that with the help of extra-ordinary causal factors such as vibhāvā"dis, an extra-ordinary power called carvaṇā or āsvāda is caused which makes the sthāyin of the enjoyer its object. But in this second attempt this intermediate vyāpāra is dropped altogether and in order to frame a very short definition of rasa, a sort of correction is introduced in the process of rasa-experience. The new definition is that no newer vyāpāra called carvaṇā is generated by vibhāvā"dis, but along with the āsvāda or taste, there is experience of 'ātmā"nanda' to the citta-vṛtti. Rasa is the name of this experience of ātmā"nanda or "bliss of soul".

J. observes : (pp. 64, 64, ibid) : "yad vā. vibhāvā"di-carvaṇa-mahimnā sahrdayasya nija-sahrdayatāvaśonmiṣitena tat sthāyyupahita-sva-svarūpā"nandā"kāra samādhāv iva yoginas' cittavṛttir upajāyate, tanmayibhavanam iti yāvat. ānando hy ayam, na laukika-sukhāntara-sādhāraṇaḥ an-antaḥkaraṇa-vṛtti-rūpatvāt.

itthaṁ ca abhinavagupta-mammaṭa-bhaṭṭā"di-svārasyena bhagnā"varaṇa-cid-viśiṣṭo ratyā"diḥ sthāyī bhāvo rasa iti sthitam."

The idea is : It may be said that on the strength of vibhāvā"di-carvaṇā i.e. chewing of determinants etc., (i.e. without accepting an intervening of an extra-ordinary vyāpāra or function, but directly) the citta-vṛtti of the sahrdaya, aided by the quality of one's own sa-hrdayatā or sympathy, attains to the form of the bliss of its own form which is befitting the enhanced sthāyin concerned in the case. This means that the mental attitude or citta-vṛtti becomes blissful or ānandamaya or 'tanmaya'. As in case of sa-vikalpa-samādhī or meditation with determinate cognition the mental attitude of a yogin takes the form of 'brahmā"nanda', i.e. it makes the brahmā"nanda its object, i.e. it is not totally merged in brahman, same is the case here. The idea is that in this rasa-realisation activity, the citta-vṛtti takes upon the bliss accompanied by the sthāyin as its object, but it does not get merged in the bliss. This means there is a sort of distance - tāsthya - between jñāta and jñeya. The rasika is necessarily conscious of the fact, while enjoying, that the particular rasa is very sweet to his taste. This consciousness is very much there and it is not efaced totally. Now, observes J., it has to be kept in mind, that this 'ānanda'

is not of the type of other enjoyment felt at ordinary parlance, because this ānanda is not of the type of feeling of happiness of the mind, but it is of the form of the self i.e. ātman itself.

Thus, according to Abhinavagupta or Mammata, rasa is that sthāyin which is fully manifested by self-consciousness after the removal of any covering whatsoever.

But J. finds difficulty in the above explanation also because he feels that even the above explanation is not in total harmony of the śruti text-viz., “raso vai saḥ.” J. further observes : (pp. 65, ibid) :

“vastutas tu vakṣya-māṇa-śruti-svārasyena ratyā”dy avacchinnā bhagnā”varaṇā cid eva rasah” - In fact, taking into account the śruti text (viz. raso vai saḥ) to be quoted later, the consciousness itself manifested in a form qualified by ratyā”di sthāyin, is itself rasa. And this rasa is of a special type. The idea is that in the earlier explanation it was stated that ratyādi sthāyin qualified by ‘cit’ or consciousness is rasa. Here it is stated that ‘cit’ qualified by ‘ratyādi’ is rasa. Thus this rasa has for its form a sort of speciality in form of a ‘viśeṣya’ qualified by a ‘viśeṣaṇa’. In normal language this can be explained as follows. There are two elements in the substance called rasa, and they are, (i) ratyādi sthāyin and (ii) “cit.” The difference in these two explanations concerns as to which of these two portions forms either the viśeṣya i.e. qualified and the viśeṣaṇa or qualification.

So, J. holds that either the ‘caitanya’ is taken as viśeṣaṇa or viśeṣya, it is clear that taking into account this caitanya-amśa rasa becomes self-manifest or svayaṁ-prakāśa. But if the ratyā”di-amśa is taken into account, rasa will be ‘anitya’ and ‘para-prakāśa’ : (pp. 65, ibid) : sarvathaiva cā’syā viśiṣṭā”tmano viśeṣaṇam viśeṣyam vā cid amśam ādāya nityatvam sva-prakāśatvam ca siddham. ratyādyamśam ādāya nityatvam sva-prakāśatvam ca siddham. ratyādyamśam ādāya tv anityatvam itara-bhāsyatvam ca.”

The enjoyment-carvaṇā - of this rasa (= āśvāda) means the removal of the lid that covers the caitanya or consciousness : “carvaṇā cā’sya cid-gata-āvaraṇa-bhaṅga-eva, prāḡ ukṛā; tad ākārā antaḥkaraṇa-vṛttir vā.” (pp. 65, ibid) - i.e. or, it is already stated that the mental state taking the shape of ratyā”di sthāyin is itself ‘carvaṇā’ i.e. ‘rasa-carvaṇā’. This is different from the samādhi i.e. concentration or meditation of mind in which there is enjoyment of para-brahma after getting merged with it. This is so (= i.e. different), because the bliss of consciousness-caitanya”nanda-associated with object such as vibhāvā”di-s, is the ālambana or



support or viṣaya i.e. object in this carvaṇā. In the sa-vikalpa samādhi pure brahman dissociated with external objects, is the ālambana. The difference between rasa-carvaṇā and the savikalpasamādhi of the yogins, is only this much. Rasa-carvaṇā is 'bāhya-viṣaya-sahita' and 'yogi-samādhi' is 'bāhya-viṣaya-rahita' : "iyam ca para-brahmā"svādāt samādher vilakṣaṇā, vibhāvādi-viṣaya-samvalita-cidānanda-ālambanatvāt." (pp. 65, ibid).

This carvaṇā is caused only by the function of poetry (called vyañjanā-function.) : "bhāvya ca kāvya-vyāpāra-mātrāt."

J. further elaborates as follows : If it is asked that what is the gurantee - or pramāṇa in the statement that in that (rasa) carvaṇā there is consciousness of the element of happiness, then the reply is our retort i.e. counter question that what is the authority in accepting that there is consciousness of the element of happiness in samādhi or deep concentration also ? If it is said that in case of the latter (i.e. samādhi) there is an authority in the words of the Bhagavad-Geetā which observes : "sukham ātyantikam yat tad buddhi-grāhyam atīndriyam", then we say that even in case of carvaṇā-sukha also there are two supports, one such as the śrīti-vākyas viz. "raso vai sah." "rasam hy evāyaṁ labdhvā ānandī-bhavati" (taittirīya upa. ānanda-vallī., anu. 7), and also the second viz. the experience (of bliss) by all the sa-hrdayas.

J. further observes that (pp. 65, ibid) : "yā iyaṁ dvitīya-pakṣe tad ākāra-cittavṛtṭy ātmikā rasa-carvaṇā upanyastā, sā śabda-vyāpāra-bhāvyatvāt śābdī. aparokṣa-sukhā"lambanatvāt ca a-parokṣā"tmikā. 'tatvam'-vākyaja-buddhivat. ity āhur abhinavaguptā"cārya-pādāḥ."

The idea is that when it is stated that rasa-carvaṇā is of the form of 'ānandā"kāra-cittavṛtṭi' that carvaṇā, as it is caused by the vyañjanā-function of words, it is 'born of words' i.e. "śābdī". Again as sāksāt-sukha or direct happiness is as base or ālambana, it can be said to be of the form of knowledge. As the knowledge brought about by the mahā-vākya viz. "tat-tvam-asi" is born of words in a sentence and therefore could be taken as 'śābda' or 'word-born', and as it is of the form of direct experience and is therefore 'direct' or 'a-parokṣa', also same is the case with this rasa-carvaṇā which is both 'śābdī' and 'a-parokṣa'. This is the view of Abhinavagupta-pādā"cārya, says J.

After this J. discusses other views on rasa-niṣpatti such as those of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka and others. This we will pick up for discussion in the next chapter on 'rasa-realisation' as explained by Abhinavagupta, Maṁmaṭa and the rest. J. of course has

his own original presentation. He also gives some other views not mentioned directly by his earlier masters, especially the views of ‘The Navyas’ or moderns. These moderns are not mentioned by name. But our impression is that contrary to the views as expressed by our guru prof. R. C. Parikh in his critical edition of the ‘Kāvya-prakāśa-khaṇḍana’ of Siddhicandra, we believe that the view of the moderns’ was very much in circulation in the circle of literary critics in the times of J. But surely it was not Siddhicandra, as Prof. Parikh wants us to believe. On the contrary Siddhicandra seems to be posterior to J. as he seems to summarise the views as expressed in the R.G. But one thing is certain that the navyas were against taking rasa to be of the form of unalloyed bliss only.

They, believed that the nature of rasa is not ‘absolute bliss’, but is a sort of a mixture of happiness and unhappiness - i.e. “sukha-duḥkhā”<sup>tmako</sup> rasaḥ.” This trend was already noted in the A.bh. itself while explaining the ‘ādi’ in “harṣādīnś ca adhigacchanti”, the famous words of Bharata. But this view is directly articulated in the Nāṭyadarpaṇa of Rāmacandra and Guṇacandra, so far as available documents are concerned. The navyas were in favour of this. The navyas had other things also to say about rasa. This will be discussed in all details in the next chapter.

For the present in this chapter, we will now turn our attention to some other works on dramaturgy such as the Daśa-rūpaka, the Nāṭya-darpaṇa, the Bhāva-prakāśana, the Rasārṇava-sudhākara, and The Nāṭaka-lakṣaṇa-ratna-kośa. Bhānudatta is taken up earlier for his work is not a work on dramaturgy, while Śāradātanaya is taken up here for his work is both a work on poetics as well as dramaturgy. We will also deal, by the end of this chapter with Rūpa and Jeeva Goswami's work as they have something special to say on rasa. We will begin with the Daśarupaka (DR.) of Daṇaṇjaya.

The DR. along with the commentary ‘Avaloka’ of Dhanika is a major work on dramaturgy after the NS. of Bharata. The ālaṃkārikas that preceded Ānandavardhana, i.e. from Bhāmaha to Rudraṭa, had avoided a direct discussion on dṛśya-kāvya i.e. visual art-forms, and also a full discussion on rasa and topics that go with the same. Rudraṭa of course had something concerning rasa, nāyaka, nāyikā etc., but primarily his work also was not dedicated to dramaturgy and discussion on rasa in the centre. With the DR. and other works on dramaturgy mentioned above, a new trend is seen wherein dramaturgy is in focus as against poetics. Rasa of course is a major topic with these and we will pick up a critical presentation of what these works have to offer, especially concerning the topic of ‘rasa’.

The fourth flash of the DR. (Edn. The Adyar Library Series Vol. 97, '69; Prof. T. Venkatakarya, with Avaloka of Dhanika and Laghutiṭkā, of Bhaṭṭa-Nṛsiṃha, and also, Edn. (Hindi) - Chawkhamba Vidya Bhavan, Chowk, Benares; '55, Dr. Bholashanker Vyas) begins with the remark : (pp. 167, ref.s are to the Adyar Edition) - atha idānīm rasabhedah pradarśyate -

“vibhāvair anubhāvaiś ca  
sāttvikair vyabhicāribhiḥ,  
ānīyamāṇaḥ svādyatvaṃ  
sthāyī bhāvo rasaḥ smṛtaḥ.” (DR. IV. i)

“sthāyī-bhāva or the basic emotion brought to the state of being tasted, with the help of vibhāva-s, anubhāva-s, sāttvikabhāva-s and ‘vyabhi cāri-bhāva-s, is rasa.”

Contrary to Bharata, DR. makes a separate mention of the sāttvika-bhāvas. Normally the Kashmir School of thought following Bharata chooses to include the sāttvika-bhāvas in the anu-bhāvas; the former being more concerned with the mental or psychological aspects and the latter being more physical.

The Avaloka (pp. 167, ibid) observes : “vaksyamāṇa-svabhāvair vibhāvā'nubhāva-vyabhicāri-sāttvikaiḥ kāvyópāttair abhinayópadarśitair vā, śrotr-prekṣakāṇāṃ antarpāriparivartamāno ratyā”dir vaksyamāṇa-lakṣaṇaḥ sthāyī svāda-gocaratām nirbharā”nanda-saṃvid-ātmatām ānīyamāṇo rasaḥ. tena rasikāḥ sāmājikāḥ, kāvyam tu tathāvidhā”nanda-saṃvid-unmīlāna-hetubhāvena rasavat, ‘āyur ghṛtam’ ityā”di-vyapadeśavat.

It may be noted that Dhanañjaya does not enter into the topic of how rasa is experienced from poetry or drama. It is Dhanika who elaborately rejects the case of vyañjanā as established by the great Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta representing what we term as the Kashmir School of thought. Dhanika has supported the case of tātparya as against vyañjanā. We have discussed his anti-dhvani and anti-vyañjanā approach under both tātparya and vyañjanā earlier. So, we will not get involved in that topic anymore but pick up the thread concerning rasa, the number of rasas, vibhāvā”di etc. as explained and accepted by Dhanañjaya in the text of the DR.

The DR. IV. 2 speaks of ‘vibhāva’ as two-fold :

“jñāyamānatayā tatra  
vibhāvo bhāva-poṣakṛt,

ālambanóddipanatva-  
prabhedena sa ca dvidhā."

That which is known is 'vibhāva'. It sustains the bhāva. It is two-fold such as 'ālambana-vibhāva' and 'uddīpana-vibhāva'.

Dhanika explains (pp. 168, ibid, avaloka on DR. IV. 2) 'evam ayam', 'evam iyam' ity' atīśayokti-rūpa-kāvya-vyāpārā" hita-viśiṣṭa-rūpatayā jñāyamāno vibhāvya-mānaḥ san ālambanatvena uddīpanatvena vā yo nāyakā"dir abhimata-deśakālā"dir vā sa vibhāvaḥ -

The substance is that we take the characters as depicted either in poetry or presented on stage in a drama, as they are, i.e. 'he is like this', or 'she is like this'. The description of characters in poetry or drama is of course, being poetic, is having a tinge of 'atīśayokti' i.e. extra-ordinariness about them. But through this extraordinary description the poet secures the particular form of his characters. The sāmājika or the cultured reader or spectator accepts the character of Rāma or Sītā, etc. to be as such i.e. "He (= Rāma) is like this", or, "She (= Sītā) is like this" etc. Thus the agents which cause the sāmājika to have this apprehension are termed 'vibhāvas' and they are 'ālambana' or forming the very base, such as the hero or the heroine etc., and 'uddīpana' or enhancing agency such as the surrounding conditions consisting of say, a lovely garden, a moonlit-night, etc. etc. as the context may be. Dhanika quotes Bharata in support suggesting, "vibhāva is that the meaning of which is grasped." The two-fold vibhāva-s will be elaborated while discussing individual rasas, observes Dhanika.

Dhanika silences an objection here. He observes : (pp. 168-9; ibid) -

"amiṣāṃ ca an-apekṣita-bāhya-sattvānāṃ śabdōpadhānād eva āsādita-tadbhāvānāṃ sāmānyā"tmanāṃ sva-sva-sambandhitvena vibhāvitānāṃ sākṣād bhāvaka-cetasi viparivartamānānāṃ ālambanā"dibhāva iti na vastuśūnyatā. tad uktaṃ bhartṛhariṇā -

śabdōpahitarūpāṃs tān  
buddher viśayatām gatān,  
pratyakṣam iva kāmā"dhīh  
sādhanaatvena manyate." - iti.

(V. P. Sādhana-samuddeśa - 5)

ṣaṭ sahasrī-kṛtā'py uktam - ebhyās' ca sāmānyaguṇa-yogena rasā nīspadyante." iti. (N.S., G.O.S., Vol. I. pp. 348)."

The substance of Dhanika's argument is :

The objector may say that the vibhāvā"di-s in poetry are limited to words only. They do not have a real physical existence. In drama also Rāma, or Mālinītata etc. are also unreal. Thus on account of their not being real, i.e. because of their vastu-śūnyatā, they are not directly cognised (i.e. pratyakṣa). Thus the vibhāvā"di-s in kāvyā can not be associated with "jñāyamānatva". To this Dhanika's reply is as follows : Whatever is applicable with reference to vibhāvā"di-s that are objects of worldly knowledge, is not applicable to vibhāvā"dis delineated in poetry or drama. With reference to worldly cognition the physical existence of a given object is expected.

But vibhāvā"di-s in poetry do not require physical existence as a pre-condition. For, the apprehension of vibhāvā"di-s in poetry is brought about by words used in poetry and not by real objects. Again, the objects of worldly knowledge are only particular while those described in poetry are of 'sāmānya' or 'de-individualised' - form. These vibhāvas go with their individual rasas and move in the mind of the connoisseur in such a way that, as it were, he has direct knowledge. Marked with such special features such vibhāvas are either 'ālambana' or 'uddīpana'. The fact is that in the mind of the connoisseur this generalised - sāmānya-or - 'ideal' - form of vibhāvā"di-s is apprehended and hence they should not be taken as "vastu-śūnya" i.e. unreal. When through words we apprehend some object mentally or intellectually, it becomes as if such as "directly apprehended". Bhartṛhari also suggests the same thing when he says that, "when words such as 'Kāṃsa' are used in a sentence, not only the words are uttered but along with that these words make the form of 'Kāṃsa' etc. the object of our intelligence. Now these "buddhi-gata kāmṣa" etc. i.e. Kāṃsa etc., apprehended by intellect are accepted by us as if they are directly cognised and become 'karma', 'kāraṇa', etc. and thus are apprehended by us as jñāpaka' i.e. sādḥaka - of our knowledge in form of agent, or object (i.e. kartā, karma), etc.

Bharata has also said the same thing when he observes that these vibhāvas, when generalised - "sāmānya-guṇa-yogena" - make for rasas.

The DR. IV. 3 observes that -

“anubhāvo vikāras tu  
bhāva-saṃsūcanā”tmakaḥ,  
hetu-kāryā”tmanoḥ siddhis  
tayoḥ saṃvyavahārataḥ.”

‘anubhāva’ is that (external) indication which suggests the (basic) emotion. They are cause (i.e. *hetu*, *vibhāva*) and effect (= *kārya*, *anubhāva*) of *rasa* and as they are seen as such (i.e. cause, effect etc.) in worldly context, they are said to be established as such. Hence their definitions are not separately attempted.

Dhanika says that because these *vibhāvas* and *anubhāvas* (in poetry) are directly realised as *hetu* and *kārya* in worldly real context, they are established as *hetu* and *kārya* in art-context (i.e. poetry, drama etc.) also. He observes : (pp. 171, 172, *ibid*) : “*tayor vibhāvā'nubhāvayor laukika-rasaṃ prati hetu-kārya-bhūtayor samvyavahārād eva siddhatvān na prthag-lakṣaṇam upayujyate. tad uktam - 'vibhāvā'nubhāvau loka-samsiddhau loka-yātrā'nugāminau loka-svabhāvā'nugatvāc ca na prthag lakṣaṇam ucyate.'*” (N.S., G.O.S. Vol. I, pp. 348).

Dhanañjaya at DR. IV 4 tries to explain as to why a ‘bhāva’ is so termed as ‘bhāva’. Why all i.e. *sthāyin*, *anubhāva*, *sāttvika*, and *vyabhicārins* are termed ‘bhāvas’ to begin with ? DR. IV. 4 observes :

“*sukha-duḥkhā*”dikair bhāvair  
bhāvas tadbhāva-bhāvanam;”

In the first *kārikā* i.e. DR. IV. i, along with ‘*vibhāva*’ and ‘*anu-bhāva*’, ‘*sāttvikas*’ and ‘*vyabhicārin-s*’ were also mentioned. The word ‘*bhāva*’ is used with all the three viz. *sthāyin*, *sāttvika* and *vyabhicārin*. So, here Dhanañjaya feels it imperative to explain the basic term “*bhāva*”. This is defined as - ‘By the happiness or unhappiness as expressed by the ‘*anukārya*’ (i.e. original character) as depicted in poetry or drama, the *sāmājika* also feels similar happiness or unhappiness etc. in his heart. Thus his heart is having the same feeling as expressed by the *anukārya* of poetry or drama. This identity of the *bhāva* of the *anukārya* with the *bhāva* of the *sāmājika* is termed ‘*bhāva*’. Dhanika observes : (pp. 172, *ibid*) -

“*anukāryā*”śrayatvena upanibadhyamānaiḥ *sukha-duḥkhā*”di-bhāvais tadbhāvasya bhāvaka-cetaso bhāvanam, vāsanam bhāvah. tad uktam - ‘*aho hy anena rasena gandhena vā sarvam etad bhāvitam, vāsitam, iti. yat tu 'rasān bhāvayan bhāvah' iti, 'kaver antargataṃ bhāvaṃ bhāvayan' iti*” (N.S. G.O.S. Vol. I., pp. 346) *ca, tad abhinaya-kāvyaṃ pravartamānasya bhāvaśabdasya pravṛtti-nimitta-kathanam. te ca sthāyino vyabhicārīṇaś ca iti vakṣyamāṇāḥ.*”

The substance of what Dhanika wants to convey here may be put as follows. The characters that are imitated in drama are real *Rāma*, *Duṣyanta* etc. The poet depicts feelings of happiness, unhappiness etc. in these characters and they are

presented by the actors on stage. When the feelings of these anukāryas are felt, i.e. when their bhāvanā/vāsanā is felt by the connoisseur, this bhāvanā is termed bhāva (bhāvaka-cetaso bhāvanam vāsanam bhāvaḥ). Dhanika quotes the N.S. here in support. It is stated therein - "oh, by this rasa or gandha, (= fragrance), everything is, as it were, turned into bhāva i.e. bhāvita. Just as an incense stick, when lighted, turns everything around fragrant, in the same way the happiness etc. of the character makes the spectator feel happiness etc. The heart of the sāmājika is, as it were, 'vāsita' i.e. rendered full of fragrance.

The term 'bhāva' is explained with the help of another etymology also. It is said, "rasān bhāvayan bhāvaḥ". i.e. bhāva is such that makes the rasas possess those bhāvas, (i.e. they are bhāvita). It is also said, "Bhāva is one which equips the heart of the poet with that particular bhāva'. The ancient ācāryas have fielded these etymologies of 'bhāva'. The etymology given above (i.e. the first) therefore, cannot be accepted, says an objector. To this Dhanika's reply is as follows : These two etymologies (as cited in the N.S.) are for the currency of the term 'bhāva' with reference to acting and poetry. The etymology as attempted by Dhanika is with reference to the bhāva as is being experienced in the heart of the connoisseur. Thus the etymologies as presented by the NS. are not in contradiction of the one presented by Dhanika with reference to the sāmājika.

There is viṣaya-bheda in these views and hence no opposition.

These bhāvas are sthāyins and vyabhicārins as will be shown later.

DR. IV. 4b, 5a, explain the sāttvika-bhāva-s as,

"pṛthag bhāvā bhavanty anye  
anubhāvatve'pi sāttvikāḥ, (4b)  
sāttvād eva samutpattes  
tac ca tadbhāva-bhāvanam. (5a)

Even though the sāttvika-bhāvas are also anu-bhāvas, they are taken as different bhāvas. They are called 'bhāva', because they are derived from 'sattva' i.e. mental attitude. 'sattva' means experiencing the same feeling by the sāmājika in his heart, as is experienced by the anukārya i.e. 'rāma' etc.

Dhanika observes (pp. 173, ibid) : "para-gata duḥkha-harṣa"di bhāvanāyām atyantānukūlā'ntaḥ-karaṇatvaṃ sāttvaṃ yad āha-"sāttvaṃ nāma manaḥ prabhavaṃ. tac ca samāhitamansttvād utpadyate. (N.S. G.O.S. Vol. I. pp. 374). etad eva asya sāttvaṃ yat duḥkhitena praharsitena vā āśru-romāñcā"dayo nirvartyante.

tena sattvena nirvṛttāḥ sātṭvikāḥ. tad bhāva-bhāvanam ca bhāvaḥ; tata utpadyamānatvād aśru-prabhṛtayo’pi bhāvāḥ, bhāva-samsūcanā”tmaka-vikāra-rūpatvāc ca anubhāvā iti dvairūpyam eteṣām.”

The substance is as follows. ‘Sattva’ is that special quality of mind when the antahkaraṇa or heart is filled with absolute identical or favourable response on account of unhappiness or happiness seen with reference to somebody else. It is said ‘sattva’ springs from mind. It is born of concentrated mind. It is the quality of sattva which makes for tears or horripilation when one is either unhappy or happy. Thus sātṭvika bhāvas are those that are displayed with the help of sattva i.e. extreme concentration of mind. Bhāva is explained as ‘attaining that feeling of someone else’. Tears etc. as born of sattva (i.e. concentration of mind), are also termed anubhāvas as they are signs suggesting this or that feeling. Thus sātṭvika bhāvas have a double role and hence are also anu-bhāvas as well.

DR. IV. 5b-6 describe the eight anubhāvas such as stambha, pralaya, romāñca etc. DR. explains only stambha which is stupefaction of limbs, and ‘pralaya’ as ‘unconsciousness’. The rest, the DR. observes are absolutely clear and need not be explained.

The vyabhicārins are explained in the DR. IV. 7 as :

viśeṣād ābhimukhyena  
caranto vyabhicārīṇaḥ,  
sthāyiny unmagna-nirmagnāḥ  
kallolā iva vāridhau.”

By ‘viśeṣa’ is meant ‘ābhimukhya’ i.e. in consonance with, in front of. So those that take place following the lead of the sthāyins are termed vyabhicārins. They are, like upsurging and falling waves in an ocean, also gathering strength and fading away only when respective sthāyi-bhāva is present.

Dhanika explains (pp. 174, ibid) “yathā vāridhau saty eva kallolā udbhavanti vilīyante ca tad vad eva ratyā”dau sthāyini satyeva āvirbhāva-tirobhāvābhyām ābhimukhyena caranto vartamānā nirvedādayaḥ vyabhicārīṇo bhāvāḥ.”

Thirty-three vyabhicārins are enumerated following Bharata's lead. They are individually defined in the DR., and Dhanika cites stanzas to illustrate the same. Nirveda and jaḍatā have sub-varieties also. So also śrama, dhṛti, and trāsa. Āvega also has a number of sub-varieties.



Sthāyin is defined at DR. IV. 34 (pp. 196, ibid) as -

viruddhair a-viruddhair vā  
bhāvair vicchidyate na yaḥ,  
ātmabhāvaṃ nayaty anyān  
sa sthāyī lavaṇā"karah."

That which is not hindered by opposite or non-opposite emotions but leads others to merge with oneself is the permanent basic emotion. It is like an ocean (which leads all that pours into it to merge in itself).

Dhanika explains further as follows : (pp. 196, ibid) - "sajātiya-vijātiya-bhāvāntarair atiraskṛtatvena upa-nibadhyamāno ratyā"diḥ sthāyī." He illustrates it from Bṛhatkathā and also Mālatī-mādhava.

Then he discusses the possible nature of 'virodha'. It could be born of the fact that two emotions either cannot be juxtaposed - 'saha-anavasthānam' or there may be absolute contradiction allowing no co-existence whatsoever - i.e. "bādhya-bādhaka-bhāva". All this seems to follow Ānandavardhana's lead.

Commenting on "viruddhair a-viruddhair vā", Dhanika (pp. 197, ibid) explains : "viruddhair a-viruddhair vā bhāvaiḥ ya āhitāḥ saṃskāro na vicchedī bhavati, pratyuta tān sarvān ātmabhāvaṃ nayati, sa sthāyī bhāvo lavaṇā"karah." This is illustrated by Dhanika. Ānandavardhana's lead is apparent in all this.

The sthāyi-bhāvas are mentioned as eight and the ninth 'śama' is reluctantly mentioned with a remark that - "śamam api kecit prāhuḥ puṣṭir nāṭyeṣu na etasya." (DR. IV. 35 b. pp. 202, ibid). So, both Dhanañjaya and Dhanika have no faith in śama, at least so far as dramatic art is concerned. It seems that Mammata, a great protegonist of the Kashmir school, was also impressed by Dhanañjaya and Dhanika.

Dhanika denounces śama with reference to drama and critically discusses, to his satisfaction, the case of Nāgānanda. He suggests that the sthāyin in this play is "dayāvira-utsāha". : (pp. 203, ibid) - "ato dayāvīrōtsāhasyaiva tatra sthāyitvaṃ śṅgārasya aṅgatvena, cakravartitva-avyāpteś ca nāntarīyaka-phalatvena a-virodhād abhīpsitam. evaṃ ca sarvatra draṣṭavyam iti. paropakārapravṛttasya vijigīṣor nāntarīyakatvena phalaṃ sampadyate ity āveditam eva prāk. atōṣṭāv eva sthāyinaḥ."

The DR. IV. 36 further disowns 'nirveda' as a sthāyin in the words :

"nirvedā"dir atādrūpyād  
a-sthāyī svadate katham,  
vairasyāyaiva tat-poṣas  
tenā'sṭau sthāyino matāḥ."

‘a-tādrūpya’ means ‘getting over-whelmed by viruddha or a-viruddha’ emotions. ‘nirveda’ has no capacity to absorb the riot run by other emotions. It can not absorb other emotions and cannot see that other emotions get defeated and merged into it. So nirveda can not be called a sthāyin. As it is a-sthāyin, how can it be relished in form of a rasa ? Actually if nirveda is enhanced in poetry and drama it will cause ‘vai-rasya’ i.e. negation or demolition of rasa. Dhanika observes : (pp. 204, ibid) :

viruddha-a-viruddha-a-viccheditatvasya nirvedā”dīnām abhāvāt a-sthāyitvam. ata eva te cintā”dī-vyabhicāryantaritā api paripoṣaṃ nīyamānā vairasyam āvahanti. na ca niṣphalāvasānatvam eva eteṣām asthāyitvanibandhanam, hāsyā”dīnām apy a-sthāyitva-prasaṅgāt. pāraṃparyeṇa tu nirveda”dīnām api phalatvāt. ato’ sthāyitvād evai teṣām a-rasatā.”

Nirveda, because of the lack of the quality of “viruddha-a-viruddha-a-viccheditatva”, cannot be a sthāyin. It gets removed or ‘vicchinna’ by other bhāvas. Some take nirveda along with ‘cintā’ etc, the vyabhicārins together and accept its enhancement. But even with the help of a-virodhi-vyabhicārins, nirveda is not enhanced to the capacity of rasa. Now it can be argued that sthāyins such as ‘hāsa’ etc. also do not have a clear phala or effect, i.e. they also are ‘niṣphalāvasāna’. So, even hāsa as a rasa also will have to be discarded. Their result also has no contribution whatsoever. On the other hand if closely observed, even nirvedādi are not totally without an effect i.e. they are not niṣphalāvasāna, for nirvedā”dī become aṅga - i.e. subservient to any other sthāyin which in itself is not ‘niṣphala’. Thus in sequence - paraṃparā - ‘nirveda’ also bears some fruit. So ‘whatever’ is ‘niṣphala’ is not a ‘sthāyin’ - is not a rule. Absence of an effect i.e. ‘phala-rahitatā’ cannot be taken as the ‘prayojaka’ of a sthāyin. The actual reason for any emotion not being taken as a sthāyin could be only this that it has no capacity to stand the strength of other emotions, opposite or not opposite. As ‘nirveda-ādi’ lack this quality, they can not be taken as sthāyins. So, for Dhanika there are only eight sthāyins and eight rasas.

After this Dhanika enters into a long discussion as to how rasas are arrived at through ‘tātparya’ and that projection of vyāñjanā is useless. We have discussed all this in separate chapters earlier and therefore this may not detain us here.

The DR. IV. 37 observes : (pp. 211, ibid) :

“vācyā prakaraṇā”dibhyo  
buddhisthā vā yathā kriyā,  
vākyārthaḥ, kārakair yuktā  
sthāyī bhāvas tathétaraṇiḥ.”

In a sentence we understand, with the help of context and kārakas, a particular activity as vākyārtha, either directly stated as above or as implied through context alone. Thus 'kriyā' either directly stated or otherwise is the sentence-sense. In the same way, through vibhāvādi-s, sthāyin emerges as 'vākyārtha' i.e. tātparyārtha or purport in poetry, i.e. in a poetic statement. Sthāyī, like implied kriyā i.e. buddhisthā kriyā, is arrived at through context i.e. prakaraṇā"di.

Dhanika establishes the supremacy of tātparya-vṛtti and denounces vyañjanā in his Avaloka on DR. IV. 37.

The DR. IV. 38-47 discuss the topic of rasa in greater detail. DR. IV. 38-39 (pp. 217) read as -

“rasaḥ sa eva svādyatvād  
rasikasyaiva vartanāt  
na-anukāryasya vṛttatvāt  
kāvyasya a-tatparatvataḥ.” (IV. 38)  
draṣṭuḥ pratītir vrīḍērsyā-  
rāga-dveṣa-prasaṅgataḥ,  
laukikasya sva-ramaṇī-  
saṃyuktasyaiva darśanāt.” - (IV. 39)

Rasa is so called because of its being relished and because it is located only in the connoisseur or rasika who is present. Rasa is not said to be present in the 'anukārya' i.e. original character such as Rāma, Sītā, etc., that are imitated. The reason is that the 'anukārya' is a matter of past i.e. history. Again poetry is not written to please these historical characters. If rasa were accepted with reference to the anukārya, then as in drama, so also in actual life if a seer sees somebody making love, he should experience rasa. But on the contrary such a sight promotes, with reference to the individual culture of an onlooker, a response of aversion, shame, jealousy, attachment, displeasure etc. as the case may be.

Dhanika (pp. 217, ibid) observes in Avaloka : “kāvyārthópaplāvito rasikavartī ratyā”diḥ sthāyī bhāvaḥ sa iti nirdiśyate. sa ca svādyatām nirbharā”nanda-samvidātmatām-āpādyamāno rasaḥ. rasikavartī vartamānatvāt; na anukārya-rāmā”di-vartī, vṛttatvāt tasya.

atha śabdopahita-rūpatvena vartamānasya api vartamānavad avabhāsanam ucyate. tathā'pi tad avabhāsasya asmadā”dibhir anubhūyamānatvād asat-samatā eva svādaṃ prati. vibhāvatvena tu rāmā”der vartamānatvād avabhāsanam iṣyata eva. kiṃ ca na kāvyam rāmā”dīnāṃ rasopajanānāya kavibhiḥ pravartyate. api tu sahrdayān ānandayitum. sa ca samasta-bhāvaka-saṃvedya eva. yadi ca anukāryasya rāmā”deḥ śṛṅgāraḥ syāt. tato nāṭakā”dau taddarśane laukika iva nāyake śṛṅgāriṇi sva-kāntā-saṃyukte drśyamāne śṛṅgāravān ayam iti prekṣakāṇāṃ pratīti-mātram bhavet na rasikānāṃ svādaḥ satpuruṣāṇānāṃ ca lajjētareṣāṃ tv asūyā-rāgā'pahārecchādayaḥ prasajyeran. evam ca sati rasādīnāṃ vyaṅgyatvam apāstam...etc.

The DR. IV. 40, 41, 42a - read as :

“dhīrodāttādy avasthānāṃ  
rāmādiḥ pratipādakaḥ,  
vibhāvayati ratyā”dīn  
svadante rasikasya te. (IV. 40 DR.)  
tā eva ca parityakta-  
-viśeṣā rasahetavaḥ;  
krīdatām muṇmayair yādvad  
bālānāṃ dviradā”dibhiḥ (IV. 41)  
svōtsāhaḥ svadate tādvat  
śrotṛnāṃ arjunā”dibhiḥ -

42a DR. 42b reads -

kāvyārtha-bhāvanā”svādo  
nartakasya na vāryate.” (DR. IV. 42b)

Dhanañjaya is of the opinion that the anukārya such as Rāma and the like that are described in poetry, stand for the stage of a dhīrodātta and the like (in general). These Rāma etc. cause the apprehension of ratyā”dī in the sāmājikas who relish the same. These ‘rāmā”dī’ deprived of their individuality i.e. when they are de-individualised, make for the (enjoyment of) rasa.

As children, while playing with earthen toys, say a toy elephant etc., relish their own sthāyin such as ‘utsāha’, in the same way the cultured readers or spectators enjoy their own emotion seeing the emotion of characters such as Arjuna and the

like. This, i.e. Arjuna and others presented through art-forms are as unreal as toy-elephants in case of children. But, the sāmājikas derive bliss or ānanda through these characters.

In DR. 42 b. Dhanañjaya says that enjoyment of rasa in case of the actor is not totally rejected. If the actor also enjoys the kāvyārtha, then in the capacity of a bhāvaka he is entitled to enjoyment of rasa.

Now Dhanañjaya talks of the four types of rasa-experience with reference to the resultant four-fold mental state of the enjoyer. He observes : DR. IV. 43, 44, 45 a read as :

“svādaḥ kāvyārtha-sambhedād  
 ātmānanda-samudbhavaḥ,  
 vikāsa-vistara-kṣobha-vikṣepaiḥ  
 sa caturvidhaḥ.” - DR. IV. 43  
 śṛṅgāra-vīra-bībhatsa-raudreṣu-  
 manasaḥ kramāt  
 hāsyā'dbhuta-bhayótkarṣa  
 karuṇānām ta eva hi. - DR. IV. 44  
 atas tajjanyatā teṣām  
 ata evāvadhāraṇam. - 45 a

“On account of the apprehension of poetic meaning, the special bliss caused in the heart of the connoisseur is termed ‘svāda’ or relish.

This relish is said to be four-fold such as (i) when the mind or conscience feels a flash of light as it were, or expansion, or dilation, or shaking i.e. disturbance or movement, i.e. scattering. This happens in case of śṛṅgāra, vīra, bībhatsa and raudra respectively and similarly respectively in case of hāsyā, adbhuta, bhayānaka and karuṇa also. DR. talks of the four mental attitudes or states of consciousness - citta-bhūmayah - that result from a rasa-experience. The next four i.e. hāsyā etc. also have a similar effect and therefore they are deemed as resulting from the first four respectively. This refers to Bharata's concept of four prakṛti-rasas and four-vikṛti-rasas. Dhanika explains that in Bharata's statement viz. “śṛṅgārād hi bhaved hāsyah”... etc. the idea is that śṛṅgāra etc. are the ‘hetu’ of hāsyā etc. But they are not related as absolute kārya-kāraṇa-bhāva because they are caused by other reasons also. Dhanika observes : (pp. 221, ibid)

śṛṅgārād hi... (N.S. G.O.S. 6/39) iti hetu-hetumadbhāva eva sambhedā'pekṣayā darśitaḥ. na [tat] kārya-kāraṇā'bhiprāyeṇa. teṣāṃ kāraṇāntara-janyatvāt.

Dhanika thus suggests that the rasas are only eight as suggested here.

He then discusses how even karuṇa causes bliss and not unhappiness. In this respect these Mālava-School ālaṃkārikas seem to agree with the Kashmir school.

After this the DR. once again focuses on śānta rasa. It is observed at DR. 45b -

śama-prakarṣo nirvācyo

muditādes tad ātmata - (pp. 223, ibid)

Introducing these lines Dhanika observes : (pp. 223, ibid) : nanu ca śānta-rasasya an-abhineyatvāt yady api nāṭye'nupraveśo nāsti tathā'pi śūksmā'tītā"divastūnām sarveṣāṃ api śabda-pratipādyatāyā vidyamānatvāt kāvya-viśayatvam na nivāryate. atas tad ucyate -

As śānta-rasa cannot be represented on stage, it is not recognised with reference to drama. But all subtle or past things can be apprehended through words. Thus everything (including śānta) can be the object of poetry.

DR. 45b therefore suggests that śānta rasa, which is of the form of enhancement of śama is indescribable. It is of the form of 'muditā' or joyousness etc.

Kārikā IV. 46 is an attempt to suggest how the combination of vibhāva, - anubhāva and sañcārī results in rasa-relish. We may say that the DR. attempts its own explanation of rasasūtra. It is observed :

padārthair indu-nirveda-

romāñcā"di-svarūpakaiḥ

kāvyād vibhāva-sañcāry

anubhāva-prakhyatām gataiḥ - IV. 46

bhāvitaḥ svadate sthāyī

rasaḥ sa parikīrtitaḥ." IV. 47 a DR.

Worldly objects, with reference to poetry (or any art) are termed vibhāva etc. With the help of these vibhāvā"di-s the sthāyī is relished as rasa when it is turned into a state of 'bhāva'. Dhanika observes : (pp. 224, ibid, on DR. IV. 46, 47a) :

"atīśayōktirūpa-kāvyavyāpāra-āhita-viśeṣaiḥ candrā"dyair uddīpana-vibhāvaiḥ, pramadā-prabhṛtibhir ālambana-vibhāvaiḥ, nirvedā"dibhir vyabhicāri-bhāvaiḥ romāñca-aśru-bhrūkṣepa-katākṣā"dyair anubhāvaiḥ avāntara-vyāpāratayā padārthibhutaḥ vākyaṛthaḥ sthāyī bhāvo, bhāvito bhāvarūpatām ānītaḥ svadate, sa rasa iti prāk-prakaraṇa-tātparyam."

The idea is that the sāmājika apprehends the vibhāvā"di-s in form of padārtha i.e. word-meaning, and padārtha makes the sthāyin situated in the heart of the sāmājika, an object of bhāvanā-vyāpāra. The result is the attainment of bliss in form of relish. This "ānanda" in form of "āsvāda" is rasa. Thus rasa is nothing else but the 'bhāvita' state, or the state of relish of the sthāyin itself. It seems Dhanañjaya is closer to Lollata and Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka.

It may be observed that Bharata had devoted a separate chapter viz. the bhāvādhyāya over and above the rasādhyāya for explaining bhāva. But the DR. seems to suggest that on account of the basic identity of bhāva and rasa, no separate treatment of bhāvas along with their vibhāvā"di-s is considered here. As the vibhāvas of both rasa and the related bhāva are identical, both rasa and bhāva are taken as non-different and hence no separate treatment of bhāvas is required as is done by Bharata. DR. IV. 47b observes :

“lakṣaṇaikyam vibhāvaikyād  
abhedād rasa-bhāvayoh.”

Now onwards, the DR. takes up individual rasas with their varieties if any. Dhanika of course provides poetic illustrations for all rasas, such as śṛṅgāra, with its varieties and avasthās, vīra, bībhatsa, raudra, etc.

DR. IV. 84 (pp. 250, ibid) observes that bhāvas such as prīti, bhakti etc., and rasas such mṛgayā, akṣa, etc. get included in harṣa, utsāha etc. clearly; and therefore are not separately cognised :

“prīti-bhakty ādayo bhāvā  
mṛgayā'kṣā"dayo rasāḥ,  
harṣotsāhā"diṣu spaṣṭam  
antarbhāvān na kīrtitāḥ.”

DR. IV. 84

This means that the DR. is in favour of absorbing the love for any game, be it the game of dice, or say cricket or boxing or any, in 'utsāha', the sthāyin of vīra, while prīti or bhakti are taken up under accepted vyabhicārins.

In the same vein, harṣa, utsāha etc. along with alaṃkāras, are capable of absorbing the 36 bhūṣaṇas (or lakṣaṇas), and 21 sandhyantarās. DR. IV. 85 reads :

“śad-triṃśad bhūṣaṇā"dīni  
sāmā"dīny eka-viṃśatiḥ,

lakṣma-sandhyantarā”khyāni  
sālaṃkāreṣu teṣu ca.”

Dhanika observes : (pp. 250, ibid) -

“vibhūḍṣaṇaṃ cāḥṣara-saṃhatis ca,  
śobhābhīmānau guṇakīrtanaṃ ca.” -

ity evaṃ ādīni ṣaṭ-triṃṣaṭ kāvya-lakṣaṇāni, ‘sāma bhedaḥ pradānaṃ ca’ ity evaṃ ādīni sandhyantarāṇy ekaviṃṣatir upamādiṣv alaṃkāreṣu haṣṭotsāhādiṣv antarbhavanti. tena na prthag uktāni.”

Dhanañjaya ends his work with a famous expression that there is no object on earth, howsoever ugly, or even if it be a non-object so to say, which does not attain the status of rasa-bhāva. DR. IV. 86 (pp. 250, 251) reads :

“ramyaṃ jugupsitaṃ  
udāraṃ athā’pi nīcam,  
ugraṃ prasādi gahanaṃ  
vikṛtaṃ ca vastu,  
yad vā’py a-vasu  
kavi-bhāvaka-bhāvyamānaṃ  
tan nā’sti yaṇ na  
rasa-bhāvaṃ upaiti loka.”

The Laghatikā of Bhaṭṭa Nṛsiṃha adds (pp. 251, ibid) : ramya-jugupsitā”dīrūpaṃ vastu a-vasu vā rasībhūya kavi-bhāvena anākṛantaṃ loka nāsti ityā”ha - ramyaṃ iti.

It may be observed that after Abhinavagupta these two viz. Dhanañjaya and Dhanika have come up with a great contribution in the field of art-criticism. They belonged to the court of Muñja and were the protegonists of the Mālava School of aesthetics with a lot of influence of Bhaṭṭanāyaka and mighty following in the works of Bhoja and some others. We see how the Mālava School has wielded its influence on even Rāmacandra and Guṇacandra who were disciples of Ācārya Hemacandra, an ardent follower of the Kashmir School of thought as represented by the great Ānandavardhana, Abhinavagupta and Mammata. Even Śāradātanaya the author of Bhāvaprakāśana, Sāgaranandin the author of Nāṭaka-lakṣaṇa-ratna-kośa, and Śiṅga-bhūpāla the author of Rasārṇava-Sudhākara were influenced by



the Mālava School in general and perhaps the DR. in particular. So, the DR. along with the Śr. Pra. of Bhoja and the Sāhityamīmāṃsā of unknown authorship were great works belonging to the Mālava School of aesthetics. We will now move on to the Nāṭyadarpaṇa (= ND.) of Rāmacandra and Guṇacandra (= R. & G.). Kṣemendra's rasa-vicāra will be taken up in our proposed Vol. II, when in a separate chapter, we will discuss the concept of 'aucitya'.

**Nāṭyadarpaṇa** (ND.) discusses the concept of rasa in the fourth chapter or 'Viveka' : The editions referred to by us are the G.O.S. Edn. '29; and the Hindi N.D. Deptt. of Hindi, Delhi University, Delhi, '91; with Intro., Trans. and explanation by Ācārya Viśveśvara Siddhānta-Śiromaṇi. We have great respect for Viśveśvarajee, but the other names associated with this edition do not carry weight whatsoever, for us.

It may be noted at the outset that the ND. moves away, though not totally, from the Kashmir School, while discussing the topic of rasa. It takes rasa to be of the nature of both happiness and un-happiness - i.e. sukha-duḥkhātmako rasaḥ - and perhaps the forgotten tradition that went with the words of Bharata such as, "harṣādīnśca adhigacchanti" - is revived here. It may be observed that the ND. has absorbed a number of influences from Dhanañjaya's and Bhoja's Mālava tradition, and has also restated some elements from Daṇḍin, Lollaṭa, and Śaṅkuka. We will carefully and closely examine what the ND. has to say on rasa.

The ND. I. 3 observes that the part of drama is difficult to traverse as it is rendered complex by billows in form of 'rasa'; while the path of poetry is easier on account of its being rendered soft by the use of alaṃkāras.

“alaṃkāra-mṛduḥ panthāḥ  
kathā”dīnāṃ su-saṅcarāḥ,  
dus-saṅcaras tu nāṭyasya  
rasa-kallola-saṃkulāḥ.”

It is observed that only he is a poet with the help of whose composition even the mortals drink nectar. His language dances in the area of drama, twisting and whirling with the waves of rasa.

sa kavis tasya kāvyena  
martyā api sudhāndhasaḥ,  
rasórmī-ghūrṇitā nāṭye  
yasya nr̥tyati bhārati, (ND. I. 5)

To glorify the presence of rasa in a poetic composition, the ND. I. 6, 7 read as follows :

nānārtha-śabda-lauilyena  
parāñco ye rasāmṛtāt,  
vidvāmsas te kavīndrāṇām  
arhanti na punaḥ kathām. I. 6  
śleṣā'lamkāra-bhājópi  
rasā'niṣyanda-karkaśāḥ  
durbhagā iva kāmīnyāḥ  
prīṇanti na mano girāḥ.” (ND. I. 7)

After the glorification of ‘rasa’ in the first viveka, the N.D. in its third viveka deals with the topic of rasa, theoretically.

The definition of rasa at N.D. III. 7 reads as : (pp. 290, Edn. Viśveśvara, Hindi) :

“sthāyī bhāvaḥ śritótkarṣo  
vibhāva-vyabhicāribhiḥ,  
spaṣṭā'nubhāva-niśceyaḥ  
sukha-duḥkhā”tmako rasaḥ.”

The basic emotion, when enhanced with the help of determinants and accessories, and when confirmed by clear consequents, and which is of the nature of happiness and unhappiness, is termed ‘rasa’.

It may be noted that the ND. does not use the term “saṃyoga” or combination (of vibhāvā”dis), but instead places the term ‘sthāyibhāva’ in the definition. We know that Bharata had not used the term ‘sthāyin’ and had used the term ‘saṃyoga’. The sthāyin for the ND. becomes rasa when enhanced by vibhāva and vyabhicārins and inferred by clearly marked anubhāvas. We may say that by calling the ‘śritótkarṣa sthāyin’ i.e. enhanced basic emotion as (identical with) rasa, the N.D. seems to revive the tradition of Lollaṭa for whom upacita-sthāyin was rasa. In a way the ND goes with the upacitivāda of Lollaṭa, so to say. But it is not just this. Vyañjanā is neither opposed nor totally rejected by the ND. Thus the ND. puts in a newer light the whole heritage of dramatic criticism and seems to evolve a sort of synthesis of its own. We may also say that by taking rasa as enhanced sthāyin and also by taking rasa to be of the nature of both happiness and unhappiness, the ND. also seems to accept the tradition of “sthāyī eva rasaḥ” as against the Kashmir tradition of (laukika) sthāyi-vilakṣaṇo rasaḥ.”

'Sthāyin' is explained by the N.D. as : (vṛtti, ND. III. 7, pp. 290, ibid) - "prati-kṣaṇam udaya-vyaya-dharmakeṣu bahuṣv api vyabhicārīsv anuyāyitayā avāśyaṃ tiṣṭhati iti sthāyī." The permanent basic emotion is one which necessarily stays as constant among many passing feelings (= vyabhicārīns) that have rise, fall etc. as their characteristic every moment." Or, say 'ratyā'di' is sthāyin, with reference to 'glāni' etc. the vyabhicārīns for only in the presence or absence of the former the latter are present or absent. This ratyādi sthāyin when enhanced, takes the form of rasa. The Vṛtti (ND. III. 7, pp. 290, ibid) reads further : "vibhāvair lalanódyānā" dibhir ālambanóddīpana-rūpair bāhyair hetubhiḥ, sata eva āvirbhāvāt, vyabhicāribhir glānyā" dibhī rasika-manah-śarīra-vartibhiḥ, paripoṣaṇāc ca, śrītótkarṣaḥ, svīkṛtasākṣātkāritvā'nubhūyamānā'vastho, yathā-sambhavam sukha-duḥkha-svabhāvo rasyate āśvādyate iti rasah."

Now this "sata eva āvirbhāvāt" is not in tune with the Kashmir School of thought which regards 'rasa' not as pre-existent but only "tātkālīka" and "vibhāvā"di-jīvitāvadhi". But this trend we see later in Viśvanātha and earlier perhaps in the Mālava School of thought. ND. is clear that "upacayaṃ prāpya rasa-rūpeṇa ratyā"dir bhavati", thus favouring upacitivāda' basically. The vyabhicārīns that enhance this sthāyin are those staying in the mind of the 'rasika'.

ND. divides rasas into two such as those like śṛṅgāra-hāsyā-vīra-adbhuta and śānta that promote happiness on account of their determinants etc. being 'iṣṭa' i.e. of welcome type. The rest, i.e. karuṇa, raudra, bībhatsa, and bhayānaka born of unwelcome - an-iṣṭa-determinants etc. cause unhappiness and therefore are said to be "duḥkhā"tmānaḥ. : "tatra iṣṭa-vibhāvā"di-grathita-svarūpa-sampattayaḥ śṛṅgāra-hāsyavīra-adbhuta-śāntāḥ sukhā"tmānaḥ. apare punar aniṣṭa-vibhāvā"dy-upanītā"tmānaḥ karuṇa-raudra-bībhatsa-bhayanakās' catvāro duḥkhā"tmānaḥ.

ND. criticises the view of those who hold all rasas to be of the nature of happiness, because this is against our experience. ND. observes that forget about the second group of rasas - i.e. bibhatsa, bhayānaka, karuṇa and raudra, to provide happiness when born of real causes - "mukhya-vibhāvópacitāḥ", but even when these four are born of vibhāvā"dis, projected through either poetry i.e. kāvya or drama i.e. nāṭya, they cannot cause happiness. Actually they lead to unexpressible unhappy state of mind in case of those who experience the same. It is therefore that people shun or get nervous about such rasas as bhayānaka etc. There can be no mental disturbance by any experience of happiness :

"yat punaḥ sarva-rasānāṃ sukha-duḥkhā"tmakatvam ucyate tat pratīti-bādhitam. āstāṃ nāma mukhya-vibhāvópacitāḥ, kāvyābhinayópacitōpi bhayānako

bībhatsaḥ karuṇo raudro vā rasā”svāda-vatām anākhyeyām kām api kleśa-ḍaśām upanayati ata eva bhayānakā”dibhir udvijate samājah. na nāma sukhā”svādād udvego ghaṭate.” (pp. 291, ibid)

This is in direct opposition to and flagrant discard of what Abhinavagupta and the Kashmir School of aesthetics has to report on the nature of rasa. Abhinavagupta's words are (A.bh. NS. VI. 31) “asman mate tu samvedanem eva ānandaghanam āsvādyate, tatra kā duḥkhā”saṅkā.” ND. seems to follow a line suggested through the words of Bharata in the expression, “harṣādīn śca adhigacchanti”, and explained there by Abhinavagupta that here by ‘ādīn’ are suggested both harṣa and śoka i.e. happiness or bliss and also unhappiness or, sorrow. This line of thinking, perfectly misguided and also supported by some of the moderns such as Siddhicandra in his “Kāvya-prakāśa-khaṇḍana”, and also by the ‘navyāḥ’ to an extent as seen in the R.G., takes its stand on the fallacious assumption that the emotions and feelings as depicted in poetry, drama or any art, are not only the same as met with in the work-a-day world but are absolutely identical in nature i.e. are yielding both happiness and unhappiness as the case may be, with the worldly emotions and feelings. Actually the Kashmir School has vehemently opposed this conclusion and it is therefore, that for this school ‘rasa’ is “sthāyi-vilakṣaṇa” i.e. laukika-sthāyi-vilakṣaṇa in the sense that it is made of pure bliss - ānanda-ghana- and is experienced in the context of art only : “nāṭya eva rasaḥ, na loke” and not in worldly context at all. This is a fundamental difference between these two schools of thought and we support only Abhinavagupta in this regard.

But the ND. seems to be conscious of another fact also and it is that even tragic scenes in a drama are appreciated by men of taste. But they i.e. Rāmacandra and guṇacandra say that men of taste feel ultimately happy not because of the inherent extra-ordinary bliss-generating nature of rasa, but because at the first phase of experiencing bhayānaka etc. they do feel unhappy but at a later stage they are awe-struck i.e. they as it were experience ‘camatkāra’ at the thought of the expert presentation by both the poet who wrote the script and the actor who performed so well as to make it look real. This ‘camakāra’ gives them delight. All this seems childish to us.

The ND. to substantiate their belief of rasa being “sukha-duḥkhā”tmaka’, further illustrate from poetry and drama. They say that no sa-hṛdaya will enjoy i.e. feel happy at the sight of Sītā's abduction, Draupadi's insult, Hariścandra's slavery, or death of Rohitāśva.

ND. reads as follows : (pp. 291, ibid) : “yat punar ebhir api camatkāro dṛśyate

sa rasā"svāda-virāme sati yathā'-vasthita-vastu-pradarśakena kavi-nāṭa-śakti-kausalena. vismayante hi śīrścheda-kāriṇā'pi prahāra-kuśalena vairiṇā śaundīramāninaḥ. anena eva ca sarvāṅgā"hlādakena kavi-nāṭa-śakti-janmanā camatkāreṇa vipra-labdhāḥ paramānanda-rūpatam duḥkhā"tmakeṣv api karuṇā"diṣu sumedhasaḥ pratijānate. etad āsvāda-laulyena prekṣakā api eteṣu pravartante. kavayas tu sukha-duḥkhā"tmakasamśārā'nurūpyeṇa rāmā"di-caritam nibadhnantaḥ sukha-duḥkhā"tmaka-rasānu-viddham eva grathnanti. pānaka-mādhuryam iva ca tikṣṇā"svādena duḥkhā"svādena sutarām sukhāni svadante iti.

api ca sītāyaḥ haranam, draupadyāḥ kacāmbarā"karṣaṇam, hariścandrasya cāṇḍāla-dāsyam, rohitāśvasya maraṇam, lakṣmaṇasya śaktibhedanam, mālātyā vyāpādanā"rambhaṇam ity ādy abhinīyamāṇam paśyatām sahrdayānām ko nāma sukhā"svādaḥ." ?

The arguments are advanced on the theory that laukika-rasa and kāvyā-nāṭyā"di-gata-rasa are absolutely identical in nature. The ND. seems to accept 'rasa' even at worldly level, but we know that the school represented by Abhinavagupta accepts the possibility of rasa in the context of art only.

The ND., believes that the actual sorrowful behaviour results with reference to the karuṇa, as experienced by actual Rāma (i.e. real anukārya). This expression of sorrow is of the nature of unhappiness only. If its imitation causes happiness, then it cannot be considered to be actual imitation, for it would look contradictory : "tathā anukāryagatāś ca karuṇā"dayaḥ paridevitā'nu(di)kāryatvāt tāvad duḥkhā"tmakā eva. yadi cā'nukaraṇe sukhā"tmānaḥ syur na samyag anukaraṇam syāt. viparītatvena bhāsanād iti." (pp. 292, ibid)

This shows that the ND. has failed even to understand the true significance of Bharata's words viz. "nāṭyam... bhāvā'nukīrtanam". Gross imitation and artful representation or recreation are never identical.

The ND. observes further that when there is experience of happiness even in the context of the karuṇa. being either staged or described, actually it is a taste of unhappiness only. Only a miserable person will feel happy while listening to the miserable condition of some other unhappy person. He will be unhappy on listening to the joy of somebody else. So, Karuṇa and such other rasas have to be taken as causing unhappiness.

All these arguments may hold good when psychology of 'people in ordinary worldly context is looked into. But only the elect enter the world of art. Only the people blessed with divine sensitivity have an admission in the world of art wherein laws of gross physical world pale into insignificance

**along with the apparent rules of common psychology. The ND. has to learn this or get out of the world of aesthetics.**

The ND. further notes that the vipralambha-śṅgāra is of the nature of unhappiness due to torment, but as there is inherent possibility of love in union, it is taken, in the end, to be of the nature of happiness. The ND. has to pass this remark because it has branded śṅgāra as basically ‘sukhā’tmaka’, and one variety viz. vipralambha is seen apparantly associated with unhappiness due to mental torment, the disunited lovers have to experience.

**After this the ND. turns its attention to yet another basic question concerning the substratum of rasa.** For the ND. rasa is seen primarily in the original characters and then in the spectators, and also in those too who listen (or read) poetry and also compose it. **We strongly object to this observation which unholds rasa in actual persons in worldly context.** The ND. observes - (pp. 293, ibid) - rasas' ca mukhyalokagataḥ, preṣakagataḥ, śrotr-anusandhāyakadvaya-gato vā iti.” By ‘anusandhāyaka’ we mean the poet who composes poetry. He too may enjoy rasa, we believe, only when purged of all limitations of lower ego. Of course, as a sensitive soul he receives impressions personally from his personal encounter with the context he is involved in, but when he writes poetry his entire limited self is brushed aside and, possessed as it were he is, he presents everything local with a universal colouring. Thus de-individualisation or sādharmaṇīkaraṇa operates first at the level of the poet personally, then at the level of the vibhāvādi's or the material he presents through his poetic muse, and then this sādharmaṇīkaraṇa operates at the level of the enjoyer of art. **This secret of art-experience the ND. and its like-thinkers refuse to accept and we feel sorry for the same.**

In their rasa-kārikā the authors had suggested that ‘rasa’ is ‘spṛṣṭānubhāva-niśceyaḥ’. This means that the effects or consequents of the enhanced sthāyin indicate the same. The anubhāvas make the inference of the enhanced sthāyin possible. As the anubhāvas help us infer the sthāyin concerned, they i.e. the anubhāvas have to be clear and unfailing signals that help this inference. Only such signals are taken as unfailing marks : “spṛṣṭāḥ iti spṛṣṭāḥ samyaṁ nirṇītāḥ. a-sandigdham hi liṅgaṁ bhavati. anubhāvayanti parasthān api rasān avabodhayanti iti anubhāvāḥ. stambha-sveda-aśru-ramāñca-bhrūkṣepa-ādayaḥ. tair yathā sambhavam sat-tayā niśceyaḥ.” (pp. 293, 4; ibid).

The ND. further observes that in poetry and drama the rasa that is apprehended is that rasa which stays in somebody else. Now such an apprehension cannot be

direct because the qualities of mind are beyond the grasp of physical organs. So, it has to be indirect. This indirect apprehension is caused only by a medium which in invariably associated with that object. In case of rasa signs having invariable association are only the physical reactions noted in an outward fashion : (pp. 294, ibid) : “iha tāvat sarvaloka-prasiddhā parasthasya rasasya pratipattiḥ. sā ca na pratyakṣā, cetodharmāṇām atindriyatvāt. tasmāt parokṣā eva. parokṣā ca pritiṣṭhā avinābhūtād vastvantarāt. atra ca rase anyasya vastvantarasya asambhavāt kāryam eva avinākṛtam.”

It may be noted that here the ND. tries to explain that the apprehension of rasa staying in somebody else than oneself has to be collected with the help of external signs that follow as invariable results. The characters presented on the stage express their feelings through acting that comprises of exhibiting external effects following invariably from their mental states. But these resultant expressions of the characters become so to say causes for the evocation of rasa in the spectator. This will drive the N.D., and it is absolutely logical, to a conclusion that for the spectator the stuff presented on the stage, i.e. characters, their acting, their feelings inferred from their acting etc. form an indivisible cause - a vibhāva which stimulates the sthāyin in the heart of the spectator. So, actually Bharata's rasa-sūtra can be shortened to just this much viz. “vibhāvād rasanīṣṭhā”, wherein this ‘vibhāva’ in the newer and wider sense is made of everything seen on the stage i.e. the characters or ālambana, the context or uddīpana, their acting suggesting their mental state etc. The milieu or the whole sāmāgrī or combination becomes a cause, so to say, a vibhāva which stimulates the sthāyin of the spectator or art-enjoyer.

The ND. believes that an actor or an artist exhibits the signs of his experiencing an emotion even in the absence of actual experience of such a feeling in his case personally. But such effects as exhibited by an artist even in the absence of actual emotion are to be taken only as causes. It should not be said that these artificial exhibition of effects has no invariable relation with a feeling. Actually these effects serve only as cause - vibhāva - for the spectators.

ND. observes (pp. 295, ibid) : “paragata-vibhāvādy anukriyāyām ca para-rañjanārthaṁ pravṛttasya naṭasya rasā'bhāve'pi stambha-svedā”dayo bhavanti iti, naiṣāṁ rasa-nāntariyakatvam āśaṅkāniyam. teṣāṁ paragata-rasa-janukatvena a-kāryatvāt. naṭa-gatā hi stambhā”dayaḥ prekṣaka-gatarasānām kāranam. prekṣaka-gattās tu kāryāṇi.” Lollaṭa has also indicated this difference between anubhāvas as exhibited by an artist and the anubhāvas that are connected with rasa/bhāva of the character or person concerned.

The ND. observes that if the anubhāvas seen in a actor are genuine, i.e. are of the form of real kārya or effect, then we can imagine the existence of rasa even in an actor. There is no law that debars the actor from experiencing rasa, observes the ND. : “na ca naṭasya raso na bhavati ity ekāntaḥ.” (pp. 296, ibid). The harlots, exhibiting love for earning money, at times fall in love genuinely also. Same could be the case with the actor also. Just as a singer, singing to entertain someone else, himself also enjoys his own singing, in the same way the actor can experience rasa while getting one with the character, say Rāma, during his imitation of Rāma's feelings.

ND. observes that the horripilation and the like as observed in a man or woman, or in an actor, or as described in poetry, cause rasa in somebody else. So, these ‘anubhāvas’, causing rasa in others are actually counted in ‘vibhāvas’ or ‘cause’. But the anubhāvas located or observed in a spectator, or a listener (of poetry), or in a poet (anu-sandhātā) or a composer, are results of rasa and as they are sure indicators - niśceyaka - or vyavasthāpaka of rasa staying in them, so, they are kārya-rūpa or of the form of effects : (NP., pp. 296, ibid) : “romāñcā”dayaś ca ye strī-puṃsa-naṭa-kāvyasthās te pareṣāṃ rasa-janakatvād vibhāva-madhyā-vartināḥ, prekṣaka-śrotraṇusandhātrā”di-sthitās tu rasasya kāryāṇi santo vyavasthāpakāḥ.”

The ND. as noted above, accepts rasa at worldly context, of course both with reference to individual and also at a general level. Laukika-rasa at both levels, particular and general, is acceptable to the ND. and this goes diametrically opposite to the theory of the Kashmir School of thought. The ND. observes that when the vibhāvas are real and lead the individual sthāyin to rasa only in a limited personal context, there the experience of rasa is limited to an individual only. The ND. observes that when love concerns a woman who actually is in love with someone else, the ‘rati’ that is enhanced in of a general type - “sāmānaya-viṣayā-ratiḥ” and hence the taste of śṛṅgāra here is not with reference to a fixed person - i.e. niyata-viṣaya but is of the ‘sāmānya’ type. Now, all this for us falls beyond aesthetics. For us, the primary concern of art is absolute bliss with no personal limitations active at any stage. The full circle of art-experience is made of de-individualisation and has no concern whatsoever with practical context of day-to-day world. The ND. however accepts rasa-experience at the reality level and that too both of the individual and general type. This confounds us totally. The ND. says that when we look at a woman, though unknown to us, getting unhappy owing to a tragedy concerning her kith and kin, we experience general type of enjoyment of karuṇa-rasa. This means that sympathy, unselfish of course, for any tragic event in actual



reality is taken by ND. as general type of rasa-experience. ND observes : (pp. 297, ibid) - “bandhu-śokā”rtām ca rudatīm striyam avalokya sāmānya-viśaya eva karuṇa-rasā”svādaḥ. evam anyeṣv api raseṣu viśeṣa-sāmānya-viśayatvam dṛṣṭavyam.”

This observation of ND. goes against our normal practice also. When we witness a tragic accident we say, “how tragic?”. We do not say we enjoy “tragic-sentiment”. We also do not appreciate love-making in public. It is never termed ‘śṛṅgāra-rasa’. Actually the term ‘rasa’ means ‘āśvāda’ or “carvaṇā” i.e. aesthetic chewing. In practical world we do not relish such situations and certainly will not choose to use the term “rasa” in such contexts. ND.’s observations are absolutely unfounded from practical point of view also. Let us dismiss such a talk as pure, unalloyed non-sense.

The ND. further observes that the vibhāva-s in poetry and drama that are basically unreal but are presented (in such an artistic way) in poetry and acting that they look as it were real. These apparently real but in fact unreal vibhāvā”dis presented through poetry or drama (or any art whatsoever) cause the sthāyin to rise to the status of rasa for the listeners, spectators and composers. This ‘rasa’ is only of the general type. So, ND. is hopefully agreeable to the fact that at least in art there is no scope for rasa-experience of ‘individual’ type. (pp. 298, ibid) : “ye punar a-paramārtha-santōpi kāvyā”bhinayābhyām santa iva upanītā vibhāvās te śrotr-anusandhātr-preksakāṇām sāmānya-viśayam eva sthāyinaṁ rasatvam āpādayanti. atra ca viśaya-vibhāga-anapekṣī rasā”svādapratyayaḥ.” Here the apprehension of rasa does not involve any personal consideration.

Thank God; at least the authors of ND. accept this much that aesthetic enjoyment through art is beyond personal limitations.

We may raise one question here. On an earlier occasion, the authors had argued that who would not be (personally) unhappy witnessing scenes of the abduction of Sītā, or the insult of Draupadī, etc. ? This observation involves an accepted situation where the spectators individually feel unhappy. This goes against the observation by ND. noted in earlier paragraphs here. This is self-contradiction. Or, the authors may defend their position by saying that Sītā or Draupadī is not personally related to the spectator and so the Karuṇa is here of a ‘general’ nature. But all this is pure none-sense. The ND. exhibits this lack of any sense when it is observed (pp. 298, ibid) : “na hi rāmasya sītāyām śṛṅgāre anukriyamāṇe sāmājikasya sītā-viśayaḥ śṛṅgāraḥ samullasati api tu sāmānya-stri-viśayaḥ. niyata-viśaya-smaraṇā”dinā sthāyinaḥ pratiniyata-viśayatāyām tu pratiniyataviśayaḥ rasā”svādaḥ.”

The basic trouble with ND. is that it fails to draw a line of demarcation between the world of art and the world of practical reality. ND. seems to take them as one and identical.

ND. observes that the reason why when one person enjoys a dramatic scene somebody else does not raise an objection to his enjoying, is that the vibhāvādi-s, presented by poetry or drama (or any art) are in fact unreal and as they are common to all, the enjoyment or rasa is not ruled out in case of any individual enjoyer and surely this is not in contradiction to someone else's enjoyment also. : (pp. 298, *ibid*) : “tathā a-paramārthasatām abhinaya-kāvya-rpitānām ca vibhāvānām bahu-sādhāraṇatvād ya ekasya rasā”svādaḥ sōnya-a-pratikṣepā”tmā, ity ayoga-vyavacchedena na punar anya-yoga-vyavacchedena.”

Thus the rasā”svāda or art-experience in both practical life or in poetry (i.e. art), is having some location necessarily. For it can not take place in the absence of substratum whatsoever. (Thus, it is either located individually in a person, or in a general nature with many, both in art and reality). ND. observes that total absence of substratum will defeat all mental states. No mental state is possible without its being grounded in a substratum. Rasa is just a variety of mental disposition : (pp. 299, *ibid*) - “evaṃ ca loke kāvyē vā sarva-rasika-sādhāraṇo rasā”svādo, na punaḥ sarvathā api ādhārānullekhī. ādhārollekha-nirapekṣāyās cittavṛtteḥ kasyāścid anupalakṣaṇāt. citta-vṛtti-viśeṣaś ca rasaḥ.”

The ND. again turning its focus on the connoisseur asserts that the stuff that causes the basic sthāyin to enhance, i.e. the vyabhicārins or assessories are also to be imagined as staying in the sāmājika only. These vyabhicārins staying in the sāmājika enhance the sthāyin staying in the same substratum to the capacity of rasa. Precisely because of these they are termed as co-runners - “sahacārins” of the sthāyin. In poetry or drama, the vyabhicārins or anubhāvas concerning women etc. - make up a whole to arouse the sthāyin in someone else (i.e. sāmājika) and therefore the whole “sāmagrī” presented through art-medium can be broadly termed “vibhāva” i.e. they can be imagined to fall in the scope of ‘vibhāva’. From the point of view of the lady-character concerned they may be termed “vyabhicārins” etc. (of the heroine), but in reality from the point of view of rasa-experience of the sāmājika, all these can be covered up by just “vibhāva-s”. In short, if Bharata had stated, “vibhāvād rasa-niṣpattiḥ” - only, even then it would have been a correct and exact narration of facts. This seems to be the opinion of the authors of the ND. Read (pp. 301, *ibid*) : “yad apy ucyate “vibhāvā'nubhāva-saṃyogād rasa-niṣpattiḥ”, iti tatra api anubhāva vyabhicārīṇaś ca sṛy ādi-varṇanīya-anukāryā”pekṣayā eva draṣṭavyāḥ.”

ND. further notes : (pp. 301, ibid) : “tad evaṃ pratyakṣa-parokṣābhyāṃ gamah sukha-duḥkhā”tmā (i) lokasya, (ii) naṭasya (iii) & (iv) kāvyā śrotr-anusandhātroph, (v) prekṣakasya ca rasaḥ. kevalaṃ mukhya-strī-puṃsayoḥ spaṣṭena eva rūpeṇa raso, vibhāvānām paramārtha-sattvāt ata eva vyabhicāriṇónubhāvāśca rasajanyāḥ tatra spaṣṭa-rūpāḥ. anyatra tu prekṣakāḍau dhyamalena eva rūpeṇa. vibhāvānām a-paramārtha-satām eva kāvyā”dinā darśanāt. ata eva vyabhicāriṇónubhāvāśca rasā”nusāreṇa a-spaṣṭā eva. ata eva prekṣakā”di-gato raso lokottara ity ucyate.”

Rasa is an experience involving happiness and, or, unhappiness. It takes place with reference to oneself or someone else, and is therefore said to be pratyakṣa i.e. direct or parokṣa i.e. indirect. It is seen with reference to practical world of reality i.e. loka, and also with reference to the actor, the one who listens to (or reads) poetry, or the composer (i.e. poet, etc.) and the spectator. The rasa in practical life, i.e. loka-gata rasa, is to be understood as pratyakṣa or direct and clear i.e. spaṣṭa; because the young woman or young man involved therein are real i.e. are actually living persons. The rasa on the otherhand as experienced through the art-medium i.e. poetry or drama, is to be taken as parokṣa i.e. indirect and a-spaṣṭa or hazy or nebulous, as the characters involved therein are un-real or imaginary. Because of its being hazy or nebulous, this type of rasa is said to be extra-ordinary or “lokóttara”, observes ND., which also accepts that poetry (or drama) is said to be ‘sa-rasa’ i.e. ‘having rasa’, only metaphorically because in fact rasa is a characteristic only of the sentient beings, it being of the form of citta-vṛtti or mental despoisition. How can rasa, of the form of an enhanced mental state could be designated as “soul” of poetry/drama which is in-sentient ?

The ND. observes (pp. 302, ibid) : “kāvyasya ca rasā”virbhāvakatvāt sa-rasatvam. na punaḥ kāvyam eva rasaḥ, kāvyē ādhāre vā rasaḥ. śrítótkarṣo hi cetovṛtti-rūpaḥ sthāyī bhāvo rasaḥ. sa ca a-cetanasya kāvyasya ātmā ādheyo vā katham syāt ? tataḥ kāvyā”rthapratipatter anantaram pratipatṛṇām rasā”virbhāvaḥ.”

ND. further obsrves that those who apprehend poetry enjoy rasa, like happiness, that stays within their self. They do not enjoy rasa as something external such as a sweet-ball etc. : pratipattāraś ca ātmastham sukham iva rasam āsvādayanti. na punar bahistham rasam modakam iva pratiyanti.” (pp. 302, ibid) : Thus for ND. rasa-experience is not an external entity but is only subjective and internal. Experience of sweets is different from that of rasa. By the taste of an external item, ‘rasa’ of the nature of aesthetic chewing is not caused. - “na hi bahisthasya rasasya pratyaya-mātreṇa rasā”svādas’ carvaṇā”tmakaḥ saṃgacchate.” (pp. 302, ibid). ND. adds that from poetic content concerning the horrible and the tragic (i.e.

bhayānaka and karuṇa) the basic emotions of fear and sorrow (i.e. bhaya and śoka) staying in the mind of the apprehender, result in the experience of bhayānaka and karuṇa rasa. If the sthāyin of the apprehender himself does not terminate into the state of rasa, then there is no possibility of the apprehension of rasa which stays outside the self of the enjoyer. For, actually if rasa is noted basically located in the self of the enjoyer than there is no possibility of its being located in either poetry or the artist. For if there is apprehension of something which is non-existent, then even a non-sensitive person will experience rasa : “asataśca api pratyaye a-  
hrdayasya api pratitih syāt.” (ND. pp. 303, ibid).

Thus, after the apprehension of poetry that describes vibhāva (etc.), the sthāyin of the apprehender himself becomes rasa. It is for this reason that poetry is also said to be “having rasa” (only metaphorically). ND. observes : (pp. 303, ibid) - “rato vibhāva-pratipādaka-kāvya-pratipatter anataram pratipattur eva sthāyī raso (sī) bhavati. tad hetuvāc ca kāvyam rasavad iti.”

The ND. ends its discussion on rasa with this remark. Hopefully it looks that the authors are concerned more with rasa through art-medium, rather than through real causes in practical world.

It may be said to the credit of the authors Rāmacandra and Guṇacandra that they have discussed the problem of rasa-experience from many angles, both relevant and irrelevant. But they have presented a broad-based theory of rasa to their satisfaction. They being the disciples of Ācārya Hemacandra who was a staunch follower and admirer of Ānandavardhana, Abhinavagupta and Mammaṭa, and therefore a die-hard supporter of the Kashmir School of aesthetics, these authors showed guts to differ from their great guru. This shows the brighter side of the academic climate in those days in Gujarat and India, where freedom of thought and expression prevailed perfectly and when respect for human values touched the highest peak.

After giving the rasa theory the ND. discusses, practically after Bharata and the tradition in dramaturgy in general, the topics such as the nature, number and scope of anubhāvas, vibhāvas and vyabhicārin. Following Mammaṭa, it looks the ND. observes (pp. 303, ibid, Kārikā III. 8) :

“kārya-hetuḥ-sahacārī  
sthāyyādeh kāvya-vartmani,  
anubhāvo vibhāvaśca  
vyabhicāri ca kīrtyate.”

The same explanation of individual terms is also read here under. ND. observes that the stāyins, being of the form of consciousness, are said to be 'a-jada' i.e. only sentient, while the vibhāvas, anubhāvas and vabhicārins are both sentient as well as in-sentient. The anubhāva called dhairya, being of the nature of mental state is sentient while perspiration (i.e. 'sveda') being only physical is insentient; sthāyin alone which is enhanced, is principal and the rest being covered by the sthāyin are all subordinate. ND. also notes, following Abhinavagupta that the whole combination of vibhāvā"dis goes with this or that rasa invariably, but individual vibhāva, anubhāva or vyabhicārin may be found with this or that rasa, as the case may be. There is no invariable conomittance between individual vibhāvā"di and individual rasa.

Then ND. talks of the number of rasas to be nine (ND. III. 9, pp. 305). The sequence in the Kārikā also follows the logic as stated in the A.bh. ND. observes that only these nine rasas deserve to be enumerated as they cause special delight and are related to the ends of life, basically. But reluctantly the ND. mentions that there are other rasas also, but they are subsumed under the said rasas by some learned people : "ete śṛṅgārā"dayo navaiva rasā rañjanā-viśeṣeṇa puruṣārthayogādhikyena ca sadbhiḥ purvā"cāryair upadiṣṭāḥ. sambhavanṭy apare'pi. yathā garddha-sthāyī laulyaḥ, ārdratā-sthāyī snehaḥ, āsakti-sthāyī vyasanam, a-ratisthāyī duḥkham, santoṣa-sthāyī sukham ityādi. kecid eṣāṃ pūrveṣvantarbhāvam āhur iti. (pp. 306, ibid)

Then the ND. explains and illustrates these nine rasas. Then after Ānandavardhana the ND. observes that in poetry poets should be very attentive to rasa-delineation (pp. 318, ibid)

"atha kāvyeṣu rasa-nibandhane avahitair bhāvyam iti upadiṣāti-

artha-śabda-vapuḥ-kāvyam

rasaiḥ prāṇair visarpati,

añjasā tena sauhārdaṃ

raseṣu kavimāninām." (ND. III. 21)

ND adds (pp. 320, ND. III. 22) -

"na tathā artha-śabdōtprekṣāḥ

ślāghyāḥ kāvye, yathā rasaḥ,

vipāka-kamram api āmram

udvejayati, nīrasam."

After Ānandavardhana the problem of rasa-virodha is also then discussed. Rasa-doṣas are also enumerated following the lead of Abhinavagupta and Mammaṭa. The Vṛtti under ND. III. 23, explains this with illustrations.

Nine sthāyins, including śama, are enumerated at ND. III. 24 and explained in the vṛtti. Thirty-three vyabhicārins following tradition are enumerated at ND. III. 25-27., followed by explanation of individual vyabhicārins. At times the authors differ from Mammaṭa, and the DR. also.

At ND. III. 44, it is observed that among the rasādī-s, there is cause-effect relation with one another also. Anubhāvas are taken up next (ND. III. 45) and explained individually (upto ND. III. 49). The third chapter of the ND. ends with a discussion on four-fold abhinaya or acting such as vācika-āṅgika, sāṭtvika and āhārya.

**We will now turn to the Bhāraprakāśana (= B.P.) of Śāradātanaya. (Śā)** (Ref.s are to the two editions viz. Edn. Oreintal Institute, Baroda, 1968, and Edn. Madan Mohan Agrawal., pub. Chowkhamba Surabharati prakashan, Varanasi, '83.). **It may be noted that B.P. records a number of dramaturgic traditions even prior to Bharata and the author seems to present some views which do not conform perfectly with the tradition as represented by Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta, though of course he is quite close to them and Mammaṭa on so many counts. But by and large he seems to represent a tradition that we have termed “Mālava School of aesthetics”, as represented by the DR. Bhoja, and the Agnipurāṇa also.** But one fact emerges that Śā. has incorporated certain thought currents that were obsolete, so to say, when we look into the throbbing tradition of aesthetics that seems to be represented in Mammaṭa and his illustrious followers. As we are committed to the tradition as represented by Ānandavardhana, Abhinavagupta and Mammaṭa, we feel that Śā. at times, talks things that look simply unacceptable. But, on the other hand, the fact remains that the so called Mālava tradition as preserved in Bhoja, Agnipurāṇa and the rest keeps on making appearance now and then in the works of such authors as Śā., Bhānudeva, or even Jayadeva to an extent. We will try to examine Śā.'s views on rasa and bhāva and problems correlated with these topics quite closely, and of course as dispassionately and critically as possible. One thing is certain that Śā. deserves a very close analysis and claims tremendous respect for preserving traditions that seem to be almost pushed out by the juggernaut of what we call the Kashmir School of thought.

It may be noted that we will restrict our study of Śā. only to the area of bhāva and rasa, though of course Śā. has a number of noteworthy observations in other directions of dramaturgy as well. We have noted his views on śabdaśakti-s, especially rātparya and vyañjanā, and also on minor art-forms in earlier chapters. His special views on “nātyōtpatti” etc. need not detain us here, nor his views to correlate ‘nātya’-tradition with its philosophical or ‘dārśanika’ background. His views on music and dance also form his special contribution.

As suggested earlier we are concerned here with what Śā. has to say about ‘bhāva’ and ‘rasa’. Before we go for a closer observation citing actual references from his text, we will try to make a general survey of his attitude towards these two basic concepts of Indian Aesthetics. We will go for an in-depth study at a later stage.

The first important point that emerges from a casual survey of the contents of his work is that he has paid prime importance to the concept of ‘bhāva’ and has rendered the consideration of ‘rasa-tattva’ also to a position secondary to ‘bhāva’. This is evident from the very title of his work which reads as “Bhāva-prakāśana” or ‘Light on Bhāva’. For him also, though ‘rasa’ forms the vital energy, the ‘prāṇa’ of dramatic art (or any art in general), but ‘rasa’ has for its cause ‘bhāva’ at its root. ‘Rasa’ is ‘sādhya’ or ‘end’ and ‘bhāva’ is ‘sādhana’ or ‘means’ for him, and therefore more important and more basic. It is precisely for this reason that Śā. has taken up first the consideration of the concept of ‘bhāva’, to be followed by the thoughts on ‘rasa’. This goes against Bharata who has upgraded ‘rasa’ when he treated the topic of ‘rasa’ in the VI th Ch. of his N.S., and followed it with ‘bhāva’, to be discussed in the next Ch., i.e. in Ch. VII of the N.S. This topic is debatable and we will try to examine what logic prompted Bharata to maintain the order of ‘rasa-bhāva’ as against Śā.’s, ‘bhāva-rasa’. This we will do later.

But, Śā. feels that as the position of bāvas is permanent in man's mind, heart or consciousness, and through the medium of this bhāva alone we arrive at rasa-experience, ‘bhāva’ should come first for treatment. This is Śā.’s logic. Basically this fact cannot be negated if we look at it from an angle Śā. has advocated. But there are loop-holes in this and we will talk of it later.

The poet’s mental state, which through the medium of the actor bewitches the mind of the cultured spectator or ‘sāmājika’, is termed ‘bhāva’. It is observed by Dr. M. M. Agrawal (pp. 13, Intro. Edn., ibid) that while Bharata has analysed Bhāva

from the angle of sensation śā. has done it, over and above from the angle of sensation of happiness and unhappiness, also from the angle of the philosophical tenets of the Sāṃkhya School of thought. We do not get this point clearly. But we will try to explain Bharata's approach and the fallacy in Śā.'s understanding later. Dr. M. M. Agrawal's approach is not acceptable to us for our own reasons.

But this does not deter us from appreciating the subtle and analytical approach Śā. has placed before us in considering the topic of 'bhāva'. At the out-set we may note that Śā. has explained eight types of uddīpana-vibhāvas, and four types of anubhāvas. We will go into greater details later.

One more point to be noted as distinguishing Śā.'s approach is that for him relish of rasa i.e. 'rasa-āsvāda' is different in type, when we take into account the aptitude, culture, intellectual equipment etc. of the enjoyer. Young people seek passion - physical aspect in the delineation of Śṛṅgāra, a person with 'money' or wealth at the centre of his psyche will consider achievement of wealth in it, i.e. 'artha-lābha' will be sought after by such a person even in Śṛṅgāra, etc. A brave man has a leaning towards appreciation of adventure only and regards such theme as the best, and a learned man has fascination for philosophical considerations over anything else. This type of subjective and preferential attitude to rasa-relish has roots, more in psychology, we feel, than in pure aesthetics.

Agrawal observes that Bharata's approach to the problem of rasa concerns dramatic art in chief and later writers (on poetics) placed poetry in the centre. But Śā. has a fusion of both these angles. This observation is also debatable. We feel that Bharata kept 'drama' in focus while discussing 'rasa' not because he was ignorant of the applicability of rasa-theory to literature or any other art for that matter. But he did it because his work dealt with drama and dramatic art in particular and hence his application of rasa-theory was drama-oriented. But at a number of places, we have yet to find time to count, Bharata has talked of "kāvyā-rasa" also. That 'rasa' theory was catholic enough to cover all art, including drama, poetry, music, dance, architecture, sculpture, painting and what not, - was clear to Bharata and to Ānandavardhana and other writers on alaṃkāraśāstra who applied rasa-theory to poetry. That rasa-theory was germane to all the arts was known to all aestheticians beginning with Bharata down to Jagannātha and even his followers. Śā. is just one of those. We will now first pick up the thread concerning 'bhāva', along with a close reference to the text of the B.P. and then 'rasa', applying the same methodology. Our observations are going to be critical and neutral or dispassionate.



Śā. in the first chapter or 'adhikāra' states that he studied all relevant sources on dramaturgy and has composed his work. He observes :

(pp. 2, G.O.S., Edn., '68; Line 15) -

“tayaiva nāryavedasya  
 niyuktódhyāpane tadā,  
 prītas sópi sadāśivasya  
 śivayor gauryā matam vāsuker  
 vāg-devyā api nāradasya ca muneḥ  
 kumbhódbhava-vyāsayoḥ  
 śiṣyāṇaṃ bharatasya  
 yāni ca matāny adhyāpya tāny añjanā-  
 sūnor apy atha nātyavedam  
 akhilaṃ samyak tam adyāpayat.”  
 śāradātanayo devyāḥ  
 tān adhītya ca sannibhau,  
 ādāya sāram etebhyo  
 hitārthaṃ nātyavedinām.  
 bhāva-prakāśanaṃ nāma  
 prabandham akarot tadā  
 etasmin prathamam bhāvas  
 tasya bhedās tataḥ param...

Śā. treated bhāva first, along with its subdivisions, and things connected with bhāva. B.P. (pp. 3, ibid, reads) :

tad avāntara-bhedāśca,  
 tat tat kāryeṣu kauśalam,  
 tat-sādhyo'rthas tathā teṣāṃ  
 upakāryópakāritā.  
 rasópādānatā teṣāṃ  
 cara-sthira-vibhāgataḥ  
 tad darśanāni, tad drṣṭiḥ  
 drṣṭi-dharmāḥ prthagvidhāḥ.  
 parasparasya sāmartyam

sāhacaryāt kvacit kvacit  
iti-bhāgatayā bhāvā  
dvādaśaite, rato rasaḥ.  
tadbhedā bhedabhedāśca  
teṣāṃ janma ca nāma ca  
janakatvaṃ ca janyatvam  
teṣāṃ anyónyataḥ prthak  
pradhānetara-bhāvaśca  
teṣāṃ anyónya-saṃkaraḥ,  
tanmelanaṃ ca tat-siddhir  
viśeṣaḥ saṃkaródbhavaḥ.  
tad vyaṅgyatā vācyatā ca  
tan maitrī tad-virodhitā,  
tat-kālaniyamas tat-tad-varṇās  
tad-daivatāni ca.  
sthāyi-sañcāri-bhedāśca  
teṣāṃ dr̥ṣṭayópi ca  
iti viṃśatir uddiṣṭāḥ  
prakārā rasa-gāmiṇaḥ.  
tataḥ śabdārtha-sambandhas  
tat-prakārāḥ prthag-vidhāḥ,  
tad-vṛttayo rūpakāni  
tad-bhedās triṃśad ātmakāḥ.  
etair arthaiḥ prabandhóyaṃ  
yathāvat kathyate'dhunā  
kathyante yéntarā bhāvās  
tat-tad-arthānuṣaṅgiṇaḥ.  
tatra tatraiva vijñeyās  
te sūksmekṣikayā budhaiḥ,  
uddiṣṭānām ihārthānām  
lakṣaṇa-pratipādanam.”

Śā. composed this work called Bhāva-prakāśana. In this, first 'bhāva' is treated. Then its divisions and sub-divisions are discussed. Then the expertise needed to present these bhāvas with the meaning aimed at by them is discussed and the relation of utility between them is discussed. How bhāvas whether 'cara' or 'sthira' become instrumental in rasa is then shown. The appearance, vision connected with the particular bhāva, different characteristics of sight, their strength at times due to mutual relation of bhāvas, are all discussed. These go to make twelve approaches to the topic of bhāva.

Then 'rasa' is discussed along with its divisions and sub-divisions (or, varieties and sub-varieties), their birth, name, their mutual causality, their relation of principal and subordinate., their mutual relation due to saṃkara i.e. mixed type their mixture, their special achievement, mixing up and birth, their suggestivity or capacity of being directly stated, their favourableness (to one another) or opposition, the time, rules, colour, preciding deity, their basic emotion, passing feelings, their dr̥ṣṭi etc. are discussed. Thus twenty angles concerning rasa are discussed in the B.P.

This is followed by a discussion on the relationship between word and meaning, their varieties, the vṛttis, and then of the types, in all thirty, of rūpakas and upa-rūpakas.

B.P. observes that the definitions of these topics are given either following the order, or the propriety concerned. Subtle observations mark all this presentation.

With this, the discussion on bhāvas starts (pp. 3, 4, etc., ibid) :

“bhāvaḥ syād bhāvanam bhūtir  
atha bhāvayatīti vā.  
padārtho vā kriyā sattā  
vikāro mānasóthavā,  
vibhāvāś cā'nubhāvāś ca  
sthāyino vyabhicāriṇaḥ.”

Bhāva is primarily 'bhāvana'. The idea is that through the feelings of happiness and unhappiness of the 'anukārya' Rāma and the like, the causing (or rousing) of (identical) bhāvas or feelings in the heart of the sāmājika i.e. man of taste is called 'bhāva'. So bhāva is “causing i.e. bhāvana” of the bhāva of the sāmājika.

Then two-fold etymology of the term ‘bhāva’ is given, such as (i) bhūtiḥ and (ii) ‘bhāvayati’. ‘bhūti’ means ‘bhavanam’ or ‘being’ (bhū+ktin) ‘bhāvayati’ is that which causes (something else than itself, here the bhāvas in the hearts of the sāmājikas). So that which happens and that which causes to happen are both called “bhāva”. The first etymology means ‘sattā’ i.e. existence or ‘being’. The second leads us to the ‘act of causing’ i.e. activity, which causes something else.

Bhāva in the sense of a ‘padārtha’ i.e. object is called ‘vibhāva.’ In the sense of ‘kriyā’, it is termed anubhāva. In the sense of ‘sattā’, or being it is termed ‘sthāyi-bhāva’, i.e. that which stays. In the sense of mental off-shoot it is an impermanent feeling, the ‘vyabhicārin’. In the sense of presentation through mental concentration mānasa - it is a ‘sāttvika’ - bhāva.

B.P. (pp. 4, ibid) observes :

“padārtho vā kriyā sattā vikāro mānasóthavā  
vibhāvās cā'nubhāvāśca sthāyino vyabhicāriṇaḥ,  
sāttvikāś ceti kathyante bhāva-bhedās ca pañcadhā.”

Vibhāvas are those that make the objects known : “arthān vibhāvayanti iti vibhāvāḥ parikirtitāḥ.” (B.P. pp. 4, ibid)

‘anubhāva’ is explained as “making the known object (= vibhāvita artha) an-object of experience.” -

“vibhāvitārthānubhūtiḥ anubhāva iti smṛtaḥ.” (pp. 4, ibid)

Sthāyin-s are explained as those ‘bhāvas’ that have stayed in the mind for long, those that are enhanced with the help of related items (= anubandhi-s; here vibhāva, anubhāva and sañcārin-s), and those who attain to the status of rasa, i.e. who are of the form of rasa - “rasā”tmānaḥ.” B.P. (pp. 4, ibid) observes :

“avasthitās ciraṃ citte  
saṃbandhāc cā'nubandhibhiḥ,  
vardhitā ye rasā”tmānaḥ  
te smṛtā sthāyino budhaiḥ.”

Vyabhicārin-s are those that are by nature not permanent, but appear again and again, i.e. those that sub-serve or move (around) the sthāyin-s in the act of the birth of rasa. Sāttvika-bhāva-s are those that are born of Sattva (i.e. mental concentration) and are two-fold viz. svīya i.e. belonging to self or a-svīya not belonging to self.

B.P. (pp. 4 ibid) reads as -

“sthāyinā rasa-niṣpattau  
caranto vyabhicāriṇaḥ,  
sattvajā ye vikārāḥ syuḥ  
svīyā'-svīya-vibhāgataḥ  
ta eva sātrvikā bhāvā  
iti vidvadbhir ucyate.”

We may say in explaining the terms viz. sthāyin, vibhāva, anubhāva and vyabhicārin, Śā. is indebted to his predecessors, though of course, he has the distinction of putting things very succinctly.

Bharata explains as - (pp. 344, 5, 346, etc.) (Vol. I. G.O.S., Edn., '56)

“bhū iti karaṇe dhātus tathā ca bhāvitam vāsitaṃ kṛtyam ity anarthāntaram.  
loképi ca prasiddham. aho hy anena gandhena rasena vā sarvam eva bhāvitam iti.  
tac ca vyāptyartham.

Ślokāś cātra -

vibhāvenā”hrto yórho hy anubhāvais tu gamyate,  
vāg-aṅga-sattvā'bhinayaīḥ sa bhāva iti saṃjñitāḥ  
vāgaṅga-mukha-rāgeṇa  
sattvenā'bhinayena ca  
kaver antar gatam bhāvaṃ  
bhāvayan bhāva ucyate. 2  
nānā'bhinaya-saṃbaddhān  
bhāvayanti rasān imān  
yasmāt tasmād amī bhāvā  
vijñeyā nātya-yoktrbhiḥ. 3

atha 'vibhāva' iti kasmāt. ucyate-vibhāvo vijñānā'rthaḥ. vibhāvaḥ kāraṇam  
nimittam hetur iti paryāyāḥ. vibhāvyante'nena vāgaṅga-sattvā'bhinayā ity ato  
vibhāvaḥ. yathā vibhāvitam vijñātam ity anarthāntaram.

atra ślokaḥ -

“bahavo'rthā vibhāvyante  
vāgaṅgā'bhinayā"śrayāḥ,

anena yasmāt tenāyaṃ  
vibhāva iti saṃjñitaḥ.” - 4

atha ‘anubhāva’ iti Kasmāt ? ucyate - anubhāvyate anena vāg-aṅga-sattva-kṛtō bhinaya iti.

atra ślokaḥ -

“vāg-aṅgā”bhinayenēha  
yatas tv arthónubhāvyate,  
śākhāṅgópāṅga-saṃyuktas  
tv anubhāvas tataḥ smṛtaḥ.” - 5 .... (pp. 348, ibid)

tatrāṣṭau bhāvāḥ sthāyinaḥ trayas-trimśad vyabhicāriṇaḥ. aṣṭau sātṭvikā iti bhedaḥ. evam ete kāvya-rasā”bhivyaṅgi-hetavaḥ ekonapañcāśad bhāvāḥ pratyavagantavyāḥ ebhyaś ca sāmānya-guṇa-yogena rasā nīspadyante.

(pp. 355, ibid) - vyabhicāriṇa idānīm vyākhyāsyāmaḥ atrā”ha - vyabhicāriṇa iti kasmāt ? ucyate - vi abhi ity etāv upasargau. cara iti gaty artho dhātuḥ. vividham ābhimukhyena caranti iti vyabhicāriṇaḥ. vāg-aṅga-sattvópetāḥ prayoge rasān nayanti iti vyabhicāriṇaḥ. katham nayanti iti. ucyate - ‘loka-siddhānta eṣaḥ. yathā sūrya idaṃ dinam nakṣatram vā nayatīti. na ca tena bāhubhyāṃ skandhena vā nīyate. kiṃ tu loka-prasiddham etat. yathēdaṃ sūryo nakṣatram dinam vā nayatīti. evam ete vyabhicāriṇa ity avagantavyāḥ..”

Abhinavagupta, Mammaṭa, and Hemacandra follow this. We have explained the DR. earlier.

The B.P. has given a further analysis of the vibhāvas. Śā. observes that with reference to the eight rasas such as śṛṅgāra, etc. there are eight types of vibhāvas such as : lalita, lalita”bhāsa, sthira, citra, khara, rūkṣa, nindita, and vikṛta : (B.P., pp. 4, ibid) :

“lalitā lalitā”bhāsāḥ  
sthirās citrāḥ kharā iti,  
rūkṣās ca ninditās caiva  
vikṛtās ceti ca kramāt,  
śṛṅgārā”di-rasānām te  
vibhāvā nāmabhiḥ kṛtāḥ.”

Śā. observes that - (pp. 4, ibid)

“lalitā lalitā”bhāsā  
 bhāvāḥ śṛṅgāra-hāsyayoḥ,  
 sthirāś citrā vibhāvā ye  
 te vīrā’dbhutayoḥ kramāt  
 kharā rūkṣā vibhāvāḥ syū  
 raudrasya karuṇasya ca  
 bhayānakasya vikṛtā  
 bībhatsasya ca ninditāḥ.”

These very same when combined into one, two or three different bhāvas, are termed uddīpanas.

Lalita and the rest are explained by Śā. as follows : Those bhāvas which are instrumental in enhancing the śṛṅgāra-rasa, and those that are collected by respective sense-organs, those that create pleasure in mind are called “lalita”.

The vibāvas associated with hāsyā are either indicated, heard, seen or remembered. They are called “lalitā”bhāsa”.

Sthira vibhāvas are connected with vīra, and they are capable of yielding steadiness. They are also either heard, seen, remembered or meditated upon i.e. thought over.

Citra vibhāvas go with adbhuta-rasa. They make for supremacy (i.e. aiśvarya). They make the heart experience surprise.

Those that go to create karuṇa-rasa are ‘rukṣa’ vibhāvas. They torment the sense-organs by the objects that fall within their scope.

‘Khara’ vibhāvas are those which cause mental timidity instantly when considered. They make for the ‘raudra’ rasa.

The vibhāvas of the bībhatsa cause the eyes to be closed immediately and they are never cherished. They are termed “nindita”.

‘Vikṛta’ vibhāvas go with the terrible or bhayānaka rasa and when contacted with sense-organs, they cause degeneration.

Śā. then takes up ālambana vibhāvas : (pp. 5, ibid) -

“atraivālambanā bhāvāḥ  
 kathyante rasa-bhūmayāḥ,

anuddiṣṭā api yathā  
rasā'nubhava-siddhaye.”

‘For the success of rasa-experience, the ālambana-bhāvas, that form the background of rasa, are now stated.

The ālambana-bhāvas that go with śṛṅgāra are in form of young ladies or young men that are sweet, graceful, handsome etc.

Deformed, of ugly shape, and imitating some-one-else's actions are the ālambana of hāsyā, such as ‘kuhaka’ or cheating, etc.

The person who is self-sacrificing, gifted with sāttvika qualities, i.e. purity, humility and the like, one who is brave and bold and adventurous and decorated by the scars of weapons forms the ālambana of vīra-rasa.

Persons with deformed figure, irregular dress, abnormal behaviour and movements, etc. are persons who perform illusory performances and are the ālambana of adbhuta-rasa.

Ferocious figures are the ālambana of raudra. Ematiated persons, disheartened souls, weak, dispirited, afflicted with disease and dirty persons are the ālambana of karuṇa rasa.

People with figure and dress abhorred, un-welcome behaviour, limbs etc. and afflicted with disease, and piśāca etc. i.e. fiends, goblins, etc. are the ālambana of bībhatsa rasa.

Those who have entered a deep forest, or have entered a great war, or who have offended their preceptors or seniors or masters or kings are the ālambana of bhayānaka rasa.

These vibhāvas of the type of lalita and the like, with respective ālambana bhāvas awaken the respective sthāyin to the capacity of a rasa.

Actually the above is just the summary of the descriptions of śṛṅgārā”di along with their vibhāvā”di, as given by earlier masters such as Bharata and the like. The only contribution of Śā. is that he has named them as ‘lalita’, and the like.

Now Śā. picks up the discussion on anubhāvas. It may be noted that here he is absolutely influenced by Bhoja. Agnipurāṇa and the so called Mālava school of aesthetics. The anubhāvas are four-fold accordingly. B.P. (pp. 6, ibid) observes :

anubhāvaś caturdhā syān  
mano-vāk-kāya-buddhībhiḥ,



i.e. The anubhāvas or consequents are four-fold with reference to mind, speech, body and buddhi i.e. intelligence.

The B.P. observes that those that fall in the first category are the ten bhāvas of a young-lady-

“mana-ārambhā'nubhāvā  
bhāvā”dyā daśa yoṣitām.” (pp. 6, ibid)

The twelve 'ālāpa' etc. form the vāg-ārambha. anubhāvas. The ten bhāvas such as līlā etc. of the young ladies are gātrā”rambhā'nubhāvas. Rīti-vṛtti and pravṛtti are buddhyā”rambhā'nubhāvas :

vāgārambhā'nubhāvāś ca  
dvādaśā”lāpa-pūrvakāḥ,  
gātrā”rambhā'nubhāvāś ca  
līlā”dyā daśa yoṣitām.  
buddhyā”rambhā'nubhāvāś ca  
rīti-vṛtti-pravṛttayah. (B.P. pp. 6, ibid)

Stupification i.e. stambha and the rest are the eight sātṭvika-bhāvas. Nirveda or dispondancy and the rest, i.e. the thirty three in all are the vyabhicārins.

With reference to young ladies twenty natural i.e. sattvaja alamkāras or ornaments are considered. The bhāvas such as līlā etc. are of course not sattva-ja i.e. sātṭvika, but they are counted here on the analogy of “people holding umbrellas are moving” - i.e. 'chatri-nyāya.' So the līlā”di bhāvas, on account of their carrying the special mark or līṅga of sattva, are termed “sātṭvika”s.

“yauvane sattvajāḥ strīṇāṃ  
alamkāraś tu viṃśatiḥ,  
tatra līlā”dayo bhāvā  
yady api syur na sātṭvikāḥ,  
chatriṇāṃ gativattépi  
tallīṅgatvena sātṭvikāḥ. (pp. 6, ibid) -

That stuff, observes Śā., that terminates into 'sattva' is termed 'manas'. It is said to be the 'samkalpa' or 'strong determination' of both Ívara and liberated souls. The 'sattva' of worldly people acts in form of 'manas' and the wise call this 'manas' by the name of 'sattva' for it takes its form.

The stuff, caused from ‘rajas’ is termed ‘prāṇa’. For God and liberated souls, it is said to be the cause of activity. It stays in form of ‘prāṇa’ among worldly people.

That which results from ‘tamas’ is ‘vāk’. For God and liberated souls it is sweet language, but for worldly people it takes the form of “word” in general. That which is pronounced with feelings of anger etc., and which causes such fruits (i.e. anger etc.) without failing, is the speech of worldly people. That speech which originates from God and liberated souls is termed ‘vāṇī’, by the wise : B.P. (pp. 6, 7, ibid) -

yat sattva-pariṇāmi syād  
dravyaṃ tan mana ucyate,  
īśvarasya ca muktānām  
tat samkalpo bhaviṣyati.  
samsāriṇām manastvena  
pariṇāmya pravartate,  
tat-sattva-pariṇāmitvāt  
sattvam ity ucyate budhaiḥ.  
yad rajaḥ pariṇāmi syād  
dravyaṃ sa prāṇa ucyate,  
īśvarasya ca muktānām  
kriyāhetuḥ sa īritāḥ. ... etc. etc.

It may be noted that to explain mana-ārambhānubhāva, Śā. here first explains the mystic background of vāk, as used by the Gods, liberated souls and ordinary people. We feel this has hardly any bearing on the aesthetics of mana-ārambha-anubhāva.

B.P. goes on to add to the above discussion by observing that Ravi, Soma and Vahni are the presiding deities of manas, prāṇa and vāk respectively. This order is established by the yogins. This is followed by some other mystic details.

After this the B.P. comes to explain and define mana-ārambha-anubhāva. A clear impression of the DR. is seen here and this we will show later by citing comparison. The B.P. had earlier observed that Ravi, etc. are the presiding deities of manas, etc. The soul takes respective forms of names etc. and is identified with the same. These three viz. manas, prāṇa and vāk, as they become instruments for the acts of God, and liberated souls, they are termed deities. That which is ‘prāṇa-maya’ is termed ‘antaryāmin’ or one who dwells within, and jīva stays in the body. The jīva, by its activities, controls the body and so with the body (as its instrument) becomes the doer of all activity.

The doer becomes 'prāṇamaya' by presiding over and controlling the sense-organs, soul, earth etc. (i.e. pṛthivī, ap, tejas, vāyu and ākāśa), and other deities : This 'prāṇamaya' neither stays in that doer, nor in the jīva. Whatever is 'manomaya' guides the jīvas to activity. The triguṇātmaka buddhi, citta, and ahaṁkāra are the means of all activity for the jīvas. From these all bhāvas emanate. As the Sun is a witness to all, manas is occupied by the Sun. The manas knows whatever through saṁskāras or impressions, and remains pure of all impressions. Such pure mind, along with guṇas is termed 'sattva'. B.P. (pp. 7, 8, ibid) reads -

“buddhi-cittā'haṁkṛtayaḥ  
tasya triguṇa-sambhavāḥ,  
sarveṣāṁ apī jīvānāṁ  
sarva-vyāpāra-hetavaḥ.  
etebhyaḥ sarva-bhāvānāṁ  
prabhavaḥ samudāhṛtaḥ,  
ādityaḥ sarva-sākṣitvāt  
mano yat tad adhiṣṭhitam.  
yat-saṁskāra-vaśād veti  
sarvaṁ, tat tena nirmalam,  
tādṛg eva manasḥ sattvaṁ  
guṇair asprṣṭam ucyate.”

Now the B.P. gives the definition of mana-āraṁbha-anubhāva. It reads as -

“tasmād a-vikṛtād ādyaḥ  
spando bhāva udāhṛtaḥ,  
cittasya a-vikṛtiḥ sattvaṁ  
vikṛteḥ kāraṇe sati.”

The first 'spandana' or vibration, born of that sattva which is beyond any change is termed 'bhāva'. Sattva is that state of mind which remains unchanged eventhough there are reasons for a change. Then from that springs 'bhāva' which is like the first change from a seed. Thus a change in mental attitude is termed "bhāva". B.P. (pp. 8, ibid) -

“tatōlpā vikṛtir bhāvo  
bījasya ādi-vikāravat,

ato manovikārasya  
bhāvarvaṃ prakatīkṛtam.”

This can be read with DR. II. 33b (pp. 112, ibid) :

“nirvikārātmakāt sattvād  
bhāvas tatrā”dya-vikriyā.”

Dhanika writes : (pp. 112, ibid) - tatra vikārahetau saty a-vikārā”tmakam sattvam. yathā Kumārasambhave (3/40) - “śrutāpsarogītirapi... samādhībhedaprabhavā bhavanti.” tasmād a-vikāra-rūpāt sattvāt yaḥ prathamō vikārāntar viparivarti-bījasya ucchūnatā iva sa bhāvaḥ.”

Now this exhibition of philosophical information on the part of Śā. is not in good taste. Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta had written a number of philosophical works and were great yogins themselves, but they have never engaged themselves in such showmanship.

On the contrary Abhinavagupta clearly says that we do not believe in such activity and do not drag in unnecessarily innocent souls in this sort of a mire.

Actually the four-fold anubhāvas that the Mālava school advocates, are nothing else but pure anubhāvas i.e. mental and physical responses to an emotion, with manas, vāk, gātra and buddhi playing major roles. In fact all activity is having a mixture of all these four factors but here they are named or classed differently taking into account the predominance of this or that element. Virtually anubhāvas are ‘acting’.

The DR. has discussed twenty ornaments of young ladies.

“yauvane sattvajāḥ strīṇaṃ  
alamkāras tu viṃśatiḥ.” (DR. II. 30a, pp. III, ibid)

Śā. has utilized all these in his various types of anubhāvas, as we will go to observe next.

Śā. observes that (according to the tradition as read in Bharata),

“vāgbhir āṅgair mukha-rasair  
yas sattvābhinayena ca,  
bhāvayan bahir antassthān  
arthān bhāva udāhṛtaḥ.” (pp. 8, ibid)

i.e. Bhāva is that which causes (or makes 'bhāvita') the internal and external items with the help of vāk i.e. speech, aṅga i.e. limbs and the colour of the face - 'mukha-rāga'.

The B.P. then describes hāva, helā, śobhā, kānti, dīpti, mādhyura, prāgalbhya, dhairya, and audārya. The DR. had taken the first three as 'śarīraja', and the next seven as "a-yatnaja".

B.P. following the DR. then describes the ten bhāvas such as līlā, vilāsa, vicchitti, vibhrama, kilikīñcita, moṭṭāyita, kuṭṭamita, bibboka, lalita and vihrta. The DR. calls them "daśa bhāvā svabhāvajāḥ". But the B.P. reads : "śārīrā daśa yoṣitām." While the DR. had only three viz. bhāva, hāva and helā as "śarīrajāḥ" and the next 'a-yatnajāḥ' i.e. svabhāvajāḥ, the B.P. has all these ten as "sāttvikāḥ".

The B.P. (pp. 9, ibid) then explains all these i.e. līlā, vilāsa, etc. almost after the DR.

The B.P. then observes : (pp. 10, ibid)

“ete sādharmaṇā sattva-  
gātrā”rambhā'nubhāvayoḥ,  
sthairyaṃ gāmbhīryam ācāryaiḥ  
cittārambhāv udāhṛtau.”

i.e. These are the common types of both sattva (i.e. mana) ārambha-anubhāva, and gātra-ārambha-anubhāva. The ācāryas (i.e. Bhoja, here) have counted 'sthairya' and 'gāmbhīrya' as included in citta-ārambha-anubhāva. These two (i.e. mana-ārambha and gātra-ārambha.) are seen in a greater proportion in śṛṅgāra-rasa and in the mixture of vīra-rasa, and adbhutarasa. Elsewhere their abundance is located depending on special purpose or context. Thus in case of śṛṅgāra-rasa and at places in adbhuta-rasa twenty bhāvas of women are observed. The ācāryas (i.e. Bhoja) have also mentioned "krīḍita" and "keli" among gātra-ārambha-anubhāva : (B.P. pp. 10, ibid)

“prācūryam eṣāṃ śṛṅgāre, virādbhuta-samāgame,  
anyatra teṣāṃ saṃsargavaśāt kāryavaśād api.”  
“bhāvās tu viṃśatis straiṇāḥ śṛṅgāre kvacid adbhute,  
krīḍitaṃ kelir ity etau gātrā”rambhāv udāhṛtau.”

'krīḍita' is explained as special sport of the time of childhood, youth or adolescence. The same is termed 'keli' with reference to a lover.

The learned (i.e. Bhoja of course) talks about these two bhāvas by the name “gātrā”rambhā’nubhāva” -

“gātrā”rambhā’nubhāvatva  
dvitayam kathyate budhaiḥ.” (B.P. pp. 10, ibid)

The following twelve bhāvas are vāg-ārambha-anubhāva. They are - ālāpa, pralāpa, vilāpa, anulāpa, saṃlāpa, apalāpa, sandeśa, atideśa, upadeśa, apadeśa and vyapadeśa. Śā. explains them individually.

With reference to buddhyā”rambhā’nubhāva, rīti is first stated. Rīti is use of sentences of speech. It is said to be four-fold : (B.P. pp. 11, ibid) -

buddhyā”rambā’nubhāveṣu  
rītiḥ prathamam ucyate,  
rītir vacana-vinyāsa-kramah,  
sā’pi caturvidhā.

‘Vacana-vinyāsakrama’ seems to be accepted from Rājaśekhara's kāvya-mīmāṃsā.

The four types of rīti accepted by Śā. are from the area of vaidarbha, pāñcāla, lāṭa and gauḍa. Two more are mentioned as “saurāṣṭrī” and “drāviḍī”.

Śā. observes that a style or rīti of composition is named after the province concerned. At times rīti is known on the basis of compounds, sukhmāratā or felicitous expression, etc. also, and also on the basis of metaphorical expression, alliteration, or even any expression, speaker or any sub-variety etc. also; - B.P. (pp. 11, ibid) :

“tatra vaidarbha-pāñcāla-  
lāṭa-gauḍa-vibhāgataḥ,  
saurāṣṭrī-drāviḍī ceti  
rīti-dvayam udāhṛtam.  
tat-tad-deśīya-racanā-  
rītis-tad-deśa-nāmbhāk,  
samāsa-saukumāryā”di-  
tāratmyāt kvacit kvacit.  
upacāra-viśeṣāc ca  
prāsā’nuprāsa-bhedataḥ.”

tathā saurāṣṭrikā bhedād  
 drāviḍībhedaṭopi ca.  
 prativacanam pratipurusaṃ  
 tad avāntara-jāritaḥ, prōktā  
 kavibhiś caturvidhā ity eṣā.”

The manifold rīti, in short is said to be four-fold by the wise people. We stop here only, says Śā., for fear of expansion of our work -

“grantha-vistara-bhītena  
 mayā tābhyo viramyate.” (pp. 11, ibid)

‘Vṛtti’ is said to be four-fold with reference to its being originated from rk, yajus, sāma and atharvan. They are bhāratī, sāttvatī, kaisikī and ārabhaṭī. The followers of Udbhaṭa (i.e. Audbhaṭaḥ) are considering a fifth vṛtti also, based on meaning; the artha-vṛtti. But others (i.e. Bhoja) mention the fifth as ‘viśrāntā’ in place of the artha-vṛtti.

B.P. pp. 12, ibid, reads as -

“vṛttis’ caturvidhā, ṛg-yajus-  
 sāmā’rtha-va-sambhavā.  
 “bhāratī-sāttvatī-caiva  
 kaisiky ārabhaṭīti ca,  
 audbhaṭaḥ pañcamīm  
 arthavṛttiṃ ca pratijānate.  
 arthavṛtter abhāvāt tu  
 viśrāntām pañcamīm pare;”

According to a tradition recorded in the NS., the four vṛttis originated from the various functions of speech, body and mind, during the fight between Viṣṇu and the demons Madhu and Kaiṭabha.

The Kāvya-mīmāṃsā calls vṛtti to be “vilāsa-vinyāsa-krama”. Other traditions concerning the origin of vṛttis are also noted such as the ‘bharatas’ promulgated the ‘bhāratī’ with speech as a predominant element. According to others the four vṛttis came out from the four faces of Brahmā when he watched a dramatic performance. These, were accompanied by śṛṅgāra, vīra, bībhatsa and raudra rasas.

Four pravṛttis are enumerated in the B.P. (pp. 12, ibid) :

“dākṣiṇātyā tathā”vanti  
pauratsyā ca audra-māgadhi,  
pravṛttayas' catasrópi  
vāg-ārambhāḥ syur ekadā.”  
tad-vyāpārātmikāḥ proktā  
vṛttayaś ca caturvidhāḥ”

Now it may be observed that Śā. talks of four pravṛttis in between and once again starts talking on vṛttis, which are “tad-vyāpārātmikā” - the expression accepted from the DR. II. 47a - meaning that there are four vṛttis (such as kaiśikī etc.) based on tad = his (= of the hero) behaviour. The B.P. observes that in the four vṛttis such as bhāratī, and the like, the behaviour pattern of the hero is fixed with reference his speech (vācika), mental activity (sāttvika), dance form (nṛtta), external make-up (āhārya) and bodily movement (āṅgika).

B.P. observes (pp. 12, ibid) :

“tad-vyāpārā”tmikāḥ proktā  
vṛttayaś ca, caturvidhāḥ.  
vācikaṃ, sāttvikam, nṛttam  
āhāryam ca tathā”ṅgikam,  
yathākramam niyamitam  
bhāraty ādyāsu vṛttisu.”

Actually the mention of four pravṛttis seems to be mis-fit.

B.P. again quotes from DR. II. 62 (pp. 131, ibid) - informing us as to which vṛtti is fixed with which rasa. (B.P. pp. 12, ibid) :

“śṛṅgāre kaiśikī vīre  
sāttvaty ārabhatī punaḥ,  
rase raudre ca bibhatse  
vṛttiḥ sarvatra bhāratī.”

Kaiśikī goes with śṛṅgāra, sāttvatī with vīra, and ārabhatī is fixed with raudra and bibhatsa while bhāratī is used in the context of all the rasas. The Kāvya-mīmāṃsā has - “tatra veśa-vinyāsa-kramāḥ pravṛttiḥ, vilāsa-vinyāsa-kramāḥ vṛttiḥ, vacana-vinyāsa-kramāḥ rītiḥ. (Ch. III)



Śā. again switches over to 'pravṛtti' and accepts a verse from the DR. (= DR. II. 63, pp. 132, ibid) This reads (B.P. pp. 12, ibid) as :

“deśa-bhāṣā-kriyā-veśa-lakṣaṇāḥ syuḥ pravṛttayaḥ,  
lokādevāvagamyaitā yathaucityaṁ prayojayet.”

Pravṛttis have varieties with reference to deśa (= region), bhāṣā (= language), and kriyā (= activity). They are to be understood from worldly context. They are to be employed with reference to the propriety. Thus 'pravṛtti' represents local context.

Śā. observes that vṛttis with their subdivisions are explained by Bhoja, Someśvara and the rest. So, their form is only slightly indicated.

The pravṛttis concerning particular regions should be understood from experts belonging to those particular regions, but the difference in activity are impossible to know or describe. So the pravṛttis and kriyās, wherever found, are to be understood with the help of regional experts.

Normally there are seven types of languages, and as many branches (vi-bhāṣā) of languages also. Māgadhī, āvantikā, prācyā, śaurasenī, ardha-māgadhī, paiśācī and dākṣiṇātyā are spoken in those respective regions. Śākārī, ābhirī, cāṇḍālī, śābarī, drāviḍī, andhrajā, and lowly language - hinā of the foresters, are spoken by respective tribes. The types of activities should be looked for, in different regions.

All this was discussed with reference to the four-fold anubhāvas. The B.P. (pp. 13, ibid) - reads -

“ete'nubhāvāḥ kavibhir  
nibandhe yogyakalpitāḥ,  
abhineyā natāir nārye  
tat-tad arthā'nukūlataḥ.”

These (four-fold) anubhāvas are imagined by wise people for presentation. With reference to the meaning in context, they are to be performed by actors in a drama.

Śā. now once again picks up the main thread and talks of vibhāva and anubhāva following DR. Read B.P. pp. 13, ibid -

vibhāvaḥ kāraṇaṁ, kāryaṁ  
anubhāvaḥ prakīrtitaḥ,  
hetu-kāryā'tmano siddhis  
tayoḥ saṁvyavahārataḥ

jñāyamānatayā tatra  
vibhāvaḥ bhāva-poṣa-kṛt  
bhāvo hr̥di sthito yena  
vyajyate cā'nubhāvyate.

Vibhāva is said to be the cause, anubhāva is said to be the 'kārya', i.e. effect. Their relation of cause and effect is supported by worldly order.

Vibhāva is that which is known. Vibhāva enhances the bhāva or (basic) emotion. Bhāva stays in the heart. It is suggested as well as effected by that (which is vibhāva).

Now there is some difficulty in following this line, : bhāvo hr̥di sthito yena vyajyate ca anubhāvyate” which is followed by,

bhrūkṣepa-katākṣādīr  
vibhāvo hr̥dayaṃ śritāḥ,  
bhāvān vyanakti yaḥ  
sōyam anubhāva itīritāḥ.”

We feel that we should read a full-stop after... yena vyajyate. The meaning will be that the emotion staying in the heart of the sāmājika is suggested by the 'vibhāva' (on the stage, or as described in poetry.). The next line should be read along with “ca anubhāvyate” of the earlier line and has to be corrected as,

“bhrūkṣepa-katākṣādībhir bhāvo  
hr̥dayaṃ śritāḥ.”

The emotion staying in the heart of the character is also inferred by twisting of eye-brows etc. presented by the actors and these anubhāvas also then help in the suggestion of emotions in the hearts of the sāmājika - “bhāvān vyanakti sōyam anubhāva iti īritāḥ.”

Bhāva, observes Śā. is the mental identity of experience on the part of the sāmājika, with the unhappiness etc. of characters such as Rāma and the like :

“rāmādy āśraya-duḥkhā”der  
anubhūtes tad ātmatā  
sāmājikasya manaso yā  
sa bhāva iti smṛtāḥ.”

Thus (B.P., pp. 13) through their nature vibhāvas, anubhāvas and bhāvas are explained -

“evaṃ vibhāvā'nubhāva-bhāvāḥ  
próktā svarūpataḥ.”

The B.P. (pp. 13, ibid) further observes that when rasa manifests, many other anubhāvas are seen. They are said to be the enhanceers of respective rasas (in the sāmājika).

Śā. further observes that 'sattva' is three-fold with reference to buddhi, jñāna and ānanda. This sattva sits upon (i.e. controls) the mind and naturally enjoys the objects that go with respective sense-organs -

“manas sattvaṃ adhiṣṭhāya  
tat tad indriya-gocarān,  
buddhim āśliṣya viṣayān  
anubhūṅkte svabhāvataḥ,  
tridhā sattvaṃ bhaved  
buddhi-jñāna-ānanda-vibhedataḥ.”

B.P. (pp. 14, ibid) says that 'sāttvika' (bhāvas) are so termed because they are caused by 'sattva' - which is a quality (of mind) by which one experiences the same bhāva as that of the character observed. These are feelings of happiness or unhappiness of mind. By observing these as related to others the mind experiences the same bhāvas for oneself. This is 'sattva' and sāttvika-bhāvas are born of this sattva i.e. concentration of mind. These sāttvikas are also anubhāvas, but are termed differently as they are born of sattva i.e. concentration of mind, or concentrated mind.

B.P. (pp. 14, ibid) reads as -

“tad-bhāva-bhāvanā”tmā syāt  
para-duḥkhā”di-sevayā,  
parasya sukha-duḥkhā”der  
anubhāvena cetasaḥ  
tad-bhāva-bhāvanam yena  
bhavet tad anukūlataḥ,  
tat sattvaṃ tena nirvṛttās

sāttvikā ity udīritāḥ.”  
 anubhāvatva-sāmānye  
 saty apy eṣāṃ prthaktayā  
 lakṣaṇaṃ sattvajattvād hi  
 te'pi ṣṭambā"dayaḥ smṛtāḥ.

Eight sāttvikas such as stambha, sveda etc. are counted, and then explained individually.

These are seen as enhancers of rasas in poetic compositions in particular.

After this, thirty three vyabhicārins are enumerated and individually explained, along with sub-divisions in certain cases.

B.P. (pp. 25, ibid) observes that those who are experts in rasa-theory should realise the mutual 'vibhāvā'nubhāvatva' i.e. cause-effect relation, between sāttvika-s and vyabhicārins. If some other bhāvas are also observed over and above these, they are to be subsumed under these that are mentioned. Other bhāvas that are closer to those vyabhicārins considered here are named as vibhāvas and anubhāvas. The learned should know this mutual relationship among the sthāyins also.

They (i.e. presented in poetry and drama) should be termed “vibhāva-s” in a general sense as they are meant to touch the heart of the sāmājikas, and for exhibition of excellent acting, and also for enhancement of rasa. The N.D. also has suggested this that the whole mix of vibhāvādi-s presented on the stage or through poetry should be termed “vibhāva” in a general sense. When certain vibhāvādi-s are ascertained and fixed with reference to certain sthāyins, they suggest that fixed sthāyins. If this desired result does not follow, it is because of some drawback in their presentation (by poets or artists)

B.P. pp. 25 reads as-

“draṣṭavyaṃ tatra tatraiva  
 sāttvika-vyabhicāriṇām,  
 paraspara-vibhāvā'nubhāvatve rasakovidaiḥ.  
 anyépi yadi bhāvāḥ  
 syuś citta-vṛtti-viśeṣataḥ,  
 anatarbhāvas tu sarveṣāṃ  
 draṣṭavyo vyabhicāriṣu  
 ye bhāvās teṣu bhāveṣu

pratyāsannāḥ paraspāram,  
 vibhāvato'nubhāvāc ca,  
 sphuṭābheda ihōditāḥ.  
 sthāyīṣvapīyam anyonyam  
 prakriyā jñāyatām budhaiḥ.  
 sabhyān rasayitum,  
 abhinaya-cāturyāṛtham,  
 rasam ca poṣayitum  
 kavibhir nibandhanīyās te  
 [ca] vibhāvā"dayo niyatāḥ.  
 sthāyīṣu bhāveṣu ye ca  
 vibhāvā"dayaḥ pratiniyatāḥ,  
 tair eva sati nibandhe  
 bhāva-viśeṣaḥ pratīyate tatra.  
 yady anyathā nibandhe,  
 sādharanyena saṁśayōtpatteḥ  
 doṣo vibhāvīyate vā,  
 yukta-vibhāvā"di-vaidhuryāt.

It may be noted that the concepts of vibhāva, anubhāva, sthāyin, sāttvikas and sañcārīn as read in the B.P. are also under the strong influence of the DR. and quite often the same words are accepted in definitions and elaborations.

Śā. observes that the vibhāvādis either stated directly or implied help the cause of enhancement of rasa.

Vyabhicārīns are explained in the same terms as read in the DR. BP. (pp. 25, ibid) reads -

viśeṣād ābhīmukhyena  
 caranto vyabhicārīṇaḥ  
 sthāyīny unmagna-nīrmagnāḥ  
 kallolā iva vāridhau.

This is DR. IV. 7 (pp. 174, ibid) Śā. further observes that as waves in an ocean are rising and falling and expanding the glory of the ocean they merge with the same, in the same way the vyabhicārīns are rising and merging in the sthāyīns and thus nourish the sthāyin and themselves also and become rasa.

Śā. again suggests that at times (as in case of nirveda or śama) though they (i.e. vyabhicārins) rise to the capacity of rasa, as they are not steady, they are not useful for the purposes of nāṭya etc. So, those who know nāṭya take only eight as sthāyins. Even if śama, wherein all activity ceases, be taken as sthāyin, its acting is not possible in a drama as it is without any anubhāva. So, according to the seniors (i.e. vṛddha i.e. Bharata) there is no enhancement of rasa (in case of śama) and so only eight sthāyins are recognised as useful for drama.

Again drawing inspiration from the DR., Śā observes that sthāyin is only that which, by imposing its nature or form renders others (= opposite or non-opposite bhāvas) one with oneself. It is like waters of the ocean.

Eventhough ‘nirveda’ may be a bhāva (= sthāyi-bhāva), as they are also relished like other sthāyins, nirveda and such others can not be taken as sthāyins as they like the other eight recognised sthāyins, cannot make others (= viruddha or a-viruddha) one with oneself like the ocean. So, even if nirveda and others are enhanced, they will bring ‘vairasya’ or absence or mis-representation of rasa. This is under the influence of DR. IV. 36 (pp. 204, ibid)

Śā. thus concludes : (pp. 26, ibid) :

ato nāṭyavidām aṣṭāv  
evā'tra sthayino matāḥ.

So, only eight sthāyins are recognised by those who know the dramatic art.

Only that bhāva, when enhanced becomes rasa, is sthāyin. If others also rise to the status of rasa they are to be included or subsumed under these eight only. The activity of bhāva is of the form of experience. The expertness in presenting the same should be termed as their enhancement. The sādhyā artha - i.e. the end for them is rasa, which is their soul.

“tat sādhyo'rtho rasas  
teṣāṃ, tad ātmā”pattir eva saḥ.”

Śā. observes that even vibhāva is anubhāva and the latter is like vibhāva. Both of them are vyabhicārins and the latter are also both of them. Thus they are interrelated. The difference in rasa is brought about by difference in this mutual relation. Their being ‘cara’ i.e. not constant or ‘a-cara’ i.e. steady is due to context. Śā. promises to discuss the darśana, dṛṣṭi, etc. concerning the bhāvas later. With this the first adhikāra on bhāva ends.

In the second chapter Śā. picks up discussions on rasa. But before we get into it, we should make our point clear about Śā.'s treatment of giving priority to bhāva and therefore discussing the same ahead of the topic of rasa as against Bharata's order of rasa first and Bhāva next. Śā. is right and Bharata also agrees to the point that it is the bhāva, i.e. sthāyī bhāva to be precise, that is raised to the capacity of rasa. So, 'bhāvebhyo rasāḥ' is a generally accepted theory. In view of this Śā. has treated bhāvas first and has also called his work "Bhāva-prakāśana" suggesting that bhāvas are the basis on which the grand edifice of rasa is raised.

Bharata knew this. But, even then he has treated rasas first and bhāvas next, why ? The reason is obvious. Dramatic art, or literary art or any art worth its name has "rasa" in the centre. 'Rasa' again is something which we experience in the context of art only. Abhinavagupta asserts : "nāṭya eva rasāḥ". Here 'nāṭye' stands for any art. Now whatever is discussed, whichever topic, forms part of the central theme viz. rasa. Nothing, no part, division, sub-division, no nothing concerning art can be discussed without reference to 'rasa' which is the central theme of any art. na hi rasād ṛte kaścid arthaḥ pravartate - asserts Bharata. This means that there is no topic whatsoever, however intimate portion it may be of a given art, can proceed without rasa, i.e. can be discussed without its basic relationship with rasa. Bhāvas are also discussed therefore with a view to their being promoters of rasa. - i.e. aesthetic relish. Bhāvas are two-fold so to say; viz. the worldly bhāvas that are topic of such modern science as psychology and there are bhāvas that are stuff for aesthetics. Now the worldly bhāvas or normal bhāvas that we talk about in all our worldly context, are by nature either giving happiness or unhappiness - i.e. they are sukha-duḥkhātmaka. Whatever gives happiness is welcome to us, and we shun those feelings that cause pain or sorrow, so to say. This is a fact of life. But art is such a medium which transforms the nature of these worldly feelings. All bhāvas, when object of art, or when presented through the medium of art are yielding bliss alone and nothing else than that. So, their nature is exclusively blissful. Bhāvas remain the same but their nature is transformed in the context of art, here dramatic or poetic art for Bharata and Ānandavardhana. Abhinavagupta observes : "asman mate tu samvedanam eva ānandaghanam āsvādyate, tatra kā duḥkhāśāṅkā ?". Bharata also seems to hold the same view for he is very clear that the taste enjoyed by the qualified people is never physical, but only mental - "api tu mānasaḥ." No physicality can be dreamt of as having any bearing on art-experience. Thus bhāvas, in context of art-experience or rasā'nubhūti, are simply blissful by nature. They are the same bhāvas as we come across in routine context but their nature is transformed and thus they are a

different set of bhāvas, a different bunch of feelings not come across in routine experience. Thus these special bhāvas earn their speciality, in view of the central theme called ‘rasa’ or aesthetic experience or art-experience. This is how ‘rasa’ which is basic to anything connected with art, comes first. Bhāvas, a new set of bhāvas, - thus follow this basic concept of rasa. Precisely for this Bharata treated ‘rasa’ first, to be followed by bhāvas. The seventh chapter of the NS. deals with bhāvas as they are. But when they become art-stuff they change into something “only blissful”. So, we feel Śā. is not justified in treating bhāvas ahead of rasas. In fact he has missed the very intention of Bharata when the latter places rasas first.

We will now discuss the treatment of rasa by Śā. It may be noted that Śā. is, as elsewhere, here also under the tremendous impact of the Mālava school as represented by Bhoja, Dhanañjaya and Dhanika.

Śā. has discussed the topic of rasa keeping both the dramatic and the poetic art in the centre. It may be noted at the outset that he has taken care to note down certain ancient traditions also, even prior to Bharata's, such as those of Vṛddha-Bharata, Vāsuki, Padmabhū, Nārada, etc. Perhaps by Vṛddha-Bharata he means the senior Bharata who drafted the larger version of the N.S. The present available N.S. is supposed to contain six thousand verses and 36 or 37 chapters. The longer version is not available to us but was perhaps known to Śā. The ānuvaṃśya verses, or “bhavanti ca atra ślokās” i.e. verses, or āryās that appear in the present NS. could be from the earlier NS. of the longer magnitude. In the absence of the name of the author, or perhaps the tradition so named him, Śā. also refers to the author of the longer version as “vṛddha-Bharata”. We will refer to these details as and when we deal with Śā.'s views.

B.P. second chapter begins with etymological explanation of the terms dealing with this or that vyabhicārin. We do not know the exact source of this presentation. It could be Śā.'s own contribution, or he might have accepted it from a source not available to us. Śā. also discusses the mutual relationship between vyabhicārins, sātṭvika-s, and sthāyins etc. They are mutually found to be obliging and or helpful to one another, observes Śā.

He says : “evam uktās ca nīrvāhāḥ sātṭvika-vyabhicārinām,

nirukṭā yogataḥ kecid uktāḥ kecid ca rūḍhitāḥ.” (B.P. pp. 32, Line 3-4)

(pp. 32; line 5, ibid)

upakāryōpakāritvaṃ

eteṣāṃ kathyate'dhunā, etc.



Śā. explains how various vyabhicārins and sāttvikas combine and contribute to the birth of a rasa, : āvirbhāvo rasānām syāt, sāttvikais tu yathōditaiḥ.” (pp. 32, line 17, ibid). When rasas are born they are indicated by the vyabhicārins - “jñāpakā jāyamānānām ete syur vyabhicārīṇaḥ.” (pp. 32, line 18, ibid). The anubhāvas are indicating - lakṣayanti - the rasas - “lakṣayanty anubhāvās tu vartamānam tadā rasam.” (pp. 32, line 19 ibid) Thus the vibhāvas and the vyabhicārins deserve a serious study, observes Śā. Some, relying on others, or becoming subordinate to others derive strength among these :

“eṣu kecit sva-sāmarthyam  
puṣyanty anyaśritā apī,  
guṇibhūtāḥ kadācit tu  
sāmarthyam prāpayanty amī.”  
evam anyonya-sāmarthyam  
darśayanti rasōdaye.”

We do not make out the difference between ‘anya-śrita’ and “guṇibhūta”. But bhāvas show strength by inter-dependence, in the act of the birth of rasa, says Śā.

Śā. goes to explain how a certain sthāyin accompanied by various sāttvikas and vyabhicārins helps the cause of say, sambhoga śrīngāra, or any other contextual rasa.

After explaining the association and strength of various bhāvas, Śā. explains the causality of various sthāyins with reference to rasas - (pp. 34, lines pp. 9, 10, B.P.) - “sāhacaryam ca sāmarthyam bhāvānām samyag īritam,

kathyate sthāyibhāvānām rasōpādāna-hetutā.”

Śā. then explains rati, prīti, hāsa, utsāha, etc. The etymological explanation of the terms such as rati, hāsa etc. are also given. This is of hardly any consequence.

After this he comes to the consideration of how these bhāvas tend to be rasas, their nature and scope, the nature of rasa, the expression of the state of rasa etc. B.P. (pp. 36, line, 5 ibid) :

“eteṣām ca rasā'tmatvam  
svarūpam ca rasasya ca,  
rasāśrayā'bhivyaktīnām  
viśeṣaḥ kathyatédhunā.”

‘Rasa’ is sthāyin raised to the capacity of relish, caused by vibhāvas, anubhāvas, sāttvikas and vyabhicārins. This is directly accepted from DR. IV. i. Śā. also observes before this that when vibhāvā”dis are presented in an appropriate way, they cause the sthāyin to be known. Along with vibhāvā”di-s and four-fold acting these sthāyins reach the status of a rasa.

B.P. (pp. 36, lines 7-10) :

vibhāvā”dyair yathāsthāna-praviṣṭaiḥ  
sthāyinaḥ smṛtāḥ,  
caturbhis’ cā’py abhinayaiḥ  
prapadyante rasā”tmatām.  
vibhāvair anubhāvaiś ca  
sāttvikair vyabhicāribhiḥ,  
āñīyamānaḥ svādutvaṃ  
sthāyī bhāvo rasaḥ smṛtāḥ.”

The DR. has “āñīyamānaḥ svādyatvaṃ.” This is the only difference between the DR. and the BP.

Then the BP. accepts parts from the NS. and continues as follows :

B.P. (pp. 36, lines - 11-14) reads as -

“vyañjanausādhi-samyogaḥ  
yathā”nnaṃ svādutāṃ nayet,  
evaṃ nayanti rasatāṃ  
itare sthāyinaṃ śrītāḥ.”

The first half is from Bharata (ref. G.O.S. Edn. Vol. I, pp. 288-289, Ch. VI. 35, etc. etc.) The next half says that the other bhāvas lead the sthāyin to the status of a rasa, (like ingrediats leading food-stuff to the state of being palatable). The other portion that follows in the B.P. is also under the influence of the NS. The B.P. reads : (lines : 15-22) :

“yathā nānā-prakārair vyañjanausādhaiḥ pāka-viśeṣaiśca saṃskṛtāni vyañjanāni madhurā”di-rasānām-anyatamena ātmanā pariṇamanti, tad bhoktṛnām manobhis tādṛśā”tmatayā svādyante, tathā nānāprakārair vibhāvā”dibhāvair abhinayaiḥ saha yathā”rham abhivardhitāḥ sthāyino bhāvāḥ sāmājikānām manasi rasā”tmanā pariṇamantas teṣāṃ tādātvika-manovṛtti-bheda-bhinnās tat tad rūpeṇa tai rasyante.”

“nānā-dravyauśadhaiḥ pākair  
 vyañjanam bhāvyate yathā,  
 evaṃ bhāvā bhāvayanti  
 rasān abhinayaḥ saha.” (This is from NS. VI. 37).

Śā. observes that thus Vāsuki has also observed the birth of rasa from bhāvas. So, rasas, as the case may be (of individual rasas), are born of bhāvas : (BP. pp. 37, lines, 1, 2, ibid) -

“iti vāsukinā 'pyukto bhāvebhyo rasa-sambhavaḥ  
 tasmād rasās tu bhāvebyo niṣpadyante yathā'r hataḥ.”

Śā. now suggests that the sthāyins resting in hero and heroines are enhanced with the help of vibhāvas, anubhāvas, sāttvikas and vyabhicārins. The actors or artists represent them as imitation in drama. These are relished by the sāmājikas and are hence termed rasas. (B.P. pp. 37, lines 3-8) :

“vibhāvaiś'cā'nubhāvaiś ca  
 sāttvikair vyabhicāribhiḥ,  
 vardhitāḥ sthāyino bhāvā  
 nāyikā'di-samāśrayāḥ.  
 anukāratayā nātye  
 kriyamāṇā naṭā'dibhiḥ,  
 sāmājikaḥ tu rasyante  
 yasmāt tasmād rasāḥ smṛtāḥ.”

Śā. enters into, so to say an epistemological investigation in the nature of rasa. He observes that rasa is neither a 'dravya' or an object, nor a 'sāmānya', or viśeṣa i.e. it is berefect of particularity or class. It is not even a quality - “guṇa”. It is, neither 'karma', activity, nor 'samavāya' or combination or union, nor “another substance.” It is a sort of mental attitude, depending on external objects, raised to the highest capacity by vibhāvā'di-s. This is called 'rasa' by the wise : (BP. pp. 37, line 7-10) :

na dravyam na ca sāmānyam  
 na viśeṣo guṇo na ca,  
 na karma samavāyo na  
 na padārthāntaraṇ ca saḥ.

vikāro mānaso yas tu bāhyā'rthā"lambanā"tmakah  
vibhāvā"dyā"hitótkarṣo rasa ity ucyate budhaiḥ."

Śā. further adds that even if rasa is said to be mano-vikāra or attitude of mind, it has to be a 'padārtha' i.e. an object. Six (different) objects making us experience (six) rasas are apprehended and hence 'rasa' itself is different from the objects. But as rasa is manifested through (various forms of) objects, it can be taken as one such (padārtha). Thus, rasa though different from padārthas or objects could be also one of those.

BP (pp. 37, lines 11-15, ibid) :

"raso mano-vikārópi  
padārthā'nyatamo bhavet,  
padārthā ṣaḍ pramīyante  
rasasyā'nubhavā"tmakāḥ.  
ato rasaḥ padārthébhyo  
mātrayā kvā'pi bhidyate,  
dravyā"dīnām padārthānām  
tat tad rūpatayā rasaḥ  
kvā'pi kvā'pi prakāśena  
teṣām anyatamo rasaḥ."

We know that 'padārtha' is that which has a name : abhidheyatvaṃ padārtha-sāmānya-lakṣaṇam (Tarka-saṃgraha). Now they are six such as 'dravya, guṇa, karma, samavāya, viśeṣa, sāmānya', Śā. drives home a point while discussing the nature of rasa epistemologically, that 'rasa' is both a 'padārtha' as well as it is not a 'padārtha'. But here it seems that Śā. confuses between aesthetic entity called rasa and rasa in its physical context such as the six tastes of eatables : We do not feel convinced about Śā.'s approach here.

Accepting Bharata as a final authority Śā. observes that we will discuss vibhāva-s, anubhāvas and sthāyins for the establishment of rasa, following the lead of Bharata. Though vibhāvā"di-s, observes Śā., have been spoken of earlier by him, according to their respective nature and form, they will be spoken of again from other point of view also; for knowledge (i.e. information) is always useful (anywhere in any form). : (pp. 37, lines 16-19) -

“vibhāvāś c”ānubhāvāś ca  
 sthāyino rasa-siddhaye  
 kathyante bharatóktena  
 vartmanā nā’nyathā kvacit.  
 uktā api vibhāvā”dyāḥ  
 pūrvatra sva-svarūpataḥ  
 matāntareṇa kathyante  
 jñānaṃ kvā’py upayujyate.”

The vibhāva, anubhāva, sāttvika-bhāva, vyabhicāri-bhāva and sthāyins are also narrated following the views of the learned. Accordingly, that which, along with sattva, vāk, and aṅga, make the kāvyārtha (= meaning or object) of poetry cause to manifest, are said to be bhāvas in dramatic theme, by the wise. (B.P. pp. 37, 38, ibid)

“yad bhāvayanti kāvyārthān  
 sattva-vāg-aṅga-saṃyutān,  
 tasmād bhāvā iti prājñair  
 ucyante nāṭya-vastuṣu.

Śā. further observes : (pp. 38, ibid, also NS. VII. 2. G.O.S., Vol. I)

vāg-aṅga-mukha-rāgaiś ca  
 sattvena abhinayena ca,  
 kaver antargataṃ bhāvaṃ  
 bhāvayan bhāva ucyate.

Through speech, body, facial colour, and sāttvika abhinaya (= acting, performance), that which makes one realise the feeling internal to a poet's heart, is called ‘bhāva’. Again following NS., Śā. observes that ‘that meaning which is brodught about by vibhāva, and is inferred by the anubhāva along with the help of three-fold acting concerning speech, body and mind, is termed “bhāva”. (pp. 38, ibid)

“vibhāvenā”hrto yórtas  
 tv anubhāvena gamyate,  
 vāgaṅga-sattvā”bhinayaiḥ  
 sa bhāva iti kīrtitaḥ.”

Those who know drama observe that ‘vibhāva’ is that which causes to know the acting with the help of speech, body and mind : (BP. pp. 38, ibid)

“vāg aṅga sattvā’bhinayo  
yenaiva ca vibhāvyate,  
sa bhāvo nāṭya-tatrvajñair  
vibhāva iti darśitaḥ.”

Those who are experts in ‘bhāva’, know that ‘nimitta’, ‘kāraṇa’, ‘hetu’ and ‘vibhāva’ and ‘vibhāvanā’ are synonyms.

“nimittaṃ kāraṇaṃ hetur  
vibhāvaś ca vibhāvanā,  
itthaṃ vibhāva-paryāyāḥ  
kathyante bhāva-kovidaiḥ.” (B.P. pp. 38, ibid)

‘Vibhāva’ means ‘vijñāna’ or knowledge. Knowledge is that which is known. “Vibhāva is so called because many objects, resting on three-fold acting of speech, body and mind, are known through it.”

“vijñānā’rtho vibhāvaḥ syād  
vijñānaṃ ca vibhāvitam,  
bahavó’rthā vibhāvyante  
vāg-aṅgā’bhinayā’śrayāḥ  
anena yaśmāt tenā’yaṃ  
vibhāva iti saṃjñitaḥ.” (B.P. pp. 38, ibid)

All this follows the NS. In the same vein, following the NS., Śā. explains ‘anubhāva’ and ‘vyabhicāri-bhāva’. B.P. (pp. 38, ibid) :

“vāg-aṅgā’bhinayenēha  
yasmād arthónubhāvyate,  
sarvāṅgópāṅga-sahitaḥ  
so’nubhāvas tataḥ smṛtaḥ.  
āvirbhūya tirobhūya  
caradbhiś cā’ntarā’ntarā,  
yair raso bhidyate’nekaḥ  
te smṛtā vyabhicāriṇaḥ.”

Those by which the existence of all bhāvas is known, are the sātṭvika-bhāvas, as they are born of sattva i.e. concentrated mind.

“bhāvānām api sarveṣāṃ  
yaiḥ sva-sattā vibhāvyate,  
te bhāvāḥ sattva-janmānaḥ  
sātṭvikā iti darśitāḥ.” (B.P. pp. 38, ibid)

Those that are described in poetry and presented by the actors (on the stage) and those that (finally) stay as rasa (in the hearts of the sāmājikas) are known to be sthāyins. : (B.P., pp. 38, ibid) -

“sthītāḥ kāvyā”diṣu naṭair  
abhinītā yathā'rhataḥ,  
rasā'tmanā'varīṣṭhante  
satsu ye sthāyino'tra te.”

Śā. further observes that certain bhāvas are purely mental, certain bodily, still others are of the speech and some are sātṭvikas i.e. belonging to sattva, i.e. concentrated mind. (B.P., pp. 38, ibid)

bhāvāḥ syur mānasāḥ kecid  
āṅgikā api kecana  
vācikā api kecit syus  
sātṭvikā api kecana.”

Some bhāvas are found in objects (dravya) and some among guṇa and karma. But in all these 'bhāva' means 'prayojana' i.e. intention. Prayojana, i.e., 'abhiprāya', 'tātparya' or 'phala' also, and also 'bhāva' - are all synonyms.' 'Bhāva' is a term also used by the wise for 'dravya' (object), kriyā (activity), guṇa (quality), speech (vacāḥ) and manas (= mind). 'Bhāva' is a term that conveys 'abhiprāya' i.e. opinion, intention etc.

Śā. has given different meanings of the term bhāva, but all these meanings, we feel are not having the aesthetic context. They are meanings found in general usage.

Śā. now comes to the topic of rasa and loosely using the terms observes that all these bhāvas are useful in enhancing the rasas in a given context. Enhanced by the vibhāvas, nourished by the anubhāvas (= now this is a loose usage. He should have said 'inferred by anubhāvas), placed in deserving relation by the sātṭvikas, and

painted or coloured or decorated by the vyabhicārins, the sthāyi-bhāvas are the basis of arriving at rasa - (B.P. 39, ibid reads) -

“ete bhāvā rasórkarṣe  
tatra tatro'payoginah.  
uddīpitā vibhāvaiḥ svair  
anubhāvaiśca poṣitāḥ,  
bhāvaiś ca sāttvikair yogya-  
samsargair vyabhicāribhiḥ,  
citritāḥ sthāyino bhāvā  
rasópādāna-bhūmayāḥ.”

When their (= of the sthāyins) relishable form is evolved, i.e. relishable through the minds of the spectators, it is said to be of the form of rasa. And, through different types of their forms (or activity) evolved; the dramaturgists call them different rasas.

B.P. (pp. 39, ibid) :

“yadā tadaiṣām āsvādyamānarūpaṃ yad unmiṣat,  
manobhiḥ prekṣakāṇaṃ tad  
udeṣyati rasā”tmanā.  
tatrā'ntarasya bhedā ye  
vyāpārasyóditāḥ prthak,  
te sarve nāṭya-tattvajñaiḥ  
kathyante hi rasā”hvayāḥ.”

Śā. observes that thus is narrated in general the birth of rasa-s. In these the nature of things or its imitation is seen as presented in a visual way (pp. 39, ibid) :

“evaṃ rasānām udayaḥ  
sāmānyena samīritaḥ,  
svabhāvo vā'nukāro vā  
yasmin drśyatayā sthitaḥ.”

According to the followers of Bharata (i.e. Bhāratāḥ), that is the substratum of rasa (i.e. here sāmājika or naṭa). But Śā. holds that rasas can never reside in naṭa or actors. In fact the actors present before the cultured audience, the bhāvas that reside in the noble characters, as imagined by the poets in poetry, and to be



performed by experts. These are presented in poetry by poets for fame, wealth, pacification of unrest in the kingdom, or for the pacification of obstacles in (religious) activity, and for the achievement of the auspicious. They are presented, as if they are present (or belonging to to-day) by the actors. So, naṭas do only this and hence, they can never be the substratum of rasa.

Śā. observes that mental savour is rasa, and it causes mental pleasure : (pp. 40, B.P. ibid) -

“manaso hlādajananah  
svādo rasa iti smṛtaḥ.”

According to this terminology only Śṛṅgāra can be called a ‘rasa’, as it only gives pleasure :

śṛṅgārasya sa yujyeta  
tasya hlādā”tmakatvataḥ.

The rest (i.e. other rasa-s) are called ‘rasa’ on account of some reason or the other.

“anyeṣāṃ rasatā prāyaḥ  
siddhā kenā’pi hetunā.”

Just as people enjoy other tastes, beyond the sweet, on account of variety of place and time (i.e. context), in the same way those who are born, or are yet to be born, through their friendship or enmity being carried as impressions (= saṃskāras) enjoy different rasas such as Śṛṅgāra, hāsyā, karuṇā, etc. - Thus all rasas, getting combined, make for the pleasure of people in context of different time, place etc.

B.P. (pp. 40, ibid) observes :

śṛṅgārasya tu yujyeta  
tasya hlādā”tmakatvataḥ,  
anyeṣāṃ rasatā prāyaḥ  
siddhā kenā’pi hetunā.  
yathā nṛṇāṃ tu sarveṣāṃ  
sarvépi madhurā”dayaḥ,  
bhuktā rasā”tmatāṃ yānti  
deśa-kālā”di-bhedataḥ,

tathā jātā janīṣyanto  
jāyamānā parasparam,  
parasparasya sarvatra  
mitrōdāsīnaśatravaḥ,  
teṣu kasyā'pi śṛṅgāro,  
hāsyah kasyacid eva saḥ,  
adbhutas sa ca kasyā'pi  
kasyā'pi karuṇo bhavet  
evam saṅkarato'nyonyam  
deśa-kāla-guṇā'dibhiḥ  
śṛṅgārā'dyā sadasyānām  
bhavanti hlādanā yataḥ.”

It is therefore that they are called ‘rasas’ as they are relished by the cultured :

“tasmāt sāmājikaiḥ svādyā  
rasa-vācyā bhavanti te.”

Śā. further observes that due to differences in human nature, and also differences due to situation etc., and because of the mind being momentary (i.e. its tendency being such), someone tastes a particular one rasa. Hence, all are called by the name of “rasa”. This is the opinion of the teachers :

“prakṛtīnām ca bhinnatvād  
avasthā'di-vibhedaḥ  
manasaḥ kṣaṇikatvāc ca  
tān ekaḥ svadate yataḥ,  
tatōpi rasa-vācyā syur  
ity ācāryāḥ vyavasthitāḥ. (pp. 40, B.P., ibid)

Śā. now picks up another topic. He observes that some accept the suggestivity of rasas while others hold that they are directly stated. Some call them inferred or apprehended and some, only implied. Some take them as meaning of clauses - “avāntara-vākyārtha”, and some as meaning of a mahā-vākya (i.e. a complex sentence). Thus the theory is undisturbed by its expression at different places : (pp. 40, B.P. ibid) :

“eke rasānām vyaṅgyatvaṃ  
 vācytvaṃ kecid ūcire,  
 pratyāyyatvaṃ vadanty anye  
 gamyatvaṃ api kecana.  
 tathā'vāntara-vākyārthaṃ  
 mahāvākyārthatām pare  
 evaṃ nyāyo no bhidyeta  
 kvā'pi kvā'pi prakāśataḥ

Śā. observes that rasa will be 'vyaṅgya' i.e. suggested in the anukārya i.e. original rāmā"di by the agency of the actors. This is beyond our understanding. Rasa will be the total sentence-sense when delineated in any particular poem. It can be apprehended-pratyāyya-in the naṭa i.e. artist also on account of the identity of name, i.e. when the naṭa is called "Rāma", rasa is imagined in him also through temporary identity through the name Rāma given to him. On an earlier occasion Śā. had denied the possibility of the actor being infused with rasa. Here, he seems to contradict his earlier remark. Or, perhaps here he quotes the opinion of others. Śā. observes that thus the location of rasa has to be imagined by the learned at various substratums. B.P. (pp. 40, 41, Edn. G.O.S., ibid) :

“rāmādāv anukārye tu  
 naṭair vyaṅgyo bhaviṣyati,  
 tat tat kāvya-nibaddhas tu  
 vākyārthaḥ sa bhaviṣyati.  
 nāmā"di-tādātmyā"patter  
 naṭe pratyāyya eva saḥ,  
 evaṃ evōhya eva syāt  
 tatra tatra vicakṣaṇaiḥ.”

Rasa, according to some, is both, when delineated in poetry; an avāntara-vākyārtha and a mahāvākyārtha i.e. both the meaning of a subordinate clause and also the total meaning of a compound or a complex sentence.

tad avāntara-vākyārtho  
 mahāvākyārtha eva ca. (B.P. pp. 41, ibid)

Following his Mālava School, Śā, now proceeds to deal with the topic of rasa. He observes that in muktaka i.e. a single-verse or a prabandha, i.e. a composition of larger magnitude, with the help of the difference or varieties of śrhāyins and sañcārins, and with the help of anubhāvas of lady-characters (and also of male-characters, as depicted by the artists), rasa is ‘bhāvita’ i.e. caused, or it is said to be ‘vāsita’ i.e. caused. Through the acting of this or that form (i.e. original characters), rasa is clearly manifested in the cultured spectators (= sabhyeṣu). This rasa is of the form of consciousness i.e. saṃvit, and also of the form of prakāśa and ānanda i.e. light and bliss. (or, it is of the form of flash of consciousness - “saṃvitprakāśa”, and bliss - “ānanda.”). It is apprehended (gamyah) (by the cultured person) an one's own direct experience (svā'nubhūti-taḥ) It is also of the form of ‘ahaṃkāra’ or ‘I-ness’ and ‘abhimāna’ i.e. something which is abhimata i.e. acceptable and therefore ‘abhi-māna’. On account of rasa being of the form of ahaṃkāra-abhimāna, it flashes forth in external objects also - (bāhyārtheṣu). The light (prabhā) of knowledge (jñāna), the light of bliss, and that of kriyā or activity is born of either an external cause or of its own. In view of this, ahaṃkāra-abhimāna are explained later.

B.P. (pp. 41, ibid) :

“muktakā”dau prabandhe ca  
sthāyi-sañcāri-bhedataḥ,  
pramadādy anubhāvena  
bhāvito vāsito rasaḥ.-  
tat tad rūpasya abhinayaḥ  
sabhyeṣu vyajyate sphuṭam,  
saṃvit-prakāśānandā”tmā  
gamyah syāt svā'nubhūtitah,  
ahaṃkāra’bhimānā”tmā  
bāhyārtheṣu prakāśate.  
ahaṃkāra’bhimānā”di  
svarūpaṃ kathyate'dhunā.  
parasmād ātmano bhānti  
jñānā”nandakriyā-prabhāḥ.

Śā. explains that jñāna-prabhāsa i.e. flash of knowledge is that which pervades the body (or enclosure) of jīva, which is the jewel of consciousness. (caitanya-maṇi). It is that consciousness which is born of the (para-ātma) highest spirit as well as of all objects : “saiṣā parā” tmanahsarva-vastūtthā cetanā bhavet. (pp. 41, ibid)

Ānanda-prabhāsa or the light of bliss is also that which is manifested on all sides of the beings and is connected with their happiness and (happiness-yielding) objects.

Kriyā-prabhā is prāṇa or vital air, that stays in all bodies. The highest being is one that causes vibrations in all objects. Jñāna-prabhā along with ānand-prabhā is the source of being or ‘sattva.’ :

(B.P. pp. 41, ibid)

“jñāna-prabhāsāś caitanya-maṇeḥ  
jīvasya sarvataḥ,  
śarīra-vyāpinī tatra  
vyāpanā bhavati sphuṭam.  
saiṣā parā” tmanah  
sarva-vastūtthā cetanā bhavet,  
tathā” ānanda-prabhāsā’pi  
puruṣeṣu samantataḥ.  
abhivvyaktā satī teṣāṃ  
sukhaṃ vaiśayikaṃ bhavet.  
kriyā-prabhā bhavet prāṇaḥ  
sa deheṣu pravartate.  
paramā” tmā sarva-vastu-  
parispanda-pravartakaḥ,  
jñāna-prabhā sā” nandā  
tasyaḥ sattvaṃ prajāyate.”

From kriyā-prabhā ‘rajas’ is born. Śakti is born of sattva. Thus it gives birth to the highest - “kriyāprabhā rajas sattvāc chaktiḥ, syād uttamā prasūḥ.” (B.P. pp. 41, ibid)

‘Mano-mayādayah’ - i.e. mind and the rest are the substratum of these three ‘prabhās. At times they stay independently and at times jointly. Sattva-guṇa is having a very wide area and in it stays ‘rajas’. In ‘rajas’ stays ‘tamas’. Manas stays in ātman. As they stay close to each other, they are imagined to be mixed with one another. Sattva stands in the centre and around it stay rajas and tamas. Out of the combination of the guṇas are born five ‘tan-mātrā-s’ (i.e. śabda, sparśa, rūpa, rasa and gandha). Along with these are born the five (mahā)bhūtas (such as, pṛthvī, ap, tejas, vāyu and ākāśa). Thus are born these ten objects. Along with five karmendriyas (i.e. hasta, pāda, pāyu, upastha and vāk) five jñānendriyas (i.e. cakṣu, śrotra, ghrāṇa, rasana and tvak) and two-fold mind are born. The ten tanmātrās along with ahaṁkāra have ten sense-organs as their fall-off (vikṛti) (or change)

“ahaṁkāreṇa yuktānām  
tanmātrāṇām yathākramam,  
daśendriyāṇi kathyante  
teṣāṁ vikṛtayas tadā.” (BP. pp. 42, ibid)

Manas is said to be the ‘vikṛti’ of one ahaṁkāra. Vikṛti (change, fall-off) is born of prakṛti (= source). So, it is termed ‘mahān’. That prakṛti is three-fold i.e. sāttvikī, rājasī and tāmasī. This follows sāmkhya system -

(B.P. pp. 42, ibid) -

ahaṁkārasya caikasya  
vikṛtir mana ucyate,  
prakṛter vikṛtiḥ, sopi  
mahān; sā ca tridhā bhavet.  
sāttvikī, rājasī caiva  
tāmasī ceti;

Sāttvikī determines the objects of senses and so the wise call it to be “buddhi.” (adyavasāyo buddhiḥ, sāmkhya-kārikā, 23).

Along with its parts this buddhi alone (acts for the benefit of) all living beings -

“svāmśaiḥ saha yutā  
sarva-jīvānām upakārikā.”

(B.P. pp. 42, ibid) - Its portions i.e. aṃśas are of the form of 'vyasti' i.e. individual parts. Its five jñānendriyas i.e. subtle sense-organs are helpers in reviewing the object :

“vijñānēndriya-pañcakam, sāhāyakam bhavet tat tad viṣayā”locanā”diṣu.”

Manas helps (oblige) it by strong will or desire-saṃkalpa. (saṃkalpakam manaḥ, sāmkhya-kārikā, 27). When a sense-organ has indistinct perception such as, “this object”, the mind has a distinct perception in form of its saṃkalpa such as, “this object is such and such; it is this and not that.” etc. Saṃkalpa thus is special perception in form of viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya. This is the quality of mind-manas. Direct knowledge - ‘a-parokṣa-jñāna’ is ‘ālocana’ but ‘parokṣa’ or indirect-perception is ‘saṃkalpa’ : ‘buddhīndriyānām sammugdhavastu-darśanam ālocanam uktam’ (Tattva-kaumudī, edn. Jha, pune, '65, pp. 103)

Ahṃkāra is that which qualifies buddhi, through ‘abhimāna’. ‘Abhimāna’ is that cognition such as “this is mine.” Thus the cognition of the knower with the object known is termed ‘abhimāna’. As it is the cause of activity, rājasī (ahamkāra) is termed “prāṇa”. It helps, by its parts, all beings, itself staying in the heart of all. Karmēndriyas help the cause of ahamkāra by accepting (i.e. uniting with) its objects. Manas also helps the cause of ahamkāra by a desire or saṃkalpa such as “I should do”. Tāmasī (ahamkāra), due to constant pariṇāma (i.e. changes), in the state of creation, is (called) “kāla”. Its ‘pariṇāma’ are the moments (i.e. kṣaṇā”di). On account of this all being meet with ‘pariṇāma’ i.e. changes. In form of vibration (spandana) Kāla brings changes in objects and thus in fact helps the cause of jñātā i.e. knower, jñāna i.e. knowledge or cognition, and jñeya i.e. object of knowledge. Śā. observes :

“sa kālaḥ spanda-rūpeṇa  
padārthān pariṇāmayan,  
anugrṇāti vettāraṃ  
vittiṃ vedyāṇ ca, tattvataḥ.”

(pp. 43, ibid)

Thus, ahamkāra is said to be three-fold in view of the three guṇas such as sattva, rajas and tamas (pp. 43, ibid) :

“ahamkāras tridhā sóyaṃ  
sattvā”di-guṇa-bhedataḥ,”

That which is of the ‘sāttvika’ variety due to sattva-guṇa, has sense-organs as its effects or off-shoots or parts born of it; i.e. resultant items. Thus ahaṃkāra is the cause of indriya-s or sense-organs. From ‘tāmas’ ahaṃkāra spring ‘bhūtaś i.e. the five tanmātrā-s are born of tāmas ahaṃkāra, which is its cause. Rājas or taijas ahaṃkāra helps the cause of both of these i.e. both the kārya-gaṇas are caused by rājas ahaṃkāra. Sāṃkhya kārīkā, 25 may be read here as -

“sāttvika ekādaśakaḥ pravartate  
vaikṛtād ahaṃkārāt,  
bhūtā”des tanmātraḥ, sa tāmasaḥ,  
taijasād ubhayam.”

Ahaṃkāra is of three types viz. sāttvika, rājasa and tāmasa; sāttvika variety causes eleven sense-organs, and tāmasa causes five tanmātrās. Eventhough the rājasa-ahaṃkāra has no independent function, but as sattva and tamoguṇa are by themselves without any activity, they cannot perform their functions on their own and hence they need the help or assistance of rājasa or rajo-guṇa which is capable of activity. Thus rājasa-ahaṃkāra helps the cause of both sāttvika and tāmasa. Rajoguṇa being active-‘cañcala’-makes the other two also move. Thus by generating activity in the other two, rājasa ahaṃkāra also is a cause in generating the effects brought about by the other two.

The tendency-vṛtti or ahaṃkāra is termed ‘abhimāna’. This ‘abhimānā”tmikā vṛtti’ becomes the object of fixed sense-organ : “sā”bhimānā”tmikā vṛttis tat-tad-indriya-gocarā” (B.P., pp. 43, ibid) :

Now the concept of rasa is correlated to this philosophical context. BP. (pp. 43, ibid) observes :

“bāhyārthālambanavatī  
śṛṅgārā”dirasā”tmatām  
yāti, tatra vibhāvā”di-  
bhedād bhedaṃ prayāti ca.”

Relying on external objects, this vṛtti (i.e. abhimāna) takes to śṛṅgārā”di rasas. This means that the abhimānā”tmikā vṛtti, being the object of sense-organs,



through external objects, takes the form of śṛṅgārā"di rasa-s. On account of differences of vibhāvā"di-s, it attains to various types.

When, depending, on one's own abhinaya or acting, the 'lalita' - vibhāvas, get engaged to respective sthāyin along with sāttvika-s, anubhāva and vyabhicārin-s. there whatever is the result of rati (sthāyin) attains the name of śṛṅgāra-rasa. The sāmājikas enjoy the same:

(B.P. pp. 43, ibid) :

"vibhāvā lalitāḥ sattvā'nubhāva-vyabhicāribhiḥ,  
yadā sthāyini vartante, svīyā'bhinaya-saṁśrayāḥ,  
tadā manah preksakānām, rajas-sattva-vyapāśrayi-  
sukhānubandhī tatradyo vikāro yaḥ pravartate,  
Śṛṅgāra-rasābhikhyām labhate, rasyate ca taiḥ."

Thus Śā. explains other rasa-s also. When lalitā"bhāsa (imitation of genuine lalita) vibhāva, along with sattvā"di bhāvas that bring enhancement, alone with acting, enhance the sthāyin concerned, the mind of the spectators is in touch of rajo-guṇa and is blended with tamo-guṇa also, and resorts to caitanya i.e. consciousness. There whatever vikāra - 'change' of rati is caused, is termed "hāsyā-rasa. The sāmājikas relish the same.

Thus Śā. explains the formation of vīra, adbhuta, raudra, karuṇa, bībhatsa and bhayānaka-rasas.

Śā. observes that this sort of creation of rasas-s is narrated in "yoga-mālā-saṁhitā".

"īdrśī ca rasótpattiḥ  
manovṛttiś ca, śāsvatī,  
kathitā yoga-mālāyām  
saṁhitāyām vivasvate." (pp. 45, ibid).

We do not know anything about this "yoga-māla" - saṁhitā, which is either a philosophical treatise or a work on dramaturgy. Śā. observes that in 'saṁhitā' (perhaps the same, yoga-mālā) Śiva has explained fully tāṇḍava, lāsya, nāṭya and nartana to the Sun-God, i.e. Vivasvān.

Śā. then goes on to explain that along with ārabhaṭī vṛtti (style), dance with uddhaṭa (fast) karaṇas and āṅgaḥāras is termed "tāṇḍava". The NS. (IV. 30)

explains that the movement of hands and feet in dance is termed “karaṇa”. They are one hundred and eight. Six, seven, eight or nine karaṇas taken together are termed “aṅga-hāra”. They are thirty-two.

Read,

“hasta-pāda-samāyogo  
nṛtyasya karaṇam bhavet.”

(NS. IV. 30) and also, “ṣaḍbhirvā saptabhir vā'pi  
aṣṭabhir navabhir tathā,  
karaṇair iha saṃyuktā  
aṅgaḥārāḥ prakīrtitāḥ.” (NS. IV. 33)

Tāṇḍava is of three types such as fast, very fast and fastest or very very fast. Such varieties as, “an-uddhata, uddhata and ati-uddhata” also are noticed. These, Śā. says, will be discussed later.

‘Lāśya’ is a softer form of dance with kaiśikī vṛtti, gentle aṅgaḥāra and ‘laya’-rhythm. Śā. talks of its varieties also. That which was associated with “Tāṇḍu” sage is called “tāṇḍava”. After explaining “nṛtya”, Śā. says that “nāṭya” is that which is the act of an actor. This is of the form of representation of the padārtha/vākyārtha as seen in a drama. (B.P. pp. 46, ibid) -

“nāṭaka-sthita-vākyārtha-  
padārthā'bhinayā'tmakam,  
naṭa-karmaiva nāṭyam syād  
iti nāṭyavidāṃ matam.”

‘Nṛtta’ is that which consists of bear movements of hands and feet, i.e. that which is brought about by karaṇas and aṅga-hāras. Modern ‘break-dance’ could be placed with ‘nṛtta’.

“karaṇair aṅgaḥārāisca  
nirvṛttam nṛttam ucyate.”

(B.P. pp. 46, ibid) :

‘Nartana’ is accompanied by vṛttis and instruments and songs. This is qualified by movements of limbs also. This ‘nartana’ commonly stays in nāṭya, nṛtta, lāśya and tāṇḍava and guṇḍalī (a variety of lāśya).

(B.P. pp. 46, ibid) :

“vṛttibhiḥ sahitaṃ gītaṃ  
tathā vādyā”dibhir yutam,  
nartanaṃ; gātra-vikṣepa-  
mātraṃ ity ucyate budhaiḥ.”  
etan nāṛye ca nṛtte ca  
lāsyā tāṇḍavayor api,  
guṇḍaly ādiṣu sarvatra  
sādhāraṇyena vartate.”

There are eight types of mental behaviour of the sāmājikas. These eight only are experienced in a drama. The Sāmājikas know (eight) different rasas through them only.

“yatōṣṭadhā manovṛttiḥ  
sabhyānāṃ nāṛya-karmaṇi,  
aṣṭāv evānubhūyante  
tāsūktās tai rasāḥ pṛthak.”

Śā. thus bases all this, including the discussion on nṛtta, nṛtya, nāṛya etc. and holding of only eight rasas in a drama, on the DR. Thus he follows the Mālava tradition. It may be noted that the philosophical concepts of the sāmkhya system which he narrated as a background to explain ahaṃkāra-abhimāna-rasa, seems to be useless. Bhoja also has done such unnecessary exercise. Actually Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta, who were great ‘yogin-s’ themselves and very learned philosophers or dārśanikas too, refrained from making this “show-off” of their learning. For, their prime task was to discuss aesthetics and not philosophy. But very great as they are, they could afford to do away with such a show of pseudo-scholarship to which Śā. falls a prey.

Śā., following the DR. again rejects the case of Śānta-rasa with reference to drama. He observes that some theorists mention a ninth mental attitude (i.e. śama), and as a result accept ‘śānta’ as a (ninth) rasa in drama also.

But the vākyārtha-padārtha i.e. the content, such as practicing penance etc., on account of their expectancy of being acted (which in itself is not possible) can not be presented on the stage and hence ‘śānta’ cannot be a rasa in a drama.

(B.P. pp. 47, ibid) :

“kecin navā”tmikām āhur  
manovṛttim vicakṣaṇāḥ  
tataś śānto raso  
nāṭye’py astīti pratijānate.”  
nāṭakā”di nibandhe tu  
tapaś caraṇa-vastuni  
abhinetum aśakyatvāt  
tad-vākyārtha-padārthayoḥ.”

Śā. observes that śama-sthāyin, being enhanced by determinants that may be proper to it, is termed ‘śānta-rasa’ by some experts.

But śama is marked by absence of mental digressions. So it can not rise to the capacity of ‘rasa’. Hence ‘śānta’ cannot be accepted as rasa (B.P. pp. 47, ibid) -

“śamas sthāyī vibhāvā”dyair  
yathāsthāna-niveśitaiḥ  
vardhitaś ced rasaḥ śāntaḥ  
astīty udbhāvyate kvacit.  
asya sarva-vikārāṇām  
śūṇyatvād rasā”tmanā,  
pariṇetum na śaknoti  
tasmāt śāntasya nōdbhavaḥ.”

Hence, holds Śā., nāṭyarasa-s are only eight. This is the opinion of “Padmabhū” i.e. Brahmā also,

“tasmān nāṭyarasā  
aṣṭāv iti padmabhūvo matam.”

Śā. now records the origin of these concepts, not recorded elsewhere. This is in ‘paurāṇika’ style - He observes :

In ancient times the origin of rasas was narrated by Vāsuki. Nārada narrated the same differently.

“utpattis tu rasānām yā  
 purā vāsukinóditā,  
 nāradasyócyate saisā  
 prakārāntara-kalpitā.” (pp. 47, ibid)

Following Bhoja and elucidating Bhoja's position Śā. observes that mind is in contact with external objects and with its seat in rajo-guṇa and helped by ahaṁkāra brings out a change-vikāra which is termed “Śṛṅgāra”.

bāhyārthā”lambanavato  
 manaso rajasi sthitāt  
 sā'haṁkārād vikāro yah  
 sa śṛṅgāra itīritah. (B.P. pp. 47, ibid)

From the same mind, in the absence of rajoguṇa, but with sattvagūṇa, 'hāsya' is born -

“tasmād eva rajohīnāt  
 sa-sattvād hāsya-sambhavaḥ.” (pp. 47, ibid)

Vīra is the change, when mind is in contact with external objects, and is in touch with ahaṁkāra, rajah and sattvagūṇa. Thus vīra results.

“ahaṁkāra-rajah-sattva-  
 yuktād bāhyārtha-saṁgatāt,  
 manaso yo vikāras tu  
 sa vīra iti kathyate.” (pp. 47, ibid)

From the same combination as above, but without ahaṁkāra and rajas, is adbhuta born -

“tasmād evā'dbhuto jāto  
 rajo'haṁkāra-varjitāt.” (pp. 47, ibid)

But with contact of external objects along with rajas, tamas and ahaṁkṛti, raudra is born as a change from mind :

“rajas-tamóhaṁkṛtibhiḥ yuktād bāhyārtha-saṁśrayāt,  
 manaso yo vikāras tu, sa raudra iti kathyate.”

(pp. 47, ibid)

But from the same combination but without rajas and ahaṁkāra, karuṇa is born from the mind.

“karuṇas tata eva syād  
rajo'haṁkāra-varjitāt,  
cittāvasthāt tu manaso  
bāhyārthā”lambanā”tmanah.” (pp. 47, ibid)

When mind is in contact with external objects and tamas and sattva, bībhatsa is born -

tamas-sattva-yutāj jāto  
bībhatsa iti kathyate. (pp. 48, ibid)

In the absence of sattva, when mind is covered up by tamas, and in contact with external objects, bhayānaka is born -

“sattva-buddhi-vihīnāt tu  
manasas tamasā'nvitāt,  
bāhyād eva samutpanno  
bhayānaka itīritah.” (pp. 48, ibid)

But Śānta is born of mind, when there is absence of rajas and tamas and it is seated in sattva and when it is slightly out of contact with external objects :

“rajas-tamo-vihīnāt tu  
sattvā'vasthāt sa-cittataḥ,  
manāg a-sprṣṭa-bāhyārthāt  
śānto rasa itīritah.”

Though Śā. does not accept śānta with reference to drama, he accepts the same in poetry as is done by his mentor Dhanañjaya in his DR.

Śā. now explains the etymology of the word “śṛṅgāra” as is done by Bhoja. Śā. observes that whatever is the best form of manifestation of bhāvas, such as deśa (space), kāla (time), vayas (= condition) dravya (physical object), guṇa (quality), prakṛti (nature) and karma (activity) is termed “śṛṅga” i.e. the highest peak. That by which this śṛṅga or highest peak is reached is termed ‘śṛṅgāra’.

“deśa-kāla-vayo-dravya-  
guṇa-prakṛti-karmaṇām,  
bhāvānām uttamaṃ yat tu  
tac chṛṅgam śreṣṭham ucyate.”  
iyanti śṛṅgaṃ yasmāt tu  
tasmāt śṛṅgāra ucyate.”

(B.P., pp. 48, ibid) -

√‘Has’ with termination “ap” gives the word “hasa”. It means laughter. When ‘ghañi’-termination operates, we arrive at the word “hāsa”. Thus from the √has, with two terminations we get ‘hasa’ and ‘hāsa’. Here there is an alternate granted. Either take √has or √svan, (= to make noise), we come to the word ‘hāsyā’ with the etymology viz. “that for which a person is laughed at - “hāsyate asau.” So, deformed limb, age (avasthā), object (dravya), language (bhāṣā), ornament (aṅgāra), activity (karma) - are causes which make a man laugh. Thus it is termed “hāsyā”.

Now Śā. explains the etymology of ‘vīra’. √rā is in the sense of giving alms -- --- √lā also is in the same sense. It is in the sense of ‘jñāna’ or ‘khaṇḍana’ also. The grammarians take √ra’ & √la’ as identical. ‘Vīra’ is therefore one which destroys the opposition - “viruddhān rāti hanti it vīra-śabdasya nirvāhaḥ.” (Śā., pp. 48, ibid) Or, that which knows various objects, or beautiful objects, is vīra. “vividham vicitrāṃ ca lāti, jānāti, kṛntati” is vīra. This is the opinion of some ancient masters. Or, “that which inspires the enemies” is also the etymology of vīra - “vidviṣṭān prerayati.”

The word ‘adbhuta’ is derived from √bhr̥, with ‘utac’ termination, along with ‘avyaya’, meaning ‘vismaya’ or marvellous. Śā. observes : “vicitrā yasya bhavati citta-vṛttis tatōdbhutaḥ.” (pp. 49, ibid)

“Rudra gives hand” - “rudraḥ haṣṭam dadāti” - This is the derivation of “raudra”. The activity or agency has for its cause, what is “raudra”. That activity which makes others cry is called “raudra” -

‘yat karma raḍayaty anyān  
sa raudra iti vā bhavet.”

‘Karuṇa’ is derived as follows - √ghṛṇi is used in the sense of compassion, alms-giving, catching etc. “ghṛṇi dhātur -

dayā-dāna-grahaneṣu ca vartate.”

“gr̥hṇāti datte dayate

iti karma gr̥hṇer itam.” (B. P. pp. 49, ibid)

Thus √gr̥hṇ is used in the sense of compassion, giving alms, and accepting something (grahana). “gr̥hṇāti datte dayate iti karma”.– this is the meaning of ‘gr̥hṇā’ The wise men say that through this activity whatever is the mental attitude that results is termed “gr̥hṇā”. The grammarians explain “gr̥hṇā” as “karuṇā.” So, the composers of nighṇu also take ‘gr̥hṇā’ as “karuṇā”. “Karuḥ” means ‘kleśa’ or unhappiness. That which does not tolerate this “karuḥ” is ‘karuṇā’. The experience of this feeling of ‘karuṇā’ is “karuṇa” (rasa). The mental attitude which does not bear or tolerate the miseries inflicted by others, is the bhāva called “karuṇa.”

Thus ‘bībhatsa’ is explained from √badh, with ‘san’ termination. garhā, nindā, bībhatsa, kustā, etc. are synonyms.

‘ñi-bhī’-bhaye–means √bhī is for fear. The learned explain the word ‘bhaya’ as ‘calaṇa’ (i.e. going away, running away). “bībheti bhāyayati anyān karmanā iti bhayam.” That which is afraid and that which makes others afraid is termed ‘bhaya.’ That which is born of ‘bhaya’ and ākrośa’ is termed “bhayānaka.”

Wherein changes, both external and internal get mixed and get quiet, that feeling (bhāva) is termed śānta-(Śā. pp. 50, ibid).

“ābhyantrās ca bāhyās ca vikārā yatra saṃyutāḥ  
yasya bhāvasya śāmyanti sa śānta iti kathyate.”

Śā. says that derivations of words such as ‘śṛṅgāra’ and the like are attempted by him following the line of etymologists who derive words either on the basis of meaning, or roots, or ‘vacana’, or ‘yoga’ or through commonness of letters etc.

To us, these derivations of words does not help the cause of aesthetics and therefore, this is a totally futile exercise by Śā.

Śā. now turns to an important topic. He says that experts explain differently how the spectators experience the fact of the superimposition of Rāma etc. on the actors :

(pp. 50, ibid)-

“rāmādyā”ropanātmā dhīḥ  
prekṣakāṇāṃ natā”diṣu  
jāyate yā’tra vidvadbhir  
bahudhā sā vivicyate.”



He follows the views as recorded in the A.bh. First of all he takes up the view of Śrī. Śaṅkuka, without naming him. He observes : (pp. 50, ibid)-

“rāmóyam ayam evéti  
yéyam prekṣakadhīr naṭe,  
anukāryépi rāmā”dau  
sā samyag iti kathyate.”

Right-cognition is that which is of the form of “only this (man) is Rāma and Rāma is only this man.” This right-cognition is with reference to the original (anukārya) Rāma as well as the actor. This should be the nature of the cognition of the spectator if it is right-cognition.

It will be called false cognition if after the first cognition of the actor being taken as Rāma, there will subsequently arise a cognition, a stronger one, that he is not Rāma.

“ayam sa na iti mithyaiva  
bodhād auttara-kālikāt” (pp. 50, ibid)

Doubtful-cognition is of the nature of-

“Is he Rāma or not ?”  
“ayam rāmo na véty eṣā  
matih syāt saṁśayā”tmikā.” (pp. 50, ibid).

A cognition of similarity on the part of the spectator takes the form of “this actor is like Rāma.” Thus these are the optional cognitions which a spectator may have with reference to the actor who plays the role of Rāma in a drama.

But actually the cognition in the context of art is different from all these four types of cognition. This is the view of Śaṅkuka which is explained by Śā. with naming Śaṅkuka. Śaṅkuka holds that art-cognition is different from samyag-mithyā-saṁśaya and śādrśya types of cognitions. This art-cognition takes place on the analogy of “citra-turaga” i.e. a painted horse.

“citre turaga-buddhyā”di-  
nyāyenaiva naṭā”diṣu dhiyā...” (pp. 50, ibid)

This art-cognition is brought about on the strength of ‘kāvyā’nusamdhāna’ i.e. repeated encounter with poetry and due to strength of training-śikṣā-bala; on the part of the actor, who performs his role in an expert way. This the actor presents with the help of vibhāvā”di-s that are basically artificial, but are tainted by the perception of reality in them. With these vibhāvā”di-s, through the relation of gamya-gamaka- bhāva i.e. relation of inference, a feeling is inferred. This inferred sthāyin, on account of its inherent beauty, is relished and this anukṛta-anumita-sthāyin is termed rasa(according to Śaṅkuka.) : (BP. pp. 50, 51), ibid) :-

“citre turaga-buddhyā”di-  
nyāyenaiva naṭā”diṣu,  
dhiyā kāvyānusamdhāna-  
balāc chikṣāvaśād api.  
nirvartita-sva kāryā”di-  
prākātyena prakāśyate  
kṛtrimair api satyatvā-  
-bhīmāna-kaluṣīkṛtaiḥ,  
vyapadeśyair vibhāvā”di-  
sabdaiḥ samyoga-rūpiṇā  
sa gamya-gamakatvena  
kvacid apy anumīyate  
vastu-saundaryataḥ sōpi  
rasanīyatvam eṣyati,  
anyānumīyamānena  
sthāyitvena vibhāvitāḥ.

Here, actually the ratyādi is not present and yet it is relished in form of rasa

“atrāsann api ratyā”diḥ  
svādyate taiḥ rasā”tmanā.” (pp. 51, ibid)

This is the view of some (=i.e. śrī-Śaṅkuka)

“evaṃ kecīd vadanty etāṃ  
naṭe rāmā”di-śeṃuṣīm.”

But, Śā. further observes, that the Bharatas who know dramaturgy say that this (= as explained by Śāṅkuka) is not so-

“naivam ity eva bharatā  
nāṭya-vedārtha-vedinaḥ.” (pp. 51, ibid)

Who these Bharata-s are, we do not know. But in the A.bh. we know that the preceptors (=upādhyāyāḥ) of Abhinavagupta refuted Śāṅkuka's views. Without naming, Śā. also presents the views of these Upādhyāyas (i.e. Tauta, perhaps). Śā. observes : (pp. 51, ibid) :-

“naivam ity eva bharatā  
nāṭya-vedārtha-vedinaḥ,  
rāmā”di-buddhir yā nāṭye  
prekṣakāṇām naṭā”diṣu,  
séyaṃ na saṃśayamatir  
na viparyāsa-dhīr api  
naiva sādṛśya-dhīr eṣā,  
na citra-turagā”tmikā-

Experts in dramaturgy hold the view that the cognition of Rāma in the actor, by the specators, is not of the form of doubt (=saṃśaya), nor of the form of similarity (=sādṛśya), nor a false cognition(viparyāsa).

It is not of the form of “citra-turaga” cognition as well.

The reason is that, as there is no possibility of a doubt due to factors viz. time and space, it can not be of the form of doubt. Spectators know that Rāma happened to be in times and place quite different from the present. So, no doubt of the form of, “Could the actor be Rāma ?” can ever take place in the mind of the spectators. On account of subsequent termination of cognition, it certainly can not be a false cognition. The cognition that takes place during performance can not be of the form of similarity for the spectators know that there is no ghost of a chance of similarity between the legendary Rāma and the poor actor. Rāma is presented through poetry and naṭa is very much existing before the eyes of the spectators. This can not be a cognition on the analogy of ‘citra-turaga’ also, for the spectators know the artificiality connected with the horse that is painted in a picture. All painted things are not real but only artificial. The painting again is insentient, while the actor is a sentient being. So, on earth, there can never be a

cognition based on the analogy of a painting. Śā. has beautifully analysed the views of the Upādhyāyas (=Tauta) as mentioned in the Abhinava-bhāratī. Abhinavagupta himself has not presented this analytical presentation of the views of his preceptors. B.P. (pp. 51, ibid) observes :

“na saṁśayasya śaṅkā syād  
deśa-kālā”di-bhedataḥ,  
na viparyāsa-dhīḥ sā syād  
bādhād auttara-kālikāt.  
kāvyā”dy upanibaddhasya  
rāmādeś ca naṭasya ca,  
sādrśya-dhī-hetv-abhāvān  
na ca sādrśya-dhīr bhavet.  
citre likhita-vastūnām  
manyante kṛtrimā”tmatām,  
sarvépi yat-tataś citra-  
turagā”tmā na dhīr bhavet.  
naṭādeś cetanatvena  
citrasyācetanatvataḥ,  
tasmāt kadācana kvāpi  
na citrā”di-matir bhavet.”

When the cognition of Rāma in the actor is yielding the desired result, then in the absence of bādhaka (i.e. refuting cognition), it has to be right cognition. On account of this samyak-pratīti with reference to naṭa, the spectators are overpowered by rasa. Thus the cognition of Rāma with reference to the naṭa is supported by the result (artha-kriyā).

(B.P. pp. 51, 52, ibid) -

“yadā hy artha-kriyā-karma-  
samarthā rāmadhīr naṭe,  
tadānīm bādhakābhāvāt  
tasya samyaktvam ucyate.  
prekṣakās tad-rasā”viṣṭā

naṭe samyak-prayoktari,  
yat tatóṛtha-kriyā-karma-  
samarthā rāmadhīr naṭe.

Śā. now observes that he has thus proclaimed the rise of rasa (=rasódaya), from the point of view of its form (=rasa-svarūpa) and its substratum (=rasāśraya), from Bharataś point of view. Now its manifestation will be discussed : (B. P. pp. 52, ibid)-

“evaṃ rasānām udayah  
svarūpāśraya-buddhitah  
darśito bharatóktah.  
tasya vṛttir nirupyate.”-

Now Bhaṭṭa- Nāyakaś view is stated. Śā. observes that – rasa is not apprehended as if it is a taṭastha-experience i.e. it is not apprehended through inference, as if no one is personally involved. Nor it is apprehended in a personal way. It is neither directly stated, nor produced at any given moment. With the help of anubhāvas presented as if they are genuine (i.e. identical with the original) by lady-characters etc., the taste is caused, which carries the hearts of the connoisseurs. Due to presentation of bhāvas and abhinaya (=acting) in a generalised way, it is conveyed by bhāvakatva-vyāpāra, and is enjoyed by bhoga-function which is of the nature of the experience of blissful consciousness. Thus the relation (between vibhāvāś and bhāva) is said to be “bhoktr-bhogyārtha-sambandha” This view of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka is explained by Śā. without naming the author -

“na taṭastha-tayā  
na ātma-gatarvena pratīyate,  
na cābhidhīyate kvāpi  
nótpadyate kadācana.  
tādātvikena pramadādy-  
anubhāvena vāsitaḥ,  
svādaḥ sahrdayānām yo  
hlādātmā hrdayaṃgamah  
sa bhāvābhinayāt  
sādhāraṇīkaraṇa-rūpayā

bhāvakarva-vyāpriyayā  
bhāvyamānaḥ svabhāva-vat,  
bhogena samvidā”nanda-  
mayenaivópabhuksyate,  
bhokṣ-  
bhogyārtha-sambandha-  
prakāśaś cābhidīyate.”

In the end Śā. gives his own rasa-theory. He observes that on account of three tattva-s or entities such as rāga (attachment), vidyā (knowledge) and kalā the self-operative activity (svataḥ pravṛtti) of puruṣa i.e. an individual soul takes place with reference to objects of senses-(gocara). With the help of instruments i.e. karaṇas-such as intelligence (buddhi) etc., this activity begets ‘bhoga’ i.e. enjoyment and rests (finally) in form of impressions i.e. vāsanā. There is experience of enjoyment coloured by unhappiness, delusion etc. also.

The abhimāna which is of the form of happiness is termed ‘rāga.’ Rāga is said to be the cause of limiting of the quality of content of a soul.- Through this limitation the soul is attached to objects of senses (Ref. Īśvara-pratyabhijñā-vimarśinī, Edn. K. C. Pandey, ’50, pp. 237-8; Allahabad).

Vidyā is that factor which limits the omniscience of a soul. As a result the soul become a knower of “limited objects.” (see, Pandey, ibid, pp. 237).

Thus ‘Vidyā’ is the upādāna-material cause-of rāga. With the help of ‘vidyā’ a wise man’s knowledge is manifested.

‘Kalā’ is the factor which flashes the consciousness covered by ‘mala’ or covering. The activity of intelligence of the form of happiness and unhappiness is termed “gocara.”

According to Kashmir Śaiva darśana three types of ‘mala’ go with a soul. They are “āṇava”, “māyā” and “kārma.” Āṇava-mala is that covering which covers the form of Jiva such as jñātṛ-i.e. knower and karṣṇ i.e. doer. On account of āṇava-mala, jiva has a limited form. Māyā is the apprehension of ‘a-vastu’ as against ‘vastu’ i.e. thing in itself. In fact māyā is said to be the root-cause of all the three mala-i.e. limitations or covering. Kārma-mala is the cause of the birth and enjoyment of fruits of a soul. (See Īśvara-pratyabhijñā-kārikā- 2,3,4,5)

Thus, observes Śā. through the agency of bhāvas or feelings, acquired through successive births, and with the help of intelligence which is instrumental in enjoying these bhāvas which are objects, the enjoyment derived is in form of rasa.

The ancient masters of Śaivā"gamas have delineated this subject in this way. The soul enjoys objects, having sole interest in enjoyment. This the soul does when its consciousness is charged by 'Kalā', when it is shown objects by 'vidyā', and when it is coloured by 'rāga'. With the help of instruments in form of intelligence-the soul enjoys with 'māyā' staying in him for all time. The rasika-s thus enjoy the bhogas. The guṇa-s such as sattva etc. help the cause of buddhi. This enjoyment is rasa.

Śā. has thus discussed the nature of rasa-experience from the point of view of śaiva-āgama. He has discussed the epistemological background of rasa-experience. But we feel that this discussion of theory is uncalled for. What matters is only the nature of rasa-experience and not an account that explains the "making of rasa." The B. P. (pp. 52, 53) read as—

“rāga-vidyā-kalā-saṃjñaiḥ  
 puṃsas tattvais tribhiḥ svataḥ,  
 pravṛttir gocarótpannā  
 buddhyā”di-karaṇair asau,  
 bhogaṃ niṣpādyā niṣpādyā  
 vāsanā”tmaiva tiṣṭhati,  
 duḥkha-mohādi-kaluṣam api  
 bhogyam pratīyate.  
 yat-sukhatvābhimānena  
 sa rāga iti kathyate,  
 vidyā nāméti tattvaṃ  
 yad rāgópādānam ucyate.  
 tayābhivyajyate jñānam  
 puruṣasya vipaścitaḥ,  
 caitanyasya svabhāvataḥ.  
 abhijvalanahetur yā sā kaléty abhidhīyate  
 sukha-duḥkhā”tmikā buddher  
 vṛttir go-cara ucyate.  
 evaṃ paramparā-prāptair  
 bhāvair viśayatām gataiḥ,  
 buddhyādi-karaṇair bhogān

anubhuñkte rasā”tmanā.  
śivāgama-jñāir arthóyam  
evam uktaḥ purātanaiḥ.  
kalótkalita-caitanyo  
vidyā-darsīta-gocarāḥ.  
rāgeṇa rañjitaścāyam  
buddhyā”di-karaṇair yutaḥ  
māyādyavani-paryantaṁ  
tattva-bhūtāni sthitam.  
bhuñkte tatra sthito bhogān  
bhogaika-rasikaḥ pumān  
prerakatvena buddhyā”di-  
karaṇānām punaḥ punaḥ.”  
upakurvanti sattvā”di guṇās te  
tatra tatra tu.”–

**We will now turn to Nāṭaka-lakṣaṇa-ratna-kośa (NLRK.) of Sāgaranandin.**

Our impression is that Sāgaranandin has given the summary of what Śāradātanaya has presented at length in the BP.-

Actually the NLRK. has not made any theoretical observations on various views concerning rasa-realisation. It has mostly quoted from Bharata and kept quiet over issues of concern. It speaks of eight rasas only and avoids discussing the case of śānta-rasa, altogether. NLRK (Edn. chaukhambha Skt. sansthan, Varanasi, Prof. Babulal Shukla, Shastri, '72) (pp. 182) Kārikā 190 mentions eight rasas to begin the topic, with introductory words such as- “atha rasāḥ kathyante.”-

After mentioning the eight rasas, the vṛtti observes :

catvāra eva vā. yataḥ-

“śṛṅgārānugūṇo hāsyāḥ,  
karuṇo raudra-karmajāḥ,  
adbhutaḥ karma vīrasya  
bībhatsasya bhayānakāḥ–”

This follows Bharataś observation concerning prakṛti-rasa-s and vikṛti-rasa-s.



Describing how rasa is arrived at, NLRK. (pp. 182, ibid) Kā. 191 observes :

“vibhāvasyānubhāvasya  
vyabhicāriṇa eva ca,  
saṃyogād unmīṣed bhāvaḥ  
sthāyyeva tu raso bhavet.”

When due to combination of vibhāva, anubhāva and vyabhicārin a sthāyin is enhanced, it becomes rasa.

That NLRK. adds ‘sthāyin’ follows DR. and other such sources. Bharata in his rasa-sūtra did not mention ‘sthāyin.’ But we cannot say here for certain that the NLRK., by mentioning sthāyin is a supporter of Lollaṭa, or a supporter of ‘rasa’ being of the nature of both ‘sukha’ and ‘duḥkha.’ We will go ahead with the NLRK. and try to fix its attitude later.

After giving the observation as above, NLRK. in its vṛtti says that- “athavā rasās ca bhāvās ca ete anyonyopakārāt sahabhāvena eva pravartamānāḥ siddhiṃ adhirohanti. yathā

“na bhāva-hīnoṣti raso  
na bhāvo rasa-varjitah,  
paraspara-kṛtā siddhir  
anayoḥ rasa-bhāvayoḥ.” Kā. 192 (NS. VI. 37).

This is a quotation from NS. of Bharata. But we are surprised to see that after giving a rasa-sūtra (kā. 191), the NLRK. switches over to the problem of the relation between bhāva and rasa. Of course the NS. does discuss this topic but here the treatment lacks a proper design and methodology.

vṛtti (pp. 183) on Kā. 192 observes : anna-vyañjanavat. yathā bhoktur annam vyañjanam upa-kurute, vyañjanam annam, tato rasaḥ syāt tathaiva bhāvān rasāḥ, rasāś ca bhāvā upakuryuḥ.-

This is like food and spices, observes the NLRK. As in case of the food of an enjoyer, spices make it richer and testier, and spices find place because of food-stuff, and by their combination taste is born, similarly, rasa-s and bhāva-s help the cause of one another.

Now actually this illustration of anna-vyañjana is borrowed from the NS. of Bharata but is applied to a different context. In the NS. the illustration was served only to illustrate, how many things combine and produce a single entity. There was

no intention in the NS. to illustrate utility of each other to serve the cause of each other, i.e. “parasparópakāra.”

The NLRK. further observes in the vṛtti (pp. 183, ibid) :

“parasparam sarvadā sambaddhāḥ preksakān manasi pramodena upaśliṣyanto rasā iti vyapadiśyante. (=These bhāvas, including the sthāyin and the vibhāvādi-s) combine with one another and are termed rasas, embracing the spectators with delight in their minds.”

This is a careful non-committal expression of the NLRK. How the vibhāvādi-s combine with the sthāyin is not made clear thus implying all the possibilities of janya-janaka-bhāva, gamya-gamaka-bhāva and vyaṅgya-vyañjaka bhāva all in one !

The NLRK. further notes the views of others. (pp. 183, ibid) : “anye tu kārya-kāraṇatvam anayoḥ sat-kārya-vādidarśanena aṅgikurvanti-yatra bhāvāḥ kāryam rasāḥ kāraṇam, dvayam apy etat tulya-kālāvasthityā anyōnyōpasādhayanti.”-

“Others, following the principle of satkāryavāda, accept the cause-effect relationship between these two (i.e. rasas / bhāvas). Accordingly, the bhāva-s are ‘effect’ and the rasa-s are ‘cause’. Both of these, on account of simultaneity, serve the cause of one another (=parasparópakāra), and achieve the end resulted from (contribution of) one another.”

Perhaps the view of the sāmkhya-theorists on rasa, read in the A.bh. is referred to here. But ‘rasa’ here is said to be ‘cause’ and ‘bhava’ is mentioned as “effect.” This goes against Śā.ś view. We had suggested that bhāva-s in aesthetic context are considered by Bharata and placed next to rasa for consideration. This way NLRK.ś observation can be said to be true, because laukika-bhāvas have no bearing on rasa.

After this NLRK. treats of individual rasas such as śṛṅgāra and the like. The vibhāvādi-s, the types if any etc. are also mentioned following Bharata and tradition. Sāgaranandin (=Sā.) does not consider Śānta-rasa, but at the end of the treatment of individual rasas, he, following the lead of Ānandavardhana observes :

“ākṣipya sa-vyājam ati-prasaktam  
rasam rasajñāḥ punar ādadīta,  
na cātigādham ca, na cāti-madam  
sandīpanam dr̥ṣtam idam rasānām.”- Kā. 227 (pp. 191. ibid).

If the delineation of rasa is stopped in the middle due to any reason, the knower of rasa should once again start. This delineation should neither be over-done nor should be below normal level. This is the right process of presenting rasas.

After this Sā. correlates rasas and vṛtti-rīti-s. He observes :

eṣu ca raseṣu śṛṅgāra-kāruṇya-hāsā mṛdavaḥ bhāratī-kaiśikī-vaidarbhā-rītibhājaḥ raudra-bībhatsa-bhayānakāḥ dīptāḥ bhārarty-ārabhaī-ṣayāḥ gauda-rīti-bhājaḥ madhyamau vīrādhutau bhāratī-sātvatī-ṣayau pāñcāla-rīti-bhājau iti.”

-This passage is clear.

The NLRK. now treats of bhāva-s etc. Sā. quotes NS. VII. 2

“vāg-aṅga-sattvābhinayair  
āhāryābhinayair api,  
kaver antar gataṃ bhāvaṃ  
bhāvayan bhāva ucyate.”

With the help of the (four-fold) acting concerning speech, body, mind and costumes, settings etc., that which brings into focus the internal feeling of a poet is termed ‘bhāva.’

Sā. also quotes NS.VII. 7-  
yóṛtho hṛdaya-saṃvādī  
tasya bhāvo rasódbhavaḥ,  
śarīraṃ vyāpyate tena  
śuṣkaṃ kāṣṭham ivāgninā.”

“That meaning which sweeps the heart is the bhāva which causes rasa. The body (i.e. the whole self of the rasika) is covered up by that, like fire engulfing dry wood.”

Sthāyin, according to Sā. is- (pp. 192, ibid; Kā. 230) :

“bahūnāṃ samavetānāṃ  
rūpaṃ yasya bhaved bahu,  
sa bhāvaḥ kathyate sthāyī  
śeṣās tu vyabhicāriṇaḥ.”

When many bhāva-s come together, that which comes out as most striking, is called sthāyin, and the rest are all accessories. This carries impression of the DR.

All these bhāvas are resulting from mind, says Sā. They stay in the body which is their natural resort. These bhāvas cause the rasa-s to happen and hence are termed bhāva-s :-

“sattva-bhedāḥ bhavanty ete,  
śarīra-prakṛti-sthitāḥ,

bhāvayanti rasān yasmāt

tasmād bhāvaḥ prakīrtitāḥ.” (Kā. 231, pp. 192, ibid)

Then eight sthāyin-s are enumerated but the list begins with hāsa, suggesting that the treatment lacks proper method :

“hāso ratiś ca śokaś ca

krodhōtsāhau bhayaṁ tathā,

jugupsā vismayaś cēti

sthāyibhāvāḥ prakīrtitāḥ.” (Kā. 232, pp. 192, ibid)

Vibhāva-s are explained in the NLRK (Kā. 233) as-

“vibhāvyaṁte dhigamyante

vāgaṅgābhīnayaśrītaḥ,

ebhir arthā yatas tasmād

vibhāvā samudāhṛtaḥ.”

vibhāva-s are so called because through them, with the assistance of acting concerning speech and body, the meanings are properly conveyed.

To explain ‘anu-bhāva’ Sā. quotes NS. VII. 5 :- (pp. 192, ibid)

“vāgaṅgābhīnayaair ebhir

yasmin arthónubadhyate,

sarvāṅgópāṅga-samyuktas-

tv anubhāvas tataḥ smṛtaḥ.”

Anubhāva is so called for it conveys (i.e. makes infer) the meaning with the help of acting concerning speech, body etc. The anu-bhāva is accompanied by (movements of) all major and minor limbs.

Sā. quotes the opinion of others (pp. 193, ibid) :-

anyas tv āha- rasópādāna-hetur-vibhāvāḥ, rasābhivyañjakónubhāvāḥ, rasa-prāpayitā bhāvāḥ, bhāvópakāriṇaḥ carāḥ sātrvikāś ca bhāva bhaveyur iti. –

Others say that-vibhāva is the material cause of rasa, anubhāva is the suggester (i.e. manifest through inference), bhāva is that which causes the rasa (to enhance). The accessories are those that help the cause of (i.e. nourish) rasa.

These ‘cara’ i.e. impermanent accessories are thirty-three. Sā. enumerates the thirty-three vyabhicārins after Bharata.

Then individually the vyabhicārins are explained / defined and illustrated, beginning with 'nirveda.' How each vyabhicārin is born of which causes (vibhāvas) and how it is presented through acting is also explained. The last vyabhicārin is termed 'śaucam'.

At times synonyms are given.

Eight sāttvika-s follow the traditional list. Sā. observes that 'sattva' is that quality which flashes forth other things. The bhāva-s born of this quality of 'sattva' are termed 'sāttvika-s' : "sattvaṃ nāma prakāśako guṇaḥ. tena nirvṛtāḥ sāttvikāḥ."

Sā. here has followed the concept of sattva-guṇa of the sāmkhya darśana. Abhinavagupta (G. O. S. Vol. III. pp. 150) explains it as- "sattvajam, manaḥsamādhānam."

Sā. observes that only to help the cause of sthāyin-s, the sāttvika-s and vyabhicārin-s operate :

"sthāyinām eva bhāvānām  
upakārāya sarvadā  
pravartante nivartante  
sāttvikā vyabhicāriṇaḥ." (Kā. 240, pp. 207, ibid),

with this the treatment of 'rasa' and 'bhāva' is over in the NLRK.

We will now pick up the Rasārṇava-Sudhākāra (=RS.) of Śiṅga-Bhūpāla (=Ś. B.) for the treatment of the topics of 'rasa' and 'bhāva'. It may noted beforehand that the so called Mālava School had its effect more on works concerning dramaturgy, rather than works concerning pure poetics or alaṃkāra-śāstra.

We cannot trace the origin of this Mālava School of aesthetics but it could be parallel to, or even prior to the Kashmir School of thought to which, we feel even Bharata belonged. Śāradātanaya has given an account of the origin of drama etc., which is not met with even in Bharata. Bharata, we know, sought the origin of nāṭya from the four vedas. Śā. respects this view but suggests (B. P. pp. 55, 57; 284-285, G. O. S. Edn. ibid) that nāṭya originated from Lord Śiva, (B. P. pp. 55, line 20)-

svātantryam eṣāṃ (=mukhya-rasānām)  
utpattim itareṣāṃ ca sambhavam,  
vyāsa-próktena mārgeṇa  
kathayāmi yathārthataḥ.  
kalpasyānte kadācit tu

dagdhvā lokān maheśvaraḥ,....

..... etc- etc.

pp. 285- “gaccha brahman purārātim

ambikā-patim īśvaram.... etc.

Bharata and others have correlated the origin of drama with Brahmā.

Again according to Bharata, the sons of Bharata brought ‘nāṭya’ down to earth from heaven, when they were inspired by Nahuṣa. For Śā., the credit goes to Manu and not to Nahuṣa.

In short, even if we do not pay attention to the ‘paurāṇika’ account in BP., the fact remains that Śā. talks of a different tradition of art, particularly the dramatic art. But with this was also related the poetic art and hence Śā. treats both of the dramatic and poetic arts together. But he seems to represent in both an older tradition that may go by the name of Mālava tradition. Danañjaya and Dhanika, Bhoja, to some extent even Rāmacandra and Guṇacandra or even their preceptor Hemacandra, and then Śāradātanaya(—we may not mention the anonymous work, Sāhitya-mīmāṃsā that preceded Ruyyaka), and Sāgaranandin and Śiṅga-Bhūpāla, to an extent even Vāgbhaṭa I and II, and also some other Jain writers on Kavi-śikṣā, and Pratāpa-rudra, followed the lead of this Mālava-School of thought, which was not favourably inclined to Śānta-rasa and talked also of four types of anubhāvas such as vāg-ārambha, gātrārambha, sattvārambha and buddhyārambha types, with the last variety covering rīti-vṛtti-and pravṛtti.

Now with this background we will proceed with the Rasāmaya-Sudhākara (RS.) of Śiṅga-Bhūpāla (Ś. B.), to examine the concepts of ‘rasa’ and ‘bhāva’ as seen in this work. All our references are to the Ananthashayan Edn. (=Trivendrum Edn.) by T. Ganapatishastri, ’16.)

RS. I. 58 (pp. ibid) observes that rasa in full bloom is the life-breath of nāṭya i.e. dramatic art. Therefore the author takes up its consideration,

“rasótkarṣo hi nāṭyasya  
prāṇās tat sa nirūpyate.”

RS. (I. 58b, 59a) defines rasa as,

vibhāvair anubhāvaiś ca  
sāttvikair vyabhicāribhiḥ, (I. 58b)  
ānīyamāṇaḥ svādutvaṃ  
sthāyī bhāvo rasaḥ smṛtaḥ. (I. 59A).

Sthāyin raised to the capacity of relish with the help of determinants, consequents, sāttvika-s, and accessories is termed rasa. This is clearly under the influence of the DR. IV. i where in place of 'svādutva' we read 'svādyatva', as under :

“vibhāvair anubhāvaiśca  
sāttvikair vyabhicāribhiḥ,  
ānīyamānaḥ svādyatvaṃ  
sthāyī bhāvo rasaḥ smṛtaḥ.”

It may be noted that the RS. has covered up all details concerning the art of drama in three chapters called 'vilāsa-s', while the DR. has given four chapters for the same treatment. Both of course basically follow the lead of Bharata, but as noted above they have absorbed greater influence of what we term the Mālava School of aesthetics. This need not mean that the Mālava School and the Kashmir School to which Bharata seems to belong to, were at daggers drawn against each other in all respects. No, not so. On the contrary both respected the basic thought-currents of rasa and bhāva, keeping them in centre. Their approach to certain basics was identical but perhaps the Mālava School had a more systematic approach to the concept of anubhāva-s, which were four-fold such as vāg-ārambha, gātrā"rambha, cittā"rambha (or sattvā"rambha) and buddhyā"rambha, the last variety included rīti-vṛtti-pravṛtti in its fold. We saw this in Agnipurāṇa and Bhoja but we miss it in the DR. though it is a leading pro-mālava-school document. A general tendency is not to accept Śānta-rasa at least in the context of dramatic art. As for the basic concept of, (laukika) sthāyī eva rasaḥ," leading to "sukha-dhukhā"tmako rasaḥ," and (a-laukika) sthāyī is rasa, i.e. rasa is (laukika) sthāyī-vilakṣaṇa, as it is an "ānanda-ghana-samvedanaṃ eva", - individual writers have their own choice. We will go to see what line is picked up by the RS.

After defining 'rasa', RS. comes straight away to what is meant by vibhāva, and its varieties. RS. (I. 59 b, 60; pp, 9 ibid) observes :-

“tatra jñeyo vibhāvas tu  
rasa-jñāpana-kāraṇam, (I, 59. b)  
budhair jñeyōyam ālamba  
uddīpanam iti dvidhā,  
ādhāra-viśayarvābhyāṃ  
nāyako nāyikāpi ca.” (I. 60)

Vibhāva is to be acknowledged as the cause of the apprehension of rasa. The wise should know it to be two-fold viz. the base (ālamba) and the cause of evocation, i.e. uddīpana, or evocater. The first is two-fold from the angle of substratum and object. Both the hero (=nāyaka) and the heroine (=nāyikā) are mutually substratum and object for each other.

With this introduction, without going into the nicety of how rasa is born (=rasa-niṣpatti) and the true nature of rasa, etc. the Rs. deals with the concepts of Nāyaka and nāyikā in all details, as they form the ālambana-vibhāva causing rasa. Nāyaka for RS. is the substratum for rasa and he carries away the heart of the sāmājika with the help of ‘vastu’ or dramatic theme. So, he is to be carefully understood by theorists.

Rs. I. 56 (pp. 8, ibid) observes-

“svaccha-svādu-rasā”dhāro  
vastu-cchāyā-manoharah,  
sevyah suvarṇa-nidhi-vat  
nāṭyamārgasya nāyakah.”

The principal hero of a dramatic piece is one who is associated with the principal out-come or object of the drama and he is said to be not given to misfortune or ultimate defeat or blemishes in character (=a-vyasanī).

“pradhāna-phala-sampannah  
a-vyasanī mukhya-nāyakah.”

This is suggested by the Nāṭya-darpaṇa IV. 7 (G. O. S. Edn.)-

The RS. goes on describing the general good qualities of the nāyaka as mahā-bhāgya, audārya, sthairyā, dakṣatā, aujvalya, dhārmikatva, kulīnatva, vāgmitā, kṛtajñatva, naya-jñā-tva, śucitā, māna-śālītā, tejasvitā, kalā-varva, prajā-rañjakatā etc. (RS. I. 61b-63) (pp. 9 ibid).

RS. observes that the nāyaka is ‘uttama’ i.e. of the highest ranking when blessed with all the aforesaid high qualities. If some qualities are missing, he is of the middle order (=madhyamah), and with many good qualities missing (bahu-guṇa-hīnah) he belongs to the lowest type (=adhamah) (RS. I. 71, 72a, pp. 13). He is also classified as four-fold such as dhīrōdāṭṭa, dhīra-lalita, dhīra-prasānta and dhīrōddhata i.e. the noble lofty, the one attached to sweet things and fine arts in life, the steady and serious type and the haughty. RS. then discusses these types (I. 73-77 pp. 13-16 ibid). Then types such as ‘anukūla’, śaṭha, dhṛṣṭa and dakṣiṇa



(RS. I. 81,a) are mentioned with sub-varieties discussed at length in what follows. The RS. illustrates all this with apt quotations. After this 'upa-pati'-or paramour is described at RS. I. 83 (pp. 18) as one who is served by a woman who crosses all decorum (=laṅghitā"cārayā striyā) and one who does not observe basic etiquette (vināpi vidhinā). His characteristics are also described. Then the helpers of the hero in his love-adventures (=śṛṅgāra-nāyaka-sahāyāḥ) are treated. They are piṭhamarda, viṭa, ceṭa, and vidūṣaka (RS. I. 90-92a, pp. 20, 21, ibid), along with their qualities. With this ends the topic on 'nāyaka' or hero.

RS. now picks up nāyikā (I.94, pp. 21, ibid) and gives as many as three hundred and sixty types. Bhānudatta's Rasa-Mañjari also discusses this. Basically a noble lady is having the same lofty qualities as are seen in a noble hero. The helpers of the heroine are (RS. I. 160, 1, pp. 37 ibid) dūtī, sakhī, ceṭī, līnginī (a lady-mendicant), prati-veśinī (lady staying in neighbourhood), dhātreyī, śilpakārī (=beautician), kumārī (an unmarried girl), kathinī (a story-teller), kāruḥ i.e. a washer-woman, vipraśnikā (=a fortune-teller), etc. etc. They are having qualities of the helpers of the hero (=netṛ-mitra-guṇānvitāḥ; RS. I. 161, pp. 37, ibid). With this the treatment of 'nāyikā' ends.

Now RS. picks up uddīpana-vibhāva with 'śṛṅgārasya uddīpana-vibhāva' to begin with. They are said to be four-fold—"guṇa-ceṣṭā-ālaṃkṛtayas taṭasthāś ca" (RS. I. 162, pp. 38, ibid). Nāyaka-Nāyikā are the direct substratum of rasa. Uddīpana-vibhāva are the indirect causes of rasa (=a-pratyakṣa).

RS. observes (I. 162);

“uddīpanaṃ caturdhā syād  
ālabhana-samāśrayam,  
guṇa-ceṣṭā-ālaṃkṛtayas  
taṭasthāś ceti bhedataḥ.”

The first three rest on the ālabhana, i.e. guṇa-s, ceṣṭā and ālaṃkṛti rest in the hero or the heroine. But 'taṭastha' is that type such as natural surrounding etc. Bhoja also talks of mālya, vastra, vibhūṣaṇa etc., and also ṛtu or natural surrounding etc. This is a special quality of The Mālava-School. The Kashmir school of aesthetics chooses not to go into minor details like this. The ND., B.P. PR. also discuss this. Actually though the SD. is primarily committed to the Kashmir School of thought, its treatment of nāyaka, nāyika, their friends, their qualities etc. is inspired more by the Mālava School, though of course, traits of these are noticed in Bharata also.

The guṇas in ālambana are :

"yauvanam rūpa-lāvanye  
saundaryam abhirūpatā  
mārdavam saukumāryam  
céty ālambana-gatā guṇaḥ." (R.S.I. 163, pp. 38, ibid)

Youth is again said to be fourfold, and with reference to each type the behaviour pattern is different. All these are described in great details. Alamkāra is also fourfold with reference to dress (vāsa), ornaments (bhūṣā) garlands (mālya) and cosmetics (anulepana) (R.S.I. 187a, pp. 44). 'Tatastha' uddīpana includes moon-light (candrikā), bath-room with shower (dhārā-grha), rising of moon, cooing of a cuckoo, the mango-tree, soft-wind, bees, a bower, a step-well, thundering of clouds, interior of a palace, music, pleasure-mountain, a river etc. (RS. I. 187-9; pp. 45) The 'ceṣṭā' includes līlā, vilāsa, etc. as described in the 'anubhāva'-section. With this the topic on vibhāva comes to an end.

'Anubhāva'- is explained as (RS. I. 190, pp. 48, ibid) :

"bhāvam manógatam sāksāt  
svahetum vyañjayanti ye,  
ténubhāvā iti khyātā  
bhrū-vikṣepa-smitā"dayaḥ."

Movement of eye-brows, smile etc. are anu-bhāvas i.e. consequents which cause to imagine (or manifest) their cause, viz. the feeling in the mind (or heart).

These are said to be four-fold such as those going with citta (i.e. mind, or concentration of mind), gātra (body, limbs), vāg (i.e. speech) and buddhi (i.e. intellect). RS. I. 19a, (pp. 48 ibid) observes;-

"te caturdhā citta-gātra-  
vāg-buddhyā"rambha-sambhavāḥ."

Cittajāḥ bhāvāḥ or feelings connected with mental effort are said to be ten :

"tatra ca bhāvo hāvo helā  
śobhā ca kānti-diptī ca;  
prāgalbhyam mādhyam  
dhairyódārye ca cittajāḥ bhāvāḥ."

(RS. I. 191, pp. 48 ibid)

Gātrā”rambha anubhāva covers all bodily movements. They are also counted as ten such as—

(RS. I. 199, pp. 52, ibid) :

“lilā-vilāso-vicchitir  
vibhramah kilikiñcitam,  
mottāyitam kuttamitam  
bimbo(vvo)ko lalitam tathā,  
vihṛtam ceti vijñeyā  
yositām daśa gātrajāḥ.” (I. 200 A)

The author explains each of these with illustrations. It may be noted that Ś.B. has taken the twenty anubhāvas as enumerated above going with ‘citta’ and ‘gātra’, to begin with but after supplying apt illustrations he has called them to be “sāttvika-alamkāra-s” of the heroine :

(RS. I. 209, pp. 57 ibid) :

“kathitāḥ sattvajāḥ strīṇām  
alamkāras tu vimśatiḥ.”

For Bharata, bhāva, hāva and helā were three ‘aṅga-ja’ alamkāras, and the seven viz. śobhā and the rest were a-yatnaja-alamkāras-s. Lilā and others, the ten enumerated as ‘gātra-ja’ are taken here as svabhāvaja alamkāras-s. (NS. Ch. XXIV-5,6; 12, 13; 24).

Dhnañjaya, and Rāmacandra/ Guṇacandra follow Bharata, while Śāradātanaya takes these twenty alamkāras-s as mana-ārambha (i.e. citta-ārambha) and gātra-ārambha alamkāras-s. Śiṅgabhūpāla seems to have accepted Śāradatanaya’s approach. Bhoja in his Śr. Pra. enumerates twelve mana-ārambha-anubhāva-s, including “sthairya” and “gāmbhīrya” in these. RS. has other ideas as seen above. RS. includes ‘sthairya’ and ‘gāmbhīrya’ under “dhairya”. Thus citta-ārambha-anubhāvas are ten only for Ś.B. Bhoja has also enumerated ‘krīḍita’ and ‘keli’ under gātra-ārambha which are rejected by RS., according to which ‘krīḍita’ is found only in the childhood of a girl and does not deserve to be counted among anubhāvas. But we find in normal life that girls, who have entered youth, also undertake ‘krīḍita’ and it has a special colouring of youth. ‘Keli’ is also rejected by RS. (I. 213, 214), but even this rejection does not look logical.

After describing the sāttvika alaṃkāras-s for nāyikā, RS. deals with same with reference to a nāyaka also. They are enumerated as : (RS. I. 215, pp. 58, ibid).

“śobhā vilāso mādhyam  
dhairyaṃ gāmbhīryaṃ eva ca,  
lalitaudārya-tejāṃsi  
sattva-bhedās tu pauruṣāḥ.”–

Dhairya, gāmbhīrya, audārya, and teja were treated under nāyaka-nirūpaṇa.

The rest are explained here. Śiṅga-bhūpāla has taken ‘gāmbhīrya’ and dhairya as citta-ja, and the six others are gātra-ja. (RS. I. 219, pp. 60)

“atra gāmbhīrya-dhairye dve  
cittaje gātrajāḥ pare,  
eke sādharmaṇ etān  
menire citta-gātrayoh.”–

For Bharata, Dhanañjaya, Rāmacandra and Guṇacandra, Sāgaranandin and Viśvanātha these are Sāttvika-guṇas of the nāyaka. Śāradātanaya takes these eight anubhāva-s going with males, as gātra-ārambha-anubhāva.

Vāg-ārambha anubhāvas of RS., are treated by Bharata as vācika-abhinaya : N. S. XXII. 51, G. O. S.-

“kāvyavastuṣu nirdiṣṭo  
dvādaśābhinayā”tmikāḥ.”–

The A.bh, on it reads as-kāvyavastuṣv iti daśa-rūpaka-bhedeṣu dvādaśa-rūpābhinayā”tmako vācikābhinayasya bhāvaḥ ity arthaḥ.”–. For Śiṅga-bhūpāla, it is termed vāg-ārambha-anubhāva-This is twelve-fold such as (RS. I. 220, 221, pp. 60, ibid) :

“ālāpaś ca vilāpaś ca  
saṃlāpaśca pralāpakāḥ,  
anulāpāpalāpau ca  
sandeśaś cātideśakāḥ;  
nirdeśaś cōpadeśaś ca  
apadeśo vyapadeśakāḥ,  
evaṃ dvādaśadhā proktā  
vāg-ārambhā vicakṣaṇaiḥ.”

These are individually explained next. These twelve vāg-āmbha-anubhāva-s are found everywhere in rasa. Bharata mentions them at NS. XXIV. 50, 51. Śā. has also treated these at BP. I. pp. 10, 11. RS. has made the concepts clearer by defining and illustrating them individually.

Buddyā”rambha-anubhāva-s include rīti-, vṛtti and pravṛtti. (buddhyā”rambhāḥ tathā proktā, rīti-vṛtti- pravṛttayah”

Rīti for RS. (I. 227, 228, pp. 64, ibid) is–

“rītiḥ syāt pada-vinyāsa-bhaṅgī,  
sā tu tridhā matā,  
komalā, kaṭhinā, miśrā  
ceti syāt, ”....

Komalā is also termed vaidarbhī as it is popular among vidarbha-people (RS. I. 230 A., pp. 64, ibid). Kaṭhinā is also known as “gaudī” as it is popular among gauda-people :

“kaṭhinā sā gaudīty uktā  
taddeśa-budha-manojñarvāt.”

(RS. I. 239, pp. 68, ibid).-

Miśrā is having balancelly mixed qualities of the first two :

“yatrōbhaya-guṇa-grāma-  
sanniveśas tulādhrtaḥ,  
sā miśrā saiva pāñcālī-  
ityuktā taddeśaja-priyā.” (RS. I. 240, pp. 69, ibid)

Miśrā is also termed Pāñcālī.

Over and above this RS. also accepts āndhrī, lāṭī, and saurāṣṭrī, as equivalent to Komalā with soft letters. (RS. I. 241, 2, 3, pp. 69, ibid). RS. does not give definitions of these as this act may create difficulty in the present work, but recommends that those who are interested in these may look for them further in Bhojaś works :

“tāsām grantha-gaḍutvena  
lakṣaṇam nocyate mayā,  
bhojā”di-granthakāraīs tu  
tad ākāṅkṣibhir īkṣyatām.”

(RS. I. 243, pp. 69, ibid)–

We know that Rājaśekara has suggested that, “vacana-vinyāsa-kramo rītiḥ, veśa-vinyāsa-kramo vṛttiḥ, vilāsa-vinyāsakramo pravṛttiḥ.” Thus ‘vṛtti’ covers costumes and make-up also and pravṛtti covers the general behaviour-pattern of a given locality, region, province, or country as the case may be. Sanskrit dramaturgy and literary criticism are so broad-based and also catholic in their approach that all these elements are systematically covered and treated under specific heads with meticulous care. Opinions seem to differ concerning minor details. But the approach is absolutely methodical and in keeping with aesthetics.

Śiṅgabhūpāla has named śleṣa, prasāda, samatā, mādhyura, sukumārātā, arthavyaktiḥ, udārātā, ojaḥ, kāntiḥ, and samādhi as the ten excellences of vaidarbhī rīti (R. S. I. 231, pp. 65, ibid).

These are individually explained also. Bharata has also enumerated these ten guṇas-and so also Daṇḍin and Vāmana have done. Sāgaranandin also follows Daṇḍin.

Vidyānātha has twentyfour guṇas with fourteen more such as udāttatā, suśabdatā, preyān, aurjitya, vistara, sammitatva, gāmbhīrya, saṁkṣepa, sauksmya, prauḍhi, ukti, bhāvika, gati, and rīti. This has likeness with Bhoja. We need not go into greater details as we propose to pick up these concepts of rīti, vṛtti, pravṛtti, guṇa, doṣa, lakṣaṇa, alamkāra etc. in their entirety in the vol. II of this work in separate chapters. Suffice it to say, that RS. has followed Daṇḍin in the concept of guṇa-s.

“Vṛtti” is from √vrt, to behave. With the affix ktin in the sense of bhāva, we arrive at the meaning of ‘vartana’ i.e. behaviour. The behaviour that goes to achieve the four ends of life is vṛtti. Ānandavardhana observes : “vyavahāro hi vṛttir ucyate” (Dhv. III. 33, vṛtti.) Thus the behaviour which in art imitates normal worldly pattern is vṛtti- Nāṭya-vṛtti-s are said to be four such as bhāratī, sāttvatī, kaiśikī and ārabhaṭī. Abhinavagupta observes : (NS. XX. i, A.bh., pp. 83, G.O.S.) : “viśeṣeṇa hṛdayā”veśeṇa yuktā vṛttayo nāṭyopakārinyaḥ.”– He says that the whole universe is covered up by these four vṛtti-s, which are operative since of yore, but when practiced in art with a special mental effort, they help the cause of drama through the medium of a poet and an actor.

For Śiṅgabhūpāla, vṛtti is connected with rasa and bhāva, both in poetry and in drama, through acting.

“nāṭya-kāvya-kriyā-yoga-  
rasa-bhāva-samanvitaḥ,

sa eva samayo dhātrā

vṛttir ity eva samjñitah.” (RS. I. 258, pp. 71, ibid).

The N. D. and the S.D. also call the vṛtti-s to be nāṭya-māṭrkāḥ or nāṭya-mātarah as they help the cause of drama. The vṛtti-s thus not only help the cause of drama, but also cover the bodily, mental and speech-activities of the hero and other characters. : tad-vyāpārā”tmikā vṛttiḥ, DR. II. 47; Dhanika observes here : “pravṛttirūpo netrivyāpāra-svabhāvo vṛttiḥ.”

Origin of vṛtti-s is described in the RS. following the NS. (XXII 1-23) account of the fight between Viṣṇu and Madhu Kaitabha. Following the BP., RS. observes that bhāratī is born of the Ṛgveda, sāttvatī from Yajurveda, kaisikī from the Sāmaveda and ārabhaī from the Atharvaveda :

(R. S. I. 260, pp. 71 ibid) :-

“rgvedāc ca yajurvedāt  
sāmavedād atharvaṇaḥ,  
bhāratyādyāḥ kramāj jātā  
ity anye tu pracakṣate.”

Bhāratī is one followed by the Bharata-s : “prayuktatvena bharataiḥ bhāratīti nigadyate.” (RS. I. 261, pp. 71, ibid). RS. observes that as this is practice in prastāvanā, it will be treated there in details. NS. DR. and SD. describe this as predominantly in sanskrit, with speech element as principal -vāk-pradhānā, saṃskṛta-mayī, to be used by male characters- puruṣa-prayojyā and Bharata-prayuktā, but not used by females- “strī-varjitā”. The four parts of bhāratī are prarocanā, vīthī, prahasana and āmukha.

Sāttvatī is one with sattva-guṇa as predominant quality.

Other qualities are also seen in this.

RS. I. 262, pp. 71 observes :

“sāttvikena guṇenāpi  
tyāga-śauryā”dinā yutā,  
harṣa-pradhānā, santyakta-  
śokabhāvā, ca yā bhavet.”  
sāttvatī nāma sā vṛttiḥ  
próktā lakṣaṇa-kovidaiḥ.” (I. 263 A).

The four parts of sāttvatī are saṁlāpa, utthāpaka, saṁghātya and parivartaka.

“aṅgāny asyās tu catvāri  
saṁlāpōtthāpakāv api,  
saṁghātyaḥ parivartaś ca  
ity eṣāṁ lakṣaṇam ucyate.”-

(RS. I. 263, 264 A., pp. 71, ibid).-

Kaiśikī is – (RS. I. 268, 269, pp. 74, ibid) :

“nṛtta-gīta-vilāsā”di-  
mr̥du-śṛṅgāra-ceṣitaiḥ,  
samanvitā bhaved vṛttiḥ,  
kaiśikī ślakṣṇa-bhūṣaṇā.”  
“aṅgāny asyās tu catvāri  
narma, tat-pūrvakā ime  
spañja-sphoṭau ca garbhaś ca  
eṣāṁ lakṣaṇam ucyate.”

Kiaśikī is blessed with soft activities of śṛṅgāra and has four parts or limbs such as narma, narma-spañja, narmasphoṭa and narma-garbha.

narma is a-grāmya-parihāsa i.e. cultured light talk for pleasing the lover. Its subvarieties are also counted. Narma-sphañja is a union which is happy in the beginning and fearsome in the end. Narma-sphoṭa is having some portions of a feeling that suggest śṛṅgāra. Narma-garbha is the behaviour of the hero or the heroine for achieving one's end.

Ārabhaī vṛtti is packed with magical performances, - māyā, indrajāla, and also full of a variety of fights, cutting and splashing etc.

RS. I. 280, 281, (pp. 83, ibid)- observe :-

“māyēndrajāla-pracurāṁ  
citra-yuddha-kriyāmayīm,  
chedyair bhedyaiḥ plutair yuktām  
vṛttim ārabhatīm viduḥ.”  
aṅgānyasyās tu catvāri  
saṁkṣiptir avapātanam,



vastūttthāpana-sampheṭau  
iti pūrve babhāṣire.”

The four parts of ārabhaī are, samkṣipti, ava-pātana, vastūttthāpana, and sampheṭa.

RS. I. 286 pp. 85 ibid, observes that out of these four, bhāratī is said to be śabda-vṛtti and the other three are artha-vṛtti-s. RS. also mentions a fifth vṛtti viz. a ‘miśrā’ or a mixed one which has a mixture of all the four vṛttis. This is the view of others. RS. has no faith in this variety. (pp. 86, ibid).

RS. has tried to demarcate each vṛtti with special rasa-s. RS. I. 290, pp. 87, ibid, observes :

“kaiśikī syāt tu śṛṅgāre  
rase vīre tu sāttvatī,  
raudra-bībhatsayor vṛttir  
niyatā”rabhaṭī punaḥ.”

śṛṅgārā”diṣu sarveṣu rasesviṣṭā eva bhāratī.

It may be noted that in the above observation the mention of śṛṅgāra etc. is just a sort of a token. By śṛṅgāra is also meant hāsyā, by vīra, also adbhuta, and by raudra and bībhatsa also karuṇa and bhayānaka are meant respectively. Thus Kaiśikī is fixed for śṛṅgāra and hāsyā, sāttvatī for vīra and adbhuta, and ārabhaṭī goes with raudra, karuṇa, bībhatsa and bhayānaka-rasa-s. Bhāratī is common to all rasa-s.

RS. criticises Rudrāṭa in this context :

kaiśikīṭy anuvṛttau rudrāṭaḥ—

“śṛṅgāra-hāsyā-karuṇa-  
rasātiśaya-siddhaye,  
eṣā vṛttiḥ prayatnena  
prayojyā rasa-kovidaiḥ.”— iti.  
“vicāra-sundaro naiṣa  
mārgaḥ syād ityudāsmahe.”

—RS. I. 291 B.

It may be noted in passing that Rudrāṭa feels that Bharataś suggestion is that the use of the vṛtti-s with reference to this or that rasa is based on most

observations but it is not a fixed rule which can never be altered. This is Rudraṭaś view. RS. does not agree with Rudrata and takes the fixing of vṛtti-s to be as tight a regulation as a law of natural sciences. But this may not be so.

“Pravṛtti” is also part of buddhy-ārambha-anubhāva. It is a technical term. As by ‘vṛtti’ is meant the physical, mental and speech activities of nāyaka and the rest, ‘pravṛtti’ also stands for the same “vyāpāra” or activity. But this vyāpāra is of a different type. From the point of view of difference in country or region, there are seen differences in a hero’s language, costume, behaviour pattern etc. These are termed ‘pravṛtti.’ Say, for example to crack a joke by speech is vācika-vyāpāra and it falls under “vaco-hāsyā-narma” type of kaisikī-vṛtti. But this activity of cracking a joke etc. is done in a language that goes with the hero’s region or country. This will fall under “pravṛtti.”

Thus ‘pravṛtti’ is general behaviour-pattern of a particular region or land or country.

The NS. observes : (Ch. XIV.36 prose vṛtti thereon, pp. 165, G.O.S.) “pravṛttir iti kasmāt ? ucyate, pṛthivyām nānā-deśa-veśa-bhāṣā-ācāravārtāḥ khyāpayati iti pravṛttiḥ.” Thus ‘pravṛtti’ is that which reveals the language, behaviour, occupation (=vārtā,=‘kṛsi’ etc.), etc. of a given country or region. The poet derives the knowledge of different languages or dialects of regions and applies the same in his dramatic creation. Bharata talks of four pravṛtti-s such as āvantī, dākṣiṇātyā, pāñcālī and auḍra-māgadhī. DR. and BP. almost follow Bharata. RS. also observes- I. 294, pp. 88, ibid – that the language (or dialect), costumes and activity of a given region is “pravṛtti”-

“tat tad deśocita

bhāṣā- kriyā-veśāḥ, pravṛttayaḥ.” Bhāṣā is divided by Śiṅga-bhūpāla into prācya (=eastern), āvantīyā, māgadhī, bahlikā, dākṣiṇātyā, śūrasenīyā and āndhra-māgadhī. Thus it is seven-fold –“saptadhā syād”. Then there is vibhāṣā (=minor language) such as śabara, draviḍa, āndhraja, śākāra, ābhīra, cāṇḍāla, and one projected by foresters. These are also seven.

Actually the list can be wider or narrower as to the know-how of a theorist. RS. suggests that there are other vibhāṣā-s also but as they do not serve the purpose they are not enumerated, (RS. I. 294, 298 A)–“tāsām an-upayogitvāt nātra lakṣaṇam iṣyate.” (pp. 88, ibid).

Thus, it may be observed that the delineation of the concept of “anubhāva” in the RS. is quite exhaustive. It is in keeping with the tradition of what we term the

Mālava-School of thought as represented in the Agni-purāṇa. Bhoja's works, the DR., etc. RS. has not only quoted various views but has also begged to differ from some predecessors. By and large the presentation is critical and objective.

We now turn to the more important topics of 'Bhāva' and "Rasa".

We know that for Bharata bhāva-s were the instruments that made the sāmājika-s understand the kāvyārtha. :

“vāg-aṅga-satrvópetān kāvyārthān bhāvayanti iti bhāvāḥ.”

(NS. Vol. I. Ch. VII, pp. 76, G.O.S. Edn.) Bharata has, in a way, also advocated the interdependence of bhāva and rasa-

“na bhāva-hīnósti rasah,  
na raso bhāva-varjitaḥ,  
paraspara-kṛtā-siddhis  
tayoḥ abhinaye bhavet.”

The bhāva-s and rasa-s, with mutual dependence, make their presence feel in acting. Abhinavagupta explains that rasa-s make the bhāva-s capable or make them deserve the nomenclature of 'bhāva'; but of course from bhāva-s spring the rasas. “bhāvā rasān bhāvayanti niṣpādayanti. rasās tu bhāvān bhāvayanti. bhāvān kurvanti. bhāvā”di-vyapadesyān kurvanti. -ity arthaḥ.” (A.bh., NS.) VI. 37.)

Bharata has enumerated forty-nine bhāvas in all out of which eight are sthāyin, eight are sāttvikas and thirty-three are vyabhicārin-s. All posterior writers, both on dramaturgy and poetics have followed Bharata in this regard, with very minor additions, alterations, if at all.

The RS. begins its treatment of bhāva-s with sāttvika-bhāva-s (pp. 88, 89, ibid, I. 298B-301, etc.) Those that are born of 'sattva' or mind or “special mental effort, concentration” are termed sāttvika-bhāva-s. The term 'sattva' means, “to paint (the spectator's mind) with some bhāva or feeling.” Sāttvika-bhāva-s normally are seen or produced after the feelings or emotions are created, and in this sense they are also “anu-bhāvas” i.e. “those that follow the bhāva-s” but they are not termed “anu-bhāva-s” but are given a special name of “sāttvika”, because they are born of 'sattva' i.e. mind or a special mental effort that is qualified by concentration. To be happy or unhappy following the happiness or unhappiness of others, is a quality called “sattva”. This is a special mental state on the part of an artist which is born of concentration of mind. The mind of the actor, so to say, gets identified with the state of mind of the character concerned. Śiṅga-bhūpāla accepts this view of

Bharata and holds that when the mind of the bhāvaka-s feels an identical feeling as that of some others (i.e. characters) it is called “sattva” by those who know : RS. I. 298 B (pp. 88) observes :

“anyeṣāṃ sukha-duḥkhā”di-  
bhāvanā-kṛta-bhāvanam.”

RS. I. 299 (pp. 88 ibid) observes :

“ānukūlyena yac cittam  
bhāvakānām pravartate,  
sattvam tad iti vijñeyam  
prājñaiḥ sattvódbhavān imān.”

The bhāva-s or feelings born of this ‘sattva’ i.e. special mental quality, are termed ‘sāttvika’-bhāva-s. They are eight such as : “stambha, sveda, romāñca, svara-bheda, vepathu, vaivarṇya, āśru, and pralaya.”

RS. I. 300-301 (pp. 89. ibid) read as :-

“sāttvikā iti jānanti  
bharatā”di maharṣayaḥ,  
sarveṣāṃ api bhāvanām  
yaiḥ sattvam pravibhāvyate.  
te bhāvā bhāva-tattvajñāḥ  
sāttvikāḥ samudīritāḥ,  
te stambha-sveda-romāñcāḥ,  
svarabhedaś ca vepathuḥ. (Rs. I. 300, 301)  
vaivarṇyam āśru-pralayāv-  
ity aṣṭau parikīrtitāḥ.”—(I. 302A)

RS. describes each sāttvika bhāva following Bharata. The cause and expression of each sāttvika are meticulously discussed, with apt illustrations of all various causes of a given sāttvika.

With the consideration of sāttvika-s, ends the first Chapter or vilāsa of the RS. called ‘rañjakollāsa.’ (pp. 97, ibid).

In the beginning of the second ‘vilāsa’ of his RS., Śiṅgabhūpāla starts with the discussion on vyabhicāri-bhāva-s that are thirty-three following Bharata’s lead.

The term “vyabhicārin” is explained in the beginning of the chapter. RS. II. 1-3, pp. 98 read as :

“vyabhī” ity upasargau dvau  
 viśeṣābhimukhatvayoḥ,  
 viśeṣeṇābhimukhyena  
 caranti sthāyinaṃ prati.– (RS. I. i)  
 vāg aṅga-sattva-yuktā ye  
 jñeyās te vyabhicāriṇaḥ.  
 sañcārayanti bhāvasya  
 gatiṃ sañcāriṇópi te.” (II. ii)  
 unmajjanto nimajjantaḥ  
 sthāyiny ambunidhāv iva,  
 ūrmivad vardhayanty enaṃ  
 yānti tadrūpatāṃ ca te.” (II. iii)

The term ‘vyabhicārin’ is derived with the help of ‘vi’ and ‘abhi’ as upasarga-s with √car-“viśeṣeṇa ābhimukhyena caranti” is the explanation. The accessories i.e. vyabhicārins are so called because they move with a special purpose of nourishing towards the basic emotion i.e. sthāyin. These, accompanied by acting (in drama, or description of the same in poetry), are known as vyabhicārin-s. They are called sañcārin-s also as they become instrumental in the movement of various sthāyi bhāva-s towards rasa. The sthāyin is related to them as ocean to the waves that are rising and falling. These vyabhicārins also come and go, or rise and fall as needed for the promotion of the sthāyin towards rasa. They nourish the sthāyin and help it to achieve the status of rasa.

They are also vyabhicārin-s or not-permanent as there is no permanent relation between a given vyabhicārin and a given sthāyin. A given vyabhicārin may be found with a particular sthāyin in a given context and the same vyabhicārin may accompany a different sthāyin in a different context. These vyabhicārin-s are counted to be thirty-three in the RS., which follows Bharata’s tradition here. Each is explained in details with sub-varieties arising from different contexts. For example ‘nirveda’ is seen because of tattvajñāna, durgati, āpad, viprayoga, īrṣyā, etc. It is said to be a sense of frustration or despondency-‘naisphalyamati’ born of various reasons as above. All are illustrated. In the same way different vyabhicārins having different reasons are all taken into account.

RS. observes that some other vyabhicārin-s counted by other authorities could be included in these thirty-three, as the case may be. RS. (II. 94b, 95, pp. 139, ibid)-observes :

“udvega-sneha-dambhērṣā-  
pramukhās citta-vṛttayaḥ,  
utkeṣvantar bhavantīti  
na prthaktvena darśitāḥ.”

To support his view Śiṅga-bhūpāla also quotes BP. :

“anyēpi yadi bhāvāḥ syus’  
cittavṛtti-viśeṣataḥ,  
antarbhāvas tu sarveṣāṃ  
drṣṭavyo vyabhicāriṣu.”

But an interesting point is noted by the RS. when (II. 95b, pp. 139-ibid) it observes that these vyabhicārins could also play the role of a vibhāva or an anubhāva towards one another in a given situation.

“vibhāvā anubhāvās ca  
te bhavanti parasparam.”

This reminds us of the remark in the A.bh. in the context of Śānta-rasa for which Bharata lays down jugupsā (a sthāyin) as a vyabhicārin.

The cause-effect relation with reference to each vyabhicārin is to be understood, observes RS., following world-order :

“kārya-kāraṇa-bhāvas tu  
jñeyaḥ prāyeṇa lokataḥ.”

(RS. II. 90a; pp.139 ibid). The RS. elaborates this in the vṛtti : (pp. 139, 140 ibid) :-

tathā hi, – santāpasya dainyaṃ prati vibhāvatvaṃ, glāniṃ praty anubhāvatvaṃ. prahārasya pralaya-mohau prati vibhāvatvaṃ, augryaṃ praty anubhāvatvaṃ. ca. viśādasya utpādā”vegāṃ praty anubhāvatvaṃ stambhaṃ prati vibhāvatvaṃ. vyādher glāni-stambha-pralayādīn prati vibhāvatvaṃ.

These vyabhicārin-s are again two-fold, observes RS. (at II. 96, 97, pp. 140 ibid) with reference to their independence or dependence. They are said to be independent when not engaged in arousing some other bhāva, but once they reach

the stage of being subservient to others they are dependent. Perhaps the first case gives rise to what may be taken as bhāva-dhvanī. :

svātantryāt pāratantryāt ca  
te dvidhā vyabhicāriṇaḥ. (RS. II, 96b)  
parapoṣakatām prāptāḥ  
paratantrā it īritāḥ,  
tad abhāve svatantrā syur  
bhāvā iti ca te smṛtāḥ”– RS. II. 97.)

RS. illustrates this with ‘nirveda’ being svatantra or otherwise (pp. 140 ibid)

With this RS. discusses the problem of Śāntarasa which is not acceptable. This is in keeping with the Mālava tradition. The RS. starts the discussion with these remarks : (pp. 140, 141, ibid) :

“nanu nirvedasya śānta-rasa-sthāyitvaṃ kaiścid uktam. katham asya anyōnyōpakaraṇatvaṃ iti ced, ucyate– sati khalu grāme sīmā-sambhāvanā.

sthāyitvaṃ nāma saṃskāra-pāṭavena bhāvasya muhur muhur navibhāvaḥ. tena nirveda-vāsanā-vāsīte bhāvaka-cetasi naiṣṭhalyena abhimateṣu vibhāvā”diṣu tatsāmagrībhūtasya nirvedasya utpattir eva na saṅgacchate, kiṃ punaḥ sthāyitvaṃ. kiñca a-sati nirveda-sthāyini śānta-rūpo bhāvakānām ‘svādas’ citra-gata-kadalī-phala rasā”svāda-lampaṭānām rāja-śukānām viveka-sahodaro bhaved iti kṛtaṃ saṃrambhena.

Śiṅga-bhūpāla does not accept the śānta-rasa for there is no sthāyin for this rasa. He says that when there is no village the question of its boundary never arises ! Sthāyitva means having fresher and fresher expression when a feeling strongly layed in form of vāsanā or impression in mind is aroused due to favourable reasons. In case of the mind of an enjoyer imagined to be pervaded by the impression of nirveda, owing to failure of securing an objective (=niṣphalatā), the activity of required vibhāvā”di-s does not start at all. Now nirveda depending on this sāmagrī, of special vibhāvā”di-s, which is absent, is not at all born to begin with. What to talk of its being raised to the capacity of śānta-rasa ? The relish of śānta of the so called enjoyers is equivalent to the relish of painted bananas by royal parrots !

We may say that analogy is not an argument. Actually the RS. only parrots the arguments of some others belonging to the Mālava School of thought. Śiṅga-bhūpāla has refused himself an honest following of A.bh.–

RS. now (II. 98, pp. 141, 2 *ibid*) comes to the problem of bhāvā”bhāsa. This is done following the accepted lead of the Kashmir School as represented by Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta. RS. II. 98, observes :

“ābhāsātā bhaved eṣām  
 anaucitya-pravartinām,  
 asatyatvād a-yogyatvād  
 anaucityam dvidhā bhavet.”

Bhāvā”bhāsa is born of impropriety which is two-fold viz. (i) due to its (=bhāva’s) being unreal or (ii) due to its being improper (to the context).

The first type is seen with reference to insentient objects. In the verse viz. “kas tvam bho, kathayāmi....” etc. actually a tree cannot feel a sensation and the description of despondency with reference to a tree is in itself untrue. The other variety is with reference to the lowly born people with undignified behaviour, and also with reference to birds, beasts etc.

RS. II. 99 (pp. 142, *ibid*) reads as :

a-satya-kṛtaṁ tat syād  
 acetanagataṁ tu yat,  
 a-yogyatva-kṛtaṁ prōktaṁ  
 nīca-tiryañ-narā”śrayam.

RS. talks of four stages of vyabhicārins such as utpatti (=bhāvōdaya), sandhi, śabalya (=śabalatā), and (bhāva) śānti. (RS. II. 100, pp. 143).

RS. picks up the discussion on sthāyins at II. 104, and enumerates the eight as established by Bhārata :

(pp. 145, *ibid*) :-

“sajātīyair vijātīyair  
 bhāvair ye tv atiraskṛtāḥ,  
 kṣirādbi-van nayanty  
 anyān svātmatvaṁ sthāyino hi te.”  
 bharatena ca te kathitā  
 rati-hāsō-tsāha-vismaya-krodhāḥ,  
 śokōtha jugupsā bhayam  
 ity aṣṭau lakṣma vakṣyate teṣām.”



RS. describes each sthāyin individually mentioning different causes that give them birth; e.g. 'rati' is—

“yūnor anyonya-ṣayā  
sthāyīñicchā ratir bhavet,  
nisargeṇa, abhiyogena,  
saṃsargeṇa abhimānataḥ.” (RS. II. 10, 60)  
upamā-dhyātma-ṣayair  
eṣa syāt tatra vikriyāḥ.” (RS. II. 1079)

All varieties are duly illustrated. This pattern continues with other sthāyins also. In his treatment Śiṅga-bhūpāla has controverted the views of Bhoja and others such as Dhanañjaya, on minor issues.

RS. talks of six stages of rati such as prema, māna, praṇaya, sneha, rāga and anurāga. This is equated with the sprouting, blossoming etc. of a flower, fruit etc. All stages are defined and illustrated.

Other sthāyins are also treated mostly following tradition. Śiṅgabhūpāla refutes the views of Bhoja under rati, of Dhanañjaya under jugupsā, and of Śārṅgadeva under bhaya. He explains the view of Bharata to assert the unitariness -ekatva-of bhaya. He also refuted the sthāyitva of 'garva' as accepted by Bhoja. Same is the case with Bhoja's assertion of sneha, dhṛti and mati. Bhoja in his Sarasvatikanṭhābharaṇa V, accepts these four additional sthāyins flowering into uddhata, preyaś, śānta and udātta rasa-s. Actually Bhoja's Śr. Pra. talks of three koṭis of rasa, the highest being śṛṅgāra, which we may equate with the mahā-rasa or śānta-rasa concept of Abhinavagupta.

RS. sums up the discussion on rasa-bhāva (RS. II. 159-166a, pp. 172, 3, 4, 5). This of course is followed by consideration of individual eight rasas (RS. II. 166b-264) (pp. 175-208, ibid).

We will deal with Śiṅgabhūpāla's theoretical concern regarding the nature, substratum etc. of rasa first; RS. II. 159-166a-(pp. 172, 173 ibid) read as :-

“tad aṣṭāv eva vijñeyāḥ  
sthāyīno munisammataḥ,  
sthāyīnoṣṭau trayastriṃśat  
sañcārīnoṣṭa sātṭvikāḥ.”— II. 159

evam ekóna-pañcāśad  
 bhāvāḥ syur militā ime.  
 evaṃ hi sthāyino bhāvān  
 Śīṅga-bhūpatir abhyadhāt.- II. 160.  
 athaisāṃ rasa-rūpatvam  
 ucyate Śīṅga-bhūbhujā,  
 vidvanmānasa-haṃsena  
 rasa-bhāva-vivekinā. II. 161.  
 ete ca sthāyinaḥ svaiḥ svair  
 vibhāvair vyabhicāribhiḥ,  
 sātṭvikair anubhāvaiśca  
 naṭābhinaya-yogataḥ. II. 162  
 sāksātkāram ivā"nītaiḥ  
 prāpitāḥ svādurūpatām,  
 sāmājikanāṃ manasi  
 prayānti rasa-rūpatām. II. 163.

The sthāyins attain to the status of rasa in the minds of the connoisseurs. With the help of particular vibhāva-s. etc., and the acting of the actors, the sthāyins are as it were directly experienced-sāksātkāram iva ānītāḥ-and raised to the status of taste in the minds of the sāmājikas. They are then termed rasa-s.

The illustration is also drawn, to explain this, from Bharata. RS. II. 164, 5 read as-

dadhyā"di-vyañjana-dravyais'  
 ciñcā"dibhir atha auśadhaiḥ.  
 guḍā"di-madhura-dravyair  
 yathāyogaṃ samanvitaiḥ. - II. 164.  
 yadvat pāka-viśeṣena  
 śāḍavā"khyo rasaḥ paraḥ,  
 niṣpadyate, vibhāvā"dyaiḥ  
 prayogena tathā rasaḥ. II. 165.

The nature of rasa is supreme bliss and it is experienced by men of taste-

sóyam ānand-sambhedo

bhāvakair anubhūyate. II. 166a (pp. 173, ibid)

Śiṅgabhūpāla then goes for some discussion in his vṛtti- (pp. 173, ibid).

An objection is raised. It is that rasa-experience in case of a sāmājika is impractical. Rasa which is of the form of enhancement of sthāyin (sthāyi-prakarṣa) staying in the hero can not be experienced by the sāmājika (where the sthāyin does not stay).

To this RS. replies, as follows : Yes, the objection is true. But who the hell accepts rasa with reference to the hero ? For, the particular nāyaka can be the substratum of rasa only if he is physically seen, heard or imitated. He is not seen physically. For in that case seeing the hero making love, one would experience shame, disgust, etc. This cannot end in tasting. The second and third options are also not tenable, for they are not present. When the āśraya is not there, the things (=rasa) resting on the same cannot exist. Thus nāyaka cannot be the substratum of rasa.

Even if it is accepted that rasa is located in the hero, it can not be a matter of taste for the sāmājika. Again, rasa can be said to exist in naṭa, only on the strength of anubhāva-s or by creation of bhāvanā i.e. sthāyin in naṭa. If the first alternative is accepted, we are likely to go astray, because anubhāva-s marked in the naṭa could be born of his practice and not because of the feeling in his heart. They are thus artificial. Again, if we take the actor as the substratum of rasa, we do not believe rasa to exist in the sāmājika even if anubhāva-s are located in the latter. Thus existence of rasa anywhere on the strength of the presence of anubhāva-s stands vitiated and not vindicated.

If it is stated that rasa is believed to exist in the actor due to vibhāva, then the question to be answered is that whether rasa is located in naṭa due to the character of Mālavikā which is enacted (anukārya), or by the lady who presents Mālavikā and is naṭa's wife herself ? If rasa-creation in naṭa is due to anukārya Mālavikā who is taken as a vibhāva, then there is impropriety; for Mālavikā can be a vibhāva only for Agnimitra and never for the actor. If the beloved or wife of the actor, playing the role of Mālavikā, is treated as vibhāva, then no rasa-experience will result, for in case of direct physical love-making at reality level only vulgarity will result and not rasa.

Thus rasa can neither reside in the anukārya (=original character of Rāma and the like) or anukartā (i.e. actor). Śiṅgabhūpāla asserts that rasa can be believed to

exist only in the sāmājika, the cultured enjoyer. The objector may raise a point that if rasa is believed to be located in the sāmājika then the same difficulties will arise. There is lack of propriety-anaucitya-in taking Mālavikā as the vibhāva for sāmājika, and there is vulgarity or ugliness if the wife or beloved of the sāmājika is believed to replace Mālavikā. To remove this crunch Śīṅabhūpāla has resorted to the views of both the bhuktivādins and also the abhivyaktivādins- He observes : (pp. 173, 174-ibid) : “nanu mālavikā”di-vibhāva-viśesasya anaucityād bhāvasya a-sannihitavāc ca, sāmājikānām api naṭavad evaṃ rasāśrayatvaṃ prasajyata iti ced, atra kecana samādadhate.”–

“vibhāvā”di-bhāvanām anapeksita-bāhya-sattvānām śabdópādānād eva āsādita-sadbhāvanām ānukūlyāpekṣayā nissādhāraṇānām api kāvyē nāṭye ca abhidhāparyāyeṇa sādharāṇīkaraṇā”tmanā bhāvanā-vyāpāreṇa sva-sambandhitayā vibhāvitānām sākṣād-bhāvaka-cetasi viparivartamānānām ālambanatvā”dy a virodhād anaucityā”di-viplava-rahitaḥ sthāyī nirbharā”nanda-viśrānti-svabhāvena bhogena bhāvakair bhujyate iti.”–

The view of the Bhuktivādin-s (=we know them to be Bhaṭṭanāyaka and his followers) is that the vibhāvā”di-s take a generalised form with the help of bhāvanā-vyāpāra which follows abhidhāvyāpāra. These vibhāvā”di-s do not bother about external objects and are present only through the agency of words only. In poetry and drama, these vibhāvā”di-s, though a-sādhāraṇa i.e. particular in nature (i.e. though they are presented as individual Rāma, Sītā etc.), are realised as if in a generalised form through bhāvanā vyāpāra which follows the abhidhā function. Presented in a generalised form they get related to the sāmājika as if they are his personal relations (sva-sambandhitayā vibhāvitānām). Thus, there is no opposition to these vibhāvā”di-s that operate in the heart of the bhāvakā-s in form of their ālambana. Thus the bhāvaka, through a vyāpāra or function called bhojakatva, enjoys the supreme bliss which is of the form of repose of the sthāyin which is free from all possible blemishes of impropriety etc.

RS. then presents the view of the abhivyakti-vādin-s almost in the words of Abhinavagupta and Mammāṭa. RS. observes (pp. 174, ibid) :

“anye tv anyathā samādhānam āhuḥ. –loke pramadā”di-kāraṇaiḥ sthāyyanumāne abhyāsa-pāṭavāt, sahrdayānām kāvyē nāṭye ca vibhāvā”di-pada-vyapadesyaiḥ a-sva-sambandhitvena ca sādharanyāt pratītaiḥ, abhivyaktībhūtaḥ, vāsanātmakatayā sthitaḥ sthāyī ratyā”dih, pānaka-rasa-nyāyena carvyamāṇo lokóttara-camatkāri-paramānandam iva kandalayan rasa-rūpatām āpnoti.”–

The abhivyaktivādin suggest that it is the sthāyin of the sahrdaya that is tasted as rasa. The sahrdaya reader or spectator of poetry or drama should be adapt, at wordly level, in infering somebody else's mental feelings through external expressions. Such an expert spectator sees the vibhāvā"di-s presented through art-medium in a generalised and yet personally connected form. These vibhāvā"di-s make for the manifestation of the sthāyin and all these get combined on the analogy of a beverage which is tasted and which causes extra-ordinary bliss resulting in rasa-experience.

RS. has not directly mentioned vyañjanā but he does not seem to oppose it either. Śiṅga-bhūpāla observes that as the bhuktivādin-s and the abhivyaktivādin-s hold rasa to be rested in the sāmājika, and therefore, he also has no objection to this view : (pp. 174, ibid) --

“evañca bhukti-vyakti-pakṣayor ubhayor api sāmājikānām rasāśrayatvōpapatter anyatara-pakṣa-parigrahā”grahād udāsmahe.”— As both bhuktivādin and abhivyaktivādin accept rasa with reference to the sāmājika, we (i.e. Śiṅgabhūpāla) do not feel like taking sides. This means both are acceptable to him so far as rasa-experience is accepted by both to rest with the sāmājika. Thus, RS. has avioded a theoretical position concerning the process of rasa-niṣpatti but has accepted the general agreement of both the views that rasa rests with the sāmājika. This means that he is not favourably inclined to the view of Lollaṭa or Śrī. śaṅkuka, the former-“utpatti-vādin” preferring to locate rasa in anukārya, the latter-“anumitivādin” making rasa rest in “anukartā.” RS. makes the concluding observation (pp. 174, 175, ibid) favouring the view that the sthāyin-s of the sāmājika-s are enjoyed as rasa, with vikāsa. (flashing), vistāra (expansion) vikṣobha (disturbance) and vikṣepa (movement) as qualifying this experience of rasa. It may be noted that these four citta-bhūmi-s are alluded to by Dhanañjaya, but Bharata is not against this. RS. observes : (pp. 174, 175 ibid) :

“prāyeṇa bhāratīya-matānusāriṇām prakriyā tu loke kāraṇa-kārya-sahakāri-rūpatām upagataiḥ kāvye nārye vā rasa-sūkti-sudhā-mādhurī-dhurīnair yathóktābhinaya-sametair vā, padārtharvena vibhāvānubhāva-sañcāri-vyapadeśam ca prāpitair nāyikā-nāyaka-candra-candrikā-malayānil”ādi-bhrūvikṣepa-katāksapāta-sveda-romāñcā”di-nirveda-viśādā”di-rūpair vāsanā”tmakair ātma-sambandhitvena abhimatair bhāvaiḥ dharma-kīrti-ratānām ṣaḍ-aṅga-nāṭya-samaya-jñānām nikhilakalā-kalāpa-kovidānām santyakta-matsarāṇām, sakala-siddhānta-vedinām rasabhāvā-vavecakānām kāvyārtha-nihita-cetasām sāmājikānām manasi mudrā-mudrita-nyāyena viparivartitā vāsitaś cābhivardhitāḥ sthāyino bhāvāḥ kāvyārtharvena

abhimatāḥ bāhyārthā”lambanā”-tmakāḥ santo, vikāsa-vistāra-vikṣobha-vikṣepā”tmakatayā vibhinnāḥ, svarūpeṇa āśvādyamānāḥ paramānanda-rūpatām āpnuvanti iti sakala-saḥṛdaya-saṃvedana-siddhasya rasasya pramāṇāntareṇa saṃsādhana-parīśramāḥ śatṛjana-citta-vikṣobhāya kevalam, na upayogāya iti prakṛtam anusarāmaḥ.”–

This is beautiful prose and makes excellent reading.

With this RS. embarks upon the varieties or number of rasa-s which according to it is eight such as śṛṅgāra, hāsyā, vīra, adbhuta, raudra, karuṇa, bībhatsa and bhayānaka. In these pairs of two, the latter each is derived from the former : “eṣu uttaras tu pūrvasmāt sambhūtaḥ viśamāt samaḥ–” (RS. II. 167, pp. 175 ibid).

RS. observes that as there is much to talk about of śṛṅgāra and as it pleases all, śṛṅgāra is taken up first for treatment (RS. II. 168, pp. 175, ibid) The varieties saṃbhoga and vipralamba are accepted by RS. The latter is caused by many reasons. RS. describes all sub-varieties due to various reasons. The word used is “...ādibhir vyajyate.” But this is not RS.'s commitment to vyañjanā; ‘vyajyate’ here may mean just “manifested.” RS. accepts karuṇa-vipralambha and refutes the views of the DR. in this respect (RS. II. 218, 219, pp. 189, ibid). Hāsyā is accepted as six-fold. This follows accepted pattern. Vīra has three varieties such as dāna-vīra, yuddha-vīra and dayā-vīra (RS. II. 236, pp. 195, ibid).

RS. does not mention any varieties of either adbhuta or raudra; or karuṇa though Bharata has given three varieties of raudra and karuṇa. Bībhatsa is also kṣobhaja, śuddha and udvegī i.e. three-fold for Bharata and Dhanañjaya but RS. has not given these varieties. Bhayānaka also is three-fold for Bharata such as vyāja-janya, aparādhajanya and vitṛṣṭitaka, but RS. has kept quiet over the varieties.

RS. has accepted ‘rasa-saṃkara’ in its own way. When there is aṅgāṅgi-bhāva located with reference to two rasa-s, it is rasa-saṃkara for RS. (II. 252, 253, pp. 200 ibid). RS. has no faith in a rasa-saṃkara wherein two rasa-s of equal prominence are juxtaposed. Śiṅgabhūpāla says that this position is unacceptable as there is no factor which decides in favour of one of the two to be tasted first. –

“kecit samānabalayor  
anayoḥ saṅkaram viduḥ-II. 252b  
na parīkṣākṣamam idam  
matam prekṣāvatām bhavet,  
tulyatve pūrvam āśvādaḥ  
katarasyéty anīścayāt.”

But this argument seems primary. In a given illustration rasa is not to be tasted one by one. As is the case of bhāva-śābalatā, so is the case of rasa-saṃkara wherein the man of taste enjoys more than one rasa simultaneously in a given illustration.

Rasa-virodha is treated in RS. following the lead of Ānandavardhana. (RS. II. 257-261, pp. 200, 201, ibid).

Rasā"bhāsa for RS. is subordination of the principal rasa, or attaching greater importance to subordinate rasa is also rasā"bhāsa.

aṅgenāṅgī rasah svecchā-

vṛtti-vardhita-sampadā,

amāryena avinītena

svāmīva-ābhāsatām vrajēt." (li. 263, pp. 202, ibid).

Rasā"bhāsa for RS. is four-fold such as a-rāga, aneka-rāga, tiryak rāga and mleccha-rāga. a-rāga is lack of love. aneka-rāga is when one lady has affairs with many heroes. Even a hero with equal love for many ladies gives rise to aneka-rāga. Tiryag-rāga is expression of love among birds and beasts and mleccha-rāga is love for a lowly born. Meanwhile RS. refutes the view of Vidyādhara concerning tiryag-rāga.

We know that anaucitya-pravṛtti is said to be the cause of rasā"bhāsa in view of almost all predecessors of Śiṅgabhūpāla. But Śi. and Śā. have different ideas about rasā"bhāsa where the prādhānya-aprādhānya of aṅgī and aṅga rasa-s is taken into consideration. This is throwing away tradition. But getting deeper into the four varieties as suggested by the RS. perhaps we arrive at the acceptance of tradition.

With this the consideration of the concepts of rasa and bhāva in RS. ends. The RS. has some fresh ideas and has remained open to the influence of both the Kashmir and Mālava Schools of aesthetics in this respect.

Our investigation of Rasa as seen in Ānandavardhana and his posterior authors ends here. For the sake of convenience we have treated writers on dramaturgy at the end of the chapter; those, almost all of them have preceded Viśvanātha.

In Ch. XVI, we will now discuss the theory of rasa-realisation as seen in Abhinavagupta and then in Mammaṭa and Jagannātha in the following chapter with the status of śāntarasa at the end of Ch. XVII.



## Chapter XVI

# Rasa-niṣpatti-vicāra in Abhinavagupta

It may be noted in the beginning of this discussion that Abhinavagupta has treated this topic of the process of rasa-realisation both in the Abhinavabhāratī (A. bh.) on the NS. (Ch. VI) and also in the Locana on the Dhvanyāloka. The treatment in the A. bh. is more exhaustive and hence we will take it as the base of our discussion, but we will also cite paralld treatment as read in the Locana in a comparatively brief way, wherein even names of ācārya-s holding this or that view are also not always mentioned. So, keeping the A. bh. in the centre we will continue here. It may be noted that we have dealt with the views of post-Mammaṭa writers as and when they have figured in the earlier chapter. These writers almost echo the views as expressed by Mammaṭa and then Abhinavagupta. Viśvanātha as we have seen has been very exhaustive in his treatment but the rest are comparatively brief in their presentation. We have seen Hemacandra also in the earlier chapter but he has a special status in so far as his Viveka commentary presents some genuine readings from the A. bh. which remained doubtful in the G.O.S. Edn. also. Dr. Gnoli has preferred to accept Hemacandra's readings and we in our gujarati edn. of the rasādhyaṃya of the NS. with A. bh. have done the same.

We have seen that the theory of rasa forms the central topic of Indian aesthetics with reference to any art such as drama, poetry, music, painting, sculpture, architecture, dance etc. Bharata has shown how the concept of rasa is central to the dramatic art as well as music and dance, and it may be noted that he was very clear that even the art of poetry has rasa at its centre, for he refers at innumerable places to what he terms "Kāvya-rasa". Thus 'rasa' was not exclusive to drama only but was the soul of any art.

Ānandavardhana advocated the theory of three-fold dhvani with reference to poetry and even here 'rasa-dhvani' captures the central position. All writers who followed the lead of Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta in literary criticism, in



reality acknowledged “rasa-dhvani” as the soul of poetry, though theoretically tri-rūpa-dhvani was accepted as the soul of poetry. These writers on literary criticism tried to apply, of course keeping Bharata’s lead at heart, the rasa-theory to sāhitya or poetry. The dhvanivādin-s actually correlated all other concepts of literary criticism such as alaṃkāra, guṇa, rīti, vṛtti, doṣa, etc. to ‘rasa’ which was always kept in the centre of consideration. Even Bharata, while discussing lakṣaṇa-s, alaṃkāra-s, guṇa-s, etc. suggests that these are to be used in poetry keeping “Kāvya-rasa” in the centre.

The pure form of rasa is discussed by Bharata in the sixth chapter of his NS. The famous rasa-sūtra in the NS. runs as : “vibhāvānubhāva-vyabhicāri-samyogād rasa-nispattiḥ.”– The birth of rasa takes place by (=results from) the combination of dererminants, consequents and accessories. Different commentators of the NS. have examined this rasa-sūtra carefully and have presented their explanations. We know that a commentary on NS., Abhinavabhāratī (=A.bh.), of the great Abhinavagupta, is available in print. Abhinavagupta has taken judicious and unbiased note of different opinions on various topics of the NS. of his predecessors who also commented on the NS. of Bharata. The original commentaries of these precessors such as Bhaṭṭa Lollāṭa, shrī Śaṅkuka, Bhaṭṭa nāyaka and the rest are not available to us. Perhaps the mss. containing the same are lost to us, or some day they may appear before us. But for the present they are as good as lost to us. Abhinavagupta has noted the views of these predecessors on various topics. At times he has discussed at length and even refuted the same. We can reasonably have faith in the fact that these works, in form of commentaries on the NS. were available to Abhinavagupta and also to some of his illustrious posteriors such as Ācārya Hemacandra and prior to him even Mammaṭa, the author of the Kāvya-prakāśa. If they were available to Hemacandra, may be they were also available to Dhanañjaya, Dhanika and Bhoja also, and also perhaps to Kuntaka and Mahimā. But we are not sure of this. But this could have been the academic climate of centuries around 1000 A.D. We also know that after Abhinavagupta who follows the lead of Ānandavardhana, many others such as writers from Kuntaka down to Jagannātha and even after him, discussed the topic of rasa and of rasa-nispatti also, in their own way. But most of them such as Mammaṭa, Hemacandra, Vidyādhara, Viśvanātha etc. echo the views of Abhinavagupta. Those who tried to dig a new sub-way of their own, leaving the high-way prepared by Abhinavagupta, did not exert great influence on posterity. We have examined quite a few of them earlier. By and large the thought current promoted by Ānandavardhana-

Abhinavagupta-Mammāṭa got currency and was firmly established in Indian art criticism in general and dramatic or literary criticism in particular. We will try to examine these views in the light of mainly Abhinavagupta in a balanced, unbiased and critical way.

The process of rasa-realisation as reflected in Bharata's rasa-sūtra was explained by various commentators whose views, either in brief or at length are presented in the Abhinavabhāratī. We have no quarrel in believing that the sequence as maintained in the Abh. of these views also reflects the date of these authors. Thus, perhaps Bhaṭṭa Lollāṭa comes first as his views are presented at the head of all else, in the Abh.-

**Bhaṭṭa Lollāṭa's views are given in the Abh. on pp. 266, NS. vol. I. G.O.S. 4th Edn., '92, Prof. K. Krishnamoorthy.** The substance of Lollāṭa's observations on the famous rasa-sūtra of Bharata, can be explained as follows; - but before we proceed with the same, it may be noted that the various views on rasa-niṣpatti differ on the interpretation of two key words in the sūtra, viz. 'saṃyoga' and 'niṣpatti'. Ācāryas differ in explaining how the combination-saṃyoga-of vibhāvā"dis takes place, and how the birth or niṣpatti of rasa follows. Bhaṭṭa Lollāṭa seems to present the following explanation which most of the critical observers name as 'utpatti-vāda', but what we have chosen to term "utpatti-upaciti-vāda" for reasons we will explain in due course.

Lollāṭa observes that the term 'saṃyoga' or combination appearing in the rasa-sūtra should mean a combination of the vibhāvā"di-s mentioned in the sūtra with "sthāyin", a term not mentioned by Bharata, but as Lollāṭa wants us to believe, should be added in the rasa-sūtra. This combination of vibhāvā"di-s with sthāyin makes for the 'niṣpatti' i.e. birth, "utpatti"of rasa, according to Lollāṭa. : "vibhāvā"dibhiḥ saṃyago'rthāt sthāyinas tato rasa-niṣpattiḥ. (pp. 266, ibid); He further observes that 'niṣpatti' or 'birth' has to be understood in the following way. 'Niṣpatti' consists of three elements. First comes 'utpatti' i.e. the vibhāva-s are the cause of the citra-vṛtti in form of the basic emotion of sthāyin. : "tatra vibhavs' cittavṛtteḥ sthāyyātmikāyā utpattau kāraṇam." (pp. 266, ibid) : "More precisely, the determinants are the cause of the birth of the feeling, which constitutes the permanent state of mind." (Trans. Gnoli, pp. 25, ("The Aesthetic Experience According to Abhinavagupta"— second Edn., Chowkhamba Sanskrit series office, Varanasi, 1968). How anubhāva-s and vyabhicārin-s combine with the sthāyin is explicitly explained by Mammāṭa who observes that anubhāva-s make for the (inferred) apprehension of the sthāyin and the vyabhicārin-s stand to support the

same and make it more enhanced or 'puṣṭa'. Thus Mammata, as we will go to observe later, is of the opinion that the three factors viz. vibhāva, anubhāva and vyabhicārin have their individual special relation- samyoga-with the sthāyin and as a result a three-fold nispatti also takes place. Vibhāva-s cause the sthāyin to appear, anubhāva-s make for its inferential existence and vyabhicārin-s make for its enhancement or puṣṭi. Thus nispatti is made up of uttpatti-upaciti-puṣṭi. It is therefore that we have chosen to call Lollaṭa's view by the name of "utpatti-upaciti-vāda." This sounds better than calling it as "utpattivāda", which reveals only half truth. Or We may call it by the name "utpatty ādi-vāda."

Lollaṭa further explains that here "anubhāva-s" are not to be taken as effects of rasa, for how can anubhāva-s of the form of 'effect' of rasa could find place among the cause element mentioned by the sūtra ? : "anubhāvāś ca na rasa-janyā atra vivakṣitāḥ, teṣāṃ rasa-kāraṇatvena gaṇanānarhatvāt." (pp. 266, ibid). So, observes Lollaṭa, these anubhāva-s mentioned in the sūtra are to be taken as anubhāva-s of the bhāva-s. "api tu bhāvānām eva."—"The consequents intended by Bharata are not, obviously, those which arise from the rasa-s,- for they cannot be considered as causes of rasa-, but the consequents of the states of mind only," (Trans. Gnoli., pp. 25, ibid);

Here what exactly is meant by "api tu bhāvānām eva" is not made clear. Gnoli explains (pp. 25, ft. note no 2, ibid) : "Rasa will also produce certain effects in the spectators- it will make them mutter in fear, make their hair stand on the end, etc. These effects, (lit. consequents,- anubhāva) cannot, of course, be considered as the causes of rasa. The causes of rasa can only be the effects of the permanent mental states." We do not agree with this explanation of Gnoli.

As noted above "bhāvānām anubhāvāḥ" are explained as "sthāyinaḥ anubhāvāḥ" by Gnoli. Bharata has in the VII th Chapter of the NS., discussed various bhāva-s, both sthāyin-s, and also sāttvika-s and vyabhicārin-s where he has mentioned the anubhāva-s or effects of mental states. These are mental states accepted at normal worldly level, i.e. these are laukika-bhāva-s which become aesthetic material with reference to rasa only. We believe that the anubhāva-s that Lollaṭa wants us to understand as 'cause' element are the anubhāva-s as exhibited by the actors playing the role of the characters concerned. Thus they are to be taken virtually as anubhāva-s of the ālambana-vibhāva, i.e. the hero, heroine or any character on the stage, viewing which, a sympathetic response is created in the spectator through "hrdaya-saṃvāda." So the anubhāva-s of the sthāyin should mean the anubhāva-s exhibited by the characters i.e. ālambana-vibhāva-s- of the

sthāyin staying in their mind. They are part of acting which stimulates sympathetic response in the spectator. Thus there is cause-effect relation between these anubhāva-s of the sthāyin (of the character) (as exhibited by the actor) and the anubhāva-s resulting from spectator's experience of the feeling concerned. Duṣyanta's physical expressions stimulate Śakuntalā's feeling and her physical expressions of that feeling, and vice-versa. The expressions of both Śakuntalā and Duṣyanta form part of the "cause" that generates sympathetic response in the spectator. This is what Lollaṭa wants to convey. Thus Lollaṭa is clear between the difference between two sets of anubhāvas, the first as exhibited on the stage by actors and the second set as resulting on the person of the spectator due to the rasa-experience on his part personally. The former are the 'cause' mentioned in the rasa-sūtra. This is the view also of Prof. Dr Kanti Candra Pandey. Anubhāva-s are those of the sthāyin-s as explained by Gñoli and some others. But they are those expressed by the artists— who play the role of various characters. This is the view of Dr. Pandey with which we feel like agreeing.

Another point that Lollaṭa discusses is that both the vyabhicārin-s and the sthāyin-s are mental feelings i.e. two cognitions, and hence how is it that they can co-exist ? The answer to this difficulty is that the sthāyin-s here are to be taken as existing in form of vāsanā i.e. latent impression. So, for Lollaṭa, enhanced sthāyin is itself rasa—"tena sthāyyeva vibhāvā" dibhir upacito rasaḥ." sthāyī bhāvatv anupacitaḥ."— By itself the sthāyī is 'an-upacita' and is not termed 'rasa'. 'Vāsanā' or 'latent impression' is explained by Gñoli in ft. note no.1, pp 26 (ibid) as follows : "It is a general principle of Indian thought that two forms of cognition cannot occur simultaneously (cf. Nyāyasūtra, I. i. 16) To avoid a contradiction of this rule, Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa remarks that there is nothing to prevent the assumption that the permanent mental state is presented in the state of latent impression (saṃskāra-vāsanā). The word 'Saṃskāra' " means the impressions (which exist sub-consciously in the mind) of the objects experienced. All our experiences whether cognitive, emotional or conative exist in a sub-conscious state and may under suitable conditions be reproduced as memory (Smṛti). The word vāsanā (Yogasūtra, IV, 24) seems to be a later word. It comes from the root √"vas" to stay. It is often loosely used in a sense of saṃskāra, and in Vyāsa-bhāṣya they are identified in IV. 9. But vāsanā generally refers to the tendencies of past lives most of which lie dormant in mind. Only those appear which can find scope in this life. But Saṃskāra-s are the sub-conscious states which are being constantly generated by experience. Vāsanās are innate saṃskāras not acquired in this life." (Dasgupta H. I. Ph. I, pp. 263).

Lollaṭa observes that in the example given by Bharata too, some flavourings appear in a latent state, like the permanent state, and others in an emergent state, like the transitory states. Thus rasa, as observed earlier, according to Lollaṭa, is simply a permanent state, intensified by the determinants, consequents etc.; but, had it not been intensified, it is only a permanent mental state. Lollaṭa also adds that rasa is present both in the person reproduced i.e. original character such as Rāma and the like, the 'anukārya', and also in the reproducing actor, the artist who plays the role of a given character, the 'anukartā', by virtue of the power of realisation (of the form of the original, i.e. rūpānusaṃdhāna).

It may be noted that Lollaṭa broadly terms the three factors of utpatti, pratīti and paripuṣṭi by a single term "upaciti." The relation of the sthāyin with vibhāvā"di-s is that of "janya-janaka-bhāva", with anubhāva-s of "gānya-gamaka-bhāva" and with vyabhicārin-s, of "poṣya-poṣaka-bhāva." Thus it is three-fold, or say, "three in one." The sthāyin, which basically by itself is not intensified (an-upacita), becomes rasa, when thus intensified or enhanced by "vibhāva-anubhāva and vyabhicāri-bhāva."

Lollaṭa's opinion deserves further scrutiny. Basically he calls the sthāyin itself, "sthāyi eva", to be rasa, may be in an enhanced form. We know that among theorists of aesthetics, there are two thought currents prevalent and they are diametrically opposite to each other. The first one is the one supported by Lollaṭa and in this tradition, 'rasa' is imagined to be identical with (laukika) sthāyin (of course in an intensified form). Thus between rasa and sthāyin there is difference in 'avasthā' i.e. state or position but not in nature i.e. svarūpa. This thought-current holds that "sthāyī eva rasah." As opposed to this, the other thought-current holds that 'rasa' is "sthāyī-vilakṣaṇa" i.e. "of a different nature than that of sthāyin." The first tradition that takes rasa and sthāyin as identical in nature (and not in form), do accept that cause, effect and accessory i.e. kāraṇa, kārya and saha-kārin of the worldly level are the same as the vibhāva, anubhāva and vyabhicāribhāva in art, i.e. in poetry and drama here. These are identical in nature, i.e. there is no svarūpabheda or, svabhāvabheda between the two sets. The difference is not in basic nature but in name only. Thus for these theorists, the sthāyin-s that appear in art-forms such as poetry, drama, etc. are not only the same but are also identical in nature with the sthāyin-s as observed in the worldly context. There is no difference in nature between these two sets of laukika-sthāyin, cause, effect and accessory on one hand and a-laukika (or kāvyā-nāṭya-gata) sthāyin-vibhāva-anubhāva and vyabhicārin on the other. The two sets are not only identical in form but identical in nature also. This means that the sthāyin as presented in the art-form is equally 'sukha-duḥkha-

mohā't maka' as the sthāyin in worldly context. Thus both are causing happiness or unhappiness as the case may be. They are both "sukha-duḥkha -mohā"tmaka." Thus these theorists do not maintain that 'rasa' is an apprehension made of "pure bliss"—, and that it is met with only in an art-form. The other thought current maintains that there is basic difference between the nature of the two sets mentioned above. For these theorists rasa is met with, never in ordinary parlance but only in art- "rasas tu nātya eva, na loke." and that for them therefore rasa is an apprehension made of pure pure bliss alone : "asmanmate tu samvedanam eva ānandaghanam āsvādyate, tatra kā duḥkhā"śaṅkā ?" –How can we ever imagine even a faint shadow of unhappiness in 'rasa' i.e. "art-experience?" This second thought-current is supported by Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta and their followers down to Jagannātha. For the first batch of theorists laukika-bhāva-s i.e. feelings met with in normal worldly experience and kāvya-nātya-gata-bhāva-s i.e. feelings delineated through art-medium are identical in form and nature, and for the second batch of theorists these feelings are identical in form and name only but never in nature. When presented through art-medium the worldly feelings have their nature completely transformed and they become perennial source of eternal bliss alone. Thus tragic feelings presented through art-medium, which is so to say an alchemy, are transformed into bliss-yielding material.. Thus all rasa-s are said to be 'sukhā"tmaka' or ānanda ātmaka or bliss-yielding for these theorists, and therefore they are 'a-laukika' or 'extra-ordinary.' They make us experience the state of ānanda which is beyond worldly feeling of happiness or 'sukha.'

But if this 'a-laukikatva or 'extra-ordinariness' of the feelings presented through art-medium, i.e. poetry and drama here, is removed and thus if worldly feelings causing happiness or unhappiness (laukika-sukha-duḥkhā"tmaka-bhāvas) are identified with rasa of poetry and drama etc., then there will arise a situation where 'rasa' or art-experience will have to be taken as one yielding happiness and unhappiness i.e. of the sukhā-duḥkha-mohā"tmaka-svabhāva, like worldly experience. Abhinavagupta has opposed this thought current but Lollaṭa perhaps seems to support it and no doubt it was also perhaps even older than Bharata and perhaps also not accepted by him. Bharata seems to refer to this tradition when he uses such terms as "harṣādīnī ca adhicacchanti", i.e. "connoisseurs attain to joy etc." It is this thought-current which is supported by Rāmacandra and Guṇacandra in their Nāṭyadarpaṇa and later also by Siddhicandra Gaṇi in his Kāvya-prakāśa-khaṇḍana. Perhaps this thought-current got currency in Gujarat of those days under some impact of the Mālava tradition.

Lollaṭa also mentions the substratum of rasa. For him, rasa primarily resides in Rāma etc. the anukārya, and through art-ful identification of form (i.e. the power of realisation or, rūpānusandhāna). rasa is also imagined to reside in the actor who imitates the original character. The actor is “anu-kartā.”

Now if we look at these observations of Lollaṭa in a casual way, we may feel that Lollaṭa has not concerned himself with, i.e. say he is innocent of, the experience of the connoisseur i.e. spectator, or reader etc. Thus for Dr. Kanticandra Pandey Lollaṭa discussed the topic of rasa only from the point of view of the production of drama. i.e. took care only of the view of the producer alone. But we fail to agree with this observation of Dr. Pandey who also feels that Mammaṭa in his K. P., while placing the view of Lollaṭa has knowingly twisted the text by using such terms as “nartakēpi pratiyamānaḥ” We do not accept Dr. Pandey’s views when we carefully look into the presentation of Lollaṭa’s views by Abhinavagupta. It is impossible to accept that Lollaṭa has no idea whatsoever of the rasa-experience on the part of the connoisseur at all. For, we know that while discussing the term “anubhāva” in the rasa-sūtra, Lollaṭa makes a remark that these anubhāva-s are to be understood as “those of the bhāva-s and not as the result of rasa-experience.” Thus Lollaṭa very clearly understands the difference between “bhāvānām ye anubhāvāḥ” which are of the nature of “cause” and “kārya-rūpa i.e. rasa-janya-anubhāva-s” which are of the nature of “effect of rasa”. Now if we proceed from this position further, we have to find out where could these “kārya-rūpa-anubhāvas” stay. It is obvious that in the absence of no other alternative these kārya-rūpa-anubhāva-s can stay only in the enjoyer i.e. spectator. The cause or kāraṇa-rūpa-anubhāva-s are those of the bhāvas i.e. vibhāva-s, ālambana such as Rāma and the like, presented on the stage and the kārya-rūpa-anubhāva-s different from these are marked in the enjoyer as a result - kārya-of rasa-experience on his part. Thus it is childish to imagine that Lollaṭa has no idea whatsoever of the art-experience on the part of the enjoyer i.e. “rasika”. Of course, this our belief is logical and clear but Lollaṭa has not clearly laid down the same in so many terms. So, we do not agree with Dr. Pandey’s another suggestion that Mammaṭa has knowingly twisted the text of the A.bh., by adding the term “pratiyamānaḥ.” Perhaps, Mammaṭa had a better version, an original one, with him. or, he explained the text in a clearer way.

Now, as a logical corollary our second observation also stands vindicated that ‘rasa’ was imagined to be of the nature of both happiness and un-happiness by Lollaṭa, when he accepted rasa at worldly level i.e. in the ‘anukārya’ or original worldly character like Rāma and the like. It is possible to argue that ‘anukārya’ is the character as portrayed by the poet. But in that case also it becomes equivalent

to the historical character, if any, not seen physically equally by the spectator. Even if it is argued that the *anukārya* is not a historical character but a Ramesh or a Suresh or a Sachin imagined to be the hero by the poet, then also for the spectator he is not only a distant person for all time, but a person belonging to the real world and so an individual. To imagine *rasa* in this '*anukārya*' also peters out to the position that *rasa* is accepted at the worldly level and hence *rasa* is just an intensified worldly feeling resulting in an experience of happiness, unhappiness and *moha* or delusion. Abhinavagupta testifies that earlier *ācāryas* such as Daṇḍin also consider *upacita* or intensified or advanced *sthāyin* as *rasa*. Thus Lollaṭa's thought current also seems to be quite ancient and was perhaps even known to Bharata.

Lollaṭa observes that with the help of '*anusamdhāna*' *rasa* is located even in the actor. This term '*anusamdhāna*' is technical but is left unexplained by Lollaṭa, however commentators on Mammata's *Kāvyaprakāśa* try to explain it either as "*āropa*" i.e. superimposition or '*abhimāna*' or "*I-ness*" i.e. sense of "*I am Rāma*" in the actor. Dr. K. C. Pandey tries to explain it as "*Yojana*" or '*connection*' of the individuality of the actor with that of the character. '*Yojana*' is also a technical term of the *Pratyabhijñā darśana* used when *Jīva* correlates itself with *Śiva*.

In Lollaṭa's view thus we may find the seeds of "*laukikatva*" and "*sukha-duḥkhātmakatva*" of *rasa*. We may call this opinion as having "*realistic*" undertone. Lollaṭa also thought that the co-existence of both *sthāyin* and *vyabhičārin* is possible in a single given moment if the former is taken as '*saṃskāra*' or '*vāsanā*' i.e. latent impression.

**Śrī. Saṅkuka** has severely criticised Lollaṭa's view on *rasa*. It may be noted that Abhinavagupta himself does not directly criticise or find fault with any view expressed by his predecessors. He simply quotes the refutation of an earlier view by a later authority which is prior to him. He does this without passing any comments of his own. On the contrary when he passes epistemological observations on the nature of *rasa* he seems to accept, or at least does not seem to reject, the opinions of all of his earlier masters.

Śrī Saṅkuka's refutation of Lollaṭa's views is quoted in great details by Abhinavagupta. In Saṅkuka we may find the roots of what later Mahima-bhaṭṭa stood for, i.e. of the thought-current of accepting inferential nature of *rasa*-experience. It is safer for us to believe that Śrī Saṅkuka is the earliest known promulgator of *anumiti-vāda* rather than taking him to be the original promoter of this view. This thought-current also could be still older. We can correlate



Śrī Śaṅkuka's views with the views of the Naiyāyikas as expressed by Ānandavardhana under Dhv. III. 33. Before we proceed with Śrī Śaṅkuka's views as laid down in the Abh., it will be interesting to quote the same from Locana (on Dhv. II, 4, pp. 108, ibid, Dr. Nandī's edn.), which reads as :-

“atrócyate-rasa-svarūpa eva tāvad vipratipattayaḥ prati-vādinām. tathā hi, pūrvāvasthāyām yaḥ sthāyī sa eva vyabhicāri-sampā”dinā prāpta-paripoṣṇukāryagata eva rasaḥ. nāṭye tu prayujyamānatvān nāṭyarasa iti kechit. –

The refutation proceeds in the Locana without mentioning the name of Śrī Śaṅkuka. It reads as (pp. 108, ibid)-

“pravāha-dharminyām citta-vṛttau citta-vṛtteḥ citta-vṛtty antareṇa kaḥ paripoṣārthaḥ ? vismaya-śoka-krodhādeś ca krameṇa tāvaṇ na paripoṣaḥ, iti na anukārye rasaḥ anukartari ca tadhātve layā”dy ananusaraṇam syāt. sāmājikagate vā kaś camatkāraḥ ?, pratyuta karuṇā”dau duḥkha-prāptiḥ. tasmān nā”yam pakṣaḥ. kas tarhi ? iha ānanyān niyatasya anukāro na śakyāḥ, niṣprayojanaś ca viśiṣṭatā-pratītau tācāsthyena vyutpatty abhāvāt.”

The objections raised by Śrī Śaṅkuka against Lollāṭa, as read in the Abh. are as follows :-

(pp. 266, NS. vol. I. G.O.S. ibid) : etan na iti śrī śaṅkukaḥ. vibhāvā”dy ayoge sthāyino liṅgā-bhāvena avagaty anupapatter, bhāvānām pūrvamabhidheyatā-prasaṅgāt; sphīta-daśāyām lakṣaṇāntara-vaiyarthīyāt, manda-tara-tamā-mādhyasthyā”dy ānanyā āpatteḥ, hāsya-rase śodharvā bhāva-prāpteḥ, kāmāvasthāsu daśasv asaṃkhyā-rasa-bhāvā”di-prasaṅgāt, śokasya prathamam tīvratvam kālāt tu māndya-darśanam, krodhōtsāha-ratīnām amarṣa-sthairya-sevāviparyaye hrāsa-darśanam iti viparyayasya dr̥śyamānatvāc ca.”

“This interpretation, says Śaṅkuka, is unsound. Why ?- (a) Because, without the determinants etc., the permanent mental state cannot be known, for the determinants, etc., are the characteristic signs, i.e. the logical reasons (liṅga), by means of which knowledge of it is made possible. (b) Because, if the thesis of Lollāṭa is right, Bharata should first have expounded the permanent states and only afterwards the Rasas, (c) Because the second definition of the determinants, etc., in their state of full development, (put forward by Bharata in connexion with Rasas, which according to Bhaṭṭa Lollāṭa, are nothing but permanent mental states), would become a useless waste of words. (d) Because, every feeling would come to be subdivided into an infinity of different gradations, weak, weaker, weakest, indifference, etc. (e) Because, there would no longer be six

varieties of Comic Rasa (hāsyā). (f) Because, in the ten states of love (Kāma), there would be an infinite number of mental states and of rasas. (g) Because we see that what happens is just the contrary, in the sense that sorrow (śoka) is at first intenser and is seen to grow weaker with time, and that in the feelings of anger (krodha), heroism (utsāha), and delight (rati) a diminution is met with when the indignation (amarṣa), firmness (sthairya) and sexual enjoyment (sevā) are absent.” (Trans. Gnoli, pp. 27, 28, 29, *ibid*).

The substance of all this is that without accepting vibhāvādi-s as logical reasons or unfailing mark (i.e. līṅga), the apprehension of rasa, which is “līṅgin”, is impossible, like the knowledge of fire on the mountain without sighting the smoke. Hemacandra has added this remark here : “na hi dhūmaṃ vinā dharādharāntastho vahnir avagamyate.” (viveka, Kā, Śā.) Thus acceptance of līṅga-līṅgi-bhāva between vibhāvādi-s and rasa is inescapable.

Again, for Lollaṭa rasa is the intensified state of the basic emotion. Thus for him, existence of sthāyin-s prior to rasa-s has to be accepted. But, argues Śrī Śaṅkuka, if in reality it were so, then Bharata would have taken up first the sthāyin-s for consideration, and rasa-s could have followed this consideration. But Bharata has not done this. We know that Bharata first considers the rasa-s in the VI th Ch. of his NS. and then takes up bhāva-s for consideration in the next i.e. the VII th Ch. of his NS. This can serve as an answer to Śārdātanaya also who prefers to consider bhāvas first and discusses rasa later in his Bhāva-prakāśana. Again, if rasa were only an intensified stage of bhāva, then Bharata need not have enumerated the vibhāvādi-s of both rasa once, and then again of sthāyins next, the vibhāvādis in both the cases being identical. There can not be difference in Vibhāvādis simply because of a different stage of one and the same thing. Hemacandra again clarifies in his Viveka : “na ca utpattau padārthānāṃ kāraṇaṃ abhidhāya puṣyatāṃ punaḥ tad utpattikāraṇaṃ abhidhātavyaṃ vaiyarthya”patteḥ.”— It will be meaningless to explain the causes etc. of one and the same thing twice over.

Again as the enhancement or intensification – “upaciti” of sthāyin, if accepted, has to be in a certain rising order or sequence, and we will also have to accept this rising order or sequence i.e. ‘tāra-tama-bhāva’ in case of rasa-experience also. So, we will have to accept many and not just six varieties of hāsyā or comic, and also will have to accept not just the ten stages of love but innumerable stages of love will have to be accepted. These three arguments virtually suggest one and the same point.

Thinking on the same line, we find that in case of sorrow i.e. śoka the order is reversed. The force or shock of sorrow is most intense in the first moment and

tends to fade away gradually as time passes. The Śoka has a tendency not to get intensified or 'upacita', every next moment but that of fading away gradually in course of time ! Thus Lollaṭa's view can not be accepted, suggests Śrī Śaṅkuka. From these arguments also, we get an indication that Lollaṭa seems to take the rasas as of worldly nature only.

After refuting thus the view of Bhaṭṭa-Lollaṭa, Śrī-Śaṅkuka presents his own view as follows : (pp. 266, NS. vol. I, ibid) :- "tasmād hetubhir vibhāvā"khyaiḥ kāryaiś ca vyabhicāribhiḥ, prayatnārjitatayā kṛtrimair api tathānabhimanyamānair anukartrsthatvena liṅgalalataḥ pratiyamānaiḥ stāyī bhāvo mukhya-rāmā"digatasthāyy-anukaraṇa-rūpaḥ. anukaraṇarūpatvād eva ca nāmāntareṇa vyapadiṣṭo rasaḥ."

—"Therefore, Rasa is simply a permanent mental state of mind, and, more precisely, the reproduction (anukaraṇa) of the permanent state of mind proper to the person reproduced-Rāma, etc.; and just because it is reproduction, it is called by a different word that is 'Rasa'. (p. 29, Gnoli)

The substance of Śrī Śaṅkuka's theory is that in the process of rasa-realisation the vibhāva-s are of the nature of cause i.e. hetu, the anubhāva-s are of the nature of kārya i.e. effect and the vyabhicārin-s are accessories or 'sahacārin-s'. Before we proceed with the theory of Śrī Śaṅkuka, it may be observed that actually there are two aspects of his theory and they are 'anukṛti' or artful imitation on the part of the 'naṭa' or stage-artist, and 'anumiti' or (artful) inference on the part of the cultured spectator or reader i.e. sāmājika. Thus his view, which is normally popularly known as "anumitivāda" should be better termed as "anukṛti-anumiti-vāda". This is our opinion. We will now proceed to analyse this anukṛti-anumiti-vāda of Śrī Śaṅkuka.

We have noted above that in this view, the vibhāvā"di-s are held as cause, effect and accessories. Now the naṭa or the stage artist accomplishes those vibhāvā"di-s through his personal effort. Basically the naṭa or the stage artist has personally nothing to do with the character he is representing on the stage. So, everything with the artist is only acquired and there is nothing that is naturally related to him. He presents the vibhāvā"di-s on the stage on the strength of the training that he has received and the practice he has put up.

"The determinants (= vibhāva-s), indeed, can be realized (anusamdhāna) through the power (bala) of poetry, the consequents through the skill (śikṣā) of the actor, and the transitory mental states through the actor's ability to present his own

artificial consequents. But the permanent mental state cannot be realized, even through the power of poetry.” (Trans. Gnoli, pp. 29, 30, *ibid*) -

The Abh. reads (pp. 4, Nandi Edn.) - “vibhāvā hi kāvyabalād anusam̐dheyāḥ, anubhāvāḥ śikṣātaḥ, vyabhicāriṇaḥ kṛtrima-nijā’-nubhā vā”rjanabalāt. sthāyī tu kāvya-balād-api nā’nusam̐dheyah.”

However, the fact is that the actor, though presents the combination of artificial expressions, these vibhāvā”di-s, though artificial, do not look like artificial. But they look like natural. Mammata, we will go to observe later, suggests that this apparent naturalness is caused on the strength of the material presented, which, by nature is beautiful - “vastu-saundarya-balāt”. The naturalness of the vibhāvā”di-s thus presented is not genuine but only artificial but looks like genuine on the strength of the inherent beauty of the material presented - (kṛtrimair api tathā an-abhimanyamānaiḥ). ”

With the help of the artificial but skillful presentation on the part of the actor, the sāmājika is made to infer the feeling staying in the character imitated. This feeling of the character imitated is also of the form of imitation of the feelings of the original character i.e. Rāma and the like. Thus the actor is himself not Rāma, but we have before us imitated Rāma. The feelings the actor presents are also imitation, and this through gestures not genuine but looking natural due to the training he has received and the practice he has put up of presenting the artificial in an artful way so that the whole presentation looks natural. Now with the help of this natural looking artificial presentation of the actor who plays the role of the character, the spectator infers the mental state, which of course is not genuine but could be only of the form of imitation ! Thus this anukṛta - anumita-sthāyin is rasa according to Śrī-Śaṅkuka. The actor imitates the feelings of the original. These imitated feelings are inferred to be there in the character, by the spectator with the help of vibhāvā”di-s, artificial of course, presented in form of ‘cause’ or līṅga. The anukṛta-anumita-sthāyin is enjoyed by the sāmājika in form of rasa. As they are anukṛta-i.e. imitated, the feelings or bhāva-s are termed “rasa”. Thus, we can safely call the view of Śrī Śaṅkuka by the name of “anukṛti-anumiti-vāda”.

The vibhāva-s are here in this process, correlated on the strength of poetry, the anubhāvas on the strength of the training the actor has undergone and the skill he has acquired thereby, and the vyabhicārin-s are artificially presented on the strength of anubhāva-s or artful expressions which are not genuine but only artificial. The sthāyin is not collected, says Śaṅkuka, even on the strength of poetry, and is only inferred. Precisely for this reason, observes Śrī Śaṅkuka, Bharata has not mentioned

'sthāyin' in the rasa-sūtra. The sthāyin of the anukārya can never be grasped in any way. Only its imitation can be inferred. Thus for Śrī-Śaṅkuka, 'anukṛta-rati' is 'śṛṅgāra-rasa." "tena ratir anukṛīyamāṇā śṛṅgāra iti tad ātmakatvaṃ tat-prabhavatvaṃ ca yuktaṃ." (pp. 5, Gnoli.) - "Thus, the Erotic Rasa is simply the permanent mental state of delight imitated; So that [what Bharata said, namely] that Rasas are made up of the permanent feelings and are born of them is quite appropriate too." It may be noted that according to Bharata the erotic and the pathetic rasa-s are born (- prabhava) of the sentiments of delight and sorrow respectively; while instead, the other rasas are made up of them (- ātmaka), observes Gnoli. (foot-note 6, pp. 31, ibid). Thus rasa is not of the form of sthāyin (as imagined by Lollaṭa) or is not even born of it. From the words "tad-ātmakatvaṃ tat-prabhavatvaṃ ca [a]yuktaṃ" and Mammaṭa's note : "vastu-saudāryabala" it is suggested that for Śrī-Śaṅkuka, rasa is not sthāyi-rūpa, but is "sthāyi-vilakṣaṇa", i.e. 'a-laukika' or extra-ordinary, and not of worldly nature.

Śrī Śaṅkuka also covers up another point here. For him "anukṛta-sthāyin" is rasa. But this anu-karaṇa, brought about by the actor, which is inferred-anumita-by the sāmājika is itself 'mithyā' or un-real. So then, how can this un-real cognition bring about the apprehension of the aesthetic experience which is 'real' in its nature ? The answer follows in the following words :

"artha-kriyā'pi mithyā-jñānād dr̥ṣṭā yathā -  
maṇi-pradīpa-prabhayor  
maṇi-buddhyā'bhidhāvatoh  
mithyājñānā'viśeṣēpi  
viśeṣo'rtha-kriyāṃ prati."

(pramāṇa-vārtike prattyakṣa-paricchede 57) -

"It is found furthermore, that even mistaken cognition is, sometimes, not without causal efficiency (arthakriyā) - (Gnoli, Trans. pp. 31)

Gnoli does not read the stanza viz. "maṇi-pradīpa-prabhayoḥ..." etc. in the body of the text but we have incorporated it in bracket in our (i.e. Dr. Nandi's) edition following the G.O.S. Edn., which is retained by Dr. K. Krishnamoorthy also in the '92 Edn. of the N.S. Vol. I. (G.O.S.). Gnoli observes (pp. 31) in the foot-note no. 7. : "To corroborate this statement, Hemacandra quotes here a famous stanza of Dharmakīrti. PV. II. 57 : "Between two people approaching two lights, the one produced by a jewel, the other by a lamp [without being conscious of what they

really are, but] with the idea that it is jewel, there exists a difference in respect of causal efficiency, but not a difference of mistaken cognition. This stanza is also quoted by Mahimabhaṭṭa, Vyakti-viveka pp. 78. Causal efficiency, the capacity to produce effects (artha-kriyā, artha-kriyā-kāritva) is the basic criterion of every form of right cognition, and, therefore, of the real existence of a thing. When, for example, a man sees a mirage and, on going near it, does not find water which he expected to find, (and cannot, therefore, drink, wash himself, etc.), his perception is a mistaken one; the water which he has seen is not capable of appeasing his desires, of carrying out functions proper to real water. In some cases, however, even the mistaken perception is endowed with causal efficiency. In the present case, for instance, it allows the observing subject to find a jewel which is real, in other terms, it does not delude the expectations of the perceiving subjects. Even a mistake, observes Dharma-kīrti, if it does not delude the perceiving subject, is a source of right knowledge. Now, if even a mistaken cognition, observes Śaṅkuka, can be gifted with causal efficiency, then it is all the more reason for a reproduced cognition, i.e. the aesthetic cognition, to be gifted with it. The spectators do not, in fact, remain deluded by this, but find in the spectacle the fulfilment of their desires.”

It may be observed here that Śrī Śaṅkuka here clearly underlines the location of rasa in the sāmājika or the spectator.

But before the sāmājika or the spectator here is blessed with this aesthetic perception, he has to make certain preparations, so to say. According to Śrī Śaṅkuka, the sāmājika, first of all to begin with, takes the actor to be Rāma, or the character portrayed. If he does not take the actor to be Rāma, no further step is possible. But this apprehension of Rāma-buddhi or Rāmatva in the actor or naṭa, which occurs to the sāmājika, is of a special type.

This apprehension of Rāmatva in naṭa, by the sāmājika, is not a samyak-pratīti or true apprehension, nor a māthyā-pratīti or unreal apprehension. Nor is it of the type of saṁśaya or doubt, nor of similarity either. The sāmājika does not feel that the actor is “like Rāma”.

The apprehension, or say art-apprehension which is different from all the four types of cognitions viz. samyak, mithyā, saṁśaya or sādṛśya, is explained by Śrī Śaṅkuka on the analogy of “citra-turaga” i.e. a painted horse. We believe that for Śaṅkuka the apprehension of painted horse is above the apprehensions of the real, unreal, similar or doubtful types. Thus, this special apprehension is a-laukika i.e. extra-ordinary perception which is different from normal worldly perceptions.

Now this nāṭa or artist, for whom this special rāma-buddhi is caused in the sāmājika, with the help of vibhāvā"di-s which are also not real, brings about an artful imitation of the feelings of anukārya or rāmā"di and the anumiti or inference by the sāmājika of this imitated feeling is termed 'rasa' by Śrī Śaṅkuka. Thus Śrī Śaṅkuka draws a neat line of demarcation between what may be called art-perception or kalānubhūti and real perception or worldly experience. This throbbing experience, observes Śaṅkuka, cannot be thwarted by any argument, though it (i.e. the art-experience) does not fall in the limits of known types of perceptions.

These words are :

"na cā'tra nartaka eva sukhīti pratipattiḥ. nā'pyayam eva rāma iti. na cā'pyayam na sukhīti. nā'pi rāmaḥ syād vā na vā'yam iti. na cā'pi tat-saḍṛśa iti. kintu (samyāṇ-mithyā-saṃśaya-śāḍṛśya-pratītibhyo vilakṣaṇā citra-turagā"di-nyāyena) yaḥ sukhī rāmaḥ asāv ayam iti pratītiḥ asti. yad āha -

"pratibhāti na sandeho  
na tattvaṃ na viparyayaḥ  
dhīrasāv ayam ity asti  
nāsāv evā'yam ity api.,  
viruddha-buddhi a-saṃbhedād  
a-vivecita-saṃplavaḥ, (viplavaḥ H.C.)  
yuktyā paryanuyujyeta  
sphurann anubhavaḥ kayā" iti. (pp. 269, G.O.S. Edn. ibid)

Gnoli, pp. 32 translates : "Furthermore, here there is none of the following perceptions : "The actor is really happy", "Rāma is really that man", "That man is not happy", "Is this Rāma or not ?", "This is similar to Rāma", but rather the perception : "This is that Rāma who was happy." Śaṅkuka himself said : "(Here) there is neither doubt, nor truth, nor error; the notion which appears is, "This is that", not "this is really that." What sort of an argument could disprove an experience evident in and by itself, - an experience wherein, being it devoid of any contradictory idea, one cannot distinguish any error ?"

Gnoli adds in foot-note no. 1, (pp. 32) - "Here Mammata quotes and clarifies at the same time A.G. (= Abhinavagupta). "The perception we have", he says, "takes the form : "This is Rāma." Like the experience one has when observing a horse in a picture, the aforementioned perception is neither valid perception, nor error, nor doubt, nor similitude. These indeed, take respectively the forms, : "This

is really Rāma", "Rāma is really this", This is Rāma" (being vitiated, in a second time, by the perception : "This is not Rāma."), "Is this Rāma or not"; "This is similar to Rāma."

As it is, on the strength of available documents, Śrī, Śaṅkuka is the first to correlate rasa-experience with the sāmājika. But of course, Bharata had also dropped a hint in this direction when he had observed, : "sumanasah preksakāḥ, harṣā" dīnśca adhigacchanti." It is like that Śrī. Śaṅkuka's tradition is still older. Instead of taking him as the originator of anukṛti-anumiti-vāda, it is safer to take him as a great supporter and promulgator of this theory. Ānandavardhana has refuted anumitivādins who could be the precursors of Śaṅkuka. We had also observed that perhaps even Udbhata was inclined to this view. So, it is accurate to take Śrī Śaṅkuka as an important name of this thought-current. He takes the artful imitation of sthāyin to be of the form of rasa.

The Upādhyāyas of Abhinavagupta, here perhaps Tauta (and some others, Indurāja ?) have severely criticised Śrī Śaṅkuka's views. They hold that all that Śrī Śaṅkuka says is pretty non-sense, and does not deserve serious attention. However, they show certain drawbacks which are noticed at the first observation. They observe : (pp. 268, ibid) :

"idam apy antastattva-śūnyaṃ na vimarda-kṣamam ity upādhyāyaḥ. anukaraṇa-rūpo rasa iti yad ucyate, tat kim-sāmājika-pratīty abhiprāyeṇa, uta naṭābhiprāyeṇa, kim vā vastu-vṛtta-vivecaka-vyākhyātr-buddhi-samavalambanena, 'yathā' hur vyākhyātāraḥ khalv evaṃ vivecayanti."

(pramāṇa-vārtike sva-vṛttih, pp. 39, Gnoli's edn.) iti. - "atha bharata-muni-vacanānusāreṇa."

(This fourth option of Bharata's opinion is listed together by Gnoli. 'We accept this. But the G.O.S. Edn. takes this line in the beginning of the next para, with other words - "tatrā"dyah pakṣaḥ, a saṅgataḥ." The Kā.śā. Viveka, Edn. Prof. Parikh and Dr. Kulkarni, (pp. 93, line 20, ibid) also has the G.O.S. way of presentation. But Pundit Viśveśvarajee has also taken this as the fourth alternative and this view is separately mentioned in refutation also.) -

Gnoli translates it as (pp. 33, ibid)

Before we give Gnoli's translation it may be observed, that he read "upādhyāyāḥ" i.e. plural, as done by Māṇikyacandra. The G.O.S. has Singular. H.C. has "Bhaṭṭa Totāḥ."

Trans. [Abhinavagupta following his master Bhatta Tota, criticises the theory of reproduction, supported by Śaṅkuka.]



“This thesis too, my masters say, is without intrinsic value and is capable of resisting a close criticism. Specifically, from what point of view, may we ask, was Śaṅkuka saying that Rasa has the nature of a reproduction ? 1. From the point of view of the spectators’ perception, 2. Or, that of actor, 3. or that of the critics (vyākhyātr) who analyse the real nature (vastuvṛtta) of dramatic presentation) - for it has been said that, “it is in fact, the critics who analyse in this way” - 4. Or, finally following the opinion of Bharata himself ?

Gnoli observes in foot-note 1, pp. 33, ibid that “The expression, “my masters”, observes HC., alludes to Bhaṭṭa Tota (or Tauta), who was the direct master of A.G. and, therefore, lived in Kashmir during the second half of the tenth century. Bhaṭṭa Tota wrote a work on poetry, The Kāvya-kautuka, on which A.G. wrote a commentary (vivarāṇa) which has not yet been found. The confutation of Śaṅkuka given in the following pages, goes back, therefore to Bhaṭṭa Tota”. We may add that perhaps even Bhaṭṭa Indurāja also could have been referred to here as one of A.G.’s masters.

As regards the third option, viz. “kim vā vastuvṛtta-vivecakavyākhyātr-buddhi-samavalambanena...” etc. Gnoli elaborates in foot-note 2, pp. 33, as follows : “This quotation is taken from the Sva-vṛtti of Dharmakīrti to the Svārthānumāna-pariccheda of the Pramāṇa Vārtika (cf. supra, p. 5; ed. Gnoli, p. 39) :

“vyākhyātāraḥ khalv evaṃ vivecayanti na vyavahartāraḥ te tu svā”lambanam evārtha-kriyā-yogyam manyamānā dṛṣyavikalpyāv arthāḥ ekīkrtya pravartante.” - Practical life ‘(vyavahāra)’ is based, according to Dharmakīrti, on the identification of the thing in se (svalakṣaṇa) with its mental image. The mind super imposes (ārop) on the thing itself the image that it has of it and the subject believes that he is faced with reality. The difference between the thing itself, which is real and the illusory character of the mental image which has been superimposed upon it, is a theoretical distinction created by the ‘critics’ and ‘philosophers’ (vyākhyātr, tattva-cintaka). In confuting this concept, A.G. asserts that it is impossible to explain a thing in the theoretical moment by an explanation which contradicts one’s awareness of it in practical moment. In other words, the spectators, while they are immersed in the rasa aroused by the spectacle, do not know that they are faced with an imitation. The fact automatically confutes those who sustain the theory that there is an imitation. cf. infra. pp. 40, 41.

Now, we will proceed with the refutation of Śaṅkuka as meted out by Tauta.

The thrust of Tauta’s argument depends on this argument that, when we say

something to be an imitation or reproduction of something else, the similarity between these two is grasped first, as it is implied. They observe that there is no similarity with the mental feeling of rati or love on one hand and whatever the spectator actually observes on the stage, on the other. These two are totally different. The difference between these two is underlined by Tauta in a dārśanika style, i.e. he lays bare the difference between these two from the point of view of nature i.e. svarūpataḥ, and viśayataḥ or scope.

The 'svarūpabheda' is brought about by bhinnendriya-grāhyatva and āśrayabheda by the inherent difference in these two being perceived by different sense-organs and by their being located in different substratum. The person or body of the nāṭa or actor, his physical movements, the items such as crown on his head etc. which he bears on his person etc. are physical objects. Rati, krodha etc. the mental feelings are of the form of mental state or disposition (i.e. citta-vṛtti-rūpa). Thus there is difference in nature - svarūpabheda-between the two. The apprehension of the body of the actor etc. is done by the sense-organ of sight i.e. eye. The mental feelings such as rati, krodha etc. are observed by antaḥ-karāṇa or internal organs, i.e. conscience. Thus, between the two there is - bhinnendriya-grāhyatva - i.e. difference in instrumentality of their observation. Āśrayabheda or difference in location is also clear. The first stays on physicality, the other on conscience. Crown and the rest are held on the body, while rati etc. are located in the mind of Rāma etc. Thus there is great difference between the original mental feelings and the reproduction on the part of the actor.

The substance of Tauta's argument is this that whatever the actor-anukartā-reproduces is just gross physical. The mental feelings such as rati and the like, which are qualities of conscience i.e. antaḥkarāṇa - can never be imitated or reproduced by just physical movements. So, it is useless to say that rasa is "imitation or reproduction of mental feelings." In this argument advanced by Tauta, first it is taken for granted that the opponent takes physical presentation as Śṛṅgāra etc., and then this is refuted as reproduction of the feeling of love. So, the objector tries to improve upon the Siddhāntin's faulty observation. The objector, i.e. pūrva-pakṣin says that he does not take physical expressions as reproduction, but he takes the mental feeling of the actor, which is realised through physical expression, as imitation or reproduction of the original feeling of the character concerned, here, say, Rāma. To this, Tauta's answer is that the mental feeling apprehended in this way is simply that of the actor. How can we arrive in this case at the reproduction of the mental feelings of Rāma, when we observe only the

feeling of the actor ? Thus, simply speaking, whatever is apprehended or perceived cannot be and is not of the nature of reproduction or imitation.

The objector had stated that the actor does not reproduce his own natural feeling of love, etc. but reproduces only the feelings of Rāma and the like. It is only because of this that the objector has taken the vibhāvā"di-s to be unreal or artificial i.e. kṛtrima. Bhaṭṭa Tauta now takes this argument for confutation. Tauta argues that if the cultured spectator takes the vibhāvā"di-s as artificial, then how can artificial vibhāvā"di's make for the collection of feelings such as rati or love and the like ? The objector replies to this that the cultured spectator or bhāvaka, does not apprehend rati i.e. the feeling of love and the like, but only its imitation' i.e. 'raty-anukāra'. The objector says that he has already stated from the very beginning that this thing happens, with the help of inference or 'anumāna' only.

Tauta now comes down heavily on the frivolity of the inference of the imitation of rati - "ratyanukāra." He observes that we may say that here an inference of rati or feeling of love can take place somehow, but how can an inference of imitation of rati take place ? The vibhāvā"di-s are said to be the causes of rati etc., but not of their imitation. The point is that this "raty anumāra" is not the effect of the vibhāvā"di-s, which are the cause here. We also cannot say that whatever is like rati (= rati-sadṛśa) is 'raty anumāra' i.e. imitation or reproduction of rati. Similarity will not serve the purpose here. How can we infer japā-flower or jasmine flower which is red like fire or agni, from fog which is like smoke ? How can we establish inference i.e. anumāna between līṅga-ābhāsa or artificial mark cause and "līṅgi-ābhāsa" i.e. artificial effect. i.e. between artificial proban and probandum.

The words in the A.bh. read here as : (pp. 268, G.O.S. Edn., pp. 6 Gnoli. We prefer Gnoli's presentation of text) :

“nanv ata eva tat pratīyamānaṃ ratyanukaraṇaṃ. mugdhabuddhe kāraṇātara-prabhava hi kārye, susikṣiteṇa tathā jñāne vastvantarasya anumānaṃ tāvad yuktam. asusikṣiteṇa tu tasyaiva prasiddhasya kāraṇasya. yathā vṛścika-viśeṣād gomayaśyaiva anumānaṃ vṛścikasyaiva tat paraṃ mithyājñānaṃ. yatrā'pi līṅga-jñānaṃ mithyā tatrā'pi na tad ābhāsānumānaṃ yuktam. na hi bāṣpād dhūmatvena jñātād anukaraṇa-pratibhāsamānād api līṅgāt, tad anumāra'numānaṃ yuktam. dhūmā'nukāratvena hi jñāyamānān nihārān nāgnyanukāra - japāpuñja-pratitir drṣṭā.” (Gnoli, prefers H.C.'s readings. We have done the same in our edn. of the N.S.)

Gnoli translates (pp. 35, 36, *ibid*) : “If you say that for this very reason what is perceived is not delight but the reproduction of delight, this answer, we reply, could only be made by a man of dull wits. For a thing different from the usual one can be inferred from more apparently similar effects, only if the effect, from which it is inferred is really derived from a different cause and is recognised as such by a person of experience. An inexperienced person can infer from them the usual cause only. From some particular scorpions, for instance, it is legitimate to infer that their cause is cow-dung; and the inference, from them, of another scorpion, as their cause, would be nothing but a false cognition. But when the cognition of logical reason - e.g. The Smoke - is erroneous, the inference based on this apparent logical reason will itself be invalid. The inference from mist (whether it be supposed by the observer to be smoke, or whether the latter is aware of its being only a reproduction of the true logical reason) of something which is a reproduction of fire, is nodoubt unsound. Indeed, a veil of mist - something which reproduces smoke and is recognised as a reproduction - does not legitimate the inference of a heap of red roses, (we take ‘jasmine’) namely something that reproduces fire.”

Gnoli (pp. 35) adds a foot-note here (No. 2) (pp. 35, 36) which reads as -

“Bhaṭṭa Tota’s reply (set out in the following lines) may be summarized : Assuming that the Determinants, etc., are perceived as unreal or artificial (kṛtrima), they cannot legitimize the inference of either Delight or an imitation of Delight. From a mistaken or apparent logical reason, (e.g. a cone-shaped cloud mistaken for a pillar of smoke; the cone-shaped cloud does not stand in any cause-effect relation to fire, and is thus a mistaken logical reason. We cannot infer fire (in this case, mistaken cognition would occur) nor, still less, anything imitating fire (e.g., as A.G. says, a heap of read roses). A person of experience can undoubtedly infer from two things, which to the layman are apparently the same, the respective causes of each of them (example : the scorpions. According to tradition there are two kinds of scorpions, one kind being born from other scorpions, and the other kind from dung); but in the present case the logical reason is nevertheless mistaken or apparent (the determinants, etc., are perceived as ‘Kṛtrima’) and as such an effect is neither of delight nor of an imitation of the delight. Thus, for a person of experience the inference of something which imitates delight is impossible. The inference of delight made by an inexperienced person is a from of mistaken cognition. H.C. explains : *ayaṃ bhāvaḥ prasiddhād rati-lakṣaṇāt kāraṇād ratyanukaraṇaṃ nāma kāraṇāntaram tat-prabhavās ced anubhāvāḥ syuḥ.*

tathaiva ca viśeṣavidā yadi jñāyeran tadā ratyanukaraṇa-lakṣaṇasya vastvantarasyā'numānam samañjasam syāt, na caivam, tat katham iva ratyanukaraṇa-pratītiḥ. aviśeṣa-vidā ca tathāvidhā'nubhāva darśane ratir evā'numīyate tac ca mithyājñanam eva iti."

After this Bhaṭṭa Tauta also rejects Śaṅkuka's further observation that the 'rāma-buddhi' in 'naṭa' is neither samyak, nor mithyā, nor sādṛśya nor saṁśaya-type. Tauta asks as to when a spectator sees Rāma in actor, why should his apprehension not be called 'samyak' i.e. real ? And when after the performance is over the same rāma-buddhi terminates and at this moment-why should, in view of this, the earlier apprehension be not called mithyā or invalid ? - Thus it is both 'tattva' as well as 'viparyaya' i.e. contradiction of the same. Rāma is perceived in other actors also. Again Śaṅkuka had stated that on the strength of poetry, determinants are correlated (= anusaṁdhāna). But even this is not true. The actor who recites "seyam mamā'ṅgeṣu...." etc. never for a moment thinks that sītā is his somebody. If this is for the spectators, then the correlation with the sthāyin is easier still : "yac ca ucyate vibhāvāḥ kāvyād anusaṁdhīyante tad api na vidmaḥ. na hi 'maméyam sītā kācit' iti svātmīyatvena pratītir naṭasya. atha sāmājkasya tathā pratītiyogyāḥ kriyanta ity etāvad eva anusaṁdhānam, ucyate, tarhi sthāyini sutarāṁ anusaṁdhānam syāt. tasyaisa hi mukhyatvena "asminnayam" iti sāmājikānām pratipattiḥ." (pp. 261, G.O.S. Edn.; pp. 7, Gnoli) - Gnoli translates : (pp. 38, ibid) : "Nor can his other assertion, "The determinants can be recognised through the power of poetry", be successfully explained. Indeed the actor, does not have the perception, "Sīta is the woman I love", as if that is to say, Śītā were a part of his own real life. If it is replied that this is the meaning of the word realisation, i.e. that this is how the determinants are made perceptible to the spectators, then we answer that there ought more reasonably to be, a realization of the permanent state. Indeed the perception of the spectators is concerned, in a primary sense, principally with this and is presented in the form : "that man (is) in this (feeling)."

Thus, it is wrong to say that from the point of view of the spectators, rasa is reproduction of the sthāyin or the permanent mental state.

Tauta now picks up the second alternative. He rejects the proposition that imitation is possible from the point of view of the actor as well. Tauta observes that when the actor performs his role, he is not conscious of the fact that he is imitating

either Rāma or his mental feeling. Even with this, however, if imitation is insisted upon then, the following difficulties will occur. First point is whom does the actor imitate ? It cannot be the original Rāma for he is not present at the time when the actor performs. Thus 'anukaraṇa' here cannot have the meaning of "Sadṛśa-karaṇa" or behaving in a similar way, for it is not applicable here. It is because the actor has not seen Rāma personally and in the absence of this fact he cannot imitate Rāma. So, the second meaning of anu-karaṇa will follow, i.e. it will mean, "anu=praścāt karaṇa" i.e. doing something after something else done earlier. But then this sort of "paścāt karaṇa" is possible in worldly context in case of one and all who live after Rāma's times. Why only the behaviour of an actor should be singled out as "anu-karaṇa" ? Thus, in case of an actor, neither of the two meanings of "anu-karaṇa" is feasible.

But the objector does not leave his point easily. He suggests that while imitating Rāma and the like, the actor is imitating the feelings of some noble person. But here the old difficulty will re-arise ! How will the imitation of the feelings of noble characters will be made possible ? If it be said that through anubhāva-s the imitation of feelings will be made possible, then the fault of 'vailakṣaṇya' as suggested earlier will re-appear ! If it is said that the actor imitates merely the anubhāva-s or physical gestures of a noble character, then it will require further clarification as to which particular noble man or woman is intended here for imitation, for a general reference will not work here. If the objector explains that the actor imitates the anubhāva's of someone who weeps like this, or laughs like this, etc., then the very self of the actor also enters in this practice and the whole thing ceases to be an imitation. On the contrary the actor will exhibit his own personal feelings of love, sorrow, etc.

After thus rejecting the anukārya-anukartṛ-bhāva, it becomes pertinent for the siddhāntin to explain Bharatamāni's words such as (pp. 275, Abh.) 'nāṭya' is "loka-vṛttā'nukaraṇa" (NS. I. 112) or 'nāṭya' is "bhāvā'nukīrtana" (NS. I. 107), Abhinavagupta (= A.G.) has discussed this point on pp. 35-37 etc. (NS. Vol. I., G.O.S., ibid) and there he has also quoted the opinion of his guru, Bhaṭṭa Tauta, the author of "Kāvya-kautaka". There "anukīrtana" is explained as "anuvyavasāya" i.e. artful re-creation. Here on pp. 276 also the same context is cited. Abh. observes : "sapta-dvīpā'nukaraṇam" (N.S. I. 117) ity ādi tvanyathā'pi śakya-gamanikam iti. tad anukāre ca kva nāmāntaram kanta-veśa-gatyanyakaraṇā'dau." Gnoli (pp. 41) translates : "The expression met with in Bharata every now and again, "Drama is

an imitation (of all the forms of existence in) the seven islands”, etc., can have also other explanations. And even if that was a reproduction, then what would be the difference between it and the reproduction of the attire, the walk, etc. of the beloved one ?”

Gnoli observes that (foot-note 4, pp. 41) the text and the translation are both doubtful. But he has obviously missed the point. Viśveśvarjee has explained it in a perfect way. When a beloved imitates the style of her lover it is not just imitation but it is something richer and is termed by a different name viz. “līlā”. In the same way the acting, on the stage is no mere imitation but is ‘nāṭya’, the dramatic art and is thus given a separate name. Of course Gnoli himself (foot-note 3, pp. 41, ibid) explains that “imitation” must be interpreted as “re-telling”, (anu-kīrtana), and therefore as a “re-perception” (anuvyavasāya). We use the term “artful recreation” for ‘anukaraṇa’, and it explains the idea perfectly. This was the fourth option rejected by Tauta. The third option stands rejected of its own. (p. 40)

Abhinavagupta quotes the views of Tunta here : “nā’pi vastuvṛttā’nusāreṇa tad anukāratvaṃ a-saṃvedyamānasya vastuvṛttātvā’nupapatteḥ yac ca vastuvṛttam tad darśayiṣyāmaḥ - (Gnoli, pp. 9. Reading of H.C. are preferred).

Gnoli translates (pp. 40, ibid) : “Nor can it be said that there is a reproduction from the point of view of the nature of things (vastu-vṛtta); for it is impossible that a thing which one is not conscious, has a real nature. We shall explain further in what the nature of things consists. Gnoli adds (in foot-note 3, pp. 40, ibid) that here “vastu-vṛtta” is to be viewed from the point of view of the analysing mind. Reference is made to I.P.V. II. pp. 179 - “saṃvedana-tiraskāriṇī kā khalu yuktir nāma, anupapattiś ca bhāsamānasya kā’nyā bhaviṣyati ?”

Thus, after rejecting all the four options, “citra-turaga-nyāya” is taken up for consideration. It is not proper to accept the manifestation of a bull or a horse on the strength of this maxim. Of course, the lamp brings into light the jar. But just by the combination of colours original bull or cow or horse is not manifested. With the help of the painting only an aggregate similar to a cow is apprehended. The combination of vibhāvā’di-s can not be said to be similar to delight (= rati). Thus, it is not true to say that rasa is the reproduction of mental states.

The Abh. (pp. 270, G.O.S.; pp. 9, Gnoli) reads as : “yac cōcyate varṇakair haritālā”dibhiḥ saṃyujyamāna eva gaur ityā’di. tatra yady abhivyaajyamāna ity arthōbhhipreteḥ, tad asat. na hi sindūrā”dibhiḥ pāramārthiko gaur abhivyaajyate, pradīpā”dibhir iva : kintu tat-sadṛśaḥ samūha-viśeṣo nirvartyate. ta eva hi

sindūrā"dayo gavā'vayava-sanniveśa-saḍṛśeṇa sanniveśa-viśeṣeṇa avasthitā go-saḍṛg iti pratibhāsasya viśayaḥ, naivam vibhāva-samūho rati-saḍṛśatā-pratipatti-grāhyaḥ. tasmād bhāvā'nukaraṇam rasā ity asat."

Gnoli translates (pp. 41, ibid) : "5-Some people say : "The pigments-orpiment, etc. - undoubtedly compose (saṃyñj) a cow." Now if the word "composé is understood in the sense of manifest (abhi-vyaj)", these people are also in error. For, we cannot say that minium, etc., manifest a real (pāramārthika) cow, like the one which might be manifested by a lamp, etc. All they do is to produce (nirvṛt) a particular aggregate (samūha) similar to a cow. The only object of the image, "It is like a cow," is simply this minium, etc. applied so as to constitute a particular arrangement (saṃniveśa) similar to the arrangement of the limbs of a cow. In the case of the aggregate of the determinants, etc., the situation is different : this-as we have said - cannot be perceived as similar to delight. Thus, it is not true that Rasa is the reproduction of mental states."

Gnoli adds in foot-note 1, pp. 42, ibid : "The visual arts are regarded in this passage as being of a different order from poetry : The pigments, etc., are material things which imitate a material thing. Very well then, says A.G., all the same, it is impossible that the poetic expression (consisting of determinants etc., i.e. of material elements) could imitate mental movement, which is of a spiritual nature."

It may be noted here, that Gnoli (pp. 41, Translation) gives a title : "other theories", and gives no. 5 to the discussion read above in which a painting is rejected as manifestation. Actually, we feel, and this is the feeling of Pandit Viśveśārjee also that the lines : "yac cōcyate varṇakair haritālā"ḍibhiḥ..." etc. have a clear reference to Śrī Śaṅkuka's citra-turaga-nyāya. In place of 'turaga' we have "gavā"ḍi" here. This is not an independent view rejected by Tauta. So, a separate number, i.e. number '5' given to this view by Gnoli is not justified. The concluding remark proves our point, wherein it is stated "tasmāt bhāvā'nukaraṇam rasā ity asat." - We know that anukṛti-anumiti-vāda was supported by Śrī. Śaṅkuka and even the maxim that he has quoted is faulty. Tauta wants to expose the hollowness of the maxim also. It need not be taken as a separate view. A separate view however follows now which is very briefly dismissed by A.G. But before we turn to that we may once again take note of the fact that the principal attack of Tauta is directed towards the anukṛti-vāda of Śrī Śaṅkuka. Whatever is presented as a means to rasa-experience is certainly not of the form of an imitation. The cultured spectator only sees the attire, the ornaments, crown etc. put on by an actor and listens to his voice. With the help of all these, universalized feelings are suggested. Bhaṭṭa Tauta aims to bring this point into relief.



Next, A.G. discusses another view in brief. The view holds that the material i.e. combination which is purely external and is capable to cause happiness or unhappiness etc., is itself rasa. Its nature is determined from the point of view of Sāṃkhya philosophy which takes external objects as “sukha-duḥkhā”tmaka”. Vibhāva-s in this combination stand as upādānakāraṇa (= dala-sthānīyāḥ) (this explanation was suggested to us by our guru Prof. R. C. Parikh who received this explanation, on his verbal authority, from Pundit Sukhlaljee). The anubhāva-s and vyabhicārin-s add only to the flavour - i.e. are saṃskārakāḥ. The sthāyins are born of this combination and are internal and are of the nature of happiness, unhappiness etc. - But this view of some who follow Sāṃkhya philosophy is easily put aside by the siddhāntin who finds a contradiction between the statement “tat-sāmagrī-janyām, for sthāyin-s, and Bharata’s statement viz. “sthāyibhāvān rasatvam upaneṣyāmaḥ,” which implies that the sthāyin-s are permanently staying in the mind and are not born a new by external factors. The pūrvapakṣin here has to resort to metaphor to explain Bharata’s simple statement. Thus, says A.G., we do not go in further refutation of this view as it is useless and foolish to discuss such views which are in apparent contradiction with Bharata’s views. - Again, another difficulty of difference in proportion also will arise. Will an added or reduced dose of vibhāvā”di-s generate larger or lesser quantity of sthāyin ? This question also will remain unanswered. : Abh. pp. 270 reads : “tena sthāyibhāvān rasatvam upaneṣyāmaḥ ity ādāv upacāram aṅgīkurvatā grantha-virodham svayam eva budhyamānena dūṣaṇā”viṣkaraṇa-maurkhyāt prāmāṇiko janaḥ pari-rakṣita iti kim asy ōcyate. yat tv anyat tat-pratīti-vaiṣamyā-prasaṅgā”di tat kiyad atrōcyatām.” (pp. 10, Gnoli; this reading follows H.C. We have accepted the same).

Gnoli has a foot-note no. 4, pp. 42, ibid, which reads as : “According to the Sāṃkhya, external objects are a modification of prakṛti, which is made up of pleasure, pain and stupor. The external objects are, thus, also themselves made up of pleasure, pain, etc. This conception is emphatically confuted by Dharmakīrti, P.V. III, 268 ff.”

Srī Śaṅkuka’s views also find expression in the Locana as below : (Locana, on Dhv. II. 4, pp. 108, Edn. Nandi ibid) : “atrōcyate - rasa-svarūpa eva tāvad vipratipattayaḥ pravivādinām. tathā hi - pūrvā”vasthāyām yaḥ sthāyī sa eva vyabhicāri-sampātā”dinā prāpta-paripoṣṇukāryagataḥ eva rasaḥ. nātye tu prayujyamānatvān nātyarasa iti kecit.

pravāhadharminyām cittavṛtttau citta-vṛtteḥ citta-vṛtṭy antareṇa kaḥ paripoṣārthaḥ ? vismaya-śoka-krodhā”deś ca krameṇa tāvaṇ na paripoṣaḥ iti na

anukārye rasaḥ, anukartari ca tadbhāve layā"dy ananusaraṇam syāt. sāmājika-gate vā kaś camatkāraḥ. pratyuta karuṇā"ḍau duḥkha-prāptiḥ. tasmān nā'yam pakṣaḥ. kas tarhi ? iha ānantyān niyatasya anukāro na śakyah, niṣprayojanaś ca, viśiṣṭatā-pratītau tātasthyena vyutpatty abhāvāt.

tasmād aniyatāvasthātmakam sthāyinam uddiśya vibhā'vānubhāva-vyabhicāribhiḥ samyujiyamānair ayaṁ rāmaḥ sukhī iti smṛti-vilakṣaṇā sthāyini pratigocaratayā āsvāda-rūpā pratipattir anukartrāmbanā nātyaika-gāminī rasaḥ, sa ca na vyatiriktaṁ ādhāram apekṣate. kimtv anukāryā'bhinnā'bhimate nartake āsvādayitā sāmājika ity etāvanmātram adh. tena nātya eva rasaḥ, na anukāryādiṣv iti kecit.

anye tu - anukartari yaḥ sthāyy avabhāso bhinayā"di-sāmagryādi-kṛto bhittāv iva haritālā"dinā āśvāvabhāsaḥ, sa eva lokātita-tayā āsvādā'para-samjñayā pratītyā rasyamāno rasa iti nātyād rasā nātyarasāḥ."

It may be noted that Abhinavagupta's presentation in Locana is less clear as compared to the one we read in the Abh. In Locana AG. does not name particular ācāryās clearly. As read above, Lollaṭa's and Śaṅkuka's views are almost placed together in one section and Lollaṭa's refutation is not fully developed. Again AG. actually starts with Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka's views first in Locana, and this is followed by the passage quoted as above. Again, the passage quoted above has some lines to be read further as : (pp. 108, 110, ibid) :

"apare punar vibhāvā'nubhāva-mātram eva viśiṣṭa-sāmagryā samarpyamāṇam tad-vibhāvanīyā'nubhāvanīya-sthāyi-rūpa-citta-vṛttya-ucita-vāsanā'nusaktam svanirvṛti-carvaṇā-viśiṣṭam eva rasaḥ tan nātyam eva rasaḥ.

anye tu śuddham vibhāvam, apare śuddham anubhāvam, kecit tu sthāyimātram, itare vyabhicāriṇam, anye tat samyogam, eke anukāryam, kecana sakalam eva samudāyam rasam āhur ity alaṁ bahunā."

We will go to see later that Jagannātha has given nearly as many as eleven views which follow the above pattern. But the presentation of this topic is less scientific and less methodical in Locana, perhaps because Ānandavardhana has not bothered about discussing this topic-Ānandavardhana concentrates just on the fact of rasa or rasa-dhvani with which other thought-currents are duly correlated. On the other hand the Abh. has a direct concern with the fact of the process of rasa-experience as Bharata himself has given the rasa-sūtra.

The Bālapriyā on Locana (pp. 184, Edn. Chowkhamba, skt. Sr. Benares city, 1940) takes the first view to be that of Lollaṭa : "bhaṭṭa-lollaṭādimataṁ ādau

darśayati.” “pūrvety ādi”. Then Bālapriyā observes : “matam idam dūṣayitvā prakārāntareṇa vadatām Śrī-Śaṅkukā”dīnām matam darśayati-pravāha. ity ādi.

Then what follows is explained in Bāla-priyā as “sva-mata” i.e. The opinion of Śrī Śaṅkuka. Then, without naming (pp. 186; ibid) it is stated “matāntaram āha-apara ity ādi.”

With this observation we will now proceed to examine **Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka's view as presented in the Abh. first and then we will also examine how Locana presents the same.**

**Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka** starts with rejecting either the ‘pratīti’ or ‘utpatti’ of rasa. ‘Pratīti’ is both direct i.e. pratyakṣa or through śabda-pramāṇa, or smṛti, or inference. This again is both personal i.e. sva-gata, or impersonal i.e. paragata. In short Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka rejects the pratīti of rasa and also its utpatti, and thus he is opposed to both Bhaṭṭa Lolāṭa and Śrī Śaṅkuka. He rejects even ‘abhivyakti’ i.e. manifestation of rasa. Here, perhaps Ānandavardhana and his predecessors are targeted for it certainly cannot be Abhinavagupta who was later in time and who quotes Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka at various points.

The main thrust of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka's argument is that if the apprehension of say, karuṇa rasa, is said to be with reference to ‘sva’ i.e. if it is taken to happen individually or at personal level, – ātmagatatvena-then the sāmājika or spectator will have an experience of pain or unhappiness. Of course, those who accept the sukha-duḥ-khā”tmaka-svabhāva of rasa will not find any difficulty in accepting this. But the very fact that Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka objects to this shows that he too, like Ānandavardhana, Abhinavagupta and their followers takes rasa to be of the nature of only bliss, pure and simple ! Or, even from another angle also rasa-experience cannot be understood as happening at personal level i.e. ātmagatatvena. The fact is that Sītā and others can never be imagined to be related to the sāmājika or spectator individually. If one's own beloved is placed in place of Sītā, then even this is not possible because under the given context, the sāmājika does not remember one's own beloved. Again, yet another difficulty will arise. When the sāmājika observes Rāma and such other heroes performing superlative exploits such as crossing of ocean etc., the self-“sva” of sāmājika will not be able to enter in this. The spectator simply cannot imagine that he can even cross the ocean as done by Rāma.

The sāmājika has no apprehension of rasa even through ‘smṛti’ or memory. Rāma and others were not experienced or seen by the spectator personally on an

earlier occasion and hence, as Rāma and others are not pūrva-dṛṣṭa i.e. met with earlier, their 'smaraṇa' or memory is impossible. Only that which is seen or heard or experienced earlier, i.e. only that which is "pūrva-dṛṣṭa" can be remembered at a later stage.

Again if it is said that here rasa-perception takes place either through direct words or statement, or by anumāna i.e. inference., then the answer is that such a perception is without joy, i.e. it is "nīrasa" or dry.

If rasa-perception is taken to happen in a "para-gata"-way i.e. with reference to someone else, then also the same contingency will occur. Thus, here the anumiti-vāda of Śaṅkuka is also found to be faulty. When Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka says : "rasaḥ na pratiyate," then this sort of 'pratīti', as observed earlier could be verbal i.e. śābdī, inferential i.e. ānumānikī, of the form of memory i.e. smṛti-rūpā, and of course pratyakṣa or direct perception. All these could be with reference to an individual-'sva-gata' or with somebody else, i.e. 'para-gata'. Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka rejects all these types of apprehension or 'pratīti' by a single observation that "rasaḥ na pratiyate." Again, Śrī Śaṅkuka's anumitivāda is also rejected on the ground that inferential knowledge could be either true or false as the case may be, but is certainly not "beautiful" i.e. "sa-rasa". AG. has also repeated this observation -"laukikānumāne tu kā rasatā ?-, but we know that Mahimā has advocated strongly the case for, what he terms as "kāvyānumiti" as against "trakānumiti", and this kāvyānumiti is "sa-rasī." But we know that here practically what happens is that 'kāvyānumiti' is certainly not the technical 'anumiti' of the śāstras and is also hardly a diluted or an adulterated mixture, hardly deserving the name of "anumiti." It is a quarrel of name only. Whether you call it to be "vyāñjanā", which is exclusive to art, here poetry and drama, or call it this loose "kāvyānumiti", the result is the same. But Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka rejects both of them taking both "anumiti" and "abhivyakti" in the strict sense of the darśana-śāstra.

Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka feels that if rasa-bodha or apprehension of rasa is caused by direct means i.e. if it is held to be a case of "pratyakṣa" or direct perception, then there are chances of opposite reactions in case of different persons. People of different culture and taste will feel either lust, shame, disgust etc. : "na ca śabdānumānā" dibhyas tat-pratītau lokasya sa-rasatā yuktā, pratyakṣād iva." (Gnoli, pp. 10) : (Translation, Gnoli, pp. 44, ibid.)- "Moreover, even if it is supposed that he (=Rāma) is perceived through verbal testimony (śabda), inference (anumāna), etc., logically there cannot be any occurrence of rasa in the audience- just as it is not aroused by a thing perceived through direct knowledge. For on the appearance of

a pair of lovers united together, the mind of anyone present rather becomes the prey of conflicting feelings (shame, disgust, envy, and so on); and we surely cannot say that the onlooker in such a scene is in a state of Rasa !” – In short, when the sāmājika or onlooker is himself disturbed by such stray feelings, how can a state of rasa-experience, i.e. absolute bliss, can ever be imagined ? Thus ‘rasānubhava’- or rasa experience, following direct perception or recollection stands confuted. Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka also observes here in brief that the same difficulties will arise in case rasa is said to be born or caused i.e. if “utpatti” of rasa is asserted by the pūrvapakṣin. : utpattāṁ api tulyam etad dūṣaṇam.” (pp. 10, Gnoli, ibid).

Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka also rejects the abhivyakti-vāda, perhaps as supported by Ānandavardhana, who was his predecessor. He observes : “śakti-rūpatvena pūrvam sthitasya paścād abhivyaktaṁ viśayārjana-tāratanyā”pattiḥ. sva-gata-para-gatatvā”di ca pūrvavad vikalpyam.”—“If it is supposed that Rasa first pre-exists in a potential form (śakti-rūpatvena) and is later manifested, then the determinants must necessarily illuminate it little by little. Besides. the difficulties already encountered would recur : is Rasa manifested as really present in our own self, or as present in third party ?” (Trans. Gnoli. pp. 44, 45 ibid).

Gnoli (pp. 45 ibid) here adds a foot-note (no.1) : “This objection repeats, mutatis mutandis, the objection of the Buddhists and of the Mīmāṃsakas against the concept of sphoṭa which, according to the grammarians (vaiyākaraṇa) is a vocality, eternal and without parts, distinct from the letters and manifested (√vyaj) by these. This eternal vocality causes the cognition of the meaning. This objection is as follows : is sphoṭa manifested entirely by the first letter on of a word or not ? (a) If sphoṭa is manifested in its entirety, the letters which come after are unnecessary. In other words, the first letter would be capable of rendering perceptible the meaning of the whole word. (b) If sphoṭa is manifested gradually, then it could no longer be without parts. This second alternative is, therefore, in contradiction to the very nature of sphoṭa. The same reasoning is applied by Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka to Rasa and to the words by which it is manifested.”

This gradual manifestation of the Rasa has also been criticised by Śaṅkuka, cf. supra, p. 28.” (This means that when Śaṅkuka rejects six types of hāsyā or ten types of Kāma, there is a veiled reference to the manifestation theory.)

It may be noted here that Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, while rejecting the case of “abhivyakti”, takes it strictly in the philosophical sense as accepted in the darśanas. Abhivyakti or manifestation means the revelation of only that which pre-exists. Thus, if rasa is said to be abhivyakta or manifested (i.e. abhivyajyate) then it must

have existed prior-pūrva-sthiti- to its revelation. May be, it could have existed in form of latent impression i.e. “saṃskāra.” Now, in normal case, any manifestation of an object depends on the strength of the means or apparatus of manifestation. For example, if light is dim in the beginning and gets brighter and brighter later, then the objects covered in darkness will start appearing more and more clearly as the light increases. Rasa if held to be manifested by vibhāvā”di-s, then in that case there will arise this contingency of accepting gradual stages of clearer manifestation i.e. “tāratamyadoṣa” will prop us in case of rasānubhūti. Any added dose of vibhāvā”dis will make for brighter manifestation of rasa, and in fact, theoretically there will be no end to this, or no final stage of rasa-revelation. But we know that in the case of rasānubhūti such thing is not observed. Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka observes that this again can be both sva-gata and para-gata i.e. subjective or neutral as the case may be ! Thus he rejects the case of “rasābhivyakti.”

But here again we feel that Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka has blundered. He equates the abhivyakti of rasa, practically with the abhivyakti of sphoṭa of the Vaiyākaraṇas or, the abhivyakti as understood by the dārśanikas. This means that Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka seems to take “abhivyakti” strictly in its philosophical-“dārśanika-” context and meaning, which means that only a pre-existing object can get manifested. But there is a vital difference between dārśanika-abhivyakti and the “abhivyakti” of the ālaṃkārikas of the rasa-dhvani school of thought. It is true that rasa is manifested or is abhivyakta as is the “sphoṭa” of the grammarians, but it is not true to hold that as is “sphoṭa” believed to be “pūrva-siddha”, rasa is also a “pūrva-siddha” entity. No; never. We do not experience rasa before we move to the theatre and view the performance. For want of any other perfectly suitable technical terminology, rasa is said to be “abhivyakta” in a loose sense, or in a poetic context. It is ‘abhivyakti’ “sui generis”. Again here ‘abhivyakti’ proves to be as less acceptable as was “kāvyānumiti” of Mahimā or Śaṅkuka or their predecessors ! For the ālaṃkārikas rasa is apprehended through vyañjanā, i.e. it is abhivyakta, but is not pūrva-siddha ! It is said to be “tātkālikaḥ eva, vibhāvā”di-jīvitāvadhiḥ.” Thus it is ‘abhivyakta’ in a loose or, a special sense of the term which Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka fails to grasp.

In Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka’s presentation we come across some terminologies as seen in the Sāṃkhya darśana and hence scholars take him to be a follower of the Sāṃkhya system. But this conclusion is hazardous and is done in a hurry and therefore unsound. In the same vein to stamp Lollaṭa as a mīmāṃsaka, or take Śrī Śaṅkuka as a naiyāyika is unscientific. Actually many axioms of mīmāṃsā, vyākaraṇa, and nyāya were a common intellectual and cultural heritage and were acceptable to the

vedāntins as well and also perhaps to the non-vedic disciplines. For example no darśana ever brands “prakṛti” to ‘be “caturguṇā”tmikā” as against its being termed “triguṇāmika” by the Sāṃkhyas. Again, aesthetics has philosophy in its back-drop, but it was never coloured and certainly never vitiated by philosophical bias. Ācārya Hemacandra of the Jain faith has no hesitation in following Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta of the Śaiva-Pratyabhijñā darśana. Aesthetics never ran a narrow track in India. But an honest effort can be made in the direction of fixing the religious and philosophical faith of a given ācārya. At times even aesthetics was slightly coloured or rendered pink by philosophical tenets as is seen with the great Vaiṣṇava ācāryas Rūpa and Jīva Goswamī-s. Dr. Hiriyanna in his “Art Experience” has taken note of the free movement of aesthetics in India. Or, we may say that as a rich background, not just only this or that darśana, but the whole Indian philosophical climate serves the purpose of Indian aesthetics. However, Śaiva-Pratyabhijñā darśana had a major say in this business.

So, as observed earlier, there can be noted certain technical terminologies in Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka’s presentation. We do not know whether he had anything to deal with the view of the “Sāṃkhyas” as discussed earlier. But as he is a great supporter of only the blissful nature of rasa, perhaps he had nothing to do with the Sāṃkhya-view which believed in the sukha-duḥkhā”tmakarva of rasa.

We know that the Sāṃkhya discipline accepts three guṇas-sattva, rajas and tamas that go with buddhi. ‘Tamas’ is termed ‘moha’ or stuper also. We had seen a lot of this in Bhoja in an earlier chapter and certainly the Mālava School as represented by Dhanañjaya, Dhanika and Bhoja had a lot to do with Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka also. That way, we will go to see, even Abhinavagupta and his thought-current also had a lot to do with Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka. So, it is accepted that till there is predominance of ‘moha’ or stuper over ‘buddhi’, it cannot observe subtle things, and fails to understand clearly any point. One of the chief targets of art is to lessen or remove totally this veil of moha or stuper that colours the intelligence. This thing, i.e. removal of moha is done with the help of “doṣa-hāna” i.e. freedom from blemishes, and “guṇa-ādāna” acceptance of excellences. We can see how later Bhoja has taken these qualities as the distinguishing marks of sāhitya. This is the case of poetry. In drama, however, removal of moha is effected by the four-fold acting-caturvidha abhinaya. When the curtain of moha-stuper is removed, the process-vyāpāra- of sādharmaṇīkaraṇa i.e. de-individualisation starts operating in poetry or drama. Through this sādharmaṇīkaraṇa, in poetry and drama, the vibhāvā”dis-unfold in a de-individualised form i.e. sādharmaṇīkṛta-svarūpa. Through this rasa-

realisation takes place, the enjoyment of which occurs to the sāmājika through bhojakatva-or the power of enjoyment. Thus 'bhoga' of rasa takes place. In the Sāṃkhya darśana, 'bhoga' is explained as the union of puruṣa and prakṛti realised in buddhi i.e. intelligence. The puruṣa gets reflected in the buddhi and enjoys rasa-buddhi. This bhoga is imagined to be distinct in nature from anubhava or direct experience, smṛti or recollection, etc. On account of the continuence of rajas and tamas in the buddhi at this moment, vaividhya or variety is added in this bhoga. On account of this 'vaividhya' or diversity, we locate 'druti', 'vikāsa' and 'vistara'. Some add 'vikṣobha' also as a fourth citra-bhūmi. This 'bhoga' rests i.e. its 'viśrānti' takes place in sva-saṃvit. Thus 'sva-saṃvit' i.e. one's own consciousness gets characterised by light i.e. prakāśa, and ānanda or bliss. For this sattva-guṇa becomes instrumental. Rajas and tamas are subdued at this moment by the predominance of 'sattva'. Thus the nature of 'bhoga' becomes equated with the enjoyment and bliss of parabrahma-"parabrahmā"svāda-kalpa."

The thrust of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka's thesis is like this :- In poetry and drama words do not end in abhidhā or the power of expression only. They have a capacity to yield deindividualised meaning, i.e. they render the vibhāvā"di-s sādharmaṇīkṛta or of the de-individualised nature. So rasa, which results from the vibhāvā"di-s, is enjoyed in a de-individualised form. To put it in a different way, it can be stated that the sthāyin caused by a certain imagined individual, place, time, etc., becomes generalised due to the force of generalised vibhāvā"di-s, and hence the limitations of individuality are removed and the bhāvaka is gifted with a sense of the vibhāvā"dis being his own. This means that the vibhāvā"di-s are presented as part of his own consciousness i.e. sva-saṃvid. with the help of poetic word, thus sva-saṃvit is manifested in full and enjoyment of rasa-'rasa-bhoga'-results. Thus in poetry the śabda-vyāpāra or power of word extends upto "bhoga." Thus generalisation or "bhāvakatva" and enjoyment i.e. "bhojakatva" or "bhoga", prove to be the powers of word only. We know the view of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka as "bhukti-vāda."

The opinion of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka is presented in the Abh. in the following words : (pp. 10, Gnoli. ibid) :

"tasmāt kāvyē doṣā"bhāva-guṇālaṃkāra-mayatva-lakṣaṇena, nāṭye caturvidhābhinaya-rūpeṇa niviḍa-nija-saṃkaṭatā-nivāraṇa-kāriṇā vibhāvā"di-sādharmaṇīkaraṇā"tmanā, abhidhāto dvitīyena aṃśena bhāvakatva vyāpāreṇa bhāvya-māno rasónubhava-smṛtyā"di-vilakṣaṇena rajas-tamónuvedha-vaicitrya-balād druti-vistara-vikāśā"tmanā sattvodreka-prakāśā"nanda-maya-nija-saṃvid-viśrānti-lakṣaṇena para-brahmā"svāda-savidhena bhojena param bhujyata iti."



(Gnoli translates- pp. 45, 46, *ibid*) : “Therefore (our thesis is as follows :- (Rasa is revealed (bhāvyamāna) by a special power assumed by words in poetry and drama; the power of revelation (bhāvanā)—to be distinguished from the power of denotation (abhidhā)—consisting of the action of generalizing the determinants, etc. This power has the faculty of suppressing the thick layer of mental stupor (moha) occupying our own consciousness : in poetry it is characterized by the absence of defects (doṣa) and the presence of qualities (guṇa) and ornaments (alamkāras); in drama by the four kinds of representation. Rasa revealed by this power, is then enjoyed (bhuj) with a kind of enjoyment (bhoja), different from direct experience, memory etc. This enjoyment, by virtue of the different forms of contact between sattva-and rajas and tamas, is consisting of the states of fluidity (druti), enlargement (vistara) and expansion (vikāsa), is characterised by a resting (viśrānti) on one’s own consciousness (saṁvit), which due to the emergent state of sattva, is pervaded by beatitude (ānanda) and light (prakāśa), and is similar to the tasting (āsvāda) of the supreme brahman.”

Gnoli has notes (pp. 46, 47, 48 *ibid*) on sattva, rajas, tamas, prakāśa and brahman. They read as : (pp. 46, ft. n. 1 a)– “The light of the self, of the consciousness, does not reveal itself, in the ‘sāṃsārika’ existence, in immaculate purity, but is conditioned by the three constituent elements (guṇa) of mental substance (buddhi) sattva, light, luminous and pleasant, rajas, mobile, dynamic and painful, tamas, inert, obstructive, and stupid. These three constituent elements are never present in isolation, but mingled together in unequal proportions. The state of emergence of the element sattva, limpid and mirror-like, coincides with a manifestation, always more distinct and evident, of the light and beatitude proper to the self—these indeed reflect themselves in sattva. I. P. V. V.I. p. 150 : “sattvaṃ prakāśa-rūpaṃ nirmala-nabhaḥ-prakhyam, sarvato jalada-pāṭalena iva vāraṇā” tmaṇā tamasā samāvṛtam āste. tatra ca māruta-sthānīyaṃ pravṛtti-svabhāvaṃ rajaḥ, kriyā” tmaṇatayā krameṇa tamojaladaṃ apasārayati nyag-bhāvayati,” “sattva, which is made up of light, like the immaculate ether, is completely enshrouded by tamah, the principle of obstruction, as by a blanket of cloud; Rajaḥ, which is made up of action and is, therefore, imbued with activity, serves as a wind, which, little by little, brushes away, dissipates, the cloud-bank of tamas.” The three constituent elements, sattva, rajas and tamas, are associated with three states of consciousness called, respectively, expansion (vikāsa). provoked by an absolute predominance of sattva, fluidity (druti), determined by a contact of sattva with rajas, and dilatation (vistara) determined by a contact of sattva with tamas.

The conception of the three guṇas, belonging, in particular, to the sāmkhya and yoga systems, is accepted, without notable modifications, by the whole of Indian Thought.

(b)- Druti, vistara and vikāsa are each connected with certain Rasas by later Indian theorists. Druti is the pure state of consciousness of śṛṅgāra, karuṇa and śānta; Vistara of vīra, raudra and bībhatsa; Vikāsa of hāsyā, adbhuta and bhayānaka. cf. Dhv. Ā. L. Comm., p. 206. Rajas predominates in druti, tamas in vistara, and sattva in vikāsa. M.C., p. 74 : yadā hi rajaso guṇasya drutiḥ, tamaso vistarāḥ, sattvasyāti-vikāsaḥ, tadānīm bhogaḥ svarūpaṃ labhate. "It is when rajas is in fluidity, tamas in dilatation, and sattva in full expansion that fruition is realized."

ft. note 1, pp. 47, on "prakāśa"—reads as : "1-a)- The expression sattvódreka is reproduced almost without change by Mammaa., p. 74- sattvódreka-prakāśā"nanda-maya-saṃvid-viśrānti-lakṣaṇena. It has been commented upon in several ways. I have followed, in the translation, the commentary of Vidyācakravartin (K. P., Trivendrum Sanskrit Series, LXXXVII) : sattvódrekāt yau prakāśā"nandau tanmayyāṃ saṃvidi samādhi-vṛtti-rūpāyāṃ yā yogināṃ viśrāntir vigalita-sakala-śramā nistarāṅgeṇāvasthitiḥ tat-sadrśena. M. C. p. 74 comments on : sattvódrekeṇa prakāśaḥ prakāṣo ya ānandaḥ tanmayī yā saṃvit tasyāṃ viśrāntiḥ, sā satattvaṃ paramārtho yasya sa tathā. Referring to Rasa, A.G. says in Dh. Ā.L., p. 183, that it is "rajastamo-vaicitryānuviddha-sattvamaya-nija-cit-svabhāva-nirvṛti-viśrānti-lakṣaṇaḥ." The famous definition of the aesthetic experience given by Viśvanātha in his Sāhityadarpaṇa, adds nothing to the conception of A. G. and Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka. Viśvanātha says :

"sattvódrekād akhaṇḍa-sva-  
prakāśānanda- cinmayaḥ,  
vedyāntara-sparsā-śūnyo  
brahmā"svāda-sahodaraḥ.  
lokóttara-camatkāra-prāṇaḥ  
kaiścit pramāṭṛbhiḥ,  
svākāravad abhinnatvenāyam  
āsvādyate rasaḥ."

"Rasa is tasted by the qualified persons (i.e. qui rationem artis intelligunt). It is tested by virtue of the emergence of sattva. It is made up of a full intelligence,

Beatitude, and self-luminosity. It is void of contact with any other knowable thing, twin brother to the tasting of brahman. It is animated by a camatkāra of non-ordinary nature. It is tasted as if it were our very being, in indivisibility." cf. the translation of A. K. Coomaraswamy. The Transformation of Nature in Art, Harvard, 1934, pp. 48 ff. Coomaraswamy translates camatkāra with "lighting-flash." According to Viśvanātha, sattva is nothing but the mind or inner sense (manah) devoid of any contact with rajah and tamah.-

(b) – The terminology used by Bhaṭṭa Nīyaka and referred to by A. G. is exactly analogous to that used by Bhoja, in his definition of the-Sā'nanda-samādhi. : yadā tu rajas-tamo-leśānu-viddham antahkaraṇa-sattvaṃ bhāvya tadā guṇabhāva citiśakteḥ śubha-prakāśa-mayasya sattvasya bhāvyamānasyódrekāt sā'nandah samādhir bhavati. (Bhoja : Vṛtti. I. 17). "When the matter of concentration (bhāvanā is commented on by Bhoja." bhāvanā bhāvyaṣya viṣayāntara-parihāreṇa cetasi punaḥ punar niveśanam) is the sattva tinged by rajah and tamah proper to the inner sense, then by virtue both of the subordinate state of the self, and of the emergence of sattva, which is made up of bliss and light and is the matter of concentration, that which is called 'Sā'nanda-samādhi' occurs. This passage is also quoted by Pandey I. Aes., p. 189.

On "para-brahmā"svāda-savidha," Gnoli adds ft. note 1, pp.48 ibid as follows :-

"Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka was perhaps the first to associate aesthetic experience with mystical experience. The aesthetic state of consciousness is no longer associated with the limited "I"; during the aesthetic experience the subject is completely absorbed in the object contemplated, and the whole of the reality which surrounds him disappears from his view. The same thing, mutatis mutandis occurs in mystical experience; in this sense, aesthetic experience is similar (savidha, sa-brahmacārin, sahodara) to experience of the Absolute or of the brahman. Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka and A.G. (A.G. also accepts Bhaṭṭa-Nāyaka's opinion; Dh. Ā.L. p. 190, "parabrahmā"svāda-sabrahmacāritvaṃ cāstv asya rasā"svādasya), however, do not fail to emphasize the unmistakable characteristics of each. Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka says (Dh. Ā. L., p. 91).

"vāg-dhenur dugdha etaṃ hi  
rasaṃ yad bāla-trṣṇayā,  
tenāśya samaḥ sa syād  
duhyate yogibhir hi saḥ."

"This rasa (aesthetic experience) is poured forth spontaneously by the word which is like a cow, for love of her children, for this reason it is different from that

which is (laboriously) miked by yogins.”– Cf. also A.bh. p. 5- On the opinion of A.G., infra. pp. 82- 84. Two stanzas which reflect the same idea and which are certainly from Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, are quoted by Mahimabhāṭṭa (Vyaktiviveka), p. 94 (see the translation in the Introd. p. XXVI) :

“pāṭhyād atha dhruvāgānāt  
tataḥ sampūrite rase,  
tadā”svāda-bharaikāgro  
hr̥ṣyaty antarmukhaḥ kṣaṇam.”  
tato nirviṣayasyāsya  
svarūpāvasthitau nijaḥ,  
vyajyate hlāda-niṣyando  
yena tṛpyanti yoginaḥ.

The association between these two states also appears in the affinities of the terms which designate them : viśrānti, nirvṛti, laya, nirveśa, samāpatti, camatkāra, etc.”

We may observe here that Gnoli’s observation that Bhaṭṭa Nāyakā “was perhaps the first to associate aesthetic experience with mystical experience” is unsound. Actually art itself, in Indian thought, is taken as an expression of the divine and “satyam, śivam, sundaram” is the description of the highest spirit. These western scholars have a tendency to make bold observations with an intention at times, as we see in lesser names, of course not Gnoli, to disturb the rhythm and put things out of balance. There was no second opinion about the fact that art was acceptable only for the sake of life and that art was a step towards the divine. Art-experience therefore was also held closer, if not a variety of divine mystical experience. The very fact that Bharata seeks the origin of Nāṭya from divine source clears this objective. Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka was vocal but may be he had predecessors who were perhaps more vocal about this. The verses quoted by Mahimā from Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka as seen above could have been from a common source that was a sacred heritage for all Indian thinkers. And ‘camatkāra’ can be translated as ‘divine surprise’.

**We will now turn to what Abhinavagupta himself has to say concerning rasa-experience.** But it may be noted beforehand that A.G. has welcomed much of what Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka has observed. But for the present we will look for the reasons why A.G. does not accept Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka’s authority in full without questioning. Abhinavagupta’s main objection to the thesis of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka seems to be against

the use of the word “bhoga” used in a special sense by Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka. He observes that the pūrvapakṣa or objector’s views denounced by Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka stands rejected in its own. Even A.G. agrees to this rejection of Lollaṭa’s and Śaṅkuka’s views. But coming to Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka’s own view A.G. observes :— “tatra pūrvapakṣōyam bhaṭṭa-lollaṭa-pakṣānabhyupagamād eva nābhyupagata iti tad dūṣaṇam anutthānōpahatam eva. pratīyā”di-vyatiriktaś ca saṃsāre ko bhoga iti na vidmaḥ.” (pp. 11, Gnoli, ibid)-

“In this exposition, the thesis confuted by Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka are accepted even by us—simply because we do not accept the thesis of Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa. Thus the errors confuted by Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka have been definitely put to death.

As for the rest we do not see what kind of enjoyment distinguishable from perception, etc., can exist in the world.” (Trans. Gnoli., pp. 49. ibid).

If Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka explains this ‘bhoga’ by ‘rasanā’, then this ‘rasanā’ is also a sort of “pratīti”, perception or apprehension. Of course, due to difference in the shade of meaning, new term can be coined. There are other terms also such as darśana, anumiti, śruti, upamiti, pratibhāna, etc. : “rasaneti cet sāpi pratipattir eva, kevalam upāya-vailakṣaṇyān nāmāntaravat.” (pp. 11, Gnoli, ibid, Abh.)

“If you say it is tasting (rasanā), we reply that this too is a perception, and is only called by another name on account of particular means (upāya) by which it is called into existence. The same thing happens in the case of direct perception (darśana), reasoning (anumāna), the revealed word (śruti), analogy (upamiti), intuition (pratibhāna), etc., each of which takes a different name.”

Gnoli adds a foot-note (No. 4 pp. 49, ibid) and observes on “pratibhāna”—“The term pratibhā, pratibhāna, is used in several senses, (cf. Introd. pp. XLVIII ff.) In the present passage, it has the sense of “an inexplicable intuition as to what may occur in the future, for example, “Tomorrow my brother will come.” It also includes the power of understanding all kinds of sounds without effort, all that may be communicated by an animal in the world and also the power of having heavenly visions.” (Dasgupta, H.I. Ph., V. 127) This particular form of consciousness is discussed by Jayanta, Nyāyamañjarī (Benares) 1936, pp. 97. ff.

Abhinavagupta’s second objection against Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka is when the latter rejects both ‘utpatti’ and ‘abhivyakti’. A.G. holds that rasa is an object of our experience and if we reject the case of ‘utpatti’ i.e. of its being caused, then we should accept that it is pūrvā-siddha i.e. having pre-existence and in that case its ‘abhivyakti’ or manifestation has to be accepted. If it is held that rasa is not manifested then the position of its being caused (utpatti) has to be accepted. For

if both 'utpatti' and 'abhivyakti' are rejected at a time, then rasa will be beyond any apprehension, i.e. it will be "a-prameya." Thus rasa will be a non-entity, i.e. it will be "a-siddha", for there is no third option seen in this case. : "niṣpādanābhivyakti-dvayāna-bhyupagame ca nityo vāsan vā rasa, iti na tṛtīyā gatiḥ syāt." (pp. 11, Gnoli, ibid).

"Besides, if we do not admit that rasa is produced or manifested, we shall be forced to conclude that it is either eternal or non-existent : no third possibility exists." (Tran. Gnoli, pp. 49)

A.bh. further observes : "na ca apratītaṃ vastu asti vyavahāre yogyam. athócyate pratītir asya bhogīkaraṇam, tac ca druty ādi, svarūpam. tad astu, tathāpi na tāvan mātram. yāvanto hi rasās tāvā"tya eva rasanā"tmānaḥ pratītayo bhogīkaraṇa-svabhāvāḥ. guṇānām cāṅgāṅgi-vaicitryam anantaṃ kalpyam iti kā tritvena iyattā."— (Gnoli, pp. 11. ibid).

"Again, the existence of an unperceived thing cannot be affirmed. The supporters of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka will perhaps reply that the perception of rasa is just what they call the power of bringing about enjoyment (bhogīkaraṇa)—consisting in the states of fluidity, etc. Very well, then ! But it is impossible that it should consist solely in these three states. For there exist just as many forms of perception—whose nature, according to you, lies in this very power of bringing about fruition—consisting of a relish, as there are kinds of Rasa. Besides, the constituent elements, sattva, etc., can be found set out in an infinite number of different ways : one may predominate at one time and another at another. Thus it is absurd to limit the forms of relish to only three."— (Trans. Gnoli, pp. 49, 50, ibid).

It may be noted that though for the sake of argument A.G. has denounced Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka's position that there is neither 'utpatti' nor 'abhivyakti' of rasa, but in fact he himself accepts the extra-ordinariness, a-laukikatva, of rasa which is not to be met with in worldly context. We will see that he will observe, "na dṛṣam" iti bhūṣam etat, na dūṣaṇam." But this alaukikatva, for A.G. is best expressed by the term 'abhivyakti' through "vyañjanā", which covers up both bhāvakatva and bhojakatva of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, thus avoiding the contingency of what is termed "gaurava-doṣa". We will see this in greater details later.

Third point that A. G. finds objectionable in Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka's thesis is as noted above the three states of consciousness, vig. fluidity (druti), enlargement (vistara) and expansion (vikāsa). We have noted above that A.G. observes that there can be as many states as are rasas and the proportion in the combination of sattva, rajas

and tamas the three constituent elements can give rise to a number of varieties. But again here we can argue that Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka mentions just three states from the practical point of view. Major states could be these three while the possibility of minor combinations and innumerable states cannot be denied theoretically. From the point of view of workable classification, perhaps Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka has enumerated three states of consciousness which are obvious and born of self-discrimination.

However, Abhinavagupta shows tremendous respect for Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka also. He accepts “bhāvanā” in the sense of “making anything an object of apprehension which is of the type of tasting i.e. rasanā-vyapāra.” Abhinavagupta welcomes the statement of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka contained in a given verse, because here rasa is said to be ‘kāvyārtha.’ Rasa is Kāv्यārtha, is of the nature of tasting, is the object of highest consciousness (para-saṁvitti-gocaraḥ), and is born by the combination of bhāvas i.e. vibhāvā”di-s.

A.bh. observes : (pp. 11, 12; Gnoli, ibid) : “bhāvanā-bhāvya eśōpi śṛṅgārā”di-gaṇōpi yat,” iti tu yat kāvyena bhāvante rasā ity ucyate, tatra vibhāvā”di-janita-carvaṇā”tmakā”svāda-rūpa-pratyaya-gocaratā”pādanam eva yadi bhāvanam tad abhyupagamyata eva. yat tūktam-

“bhāva-saṁyojanā-vyaṅgya-  
para-saṁvitti-gocaraḥ,  
āsvādanātmānubhava  
rasaḥ kāvyārtha ucyate.”

iti tatra vyajyamānatayā vyaṅgyo rakṣyate. anubhavana ca tad-viṣaya iti mantavyam”-

(Trana. Gnoli, pp. 50, 51, ibid) : “However, if the word “revelation” in the expression “the Rasas are revealed by the poem” (what Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka says is : “The various rasa-s, the etotic etc., are revealed by the power of revelation”), is used in the sense that the poem becomes the matter of a tasting made up of gustation, and which is generated by the determinants, etc., it may be accepted without any question.

Again in the stanza, “Rasa is, it is said, the aim of poetry (kāvyārtha), it is an experience (anubhava) consisting of tasting and is the matter of cognition by not ordinary form of consciousness (para-saṁ-vitti), manifested (vyaṅgya) by the union of the determinants, etc.,” Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka apparently considers Rasa as manifested so that the theory of manifestation is rather maintained then discarded. By the word “experience”, we must really understand the object of it.”

Here, the discussion on the views of the pūrvā-cārya-s i.e. the predecessors ends in the A.bh. We saw that Lollaṭa's view was refuted by Śaṅkuka and Śaṅkuka's stand was refuted by Tauta. The main objection against Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka was against "bhoga", which he held as different from all types of perception,

**All these thinkers have contributed in their own way to the cause of aesthetics.** The result is that the thinking on rasa-niṣpatti was raised to higher and higher level. It is true that the relation of poet's world with the real worldly context gives the cultured reader or spectator-the sāmājika-the expertise to catch the mental feelings in their true perspective. The poet's world has a sound foundation in form of practical world. Insistence on this point could be the basic contribution of Lollaṭa. On the other hand Śrī Śaṅkuka lays greater stress on the inferential process concerning the understanding and apprehension of feelings based on the similarity between the world of the poet and the practical world. Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka insists on the all acceptable and rich fact of "sādhāraṇī-karaṇa" i.e. generalisation, better termed de-individualisation. But we can trace the roots of this thought current even in Bharata. What is fresh about Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka's thesis is that he has projected bhāvakatva-vyāpāra that brings about sādhāraṇīkaraṇa. This is equivalent to the presence of guṇas and alaṃkāras in poetry with absence of doṣas, and it operates through the medium of four-fold representation -caturvidha-abhinaya-in drama. But as we will go to see, when Abhinavagupta will explain, that virtually this bhāvakatva-vyāpāra is covered up by the vyañjanā-vyāpāra as supported by the great Ānandavardhana. And this vyañjanāvyaṅgya was projected by theorists quite earlier than the bhāvakatva-vyāpāra. The difference if any, is in name only. Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka's "bhoga" also does not fall beyond the scope of rasa-pratīti, and this is clearly explained by Abhinavagupta as noticed by us earlier. Of course the mental states of druti, vistara, and vikāsa following rasa-experience could be taken as an important contribution of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, but we feel that the uselessness of recognising only three mental states as argued by Abhinavagupta is quite convincing and virtually the mental state, peri passu with rasa-experience, and following the same, could be covered up by the acceptance of Śānta-rasa or mahārāsa as ably supported by Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta,. Again, the concepts of druti, vistara, vikāsa can be correlated with the concept of mādhyamā-di guṇas as supported by the dhvanivādins. True, with further research, Abhinavagupta has accepted some of the basic concepts or ideas advocated by Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, and some, though not accepted, are, in turn, accepted by Abhinavagupta in a new guise. Thus the area of differences between Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka



and Abhinavagupta narrows down to a great extent. It is possible that Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka was either a young contemporary, or immediately posterior to Ānandavardhana, so, when Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka raised his voice against the all-covering genius of Ānandavardhana and drafted his "Hṛdaya-darpaṇa" for the demolition of dhvani, i.e. dhvani-dhvaṃsa, perhaps it was more a personality clash than theoretical differences. For, when we carefully analyse the bhāvakatva-vyāpāra as supported or, say, projected by Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, the net result is that, in poetry, it patters out to be merely doṣa-hāna and guṇālaṃkāra-grahaṇa, which could be covered up by abhidhā-or vyācya-vācaka-bhāva to a great extent and vyañjanā to some extent, and in drama it is equivalent only to the four-fold-representation. Drama is an art which has acting as its medium and this acting has natal relations with both abhidhā and vyañjanā. Ānandavardhana has attached supreme importance to these word-powers. But when he observed that word and sense in poetry, activated by these powers attains the potentiality of rasa-suggestion, he went a step further and whatever was not directly stated or established by Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka in plain words was rendered clear by Ānandavardhana. But for reasons of his own, Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka picked up a quarrel with Ānandavardhana, placed a cross on vyañjanā accepted by thinkers of yore, and tried to put a new name, or new label called "bhāvakatva." Virtually he served old wine in a new bottle with some disadvantage of invoking "gaurava-doṣa." Why Ānandavardhana called this word-power of suggestion by the name of vyañjanā is clear from the history and usage of this word, as seen earlier by us, in ancient literature beginning with the vedas and then vedāṅgas, both nirukta and vyākaraṇa, and then down to Pāṇini, Kātyāyana, Patañjali and on top of all, the actual practice of ancient poets beginning with Vyāsa, Vālmīki, Kālidāsa and the rest. Again. Ānandavardhana must have received inspirations from Bharata also who has used abhi+√vyaj at a number of places in the same sense as understood by the dhvanivādins. So what remains on the part of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka is only his wrong insistence on giving a new name to an age-old brand. To remove one word-power called vyañjanā he has to project two powers called bhāvakatva and bhojakatva, thus crossing the limits, beauty and grace of brevity, and inviting "gaurava-doṣa". His "bhojakatva-vyāpāra" stands nullified on the ground that "rasa-bhoga" is nothing but a sort of "rasa-pratīti", and this fact cannot be denied. Or, we may put this slightly differently. May be, Ānandavardhana following the vyākaraṇa-darśana and its "sphoṭa" concept, supported and promulgated the concept of vyañjanā, and as against this, Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, following the plea of the Mīmāṃsā darśana, supported and promulgated

the concept of “bhāvanā”, and voted for “bhāvakatva.” Reality is that vyañjanā serves the purpose of both bhāvakatva and bhojakatva taken together.

Before examining the rasa-theory as advanced by Abhinavagupta, certain observations emerge on their own at the outset, which are corroborated as seen earlier even by Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka. Abhinavagupta depicts or explains rasa as “kāvyārtha”-“tat kāvyārtho rasah.”-A.bh. (pp. 272, Edn. K. kris.- G.O.S. vol. I, '92). The A.bh. (ch. VII, pp. 337, *ibid*) further notes — *tatra ca padārtha vākyārthau raseṣv eva paryavasyata ity a-sādhāranyāt prādhānyāc ca kāvyasya arthāḥ rasāḥ. arthyante prādhānyena ity arthāḥ. na tv artha-śabdō abhidheya-vācī (api tu prayojana-vācī). sva-śabda-anabhidheyatvaṃ hi rasādīnāṃ dhvanikārādibhir darśitam.*” Abhinavagupta (pp. 272, *ibid*) (ch. VI. NS. A.bh.)- quotes from Bharata :- “kāvyārthān bhāvayanti iti.” It may be noted that Dr. K. Krishna-moorthy in his writing elsewhere, reads (api tu prayojanavācī) and this added note, we do not find in the printed G.O.S. Edn. We do not know the source of this added remark by Dr. K. Krishnamoorthy though it is exactly implied and therefore welcome.

**Sādhāraṇīkaraṇa** : We have observed that Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka had mentioned sādhāraṇīkaraṇa-vyāpāra prevailing in poetry. To explain this on practical grounds, Abhinavagupta seeks an illustration from Mīmāṃsā darśana. This explanation is served first in practical and then in religious context by Abhinavagupta, to effect clarity of thinking. Just as Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka had sought inspiration for his bhāvakatva-vyāpāra from the concept of Bhāvanā in the Mīmāṃsā darśana, Abhinavagupta also turns to the same Mīmāṃsā darśana to seek inspiration. Thus, he quotes two śruti injunctions such as “rātrim āsata” and “tām aganu prādāt.” In these two statements the meaning is primarily restricted with reference to individual, number and time. But when a qualified person-adhikārin- who has relevance with the śruti injunction (i.e. who has arthitā) listens to these injunctions, a further extended meaning dawns upon his mind-“adhikā pratipattiḥ.”-and in this higher apprehension the limitations of time, number, individual etc. get removed. He understands a further meaning such as “I will sit”, “I will offer in fire” etc. According to various schools, this perception is called propulsion (bhāvanā), command (vidhi), order (niyoga), etc.

Gnoli (pp. 52, ft. note no-4) explains : “In other words, some scriptural sentences (e.g. those quoted), awaken in the believer the need to give the omentum to the fire himself, etc. In this sense, their literal meaning undergoes a transformation : the past tense and the third person, etc., used in these sentences are turned into the present tense etc. There arises in the heart of the believer the

form of consciousness (pratipatti), "I will give the omentum to the fire." This passing from one sense to another is given the names of propulsion (bhāvanā), order and command (vidhi, nyioga). The terms bhāvanā, vidhi, and nyioga, are proper to the liturgical speculations of mīmāṃsā (the term 'bhāvanā' used by Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka was probably taken from the terminology of the pūrva-mīmāṃsā). The terms 'vidhi' and 'nyioga' observes J. T. Ā. I, p. 167, are used above all by followers of Prabhākara; Kumārila's disciples prefer instead the word 'bhāvanā.' The shift of sense involved, of course, presupposes the adherence of the subject to the sacred writings, his desire to attain certain ends, etc. This shift of sense is clearly explained in three ślokaś quoted by H.C., pp. 98 (no doubt taken from a work on poetics existing prior to A.G., perhaps the Hṛdaya-darpaṇa of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka. [Before we quote the verses, we place our disagreement with Gnoli. The verses could not be from Hṛdaya-darpaṇa. Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka was favourably inclined towards Mīmāṃsā Śāstra and therefore the Śṛti-vākyas quoted by A.G., or similar other could be in the Hṛdaya-darpaṇa. Actually H.C. did not belong to the dāṛśanika faith and hence he could have given these verses from some other source with popular basis.]

(The verses in H.C. read as-)

"ārogyam āptavān sām̐baḥ  
stutvā devam aharpatim,  
syād arthāvagatiḥ pūrvam  
ity ādi-vacane yathā."  
tataś cōpātta-kālā"di-  
nyakkāreṇōpajāyate,  
pratipattur manasy evaṃ  
pratipattir na saṃśayaḥ,  
yaḥ kōpi bhāskaraṃ stauti  
sa sarvōpy agado bhavet,  
tasmād aham api staumi  
roga-nirmuktaye ravim."

"In the sentence "Sām̐ba regained his health when he praised the Sun-god", etc. there occurs at first the perception of its literal sense, and then (and on this there is no matter of doubt) there arises in the mind of the perceiving subject a

perception, which eliminates the temporal data, etc., assumed by the sentence in question. This perception is presented in the following form : “Every one who praises the Sun regains his health; so I too will praise the Sun, so as to free myself from disease.” Cf. I. PV. V., I. p. 24; I. P. V., I. p. 27.

The words in the A.bh. read as : (pp. 12, 13 A.bh., Gnoli, *ibid*) –“yathā hi “rātrim āsata”, “tām agnau prādāt” ity ādāv arthitā”di-lakṣitasya adhikāriṇaḥ pratipattimātrād ati-tivra-prarocitāt prathama-pravṛttād anantaram adhikaivópātta-kāla-tiraskāreṇaiva “āsai” “pradadāni” ity ādi-rūpā saṁkramaṇā”di-svabhāvā yathādarśanaṁ bhāvanā-vidhi-niyogā”di-bhāṣābhīr vyavahṛtā pratipattiḥ, tathaiva kāvyā”tmakād api śabdād adhikāriṇódhikā asti pratipattiḥ. adhikārī cátra vimāla-pratibhāna-śāli-hṛdayaḥ.”

(Trans. Gnoli., pp. 52, 53, *ibid*) :—

“For instance, immediately after the first perception of the literal sense of the following expressions, “They lay by night,” “He gave it (scil, the omentum) to the fire,” there occurs (in a qualified person (adhikārin), characterized by a certain pragmatic requirement (arthitā) and so on, and possessed of a keen interest in the object of perception involved, a second perception eliminating the temporal data, etc., contained in the first. This second perception consists in a transfer (saṁkramaṇa), etc., of the literal sense and is presented in the form : “I will lay,” “I will give”, etc. According to the various schools, this perception is called propulsion (bhāvanā), command (vidhi), order (niyoga), etc. Now, a similar thing may be said to happen in the case of poetry : there occurs in a qualified person a perception transcending the words of a poem. The qualified person is in this case any person whose heart possesses a spotless power of intuition (pratibhāna).”—. In short to the Saḥṛdaya, the poetic meaning flashes forth in an unrestricted form.

**Saḥṛdaya** : Abhinavagupta calls the adhikārin with reference to poetry or art, by the name sa-hṛdaya. The idea is that sādharmaṇīkaraṇa takes place only in the context of a saḥṛdaya. Thus “saḥṛdayatā”-having a sympathetic heart - is a quality which is the first requirement in the kāvyā-bhāvanā i.e. appreciation, enjoyment of poetry. Abhinavagupta therefore puts great stress on this quality. He observes as seen above : “adhikārī cátra vimāla-pratibhāna-śāli-hṛdayaḥ.”, or one who possesses a heart or one whose heart shines, with the light of spotless intuition. Thus, the heart of the adhikārin is like a spotless mirror. All those who have the capacity to appreciate poetry are said to be –“sa-hṛdaya” or one having a compassionate heart, in whom sympathetic heart has flowered-; who are hṛdaya-saṁvāda-bhāg-i.e. gifted with artistic sympathy of heart.—

**Rasa-svabhāva** : while dealing with the nature of rasa A.G. first explains the process of sādharmaṇīkaraṇa, and how a sa-hṛdaya experiences rasa. He takes an illustration from the Abhijñāna-śākuntala of Kālidāsa viz. “grīvābhaṅgābhirāmam muhur anupatati...” etc. (Ab. śā. I. 7). He also quotes from Kumāra-saṁbhava and cites two illustrations viz. “umāpi...” (Kumāra. III. 62), and “haras tu kiñcit...” (Kumāra. VI. 67) The first illustration suggests the bhayānaka rasa and the other two illustrate the śṛṅgāra-rasa. The rasa-process proceeds as follows.— First of all the primary or denotated meaning of “grīvābhaṅgābhirāma...” etc. becomes clear to the sensitive reader. Then follows the next apprehension which is mental—“mānasī”. In this apprehension, the spatio-temporal limitations are removed. The youngone of the deer that is perceived is not perceived as an individual youngone of a deer which is terrified. After this there is apprehension of bhayānaka-rasa itself in which the limitations of space, time, individuality etc. are removed. We find similarity of case as was observed in the illustrations quoted from the Śruti. But here we go a step further. The bhayānaka-rasa that is perceived here does not terrify the onlooker, nor does he have a feeling that some third neutral person is also terrified. Thus this apprehension is beyond the touch of a particular individual. So, the feeling of pleasure (sukha), pain (duḥkha) etc. is removed and hence there is no inclination either to grab or avoid something (hānōpādāna-buddhi). Actually the feeling individually of pleasure and pain, or to have a feeling to possess or disown, are considered to be obstacles to rasa-experience. Thus perception of rasa is different from any worldly perception, for in the latter there are obstacles such as nija-sukhādi-vivaśībhāva, etc. Here the perception of bhayānaka-rasa is vīta-vighnā i.e. free from obstacles. Thus it is felt as if ‘rasa’ is entering the heart, dancing before the eyes, etc. This process marked in case of this illustration of bhayānaka-rasa, is common to all other rasas such as the śṛṅgāra and the like.

The A.bh. reads as follows : (pp. 13, Gnoli, ibid) :- “adhikārī cātra vimala-pratibhāna-śāli-hṛdayaḥ. tasya ca “grīvābhaṅgā”bhirāmam” iti, “umāpi nīlālaka...,” iti “haras tu kiñcit” ityā”di-vākyebhyo vākyārtha-pratīter anantaram mānasī sāksātkārā”mikā, apahastita-tat-tad-vākyōpātta-kālā”di-vibhāgā, tāvat pratītir upajāyate. tasyām ca yo mṛga-potakā”dir bhāti tasya viśeṣa -rūpatvābhāvād bhīta iti, trāsakasyāpāramarthaikatvād bhayam eva param deśakālādy anā”līṅgitam, tata eva bhītōham bhītōyam śatrur vayasyo madhyastho vetyā”di-pratyayebhyo duḥkha-sukhā”di-kṛta-hānā”di-buddhy-antarodaya-niyamavattayā vighna-bahulebhyo vilakṣaṇam nirvighna-pratīti-grāhyam sāksād iva hṛdaye nivīśamānam cakṣuṣor iva viparivartamānam bhayānako rasah.”

Gnoli translates : (pp. 53, 54, etc. *ibid*) : “The qualified person is in this case any person whose heart possesses a spotless power of intuition (*pratibhāna*). In such a person hearing the following phrases, “There he (*scil.*, the deer) is now, gracefully by the bending of his neck...”, “Even Umā, dropping the golden *Karṇikāra* “The firmness of Hara....”, there appears, immediately after the perception of their literal sense, a perception of different order (an inner-*[mānasī]* perception) consisting in a direct experience [*sākṣātkāra*] which completely eliminates the temporal distinction, etc. assumed by these sentences. Besides, the young deer, etc., which appears in this perception is devoid of its particularity (*viśeṣa*), and at the same time, the actor, who [playing the role of the deer] frightens [the spectators] *trāsaka*, showing to be afraid, is unreal (*a-pāramārthika*). [please note that Gnoli has given an awkward explanation of “*trāsaka*.” The simple thing is that just as the deer is robbed of his particularity, in the same way the *trāsaka*, i.e. the terrifier, i.e. *Duṣyanta* in this case, also loses his particularity. This explanation is given by *Viśveśvarjee* also; we do the same.]

–As a result, what there appears is simply and solely fear -fear in itself, uncircumscribed by time, space, etc. This perception of fear is of a different order from the ordinary perceptions (“I am afraid, he-my enemy, my friend, anybody)-is afraid”); for these are necessarily affected by the appearance of fresh mental movements (of shunning, etc.), consisting of pleasure, pain, etc., and just for this reason are full of obstacles (*vighna*). The sensation of fear above mentioned, on the contrary, is the matter of cognition by a perception devoid of obstacles (*vīta-vighna*), and may be said to enter directly (*niviś*) into our hearts, to dance (*viparivṛt*) before our eyes : this is the terrible *rasa*-”

In “*mānasī sākṣāt-kārātmikā* (*pratītiḥ*), Gnoli adds in ft. note no. 4, pp. 54. *ibid*;- “Like the sensation of pleasure, pain, etc., the aesthetic experience is an inner or mental perception (*mānasapratyakṣa*) , i.e. it is perceived through the mind or inner self. Such a perception is self-knowing (*sva-samvedana-siddha*). In the A.bh. pp. 29/, A.G. observes that the fact of tasting (*āśvādana*); (aesthetic perception being conceived as a particular form of tasting) is of a mental order : it differs from the fact of eating, which is a purely material act (*rasana-vyāpārād bhojanād adhiko yo mānaso vyāpārah sa eva āśvādanam*). The mind of him who tastes must be ‘*ekāgra*’, absorbed in the object of tasting to the exclusion of all else. On the contrary, he who eats may be also “*anya-citta*” : he can also think of other things, etc. Aesthetic tasting is of a non-ordinary nature (*a-laukika*), *sui generis*. The mind is the organ of tasting; during the tasting the mind must be free of all obstacles, devoid, that is to say, of any other sensory perceptions, etc. The subject is immersed

in a “camatkāra” set apart from any distinction of ‘self’, or ‘others’. Aesthetic tasting is a “generalised” perception and free therefore, of obstacles (in the A.bh., I. p. 291), the expression “āsvādayanti manasā” N.S. VI. v. 36; is commented upon in the following manner : ā samantāt sādharmaṇībhāvena nirvighna-pratipattivaśān manasā indriyāntara-vighna-sambhāvanā-sūnyena svādayanti sva-para-viveka-sūnya-svāda-camatkāra-paravaśā....)”

On “apahastita-tat-tad-vākyōpātta-kālā”di-vibhāgā”, Gnoli observes (ft. note, 1, pp. 55, *ibid*) : “In other words, the spectator (and hence the state of consciousness by which he is pervaded) is not in the real time and space either of the deer or of the actor as such. In the aesthetic experience, these two temporal and spatial orders cancel each other out. On the other hand, therefore, the deer, etc. is without any temporal or spatial determination (viz. it is not felt as an element of ordinary life but is perceived in a generalised form); similarly, the actor, and hence the impression of fear which he suggests, is not perceived as a constituent element of practical life. The state of consciousness which does occur is, therefore, unaffected by space and time; it is a generalized permanent mental state.”

An interesting note is also added by Gnoli (ft. note, 1, pp. 56, *ibid*) on the word “viparivartamānam” : –“viparivṛt”-means to move, to revolve, etc. The use of the word is ancient. It is to be found in Bhartṛhari (I., 125, *ṭikā*, p. 125 (ed. of Lahore) : “buddhau viparivartate.” In the same sense (that is, with buddhau) it is used by Dharma-Kīrti and Kumarila also. A.G. comments on the word ‘viparivartamānasya’ in the following way (I. P. V., II, p. 140) : “vicitratvena viśvasya bhedābhedā”tmanā parivartamānasya spandanena sphurato....”–

Abhinavagupta further observes that during rasa-experience the self of the sāmājika is neither absolutely negated nor presented in its particularity. What is implied by this is that the sāmājika comes out of his small particularity and grows higher in self and thus he is not presented as a small individual-viśeṣatayā-i.e. one covered by limited ego, but at the same time he himself is the enjoyer of rasa and thus his I-ness is not totally erased. All who observe the performance of such feelings as śoka or grief, or who taste such feelings as narrated in poetry, have an identical experience. Thus the generality-sādhārya-is not limited to a single spectator but is extended or wider, and it can be equated with the invariable concomitance between smoke and fire. In this experience which is like a direct experience-sākṣātkāra-the nourishing material is provided by the actor etc. In this sāmāgrī or combination, generality is nourished because the limiting factors such as time, space, individual enjoyer, etc. get removed. So all the sāmājikas have an identical

solid apprehension resulting in nourishment of rasa. This becomes possible with reference to all sāmājikas taken together because the mind of all of them are imprinted or coloured with permanent mental states that have no beginning. This sort of apprehension which is free from obstacles-nirvighnā samvit-is itself camatkāra, a sort of divine surprise. This camatkāra is a mental attitude-‘mānasa adhyavasāya’, or it is the capacity of the mind to arrage together different things so as to create a whole design. It is termed samkalpa, smṛti etc. also. But it is not smṛti or recollection of the logicians. It is the ‘smṛti’ so termed by Kālidāsa in the line : tac cetasā smarati nūnam a-bodha-pūrvam, bhāvasthirāṇi jananaṅtara-sauhrdāni.”-

This smṛti does not rest on things experienced beforehand. Its another name is “pratibhāna”. Its nature is of “sakṣātkāra” or direct experience. Viewed from any angle this apprehension is of the nature of taste and pure ‘rati’ and other feelings get reflected in it. This apprehension which is of the nature of taste is not conditioned by any particularity, or by any other particular object. It is neither “indescribable” nor, “similar to worldly ordinary apprehension”—i.e. it is neither “a-nirvācyā” nor “laukika-tulyā”, nor also of the nature of superimposition—“tad āropā”ditulyā”. As there is absence of any limitation of space, time and particularity, this apprehension may be called, from a certain angle, of the form of enhancement i.e. ‘upacayāvasthā astu’ It can be also thought of as a sort of viśaya-sāmagrī-combination of different elements, when viewed from the angle of vijñāna-vādin. But, in short from all points of view rasa may be called a feeling collected in the absence of all obstacles.

The A.bh. (pp. 14, Gnoli, ibid) reads as—“sarvathā tāvad eṣāsti pratītir āsvādā”tmā, yasyām ratir eva bhāti. tata eva viśeṣāntarānupahitatvāt sā rasanīyā satī na laukikī, na mithyā, nānirvācyā, na laukika-tulyā, na tadāropā”dirūpā.

eṣaiva cōpacayāvasthās tu deśādy anīyantraṇāt anukārōpy astu bhāvānugāmitayā karaṇāt. viśaya-sāmagry api bhavatu vijñāna-vādāvalambanāt sarvathā rasanā”tmaka-vīta-vighna-pratīti-grahyo bhāva eva rasah”.

(Trans. Gnoli, pp. 60, 61, ibid) :

“In any case, however, it is a form of perception-a perception in which what appears is (just a feeling, for instance) delight, consisting of a tasting. For this reason, i.e. because it is not conditioned by further specifications, this perception is apt to become the object of a relish, and, as such, it is neither a form of ordinary cognition, nor is it erroneous, nor, ineffable, nor like ordinary perception, nor does it consist of a superimposition. To conclude we may say equally well that it consists of a state of intensification, -using this term to indicate that it is not limited by



space, etc; that it is a reproduction-using this word to mean that it is a production which repeats the feelings; and that it is a combination of different elements-this conception being interpreted in the light of the doctrine of the vijñānavādin. From which ever point of view it is examined, Rasa is, in any case, simply and sloely, a mental state which is the matter of cognition on the part of a perception without obstacles and consisting in relish.”-

We can see in this epistemological observation on the part of Abhinavagupta that he accepts and incorporates the views of his predecessors such as Lollata, Śaṅkuka and the rest by slightly modifying the same. For him rasa is a perception from which all obstacles concerning space, time, particularity etc. are removed and it is of the form of taste, pure and simple. This rasa-perception is termed differently by names such as, camatkāra, nirveśa, rasanā, āsvādana, bhoga, samāpatti, laya, and viśrānti,

We may take note of the fact here that the views stated above reflect - Abhinavagupta's own view on rasa. The fact of sādharmaṇīkaraṇa, in his view, is welcomed from both Bharata and Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka. Abhinavagupta's own contribution is this that he has called rasa to be a perception free from obstacles. In view of this he has a detailed discussion on the obstacles; their nature and all the procedure to remove each one of them. He enumerates seven such obstacles with the devices to avoid or remove them. We will look into it a little later. But, while dealing with the sixth obstacle, he establishes both sthayin-s and vyabhicārins on the basis of psychology. Actually the chewing of these emotions and feelings form the stuff of rasa-carvaṇā. So, we will also examine their nature and form as Abhinavagupta has explained.

But before we look into this we may take note of what Gnoli has explained at given points in the A.bh. On the expression : “tathāvidhe hi bhaye, nātmātyanta-tiraskṛto na viśeṣata ullikhitah.” Gnoli (ft. note 2, pp. 56, ibid) observes :-

“In the first case there would be no aesthetic cognition, but mystical cognition, characterized by the total absence of discursive thought and distinct apprehensions (vikalpa). In the second case, ordinary discursive cognition would occur. In both these cases, then, the “ubhaya-deśa-kāla-tyāgaḥ” required by the aesthetic experience would be absent. cf. the Nāṭyadarpaṇa by Rāmacandra and Guṇacandra, Baroda, 1929, p. 161. For the antithesis between ātman and ‘para’ cf. PTV., pp. 71-72; atra hi madhyama-pāde ātmaiva samśṛṇute nāparaḥ....ātmnā eva śravaṇam syāt na parasya...”

Again, on the expression in the A.bh. vig. “tata eva na parimitam eva sādharanyam api tu vitatam, vyāptigraha iva dhūmāgnyor ...” etc., Gnoli observes (ft. note, no. 3, pp. 56, 57, *ibid*) :— “The best explanation of this passage is to be found in the IPV., II, 4, 12 : iha tu darśana vyāpti-grahaṇāvasthāyām yāvantas tad-deśa-sambhāvyamāna-sadbhāvaḥ pramātāras tāvatām ekósau dhūmā”bhāsaś ca vahnyā”bhāsaś ca bāhyānaye iva, tāvati teṣām parameśvareṇaikyam nirmītam.” K. C. Pandey, *Bhāskari* vol. III. p. 178. translates : “But according to this system, at the time of forming the idea of invariable concomitance, the images of smoke and fire are common to all perceivers, who can possibly have their existence at that place [i.e. in the kitchen, etc.], as according to those who admit the existence of an external objective world. For, in relation to these images, the Lord [i.e. Īśvara, the unlimited Ego. etc.] has made the subjects one.” A.G. observes that the pleasure given by a spectacle increases when there are a large number of spectators. In other words, when each spectator is conscious that the spectacle is being seen at the same time by a number of other people T. Ā. X. v. 85, ff :

“tathā hy ekāgra-sakala-  
 sāmājika-janeṣitam,  
 nṛttaṃ gītaṃ sudhāsāra-  
 sāgaratvena manyate.”  
 tata evocyate malla-  
 nata-prekṣōpadeśane  
 sarvapramāṭṛ-tādātmyam  
 pūrṇa-rūpānubhāvakam.  
 tāvanmātrārtha-saṃvṛtti  
 tuṣṭaḥ pratyekaśo yadi.  
 kaḥ sambhūya guṇas teṣām  
 pramāṭṛyaikyam bhavec ca kim.  
 yadā tu tat-tad-vedyatva-  
 dharma-saṃdarbha-garbhitam,  
 tad-vastu śuṣkāḍ prāgrūpād  
 anyad yuktam idaṃ tadā.”

“The spectators who watch, absorbed, a performance of dancing, of singing, etc., feel that it is a real sea of nectar (J. comments : “anyone, in fact, can observe that spectacles seen by many people at the same time generate a greater pleasure than those which are seen by a single individual. (It is for this reason that those who teach the true nature of performances of wrestling and acting, say that, in these, a real state of identity of all knowing subjects takes place; this state generates a perception of a full and perfect beatitude (J. comments : *pūrṇa-rūpēti iyad eva hi pūrṇam rūpaṃ yad vikalita-vedyāntaratayā tatraivānanyā*”*kāṅkṣatvena parāmarśanaṃ nāma*).

If the mere consciousness of what they see on the stage (without, that is, the realization that the performance is seen by other people) were sufficient to satisfy the spectators taken one by one, how then can the different state of consciousness, which arises when they are together, be explained ? And how could it still be sustained that a state of identity of knowing subjects exists ? When, instead, the spectator is aware that the spectacle is seen at the same time by all others also, one can say with reason that it appears in a different form from the arid aspect it had before (this spectacle, then, observes J., takes in another nature which generates a very high ‘*camatkāra*’).”. See on all that the *Introd.* pp. XXXVII. ff. In A.G. the expression ‘*vitata-vyāpti*’ etc. occurs elsewhere also, and not always in a technical sense (See f.i. Dh. *Ā.L.*, p. 378; A.Bh. *G.O.S.* pp. 110, 136)

We will now proceed with the seven obstacles enumerated by A. G. and the devices for their removal. The A.bh. observes (: Gnoli, pp. 14, 15, *ibid*)– “*tathā hi loke... sakala-vighna-vinirmuktā samvittir eva camatkāra-nirveśa-rasanā-āsvādana-bhoga-samāpatti-laya-viśrānti ādi-śabdair abhidhīyate.*

vighnās ca asyām- (1) *pratipattāv ayogyatā sambhāvanā-viraho nāma*, (2) *svagatatva-paragatatva-niyamena deśa-kāla-viśeṣā*”*veśaḥ*, (3) *nija-sukhā*”*divivaśībhāvaḥ*, (4) *pratīty upāya-vaikalyam*, (5) *sphuṭatvābhāvaḥ*, (6) *a-pradhānatā*, (7) *saṃśaya-yogaśca*.”–

(Trans. Gnoli, pp. 62, *ibid*) – “Also in the ordinary world, indeed, the different words *camatkāra*, immersion (*nirveśa*), relish (*rasanā*), tasting (*āsvādana*), enjoyment (*bhoga*), accomplishment (*samāpatti*), lysis (*laya*), rest (*viśrānti*). etc., mean nothing but a [form of] consciousness completely free from any obstacles whatever. Now the obstacles to the perception in question are- (a) the unsuitability, that is to say, the lack of verisimilitude; (b) the immersion in temporal and spatial

determinations perceived as exclusively one's own or exclusively those of another; (c) the fact of being at the mercy of our own sensations of pleasure etc.; (d) the defective state of the means of perception; (e) the lack of evidence; (f) the lack of some prominent factor; (g) and the presence of doubt.

The first blemish is caused by inapt presentation on the part of the poets. He presents something which creates lack of conviction on the part of the sāmājika, who cannot establish contact between his consciousness, including his intelligence and common-sense, with things presented by the writer. The enjoyer feels that all that is presented is just non-sense, which cannot be believed. It is impossible to enjoy art when you just cannot establish any relationship whatsoever with the thing presented. So, this is the first obstacle. It is like "prathamagrāse makṣikā-pātaḥ." No question of rasa-experience can ever arise in such a condition.

The second obstacle concerns people of undevelopped sensitivity, or art-sense. Majority of viewers are like this. When something is presented through art-medium, you have not to take it as something coloured by particularity, time, space etc. In that case you are likely to be either prejudiced against or unduly attached to something presented. If you take the things presented through art medium as connected or disconnected either, personally with you, or with somebody else, enemy, friend or a neutral person, then your responses to art are bound to get coloured. You would like to accept and possess whatever is favourable and would like to reject and hate that which is unfavourable to you in any respect. The pre-condition of art-experience is that you should be a qualified sensitive soul, -vimala-pratibhāna-śāli- sāmājika-; a sa-hṛdaya who can grow beyond limited ego and personal likes and dislikes. If things are taken as connected with individuals, or belonging to this or that time and place, they are likely to thwart genuine art-appeal and hence rasa-experience also. This obstacle squarely rests with the enjoyer who cannot cut through the limitations of his nature and grow into a higher I-ness.

The third obstacle is of a subtler type. Given that you have a capacity to link yourself with universal ego, i.e. to outgrow your limited ego, given that you are a man of cultivated taste and anything low or less noble does not touch you. This means you are qualified for the highest aesthetic experience. But then, you are a human being. Something has happened to you in your personal life and surrounding which has disturbed your balance of equanimity. You are, at worldly level, taken away by the force of some event and this results in your apathy towards everything around you including art-performance. Your personal pleasure or pain

is such that has gagged your taste for artistic enjoyment for the time being and the result is that because of this disturbance at purely physical or psychological level you are not in a mood to enjoy art, even though basically you are an adhikārin. This obstacle also squarely rests with the inner consciousness of the adhikārin. In case of the second obstacle the enjoyer concerned had a low taste, while in this case the taste is not in question but the circumstances have conspired against a qualified art-enjoyer.

The fourth obstacle, the defective state of the means of perception, goes with a number of things. If the presentation cannot be viewed properly, or cannot be heard properly, i.e. if the difficulty lies with production side, or if the spectator has difficulty with vision, hearing, sitting arrangement etc., the art-performance cannot be enjoyed.

The fifth obstacle also results from the same sources i.e. imperfect production, acting, etc. The presentation should be such so as to render clear the intention of presentation. The presentation should be such that it renders the thing such that it is directly experienced, so to say. A.bh. observes : (pp. 16, Gnoli, *ibid*) : “a-sphuṭa-pratītikāri-śabda-līṅga-saṃbhavēpi na pratītir viśrāmyati sphuṭa-pratīti-rūpa-pratyakṣōcita-pratyaya-sākāṅkṣatvāt.”—i.e.—“Even if there may be such verbal testimonies and inferences, as to provoke an evident perception, perception, however, does not rest (in them) because there is, in it, the expectancy of the certainty proper to direct experience, which consists in an evident perception.” (Trans. Gnoli, pp. 68, *ibid*). Gnoli adds ft. note 1, pp. 68, *ibid* : “Even though—thus A. Shankaran, op. cit. p. 106, paraphrases this passage—there may be clear and unmistakable verbal testimony and inference, we do not completely rest content with the knowledge derived therefrom; for therein is lacking that perpetual cognition which alone makes for clear, direct and definite knowledge.” With A-Shankaran, I have read here—“sphuṭa-pratīti-kāri-śabda-līṅga-saṃbhavēpi.” should I have preferred the reading “a-sphuṭa....” the translation would have been : “Even if there may be verbal testimonies and inferences— which as a rule, do not provoke an evident perception—”etc.

We feel that no question arises for this second reading. Actually the obstacle is caused by lack of capacity on the part of the poet, the producer-director and also the actor. Something is basically missing which stops the presentation becoming life-like, as if directly experienced. Anyone from the three mentioned above with his

intuitive insight can make things look like real or directly experienced. This something special can cure this difficulty.

The sixth obstacle is “a-pradhānatā” or the presentation on the part of the poet not centrally focussed. Unity of action, if not also of time and place, is required and the purpose should be kept in focus. Nobody is interested in anything that is not of central attention i.e. which is of central importance. Thus, only one sthāyin or permanent mental state should occupy the central point. Modern specimen of absurd theatre or art does not pay attention to this and does not encourage a central theme. But as we shall try to show the catholicity of art-theory later, we will see how rasa-experience is possible even in such performances that go under the name of absurd poetry or absurd theatre. But at least Abhinavagupta insists on a central motive, to begin with.

The seventh obstacle is a necessary corollary following from the sixth one. ‘saṁśaya-yoga’ is a state when the enjoyer is left in the lurch and he fails to have an exact idea as to what is aimed at by either the poet or the artist. Confusion in understanding or grasping due to confused presentation creates this obstacle.

These seven obstacles in rasa-experience have to be removed before a true rasa-experience follows. Abhinavagupta has himself suggested how these obstacles have to be removed. Let us examine the same. But before we go into any details, it may be underlined that the presentation in a proper way, i.e. the right combination of vibhāvā”di-s is the only and right key to remove these obstacles : “tatra vighnāpasāraṁ vibhāva-prabhrtayah.”

The first obstacle occurs as noticed above by the presentation of unconvincing material. The solution is that only such stuff should be presented for which people have an accepted faith. In things of supernatured exploits only such names should be presented as heroes for whom people have implicit faith. Only Rāma can be credited with constructing a bridge over an ocean, or only a Hanuman can be credited with a jump that crosses an ocean, A.bh. observes : (pp. 15, Gnoli) -ata eva niḥsā-mānyōtkarṣōpadeśa-vyutpatti-prayojane nāṭakā”dau prakhyāta-vastu-viśayatvā”di niyamena nirūpayisyate.

For the removal of the second obstacle, Bharatamuni has suggested the whole pūrva-raṅga. Items in the pūrva-raṅga would help a spectator to come out of his personal mental attitude and would prepare him to enjoy art in an impersonal way. Again, the costumes and settings provided help the cause. All these things help the

spectatos to get into the right mental groove and be part of the generalization process : A.bh. observes (pp. 16, Gnoli, ibid)–

–“...sa eṣa sarvo muninā sādharmaṇībhāva-  
siddhyā rasa-carvaṇópayógitvena  
parikara-bandhaḥ samāśrita, iti  
tatraiva sphuṭī-bhavīṣyati iti tad iha  
tāvan nódyaṁānīyam.”

(Trans. Gnoli, pp. 67, ibid) –“To conclude, all this system of relative and connected matters has been adopted by Bharata, in so far as by virtue of the state of generality produced, it primotes the gustation of rasa....”

To remove the third obstacle of personally indisposed context, various means are adopted to be used at suitable times and places. These include music, both vocal and instrumental, well-decorated halls, well-accomplished courtesans etc. Abhinavagupta observes that in view of the aforementioned state of generality, these expedients- phonic etc.– are such as to be enjoyed by all the spectators and possess such a charming power (upa-rañj) that even an unaesthetic person (a-hṛdaya) reaches limpidity of heart and becomes “possessed of heart” i.e. becomes “sa-hṛdaya”.

The fourth obstacle is basically so apparent that all concerned, the actor, director, producer, poet, etc. can make amends in presentation and bridge the gap.

Actually for the removal of fourth and fifth obstacle, representation of four types (abhinaya), loka-dharmī, vṛttis and pravṛttis are all recommended. A.bh. (pp. 16, 17, Gnoli, ibid) observes : “tasmāt tad ubhaya-vighna-vighāte abhinayā loka-dharmi-vṛtti-pravṛtṭy upaskṛtā samabhiśicyante. abhinayanam hi śabda-līga-vyāpāra-visadṛśam eva pratyakṣa-vyāpāra-kalpam iti niśceṣyāmaḥ.” (Trans. Gnoli., pp. 68, 69, ibid)–“Therefore, to remove these two obstacles, there are –consecrated by tradition–the four modes of representation, furnished with the styles (vṛtti), the local usages (pravṛtti), and the realistic representation. (“loka-dharmī”)

We may note that vṛttis are normally recognised as four by tradition and they are : kaiśikī, sāttvatī, ārabhaṭī, and bhāratī; the pravṛttis are āvantī, dākṣiṇātyā, audra-māgadhi and pāñcālī. Local usages regarding costumes, languages. manners and professions differ in different countries of the world. They are the ‘pravṛtti’ or local colours in drama.

For loka-dharmī, i.e. realistic representation Gnoli (pp. 69, ibid) provides a footnote no. 2, which reads : "For the best explanation, see A.bh. I. 292 : " tatra ye svabhāvata eva nirmala-mukura-hṛdayāḥ, ta eva saṃsārōcita-krodha-mohābhilāṣa-paravaśa-manaso na bhavanti, teṣāṃ tathāvidha-daśarūpā"karṇana-samaye sādharmaṇa-rasanā"tmaka-carvaṇā-grāhyo rasa-saṃcayo nātya-lakṣaṇaḥ sphuṭa eva. ye tv atathābhūtās teṣāṃ pratyakṣa-kalpōcita-tathāvidha-carvaṇā-lābhāya naṭādi-prakriyā sva-gata-krodha-śokā"di-saṅkaṭa-hṛdaya-granthe-bhañjanāya gītā"di-prakriyā ca muninā viracitā."—"In this connection, the mind of those who have by nature hearts like an immaculate mirror is not at the mercy of the desires, anger or stupor proper to sāṃsārīka existence (that of everyday life). The mere fact of hearing the play read is sufficient (in itself, independently of any acting) to induce in them with the greatest clearness the perception of the various rasas which animate it; this perception consists in a Sampling animated by a generalized tasting. To make this Tasting (which needs a direct perception) available to people who are deprived of this faculty, Bharata has, on the one hand, explained the discipline of the actors, etc., and, on the other- to cut the knots of the heart obscured by anger, sorrow, etc., inherent in one's own self,—has explained the discipline of vocal music, etc."—

Representation (and therefore drama in general which is founded upon representation) consists of a form of direct perception, is an adhyavasāya (mental cognition etc.; also vyavasāya, anu-vyavasāya, cf. App. I.) that is like the direct perception (sākṣātkāra-kalpa, pratyakṣa-kalpa). A.bh. XXII. 150 :

"abhinayanam hi citta-vṛtti-sādhāraṇatā"patti-prāṇa-sākṣātkāra-kalpa-adhyavasāya-saṃpādanam. — "Representation arouses a mental cognition which is like a direct perception; it consists in causing the generalization of mental movements." A.bh. XXII. 148 : "vighna-saṃbhāvanā-vihīna-sakala-sādhāraṇa-spaṣṭa-bhāva-sākṣātkāra-kalpādhyavasāya- saṃpattaye sarveṣāṃ prayoga ity uktam." "It is said that the acting (prayoga=parādi prakāṭikarāṇam, A.bh. I. 16) of the four forms of representation aims just at rousing a mental cognition, which is like a direct perception. It consists of a generalized state of evidence common to all the spectators and devoid of every possible obstacle." Drama is the object of cognition by an "anu-vyavasāya" (about this word cf. App. I.) which is like a direct perception, A.bh. I. 43-

The sixth obstacle is removed by focussing on the central theme. A.G. wants it to be a permanent mental state-sthāyin. With this he goes deeper into the analysis



of sthāyin and we will pick it up later. Actually his insistence on keeping the sthāyin as a central theme is because all other things-including the material surrounding, etc. revolve round this sentient theme. But as we say “niraṃkuśāḥ kavyaḥ”, and hence some most modern writers do not accept such guidance and practice absurdism in poetry and drama. How even here the catholicity of rasa-theory is applicable will be shown by us by the end of the chapter. As noted above A.G. has tried to project eight or nine sthāyins and has made psychology as the basis of the explanation of sthāyin-s. We will get into this after we complete this discussion on rasa-vighnas and their removal. Here Abhinavagupta observes. (pp. 17, Gnoli, *ibid*) : “a-pradhāne ca vastuni kasya saṃvid viśrāmyati? tasyaiva pratyayasya pradhānāntaram praty anudhāvataḥ svatmany a-viśrāntatvāt. atōpradhānatvaṃ jaḍe vibhāvānubhāva-varge vyabhicāriṇi-caye ca saṃvid-ātmakēpi niyamenānya-mukha-prekṣiṇi saṃbhavati, tad atiriktaḥ sthāyyeva tathā carvaṇā-pātram :”- (Trans. Gnoli, pp. 70, *ibid*) : “Does there exist a man whose consciousness rests on anything of a secondary order (a-pradhāna) ? Indeed such a perception would find no rest in itself and would thus run (anu-dhāv) automatically towards the predominant thing. This is the reason why the permanent state only can be the object of tasting : because, I say, the dererminants and consequents, which are insentient (jaḍa), and the transitory mental states, which though not insentient, nevertheless are necessarily depending on the permanent states, are all equally subordinate.”

Gnoli adds a ft. note (no. 1) here, pp. 70, *ibid* :- “cf. Dh. Ā. L. p. 177 :- tac carvaṇāpi cittavṛttiṣv eva paryavasyatīti rasa-bhāvebhyo nādhikaṃ carvaṇīyam.” The Tasting of the Determinants, etc., necessarily terminates in the mental movements; thus, apart from the bhāva (the matter of the Rasas) there is nothing else which can be tasted.

A.bh., I. p. 268 : sa ca yady apy ananta-vibhāvātmā tathāpi sarveṣāṃ jaḍānāṃ saṃvidi tasyāś ca bhoktari, bhoktrvargasya ca pradhāne bhoktari paryavasānān nāyakābhidhāna-bhoktr-viśeṣa-sthāyi-citta-vṛtti-svabhāvaḥ.”

~“Though [drama, etc.] is constituted by a infinite number of determinants etc., all the elements, which compound it, rest, however, in the consciousness (the permanent mental state). This rests in the enjoying subject (the limited enjoying subject, the practical self) and the whole of the enjoying subjects rest, in their turn, in the principal enjoying subject [the generalized knowing subject]. Therefore, we may say that drama consists in a permanent mental state of a particular enjoying

subject, called an actor, etc.” Such a mental state, continues A.G. is unique, generalized, devoid of the notions “own”, “of others”, etc. and, therefore, it pervades also the spectators—: ata eva sādharmaṇībhūta-tayā sāmājikam api svātma-sadbhāvena samāveśayanti....

‘Saṁśaya-yoga’ is the seventh obstacle which is met with due to inaccurate delineation by the poet. The individual anubhāva-s, vibhāva-s and vyabhicārins have no fixed relationship with a given sthāyin. But the fixed combination of vibhāvā”di-s evokes only a given sthāyin and result in tasting of a particular rasa. The poet, who wants to delineate a particular rasa should narrate the full combination in a suitable way so as to enhance a particular sthāyin to the capacity of a given rasa. Failing in this, there will be doubt about the central effect of a given piece of art and the aesthete will be left in doubt as to the intention of the poet, thus thwarting the process of tasting. So, to remove this doubt “saṁyoga” or perfect combination is recommended. A.bh. (pp. 19, 20, Gnoli) reads as :— “tatranubhāvānām vibhāvānām vyabhicārīnām ca prthak shtāyini niyamo nāsti, bāṣpā”der ānandākṣirogādijatva-darśanād vyāghrādeśca krodha-bhayā”di-hetutvāt śrama-cintā”der utsāha-bhayā”dy aneka-sahacaravāvalokanāt. sāmagrī tu na vyabhicārīnī tathā hi bandhu-vināśo yatra vibhāvaḥ, paridevitāśrupātādis tv anubhā”vaś cintā-dainyā”diś ca vyabhicārī, sóvaśyaṁ sóka evéti. evaṁ saṁśayodaye śaṅkā”tmaka-vighna-śamanāya saṁyoga upāttaḥ.”-

(trans. Gnoli, pp. 77, ibid) :

—“The consequents, the determinants and the transitory sentiments considered separately are in no definite relation to any specific permanent sentiment”; for. e.g., tears, etc., may arise out of bliss, some disease in the eye, etc., and as we know, weariness (śrama), anxiety (cintā), etc., may accompany permanent feelings, as heroism, fear, etc. But the combination of these elements has an unmistakeable signification. Thus., where the death of a close relation is the determinant, wailing, shedding of tears, etc., the consequent, and anxiety, depression (dainya), etc. The transitory feelings, then the permanent sentiment can not be other than sorrow. Therefore, considered (such a possible) arising of doubt, combination is used, just to remove this obstacle.

Thus A.G. has critically considered the obstacles in tasting and the means to remove the same. While considering the sixth obstacle A.G. at length, gets into a

prolonged discussion of the nature and number of permanent mental states which have a psychological basis. We will now try to understand this—

### The psychological basis of the sthāyin-

We have seen that Bharata in his Nā.śā. ch. VII deals with the nature of sthāyins etc. The tasting or chewing- carvaṇā-of these bhāva-s is 'rasa'. Bharata has, -we have noted above,-shown the difference between the sthāyin and vyabhicārīn by citing the illustration of a king and his servants. Abhinavagupta here attempts to explain that this difference is rooted in a deeper mental or psychological background.

Abhinavagupta observes that out of the various sentiments, only some are conducive to the ends of life, i.e. to dharma, artha, kāma ad mokṣa. Thus 'rati' or delight is conducive to pleasure, kāma-and its resultant things. 'Krodha' or anger is profit-artha-oriented, but can also end in pleasure and merit. Eenergy-utsāha-has all the three ends i.e. dharma, artha and kāma. 'Nirveda' or dispondancy born of knowledge of the Highest Spirit,—reality, delivers 'mokṣa' or summom-bonum. These four sentiments viz. śṛṅgāra, raudra, vīra and bībhatsa (or śānta) are the predominant rasa-s. At best one of these is predominant in dramas. At times all these four are seen in one and the same drama, in different situations or parts, in a predominant position.

Abhinavagupta further observes that all these rasas are dominated by 'sukha'—or pleasure : “tatra sarvēmī sukha-pradhānāḥ sva-saṃvic-carvaṇa-rūpasyaikaghanasya prakāśānanda-sāratvāt” (pp. 17, Gnoli, ibid) “In this connection, all these Rasas are dominated by pleasure (sukha), for the essence of the closely dense (eka-ghana) light consisting of the gustation of our own consciousness, is beatitude.”-

Gnoli here adds a foot-note (no-2, pp. 72, ibid) : “The intimate essence of consciousness or the “I”, according to the Śaiva is beatitude. The absence of beatitude and suffering are due to a need, privation, or desire for something separated from self. Beatitude is the absence of this desire, the resting in oneself of the exclusion of everything else. The “I” contains all things; everything that exists arises from its unconfined liberty. It cannot be the seat of any deprivation and can desire nothing but itself. Aesthetic experience is the tasting of one's own consciousness and, therefore, of one's own essential beatitude. In this sense, rasa is single. This tasting is coloured (anu-rañjita, rūṣita) by latent impressions

(vāsanā, saṃskāra), of the mental process of Delight, etc., aroused by the determinants, etc., i.e. by poetic expression. From this point of view, the plurality of rasas is due to the diversity of the vibhāva (vibhāvabhedaṃ rasa-bhede bahutvena sūcayati...A.bh., I. pp. 290) cf. A.bh. I., p. 292 : asmanmate tu saṃvedanam eva ānandaghanam āsvādyate tatra kā duḥkhā"śaṅkā. kevalam tasyaiva citratākarāṇe ratisokā"di-vāsanā-vyāpāras tad udbodhane cābhinayā"di-vyāpāraḥ." "According to us, that which is tasted is consciousness alone which is saturated with beatitude. This fact excludes, therefore, any suspicion of pain. This consciousness which is single in itself, is nevertheless differentiated by the operation of the latent traces of delight, sorrow, etc., which are awakened by the operation of the consequents, etc., (abhinaya=anubhāva). For the nature of this "colouring" infused into the consciousness by the feelings of delight, etc., cf. infra, p. 82, n. 4."

Abhinavagupta explains that the mental states of permanent nature are solely these nine :

"jāta eva hi jantur iyatībhiḥ saṃvidbhiḥ  
parīto bhavati. tathā hi :  
duḥkha-saṃśleṣa-vidveṣī  
sukhā"svādāna-tatparaḥ"—

iti nyāyena sarvo riraṃsayā vyāptaḥ, svatmany utkarṣam ānītayā, param upahasan abhīṣṭa-viyoga-saṃtaptāḥ taddhetuṣu kopa-paravaśósaktau ca tato bhīruḥ, kiṃcid arjijīṣur, apy anabhiṣṭatayābhimanyamānas tat-tat-sva-kartavya-darśana-samudita-vismayaḥ kiṃcic ca jihāsū eva jāyate. na hy etac cittavṛtti-vāsanā-śunyaḥ prāṇī bhavati. kevalam kasyacid kācid adhikā cittavṛtṭiḥ kācid ūnā, kasyacid ucitaviśaya-nīyantritā kasyacid anyathā. tat kācid eva puruṣārthōpayoginīty upadeśyā. tad-vibhāga-kṛtāś cōttama-prakṛty ādi vyavahāraḥ. ye punar amī glāni-śaṅkā prabhṛtayaś citta-vṛtti-viśeṣās te samucita-vibhāvābhāvājjanma-madhyēpi na bhavanty eva, tathā hi rasāyanam upayuktavato muner, glāny-ālasya-śrama-prabhṛtayo nottiṣṭhanti. yasyāpi hetu-prakṣaye kṣiyamānāḥ saṃskāra-śeṣatām tāvan nāvaśyam, anubadhnanti. utsāhā"dayas tu sampādita-sva-kartavyatayā pralīnakalpā api saṃskāra-śeṣatām nātivartante, kartavyāntara-viśayasyōtsāhā"der akhaṇḍanāt...yathā"ha patañjaliḥ- "na hi caitra ekasyām striyām rakta ity anyāsu viraktaḥ, ityādī (A.bh. Gnoli, pp. 18, 19, ibid).

Gnoli translates : (pp. 74, 75, *ibid*) : “The mental states of permanent nature are solely these nine. Indeed every creature from its birth possesses these (nine forms) of consciousness. In fact on the basis of the principle that all beings “hate to be in contact with pain and are eager, to taste pleasure,” everyone is by nature pervaded by sexual desires (delight); believes himself to be superior to others, whom he is thus led to deride (laughter); grieves when he is forced to part from what he loves (sorrow); gets angry at the causes of such separation (anger); sets frightened when he finds himself powerless (fear)- but still is desirous of overcoming the danger which threatens him (heroism); is attacked, when judging a thing to be displeasing, by a sense of revulsion directed just towards this ugly object (disgust); wonders at the sight of extraordinary deeds done by himself or others (astonishment); and lastly, is desirous of abandoning certain things (serenity). No living creature exists without the latent impression of these sentiments. All we can say is that some of them predominate in some people and others in others; and that in some people they originate from the usual causes and in others from causes different from the habitual.

Thus, only some sentiments are able to promote the ends of man, and, as such, they are rightly the object of teaching. The current division of men into men of elevated nature, etc., is determined by the different position occupied by these sentiments. Other sentiments, as weakness, apprehension, etc. on the other hand, can never possibly be manifested if the correspondent determinants do not exist; so, for example, a muni who practices *rasāyana* is immune from weakness, indolence, weariness, etc. Even in one in whom, by virtue of the determinants, these are present, they regularly disappear without leaving any trace of themselves when the causes of manifestation cease. Heroism, etc., on the contrary, even when they apparently disappear after their tasks are completed, do not cease to remain in the state of latent impressions for other forms of heroism, concerning other task, remain intact. Indeed as Patañjali has said- “The fact that Caitra is in love with one woman does not imply that he is out of love with the others.” etc.

Abhinavagupta further explains the relation between the *sthāyin* and *vyabhicārins* by giving an illustration of beads that are placed together in a single string. The *sthāyin* is to be imagined to be the string or thread passing through *vyabhicārins*, here imagined to be beads of different colours. They place their colour on the *sthāyi-sūtra* i.e. the thread, and in turn are obliged by the thread also. *Sthāyin* is principal here, and the *vyabhicārins* are subordinate.

The A.bh. here reads as : (pp. 19, Gnoli, *ibid*) : “tasmāt sthāyi-rūpa-citta-vṛtti-sūtra-syūtā evāmī vyabhicāriṇaḥ, svātmānam udayāsta-maya-vaicitrya-śata-sahasra-dharmānam pratilabhamānā rakta-nīlā”di-sūtra-syūta-viralabhāvómbhana-sambhāvita-bhaṅgī-sahasra-garbha-sphaṭika-kāca-bhrāmaka-padma-rāga-marakata-mahānīlādi-maya-golakavat tasmin sūtre sva-saṃskāra-vaicitryam aniveśayantópi tatsūtra-kṛtaṃ upakārasaṃdarbham bibhrataḥ svayaṃ ca vicitrārthāḥ sthāyi-sūtraṃ ca vicitrayantó ntarāntarā śuddham api sthāyi-sūtraṃ pratibhāsāvakāśam upanayantópi pūrvāpara-vyabhicāri-ratna-cchāyāśabalimānam avaśyam ānayantaḥ pratibhāsanta iti vyabhicāriṇa ucyante. tathā hi glānóyam ity ukte kuta iti hetuprasānenāsthāyitāsyā sūtryate. na tu rāma utsāha-śaktimān ity atra hetuprasānam āhuḥ. ata eva vibhāvās tatródbodhakāḥ santaḥ svarūpópa-rañjakatvaṃ vidadhānā ratyutsāhā”der ucitānucitatvamātram āvahanti. na tu tad abhāve sarvathaiva te nirupākhyāḥ, vāsanātmanā sarvajantūnāṃ tanmayatvena uktatvāt. vyabhicāriṇāṃ tu sva-vibhāvābhāve nāmāpi nāsti iti vitaniṣyate caitad yathāyogaṃ vyākhyānāvasare. evaṃ apradhānatvanirāsaḥ sthāyi-nirūpaṇayā, “sthāyibhāvān rasatvaṃ” ity anayā sāmānya-lakṣaṇa-śeṣabhūtayā viśeṣa-lakṣaṇa-niṣṭhayā ca kṛtaḥ.”–

(Trans. Gnoli, pp. 76, 77, *ibid*) :–

“In some sense, they are like the beads of crystal, glass, magnet, topaz, emerald, sapphire, etc., which filling the thread on which they are threaded no matter if red, blue, etc.,- so as to be set rather far apart from each other and continuously changing their position, do not leave, it is true, trace of themselves on this thread, but, all the same, nourish the ornamental composition made by it, and, being themselves various and varying in turn the permanent thread, let in no doubt appear at intervals, in its nudity, though, at the same time, they affect it by their polychrome reflections– the reflections I mean of transitory jewels : it is for this very reason that these sentiments are called “transitory”. When, that is to say, someone says, “This is a form of weakness”, it is natural to ask by what is it provoked ? This question shows up precisely the instability of this mental movement. But in the case of the expression, “Rāma is full of heroism”, one does not ask for the cause. The determinants (the elements which awaken the mental states) are limited, therefore, to bringing to actuality the permanent sentiments (delight, heroism, etc.) corresponding respectively to their nature–and they do this by infusing into them their own colouring. Even when their corresponding determinants are absent, it can not be said that the

permanent sentiments are non-existent, for it has been said that these, in the state of latent impressions, are present in all beings. Of the transitory sentiments, however, when their corresponding determinants are absent, not even the names remain—all this will be explained more extensively at the suitable time and place.

Such a refutation of the subordinate elements has been made by Bharata also through the description of the permanent sentiments, introduced by the words :- “We shall now bring the permanent sentiments to the state of rasas.” This description follows on the definition of the general marks and concerns the particular ones.”

It may be noted that from this discussion it emerges that the tasting of mental states is rasa. It also follows from this that the sthāyins being of the form of latent impressions that are permanent, are found in all living beings. So, when a sahrdaya reads poetry or witnesses a dramatic performance, he becomes conscious of his own emotions. It is precisely because of this that the enjoyer becomes a part of the piece of art presented.

The seven obstacles that are discussed by Abhinavagupta reveal what is expected from the poet, the producer/director/actor and also the sāmājika or the cultured man of taste. Five obstacles follow from imperfection on the side of the poet and two result from difficulties with the enjoyer. Abhinavagupta underlines one important fact that the vighnas can be removed by proper presentation of the determinants, etc. “tatra vighāpasārakāḥ vibhāva-prabhṛtayaḥ.” Proper delineation of the determinants etc. make for the birth of rasa.

The explanation of Bharataś rasa-sūtra according to Abhinavagupta can be placed as follows :

It may be noted that before attempting an explanation of the rasa-sūtra A.G. explains the inner meaning of vibhāva, anubhāva and vyabhicari-bhāva. It can be held that these are jñāpaka factors, i.e. they are indicators or suggesters. In common parlance, we infer someone else's feelings or emotions by first ascertaining the invariable concomittance between the external signs and the mental feelings connected therewith. This inference or process of reasoning is so quick that we do not notice the steps such as remembering the vyāpti-sambandha or invariable concomittance etc. By the practice (abhyāsa) of inferring someone else's feelings one acquires expertise in it. The quickness in inference is caused

by practice. In poetry and drama also by the delineation of the combination of vibhāvā<sup>di</sup>-s, a sāmājika, who has acquired the above discussed expertise at worldly level, is able to get at the bhāva-s or emotions portrayed. Normally at worldly level feelings and emotions have a cause, an effect of expression, and also some assessories which help a given cause to generate a feeling. They make for the enhancement of a feeling. But in poetry these factors i.e. cause, accessories and effects are known by other technical names such as vibhāva, vyabhicāribhāva and anubhāva respectively. Vibhāva-s are so termed because of 'vibhāvana' i.e. their inherent capacity to make things relishable- i.e. "āsvādayogya." The capacity to make things an object of experience, so to say, 'anu-bhāvana' gives the name "anubhāva" that in worldly context are known as 'effects'. Vyabhicārins are so called as they have the potential to stay around the sthāyin and enhance the same-i.e. vi-abhi-caraṇa and puṣṭi. A harmonious - samyag-combination, yoga, of these three factors is essential for the birth of rasa. It is essential that their samyag - yoga or harmonious combination, or ekāgratā i.e. focussed situation should take place in the minds of the spectators. This exactly is termed : "vibhāvānubhāva-vyabhicāri-samyogaḥ", and through this ekāgratā or samyag yoga a meaning 'artha' follows which becomes the object of 'sva-saṃvadana.' The obstacles are already removed from them. So, the process of rasanā, saṃvedana or āsvādana becomes bliss-giving. When arrived at through this process, the 'kāvyārtha' or 'nāṭyārtha' or "nāṭya" is termed "rasa." It is identical with the process of enjoyment-rasanā<sup>tmaka</sup>. It is not siddha-svabhāva i.e. it does not exist prior to the process of enjoyment. It is peri passu with the process. It is "tārkālika" i.e. happening only during the process of portravel. It is experienced only while the carvaṇā-vyāpāra operates. Thus 'rasa' is non-identical with worldly feelings and emotions. It can not be held to be "inferred sthāyin" either, for if it taken as inference than the blissfulness-"sarasatā" will disappear, for there cannot be joy in the act of inference, which is a dry process. But, however, Mahimā disagrees with this for he attaches joy to what he terms as 'kāvyānumiti' i.e. inference in the context of art.

Abhinavagupta has explained the process of rasa-realisation along with the epistemological discussion on the nature of rasa in very famous lines in his A.bh. and we will go to observe that all great thinkers, Mammaṭa, Hemacandra, Viśvanātha, Jagannātha and the rest have almost quoted A.bh. verbatim and have expressed their full faith in Abhinavagupta's observations. We will quote from the original, followed by Gnoli's translation. The a.bh. reads as :- (Gnoli, pp. 20,



21, 22 ibid) :-

“tatra loka-vyavahāre kārya-kāraṇa-sahacārā”tmaka-līṅga-darśane sthāyā”tma-para-cittavṛtṭy-anumānābhyāsa-pāṭavād adhunā tair eva udyāna-kaṭākṣa-dhṛtyā”dibhir laukikīm kāraṇatva-bhuvam atikrāntair vibhāvana-anubhāvana-samuparañjakatva-mātraprāṇair ata eva alaukika-vibhāvā”di-vyapadeśa-bhāgbhiḥ prācyā-kāraṇā”dirūpa saṃskārōpajīvana-khyāpanāya vibhāvā”di-nāmadheya-vyapadeśyair, bhāvādhyāyēpi vakṣyamāṇa-svarūpa-bhedair guṇa-pradhānatā-paryāyeṇa sāmājika-dhiyi, saṃyogam, sambandham, aikāgryam vā āsāditavadbhir alaukika-nirvighna-saṃvedanā”tmaka-carvaṇā-gocaratām nītorthaś carvyamāṇataikasāro, na tu siddha-svabhāvaḥ, tātkalika eva, na tu carvaṇātirikta-kālāvalambī sthāyi-vilakṣaṇa eva rasah.”

(Gnoli translates, pp. 78, 79, ibid)

–“Rasa, in this connexion, is just that reality (artha) by which the determinants, the cosequents and the transitory feelings, after having reached a perfect combination (samyag yoga), relation (sambandha), conspiracy (aikāgrya), - where they will be in turn in a leading or subordinate position-in the mind of the spectator, make the matter of a gustation consisting of a form of consciousness free from obstacle and different from the ordinary ones. This Rasa differs from the permanent feelings, consists solely in the state of gustation and is not an objective thing (siddha-svabhāva), lasts exactly as long as the gustation, and does not lian on any time separate from it. The determinants, etc., (which consist of garden, expressive glances, feelings of contentment (dhṛti), etc.) transcend on their side the state of causes, etc., as these are understood in ordinary life. Their function consists solely in the fact that they colour (the consciousness of the spectator); their function is called ‘vibhāvanā’, ‘anubhāvanā’ etc. Thus these take the name, of a non-ordinary character, of determinants, etc., and this denomination aims at expressing their dependence on the latent traces left by the corresponding preceeding causes, etc. The particular nature of the various determinants will be explained later. The operation of the determinants, etc. presupposes, of course, that the spectator, in the course of his ordinary life, has not neglected to make a close observation of the characteristic signs, (effects, causes and concomitant elements) of other people’s mental processes, in other words to deduce the one from the other.”

Rejecting rasa-apprehension to be of the nature of ‘anumiti’ as held by Śrī Śaṅkuka, Abhinavagupta further observes : (pp. 20, 21, Gnoli, ibid) :-

“na tu yathā śaṅkukā”dibhir abhyadhīyata, ‘sthāyy eva vibhāvā”di-pratyāyyo rasyamānatvād rasa ucyata” iti. evaṃ hi loképi kiṃ na rasaḥ, asatōpi hi yatra rasanīyatā syāt tatra vastusataḥ katham na bhaviṣyati. tena sthāyi-pratītir anumitirūpā vācya, na rasaḥ. ata eva sūtre sthāyi-grahaṇam na kṛtam. tat pratyuta śalyabhūtaṃ syāt. kevalam aucityāt evaṃ ucyate sthāyī rasibhūta iti. aucityam tu tat-sthāyi-gatatvena kāraṇā”ditayā prasiddham adhunā carvaṇópayogitayā vibhāvā”ditvāvalambanāt. tathā hi laukika-cittavṛty anumāne kā rasatā. tena akaukika-camatkāra”tmā rasā”svādaḥ smṛty anumāna-laukika-sva-saṃvedana-vilakṣaṇa eva. tathā hi laukikena anumānena saṃskṛtaḥ pramadā”di na tātaṣṭhyena prati-padyate, api tu hṛdaya-saṃvādā”tmaka-saḥṛdayatva-balāt pūrṇibhavad-rasā”svādāṅkurībhāvena anumāna-smṛtyā”di-sopānam anāruhya eva tanmayībhāvōcita-carvaṇā-prāṇatayā.”–

Gnoli translates. pp. 79, 80, ibid :

[But let us turn to Rasa, This is as we have said, different from the permanent sentiment] and it cannot absolutely be maintained, as Śaṅkuka did, that what is called rasa is simply a permanent sentiment,\* brought to our knowledge by the determinants, etc., and that, because this is the object of relish, it takes the name of rasa. For, if things were so, why should Rasa not exist also in everyday life ? For if an unreal thing is capable of being the object of relish, a real thing has all the more reason to be capable of it. Thus, it is legitimate to say that the perception of a permanent mental state consists in an inference; but we certainly can not rightly say that Rasa is also of this nature. This is the reason why Bharata has made no mention in the sūtra of the word “permanent sentiment;” on the contrary, the mention of it would have been a source of difficulties. Such expressions as - “The permanent sentiment becomes rasa”, are due to the correspondence (aucitya) only. This correspondence, to specify, is due to the fact that the very same things which were previously considered to be causes, etc., related to a given permanent sentiment, now serve to realize the gustation, and are thus presented in the form of ordinary self-consciousness. Indeed, he who possesses the latent traces of the ordinary inferential processes, does not apprehend a young woman. etc., as if he were indifferent to her, but, by virtue of his sensibility—which quality is consisting in a consent of heart, he rather apprehends her, without mounting on the steps of memory, inference, etc., as if merged in a gustation, suitable to an identification (with this young woman, etc.), which is, so to say, the sprout of the tasting of Rasa, about to appear in all fullness.”–

\* Gnoli uses “permanent sentiment” for “permanent mental state.” The use is not absolutely scientific and therefore not permissible.

Abhinavagupta here explains how a sa-hṛdaya enjoys rasa. True, the sahrdaya has the expertise at ordinary worldly level to infer ordinary mental feelings of others. In practical life he is an expert to infer someone else's feelings. This means that when the relevant causes appear, the relevant feelings will be flashed in his mind. So, when he observes a beautiful lady as described in poetry or as presented on the stage in a drama, he will not look at her as a third party (tatastha). On account of his sensitiveness-sahrdayatva-born of consent of heart-hṛdaya-saṁvāda-the sāmājika acquires a capacity to grow over the 'tāṭasthya'. Without stepping on the ladder of anumāna, smṛti, etc., this experience becomes personal to him-ātmasāt, as this experience is of the nature of aesthetic chewing (carvaṇā) which causes for him an identification with whatever he observes. This aesthetic chewing is of the nature of consciousness (saṁvedana) and hence Abhinavagupta distinguishes this special consciousness from other local mental attitudes.

This brings us to **Abhinavagupta's discussion on the epistemological aspect of rasa-consciousness.** He observes :

(A.bh., Gnoli- pp. 21, 22, ibid) :-

“na ca sā carvaṇā prāṇ mātāntarād, yena adhunā smṛtiḥ syāt. na cātra laukika-pratyakṣā”di-pramāṇa-vyāpārah. kim tv alaukika-vibhāvā”di-samyoga-balapōnataiv eyaṁ carvaṇā. sā ca, pratyakṣānumāna-āgama-upamānā”di-laukika-pramāṇa-janita-ratyādy avabodhatas tathā yogipratyakṣa-tatastha-para-saṁvitti-jñānāt sakala-vaiśayika-uparāga-sūnya-śuddha-parayogi-gatasvā”nandaikaghaṇā-nubhavāc ca viśiṣyate, eteṣāṁ yathāyoham arjanā”di-vighnāntarodaya-tātsthya-asphuṭatva-viśayā”veśa-vaivaśya-kṛta-saundarya-virahāt.

atra tu svātmaika-gatatva-niyamāsambhavāt svānupraveśāt, paragata-niyamābhāvāt tad-vibhāvā”di-sādhāraṇyavaśa-samprabuddhōcita-nija-ratyā”di-vāsanā”veśa-vaśāc ca, na vighnāntarā”dīnāṁ sambhava ity avocāma bahuśah.”

Gnoli translates (pp. 82, 83, 84, iid) :-

“This gustation, again, is not already born in the past, from some other means of knowledge, so that it is, now, a form of memory; nor is it the fruit of the operation of ordinary means of cognition (direct perception, etc.); but it is aroused solely by the combination (samyoga) of the determinants, etc., which, as we have said, are of a non-ordinary nature.

This gustation is distinguished (a) from perception of the ordinary sentiments (delight, etc.) aroused by the ordinary means of cognition (direct perception, inference, the revealed word, analogy, etc., (b) from cognition without active

participation (tatastha) of the thoughts of others, which is proper to the direct perception of the yogins; (c) and from the compact ekaghana-experience of one's own beatitude, which is proper to yogins of higher orders (this perception is immaculate, free from all impressions[uparāga], deriving from external things). Indeed, these three forms of cognition, being in due order (yathāyogam) subjected to the appearance of obstacles (practical desires, etc.), lacking evidence and at the mercy of the (adorned) object, are deprived of beauty (saundarya). Here, on the contrary, because of the absence [of sensations of pleasures, pain, etc.] as inhering exclusively in our own person, of an active participation in our own self (svātmānupraveśāt), of the absence [of the afore-mentioned sensations] as inhering exclusively in other persons, and the immersion (āveśa) in the latent traces of our own sentiments of delight, etc., reawakened by the corresponding determinants, etc., which are generalized-because, I say, of all these causes, the appearance of obstacles is impossible. And all this has been said over and over again.”—

In connection with the above passage Gnoli has, in ft. note, 4, pp. 82, explained the nature of mystical experience which differs from the aesthetic one. He observes. —“Mystical experience involves the annihilation of every pair of opposites; everything is re-absorbed in its dissolving fire. Sun and moon, night and day, beautiful and ugly, etc. no longer exist in it. The limited “I” is completely absorbed into Śiva or Bhairava, the adored object; everything vanishes from the field of consciousness. Aesthetic experience, on the other hand, requires the presence of the latent traces of delight, etc. (aroused by the operation of the determinants, etc.). In other words, the aesthetic experience presupposes a pre-constituted knowledge on the part of the spectator, of the psychic reactions, etc., which are normally felt before a given situation. This knowledge is, in part, innate (it forms, that is, an integral part of human nature) and is, in part, acquired through the experience of one's own reactions and one's own observation of the reactions of others.

Aesthetic experience, Rasa, manifested by a poetical description of a beautiful woman, is, for example, coloured by the mental state of delight, which is aroused by the description itself. Such a mental state is supposed to pre-exist in the spectator in a latent state, in the form, that is, of saṃskāra or vāsanā. The Determinants which manifest aesthetic experience awaken, implicitly and of necessity, these latent traces also.

The beauty, the pleasantness proper to the aesthetic experience are due to the colouring of these mental processes; cf. A.bh. I. p. 290, “laukikāt pratyayāt

upārjanā”di-vigha-bahulād, yogi-pratyayāc ca viṣayā”svāda-śūnyatā-paruṣād vilakṣaṇā”kāra-sukha-duḥkhā”di-vicitra-vāsanānuvedhópanata-hṛdayātis’aya-saṁvic-carvaṇā”tmanā bhuñjate budhāh....”

“Aesthetic enjoyment consists in the tasting of one’s own consciousness; this tasting is endowed with extreme pleasantness (beauty), which it obtains from a contact with the various latent traces of pleasure, pain, etc. It differs both from ordinary perception, which is full of obstacles (pragmatic requirements, etc.), and from the perception of the yogins, which is not free from harshness, on account of total lack of any tasting of external objects.” Thus by comparison with the aesthetic experience, the compact homogeneity (eka-ghanatā) of mystical experience possesses a certain harshness. Its pursuit, that is to say, calls for uncommon force and energy (cf. the concept of vīra, hero). Aesthetic experience, on the other hand, is easily attained. It is particularly suitable to people endowed with a “gentle mind.”— (sukumāra-matī). In the Dh. Ā. L., p. 51, A. G. defines Rasa in the following terms :—

śabda-samarpyamāṇa-hṛdaya-saṁvāda-sundara-vibhāvānubhāva-samucita-prāgviniṣa-ratyā”di-vāsanānurāga-sukumāra -sva-saṁvid ānanda-carvaṇā-vyāpāra-rasanīya -rūpo rasah.”—“Rasa is tasted through the act of tasting the beatitude of one’s own consciousness. This tasting is pleasant (and not paruṣa as in mystic experience) in that the consciousness is coloured by the latent traces of the mental states of delight, etc., pre-existing (in the minds of the spectators). Such traces are aroused by the corresponding determinants and consequents—which pleasant (beautiful, etc.,) by virtue of the consent of the heart—are afforded by the words.” cf. Dh. Ā. L., p. 81 —:

anubhāva-vibhāvāva-bodhanóttaram eva tanmayībhavana-yuktyā tad-vibhāvānubhāvócita-citta-vṛtti-vāsanānurañjita-sva-saṁvidānanda-carvaṇāgocarórho rasā”tmā sphuraty eva...”

Gnoli, in ft. note 1, on pp. 84 also notices H.C.'s modification and enlargement of A.bh.ś passage as quoted above. He observes : “This passage has been somewhat modified and enlarged by Hemacandra (see the critical Apparatus) :” Here, on the contrary, because of the absence [of the sensations of pleasure, pain, etc.] as inhering exclusively in our own person, we are not at the mercy of the [adored] object; because of an active participation in our own self [and] the absence [of the aforementioned sensations] as inhering exclusively in other persons, there is no lack of evidence; and because of the immersion in the latent traces of our own

sentiments of delight, etc., re-awakened by the corresponding determinants, etc., which are generalized, there is no possible appearance of obstacles.”–

The A.bh. (pp. 21, 22 etc. Gnoli) further observes : “ata eva vibhāvā”dayo na niṣpatti-hetavo rasasya, tadbodhāpagamepi rasa-saṁbhava-prasaṅgāt. nāpi jñapti hetavaḥ yena pramāṇa-madhye pateyuḥ, siddhasya kasyacit prameyabhūtasya rasasyābhāvāt.

kiṁ tarhi etat vibhāvādaya iti ? alaukika evāyaṁ carvaṇópayogī vibhāvā”di-vyavahāraḥ. kva anyatr étthaṁ dr̥ṣam iti ced bhūṣaṇam etad asmākam alaukikatva-siddhau. pānaka-rasā”svādópi kiṁ guḍa-maricā”diṣu dr̥ṣta iti samānam etat. nanv evaṁ rasóprameyaḥ syāt, evaṁ yuktaṁ bhavitum arhati, rasyataikapraṇo hy asau, na prameyā”di-svabhāvaḥ.

tarhi sūtre niṣpattir iti katham ? neyaṁ rasasya, api tu tadviśaya-rasanāyāḥ. tanniṣpattyā tu yadi tad ekāyatta-jīvitasya rasasya niṣpattir ucyate, na kaścid atra doṣaḥ.

sā ca rasanā na pramāṇa-vyāpāro, na kāraka-vyāpāraḥ, svayaṁ tu na a-pramāṇikī, sva-saṁvedanasiddhatvāt. rasanā ca bodha-rūpā eva, kiṁ tu bodhāntarebhyo laukikebhyo vilakṣaṇāiva, upāyānām vibhāvā”dīnaṁ laukika - vilakṣyaṇyāt. tena vibhāvā”di-saṁyogād rasanā yato niṣpadyate tatas tathāvidha rasanā-gocarō lokóttarórho rasa iti tātparyaṁ sūtrasya.”

Gnoli translates : (pp. 84, 85, ibid) : “For this reason (ata eva) the determinants are not the causes of the production (niṣpatti) of Rasa; otherwise, Rasa should continue to exist even when they no longer fall under cognition. Nor are they the cause of its cognition (jñapti) (if they were, they would have to be included among the means of knowledge (pramāṇa), because Rasa is not an objective thing (siddha), which could function as a knowable object. What is it, then, that is designated by the expressions, “determinants etc. ?”

We reply to this question that the expressions “determinants, etc.” do not designate any ordinary thing, but what serves to realize the gustation (carvaṇópayogī). Does any such thing appear elsewhere ? But the fact that it does not occur elsewhere, we reply, can do nothing but strengthen our thesis of their non-ordinary character. Does the taste of rasa of pānaka perhaps occur in molasses, peppers, etc. (of which, however, it consists) ? The case is perfectly analogous.

“But (someone might say) in this way Rasa is not an object of cognition (a-prameya).” That is what really occurs, we reply and suitably. Rasa, indeed, consists

solely of a tasting and has not the nature of an object of cognition, etc. "But how then do you think that the expression which Bharata uses in the sūtra can be justified when he says : "The production of Rasa (rasa-niṣpatti) " ? This expression, we reply, must be understood in the sense of a production, not of Rasa, but of the tasting which refers to the Rasa (tad-viṣaya-rasanā). Likewise, if the expression "The production of Rasa" is understood in the sense of a production of a Rasa whose subsistence is exclusively depending on the said tasting, our thesis is not beset by any difficulty.

Besides, this tasting is neither the fruit of the operation of the means of cognition nor of the means of action. On the other hand, it can be said that, in itself, it is not ascertained by any means of knowledge (a-prāmāṇika), for its real existence is an inconfutable datum of our own consciousness (sva-saṃvedana-siddha). This tasting, moreover, is, no doubt, solely a form of cognition, but a form of cognition different from any other ordinary perception.

This difference is due to the fact that the means of it, that is, the determinants, etc., are of a non-ordinary character. To conclude : What is produced by the combination (saṃyoga) of the Determinants, etc., is the tasting (rasanā); and the rasa is the non-ordinary reality, which is the matter of this tasting. This is the sense and purport of the sūtra.

Abhinavagupta gives the summary of what he has discussed at length above in the words : (A.bh., pp. 22, ibid) :-

"āyam atra saṃkṣepaḥ. mūkuta-pratiśīrṣakā" dinā tāvan naṭa-buddhir ācchādyate. gāḍha-prāktana-saṃvit-saṃskārāc ca kāvya-balā" nīyamānāpi na tatra rāmadhir viśrāmyati. ata eva ubhaya-deśa-kāla-tyāgaḥ. romāñcā" dayas ca bhūyasā rati-pratīti-kāritayā dṛṣṭās tatrāvalokitā deśakāla-niyamena ratiṃ gamayanti. yasyām svā"tmāpi tadvēśanāvattvād anupraviṣṭaḥ. ata eva na tatasthatayā rati avagamaḥ, na ca niyata-kāraṇatayā, yena arjanābhiṣvaṅgā"di-saṃbhāvanā. na ca niyata-parātmaika-gata-tayā, yena duḥkha-dveṣā"dyudayaḥ. tena sādharmaṇibhūtā saṃtāna-vṛtter ekasyā eva vā saṃvido gocarībhūtā ratiḥ śṛṅgāraḥ. sādharmaṇibhāvanā ca vibhāvā" dibhir iti."

Gnoli translates : (pp. 86, 87, ibid) :- "All this may be summarized in the following way : in the first place, the identity of the actor as such is concealed by tiaras, headwear, etc.; in the second place, the idea that he is Rāma, etc., aroused by the power of the poem, nevertheless does not succeed in imposing itself upon the idea of the actor, for the latent traces of the said idea are strongly impressed on the

spectator's minds. For this very reason, the spectator is no longer living either in the space and time of Rāma, etc., nor in the space and time of the actor as such.

Acts of horripilation, etc., which have repeatedly been seen by the spectator in the course of everyday life as indexes of delight, etc., serve, in this case, to make known a delight, etc., uncircumscribed by either time or space. In this delight, just because he possesses the latent traces of it in himself, the self of the spectator also actively participates. For this very reason, this delight is perceived neither with indifference, from the outside, nor as if it were linked with a particular [ungeneralized] cause-for in this case, intrusion by pragmatic requirements, interests of gain, etc. would occur-, nor again as if exclusively belonged to a defined third person-for, in this case, sensations of pleasure, hatred, etc. would occur in the spectator. Thus, the Erotic Rasa is simply the feeling of delight-a feeling, however, which is both generalized and the object of a consciousness, which may be either single or develop consecutively. The taste of generalization is carried out by the determinants. etc."

It may be noted that when Abhinavagupta speaks of 'Rāma', as for example, in the above passage, the same is applicable to any other character, male or female, either historical or imaginary. Abhinavagupta's concern is not with a historical character only.

Again, in the above passage, when he talks of "śṛṅgāra-rasa", he means any other rasa also. In fact he and also Anandavardhana and the whole school of thought these two represent, believe in one rasa, a mahā-rasa and it can be given the name of śānta-rasa. This will be rendered clear when we will examine their position on the problem of śānta-rasa by the end of this chapter. For the present, we will just quote the relevant portion from the Locana also that deals with this problem of rasa-niṣpatti. As observed earlier, and as the advanced reader will make out for himself while reading the quotation from Locana, the treatment therein is neither that clear, nor that perfect as compared to the A.bh. But this never permits a rash conclusion that there is any contradiction of ideas between the two, i.e. Locana and A.bh.; or there is any confusion in the presentation in Locana. Only lesser souls would see such things in Abhinavagupta.

**The Locana portion which deals with this problem of rasa may be read as follows, and it forms the commentary on Dhv. II. 4 :-**

But before we quote, we repeat that Abhinavagupta's aesthetics has its essence carved out in the discussion he devotes to the śānta-rasa. It may also be noted that



the essence of 'sādhāraṇīkaraṇa' and 'rasānubhūti' has been so neatly and explicitly laid down by Abhinavagupta and Ānandavardhana apart, no Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka or any, not even Jagannātha can be said to be a match with Abhinavagupta. It has been fashionable among lesser souls, especially some writers in Gujarati who have never looked into, nor have the ability to look into what Abhinavagupta has written, to credit Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka with "sādhāraṇīkaraṇa" which was not so fully understood even by Bhaṭṭa Nāyāka as compared to the "Greatest" Abhinavagupta.

The Dhv. Locana on II. 4, the portion on rasa-niṣpatti-vicāra reads as : (pp. 106,-112; Dhv. with Locana, Edn. T. S. Nandi, Ahd.-'97-'98) :-

"nanū'ktaṃ bhaṭṭa-nāyakena-" raso yadā para-gata-tayā pratiyate tarhi tāsthyam eva syāt. na ca svagatatvena rāmā"di-carita-mayāt kāvyād asau pratiyate. svātma-gatatvena ca pratītau svātmani rasasyōtpattir evābhyupagatā syāt. sā cāyuktā; sītāyāḥ sāmājikaṃ praty a-vibhāvatvāt. kāntārvam sādhāraṇam vāsanā-vikāsa-hetu-vibhāvatāyām prayojakam iti cet,—devatā-varṇanā"tau tad api katham ? na ca sva-kāntā-smaraṇam madhye samvedyate, aloka-sāmānyānām ca rāmā"dinām ye samudra-setubandhā"dayo vibhāvās te katham sādhāraṇyam bhajeyuḥ. na ca utsāhā"dimān rāmaḥ smaryate, ananubhūtarvāt. śabdād api tat-pratītau na rasōpajanaḥ pratyakṣād iva nāyaka-mithunasya.

utpatti-pakṣe ca karuṇasyōtpādād duḥkhitve karuṇa-prekṣāsu punar a-pravṛttiḥ syāt. tan na utpattir api. nāpy abhivyaktiḥ, śakti-rūpasya hi śṅgārasya abhivyaktaḥ viśayārjana-tāratamyā"pattiḥ syāt. tatrāpi kiṃ svagōbhivyajyate rasaḥ paragato vā iti pūrva-vad eva doṣaḥ.

tena, na pratiyate, na utpadyate, na abhivyajyate kāvyena rasaḥ. kintv anya-śabda-vailakṣaṇyam kāvyā"tmanā śabdasya. tryaṃśatā-prasādāt.

tatrābhidhāyakatvam vācyā-viśayam; bhāvakatvam rasā"di-viśayam, bhoktrtvam sahrdaya-viśayam iti trayomaśabhūtāḥ vyāpārāḥ.

tatrābhidhā-bhāgo yadi śuddhaḥ syāt, tantrā"dibhyaḥ śāstra-nyāyebhyaḥ śleṣā"dy alaṃkāraṇām ko bhedaḥ ? vṛtti-bheda-vaicitryam ca a-kiñcit-karam. śṛti-duṣṭā"di-varjanaṃ ca kim artham ? tena rasa-bhāvanā"khyo dvitīyo vyāpārāḥ, yad vaśād abhidhā vilakṣaṇā eva. tac ca etad bhāvakatvam nāma rasān prati yat kāvyasya tad vibhāvā"dinām sādhāraṇatvā"pādanam nāma.

bhāvite ca rase, tasya bhogaḥ yonubhava-smaraṇa-pratipattibhyo vilakṣaṇa eva, druti-vistara-vikāśā"tmā rajas-tamovaicitryānuviddha -sattvamaya-nijacit- svabhāva-nirvṛti-viśrānti-lakṣaṇaḥ, parabrahmā"svāda-savidhaḥ. sa eva ca pradhāna-bhūtoṃśaḥ siddha-rūpa iti. vyutpattir nāma a-pradhānam eva, iti.

atrōcyate-rasa-svarūpa eva tāvad vipratipattayaḥ prativādinām. tathā hi-pūrvāvasthāyām yaḥ sthāyī sa eva vyabhicāri-sampātā"dinā prāpta-paripoṣo nukāryagata eva rasah. nāṭye tu prayujuamānatvān nāṭya-rasa iti kecit.

pravāha- dharmnyām citta-vṛttau, citta-vṛtteḥ citta-vṛttyantareṇa kaḥ paripoṣārthaḥ ? vismaya-śoka-krodhādeś ca krameṇa tāvan na pariposa, iti nānukārye rasah. anukartari ca tad-bhāve layā"dy ananusaraṇam syāt. sāmājika-gate vā kaś camatkāraḥ ? praty uta karuṇā"daḥ duḥkha-prāptiḥ. tasmān nāyam pakṣah, kas tarhi ? ihā"nāntyān niyatasya anukāro na śakyah, nisprayojanaś ca, viśiṣṭatā-pratītau tātasthyena vyutpatty abhāvāt.

tasmād aniyatāvasthā"tmakam sthāyinam uddiśya vibhāvānubhāva-vyabhi-cāribhiḥ samyuḥyamānair ayaṁ rāmaḥ sukhīti smṛti-vilakṣaṇā sthāyini prati-gocara-tayā"svāda-rūpā pratipattir anukartrā"-lambā nāṭyaika-gāminī rasah. sa ca na vyatiriktam-ādhāram apekṣate. kintv anukāryābhinnābhimate nartake āsvādayitā sāmājika ity etāvanmātram adah. tena nāṭya eva rasah, nānukāryā"disv iti kecit.

anye tu-anukartari yaḥ sthāyāvabhāsōbhinayā"di-sāmagryā"di-kṛto, bhittāv iva haritālā"dinā āsvāvabhāsaḥ, sa eva lokātīta-tayā āsvādāpara-samjñayā rasyamāno rasa iti nāṭyād rasā nāṭya-rasāḥ.

apare punar vibhāvānubhāvamātram eva viśiṣṭa-sāmagryā samarpyamāṇam tad-vibhāvanīya-anubhāvanīya-sthāyī-rūpa-citta-vṛttry-ucita-vāsanānuṣaktam sva-nirvṛti-carvaṇā-viśiṣṭam eva rasah, tan nāṭyam eva rasāḥ,

anye tu śuddham vibhāvam, apare śuddham anubhāvam, kecit tu sthāyī-mātram. itare vyabhicāriṇam, anye tat-samyogam, ekēnukāryam, kecana sakalam eva samudāyam rasam āhur ity alam bahunā.

kāvyépi ca loka-nāṭya-dharmi-sthānīyena svabhāvokti-vakrōkti prakāra-dvayena alaukika-prasanna-madhura-aujasvi-śabda-samarpyamāṇa-vibhāvāviyogād iyaṁ eva rasa-vārtā. astu vātra nāṭyād vicitra-rūpā rasa-pratītiḥ, upāyavailakṣaṇyād iyaṁ eva tāvad atra saraṇiḥ. evaṁ sthite prathama-pakṣa-evaitāni dūṣaṇāni, pratīteḥ sva-para-gatatvā"di vikalpanena. sarva-pakṣeṣu ca pratītir a-parihāryā rasasya. a-pratītam hi piśācavad a-vyavahāryam syāt. kiṁ tu yathā pratīti-mātratvenāviśiṣ-atvépi prātyakṣiki, ānumānikī, āgamotthā, pratibhāna-kṛtā, yogi-pratyakṣajā ca pratītir upāya-vailakṣaṇyād anyaiḥ, tadvad iyaṁ api pratītiś carvaṇā"svādāna-bhogāpara-nāmā bhavatu tannidāna-bhūtāyā hrdaya-samvādā"dy upakṛtāyā vibhāvā"di-sāmagryā lokōttara-rūpatvāt. rasāḥ pratīyanta iti ca oḍanam pacatītvad vyavahārah, pratīyamāna eva hi rasah. pratīter eva viśiṣṭa-rasānā. sā ca nāṭye laukikānumāna-pratīter vilakṣaṇā; tāṁ ca pramukhe upāyatayā sandadhānā.

evam kāvyē anya-śābda-pratīter vilakṣaṇā, tām ca pramukhe upāyatayā apekṣa-māṇā.

tasmād anutthānōpahataḥ pūrva-pakṣaḥ. rāmā"di-caritaṃ tu na sarvasya hrdaya-saṃvādīti mahat sāhasam. citra-vāsanā-viśiṣṭatvāc cetasah. yad āha-'tāsām anāditvam āśiso nityatvāt. jāti-deśa-kāla-vyavahitānām apy ānantaryam smṛti-saṃskārayor eka-rūpatvāt. tena pratītis tāvad rasasya siddhā. sā ca rasanārūpā pratītir utpadyate. vācya-vācakayos tatra abhidhā"di-vivikto vyañjana"tmā dhvanana-vyāpāra eva. bhogīkaraṇa-vyāpāraś ca kāvyasya rasa-viśayo dhvananā"tmaiva, nānyat kiñcit. bhāvakatvam api samucita-guṇālaṃkāra-parigrahā"tmakam asmābhir eva vitatya vakṣyate. kim etad apūrvam ?

kāvyam ca rasān prati bhāvakaṃ iti yad ucyate, tatra bhavataiva bhāvanād utpatti-pakṣa eva pratyujjīvitah. na ca kāvya-śābdānām bhāvakatvam., arthāparijñāne tad abhāvāt. na ca kevalānām arthānām, śābdāntareṇārpyamānatve tad ayogāt. dyayos tu bhāvakatvam asmābhir evōktam. "yatrārthaḥ śabdo vā tam arthaṃ vyañkta" ity atra. tasmād vyañjakatvā"dikayā itikartavyatayā kāvyam bhāvakaṃ, rasān bhāvayati, iti tryaṃśāyām api bhāvanāyām karaṇāmśe dhvananam eva nipatati, bhogōpi na kāvya-śābdena kriyate, api tu ghana-mohāndhya-saṃkaṭatā-nivṛtti-dvāreṇa āsvādanāparanāmni alaukika druti-vistara-vikāsā"tmni bhoge kartavye lokōttare dhvanana-vyāpāra eva mūrdhābhiṣiktaḥ. tac cēdam bhoga kṛtvam rasasya dhvananīyatve siddhe daiva-siddham. rasyamānatōdita-camatkāra-natiriktatvāt bhogasya iti.

sāttva"dīnām cāṅgāṅgi-bhāva-vaicitryasyā"nantiyād drutyā"ditvena āsvāda-gaṇanā na yukṛā.

parabrahmā"svāda -sa-brahma-cāritvam cāstv asya rasā"svādasya. vyutpādanam ca śāsana-pratipādanābhyām śāstrētihāsa-kṛtābhyām vilakṣaṇam. yathā rāmas tathāham ity upamānāti-riktām rasā"svādōpāya-sva-pratibhā-vijṛmbhā-rūpām vyutpattim ante karotīti kam upālabhāmahe ?

tasmāt sthitam etat-abhivyajyante rasāḥ pratītyaiva ca rasyanta iti. tatrābhivyaktiḥ pradhānatayā bhavaty anyathā vā. pradhānatve dhvaniḥ, anyathā rasā"dy alaṃkārah."

It may be noted that Abhinavagupta looks sober when we read his remarks on Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka in the A.bh. But when we go through the above passeege in Locana, we feel that Abhinavagupta has taken a sterner look at Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka and is more vocal, forthright and acid in denouncing the latter's bhāvakatva, bhogīkaraṇa, and sādhanānikaraṇa and suggesting that all this is not even a step further beyond

dhvani-vyañjanā of Ānandavardhana, This becomes very clear when we read the above passage. However, for added delight, we quote Gnoli's translation of this passage as read in Appendix III, pp. 107, etc., *ibid.* Gnoli translates :—

### Appendix III

#### Commentary on Dh. A., II. 4-

“Now Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka says-If the Rasa were perceived as present in a third party, the spectator should be in a state of indifference. On the other hand, the poem-which, f.i, might describe the story of Rāma-does not make the reader perceive it as really present in him because that would imply this admission, namely that there is a birth of Rasa in his own self. Now this birth does not stand to reason, because Sītā dose not play the role of a determinant as regards the spectator. “But”-someone may perhaps say-“that which causes her to be a determinant is the general idea of loverness, which, shared by her, is the cause of the awakening of the latent impressions.” But -I reply to this objection-how can that happen as regards a description of deities, etc. ? Further, no memory of his own beloved one does arise in the spectator's consciousness (while he looks at Sītā). Again is it possible that the construction of a bridge on the ocean and the other determinants of this kind, proper to some extra-ordinary personages as Rāma and so on, may become general ? Nor it can be said that what occurs is simply the memory of Rāma, as endowed of heroism, etc., in so far as the spectator has had no such previous experience.

Even assuming that he is perceived through verbal testimony (śabda), there cannot be any birth of Rasa, just as in the case of a pair of lovers united together, perceived through direct knowledge. Moreover, according to the thesis which maintains that Rasa is produced, the birth of the pathetic Rasa would make the perceiver to experience pain, and, consequently, he would go no more to pathetic representations. Therefore, that is not a production and not even a manifestation. Indeed, if it is supposed that a Rasa f.i., the Erotic one, first pre-exists in a potential form and is later manifested, then (the determinants must necessarily) illuminate it little by little. Besides, the difficulties already met with would recur : is Rasa manifested as really present in our own self, or as present in a third party ? Therefore, Rasa is neither perceived, nor produced, nor manifested by the poem. The truth is that the poetic word is different from the other ones. This happens thanks to three distinct powers, which are so to speak, its parts (aṃśa) : that is to say, the power of denotation, which has, as its object, the expressed sense; the power of revelation, which has, as its object, the rasa; and the power of bringing

about enjoyment, which has, as its object, the individuals who are possessed of heart. If in poetry there were, indeed one power only, i.e. the power of denotation, without the other ones, what a difference would still remain between the various ornaments, as *alliteration, etc.*, and the treatises illustrating them ? And together with the ornaments the various styles also would result useless. And, again, what would be the purpose of avoiding cacophony, etc. ? Therefore, there is a second power, called 'revelation of Rasa', thanks to which the language of poetry is different from any other. This power, the so-called revelation, proper to poetry, is nothing but the faculty of generalizing the determinants. Once the Rasa has been revealed, there is the enjoyment of it. This enjoyment, which is different from any other kind of perception, as direct knowledge, and memory, consists of the states of fluidity, enlargement and expansion, is characterised by a resting, by a lysis, in our own consciousness, constituted by sattva, and intermixed with rajah, and tamah, and is similar to the tasting of the supreme brahman. The chief member of poetry is only this, quite perfect. The so-called instruction has only a secondary place.

This is only one of the theories. The critics indeed do not agree about the true nature of Rasa. Indeed, some of them say that, in the first stage, we have only a parmanent state of mind, which, being later nourished by the transitory states of mind, etc., is experienced as Rasa. This Rasa, they add, is perecived as really present in the reproduced personage only; and, being displayed in the theatre, is called "theatre-rasa." This theory is criticised by others in the following way. What is indeed, they say, the sense of this intensification of a state of mind by another one as regards a mental state, which naturally develops in succession ? Surely, neither astonishment, nor sorrow, nor anger, etc., are seen to grow more intense with time ! Therefore your thesis, viz. Rasa is [perceived as really] present in the reproduced personage, does not stand to reason. If you, on the other hand, say it is in the reproducing actor, obviously he could not follow the tempo, etc. If, finally, you say that it is in the spectators, what a camatkāra would still subsist ? On the contrary, in front of a pathetic scene, the spectators would necessarily feel in pain. Therefore, this thesis is not sound.

Which is then the right one ? Here, because of the infinitude of gradations, no reproduction of a defined (niyata) permanent feeling must be made; this, besides, would be purposeless, because at the sight of this excessive particularity, the spectators would remain indifferent, so that there could not be any useful teaching. The true nature of Rasa is therefore the following. When the determinants, the

consequents and the transitory states are joined together with reference to a permanent mental state, (a-niyatāvasthā"tmaka), there arises a perception, different from memory, viz. "This is Rāma who was happy." This perception has, as its object, the permanent mental feeling, is made up of a tasting, is ultimately founded on the reproducing actor and is also to be found in theatre only. Rasa is nothing but that. It does not require any separate support, but, on the contrary, the spectator is tasting it in the actor, who is considered as identical with the reproduced personage. This is, in brief, the nature of aesthetic experience. Therefore, Rasa lies in the theatre only, not in the represented personage etc. (This, the theory of śaṅkuka).

Some others say : "The image of the permanent state of mind appearing in the reproducing actor is produced by the assemblage of the different forms of representation, etc., just as the image of a horse, appearing on a wall, is produced by the various pigments, as orpiment, etc. This image is tasted by a perception of a non-ordinary nature, named also sampling, and is therefore called Rasa. The meaning of the expression "theatre-rasa", is than, 'the Rasas which are caused by the theatre.'

According to others, Rasa is nothing but the whole of the determinants and the consequents, supplied by a particular assemblage, connected with determinate latent impressions suitable to the permanent state of mind—which is the object of the acting of the afore-mentioned determinants and consequents—and characterized by an intimate relish or lysis. According to this theory, the Rasas, are nothing but the drama.

Some others say that Rasa is the mere determinant, or, again, the mere consequent; according to others it is nothing but the permanent state of mind; others say it is the transitory mental state; to others it is a combination of these; others say that it is the situation to be reproduced; and others finally, that it is an aggregate of all that. But enough of these lucubrations.

The afore-mentioned Rasa occurs in poetry also, which, in the place of the realistic representation and of the theatrical conventions, possesses the natural and extra-ordinary mode of speech. The combination of the determinants, etc., by which it is produced, is, in poetry, afforded by words of a non-ordinary character, endowed with the qualities of clearness (prasanna), sweetness (madhura), and powerfulness (ojasvin). Even if it be admitted that in poetry the Rasa-perception is somehow different from drama, because of the means which are different, the process, however is the same.

Being it so, these faults concern the *prima facie* view only, for, according to it, perception is subjected to the distinctions proper to oneself, to others, etc. Anyhow, no matter which the thesis is, *Rasa* results to be perception. This is unavoidable. Indeed, the existence of an unperceived thing, as, for instance, a goblin, cannot be affirmed. The fact that this perception is called by the names of relish, tasting, or enjoyment, does not amount to any difficulty. We know indeed that the direct cognition, the inference, the tradition, the intuition, the super-normal experience, under their different names,—caused by the different means which manifest them, are equally but forms of perception. Nothing then forbids us to admit that the same occurs in the case of *rasa* also, for the very reason that the means by which it is manifested, viz. the combination of the determinants, etc., assisted by the concert of heart and so on, are of a non-ordinary nature. The use of the expression, “The *Rasas* are perceived,” is just like the one ‘the porridge is being cooked.’ The *Rasa*, indeed, is merely perceived. The relishing is only a particular perception. This perception in drama, is different from an ordinary inferential perception; yet, in the beginning, this is required as a means. Likewise, the afore-said perception, in poetry, is different from the other verbal perceptions. Yet, in the beginning, these are required, as a means.

Therefore, the *prima facie* views are put to death. But if you say that the exploits of *Rāma*, etc., do not earn the consent of heart of everybody, that, I answer, is a great mark of rashness. Everybody’s mind is indeed characterized by the most various latent impressions; for as it has been said, “As the desire is permanent, these are beginningless,” and, “On the ground that the remembrances and the impressions are homogeneous there is an uninterrupted succession of latent impressions, even if they are separated by birth, space and time.” (*yoga-sūtra*, IV., *sūtras* 10 and 9). Therefore, it is established that *Rasa* is perceived. This perception, in its turn, presents itself in the form of relishing.

This relishing is produced by a new power, different from the power of denotation, which the expressed sense and the expressing words come to possess, that is the power of tune, of suggestion, The so-called power of bringing about enjoyment, proper to poetry, according to you, consists, actually, of this power of suggestion only, and has, as its object, the *Rasa*. The other power also, viz. the power of effectuation, is actually based on the usage of appropriate qualities and ornaments. We shall explain it diffusely. It is nothing new.

On the other hand, if you say that poetry is effecting the *Rasa*, then you, by this very statement, resuscitate the theory of production. Besides, this power of

effectuation can be proper neither to the poetical words only, because, if the express sense is not known, the afore-said power cannot logically exist; nor to the express sense only, because, this being conveyed by other words, it does no longer exist. We, on the contrary, maintain that this power of effectuation pertaining to the two of them, as it is confirmed in the stanza, : That kind of poetry, wherein either the sense of the word suggests the implied meaning," etc. (Dh. I. 13). Further, the effectuation process (let us here remember) is endowed with three distinguished parts, that is, the means, the necessary measures, and the end. Therefore, if we make the power of manifestation correspond to the means, the appropriate qualities and ornaments to the necessary measures, and the Rasas to the end, produced by the effecting poem, it is quite clear that the power of suggestion will correspond to the first part, viz. The means. The enjoyment, in its turn, is not produced by the poetical word, but by this non-ordinary power of suggestion only, through the suppression of our thick pall of mental stupor and blindness. This enjoyment consists, according to you, of the states of fluidity, enlargement and expansion, is called also "tasting", and is of a non-ordinary nature. In other words, having once established that Rasa is suggested, the afore-mentioned power of bringing about enjoyment is, it too, finally established. The enjoyment, indeed, is identical with the 'Camatkāra', arising from the Rasa-experience itself. Further, as the constituent elements sattva, etc., can be found set out in an infinite number of different ways, according to the predominance of the one or the other, it is absurd to limit the forms of tasting to fluidity, etc. only. As to the theory, according to which the tasting of rasa is similar to the tasting of the supreme Brahman, we have nothing to object. Moreover, the teaching to be derived from poetry is different from the injunctions and instructions imparted by religious treatises and historical narratives. However, to them, who maintain that poetry produces at the end a teaching, which differs from usual analogy, viz. "as Rāma, so I", and consists in an enrichment of our own power of intuition,—the instrument which allows the tasting of Rasa-, we have nothing to reproach. Therefore, this is definitely established—namely, that Rasas are manifested, and are tasted through a perception."

It will be also interesting to quote another passage from Locāna, on Dnv. I. 18- This reads as : (pp. 88, 98, Edn. Nandi, *ibid*)

"tathā hi-vibhāvānubhāva-pratipādake hi kāvyē mukhyérthe tāvad bādhakānupraveśōpy āsam̐bhāvya iti ko lakṣaṇāvakāśaḥ ?

nanu kiṃ bādhayā, iyad eva lakṣaṇā-svarūpam—"abhidheyāvinābhūta-pratītir lakṣaṇocyate.", iti iha ca abhidheyānām vibhāvānubhāvādīnām avinā-bhūtā



rasādāya iti laksyante, vibhāvānubhāvayoḥ kārya-kāraṇa-rūpatvāt, vyabhicāriṇām ca tat saha cāritvād iti cet-mā evam. dhūmaśabdād dhūme pratipanne hy agnismtir api lakṣaṇa-kṛtaiva syāt, tatōgneḥ śītāpanoda-smṛtir ityā”dir a-paryavasitah śabdārthah syāt.

dhūma-śabdasya svārtha-viśrāntitvān na tāvati vyāpāra iti cet, āyātaṃ tarhi mukhyārthabādhho lakṣaṇāyā jīvitam iti. sati tasmin, svārtha-viśrāntyabhāvāt. na ca vibhāvādi-pratipādane bādhakam kiñcid asti.

nanv evam dhūmāvagamānānantaram agni-smaraṇavad vibhāvādi-pratipattyanantaram ratyā”di-citta vṛtti- pratipattir iti śabda-vyāpāra evā’tra nāsti.

idaṃ tāvad ayam pratīti-svarūpajño mīmāṃsakah praṣṭavyaḥ-kim atra para-citta-vṛtti-mātre pratipattir eva rasapratītir abhinmatā bhavataḥ ? na ca evam bhramitavyam; evam hi lokagata-citta-vṛtty anumāna-mātram iti kā rasatā ? yastv alaukika-camatkāra”tmā rasā”svādah, kāvya-gata-vibhāvādi-carvaṇā-prāṇo, nāsau smaraṇānumānā”di-sāmyeṇa khilikāra-pātrī-kartavyaḥ. kim tu, laukikena kārya-kāraṇānumānā”dinā saṃskṛta-hṛdayo vibhāvā”dikam pratipadyamāna eva, na tātasthyena pratipadyate, api tu, hṛdaya-samvādāpara-paryāya-sahṛdayatva-paravaśīkṛtatayā pūrṇibhaviṣyad-rasā”svādāṅkurībhāvena anumāna-smaraṇā”di-saraṇim anāruhya eva tanmayībhavanocita-carvaṇā-prāṇatayā. na cāsau carvaṇā pramāṇāntarto jātā pūrvam yena idānīm smṛtiḥ syāt. na cādhunā kutaścit pramāṇāntarād utpannā, alaukike pratyakṣādy a-vyāpārāt.

ata eva alaukika eva vibhāvā”di-vyavahārah. yad āha-“vibhāvo vijñānārthah.”, loke kāraṇam eva abhidhīyate, na vibhāvaḥ. anubhāvōpy alaukika eva-“yad ayam anubhāvayati vāg-aṅga-sattva-kṛtōbhinayas tasmād anubhāva iti. tac cittavṛtti-tanmayībhavanam eva hy anubhavanam. loke tu kāryam eva ucyate, nānubhāvaḥ. ata eva parkīyā na citta-vṛttir gamyata ity abhiprāyeṇa “vibhāvānubhāva-vyabhicāri-saṃyogād rasa-nispattiḥ” iti sūtre sthāyi-grahaṇam na kṛtam. tat praty uta śalya-bhūtaṃ syāt. sthāyinas tu rasībhāva aucityād ucyate, tad-vibhāvānubhāvocita-citta-vṛtti-saṃskāra-sundara-carvaṇodayāt. hṛdaya-samvādayogi-lokacitta-vṛtti-parijñānāvasthāyām udyāna-pulakā”dibhiḥ sthāyi-bhūta-ratyādy avagamāc ca. vyabhicāri tu citta-vṛttyātmakatvēpi mukhya-citta-vṛtti-paravaśā eva carvyate iti vibhāvānubhāva-madhye gaṇitaḥ. ata eva rasyamānatāyā eṣā eva nispattiḥ yat- prabandha-pravṛtta-bandhu-samāgamā”di-kāraṇodita-harṣā”di-laukika-citta-vṛtti-nyagbhāvena carvaṇārūpatvam. ataś carvaṇātra abhivyañjanam eva, na tu jñāpanam pramāṇa-vyāpāravat, nāpy utpādanam hetu-vyāpāravat.

nanu yadī neyaṃ jñaptir na vā niṣpattiḥ, tarhi kim etat ? nanv ayam alaukiko rasah, nanu vibhāvādir atra kim jñāpako hetuḥ, uta kārakah ? na jñāpako na kārakah, api tu carvaṇopyogī. nanu kva etad dṛṣṭam anyatra ? yata eva na dṛṣṭam tata eva alaukikam ity uktam. nanu evaṃ rasópramāṇaṃ syāt, astu, kim tataḥ ? tac carvaṇātaḥ eva prīti-vyutpatti-siddheḥ kim anyad arthanīyam ? nanu a-pramāṇakam etat; na, sva-saṃvedanasiddhatvāt. jñāna-viśeṣasyaiva carvaṇā”tmatvād ity alaṃ bahunā. ataś ca, rasóyam alaukikah. yena lalita-paruṣa-anuprāsasya arthābhidhānānupayoginópi rasaṃ prati vyañjakatvam; kā tatra lakṣaṇāyāḥ śāṅkāpi ?—

These lines remind us of the same usage in the A.bh. as examined earlier. Here rasa is established as a non-ordinary thing, not covered under lakṣaṇā. The translation by Gnoli, (Appendic II, pp. 102, *ibid*) reads as follows :—

“Commentary on Dh. Ā., I. 18.- As to poetry, which conveys the determinants and the consequents, there is no possible appearance of any element which could provoke the unsuitability of the primary meaning; and therefore, there is in this sense little room for metaphor (=lakṣaṣā, we favour the word, “indication.”). “But”,—someone might argue,—what has it to do with unsuitability ? The nature of metaphor had indeed been defined as follows. “The metaphor is said to be apprehension of a sense connected with the sense directly expressed. Now in poetry, we see that the Rasas are connected with the determinants, the consequents etc., which are directly expressed; indeed, the determinants and the consequents are respectively the causes and the effects of Rasas, and the transitory states co-operate with them.” Your objection, I reply, does not stand to reason. If it be right, indeed, when, thanks to the word ‘smoke’, the smoke has been apprehended, there would arise also the idea of fire, just effected by the afore-said metaphor; and again, from fore, there would arise the idea of removing coldness, and so on, so that words could no more have any fixed meaning. On the other hand, if you answer to this, saying that, since the word ‘smoke’ is reposed in its own sense, its power cannot actually extend to fire and so on, then the consequence of your argumentation is one only, namely, that the seed of metaphor, is the unsuitability of the primary meaning, because, only if this is present, the afore-said repose of a word in its own sense can be lacking. Now, in the conveying of determinants, etc., there is no element which can provoke the unsuitability of the primary meaning.

At this point, someone might perhaps urge that the apprehension of the feelings of delight, etc., immediately follows the apprehension of the determinants, etc., just as the idea of fire immediately follows the perception of smoke, and that, being it

so, there is little room, in this case, for a power inherent in words. But, instead of answering to this objection, I will pose a question to this clever logician, (actually, the term is Mīmāṃsaka, not naiyāyika)-who knows so well the nature of perception, and it is the following : Do you think that the apprehension of Rasa is merely apprehension of the feelings of some other person ? You do not deserve to fall into such a mistake. In this case, indeed, the said apprehension would be but an inference of the feeling proper to such and such people; what sort of a Rasa could it then possess ? But the tasting of Rasa, which is made up of a non-ordinary camatkāra, and is animated by the gustation of the determinants, etc., proper to poetry, cannot certainly be so condemned as to be placed on the same level as the ordinary processes of memory, inference, etc. Rather, the truth is that he whose heart possesses the latent traces of the ordinary inferential process from the effect to the cause etc., does not apprehend the determinants and so on, as if he were indifferent; being instead at the mercy of his own sensibility-which quality is also called consent of heart-, he rather apprehends them without mounting on the path of memory, inference, etc., as if merged in a gustation, suitable to an identification (with the determinants, etc.), which is, so to say, the sprout of the tasting of Rasa, about to appear in all its fullness. This tasting, again, is not already born in the past, from some other means of knowledge, so that it is, now, a form of memory; nor is it arisen now from some other means of knowledge, for as to a non-ordinary thing, the direct perception, etc., are devoid of any power. Hence, the expressions 'determinants', etc. are of non-ordinary nature; for as Bharata himself had said : "The word 'determinant' is used for the sake of clear knowledge." In everyday life, they are called causes, not determinants. The term 'consequent', is, it too, non-ordinary : "Because the representation"-Bharata says-"by means of words, gestures, and the temperament, makes one experience (the mental states) it is called, "Consequents". This experiencing, provoked by the consequents, is nothing but an identification with the said feelings. In everyday life, they are called effects, not consequents. Therefore, just with this view in mind, namely, that we do not apprehend a feeling of others, Bharata has made no mention of the permanent mental states in the sūtra : "Out of the union of the determinants, the consequents and the transitory mental states, the birth of Rasa takes place." On the contrary, mention of it would have been a source of difficulty. Such expressions as "The permanent mental state becomes Rasa", are due to correspondence only-because, that is to say, the gustation arises, beautiful as it is, thanks to the trace, latent within us, of the feeling corresponding to the determinants and the consequents;

and because in worldly life, in the stage, that is, of the knowledge of the feeling of others'-a knowledge, let us say, truly indispensable as regards the consent of heart-we are able to apprehend the permanent feelings of delight, etc. from things as gardens, brisling of the hairs, and so on. The transitory mental state, is no doubt a feeling, but, since it is enjoyed in so far as it is entirely dependent on the principal one, it is reckoned by Bharata among the determinants and the consequents.

Therefore, the 'birth of Rasa', mentioned in the sūtra, must be intended as the birth of a relishing-which relishing is a sort of immersion in gustation, appearing as superior to all the other ordinary feelings of delight, etc., that may be aroused by different causes, as, f.i., meeting with a friend, and appear to develop gradually. This gustation, therefore, is only a manifestation, not a revelation-which is the operation of the means of knowledge-, and not even a production-which is the operation of the means of action.

"but", -at this point someone might argue-"If this gustation is neither a cognition. nor a production, then what is it ?- But we reply-have we not said that this Rasa is of a non-ordinary nature ? What are then, these determinants ? Are they revealing causes or producing cause ? We reply to this question that they are neither revealing nor producing, but only something which serves to realize the gustation. Does any such thing appear elsewhere ? But for the very reason why it does not appear we say that it is of a non-ordinary nature. But (someone might say) in this way Rasa is not an object of cognition (a-prameya). Let us admit it-we reply -and what of it ? For, since from its gustation, pleasure and instruction derive, what other do you desire ? But you might say, it is not ascertained by any means of knowledge. This is untrue we reply, because its real existence is unconfutable datum of our own consciousness; besides, this gustation is a particular form of knowledge. And that is enough. Therefore, the said Rasa is of a non-ordinary nature-so that even alliterations of harsh or soft sounds can be suggestive of it, though they are of no use as to meaning. Here, then, there is not even the shadow of the metaphor."

We will once again attempt a summary of Abhinavagupta's ideas on the nature of rasa and on the nature of rasa-experience.

A.G. is very clear that the perception of rasa is not of the form of memory, for rasa is not an object experienced beforehand, with the help of other means of knowledge - i.e. it is not "pūrvānubhūta", which is remembered at this given moment. This aesthetic chewing- gustation-'carvanā' is brought about by the combination of extra-ordinary vibhāvādi-s. So this perception is different from such

worldly perceptions as direct knowledge (pratyakṣa), inference (anumāna), āgama or verbal authority, or observation of similitude which at local level give birth to the apprehension of worldly ratyādi-i.e. delight, etc. It is different from the knowledge of a mīta-yogin which is like a third person's observation. (tāstha). It is also different from a para-yogin's experience of the self, which is a compact one. The reason is that in this perception of the highest yogin, all worldly objects melt away, and hence the beauty imparted by the colouring by contact with these worldly objects is missing here. Thus there is "saundarya -viraha"-in a-mita-yogin's perception. Perception, of rasa differs from all these perceptions because, as explained by Abhinavagupta, in the apprehension of delight (rati) etc. by worldly means, there is possibility of an attitude to possess and avoid what is agreeable or pleasure-giving and non-agreeable or pain-giving respectively : thus there is "hānōpādāna-buddhi." This creates an obstacle in rasa-perception. In the case of mīta-yogin, because of tāstha there is lack of distinctness-a-sphuṭatva, and in case of rasanā-vyāpāra 'sphūṭatvābhāva' is absent. In case of para-yogin's apprehension, there is absence of beauty or 'saundarya-viraha', for the material that causes colouring has vanished. In the gustation-rasanātmaka samvedana-there is no tāstha as the self of the enjoyer enters into it, i.e. the enjoyer feels being part of the experience. He does not feel that whatever he is experiencing belongs to someone else. In the act of aesthetic chewing- rasa-carvaṇā-the sāmājika apprehends the ratyā"di, staying as impressions in his own mind, through the agency of generalized determinants, etc. This apprehension is of the nature of aesthetic chewing-"rasyamāna-svabhāva." The idea is that the taste of this special apprehension is only during the time of the apprehension of vibhāvā"di; i.e. it is of the form of a perception. To say that 'rasa' is an "object" of perception is resorting to metaphorical expression, for, in fact, the perception, the process, itself is tasting. There is no possibility of the rise of obstacles here, as this perception, when it takes place, is beyond obstacles, i.e. it is a "vīta-vighnā pratīti."

Simply for this reason only the vibhāvā"di-s can not be said to be the production causes-kāraka-hetu-of rasa-perception, for, in that case rasa-perception should continue to occur even when the vibhāvā"di-s cease to exist. But this is not the case. The moment the curtain drops rasa-perception is over and the sāmājika again crashlands on the ground of everyday reality. In the same tune the vibhāvā"di-s can not be said to be the causes of cognition (jñapti-hetu) of rasā"di, for 'rasa' has no prior objective existence. As a pot lying in a room in darkness is revealed by torch, in the same way rasa, pre-existing before the art-performance begins, is not

revealed by vibhāvā”dis. If it has a prior objective reality, the existence of rasa should be accepted prior to the beginning of art-show. But it is impossible to accept this. We have observed during our discussion on vyañjanā or suggestion, that it is not identical with manifestation-abhivyakti of the dārśanikas. Actually it is taller by ten figures-atyatiṣhat daśāṅgulam !

Naturally that a question can be raised as to what exactly are these vibhāvā”dis ? The reply is that the use of these vibhāvādi-s is inevitable in the process of tasting. But their function should be taken as extra-worldly. It is neither kāraka, nor jñāpaka, but it is extra-ordinary ! If it is asked if a similar thing is marked anywhere anytime, the answer is “No, And precisely because of this it is termed a-laukika, i.e. extra-worldly. If it is said that then rasa will be a-prameya or not an object of cognition, the answer is, “let it be so.” For, to take rasa as an entity beyond cognition, is a bhūṣaṇa, an ornament in explaining it as an extra-worldly object. This in short is not a limitation, i.e. “dūṣaṇa.” At worldly level the generation of ṣāḍavā”di-rasa’, which in itself is beyond its ingredients such as molasses, pepper, etc., could be taken as an illustration here. Thus Abhinavagupta underlines the extra-ordinary nature of rasa-perception or aesthetic tasting.

When it is said that rasa-pratīti is a-laukika, what is to be understood is its difference from worldly cognitions. Art-experience can never be equated with ordinary worldly experience. The authors of the Nāṭya-darpaṇa do not agree with this and they accept the nature of this taste to be pleasure-yielding and also pain-giving -i.e. sukha-duḥkhā”tmaka, But for the school represented by Abhinavagupta aesthetic chewing-tasting-is only of the nature of supreme bliss or beatitude-, or say, is made only of bliss-ānanda-ghana-saṃvedana, and even a shadow of unhappiness is ruled out from it-“tatra kā duḥkhā”śaṅkā” Now when rasa is thus placed beyond the field of worldly cognition, logically it will be said to be a-prameya i.e. beyond cognition. This is acceptable to Abhinavagupta for rasa for him is having tasting only as its life-breath-“rasyamāṇataikapraṇa”. Therefore it is always beyond worldly cognition. If it is asked that in the sūtra there is mention of “niṣpatti”which is either “jñāpi” or “utpatti”, then, the answer is that there is ‘niṣpatti’ not of rasa, but of rasanā-vyāpāra i.e. only the process of relishing starts, the relish itself is beyond being produced. This process is of the form of consciousness - sva-saṃvedana,’ which has ‘rasa’ as its object. Thus rasa depends on “rasanā”. With reference to the niṣpatti’ of rasanā-vyāpāra, the birth / niṣpatti of rasa is also stated metaphorically. In fact the rasanā-vyāpāra is of the form of consciousness and is not brought about either by pramāṇa-vyāpāra or kāraka-vyāpāra. But for this, we will not be able to brand it as ‘a-pramāṇika’ for it is “sva-saṃvedana-siddha.”

After this Abhinavagupta discusses the nature of rasa-apprehension, which for him is first and last a perception—"a 'samvedana'. It is bodha-rūpā-pratītiḥ. That this bodha-or pratīti is different from other cognitions is because the determinants etc. which cause it are non-ordinary and therefore different from worldly causes. We have explained in detail earlier how Abhinavagupta explains Bharata's rasa-sūtra, so we will not repeat it over here once again.

### **All rasas are bliss-giving :-**

For Abhinavagupta all rasa-s are sukhātmaka. He accepts the "ānanda-rūpatā sarva-rasānām" and perhaps this will drag us to believe that he, from the highest point of view, believes in only one rasa-the mahārasa-or Śānta-rasa which is made of bliss alone, as we will go to see later.

The level of this ānanda is higher or is beyond the level of worldly pleasure and pain. He has discussed this point while treating the sixth obstacle in rasa-perception. All worldly feelings are not ānandātmaka or sukhātmaka or joy-giving. But in rasa-tasting all these worldly feelings become the object of a compact experience of beatitude and hence are all pleasure-giving. They are apprehended by a perception free from all obstacles. Thus śoka, krodha, etc. also, when they are part of this compact consciousness, they leave their original nature of yielding pleasure or pain. and become just blissful. the apprehension free from all obstacles is necessarily bliss-giving. This is one of the basic principles of the Pratyabhijñā darśana. With this ends the epistemological consideration of 'rasa' in the estimation of Abhinavagupta.

**"Śānta-rasa."** – As noted earlier, Abhinavagupta is, like Ānandavardhana, a great protagonist of Śānta-rasa, which is the "rasa of rasas" which is a 'mahārasa', a sort of canvass' bhitti-on which other rasas are painted, a source-prakṛti, other rasas being vikṛti-s formed due to difference in the set of vibhāvādi-s. Thus for him, rasa-is basically one and of the nature of beatitude alone—"ānadaike-ghana." We will try to examine Abhinavagupta's attitude towards Śānta-rasa which in fact lays out his philosophy of aesthetics.

The śānta-rasa-prakarṇa is considered to be a later interpolation in Bharata's Nā-Śā., though of course, opinions differ, among scholars, on this count. But whatever it may be, for Abhinavagupta it is a genuine part of the Nā-Śā. and he has written his A.bh. on this portion also, contronverting the views of anti-Śānta theorists. Not only this, but actually 'Śānta-rasa' seems to be the only 'rasa', so to say, which is experienced in the last stange of tasting in any art-form. If 'viśānti', 'laya', 'samāpatti', etc. are the ultimate test of aesthetic experience, then Śānta

deserves to be very much there for even the taste of any other rasa is ultimately a vigalita-vedyāntara-anubhūti. So, the other rasas, the eight i.e. śṛṅgāra and the rest get their names from the variety of vibhāvādi-s seen in them, the highest goal being carvaṇā-viśrānti. It is because of this that Abhinavagupta argues in favour of ‘Śānta’ which again is a name, only a name, for the mahā-rasa, the ‘rasa’ of ‘rasa-s’, which unites all art. The famous verses from the Nā-Śā. make this point clear, But before we quote the same, it may be noted that Bhoja, later than Abhinavagupta also underlined the basis one-ness of rasa, when he equated rasa with “abhimāna, ahaṁkāra, Śṛṅgāra.” The Nā-Śā. (pp. 328, 329, vol.I. G.O.S. ’92. K. Kris.) verses read as :-

“bhāvā vikārā ratyā”dyāḥ  
 śāntas tu, prakṛtir mathaḥ,  
 vikāraḥ prakṛter jātaḥ  
 punas tatraiva liyate.”  
 svam svam nimittam āsādyā  
 śāntād bhāvaḥ pravartate,  
 punar nimittāpāye ca  
 śānta evopaliyate.”

It may be noted that even the so-called śānta-rasa which as Bharata says, is-

“mokṣādhyātma-samutthas  
 tattva-jñānārtha-hetu-samyuktaḥ,  
 naiḥśreyasopadiṣṭaḥ  
 śānta-raso nāma sambhavati.”

-could be taken as just one more type of aesthetic experience adding the other eight varieties arrived at in the name of śṛṅgāra, hāsyā, karuṇa, etc. Experts in aesthetics have debated the position of this particular rasa. Some reject it, while others accept it only with reference to poetry i.e. literature and not drama proper. Be it as it is, but nobody has denied the fact of rasānubhūti in case of any art,- dance, music, poetry, drama. painting, architecture, sculpture, or any. So, it seems that Bharata has also perhaps used the name ‘Śānta’ for both of these; one for the śānta-rasa which is ‘mokṣādhyātma-samuttha etc. and for establishing which even in the context of drama Abhinavagupta has taken great care in the A.bh. on this portion, and the other, the Śānta, which is the mahā-rasa, or the basic ‘rasa’



running through all art, the art-experience itself, which is an experience exclusive to art only, *sui generis*, which is “vigalita-vedyāntara-anubhūti.” It is this Śānta which is said to be “bhitti-kalpa” or canvas on which different designs due to different set of vibhāvādi-s emerge, leading to an art-experience which is ‘a-laukika.’ It is this ‘śānta’ which is said to be ‘prakṛti’-rasa. Abhinavagupta has talked of this at other places also and Bharata also does the same when he uses a singular in the famous expression, viz. “na hi rasād ṛte kaścid arthaḥ pravartate.”

Bharata’s verses quoted above bringing home this point of ‘one basic rasa’ could be translated as :

“Śānta is in fact the prakṛti (the base) from which the transmutes in the form of emotions like Rati (love) are generated. The transmutes produced from the bases (? , base) merge in them (? ‘it’.). Emotions are generated from the basic Śānta owing to particular causes and when these causes cease to exist, the emotions too merge with Śānta” (Trans. Dr. P. unni, pp. 182, Nā.-Śā, vol-I., Nag Publishers, ’98, Delhi). We have suggested some corrections-viz. ‘base’ and ‘it’, in the brackets. Dr. Unni means as much, and we know it. So, our thesis is that Bharata uses the name ‘Śānta’, both for the so called ninth rasa –“tatra Śānto nāma śama-sthāyi-bhāvatmako....” etc., to establish which the A.bh has taken great pains and with all this, which was rejected or partly accepted in later tradition, and also in the sense of “prakṛti-rasa’, ‘the base.’ Other rasa-s emerge from this and merge into this. It is, so to say, the synthesis of rasa. Abhinavagupta has tried hard to establish this basic unity of rasa at different places. This in fact, is the essence of his aesthetics.

This one basic rasa, the rasa of all rasas, the mahārasa, or the Śānta-rasa which is said to be bhitti-sthānīya is underlined by Abhinavagupta in the following passages;—

(i) (pp.265, Nā.Śā, vol. I. Edn.K. Kris.-)

“pūrvatra bahuvacanam atra caikavacanam prayuñjānasya ayam āśayaḥ-eka eva tāvat paramārthato rasah, sūtra-sthānīyatvena rūpake pratibhāti. tasyaiva punar bhāga-dṛśā vibhāgaḥ. śopi ca na tad-eka-mukha-prekṣitām ativartate. etac ca uddeśe eva asmābhir abhihita-caram. abhidhāsyate cāgre.”

This is A.bh. on the words of Bharata which read as. (pp. 266, *ibid*)-“tatra rasān eva tāvad ādāv abhi-vyākhyāsyāmaḥ. na hi rasād ṛte kaścid arthaḥ pravartate.”

(Trans. Unni, pp. 158) : “Among these I shall deal with the sentiments at the outset. There could be nothing without the relish of sentiments (? , sentiment, singular).”

The A.bh. is clear. It observes : “In the beginning (Bharata used) the plural (viz. rasān), and here (i.e. in rasād ṛte) when singular is used (by the author, Bharata), the idea is- Only one (and identical) rasa is seen in a drama(=any art-form) in form of a string (running through the beads). From the point of view of division, the (individual variety) –‘vibhāga’ is (suggested). Even that (division into sub-varieties) does never miss focussing on that (one basic rasa) alone. This we have already stated when contents were discussed. We will say this even later, (as we go on).”

(ii) It may be noted that in Nā.Śā, VI. 10, (pp. 257, ibid) the saṃgraha’ or enumeration of topics to be covered in the Nā.Śā. was given beginning with “rasāh.” : “rasā bhāvā hy abhinayāḥ....” etc. Then, on pp. 260, ibid, verse 15 (ch. VI) reads as :

“śṛṅgāra-hāsyā-karuṇā....”

The A.bh. passage (pp. 260, ibid) reads as :-

“tatra vibhāgaṃ tāvad āha- śṛṅgāra-hāsyety ādinā, nāṭya-saṃgraha (6/39) ity antena.

tatra nāṭyaṃ nāma nāṭa-gata-abhinaya-prabhāva-sākṣār-kārāyamāṇa-ekaghana-mānasa-niṣcalādhyavaseyaḥ, samasta-nāṭakādy anyatama-kāvya-viśeṣa-dyotanīyōr-thaḥ.

sa ca yady apy ananta-vibhāvādy ātmā, tathāpi sarveṣāṃ jadānām śiṃvidī, tasyāś ca bhoktari, bhoktr-vargasya ca pradhān bhoktari paryavasānān nāyākābhidhāna-bhoktr-viśeṣa-sthāyi-citta-vṛtti-svabhāvaḥ.”

(Translation) : “Parts (of the general content) are narrated by the words, beginning with “śṛṅgāra, hāsyā” etc., and ending with “nāṭya-saṃgraha.”

Here ‘nāṭya’ (in nāṭya-saṃgraha) means that ultimate meaning (or intention) which is the outcome of the whole of a (given) dramatic piece or a (given) poem. It is arrived at as a result of a solid mental cognition, which is as it were directly experienced with the help of the force of acting of an actor.

This (ultimate meaning, viz. rasa) is having innumerable vibhāvādi-s (both sentient and insentient and presented in a variety of shapes and forms), but all the insentient ones (among them) terminate into consciousness (saṃvit), and this consciousness terminates into (or is centred round a bhoktā (i.e. ālambana-vibhāva, i.e. character), and all the bhoktā-s centre round a central character (principal bhoktā, the hero). So (the ultimate meaning of) the rasa is of the form of the permanent emotion of the hero.–

After coming to the one single sthāyi-citta-vṛtti of the hero, Abhinavagupta proceeds to explain rasa as—

(pp. 260, ibid)–

“sā ca eka-citta-vṛttiḥ sva-param-iti pratiyamāna-ananta-citta-vṛttyantara-śata-viśeṣitā, laukika-gīta-geya-padā”di-lāsyāṅga-daśakopajīvana-svīkṛta-lakṣaṇa-guṇā, alaṃkāra-gīta-ātodyā”di-samyak-sundarībhūta-kāvya-mahima-prayoga-mālā-bhyāsa-viśeṣā”śrayatvāt pratyāvitā, ata eva sādharāṇībhūtatayā sāmājikan api svātma-sadbhāvena samāveśayanti tādātmyād eva ca, anumān”āgama-yogi-pratyakṣā”di-karaṇaka-taṭastha-pramāṭṛprameya-parakīya laukika-citta-vṛtti-vilakṣaṇatayā nirbhāsamānā parimita-svātmāny āśrayatā-nirbhāsamāna-virahāc ca, laukika-pramadā”di-janita-nija-ratiśokavat, taj-jahānā”di-citta-vṛtty antara-jananākṣamā, tata eva nirvighna-sva-samvedanā”tmaka-viśrānti-lakṣaṇena rasanāpara-paryāyeṇa vyāpāreṇa grhya-mānatvād rasa-śabdena abhidhīyate.”

tena rasa eva nāṭyam. yasya vyutpattiḥ phalam ity utyate. tathā ca rasād ṛta (nā. śā. 6/31) ity atra ekavacanopapattiḥ.

tataś ca mukhya-bhūtāt mahārasāt, sphoṭa-dṛśīva asatyāni vā, anvitābhidhāna-dṛśīva ubhayātmakāni satyāni vā, abhihitānvaya-dṛśīva tat-samudāya-rūpāni vā rasāntarāṇi, bhāgābhiniveśa-dṛṣṭāni rūpyante.”

This can be translated as follows :—

“That mental feeling (the principal one of the hero) is rendered bereft of such notions as “this is mine—” (svakīya), or “this is some one else’s” (parakīya). (In short it looses its relation with an individual. That means it is de-individualised, losing all contact with particularity). This (generalisation of the permanent mental state of the hero) is brought about by the influence of-(i) the stanzas, put to music, of popular songs (that figure in the drama, or poem), (ii) the greatness of the poem and the acting of an actor brought about by practice. These two are decorated by the beauty of ten parts of lāsyā or dance etc. and guṇas or excellences and alaṃkāras or embellishments used in poetry. Thus the basic emotion rendered free from any touch of particularity covers up the sāmājika-s or the spectators also in its fold. Thus on account of identity brought about between the basic mental state of the hero and that of the spectator also, this apprehension seems to be different in nature from knowledge brought about by inference, or āgama-s. It is a sort of consciousness which is also different from the one of a yogin, which is caused without the contact of sense-organs with objects, and which is, as it were, of an un-involved person, a taṭastha. It is also different from cognitions having a part of

a pramāta-knower and prameya or the object of knowledge. It is a cognition (in which, because the hero is not limited by his narrow ego-sense) which does not cause (hindrances, such as) shame, jealousy, etc. caused at personal level in the worldly context.

As this consciousness does not cause other obstructing feelings, it is an object of a function called 'āsvādana' or tasting which is of the form of resting-viśānti-of an experience free from all obstacles. This is termed "rasa" or "taste."

So then, 'rasa' is itself 'nātya', the experience of which is also termed the 'phala' or goal, or end. It is unique and one and of an identical nature. Precisely for this, Bharata uses singular in "rasād ṛte."

Thus, for Abhinavagupta 'rasa' is basically one and identical. There is only "rasa", and not rasa-s. Abhinavagupta further notes in a conclusive way that—

—“And because (rasa is one and identical) it may be said that, from one single mahā-rasa, other rasa-s are imagined and they are unreal (as are) spoken words (as taken distinct) from sphota (which is the only reality). Or, from the point of view of the anvitābhidhāna-vāda, other rasa-s are real, being instrumental (in arriving at the basic one rasa) (as are individual word-meanings instrumental in arriving at sentence-sense). Or, the principal one rasa is of the form of an aggregate-samudāya, as is the sentence-sense made of individual word-meanings. Thus, individual rasa-s are seen as parts of the one principal rasa.”

These passages confirm our observation that Abhinavagupta believed in one basic rasa, and the individual rasa-s were just there, viewed as different from the angle of the difference in vibhāvādi-s. Now call it 'Śānta' or call it by any other name.

**This rasa-theory as promulgated by Indian thinkers is basically very catholic and it covers all arts and all individual art-forms as well, practiced by a hundred thous and poets, or artists including those of to-day. We will try to establish the Catholicity of rasa theory as follow :\***

—“With reference to the available written documents, the Nāyaśāstra (N.S.) of Bharata Muni is the earliest work on dramaturgy that lays down the theory of Rasa as applicable to the dramatic art in particular and then to any fine art in general, such as the art of music, dance, painting, sculpture, literature, etc. etc.,

\* This was a paper contributed to the W.S.C. in Delhi, 02. It was to be read from the chair in one session, but the author could not attend the conference, It was published then in A.B.O.R.I. Pune, vol. XXXV-'01, '02.

of course keeping the 'Sa-hṛdaya' or the sensitive reader/spectator in its focus. It is to be understood as a theory of art or beauty in general that attempts to explain art-experience with reference to any art worth its name. So, for us, rasānubhūti is kalānubhūti, is saundaryānubhūti, or ānandānubhūti, or experience of the highest bliss : the Divine. We can take Bharata's contribution to explain dramatic art as part of efforts by Indian art-critics in the field of aesthetics in general. Be it Bharata, Bhāmaha or Ānandavardhana or Abhinavagupta, they were all concerned with the problem of beauty in general and then beauty as seen in drama or literature.

With reference to the rasa-experience or art-experience in general, Bharata has coined his famous rasa-sūtra viz. "Vibhāvānubhāva-vyabhicāri-samyogād-rasa-niṣpattiḥ.", i.e. out of the combination (samyoga) of Determinants (vibhāva), the Consequents (anubhāva) and the Transitory Mental States (vyabhicārin), the birth of Rasa takes place," (Trans, Gnoli);pp. 25, ibid). That commentators such as Bhaṭṭa Lollāṭa, Śrī Śaṅkuka, Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka and Abhinavagupta have attempted different explanations of this sūtra need not detain us here, nor the different explanations advanced by Dhanañjaya and Dhanika, Bhoja, Rāmacandra and Guṇa-candra, Siddhicandra and Jagannātha, who, following Abhinavagupta's lead, also presents eleven different attempts to explain the theory of rasa, which for us is a general theory of art. For, our sole object here is to underline its catholicity; its applicability to newer and newer forms of art in general, and literature in particular with a special reference to newer forms of absurd play and intellectual gymnasium attempted by modern western poets and also writers in India in various modern literatures such as Hindi, Gujarati, Marathi, Bengali, Tamil, Telugu, Malayalam, Kannada, Assamia, and what not.

The challenge came from Dr. Paulose, at a seminar in Śrī Śaṅkarācārya Sanskrit university in Kaladi, Kerala, in March '99, when he raised a point as to the universal applicability of rasa-theory, particularly with reference to such modern plays, as for example, 'Mother Courage.' The prompt answer to this from the chair was that even a traditional explanation of rasa-theory will suit this dramatic piece called, "Mother Courage' when we suggest that here the principal 'aṅgī' sentiment is "dharma-vīra", with a subordinate (gauṇa) under-current of Karuṇa or the tragic. But this explanation apart, there is a larger scope for the rasa-theory. We begin with Ānandavardhana.

He observes in his Dhvanyāloka (=Dhv.), a great work on literary criticism and the first written document available, advocating the theory of vyañjanā-dhvani-rasa as solution to art experience, cf. at Dhv. IV. 1,2

“dhvaner yaḥ sa-guṇībhūta-  
vyaṅgyasyādhvā pradarśitaḥ,  
anenā”nantyam āyāti  
kavīnām pratibhā-guṇaḥ.” (Dhv. IV. i)

-ya eṣa dhvaner guṇībhūta-vyaṅgyasya ca mārgaḥ prakāśitaḥ, tasya phalāntaram kavi-pratibhānantyam;

and also,

“ato hy anyatamenāpi  
prakāreṇa vibhūṣitā,  
vānī navatvam āyāti  
pūrvārthānvaya-vaty api.” (Dhv. IV.2)

“By the ways of the principal suggestion as also the subordinated suggestion shown thus far, the quality of creative imagination in poets will assume endlessness.” (Dhv. IV. 1)

“Endlessness of creative imagination in poets will be another outcome of the theory of principal and subordinated suggestion laid down already.”

“If one should ask, ‘how is it’, (here is our reply) :

“By a mere touch of even a single variety of suggestion (among the many that have been enumerated), the poet’s expression will acquire novelty, even though it might perhaps embody only a trite idea.”

(Translation, K. Krishnamoorthy, p. 265, Dhv., Karnatak uni. , Dharwar, ’74).

He adds at Dhv. IV. 10,

“vācaspatisahasrāṇām  
sahasrair api yatnataḥ,  
nibaddhā sā kṣayaṃ naiti,  
prakṛtir jagatām iva.”

“Like the resources of premordial Nature itself, the infinite possibilities of poetic themes can never be drained off even by a million Brhaspati-s composing with all their might simultaneously.”

(Trans. K. Kris; p. 293, *ibid*).

In short, Ānandavardhana is convinced of the universal applicability of his theory of vyañjanā-dhvani-rāsa, which is a modified form of rasa-theory as applied to literature. We know that he recognises three-fold dhvani, viz. vastu-dhvani, i.e. suggestion of idea or matter, alamkāra-dhvani i.e. suggestion of a poetic figure of speech, and rasa-dhvani or suggestion of emotive milieu. He has fired the first salvo in the direction of the universal applicability of the rasa-theory, which began with Bharara, or perhaps even earlier.

We know that Bharata, while contemplating on the fact of rasa-nisṭatti or art-experience, suggests that it is the result of the appropriate blending of factors which he terms as vibhāva, anubhāva and vyabhicāri-bhāva, the technical terminology given to worldly cause (i.e. kāraṇa), effect (kārya), and accompanying subordinate feelings (sahakārin). Where all interpreters agree, is a point that by vibhāva, anubhāva and vabhicārin, Bharata imagines some material which is connected with total human consciousness, including man's rational, volitional or conative and emotive aspects; rationality and intelligence to be sure. Thus the 'sāmagrī' or stuff or combination concerns itself, according to Bharata, with the total human consciousness, the integral self of the aesthete, with a special reference to his developed sensitivity and sharp intelligence .

We know that our responses born of an encounter with worldly context manifest at individual level in our work-a-day world. Bharata keeps this fact of practical life in focus, and puts it in a new perspective in the context of art in general and with dramatic art in particular. By the coining of technical terms such as vibhāva, etc. for worldly cause, i.e. kāraṇa, etc., by art-critics even prior to Bharata, what was aimed at was that, so far as the art-experience goes, there is no place for personal likes and dislikes. On the other hand, the greater fact remains that, even in a work of art, there cannot be any subject-matter which is beyond the available milieu of practical life. A poet has to concern himself with real practical life, the foundation, on which his genius constructs great palaces of highest imagination. Thus a poet cannot go beyond life. He has to think of events and situations as resulting from the situation presented to us through nature. Now, to patch up with these constraints of life resulting in unequal personal responses, art-critics thought of coining new technical terms for local cause and effect factors, and thereby attempting a complete transformation of nature coloured by personal preferences and prejudices. Thus 'vibhāva' stands for 'vibhāvana' of worldly cause, i.e. it is, "āsvāda-yogyīkaraṇa", i.e. transforming a worldly cause into a factor that

causes supreme joy. Thus, the art-critics tried to give a new name and a new habitation to the ugly in life; “ugly”, because of personal factors intervening. This ‘vibhāvana’- process works like an alchemy, turning the gross into the etherial, into the divine. It transforms the material context into the spiritual, raises the gross to the level of art-experience, i.e. ‘rasa’. This art-experience is made up of supreme bliss, and, to differentiate it from worldly experience, the art-critics have equalled it with the divine joy caused due to the realization of Brahman, the supreme spirit. They term it as, ‘brahmā’svāda-sahodara”. The ordinary of our everyday life turns into ‘extra-ordinary’ i.e. ‘a-laukika’ in art-context. Thus, by coining new terminology, the art-critics have mounted the art-experience on a pedestal, higher than ordinary, or worldly, free from local personal colouring of the work-a-day world. This art-experience is a process of, say, de-individualisation, wherein personal ego,– or local likes and dislikes of a given enjoyer-melts away. The critics term this as, “sādhāraṇīkaraṇa”, the process of de-individnulation, wherein the lower ego melts away and yet the higher self of the enjoyer continues to exist : “ātmā na atyantam tiraskṛtaḥ, na viśeṣatayā ullikhitāḥ”, as Abhinavagupta puts it. It is a state of consciousness where the limited ego-sense fades away, giving rise to a higher self, a super ego, so to say, the ‘ahaṁkāra’, ‘abhimāna’ as Bhoja would like to put it. Just as an individual soul, after attaining to yoga, rests in supreme bliss in the company of the paramātmā, the Supreme Spirit, in the same way, the Sāhṛdayam a man of cultivated taste, who has attained to this state of Sādhāraṇīkaraṇa, or de-individualisation, a state beyond personal mean calculations of profit and loss of selfish pursnits, undergoes art-experience. He is then called ‘rasika’. –“rasikōyam, iti pravādaḥ”, says Bhoja.

It is in this state of art- experience, that the worldly feelings of ‘mine’ and ‘yours’, of grabbing the palatable and leaving the unprofitable, fade away like darkness at the advent of dawn. There is a complete transformation of the lower nature into the higher, spiritual nature. Of course, it is peri-passu with the period of the presentation of a given art form. It lasts till the performance lasts. When, say, the performance of a dramatic piece is over, or, when the reading of a classic such as “War and Peace” or “The Miserable” or “Brothers Karamazov” or “Gītāñjali” is over, this transformation evaporates. The enjoyer comes out of this experience like a yogin coming out of his state of meditation. The difference is that a yogin, after his experience of the Divine is a totally changed personality there after, which is not the case with the connoisseur, who enjoys only a short break, a limited stay in the realm of higher consciousness. Art serves the purpose of the Divine vision, ‘divya-



cakṣus, gifted to Arjuna by Lord Kṛṣṇa to view the 'virāj' form of His Divine self. Art experience also serves as an incentive for an individual to grow permanently into higher self.

Art strips you, for the time being, of all vestures of the six-enemies, the 'śad-ripu'-s, that cover the inner self. Thus art-criticism is pondering over the beautiful aspect of the Divine, and it transforms the enjoyer of cultivated taste, into a man of purer self. It becomes a gate-way, so to say, to the higher plane of spirituality, it opens up the "yoga-mārga" for the enjoyer. Thus, art-experience is a special perception; it is exclusive to art; it is sui generis. This experience, according to Abhinavagupta, is free from obstacles,—it is a "vīta-vighnā-pratīti", an apprehension, free from all worldly obstacles. It "may be said to enter directly, (ni-viś) into our hearts, to dance (vi-parivṛt) before our eyes", so to say. (Trans. Gnoli, pp. 56, *ibid*). In such an art-experience, "one's own self is neither completely immersed (tiras-kṛta), nor in a state of particular emergence (ullikh), and the same thing happens with other selves. As a result of this, the state of generality involved is not limited (parimita), but extended (vitata), as happens at the moment on which is formed the idea of the invariable concomitance (vyapti) between smoke and fire, or, in fact, between trembling and fear." (Trans. Gnoli, p. 56, *ibid*). It is a perception, free from obstacles; call it by any name such as 'camatkāra', nirveśa (immersion), rasana (relish), āsvāda (tasting), bhoga (enjoyment), samāpatti (accomplishment), laya (lysis), or viśrānti (rest). It is art-experience and nothing else. A rose, is a rose, is a rose, and will smell as sweet, even if we call it by any other name !

Thus, any art, be it dance, music, painting, drama, literature, sculpture, or any fine art we may name, through its own vibhāvādī' content, draws the enjoyer closer to the Divine. It transforms his total personality beginning with the physical and passing through the mental and intellectual and the emotive, and ending in the spiritual. It is a transformation of body and mind into the spirit. So, rasa-experience does not end merely in evocation or enhancement of this or that feeling or emotion only to the plane of a sentiment; no, it is not just this, but it covers the volitional as well as the intellectual or rational portion of a man's personality also. Precisely for this that the great Ānandavardhana has reserved a place for vastu-dhvani or suggestion of an idea or matter, wherein human intelligence has a greater role. It is childish on the part of Viśvanātha to dismiss vastu-dhvani as a foolish riddle, a 'prahelikā-mātra'. Actually, it is a sort of intellectual exercise causing art-experiences. This part of dhvani covers all modern art-forms where the intelligence or rationality of a man of cultivated taste is tested. All absurd poetry and newer

and newer forms of absurd drama can be covered under vastu-dhvani and even alamkāra-dhvani which takes care of the faculty of imagination, or fancy of a poet, running riot. The Indian theory of art, the theory of rasānubhūti with reference to the literary or dramatic art, or any fine art, does not end only in the suggestion of emotive stuff only. It is both a visa and a passport for the enjoyer's adventure for 'a journey within.' Thus rasānubhūti or art-experience in the view of the Indian Art-Critics does not end in the explanation of eight or nine principal sentiments. It is not a key to sentimental literature alone. The art-experience takes care of the enjoyer's total personality and is 'pari-passi' with the presentation of a piece of art. It is relished in the fashion of a beverage; as it were it flashes forth before the mental eye of a cultivated enjoyer; as it were it enters the heart and moves the soul; as it were it takes the whole of the enjoyer's self, his sensitivity and his intelligence, in its close embrace; as it were it removes consciousness of anything but itself,— a 'vigalita-vedyāntara-anubhava'-so to say. as if it makes you taste the supreme bliss of Brahman or Divine consciousness and gets the enjoyer wedded with extraordinary joy, i.e. bliss.

Thus no question of its non-applicability to such modern plays as Mother Courage or any abstract poetry ever arises. Any newer and newer form of art attempted either by a poet, or a dramatist, or a musician, or a painter, or a dancer falls within the range of this theory of beauty advanced by Indian art-Critics. In any newer form attempted by modern artists, when there is this total effect, when there is this total transformation of the small and individual into the vast and the divine, it is 'rasānubhūti' in the real sense as understood by the ancients. In short, this theory of art sets itself to explain an experience, involving the total personality of the enjoyer, including the intellectual; it is a take off from the earth and landing into the Divine; it is a flight from the region of 'the earth earthy' to the region of 'the air airy'; it is a growing of the corporeal 'I' into the cosmic-consciousness "I". It is sinking, mixing, melting, merging and becoming one with the Divine. This is the real secret of art-experience as explained by the ancients and surely it can meet any challenge posed by any newer experiment in the field of literary art or dramatic art, or art in general. True art-criticism lies in explaining the gross and the limited in terms of the spiritual and unlimited, the local into the eternal, the ugly into the beautiful. Indian art-theory attempts this "pratyabhijñā" of 'Jīva' as "Śiva", of the small into the limitless; it explains the artist's 'sādhana' or concentrated effort, or discipline of knowing or recognising the Divine in form of the beautiful; the Highest as "satyam" or pure-existence, 'śivam' or pure

auspiciousness, and “Sundaram” or pure divine beauty. Perhaps the Vaiṣṇava art-critics Rūpa and Jīva Goswami aimed exactly at this only.

Thus, the theory of rasānubhūti or art-experience, and then the theory of vyañjanā-dhvani-rasa as promulgated specifically with reference to poetry, as advanced by Indian art-critics, takes in its fold, all art-forms, including all modern attempts in the direction of absurd theatre and absurd poetry, and is capable to meet with any challenge posed by modern creative play-wrights and poets.

It is the most catholic art-theory we can ever imagine, and it can stand the test of world-literature of the present day.

We will try to consider specific illustrations. Absurd plays such as “The Chairs” by Eugene Ionesco or, “Waiting for the Godot” by Samuel Beckett can serve our purpose. The dramatists have made use of symbolism to convey their inner unrest, or dissatisfaction with the world-order, or, say, their quarrel with the great creator, i.e. God. Even language seems to be a poor, poorer medium to convey their unrest and they take recourse to the use of images and symbols for which we have to be in tune with their psyche, their intelligence, their conscience, their conviction. May be their creations suffer from a blemish that Indian art-critics recognise as “ati-gudha-vyaṅgya” i.e. suggestion being too much personal. We will not worry about this. But what emerges is that the poet or the artist concerned wants to suggest his deep-rooted discontent with existence as it is. And this he does through literary art and also by the art of drama at his command. The dictionary meaning i.e. the expressed sense of the lines they have written do not take us to their inner experience. But the whole thing is suggested by the play as a whole. It is “prabandha-dhvani” i.e. suggestion resulting from the whole composition. Only men of cultivated taste and intelligence can reach this point which we will call the moment of ‘rasānubhūti’ or ‘art-experience.’

Dr. S. D. Desai, a young friend of mine who is an art-critic with the Times of India, (Ahmedabad, Edn., dt. 3/12/00) has brought out the inner message of a play named “Puruṣa”, directed by Vijayā Metha, with the characters being played by Nana Pateker, Ayesha, and others. He writes, under the caption : “Contemporary Issues masterfully portrayed,” :—“Great play-wrights, who believe in a moral vision of emerging societies in the history of civilization, have always held a mirror to them and exposed its tragic flaws. In to-day’s decadent world, inadequacies of drama skills, ethical perspectives, and moral concerns stare man in the face.

And yet, theatre still remains a medium in the realm of art that can effectively portray excesses, imbalances, and aberrations in society and prompt introspection.

Apart from the star value attached to the play, directed by Vijayā Mehta, those who came for its star cast were incidentally terribly disappointed. It is the social concern, shared equally by the play-write Jaywant Dalvi, its director and players, that distinguishes the play. Vijaya Mehta's judicious casting (Nana, Ayesha, etc. is an important factor for effective communication. There is a ring of conviction in the social comment that the play-wright, directors and players (and that's what good theatre is all about) make without affectation..."

The Critic, Dr. Desai, has tried to analyse the play not only as a written script but also as an act of performance. What we are concerned with is only one point, that he has tried to bring out "the message" from this dramatic piece, which he suggests in the caption he has given, viz. "Contemporary issues masterly portrayed," (and, we may add, 'presented' on the stage). This message brought home by efforts of the playwright, the Director, and the artists, is only suggested, and we can place it under the variety of 'vastu-dhvani' or suggestion of a matter of fact, or some ideas, resulting, in art-experience or 'rasānubhūti' by only the men of cultivated taste.

In yet another good paper, "A perspective on Theatre of the absurd", Dr. S. D. Desai observes :

"Absurdum (Latin) literally means discordance, lack of harmony. The plays written chiefly during the '50s and '60s in Europe and America, highlighted, through a new idiom, a discord between the epic human endeavour and its insignificant outcome, between the illusory security and shocking discovery or lack of it, between the grandeur that thinkers and artists associated with life and the contemporary existence, found futile and devoid of meaning."

There is no end to the waiting for Godot. In Ionesco's "The chairs", the message was that at the end of a long life, man was reduced to moans and groans. The promise in many absurd plays was that human mobility, deceptively outward or upward, was in fact circular. Life was static.

Samuel Beckett's "waiting for Godot" opened with the line, "Nothing to be done". The last spoken line in it was, "Yes, let's go", but, "They do not move." In Ionesco's "The Lesson," The door-bell rings and a pupil enters the professor's study for a lesson at the end, as at the beginning.

Both, relationships and language of communication, were considered cliched and hollow. In Ionesco's "The Bald Prima Donna", a man and a woman who met as total strangers, found they were from the same city. In course of time, they discovered that they had been living in the same flat and, in fact, shared the same bed as husband and wife.

The absurdists exposed the cliched form and the inadequacy of language, especially for the portrayal of the abstract, psychological reality that is part of one's consciousness, and developed a new idiom suited to it for theatre, "Associative clusters of images with a strong visual appeal are an indispensable part of this idiom." There was neither a story nor a conflict in these plays. They did not depict the kind of reality Brecht or Osborne's plays did. The characters were not recognizable and their action seemed inapplicable. There was often a contradiction between the dialogue and the action. If you read or watched such a play with the interest, "What then?" You would have been disappointed.

- The appeal through poetic images in these plays was to reason, not emotions. A kind of tension caused by an unsettling realisation replaced the conventional conflict here. The suspense in them generally was not about what would happen next, it was about what was happening. More than the terse dialogue, it was the ingenious theatre language that became medium of communication. Chairs, a corpse, and rhinoceroses in Ionesco, characters in dust-bins in Beckett and role playing in Genet, for example, in their themes. They related to the very human existence rather than life in contemporary society.

There was a background to the shared vision of these playwrights. Around seven decades ago, Nietzsche had in an obituary announced God dead. Two world wars had shaken faith in progress and rendered cherished personal and social ideals meaningless. Hopes of radical social change were belied. A sadist had numbed human sensitivity. Material affluence was no answer to the quest of lasting fulfilment. Words seemed to have been drained dry. Albert Camus wrote "The Myth of Sisyphus" in 1942. A broad-chested and strong Sisyphus kept rolling a huge stone up a steep rise to the mountain top. The endeavour endless, the outcome a failure.

Waiting for Godot was recognized as a classic. Ionesco distinguished himself with his idiom, eminently suited to theatre, and his communication concerning the very essence of human life. Both these playwrights, and to some extent others, lent to their plays the strength and charm of poetry. Having a place in the main-stream

dramatic literature, many absurd plays stand re-reading and re-viewing, and like poems they thrill one with flashes of imagination. They expose limitations of language and hint at the possibilities still remaining unexplored in theatre.....”

We will not concern ourselves with the view of life taken by such artists as Ionesco and others, for which a separate paper is contemplated by us; but for the present, suffice it to note, that even these artists ‘had a message’ to convey, not through direct power of expression, (i.e. abhidhā). of a word, but through use of images, which are innumerable possible ‘vyañjaka-s’ or ‘Suggesters’ in Ānandavardhana’s opinion. Again, the appeal was to reason and not emotion. Here our ‘Vastu-dhvani’ comes in. ‘Ingenuis theatre language’ and ‘the strength and charm of poetry’ fall under ‘alaṃkāra-dhvani.’ The dark message, which even Vyāsa conveyed in the great Mahābhārata was that, “yathā yathā vicāryate, tathā tathā viśīryte,” i.e. ‘Thinking more and more (about world-existence), makes for its greater and greater failure.” But Vyāsa had a greater message which for want of space here, we will not discuss. One point emerges that in all these plays the dominant emotion suggested is that of ‘nirveda’, or better say, “tattvajñāna-janya-nirveda’ or disgust, leading to Śānta-rasa, and also ‘Viśāda’ or despondency, resulting in the great ‘mahā-rasa’ in Abhinavagupta’s opinion, the prakṛti-rasa, the Śānta-rasa.

Thus, the catholic applicability of Sanskrit art-criticism stands proved and we will repeat with a sense of pride that Sanskrit art-criticism, and of course Sanskrit Language, conveying the same, are competent enough to meet with contemporary challenges, here in literature and drama, as explained by the great Abhinavagupta inspired by the greatest Ānandavardhana, for the present. The rasa-theory, in fact, covers all art-forms, whatever; practiced either in hoary past or rabid present or as will be practiced in the golden and divine future of humanity in general and art in particular.



## Chapter XVII

### “Rasa-niṣpatti-vicāra in Mammāṭa, (= M.), some others, and Jagannātha. (= J.)”

It may be noted at the outset that practically all writers have followed the lead of Ānanda-vardhana and Abhinavagupta in explaining the fact of rasa, those who had stricken a different note, such as Kuntaka, Mahimā, Dhanañjaya-Dhanika and Bhoja and some others such as the author of the Agni-Purāṇa, Ramchandra, Guṇacandra, and also Śāradātanaya and to some extent Sāgaranandin and also Śiṅgabhūpāla have been taken care of in an earlier chapter. Even some of those who perfectly or mostly followed the lead of Abhinavagupta and Mammāṭa, such as Ācārya Hemacandra, Vidyādhara, Vidyānātha, Jayadeva and Viśvanātha have also been thoroughly examined in the same chapter, No. XV, in which their views on rasa, and also Ānandavardhana and others posterior to him, are discussed in great detail. What remains therefore in this chapter to be done is to place clearly the ideas of Mammāṭa who has neatly presented Abhinavagupta's view and of Jagannātha, who as usual has always something original to contribute in any topic concerning Sanskrit literary criticism.

In the fourth chapter of his Kāvya-prakāśa (=K. P.), Mammāṭa (=M.) deals with the divisions and sub-divisions of what he terms “dhvani-kāvya”. While treating vivakṣitānyapara-vācya-dhvani i.e. the variety where the expressed sense is intended and yet refers to another meaning, he comes to treat rasa-dhvani, which concerns itself with suggested sense without perceptible sequence (=a-samlakṣya-krama). M-takes care to note that by the expression, viz. “alakṣya.” etc. i.e. “without perceptible sequence, what is implied is that ‘rasa’ is not identical with vibhāvā”di-s, but it is suggested or manifested through vibhāvā”di-s, but the sequence is so fast that it is not noticed at all. But the sequence between the realization of vibhāvā”di-s and rasa is very much there : “na khalu vibhāvānubhāva-vyabhicāriṇa eva rasaḥ, api tu rasas tair ity asti kramah, sa tu na lakṣyate.” (vṛtti, on K. P. IV. 25).

K. P. IV. 26 observes that this *rasā*”di dhvani, with sequence not noticed therein, consists of such varieties as-rasa, *bhāva*, *rasā*”bhāsa, *bhāvā*”bhāsa, *bhāva*-sānti etc. All these patterns are different from the figures such as *rasavat*, etc. (*rasādy alaṃkārad bhinnah*), for they, i.e. *rasa*, *bhāva* etc. are “*alaṃkārya*” i.e. “to be adorned”, while *rasavat* and such other emotion based figures are *alaṃkāra*-s, i.e. adornments that serve the cause of the principal sentence-sense.

With this Mammāṭa sets himself to explain the fact of *rasa*, the birth of *rasa*, how the cognition of *rasa* is exclusive to the field of art, i.e. how it is “*sui generis*”, and how other cognitions differ from *rasa*-apprehension. He observes at K. P. IV. 27, 28 :

“*kāraṇāny atha kāryāṇi*  
*sahakārīṇi yāni ca,*  
*ratyādeḥ sthāyino loke,*  
*tāni cen nāṭya-kāvya-yoḥ-* (IV. 27)  
*vibhāvā anubhāvās’ ca*  
*kathyante vyabhicāriṇah,*  
*vyaktaḥ sa tair vibhāvā*”*dyaiḥ*  
*sthāyī bhāvaḥ rasaḥ smṛtaḥ.”* (IV. 28)

i.e. The causes, effects and auxiliaries of the basic mental state, such as love, as seen in the world, are found in poetry and drama, and they are termed determinants, consequents and transitories respectively. The basic permanent emotion manifested by these factors such as determinants etc., is known as “*rasa*.”

It may be noted here that there is a difference in nature and scope between the worldly emotion i.e. *laukika*-*sthāyin* and the suggested *sthāyin* or *abhivyakta* *sthāyin* as seen in poetry or drama (or, say, any art; dance, music, painting etc.). So, *rasa* is “*sthāyi-vilakṣaṇa*” i.e. “*laukika*-*sthāyi-vilakṣaṇa*” and is different in nature, as it is made of a cognition made of extra-ordinary joy-“*ānandamaya-samvit-svarūpa*” as we will go to observe. Mammāṭa follows Abhinavagupta in all aspects of this topic of *rasa* and *rasa-niṣpatti*.

M. begins this discussion by quoting the famous *rasa-sūtra* from Bharata-viz. “*vibhāvānubhāva-vyabhicāri-samyogād rasa-niṣpattiḥ.*” It may be noted that though Ānandavardhana’s views are also *rasa*-oriented, he has never cared either to define *rasa*, or discuss the process of the birth of *rasa*. He has kept away from it taking it for granted that the learned are fairly conversant with the text of Bharata and the learned commentaries on the *Nāṭya-Śāstra* that had preceded him (i.e.



Ānandavardhana). But as Mammaṭa comes after Abhinavagupta who had stalled the storm of various views on rasa-niṣpatti, M. thinks it advisable to put straight all these ideas and declare his support to Abhinavagupta in unequivocal terms. The reasons, why M. was guided to register Abhinavagupta's views firmly once again was perhaps because a host of great thinkers including Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka who was mentioned by Abhinavagupta and others who followed him had picked up great quarrel with the theory of vyañjanā. Mahimā, Dhanañjaya and Dhanika opposed it tooth and nail, while Bhoja did not come out openly for rasā"bhivyakti-vāda. It was then left to M. to place the last nail in the coffin by rejecting everything that went against Abhinavagupta's views.

So, quoting the rasa-sūtra of Bharata, M. discusses various views on the process of rasa-realization as recorded both in the Locana and also the A.bh. on the Nā.Śā. It may be noted that M. has presented all views in a comparatively lesser space but with equal success as compared to Abhinavagupta's efforts. At times M. shows finer analysis also of the views of the ancients. For example, M. has neatly analysed the view of Lollaṭa. This is clearer as compared to even the presentation of Abhinavagupta himself for the A.bh. does explain that Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa favoured "upaciti" of rasa. M. goes a step further and also explains how this final "upaciti"-nourishment-is brought about by the three factors viz. vibhāva, anubhāva and vyabhicāri-bhāva, each having a specialised role to play in this process of "rasa-niṣpatti" or, "rasa-utpatti." Thus, M. explains that the sthāyin is caused by the vibhāva-s. i.e. the vibhāva-s and sthāyin have a cause-effect relationship. Sthāyi (janya) is related to vibhāva-s (janaka) by a-"janya-janaka-bhāva-saṁbandha". Then, this sthāyin which is caused by the vibhāva-s has a different interaction with the anubhāva-s. The anubhāva-s make us known, or infer the existence of the sthāyin. Thus there is "gamyā-gamaka-bhāva-saṁbandha" or "anumāpya-anumāpaka-bhāva-saṁbandha" between the sthāyin and the anubhāva-s. The sthāyin is inferred with the help of the anubhāva-s i.e. consequents. The vyabhicārin-s also have a different role to play. They make for the enhancement or nourishment - "puṣ-ṭi" of the sthāyin which is caused by the vibhāva-s. Thus, between the sthāyin and the vyabhicārin, there is the relation of "poṣya-poṣaka-bhāva-saṁbandha". M. explains that the sthāyin, thus caused, inferred and nourished by the vibhāva-s, anubhāva-s and vyabhicārin-s respectively is termed rasa in its state of upaciti-or enhancement. Thus upaciti is explained as the sum total of birth, inference and nourishment of the sthāyin. It is in its 'upacita' state, that the sthāyin is termed "rasa", observes Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa.

M. goes a step further, following Abhinavagupta. M. explains that for Lollaṭa this rasa resides primarily in the 'anukārya' i.e. Rāma and other historical personages who are to be imitated by the 'anukartā', the actor or imitator. It should be understood that 'Rāma' is cited as an illustration of "anukārya". But as the name is familiar with us as the hero of Rāmāyaṇa, we should not rush to a conclusion that Lollaṭa refers only to a historical character here. Actually he can be anyone; i.e. Rāma of the Rāmāyaṇa or Rāma of the poet's imagination, a Rāmaṇalal, or Rāmbhai, or anyone. But he is a character of a dramatic piece who is imitated by the actor or artist. Lollaṭa holds that rasa is found first in this 'anukārya' i.e. character imitated and then rasa is found also elsewhere. M. records that according to Lollaṭa, rasa is also found located in "anukartari ca naṭe", i.e. 'and also in the actor who imitates (the original character)'. M. says rasa is also apprehended or perceived, -pratīyate-in the anukartā naṭa. This is because the actor has assumed the role of the anukārya, or original character. The words that record this situation of rasa in the actor or artist require special attention as Dr. K. C. Pandey has taken the word "pratīyate" in a special sense and has objected to the presentation made by M., suggesting that he has not remained faithful to his master Abhinavagupta and has injected his own twist in the view of Lollaṭa. Lollaṭa's view is presented by Mammāṭa in the following words :- (vṛtti, K. P. IV, 28) – (pp. 64, edn. R. C. Dwivedi, ibid)-

"vibhāvair lalanódyānā" dībhīr ālambanóddīpana-kāraṇaiḥ sthāyī ratyā" dīko bhāvo janitah, anubhāvaiḥ kaṭākṣa-bhujākṣepa-prabhṛtibhiḥ kāryaiḥ pratītiyogyah kṛtaḥ, vyabhicāribhir nirvedā" dībhīḥ saha-kāribhir upacito mukhyayā vṛttyā rāmādāv anukārye, tadrūpatānusamdhānān nartakēpi pratīyamāno rasa iti bhāṭṭa-Lollaṭa-prabhṛtayah."

(Trans. R. C. Dwivedi pp. 65, ibid)–"The basic emotion, such as love, brought about by determinants, women, gardens, and the like, which are (respectively) the substrate and stimulating causes, rendered apprehensible by the ensuants, namely; effects, such as the side-glance, and the tossing of arms and augmented by transitoriness, viz. auxiliaries such as self-disparagement, constitutes rasa which primarily exists in the character to be represented, such as Rāma, but which is also apprehended in the stage-player on account of the assumption of his role. This is the view of Bhāṭṭa Lollaṭa and others."

We know that Sanskrit commentators explain "rūpānusamdhāna" as "āropa" or "abhimāna", and Dr. K. C. Pandey suggests the technical meaning of "Yojana" a pratyabhijñā-darśana terminology, for this.

But what we object to is Dr. Pandey's observation concerning "nartakēpi ca pratiyamānaḥ." He feels that M. has tampered with the original text and has added "pratiyamānaḥ", dragging in the sāmājika. He feels that Lollāṭa has no idea of the 'sāmājika' sharing rasānubhūti and here by "nartakēpi pratiyamānaḥ", indirectly the sāmājika is brought in. We strongly object to this. True, M. has explained 'upaciti' in three ways concerning the vibhāvā"di-s and even this was not read in the A.bh. But it is very much implied in the A.bh. In the same way the A.bh. has clearly suggested that the "anubhāva-s" included in the Bharata-sūtra are to be taken as "bhāvānām anubhāvāḥ"; for the resultant anubhāvas following a rasānubhūti cannot be included in the sūtra which explains the 'cause' element of rasa. This means that Lollāṭa was conscious of the resultant anubhāva-s, which are "effects" of rasa. Naturally they are spotted in the sāmājika who has a rasa-experience. Thus, Lollāṭa is absolutely conscious about a sāmājika undergoing rasa-experience. He is not "unknown" to Lollāṭa. So, Dr. Pandey's talk of M. twisting the text of the A.bh. to accomodate for the sāmājika, falls flat. We have observed earlier while dealing with the A.bh. that Lollāṭa seems to favour a line of thinking which is in favour of (laukika)-"sthāyī eva rasah", and he seems to accept 'rasa' at worldly context level also when he accepts rasa to be "anukārya-gata", and therefore, perhaps he i.e. Lollāṭa also advocated the "sukha-duḥkhā"tmakatva" of rasa.

Śrī. Śaṅkuka's views are also presented by M. in a brief but clearer presentation : Śrī. Śaṅkuka advocates a theory of rasa having two stages; the first stage is 'anukṛti' on the part of the actor, followed by the second stage when a sāmājika infers (anumita) a given basic emotion in the actor who is taken as a given character, say, Rāma and the like; the apprehension here being peculiar to art and hence beautiful and falling beyond the range of cognitions such as distinct or samyak, i.e. valid, or invalid (mithyā), or doubtful (saṁśaya) or analogical (i.e. sādrśyamūlaka). The actor is taken as Rāma by the Sāmājika who then infers the emotion of Rāma in the actor who is taken as Rāma. This inference of the imitated emotion is termed 'rasa' by Śrī. Śaṅkuka, for whom the acceptance of the actor as Rāma by the sāmājika, then the artificial presentation of artificial vibhāvā"di-s taken as genuine by the sāmājika on account of the actor's competence, and the imagined emotion itself are all basically false but they are covered up so beautifully by artful presentation that they look genuine—"kṛtrimaiḥ api tathā anabhimanyamānaiḥ." Śrī. Śaṅkuka thus directly connects the sāmājika with rasa. The sāmājika was only indirectly implied as having rasa-experience in Lollāṭa's presentation. Again, as M. presents, it is made absolutely clear that the inference here is also beautiful on

account of the inherent beauty of the whole matter concerned : “anumīyamānōpi vastu-saundryabalād rasanīyatvena anyānumāna-vilakṣaṇaḥ sthāyitvena sambhāvyamāno ratyā”diko bhāvaḥ tatra asan api sāmājikanām vāsanaya carvyamānaḥ rasaḥ.”—“Because of the relation of the type of the inferred and the inferential mark (with vibhāva-s, etc.) rasa, though inferred, is yet distinct from the other objects of inference on account of its being relishable through its power of inherent charm. Rasa is that emotion considered to be permanent, which though non-existent in him (i.e. the actor) is yet being relished by men of taste.” (Trans. R. C. Dwivedi, pp. 67, *ibid*).

Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka's view is also neatly presented by M., of course very briefly in the words : (pp. 68, *ibid*) : —

“na tāsthyena, nā”tmagatatvena rasaḥ pratīyate, nōtpadyate, nābhivyajyate, api tu, kāvyē nātye cābhidhāto dvitīyena vibhāvā”di-sādhāraṇīkaraṇā”tmanā bhāvakatva-vyāpāreṇa bhāvyamānaḥ sthāyī, sattvōdreka-prakāśā”nandamaya-samvid-viśrānti-satattvena bhogena bhujiyata iti bhaṭṭa-nāyakaḥ.” R. C. Dwivedi translates (pp. 69, *ibid*) :—

“Neither by neutrality (i.e. being related to the actor and the real hero-and we may add, ‘a third person’.) nor by a reference to one's own self (i.e. The man of taste-“taken individually”, - we may add), rasa is cognised, produced or revealed; but in poetry and drama the basic emotion, universalised by the emotive function (bhāvakatva vyāpāra), different from expression (i.e. denotation and indication), and constituting in the impersonalisation of the determinant, etc., is enjoyed by (a process of) relish which is of the nature of repose in consciousness abounding in enlightenment and bliss due to predominance of the sattva. Thus holds Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka.”

We have analysed this view thread-bare while going through the A.bh. and it needs no repetition here.

M. who follows the view of Abhinavagupta presents the abhivyakti-vāda almost in the same words as those read in the A.bh. M. writes : (pp. 68, 69, *ibid*) :—

“loke pramadā”dibhiḥ kāraṇā”dibhiḥ sthāyy anumāne abhyāsa-pātava-vatām kāvyē nātye ca tāir eva kāraṇatvā”di-parihāreṇa vibhāvanā”di-vyāpāravattvād alaukika-vibhāvā”di śabda-vyavahāryair mamaivaite, śatrorevaite, taṣṭhasyaivaite, na mamaivaite, na śatrorevaite, na tāsthasyaivaite iti sambandha-viśeṣa-svikāra-parihāra-niyama-anadhyavasāyāt, sādharanyena pratītaḥ abhivyaktaḥ, sāmājikanām vāsanā”tmatayā sthitaḥ sthāyī ratyā”diko, niyata-pramāṭṛgatatvena sthītōpi

sādhāranyópāya-balāt tatkāla-vigalita-parimita-pramāṭṛtva-vaśónmīṣita-vedyāntara-samparka-śūnyā parimita-bhāvena pramāṭṛā, sakāla-sahṛdayabhājā sādharanyena, svā"kāra ivābhinnópi gocarīkṛtaś carvyamāṇataika-prāṇo, vibhāvā"di-jīvitāvadhiḥ, pānaka-rasa-nyāyena carvyamāṇaḥ pura iva parisphuran, hṛdayam iva praviśan, sarvāṅgīnam iva ālīṅgan, anyat sarvaṃ iva tirodadhat brahmā"svādam iva anubhāvayan a-laukika-camatkāra-kārī śṛṅgārā"diko rasah."–

R.C. Dwivedi translates -(pp. 67, 71, ibid) :- "In common life, the men of taste are possessed of proficiency by repeated observation, in inferring the basic emotion through women and the like. i.e. through causes, etc. In poetry and drama, the same (causes etc.) are designated by the words determinants, etc., by giving up (their) causality, etc., and because of possessing the pervading function and the like (vibhāvanā"di-vyāpāra). These (vibhāvā"di-s, etc.) are cognised in universal character on account of non-apprehension of the rule of acceptance or rejection of a particular relation as (illustrated) in (the following) :

These indeed are mine; these indeed, are of the opponent; these, indeed are of the neutral; these indeed are not mine, these indeed are not of the opponent; and these, are not of the neutral.

Thus apprehended the basic emotion, love, etc., is situated in the spectator in the form of impression. Although it (the basic emotion) exists as belonging to the particular connoisseur, but on account of the power of universalising process the rasa, though non-different as one's own self, is yet experienced universally by a connoisseur, sharing the correspondence of heart (or aesthetic sensibility) with all, in whom becomes manifest a state of limitlessness free from the contact of any other object of cognition arising from the immediate cessation of the limited character of a cogniser. Having relish (tasting) as its supreme essence, having its life coeval with determinants etc., being enjoyed as a delicious beverage, throbbing as it were; embracing as it were, the entire being; overpowering as if everything else; producing an experience akin to the taste of ultimate Reality (Brahman), and effecting an extra-ordinary charm-such is Rasa, Śṛṅgāra, etc."

M. also, following Abhinavagupta enters into an epistemological analysis of rasa-perception, observes rasa is not of the form of an effect (sa ca na kāryaḥ), for effects have a tendency to continue even when their causes cease to exist. Thus rasa, if it were an effect, would continue ever after the disappearance of vibhāvā"dis. But as such rasa-parception is "pari-passu" with the continuation of vibhāvā"dis. Rasa is neither cognised (nāpi jñāpyaḥ), for it is not a 'siddha', i.e. (pūrva-siddha) an entity already accomplished prior to the function of the vibhāvā"di-s. On the contrary, rasa

is something to be relished after it is manifested through the agency of the determinants, etc. If it is asked, “where have you seen anything which is different from both the material and manifesting cause?”, (kāraṇa-jñāpakābhyām anyat kva dṛṣam iti cet), the answer is, “this is seen nowhere.” And not being ever seen anywhere is an adoration and not a blemish, for it proves the non-ordinary nature of rasa (a-laukikatva-siddher bhūṣaṇam etat, na dūṣaṇam). Rasa may be called to be “an effect” only metaphorically, as the process of relishing comes into being.

After Abhinavagupta, M. further observes that Rasa may be spoken of as cognisable (pratheyópi abhidhīyatām), as it is the object of extra-ordinary self-consciousness, which is distinct in nature from (i) The empirical knowledge (laukika-pratyakṣa), perceptual and the like, and also distinct from (ii) The knowledge of yogins in primary stage, which is possessed of analytic knowledge, i.e. from cognition without active participation (tāṭasthya) of the thoughts of others, which is proper to the direct perception of the yogins, and is also, distinct from (iii) the perfect yogin’s entirely self reposed experience, free from the contact of any object of cognition, i.e. perception of the yogins of the higher order. The mode of proof cognising it (tad-grāhakaṃ ca pramāṇam) is not indeterminate (nirvikalpa) as it is characterised by the consideration of vibhāvā”di-s. It is not even determinate, = (sa-vikalpa) as rasa is being relished, and it abounds in extra-ordinary delight and is known to exist from its own consciousness (sva-samvedana-siddharvāt).

The character of rasa-perception, consisting of the negation of both (i.e. determinate and indeterminate modes of proof), and yet being characterised by both, suggests as before, its extra-ordinariness, without any contradiction (-pūrva-val lokottara-tām avagamayati, na tu virodham). This is the opinion of Abhinavaguptapāda. M. follows him absolutely.

Here ends M.’s analysis of the process of rasa-realization.

We will now turn to Jagannātha (= J.) as all other leading authorities in this field of literary aesthetics have been thoroughly and individually covered by us in an earlier chapter.

Jagannātha also basically follows the view of Abhinavagupta but he has so many new things to report.

We have observed earlier that J. has given a five-fold division of dhvani. Rasa-dhvani is one of the five types of dhvani. He observes : (pp. 64, Edn., Athavale ibid)– :

“evaṃ pañcā”tmake dhvanau parama-ramaṇīyatayā rasa-dhvanes tad ātmā rasas tāvad abhidhīyate”–

With this brief note he explains the nature of rasa, of course following the lead of Abhinavagupta and Mammāṭa. J. observes (pp. 64, *ibid*)—

“samucita-lalita-sanniveśa-cāruṇā kāvyena samarpitaiḥ, sahrdaya-hṛdayam pravṛtṭaiḥ, tadīya-sahrdayatā-saha-kṛtena bhāvanā-viśeṣa-mahimnā, vīgālita-duṣyanta-ramaṇītvā”dibhir alaukika-vibhāvā-nubhāva-vyabhicārīśabda-vyapadeśyaiḥ. śakuntalādibhir ālambana-kāraṇaiḥ, candrikā”dibhir uddīpana-kāraṇaiḥ, aśrupātā”dibhiḥ kāryaiḥ, cintā”dibhiḥ sahakāribhiś ca, sambhūya prādurbhāvitena alaukikena vyāpāreṇa, tatkāla-nivartitā”-nandāṃśā”varaṇājñānena ata eva, pramuṣṭa-parimita-pramāṭṛtvā”di-nija-dharmaṇa pramātra, sva-prakāśatayā vāstavena nija-svarūpā”nandena saha gocarikriyamāṇaḥ prāg-vinivṛta-vāsanā-rūpo ratyā”dir eva rasaḥ.”

The substance of this presentation is—(i) When a beautiful piece of poetry or drama is read or presented, the cause etc. of rasa, i.e. vibhāvādi-s, as presented in poetry or drama enter the heart of a connoisseur. -(ii) Through the agency of these - vibhāvā”di-s, an extra-ordinary function called vyañjanā comes into operation. (iii) This special function called vyañjanā has two objectives—(a) to effect a sort of cleaning of the heart of the rasika-s. Actually, on account of attachment towards worldly matters, ‘ajñāna’ and ‘mālinya’ i.e. absence of true-knowledge and obstruction (caused thereby), characterise the heart or conscience of the rasikas. Removing this ‘ajñāna’ and ‘mālinya’, the poetic function presents the inner conscience of the rasika as pure consciousness and supreme bliss. This is the first achievement of vyañjanā. (ii) The second objective is to make the rasika deserve the taste of rasa, manifested, in his heart. The idea is that the ‘rasa’ produced by kāvyā or nāṭya is of the form of ‘ātmā”nanda’. i.e. bliss of the soul. Tasting this ‘ātmā”nanda’, the rasika is carried away by beatitude. This tasting or rasa is the result of the enhancement of the basic emotion -sthāyin-already present in the heart of the rasika, in form of ‘vāsanā’ i.e. impressions from the past birth. This vāsanā in form of sthāyin becomes an object of rasika’s taste due to the vyañjanā-vyāpāra resulting from the vibhāvā”di-s. In this taste the ātmā”nanda of the rasika gets mixed up. So, this sthāyi-vāsanā takes the form of rasa; i.e. of the form of “ānanda” itself. The idea is that the rasa which is an object of the rasika’s taste is not the rasa belonging to such characters as Duṣyanta and the like, portrayed in poetry or drama. But it is of the form of tasting of the inborn impressions carried in the heart by the Sa-hṛdaya. But the same sthāyin getting enhanced through the agency of causes etc. that effect feeling etc. in the heart of Duṣyanta, reaches the state of rasa in the rasika’s heart.

The hero, heroine etc. that are seen on the stage perform acting. Through this acting, i.e. through the agency of the vibhāvā"di-complex, the sthāyin in the heart of the rasika is roused to the capacity of rasa and this is a "Camatkāra"-or "a divine wonder" in itself. Precisely because of this, the function viz. vyañjanā, caused by the vibhāvā"di-s presented through poetry or drama, is termed extra-ordinary.

J. proceeds to explain this topic in the light of what Mammaa has stated. He observes :- (pp. 64, 65, ibid)

–“tathā ca āhuḥ-“vyaktaḥ sa tair vibhāvā”dyaiḥ sthāyi-bhāvo rasaḥ smṛtaḥ,” iti. vyakto vyakti-visayīkṛtaḥ. vyaktiś ca bhagnā”varaṇā cit. yathā hi śārāvā”dinā pihito dīpas tan nivṛttau sannihitān padārthān prakāśayati, svayaṃ ca prakāśate, evaṃ ātma-caitanyaṃ vibhāvā”di-saṃvalitān ratyādīn. antaḥkaraṇa-dharmāṇāṃ sākṣi-bhāsyatvābhyupagataḥ. vibhāvā”dinām api svapna-turagā”dinām iva raṅga-rajatā”dinām iva vā sākṣi-bhāsyatvam a-viruddham. vyañjaka-vibhāvā”di-carvaṇāyā āvaraṇa-bhaṅgasya vā utpatti-vināśābhyāṃ utpatti-vināśe rase upacaryete, varṇa-nityatāyāṃ iva vyañjaka-tālvā”di-vyāpārasya gakārā”dau. vibhāvā”di-carvaṇāvadhitvād āvaraṇa-bhaṅgasya, nivṛttāyāṃ tasyāṃ prakāśasya āvṛtatvād, vidyamānōpi sthāyī na prakāśate.”

The idea is-Mammaṭa has already stated – “vyaktaḥ sa tair vibhāvādyaiḥ sthāyi-bhāvo rasaḥ smṛtaḥ.”

Here ‘vyaka’ means through the agency of vyañjanā. ‘vyakti’ or manifestation means the consciousness, the lid covering which is removed. This means pure consciousness, the self of the sāmājika, which is of the nature of beatitude. Like a lamp which presents itself as well as the objects, when the lid covering the lamp is removed, in the same way, the self-consciousness of the connoisseur reveals the sthāyin along with the vibhāvā”di-s, and also reveals itself. The ratyā”di sthāyin-s are the qualities of the conscience as they are of the form of vāsanā or impressions. The antaḥ karaṇa-dharma is manifested by self-consciousness ‘ātma-caitanya.’ Thus ratyā”di-s are sākṣi-bhāsyā and this is accepted by all ālaṃkārikas and not just by the vedāntin-s. Now the vibhāvā”di-s are not the qualities of soul and yet they are manifested by self and there is nothing wrong in this. Just as there is nothing wrong when a horse seen in a dream becomes sākṣi-bhāsyā or silver in rags becomes sākṣi-bhāsyā in a dream, same is the case with vibhāvā”di-s becoming sākṣi-bhāsyā. The process of relishing-carvaṇā-starts and ends and hence rasa also is said to be caused and destroyed, metaphorically. The removal of the lid in form of ignorance is ‘pari passu’ with the carvaṇā or aesthetic chewing of vibhāvā”di-s.

So, when tasting or carvaṇā ends, the manifestation of sthāyin also ends.



J. here suggests an alternative also :—

“yad vā vibhāvā”di-carvaṇā-mahimnā sahrdayasya nija-sahrdayatāvaśonmiṣitena tat tat-sthayyupahita-sva-svarūpā”nandā”kāra samādhāv iva yogina’s citta-vṛttir upajāyate; tanmayībhavanam iti yāvat. ānandóhyayaṃ na laukika-sukhāntara-sādhāraṇaḥ. antaḥkaraṇa-vṛtti-rūpatvāt. itthaṃ ca abhinavagupta-mammaṭa-bhaṭṭā”di-grantha-svārasyena, bhagnā”varaṇā cid-viśiṣṭo ratyā”diḥ sthāyī bhāvo rasa iti sthitam.”—

Or, it can be said that through the tasting of vibhāvā”di, (i.e. without dragging in between the alaaukika-vyāpāra, but just directly) the basic emotion of the sahrdaya, along with the help of the quality of sahrdayatā, becomes one with the beatitude which is of the form worthy of the enhanced sthāyin. This means that the citta-vṛtti itself becomes ānanda-maya i.e. one with beatitude. As it happens with the yogin in sa-vikalpa-samādhī, the yogin’s mental attitude makes brahmā”nanda its object, i.e. it does not get merged absolutely with brahma, but makes brahmā”nanda its object, in the same way, in rasa-prakriyā also, the mental state makes the bliss along with the sthāyin, its object. It does not get merged totally into the bliss. Thus the rasika is in a way conscious of the fact that he is enjoying. But this enjoyment is not similar to ordinary happiness, for this ‘ānanda’ is not of the form of mental state of happiness but is of the form of the soul or consciousness itself.

Thus, observes J., looking at the substance of what Abhinavagupta and Mammaṭa and the rest have written, ‘rasa’ is ratyādi itself, qualified by self-consciousness, the lid (of ignorance) over which is removed.

But J. has some further observations concerning the above view. He observes that instead of saying, “bhagnāvaraṇa-cid-viśiṣṭo ratyādiḥ sthāyī bhāvo rasaḥ,”— it is advisable to say that :— “vastutas tu vakṣyamāṇa-śruti-svārasyena ratyā”dy avacchinnā bhagnā”varaṇā cid eva rasaḥ,—” i.e. looking at the substance of the śrūti, to be quoted next, actually the consciousness itself, removed of covering, and qualified by ratyā”di is itself rasa.” In place of ‘cid-viśiṣṭa -ratyā”di’ being taken as rasa, here “ratyā”di-viśiṣṭa cit eva rasaḥ” is accepted.

This rasa is of a special nature. Whether the consciousness is taken either as viśeṣaṇa or viśeṣya, rasa is ‘nitya’ and also ‘sva-prakāśa’ i.e. self-luminous viewed from the point of view of the ‘caitanya-aṃśa’. But at the same time it becomes ‘a-nitya’ and ‘itara-bhāśya’ when looked at from the ‘ratyā”di-aṃśa.’ The relish or tasting means just the removal of the covering of consciousness. Or, it is already stated beforehand, that the mental state of conscience which takes the form of

ratyādi is itself carvaṇā or tasting. This rasa-carvaṇā is different in nature from the taste of para-brahma in the state of samādhi. Thus it is different from sa-vikalpa-samādhi, because the caitanya"nanda or joy of consciousness which is associated with vibhāvā"di-s that are objects, is the 'ālambana' here. The idea is that in sa-vikalpa samādhi pure brahman, which is free from any external object, is the ālambana or source. In rasa-carvaṇā, however this is not the case because external objects in form of vibhāvādi-s walk in.

This relish or tasting or carvaṇā is caused by vyañjanā which is the function of poetry (i.e. poetic word) : "bhāvyā ca kāvya-vyāpāra-mātrāt." Now, if it is asked as to what is the proof of the existence of beatitnde in this carvaṇā of rasa, then our reply is : "What is the proof of the existence of bliss in samādhi either ? If you say that the Gītā-vākya viz. "sukham ātyantikam yat tad buddhi-grāhyam atīndriyam" is a pramāṇa for us, then we have also two pramāṇa-s to prove blissful nature of rasa-carvaṇā, and they are – (i) The śrutivākya viz. "raso vai saḥ...", and (ii) The direct experience to the effect of the connoisseur himself. J. ends the discussion here with the remark : (pp. 65, ibid) : "yéyaṃ dvitīya-pakṣe tad ākāra-citta-vṛtṭy-ātmikā rasa-carvaṇópanyastā sā śabda-vyāpāra-bhāvyatvāc chābdī. aparokṣa-sukhā"lambanatvāc ca aparokṣā"tmikā. tattvaṃ vākya-ja-buddhivat; ityā"hur abhinavaguptā"cārya-pādāḥ."

–This is the view of Ācārya Abhinavagupta-pāda.

J. now presents the view of Bhaṭṭa-Nāyaka, who held that if rasa-pratīti is caused to the sāmājika in form of a third-party i.e. "tāṭasthyena", then it will not result in tasting or "āsvāda." Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka argues that if it is said that rasa caused by vibhāvā"di in form of Śakuntalā is at personal level, so the sāmājika can have taste, the reply is that Śakuntalā etc. are not the vibhāvas of the sāmājika at all. Rasa-pratīti can not take place without the support-ālambana-of vibhāva-s, and here the vibhāvas cannot be related personally to the sāmājika. It again cannot be observed that here 'kāntātva' in a generalized form serves as a vibhāva for the sāmājika for the 'avacchedaka-dharma' due for anything to become a vibhāva, should have the following qualities :– for example, in the avacchedaka dharma of śṛṅgāra, there should be an absence of the sense of, "this lady is a-gamyā for me" in the ālambana-vibhāva. The absence of the consciousness of 'a-gamyātva' with reference to the heroine, can only make her proper vibhāva. The jñāna or perception in form of "Śakuntalā is agamyā for me" will be pratiyogī with reference to the required absence of such consciousness. Thus even in form of "generalized kāntā" Śakuntalā

can not be the object of love personally for a sāmājika, for “that she is a-gamyā” is a consciousness that will continue to linger in the mind of the sāmājika.

If this is not accepted, i.e. if ‘absence of agamyātva’ is accepted, then this sort of perception will take place even with reference to one’s own sister ! As in case of śṛṅgāra quoted above, so also in case of karuṇa, the sāmājika should have a feeling that “this one cannot be the object of Śoka” :—“evam a-śocyatva-kāpuruṣatvā”di-jñāna-virahasya tathāvidhasya karuṇādaḥ.”— observes J.

Now for arriving at the absence of the consciousness of agamyātva in case of Śakuntalā etc. a pratibandhaka-jñāna, i.e. a perception which can thwart the earlier perception is required. Now, here that the apprehension of identity of the sāmājika with Duṣyanta is also not possible because the sāmājika will always carry a sort of consciousness that he lives in present and is bereft of the high qualities of Duṣyanta who lived before centuries. So, he will never be able to realise an absolute identification with Duṣyanta.

Now J. continues further with Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka’s view,

For Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, observes J., this apprehension of rasa as it is not caused by other means of knowledge, is not verbal or śābdī either, because, it can not be verbal. For if it is said to be śābdī, then it will be as ordinary as the narration of the story of a couple in actual life as well—“kim ca keyaṃ pratītiḥ ? pramāṇāntara-anupasthānāc chābdī iti cet na; vyāvahārika-śābdāntarajanya-nāyaka-mithuna-vṛttānta-vittinām iva asyāpy a-hṛdyatvā”patteḥ.” (pp. 65, 66, ibid)-

Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka observes that this rasa-apprehension is also not a mānasī-pratīti, for there is difference in nature between an apprehension caused by mental effort and apprehension of the vibhāvā”di-s. : nāpi mānasī. cintōpanītānām teṣām eva padārthānām mānasyāḥ pratīter asyāḥ vailakṣanyōpalambhāt.

This rasa-apprehension, according to Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, is not of the form of smṛti or memory also, as the objects of rasa-pratīti are not ‘pūrvānubhūta’ i.e. are not experienced prior to the said moment, i.e. are not ever experienced in the past.

So, J. says, according to Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka,—there is a function called ‘bhāvakatva’ or revelation.. The objects, as denoted by the power of denotation (abhidhā), get free from such perception as “a-gamyā”, etc. on the strength of this bhāvakatva’, and these objects get their qualities of “kāntātva” etc. promoted by this function. Thus they are presented before the sāmājika, through bhāvakatva. Duṣyanta. Śakuntalā etc. are placed in a generalized form before the sāmājika by their deśa, kāla, vayah etc. presented in a favourable way. After this the bhāvakatva function

fades away and a third function called “bhoga-kṛtva” i.e. the process of relish, prevails. Through the power of this function, rajas and tamas get subdued to sattva which becomes prominent and this sattva helps create a sāksātkāra, a sort of direct experience of enjoyment. This sāksātkāra is of the form of resting viśrānti-in ānanda or beatitude which is of the form of self-consciousness. This sāksātkāra has for its object “ratyā”di which is of a generalized form, which itself is “rasa”.— Here ratyā”di which is enjoyed or tasted or the enjoyment (bhoga) of ratyā”di is termed rasa. As this bhoga i.e. āsvāda is mixed with the object it is termed as “equivalent” —“savidha” to brahmā”svāda. Thus for Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka kāvyā is gifted with three functions viz. abhidhā, bhāvanā and “bhogī-kṛti”. The only difference between this view and the earlier view is that here a fresh function called “bhāvakatva” is imagined. Rest is the same, for example ‘bhoga’ is not different from vyañjanā, for both have ratyā”di as an object. We know that in the A.bh. ‘bhāvakatva’ is explained by Abhinavagupta as just the presence of guṇas and alaṃkāras and absence of doṣa-s in poetry, and the four-fold acting in drama. So he had no requirement to postulate ‘bhāvakatva’ to arrive at sādharāṇīkaraṇa.—

Jagannātha now presents the views of those whom he calls the “navya-s”. Though J. is almost committed to Abhinavagupta and Mammāṭa, his leaning more towards this view of the Navya-s, is also obvious. The view of the navyas is presented as follows :— (p. 66)

“navyās tu—kāvye nāṭye ca kavinā naṭena ca prakāśīteṣu vibhāvā”diṣu vyañjana-vyāpāreṇa duṣyantā”dau śakuntalā”di-ratau grhītāyām anantaram ca sa-hṛdayatōllāsitasya bhāvanā-viśeṣa-rūpasya doṣasya mahimnā, kalpita-duṣyantatvāvacchādite svātmany ajñānāva-cchinne śūktikāśakala iva rajata-khaṇḍaḥ samutpadyamānó ‘nirvacanīyaḥ śākṣibhāṣya-śakuntalā”di-viṣayakaratyā”dir eva rasaḥ—ayaṃ ca kāryo doṣa-viśeṣasya.

The idea is that the New-School-thinkers proceed as follows :

In poetry and drama, the poet and actor respectively present the vibhāvā”di-s first. Then through the function called vyañjanā Duṣyanta’s love for Śakuntalā is suggested. Then a doṣa-a blemish-called “bhāvanā-viśeṣa” (or, special aesthetic chewing)-on the part of the sa-hṛdayas starts functioning. By the force of this blemish called ‘bhāvanā-viśeṣa’, on the part of the connoisseur, he, i.e. the sāmājika gets associated with qualities of Duṣyanta who is imaginary. Like silver seen in the mother of pearl through ignorance, sthāyibhāva, created in the self of the sāmājika, (sthāyibhāva) the nature of which is uncertain (i.e. indescribable), which is

manifested by self-consciousness, i.e. one in which (imagined) Śakuntalā etc. are the object, –(such a sthāyibhāva) is rasa. As this rasa is caused by the after-said blemish viz. bhāvanā-viśeṣa, it is said to be 'kārya' or 'caused'. The moment the blemish (=bhāvanā-viśeṣa) is removed, rasa also ends : “nāśyaśca tannāśasya.”

Again, “svōttara-bhāvinā lokōttarā”hlādena bheda”grahāt sukha-pada-vyapadeśyo bhavati- i.e. As its difference from the extra-ordinary bliss that follows it, is not grasped, rasa is said to be of the form of happiness.

Again, (pp. 66, ibid) :–

sva-pūrvōpasthītena ratyā”dinā tad-agrahāt tad-ratitvena ēkarvādhyavasānād vā vyaṅgyo varṇanīyas’ ca ucyate. avacchādakam duṣyantatvam apy anirvacanīyam eva, avacchādakatvam ca ratyā”di-viśiṣa-bodhe viśeṣyatāvachchedakatvam.”–

Because, either of the distinction not being grasped–the distinction between the rati or love of Śakuntalā for Duṣyanta in poetry as described therein before rasa –being born in the heart of the sāmājika, or, knowing for sure that the love (described in poetry) is different and yet certainly taken as identical, this rasa in the sāmājika is said to be both suggested (vyaṅgya) and also describable (i.e. varṇya).– The idea is that as rati-sthāyibhāva in poetry it is ‘vyaṅgya’, but as it is an object of poetry, it is ‘varṇya’ also.

The quality of Duṣyantatva’ which covers up the self of the sāmājika is also indescribable. “Avacchādakatva”–i.e. the dharma which covers the self–means when a verbal knowledge Śābda-bodha-is attempted with reference to the sāmājika, ratyā”di take the place of viśeṣaṇa (and the self of the sāmājika becomes ‘viśeṣya), and ‘duṣyantatva’ is said to be “viśeṣyāvachchedaka.” In plain words this means that there is an imagination on the part of the sāmājika that he is Duṣyanta and that he is associated with the quality–dharma–viz. ‘duṣyanatatva’. This means that the sāmājika is totally covered by ‘dharma’ named ‘duṣyanta-tva’.

The navyas therefore, further note (pp. 66-67 ibid)–etena–“duṣyantā”di-niṣṭhasya ratyā”der anā”svādyatvān na rasatvam. sva-niṣṭhaya tu tasya śakuntalā”dibhir a-tat-sambandhibhiḥ katham abhivyaktiḥ ? yad api svasmin duṣyantā”dy abheda-buddhis tu bādha-buddhi-parāhatā” ity ādikam apāstam.

This means that from the discussion as above what follows is this : “Because the sāmājika can not taste the rati or love as staying in Duṣyanta, therefore the original Duṣyanta-based-love can not be taken as ‘rasa’. And also, if it be said that the rati in the sāmājika is suggested, then how can it be said that this rati in the sāmājika is suggested through the agency of Śakuntalā etc. that has no relation whatsoever

with the sāmājika ? If it is said that there is realised an identity of the sāmājika with Duṣyanta, this sense of identity is destroyed by the factual knowledge on the part of the sāmājika that he is not Duṣyanta.”– These arguments advanced by Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka are refuted.

The Navyas say that for the ancients (i.e. Abhinavagupta) also the following is to be taken into account:—

“yad api vibhāvā”dīnām sādharmaṇyam prācīnair uktam, tad api, kāvyena, śakuntalā”di-śabdaiḥ śakuntalārva-prakāraka-bodha-janakaiḥ, pratipādyamāneṣu śakuntalā”diṣu doṣa-viśeṣa-kalpanam vinā dur upapādam. atōvaśya-kalpye doṣa-viśeṣe tenaiva svātmani duṣyanta”dy abhedabuddhir api sūpapādā.”–

The idea is this—The ancients (i.e. Abhinavagupta and others) have advocated the sādharmaṇya or universalization of vibhāvā”di-s. But this sādharmaṇya will not stand without the projection of a special blemish—(viśiṣa-doṣa-kalpanā.). This special blemish is to be imagined with reference to Śakuntalā etc., that are presented by poetry made of words.

The idea can be expanded as follows—It is a fact that Śakuntalā in poetry or drama is not as real as original Śakuntalā. This means Śakuntalā portrayed in poetry or drama is a creation of imagination, i.e. it is imaginary. Now without accepting this blemish of “ābhāsatva” or “kalpitatva” or “being imaginary”, with reference to Śakuntalā in poetry or drama, these ladies i.e. Śakuntalā or whichever others, can not be an ālambana-vibhāva for the sāmājika. This fact has to be accepted even by the ancients, i.e. Abhinavagupta and others. So, even they cannot escape the situation of accepting some sort of blemish with reference to Śakuntalā of poetry or drama. Without accepting this doṣa, we cannot justify the sādharmaṇya of vibhāva-s such as Śakuntalā. In view of this, what harm is there, with us the Navīna-s, who, in order to justify the love of the sāmājika with reference to Śakuntalā, resort to an explanation that, through bhrānti or error,—a doṣa— the sāmājika believes that, “I am Duṣyanta” ? If the prācīna-s believe in one type of doṣa, the navīna-s project another type of doṣa, instead. This is the only difference between the two.

J. further describes the view of the Navīna-s as follows : (pp. 67, ibid) :—

“nanv evam api rates tu nāma duṣyanta iva sa-hṛdayēpi sukha-viśeṣa-janakatā, karuṇa-rasā”diṣu tu sthāyinaḥ sōkā”der duḥkha-janakatayā prasiddhasya katham iva sahrdayā”hlāda - hetutvam ? praty uta nāyaka iva sa-hṛdayēpi duḥkha-jananasyaiva aucityāt.

na ca satyasya śoka"der duḥkha-janakatvaṃ klṛptam, na kalpitasya, iti nāyakānām eva duḥkham, na sahrdayasya iti vācyam. rajju-sarpā"der bhaya-kampā"dy anutpādakatā"-patteḥ." sahrdaye rater api kalpitatvena sukha-janakatānupapattes' ca;

iti cet – –

The idea is this-there is a possibility of some doubt here-It is this.- "If, for sometime, we accept that as in case of Duṣyanta, on account of rati for Śakuntalā, the sahrdaya also feels a special type of happiness, then, how can śoka which is the sthāyibhāva of karuṇa cause happiness in the sahrdaya ? On the contrary, when it (=śoka) creates unhappiness in the hero, it is appropriate to believe that it will create unhappiness in the sahrdaya also. Now, if someone argues against this that it is true that from real śoka unhappiness is caused, but it is not true to say that from imagined śoka (as in poetry or drama), duḥkha or unhappiness is felt. "This means that the hero in poetry may feel unhappiness, but the sahrdaya does not feel the sameway." But to say this is not true. For, if we believe that imagined unhappy situation does not create unhappiness, then we will have to accept that imagined serpent in a rope does not cause fear, trembling etc. Again, even ratyā"di which are only imagined in case of the sa-hrdaya, will fail to cause him happiness."

Now J.'s reply to these miśra-ānanda-vādin-s, (i.e. those who believe in sukha in one context and duḥkha in the opposite)-is as follows :-

(pp. 67, ibid) :- "satyam, śṛṅgāra-pradhāna-kāvyebhya iva karuṇa-pradhāna-kāvyebhyo 'pi yadi kevalā"hlāda eva sa-hrdaya-pramāṇakaḥ, tadā, kāryānurodhena kāraṇasya kalpanīyatvāl lokōttara-kāvya-vyāpārasya eva āhlāda-prayojakatvam iva duḥkha-pratibandhakatvam api kalpanīyam-

True, says J.; if as the śṛṅgāra-pradhāna kāvya causes happiness in the same way karuṇa-pradhāna-kāvya also causes happiness-is borne out by the experience of the sahrdaya-s, then in that case from the effect in form of pure bliss its cause, viz. karuṇa-pradhāna-kāvya, also has to be imagined. This means that the pure bliss experienced by the sahrdaya has for its cause poetry which is karuṇa-pradhāna. This sort of situation has to be imagined for sure. Then in that case it will have to be admitted that by extra-ordinary poetry just as pure bliss is caused in the same way unhappiness is also thwarted. But if on the other hand it is believed that the karuṇa-pradhāna kāvya causes unhappiness, then this "duḥkha-pratibandhakatva" or capacity to thwart unhappiness, need not be imagined in case of poetry. So, it will follow that from each particular cause, a like effect, i.e. either happiness or unhappiness will be caused--"sva-sva-kāraṇavaśād ca ubhayam api bhaviṣyati."

But in this case, these miśra-āhlādavādins will have to face a question from the pure āhlādavādins in the following manner—”(pp. 67, ibid) :-

“atha tatra kavīnām kartum, sahr̥dayānām ca śrotum, katham pravṛttiḥ ? anīṣṭa-sādhanaṭvena nivṛtter ucitatvāt.” i.e. “If, kāvya causes both sukha and duḥkha as the case may be, then in that case why should a poet write or why should a sāmājika read such poetry (which also causes duḥkha) ? For, in fact, if something is found to be an instrument of unwelcome things, people would refrain from it rather than go for it—

J. further observes—“If this be so”, iti cet,—“iṣṭasya ādhikyād anīṣṭasya ca nyūnatvāc candana-drava-lepanād iva pravṛtter upapatteḥ.”- i.e. If this be so, then on account of much of it being iṣṭa or palatable and less of it (i.e. poetry) being non-acceptable, the activity (of kavi and sahr̥daya) with reference to poetry, will continue. This is illustrated by sandal paste.

But, J. argues that for those who believe only in happiness as a result of poetry the activity will be constant in all cases.—kevalā”hlāda-vādinām tu pravṛttir a-pratyūhā eva.

We may note that this sukha-duḥkhā”tmavāda held by some critics is expressed by Siddhicandra Giṇi, the authour of Kāvya-prakāśa-khaṇḍana, who was preceded in this respect by Rāmacandra and Guṇacandra, the authors of the Nāṭya-darpaṇa, and actually a whole tradition of such a belief is perhaps hinted at even in the Nā.Śā. of Bharata. We believe that Siddhicandra was posterior, or at the most a very juniour contemporary of J. So, it is no use identifying the name of this or that ālamkārika, holding this view. But the fact is that it was current in the times of J. and hence this discussion is seen here.—

J. observes further that for Kevalā”hlādavādins, the anubhāva-s such as shedding of tears etc. are also caused due to the boundless joy; and not due to unhappiness. In the same vein the shedding of tears by devotees is also explained as a result of joy experienced by them. There is not even an iota of unhappiness.

But the miśra-ānandavādins have an objection to this; and the objection reads as—“If as you say, in case of karuṇa-rasa, the sāmājika, though he has identified with unhappy Daśaratha, enjoys bliss, then the same experience of happiness should be seen when a man either in a dream or in delirium, should feel happiness because the superimposition of Daśaratha is very much there. But the real experience is that he feels miserable in a dream or/in/delirium.



The reply is that it is the greatness of extra-ordinary poetic function that the palatable taste that is caused due to it is absolutely different from any worldly experience. So, the outcome is that the bhāvanā (aesthetic chewing or, emotive process) caused by poetry causes 'āsvāda'-taste which has 'ratyā'di' as its subject. : "ayaṃ hi lokóttarasya kāvya-vyāpārasya mahimā, yat-prayojyā a-ramaṇīyā api śokā"dayaḥ padārthā, āhlādam a-laukikaṃ janayanti.

vilakṣaṇo hi kamaṇīyaḥ kāvyavyāpāra-ja āsvādaḥ, pramāṇāntarajād anubhavāt. janyatvaṃ ca sva-janya-bhāvanā-janya-ratyā'di-viśayatvaṃ."(pp. 67, ibid).

So, if this joy is believed to be not caused by bhāvanā, caused by kāvyavyāpāra, there is no harm.—"tena rasā"svādasya kāvya-vyāpāra-a-janyatvépi, 'na kṣatiḥ. śakuntalā"daṃ a-gamyātva-jñānótpādas tu duṣyantā"dy-abheda-buddhyā pratibadhyatē ityā"huḥ.

The rise of such a consciousness that, 'Śakuntalā is a-gamyā for me', is also removed for in the mind of the rasika a consciousness of identity with Duṣyanta has taken place and this removes that a-gamyātva-buddhi.

We have seen that J. has given three views concerning rasā"svāda, the first being the view floated by Abhinavagupta and supported by Mammata and acceptable to him also.

The second view was that of Bhaṭṭa-nāyaka and he tried to bridge the difference with the first view by saying that bhāvakatva is covered up by guṇālamkāra-yoga and doṣa-hāna in kāvya and caturvidha-abhinaya in drama, and bhoga-vyāpāra is identical with vyañjanā itself. So, virtually J. feels that Bhaṭṭa-Nayaka had nothing fresh to offer except a quarrel in 'name' only.

The third view was that of the so-called Navya-s, perhaps also shared by Siddhicandra gaṇi, who for us is a lesser light and perhaps, in our opinion was posterior to J. We are clear that the view of these navya-s is not shared by J. but as it did carry some weight in the literary circle of his times, he has discussed the same at length. Our Guru Prof. R. B. Athavale also feels that J. accepted the views of the Naavya-s. But we politely disagree; for J.'s commitment to the views of Abhinavagupta and Mammata is clear and final and he also had an absolute faith in the "Kevala-āhlāda-Kāritva"of poetry, drama or any art. For him rasa is "ānanda-ghana-samvedanam eva, tatra kā duḥkhā"—śaṅkā ?" Actually but for the sukha-duḥkhā"tmakatva of rasa as acceptable to the Navyas, even what they call a special bhāvanā-doṣa, can be called a "special bhāvanā-guṇa" also. Why should they call it a doṣa ? Thus, when put to critical test the view of the navyas seems to lose ground.

After these three views, J. again presents eight more views on the nature and realization of rasa. But before we discuss these views threadbare, we will quote at length first from prof. Dr. Sri Ramachandrudu who sits high in our estimation along with our gurus Prof-s Parikh, Dr. Kulkarni and Prof. Athavale. It may be noted however that we do not agree on all points with Prof. Ramacandrudu (Ref. The contribution of Pandita-rāja Jagannātha to Samskrit Poetics, Vol. I, Pub. Nirajanā, Delhi, Edn. '83), whose views we quote out of sheer respect for him. We have expressed our own views as above and will also note our differences with Prof. Ramachandrudu as and when we feel it pertinent.

Prof. Dr. Sri Ramachandrudu writes : (pp. 113-114) : ...“Let us now examine, under this background, the theory of Rasa as expounded by PR (=Paṇḍita-rāja, i.e. J.). As was already noted, he mentions in Rasa-gaṅgādhara eleven different views on Rasa. He begins with mentioning the views of Abhinavagupta which are generally taken as the last word on the theory of Rasa. Of the eleven theories mentioned by PR. the first Six theories have got some important points of their own and the last three theories, which are mentioned just because they were expounded by some ancient writers, cannot get, as PR. says, the approval of Bharata. [Here we may add that true, Bharata speaks of the three viz. vibhāva, anubhāva and vyabhicārin combined only cause rasa, but in practice, as Abhinavagupta has also illustrated in his A.bh., the poets, being “niraṅkuśa” by nature, quite often describe just one of these factors or even any two of them, where, as Abhinavagupta suggests the elements not mentioned are to be placed by the imagination of the sāmājika. The sāmājika has to do the exercise and fill the gap. So, virtually the three together cause rasa but these three theories are mentioned keeping the practice of the poets in mind, and of course, keeping the most important among the three of vibhāvā”di-s, keeping in mind. So, we feel there should not be any grudge against these three theories also which are mentioned as follows.) :-

“According to the last three theories only the vibhāva (9th view), or the Anubhāva (10th view) or the vyabhicāribhāva (11th view) which is being relished (Bhāvya-māna) is the Rasa. The last two theories are reminiscent of the views of Rudraṭa and Bhoja, who believe that every Bhāva can be developed to the state of Rasa; and the first theory is related to the prehistoric conception of even Vibhāva becoming Rasa, a theory which is not found in any of the extent works.” [we beg to differ. For if scrutinized minutely, even Bhoja, and then both Rāmacandra and Guṇacandra virtually suggest the abridgement of rasa-sūtra as only- “vibhāvād-

rasa-niṣpattiḥ.” Even Lollaṭa had suggested that the anubhāva-s mentioned in the sūtra were not to be taken as ‘rasa-janya’ but as those belonging to the bhāva-s that stand for either the sthāyin-s,—and the anubhāva-s of the sthāyins are discussed at length in the Nā.Śā. Ch. VII (vol.I), —or bhāva-s may mean the ālambana-vibhāvas. In the second alternative, we arrive at “vibhāvād-rasa-niṣpattiḥ.” Actually ‘vibhāva’ is a ‘cause’ in general and therefore if in brief it is said, “vibhāvād rasa-niṣpattiḥ,” there is nothing wrong in it and we have to take this view in this light only. This is our humble opinion. Prof. Ramachandrudu then proceeds as—

“The seventh theory that all the three thinga-Vibhāva-s, Anubhāva-s and the Vyabhicāri-bhāva-s, together constitute Rasa, results, evidently, from understanding in a most general way, Rasasūtra of Bharata, where only these are mentioned without the explicit reference to the sthāyibhāva. The eighth theory holds that one of the three which ever can produce Camatkāra is Rasa and that none of them can become rasa if it fails to produce the same. This theory again, must have been the outcome of the ninth, tenth and eleventh theories, according to which, each of the Vibhāva-s etc. can become as explained above, Rasa. Thus all these five theories represent the views of the earlier writers, and historically speaking, they should, most probably, be placed in the following order (i) bhāvyamāno vibhāva eva rasaḥ, (ii) anubhāvaḥ, tathā (iii) vyabhicāryeva tathā tathā pariṇamati. (iv) trisu ya eva camatkārī sa eva rasaḥ (v) and, vibhāvā-dayaḥ trayaḥ samuditāḥ rasaḥ.”—

[It may be noted that we may not read any order historically speaking, for as explained by us as above, virtually these views result in only the said prominence of a given factor. It is the result of a personal choice when someone would place it this way and the other, another way.]—

(pp. 114, ibid)—“PR, understands the weakness of these theories and disposes them off with one remark without any comment there on. Even Abhinavagupta mentions [and, it may be noted, we have referred to these in our earlier chapter], similar theories only in a passing remark : “anye tu śuddham vibhāvaṃ, apare tu śuddham anubhāvaṃ, kecin tu sthāyīmātram. itare vyabhicāriṇaṃ, anye tat-saṃyogam, eke anukāryam, kecana sakalam eva samudāyaṃ rasam āhur ity alaṃ bahunā.” [Abhinavagupta has mentioned, “sthāyinaṃ”, and “anukāryam” and “sakalam samudāyam” also, in addition to what J. has done. By ‘Sakalam Samudāyam’ as it comes after ‘anukārya’ of course meaning the hero, should mean all the characters taken together, and not just the hero alone. Again, as we had seen in a quotation in the earlier chapter, the pradhāna-saṃvit of the nāyaka, here anukārya, is the last biggest circle in which other saṃvid-s get merged. So, there

is virtually no harm in calling the *anukārya*, meaning the *pradhāna-saṃvit* of the *anukārya* to be *rasa*.] So, these theories do carry some weight and are not as weak or useless as *sri Ramachandrudu* imagines. He, however, proceeds to say, with which we feel like agreeing that—]—“In the theories of *Bhaṭṭa Lollāṭa*, *Śrī. Śaṅkuka* and *Bhaṭṭa-Nāyaka*, presented by PR. as the fifth, sixth and the second theories, we do not find much (-any-) difference from what is written about them by *Abhinavagupta* and *Mammāta*.

PR. refers to the theory of *Bhaṭṭa Lollāṭa* in the following words. (pp. 88, Edn. prof. Athavale, *ibid*)—“*mukhyatayā duṣyantā*” *digata eva rasaḥ, ratyā*” *diḥ kamaniya-vibhāvā*” *dy-abhinaya-pradarśana-kovide, duṣyantā*” *dy anukartari nate samāropya sāksāt-kriyate,*” *ity eke. mate’smin sāksātkāro duṣuantōyaṃ śakuntalā*” *di-ṣayaka-ratimān, ity ādiḥ, prāgvad dharṃyamśe laukikaḥ āropyāmśe tv alaukikaḥ.*”— By the sentence beginning with “*matésmin*”, PR. explains how the *Rasa-sāksātkāra* can be had by the *Sāmājika* when, according to *Lollāṭa*, the real *Rasa* rests with the original character only. [It may be noted that in the earlier chapter while discussing Dr. K. C. Pandey’s views, we had stated that the possibility of the *sāmājika* also experiencing *rasa*, was not totally ruled out by *Lollāṭa*. Our same reemarks are applicable here also to *Śrī Ramachandrudu*’s remarks and the discussion he adds further. We will also go to observe later how Prof. Athavale takes this.].—[Prof. *Ramachandrudu* continues, pp. 114, as follows.] “The *sāmājika* will be having a peculiar *śāksātkāra*,— “*duṣyantōyaṃ śakuntalā-ṣayaka-ratimān*” i.e. ‘This *Duṣyanta* is having *Rati* about *Śakuntalā*’. Here, this cognition is *Laukika-pratyakṣa* so far as the “*Idantāmśa*” “this” is concerned, and *Alaukika-pratyakṣa*— so far as the ‘*Rati*’ is concerned, as in the case of the cognition, ‘*surabhi candanam*’ etc., which is *laukika-pratyakṣa*, so far as ‘*candana*’ is concerned, which is ‘*cakṣuḥ-samyukta*’, and ‘*Alaukika-pratyakṣa*’, so far as ‘*saurabha*’ is concerned which is in contact the *cakṣuḥ* by ‘*Jñāna-ṣaya-pratyāsatti*’ (*Muktāvalī*, p. 270 & p. 280).

This is how this passage of *Rasa-Gāṅgādhara* has been explained by Dr. Chaudhury (*Kāvya-tattva-samīkṣā*, p. 175), and this explanation seems to be quite proper and bringing out the views of PR. But some commentators (*saralā*, R. G., pp. 34; *Candrikā*, Part I, p. 124, *Hindi R. G.*, Part I, 67) understand this passage to mean that the *pratyakṣa* is *Laukika* so far as the *Idantvāmśa* is concerned, and *Alaukika* in the *Duṣyantatvāmśa*. There may be nothing technically wrong in this explanation because the *Āropyamāṇa*, according to the *Naiyāyikas*, is *Alaukika-pratyakṣa-ṣaya*.’ But (it) does not convey the correct idea of PR. who wants to

explain how the Rati etc., can be the object of the cognition of the spectator (sāmājika-pratyakṣa-viśaya), because in the first sentence quoted above, he says,—“Raso ratyā”di...sākṣāt-kriyate,” and in the second sentence he explains the nature of Sākṣātkāra of Ratyādi, and therefore, to explain the passage without any reference to Ratyādi is only to neglect the spirit of this passage.”

Prof. Athavale (p. 97, *ibid*, ft. note 12) explains this point in Lollaṭa's view as follows— He observes that a question can be raised in this procedure about the place of the sāmājika-s. Is it that rasa is caused in them also, or not? To this question these people (i.e. Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa, etc.) suggest that rasa in reality is in Duṣyanta. But here there is superimposition of Duṣyanta over the actor. Then through inference there is apprehension of rati in the naṭa- (we may say, Prof. Athavale here seems to have Mammata's words—“anukartari naṭe ca pratīyate” in mind, where ‘pratīti’ is understood as inference, done by the sāmājika). Prof. Athavale adds that the sāmājika, through a special doṣa, identifies himself with the naṭa and enjoys rasa.

Prof Ramachandrudu (pp. 115, *ibid*) continues : “PR. sums up the views of Śrī. Śaṅkuka in the following words :—“duṣyantā”di-gato ratyā”dir naṭe pakṣe duṣyantarvena gr̥hīte, vibhāvā”dibhiḥ kṛtrimair a-kṛtrimatyā gr̥hītaiḥ, bhīnne viṣayenumiti-sāmgryā balavatvāt anumīyamāno rasaḥ ity apare.”

Thus according to PR., The main difference between the views of Lollaṭa and Śaṅkuka is that according to the former the Rati, etc. are ascribed to naṭa taken as Duṣyanta, who is pratyakṣa-viśaya (of course Alaukika it is) of the sāmājika, and according to the latter it is anumeya. The form of anumiti will be like this—

—“rāmōyaṃ sītā”di-viśayaka-rati-mān. sītā”dyālambana-vibhāva,—romāñcā”—dyanubhāva—autsukryādi-sañcāribhāva-vattvāt. yo yad-ātmaka-vibhāvarve sati anubhāva-sañcāri-bhāvavān, sa tad ratimān.”

Here naṭa is recognised only in the form of Duṣyantā”di not as naṭa, as the naṭa-pratyakṣa is obstructed by the Anumiti of the Rati etc., because when there is sāmagrī both for the pratyakṣa and the Anumāna, the sāmagrī of Anumāna is considered to be powerful, provided the objects of them (pratyakṣa and Anumāna) are different.

Here Dr. Chaudhury raises a question which deserves a brief reproduction. (Kāvya-tattva-samīkṣā, pp. 182). While explaining the theory of Lollaṭa it was said that the Rati etc. is Alaukika-pratyakṣa-viśaya. Now it is not proper to say, on behalf of Śaṅkuka, that the Rati, etc. is Anumeya; because there is also the Sāmagrī for the pratyakṣa of Rati, etc. In other words, the Rati etc., being the object of both

the pratyakṣa and Anumiti, the Anumiti-sāmagrī can not be more powerful than the pratyakṣa-sāmagrī and on the contrary, the pratyakṣa-sāmagrī should suppress the Anumiti sāmagrī and produce pratyakṣa and so Śaṅkuka's theory is baseless. This objection is answered by Dr. Chaudhuri by quoting the views of Śrīnivāsācārya, the commentator on Nyāya-parīśuddhi, who maintains that Anumiti-sāmagrī is always powerful, whether the objects of pratyakṣa and Anumiti are different or the same. In view of this explanation, Dr. Chaudhuri feels, P.R.'s words—"Bhinne-viṣaye"—etc. are to be considered used by oversight. (Kāvya-tattva-samīkṣā, pp. 183-184)."

We have already considered above the three theories covering Abhinavagupta, Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka and the Navya-s. The only theory now to be considered is one which starts with the words- "pare tu..." (pp. 88, edn. Prof. Athavale.).

Sri. Ramachandrudu has the following comments for the theories of Navya-s and also "pare". He observes : (p. 121, *ibid*) :—

"After briefly stating the theories of Abhinavagupta and Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, PR. advances two more theories under the headings 'Navyās tu' and 'Pare tu'. It is not known whose theories he is reproducing here; because these two theories are not to be seen in any of the extant works on Rasa. Perhaps these are the product of the fertile brain of PR. himself which he hesitates to put forth boldly on the face of the generally accepted theory of Abhinavagupta, though he must be having some secret inclination towards at least one of the theories (most probably towards the first one beginning with 'Navyās tu')." [we have already expressed our views concerning this earlier].

Sri. Ramachandrudu notes further-(pp. 121m *ibid*). —"The first theory also is based on Vedānta. On account of some defects, the defect of eye-sight and the dimness of light etc., a man on seeing the piece of the pearl oyster gets the wrong impression that it is silver. A cognition cannot be produced unless the object of cognition exists before.

Therefore, the Vedāntins accept that a particular kind of Rajata, which is technically called Prātibhāsika is produced here on the seep by the above defects and this silver is beyond definition (Anirvacanīya), for, it is neither existing, because it is not of any consequence, nor non-existing, because it is being actually seen by the perceiver. Applying the same principle, this theory believes that the Rasa also which is no other than Rati, etc., is Anirvacanīya. When the Vibhāva-s etc. are presented by the poet or the Naṭa, the sahr̥daya, on account of vyañjanā-vyāpāra,

first gets the cognition of Rati, etc., about Śakuntalā and the like, as associated with Duṣyantā"di. The spectator being a sa-hṛdaya, possesses Bhāvanā, which is a kind of defect (Doṣa), and this Bhāvanā produces in him a sense of identity with Duṣyantā"di (Duṣyantā"dy abheda-buddhi), which in its turn, produces Rati etc., about Śakuntalā"di in him. The Rati etc., like any other Prātibhāsika, is 'sākṣi-bhāsyā' i.e. cognisable through the direct contact with the caitanya, and at this state it is called Rasa. Immediately after this cognition of Rati, etc., a peculiar transcendental joy is being experienced which is wrongly identified with the cognition of Rati, and this is why Rasa is said to be 'Sukha-rūpa.' This Rasa is Kārya because it is produced by the defect i.e. bhāvakatva which is invariably existing in Sahrdaya, and is Nāśya because it disappears with the disappearance of the defect. It can not be said to be vyaṅgya in the strict sense of the word, but it is called so because it is identified with Rati, etc. of Duṣyantā"di which only is really vyaṅgya. Even the Duṣyantatva ascribed to himself by Sahrdaya is Anirvacanīya like the ratyādi, and it conceals the reality of Sahrdaya, and this also is the result of the doṣa i.e. Bhāvakatva, inherent in him. It is inevitable, the Navyas contend, to accept this Doṣa in a sahrdaya, because without this, it is not possible, to justify the universalisation (sādhāranīkarāṇa) of Vibhāva-s etc. Once this Doṣa is accepted, it can be justified that the Sa-hṛdaya identified himself with Duṣyantā"di on account of the some Doṣa.

Here, one question may be raised. Some sthāyibhāvas like Rati which are the source of pleasure by nature, may be able to produce pleasure in the Sahrdaya when they are born in him by the above process. But the same cannot be said of the sthāyibhāva-s like Śoka which are the source of grief by nature in the ordinary world, but are considered to be pleasing in a Kāvya. This objection is met by these Critics like this : If it is the experience of the sahrdaya to get pleasure even from the kāvya-s with karuṇa as a dominant sentiment, we have to accept that the same vyāpāra of Kāvya, while producing pleasure, can also obstruct the feeling of grief. And if there is the experience of both pleasure and grief, then let us accept that both pleasure and grief are natural in Rasa. People are inclined towards such works because the quantity of pleasure is more than that of grief. Here, it may be questioned, how it is, only grief is experienced when a man identifies himself wrongly with the grief-stricken Daśaratha etc. in a dream or in a state of delirium, with no touch of pleasure ? The answer is that only a beautiful Kāvya has got this power of presenting the unpleasant Śoka, etc., in a pleasant manner, which cannot be found in dream or delirium.

After giving this theory of Navya-s, PR. puts forth another theory under the headings “pare tu”. (pp. 88, Edn. Athavale, *ibid*).—

Before proceeding with Sri Ramacandrudu's presentation, we will first quote the view of “Pare” from the original, which read as :—

“pare tu, ‘vyāñjana-vyāpārasya a-nirvacanīya-khyāteś ca anabhyupagamépi prāg-ukta-doṣa-mahimnā svātmani duṣyantā”di-tādātmyāvagāhī śakuntalā”di-  
viṣayaka-ratyā”dimad abheda-bodho mānasaḥ kāvyārtha-bhāvanā-janmā vilakṣaṇa-  
viṣayatāśālī rasaḥ. svapnā”dis tu tādṛśabodho na kāvyārtha-cintana-janmeti, na  
rasaḥ. tena tatra na tādṛśā”hlādā”pattiḥ. evam api svasminn avidyamānasya  
ratyā”der anubhavaḥ katham nāma syāt. maivam. na hyayaṁ laukika-sākṣātkāro  
ratyā”deḥ, yena-vaśyaṁ viṣaya-sadbhāvopekṣanīyaḥ, syāt. api tu bhramaḥ.  
āsvādanasya rasa-viṣayakatva-vyavahāras tu ratyā”di-viṣayakatvā”lambanaḥ’ ity  
api vadanti. etaiś ca svātmani duṣyantatva-dharmitāvacchedaka-śakuntalā”di-  
viṣayaka-rati-vaiśiṣṭyāvagāhī, svātmatva-viśeṣe śakuntalā”di-viṣayaka-rati-viśiṣṭa-  
duṣyanta-tādātmyāvagāhī, svātmatva-viśiṣṭe duṣyantatva-śakuntalā-viṣayaka-ratyor  
vaiśiṣṭyāvagāhī, vā trividhōpi bodho rasa-padārthatayābhūpeyaḥ. tatra rater  
viśeṣbhūtāyāḥ śabdād a-pratītatvād vyāñjanāyāś ca tat-pratyāyikāyā anabhyupagamāc  
ceṣṭādi-līngikam ādau viśeṣaṇa-jñānārtham anumānam abhyupeyam.”

Let us first try to understand this. Then we will quote from Sri Ramachandrudu also. This view holds that, even if we do not accept the vyāñjanā-vyāpāra (of the ancients) and the a-nirvacanīyakhyaṭi (as advanced by the navya-s), with the help of the influence of doṣa (as advocated by the navīna-s), a sort of abheda-bodha-“a perception of identity”-in the sahrdaya is created. (This is the view of these “pare”-others.).

This ‘abheda-mānasa-bodha’ has for its subject the abheda or identity with Duṣyanta felt in the mind of the Sāmājika. Again, this abheda-bodha has also for its subject the ratyā”dika, wherein Śakuntalā is the object. [This abhedabodha is caused to the sāmājika who is non-different from Duṣyanta.] This abheda-bodha is caused due to repeated (mental) connection with the meaning of poetry. The objects such as Duṣyanta, Śakuntalā etc. of this repeated connection have their viṣayatā or object-ness, different from other ‘viṣayatā : The obvious reason is that when this experience takes place, the ratyādi bhāva-s of real Duṣyanra, etc. are not present and hence this experience is of the form of a ‘bhrama’ i.e. unreal apprehension. But even if it is a mis-apprehension its knowledge or experience is very much there. J. replies to a query as to how such an unreal apprehension can be experienced, in the following way.— This, says J., mental cognition is termed rasa by us. Now the aforesaid unreal apprehension is there in a dream also, but as the



same is not caused by brooding over poetic meaning and hence it cannot be termed rasa. So, no question of experiencing the joy of rasa ever arises with reference to a dream. If it is asked as to how can a sāmājika enjoy ratyādi-s which are not in him, even if your talk of 'bhrama' is accepted, then the answer is that it is not proper to ask such a question. For, the experience of ratyādi is not ordinary i.e. worldly. If it were worldly the existence of its object would have been a necessity. But this experience is only 'bhramātmaka' i.e. unreal. Now 'rasa' becomes the object of this taste is because in this taste 'rati' is the object. The idea is that in reality the taste of rasa unreal or bhramātmaka. The taste of ratyādi is only superimposed on 'rasa'. That this knowledge is unreal is a different matter. 'To have the taste of knowledge' is a thing which does not click in our mind, for taste is related only to a 'dravya' i.e. an object. We cannot taste jñāna or such other qualities. So, the doubt raised is this that how can 'rasa' which is of the form of jñāna i.e. apprehension, be tasted? The answer is that taste is only of ratyādi, but this taste is superimposed on 'rasa'. Actually on tasting the sthāyin rati etc., accompanied by vibhāvādi-s, rasa is caused. So 'rasa' cannot be said to be the object of taste-āsvāda-visaya. But in common parlance, rasa is said to be the object of taste. The viṣayatva of sthāyi which is an object of taste is superimposed on 'rasa.'

Now, these people who hold the above view, will have to accept 'rasa' to be one of the three types of 'bodha' or apprehension. (i) A 'bodha' in which, in the mind of the sāmājika, dharmi Duṣyanta appears as a 'vidheya'. Here this Duṣyanta has Duṣyantatva as its avacchedaka-dharma. So, in this 'bodha' the sāmājika is pushed into 'anuvādyā-koti', while duṣyantatva-dharma-yukta-duṣyanta-dharmī remains in the 'vidheya'-koti. In clear words it may be said that the sāmājika has a bhrama - an unreal cognition though a sweet one, that, "I am Duṣyanta". In this 'bodha', or mānasabodha Śakuntalā is related as an object. This is the first type of bodha. In short, in this bodha, the sāmājika has a cognition "I- who am associated with rati concerning Śakuntalā,—that sāmājika (=I am) is Duṣyanta". Thus Śakuntalā-viṣayaka-rati is the viśeṣaṇa of sāmājika, sāmājika himself is the uddeśya, and Duṣyanta is the vidheya. In the original, "rati-vaiśiṣṭya" is the word used which means "The relation of rati."

The second bodha will take the following shape— That Śakuntalā-viṣayaka-rati-viśiṣṭa-Duṣyanta is one with myself (i.e. the sāmājika). This means that I (i.e. sāmājika) am identical with Duṣyanta who believes that Śakuntalā is the object of my love or 'rati.' The plane meaning is that I am very much the Duṣyanta who has love for Śakuntalā. In Śāstriya terminology here it can be said that on the uddeśya which is duṣyantatva there is vidhāna of 'ahaṃtva'.

The third bodha will take this shape : “svātmatva-viśiṣṭa” meaning in sāmājika the vaiśiṣṭya of duṣyantatva and also of ‘śakuntalā-viṣayaka-rati’ is apprehended. This means that in this third bodha “T”-is ‘uddeśya’, duṣyantatva is the vidheya and Śakuntalā-viṣayaka-rati-viśiṣṭatva’ is also a (second) ‘vidheya.’ So, this third mānasa-bodha has ‘T’ both as viśeṣya and also uddeśya, and duṣyantatva and śakuntalā-viṣayaka-rati—these two are viśeṣaṇa-s.

In all these three mānasa-bodha-s, rati which becomes a viśeṣaṇa is never apprehended through (direct) word-expression, as there is, in the poem, not a single word which is the vācaka or directly expressive of rati. Again the vyañjanā which causes the apprehension of that rati is not admitted by these thinkers. So, it becomes pertinent to accept an inference, anumāna, which makes for the apprehension of rati which becomes a viśeṣaṇa in this apprehension. In this inference, naṭa is the pakṣa, rati is sādhyā, and for sādhyā-siddhi, the abhinaya of naṭa is ‘līṅga’ i.e. ‘hetu.’ (Once this rati is realised through inference, then due to the doṣa or bhrama aforesaid, there is identity of Duṣtanata qualified by that rati with the Sāmājika. The cognition of this abhedha or identity is rasa.

This fourth opinion also is held by the Navya-s. The third opinion which preceded this fourth one has been credited to the name of the navya-s. So, to avoid repetition, J. has used the words “pare tu.” The only difference between these two opinions is that the navya-s mentioned earlier first believe in vyañjanā-vyāpāra and also accept anirvacanīyakhyāti. The other ‘navya-s’, signified by ‘pare tu’ do not accept either vyañjanā-vyāpāra or anirvacanīya-khyāti. This is how Prof. R. B. Athavale explains-(pp. 92, ibid).

The fifth opinion as seen above is that of Lollāṭa, the sixth floated by Śaṅkuka and 7toll, the last five are mentioned without reference. We have discussed these beforehand and hence we avoid repetition of the same here.

Now we will turn once again to Sri Ramachandrudu and examine how he explains the views of “pare tu”. He observes : (pp. 123, ibid) :-

—“According to this theory, there is no need of accepting vyañjanā-vyāpāra or Anirvacanīya-khyāti as explained in the previous theory. The Sahṛdaya on account of the Bhāvanā-doṣa, will have a feeling identifying himself with the character presented on the stage or by the kāvya, as having Rati etc. about Śakuntalā”di. Only this feeling of identification which is produced by the Bhāvanā of the kāvyārtha, is capable of causing Camatkāra, but not the one produced in dreams etc. The rati is not existing in Sāmājika; he may feel the Rati because he wrongly identifies himself with the one, having it. In a ‘bhrama’, a thing which is actually existing in

some other place may appear as existing in a different place as in the cause of “śukti-rajata-jñāna” where the Rajatatva is ascribed to ‘idaṃkarāspada,’ i.e. śukti, though it (Rajatatva) is really associated with Rajata only, which is in a different place and this is technically called Anyathākhyāti of Naiyāyikas (Bhāmati, pp. 29-30). Thus this theory instead of accepting anirvacanīya-khyāti as in the previous theory, appears to be inclined to accept Anyathākhyāti.

The identification of sahrdaya with Duṣyantā”di may be in three different ways with slight difference in viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya-bhāva. The first bodha is - “śakuntalā-viṣayakarati-viśiṣṭo’haṃ duṣyantaḥ.” The second bodha is - “śakuntalā-viṣayakarati-viśiṣṭaḥ duṣyantaḥ ahaṃ asmi”, and the third bodha is - “ahaṃ duṣyantatvena śakuntalā-viṣayakaratyā ca viśiṣṭaḥ.” In all these three bodha-s, the ultimate meaning is the same, though there is difference in the uddeśya-vidheya-bhāva. In the first bodha Duṣyantatva is ascribed to “Ahaṃtva”. In the second “Ahaṃtva” is ascribed to “Duṣyantatva”, whereas in the third bodha, Duṣyantatva and rati are ascribed to Ahaṃ. In all these three bodhas, rati is viśeṣaṇa. Its cognition is not a śabda-jñāna, because it cannot be expressed by śabda-s. In this theory, vyañjanā is also not accepted, therefore, the cognition of rati, etc., is Anumāna. For, at first, the Sāmājika infers Rati in Duṣyanta etc. with the help of the action of the actor. Next the defect in the Sahrdaya, referred to above, removes the sense of difference between himself and Duṣyanta which ultimately results in one of the three kinds of cognitions, identifying him with Duṣyanta. Now the Rati can be the object of direct cognition (sākṣātkāra) of sahrdaya by “jñāna-rūpa-pratyāsatti”, as was shown above while discussing about Lollaṭa’s theory. These two theories are perhaps the amplification of the one that is briefly stated in the Locana (pp. 186, Edn. with Bāla-priyā) : “anye tu anukartari yaḥ sthāyyavabhāsaḥ abhinaya-sāmagryādikṛtaḥ, bhittāv iva haritālā”dinā aśvāvabhāsaḥ sa eva lokātītatayā āsvādāpara-samjñayā pratītyā rasyamāno rasa iti nāṭyād rasāḥ nāṭya-rasaḥ.”

Here the word “sthāyyavabhāsaḥ” might have given clue to PR. to develop a theory establishing the Rasānubhava to be a kind of Bhrānti-jñāna.

[We have explained this passage differently, taking it as an explanation concerning the citra-turaganyāya of Śrī-śaṅkuka. Sthāyyavabhāsaḥ is to be equated with aśvāvabhāsa - or the apparent appearance of the aggregate of a horse presented through colours on a canvass. So, we need not correlate this theory with the one held by “pare tu.” However, even the “pare” favour inference and do not accept vyañjanā. Hence Sri Ramachandrudu’s suggestion is also not un-welcome to us. Actually in a research paper : “The saṃlakṣya-kramatva of rasā”di-dhvani”, we have also tried to correlate the ideas in Locana with some views mentioned by

Jagannātha in connection with words having a multiple sense. Actually J. seems to be closer to the Locana, at times] Sri. Ramachandrudu continues : (pp. 124, *ibid*) : Dr. N. N. Chaudhary states that these two theories are not satisfactory and he raises the following objection against them. If the Sahṛdaya, as stated in the above theories, experiences the Rati about Śakuntalā within himself, he will have some sense of shame to express in the presence of others. If the Rasā"svāda were to be mere Bhrānti-jñāna, it will not be an object of attraction for the wise men. To state that śoka also, when presented by a poem can be a source of pleasure, is to attach much importance to the Lokottaratva of a kāvya, without giving satisfactory reasons. Unless the process of Ajñāna-nāśa, as explained in the theories of Abhinava and others is accepted, it is not possible to establish that Rasatva is Ānanda-rūpa. If, moreover, the Sahṛdayatva is only a cause of Bhrānti-jñāna, it will be perhaps, like madness, a thing more to be distasted than to be worthy of aquisition. Thus Dr. Chaudhary feels that these two theories are not even worthy of serious consideration. (Kāvya-tattva-samīkṣā; pp. 207).

In spite of all that is said, the theory contending the Rasā"svāda to be a kind of Bhrāntijñāna, cannot be brushed aside as worthless. PR. himself appears to be in favour of this theory. The exponents of all theories of Rasa are unanimous, in spite of the difference in procedure, in accepting that there is jñāna involved in Rasa. (Abhinavagupta had attacked Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka on the ground that even 'Bhoga' is a 'pratīti' and 'rasa' is also a pratīti, and nothing is beyond a pratīti, so, it is not proper for Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka to say that, "rasaḥ na pratīyate...") - Whether a jñāna is a pramā or bhrama is to be decided by the nature of the object of the cognition, but not by the cognition itself. Nobody can dispute regarding the existence of jñāna, whether it is pramā or bhrama, irrespective of the existence or otherwise of its object. Thus a jñāna can be produced by the really existing things or the spurious ones. Such being the case, it cannot be altogether ignored that a Rasa also can be Bhranti-jñāna or the result of Bhrānti-jñāna, because it is being produced by things which are really non-existing at least at the time of their presentation. After all Plato is quite correct in stating that the object of art is twice removed from truth. (Principles of Literary Criticism, p. 70). Whether he is right in condemning art on that ground is altogether a different question. The famous poet, Shakespeare places, though in a lighter vein, the poet by the side of a mad man and a lover (A mid-summer-Night's Dream V. i.sc.) clearly suggesting that the work of a poet consists in producing illusion (Bhrānti-jñāna) though perhaps a happy one.

Even while stating the theory of Abhinavagupta, PR. indicates that Rasā"svāda is, to a certain extent, illusory. There, first he states :

“yathā hi śarāvādinā pihito dīpas tan nivṛttau sannihitān padārthām prakāśayati, svayaṃ ca prakāśate, evaṃ ātma-caitanyaṃ vibhāvā”di-saṃvalitān ratyā”dīn, antaḥkaraṇa-dharmāṇaṃ sākṣibhāsyatvā”bhyupagateḥ.” (R.G. p. 26).

Here a question would arise. It may be correct that Rati etc. being the Antaḥkaraṇa-Dharmas, should be sākṣi-bhāsyas. But how can the vibhāvas etc. be sākṣi-bhāsyas ? In reply to this probable objection he says : “vibhāvādīnām api svapna-turagā”dīnām iva, raṅga-rajatā”dīnām iva sākṣi-bhāsyatvam a-viruddham.” (R.G. p. 26).

In fact, PR. could have established the sākṣi-bhāsyas-vibhāvas etc. by following the famous dictum of Vivaraṇā”cārya : sarvaṃ vastu jñāta-tayā a-jñāta-tayā vā sākṣi-caitanya-viśayaḥ.” (Pañca-padika-vivaraṇaṃ, p. 99). But he prefers to take the vibhāvas as the creation of imagination and so the vibhāva-jñāna should be considered only as a Bhrānti-jñāna. Once the vibhāvā”di-jñāna is accepted as a Bhrānti, there should be no objection in accepting the Rasā’nubhava as the result of Bhrānti; because it is the result of vibhāvādi-jñāna, and in fact, as explained above while stating Abhinavagupta’s theory, is the samūhālambana-jñāna of the vibhāvas etc.

Thought it is Bhrānti-jñāna, there is nothing wrong if it is sought by the wise men, when they are sure to get pleasure of peculiar nature from it. Only become it is Bhrānti-jñāna, we cannot deny the existence of Ānanda or the mixture of Sukha and Duḥkha as the case may be, and this can induce the Sahṛdaya towards the drama or anykind of poetical work. Only this is how we can explain the craze of the people for reading the detective novels, which may be in our technical language, the source of Adbhuta-Rasa. That Sahṛdaya would feel ashamed also need not be a serious drawback because, according to the above theories, the Sahṛdaya ascribes Duṣyantatva on himself and so there is, no question of experiencing Rati etc. as Ātma-gata. Moreover, even if he has such Rati, he need not have the sense of shame, because, he does not express it normally. [We feel Sri Ramacandrudu has gone astray here.] It is not clear how far the Ālankārikas are justified in applying the process of Brahmā”nandā”svāda (the Āvaraṇa-bhaṅga, etc.) in the case of Rasā”svāda; just because they call it Alaukika. [The earlier chapter in which following Abhinavagupta’s rasa-theory we have dealt with the secret of art-experience in general which borders on the Divine. This may be looked into carefully.] The Ātmajñāna being directly connected with the Brahman which is Ānandarūpa, there may be Āvaraṇabhaṅga etc. acceptable on the authority of the upaniṣads but how such things can be talked of in the context of rasāsvāda ?”

If it is the question of simply importing the philosophic process in this sphere also, why, even a glutton can talk of the Āsvāda which is Brahmā"svāda-sa-brahmacārin, and which is produced by a unique well-proportioned mixture of different ingredients in a delicious dish ! Therefore, in the absence of such, strong authority like Upaniṣads, acceptable at least to one section of people, all the above procedure appears to be over burdening on otherwise simple theory of aesthetic enjoyment. It may be a peculiar pleasure, but its peculiarity does not warrant accepting all this procedure.

If the ālaṃkārikas are so particular, they can accept the whole procedure, even if the Rasapratīti is accepted only as a bhrānti-jñāna rather as a result of Bhrānti-jñāna, because according to the Vedāntins, the whole process, leading to Brahmajñāna is only mithyā. Why, even Brahmākāra-Vṛtti is Mithyā for them. As explained by Śaṅkara-bhagavat-pāda ("kathantv asyatyena vedānta-vākyena satyasya brahmātmatvasya pratipattir utpadyate; na hi rajju-sarpena daṣṭo mriyate... naiṣa doṣaḥ. śaṅkā-viśādi-nimitta-māraṇā"di-kāryo-palabdheḥ; Bra. Sū. Śā. Bhā. pp. 458), Vācaspati-Miśra (śravaṇādy upāyaḥ ātma-sāksātkāra-paryantaḥ, Vedānta-samuttho'pi jñāna-nicayo-'satyaḥ. So'pi hi vṛtti-rūpaḥ kāryatayā nirodha-dharmā; Bhāmatī, pp. 458), and Vivaraṇakāra ("nanu brahmajñānasyā'py yadi tāvat svarūpa-miṭhyātvam-ucyate, aṅgīkṛtam eva tat. artha-viśaya-miṭhyātvam na. brahmaṇi bādhā'bhāvāt." - Pañca-pādikā-vivaraṇa, Part I., pp. 441) a real result may be achieved even through an unreal means. Thus there should be no objection in a Bhrānti-rūparasā"svāda leading to, nay, being identical with Ānandā'nubhava.

Moreover, it is, against the common experience to accept that the Āsvāda of every Rasa is a source of only pleasure. Many of the rhetoricians having once declared the Rasā"svāda as Brahmānanda-sa-brahmacārin, strive hard to explain that even in such cases like śoka, the Sāmājika gets pleasure only as in case of nakha-kṣata etc. But all such explanations are against our general experiences, because in Karuṇa, etc., we get a peculiar feeling of sadness rather than pleasure; and peculiarity can not be a proof to establish that it is only Ānanda. Even Abhinavagupta declares, in unambiguous terms that in almost all the Rasas, there is a mixture of both Sukha and Duḥkha, with only some difference of degrees.

[It may be noted that we do not agree with Sri Ramachandrudu's conclusions. We have explained the secret of rasānubhūti or art-experience

following Abhinavagupta in the earlier chapter. The discerning learned should look into the same. For Abhinavagupta, as explained by us, there is only one rasa, a mahārāsa, and it can be called even Śāntarāsa in the higher sense of the term. And this art-experience is only an “ānanda-ghana” samvedana, a solid compact experience of pure bliss. The quotations given by Ramacandrudu can be explained in a different way also, keeping Abhinavagupta’s main thrust in the centre, viz. that all art is a gateway to the entry into the Divine, and therefore only blissful. We continue with Sri. Ramacandrudu’s quotations further, pp. 128, ibid.) - (Before we proceed with the quotation from A.bh. as cited by Ramacandrudu, it may be noted that he forgets a glaring fact that this A.bh. is on Nā. Śā. I. 119 which talks of “Loka-Svabhāva” being “Sukha-duḥkha-samanvitaḥ” - Ramacandrudu forgets the next line after his quotation ends, which reads - “evaṃ laukikā ye sukha-duḥkā”tmāno bhāvāḥ, tat-sadrśaḥ, tat-saṃskāra’nuviddho nātya-lakṣaṇo’rthaḥ, samudāya-rūpaḥ tasyaiva bhāgo’bhinayaḥ.” - The theme of a dramatic piece is full of the delineation of laukika-bhāva-s of sukha-duḥkha-svabhāva. But the āsvāda of this dramatic piece is only ānanda-maya, as it passes through the alchemy of art. - Ramacandrudu quotes from Hindi A.bh. (pp. 210-229) - The passage, a comm. on Nā. Śā. I. 116, reads as -

“lokasya sarvasya sādharmaṇatayā svarvena bhāvyamānas’ carvyamāno’rtho nātyam. sa ca sukha-duḥkha-rūpeṇa vicitreṇa samanugato, na tu tad ekātmā. (Rāmacandrudu should underline these words - ‘na tu tad ekātmā’ i.e. ‘nātya’ is not identical with the nature of the theme which is sukha-duḥkhā”tmaka; it is beyond it.) - tathā hi-rati-hāsotsāha-vismayānām sukha-svabhāvatvam. tatra tu cirakāla-vyāpī sukha’nusandhi-rūparvena viśayānāmukhyaprāṇatayā tadviśayāśamsā-bāhulyena apāyabhīrurvāt duḥkhāṃśā’nuvedho rateḥ - (All this is to be understood at worldly level) - hāsasya sā’nusandhānasya vidyutsadrśas tātkalikolpa-duḥkhā’nuvedhaḥ sukhā’nugataḥ. utsāhasya tātkalika-duḥkhā”yāsa-nimajjana-rūpā’nusandhinā bhāvi-bahu-janopakāri-cirātara-kāla-bhāvi-sukha-samācīkṛtsātmanā sukhārūpatā. vismayasya niranusandhāna-tadit-tulyasukharūpatā. krodha-bhaya-śoka-jugupsānām tu duḥkha-rūpatā. tatra cirakāladuḥkhā’nusandhi-prāṇaḥ viśayagatā’tyantika nāsa-bhāvanā-tadā”kāṅkṣā-prāṇatayā sukha-duḥkhā’nuvedhavān krodhaḥ. niranu-sandhi-tātkalika-duḥkha-prāṇatayā tad-avagamā”kāṅkṣo’tprekṣita-sukhā’nusambhinnaṃ bhayam. dvaikālikastva-abhīṣṭa-viśaya-nāsa-jāḥ prāktana-sukhasmaranā’nuviddhaḥ sarvathaiiva duḥkharūpaḥ śokaḥ. utpadyamāna-duḥkhā’nusandhāna-jīvita-viśayāt palāyana-parāyaṇa-rūpā niśidhyamāna-śāṅkita-sukhā’nuviddhā jugupsā. samasta-pūrva-duḥkha-saṅcaya-

samarāṇa-prāṇitaḥ sambhāvita-tad-uparamabahula-sukha-mayo nirvedaḥ evaṁ vyabhicāri-prabhṛtiṣvapi vācyam."

Here the sthāyibhāvas stated as Ubhaya-svabhāva by Abhinavagupta stand for their respective Rasas. [Ramacandrudu is grossly out of truth here. For Abhinavagupta, the basic fact of his Rasa-concept is, "sthāyī (i.e. laukika-sthāyī) vilaksano rasah." The learned author has overlooked this plain truth., because in another place Abhinavagupta says - "ity ānanda-rūpatā sarva-rasānām. kiṃtu uparañjaka-viśaya-vaśāt teṣām api kaṭukimnā'sti sparśo, vīrasya iva] - (we have kept our reading following Hemacandra, and Gnoli), sa hi kleśasahīṣṇutā"di-prāṇa eva." (Hindi A.bh. pp. 478) - [We have explained in the earlier chapter how for Abhinavagupta Rasa - The basic rasa; you may call it śānta or Mahā-Rasa; is only one, and is ānanda-ghana-eva.] (Ramacandrudu Continues, pp. 128, ibid) -

There are some others who believe some Rasas as Sukharūpa and others as Duḥkha-rūpa. For example, Rāmacandra and Guṇacandra the authors of Nāṭyadarpaṇa (and how grossly mistaken they are in understanding the 'alaukikatā' of rasa) - state, "tatra iṣṭa-vibhāvā"di-prathita-svarūpa-sampattayah śṛṅgāra-hāsyā-vīra-adbhuta-śāntāḥ pañca sukhātmānaḥ. apare punaḥ anīṣṭa-vibhāvā"dy upanītā"tmānaḥ karuṇa-raudra-bībhatsa-bhayānakāś' catvāraḥ duḥkhātmānaḥ. (Nā. Darpaṇa, pp. 141, G.O.S. Edn.).

[It may be noted that we have thoroughly denounced the view of the Nā. Darpaṇa. Relevant pages may be looked into earlier chapters.]

(pp. 129) (Rāmacandrudu) - "The Nāṭyadarpaṇa (p. 141) further argues : People are averse to Bhayānaka-rasa. If at all there is some camatkāra, it is not because of the Rasas like Bībhatsa, but because of other things presented next to them by a skillful actor; and being deceived by this Camatkāra, even wise men declare that even rasas like Karuṇa are a source of pleasure.

[How grossly mistaken are these authors !] Madhusūdana Saraswati also states that there is a difference of degree in the experience of different Rasa-s, and it is not correct to say that all the Rasa-s give same kind of pleasure. (B. B. Rasāyana p. 22). [We pity this gentle man.] Thus the general experience compells us to believe that all the Rasas do not consist of pure Ānanda, and that there is a mixture of Duḥkha, at least in some Rasas. This fact is proved beyond doubt, by the popularity of some works of some Rasas only even to-day.' [God save Sri. Ramacandrudu; what has he to say about the 'Four great Tragedies' of Shakespeare ?].



Some rhetoricians are not prepared even to give the status of Rasa to Karuṇa Bhayānaka, and Bībhatsa, because there is no element of pleasure in them. Siddhicandra-gaṇi, [a just third-rate-name in our estimation; just third-rate !] writes in this context - “na ca teṣāṃ (karuṇā”dinām) tathābhūtarvėpi abhivyaktā” nanda-cidātmanā sahābhivyaktānām rasatvaṃ iti vācyam. evaṃ api sthāyyaṃśe rasa-virodhāt... yat tu śokā”dayopi ratyā”divat svaprakāśa-jñāna-sukhātmakā iti tad unmatta-pralapitam. kiñca, sāmājikeṣu mṛta-kalatra-putrādīnām vibhāvādīnām śokā”di-sthāyi-bhāvasya carvaniyena aja-mahīpālā”dinā saha sāmānādhikaranyam. āsrupātā”di-darśanāt. varṇaniya tanmayībhavanañ ca apekṣitam iti cet, katham brahmā”nanda-sahodara-rasod-bodhaḥ. katham vā na a-māṅgalyam. ata eva kecid aja-vilāpādikam na paṭhanti. bībhatse māṃsa-pūyā”dy-upasthityā vānta-niṣṭhivānā”dikam yan na bhavet tad eva āścaryam. kutas tādṛśaparamā”nanda-rūpa-rasodbodha iti. evaṃ bhaye’pi. śāntasya tyakta-sarva-vāsaneṣu bhavatu nāma kathañcit rasatvaṃ, viṣayiṣu punaḥ sarva-viṣayoparamopasthityā katham rasatvaṃ ? (Kāvya. Pra. Khaṇḍana; pp. 16-22, Edn. Parikh.) Gaṇi does not accept vira and raudra as separate Rasa-s because their vibhāva-s etc. are the same.”

[Siddhicandragaṇi’s arguments neither deserve mentioning nor refutation, in our estimation, for he does not seem to understand even the basics of aesthetics.]

Rāmacandrudu (p. 130) continues : “In views of these contradicting theories, and on the strength of the common experience, one would naturally get a doubt whether some of the old theories discussed above, are away from the point on hand. Because the revealing of Ānandāṃśa by Sattvodreka or by any such cause, being a common thing, according to them in all the Rasas, there should be no satisfactory reason to explain why there is the feeling of grief or the like, in Karuṇa, etc., instead of pure Ānanda. If one has to come forward with such explanations like the effect of Upādhi etc., (nature of sthāyibhāva), all the previous elaborate explanations would become futile. Under these circumstances, instead of loading the Rasa theory with so many philosophical arguments, there is nothing wrong in accepting that the Rasā’nubhava is the result of a peculiar kind of Bhrānti-jñāna which produces different effects like pleasure, melancholy-pleasure, etc.

This consideration has, perhaps prompted PR. to put forward the third and the fourth theories under the names of ‘Navya-s’ and ‘Pare’. And it may not be improper to believe that PR. attached much value to these theories (or at least to the first of the two, because we find him generally identifying himself with Navya-s), and he names his work Rasa-Gaṅgā-dhara, because he feels that he, for the first time, has

given a new turn to the theory of Rasa, on the face of the well established theories of Abhinavagupta and others. The same cannot be said of the first theory, (first in the order of Rasa-gaṅgā-dhara, and based on vedānta) because, as shown above, PR. cannot claim any originality in that respect."

Here ends the very long quotation from Sri. Ramacandrudu. We are reminded of the famous expression from the Upanisad, of course, only in the sense we mean, viz. "tato bhūya eva tamaḥ." Ramacandrudu has entered into "bhūya eva tamaḥ" concerning the basics of aesthetics. And talking about "originality" ? This is a sad modern concept of people who read and write trash ! For the great Jayanta has said, "kuto'sti nūtanam vastu ?", and the great Abhinavagupta politely observes :

"ūrdhvordhvam āruhya yad artha-tattvaṃ  
dhīḥ paśyati, śrāntim avedayanti,  
phalam tad ādyaiḥ parikalpitānām  
viveka-sopāna-paramparānām."

Actually there was no need for Ramacandrudu to bring in all these views of N.D. and K.P.Kha., and such trivials, while considering rasa-theory of Jagannātha. We do not agree with him, nor even with our guru Prof. Athavale in thinking that J. was a "pracchanna-Navya". No; he followed Abhinavagupta and Mammāṭa in the rasa-theory to the ditto, with further sophistication, in suggesting "bhagnā'varanā cid eva rasaḥ." These things are inherent in Abhinavagupta who holds rasa to be "vīta-vigha-pratīti-grāhyo bhāva eva rasaḥ." - or "nirvighnā samvit" as Rasa.

With this, we come to the end of a most interesting topic in Indian aesthetics, viz. the consideration of the nature of rasa, i.e. rasa-svabhāva and the process of rasa-realisation. It is better, if like our gurus, Prof. Parikh, Dr. Kulkarni and Prof. Athavale, we refrain from making sweeping statements and keep quiet. But at times, we have to cross this limit, for saving the youngsters from gross misunderstanding of Indian aesthetics.



## Chapter XVIII

### “Daśarūpaka-Vicāra”

While dealing with the topic of classification of poetry, we had suggested that such form of poetry which is both *drśya* and *śravya*, i.e. the *rūpaka*-s, will be taken up later. Accordingly, we take up this topic in this chapter, at the end of Vol. I of our proposed work, “Sahṛdayāloka; OR, Thought-currents in Indian Literary criticism.” It may be noted that the type of poetry called *Upa-rūpakas* could have been placed here also, but as, we thought, this variety had less of drama than of poetry as compared to the major *rūpaka*-s, we dealt with them in the earlier chapter. The *upa-rūpakas* involve a lot of dance and music as well. The *rūpakas* the ten major types to be considered here, are also ‘*kāvya*’ from the point of view of the written script and also when they are only read and not presented on the stage. It is to be noted very carefully that when we call them *kāvya* or “*drśya kāvya*”, they do not cease to be pure drama i.e. *rūpaka*. Even Bharata did not hesitate in taking them under *kāvya*, for he talks of *guṇa*, *lakṣaṇa*, *dosa*, *alaṃkāra*, *rīti*, *vṛtti*, *pravṛtti*, etc. in view of “*kāvya-rasa*”. The use of these beautifying agents is contemplated by Bharata in view of “*kāvya-rasa*”. So, it is gross mis-understanding on the part of such great Scholars like Dr. S. K. De, when he observes only to run down Sanskrit drama, that Sanskrit Drama, also like Sanskrit poetry, had “*rasa*” in the centre ! Actually “*Rasa*” is in the centre of any art, including poetry, drama, music, dance and what not ! So, the consideration of ten major types of drama will complete the circle. The methodology will be the same. We will of course keep Bharata as a starting point and go through major works on dramaturgy to pin-point the characteristics of Sanskrit drama in general. We will also deal with the problem of the structure of Sanskrit drama, with its plot divided into junctures or *Sandhis* and then sub-divided into *sandhyaṅga*-s. We will have passing observations on some allied topics also. Other topics, that are part of what the *Mālava*-school of aesthetics terms as “*buddhyārambha anubhāva*”, such as *rīti*, *vṛtti* and *pravṛtti*, will form part of our proposed volume II of this project. Each topic will be given a separate

chapter and such other topics as guṇa, lakṣaṇa, alaṃkāra, doṣa, etc. will be treated in the next volume, God-willing, of course !

So, for the present we will start with the consideration of the characteristics and structure of the ten major types of drama, such as, nāṭaka, prakaraṇa, etc.

### “Nāṭaka.”

It may be noted that Bharata mentions ten major types of rūpakas and nāṭaka is the first one. Bharata observes : N.S. XVIII-1 -

“vartayiṣyāmy ahaṃ viprā  
daśrūpa-vikalpanam,  
nāmataḥ karmatas' caiva  
tathā caiva prayogataḥ.”

“O Brahmins ! I will now set the ten divisions of dramatic compositions, giving their names, functions and modes of stage-performance.” (Trans. Dr. G. K. Bhat, Bharata-Nāṭya-Mañjarī; B.O.R.I. Poona, '75; pp. 112; We have accepted translation at all places from Dr. Bhat. We will indicate, if and when we defer.) Bharata treats of the varieties or rūpaka in Ch. XVIII and then also in Ch. XIX - (G.O.S.) Edn.) -

Bharata enumerates the following ten major types of drama -

“nāṭakam sa-prakaraṇam  
aṅko vyāyoga eva ca,  
bhāṇaḥ samavakāras' ca  
vīthī prahasanaṃ dimaḥ.” (N.S. XVIII-2)

They are, Nāṭaka, Prakaraṇa, Aṅka, Vyāyoga, Bhāṇa, Samavakāra, Vīthī, Prahasana, Dima, and Ihāmṛga, mentioned in the next verse :

īhāmṛgaśca vijñeyo  
daśamo nāṭya-lakṣaṇe  
eteṣaṃ lakṣaṇam ahaṃ  
vyākhyāsyāmy anu-pūvasaḥ.” XX-3

Abhinavagupta in his A.bh. explains : rūpyate pratyakṣīkriyate yóṛthaḥ tad vācakatvāt kāvyam rūpāṇi, daśānām rūpāṇām vibhāgaḥ kalpyate asmād iti daśa-rūpa-viklapanam.” As we had noted above, Abhinavagupta also explains here that the word ‘daśa-rūpa’ could be taken as referring to kāvyā in general. In Bharata even rūpakas are viewed primarily as ‘kāvyā’. This is clearer when we read the

following verse :

“sarveṣām eva kāvyānām  
mātrkā vṛttayah smṛtāḥ,  
ābhyo vinis srutam hy etad  
daśa-rūpaṃ prayogataḥ.” XVIII-4.

Dr. Bhat translates (pp. 112, ibid)

“The vṛtti-s or styles are traditionally known as the “mothers” of all dramatic poems. The ten kinds of play, so far as their production is concerned, have proceeded from these.” - The first half of the verse observes “sarveṣām eva kāvyānām” and in the next half the ‘daśa-rūpa’ is said to have proceeded from these (i.e. vṛtti-s). So, no water-tight division was meant by Bharata between ‘kāvyā’ and ‘daśa-rūpa’, the latter also being ‘kāvyā’ in the wider sense of the term. Thus Dr. De’s observation concerning the importance of ‘rasa’ in drama also, as in ‘poetry’, and thereby making sanskrit drama a lesser drama, is also unfounded.

Bharata, before coming to the definitions of each variety of the ten rūpaka-s, observes how different vṛtti-s are associated with different types of rūpaka-s. He says that both nāṭaka and prakaraṇa proceed from all styles, and resort to different structures (bandha) (XVIII-7), but the other eight types such as vīthī, samavakāra, ihāmṛga, utsṛṣṭikāṅka, vyāyoga, bhāṇa, prahasana and ḍima should be composed without using kaisikī-vṛtti.

Bharata now defines “nāṭaka” proper (XVIII. 10-12) :

“prakhyāta-vastu-viśayaṃ  
prakhyātódātta-nāyakaṃ caiva,  
rājarsī-vaṃśya-caritaṃ  
tathaiva divyāśrayopetaṃ. 11  
nānā-vibhūtibhir yutaṃ  
ṛddhi-vilāsāḥ dibhir guṇai ś caiva,  
aṅka-praveśakāḥ dhyam  
bhavati hi tan nāṭakaṃ nāma. 12  
nṛpatināṃ yac caritaṃ  
nānā-rasa-bhāva-ceṣṭitaṃ bahudhā  
sukha-duḥkhotpatti-kṛtaṃ  
bhavati hi tannāṭakaṃ nāma.” 13

(Trans., pp. 115, ibid) - (10-12)

“The name ‘Nāṭaka’ is given to the type of play whose subject is a well-known plot-material, the hero equally well-known and exalted, which describes the life and work of one born in the family of royal sages, uses episodes connected with the divinities; comprises the (hero’s) many dazzling achievements (vibhūti) [resulting in realization of the four goals of human life], and also (his) achievements connected with regal and material prosperity (riddhi) and with women and pleasure (vilāsa), as also minor deeds (guṇa, like the harmful opposition of the villain), and is properly equipped with a number of acts (aṅka), and linking scenes (praveśaka). The behaviour (carita) of kings, (consisting of) actions (ceṣṭita) (revealing) varied sentiments and emotional states, and arising out of joys and sorrows in their innumerable aspects (bahudhā), becomes what is called nāṭaka.”

Dr. Bhat (pp. 115, foot note No. 4) observes : “The expectation about a well-known plot and exalted type of hero is natural. Aristotle’s prescription of tragic drama is similar. Heroes like Rāma, Kṛṣṇa, Udayana, Duṣyanta fulfil the particular requirement. The divine characters are used in the nāṭaka form only in a smaller episodes (patākā or prakarī) as, for example, the divine Bhagavatī Ambā in the Nāgānanda. The reason Abhinava [gupta] explains, is that ‘devacarita’ is not very suitable for dramatic representation intended for human appreciation; if it is connected with vipralambha, karuṇa, adbhuta, it will not differ very much from human emotions; besides, the gods have no unhappiness or misery; human response thus is difficult to be obtained. Types like Dima, Samavakāra, which use heroic themes, are alone proper for divine characters.

The terms ‘vibhūti’ ruddhi, and guṇa are translated according to Abhinava’s explanation (see A.bh. pp. 412).

Dr. Unni (pp. 545, ibid) has the following observation : “AG. (= Abhinavagupta) notes : Śrī. Śaṅkuka justifies the usage ‘prakhyāta’ to exclude the minor episodes of the Bhārata. Whereas, upādyāya(Bhaṭṭa Tauta) stresses the popularity of the plot.” “prakhyāte Bhārata”dau yad vastu, tad-viśayasya, tatra’pi kiñcid a-prasiddham bhavati, tan nirākaraṇāya ‘prakhyātódāte”ti śrī. Śaṅkukaḥ.” - etat tu prakhyātaṁ vastu viśayo’syeti iyatā gatā’rtham ity upādhyāya ittham āhuḥ.” The interpretation of the word ‘guṇa’ as ‘sandhi-vigrahādāya’, only helps to show the proficiency of the commentator in cāṇakya-śāstra (Artha-śāstra) - “iti vyākhyātaṁ cāṇakyaśāstra-paricayā”vedanamātra-phalam.”

Śrī Śaṅkuka explains : 'nrpati-caritam' to include a host of kings. "śrī śaṅkukas tu vyācāṣṭe-vijigīṣur-ari-madhyamó-dāsīnau mitra-mitram iti. eṣāṃ caritam iti bahuvacanena labhyate."

Bharata does not go into further characteristics of 'nāṭaka', such as number of acts, sandhis, arthaprakṛtis, rasa-s etc. here, but he discusses these points separately and we will also discuss the same when we deal with the general structure, plot-construction etc. of drama in general. But later works on dramaturgy give such characteristics along with a given variety of rūpaka.

We will discuss a given rūpaka-variety in the light of the following works on dramaturgy or poetics as the case may be in the sequence as follows : The Daśa-rūpaka (DR.) Śṛṅgāra-prakāśa of Bhoja (Śr. Pra.). Nāṭyadarpaṇa (N.D.); Bhāva-prakāśana (B.P.) of Śārdātanaya (= Śā.); Nāṭaka-lakṣaṇa-ratna-kośa (NLRK.) of Sāgaranandin (Sā.), Sāhityadarpaṇa (S.D.) of Viśvanātha (= V.) and Rasārṇava-sudhākara (R.S.) of Śiṅga Bhūpāla.

The DR. (Edn. T. Venkatacharya, Adyar Library Series, Madras, '69) discusses the 'nāṭaka' in the third flash (= chapter; prakāśa). It may be noted that Dhanañjaya had stated earlier that rūpakas are classified on the basis of vastu (= theme), netā (= hero) and 'rasa'. In the first chapter 'vastu' is discussed. In the second chapter 'netā' is discussed along with other characters. Now in the third chapter, it should have been 'rasa' but actually 'rasa' finds place in the fourth chapter, while the third chapter deals with the types of rūpaka-s, beginning with nāṭaka. Dhanika, the commentator explains this deviation in treatment as follows : (pp. 135, ibid) - "bahu-vaktavyatayā rasa-vicāra-atilaṅghanena-vastu-netṛ-rasānām vibhajya nāṭakā"diṣu upayogaḥ pratipādyate" - i.e. "As the topic of rasa is very wide, and as much therefore is to be noted about that, here, the topic of rasa is bypassed and on the practice of vastu, netā and rasa, the description of the varieties of rūpakas beginning with nāṭaka, how these i.e. vastu, netā and rasa are used in different ways etc. is taken up first (in the third chapter). The Laghutiṅkā of Bhaṭṭa-Nṛsiṃha observes (pp. 135, ibid).

- 'bahuvaktavyatayā iti' - vastu-netṛ-vicārā'nantaraṃ rase pratipādaniye'pi tatra bahu-vidhaṃ vaktavyam asti iti paścād vaktum idānīm rasa-vicāraṃ siddhaṃ kṛtvā, tam atilaṅghya vastu-netṛ-rasā'dīnām nāṭakā"diṣu tāvad upayogaḥ pratipādyata ity arthaḥ."

With this, the DR. III. i begins with the topic of ‘nāṭaka’ with the words -

“prakṛtitvād athā’nyesām  
bhūyo-rasa-parigrahāt,  
sampūrṇa-lakṣaṇatvāc ca  
pūrvam nāṭakam ucyate.”

As nāṭaka forms the base of other varieties of rūpakas, as rasa is delineated to its highest and most varied condition, and as nāṭaka is said to be accomplished by all characteristics, it is discussed first.

The Avaloka observes : (pp. 135, ibid) - uddiṣṭa-dharmakam hi nāṭakam anuddiṣṭadharmāṇām prakaraṇā”dīnām prakṛtiḥ śeṣam pratītam - The Laghuṭīkā observes : (pp. 135, ibid) : tatra prathamam nāṭakalakṣaṇa-vacāne hetur uktaḥ, ‘prakṛtitvād’ iti. anyeṣām prakaraṇā”dīnām vikṛtibhūtānām asya prakṛtitvāt, bhūyasām rasānām āngatvena, āngitvena cā’tra parigrahāt, asya sampūrṇa-lakṣaṇatvāc ca, prakaraṇā”dibhyaḥ pūrvam nāṭakam ucyate iti. kim idam asya prakṛtitvam nāma ity apekṣāyām āha ‘uddiṣṭa-dharmakam” iti.

After this in the DR. III. 2-38a, some miscellenious items, to be taken up later are discussed but DR. III. 38b observes that -

“pañcā’ṅkam etad, avaram  
daśāṅkam nāṭakam param.”

i.e. the nāṭaka has five acts to begin with, (but it may have) and (upto) ten acts. : Laghuṭīkā (pp. 153, ibid) has - etan nāṭakam avaram pañcā’ṅkam, param daśāṅkam ‘iti nāṭakasya aṅkeṣu samkhyā-niyamam darśayati, ‘pañcā’ṅkam’ iti. -

The verses in between discuss topics such as pūrva-raṅga, bhāratī-vṛtti, the types such as prarocanā etc., three types of prastāvanā (or āmukha), vīthyaṅga-s, the ‘itivṛtta’ of nāṭaka, and avoiding such portions of the itivṛtta as are not favourable to the nāyaka.

Thus the DR. also treats some items such as aṅka, sthāpanā, etc. along with the nāṭaka.

Now it may be noted that even the ND. first defines nāṭaka and along with it takes up all topics concerning the nāṭaka including the things to be avoided. Then, aṅka (= act), upāya, (= artha-prakṛti-s), daśā, saṁdhi, sandhyaṅgas, etc. are discussed, followed by the characteristics of prakaraṇa and other types of rūpakas in the second chapter. Vṛtti, rasa and abhinaya are discussed in the third chapter



and the fourth one has nāndī, dhruvā, nāyaka-nāyikā, their qualities, other allied topics such as language, mode of address, etc. etc. and upa-rūpaka-s in the end. B. P. has its own treatment wherein it has mixed up other things also. The NLRK. also discusses nāṭaka along with other related topics. Same is the pattern with the S.D. and R.S.

It is therefore advisable that here also we proceed in the same way. We will begin with Bharata, who also discusses allied topics along with nāṭaka. We have seen his definition of nāṭaka earlier. The other topics that go with nāṭaka are discussed as follows :

Bharata (N.S. XVIII-12) had stated that the story or behaviour of kings abounding in rasa-s (sentiments), moods, and actions, representing pleasure as well as pain, characterises a nāṭaka, XVIII. 13 - observes :

“asyā’vasthópetam kāryam  
pra-samīksya bindu-vistārāt,  
kartavyónkaḥ sópi tu  
guṇā’nvitam nāṭya-tattva-jñaiḥ.”

(Trans. Bhat, pp. 117, ibid) - (13) Having properly reviewed the dramatic accomplishment to be achieved (kārya) which consists of definite stages of development (avasthā), from the drop (bindu) (i.e. germ) to its expansion, the experts on the principles of nāṭya should build an act, and also in such a manner as to conform to the requisite number (guṇā’nvita).

It may be noted here that avasthā, bindu etc. are technical terms that are related to the plot of a drama and also to its development. Five stages (avasthā-s) are calculated as will be seen in due course. The ārambha is the first avasthā where the germ is cast and a hint is given as to what will be achieved by the end. This is then enlarged-bindu-methodically.

The ‘aṅka’ or act, according to Bharata is discussed here after.

N.S. XVIII-14 observes :

“aṅka iti rūdhi-śabdo  
bhāvaiś ca rasaiś ca, rohayaty arthān  
nānā-vidhāna-yukto yasmāt  
tasmād bhaved aṅkaḥ.”

(Trans. Bhat, pp. 117, ibid)

“Aṅka is a conventional word fixed by usage. As it makes the (poetic) contents climb. [i.e. it carries to] (the heart of the spectator), with the (presentation of) sentiments and emotional states, and as it follows various technical presentations (nānā-vidhāna), it is called an ‘aṅka’ or act.”

Dr. Unni, (pp. 546, NS. Vol. II, Nag Publishers '98) puts this as, “Aṅka is a word with a conventional meaning. With the help of several devices the meaning is here developed by bhāva-s and rasa-s, and hence it is called ‘Aṅka’ (lit., a lap) - a basis.”

Abhinavagupta (A.bh., pp. 415, 6; *ibid*) observes that Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa and others read, “gūḍha-śabdah” for “rūḍhi-śabdah”. The explanation here is “bhāvaiśca rasaiśca gūḍhah” - i.e. concealed by bhāva-s and rasa-s, i.e. it contains in its depth bhāva-s and rasa-s. Others read “rūḍha” and observe - “rohayaty arthān” germinates or makes climb the meaning. It is observed : “rūḍhī rohaṇam; tena utsaṅga ucyate, tasmād utsaṅgavad ārohaṇa-sambandhāt aṅka ity ucyate.” The poetic content enters into the heart of the audience - “yathā-svaṁ bhāvādīn arthān hrdayam āropayati.” A further explanation is that “rasa-bhāvair upalakṣitān apy arthān rohayati”, i.e. meanings or ideas hinted by or charged by rasa and bhāva are brought to the understanding i.e. grasp.

DR. Bhat, (ft. n. 6, pp. 117, *ibid*) observes : “Abhinava refers to the reading ‘bhāvaiśca rasaiśca gūḍhārtho’ adopted by Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa and others and rejects it in favour of ‘rohayaty arthān’.

Rūḍhi according to him, is the same as Rohaṇa, and implies aṅka or lap; this refers to the portion of nāṭaka which, in its own way, presents the sentiments and emotions and carries them to the heart of the spectators; like a lovable child climbing into the lap of a parent, the aesthetic content presented through vibhāvas etc., climbs the heart, as it were, of the reader-spectator bringing him an awareness of rasa or bhāva. This analogy explains the term : rūḍhi rohaṇam, tena utsaṅga ucyate yo nāṭakāṁśah... tasmād utsaṅgavad ārohaṇa(m) sambandhāt aṅka ity ucyate.” Abhinava, pp. 415-416.

It may be noted here that in Indian dramaturgy or literary aesthetics, every portion of a drama is expected to be important, meaningful and goal-oriented; the goal being supreme enjoyment on the part of the reader/spectator. Thus nāṭaka is “rasa-oriented”. This ‘rasa’ is “vīta-vigha-pratīti” and “vigalita-vedyāntara” experience, which can result even from enjoyment of the pure intellectual type also. Emotion, intelligence and conation and thus the whole of the enjoyer’s self should get involved in the poetic content in such a way that for the time being anything else than what is presented, falls out of consciousness of the reader/spectator. Each ‘aṅka’ is expected to work in this direction. It could be a portion of an ‘absurd play’ as well.

NS. XVIII. 15-18 further observe :

“aṅka-samāptih kār्या  
 kāvya-cchedena bīja-saṃhārah,  
 vastu vyāpī binduḥ,  
 kāvya-samuttho'tra nityaṃ syāt. 15  
 yatrā'rthasya samāptir  
 yatra ca bījasya bhavati saṃhārah,  
 kiñcid avalagna-binduḥ  
 sōṅka iti sadā'vagantavyah. 16  
 ye nāyakā nigaditās  
 teṣāṃ pratyakṣa-carita-saṃbhogaḥ  
 nānā'vasthópetah  
 kār्याstv aṅkóvikrṣtas tu.  
 nāyaka-devī-gurūjana-  
 purohitā'mātya-sārthavāhānām,  
 naika-rasāntara-vihito  
 hy aṅka iti sa veditavyas tu. 18

Aṅka has to be completed. By closing the poetic theme (in an appropriate way) the seed of the plot should reach its natural end. Bindu, born of poetic theme, meaning extension of the theme, should continue all through out the play.

By 'Aṅka' is to be understood that part of the play, where (a portion of) the meaning (= theme) comes to an end, and where the seed-bīja is collected (i.e. where the seed relating to the juncture joining this stage of the theme to the next is collected), and where the 'bindu' (= extension of the theme) is somewhat connected. This means that 'aṅka' is that portion of the play where a part of the plot comes to an end and the bīja also comes to a close, however a little of 'bindu' (= potential extension of the plot) clings on to an extent.

The 'aṅka' or act should display directly the behaviour and the relationship (with queens) of the (various) heroes already mentioned. Various situations (of the heroes and other characters) should be shown in the act, which should not be too long.

The actions or various sentiments concerning the hero, the heroine, elderly people, family priest, ministers and commander of the army are displayed in an ‘aṅka’.

Dr. Bhat translates (Vs. 16-18) (pp. 119, ibid)

(16) “What is to be always known as an ‘aṅka’ of a play is (that presentation) where a (particular stage of) plot (development) is brought to a close, where the seed (relating to the juncture joining this stage and the next) is gathered up, and where the drop (bindu) remains somehow connected (with the theme and the following phases of the dramatic content.)”

Dr. Bhat adds in the foot-note : The translation follows Abhinava : cf : prārambhā”di-avasthā-lakṣaṇo’rthah yatra samāpyate sōṅkaḥ. aṅkasamāptyām api vā avasthāyām yadā bījasya saṃharaṇam yathāsvam sandhibhedena ucitam bhavati tadā api aṅka-cchedaḥ. tatra utpattiḥ udghāṭanam, udbhedo, garbha-nirbhedaḥ, phalasamā”nayanam iti mukhā”diṣu yathākramam bījasya daśā-viśeṣāḥ saṃhāra-śabda-vācyaḥ. aṅka-vicchedo mā bhūt iti ava-lagna-sambandhaḥ binduḥ yatra trāḍṛg kartavyaḥ-p. 416.

What is meant is that an act, while maintaining connection with the previous and the following stages of plot-development, must present some complete phase of the dramatic plot. Thus the phase of the plot shown in an act is three-fold-relating to the main theme, auxiliary, and something which by co-incidence or causal connection helps the main theme. (Abhinava, op. cit., p. 418)

Dr. Unni (p. 547) notes : “It is noted that three varieties of Aṅka are suggested here and in support the view of Kohala is cited - anayā tv āryayā aṅkasya traividhyam ucyate, tathā ca uktaṃ kohalena.”

Actually ‘aṅkasya traividhyam. should mean the phase of the plot shown in the act is three fold as explained by Dr. Bhat.

Dr. Bhat translates (VS. 17-18) : (pp. 119, ibid)

“But the act which shows different stages of plot-development connected with the direct action and union of the (different kinds of) heroes mentioned and (the actions) of the (chief and other) queens of the hero, elderly persons, family priest, minister and the leader of the caravan [i.e. commander in-chief of the army], and using various sentiments, should not be made too long; this should be clearly understood.”

Dr. Bhat adds the following foot-note, (pp. 119, ibid) : The actions and love leading to union of the hero must be actually presented and not left to imagination,

says Abhinava; otherwise the spectators would lose interest in the play. (The word in the original is 'pratyaksacarita-sambhogah')

The kinds of heroes are - Dhīrōdāṭṭa, Dhīra-lalita, Dhīrōddhata and Dhīra-prasānta. Abhinava says that 'nāyaka-devī.' etc. are mentioned to indicate the direction of incidental matters helpful to the principal plot. "nāyakā mukhyāḥ patākā"dayaḥ; devyo mahādevi-bhaginīprabhṛtayaḥ." Chief queen and other consorts. "Gurujano mātṛ-pitr-bhrātrā" cāryā"di, sārthavāho'tra senāpatiḥ." Since the act presents words and actions of all these it is bound to have different sentiments : ata eva naikena vicitreṇa rasa-viśeṣeṇa yuktaḥ. tathā hi - devīyoge śṛṅgāraḥ, nāyake vīraḥ; evaṃ anyad utpreksyam." Op. Cit. p. 418.

This means that the act is expected to present variety in its theme.

N.S. XVIII. 19 reads as -

"pañcā'varā daśa-parā hyaṅkāḥ  
syur nāṭake prakaraṇe ca,  
niṣkrāmaḥ sarveṣāṃ yasminn  
aṅkaḥ sa vijñeyah."

This means that in the Nāṭaka and Prakaraṇa varieties of rūpaka the number of acts is supposed to be five (in the minimum) to ten (maximum). An act is known to be (that portion of a play) in which all characters (on the stage) are supposed to retire (to the green-room).

N.S. XVIII 20-22 read as -

"krodha-prasāda-śokaḥ  
śāpotsargo'tha vidravōdvāhau,  
adbhuta-sambhava-darśanam  
aṅke pratyakṣajāni syuḥ. 20

(A.G. explains 'pratyakṣajāni' as 'akṣajaṃ jñānaṃ prati gatāni pratyakṣajāni - i.e. those which are directly observed).

"eka-divasa-pravṛttam  
kāryas tv aṅkōrtha-bījam adhikṛtya  
āvaśyaka-kāryāṇām  
avirodhena prayogeṣu." 21

ekā'ñkena kadācid bahūni kāryāṇi yojayed dhimān,  
 āvaśyaka-a-virodhena  
 tatra kāryāṇi kāryāṇi. 22

This means that things that are directly displayed in an act should include acts of anger, favour, sorrow, release from curse, running away due to fear, marriage, the beginning of a miracle and its actual occurrence etc. Incidents or activities that last for a full day should be presented in an act. This should be in consideration of the seed i.e. bīja of the dramatic theme. This means that all activities presented in an act should have a unity of time and unity of action. This performance should not obstruct the essential activities.

Here A.bh. observes that the maximum duration for the performance of an act should last a single day. ‘āvaśyaka kārya’ refers to taking meals, etc. for which both the actors and spectators must have enough free time. An intelligent (producer or playwright) may accomplish performance of many activities through one act but they should not hamper essential things.

NS. XVIII 23 suggests that all artists who enter the stage should leave the stage (by the end of the act) after performing action that is connected with the purpose of the seed : bījārtha-yukti-yuktaṃ kṛtvā kāryaṃ yathārtha-rasam.” This should harmonise with the object and rasa related to the seed.

Considering the nature (avasthā) of the day split up into moments (kṣaṇa), watches (yāma), and auspicious time (muhūrta, consisting of about twenty-four minutes), the plot should be suitably arranged in separate activities. This distribution should be spread in several acts. This means that all acts should display activities in consideration of the nature of the day.

Abhinavagupta observes : kṣaṇa-yāma-muhūrtānāṃ yāni lakṣaṇāni kartavyāni, asmin kṣaṇe sandhyā anuṣṭheyā ityādīni... tena eka-divasa-sampāditam upayogi ceṣṭitam aṅke badhnīyāt iti tātparyam.

Bharata observes that if some incidents could not be presented within the span of a day, the act should be brought to a close and the matter may be represented later through a praveśaka or interlude. If any character moves on a journey to a distant place, it could be conveyed through an interlude after closing the particular act.

Bharata observes (NS. XVIII. 28) -

“sannihita-nāyakónkah  
kartavyo nātake prakaraṇe vā  
parijana-kathā'nubandhaḥ  
praveśako nāma vijneyaḥ.”

This means that in the case of nāṭaka and prakaraṇa, (types of rūpakas) the act should always have the hero present in it. The praveśaka is to be known as connected with the conversation of the servants and retinue.

It is further observed that in prakaraṇa and nāṭaka the number of acts should be from five to ten. And similar number of intertudes - praveśakas - are possible in them in the interval between two acts.

Bharata further says that in between the acts intertudes are to be placed depending upon the requirements of the theme (artha-kriyāṃ samabhivikṣya). It is further observed - (NS. XVIII-31) -

“aṅka-cchedaṃ kṛtvā  
māsa-kṛtaṃ varṣa-sañcitaṃ vā'pi,  
tat sarvaṃ kartavyaṃ  
varṣād ūrdhvaṃ na tu kadācit.”

Dr. Bhat translates : (pp. 123, ibid) -

(31) “Having made a break in an act, (i.e. having brought an act to a close), the events which take a month or an year, all that should be shown (in a praveśaka), but (not events) which have taken more than an year.”

In a foot-note (pp. 123) he observes : “Obviously, this rule means that the time-interval between two acts, so far as it relates to actual happenings, should not be more than an year. This is generally observed by the dramatists. But the rule breaks down in the case of the Rāma-kathā. See Bhāsa's Pratimā and Bhavabhūti's Uttara-rāma-carita. To accomodate this unavoidable interval of 12 to 14 years, Abhinava refers to an interpretation by which the word 'month' and 'year' is taken as collective singular. But he does not approve of this and says that time-period like an year mentioned by Bharata refers only to the actual accomplishment of an action; the time taken up by preparation or the intervening period of time, even though factually real, is to be ignored in dramatic presentation. See. Op. Cit., pp. 422-423.”

Bharata further observes that when a dramatic character (yaḥ kaścit - (puruṣa)) has to go on a long journey on account of some business, the experts should close the act on this point, as laid down before.

Here in the A.bh. the views of Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa and Upādhyāya i.e. Bhaṭṭa Tauta are referred to. This stanza is not accepted by Lollaṭa, while Tauta not only accepts it but also notes that the idea mentioned here is only a repetition of a previous concept to bring home the point.

Bharata (NS. XVIII. 33) further observes that both in a prakaraṇa and a nāṭaka, praveśaka should be placed between two acts, in order to facilitate the development of the theme in other acts, i.e. the praveśaka should refer to the inter-connection and further development of the central points (of the dramatic theme, in every act - ‘bindūnām’) (The other reading is ‘sandhīnām’ - i.e. junctures.)

This ‘praveśaka’ or interlude between two acts, should not be presented by characters of high or middle class, i.e. it should not display actions of such people. The language also should not be a refined one, i.e. used by noble characters. But it should use common (prākṛta) language and common conduct.

Bharata further observes that a praveśaka (NS. XVIII : 35) is -

“kālotthāna-gatir-asau  
vyākhyā-samrambha-kārya-viṣayānām,  
arthābhīdhāna-yuktaḥ  
praveśakaḥ syād anekārthaḥ.”

(Translation, Dr. Bhat, pp. 125, ibid) -

“A praveśaka may have many purposes. It may be intended to state a matter (artha-abhīdhāna), the rise and passage of time, an explanation (of mysterious-occurrence or action), an event (kārya, connected with main plot), or theme (viṣaya), connected with the next development of the dramatic action).

Bharata further observes (XVIII 36-38) that such events, the execution of which is dependent on many persons, should be revealed succinctly i.e. should be compressed by the use of interludes (praveśakaiḥ), or through junctures (sandhiṣu vā) of the play. A play, which contains many speeches in prose, which is associated with cūrṇa-padas i.e. with words not in compound expression and not in Sanskrit for most part, will be unsuitable as this creates hindrance in recitation (NS. XVIII. 36).

When in a play, the content of an act cannot be completed in stipulated time and when it requires long time due to multiplicity of incidents, i.e. when the



presentation being wider, such matter should be expressed by brief introductory scenes (praveśakaiḥ sóbhidhātavyah), i.e. through praveśaka-scenes the happenings are to be narrated briefly (XVIII. 37).

Dr. Bhat in a foot-note, pp. 125, explains that according to Abhinava(gupta), this rule means that of all things that could be covered in a day, only such as are beautiful for stage presentation and helpful to the purpose of the play are to be actually presented in an 'act' of a play; all other things should be relegated to more statements in the praveśakas. We may add that this shows how Bharata was keen on maintaining unity of purpose in a play. Again the 'prayoga-lakṣitā' of sanskrit play is noticed here.

Bharata (NS. XVIII. 38) further ordains that such scenes as are directly connected with war or battle or fight, dethronement or loss of kingdom (rājya-bhramśa), death, seige of a city by an army (nagaróparodhanam) - are not to be portrayed actually in an act; i.e. they are not to be shown actually in reality (pratyakṣāṇi tu na āṅke), but they are to be arranged (i.e. conveyed, saṁvidheyāni,) only indirectly, through praveśakas i.e. interludes.

Bharata further observes (NS. XVIII. 39) that in both 'prakarana' and 'nāṭaka' types of rūpakas, a hero, who is well-known, and who is prone to prosperity (abhyudayī), should not be shown as killed, i.e. his killing (vadha) is not to be enacted either in the act, i.e. directly on the stage, or even in an interlude (i.e. indirectly through information his killing is not to be accomplished).

It is further suggested (NS. XVIII. 40), that the hero's flight, i.e. running away or removal could be conveyed. Or, either his capture i.e. his being taken as a captive, or entering into a treaty (grahaṇam vā sandhiḥ va) could be arranged by those who know the essence of dramatic art. All this could be in keeping with the main sentiment-yathā-rasaṁ. This could be achieved by varied poetic constructions (kāvyā-śleṣair bahubhiḥ). Dr. Unni reads : "tais taiḥ kārya-viśeṣaiḥ" praveśakaiḥ sūcayec caiva." (pp. 580, ibid). This means the above-mentioned (i.e. apasarana, grahaṇa, etc.) could be accomplished i.e. suggested by praveśakas which are rich in special devices.

NS. XVIII. 41 suggests that for both nāṭaka and prakaraṇa there should not be many characters, - na mahājana-parivāram kartavyaṁ nāṭakaṁ prakaraṇaṁ vā. This means that the hero should not be surrounded by a very big retinue. Actual number of persons playing useful role, should be just four or five, i.e. actual men of action - (kārya-puruṣāḥ) should be just four or five.

All this points to maintaining unity of purpose, or action. There should not be superfluous characters flooding the stage.

NS. XX. 42 has interesting suggestions. It suggests -

“kāvyam go-pucchāgram kartavyam  
kārya-bandham āsādyā,  
ye cōdāttā bhāvās te  
sarve pr̥ṣṭharaḥ kāryāḥ.”

Dr. Bhat (pp. 127) translates :

“While attempting the formal construction of dramatic action (kārya-bandha) the poetic composition should be made (like) the tip of a cow’s tail, and all exalted emotional states should be arranged at the end.”

Dr. Bhat explains Abhinava’s stand in a foot-note here. Accordingly Abhinava mentions two opinions about the meaning of ‘go-pucchāgra’ : (a) dramatic action which gradually tapers down towards the end; (b) the phases of dramatic development showing completion at various junctures in different acts : that is to say, some completed in the 1st or 2nd; and some only in the final act : e.g. the Madana-Mahōtsava is completed in the first act of Ratnāvalī; but the episode of Bābhavya hinted in the beginning is accomplished only at the end. The events thus have varied length like the hairs in a cow’s tail.

We may add that later, The N.D. seems to support this second explanation. There it is suggested that in a cow’s tail some hairs are very long and hang from the beginning to the end while others go to a short, or shorter or shortest length. In the same way, in a play, the main action concerning the objective of the hero stretches from the first act to the end of the play, while other incidents are of shorter or longer duration as the case may be.

NS. XVIII. 43 observes that in all poetic compositions - “sarveṣāṃ kāvyānām”, abounding in various sentiments and emotions - “nānā-rasa-bhāva-yukti-yukta” - the experts should always delineate the Adbhuta i.e. Marvellous sentiment in the end. We will see that Viśvanātha suggests that his senior, one Nārāyaṇa, recommended that ‘adbhuta’ should always be employed in a play, perhaps as the principal rasa.

It may be noted that with this Bharata’s treatment of the “nāṭaka” variety ends. He picks up prakaraṇa and other rūpakas ending with vīthī after this. It is only in the next chapter i.e. Ch. XIX that Bharata deals with the structure of drama, i.e. with sandhis and sandhy āṅgas. The DR. however, in the very first chapter, while dealing with the distinction between rūpaka (i.e. nāṭya), nṛtta and nṛtya, suggests

that rūpaka is again ten-fold. These types of rūpakas evolve due to difference in theme (vastu), hero (netā) and rasa. Then the DR. first deals with vastu, which is principal and subordinate and observes that vastu, artha-prakṛti-s and avasthās are five each. These sets of five each, in sequence cause five junctures viz. mukha, pratimukha, etc. Thus five sandhis along with sandhyaṅga-s forming the structure of the drama are taken up in the beginning by the DR. We feel that this is a better arrangement. So, we will also prefer to pick up the thread from the DR. and go along with its design. For the rest of rūpaka-s i.e. for rūpaka-s beginning with prakaraṇa and ending with vīthī, we will again start our consideration with the NS. of Bharata, followed by other works on dramaturgy such as the DR., and others chronologically. So, we will treat in the beginning the variety called the “nāṭaka” first, as treated in works beginning with the DR. and ending with the SD. Most of these works have dealt with the structure of the drama i.e. with the problem of dramatic theme and its treatment through sandhi-s and sandhyaṅga-s, along with the consideration of ‘Nāṭaka’. The treatment of other varieties will follow next and there we will have only to deal with their characteristics and not with the structure.

It may be noted that, of course we will follow the design of the DR., but while dealing with the structure, i.e. with junctures - sandhis and its parts - sandhyaṅgas, we will attempt a critical and comparative study beginning with the NS. of Bharata. The ND. also has followed the pattern of the DR.

Dhanañjaya, the author of the DR. observes (DR. I. 4) :

(p. 4, Edn. Venkatacharya, Adyar, Madras, '69)

“nāṭyānām kintu kiñcit  
pragūṇa-racanayā  
lakṣaṇam samkṣipāmi.”

Dhanika observes : “...asya sāmastyena lakṣaṇam kartum kaḥ śaktaḥ. tad ekadeśasya lakṣaṇam samkṣepataḥ kriyata ity arthaḥ.”

(pp. 6, ibid) Avaloka has - “nāṭyānām lakṣaṇam samkṣipāmi” (1/4) ityuktam, kiṃ punas tan nāṭyam ity āha -

What is ‘nāṭya’ ? In answer to this the DR. observes : (I. 7, pp. 6, 7, ibid) :

“avasthā’nukṛtir nāṭyam  
rūpaṃ drśyatayōcyate,  
rūpakam tat samāropāt,  
daśadhaiva rasā’śrayam.”

Dhanika explains that the identification by four-fold representation such as āṅgika etc., of the state of heroes such as dhīrōdāṭṭa etc. as portrayed in poetry is ‘nāṭya’.

- “kāvyōpanibaddha-dhīrōdāṭṭā”dy avasthā’nukāraś caturvidhā’bhinayena vācīkā’ṅgika-sāttvikā”-hārya-rūpeṇa tādātmyā”pattir nāṭyam.”

Dhanika explains that artful representation or identification, as it is viewed, is termed ‘rūpa’, like blue object etc. -

(pp. 7) “tad eva nāṭyam dr̥śyamānatayā rūpam ity ucyate, nīlā”di-rūpa-vat.

The Laghuṭīkā explains that ‘nāṭya’ is termed ‘rūpa’ or ‘spectacle’ only metaphorically just as a blue object is also termed ‘rūpa’ as it is viewed. (pp. 7) - “tad eva nāṭyam rūpam ity ucyate. yathā nīlā”di-rūpasya dr̥śyatvaguṇa-yogaḥ, evam idam api dr̥śyatva-guṇayogād rūpam ity ucyate. yathā māṇavake jvalanaśabdo gaṇaḥ evam nāṭyastho rūpa-śabdo’pi gaṇa ity arthaḥ.”

Dhanika (pp. 7) further explains : “nāṭe rāmā”dyavasthā”ropeṇa vartamānarvād rūpakam.” As the state of Rāma is superimposed on ‘nāṭa’-or ‘actor’, it is also termed “rūpaka”. Dhanika also explains that as the words ‘indra’, ‘śakra’ and ‘purandara’ are basically referring to one and the same deity and yet they are placed in the same case - i.e. sāmānādhikarāṇya’ - on account of difference in activity or role, in the same way, ‘nāṭya’, ‘rūpa’ and ‘rūpaka’ though basically identical and therefore not capable of being mentioned through sāmānādhikarāṇya are mentioned that way because of different functions suggested by these terms.

This nāṭya, i.e. rūpa, i.e. rūpaka is ten-fold on the strength of the variety of rasas delineated in them. Dhanika observes : (pp. 7, ibid) - “rasān āśritya pravartamānaṃ daśa-prakāram. ‘eva’ ity avadhāraṇaṃ tu śuddhā’bhiprāyeṇa nāṭikāyāḥ saṅkīrṇatvena vakṣyamāṇatvāt.”

By “eva”, observes Dhanika, it is ascertained that rūpaka-s are ten only in number from the point of view of “pure” types. ‘Nāṭikā’ is a mixed form and this will be explained later.

These ten varieties of rūpaka-s are enumerated in DR. I. 8 such as -

“nāṭakaṃ sa-prakaraṇaṃ  
bhāṇaḥ, prahasanaṃ, ḍimaḥ,  
vyāyoga-samavakārau  
vīṭhy anḱéhāmrgā iti.” (pp. 8, ibid)

Dhanika observes that by 'iti', no 'avadhāraṇa' i.e. ascertainment is meant and hence possibility of other varieties being counted remains open. This doubt, observes Dhanika is removed by the following kārikā which rules out the possibility of upa-rūpaka-s or other art-forms being placed under the head or "rūpaka". The DR. I. 9. (pp. 8, 9, 10) observes that 'nṛtya' i.e. dance-form is different from 'rūpaka' as it is dependent on 'bhāva' and not 'rasa' as in case of 'rūpaka', 'nṛtta' or rhythmic movement, which is a sort of lesser dance-form is quite different from these two as it depends only on 'tāla' or tempo and 'laya' i.e. rhythm (tālaḥ cañcat-putā"diḥ, layaḥ drutā"diḥ), thus it has nothing to do with emotional content. So, even if all these three are "viewed" they have separate identity. The DR. I. 9 observes :

"ānyad bhāvā"śrayaṃ nṛtyaṃ nṛttaṃ tāla-layā"śryam,  
ādyam padārthā"bhinayo, mārgo deśī tathā-param."

Dhanika observes : "nṛtyam padārthā"bhinayā"tmakaṃ mārga iti prasiddham. nṛttaṃ tu deśī iti."

'Nṛtya' is known as "mārga" as it is having "padārthā"bhinaya" as its soul. By this it is meant that the element of acting is less as compared to 'rupaka' which is vākyārthā"bhinayā"tmaka. It is more of dance than of acting. 'Nṛtta' is different from both 'rupaka' and 'nṛtya' as it contains no emotional basis and depends only on rhythmic movements of limbs. This is termed 'deśī' i.e. perhaps folk-based as against classical art. These two i.e. 'nṛtya' and 'nṛtta' are again two-fold being of the faster and slower variety :

"madhuróddhata-bhedena  
tad dvayaṃ dvididhaṃ punaḥ,  
lāsyā-tāṇḍava-rūpeṇa  
nātakā"dy upakāraṃ." (DR. I. 10, pp. 10, ibid)

Both graceful types (i.e. one each of nṛtya and nṛtta, the slower variety) are termed 'lāsyā', the other two (i.e. one each of nṛtya, nṛtta) are termed 'tāṇḍava'. These help the cause of nāṭaka etc. (i.e. rūpakas in general). Nṛtya helps at times in form of padārthā"bhinaya which is placed in between where required, and nṛtta helps the cause of nāṭakā"di as just a decorative agent. Dhanika observes (pp. 70) "nṛtyasya kvacid avāntara padārthā"bhinaya rūpatvena, nṛttasya ca śobhāhetutvena nāṭakā"daḥ upayogaḥ iti."

Now, a question is raised and then solved. The question is that as artful imitation all rūpaka-s are identical, so how come the difference in ten varieties is explained ? To this question, says Dhanika, the author Dhanañjaya replies in DR. I. 11 (pp. 11, ibid) :

“vastu netā rasas-  
teṣāṃ bhedakah,  
vastu ca dvidhā  
tatrā”dhikārikam mukhyaṃ,  
aṅgaṃ prāsaṅgikam viduḥ.”

The varieties of rūpaka-s stand justified from the point of view of ‘vastu’-i.e. theme, ‘netā’, i.e. hero and ‘rasa’ i.e. predominant sentiment. Now ‘vastu’ again is principal or ādhikārika and subordinate or incidental i.e. ‘prāsaṅgikam’.

Dhanika explains : (p. 11) - “pradhānabhūtam iti-vṛttam ādhikārikam, yathā rāmāyaṇe rāma-sītā-vṛttāntaḥ” - “story of Rāma and Sītā in the Rāmāyaṇa is the illustration of principal theme i.e. ādhikārika vastu or iti-vṛtta.

The subordinate theme is illustrated in the same i.e. Rāmāyaṇa by the account of Vibhīṣaṇa, or Sugriva etc., for example -

“tad aṅga-bhūtam prāsaṅgikam. yathā tatraiva vibhīṣaṇa-sugrīvā”di-vṛttāntaḥ.” These accounts are subordinate, aṅgabhūta, to the main story or main plot or theme.

Ādhikārika - is further explained (DR. I. 12) as that account which deals with adhikāriṇ, the hero, who is the master of final out-come, “phala-svāmin”. ‘adhikāra’ is explained as claim or mastery over the ultimate fruit. This account pervades the whole of the composition and is therefore termed ādhikārika i.e. major or principal -

“adhikāraḥ phala-swāmyam  
adhikārī ca tat-prabhuḥ,  
tan-nirvartyaṃ abhivyāpi  
vṛttam syād ādhikārikam.

The hero takes care of this account - “tannirvartya”.

Dhanika (pp. 11) observes : “phalena sva-svāmi-saṃbandho’dhikāraḥ, phalaswamī ca adhikārī; tena adhikāriṇā nirvṛttam, phalaparyantatām nīyamānam iti vṛttam ādhikārikam.” - ‘adhikāra’ or ‘right’ means the relation of “being a master

himself of." 'Adhikārin' is one who is, being a master empowered to have right, or claim over something. The theme - iti vṛtta - which is led to its final denouement or final stage i.e. achievement of goal by the adhikārin, and hence his role is 'ādhikārika' i.e. major or principal, and thus the theme connected with the hero's activity is 'principal'.

'Prāsaṅgika' or minor or incidental theme is one played by some other character who works either solely in the interest of the other - parārtha - i.e. for the hero, or perhaps in this some self-interest on his part is also involved : Thus minor theme is that which is connected with other characters who are either totally self-less or partly acting also in self - interest, but both acting in the interest of the hero, no doubt. This incidental theme either stretches for a longer part in a play and is termed 'patākā', or is of a short and temporary duration and is termed 'prakarī.' 'Patākā' is a metaphorical expression meaning a flag and as the patākā-nāyaka carries on his work longer, it helps to a greater extent the cause of the hero. It is like carrying a flag in an army. DR. I. 13 and 'avaloka' of Dhanika, read as (pp. 12, ibid) :

“prāsaṅgikaṃ parārthasya  
svārtho yasya prasaṅgataḥ,  
patākā-prakarī-bhedād  
dvi vidhatvaṃ prapadyate.  
sā'nubandhaṃ patākā"khyam  
prakarī ca pradeśa-bhāk.”

'Avaloka' reads : “yasya iti-vṛttasya para-prayojanasya satas tat-prasaṅgāt sva-prayojana-siddhiḥ, tat prāsaṅgikaṃ iti-vṛttam. prasaṅga-nirvṛteḥ prāsaṅgikaṃ.

prāsaṅgikaṃ api patākā-prakarī-bhedād dvividham.

dūraṃ yad anuvartate prāsaṅgikaṃ sā patākā, sugrīvā"di-vṛttantavat. patākā-iva-a-sādhāraṇa-nāyaka-cihna-vat tad upakāritvāt. yad alpam = dūraṃ na anuvartate sā prakarī, śrāvaṇā"di-vṛttānta-vat.”

When 'patākā' is discussed, on account of similarity in naming and pronouncing. “patākāsthānaka” is also explained. These are devices that help the cause of the enhancement of the theme.

Dhanañjaya then observes that the ādhikārika and two-fold prāsaṅgika make 'three' in all. These three are again either 'prakhyāta' i.e. wellknown, i.e. historical

theme, or ‘utpādyā’ i.e. imagined or ‘newly created’ theme, or ‘mixed’ i.e. having portions of both ‘prakhyāta’ and ‘utpādyā’. The ‘mīśra’ is having a number of varieties, i.e. sub-varieties and are boundless in number as the mixed has portions of the activity of divine or human characters.

The ‘phala’ or ‘out-come’ or ‘goal’ of this theme is termed “kārya”, and the three goals of human life, dharma, artha and kāma are meant by the same. This goal can be ‘suddha’ i.e. pure if only one of the three is aimed at. By combination of all the three, or any two of the three puruṣārthas, it is else than ‘śuddha’. With this DR. embarks upon the means of achieving these goals or kārya. Dhanika has a remark (pp. 15, ibid) - “tat-sādhanaṃ vyutpādayati” - The means is explained in DR. I. 17, 18 such as -

“svalpōddiṣṭas tu taddhetur  
bījaṃ vistāry anekadhā.”

The ‘seed’ is manifested a little and expands in a number of ways and proportion.

“stokōddiṣṭaḥ kārya-sādhakaḥ parastād aneka-prakāraṃ vistārī hetu-viśeṣo, bija-vad bījaṃ” - It is termed ‘bīja’ or seed metaphorically, - observes Dhanika (Avaloka, pp. 15, ibid).

‘Bindu’ or ‘drop’ i.e. expansion of the theme is a sort of continuation, after a brief pause or cutting of, due to something -

“avāntarā’rtha-vicchede  
bindur accheda-kāraṇaṃ.” (DR. I. 17b)

Dhanika explains as : “yathā ratnāvalyām avāntara-prayojana-anaṅga-pūjā-pari-samāptau kathā’rtha-viccheda saty anantara-kārya-hetuḥ... bindur jale taila-bindu-vat prasāritvāt.”

Dhanika explains that the term ‘bindu’ is also metaphorical. It is like drop of oil in water. This drop has a tendency to expand. Similarly this kārya-hetu also is a device which helps the expansion of the main theme.

These are, along with patākā, prakarī and kārya are said to be five artha-prakṛti-s. By ‘artha-prakṛti’, which is termed ‘upāya’ in the ND., is meant the causes of attainment of goal, explains Dhanika (pp. 16, ibid) :

“artha-prakṛtayaḥ = prayojana - siddhi - hetavaḥ.”



DR. I. 18 (p. 16) reads :

“bīja-bindu-patākā”khyā-  
prakārī-kārya-lakṣaṇāḥ,  
artha-prakṛtayaḥ pañca  
ta etāḥ parikīrtitāḥ.”

After this the DR. picks up the topic of five ‘avasthā’s or ‘stages’ of the theme.

Before we discuss this topic, we will see how the NS. of Bharata treats of the five artha-prakṛtis, viz. bīja, bindu, etc.

It may be noted that in Ch. XIX (G.O.S. Edn.) of the NS., Bharata treats these topics in the following order; (i) itivṛtta, i.e. dramatic plot, vs. 1-16; (ii) pañca-avāsthās and sandhayāḥ-junctures as found in a plot vs. 7-19; (iii) pañca artha-prakṛti-s, i.e. components of plot, vs. 20-30; and (iv) patākāsthānaka; plot indications or suggestive happenings; vs. 30-36; (v) sandhi-pañcakam; vs. 37-49; (vi) sandhyaṅga-kalpa; i.e. significance and purpose of sandhi-aṅgas; 50-55 vs.; (vii) arthopakṣepa-pañcakam; i.e. Introductory or presentation devices vs. 110-116; - and then this is followed by “daśa-rūpa-samāsaḥ” - i.e. ten types of drama, vs. 139-153; while in Ch. XVIII types of dramas are discussed.

We will follow the line of DR. and pick up from Bharata in sequence. This is for convenience in treatment and the DR. is, in our opinion, gifted with a better and more sound methodology.

So, after discussing the artha-prakṛti-s in the DR. we turn to the NS. We will treat all the topics at a time in individual works on dramaturgy in sequence in a chronological order.

Itivṛtta - The NS. (XIX. i) observes that the dramatic plot has been called the ‘body’ of the drama. Its division is imagined by means of five junctures - sandhis.

“itivṛttaṃ tu nāṭyasya  
śarīraṃ parikīrtitaṃ,  
pañcabhiḥ sandhibhis  
tasya vibhāgaḥ samprakalpitaḥ.”

It may be noted that ‘iti-vṛtta’ means the same as “vastu” i.e. theme. A.bh. observes : “iti-vṛtta-śabda-vācyaṃ tad vastu śarīraṃ, rasāḥ punar ātmā, śarīrā”virbhāvakāḥ.” Normally five junctures are enumerated but their use - i.e. of all or less - is left to the dramatist.

Bharata (XIX. V. 2) observes that *iti-vṛtta* is Principal and Subsidiary - i.e. *ādhikārika* and *prāsaṅgika*; *ādhikārika* (XIX. 3) is that which is total action, having the capacity to lead to the achievement of desired object, or goal, i.e. *phala-prāpti*. The other (action) is termed subsidiary plot -

“yatkāryam hi phalapṛāptyā  
sāmarthyāt parikalpyate,  
tad ādhikārikam jñeyam  
anyat prāsaṅgikam viduḥ.” (U.S. 3)

When the goal or fruit is caused by the plot, it is termed Principal i.e. main plot. To bring about this final achievement the incidental or subordinate plot is conceived (VS. 4).

Through the efforts of the poet, the achievement of the fruit is planned (kalpyate). This is aided by the regular activity (*upāśraya*) towards the desired goal (*vidhi*) performed by the heroes (i.e. main and other characters.) Finally comes the exaltation of fruit which ends in achievement. -

NS. XIX - 5 reads as -

“kaveḥ prayatnān netṛṇām  
yuktānām vidhyupāśrayāt,  
kalpyate hi phala-prāptiḥ  
samutkarṣāt phalasya ca.”

After this Bharata discusses the five stages of dramatic action - pañca avasthāḥ - followed by use of sandhi-s, and then five *artha-prakṛti*-s or components of the plot. The DR. picks up the treatment of the five *artha-prakṛti*-s or “*prayojana-siddhi-hetavaḥ*” as explained by Dhanika first. The NS. explains this after *avasthā*-s. In a way when plot is explained, the explanation or mention of stages also is not illogical. But we will prefer to stick to the order as planned in the DR. So, the *artha-prakṛti*-s as explained by Bharata will be treated first. Bharata observes (vs. 20-36) that five *artha-prakṛti*-s or components of plot are mentioned in keeping with five stages or ‘*avasthā*’ of *itivṛtta*. NS. XIX 20 reads as -

*iti-vṛtte yathā'vasthāḥ*  
*pañcā"rambhā"dikāḥ smṛtāḥ,*  
*artha-prakṛtayaḥ pañca*  
*tathā bījā"dikā api.”*

The idea is iti-vṛtta or theme or plot is the story of the behaviour or activity of the hero, at times helped by the efforts of minor heroes i.e. patākā-nāyaka and/or prakarī-nāyaka.

This theme, i.e. the effort of the hero is goal oriented, i.e. it aims at phala-prāpti. For this phala-prāpti the efforts of the hero and his aids are directed. They make a start, put in greater effort, then have a hope of achievement, then a stage is reached in the efforts when there is certainly of achievement and then the final achievement. These are five stages of efforts which are ārambha, yatna, prāptyāśā, niyatāpti and phalāvacaḥ. But for this in the beginning a seed is cast which is termed bīja, which when expanded is termed bindu and this thought-element is aided by physical action or kārya i.e. activity. The activity has five stages mentioned above. So, the ND. terms bīja and bindu as 'cetana' or consciousness-roles, and 'kārya' as a-cetana i.e. physical effort. *The theme, narrating these efforts of the hero and his aid thus according to the stages of activity, is marked by five joints or junctures - sandhis. These sandhis of the plot follow the five stages of efforts i.e. avasthā-s as noted by the ND. rightly. A sandhi is not the sum total of arthaprakṛti and avasthā, but a sandhi is a joint or a portion of the plot arrived at through various stages of activities, avasthās.*

The NS. XIX. 21-36 treats of these artha-prakṛtis or components of the plot.

“bījaṃ binduḥ patākā ca  
prakarī kāryam eva ca,  
artha-prakṛtayaḥ pañca  
jñātvā yojyā yathāvidhi.”

Bharata says that these are to be employed properly after knowing them. Thus it is hinted that every theme need not be graced by a patākā and, or a prakarī. It is observed in the ND. that when a hero is competent enough to achieve his goal single-handed, no need of employing a patākā or a prakarī arises.

As explained by Dhanika the artha-prakṛtis are 'prayojana-siddhi-hetus'. That special effort which is seen partially in a manifold way later is 'bīja' or seed; (DR. I. 17a) and 'bindu' is 'continuation' of this effort, after some 'break' is seen. This follows the NS.

Bharata explains 'bīja' (XIX. 22) as -

“svalpa-mātraṃ samut-sṛṣṭaṃ  
bahudhā yad visarpati,  
phalāvasānaṃ yac caiva  
bījaṃ tat prakīrtitam.”

Dr. Bhat translates (pp. 167, ibid)

“That which very slightly cast (through the dramatic dialogue), moves in expanding circle in many ways and culminates in fruition, that is called Bija or Seed.

‘Bindu’ is explained by Bharata (XIX. 23) as -

“prayojanānām vicchede  
yad a-viccheda-kāraṇam,  
yāvat samāptir bandhasya  
sa binduḥ parikīrtitaḥ.”

(Translation, Dr. Bhat, pp. 167)

“That which sustains the unbroken continuity (of dramatic action) till the end of the composition, even when the means (leading to the chief object of the play) are suspended (temporarily), that is called ‘bindu’ or ‘Drop’.

Dhanika explains that in Ratnāvali the bīja is cast under the pretext of anaṅga-pūjā. Then the flow of events stops. To re-charge the battery something happens. Sāgarikā, listens to, “udayanasyēndor ivōdvikṣate” and an idea flashes in her mind viz. “kaḥaṃ eso so...” “Is this the same Udayana to whom my father has pledged to give me in marriage...” etc. Thus ‘bindu’ is further opening, expansion, of something which has come to a halt for the time-being.

‘Patākā’ is explained by Bharata (vs. 24) as that happening, vṛtta, which is in the interest of someone else (parārtha) but helps the cause of the main plot (pradhānasya upakāraṇam). This episode is almost treated as major plot. (pradhānavac ca kalpyeta). It is a subsidiary plot which runs almost parallel to the main plot and occupies a fairly large part of the play. Patākā-s are so called metaphorically for like banners, they help to recognise the chief. These are independent episodes in the plot and they have a purpose and a fruit of their own, but these merge necessarily in the main plot as they assist the main plot developing in final fruition.

Bharata (vs. 25), explains ‘prakarī’ as such events that are meant only for the purpose of the main plot (parārthāya eva kevalam). They i.e. prakari-s have no further continuation i.e. connected development - ‘anubandha-vihīnatva.’ Etymologically ‘prakarī’ is that which operates for the main plot, i.e. it achieves something conspicuously for the main plot and there is absolutely no personal interest involved in itself : “prakarṣeṇa svārtha-anapekṣayā karoti iti.”

Abhinavagupta illustrates this by the role of Sri. Kṛṣṇa in Venīsaṃhāra. The role of Jaṭāyu in the Rāma-kathā is the illustration as seen in the ND.

(pp. 168, ibid) - 'kārya' is explained by Bharata (XIX. 26) as,

yad ādhikārikam vastu  
samyak prājñaiḥ prayujyate,  
tad artho yaḥ samārambhah  
tat kāryam parikīrtitam."

Dr. Bhat translates : (pp. 169) : The total effort, which is appropriately employed by the intelligent dramatist) for the purpose of the main plot, is called 'kārya' or "Dramatic Action." -

This 'kārya' is 'itivr̥ttasya phalam' as explained by Dhanika, which is of the form of three pursuits of life, viz. dharma, artha, and kāma, either taken individually or jointly.

- The DR (I. 16b) has -

"kāryam trivargaḥ, śuddham  
ekā'nekā'nubandhi ca."

The total effort is action employed for the achievement of this goal. This is also termed kārya, which has five 'avasthās'. So, the kārya which is of the form of tri-varga is the goal, to achieve which, bīja is cast, bindu operates and physical effort-kārya-divided into five avasthā-s, is made. These avasthas have five sandhi-s or joints conceived as parrallel, in the plot. The sandhi-s one or many seen in 'patākā' or subsidiary plot are termed as 'anusandhi' (NS. XIX. 28) -

[Lollaṭa and others explain that anu-sandhi is to deal with the story of patākā-nāyaka - "tathā lollaṭā"dyās tu manyante, parārthe sādhayitavye patākānāyakasya itivr̥tta-bhāgā anu-sandhayah.]

The patākā extends upto either 'garbha' or 'vimarśa' juncture. It terminates before 'nirvahaṇa' because the composition of 'patākā' and its construction are meant only for the main plot (vs. 29)

DR. treats of patākāsthānakas along with 'patākā'. This follows the pattern of the NS. which also picks up 'patākāsthānakas' or suggestive happening i.e. plot-indications after the treatment of 'patākā'.

There can be two explanations for this. The first reason is similarity in name. But this is not backed by logic. But second reason is that these suggestive devices also contribute, like 'patākā', to the cause of helping the hero in his endeavour to

reach the goal. Again, the conception of patākā-sthānaka-s is so attractive or charming and useful that it draws our attention as is a flag.

Bharata explains patākāsthānaka (vs. 30) as -

“yatrārthe cintite’nyasmins  
tallīṅgo’nyaḥ prayujyate,  
āgantukena bhāvena  
patākāsthānakam tu tat.

“When some matter is already contemplated (i.e. expressed or represented in the drama), another matter, having the same characteristics (or, similar to it) is suggested (i.e. employed, prayujyate) on account of accidental happening, it is patākā-sthānaka or plot-indication. (Trans. Dr. Bhat, p. 171)

Abhinavagupta explains that patākāsthānaka is iti-vṛtta, i.e. plot or a phase of plot-development. The particular happening suggests such plot-development in such a way, as a banner suggests a special place in which it is planted.

Four types of patākāsthānaka-s are explained by Bharata (vs. 31-34). When sudden wealth of meaning, full of excellence and helping the cause of the main plot occurs, it is said to be the first type of patākā-sthānaka. Words, charged with śleṣa-double entendre, expressed in a poetic composition (help the cause), it is the second variety. Third type of patākāsthānaka is that when a polite conversational usage of words suggesting a future idea with the help of double entendre is used. Thus here, a concealed (līna) subject-matter is suggested, by a special device through conversation which is subtly connected. The verse (33) reads as -

“arthopakṣepaṇam yatra  
linam sa-vinayam bhavet,  
śliṣṭa-pratyuttarōpetam  
trīyam idam isyate.” (NS. XIX. 33).

Abhinavagupta explains ‘sa-vinayam’ as -

‘viśeṣeṇa nayanam viśeṣa-niścaya-prāptyā sahitaṁ.’ ‘śliṣṭeṇa’ is explained as -  
“saṁbandha-yogena abhiprāyā’ntara-prayuktena api.”

Fourth variety occurs in the use of words in a poetic composition, conveying a double meaning. Thus su-śliṣṭaḥ - i.e. judicious or well-connected, or with the use of beautiful double entendre, - words are used in a poetic composition, well connected with the theme, make for this variety.

Bharata (vs. 36) observes that action in a drama should have four (types of) patākāsthānaka-s and the dramatic action must have five sandhi-s.

“catuspatākā-paramam  
nāṭake kāryam iṣyate,  
pañcabhiḥ sandhibhir yuktaṃ,  
tānś ca vaksyāmy  
ataḥ param.”

The ‘Avaloka’ on DR. I. 14 observes that, “patākā-prasaṅgāt patākāsthānakam api vyutpādayati.”

DR. I. 14 (p. 13, ibid) has -

“prastutā”gantu-bhāvasya  
vastuno’nyókti-sūcanam,  
patākāsthānakam tulya-  
samvidhāna-viśeṣaṇam.”

(p. 13) - The Avaloka on this reads as - “prākaraṇikasya” bhāvinórthasya sūcana-rūpaṃ patākāvad bhavatiṭi patākā-sthānakam. tac ca tulyétivṛtta-tayā, tulya-viśeṣaṇatayā ca dvi-prakāram-anyóktisamāsókti-bhedāt. samāsókṭeḥ sakāśād anyókter bhedāt”. Thus only two varieties are hinted at in the DR. as against four in the NS. the Laghutiḥ explains further : tatrā”ha-samāsókṭeḥ sakāśād anyókter bhedād iti. - samāsókter vilakṣaṇaiva anyóktiḥ. samkṣipyóktiḥ samāsókṭiḥ ity etāvatī samāsókṭiḥ samāse saty api anyapratītim uddiśya anyasyóktir anyóktir iti tayoṛ bhedaḥ.

The N.S. (XIX. 37-49) treats of five junctures - sandhi-pañca-here after first treating the five stages - ‘pañcā’vasthāḥ’ - of dramatic action. The DR. also follows the same order.

In the NS., the five avasthā-s - pañcā’vasthāḥ - are treated at Ch. XIX. vs. 7-16 as follows :

“samsādhye phalayoge tu  
vyāpāraḥ kāraṇasya yaḥ  
tasyā’nupūrvyā vijñeyāḥ  
pañcā’vasthāḥ prayoktrbhiḥ.” - (vs. 7)  
prārambhaś ca prayatnaś ca  
tathā prāpteś ca sambhavaḥ,  
niyatā ca phala-prāptiḥ  
phala-yogaś ca pañcamah.” (vs. 8)

Dr. Bhat translates : (pp. 163, ibid) -

Five stages of dramatic action. (7-8) :- The (mental and literary) activity on the part of the poet (lit. the cause of art-creation) for the accomplishment of the solemn fruit, of its five stages in consecutive order should be recognised by the representators (poets and directors) : (viz.) Beginning or commencement, efforts, possibility of realization, ordained attainment of fruit, Accomplishment of fruit.”

It may be noted that in the VS. 7, in place of ‘kāraṇasya’ another reading viz. “sādhakasya” is given. This should be preferred. By ‘sādhakasya’ is meant of ‘one who strives’ for the attainment of the fruit, i.e. the hero. Actually the whole effort of the hero is goal oriented and this effort passes through five stages. Even if we prefer “kāraṇasya”, the translation should be “of the hero, who serves as a cause”. Dr. Bhat translates as ‘of the poet’, the cause of art-creation. This sounds redundant and useless. “kāraṇa-bhūtasya netuḥ vyāpārasya pañcāvasthāḥ” - could be the idea and this sounds logical and reasonable.

‘Āraṃbha’ is the first of the hero’s behaviour which is goal-oriented. Here only ‘autsukya’ or curiosity about the great fruition of the seed - bīja - is termed ‘āraṃbha.’ So, ‘prāraṃbha’ is that stage, when the engerness of the hero for the attainment of the final result is set forth in form of a seed-bīja.

‘Prayatna’ (XIX. 10) is explained by Bharata as -

a-paśyataḥ phala-prāptim  
vyāpāro yaḥ phalaṃ prati,  
paraṃ cautsukya-gamanam  
sa prayatnaḥ prakīrtitaḥ

Prayatna or effort is striving towards the attainment of the goal, which seems to be unseen (i.e. beyond grasp). This is qualified by much expectation.

Prāpti-saṃbhava is the possibility of securing, or apprent ascertainment of the goal in a partial way. This is done only by the (appropriate) means (bhāvamātreṇa).

Abhinavagupta observes : bhavati asmāt iti bhāvaḥ, upāyaḥ, tasya sahakāryantara-yogaḥ, pratibandhakavāraṇam avadhāritam.

M. M. Ghosh is of the opinion that when, slight or partial attainment of the goal is suggested by psychological state of the hero, it is prāptyāśā. The idea is that experts call that portion of the total effort as prāptyāśā when mentally the hero feels slightly hopeful of achieving the goal.



NS. XIX. 12 reads as -

“niyatām tu phalapṛāptiṃ  
yadā bhāvena paśyati,  
niyatām tām phala-prāptiṃ  
sa-guṇām paricakṣata.”

Dr. Bhat (pp. 165, ibid) translates -

“When (the hero) is able to see the attainment of fruit definitely ordained (niyatā) on account of the (important) means (already employed) (bhāvena), that is called “Niyatā phalapṛāpti”, or Ordained attainment of fruit, which is meritorious.” This means that niyatā”pti - i.e. certainty of the achievement of fruit - consists of the absolute certainty of getting the final result.

XIX. 12 observes -

“abhipretam samagram ca  
pratirūpaṃ kriyāphalam,  
iti-vṛtte bhaved yasmin  
phalayogaḥ sa kīrtitaḥ.”

The phalayoga or attainment of the goal is where full intended result of the activity is shown in the plot

Dr. Bhat translates : (p. 165), -

“When the desired, appropriate (pratirūpa), total fruit of the action, becomes available in the (development of the) plot, that is called phala-yoga or Accomplishment of fruit.”

Abhinavagupta takes note of the view of his teachers that everywhere, the plot should have the five joints or junctures since no effort is possible without various stages : upādyāyāstv āhuḥ - sarvatrétivṛttaṃ pañca-sandhyeva; na hi kiñcid api vyāpāro prārambhādy avasthā-pañcakam vinā sidhyet.”

NS. XIX. 14 informs that whatever action is started by those who want to achieve a certain fruit, these stages occur in consecutive order. The putting together in a unified relation, - vs. 15 observes, of these stages having different nature individually, by bringing them into mutual connection - is said to be the cause of the fruit. This means that when these stages are made to serve jointly, they bring about the result.

The ādhikārika or principal plot which is described separately earlier, should have its beginning etc. neatly delineated, so that it runs its course into achievement of the fruit. (vs. 16).

NS. further observes that the main plot should be so woven that it has all the joints or sandhis normally, as a rule. There may be less sandhis, only if required due to some reason (VS. 17).

(VS. 18) Normally when one juncture is omitted, it is the fourth one that is dropped. In case of omission of two, the third and fourth may go out. When three sandhis are omitted the second, third and fourth are out. Naturally any plot whatsoever, has to have its beginning and end and thus two junctures are a must.

Bharata (VS. 19) observes that in case of subsidiary plot, this rule does not hold; for the prāsaṅgika-vṛtta is supposed to serve the purpose of the main i.e. ādhikārika-vṛtta. So, says Bharata -

“yad vṛttaṃ saṁbhavet tatra  
tad yojyam avirodhataḥ.”

i.e. Whatever plot i.e. events are possible in that prāsaṅgika-vṛtta, could be used without fear of any contradiction, of the main plot.

We have noticed that in the NS. the artha-prakṛtis are treated after the pañca-avasthās. We have examined them on an earlier occasion so, we will now proceed with the concept of junctures with their parts as treated by Bharata and then the DR.

**Sandhis - and Sandhyaṅgas :- Bharata (NS. XIX. 37) talks** of the five junctures as Mukha-i.e. opening, pratimukha or progression; garbha i.e. climax or development, vimarśa or contemplation i.e. deliberation, or pause, and nirvahaṇa or conclusion.

vs. 37-43 read as -

“mukhaṃ prati-mukhaṃ caiva  
garbho vimarśa eva ca,  
tathā nirvahaṇaṃ cēti  
nāṭake pañca sandhayah. (37)

‘Mukha’ sandhi is that portion of the plot where the seed is created. This leads to the birth of many matters and sentiments. These take shape in relation to the

body of the plot as narrated in poetry.

“yatra bīja-samutpattir  
nānā'rtha-rasa-saṃbhavā  
kāvyē, śarīrā'nugatā  
tan mukhaṃ parikīrtitam.” 38

Prati-mukha or progression is that part of the plot where the original seed which was cast in the opening (mukha), looks uncovered or in a state of flowering, but is at times marked (clearly) and at other times, as it were lost, to view. This means the real is apparently lost at times after making its appearance -

“bījasyōdghāṭanam yatra  
dr̥ṣṭa-naṣṭam iva kvacit,  
mukha-nyastasya sarvatra  
tad vai pratimukhaṃ bhavet.” 40

Garbha or development is that portion of the plot, wherein the sprouting, attainment and loss of the seed, and its fresh search occur.

udbhedaś tasya bījāśya  
prāptir a-prāptir eva vā,  
puṇś cā'nveṣanam yatra,  
sa garbha itī sañjñitaḥ. 41

Vimarśa or contemplation or pause is that part of the dramatic action or plot where the seed sprouted in the garbha (i.e. development part) is subjected to contemplation due to (= obstacles in form of) some temptation, anger or calamity.

garbha-nirbhinna-bījārtho  
vilobhana kṛto'thavā  
krodha-vyasanajo vā'pi  
sa vimarśa itī smṛtaḥ 42

The idea is that after the flowering of seed in the development state there is marked some lack of concentration in efforts caused due to some attraction elsewhere, or anger or unexpected calamity etc. This is psychological, for when one gets over-confident of achieving some goal, a lack of concentration due to various reasons occurs.

Nirvahaṇa is that part in which proper blending of all matters takes place. These matters include mukha etc. along with seed etc. This happens when these matters reach accomplishment along with different states or emotions. This means that threads of the story containing ideas from the beginning onwards are properly knit together into a culmination.

NS. XIX. 43 observes -

samānayanam arthānām  
mukhā”dyānām sa-bījinām,  
nānābhāvōttarānām yad  
bhaven nirvahaṇam tu tat. 43

(VS. 44) - Bharata further ordains that the producers of plays should know full well of these junctures in case of Nāṭaka. They also belong to the prakaraṇa (rūpaka) as well. For other types the following may be noted.

Thus Bharata expects that the two types viz. nāṭaka and prakaraṇa have all the five sandhis marked in them. The other types do not have all junctures. The ND. calls these two as “pūrṇa-daśā-sandhi-rupakas” and the rest are not so.

Bharata (vs. 45) further suggests that dima and samavakāra are types of rūpaka-s having four sandhi-s each, with the omission of the fourth i.e. avamarśa or vimarśa sandhi.

Vyāyoga and ihāmṛga have three sandhis, with garbha and vimarśa not finding place (vs. 46). They both have kaiśikī style.

Prahasana, vīthī, (utsrṣṭika) aṅka and bhāṇa have only two sandhi-s i.e. mukha and nirvahaṇa. (vs-47). Bharata observes that vīthī and bhāṇa and prahasana are composed in a style which lacks in kaiśikī (kaiśikī-vṛtti-hīnāni).

### Sandhyaṅga-kalpana :

After describing the number of sandhi-s that go with different types of rūpakas, Bharata (NS. XIX 49) proceeds to suggest the ideas about the limbs i.e. parts in each junctures -

evam hi sandhayah kāryā  
daśa-rūpe prayokṛbhīh,  
punar eṣām tu sandhīnām  
aṅga-kalpaṁ nibodhata. 49

NS. XIX 50 observes -

sandhīnām yāni vṛttāni  
pradeśeṣv anupūrvaśaḥ,  
sva-sampad-guṇa-yuktāni  
tāny aṅgāny upadhārayet. 50

Dr. Bhat (p. 175) translates -

(50) The events (of the plot), which belong to the different sandhis and which are (shown) in different places (or parts of the play), are a kind of supplement (guṇa) to the rich development shown in a sandhi (sva-sampad) : They are (therefore) to be understood as aṅgas."

Dr. Bhat has a foot-note (pp. 175) -

"Sandhi or juncture represents some definite portion of the dramatic plot or subject-matter of the play (artha-bhāga-rāṣi). The actual events which form a part of the plot (saṃvidhāna-khaṇḍa) are called the aṅgas. The name is justified because these events make up the particular sandhi and contribute towards the ordinary development of the plot, as limbs fill up or support the body, and contribute to its excellence and charm."

The incidents that occur in particular portions of the sandhis, may become sandhyaṅga-s i.e. ancillaries when they are represented properly with guṇas or excellences and other embellishments. Construction of suitable matter, smooth course of progression with reference to the plot, emotional fervour in representation, concealment of such matter that deserves concealment, revelation of that which deserves revelation, narration in a wonderful fashion - These are the six purposes underlined in treatises with regard to the events in a juncture. These might have inspired Ānandavardhana to observe rasa-doṣa-s, such as akāṇḍe vicchittiḥ, etc.

Bharata (XIX. 51-55 NS.) observes :

“iṣṭārthasya racanā  
vṛttāntasyā'nupakṣayaḥ,  
rāgaprāptiḥ prayogasya  
guhyānām caiva gūhanam.” - 51  
āścaryavad abhikhānam  
prakāśyānām prakāśanam,

āṅgānām ṣaḍvidhaṃ hy etad  
drṣṭaṃ śāstre prayojanam.” - 52

Dr. Bhat translates (pp. 177, ibid)

(51-52) - “The purpose of the āṅgas as seen in the śāstra-s is six-fold : constructive arrangement of the desired matter; non-loss or non-dwindling [i.e. presence and continuity] of the (essential) happenings in the plot; securing attraction or pleasure for the dramatic performance; concealment of things which deserve to be concealed; narrative representation of things full of surprise and wonder; open presentation of things that deserve to be disclosed.”

We have observed earlier that this discussion could have inspired Ānandavardhana to lay down favourable conditions that make for the suggestivity of the whole composition (= prabandha vyañjakatā)

Bharata further observes that like a person lacking in limbs getting unable of starting useful activity, so a poetic composition deficient in limbs will not be good enough for stage-production - “na prayoga-kṣamaṃ bhavet.” (VS-53)

Any composition, however lofty it may be, if lacking in limbs will fail to entertain the mind of the experts due to defective representation (hīnatvād hi prayogasya) - (VS. 54).

But a poetic composition though poor in meaning and content, i.e. though not lofty in this respect, if properly rich in limbs (samyag āṅgaiḥ samanvitam), on account of dazzling performance (dīptatvāt tu prayogasya) attains to great charm.

Such productions become a box-office hits. (VS. 55).

The DR. I. 54 observes, after discussing the sixty-four sandhyaṅgas :

“ukrāṅgānām catuḥ-ṣaṣṭhiḥ,  
ṣaḍdhā caiṣāṃ prayojanam.”

Six-fold is the purpose behind discussing the sixty four limbs of junctures. DR. I. 55 - observes (pp. 63, ibid) -

“iṣṭārthasya racanā  
gopya-guṇtiḥ, prakāśanam,  
rāgaḥ prayogasya, āścaryam  
vṛttāntasyā’nupakṣayaḥ.”

i.e. creation of required matter, concealment of that which should be concealed, presentation (of that which deserves presentation), attraction for the represented

matter, (creation of) wonder (i.e. sense of wonder), and absence of discontinuation of the theme."

Dhanika in the Avaloka (pp. 63) observes : vivakṣitā'rtha-nibandhanam, gopyā'rtha-gopanam, prakāśyārtha-prakāśanam, abhinaya-rāga-vṛddhis' camatkāritvaṃ ca kāvyasya itivṛttasya vistara ity aṅgaiḥ ṣaṭ prayojanāni sampādyanta iti. -

It may be noted that these guide-lines for making the stage-presentation successful are more relevant when the theme is historical or borrowed from ancient sources. For, example Kālidāsa removed Duṣyaṇṭa's unwelcome behaviour of disowning Śakuntalā till a divine voice was heard, as read in the Mahābhārata. Instead he invented the episode of the curse of Durvasas to lift the image of his hero.

After Bharata's views expressing the necessity of presenting sandhyaṅgas for the success of presentation the NS. treats five arthopakṣepaka-s i.e. Introductory or presentation devices (VS. 110-116, Ch. XIX N.S.). Prior to this 64 sandhyaṅgas are discussed in the NS. We will deal with sandhi-s and sandhyaṅgas in greater detail later in this chapter. But here we will discuss the "Introductory Devices" first.

#### **Arthopakṣepaka-s :**

NS. XIX. 110 observes that there are five Introductory or presentation devices such as -

viṣkaṃbhakaś cūlikā caiva  
tathā caiva praveśakaḥ,  
aṅkāvatāro'ṅkamukham  
arthopakṣepa-pañcakam."

Five presentation devices are - (i) viṣkaṃbhaka, (ii) praveśaka, (iii) cūlikā, (iv) aṅkā'vatāra and (v) aṅka-mukha.

These are explained individually in the NS. as follows :

(vs. 111) : "madhyama-puruṣa-niyojyo  
nāṭaka-mukha-sandhi-mātra-saṅcāraḥ,  
viṣkaṃbhakas tu kāryaḥ  
purohitā'mātya-kancukibhiḥ."

(Translation, Dr. Bhat, p. 179) -

“The ‘viṣkaṃbhaka’ or Intertude is to be presented with midling characters and occurs only in the mukha-sandhi (opening juncture) of a play : It should be constructed with (such characters as) the domestic priest, minister, chamberlain.”

(VS. 112) - “śuddhaḥ saṅkīrṇo vā  
dvividho viṣkaṃbhakas tu vijñeyah,  
madhama-pātraiḥ śuddhaḥ,  
saṅkīrṇo nīca-madhya-kṛtaḥ.”

Viṣkaṃbhaka is two-fold such as śuddha i.e. pure wherein only middling characters participate, and “mixed”, in which both middling and low characters participate.

(VS. 113) - “antar yavanikā-samsthaiḥ  
sūtā”dibhir anekadhā  
arthopakṣepaṇam yat tu  
kriyate sā hi cūlikā.”

Cūlikā (= intimation) is that device wherein the presentation of certain details concerning the theme (i.e. its progress) is - done, in many different ways, by characters such as the charioteer etc., who stay behind the curtain. This means “behind - the curtain-pronouncements” make for cūlikā.

VS. 114 - “aṅkāntarā’nusārī  
saṅkṣepārtham adhikṛtya bindūnām,  
prakaraṇa-nāṭaka-viṣaye  
praveśako nāma vijñeyah.”

Dr. Bhat translates (pp. 179) :

“The Praveśaka or Linking scene comes in the nāṭaka and prakaraṇa type (of drama) between two acts, and presents a concise statement (saṅkṣepārtha) of some of the stages of plot-development (bindūnām).”

VS. 115 - “aṅkānta eva cā’ṅko nipatati yasmin, prayogam āsādyā bījārtha-yukti-yukto jñeyo’ṅkāvatāro’sau.”

(Trans. Dr. Bhat, pp. 179) - “The Aṅkāvatāra or Descent of Act contains the presentation of some matter connected with the seed (bījārtha-yukti) and, with reference to the stage performance, it comes right at the end of an act (aṅkā’nte) or an act falls right into it.”

This means that aṅkāvatāra is almost the use of another act immediately after the previous one, as though a continuation of the main plot in transition. We will



VS. 116 - viśiṣṭamukham aṅkasya  
striyā vā puruṣeṇa vā  
yad upakṣipyate pūrvam  
tad aṅka-mukham ucyate.

The DR. has presented this topic in a more logical way. It observes (I. 56, pp. 64) that the theme of a play should be divided into two such as something which is only to be suggested, i.e. not presented on the stage and something that is to be directly enacted -

“dvedhā vibhāgaḥ kartavyaḥ  
sarvasyā’pīha vastunaḥ  
sūcyam eva bhavet kiñcit  
drśya-śrāvyam athā’param.”

The DR. (I. 59, pp. 65) informs that Viṣkaṃbhaka is that device which suggests parts of narration or plot that have either happened or are to happen next. This suggestion is brief and presented through (the dialogue of, or through the agency of) middling characters. -

“vṛtta-vartīṣyamāṇānām  
kathāśśānām nidarśakaḥ,  
saṅkṣepārthas tu viśkaṃbho  
madhya-pātra-prayojitah.” (DR. I. 59, pp. 65, *ibid*)

As in Bharata, here also it is said to be two-fold, i.e. śuddha and saṅkīrṇa., When the characters are only middling or belonging to the middle and also the low order of society, respectively.

The ‘Praveśaka’ (DR. I. 60) is similar (tad-vad; i.e. suggesting some portion of the theme), through not dignified expression-anudāttókyā-and presented through characters of the lower strata. Praveśaka is presented only in between two acts and never in the beginning of the first act as is the case of the viṣkaṃbhaka which occurs also in the beginning of the first act. Avaloka (pp. 66, ibid) observes - “aṅka-dvayasyā’ntar iti prathamāṅke pratishedha iti.”

DR. 61b observes that cūlikā is suggestion of matter through the agency of the characters that operate from behind the curtain - “antarjavanikā-saṁsthaiḥ”.

DR. I. 62 describes ‘aṅkā”sya’ and ‘aṅkā”vatāra’ :

“aṅkānta-pātrair aṅkā”syam  
chinnāṅkasyā’rtha-sūcanāt,  
aṅkāvatāras tv aṅkānte  
pāto’ṅkasy a-vibhāgataḥ.”

Avaloka explains (pp. 67, ibid) : aṅkānta eva pātram aṅkānta-pātram. tena viśiṣṭasya uttarāṅka-mukhasya sūcanam, tad-vaśena uttarāṅkā’vatāro’ṅkā”syam iti. - A character that appears at the end of an act is “aṅkāntapātra.” When such a character that has entered the stage at the end of a given act supplies information concerning the beginning of the next act, which otherwise would have looked disconnected with the theme, it is called the device of ‘aṅkā”sya’.

The illustration is drawn from the Mahāvīra-carita, act II, end portion, wherein Sumantra informs some characters present that they are expected to appear before Vasiṣṭha and Viśvāmitra who are in company of king Daśārtha. Others then move to join them in the next act.

Aṅkāvatāra is correlation of the next act brought about by the end of the earlier act, without formally bringing the same to termination. The next act just drops in i.e. starts without the formal termination of the earlier act and without the use of such correlating devices as viṣkaṃbhaka or praveśaka in the beginning of the next act. The Avaloka (pp. 68) explains - “yatra pravīṣṭa-pātreṇa a-sūcita eva pūrvāṅka-a-vicchinārthatayā eva aṅkāntaram āpatati, praveśaka-viṣkaṃbhakā”di-sūnyaḥ sōṅkāvatāraḥ.” The illustration is cited from Mālavikā’-gnimitra, wherein by the end of the first act the viduṣaka asks the two who are

present to inform when actually the dance-competition will start in the queen's chamber. Then he adds that only the sound of the drum itself will convey the fact. Thus by listening to the sound of the drum all the characters act accordingly and there only the second act starts. Avaloka observes : "...mrdaṅga-śabda-śravaṇānantaraṃ sarvāṇy eva pātrāṇi prathamāṅka-prakrānta-pātra-sankrānti-darśanaṃ dvitīyāṅkā"dau ārabhanta iti prathamā"ṅkārthā'vicchedena eva dvitīyāṅkasya avatāraṇād aṅkāvatāra iti." (pp. 68, ibid).

### "Sandhi-s and Sandhyaṅga-s."

As noted earlier the dramatic theme or action i.e. plot is imagined to be divided into five junctures - sandhi-s or joints, having a number of limbs or sandhyaṅga-s, totalling 64 in all the five sandhi-s. This division helps the course of successful presentation of the play. By success is meant that the spectators enjoy it every minute. Sandhi-s are the component divisions of the dramatic action. We have noted that Bharata does not give us a general definition of 'sandhi' but proceeds to define, as seen above, individual sandhi-s straight away.

Bharata in the same fashion enumerates the sandhyaṅga-s that occur in the five sandhi-s respectively. They read as -

“upakṣepaḥ parikaraḥ  
parinyāso, vilobhanaṃ,  
yuktiḥ, prāptiḥ samādhānaṃ  
vidhānaṃ paribhāvanā.  
udbhedaḥ karaṇaṃ bheda  
etānyaṅgāni vai mukhe.

Twelve limbs are read in the first juncture, i.e. mukha-sandhi.

'Upakṣepa' is suggestion; parikara (or parikriyā) is 'enlargement'. Parinyāsa is 'establishment.' 'vilobhana' is allurement. 'Yukti' is resolve. 'Prāpti' is attainment. 'Samādhāna' means 'settling'. 'Vidhāna' is conflict of feeling (of pain and pleasure). 'Paribhāvanā' is surprise. 'Udbheda' is disclosure. 'Bheda' means 'division'. 'Karaṇa' is 'resumption'.

Pratimukha-sandhi has 13 sandhyaṅgas enumerated by Bharata as -

“tathā pratimukhe caiva  
śṛṇutāṅgāni nāmataḥ.  
vilāsaḥ parisarpaś ca  
vidhūtaṃ tāpanaṃ tathā,

narma narmadyutis’ caiva  
tathā pragamanam punaḥ.  
nirodhaś caiva vijñeyam  
paryupāsanaṁ eva ca  
puṣpaṁ vajaram upahyaśo  
varṇa-saṁhāra eva ca.  
etāni vai prati-mukhe...”

‘Vilāsa’ is craving, ‘Parisarpa’ is pursuit. ‘Vidhūta’ is disinterest; ‘Tāpana’ is torment. Śama is pacification, ‘Narama’ is joke. Pragamana means ‘response’. Nirodha is impediment. Paryupāsana is apology. Vajra is ‘bolt’. Upanyāsa is intimation or propitiation and Varṇasaṁhāra is congregation.

Thirteen limbs are enlisted under the third sandhi. The ‘garbha’-joint such as -

...garbhēṅgāni nibodhata.  
“abhūtāharaṇam mārgo  
rūpódāharaṇe kramam,  
saṁgrahaś cānumānam ca,  
prārthanā”kṣiptam eva ca,  
toṭakā’dhibale caiva  
hy udvego vidravas tathā.

etānyaṅgāni vai garbhe.... Adbhutāharaṇa is false statement. Mārga is statement of truth. Rūpa means ‘supposition.’ or ‘reflection’. Udāharaṇa is exaggeration. Krama is comprehension of reality; progress. Saṁgraha is propitiation. Anumāna is inference, deduction. Prārthanā is request or supplication. Ākṣipta (or kṣipti) is revelation. Toṭaka is quarrel or words of agitation. Adhibala means deceit, or outwitting. Udvega is anxiety. Vidrava is also termed saṁbhrama. It means flight from fear.

Avamarśa or Vimarśa sandhi has 13 aṅgas enumerated by Bharata as -

hy avamarśe nibodhata, apavādaśca saṁphetaḥ  
sadravaḥ śaktir eva ca.  
vyavasāyam prasaṅgaś ca  
dyutiḥ khedo niṣedhanam,  
virodhanam athā”dhānam

cchādanam ca prarocanā.

etāny avamrṣe'ṅgāni -

Limbs of the Avamarśa Sandhi are : apavāda = scandal, or censure; sampheta is rebuke or wrathful words; drava is disobeying the elders, or contempt. It is also called 'abhi-drava'. Śakti is prowess. Vyavasāya is effort. Prasāṅga is reverence. Dyuti is excitement (through censure). Kheda is dejection or depression. Niśedhana is impediment. Virodhana is opposition. Ādhāna means comprehension. Chādana is concealment; forbearance. Prarocanā is foresight; precursion.

In the fifth i.e. nirvahaṇa sandhi there are 13 sandhyaṅga-s. Bharata observes...

bhūyo nirvahaṇe śruṇu.

“sandhir nirodho grathanam

nirṇayaḥ paribhāṣaṇam, (95b; XIX)

dhṛtiḥ prasāda ānandaḥ

samayo hy upagūhanam,

bhāṣaṇam pūrva-vākyaṁ ca

kāvya-saṁhāra eva ca.

prasastir iti saṁhāre

jñeyāny aṅgāni nāmataḥ.

catuḥṣaṣṭhir budhair

jñeyāny etāny aṅgāni sandhiṣu.

punar eṣāṁ pravakṣyāmi

lakṣaṇāni yathā kramam.

The limbs are - sandhi i.e. junction or the seed coming to fruition. Nirodha also termed vibodha means reasonable search. Grathana is assembling, hint. Nirṇaya is ascertainment; paribhāṣaṇa is conversation. Dhṛti is conformation of reason. Prasāda is graciousness. Ānanda is 'joy'. Upagūhana is surprise. Bhāṣaṇa is pacification by words. Pūrva-vākya is restatement and kāvya-saṁhāra is termination due to attainment of goal.

It may be noted that Bharata's concept of Sandhi-s and sandhyaṅga-s has been accepted by later theorists almost without any major change except sometimes, somewhere the names change or the number of sandhyaṅga-s in a given sandhi differs. So, we feel that along with original sources this concept will be discussed in greater details with a comparative and critical approach. We may note here that

Bhoja (Ch. XI. Śr. Pra.) has accepted Bharata's definitions of the ten rūpakas and has added two more which have been examined by us under uparūpakas in the earlier chapter on the classification of poetry. As Dr. Raghavan observes (p. 533, Bhoja's Śr. Pra.; Madras, '64) Bhoja has also discussed the structure of Drama. Bhoja has newly introduced the topic of 5 Ārambha-vidhis and has also discussed 5 arthaprakṛti-s, 5 avasthā-s, 5-samsthā-s, 5 samavasthās (These two are newly discussed topics in Bhoja), 5 sandhis, 5-vṛttis, 5 pravṛtti-s, 24-pravṛttihetus - This makes for his first set of 64. Then 10 lāsyāṅgas, 13 vīthyaṅgas, 16 vṛtryaṅgas 21 sandhyantara-s, 4 patākāsthānaka-s make for his second set of 64. 64 sandhyaṅgas make for his third set of 64 and 64 lakṣaṇas make for his fourth set of 64.

It may be noted that we will discuss, following of course the original text and the great work of Dr. Raghavan, the concept of sandhi-s and sandhyaṅga-s in Bhoja, only after we treat sandhi-s and sandhyaṅgas first in Bharata and Dhanāñjaya. Hemacandra, the N.D., and The S.D. and R.S., normally follow Bharata's line. Though there is no great basic difference but Bhoja's line of thought is toed by Śāradātanaya in B.P. and so also in the NLRK. of Sāgaranandin and R.S. of Śīṅgabhūpāla to an extent. So, we will treat Bhoja and his followers separately after first dealing with the NS. of Bharata, DR. of Dhanāñjaya, Hemacandra, N.D. and the S.D. of Viśvanātha. We will discuss this in the light of a very enlightening research article by our guru and most respected Dr. V. M. Kulkarni, who in his “The conception of sandhi-s in the Sanskrit Drama” has done an excellent work in studying this topic in a critical and comparative fashion. But first of all as in case of Bharata so also in case of other authors, we will first take care of the original source material that covers this topic. Bhoja of course will be looked into along with Śāradātanaya and Sāgaranandin later. We start with the DR.

The DR. is under a mis-conception that a 'sandhi' is the out-come of artha-prakṛti-s and 5 avasthā-s taken together respectively. This we will view later but for the present we note what the DR. has to say.

The DR. (I. 22b.) observes - (pp. 19, ibid)

artha-prakṛtayaḥ pañca  
pañcā'vasthāḥ samanvitāḥ - 22b  
and,  
yathāsaṁkhyena jāyante  
mukhā'dyāḥ pañca sandhayaḥ. 23a

The Avaloka explains : “artha-prakṛtīnām pañcānām yathāsaṃkhyenā’vasthābhiḥ pañcabhir-yogād yathā-saṃkhyenaiva vakṣyamāṇa-lakṣaṇā mukhā”dyāḥ pañca-sandhayo jāyante.

The Laghutiḥkā observes : “bījā”dīnām artha-prakṛtīnām avasthābhiḥ pañcabhir-yogāt yathā-saṃkhyam sandhayo bhavanti. bījasyā’rambhaṇenā’nvayo mukhasandhiḥ, bindoḥ prayatnenā’nvayaḥ, pratimukha-sandhiḥ patākāyāḥ, prāptyāśayā’nvayo garbha-sandhiḥ.

Laghutiḥkāḥkāra knows that at times patākā may not figure in a play. Hence, it is observed : “yadyapy aniyatā eva patākā tathā’pi yadā patākā bhavati tadānīm avasthā-parvaṇā prāptyāśayā yogāt garbha-sandhir bhavati. yadā tu sā nā’sti tadānīm garbhasandhiḥ kevalā prāptyāśā bhavatī’ti evam uparyapi neyam.

This is exactly the reason why the N.D. explains that the concept of sandhi-s follows the avasthā-s and not the upāya-s or the arthaprakṛti-s.

DR. however gives a general definition of a sandhi, which is not attempted by Bharata, DR. I. 23b (pp. 19, ibid) observes :

“avāntarā’rtha-sambandhaḥ  
sandhir ekā’nvaye sati. (J. 23b)

The Avaloka explains : ekena prayojanena anvitānām kathāṃsānām avāntaraikaprayojana-sambandhaḥ sandhiḥ.

This means that the concept of sandhi becomes relevant and stands to clear grasp only in view of the whole of the plot or iti-vṛtta. All minor parts are associated with one principal goal and these minor parts remaining absolutely tied with the one goal are interconnected among themselves to form a particular sandhi. The Laghutiḥkā explains (pp. 19, ibid) - yady api rūpakeṣu mukhā”dyāḥ pañcā’pi sandhayo bhavanti, tathā’pi sāmānyata eva iti-vṛtta-mātra-gāmini jñāte hi sandhau sandhi-viśeṣo jāyate.”

The sandhis are enumerated in the DR. (I. 24a) as -

“mukha-pratimukhe garbhaḥ  
sā’vamarśo’pa-saṃhṛtiḥ.”

Not even Bhoja or anyone belonging to what we have called the Mālava-school of thought, the DR. of course being a leader among the same, ever attempts

different names of these sandhis and the number also remains the same, whoever be the author and whatever be his faith. Actually in the field of art-criticism the Indian tradition presents almost an identical design, the variety seen anywhere is due to a greater thrust on this or that point here or there. This is true even of literary criticism as well where divergence in what may be called the Kashmir school of thought and the Mālava school of thought is more vocal. But all agree in one point that all art-including literary and dramatic-is rasa-oriented.

The DR. then proceeds to define each sandhi individually along with its sandhyaṅga-s. The sandhi-s, mukha, pratimukha etc. are defined in their order following Bharata as follows :

mukha-sandhi (DR. I. 24b) is -

“mukhaṃ bīja-samutpattir  
nānārtha-rasa-sambhavā.”

pratimukha is -

“lakṣyā’lakṣya ivōdbhedas  
tasya pratimukhaṃ bhavet.”

‘Mukha’ is associated with the casting of ‘bīja’ or seed and pratimukha is connected with its sprouting, marked at times and unmarked in other moments.

Garbha-sandhi is : (DR. I. 36a)

“garbhas tu dr̥ṣṭa-naṣṭasya  
bījasyā’nveṣaṇaṃ muhuḥ,  
dvādaśā’ṅgaḥ, patākā syān  
na vā, syāt prāpti-sambhavaḥ.”

The ‘bīja’ which was marked or un-marked in the prati mukha-sandhi is sought after with a hope in this juncture.

Avamarśa (or vimarśa) sandhi is - (DR. I. 43) (pp. 45, ibid) -

“krodhenā’vamarśed yatra  
vyasanād vā, vilobhanāt,  
garbha-nirbhinna-bījārthaḥ  
so’vamarśa iti smṛtaḥ.”

This follows Bharata.



Nirvahaṇa-sandhi (DR. I. 48b - 499) is -

“bījavanto mukhā”dyarthā  
viprakīrṇā yathāyatham  
ekārthyam upanīyante  
yatra nirvahaṇam hi tat.”

The Avaloka explains these sandhi-s as - (pp. 20, mukha-sandhi) bījānām samutpattir aneka-prakāra-prayojanasya rasasya hetur mukha-sandhir iti vyākhyeyam. tena a-tri-vargaphala prahasana”dau rasotpatti-hetor-eva bījatvam iti. asya ca bījā”rambhā”rtha-yuktāni dvādaśāṅgāni bhavanti.”

‘pratimukha’ is explained as (pp. 28, ibid) - “taya bījasya kiñcillakṣyaḥ kiñcid alakṣya iv’odbhedaḥ prakāśanam, tat pratimukham.

garbha-sandhi is - (pp. 36, ibid) - “pratimukha-sandhau lakṣyā”lakṣya-rūpatayā stokodbhinnasya bījasya yaḥ sa-viśeṣodbhedapūrvakaḥ sāntarāyo lābhaḥ, punar vicchedaḥ, punaḥ prāptiḥ, punar vicchedaḥ, punaśca tasyaiv-ānveṣanam vāram vāram sōnirdhārītaikānta-phala-prāptyāśātmako garbha-sandhir iti.

Avamarśa is explained by Avaloka (pp. 45, ibid) as - avamarśanam avamarśaḥ paryālocanam. tac ca krodhena vā, vyasanād vā, vilobhanena vā, bhavitavyam anenā”rthena iti (evam ?) avadhārītaikāntaphala-prāptyavasāyā” [nā” ?] tmā garbhasandhy udbhinna-bījārtha-sambandho vimarśo’vamarśaḥ.”

Nirvahaṇa is first only illustrated in the Avaloka (pp. 55, ibid) and then it is added - “ity ādinā draupadīkeśa-samyamanā”dīnām mukha-sandhyā”dibījānām nija-nija-sthāno’pakṣiptānām ekārthatayā yojanam.”

**Hemacandra** in his kā. śā. only records the definitions of daśa-rūpaka quoted from Bharata. He also talks of uparūpaka-s which we have looked into earlier. He does not discuss the structure of the drama as done by Bharata and other writers. So, the discussion of his treatment of artha-prakṛti-s, avasthā-s, sandhi-s, sandyaṅga-s etc. does not arise.

**The Nāṭya-darpaṇa of Rāmacandra and Guṇa-candra** use the terms upāya, daśā and sandhi for artha-prakṛti, avasthā and sandhi respectively.

The ND. first observes that (ND. I. 2) the ‘abhineya kāvya’ is having many varieties. Only some of these to some extent, will be treated here. This definition will be a critically considered one, say the authors : “dṛṣṭam pūrva-muni-praṇīta-nāṭya-lakṣaṇa-paurvāparya-parāmarśena upayuktatayā lakṣitam. evam ca sva-manīṣikānirāśena lakṣaṇasya upādeyatvam uktam.”

The rūpakas enumerated by the N.D. are twelve including the ten major rūpaka-s as read in the N.S. and the D.R., added by two more, i.e. nāṭikā and prakaraṇī, also counted by them as major rūpakas (N.D. I. 3).

Nāṭaka (N.D.I.5.) is defined as having the activity of a well-known king in its centre, having three puruṣārtha-s (i.e. dharma-artha-kāma) as its goal, and gifted with aṅka (act), upāya (= bīja, etc.), daśā (i.e. āraṁbha etc.) and sandhi (= mukha, etc.).

Types of ‘Nāyaka’ or ‘Netā’ are explained in N.D. I. 6-7-8-9. ‘Carita’ i.e. activity or behaviour of the hero i.e. vṛtta (= iti-vṛtta) is said to be two-fold; principal and subsidiary which may or may not find place in a given play. This two-fold ‘carita’ is ‘sūcya’, prayojya, abhyūhya and upekṣya. (N.D. I. 10). N.D. I, 11 observes that ‘nīrasa’ and ‘anucita’ (i.e. not appealing to cultured taste) is to be suggested i.e. sūcya. Prayojya i.e. worthy of presentation is other than this, i.e. ‘sa-rasa’ and ‘ucita.’ ‘ūhya’, to be imagined, is that without imagining which things will not proceed, and that which is of positively in bad taste - jugupsita - is to be ignored - i.e. ‘upekṣya’.

With this ND. treats of some other varieties of theme such as that which is to be narrated aloud, that which to remain - sva-gata - i.e. at mental level only, that which is to be narrated to many on the stage but one (= janāntika), or to one only avoiding many (= apavārta), something to be presented by the device of ākāśokti, etc.

The N.D. also describes the literary quality expected of a play. After treating these minor points the ND. I. 19, defines an act, i.e. aṅka as -

“avasthāyāḥ samāptir vā  
chedo vā kārya-yogataḥ,  
aṅkaḥ sa-bindur, drśyārthaḥ  
caturyāmo muhūrtataḥ.”

The number of acts is also laid down as five to ten in a given rūpaka (ND. I. 20).

‘aṅka-anibandhanīya’ i.e. that which is not to be treated in an act such as the killing of the hero, etc. is described in N.D. I. 21. ‘aṅka-avarṇanīya’ - that which can not be directly staged in an act, such as a journey to a distant place etc. is to be described through devices such as viṣkaṁbhaka, etc. (N.D. I. 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27).

We must confess that even as compared to the DR., - certainly the NS. of Bharata is no match, - the ND. has presented the subject of dramaturgy adopting almost perfect design or methodology. Topics after topics are discussed as they come up naturally; the next one as it were flowering from the earlier one.

Thus, ND. I. 28 speaks of 'upāya-s' after 'aṅka.' Nāṭaka was defined as "sāṅkopāyadaśā-sandhi", and hence after 'aṅka' upāya-s i.e. bīja etc. come up for discussion. One important point is that these upāya-s, called artha-prakṛti-s in the NS. and the DR. are divided into "cetana" and "a-cetana." ND. I. 28 observes :

"bījaṃ patākā prakarī,  
binduḥ kāryaṃ yathā-ruci,  
phalasya hetavaḥ pañca  
cetanā'cetanā'tmakāḥ."

This is very interesting. After bīja which is a-cetana, patākā and prakarī are enumerated as they are "cetana" type. 'bindu' is cetana and 'kārya' is taken as 'a-cetana.' By 'yathā-ruci' is meant that these do not follow in the sequence mentioned in the kārikā, nor is their presence inevitable. This of course refers to patākā and prakarī.

The vṛtti clearly explains the position. It is observed - "upāya-svarūpa-a-pari-jñāne tad-viśayāṇaṃ ārambhā'dīnāṃ svarūpa-parijñāna-asambhava iti upāya-svarūpaṃ vyutpādyate."

This means that without grasping the concept of upāya (i.e. bīja, etc.), it is not possible to understand the concept of avasthā (i.e. ārambha, etc.) So, first upāyas are explained.

The vṛtti further makes very interesting reading - "yathā-ruci"iti na eṣāṃ auddeśiko nibandha-kramaḥ, sarveṣaṃ avaśyaṃbhāvitvaṃ vā. 'phalasya' su-sādhyasya hetavaḥ upāyāḥ."

The Avaloka had explained these as "prayojana-siddhi-hetavaḥ."

ND. further observes - "iha hetur dvidhā a-cetanaś cetanaś ca. acetanōpi mukhyā'mukhya-bhedād dvidhā. mukhyo bījaṃ, tanmūlatvād itareṣaṃ. a-mukhyas tu kāryaṃ. cetanōpi dvidhā, mukhya upakaraṇa-bhūtaśca. mukhyo binduḥ, kāryā'nusandhāna-rūpatvāt. upakaraṇabhūto dvidhā, (i) svārtha-siddhi-yutaḥ parārtha-siddhi-parāḥ, (ii) parārtha-siddhi-parāś ca. pūrvaḥ patākā, anyāḥ prakarī iti. atra acetana-cetanānāṃ madhye bīja-bindvor mukhyatvam, sarva-vyāpītvād iti."

After treating the upāya-s, daśā-s i.e. ārambha etc. are considered and this is followed by sandhi-nirūpaṇa in the ND. (I. 37) - A very interesting, and of course remarkable for its clear perception is the observation in the N.D. that the sandhis are parts of the main plot and that they follow the daśā or avasthā-s. The DR. had blundered in its observation of a sandhi being a sum total of artha-prakṛti-s and avasthās.

The N.D. I. 37 observes :

“mukhaṃ pratimukhaṃ garbhā-  
-marśa-nirvahanāny amī,  
sandhaya mukhya-vṛttāṃśāḥ  
pañcāvasthā’nugāḥ kramāt.”

The vṛtti on ND. I. 37 observes : “mukhyasya svatantrasya mahā-vākyārthasyā’ṃśā bhāgāḥ, parasparaṃ svarūpeṇa cā’ṅgaiḥ sandhīyanta iti sandhayaḥ. avasthābhiḥ prārambhā”dibhir anugatā, avasthā-samāptau samāpyanta ity arthaḥ. avasthānāṃ ca dhruva-bhāvītvāt sandhaya’pi nāṭaka-prakaraṇa-nāṭikā-prakaraṇiṣu pañcā’vaśyam-bhāvināḥ. samavakārā”dau tu viśeṣopādānād ūnatve’pi na doṣaḥ. kramād iti mukhādy uddeśa-krameṇa avasthā-krameṇa ca nibadhyante. iha tāvat prabandha-nibandhaniyo’rthaḥ avasthā-bhedena pañcabhir bhāgaiḥ parikalpyate. ekaikaśaś ca bhāgo dvādaśa-trayodaśa-ityā”di-rūpayā aṅga-saṃkhyayā vibhajyate. prāsaṅgikavṛtta-sandhayaḥ tu mukhya-sandhy-anuyāyivād anusandhaya eva ity uktam eva iti.”

Thus the concept of sandhis is rendered very clear in the ND. 64 aṅga-s are also recognised. We will consider them later, all at a time.

Śāradātanaya the author of Bhāva-prakāśana (B.P. Edn. G.O.S. 68, and Edn. Dr. Agrawal, '83) does not accept this very clear and logical presentation of the N.D. and chooses to follow the master, the DR.

In the seventh chapter of the B.P., Śā. (= Śāradātanaya) first explains ‘vastu’ or ‘itivrta’, following the earlier masters. The prāsaṅgika vastu is three-fold such as patākā, prakarī and ‘patākāsthānaka’. Śā. correlates the third variety with subsidiary theme and this is quite logical also. This ‘patākāsthānaka’ is explained by Śā. (pp. 202, G.O.S., pp. 293 Agrawal Edn.) as -

“yathā patākā kasyā’pi  
śobhākṛccihna-rūpataḥ.

svasyópanāyakādīnām  
 vṛttāntas tad vad ucyate,  
 śobhāyai vedikādīnām  
 yathā puṣpā'kṣatādayaḥ,  
 tathā'tra varṇanādis tu  
 prabandhe prakarer bhavet,  
 āgantukena bhāvena  
 yad-abhivyaktikāraṇam.  
 vastuno bhāvy avasthasya  
 patākāsthānakam tu tat."  
 tat patakā-prakaryāder  
 bhāvy avasthasya vastunaḥ  
 sūcanópāyam evā"huḥ  
 patākā-sthānakam budhāḥ.  
 atītā'nāgate kārye  
 kathyete yatra vastunā.  
 anyā'padeśa-vyājena  
 patākā-sthānakam tu tat.

Four - fold patākāsthānaka-s are explained after this. After this artha-prakṛtis, and avasthā-s are discussed and this is followed by sandhi-s and arthopakṣepaka-s.

The sandhi-s are explained (Ch. 7, pp. 207, G.O.S., pp. 300, 301, Agrawal) as -

"avasthā-pañcakam hy etad  
 artha-prakṛtibhis saha,  
 nibandhaniyaṃ kavibhir  
 yathaivā'nyonya-samanvitam.  
 tad anvaya-vaśād  
 artha-prakṛtīnām yathākramam,  
 ekaikasya bhavet sandhir  
 ekaika iti nirṇayaḥ."

As it were “iti nirṇayaḥ” are words used to reject the view of the N.D. Or, perhaps Śā. had no access to the ND. Śā. further observes :

athā'rtha-prakṛtīnām  
tad avasthā-pañcakasya ca,  
anvayo hy upasaṃhāra  
kramā”rambha-kramāśrayaḥ.”  
pañcā'vasthā-sametā'rtha-  
prakṛtīnām yathā-kramam,  
yathā saṃkhyena jāyante  
mukhā”dyāḥ pañca-sandhayaḥ.

In B.P., Sandhi is defined under the influence of the D.R. as -

“antaraikā'rtha-saṃbandhaḥ  
sandhir ekā'nvaye sati,  
anvitānām kathāṃśānām  
parame tu prayojane.  
saṃbandhas sandhir ityuktaḥ  
avāntaraika-prayojanaḥ,  
eka-kāryā'nviteṣv atra  
kathāṃśeṣu prayogataḥ.  
avāntaraika-kāryasya  
saṃbandhaḥ sandhir iṣyate.

But for a moment, as it were, Śā. also seems to accept the lead of the ND., when he observes that -

“mukhaṃ pratimukhaṃ garbhaḥ  
sā'vamarśo'pa-saṃhṛtiḥ,  
vivakṣitōyam uddeśa-kramaḥ avasthā-kramo yatha...”

This is, because the observation on the part of the ND. was absolutely logical. We, however, still feel that Śā. did not have an access to the ND. and by and large it follows the dictum of the DR., it being the representative of the Mālava tradition. We have observed earlier how indebted Śā. is to Bhoja, the mentor of the Mālava tradition.

Śā. has not treated the sandhyaṅgas.

The (NLRK. =) Nāṭaka-lakṣanaratna-koṣa of Sāgaranandin. in our opinion is posterior to Śāradātanaya as quite often observed by us on earlier occasions, the impression that is created is that the NLRK. at a number of places, seems to give a brief summary of what Śā. narrates at length.

Sāgaranandin (= Sā.) (NLRK. Edn. Babulal Shastri, Chowkhambha skt. Saṁsthāna, Varanasi, '72) treats of Sandhi-s and also sandhyaṅgas after treating vastu, avasthā, and here five avasthās following Mātrgupta are also mentioned -, arthaprakṛti-s, then again itivṛtta and its varieties, viz. ādhikārika and prāsaṅgika, aṅka, nāyaka and five devices such as praveśaka etc.

Sandhis and Sandhyaṅga-s follow the above mentioned topics.

NLRK. (p. 45, Kā. 57) observes :

“pañca-sandhi nāṭakaṁ kartavyam. asya nāṭakasya pañca sandhayo bhavanti iti niyamaḥ-yathocyate.

“pūrṇa-sandhi tu tat kāryaṁ  
hīna-sandhyapi vā punaḥ,  
niyamāt pūrṇa-sandhis syāt  
hīnasandhis tu kāraṇāt.” (57)

This is a quotation from the NS. XXI/16. It allows even nāṭaka to have sandhis, less than five, on some special grounds.

That nāṭaka which is pūrṇasandhi, has to be inclusive of five sandhis. If when on account of shortness of theme, there are less than five sandhi-s, it is said to be “hīna-sandhi” nāṭaka. There is also, observes NLRK, a rule in lessening sandhi-s - (pp. 46, ibid)

: yat pūrṇa-sandhi tat pañca-sandhy eva kartavyam. yasya punar ākhyānavastunaḥ svalparvād hīyate sandhis taḥ khalu hīna-sandhiḥ syāt. tatrāpi niyamaḥ.

Here, the NLRK. again quotes NS. XXI/17 which as seen in the NS., ordains that when it is cancellation of one sandhi, it is vimarśa, then, when two sandhis are omitted they are vimarśa and garbha and when three are dropped the second, third and forth i.e. pratimukha, garbha and vimarśa are dropped.

We may observe that the editor of the NLRK, here refers to the chowkhamba edn. (Kashi.) of the NS. So, when Ch. XXI is mentioned it is 19th of the G.O.S. But for the sake of convenience here we have mentioned the references from the NS. as identified by the editor of the NLRK in his edition.

The NLRK (p. 46 *ibid*) also observes that in case of the subsidiary theme (prāsaṅgika) which is employed only to serve the cause of the principal theme (i.e. ādhikārika-vastu), if there is extension required in this theme, and if all the five sandhi-s find place in it (= prāsaṅgika-vastu), then this rule of hīna-saṅdhi need not be forced upon it, - as observed in the NS. XXI-18; (Kārikā - 59, NLRK, pp. 47)

“prāsaṅgike parārtharvān  
na tv eṣa niyamo bhavet,  
yad vṛttaṃ tu bhavet kiñcit  
tad yojyam a-virodhataḥ.”

The NLRK. in vṛtti also quotes the definition of sandhi as given by Mātrgupta -

(pp. 47, *ibid*) - “vṛttaṃ yad tad a-virodhataḥ sandhīnām prayoktavyam. sandhīḥ parasparam kathāṃśānām saṃghaṭanam. yathóktam-sandhīyante arthāḥ parasparam ebhir iti sandhayaḥ yathā mukhaṃ, prati-mukhaṃ, garbhaḥ, vimarśaḥ, nirvahaṇaṇi ceti. eṣām lakṣaṇaṃ mātrgupta etādrśaṃ varṇayati -

(NLRK. Kā. 60; pp. 47 *ibid*) -

“prārthanā viśayautsukyam  
ārambho hetu-cintanam,  
bījaṃ sādhyo’pagamanam  
mukha-sandhāv iti trayam. 60

To have aspiration for the goal is ‘autsukya’; to think about ways and means for the attainment of the goal is “ārambha” and to turn towards the goal i.e. to obtain it partially is termed “bīja”. These three are part of mukha-sandhi. (This is the view of Mātrgupta). (He is believed to have lived in the 5th cen. A.D. and was the author of an independent work on dramaturgy and is also credited by Sundara-miśra, the author of Nāṭyapradīpa, to have written a commentary on Bharata’s NS., also).

NLRK. 61 (pp. 47, *ibid*) - quotes the definition of prati-mukha sandhi from Mātrgupta, who observes -

“lābhāḥ sādhana-sampattiḥ  
prasaraḥ prasṛtā kriyā,  
bīja-sādhana-saṃbandhaḥ  
iti pratimukhe trayam.”



The pratimukha sandhi contains three things, (i) 'lābha' i.e. access to the means of securing the goal, (ii) prasara i.e. extension of activities for achieving the goal, and (iii) 'bindu' i.e. drop - meaning the seed (bīja) getting connected with the goal.

'Garbha' is explained as -

(NLRK. 62 pp. 48 ibid) -

sambhogo योग्याता तत्रा  
udbhedaḥ siddhi-darśanam,  
mitra-sampat patākēti  
trayaṁ garbhe prakīrtitam.”

Three things are ordained in the garbha-sandhi : (i) sambhoga i.e. enjoyment of pleasure, or being qualified (yogyatā) for the same, (ii) udbheda i.e. 'opening'. This means appearance of success; (iii) patākā, i.e. assemblage of friends (for the help of the hero).

The vimarśa is explained by Mātrgupta as -

“nāśaḥ kāraṇa-vaidhuryaṁ  
kiñcic chreyaḥ, sa-vighnatā,  
punar bījena sampattiḥ  
vimarśe tritayaṁ bhavet.” (NLRK. 63, pp. 48, ibid)

Three things qualify the vimarśa, viz. - (i) nāśa or destruction. This means appearance of obstacles in the principal activity, or in the attainment of goal, or in its causes; (ii) sa-vighnatā i.e. association of obstacles in achievement of desired goal, and (iii) sampatti or achievement, meaning the obtaining of bīja once again in its pure original form.

Mātrgupta explains that nirvahaṇa is qualified by three things (NLRK. - 64, pp. 48, ibid) - such as -

abhipretā'rtha-sampattiḥ,  
siddhiḥ, sādhyasya siddhatā,  
prārabdhasya ca nirvāho,  
bhaven nirvahaṇe trayaṁ.

This means that the nirvahaṇa sandhi has three things viz. (i) abhipretā'rthasampatti i.e. full achievement of the desired object, (ii) siddhi - or

success meaning obtaining the goal, and (iii) nirvāha - i.e. reaching to the culminating point of the activity already started.

Then, the NLRK. quotes the view of certain experts who believe that the five objects such as the desired goal and others, are as follows - (i) sādḥaka or one who strives to achieve the goal, (ii) sādḥana i.e. the means, (iii) sādḥya i.e. the goal, (iv) siddhi is achievement and (v) saṃbhoga i.e. enjoyment of the goal that is achieved.

All this is illustrated at length, in the NLRK. from a play named “māyā-madālasā”.

The NLRK. observes (pp. 54, ibid) that Mātrgupta has explained the nature of sandhi-s without mentioning the sandhyaṅga-s - “mātrguptena saṅkṣepāt sandhyaṅga-nir apekṣam eva idam lakṣaṇam uktam.”

Then again, the NLRK. (pp. 54, ibid) quotes the definition of - mukha-sandhi (NS. 21/37) from Bharata such as : “yatra bīja-samutpattir... parikīrtitam.” This we have already examined earlier. But the NLRK. adds in its prose vṛtti - as follows :

“bījaṃ nāṭakasya phalabhūtasya hetuḥ. bahuprakāraś cārthaḥ saṃbhavo yasyā sā tathóktā utpattir iti. kāvya-śarīraṃ nāṭakasya vastu. yatra evaṃvidhaṃ bījam utpadyate tan mukham. yathā bāla-carite rāmāyaṇe viśvāmitreṇa rāme kathitam - rakṣo-rudhira-pānasya...

This means that the chief cause of the attainment of the fruit of a play is termed “bīja”. From this many activities or objects i.e. matters of the theme arise. By kāvya-śarīra i.e. ‘body of poetry’ is meant the structure or plot of the dramatic theme. The part or portion in which the seed is cast, is known as ‘mukha-sandhi’. This is illustrated from a play called “Bāla-carita” based on the Rāma-kathā.

Another opinion of experts is quoted in the NLRK. Here it is said that on account of proximity along with bīja, bindu (= drop) also should be placed in the mukha-sandhi. The NLRK (Kā. 67, pp. 55, ibid) and the vṛtti thereon read as -

“sāhacaryeṇa bījasya  
mukha eva hi kecana  
bindum ādau prakurvanti  
nāṭakārtha-vido janāḥ.”

bīja-bindū mukhe darśayitavyāv iti pakṣāntaram etat.

But at times, they find place in sequence only - “kvacit kramaśa eva nirdeśaḥ.”

The NLRK. then quotes yet another definition of mukha-sandhi as - (NLRK. kâ. 68, pp. 55, ibid)

“yasminn âkhyâna-bījasya  
śleṣeṇa cchâyayā’pi vā,  
kriyate kīrtanam sadbhis  
tan mukham parikīrtitam.” - 68. NLRK

i.e. Where bīja or seed of the theme is narrated either by double-meaning words or by some other beautiful means, it is termed ‘mukha’ by wise people.

Thus bīja is defined and illustrated earlier, observes the NLRK. Then 12 limbs of the mukha-sandhi are enumerated as - upakṣepa etc. following the NS. of Bharata. These are - Upakṣepa, parikara, parinyāsa, vilobhana, yukti, prāpti, samādhāna, vidhāna, paribhāvanā, udbheda, karaṇa and bheda. (NS. 21/53-54)

The Pratimukha Sandhi is defined after NS. 21/38. The 13 limbs here are enumerated as - vilāsa, parisarpa, vidhuta, tāpana, narma, narma-dyuti, pragamana, virodha, puryupāsana, puṣpa, vajra, upanyāsa and varṇa-saṃhāra.

‘Garbha’ in NLRK. is again defined after NS. But the NLRK observes (vṛtti before - kâ. 87, pp. 71) - nāṭakasya madhyatvād garbhaḥ. ‘Garbha’ sandhi is so termed as it happens in the middle of a play. This is duly illustrated. The NLRK. also adds (pp. 72, ibid) : nāṭakā”ḍau vastudvayaṃ bhavati, vidhir vā niṣedho vā. In the theme of a play two things are possible - either vidhi or affirmation or niṣedha i.e. negation. ‘Vidhi’ is said to be of the nature of achievement, and niṣedha is of the nature of loss : tatra prāpti-rūpo vidhiḥ, a-prāpti-rūpo niṣedhaḥ. NLRK 88 (pp. 72, ibid) observes :

“prāptirūpo yathā bījam  
ārabdham, rakṣasāṃ kṣayaḥ,  
nītaṃ sītā’pahāreṇa  
rāmasyā’vaśya-kāryatām.”

i.e. Vidhi or prāpti is illustrated as in the fact of the killing of demons. This is the bīja and due to this, when Sītā is abducted by Rāvaṇa, Rāma’s unavoidable task takes the form of killing all the demons.

a-prāpti-rūpa is illustrated as in the Udayana-kathā, when the hero is lost in love of Vāsavadattā, and his kingdom was attacked by enemies. But even here when Udayana did not wake up for revenge, Yangadharāyaṇa burned Lāvāṇaka and under this pretext concealed Vāsavadatta.

Then after great penance she was attained again. This is the form of garbha-sandhi. (This ref. is perhaps to “Tāpasa-vatsa-rāja.”)

13 limbs of garbha-sandhi are - abhūtódāharāṇa, mārga, rūpa, udāharāṇa, krama, saṃgraha, anumāna, prārthanā, utkṣipta, totaka, adhibdala, udvega and vidrava.

These are all illustrated, after explaining properly.

On vimarśasandhi, the NLRK. first observes in vṛtti, before giving its definition in kā. 90 - as follows : (pp. 78, ibid).

“atha vimarśaḥ - nanu vimarśa iti ko'rthaḥ ? ucyate - garbheṇa sandhinódbhinnasya bījārthasya lobhakāriṇa āśleṣaṇasamyukto [yo] bhavati sa vimarśaḥ. - i.e. “what is meant by the term vimarśa ? The answer is that the bījārtha that was developed in the garbha-sandhi, and in that vikāsa of bījārtha, when due to pralobhana or greed additional delineation is done, it is the object of vimarśa. As is observed by Bharata Muni - (pp. 78, ibid)

“garbha-nirbhinna-bījārtho  
vilobhana-kṛto'pi vā  
tasya vā”śleṣa-samyuktaḥ  
sa vimarśa iti smṛtaḥ.” - Kā. 90

Opion of some others is also quoted in the NLRK. (Kā. 91, pp. 78, ibid)

“prakīrṇasyā'rtha-jātasya  
vimarśad yatra saṃvṛtiḥ,  
śātror upacayo bhūyān  
vimarśaḥ sa ca kathyate.”

i.e. Vimarśa-sandhi is that portion wherein wide-spread or dis-assembled activities are unified (saṃvarāṇa) after due thinking, and in which the strength of the enemy is felt more in the increase.

Yet again someone says (NLRK. 92, pp. 78, ibid)

sampanna-rūpaṃ yat kāryam  
manasy āyāti sandeham  
vimarśam ke'pi taṃ viduḥ.”

i.e. Vimarśa is that in which the object (prayojana) of the activity attains to the state of perfection (sampanna-rūpa), but doubt also continues concerning its perfection; that portion is Vimarśa.

The Vṛtti (NLRK. pp. 79, on Kā. 92) observes : “asya vimarśas tridhā bhavati - vilobhana-samudbhavaḥ, krodhajaḥ, vyasanajaś ca. - This means that vimarśa or thoughtful concealment happens in three-ways - (i) due to vilobhana i.e. greed, (ii) due to krodha i.e. anger, and (iii) due to vyasana i.e. caused by some (unexpected) calamity. - This is duly illustrated.

The 13 limbs of vimarśa-sandhi are enumerated in the NLRK. as (pp. 80) - apavāda, sampheṭa drava, śakti, vyavasāya, prasāṅga, dyuti, kheda, pratiśedha, virodha, ādāna, sādana and prarocanā.

These are duly explained and also illustrated.

Nirvahaṇa-sandhi is defined in the NLRK (Kā. 95, pp. 85, ibid) as -

“samāptiḥ samyag arthānām  
prastutānām mahaujasām,  
nānābhāvo'ttarāṇāṇ ca  
bhaven nirvahaṇam tu tat.”

Nirvahaṇa juncture is that portion of the theme where in all activities that are important and of lofty stature that have been started, are led to completion or attainment of goal. The vṛtti observes (pp. 86, on kā. 95) - “pūrvam prastāritānām bījā”dīnām grathanam yatra nirvyūḍhatayā samāpanam tan nirvahaṇam ity arthaḥ.” i.e. when matters such as bīja or seed, attain to completion by achievement of goal, it is said to be nirvahaṇa-sandhi.

The 14 limbs of nirvahaṇa are : artha, prathana, nirṇaya, paribhāṣaṇa, dyuti, prasāda, ānanda, samaya, anuyoga, upa-gūhana, bhāṣaṇa, pūrva-vākya, kāvya-saṃhāra and ‘praśasti’. These are explained and duly illustrated in the NLRK.

The NLRK. (pp. 90, ibid) observes : “iti catuḥśaṣṭhy aṅgāni nātake’vasyam kavibhiḥ kartavyāni. sammiśrāṇy api dvi-tri-saṃkhyāyuktāni antara-sandhiṣu bhavanty etāni rasa-bhāvā’peksayā - Two or three limbs can be simultaneously placed together. NLRK. quotes from Bharata (21/205-6) -

“yathā-sandhi tu kartavyāny  
etāny aṅgāni nātake,  
kavibhiḥ kāvya-kuśalaiḥ  
rasa-bhāvam apeksya ca. (Kā. 98)  
sammiśrāṇi kadācit syus  
dvi-tri-saṃkhyā-pramāṇataḥ,

jñātvā kāryam avasthāñ ca  
sandhiṣv aṅgāni nātake.”

Bharata is again quoted (Kā. 100, pp. 91, NS. 20/42) to suggest that the poetic theme in a play should follow the pattern of hairs in cow's tail and thus lofty feelings (udāttā bhāvāḥ) should be placed at the end. Adbhuta also should find place necessarily at the end of a dramatic composition, observes NLRK (kā. 101) following Bharata. (NS. 20/43)

The NLRK. also quotes the opinion of some authorities that some calamity should also be woven by the end of a dramatic composition ~~as for example the test~~ of fire-agniparīkṣā of sītā. Another opinion is also quoted that a sort of summary of all activities concerning all the junctures such as mukha, etc. should be placed in the end : “aparastv āha - mukhā”di-sandhīnām rīti-phalōpanyāsaḥ ca leśato'tra kartavya iti ca. (vṛtti, kā. 102, pp. 92, ibid)

The NLRK. also mentions (pp. 92, ibid - Kā. 103, 4, 5a) sandhyantaras such as 21. These take place in between the 5 major sandhi-s. They are mentioned as following :

“eteṣāṃ eva sandhīnām eka-viṃśatipradeśā artha-vaśād bhavanti. yathā

sāma-bhedaḥ-pradānañca,  
daṇḍaś ca, vadha eva ca,  
pratyutpanna-matirvañ ca  
gotra-skhalanam eva ca. 103  
sāhasaṇ ca bhayaś caiva  
dhīr māyā krodha eva ca,  
rajaḥ saṃvaraṇam bhrāntiś  
tathā herv avadhāraṇam. 104  
dūtōpadhī tathā svapnaś  
citram mada iti smṛtam.” 105-a

The NLRK observes that in view of the goal (prayōja-vaśāt) as many of these should be shown in sandhis as are possible to be accomodated - “prayōjanavaśād yāvanta ete pravestum śakyante tāvantaḥ sandhiṣu pradārśayitavyāḥ. All these are illustrated. ‘dūta’ is one who carries a message and ‘upadhiḥ’ means “chalanam” - deceit.

Actually these are various devices to further the plot and make it of absorbing interest, as seen practiced by dramatists in many plays.

The NLRK. treats of four patākāsthānaka-s at this place, which others have placed in sequence of the treatment of patākā, an arthaprakṛti. It is observed (pp. 100, ibid) - "patākāsthānāni catvāri kāvyasya alaṃkārabhūtāny api nirvaḥaṇa-sandhi-varjyaṃ kāryāni." These are to be employed anywhere, but in the nirvaḥaṇa-sandhi. These are agents of beauty - śobhāhetūni. The general definition (kā. 106) follows NS. 21/29. All types are illustrated.

After this the NLRK. treats of four vṛttis, the sahaja-guṇa of nāyaka, lakṣaṇas, bhūṣaṇas, guṇa-s, nāṭyālaṃkāra-s, followed by rasa-nirūpaṇa including bhāva, vibhāva, anubhāva, vyabhicārī and sattvika-nirūpaṇa, and yauvanāvasthā-s, the types of nāyikā-s, ceṣṭālaṃkāra, and the varieties of major forms of rūpaka-s and minor forms of rūpaka-s, i.e. upa-rūpaka which also include vithy aṅgas, aṅga-s of bhāṇa, aṅgas of śilpaka (upa-rūpaka) and aṅga-s of bhāṇikā (an uparūpaka). By and large the NLRK. has presented the area of dramaturgy in a lucid and clear style with illustrations from a number of plays now not available, and of course, following the NS. and also B.P. to a great extent.

**The S.D. of Viśvanātha follows the Kashmir tradition of Ānanda-vardhana Abhinavagupta and Mammata** and is a useful work on poetics. But following the pattern of both Bhoja and the Kā. Śā. of Hemacandra, the S.D. has covered the area of dramaturgy in Ch. VI, in all its details. This is seen to an extent in Vidyānātha's Pratāpa-Rudra-Yaśobhūṣaṇa also, which has a leaning more towards the Mālava school of art-criticism. The S.D. is a major work covering the areas both of śravya kāvya and also dṛśya-kāvya. The sixth pariccheda is reserved for treatment of the topics concerning dramaturgy. Thus, the topics of dramaturgy that are treated in Ch. VI of the Sāhitya-darpaṇa are as follows : dṛśya-śrava-bheda of poetry; the former is abhinaya and is termed rūpaka due to superimposition of characters; rūpaka-bheda, upa-rūpakabheda, followed by nāṭaka-lakṣaṇa. This is followed by aṅka-lakṣaṇa, garbhāṅka-lakṣaṇa, and nāṭaka-racanāparipāṭi, pūrvaraṅga, vṛtti-s, vastuno dvaividhyam, ādhikārika-prāsaṅgika-vastu, patākāsthānam, four types; arthopakṣepakas, artha-prakṛtis, kāryāvasthā-s, sandhis, sandhyaṅga-s, aṅgānām phalam, nirūpaṇam, vṛttis, nāma-karaṇa, ālāpocita-śabda-nirdeśa, bhāṣā-vibhāga, 36 lakṣaṇas, nāṭyālaṃkāras, muni-nirūpita-nāṭaka-svarūpa followed by other forms of rūpaka-s, upa-rūpakas, and aṅgas found in any.

Thus the S.D. runs the full course of dramaturgy. Here we will concern ourselves with sandhi-s and sandhaṅga-s.

The S.D. talks of sandhi-s at VI. 74 :

“yathā-saṃkyam avasthābhir  
ābhir yogāt tu pañcabhiḥ,  
pañca-dhaiv etivṛttasya  
bhāgāḥ syuḥ, pañca-sandhayaḥ.”

The S.D. following the clear observation of the N.D., though not mentioned by name, observes that the sandhi-s follow the avasthā-s in sequence. The S.D. does not follow the observation of the DR. that a sandhi is a sum total of artha-prakṛtis and avasthās in sequence respectively. The sandhi-s following the avasthā-s in their order, are only five and are the portions of the dramatic theme.

The definition of a sandhi is stated by Viśvanātha (= V.) in these words -

tal lakṣaṇam āha -  
antaraikārtha-saṃbandhaḥ  
sandhir ekānvaye sati (VI. 75a).

i.e. Sandhi is mutual relation of themes having a single goal -

“ekena prayojanena anvitānāṃ kathāṃśānāṃ (= parts of the theme; themes)  
avāntaraika - prayojana-saṃbandhaḥ sandhiḥ -

The types of sandhis are (S.D. VI. 75b)

mukhaṃ pratimukhaṃ garbho  
vimarśa upa-saṃhṛtiḥ  
iti pañcā'sya bhedāḥ syuḥ,  
kramāl lakṣaṇam ucyate (76 a)

The definitions of these follow in due order.

Mukha-sandhi (SD. VI 76b, 77a) is -

“yatra bīja-samutpattir  
nānārtha-rasa-sambhavā,  
prārambheṇa samāyuktā  
tanmukhaṃ parikirtitam.”

Where bīja or seed, the cause of many matters, rasa-s and bhāva-s, is placed along with the stage of beginning or ārambha that portion of the theme is called mukha-sandhi.



As far as the general and individual concepts of sandhi-s are concerned there is no basic difference in indian dramaturgy as a whole. -

'Pratimukha' is defined as - (S.D. VI. 77b - 78a)

“phala-pradhānōpāyasya  
mukha-sandhi-niveśinaḥ,  
lakṣyā'lakṣya ivōdbhedo yatra  
pratimukhaṃ ca tat.”

The vṛtti serves an illustration from the Ratnāvalī. In giving illustrations, V. follows the inspiration received from earlier sources such as the DR. and also Bhoja. Thus 'pratimukha' sandhi is that portion of the dramatic theme wherein the main cause of the goal, i.e. bīja, which was cast in the mukha-sandhi, sprouts in a way, at times clearly discernible and at times not so.

Garbha-sandhi is explained at S.D. VI 78, b, and 79.a, as -

phala-pradhānōpāyasya  
prāg udbhinnasya kiñcana,  
garbho, yatra samudbhedo  
hrāsā'nveṣaṇavān muhuḥ

- that portion in which, the upāya (= bīja) which has (been laid and) sprouted in the earlier sandhis, develops, with at times its loss and finding out again, is termed garbha-sandhi.

The vṛtti adds - phalasya garbhīkaraṇād garbhaḥ - i.e. as the goal is placed in the womb, i.e. centre, it is termed 'garbha'. This is illustrated from the Ratnāvalī.

'Vimarśa' - sandhi or contemplation is the fourth portion of the theme defined in the S.D. at VI. 79 b, 80a - as

“yatra mukhya-phalópāya  
udbhinno garbhato'dhikaḥ,  
śāpādyaiḥ sā'ntarāyaś ca  
sa vimarśa iti smṛtaḥ.

i.e. Here the effort for the goal is more pronounced in comparison with the garbha-sandhi, but is hampered by curse and such other obstacles. This is illustrated from the Abhijñāna-Śākuntala.

Nirvahaṇa sandhi, i.e. denouement is defined at S.D. VI. 80b, 81a, such as -

bījavanto mukhādy arthā  
viprakīrṇā yathāyatham,  
ekārtham upanīyante  
yatra, nirvahaṇam hi tat.

That is nirvahaṇa, wherein all matters such as bījā etc. of sandhi-s such as mukha etc. that lie scattered in the dramatic theme are tied together to a single principal goal in respective order. The illustration is drawn from Veni-saṃhāra.

Then follow the delineation of limbs or aṅga-s of respective sandhi-s in the S.D. VI at 81b, 82 giving the limbs of the mukha-sandhi such as, upakṣepa, parikara, parinyāsa, vilobhana, yukti, prāpti, samādhāna, vidhāna, paribhāvanā, udbheda, karaṇa and bheda making in all 12 parts. All are defined and illustrated. The aṅgas or the pratimukha-sandhi are - vilāsa, parisarpa, vidhuta, tāpana, narma, narmadyuti, pragamana, virodha, and paryupāsana, followed by puṣpa, vajra, upanyāsa and varṇa-saṃhāra. These are 13. They are duly defined and illustrated by Viśvanātha. The garbha-sandhi also has 13 limbs such as - abhūta<sup>7</sup> haraṇa, mārga, rūpa, udāharāṇa, krama, saṃgraha, anumāna, prārthanā, kṣipti, troṭaka, adhibala, udvega and vidrava all duly defined and illustrated in the vṛtti - The Vimarśa sandhi has 13 limbs all duly defined and illustrated. They are - apavāda saṃpheta, vyavasāya, drava, dyuti, śakti, prasaṅga, kheda, pratiśedha, virodhana, prarocanā, ādāna and chādāna. The nirvahaṇa sandhi has 14 aṅgas, all defined and illustrated by V., such as - sandhi, vibodha, grathana, nirṇaya, paribhāṣaṇa, kṛti, prasāda, ānanda, samaya, upagūhana, bhāṣaṇa, pūrvavākya, kāvya-saṃhāra and praśasti.

The S.D. observes that some aṅga-s in this or that sandhi are more prominent as compared to others which are simply found there. Thus in the mukha-sandhi, upakṣepa, parikara, parinyāsa, yukti, udbheda and samādhāna are relatively more prominent. Similarly in other sandhis the following are observed to be more important such as - in pratimukha, aṅgas viz. pari-sarpaṇa, pragamana, vajra, upanyāsa, mārga, troṭaka, adhibala and kṣepa, in vimarśa, aṅga-s such as apavāda, śakti, vyavasāya, prarocanā and dāna, are more predominant - ...prādhyānyam; anyeṣaṃ ca yathāsaṃbhavam sṭhitiḥ. The others are accommodated with reference to the need or context. This is the opinion of some, says V. - iti kecit. V. remains non-committal in this respect.

But it is clearly observed by Viśvanātha that aṅga-s belonging to different sandhis may find place also in different sandhis in view of the context of rasa,

which is having supreme importance. The S.D. (VI. 115, 116 a) observes -

“catuṣṣaṣṭi-vidhaṃ hy etad  
aṅgaṃ proktaṃ maṇiṣibhiḥ,  
kūryād āniyate tasya  
sandhāv api niveśanam  
rasā'nugūṇatāṃ vīkṣya,  
rasasyaiva hi mukhyatā.”

the vṛtti adds - yathā veṇī-saṃhāre tṛtīyāṅke duryodhana-karṇayor mahat saṃpradhāraṇam. evaṃ anyad api. yat tu rudratā”dibhiḥ “niyama eva” ity uktam tal lakṣya-viruddham.

i.e. - as in veṇīsaṃhāra, act III, (saṃpradhāraṇam arthānām yuktiḥ) yukti. i.e. fixation of matters, which belongs to mukha-sandhi-is shown in the garbha-sandhi. Such other occurrences can also be noted. Rudratā had observed that there is fixed -rule-niyama eva-concerning the display of respective limbs in respective sandhis only. But this, V. observes, is against actual practice of dramatists. It i.e., Rudratā's observation, is therefore baseless.

After this V. notes the six things that result from these aṅga-s. Here V. follows whatever is said in this respect by earlier masters such as Bharata, Dhanañjaya, etc. He observes (S.D. VI. 116 b-119)

iṣṭārtha-racanā”ścaryalābho  
vṛtānta-vistaraḥ, 116b.  
rāga-prāptiḥ prayogasya,  
gopyānām gopanam tathā,  
prakāśanam prakāśyānām  
aṅgānām ṣaḍvidhaṃ phalam.” 117

Through the practice of these limbs six things are achieved as results - they are - (i)formation of desired matter, (ii) advantage of having wonderful narration. (iii) expansion of theme, (iv) winning admiration and love for the presentation, (v) concealment of that which deserves concealment, and (vi) revelation of that which deserves revelation. Six things are thus achieved through the staging of limbs. Like a person bereft of limbs can not start new things, in the same way, poetry or script without limbs is not worthy of being staged. V. observes (VI. 119) that ‘aṅga’ or a limb has to be presented by either the hero, or his enemy or the hero of the subsidiary plot i.e. patākā-nāyaka.

S.D. VI. 119 reads as -

sampādayetām sandhyaṅgaṃ  
nāyaka-pratināyakau,  
tad abhāve patākā”dyās  
tad abhāve tathétarat.

In the absence of patākā-nāyaka, any other character can present any aṅga in a play.

(Vṛtti, VI. 119) - Viśvanātha observes : “prāyeṇa pradhāna-puruṣa-prayojyāni sandhyaṅgāni bhavanti. kintu, prakṣepā”di trayam (i.e. prakṣepa, parikara and parinyāsa), bījasya alpamātra-samuddiṣṭatvād a-pradhāna-puruṣa-prayojitam eva sādhu.” - Normally, the limbs of a juncture are to be presented by the hero only. But as bīja is manifested in very little proportion, the three aṅgas such as prakṣepa, parikara and parinyāsa, are to be presented by subsidiary characters i.e. those of lesser importance.

Following Ānanda-vardhana’s observation viz. (Dhv. III. 12)

sandhi-sandhyaṅga-ghaṭanam  
rasā”bhivyakry apeksayā  
na tu kevalayā śāstra-  
sthiti-sampādanecchayā.” - that

sandhi-s and sandhyaṅga-s are to be depicted only with a purpose to manifest rasa, and not just to carry out the rule of the text-book or authority i.e. śāstra. Viśvanātha also observes -

(S.D. VI. 120)

“rasa-vyaktim apeksyaiṣām  
aṅgānām sanniveśanam,  
na tu kevalayā śāstra-  
sthiti-sampādanecchayā.”

The same illustration as cited in the Dhvanyāloka is quoted here also by V. in the vṛtti - “tathā ca yad venyām duryodhanasya bhānumatyā saha vipralambho darśitaḥ, tat tādrśe avasare atyantam anucitam.”

V. also follows Ānandavardhana and observes that (S.D. VI. 121) whatever matter from historical source which may not be contrary to the source, but if found

extra or not required for rasa-manifestation, should be either changed or completely discarded by a good poet.

After this V. takes up such topics such as vṛttis and the rest as pointed out by us earlier.

**The Rasārṇava-sudhākara** (RS., Edn. Trivedrum, T. Gaṇapati Śāstri, Trivendrum, 1916 A.D.) of Śiṅgabhūpala has its own identity among all the works on dramaturgy. It is written in a smooth and flowing style and covers all topics concerning dramaturgy and quotes views of the ancients. It is directly under the influence of Dhanañjaya-Dhanika and Bhoja but Ānandavardhana with the Kashmir tradition also finds ample respect in this work. The first chapter-vilāsa-treats of nāṭaka-lakṣaṇa in general, rasa-lakṣaṇa, vibhāva-lakṣaṇa and its two types, nāyaka with his qualities and all types, nāyakasahāyāḥ, nāyikā in three types, all types of nāyikās, nāyikāsahāyāḥ, - śṛṅgārōddīpana-vibhāvasya cāturvidhyam, guṇa-s of the ālambana, four types of alaṃkāṛi, taṭastha-ūddīpana-vibhāvas, anubhāva-lakṣaṇa, four-fold anubhāva-s under the influence of Bhoja or Mālava-school such as cittaja, gātraja, vāg-ārambhā, and buddhyārambhā-anubhāvas.

The second vilāsa treats of all vyabhicārins, consideration of additional vyabhicārins beyond the 33 given by Bharata, sthāyilakṣaṇam, rati as treated in Bhoja, sthāyins as treated by Bhoja, rasa-nirūpaṇam, eight-fold rasa-s, topics concerning individual rasa-s, rasa-sāṃkarya, rasa-virodha etc., rasā"bhāsa, etc.

The third vilāsa has-nāṭya-śabda-vyutpattiḥ, rūpaka-śabdā"rthaḥ, nāṭyasya daśa-vidhatvam, rūpaka-bhedakāḥ, netā, itivṛtta, 5 varieties of itivṛtta, bīja, bindu etc., pañca-kāryāvasthāḥ, pañca-sandhayaḥ, sandhyaṅga-s 21 sandhyantara, sandhyaṅga-sandhyantarāṇām prayoge bhedaḥ, 36 vastu-bhūṣaṇāni, rūpakeṣu nāṭaka-prādhānyam, prastāvanā, etc., vastuno dvaividhyam aṅkāvatāra-devices, aṅka-lakṣaṇam, prakaraṇa, other rūpakas, language, nirdeśa-paribhāṣā, names of character etc. etc.

The R.S. has not left any topic concerning dramaturgy out of its treatment. In this it stands comparison with the N.D.

After viewing some important primary observations, we will deal with the treatment of sandhi-s and sandhyaṅga-s first, as read in the RS. and then deal with the types of drama in due course.

In the first vilāsa RS. has interesting observations on the nature of drama in general. RS. (I. 57-59a, pp. 9, ibid) observes -

sāttvikā”dyair abhinayaīḥ  
prekṣakāṇāṃ yato bhavet,  
naṭe nāyaka-tādātmya-  
buddhis tan nāṭyam ucyate. 57

The apprehension of the hero, in the person of an actor, through representation such as sāttvika, etc., on the part of the spectators is termed ‘nāṭya’ i.e. drama or dramatic art.

Singabhūpāla is very clear and forthright in declaring (VS. 58) that rasa - i.e. aesthetic delight is the soul of dramatic art. Rasa is arrived at through the agency of vibhāvā”dis. Rasa is explained under the influence of the DR. RS. I. 58-59a, read as -

“rasótkarṣo hi nāṭyasya  
prāṇās, tat sa nirūpyate,  
vibhāvair anubhāvaiś ca  
sātrvikair vyabhicāribhiḥ - I. 58  
ānīyamānaḥ svādotvam  
sthāyī bhāvo rasaḥ smṛtaḥ - 59a.

Now we will turn to the Vilāsa III., which starts with the etymology of the word nāṭya. It is observed (RS. III. i)

tad īdṛśa-rasā”dhāram  
nāṭyam rūpakam ity api,  
naṭasyā”ti-pravīṇasya  
karmatvān nāṭyam ucyate.

i.e. ‘Nāṭya’ which is the substratum of the rasa (described earlier) of this type, is also termed rūpaka. As acting of an expert artist or actor, it is termed ‘nāṭya’.

It is termed ‘rūpaka’ also in the fashion of rūpaka-ālaṃkāra in which there is superimposition of lotus etc. on face etc. Here in drama, the hero is superimposed on the actor and hence it is termed ‘rūpaka’.

Following the lead of the DR. and Bhoja, i.e. the Mālava school of art-criticism, the RS. also observes that ‘nāṭya’ is ten-fold and is of the nature of “vākyārthābhinaya”.

Following the general tradition of Bharata and the DR., RS. observes that nāṭya is ten-fold such as nāṭaka, prakaraṇa, etc. This division in ten types is caused by the basic difference in rasa, the types of hero and the theme.- RS. III 3b - reads as -

rasétivṛtta-netāras

tat tad rūpaka-bhedakāḥ.

The hero is the protector. Itivṛtta is the synonym of kathā-vastu. (Rs. III. 4b) Itivṛtta is said to be the body of the composition and is three-fold such as well-known, imagined and mixed. With the types of divine and human characters, it is said to be five-fold by the learned.

After this bijā”di artha-prakṛtis are treated, including the patākāsthānaka-s, etc. Then, the ārambha, etc. - kāryāvasthā-s are treated, leading to the consideration of sandhi-s and sandhyaṅgas.

It is interesting to note that the RS. also observes that sandhi-, as held in the DR., is a sum total of artha-prakṛti and avasthā.

RS. III. 26 observes :

atha sandhiḥ -

ekaikasyāstv avasthāyāḥ

prakṛtyā caika-yaikayā,

yogaḥ sandhir iti jñeyo

nāṭya-vidyā-vicakṣaṇaḥ.”

Of course as observed in the DR. and Avaloka, RS. also says that the status of patākā is not permanent and in that case the sandhi follows the bindu or drop.

Rs. III. 27 reads as -

“patakāyāstv avasthānam

kvacid asti na vā kvacit

patākayā vihīne tu

binduṃ vā viniveśayet.”

Following earlier authorities, especially the DR., the RS. observes that when parts of the theme are interconnected in view of the central goal, they give rise to sandhis.

“mukha-prayojana-vaśāt

kathāṅgānāṃ samanvaye,

avāntarārtha sambandhaḥ

sandhiḥ sandhāna-rūpataḥ.”

Sandhi is so termed as it joins the various parts or stages of the main theme or plot.

The five sandhi-s then are defined in the following kārīkā-s.

RS. III. 29 (abc) -

mukha-pratimukhe garbha-  
vimarśāv upa-saṃhṛtiḥ,  
pañcaite sandhayas teṣu  
(29-d) yatra bīja-samudbhavaḥ  
nānāvidhānām arthānām  
rasānām api kārāṇam,  
tan-mukhaṃ (30, abc)  
tatra cāṅgāni  
bījā”rambhā’nurodhataḥ.”

The aṅgas of the mukha-sandhi wherein the bīja is cast, which causes many matters and rasa-s, are upakṣepa, parikara, parinyāsa, vilobhana, yukti, prāpti, samādhāna, vidhāna, paribhāvanā, udbheda, bheda, and kārāṇa - in all twelve. All these are duly explained and illustrated.

The prati-mukhasandhi with its 13 aṅga-s is explained in RS. III 38b-41(a) - They read as -

bījaparakāśanam yatra  
drśyā’drśyā’ntaram bhavet, 38b -  
tat syāt pratimukhaṃ  
bindoḥ prayatnasyā’nurodhataḥ,  
iha trayodaśāṅgāni  
prayojyāni manīṣibhiḥ.” 39  
vilāsa-parisarpau ca  
vidhutaṃ śama-narmanī,  
narma—dyutiḥ pragamanam  
virodhaḥ paryupāsanam. 40  
puṣpaṃ vajraṃ upanyāso  
varṇa-saṃharaṇam tathā. 41a

All these are explained and illustrated in the vṛtti.



The garbha-sandhi with 12 āṅga-s is explained as - RS. III. 49b - 51a.

dr̥ṣṭā'dr̥ṣṭasya bījasya  
 garbhastv anveṣaṇaṃ muhuḥ. 49b  
 āprāptyāśā-patākā-'nurodhād  
 aṅgāni kalpayet  
 abhūtā"haranaṃ mārgo  
 rūpódāharāṇe kramah, - 50  
 saṃgrahaś cā'numānaṃ ca  
 totakā'tibale tathā,  
 udvegaḥ sambhramākṣepau  
 dvādaśaisāṃ tu lakṣaṇam. 51

All these are duly illustrated in the vṛtti that follows.

- The RS. III. 57b - 60. a, treat of the vimarśa sandhi and its 13 āṅgas, and read as -

"yatra pralobhana-krodha-  
 vyasanā"dyair vimr̥syate, 57b  
 bījārtho garbha-nirbhinnah  
 sōvamarśa itīryate  
 prakarī-niyatā"ptyā'nu-  
 guṇyād atrāṅga-kalpanam 58  
 apavādo'tha sampheto  
 vidrava-drava-śaktayaḥ,  
 dyuti-prasaṅgau chalana-  
 vyavasāyau nirodhanam. 59  
 prarocanā vicālanam  
 ādānam syus trayodaśa 60a.

These 13 āṅgas are explained and illustrated in the vṛtti.

The nirvahaṇa-sandhi with its 14 āṅga-s is defined at RS. III 67-69., which read as -

mukha-sandhyā"dayo yatra  
 vikīrṇā bīja-saṃyutāḥ,

mahā-prayojanam yānti  
 tannirvahanam ucyate 67  
 sandhi-virodhau grathanam  
 nirṇaya-paribhāṣaṇe prasādaś ca,  
 ānanda-samaya-kṛtayah  
 bhāṣopanigūhane tadvat. 68  
 atha pūrvabhāvayujā  
 upasaṃhāra-prasasti ca  
 iti nirvahanasyāṅgāny  
 āhur amiśām tu lakṣaṇam vaksye. 69

The RS. also advises the proper usage of these aṅga-s saying that, the sequence of these aṅga-s is not to be observed compulsorily :

RS. III. 75-78 read as -

rasa-bhāvā'nurodhena  
 prayojanam apekṣya ca  
 sākalyam kāryam aṅgānām  
 ity ācāryaḥ pracakṣate 75  
 keṣāmcid eṣām aṅgānām  
 vaikalyam kecid ūcire,  
 mukhā"di-sandhiṣv aṅgānām  
 kramōyam na vivakṣitaḥ 76  
 kramasyā'nādr̥tarvena  
 bharatā"diḥ bhir ādimaiḥ  
 lakṣyeṣu vyutkrameṇā'pi  
 bharatena (?) vicakṣaṇaiḥ 77  
 catuḥṣaṣṭi-kalā-marma-  
 vedinā śiṅga-bhūbhujā,  
 lakṣitā ca catuḥ ṣaṣṭir  
 bālarāmāyaṇe sphuṭam. 78

With this the RS. deals with the sandhyantara-s suggesting that 21 sandhyantara-s' are also recommended :

RS. III 79-82 read as -

mukhā"di-sandhiṣv aṅgānām  
 a-śaithilyaṃ pratiyate,  
 sandhyantarāṇi yogyāni  
 tatra tatraika-viṃśatiḥ 79  
 ācāryāntara-saṅgatyā  
 camatkāro vidhīyate,  
 lakṣya-lakṣaṇam eteṣām  
 udāhṛtam api sphuṭam. 80  
 sāma-dāne bheda-daṇḍau  
 pratyutpannamatir vadhaḥ,  
 gotra-skhalitam ojas'ca  
 dhīḥ krodhaḥ sāhasaṃ bhayaṃ. 81  
 māyā ca saṃhṛtir bhrāntiḥ  
 dūtyaṃ hetv avadhāraṇam,  
 svapna-lekhau madaś citram  
 ityetāny eka-viṃśatiḥ." 82

It may be noted, observes Dr. Raghavan (pp. 592), that the DR. has disposed of these sandhyantara-s, along with 36 lakṣaṇa-s, as not being distinct from bhāvas and alaṃkāra-s.

DR. IV. 84 observes :

ṣaṭ-triṃśad bhūṣaṇā"dīni  
 sāmā"dīny ekaviṃśatiḥ  
 lakṣma-sandhyantarā'ṅgāni  
 sā'laṃkāreṣu teṣu ca.

The Avaloka reads - 'sāmaḥ bhedaḥ pradānaṃ ca' ity evaṃ ādīni sandhyantarāṇy eka-viṃśatiḥ upamā"diṣviva alaṃkāreṣu haṛṣotsāhādiṣu (bhāveṣu) antarbhāvān na prthag uktāni.

As for the treatment of this topic in the NS. of Bharata, Dr. Raghavan observes that (pp. 592, *ibid*) the main text of the K.M. Edn., of the NS., does not contain the supplementary list of 21 items called sandhyantara-s following on the heels of the Sandhyaṅga-s. But the edition notes in a foot-note on p. 213, the existence of these in another recension. The Kāśī Edn. (Ch. XXI), has the sandhyantaras in the main body of the text on pp. 241-245, but a foot-note here points out the absence of this in another recension.

The G.O.S. Edn. (Vol. III. Ch. XIX, pp. 63) contains sandhyantaras at XIX - 106b, 107a :

“eteṣāṃ eva cāṅgānām, sambaddhānyartha-yuktitāḥ,  
sandhyantarāṇi sandhīnām viśeṣāstveka-vimśatiḥ.”

Dr. Unni (on pp. 576, Edn. Nag Publishers, '98) reads these twenty one sandhyantara-s in the body of the text at, Ch. XXI, VS. 46-48. They read as -

sāma bhedaḥ pradānaṅca  
daṇḍaś ca vadha eva ca,  
pratyutpanna-matitvaṃ ca  
gotra-skhalitaṃ eva ca.  
sāhasas' ca bhayaṅ caiva  
dhīr māyā krodha eva ca,  
dūto lekhas tathā svapnaś  
citram mada iti dvijāḥ  
sandhyantarāṇi sandhīnām  
viśeṣās tve ka-vimśatiḥ. (VS. 46-48)

G.O.S. Edn. reads as :

sāma bhedas tathā daṇḍaḥ  
pradānaṃ vadha eva ca  
pratyutpanna-matitvaṃ ca  
gotra-skhalitaṃ eva ca  
sāhasaṃ ca bhayaṃ caiva  
hrir māyā krodha eva ca  
ojaḥ saṃvaraṇaṃ bhrāntiḥ  
tathā hetvapadhāraṇaṃ  
dūtāḥ lekhas tathā svapnaḥ  
citram mada iti smṛtaṃ.

These 21 sandhyantara-s or special junctures occur between the various junctures.

Bhoja (pp. 498, Śr. Pra. Vol. II, Edn. Josyer) reads as : atha sandhyantarāṇy eka-vimśatiḥ tad-yathā-sāma, bhedaḥ daṇḍaḥ, pradānaṃ, vadhah, pratyutpanna-matitvam, gotra-skhalitam, sāhasaṃ, bhayaṃ, hriḥ, māyā, krodha, ojaḥ, saṃvaraṇaṃ, bhrāntiḥ, hetvavadhāraṇaṃ, dūtaḥ, lekhaḥ, svapnaḥ, citraṃ, madaḥ iti.

All these are illustrated fully (pp. 499-503, ibid). Regarding 'krodha' (pp. 501, ibid) - Bhoja observes - "yo'sau puruṣārtha-siddhi-hetuḥ krodha-sthayibhāvaḥ, sōyaṃ na bhavati ity udāhṛtaṃ, puruṣārtha-siddhi-hetus tu sthāyibhāvo na sandhyantaram."

Dr. Raghavan here observes (pp. 593, ibid) - "It is correct to say that the Krodha here meant as a sandhyantara is a fleeting vyabhicārin; yet it is all the same a bhāva, and Bhoja's argument can not be pressed further. That apart, we must be indebted, in untold measure, to Bhoja for such things as the sandhyantara-s, not because these by themselves are of great value, but because these are responsible for immensely valuable quotations from such rare and now lost dramatic masterpieces as the Devicandragupta, and the Abhisārikā-vañcitaka of Viśākhadeva and the Pārtha-vijaya of Trilocana.

The enumeration and illustration of these 21 sandhyantarās run from p. 480 to p. 487 (number is different in Josyer Edn. as noted above). The names of these sandhyantara-s in the list of the Kāśī Edn. are, some of them, wrong. After Sāhasa in XXI. 50 the vadha must be bhaya; in the same verse, Hitvāvadhāraṇaṃ must be Hetvāvadhāraṇaṃ. The list in K.M. Edn., foot-note is purer, except in the case of the last sandhyantara which is given as mada correctly in the Kāśī Edn., but wrongly as 'Manda' in the K.M. text."

Dr. Raghavan has done some proof-reading here. But as we see it, the list in Dr. Unni's edn. is very pure.

The RS. has inherited this concept from not only Bhoja and Dhanañjaya but also from Bharata. A recension containing this topic could have been available to Śiṅga Bhūpāla.

The RS. further notes that the sandhyaṅga-s go with the sandhi-s, but these 21 sandhyantarās are presented without consideration of any sandhi. The RS. criticises the stand of the DR. in merging these under sandhi-s, because these are not a regular feature. The RS. (pp. 247, Kā. III. 92-96, read as -

“udbhāva-kalpanāṅgānāṃ

mukha-pramukha-sandhiṣu. 92b

i.e. the birth and conception of the sandhyaṅga-s are with reference to the sandhis such and mukha, pratimukha etc. The ṅga-s are fixed with reference to individual sandhi-s but the practice of the sandhy antara-s is not limited by any sections (such as individual sandhi-s) :

pratyekaṃ niyatatvena  
 yojyā tatraiva kalpanā,  
 sandhyantarāṇāṃ vijñeyah  
 prayogas tv a-vibhāgataḥ. (III. 93)  
 R.S. further observes :  
 tathaiva darśanād eṣāṃ  
 a-naiatyena sandhiṣu (III. 94a)

i.e. As these sandhyantaras are seen not as fixed with sandhi-s, they could not be included in the (concept of) ṅga-s i.e. sandhyaṅga-s, which is so ordained in the DR. -

“tad eṣāṃ a-vicāreṇa  
 kathito daśa-rūpake III. 94b  
 sandhyantarāṇāṃ aṅgeṣu  
 nā’ntarbhāvo mato mama,  
 sāmādyupāya dakṣeṇa  
 sandhyā”di-guṇa-śobhinā. III. 95  
 nirvyūḍhaṃ śiṅgabhūpena  
 sandhyantar-nirūpaṇam, III. 96a

So, I, Śiṅgabhūpāla, expert in the use of upāya-s such as ‘sāma’ and the like and one who am decorated by, qualities of sandhi etc. [‘sāma’, and ‘sandhi’ are used in a double sense] treat sandhyantara (separately). -

Thus Śiṅgabhūpāla flouts the authority of the DR. in this respect and chooses to follow the tradition of treating sandhyantara as a concept, independent of sandhyaṅga-s.

Whatever his opinion, Śiṅgabhūpāla adds grace to his treatment.

We will now turn to a comparative and critical study of the concept of sandhis and sandhyaṅga-s as found in major works, with special help from the article of our guru Dr. V. M. Kulkarni who has attempted this study in an article printed in

his “Studies In Sanskrit Sāhitya-Śāstra” pp. 78-108; pub. B. L. Institute of Indology, Patan (N. Guj.) 1983. The title of this article is, “The conception of sandhi-s, In the Sanskrit Drama.” The subject is very interesting and Dr. Kulkarni has made valuable and critical observations, which we welcome here along with accepting our immense indebtedness to our Guru. It may be added that with all flourish shown in the “Bharata Nāṭya Mañjarī”, Dr. G. K. Bhat has not included the topic of Sandhyaṅga-s in his excellent work nor has he anything to mention about the “Sandhyantara-s either. Accepting our indebtedness to Dr. VMK. not only here, but in anything that we have thought or drafted, we will treat this topic borrowing from his article all that is acceptable to us.

Dr. Kulkarni starts with an observation that to understand the concept of Sandhi-s in the Sanskrit drama it is necessary to know what is iti-vṛtta, artha-prakṛti and avasthā. As we have earlier dealt with these topics in all depth we need not repeat the matter here. We will begin with the five sandhis.

Dr. Kulkarni observes that Bharata does not attempt a general definition of sandhi (= dramatic juncture) but proceeds to define each one of the five sandhis straight away. We have fully quoted earlier, from Bharata’s text, and observed what he has to say in this respect. Later authorities - and we have also taken note of this while dealing with them earlier, individually - define it as, “The connection of parts of the (dramatic) story linked together by their contribution towards the same end, each part having its own secondary end.

“antaraikārtha-sambandhaḥ

sandhiḥ ekānvaye sati.” - DR. p. 6

ekena prayojanena anvitānām kathāṃśānām avāntaraika-prayojana-sambandhaḥ sandhiḥ - Avaloka (pp. 6) [Here all Ref.s are to the Edn.s, whatever, used by Dr. Kulkarni]. A.bh. III. p. 23 has - “tena arthā’vayavāḥ sandhiyamānāḥ parasparam aṅgaiś ca sandhaya iti samākhyā niruktā tad eṣāṃ sāmānyalakṣaṇam.”

The DR. besides giving this definition, as also observed earlier, lays down that the five artha-prakṛti-s joined to the five avasthā-s respectively give rise to the five sandhi-s beginning with Mukha (opening) etc. This view is followed by B.P., the PR. (= Pratāpa-rūdra-yaśobhūṣaṇa of Vidyānātha) and the RS. We have presented relevant references from the B.P. and the RS. earlier. Dr. V. M. Kulkarni observes, and this is a very interesting and critical observation that, in enunciating this view, the DR. had in mind the text of Bharata which lays down that like the five avasthās

the five artha-prakṛtis should be used by a dramatist. The NS. XIX. 19-20 has -

“itivṛtte yathā’vasthāḥ  
pañcā”rambhikāḥ smṛtāḥ,  
artha-prakṛtayaḥ pañca  
tathā bījā”dikā api.  
bījaṃ binduḥ patākā ca  
prakarī kāryam eva ca,  
artha-prakṛtayaḥ pañca  
jñātvā yojyā yathā-vidhi.”

Dr. Kulkarni feels that when Bharata said that as in case of avasthās, the artha-prakṛti-s are also to be used, accordingly, the DR. thought that they are to be employed together. This meaning of ‘yathāvidhi’ must have entered the mind of Dhanañjaya, which was a gross misunderstanding. The faithful followers as Śārādātanaya and Śiṅgabhūpāla followed the suit. But Abhinavagupta has never said such a thing. He has simply stated (pp. 31, A.bh. III) that - “artha-bhāga-rāṣiḥ sandhir ity uktam, tatra sandhinām sambandhanīyāni vṛttāni samvidhāna-khaṇḍāni... aṅgam.” The definitions, of course the general definitions in the DR. as seen above, and in the BP. and NLRK. also do not reveal this. The BP. (p. 207) observes :

eka-kāryā’nviteṣv atra  
kathāṃśeṣu prayogataḥ,  
avāntaraika-kāryasya  
sambandhaḥ sandhir isyate.

The NLRK. (p. 20) has - “sandhiḥ parasparam kathāṃśānām saṃghaṭanam. yathóktam sandhīyante arthāḥ parasparam ebhiḥ iti sandhayāḥ.”

As noted above by us Dr. Kulkarni also suggests that the fact that avasthas occur in the order of their enumeration and the use of the word “yathā-vidhi” must have tempted the DR. to believe that the five arthaprakṛtis too, occur in the very order in which they are mentioned. The note no. 26, (pp. 83), given by Dr. Kulkarni tries to explain Abhinavagupta’s position in this respect. The A.bh. says (Vol. III. p. 12) :

“jñārvā yojyā yathā-vidhi iti tāsām auddeśikóktivad upanibandha-kramaniyama ityarthāḥ.” We feel that the A.bh. by “tāsām” seems to refer to the artha-prakṛtis and recommends that these occur in the order shown by Bharata. But this reference



never suggests that patākā and prakarī are inevitable in a play, though of course, they occur only after bīja and bindu, which is absolutely naturel. So, when Dr. Kulkarni observes in the foot-note while giving yet another quotation from the A.bh., that "Here Abhinava appears to nod", we mean that Abhinavagupta accepts the sequence of artha-prakṛtis but not the inevitableness of all of them, i.e. specially of patākā and prakarī. The other reference reads as : (A.bh. Vol. III. p. 16, on NS. XIX 26, 27) : "na sarvatra prārambhādivat sarvā artha-prakṛtayo'pi. api tu yasya nāyakasya yena'rtha-prakṛti-viśeṣeṇa prayojana-sampattir adhikā'dhikā, tad eva pradhānam; anyat tu bhavad api guṇabhūtam a-satkalpam, yathā sva-parākrama-bahumāna-śālinām patākā-prakaryaū a-vivakṣite eva. bīja-bindu-kāryāni tu sarvatra anapāyīni. tatrā'pi tu guṇa-pradhāna-bhāvaḥ." So, we again assert that nowhere Abhinavagupta nor even Bharata, has given even a semblance to believe that for either of them a sandhi meant a sum total of artha-prakṛti-s and avasthās. Our understanding is that even the sequence or order with reference to both patākā and prakarī is also not fixed. Bharata and others following him mention patākā first and prakarī next only because they want to suggest that patākā goes a longer way in the main theme and prakarī occupies only a shorter space. No sequence is meant; for we feel prakarī as in case of Jaṭāyu episode, can precede a patākā and there may be only prakarī and not patākā if the poet so chooses.

But misguided as Dhanañjaya was by the term "yathā-vidhi" in the NS., Dr. Kulkarni observes, that naturally he (i.e. Dhanañjaya) evolves the doctrine that each sandhi rests on an avasthā and an artha-prakṛti. Dr. Kulkarni observes, and we fully agree with it, that this doctrine does not stand to reason, for as pointed out by the A.bh. and the ND., the patākā or prakarī, or both of them, are not indispensable elements in the Nāṭaka if the hero is capable of attaining the object of desire without external help. Even in the absence of patākā and the prakarī we do find all the five sandhis in the drama. The definitions of the five sandhi-s as given by the NS. show that the five respective sandhi-s essentially rest on the five respective avasthā-s and the progressive development of the bīja. The DR. too, is aware of this fact, when it says that patākā may or may not occur in the garbha sandhi - "garbhas-tu... patākā syān na vā syāt prāpti-sambhavaḥ." Dr. Kulkarni points out in his foot-note (No. 27, pp. 84) that Haas is wrong when he translates : "(In it) there should be an Episode (patākā) or (else) there should not be prospect of success (prāpti-sambhava-prāptyāśā)." What the DR. means is this : In the garbha the patākā may or may not occur but the prospect of success - the third avasthā shall occur. It may be noted that the ND. is very clear about this and observes,

following of course the A.bh., that - “sahāyā-napekṣāṇām nāyakānām vṛtte bīja-bindu-kāryāṇi tu traya evopāyāḥ, sahāyā’peksāṇam tu patākā-prakaribhyām anyatarayā vā saha pañca catvāro vēti. (p. 47), and,

“naiṣām auddeśiko nibandha-kramah sarveṣām avaśyaṃbhāvitvaṃ vā. - The DR. remains silent as to the place of prakarī in the avamarśa or vimarśa. It would not, therefore, be proper to accuse the DR. of mis-interpreting Bharata. Instead, in fairness to Dhanañjaya, his statement - which makes each sandhi essentially rest on one avasthā and one artha-prakṛti-may be looked upon as a description of mechanical or ideal perfection to be wished for rather than a strict doctrine or a rule to be adhered to.

Here we disagree with our Guru, Dr. Kulkarni. Yes, we may concede that the DR. has not mis-interpreted Bharata, but unwittingly perhaps he has mis-understood Bharata. The DR. does mean what it is exactly made out to be for not only Avaloka, but the Laghukā also states that (pp. 19, Adyar Edn. ibid) - “bījādīnām artha-prakṛtīnām avasthābhiḥ pañcabhir yogāt yathāsamkhyam sandhayo bhavanti. bījasya ārambheṇa anvayo mukha-sandhiḥ, bindoḥ prayatnena anvayaḥ pratimukha-sandhiḥ, patākāyāḥ prāptyāśayānvayo garbha-sandhiḥ, yadyapi a-niyatā eva patākā, tathā’pi yadā patākā bhavati tadānīm avasthāparvaṇā prāptyāśayā yogāt [tan nibandhana ?] garbha-sandhir bhavati. yadā tu sā nā’sti tadānīm garbha-sandhiḥ kevalā prāptyāśā bhavīti. evam upary api neyam. But here we may suggest another solution, to defend the DR. It may be accepted that a sandhi is a sum total of both artha-prakṛti and avasthā, but in case when there is absence of patākā and/or prakarī we may hold that the artha-prakṛti called ‘bindu’ continues, and when prakarī is not there, patākā continues along with the next avasthā. Thus “yathāsamkhyena” also can be defended. The table can be placed like this -

table-I - bīja; bindu, patākā, prakarī + ārambha + yatna + prāptyāśā, niyatāpti and kārya + phalāvacaḥ.

table-II In place of both patākā and prakarī let bindu continue with avasthā-s in sequence, i.e. yatna, prāptyāśā and niyatāpti.

table-III In case if patākā is present and prakarī is absent, patākā will join first with prāptyāśā for garbha sandhi and will join with niyatāpti for vimarśa.

table-IV In case if only prakarī is present, bindu will extend to join with prāptyāśā to form garbha and then prakarī will mix with niyatā’pti for vimarśa.

Thus, use of artha-prakṛtis in fixed sequence - yatha-samkhyena will continue to hold good.

But this explanation is of course not final, nor does it carry any authority but is placed before the learned like a defence-lawyer trying to defend the accused. This suggestion may be pushed aside gently by the learned. Actually the BP. prescribes that in case the patākā does not occur in the garbha the playwright should employ the bīja or the bindus in its place. “a-patāke niveśaḥ syād bindor bījasya vā kvacit.” (pp. 210). This supports our conjecture.

Dr. Kulkarni further observes that the sandhis, as observed earlier, are the structural divisions of the drama which clearly and closely correspond with the avasthās in the hero's realization of his object of desire. The classification into (the five avasthā-s and) the five sandhi-s is intended to help the dramatist to achieve the unity of action or impression. The five sandhi-s are defined as follows.

That part of a play which contains the origination of bīja, the source of several incidents and sentiments and corresponds with the prārambha avasthā (Beginning) is called Mukha (opening). Abhinava gives the etymological interpretation of Mukha as follows : (NS. III. pp. 23) : “prāg ārambhabhāvitvān mukham iva mukham.” NS. XIX 319., SD. p. 320

As regards the pratimukha the theorists differ. According to the DR (which the SD., the BP., the PR. and the RS. follow) that part of a play which represents the development of the bīja in such a way as to be perceptible and imperceptible by turns is called pratimukha (progression) - We have quoted the definitions earlier from respective sources.

Abhinava, Dr. Kulkarni observes, whom the KS (= Kā. Śa., Hemacandra) and the ND. follow, interprets the text of Bharata - [i.e. NS. XIX. 40 - bījasyódghāṭanam yatra dr̥ṣṭa-naṣṭam iva kvacit, mukha-nyastasya sarvatra-tad-vai pratimukhaṁ bhavet.]

- to mean that the part of a play which represents total manifestation of the bīja that is shown in the Mukha to be seen and then veiled, as it were, by some secondary incident, is called pratimukha. Abhinavagupta notes in his commentary (Abh. - on NS. XIX. 40, Vol. III pp. 24-25) the views of other theorists, criticises them and gives his own. He interprets the text thus : “bījasyódghāṭanam tāvat phalānugūṇo daśā-viśeṣaḥ tad dr̥ṣṭam api virodhi-sannidher naṣṭam iva pāṃsunā pihitasyeva bījasyāñkura-rūpam udghāṭanam... dr̥ṣṭam naṣṭam iva kṛtvā tāvan mukhe nyastam bhūmāv iva bījam, amāryena sāgarikāceṣṭitam vasantotsava-kāmadeva-pūjādinā tirohitam naṣṭam iva, sāgarikā-ceṣṭitasya hi bījasya iva tad ācchādakam apy utsavā”di-rūpam bhūmir iva pratyudbodhakam. tasya dr̥ṣṭa-naṣṭa-tulyam kṛtvā nyastasya, ata eva kuñkuma-bījasya yad udghāṭanam tat-

kalpam, yatrōdghāṭanam sarvatraiva kathābhāga-samūhe tat-pratimukham.” Abhinava gives etymological explanation of pratimukha as follows : “pratir ābhimukhyena yato’tra vṛttiḥ, parānmukhatā hi dr̥ṣṭa-naṣṭa-kalpanānidarśanam. (III. p. 25). In the word ‘prati mukha’, ‘prati’ has the sense ‘favourable to’.

We may humbly say that we fail to understand how the DR. and the NS. and the explanation of Abhinavagupta differ in themselves. The words in the NS. - “bījasya, mukhanyastasya, udghāṭanam yatra, dr̥ṣṭa-naṣṭam iva kvacit” are echoed exactly in the DR - observing - “tasya (= bījasya), lakṣyā’lakṣyatayod bhedaḥ” - pratimukham bhavet.”

The illustration that Abh. gives is from Ratnāvalī, wherein the bīja was as it were concealed for the time-being, being covered up by the pūjā, but once again came to light on listening the word “Udayana” by Sāgarikā, who was reminded of the fact that she was given, by word, in marriage to this king by her father. Thus as the bīja, - seed covered as it were by earth for the time being appears as a sprout, in the same way the desire for Udayana reappears.

Dr. Kulkarni continues to explain garbha-sandhi as that part of a play which represents a further stage in development of the bīja which the hero gains and loses by turns and which he frequently searches, everytime it is lost.

It is so called as it contains the fruit as it were within itself :

phalasya garbhīkaraṇād garbhaḥ - S.D. pp. 320. “prāpti-sambhavā”khyayā’vaṣṭhāyukratvena phalasya garbhībhāvāt.” A.bh. III. pp. 25.

“nātakasya madhyatvād garbhaḥ.” NLRK. p. 30.

The authorities differ regarding the definition and interpretation of the fourth sandhi avamarśa or vimarśa. Bharata’s text is very knotty, defying as it does, a satisfactory interpretation. Bharata has, as observed earlier : (NS. XIX. 42) -

“garbha-nirbhinna-bījārtho  
vilobhana-kṛto’thavā  
krodha-vyasanajo’pi vā  
sa vimarśa iti smṛtaḥ.”

[Dr. Bhat, as noted earlier, translates - (pp. 173, ibid - “The context (or developments) of the seed which has sprouted in the Garbha (sandhi), its contemplation (vimarśa) made (necessary) on account of some temptation, or born out of anger, or calamity, - is known as Vimarśa.” We feel the translation makes Bharata’s concept very clear. Dr. Bhat adds in the foot-note : “Abhinava says that a review of the plot-development is taken in this sandhi, and the possibility of

doubt about the fructification of the seed is examined. Vimarśa or avamarśa also means 'an obstacle' : fresh obstacles to the final attainment of fruit on account of anger, temptation, calamity or curse introduced at this stage and the way to overcome them deliberated. See Abhinava, op. (cit, pp. 26-28)]

Dr. Unni takes note of A.bh.'s observation that vimarśa and Avamarśa are synonymous. "kecid vimarśa iti paṭhanti, anye avamarśa iti. tatra sandehā"tmako vimarśaḥ, anye tv avamarśo vighna iti vadanti."

Dr. Kulkarni observes that Abhinava quotes different views as to the nature of Avamarśa. He himself holds that 'vimarśa' is 'sandehā"tmaka'. He argues that even after sambhāvanā (or, possibility of attainment) samśaya is possible when some unforeseen obstacle appears in the way of the achievement of desired object. The hero reflects over the new situation and realizes that he can attain the end if he surmounts a specific difficulty. He takes courage in both the hands and does his best to surmount the obstacle. This obstacle may be caused by a curse, or anger, or selfishness or temptation.

- The KS. (= Kā. Śā.) literally borrows one of the passages quoted by the A.bh. to explain Bharata's definition of Vimarśa : That part of a play where the bīja about to fructify loses its progress and seems to return to its original state on account of interruption caused by the wrath of the opponent, or selfishness of the rival, or some calamity like a curse etc. - is called vimarśa. (pp. 454 - Kā. Śā.) The Viveka reads as : "bīja-śabdena bīja-phalam. artha śabdena nivṛttir ucyāte. tena garbhān nirbhinnam, pradarsitamukham, bahirnisaranāmukham yad-bīja-phalam tasya yōrthaḥ nivṛttiḥ punas tatraiva ca praveśa iva yatra, sa vimarśa-śandhiḥ."

The word vimarśa is here taken to mean 'vighna', the 'bīja' as 'bījaphala' and 'artha' as 'nivṛtti'. The definition given by SD. is however, quite unambiguous : "That part of a play where the bīja (= lit. the principal means to the end) has developed further than in the garbha and faces some obstacle due to curse and such other reasons is called Vimarśa. [we have cited the definition earlier]. The concluding part of a play where the incidents and events which occurred in the first four sandhis and which contained the bīja and were distributed in due order are brought together to one end is called "nirvahaṇa".

In connection with the five sandhis, - Dr. Kulkarni observes further, - Jagirdar remarks that Bharata has done nothing great except coining some technical words. The five stages of development mentioned above (i.e. the five sandhis) are just the five members of a syllogism in Indian logic. (Drama in Sanskrit Literature, pp. 119) He tries to establish parallelism between them which is faulty and unconvincing, observes Dr. Kulkarni.

The analysis of the dramatic plot into five sandhis is given by the theorists to facilitate the dramatist's task of plot-construction while that into five artha-prakṛtis is simply an objective one irrespective of the dramatic structure. It will thus appear that Keith is not quite correct when he remarks : “the classification of elements of the plot (i.e. artha-prakṛti) is perhaps superfluous beside the junctures (i.e. sandhi-s). (Sanskrit Drama, p. 299). Abhinava, in course of his exposition of artha-prakṛtis, accepts the meaning of “means to the end-phala-hetus” and rejects the meaning of elements or parts of the plot. He advances the following grounds for rejecting the second meaning : “anye tv āhuḥ. - arthasya samasta-rūpaka-vācyasya prakṛtayaḥ prakaraṇā'nyavayavārtha-khaṇḍā ity artha-prakṛtayaḥ. etac ca vyākhyānaṁ nātiva prakṛtaṁ poṣayati. sandhyā'dīnāṁ api ca artha-prakṛtitvam atra vyākhyāne syāt, itivṛttam eva ca samudāyarūpam. artha itivṛtte prakṛtaya iti vaktavye arthgraham atiriktam syāt, ity avasthābhīś ca tulyatā-varṇaṁ varṇana-mātraṁ syād iti kim anena.” III. p. 12.

Abhinava accepts the classification of artha-prakṛti-s in the sense of “means to the end.” He rejects it in the sense of elements of parts of the plot - as then the sandhis too will be artha-prakṛtis. What has been said above will obviate this difficulty.

It may be noted that the Avaloka (pp. 16, Adyar Edn.) observes on DR. I. 18, - “artha-prakṛtayaḥ prayojana-siddhi-hetavaḥ.”

All the five sandhi-s occur in a full-fledged drama (nāṭaka, prakaraṇa, nāṭika). In the Dima and Samavakāra, Vimarśa finds no place, in vyāyoga and ihāmṛga both garbha and vimarśa are omitted, while in Prahasana, Vithī and Bhāṇa. The pratimukha, garbha and also vimarśa find no place. In any type of drama the first i.e. mukha and the last i.e. nirvahaṇa are positively present.

The Patāka, as we have observed earlier also, though an incidental vṛtta, is having anusandhi-s which are to be less in number than the sandhi-s. The prakarī being of very short duration is without any sandhi. : A.bh. observes, (pp. 48-49) - “patākā-vṛttasya prādhānya-nibandhe'pi anusandhir-mukhya-vṛtta-sandhy-anugataḥ sandhir bhavati, gaṇaḥ sandhir ityarthah... prakaryās tu prādhānye'pi svalpa-vṛttatvāt sandhy-anusandhi-cintaiva nā'sti.”

Dr. Kulkarni refers to the opinion of Keith who remarks that even the incident is permitted on one view to have incomplete junctures. He refers here to the text of the DR. : a-sandhiṁ prakarīṁ nyaset. Avaloka explains ‘a-sandhi’ as ‘a-paripūrṇa-sandhi.’ : Prakarī-vṛttaṁ tv aparipūrṇasandhi-vidheyam (pp. 150, Adyar Edn.). The Laghutiṅgā explains it as - “sandhyaṅgānāṁ pūrṇatā na bhavaty asminn ity arthah.” (pp. 150, ibid). The ND. however, is explicit on this point and denies any sandhi or anu-sandhi to prakarī.

These five sandhi-s are further sub-divided into sixty-four sandhyaṅga-s. Bharata observes, among other things, that a dramatist should compose a play having 64 sandhaṅga-s, others, however take a saner view and interpret it to mean that a dramatist should use only such of these aṅga-s as are essential to his purpose. We have noted how Ānandavardhana has suggested that the practice of sandhi-s and sandhyaṅga-s has to be rasa-oriented only (rasā'bhivyakṛty apeksayā) and not just to conform to theory - (na tu kevalayā śāstra-sthiti-sampādanecchayā). We have observed earlier that Śiṅga Bhūpāla, the author of RS., declares that he has illustrated all the 64 sandhyaṅgas from the Bāla-rāmāyaṇa.

Read, R. S. III. 78 - "catuṣṣaṣṭi-kalā-marmavedinā śiṅga-bhūbhujā, lakṣitā ca catuḥ-ṣaṣṭir bāla-rāmāyaṇe sphuṭam."

The Avaloka and also the ND. and the SD. observe that six, five, four and five aṅga-s of the first four sandhis respectively are principal i.e. pradhāna and avāśyambhāvi - i.e. unavoidable; must. About the aṅga-s of the nirvahaṇa the ND. observes that as nothing special is said about the same, all the aṅga-s of the nirvahaṇa-sandhi are pradhāna and therefore inevitable. Read ND. p. 104 : "viśeṣā'nupādānāt sarvāṇy etāni pradhānāni." Both the ND. and the A.bh. which is followed by the ND. observe that though 64 aṅga-s are possible, all of them need not be used in every drama. : Read A.bh. III. p. 37 - yat tū'cyate catuṣṣaṣṭyaṅgasamṃyutam iti, tena sambhavamātram eṣāṃ uktam, na tu niyamah."

Of course Abhinavagupta follows the observation of Ānandavardhana, and even the DR. respects the same.

### The Sixty four Sandhyaṅga-s.

Authorities on dramaturgy lay down that the dramatist should select and, if necessary, observes Dr. Kulkarni, modify the story of his play, to suit his hero or the ruling sentiment of the dramatic piece. After determining on the beginning and the end of the play, he should divide the story in five parts (sandhi-s). Which, in turn, he should split into sub-divisions (sandhyaṅga-s). It may be noted that though in theory 64 aṅga-s are recognised, as observed earlier, even theory does not expect that all the 64 should be used in every play. Thus, excepting the PR. (= pratāparūdra.) the RS. and also Dhunḍirāja, the commentator of the Mudrārākṣasa, no other authority tries to illustrate these sixty-four aṅga-s from one and the same play. The illustrations are usually drawn from plays like the Ratnāvalī, the Veṇiśamhāra and some later plays. The illustrations are cited in the A.bh. and the Avaloka, and almost accepted by later writers.

Dr. Kulkarni observes that presumably, the authors (i.e. of Ratnāvalī and Veṇīsaṃhāra) were under the strong influence of the rules of the dramatic science and consciously wrote their plays in conformity with these rules. We beg to disagree; for sandhyaṅga-s are pointed out by commentators even in the plays of Kālidāsa also. Again, we are of the opinion that even Śrī Harṣa, the author of Ratnāvalī and Bhaṭṭa Nārāyaṇa were no mean dramatists and so also was Viśākhadatta. We do not agree with the views of western writers and also of Dr. De that Ratnāvalī and such other plays were just stereotype plays and that life had blown out completely from later plays that belonged to what they term as decadent period. Only prejudice can keep eyes blinded to the sterling qualities of certain plays of later times also.

The 64 sandhyaṅgas are divided in five sandhi-s. The first - i.e. mukha-sandhi admits of 12 sub-divisions or aṅga-s. They are upakṣepa, parikara, samādhāna, vidhāna, paribhāvanā, udbheda, karaṇa and bheda, we will examine them individually following Dr. Kulkarni's findings as under :

(1) **Upakṣepa** : It means sowing of the bīja-seed. In the Veṇī. I. 8. Bhīma emphatically denies the possibility of the Kauravas even resting in peace as long as he is alive and thus suggests the train of events to be developed later, and also the governing sentiment, viz. the 'vīra-rasa'.

(2) **Parikara** (= Parikriyā) - is enlarging or amplifying the bīja which is indicated earlier. Bhīma hurls defiance at his brothers who might bring about peace. He was determined to break peace as soon as it was effected (Veṇī. I. 10). This strengthens the idea already suggested earlier that war is inevitable.

(3) **Parinyāsa** means describing very clearly and beyond any streak of doubt the bīja of the play that was indicated and enlarged before. It may be noted that these three aṅga-s should occur in order of their enumeration, as it happens in the Veṇī. It may also be noted, however, that prāpti and yukti intervene parikara and parinyāsa.

(4) **Vilobhana** means mentioning of good qualities (possessed by the hero or the heroine). Draupadī tells Bhīma that nothing is impossible for him to accomplish when he is angry and thus pays a handsome tribute to his heroic strength, and expresses confidence that he should win in the war.

(5) **Yukti** is establishing the propriety of a particular course adopted to achieve the ends aimed at. Yaugadhavāyana has introduced Sāgarikā to the queen, merely to put her in the way of the king so that he may see her and fall in love with her. The course of the drama is founded on the result which follows as expected by Yaugandharāyaṇa.



(6) **Prāpti** - (or, *prāpaṇa*) is attainment of happiness. The NLRK. defines 'prāpti' as "mukhā'rthasya yad upagamanam sā prāptiḥ." (p. 26) Ghosh favours this definition when he translates the definition in the NS. as, "summing up the purpose of the opening (= Mukha)." Excepting the NLRK., all authorities read 'sukhā'rtha'. The illustration furnished in NLRK. is the same as read in the Avaloka and the SD. So, attainment of happiness either by the hero or the heroine at a particular occurrence is illustrated from the Venī. Bhīma is happy on Krishna's failure to settle the issue through peaceful negotiations. Again, Draupadī is overjoyed to hear from Bhīma that he is capable of fulfilling the vows of destroying the Kauravas etc., and that he would never be a party to any peace which Yudhiṣṭhira might effect. (Venī. I. 15)

(7) **Samādhāna** (ND. *Samāhiti*) - is the complete unfolding of the bīja which earlier was only hinted at. - The A.bh. (III. pp. 30-40), the ND. (p. 62), the SD. (p. 326) point out that the bīja which was indicated before is here developed by relating it to the hero. Venī. I. 24 clearly points out how the anger of Yudhiṣṭhira, the source of destruction of the Kurus suppressed so long, is now violently stirred and is working in all its fury against the Kurus. Yudhiṣṭhira is traditionally taken as the hero of the Venī. The Avaloka, however, cites this passage to illustrate 'parinyāsa'. This means that the approach of an individual critic also carries weight in this respect.

(8) **Vidhāna** is what causes both joy and sorrow. Bhīma informs Draupadī of his intention to set out to slaughter the Kurus. She is naturally glad to hear this as Bhīma would get an opportunity to avenge the insults heaped on her. At the same time, she is overcome with fear and nervousness as after all he was to participate in war and therefore, very naturally she bids him and Sahadeva too, to take care of their lives against the enemy.

(9) **Paribhāvanā** : Words full of curiosity or wonder, on finding something extra-ordinary constitute *paribhāvanā*. Draupadī, who is doubtful whether war would break out between the Pāṇḍava-s and the Kurus hears the war-drum that was being beaten loudly and repeatedly. Naturally, she is struck with wonder and asks Bhīma why it was thus being beaten.

(10) **Udbheda** : According to the NS., the A.bh., the ND., and SD., Udbheda is the sprouting of bīja. The A.bh. (III. p. 41) and the ND. (p. 32) particularly note that Udbheda does not mean *Udghāṭana*, which is connected with the *pratimukha sandhi*. (we do not find 'udghāṭana' in the *pratimukha sandhi* !). This is illustrated

in the declaration of Bhīma of his determination to kill all the Kurus and not to see Draupadī before doing it. (Venī. I. 26).

According to the DR., it is the disclosing of something previously hidden. Sāgarikā thus learns through the words of the bards that it was not the God of love whom the queen worshipped but it was Udayana, the king for whom she was destined to be a bride. As already said, it cites Venī. I. 24 also as an illustration of Udbheda.

(11) **Karāṇa** (Kāraṇa, NLRK.) is the beginning made (by the hero or the heroine) to accomplish the object of his desire. Sahadeva and Bhīma thus announce at the close of Venī. I that they are proceeding to fight a battle against the Kurus.

The ND. sets forth the view of some theorists that Karāṇa is the allaying of calamities. It is brought about by benediction and the like. Draupadī's benediction to Bhīma - “May bliss attend on you, as on Hari prepared for battle with the asuras”, illustrates this.

(12) **Bheda** means the exit of characters from the stage in pursuance of their respective ends; Bhīma thus at the end of Venī. I. addresses Draupadī, asks her not to be anxious on their (i.e. his and Sahadeva's) account as they are experts in warfare, indicates their readiness to join war and leave the stage. Thus the A.bh. and the ND. understand ‘bheda’.

The DR. defines it as ‘the heartening up’ and cites the closing position of the Venī-I. for illustration. Bhīma, here, cheers up Draupadī, who is overcome with gloom, by pointing out that the Pāṇḍava-s are well-versed in the art of war.

The SD. defines it as a ‘breach of union’. It quotes Venī. (p. 9) where Bhīma speaks of breaking up his alliance with his brothers, as in illustration.

The ND. has yet another view expressed, which regards Bheda as the political expedient of the name whereby the adversaries standing in the way of realizing the aims of the hero are estranged.

Of these 12 subdivisions of this Sandhi, the following six must always be used viz. 1-upakṣepa, 2-parikara, 3-parinyāsa, 4-yukti, 5-udbheda and 6-samādhāna.

The Mukha Sandhi is well illustrated, observes Dr. Kulkarni, by Venī. I, where the bīja is seen in Yudhiṣṭhira's readiness to declare war on the failure of Krishna's peace mission. Bhīma's eagerness to fulfill his vow of breaking the thighs of Duryodhana and braid Draupadī's hair is prominently seen in the whole act.

The Pratimukha-Sandhi covers 13 sub-divisions, which are -

(1) **Vilāsa** : It is the desire for amorous pleasures. Sāgarikā's soliloquy at the opening of Act II, Ratnāvalī, illustrates this āṅga. It may be noted that the Pratimukha sandhi answers the description of the Mukha as given by the DR. Here we have the joining of the bīja and ārm̐bha, according to the DR. A.bh. explains that this āṅga is appropriate in a love play, but in vīra-rasa-play, vilāsa is only, an utsāha, an upalakṣaṇa.

(2) **Parisarpa** - (ND - Upasarpaṇa) - This means pursuing of the bīja, once seen and then lost. The passage (Venī. II. 2) where the chamberlain tells of the slaying of Bhiṣma (the bīja of the Venī. is here seen) and of young Abhimanyu (the bīja is here lost) is an example.

(3) **Vidhūta** - (SD. Vihṛta; RS - Vidhuta, ND. dhūnana) - This is non-acceptance, at first, of anumaya i.e. friendly persuasion. Śakuntalā (Act III) asks Priyamvadā, who, on behalf of Śakuntalā, requests the king to requite Śakuntalā's love "not to detain the royal sage, who is pining on account of his separation from the ladies of his harem".

The DR. defines it as despondency or absence of pleasure due to unrequited love. Sāgarikā's throwing away the lotus-stalks etc., intended by her friend to be a source of relief in her love-torment, illustrates this subdivision.

(4) **Tāpana (torment)** - is the grim prospect of a danger (NS). Tāpana is 'not finding any means to allay the dispondency' (owing to the difficulty of attaining the object of desire-SD.). The passage from Ratnāvalī (Act. II. 1) Where Sāgarikā says - "My love is fixed on an object beyond my reach, I am overcome with a heavy sense of shame, my soul is enslaved by passion... then is not death the only alternative ?" - illustrates this tāpana.

The DR. reads 'Śama' instead of 'tāpana' and defines it as the dispelling of dispondency due to difficulty of attaining the object of desire. The king's admiration of the beauty of Sāgarikā surpassed all her expectations which evoked - her comment "O heart, cheer up ! Even your desire could not go so far !" This constitutes 'Śama'.

(5) **Narma** consists of the use of banter. The conversation in the Ratnāvalī (Act II) where Susaṅgatā deliberately uses words in such a way as to apply to the king as well as to the picture-board is an example of 'Narma'.

(6) **Narma - dyuti** is humorous speech with a view to covering one's weakness (The NS., the A.bh., the ND.) The ND. notes that 'narma' and 'narma-dyuti' are to be used in love-plays. (p. 76).

The conversation between the king and the Vidūṣaka (Ratnāvalī, Act III), where the latter styles ‘gāthā’ as a vedic hymn in his attempt to hide his ignorance and excites the king’s laughter is an illustration of ‘narma-dyuti’.

The DR. defines it as the gratification caused by humorous remark, and illustrates it by citing a passage from the Ratnāvalī (Act. II) where Sāgarikā outwardly expresses her anger at Susaṅgatā’s remark that she does not give up her anger even when the king holds her by her hand.

(7) **Pragayaṇa** : This is the reading of the NS. Abh. remarks - “pragayaṇam iti rūdhi-śabdah, anye tu prajā-śabdād vici kṛṣya-yatna-śabdena śatā (?) kavina vyutpattiṃ klapayanti. prāgayaṇam iti anye paṭhanti. ‘prāk’ iti pūrva-vacanam tato’yanam prāptiḥ, yasya uttara-vacanasya iti.” - Abh. III. 55.

The ND., which normally follows the A.bh., accepts the reading “pra-gamana”. So, Pragayaṇa (= pragamana) is a series of questions and answers. This is best illustrated by the long passage in the Ratnāvalī (Act. II) where the Vidūṣaka and the king (Susaṅgatā and Sāgarikā as well) engage themselves in conversation starting with Vidūṣaka’s question as to what the verse (II. 7) is like, and ending with the stanza (II. 15) addressed to the garland of lotus-stalks. It considerably helps to advance the bīja (here love) of the play.

The DR. and the SD., and all later authorities read ‘pragamana’ for ‘pragayaṇa’. Their definitions are, however, essentially identical.

(8) **Nirodha** - (VI; ‘Virodha’) (The ND. calls it ‘rodha’, B.P. calls it ‘nirodha’ while all the rest call it ‘virodha’). - Nirodha (rodha, virodha) is obstructing the attainment of the desired object (by the hero and the heroine). Vidūṣaka thus obstructs the union of the king and the heroine by his speech (Ratnāvalī - II, 17, etc.) which is misunderstood by others.

(9) **Paryupāsana** is propitiating an angry person. In the Ratnāvalī (Act. II, 18) where the king tries to conciliate Vāsavadattā who is offended at the sight of the picture-board (showing Sāgarikā and the king side by side) we have an illustration of this ‘aṅga’. The ND. calls it ‘sāntvana’.

(10) **‘Puṣpa’** - is a hyperbole statement (tending to enhance the bīja of the play). The king’s statement in the Ratnāvalī (Act. II. 16) that Sāgarikā is Lakṣmī herself etc., illustrates this sub-division. The A.bh. III. p. 46 observes : “yathā hi premavikāsi puṣpaṃ bhavaty evaṃ atrā’pi rājñā uttaróttarā’nurāgaviśeṣa-sūcakam vaco vikāsam asyā’nurāgasya darśayati.”

(11) **Vajra** : is a cruel remark made to one's face. The passage in the Ratnāvalī (Act II) where Susaṅgatā pretends to be a partisan of the queen and hence not to like the affair about Sāgarikā threatens the king that she would disclose the affair to the queen is an illustration (A.bh.). The DR. illustrates it by citing the passage in the Ratnāvalī (Act. II) where the queen sarcastically asks the king whether the picture of Sāgarikā by the side of the king, drawn on the board, is the work of Vasantaka and adds that the king of the board has given her headache.

(12) **Upanyāsa** : is a statement based on argument or reasoning (The NS., the DR., the A.bh., The N.D. and the RS.). The statement of the Vidūṣaka that the born-slave (Susaṅgatā) is a great tattler and that everything is possible in her case and hence the king should please her by a reward (Rātnāvalī, Act II) illustrates it.

According to the SD., it is conciliation (in order to remove the annoyance caused by some jest previously). The passage in the Ratnāvalī (Act. II) where Susaṅgatā asks the king not to get panicky as she played only a joke (in threatening to report the affair to the king) and cleverly suggests to him to appease Sāgarikā, illustrates this aṅga.

Bhoja has omitted this aṅga altogether. Dr. Kulkarni in the foot-note (No. 58) quotes the Editor's note, NS. III. p. 46 : "bhojena tu upanyāsāṅgaṃ parihṛtam." Actually, we will consider Bhoja separately for he shows a number of differences. For example, (pp. 504, 505, Śr. Pra. Edn. Josyer) Bhoja observes : "pratimukhasandhāv api dvādaśāṅgāni. abhūtā" haraṇaṃ, mārgaḥ, rūpaṃ, udāharaṇaṃ, karma, saṅgrahaḥ, anumānaṃ, prārthanā, ākṣiptiḥ, totakaṃ, adhibalaṃ, udvega iti." We will look into a comparative table by the end of the treatment of Saṅdhyāṅgas; first following the normal list as given by Dr. Kulkarni.

(13) **Varṇa-saṃhāra** : (or, Varṇa-Saṃhṛti - ND.) is coming together of the four castes such as the Brāhmaṇas, the Kṣatriyas, etc. This is the meaning as supported by the DR. and the SD. Actually this, on the face of it, sounds useless in modern context. We will ponder over the utility of recognising these aṅga-s in the context of modern theatre as well. The meeting of four varṇa-s is the meaning as seen in the DR. and the SD., as noted above and this is illustrated in the stanza in the Vira-Carita III. 5. Actually some aṅga-s as this one, have no relevance in the context of modern theatre. Even in case of Sanskrit Drama only some have relevance with some plays having love theme, and with others having a vīra-rasa theme or theme having a design other than love-theme. The efforts of the PR., RS. and Dhundirāja to trace all the aṅga-s in a single play is a wild goose chase in our estimation.

Abhinavagupta interprets ‘Varṇa’ as characters (pātras) and ‘Saṃhāra’ as ‘drawing together’, ‘close association’. He rejects the interpretation given as above as meaningless. He illustrates this aṅga by an incident in the Ratnāvalī (Act. II) where the king, the Vidūṣaka, Sāgarikā, and Susaṅgatā meet together.

The NLRK., however, defines it as ‘varṇita-arthasya-tiraskāraḥ’.

The editor (NS. III. p. 47) paraphrases it as ‘uktārthasya viśayāntara-prasaktyā pracchādanam’. The NLRK. cites as an example the sentence in the Ratnāvalī, where the Vidūṣaka refers to Susaṅgatā as a ‘born-slave’ and ‘tattler’ (and with a view to guarding the secret asks the hero to win her over by a reward).

The most-important sub-divisions of this sandhi are : 1-parisarpa, 2-pragamana (prasama appears to be an error in view of the remarks of the ND. p. 69, SD. p. 35, the PR. p. 110), 3-vajra, 4-upanyāsa and 5-puṣpa.

Dr. Kulkarni observes that in the Venī. the pratimukha sandhi is found to cover the second Act. The bīja of the play, namely, ‘Krodha’ (anger) is seen here fully developed in that the poet foreshadows that the son of Pāṇḍu would in a short time slay Suyodhana in battle together with his kinsmen, friends etc. (II. 6), and describes the effort of Pāṇḍavas, particularly of Arjuna to slaughter Jaydratha (p. 53) and alludes to Bhīma’s vow to drink the blood from the heart of Duṣśāsana and break the thighs of Duryodhana (II. 28). In this act, we find the love-scene with Bhānumati which is a secondary incident. It appears to interrupt the course of the drama. The entrance of Jayadratha’s mother (and Duśśalā) who describe the important events connected with the main action such as Arjuna’s vow to slay Jayadratha etc., sets the principal action in motion again. This is the ‘bindu’ (what maintains the continuity of the main action). This sandhi answers the description of the pratimukha as given by the DR. Here we have the combination of bindu and prayatna.

The Garbha-Sandhi has 13 (or 12, according to some authorities) aṅga-s or sub-divisions.

(1) Abhūtā<sup>2</sup>harāṇa - is a speech based on deceit. The Abh. illustrates this by the speech of the Vidūṣaka in the Ratnāvalī (Act II) where he tells the queen that the king drew his own picture on the board to refute his assertion that a man can hardly draw his own picture. The SD. quotes the passage from the Venī. (Act. III. 11) as its illustration : truthful Yudhiṣṭira proclaims that Aśvatthāman has been slain, Droṇa supposes that his son has fallen, but what really has happened is the death of an elephant so named.

The DR. cites the passage from the Ratnāvalī (Act. III) where Kāñcanamālā refers to the Vidūṣaka's secret plot according to which Sāgarikā, disguised as Vāsavadattā is to meet the king. The ND. refers to the clever ruse used by the Vidūṣaka (in the Mālavikā.) in securing the signet-ring from the queen.

(2) **Mārga** - is speaking out the exact truth - a pointing out of one's real purpose. A.bh. illustrates it by a passage in the Ratnāvalī (Act II) where the queen refuses to believe with Kāñcanamālā that it may be by accident that the figure drawn by the king resembles Sāgarikā and says that Kāñcanamālā does not understand Vidūṣaka's prevarications. The Avaloka illustrates it by a passage in the Ratnāvalī (Act III), where the Vidūṣaka tells the king of his plot of bringing about his union with Sāgarikā about whose success he was quite certain.

The ND. interprets this limb thus : "paramārthasya vacanam sāmānyenocyamānam prakṛtārthena yat sambadhyate tan mārgaḥ." and illustrates it by Mudrārāksasa III. 4-5.

(3) **Rūpa** : is a statement embodying doubts regarding the true nature of something, e.g. in the Kṛtyārāvaṇa, Rāma not recognising Jaṭāyu's body, doubts whether it was the mountain with its wings chopped off by Indra, or Garuḍa smashed down by the Lord of the Asuras or it was Jaṭāyu who was lying dead. This is how the ND. defines and illustrates rūpa following the NS. and the A.bh. and with this definition rūpa does not differ in any way from the sa-sandeha alaṃkāra. The Abh. illustrates it by a passage in the Ratnāvalī (Act II. 20) which the Avaloka cites as an example of Paryupāsana.

The DR. defines it as a remark embodying some hypothesis (vitarka). The Avaloka illustrates it by a passage in the Ratnāvalī (Act. III. 9 etc.) where the king expresses his hope of being united to Sāgarikā, but finds that Vidūṣaka was carrying doubts : "can it be that the queen has come to know the whole plot ?"

The NLRK. defines it as a logical argument or hypothesis having a striking sense and illustrates it by Ratnāvalī III. 2 : The mind is, by its very nature, fickle, and thus it should be a difficult mark to hit. How does it happen then that god of love has pierced it with all his arrows at once ?" The SD., too, cites this stanza as an example.

The ND. following the A.bh. distinguishes between Yukti, a sub-division of Mukha and this "rūpa", as follows : "rūpam iva rūpam. a-niyato hyākāro rūpam ucyate. .... yukteḥ kṛtya-vicāra-rūpatvena, niyatā" kārāyā asya bhedaḥ." (p. 83)

(4) **Udāharāṇa** : (Udāhṛti; ND.) - is an exaggerated statement. The A.bh. and the ND. quote the above passage (Ratnāvalī III. 2) as an illustration of this sub-division. The Avaloka illustrates it by a passage in the Ratnāvalī where the Vidūṣaka enthusiastically remarks that the news of his meeting with Sāgarikā would delight the king more than the acquisition of the kingdom of Kauśāmbī.

(5) **Krama** : is a knowledge of the feelings of another (NS., A.bh. ND. & SD.) Ratnāvalī III 4 where the king describes the helpless conditions of Sāgarikā on account of the extreme uneasiness deep placed in the heart, is an example of it. The Avaloka illustrates it by Ratnāvalī III. The Krama here consists in the king's love for Sāgarikā having been known to Vāsavadatta.

The DR. defines it as the acquisition of an object when it is being thought of : The passage in Ratnāvalī (III. 10, etc.) which speaks of the king's meeting with Sāgarikā, who has solely absorbed his mind, illustrates this Krama. It is to be noted that here it is not real attainment as he meets real Vāsavadattā in place of Sāgarikā disguised as Vāsavadattā. The example in the PR., is more appropriate. The King was thinking of the victory of Pratāparūdra when news actually came to him, declaring his complete victory.

The NLRK. defines it as “Knowledge of the future” and illustrates it by the speech of Kṛpa in the Veṇī. III., where he says : “Aśvatthāman if invested with supreme command would be able to destroy even the three worlds, not to speak of Yudhiṣṭira's army.”

(6) **Sangraha** : means ‘use of sweet conciliatory words and gifts’. The ND. defines it as “sāma-dānā”diḥ”, and comments that sāma-dāna includes, by upalakṣaṇa, bheda and daṇḍa and ādi includes deceit, magic etc. (pp. 82-83). Sangraha is taking some person on one's side, winning him over by the use of sweet words and gifts. The passage in the Ratnāvalī (Act. III) where the king gives a reward of his bracelet to the Vidūṣaka who assists him in the acquisition of his object of desire (= Sāgarikā) illustrates this sub-division.

(7) **Anumāna** : (or anumā) is an inference (of the liṅgin, that which possesses the liṅga i.e. mark) from its characteristic sign (= liṅga, hetu). The A.bh. illustrates it by a passage in the Ratnāvalī (Act III. 8) where the path is inferred by fragrance of flowers of the trees in the garden. The Avaloka illustrates it by a passage (Act. III, 15, etc.) where the king concludes that the death of Vāsavadattā would follow from her great disappointment consequent upon his extreme love of Sāgarikā.



(8) **Prārthanā** : is invitation or request for love's enjoyment, rejoicing and festivity (NS.). Ratnāvalī (Act. III. 11) where the king invites (the supposed) Sāgarikā to enjoy pleasures of love with him - illustrates this sub-division.

The ND., broadens the definition as "bhāva-yācanam". The NLRK. defines it as "more request; entreaty". The ND. illustrates it citing a passage from the Raghuvilāsa where Rākṣasa disguised as Hanumat's father, requests Rāvaṇa to forgive the various offences committed by Hanumat.

It is to be noted that the DR. does not recognise this sub-division found in the NS. The SD. takes particular care to point out that he has included the Subdivision 'prārthanā' so that those who exclude 'praśasti' from the number of divisions of the nirvahaṇa may still have the full complement of 64 sub-divisions. Otherwise the total number of aṅga-s would make 65.

(9) **Ākṣipti** - (or Ākṣipta, NS.; Ākṣepa, DR., ND., PR.; Utkṣipta, NLRK.; kṣipti - S.D.) is revelation or unfolding of the bīja (or germ of the plot) lying concealed in the garbha.

"garbhasyódbhedanam yat  
sā"ksiptir ity abhidhīyate, NS.

ND - prāptyā"śā-'vasthā-nibaddhasya bījasya mukha-kāryōpāyasya prakāśanam prakarṣeṇ"āvirbhavanam ākṣepaḥ."

Abhinavagupta calls it revelation of the innermost passion or feeling on some pretext or another. Thus the king reveals his heart before Vāsavadattā (Ratnāvalī, Act III) all the time taking her to be Sāgarikā. The Avaloka illustrates it by a passage from the Ratnāvalī (Act III) where there is revelation of the bīja lying concealed in the garbha, viz. the acquisition of Sāgarikā by the king solely depends on the queen's favour.

The PR. defines it as the adoption of means for the accomplishment of the end aimed at. The object aimed at in the Pratāparudra play is the coronation of Pratāparudra and the means to attain it is the propitiation of God Gaṇapati.

The ND. informs us that some dramaturgists do not recognise this sub-division.

The SD. defines it as -

"rahasyā'rthasya tūdbhedaḥ kṣiptiḥ syāt." It cites as an example, Veṇī. III. 14, where Kṛpa suggests the inner meaning that Aśvatthāman or 'daiva' will bring about total destruction of the subjects.

10. **Toṭaka** - (Troṭaka, SD.) is a speech uttered in excitement due to anger, joy or the like. The A.bh. cites a passage from, Ratnāvalī, where Vidūṣaka asks Sārikā

to talk to the king and regale his ears with the sweet cadence of her words as his ears are grated by the harsh words of the ever-irate queen. The instance given by the Avaloka is “a scene from the Ratnāvalī where Vāsavadattā having clearly perceived the king’s attachment to sāgarikā orders her maid-servant to bind Vidūṣaka and Sāgarikā in fetters and take them away.”

(11) **Adhibala** - (or, atibala, RS.) is a deception on others (with a view to accomplishing the object in hand). Thus in the Ratnāvalī Vāsavadattā outwits the king by disguising herself as Sāgarikā.

According to some theorists, adhibala is the opposite of toṭaka, but this view does not seem to be correct for then there would hardly be any distinction between it and ‘paryupāsana’.

(12) **Udvega** - is fear arising from the king, an enemy or a robber.

When the queen outwits the king and the Vidūṣaka, the latter expresses fear caused by the queen’s fury. Or, when Sāgarikā is taken prisoner, she is terribly afraid of the queen as is seen in her remark that she is not allowed even to die an honorable death (Ratnāvalī, III). These are instances of Udvega.

(13) **Vidrava** - (sambhrama) is apprehension caused by something dreadful or frightening. The A.bh. illustrates it by the king’s apprehension that Vāsavadattā would put an end to her life because of his deep love for Sāgarikā (Ratnāvalī, III. 15). Others like Śaṅkuka define vidrava as apprehension, fear and fright. Śaṅkuka illustrates it by a passage from Kṛtyārāvaṇa (Act. VI) : From behind the curtain Mandodarī cries, ‘help, help !’ The Pratihārī reports to Rāvaṇa that there is uproar in the harem. Rāvaṇa apprehends some trouble and asks the Pratihārī to find out what it is about. Here we notice ‘apprehension’ of Rāvaṇa, fear and fright of the Pratihārī. The ND. too, quotes this example to illustrate vidrava.

The DR. defines sambhrama (= Vidrava) as ‘fear and trembling’. The ND. comments on it - The most important sub-divisions of garbha are 1-abhūtāharāṇa, 2-mārga, 3-toṭaka, 4-adhibala and 5-ākṣepa. The rest are to be employed when possible.

The Garbha-sandhi extends over the Veṇī. Acts III & IV. Bhīma’s speech from behind the curtain wherein he declares his intention of slaughtering Duṣśāsana who has fallen into his clutches and the speeches of Aśvatthāman that refer to Bhīma’s drinking of Duṣśāsana’s blood, and certain stanzas of act IV that foreshadow the slaying of Duryodhana represent the ‘prāptyāśā’ (prospect of success) which corresponds to the Garbha sandhi. The quarrel between Aśvatthāman and Karna helps the Pāṇḍava-s in their victory over the Gurus. From that point of view this episode may be regarded as patākā.

The Vimarśa (or Avamarśa) sandhi has thirteen sub-divisions :

(1) **Apavāda** - is 'the proclaiming of a fault or misdeed of another.' The ND. comprehends under it 'one's own censure.' The DR. illustrates this sub-division by a passage from the Ratnāvalī (Act. IV) where we are informed of the misdeed of the queen in her harsh treatment of poor Sāgarikā.

(2) **Sampheta** - is altercation - exchange of angry violent words. The Avaloka illustrates it by a passage in the Veṇī. (VI. 10, 11) which reports exchange of hot words between Bhīma and Suyodhana. The SD. illustrates it by a passage in the Veni. (V. 30) where Duryodhana strongly condemns Bhīma and his brothers.

(3) **Drava** - (or, abhidrava, vidrava) is showing disrespect or insolence towards one's elders. Thus Yudhiṣṭira shows disrespect to Balarāma in Veṇī. (VI. 20), or Lava shows contempt for Rāma in Uttaracarita (V. 34).

(4) **Śakti** - is placating one who is angry. (NS), or 'allaying of opposition (to the accomplishment of the desired end by the hero.' DR. Abh. paraphrases the definition as 'virodhinaḥ kupitasya śamaḥ'. The DR. defines śakti as 'virodha-śamanam'. The Avaloka illustrates it by two instances, one from the Ratnāvalī (IV. 1) in which the King's speech shows that the anger of Vāsavadattā standing in his way of the acquisition of Sāgarikā, is pacified; and the other from Uttaracarita (VI. 11) Where Lava's opposition to Candraketu and his army is removed or allayed at the sight of Rāma. The ND. includes under Śakti complete destruction of one's enemy. It adds that some theorists recognise 'ājñā' in place of Śakti, and define it as 'giving an order when provoked to anger, without giving due thought to the matter in question. (p. 100).

(5) **Vyavasāya** - is defined by the NS. as 'pratijñā-hetu-sambhavaḥ'. Abh. explains it (NS. III. 91, p. 54) as - "pratijñātasya āngīkṛtasya arthasya hetavo ye teṣāṃ sambhavaḥ, prāptiḥ, vyavasāyaḥ." Thus, vyavasāya is acquisition of the means to accomplish one's undertaking. In the Ratnāvalī, the magician's entry on the stage helps Yaugadharāyaṇa in accomplishing his desired aims. The DR. defines, it as 'mention of one's own power', and illustrates it by a passage in the Ratnāvalī (IV. 8.9) where the magician mentions his supernatural power and suggests that he would show the king Sāgarikā whom he so eagerly longed to see.

(6) **Prasaṅga** - is mentioning with reverence, one's elders. The Avaloka illustrates it by a passage in the Ratnāvalī (Act. IV), where the declaring of Sāgarikā's parentage helps the attainment of the object of the King's desire.

The NLRK. defines it as “giving expression to what really is aprastuta (the irrelevant). The ND. cites Veṇi. VI. 18, where Yudhiṣṭhira laments the (supposed) death of Bhīma, as an illustration of ‘prasaṅga’ in this sense.

(7) **Dyuti** : is ‘rebuking’. The DR. defines it as ‘threatening and hurting the feelings of others.’ Wilson, Dr. Kulkarni observes, freely renders it as ‘provoking to combat’. The Avaloka illustrates it by a passage from the Veṇi (Act. VI. 6-9), where Bhīma rebukes Suyodhana and forces him to come out of the lake.

(8) **Kheda** is lassitude (= fatigue) arising either from mental or physical activity. The SD. illustrates it by a well-known stanza occurring both in the Mālātī Mādhava (IX. 12), and Uttara-Carita (III. 31) which vividly portrays Rāma’s poignant sorrow at the loss of Sītā. The Abh. illustrates the physical fatigue by a passage from the Vikramorvaśīyam (Act. IV. p. 166) where Pururavas, tired on account of his wanderings in search of Urvaśī says - “I am tired. So, reposing on the bank of this mountain stream I shall enjoy the breeze from its waves”, etc. The D.R. and its followers do not recognise ‘kheda’ as a ‘saṁdhyāṅga’.

(9) **Pratiṣedha** (or, Niṣedha) is obstruction to the attainment of one’s desired end. The SD. quotes a passage from Prabhāvatī where Pradyumna is told by the Vidūṣaka that Prabhāvatī has been abducted by the lord of the asuras. This abduction of Prabhāvatī is an obstruction in the way of Pradyumna’s attaining Prabhāvatī - the object of his desire. In place of ‘pratiṣedha’, the ND. substitutes ‘saṁrambha’. ND. defines it as ‘śakti-kīrtanam’, and comments - saṁrambha is ‘mention of one’s own power in the conversation between two persons who are agitated.” ND. quotes Veṇī. V. 33, 34 to illustrate it. It is further observed that Saṁrambha is found even when there is mention of one’s power by one who is not agitated, and quotes Veṇī. VI. 6. as an instance.

The ND. distinguishes between ‘saṁpheta’ and ‘saṁrambha’ as follows : In the saṁpheta we have angry speech only, whereas in the saṁrambha mention of ‘one’s own power’. It is clear from ND.’s treatment of saṁrambha, that it comprehends under this sub-division, the two sub-divisions of the DR., namely virodhana and vyavasāya.

(10) **Virodhana** (= Nirodhana; Virodha) - When some obstacle suddenly arises in the way of accomplishing the object of one’s desire, we have this sub-division. The SD. cites Veṇī. VI-1 as an example. Here Yudhiṣṭhira expresses his fear that the rash declaration of Bhīma (that he would kill Duryodhana that very day or would himself commit suicide) has imperilled the lives of all Pāṇḍavas at a time when complete victory over the Kurus was just within their reach.

From the definitions and illustrations of Pratishedha and Virodhana it is perfectly clear that there is hardly any real distinction between the two sub-divisions.

The DR. defines it as declaring one's own superior power by two persons when they are agitated - perturbed. It illustrates this sub-division by Venī. (Act V. 30-34) where Bhīma and Duryodhana, who are highly excited, assert their superior strength.

(11) Ādāna : When fruition (= attainment of thing desired) is in sight, we have 'ādāna' -

The NS. XIX. 94a has -

“bīja-kāryōpagamanam  
ādānam iti samjñitam.”

Abh. III. p. 55 - has, “bīja-phalasya samīpatā-bhavanam ity arthaḥ.”

ND. has (p. 103) - “mukhya-phalasya darśanam ādānam.”

According to the DR., it is 'a resume of the action' - “ādānam kārya-saṁgrahaḥ.” Dr. K. P. Trivedi thus renders it - “ādāna consists in the collection of preparations for the accomplishment of the desired object.” (PR. notes, pp. 49). For the DR. the illustration is Venī. VI. 37, where the total destruction of the enemy is recapitulated.

(12) Chādana (or, Sādana, NLRK.) is a statement or speech arising from 'disgrace' and made for some purpose. The N.D. has - 'chādānam manyumārjanam'. and comments 'manyur apamāno mārjyate tat chādānam.' (p. 95). In Ratnāvalī, (Act. IV) Sāgarikā welcomes the breaking out of fire in the harem where she has been held captive as it would put an end to her sorrows. She means death caused by fire would put an end to her suffering and disgrace. In reality, however, union with the king brought about by that fire ends her sorrows.

The SD. defines it as putting up with humiliation etc. with a view to attaining the desired object and quotes Venī. V. 31, as an instance. - Arjuna here appeals to Bhīma, not to mind the ravings of Duryodhana, whose hundred brothers are killed and who is unable to do Pāṇḍavas any harm.

The DR. and its followers do not recognise chādana as a sub-division.

The ND. observes that some theorists recognise 'chalana' in place of 'chādana'. “The word 'chalana' is interpreted by some as 'humiliation' (this is a clear reference to the DR.) While by some others as 'sammoha' i.e. 'fainting'. The abandoning of Sītā in the play 'Rāmābhyudaya' illustrates this 'Chalana' in the sense of

‘humiliation’. ‘Chalana’ in the sense of ‘fainting’ is illustrated by a passage in the Venī act. VI, 15, 16; where Rāksasa gives the false news of Bhīma’s death and as a result Yudhiṣṭhira faints away.

(13) **Prarocanā** - is representing in advance that the desired end is accomplished, the actual accomplishment of the desired end being found in the Nirvahaṇa. It is illustrated in the Venī. VI. 12, etc., where the braiding of Draupadi’s hair and Yudhiṣṭhira’s coronation are represented in advance as accomplished.

The A.bh. notes that some dramaturgists call this aṅga, ‘yukti’. The ND. mentions a view that some define ‘prarocanā’ as ‘a direction to honour persons with gifts etc.’, and cites a passage from the Venī. (Act. VI pp. 153-4) where Yudhiṣṭhira orders Sahadeva through his attendant to employ clever spies, etc. to whom rewards in the form of money and honour are promised, to track Duryodhana who has disappeared on hearing Bhīma’s vow.

The DR. and its followers (BP., PR. and the RS.) do not recognise the three aṅga-s viz. kheda, Pratiṣedha and Chādana. In place of them they have Vidrava, Vicalana and Chalana.

‘Vidrava’ is ‘slaying, taking prisoner, and the like.’ The description of the breaking out of fire in the harem, of the imprisonment of Sāgarikā and danger of her life (Ratnāvalī, Act. IV) illustrates this sub-division. As suggested earlier the ND. informs, that some recognise ‘yukti’, in place of ‘prarocana’. Yukti is defined as ‘sa- vicchedókṛtiḥ’. This definition agrees with NS. XIX. 96a, which is possibly a later addition according to Dr. Kulkarni.

‘Vicalana’ - is ‘bragging’, boasting of what is done by oneself. The ND. defines ‘vicalana’ as boasting of oneself on account of valour, family, learning, beauty, good fortune, and the like (pp. 98). This is illustrated by a passage in the Ratnāvalī (Act IV. 19) where Yaugandharāyaṇa proudly declares that he brought about the marriage of the king with Ratnāvalī, which in its turn, was to lead to the King’s achievement of sovereignty of the world. ‘Chalana’ is treated above under ‘chādana’.

It will be seen that the ‘Vidrava’ of the DR. is very much like the Pratiṣedha as illustrated by the SD., and chalana like chādana.

The most important divisions of the Avamarśa are - apavāda, śakti, vyavasāya, prarocanā and ādāna. A careful scrutiny of the sub-divisions of the avamarśa shows that ‘virodhana’ creates a serious obstacle in the way of hero’s attaining his desires. This obstacle however, brings out the best in the hero and certainty of success is guaranteed (niyatā”pti). The subdivisions like vyavasāya, dyuti, śakti, prarocanā and ādāna bear out the truth of this statement.

The Vimarśa or avamarśa extends over Venī. V and a considerable portion of act VI (upto stanzā no. 37). Act V informs us of Karna's death and that Aśvatthāman, who seeks reconciliation is received coldly by Duryodhana. Act VI. informs us of Bhīma's rash vow that he would kill Duryodhana that very day or himself commit suicide, and of the disappearance of Duryodhana. This imperils the lives of the Pāṇḍavas at a moment when victory was within reach. Thus Bhīma's rash declaration and Duryodhana's disappearance form a serious obstacle in the way of the attainment of the ends aimed at. It, however, later informs us that Duryodhana is found and that Kṛṣṇa sends message to Yudhiṣṭhira to commence festivities in expectation of Bhīma's victory over Duryodhana. This represents "certainty of success", which corresponds to the vimarśa sandhi. Cārvāka, a Rākṣasa, deliberately gives Yudhiṣṭhira and Draupadī the false news of the death of Bhīma. Out of grief they both resolve on death. For a moment all hope seems to have been lost but Bhīma, with his body all covered with blood, appears on the scene and certainty of success is guaranteed.

'Prakarī' in true sense, is not found in these two acts, which constitute vimarśa. It has been already pointed out that prakarī is not an essential element of Vimarśa. The Abh. illustrates it by the doings of Kulapati in Kṛtyā-rāvaṇa and of Lord Vāsudeva in the Venī. But Kṛṣṇa's doings are not confined to this part only.

The Cārvāka episode, strictly speaking, cannot be called a prakarī. For, Cārvāka appears on the scene with the express intention of duping the Pāṇḍavas. The playwright introduces the character of Cārvāka towards the end of the play, most probably with a view to creating the marvellous sentiment in accordance with the dictum - "nirvahaṇe kartavyo nityaṃ hi raso'dbhutas tajñaiḥ." N.S. XVIII. 94b. The incident of the cārvāka may however, be regarded as a prakarī, in a very loose sense in as much as it serves to bring out the deep affection and love of Yudhiṣṭhira and Draupadī for Bhīma.

The Nirvahana (or Upa-samhāra or Samhāra) has 13 (or. 14) sub-divisions :

(1) 'Sandhi' - is coming up again of the bīja that was indicated in the mukha sandhi. The NLRK. has 'artha' in place of sandhi and artha is defined as - "pradhānā'rtho'pakṣepaḥ arthaḥ."

The illustration of Sandhi is given from the Ratnāvalī. Vasubhūti and Bābhravya seeing Sāgarikā who has been rescued from fire, strongly believe that she must be the princess Ratnāvalī. Thus what was stated in the Mukha sandhi about the bīja is here repeated. Or, in the Venī. (Act. VI) Bhīma, with his hand smeared with

Duryodhana's blood and about to tie up Draupadi's locks asks her whether she remembers the vow he had taken that he would braid her hair only when the insult to her was avenged. Thus the braiding of Draupadi's hair, the *bija* of the play, is again alluded to here.

(2) **Nirodha** (or **Vibodha**) is seeking for the end aimed at. Thus Bhīma in the *Veṇi* (Act VI) who has been embraced affectionately by Yudhiṣṭhira after the annihilation of the Kurus asks Yudhiṣṭhira to release him for a moment as he has yet to braid Draupadi's hair. Yudhiṣṭhira permits him to go so that poor Draupadī can bind up at last her locks. This sub-division is designated by NLRK. as 'anuyoga'.

(3) **Grathana** : is 'referring to a purpose held in view throughout.' Thus Bhīma reminds Draupadī that she had been forbidden by him to tie up her dishevelled hair, as he had vowed to do it himself for her, when he had slain those who had subjected her to the indignity of untying her braid of her.

(4) **Nirṇaya** - is a narration to one's experience (with reference to the end or purpose). The speech of Bhīma (*Veṇi*. VI. 39) which is addressed to doubting Yudhiṣṭhira illustrates this sub-division, for Bhīma here describes his triumphant success in slaying Duryodhana and annihilating the Kurus and the acquisition of sovereignty over the world.

(5) **Paribhāṣaṇa** - is a speech censuring oneself by admitting one's faults. The speeches of Ratnāvalī and Vāsavadattā at the close of the play where they censure themselves for their own improper behaviour illustrates this sub-division.

The DR. and its followers define it as 'talking (of persons) with one another.' Their illustrations are, however, of the same kind given above. It is, therefore, clear that ordinary conversation is not meant by these theorists.

(6) **Dyuti** - is pacifying of anger, jealousy, etc. The speech of Yaugandharāyaṇa at the close of the play *Ratnāvalī*, where he discloses his whole plot and pacifies Vāsavadattā's anger and jealousy towards Sāgarikā and secures Sāgarikā for the king illustrates this sub-division.

The DR. and its followers substitute *Kṛti* for 'dyuti' and interpret it as (i) substantiation or confirmation of the result attained, or (ii) conciliation of each other (by the hero and the elder queen, who was earlier opposed to his acquisition of Sāgarikā) on attaining the object of one's desire. *Kṛti*, in the first sense, is illustrated by Kṛṣṇa's address to Yudhiṣṭhira where he says that Vyāsa, Vālmīki and others have arrived for his coronation (*Veṇi*. VI. 24); '*kṛti*' in the second sense is illustrated by a passage in the *Ratnāvalī* (Act IV) where, on attaining Ratnāvalī, the king and Vāsavadattā try to conciliate each other.



The ND. mentions the view of some that, 'dyuti' is 'persuasion of a person who is already under your control but is unwilling to act up to your advice.' It is illustrated by a passage in the Mudrārākṣasa, where Rākṣasa is persuaded to accept ministership by Cāṇakya.

(7) **Ānanda** is the 'attainment of one's desire'. The king in the Ratnāvalī is happy at the acquisition of Ratnāvalī, and Draupadī in the Veṇī., at the braiding of her hair by Bhīma.

(8) **Samaya** - is end of all misery or misfortune. The union of Vāsavadattā and Ratnāvalī as sisters at the end of the play puts an end to their sorrows and sufferings.

(9) **Prasāda** is waiting upon (the hero or heroine) with a view to conciliating the anger of the offended person. Yaugandharāyaṇa who did not till the last moment take the king into his confidence regarding his plot requests him to forgive him, for what was done by him, without informing him (= the king). This speech of the minister illustrates 'prasāda'. The ND. names this subdivision as 'Upāsti'.

(10) **Upagūhana** - is the experience of something wonderful. In the Rāmābhyudaya, Sītā repudiated by Rāma enters fire. The God of fire brings her out safe. At this moment, all those present on the occasion are struck with wonder. This is Upagūhana. The ND. calls it by the name 'parigūhana'.

(11) **Bhāṣaṇa** - is speech accompanied by sweet words (śāma), gift and the like (NS.). The ND. quotes a passage from the Mṛcchakatika, where Śarvilaka, at the instance of Āryaka, confers favours on Cārudatta, Vasantasenā etc. to illustrate this sub-division.

The DR. defines it as, 'the attainment of honour and the like', and illustrates it by a passage from the Ratnāvalī (Act. IV. 21) where the king proudly refers to various achievements such as the acquisition of Sāgarikā and the like.

(12) **Pūrva - vākya** is uttering words which were earlier used in the mukha-sandhi. The ND. illustrates it by a passage from the Mudrārākṣasa (VII. 17) where Cāṇakya says : "Let the bonds of all except those of horses and elephants be untied, I only having made good my vow, will tie up my tuft of hair", as it contains words which he had earlier uttered in the Mukha.

Other theorists define it as the foreseeing of the object of one's desire. Thus in the Ratnāvalī, Yaugandharāyaṇa says to Vāsavadattā, "Do as you please in the case of Sāgarikā, your sister." In this speech Vāsavadattā foresees the Kārya, the union of the king and Sāgarikā.

(13) **Kāvya-saṃhāra** is ‘obtaining a boon’ (by the hero etc.). When some very important character in a play says to the hero etc., “what further can I do for you ?” We have this sub-division. This aṅga invariably precedes ‘praśasti’. With this ‘aṅga’, as the objects of one’s desire are attained in this sub-division, the play proper comes to its end.

(14) **‘Praśasti’** is a prayer for peace to the king and the country and other good things. Veṇi. VI. 46 illustrates it : “May people live the full span of man’s life free from misery and illness... May single-minded devotion to you prevail in the world, O Puruṣottama; may the king be loving towards the world.”

With reference to the sub-divisions of the Nirvahaṇa, the ND. observes that all of them are very important as no specific rule is laid down regarding their comparative importance. But it says, further on, in the course of treatment of these aṅgas that (1) Sandhi, (2) paribhāṣā, (3) Bhāṣaṇa (4) Kāvya-saṃhāra and (5) Praśasti may be employed in the concluding part of the play. It adds that excepting sandhi, nirodha, grathana, pūrvabhāva, kāvyasaṃhāra and praśasti, the rest of the sub-divisions may be used, if need be, in other parts of the drama.

Usually, nirvahaṇa covers a little portion only of the last act in a drama. The ‘Kārya’ is embodied in the closing portion and this final sandhi corresponds to ‘phalā”gama’ stage of the action. The BP. (p. 205) observes :

“sādhanatvād hi bījasya  
pratamaṃ tad upakṣipet,  
sādhyatvād eva kāryasya  
sarvā’nte tat prayojayet.  
a-vicchedāya rased binduṃ  
madhye tayor api.”

The portion in the Veṇi. beginning with the Chamberlain’s identifying of Bhīma, (p. 192) to the end of Act VI, constitutes nirvahaṇa. The Kārya in the present case is the slaying of Duryodhana. This Kārya is embodied in Act. VI. 37, where Bhīma informs us that he has fulfilled his terrible vow (of slaying Duryodhana that very day). Veṇi. VI. 42 comprises phalā”gama as the braiding of Draupadi’s hair, is shown here to be accomplished.

**Observations on the Number, Names and Definitions of the Sandhyāṅgas :**  
**(p. 104, Dr. Kulkarni)**

Dr. Kulkarni has done a marvellous job in putting this section in his article. He observes :

It is easy to dismiss these subdivisions of the sandhi-s on the ground that to follow their description “would be to exhaust any patience except Hindu”, or that, “The definitions and the classifications are without substantial interest or value.” The study of these sub-divisions however, reveals the theorist’s distinct power of subtle analysis of the variety of dramatic incidents (interpreted broadly enough to cover mental processes as well as external events) which the sanskrit drama presents. The dramatic incidents enumerated as sixty-four, really speaking, ‘have no limits except those of imagination and dramatic effect.’ This is the remark which the ND. makes : (p. 101) - “sarvasandhiṣv api matāntarāṇi, vṛddhókratvād, bhaṇitibhedād, vaicitryasya rañjakatvāc ca, pramāṇāṇy eva. ata eva sarvasandhiṣv api aṅga-saṅkhyākaraṇam udāharaṇa-param draṣṭavyam iti.”

All the authorities agree that the number of the sub-divisions of the mukha, pratimukha, the avamarśa and the nirvahaṇa is 12, 13, 13 and 14 respectively. The NS., as interpreted by Abhinava, The NLRK., the ND., and the SD. give 13 subdivisions of the garbha, whereas the DR, the BP., the PR. and The RS. give 12. The total number of the sub-divisions according to the DR. and its followers is 64, which agrees with their total number given by the NS. The total number of the sub-divisions as enumerated by Abhinava and his followers, comes to 65. The DR. and its followers make the total 64 by omitting one sub-division of the Garbha called “prārthanā”. Abhinava and his followers arrive at the total 64 by excluding ‘praśasti’. (The last sub-division of the nirvahaṇa) which is of the nature of benediction, and like nāṇdi cannot be regarded as a part of dramatic story. This point of view stands to reason as with the 13<sup>th</sup> sub-division of the nirvahaṇa named ‘kāvyā-saṃhāra’, the play proper comes to its end.

The names, definitions and interpretations of the aṅga-s, barring some exceptions are essentially the same. The two aṅgas, karaṇa and bheda of the Mukha are variously interpreted. Vidhūta, tāpana, (śama is recognised instead of it by the DR.), narmadyuti, upanyāsa, and varṇa-saṃhāra, - these sub-divisions of the pratimukha are differently interpreted and illustrated by various theorists. The sub-division “pragayana” of the sandhi is called ‘pragamana’ in the DR. The nature of the two is essentially the same. Rūpa, Krama, ākṣipti (utkṣipta, ākṣepa) and abhibala - the sub-divisions of the garbha are variously interpreted. Vidrava of the

NS. is called ‘sambhrama’. by the DR., and the ‘prārthanā’ of the garbha is not recognised by the DR. Instead of Kheda, Pratiṣedha and Chādana of the avamarśa in the NS., The DR. gives drava, vicalana and Chalana. Chādana of the NS. and chalana of the DR. are essentially the same as is clear from their definitions and interpretations. The remaining two of each group have nothing in common except that they belong to the same sandhi. Vyavasāya, prasaṅga, virodhana, chādana and prarocanā of this avamarśa are differently treated by different theorists. The two aṅgas, - nirodha and dyuti of the nirvahaṇa given by the NS. are called vibodha (virodha) and kṛti by the DR. But their definitions and interpretations are nearly the same. The pūrva-vākya of the nirvahaṇa (NS.) is called “pūrva-bhāva” by the DR. The interpretations of the Abh., and the DR. regarding it differ. Although some of the sub-divisions such as kheda (= śrama), udvega, vitarka vidrava (sambhrama) are of the nature of transitory feelings, they are so described with a view to impressing on the mind of the dramatist that they ought to be used, if the occasion demands, for developing particular rasa-s etc.

The A.bh. III. p. 55 reads - yady api śram’odvega-vitarka-lajjā-prabhṛtayo vyabhicāri-varge pūrvam uktās tathā’py ete saty avasare’vaśyaprayojyāḥ prāg ukta-prayojanārtha-siddhaye, te pṛthak-prayojanatvāt sandhyaṅgatveno’ktā mantavyāḥ.

The ND. (p. 97) almost repeats this : “yady api śramo’dvegavitarkā”dayo vyabhicāri-madhye lakṣayisyante tathā’pi rasa-viśeṣa-puṣṭyartham sandhyaṅgā’vasarēpi lakṣyanta iti.”

The ND. observes, elsewhere, that the ‘Sandhyaṅgas’ should be regarded as of the nature of the dominant emotions, the determinants, the consequents and the transitory feelings : “aṅgāni ca sthāyi-vibhāvā’nubhāva-vyabhi-cāri-rūpāṇi draṣṭavyāni.” (p. 115). [This means that like guṇas, alaṃkāra-s, lakṣaṇa-s or any other concept these sandhyaṅga-s are also meant for the cause of effecting rasa-experience.]”

Dr. Kulkarni further observes (pp. 106) that - A scrutiny of the definitions of certain sub-divisions, e.g. saṅgraha and bhāṣaṇa shows that they overlap. The A.bh. III. p. 59 observes : yadyapi tad arthe’pi saṅgrahākhyam idam aṅgam uktam tathā’pyatra sthāne’vaśyam prayoktavatyatām khyāpayitum punar upādānam śabdāntareṇa ca.” - The same examples are cited by different authorities to illustrate different aṅgas. This phenomenon can easily be explained if we remember that their definitions of those aṅga-s differ. The names and definitions of some aṅga-s which differ from the NS. are satisfactorily explained by the fact that various authorities had different versions of the NS. before them when they wrote.

[Even the presentation of these in the G.O.S. and one in Dr. Unni's edn. differ, as could be seen by our full references to these as given above.] Most of these variant readings are noted in the foot-notes to the NS. Lastly, these sub-divisions of the five sandhis appear to be derived by an analysis of plays with love or the heroic sentiment as the ruling motive, especially the former. This is clear from the names and definitions of sub-divisions in the pratimukha such as, vilāsa, vidhūta, śama (for tāpana), narma and narma-dyuti. It is, therefore, a case of misdirected ingenuity to say that all sub-divisions of the sandhi-s are present in the Mudrārākṣasa which is wholly a play of political intrigue and in which the element of Śṛṅgāra is totally absent.

Abhinava clearly adds that in a play based on the Vira sentiment 'vilāsa', by 'upalakṣaṇa' stands for 'utsāha'. 'Narma' and 'narma-dyuti' sub-divisions are to be employed in plays with love as principal sentiment as is rightly observed by the ND (p. 76). So these aṅga-s as understood by the NS. cannot occur in plays like the Mudrārākṣasa."

The observations made by Dr. Kulkarni are not only critical and analytical but also absolutely sound. With great respect for Dr. Raghavan, we will go to observe later that, he has also made useful suggestions while studying Bhoja's position which also we will look into later, but Dr. Raghavan's achievement in this direction is not of the same class or standard as that of our Guru Dr. V. M. Kulkarni, though of course, it is not mean by itself.

We will first present, - in view of our close first hand study of the topic as revealed by all the useful quotations from relevant texts as given by us earlier and also in view of what Dr. Kulkarni has observed - the following neat conclusions concerning the sandhyaṅga-s :

(1) The Sandhyaṅga-s, like the concepts of alaṃkāra-s, lakṣaṇa-s and even guṇa-s to an extent, are only 'accidents' and not 'essentials' of both drama and also poetry (as will be observed by Bhoja.).

We have included guṇa-s also in the list because even the guṇa-s are not absolute 'nitya' dharma-s as they are made out to be. Ānandavardhana has observed that normally 'ojo-guṇa' is associated with the vīra rasa. But in the verse viz. "yo yaḥ śāstram bibharti..." from the Veṅī., even in the absence of ojas, and simply by the presence of prasāda the suggestion of vīra-rasa is effected. So, the sandhyaṅga-s are more of accidents than of essentials with reference to both drama and poetry.

(ii) The Sandhyaṅga-s are used in a play with the sole objective of rasa-delineation, the principal rasa could be any, either śṛṅgāra, or vīra, as illustrated by all theorists led by Abhinavagupta, or any other rasa. Aesthetic enjoyment or rasa-experience is the sole object of any art and the poetic and the dramatic art are no exceptions. So, the sandhyaṅga-s are also means-only means, and just one among many - to effect rasa-experience. The avaloka explains them along with sandhi-s as, “prayojana-siddhi-hetavaḥ”. For us this ‘prayojana’ is one and only and it is rasa-experience for the Sāmājika. Abhinavagupta had explained that in Bharata’s observation viz., “kāvyārtho rasaḥ” the word ‘artha’ stands for ‘prayojana’ and not abhidheya. -

[Abh. : artha śabdaḥ prayojana-vācī (natv abhidheya-vācī)] :

Thus the sole ‘prayojana’ of any art, including the art of drama is “rasa”. Sandhyaṅgas are therefore meant for rasa-effect only.

(iii) The numbers in a given sandhi varies. The names also vary.

(iv) At times different names carry the same idea or concept and at times the same name works for different concepts.

(v) For us, an attempt therefore to trace all the sandhyaṅga-s in a single play is foolhardy. We denounce Dhunḍirāja and Vidyānātha (PR.) and Śiṅga-bhūpāla as only mad-caps.

(vi) As observed by Dr. Kulkarni theorists have tried to trace sandhyaṅgas from plays with love or heroism as central theme. We may add that in view of the other types of drama as recognised by Indian theory, such as the Bhāṇa, Prahāsana, Ihāmṛga, samavakāra, etc., not to mention any number of upa-rūpaka-s, and to this other varieties of poetry also could be added, - the number of Sandhyaṅgas is bound to swell. And why think of the Sanskrit heritage only. Taking into account the plays written to-day in all Indian languages and also in English, French or any other modern foreign language, and also taking into account the “absurd theatre”, the number and varieties of the sandhyaṅga-s is bound to swell beyond any imagined limits, as the intension for their use is simple, clear and just one - to make a dramatic piece relishable. Elsewhere we have attempted to show that no art, and certainly not the poetic and dramatic arts, can have any other goal except effecting rasa-experience, which understood in its most catholic sense covers up everything. After all these Sandhyaṅgas are only various devices to add colour and beauty to a play or poetry; they are agents of beauty and newer and newer devices, like innumerable varieties of dhvani can be arrived at in this form also by artists with

newer and newer vision. Like hundred thousand daffodils, or like hundred-thousand varieties of dhvani, the sandhyaṅga-s also can be as many, yes, accidental of course, but a device or source of beauty to be sure.

(vii) The Sandhyaṅga-s by and large also should be termed alaṃkāra-s or beautifying agents as is indicated by the great Daṇḍin - (Kāvyaḍarśa, II. 367, pp. 312, Edn. B.O.R.I.) When he observes :

“yac ca sandhyaṅga-vṛtṭyaṅga-  
lakṣaṇā”dy āgamāntare,  
vyāvarṇitam idam ca iṣṭam  
alaṃkāratayāiva naḥ.”

Thus all sandhis, and all sandhyaṅgas, vṛtṭis and vṛtṭyaṅga-s, lakṣaṇas and other concepts are alaṃkāras or beautifying devices for us. -

The “prabhā” (pp. 312) observes : “yacceti”. sandhayaḥ mukha-pratimukhe - garbhaḥ sāvamarśoṭha saṃhṛtiḥ iti pañca. teṣaṃ aṅgāni-upakṣepaḥ, parikaraḥ, parinyāso, vilobhanam, ityādīni catuḥṣaṣṭhi-saṃkhyakāni.

vṛttayaḥ -

“śṛṅgāre kaiśikī vīre  
sārvaty ārabhaṭi punaḥ,  
rase raudre ca bībhatse  
vṛtṭiḥ sarvatra bhārati.”

iti. niyata-sthānāś cataśraḥ, tāsām aṅgāni-narma-tat-sphūrjatas sphoṭa-tad-garbhaiś catur aṅgikā, ity ādīni ṣoḍaśa. lakṣaṇāni bhūṣaṇāḥkṣara-saṃghātā”dīni śat trimṣat. ādinā nāṛyālaṃkāra”dīnām grahaṇam, etat sarvam āgamāntare bharata-muni-praṇīta-nāṛyaśāstre vyāvarṇitam, vistāreṇa kathitam. tad idam naḥ alaṃkāratayaiv eṣṭam. tatra keśāmcit svabhāvā”khyānā”dau antarbhāvaḥ, keśāmcit bhāvike iti yathāyatham viṣayā’nurodhena jñātavyam.”

(viii) These Sandhyaṅga-s therefore are wider in scope so as to include even vibhāvā”di-s, and other things also as also observed by the Nāṛya-darpaṇa which presents a more balanced, mature and more logical approach to concepts of dramaturgy as compared to the DR., not to talk of the B.P., NLRK. or RS. The ND. has very interesting observations such as -

“sarva-sandhīnām ca aṅgāni itivṛtta-a-vicchedārtham upādīyante. itivṛttasya a-vicchedaś ca rasa-puṣṭyarthāḥ. vicchede hi sthāyā”des trūṭitatvāt kutastyo rasā”svādaḥ ? tato rasa-vidhānaikatānacetasāḥ kaveḥ prayatnāntara-anapekṣam

yad aṅgam ujṛmbhate, tad eva, upanibaddham sahrdayānām hrdayam ānandayati. aṅgāni ca sthāyi-vibhāva-anubhāva-vyabhicāri-rūpāni dṛṣṭavyāni. amīśam ca sva-sandhau sandhyantare ca yogyatayā nibandhaḥ. yogyatām ca rasa-niveśaika-vyavasāyinaḥ prabandhakavayo vidanti, na punaḥ śabdārthagrathana-vaicitrya-mātrōnmadīṣṇavo mukta [ka]-kavayaḥ.

tena ekam apy aṅgam rasa-poṣakatvād ekasminn api dviṣ trir vā nibadhyate. yathā veṇīsamhāre sampheta-vidravau punaḥ punar darśitau vīra-raudra-rasāv uddipayataḥ. ratnāvalyām ca vilāsaḥ punaḥ punar uktaḥ śṛṅgāram ullāsayati. ataḥ param api nibandhas tu vairasyam āvahaṭīti.

tathā aṅga-dvayena sādhyam yadi ekena eva siddhyati tad ekam eva nibadhyate. yathā Śrī. bhīmadeva-sūnoḥ vasunāgasya kṛtau pratimāniruddhe parikarārthasya upakṣepeṇa eva gatarvāt na tannibandhaḥ.

evam aṅga-trayenā'pi. yathā bhejjala-viracite rādhā-vipralambhe rāsakāṅke parikara-parinyāsayor upakṣepeṇaiva gatarvān na tan nibandhaḥ. evam parasparā'ntarbhāve catur aṅgo'pi kvā'pi sandhir bhavati.”

This means that all the limbs of all the junctures are employed only with an aim of the continuation of the theme or plot. Continuation of the theme has nourishment of rasa as its goal. If there is non-continuation or break, the (delineation of) sthāyins etc. will break up and in that case how can rasa be relished ? [What follows now in the ND. seems to be directly under Ānandavardhana's influence.] So, for a poet who was focussed only on rasa-delineation, only that aṅga is to be used which delights the hearts of the sensitive souls. The aṅga-s are to be viewed as sthāyin-s, vibhāva-s, anubhāva-s and vyabhicāri-s. [This either means that aṅga-s are to be treated and respected as sthāyin-s etc., or that they also serve as, or stand for sthāyin-s, etc.] These limbs are to be employed not only in the respective junctures they belong to, but also in other sandhi-s as well. following propriety. This means the sandhyaṅga-s are not wedded to respective sandhi-s only in the fashion of a Hindu marriage ! What propriety is, is known to the great rasa-oriented poets who compose big compositions, and is not known to poets who pride only over small compositions having the beauty of pleasant delineation of word and sense only.

So, observes the ND., even a single aṅga, due to its capacity to nourish rasa, can be employed even twice or thrice in a single sandhi. The example is the Veṇī. in which, Sampheta and Vidrava are employed again and again and make for the suggestion of vīra and raudra rasa-s. Similarly in the Ratnāvalī, 'Vilāsa' is the limb,



employed again and again, which takes care of Śṛṅgāra-enhancement. But employment beyond this (= beyond the line of propriety and effectiveness), makes for an ebb in rasa-experience.

Again, if one limb can secure an effect that is caused by the employment of two aṅga-s, then only one is to be employed. In Vasunāga's Pratimāniruddha, 'Upakṣepa' removes the necessity of another aṅga, viz. Parikara. This is the case with a group of three also. In Rādhāvipralambha, a Rāsakāṅka, composed by Bhejjala, both parikara and parinyāsa are rendered useless by just the employment of 'Upakṣepa'. Thus, when aṅgas are accommodated mutually in one another, at times a sandhi is seen to have four aṅga-s only.

(ix) The ND. is of the opinion that the 21 sandhaṅga-s (i.e. the sandhyantaras) such as sāma, bheda, etc., enumerated by others are also redundant as some of them are of the form of sandhyaṅga-s, some such as 'matī' etc. are of the form of vyabhicārins, some like dūta, lekha, etc. are of the form of itivṛtta, still others can be accommodated under 'upakṣepa' etc. So the ND. finds it futile to attempt their separate definitions.

Thus the employment of sandhaṅga-s along with their individual concepts entertain a variety in approach by theorists and one feature emerges in common that whatever their form, they are just beautifying devices, alaṃkāras so to say, which when employed with a view to rasa-nourishment only, add colour to the composition like upamā of Kālidāsa, and tend to become an integral portion of a composition, but otherwise they tend to be a burden only in the hands of poets without imagination.

(x) As Bhoja says this sandhyaṅga-s are formed in any form of literature.

Bhoja : We will now look into what Bhoja has to say about the sandhaṅga-s. We treat Bhoja separately as he has always something different and fresh to convey, though here in case of the Sandhyaṅga-s he chooses to follow the N.S., as will be observed by Dr. Raghavan, the greatest authority on Bhoja. We will also quote from Dr. Raghavan at length and as done earlier, will pass dissenting note if any, of course showing due respect to Dr. Raghavan. First we will quote from Bhoja's Śr. Pra. the relevant lines treating the sandhyaṅgas.

Bhoja has counted in all three sets of '64', and third of them forms the enumeration of 64 Sandhyaṅga-s that read as follows :

Vol. II Śr. Pra. pp. 504 (Edn. Josyer) reads as follows, beginning with the aims or purpose behind the concept of 'sandhyaṅga' - accepted from Bharata :

atha tṛtīyā sandhyaṅga-catussasṭir ity ācaksate -

sandhīnām yāni vṛttāni  
 punar uktāni pūrvaśaḥ,  
 su-sampad-guṇa-yuktāni  
 tānyaṅgāny aparādhayet. (G.O.S. NS. XIX. 50 with variant)  
 iṣṭārthasya racanā,  
 vṛtāntasyā'nupakṣayaḥ,  
 anurāga-prayogasya  
 guhyānām ca nigūhanam.  
 āścaryavad adbhikyānam  
 prakāśyānām prakāśanam,  
 aṅgānām śaḍ-vidham hy etad  
 dṛṣṭam śāstre prayojanam.  
 aṅga-hīno naro yaśca  
 naivā"rambha-kṣamo bhavet,  
 aṅgaḥīnam tathā kāryam  
 na prayoga-kṣamam bhavet. (NS. XIX. 53, G.O.S.)  
 kāvyam pada-vihīnā'rtham  
 samyag aṅgaiḥ samanvitam  
 [dīptatvāt tu prayogasya]  
 śo] bhām eti nā samśayaḥ. (XIX. 55)  
 udāttakāryam yat tatra  
 syād aṅgaiḥ parivarjitam,  
 hīnatvād hi prayogasya  
 na satām rañjayed manaḥ. (XIX. 54)

[The NS., G.O.S. Edn. has shown certain readings in the foot-notes, pp. 33, Vol. II, which are accommodated in Bhoja's text.]

The next verse, XIX. 56, shown in [ ] by the editor is read in the body of the text by Bhoja. It reads as -

“tasmāt sandhi-prayogeṣu  
 yathākāvyam yathā-rasam,

kāryāṇy aṅgāni teṣāṃ tu  
 pravibhāgaḥ pradṛśyate."  
 (pradarśyate) - NS. XIX. 56  
 "ākṣepaś ca parīkarma  
 parinyāso vilobhanam,  
 yuktiḥ prāptiḥ samādhānam  
 vidhānam paribhāvanā. (NS. XIX. 57)  
 udbhedah kāraṇam bhedaḥ."

With this Bhoja stops quoting from the NS. and just enumerates the aṅga-s of all the sandhi-s in prose - (pp. 504, 504, ibid) These lines read as -

"mukha-sandhau dvādaśāṅgāni. = The aṅga-s of mukha-sandhi, twelve in number, are enumerated (as above). For 'upakṣepa' and 'parikara' the verse quoted above in Bhoja reads 'ākṣepa' and 'parīkarma', though while treating them individually he again gives the names as, 'upakṣepa' and 'parikara' and quotes the definitions read exactly in the NS.

So, Bhoja proceeds - vilāsaḥ, parisarpa, vidhūta, tāpana, narma, narmagarbhaḥ, narma-sphoṭaḥ, narma-dyutiḥ, paryupāsanaṃ, puspam, vajram, varṇa-saṃhāra iti - pratimukha-sandhāv api dvādaśāṅgāni [For narma-garbha, narma-sphoṭa, the NS. has pragayaṇam and 'nirodha'.]

But in the treatment with illustrations Bhoja follows the NS. Bhoja has 'praśamanam' for 'pragayaṇam'. 'Nirodha' is also treated by Bhoja. It seems that 'narma-sphoṭa' and 'narma-garbha' are misplaced here by Josyer, the editor.

Bhoja reads further - "abhūtā" haraṇam, mārgaḥ, rūpaṃ, udāharaṇam, kramam, saṃgrahaḥ, anumānam, prārthanā, ākṣiptiḥ, toṭakaṃ, adhibalaṃ, udvega iti.

[We should add 'vidravaḥ' after 'udvegaḥ' and before 'iti', to make for 13 limbs of the garbhasandhi, following the NS. Bhoja has different names or readings in the explanation and illustrations that follow - Thus he has 'saṃkṣipti' for ākṣiptiḥ, satyam for mārgaḥ, and he adds 'vidravaḥ' at the end, which is not read above as 13th aṅga.]

Bhoja proceeds - "vidravaḥ"... Actually this should have been read before 'iti' garbha-sandhau trayodaśāṅgāni.

Bhoja has - 'vidravaḥ', then - "apavādaḥ saṃsphoṭaḥ (for saṃphetaḥ, NS.) śaktiḥ, vyavasāyaḥ, prasaṅgaḥ, kāntiḥ, khedaḥ, pratishedhaḥ, virodhanam, ādānam

sādhanaṃ, prarocanā iti vimarśa-sandhāv api trayodaśāṅgāni. [NS. has ‘vidravaḥ’ after ‘sāmpheṭa’. Bhoja reads it in the beginning.

For ‘kāntiḥ’ NS. has ‘dyutiḥ’ which is read in his further treatment by Bhoja.

Bhoja reads : “viśeṣaṇaṃ, dyutiḥ, prasādaḥ, ānanaṃ, samayaḥ, upagūhanaṃ, bhāṣaṇaṃ, pūrva-vākyam, vākya-saṃhāraḥ, praśastir ityādi, nirvaḥaṇa-sandhau caturdaśāṅgāni.

Bhoja has an interesting remark at the end - (pp. 505) - *saiśā sandhyaṅga-catuṣṣaṣṭir nāṭakā”diṣu mahākavyā”diṣu ca pūrṇa-sandhyā”diṣu nibandhanīyāni.*

*prati-sandhi ca yāny āṅgāni paṭhitāni tāvatām eva krameṇa nibandhabh kārya ity eṣa pracuraḥ prayogaḥ. saṃvidhāna-vaśāc ca, nyūnādhika-bhāvena, vyutkrameṇa ca prayoga ity etad apy avagantavyam iti.*

It may be noted that while attempting definition of individual sandhyaṅga, Bhoja follows, mostly, the sequence and definitions as given in the NS. At times variants read in the foot-notes in the NS. are read by Bhoja in the body of his text. This we will try to clear in the comparative table to be given by us at the end of this treatment. One thing emerges clearly that Josyer has not taken care to correlate the names of sandhyaṅga-s read in Bhoja first in enumeration and then in definitions and illustrations.

Dr. Raghavan has ignored the '54 - text of the G.O.S. while publishing his magnum opus “Bhoja's Śr. Pra.”. for reasons best known to him. for it is absolutely clear that the G.O.S. Edn.s present better readings and better foot-notes showing variants. as compared to the edn.s of the NS. consulted by Dr. Raghavan. This is very sad. The G.O.S. Edn. was available to Dr. Raghavan but he chose to ignore the same to his own disadvantage.

Now we will quote from Dr. Raghavan at length, but a most interesting and comparative study of Bhoja and the A.bh. has to be attempted by us in near future, but not at this moment. We will try to indicate something in this direction in the table showing comparative details later.

Dr. Raghavan writes : (pp. 593; Bhoja's Śr. Pra., *ibid*) - (We do not know which edn. Dr. Raghavan is referring to. We have only Josyer's Edn. with us. But we will keep the page numbers as mentioned by Dr. Raghavan as they are while quoting from him) :

“The Sixty-four sandhyaṅgas : Bhoja deals with the 64 sandhyaṅga-s on pp. 490-524. The section opens with a few verses on the Sandhyaṅga-s in general, their

nature and purpose, all culled from the same context in Bharata (Kāśī Edn. Ch. XXI. 52-58). The text of Bharata itself gives the sandhyaṅga-s as 64 and it is this number of 64 that is responsible for Bhoja making up a regular set of three other '64-s'. The definitions of all these 64, of each in a single line in an Anuṣṭubh, is taken from Bharata<sup>1</sup> and all the illustrations are either from the Ratnāvalī or from the Venīsaṃhāra, most often, the aṅgas are illustrated from both these dramas.

[foot-note 1, on pp. 593, Raghavan, reads as - "Regarding the total number of Sandhyaṅga-s, there is a discrepancy to which Dr. J. K. Balbir, drew my attention, viz. that though Bharata mentions the Sandhyaṅga-s as sixty-four, he actually enumerates and defines sixty-five. The Abhinavabhāratī notes this and says (p. 526, Vol. II. Madras MS. - that Prarocanā of the Vimarśa sandhi or the very last, 'praśasti' of the Nirvahaṇa, is left out by writers to solve this difficulty. The Daśa-rūpaka leaves out 'Prarthanā' from the Garbha, and the Nāṭyadarpaṇa notes the view that some consider 'Prarthanā' from the Garbha, and the Nāṭyadarpaṇa notes the view that some consider 'Prarthanā' as a later introduction (p. 85). The Sāhityadarpaṇa also refers (VI. 98-99) to those who leave out either prārthanā or Praśasti. Bhoja in his Śr. Pra. keeps all of these, but omits 'upanyāsa' of the Pratimukha. (Vol. II. p. 502).] [It may be noted that in the list quoted above by us from Josyer, there is no space for 'upanyāsa', in the pratimukha-sandhi, having 12 limbs. 'Upanyāsa' in the name of 'upakṣepa' figures in Mukha in the NS., and Bhoja called it 'ākṣepa' in the enumeration and then 'Upakṣepa' while giving definition and illustration. We do not know what text was before Dr. Raghavan. Again, we are surprised to read that Dr. Raghavan required some Dr. Balbir's help to know about the discrepancy. Had he looked into the A.bh., it would have been clear without the help of any assistant.].

Dr. Raghavan continues : "The Sandhyaṅga-s are very well explained by Abhinavagupta in his commentary on the NS. and to an extent, in his Locana on the Dhvanyāloka also. It has been pointed out in my contribution on Lakṣaṇa, how Bharata takes the text of drama as kāvyā, poetic expression, and how this significant expression kāvyā means that the Lakṣaṇas, Guṇas, Alamkāras, and Sandhyaṅga-s belong as much to Śravyakāvya also. While speaking of the sandhyaṅg-s also, Bharata uses the word kāvyā at a number of places -

"aṅga-hīnaṃ yathā kāvyam  
na prayoga-kṣamam bhavet." (XXI. 55)  
"kāvyam yad api hīnārthaṃ,  
uddātam api yat kāvyam." (XXI. 56, 57, etc.)

The Sandhis or the junctures form the various stages of the coming together of the five Arthaprakṛti-s and five avasthās. [Dr. Raghavan seems to follow here the wrong equation advanced by the DR. If only he had looked into the ND. he would have changed his view.] Any action or event must pass through these five avasthas, whether it be common worldly activity, or action in a novel, poem or drama. An activity as such must necessarily have a beginning, a development, an impediment, a set-back [The last two may not be there always, and mention of worldly activity is not needed here, for it is consideration of a play, an art-form.], success over obstacles, redoubled force and final fruition. Bharata says of the avasthā-s -

sarvasyaiva hi kāryasya  
prārabdhasya phalārthibhiḥ,  
yathā'nukramaśo hy etāḥ  
pañcā'vasthāḥ bhavanti hi.

See Locana on Dhv. pp. 149-150. Bhoja realises this and holds these Sandhyaṅga-s etc., as common to drama and poetry. He says of all the four sets of '64' - aṅgas dealt with in the 12th Chapter that, -

“udāhṛtā nāṭaka-nāṭikā”dau  
iyaṃ catuḥ-ṣaṣṭi-catustayī yā,  
rasā'virodhena nibandhanīyā  
kathāsu kāvyesya ca sā mahadbhiḥ.”

(pp. 553, Vol. II. Śr. Pra.)

(pp. 564, Edn. Josyer Edn.)

Of the sandhyaṅga-s in particular, he says on p. 491 (pp. 505, Josyer Edn.)

“Saiśā sandhyaṅga-catustayī; nāṭakā”diṣu, mahākāvya”diṣu ca pūrṇasandhyā”diṣu nibandhanīyāni, pratisandhi ca yāny aṅgāni.”

[We may note that the ND. is perhaps prompted to call the four i.e. nāṭaka, prakaraṇa, nāṭikā and prakaraṇī, to be “pūrṇa-daśā-sandhīni rupakāṇi, seeking inspiration from Bhoja.]

At the end of the S.K.Ā. (p. 647), Bhoja takes a muktaka verse on love and shows how even a small event and a mere idea has these five stages of Mukha, etc. The verse taken is -

“katham api kṛta-pratyāsattau  
priye skhalitōttare.”

On p. 458, Vol. II, XII, Bhoja says in his Śr. Pra. (= pp. 485, Josyer Edn.)

ete tu sandhayah kāryāḥ  
nātakeṣu prayokṭrbhiḥ,  
tathā prakaraṇeṣv evaṃ  
kathāsv ākhyāyikāsu ca  
mahākāvyēṣu campūṣu  
tathaivā"khyānakeṣu ca.

On p. 573-4 Vol. IV. Śr. Pra. Bhoja says that he will illustrate the five sandhis by a single śloka and he does so with the same verse, "katham api kṛta...." etc.

Bhoja realises that all these are after all means to delineate Rasa and that these are not ends by themselves, to be introduced with zest and loyalty to the text of Bharata, when he says in the end, "rasā'virodhena nibandhaniyāḥ" [of course, under Ānandavardhana's influence]. It is not laid down that all these 64 and all of them in the same order, should be seen to be present in dramas of all kinds. Says Bhoja briefly on p. 406 - (pp. 505, Josyer Edn.) - "prati-sandhi ca yāny aṅgāni paṭhitāni tāvatām eva krameṇa nibandhaḥ kāryaḥ ity eṣaḥ pracuraḥ prayogaḥ. Samvidhānaka-vaśāc ca nyūnā'dhika-bhāvena vyutkrameṇa ca prayoga ity etad avagantavyam. iti."

Bharata himself gives the caution and says : These are the aṅga-s and the poet must utilize them with his eye on rasa and bhāva; he may have all of them sometimes or he may omit one or two or three; he must introduce them in accordance with the purpose on hand and the situation.

ityetāni yathā-sandhi  
kāryāṇy aṅgāni rūpake,  
kavibhiḥ kārya-kuśalaiḥ  
rasa-bhāvam avekṣya tu  
sarvāṅgāni kadācit tu  
dvi-tri-yogo na vā punaḥ,  
jñātvā kāryam avasthāṃ ca,  
yojyāny aṅgāni sandhiṣu.

N.S. XXI. p. 206-7.

Ānandavardhana pays special attention to this point [already mentioned by us earlier] while speaking of prabandha-rasa-dhvani and rasaucitya in uddyota III. He says : Sandhi-s and sandhyaṅga-s are to be harnessed for the main object of developing the theme or rasa; they are not to be adhered to with the sole idea of devotion to Bharata’s text.

“sandhi-sandhyaṅga-ghaṭanam  
rasābhivyakty apeksayā,  
na tu kevalayā śāstra-  
sthiti-sampādanecchayā.” Dhv. III. 12.

Ānandavardhana explains this point on pp. 148, and 150 and cites counter-example of the Veṇīsaṃhāra introducing ‘Vilāsa’ inappropriately for the sake of following faithfully all that has been given in the text as aṅga-s. Vilāsa, as such, like ‘narma’ belongs to kaiśikī vṛtti and Śṛṅgāra-Nāṭaka-s. In those drama-s such aṅgas will occur not once, not in the only one place where they have been enumerated, but often. In plays of fight such aṅga-s of ārabhaṭi as saṃpheṭa and vidrava will occur often, these will have no place in plays where they are not needed to develop the theme and rasa. Therefore, it does not hold good that sandhyaṅga-s are only so much as 64 in number; Bharata’s list must be taken as indicating what the aṅgas are, all possible situations and incidents are not exhausted by these. Though this point as such has not been pressed expressly by any writer, it has been pointed out by most dramaturgists that some aṅga-s may be left out and that the order of these may be otherwise also, changed to suit the needs of the dramatists. [Actually we have already indicated this in our observations earlier and we may quote Daṇḍin, though observed in another context by him but also applicable here, that, “kas tāt kārtneyena vakṣyati ?”]. In the above given quotation from Bhoja’s Śṛ. Pra., we find Bhoja saying that the general rule is that all aṅga-s appear at their given places in the same order; but it must be understood that contexts need, not only omission of some, but also a change in the order. It must also be pointed out here that one aṅga will appear more than once, if need be. Udbhaṭa did not realise this and seems to have said that the aṅga-s of the sandhis must appear in their given places. Abhinavagupta says in his A.bh.

“tena yad udbhaṭa-prabhṛtayaḥ aṅgānām sandhau krame ca niyamam āhuḥ, tad uktā”gama-viruddham eva.” - Vol. II. pp. 514, Mad. MS. [It is surprising that Dr. Raghavan does not look into the printed A.bh. in the G.O.S. Vol.s.; Sad.] [Same is the case with ‘Locana’].



The point is found emphasised more elaborately in an anonymous MS. in the Madras Govt. Oriental Ms. Library giving some excellent treatment of topics of dramaturgy. The work is well acquainted with the A.bh. It says :

“eṣāṃ ca aṅgānāṃ muninā lakṣaṇe ya upāttaḥ kramaḥ sa kavibhiḥ nibandhane na upādeyaḥ. yat punar udbhaṭa-prabhṛtayaḥ aṅgānāṃ sandhau krame ca niyamam āhuḥ, tad bharata-mata-viruddham eva. tathā hi, “saṃpradhāraṇam arthānāṃ yuktir ity abhidhīyate” iti yan mukha-sandhau pañcamam aṅgam tat sarveṣu sandhiṣu tāvan nibandhayogyam. na ca tathā niveśyamānam a-drṣṭa-doṣa-kṛt. na ca lakṣye na drśyante. Veṇīsaṃhāre hi prathame’ṅke mukha-sandhau nibaddhā...

tathā tṛtīye’ṅke garbha-sandhau ca droṇa-vadhe vṛtte duryodhana-karṇayoḥ mahatī saṃpradhāraṇe nibaddhā... na cā’tra prītivyuṭpattyoh kṣatiḥ. pp. 56-57, R. 5171, Mad. Ms.

Thus, some of the aṅga-s pertain to more sandhi-s than one in which they are given; in the same sandhi also, some may occur again, that is, aṅga-s can appear wherever necessary. The niyama or rule of the given order does not apply to these cases. But the author realises that there are certain major aṅga-s that can neither be left out in any kind of play nor can be possibly changed to other places. As for instance, the first aṅga of the first sandhi, Upakṣepa, the sowing of the seed, cannot appear anywhere else except in the beginning nor can it disappear altogether. The MS. says further -

kānicid aṅgāni svarūpa... (ni) yamabhāñji. yathā upakṣepaḥ mukha sandhāv eva, prathamam eva ca. na hy anukṣipte vastuni kiñcid api śakya-kriyam.

It further says that some can be omitted :

eṣu ca kānicit avaśyayojanīyāni, kānicit tu upekṣyāni. yat tu ‘catuḥ ṣaṣṭyaṅga-saṃyuktam’ iti munivacanam, tena saṃbhava-mātram eṣāṃ darśitam.

Above all sandhyaṅga-s are not 64 only. The fact that a supplementary list grew up under the name sandhyantara, such as, sāma, bheda, etc., shows that the incidents are too infinite to be exhausted by 64 items.

The anonymous MS. then points out the intimate relation between the sandhyaṅga-s and Bhāva and Rasa (p. 58). Such aṅga-s as prasāda and ānanda are directly related to bhāva-s; narma and narma-dyuti pertain as aṅga-s to the Kaiśikī vṛtti which is inseparably fused with the śṛṅgāra rasa. Similarly we find saṃpheta and vidrava of the ārabhaṭī vṛtti, adhibala, a vīthy aṅga, prarocanā an aṅga of the bhāratī vṛtti among the sandhyaṅga-s.

In my contribution on Lakṣaṇa referred to previously, I have dealt with the relation between the sandhyaṅga-s and the lakṣaṇa-s, of how certain writers hold the lakṣaṇas to be similar to sandhyaṅga-s and how, as a matter of fact, some of the lakṣaṇa-s are identical with some sandhyaṅga-s, even as there are lakṣaṇa-s which are identical with bhāva-s and alaṃkāra-s.”

With this we end our long quotation from Dr. Raghavan. As noted above, as compared to Dr. Kulkarni's thorough and painstaking, critical observations, Dr. Raghavan's presentation to us, seems lesser. He has not even taken care to look into Bhoja's treatment of individual lakṣaṇas with illustrations from various plays. We will however now attempt to give a table of sandhyaṅga-s along with the mention of which author recognises which, and in what name, along with definitions cited from all authorities and also critical comparative remarks, if any Dr. Kulkarni has done a marvellous job and we will just make a modest attempt to supplement the same in our table :

It may be noted that we will take the NS. (G.O.S. Edn.) for the enumeration and order of Sandhyaṅga-s as the base and look into the DR., Śr. Pra., N.D., B.P., PR., NLRK. RS. and the S.D. - on the chronological order relying on Dr. De's "Sanskrit Poetics".

### A Comparative and Critical table of the Sandhyaṅga-s :

#### Mukha-Sandi :

(1) **Upakṣepaḥ** : This is recognised by NS., DR., Śr. Pra., ND., B.P., PR.; NLRK; RS., S.D.;

N.S. defines it as : “kāvyārthasya samutpattiḥ upakṣepa iti smṛtaḥ.”

(p. 38, Ch. XIX. G.O.S. Ed. Śloka - 69b.)

DR - bījanyāsa upakṣepaḥ - (I. 27, a; p. 20 Adyar Edn.)

Śr. Pra. “kāvyārthasya samutpattir upakṣepa iti smṛtaḥ.” (Śr. Pra. XII. pp. 505, Josyer Edn.)

This is from the NS. -

Normally Bhoja quotes exactly from the NS., however, on pp. 504, in enumeration the reading is - “ākṣepaś ca parīkarma... etc.”

ND. “bījasyo'ptir upakṣepaḥ” - (I. 43, pp. 108, Edn. Delhi Uni. Delhi, Viśveśvar Pandit)

BP. - “bījanyāsa Upakṣepaḥ” - (pp. 208, line 12, G.O.S. Edn.)

This follows DR. Normally DR. is followed by BP.

PR. - "bījanyāsa upakṣepaḥ" - (pp. 78, Madras Edn. Edn. Sastrigal)

This follows DR. & BP. (Nāṭaka-prakarāṇa.)

NLRK. - "tatra kāvyārthotpattir upakṣepaḥ." (pp. 56, Kārikā 71, Edn. Chowkhambhā SKT. Samsthan, Babulal Shukla)

RS. : "upakṣepastu bījasya sūcanā kathyate budhaiḥ." (III. 32b)

(Edn. Trivendrum, T. Ganapati Shastri)

SD. "kāvyārthasya samutpattir (S.D. VI. 83, p. 360, Edn. Chaw. Skt. Sam. With 'Lakṣmī ṭikā)

kāvyārthasya samutpattiḥ

upakṣepa iti smṛtaḥ."

(2) Parikaraḥ : This is recognised by NS., DR. Śr. Pra., ND., BP. PR., NLRK. RS. and SD.

- NS. "yad utpannārtha bāhulyam

jñeyāḥ parikaras tu saḥ." (pp. 39. XIX. 70a)

DR. - 'tad bāhulyam parikriyā" (pp. 21, I. 27)

The enumeration uses the term 'Parikaraḥ', but the definition has, "pari-kriyā".

Śr. Pra. "samutpannārtha-bāhulyāj

jñeyāḥ parikaras tu saḥ." (pp. 505)

The enumeration has "parīkarma", the definition has, 'parikaraḥ.' - This is not verbatim from the NS., but it is almost the same.

ND. - "svalpa-vyāsaḥ parikriyā" (pp. 109, I. 43)

Kā. I. 41, in enumeration uses the term 'parinyāsa', and definition reads 'pari-kriyā'.

B.P. - 'tad-bāhulyam parikriyā' - (p. 208, line 12) B.P. has 'parikara' in the enumeration, but 'parikriyā' in the definition. This follows DR., verbatim.

PR. "bījasya bahūkaraṇam parikaraḥ." (pp. 78)

NLRK. "samutpanne'rthe yad artha-bāhulyam sa parikaraḥ." (pp. 57).

This is followed by a quotation from the NS., as noted by the Editor. They do not mention G.O.S. Edn. They follow the Chow. Edn.

"samutpannārtha-bāhulyam

jñeyāḥ parikaras tu saḥ." (NS. XXI. 65)

This is read exactly so in the Śr. Pra. which also seems to follow the same, i.e Chow. Edn.; NS.

RS. - “Parikriyā tu bījasya  
bahulīkaraṇaṃ matam.” (pp. 216, III. 33)

The RS. reads ‘parikaraḥ’ in the enumeration and reads ‘parikriyā’ in the definition. This almost reads like the DR.

SD. “samutpannārtha-bāhulyaṃ  
jñeyaḥ parikaraḥ punaḥ.” (VI. 83 pp. 360)

This follows the NS. (Chow. Edn.), as read in the Śr. Pra., & NLRK.,

(3) “Parinyāsaḥ” - is recognised by - NS., DR., Śr. Pra., N.D., BP., PR., NLRK., RS. & SD.

NS. - “tan niṣpattiḥ parinyāsaḥ” (XIX. 70b, p. 39)

DR. - “tan niṣpattiḥ parinyāsaḥ.” (I. 27; pp. 21), This is from NS.

Śr. Pra. “tan niṣpattiḥ parinyāso vijñeyaḥ kavibhiḥ sadā.” (pp. 505, Ch. XII)

This follows the NS., DR.

ND. - “vinīścayaḥ parinyāsaḥ.” (I. 43; pp. 109)

This is the same as above, termed differently.

B.P. - “tan niṣpattiḥ parinyāsaḥ.” (pp. 208, live 13)

This follows the NS., DR.

PR. “bīja-niṣpattiḥ parinyāsaḥ.” (pp. 78)

NLRK. - “tanniṣpattiḥ parinyāso  
vijñeyaḥ kavibhiḥ sadā.” (Kā. 73, pp. 58)

This is NS., Śr. Pra., etc.

RS. - “bīja-niṣpatti-kathanam parinyāsa itīryate.” (III. 33; pp. 217)

‘kathanam’ is added and explained in the illustrations.

SD. - “tanniṣpattiḥ parinyāsaḥ.” (VI. 83, pp. 361; This is NS.)

(4) Vilobhana - is recognised by NS., DR., Śr. Pra., ND., BP., PR., NLRK., RS., & SD.

NS. “guṇa-nirvarṇanam caiva vilobhanam iti smṛtam.” (XIX. 71, pp. 39)

DR. - “guṇā”khyānād vilobhanam” (I. 27; pp. 21)

This is almost the NS.

Śr. Pra. - “guṇa-nirvarṇanam caiva vilobhanam iti smṛtam.” (pp. 506, Ch. XII.)

This follows the NS.

ND. "vilobhanam stuter gārdhyam." (I. 44; pp. 115)

Vṛtti has-stuter guṇavad etad iti ślāghātaḥ prastute kṛtye gardhyam abhilāṣa-sthīrikaraṇam vilobhanam.

The ND. has placed 'vilobhana' not at no. 4 as done by the authorities quoted above, but at No. 7.

BP. "guṇā"khyānam vilobhanam" - (pp. 208, line 13)

This follows DR.

PR. - "bīja-guṇa-varṇanam vilobhanam." (pp. 78)

NLRK. "guṇa-nirvarṇanam yat tu vilobhanam iti smṛtam." (Kā. 74; pp. 59)

This is NS. XXI. 66, Chow. Edn.

This is also read in the Śr. Pra.

RS. - "nāyakā"di-guṇānām yad varṇanam tad vilobhanam." (III. 34; pp. 217)

SD. - "guṇā"khyānam vilobhanam." (VI. 83; pp. 361)

The A.bh. (pp. 38, Vol. II. G.O.S.) reads as - tad etad upakṣepā"dyāṅga-catuṣkaṃ prāyaśo mukha-sandhau bhavati. uktenaiva na paurvāparyeṇa bhavati. ānantarya niyamas tu nā'sti, na sandhyantarānām sāmā"dinām madhye'nupraveśāt. tad etad āhuḥ muniḥ - "kāvyārthasya samutpattir" ityā"dinā, "vilobhanam iti smṛtam" ityantena. tatra vṛttāntena upakṣayaḥ sarveṣāṃ prayojanam uktam. parikarasya prayojanam iṣṭārthasya racanā'pi."

It may be noted that the ND. has placed this 'aṅga' at no. 4, and this challenges A.bh.'s observation that Bharata wants the first four only in the order suggested by him. But the ND. explains its placement in the vṛtti (pp. 115) with the remark - "idaṃ parinyāsa'nantaram eva nibadhyate. sandhyantara-sādhāraṇyāya cōktakrameṇóddeśaḥ." - i.e. Actually this 'aṅga' is placed after 'parinyāsa' only, but here it is placed at no. 7, only to suggest that this 'aṅga' appears also in other sandhis. This means that aṅga-s upto 'karaṇa' are associated only with the mukha-sandhi alone, while the next six aṅga-s as enumerated in the ND. also appear in other sandhis too. Thus ND. observes that the first six aṅga-s as enumerated in it, viz. upakṣepa, parikara, parinyāsa, samādhāna (samāhiti), udbheda and karaṇa are part of mukha-sandhi alone (ca etāny atraiva); and vilobhana, bhedana, prāpaṇa, yukti, vidhāna and paribhāvanā, - these six appear in other sandhi-s too - "sarva-sandhiṣv amūni syūḥ" - Thus, the dictate of Bharata and the explanation of the A.bh. are not actually flouted by the ND., but it has a better logic for the placement of 'vilobhana' at no. 7.

(5) Yukti : This limb is read in - NS., DR., Śr. Pra., ND., BP., PR., NLRK. RS. and SD.

NS. (XIX. 71b; pp. 39) -

“sampradhāraṇam arthānāṃ yuktir ity abhidhīyate.”

DR. (I. 28; pp. 22) -

sampradhāraṇam arthānāṃ yuktiḥ - This follows the NS.

Śr. Pra. - (XII. pp. 506) -

“sampradhāraṇam arthānāṃ yuktir ity abhidhīyate.”

This is NS. XIX. 71b.

ND. - “Yuktiḥ kṛtya-vicāraṇā” - (I. 45; pp. 119)

This is placed at number ten. The sources consulted earlier have all placed it at no. 5. ND - vṛtti explains - “vicāraṇā, guṇa-doṣa-vivekataḥ kārya-paryā”locanam.”

B.P. - (pp. 208, line 14) -

“sampradhāraṇam arthānāṃ  
yuktir ity abhidhīyate.”

This follows the NS., DR and Śr. Pra. Actually the DR. and its followers, who we choose to call the Mālava school of Aesthetics, also normally follow the NS. Bharata's dictate is hardly challenged or over-ruled.

PR. (pp. 78, nāṭaka-prakarāṇa)

“bījā'nukūla - saṃghaṭana-prayojana-vicāro yuktiḥ.”

The PR. after enumerating the aṅga-s of the mukha-sandhi (kā. 9) observes : “...anvarthāni yathākramam.” Kumārasvāmin, the commentator observes (pp. 77) : anvarthānīti - na pṛthak lakṣaṇā'pekṣā iti bhāvaḥ. (9). tathā'pi mandabuddhya-nugrahārtham upakṣepā'dīnāṃ krameṇa lakṣaṇam pratijānīte. yathākramam eṣāṃ iti. kaṇṭaka-śodhanam aṅga-lakṣaṇānāṃ yathāyogam udāharaṇa-pradeśa eva kariṣyāmaḥ mithaḥ prayoga-kramo na vivakṣitaḥ iti vakṣyāmaḥ.”

NLRK. (pp. 59; Kā. 75)

“arthānāṃ sampradhāraṇam yuktiḥ.”

This follows the NS., DR., etc.

NLRK. quotes NS. (XXI - 67 Chow.)

“sampradhāraṇam arthānām yuktir ity abhidhīyate.”

RS. (III. 34; pp. 217) -

“samyak prayojanānām hi nirṇayo yuktir iṣyate.”

SD. (VI. 83; pp. 362) -

“sampradhāraṇam arthānām yuktiḥ...”

- This follows the NS.

(6) **Prāpti** : is read in the NS., DR., Śr. Pra., ND., BP., PR., NLRK., RS. and SD. It is also termed “prāpaṇa”.

NS. (XIX. 72a; pp. 39)

“sukhārthasyābhigamanam  
prāptir ity abhi-samjñitā.”

DR. (I. 28; pp. 22) “...prāptiḥ sukhā”gamah.”

Śr. Pra. (pp. 506, Ch. XII) -

“sukhārthasyópagamanam prāptir ity abhidhīyate.”

ND. calls it “prāpaṇa” and places it at no. 9; [pp. 117, I. 45.]

“prāpaṇam sukha-samprāptiḥ.”

BP. [pp. 208, line 15) - ‘Prāpti’ is read after ‘samādhāna’ here. -

- “prāptiḥ ko’pi sukhā”gamah.”

‘ko’pi’ is added in the DR. definition.

PR. (pp. 78) - “bīja-sukhā”gamah prāptiḥ.” The mukha-sandhi has direct relation with ‘bīja’, and hence the PR. correlates ‘bīja’ in all definitions of all ‘aṅga-s’ of the mukha-sandhi. It places “bīja” in the beginning of all definitions.

NLRK. (pp. 60, Kā. 76) -

“mukhyārtha yad upagamanam sā prāptiḥ.”

This is supported by a quotation from the NS. (XXI. 67. chow.) :

“mukhyārthasyópagamanam prāptir ity abhidhīyate.”

It may be noted the the G.O.S. reads “sukhārthasya”, but gives “mukhyārthasya” as a variant in the ft. note, no. 6, pp. 39 - “bha. - mukhyārthasyópa....”

The NLRK. follows this second reading.

RS. (pp. 218; III. 35)

“prājñaiḥ sukhasya samprāptiḥ  
prāptir ity abhidhīyate.”

Naturally ‘prājñaiḥ’ refers to Bharata, Dhanañjaya and such others.

SD. (pp. 362, VI. 84) -

“prāptiḥ sukhā”gamah.”

(7) ‘Samādhāna’ is recognised by NS., DR., Śr. Pra., ND., BP., PR., NLRK., RS. & SD. It is termed “Samāhiti” by the ND.

NS. - (pp. 39, Ch. XIX. 72b) -

“bījārthasyo’pagamanam  
samādhānam iti smṛtam.”

The Abh. (pp. 39, 40) observes : “yasmin bījam tad idānīm pradhāna-nāyakā’nugatatvena samyag āhitam bhavatīti (samādhānam).

DR. (I. 28; pp. 23) -

“bījā”gamah samādhānam...”

The Avaloka gives illustrations from the Ratnāvalī and the Venī. After citing - Venī. (I. 21; Cañcad-bhuja. etc.), it observes - “ity anena vemīsamhāra-hetoḥ punar upādānāt samādhānam.

Śr. Pra. (pp. 507, Ch. XII) -

“bījārthasyo’pagamanam  
samādhānam iti smṛtam.”

This is NS. -

ND. calls it ‘Samāhiti’, and places it at no. 4. (pp. 105, I. 43).

“punar nyāsaḥ samāhitiḥ.”

Vṛtti reads - samkṣipyopakṣiptasya bījasya spaṣṭatā-pratipādanārtham punar nyāso bhaṇiti-vaicitryam, samyag ā samantāt dhānam poṣaṇam samāhitiḥ - i.e. The seed that was cast in ‘upakṣepa’ in a brief way is re-told here to place it more effectively, i.e. to speak about the same (again); samyag = well (laid), ā - samantāt = in a more perfect way casting of the seed is said to be “samādhāna”.

BP. (pp. 208, line 15) - has ‘samādhāna’ placed before “prāpti”.



- “bījā”gamaḥ samādhānam.”

This follows the DR.

PR. (pp. 78) -

“bīja-sannidhānam samādhānam”

NLRK. (pp. 61; Kā 77) -

“bījārthasyópagamanam  
yat tat samādhānam.”

NS. XXI. 68 (Chow. Edn) is quoted in support. This reads like G.O.S. Edn. XIX. 72b., as quoted above.

RS. (pp. 218; III. 35) -

“bījasya punar ādhānam  
samādhānam ihócyate.”

- SD. (pp. 363; VI. 85) -

“bījasyā”gamanam yat tu  
tat samādhānam ucyate.”

This follows the Chow. Edn. NS. reading, as quoted exactly in the NLRK.

#### (8) Vidhāna :

This is read in the NS., DR. Śr. Pra. ND., BP., PR. NLRK., RS. & SD.

NS. (pp. 40; XIX. 73a) -

“sukha-duḥkha-kṛto yórtas  
tad vidhānam iti smṛtam.”

Abh. : “vyāmiśratayā sukha-duḥkhe abhidhīyete yatra iti (vidhānam)” - (pp. 40).

DR. (I. 28; pp. 24) -

“vidhānam sukha-duḥkha-kṛt” -

Avaloka illustrates it from Mālatīmādhava (I. 32) and veṇī. I. 26. It observes :  
...ity anena mālāty avalokanasya anurāgasya samāgama-hetor bījasya ānugūnyena  
eva mādhasya sukha-duḥkhakāritvāt vidhanam iti...” and also, (after veṇī...” iti  
saṃgrāmasya sukha-duḥkha-hetutvāt vidhānam iti.”

Śr. Pra. (Ch. XII. pp. 508) -

“sukha-duḥkā’nvito yórtas tad vidhānam iti smṛtam.”

This is NS. (G.O.S.) as quoted above.

ND. reads ‘vidhāna’ at no. 11. (pp. 120; I. 45)

“vidhānaṃ sukha-duḥkhā”ptiḥ.”

vṛtti adds (pp. 120) : dvayoḥ sukha-duḥkhaḥ ekaṭra anekatra vā pātre prāptiḥ.”

This means attainment of happiness and unhappiness either with reference to the same character or with reference to many.

“eka-pātre sukha-duḥkhaḥ prāptiḥ” is illustrated from Mālatīmādhava - “yad vismaya-stimīta.” etc. : “ity anena sā’nurāga-mālaty-avalokanān mādhasya sukha-duḥkhā”ptiḥ.”

The other variety, viz. ‘anekatra’ is illustrated from the Tāpasa-vatsarāja; - “dṛṣṭiṃ prema-bharā”laṣāṃ”... etc. - ND. observes (pp. 121) - atra ca vāsavadattāyāḥ pravāsā’bhyupagamād duḥkham vatsarājasya ca a-vidita-pravāsa-vṛttāntasya sukham.”

BP. It reads “paribhāva” (= paribhāvanā) ahead of vidhāna which is defined as - [pp. 208; line 16] -

“vidhānaṃ sukha-duḥkhakṛt.”

This is DR., as quoted above.

PR. (pp. 78) -

“bīja-sukha-duḥkha-hetur vidhānam.”

NLRK. (pp. 61, Kā. 78) -

“sukha-duḥkha-kṛto yōrthas

tad vidhānam...”

- This is NS. (G.O.S.) It quotes NS. (Chow. XXI. 68) as - (pp. 62)

“sukha-duḥkhā’nvito yōrthas tad vidhānam iti smṛtam.”

RS. (III. 36; pp. 219) -

“sukha-duḥkha-karam yaḥ tad vidhānam budhā viduḥ.”

SD. (VI. 85b; pp. 364) -

“sukha-duḥkha-kṛto yōrthas

tad-vidhānam iti smṛtam.”

This is NS. (G.O.S.)

(9) Paribhāvanā - (also, "paribhāvaḥ" - DR. & BP.) This is read in NS., DR., Śr. Pra., ND., BP., PR., NLRK., RS. & SD.

NS. (pp. 40; XIX. 73b) -

"kutūhalottarā"vego  
vijñeyā paribhāvanā."

Abh. (p. 40) observes :

kutūhaleti kautukena jijñāsā'tisayena vyāmiśro  
yaḥ āvegaḥ sā paribhāvanā; kim etad iti."

DR. (I. 29; pp. 25) -

"paribhāvo'dbhutā"veśaḥ"

Śr. Pra. : (pp. 508, Ch. XII)

"kutūhalottarā"vedhaḥ  
proktā tu paribhāvanā."

This is NS. But "āvedhaḥ" follows a variant noted in ft.noot 3, pp. 40, G.O.S. Edn. ND. reads this as the 12<sup>th</sup> āṅga. (pp. 122; I. 45) -

"vismayaḥ paribhāvanā."

Vṛtti almost follows the Abh. When it reads (pp. 122) : jijñāsā'tisayena 'kim etad' iti kautukā'nubandho vismayaḥ, paribhāvanā.

BP. reads it before 'vidhāna'.

It has, (pp. 208, line 16)

"paribhāvo'dbhutā"veśo, vidhānaṃ...

This follows the DR.

PR. (pp. 78) : "bīja-viśayā" ścaryā"veśaḥ paribhāvanā."

NLRK. (pp. 62; Kā. 79b) -

"kutūhalā'ntarā"dāyī syād arthaḥ paribhāvanā."

The editor calls this to be NS. 21, 69; i.e. Chow. Edn.

RS. (pp. 219; III. 36b) -

"ślāghaiś citta-camatkāro  
guṇā"dyaiḥ paribhāvanā."

SD. (pp. 364; VI. 86a)

"kutūhalottarā vācaḥ  
proktā tu paribhāvanā."

This closer to the Śr. Pra., which has a NS. reading, different from the G.O.S.

(10) Udbheda :

This is recognised by the NS., DR., Śr. Pra., ND., BP., PR., NLRK., RS. & SD.  
NS. (pp. 41; XIX. 74a) -

“bījārthasya praroḥo yaḥ  
sa udbheda iti smṛtaḥ.”

The Abh. illustrates it from the Veṇi., and observes (pp. 41) : na ca idam udghāṭanam yena pratimukhaṁ bhavet, api tu śatruḥsayā”rambhaṁ bījasyā”ṅkuraḥ kurukulódghāṭanena vinā’pi praroḥa-mātram anusthānā’nugūṇyāt; bhūmi-saṁśloṣa iva bījasya.”

DR. (pp. 26; I. 29)

“udbhedaḥ gūḍha-bhedanam -”

Śr. Pra. (Ch. XII; pp. 509) -

[bījārthasya] ..... praroḥo yaḥ  
udbhedaḥ sa tu kīrtitaḥ.”

[bījārthasya] is added by us from the NS. (G.O.S.), as read above. Josyer could have himself done this.

ND. reads this at no. 5.

(pp. 112; I. 44;)

“svalpa-praroḥo udbhedaḥ...”

The vṛtti reads : (pp. 112) - āmukhāntaram uptasya svalpa-praroḥaḥ, kiñcit phalānuṣṭhānānukulya-pradarśanam dhānyasya ucchūnatā iva “udbhedaḥ”.

ND. vṛtti (p. 112) further adds - bījasya udghāṭanam aṅkura-kalpam, udbhedaḥ punar aṅkura-kalpād udghāṭanād bhūmi-nyasta-dhānyóchūnateva prācīnā’vasthā ity ayaṁ mukha-sandher evā’ṅgam. na punar-udghāṭa-rūpatvāt pratimukha-sandheḥ.

BP. - ‘Udbheda’ is treated after ‘karaṇa’ in BP. -

(pp. 208; line 17b) -

“udbhedo gūḍha-bhedanam.”

This follows the DR., which has disclosing of something previously hidden as ‘udbheda’.

PR. also has the same observation as the NS.

(pp. 78) - “gūḍha-bīja-prakāśanam udbhedaḥ.”

NLRK. (pp. 63, Kā. 80) -

“bījā'rthasya praroho yaḥ  
sa udbheda iti smṛtaḥ.”

The editor identifies this as NS. 21/69; (Chow. Edn.). But it reads the same in the G.O.S. Edn. (XIX. 74a) also.

RS. (pp. 219; III. 37a)

“udghāṭanam yad bijasya  
sa udbhedaḥ prakīrtitaḥ.”

This follows the NS.

SD. (pp. 365; VI. 86b)

“bījā'rthasya prarohaḥ syād udbhedaḥ...

(11) Karaṇa - is read in NS., DR., Śr. Pra., ND., BP., PR., NLRK., RS. & SD. - Śr. Pra. calls it “Kāraṇa”.

NS. - (pp. 41; XIX. 74b).

“prakṛtā'rtha-samārambhaḥ  
karaṇam nāma tad bhavet.”

The Abh. (p. 41) has a ft.note : “anye tu vipadāṃ śamanam karaṇam āhuḥ.”

DR. (I. 29; pp. 27) - has,

karaṇam prakṛtā"rambhaḥ... This follows the NS.

Śr. Pra. (pp. 509, Ch. XII) has “Kāraṇa” for ‘Karaṇa’. It reads as -

“prakṛtā'rtha samā"rambham kāraṇam paricakṣate.”

ND. places ‘Karaṇa’ at no. 6; (pp. 124; I. 44)

“karaṇam prastuta-kriyā.”

The Vṛtti has - “avasarā'nugūṇasya arthasya prārambhaḥ karaṇam.”

BP. (pp. 208; line 17) has,

“karaṇam prakṛtā"rambhaḥ.”

This follows the DR.

PR. - reads it at no. 12;

(pp. 78); - “bījā'nugūṇa-prastuta-kāryā"-rambhaḥ karaṇam.”

ND.'s influence can be read.

NLRK. (pp. 63; Kā. 81) has -

“prakṛtā'rtha-samā”rambhaḥ karaṇam...” This follows the NS.

RS. - ‘Karaṇa’ is placed as no. 12. (pp. 220; III. 37)

It reads as - “prastutā'rtha samā”rambham karaṇam paricakṣate.”

SD. (pp. 365; VI. 86b; 87a)

karaṇam punaḥ, prakṛtā'rtha-samā”ramthaḥ.” This follows the NS.

(12) **Bhedah** - is read in the NS., DR., Śr. Pra., ND., BP., PR., NLRK., RS. & SD.

NS. (pp. 41; XIX. 75a) has,

“saṃghāta-bhedanārtho yaḥ

sa bheda iti kīrtitaḥ.”

Abh. reads (pp. 41) : “pātra-saṃghātasya yaṇ nija-prayojan’opakṣepeṇa niṣkramaṇasiddhaye bhedanam prakaraṇam iva, sa bhedaḥ sarvatrā’ñke’ntarbhāvi vastūpāyā”tmā bhedaḥ, sa sandhyantaraika-vimśatau vakṣyate.” Dispersing of characters is ‘bheda’.

DR. (pp. 27, I. 29) has -

“...bhedaḥ protsāhandād bhavet.” This is different from the NS. This means “heartening up”.

Śr. Pra. (pp. 509; Ch. XII) - has -

“saṃghāta-rūpa-bhedo yaḥ

sa bheda iti kīrtitaḥ.”

This follows the NS.

ND. - has ‘bhedana’ for “bhedaḥ”. It is read at No. 8. But it explains it after the NS. as

(pp. 116; Kā. I. 44) - “bhedanam pātra-nirgamaḥ. But the ND. gives another opinion also - (vṛtti; pp. 117) - “anye tu bhedaṃ protsāhanam āhuḥ.” There is a third view also - (pp. 117) - “anye tu saṃghatānām pratipakṣānām bīja-phalotpatti-nirodhakānām viśeṣakam bheda-rūpam upāyam ‘bhedanam’. manvate. - Here ‘bheda’ is one of the expedients, meaning to cause a divide among enemies.

BP. (pp. 208; line 18) - has “bhedaḥ protsāhanā” This follows the DR.

PR. (pp. 78) : “bījā’nugūṇa-protsāhanam bhedaḥ”. This is read as no. 11. The illustration (pp. 109, 110) explains that ‘bheda’ means parting of characters. It adds - “eteṣāṃ madhye upakṣepa-parikara-parinyāsa-yukty-udbheda-samādhānānām āvaśyikatvam.”

NLRK. (pp. 63; Kā. 82) - has -

“saṃghātena militā'rthasya bhaṅgo bhedaḥ.”

This follows the NS.

RS. (pp. 220; III. 37b) - reads it as no. 11 -

“bījasyódbhedanam bhedo

yad vā saṃghāta-bhedanam.”

sprouting of the seed and also parting of characters make for 'bheda' in RS.

SD. (pp. 365; VI. 87a) -

“bhedaḥ saṃghata-bhedanam.”

Here it is parting of company, illustrated by Bhīma's statement in which he seems to desert his brothers. The SD. also quotes another opinion :

“kecit tu, “bhedaḥ protsāhanā” iti vadanti. This refers to the DR. The Laxmī ūkā reads - (pp. 365) -

“prakāraṅtareṇa lakṣayatām matam darśayati - 'kecid iti'. daśarūpa-kārā” -  
daya ity arthaḥ. “kartavyam prati prakarṣeṇo'tsāhótpādanam bhedaḥ” iti vadanti.

### Āṅga-s of the Pratimukhasandhi

(1) Vilāsa - This is accepted by the NS., DR., Śr. Pra., ND., BP., PR., NLRK., RS and SD.

NS. (p. 42; XIX. 76a)

“saṃhā rati-bhogārthā

vilāsa iti saṃjñitah.”

DR. (p. 29; I. 32) -

“raty arthéhā vilāsaḥ syād” - This follows the NS.

Śr. Pra. (p. 510; Ch. XII) - The editor, Josyer should have taken care to add [-ī] or [samī] in the text. This follows the NS. :

“[samī] hā ratibhogārthā vilāsaḥ parikīrtitah.”

ND. The ND. has 'vilāsa' at no. 1, but it gives a different order and even the names differ. The ND. [(pp. 123) (kā. I. 46, 47)] reads as -

(46) “vilāso dhūnanam rodhaḥ sāntvanam varṇa saṃhṛtiḥ  
narma narmadyutis tāpaḥ syur etāni yathāruci.”

- (47) puṣpaṃ pragamaṇaṃ vajraṃ upanyāsopasarpaṇaṃ,  
pañcā'vaśyaṃ athā'ṅgāni pratimukhe trayodaśa.

Thus, 'dhūnana', 'rodha', 'sāntvana' are new names. We will see if the concepts coincide with any from the NS. We have 'tāpa' for 'tāpaṇa'. 'pragamana' is for 'pragayaṇa'. 'Nirodha' is for 'rodha' of ND. The last five have to be there in this sandhi, observes ND.

N.D. observes : “yathā-ruchi iti vṛtta-vaicitryā'nurodhena atra bhavanti, na bhavanti ca. puṣpā'dīni punaḥ pañca avaśyaṃ pratimukha-sandhau bhavanty eva. trayodaśā'py etāni pratimukha eva sutarāṃ nirbandham arhanti. In their employment, order is not to be observed. “uddeśya kramaś ca nibandheṣu nā'pekṣaṇīyaḥ iti.”

ND.-Vilāsa (pp. 124; I. 48) -

“vilāso nṛ-striyōr iḥā.” The desire of man and woman to get together is termed 'vilāsa'.

BP.-It is observed, pp. 209, lines - 5, 6 that

“samāgameccā bījaṃ tu, dṛśyā'dṛśyatayā sthitam,  
bindu-prayatnā'nugamād aṅgānyasya trayodaśa.

The aṅga-s are enumerated exactly after the DR.,

BP., - vilāsa - is “rati-ceṣṭā vilāsaḥ syād

dampatyōr nava-saṅgame.”

PR. - also follows, or quotes from, the DR. in enumerating the 13 aṅgas here.

PR. Vilāsa (p. 78) : “saṃbhoga-viśaya-manoratho vilāsaḥ.”

NLRK. - Follows the NS. in giving names.

Vilāsa - is, samīhā ratibhogārthā 'vilāsaḥ” this follows the NS.

RS. follows the DR. It defines vilāsa (p. 220, III. 41) as -

“vilāsaḥ saṅgamārthastu  
vyāpāraḥ parikīrtitaḥ.”

SD. follows the NS. - Vilāsa is,

“samīhā ratibhogārthā vilāsa iti kathyate.”



(2) 'Parisarpa' - is recognised by NS., DR., Śr. Pra., ND., BP., PR., NLRK.

NS. (pp. 43; XIX. 76b)

"dr̥ṣṭa-naṣṭā'nusaraṇaṃ parisarpa iti smṛtaḥ."

DR. (pp. 29; I. 32) - "dr̥ṣṭa-naṣṭā'nusarpanam."

Śr. Pra. (pp. 510, Ch. XII). Josyer should have looked into the NS. and added accordingly.

[dr̥ṣṭa-naṣṭā] nu-saraṇaṃ parisarpah."

ND. calls it "upasarpaṇa" and places it at no. 13. The last five among the 13, viz. puṣpa, pragamana, vajra, upanyāsa and upasarpaṇa have to be employed in the pratimukha and the first eight are to be employed at the poet's will. But all these are necessarily to be employed in this sandhi and not elsewhere -

Upasarpaṇa - is, "naṣṭésthā'nusarpanam." The recollection of the iṣṭa (= desired) which was lost, makes for 'upasarpaṇa'.

BP. (p. 209, line 11) -

"parisarpastu bijasya dr̥ṣṭa-naṣṭā'nusarpanam" This follows the DR.

PR. - (p. 78) - "dr̥ṣṭa-naṣṭa-padārthā'nusaraṇaṃ parisarpah."

NLRK. - "prathamam dr̥ṣṭasya paścān naṣṭasya anusaraṇaṃ parisarpah."

RS. (p. 221; III. 42)

"pūrvóddiṣṭasya bijasya tv aṅka-cchedā'dinā tathā  
naṣṭasyā'nusmṛtiḥ śāśvat parisarpa iti smṛtaḥ."

SD. "iṣṭa (dr̥ṣṭa-vi) naṣṭā'nusaraṇaṃ parisarpaś ca kathyate."

(3) Vidhūta - is recognised by NS., DR., Śr. Pra., ND., BP., PR., NLRK., RS., & SD.

NS. (p. 43; XIX. 77a)

"kṛtasyā'nunayasyā'dau vidhūtaṃ hy aparigrahaḥ".

DR. (p. 30; I. 33) - "vidhūtaṃ syād aratiḥ."

ND. calls it 'dhūnana', (p. 127, I. 48). This is placed at no. 2. - "dhūnanaṃ sāmny anādarah." i.e. disrespecting i.e. not accepting words that try to pacify; i.e. pursuance.

BP. (p. 209, line - 12) - "vidhūtaṃ aratir yūnos suratā'prāpti-sambhavā."

PR. (p. 78) - "aniṣṭa-vastu-vikṣepo vidhūtam.

NLRK. - "ādāv anunayasya kṛtasya a-parigraho vidhutam." We read 'vidhuta' for 'vidhūta' here.

RS. (p.221; III. 43) -

“nāyakā”der ipsitānām arthānām anavāptitaḥ,  
aratir yā bhavet taddhi vidvadbhīr vidhutaṃ matam.”

‘vidhuta’ is read for ‘vidhūta’.

SD. (pp. 367; VI. 90b) : “kṛtasyā’nunayasyā”ḍau vidhutaṃ tv aparigrahaḥ.”

This is NS., as above. but here we read ‘vidhuta’ and not ‘vidhūta’.

#### (4) Tāpana :

This is read in NS., RS., NLRK. & SD. DR. BP. & PR. have ‘śama’.

NS. (p. 43; XIX. 77b) - “apāya-darśanam yat tu,  
tāpanam nāma tad bhavet.”

The editor, NS., has a ft.-noot (p. 43) - “kecit tu tāpanasthāne śamanam paṭhanti; a-rateḥ śamanam athavā anunaya-graṇād arater nigrahaḥ śamanam. We read ‘śama’ in DR. and its followers. The ft.-note 3 (p. 34) also has - ms-‘ḍa’- ‘śamanam’.

DR. - reads ‘śama’ for ‘tāpana’ and defines it as, “tac chamaḥ, śamaḥ.” (p. 31; I. 33)

Avaloka has - tasyaḥ a-rater upaśamaḥ śamaḥ. ND. has tāpa - “apāya-darśanam tāpaḥ.” Śr. Pra. - (p. 511; XII Ch.) - has, ‘rodhaḥ’ (p. 128; kā. I. 48), defined as “rodhóratiḥ”; vṛtti has - artiḥ khedo vyasanam iṣṭa-rodhād rodhaḥ.” Due to hindrance with reference to the desired object, unhappiness caused is ‘rodhaḥ’.

BP. has śama; following the DR. It is defined as (pp. 209, line 13) - “yūnor araty upaśamaḥ

śama ity ucyate budhaiḥ.”

PR. (p. 78). - “aratyupaśamanam śamaḥ.” following the DR.

NLRK. has ‘tāpana’ following the NS. and the Śr. Pra. “apāya-darśanam yat tat, tāpanam” (p. 67, Kā.85)

RS. has śama, following the DR.

(pp. 222; III. 44) - “a-rateḥ śamanam tajñāḥ śamam āhur manīṣiṇaḥ.”

SD. - has tāpana, (p. 368, VI. 91).

“u(a)pāyadarśam yat tu tāpanam nāma tadbhavet” - This follows the NS.

The reading is faulty. It should be corrected from ‘upāya’ to ‘apāya’, following the NS.,

(5) **Narma** - is accepted by NS., DR., Śr. Pra., ND., BP., PR., NLRK., RS. & SD.

NS. (P. 44; XIX. 78a) -

“kṛidā'rtham vihitam yat tu, hāsyam narmēti tat smṛtam.”

DR. (p. 31, J. 33) has - “parihāsa-vaco narma”.

Śr. Pra. - following NS., observes (p. 511; Ch. XII). “kṛidā-vilobhanā'rtham ca hāsyam narmēti kīrtitam.”

ND. (p. 133; I. 49) - “kṛidāyai hasanam narma.”

BP. (p. 209, line 14) follows the DR. - “parihāsa-vaco narma.”

PR. (p. 78) - ‘parihāsa-vacanam narma.’

NLRK. treats ‘narma’ and ‘narmadyuti’ together. (p. 68; Kā. 86). It observes. narma-purastād vaktavyam. kṛidā-vilobhanā' rtham hāsyam narma-dyutiḥ.

The direct statement conveying a light joke is ‘narma’ and if such ‘narma’ employed in a jokular vein also becomes a source of attraction, it is termed ‘narma-dyuti’.

RS. (p. 222; III. 45) - “parihāsa-pradhānam yad vacanam narma tad viduḥ.”

SD. (p. 368, VI. 91) - “parihāsa-vaco narma.”

(6) **Narmadyuti** - is mentioned by the NS., DR., Śr. Pra., ND., BP., PR., NLRK., RS. & SD.

NS. - (pp. 44; XIX. 78b)

“doṣa-pracchādanā'rtham tu hāsyam narma-dutiḥ smṛtā” A.bh. observes : (p. 44). doṣo yenóktena pracchādayitum iṣyate tasyā'pi hāsyajananarvena narma ca sutarām dyotitam bhavatīti narma-dyutiḥ.”

DR. (pp. 32; I. 33) - “...dhṛtis tajjā dyutir matā.” Avaloka has... dhṛtir narmajā dyutir iti darśitam.

Śr. Pra. (pp. 512; Ch. XII) - “doṣa-pracchādanā'rtham tu hāsyam narma-dyutiḥ smṛtā.”

ND. (p. 135; I. 49) - ‘doṣā’vṛttau tu tad dyutiḥ.” The vṛtti (p. 136) adds : “ete ca narma-narmadyuti āṅge kāma-pradhāneṣu eva rūpakeṣu nibandham arhataḥ.”

BP. (p. 209, line 14) follows the DR. and observes - “dhṛtis tajjā dyutir bhavet.”

PR. (p. 78) - “anurāgódghātanóthhā prītir narma-dyutiḥ.”

NLRK. - see ‘narma’, above.

RS. - (p. 222; III. 45b) : “krodhasyā’pahnava’rtham yad hāsyam narma-dyutir matā.”

This follows the DR.

SD. (pp. 368; VI. 91) - “dhṛtis tu parihāsajā” - narma-dyutiḥ.

~~This is closer to the DR.~~

(7) **Pragayaṇa** - also, “pragamana”. This is accepted by NS., DR., Śr. Pra., ND., BP., PR., NLRK., RS. & SD.

NS. (p. 45; XIX. 79a) - has,

“uttaróttara-vākyam tu bhavet pragayaṇam punaḥ. The editor has a ft-note : ‘anye tu’pragamanam’ iti, ‘pra-śamanam’ iti ca paṭhanti.

We have noted above what the A.bh. has to say.

DR. (p. 33; I. 34) has ‘pragamanam’ -

“yathóttarā vāk pragamanam.”

Avaloka illustrates this, quoting a dialogue from Ratnāvalī (II) and observes :  
...ityantena rāja-vidūṣaka-sāgarikā-susaṅgatānām anyonya-vacaneno’ttaro’tta-  
rā’nurāga-bijódghātanāt pragamanam iti.”

Śr. Pra. (p. 512; Ch. XII) - “uttaróttara-vākyam tu bhavet praśamanam ta thā.”

Here we read ‘praśamana’.

ND. (p. 140, I. 50) has “pragamaḥ”.

“pragamaḥ prativāk-śreṇiḥ.” This is read as no. 10. The Vṛtti has - “praśna-  
pratipanthinī vāk, prativāk”; tasyāḥ śreṇiḥ. apakarṣato dve prativacane, utkarṣato  
bahūnyapi.” i.e. menimum two answers and maximum any number of answers are  
given in this.

BP. (p. 209, line 15) : “yuktóttaram pragamanam.”

PR. (p. 78) : “uttaróttarair vākyair anurāga-bīja-prakāśanam pragamanam.”

NLRK. (p. 68; kā. 86) - “uttaróttara-vākyam pragamanam.”

RS. (p. 223; III. 46) : tat tu pragamanam yat syād uttaróttara-bhāṣanam.”

SD. (pp. 369; VI. 92) : ....pragamanam vākyam syād uttaróttaram.”

(8) **‘Nirodha’**; (also-‘virodha’) is recognised by the NS., DR., Śr. Pra., ND., BP., PR.,  
NLRK., RS. & SD.; NS., (p. 45; XIX 79b) :

“yā tu vyaśana-saṃprāptiḥ.

sa nirodhaḥ prakīrtitaḥ.”

DR. (p. 33; I. 34) has, "hita-rodho nirodhanam."

Śr. Pra. (p. 512; Ch. XII.) : "sukhānām sanniveśo yaḥ  
sa nirodhaḥ prakīrtitaḥ."

ND. reads it at no. 3. - as 'rodhaḥ' - We have treated it under 'tāpana'. BP. (pp. 209; line 15) : "nirodhaḥ syān nirodhanam."

PR. (p. 78) has 'virodha', explained as -

"chadmanā hitā"gamana-nirodhanam virodhanam."

NLRK. (p. 69) (Kā. 86) has 'virodha'

"virodho vyasana-prāptiḥ."

(9) Paryupāsana - is read in the NS., DR., Śr. Pra., ND. (calls it sāntvana); BP., PR., NLRK., RS. & SD.

NS. (p. 45; XIX-80a) - "krddhasyā'nunayo yas tu bhavet tat paryupāsanam."

DR. - has "paryupāstih"; (p. 34; I. 34) -

"paryupāstir anunayaḥ."

Śr. Pra. (p. 513, Ch. XII) - "kruddhasyā'nunuyogastu bhavet tat paryupāsanam."

ND. calls it sāntvana; it reads it as no. 4.

(p. 130; kā. 48) : "sāntvanam sāma." -

vṛtti adds : kruddhasya anukūlam.

BP. has "paryupāstih" like the DR.

(p. 209, line 16) : "anunītiḥ paryupāstih." -

PR. (p. 78) has - "iṣṭajanā'nunayaḥ paryupāsanam."

NLRK. (p. 69; Kā. 87) : "kruddhasya anunayaḥ paryupāsanam." This follows the NS.

RS. (p. 223; III. 47) : "ruṣṭasyā'nunayo yaḥ syāt paryupāsanam īritam."

SD. (p. 370; VI. 92; 93a) - ... "kruddhasyā'nunayaḥ punaḥ, syāt paryupāsanam."

This follows the NS. -

(10) Puṣpa - is read in the NS., DR., Śr. Pra., ND., BP., PR., NLRK., RS. & SD.

NS. (p. 46, XIX. 80b) : "viśeṣavacanam yat tu  
tat puṣpam iti samjñitam."

DR. (p. 34; kā. I. 34) - "puṣpam vākyam, viśeṣavat." This follows the NS.

Śr. Pra. (p. 513, Ch. XII) - "viśeṣa-vacanam yat tu tat puṣpam iti samjñitam."

This is NS.

ND. (p. 138; I. 49) : “puṣpaṃ vākyam viśeṣavat.”

BP. (p. 209, line 16) : “puṣpaṃ sāti(nu)śayam vacaḥ.”

PR. reads ‘puṣpa’ after ‘vajra’.

(pp. 78) : “anurāga-prakāśana-viśiṣṭavacanam puṣpaṃ.”

NLRK. (p. 70; Kā. 86) : “viśeṣa vacanam puṣpaṃ” - This follows the NS.

RS. - (p. 223) (III. 47) : “yad viśeṣā’bhidhānā’rtham puṣpaṃ tad iti samjñitam.”

SD. (p. 370; VI. 93) : “...puṣpaṃ viśeṣa-vacanam matam” -

(11) ‘Vajra’ - is read by the NS., DR., Śr. Pra., ND., BP., PR., NLRK., RS., & SD.-

NS. (p. 46; XIX. 81a) : “pratyakṣa-rūkṣam yad vākyam vajram tad abhidhīyate.”

DR. reads it after “upanyāsaḥ.”

vajra (p. 35; I. 35) is - ‘vajram pratyakṣa-niṣṭhuraṃ’.

Śr. Pra. (p. 513; Ch. XII) : “pratyakṣa-rūkṣam yad vākyam tad vajram iti kīrtitam.”

ND. reads ‘vajra’ at no. 11. -

(p. 141, I. 50) - “vajram pratyakṣa-karkaśam.”

BP. (p. 209; line 17) “pratyakṣa-niṣṭhuraṃ vajram.”

PR. (p. 78) : “pramukha-niṣṭhura-vacanam”

NLRK. (p. 70, kā. 86) - “rūkṣa-prāyam vacanam vajram.”

RS. - (p. 124); III. 48) : “vajram tad iti vijñeyam sāksān niṣṭhura-bhāṣanam.”

SD. (p. 370; VI. 93) - “pratyakṣa-niṣṭhuraṃ vajram.”

(12) Upanyāsa - This is not read by Bhoja. All others read it.

NS. (p. 46 XIX. 81b) - “upapatti-kṛto yóṛthaḥ  
upanyāsaś ca sa smṛtaḥ.”

The foot-note 2 - has - bh. - sopāyavacanam yat tu sa upanyāsa ucyate.”

DR. (p. 34; I. 35) has, “prasādanam upanyāsaḥ.”

Śr. Pra. does not read this ‘aṅga’.

ND. - ‘upanyāsa’ is read at no. 12.

(p. 143, I. 50) “upapattir upanyāsaḥ.”

The Vṛtti observes : kamcid artham vidhātum yā upapattir yuktiḥ, sa upanyāsaḥ.”

BP. (p. 209; line 17) - "upanyāsaḥ prasādanam."

This follows the DR. and then NS.

PR. (p. 78) - "anurāga-hetu-vākya-racanā upanyāsaḥ.

NLRK. (p. 71, Kā. 86) : "upapatti-kṛto yōrthaḥ sa upanyāsaḥ..."

This is from NS.

RS. (pp. 124, III. 48b) : "yuktibhiḥ sahito yōrtha upanyāsaḥ sa ucyate."

This is closer to the ND.

SD. (p. 370; VI. 93) : "upanyāsaḥ prasādanam"

This follows the DR.

(13) 'Varṇa-saṃhāra' (= Varṇa-saṃhṛti, ND.) All sources read it.

NS. (pp. 47; XIX. 82a) : "cāturvarṇyopagamanam varṇa-saṃhāra isyate."

Abh. observes (pp. 47) : cāturvarṇya-śabdena pātrāṇi upa-lakṣyate. tena yatra pātrāṇi pṛthak sthitāṇy api dhaukyante sa varṇasaṃhāraḥ. upādhyāyās tv āhuḥ - iha vīra-pradhāne tāvan nāyaka-pratināyakau tat-sacivau ca pradhānatvena varṇyante iti varṇāḥ, kāma-pradhānēpi nāyako nāyikā, tat-sacivau ca iti." "atra caturṇām ekībhāvāḥ prayogasya, iṣṭasya racanā, prakāśye prakāśanam ity api prayojanāni. yattu brāhmaṇādi-varṇa-catuṣṭayamelanam iti tad a-phaladvāt anādṛtyam eva." This suggestion, which is rejected by A.bh. is accepted by the DR. and the SD.

DR. (p. 35, I. 35) : "cāturvarṇyopagamanam varṇa-saṃhāra isyate."

The Avaloka quotes - "pariṣad iyam..." from Mahāvīra-carita and explains it as an assemblage of Brahmins, Kṣatriya-s, etc. ... (pp. 36) : "...ity anena ṛṣi-kṣatriyā'mātyā'dīnām saṃgatānām varṇānām vacasā rāma-vijayā'samsinaḥ paraśurāma-durnayasyā'droha yācñā-dvāreṇa udbhedanād varṇa-saṃhāra iti.

Śr. Pra. (p. 513, Ch. XII) : "varṇitārtha tiraskāro varṇasaṃhāra ucyate."

This is taken up by the NLRK., as we will go to observe.

ND. (p. 131; I. 48) : "pātraugho varṇa-saṃhṛtiḥ." This follows Abh., and the NS. - The vṛtti reads "pṛthak-sthitānām pātrāṇām oghaḥ, kāryārtham mīlanam. varṇyante iti varṇāḥ, teṣām nāyaka-pratināyaka-nāyikā-sahāyā'di-pātrāṇām saṃhṛtir ekatra-karaṇam."

BP. (p. 209; line 18) : "varṇa-saṃhāra ity ukto nānā-jātīya-saṅgamaḥ."

This follows the DR. The BP. further observes (lines 20, 21) - "paurvāparyam bhavennarma-dyutyante vidhutā'dike, vilāsā'deḥ pradhānatvam netrā'di-vaśato bhavet."

PR. (p. 78) also follows the DR. & BP.

“caturvarṇa-nirvarṇanam varṇa-saṃhāraḥ.” - It further observes :  
eteṣāṃ madhye parisarpa-pragamana-vajrō-panyāsa-puṣpāṇāṃ prādhānyam.”

NLRK. (p. 71, Kā. 86) - “varṇitasya arthasya tīraskāro varṇa-saṃhāraḥ.” This follows the Śr. Pra.

RS. (p. 224; III. 49a) - “sarva-varṇōpagamako varṇa-saṃhāra ucyate.”

This follows the DR. The illustration is drawn from the Vira-carita and it is observed... “...ityantena hara-cāpa-dalana-viśayatayā, karṭṛtayaṃ anumantṛtayaṃ stotṛtayaṃ ca rāghavaviśvāmitra-paurā”di-parāmarśena brāhmaṇa-kṣatriyā”di-varṇānāṃ saṃgrahaṇād varṇa-saṃhāraḥ -

SD. (p. 371, VI. 94a) - cāturvarṇyōpa-gamanam varṇa-saṃhāra-īsyate.”

This follows the DR., BP., PR., & RS.

The Aṅgas of the Garbha-sandhi - They are 13, as follows;

(1) **Abhūtāharaṇam** - This is accepted by the NS., DR., Śr. Pra., ND., BP., PR., NLRK., RS. & SD.

NS. (p. 47, XIX. 82b) - “kapaṭāpāśrayam vākyam abhūtāharaṇam viduḥ.”

This is a speech based on deceit.

DR. (p. 37, I. 38) - “abhūtāharaṇam chadma.”

Śr. Pra. (p. 514, Ch. XIII) “abhūtāharaṇam tat syād vākyam yat kapaṭāśrayam.”

ND. (pp. 159; I. 55) calls it “a-satyā”haraṇa.” - “asatyā”haraṇam chadma.” This is read as no. 12. The ND. takes ākṣepa, adhibala, mārga, a-satyā”haraṇa and toṭaka as five principal aṅga-s of garbha-sandhi.

BP. counts 12 aṅga-s, with the omission of ‘prārthanā’. This follows the DR. which also omits ‘prārthanā’ and has only 12 aṅga-s for garbha-sandhi.

BP. (p. 210; line 20) has - “abhūtāharaṇam chadma.” This follows the DR.

PR. also has 12 aṅga-s of garbha-sandhi and follows the DR. & BP. in the omission of “prārthanā.”

PR. (p. 79) - has, “prastutōpayogi-chadmā”caraṇam abhūtāharaṇam.”

NLRK. (p. 73, Kā. 89) has 13 aṅgas and follows the NS. in mentioning “prārthanā”.

P. 73 has - ‘abhūtōdāharaṇa’ defined as “kapaṭāśrayam vacanam abhūtō-dāharaṇam.”



RS. - also (p. 225, Kā. III. 9-51, 52a) has 12 aṅgas following the DR., BP., etc. and omits “prārthanā”.

**abhūtāharaṇa** (III. 52a) is - “abhūtāharaṇam tat syāt, vākyam yat kapaṭāśrayam.”

SD. (p. 372, VI. 944, 95) has 13 aṅga-s and follows the NS. -

“tatra vyājāśrayam vākyam

abhūtāharaṇam matam.” (VI. 96a)

(2) **Mārga** : This is recognised by NS., DR., Śr. Pra., ND., BP., PR., NLRK., RS. & SD.

NS. (p. 47, XIX. 839) : “tattvārtha-vacanam caiva mārga ity abhidhīyate.”

DR. (p. 37, I. 38) : “...mārgas tattvārtha-kīrtanam.”

This follows the NS.

Śr. Pra. (p. 514, Ch. XII) The Śr. Pra. (p. 504, 5) does not read ‘vidrava’ and yet observes that the garbha-sandhi-aṅgāni are 13. But on p. 518, we read ‘vidrava.’ So obviously ‘Vidrava’ is left out on p. 504-5, and it is a mis-print.

But on p. 514, Śr. Pra., in place of ‘mārga’ we read ‘satyam.’ - “tattvārtha-vacanam caiva satyam ity abhidhīyate.”

ND. (p. 158, I. 55) has, “mārgas tattvārtha-śamsanam.” - The vṛtti observes : “paramārthasya vacanam sāmānyenocyamānam prakṛtārthena yat sambadhyate tan mārgaḥ.”

BP. (p. 210, line 22) - “tattvārtha-kīrtanam mārgaḥ...”

PR. (p. 79) : “tattvārthānukīrtanam mārgaḥ.”

NLRK (p. 74; Kā. 89) - “vāstavārtha-kathā mārgaḥ.”

SD. (p. 372; VI. 96) - “tattvārtha-kathanam mārgaḥ.”

(3) **Rūpa** - is recognised by NS., DR., Śr. Pra., ND., BP., PR., NLRK., RS. & SD.

NS. (p. 48; XIX. 83b) : “citrārtha-samavāye tu vitarko rūpam ucyate.”

The editor has a foot-note (p. 48) - “citrārtho vākya-samyogo rūpakam iti pāṭhe, rūpakam saṁśayasya tarkaṇa cchedanam iti kecit. anye tu citrārtham eva vaco rūpakam iti manyante.”

DR. (p. 38; I. 39) : “rūpam vitarkavad vākyam.”

Śr. Pra. (p. 515 Ch. XII) : “citrā'rtha samavāye tu tac citraṃ rūpaṃ iṣyate.”

ND. reads 'rūpa' at no. 2.

(p. 147; I. 53) - “rūpaṃ nānārtha-saṃśayaḥ.” The Vṛtti reads (p. 147) : nānārūpāṇāṃ arthānāṃ saṃśayo'navadhāraṇaṃ rūpaṃ iva rūpaṃ. a-niyato hy ākāro rūpaṃ ucyate. mukha-sandhyāṅgāt yukteḥ kṛtya-vicāra-rūpatvena niyatākārāyā asya bhedaḥ -

BP. (p. 210; line 22) - “rūpaṃ sandehakṛd vacaḥ.” p. 211 - line 1 - dvitrā'rtha samavāye tu vitarko rūpaṃ ucyate.”

PR. (p. 79) : vitarka-pratipādana-vākyam rūpaṃ.

NLRK. (p. 74) - ‘citrā'rtha-samāyukto vitarko rūpaṃ.’’

RS. (p. 226; III. 52d) : “rūpaṃ sandehakṛd vacaḥ.”

SD. (p. 373; VI. 96d) : “rūpaṃ vākyam vitarkavat.”

#### (4) Udāharaṇa - (udāhṛti; DR., ND. PR.)

This is recognised by NS., DR., Śr. Pra., ND., BP., PR., NLRK., RS. & SD.

NS. (p. 48; XIX. 84a) - “yat sātīśayavad-vākyam tad udāharaṇam smṛtam.”

Abh. observes : (p. 48) - loka-prasiddha-vastv apekṣayā yat sātīśayam ucyate utkarṣam āharati ity udāharaṇam.

DR. (p. 39; I. 39) : “...sōtkarṣam syād udāhṛtiḥ...”

Śr. Pra. (p. 515; Ch. XII) repeats the NS. expression.

“yac cātīśayavad vākyam tad udāharaṇam smṛtam.”

ND. (p. 150; I. 54) - “...udāhṛtiḥ samutkarṣaḥ.”

“loka-prasiddha-vastv apekṣayā yaḥ samutkarṣaḥ  
samutkrṣṭōrthah sa utkarṣā”haraṇād udāhṛtiḥ.”

(p. 151, Vṛtti). This follows the A.bh.

BP. (p. 211; line 2) : “yattu sātīśayam vākyam tad udāharaṇam bhavet.”

PR. (p. 79) - calls it ‘udāhṛti’ in the definition-

“prastutōtkarṣā”bhidhānam udāhṛtiḥ.”

NLRK. (p. 74) - “sātīśayam vacanam udāharaṇam”

RS. (p. 226; III. 53a) : “sōtkarṣam vacanam yattu tad udāharaṇam matam.”

SD. (p. 373; VI. 79a) : “udāharaṇam utkarṣayuktaṃ vacanam ucyate.”

(5) Krama - is recognised by NS., DR., Śr. Pra., ND., BP., PR., NLRK., RS. & SD.

NS. (p. 49; XIX. 84b) : “bhāva-tattvopalabdhis tu krama ity abhidhīyate.”

A.bh. (p. 49) : “bhāvasya bhāvyamānasya vastuno bhāvanā’tisaye satyūhaṃ prati bhāvanā’dībalāt syāt yā paramārthopalabdhīḥ sā kramah.”

DR. (p. 39; I. 39b) - has two opinions.

“kramah saṃcintyamānā”ptir  
bhāvajñānam athā’pare.”

Śr. Pra. (p. 515) : “bhāvatattvopalabdhistu krama ityabhidhīyate.”

For ‘krama’, ‘tama’ is read here, through misprint.

ND. (I. 54) : “kramo bhāvasya nirmayaḥ.” - vṛtti adds : bhāvasya parābhiprāyasya, athavā bhāvyamānasya arthasya ūha-pratibhāvā’divaśān nirmayo yathāvasthita-rūpa-nīscayaḥ kramah buddhis tatra kramate, na pratihanyate ity arthāt.”

BP. (p. 211, line 3) quotes from the DR. -

“kramah sañcintitārthā”ptir bhāva-jñānamathā’pare.”

PR. (p. 79) - “saṃcintitārtha-prāptiḥ kramah.”

NLRK. (p. 75) - “bhaviṣyat-tattvopalabdhīḥ kramah.”

RS. (p. 226; III. 53b) - “bhāvajñānam kramo yad vā cintyamānārtha-saṅgatiḥ.”

SD. (p. 374; VI. 97b) - “bhāva-tattvopalabdhis tu kramah syāt...”

(6) Saṅgraha - is read in the NS., DR., Śr. Pra., ND., BP., PR., NLRK., RS. & SD.

NS. (p. 49, XIX. 85a) : “sāma-dānā”di-sampannaḥ saṅgrahaḥ parikīrtitaḥ.”

DR. (p. 40; I. 40) - “saṅgrahaḥ sāma-dānóktir...”

Śr. Pra. (p. 516) : (Ch. XII) : sāmādānārtha-sampannaḥ saṅgrahaḥ parikīrtitaḥ.”

ND. reads it as no. 1 -

(p. 145, I. 53a) : “saṅgrahaḥ sāma-dānā”dih.”

The vṛtti observes : sāma-dāne daṇḍa-bhedayor upalakṣaṇam. ādi-śabdena māyendra-jālā”di-saṅgrahaḥ.”

BP. (p. 211, line 4) : “saṅgrahaḥ sāma-dānóktiḥ.” This is DR. .

PR. (p. 79) - “prastutōpayogi-sāmādāna-vacanam saṅgrahaḥ.” - The editor has a foot-note - “prastutōpayogi-samādhānavākyaṃ iti pāṭhāntaram.”

NLRK. (p. 75) “sāma-dānā”di-yuktaṃ vākyaṃ saṅgrahaḥ.”

RS. (p. 227; III. 54a) - “saṅgrahaḥ sāmādānārtha saṃyogaḥ parikīrtitaḥ.”

SD. (p. 374; VI. 97d, 98a) - ....saṅgrahaḥ punaḥ sāma-dānārtha-sampannaḥ.”

(7) ‘Anumāna’ - is read in the NS., DR., Śr. Pra., ND., BP., PR., NLRK., RS. and SD.

NS. (p. 49, XIX. 85b) : “rūpānurūpa-gamanam anumānam iti smṛtam.”

Abh. (p. 69) observes : “rūpyamānena pratyakṣā”dy upalabhyamānena rūpasya vyāpakasya avinābhāvino gamanam jñānam anumānam niścayā”tmakatvād ūhaḥ, upāyayukter anyatvāt.”

DR. (p. 40. I. 40) : ...abhyūho līngato’numā.

Śr. Pra. (p. 516; Ch. XII) : “rūpānurūpa-gamanam anumānam iti smṛtam.”

ND. (p. 148; I. 53b) : “anumā niścayo līngāt.”

vṛtti observes : (p. 148) - “līngād hetor nāntariyakasya līngino niścayo’numānam. niścaya-rūpatvena ca ūha-rūpāyā yukter bhidyate.”

BP. (p. 211, line 4) “...abhyūho līngato’numā.”

PR. (p. 79) - “līngād abhyūhanam anumānam.”

NLRK. (p. 75) - “rūpasyā’nugamanam anumānam. rūpyate iti rūpaṃ vastu.”

RS. (p. 227; III. 54 b) : “arthasyā’bhyūhanam līngād anumānam pracakṣate.”

SD. (p. 375; VI. 98a) : “...līngād ūho’numānatā.”

(8) Prārthanā - is recognised by the NS., Śr. Pra., ND., NLRK., SD.

NS. (p. 50, XIX. 86a) : “rati-harṣotsavānām tu prārthanā prārthanā bhavet.”

DR. does not read this aṅga. It has only 12 aṅga-s of the garbha-sandhi. This is an effort not to exceed the total of 64 aṅgas.

Śr. Pra. (p. 516; XII. Ch.) has - “abhyarthānāparam vākyaṃ prārthanéty-abhidhīyate.”

ND. reads it at no. 4.

(p. 149; I. 53) : “prārthanā bhāva-yācanam.”

vṛtti reads - “bhāvānām sādhyaphalócitānām rati-harṣa-utsavā”dīnām yācanam prārthanā.”

BP. (p. 211) does not read ‘prārthanā’.

PR. (p. 79) also does not read ‘prārthanā’. These two go with the DR.

NLRK. (p. 75) reads this after NS. -

“abhyarthanā-yuktaṃ vacanam prārthanā.”

RS. also does not read this aṅga.

SD. (p. 375; VI. 98) reads it following the NS. -

“rati-harṣotsavānām tu prārthanam prarthana bhavet.” It adds in the vṛtti - (p. 376) : idam ca prārthanā”khyam aṅgam. yammate nirvahaṇe bhūtāvasaratvāt praśasti-nāmāṅgam nā’sti tanmatānuśāreṇa uktam, anyathā pañca-ṣaṣṭhi-saṃkhyatva-prasaṅgāt.”

(9) Ākṣipti - is read in the NS., DR., Śr. Pra., ND., BP., PR., NLRK., RS., & SD.

This is also termed “ākṣipta” in the NS., Ākṣepa in DR., & ND., utkṣipta in NLRK., and kṣipti in the SD. - Śr. Pra. calls it “saṃkṣipti”

NS. (p. 50, XIX. 86b) : “garbasyódbhedanam yat sā ākṣiptir ity abhidhīyate.”

The foot-note 2 has - “bh. - yat tu tam ākṣepam vidur budhāḥ.”

DR. reads it as no. 12

(p. 44; I. 42b) : “garbha-bīja-samudbheda ākṣepaḥ parikīrtitaḥ.”

Avaloka observes : (p. 45) : etāni dvādaśa garbhāṅgāni prāptyāśā-pradarśakatvenópanibandhanīyāni. eṣāṃ ca madhye abhūtāharaṇa-mārga-toṭaka-adhibalā”kṣepāṇām prādhānyam. itareṣāṃ yathā-saṃbhavam prayoga iti sāṅgo garbhasandhir uktaḥ.”

Śr. Pra. (p. 517, Ch. XII) : “garbhasyódbhedanam yat tu saṃkṣiptir iti gīyate.”

ND. calls it ‘ākṣepa’ and reads it at no 9.

ND. (p. 155, I. 54d) : “ākṣepo bīja-prakāśanam.”

Vṛtti reads - “prāptyāśā’vasthā-nibaddhasya bījasya mukha-kāryópāyasya prakāśanam prakarṣeṇa āvirbhāvanam ākṣepaḥ.”

BP. (p. 211, line 8) also reads it at no. 12, like the DR. - “garbha-bīja-samutkṣepād ākṣepaḥ parikīrtitaḥ.” This follows the DR.

PR. also reads it as no. 12, after BP. & DR. (p. 79) - “iṣṭārthópāyā’nusaraṇam ākṣepaḥ.” Vṛtti adds : eteṣāṃ madhye abhūtāharaṇa-mārga-toṭakādhibalā”kṣepāṇām prādhānyam.”

NLRK. (p. 76) calls it “utkṣiptam” -

“bījódbhedanam utkṣiptam.”

RS. (p. 228) also reads it at no. 12, after DR. and calls it ‘ākṣepa’ -

(p. 228, III. 57a) : “garbha-bīja-samutkṣepam ākṣepam paricakṣate.”

SD. (p. 376, VI. 99) calls it ‘kṣipti’ and defines it as - “rahasyārthasya tad bhedaḥ kṣiptiḥ syāt...”

(10) **Toṭaka** - is read by the NS., DR., Śr. Pra., ND., BP., PR., NLRK., RS. and SD.

NS. (p. 51, XIX. 87a) : “saṃrambha-vacanam caiva toṭakam tv iti saṃjñitam.”

Abh. (p. 51) observes : “āvega-garbham yad-vacanam tat toṭakam. sa cā'vego harṣāt, krodhāt anyato'pi vā. bhinatti yato hrdayam tatas toṭakam.”

DR. (p. 41; I. 40) : “saṃrabdhām toṭakam vacaḥ.”

The DR. also observes : “granthā'ntare tu-toṭakasyā'nyathābhāvam bruvate'dhibalam budāḥ. & also, “saṃrabdhā-vacanam yattu toṭakam tad udāhṛtam.”

Śr. Pra. (p. 517, Ch. XII) : saṃbhāva-vacanam caiva toṭakam samudāhṛtam.”

ND. places it at No. 13; (p. 160; I. 55) -

“toṭakam garbhitam vacaḥ.” Under the influence of the A.bh., the vṛtti adds - “krodha-harṣā'di-saṃbhūtā'vega-garbhitam vacanam, toṭayati bhinatti hrdayam iti toṭakam.”

BP. has toṭaka, (p. 211; line 6) : “saṃrambha-yuktam vacanam yat tat toṭakam ucyate.”

PR. (p. 79) - “roṣa-saṃbhrama-vacanam toṭakam.”

NLRK. (p. 76) “saṃrabdhā-vacanam toṭakam.”

RS. (p. 227, III. 55a) : “sa-saṃrambham tu vacanam saṅgirante hi toṭakam.”

SD. (p. 376; VI. 99) : “...tro(to)ṭakam punaḥ, saṃrabdhā-vāk...”

(11) **Adhibala** (= atibala; RS.) is read in all the nine sources (i.e. from NS. to SD.)

NS. (p. 51; XIX. 87b) : “kapaṭenā'tisandhānam bruvate'dhibalam budhāḥ.”

DR. (p. 41; I. 40) : “adhibalam abhi-saṃdhiḥ”

Śr. Pra. (p. 517, Ch. XII) : “kapaṭasthā'nyathābhāvam bruvate'dhibalam budhāḥ.”

ND. (p. 156; I. 55) - “adhibalam balā'dhikyam.”

vṛtti reads - “paraspara-vañcana-pravṛttayor yasya buddhi-sāhāyā'di balā'dhikyena yatkarma itaram abhisandhātum samartham tat karma balaviṣaye adhika-bala-yogād adhibalam.”

BP. (p. 211; line 5) : “ceṣṭayā'nyā'tisandhanam vadanty adhibalam budhāḥ.”

PR. (p. 79) - “iṣṭa-janā'ti-sandhānam adhibalam.”

NLRK. (p. 76) : “kapaṭasya anyathākaraṇam adhibalam.”

RS. (p. 227, III. 55b) : “budhair atibalam prokṛtam kapaṭenā'ti-vañcanam.”

RS. reads “atibalam”.

SD. (p. 376; VI. 99d) : “adhibalam abhi-sandhicchalena yaḥ.”

(12) “Udvega” - is read in all sources.

NS. (p. 51; XIX 88a) : “bhayaṃ nṛpā'ri-dasyūttham udvegaḥ parikīrtitaḥ.”

Abh. has - ‘ari’ (ādi) śabdān nāyikā”di.”

DR. (p. 43; I. 42) “udvego'rikṛtā bhītiḥ.”

Śr. Pra. (p. 518; XII) “bhayaṃ nṛpā”di-janitam udvegas saṃprakīrtitaḥ.”

ND. reads it at no. 7., (pp. 152; I. 54) : “udvego bhīḥ.” Vṛtti - “caura-nṛpa-ari-nāyikādibhyo bhayaṃ udvegaḥ”.

BP. (p. 211, line 7) : “udvego'rikṛtā bhītiḥ.” This follows the DR.

PR. (p. 79) : “apakāri-janād bhayaṃ udvegaḥ.”

NLRK. (p. 77) : “nṛpati-janita-bhayaṃ udvegaḥ.”

RS. (p. 228; III. 56a) : “śatru-corā”di-saṃbhūtaṃ bhayaṃ udvega ucyate.”

SD. (p. 377; VI. 100a) : “nṛpā”di-janitā-bhitiḥ udvegaḥ parikīrtitaḥ.”

(13) Vidrava (also, saṃbhrama) - read in the NS., DR., Śr. Pra., ND., BP., PR., NLRK., RS. & SD.

NS. (p. 52; XIX. 88b) - “śaṅkā-bhaya-trāsa-kṛto vidravaḥ samudāhṛtaḥ.”

The foot-note has - 1-bh. - “nṛpārībhaya-saṃyuktaḥ saṃbhramastv abhisamjñitaḥ.”

DR. calls it ‘saṃbhrama’.

(p. 43; I. 42) : “śaṅkā-trāsau ca saṃbhramaḥ.”

Śr. Pra. (p. 518, Ch. XII) : “śaṅkā-bhaya-trāsa-kṛto vidravaḥ samudāhṛtaḥ.”

ND. reads it at no. 8; (p. 154; I. 54) : ‘dravaḥ śaṅkā.’

Vṛtti reads : “bhaya-trāsa-kāriṇo vastuno yā śaṅkā apāya-kāraṅga-sambhāvanā, sa dravati ślathī-bhavati hṛdayam anayā iti dravaḥ.” - upanataṃ bhayaṃ udvegaḥ. tat-sambhāvanā tu vidravaḥ.”

BP. (p. 211; line 7) : “śaṅkā-trāsau ca saṃbhramaḥ.”

PR. (p. 79) : “śaṅkā-trāsau ca saṃbhramaḥ.” These two follow the DR. in naming and defining this aṅga.

NLRK. (p. 77) - śaṅkā-bhaya-trāsa-kṛto vidravaḥ.”

RS. (p. 228); III. 56b) : “śatru-vyāghrā”di-saṃbhūtā śaṅkā syāt saiva saṃbhramaḥ.”

SD. (p. 377; VI. 100b) : ‘śaṅkā-bhaya-trāsa-kṛtaḥ saṃbhramo vidravo mataḥ.”

The PR. observes (p. 79) : . eteṣāṃ madhye abhūtāharaṇamārga-toṭakā'dhibalā'pekṣāṇāṃ prādhānyam.”

Āṅga-s of the Vimarsā-saṃdhi are 13 - as follows :

- (1) Apavāda - is read in the NS., DR., Śr. Pra., ND., BP., PR., RS., NLRK. and SD.  
 NS. (p. 52; XIX. 89a) : “doṣa-prakhyāpanam yat tu sōpavāda iti smṛtaḥ.”  
 DR. (p. 46; I. 45) : “doṣa-prakhyā’pavādaḥ syāt.”  
 Śr. Pra. (p. 519; Ch. XII) : ‘doṣa-prakhyāpanam yat syāt sōpavādaḥ prakīrtitaḥ.”  
 ND. (p. 164; I. 58) : “apavādaḥ parivādaḥ.”

Vṛtti reads : “parivādaḥ sva-para-doṣōdghaṭṭanam.”

The ND. (p. 161) counts drava, prasaṅga, sampheta, apavāda, chādanam, dyutiḥ, khedaḥ, nirodha and saṃrambha - as first nine which are subsidiary to the four major or principal that are, śakti, prarocanā, dāna and vyavasāya. The Vṛtti (p. 161) observes : “dravā”dīni nava prayojanam apeksya gaunatayā badhyante. śaktyādīni catvāri punaḥ prādhānyena.

BP. (p. 211, line-19) “doṣa-prakhyā’pavādaḥ syāt.”

PR. (p. 80) - “doṣa-prakhyāpanam apavādaḥ.”

NLRK. (p. 80) - “tatra doṣa-prakhyāpanam apavādaḥ.”

RS. (p. 229; III. 60b) : “tatrā’pavādo doṣānām prakhyāpanam itīryate.”

SD. (p. 378; VI. 102a) - “doṣa-prakhyā’pavādaḥ syāt.”

- (2) Smpheṭa - is read in all sources.

NS. (p. 53; VL. 89b) - “roṣa-grathita-vākyam tu samphetaḥ parikīrtitaḥ.”

DR. (p. 47; I. 45) : “sampheto roṣa-bhāṣanam.”

Śr. Pra. (p. 519; XII) reads it as “samsphoṭa”.

“roṣa-grathita-vākyam tu samsphoṭa iti kīrtitam.”

ND. reads it as no. 3. (p. 163; I. 58) - “samphetaḥ krodhajam vacaḥ.” - Vṛtti has - “parasparam krodhajanmōttara-pratyuttara-rūpaḥ saṃlāpaḥ samphetaḥ.”

BP. (p. 211; line 19) : “sampheto roṣa-bhāṣanam.”

PR. (p. 80) - “roṣa-bhāṣanam samphetaḥ.”

NLRK. (p. 81) : “roṣa-grathitam vākyam samphetaḥ.”

RS. (p. 229; III. 61a) : doṣa-saṃgrathitam vākyam samphetaṃ saṃpracakṣate.”

RS. has “doṣa” for “roṣa”.

SD. (p. 378; VI. 102) : “sampheto roṣa-bhāṣanam.”



(3) Drava - (also vidrava, abhidrava) is read in the NS., DR., Śr. Pra., ND., BP., PR., NLRK., RS. & SD.

NS. (p. 53; XIX. 90a) - "guru-vyatikramo yas tu sa dravaḥ parikīrtitaḥ."

DR. reads it after 'vidrava'.

(p. 48, I. 45d) : "dravaḥ guru-tiraskṛtiḥ."

DR., BP., PR. & RS. do not recognise kheda, pratiṣedha, and chādana as read in the NS. 'vidrava' of DR. is like 'pratiṣedha' and 'chalana' is like 'chādana'.

Śr. Pra. (p. 520; XII th.) : "guru-vyatikramo yas tu sa dravaḥ parikīrtitaḥ."

This follows the NS.

ND. places "drava" at no. 1. (pp. 161; I. 57) -

"dravaḥ pūjya-vyatikramah."

BP. (p. 211; line 20) also reads it after 'vidrava' as in DR. and defines it after DR. It has the same sandhyaṅga-s as read in the DR. "dravaḥ guru-tiraskṛtiḥ."

PR. (p. 80) : "gurutiraskṛtir dravaḥ." PR. follows the DR.

NLRK. (p. 81); - "guruvyatikramo dravaḥ."

RS. (p. 230; III. 62a) reads it after 'vidrava' as in the DR. - "guru-vyatikramam prāha-dravaṃ tu bharato muniḥ."

SD. (p. 379; VI. 103b) - "dravo guru-vyatikrāntiḥ śokā"vegā"di-sambhavā."

(4) Śakti is read in all sources.

NS. (p. 53, XIX. 90b) : "virodhi-prasāmo yaś ca sā śaktiḥ parikīrtitā."

DR. (p. 49. I. 46a) : "virodha-śamanam śaktiḥ."

Śr. Pra. (p. 520, Ch. XII) - "virodha-prasāmo yas tu sā śaktiḥ parikīrtitā." This is NS.

ND. (p. 172; I. 60a) : "kruddha-prasādanam śaktiḥ."

Vṛtti has - "kruddhasya prasādanam anukūlanam buddhi-vibhavā"di-śakti-kāryatvena sā śaktiḥ. yadi vā kruddhasya dviṣataḥ prakarṣeṇa sādhanam vināśanam śaktiḥ."

BP. (p. 211; line 21) - "virodha-śamanam śaktiḥ."

RS. (p. 80); "virodha-śamanam śaktiḥ."

NLRK. (p. 82) "virodha-prasāmah śaktiḥ."

RS. (p. 210; III. 62b) - "utpannasya virodhasya śamanam śaktir ucyate."

SD. (p. 380; VI. 104) -

"...śaktiḥ punar bhavet.

virodhasya prasāmanam."

(5) Vyavasāya is read in the NS., DR., Śr. Pra., ND., BP., PR., NLRK., RS. & SD.

NS. (p. 54; XIX. 91a) : “vyavasāyaś ca vijñeyah pratijñā-hetu-sambhavaḥ.”

Abh. : pratijñātasya aṅgikṛtasya arthasya hetavo ye, teṣāṃ sambavaḥ, prāpti-vyavasāyah.”

DR. (p. 51; I. 47a) : “vyavasāyah sva-śaktyuktiḥ.”

Śr. Pra. (p. 521; XII) “vyavasāyaś ca vijñeyah pratijñā-hetu-sambhavaḥ.”

ND. reads it at No. 13; (p. 177, I. 60) -

“vyavasāyo'rthyahetuyuk.”

Vṛtti - “yug” iti yojanaṃ yuk. arthanīyaphalasya hetus tadyogo vyavasāyah.”

BP. (p. 212, line 1) : “vyavasāyah sva-śaktyuktiḥ.”

PR. (p. 80) : “pratijñā-hetu-samśliṣṭaṃ vākyam vyavasāyah.”

NLRK. (p. 82) : “pratijñā hetu-samśliṣṭaṃ vākyam vyavasāyah.”

RS. (p. 231, III. 65a) - “vyavasāyah sva-sāmarthya-prakhyāpanam udīryate.”

SD. (p. 379; VI. 103) : ‘vyavasāyaś ca vijñeyah pratijñā-hetu-sambhavaḥ.”

(6) ‘Prasaṅga’ is read in all sources.

NS. (p. 54; XIX. 91b) : “prasaṅgaś caiva vijñeyah gurūnām parikīrtanam.”

DR. (p. 50; I. 46) reads it at no. 7. - “gurukīrtanam prasaṅgaḥ.”

Śr. Pra. (p. 521; XII) “a-prastutārtha-kathanam prasaṅgaḥ parikīrtitaḥ.”

This is different from the NS. and also DR.

ND. (p. 162; I. 58) reads it at no. 2 -

“prasaṅgo mahatām kīrtiḥ.”

BP. (p. 211, line 22) follows the Śr. Pra. and observes -

“a-prastutārtha-kathanam prasaṅga iti kathyate.”

PR. (p. 80) : “guru-kīrtanam prasaṅgaḥ.”

NLRK. (p. 83) also follows the Śr. Pra. & B.P. -

“a-prastutārtha-khyāpanam prasaṅgaḥ.”

RS. (p. 231, III. 63, 649) : has something different. -

“prastutārtha-pragamanam prasaṅgaḥ parikīrtitaḥ.” This is exactly opposite of Śr. Pra., BP. & NLRK. But it again says : “prasaṅgam kathayanty anye gurūnām parikīrtanam.”

This follows the NS., DR. etc.

SD. (p. 380; VI. 104) : “...prasaṅgo guru-kīrtanam.”

(7) **Dyutih** - read in NS., DR., Śr. Pra., ND., BP., PR., NLRK., RS. & SD.

NS. (p. 54; XIX. 92a) : “vākyam ādharṣa-samyuktam, dyutis taj-jñair udāhṛtā.”

Abh. - ādharṣo nyakkāraḥ, tena samyuktam.

DR. (p. 49; I. 46) reads it at no. 6 -

“tarjanódvejane dyutih.” -

Śr. Pra. (p. 522, XII) “vākyamādharsa-samyuktam dyutis taj-jñair udāhṛtā.”

ND. - reads it at no. 6 (p. 167, I. 59) -

“tiraskāro dyutih.”

Vṛtti adds : tarjanódvejane dyutiṃ kecid icchanti. apare tu tarjanā”rṣane dyutiṃ manayante. tad etan mata-dvayam api arthābhedāt samgrhītam. evam anyad api sāksāt pāramparyeṇa vā nyakkāra-param vākyam dyutir eva.” (pp. 167).

BP. (p. 211, line 21) - “tarjanódvejane dyutih.”

PR. (p. 80) : “tarjanódvejane dyutih.”

NLRK. (p. 83) : tarjanā ādharṣanā. adhikṣepakṛtaṃ vākyam dyutih.” - dur ukti-pariṇāmā āhutir atra abhimatā.

RS. (p. 231, III. 63a) : “dyutir nāma samuddiṣṭā tarjanóttejane budhaiḥ.”

SD. (p. 379, VI. 104a) : “tarjanódvejane proktā dyutih.”

(8) **kheda** - is read in all sources except in DR., BP., PR. & RS. They do not read pratiṣedha and chādana also.

NS. (p. 54; XIX. 92b) : “manaśceṣṭā-viniṣpannaḥ śramaḥ kheda udāhṛtaḥ.”

Śr. Pra. (p. 522; Ch. XII) defines it exactly after the NS. - “manaśceṣṭā-viniṣpannaḥ śramaḥ khedaḥ udāhṛtaḥ”.

ND. reads it at no. 7. (p. 167; I. 59) -

“khedaḥ śramaḥ kāya-manódbhavaḥ.”

NLRK. (p. 83) - “manśceṣṭā-samutpannaḥ śramaḥ khedaḥ.”

SD. (p. 381; VI. 105a) : “manaśceṣṭā-samutpannaḥ śramaḥ kheda iti smṛtaḥ.”

(9) **Prateṣedha** not read in DR., BP., PR., & RS. NS., Śr. Pra., NLRK. & SD. read it. It is also termed ‘Niṣedha’. ND. replaces ‘pratiṣedha’ by ‘saṃbhrama’.

NS. (p. 55, XIX. 939) : “īpsitārtha-pratighātaḥ pratiṣedhaḥ prakīrtitaḥ.”

Śr. Pra. (p. 623, XII) same as NS.

ND. - has ‘saṃrambha’ in place of ‘pratiṣedha’ (p. 171, I. 59) : “saṃrambhaḥ śakti-kīrtanam.”

Vṛtti has - samrabdhānām uttara-pratyuttareṇa ātmaśakti-bhāṣaṇam samrambhaḥ.”

This has nothing to do with ‘pratiśedha’ of the NS. ND. observes that, “a-samrabdhasyā’pi dṛśyate.”

ND. also observes that : “samphete krodhena bhāṣaṇa-mātram, samrambhe tu bala-kīrtanam ity anayorbhedah.”

The ND. is very clear that all āṅga-s in a given sandhi should be taken only as stray instances causing beauty. There are differences in āṅgas in all samdhis, from the point of view of beauty involved, from the point of view of views of the seniors (vṛddhas, i.e. Bharata etc.) and also from the angle of expression. So, in all sandhis the āṅga-s are given in view of various illustrations only. There is nothing fixed concerning their number or naming : (p. 175; Vṛtti) - “sarva-sandhiṣv api matāntarāṇi vṛddhókatvāt, bhaṇīti-bhedāt, vaicitryasya rañjakatvāc ca pramāṇāny eva, ata eva sarva-sandhiṣvaṅga-samkhyā-karaṇam udāharaṇa-param iti.”

NLRK. (p. 84) follows the NS. and observes :

“īpsitārtha-pratīghātaḥ pratiśedhaḥ.”

SD. (p. 382, VI. 105b) follows the NS. :

“īpsitārtha-pratīghātaḥ pratiśedha itīśyate.”

(10) Virodhana (also nirodhana; virodha)

All sources accept this.

NS. (p. 55; XIX. 93b) : “kāryātyayópagamanam virodhanam iti smṛtam.”

The foot-note 2 has - bha. “uttaróttara-vākyam tu virodha iti samjñitah.”

ḍa. - “virodhanam tu samrambhāt uttaróttara-bhāṣaṇam.”

The Abh. reads ‘nirodhana’.

DR. calls it “virodhanam”; (p. 52; I. 14) -

“samrabdhānām virodhanam.”

Śṛ. Pra. (p. 523, XII) follows The N.S. -

“kāryātyayópagamanam virodhanam iti smṛtam.”

ND. (p. 161); calls it ‘nirodha’, but reads ‘virodha’ on p. 168, I. 59 and explains it as : “virodhaḥ prastutajyāniḥ.” Vṛtti - prastutasya kāryasya jyāniḥ atyayo virodha iva “virodhaḥ”. The ND. adds : “anye tu kheda-virodhau na manyante. vidrava-vicalane tu paṭhanti. tatra vidravaḥ bandha-vadhā’dhy avasāyā”diḥ. ...atra sva-guṇā”viṣkaraṇāt vicalanam iti.

BP. (pp. 212, line 3) : “saṃrabdhānām avajñā yā tad virodhanam ucyate.

PR. (p. 80) : “krodha-saṃrabdhānām anyōnya-vikṣepo nirodhanam.”

NLRK. (p. 84) “kāryātyayōpagamanam virodhanam”.

RS. (p. 232, III. 65b) : “virodhanam nirodhōktiḥ śabdānām ca parasparam.”

SD. (p. 382; VI. 105) : “kāryātyayōpagamanam virodhanam iti smṛtam.”

(11) Ādāna - is accepted by NS., DR., Śr. Pra., ND., BP., PR., NLRK., RS. & SD.

NS. (p. 55; XIX. 94a) “bīja-kāryōpagamanam ātānam iti saṃjñitam.”

“Ātāna” is the same as “ādāna.”

DR. reads it at no. 13. (p. 55; I. 48) :

“...ādānam kārya-saṃgrahaḥ.”

Śr. Pra. (p. 524; XII) : “bīja-kāryōpagamanam ādānam iti saṃjñitam.”

ND. (p. 177; I. 60) : “phala-sāṃpiyam ādānam.” Vṛtti - “mukhya-phalasya - darśanam ādānam.”

BP. (p. 212, line 6) : “ādānam kārya-saṃgrahaḥ.”

PR. (p. 80) - “kārya-saṃgraha ādānam.”

NLRK. (p. 84) - “bīja-kāryōpagamanam ādānam.” i.e. collection of actions that form the seed, or availability of means is “ādāna”.

BP. (p. 232; III. 66) : ādānam kārya-saṃgrahaḥ.”

SD. (p. 384; VI. 106) “kārya-saṃgraha ādānam.”

(12) Chādana (also, sādana). DR., BP., PR., & RS. do not accept this. ND. observes that some accept “Chalana” for ‘Chādana’.

NS. (p. 55; XIX. 94b) - “apamāna-kṛtam vākyam

kāryārtham cchādanam bhavet.”

Abh. observes (p. 55, 56) : “vākyam iti tad artho lakṣyate. karotiḥ bahumāne vartane, tena duṣṭo’pyartho’pamānena bahumatīkṛtaḥ. tad apamāna-kalaṅkā’pacāraṇācchādanam iti.”

DR. has ‘chalana’ in place of ‘chādana’. (p. 51; I. 46) :

“chalanam cā’vamānanam.”

Dr. Kulkarni’s observations as quoted earlier may be looked into once again.

Śr. Pra. (p. 505) mentions ‘sādhana’ which could be ‘sādana’. But then this is not treated later and after ‘ādāna’ we read ‘prarocanā’ (p. 524, Ch. XII)

ND. (p. 165, I. 58) “chādanam manyu-mārjanam”

Vṛtti - “manyur apamāno yena mārjyate tat chādanam.”

...anye tu - kāryārtham a-sahyasyā'pyarthasya sahanam chādanam ā-mananti.

...“anye tv asya sthāne cchalanam avamānana-rūpam āhuḥ. apare tu chalanam sammoham icchanti.

Thus a number of differences are noted with reference to this aṅga.

BP. (p. 212, line 1) has “chalanam cā'vamānanam.”

PR. (p. 80) has ‘calana’ - “upamānam tu calanam.”

NLRK. (p. 85) has ‘sādanam’ -

“apamāna-kṛtam vākyam sādanam.”

RS. (p. 231, III. 64) : “avamānā”di-karaṇam kāryāntam chalanam viduḥ.”

SD. (p. 384; VI. 106, 7) : “...tad āhuḥ chādanam punaḥ

kāryārtham apamānā”deḥ sahanam

khalu yad bhavet.”

(Read Dr. Kulkarni's comments as given earlier).

**(13) Prarocanā is read in all sources.**

NS. (p. 56; XIX. 95a) : “prarocanā tu vijñeyā saṃhārā'rtha pradarsinī.”

Abh. (p. 56) : “saṃhriyamāṇasya nirvāhyamāṇasya arthasya darśikā prakarṣeṇa rocata iti prarocanā.”

DR. (p. 53, I. 47) : “siddhā”mantraṇato bhāvidarśikā syāt prarocanā.”

Śr. Pra. (p. 524; Ch. XII) : “prarocanā ca vijñeyā saṃhārā'rtha-pradarśanī.”

ND. (p. 175; I. 60) : “bhāvi-siddhiḥ prarocanā.”

Vṛtti - “nirvahaṇa-sandhau bhāvino'rthasya siddhiḥ, siddhatvena upakramaṇam, prakarṣeṇa rocyate dīpyate'nayā rūpakā'rtham iti prarocanā.”

BP. (p. 212, line 5) : “āmantraṇam yat sādhyasya siddhavad sā prarocanā.”

PR. (p. 80) “siddhavad bhāvi-śreyah-kathanam prarocanam.”

NLRK. (p. 85) (Kā. 94b) : “prarocanā ca vijñeyā saṃhatā'rtha pradarsinī.”

This follows the NS. & Śr. Pra., verbatim.

RS. (p. 232; III. 66a) : “siddhavad bhāvinórthasya sūcanā syāt prarocanā.”

SD. (p. 383; VI. 106a) : “prarocanā tu vijñeyā saṃhārā'rtha-pradarśinī.”

This follows the NS., Verbatim.

The Abh. (NS., p. 56) has some further observation : “yuktir ity anye vyavaharanti. atra uddeśa-kramatyāge yat keśāmcit aṅgānām lakṣaṇam tat krama-a-niyama-sūcanārthārthaḥ. anena pāṭha-viparyāseṇa yat-kaiścid uddeśasya anyathā-paṭhanam, tad-granthakāra-āśaya-a-parijñāna-kṛtam.

kecid atra anyatamam aṅgam na-ādhiyate, dvādaśaṅgam eva etat-sandhim āhuḥ.

anye tu trayodaśaṅgarve'pi - asya nirvahaṇa sandhāv api prasakter iti-  
vṛttāntarbhūtatvena gaṇanam anyāyyam iti trayodaśaṅgarvāt catuḥṣaṣṭi-saṃrūpām  
samarthayante.

The DR., BP., PR. & RS. do not recognise the three aṅga-s viz. kheda, pratisedha and chādana. These three are replaced by vidrava, vicalana and chalana. They are read as -

**Vidrava** - DR. (p. 47, I. 45) - “vidravo vadha-bandhā”dihī.

BP. (p. 211; line 20) “vidravo vadha-bandhā”dih.”

PR. (p. 80) : “vadha-bandhā”dikam vidravaḥ.”

RS. (p. 230; III. 61a) : “virodha-vadha-dāhā”dir vidravaḥ parikīrtitaḥ.”

**Vicalana** - DR. (p. 54, I. 48) : “vikatthanā vicalanam.”

BP. (p. 212; line 6) - “vikatthanā vicalanam.”

PR. (p. 80) : “sva-guṇā”viṣkaraṇam vicalanam.”

PR. (p. 80) : “sva-guṇā”viṣkaraṇam vicalanam.”

RS. (p. 232, III. 66b) : “ātmā”lāpād vicalanam.”

**Chalana** - DR. (p. 51; I. 46) “chalanam cā'vamānanam.”

BP. (p. 212; line 1) “chalanam cā'vamānanam.”

PR. (p. 80) has ‘calanam’ defined as -

“upamānam calanam.” This is a new aṅga.

RS. - (p. 231; IV. 64b) : “avamānā”di-karaṇam kāryāntam chalanam viduḥ.”

See also Dr. Kulkarni's observations as quoted earlier. It may be noted that there are a number of differences in the avamarśa-sandhyaṅga-s and this is also noted by the Abh. as seen above. ND. also observes (p. 178) : “kecid anyatamāṅgā'naṅgikāreṇa dvādaśaṅgam eva ekaṁ sandhim icchanti. evaṁ garbha-sandhim api. etāny avamarśa-sandhes trayodaśāny aṅgāni.”

**Aṅga-s of the Nirvahaṇa-sandhi are 13, as follows :**

(1) **Sandhi** - is read in all the sources consulted by us, except NLRK.

NS. (p. 57; XIX. 97a) : “mukhabijōpagamaṇaṁ sandhir ity abhidhīyate.”

DR. (p. 56; I. 51) : “sandhir bijōpagamanam.”

Śr. Pra. (p. 525) “camūr (mukha) bijōpagamanam sandhir ity abhidhīyate.”

‘camūh’ seems to be a mistake.

ND. (p. 179; I. 62) : sandhir-bīja-phalā”gamah.”

Vṛtti - “mukha-sandhau nyastasya prārambhā’vasthā-viśayīkṛtasya bījasya udghāṭaunmukhyādyair vikāraiḥ phale, phalā”gamā”vasthāyām āgamanam dhaukanam sandhiḥ.”

BP. (p. 212, line 18) “sandhir bijōpagamanami”. This is DR.(see above).

PR. (p. 81) : “bijōpaśamnam sandhiḥ.”

NLRK. (p. 86) has “arthah” for ‘sandhi’ -

“tatra pradhānā’rthōpakṣepaḥ arthah.”

RS. (p. 233; III. 70a) : “sandhir bijōpagamah.”

SD. (p. 385; VI. 109) - “bijōpagamanam sandhiḥ.”

(2) **Nirodha** - is read in all sources.

NS. (p. 57, 98a XIX) “kāryasya’nveṣaṇam yuktyā nirodha iti kīrtitaḥ.

DR. (p. 57; I. 51) calls it “vibodha” -

“vibodhaḥ kārya-mārgaṇam.”

Śr. Pra. (p. 525; XII) : ‘anyasya’ (This should read ‘kāryasya)

“anyasya’nveṣaṇam yuktyā

nirodha iti kīrtitaḥ.”

The illustration from Ratnāvalī is also read in the DR. and the A.bh.

ND. (p. 179; I. 63) : “nirodhaḥ kārya-mīmāṃsā.”

Vṛtti explains : naṣṭasya kāryasya yuktaye yad anveṣaṇam tan niruddha-vastu-viśayatvān nirodhaḥ.”

BP. also reads ‘vibodha’, after the DR. (p. 212; line 18) : “vibodhaḥ kārya-mārgaṇam.”

PR. (p. 80, 81) reads “virodhaḥ” for ‘vibodhaḥ’. “kārya-mārgaṇam virodhaḥ.”



NLRK. calls it “anuyoga” and reads it at no. 9. “yukta-kāryā’nveṣaṇam anuyogaḥ.”

Name given is different; the concept is the same.

RS. - also calls it ‘virodha’.

(p. 233; III. 70) : “kāryasyā’nveṣaṇam virodhaḥ syāt.”

SD. (p. 385; VI. 109) calls it ‘vibodha’.

“vibodhaḥ kāryamārgaṇam.”

Thus for this sandhyaṅga we have four names such as ‘nirodha’, ‘virodha’, ‘vibodha’ and ‘anuyoga’.

(3) Grathanam : read in NS., DR., Śr. Pra., ND., BP., PR., NLRK., RS. & SD.

NS. (p. 57; XIX. 98b) : “upakṣepas tu kāryāṇām grathanam parikīrtitam.”

The foot-note 7 - reads (p. 57) : bha. - prasavaṃ nāma tad bhavet.

DR. (p. 57, I. 51) - “grathanam tad upakṣepaḥ.”

Śr. Pra. (p. 525, XII) : “upakṣepast tu kāryāṇām grathanam parikīrtitam.”

ND. (p. 180; I. 63) “grathanam kārya-darśanam.”

Vṛtti : “kāryam mukhya-phalam. grathyate sambadhyate vyāpāreṇa mukhya-phalam anena iti grathanam.”

BP. (p. 212, line 19) : “grathanam tad upakṣepaḥ.” tacchabdaḥ kārya-vācakaḥ.”

PR. (p. 81) : “kāryopakṣepaṇam grathanam.”

NLRK. (p. 86) : “kāryāṇām bahūnām upakṣepo grathanam.”

RS. (p. 234; III. 71) : “grathanam tad upakṣepaḥ.”

SD. (p. 386; VI. 110) : “upanyāsas tu kāryāṇām grathanam...”

(4) ‘Nirṇaya’ is read in all sources.

NS. (p. 57, XIX. 99a) : “anubhūtā’rtha kathanam nirṇayaḥ samudāhṛtaḥ.”

Abh. - “pramāṇa-siddhasya vastunaḥ kathanam ity arthaḥ.”

DR. (p. 58, I. 51) : “anubhūtā’khyā tu nirṇayaḥ.”

Śr. Pra. (p. 526, XII) : “anubhūtā’rtha-kathanam nirṇayaḥ samudāhṛtaḥ.”

ND. (p. 181; I. 63) : “nirṇayo’nubhava-khyātiḥ.”

Vṛtti (p. 81) reads : jñeye’rthe sandihānam apratipadyamānam vā prati, yad anubhavasya, anubhūtasya arthasya nirṇayārthaṃ kathanam tat jñeyā’rtha-nirṇayāt nirṇayaḥ.”

BP. (p. 212, line 20) : “nirṇayastv anubhūtā”khyah punah punar itiritah.”

PR. (p. 81) : “bījā’nuguna-kārya-prakhyāpanam nirṇayah.”

NLRK. (p. 87) : ‘anubhūtā’rtha-kathanam nirṇayah.”

RS. (p. 234; III. 70) : “...syād anubhūtasya nirṇayah kathanam.”

SD. (p. 386; VI. 110, 111a) :

“...nirṇayah punah” anubhūtā’rtha-kathanam.”

(5) ‘Paribhāṣaṇa’ is read in the NS., DR., Śr. Pra., ND., BP., PR., NLRK., RS. & SD.

NS. (p. 58) (XIX. 99b) - “parivāda-kṛtam yat syāt tad āhuḥ paribhāṣaṇam.”

DR. (p. 58; I. 52) : “paribhāṣā mitho jalpah.”

Śr. Pra. (p. 526; XII) : “parivāda-kṛtam yat syāt tad āhuḥ paribhāṣaṇam.”

ND. (p. 182, I. 63) “paribhāṣā sva-bhāṣaṇam.”

Vṛtti - “svā’parādhódghaṭṭanam paribhāṣā.” (p. 182)

BP. (p. 212, line 21) - It follows the NS. verbatim in place of the DR. and also calls it ‘paribhāṣaṇa’. DR. & ND. call it “pari-bhāṣā”. BP. reads : “parivāda-kṛtam yat syāt tad āhuḥ paribhāṣaṇam. BP. also reads : “paribhāṣā mitho jalpah.”

PR. (p. 81) : “mitho jalpanam paribhāṣā.” This follows the DR. only terminology differs, not the concept.

NLRK. (p. 87) - “parivāda-kṛtam paribhāṣaṇam.”

RS. (p. 234; III. 71a) - “paibhāṣā tv anyonyam jalpanam athavā parivādaḥ.”

SD. (p. 387, VI. 111) : “...vadanti paribhāṣaṇam parivāda-kṛtam vākyam.”

(6) Dyuti - (Kṛti) - is read in NS., Śr. Pra.; Kṛti - for dyuti is read in DR., ND., BP., PR., RS., SD., NLRK. has “dyuti.”

NS. (p. 58; XIX. 100a) : “labdhasyā’rthasya śamanam dyutim ācakṣate punah.”

Abh. (p. 58) : sāmāthyāt praśamanīyasya krodhāder arthasya prāptasyā’pi yat praśamanam sā dyutiḥ. -

DR. (p. 60, I. 53) reads “kṛtiḥ”.

- “kṛtir labdhā’rtha-śamanam.”

Śr. Pra. (p. 527) - “īrṣyā-kopa-praśamanam dyutim ācakṣate budhāḥ.”

The reading “īrṣyā...” follows foot-note. 3. (p. 58, NS.)

- “pa - “īrṣyākopopāśamanam.”

ND. also reads “kṛti”. (p. 184; I. 64) : “kṛtiḥ kṣemaḥ”; Vṛtti - “labdhasya paripālanam kṣemaḥ.”

This is a new concept. Vṛtti also reads - “anye punar asya sthāne prāptasya prātikulya-śamanam dyutim āhuḥ.” - This is a reference to the NS. view.

BP. follows the DR. (p. 213, line 2) -

“kṛtir labdhārtha-śamanam  
tat sthīrī-karaṇam tu vā.”

PR. (p. 81) : “labdha-sthīrīkaraṇam kṛtiḥ.”

The BP. & PR. seem to be closer to the ND.

NLRK. (p. 87) : “īrsyā-kleśopaśamanam dyutiḥ.”

This follows the alternate reading as given in the NS., noted as above.

RS. has ‘kṛti’ (p. 235, III. 72b).

“kṛtir atha labdhārtha-susthīrīkaraṇam.” This is closer to BP. & ND.

SD. also has ‘kṛti’ - “...labdhārtha-śamanam kṛtiḥ.”

(7) **Ānanda** - is read in all sources.

NS. (p. 58; XIX. 100b) : “samāgamas tathārthānām  
ānandaḥ parikīrtitaḥ.”

Abh. : arthitasya tathā iti prakāśataiḥ prārthitasya samyag a-punar-viyogavad yad āgamanam tad ānada-hetutvād ānandaḥ.”

DR. (p. 59, I. 52) : “ānando vāñchitā”vāptiḥ”,

Śr. Pra. (p. 527; XII) : “samāgamas tathārthānām ānandaḥ parikīrtitaḥ.”

ND. (p. 186; I. 64) : “ānando vāñchitā”gamaḥ.”

Vṛtti - “prakāśatair vāñchitasya arthasya sāmastyena āgamaḥ prāptiḥ, ānada-hetutvād ānandaḥ.”

BP. (p. 213, line 1) : “ānando vāñchitā”vāptiḥ.”

PR. (p. 81) : “vāñchitārtha prāptir ānandaḥ.”

NLRK. (p. 88) : “vāñchitārthā”gamaḥ ānandaḥ.”

RS. (p. 235, III. 72a) : “abhilaṣitārtha-samāgamam ānadam prāhur ācāryāḥ.”

SD. (p. 287) (VI. 112) “...ānando vāñchitā”gamaḥ.”

**(8) Samaya** - is read in all sources.

NS. (p. 59, XIX. 101a) : “duḥkhasyā’pagamo yas tu samayaḥ sa nigadyate.”

DR. (p. 60, I. 52) - “...samayo duḥkha-nirgamaḥ.”

Śr. Pra. (p. 528, XII) “duḥkhasyópaśamaś caiva samayótha nigadyate.”

ND. (p. 187, I. 64) : “samayo duḥkha-nirvāsaḥ.”

Vṛtti - “duḥkha-nirgama-yuktaḥ kālaḥ, samayaḥ.”

BP. (p. 213, line 1) : “samayo duḥkha-nirgamaḥ.”

PR. (p. 81) : “duḥkha-prasāmanam samayaḥ.”

This is slightly different from NS. & others.

RS. (p. 235, III. 72b) : “samayo duḥkhā’pagamaḥ.”

SD. (p. 287, VI. 112) : “samayo duḥkha-niryānam.”

**(9) Prasāda** is read in all sources. ND. terms it “upāsti”.

NS. (p. 59, XIX. 101b) : “śuśrūṣādy upasampannaḥ prasādaḥ prītir ucyate.”

DR. (p. 59, I. 52) : “prasādaḥ paryupāsanam.”

Śr. Pra. (p. 527, XII) : “śuśrūṣādy upasampannaḥ prasāda iti kīrtitaḥ.”

ND. (p. 183; I. 64) terms it “upāsti” (= upāsanā), “sevā upāstih.”

Vṛtti - (p. 183) : “sevā para-prasatti-hetur-vyāpāraḥ.”

- “That activity which pleases others.”

BP. (p. 212, line 22) - “prasādaḥ paryupāsanam.”

PR. (p. 81) : “paryupāsanam prasādaḥ.”

NLRK. (p. 88) : “śuśrūṣā”dy upapannā’rthaḥ prasādaḥ.”

RS. (p. 234, III. 71b) : śuśrūṣā”di-prāptam prasādam āhuḥ prasannatvam.”

SD. (p. 387, VI. 112) : “śuśrūṣā”dih prasādaḥ syāt.”

**(10) Upagūhana** : read in NS., DR., Śr. Pra., ND., BP., PR., NLRK., RS. & SD.

NS. (p. 59, XIX. 102a) : “adbhutasya tu samprāptih upagūhanam iṣyate.”

DR. (p. 61, I. 53b) treats ‘pūrvabhāva’ and ‘upagūhana’ together : “kāryadrṣyādbhutaprāptiḥ pūrvabhāvopagūhane.”

Avaloka (p. 62) has “kāryadarśanam pūrvabhāvaḥ” “adbhuta-prāptih upagūhanam.”

Śr. Pra. (p. 528, XII) : “adbhutasya ca samprāptih bhavet tad upagūhanam.”

ND. (p. 187) terms it 'parigūhana', and also (I. 64) - "adbhutā"ptih parigūhana', and also 'upagūhana'.

Vṛtti (p. 188) - "vismaya-sthāyi-bhāvā"tmakasya adbhuta-rasasya prāptir upagūhanam."

BP. (p. 213, line 4) also treats, 'pūrva-bhāva' and 'upagūhana' together in the same terms as the DR. :

"kāryadrṣty adbhutaprāptih  
pūrvabhāvōpa-gūhane."

PR. (p. 81) : "adbhutā'rtha-prāptir upagūhanam."

NLRK. (p. 89) : "adbhuta-prāptir upagūhanam."

RS. (p. 236, III. 73a) terms 'upagūhanam' as 'upagūḍha' "upagūḍham adbhuta-prāptih."

SD. (p. 388, VI. 112, 113) : "...tad bhaved upagūhanam, yat syād adbhuta-samprāptih."

(11) Bhāṣaṇa - is read in all sources.

NS. (p. 59, XIX. 102b) : "sāma-dānā"di-sampannam bhāṣaṇam samudāhṛtam."

Abh. (p. 59) : yadyapi tadā'rthēpi samgrahākhyam idam aṅgam uktaṁ tathā'py atra sthānévaśyam prayoktavyatā khyāpayitum punar upādānam śabdāntareṇa ca."

DR. (p. 61, I. 53) - "mānā"dyūptiś ca bhāṣaṇam."

This is a different sense then the one taken by NS.

Śr. Pra. (p. 528, XII) : "sāma-dānā"di-sampannam bhāṣaṇam bruvate budhāḥ."

ND. (p. 190, I. 65) : "bhāṣaṇam sāma-dānóktiḥ."

Vṛtti - sāmno vacanam, dadataś ca vacanam. ābhyām upalakṣaṇa-paratvāt priyam hitam ca grhyate."

BP. (p. 213, line 3) : "mānā"dyarthasya samprāptir bhāṣeti paribhāṣyate."

PR. (p. 81) - "prāpta-kāryānumodanam ābhāṣaṇam."

NLRK. (p. 89) - "sāma-vādā"di-sampannam bhāṣaṇam bhāṣaṇam."

BP. (p. 235, III. 73) : "bahumānād vyākhyānam bhāṣaṇam."

SD. (p. 388; VI. 113) : "...sāma-dānā"di bhāṣaṇam."

(12) Pūrvavākya - is read in NS.,

NS. (p. 60, XIX. 103a) : “pūrva-vākyaṃ tu vijñeyam yathóktā'rtha-pradarśanam.”

DR. treats it as ‘pūrva-bhāva’ with upagūhana. See. no. 10. See also Dr. Kulkarni's observations as quoted earlier.

Śr. Pra. (p. 529, XII) : “pūrva-vākyaṃ tu vijñeyam  
yathóktā”kṣepa-darśanam.”

This reading follows the NS. (foot-note 1 - “punar vākyaṃ - ...yathóktā”kṣepa-darśanam.”

ND. (p. 191, I. 65) calls it “pūrva-bhāvaḥ” and defines after the DR. - “prāgbhāvaḥ kṛtya-darśanam.” The ND. suggests that this ‘aṅga’ is different from ‘pūrva-vākya’. (Vṛtti., p. 192 : “mukha-sandhy ādy-ukta-vākya-sadrśa-vākya darśanam pūrva-vākyaṃ aṅgam asya sthāne kecid āmananti.” This clearly refers to the NS.

BP. (p. 213, line 4) also treats “pūrva-bhāva” with ‘upagūhana’, after the DR. See no. 10.

PR. (p. 81) has - “iṣṭa-kārya-darśanam pūrva-bhāvaḥ.”

This also follows the DR., BP.

NLRK. (p. 89) has - “bījódghāṭanam pūrvavākyaṃ.”

This follows the NS.

RS. follows the DR. (p. 236, III. 73b) :

“taḍ upakramaṇa-kāryasya  
syād drṣṭiḥ pūrva-bhāvas tu.”

SD. follows the NS. (p. 388, VI. 113) :

“pūrva-vākyaṃ tu vijñeyam  
yathóktā'rthópa-darśanam.”

(13) ‘Kāvya-saṃhāra’ is read in all sources.

NS. (p. 60, XIX. 103b) - “vara-pradāna-samprāptiḥ kāvya-saṃhāra iṣyate.”

DR. (p. 62, I. 54) - “varā”ptiḥ kārya-saṃhāraḥ.”

Śr. Pra. (p. 529, XII) : “vara-pradāna-samprāptiḥ kāvya-saṃhāra iṣyate.”

ND. (p. 193, I. 65) : “varecchā kāvya-saṃhāraḥ.”

Vṛtti (p. 193) observes : “īpsitam dātum abhilāṣo varecchā. taj janito “bhūyaḥ kiṃ te priyam upakaromi” iti praśna ity arthaḥ sa ca grahitari a-pratīcchati,

pratīcchati ca sampādayitur bhūyasīm icchāṃ darśayitum nibadhyate. tatra sati sarvasminn eva īpsite sampanne prastutam kāvyam eva saṃhriyate iti “kāvyā-saṃhārah.” The vṛtti notes at the end. : (p. 195) : “idam aṅgaṃ avaśyaṃ nibandhaniyaṃ praśastināntariyakatvāt, iti.”

BP. (p. 213, line 5) : “vara-pradāna-lābhā”dih kārya-saṃhāra ucyaṭe.”

PR. (p. 81) : “kāryā’rthōpa-saṃhṛtiḥ saṃhārah.”

NLRK. (p. 90) : “varapradāna-saṃprāptiḥ kāvyā-saṃhārah.”

RS. (p. 237, III. 74-a) : “dharmā’rthādy upagamanād upasaṃhārah kṛtārthatākathanam...”

SD. (p. 389, VI. 114) : “varapradāna-saṃprāptiḥ kāvyā-saṃhāra isyate.”

(14) Praśastiḥ. This is read in all sources. Read Dr. Kulkarni’s observations as quoted above.

- NS. (p. 61, XIX. 104a) : “nṛpa-deśa-praśāntiś ca praśastir abhidhīyate.”

DR. (p. 63, I. 54) : “praśastiḥ śubha-śaṃsanam.”

Śr. Pra. (p. 505) mentions ‘praśastyā’dir ityā’di’ but does not treat the same at the end.

ND. (p. 195, I. 65) : “praśastiḥ śubhaśaṃsanā.”

Vṛtti observes : (p. 196) : iyaṃ cā’vaśyaṃ nibandhaniyā. tathā iti-vṛttāntar-bhūtā céyam. tenāśyāḥ pṛthag gaṇane catuṣaṣṭir api aṅga-saṃkhyā bhavati.

BP. (p. 213, line 6) : “praśastir vīrya-vijaya-maṅgalā”di-praśaṃsanam’.

PR. (p. 81) : “śubha-śaṃsanam praśastiḥ.”

NLRK. (p. 90) : “nṛpa-dvijāti-gavā”dīnāṃ śivā’vadhāraṇa-pūrvam kāvyasya avadhāraṇam praśastiḥ.”

RS. (p. 237, III. 74b) : bharataiścarā’carāṇāṃ āśīrāśaṃsanam praśastiḥ syāt.”

SD. (p. 389; VI. 114b) : “nṛpa-deśā”di-śāntis tu praśastir abhidhīyate.”

With this the treatment of the 64 sandhyaṅgas is over. We have already taken note of the six-fold purpose of the Sandhyaṅga-s earlier. The fact remains that these sandhyaṅga-s deal more with accidents rather than with essentials and broadly speaking, as they add to the beauty of a dramatic composition, they may be termed “alaṃkāra-s” in the wider sense of the term, as suggested by Daṇḍin.

## Types of drama

We will now turn our attention to the characteristics of the ten major types of drama - the daśa-rūpaka and will also furnish definition-cum-description as given by the NS., DR., ND., BP., NLRK., RS. and SD. Normally there is hardly any difference seen in the concepts. So, first we will try to present the concepts that are seen as common to almost all sources and at the end we will read definitions from selected sources to complete our chapter of classification of poetry, here “daśa-rūpaka-vicāra” or, “nāṭaka-nirṇaya.” - We will deal with the ten major types of drama here. Hemacandra and Bhoja quote from the NS. So, they are not treated separately.

### (1) NĀṬAKA :

The Nāṭaka depicts an event or events in the life of a prince who is of a noble lineage (prakhyāta-vaṃśo rājarṣiḥ). Nāṭaka deals only with the past and not with present or future. The poet, for dramatic effect prefers the presentation of certain events and rejects or modifies others to suit his purpose of ‘rasa’. He may even add imagined events to suit the high profile of his hero.

The hero has to be a distinguished historical figure such as Udayana of Kauśāmbī, or a figure from tradition such as Agnimitra, or hero from the epics such as the Rāmāyaṇa or the Mahābhārata, or Purāṇas.

Abhinavagupta observes that the distinction may be in form of a quality of the hero, or of the action or of the place of action. The ND. takes these three as inter-dependent. The BP., SD. and some others observe that the nāṭaka should have a hero who is of “dhīrōdāṭṭa” type only. Others feel that the nāyaka can be ‘dhīra-lalita’ also. Hemacandra however feels that one and the same hero may look as belonging to different types with reference to context. Dhanika also feels it this way. The hero is again expected to be a saintly prince - “rājarṣi”. Thus he has qualities of a balanced view, devoutness of character etc. ‘Rāja’ means a ‘kṣatriya’, as explained by the ND. SD. observes that the hero of a nāṭaka should also be a mortal, a divine or a pseudo-divine person. But Bharata wants him to be a human being.

As for the plot, place and nature of the hero, the motive and the sentiments prevailing as principal, Bharata suggests that the nāṭaka should end with the achievements of the puruṣārthas viz. dharma, artha and kāma. The activities of the hero should keep in centre various kinds of prosperity (nānā-vibhūti). These several vibhūti-s include dharma, artha, kāma, which bring in wealth and pleasure. This is the main motif of the dramatic action. Thus Bharata holds that nāṭaka should



contain elements of prosperity-riddhi and enjoyment - vilāsa. Abhinavagupta explains 'riddhi' as acquisition of kingdom, conquest over foes, etc., and pleasure includes all sensual enjoyments and pursuit of fine arts.

The determination of the object of hero's pursuit leads to the central point viz. the rasa that should be principal. With 'artha' and 'kāma' in centre, the sentiment will be 'vīra' or 'śṛṅgāra' as principal. Other sentiments can be subsidiary to these. Bharata holds that a nāṭaka is full of a number of activities and displays diverse sentiments and feelings. Nāṭaka is rich in different behaviour-patterns or vṛtti-s with reference to the various sentiments and emotions presented.

The nāṭaka should have its theme or plot divided into five to ten acts (aṅkas) with various sandhi-s and sandhyaṅga-s properly displayed.

The definitions of 'nāṭaka' as read in some of the major sources are as follows :

**NS. of Bharata** - (The Śr. Pra. & Hemacandra accept the NS. verbatim) :

- (Ch. XVIII. 10-12) :

“prakhyāta-vastu-viṣayam  
prakhyātódātta-nāyakam caiva,  
rājarṣi-vamśya-caritam  
tathaiva divyāśrayōpetam.  
nānā-vibhūtibhīryutam  
riddhi-vilāsāḥ dibhir guṇaiścaiva,  
aṅka-praveśakāḥ dhyam  
bhavati hi tan nāṭakam nāma.  
nṛpatinām yac caritam  
nānā-rasa-bhāva-ceṣṭitam bahudhā,  
sukha-duḥkhōtpatti-kṛtam  
bhavati hi tan nāṭakam nāma.”

Dr. Bhat (p. 115, Bharata-nāṭya-mañjarī) observes in foot-note 4, : “The expectation about a well-known plot and exalted type of hero is natural. Aristotle's prescription of tragic drama is similar. Heroes like Rāma, Kṛṣṇa, Udayana, Duṣyanta fulfil the peculiar requirement. The divine characters are used in the nāṭaka form only in smaller episodes (patākā or prakarī) as, for example, the divine Bhagavatī Ambā in the Nāgānanda. The reason, Abhinava explains, is that 'devacarita' is not very suitable for dramatic representation intended for human

appreciation; if it is connected with vipralambha, karuṇa, adbhuta, it will not differ very much from human emotions; besides, the gods have no unhappiness or misery; human response thus is difficult to be obtained. Types like Dima, Samavakāra, which use heroic themes, are alone proper for divine characters.”

**The DR.** - The DR., as done in the NS. also, has treated the whole structure of the drama as seen earlier by us. However, it talks of ‘nāṭaka’ in the beginning of the third flash. DR. observes : (III. 1)

“prakṛitvād athā’nyeṣaṃ  
bhūyo-rasa-parigrahāt,  
saṃpūrṇa-lakṣaṇatvāc ca  
pūrvam nāṭakam ucyate.”

Then DR. III. 22-27 observe -

eṣāṃ anyatamenā’rthaṃ  
pātram cā’kṣipyā sūtrabhṛt. - 21b.  
prastāvanānte nirgacchet (sūtradhārah)  
tato vastu prapañcayet. 22-a  
tatra,  
abhigamya-guṇair yukto  
dhīrōdāttah pratāpavān - 22b.  
kīrtikāmo mahōtsāhas  
trayyās trātā mahīpatiḥ  
prakhyāta-vaṃśyo rājarsih  
divyo vā, yatra nāyakaḥ. - 23  
tat prakhyātaṃ vidhātavyaṃ  
vṛttam atrā’dhikārikam,  
yat tatrā’nucitaṃ kiñcin  
nāyakasya rasasya vā - 24  
viruddhaṃ tat parityājyam  
anyathā vā prakalpayet.  
ādyantam evaṃ niścītya,  
pañcandhā tad vibhajya ca - 25

khaṇḍasaḥ sandhi-samjñāns  
 tān vibhāgān api khaṇḍayet.  
 catuḥṣaṣṭis tu tāni syuḥ  
 aṅgānī'ty aparaṃ punaḥ. - 26  
 patākā-vṛttam apyūnam  
 ekā'dyair anu-samdhībhiḥ  
 aṅgāny atra yathālābhaṃ  
 abhisandhiṃ prakarīṃ nyaset. - 27 etc.

DR. then goes on to define or explain 'aṅka' i.e. act, etc. We will look into the same when we take up the ND. which has a more methodical, mature and scientific presentation.

ND. - In the first viveka the ND. treats of "nāṭaka", with all its topics. Thus 'aṅka', 'viṣkambhaka etc.' 'upāya-s i.e. bīja", etc. daśā i.e. avasthās, sandhi-s and sandhyaṅga-s are treated in the first chapter. The topics connected with nāṭaka, or rūpaka in general follow like flowers and fruits following buds. The presentation reminds us of the great Vāgdevatāvātāra Mammata, who has given chapters treating different topics as mentioned in the definition of 'kāvyā'.

The ND. also follows the same technique. The definition of nāṭaka follows after first (ND. I/3) enumerating the types of major rūpakas that are twelve - in the opinion of the authors.

Nāṭaka is defined as (ND. I. 5) -

"khyātā"dya-rāja-caritaṃ  
 dharma-kāryārtha-sat-phalam,  
 sā'ṅkopāya-daśā-sandhi-  
 divyāṅgaṃ tatra nāṭakam."

The Vṛtti reads : "khyātā"dya-rājasya caritaṃ yatra ity anyapadārthaḥ. iha khyātatvaṃ tridhā nāmnā, ceṣṭitena, deśena ca. kauśāmbhyāṃ caritaṃ vatsarājena eva rañjakam. caritaṃ api vatsarājasya, kauśāmbhyāṃ vāsavadattā-lābhā'dikaṃ eva. vāsavadattā lābhā'dikaṃ vatsarājasya kauśāmbhyāṃ eva.

carita-khyātatvaṃ ca pradhāna caritā'pekṣayā. tatas tad anuyāyini rañjakatvā'rthaṃ akhyātāny api caritāni kriyante. tena bahuṣu rāma-prabandheṣu sitā-haraṇā'nayanópāyānām' yuddhānām gaṇa-pātrāṇi. apareṣāṃ ca bhaṇiti-viśeṣā'dīnām bhedēpi na virodhaḥ.

adyēti pūrvah, tena vartamāna-bhaviṣyator nirāsaḥ. kavinā hi rañjanārtham kiñcit sad apy upekṣyate, kiñcid asad apy ādriyate, vartamāne ca netarī, tatkāla-prasiddhi-bādhayā rasahāniḥ syāt. pūrva-mahāpuruṣa-cariteṣu ca a-śraddhānam syāt. bhaviṣyatas tu vṛttam caritam api na bhavati, ‘caryate sma caritam’ ity aṭita-nirdeśāt.

‘rajā’ iti kṣatriya-mātram, na punar abhiṣikta eva. rāma-jīmūtavāhana - pārthā’dīnām anabhiṣiktānām api darśanāt. kṣatriyo martya eva, tena na deva-netṛkam nāṭakam ity uktam bhavati. nāṭakam rāmavad-vartitavyam na rāvaṇavat ity upadeśaparam. devatānām tu durupapādasya apy arthasya icchāmātrata eva siddhir iti taccaritam aśakyā’nuṣṭhānatvān na martyānām upadeśayogyam. tena ye divyam api netāram manyante na te samyag amaṃsata iti.

nāyikā tu divyā’pi bhavati yathā urvaśī. pradhāne martyacarite tac caritāntarbhāvāt. upadeśā’narhaprāya-vṛttatvena dīpta-rasatvenaiva ca samavakārā’dau divyo’pi netā na viruddhyate. caritam ity ācaritam, na tu kavi-buddhi-kalpitam. bāhulyā’pekṣam caitat, tena alpam kim api rañjakam kalpitam api na doṣāya iti.

dharma-kāma-arthā vyasta-samastāḥ sat pradhānam phalam yatra. mokṣas tu dharma-kāryatvāt gaṇam phalam. santo’cira-bhāvitvād vartamānā vā dharma-ārtha-kāmāḥ phalam. tena bhāvi kāmārtha-phalatvād āgamā na nāṭakam.

tatra dharma-phale nāṭake dayā-dama-dāna-nyāya-prāyam drṣṭa-phalam ca rājyādy abādhayā netuś caritam vyutpādyate. na punaḥ sarva-saṅga-parityāgam kṛtvā vratam ācaritam ity āmuṣmika-phalam eva. sāksād-drṣṭa-phalārthī hi lokāḥ.

kāmaphale ca divya-kula-strīsaṃbhoga-saṅgītaka-kāmacāra-upavana-vihāraprāyam. artha-phale ca śatrūccheda-sandhi-vigrahā’di-rājya-cintā-prāyam iti.

‘sāṅka’ iti aṅkā-upāya-daśā-sandhibhir-vakṣyamāṇaiḥ saha vartate. ‘divyāṅgam’ itī divyam devatā anyo’pi ca uttamaḥ pradhānasya netur aṅgam, sadhāyaḥ, patākā-prakarī-nāyaka-lakṣaṇo yatra. divyo hi netā eva virudhyate na punaḥ sahāyaḥ atyanta-bhaktānām eva nāma devatāḥ prasīdanti iti devatā’rādhana-puraḥ-saram upāyā’nuṣṭhānam ādheyam itī vyutpādanārtham divyo’py aṅgatvena kāryaḥ.

tatra devatā yathā nāgānande gaurī. uttama-prakṛtir yathā rāma’di-prabandheṣu sugrīvā’di-iti. yad vā divyāni anavadyāni aṅgāni vakṣyamāṇāni upakṣepā’dīni yatra.

tatra itī nirdhāraṇārthaḥ abhineya-samudāyāt pradhāna-puruṣārtha-pravṛttavineya-rājā’di-vyutpādana-guṇena nāṭakam nirdhāryate. nāṭakam itī nāṭayati vicitram rañjanāpraveśena sabhyānām hṛdayam nartayati itī nāṭakam.

abhinavaguptas tu namanā'rthasyā'pi naṭer nāṭaka-śabdam vyutpādayati. tatra tu ghaṭāditvena hr̥svā'bhāvaś cintyah."

yady api kathā"dayo'pi śrotr-hr̥dayam nāṭayanti tathā'pi aṅkopāyādīnām vaicitrya-hetūnām abhāvāt na tathā rañjakatvam iti na te nāṭakam. tathā nāṭakam pradhāna-puruṣārtheṣu rājñām tad-aṅga-bhūtānām ca bahūnām vyutpādakam iti katipaya-vyutpādakāni prakaraṇā"ḍīny api na nāṭakam iti."

The definition and analysis are more perfect and scientific as compared to other sources of dramaturgy.

We will not quote everything from the BP., but the BP. has mentioned five special types of drama which need mention. The reference from BP. to this effect reads as -

In the VIII. th Ch. Śāradātanaya begins with the enumeration of 30 types of rūpakas, which include what we call upa-rūpaka-s also, which are discussed earlier (Ch. X). Then he comes to nāṭaka and talks of the number of 'aṅka-s' in nāṭaka and prakaraṇa. Then after dealing with topics connected with nāṭaka in general he comes to the five-fold classification of nāṭaka from the point of view of Subandhu. It may be noted that Śā. has recorded a number traditions not mentioned in other sources. The five-fold nāṭaka is explained on pp. 238 (line 15) - 241 (line 4). This reads as :-

pp. 238 (line 15) :

subandhur nāṭakasyā'pi  
lakṣaṇam prāha pañcadhā,  
pūrṇam caiva praśāntam ca  
bhāsvaraṁ lalitam tathā  
samagram iti vijñeyā  
nāṭake pañca jātayaḥ (line 17).  
pūrṇasya nāṭakasyā'sya  
mukhādyā pañca sandhayaḥ.  
udāharaṇam etasya kṛtyārāvaṇam ucyate.  
praśānta-rasa-bhūyiṣṭham  
praśāntam nāma nāṭakam. (line 20)  
nyāso nyāsa-samudbhedo  
bījōktir bīja-darśanam,

tato'nuddiṣṭa-saṃhārah  
 praśānte pañca sandhayah.” (line 22)  
 (p. 239, lines - 1-22)  
 sāttvatī-vṛttir atra syād  
 iti drauhiṇir abravīt.  
 svapnavāsavadattā”khyam  
 udāharaṇam atra tu.  
 ācchidya bhūpāt sa-vyasanā  
 devī māgadhikā-kare  
 nyastā, yatas tato nyāso  
 mukha-sandhir ayaṃ bhavet.  
 nyāsasya ca pratimukhaṃ  
 samudbheda udāhṛtaḥ, - 5  
 padmāvatyā mukhaṃ vīkṣya  
 viśeṣaka-vibhūṣitam.  
 jīvatyāvantikety etat  
 jñātaṃ bhūmibhujā yathā,  
 utkaṇṭhitena sōdvegam  
 bījoktir nāma-kīrtanam.  
 ehi vāsavadatte kva  
 kva yāsīty ādi dṛśyate,  
 sahā'vasthitayor eka-  
 prāptyā'nyasya gaveṣaṇam 10  
 darśana-sparśanālāpair  
 etat syād bīja-darśanam.  
 “cira-prasuptaḥ kāmo me  
 viṇayā pratibodhitah  
 tām tu devīm na paśyāmi  
 yasyāḥ ghoṣavatī priyā.”  
 kiṃ te bhūyaḥ priyaṃ kuryām

iti vāg yatra nocyate,  
 tam anuddiṣṭa-saṃhāraṃ  
 ityāhur bharatā"dayaḥ - 15  
 mālā-nāyaka-siddhyaṅga-  
 glānis tasyāḥ parikṣayaḥ  
 mātrā'vaśiṣṭa-saṃhāre  
 bhāsvare pañca-sandhayaḥ.  
 ekasminnāyake khyāte  
 tat-sāmānya-pratāpa-vān,  
 yadi syāt pratipakṣaś ca  
 sā māleti prakīrtitā.  
 yathā hi candraguptasya  
 na(ca)ndanaḥ prati-pūruṣaḥ. 20  
 nāyakaṃ chalayitveṣṭa-  
 siddhir yā paripanthinaḥ  
 eṣā nāyaka-siddhiḥ syān  
 māricenseva rāvaṇaḥ." - 22  
 (p. 240; lines 1-22) -  
 garbhasyāṅgair vimardādi-  
 darśanaṃ glānir iṣyate.  
 kapibhir vāridhim uttīrya  
 laṅkā-veṣṭanam eva tat.  
 parikṣayo'tra nohā"dir  
 nāyakasya ripor balāt  
 sa nāgapāśa-bandhā"di  
 rāma-lakṣmaṇayor iva.  
 mātrā'vaśiṣṭa-saṃhāra-  
 sandhir ekaṃ tu nātake - 5  
 śatrubandīkṛta-strīṇāṃ  
 tasya śatror vadhād atha.

tat-parīkṣā-sthitir mātṛā'  
 vaśiṣṭam iti kathyate,  
 yathā sītā-parikṣeva  
 rāvaṇā'nantare kṛtā.  
 bhāratī-vṛtti-bhūyiṣṭhaṃ  
 vīrā'dbhuta-rasā'śrayam  
 bhāsvaraṃ nāṭakaṃ  
 bāla-rāmāyaṇam idaṃ yathā. - 10  
 laliṭaṃ kaiśikīvṛtti-  
 śṛṅgāraika-rasā"śrayam,  
 urvaśī-vipralambho'tra  
 tad udāharaṇaṃ yathā  
 (lines 11-12)

vilāso vipralambhaś ca  
 viprayogo viśodhanaṃ,  
 uddiṣṭā'rtho'pa-saṃhāro  
 lalite pañca-sandhayaḥ.  
 (lines 13-14)

vilāso nāyakā"dīnāṃ  
 yathartu rati-sevanam - 15  
 yathā śrī-vatsa-rājasya  
 vasantotsava-varṇanam.  
 īrṣyayā chandato yūnoḥ  
 vipralambhaḥ pṛthak-sthiṭiḥ,  
 yathā hi vatsa-rājasya  
 devyā vāsavadattayā  
 vipralambhas tu śāpā"di-  
 vatsarā'ntam asaṅgatiḥ,  
 yathā śarmiṣṭhayā devyā  
 yayāter vārṣa-parvaṇaḥ. - 20



parivāda-bhayād doṣa-  
 śodhanam syād viśodhanam. - 22  
 (p. 241 lines 1-5) -  
 yathā hi vikramórvaśyām  
 uddiṣṭārthopa-saṁhṛtiḥ,  
 urvaśīyaṁ ciraṁ gehe  
 saha-dharma-carī tava  
 bhavatv itīndra-sandeśaḥ  
 tāṁ pūrūravasaṁ prati.  
 sarva-vṛtti-viniṣpannam  
 sarva-lakṣaṇa-samyutam,  
 samagraṁ tat pratinidhiḥ  
 mahānāṭakam ucyate. - 5

Then it is recommended by the same source (i.e. Subandhu) that certain sandhyaṅga-s are mendatory with reference to a certain type, such as (p. 241, lines - 6-15)

upakṣepaḥ parikaraḥ  
 parinyāso vilobhanam,  
 etānyaṅgāni kāryāni  
 sarva-nāṭaka-jātiṣu.  
 yuktiḥ prāptiḥ samādhānam  
 vidhānam paribhāvanam.  
 etāny avaśya-kāryāni  
 praśānte nāṭake budhaiḥ -  
 ājñā'pavādaḥ samphetaḥ  
 prasaṅgo vidravas tathā - 10  
 saṁgrahaś ceti sāṅgāni  
 samyag yojyāni bhāsvare.  
 virodham praṇayaṁ caiva  
 paryupāsanam eva ca,  
 pūṣpaṁ vajraṁ ca badhniyād

avaśyaṃ lalite sudhīh.  
 sarveśaṃ yatra rūpāṇi  
 dṛśyante vividhāni ca  
 nāṭakam nṛtta-cārākhyam  
 tat samagram itīritam. - 15  
 The NLRK. Kā. 9, 10, 11 - (p. 5) read as -  
 prakhyāta-vastu-viśayam  
 prakhyātódatta-nāyakam,  
 rājarsi-vaṃśa-caritam  
 tathā divyāśrayotthitam. - 9  
 nānā-vibhūti-saṃyutam  
 rddhi-vilāsāḥ dibhir guṇair yuktam,  
 aṅka-praveśakādhyam  
 bhavati hi tan nāṭakam nāma.”

These are quoted from the NS. XVIII. 15-16.

The NLRK. quotes further from the NS. -

“nṛpatinām yac caritam  
 nānārasa-bhāva-ceṣṭitair bahudhā  
 sukha-duḥkhótpatti-kṛtam  
 vijñeyam nāṭakam nāma.

The NLRK. accepts definitions from the NS. as is done by Bhoja. So, we will not quote any further beyond this, from these sources. The BP. follows the lead of the DR. and the NS. yet the drafting changes at times without difference in contents.

RS. (pp. 264; 130-134) :

atideśa-bala-prāpta-nāṭakāṅgopa-jīvanāt  
 anyāni rūpakāni syur vikārā nāṭakam prati. - 130  
 ato hi lakṣaṇam pūrvam nāṭakasyābhidhīyate  
 divyena vā mānuṣeṇa dhīródāttena saṃyutam. - 131  
 (divine or human hero is allowed) -  
 śṛṅgāra-vīra'nyatara-pradhāna-rasa-saṃśrayam  
 khyātétivṛttasambaddham sandhi-pañcaka-saṃyutam. - 132

prakṛtyavasthā-sandhyaṅga-sandhyantara-vibhūṣaṇaiḥ  
 patākāsthānakair vṛtti-tadaṅgaś ca pravṛttibhiḥ. - 133  
 viṣkambhakā”di-samyuktaṃ nāṭakaṃ tu trivargadam  
 tadetannāṭakārambha-prakāro vaksyate mayā.” - 134

After discussing topics related to nāṭaka, the author quotes an opinion of Bharata suggesting that the nāṭaka has to be resorted to for the removal of all unhappiness. In the types such as pūrṇa, etc. (as noted in BP. by Śā., given by Subandhu) - Śiṅgabhūpāla declares his lack of faith as they are not so charming and not supported by Bharata. Then RS. proceeds to define ‘prakaraṇa’ etc. (pp. 285).

The verses (p. 285) read as - tathā ca bharataḥ -

“dharmārtha-sādhanam nāṭyam  
 sarva-duḥkhā’panodakṛt,  
 āsevadhavam tad ṛṣayas  
 tasyotthānam tu nāṭakam.” - iti.  
 nāṭakasya ca pūrṇādi-  
 bhedāḥ kecana kalpitāḥ  
 teṣāṃ nā’tiva ramyatvād  
 a-parīkṣā-kṣamatvataḥ - 213  
 muninā’nāḍṛtatvāc ca, tān uddeṣṭum udāśmahe.”

The SD. defines nāṭaka as - (pp. 321; VI. 7-11)

“nāṭakam khyāta-vṛttam syāt  
 pañca-sandhi-samanvitam,  
 vilāsardhyā”di-guṇavad  
 yuktaṃ nānā-vibhūtibhiḥ. - 7  
 sukha-duḥkha-samudbhūti  
 nānā-rasa-nirantaram,  
 pañcā”dikā daśa-parāś  
 tatrāṅkāḥ parikīrtitāḥ. - 8  
 prakhyāta-vamśyo rājarsir  
 dhīrōdāttāḥ pratāpavān,  
 divyo’tha divyā’divyo vā  
 guṇavān nāyako mataḥ. - 9

eka eva bhaved aṅgī  
 śṛṅgāro vīra eva vā,  
 aṅgam anye rasāḥ sarve  
 kāryo nirvahaṇe'dbhutaḥ. - 10  
 catvāraḥ pañca vā mukhyāḥ  
 kārya-vyāpṛta-pūruṣāḥ,  
 go-pucchāgra-samagram tu  
 bandhanaṃ tasya-kīrtitaṃ - 11 (p.322)

Then 'aṅka' and other topics are discussed.

We will now quote definitions of prakaraṇa from the NS., DR., ND., RS., & SD.  
 NS. (XVIII. 44-53)

“nātaka-lakṣaṇam etat mayā samāsena kīrtitaṃ vidhi vat  
 prakaraṇam ataḥ param ahaṃ lakṣaṇayuktyā pravakṣyāmi. 44  
 “yatra kavir ātma-śaktyā vastu-śarīraṃ nāyakaṃ caiva,  
 autpattikaṃ prakarute prakaraṇam iti tad budhair jñeyam.” - 45  
 yad anārṣam athā”hāryaṃ kāvyam prakarotyabhūta-guṇa-yuktaṃ,  
 utpanna-bīja-vastu prakaraṇam api tad api vijñeyam.” - 46  
 “yannātake mayōktaṃ vastu śarīraṃ ca vṛtti-bhedās ca,  
 tat-prakaraṇēpi yojyam sa-lakṣaṇam sarva-sandhiṣu.” - 47  
 vipra-vaṇik-sacivānāṃ purohitā'mātya-sārthavāhānām  
 caritaṃ yannaikavidhaṃ jñeyam tat prakaraṇam nāma”. - 48  
 nódātta-nāyaka-kṛtaṃ, na divyacaritaṃ, na rājasambhogam  
 bāhya-jana-samprayuktaṃ tajjñeyam prakaraṇam tajjñaiḥ.” - 49  
 dāsa-viṭa-śreṣṭhi-yutaṃ veśa-stryupacāra-kāraṇopetaṃ,  
 manda-kula-strījanam kāvyam kāryam prakaraṇe tu. - 50  
 saciva-śreṣṭhi-brāhmaṇa-purohitāmātya-sārthavāhānām  
 gr̥havārtā yatra bhaven na tatra veśyāṅganā kārya.” - 51  
 yadi-veśa-yuvati-yuktaṃ, na kulastrī-saṅgamo'pi syāt,  
 atha kulajana-prayuktaṃ, na veśa-yuvatir bhavet tatra.” - 52  
 yadi vā kāraṇa-yuktyā veśa-kula-strī-kṛtopacāraḥ syāt  
 a-vikṛta-bhāṣā”cāram tatra tu pāṭhyam prayoktavyam.” - 53

Dr. G. K. Bhat translates : (pp. 129, *ibid*) -

(44) I have duly mentioned in brief, the characteristics of the nāṭaka so far. I will now explain the prakaraṇa with its characteristics.

(45) (The play) in which the poet builds up by his own (creative) power the dramatic plot (vastu), the elaborate (dramatic) construction (śarīra), and the hero, so that the composition appears to be inventive (or original, autpattika), that is to be known by the wise as prakaraṇa.

(46) The poetic composition not based on the (works of) the ancient sages (an-ārṣam), imaginatively produced (āhārya), consisting of unprecedented qualities with the seed and the plot invented, which (a poet) makes is also to be known as prakaraṇa.

[Dr. Bhat has a foot-note : “an-ārṣa” - The ārṣa kāvyas are Mahābhārata, Rāmāyaṇa, the Purāṇas; omitting these, a poet may draw on folk-legends as contained in the Brhatkathā.

Āhārya - mentally conceived, the plot may be derived from the works of earlier poets, but adapted to suit the dramatic construction with necessary modifications, alterations, etc.]

(47) - “Whatever I said in the context of nāṭaka, regarding the dramatic plot, elaborate construction, and varieties of styles, all that with its characteristics is to be used in the prakaraṇa, only these are to be used in all junctures (sandhi) of dramatic construction.

(48) The varied life and conduct of a brahmin, merchant, counsellor (saciva), domestic priest, accredited minister, leader of caravan, (presented in dramatic form) are to be known as ‘prakaraṇa’.

(49) (A play) which has no exalted hero, which does not show the life and conduct of Gods, nor the love-union of a king, and which contains men from the outside (i.e. servants not associated with royal haram) is to be known by the experts as “prakaraṇa”.

(50) In a prakaraṇa, the poetic construction should comprise servants, viṭa, the chief of the merchant guild, and incidents occasioned by the behaviour of a courtesan or the fallen actions (manda carita) of a woman of noble family (or the actions of a woman of doubtful (manda) family).

[Dr. Bhat has a foot-note here, under v. 50 - (p. 131, *ibid*) : “As contrasted with the nāṭaka, built with a king-hero the prakaraṇa uses servants in place of kañcukin, viṭa for vidūṣaka, śreṣṭhin for minister, etc. The courtesan as the main character makes the prakaraṇa a love-play full of śṛṅgāra.

‘Manda-kula-carita’ may mean both, the immoral behaviour of a noble woman, or the actions of a woman of low family. Though examples are not found in the extent sanskrit plays. See Abhinava - op. it. pp. 431-432.

(51) In (a prakaraṇa) where domestic happenings and accomplishments connected with counsellor, head of the merchant-guild, brahmin, domestic priest, minister and leader of caravan are presented, no courtesan should be introduced (as a dramatic character).

(52) If it contains a courtesan, union or meetings with a woman of noble family will not be shown, on the contrary, if it employs a woman of noble family, a courtesan should not be present (simultaneously) there.

(53) If, however, out of some dramatic necessity (kāraṇa-yuktyā) a formal meeting (upacāra) of a courtesan and a noble lady has to be used (in a scene), the dramatic dialogue there should be used without distortion of language and behaviour.

[Dr. Bhat has a foot-note : (p. 131, ibid) : “This according to Abhinava, means that respectable ladies will use śaurasenī, the courtesan sanskrit; ladies will behave with usual courtesy, the courtesan according to her usual ways. The Bhāva-prakāśana (p. 242), however, gives the rule : “bhāṣate prakṛtaṃ veśyā saṃskṛtaṃ kula-nāyikā.”]

The DR. (p. 154; I. 39-42) reads as :

“atha prakaraṇe vṛttam  
utpādyam loka-saṃśrayam,  
amātya-vipra-vaṇijām ekaṃ  
kuryāc ca nāyakam.” - 39  
dhīra-prasāntaṃ śopāyaṃ  
dharma-kāmārtha-tatparam.  
śeṣam nāṭakavat sandhi-  
praveśaka-rasā’dikam. - 40  
nāyikā tu dvidhā tatra  
kulastrī gaṇikā tathā,  
kvaśid ekaiva veśyā,  
kvā’pi dvayaṃ kvaśit. - 41

kulajā”bhyantarā bāhyā  
 veśyā nātikramo’nayoḥ,  
 ābhiḥ prakaraṇaṃ tredhā  
 saṅkīrṇaṃ dhūrta-saṅkulam.” - 42

ND. II. 1-4 :

“prakaraṇaṃ vaṇig-vipra-  
 saciva-svāmy-a-saṅkarāt,  
 manda-gotrāṅkanaṃ  
 divyā’nāśritaṃ, madhya-ceṣṭitaṃ. - 1  
 dāsa-śreṣṭhi-vitair yuktaṃ  
 kleśā”dhyam, tac ca saptadhā,  
 kalpy-éna-phala-vastūnām  
 eka-dvi-tri-vidhānataḥ - 2  
 kulastrī-gr̥ha-vārtāyām  
 paṇyastri tu viparyaye,  
 viṭe patyau dvayaṃ tasmāt  
 eka-triṃśatidhā’py adah.” - 3  
 atrā”kalpyam, purā kl̥ptaṃ  
 yad vā’nārṣam a-sad-guṇam.  
 śeṣam nāṭakavat sarvaṃ  
 kaiśikī-pūrṇatām vinā. - 4

RS. (p. 285; III. 214b - 218 a) -

yatrétivṛttam utpādyam  
 dhīra-śāntaśca nāyakaḥ, 214b  
 rasaḥ pradhānaḥ śṛṅgāraḥ  
 śeṣam nāṭaka-vad bhavet.  
 tat tu prakaraṇaṃ śuddham  
 dhūrtaṃ miśraṃ ca tat tridhā. - 215  
 kulastrī-nāyikaṃ śuddham  
 mālatī-mādhavā”dikam,  
 gaṇikā-nāyikaṃ dhūrtaṃ  
 kāmadattā”hvayā”dikam. - 216

kitava-dyūtakārā”di-vyāpāraṃ  
tv atra kalpayet,  
miśraṃ tat kulajā-veśye  
kalpīte yatra nāyike - 217  
dhūrta-śuddha-kramopetaṃ  
tan-mṛccha-kaṭikā”dikam, - 218a

SD. (p. 434, 5; VI. 224b - 227b)

“bhavet prakaraṇe vṛttam  
laukikam, kavi-kalpitam, - 224b  
śṛṅgāro’ṅgī, nāyakaḥ tu  
vipro’mātyo’thavā vaṇik,  
śāpāya-dharma-kāmārtha-paro  
dhīra-praśāntakaḥ.” - 225  
nāyikā kulajā kvā’pi  
veśyā kvā’pi, dvayam kvacit,  
tena bhedaś trayas tasya  
tatra bhedaś tṛtīyakaḥ.” - 226  
kitava-dyūta-kārā”di-  
vīta-cetaka-saṅkulah.’ - 227a

Samavakāra is defined in the NS. (XVIII. 63-77) -

“devā’sura-bīja-kṛtaḥ  
prakhyāto dārta-nāyakaś caiva,  
tryaṅkaś tathā trikaṇḍas  
tri-vidravaḥ syāt tri-śṛṅgāraḥ. - 63  
dvādaśa-nāyaka-bahulo  
hy aṣṭādaśa-nāḍikā-pramāṇaś ca,  
vaksyāmy asy’āṅka-vidhiṃ  
yāvāryo nāḍikā yatra. - 64  
āṅkaḥ tu sa-prahasanaḥ  
sa-vidravaḥ, sa-kaṇḍas, sa-vīthikaḥ,  
dvādaśa-nāḍī-vihitaḥ  
prathamah kāryaḥ kriyopetaḥ.” - 65



kāryas tathā dvitīyaḥ  
 samāśrito nāḍikā-catasras tu,  
 vastusamāpana-vihito  
 dvi-nāḍikaḥ syat tṛtīyas tu. - 66  
 nāḍī-samjñā jñeyā mānaṃ  
 kālasya yaṃ mūhūrtā'rdham,  
 taṃ nāḍikā-pramāṇaṃ  
 yathoktaṃ aṅkeṣu  
 samyojyam. - 67  
 yā nāḍkeri samjñā  
 kāla-vibhāge kriyā'bhi-sampannā,  
 kāryā ca sā prayatnād  
 yathākrameṇā eva śāstroktā." - 68  
 aṅko'ṅkaśv anyārthaḥ  
 kāvya-bandham āsādyā,  
 arthaṃ hi samavakāre  
 hy a-prati-sambandham icchanti." - 69  
 yuddha-jala-sambhavo vā  
 vāy-vagni-gajendra-sambhrama-kṛto vā,  
 nagarōpa-rodhajo vā  
 vijñeyo vidravas trividhaḥ." - 70  
 vastu-gata-krama-vihito  
 daiva-vaśād-vā paraprakṛto vā,  
 sukha-duḥkhotpatti-kṛtas  
 trividhaḥ kapaṭo'tra vijñeyah - 71  
 trividhaścā'tra vidhijñaiḥ  
 pṛthak-pṛthak-kārya-yoga-vihitā'rthah,  
 śṛṅgārah kartavyo dharme  
 cārthe ca, kāme ca. - 72.

yasmin dharma-prāpakam  
 ātmahitaṃ bhavati sādhanam bahudhā,  
 vrata-niyama-tapo-yukto  
 jñeyo'sau dharma-śṛṅgāraḥ. - 73  
 “arthasyecchā-yogād bahudhā  
 caivā'rthato'rtha-śṛṅgāraḥ,  
 strī-saṃprayoga-viśayeṣv  
 arthā'rthā vā ratir yatra.” - 74  
 kanyā-vilobhana-kṛtaṃ  
 prāptau strī-pūṃsayos tu ramyaṃ vā,  
 nibhṛtaṃ sāvegaṃ vā  
 yasya bhavet kāma-śṛṅgāraḥ.” - 75  
 uṣṇig-gāyatri ādyāny anyāni ca  
 yāni bandha-kuṭilāni,  
 vṛttāni samavakāre  
 kavibhis tāni prayojyāni. - 76  
 evaṃ kāryas taj-jñair  
 nānā-rasa-saṃśrayaḥ samavakāraḥ,  
 vakṣyāmy atah param ahaṃ  
 lakṣaṇaṃ ihāmr̥gasyā'pi. - 77

Dr. Bhat translates : (p. 135, 137, 139, 141) :

(63) Its theme is made from (the conflict of) gods and demons; its hero has to be well-known and exalted; it should have three kinds of deception, three kinds of flight or excitement, and three kinds of love.

[Dr. Bhat has a foot-note : “Abhinava points out that gods are naturally exalted as compared to ordinary men. But among the gods too some like Brahmā are quiet, some like Nṛsiṃha are bold and terrible. For this type of play, the hero has to be a god well-known from old mythology and not a deified person. The three subjects or contents - kapaṭa, vidrava and śṛṅgāra - are to be used in each of the three acts.]

(64) It should have twelve leading men and its duration (of performance) is to be eighteen nāḍikā-s. I will explain the arrangement of the act according to the number of nāḍikā-s allotted to it."

[Dr. Bhat adds a foot-note : "Abhinava mentions two opinions : 12 nāyakas in every act, or four in every act. (The principal hero, villain and their assistants). The total coming to 12. The measure of nāḍikā is explained further in VS. 67.]

(65) - The first act (of Samavakāra) is to have comic laughter, flight or excitement, deception and vithī; its dramatic action, will run to 12 nāḍis.

[Dr. Bhat has a foot-note : (p. 137) - "Saprahasana" implies, according to Abhinava, that kāma-śṛṅgāra is to be used in the first act because that alone is capable of evoking laughter. (See, op. cit. p. 437). Vithī is explained further in VS. 112-115.]

(66) - The second act should be similarly constructed but will have four nāḍikās; and the third act which is to show the conclusion of the plot will be two nāḍikās in duration.

(67) The term 'nāḍī' (or nāḍikā) is to be known as a measure of time and equals half a muhūrta. [muhūrta = 48 minutes; nāḍī or nāḍikā = 24 minutes, 2 nāḍis = 48 minutes; 4 nāḍis = 1 hr. and 36 minutes; 12 nāḍis = 4 hrs., 48 mts.]

(68) The term "nāḍikā" which, in the division of time, has been given (as the duration) for dramatic action should be carefully put to practice according to the śāstra rule and with due order (of the three acts and their prescribed duration).

(69) The poetic form should be resorted to and every act (in the Samavakāra) should be composed to have different content (or topic). They (the experts) desire the content in the Samavakāra to be not closely knit together -

[Dr. Bhat has a foot-note : sam-properly, i.e. not very closely (connected); ava-slightly; kāra-what is made, i.e. the dramatic action. The etymology shows that the dramatic plot in Samavakāra is not too much but slightly connected. 'Prati' means 'access'; "a-(prati)" negates any excess of connection. Both thus show that the 'Samavakāra' is rather a loosely built play. This may be due to the fact that its theme is triple : deception, flight, and love woven round the basic conflict; the phases of which are to be presented in each of the three acts, all the three in the first act, deception and flight in the second, and fulfilment in the third. The loose structure of the play also suggests that it must have been a very early type : This is borne out by the fact that when the Nāṛya-veda was created and handed over to Bharatamuni, the first play that he produced was "Amṛta-manthana", a 'samavakāra' and 'Tripura-dāha' a Dima. See NS. Ch. IV. 2-4; 9-11.]

[We beg to differ. At least when Bharata wrote his NS., all the major types and some minor types were being staged before him, for quite long, i.e. a tradition of centuries, otherwise the codification could not have been possible. Prof. Dolararai Mankad (Types of Drama) suggested that one-act plays-bhāṇa-could have been the oldest.

We do not accept this either, for these are only hypotheses not supported by facts. At least for Bharata ten types and two minor types were a living tradition. We can not surmise that this or that type was the first to evolve. It was a rich heritage that came down to Bharata and he passed it over to his posteriors. This is a logical stand.]

(70) - The flight (for excitement) is three fold : (a) arising out of battle or flood (jala), (b) caused by storm (vāyu), fire or havoc of a lordly elephant, and (c) born out of the siege of a city.

[foot-note by Dr. Bhat reads : Abhinava explains that Vidrava is a terrific calamity from which people try to run away in fright. He classifies this as (a) - caused by inanimate factors : like flood, storm; (b) caused by animate factors; like a loose elephant, and (c) caused by both animate and inanimate factors; like war, seige, or fire, op. cit. p. 439]

(71) The threefold deceit in this context (atra) is to be known as (a) that which has been brought by a calculated plan (vastu-gata) and involving (on the part of the innocent victim), worry about means (krama) for counteracting it); (b) which has been deliberately employed by another (to avenge an offence given), and (c) which occurs due to adverse fate (or accident). It causes the advent of happiness or misery.

[foot-note by Dr. Bhat reads : See Abhinava, op. cit. p. 439. The difference between ‘vastu-gata’ and ‘para-prayukta’ is that in the former a person is an innocent victim of the Kapaṭa, in the latter the victim is guilty, his own action has invited the ‘Kapaṭa.’

(72) In this (Samavakāra) the experts who know the rules should employ threefold love as connected with different kinds of actions : that in relation to religious duty, that prompted by material gain, and that inspired by passion (or sexual desire).

[foot-note by Dr. Bhat reads : “The locative in dharme, arthe, kāme indicates that these are the causes or the results of Śṛṅgāra presented in the Samavakāra. Normally, the gods being self-sufficient, these puruṣārthas do not concern them but

only such divine beings as Gandharva, Yakṣa, etc. But if Gods were delineated with human emotions these arthas can be easily used. Another possibility is that these artha-s may be achieved through the assistance or instrumentality of God; for instance, the love of Śiva and Pārvatī is an illustration of dharma-śṛṅgāra, as the union is brought about by the Gods for destroying the demon Tāraka through the son born of this union, Indra's passion for Ahalyā will be illustrating kāma-śṛṅgāra. See Abhinava, op. cit pp. 439-440.]

(73) When it becomes an instrument to achieve, in many ways, one's religious duty and one's own welfare through the practice of (religious) vows, prescribed rules, and austerities, it is known as dharma-śṛṅgāra.

(74) - The artha-śṛṅgāra results from artha, due to the desire for (acquiring) wealth in many ways : Here the love in matters of union with woman is prompted by the motive of wealth (arthārthā).

(75) The love (yasya=śṛṅgārasya) which is caused by the seduction of a maiden, or which takes a delightful form (ramyam) when a man and a woman meet each other, and (the affair) is carried on either secretly (nībhṛtam) or with open impetuosity, (that is) kāma-śṛṅgāra.

(76) The metres which have an uneven structure like Uṣṇik, Gāyatrī, etc. are to be used by the poets in the Samavakāra.

[Dr. Bhat reads in a foot-note : "Bandhakuṭila" refers to viṣama (uneven) and ardha-sama (semi-even) metres. Abhinava refers to Udbhaṭa according to whom Uṣṇik and Gāyatrī are not to be used, but the long metres like Sragdhara are to be used.]

(77) In this way, the experts should construct the samavakāra based on many sentiments. - I will now proceed to define the character of īhāmṛga.

The DR. defines samvakāra as (pp. 162, l. 62b-68a) :

"kāryaṃ samavakāre syād  
 āmukhaṃ nāṭakā"di-vat. - 62b  
 khyātaṃ devā'suraṃ vastu  
 nirvimarśāstu sandhayaḥ,  
 vṛttayo manda-kaiśikyo  
 netāro deva-dānavāḥ. - 63

tato'nuddiṣṭa-saṃhārah  
 praśānte pañca sandhayaḥ.” (line 22)  
 (p. 239, lines - 1-22)  
 sāttvatī-vṛttir atra syād  
 iti drauhinīr abravīt.  
 svapnavāsavadattā”khyam  
 udāharaṇam atra tu.  
 ācchidya bhūpāt sa-vyasanā  
 devī māgadhikā-kare  
 nyastā, yatas tato nyāso  
 mukha-sandhir ayaṃ bhavet.  
 nyāsasya ca pratimukhaṃ  
 samudbheda udāhṛtaḥ, - 5  
 padmāvaryā mukhaṃ vīksya  
 viśeṣaka-vibhūṣitam.  
 jīvatyāvantikery etat  
 jñātaṃ bhūmibhujā yathā,  
 utkaṇṭhitena sōdvegam  
 bījoktīr nāma-kīrtanam.  
 ehi vāsavadatte kva  
 kva yāsīty ādi dṛśyate,  
 sahā'vasthitayor eka-  
 prāptyā'nyasya gaveṣaṇam 10  
 darśana-sparśanālāpair  
 etat syād bīja-darśanam.  
 “cira-prasuptaḥ kāmo me  
 viṇayā pratibodhitah  
 tām tu devīm na paśyāmi  
 yasyāḥ ghoṣavatī priyā.”  
 kim te bhūyaḥ priyaṃ kuryām

iti vāg yatra nocyate,  
 tam anuddiṣṭa-saṃhāraṃ  
 ityāhur bharatā"dayaḥ - 15  
 mālā-nāyaka-siddhyaṅga-  
 glānis tasyāḥ parikṣayaḥ  
 mātrā'vaśiṣṭa-saṃhāre  
 bhāsvare pañca-sandhayaḥ.  
 ekasminnāyake khyāte  
 tat-sāmānya-pratāpa-vān,  
 yadi syāt pratipakṣaś ca  
 sā māleti prakīrtitā.  
 yathā hi candraguptasya  
 na(ca)ndanah prati-pūruṣah. 20  
 nāyakam chalayitveṣṭa-  
 siddhir yā paripanthinaḥ  
 eṣā nāyaka-siddhiḥ syān  
 māriceneva rāvaṇaḥ." - 22  
 (p. 240; lines 1-22) -  
 garbhasyāṅgair vimardādi-  
 darśanam glānir iṣyate.  
 kapibhir vāridhim uttīrya  
 laṅkā-veṣṭanam eva tat.  
 parikṣayo'tra nohā"dir  
 nāyakasya ripor balāt  
 sa nāgapāśa-bandhā"di  
 rāma-lakṣmaṇayor iva.  
 mātrā'vaśiṣṭa-saṃhāra-  
 sandhir ekaṃ tu nāṭake - 5  
 śatrubandīkṛta-strīṇāṃ  
 tasya śatror vadhād atha.

tat-parīkṣā-sthitir mātṛā'  
 vaśiṣṭam iti kathyate,  
 yathā sītā-parikṣeva  
 rāvaṇā'nantare kṛtā.  
 bhārati-vṛtti-bhūyiṣṭham  
 vīrā'dbhuta-rasā'srayam  
 bhāsvaraṃ nāṭakam  
 bāla-rāmāyaṇam idaṃ yathā. - 10  
 lalitam kaiśikivṛtti-  
 śṛṅgāraika-rasā'srayam,  
 urvaśi-vipralambho'tra  
 tad udāharaṇam yathā  
 (lines 11-12)

vilāso vipralambhaś ca  
 viprayogo viśodhanam,  
 uddiṣṭā'rtho'pa-saṃhāro  
 lalite pañca-sandhayah.  
 (lines 13-14)  
 vilāso nāyakā'dīnāṃ  
 yathartu rati-sevanam - 15  
 yathā śrī-vatsa-rājasya  
 vasantotsava-varṇanam.  
 īrṣyā chandato yūnoḥ  
 vipralambhaḥ pṛthak-sthiṭiḥ,  
 yathā hi vatsa-rājasya  
 devyā vāsavadattayā  
 vipralambhas tu śāpā'di-  
 vatsarā'ntam asaṅgatiḥ,  
 yathā śarmiṣṭhayā devyā  
 yayāter vārṣa-parvaṇaḥ. - 20



parivāda-bhayād doṣa-  
śodhanam syād viśodhanam. - 22

(p. 241 lines 1-5) -  
yathā hi vikramórvaśyām  
uddiṣṭārthopa-saṁhṛtiḥ,  
urvaśīyam ciraṁ gehe  
saha-dharma-carī tava  
bhavatv itīndra-sandేశaḥ  
tām pūrūravasaṁ prati.  
sarva-vṛtti-viniṣpannam  
sarva-lakṣaṇa-samyutam,  
samagram tat pratinidhiḥ  
mahānātakam ucyate. - 5

Then it is recommended by the same source (i.e. Subandhu) that certain **sandhyāṅga-s** are mendatory with reference to a certain type, such as (p. 241, lines - 6-15)

upakṣepaḥ parikaraḥ  
parinyāso vilobhanam,  
etānyaṅgāni kāryāni  
sarva-nāṭaka-jātiṣu.  
yuktiḥ prāptiḥ samādhānam  
vidhānam paribhāvanam.  
etāny avaśya-kāryāni  
**praśānte** nāṭake budhaiḥ -  
ājñā'pavādaḥ samphetaḥ  
prasaṅgo vidravas tathā - 10  
saṁgrahaś ceti sāṅgāni  
samyag yojyāni **bhāsvare**.  
virodham praṇayam caiva  
paryupāsanam eva ca,  
pūṣpaṁ vajraṁ ca badhniyād

avaśyaṃ lalite sudhīh.  
 sarveśaṃ yatra rūpāṇi  
 drśyante vividhāni ca  
 nāṭakaṃ nṛtta-cārākhyam  
 tat samagram itīritam. - 15  
 The NLRK. Kā. 9, 10, 11 - (p. 5) read as -  
 prakhyāta-vastu-viśayaṃ  
 prakhyātódātta-nāyakam,  
 rājarsi-vaṃśa-caritaṃ  
 tathā divyā”śrayotthitam. - 9  
 nānā-vibhūti-saṃyutam  
 rddhi-vilāsā”dibhir guṇair yuktam,  
 aṅka-praveśakādhyam  
 bhavati hi tan nāṭakaṃ nāma.”

These are quoted from the NS. XVIII. 15-16.

The NLRK. quotes further from the NS. -

“nṛpatināṃ yac caritaṃ  
 nānārasa-bhāva-ceṣṭitair bahudhā  
 sukha-duḥkhótpatti-kṛtaṃ  
 vijñeyaṃ nāṭakaṃ nāma.

The NLRK. accepts definitions from the NS. as is done by Bhoja. So, we will not quote any further beyond this, from these sources. The BP. follows the lead of the DR. and the NS. yet the drafting changes at times without difference in contents.

RS. (pp. 264; 130-134) :

atideśa-bala-prāpta-nāṭakaṅgopa-jīvanāt  
 anyāni rūpakāni syur vikārā nāṭakaṃ prati. - 130  
 ato hi lakṣaṇaṃ pūrvam nāṭakasyā’bhidhīyate  
 divyena vā mānuṣeṇa dhīródāttena saṃyutam. - 131  
 (divine or human hero is allowed) -  
 śṛṅgāra-vīrā’nyatara-pradhāna-rasa-saṃśrayam  
 khyātétivṛttasambaddham sandhi-pañcaka-saṃyutam. - 132

prakṛtyavasthā-sandhyaṅga-sandhyantara-vibhūṣaṇaiḥ  
 patākāsthānakair vṛtti-tadaṅgaiś ca pravṛttibhiḥ. - 133  
 viṣkambhakā”di-samyuktaṃ nāṭakaṃ tu trivargadam  
 tadetannāṭakārambha-prakāro vakṣyate mayā.” - 134

After discussing topics related to nāṭaka, the author quotes an opinion of Bharata suggesting that the nāṭaka has to be resorted to for the removal of all unhappiness. In the types such as pūrṇa, etc. (as noted in BP. by Śā., given by Subandhu) - Śiṅgabhūpāla declares his lack of faith as they are not so charming and not supported by Bharata. Then RS. proceeds to define ‘prakaraṇa’ etc. (pp. 285).

The verses (p. 285) read as - tathā ca bharataḥ -

“dharmārtha-sādhanaṃ nāṭyaṃ  
 sarva-duḥkhā’panodakṛt,  
 āsevadhavaṃ tad ṛṣayas  
 tasyotthānaṃ tu nāṭakaṃ.” - iti.  
 nāṭakasya ca pūrṇādi-  
 bhedāḥ kecana kalpitāḥ  
 teṣāṃ nā’tīva ramyatvād  
 a-parikṣā-kṣamatvataḥ - 213  
 muninā’nādr̥tatvāc ca, tān uddeṣṭum udāśmahe.”

The SD. defines nāṭaka as - (pp. 321; VI. 7-11)

“nāṭakaṃ khyāta-vṛttaṃ syāt  
 pañca-sandhi-samanvitam,  
 vilāsardhyā”di-guṇavad  
 yuktaṃ nānā-vibhūtibhiḥ. - 7  
 sukha-duḥkha-samudbhūti  
 nānā-rasa-nirantaram,  
 pañcā”dikā daśa-parāś  
 tatrāṅkāḥ parikīrtitāḥ. - 8  
 prakhyāta-vaṃśyo rājarṣir  
 dhīrōdāttāḥ pratāpavān,  
 divyo’tha divyā’divyo vā  
 guṇavān nāyako mataḥ. - 9

eka eva bhaved aṅgī  
 śṛṅgāro vīra eva vā,  
 aṅgam anye rasāḥ sarve  
 kāryo nirvahaṇe'dbhutaḥ. - 10  
 catvāraḥ pañca vā mukhyāḥ  
 kārya-vyāpṛta-pūruṣāḥ,  
 go-pucchāgra-samagram tu  
 bandhanam tasya-kīrtitam - 11 (p.322)

Then 'aṅka' and other topics are discussed.

We will now quote definitions of prakaraṇa from the NS., DR., ND., RS., & SD.  
 NS. (XVIII. 44-53)

“nāṭaka-lakṣaṇam etat mayā samāseṇa kīrtitam vidhi vat  
 prakaraṇam ataḥ param ahaṁ lakṣaṇayuktyā pravakṣyāmi. 44  
 “yatra kavir ātma-śaktyā vastu-śarīram nāyakaṁ caiva,  
 autpattikam prakarute prakaraṇam iti tad budhair jñeyam.” - 45  
 yad anārṣam athā’hāryam kāvyam prakaroryabhūta-guṇa-yuktaṁ,  
 utpanna-bīja-vastu prakaraṇam api tad api vijñeyam.” - 46  
 “yannāṭake mayōktaṁ vastu śarīram ca vṛtti-bhedās ca,  
 tat-prakaraṇēpi yojyam sa-lakṣaṇam sarva-sandhiṣu.” - 47  
 vipra-vanīk-sacivānām purohitā’mātya-sārthavāhānām  
 caritaṁ yannaikavidhaṁ jñeyam tat prakaraṇam nāma”. - 48  
 nódātta-nāyaka-kṛtaṁ, na divyacaritaṁ, na rājasambhogam  
 bāhya-jana-samprayuktaṁ tajjñeyam prakaraṇam tajjñaiḥ.” - 49  
 dāsa-viṭa-śreṣṭhi-yutaṁ veśa-stryupacāra-kāraṇopetaṁ,  
 manda-kula-strijanam kāvyam kāryam prakaraṇe tu. - 50  
 saciva-śreṣṭhi-brāhmaṇa-purohitāmātya-sārthavāhānām  
 grhāvartā yatra bhaven na tatra veśyāṅganā kārya.” - 51  
 yadi-veśa-yuvati-yuktaṁ, na kulastrī-saṅgamo’pi syāt,  
 atha kulajana-prayuktaṁ, na veśa-yuvatir bhavet tatra.” - 52  
 yadi vā kāraṇa-yuktyā veśa-kula-stri-kṛtopacāraḥ syāt  
 a-vikṛta-bhāṣā”cāram tatra tu pāṭhyam prayoktavyam.” - 53

Dr. G. K. Bhat translates : (pp. 129, ibid) -

(44) I have duly mentioned in brief, the characteristics of the **nātaka** so far. I will now explain the **prakaraṇa** with its characteristics.

(45) (The play) in which the poet builds up by his own (creative) power the dramatic plot (**vastu**), the elaborate (dramatic) construction (**śarīra**), and the hero, so that the composition appears to be inventive (or original, **autpattika**), that is to be known by the wise as **prakaraṇa**.

(46) The poetic composition not based on the (works of) the ancient sages (**an-ārṣam**), imaginatively produced (**āhārya**), consisting of unprecedented qualities with the seed and the plot invented, which (a poet) makes is also to be known as **prakaraṇa**.

[Dr. Bhat has a foot-note : “an-ārṣa” - The **ārṣa** **kāvya**s are **Mahābhārata**, **Rāmāyaṇa**, the **Purāṇas**; omitting these, a poet may draw on folk-legends as contained in the **Brhatkathā**.

**Āhārya** - mentally conceived, the plot may be derived from the works of earlier poets, but adapted to suit the dramatic construction with necessary modifications, alterations, etc.]

(47) - “Whatever I said in the context of **nātaka**, regarding the dramatic plot, elaborate construction, and varieties of styles, all that with its characteristics is to be used in the **prakaraṇa**, only these are to be used in all junctures (**sandhi**) of dramatic construction.

(48) The varied life and conduct of a **brahmin**, **merchant**, counsellor (**saciva**), domestic priest, accredited minister, leader of **caravan**, (presented in dramatic form) are to be known as ‘**prakaraṇa**’.

(49) (A play) which has no exalted hero, which does not show the life and conduct of Gods, nor the love-union of a king, and which contains men from the outside (i.e. servants not associated with royal harem) is to be known by the experts as “**prakaraṇa**”.

(50) In a **prakaraṇa**, the poetic construction should comprise servants, **vita**, the chief of the merchant guild, and incidents occasioned by the behaviour of a courtesan or the fallen actions (**manda carita**) of a woman of noble family (or the actions of a woman of doubtful (**manda**) family).

[Dr. Bhat has a foot-note here, under v. 50 - (p. 131, ibid) : “As contrasted with the **nātaka**, built with a **king-hero** the **prakaraṇa** uses servants in place of **kañcukin**, **viṭa** for **vidūṣaka**, **śreṣṭhin** for minister, etc. The courtesan as the main character makes the **prakaraṇa** a love-play full of **śṛṅgāra**.

‘Manda-kula-carita’ may mean both, the immoral behaviour of a noble woman, or the actions of a woman of low family. Though examples are not found in the extant sanskrit plays. See Abhinava - op. it. pp. 431-432.

(51) In (a prakaraṇa) where domestic happenings and accomplishments connected with counsellor, head of the merchant-guild, brahmin, domestic priest, minister and leader of caravan are presented, no courtesan should be introduced (as a dramatic character).

(52) If it contains a courtesan, union or meetings with a woman of noble family will not be shown, on the contrary, if it employs a woman of noble family, a courtesan should not be present (simultaneously) there.

(53) If, however, out of some dramatic necessity (kāraṇa-yuktyā) a formal meeting (upacāra) of a courtesan and a noble lady has to be used (in a scene), the dramatic dialogue there should be used without distortion of language and behaviour.

[Dr. Bhat has a foot-note : (p. 131, ibid) : “This according to Abhinava, means that respectable ladies will use śaurasenī, the courtesan sanskrit; ladies will behave with usual courtesy, the courtesan according to her usual ways. The Bhāva-prakāśana (p. 242), however, gives the rule : “bhāṣate prakṛtaṃ veśyā sanskr̥taṃ kula-nāyikā.”]

The DR. (p. 154; I. 39-42) reads as :

“atha prakaraṇe vṛttam  
utpādyam loka-saṁśrayam,  
amātya-vipra-vaṇijām ekaṃ  
kuryāc ca nāyakam.” - 39  
dhīra-prasāntaṃ sōpāyam  
dharma-kāmārtha-tatparam.  
śeṣam nāṭakavat sandhi-  
praveśaka-rasā”dikam. - 40  
nāyikā tu dvidhā tatra  
kulastrī gaṇikā tathā,  
kvacid ekaiva veśyā,  
kvā’pi dvayaṃ kvacit. - 41

kulajā"bhyantarā bāhyā  
 veśyā nātikramo'nayoḥ,  
 ābhiḥ prakaraṇaṃ tredhā  
 saṅkirṇaṃ dhūrta-saṅkulam." - 42

ND. II. 1-4 :

"prakaraṇaṃ vaṇig-vipra-  
 saciva-svāmy-a-saṅkarāt,  
 manda-gotrāṅkanam  
 divyā'nāśritam, madhya-ceṣṭitam. - 1  
 dāsa-śreṣṭhi-vitair yuktam  
 kleṣā'dhyam, tac ca saptadhā,  
 kalpy-éna-phala-vastūnām  
 eka-dvi-tri-vidhānataḥ - 2  
 kulastrī-grha-vārtāyām  
 paṇyastri tu viparyaye.  
 viṭe patyau dvayam tasmāt  
 eka-triṃśatidhā'py adaḥ." - 3  
 atrā"kalpyam, purā kṛptam  
 yad vā'nārṣam a-sad-guṇam.  
 śeṣam nāṭakavat sarvam  
 kaiśiki-pūrṇatām vinā. - 4

RS. (p. 285; III. 214b - 218 a) -

yatrétivṛttam utpādyam  
 dhīra-śāntaśca nāyakaḥ, 214b  
 rasaḥ pradhānaḥ śṛṅgāraḥ  
 śeṣam nāṭaka-vad bhavet.  
 tat tu prakaraṇaṃ śuddham  
 dhūrtaṃ miśraṃ ca tat tridhā. - 215  
 kulastrī-nāyikaṃ śuddham  
 mālatī-mādhavā'dikam,  
 gaṇikā-nāyikaṃ dhūrtaṃ  
 kāmādatā'hvayā'dikam. - 216

kitava-dyūtakārā”di-vyāpāraṃ  
 rv atra kalpayet,  
 miśraṃ tat kulajā-veśye  
 kalpite yatra nāyike - 217  
 dhūrta-śuddha-kramopetaṃ  
 tan-mṛccha-kaṭikā”dikam, - 218a

SD. (p. 434, 5; VI. 224b - 227b)

“bhavet prakaraṇe vṛttaṃ  
 laukikaṃ, kavi-kalpitam, - 224b  
 śṛṅgāro’ṅgī, nāyakaḥ tu  
 vipro’mātyo’thavā vanik,  
 śāpāya-dharma-kāmārtha-paro  
 dhīra-prasāntakaḥ.” - 225  
 nāyikā kulajā kvā’pi  
 veśyā kvā’pi, dvayaṃ kvacit,  
 tena bhedās trayas tasya  
 tatra bhedas tṛtīyakaḥ.” - 226  
 kitava-dyūta-kārā”di-  
 viṭa-cetaka-saṅkulaḥ.” - 227a

Samavakāra is defined in the NS. (XVIII. 63-77) -

“devā’sura-bīja-kṛtaḥ  
 prakhyāto dātta-nāyakaś caiva,  
 tryaṅkaḥ tathā trikāpaṭas  
 tri-vidravaḥ syāt tri-śṛṅgāraḥ. - 63  
 dvādaśa-nāyaka-bahulo  
 hy aṣṭādaśa-nāḍikā-pramāṇaś ca,  
 vaksyāmy asy āṅka-vidhim  
 yāvatyo nāḍikā yatra. - 64  
 āṅkaḥ tu sa-prahasanaḥ  
 sa-vidravaḥ, sa-kāpaṭaḥ, sa-vīthikaḥ,  
 dvādaśa-nāḍī-vihitaḥ  
 prathamah kāryaḥ kriyopetaḥ.” - 65



kāryas tathā dvitīyaḥ  
 samāśrito nāḍikā-catasras tu,  
 vastusamāpana-vihito  
 dvi-nāḍikaḥ syat tṛtīyas tu. - 66  
 nāḍi-saṃjñā jñeyā mānaṃ  
 kālasya yan mūhūrtā'rdham,  
 tan nāḍikā-pramāṇaṃ  
 yathoktram aṅkeṣu  
 saṃyojyam. - 67  
 yā nāḍketi saṃjñā  
 kāla-vibhāge kriyā'bhi-sampannā,  
 kāryā ca sā prayatnād  
 yathākrameṇa eva śāstroktā." - 68  
 aṅko'nkastv anyārthaḥ  
 kāvya-bandham āsādyā,  
 arthaṃ hi samavakāre  
 hy a-prati-saṃbandham icchanti." - 69  
 yuddha-jala-sambhavo vā  
 vāy-vagni-gajendra-saṃbhrama-kṛto vā,  
 nagarōpa-rodhajo vā  
 vijñeyo vidravas trividhaḥ." - 70  
 vastu-gata-krama-vihito  
 daiva-vaśād-vā paraprayukto vā,  
 sukha-duḥkhotpatti-kṛtas  
 trividhaḥ kapaṭo'tra vijñeyah - 71  
 trividhaścā'tra vidhijñaiḥ  
 pṛthak-pṛthak-kārya-yoga-vihitā'rthaḥ,  
 śṛṅgāraḥ kartavyo dharme  
 cārthe ca, kāme ca. - 72.

yasmin dharma-prāpakam  
 ātmahitaṃ bhavati sādhanam bahudhā,  
 vrata-niyama-tapo-yukto  
 jñeyo'sau dharma-śṛṅgāraḥ. - 73  
 “arthasyecchā-yogād bahudhā  
 caivā'rthato'rtha-śṛṅgāraḥ,  
 strī-saṃprayoga-viśayeṣv  
 arthā'rthā vā ratir yatra.” - 74  
 kanyā-vilobhana-kṛtaṃ  
 prāptau strī-pūṃsayos tu ramyaṃ vā,  
 nibhṛtaṃ sāvegaṃ vā  
 yasya bhavet kāma-śṛṅgāraḥ.” - 75  
 uṣṇig-gāyatri ādyāny anyāni ca  
 yāni bandha-kuṭilāni,  
 vṛttāni samavakāre  
 kavibhis tāni prayojyāni. - 76  
 evaṃ kāryas taj-jñair  
 nānā-rasa-saṃśrayaḥ samavakāraḥ,  
 vakṣyāmy ataḥ param ahaṃ  
 lakṣaṇaṃ ihāṃrgasyā'pi. - 77

Dr. Bhat translates : (p. 135, 137, 139, 141) :

(63) Its theme is made from (the conflict of) gods and demons; its hero has to be well-known and exalted; it should have three kinds of deception, three kinds of flight or excitement, and three kinds of love.

[Dr. Bhat has a foot-note : “Abhinava points out that gods are naturally exhalted as compared to ordinary men. But among the gods too some like Brahmā are quiet, some like Nṛsiṃha are bold and terrible. For this type of play, the hero has to be a god well-known from old mythology and not a deified person. The three subjects or contents - kapata, vidrava and śṛṅgāra - are to be used in each of the three acts.]

(64) It should have twelve leading men and its duration (of performance) is to be eighteen nāḍikā-s. I will explain the arrangement of the act according to the number of nāḍikā-s allotted to it."

[Dr. Bhat adds a foot-note : "Abhinava mentions two opinions : 12 nāyakas in every act, or four in every act. (The principal hero, villain and their assistants). The total coming to 12. The measure of nāḍikā is explained further in VS. 67.]

(65) - The first act (of Samavakāra) is to have comic laughter, flight or excitement, deception and vithi; its dramatic action, will run to 12 nāḍis.

[Dr. Bhat has a foot-note : (p. 137) - "Saprahasana" implies, according to Abhinava, that kāmā-śrngāra is to be used in the first act because that alone is capable of evoking laughter. (See, op. cit. p. 437). Vithi is explained further in VS. 112-115.]

(66) - The second act should be similarly constructed but will have four nāḍikās; and the third act which is to show the conclusion of the plot will be two nāḍikās in duration.

(67) The term 'nāḍi' (or nāḍikā) is to be known as a measure of time and equals half a muhūrta. [muhūrta = 48 minutes; nāḍi or nāḍikā = 24 minutes, 2 nāḍis = 48 minutes; 4 nāḍis = 1 hr. and 36 minutes; 12 nāḍis = 4 hrs., 48 mts.]

(68) The term "nāḍikā" which, in the division of time, has been given (as the duration) for dramatic action should be carefully put to practice according to the śāstra rule and with due order (of the three acts and their prescribed duration).

(69) The poetic form should be resorted to and every act (in the Samavakāra) should be composed to have different content (or topic). They (the experts) desire the content in the Samavakāra to be not closely knit together -

[Dr. Bhat has a foot-note : sam-properly, i.e. not very closely (connected); avaslightly; kāra-what is made, i.e. the dramatic action. The etymology shows that the dramatic plot in Samavakāra is not too much but slightly connected. 'Prati' means 'access'; "a-(prati)" negates any excess of connection. Both thus show that the 'Samavakāra' is rather a loosely built play. This may be due to the fact that its theme is triple : deception, flight, and love woven round the basic conflict; the phases of which are to be presented in each of the three acts, all the three in the first act, deception and flight in the second, and fulfilment in the third. The loose structure of the play also suggests that it must have been a very early type : This is borne out by the fact that when the Nāṭya-veda was created and handed over to Bharatamuni, the first play that he produced was "Amṛta-manthana", a 'samavakāra' and 'Tripura-dāha' a Ḍima. See NS. Ch. IV. 2-4; 9-11.]

[We beg to differ. At least when Bharata wrote his NS., all the major types and some minor types were being staged before him, for quite long, i.e. a tradition of centuries, otherwise the codification could not have been possible. Prof. Dolararai Mankad (Types of Drama) suggested that one-act plays-bhāṇa-could have been the oldest.

We do not accept this either, for these are only hypotheses not supported by facts. At least for Bharata ten types and two minor types were a living tradition. We can not surmise that this or that type was the first to evolve. It was a rich heritage that came down to Bharata and he passed it over to his posteriors. This is a logical stand.]

(70) - The flight (for excitement) is three fold : (a) arising out of battle or flood (jala), (b) caused by storm (vāyu), fire or havoc of a lordly elephant, and (c) born out of the seige of a city.

[foot-note by Dr. Bhat reads : Abhinava explains that Vidrava is a terrific calamity from which people try to run away in fright. He classifies this as (a) - caused by inanimate factors : like flood, storm; (b) caused by animate factors; like a loose elephant, and (c) caused by both animate and inanimate factors; like war, seige, or fire, op. cit. p. 439]

(71) The threefold deceit in this context (atra) is to be known as (a) that which has been brought by a calculated plan (vastu-gata) and involving (on the part of the innocent victim), worry about means (krama) for counteracting it; (b) which has been deliberately employed by another (to avenge an offence given), and (c) which occurs due to adverse fate (or accident). It causes the advent of happiness or misery.

[foot-note by Dr. Bhat reads : See Abhinava, op. cit. p. 439. The difference between ‘vastu-gata’ and ‘para-prayukta’ is that in the former a person is an innocent victim of the Kapaṭa, in the latter the victim is guilty, his own action has invited the ‘Kapaṭa.’

(72) In this (Samavakāra) the experts who know the rules should employ threefold love as connected with different kinds of actions : that in relation to religious duty, that prompted by material gain, and that inspired by passion (or sexual desire).

[foot-note by Dr. Bhat reads : “The locative in dharme, arthe, kāme indicates that these are the causes or the results of Śṛṅgāra presented in the Samavakāra. Normally, the gods being self-sufficient, these puruṣārthas do not concern them but

only such divine beings as Gandharva, Yakṣa, etc. But if Gods were delineated with human emotions these arthas can be easily used. Another possibility is that these artha-s may be achieved through the assistance or instrumentality of God; for instance, the love of Śiva and Pārvatī is an illustration of dharma-śṛṅgāra, as the union is brought about by the Gods for destroying the demon Tāraka through the son born of this union, Indra's passion for Ahalyā will be illustrating kāma-śṛṅgāra. See Abhinava, op. cit pp. 439-440.]

(73) When it becomes an instrument to achieve, in many ways, one's religious duty and one's own welfare through the practice of (religious) vows, prescribed rules, and austerities, it is known as dharma-śṛṅgāra.

(74) - The artha-śṛṅgāra results from artha, due to the desire for (acquiring) wealth in many ways : Here the love in matters of union with woman is prompted by the motive of wealth (arthārthā).

(75) The love (yasya=śṛṅgārasya) which is caused by the seduction of a maiden, or which takes a delightful form (ramyam) when a man and a woman meet each other, and (the affair) is carried on either secretly (nibhṛtam) or with open impetuousness, (that is) kāma-śṛṅgāra.

(76) The metres which have an uneven structure like Uṣṇik, Gāyatrī, etc. are to be used by the poets in the Samavakāra.

[Dr. Bhat reads in a foot-note : "Bandhakuṭila" refers to viṣama (uneven) and ardha-sama (semi-even) metres. Abhinava refers to Udbhaṭa according to whom Uṣṇik and Gāyatrī are not to be used, but the long metres like Sragdhara are to be used.]

(77) In this way, the experts should construct the samavakāra based on many sentiments. - I will now proceed to define the character of īhāmṛga.

The DR. defines samvakāra as (pp. 162, I. 62b-68a) :

"kāryaṃ samavakāre syād  
āmukhaṃ nāṭakā"di-vat. - 62b  
khyātaṃ devā'suraṃ vastu  
nirvimarsāstu sandhayaḥ,  
vṛttayo manda-kaiśikyo  
netāro deva-dānavāḥ. - 63

(107) - The prahasana should be composed to include any aspects of vīthī as are deemed proper. I will now explain the characteristics of Bhāṇa.

Characteristics of Bhāṇa.

[Dr. Bhat adds : (foot-note) : Bharata does not prescribe the number of acts for Prahasana. Abhinava mentions an opinion that a śuddha prahasana is a one-act, the Saṅkīrṇa, on account of the provenance of courtesans etc. will have many acts.]

DR. (p. 159, III. 54-56) reads as,

tadvat prahasanaṃ tredhā śuddha-vaikṛta-saṅkaraiḥ.

(śuddham) - pāṣaṇḍi-vipra-prabhṛti-ceṭa-ceṭi-viṭā"kulam. (54)

ceṣṭitaṃ veśa-bhāṣābhīḥ śuddham hāsyā-vaconvitam,

(vikṛtam.) kāmukā"di-vaco-veśaiḥ saṅkīrṇa-kāṇḍī-rāpasaiḥ- (55)

vikṛtam, saṅkarāt vīthiā saṅkīrṇam cūṭṭa-saṅkulam.

rasastu bhūyasā kāryaḥ ṣaḍvidho hāsyā eva tu." (56)

ND. (p. 230-232, II. 18-20) has -

vaimukhyakāryaṃ vīthyaṅgi khyāta-kaulīna-dambhavat,

hāsyāṅgi bhāṇa-sandhyāṅka-vṛtti-prahasanaṃ divdhā. (18)

nindya-pākhaṇḍi-viprāder aślīlāsabhya-varjitam,

parihāsa-vacaḥ-prāyaṃ śuddham ekasya-ceṣṭitam. (19)

saṅkīrṇam uddhatā"kalpa-bhāṣā"cāra-paricchadam

bahūnāṃ bandhaki-ceṭa-vesyādīnāṃ vicesṭitam." (20)

RS. (p. 290, III. 268, b., - 278, 279; pp. 297)

"vastu-sandhyāṅka-lāsyāṅga-vṛttayo yatra bhāṇavat tridhā

śuddham kīrṇam vaikṛtam ca tacca prahasanaṃ." (268b)

śuddham śrotṛiya-vākyāder veśa-bhāṣādi-samyutam. (278)

ceṭa-ceṭi-jana-vyāptam kīrṇam lakṣyam nirūpyatām,

ānanda-kośa-pramukham vaikṛtam tad udāhṛtiḥ. (279)

SD. (p. 449, 450; VI. 264-268) reads as -

bhāṇavat-sandhi-sandhyāṅga-lāsyāṅgāṅkair vinīrmitam,

bhavet prahasanaṃ vṛttam, nindyaṇām kavikalpitam. (264)

atra nā"rabhaṭī nā'pi viśambhaka-praveśakau,

aṅgī hāsyarāsaṣas tatra vīthyaṅgānām sthitir na vā. (265)

tapasvi-bhagavad-vipra-prabhṛtiṣvatra nāyakaḥ,  
 eko yatra bhaved dhṛṣṭo hāsyam tacchuddham ucyate.  
 āśritya kañcana janam saṅkīrṇam iti tadviduḥ. (266)  
 vṛttam bahūnām dhṛṣṭānām saṅkīrṇam kecidūcire  
 tat punarbhavati dvyaṅkam athavaikāṅka-nirmitam." (267)  
 vikṛtam tu vidur yatra śaṇḍha-kañcaki-tāpasāḥ  
 bhujaṅga-cāraṇa-bhaṭa-prabhṛter veṣa-vāg-yutāḥ." (268)  
 "idaṃ tu saṅkīrṇena gatārtham iti muninā pṛthaṅ noktam."  
 'Bhāṇa' is defined in the NS. (XVIII. 108-11) as -  
 "ātmā'nubhūta-śaṃsī para-saṃśraya-varṇanā-viśeṣastu  
 vividhāśrayo hi bhāṇaḥ, vijñeyastv eka-hāryaś ca. (108)  
 paravacanam ātmasaṃsthāṃ prativacanair uttarottaraarathitaiḥ  
 ākāśa-puruṣa-kathitaiḥ aṅgavikārain abhinayaiśca. (109)  
 dhārta-viṭa-saṃprayojyo nānāvasthāntarātmakaścaiva  
 ekāṅko bahu-ceṣṭaḥ, satatam kāryo budhair bhāṇaḥ. (110)  
 bhāṇasyā'pi hi nikhilam lakṣaṇam uktam tathā"gamānugatam,  
 vīthyāḥ samprati nikhilam kathayāmi yathākramam viprāḥ. (111)  
 DR. Bhat translates : (pp. 151, 152, ibid) -

(108) The Bhāṇa is to be known as (a play) acted by one character, and it has a varied basis : (a) that which narrates one's own experiences, and (b) that which particularly describes some one else's. [Dr. Bhat reads in a foot-note, here - "Etymologically, Bhāṇa is so called because the representation is carried to the audience by a single character; "ekena pātreṇa haraṇīyaḥ, sāmājika-hṛdayam prāpayitavyaḥ arthaḥ yatra", also, because the speeches of characters absent on the stage are voiced here by a single character : "ekamukhena eva bhāṇyante uktimantaḥ kriyante a-praviṣṭāḥ api pātra-viśeṣāḥ yatra." - See Abhinava, op. cit. p. 449.]

(109) - (And this latter is done) by (conveying) the speech of the other addressed to oneself by means of replies (prativacana), connected in (a series of questions and) answers, as (if) they are given by an imaginary person (ākāśa-puruṣa), and by means of gestures of the limbs and by (other forms of) acting.

(110) The Bhāṇa is to be presented through the (single character of) dhūrta or viṭa and is to comprise his various conditions. The wise should always construct the Bhāṇa as depicting varied activities but having (only) one act.

(111) The entire character of Bhāṇa has been explained by me as it has come down by tradition (āgama).

Now, O Brahmins !, I will state in due order the whole character of vīthī. [Prof. D. R. Mankad feels that ‘Bhāṇa’ was the first type to evolve. Dr. Bhat earlier argued for Samavakāra, on the strength of Bharata’s mentioning. But Bharata has also mentioned a ḍima. Actually a play is supposed to entertain both “devas” and ‘asuras” alike, i.e. of people of various tastes at a time. In this context Bharata has cited the illustration of ‘Samudra-mathana’. We feel that we should not rush to conclusions as is done either by Prof. Mankad or Prof. Bhat. Actually, as suggested by us elsewhere, acting and narration are two sides of a coin and evolve naturally. We can not say whether the minor popular art-forms were predecessors to classical major or not, and we are grateful to tradition (= āgama, as Bharata uses the world) for that. It is no use rushing to conclusions.]

DR. has Bhāṇa discussed (pp. 158; III. 49-51) as follows :

bhāṇas tu dhūrtacaritaṃ svā’nubhūtaṃ pareṇa vā  
yatropavarṇayaed eko nipuṇaḥ paṇḍito vīṭaḥ- (49)  
saṃbodhanokti-pratyuktī kuryād ākāśa-bhāṣitaiḥ  
sūcayed vīra-śṛṅgārau śaurya-saubhāgya-saṃstavaḥ. (50)  
bhūyasā bhāratī vṛttir ekāṅkaṃ vastu-kalpitam,  
mukha-nirvahaṇe sāṅge lāsyāṅgāni daśā’pi ca. (51)

It may be noted that the DR. also takes note of the rasas, bhāratī-vṛtti, and also “lāsyāṅgāni”. This suggests that a lot of music and dance must have been associated with this form. Thus ‘bhāṇa’ could be viewed as a minor-art-form also. The lāsyāṅgāni are enumerated in the DR. II. 52-53, as follows.

geyapadaṃ sthita-pāṭhyaṃ āsīnaṃ puṣpa-gaṇḍikā,  
pracchedakas trigūḍhaṃ ca saindhavākyam dvigūḍhakam (52)  
uttamottamakam caiva ukta-pratyuktam eva ca,  
lāsyē daśa-vidhaṃ hyetaḍ aṅga-nirdeśa-kalpanam. (53)

ND. (p. 229, II. 16, 17) reads as -

bhāṇaḥ pradhāna-śṛṅgāra-vīro mukha-nirvāhavān,  
ekāṅko daśa-lāsyāṅgaḥ, prāyo lokā’nurañjakaḥ. (16)  
eko vīṭo vā dhūrto vā veśyādeḥ svasya vā sthitim,  
vyomokṛyā varṇayed atra vṛttir mukhyā ca bhāratī. (17)



RS. (p. 287, III. 232b-237) - has

svasya vā'nyasya vā vṛttam viṭena nipuṇoktinā. (232b)

śaurya-saubhāgya-saṁstutyā vīra-śṛṅgāra-sūcakam,

buddhikalpitam ekā'ṅgam mukha-nirvahaṇeritam. (233)

varṇyate... (234)

bhaved ākāśabhāṣitam. (235)

lāsyā'ṅgāni daśaitasmin saṁyojyānyatra tāni tu,

geyapadam śṛṇita-pāṭhyam āsīnam puṣpagandhikā, (236)

pracchedakas triguḍham ca saindhavākhyam dvighāḍhakam

uttamottamakam cā'nyad ukta-pratyuktameva ca. (237)

The B.P. (Ch. VIII) describes lāsyāṅgāni elaborately by defining each one of them. The RS. also accepts the same.

SD. (p. 435, VI. 227b-230) has -

bhāṇaḥ syād dhūrta-carito nānā'vastāntarā'tmakah. (227b)

ekāṅka eka evā'tra nipuṇaḥ paṇḍito viṭaḥ,

raṅge prakāśayet svena anubhūtam itareṇa vā. (228)

sambodhanokti-pratyukto kuryād ākāśa-bhāṣitaiḥ.

sūcayed vīra-śṛṅgārau śaurya-saubhāgya-varṇanaiḥ. (229)

tatretivṛttam utpādyam vṛttiḥ prāyeṇa bhārati

mukha-nirvahaṇe sandhī lāsyā'ṅgāni daśā'pi ca. (230)

Vīthī is read in the NS. at (XVIII 112-126) :

sarva-rasa-lakṣaṇā'dhyā yuktā hy aṅgaḥ trayodaśabhiḥ,

vīthī syād ekā'ṅkā, tathaika-hāryā dvihāryā vā. (112)

adhamottama-madhyamābhir yuktā syāt prakṛtibhiḥ tisṛbhiḥ,

uddhātyakāvalagitā'va-spandita-nāly-asatpralāpās ca. (113)

vākkely atha prapañco mṛdavā'dhibale chalam trigatam,

vyāhāro gaṇḍaś ca trayodaśāṅgāny udāhṛtāny asyāḥ. (114)

atha vīthī saṁproktā, lakṣaṇam eṣāṁ pravakṣyāmi. (115a)

padāni tvagatārthāni ye naraḥ punarādarāt, (115b)

yojayanti padair anyais tad uddhātyakam ucyate. (116a)

yatrā'nyasmin samavekṣya kāryamanyat prasādhyate, (116b)  
 tac cā'valagitaṃ nāma vijñeyam nārya-yoktrbhiḥ. (117a)  
 ākṣipte'rthe tu kasmiścicchudhā'subha-samutthite, (117b)  
 kauśalyād ucyatényórtas tad ava-spanditaṃ bhavet. (118a)  
 hāsyenopagatā'rtha-prahelikā nāliketi vijñeyā. (118b)  
 mūrkhā-jana-sannikarṣe hitam api yatra prabhāṣate vidvān  
 na ca grhyatēsyā vacanaṃ vijñeyo'sat-pralāpósau. (119)  
 (120) eka-dvi-prativacanā vākkeli syāt-prayogésmin. (120a)  
 yad asadbhūtaṃ vacanaṃ samstava-yuktaṃ dvayoh (120b)  
 ekasyā cā'rthahetoḥ, sa hāsyajananaḥ prapañcaḥ syāt. (121a)  
 yat kāraṇād guṇānām doṣikaraṇaṃ bhaved vivāda-kṛtaṃ, (121b)  
 doṣa-guṇīkaraṇaṃ vā tan mṛdavaṃ nāma vijñeyam. (122a)  
 paravacanam ātmanaśca uttarottara-samudbhavaṃ dvayor yattu, (122b)  
 anyōnyā'rtha-viśeṣakam adhibalam iti tad budhair jñeyam. (123a)  
 anyā'rtham eva vākyam chalam abhi-sandhāna-hāsyā-roṣa-karam (123b)  
 srutisārūpyād yasmin bahavórtthā yuktibhir niyujyante,  
 yad hāsyam a-hāsyam vā tattrigataṃ nāma vijñeyam. (124)  
 pratyakṣa-vṛttir ukto vyāhāro hāsyā-leśārthaḥ. (125a)  
 samramba-sambhrama-yutaṃ vivāda-yuktaṃ tathā'pavādakṛtaṃ, (125b)  
 bahuvacanā'kṣepa-kṛtaṃ gaṇḍam pravadanti tattvajñāḥ. (126a)  
 Dr. Bhat translates (pp. 153-159) :

(112-113a) - The vīthī should have one act; it has the character of all the sentiments and it comprises 13 aspects (lit. limbs); it is to be acted by one or two characters; it may include three kinds of dramatic characters (prakṛti), high, middling and low. (113b, 114, 115a) - The thirteen limbs of the vīthī are stated (as follows) : uddhātyaka, avalagita, ava-spandita, nāli, asat-pralāpa, vāk-keli, prapañca, mṛdava, adhibala, chala, trigata, vyāhāra, gaṇḍa.

I have spoken about the vīthī. I will now explain the characteristics of these (thirteen aspects) (115b-116a). When dramatic characters (lit. men) connect words, (uttered) out of due respect (but) not understood in their (correct) meaning, with other words [not intended by the original speaker] that is called uddhātyaka - (Thrusted interpretation.)

[Dr. Bhat adds a foot-note : Abhinava's example is of a verse where the character asks questions and states his answers. The verse, ordinarily will be an example of *parisaṃkhyā alaṃkāra*.]

(116b-117a) - Something connected with another context (serves) to accomplish some other result, that is to be known as *Avalagita* (Transferred connection) by the designers of drama.

(Dr. Bhat) (foot-note : The example is *Ratnāvalī* II. from *Viduṣaka's* - "api sukhayati te locanam... to V. 11)

(117b-118a) - When a certain matter (*artha*) which has been stated (*ākṣipta*) from which good or evil may arise (unintentionally) is skilfully interpreted to give another meaning, that will be *Ava-spandita*, (ominous suggestion).

[Dr. Bhat - "The example is *Veṇīsaṃhāra* I. 6. ("satpakṣā madhura-giraḥ...") and the *sūtradhāra's* comments on his assistant's remarks.

(118 b) When a riddle-like (enigmatic) reply is followed by laughter, that is to be known as *Nālikā* (or *Nālī*. riddle and laughter).

[Dr. Bhat : cf. *Ratnāvalī* II. after V. 15 (from *jassa kide āgādā... upto citta-phalakāśya*) , lines 1-5.]

(119) That is '*Asat-pralāpa*' (Incoherent chatter) [Where the statement or question and the reply both are inconsistent] - where the statement made by a learned man in the presence of fools, although beneficial, is not accepted.

[Dr. Bhat adds : See Abhinava, op. cit. p. 456, for the example. The alternative reading is quite clear :

"a-sambaddham ca yad vākyam, a-sambaddham tathottaram,  
a-sat-pralāpas tac caiva vithyāṃ samyak prayojayet."

(120a) In this representation (of *Vithī*), the *vākkeli* (sportive speech, Repartee) is a single or twofold reply. (120b-121a) - A statement which is untrue but which looks like mutual praise of two, which is intended in the interest of one (of the two), and which evokes laughter, will be '*prapañca*' (comic exposure).

[Dr. Bhat : cf. *Ratnāvalī* II, after VS. 15, from the king's speech - "katham aham ihaṣṭhaḥ bhavatyā jñātaḥ", upto 'devī nivedaissam' and the gift of ornament. Abhinava, op., cit., p. 456].

(121b-122a) - When as a result of hot dispute (*vivāda*) the merits (of one) are made to look like faults, on the basis of definite cause, or the faults are turned into merits, that is known by the name '*mṛdava*'. (crushing.)

[Dr. Bhat - The name ‘mṛdava’ implies the idea of crushing, like earth, the view of the rival and establishing one’s viewpoint. cf. Veṇisaṃhāra, III. 22, as an instance of ‘doṣasya guṇī-karaṇa’ and III. 39, as of ‘guṇasya doṣīkaraṇa’, in the altercation between Aśvatthāman and Karna.]

(122b-123a) - When the words of another person as well as one’s own, in the course of mutual dialogue, lead to the strengthening (qualifying) of the meaning of both (speakers), that should be known by the wise as ‘Adhibala’ (special strengthening).

[Dr. Bhat-foot-note - The example is Nāgānanda, I. 5, to I. 7., lines 1-9.]

(123b) - A statement which really carries an altogether different meaning, employed to cause deception, laughter and anger, is ‘chala’. (Deception, Irony)

[Dr. Bhat - According to alternative reading “Having first tempted by means of traditional replies, by those very replies, (now) shown to be meaningless, exactly opposite is done, that is chala.” Abhinava’s example is, “kassa va ṇa hoi roso... where the clever sakhī represents the tooth-marks on the lip of the nāyikā as due to smelling of a lotus that has a bee, in order to conceal her wanton act of love.]

(124) - The statement in which many meanings are employed by clever means, due to similarity of sounds, that whether laugh-evoking or not, is to be known as “Trigata” (Triple or multiple import).

[Dr. Bhat : Apparently this ‘trigata’ is different from the ‘trigata’, ‘three-men’s talk’, which is an item in the pūrva-raṅga. The instance is Vikramorvaśīya IV. 56. “sarva-kṣitibhṛtām nātha...”, where due to the mountain echoes, the question asked by Pururavas, becomes, when heard back, an affirmative answer, with slight adjustment of syntax. The ‘yukti’ is usually kāku.]

(125-a) - Things (which are to be visualized in the coming future) are spoken as actually taking place. This is vyāhāra - (varied representation), which is meant to convey amused laughter (hāsya-leśa).

[Dr. Bhat : Abhinava’s instance is Ratnāvalī II. 4 - (uddāmotkalikām....) where the magic blossoming of the king’s favourite flowering tree is visualised as causing defeat and jealous anger of the queen.

Abhinava says - ‘pratyakṣa-śabdena bhāvī pratyakṣaḥ ucyate.’ - Vyāhāra is so called because “vividhaḥ arthaḥ abhinīyate yena”, op. cit. p. 458.]

(125b-126) The theoreticians speak (that to be) gaṇḍa (Dramatic coincidence) which is due to agitation, confusion, quarrel, reviling (apa-vāda), and caused by

(unexpected) words, (lit. tossing, ākṣepa) (though) the many (connected) words (previously uttered) have come to a proper break (ākṣepa).

[Dr. Bhat - foot-note - “Bahu-vacana-ākṣepa-kṛta - The elaborate translation follows the interpretation of Kohala given by Abhinava. The illustration is, Veṇiśaṃhāra II. 23 & ff.

(paryāptam eva karabhoru mamo-ru-yugmam” bhagnam... bhagnam...).

Thus, the prescription for ten types of drama has been all mentioned by me in accordance with their characteristics.

It may be noted that like sandhyaṅga-s, and sandhyantaras, these ‘aṅgas’ also make for beautification in a play and should therefore be taken as “alaṃkāras” in the wider sense of the term.

DR. (p. 163, III. 68b-69) : reads -

vīthī tu kaiśikī-ṛttau sandhyaṅgāṅkaiś tu bhāṇavat (68b)

rasaḥ sūcyas tu śṛṅgāraḥ, sprśedapī rasāntaram,

yuktā prastāvanākhyātair aṅgair uddhātyakā”dibhiḥ. (69)

evaṃ vīthī vidhātavyā dvyeka-pātra-prayojitā. (70a)

Avaloka : (p. 163) : vīthīvad vīthī mārgaḥ. aṅgādīnām upapattiḥ bhāṇavat kāryā, viśeṣatas tu rasaṃ śṛṅgāro’ paripūrṇarvād bhūyasā sūcyāḥ. rasāntarāṇyapi stokaṃ sparśanīyāni. kaiśikī ṛttir iha rasaucityād eva iti. śeṣaṃ spaṣṭam.

The ND. (p. 240-270; Kā. II. 28-36) : reads as -

ND.

sarva-svāmi-rasā vīthī tv ekāṅkā dvyeka-pātrikā,

mukha-nirvāha-sandhiḥ syāt, sarva-rūpopayoginī. (28)

[Ṛtti-sarveṣāṃ rūpakāṇaṃ nāṭakā”dīnām vakroktṛyā-di-saṃkula-trayodaśaṅga-praveśena upayoginī vaicitryakārikā. ata evā’nte lakṣitā.]

vyāhāro’dhibalaṃ gaṇḍaḥ prapañcāstrigataṃ chalam,

asat-pralāpo vākkeli nālikā mṛdavaṃ matam.

uddhātyakāvalagite athāvaspanditaṃ smṛtam,

bhāratī-ṛtti-vartini vīthyaṅgāni trayodaśa. (29-30)

anyārthā bhāvidrṣṭir vā vyāhāro hāsyā-leśā-gīḥ

mitho jalpe svapakṣasya sthāpanā’dhibalaṃ balāt. (31)

gaṇḍo’kasmād yad anyārthaṃ prastutā’nugatam vacaḥ  
 prapañcaḥ sastavaṃ hāsyam mitho mithaika-lābhakṛt. (32)  
 trigatam śabda-sāmyena bhinnasyārthasya yojanam,  
 vaco’nyārthaṃ chalam hāsyā-vañcanā-roṣa-kāraṇam. (33)  
 asatpralāpas tatvena hitam yannā’vagamyate,  
 praśnottaram tu vākkeli hāsyā vāk-prati-vāg api. (34)  
 hāsyāya vañcanā nālī, vyatyayo guṇadoṣayoḥ, mṛdavam.  
 parasparam syad udghātyam gūḍhabhāṣaṇam. (35)  
 taccāvalagitaṃ siddhiḥ kāryasyā’nya-miṣeṇa yā,  
 svecchoktasyānyathākhyānam yad avaspanditam tu tat. (36)

RS. has Vīthī (pp. 290; III. 265-268a) -

sūcya-pradhāna-śṛṅgārā  
 mukha-nirvaḥaṇā’nvitā  
 eka-yojyā dvi-yojyā vā  
 kaiśikī-vṛtti-nirbharā. (265)  
 vīthyaṅga-sahitaikāṅkā  
 vīthī’ti kathitā budhaiḥ  
 asyāṃ prāyeṇa lāsyāṅga-  
 daśakam yojayenna vā. (266)  
 sāmānyā parakīyā vā  
 nāyikā’tṛā’nurāgiṇī  
 vīthyaṅga-prāya-vastutvān  
 nocitā kulapālikā. (267)  
 lakṣyam asyās tu vijñeyam  
 mādhavīvīthikā’dikam. (268a)

The RS. enumerates the vīthyaṅga-s along with āmukhāṅgāni, at III. 164 - 166 such as -

kathitāny āmukhāṅgāni  
 vīthyaṅgāni pracakṣmahe  
 āmukhe’pi ca vīthyāṃ ca  
 sādharmaṇyena sammatā. (164)

vīthyaṅga-saṃprathā teṣāṃ vīthyāṃ āvaśyakatvataḥ,  
 uddhyātakāvalagite prapañca-trigate chalam. (165)  
 vākkelyatibale gaṇḍam avasyandita-nālike,  
 asatpralāpa-vyāhārau mṛdavam ca trayodaśa. (166)

The description of these is the same as read in earlier sources.

SD. (p. 440; VI. 253-256) reads as -

vīthyāṃ eko bhaved aṅkaḥ  
 kaścīd ekōtra kalpyate,  
 ākāśa-bhāṣitair uktaś  
 citrāṃ pratyuktim āśritaḥ. (253)  
 sūcayed bhūri-śṛṅgāraṃ  
 kiñcid anyān rasāṇ prati,  
 muka-nirvahaṇe sandhī  
 arthaprakṛtayókhilāḥ. (254)

“kaścīd uttamo madhyamódhamo vā, śṛṅgārabahulatvāc cā'syāḥ kaiśikī-vṛtti-  
 bahulatvam.

asyās trayodaśāṅgāni  
 nirdiśanti manīṣiṇaḥ,  
 uddhyātyakā'valagite  
 prapañcas trigataṃ chalam. (255)  
 vākkelyadhibale gaṇḍam  
 avasyandita-nālike,  
 asatpralāpa-vyāhāra-  
 mṛdavāni ca tāni tu. (256)

The SD. vṛtti observes : etāni cāṅgāni nātakā”diṣu sambhavanṭy api vīthyāṃ  
 avaśyaṃ vidheyāni, spaṣṭa-tayā nātakā”diṣu viniviṣṭānyapihódāhṛtāni. vīthīva  
 nānā-rasānāṃ cā'tra mālā-rūpatayā sthitatvād vīthī iyaṃ.”

With this the daśa-rūpaka-vicāra is completed.

It may be noted, as said in the preface - “namaskaromi”, that no doubt we have  
 drawn upon reliable and respectable sources, & especially in the area of historical  
 survey so to say, i.e. where the views of the mīmāṃsaka-s, naiyāyika-s and  
 vaiyākaraṇas are discussed, - but, to be honest, we have verified with the original

as far as possible, and then only accepted. With the material dealing with alamkāraśāstra proper, i.e. with Bharata, Bhāmaha and the rest, we have tried to think in an original way as prompted by the grace of our gurus - Prof. R. C. Parikh, Prof. R. B. Athavale, and Prof. Dr. V. M. Kulkarni, who at the age of 87+, even today guides us to newer and newer insights. All great names, Dr. Raghavan included, are consulted on occasions and all this is clearly recognised, but we have tried to re-evaluate the findings of these great scholars also. So, at the end of Vol. I., completed with the grace of the Divine, we may say :

“Aum pūrṇam adaḥ, pūrṇam idaṁ  
pūrṇāt pūrṇam udacyate,  
pūrṇasya pūrṇam ādāya  
pūrṇam evā'vaśiṣyate.” - iti Śivam -

“That [= the reliable source] is perfect,  
This [the material presented before you]  
is perfect.

From [the source which is] perfect  
the perfect is drawn.

After [drawing] perfect [material]  
from perfect [source]

only the perfect (which is placed in your hand) remains.

Aum Śāntiḥ, Śāntiḥ, Śāntiḥ.

Aum Mā Aum.

Aum Namaḥ Śivāya

Śubhaṁ bhavatu -

20-7-03, Sunday

[Aśāḍha-kṛṣṇa-saptamī]





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