

SANMATI TARKA



SUKHLAL SANGHAVI,
&
BECHARDAS DOSHI.

SIDHASENA DIVĀKARA'S
SANMATI TARKA

WITH A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION AND
AN ORIGINAL COMMENTARY

BY

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TO OUR LEARNED FRIENDS

MUNI SHRI JINA VIJAYJI,

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and

MR. RASIKLAL C. PARIKH B. A.

Secretary, Gujarat Vernacular Society, Ahmedabad

Whose sympathetic co-operation through-
out, has enabled us to achieve the
arduous task of editing
Sanmati Tarka.

SUKHLAL SAṄGHAVI,

BECHARDĀS DOSHI.

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Lastly, I may add that the publishers also received the sum of Rs. 300/- from Master Ratanchand Talakchand for the publication of this work.

Sukhlal Sanghavi

FOREWORD

The present volume is the English version of a Gujarati edition of Siddhasena's Sanmati Prakarana by the two learned scholars, Pandit Śukhlalji Saṅghavi, Head of the Department of Jain Śāstra, Benares Hindu University and Pandit Bechardāsji Doshi, Nyāya Tirtha, Professor of Ardhamagadhi, S. L. D. Arts College, Ahmedabad.

When their edition of Sanmati-Tarka with the voluminous commentary of Abhayadeva was published by the Gujarat Vidyapitha of Ahmedabad between the years 1927 and 1931, in five volumes, it was proposed to bring out a companion volume in Gujarati, comprising mainly, an introduction to the original work and a concise yet original, critical exposition of its text, as edited in the preceding volumes with Sanskrit commentary. Owing to political crises, however, the Vidyapitha had to be closed and the intended work was consequently published in the "Pūnjābhāi Jaina Granthamālā" in 1933, of which the present volume is an exact English rendering, with the exception that the portion dealing with the discussion of the various manuscripts from which the Vidyapitha Edition had been prepared has been entirely left out from this version, as it was seen that it would serve but little purpose, if any, to the English-knowing public for which the present volume is intended.

The question of the date of Siddhasena demands, however, a fresh discussion, as new material bearing on this aspect has been discovered in recent years, after the publication of the original work in Gujarati in 1933. In the light of these discoveries, it is probable that

there may be some change or modification in the conclusion arrived at previously. *Pramāṇa Vārtika* and several other Buddhist works which have been published for the first time in recent years, are apt to lead us to fix the date in question, in the sixth or the seventh century A. D., in place of in the fifth century A. D., as stated in this edition. But due to want of time, this discussion is not possible at present. Nevertheless, leaving this one point aside, there is nothing in the introduction which may be considered as untenable or doubtful. On the contrary, a critical comparison of *Mulāchāra* has been added afresh in this English version.

My principal object has been to see that the English translation conveys as far as possible, the true sense and spirit of its original, and I have tried my best to fulfil it through the translators who have helped me in my task.

I take this opportunity to offer my thanks to Mr. Rasiklal Parikh who has kindly gone through the introduction, comparing it with the original Gujarati. And I must also express my heart-felt gratitude to both the authors for entrusting me with the editing of this volume and reposing their trust in my responsibility.

Dalsukh Malvania

ABBREVIATIONS

A. C.	...	Āvaśyaka Cūrṇī
Ane.	...	Anekāntajayapatākā of Haribhadra
Ayo.	...	Ayogavyavacchedikā of Hemacandra
Bhaktā.	...	Bhaktāmara Stotra of Mānatuṅga
Bṛ.	...	Bṛhat-ṭippaṇikā published in J. S. S. Vol. I.
Dwā.	...	Dwātriṃśat-dwātriṃśikās of Sid- dhasena
H. I. L.	...	History of Indian Logic, by Satīśa Candra Vidyābhūṣaṇa
I. H. Q.	...	Indian Historical Quarterly, Calcutta
I. L. A.	...	Indian Logic on Atomism, by Kieth.
J. G.	...	Jainagranthāvali published by the Śvetāmbara Conferance, Bombay.
Jit.	...	Jītakalapa Edited by Muni Jina Vijayaji
J. R. A. S.	...	Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society
J. S. S.	...	Jaina Sāhitya Saṁśodhaka, Ahmedabad
J. V.	...	Jainendra Vyākaraṇa
Kalyā.	...	Kalyāṇa Mandira Stotra
K. S.	...	Kalpa Sūtra
Na. C.	...	Nandi Cūrṇī
N. B.	...	Niśītha Bhāṣya (Mss.)
N. C.	...	Niśītha Cūrṇī (Mss.)
Nir.	...	Nirvāṇakalikā
N. P. P.	...	Nāgarī Pracāriṇī Patrikā, Benares.
Ny.	...	Nyāyāvatāra of Siddhasena Divākara Edited by P. L. Vaidya.

Pari.	...	Pariśiṣṭa Parva of Hemacandra
P. C.	...	Prabhāvaka Carita
Pra.	...	Pravacanasāra
Sam.	...	Samarāicca Kahā, Edited by Jacobi
San.	...	Sanmati-Tarka of Siddhasena
Sau.	...	Saundarānanda of Aśvaghoṣa
S. S. B.	...	Svāmī Samanta Bhadra of Pt. Jugalkiśorji
S. T.	...	Sanmati Tikā of Abhayadeva
Sway.	...	Swayambhūstotra of Samanta Bhadra
Swet.	...	Śwetāśvataropaniṣat
T. Bh. V.	...	Tattvārtha Bhāṣya Vṛtti of Siddhasena Gandhahasti.
T. H.	...	Tattvārtha Bhāṣya Tikā by Haribhadra
Vi. B.	...	Viśeṣāvaśyaka Bhāṣya of Jinabhadra

INTRODUCTION

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INTRODUCTION

1 SIDDHASENA DIVĀKARA

(i) SIDDHASENA'S DATE

The author of the Sanmati-tarka is Siddhasena Sūri. There are many Jaina Ācāryas¹ known to Jaina tradition bearing the name of Siddhasena. Among them, that Siddhasena who bore the title of Divākara, is the author of this work. It is not definitely known as yet whether before this Siddhasena Divākara there was any other Siddhasena either in the Śwetāmbara or the Digāmbara sect.

Adequate materials are not yet available to prove beyond doubt the date of Siddhasena Divākara. To fix the date, we have only three kinds of sources. First, his own works ; secondly, the Jaina traditions with their several anecdotes and thirdly, references by authors whose dates are fixed.

Let us first avail ourselves of the last-mentioned source. Haribhadra Sūri who lived in the first half of the eighth century of Vikrama era,² makes a mention of Sammai or Sammati in his own work Pañcavastu and

1 See J. G. pp. 54, 75, 79, 94, 127, 138, 273, 275, 277, 281, 289 and 292.

2 See J. S. S. Vol. I p. 53 and Sam. Introduction : p. 2.

also in its comments. He mentions Siddhasena Divākara as the author of Sammati. Not only that but he refers to Divākara with the rare title of Śrutakevalī—

भरणइ एगंतेणं अम्हाणं कम्मवाय णो इट्ठो ।
 ण य णो सहाववाओ सुअकेवलिणा जओ भणिअं ॥ १०४७ ॥
 आयरियसिद्धसेणेण सम्मईए पइट्ठिअजसेणं ।
 दूसमणिसादिवागरकप्पत्तणओ तदक्खेणं ॥ १०४८ ॥

The manner of his reference rather points out that Haribhadra Sūri is referring to some ancient and celebrated Ācārya. There is no difficulty, therefore, in placing Siddhasena Divākara before the first-half of eighth century of Vikrama.

On the Jaina Āgamas there are well-known Prākṛta commentaries named Cūrṇi. The time assigned to these Cūrṇis is between the fourth and the eighth century of Vikrama era. Among these Cūrṇis there is a Cūrṇi on Nisītha Sūtra. The writer of this Cūrṇi is Jinadāsagaṇi Mahattara¹ who is also the author of many other Cūrṇis.

1 The reference to Jinadāsa as found at the end of Cūrṇi is as follows ;—

जो गाहासुत्तथो चेव विधी पागडो फुडपदथो ।
 रइतौ परिभासाए साहूण अणुग्गहट्ठाए ॥
 ति-चउ-पण-अट्ठमवग्गा ति-पण-ति-तिगअवखरा व ते तेसिं ।
 पढमततिपहिं ति-दुसरजुएहिं णामं कयं जस्स ॥
 गुरुदिण्णं च गणित्तं महत्तरत्तं च तस्स तुट्ठेहिं ।
 तेण कएसा चुण्णी विसेसनामा णिसीहस्स ॥

Now at the end of an old manuscript of the Cūrṇi on Nisītha Sūtra is given the date of its composition as Śaka¹ 598 (Vikrama 733, A.D. 676). In this Cūrṇi there are three references² to Siddhasena and his work Sanmati

नमो सुयदेवयाए भगवतीए । जिणदासगणिमहत्तरेण रइया । नमः तीर्थकृद्भ्यः ॥ छ ॥ छ ॥ शुभं भवतु । संवत् १५३१ वर्षे फाल्गुनसुदि २ लिखितं—N. C. Vol. II p. 463

1 See J. S. S. Vol. I p. 50. The reading in printed Na. C. is as follows :—सकराजतो पंचसु वर्षशतेषु नंबध्ययनचूर्णी समाप्ता इति p. 64.

2 दंसणगाही—दंसणणप्पभावगाणि सत्थाणि सिद्धिक्किण्चच्चयसंमतिमादि गेएहत्तो असंशरमाणे जं अकप्पियं पडिसेवति जयणाते तत्थ सो सुद्धो अप्रायश्चित्ती भवतीत्यर्थः—N. C. : p. 81.

दंसणणाये त्ति । अस्य व्याख्या—सुत्तत्थगतदुगाथा । दंसणप्पभावगाण सत्थाण सम्मदियादिसुत्तणाये य जो विसारदो णिस्संक्रियसुत्तत्थो त्ति वुत्तं भवति सो य उत्तिमट्ठपडिक्कन्तो सो य जत्थ खेत्ते ठिओ तत्थंतरा वा वेरज्जं मा तं सुत्तत्थं वेच्छिज्जतु त्ति अओ तग्गहणट्ठया पक्कप्पति वेरज्जविशुद्धसंकमणं काऊं—p. 238.

अथवा तिसु आइल्लेसु णिव्वत्तणाधिकरणं तत्थ ओरालिए एगिंदियादि पंचविधं, तं जोणीपाहुइतिणा जहा सिद्धसेणायरिएण अस्सा पक्ता—N. C. p. 169. Vide note by Muni Śrī Kalyāṇa Vijayaji p. 110.

In addition to those three references there is another reference to the Upayogābheda-vāda of Siddhasena—This important reference is to be found in Daśācūrṇi. In the third chapter of Daśācūrṇi, among the insults to the Guru, enumerated there, one is as follows :—

If a disciple criticises his preceptor in the presence of the audience gathered to hear the preceptor's discourse by saying—
'The interpretation of this sūtra as given by my preceptor is

The purport of the first reference is that a monk who while studying such epoch-making works (Prabhāvaka) of Jainism—as Siddhiviniścaya, Sanmati and the like, commits no sin even if he has to use forbidden things, that is, he need not undergo any purificatory penance.

The second reference to Sanmati is as follows:—"In order that the Sūtras may not perish, permission is given to go even to the country of a heretic king, if there

different. But the right interpretation of the sūtra as given by me is this," then this presumptuous disciple parading his knowledge before the audience is said to have insulted his preceptor. In the said Cūrṇi Ācārya Siddhasena has been charged of having insulted his preceptor in the manner mentioned above and this insult is said to be of a serious character Bhāvāsātānā. The author of this Cūrṇi explains the nature of this insult and as an instance in point mentions the name of Siddhasena as having insulted his preceptor. The author remarks :—"Siddhasena has interpreted the same sūtra in various ways." Looking to the nature of these remarks it is quiet clear that by Siddhasena, Ācārya Siddhasena alone is meant, no other Siddhasena is known to have interpreted the sūtras in various ways. The author of the Cūrṇis evidently refers to the interpretation by Siddhasena of the Sūtras in such a manner as would agree with his doctrine of Upayogabhedavāda. This reference to Siddhasena lends a strong support to his date as fixed above. The author of this Cūrṇi is probably Jinadāsa as at least somebody who lived not later than Jinadāsa. The reference to Siddhasena as found in the Cūrṇi is as follows :—

“अणुद्वयं निविद्वाप्य चेव, अभिन्ना ण ताव विसरति, अवोच्छिण्णा जाव एको वि अच्छति, तमेव ति जो आयरिण अत्थो कहितो दोहिं ते(ती)हिं चउहिं वा, जहा सिद्धसेणायरितो तमेवाधिकारं विकल्पयति अयमपि प्रकारो तस्यैवैकस्य सूत्रस्यैव गुणजुत्तो, भावआसादणा भवति ।” Daśācūrṇi p. 19.

lives a sādhu who has taken to fast unto death but who is well-versed in such epoch-making works as Sanmati.”

The third reference mentions Siddhasena himself. It says “As Siddhasen created horses by his miraculous powers obtained from Yoni Prābhṛta and other mystic sciences.”

In all these references, there are two chief points. The first is this that this work Sanmati was regarded as a Darśanaprabhāvaka work at the time of Jinadāsagaṇī Mahattara so much so that its student, even though committing some sort of fault on account of some reason or other, was not considered liable to any purificatory penance. Moreover, permission was granted to Jain sādhus to study the work even if the teacher stayed in the country of heretics. The second point is that the miracle on the part of a certain Ācārya named Siddhasena of having created horses was a well-known and an accepted story at the time of Jinadāsagaṇī.

The present Cūrṇi is on the Bhāṣya, and this Bhāṣya in its turn is supposed to be written by—Jinabhadragaṇī.¹ In this Bhāṣya there is no direct mention of Sanmati. But Śāstras bearing the title Darśanaprabhāvaka² are mentioned there without specific names. Jinabhadragaṇī died in Vikrama 645 according to Jaina tradition. This Siddhasena Divākara mentioned as having

1 See introduction to Jit. p. 10

2 दंसणपभावगाणं सत्थाण्डुत्ते सेवति जा उ ।

णाणे सुत्तथायं चरणेसण-इत्थिदोसा वा ॥ N. B. p. 21.

created the horses¹ is certainly the author of Sanmati-tarka.

Now these two facts—that of Siddhasena being well-known as the creator of horses and that of Sanmati being well-known as a work adding to the glory of Jainism—lead us to the inference beyond doubt that Siddhasena lived before Jinadāsa. But then the question arises as to whether Siddhasena was a contemporary of Jinabhadra or lived a little prior to Jinabhadra, or lived long before him. Siddhasena and Jinabhadra though both of great scholars, belonged to rival schools. Jinabhadra was celebrated as a guardian of Jaina tradition and a scholar of Jaina scriptures, while Siddhasena was well-known as a person who translated the Jain scriptures into Saṃskṛta, and was a great logician who started the new school. Jinadāsa being a writer of Cūṛṇis, the literature based on scriptures, has a natural tendency towards the scriptures. Now this Jinadāsa mentions Siddhasena who belonged to the rival school as a scholar of a very high order. It means, therefore, that Siddhasena could not have been a contemporary of Jinabhadra but must have lived long before him. There must have been such a wide gulf of time between these two scholars differing from each other on fundamental points as to create a high respect in the mind of Jinadāsa about the works and personality of Siddhasena. Looking to those times and to the narrow sectarian outlook that was then rampant, it

1 P. O. : Vṛddhavādi-Prabandha : verse 167, 168 contains a suggestion of Siddhasena's having created an army.

would not be out of place to suppose that a period of nearly 200 years must have elapsed between Jinadāsa and Siddhasena.

Now let us look to the Jaina tradition. All the traditions take Siddhasena to be a contemporary of King Vikramāditya and a resident of Ujjaina. It is, however, still a debatable point in Indian history as to who this Vikrama was and when he lived. Naturally, therefore, this tradition of Vikrama does not help us much in fixing the date of Divākara.

The late Pandita Satīśacandra Vidyābhūṣaṇa¹ says that in the assembly of Vikramāditya whom he identifies with Yaśodharmadeva of Mālavā there were nine jewels, that is to say, nine great scholars. Now in the verse which enumerates these scholars there is a mention of a jewel Kṣapaṇaka. This Kṣapaṇaka according to Satīśacandra is no other than Siddhasena Divākara and thus Vikrama and Divākar both lived in 530 A.D. or thereabout according to this scholar.

Now there are two errors committed by Satīśacandra in fixing this date. The first is that the date of King Vikramāditya cannot be definitely ascertained in this way. His identity with any historical king has not yet been established beyond doubt. Śrīmān Kalyāṇavijayji² has written an article in Nāgarī Pracārīṇī Patrika on the Nirvāṇa of Mahāvīra. In that article after advancing

1—H. I. L. p. 174.

2—N. P. P. Vol. 10. No 4.

some sound proofs he has tried to establish that Vikramāditya who is well-known in Jain tradition is no other than Vikramāditya Balamitra. This Balamitra defeated the Śakas, killed Gardhabhilla and occupied the throne of Ujjaina in Samvat 453 of Vīra Nirvāṇa and 17 years later that is Circa 470 he inaugurated after his own name the Vikrama era. Looking to all these conflicting opinions, the contemporaneousness of Siddhasena with Vikramāditya is not useful in fixing his date because the date of Vikramāditya himself has not yet been fixed beyond doubt. The second error of Satīśacandra in fixing the date is this:—He considers the verse mentioning the nine jewels as one of historical authenticity and regards Kalidāsa and other eight persons as contemporaries of one another. But there is not a shred of evidence to show that all these nine persons were contemporaries. Moreover to say that the word Kṣapaṇaka means Siddhasena Divākara is merely a gratuitous assumption. We cannot identify Siddhasena with Kṣapaṇaka unless we have at hand a stronger evidence.

Many Jaina Pattāvalies are written in order to fix the date of the chief Jaina Ācāryas. Now these Pattāvalies are not always unreliable. Clatt and other scholars maintain that these Pattāvalies contain many chronologies. Let us, therefore, try to fix the time of Divākara with the help of these Pattāvalies.

Prabhāvaka Carita written by Prabhācandra in Vikrama 1334 has given in detail a chronological tradition of Siddhasena; "First there lived Skandilācārya in the group of Pādalipta in the tradition of Vidyādharma. His

disciple was Mukunda, a brahmin. This Mukunda obtained the title of Vṛddhavādi later on." Now all the Jain traditions regard Divākara as a desciple of Vṛddhavādi.¹

Let us first consider the above tradition. This Skandilācārya was the compiler of Jaina Vācanā (Canon) at Mathurā. This Vacanā was compiled according to Jain tradition in 840 of Vira. Thus the date of Skandilācārya is approximately 370 Vikram era. Siddhasena belongs to the second generation of Skandilācārya. His time, therefore, is the fifth century of Vikrama. Now let us examine as to whether there is any objection from historical point of view in placing Divākara in the fifth century of Vikrama era.

We have seen above that Siddhasena can be safely placed before the beginning of the eighth century of Vikrama era on the strength of references² made by the authors whose time is already fixed. In the beginning

1 See the Summary of Prabandha below

2 Ācārya Haribhadra in his work mentions the name of Śānta-Rakṣita the author of Tattwa-saṅgraha. Now the date of Śānta-rakṣita is already fixed as the eighth century of Vikrama Era. This author of Tattvasaṅgraha discusses the view of Sumati—an Ācārya of Digambar Sect—in Syādvāda-parīkṣā and Bahir-artha-parīkṣā. Now the fact that Sumati wrote a commentry on Sanmati has been mentioned clearly more than once. One of such references are found in Pārśvanātha Caritra of Vādirajasūri (in the introductory verses) and other is found in the enalogistic verses found in the Śravaṇa-belgolā inscription. A third reference is found in Brhātṭīpanikā where a commentary on Sanmati is

of the eighth century of Vikrama era Sanmati was regarded as a Darśanaprabhāva work. Now in order to achieve such a high place of honour in the holy Jaina literature at least two centuries must have elapsed from the time of writing this work. It would, therefore, be quite proper if we place Siddhasena in the fifth century of Vikrama era.

According to Jaina tradition, Mallavādi who belonged to the fifth century Vikrama era has written a commentary on Sanmati. This fact borne by Jaina tradition,¹ together with the fact that Pūjyapāda who belonged to the sixth

referred to as having been written by a certain author. This Sumati is otherwise mentioned as Sanmati. References to him are as follows :—

नमः सन्मतये तस्मै भवकूपनिपातिनाम् ।
 सन्मतिर्विबृता येन सुखधामप्रवेशिनी ॥
 सुमतिदेवमुं स्तुत येन वः सुमतिसप्तकमाप्तया कृतम् ।
 परिहृतापदतत्त्वपदार्थिनां सुमतिकोटिविवर्ति भवार्तिहृत् ॥

These references also support the date of Siddhasena fixed above.

1 Haribhadra thus refers to Mallavādi :—“उक्तं च वादिमुख्येन श्रीमल्लवादिना सम्मतौ”-Ane. p. 47 and J. S. S. Vol. I. p. 57. and “सम्मतिवृत्तिर्मल्लवादिहृत्” See Br. J. S. S. Vol. I Appendix p. 10.

Upādhyāya Yashovijayaji in his Astasahasri Vivaraṇa refers to Mallavādi in the following words :—

“इदार्थे कोटिशा भग्ना निर्दिष्टा मल्लवादिना ।
 मूलसम्मतितोकायामिदं दिङ्मात्रदर्शनम् ॥”-p 210.

century¹ mentions Siddhasena² goes to corroborate the above mentioned Jain tradition that Siddhasena lived in the fifth century of Vikrama era. There are, however, two schools that take objection in placing Siddhasena in the fifth century. One is that of Professor Jacobi³ with his follower Professor Vaidya and another is that of Pandita Jugalkishor.⁴ Both have advanced their arguments on evidence gathered from Siddhasena's work Nyāyāvatāra. In the verses from 4 to 7 of Nyāyāvatāra there is a discussion of Pramāṇas. In the fifth verse occurs the word Abhrānta⁵ and in the sixth the word Bhrānta.⁶ Professor Jacobi and his follower Professor Vaidya lay great emphasis on these two words. They say that the use of the word Abhrānta in the definition of Pramāṇa was first made by the Bauddha Ācārya, Dharmakīrti. Dharmakīrti has improved upon the definition of Pratyakṣa "प्रत्यक्षं कल्पनापोढं नामजात्याद्यसंयुतम्"⁷ given by Dinnāga in the first chapter of Pramāṇasamuccaya, by adding the word Abhrānta.⁸ Now Siddhasena

1 See J. S. S. Vol. I p. 79.

2 वेत्ते: सिद्धसेनस्य—J. V. 5.1.7.

3 See Sam Introduction p. 3.

4 See S. S. B. p 126-133.

5 अनुमानं तदभ्रान्तं प्रमाणत्वात् समञ्जवत्

6 न प्रत्यक्षमपि भ्रान्तं प्रमाणत्वविनिश्चयात् ।

भ्रान्तं प्रमाणमित्येतद् विरुद्धं वचनं यतः ॥

7 H. I. L. p. 277 note.

8 तत्र प्रत्यक्षं कल्पनापोढमभ्रान्तम्—Nyāyabindu 1.4.

borrowing that word Abhrānta from Dharmakīrti says that Anumāna like Pratyakṣa is Abhrānta. Thus he refutes the definition of Dharmakīrti. According to the opinion of these two scholars, therefore, Siddhasena must have lived after Dharmakīrti that is from 635 to 650 A. D.

Now let us examine this argument. It is a great mistake to suppose that the word Abhrānta in the definition of Pramāṇa or any word synonymous with that word was not known in Indian logic before Dharmakīrti. Gautama in his Nyāyasūtra and Vātsyāyana in his commentary thereupon have used the word Avyabhiçāri. It is a clear synonym of Abhrānta and is used to define direct perception—Pratyakṣa (vide Nyāyasūtra 1.1.4.)

Professor P. L. Vaidya¹ says that if the conception of Abhrānta will be proved to be in existence before Diñnāga he is ready to give up his argument. Fortunately the word Abhrānta and its conception is found in Bauddha Logic even before Diñnāga.

Professor Tousi in the July number of the Journal of Royal Asiatic Society 1929 has written a long article on Bauddha logic prior to Diñnāga. In it the Professor has very ably shown that Bauddha logic had developed to a remarkable degree before Diñnāga and he has proved this point on the strength of Tibetan and Chinese translations of Budhistic Saṃskṛita works. For instance, in the works Yogācāra Bhūmi Śāstra and Prakaraṇāryavācā

1 Introduction to Ny, p. 19.

the definition of Pratyakṣa is as follows :—“ A Pratyakṣa (according to these two above mentioned works) must be Aparokṣa unmixed with imagination, Nirvikalpa and devoid of error, Abhrānt or Avyabhicāri.

Thus in the opinion of these two works Pratyakṣa must be devoid of error i.e., Abhrānta or Avyabhicāri. Now in the note on these two words Professor Tausi remarks that these two words are synonymous and the original Chinese or Tibetan words can be translated by any one of these words. He uses the word Abhrānta¹ and remarks that though—Dharmakīrti has added this word Abhrānta to the definition of Pratyakṣa, the use of the word itself is not new and that accepting the old definition of Sautrāntikas he has improved upon the definition of Dīnnāga.²

Yogācārabhūmiśāstra³ is a work written by Maitreya who was the preceptor of Asaṅga. The date of

1 J. R. A. S. July 1929 p. 470 and foot-note 4; p. 464, 472 etc.

2 Dinnāga is a follower of Yogācāra Vijnānavāda School. Naturally his definition of Pratyakṣa is in agreement with Vijnānavāda. The followers of the School of Vijnānavāda do not admit the existence of external things but regard Vijnāna to be the only thing existing. According to their point of view, every kind of knowledge except that of Tathāgata (i.e. Buddha) is philosophically illusory. They do not, therefore qualify Pratyakṣa by the word Abhrānta—because all knowledge even Pratyakṣa is according to them illusory Bhrānta. Hence in Nyāya-mukha and Nyāya-praveśa the definition of प्रत्यक्ष does not include in it the word अभ्रान्त

3 J. R. A. S. October 1929, p. 870—In July number it is given as the work of Asaṅga—but subsequently in October number the mistake has been rectified.

Asaṅga is somewhere in the middle of the fourth century A.D.¹ It is quite clear, therefore, that this word Abhrānta, its use and conception were quite well-known even before the fifth century of Vikrama era. Merely because Siddhasena used this word, it is not at all necessary to place him after Dharmakīrti. Siddhasena may be regarded as living after Asaṅga, but certainly there is no objection in thinking that he lived before Dharmakīrti.

Now the second argument of Jacobi is this:—"In Nyāyāvatāra, Siddhasena has shown a difference between Swārtha Pratyakṣa and Parārtha Pratyakṣa. This difference has been based by him on these two kinds of inferences in Dharmakīrti's work." It seems to us that this is not a sound argument, for to suppose that Siddhasena's two fold classification of perception was specially based on Dharmakīrti's classification of inference is obviously without evidence. If Siddhasena would be proved as living prior to Dharmakīrti on the strength of independent evidence then it would remain to be proved as to who was the person on whom this classification was based by Siddhasena. Now we know that in Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya systems of logic this twofold classification of inference is found. This can also be seen clearly from such Buddhist works on logic as—Nyāyamukha and Nyāyapraveśa which are prior to Dharmakīrti. Probably, therefore, Siddhasena had his eye on these two scholars of logic when he wrote his Nyāyāvatāra. There is no evidence to prove that the classification of Siddhasena was based on that of Dharmakīrti.

1 I. L. A. p. 23.

Moreover even supposing that Siddhasena had before him Dharmakīrti while writing all this, the question remains as to who was before him when he wrote in the sixth verse of his Nyāyāvatār “न प्रत्यक्षमपि भ्रान्तं प्रमाणत्वं विनिश्चयात्” (न्यायावतार verse 6). It cannot be Dharmakīrti for obvious reasons. For Dharmakīrti has already added the word Abhrānta in the definition of Pratyakṣa. Siddhasena must have, therefore, directed his argument against somebody else, and that somebody must be such a person as would not admit the necessity of the word Abhrānta in the definition of perception. Such authors as can be safely regarded as the opponents of Siddhasena are Vasubandhu, Dinnāga and Śāṅkaraswāmi. The Bauddhas of the school of Vijñānavāda do not admit Pratyakṣa as Abhrānta while Bauddhas of the Sautrāntika school do qualify Pratyakṣa by the word Abhrānta. From all this, it can be easily concluded that Siddhasena had in his mind these two schools of Bauddhas when he made his definition of Pratyakṣa. As has been already remarked, the Sautrāntika school of logic existed before Dharmakīrti. If, therefore, Siddhasena can be placed before Dharmakīrti on the strength of other evidence, it has to be admitted that the statements about Pratyakṣa and Anumāna made by Siddhasena were directed against the Bauddhas of the Sautrāntika school. Dharmakīrti was certainly not the person who was in the mind of Siddhasena at the time of writing these definitions.

The ninth verse of Nyāyāvatāra beginning with the words ‘आप्तोपपन्नमनुलङ्घ्यम्’ occur in the Ratnakaraṇḍaka

Śrāvakācāra of Samantabhadra. From this Pandita Jugalkishor infers that this verse must have been borrowed by Siddhasena Divākara from the works of Samantabhadra. His main argument is that the present verse occurring in Nyāyāvatāra does not fit in with the context and consequently, it must have been borrowed. Our critical study of Nyāyāvatāra has convinced us of the fact that the verse under discussion entirely fits in its place. As long as, therefore, stronger evidence to the contrary is not available we must suppose that both Samantabhadra and Siddhasena have perhaps borrowed the verse from a third source. Simply because the verse occurs in the work of Samantabhadra it would not be proper to say that it has been borrowed by Siddhasena or that the latter lived after Samantabhadra. Another verse of a similar kind is attributed to both Samantabhadra and Siddhasena.¹

These two objections being thus explained away, we have no hesitation in placing Siddhasena in the fifth century of Vikrama era.

In this connection, it is interesting to see what sort of relation existed between Jinabhadraṇi Kṣamāśramaṇa and Siddhasena Divākara. In the Viśeṣāvaśyaka Bhaṣya and Viśeṣaṇavati of Jinabhadra a discussion

1 नयास्तव स्यात्पदलान्धना इमे रसोपविद्धा इव लोहधातवः ।

भवन्त्यभिप्रेतफला यतस्ततो भवन्तमार्याः प्रणता हितैषिणः ॥

The commentator of Sanmati—Abhayadava attributes this verse to Siddhasena while Malliseṇa the author of Syādwādamanjari attributes it to Samantabhadra.

with reference to Ekopayoga and Kramopayoga is found. The same sort of discussion is found in the second chapter of Sanmati.¹ What does this signify? Is there any possibility of the borrowing by one from the other? We think that unless other definite evidence is at hand this similarity of discussion does not go far in proving the priority of one to the other. From the evidence of tradition mentioned above, we may say that Siddhasena most probably flourished in the fifth century of Vikrama era. Now according to Jaina tradition, Jinabhadra died in 645 Vikram era.² Nothing contrary has been advanced with reference to this date. Moreover in the Bhāṣya of Jinabhadra there are certain Gathas³ and certain discussions which are not found anywhere else than in the Sanmati of Siddhasena, and they seem obviously to have been borrowed from the latter. Taking into consideration all these things, it seems highly probable that Siddhasena was the predecessor of Jinabhadra. As long as, therefore, nothing contrary comes to light, we have to say on the strength of the discussion of the doctrine of Upyogavādā found both in Jinabhadra and Siddhasena that Siddhasena lived before Jinabhadra.

The times of Siddhasena are what is known to Indian history as the Gupta period. This period is considered to be an age of renaissance of Saṃskṛta language and literature. Prior to Siddhasena Jaina scriptures and

1 Sanmati-Tika p. 597.

2 See introduction to JIt. p. 10.

3 See below Under the Caption 'Mallavādi and Jinabhadra.'

commentaries thereon were almost written in Prākṛta. Now the extant works of Divākara are mostly written in Saṁskṛta. In some of the Jaina traditional stories there is a mention of Siddhasena's endeavour of translating Jaina scriptures into Saṁskṛta.¹ This activity of his fits in very well with the tendencies of those times. When there was such a movement for the revival of language and literature in the whole country, it is quite natural that the Jaina monk who was by birth a Barhmin should be dissatisfied with the fact of Jaina works being written in Prākṛta. But it seems from the stories about Siddhasena that his efforts in the direction were considerably checked because of the rigour of the Jaina tradition.

(ii) MATERIALS FOR HIS LIFE.

So far nothing is available written by Siddhasena or any of his contemporary or successor which might throw some light on his life. Whatever information about his life, doubtful, fragmentary or reliable that we have, is collected mainly from three sources. First Prabandhas (semi historical anecdotes), second, references, in other works and third his own works.

There are five works available at present that deal with the life of Divākara. Out of these five, two are yet unpublished while three have been published already. Of these two former one is written in prose and the other in verse. The prose work forms a part of the

1 See below p. 27.

Kathāvali of Bhadrēśwara and as such is as old as the 10th or 11th century A. D. The author as well as the date of the work in verse is not known, but one thing is absolutely certain that the work and the author must have lived sometime before 1291 Vikrama era. The reason is that there is a fragmentary quotation from this work, in a palm-leaf manuscript written¹ in 1291. Out of these two works the prose work is comparatively smaller than the other work. The matter in the prose work has been simply enlarged in the poetic composition with some addition here and there. Of the two works the prose work seems to be the older one and that in verse seems to have been composed in imitation of it. All the three published Prabandhas form part of three big works Prabhāvaka Carita, Prabandha Cintāmaṇi and Caturviṃśati Prabandha all of which have been composed during a period of 75 years.² The Prabhāvaka Carita is later than the other two works. But all the same it is of greater importance than the other two. The first reason of this is that the account of Siddhasena which is taken in this work is said to have been taken

1 At the end of the palm-leaf manuscript occur the following words—इति तत्कालकविवादिगजघटापध्वकस्य ब्रह्मचारीति ख्यातविहस्य वप्पमट्टिसूरेः कथानकं समर्थितम् । छ । छ ॥ संवत् १२९१ वैशाख वदि ११ सोमे पुस्तिका लिखिता ॥ छ ॥ शुभं भवतु ॥ छ ॥ छ ॥

2 The approximate Time of these three Prabandhas is Vikrama 1334, 1361, and 1405 respectively. See the concluding portion of these Prabandhas.

from an old Prasasti found in some old monastery.¹ Secondly, this work is based on the account given by some old poets.² The third reason is that the account found in other two works is incorporated in this work. This work again serves as a basis for the composition that forms part of Caturviṃśati Prabhandha. It seems to us, therefore, proper to give a detailed summary of the life of Divākara as is found in the Prabandha that forms part of the Prabhāvaka Carita. After giving this summary we shall point out the small differences in some minor details that are found in other works. This method will save repetition and still give a correct idea of the contents of other compositions as well. What was originally given and what was added subsequently will be seen clearly from this summary.

(a) *Summary of Prabandha in the Prabhāvaka Carita.*³

"In the branch of the Āmnāya named Vidyādhara and in the family of Pādlipta Sūri there lived Skandilācarya who bore the title of Anuyogadhara. After his demise, Vṛddhavādi his disciple, succeeded him. He, while wandering on his religious tour, once arrived at Ujjain or Viśālā where King Vikramāditya was then reigning. This Vṛddhavādi was approached there by one learned Pandita named Siddhasena, whose mother's name was Devaśrī, whose father's name was Devarśi and who

1-2. P. C.—Vṛddhavādi Prabandha. verses 177-179, 180.

3. Prabhāvaka-carita—Vṛddhavādi Prabandha. : p. 91 to 103.

came from the family of Kātyāyana. Siddhasena had already heard much about the profound scholarship of Vṛddhavādi and asked him as to whether he had seen Vṛddhavādi anywhere. Vṛddhavādi, of course, said that he was himself the person in question. Then Siddhasena said, "I have a mind to enter into a debate with you from a very long time. Will you please accept my challenge?" The Sūri replied, "Oh learned man, if you want to satisfy your own mind, why not go to a pandita's assembly? Thus though dissuaded by Vṛddhavādi from entering into a controversy on the spot, Siddhasena pressed him to carry it on then and there. Just then there came cowherd boys. Vṛddhavādi appointed them as umpires, or judges and asked Siddhasena to begin the controversy. First of all Siddhasena took up the problem of omniscience and established his own point of view that no omniscient person can ever exist. Then Vṛddhavādi referred the matter to the cowherd boys asking "Well Gentlemen, have you understood anything of this learned pandita?" They replied, "How can we understand anything of a person who speaks as intelligibly as a parsee?" Hearing this, Vṛddhavādi again said to the cowherd boys, "Look here, I have understood what this pandita says. He says that there is no Jina or an omniscient person. Do you believe in what he says?" They said, "This Brahmin tells a lie because Jina is already there in the temple of the Jainas." After this piece of humour, Vṛddhavādi took up the controversy in right earnest and refuted the point of Siddhasena and established the omniscience of Jina by the force of

arguments. Siddhasena with his throat choked with joy and admiration, admitted that he was vanquished, and asked the old man to accept him as his disciple. He further added that it was his solemn vow that whosoever vanquished him could make him his own disciple. Accordingly, the Sūri consecrated him as a Jaina monk and nicknamed him as Kumudacandra. In a short time Siddhasena became well-versed in all the sacred lores of the Jainas where-upon his preceptor raised him to the position of an Ācārya and gave him his original name Siddhasena. He then put him at the head of the Gaccha. After that his preceptor went to another place on his religious tour.

Once upon a time, Siddhasena during his wanderings met the King Vikramāditya. The King instead of formally saluting him saluted in mind. The Sūri understood it all and offered his benediction to him in a loud voice by saying Dharmalābha. The King was very much pleased at the cleverness of the Sūri and gave him a crore of golden coins and ordered his treasurer to note down that the said sum was given by him to Siddhasena who gave benediction to him (the King) even from a distance. Afterwards Siddhasena was requested by the King to accept the gift but the Sūri flatly refused to accept it and asked the King to use it in whatever manner he chose. King Vikramāditya understood his point, ear-marked the sum for the use of Jainas and for repairing Jaina temples in his kingdom.

Once, while wandering, Siddhasena arrived at Citrakūta. There on one side of the mountain he saw a pillar.

This pillar was made neither of clay nor of wood nor of stones. After surveying it critically, Siddhasena arrived at the conclusion that it must have been made with the powder of some medicinal plants. On the strength of his genius he examined the smell, the taste, and the touch of that pillar and at last applying some potent medicinal herb having properties contrary to those of the herbs of the pillar he effected a large hole in that pillar and inside he saw a collection of thousands of books. From among these books he took a book and opening it at a page at random, read a line that came before his eyes. Only from that one line he got two mystic lores; one Suvarṇasiddhi by which one could produce gold at will and another an incantation named Sarasava that would create a new army. Rejoicing at heart he began to decipher some more lines from the book, but just then the presiding deity of the pillar snatched the book from his hands thinking Siddhasena to be unworthy to know anything further of the mystic lores contained therein.

Afterwards Siddhasena went on his religious tour to the easternmost countries and arrived at the town of Karmār. King Devapāla was then the ruling king there. He welcomed Siddhasena to his capital and Siddhasena in his turn gave religious sermons to the king and made him his friend. Once King Vijayavarma of the country of Kāmaru attacked this King Devapāla and with a large force of foresters at his command besieged the capital of the King. King Devapāla was frightened at this unexpected attack and entreated the Sūri to protect him saying, "Sir, you are my protector. The forces of the

enemy are swooping on me like a swarm of locusts and will certainly annihilate my small forces." The Sūri thereupon consoled the King and promised to remedy and avert the evil. The Sūri then by his first mystic lore of Suvarṇasiddhi produced huge mass of gold and by means of his other lore created a mighty force. With its help Devapāla defeated his enemy. Delighted at his success, the King conferred the title of Divākara on Sūri. The significance of the title of Divākara (the Sun) was obviously this that the Sūri like the god Sun dissipated the darkness in the form of the terror of the enemy. After this, Siddhasena became conspicuous as Siddhasena Divākara.

After this incident his old preceptor Vṛddhavādi heard that Siddhasena had become renowned and was respected even in royal courts and had fallen a prey to the temptation of the reception in the royal courts, had begun to use palanquins, had kept with him elephants and that he frequently visited the royal courts. In order to persuade Siddhasena to give up this dangerous path his preceptor went to the town of Karmār disguised as a Brahmin. Arriving there he saw that the reports he had heard were quite true and that Siddhasena was daily using palanquins, was enjoying the paraphernalia of the king every day and was always surrounded by royal personages. The preceptor thereupon approached him as an humble student and said, "I have heard sufficiently of your high reputation and have come here to get my difficulties solved from you." Siddhasena said, "All right. Let me know what your difficulties are." After

this his learned preceptor in a wonderfully loud voice repeated the following verse : —

अणुफुल्लो फुल्ल म तोडहु मन-आरामा मा मोडहु ।

मणकुसुमेहि अच्च निरंजणु हिंडह काइ वणेण वणु ॥ ६२ ॥

Siddhasena tried his best to interpret this verse composed in Apabrah̃ṣa language but could not interpret it satisfactorily. He replied in an elusive way and asked his preceptor to ask another difficulty, but the preceptor maintained his ground and asked him to give an interpretation of the same verse. At last, Siddhasena, with an air of indifference, tried to make some irrelevant meaning out of it, which was not at all satisfactory. The preceptor did not accept the interpretation whereupon Siddhasena asked him whether he could interpret the verse himself. Then the preceptor asked him to be attentive and explained the meaning of the verse as follows : —

“ Human life is a pretty little lotus ; please do not cut the lotus by the strokes of royal favours and the pride consequent upon these favours. Manage the garden in the form of your mind. Please do not render the garden in the form of the control of your mind desolate or make it a wilderness by enjoyments ; worship the eternal god with the flowers of your virtues ; already you are in the wilderness of life, why do you enter into another wilderness more dangerous than the first, in the form of the temptations of royal favours.”

This and other interpretations calculated to bring the erring to the right path, profoundly impressed the mind of Siddhasena. He at once understood that he could have been no other person than his preceptor who alone was able to interpret the verse in such an able manner. He at once recognised his preceptor and humbly fell at his feet asking his pardon for transgressing his words of advice through his own folly. Thereupon the preceptor said, " I have thoroughly initiated you into Jaina philosophy but even you could not digest the profound principles of this philosophy, why then talk of other ordinary mortals ? I advise you therefore, to meditate upon this philosophy for some years more. It was but proper on the part of the presiding deity of the pillar to snatch the miraculous book from your hands, for there are very few unselfish persons who can digest the mystic lore." Upon this, Siddhasena said to his preceptor, " Oh lord, if disciples like myself would not ever go astray, there will be no utility of the *Prāyaścitta Śāstra*. Now I have really committed a sin, show me some proper *Prāyaścitta* " The preceptor then asked him to undergo a fitting *Prāyaścitta*, reinstituted him on the seat of *Ācārya* and himself went to heaven. *Divākara* then in his capacity of *Ācārya* went on his religious tours for the glorification of the Jainism throughout the length and breadth of India.

From his very boyhood Siddhasena was a student of *Saṃskṛta* language. Having naturally a predilection for *Saṃskṛta* and a scant respect for the *Prākṛta* dialect in his own mind, he contemplated translating the then existing

Jaina scriptures into Saṁskṛta and asked his Saṅgha to allow him to do so. The head of the Saṅgha was highly enraged and indignantly said to Divākara, "If Yuga-pradhāna Ācārya (eminent Ācārya) like you can have such an aversion to Prākṛta, then what of persons like us? We have heard from traditions that formerly there were 14 Pūrvas but they were thoroughly unintelligible to ordinary men and were forgotten in course of time. The present 11 Aṅgas were composed in Prākṛta dialect by Sudharmaswāmi specially with a view to make them intelligible to children, women and uneducated men. Under these circumstances how can you afford to slight the Prākṛta dialect in such a manner?" The leader of the Saṅgha further added, "You are a sinner, in that you have contemplated in thought and word this translation of the scriptures into Saṁskṛta. For this sin of yours a serious Prāyaścitta named Pārāñcika is mentioned in our Śāstras. In it a Jaina monk is required to remain incognito for 12 years, to give up his Gaccha and to practice austere penances. Unless you undergo such a Prāyaścitta, you cannot purge yourself of this grave sin; of course if during this interval you glorify Jainism in a conspicuous manner, you will be absolved of this sin even before the stipulated period and you can regain your former position." Siddhasena thereupon humbly accepted the decision of the head of the Saṅgha, left his Gaccha and went away to practise penance. Seven years passed in this manner. After that he once came to Ujjaina. There he straight way went to the Royal Court and sent the following message through the door keeper,

दिदृक्षुर्भिर्भुरायातो वारितो द्वारि तिष्ठति ।

हस्तन्यस्तनतुःश्लोकः किमागच्छतु गच्छतु ? ॥ १२४ ॥

“A Jaina mendicant with four verses in his hand desires to see you. He is standing at the door for he does not get access. Should he come in or go away?” Learning the arrival of Divākara, the King at once asked him to be escorted in and seated on a respectable seat and asked him to repeat the four verses.¹ The verses purported to say as follows:—

“Whence have you learnt this marvellous art of archery in which the arrows (also beggars²) come to you in numbers, while the strings³ (your merits) go to the opposite direction.”

1—अपूर्वेयं धनुर्विद्या भवता शिञ्चिता कुतः ।

मार्गयौवः समस्येति गुणो याति दिगन्तरम् ॥ १२६ ॥

अमी प्रानकुरङ्गाभाः सप्तपि जलराशयः ।

यद्यशोराजहंसस्य पञ्जरं भुवनत्रयम् ॥ १२७ ॥

सर्वदा सर्वदोऽसीति मिथ्या संस्तूयसे बुधैः ।

नारयो लेभिरे पृष्ठं न वक्षः परयोषितः ॥ १२८ ॥

भयमेकमनेकेभ्यः शत्रुभ्यो विधिवत्सदा ।

ददासि तच्च ते नास्ति यजन् ! चित्रमिदं महत् ॥ १२९ ॥

2—मार्गिण means ‘an arrow’ as well as ‘a mendicant’ while showing contradiction the first meaning should be taken, and the second meaning to remove the contradiction.

3—गुण means ‘a string’ as well as ‘quality’. The first meaning should be taken in contradiction, the second in removing it.

"All these seven oceans are water jars, to drink water from, to the swan in the form of the fame of the King and the three worlds are a cage for the swan."

"The eulogy that you give your all to the beggars is but a false one, for you never give your back to the enemies and your chest to other women."

"Oh King, it is already strange that you give the fear which you never possess to your enemies and that too perpetually and systematically."

Such was the apparent meaning of these verses, in which really the panegyric of the King was couched. The King was greatly delighted and praised Divākara saying, "That assembly is really a blessed one in which you are present." Having been pressed by the King, Divākara agreed to stay with him.

Once Divākara went along with the King to the temple of Kuṇḍaṅgeswara but he came back from the entrance of the temple. Thereupon the King asked him the reason as to why he thus insulted the God Kuṇḍaṅgeswara by not saluting him. Divākara replied, "Oh King, to tell you the truth, this God would never have tolerated my salutations. It is because of this that I do not salute him. I would certainly offer my salutations to that God who would tolerate them. The King was greatly surprised and pressed Divākara to come in and salute the God. Divākara, thereupon, on condition that he was not responsible for any mishap that

would occur, sat before the Śivalinga and in a loud voice began his prayers thus :— ¹

“Oh Lord, you have shown to the people the three worlds in their true light, in a manner which the founders of other religions have never done ; and it is no wonder, for the moon alone can illumine the world with its lustre but not the myriads of stars. I am really surprised that there are some people who are never awakened from the sleep of ignorance by your works. It is no wonder that the sun illumines the whole world by its light but to the naturally wicked owls it appears as darkness.”

Afterwards Siddhasena composed the works Nyāyavātāra, Virāṣṭuti, the famous hymn Kalyāṇamandira containing 44 verses and his well-known Bātrīśis in which there are at present 30 units having 32 verses in each unit. While composing the hymn Kalyāṇamandira extempore, he came to the eleventh verse ; then all of a sudden the God Dharaṇendra appeared and by his prowess

1—प्रकाशितं त्वयैकेन यथा सम्यग् जगत्त्रयम् ।

समस्तैरपि नो नाथ ! परतीर्थाधिपैस्तथा ॥ १३६ ॥

विद्योतयति वा लोकं यथैकोऽपि निशाकरः ।

समुद्गतः समग्रोऽपि तथा किं तारकागणः ॥ १४० ॥

त्वद्भास्यतोऽपि केषांचिदबोध इति मेऽद्भुतम् ।

भानोर्मरीचयः कस्य नाम नाऽऽलोकहेतवः ॥ १४१ ॥

नो वाऽद्भुतमुलूकस्य प्रवृत्त्या क्लिष्टचेतसः ।

स्वच्छा अपि तमस्त्वेन भासन्ते भास्वतः कराः ॥ १४२ ॥

there began to issue forth columns of smoke from the idol of Śiva and with their pitchy darkness turned the midday into night. The people round about got extremely frightened and began to run away in all directions. Then flames of fire sprang from the idol of Śiva and at last the figure of Pārśwanātha appeared. The King was impressed very much with this miraculous spectacle, got himself initiated into Jaina philosophy, escorted Divākara in a magnificent procession to the city of Ujjaina and thus glorified the Jaina religion. With this miraculous power of Siddhasena the Saṅgha was very much impressed, absolved Divākara from the necessity of remaining incognito for 12 years and proclaimed him as Siddhasena Divākara. There in Ujjaina from the idol of Śiva hood of serpents appeared for sometime which the heretics worshipped with devotion,

Once Divākara went on a religious tour to Southern India with his learned disciples. On his way he came to a promontary near the town Broach. There the cowherd boys from the town and the adjacent villages came to him with a desire to hear his religious sermons. They pressed him to deliver a sermon. Immediately Divākara composed a Rāsa in Prākṛta dialect which could be easily understood by the audience and setting it to a regular tune and time repeated it dancing in a circle. The Rāsa is as follows :—

न वि मारिअइ न वि चोरिअइ ।

परदारह संगु निवारिअइ ॥

थोवाह वि थोव दाअइ ।

वसणि दुगु दुगु जाइयइ ॥ १६१ ॥

“Do not kill anybody; do not steal anything; do not keep company with other's wives; even if you have little, give something to others; if you behave thus, you will be happy.”

Hearing this advice of Divākara the cowherd boys were pleased and in memory of Divākara founded the flourishing town of Tālarāsaka. Divākara got a Jaina temple erected therein and installed the idol of Vṛṣabha-deva there which is worshipped even to-day.

After this incident calculated to add to the glory of Jainism Divākara entered Broach, where King Dhanañjaya son of Balamitra was reigning. He welcomed Divākara with great reverence. Once the enemies of the King unexpectedly attacked him and besieged his town. The King, in utter fright, implored Divākara to save him. Divākara took mustard seeds, charged them with the power of incantations and threw them into a pot of oil. At once a host of army emerged from the seeds that were turned into men. With the help of that army the King utterly routed his enemies and thus Divākara with this miracle proved the significance of the title Siddhasena (which means in Saṁskṛta one who has an army ready at his command). The King eventually got himself initiated into Jaina religion at the hands of Divākara. Thus working miracles, Divākara arrived at the town of Paithana in the Deccan. There installing his worthy disciple on the seat of Ācārya he began his fast unto death and went up to heaven.

After this incident, a certain wandering bard from the town of Paithāna went to Visālā and there met the sister of Divākara Siddhaśrī who was a Jaina nun. The bard sang before her first two lines of a verse, Understanding the inner meaning of these two lines she completed the verse. The whole verse runs thus :—

“स्फुरन्ति वादिखद्योताः साम्प्रतं दक्षिणापथे ।

नूनमस्तंगतो वादी सिद्धसेनो दिवाकरः ॥१७५ ॥”

“At present rival debators (of Divākara) are thriving mightily like the fireflies at night in Dakṣiṇāpatha.” Thus sang the bard. The sister of Divākara completed the verse by saying, “Most certainly Divākara great debator is dead (it also means Divākara the sun has set).” After that, the sister of Divākara in a prayerful mood went to heaven.

The following is the source of information about the family named Vidyādhara to which Pādalipta Sūri and Vṛddhavādi belonged : After 150 years of Vikram reign, one Jākuṭi a follower of Jaina religion, got a temple of Neminātha repaired. It was situated on the peak of mountain Revata. There while repairing a dilapidated monastery some documents were found. Out of these documents composed by ancient poets the lives of Divākara and Vṛddhavādi has been given here. May it contribute to the delight and intelligence of the readers. Thus the life of Divākara is given.

Prabhācandra is a disciple of Candraprabha. This Candraprabha whose father's name was Rāma and mother's name was Lakṣmi wrote these lives of Divākara

and Vṛddhavādi along with lives of other ancient seers. This life has been revised by Pradyumna Sūri. The life of Divākara is the eighth in the series."

(b) Comparison of all the Prabandhas.

In the prose composition which is found in the Kathāvali about the life of Siddhasena the following are the four main incidents :—

1. The King received the benediction of Dharma-lābha from Divākara in reply to his salutation and gave him a crore of gold coins.

2. Divākara contemplated the translation of Jaina scriptures from Prākṛta into Saṃskṛta. This was considered as a grave sin by the Saṅgha and he was penalised to take the Pārāñcika Prāyaścitta.

3. Divākara in his disguise went to the temple of Kudaṅgeśwara and prayed to God with his Dwatriṃśikas. On that occasion the image of Pārśwanātha emerged from the Śivaliṅga.

4. Divākara on his religious tour went to the Deccan and died there.

In the fragmentary verse compositions referred to above the first three out of these four incidents appear as they are in the prose composition but in addition to them three more incidents are mentioned :—

1. Siddhasena entered into a controversy with Vṛddhavādi, was completely defeated in it and had to accept the discipleship of Vṛddhavādi.

2. A certain king was in calamity on account of a foreign invasion. Divākara helped the king with men

and money. The king achieved success and highly respected Divākara.

3. Divākara fell a prey to the temptations of receiving royal favours and had to be brought to his senses by the advice of his preceptor, Vṛddhavādi.

All these six incidents have a slight difference with the account as found in the Prabhāvaka Carita. But this verse composition is somewhat fragmentary owing to some of its pages being lost at various places. The King who was helped with men and money by Siddhasena is not, therefore, found mentioned by his name in it, and the place where Siddhasena died is also found not mentioned.

Caturviṃśati Prabandha being mainly based on Prabhāvaka Carita completely tallies in most of its points with it. There are, however, two points found therein which are not found in the original (i.e. Prabhāvaka Carita). The first is the account of the origin of Mahākāla temple as given by Divākara to the King Vikrama and secondly, in the town of Oṃkāra, Divākara made King Vikrama erect a Jaina temple as a rival to the Śiva temple there.

Now let us examine the fifth work. This work dealing with the life of Siddhasena is written on account of the incidental reference to Siddhasena in Vikramārka Prabandha which in its turn forms a chapter of the Prabandha Cintāmaṇi. In this short work the account of Siddhasena and Vṛddhavādi materially differs in some important points with the accounts that we get from the

above-mentioned four compositions. The points of difference are as follows :—

1. While Prabhāvaka Carita says that Vṛddhavādi was a disciple of Skandila, the present treatise describes him as a disciple of Āryasuhasti.

2. From the Prabhāvaka and others it seems that Siddhasena was a resident of the province of Ujjaina but from the present treatise it seems that he was a resident of south Karnātika.

3. In the four compositions, the Prabhāvaka and others, it is said that the figure of Pārśwanātha appeared as soon as the prayers of Divākara were begun ; while in the present work it is said that the figure of Rśabha-deva emerged from the idol of Śiva by the miraculous power of the prayers offered by Divākara.

4. In the Prabhāvaka Carita and other Prabandhas, it is said that the gift conferred upon by Vikrama as a reward for blessings given by Divākara was utilised in repairing Jaina temples and erecting new ones ; while the present composition says that the gift was utilised in liquidating the debts incurred by poor people. It is also stated that Vikrama era was commenced by King Vikramāditya from the time of this incident.

5. In the Prabhāvaka Carita and others Siddhasena is said to have helped King Devapāla ; while in the Prabandha Cintāmaṇi it is said that Divākara helped the King Vikramāditya.

6. In the Prabhāvaka Carita and others, the Saṅgha or the heads of the Saṅgha ordered Prāyaścitta for Siddhasena ; while in the present work, the Prāyaścitta

is said to have been ordered by the preceptor of Siddhasena.

With reference to the works composed by Divākara, as referred to in these five compositions we are going to offer some remarks furtheron in our reply to the seventh question (p. 47).

Making necessary subtractions and additions in the life of Siddhasena, as can be gathered from the above-mentioned five works, we have composed a short life of Siddhasena Divākara which is as follows :—

1. Vṛddhavādi, though not superior to Divākara in learning, was a ready-witted gentleman ; besides he was a man of serene temperament and one who had made supreme self-sacrifice. It was this fact which attracted Divākara to him though Divākara himself was a man of great learning and a man of strong will. It was because of this intrinsic merit in Vṛddhavādi that Divākara became his disciple.

2. The religious tour of Divākara extended from Ujjaina in the north to Paithāna in the south in which Broach seems to occupy an important place.

3. There was a king of Ujjaina who bore the title of Vikramāditya and who had an intimate friendship with Siddhasena. Siddhasena avails himself of the intimacy with the king for his religious propaganda and for the protection of Jainism. Siddhasena in his turn protected the king by averting the calamity of foreign invasion to which the king was exposed .

4. Divākara was the first person who contemplated the translation of the Jaina scriptures from Prākṛta into Saṁskṛta. The Saṅgha thereupon penalised him severely.

5. Divākara was a very great scholar of Saṁskṛta and composed many works in that language.

6. Divākara fell a prey to the temptations of royal favours and swerved from the ascetic path. He was awakened to his sense of duty by his preceptor.

7. Divākara died in the Deccan

(c) A discussion of some important points.

If we critically study all the above-mentioned five compositions we get a series of questions arising therefrom : —

1. What was the origin of Vidyādhara Āmnāya? When did it start and where?

2. (a) Can the names of Ācārya Skandila and Pādalipta be included in the Vidyādhara Āmnāya? What is the approximate time of these two Ācāryas? What must be the distance of time between these two?

(b) Was Vṛddhavādi a disciple of Skandila or of Suhasti?

(c) What is the approximate time of Vṛddhavādi as well as Divākara?

3. In the Prabandhas, we find the mention of Divākara's Gotra as Kātyāyan as also the names of his parents. What is the original source of this information? Was the sister of Divākara a Jaina nun?

4. Which is this Citrakūta mentioned in the works? What was its condition at the time of Divākara? Where

is this town of Tālarāsaka, which is referred to in the work, situated? What is its present condition? Where is the town of Karmāra situated? What was its original name? Who was the King Devapāla who is said to be reigning there and who was this Vijayavarman who is said to have attacked Devapāla? What are the dates of these two persons as compared to the date of Siddhasena?

5. Were the leaders of the Saṅgha responsible in ordaining Prāyaścitta to Divākara or did Divākara's preceptor penalise him? If the leaders, what are their names?

6. Can Kudaṅgeśwara and Mahākāla be identified or are they different temples? What is the history of these temples?

7. (a) What are the works of Divākara and how many?

(b) Is Sanmati-tarka a work of Siddhasena Divākara, the disciple of Vṛddhavādi or is he some other Siddhasena? Has any commentator, besides Abhayadeva, referred to Sanmati as being the work of Divākara?

(c) Are Gandhahasti and Divākara one and the same person or are they different persons? Is there any old reference to Gandhahasti in addition to the one found in the commentary of Ācārāṅga?

(d) Was Kumudcandra another name of Divākara and if so, what is the evidence for it?

8. Who were the ruling kings of Pratiśthāna, Ujjaina, and Broach at the time of Divākara and Vṛddhavādi?

9. "Near about Broach, a town was situated by the cowherd boys which was named Tālarāsaka. The idol of

Rṣabhadeva was installed therein. Even to-day it is being situated.” This is the account given in the Prabhāvaka Carita, Is it historically authentic ?

10. It is said in the Prabhāvaka Carita that sometime after the death of King Vikrama, a certain Jaina devotee made some repairs in some temple at Girnar and during these repairs he found some old documents from an old monastery. From these written documents the account of the life of Divākara had been taken. Is this statement reliable ? What is the basis of the account given in the Prabhāvaka Carita as well as in the Prabandha Cintāmaṇi ? What version among the two is more trustworthy ?

We admit that the account about the Ācāryas as is found in the composition and Pattāvalis is sometimes fragmentary and mutually conflicting in many places, and as such is not entirely trustworthy. Naturally therefore, the questions, that we have raised above, can never be incontrovertibly answered with the help of the materials at our disposal at present. We, therefore, state below in brief our own guesses and inferences based on the materials at present.

1. In the Prabhāvaka Carita, the only mention about Ārya Skandila is that he was the preceptor of Vṛddhavādi and belonged to Vidhyādharavara Āmnāya. This word indicates either the Vidyādhara Gaccha or the branch of Vidyādhara.

In the *Prabhāvaka Carita* the author in the chapter on *Vajra*¹ states that the *Gaccha* of *Vidyādhara* was started by the disciple named *Vidyādhara* who was one of the four disciples of *Vajraswāmi*. In the *Sthavirāvli*² of *Kalpasūtra* there is a mention of the branch *Vidyādhari* having been started by *Vidyādhara Gopāl* who was one of the five disciples of *Susthita Supratibaddha* who was in his turn the disciple of *Arya Suhasti*. It seems probable that the above-mentioned *Gaccha* of *Vidyādhara* and the branch of *Vidyādhari* had been started by different persons and considering the date of their founders, it seems that they were altogether different. At any rate these two cannot be identified with each other. According to a current tradition, the branch *Vidyādhari* was started in the first era before *Vikrama*, while the *Vidyādhara Gaccha* seems to have been probably started in the second or third century of *Vikrama* era. Thus between this branch of *Vidyādhari* and the *Gaccha* of *Vidyādhara* there is an intervening period of nearly 300 years. As to what is the place of these and as to why these were started nothing is known. Moreover there are no means available to say convincingly as to what school or branch *Ārya Skandila* belonged to. The *Prabhāvaka Carita*, however, states that *Skandila* came from the family of *Pādalipta* and from *Vidyādhara-vara Āmnaya*. If we are able to believe in this statement, we have to say that

1 P. C. verses 196—198 p. 13.

2 “धरेहितो णं विज्जाहरगोवालेहितो कासवगुत्तेहितो एत्थ णं विज्जाहरी सहा निगया ।”—p. 55.

Skandila belonged to Vidyādhari branch started by Vidyādhara Gopāl, for the time assigned to Pādalipta¹ synchronises with the time of Vajra or at the most, his disciple Vajrasena. It is proper, therefore, to suppose that Skandila who came from the family of Pādalipta must have belonged to the branch of Vidyādhari and not to the Gaccha of Vidyādhara, which is said to have been started by Vidyādhara, the disciple of Vajrasena. If our conjecture is correct, it follows as a matter of course that Divākara, Vṛddhavādi and Skandila belonged to the Vidyādhara Vara Āmnaya i. e. to the branch Vidyādhari started by Vidyādhara Gopāla and not to the Gaccha of Vidyādhara.

2. As to the second question there are three points to be discussed :—

(a) In the Sthavirāvali of the Nandi sūtra² occurs the name of Skandilācārya Anuyogadhara but no mention is made of the branch or Gaccha to which he belonged; while in the Sthavirāvali of Kalpasūtra there is a definite mention of the branch of Vidyādhari but the name of Skandila does not occur there at all. Now as to Pādlipta, his name does not occur in any of the two Sthavirāvalis and, therefore, the statement that Pādlipta and Skandila belonged to Vidyādhara Āmnāya has no older evidence, but seems to be entirely based on the Prabhāvaka Carita. According to tradition, the time of Pādlipta is the first or the second century of Vikrama era.

1 Nir. Introduction p. 16.

2 Gāthā 33.

Now if this Skandila is really the preceptor of Vṛddhavādi and can be identified with the Skandila bearing the title of Anuyogadhara and renowned as the Śūtradhāra of Māthurivācanā, his time can be taken to be approximately the fourth century¹ of Vikrama era, that is to say, there is at least an interval of 200 years between Pādlipta and Skandila

(b) In the Prabhāvaka Carita Vṛddhavādi is mentioned as a disciple of Skandila, while in the notes of Prabandha Cintāmaṇi² he is said to be the disciple of Ārya Suhasti. Out of these two versions that of Prabhāvaka Carita seems to be more consistent. Suhasti, the preceptor of Samprati and otherwise named as Ārya Suhasti, is the only Suhasti well-known in Jain tradition. Now his time is 200 years before Vikrama era. He can never, therefore, be the contemporary of Vṛddhavādi. The statement of the Prabandha Cintāmaṇi which seems to be due to the mistaken tradition regards Divākara as associated with Mahākāla Tīrtha and Suhasti.

(c) For a discussion under this head, we refer to the section dealing with the Date of Divākara at the beginning of the introduction.

1 The article of Shri Kalyāṇa Vijayaji published in N. P. P. Vol. 10 Number 4.

2 In the Prabandh Chintamani there is no special chapter on either Siddhasena or Vṛddhavādi but in the chapter on Vikramārka there is a reference to Siddhasena in connection with Vikramārka. The Editor has collected the account of Siddhasena and his preceptor from other sources and given it here in the foot-note of this Prabandha. In it Vṛddhavādi is said to be the disciple of Ārya Suhasti.

3. The Kātyāyana Gotra of Divākara, the story of his sister being a Jaina nun and the names of his parents are all known only through the Prabhāvaka Carita at present, and we have no older evidence to corroborate these statements.

4. As to Citrakūta connected with the life of Divākara, it must be the well-known historical place, the fort of Citor in Mewār. It cannot be the Citrakūta of Ramāyaṇa fame that is situated in U. P. What the condition of this Citrakūta, referred to above, was at the time of Divākara can not be ascertained with any historical authenticity. The town of Tālarāsaka said to be founded by the cowherd boys and the town of Karmāra¹ in the Gauda country referred to in the Prabhāvaka Carita can not be definitely identified with any of the modern towns, and no further information has been available on this point. No Devapāla or Vijayavarman who might be pointed out to be the contemporary of Divākara has yet been traced.

5. Nothing can be definitely said about the problems cropping up under this head.

1 The town of Karmāra has been referred to in connection with the religious tour of Mahāvira. This town must be nearby the village Kunda for it is mentioned that Mahāvira reached the town Karmāra in the afternoon having started from Kunda on the same day. Vide Acāraṅga Tika p. 301. Whether this Karmāra is identical with Karmāra in Gauda country is a point which is worth discussion.

6. Kudaṅgeśwara and Mahākāla¹ :— Both these names appear to refer to one and the same holy place or temple. On the evidence of the old works such as Āvaśyaka Cūrṇi and others Āchārya Hemacandra² and other scholars have referred to this place as a holy one where a sage named Avanti Sukumāla died. After the death of this sage his son in the sacred memory of his father built a temple which afterwards came to be known as the temple of Mahākāla. Thus, according to Jaina tradition, this holy temple of Mahākāla has its origin in the burial place of Avanti Sukumāla, the disciple of Ārya Suhasti who must have lived in the 2nd century before the Vikrama era. The significance of the name Kudaṅga seems to be that the place was covered over with thickets, for which the Saṁskṛta name is Kudaṅga³. It is moreover, stated in Jaina works that the temple is situated on the bank of the river Siprā.

The present temple of Mahākāla stands on the eastern bank of the river Siprā on the Ghats of Pisāca Mukteśwara. This holy place of Mahākāla of Avanti was once a very renowned place. It has been described in the Purāṇas such as Skanda⁴, Matsya and Narasimha. The poet Kalidāsa refers with very great reverence to this magnificent temple of Mahākāla in his Meghaduta⁵

1 “तं इयाणिं महाकालं जातं लोकेषु परिगृहितम् ।” A. C. vol. II p. 157.

2 Pari. Canto 11 v. 151-177.

3 ‘कुडङ्गको वृक्षलतागहनम्’ Amarakośa 3.17.

4 See Baṅgiya Viśwa Kośa for the words ‘Mahākāla’ ‘Ujjaina’ and ‘Avanti.’

5 See Meghadūta Pūrva-Saundēśa v. 34.

as well as Raghuvaṁśa¹. Like the temple of Somanātha this place was also desecrated and destroyed by the Muslims. But again it saw the revival of its glory at the time of the Maharathas². At present it is in the hands of the Brāhmaṇas, but, according to the Jaina tradition, it was originally a holy place of the Jainas. It seems to have been a current practice in India that a place consecrated as holy by one particular religious sect is subsequently claimed by other sects as their particular holy place. After a time, round such a holy place, there springs up quite a network of temples built by Vaiṣṇava, Śaiva, Jaina, Buddha and other sects. Often rival religions lay claim upon one and the same temple and the possession of that temple or holy place changes hands as time changes. The same has happened in the case of Mahākāla. Its importance is mentioned in Brahmin works, while on the other hand the Jainas claim that it was the original temple of the Jainas and Huentsang³ in his book of travels says that when he visited Ujjaina it was an important place of the Bauddhas. From all this, it can safely be said that Mahākāla once occupied such a high place in the religious traditions of all the religions in India that it was simultaneously claimed by all of them. As a similar instance, can be mentioned the holy place of Benāres, which from times immemorial was regarded as the most important place by the Vedic religion on one hand and the Bauddhas and the Jainas on the other. The

1 Raghu. Canto VI v. 34.

2 See p. 45 n. 4.

3 *Ibid.*

story that from the Śivlinga of Mahākāla emerged the idol of a Jaina god, as soon as Divākara began to pray, is quite natural from the point of Jaina tradition which regards Mahākāla as a holy place of the Jains.

7. (a) Now about the works of Divākara the reference, as found in the oldest and the smallest prose composition referred to above, is that when Divākara in course of his prayers in the temple of Kudaṅga came to the end of the last verse of his 32nd Dwatrimśikā¹ the image of Parśwanātha suddenly appeared. The same statement is found in the later verse composition.²

In the prose composition it is said that Divākara composed the Dwatrimśikās. But the poetic version it is suggested that the chapters of the Batrisis are 32 in number, while in the prose composition it is said that each chapter contained 32 verses. In the Prabhāvaka Carita,³ written after the verse composition, 32 chapters are mentioned, but in addition, some more account is given

1 “सिद्धसेयेण पारद्धा वत्तीसियाहि जिणथुई × × तेण कुडंगेसर सोसाओ नीसरन्ती पाससामिपडिमा कमकमेण य वत्तीसश्मवत्तीसिया समत्तीप पडिपुण्णं तं च दट्ठूण विम्बिओ रायाई लोओ ।” —Kathāvali (not printed).

2 “तस्सागयस्स तेणं पारद्धा जिणथुई समत्ताहि ॥

वत्तीसाहि वत्तीसियाहि उद्दामसदेण ॥ यथा—

after this are given the four verses प्रकाशितं त्वयैकेन etc.

(See p. 30 n. 1) and after that the verse—

एवं कमकमेणं अन्तिमवत्तीसियाय पज्जंते ।

पडिपुण्णंगोवंगा पयंसिया पासपटिमत्ति ।” Verse—Composition.

3 See p. 30.

there about the chapters : It is said that 30 chapters were written originally and two more chapters one named Nyāyāvatāra and another named Vīrastuti, made up the number 32. Moreover it is mentioned that in the stotra Kalyāṇamandira, the number of the verses is 44. Thus the name of Kalyāṇamandira which is not found in the first two composition has later on found a place in the Prabhāvaka Carita, and it is because of this probably that the name Kumudacandra given to Siddhasena does not occur in the first two compositions. It is mentioned in the Prabhāvaka Carita by saying that this name Kumudacandra was given to Siddhasena by his preceptor Vṛddhāvādi at the time of initiating him into Jaina religion. Here the reader should bear this fact in mind that the name Kumudacandra¹ is originally used as an epithet of the devine Lord Mahāvira, in the last verse of Kalyāṇamandira. But on the strength of a pun which is so common in Saṁskṛta language, it has been applied by the Pandits versed in Jaina tradition to Siddhasena as his another name. In the Prabandha Cintāmaṇi, on the other hand, there is no mention whatsoever either of the Stotra Kalyāṇamandira or of the number of the chapters of Dwatriṁśikā. But in the Caturviṁśati Prabandha again the number 32 of the Dwatriṁśikas along with the mention of the Kalyāṇamandira is found. Looking to all these conflicting accounts, we can only arrive at this conclusion that Kalyāṇamandira is the 33rd work of Divākara the 32 Dwatriṁśikas being the other 32 works of Divākara.

1 “अननयनकुमुदचन्द्र” etc.

In the Nyāyāvatāra there are only 32 verses. According to the statement of the Prabhāvaka Carita, this work also forms one of the 32 Dwātriṃśikās as referred to above. It is mentioned in the oldest composition that there are 32 Dwātriṃśikās, but there is no clear evidence to show that Nyāyāvatāra was one of them. Now, if we suppose that the 32 Dwātriṃśikās do not include Nyāyāvatāra, then Kalyāṇamandira would be the 34th work and Nyāyāvatāra must be regarded as the 33rd work of Divākara. At present only 21 out of the said Dwātriṃśikās are extant. If we add Nyāyāvatāra and Kalyāṇamandira to them there would be 23 Saṃskṛtā works of Divākara in all available at present. According to the version of the Prabhāvaka Carita, there were originally 33 works of Divākara, or 34, if we add Nyāyāvatāra to the list. It is clear that about 10 or 11 works of Divākara are missing at present. What the subject matter of these missing works was and what their names were, is totally unknown at present. There are some stray verses, found quoted from his works by old authors. Those verses occur there with the name of Siddhasena¹ or Stutikāra.² They are probably from the missing Dwātriṃśikās.

1 “आचार्यसिद्धसेनोऽप्याह—अमित्त्रि मादृशां भाज्यमभ्यात्मं तु स्वयंदृशाम् ।
एकं प्रमाणमयैक्यादैक्यं तल्लक्षणैवयतः ॥ प्रमाणद्वान्निश्चित्याम्” ।

T. Bh. V. p. 70.

2 “नयास्तव स्यात्पदलान्छना इमे” — S. T. p. 757 note 2.

“एवं कल्पितभेदमप्रतिहतं सर्वशतालान्छनम्” etc.

S. T. p. 620 note I.

(b) Sanmati does not come in the list of the works referred to in the five compositions. Those Dwātriṃśikās in which there is no direct prayer of Mahāvīra or others but which contains a mention of the doctrines of rival religions and a reference to the doctrines of the Jaina religion as well, and others, in which there is a refutation of rival religions and the advocacy of the Jaina religion, were regarded as prayers or psalms and found a place in the Dwātriṃśikās and got a place of honour in the life of Divākara. But it is really surprising that Sanmati should not find a place of honour in the life of Divākara, for Sanmati is undoubtedly a work of profound scholarship, a work containing a clear exposition of the doctrines of Jaina religion and a work in no way inferior to the Dwātriṃśikās referred to above. One probable reason of this may be that the number 32 of the verses in each Dwātriṃśikā was a thing which was peculiarly striking and on the strength of this, the Dwātriṃśikās were given an important place in the works and life of Divākara, and these Dwātriṃśikās justified their title of Stutikara given to him. Another probable reason might be this that the works that were written in Saṃskṛta came to be included in the Dwātriṃśikās. Later on these two factors (each chapter having 32 verses and the language being Saṃskṛta) were regarded as the only two necessarily qualifications for the title of Dwātriṃśikā, though some of the Dwātriṃśikās had no prayer as their subject matter. If the number of verses in Sanmati would have been 32 it would have perhaps found a place in these Dwātriṃśikās in spite of the fact that it

was written in Prākṛta and would have occupied an important place in the biography of Divākara.

Among all these 23 extant works there are only two in which there is a mention of the name Siddhasena. In the 5th and the 21st Batriśi in the concluding portion there occurs the word Siddhasena which is evidently used in a double sense.¹ In no other Dwātrīṃśikā the word Siddhasena is found mentioned, not even in the Kalyāṇamandira. The name Kumudacandra is suggested by means of a pun in it if we regard the tradition as reliable. But the name Siddhasena² is not found in Sanmati even by means of a pun. The question naturally, therefore, arises as to what evidence there is to show that all these works were written by Siddhasena Divākara and nobody else. The answer to this question can only be given on the strength of references and the peculiar genius of the author manifest in all the works.

In all these works, the subject matter and sometimes even the language is different, but the common feature of all these works is this that the profound genius of the author is evident uniformly in all these works. The language of Kalyāṇamandira³ and the flights of fancy

1—“इति निरूपययोगसिद्धसेनः प्रबलतमोरिपुनिर्जयेषु वीरः”—५.३१।

“महाशान्तिभर्ता महासिद्धसेनः । महाचिन्नेशो महाज्ञानहेन्दो” —२१.३१।

2 The word Siddha occurs in the very first Gāthā of Sanmati. It can suggest the name of the author.

3 Prof. Jacobi thinks that the stotra can not have been by Siddhasena Divākara. One of his arguments is this that there is no mention of the name of Siddhasena at the end of the stotra Kalyana Mandir as it is there at the end of Virastuti. The Second

found therein show that the author of the stotra is in no way inferior to Siddhasena Divākara. There is a difference of opinion as regards Divākara being the author of this Stotra.

We have no reference at hand older than the 10th¹ or 11th century to prove that the Dwātrīṃśikās are the works of Divākara. But as regards Sanmati being the work of Divākara² there is a reference which dates as far back as the eighth century. Abhayadeva, the commentator of Sanmati, who lived in the 10th Century had before him many commentaries³ on Sanmati. He mentions Sanmati as the work of Divākara.⁴ Two centuries prior to him, Haribhadra the son of Yakini also mentions Sanmati as the work of Divākara. From all this we can safely conclude that the present work of Sanmati is

argument is that on Kalyāṇa Mandira not a single old commentary is found.

As against these two arguments it can be said that the mention of the name Siddhasena is neither found in Nyāyāvatāra nor in any Dwātrīṃśikās nor again in Sanmati. As to the commentary on Kalyāṇa Stotra it may be said that merely because such a commentary is not found we can not say that no commentary was written; even a commentary on Dwātrīṃśikās is not yet found. Looking to the poetic flash in Kalyāṇa Mandira it can be said that the Stotra might have been by Siddhasena. Acārya Hemcandra extols Siddhasena as a great poet. This eulogy would be justified if we regard Kalyāṇa Mandira as being the work of Siddhasena.

1 See p. 47 notes 1 and 2

2 See page 2 of this intro.

3 Sanmati Tika p. 1 v. 2.

4 *Ibid* p. 1 lines 16 and 17.

undoubtedly the work of the famous Siddhasena Divākara, the disciple of Vṛddhavādi.

(c) On the one hand, the well-known Ācārya of the Digambaras, the Stutikāra Swāmi Samantabhadra, is regarded as being the same as Gandhahasti and the Bhāṣya which he had written on the Tattwārtha is known by the name of Gandhahasti Mahābhāṣya. A tradition to this effect continues even to-day in the Digambara sect. On the other hand in the Śwetāmbara sect the tradition that Divākara the disciple of Vṛddhavādi was otherwise named Gandhahasti and that he had written a commentary on Tattwārtha is current even to-day. Out of these two traditions the first is proved to be positively wrong by Pandit Jugalkishor¹ in his book on Swāmi Samantabhadra, and the falsity of the second tradition has been conclusively proved by us with sound arguments in the introduction of Tattwārtha published on behalf of the Gujrāta Vidyāpīṭha². We, however, deem it proper to repeat the arguments advanced in our introduction there. This Gandhahasti, we mention, is not that Siddhasena Divākara the disciple of Vṛddhavādi, but is another Siddhasena the disciple of Bhāswāmi who in his turn was the disciple of Simhasūra and this Siddhasena Gandhahasti wrote a commentary on the Tattwārtha Bhāṣya. The following are the proofs in brief to prove our point :—

1. In no work on the life of Divākara, whether ancient or modern, the epithet Gandhahasti has been used

1 S. S. B., p. 214 to 220

2 p. 36 to 44 and notes thereon.

with reference to Divākara, but invariably the word Divākara is used along with Siddhasena. In fact the words Divākara and Siddhasena are uniformly considered as interchangeable and they are promiscuously used whenever a reference to the works of Siddhasena is found while, the name Gandhahasti is not found associated with any quotations from the works attributed to Siddhasena with the exception of some quotations found in the works of Yaśovijayaji¹ of the 18th century.

2. All the quotations prior to those which are in the works of Yaśovijayaji—associated with the name of Gandhahasti²—had been taken from the commentary of Siddhasena the disciple of Bhāswāmi.

3. The disciple of Yaśobhadra Sūri says that Bhagāvān Gandha Hasti Siddhasena wrote a new Commentary on Tattvārtha in spite of the existence of Commentary by Haribhadra and so my Guru tried to complete the Commentary of Haribhadra with the help of it.

“हरिभद्राचार्येणार्धषण्णामध्यायानामाद्यानां टीका कृता भगवता तु गन्धहस्तिना
सिद्धसेनेन नव्या कृता तत्त्वार्थटीका नव्यैर्वांद्स्थानैर्व्याकुला इत्यादि”

T. H. p. 521.

From all this it is quite clear that the oldest reference to this Siddhasena Gandhahasti the disciple of Bhāswāmi cannot be shown to be prior to the 9th century as for instance, the one found in Śīlāṅka's commentary of

1—Tattvārtha introduction p. 37 note 62.

2—*Ibid* p. 38 note 65.

Ācārāṅga¹. Now the oldest reference, as we have said above, about Divākara is found in the works of Haribhadra the son of Yākinī who lived in the 8th century somewhat prior to Śīlāṅka.

(d) That Siddhasena Divākara was otherwise named Kumudacandra we know from no other old work than the Prabhāvaka Carita. Whether the author of the Prabhāvaka Carita is reliable or not in attributing this epithet Kumudacandra to Divākara we do not know ; but rightly or wrongly the author certainly regarded Kalyāṇamandira as the work of Siddhasena. As yet no conclusive evidence is available to prove that Kalyāṇamandira is the work of Siddhasena Divākara. Granting for a moment, however, that this stotra was the work of Divākara we cannot authoritatively say that Kumudacandra was another name of Siddhasena Divākara. If this name which is really a delightful word to hear would have been current in those times, it would have certainly been mentioned along with his other name Divākara found in some old works associated with Siddhasena. It is, therefore, quite clear that this name Kumudacandra was not originally given to Siddhasena.

8—10. As regards the problems in the 8th, 9th and 10th questions we have no materials at hand to say anything conclusively. We have, therefore, to postpone the discussion of these problems till some sound data is available to us.

1—Ācārāṅga Tika p. 1 and the beginning of p. 82.

(iii) SIDDHASENA AND OTHER JAINA ĀCĀRYAS.

To have some idea of the personality of Siddhasena, to gather some information about his age, to come to a pretty fair decision as to how far the authors succeeding Siddhasena drew upon his works, to say how far he was indebted to the authors preceding him, to say moreover something about the development of the problems discussed in the field of Indian logic at the time of Divākara would require a comparative study of the works of Siddhasena Divākara as well as the works of other scholars of Jaina religion and other Indian religions. This comparison cannot possibly be made in an exhaustive manner in this short introduction. At best we can compare some of the works of Divākara with a few works of other authors. What we aim at is suggesting a line of study in this particular field.

(a) *Kundakunda and Umāswāti.*

In Jaina literature these two Ācaryas hold a very high place, as persons who were the pioneers in composing short treatises in Sūtra fashion. We do not know definitely whether Kundakunda composed any work in Saṃskṛta or whether Umāswāti composed any works in Prākṛta¹. We can say this much that Kundakunda was the first author in Jaina tradition who composed the most authoritative work in Prākṛta dialect, while Umāswāti was the first author who composed a treatise in Saṃskṛta

1 The work Śrāvaka Prajñāti is said to have been written by Umāswāti. But no conclusive proof is yet found for this statement.

language. There is another point of difference between these two Ācāryas and it is this that while Kundakunda's work is composed entirely in verse, Umāswāti's work is composed both in verse and in prose. In both the works of these two authors the tradition of Jaina scriptures has been scrupulously maintained and to corroborate it some arguments with the help of Jaina logic have been advanced. Umāswāti does not repeat one thing again and again while Kundakunda does so in many cases. Umāswāti along with his mastery over Saṃskṛta language had received a legacy of the ancient systems of philosophy. Like Umāswāti Siddhasena also is an author of a very great eminence but his peculiarity is this that while he is perfectly at home in Saṃskṛta as well as in Prākṛta he has taken to verse in his works. Siddhasena is a very clever logician. He takes his clue from the Jaina scriptures no doubt, but he enters into hair-splitting details and tries to prove everything written in scriptures on the strength of his convincing logic. His¹ style, therefore, is more that of a logician than of an author relying on the authority of tradition. The style of Samantabhadra strikingly resembles that of Siddhasena. Between Umāswāti and Kundakunda on one hand and Siddhasena and Samantabhadra on the other there is a period of nearly 200-400 years. During this period there was a remarkable development of Indian logic and it is this development which is responsible for the logical method which is in evidence at every step in works of Siddhasena and Samantabhadra. It is this

1 For instance Sanmati 2. 18. and onward.

difference, between the works of Siddhasena on one hand and Kundakunda and Umāswāti on the other, which is really noteworthy. From the works of Siddhasena it is clear that Siddhasena must have thoroughly studied the works of these two authors—his predecessors.

Kundakunda: A comparison between Kundakunda and Siddhasena falls under four heads : (1) Similarity of words, (2) style, (3) subject matter and (4) development.

(1) In the Pravacanasāra of Kundakunda (*chapter 1, Gāthā 15-16*), the word Swayambhū is defined by the author in his own way. He interprets the word in the sense of Omniscient and uses it with reference to Vitarāga. Siddhasena in the very first verse of his Stotra¹ uses the word Swayambhū in the same sense. Samantabhadra² also does the same.

(2) The twelfth Gāthā of the 1st chapter of Pañcāstikāya and the first half of the 12th Gāthā of the 1st Chapter of Sanmati are almost the same :—

“पञ्चयविजुदं दव्वं दव्वविजुत्ता य पञ्चया णत्थि” —Pañcastikya.

“दव्वं पञ्चविजुयं दव्वविजुत्ता य पञ्चवा णत्थि” —Sanmati.

The 13th verse of Pañcāstikāya namely दव्वेण विणा ण गुणा गुणेहिं दव्वं विणा ण संभवदि has no parallel in Sanmati because the word Guṇa is used in a slightly different and modified

1 “स्वयम्भुवं भूतसहस्रनेत्रम्” etc.

2 “स्वयम्भुवा भूतहितेन भूतले” etc.

sense by the author of Sanmati¹ and, therefore, the verse in question cannot have anything similar in the Sanmati.

(3) In the 57th and 58th Gathas chapter 1st of Pravacanasāra of Kundakunda, the definitions of Pratyakṣa and Parokṣa as given by the author are obviously contrary to the current definition. After giving the definitions, the author ably defends them. As a Jaina Acārya he is the first to give satisfactory answers to the objections raised against the definitions by rival disputants. Siddhasena also in his Nyāyāvatāra (*verse 4*) defines the words Pratyakṣa and Parokṣa. He is the first Jaina logician to define these words in a manner fitting to the Jaina point of view. There is an obvious mistake in sticking to one extreme view of a thing. In order to expose this mistake, both these authors Kundakunda and Siddhasena, have employed the same arguments (*in Pravacanasāra 1. 46 and Sanmati 1. 17-18*) namely that if we stick to an extreme point of view we cannot account for Mokṣa (Salvation) as well as this worldly life. Samantabhadra in his advocacy of Anekānta has advanced the same sort of argument in Swayambhū stotra verse 14. In course of time these arguments became a common stock-in-trade for all the Jaina authors to come. Kundakunda in his Pravacanasāra has discussed Dravya by taking recourse to Anekānta view and Siddhasena in the third chapter of Sanmati has explained Jñeya (object) by taking his stand on the same Anekānta view. The words Sat and Asat that are used in the theory of Causation have been discussed even in

1—Sanmati 3. 8—25.

Jaina logic. From the times of R̥gveda¹ right up to modern times these two words occurring under different garbs have presented a sort of puzzle in philosophical discussions. These two words are discussed in Jaina logic but in its discussion prominence is given to Anekānta point of view. (See *Pañcāstikāya* 1. 15—21 and *Sanmati* 3. 50—52). The main difference between Jaina and other doctrines is fundamentally with regard to the characteristics of the soul, such as the activity, the quality of enjoying, formlessness, and the dimension of the soul. On all these points, the Jaina view is given in *Pañcāstikāya* 1. 27 and in the *Sanmati* 3. 54,55 the six points as regards the nature of the soul have been thoroughly discussed and decided from the Jaina point of view. As regards the identity of Śraddhā—Darśan (faith) and Jñāna, Siddhasena (*Sanmati* 2. 32) has clearly taken his clue from Kundakunda (*Samayasāra* 1. 13.). The only point of difference is this that Siddhasena, accepting the identification of Darśan with Jñāna, brings with great cleverness this identification even in the province of ordinary Darśana and Jñāna (*vide Sanmati 2nd ch.*). The difference between the Jaina point of view and other rival views as regards the identity and separateness of Guṇa and Guṇī has been clearly discussed both by Siddhasena (*Sanmati* 3. 8-24) and Kundakunda (*Pañcā. 1. 48—52*) each dealing with the subject according to his own peculiar method of exposition.

1 “नासदासीन्नो सदासीत्तदानीं । नासीद्रजो नो व्योमापरो यत् ॥”
Nāsadiya Sūkta M. 10. 129, Chāndogya 6. 2. 1.

(4) There are two points in which the views of Siddhasena are strikingly different from those of Kundakunda. These are worth noting here as they attract the attention of the readers most. Kundakunda explains the meaning of the two words Swa-samaya and Para-samaya absolutely from metaphysical point of view. The meaning of Swa-samaya according to Kundakunda is one's own modifications and that of Para-samaya is modifications of Pudgalas. (*Pravacana* 1. 1-2 and *Śamayāsāra* 1. 2). Siddhasena on the other hand, leaving aside this metaphysical point of view, explains the meaning of these two words purely from a philosophical point of view as suits his own times and his own temperament. Thus Swasamaya in his opinion means one's own doctrine (*i.e.* Jaina doctrine) and Parasamaya is the doctrine of others. Parasamayas are as many as the different Nayavādas. —Sanmati 3. 47—67. But the most striking point of difference, or rather improvement upon the old authors between Kundakunda, Umāswāti and other Jaina Ācāryas on one hand and Siddhasena on the other, is this, that while in defining Dravya, according to the traditions of the holy scriptures, the Ācāryas like Kundakunda, Umāswāti and others make a distinction between quality (Guṇa) and Paryāya and thus define Dravya as that which has both Guṇa and Paryāya and then, according to this definition, whenever occasion arises, these Ācāryas explain Guṇa and Paryāya as the characteristics of Dravya and treat Dravya separately. Now Siddhasena in his Sanmati 3. 8—15 takes an exception to these definitions and on the strength of the

tradition of the scriptures advances irrefutable arguments to prove that Guṇa and Paryāya are not different but are absolutely identical and both imply one and the same thing. This argument of Siddhasena and his method of proving of his own point is so very clear and powerful that it has been accepted without hesitation by Akalaṅka and other followers of Kundakunda. Even Yaśovijayaji¹ in his works had to accept this point of view of Siddhasena. Now this distinction between Guṇa and Paryāya was first advocated by Umāswāti and Kundakunda; while establishing his own point, therefore, Siddhasena had possibly in his mind these two authors.

Umāswāti: With reference to Umāswāti it is sufficient to state here that in his *Tattwārtha* (1, 6) he has hinted that the line of discussion of the essential principle in philosophy should be from the view-point of Pramāṇa and Naya, he has, moreover, explained the characteristics of Naya under five distinct heads (*Tattwārtha* 1, 34, 35). Now this hint of Umāswāti has been taken by Siddhasena and in his own work *Sanmati* he has explained the nature of Naya and Pramāṇa, devoting two separate chapters to state his view-point clearly. In this way he has made a distinct advance over Umāswāti who is the pioneer of this mode of analysis in Jain philosophy which in its turn is chiefly based on the Vedic system of philosophy in *Saṃskṛta*.

1—The old tradition regarding the Guṇa-Paryāya and the new view of Siddhasena opposed to the old tradition are given in the 4th note of *Sanmati Tikā* p. 631.

(b) *Pūjyapāda and Samantabhadra.*

Pūjyapāda : In this context we are referring to Pūjyapāda Devanandi not with a view to compare him with Siddhasena, but altogether from a different point of view. It is with reference to the date of these two authors. Pūjyapāda, in his grammar, has followed the method of Buddhist and Brahmin grammarians and has referred, with great respect, to the Ācāryas Siddhasena and Samantabhadra with a view to establish their peculiarly high position as Jaina Saṁskṛta scholars. Now looking to these references it seems highly probable (if we take into consideration the time of Pūjyapāda) that the Siddhasena referred to by Pūjyapāda¹ is nobody else than our present Siddhasena the author of *Sanmati* and *Stutis* and Samantabhadra is also that well-known Samantabhadra the *Stutikāra*. If our conjecture is correct both these authors must have flourished before the 6th century of Vikrama era. And looking to the nature of these references, by Pūjyapāda, of these two *Stutikaras*, it seems quite probable that these two authors were before Pūjyapāda and his works must have been greatly influenced by the works of these two famous authors.

Samantabhadra : The comparison of Siddhasena with Samantabhadra is more important than the

1. “चतुष्टयं समन्तभद्रस्य” 5. 4. 140. “वेत्तेः सिद्धसेनस्य” 5. 1. 7.

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comparison of Siddhasena with other Ācāryas for the following reasons :—

1. The relative time of these two authors. 2. To see if any one of them has not influenced other, who was the third person or which was the atmosphere to influence them both equally. 3. Which was the greater scholar of the two and what is the comparative estimate of their activities. 4. What were the line which were followed by these two authors in making clear the Jaina doctrines and in establishing, the tradition of logic and how the subsequent Jaina Ācāryas following the same lines developed the tradition of logic. 5. And how in spite of difference in tradition and locality, these two author remarkably agreed in their view-points as regards the Anekānta Vāda. How far have both taken the same line of thinking in defining Anekānta Vāda. A clear discussion of all these points is really important.

Before undertaking a comparative study of these two authors we refer to some points which are noteworthy. In Jaina traditions only two Acāryas occupy a high place as the premier authors of Stuti. In Digambara tradition, Samantabhadra is regarded as the first of the Stutikāras, and according to Svetāmbara tradition no other author is so well-known as Siddhasena as a composer of Stuti. Not that all the work of these two authors are available at present. Some verses in the available works of these two authors are quite similar to one another and at other places there are slight differences in them. For instance, the 9th verse of Nyāyāvātāra beginning with the words 'आप्तोपशमनुल्लङ्घ्यम्'.

is exactly similar to the 9th verse of Ratnakaraṇḍakaśrāvākācāra. The 28th verse of Nyāyāvatāra is almost identical with the 102nd verse of Aptamīmāṃsā with a slight verbal change¹. Now the verse 'नयास्तवस्यात्पद—' etc. as occurring in the Vimalanātha Stuti in Swayambhū Stotra is, in the opinion of Abhaya Deva², the commentator of Sanmati, one composed by Siddhasena. Looking to the prominent works, the subject matter, and the style of these two authors, one point becomes absolutely clear that the goal of these two authors is exactly the same. It was to establish the view that Jaina Tīrthāṅkara is omniscient and that his religious preaching is blameless and perfect. The Anekānta view-point on which this preaching is based is the perfectly correct view-point and other view-points being so many different parts of it are partially true. Both these authors desired to establish this view before the contemporary scholars on the strength of logical discussions in their learned works. In order to accomplish this object, both these Ācāryas wrote important works. We propose to compare the salient points of these two authors below. This comparison will deal with three points :—(1) with reference to words ; (2) with reference to style ; (3) with reference to subject matter.

1 "प्रमाणस्य फलं साक्षादज्ञानविनिवर्तनम् ।

केवलस्य सुखोपेक्षे शेषस्यादानदानधीः ॥" न्यायावतारः ।

"उपेक्षा फलमाद्यस्य शेषस्यादानदानधीः ।

पूर्व वाज्ञाननाशो वा सर्वस्यास्य स्वगोचरे ॥" आप्तमीमांसा ।

2 See this Intro. p. 16, note 1.

(1) Even if we do not take into consideration some peculiar words often occurring in the works of these two authors, words such as Acyuta, Akṣara, Samanta, Viśvacakaṣu, etc. from the point of view of comparative study we have to take note of some peculiar words and phrases in those two Stuti works such as :

Swayambhūstora

स्वयम्भुवा १

समालीढपदम् ४१

जितक्षुल्लकवादिशासनः ५

सहस्राक्षः ८१

स्वपरावभासकम्—६३

Dwātrimśikā

स्वयम्भुवम् १. १.

अनालीढपथः १. १३

पपञ्चितक्षुल्लकवर्कशासनैः १. ८

भूतसहस्रनेत्रम् १. १

स्वपराभासि—(Nyā. 1)

The most important among all these words is Swayambhū. It is with this word that both these authors begin their Stuti.

(2) Along with this similarity of words, identity of style can also be noted ; for instance, in the 4th verse of the 1st Dwātrimśika, Siddhasena has described certain characteristics of Mahāvīra which occur in verse 57 of Swayambhu Stotra:

“न काव्यशक्तो न परस्परैर्ष्याया न वीरकीर्तिप्रतिबोधनेच्छया ।

न केवलं श्राद्धतयैव नूयसे गुणज्ञ ! पूज्योऽसि यतोऽयमादरः ॥”—Dwā.

“न पूजयार्थं स्वयि वीतरागे न निन्दया नाथ ! विवान्तवैरे ।

तथापि ते पुण्यगुणस्मृतिर्नः पुनातु चित्तं दुरिताञ्जनेभ्यः ॥”—Sway.

(3) Placing Swayambhu Stotra and Apta Mīmāṃsa on one hand and Dwātrimśikās, Nyāyāvatāra, and Sanmati-

tarka on the other, we clearly see that the similarities as regards the subject matter are strikingly manifold. We propose here to refer to these similarities very briefly.

1. In verse 62 of the Swayambhū Stotra the author has first of all considered all the Nayas from the point of view of principal and subordinate, that is to say, from the point of view of general and particular. The same sort of view-point has been accepted by Sanmati (l. 4,5) where the author maintains that all Nayas originate either from Dravyāstika or Parayāyāstika.

3. In Anekānta Vāda all the well-known illustrations fit in perfectly, while in Ekānta Vāda they do not. This point has been mentioned in the 54th verse of Swayambhū Stotra, and 56th verse of Sanmati. Both are identical in their view.

4. In what points the Nayas are correct, and in what points they are incorrect, has been amply demonstrated both in the Āpta Mīmāṃsā verse 108 and the Sanmati chap. 1 verses 13, 14.

5. In the Sanmati, chapter 1 verses 36--41, in course of the discussion of Naya the doctrine of Saptabhaṅgī has been briefly discussed. The same doctrine has been exhaustively dealt with in the 9th verse of the Āpta Mīmāṃsā where all the various doctrines have been harmoniously synthesised from the Anekānta point of view.

6. In the 52nd verse of Swayambhū Stotra. Naya and Pramāṇa have been clearly explained. The same sort of explanation is found about these two things in the 29th verse of Nyāyāvatāra.

7. All the points that are considered as debatable in the domain of philosophy such as real and unreal; eternal and transient; oneness and multiplicity; general and particular; have been harmoniously synthesized both by Samantabhadra and Siddhasena in their respective works on proper occasions and almost in similar fashion.

8. That pairs of cause and effect, quality and the thing possessing the quality and particular and general are neither absolutely different nor absolutely identical, has been established both in the Āpta Mīmāṃsā verses 61 to 72 and in Sanmati 3rd Chapter. Only the manner of representing this is in the case of these two authors, peculiarly their own.

9. The analysis and synthesis of Hetu Vāda and Āgama Vāda occur both in the Āpta Mīmāṃsā (verses 75 to 78) and the Sanmati (chap. 3rd Gāthā 45).

10. The wide range of Anekānta has been equally demonstrated though in different words, both by Swayambhū Stotra (verse 101) and the Sanmati (chapter 3, Gāthā 27).

11. In the Āpta Mīmāṃsā (verses 88 to 91) the synthesis of the doctrine of absolute causation is discussed illustrating it with the mention of the two points of view of Daiva and Pauruṣa, while in Sanmati (chapter 3rd Gāthā 53) there are five such doctrines taken for discussion, illustration and synthesis.

12. In the Āpta Mīmāṃsā (verses 24 to 27) and Sanmati (chapter 3, Gāthā 48) there is a mention of the Advaita doctrine. The only difference is that where as in the former there is a mention of the word Advaita but

no mention is made as to whom this doctrine belongs to and what sort of Advaita it was in the latter there is no mention of the word Advaita but Kapila doctrine has been mentioned as the Advaita doctrine.

In addition to all this one point seems to be noteworthy that the Āpta Mīmāṃsā while defining the nature of omniscience refers to his preachings as embodied in the Anekānta doctrine. The Sanmati also accepts the preachings of Jina omniscient as supreme, and also discusses Anekānta in this context. In Indian logic, the authenticity of a Śāstra is a subject of supreme interest. There is one doctrine which is in vogue from times immemorial and it is this that the Śāstra has no beginning, that is to say, it is not the work of any human being. It is an authority in itself. This doctrine has for its advocate Jaimini. Another doctrine which is considered as opposed to Jaimini has been advocated by the Vaiśeṣikas, Naiyayikas and others. It says that the authenticity of a Śāstra does not depend upon the fact that it is without beginning or that it is eternal, but it depends upon the reliability of the person who preaches it. Such a reliable creature is nobody else than God himself. Therefore, naturally a Śāstra is considered to be an authority only because it is brought into being by God. These two doctrines regard Śrutis (Vedas) as their authority and base their doctrines on them. The only difference is that the reasons assigned to this doctrine are different in each doctrine. The second doctrine that of the logician has this peculiarity in it that it accepts God as the creator of the Śāstras, and thus it says that the

Śāstra is without beginning. But at the same time while the Mīmāṃsā doctrine says that the Śāstras or Veda is Apauruṣeya (that is not created by anybody) the logicians regard it to be created by somebody, and that somebody is God himself. Any how the Pauruṣeya Vāda was cleverly introduced by the logicians in the face of the Apauruṣeya Vāda then current. As opposed to these two doctrines there is a third doctrine which appeals to reason more than the first two, and it is this ; it accepts the authority of Śāstra, it also accepts the fact that this authority depends upon the worth of the preacher, but it at the same time maintains that this preacher must necessarily be a human being with a body and mouth to speak. From this discussion of various doctrines two points come to the forefront : the first is this that the standard of authority should be made wider, for while the first two doctrines regard the Vedas as their authority, others are equally authorised to regard their Śāstras as reliable which they consider as coming from the mouth of a person of authority. The second point is this that if a man is pure and is endowed with supreme intellect he is as good as God Himself, and must be considered as a man of authoritative words. This third doctrine thus revolutionised the views then current. It is not definitely known who first started this doctrine, but this much can be definitely stated that the contribution of Mahāvīra and Buddha age to this doctrine is very great indeed. In course of time, this last doctrine came to be very popular and Sāṅkhya, Ājīvika and others began to regard the founders of other sects as men of authority and began

to consider their works as having perfect infallibility. The Jainas also regarded the author of their scriptures as a man of authority and accepted his preachings as absolutely infallible and reliable. The Jainas again regard all other Śāstras except their own as having no authority at all. In order to clear this point and in order to demonstrate the infallibility of the Śāstras created by the omniscient Tīrthaṅkara the two great works Sanmati and Āptamīmāṃsā were composed.

(c) *Mūlācāra.*

Date of Mūlācāra is not fixed. It is believed to be the work of a Digambarācārya Vaṭṭakera. Our critical study has convinced us that Mūlācāra is not an original work but merely a collection, Vaṭṭakera has taken 4 gāthās from Sanmati (2 40—43) in Samayasārādhikāra of Mūlācāra (10 87—90). And so we can say this much that the work was composed after the times of Siddhasena.

(d) *Mallavādī and Jinabhadra.*

Mallavādī: In the Kathāvali and in the Prabhāvaka Carita, there are some chapters devoted to the life of Mallavādī. It is stated therein that the time when he conquered his Bauddha opponents is 414 Vikram era¹. The same Mallavādī is famous for his work Dwādasāra-nayacakra². Now this Mallavādī is the same person about whom we want to discuss something here.

Ācārya Hemcandra in his works refers to Mallavādī with the words ‘अनु मल्लवादिन’ तर्किका:’ (vide *Siddhahema* 2.2.39). Hemcandra considers him to be the greatest

1. P. C. p. 74 verse 83.

2. P. C. Mallavādī Prabandha verse 34.

logician. It is quite possible that Mallavādī referred to in his commentary on Sanmati by Abhayadeva (see page 608) is same Mallavādī who is considered as an advocate of the doctrine of simultaneity of Kevalopayoga. At present there is no complete work found written by Mallavādī. To establish, therefore, the identity of Mallavādī referred to by Hemcandra and the one referred to by Abhayadeva is not possible at the present stage. Hari Bhadra in his works *Anekānta Jayapatākā*, and Yasoyijavaji in his commentary of *Aṣṭasahasrī* mentioned Mallavādī as the commentator of Sanmati¹. This Mallavādī and our present Mallavādī are one and the same person. The Jaina tradition also corroborates this statement of ours. The commentary of Mallavādī is not available at present, but then the author of *Bṛhat Tippani* mentions this commentary as having a bulk of 700 verses. If the time of Mallavādī's victory over the Bauddha opponents as suggested in the *Prabhandas* is correct, and if this Mallavādī be the commentator of Sanmati, it is an easy matter to fix the relative time of Siddhasena and Mallavādī. It is probable that Siddhasena and Mallavādī were contemporaries and one might have written the commentaries on the works of another, even in their life-time. If no conclusive relation between these two persons can be established, at least this can be taken for granted that Mallavādī may be a disciple of Siddhasena in matter of learning. Nothing definite can further be stated at present on this point.

1 See p. 10 note 1 of this intro.

Another Mallavādī who had written a commentary on Dharmottara who is in his turn a commentator of Nyāyabindu of Dharmakīrti was probably a Bauddha, and must at least be a modern person for the author Dharmottara of whom Mallavādī is said to be a commentator flourished according to Dr. Satiśacandra¹ in the 9th century.

Jinabhadra: This is the same Jinabhadra who is well-known in Jaina tradition as Kṣamāśramaṇa and Bhāṣyakāra. He has been referred to by Hemacandra as a very great commentator (vide *Siddhahema* 2.2.39) and has also been mentioned in the Prabandhas such as Kathāvali and others. He is said to have died in 645 Vikrama era. We have mentioned before that Siddhasena was predecessor of Jinabhadra. Of all the works of Jinabhadra available at present two works Viśeṣaṇavati and Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya are very famous. A brief comparison of the subjects of these two works with the topics of Sanmati is made below. We hope that the students of these works and Sanmati will find this comparison very useful in determining among other things the date of these two authors. Our comparison can be classified under three heads :—(1) verses found in both the works, (2) words or sentences conveying the same sort of sense or similarity of thought, (3) rival views.

(1) Verses 52 and 49 of Sanmati chapter 3rd are found adverbium in Viśeṣāvaśyaka Bhāṣya also as Gāthā no. 2104 and 2195. The commentator of the Bhāṣya does not

1 H. I. L. p. 329.

say whether these verses occurring in the Bhāṣya have been quoted from Sanmati or other such works or whether they are originally in the text. Rather he regards these verses as belonging to the author himself, but a minute examination of these verses convinces a student that the author of Bhāṣya has quoted them from some other source in order to support his own view-point expressed in the Gāthās 2103 and 2194. It is an ordinary phenomenon in Saṁskṛta or Prākṛta composition that a verse originally taken as a quotation from other works comes to be regarded as a verse belonging to the composition itself¹. We think that the two verses in the Bhāṣya are taken from Sanmati. There are two reasons for this supposition. The first is this that these two verses are not found in anyother work except Sanmati and the second point is this that these two verses perfectly suit the context in Sanmati, whereas they do not at all suit the context in the Viśeṣāvaśyaka Bhāṣya. On the other hand, if we take these verses as belonging to Bhāṣya, they appear to be unnecessarily repetitions and must be regarded redundant². Such is not the case with Sanmati, for in Sanmati (3,48)

1 In the Chapter Third of Śāstravārtā, for instance, the third and the fourth verses are taken from some author, but a cursory reader is not able to detect this.

Again in the Tatvasaṅgraha, the Karikas 912-914 belong to Bhāmaha and some Karikas after this belong to Kumāril. But a cursory reader would regard all the Karikas as belonging to the original Text.

2 On the occasion of the discussion of Dravyakāraṇa, twenty one Gāthas have been written in Bhāṣya (2098 to 2118). Upto Gātha 2103 the discussion of तद्द्रव्यकारण and अन्यद्रव्यकारण is over.

it is said that the Kapila doctrine being dependent on Dravyāstika Naya and the Bauddha doctrine being dependent an Paryāya Naya are both unreliable. Now the question arises if these two doctrines are unreliable, what about the third doctrine that of Kaṇāda which depends upon both these Nayas. The reply to this question is given in the Gāthā 49 of Sanmati. If this Gāthā is considered as a quotation from other works the unreliability or otherwise of the Kaṇāda doctrine remains undecided. It must, therefore, be regarded as originally belonging to the text of Sanmati. Now the answer to the same question in the Bhāṣya is already given in the verse 2194 and that too with the name of Kaṇāda and there is no point in saying the same thing again elsewhere in the Bhāṣya. The only conclusion, therefore, is this that this verse 2195 has been taken from Sanmati by the Bhāṣyakāra. Again the gāthā “नस्थि पुदवी विसिद्धो (San. 3. 52) dealing with Sat and Asat perfectly fits in with the context of Sanmati, while the same occurring in Bhāṣya does not suit the context at all. There are other Gāthās also, with a slight change in Sanmati and Bhāṣya; for instance :—

“जावइआ वयणवहा तावइया चेव होंति णयवाया ।

जावइया णयवया तावइया चेव परसमया ॥” San. 3. 47.

From G. 2105 the discussion of cause and effect begins. Between these two mentioned above occurs Gatha No 2104 which does not fit in with the context. Moreover the purport of Gatha No. 2104 is again mentioned as the final view in Gatha from 2109 to 2111. This show that Gatha No. 2104 is superfluous. And the purport of G. 2195 is clearly seen in Gāthā No. 2194.

It occurs in Bhāṣya as verse No. 2265 with slight changes thus:—

“जावंतो वयणपहा तावंतो वा नया विसदाओ ।
ते चेव य पसमया सम्मत्तं समुदिया सव्वे ॥”

(2) In the 22nd Gāthā of the 1st. chapter of Sanmati an exhaustive illustration of the necklace of jewels is given in which occurs the words ‘रयणावली’ ‘मणि’ etc. Now these very words along with this very illustration in a brief form occur in Gāthā No. 2271 of Viśeṣāvaśyaka Bhāṣya. In the 54th Gāthā of the 1st. chapter of Sanmati the word ‘परिकम्पणानिमित्तं’ occurs. This very word occur with a slight change as ‘परिकम्पणत्थ’ in Gāthā No. 2276 of Viśeṣāvaśyaka Bhāṣya. The argument advanced in 28th. Gāthā of the 1st. chapter of Sanmati is found with some of the very words of Sanmati in the Gāthā No. 2272 of Viśeṣāvaśyaka Bhāṣya. Jinabhadra being a faithful follower of Scriptures is considered as an opponent of Siddhasena who was a famous logician. In his Bhāṣya Jinabhadra has dealt with some points that are directly opposed to the points dealt with in Sanmati. It is, however, noteworthy that some argument and views of Siddhasena in his Sanmati have been adopted in Bhāṣya. The commentator Maladhārī in all such places clearly says that these points belonged originally to Siddhasena and comments on them accordingly. Maladhārī had before him the tradition of the old commentators, and at every such place in the Bhāṣya he knew clearly that these were the views that were opposed to those of

Siddhasena. When, therefore, Maladhārī says that some views in Bhāṣya are adopted from Siddhasena he may be considered as perfectly reliable in his statement. At any rate, it seems quite clear that though Jinabhadra was an opponent of Siddhasena in some points and though he has contradicted Siddhasena in those points, which in his opinion went against the scriptures, he has accepted, with a broad mind which is characteristic of him, sound views of Siddhasena that do not go contrary to Scriptures ; and thus he has respectfully acknowledged the debt he owed to Siddhasena. The views that are thus adopted by Jinabhadra from Siddhasena are two :

- (a) the first is about the number of Nayas and
- (b) the second is as regards Nikṣepa as well as the varieties of Nayas.

(a) Gāthā No 2264 supposed by the commentator to be Nirukti deals with the seven as well as the five varieties of Naya. Now Siddhasena (San. 1. 4, 5) begins to count the Nayas from Saṅgraha and thus mentions only six kinds of Naya. In the gatha mentioned above in the Bhāṣya, however, Jinabhadra has not mentioned six kinds of Naya but incidentally at other places he has also acknowledged the sixfold divisions of Siddhasena.

The inclusion of Nayas beginning with Saṅgraha Naya in Nikṣepa is found made in Bhāṣya in Gāthā No. 75. Elsewhere, in Nayadwāra (Gāthā No. 3586) the Nayas are discussed with the Saṅgraha Naya being first mentioned. But in many other places (Gāthā 2181 etc.) they are mentioned as beginning from Naigama Naya. It seems obvious that following the ancient traditions of the

scriptures Jinabhadra accepted seven Nayas, but at the same time accepted with great reverence the six-fold divisions of Nayas as made by Siddhasena.

(b) In Sanmati 1. 6. the first three Nikṣepas are mentioned being of the nature of Dravyāstika and the fourth Nikṣepa as being of the nature of Paryāyāstika and in Sanmati 1. 5, 6 the Nayas Saṅgraha and Vyavahāra are included in Dravyāstika, and the four Nayas such as Rjusūtra, and others have been included in Paryāyāstika. Jinabhadra accepts this classification of Sanmati and incorporates this classification in the 75th Gāthā of his Bhāṣya.

(3) While trying to determine the relation between Siddhasena and Jinabhadra it is essential first to discuss the question :—with regard to what points these two authors were opposed to each other ? The opposition existed mainly with regard to the point of Kevalopayogavāda. Three points here are noteworthy :—

(a) References in ancient literature as regards this Vāda.

(b) How was this doctrine enunciated ? How was it further developed ?

(c) Who was the originator of this discussion ?

(a) In Digambara literature there is not a single work dealing with this present Vāda. It seems, therefore, that in Digambara sect this Vāda was never discussed. In Svetāmbara literature we come across a good deal of discussion about this Vāda¹. In the Svetāmbara literature

1—Vi. B. Gāthā 3089 ff.

available at present, the oldest works discussing this point are only those of Siddhasena and those of Jinabhadra. Sanmati is the work in which Siddhasena has discussed this point and Viśeṣaṇavati and Viśeṣāvaśyaka Bhāṣya are the two works of Jinabhadra in which we find a discussion of this Vāda. Subsequently, authors such as Jinadāsa, Haribhadra, Gandhabasti and others¹ have discussed this point in their respective works. But the Gāthās or verses quoted by these authors in support of their statements have all been taken from the above-mentioned three works only.

(b) According to the old Jaina tradition, it seems to us that Kevalopayoga was considered as occurring in succession. In Digambara tradition Kevalopayoga is supposed to occur simultaneously. It can, therefore, be safely inferred that either Kundakunda and several other writers in Digambara² sect started this doctrine of Simultaneity anew or supported and developed the doctrine that was going on for centuries persistently though not prominently. Digambara tradition does not accept the scriptures word for word. The Svetāmbara scholars who advocated the doctrine of succession, therefore, always retorted Digambara scholars by saying that the latter had no authority as regards the doctrine of Simultaneity in-as-much-as they were not supported in it by the scriptures. The Svetāmbaras accepted as

¹ Vide Nandi Cūrṇi, Dharmasangrahaṇi and Tattvārtha Tikā. For all these references Vide Sanmati Tikā p. 597 to 604.

² See Pra. 1. 51. also S. T. p. 603.

authority the old scriptures and advocated the doctrine of Succession on their authority. Now the Digambara scholars, having no regard for the scriptures, supported their doctrine merely on the strength of logic and argument. These Digambara scholars thus had no very great regard for the scriptural authority accepted by Svetāmbara pandits. With all this it should be regarded that there was discussion about these doctrines in Svetāmbara literature. The same discussion was taken by Siddhasena and was developed on the strength of logic. Siddhasena had studied all the Śāstras and, in course of his studies, he was convinced that this doctrine of Succession that is the Kramavāda though old and advocated by the scriptures could not appeal to reason so much as the Yugapad Vāda or the doctrine of Simultaneity supported by the Digambaras. Instead of merely accepting this Yugapadvāda he went one step further and said that in Kevalopayoga, Jñāna and Darśana are not merely Simultaneous but are absolutely identical. But though intellectually he was convinced of the truth of his doctrine, he was perforce compelled to have recourse to the authority of the scriptures, for those were the times in which nothing was accepted unless it was corroborated by the scriptures. He, therefore, addressed himself to the task of finding support for his doctrine in the scriptures themselves, and tried to interpret some of the passages in the scriptures in such a way that they would support his new doctrine of Abhedavāda. Standing on this firm ground of scriptures, the advocates of Abhedavāda came to be a host of mighty opponents of

the doctrine of Kramavāda and scholars advocating this latter Vāda, therefore, found it difficult to challenge the doctrine of Siddhasena and other advocates of Abhedavāda. Now it was not an easy task for them to refute the doctrines of Siddhasena merely by saying that it was not corroborated by scriptures. This attitude of the scholars of Kramavāda is clearly discernible in the 184th and other Gāthās of Viśeṣaṇvati in which this Vāda is discussed in details. In these Gāthās the Yugapadvāda has been contemptuously thrown away with the mere charge that it had no support of scriptures; but the case of Abhedavāda of Siddhasena was different. It, being a very sound doctrine, had to be challenged seriously. All the force of arguments, charges and refutations is levelled against this very Abhedavāda of Siddhasena. If this Abhedavāda would not have been supported by scriptures, it would not have been deemed so formidable by its opponents. In short, this present Abhedavāda has gained force mainly because it has sound logical arguments on its side and secondly because it stood on the firm bed-rock of scriptures.

(c) In order to discuss as to who was the founder of the present Vāda, we shall have to examine all the sound arguments levelled by the champions of this Vāda and Kramavāda against one another. In the second chapter of Sanmati, from verse 4 to 31, we find arguments to establish Abhedavāda and to refute the doctrines of Kramavāda. Now contrary to this, in Viśeṣaṇvati (from verse 184 to 280) and in Viśeṣāvaśyaka Bhāṣya

(from Gāthā No. 3089 onwards) we find arguments in support of Kramavāda and other arguments refuting mainly the Abhedavāda. The arguments in favour of Abhedavāda in Sanmati are refuted in Viśeṣāvaśyaka Bhāṣya and vice versa. Examining these arguments critically we find that all the arguments advanced by Sanmati in establishing its own doctrine have not been refuted in toto by Viśeṣanavati; similarly, all the arguments in support of Kramavāda as well as all the objections to its own doctrine have not been refuted by Sanmati. We have stated before (p. 6) that the fact that Siddhasena and Jinabhadra were contemporaries, or that Jinabhadra preceded Siddhasena, is not quite true. Now the question arises, if according to Abhayadeva, Jinabhadra was the first exponent of the doctrine of Kramavāda, the arguments advanced by Kramavādins must have been those of Jinabhadra and Siddhasena must have answered them in his Sanmati; but if Jinabhadra was not the first exponent of Kramavāda there must have been other advocates of Kramavāda before Siddhasena. Similarly, we must try to determine as to what person was before Jinabhadra when he advocated the doctrine of Kramavāda. Our critical study has convinced us that Jinabhadra was not the first exponent of Karmavāda doctrines. Even before Jinabhadra, there must have been many Ācāryas advocating the doctrine of Kramavāda. It may be that they did not compose any work dealing with this doctrine but their pet arguments must have been a current coin at the time of Jinabhadra and must have been taught and traditionally

circulated amongst the students of Jaina philosophy in those times. The stock arguments for and against these two doctrines were received as legacy by Jinabhadra but he in his turn added some of his arguments in support of his doctrine and arranged them in a proper order and specially composed big works to establish his own doctrines advancing arguments therein to refute the doctrine of Abhedavāda. Now this systematisation of the doctrine of Kramavāda was not attempted by any of his predecessors. It is in this sense that we have to interpret the remarks of Abhayadeva that Jinabhadra was the first exponent of the doctrine of Kramavāda;¹ not that the doctrine originated from him, but he systematised that doctrine and supported it with cogent arguments. The question arises in this connection is whether Siddhasena was the first exponent of the doctrine of Abhedavāda or whether he was the first to systematise this doctrine in his own works. Looking to Jinabhadra's two works Viśeṣaṇavati and Bhāṣya, in which there is a complete refutation of the doctrine of Abhedavāda it seems quite clear that Jinabhadra had before him no one particular individual but quite a host of Ācāryas who advocated the doctrine of Abhedavāda; for instance, he mentions one Ācārya by the word 'Kecit' another by the word 'Anye' and others by some other words; he takes the opinion of one Ācārya at a time, levels his arguments against that

1 S. T. p. 608.

particular individual and refutes his point¹. From this we can clearly see that Jinabhadra did not regard Siddhasena as the first exponent of the Abhedavāda. But it is not quite clear who the first exponent of the doctrine of Abhedavāda was. This much, of course, is quite clear that Jinabhadra had before him the works of other Ācāryas, over and above the Sanmati of Siddhasena against which he had directed his attack. Haribhadra² mentions the name of one Vṛddha Ācārya as the champion of this doctrine. If he was really a historical figure and if he was the first founder of this doctrine, then we have to interpret, the remarks of Abhayadeva³ about Siddhasena as being the pioneer of this doctrine in this sense that he systematised his own doctrine and composed able works in support of it, and these can undoubtedly be regarded as monumental works dealing with Abhedavāda. Another evidence to show that there were some supporters of Abhedavāda preceding Siddhasena is this that there are arguments levelled by Siddhasena in Gāthā 21 of the 2nd chapter of Sanmati against one kind of the doctrine of Abhedavāda which to Siddhasena does not seem to be the right sort of Abhedavāda. It seems from the commentary of Yaśovijaya⁴ on this Gāthā of Sanmati that Siddhasena had prior to him or at least in his own times some varieties of Abhedavāda which to him did not appear to be correct.

1 Vi. B. v. 3113.

2 See Nandi Tika p. 52.

3 Sanmati Tika. p. 608.

4 Jnana-Bindu p. 160.

He has, therefore, attempted to refute these varieties of the doctrine of Abhedavāda. Whether Siddhasena was the first founder of Abhedavāda or whether he was the first person who systematised this doctrine is not quite clear. But this much is quite clear that either in his own times or after him there were Ācāryas who advocated this doctrine and composed works bearing on it. Maladhārī Hemacandra has quoted a Saṃskṛta verse in his commentary on Viśeṣāvaśyaka Bhāṣya¹. This verse purports to support Abhedavāda, and very probably belongs to Siddhasena. But looking to the Dwātriṃśikās of Siddhasena that are available at present, we have not been able to trace this verse to them or to other Saṃskṛta works of his. If the verse may not be one of the lost Dwātriṃśikās it might belong to some other Ācārya and if this is true, it means that along with Siddhasena there were other Ācāryas also dealing with this doctrine. Perhaps Siddhasena himself had written another treatise on Abhedavāda.

Abhayadeva² mentions Mallavādī as an advocate (Puraskartā) of the doctrine of Yugapadvāda. Now a question arises as to what is the meaning of the word advocate (Puraskartā in Saṃskṛta). From the works of Kundakunda it becomes clear that the Yugapadvāda of the Digambaras was well-known even before Mallavādī. As to Mallavādī, no complete work of his is available at present. The remark of Abhayadeva must, therefore, be interpreted to mean that Mallavādī merely

1 p. 1198.

2 Sanmati-Tika p. 608 line 21.

systematised this doctrine or perhaps wrote an independent treatise on this subject or else wrote a commentary on some work dealing with the subject.

(e) *Simhakaṣamāśramaṇa*, *Haribhadra* and *Gandhahastī*.

Simhakaṣamāśramaṇa : *Simhakaṣamāśramaṇa*¹ in his commentary on *Nayacakra* quotes several *Gāthās* from *Sanmati* with the name of *Siddhasena* or without mentioning his name. At the end of this work it is said that *Sanmati* and *Nyāyāvatāra* are profoundly erudite works no doubt, but then they are difficult to understand as they are written in a very terse style. He, moreover, adds that in order to simplify the arguments of *Siddhasena* and to supplement them, the work *Nayacakra* was composed. This one reference is quite sufficient to show that the author of *Nayacakra* was very strongly influenced by *Siddhasena*.

Haribhadra : The influence of *Siddhasena* on *Haribhadra* is quite clear. He has described *Siddhasena* as the most profound scholar and able author of *Sanmati*, but over and above this reference his own works *Anekāntajayapatākā*, *Śāstravārtāsamuccaya*, *Śaḍdarśanasamuccaya*, *Dharmasaṅgrahaṇī*, and others freely quote, copiously draw upon and have received direct inspiration from the scholarly works of *Siddhasena* such as *Sanmati*

1 See Appendix Second S. T. vol. 5 *Simhakaṣamāśramaṇa*.

Nyāyāvatāra,¹ etc. This statement of our can easily be corroborated by comparative study of the works of these two authors. Haribhadra's work Saddarśana-samuccāya can be said to be inspired by his critical study of Siddhasena's Dwātrimśikās.

Gandhahasti : In his commentary on Tattvārtha Bhāṣya, Gandhahasti advocates the doctrine of Kramavāda and levels severe attack² on Abhedavāda. This attack it seems probable, has been levelled against Siddhasena Divākra ; but in spite of this fact, Gandhahasti himself was so profoundly influenced by the scholarship of Siddhasena that in his Bhāṣyavṛtti at other places, in spite of his opposition to Siddhasena, he has, with great respect, quoted several Gāthās of Sanmati³ and verses from Dwātrimśikās⁴ in support of his own statements. It seems from the relations of all these Ācāryas to one another that these Ācāryas, notwithstanding their strong opposition on certain points to one another, regarded one another as authority on points in which they all agreed.

(f) *Akalāṅka and Vidyānanda.*

Akalāṅka : These two towering scholars among Digambara Jaina Ācāryas were also profoundly influenced

1 The origin of the subject discussed in Anekāntajaya Pataka is to be found in the third chapter of Sanmati. In Śāstravartā Gāthā 505 & 506, a translation of the Gāthā 43 and 44 of the first chapter of Sanmati is found. The subject discussed in Saddarśana-Samuccāya is found in the Dwātrimśikās of Siddhasena.

2 “यद्यपि केचित् पण्डितमन्याः” etc. 1. 31. p. 111.

3 Vide Tattvārtha Bhāṣya Vṛtti 1. 7. in which Gāthā 21 & 28 from Sanmati are quoted.

4 Tattvārtha-Bhāṣya Vṛtti 1, 10 p. 71.

by Siddhasena. Akalaṅka in his Rājavārtika¹ not only quotes verses from the Dwātrimśikās of Siddhasena, but accepts with great regard some of the views of Siddhasena in Rājavārtika of his—such as the Guṇas not being different, from Paryāya, in spite of the fact that these views went against his own Digambara tradition. After a comparative study of the works of Siddhasena and Akalaṅka it seems to us that the latter has taken much of the subject matter of Sanmati in his Laghīyastrayi² and the development of Naya, Pramāṇa and Nikṣepa found in the work of Akalaṅka is clearly after the fashion of Siddhasena.

Vidyānanda : As to Vidyānanda he was more inspired by the study of Siddhasena's works than Akalaṅka was. In his Ślokavārtika³ he not only quotes Gāthās of Sanmati but accepts some of the views of Siddhasena whole heartedly although in some other places he has stated his strong opposition to some of them. Like Akalaṅka, he has accepted the view of Siddhasena that Guṇas are not different from Paryāya. Moreover the distribution of the Nayas under the heads of the two original Nayas has been done by Vidyānanda, thus clearly following the classification of Sanmati in this

1 The 30th verse from the 1st Dwa. is quoted in Rājavārtika 8, 1. 17.

2 See Vārtika on Sutra 5. 37.

3 See Laghīyastrayi 1.4 and the fourth verse of Nyāyavatāra.

4 On page 3rd the 45th Gāthā of the third chapter of Sanmati is quoted.

respect¹. For this classification as found in Śloka-vārtika he has no authority in Digambara works such as Sarvārthasiddhi and Rājavārtika, which are the bases of Śloka-vārtika. Indeed, he is the first author in Digambara tradition to make a classification of Nayas in this manner. The discussion of Vidyānanda as regards the Naigama Naya as being a separate Naya and as regards the number of Nayas as being seven instead of six² seems to have been directed against Siddhasena's doctrine of six Nayas ; for in the works Digambaras there is no acceptance at all of the doctrine of the six Nayas. It may be that the discussion of the Nayas made by Vidyānanda has for its inspiration the discussion in Nayacakra³, but at the same time it must be acknowledged that the whole of this discussion is influenced by Siddhasena's works. The classification and discussion of Saptabhaṅgī has been no doubt influenced by Nayacakra and other works of Mallavādī and of others no doubt, but in this Vidyānandā seems to be influenced by the scholarly discussion of Saptabhaṅgī in Sanmati. It is not necessary to prove that Vidyānandā was a close student of Sanmati for even a cursory reader of the works of Vidyānandā would at once understand it.

(g) *Śīlāṅka, Vādivetāla-Śānti-Śūri & Vādi-Deva.*

These three sūris were the Students of the works of Siddhasena, and they had copiously drawn upon

1 See Tattvārtha Śloka Vārtika 1. 33. 3.

2 Verse 17 to 25 of 1. 33 Tattvārtha Śloka Vārtika p. 269.

3 “तद्विशेषः प्रपञ्चेन संचिन्त्या नयचक्रतः” ११३३१३२ ।

the works of Siddhasena and incorporated much from them in their own works. This would be quite clear to those who study their works. Śīlāṅka in his commentary on Ācārāṅga¹, Sūtra-kṛtāṅga² and Vādi-Vetāla-Śānti-Sūri in his famous commentary named Pāīya³ have quoted many verses from Saumati in the form of conversation; and Vādi-Deva Suri in his Syād-Vāda-Ratnākara shows a very close study of the commentary of Saumati, and in his discussion of the Pramānas, one of his many sources is Nyāyāvatāra. Not only that, but Vādi-Deva in beginning his own work Ratnākara⁴ openly declares Siddhasena to be the chief authority for his work.

1 In the commentry on Ācārāṅga Sūtra p. 1. The Pūrvas and Saumati are mentioned together as Dravyānuyoga, while on p. 249 Saumati is referred to as a glorious work. The actual words are :—

“द्रव्यानुयोगः पूर्वाणि सम्मत्यादिकश्च ।” “दर्शनप्रभावकैर्वा सम्मत्यादिभिः ॥”

Vide also pages 80, 85, 147, 171, where the Gāthās from the first and third chapter of Saumati are quoted and on pages 231, 250 some verses from the second and eighth Dwā. are quoted.

2 In the commentry on Sūtra Kṛtāṅga Sūtra p. 211. some gāthās from the first and the third chapter of Saumati are quoted.

3 The 3rd and the 6th Gāthā of the first chapter of Saumati are quoted on p. 21 of Pāīya-Tika—with the words ‘तथा च महामतिः,’ On p. 67. S. 3. 47 is quoted.

4 “श्रीसिद्धसेनहरिभद्रमुखाः प्रसिद्धाः ।

ते सूरयो मयि भवन्तु कृतप्रसादाः ॥

येषां विमृश्य सततं विविधान् निबन्धान् ।

शास्त्रं चिकीर्षति तनुप्रतिभोऽपि मादृक् ॥ ८ ॥” p. 2.

(h) *Hema Candra and Yaśo Vijayaji.*

Hema Candra : The greatest scholar the well-known Ācārya, Hema Candra, bearing the title of Sarva-Tantra-Swa-Tantra, clearly imitated, and kept before himself as models, Dwātrimśikās of Siddhasena while composing his own two Dwātrimśikās. This is clear when we just cast a glance at the beginning of these works (Dwātrimśikās)¹. In his Stotra Sakalārgha Pratiṣṭhāna, Hema Candra kept before him as a model the Stotra of Swayambhū written by Samanta-Bhadra, and Hema Candra's work is an imitation, on a small scale, of Swayambhū. But admitting this, the fact remains that in the two Dwātrimśikās named Ayogavyavaccheda and Anyayogavyavaccheda, Hema Candra has chiefly taken his inspiration from the works of Siddhasena. He has openly declared Siddhasena to be the greatest poet, and it can be said that this appreciation is in no small measure, is due to his being influenced by the Dwātrimśikās of Siddhasena.

Yaśovijayji : The last of the greatest Jaina scholars, and a person who in various ways rendered signal service to Jaina literature and paid a rich contribution to it, was Vācaka Yaśovijayaji. Yaśovijayaji who

1 “क सिद्धसेनस्तुतयो महार्था अशिक्षितालापकला क चैषा ।

तथापि यूथाविपतेः पथस्थः स्खलद्रतिस्तस्य शिशुर्न शोच्यः ॥”

Ayo. 3.

Even the commentator Malliṣeṇa suggests the point in which Hemacandra has drawn inspiration from Siddhasena. Vid Syadvāda-Maṇjari p. 2.

flourished 1200 years after Siddhasena was almost the last of the Jaina scholars. It is quite plain that he had not the honour of being a direct disciple of Siddhasena, but inspite of the gulf of twelve centuries between these two towering scholars, Yaśovijayaji can very well be considered as deserving the honour of being a disciple of Siddhasena. No doubt there was a host of close students and reviewers of the works of Siddhasena among the Jaina Pandits, but from our study of Yaśovijayaji we can maintain without fear of contradiction that there was not a single scholar in the whole galaxy of Jaina scholar who could be said to have made such a deep and all-embracing study of the works of Siddhasena as Yaśovijayaji had. This scholar bearing the title of Vācaka has composed many works in Prākṛta, Samskr̥ta, and Gūjarāṭi, and almost all these works were based on the three chapters of Sanmati. He has written independent works of a very high order, merely taking suggestion from the Chapters of Sanmati, and the thoughts, arguments and doctrines of Siddhasena are scattered here and there in his other works also. In fact if we collect all the Gāthās of Sanmati commented upon by Yaśovijayaji, his whole writing can be said to be a vast commentary on the Sanmati of Siddhasena. A study of appendix No. 3 in vol. 5th of Sanmati will convince the reader of the truth of this statement.

We have in the said appendix made quite clear, by a comparative survey of the works of Yaśovijayaji and Siddhasena, as to what particular work of Yaśovijayaji

had its inspiration in a particular work of Siddhasena. But even a casual reader while studying this appendix will be convinced of the fact that Yašovijayaji was undoubtedly the profoundest student of the works of Siddhasena. Collecting the stray verses and Gāthās upon which Yašovijayaji has commented extensively but in a desultory manner, one can evolve quite a new commentary on Sanmati by Yašovijayaji and arrange the verses of Siddhasena with this commentary in a proper order. After Yašovijayaji the progress of Jaina literature was almost arrested, and after Yašovijayaji, it could as well be said, that the tradition of the study of Siddhasena's works also suffered a set-back, materially.

(iv) SIDDHASENA AND OTHER NON-JAINA ĀCĀRYAS.

In the medieval and modern works of Indian logic, it is almost impossible to find any author not being profoundly influenced by the greatest scholars in Indian Philosophy such as Bādarāyaṇa, Jaimini, Kanāda, and Akṣapāda who could be considered as the founders of Indian Philosophy. It is no wonder, therefore, if in the works of Siddhasena we find the influence of these Ācāryas at almost every step. In the extant works of Siddhasena the stream of this thought of Indian logic can very well be traced¹. It is not possible in this short space at our disposal to make comparative study of the works of Siddhasena and these other Ācāryas or Philosophers. It is only possible here to state in

1 Vide Dwa. dealing with Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Sāṅkhya and other systems of philosophy.

brief the similarity between Siddhasena and some of his non-Jaina predecessors who presumably influenced the works of Siddhasena, in point of style, technical words, thoughts and view-points.

(a) *Nāgārjuna, Maitreya, Asaṅga and Vasu Bandhu.*

Nāgārjuna is a very great Bauddha scholar, who flourished in the 2nd century A.D. He is considered as the founder of the famous doctrine of Śūnya vāda. It is possible that Siddhasena had studied the two works of Nāgārjuna *Madhyamaka-kārikā* and *Vigrahavyāvartanīkārikā* for in his own *Dwātrīṃśikā*s, Siddhasena refers to the *Madhyama Mārga* that was regarded as an important sect of the Bauddhas in his times. Siddhasena, identifying Mahāvīra with the founder of this sect, praises him as the real founder of the *Madhyama-Mārga*¹. Moreover he refers to the theory of Śūnyatva that gained a very high place in Indian logic by the efforts of Nāgārjuna and interpreting this Śūnya Vāda in his own peculiar manner connects the Vāda with Mahāvīra², and bestows his own encomium on Mahāvīra as Śūnya-vādin which is one of the significant attributes of Buddha³. The high place which Śūnya Vāda and *Madhyama Mārga* once attained in India is entirely due to Nāgārjuna who is regarded as the founder of Śūnyavāda, and who is the well-known author of *Madhyamaka Kārika*. If we think Nāgārjuna was

1 See Dwā. 3. 5

2 Dwā. 3.20

3 Dwā. 3.21.

the real founder of Śūnyavāda, it is clear that Siddhasena was influenced by the works of Nāgārjuna.

Maitreya, the preceptor, and **Asaṅga**, his disciple, are well-known in Bauddha literature, but unfortunately their original works are not available at present. Their translations in Chinese have been discovered recently and Professor Touchi has written something thereupon,¹ which if we consider as trustworthy leads to the conclusion that Siddhasena directly or indirectly was influenced in his own works, by the works of these two eminent persons. It becomes clear from the writings of the said professor that the vādas referred to in Dwātrīṃśikās have been originally taken from the great works of Maitreya and Asaṅga. The cleverness and scholarship shown by Siddhasena in discussing this doctrine convinces us that he must have studied the works of these two authors.

Vasu Bandhu: The famous founder of Vijñāna Vāda Ācārya Vasu Bandhu had written the work named Vāda Vidhi.² His work in its original form is not now available; but twenty verses which form Viṃśikā and thirty more verses forming Trīṃśikā have been discovered recently, and we have studied these verses.³ The subject matter of these verses is the doctrine of Vijñapti. Perhaps the work Vāda Vidhi influenced

1 Vide J. R. A. S. July 1929 p. 451.

2 For an able article of Prof. Touchi proving Vasu Bandhu to be the author of Vāda Vidhi, see I. H. Q. December 1928 p. 630.

3 These are edited by prof. Silvan Levy.

Siddhasena, while he wrote his *Dwātrimśikās* but it is probable that these *Vimśikā* and *Trimśikā* of Vasu Bandhu influenced the *Dwātrimśikās* of Siddhasena. Again, to devote a certain number of verses to a certain subject and to name the small work accordingly, is the method which is found first of all in the works of Vasu Bandhu. At any rate, this method can be clearly seen in his works, though there might be his predecessors who might have followed this method. That Siddhasena was a student of *Vijñāna Vāda* can easily be seen from his works. It is not too much to suppose that an eminent author like Siddhasena was conversant with the works of his eminent predecessors Vasu Bandhu; and if our surmise is correct the very idea, of composing the *Dwātrimśikās* in a peculiar fashion incorporating one single doctrine in a single *Dwātrimśikās* probably has been taken by Siddhasena from Vasu Bandhu.

(b) *Aśwa Ghoṣa and Kālidāsa*

These two poets are very well-known in *Saṃskṛta* literature, and almost all their works are very famous. Already we have mentioned above that Hemcandra has referred to Siddhasena as the greatest poet. But it cannot be definitely said that a particular epic or poems were undoubtedly composed by Siddhasena. *Dwātrimśikās* we have tried to prove, are very probably the works of Siddhasena; but a close comparative study of these *Dwātrimśikās* and the works of Kālidāsa and Aśwa Ghoṣa will easily convince the readers that there is a close similarity in style, phraseology and some of the main ideas between

the works of Aśwa Ghoṣa and Kālidāsa on one hand and Siddhasena on the other. Kālidāsa was influenced by Aśwa Ghoṣa. It is not possible to say with any amount of certainty whether Kālidāsa and Siddhasena were contemporaries or whether they were living in the same century. However this can be said without fear of contradiction that there is a striking similarity between the works of these two authors and the ideas of one poet are seen reflected in the works of the other. The similarity as regards compact style, perspicuity and simple and charming diction between Buddha Carita and Saundarānanda Caritra of Aśwa Ghoṣa on the one hand and the works of Kālidāsa such as Kumāra Sambhava and Raghu Vamśa on the other has been pointed clearly by Saṁskṛta scholars. The same sort of similarity, striking in character, exists between the works of Kālidāsa and Aśvaghōṣa on one hand and Siddhasena on the other. In Buddha Caritra and other works of Aśvaghōṣa the varieties of metres is a striking point. Similarly, we find therein at the end of every canto a different metre used. The same thing is found in Dwātrimśikās. The style of Aśvaghōṣa in describing Lord Buddha as well as the style of Kālidāsa in describing Śaṅkara and Brahman according to their own tradition and sentiment has been imitated by Siddhasena very clearly in describing his Lord Mahāvira¹; and he gives us a very brief but beautiful picture of the

1 See Dwā. 5.

self-sacrifice of Lord Mahāvīra. The famous verse ¹ of Kālidāsa, which says that all that is ancient is not necessarily good and all that is modern is not necessarily bad occurs in Mālavikāgnimitra. Now the idea in this verse has been accepted and expanded by Siddhasena in his 6th Dwātrimśikā. Even a cursory reader of this Dwātrimśikā will come to know the striking similarity of ideas. The favourite metres of Siddhasena have a striking resemblance with the favourite metres of Aśvaghoṣa and there is moreover a close similarity between the favourite metres of Siddhasena and the favourite metres of Kālidāsa. In Dwātrimśikās, there is no trace of any pompous style, no display of idle words. But almost all the verses are pregnant with deep meaning. It must be admitted that there is a sort of terseness in the verses of the Dwātrimśikās, but that is because of the philosophical subject he handles. But if we look to the lofty flights of ideas, beauty of expression and the charm of elegant similes, the works of Siddhasena have undoubtedly a close similarity with the works of Aśvaghoṣa and Kālidāsa.

(c) *Diṇnāga and Śaṅkara-Swāmi.*

Diṇnāga : The name of Diṇnāga, the famous exponent of Viññāna-Vāda, is well known as one of the greatest of Bauddha logicians. Out of his many renowned works not a single one is available at present in its original

1 “पुराणमित्येव न साधु सर्वं न चापि काव्यं नवमित्यवयवम् ।

सन्तः परीक्ष्यान्यतरङ्गजन्तै मूढः परप्रत्ययनेयबुद्धिः॥”

and unmutilated form. The only source of information about his work is the translation in Tibetan and Chinese languages¹ and the commentaries written on these works in these languages. Nyāya-Mukha is one of the famous works of Diñnāga. It has been recently translated into English by Prof. Tucci from the original Chinese translation of the said work. Another of his works is Nyāya-Praveśa. It is widely known and is available in its original form.² If we believe in the Tibetan tradition and the opinion of Professor Vidhu Śekhara Bhattācārya, this Nyāya-Praveśa also is a work of Diñ-Nāga. Nothing can be definitely said about the relative times of Diñ-Nāga and Siddhasena. There is however, reason to believe that probably both of them lived at almost the same time, or if at all there was any interval of time between them, it was very little. Though we may not definitely say which of these two authors influenced the other, this much can be said with certainty that there are many places of striking similarity in their works which suggest a third common source inherited as a legacy for both of them. A comparative study of Nyāyāvātāra of Siddhasena on the one hand and Nyāya Mukha and Nyāya-Praveśa on the

1 See H. I. L. and the preface to Nyāyapraveśa (Vol. II) by Prof. Vidhuśekhara Bhattācārya.

2 This work has been edited by Prof. A. B. Dhruva in the Gaekwar Oriental Sanskrit Series. Copies of this work are found in several Jaina bhandāras.

other, will easily convince the reader of the truth of this statement. Not only in the Nomenclature of the work but even in the choice of the subject-matter as also in the style and treatment of the works, these three works bear a close resemblance with one another. Some of the statements made by Siddhasēna in his *Nyāyāvatāra*¹ are not necessarily levelled against the statements made in these two works. It is equally uncertain whether statements were levelled against some other Bauddha works. From a comparative study of the discussion of *Pratyakṣa* and *Anumāna* as occurring in *Nyāya-Mukha* and *Nyāya-Praveśa* and that occurring in *Nyāyāvatāra* of Siddhasena, one is easily led to the conclusion that Siddhasena directed his attack against the school which was respected by *Diṅ-Nāga*.

Śaṅkara-Swāmi: If we are to regard the Chinese tradition and the conclusions derived therefrom to be true, then the *Nyāya-Praveśa* referred to above must be considered as the work of Śaṅkara-Swāmi, who is regarded as the disciple of *Diṅ-Nāga*. We have no means available at present to decide whether this Śaṅkara-Swāmi the supposed author of *Nyāya-Praveśa* is identical with that Śaṅkara-Swāmi whom *Kamala-Śīla*,² the commentator of *Tattva-Saṅgraha* and *Abhayaya-Deva*³

1 Statements about the absence of illusion in inference and direct perception and the two divisions of direct perception as *Svartha* and *Parartha* etc.

2 See *Tattva Saṅgraha Pañjikā* p. 199

3 *Sanmati-Tīkā* p. 664 line 15.

the commentator of Sanmati refer in their works. But if there is at all any Śāṅkara-Swāmi who is the author of Nyāya-Praveśa and if he be again the disciple of Diṇ-Nāga his contemporary, then it is beyond doubt that one of these two authors Siddhasena and Śāṅkara-Swāmi, influenced the other or else there was a third common source regarded by them as a legacy for both.

(d) *Dharma Kīrti and Bhāmaha.*

There is yet a conflict of opinion as to whether Bhāmaha preceded Dharma-Kīrti or Dharm-Kīrti preceded Bhāmaha¹. But we are convinced of the fact that Siddhasena was undoubtedly a predecessor of these two authors. Dharma-Kīrti is considered as one of the great logicians of the 7th Century and Bhāmaha is a well-known Rhetorician. We have no means to compare Dharma-Kīrti's Hetu-Bindu² with any of the similar works of Siddhasena. But fortunately there is a work of Siddhasena still extant which can very well be compared with Nyāya-Bindu. That work of Siddhasena is Nyāyāvatāra. In Nyāya-Bindu there is a general discussion of the nature of Pramāṇas, but there occurs a discussion of inference and especially of Parārtha-inference on an extensive scale. Now the same subject is discussed in Nyāyāvatāra. Comparing

1 See the article on Bhāmaha and Dharma-kīrti by Mr. Divekar. J. R. A. S. October, 1929 p. 825 onwards.

2 An old Manuscript of Tika of this work by Arcata is fortunately found in the Jaina Bhandāra of Pattan—a copy of which is in the Rajacandra Library of Gujrāta Vidyāpeṭha.

the definitions of Pratyakṣa as occurring in Nyāya-praveśa and Nyāya-Mukh on the one hand and in Nyāya-Bindu on the other, we find that the tradition of these two sets of works is altogether different. The tradition of the first two works is that of the doctrine of Vijñāna-Vāda, and the tradition of the third work i. e. Nyāya-Bindu is that of the Sautrāntika. Bhāmaha in his work on Rhetorics, incidentally ¹ discussing in brief the Parārtha inference, says:—"Very wide ² is the range of knowledge of a poet, for he has to utilise and press into service for his poetry among other things, the important system of logic." Bhāmaha seems to belong to the school of Vijñāna-Vāda. Now Siddhasena in his Nyāyāvatāra has discussed the Jain point of view regarding Sautrāntika and other Bauddha traditions as the rival school of thought. Now the arguments that he has directed against these rival schools are not directly levelled either against Dharma Kīrti or Bhāmaha, but against the famous two Bauddha traditions that were current for hundreds of years in India. These famous schools of thought had for their followers many able scholars, and quite a volume of literature came into existence in support of their doctrines. Some of the famous advocates of these schools were Maitreya, Asanga and others and it was against these authors that

1 See Pariccheda 5.

2 "न स शब्दो न तद्वाच्यं न स न्यायो न सा कला ।

जायते यत्र काव्याङ्गमहो भारो महान्कवेः ॥ Kavyālaṅkāra 5. 4.

Siddhasena directed his attack. A mere similarity therefore between Nyāya-Bindu or Kavyālaṅkāra, on the one hand and Siddha-Sena's Nyāyāvatāra on the other does not definitely lead us to the conclusion that Siddhasena was a contemporary of these authors. In the field of logic and other systems of philosophy, it is very difficult to determine as to who was the founder of a particular school of thought. All these different streams of thought were continuously flowing through India like mountain-streams, at one time slowly, and at another, flowing with great rapidity. Generally there arises in India, some mighty scholar who advocates one of these currents of thoughts and then this particular current of thought gains supreme strength for a time in the field of knowledge and other currents are naturally subordinated to it. To say that, a particular scholar was the original founder of the doctrine which he advocated is unhistorical, for even before that scholar lived, that particular doctrine was actually current in India. In the present case, looking to the striking resemblance between the works of Dharma-Kīrti and Siddhasena the only definite inference we can draw is this that both of them had a common source in the ancient Indian logic.

2. THE COMMENTATOR ABHAYADEVA.

In Śvetāmbara and Digambara traditions there are many learned scholars¹ bearing the name of Abhayadeva. The present commentator of Sanmati, named Abhayadeva comes from Śvetāmbara Jaina sect. We have, at our disposal, two sources as regards the personal account of this author. The first is his own Praśasti (or Panegyric) occuring at the end of his commentary on Sanmati. The second is the series of Praśastis composed by other Acāryas after Abhayadeva. The following is the original Praśasti (panegyric) written by Abhayadeva himself :—

“इति कतिपयसूत्रव्याख्यया यन्मयाप्तं । कुशलमतुलमस्मात् सम्मतेर्भव्यसाधैः ॥

भवभयमभिभूय प्राप्यतां ज्ञानगर्भं । विमलमभयदेवस्थानमानन्दसारम् ॥

पुण्यद्वान्दानवादिद्विरदघनघटाकुण्ठधीकुम्भपीठ—

प्रध्वं सोढू तमुक्ताफलविशदयशोराशिभिर्यस्य तूर्णम् ॥

गन्तुं दिग्दन्तिदन्तच्छलानिहितपदं व्योमपर्यंतभागान् ।

स्वल्पब्रह्माण्डभागदोदरनिविडभरोत्पिण्डितैः सम्प्रतस्थे ॥

प्रद्युम्नसूरेः शिष्येण तत्त्वबोधविधायिना ।

तस्यैषाऽभयदेवेन सम्मतेर्विवृतिः कृता ॥”

“Thus I have explained some of the Sūtras of Sanmati. I have acquired really immeasurable merit by

1 See the word Abhayadeva in Abhidhānarājendra-Kośa.

doing this. Let the devout persons reading my commentary attain that fearless position (liberation) which is full of joy, which is pure and full of knowledge, after having removed the fear of worldly life. Abhayadeva, the commentator of Sanmati, is the disciple of Pradyumna Sūri, whose fame is spread throughout this world as a person who has crushed the insolence of his rivals. The name of this commentary is TATTVA-BODHA-VIDHĀYINĪ."

From this brief Praśasti, the following points are clear:—

1. The name of the commentator is Abhayadeva and the name of his preceptor is Pradyumna Sūri.
2. The name of the text is Sanmati and the name of the commentary written thereupon is Tattva-Bodha-Vidhāyini.
3. Only a few Sūtras of Sanmati have been explained or commented upon by Abhayadeva.

Nothing more than the names of Abhayadeva and his preceptor is known from this praśasti ; we know nothing from this commentary about the school, date, works and other points about Abhayadeva. However, some sort of information about the date, school and followers of Abhayadeva can be gathered from the few references that are found in the Praśastis composed by other Ācāryas. Four such Praśastis are available to us at present. The first of these Praśastis occurs at the end of the commentary named Pāia written on Uttarādhyayana

by Śānti Sūri¹ Vādivetāla. Second Praśasti occurs at the end of a Vṛtti written by Siddhasena who is the commentator of Prāvācanasāroddhāra.² The third Praśasti occurs at the end of Pārśva-Nātha Caritra³

1 “अस्ति विस्तारवानुर्व्यां गुह्यशाखासमन्वितः ।

आसेव्यो भव्यसार्यानां श्रीकौटिकगणद्रुमः ॥ १ ॥

तदुत्थवैरशाखायामभूदायतिशालिनी ।

विशाला प्रीतिशाखेव श्रीचन्द्रकुलसंततिः ॥ २ ॥

यस्याभूद् गुह्यगमे गुणनिधिः श्रीसर्वदेवाह्वयः

सूरीशोऽभयदेवसूरिभवत् ख्यातप्रमाणेऽपि च (?) ।

तस्येयं सुगुरुद्वयादधिगता अल्पात्मविद्यागुण्या (?)

प्रत्याख्याय चिरं भुवि प्रचरतु श्रीशान्तिसूरेः कृतिः ॥ ३ ॥”

2 For further details see the panegyric at the end of Prāvācanasāroddhāra.

“ श्रीचन्द्रगच्छगते प्रसरितमुनिमण्डलप्रभाविभवः ।

उदगान्नवीनमहिमा श्रीमदभयदेवसूरिरविः ॥

तार्किंकागस्त्यविस्तारितप्रज्ञाचुलुकैश्वरम् ।

वर्धते पीयमानोऽपि येषां वादमहार्णवः ॥”

3 “तर्कग्रन्थविचारदुर्गमवनीसञ्चारपञ्चानन-

स्तत्पट्टेऽभयदेवसूरिरञ्जनि श्वेताम्बरग्रामणीः ॥

सद्वाक्यश्रुतिलालसा मधुकरीकोलाहलाशङ्किनी ।

हित्वा विष्टरपङ्कजं श्रितवती ब्राह्मी यदीयाननम् ॥६॥

दृङ्निम्नगाः सत्पथभेदमेता ध्रुवं करिव्यन्ति जडैः समेताः ।

written by Māṇikya-Candra who is well-known as the author of the commentary *Śaṅketa*, of *Kāvya-Prakāśa*. The fourth *Prasāsti* occurs at the end of *Prabhāvaka Caritra* written by *Prabhā-Candra*.¹ Out of the four *Prasāstis*, the author of the first, *Śānti-Sūri*, died in 1096 *Vikram Samvat*. The 2nd *Prasāsti* was written in 1248 *Vikram Samvat*. The 3rd was written in 1276, and the 4th was written in 1334 *Vikram Samvat*.

All these four *Prasāstis* mention *Abhaya-Deva* as belonging to *Candra-Gaccha* school. This school came to be known as *Rāja Gaccha* later on through the disciples of *Abhayadeva*. *Śānti-sūri*, while mentioning his two preceptors refers to *Abhayadeva* as his preceptor in logic. It seems from the circumstantial

इतीव रोधाय चकार तासां ग्रन्थं नवं वादमहार्णव' यः ॥ ७ ॥

श्रीअभयदेवसूरिस्तच्छिष्यस्तर्कभूरभूत् ।

भग्नसनाऽलितुमुत्ताद्गौर्यदास्यमशिष्यत् ॥ २६ ॥

जडोल्लासेन सन्मार्गभेदिनीं दृक्तरङ्गिणीम् ।

रोद्धुं चकार स नव' ग्रन्थं वादमहार्णवम् ॥ ३० ॥”

For further details see the panegyric of the
Pārśvanātha carita.

1 शिष्योऽस्याभयदेवसूरिरभवज्जाड्यान्धकारं हरन् ।

गोभिर्भास्करवत्परां विरचयन् भव्यासवर्गे मुदम् ॥

ग्रन्थो वादमहार्णवोऽस्य विदितः प्रौढप्रमेयोर्मिभूत् ।

दत्तेऽर्थं जिनशासनप्रबहुर्ये सांयात्रिकायां ध्रुवम् ॥ ३१ ॥”

For further particulars see the panegyric of
Prabhāvaka carita.

evidence that Abhayadeva is identical with the present commentator of Sanmati, for, if this Abhaya-Deva was a great scholar of logic and if he was the person who was worthy of being the preceptor of the great scholar Śānti-Sūri, he was nobody else than our present Abhayadeva, for no other mighty personality is known to have existed in the first half of the 11th. century of Vikrama Era.

Abhayadeva, mentioned in his Praśasti by Māṇikya-Candra, as well as in the Praśastis of Siddhasena and Prabhā-Candra, is undoubtedly our present commentator of Sanmati, for in all these three Praśastis, Abhayadeva is mentioned as the disciple of Pradyumna Sūri and as a very great logician who wrote the famous work Vāda-Mahāraṇava. Now there is no independent work known as Vāda-Mahārṇava¹ but it is only another fitting title of the present commentary, Tattva-Bodha-Vidhāyini on Sanmati. According to the geneology as given by Siddhasena, he is the 10th person from Abhayadeva. According to the geneology of Māṇikya-Candra, he is the 10th person from Abhayadeva. Siddhasena refers to one Dhaneśvara a disciple of Abhayadeva, whom the King Muñja regarded very highly. Māṇikya-Candra, again refers to one Jineśvara, the disciple of Abhayadeva, who was highly respected by King Muñja. Prabhā-Candra, again refers to one Dhaneśvara, the disciple of Abhayadeva, who was a very

1 See Sanmati-Tika p. 308 note 2.

great favourite of the King Kardama-Rāja, the Ruler of Tribhuvana-Giri.

If these names occurring in Praśastis are authentic, then it can be said that either Abhayadeva had two disciples bearing the names Dhanēśvara and Jineśvara or that Abhayadeva had only one disciple bearing these two names. In the same manner the King Muñja referred in Praśasti of Siddhasena and the King Kardama referred to in the Praśasti of Prabhā-Candra are either two separate persons or only one individual bearing two separate names. Perhaps Dhanesvara, respected by the King Kardama, is a different person from Dhanēśvara respected by the King Muñja. At any rate Abhayadeva and his disciples are historical personages and Abhayadeva can be identified with the present commentator of Sanmati. This Abhayadeva came from the family of Candra and was the disciple of Pradyumna-Sūri who belonged to the school of Candra-Gaccha. His date approximately ranges from the latter half of the tenth century of Vikram Era to the first half of the 11th Century. There were many disciples and students of Abhayadeva and they were scattered over a large area. There were many able scholars among his pupils. Many of them were highly respected by the then existing Kings. Unfortunately we do not get any information about the caste, the parentage and the birth-place of Abhayadeva. There are however, strong reasons to suppose that the Province of his religious activities was Gujrat and Rajputana.

There is no evidence to show that he composed any other works in addition to the commentary on *Sanmati*.

The panegyrics and the geneology of the pupils of Abhayadeva.

1. <i>Praśasti of Siddhasena.</i>	2. <i>Praśasti of Māṇikya Candra.</i>	3. <i>Praśasti of Prabhā-Candra.</i>
1. Abhayadeva	1. Abhayadeva	1. Abhayadeva
2. Dhaneśvara	2. Jineśvara	2. Dhaneśvara
3. Ajitasimha	3. Ajita Sena	3. Ajitasimha
4. Vardhamāna	4. Vardhamāna	4. Vardhamāna
5. Deva-Candra	5. Śīla-Bhadra	5. Śīlabhadra
6. Candra-Prabha	6. Bharateśvara	
7. Bhadreśvara	7. Vaira-Swāmi	
8. Ajitsimha	8. Nemicandra	
9. Devaprabha	9. Sāgarendu	
10. Siddhasena	10. Māṇikya-Candra	

Śrī-Candra

Pūrṇabhadra

Jineśvara

Bharateśvara

Candra

Jinabhadra

Dharmaghoṣa

Prabhā-Candra

Padma-Deva

Sarva Deva

Śrī-Candra

3 SANMATI AND ITS COMMENTARY.

Mere thoughts and words do not constitute a work, but a systematic exposition of the thoughts and a style consistent with the exposition really constitute a work. Here, before giving to the readers, some account of the style and subject matter of these two present works Sanmati and its Commentary, we intend to discuss in general the following three points:—

- (i) the object of writing this work Sanmati.
- ii) the sources of the material availed of by the author.
- (iii) the influence it had on the contemporary and succeeding literature.

(i) The object of Siddhasena, the author of Sanmati was to give an entirely new and systematic exposition of the doctrine of Anekānta which is like a key to the Jaina scriptures, and which is the very life of Jaina philosophy ; to analyse this doctrine in a logical manner and to establish it in the right place in Indian logic ; to assign a deserving place to Jaina philosophy amongst all the contemporary systems of philosophy ; to indicate the relation of Jaina Śāstras to other rival systems of philosophy ; to discuss other systems arising out of Anekānta Vāda ; to interpret the different views and doctrines occurring up-to-date in other systems from Anekānta point of view ; and to base the new currents of thoughts on the broad basis of the established and reputed doctrine of Anekānta ; and thus popularise them amongst the learned Pandits.

The object of the commentator is, over and above the object of the original author to discuss in details all the doctrines occurring in the various systems of philosophy and to refer to all the doctrines developing and developed in his own times, to refute the rival doctrines and to establish the doctrine of Anekānta advancing all the existing arguments and adding new arguments of his own.

(ii) When a particular author writes a particular work, his main object is to show that the doctrines or views which he advocates are eminently sound among all others in his own times. Not that these currents of thoughts, as advocated by the author, are altogether novel, but the author merely infuses a new life into them and this is done in the following way :—

1. By a comparative study of all the currents of thoughts kindred and rival.
2. By deep observation and critical remarks.
3. By establishing the supremacy of one's own doctrines either by means of comparison or by means of refutation of the charges levelled against one's own doctrine.
4. By new systematisation and infusing new life in old doctrines.

Mīmāṃsā-Sūtras were written as a result of the study of the Vedas and Upaniṣads. The study of the ancient school of logic, of the analysis of the principles of the universe, of the various ways of attaining liberation, gave birth to the systems of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Sāṅkhya and Yoga. The study of Jaina scriptures and Pitakas

of Bauddhas gave birth respectively to Jaina and Bauddha system of philosophy. Whenever there is a creation of some new thought or doctrine, the persons creating these new thoughts or doctrines have a great respect for the ancient tradition ; but all the same, they find something lacking in it. In order to remove that deficiency, they try their best to systematise the old doctrines and are confident inwardly that they have a power in them to reshape them. They take their stand upon some particular currents of thoughts ; revitalising them with their own genius, they create new thoughts or doctrines and often succeed in making them reputed and popular. The same thing was done by these mighty creators of new thoughts Siddhasena and Abhayadeva. The original writer and his commentator though not contemporaries had almost the same object in view in writing their respective works. But owing to the wide gulf of time between them, the different conditions of their respective times and the needs of the people, there was a great difference in the writings of the both. It is quite remarkable that though the original writer and the commentator handled the same theme, there is a noteworthy difference between them, as between a preceptor and his disciple as to the exposition of the subject. The conditions of the particular times and the needs of the people influence even contemporary literature. Same is the case with our author and his commentator too. The chief inspiration in writing their works in the case of these two authors was their deep study of Saṃskṛta and Prākṛta languages. Their critical survey

of the various branches of Jaina and non-Jaina systems of philosophy written in these two languages, and their profound study of the vast mass of literature of Indian Darśanas (See S. T. Vol. 5; Indices no. 6 and 10 would give a pretty fair idea of the profound scholarship of the two authors) gave them a great impetus in writing their works.

(iii) The original work Sanmati from its very birth came to have a wonderful influence on Jaina literature. From the 7th. century right upto the present century from among the reputed students of Jaina philosophy, either belonging to Śwetāmbara or Digambara sect, some have described this mighty work Sanmati, as a supreme work of genius ¹ that would add to the glory of Jaina philosophy. Some have copiously drawn upon the verses of Sanmati ² in support of their own thoughts. Many have written commentaries thereupon³; while still others have composed entirely new works basing their own views on Sanmati⁴. Some have written elaborate and profound works to refute these views of Sanmati with which they did not agree ⁵; others have enhanced the reputation of Sanmati harmoniously synthesising ⁶ its views. In short, it can be said that the place of honour given

1 For instance Jinadāsaganimahattara and others.

2 Hari-Bhadra, Gandha Hasti and others.

3 Mallavādi, Sumati and others.

4 For instance Yaśovijaya.

5 Jinabhadragani Kṣamāśramaṇa and others.

6 See Jñānabindu p. 164.

to the system of logic in Jaina philosophy is entirely due to this mighty work 'Sanmati'.

The influence of the present commentary on Jaina literature is mainly discernible in three points. The method of writing in Saṃskṛta that is seen in Jaina literature after the tenth century is entirely due to this monumental commentary. The desire of writing voluminous works can be traced to the present commentary and the eagerness to develop Jaina literature by means of a comparative study of Jaina and rival systems of philosophy is chiefly due to the present commentary on Sanmati. This statement can be verified by a comparative study of the Jaina Saṃskṛta literature succeeding the present commentary and of the commentary itself.

(i) THE NATURE AND STYLE OF THESE WORKS.

The external study of a work constitutes its nomenclature, language, style, volume and divisions. We propose to discuss these five things below :—

(a) *Names of the two works.*

Name of the Text: In the first four volumes of Sanmati, we have assigned the name "Sammati-Tark-Prakarāṇa." But in the 5th volume, we have changed the name to "Sanmati Prakarāṇa." It is natural that the reader should be eager to know the reason of this change. There were three reasons to accept and approve of the

name "Sammati," though we had a doubt as to the propriety of it :—

- (1) The name Sammati is heard from the mouth of almost every Jaina scholar and Jaina monk ;
- (2) The name Sammati is mentioned in most of the available manuscripts, and
- (3) The last of the scholars among the Jainas, Yašovijayaji, in his works, mentions the word Sammati, as the name of the present work. Even the ancient author of Śvetāmbara and Digambara sects mention the same name.

Now the most important reason of altering this name Sammati, in the fifth volume, was this, that we came across in Dhanañjaya-nāma-mālā¹ the word Sanmati given as one of the names of Mahāvīra. Since we came across this reference, all our doubts were set at rest, as regards the propriety of this word Sanmati, and we were convinced that the real word ought to be Sanmati instead of Sammati. The chief reason of this alteration was this that the word Sanmati is an epithet of Mahāvīra and thus connects the present work in a peculiar way with Mahāvīra himself. The second reason was this that Sanmati literally means supreme genius, or a man with superior intellect. Now this meaning suggested by the pun rightly gives an estimate of the position of the present author in Jaina literature. The name 'Sammati' does not fit in so much with the work which deals the

1 "सन्मतिर्महतिवीरो, महावीरोऽन्त्यकाश्यपः"

principal doctrines of Mahāvīra as the happy name of 'Sanmati' which suggests the name of Mahāvīra. This new reference in Dhanañjaya-Nāma-Malā thus satisfactorily accounted for the stray mention of the word 'Sanmati' in some of the manuscripts and we finally settled upon and adopted this better word Sanmati.

A question here arises as to why this name Sammati came to be substituted for the right word Sanmati. The answer is obvious. The writer originally composed his work in Prākṛta ; naturally the designation of the work was also given in Prākṛta dialect. Now according to the rules of the changes of Saṃskṛta words into Prākṛta, the word Sanmati was changed into Sammai in Prākṛta. As long as this name was current in its original Prākṛta nothing was a miss ; but when, later on, the fashion of restoring Prākṛta words to their original Saṃskṛta forms came in vogue, the word Sammai was changed to its original Saṃskṛta form Sammati through mistake, but then this mistake instead of of being rectified, persisted not only in speech but also in writing. Later on, authors, writing in Saṃskṛta inadvertently retained this wrong word Sammati and this very word became a current coin in all later manuscripts. Sometimes, however, some scribe casually wrote the correct word 'Sanmati' in one and the same manuscript, but mostly the wrong word came to be retained in the manuscripts by those who did not know that the word Sanmati in Saṃskṛta is an epithet of Mahāvīra. In the Digambara sect, the name Sanmati as given to Lord Mahāvīra is current from ancient times

and is quite well-known in some Jaina works¹. Whenever, therefore, in Digambara literature this word was written, it was written generally in its correct form 'Sanmati'. If this word Sanmati as an epithet of Mahāvīra would have been equally popular and current in Svetāmbara sect also, this mistake would not have arisen at all. The word Sammai in Prākṛta and Sanmati in Saṃskṛta thus can be finally settled as being correct on the evidence of the quotations found in ancient works. Now the word Tarka added to this word Sanmati is also quite well-known and looking to the subject-matter of this present work and looking to the high intellectual acumen of the present writer Siddhasena, we can say that it perfectly fits in with the present work. Now respecting this old tradition and popular regard shown to this word, we have printed the word Sammati-Tarka in the first four volumes but subsequently changed it to Sanmati-Prakaraṇa, a word already popular in ancient works and thus the title of the 5th volume is now 'Sanmati-Prakarāṇa.'

In the 5th volume from beginning of the 3rd chapter the word Sanmati-Prakarāṇa which is the correct word has been printed. But on the outer and inner front page as well as in the preface, owing to the fact that the old habit persisted, the word Tark has been wrongly printed along with the word Sanmati. The readers are requested to correct the word and read accordingly.

1 See the first verse of Mahāvīracaritra as translated in Hindi by a Digambara Jaina.

The present work Sanmatī is technically called a Prakaraṇa. The commentator mentions this work as a Prakaraṇa even from the very beginning. The meaning of Prakaraṇa is this :—

A Prakaraṇa is a work which is either written in verse or in prose, and it has for its subject-matter only one important topic.

Name of the Comm. : From the mention occurring at the end of every chapter of the commentary, it is obvious that the commentator named his own commentary as Tattva-Bodha-Vidhāyini. The commentator himself has used the word Vṛtti instead of Tīkā for his commentary on the text of Sanmatī. From the stray information that we gather about this commentator Abhayadeva, it seems that the name of Abhayadeva was connected mainly with the work 'Vāda-Mahārṇava'. After giving serious thought to this question we are convinced that the word Vāda-Mahārṇava occurring in connection with Abhayadeva is only other name given to his present commentary 'Tattva-Bodha-Vidhāyini'. This second name 'Vāda-Mahārṇava'¹ in course of time, came to be given to Tattva-Bodha-Vidhāyini by scholars writing panegyrics on Abhayadeva. The present commentary is really a 'Vāda-Mahārṇava', i. e. "An ocean of discussions" our decision on this point is mainly based on the following three arguments :—

1. Whenever the mention of the works of Abhayadeva occurs, this present voluminous commentary Tattva-Bhodha-Vidhāyini has never been referred

1 See p. 107 notes 2 and 3, and p. 108 note 1.

to as being one among his works, but mention is always made of Vāda-Mahārṇava only as being one of the works of Abhayadeva.

2. The name Vāda-Mahārṇava perfectly agrees with the contents of this present commentary for the discussions occurring in the present commentary are very lengthy and of a complex character. This name is, therefore, most appropriate.
3. In Syād-Vāda-Mañjarī¹, and other works, there are many quotations, said to have been taken from Vāda-Mahārṇava, which are found word to word in the portions of the present commentary.

The present name Tattva-Bodhā-Vidhāyinī begins from the word Tattva and as such is obviously an imitation of the names Tattva-Saṁgraha, Tattva-Vaiśāradi and such others given to other famous works.

(b) Language of the Text and Comm.

The language of Text, is Prākṛta. It is a comprehensive and a general form of Prākṛta and not a particular dialect of Prākṛta, such as either Śaura-Seni, Māgadhi or Paisāci.

The nature of this Prākṛta is not at all helpful in determining the date of this author. The reason is this that Prākṛta was at the time of this author not a spoken or current language. It was already obsolete in every day intercourse, and remained only as a language of philosophy and other such works. It had assumed a

1 See S. T. p. 308 note 2.

stereotyped aspect. It could not, therefore, be said from the nature of the Prākṛta language that the author lived in a particular century. When once a language becomes stereotyped, it is used by authors belonging to different centuries in exactly the same form. It is, therefore, not safe to infer anything from the Prākṛta language of Sanmati. However, this much can be said that the fact, that the peculiarities of "Da" and others frequently found in the Prākṛta Jaina works written and preserved in South India are not found in Sanmati, lends a colour to the belief that the work must have been written in North India or in the Western part of India. Most of the available manuscripts of this work have been found either in North India or in Western India. The commentators of this work are also found there; the frequent use of this work is also made by subsequent works in these parts of India. It can, therefore, be inferred that the present works must have been written, preserved and used in either of these two regions.

Another question arises as regards the language, and it is this that, curiously enough among the available works of Siddhasena, Sanmati is the only work written in Prākṛta language. All other works have been uniformly written in Saṃskṛta. Now, is it possible that the author was influenced by the current fashion in his times to write everything in Saṃskṛta and was the author directly influenced by his profound study of Saṃskṛta language and literature? We think that he was. It is a fact that whole of ancient Jaina literature was uniformly written in Prākṛta. Among the available

ancient works in Jaina literature, only the works of Umāswāti are the first written in Saṃskṛta. Evidence is not available to show that the authors living prior to Umāswāti wrote their works in Saṃskṛta. Umāswāti, therefore, may be regarded as the pioneer author who used Saṃskṛta in writing the works on Jaina philosophy. In course of time, the fashion of using Saṃskṛta as a language, to write Jaina philosophy in, became very popular and eminent works of Jaina philosophy were written in Saṃskṛta along with Prākṛta. Siddhasena being born of a Brāhmaṇa family was familiar with Saṃskṛta even from his birth and moreover he was a close student of Saṃskṛta literature especially the literature of Indian philosophy. After his initiation into Jaina religion Siddhasena studied Prākṛta but all the same the original influence of Saṃskṛta on him stood remained. It is, therefore, natural that most of his works should be written in Saṃskṛta. Sanmati is the only work that can be considered at present as the work of Siddhasena written in Prākṛta. But even in this Prākṛta work we come across Prākṛta words here and there that have been manifestly influenced by Saṃskrit words¹.

The language of the commentary is Saṃskṛta that had already its full development in writing philosophical works, for it was used for that purpose by such great scholars as Śaṅkarācārya, Vācaspti Misra and others.

1 For instance सुविशिच्छियामो, विभज्जवायं, आकुचणकालो and other such words.

(c) *The Style of the Text and comm.*

Style of the Text: The whole of Sanmati is written in verse. The metre employed throughout the work is Āryā. The popular test of determining the date of a particular author is the critical study of the particular metres used by the authors in his works. But this test will not at all be helpful in determining the date of Siddhasena. Though the authors preceding and succeeding Siddhasena have used Anuṣṭubh, Upajāti and other metres in their Prākṛta works, the most popular metre used in writing Prākṛta verses from ancient times right up to the 18th century has been the Āryā metre. Looking to the very great popularity of Āryā metre in Prākṛta, one is led to believe that this Āryā metre is more suited to the genius of Prākṛta language than all other metres; and it is because of this that the author has selected this particular metre here. It does not seem that his times have, in any way, influenced Siddhasena in making a choice of this metre. It can, however, be safely inferred that as Umāswāti got his inspiration of writing Sūtra works from the Vedic scholars and writers preceding him, Divākara also got his inspiration in writing philosophical works in verse from his predecessors. Siddhasena himself had before him as his model the verse-works such as Nāgārjuna's Mādhyamikakārikā as well as other Bauddha works, Vedic works such as Sāṅkhyakārikā of Īśwarakṛṣṇa and the famous Jaina works such as the Pravacanasāra and Pañcāstikāya of Kundakunda.

Style of the comm.: The commentary is written not in verse but in prose. Except the first few verses

containing the auspicious introductory prayer and stating the object of the work and three more verses containing the panegyric at the end of the commentary, the whole of the commentary is written purely in prose. Though there are some verses, here and there, scattered throughout the commentary, they do not belong to the author himself, but are taken from other authors chiefly to corroborate his own viewpoint. The style of prose as found in this commentary is as transparent and pregnant with meaning as the style of the works *Prameyakamalāmārtaṇḍa* and *Nyāyakumudacandra*. In the *Saṁskṛta* literature belonging to *Swetāmbara* sect written before the 10th century, there is not a single work that can be said to be equal to this present commentary either from the point of style or substance. In the present commentary there is not that pompous display of erudition and that bitterness towards the rivals which is found in the works written after the 11th century.

(d) Volume of the Text and Comm.

Volume of the Text : The volume of the text is not as small on the one hand as that of *Vasubandhu's Viṁśikā* or *Triṁśikā* nor it is as great as the *Viśeṣa-vaśyaka Bhāṣya* of *Jinabhadra* who succeeded *Siddhasena*. But it is of the *Kundakunda's Pravacānasāra* neither too small nor bulky. The verses of *Sanmati* as stated in the introduction of the first volume are 167 in all. Really speaking, the exact number is 166. One

more verse is found in the printed edition of the bare text as well as the manuscripts of the text, but it is not found in any of the manuscripts of the text with the commentary. This verse occurs before the last verse in the text and is clearly interpolated, for there is no commentary found on it. This verse pays reasoned homage to the doctrine of Anekānta and tender salutation to it. From the contents of the verse, therefore, it seems that some clever scholar who regarded the doctrine of Anekānta as his own favourite doctrine and who was attracted to this work on account of its peculiar features and the importance of the doctrine of Anekānta discussed in it, composed the present verse and interpolated it in the text of Sanmati. The verse runs as follows :—

जेण विणा लोगस्स वि ववहारो सव्वहा ण णिघडइ ।

तस्स भुवणेकगुरुणो णमो अणेगंतवायस्स ।

“Salutation to the revered doctrine of Anekānta which is the preceptor of this whole Universe and without which the daily intercourse of human beings is not at all possible.”

The volume of the commentary is as big as 25000 verses. Among the great works in the Svetāmbara or the Digambara works before the 10th century the present commentary is almost unparalleled in volume, as far as Samskr̥ta works written therein are concerned. There is not a single available Vedic Bauddha or Jaina Samskr̥ta work on philosophy written before the 10th century which contains matter as bulky as 25000 verses.

It is possible that the commentator Abhayadeva might have written this work in order to compete with his contemporary or preceding writers and must have an ambition to occupy the foremost place among these writers in point of bulkiness of work. A gradual development of the bulkiness of the Samskr̥ta philosophical works in ancient India from the 1st century right up to the 10th century has its culmination in the present commentary.

(e) Division of the Text and Comm.

Division of the Text: The original text of Sanmati is divided into three chapters like Pravacana-sāra. It is not one continuous treatise like the Sāṅkhya-kārika. Three chapters are named as Kāṇḍas in all the manuscripts of the bare text as well as those of the text with the commentary. The subject-matter of each kāṇḍa is not mentioned, but only the words first kāṇḍa, second kāṇḍa and third kāṇḍa at the end of chapter respectively are found in the manuscript. But in one of the manuscripts as well as in the printed edition, the first kāṇḍa is named as Naya kāṇḍa and the second kāṇḍa is named as Jīva Kāṇḍa but there is neither any general name kāṇḍa nor any particular name given to the third chapter. The name Naya kāṇḍa as given to the first chapter seems to be significant for indeed in that chapter there is a discussion of Naya, but the name given to the second chapter is absolutely wrong, for in that chapter there is no discussion at all of Jīva (category of living beings). In it the main

discussion is with reference to knowledge. If, therefore, any name can at all be given to that chapter it should be Jñāna Kāṇḍa or Upayoga Kāṇḍa. Now looking to the fact that there is no particular name given to the third chapter, it seems that the original author did not assign any particular names to these three chapters, but afterwards some other person gave these significant names according to his own ideas as to the contents of these chapters and might have committed a blunder in assigning the name of Jīva Kāṇḍa to the second chapter or it might be a mistake of the scribe. It is difficult to say whether any particular name was given to the third chapter or if at all it was given it later on slipped away from the subsequent copies of the manuscript. In order to decide this point many manuscripts ancient as well as modern must be collected and comparatively studied. The three particular names given by us to the chapters, as Naya Mīmāṃsā, Jñāna Mīmāṃsā and Jñeya Mīmāṃsā in keeping with the contents of the chapters, will be found in the present edition. These names are given in order to make clear the contents of the present work.

The designation Kāṇḍa is found given to sections in Vedic works such as Atharvaveda, Śatpatha brāhmaṇa, and others and also to the chapters of Rāmāyaṇa, the ancient Hindu epic. The word Kāṇḍa seems to be reminiscent of the forest life of the ancient Indians. In the whole of the ancient Jaina literature, there does not occur the word Kāṇḍa as applied to the chapters of any work. The first use of this word in the sense of a chapter of a work is, as

far as we know, made by Siddhasena. Ācārya Hemacandra, divides his Koṣa into Kāṇḍas (i. e. chapters) but it is an obvious imitation of other Koṣas existing in his times, such as Amarakoṣa Trikāṇḍakosa and others. The Prākṛta of Kāṇḍa is Kaṇḍa or Kaṇḍayaṁ and the approximate word for Kāṇḍa in Prākṛta is Gaṇḍikā a word said to have been used for the chapters of the 12th Jaina Aṅga named Dṛṣṭivāda, a great work which is no longer extant. Gaṇḍikā can be transformed in Kaṇḍikā in Saṁskṛta. This word Kaṇḍikā is found to have been used for some of the chapters of Upaniṣads and other works. The word Gaṇḍikā, therefore, as applied to some of the chapters of the famous work Dṛṣṭivāda is an obvious imitation of the word Kaṇḍikā found in ancient Vedic literature. It cannot be traced to the word Kāṇḍa in Saṁskṛta.

The whole of Sanmati is called Sutta and every Gāthā by itself, is also called Sutta. This word Sutta is well-known both in Prākṛta as well as in Pāli. At present every Jaina scripture is called one continuous Sutta, for instance, Ācārāṅga Sutta, Sūyagaḍāṅga Sutta, etc. But the word Sutta as applied to the small chapters of a book was quite well-known from remote times, for instance, out of the Piṭakas in Pāli, no complete work is called Sutta, but the different chapters of the whole book are known as Suttas ; for instance, Brahmajāla Sutta, Simhānāda Sutta, etc. The form Sutta in Prākṛta and Pāli has for its original either the word Sūtra or Sūkta. The word Sutta, as used in Buddhist as well as in Jaina literature, has been rendered by the commentators into the Saṁskṛta word Sūtra. Nowhere in Bauddha or Jaina

literature the word Sutta is found to have been traced to the original Saṁskṛta word Sūkta. But in the Vedic literature which is entirely written in Saṁskṛta the word Sūkta as well as Sūtra is used, in its original Saṁskṛta form, from remote times. In Vedas, the most ancient literature of the world, particular chapters of Maṇḍalas of some particular size have been given the name of Sūktas which contain a number of verses called Ṛks. A number of Ṛks, on one continuous subject collected together, form a Sūkta; while the word Sūtra is used for short pithy prose sentences, as are to be found in the works on Grammar such as that of Pāṇini and other Śrauta and Smārta works, and works on philosophy. The word Sutta as used in old Jaina and Bauddha works has, at present, been rendered into Saṁskṛta as Sūtra. However if we compare the word Sutta used in the sense of chapters with the Saṁskṛta word Sūkta used in the sense of chapters of veda, a question would naturally arise as to why should it not be proper to regard the Prākṛta word Sutta as used in Jaina and Bauddha literature to be a transformation of the ancient word Sūkta as used in Vedic works. It is highly probable that the word Sutta was originally derived from the ancient Saṁskṛta word Sūkta, but came afterwards to be connected with the word Sūtra when the Sūtra literature became very popular in ancient India. Whatever be the case, this much is certain that as the work Sanmati as a whole is called Sūtra, each of its verses also is named as a Sūtra. Though it is a work in verse and though it would not have been improper to apply the word Sūkta to every verse in

Sanmati after the Vedic fashion, still the Jaina literature, at any rate, has never adopted the word Sūkta, but has assimilated and made current only the word Sūtra as found in Saṁskṛta literature.

In Vyākaraṇa Mahābhāṣya, Nyāyamañjarī and others that are commentaries on some texts, the divisions of the commentaries have been made quite arbitrarily and independent of the original divisions of the text. But in the present commentary of Abhayadeva, the divisions of the commentary exactly agree with the divisions of the text itself. It is, accordingly, divided into three parts which are called Kāṇḍas. At the end of every Kāṇḍa, the commentator also uses the words "Here ends the first Kāṇḍa (chapter)" etc. In the matter of divisions, therefore, the commentary, in no way, differs from the original text.

(ii) SUBJECT-MATTER.

As regards the contents or subject-matter, both the text and the commentary are almost similar to each other, for in both, the main subject is the doctrine of Anekānta. Only two points, therefore, as regards the contents are worth discussing here. Our remarks will apply both to the commentary and the text. The first point is about the doctrine of Anekānta and the second point is about the subject connected with this doctrine. While discussing the doctrine of Anekānta, it is necessary to state its main features, to trace its historical development, and compare it with the doctrine of Anekānta as found in the ancient philosophical literature of India. It is also necessary to discuss at this place several other

doctrines that have resulted from this doctrine of Anekānta. An analysis of Jñāna and Darśana in their relation to Anekānta would also not be out of place here. Similarly, a brief exposition of this doctrine and illustrations of Ekānta and Anekānta may also be discussed at the proper place. Finally the soundness of Anekānta Vāda and the defects of Ekānta Vāda may also be discussed here.

(a) *Anekānta-vāda.*

Its Features and Definition : To examine a thing from every possible point of view, to have a frame of mind favourable for such examination and to try to examine in this manner, is what is called the Anekānta Vāda.

Historical Development : This doctrine of Anekānta was not the sole monopoly of the Jaina religion. It cannot be said that this doctrine does not exist in ancient Indian literature before Lord Mahāvīra. But looking to the ancient Jaina scriptures and comparing the Jaina scriptures on one hand and the ancient and contemporary philosophical literature on the other, one is convinced that the systematic exposition of this doctrine is found only in the Jaina scriptures that embody the preaching of Lord Mahāvīra. In the Aṅga works of the Jaina this doctrine of Anekānta and several other doctrines incidentally have been discussed no doubt, but in a very brief manner, with very few details and still fewer illustrations. But in the commentaries on the Jaina scriptures written in Prākṛta (such as

Niryukti, Bhāṣya and Cūrṇi) this doctrine of Anekānta seems to have been exhaustively discussed. However, this must be said that in these commentaries the logical and philosophical method of discussion which was current in Indian literature in those days can little be found. But when Saṁskṛta language found a place in Jaina literature and when along with the language the logical method as well as the philosophical discussion was ushered into Jaina literature, the discussion of this doctrine gathered strength and bulk, the details were than multiplied and rival currents of thoughts, arguments and proofs also found a place, consistent with their original nature in the discussion of this doctrine. Thus the doctrine assumed a huge form. The development of the doctrine which was the result of a contact with Saṁskṛta literature, is first found in the commentary on Tattavārthādhigama Sūtra written by Umāswatī¹. After this in the Gupta period many Bauddha universities flourished in northern and eastern India, while in south India Pūrva and Uttara Mīmāṃsā came in conflict with the Bauddha doctrine. Thus Saṁskṛta literature received an impetus unparalleled in the history of India and logical method and special study of logic thrived mightily. All these currents had an immediate and profound influence on Jaina literature, and we can trace this influence gradually gaining in strength in the full fledged discussions of the doctrine of Anekānta as found in the works written up to the 10th century by such great Jaina scholars as Siddhasena

1 1. 34, 35 ; 5. 29, 31.

and Samantabhadra; Mallavādi and Pūjyapāda; Siṃhakṣa-
māśramaṇa and Haribhadra; Akalaṅka and Vidyānanda
and Prabhācandra and Abhayadeva.

In works beginning from Aṅgas down to the Cūrṇis in Swetāmbara literature and in Pravacanasāra and other works of Digambara literature, there is no attempt at the synthesis of Anekānta with the Upaniṣadic monism and other currents of Vedic thought, in the discussion of Nayas. This synthesis is found first in a slight degree in the discussion of Syādvāda as found in the works of Siddhasena¹ and Samantabhadra². But, later on, this same synthesis of Anekānta with the doctrine of monism and other systems of philosophy is found clearly, on a large scale, in the discussions of Nayas as found in the works of Haribhadra³, Akalaṅka⁴, Vidyānanda⁵ and Abhayadeva⁶. Words like Brahmā-dwaita, Śabdādwaita, Dravyādwaita and others are not found in the Jaina Prākṛta literature. But in the subsequent Jaina literature written in Saṃskṛta, all these words along with philosophical discussions connected with them find a distinct place in Jaina Saṃskṛta literature and these various doctrines are found as so many illustrations of Saṅgrahanaya. In the original ancient literature of the Jainaś, written in Prākṛta a mere mention of the

1 San. 1. 27 and 51 and 3. 48.

2 Āptamīmāṃsā from verse 24.

3 Śāstravārtasamuccaya verse 543 onwards.

4 Laghlyastrayi v. 3 p. 52.

5 Tattvārthaśloka-vārtika 1. 33 verse 53 p. 271.

6 S. T. p. 271.

Bauddha doctrine as an illustration of R̥jusūtranaya is found. But in the later Jaina works written in Saṁskṛta especially the works on logic, all the four branches of the Bauddha doctrine such as Mādhyamika and others are clearly found mentioned¹. Commentators like Abhayadeva who are very fond of discussing Anekānta doctrine on an extensive scale have extended this synthesis still further and tried to put somehow all these four branches of Bauddha doctrine under the four Nayas, from R̥jusūtra to Evambhūta. This describes the gradual development of the doctrine of Anekānta upto the 10th century. But from the 10th century upto the 18th century the development of this doctrine can also be clearly seen. Vadi-Devasūri, Ācārya Hemacandra and the last great scholar Yaśovijayaji have all of them not only maintained this tradition of synthesising in the discussion of the doctrine of Anekānta but have extended this process of synthesis to other topics also. All the new currents of thought in the field of philosophy, rising and developing, were thoroughly studied by these Ācāryas and given some place in their Anekānta doctrine. The different branches of Uttara Mīmāṃsā such as Dwaitādwaita, Dwaita, Viśiṣṭādwaita Śuddhādwaita, etc, with the exception of Kevalādwaita of Śaṅkara, that were current in southern India after the 10th century have, however found no place in the discussion of Syādvāda. The reason of the absence of reference to these different branches of

1 See the commentary on Sanmati 1. 5.

philosophy in Jaina literature was this that the Jaina scholars in southern India had no one amongst them who had studied these different branches of Vedānta philosophy. And as to the profound Jaina scholars in western India they had no opportunity to study the works containing the discussion of all these branches of Vedānta or Uttara Mimāṃsā. If these Jaina scholars would have studied the doctrines of Nimbārka, Mādhwa and Rāmānuja as that of Śaṅkarācārya they would have certainly referred to these doctrines in their discussion of Nayavāda. Looking to the wonderful power of assimilation and synthesis of this doctrine of Anekānta and looking to the historical tendency of the Jaina Ācāryas in giving a place to different doctrines in their discussion of Naya, it is not too much to say that if these Jaina Ācāryas would have come across the religions such as Mohamedanism, Christianity and Zorastrianism and would have studied the doctrines of these religions, they would have certainly assimilated and given a place to the doctrines of these religions in their discussion of Naya and thus would have brought them under the grand synthesis of Anekānta.

Here a question arises as to what place Sanmati and its commentary occupy in the historical development of this doctrine of Anekānta. In the original text of Sanmati¹, a distinct synthesis of the doctrines of Bauddha, Sāṅkhya, Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika is found. But in the commentary written in the 10th century a

1 3. 48—51.

synthesis of Pūrva Mīmāṃsā, Uttara Mīmāṃsā and the four branches of Bauddha doctrines is found to have been made on an extensive scale.

Comparison : The popular notion current at present is that this Anekānta doctrine is the sole legacy only of Jaina philosophy and that it is developed only in Jaina literature. To show how false this notion is, it is necessary to have a comparative study of the Jaina doctrine of Anekānta and the non-Jaina doctrines leading to the doctrine of Anekānta. Generally speaking, in almost all the non-Jaina works on philosophy, doctrines that have a very close resemblance with the doctrine of Anekānta are clearly found in one way or the other, but particularly owing to the influence of the developed form of Anekānta, we can see a great resemblance found to the Anekānta Vāda in the systems of Nimbārka, Rāmānuja, and Vallabha. Here, however, an exhaustive comparison of Anekānta with all these systems of philosophy is not possible. An attempt is here made merely to show some traces of this doctrine of Anekānta in Pūrva Mīmāṃsā, Yoga, Sāṅkhya and Bauddha philosophy.

In Jaina philosophy the current word is Anekānta while in Bauddha philosophy the current word is Madhyamamārga or Madhyamapratipadā bearing the same significance as the word Anekānta. To view a thing not only from a single point of view, but to examine it from all possible points of view is the simple meaning of the doctrine of Anekānta. Now this meaning is found in the Bauddha word as well as in the

Jaina word. In fact, it can very well be said that both these doctrines Anekānta and Madhyamārga have greater resemblance in the fundamental idea underlying both of them. Both are the results of the idea which is to arrive at the truth and nothing but the truth. The tendency of the highest trained intellect, is to arrive at the truth from the right point of view. Mahāvīra and Bauddha, both of them men of higher intellect, having the same goal for their quest, naturally developed similar doctrines. In spite of this resemblance, however, there is a difference as regards the provinces of these two doctrines. In Jaina literature the province of Anekānta is to examine the fundamental nature of things. This doctrine, therefore, among the Jainas is mainly directed towards discussing the nature of things and towards bringing out the fundamental characteristics of things such as birth, destruction and permanency or in other words the characteristics of eternity and transitoriness. Now in Bauddha Pitakas, the province of Madhyampratipadā is the daily course of actions of human beings. Naturally, therefore, this doctrine of the Bauddhas discusses ideas, speech and conduct required in the daily intercourse of life. It is true that these two parallel courses of thought came to have interaction on each other in course of time. In the province of the philosophy of Anekānta, for instance, rules of conduct came to be added later on. But the main tendency of this doctrine remained to be the philosophical discussion of the fundamental nature of the things. This fact would be clear to us, if we look at the discussions on Naya,

Saptabhaṅgi and others resulting from Anekānta. Quite the reverse is the case with Madhyamamārga. Though this doctrine had the capacity of entering into philosophical discussions as regards the nature of things, it mainly dealt with the conduct of human beings from beginning to end. We have no proof that this doctrine of Madhyamamārga was ever used for philosophical purposes in Bauddha literature.

No specific words suggesting the doctrine of Anekānta are found in the philosophical literature of ancient India such as Pūrva Mīmāṃsā, Sāṅkhya and others. The main current of thought, however, clearly drifted towards this doctrine of Anekānta. The doctrine of evolution is propounded by Sāṅkhya and Yoga while the doctrine of birth, maintenance and destruction (Utpāda, Bhaṅga and Sthiti)¹ is propounded by Pūrva mīmāṃsā and is derived from the idea of the transcient and the eternal found in the Upaniṣads.² Now these two doctrines are in no way different from the Jaina doctrine of Anekānta. There is, however, a difference as regards the province and development of these doctrines in Indian philosophy. It is this that while the doctrine of evolution of the Sāṅkhya and Yoga has for its province the non-sentient Prakṛti and is never applied to the sentient and the doctrine of birth, maintenance and destruction as propounded by the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā never applied itself to the sentient element, the Anekānta doctrine of the Jainas has for its province

1 Vide Mīmāṃsās'lokavārtika p. 619

2 Śvetasāvatara 1. 8 Gīta 8. 4, 15, 16.

all the fundamental things, sentient as well as non-sentient. In point of development also, there is a great difference. In the philosophical systems of Pūrva Mīmāṃsā, Sāṅkhya and Yoga, the peculiar doctrine referred to above comes only incidentally while discussing the fundamental things and there is not a single special treatise either small or bulky that exhaustively deals with this doctrine independently. Quite contrary is the case with the Jaina Literature. In it the establishment of this doctrine of Anekānta, the refutation of all the charges levelled against it, the explanation of its peculiarities and its niceties, and the mention of other doctrines resulting from it have occupied the attention of almost all the Jaina scholars, and many works small or great have been written to explain this doctrine from every point of view. This development in Jaina literature had a great influence on non-Jaina literature. Students of Śrībhāṣya, Aṇubhāṣya and other works of philosophy will be convinced of the truth of this statement.

(b) Subjects connected with Anekānta.

Three points that are related to this doctrine of Anekānta, in the text as well as the commentary, have already been discussed above. Here it is necessary to say something about the subjects connected with Anekānta. For, in the text as well as in the commentary, there are discussions of these connected subjects made with the object of supporting Anekānta Vāda. We shall state in brief these subjects as they are discussed in every Kāṇḍa.

Doctrines resulting from Anekāntavāda : Our author in the first chapter of Sanmati has discussed mainly two doctrines resulting from the doctrine of Anekānta : the first of these two is Nayavāda and the second Saptabhaṅgivāda. There are two views that are often mentioned in Āgamas as being the basis of the doctrine of Anekānta. They are the Dravyāstika view that is the view-point of the universal and the Paryāyāstika view, the view-point of the particular. Our author has made a clever analysis of these two views and distributed the Nayas under these two heads¹. Mahāvīra had propounded the doctrine of Anekānta with a view to harmonise all the philosophical doctrines upto his own times. In order to do this, he classified all these philosophical doctrines under seven heads in the order of their greater and greater subtlety and assigned a place to them in his Anekānta doctrine. These seven heads are named as seven Nayas in Jaina scriptures. Siddhasena, in analysing these views and in distributing all the seven Nayas under those two has evinced two peculiarities: the first peculiarity is this that he has reduced the seven Nayas well-known in Jaina scriptures to six and the second peculiarity is this that while according to ancient tradition the range of the view of Dravyāstika was up to Rjūsūtranaya, he limited its range up to Vyavahāranaya only. Looking to these two peculiarities it seems that in the opinion of Siddhasena, Naigama should not at all be considered as an independent Naya : but from Saṅgraha upto

1 Sanmati I. 4, 5.

Evambhuta there are only six independent Nayas and the range of Dravyāstika is upto Vyavahāra only. All other Nayas beginning from Rjusūtra come under the category of Paryāyāstika Naya. It is not definitely known whether this view of six Nayas was ever advocated by anybody before Siddhasena. Perhaps because of the absence of any advocate of this view before, Siddhasena is mentioned as the well-known advocate of six Nayas. The limited range given to Dravyāstikanaya upto Vyavahāranaya only has been accepted in later literature and this view has occupied a place of eminence. For even Jinabhadra Kṣamāśramaṇa, the reputed opponent of Siddhasena, has accepted this limitation in his Bhāṣya along with the limitation mentioned by the ancient authors. In the literature of Digambaras, we find the limitation, stated by Siddhasena, whole-heartedly accepted. It should be noted that this limitation is not found in the Digambara literature preceding Siddhasena but is found in such authors as Vidyānanda¹ and Māṇikyanandi² who lived after Siddhasena and who must be regarded as close students of the works of Siddhasena. In the discussion of Nayas, Siddhasena has mainly referred to four points : (1) the relation between the two original views (2) analysis of the definition of the fundamental elements according to these two views, and showing that the definition is perfect only when looked at from the stand-point of these two views ; (3) if only one of

1 See Tattvārtha Śloka-Vārtika—discussion on Naya.

2 See Parikṣāmukha.

these two views is accepted bondage and freedom cannot be accounted for ; (4) by the illustration of the necklace of jewels and stray jewels, to assign a particular value to each Naya in its individual as well as aggregate capacity. After this, Siddhasena has discussed the doctrine of Saptabhaṅgī and has adjusted it in the two above-mentioned views. He has particularly discussed Vyañjana and Arthaparyāya in a manner which is not found in the literature preceding him and has adjusted in these two doctrines the Saptabhaṅgī. Finally, he has discussed as to whether according to Jaina view-point there is any independent principle external or internal and has clearly stated that though this doctrine of Anekānta is the only right sort of doctrine, all other doctrines also have their usefulness according to the capacity of the person in studying and understanding them.

The commentator has clearly explained all the points discussed in the first chapter named Nayakāṇḍa in the original text. But over and above this, he has most exhaustively discussed all the currents of thoughts and all the philosophical doctrines that were vigorously discussed in his times. He has also discussed the doctrines that revolted against the authority of the Jaina doctrine and the doctrines resulting therefrom (i.e. Anekānta). In this explanation and discussion he has taken as his basis the Gāthās, connecting his discussion with the original Gāthā either by word or any such relation. Even in his commentary on other Kāṇḍas he has adopted this method. Sometimes, however, being

carried away by a sense of superiority of his own Swetāmbara sect, he has opposed some views (as regards conduct etc.) mentioned by the Digambara sect and has entered into exhaustive discussion and controversies regarding them. The authority of the Jaina doctrines entirely depends upon the belief that it is composed by a human being who is omniscient. This authority of the Jaina doctrines is opposed mainly by four views of the Mīmāṃsakas. These are: (1) Apauruṣeyavāda, (2) Swataḥapramāṇyavāda, (as a corollary of the first vāda), (3) Śabdanityatwavāda—the eternity of words, and (4) the impossibility of their being an omniscient person. All these views were very powerful at the time of the commentator and in order to establish the authority of the Jaina Āgamas the commentator has entered into very lengthy and scholarly discussions following the method of Tattvasaṅgraha of Śāntirakṣita. Jaina philosophy accepts nobody as the Creator of this Universe. Moreover, the Jainas regarded the soul as covering only the dimensions of a body and regarded the freed souls as enjoying eternal bliss after their liberation. These doctrines of the Jainas are directly opposed to the doctrine of God as the creator propounded by the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika philosophy. The universality of the soul and the absence of any feeling of bliss in the state of liberation are also peculiar doctrines of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika philosophy. Now all these doctrines, going against the corresponding doctrines of the Jainas in this respect, have been ably refuted by the commentator. In the commentary of the first Gāthā, the

commentator has discussed the *Nayas* one by one but incidentally here and there, he has refuted doctrines going against the *Jaina* philosophy and after refuting them has established the truth of the *Jaina* doctrines. In the commentary on the second verse he has exhaustively discussed the relation between word and sense and has referred to all the current doctrines with regard to this relation and after completely refuting the rival views, has established the particular *Jaina* point of view in this respect. In his commentary on the 3rd *Gāthā*, as an instance of pure *Dravyāstikanaya*, he has discussed *Brahmādwaitavāda* as also *Puruṣaprakṛtivāda* of the *Sāṅkhyas* as an instance of mixed *Dravyāstikanaya*. Then after refuting these two *vādas* by means of *Paryāyāstikanaya* he has established finally the authority of the two *Nayas*—*Dravyāstika* and *Paryāyāstika*. In his explanation of the 5th *Gāthā*, while explaining ably the nature of the four *Nayas* beginning from *Ṛjusūtra* as the varieties of the *Paryāyāstikanaya*, he has incidentally discussed at great length the famous doctrines of the *Bauddhas*—the doctrine of transitoriness, the *Vijñaptivāda* and *Śūnyavāda* and has described in details the principal tenets of the four sects of *Mahāyāna*—the *Sautrāntika*, the *Vaibhāṣika*, the *Yogācāra* and the *Mādhyamika*.

In his commentary on the 6th *Gāthā*, while distributing the four *Nikṣepas* between the two original *Nayas*, he has fully explained the *Śabdabrahmavāda* of *Bhartrhari* and the *Kṣaṇabhaṅgavāda* of the *Bauddhas* and discussing, at every step, other systems of philosophy has clearly stated as to what the view of the *Jaina*

philosophy is as regards all these points. In the commentary of the 27th Gāthā he has ably refuted the doctrines of causation—Satkāryavāda of the Sāṅkhyas, Astkāryavāda of Vaiśeṣikas and others, has also refuted Tattvādwaita, Dravyādwaita, Pradhānādwaita, Śabdādwaita and Brahmādwaita every time stating the Jaina point of view on all these points. In his commentary on the 32nd Gāthā while explaining Vyañjana Paryāya, he has taken up the discussion of the relation between words and sense and has referred to the Sphoṭavāda of Grammarians, Anityavarnavācakatvavāda of the Vaiśeṣikas, Nityavarnavācakatvavāda of the Mīmāṃsakas, and other Vādas such as Sambandhānityatvavāda and finally mentioned the right view-point on all these vādas from Anekānta point of view. In the commentary of 36th Gāthā, while explaining the doctrine of Saptabhaṅgī he has advanced quite a wealth of arguments in support of this doctrine, imitating the method of Akalaṅka in supporting Saptabhaṅgi. Excepting these 8 Gāthās referred to above, all other Gāthās are briefly commented upon and at places where the commentary is rather lengthy, it deals mainly with the doctrines peculiar to Jaina philosophy as they are found in the Scriptures and has not entered into discussions regarding the doctrines found in the Non-Jaina systems of philosophy.

Discussion of Darśana and Jñāna:—The doctrine of Anekānta is a Śrutapramāṇa. It takes its stand on the two view-points—Dravyārthika and Paryāyārthika. These two view-points deal with cognition in its general

and particular aspect respectively. These two kinds of cognition are technically called in Jaina philosophy Darśana and Jñāna respectively. While discussing the chief features of the doctrine of Anekānta Siddhasena in the 2nd chapter of Sanmati has undertaken the discussion of Darśana and Jñāna that forms part of the discussion of Anekānta. In the whole of the 2nd chapter he has continued the discussion of Darśana and Jñāna

In this discussion also Siddhasena has exhibited his remarkable ability in a wonderful manner. That Darśana and Jñāna both come into existence one after another is the tenet which was quite well-known in Jaina tradition of the scriptures from the very beginning. Another view which says that these two come into existence simultaneously was also in vogue from the beginning. These two tenets were opposed by Siddhasena with his doctrine of the identity of Darśana and Jñāna. He has established this doctrine on a sound basis in his second chapter of Sanmati. The establishment of this doctrine has been made mainly on the strength of logic, but in those times it was a fashion to quote sentences from Śāstras in support of one's own doctrine. Siddhasena was, therefore, obliged to quote portions of Jaina scriptures in support of his doctrine. In so doing, in order to show that there was perfect agreement between Śāstra and his own view-point, he had to define several technical words of the Jaina Śāstra in quite a new way and had to refute very ably both the doctrines of consecutiveness and simultaneity. The main subject of the second chapter is

identity of Darśana and Jñāna; but incidentally Siddhasena has also advanced his own doctrine of the identity of Jñāna and Śraddhā. The remarkable feature of this second chapter is the identity of Darśana and Jñāna, as well as of Śraddhā and Jñāna. Hari Bhadra who wrote a commentary on Nandi Sūtra on the lines of Cūrpiś, Abhayadeva, the commentator of nine Aṅgas and Malayagiri who followed him ascribe Saha-Vāda (simultaneity of Darśana and Jñāna) to Siddhasena and attribute Abheda-Vāda to Vṛddhacārya. The commentator of Sanmati, however, our present Abhayadeva, regards Siddhasena as the advocate of Abheda-Vāda. In this respect, it is proper to regard Abhayadeva as an authority and not Hari Bhadra or Malayagiri. The following are the three reasons why we should regard Abhayadeva as a more reliable authority :—

1. After the refutation of Krama-Vāda and Saha Vāda, Siddhasena has consistently supported the doctrine of Abheda (i. e. oneness or identity) upto the end of the chapter.

2. Abhayadeva being the commentator of Sanmati had inherited naturally the legacy of the commentaries preceding his work. All these commentaries he had studied critically. Naturally, therefore, his statement must be regarded as having greater authority than that of Hari Bhadra.

3. Siddhasena is regarded, according to Jaina tradition, as the advocate of Abheda-Vāda. Yaśovijayaji also is quite definite on this point. Siddhasena thus is the advocate of Abheda-Vāda and has devoted the whole of

the second chapter of Sanmati to the discussion of this doctrine. But it is a curious thing to know that Jina-Bhadragaṇi Kṣamāśramaṇa, in his great Bhāṣya, and in his treatise Viśeṣaṇa-Vatī, while refuting the doctrine of Abhedā-Vāda, and establishing the doctrine of Kramā-Vāda, which was already found in Jaina scriptures has mentioned many arguments which are usually advanced in support of the doctrine of Abhedā, but are not found in Siddhasena's works. Some of these arguments clearly seem to have been quoted from the works of authors other than Siddhasena. From this it can very well be inferred that there were other Ācāryas who were either contemporaries of Siddhasena or preceded him or succeeded him and who were equally mighty advocates of the doctrine of Abhedā-Vāda, and these advocates must have written either independent works or commentaries in support of Abhedā-Vāda and it was against these works that Jina-Bhadra mainly levelled his attacks. It is also possible that there might be other works of Siddhasena not available at present in which there were other arguments that were refuted by Jina-Bhadra in his own treatise. This much, however, is certain that, at present, there is no other work dealing with this Abhedā-Vāda except the present work "Sanmati".

In his commentary of the second chapter of Sanmati, the commentator has briefly commented on all the Gāthās except the first and the fifteenth. All these Gāthās are commented upon just to make their meaning clear and no controversy has been introduced therein, but in the case of the fifteenth Gāthā, the commentator

has entered into a lengthy discussion on the matter of the diet of a Kevalin (Omniscient person). This was a matter of very great controversy between the Digambara and the Svetāmbara sects. In the commentary of the first verse, he has transcended his usual limits in bringing together all the doctrines of his times. He has, in the bulky commentary on this verse, discussed the general nature of Pramāṇas, made their classification and given their number, from the Jaina point of view. The doctrines of the contemporary Non-Jaina systems of philosophy have been brought in by him and discussed at very great length with a view to refute them and establish the Jaina point of view. In fact, it can be said that in the commentary on the first verse, the commentator has made a systematic exposition of the whole of Indian Logic. If the establishment of Abhedā-Vāda be regarded as the speciality of the original text, the collection of all Pramāṇas and doctrines Jaina as well as Non-Jainas, can be regarded as the speciality of the commentator.

(c) *The peculiar characteristics of Anekānta and the defects of Ekānta-Vāda.*

The subject-matter of the third chapter is mainly Jñeya (the thing to be known) or the fundamental principle to be known from the Anekānta point of view. But incidentally, along with the discussion of Anekānta there are various other subjects introduced in it that would make Anekānta more clear. Just as in the fourteenth Sūtra of the 4th chapter of Nyāya Sūtra, Gautama has introduced eight doctrines, such as Abhāvākāraṇa-

Vāda, Īśwarakāraṇavāda, Ākasmikatva-Vāda and others about the cause of this Universe and finally established his own view-point, or just as Samanta Bhadra, in his Āpta-Mīmāṃsā in the course of his discussion of Sapta-Bhaṅgi has introduced quite a host of doctrines such as Sat, Asat, Adwaita, Dvaita, Ekatva, Prthaktva, Nityatva, Anityatva, Daiva, Puruṣārtha and others, and finally established his own view-point from Anekānta point of view, similarly Siddhasena in this third chapter has introduced quite a number of non-Jaina problems such as the problem of the general and the particular; of existence or otherwise of the soul; of the nature of the soul; of the difference or otherwise of the thing and the quality; of reason and scriptures; of the five views of causation such as time etc; of the identity or otherwise of cause and effect; the six views such as accepting the soul etc., discussed them one by one at great length, and with great acumen and finally by a comparative exposition of Anekānta and other rival doctrines clearly pointed out the merits and the defects of Anekānta-Vāda and Ekānta-Vāda respectively and finally established the invincibility of Anekānta doctrine and the weakness of other doctrines. Incidentally, while doing all this he has discussed ably some vital problems regarding his own religious sect and given his own views on all these problems and suggested some sort of reformation therein. He has exploded all the notions that were popular in his time. For instance, he has exposed the hollowness of the view that even by a mere study of the Sūtras or by repeating the Sūtras without understanding their meaning, one may get merit, or that by the mere

paraphernalia of disciples and a show of versatality a man can be considered as an Ācārya. He has also shown the way to know the inner nature of things. He has also stated in plain words that quite a mass of religious acts, done without a study of Śāstras Jaina and Non-Jaina, is absolutely useless and that knowledge coupled with religious acts alone is able to accomplish the desired object. Finally, he has paid very high compliments to the preachings of Lord Mahāvīra and thus ended his work.

In the third chapter of Sanmati, the genius of Siddhasena is shining at every step. First of all, along with the two famous view-points of Dravyārthika and Paryāyārthika, he has started the discussion as to whether Guṇārthika can be regarded as a third Naya. This discussion is not at all found in any of the works preceding Sanmati. Vidyānanda in his Tattvārtha has taken up the discussion on this point, but it, obviously, has been inspired by the study of Sanmati. Siddhasena again, in this third chapter, has taken up the dispute between faith and reason and assigned limitations of the Hetuvāda and the Ahetuvāda. This discussion is really a very high compliment to the remarkable genius of Siddhasena. Here also, incidentally, he has seriously attacked those persons who regard themselves as men of versatile genius on the strength of superficial study of Jaina Śāstras, those persons again who regard themselves as great simply because they have a host of disciples, those persons again who consider themselves as scholars merely by committing to memory the Sūtras in the scriptures, without

understanding their meaning, those persons again who consider themselves as perfect men simply because they indulge in the intricacies of religious acts, without having a comparative study of Jaina and non-Jaina Śāstras, those persons again who consider themselves as scholars of the doctrine of Anekānta, simply because they have a full faith in the preachings of Lord Mahāvīra. This bold attack on all these persons is a proof of the clear vision and fearlessness of Siddhasena.

The commentator in his commentary on eight verses of the third chapter has introduced various doctrines and has advanced elaborate arguments in refutation thereof. The commentary on the rest sixty-one verses in this chapter, though lucid, is not dialectical in its treatment. In the commentary on the 49th verse of this chapter, the commentator has introduced the whole of Kaṇāda system and has taken an exhaustive review of it. In the same manner, incidentally, while discussing the Sāmānya he has taken up the discussion of the Brāhmin caste (a discussion also found in Tattva-Saṅgraha and Prameya-Kamala) and discussing the caste of the Brāhmins, has tried to explode the whole of the caste system in India. In the commentary on the 50th verse, he has exhaustively discussed Sat and Asat views of Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Bauddha and Sāṅkhya, and finally established the doctrine of Sad-asat, the doctrine which he subscribed to. In the commentary on the 53rd verse, all the five views of causation, namely, (1) Time (2) Nature (3) Destiny (4) Action, and (5) Person, have been brought together by the commentator

in a lengthy discussion and finally after refuting the rival views, has established his own Kāraṇa-Samavāya-Vāda. In the commentary of the 56th verse, he has entered into controversy as regards the number of fallacies in logic. In the commentary on the 60th verse, he has discussed the two rival views of the absolute transitoriness and absolute eternity of the world. In the commentary on the 63rd verse, while introducing the seven principles accepted in Jaina philosophy, he has proved very clearly that all the elements accepted by Kaṇāda and other systems fall under the category of Jīva and Ajīva. In this context also, he has mentioned the four kinds of contemplation and has referred to their sub-varieties. In the commentary on the same verse, with a view to ascertain the true nature of Vācya (Sense) he has undertaken the interpretation of Laṭ and others and in this connection has referred to the views of the Mīmāṃsakas. Here in the fashion of Vidyānanda in his Aṣṭa-Sahasri, our commentator has discussed at length Niyoga. In his commentary on the 65th verse, the commentator has discussed at length conflicting views regarding some points in the actual religious tradition of the Digambara as well as the Śvetāmbara sect—points such as whether a Nir-Grantha should carry along with him his clothes and utensils, whether a woman has any right to get liberation, and whether the idols of Tīrthaṅkaras can be decorated with ornaments and precious clothes. In the commentary on the 69th verse, he has again undertaken the discussion of Sapta-Bhaṅgi and finally shown the true nature of the doctrine of Anekānta. Finally he has

discussed at length the nature of Nigraha Sthāna, entering into controversy with the Bauddhas and the Naiyāyikas, and thus finished his commentary.

Almost all the discussions about the views and doctrines found in the present commentary occur in other works such as Tattvasaṅgraha, Nyāyakumudacandra, Prameya-Kamal-Mārtanḍa, Siddhivinīścaya and others.

But the speciality of this commentary, among all other works of the same nature, is from the point of language, style, and scholarly quotations, from various authors mentioned by name, with which the work bristles and the profound scholarship displayed by the commentator.

This is a short summary of the contents of the commentary as well as the original text. We are conscious of the fact that it is a very brief survey of the philosophical discussions found in these two works here. A study of Contents, given in each Volume will go a very long way in introducing the reader to the subjects of these two works even if he does not study the original text and its commentary.

4. DWĀTRIMŚIKĀS¹ OF SIDDHASENA

The present available Dwātrimśikās are twenty-one in number. Adding to them Siddhasena's Nāyāvatāra, the total comes to twenty-two. A brief survey of all these Dwā. is given below from three points of view :

1 The chief source of information about the life of Siddhasena is his works. Among all his works the place of Dwā. is very high, in fact, it is even higher than that of Sanmati. A critical review, therefore, of the Dwā. is not only relevant, but absolutely essential. We have, therefore, attempted here to give a brief review of those Dwā.

At present, we have with us a printed edition of the Dwā. published by the Jaina-Dharma-Prasāra-ka-Sabhā of Bhāwanagara. The order of the Dwā. found therein does not seem to be the original order when the work was compiled. In course of time, the scribes or the readers might have arranged them in the present order. At the end of some Dwā. occur the names of those particular Dwā., while other Dwā. have no particular names assigned to them. It seems, therefore, that originally these Dwā. were not named at all, but subsequently the names were invented and applied to these Dwā. Though, as the very word Dwā. suggests, every Dwā. is expected to have 32 verses precisely, in the present edition some of the Dwā. have less and some have greater number of verses. According to right calculation, all the twenty-two Dwā., available at present, ought to have 704 verses in all ; but the number of verses in the present edition is only 695. In the 21st Dwā., there are 33 verses instead of 32, while in the Dwā., Nos. 8, 11, 15 and 19 there are verses less than 32 in number. Whether this number (sometimes less and sometimes greater than the expected number of 32) is due to subsequent handling or whether it was so at the time of the actual compilation of those Dwā. or whether

(I) Discussion of the state of society at the time of Siddhasena, the author ; (II) the information about Siddhasena and (III) a study of the Dwā. themselves.

I.

A critical study of the Dwā. gives the reader a general idea of the times in which they were composed. Those were the times when Samskr̥ta language came into prominence and was mightily developed.

this number is found in the printed edition because of the imperfect nature of the manuscripts which formed the basis of that edition, it is difficult to say with any absolute certainty. Still it seems to us that this absence of uniformity in the number of verses was not there from the beginning when the work was composed but is a subsequent development.

It cannot be said that all these Dwā. were composed by Siddhasena after he was initiated into Jaina religion. It is quite possible that some of these Dwā. might have been composed by Siddhasena prior to his initiation and that he or his followers and disciples might have collected together all these Dwā. and preserved them into their present form.

The Dwā. aiming its attack on the Mimāṃsā Philosophy of Jaimini is not found in the present edition. Perhaps this Dwā. is altogether lost. The present edition is extremely incorrect and full of doubtful readings. In some places, we could not bring out any sense from the verses even after a strenuous effort for a number of times. Some of the verses are not yet clear to us. If older and authentic manuscripts giving different readings be collected and examined, it will be possible to bring out a readable edition of these Dwā. Our present review of the Dwā. is based on the present mutilated and extremely incorrect edition of the Dwā. available to us. Our review is thus open to correction and alteration.

In those times, it was a fashion to compose philosophical works in Samskr̥ta language and some times these works were composed even in verses. Those were the times when Ācāryas belonging to different sects, established various religious sects in India and for the widespread of the doctrines of their sects, wrote works in which they showed great logical and critical acumen and evinced profound study of the science of dialectics, always took pleasure in refuting rival views and establishing their own views. Those were the times in which if a rival school came into prominence and became so powerful as to shake the foundations of one's own sect, the scholars in these particular sects were obliged to assimilate the principles of the rival sects and to mould the currents of thoughts in their own sects to suit the needs of the occasion. Those were the times when scholars were obliged to study the doctrines of a rival sect in order to refute them and by a comparative study establish the tenets of their own religious sect. Those were the times when the principal branches of Vedic religion as well as the principal branches of Bauddha religion had in their respective camps greatest scholars as their followers and there was quite a mighty war of discussion waged with one another by these mighty scholars of old. Profound scholars in these days had to take recourse to royal courts or some such mighty assembly where Umpires were appointed to give decision in their controversies. Thus the Umpire of these assemblies acquired a place of very high eminence and works were written by scholars in

praise of these Umpires in order to win them over to their side. Works of logic with all their nice subtleties and details were composed, on a grand scale, in those times, especially works relating to Parārthānumāna and the rules of dialectics. Controversy was the order of the day in those times. It is in those times that the present Dwā. were composed by Siddhasena

II.

After the perusal of these Dwā, we get some information about the author, which could be put under the following nine heads :—

1. Name : At the time of the composition of these Dwā. the author, was well-known as Siddhasena for, at the end of the 5th Dwā. his name is explicitly mentioned.

2. Caste : It seems Siddhasena was born of a Brāhmaṇa family. This can be inferred from his mastery over Saṃskṛta language and from his critical study of the Upaniṣads and the Vedas.

3. Sect : It seems from the Dwā. that Siddhasena, the author, was a Jaina and belonged to Svetāmbara sect. He was not a follower of Digambara sect as can be inferred from the fact that some of the tenets not accepted by the Digambaras but accepted by the Svetāmbara scriptures, such as the life of a house-holder as lived by Mahāvīra and the story of Camarendra¹ as surrendering himself at the feet of Mahāvīra have been mentioned with approval in Dwā.

¹ Vide Dwā. Nos, 2,3 ; 5,6.

4. Study and Scholarship : Siddhasena had studied all the contemporary Vedic schools of philosophy, all the branches of Mahā-Yāna sect and the principal works of Ājīvika philosophy. It is needless to mention that he was the most critical student of the Jaina philosophy. All the principal doctrines of various religious sects have been briefly but most clearly and logically mentioned in the different chapters of these Dwā. Siddhasena has thus opened a way to all other scholars to have an easy grasp of the principal tenets of all the important systems of philosophy of his times.

5. Nature : He was by nature a merry person and seems to be given to wit and satire. He has described even ordinary things in such a manner that even a serious reader would not held bursting into a loud peel of laughter by their reading¹.

6. View-point : He was a critical observer of things and was quite logical in his arguments and dauntless in his analysis of things. But with all this he was not free from religious narrow-mindedness, for while attacking rival doctrines and views, though scrupulously logical in his arguments, he is sometimes very bitter in his attack. Whenever he was not able to prove anything on the strength of logic, he took recourse to faith, and on its strength, tried to refute rival arguments and establish his own point of view². The sort of critical acumen and sound logic found in him while attacking

1 Dwā. 6. 1 as well as 8.1; 12.1.

2 Vide Dwā. 1.14

his rivals, is not employed by him impartially while discussing his own doctrines.

7. Acquaintance with Kings, assemblies and halls of dispute:—It seems he was closely familiar with some king, for he has devoted one whole Dwā. to the praise of a certain king. That he had intimately come in contact with royal courts and dispute-halls is evident from some of the Dwā. dealing with the modes of controversy fashionable in those days. He seems to have a personal knowledge of controversies and seems to have made a critical observation of such controversies in which he was an eye-witness; for he has described the rules of controversy (such as Jalpa and Virandā) in a manner as if he was intimately familiar with all these things.

8. Genius:—His genius seems to be eminently of a creative character. In writing his Dwā. he has, to some extent, followed his predecessors, no doubt, but the remarkable manner of giving a peculiarly happy turn to a subject, is entirely his own and things described by others have been described by him in a peculiarly charming manner all his own. Some of the thoughts in the present Dwā. are entirely novel and are found nowhere else. He has the courage to express his thoughts, though contrary to the current of thoughts in his days.

9. His rational devotion:—His devotion towards Lord Mahāvīra is not merely that of a man of faith, but is the devotion of a true thinker. Wherever he has lavished profusely his treasure of devotion at the

feet of Lord Mahāvīra, he is perfectly conscious of the inspiring personality of Lord Mahāvīra and the profound depths of his remarkable philosophy. He was mightily influenced by some of the views in Lord Mahāvīra's philosophy, and it is because of these rational convictions of his, that he embraced Jaina religion and became a student of Jaina philosophy. It is these points in the philosophy of Mahāvīra that he has described in his own charming manner in his, *Stutis* and thus evinced his living faith and devotion towards Lord Mahāvīra. In fact, under the garb of showing devotion to Lord Mahāvīra, he has tried to shed quite a new light on his profound philosophy.

III

The study of these *Dwā.* may be divided into two parts (i) Style as well as (ii) Subject matter.

(i) STYLE OF DWĀTRIMŚIKĀS

The language of these *Dwā.* is *Saṃskṛta*, but it is not the ordinary *Saṃskṛta* language but one as would suit highly philosophical discussions. His writings bristle with many figures of speech and are perfectly dignified and perfectly mature and testify to his being a poet of rare genius. The diction of the verses is as lucid as that of Kālidāsa and transparency (otherwise called *Vaidarbhi Rīti*) is its chief merit. There are seventeen different metres employed in all these *Dwā.* Excepting the seventh *Dwā.* dealing with the discussion with the fundamental nature of things, all the *Dwā.* dealing with philosophical discussions are

composed in Anuṣṭubh metre and either at the beginning or at the end of these Dwā. there is no change in metres. But in the Dwā. that are eulogistic critical, and devotional, various metres are used. Generally at the beginning and at the end of these, there is a change of metre.

(ii) SUBJECT-MATTER

From the view-point of subject-matter the available Dwā. can be classified under three heads. First to Fifth, and eleventh and twenty-first these seven are devoted to eulogy; the 6th and the 8th deal with critical analysis and the rest are given to philosophy and discussion of the fundamental nature of things.

The 11th Dwā. coming under the first head eulogizes some king. All others have got for their subject-matter the praise of Lord Mahāvīra. Out of these Dwā., the 21st that deals with Lord Mahāvīra's praise, is, in all probability, composed by some other Siddhasena as seems from a comparative study from the point of style, language and matter. This other Siddhasena must have been a person not bearing the title of Divākara, but by a confusion of the words Siddhasena and Divākara, the former's Dwā. were fastened upon our Siddhasena Divākara¹. Among the Dwā. dealing with

1 Out of the available Dwā the twenty-first and the twenty-second Dwā. have been printed with commentary. Udayasāgara Sūri (Vidhipakṣīya-Aṅcalika) of the 16th century has written a commentary on the twenty-first Dwā. and the famous Acārya Siddharsi has written a commentary on the twenty-second Dwā. otherwise known as Nyāyavatāra. No other Dwā. has been known to have any commentary written on it.

critical analysis the 6th Dwā. gives a critical analysis of the author of a Śāstra, while the 8th Dwā. discusses the merits and defects of the controversy, based on Jalpa. Among the philosophical Dwā. the 7th gives the main rules of controversy, while the rest of the Dwā. are purely philosophical. Among the philosophical Dwā. six are devoted to the discussion of Non-Jaina philosophy, and the 9th Dwā. called Veda-Dwā. discusses the nature of Vedas, describes the nature of Puruṣa (both Saṁguṇa and Nirguṇa) as is to be found in the Upaniṣads. The 12th Dwā. deals with Nyāya ; the 13th refers to Sāṅkhya ; the 14th mentions Vaiśeṣika ; the 15th discusses the Buddhist philosophy and the 16th, perhaps refers to Ājīvika philosophy. All the six remaining Dwā (No. 10, 17, 18, 19, 20, 22) discuss generally the Jaina philosophy and the 22nd Dwā. deals with Jaina logic.

(a) *Eulogistic Dwātrīṁśikāḥ.*

In the literature of this sort, the works of the classical authors such as Mayūra, the author of Sūrya-Śataka, Baṇa, the author of Candi Śataka, Samantabhadra and Jambū-Kavi, authors of Jina Śataka and Rāma-Candra Bhārati, the author of Bhakti-Śataka praising Buddha are well-known. But the contents of these works referred to above are purely eulogistic in character and are not based upon philosophy as is the case in the present Dwā. These Stotra works, therefore, need not be compared with the Stutis of Siddhasena. One stotra is worthy of being compared with the

Dwā. It is the Swayambhū Stotra of Samanta-Bhadra. In this stotra, the eulogy of not one but all the 24 Tirthaṅkaras are found, while in the present five Dwā. the subject of eulogy is Lord Mahāvīra only. The total number of verses of Swayambhū Stotra is 143, while the number of verses in the eulogistic Dwā is 163. Excepting this difference, there is a close resemblance of ideas in these two works. The resemblance is also with reference to metres at the beginning or at the end, some peculiar words, style and subject matter arrests the attention of a critical student¹.

1 Verses having some similarity of sense :—

Sway.	Dwā.
जिनो जितक्षुल्लकवादिशासनः ५	प्रपञ्चितक्षुल्लकतर्काशासनैः १.६
नैतत्समालीढपदं त्वदन्यैः ४१	परैरनालीढपथस्त्वयोदितः १.१३
समन्तभद्रम् १४३	समन्तसर्वाङ्गगुणम् १.२
जिने त्वयि सुप्रसन्नमनःस्थिता वयम् १३०	त्वदाश्रयकृतादरास्तु वयमद्य वीरःस्थिताः ३.२
मयाऽपि भक्त्या परिण्यसेऽद्य ३५	न केवलं श्राद्धनयैव नृपसे १.४
वाक्सिंहनादैः ३८	सुगदसिंहनादः कृतः ३.२६

The word Simhanāda was well-known even in Bauddha-Pitaka for it occurs in the Simhanādasutta of Majjhimanikāya and it has also been used by Aśvaghosa; e. g. ननाद सिंहनादम् Sau. 5/84 cf. also Gita 1/12 where this word is used.

Similar words used in both the Swayambhustotra and the Dwā.

Sway.	Dwā.
स्वयम्भू १	१.१
वसुधावधू ३	५.५
इति निरुपम १०२	५.३२

As in Swayambhū Stotra, there is a variety of meters used in Dwā. The beginning of Swayambhū Stotra is with the word "Swayambhū" and the Stotra ends with the word "Samant-Bhadra" (verse 143) which, on the strength of a pun of the word, suggests the name of the author. Similar is the case with these Dwā. They begin with the word "Swayambhū" and end with the word "Siddhasena" (5. 32) which also suggests, by pun, the name of the author.

Another noteworthy feature is the use of similar words in these two Stotras. "You have, Oh Lord! propounded this doctrine—which nobody else has done." This distinguishing method¹ of praising Lord Mahāvīra for his philosophical greatness is the predominant features of both Siddhasena's Dwā, as well as Samantabhadra's Stotra. This peculiar method has been adopted later on by Vidyānanda in his Āptaparīkṣā and by Hemacandra in his Dwā. "Oh Lord! other ascetics began to compete with you, but ultimately surrendered themselves to you because they were defeated." This very idea is expressed both in Siddhasena's Dwā, as well as in Samanta-bhadra's Swayambhū-Stotra in almost the same words²

1 Compare Dwā. 1. 26—28; and 3. 20 with Sway. 19, 25, 33.

2 "यमीश्वरं वीक्ष्य विभूतकल्मषं तपोधनास्तेऽपि तथा बुभूषवः ।
वनौकसः स्वश्रमवन्ध्यबुद्धयः शमोपदेशं शरणं प्रपेदिरे ॥" Sway. 134.
"अन्येऽपि मोहविजयाय निपीड्य कदा-
मन्युस्थितास्त्वयि विरूढसमानमानाः ।
अप्राप्य ते त्वं गतिं कृपणावसाना-
स्त्वामेव वीर शरणं ययुर्बहन्तः ॥" Dwā. 2. 10.

The play of fancy upon a well-known notion of Indra's having 1000 eyes is found in both of these Stotras in almost exactly the same manner.¹ The peculiarity of basing the Stotra mainly on philosophy is found in both these Stotras. Both these Stotras show clearly the peculiar greatness of the doctrine of Anekānta, which is, as it were, the very soul of Jaina philosophy and both have accepted Mahāvīra as the founder of this doctrine, and have eulogised him accordingly. In both of these Stutis, under the pretext of eulogy, various branches of Jaina philosophy and various phases of the religious rites of the Jainas have their distinguishing features clearly brought out. In fact the bed-rock on which these stotras stand, is Jaina philosophy and Jaina religious rites².

The idea of Trinity of Gods (in which Swayambhū that is the creator—Brahmā comes first, Viṣṇu, the Puruṣottama, comes second, and Maheśwara, that is God Shiva, comes last of all) is an idea which is most conspicuous in Purāṇas and has obtained prominent place in the popular literature of India. This idea, which had a very strong hold on popular mind, was borrowed from the Purāṇas by the author of Saddharmapundarika³—an

1 Compare Sway. 89 with Dwā. 5.15.

2 Compare Sway 14, 22, 23, 24, 25, 33, 41, 42, 43, 44, 52, 54, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 82, 98, 99, 100, 101, 118, 119, 120 with Dwā. 1. 20, 24, 26, 28, 29 ; 2. 25 ; 3. 3, 8, 10, 11 ; 4.19 etc.

3 एमेव हं लोकपिता स्वयंभूः चिकित्सकः सर्वप्रजान नाथः । etc.

Saddharma Puṇḍarika p. 326

Even in Amarakosa we find the words Advayavādi and Vināyaka

old Buddhistic work and applied to Lord Buddha by Buddhist scholar. The same idea again has been borrowed by Siddhasena¹ and Samanta-Bhadra² from the Purāṇas and has been applied to Tīrthaṅkara in a manner in which it perfectly fits in with the Jaina tradition. By borrowing this idea and applying it to the present subject, it is attempted to suggest that the trinity of Brahmā, Viṣṇu and Maheśa, as found in the Purāṇas, is nothing but Lord Mahāvīra himself, and no-body else. Once this method came in vogue, it was applied not only to other Vedic Gods such as Indra, Sūrya and others but to the great philosopher and sage Kapila, the founder of Sāṅkhya philosophy as well as to Lord Buddha, the reputed founder of Buddhism ; and in course of time, words used with reference to these Gods and others came to be interpreted in the sense of Lord Mahāvīra. It was suggested thereby that the persons or Gods, referred to above, would be realized in the figure of Lord Mahāvīra³. The same method is found adopted in the Bhaktāmara-Stotra as well as in the Kalyāṇa-Mandira-Stotra.

The profound influence of the study of Upaniṣads and Gīta is not only found in these five eulogistic

used as synonyms of Buddha. Really these two words belong to Vedic tradition.

1 See Dwa. 1. 1 ; 2. 1 ; 3. 1.

2 Sway. 1.

3 Compare Dwa. 1. 1 ; 2. 1, 19 and Swa. 3, 5.

Dwā.¹, but in other Dwā. as well. No trace of such influence is found in Swayambhū Stotra,

In Brāhmanical religion, the order of different Āśramas is the most conspicuous idea and Kālidāsa, the follower of Brāhmanical religion has elevated the second of these Āśramas, viz Gṛhastha Āśrama (i.e. the life of a house-holder) to a high place. In order to sanctify the institution of marriage, Kālidāsa in his Kumāra Sambhava has described the marriage-procession of Mahādeva and Pārvatī. Similarly in Raghu-Vaṁśa Kālidāsa has described, with all the wealth of his poetic imagery, the marriage-procession of King Aja, and has depicted a vivid and clever picture of the eagerness of the women of the city in witnessing this procession². Aśva-Ghoṣa in his own poem has depicted a similar picture.³ A similar vivid picture

1 Cf:— Dwā

Gita and Upanishads

अव्यक्तमव्याहृतविश्वलोकमनादि-

अनादिमध्यान्तमनन्तवीर्यमनन्तबाहुं

मध्यान्तमपुण्यपापम् । 1. 1.

शशिसूर्यनेत्रम् G. 11.19.

समन्तसर्वाङ्गुणं निरञ्जं स्वयंप्रभं

सर्वेन्द्रियगुणाभामं सर्वेन्द्रिय-

सर्वगतावभासम् 1. 2.

विवर्जितम् G 13.14, Śwet 13 16, 17.

विद्यामहेश्वरम् 2.1.

मायिनं तु महेश्वरम् Sweta. 4.10.

ब्रह्माक्षरम् 2.1.

Katha 1.2, 15 and Gita. 8.15.

3. 8.

Sweta. 1. 2 ; 6. 1.

10. 23, 24

Gita 6.11-13 Swet. 4. 10, 11.

10. 28

Gita 2.40.

13. 32

Katha 2.5.

2 Vide Kumārasambhava 7. 56 and Raghu. 7. 5.

3 Buddhacarita 8. 20.

is also found in one of the Dwā. of Siddhasena also.¹ The only difference in the description found in Kālidāsa on the one hand, and Siddhasena and Aśva-Ghoṣa on the other, is that while Kālidāsa being an advocate of the order of the four Āśramas has infused the sentiment of joy in those pictures, Siddhasena and Aśva-Ghoṣa, on the other hand, being followers of religions that advocate complete renunciation as the ideal of mankind in this life, created an atmosphere agreeing with renunciation and asceticism and described the tragic scenes of the abdication of home by Buddha and Mahāvīra and the consequent sadness and disappointment of the women who had gathered to have a last lingering look of these mighty ascetics.

While reading the second Dwā. written in Vasantatilakā metre, the reader is at-once reminded of the famous stotras Bhaktāmara and Kalyāṇa-Mandira. The similarity of these two Stotras with the second Dwā. is really great² in point of words, style,

1 Dwā. 5. 10, 11. The tenth verse is influenced by the sixth verse of Sau. canto. 4th :—

“अपूर्वशोकोपनतक्लमानि नेत्रोदकक्लिन्नविशेषकाणि ।

विविक्तशोभान्यबलाननानि विलापदाक्षिण्यपरायणानि ॥” Dwā. 5.10.

“सा खेदसंखिन्नललाटकेन निःश्वासनिष्पीतविशेषकेण ।

चिन्ताचलाक्षेण मुखेन तस्थौ मर्तारमन्यत्र विशङ्कमाना ॥” Sau. 46.

2 Compare Dwā. चित्रं किमत्र (2, 8) with Bhaktāmara 15 and Kalyāṇa Mandira 20.

Dwā. क्षयेन etc. (2/23) with Kalyā. 11, 15

For style compare Dwā. 2/15 with Bhakta. 29 & Kalya. 7

For similar ideas compare Dwā. 2. 27, 28, 29 with Bhakta. 17, 18, 19.

lucidity and imagery, but the difference is also striking. In the Dwā of Siddhasena, there is the atmosphere of philosophy which is quite remarkable¹, while in Bhaktāmara and Kalyāṇa-Mandira, there is no atmosphere of philosophy. If Siddhasena would have been the author of Kalyāṇa-Mandira, as is generally supposed, that Stotra would inevitably have been influenced, somewhere at least, by philosophical ideas—which is the very characteristic of Siddhasena.

The beginning of the third Dwā contains the idea of Puruṣottama. It is in this Dwā. that Mahāvīra is identified with Puruṣottama. This idea of Puruṣottama can be easily traced to the Gītā (Chapter 15) as well as to the Yoga-Sūtra, in which latter the idea of highest Puruṣa occurs (in 1. 24.)

While reading the 4th Dwā written in Vaitāliya metre, the reader is naturally reminded of the 4th Canto of Kumāra-Sambhava, and the 8th Canto of Raghu Vaṃśa, in which the lamentations of Rati and Aja respectively are described. It is true that the subject-matter of these three poems is different but the style and manner of the Dwā closely resembles that of Kālidāsa. It also reminds the reader of the 8th Canto of Saundarānanda of Aśva-Ghoṣa. the subject-matter of which is the murder of a woman.

All the five eulogistic Dwā. are together published one after another in the present available edition. However, looking to the beginning and the end of all these Dwā. it becomes clear that originally they were

1 Dwā. 2. 19, 22, 25, 31.

not composed either consecutively or at the same time; but were composed, each one independently. Their order in the text is certainly fixed at a later stage. The 5th Dwā is, as usual, a small one containing only 32 verses; but it has, in brief, a very beautiful description of the householder's life of Mahāvīra, his forsaking of his home, his wanderings in the forest to practice penance, the greatest hardships he had to endure and the ultimate victory he gained over them, the divine knowledge he gained at the end of all these terrible sufferings and his propagation and preachings of Jaina religion. In short, the whole of this Dwā, though small is a very charming biography of Lord Mahāvīra. It appears to be a pretty little poem by itself.

In all these eulogistic Dwā the main theme is the praise of Lord Mahāvīra and his unsurpassed excellence. It is interesting to study the manner in which Siddhasena has brought out clearly the supreme excellence and the peerless greatness of Lord Mahāvīra. Looking from this point of view, we see that the excellence of Mahāvīra has been brought out by the author in the following four ways :—

1. By the description of the matchless beauty of his person¹ as is found mentioned in Jaina tradition ;
2. By the description of the miracles² (referred to in the Jaina tradition) that were worked by Lord Mahāvīra ;

1 Dwā. 1. 14.

2 The episode of Camarendra 2. 3. Sangama Parisaha 5. 18.

3. By proving the inferiority and hollowness of rival religions and their founders and by establishing the superiority of Jainism and of Lord Mahāvīra.¹
4. By proving the excellence of Lord Mahāvīra in point of conduct, thought, words, view-point, philosophical tenets as compared with those of other preachers and opponents.²

At the end of the 11th Dwā, the name Guṇavācena-Dwātrīmśikā is found to have been mentioned. A certain king is praised in this Dwā. It seems from the reading of this Dwā that Siddhasena had actually before him³, at the time of writing this Dwā, a certain king whom he praised for his bravery and brilliance. Like the classical Saṃskṛta poets, Siddhasena has lavished quite a wealth of conceits and figures of speech over this king, and has employed various metres in his description of the king.

(b) *Dwātrīmśikās of Critical Character.*

The sixth Dwā deals critically with the nature of an Āpta (a man of authority). It reminds one of the Āpta-Mīmāṃsā of Samanta-Bhadra and the Āpta-Parīkṣa of Vidyānanda. The decision as well as the final choice of a man, who is the highest Āpta, that is, a man of authority, is the theme of these three famous works. There is, however, a slight difference as regards the

1 Dwā 1. 5, 6, 7, 12.

2 Dwā. 1.18-24 etc.

3 Cf. verse 22.

treatment of this subject. Among these three authors Samanta-Bhadra, first of all discusses some of the external peculiarities that are regarded popularly as the characteristics of an Āpta, and after refuting all these peculiarities, finally settles upon the quality of Vita-Rāga, that is passionlessness as the highest standard of a true Āpta. This quality, according to Samanta-Bhadra, is found only in Jaina-Tīrthaṅkara and in nobody else¹. In order to establish this authority of a Tīrthaṅkara, he introduces the doctrine of Anekānta as the highest sort of preaching of Mahāvīra and adjusts in it the philosophy of Jainism. Vidyānanda, on his part, adopts the same line of argument as that of Samanta-Bhadra, but refutes the idea of an Āpta, as is found in the system of Nyāya which regards God as an Āpta, the idea of Puruṣa of the Sāṅkhya and the idea of Sugata that is Buddha in Buddhism. Next he refutes Apauruṣeyatva of the Vedas advocated by the Mīmāṃsakas and proves the fallacy of the doctrine of the absence of an Omniscient person. Vidyānanda, thus, while launching on this discussion of Āpta refutes in details all the rival doctrines, naming them one by one. Siddhasena takes this very theme in his sixth Dwā, but has a different manner of dealing with it. He, first of all, says that the chief hindrance, in recognizing Mahāvīra as the highest Āpta is the tendency of the people in general of adhering to old things and the tendency of regarding every old thing as being absolutely true. This conservatism, or rather orthodoxy, he tries to analyse first of all and by a very

1 Vide Āpta Mīmāṃsā verses 1—7.

clever and severely critical discussion proves up to the hilt that there is no connection necessarily between old and truth. In proving that old is not necessarily always gold, he takes a very bold stand¹, and does not care for the slander that he is likely to incur at the hands of his orthodox enemies and takes his stand merely on merciless reasoning and logic, and asks his readers boldly to kick a thing away, if it is false and accept, if it is logically sound. Ultimately on the strength of the same logic he accepts Mahāvīra as the highest Āpta. Kālidāsa in his Mālavikāgnimitra has severely condemned the attitude of blind conservatism, the attitude of regarding everything old as gold and to see defects in everything new; but then he has limited his remarks to the province of poetry only. Siddhasena, on the other hand, offers his remarks in a similar strain, but applies them impartially to every possible thing and thus widens its range. We have already said that this Dwā. of Siddhasena is a vast commentary on the Sūtra-like verse “पुराणमित्येव न साधु सर्वम्” etc. of Kālidāsa in Mālavikāgnimitra. The 4th line of Kālidāsa’s verse has been adopted by Siddhasena with a very slight change in words and idea in his first Dwā.²

In the 8th Dwā. there is a critical discussion of Jalp-Kathā employed for the sake of a rival’s defeat and one’s own victory. Even between brothers who employ this trick of Jalpa enmity is sure to arise. Persons taking

1 Cf. Dwā. 6. 1, 5, 8, 16.

2 Cf. फलप्रणाल्यात्मसिर्भासनैः Dwā. 1. 9 with मूढः परप्रत्ययनेयबुद्धिः Mālavika. Act I prologue.

recourse to this Jalpa leave aside truth and are overwhelmed with a sort of false vanity. Their broad-mindedness disappears and they betray a sort of crookedness of spirit. Two such opponents employing this trick become a toy in the hands of the Umpire and expose their Śāstras to utter ridicule. Thus, this tricky debate is altogether different from the path of righteousness and in comparison to hundreds of such debates which end in the sheer fatigue of one's own tongue, one peaceful talk carried on right lines is immensely beneficial. This debate compels a person who undertakes it to pass sleepless nights, and both in victory as well as in defeat, he transcends the bounds of decorum. Cunning scholars have given a beautiful name of Mīmāṃsā to this trick of debate, but it is nothing but a sham show of scholarship. Thus in this Dwā. Siddhasena has very cleverly discussed this trick of debate and exposed its hollowness in an interesting manner¹.

(६) *Dwā. dealing with the systems of philosophy and the nature of things.*

At the end of the 7th Dwā., the name Vādopaniṣad² occurs and it is quite significant, for, therein, is a

1 Dwā. 8. 1, 2, 4, 7, 9, 12, 16, 24.

2 In the first verse of the seventh Dwā. occur the words धर्मार्थकीर्त्यधिकृतानि Similarly in the eleventh Dwā. eulogizing a king there occur the words महीपालोऽसीति Those who know the view of Prof. Jacobi that Siddhasena lived after Dharmakīrti are likely to think that perhaps Siddhasena might have referred to Dharmakīrti in these words. While discussing the date of Kālidāsa scholars try to advance as proofs such words as Skanda-Kumāra, Diṇṇāga found in

brief but clever survey of the art of debate. At the time of Socrates, and even before him, this art of debate had developed to a remarkable degree among the ancient Greeks. The teachers and instructors in this art were called Sophists and they used to give instructions to the Greek youths in delivering speeches before the public and undertaking controversies. This teaching consisted of refuting the views of the rival party and establishing one's own views. Like the Greeks, even the Brahmins in ancient India undertook serious debates in sacrificial halls. At the time of Upaniṣads also, such debates frequently occurred. When these debates became the fashion of the day, a technique arose out of it and the different methods of controversy such as Vāda, Jalpa and Vitaṇḍā, developed greatly. The development of this technique ultimately culminated in special treatises¹ which testify to the propagandist

the works of Kālidāsa. Not that this method, of inferring the date of an author on the strength of some peculiar words in his work, is utterly useless ; yet it should be used with great caution. If the date of an author can be definitely determined by other strong proofs such words can be mentioned as additional evidence for the date. This method of giving the proof of words can be relied upon independently. We have already shown that Siddhasena must have lived prior to Dharmakīrti. The evidence of such words as are mentioned above does not help us much in determining the date of Siddhasena.

1 See Nyāyadarśana 2. 1. 1—3. and Nāgārjuna's Vighraha-vyāvartani, Yogācāra Bhūmiśāstra and Prakaraṇāryavācā—(in this connection read "Buddhist Logic before Diṇṇāga"—J. R. A. S. July 1929 p. 457).

spirit and conquering zeal of the Brāhmaṇas as well as the Śramaṇas.

The present Dwā. is inspired by such sort of literature. The idea underlying the study of this technique of debate is that of gaining victory over the opponent. This is clearly accepted by our author who says, "If you want to secure handsome certificates, you have to go to the debate-halls and conquer your opponents." The author in this Dwā. has, in a poetic manner, given all the details of the tricks of debate—as to what a man should do, before he goes to an assembly of debate, as to what he should do after he goes there, as to how he should begin the debate, as to what qualities are needed most in debate, as to what points should be neglected. All these secrets of a successful debate have been practically given in this Dwā. by our author.

In the 9th Dwā. which is named as Veda-vāda, the Brahma of Upaniṣads has been described evidently on the pattern of and almost in the words of some of the Upaniṣads in verse especially the famous Upaniṣad Śwetāśvatara. In the present Dwā. Siddhasena has quoted verses from Ṛgveda describing the nature of Brahma. This Dwā. has in it such a subtle vein of disapproval regarding the Upaniṣadic doctrines that it is quite possible that it might have been written to refute the famous Upaniṣadic doctrines. But if it be supposed that it is written by a faithful student of Vedānta philosophy then it speaks highly of the deep scholarship of the author and his intimate knowledge of Indian philosophy.

In the 12th Dwā, Nyāya-Darśana is referred to ; Sāṅkhya doctrine is mentioned in the 13th ; Vaiśeṣika doctrine in the 14th ; and all the Bauddha systems of philosophy such as Śūnya-Vāda and others are referred to in the 15th Dwā. These Dwā, as printed, at present, are extremely incorrect and it is very difficult to make out anything consistent from them. However, this much is clear that these Dwā. merely mention the principal tenets of these systems of philosophy, they do not aim at refuting them. Dwā. dealing with ancient Indian logic testify to the profound study of this system on the part of Siddhasena. Looking to the Dwā, dealing with Sāṅkhya doctrine it seems that the author must have before him Sāṅkhya works other than the Kārikās of Īśwara-Kṛṣṇa, for¹ the number of Pramānas as found in the Kārikās of Īśwara-Kṛṣṇa and the definition of Pratyakṣa as found therein is not at all found in this Dwā.

From the Dwā. describing Bauddha doctrines, it seems that the author was an intimate student of not only the Śūnya-vāda works such as the Mādhymika Kārikā of Nāgārjuna, but he also had studied critically other Bauddha-works of Vijñāna-Vāda in a critical way.

In the 10th Dwā, the preachings of Jina are given. In it the two varieties of Dhyāna—Ārta and Raudra—that lead a man to worldly life are mentioned and two other forms of Dhyāna (that of Dharma and Śukla) that lead a man to liberation are also referred to ; but even here the description is influenced by Śwetāśwatara²

1 Cf. Karika 3 with Dwā. 13. 5.

2 Dwā 10. 23, 24.

and Gīta¹. The technical things common to all students of Yoga philosophy, such as Sthāna, Āsana, Japa, Prāṇāyāma, etc., are all taken from these works. We find here a very critical analysis made by our author of Para and Aparā Vairāgya, well-known in Yoga Sūtras². The description here is brief but speaks of the deep erudition of the author.

The 16th Dwā, as its printed name shows, deals with Niyati-Vāda or the doctrine of destiny. It is difficult, however, owing to its extreme incorrectness, to make out clearly as to what the author really means in this Dwā. The word Niyati, moreover, does not actually occur in this Dwā. The word is used in the 3rd Dwā, but this much is clear from this Dwā, that it contains discussion of some philosophical subject and it is highly abstruse and analytical.

The Four Dwā, from the 17th to the 20th are extremely incorrect and it is almost impossible to make out anything from them. This much is seen therein that they all deal with Jaina Philosophy. No names are given to these Dwā, except that the 19th has got the name of Dṛṣṭi Prabodha, and the name Niścaya Dwātriṃśikā occurs at the end of the 20th.

After a persistent and critical study of these Dwā, we are able to give a very brief summary of the contents of these Dwā as follows :—

In the 17th Dwā, the technical words Āśrava and Samvara, occurring in Jaina Philosophy, are found.

1 Yogadarśana 1. 15-16 with the commentary of Yaśovijaya and Dwā. 1. 21. 2 Dwā. 3. 8.

It seems that the discussion of these two words and the idea underlying them is made by the author from Vyavahāra and Nīścaya point of view. The cause of worldly life and the means of liberation seem to be the subject-matter of this Dwā.

Great men give up all the defects in them but ordinary persons merely leave their homes and relatives and betake themselves to forests, while the liberal-minded persons, given to do benevolence to others, follow these two types of men (16). Here the author seems to have made a synthesis of the two kinds of renunciation, namely, Vyavaharā and Nīścaya.

The fruit of Karma, whether good or bad, depends upon its cause. It is necessary, therefore, to have a knowledge of this cause. After knowing the cause of the fruit of Karma, a man has no occasion to repent. Human beings enjoy worldly pleasures through mind and leave them also through their mind. How are we to know the cause of Karma? Is it in the body or outside? Is it great or small? The famous line in Saṁskṛta :

“मन एव मनुष्याणां कारणं बन्धमोक्षयोः”

(which gives utmost importance to mind in bringing bondage or freedom to a man) seems to have been thoroughly explained by the author in this Dwā (17-18).

Egotism is not born of myness (Mamatā), but Mamatā,—myness springs from egotism. Egotism is the source of every possible misery in this world (19). Siddhasena thinks that egotism is the root cause of all defects.

The remedy to eradicate this egotism is to meditate on

the idea of "Nāhamasmi"—I am not—an idea originally belonging to the Bauddhas, but assimilated by Siddhasena. This idea is both positive and negative. Happiness and misery have been discussed in the present Dwā. by the author, while stating the efficacy of the combination of knowledge and action the author says:—Knowledge alone is not competent to do anything. Mere knowledge of a disease is not able to uproot it. Similarly, knowledge without action is useless (27).

In the 18th Dwā, the chief subject is how to follow the instructions. In order to have the capacity to follow, time, place, conduct, age, and nature must be taken into consideration (1).

In this Dwā, he has also enumerated some of the qualities necessary for a preacher: he must be a man of purity both externally and internally. He must be serene. He must have both lustre and compassion in him. He must have a clear idea as to what he means to say and as to what the rival doctrines mean to say. His tongue must be very sweet and clever. He must be a man who has controlled his mind and senses (2).

A candidate for religious initiation is sometimes overwhelmed with doubts rising, of themselves, in his heart. Sometimes the doubts are created in his mind by others. Some of the initiated have the capacity to master the words of the scriptures. Others have the capacity to know the inner meaning of the scriptures, while still others have the double capacity of comprehending the meaning as well as remembering the words of the texts (5).

While describing the rules of conduct in Jaina religion, Siddhasena has given a variety of conduct on the part of disciples according to their motive (6). In this context, the technical words "Gītārtha" and "Āsewanaparihāra" occurring in this Dwā (14–15) belong to Jaina tradition.

In the 19th Dwā the famous trinity of Jaina philosophy that of Jñāna, Darśana and Cāritra is first mentioned as a means of liberation (1), then comes a very subtle analysis of Jñāna. Incidentally we see here an analysis of Dravya also. Out of the six Dravyas well-known in Jaina Śāstra, emphasis seems to have been apparently laid on the two main Dravyas Jīva and Pudgala (24–26). Here we come across some of the technical words of Jaina philosophy such as Dravyaparyāya, Vyañjanaparyāya, Saklādeśa, Vikalādeśa (31).

In the 20th Dwā, the nature of the preaching of Mahāvīra is described. In this reference, Siddhasena says, "Whenever Dravya and its characteristics are found mentioned along with the exposition of Utpāda, Vyaya and Dhrauvya, there the preaching of Vardhamāna is undoubtedly found (1)".

In this Dwā, the author says with reference to the debators "All these debators have, no doubt, some authority in what they want to say, but the poor fellows do not know that the difference lies only in name and view-point and, therefore, continue the debate endlessly (4)".

While discussing the remedies of removing the defects he says that knowledge or action removes the defects (6).

While referring to freedom and bondage he says that the cause of freedom and bondage are exactly the same, neither more nor less.

In the 7th verse, the doctrines of Bauddha, Sāṅkhya and Kaṇāda are mentioned. Even in Sanmati, 3rd Chapter, Gāthās 48 and 49 the same doctrines are referred to.

In the 12th verse, the technical words Sakalādeśa and Vikalādeśa occur.

In the 22nd Dwā, (Nyāyāvatāra) the author has discussed at great length all the logical proofs. He has specially dealt at length with the Parārtha kind of inference. All the logical details such as Pakṣa, Sādhya, Hetu, Driṣṭānta, Hetvābhāsa etc. are defined in the present Dwā from Jaina point of view and the vast gulf existing between the doctrine of Naya and the doctrine of Anekānta has been clearly mentioned. This Dwā seems to have been written with a view to facilitate the study of Jaina logic. This Dwā, with its explanation in Gujarati and an introduction has been separately published¹.

Altogether it seems from a comparative study of the available Dwā, on the one hand, and Sanmati Tarka

1 Vide J. S. S. Vol. III No. I.

on the other, that these works have a very close resemblance to one another, in many places, in point of subject-matter and ideas¹.

Sukh Lal

and

Bechar Das

END

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Sanmati

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END

SANMATI-TARKA

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SANMATI-TARKA.

CHAPTER I.

Introductory verse in the form of a panegyric of the teaching of the prophet of Jainism with its peculiar merits :—

सिद्धं सिद्धत्वाणं ठाणमणोवमसुहं उवगयाणं ।

कुसमयविसासणं सासणं जिणाणं भवजिणाणं ॥ १ ॥

The teaching of Jinas i. e. the Conquerors of attachment and hatred, the teaching with its twelve subdivisions stands supreme on its own merit. For that teaching is the repository of irrefutable matter. That teaching is supremely blissful to those who approach it meekly for protection. That teaching is competent to refute false doctrines of Absolutism.

Here four peculiar qualities of Jaina teaching are referred to :—(i) It is endowed with all the excellences. (ii) It postulates the true nature of things. (iii) It is blissful to those who approach it for protection (iv) and it refutes false doctrines. 1

Second verse makes the declaration of composing the work Sanmati-Tarka and states its object in doing so :—

समयपरमत्थवित्थरविहाडजणपज्जुवासणसयन्नो ।

आगममलारहियओ जह होइ तमत्थमुन्नेसुं ॥ २ ॥

I shall deal with such a matter as, when stated, will inspire or stimulate even an idle fellow, with a mind as dull as that of a bull in comprehending the meaning of scriptures, to wait upon Savants or learned men who clearly illuminate real things referred to in the sacred books.

The author while stating his object in writing the present work says that there are people who do not take any interest in the study of scriptures and are therefore not attracted to them. But the present work has been written with the express intention of creating an interest in the minds of such persons who would approach the Savants (called Śrutadharas in Jainism) and try to understand the import of the speech of Śrutadharas who have mastered all kinds of knowledge and who illumine the mysteries of sacred lore. **2**

Third verse indicates the main subject-matter of this work :—

तित्थयरवयणसंगह-विसेसपत्थारमूलवागरणी ।

दन्वट्टिओ य पज्जवणओ य सेसा वियप्पा सिं ॥ ३ ॥

The Noumenal (Dravyārthika) and the Phenomenal (Paryāyārthika) i.e. the analytical methods of inquiry, are the two fundamental methods (the two Nayas) that cover the general and the particular view-points of things as stated by Tirthaṅkaras. All other analytical methods of inquiry fall under these two heads only.

Three things are suggested here :—(i) The principal subject of this work (ii) the inclusion of other kinds of Naya in these two main Nayas and (iii) the characteristic of the principal Nayas. Many are the things discussed here and there in the present work but they are so discussed only incidentally. The subject that is primarily treated here is the view or doctrine of the Versatility of Aspects (Anekānta). A clear exposition of this doctrine of Anekānta is possible only by the statement of Nayas. There are many kinds of Nayas but all of them can be included under the two Nayas—Dravyāstika and Paryāyāstika. These two Nayas are the principal Nayas.

Dravyāstika is the view of looking at the identity of things while Paryāyāstika is the view which looks at the difference of things. Man thinks or speaks of

something either from the standpoint of identity or difference. Statements of things from the former point of view come under the head of Dravyāstika or Saṅgraha or Sāmānya--generalisation as it is otherwise called. Statements of things from the standpoint of difference fall under the category of particularization or Viśeṣa as it is called. Many minor classifications of things are possibly ranging between general and particular view-points. But briefly speaking there can be only two groups of statements of these sorts. These two groups are respectively Saṅgraha and Viśeṣa. All the sayings in the scriptures mainly come under these two groups. For some statements deal with generalisations--others with particularisations. Correspondingly there are only two principal view-points as accepted by the scriptures. The view-point of identity, upon which are founded the statements of generalisation in the scriptures, is called Dravyāstika Naya while the view-point upon which are founded the statements of particularisation is called Paryāyāstika Naya. In as much as all thoughts or the sayings in the scriptures inspired by thought, are founded on these two Nayas. These Nayas are called the mouth-piece of the scriptures. The exposition of these two Nayas and their mutual reconciliation results in the doctrine of Anekānta—Versatility of aspects. As these two Nayas form thus the bedrock of Anekāntavāda, a discussion of their salient features is entered into in the subsequent verses. 3

Subdivisions of Dravyāstika Naya:—

दव्वट्टियनयपयडी सुद्धा संगहपरूवणाविसओ¹ ।

पडिरूवे पुण वयणत्थनिच्छओ तस्स ववहारो ॥ ४ ॥

The fundamental nature of Dravyāstika in its extreme form is what is called Saṅgraha Naya and limited generalizations as regards particular things come under the head of Vyavahāra Naya.

Two things are stated here :—(i) Subdivisions of Dravyāstika Naya and (ii) their mutual relation.

Keeping aside Naigama Naya, out of the remaining six Nayas the first two Nayas viz — Saṅgraha and Vyavahāra are the subdivisions of Dravyāstika Naya.

The world is neither composed of disconnected things without any underlying unity, like the parts of broken chain, nor composed of one single whole without any difference or dualism whatsoever. But we see it has both the elements of unity and difference. When we look at this world from the standpoint of unity, keeping aside mutual differences of things, it appears as merely an existence. How so ever comprehensive or broad the standpoint of oneness of this world may be, our daily life entirely depends for its everyday dealing upon the standpoint of difference. In our everyday dealing we are naturally inclined towards the standpoint of differ-

1 Compare Viśeṣāvaśyaka-bhāṣya : Gāthā 75 with this and the next two verses.

ence, and we talk of the single whole of ultimate reality (Sat), as suits our purpose. Reality is to be understood in terms of Jīva (Animate things), Ajīva (Inanimate things) and other divisions. Thus the view point of looking at the ultimate reality as a single whole divested of all differences is called Saṅgraha Naya and this is Dravyāstika in its pure form. But if we refer to the ultimate reality by breaking it up as it were and dividing it into Jīva Ajīva and others, for the convenience of daily dealing, this view of limited oneness is called Vyavahāra Naya. Thus Saṅgraha deals with an aspect of Infinite Oneness of the reality and Vyavahāra deals with the aspect of reality in its limited or Finite Oneness. Vyavahāra Naya, therefore, is only a finite or limited portion of Śaṅgraha Naya or for the matter of that, of the pure Dravyāstika Naya. Saṅgraha, however, is that part of Dravyāstika Naya which is pure and unlimited and Vyavahāra is a part of Dravyāstika in its impure and limited aspect. 4

Subdivisions of Rjusūtra Naya :

मूलणिमेणं पञ्जवणयस्स उज्जुसुयवयणविच्छेदो ।

तस्स उ सद्दईआ साहपसाहा सुहुममेया ॥ ५ ॥

Rjusūtra Naya is the very foundation of the Paryāyāstika Naya. Śabda and other minor Nayas are, of course, subtle varieties of Rjusūtra, its branches and twigs.

Even here there is a statement of two things :—(i) the subdivisions of Paryāyāstika and (ii) their mutual

relation. After the first two Nayas—Saṅgraha and Vyavahāra the four Nayas viz. R̥ju, Śabda, Samabhirūḍha and Evaṃbhūta are but the subdivisions of Paryāyāstika.

A thing, as a whole, is broken into parts, as it were, from the standpoint of species or attributes or other particulars. All these parts or divisions are the legitimate province of Vyavahāra Naya. But as soon as the element of time is introduced in the division, it falls under the category of R̥jusūtra. Hence R̥jusūtra is said to be the foundation-stone of Paryāyāstika. The three Nayas after R̥jusūtra Naya are really dependent on R̥jusūtra Naya and hence properly speaking the subdivisions of R̥jusūtra. In one way, however, all these four R̥jusūtra, Śabda, Samabhirūḍha and Evaṃbhūta can be considered as subdivisions of Paryāyāstika.

The view-point, which admits the reality of a thing only in its present and does not admit its reality in its past or future as being incompetent to produce any effect, is called R̥ju, the view-point of looking at a thing at a particular moment. Śabda Naya accepts what R̥ju states but, in addition, looks at that thing from the standpoint of person and gender also.

Samabhirūḍha goes a step further and tries to distinguish between the meaning of words that are synonyms of the same thing from its etymological point of view (e.g. Rājā, a person who shines, is different from Nṛpa a person who rules over men or protects them).

Evāmbhūta not only sees difference between words with different etymologies but sees difference in one and the same word if it does not signify the meaning denoted by the root of the word (e.g. there is a difference between a Rājā when he is not shining and a Rājā when he is shining with his royal glory).

It is quite clear from the above explanation that Śabda, Samabhirūdha and Evāmbhūta are but the gradual subtler distinctions of a thing viewed from the standpoint of time i.e. present. All these three, therefore, are but the ramifications of Rjusūtra which may be compared to a tree. Śabda is a branch of the tree, while Samabhirūdha is a twig upon the branch Śabda, and Evāmbhūta is a smaller twig upon the small twig—Samabhirūdha. 5

Here in this verse the author enumerates the varieties of Nikṣepa¹ method and the distribution of the principal Nayas in it.

1 In order that there should be no ambiguity about the meaning of a word and that the purpose of the speaker should be perfectly clear the Jain commentators of the ancient scriptures devised, in their times, the analytical method of Nikṣepa and incorporated this method in the sacred lore. While bringing out the meaning of a given word or a sentence this method of Nikṣepa refers to every possible meaning of that particular word or sentence and then it determines as to what particular meaning is intended by the speaker at that particular moment or what meaning is proper to that particular context. Herein lies the great utility of this method of Nikṣepa. For instance suppose there is a sentence "A Jīva has got attributes, knowledge etc." Now a doubt naturally arises as to the exact connotation of the word Jīva. Then the analyser comes forward and says that here Jīva is neither a named Jīva nor is it a picture

नामं ठवणा दविए चि एस दव्वट्टियस्स निक्खेवो ।

भावो उ पज्जवट्ठिअस्स परूवणा एस परमत्थो ॥ ६ ॥

Name (Nāma), picture (Sthāpanā) and potentiality (Dravya) are the varieties of Nikṣepa which are applicable to Dravyāstika while Bhāva includes under it Paryāyāstika.

Here all the possible varieties of Nikṣepa are mentioned first and then their relation to the two principal Nayas—Dravyāstika and Paryāyāstika is brought out clearly. The four divisions or rather varieties of Nikṣepa which are the least found elsewhere are mentioned here. When we try to determine the meaning of a word we look at the word from four different points of view. These points of view are the four divisions of this Nikṣepa method, e. g. if a person has got the name of Rājā he is called Nāma Rājā.

(technically called Sthāpanā) of a thing called Jīva nor is it a thing which had once life in it nor which, in future is likely to have life—but an entity having actually life element in it at the present moment that is to put it technically it is a Bhāva Jīva and this is the only proper meaning, looking to the context. Thus whenever ambiguity arises, a person who is an advocate of this method of analysis called Nikṣepa comes forward and points out the real or the proper meaning of that particular word or sentence and entirely removes the ambiguity. Thus the method is very useful in determining the meaning of words or sentences. It is true that Indian Rhetorics has shown various ways in determining a definite sense of a word intended by the speaker when that word yields various senses. But nowhere except in Jain works called Niryukti do we find this clear and practical method of determining the sense of a word or a sentence—the method called Nikṣepa. In Vedic and Budhistic works this analytical method is conspicuous by its absence

If there is a picture or any other counterpart of a Rājā then it is Sthāpanā Rājā. If that person was formerly a king or is likely to be a king in future then he is called Dravya Rājā. And a person who is actually a king at present—ruling over a province is called Bhāva Rājā. These are the four possible meanings of a word Rājā according to the Nikṣepa method. Out of these divisions of Nikṣepa (view-point) the first three have in them in one way or the other the element oneness or sameness. Thus they are the legitimate province of Dravyāstika Naya. Bhāva Nikṣepa on the other hand having in it the element of difference naturally is the subject of Paryāyāstika Naya. Looking at a person whose name is king, people identify him with his name and say “Here is the King.” Similarly looking at a picture of a king who is long since dead people say “Here is the King.” Here people identify the past king with the present picture. In the same manner, a person, who was once a king and is likely to be a king in future, when seen, is pointed out as a king. Here the past or the future is identified with the present. In all these three cases the idea of complete identity or oneness is predominant. Not so in the case of Bhāva Nikṣepa. There the person in question being a ruling prince at that particular moment is distinguished from others not so ruling. Difference is, therefore, in this case predominant. Thus the two principal Nayas are connected with the four Nikṣepas—the first Naya Dravyāstika with the first three Nikṣepas and the second Naya Paryāyāstika with the fourth Nikṣepa i.e. Bhāva Nikṣepa. 6

A discussion is introduced as to whether the subject or the province of each Nayas is fundamentally different from that of the other Nayas. Distribution of Nayas amongst various statements.

पञ्जवर्णिस्सामणं वयणं दन्वद्विस्स 'अत्थि' त्ति ।

अवसेसो वयणविही पञ्जवभयणा सपडिक्खो ॥ ७ ॥

Dravyāstika Naya in its pure form is only concerned with the simple statement "It is" that is to say when the thing is mentioned divested of all its particular attributes or modifications. All other statements deal, in one way or the other, with some attribute or the other and as such is the subject of both the Dravyāstika and Paryāyāstika.

Hitherto all the statements about a particular thing in popular or scientific parlance were divided under the two groups viz. Saṅgraha and Viśeṣa. Now the author goes deeper into the things and explicitly says as to what kind of statement can definitely fall under Dravyāstika and what statement can be the legitimate province of Paryāyāstika. That ultimate reality, which is one single whole, and in which there is no division or limitation or attribute of any kind whatsoever, is the highest or the widest generality or universal principle. Thus Sāmānya

or generality or universal principle can only be mentioned by such word as Asti (it is) or Sat (it exists) or others of the kind. All such statements become the legitimate province of Dravyāstika Naya. All other statements about a thing such as Jīva, Ajīva, Mukta (liberated soul), Saṁsāri (a soul bound by worldly life), atom (physical body), Guṇa (attributes) etc. deal necessarily with the limited aspect of the ultimate reality and therefore have in them some element of difference, division, part or attribute. These statements, therefore, do not exclusively belong to Dravyāstika but belong to the province of both Dravyāstika and Paryāyāstika, for in one sense the objects they deal with e.g. Jīva, Ajīva etc. are general ; but from another point of view are the subdivisions of a higher general that is to say they are particulars (Viśeṣas)

Here it should be noted that as the statements such as Asti, Sat are exclusively the subject of Dravyāstika, those statements that deal with the most final attributes of things which admit of no further particularization, exclusively belong to the province of Paryāyāstika. All other intermediary statements partake of the character of both the Dravyāstika and the Paryāyāstika, for they deal with the general as well as the particular aspect of things. 7

Circumstances under which there occurs an overlapping of these two Principal Nayas are mentioned in the following verse :—

पज्जवण्यवोक्तं वत्थुं दव्वद्वियस्स वयणिज्जं ।

जाव दविओवओगो अपच्छिमवियप्पनिव्वयणो ॥ ८ ॥

Dravyāstika includes in itself all those statements in which there is some sort of general statement. In all such statements there is an overlapping of Paryāyāstika also. Only that statement where there is no further possibility of particularization falls under the strict purview of pure Paryāyastika.

Here the author indicates that province of Dravyāstika which is likely to be covered by Paryāyāstika. As a rule, every statement that deals with some sort of universal statement is the legitimate province of Dravyāstika. Barring the ultimate statement where there is a statement of that indivisible particularization—all other statements gradually culminating in the statement of the highest universality fall under the purview of Dravyāstika. But, at the same time, all these statements, except the statement of the highest universality, become the subject-matter of Paryāyāstika as well. To be more plain, only one statement dealing with the highest entity without a single attribute, is covered by Dravyāstika only. Only one statement, which deals with ultimate particularization beyond which there is no possibility of further particularization—falls under the purview of Paryāyāstika.

only. All the intermediary statements are covered both by Paryāyāstika as well as Dravyāstika. For in every such intermediary statement there is some sort of generalization, as well as some sort of particularization. That very thing that is viewed by Dravyāstika from universal point of view, is viewed by Paryāyāstika from the viewpoint of particularization. Only that final statement where we can not even dream of universal viewpoint, is ear-marked so to say for Paryāyāstika. 8

The author in the following verse now sums up the discussion of the overlapping of the two principal Nayas :—

द्वन्द्विद्विओ त्ति तम्हा नत्थि एअओ णियम सुद्धजाईअओ ।
ए य पज्जवट्ठिअओ णाम कोइ भयणाय उ विसेसो ॥ ९ ॥

This being the case, it is impossible to find a Dravyāstika, in its pure form—that is to say absolutely unmixed with Paryāyāstika. Similarly it is equally impossible to find a Paryāyāstika in its pure form that is to say totally unmixed with a Dravyāstika. Hence assigning a particular statement to a particular Naya depends upon the volition of the speaker.

Hitherto there has been a clear statement of two distinct Nayas—Dravyāstika and Paryāyāstika. Even there differ-

ent provinces have been clearly demarcated. From this, one is likely to suppose that there is no connexion whatsoever between these two Nayas or for the matter of that, its subjects or provinces. Here this erroneous notion is removed from the minds of the reader, by stating the truth about this theory. Really speaking, there cannot be any general without a particular nor any particular without a general. But one and the same thing assumes the aspect of universality from one point of view. Hence there is bound to be an overlapping of these two Nayas in one and the same statement. This being the case, when a particular statement is said to be the legitimate subject of a particular Naya, it only means that the speaker gives only a prominence to that Naya in that statement and assigns a subordinate place to another Naya. Thus, for instance, when the standpoint of Sāmānya or universality is predominant the statement is said to fall under Dravyāstika. Similarly when the standpoint of particularization predominates, the statement is said to belong to the province of Paryāyāstika. 9

What is the attitude of each Naya towards the other or the rival Naya is discussed in the following verse :—

दन्वद्वियवत्तावं अवत्थु गियमेण पज्जवणयस्स ।

तह पज्जववत्थु अवत्थुमेव दन्वद्वियनयस्स ॥ १० ॥

Paryāyāstika does not view the positive assertion of Dravyāstika as its legitimate

subject. On the other hand Dravyāstika looks down upon the statement of Paryāyāstika in the same fashion.

An additional light is thrown here upon the distinction between the proper provinces of two Nayas. Dravyāstika takes its stand exclusively upon the universality of a subject, while Paryāyāstika views the same object exclusively from the standpoint of particularization. Here each does not consider the assertion of its rival Naya as its property. Herein lies the true distinction between these two Nayas and their spheres when applied to one and the same thing. 10

Both the Nayas touch different phases or aspects of one and the same thing. This is stated in the following verse :—

उप(प)ज्जंति वियंति य भावा नियमेण पज्जवणयस्स ।
दव्वट्ठियस्स सव्वं सया अणुप्पन्नमविणट्ठं ॥ ११ ॥

From the standpoint of Paryāyāstika all things are necessarily born and perish; Dravyāstika, on the other hand, holds that all things exist eternally without birth and decay.

Dravyāstika takes cognizance of the eternal or the abiding element in a thing while Paryāyāstika looks only towards the changing character of that thing. 11

Characteristic of a real or entire thing or a thing in its integral whole is referred to in this verse :-

दव्वं पज्जवविउयं दव्वविउत्ता य पज्जवा एत्थि ।

उप्पाय-ट्टिइ-भंगा हंदि दवियलक्खणं एयं ॥ १२ ॥

There cannot be a thing which is devoid of its modifications of birth and decay. On the other hand, modifications cannot exist without an abiding or eternal something – a permanent substance, for birth, decay and stability (continuance)—these three constitute the characteristic of a substance or Entity.¹

By stating the characteristic of the Entity the true nature of it is here described. Nothing is there in this world that remains stable without the modifications of birth and decay. In the same manner, there is nothing that is always subject to the modifications of birth and

1 This trinity of birth, decay and stability which has been defended by Jain writers, has been attacked by Budhistic writers such as Nāgārjuna and others. In Nāgārjuna's *Madhyamaka-Kārikā*, for instance, there is a chapter named *Saṃskṛta Parīkṣā*. Therein is refuted this doctrine of trinity (of birth, decay and stability) said to be the characteristic of entity. Subsequent Bauddha writers have also tried to refute this doctrine. Jain logicians, on the other hand, seem to have tried to defend this doctrine wherever possible.

Compare Pāncāstikāya : 1.12, and Tattvartha : 5.29.

decay and has nothing of an abiding character in it. For it is the very nature of things that they are permanent in their original character, but undergo different modifications according to circumstances. Stability and changeability therefore, are not naturally contradictory but are both real and do reside in one and the same thing. Not only that but both are absolutely essential for an integral entity. **12**

In the following verse the author explains as to how both these Nayas become wrong in their exclusive assertions :—

एष पुण संगहञ्चो पाडिक्कमलक्खणं दुवेण्हं पि ।

तम्हा मिच्छदिट्ठी पत्तेयं दो वि मूलणया ॥ १३ ॥

These three characteristics of birth, decay and stability must dwell together in harmony to make a real definition of a thing in its integral form. Each Naya therefore, if taken independently, isolated from the other, can never yield an adequate idea of Sat an entity. Both these, therefore, divorced from each other, are wrong in their standpoints.

The reason, why these two Nayas in their exclusiveness are wrong, is this that they in their individual capacity cannot give a perfect definition of Sat i.e.

Reality or Entity. Take the view of universality as advanced by Dravyāstika or take the view of particularization as held by Paryāyāstika. Not one of them separately can give all the characteristics of an object in its integral whole. Both the general and the particular aspects of a thing, if combined, can give the integral conception of a thing. To presume, therefore, that one only out of these two Nayas can give a perfect definition of a thing as a whole is wrong. 13

The following verse explains as to how and when both the Nayas can be regarded as right :—

ए य तद्वो अत्थि एवो ए य सम्मत्तां ए तेषु पडिपुणं ।
जेण दुवे एगन्ता विभज्जमाणा अणोगन्तो ॥ १४ ॥

There is no third Naya. Moreover, it can not be said that truth cannot be adequately expressed by these two Nayas ; for if we combine both these standpoints in their particular aspects we can certainly arrive at the truth by the method of Anekānta (The Versatility of Aspects).

An Entity is composed of both the general and the particular aspect. If, therefore, there be a Naya which takes cognizance of both these aspects of a thing, it must be said to be the right view of a thing. But such a Naya

is not possible because a Naya which is but a partial view of a thing cannot give a perfect view of an Entity. True knowledge (Pramāṇa) alone can define a thing in its integrality. Thus each in its isolated form is wrong and a third Naya is not possible. How then can true knowledge of a thing be arrived at ? The answer is this :—True knowledge is possible. Not only that but this true knowledge is already inherent in the two aforesaid Nayas that are from a particular point of view considered as wrong. To say, that it would be self contradictory to consider both the Nayas being both right and wrong at the same time, is not proper. The reason is that these two Nayas are wrong in their view-point only when they claim infallibility for themselves in their splendid isolation from one another. Both of them divorced from each other can certainly give a partially true idea of the Entity. But that does not mean that they in their singleness give the whole truth. When, however, these two Nayas work in harmony with each other and state their own view without trying to refute the assertion or the view of the other Naya, they both are right in their viewpoints, for now both consider themselves as competent to give only partial truth about a thing without trying to refute the view of the rival Naya. That rival Naya in its own province gives a partial but true view of an Entity. 14

What is true of these two principal Nayas is also true in the case of their classification says the following verse :—

जह एए तह अणणे पत्तेयं दुण्णया णया सव्वे ।

हंदि हु मुलणयाणं पण्णवणे वावडा ते वि ॥ १२ ॥

As these two Nayas when taken in their exclusiveness are false Nayas, all other Nayas also are wrong when taken in their isolated standpoints. For the subsequent Nayas occupy themselves in viewing the different aspects of the thing which is the subject of these two principal Nayas.

To work independently, all alone, without any regard to other Naya is the fundamental cause of the defect of a Naya. If this is found in subsequent Nayas, they are also faulty ; for the subject-matter of these Nayas is the same. All these Nayas view at one and the same thing from different points of view. It is therefore quite natural that they should be regarded faulty if they claim perfect truth for their own view and disregard the views of other rival Nayas. 15

The following verse again emphasises the point that no single Naya of all the subsequent Nayas, is competent to comprehend the Reality in its entirety :—

सव्वणयसमूहम्मि वि णत्थि णओ उभयवायपण्णवओ ।

मूलणयाण उ आणं पत्तेय विसेसियं विति ॥ १६ ॥

Among all the subsequent Nayas, there is not a single Naya which has for its province both the aspects of a thing viz. the general and the particular—in their entirety. The reason is that all these Nayas look at the different aspects of the thing or Reality viewed by the principal Nayas.

It is impossible to find a third Naya (in addition to the first two Nayas) which can describe the Reality in its entirety that is to say its general and particular nature, simultaneously. And even among the subdivisions of the two principal Nayas there is not a single Naya that can state the double aspect of a thing (viz. its general and particular aspect). The reason is obvious. Every subsequent Naya being a subdivision of one of the two principal Nayas naturally deals with the reality and looks at it from that very standpoint which is taken by its principal Naya. The province of these minor Nayas is not outside the province of the principal Nayas. The minor Nayas only undertake a more subtle analysis than that undertaken by the principal Nayas. Naturally therefore, they are incompetent to comprehend the double aspect (of the general and of the particular) of an Entity or Sat. 16

We cannot account for this worldly life, happiness and misery, bondage and liberation if we adhere exclusively to the stand-

point of one single Naya. This is explained in the following verses :—

ए य द्वावद्वियपक्खे संसारो एव पज्जवणयस्स ।
 सासयवियत्तिवायी जम्हा उच्छेअवाइआ ॥ १७ ॥
 सुह-दुक्खसंपओगो ए जुज्जए णिच्चवायपक्खम्मि ।
 एगंतुच्छेयम्मि य सुह-दुक्खवियप्पणमजुत्तं ॥ १८ ॥
 कम्मं जोगनिमित्तं बज्झइ बंध-ट्ठिइ कसायवसा ।
 अपरिणवच्छिण्णोसु य बंध-ट्ठिइकारणं एत्थि ॥ १९ ॥
 बंधम्मि अपूरन्ते संसारमओघदन्सणं मोज्झं ।
 बन्धं व विणा मोक्खसुहपत्थणा एत्थि मोक्खो य ॥ २० ॥
 तम्हा सव्वे वि णया मिच्छादिट्ठी सपक्खपडिबद्धा ।
 अण्णोणणणिस्सिआ उण हवन्ति सम्मत्तसव्भावा ॥ २१ ॥

(17) This worldly life cannot be accounted for from Dravyāstika standpoint. It is equally unaccountable from Paryāyāstika point of view. For, the former holds that there is only one element and stable thing ; while the latter holds that birth and decay are the true characteristics of a thing.

(18) From the point of view of those who hold that an entity is unchangeable, happiness and misery cannot stand ; in the opinion of those who hold that things

eternally change the idea of happiness and misery can never hold good.

(19) 'Action-current' (yoga) attaches or binds a man through mind, speech and body. And it is through our passions (Kāṣāyas) that this action-current binding a man takes its firm stand. But if we think that a thing is eternally unchangeable or when we think that thing is born and in a moment decays, we can never account for the binding of an action-current or its continuance.

(20) If there is no binding by Action-current, then it will be a folly to think that this worldly life is beset with perils. If, on the other hand, there be no Bandha i.e. binding then it is idle to desire the happiness of liberation—in fact then there cannot be any such thing as liberation at all.

(21) All the Nayas, therefore, in their exclusively individual standpoints are absolutely faulty. If, however, they consider themselves as supplementary of each other, they are right in their viewpoints.

If every Naya that claims truth for itself only and disregards the viewpoints of other Naya, it goes contrary to the daily experience of things and offends against the established propositions of science. This truth has been illustrated here with reference to the 'soul'. If we take our stand exclusively on Dravyāstika Naya we must regard the soul as being an eternal and unchangeable thing. On the other hand, if we take our stand on the view of Paryāyāstika Naya, we have to regard the soul as being ephemeral. From the standpoint of both these Nayas, this worldly life, the quality of happiness and misery, human endeavour for the attainment of happiness and removal of misery, the bondage of Karma and its continuance or persistence, liberation and the desire for liberation—all these can never be accounted for. For in the opinion of those who vote for the eternity of things, Ātmā being eternal and unchangeable can never be subjected to the turmoil of passions. On the other hand, if we accept the view that things are ephemeral and eternally change, then the soul would be ephemeral and would be born and perish at every moment and therefore the continuity of consciousness, desire, endeavour and such other attributes that imply a permanent character of the thing of which they are the attributes can never be predicated of the soul.

The inevitable conclusion, therefore, is this that two principal Nayas with their attendant minor Nayas should be considered as faulty if they are regardless of the views of other Nayas and arrogate to themselves the whole truth. But if they act in harmony with each

other, then alone they can be deemed right in their views. 17—21

This statement is illustrated in the following verses.

जहऽण्यलक्खणगुणा वेरुलियाई मणी विसंजुत्ता ।
 रयणावलिववणसं न लहंति महग्घमुल्ला वि ॥ २२ ॥
 तह णिययवायसुविणिच्छिया वि अण्णोण्णपक्खणिरवेक्खा ।
 सम्महंसणसदं सव्वे वि णया ण पावेंति ॥ २३ ॥
 जह पुण ते चेव मणी जहा गुणविसेसभागपडिबद्धा ।
 'रयणावलि'त्ति भण्णइ जहंति पाडिक्कसण्णाउ ॥ २४ ॥
 तह सव्वे णयवाया जहाणुरुवविणिउत्तवत्तवा ।
 सम्महंसणसदं लहन्ति ण विसेससण्णाओ ॥ २५ ॥

(22, 23) Just¹ as emerald and other jewels of rare quality and of excellent kind do not acquire the designation of a necklace of jewels even though all of them be priceless jewels on account of their lying unconnected with or disunited with each other, similarly every Naya in its own sphere is right, but if all of them arrogate to themselves the whole truth and disregard the views of rival Naya then they do not attain the status of a right view.

1 Compare Viśeṣāvaśyaka-bhāṣya : Gāthā 2271.

(24) Moreover, just as those jewels unite with each other and occupy the place that is assigned to them individually in the string, they, all together, attain the designation of a necklace of jewels, disowning their individual names.

(25) Similarly if all the Nayas arrange themselves in a proper way and supplement to each other, then alone they are worthy of being termed as 'the whole truth' Samyag-Darśana or the right view in its entirety. But in this case they merge their individuality in the collective whole.

However bright or precious the jewels may be in their individual capacity, as long as they are not joined with each other, they cannot be termed as a necklace of jewels. But if those very jewels are properly perforated and strung together—they give up their individual names and assume the new title of 'necklace of jewels.' It is then that they are considered highly precious. Similarly, however correct the view of a particular Naya may be, if it disregards the view of other Naya it cannot be considered as 'the whole truth.' But if all these supplement the partial truth of each other and try to view at seeing the different aspects of one and the same thing by acting in harmony with each other,

they discard their individual name of ' a partial truth ' and get the designation of Samyag-Darśana.

Jewels are transformed into necklace by virtue of their perforations and arrangement. Similarly the veracity of the Nayas depends upon their mutual supplementing. **22-25**

The method of illustration has got its own merits says the folloing verse :—

लोड्यपरिच्छयसुहो निच्छयवयणपडिवत्तिमगो य ।

अह पणवणविसउ त्ति तेण वीसत्थमुवणीओ ॥ २६ ॥

An illustration¹ appeals both to the man of common sense as well as to the man of science with his subtle intellect. It is an easy means of convincing them beyond doubt as regards the significance of a particular proposition.

An illustration has the merit of easily convincing both the man adept in science and a man with a practical sense. It is competent to bring out clearly the matter at issue ; and has a power of imparting the knowledge of the concomitance of things ; without it no establishment of conclusion is possible. It is with all these considerations that the illustration of a necklace of jewels has been freely introduced by the author. **26**

1 Compare Nyaya-Sūtra : 1. 1. 25.

If there is no co-relativity between Nayas, it leads to the sure defect of a Naya. This is illustrated by taking concrete examples of some well known particular doctrines :—

इहरा समूहसिद्धो परिणामकञ्चो व्व जो जहिं अत्थो ।

ते तं च ए तं तं चेव व त्ति नियमेण मिच्छत्तं ॥ २७ ॥

Or¹ if the Nayas the (standpoints) offend against the rule of 'mutual supplementing' such as for instance when one says that the effect and the cause are identical; or another says that the effect can never be identical with the cause; or when a third says that the effect and the cause are not at all separate or different from each other. All these absolute statements or unqualified statements are wrong even though it is a fact that an effect is inherent in a cause in as much as the former is either a transformation of the latter or the former is a substance of which the latter forms the constituent.

What is illustrated by the example of a necklace is again discussed by taking the cases of some famous doctrines.

1 Compare Siddhasena's first Batriśī : Śloka 20.

Sāṅkhyas hold that the effect is existent because according to them a thing which was not previously existing never comes into being. Because the cause and the Effect are not really speaking different.

Vaiśeṣikas and others, on the other hand, regard the Effect as previously not existing. Since they hold the theory of Ārambha, i.e., creation, they maintain that the effect which was not existent is created by the cause. Others, again such as the absolutists or monists hold that there is only one thing in the universe and hence deny the existence of any such things as a cause and an effect. According to the theory of Parīṇāma Vāda curd is only the transformation of milk, hence there is no difference what-so-ever between the two. According to the theory of Ārambha a piece of cloth is created or prepared out of collection of threads and therefore that piece of cloth is different from the collection. From the standpoint of a monist the notion of a cause and an effect is false. Everything in the universe is the ultimate Reality. What the author means here is this :—If these three theories or views think themselves as possessing the entire truth of the matter and try to defend their own exclusive position without any regard to other rival views and run down other views as false all these theories are entirely wrong.

Qualified assertion (Sāpekṣa Pratipādana) is the only right method. It means that every Naya should state its view in such a way as would not militate against the truth contained in the rival Naya and would try to defend its own partial truth in its own limited scope. **27**

The theory of cumulative truth (Anekānta) or the theory of the versatility of aspects is the right theory. It never dogmatically asserts as regards anything. How a man well versed in Anekānta looks at various views is mentioned in the following verse :—

णिययवयणिज्जसच्चा सव्वनया परवियालणे मोहा ।

ते उण ण दिट्ठसमञ्जो विभयइ सच्चे व अलिण वा ॥ २८ ॥

All¹ the Nayas are right in their own respective spheres—but if they encroach upon the province of other Nayas and they try to refute their views they are wrong.

A man who holds the view of the cumulative character of truth (Anekāntajñā) never says that particular view is right or that a particular view is wrong.

Every Naya is justified in defending its own view in its limited aspect. As long as it is conscious of the limitation of its own view—it is right. If it transgresses its limit and tries to refute the rival view, it is faulty. It is because of this that an Anekāntajñā (a man who holds the versatility of aspects or viewpoints)—having understood the limitations of each view tries to synthe-

1 Compare Viśeṣāvaśyaka-bhāṣya : Gāthā 2272.

tise them all and never upholds particular views as true or runs down other views as wrong. In fact he tries to synthetise all the views even though they seem apparently contradictory. He thus tries to arrive at the truth by the method of synthesis. Thus, for instance, an Anekāntajña holds Kārya (effect) as existant from one point of view and unexistant from another point of view. Similarly he thinks that a substance is one from one point of view and subject to dualism from another point of view 28

These are the limitations of each Naya :—

द्वन्द्वद्विषयवत्तत्त्वं सत्त्वं सत्त्वेण णिच्चमवियत्त्वं ।

आरद्धो य विभागो पञ्चववत्तत्त्वमगो य ॥ २९ ॥

Dravyāstika Naya has for its province all those objects which are stripped of every kind of difference—but as soon as those objects are subjected to some sort of difference or division they become the province of Paryāstika Naya.

The world is characterised by both difference and unity. But when the world (or the objects therein) is looked at from the point of view of unity or entity, it becomes the province of Dravyāstika Naya. This means that Dravyāstika deals with only the unity of things. When, however Reality or Entity is subdivided into

Dravya (substance), Guṇa (attributes), and others or into past, present or future, then alone the province of Paryāyāstika begins. That is to say, Paryāyāstika concerns itself solely with the difference or division of things. 29

The following verse deals with difference in its minute details.

જો હણ સમાસઑ ચિય વંજણણિઑ ય અથણિઑ ય ।
અથગઑ ય અભિણો મહ્યવો વંજણવિયપો ॥ ૩૦ ॥

Moreover, difference is of two kinds :—(i) difference depending on words and (ii) difference not dependent on words that is to say conditioned by meaning. A division as regards the object itself admits of no further differences, while divisions from the point of view of words are both divisible and not divisible.

Every object has the double aspect of unity and difference. When on this unity (which is inherent in every object) we begin to super-impose differences that are due to time and space—through minute analysis—these differences infinitely multiply. The more the minute analysis, the more the differences. All those differences, gathering volume at every step, like a

grand flow of the waters of a river, flow on incessantly. When the current of similar modificatory changes amongst all these differences can be expressed in words and brought into the domain of practical use they are called Vyañjana Paryāya.

In the said chain of infinite differences, that difference or division which admits of no further sub-division, because of its being the most final division is called Artha Paryāya. Even if that division admits of further division but somehow or other appears indivisible, it is also called Artha Paryāya.

For instance : life element in a sentient being is of the character of a universal. This life element, of the sentient thing can be infinitely divided, from the standpoint of time, space etc. such as :—coming into worldly life, being a human being, being a man, being a boy etc. In all these divisions—that group of divisions, in which the idea of a man (Puruṣa) is common and running through them all, and which admits of being mentioned by the word Puruṣa is thus, in a way, a group of similar divisions, and is called Vyañjana Paryāya. And in this very group—the ultimate divisions such as those of boyhood, youth and others or even more minute divisions that admit of no further divisions and do not happen to be divided further are called Artha Paryāya.

We have said above to the effect that Vyañjana Paryāya has the double aspect of unity and difference

because that group of divisions which has the quality of man running through it and is capable of being expressed by the word *Puruṣa* (a man) has, from this point of similarity, oneness or unity in it. But at the same time it can further be subdivided into boyhood, youth etc. and hence admits of the element of difference also. Similarly the group of divisions, that can commonly be expressed by *Bāla* (the boy) and is thus a group of similar things and has the element of unity in it, can be further subdivided into groups such as newly-born, sucklings etc.—and from this point of view. this very group has the element of difference also. This is exactly the case with every group of divisions, that is to say, it has both the elements of unity and difference.

We have said that *Artha Paryāya* has got the element of unity only. For this reason—though it is itself a subdivision of a higher group and is different from other sub-divisions it is itself the most ultimate division, admits of no further subdivision and as such is said to have got the element of unity in it. 30.

The following verse explains as to how one substance becomes manifold :—

एगदवियम्भि जे अत्थपज्जया वयणपज्जया वा वि ।
तीयाणागयभूया तावइयं तं हवइ दव्वं ॥ ३१ ॥

One and the same substance assumes various forms from various standpoints ; for

instance from the standpoint of past, present and future it becomes three-fold subjecting itself to Artha Paryāya. In the same manner, it assumes manifold forms from Vyañjana Paryāya point of view.

An atom, a being or some such thing, originally is one indivisible thing only, individually ; but it undergoes infinite variations of Śabda as well as Artha if we look to it from the standpoint of past, present and future. If we think that every such new variation is a different form of that thing, corresponding to the infinite variations the thing also becomes infinite in its forms. Thus owing to the difference of variations, the thing though originally one, becomes many. The one thing by virtue of its attributes becomes many. 31

An illustration of a Vyañjana Paryāya:—

पुरिसम्मि पुरिससदो जम्माई मरणकालपज्जन्तो ।

तस्स उ बालाईया पज्जवजेया बहुवियप्पा ॥ ३२ ॥

A man is termed as a man from the time of his birth to the time of his death. Boy and youth and other are mere modifications of that same Puruṣa (man).

The same term 'man' is applicable in the case of a man from his birth upto his death, and every time he is

recognised to be 'a man.' This variation termed as a man forms a group of divisions having the common characteristic 'a man.' This group is called Vyañjana Paryāya. All other variations and some gross variations such as old, young or other minute variations are the subdivisions of the principal variation of 'a man.'

As a rule every Vyañjana Paryāya is liable to have subdivisions more and more minute. **32**

Now all such Vyañjana Paryāyas cannot be considered as having an element of unity only. If it is so considered, it is faulty :—

अथि ति णिविवयप्पं पुरिसं जो भणइ पुरिसकालम्भि ।

सो बालाइवियप्पं न लहइ तुल्लं व पावेज्जा ॥ ३३ ॥

If the Vyañjana Paryāya a man (Puruṣa) is considered absolutely as one indivisible, it would mean that it admits of no subdivisions or subvariations. But such a supposition would mean that even the variation of a man is not possible.

For what does after all the variation of a man mean ? It means an aggregate of various minor sub-variations. But if we do not accept these minor sub-variations, its aggregate—the man-variation also cannot stand. Hence if we consider the man-variation as an indivisible one,

the subvariations have no existence at all. Eventually, even the Vyañjana Paryāya of 'a man' will have the same fate. 33

The same illustration makes a clear distinction between Vyañjana Paryāya and Artha Paryāya is shown in the following verse :—

वंजणपज्जायस्स उ 'पुरिसो' 'पुरिसो'त्ति णिच्चमवियप्पो ।

बालाइवियप्पं पुण पासई से अत्थपज्जाओ ॥ ३४ ॥

To a man who looks from Vyañjana Paryāya point of view, a man-variation appears to be one, without any particular, simply a man. If, however, he looks at the subvariations of 'a boy,' 'a youth' etc.' it means he is looking from an Artha Paryāya point of view.

With reference to an individual—a man—we have the conception of both unity and diversity. When we conceive the man as devoid of his subdivisions—as simply a man it is the one (indivisible) Vyañjana Paryāya. If, however, along with the conception of a man, we at the same time are conscious of the variations of a boy etc. these latter are said to be Artha Paryāyas of the Vyañjana Paryāya of a man. This means that Artha Paryāyas of a Vyañjana Paryāya are those manifold

variations that manifest themselves in the Vyañjana Paryāya of a man viewed as one indivisible whole. 34

Exclusiveness of a viewpoint is always faulty and unscientific says the following verse :—

सवियप्प-णिग्वियप्पं इय पुरिसं जो भरोज्ज अवियप्पं ।
सवियप्पमेव वा णिच्छएण ए स निच्छिओ समए ॥ ३५ ॥

Thus when in fact a man is both devoid of subdivisions and endowed with subdivisions to say that he is absolutely devoid of subdivisions or to say that he is nothing but subdivisions is faulty and unscientific.

Man serves as merely one of the many illustrations. In fact all Vyañjana Paryāyas like man are both Savikalpa and Nirvikalpa, with and without subdivisions.

If under these circumstances, a man views a thing exclusively from one of the two points of view—it can be definitely said about the man that he has not grasped the secret of the Doctrine of versatility of aspects. 35

The following verses state the main feature of the Sapta-bhaṅgī or the Heptagonal forms of ontological enquiry :—

अत्थंतरभूएहि य णियएहि य देहि समयमाईहिं ।
वयणविसेसाईयं दव्वमवत्तव्वयं पडइ ॥ ३६ ॥

अहं देसो सब्भावे देसोऽसब्भावपज्जवे णियञ्चो ।

तं द्वियमत्थि एत्थि य आएसविसेसियं जम्हा ॥ ३७ ॥

सब्भावे आइट्ठो देसो देसो य उभयहा जस्स ।

तं अत्थि अवत्तव्वं च होइ द्विअं वियप्पवसा ॥ ३८ ॥

आइट्ठोऽसब्भावे देसो देसो य उभयहा जस्स ।

तं एत्थि अवत्तव्वं च होइ द्वियं वियप्पवसा ॥ ३९ ॥

सब्भावाऽसब्भावे देसो देसो य उभयहा जस्स ।

तं अत्थि एत्थि अवत्तव्वयं च द्वियं वियप्पवसा ॥ ४० ॥

(36) If we desire to describe a thing simultaneously from the standpoint of its own particularising elements and the particularising elements of another thing, it baffles description and is said to be indescribable.

(37) If we desire to say that a thing partly exists from one point of view (or in a certain sense) and does not exist from another point of view—that thing is said to exist and not to exist.

(38) If we desire to say that one part of a thing exists and another exists and does not exist at the same time the thing is said to be existing and indescribable.

(39) If we desire to say that one part of a certain thing does not exist and another part does and does not exist at the same time, the thing is said to be not existing and indescribable.

(40) If one part of a thing does and does not exist and another does and does not exist at the same time—the thing is said to be existing, not existing and indescribable.¹

A true statement of a thing either affirmatively or negatively from the standpoint of one of its qualities is called a Bhaṅga or mode or way. Such modes or ways are originally only two or at the most three. But by the permutation and combination of these ways, we get seven ways and consequently seven kinds of statements. This sevenfold mode of sentences is termed Sapta-bhaṅgī.

For instance :—(1) The soul is eternal (2) is not eternal (3) is indescribable (4) is eternal as well as not eternal (5) is eternal as well as indescribable (6) is not eternal as well as indescribable (7) is eternal, not eternal as well as indescribable.

The soul may seem to undergo different modifications but in reality it is neither created anew, nor is ever wholly destroyed ; therefore, from the standpoint of substance it is eternal.

1 Compare Viśeṣaśāstra-bhāṣya : Gāthā 2232 and Sanmatī-tīkā : P. 441.

In the same way, though intrinsically it is without beginning and without end, it does undergo various modifications or conditions owing to some cause or other. It, therefore, from the standpoint of modifications, is multiform or ever-changing. From one point of view, the soul may be said to be eternal, from another point of view it may be said to be changing.

Now it is impossible to describe in words these two characteristics of the soul (viz. eternal and everchanging) at one and the same time. From this standpoint of view, therefore, the soul is indescribable.

If we desire to state these two qualities of the soul not simultaneously but consecutively we may say that the soul is eternal as well as ever-changing.

Now if we view the soul from the standpoint of substance and at the same time, view the said two qualities simultaneously we have the statement thus:—The soul is eternal as well as indescribable.

Similarly, first by accepting only the standpoint of modifications and then taking the two standpoints at once we have this statement:—The soul is not eternal as well as indescribable.

And lastly if we accept both these standpoints consecutively and then simultaneously in one statement, we have to say:—The soul is eternal, not eternal as well as indescribable.

If we cast a glance at the above sevenfold mode of statements we find that out of these seven modes only three modes viz, (1) the soul is eternal (2) is not eternal and (3) is indescribable—are principal.

All the rest are got by the process of permutation and combination. By understanding, therefore, the nature of these three, we get a clear idea of the nature of the sevenfold system of logic. The first mode predicates the eternal nature of the soul, while the second negatives this nature of the soul. These two statements can be considered as true only when they are not mutually contradictory. The eternal nature of the soul is evident from the continued (unbroken) consciousness of the past and future. The changeability of the soul is also a patent fact if we look at the various modifications of it under different conditions. Both these statements, therefore, are true only when we regard the eternal nature of the soul from the standpoint of Reality and accept its everchanging nature from the standpoint of Modifications. Both these statements about the soul, though apparently contradictory to each other are not in the least ambiguous or doubtful. For, these statements are born of different standpoints and therefore not essentially contradictory to each other. To indicate this difference of standpoint the words 'from a particular standpoint' (Apekṣā-viśeṣa) are used at the beginning of the sentence in every mode (Bhaṅga) and the word 'only' is used at the end of the sentence of every mode.

Thus the sentence of the first mode would run thus:— From a particular standpoint the soul is only eternal. The sentences of the rest of the modes should be similarly framed. Usually the word Kathaṅcit or Syāt is used in place of the Samskr̥ita word Apekṣā-viśeṣa. Thus it is said 'आत्मा कथंचिन्नित्य एव or आत्मा स्यान्नित्य एव.'

All the affirmative qualities of a thing can be stated one after another in the clear unambiguous words but if we have to describe all such qualities simultaneously we cannot find any adequate expression for it. In such cases the thing is said to be indescribable. This is the third mode (where the thing is said to be indescribable) and from its own point of view this statement also is true.

With reference to a man—these seven modes would be as follows:—From a particular point of view, he is only a man (2) not a man (3) he is indescribable (4) is man as well as not man (5) is man as well as is indescribable (6) is not a man as well as indescribable (7) is man, not a man as well as is indescribable.

The characteristic of a man consists in his being of a particular form, size and attributes and also consists in his not being of any other qualities or nature. It follows, therefore, that a man is man from the standpoint of his own form and a not-man from the standpoint of the form of others. Similarly it is impossible to be man from the standpoint of his own form as well as other's form at one and the same time. Thus originally there are only three principal modes:—(i) is (ii) is not and (iii) is indescribable. All the rest are derived from these three modes. 36—40

Distribution of these seven modes between Artha-paryāya and Vyañjana-paryāya is made in the following verse:—

एव सत्त्वियप्पो वयणपहो होइ अत्यपज्जाए ।

वज्जणपज्जाए उण सवियप्पो णिव्वियप्पो य ॥ ४१ ॥

All these seven modes of stating a thing are possible in Artha Paryāya, but in Vyañjana Paryāya those statements that deal with the divisible (Savikalpa) aspects of a thing as well as its indivisible aspects are possible.

¹ Paryāya means difference or modification. When a thing differs from another, it necessarily is limited on account of its space, time and form ; and when it assumes some particular form it is necessarily devoid of other forms. Thus difference presupposes the affirmation of some quality and the negation of some other qualities. Owing to this affirmation as well as negation, it is sometimes said that it is and at other that it is not. And as this existence and non-existence of the thing cannot be stated at the same time it is said to be indescribable from this point of view. Thus with the standpoint of modifications the three modes of (i) is (ii) is not and (iii) indescribable are necessarily connected. That the rest of the modes as well, are connected with the standpoint

1 It cannot be said definitely whether the interpretation of this verse, which we have offered is the same as meant by the author himself. The commentators Abhayadeva Sūri and Yaśovijaya Upādhyāya do not seem to have clearly interpreted this verse. Both have more or less indulged in wild fancy while interpreting this verse. The readers are, therefore, requested to try to understand traditional interpretation of this verse. vide in this connection Dravya-guṇa-paryāya-Rāsa 4.13.

of modifications, follows as a matter of course. These seven modes are possible only in Artha Paryāya and not in Vyañjana Paryāya. For Vyañjana Paryāya means a Paryāya dependent on words that is to say it can only be stated by means of words and is thus never indescribable. All the modes, therefore, that have the element of indescribability in them are not possible with reference to Vyañjana Paryāya. In Vyañjana Paryāya only two modes or at the most three modes are possible viz. (i) the statement of affirmation of some quality (ii) the statement of negation of any quality and possibly (iii) the statement of affirmation and negation of a quality, one after another. From this point of view it is said that all seven modes are possible in Artha-Paryāya while only two modes are possible in Vyañjana-Paryāya. The Vyañjana Paryāya of a man (Puruṣa) is the quality of being a man (Puruṣatva) while the Vyañjana Paryāya of a Ghaṭa (jar) is ghaṭatva, the quality of being a jar. These two Paryāyas being of the nature of one from the standpoint of unbroken stream of similar Paryāyas partake of the nature of generic and from the standpoint of modification created anew every moment partake of the nature of Viśeṣa, distinguishing attributes. Thus these two Paryāyas are both Savikalpa and Nirvikalpa, of the nature of generic and particular but they can never be said to be indescribable for they are already expressed by the words 'a man' and 'a jar' respectively. But those modifications that arise and disappear at every moment, and that are not expressed by means of words merely, have in them the possibility of being indescribable 41.

The viewpoint of Paryāyārthika-naya does not cover the whole truth.

जह दवियमपियं तं तहेव अत्थि त्ति पज्जवणयस्स ।

ए य ससमयपन्नवणा पज्जवणयमेत्तपडिपुण्णा ॥ ४२ ॥

Paryāyārthika-naya maintains that the modification which a thing undergoes at a particular time is its real nature. But this view of Paryāyārthika since it does not take into consideration the substance (underlying the modifications) does not cover the whole truth as propagated by Jains.¹

The following verse presents the real significance of the viewpoint of Dravyārthika-naya by means of an illustration.

पडिपुण्णजोवणगुणो जह लज्जइ बालभावचरिएण ।

कुणइ य गुणपणिहाणं अणागयसुहोवहाणत्थं ॥ ४३ ॥

A man who has attained his youth is ashamed of the activities of his childhood and at the same time longs to have those qualities that would contribute to his future happiness.

¹ We have given the explanation of the verses 42 and 43 together. See P. 48.

From the standpoint of Paryāyārthika-naya, that accepts the reality of the form of a thing which is perceived by senses only, there is no permanent thing that persists at all times. This view accepts as real that thing only which exists at present. It ignores the connection of a thing with the past and the future and takes that thing to be real which exists at present. In its view every new moment a new thing springs up. Exactly opposite is the view of Dravyārthika-naya that accepts a permanent substance persisting at all times ; in this view, therefore, there is no such thing as difference due to difference of time.

Dravyārthika-naya offers an illustration to prove the eternal substance existing at all times thus:—when a man attains maturity and develops his power of understanding what is right and what is wrong, he recollects the indiscretions of his childhood and is ashamed of them. His thinking power also inspires him to acquire qualities that would secure happiness for him in future.

Thus the dismay caused by recollections of his mistakes in the past and the regard for qualities born of the hope for happiness, bind the man with the past and the future respectively, for if the man would not have lived in the past and he would not have committed mistakes how would he have been ashamed ? And moreover if he would not have hoped to live in future for whom would he desire to secure means for future happiness ? The significance of the illustration is that the man must be considered as one having lived in the past

and living at present and likely to live in future—that is one and the same persisting at all times.

Thus, in short, the first view that looks at the differences of things, regards as true various states of a man such as, childhood and youth ; while the other view looking at the oneness of thing regards as true the underlying Reality or substance abiding at all times. Both these views are true in their own limited spheres, but if they arrogate to themselves the whole comprehensive truth without any regard for the limited truth of the rival view, they are not true. 42, 43

What in reality is the intrinsic nature of a man, is related in the following verses. They also determine the nature of the soul by following the same line of inquiry :—

एय होइ जोव्वएत्थो बालो अएणो वि लज्जइ ए तेण ।
 ए वि य अणागयवयगुणपसाहणं जुज्जइ विभत्ते ॥ ४४ ॥
 जाइ-कुल-रूव-लक्खण-सएणा-संबंधओ अहिगयस्स ।
 बालाइभावदिट्ठविगयस्स जह तस्स संबंधो ॥ ४५ ॥
 तेहिं अतीताणागयदोसगुणदुगुंछणज्जुवगमेहिं ।
 तह बंध-मोक्ख-सुह-दुक्खपत्थणा होइ जीवस्स ॥ ४६ ॥

(44) A man who is in his youth cannot be regarded as merely a child. He is something else than a mere child. But at the same time

he cannot be considered as altogether different from a child for if he is so, how can he be ashamed of the indiscretions of his childhood ? In the same manner if the young man is entirely different from the old man which he is likely to be in future, we can not account for endeavour in securing qualities for his future. He, therefore, must be considered as identical with the old man in future.

(45) Thus the man appears to be one and the same on account of the abiding characteristics of caste, family, form, qualities, name and others while the same man appears to be changing or perishing on account of his different states such as childhood, youth and old age. Moreover on account of his sense of shame his past mistakes and preference for the qualities in future, the man must be considered as one and the same person in all states and at all times.

(46) Exactly similar is the case with the soul. Like the man in the above illustration, it must be considered as one, as well as many, the same as well as different—when we look

at it with reference to bondage and liberation and happiness and misery etc.

In the above illustration of a man both unity and diversity with reference to a man have been proved thus. Apparently there is a clear difference between a child and a young man. But even in spite of this apparent difference, if we do not regard the child as one with the young man at present, we cannot account for the sense of shame which the young man feels when he remembers the mistakes of his childhood ; nor can we account for his attempt to secure future happiness if we do not regard the young man at present as one with the old man which he is likely to be in future.

Caste, family, form, peculiar signs (as those of a mole on the body) name, and other relations of a son, a father etc.—all these go to prove the oneness of that man ; on the other hand the states of childhood, youth and others following one after another—go to prove the diversity or manyness of a man. Not only this external attributes such as caste, family, childhood, youth go to prove the uniformity as well as diversity of a man, but his inner qualities such as his sense of shame for his past indiscretions and his longing for future happiness, go to prove the same uniformity and diversity of a man.

The soul also, must be considered as one, as well as many—the same as well as different, if we are to account for the bondage and liberation, the desire for obtaining happiness and the removal of misery. The soul, therefore,

like a man, is both one and many—the same as well as different. 44-46.

“The soul and the matter are from one point of view—one and from another point of view different”—say the following verses:—

अणोणानुगयाणं ‘इमं व’ ‘तं व’त्ति विभयणमजुत्तं ।

जह दुद्ध-पाणियाणं जावंत विसेसपज्जाया ॥ ४७ ॥

रुआइ पज्जा जे देहे जीवदवियम्मि सुद्धम्मि ।

ते अणोणानुगया पणवणिज्जा भवत्थम्मि ॥ ४८ ॥

(47) As it is impossible to separate milk from water when they both are intermingled with each other, similarly it is neither possible nor logical to separate two things (such as the soul and the matter in the present case) when they are inextricably blended together or when one permeates the other. No one can point out in such cases, that this is one thing and this—another. It is not possible to distribute the Paryāyas of a composite thing into its component parts.

(48) All the modifications in a body such as form and others should be described as inextricably mixed together. Similarly in

the case of the soul all the attributes of it in the state of its temporal existence should be described as interpenetrating.

The Author has given the illustration of a man to prove that what is true in the case of a man is also true in the case of the soul. But here some one would take an objection to this sort of a comparison between a man and a soul. For, the objector would say, the soul is one pure element—but in the illustration given the man is not one pure element. He is, composed of a body and a soul. This illustration is therefore, not a correct one. You have first proved the unity and diversity of a man and established the proposition of birth, decay and permanence of a thing. Then on the strength of this illustration you proved the same sort of unity and difference in the soul, in order to account for the capacity to incur Karmic bondage and liberation and to account for the attempt to secure happiness and remove unhappiness. But the comparison of the soul with a man does not stand, for in the first place the man is not characterised with unity and difference at the same time. All the states that you have shown such as those of childhood, youth etc., as proving the difference in man really show the difference of his body, for these are the different states of his body and not of his soul. On the other hand the qualities, such as, his sense of shame due to his recollection of the past and his longing for future happiness, that in your opinion, go to prove the oneness of his soul, for these qualities belong exclusively to the soul. To sum up, therefore, the

difference in man that you presume to have proved is the difference with reference to his body only while the oneness which you thought you proved with reference to the man, in reality belongs to the soul of the man. Thus the illustration being incorrect, the unity and difference of a soul and matter is not proved. To this objection the Author answers thus :—

In the above illustration of a man, his body and soul are so inextricably bound together by mutual attraction that you cannot assign separate places to them by saying 'Here is the body' and 'There is the soul'.

Not only this but the attributes of colour, smell and others and the states of childhood, youth etc. which you think are concerned with the body only and which, you think, are not influenced by the soul are not so in reality. They are more or less concerned with the soul also. Similarly you think that knowledge, recollection, happiness, misery and others are the attributes of a soul and have nothing to do with the body. But this also is not true. They are more or less concerned with the body and are influenced by the body. The fact of the matter is that all the attributes or modifications of the soul and the body that are observed in a mundane soul are the result of the union of the soul with matter and as such should be considered as the joint attributes of the soul and matter. Thus so called modifications or attributes of matter, therefore, should be regarded as belonging to the soul also, while the so-called attributes of the soul as belonging to matter also. This being the case, the different

states of childhood, youth etc. not only prove difference in a body but in the soul as well. Similarly past remembrances and others not only prove oneness in the soul but also in the body. There is, therefore, nothing wrong in regarding unity and difference in a man as he is composed of body and the soul.

On the other hand, though it is not possible to show difference in space, of the soul and its tenement the body, still in reality both the soul and the body are different for their characteristics are essentially different.

As all the modifications of a mundane soul are dependent on Karma, while all the subtle and gross modifications due to Karmic atoms depend on the soul, all the possible modifications of the soul and the Karmic body should be properly considered as their joint modifications, for both the soul and the body are inextricably bound together is clear from the above explanation. It is evident that the case of man compared with that of the soul is an apt illustration in point.

A doubt may be raised as to how the incorporeal soul can be united with the corporal Karmic matter. But this can only be removed by saying that it is the very nature of things that this should be so that the soul and the body be united together. 47, 48.

The following verse states as to how things are philosophically termed when this intermingling of the soul and matter is taken into consideration :—

एवं 'एगे आया एगे दंडे य होइ किरिया य' ।

करणविसेसेण य तिविहजोगसिद्धी वि अविरुद्धा ॥ ४९ ॥

This being the case "One soul, one Activity (daṇḍa) and one Action is established." And it is also not contradictory to say a three fold yoga is possible on the strength of different media (Karaṇas).

In the religious books such as Sthānāṅga and others it is often stated that the Soul is one, a Daṇḍa is one ; an act is one. It is also stated therein that Yoga in a soul is three-fold. These statements cannot be reconciled if we regard the soul and matter as absolutely different from each other. Daṇḍa means minds, body and speech. Now these three are nothing but molecules of matter and are in reality, many forms of matter. Now how can these many be termed as one ? In the same manner—Yoga is but the vibrating power of the soul. How can it be said to be threefold, being only one ? Either this power being one with the soul may be termed as one, or taken in the sense of a form of power, may be said to be infinite ? But how can it be reasonably said to be threefold ?

All these contradictions disappear if we regard mutual identity of the soul and matter. Forms of matter may be innumerable. The molecules of mind, speech and body may be infinite, and the actions dependent on these molecules may be correspondingly innumerable. But

all these when viewed as bound with one soul may reasonably be termed as one Daṇḍa and one Kriyā. Similarly though the power of the soul is one, when we look at it as being bound with the threefold means of matter such as mind, speech and body, there is nothing wrong in saying that the power is only threefold Yoga. 49

The following verse explains the reason as to why a particular principle or element is said to be internal and why another is said to be external :—

ए य बाहिरञ्चो भावो अन्तर्बो य अत्थि समयस्मि ।

एतद्विद्यं पुण पदुच्च होइ अन्तर्विसेसो ॥ ५० ॥

In reality, there is no such division as external or internal; but internality depends upon mind.

It is said that there is internal principle that experiences happiness, misery etc. Similarly, matter that has the attributes such as form etc. is external. Now as it is said above, if the soul and matter are regarded as interpenetrating each other, it follows that matter which becomes one with the soul must be said to be external. But this is not admissible in Jaina philosophy. How, then, do you reconcile these contradictory statements? The Author answers the question in the present verse as follows :—There is not such division as external thing or

internal thing in Jaina philosophy. It only says that those things that can be perceived by the mind only, are called internal ; while those things that can be perceived by outward senses are called external. According to this definition, even matter can be said to be internal, while even the soul can be said to be external. Those Karmic and other atoms that are not the objects of external senses are necessarily internal ; while though the soul is subtle, its activities being perceived by the outward senses through matter, it becomes corporal and, as such, is external also. 50.

What, then, is the standpoint of each Naya with reference to the soul and matter ? this is explained in the following verses :—

द्वन्द्वियस्स आया बंधइ कम्मं फलं च वेएइ ।

बीयस्स भावमेत्तां ए कुणइ ए य कोइ वेएइ ॥ ५१ ॥

द्वन्द्वियस्स जो चेव कुणइ सो चेव वेयए णियमा ।

अण्णो करेइ अण्णो परिभुंजइ पज्जवणयस्स ॥ ५२ ॥

(51) According to the standpoint of Dravyāstikanaya the soul does exist and therefore it is bound by Karma and gets the fruit of this bondage of Karma. According to Paryāyāstika on the other hand, there is nothing except creation. Neither, therefore, is anything bound or gets fruit of the bondage.

(52) According to the view of Dravyastika whosoever does any thing, necessarily gets the fruit of it himself. According to the view of Paryāyāstika, however, some one does an act and another receives the fruit of that act.

Dravyāstika-naya believes in an eternal principle. According to its view, therefore, it can be said that the doer of an act and the enjoyer of its fruits are one and the same. That is to say he who does an act also enjoys the fruit of it. But this can never be said from the standpoint of Paryāyāstika, for it believes in the momentariness of things, and thinks a thing is created in one moment and the very next moment it perishes. There can, therefore, according to this view, never be any doer of a thing or any enjoyer of its fruit. At the most, if this Naya accepts the possibility of a doer or an enjoyer at the very moment of its creation, it can be said, on behalf of this Naya that one does an act but another enjoys the fruit of it. The first Naya accepts an eternal or persisting substance and therefore can regard the agent and the enjoyer as being one and the same person. But the fundamental defect in this is that when it regards the soul as absolutely changeless it cannot account for its various modifications under different conditions. And unless it accepts these modifications, the soul, as an agent and an enjoyer, cannot be accounted for. To remove this difficulty, this Naya must accept the doctrine of modifications

of the second Naya. On the other hand, in the second Naya there being no permanent underlying principle or substance, the idea of an agent or of an enjoyer has no stand at all. This Naya, therefore, must accept some permanent principle, as it is accepted by the first Naya. Thus both these Nayas are defective in something. Jaina philosophy, therefore, has accepted both these Nayas to have the whole comprehensive truth. 51, 52.

The following verse states the Jaina view-point :—

जे वयणिज्जवियप्पा संजुज्जंतेसु होन्ति एएसु ।

सा ससमयपण्णवणा तित्थयराऽऽसायणा अण्णा ॥ ५३ ॥

The right Jaina view consists of the combination of these two Nayas with all their attendant statements.

Both these Nayas are not competent to give the whole comprehensive truth, when taken individually and therefore both are in a way partial and defective and false.

If they recognise their own limitation and supplement their partial truth by the partial truth of the rival Naya the whole becomes a perfect and all comprehensive truth. Jaina philosophy accepts these statements and thoughts that lead to an all comprehensive truth. For, instance:—it holds that from a particular point of view, the soul is eternal ; it is also changing from another point of view.

As regards the corporal nature of the soul, it holds that the soul is both corporal as well as incorporal ;

-as regards the purity of the soul, it holds that it is both pure and impure ; as regards its size, it holds that it is both-- all-pervading and limited ; as regards number, it holds that the soul is one as well as many. All such comprehensive thoughts and statements come within the pale of philosophy.

All such comprehensive statements and thoughts have a place in Jaina philosophy only if they lead to truth. It wants to accommodate liberally all such statements. But those statements which appear to be comprehensive or absolute, come in conflict with the right view of Jaina philosophy, are not accepted. For instance such absolute statements as this that the soul is nothing but eternal, or that the soul is nothing but ephemeral or again statements based upon false view such as this that the soul, in its own nature, is corporeal and incorporeal, from the point of view of the nature of others or that the soul is impure by its very nature but pure from the standpoint of the nature of others, are unacceptable to Jaina philosophy even though such statements have an appearance of mutual connection. 53.

The following verse tells us that even in Jaina view mentioned there is a place for exception :—

पुरिसज्जायं तु पडुच्च जाणओ पणवेज्ज अणायरं ।

परिकम्मणाणिमित्तं दाएहि सो विसेसं पि ॥ ५४ ॥

A wise speaker sometimes places before his audience even one of the two Nayas

having regard to their various mental levels. - For that speaker is justified in stating one particular standpoint of one Naya only, with a view to lead them in the long run to all-comprehensive truth.

It is true that according to Jaina view it is advisable to make statements presenting various aspects of a thing. Sometimes, however, it is permissible for a speaker to make statements presenting the view of one Naya only looking to the level of his audience. When a speaker following the Anekānta or many-sided view of logic thinks the audience before him of a mixed character, of different levels of culture, or when he sees that a particular man in his audience already accepts one of the two Nayas, he merely states the remaining Naya before him and tries to win him over to that Naya only. Sometimes therefore he is found to state the view of Paryāyāstika Naya before a man adhering to Dravyāstika and to state the view of Dravyāstika before a man adhering to Parvāyāstika for thus he hopes to supplement the onesided view of his hearer by stating the other view and thus to bring him nearer to all-comprehensive truth of things which is only possible for Anekānta the many-sided view of things. Such onesided statement of only one Naya made by the speaker deliberately has a place as an exception in Jaina philosophy. **54.**

CHAPTER II.

The following verse distinguishes Jñāna (knowledge) from Darśana (perception.) : —

जं सामण्यगहणं दंसणमेयं विसेसियं णाणं ।
दोएह वि णयाण एसो पाडेक्कं अत्थपज्जाओ ॥ १ ॥

Perception is the cognition of the general ; and knowledge means the cognition of the particular.

This is the import of the two Nayas respectively.

Two points as accepted by the Jaina Doctrine are mentioned here (i) Definition of Jñāna (knowledge) and Darśana (perception) (ii) Their distribution between the two Nayas.

A thing is cognized by the soul either in its general form or with its particulars. This general cognition of a thing is called Darśana (perception) in Jain a terminology ; and the cognition of a thing in its particular aspects is termed as knowledge. This comprehension of the general aspect of a thing gives rise to Dravyāstika (Non-menal) standpoint ; while comprehension of the particular aspects of a thing gives rise to Paryāyāstika (Pheno-

menal) standpoint. Perception therefore goes with Dravyāstika and knowledge goes with Paryāyāstika. 1.

How far one and the same thing appears different at the time of its perception and at the time of its knowledge is stated in the following verse :—

दन्वट्टिओ वि होऊण दंसणे पज्जवट्टिओ होइ ।

उवसमियाईभावं पडुच्च णाणे उ विवरीयं ॥ २ ॥

At the time of perception i.e. from the Dravyāstika point of view the soul appears in its general aspect. But even then (i.e. at the time of perception) it is with its particular attributes also when its quality of Upāsama is concerned.

Exactly otherwise does the soul appear when viewed from Paryāyāstika point of view; but even then, though it seems to appear with its particular aspects only, it maintains at the same time its general character also.

The soul or for the matter of that, any other thing has always got double characteristic of general and particular. Now the question arises, if everything has this double aspect of general and particular, what difference is there

either when it is looked at from a particular point of view or from a general point of view? The answer to this question is given in the present verse :—

With whatever view-points a thing is looked at, the thing itself is the same. The only difference is this that when it is looked at from a general point of view, its particular aspect though existing all the time does not appear in bold relief at that time but remains unseen or concealed, behind the general feature. Similarly when a thing appears in its particular aspect, its general form is there all the while ; only it does not intrude upon our notice but is hidden in the background. Take for instance, the soul. Even when it appears, in its pure general form, that is to say merely as a consciousness, it has got its particular aspects (such as Aupaśamika, Kṣāyika etc., and various other attributes) existing at that very time ; only these particulars are not manifest at that particular time. On the other hand, at the time of looking at it from the standpoint of particular aspects the general characteristics of the soul such as consciousness etc., are there present—only they are not manifest at the time of looking at it from the standpoint of its particulars. In short, the particular aspect of a thing is dormant or subordinate at the time of the perception of a thing and the general character of a thing is dormant at the time of the knowledge of a thing. 2.

As a rule these two cognitions—perception and knowledge—do not occur or take place at one and the same time, but even this rule has

its limitation—as is made clear in the following verse :—

मणपज्जवणाणंतो णाणस्स य दरिस्सणस्स य विसेसो ।
केवलणाणं पुण दंसणं ति णाणं ति य समाणं ॥ ३ ॥

This rule of separate time for the two cognitions, perception and knowledge, holds good upto the knowledge called *Manahpariyāya* (thought-reading of others). But in the case of the highest kind of knowledge called *Kevala Jñāna* (the supreme or the absolute knowledge) no such separate time for perception and knowledge is necessary ; for these two cognitions synchronize in *Kevala Jñāna* (absolute knowledge). In fact at this stage, perception and knowledge are one and the same.

Looking to the definitions of perception and knowledge (as is given in the first verse of this chapter) and considering the fact that at the time of perception particular is dormant and at the time of knowledge general lies dormant, three questions arise in our mind—(1) are, perception and knowledge, the two functions of only one soul but occurring at different times ? or (2) do these two functions of the soul occur at one and the same time ? or (3) do these two perception

and knowledge, constitute but one function with reference to one thing only, but merely assuming two different names because of the two standpoints of a thing—the general and the particular ?

While answering to these questions, the author first states a point about which there is likelihood to be no difference of opinion. After this he takes a controversial matter and states his point of view with reference to it.

It is a matter of common knowledge that five kinds of Jñāna (knowledge), and four kinds of Darśana (perception) have been enumerated in the Jaina metaphysics.¹ Out of these five kinds of knowledge four excepting perfect knowledge differ from perception in point of time. They are obviously, therefore, different from perception. From this statement which is universally accepted it follows as a matter of course that in the imperfect or Sāvarana Upayoga the two upayogas—perception and knowledge—are mutually different. Not only that but these two take place at different times. But in the case of Nirāvarana Upayoga the author states his opinion as being different from that of the current Jaina tradition and says that in the case of Kevala-jñāna there is no difference in time as regards perception and knowledge. Not only that but from the point of view of Absolute or Kevala-jñāna perception and knowledge are one and the same. It follows from this, therefore, that the Upayoga of Nirāvarana Cetanā is quite different from that of Chādmasthika Upayoga and that, in consequence, the former comprehends

¹ See Tattvārtha : 2. 9.

both the general character and the particular aspects of things and then it is called Darśana (perception) when it takes cognizance of the general and is called knowledge (jñāna) when it takes cognition of the particular. From the above explanation it follows that in the state of absolute knowledge, the two Upayogas viz. perception and knowledge are neither two different functions at one and the same time but one function only at one and the same time. 3.

The author, now, in course of his discussion of different views of this matter refers in the following verse to the view of "the consecutiveness of perception and knowledge which is based on Āgama (Jain scriptures):—

केई भणंति "जइआ जाणइ तइया ए पासइ जिणे" ति ।
सुत्तमवलंबमाणा तित्थयरासायणाभीरू ॥ ४ ॥

Some Ācāryas (Jain preceptors) who are afraid, lest they violate the command of Tirthaṅkara the holy guide and who consequently, depend on the Sūtra view of the matter say that whenever the omniscient that is the holy guide comprehends a thing that is to say knows a thing in its particular form, he does not look at the general character of the thing.

The author here introduces one of the two current views, as regards the peculiarity of absolute knowledge. He first introduces the view of Krama-vāda i.e. consecutiveness and explains its import. This view maintains that in the very nature of things, consciousness is incapable of grasping the general and the particular aspect of things simultaneously. Whether it be Chādmasthika or Nirāvaraṇa, therefore, the two functions of perception and knowledge are necessarily consecutive i. e. take place one after the other. This view is particularly supported by the text of the Sūtras. The persons holding this view being afraid to hold another view lest they would thereby flout the opinion of the holy Tirthāṅkara who preached these sūtras, set forth their view strictly in accordance with the traditional interpretation of the Sūtras. In support of their view, they cite some Sūtras. ¹ :—

“केवली णं भंते ! इमं रयणप्पमं पुढविं आगारेहिं हेतूहिं उवमाहिं दिट्ठं तेहिं वण्णेहिं संठाणेहिं पमाणेहिं पढोयारेहिं जं समयं जाणति तं समयं पासइ ? जं समयं पासइ तं समयं जाणइ ?

गोयमा नो तिणट्ठे समट्ठे ।

से केणट्ठेणं भंते ! एवं वुच्चति—केवली णं इमं रयणप्पमं पुढविं आगारेहिं जं समयं जाणति नो तं समयं पासति । जं समयं पासति नो तं समयं जाणति ?

गोयमा । सागारे से नाणे भवति । अणागारे से दंसणे भवति, से तेणट्ठेणं जाव यो तं समयं जाणति । एवं जाव अहे सत्तमं । एवं सोहम्मकप्यं जाव अच्चुयं गेबिज्जगविमाणा अणुत्तरविमाणा ईसीपम्भारं पूढविं परमाणुपोग्गलं दुपदेसियं खंधं जाव अणं तपदेसियं खंधं ॥” —Prajñāpāṇa : 30. 319. p. 531.

Similar Sūtras occur in Bhagawati : 14. 10 ; 18. 8.

*Question:—*Divine Lord ! When the man with Absolute knowledge knows this earth Ratna-prabhā in all its details such as its size (dimensions), its causes, its resemblance to something, its illustrations, its colour, its form, its measurements and its Pratyavatāra—in short when he knows this earth, does he at the same time perceive it ? And when he perceives it, does he at the same time know it ?

*Answer.—*Oh Gautama ! What you think is not correct (that is to say, it is not correct to think His knowledge and perception are simultaneous).

*Question :—*Divine Lord ! When the absolute knower knows this Ratna-prabhā earth he does not perceive it (as you say) and when He perceives it, he does not know it. What is the reason of this ?

*Answer :—*The reason is, Oh Gautama ! That his knowledge is full of forms, but his perception is formless. He, therefore, does not perceive when he knows, and does not know when he perceives. This is absolutely true in the vast range of his knowledge and perception that is to say down from the seventh earth and Saudharma-kalpa upto Iṣatprāgbhāra and from the matter of ultimate atom to the molecules having infinite special units. 4.

The following verses introduce for discussion the Sahavādipakṣa (the view of simultaneousness) to criticise the Kramavadi-pakṣa.

केवलणाणावरणकखयजायं केवलं जहा णाणं ।

तह दंसणं पि जुज्जइ णियआवरणकखयस्संते ॥ ५ ॥

भयणइ खीणावरणे जह मइणाणं जिणे ण संभवइ ।
 तह खीणावरणिज्जे विसेसओ दंसणं नत्थि ॥ ६ ॥
 सुत्तम्मि चेव साई अपज्जवसियं ति केवलं वुत्तं ।
 सुत्तासायणभीरूहि तं च दट्ठवयं होइ ॥ ७ ॥
 संतम्मि केवले दंसणम्मि णाणस्स संभवो णत्थि ।
 केवलणाणम्मि य दंसणस्स तम्हा सणिहणाइं ॥ ८ ॥

(5) When the obstruction in the way of absolute knowledge is completely removed, absolute knowledge springs up as a matter of course. Similarly when the obstruction in the path of absolute perception is completely removed, absolute perception springs forth as a matter of course.

(6) It is said that as sensuous knowledge is not possible in the case of a man with absolute knowledge when the obstructions in his path are completely removed, in the same manner perception at a time different from that of knowledge is not possible in a man, all the obstructions in whose path are absolutely removed.

(7) The Sūtra expressly says that absolute knowledge or perception has beginning but

no end. Those who have any regard for the commandment (*i.e.* import) of the Sūtra must pause and ponder over the Sūtra.

(8) If we persist in saying that at the time of absolute perception, knowledge is not possible, and that, at the time of absolute knowledge, perception is not possible, it would mean that both have end, (but this is absurd, since we already know from the Sūtra that both are endless).

In this connection there is another view—the view of simultaneousness of knowledge and perception which takes its stand mainly on logical arguments. Here the author places in the spirit of a dispassionate reviewer, this view in juxtaposition to the view of successiveness ; and asks the Sahavādī to advance arguments against Kramavādī. Advocates of simultaneousness advance these following three arguments against the Kramavādī:—

(1) If, by virtue of something, absolute knowledge is possible at a certain moment, then, obviously, absolute perception also must take place by virtue of the same thing, at that moment. If complete removal of obstruction is the cause of absolute knowledge, how is it— then that absolute perception is not possible even when the removal of obstruction of perception has taken place at that very moment ? The fact is that, as the unclouded sun, by its very nature, gives light and heat at the same

time, unhampered consciousness brings to light as a matter of course, both knowledge and perception at the same time.

(2) As when all the Karmas obstructing knowledge are removed, in the case of Kevalin (omniscient) his Mati-jñāna and Śruta-jñāna and others are not different from absolute knowledge—in the same manner, when the Karama obstructing perception is removed in the case of a Kevalin—it is not proper to say that even His perception appears at a time different from that of knowledge.

(3) In the holy scriptures it is said that both Absolute knowledge and Absolute perception have beginning but no end. Now according to Kramavāda both these will have beginning as well as end. For according to Kramavāda, Absolute perception is not present at the time of Absolute knowledge and Absolute knowledge is not present at the time of Absolute perception. The Kramavāda, therefore, obviously goes against the scriptures. This is what the scriptures say¹ :—

Question :—Divine Lord! Is there any duration, period as regards Absolute knower (Kevala Jñani)?

Answer :—Oh Gautama—Absolute knower even though has beginning, is imperishable, endless. 5-8

In the following verse the Siddhāntavādi (author) first questions his opponent and then introduces his own viewpoint :—

1 “ केवलज्ञाणी णं पुच्छा । गोयमा । सातिप अपज्जवसिप ”
—Prajñāpanā : 18. 241, p. 389.

दंसणणाणावरणक्खए समाणम्मि कस्स पुण्वञ्जरं ।

हेज्ज समं उप्पाओ हंदि दुए एत्थि उवओगा ॥ ९ ॥

If the removal of obstruction, in the case of both perception and knowledge, is common, which of the two will spring forth perception first or knowledge first ? To this question this must be the only answer that both spring forth simultaneously. In fact, both are not different from each other.

In order to refute the view of Kramavādin, advocate of oneness, using the argument of Sahavadin puts a query to Kramavadin thus:—If the removal of the obstruction of both knowledge and perception takes place at one and the same time, can the question at all arise as to which comes out first.—Knowledge or Perception ? There is no reason why absolute knowledge should come first and absolute perception afterwards ? Now if the Kramavādin persists in saying that absolute knowledge comes first, then with an equal force of argument, this opponent may say that absolute perception appears first and knowledge afterwards. Besides, the Kramavādin has to answer the question as to why there should be succession at all as regards absolute knowledge and perception even when the removal of their obstruction is simultaneous ?

This difficulty in the way of Kramavādin does not present itself in the case of Sahavādin, for the latter holds

that both absolute knowledge and perception appear simultaneously. But the Author holds that even the view of Sahavādin is not logical. The Author grants that the sahavādin cannot be blamed as the Kramavādin in advancing faulty argumetns as regards the appearance of knowledge and perception, but says that Sahavādi-view which holds that absolute knowledge and perception are two separate functions, is wrong. The truth of the matter is that in the state of omniscience, there is only one function. 9.

In the following verses the Author charges his opponent with the following faults (in argument).

जइ सव्वं सायारं जाणइ एकसमएण सव्वएणू ।

जुज्जइ सया वि एवं अहवा सव्वं ए याणाइ ॥ १० ॥

परिसुद्धं सायारं अवियत्तं दंसणं अणायारं ।

ए य खीणावरणिज्जे जुज्जइ सुवियत्तमवियत्तं ॥ ११ ॥

अहिट्ठं अणायं च केवली एव भासइ सया वि ।

एगसमयम्मि हंदी वयणवियप्पो न संभवइ ॥ १२ ॥

अणायं पासंतो अहिट्ठं च अरहा वियाणंतो ।

किं जाणइ किं पासइ कह सव्वएणू ति वा होइ ॥ १३ ॥

केवलणाणमणंतं जहेव तह दंसणं पि पएणत्तं ।

सागारग्गहणाहि य णियमपरित्तं अणागारं ॥ १४ ॥

(10) If you say that the omniscient comprehends in deeper details all physical things

at one and the same time, you must admit that it is so at all times, otherwise there is no meaning in his omniscience.

(11) Granted that the knowledge is distinct and that the perception is indistinct but in the case of a person whose knowledge-obstructions are absolutely removed there is no such thing as distinct or indistinct.

(12) The omniscient, at all times, speaks of things unperceived and unknown—you will have to grant this and if you do so, you will not be able to account for the belief that the omniscient preaches a thing which is both known and perceived at one and the same time.

(13) What can an omniscient know and perceive if he is said to be perceiving what is unknown and knowing what is unperceived? If such is the case, how can he claim omniscience?

(14) In the scriptures, both knowledge and perception are said to be endless. But if we make a distinction between

perception and knowledge, the former has necessarily a limited province.

The author in these verses, in order to establish his view of oneness (of knowledge and perception) leaves five charges with equal force against both the Kramavādin and Sahavādin.

1. Both the Kramavādin and Sahavādin hold that knowledge and perception are two separate functions. Naturally they must hold that the province of Absolute knowledge is 'the particular' and that of Absolute perception is 'the general'. It follows, therefore, that both these functions (Absolute knowledge and Absolute perception) like other kinds of knowledge such as Mati, Śruta and others comprehend only one of the many objects. If they once accept this, they have to admit that in their view there is no function of knowledge which has the capacity to comprehend all things, in other words there is no such thing as Absolute knowledge. If this be so how can a Kramavādin or Sahavādin account for Absolute knowledge or Absolute perception ? Now to account for Absolute knowledge and Absolute perception one has to suppose that every comprehension has as its object the partial and the general aspect of the world at every moment. If this is believed, we will have also to believe in a comprehension of all things through one comprehension, to make room for Eternal knowledge and Eternal perception. While doing this the distinction between knowledge and perception will be effaced

absolute knowledge and absolute perception being one and the same thing.

2. The only difference between Sākāragrahaṇa and Nirākāra-graṇa is that the former is Vyakta while the latter is Avyakta. Now in the case of a Kevalin the obstructions being completely removed there can not be any difference between Vyakta and Avyakta for this difference is entirely due to obstructions.

3. It is said in the scriptures that a Kevalin at all times speaks of things known and perceived. This statement in the scriptures neither Kramavāda nor Sahavāda agrees with. According to Kramavāda a thing which is known at a certain moment is not perceived at that very moment and a thing which is perceived at a certain time is not known at that very time. This being the case, according to Kramavāda, whatever a Kevalin says is either known or perceived at a given time but it is not both known and perceived at the same time. Thus a Kevalin may be said to say about things unknown or unperceived.

Now in Sahavāda it is true that both the functions (of knowing and perceiving) are said to take place simultaneously; still the province of each function is strictly limited, that is to say according to Sahavāda knowing concerns itself with the particulars of things while perceiving busies itself with the general only. Hence, when Kevali knows a thing he does not perceive it and when he perceives a thing, he does not know it. Thus according to this view a Kevali at all time is either a speaker of unknown things or else a speaker of unperceived things.

4. If we, according to the view of Kramavāda or Sahavāda, regard two separate functions of knowing and perceiving, it follows that a Kevali perceives a phase or aspect of a thing which was unknown before, similarly he knows an aspect of a thing which was not perceived before. In other words, it would mean that for a Kevali some thing at least of a thing remains either unknown or unperceived. If this be so, how can we say that he is all knower or all perceiver ? On the other hand, a Kevalin according to these two views would mean one by whom some thing remains unknown or unperceived.

5. In the scriptures knowledge and perception are said to be endless, limitless. But if we follow these two views and regard two separate functions the limitlessness of knowledge and perception can not be maintained. For perception, because it is indistinct, has necessarily a limited province as compared with knowledge which is distinct.

The view of oneness, on the other hand, is not at all open to the above-mentioned fallacies or defects since it accepts only one function and admits that the one function has the double capacity to comprehend both the general and the particular in the case of a Kevalin. And so there is no difference between Absolute knowledge and Absolute perception **10—14.**

In the following verse Kramavādi tries to defend himself but is finally silenced by the author :—

भण्णइ जह चउणाणी जुज्जइ णियमा तहेव एयं पि ।

भण्णइ ण पंचणाणी जहेव अरहा तहेयं पि ॥ १५ ॥

Kramāvadi says —As it is in the case of a person who is said to possess four kinds of knowledge so also it is the case here. To this the Author says:—As the omniscient can not be said to be the possessor of five fold knowledge so also it is the case here.

This is what Kramavādi says:—Take a man who is still in an imperfect state, that is to say, has his knowledge obstructed but is a possessor of four kinds of knowledge. He deals with his functions of knowledge by turns, still as the capacity of his knowledge is ever present, he is said to have knowledge having beginning but no end, to have eternal knowledge, to have a distinct knowledge to speak about things known and perceived ; to be both the knower and perceiver. Similarly a Kevali though dealing with his functions of knowledge in succession may be said, on account of his having the potentiality of Absolute knowledge and perception, to have limitless knowledge, perception etc. The analogy being perfect Kramavādi cannot be said to be at fault.

The following is the rejoinder of Author to this :—Having mere potentiality is no sufficient argument. If we regard mere potentiality as good as actual working of the power, how is it that an Arihanta is not said to be a possessor of five types of knowledge, Pañca-Jñāni ?

It is, therefore, quite clear that a Kevalin is said to be omniscient etc., not merely because he has the capacity of absolute knowledge, perception etc, but because he actually functions the power—utilizes the power. 15

In the following verse the author explains the illustration given in the preceding verse and establishes finally his own views :—

परमाण्वणिज्जा भावा समत्तसुयणाणदंसणा विसञ्चो ।
 ओहिमणपज्जवाण उ अण्णोणविलक्खणा विसञ्चो ॥ १६ ॥
 तम्हा चउन्विभागो जुज्झइ ण उ णाणदंसणजिणाणं ।
 सयलमणावरणमणंतमक्खयं केवलं जम्हा ॥ १७ ॥

(16) That kind of knowledge, which is called Śruta i.e. heard or studied, deals with things that can be stated or mentioned by means of words. While the provinces of Avadhi and Maṇḍaparyāya kinds of knowledge are things altogether distinct and different in each kind. All these things are limited and may yield to some sort of classification or division.

(17) But in the case of knowledge, and perception of a Kevalin unlike the four kinds of knowledge no division is possible. For that knowledge and perception are absolute, perfect, endless and imperishable.

It is already said in the sixth verse that if absolute knowledge and perception are regarded as having succession on the analogy of Mati, Avadhi and other kinds of knowledge—it would follow that Absolute knowledge deals only with the particulars of things while Absolute perception deals only with the generality of things. This would mean that both Absolute knowledge and perception are imperfect and partial. Now whatever is imperfect or partial can never be persent, just as Mati and Avadhi and others in a Kevala state where the obstructions are completely removed.

By the above illustration or analogy of Mati and others the Absolute knowledge which occurs successively is proved to be open to the charge of imperfection. The analogy of Mati and others is more clearly explained in the present verse. The province of Mati and Śruta kinds of knowledge is those things that can be stated, spoken or decided. For both these kinds of knowledge deal with things, having limited attributes. Now Avadhi knowledge deals with Pudgala (atoms) only and the province of Manaḥparyāya is merely the mind-atoms

It is clear, therefore, that all these four kinds of knowledge working always in succession have their province quite limited.

Moreover, owing to suppression or annihilation of obstruction as well as owing to imperfection, there can be mutual distinction between these four kinds of knowledge. But there cannot be any kind of internal difference between Absolute knowledge or Absolute perception

either from the view point of succession or simultaneity for these two (Absolute knowledge and perception) are neither imperfect nor have any such accident such as suppression or annihilation. Hence it is clear that only one Absolute comprehension must be accepted. 16, 17.

Verse 18th wipes out scriptural inconsistencies :—

परवत्तव्यपक्त्वा अविसिद्धा तेसु तेसु सुत्तेसु ।

अत्थगईअ उ तेसिं वियंजणं जाणओ कुणइ ॥ १८ ॥

In some of the Sūtras apparently it seems that the views of Krama-vāda and Sahavāda are mentioned and supported but it is for the wise to see that these Sūtras are interpreted in their proper spirit (that is in a way in which they are shown to be in agreement with the view of oneness).

It is clearly established with cogent argument in the preceding verses that Absolute knowledge and perception are identical. There are, however, some Sūtras in the scriptures which do not apparently agree with the view of oneness, nay, some of these Sūtras distinctly state separateness of knowledge and perception. How to steer clear of this difficulty ? To this the Author says :—If a thing is once proved to be of a particular nature on the strength of clear proofs but is found to be stated in the Śāstra in

a contrary way, the best course is to interpret the Śāstra in a way which will not be contrary to the proofs or evidence adduced. In the present case the view of oneness is conclusively proved by several proofs. A wise man, therefore, ought to interpret the Sūtras in such a way that they will not go against the established view. Those Sūtras in which is stated the difference between knowledge and perception, should be considered or regarded as quoting the view of Kaṇāda or some such non-Jaina view. These non-Jaina works accept the succession of knowledge with regard to a person who is not a Kevalin. The Jaina Sūtras obviously follow this non-Jaina view in that limited field. In the Sūtra "Jaṁ Samayaṁ Jāpai" therefore, the word Kevalin should not be interpreted as omniscient (Sarvajña) but one with absolute Śruta knowledge or Avadhi or Manāḥparyāya. In the case of these three kinds of absolute knowledge it is to be supposed that at the time of knowledge there is no perception and that at the time of perception, there is no knowledge. 18

In the following verse, the author removes all the doubts as regards his own view:—

जेण मणोविसयगयाण दंसणं एत्थि दव्वजायाण ।
तो मणपज्जवणाणं शियमा णाणं तु णिदिट्ठं ॥ १९ ॥

In as much as there is no Perception (Darśana) of substance that is the object of Manāḥ-

paryāya, it is exclusively said to be Jñāna and not perception.

Absolute knowledge and perception are one, but in practice both the words Jñāna and Darśana are used. Now the question arises:—If in the case of Absolute knowledge both the terms Jñāna and Darśana are accepted to point out one and the same thing for all practical purposes, why not so in the case of Manahparyāya? Why not say both Manahparyāya-Jñāna as well as Manahparyāya-Darśana? To this the Siddhānti gives the following answer:—The object of the function of Manahparyāya is the mass of the atoms of mind. But the peculiarity of this function of Manahparyāya is that it takes its objects always in their particular aspect and never in their general aspect. As, therefore, the substances that are the objects of Manahparyāya are always comprehended in their particular aspect it is named in the Śāstras as 'Knowledge.' The case of Absolute knowledge is altogether different. Though it is one, it is comprehended in two-fold ways—in its general as well as its particular aspect. It is therefore quite proper to use the words Jñāna and Darśana with reference to Kevala Jñāna. 19

The following verse gives another reason as to why one Absolute knowledge is said to be twofold :—

चक्षुश्चक्षुश्चवदिकेवलाण समयस्मि दंसणाविअप्पा ।
परिपट्टिया केवलणाणदंसणा तेण ते अण्णा ॥ २० ॥

In the Śāstra Darśana is divided into Cakṣu, Acakṣu, Avadhi and Kevala. From this division we can say that Jñāna and Darśana are different,

It is by the force of argument already proved that Kevala Jñāna is one and one only. How is it then that it has been the practice to speak of knowledge and perception as being different? The reason is similarly this that it has been so stated in the Śāstras. In Jain Śāstra among the four divisions of Darśana, Kevala Darśana is mentioned to be one. But if it is said that Kevala Jñāna and Darśana are really different, since it is so distinctly stated in the Śāstras, we reply no. Whatever Śāstra may say, it has been incontrovertibly proved that Absolute knowledge and perception are one but they are said to be different not because the cognitions are different but because the objects of this knowledge are two-fold viz., general and particular. **20**

The following two verses describe the partial view (Ekadeśi) :—

दंसणमोगहमेत्तं 'घडो' त्ति णिण्वण्णणा हवइ णाणं ।

जह एत्थ केवलाण वि विसेसणं एत्तियं चेव ॥ २१ ॥

दंसणपुण्वं णाणं णाणणिमित्तं तु दंसणं एत्थि ।

तेण सुविणिच्छियामो दंसणणाणाण अण्णत्तां ॥ २२ ॥

(21) Just as all Avagraha is Darśana and definite comprehension of a thing such as

‘This is a jar’ is knowledge, in the same manner, definite and indefinite apprehension is the differentiating factor between Absolute knowledge and Absolute perception.

(22) Perception necessarily precedes knowledge but knowledge never precedes perception. It can, therefore, be definitely asserted that, in a Kevalin, knowledge and perception are not different from each other.

There is a third party man who regards knowledge and perception as identical, but gives another illustration to prove his point, which the Siddhāntin does not approve of. He, therefore, introduces this view of the third party in order to refute the illustration :—

This is what the third party says :—

The function of Mati is only one but its preliminary stage namely that of Avagraha (indistinct) is nothing but Darśana and the next or final stage such as that of apprehending the thing fully is called Jñāna. In other words the same Mati function in its lengthy process is named two-fold. In its primary stage when the object is indistinctly apprehended, it is called Mati Darśana and in its latter stage owing to the distinct apprehension of objects it is called Mati Jñāna. In exactly the same manner Absolute knowledge is fundamentally one, but owing to the differ.

ence in apprehending its objects, in practice it acquires two-fold names that of Darśana and Jñāna

In truth, however, Jñāna and Darśana in Kevalin ought to be regarded as identical otherwise it goes against the dictum of Śāstra. It is as follows :—

It is everywhere accepted that Jñāna—knowledge, always follows Perception—Darśana. Now if Jñāna and Darśana in Kevalin are different, this rule must hold good even in the case of a Kevalin. That is to say, even in the case of a Kevalin, Kevala Jñāna ought to be regarded as following Kevala Darśana. It cannot be so regarded. This can never be, for as all the Labdhi (spiritual acquisitions) are already obtained as knowledge of the forms (Sākāra-upayoga). The beginning of Kevala-labdhi also takes place with Sākāropayoga. But if this is admitted we have to suppose Darśana as following Jñāna which is simply absurd. For the usual rule is this that a Jñātā first apprehends things in their general form and afterwards in their particular form. 21, 22.

Following verses examine the illustration given by the Ekadeśi objector.

जइ ओगहमेत्तं दंसणं ति मण्णसि विसेसिअं णाणं ।

मइणाणमेव दंसणमेव सइ होइ निप्फणं ॥ २३ ॥

एवं सेसिदियदंसणम्मि नियमेण होइ ण य जुत्तं ।

अह तत्थ णाणमेत्तं घेप्पइ चक्खुम्मि वि तहेव ॥ २४ ॥

(23) If you say that all Avagraha is Darśana and comprehending the particulars of a thing is Jñāna (knowledge) then it follows that Mati-jñāna alone is Darśana (perception.)

(24) The same must be said of all the rest of the senses as regards Darśana. But this is absurd. Now if in the case of objects of other senses, only knowledge is accepted the same must be accepted in the case of the objects of sight.

The Siddhānti agrees with this partial objector as regards identity but the Siddhānti does not agree with the illustration given by the Ekadeśi. He therefore subjects the illustration to a searching analysis and in order to show his disapproval of the illustration shows to what absurdity the acceptance of the illustration will land the Ekadeśi.

The Siddhānti points to the objector his absurdity. He says "If you regard the portion of Mati namely Avagraha as Darśana and regard the comprehension of particulars as Jñāna, it would follow that the case of the sight Cākṣuṣāvagrahā-mati will have to be regarded as sight-perception. The same will be the case as regards other senses. That is to say Avagraha Mati with regard to the sense of hearing will have to be regarded as ear-perception and Avagraha-mati with regard to the sense of smell will have to be regarded as smell-perception. But in Śāstra there is no such thing as ear-perception or smell-

perception is mentioned. On the other hand ear-knowledge or smell-knowledge are terms found used in Śāstra. Now if you say, sight-perception is the only thing accepted in Śāstra then we say why this partiality in the case of sight perceptions. The proper thing, then, is to deny Cakṣu-darśana in the case of the sense of sight along with the senses of hearing and smelling. Unless you accept this position, you cannot account for Cakṣu-darśana and Acakṣu-darśana. Either you shall have to accept Darśana impartially in the case of all the senses (not in the case of Cakṣu alone) or you shall have to give up the idea of accepting any such thing as Cakṣu-darśana. On the whole, it is difficult for you to account for the two terms—Cakṣu-darśana and Acakṣu-darśana—as are found in the Śāstra." 23, 24.

In the following verse the Siddhānti defines clearly the term Darśana thus :—

गणं अपुढे अविसय य अत्थम्मि दंसणं होइ ।

मोत्तूण लिंगओ जं अणागयाईयविसयसु ॥ २५ ॥

Darśana is that kind of knowledge which takes place as regards things untouched and which do not come within proper province. This cognition does not admit in its fold that knowledge which takes place by virtue of Hetu (the middle term) as regards things that are to happen in future and other things.

The Siddhānti on his part is accosted by the objector thus:—If the two functions namely Jñāna and Darśana are not regarded as separate and if the Avagraha portion of Mati be not regarded as Darśana how are you going to account for the fact that in the Śāstra the two terms Cakṣu-darśana and Acakṣu-darśana are used in the sense of two different functions ?

To this, the Siddhānti answers thus : - Yes ; we say that Jñāna and Darśana are not two different functions. To say that Avagraha portion of Mati is Darśana and thus to account for the use of the term Darśana is, we think, not quite proper. Still we think Śāstra is quite right in using the two terms in different senses. This does not go contrary to the supposition that the two functions are identical. Our definition of Darśana is this: That knowledge which takes place through the medium of Cakṣu without touching its objects and through the medium of mind is called Cakṣu-darśana and Acakṣu-darśana respectively. The knowledge proceeding from inference is of course to be excluded from this definition. According to this definition, knowledge of remote objects such as the sun or the moon, not actually in touch with eye but springing through the medium of eye is called Cakṣu-darśana. And the cognition of subtle things such as an atom or other things apprehended through mind is called Acakṣu-darśana. Cognition springing from mind alone (and not from any other senses falls under the head of Acakṣu-darśana. From this it follows that only two senses are such that they do not actually touch the objects which they perceive and

that the two kinds of cognition from these two senses are respectively called Cakṣu-darśana and Acakṣu-darśana. There is a subtle distinction between these two kinds of cognition. It is this that while all the cognition proceeding from the eye which does not touch its objects is called Cakṣu-darśana—all the cognition through mind with regard to objects that are not perceived by senses is not necessarily Acakṣu-darśana. For instance, though cognition by inference is with regard to objects not perceived by senses, it is not to be regarded as Acakṣu-darśana. It is for this reason that cognition by inference is expressly excluded from the definition of Darśana. That inference about past and future things which takes place on the strength of Hetu such as for instance—the inference of rains in upper regions on seeing the floods of a river in lower regions or the instance of an impending rain by seeing the clouds overcasting the sky, or the inference of fire in a kitchen by seeing the smoke issuing from it are all such kinds of cognition as deal with objects not apprehended by senses but by mind ; still they are not called Acakṣudarśana. The long and short of this is Acakṣudarśana means no more than conceptual judgment through mind. 25.

Over-absurdity (Atiprasaṅga) avoided :—

मणपज्जवणाणं दंसणं ति तेणेह होइ ए य जुत्त ।

भरणइ णाणं णोइदियम्मि ए घडादयो जम्हा ॥ २६ ॥

According to the aforesaid definition Manahparyāya is Darśana ; but it is not so.

It is laid down that proper province of this knowledge is Mind which is technically called No-indriya. The jars etc. are excluded from its sphere.

If this definition of Darśana 'Only that cognition which is neither begotten from the contact with nor comprehended by sense-organs is Darśana (Perception)' be adopted, Manaḥ-paryāya Jñāna will have to be termed Darśana, because Manaḥ-paryāya Jñāna takes cognizance of or say appertains to the things such as jars etc. as thought out by the mind and at the same time those objects are not physically associated with or touched by the soul or mind.

Admission of Iṣṭāpatti (proving what is to be proved) also would not do here because there is not a single reference in the whole of the canonical literature to the effect that one may be led thereby to believe Manaḥ-paryāya as Darśana. Now how this anomaly should be dismissed? To meet this objection it is said that this is not a real hitch in as much as it is wrong to say that Manaḥparyāya Jñāna concerns only with those things as thought out by mind. The real business of Manaḥ-paryāya consists in knowing the molecular change of the particles of mind and not the things such as jars etc. One with a Manaḥparyāya does think of the things as thought out by other's mind but he does that through inference. First he knows the mind-particles and this he knows directly. Then he infers and through infer-

ence he comes to know of the things as thought out by the mind-particles of other people.

This means that if there is anything on which the Manaḥparyāya has a legitimate claim, it is the mind-particles and not the things as alleged by the objector. Moreover, it is never the case that the mind particles of other people are not touched by Manaḥparyāya Jñānā because those mind particles are nothing but the members of the same category called mind which is always in touch with the soul which is the recipient. Thus they being similar are in constant touch with the soul. So Manaḥparyāya can be clearly excluded from Darśana. 26

Further explanation regarding accepted arrangement :—

मइसुयणाणणिमित्तो छउमत्थे होइ अत्थउवलंभो ।

एगयरम्मि वि तेसिं ए दंसणं दंसणं कत्तो ? ॥ २७ ॥

In the case of Chadmasthas, Mati and Sruta-jñāna are the two things responsible for arriving at a cognition of categories. If there is nothing like Mati-darśana or Sruta-darśana, how then Darśana is at all possible ?

On one hand it is logically established that Jñāna (knowledge) and Darśana (Perception) are different

because the arrangement that only that process of knowledge which goes by the name of Avagraha is styled Darśana is also not free from flaw. While on the other hand understanding in the case of Chadmasthas is possible only if the presence of Mati and Śruta is granted. Now if Darśana is not believed to exist either in Mati-upayoga or in Śruta-upayoga, Vyavahāra cannot be justified. Therefore, we arrive at a conclusion that the definition of Darśana outlined just before holds good. 27

Why Śruta-jñāna is not Darśana ?

जं पञ्चस्वग्गहणं ए इन्ति सुयणाणसम्मिया अत्था ।

तम्हा दंसणसद्दो ए होइ सयले वि सुयणाणे ॥ २८ ॥

The term Darśana cannot be applied to śruta-jñāna because the things conceived by śruta-jñāna cannot be directly conceived.

The definition of Darśana is only that the cognition which is neither begotten from the contact with nor comprehended by sense-organs is perception. According to this definition Śruta-jñāna is also Darśana because its objects are not all necessarily touched by sense-organs. How can it be said, then, that the term Darśana cannot be applied to Mati or Śruta ? This objection can be met with by saying that Śruta-jñāna no doubt comprehends objects not touched by the sense-organs but it does this only indirectly. While the aforesaid definition of Darśana enjoins direct comprehension; This means, in

other words, that whole Śruta-jñāna can never be Darśana. 28

Arrangement of Avadhi-darśana :—

जं अप्पुट्टा भावा ओहिण्णाणस्स होंति पच्चक्खा ।

तम्हा ओहिण्णाणे दंसणसद्दो वि उवउत्तो ॥ २९ ॥

There can be also Avadhi-darśana because by Avadhi-jñāna things though untouched are directly comprehended. It means that as there is Avadhi-jñāna there is also Avadhi-darśana.

There is no objection in believing the existence of Avadhi-darśana because it can see directly the Paramāṇus which the sense-organs cannot necessarily see and comprehend. So the definition of Darśana does include Avadhi-darśana. 29.

Both Jñāna and Darśana can simultaneously fit in with Kevala-upayoga which is only one :—

जं अप्पुट्टे भावे जाणइ पासइ य केवली णियमा ।

तम्हा तं णाणं दंसणं च अविसेसओ सिद्धं ॥ ३० ॥

Jñāna and Darśana can remain simultaneously without distinction as we see in the case of a perfect being who as a rule

perceives and knows the objects simultaneously.

A perfect being perceives and knows directly the whole universe in its particular and general form. At the same time that whole universe is not touched whole to whole to his Soul-Particles. So His comprehension of the universe is a direct one and arisen without the actual touch of His sense-organs with it. Hence this comprehension can be equally, though relatively, expressed by both the terms jñāna and Darśana. That comprehension is Jñāna because it knows its particular elements and the same is Darśana also because it sees its general features also. So the Upayoga the common offsprings of which are jñāna and Darśana is one throughout. Hence it is illogical not to believe in Ekopayoga-vāda. 30

Contradiction evidenced in Canonical literature avoided :—

साई अपज्जवसिये ति दो वि ते ससमयओ हवइ एवं ।

परतिथयवत्तवं च एगसमयंतरुप्पाओ ॥ ३१ ॥

According to real Jaina doctrines both Jñāna and Darśana have a beginning but no end. This being the case a doctrine which formulates that there is an interval of one Samaya between the productions of both of them should not be accepted as a real Jaina Doctrine.

It is logically proved that they are identical but the contradiction which is still there in the Canonical Literature is to be reconciled. Because when an omniscient sees, he cannot know and when he knows, he cannot see. In short, he cannot see and know at one and the same time. Such a statement which is found in the Sacred Books has got to be clearly explained.

It has been logically proved once for all that one and the same Upayoga is responsible for both Jñāna and Darśana. And that represents the true doctrine of the scriptures. When this doctrine is accepted as a standard doctrine every other is to be taken only relatively. So the doctrine which preaches succession and not the simultaneity of jñāna and Darśana is not the real Jaina doctrine and every other doctrine is non-jaina in its implication. It is not the case always that in a sacred literature of a particular creed, those doctrines only are described which are favourable. Sometimes the doctrines belonging to other creeds are also incidentally described, disproved and discarded. So the doctrine of Kramavāda (succession of jñāna and Darśana) is to be taken as belonging to the other creeds. 31.

Explanation of Darśana when used in the sense of faith :—

एवं जिणपण्यत्ते सहमाणस्स भावओ भावे ।

पुरिसस्साभिणिबोहे दंसणसहो हवइ जुत्तो ॥ ३२ ॥

सम्मरणाणे शियमेण दंसणे दंसणे उ भयणिज्जं ।

सम्मरणाणं च इमं ति अत्थञ्चो होइ उववणं ॥ ३३ ॥

(32) Darśana is to be strictly confined to that process of knowledge, which is styled as crude impression (Abhinibodha) of one who looks at all things described by Jinas with unquestionable faith.

(33) When there is Samyag-jñāna, there is Samyag-Darśana always but the converse is not true.

The word Darśana as used in the Jaina scriptures is a technical one. It has got two special meanings. One meaning of it is Indistinct consciousness (Nirākāra Upayoga) and the other is Faith (Śraddhā). As regards its first meaning, the author while recording his protest, has established its real meaning. According to him the meaning of Darśana is not Nirākāra Upayoga which is totally different from distinct knowledge (Sākāra Upayoga). But the knowledge can be from another point of view also styled Darśana.

In the same way he differs from others as regards its other meanings also. What he means clearly is this that Samyag-darśana which is one of the three instruments ensuring emancipation is not according to him different from Samyag-jñāna. In other words Samyag-jñāna is Samyag-darśana. However, it is

a question which of the Samyag-jñāna can properly become Samyag-darśana. To this he replies that Darśana is that process of knowledge which is firm in faith (Apāya) regarding Jaina scriptures. Samyag-darśana, he goes on, is a particular kind of inclination (Ruci) which is never essentially different from knowledge (Mati jñāna) that is based upon genuine, unshakable belief in things taught by Jinas.

This leads us to believe that the word Darśana as used in Darśanā-varaṇa and Darśana-mohanīya at the time of describing varieties of Karmas, is not to be taken in the sense of Darśana but in the sense of jñāna.

It is no doubt true that Samyag-jñāna is Samyag-darśana but all Darśana is not always Samyag-jñāna because Darśana which is one-sided cannot claim to be Samyag-jñāna. It should touch all the facts of a thing. So it becomes established that Samyag-darśana as it is grounded on Anekānta can claim to be called Samyag-jñāna. Therefore one who wishes to obtain Right Faith (Samyag-daśrana) should simply try for the acquisition of Versatility of Aspects (Anekānta). 32-33.

Mention of a delusion created by the word Sādi-aparyavasita and its removal :—

केवलणाणं साई अपज्जवसियं ति दाइयं सुत्ते ।

तेत्तियमित्तोत्तूणा केइ विसेसं ण इच्छंति ॥ ३४ ॥

जे संघयणाईया भवत्थकेवलिविसेसपज्जाया ।

ते सिञ्जमाणसमये ण होंति विगयं तन्नो होइ ॥ ३५ ॥

सिद्धत्तरोणं यं पुणो उपपणो एस अत्थपज्जाओ ।

केवलभावं तु पडुच्च केवलं दाइयं सुत्ते ॥ ३६ ॥

(34) Some do not recognize Viśeṣa which means a modificatory change because they have become reckless on account of the sūtra which is to the effect that perfect knowledge is without an end but not without a beginning.

(35) Those particular conditions such as bodily frame etc. which exist in a perfect being—Kevali who is still not a Siddha do not remain as entities when he attains Siddhatva. It means, then, Kevala is destroyed.

(36) Moreover, this Artha-paryāya, which is just like absolute knowledge, comes into being in the form of Siddhatva. With reference to Kevala-Bhāva the sūtra declares that it is without an end.

Sādi means with a beginning that is to say it is produced ; Aparyavasita means without destruction that is to say endless. The sūtra declares that both Kevala-jñāna and Kevala-darśana are without a termination but not without a beginning. Some of the pontiffs understand this 'beginningfulness' and 'beginninglessness' in

the sense that they both are produced after the removal of the Karmic obstruction and thus they have a beginning while, they are never destroyed after their having once come into existence on account of the simple absence of the Karmic obstruction and hence they have no end as they had a beginning.

The Siddhānti meets the objector on the ground that he merely indulges in the outward form of its meaning without entering into its very heart and offers this explanation for his own part.

According to Jainism, such a Padārtha as has no origination, destruction and permanence, is never existent. Kevala Paryāya, being a Padārtha, must have *prima facie* all the three above-mentioned characteristics. Corporeal peculiarities such as a particular bent of body etc. in a Kevali when he has a body, vanish when he gets Siddhi.

The bodily peculiarities which appear at the time of the body's existence do also indicate those of the soul because between them too there is a milk and water relationship. When it stands thus, it means that when the body with a particular condition is destroyed the soul which had had a parallel condition is also destroyed. Now the soul is Kevalarūpa and when the soul is destroyed as proved above, it also means that the Kevala is also destroyed. Moreover, the very soul now became Siddha thus giving rise to a new Siddha-paryāya. Thus from the viewpoint of the destruction of Bhava-paryāya and a production of a new Siddha-paryāya with

reference to the same soul, it can be conclusively established that the previously existing Kevala-Jñāna-Darśana paryāya of the soul is destroyed bringing into existence a new Kevala-Jñāna-Darśana. This means clearly that both Kevala-jñāna and Kevala-darśana are not merely Sādi (with a beginning) but Saparyavasita (with an end) also. Moreover, even though Jñāna-Darśana-paryāya undergoes origination and destruction every moment, it is still one and permanent in the form of Kevala. Thus it is endless. This smoothes down a contradiction in the Shāstras that they are Aparyavasita. They are Saparyavasita and Aparyavasita both strictly in the senses mentioned above. To sum up, Kevala-bodha as it comes into being only once, is no doubt, Sādi, and because it undergoes modificatory changes and remains stable also, it is Aparyavasita 34-36.

Doubt as to the difference between Jiva and Kevala and its removal through example :—

जीवो अणाइणिहणो केवलणाणं तु साइयमाणंतं ।
 इअ थोरम्मि विसेसे कह जीवो केवलं होइ ॥ ३७ ॥
 तम्हा अणो जीवो अणो णाणाइपज्जवा तस्स ।
 उवसमियाईलक्खणविसेसओ केइ इच्छन्ति ॥ ३८ ॥
 अह पुण पुण्वपयुत्तो अत्थो एगंतपक्खपडिसेहे ।
 तह वि उयाहरणमिणं ति हेउपडिजोअणं वोच्छं ॥ ३९ ॥
 जह कोई सट्ठिवरिसो तीसइबरिसो णराहिवो जाओ ।
 उभयत्थ जायसदो वरिसविभागं विसेसेई ॥ ४० ॥

एवं जीवद्वयं अणाइणिहणमविसेसियं जम्हा ।

रायसरिसो उ केवलिपज्जाओ तस्स सविसेसो ॥ ४१ ॥

जीवो अणाइनिहणो 'जीव' ति य णियमओ ण वत्तवो ।

जं पुरिसाउयजीवो देवाउयजीवियविसिट्ठो ॥ ४२ ॥

(37) Soul is Anādi-nidhana and perfect knowledge has a beginning and no end. Thus there being a gulf of difference, how can soul become Kevala-rūpa.

(38) Therefore, some believe that soul is different due to the differences in characteristics such as Aupaśamika etc. and its modificatory changes such as Jñāna etc. are also different.

(39) This has been referred to before while controverting Ekānta-pakṣa. Still, however, I am inclined to cite an example which points to the relationship between Sādhya and Hetu (Major Term and Middle Term).

(40) Just as the word 'became' in 'A sixty years old man became a king at the age of thirty' shows a difference in years.

(41) So also Jiva-dravya without any Viśeṣa is Anādinidhana. Thus a Kevala-

paryāya just as Rāja (in the above example) is a viśeṣa and nothing more.

(42) We cannot make this one-sided statement that the eternal soul is soul and nothing else, that is to say, it is in a general form and none else. Because a soul embodied in a man's frame is treated as different from a soul embodied in a god's frame.

Some, in order to prove the statement 'Soul is Absolute knowledge' as inconsistent, argue that Soul being a substance is beginningless and endless while Absolute knowledge has a beginning and no end. There being so much essential difference between them two, how can soul be called Absolute knowledge? Is not this a difference of the type of a difference that exists between a substance and a modificatory change?

Moreover, between them there is also a difference of characteristics. Kevala-paryāya is due to Karmic annihilation while Jīva has a transformatory character. Therefore it follows that soul and knowledge which is its modificatory change are totally different from one another.

While refuting this one-sided view the writer says that such a refutation has already been made in verse 12. Chapt. 1. Still for further illucidation, he gives an example wherein is shown a concomittance between middle term and major term.

Just as a sixty years old man who becomes a king at the age of thirty, is styled "This man became a king"; so also a soul fit to get emancipation is beginningless in the form of a soul but when it gets perfect knowledge, we say, "This soul became Omniscient." The man of the example is the same throughout but a modificatory change of his not being a king is now gone and in its place a modificatory change of his being a king has come into existence. So also in the matter under discussion, soul which was there persists throughout. A modificatory change of his not being Omniscient is now gone and in its place a modificatory change of his being an Omniscient has appeared. At both these places, as there is no distinction between a modificatory change, and a general the origination and destruction of modificatory change are construed as origination and destruction of general. Thus we are entitled to say:—"This man having first ceased as a not-king has now become king" and "This soul having first ceased as imperfect being has now become an Omniscient." In other words, general even though it is permanent throughout, is destroyed as a previous modificatory change and has come into existence as posterior modificatory change. This establishes identity between Dravya and Paryāya. It can never be exclusively said that a Dravya remain as a Dravya throughout.

If the case stands like that, we will have to believe that Jīva-dravya as such will be one throughout. And if we believe like that the practice that the present man is different from the past man will not hold good for the

simple reason that the Jīva, according to the above mentioned belief, being one and the same in any condition and under any circumstances, cannot receive different names. While Bheda has a sure recognition. This leads us to believe that Dravya and Paryāya are interconnected. If we believe like this the Jīva in which are inhered Puruṣa paryāya and the Deva paryāya which are themselves different, will receive different designations of Puruṣa and Deva. From this we can deduce that Dravya and Paryāya which are connected by a common tie of Sattva, are not Bhinna (Separate). Just as a man has got Paryāya of Arājatva and Rājatva so also we can say without inconsistency that Jīva is Kevala-rūpa because Kevala-jñāna-paryāya and Jīva dravya are not separate entities on the ground that they both are Sat (existent). So, as we are able to establish identity between Dravya and Paryāya we can very well do so as regards Samānya and Viśeṣa also. 37-42.

Corroboration of difference in the same modificatory change :—

संखेज्जमसंखेज्जं अणंतकप्पं च केवलं णाणं ।

तह रागदोसमोहा अणणे वि य जीवपज्जाया ॥ ४३ ॥

Kevala-jñāna (Perfect knowledge) is threefold:—Saṅkhyāta (measurable), Asaṅkhyāta (immeasurable) and Ananta (infinite or endless). In the same fashion Rāga

(attachment), Dveṣa (hatred) and Moha (infatuation) are also the non-essential modificatory changes of the Jiva (Soul).

Just as Śāstras (Canonical Literature) declare that Kevala-jñāna is three fold as aforesaid, so also the Vai-
bhāvika-paryāya (non-essential modificatory changes) such
as Rāga etc. are also threefold. Shāstric statement
as regards this classification with respect to every
Paryāya indicates that in the view of the great Lord
there is not only the identity amongst Paryāyas but
difference also. Without difference or dissimilarity,
there cannot be numerical diversity in modificatory
changes also and therefore Bheda (non-identity) as between
Dravya and Paryāya should be Śāstrically believed in
just as Abhedā. In short, Dravya and Paryāya are some-
what Bhinna and somewhat Abhinna. There is identity
in difference and difference in identity. 43

CHAPTER III

The first two verses support the mutual identity of the general and the particular :—

सामरणस्मि विसेसो विसेसपक्खे य वयणविणिवेसो ।

दव्वपरिणाममरणं दाएइ तयं च णियमेइ ॥ १ ॥

एगंतणिव्विसेसं एयंतविसेसियं च वयमाणो ।

दव्वस्स पज्जवे पज्जवा हि दवियं णियत्तेइ ॥ २ ॥

(1) Sometimes the particular is mentioned with reference to the general, while sometimes the general is mentioned with reference to the particular. Such mixed references go to prove that apart from the general there is such a thing as its particular that is different from it or from its transformation, however, that particular is in no way different from the general.

(2) A person who refers exclusively to the general divests it of its particulars ; similarly a person who talks of the particulars exclusively divorces them from their general.

Everyday affairs are based on knowledge. The proof of the validity of knowledge is that our daily intercourse that is based on knowledge must be in itself valid. Real knowledge is the only means of determining the true nature of a thing. All the highest generalizations as well as the middle generalizations such as Sat (reality), Dravya (substance) always assume the form of particulars in one form or the other, when they come into the province of our daily life. Now this everyday dealing of ours cannot be said to be wrong. It must, therefore, be supposed that over and above the general, there is such a thing as particular. But all the same this general and particular are not mutually exclusive. They are one and the same thing. It is clear, therefore, that the general and the particular are interwoven in each other and the particular stands on the same level as the general. Everything, therefore, has two aspects one general and another particular and these two aspects are mutually indivisible.

If we suppose that there is nothing except the general and that there is no such thing as particular, we shall be forced in everyday dealing to give up all the particulars of a thing and to accept only its general aspect, for instance, all the transformations of gold such as bracelets or ear-rings that are real in our daily life and that are actually experienced by us shall have to be given up and every time we shall have to deal with gold as gold and nothing else—no varieties or transformations of it. If on the other hand we accept only the particulars of gold such as bracelets and ear-rings and eliminate the

underlying substance gold from our daily intercourse, there will be a great confusion in our daily experience. The truth is that exclusive acceptance of the general only or particular only would land us into utter confusion. Our experience tells us that in a language no words are competent enough to signify merely the general or merely the particular. They are mutually interdependent. Though, therefore, they are separate from each other they are also identical. 1-2.

The following two verses explain the meaning of the word Pratitya-vacana that is words that are considered as authentic :—

पञ्चुप्पन्नं भावं विगयभविस्सेहिं जं सम्मण्णोइ ।

एयं पडुच्चवयणां दव्वंतरणिस्सियं जं च ॥ ३ ॥

दव्वं जहा परिणयं तहेव अत्थि त्ति तस्मि समयस्मि ।

विगयभविस्सेहि उ पज्जएहिं भयणा विभयणा वा ॥ ४ ॥

(3) Those words that connect the present change of a thing with its past and future changes and those words that synthetise the general running through all the individuals are words that are reliable or authentic.

(4) Because although the present change of a certain thing apparently has not any relation to the changes of that thing in past

or in future still the truth is that the present change has definitely a relation with the past and future changes of that thing.

Those words that give a correct idea of a thing are technically called in Jain śāstras "Pratitya-vacana." The same words are otherwise said to be the words of a reliable person (Āpta-vacana).

If we want to change a gold ear-ring into a necklace and if that gold ear-ring was formerly a bracelet it is obvious that all these three varieties or transformations of gold are different from one another. They are however, identical from the standpoint of gold which is the original or underlying substance in all transformations. From this illustration we can lay down the general proposition that though the particulars of a certain thing (at different times) are different from one another looking at them from the standpoint of a particular, they are at the same identical with one another for the substance underlying all these particulars is one and the same. This being the truth, words that denote the relation of a certain change in the present with another change in the past or the future must be regarded as reliable words for they give the most correct idea of a substance and its various particulars.

What is true about the changes of a thing at all times is also true of the changes at all places. For instance, a black cow at a particular place appears to be different from a white cow at another place. But in truth both

these cows and hundreds of other cows differing in point of colour or size are all identical for Cowness is common to them all. Thus if there are words that find oneness in things apparently differing from one another, those words are reliable because they establish oneness among things widely different from one another. 3, 4.

The following two verses explain as to how the attributes of existence as well as of non-existence are possible in one and the same thing :—

परपञ्जवेहिं असरिसगमेहिं गियमेण गिञ्चमवि नत्थि ।
 सरिसेहिं पि वंजणओ अत्थि ण पुणत्थपज्जाए ॥ ५ ॥
 पच्चुप्पणम्मि वि पज्जयम्मि भयणागइं पडइ दत्वं ।
 जं एगगुणाईया अणंतकप्पा गमविसेसा ॥ ६ ॥

(5) Every thing is non-existent from the standpoint of dissimilar particulars that are absolutely different from the thing.

Even among things that are similar a thing exists from Vyañjana-paryāya point of view and does not exist from Artha-paryāya point of view.

(6) Even as regards the present state a substance is both different and not different.

from it. For the degrees of qualities range from one to infinity.

A thing becomes fit for our daily intercourse only on the strength of its peculiar form. This peculiar form of the thing is all its own and is quite clear. It is neither of the nature of existence nor of non-existence. This peculiar nature of the thing is here expressed by its double nature of "is" and "is not." A thing definitely "is not" from the standpoint of the particulars of other things and definitely "is" from the standpoint of its own particulars. Those particulars which create the sense of "otherness" are the particulars of other things, while in things of the same class come both the Vyañjana-paryāya and Artha-paryāya. Out of these two Paryāyas a thing "is" from Vyañjana-paryāya point of view, while from Artha-paryāya point of view a thing "is not". An illustration in point will make this clear. An ear-ring which was formerly a bracelet and which is to be changed into a necklace in future "is not" from the standpoint of a bracelet as well as a necklace. It "is not" even from the standpoint of things that exist along with the ear-ring but are altogether different from the ear-ring such as a jar, a piece of cloth etc. That gold which has assumed the form of an ear-ring is referred either as existent (Sat) or a substance or gold or even an ear-ring. Now in our daily life all the possible individuals which can be referred to by a word come under the category of Vyañjana-paryāya. In Vyañjana-paryāya all the modificatory changes of a thing of the same class are brought together. It is, therefore otherwise

named as Sadṛśa-paryāya changes of a similar type. When, therefore, we say that an ear-ring comes under Vyañjana-paryāya we mean that all the ear-rings in the world or all things supposed to be ear-rings or mentioned as ear-rings are identical for all bear the same name ear-ring (kundala). In the same manner the one particular ear-ring that I mention will remain as an ear-ring as long as it does not change its form. As long as all the things are referred to by the same word "ear-ring" and create an idea of oneness on account of their being mentioned by one and the same word they are identical. The same is the case with one ear-ring. From its production up to its destruction it is one and the same ear-ring as it is referred to by the same word and creates an idea of oneness.

But this is true of a thing or things as far as they are mentioned by a word. But if we go beyond the province of words the case is different. For when we look at the ear-ring from the standpoint of time, we must admit that an ear-ring in the present state is really different even from its former and future states. All the ear-rings may appear identical with one another owing to the fact that all are mentioned by the same word ear-ring; it may also be granted that an ear-ring is the same in past present or future so long as it does not give up its own form of an ear-ring; but it cannot be denied that when we look at things from a real viewpoint they appear different from one another. And this is non-existent from the viewpoint of the current of similar modificatory changes.

Moreover from the standpoint of time, it must be admitted that the present ear-ring is certainly different from the same ear-ring in the past or for the matter of that the same ear-ring in future. Not only that but two ear-rings existing at one and the same time are different from each other from the standpoint of peculiar individual difference granting that both the ear-rings are made of gold, both are shaped as ear-ring, both have the same yellow colour, the same softness and other attributes, it must be said that both the ear-rings are different from one another. In the first place, the portion of gold in each is obviously different, moreover though the yellowness and softness in both appears to be exactly similar yet there is always some sort of difference at least in the yellowness or softness of both. There are infinite degrees of yellowness, softness or any other quality. There is, therefore, at least a very small difference in degree as regards the attributes of things. 5, 6.

The following verse says that both difference and sameness can reside in one and the same person :—

कोवं उप्पायंतो पुरिसो जीवस्स कारओ होइ ।

तत्तो विभण्णवो परम्मि सयमेव भइयव्वो ॥ ७ ॥

A person, who on account of his passions in the present life, which becomes a cause of his future life is obviously different from

person in the next birth, for cause and effect are different from each other.

But on the other hand the person who exists at present will be the same person in his next birth. From this point of view, therefore, the person in his present as well as future life is identical.

A man who is entangled in the meshes of worldly life, himself creates his future life. It is, therefore, proper to think that the person in his present life is different from that very person in his next life. For as we have already said cause and effect are different from each other. But as the same person assumes another form in his next birth the individual soul underlying is the same. From this point of view of the identity of a soul the person is one and the same.

Just as a lump and jar are also identical as much as earth is common to both of them. Similarly when a person is under the influence of passions such as anger and others, he becomes the cause of his future life which is shaped according to the effect of his passions and from this point of view the two persons in two lives (present and future) are different from each other. But as the same soul persists in both the lives of the person, the two persons are also identical. 7

The following verse states the discussion of the oneness or otherwise of a substance

and its attributes. The author first of all mentions the viewpoint of his opponent :—

रूप-रस-गंध-फासा असमाणगहण-लक्खणा जम्हा ।

तम्हा दब्बाणुगया गुण ति ते केइ इच्छति ॥ ८ ॥

Some people think that attributes or qualities of a substance are different from the substance and depend upon the substance because these attributes of colour, smell, touch, taste are comprehended by means other than those by which a substance is different from those of its attributes.

Followers of Vaiśeṣika doctrine and even some of the followers of Jaina¹ doctrine believe that things that are cognized by different means and things that possess different characteristics are different from one another. For

¹ In the original Gāthā, there is a word Kēcīt meaning "Some." Here that meaning is accepted which is meant by the commentator. It cannot be said with reference to what Jaina learned men the commentator has applied the term of Swayūthya. Perhaps the works of such Jaina learned men must be before the eyes of the commentator as believe, like Vaiśeṣikas, that attributes are different from the substance. How can the commentator employ the term Swayūthya with reference to Kundakunda, Umāswatī and others who are never extremists even though they believe in the theory that the attributes are different from substance ?

instance, a pillar and a jar are different from each other. For both have got different characteristics. Similarly the means to know a substance are different from the means to know its attributes. For a substance such as a jar is perceived by means of two senses, namely the sense of touch and the sense of seeing and the perception by means of these senses has got for its object one and the same thing simultaneous in our mind. But the attributes of taste, smell and others are perceived by means of only one sense each and their perception is based upon one sense only. Moreover the characteristics of both the substance and its attributes are different. A substance is a repository of qualities and movement. While attributes which reside in a substance, are in themselves attributeless and motionless. It is, therefore, proper to regard the attributes that reside in a substance as different from the substance itself. 8

With a view to refute this view-point the author in the following verse first of all tries to establish an identity between attributes and transformations of a substance :—

दूरे ता अण्णत्तं गुणसहे चेव ताव पारिच्छं ।
 किं पज्जवाहिओ होज्ज पज्जवे चेवगुणसण्णा ॥ ९ ॥
 दो उण्ण णया भगवया दब्बद्विय-पज्जवद्विया नियया ।
 एत्तो य गुणविसेसे गुणद्वियणओ वि जुज्जंतो ॥ १० ॥
 जं च पुण्ण अरिहया तेसु तेसु सुत्तेसु गोयमाईणं ।

पञ्जवसण्णा णियया वागरिया तेण पज्जाया ॥ ११ ॥
 परिगमणं पज्जाओ अणोगकरणं गुणं ति तुल्लत्था ।
 तह वि ण 'गुण' ति भण्णइ पज्जवणयदेसणा जम्हा ॥ १२ ॥
 जंपन्ति अत्थि समये एगगुणो दसगुणो अणंतगुणो ।
 रुवाई परिणामो भण्णइ तम्हा गुणविसेसो ॥ १३ ॥
 गुणसहमंतरेणावि तं तु पज्जवविसेससंखाणं ।
 सिज्झइ णवरं संखाणसत्थधम्मो 'तइगुणो' ति ॥ १४ ॥
 जह दससु दसगुणम्मि य एगम्मि दसत्तणं समं चेव ।
 अहियम्मि वि गुणसहे तहेय एयं पि दट्ठव्वं ॥ १५ ॥

(9) Let alone the difference between substance and quality. First we have to consider whether the words Guṇa and Paryāya are used in different senses or are used as synonyms ?

(10) Lord Mahāvīra has once for all acknowledged only two points of views namely Dravyāstika and Paryāyāstika; now if the idea of Guṇa would have been altogether different from the idea of Paryāya, He would have certainly admitted a third view-point namely that of Guṇāstika.

(11) But in as much as Lord Mahāvīra, in various sūtras addressed to Gautama and

others, has fixed the comotation of Paryāya and has explained that word, it must be said that the real thing is Paryāya that is to say Guṇas are not different from Paryāyas.

(12) Paryāyas are those that subject a thing to various transformations and Guṇas are those that make a thing assume various forms. Both these words are synonyms but the words are not interchangeable for the word Paryāya is propagated by Lord Mahāvīra, but He has not used the word Guṇāstika.

(13) Some say that in Āgamas the transformation of colour is mentioned as onefold (Eka-guṇa) black, tenfold black, infinitefold black. It is therefore clear that there is a difference between Guṇa and Paryāya.

(14) To this the author replies :—The word Guṇa when applied with reference to colour as well as the degree of colour is used to show the number of peculiar transformations. It does not signify, Guṇāstika. Here the word Guṇa is purely numerical and nothing else.

(15) As tenness is common in ten things or tenfold one thing. In the same manner we should understand in the case of one fold, twofold black etc.

Before starting a discussion as to whether there is any difference between a substance and a quality, it is proper to decide whether the word *Guṇa* as used in Jaina Śāstras is used in the sense of *Paryāya* or whether it is used in a sense other than that of *Paryāya*. Out of these two alternatives the one acceptable to our author is this that the word *Guṇa* is not used in the sense of any other quality than *Paryāya* itself. Looking to the use made of the word *Guṇa* by Lord Mahāvīra in Jaina Śāstras, it seems that He has used the word *Guṇa* as absolutely a synonym of *Paryāyas* (attributes of a thing) and that in His opinion, there is no difference between *Guṇa* and *Paryāya*. The reason for this is that Mahāvīra has divided the *Nayas* or viewpoints into only two *Dravyāstika* and *Paryāyāstika*. If he would have regarded *Guṇa* as different from *Paryāya* and as an attribute residing in a thing then He would have mentioned a third *Guṇāstika-naya* viewpoint over and above the *Paryāyāstika-naya*.

But in *Sūtras* of the *Āgamas*, Lord Mahāvīra while addressing his disciples such as Gautama and others has used the *Paryāya* along with the words *Varṇa*, *Gandha* etc. and thus formed the words *Varṇaparyāya*, *Gandhaparyāya* and explained them. He has used the words *Varṇaguṇa*, *Gandha-guṇa* nowhere and has never used the word *Guṇa* in reference to *Varṇa*. It is therefore

quite clear that in the opinion of Mahāvīra the sense of Guṇa is Paryāya and nothing else. Beyond Paryāya there is no attribute of a thing.

If we look to the etymology of the two words Guṇa and Paryāya we find that they are absolutely synonyms : Paryāya means the changes in the Dravya either consecutive or simultaneous, and Guṇa means assuming of different forms on the part of a thing. Thus really there is no difference in the sense of the word Guṇa and Paryāya. Lord Mahāvīra, however, has used the word Paryāyāstika. He has used the word Paryāya with reference to the attributes of a thing, such as a Varṇa (colour) and Gandha (smell) Rasa (taste), etc. In this reference he has nowhere used the word Guṇa. It is therefore quite clear that there is no such thing as Guṇa apart from Paryāya.

Here an opponent who believes in the difference between Guṇa and Paryāya protests by saying that with reference to colour in Āgamas the word Guṇa is used in words such as Eka-guṇa-śyāma etc. It seems that Mahāvīra, therefore, has used the word Guṇa and that the word is different from Paryāya in its sense. To this the author replies by saying that the word Guṇa is not used by Mahāvīra in the sense of any attribute such as colour etc. He has nowhere used the word Guṇa along with the words Varṇa, Gandha etc. Now the word Guṇa as used in the Eka-guṇa, Daśa-guṇa or Ananta-guṇa black denotes the degree of blackness of the same type. It is not used in the sense of attributes but to show the difference in degree between attributes of the same class thus this

word *Guṇa* is a technical word used in mathematics in the sense of degrees either more or less when one attribute of a thing is compared with the same attribute differing in degree.

Ten different things are referred to as ten things, similarly if a thing is ten times bigger than other things it is referred to as 'tenfold' (*Daśagūṇa*). In the second of this two cases there is only the additional word *Guṇa*. But the idea of 'ten' is the same. In the first case the word ten is used to express the number ten which resides in the substance. In the second case the substance is one but the word ten along with the word *Guṇa* is in order to express tenfold degree in the measure of the quality of the substance. In other places similar to this we come across expressions such as the atom is one-fold (*Eka-guṇa*) black, tenfold black, infinitefold black, the word *Guṇa* is used no doubt but it does not mean any thing else than the attributes of a substance, in fact it is only a synonym of *Paryāya*. There the word *Guṇa* is used to denote the difference in degree either in point of superiority or inferiority. In short the word *Guṇa* is not used in any other sense than *Paryāya* or attribute of a substance. It does not denote any *Dharma* (quality) other than *Paryāya*.

Thus it is established beyond doubt that in Jaina Śāstras all the attributes of a substance are mentioned by the word *Paryāya* and that the word *Guṇa* is only a synonym of *Paryāya*. We now come to the next question as to whether a substance and quality are different from each other or are identical to each other. On

this question the author gives his opinion that a quality is not different from a substance but identical. For Guṇa is a synonym of Paryāya and Paryāya or attributes are of the nature of substance. A substance on the other hand is of the nature of attributes. The soul is of the nature of knowledge or of the nature of perception. Similarly a jar is red or yellow, in all these dealings it is obvious that the quality and the substance having that quality are identical. Once we accept the identity between substance and its Paryāya, it is needless to say that Guṇa (quality) and the substance are identical. For Guṇa and Paryāya are synonyms **9—15**

The following three verses give the arguments of the person who regard a substance and its quality as absolutely identical:—

एयंतपक्खवाओ जो उण दव्व-गुण-जाइभेयम्मि ।
 अह पुव्वपडिक्कुट्ठो उआहरणमित्तमेयं तु ॥ १६ ॥
 पिउ-पुत्त-णत्तु-भव्वय-भाऊणं एगपुरिससंबंधो ।
 ए य सो एगस्स पिय त्ति सेसयाणं पिया होइ ॥ १७ ॥
 जह संबंधविसिट्ठो सो पुरिसो पुरिसभावणिरइसओ ।
 तह दव्वमिदियगयं रुवाइविसेसणं लहइ ॥ १८ ॥

(16) We have already refuted the opinion that there is absolute difference between a substance and its quality. Here we want to

give an illustration which will corroborate the identity of a substance and its quality.

(17) We have to regard that a father, a son, a grandson, a nephew or a brother has different relation with one and the same person. For, a person who is a father to one cannot be a father to all.

(18) Just as a man though of the same form appears to be different from the standpoint of different persons, in the same manner the same substance when perceived by different persons appears to assume different aspects such as colour etc. That is to say it is mentioned as various particular things or attributes.

Upon this the author objects in the following verse thus :—

होज्जाहि दुगुणमहुरं अणंतगुणकालयं तु जं दव्वं ।
ए उ डहरओ महल्लो व होइ संबंघओ पुरिसो ॥ १९ ॥

That a certain substance is double that of another or that it is infinitesimal of another substance does not depend merely

on its relation to other things. Similarly that a person is either great or small does not depend merely on his relation to other persons.

In the following verse the person holding the view of absolute identity defends his own position thus :—

भएणइ संबंधवसा जइ संबंधित्तणं अणुमयं ते ।
एणु संबंधविसेसे संबंधिविसेसणं सिद्धं ॥ २० ॥

We say if you once admit a general relation of a thing owing to its being related in general to other things, why should you have any difficulty in allowing same particular relation of a thing with another thing with which it is related in a particular way ?

To this the author replies in the following verse :—

जुज्जइ संबंधवसा संबंधिविसेसणं ए उण एयं ।
एयणाइविसेसगओ रुवाइविसेसपरिणामो ॥ २१ ॥

True that peculiar relation proceeds from peculiar relationship, but colour, smell and other transformations spring from the

relation of the senses (with things) and so in this particular case the proposition stated above (as regards the peculiar relation) does not hold good.

In the following verse both the argument of the complete identity and its refutation by the author are given:—

भण्णइ विसमपरिणयं कह एयं होहिइ त्ति उवणीयं ।
तं होइ परणिमित्तं ए व त्ति एत्थइत्थि एगंतो ॥ २२ ॥

“We ask,” says the person holding the view of absolute identity “the persons who regard substance and quality as different from each other this:—Is it possible for a substance to have various transformations? For, we hold that a substance is one and unchangeable.” To this the author replies by saying that the final opinion in this matter has been given by men of authority in Jaina Śāstra and it is this that a substance undergoes and does not undergo various transformations owing to some exterior causes. Nothing absolutely or dogmatically can be said in this matter.

From the discussion in the preceeding verses it has been finally decided that the two words *Guna* and *Paryāya* are synonyms. But the main question still remains as to whether *Guna* and *Dravya* that is quality and substance (as has been regarded by some) are absolutely identical. The author before giving his verdict in this matter asks the person who believes in the absolute identity of a substance and quality to refute the opinion of difference between a substance and quality. Now the *Ekāntā-Abhedā-vādī* instead of advancing arguments against the *Bhedavādi* simply says that the opinion of persons who regard the nature of substance and quality as different from each other has already been refuted in the beginning of this chapter (*Gāthā 1-2*) the only thing that now remains to be done is to give an apt illustration to show that absolute identity between substance and quality is the only right view.

The illustration has already been once given—that of a person who is regarded in various capacities by various persons. One person regards this particular person as his uncle but that does not mean that he is uncle to every body. Another person regards him as his father but that does not mean that he is father to every body. He assumes different relations to different persons, no doubt, but is one and the same from the standpoint of 'a man;' all the different relations are but mere illusions with regard to that one persistent individuality of the person. Similarly substance is originally one general thing but when it comes in contact with different senses it assumes the different forms of colour,

smell etc. In reality only the substance is true while all its various particular aspects being due to external causes are illusory. What are, therefore, Paryāyas in Jain Śāstras and what are in ordinary parlance called Guṇas are fundamentally not at all different from the substance. In fact the supposed difference between them is not real.

The view of absolute identity is not accepted by our author who takes his stand on the view of Anekānta (manysided nature of things). He neither subscribes to view of absolute difference on the one hand, nor to the view of absolute identity on the other. But as the view of absolute difference has already been refuted by persons holding the view of absolute identity, here the author deals with the view of absolute identity and establishes that the view of absolute identity is also wrong being one sided and that the truth lies in the middle that is between a substance and its quality there is both a difference and identity.

The soundest argument against the view of absolute identity is this that if we consider that all the particulars of a substance are regarded as false and as due to merely external causes, we can not account for the degrees of intensity or otherwise as are found in the particulars or qualities. For instance, we find that even in the quality of blackness or sweetness there are different degrees. Some things are utterly black, some are slightly black ; some things are sweetest ; other are slightly sweet. Now if the qualities of a thing or a substance are merely illusory or if the qualities are due to merely external

causes such as the senses then this difference in degree of quality would not have existed at all. Even in the illustration of a person cited above if the person is only real and his different capacities are all illusory, then how is it that the same person is sometimes said to be father and greater than another person and sometimes smaller ?

We must therefore admit that over and above the general thing, there is such a thing as particular which must be regarded as true along with the general ; these particulars do not spring out of the relations with external things but are merely brought out clearly by them. That does not mean that we should not at all recognise these particulars. Now if we regard these particulars as false or illusory and eliminate each particular at every stage, there will come a time when we shall have to eliminate the substance the general thing for divested of its particulars no general thing can ever stand, can ever exist. The word *Sāmānya* signifies that the substance is uniform and one ; the words 'uniform' and 'one' are relative terms

The fact is that both the substance and the quality are true and different from each other, but at the same time both are also identical. To say that both of them are absolutely identical is therefore quite wrong.

Here the advocates of the view of absolute identity would perhaps argue that if every thing stands in some relation to some thing then by stretching the proposition to its logical extremity we may as well say that owing to the multiplicity of relations there is multiplicity in the thing itself.

To this the reply given by the author is this :—

It is true that a thing is referred to in various ways owing to various relations with other things. For, instance the same man is referred to as staff-holder if he has got a staff in his hand and book-holder if he has got a book in his hand. But how are you going to account for the different degrees of sweetness, blackness, etc. ? True it is that black colour is a quality which becomes manifest by the contact with the sense of seeing but we can not deny that there is such a quality as black which is true by itself. Otherwise we cannot account for the various degrees of blackness. It must, therefore, be accepted that along with the thing or substance the quality is also true and that both these are different as well identical with each other.

Now if an objection is raised against this by saying that if we regard Paryāyas or particulars as true, we shall be confronted with the difficulty of regarding that contrary particulars reside in one and the same thing. For instance, the same thing would have both heat and cold (two diametrically opposite qualities) residing in it which is absurd. To this the author says that these contrary qualities reside in one thing no doubt but they can do so if there is difference of time, place and other factors. Sometimes the thing has got such an inherent nature that two contrary qualities may safely reside in it. There is, therefore, no difficulty in thinking that qualities are real and that sometimes diametrically opposite qualities reside in a thing.

Moreover it is also not the case that difference is simply due to extrinsic source ; because that very thing is also instrumental. Therefore that difference is neither exclusively extrinsic, nor intrinsic but both, 16-22.

The following verses analyse the difference of substance and quality as advanced by the persons holding the view of absolute difference and prove that the definitions of substance and quality, forwarded by him do not hold much water.

द्ववस्स ठिई जम्म-विगमा य गुणलक्खणं ति वत्त्वं ।

एवं सइ केवलिणो जुज्जइ तं णो उ दवियस्स ॥ २३ ॥

द्ववत्थंतरभूया मुत्ताऽमुत्ता य ते गुणा होज्ज ।

जइ मुत्ता परमाणू एत्थि अमुत्तेसु अगहणं ॥ २४ ॥

(23) According to the view of absolute difference between substance and quality a substance is that which has a permanent state and a quality is that which is produced and which perishes. But the author objects to these definitions of substance and quality and says that the definitions would have been proper if substance would have been altogether different from quality and if quality would have been absolutely

different from substance. But they cannot be applied to a substance and quality in one.

(24) If qualities are regarded as absolutely different from a substance they are either corporeal (Mūrta) or incorporeal (Amūrta). If they are corporeal then Paramāṇu (an atom) which is a substance and in which qualities are said to reside will also be corporeal for it is a repository of corporeal things. But the universally accepted characteristics of an atom is that it is incorporeal; while on the other hand qualities are regarded as incorporeal then they will never be known.

The definitions cited above are objected to by our author for the obvious reason that the definition would be proper only if substance and quality are different from each other. But in reality the two are not mutually exclusive; substance like quality is subject to birth and destruction, on the other hand quality is also stationery or permanent like the substance. The definitions, therefore, are not complete. They are partially true. The perfect definition would be that in which there is the combination of the characteristics of substance and quality brought together. Such a perfect definition is given by Umāswāti in his Tattwārtha Sūtra 5, 29. According to

him Sat is that which has the double aspect of a substance and its quality that is, which has the characteristics of birth, stability and decay. None of the above two definitions apply to Sat for they are based on the view of absolute difference.

After showing that the above two definitions of Bheda-vādi do not cover the whole truth our author proceeds to show the hollowness of the view of absolute difference in another way. He asks his opponent whether qualities (Guṇas) are in his opinion corporeal or incorporeal. If qualities are corporeal then the substance which is the repository of qualities and which is separate from the qualities must also be regarded as corporeal and if it is corporeal there is no possibility of its being Atīndriya (beyond the reach of senses). Not only that but in that a substance will never be of the nature of an atom. If on the other hand qualities are incorporeal then they will never be perceived by senses but in the case of jar and other things contrary is our experience. Thus qualities cannot be regarded as corporeal or incorporeal in its independent capacity. Qualities, therefore, must be considered as identical with the substance. Then alone the double nature of qualities would be accounted for by saying that where the substance is corporeal, its qualities are also corporeal and where the substance is incorporeal, its qualities are also incorporeal. The qualities of an atom, for instance, are beyond perception for atom is Atīndriya and the qualities of a jar, a piece of cloth etc., are perceivable by senses since the things in themselves are perceivable by senses. **23, 24**

The following two verses give the aim of the above discussion:—

सीसमईविष्फारणमेत्तत्थोऽयं कञ्चो समुल्लावो ।

इहरा कहामुहं चेव एत्थि एवं ससमयम्मि ॥ २५ ॥

ए वि अत्थि अण्णवादो ए वि तव्वाञ्चो जिणोवएसम्मि ।

तं चेव य मण्णंता अवमण्णंता ए याणंति ॥ २६ ॥

(25) The digression in discussing things that do not form our subject matter is for the sake of sharpening the intellectual powers of the disciples. There is really speaking no room for all these discussions in Jaina Śāstra.

(26) Both the views of absolute difference and absolute identity are not admitted by Jaina Śāstra. Persons holding both these extreme views, not knowing the real nature of things, are totally ignorant.

After undertaking the above discussion the author explains the reason of his plunging into this seemingly irrelevant discussion. His object in pursuing this discussion was to give full scope to the intellectual powers of his disciples. They should really know that the views quoted above are outside the pale of Jaina Śāstra. They are given here to show non-Jaina views. For

instance, the view of absolute difference is held by Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya Philosophy, while the views of absolute identity is maintained by Sāṅkhya and others. The synthesis of these two extreme views is the peculiarity of the doctrine of Anekānta. 25, 26

The following two verses show the all-embracing range of this doctrine of Anekānta :—

भयणा वि हु भइयव्वा जइ भयणा भयइ सव्वदव्वाइ ।

एवं भयणा णियमो वि होइ समयाविरोहेण ॥ २७ ॥

णियमेण सदहंतो छक्काए भावओ न सदहइ ।

हंदी अपज्जवेसु वि सदहणा होइ अविभत्ता ॥ २८ ॥

(27) As the doctrine of Anekānta shows all possible sides of a thing and thus does not postulate about a thing in any fixed way, in the same way Anekānta itself is also subject to this possibility of other side—that is to say, it also sometimes assumes the form of onesidedness (Ekānta). The author admits that thus Anekānta may also become Ekānta if it does not go against the right view of things.

(28) For instance, a man who pins his faith on the six Kāyas does not really show

the right sort of faith. Because thereby a sense of unity is imposed on disunity.

Anekānta is a means of right knowledge. As it is used as regards all other things it is used sometimes with reference to itself and thus it makes its own position also quite clear. When it is used with reference to a certain thing it looks at the thing from all possible sides and tries to harmonize all these sides and places them in their right place. It takes a man to the real nature of a thing. Let us take an instance in point and try to show the utility of the doctrine of Anekānta. There are at present many views current with reference to the two fundamental elements in this world namely the Jada and Cetana. Some say that the two are identical or non-identical ; some say that the two are eternal ; some say that they are both of them ephemeral ; or some that they are one or many. Now to harmonise all these views and to assign proper place to each of the above views is the mission of Anekānta. It creates a harmony among all the warring views and thus gives the right view of every thing. Thus it says that Jada and Cetana are identical from the stand-point of general and are different from the standpoint of particular. So also in the case of eternal and non-eternal, one and many. Thus it creates a harmony between the opposing qualities of identity and difference by assigning a right place to each characteristic.

Now if Anekānta shows all possible sides or characteristics of a thing we have to admit that Anekānta will

have also 'other side of the shield' that is to say it also sometimes assumes the form of Ekānta (i.e. single point of view). But if that single point of view is in keeping with the true nature of a thing, there even Anekānta may sometimes become Ekānta.

Thus Anekānta guards us from holding opinions that are based on views that are one sided and extreme and that under the cloak of Anekānta really maintain one-sided views. The thoughts in Jaina Śāstra are really based on Anekānta. If instead of knowing their nature of many-sidedness, a man lapses into one-sidedness, his viewpoint is wrong. The following two instances are typical. There are according to Jaina Śāstra six classes of worldly beings. Now to think that there are only six classes neither more nor less is an extreme view and should, therefore, be discarded. The fact is that sentient beings are also one from the standpoint of Caitanya. And similarly various statements of the Śāstras such as "Soul is one and souls are many" are synthesized.

Similarly every kind of killing is violence and as such is a sin. Now to think that this is an absolute truth is wrong. For we know as a fact that if a sage inspite of his being quite vigilant and extremely cautious inadvertently kills any being it is not at all violence. Sometimes, therefore, killing is also non-violence. We must therefore suppose killing is sometimes violence and sometimes non-violence. Thus we should subscribe not to extreme one sided views even though they are stated in Jaina Śāstra. **27, 28**

The application of the view of Anekānta in respect to objects (Prameyas) is illustrated in the following verses :—

गइपरिगयं गई चेव केइ गियमेण दवियमिच्छंति ।
 तं पि य उड्ढगईयं तहा गई अन्नहा अगई ॥ २९ ॥
 गुणगिण्वत्तियसएणा एवं दहणादओ वि दट्ठवा ।
 जं तु जहा पडिसिद्धं दव्वमदव्वं तहा होइ ॥ ३० ॥
 कुंभो ण जीवदवियं जीवो वि ण होइ कुंभदवियं ति
 तम्हा दो वि अदवियं अएणोएणविसेसिया होंति ॥ ३१ ॥

(29) Some regard a thing moving upwards as decidedly full of motion. But though it is in motion from the standpoint of going up, it is also not in motion considering that it does not move downwards.

(30) Similarly fire is fire because it burns. Dahana means one that burns i.e. fire. But in some cases fire cannot burn things that cannot, by their very nature, be burnt. Thus fire both burns and does not burn.

(31) From the standpoint of a mere substance a jar does exist, but from the standpoint of sentient thing it does not

exist. Similarly a sentient thing is not a thing from the standpoint of a jar.

By having recourse to Anekānta, a man knows how to analyse things. He knows how to reconcile seeming contradictions in a thing. Thus Anekānta is a sure means to arrive at the true nature of a thing. To elucidate this point, our author cites three illustrations, viz. that of a thing in motion, of fire and a jar.

A thing in motion is so only in one direction at a given time. It cannot be, therefore, in motion in all directions. Naturally therefore it is not in motion considering the direction in which it is not moving. The two seemingly contradictory statements that a thing is and is not in motion are thus quite true from the explanation given above and thus these statements therefore are easily reconcilable. Though apparently it seems that motion and non-motion are contradictory things.

Fire burns fuel and sometimes it is also a thing that does not burn, for it can never burn the sky, the soul and other incorporeal things. It, therefore, both burns and does not burn. These seemingly contradictory statements are relatively true ; thus the many sidedness of a thing as postulated by the doctrine of Anekānta is perfectly justifiable. The same argument applies to wind also.

Similarly we can say a sentient thing is a positive thing being a substance but it also does not exist from the standpoint of definite form and other concrete qualities, or in other words Jīva exists from the standpoint

of Caitanya but does not exist from the standpoint of concrete qualities such as form and others.

A jar on the other hand exists from the standpoint of modification of Pudgalas (atoms) and does not exist from the standpoint of Caitanya. Thus the view of Anekānta harmonises all the seeming contradictions in a thing and represents a thing in its true nature and perspective. 29, 31.

The following verses state different kinds of creation and destruction of a substance :—

उप्पाओ दुवियप्पो पओगजणिओ य वीससा चेव ।
तत्थ उ पओगजणिओ समुदयवायो अपरिसुद्धो ॥ ३२ ॥
साभाविओ वि समुदयकओ व्व एगंतिओ (एगत्तिओ)
व्व होज्जाहि ।

आगासाईआत्तं तिण्हं परपच्चओऽणियमा ॥ ३३ ॥
विगमस्स वि एस विही समुदयजणियम्मि सो उ दुवियप्पो
समुदयविभागमेत्तं अत्थंतरभावगमणं च ॥ ३४ ॥

(32) Creation is of two kinds one natural and another brought about by special efforts (artificial). Artificial creation is known by the names of Samudāya-vāda and Apariśuddha.

(33) Natural creation is also of two kinds :—Samudāya-kṛta and Aikatvika.

Aikatvika creation (or rather onesided creation) is seen in Ākāśa, Dharma and Adharma. It is due to external causes and is not seen invariably.

(34) The same is the case with destruction. It is of two kinds natural and artificial. It is also found in Samudāyakṛta creation in two ways. One is in the form of separation of aggregates and another is a destruction which is in the form of assuming quite a new form.

According to theistic doctrines that believe that God has created this universe, every creation or destruction whether it be natural or brought about by the efforts of man is due to the will of God. Jaina Śāstra does not accept this view.

According to those who believe in the theory "God is the sole cause" (Īśvara-kāraṇa-vādi), the production and destruction of any new thing, brought about with or without the effort of worldly beings, are to be attributed to God's effort because they are dependent only on it. Jainism does not accept this theory and to show that the author says that the production and destruction of all things do not result simply from effort. Because the theory that God is a doer does not hold good, It is proper to say in terms of our daily experience that those productions and destructions should be said

arising from effort (Prayatna-janya) where there is an effort and where there is no effort they should not be said resulting from effort. Therefore it comes to this that the production and destruction of a product are either arising from human effort or not. That is to say they are either artificial (Prāyogika) or natural (Swābhāvika). To believe, just like Vaiśeṣikas, that they are simply effort-produced goes against experience.

A detailed nature of production and destruction is given below:—

It is called an aggregational production (Sāmudāyika-utpāda) when disjoined members of a body unite. It is this very production which is styled a “body” (Skandha) in Jaina philosophy and an “aggregate” (Avayavi) in Nyāya philosophy and others. This production is also termed “Impure production” (Aparisuddha) as it does not belong to one particular substance. In the same manner, it is called an aggregational destruction when it is with reference to a “body” or with regard to an “aggregate”. Both the aggregational production and destruction are possible only in the case of corporeal bodies and not incorporeal ones because for their existence they are dependent on a physical body or a new product (Janya-skandha) and such a physical body, in its turn, depends on atoms (Pudgala). Moreover, incorporeal substance has no Janyaskandha. Aggregational production and aggregational destruction are both artificial (Prāyogika) and natural (Vaisrasika). The production and destruction of physical bodies such as a jar and a cloth are called artificial aggregational production and destruction,

because human effort is responsible for both of them. While the aggregational production and the aggregational destruction of a cloud and of a mountain are designated natural aggregational production and destruction for they depend on none for their existence or extinction.

That is called a single production or destruction which is confined to only one thing or which takes place without first assuming the form of a physical body by mixing with it. That production or destruction is called "pure" because it does not depend on a physical body for its existence. Incorporeal substances can become the subject of such a production or destruction and especially amongst incorporeal substances, those which are one single entity as a whole. And therefore only such a production or destruction is possible in the case of Ākāśa, Dharma and Adharma. Moreover such a production or destruction is simply natural and never artificial. Because the abovenamed three substances cannot give scope to effort as they are, unlike atom, devoid of the power of motion in spite of the fact that they undergo a modificatory change. The production or the destruction of these three substances is or can be simply this that they disinterestedly become or do not become a canvas or a receptacle and passive instruments in effecting motion or stability from the view-points of Time and Space for the atom or the soul which has the dynamic power. Such a production or destruction is indefinite or unconditional as it has to depend on others.

Special¹ point to be noted regarding destruction is this that an aggregational destruction—both artificial and natural—is of two kinds, namely, one arising from a disjunction or division of an aggregate and the other results when a thing assumes another state. It is called a destruction brought about by the disuniting of an aggregate when different members making an aggregate disunite or leave out the composite physical body. An example illustrating an artificial aggregational destruction is that of a building which when broken by a human effort has its component parts namely bricks disunited. An example showing natural aggregational destruction is that of a cloud or a mountain the comprising elements of which disunite naturally without any human effort.

The destruction which is called Arthāntarabhāva-prāptivinaśa—it takes place only then when a thing transforms leaving aside its former state as a physical body without a disjunction of its component parts. The example of the artificial aggregational destruction of this second type is the transformation of a wristlet into an ear-ring and that of natural aggregational destruction of this second type is the transformation of snow into water and that of water into air etc. etc. brought about by the physical phenomena or seasonal effects.

Here a doubt arises as to why the productions and destructions—both artificial and natural—taking place in the modificatory changes of the liberated souls and

¹ For a detailed explanation see Tattvārtha Bhāṣya Vṛtti 5. 29, page 383.

the worldly souls as well as those occurring in independent atoms (Paramāṇus) are not at all referred to? In solution of this doubt the author, it seems, has to offer two opinions. The discussion of artificial and natural production or destruction is made here chiefly against the theory "God is a door" and therefore those substances only are here considered behind the production and destruction of which God's power to do is supposed by some to exist. And therefore atom (Paramāṇu) or any sentient substance is not touched here. Because one believing in the theory of God's power to do does not believe that an atom or a sentient substance is a product (Janya-Dravya). Vaiśeṣikas believe that anything consisting of component parts is produced by God and Aupaniṣada system of philosophy recognizes Ākāśa to have been produced by God. And therefore an atom which represents corporeal substances and soul which represents incorporeal substances have been excluded from discussion here.¹ A substance which is a composite physical body forms the central part of the discussion here. An atom is not at all a composite physical body. Soul, just like Ākāśa is no doubt one endless physical body consisting of Pradeśas, but the discussion about its production and destruction is not done here because it occurs in the seventh verse. It itself creates its own condition and therefore the production and the destruction of its modificatory changes are artificial in view of its own effort to create them.

1 For this see Tattvartha Bhāṣya Vṛtti pp. 389-390.

Soul may be in whatever condition but its modificatory changes are produced by its latent power and hence they should be called artificial. It matters very little whether the effort is deliberate or automatic. **32-34**

Discussion of time-distinction etc. of origination, destruction and permanence.

तिणिण वि उप्पायाई अभिण्णकाला य भिण्णकाला य ।

अत्थंतंरं अणत्थंतंरं च द्वियाहि णायव्वा ॥ ३५ ॥

जो आउंचणकालो सो चेव पसारियस्स वि ण जुत्तो ।

तेसिं पुण पडिवत्ती-विगमे कालंतंरं णत्थि ॥ ३६ ॥

उप्पज्जमाणकालं उप्पणं ति विगयं विगच्छंतं ।

द्वियं पणवयंतो तिकालविसयं विसेसेइ ॥ ३७ ॥

(35) Time-limit of Utpāda (origination) etc. is different from one another and also is not. So also they should be considered different and non-different from Dravya.

(36) Time of extension is not the time of drawing in. And also, there is no interval between destruction and origination of extension and drawing in.

(37) A particular Dravya is produced, is being produced and shall be produced; so also a particular Dravya is destroyed, is being

destroyed and shall be destroyed :—these two sets of speaking show nothing but particularizing that substance from three viewpoints of Time.

The definition of Sat consists of a synthesis of these three viz. origination (Utpāda) destruction, (Nāśa) and permanence (Sthiti). The object of the writer here is to point out very clearly that time-limit of Utpāda (origination) is and also is not different from that of Nāśa (destruction) and Sthiti (Permanence). So also a Trinity namely Utpadāda, Nāśa and Sthiti is and also is not different from Sat (Abstract Entity).

Nature of everything is twofold:—Noumenal and Phenomenal. So the real nature of a thing consists in taking a synthetic view. Some of the Paryāyas (modificatory changes) being mutually contradictory occur successively while some of them being non-contradictory occur simultaneously. With reference to two Kramavartī Paryāya (occurring successively), then, the time of Utpāda (origination) and Vināśa (destruction) is, say, one and the same because the final time-unit of the former Paryāya marks the beginning of the latter Paryāya. But if with reference to any single Paryāya when we think of Utpāda and vināśa we find they are Bhinna-kālīna (occurring successively), because the time of the beginning and end of any single Paryāya is different. But a thing remains somewhat stable even when any single Paryāya exhausts giving rise to a new one. Looking from this point of view, Utpāda, Vināśa and

Sthiti—all these three are simultaneous occurrences. But when a stability or permanence of a Dravya is thought of, say, from a view-point of any single Paryāya, we shall find that the time of Sthiti is different from that of Utpāda and from that of Vināśa also. In other words, Prārambha-samaya (the time of origination), Nivṛtti-samaya (the time of exhaustion) and Sthiti-samaya (the time which connects Prārambha and Nivṛtti) all these three shall be felt taking place successively. This is more clearly explained through the example of 'Finger.'

Finger is a thing which when bent cannot remain erect and vice versa. Straightness and crookedness of a thing take place successively. The origination of "straightness" (Saralatā-paryāya) means the destruction of "crookedness" (Vakrata-paryāya). They both are the results of one and the same action taking place at one and the same time. And at the same time "Finger" is permanent (Sthira) as a finger. This establishes the fact that Utpāda, Sthiti and Nāśa are Sama-kālīna, that is to say, they occur at one and the same time.

Now, contrary to that, if we take only one Paryāya, namely crookedness (Vakratā) or straightness (Saralatā) we are able to accomodate a different time limit for each of the three Utpāda, Sthiti and Nāśa. When the finger ceases to be crooked and becomes straight, from that very moment Saralatā-paryāya begins. Vakratā-paryāya begins when the finger loses straight condition and assumes crookedness. And Sthitisamaya remains in force from the moment it becomes straight upto the

moment it loses straightness. Thus we are able to allot different moments for each of them.

Utpāda, Sthiti and Nāśa (all these three)—Bhinna-kālīna (occurring at definite intervals) or Ekakālīna (occurring simultaneously)—as we saw above, are themselves different from or one with the Dravya of which they are the Dharma (properties).

They are different because they are its constituents and they are not different also because they don't claim a separate existence being all included in the Dravya. If we want to understand a particular Dravya with reference to past, present and future, we should do so in this manner. Let us take the example of a building. When it is in the process of building we think that the whole building is being built but it is not so really speaking because some portion of it is already built while some is still to be built.

In the same way the building is Vigacchat (in the process of destruction) because the constituting parts such as bricks etc are giving up their loose condition; it is Vigata (destroyed) as far as its completed part is concerned, because the loose condition of its constituting parts is already destroyed; it is Vigamiṣyat (about to be lost) so far as the incomplete part is concerned because the destruction of loose condition of the constituting parts such as bricks etc., is still to take place. Thus all the three states can be very well accommodated. Thus going deeper into details, three conditions namely Utpadyamāna, Utpanna and Utpatsyamāna can be established regarding every destruction (Vigama) and vice versa.

Thus we connect the building with the past, present and future. A very important point to be remembered here at this stage is that when we want to adjust Utpāda, Sthiti and Nāśa in one particular Dravya, we should take modificatory change of the substance (Dravyaparyāya) or the modificatory change of the attribute (Guṇa paryāya) to illustrate them because the pure Dravya or the pure Guṇa shall not be able to make room for them. When the aforesaid Utpada, Sthiti and Nāśa are to be adjusted with reference to any single Dravya-paryāya¹ or Guṇa-parayāya, that very Paryāya is first of all singled out and treated as an independent entity different from all the Paryāyas of a similar or a dissimilar character. This is only the way to understand Reality in its particular aspect. 35—37

Discussion of Dravyotpāda according to Vaiśeṣika :—

द्व्वंतरसंजोगाहि केचि दवियस्स वेति उप्पायं ।

उप्पायत्थाऽकुसला विभागजायं एा इच्छन्ति ॥ ३८ ॥

1 Physical body resulting from a combination of similar substances such as atoms is called a modificatory change of the substance. Modificatory changes such as man-ness etc., originating from a conglomeration of dissimilar substances namely soul and matter (Pudgala) are also called modificatory changes of the substance. Decreased or increased transformation of the attributes such as colour or vitality residing in the substance is called a modificatory change of the attributes. For further details see Amṛtacandra's commentary on verse I of the second chapter of Pravacanasāra.

अणु दुअणुएहिं दन्वे आरद्धे 'तिअणुयं' ति ववएसो ।

तत्तो य पुण विभत्तो अणु त्ति जाओ अणु होइ ॥ ३९ ॥

बहुयाण एगसदे जह संजोगाहि होइ उप्पाओ ।

णणु एगविभागम्मि वि जुज्जइ बहुयाण उप्पाओ ॥ ४० ॥

एगसमयम्मि एगदवियस्स बहुया वि होंति उप्पाया ।

उप्पायसमा विगमा ठिईउ उस्सग्गओ णियमा ॥ ४१ ॥

काय-मण-वयण-किरिया-रूवाइ-गईविसेसओ वावि ।

संजोयभेयओ जाणणा य दवियस्स उप्पाओ ॥ ४२ ॥

(38) Coming into existence of a new Dravya (substance) is described, by some, as a conjunction of one Dravya with the other. Disjunction cannot beget a new Dravya. These people are, it should be said, do not know the real nature of Utpatti (origination) because,—

(39) It is customary to say "This is Aṇu" with respect to a Dravya consisting of two Paramaṇus (Dvyaṇuka) and also "This is Tryaṇuka" in the case of a Dravya which is composed of many Dvyaṇukas.

Moreover, when an Aṇu disunites from a Tryaṇuka, we say “Aṇu is produced.”¹

(40) If you believe that only conjunction is responsible for the origination of a new Dravya on the ground that word Eka (one) is used in the place of Bahu (many), then it is easy to show that by the division of one (Eka) many are produced.

(41) In one Samaya (indivisible unit of time), one Dravya produces some times many Utpādas, Sthitis and Vināśas.

(42) Origination of a Dravya is the result of modifications of Sarira (body), Manas (mind), Vacana (speech), Kriyā (action), Rūpa (form), Gati (motion), Saṃyoga (conjunction), Bhedana (disjunction) and Jñāna (knowledge).

There are three theories regarding the production Janya-Dravya (a new substance coming into existence from a former substance)—namely Parināma-vāda, Samūha-vāda and Ārambha-vāda. Sāṅkhyas are

¹ The word Aṇu in this verse here means the atom and a diad (Dvyaṇuka) both. All those which have the dimension of an atom are called atom (Aṇuka) and not merely a Paramāṇu. A diad also has the dimension of an atom. A diad and an atom also can disunite from a Triad (Tryaṇuka). And that is why they are called produced (Jāta).

Pariṇāma-vādi because they believe that a newly produced substance is nothing but a Pariṇāma of the former substance meaning thereby it is a Rūpāntara of the former Dravya or a substance in a modified form only. Bauddhas are Samūha-vādi because they think that the Dravya (Dravya in a perceptible form) is no more than a Samūha (conglomeration or combination) of Sūkṣma Avayavas (minute imperceptible particles). They do not believe in a modificatory change (Rūpāntar) of the component particles and also they do not believe in the production of a new Dravya. Vaiśeṣikas are Ārambha-vādi. Their favourite dogma is that a newly produced substance is neither a Pariṇāma (as Sāṅkhyas believe) nor a Samūha (as Bauddhas believe) but a novel substance altogether, brought about by so many causes.

Jaina philosophy recognizes all the three theories but only in a way acceptable to it.¹ It has something to say against Ārambhavāda of Vaiśeṣikas and it is referred to here by the author.

Ārambha means a production of a new substance, which is Āpurva (not latent in the mother substance). Such an Utpatti (production) is believed by Vaiśeṣikas to be due only to combination. In other words a small or a large Dravya is produced, if at all it is

¹ Jain Philosophy gives a technical name of Skandha (Physical body) to a new product. Still however it also recognizes the physical body as a transformation (Pariṇāma), an aggregate (Samūha) and a compound (Avayavī). Because according to it, it is one and the same thing to be transformed into a physical body or to be so arranged as to give rise to a particular aggregate or to result into a compound thing.

produced, by a mere combination of so many Dravyas comprising it. Vibhāga (disjunction ; division or disuniting) is in no way responsible for a new product. According to them, the pieces of the pot when it is broken are not the direct products brought about by Vibhāga (disjunction or breaking). But the process is somewhat like this. First of all the disunion of elementary (Ārambhaka) Paramāṇu takes place, yielding separation of Dvyaṇukas which finally brings about the destruction of the pot. Now all the Paramāṇus which are in a disunited form again unite and the result is the pieces. The author differs from this dogma of Utpatti the very soul of the Vaiśeṣikas. The author's contention and his own theory are as follows :—

A new product comes into being by the disunion of constituting elements just as their union gives rise to a new product. Speaking in different terms, combination (Saṁyoga) and separation (Vibhāga) both are equally capable to yield a new product. This is also supported by our daily experience. To say that Saṁyoga only can bring about a new product has then no meaning. Just as a union of two Paramāṇus causes a Dvyaṇuka, a union of so many Dvyaṇukas does a Tryaṇuka and so on and so on, so also it is consistent to say that separation (Vibhāga) in Tryaṇuka produces Dvyaṇuka and that of Dvyaṇuka causes Aṇus etc. This proves that Saṁyoga and Vibhāga are equally authorized to beget a new product.

If it is objected that a constant experience that the cloth exists in so many Tantus (threads) and the use of

the word cloth for special stage of the threads are there, they give support to a belief (theory of Vaiśeṣikas) that Saṁyoga causes Dravyotpatti. But it is not so as regards Vibhāga. The author, by way of contradicting the above statement of Vibhāga, declares that coming into existence of a substance due to disjunction (Vibhāga-janya-dravyotpatti) has also such a support. Origination of new products due to the breaking of a Skandha-dravya (a technical jain term for a Janya-dravya) is also corroborated by experience and usage. Bheda-Pratīti (experience of distinction) and Bhedavyavahāra (usage of distinction) establish the theory of origination of new products as we see in the case of pieces after the breaking of Ghaṭa. Therefore, the argument which proves Saṁyoga-janya Dravyotpatti also holds true for Vibhāga-janya Dravyotpatti.

Counting one Utpāda, one Vināśa and one Sthiti per one Samaya, we can say that a particular Dravya can make room for infinite Utpādas, Nāśas and Sthities in infinite time. But how can we account for the fact that one Samaya can produce infinite Utpādas etc.? To meet this objection the author says that one Samaya can and does produce innumerable Utpādas etc. He says that when Sahabhāvi Ananta-paryaya (innumerable modificatory changes occurring simultaneously) take place in one Samaya and in one particular Dravya the innumerable Utpādas of the Uttaravarti-paryāya (Paryāya which succeeds) and the innumerable Nāśas of the Pūrvavarti-paryāya (Paryāya which precedes) do take place. In the same Dravya there are Ananta Sthities also because the Dravya remains the same throughout in

its Sāmānyarūpa (elemental form). This is further illustrated by the example of Jīva.

Wordly being means vitality incarnate. Its Paryāyas are not merely the Paryāyas of Pudgala (here it is used in the sense of "body") or those of the Cetanā (here it is used in the sense of the "soul") but they belong to both. Various Parīṇatis (modifications) such as Manas, Vacana and Kāya etc. even though they belong to Pudgalas, are immediately or otherwise connected with Kāṣayika Parīṇāma (soul assuming the forms or the sentiments of anger etc) Vīrya-viśeṣa (a kind of vitality) and hence dependent on soul. In the same fashion, Jñāna (knowledge) and Vīrya-viśeṣa (vitality) even though they are the properties of soul they cannot assert themselves without the Pudgala. When the Pudgala undergoes a perceptible or imperceptible bodily modification in a worldly being, the Pudgalas of the mind and the speech undergo a change likewise; Kriyās (actions) such as Kāyika (bodily) etc., take place in the numberless Ātmapradeśa on account of the close relationship between body and soul; Paryāyas such as Rūpa etc. also undergo a change; Karmic bondage (Karmabandha), responsible for the coming life as well as new combinations and disjunctions of Paramānus occur. And at that very moment Paryāyas of Jñāna and Jñeyatva (knowability) also manifest themselves Utpādas of these and other innumerable, simultaneously—occurring Paryāyas of the same type, Vināśas of the former Paryāyas and Sthities which are a canvas for the Utpāda and Vināśas to depict, take place at one and the same Samaya.

All this taking place at one and the same time, in the case of a certain worldly being at the time of his birth—numberless Utpādas, Sthities and Nāśas are thus possible.
38—42

Distinction between dogmatic and rational scriptures :—

दुविहो धम्मावाओ अहेउवाओ य हेउवाओ य ।

तत्थ उ अहेउवाओ भवियाऽभवियादओ भावा ॥ ४३ ॥

भविओ सम्मदंसण-णाण-चरित्तपडिवत्तिसंपन्नो ।

णियमा दुक्खंतकडो त्ति लक्खणं हेउवायस्स ॥ ४४ ॥

जो हेउवायपक्खम्मि हेउओ आगमे य आगमिओ ।

सो ससमयपण्णवओ सिद्धंतविराहओ अन्नो ॥ ४५ ॥

(43) Āgama (canon or canonical Literature) which propounds Religion, consists of Hetuvāda (Rational portion) and Ahetūvāda (dogmatic portion). Padārthas (categories) such as Bhavya and Abhavya etc. are the proper subjects for Ahetūvāda

(44) Bhavya according to Hetuvāda removes or destroys all unhappiness through Right vision, Right knowledge and Right conduct.

(45) He only is Ārādhaka (propagator of right religion) who takes recourse to Hetu only when Hetuvāda is to be discussed and relies on Āgama when Āgamavāda is under discussion. One, who does not do this, is Virādhaka (heretic).

Man's temperament or mind is composed of two elements—Śraddhā (Faith) and Buddhi (knowledge). In one, Faith predominates while in other, knowledge or intellect. Sometimes Faith prevails while other times Intellect has also her days. People largely dependent on Faith check the movement of Intellect and Logic, while those who have the sole support of Intellect launch a fight against Faith. Thus the reign of Faith and Intellect comes and goes and so on To be simply rational (Buddhi-jīvi) or dogmatic (Śraddhājīvi) is one-sided and hence imperfect. One to whom intellect is everything will take imperfect as perfect and thus be liable to arrogance and non-admission of intellect superior to his. While the other who relies mainly on Faith will always remain dependent on others thus stopping his further intellectual development and thereby will be prone to admitting falsehoods. When such is the case, the author, in order to observe balance between two extremes, respects Śraddhā and Buddhi equally, drawing full support from Anekānta-dṛṣṭi and shows a way to real utility of them both with an analysis as to which should be considered by us a proper province of Śraddhā and Buddhi. And he

authoritatively suggests to take a synthetic view of them both in life and to avoid conflict as far as possible between them.

The author says that some part of the Canon is governed by Ahetuvāda while some by Hetuvāda. Ahetuvāda is one which makes an exposition of subjects where there is no scope for Pratyakṣa (Direct knowledge) or Anumāna jñāna (Inference) but which are to be taken as granted because their exposition has been made by the Canon. And Hetuvāda is that which enunciates those subjects which come within the grasp of Pratyakṣa or Anumāna and the belief in which does not necessarily demand any Faith. Ahetuvāda requires Faith and the things taught by it are to be accepted only on the ground of Faith and it refuses to be acted upon by intellect or logical reasoning as long as final divine knowledge does not unravel the whole mystery.

And where there is any possibility of Hetuvāda, intellect and reasoning should be allowed full play and then faith should be developed. Thus an imperfect being should train intellect on one hand and faith on the other and establish identity between them, narrowing down their differences and distances.

Having done accurate analysis of Hetuvāda and Ahetuvāda the author, through a following example, states that two classifications of Bhavya and Abhavya which are self-evident form the proper province of Ahetuvāda because no reason is adduced as to why all are not merely Bhavya or merely Abhavya. No logical reasoning can find out a proper cause for such a state of

affairs. In believing this classification, only one alternative is left and that is faith in the Canon and in the words of the seers. Any intellect will have to fumble to account for this arbitrary classification. There is only one remedy and that is to say that it is the nature of the Jīvas and such a nature can be known only by the Omniscient seers. Thus any words or sentences describing this arbitrary division should belong to the Ahetuvāda section of the Canon. In the same way, Sādhāraṇa-vanaspatis (vegetation which has only one physical body, but many souls) which contains Ananta-jīvas (innumerable living organisms) and Pratyeka (Vegetation having one body and one soul) which contains one living organism also form part of the same Ahetuvāda.

Having been fully convinced of the Śāstric classification of Bhavya and Abhavya and its characteristics when one begins to infer that this Jīva is Bhavya because it has got the merit of Samyag-darśana (right vision) and once it will surely put an end to this worldly cycle, Hetuvāda begins. Moreover, it is also the beginning of Hetuvāda when one infers that a Pudgala is Ajīva because there is no Jīvatva (essential characteristic of a Jīva).

He only is entitled to rightly understand and propagate the Jaina Doctrine who, having first understood the limitations and demarkations of Ahetuvāda (the legitimate province of Faith) and Hetuvāda (the legitimate province of Intellect) employs logic and intellect where they are needed or goes to Faith. While, one who seeks the help of logic where Faith simply is required and vice versa

cannot claim to have rightly and thoroughly understood Anekānta Śāstra (doctrine of manifold aspects) and thus he is a Virādhaka (a technical Jain term for one who has no knowledge of the real significance and meaning of the Jaina Canon). As for example, Jiva-tattva can be logically established but that very logical faculty is not able enough to come to a right understanding of its nature and kind. Jiva has got Asaṅkhyāta (numberless) Pradeśa, every individual Pradeśa (cell or molecule) has got a certain type of structure, the relationship between Karmas and Jiva is from times immemorial, one and the same body contains infinite Naigodika Jivas—all these and such like dogmas are grounded exclusively on Ahetuvāda. Just so, in the case of Ajīva Tattva, the entity of Adharmāsti-kāya can be rationally arrived at but for the knowledge of its real nature, the Canon or say the Ahetuvāda is the last word. In other Tattvas such as Āsrava etc. Hetuvāda takes us a good way but Ahetuvāda steps in to solve the final difficulty. At the time of the exposition of every Tattva, then, limitations of both the Vādas (systems) are to be first borne in mind. This is the only method to convince the audience. Otherwise their sympathy will be lost because they will at once detect the errors of inconsistency, improbability etc. 43—45.

Discussion of Naya-vāda :—

परिसुद्धो नयवाओ आगममेत्तत्थसाहओ होइ ।

सो चेव दुण्णिगिण्णो दोण्णि वि पक्खे विधम्मोइ ॥४६॥

जावइया वयणवहा तावइया चेव होंति णयवाया ।

जावइया णयवाया तावइया चेव परसमया ॥ ४७ ॥

जं काविलं दरिसणं एयं दव्वट्टियस्स वत्तव्वं ।

सुद्धोअणतणअस्स उ परिसुद्धो पज्जवविअप्पो ॥ ४८ ॥

दोहि वि णएहि णीअं सत्थमुलूएण तह वि मिच्छत्तां ।

जं सविसअप्पहाणत्तणेण अणोएणणिरवेक्खा ॥ ४९ ॥

(46) The only subject of pure Naya-vāda (a system of view-points) is the exposition of the Canon. If it is not rightly applied, it spoils both purposes.

(47) Naya-vāda are as many in number as there are methods of putting the sentences. Para-samayas (heresies) also are so many as Naya-vādas.

(48) Philosophy taught and promulgated by Kapila is nothing but a representation of Dravyāstika-naya (Noumenal) and that which is taught by Buddha—the son of Suddhodana is an exposition of Paryāyāstika Naya (phenomenal) pure and simple.

(49) Although the philosophical exposition is made by Kanāda (who is also known

by the name of Ulūka) with reference to both the Nayas but it is full of fallacies because both the Nayas are made use of independently.

Three things are principally mentioned here regarding *Naya-vāda* (A system of *Nayas* meaning methods of looking at a thing). Result of pure and impure *Nayavāda*, the possible number of heresies and their basic principles as well as distribution of heresies into *Nayavāda*—all these are touched here.

A thing conceived by a *Pramāna* (Right knowledge) has innumerable attributes. *Pramāna* is a synthetical or a collective view, while *Naya* represents or makes a representation of every point (cognized collectively by *Pramāna*) severally. So it reveals only a partial truth. *Pariśuddha Naya* (Pure *Naya*) is that which while engaged in exposing its specific point never touches a fact which belongs properly to another *Naya*. It busies itself with the exposition of a particular *Anśa* (point) over which it only has a claim. In short, its exposition is not based on the refutation of rival points but on complete indifference towards the other. *Apariśuddha Nayavāda* (impure *Naya*) is just the reverse. Thus *Pariśuddha Nayavāda* (*Nayas* pure and simple) never comes in conflict with the other *Nayas* and therefore it helps to expound fully the subject of Canonical Literature. In other words, *Naya-vāda* even though it is used in revealing the Truth partially, supports the whole Truth which is *Anekadharmātmaka*

(consisting of many aspects) and established by Pramāna because it is Itara-sāpekṣa (admitting the relative value of all other Nayas). To sum up, all the Pariśuddha Nayas by doing their duties independently, contribute collectively to unravel the whole Truth. Contrary to that, Apariśuddha Nayavāda (Impure Nayavāda) not only refuses the other Pakṣa but disproves what it has to prove. Because the statement which it has to make for a particular point cannot be done without a reference to other Nayas. So while disregarding the other Nayas, it disregards itself. The “nature” of a thing is nothing but a harmonious blending of all the points that go to make the thing. So when the relative importance of all the aspects is not recognized, we fall short of arriving at a correct estimate of a thing. That is why it has been told before that Apariśuddha Nayavāda not only uproots the other Nayas but uproots itself.

Words are uttered according to the opinion of the speaker and therefore we should understand that there are so many types of words as there are opinions about a thing. Opinions mean Nayavādas. Nayavādas are as many as there are types of words. All the Nayavādas when they are mutually regardless of each other are Para-samayas (non-Jaina doctrines), Therefore there are as many Para-samayas as there are mutually contradictory Nayas. In other words we should understand that there are as many Philosophies as there are mutually contradictory thought-processes and they all are non-Jaina in character and essence. Jaina Philosophy is only one because it synthesizes all the philosophies which contra-

dict each other. The controlling and conditioning factors of non-Jaina and Jaina philosophies are “contradiction” and “synthesis”—respectively.

The attitude of Sāṅkhya Philosophy towards soul and that of Buddhist Philosophy is that of Nityatva-vāda and Anityatva-vāda respectively. Both these view-points are Para-samayas because they disregard each other, being extremes. Jaina Philosophy, while attempting to synthesize both the view-points, declares that the Soul is Nitya (never-changing) on the strength of Dravyāstika-naya (Noumenal) and on the ground of Paryāyāstika-naya (Phenomenal) it is ever-changing. Thus, the Tattvas such as Ātman etc. are both changeless and changeful. And this is the real Jaina principle which represents a synthetical view.

Here arises a question that if Jaina Philosophy means a harmonious combination of mutually contradictory views such as Nitytva and Anitytva, Vaiśeṣika Darśana also will have to be styled a Jaina Darśana because it is also sympathetic to both the views. Reply to that question will have to be sought in the fact that it may be so in Vaiśeṣika Darśanas but there is a radical difference between both the Darśanas in the form that Vaiśeṣika-Darśana does not recognize importance of “relativity.” And this is what distinguishes Jaina Philosophy from Vaiśeṣika Philosophy.

The Nayas as used in Vaiśeṣika Darśan view the subject independently because Vaiśeṣika-Darśana believes that Paramāṇu, Ātman etc., which are Nitya (eternal) will

remain eternal for ever. And Ghata (Jar) Pata (cloth), etc., which are Anitya (transient) will remain so for ever. So Nityatva (eternality) has no place in the transient things and transience in eternal things. In short, it has recognized both the eternal and transient things no doubt but it does not admit that one and the same thing can be Nitya and Anitya at one and the same time. This is the differentiating feature and that is why Vaiśeṣika-Darśana is not Jaina Darśana.

Jaina Philosophy harmonizes antagonistic properties of a thing while Vaiśeṣika Philosophy recognizes distinction between them. This is a radical difference between both the philosophies. In the same way, the explanation exists between general and particular. Vaiśeṣika-Darśana acknowledges two independent elements namely general and particular designations of a thing. Jaina Darśana dogmatizes that a thing has a twofold nature (general and particular) and there cannot be two independent entities such as general and particular with reference to one and the same thing. **46—49.**

Difference between Ekānta and Anekānta standpoints in the case of Kārya (effect):—

जे संतवायदोसे सक्कोलूया भणंति संखाणं ।

संखा य असव्वाए तेसिं सव्वे वि ते सच्चा ॥ ५० ॥

ते उ भयणोवणीया सम्महंसणमणुत्तरं होंति ।

जं भवदुक्खविमोक्खं दो वि न पूरेंति पाडिक्कं ॥ ५१ ॥

नत्थि पुढवीविसिट्ठो 'घडो' त्ति जं तेण जुज्झइ अणणो ।
जं पुण 'घडो' त्ति पुवं ण आसि पुढवी तत्थो अणणो ॥५२॥

(50) Faults and Fallacies which are there according to Bauddhas and Vaiśeṣikas in the Sadvāda (theory of evolution) of Sāṅkhya are all true and those of Asadvāda Pakṣa (theory of creation) of which the Bauddhas and Vaiśeṣikas are accused hold also true.

(51) When this Sadvāda and Asadvāda are adjusted according to Anekānta the result is Samyag-Darśana (Right vision), because they both are not severally able to liberate a man from the world.

(52) The same reason, which proves the Jar not a separate entity from the earth, accounts for the fact that it is same as earth. And because the earth was not a pot before, it is also separate from it.

Two things are referred to here (1) Fallacies included in Radical viewpoint do not occur in Anekānta Dṛṣṭi (Versatile viewpoint) (2) The nature of a thing arrived at through Anekānta Dṛṣṭi.

There are more than one ways or viewpoints to establish identity and difference between cause and effect. Bauddha and Vaiśeṣika Darśana being Bhedavādi, declare cause and effect to be separate entities. And therefore, their favourite theory is that the Effect (Kārya) never

pre-exists in the Cause. Contrary to that, Sāṅkhyas being Abhedavādi, dogmatize that Cause and Effect are one and the same and therefore their cardinal principle is that Effect pre-exists in the Cause. Bauddhas and Vaiśeṣikas—while establishing thier ground, point out by way of objection that if the Effect pre-exists in Cause, efforts to bring out a new product are meaningless, Effect as it pre-exists in the Cause, should appear in it before its real manifestation and lastly all the endeavour regarding Effect should also be done before its real origination takes place. Thus the Sadvāda Pakṣa of Sāṅkhyas is ridiculed. Just so the Sāṅkhyas in their turn advance arguments in order to prove the Asatkārya-vāda of Buddhas and Vaiśeṣikas as untenable. Their chief difficulty in accepting it lies in the fact that if an Effect not previously existing in the Cause, is produced, any Cause should yield any Effect. There should be no reason why earth should produce pot and fabrics a cloth. And lastly if Asat Vastu comes into existence, why man should not have horns etc. There both the theories are true no doubt in accusing each other because they both stand on extremes—thus becoming prone to fallacious reasoning. But these two imperfect theories when they are harmoniously adjusted become perfect and there is no margin left for the faults and loop-holes. Thus the Cause and Effect are Bhinna and Abhinna both. Effect, being different, from cause is Asat (not pre-existing) before its real production and as it is Abhinna (identical) it is Sat (pre-existing in the latent form) also. Because Kārya is Sat, efforts are necessary to produce it. It is Sat from

the view-point of potentiality. Therefore, in its Avyakta-daśā (latent stage) it does not serve our purpose. It is Asat from the view-point of “production” (Utpatti) ; from the view-point of “potentiality” it is always Sat. This explodes the rival theory that any cause can produce any effect as well as a man can have horns. A cause which has a latent power to produce a thing can do so when efforts are made to make it manifest. Thus the drawbacks which severally attach to every theory vanish when Anekānta view-point is applied to it. Any theory when it is not based upon Anekānta-dṛṣṭi can never ensure perfect knowledge, in spite of its strength and on account of this very defect it cannot disentangle a man who has been entrapped into it. While Samanvaya (“Synthesis”) is based upon a broader aspect and is able enough to free a man from narrow-mindedness.

According to Anekānta-dṛṣṭi, Effect Ghata is Bhinna (separate) from as well as Abhinna (identical) with the cause Earth. It is identical with the earth because earth has got a potentiality to produce a Ghata and Ghata, when it is produced, is not without the essence of earth. It is Bhinna (separate or different) because before its production as a Ghata there was merely earth and the Ghata was not manifest. The works to be carried out through Ghata were not there. **50—52.**

Theories of causation¹ are Mithyā (false) if they are based on Ekānta view-point

1 See Śvetāśvatara 1st Adhyāya and Sanmati Tika p. 710. n. 5.

and Samyak (true) if they are grounded on Anekānta.

कालो सहाव गियई पुञ्चकयं पुरिसकारणेगंता ।

मिच्छत्तं ते चेवा(व) समासओ होंति सम्मत्तं ॥ ५३ ॥

Kāla (Time), Svabhāva (Nature), Niyati (Destiny), Pūrvakṛta Adṛṣṭa (Unknown actions of the past) and Puruṣārtha (Effort)—all these five taken singly are false because they touch only one point. They all are true if they are made use of with reference to each other.

Origination of a new product is due to a cause. There are many schools regarding causation. Out of them all five are referred to here.

Some are Kālavādi who take Time to be the only cause and argue out that different types of fruits are due to winter, summer and monsoons. And this Ṛtubheda (change in season) is nothing but Kāla-viśeṣa.

Some are Svabhāvavādi who regard Svabhāva (Nature) as the only cause. Their central argument is that the walking capacity of the animals only on land, flying power of the birds in the sky, tenderness of fruits and the pointedness of a thorn are all due to nothing but their inherent Nature.

Some are Niyativādi whose favourite theory is that destiny only is the cause. They believe that what is

to be obtained ; shall be obtained, what is to happen will happen ; and what is not to occur, shall never come to pass. All this is due to Destiny. Time and Nature have nothing to do with it.

Some are Adr̥ṣṭavādi who think that Adr̥ṣṭa only is the cause. All men are born with Karmas done in their past births and they are taken away in the Karmic current unexpectedly. Man's intellect is not independent. It shapes its course according to the Karmas accumulated hitherto. So Adr̥ṣṭa only is the cause of all.

Some are Puruṣavādi who advocate a theory that Puruṣa only is the cause and in support of their theory argues that God creates, destroys and keeps this world stable just as a spider weaves a web and a tree shoots forth sprouts. They say there is no cause outside God. This is Īśvara-Tantra a government of God.

All these five theories of causation are not true because every theory does not look beyond its own circle and hence is imperfect. They all are destroyed by mutual disregard and contradiction. They attain perfection only when they are accommodated and adjusted and arranged on a common ground of "Synthesis." Thus they become true and significant. 53.

Invalidity of Nastitva etc. six theories as regards "soul" :—

एतत्थि ए एतच्चो ए कुणइ कयं ए वेएइ एतत्थि एतत्त्वाणं ।

एतत्थि य मोक्खोवाओ छ म्मिच्छत्तस्स ठाणाइं ॥ ५४ ॥

अति अविणासधम्मी करेइ वेएइ अति णिन्वाणं ।

अति य मोक्खोवाओ छ रसम्मत्तास्स ठाणाइं ॥ ५५ ॥

(54) There is no soul ; It is not eternal ; It does not do ; It does not experience ; It has no emancipation ; and there is no remedy for emancipation, these six theories are receptacles of false knowledge.

(55) There is soul ; It is eternal : It does ; It experiences ; It can be liberated and there is a remedy for liberation—all these six theories are abodes of right knowledge.

Here in these verses we find a statement of those dogmas of the rival schools which come in our way of spiritual developement and a statement also of those which help us in accomplishing spiritual progress.

Dogmas which interfere with the accomplishment of spiritual progress are based on a mistaken view while those which are instrumental in bringing about spiritual evolution are grounded on a right view-point. Those schools of dogmas are mentioned as under in due order :—

(1) It is called Anātmavāda which does not recognize any Tattva (reality) such as Atman (soul) ; (2) Kṣaṇikātmavāda is that which acknowledges soul but its Atman is not eternal and hence destructible ; (3) A school, which accepts that there is soul and it is eternal

but it is never the agent because it is Kūṭastha, is Akartṛtva-vāda. ; (4) To believe that soul does something but it does not experience because it is transcendent or emotionless constitutes the very essence of a theory designated as Abhokṛtva-vāda. ; (5) Anirvānavāda admits that soul always does and always experiences but it also theorizes that there is no end to Rāga (attachment) and Dveṣa (hatred) just as the nature of a soul ; (6) And lastly a theory which states that the soul by its very nature gets emancipation sometime in future but there is no remedy to get it is Anupāyavāda.

If a prejudice is cultivated for anyone of the six theories, spiritual progress will at all be stopped or hampered seriously. And one who wishes to ensure spiritual development should pin his faith on all the below-mentioned rival theories :—(1) There is soul ; (2) It is indestructible ; (3) It is an agent—a doer ; (4) It is an experiencer also ; (5) In spite of its power as an agent and an experiencer, there is every possibility to put a stop to Rāga and Dveṣa which compel it to act ; (6) There is a way to effect their stoppage and it is practicable also. These six theories are Samyak (true) because they inspire faith in the subject and push him forward in his progress. 54—55.

Faults liable to crop up in the debate due to the absence of Anekānta Dṛṣṭi :—

साहम्मद एव अर्थं साहेज्ज परो विहम्मदो वा वि ।

अण्णोणं पडिकुट्टा दोण्णवि एए असन्वाया ॥ ५६ ॥

द्वन्द्वद्वयवत्तत्त्वं सामर्थ्यं पञ्चवस्स य विसेसो ।
 एष समोवणीया विभज्जवायं विसेसेति ॥ ५७ ॥
 हेउविसत्तोवणीयां जह वयणिज्जं परो नियत्तोइ ।
 जइ तं तहा पुरिल्लो दाइतो केण जिव्वंतो ॥ ५८ ॥
 एयंताऽसब्भूयं सब्भूयमणिच्छियं च वयमाणो ।
 लोइय-परिच्छियाणं वयणिज्जपहं पडइ वादी ॥ ५९ ॥

(56) When Ekāntavādi (Radicalist) establishes a conclusion by Sādharmya (Similarity; analogy) or Vaidharmya (dissimilarity), they both result in an Asadvāda.

(57) Noumenal view-point is concerned with Sāmānya (general) and Phenomenal view-point with Viśeṣa (particular). When they are employed independently, they give rise to Radical view-point.

(58) The opponent disproves the Sādhya (major term) which is going to be proved by Hetu (Middle term) because it has been put in an objectionable way. Who would have conquered the Vādi who has employed the major term as it ought to be employed?

(59) Vādi who speaks utter falsehood or who makes an indefinite statement even

though it may be true, is accused by the examiners.

A Vādi entering into discussion never gets success if his discussions are not based on versatility of aspects. On the contrary, he becomes Asadvādi (liar), is defeated and falls a prey to the cultured.

It does not matter whether a defendent proves his point by a positive or a negative example but he will no doubt come into conflict with the opposite party if his judgments are one-sided. To avoid these, he should never make use of a major term (Sādhya) with radical view in a syllogism.

Only a Sāmānya (generality) is the subject of Nonmenal and Particularity of Phenomenal. When these two are engaged independently, they end into Radical view-point.

If a defendent, while proving his point, employs the Sādhya (major term) with radical view-point, the opposite party defeats him seeing his weak point. It is, then, patent that had that defendent employed his Sādhya with versatility of view-points—thus avoiding a loop hole, he would never have suffered a defeat at the hands of his opponent.

What to talk of a thing which is totally false on account of radical view-point? If a statement which is true from one point of view is put forward by the defendent in his discussion as an uncertain statement, he lowers himself down in the eyes of others who may be practical and proficient. Thus only to keep versatility of

view-points is not sufficient but one should try to avoid indefiniteness also in his discussions. **56-59.**

A proper method to make an exposition of a Tattwa (Reality) :—

द्वं खित्तं कालं भावं पञ्जाय-देस-संजोगे ।

भेदं च पडुच्च समा भावाणं पणवणपञ्जा ॥ ६० ॥

A proper exposition of Padārthas (categories) depends on Dravya (Substance), Kṣetra (Space), Kāla (Time), Bhāva (modality), Paryāya (modificatory change), Deśa (province), Saṁyoga (circumstances), and Bheda (distinction)

An exposition of categories in which versatility of view-points is predominant should strictly refer to eight things mentioned above. As for example, when Dhyāna (meditation), Tyāga (charity) etc. are to be described, a strict attention to at least eight things mentioned above should be paid. **60.**

Faults in a Sutra which is taken as perfect:—

पाडेक्कनयपहगयं सुत्तां सुत्ताहरसइसंतुट्ठा ।

अविकोवियसामत्था जहागमविभत्तापडिवत्ती ॥ ६१ ॥

सम्मइसणमिणमो सयलसमत्तवयणिज्जनिहोसं ।

अत्तुक्कोसविणट्ठा सलाहमाणा विणासेति ॥ ६२ ॥

(61) Those, who are satisfied by being called Sūtradhara (well-versed in Sūtras) because they recite Sūtras which depend only on one Naya, remain devoid of capability indispensable to learned people. Their knowledge touches only words.

(62) These boasters destroy Versatility of view-points which takes a wholesale review and at the same time impede their spiritual progress.

Those who stick to only one view-point without having studied all the possible stand-points and who are satisfied by being called a Sūtradhara (one who recites a Sūtra) because they have memorized a Sūtra which supports what they want to say, never come to possess true, intrinsic worth of a learned man. Their knowledge touches only the outer forms of words.

They do not show so much brilliancy as is associated with independent intellect. Thus they become puffed up with what little they have acquired and destroy Anekāntadṛṣṭi by their boastings. 61-62

Important merits for the exposition of a Śāstric lore:—

ए ह सासणभक्तीमेत्तएण सिद्धंतजाणओ होइ ।

ए वि जाणओ वि एणियमा पणवणाणिच्छिओ एम ॥६३॥

• No one can come to possess the real knowledge of Siddhanta by mere devotion of the Canon. And also its knower as a rule is not entitled to make an exposition of the Śāstras.

One believes that he has a right to interpret the Canon because he has a devotional fervour for it while the other believes that he has a right to do so because he has a knowledge of it. The author, with reference to both these types of people, says that he only has a claim who possesses a perfect and a definite knowledge of the Śāstra. That cannot be accomplished by a meagre knowledge of the Śāstras or by a mere devotional fervour because many do not have Śāstric knowledge even though they have a reverence for it while those who have its knowledge do not hold necessary qualifications to do so. This fitness is rarely to be found even in those people who are well-versed in Śāstras. 63

Statement as to what should be done for the attainment of perfect knowledge of the realities :—

सुत्तं अत्थनिमेणं न सुत्तमेत्तेण अत्थपडिवत्ती ।
 अत्थगई उण एयवायगहणलीणा दुरभिगम्मा ॥ ६४ ॥
 तम्हा अहिगयसुत्तेण अत्थसंपायणम्मि जइयठवं ।
 आयरियधीहत्था हंदि महाणं विलंवेन्ति ॥ ६५ ॥

(64) Sūtra is a receptacle of meaning. But mere Sūtra does not yield meaning. Knowledge of a genuine meaning is difficult to be obtained as it is dependent on a complex Nayavāda theory.

(65) Therefore, those who know the Sūtra, should try to get at the right meaning because the presumptuous and ignorant preceptors misinterpret the Śāstras.

The author retorts to one who, by the mere knowledge of the Sūtras, boasts to have known the realities, and declares that the recital of the Sūtra is no doubt an abode of meaning but mere recital cannot give rise to a perfect and right meaning. Such a knowledge, as it is dependent on a complex Nayavāda theory is difficult to be obtained. If then Nayavāda is thoroughly mastered it is easily obtained.

Therefore one who wishes to obtain a full and genuine knowledge of realities, should strive to get at the meaning having first learnt the Sūtras which may not be contradictory and which may have been evolved with reference to Nayas. For this the theory of Nayas should be well studied. Those who do not do this, lower down the Canon in the eyes of others because they are nothing more than presumptuous and ignorant people. 64, 65.

Statement of faults which find place in outward show without serious thinking :—

जह जह बहुस्सुओ सम्मओ य सिस्सगणसंपरिवुडो य ।
अविणिच्छिओ य समए तह तह सिद्धंतपडिणीओ ॥ ६६ ॥
चरणकरणप्पहाणा ससमय-परसमयमुक्कवावारा ।
चरण-करणस्स सारं णिच्छयसुद्ध ण याणंति ॥ ६७ ॥

(66) A man, who is not strong in Śāstric lore, passes as one who is well-versed, becomes the enemy of the Śāstras as much as he is surrounded by the pupils.

(67) Those, who strictly adhere to rules and regulations and who have left of thinking Jaina and non-Jaina doctrines, are people who do not know the fruit of such rules and regulations with Niścaya-Dṛṣṭi (from philosophical point of view).

With reference to those who are fond of degrees and diplomas as well as who have stuck fast to the mud in the form of attachment for pupils and paraphernalia and also with reference to those that are mad after ceremonious performances. (Kriyās) leaving aside meditation and thinking, the author says that such people will go on becoming as much inimical to Jainism as they will try to pass on as well-versed people amongst men and go on taking a lead amassing a crowd of pupils around them.

Stamp of erudition and a large crowd of pupils do not prove Śāstric knowledge. On the contrary, pomp and hypocrisy come in the way of acquisition of right knowledge. Those who leave aside meditating and thinking and indulge in simply observing rules and regulations are not entitled to reap their fruits. The fruit of philosophical thinking is to acquire right knowledge of realities and to purify the soul through cultivating a right taste for it. If thinking on Śāstric things is left off, ordinary knowledge of realities will not arise. And when there is no possibility of even ordinary knowledge, what to talk of pure, unsullied knowledge? Without such knowledge right perception will be impossible and without right perception purity of soul can never be attained. So for one whose aim and end is purity of soul, observance of religious practices is not the only necessary thing but philosophical thinking also.

For one who is not able to start independent thinking on Śāstric things, the royal road to be entitled to the fruit of religious practices is to resort to a true preceptor and to pass his life there and breathe healthy atmosphere of philosophical thinking which surrounds his teacher. 66. 67.

Knowledge alone or practice alone is not wanted—says the following verse :—

गणान् किरियारहियं किरियामेत्तं च दो वि एगंता ।
असमत्था दाएउं जम्ममरणदुक्ख मा भाई ॥ ६८ ॥

Knowledge without religious practices and religious practices without knowledge are not able to free a man from the turmoils of birth and death because they both are Ekāntas (extreme view-points).

In the preceding verse, the importance of knowledge with the religious practices is referred to while here the verse contains a suggestion to make use of Anekānta-dṛṣṭi in order to establish a synthesis.

No good result can be arrived at without allround spiritual progress. Its powers are mainly two. One is Cetanā (vitality) and the other is Virya (Action-power).

These two powers are so interlocked that the development of one gives rise to that of the other. Thus simultaneous development of both the powers is indispensable. Development of vitality means acquisition of knowledge and that of Virya (action-power) means the shaping of the life according to knowledge. Without knowledge, proper moulding of life is not possible and without properly shaping the life, the life itself is meaningless. This is why it is said that knowledge and practice are severally the two extremes. If these two extremes are understood in right perspective, they yield fruit. In this connection the proverb of "The Blind and the lame" is famous. 68

Conclusion :—

भद्रं सिद्ध्यारं स एतत्समूहमवश्यम् असमसारम् ।

जिज्ञासुयणस्म भगवन्मो स विमलसुहाहितात्मस्म ॥ ६९ ॥

Be good to Jainism which is the repository of all heresies and which is nectar of nectars and which is easily understood by those desirous of liberation.

Three adjectives are used by the author here while wishing good luck to Jainism. By the adjective "Repository of all heresies" the author means to say that the peculiarity of Jaina Philosophy consists in accomplishing its utility by properly accomodating various types of thought-processes which are false as they wend their way in complete disrespect towards each other. By the second adjective "Easily understood by those who are desirous of liberation" the author intends to say that Jainism can be easily understood by those who approach it with unbiassed mind or by those who are desirous of liberation even though it is very very complex on account of the fact that it tries to synthesize all the mutually conflicting theories and thought-processes. The right to understand it consists in cessation of distress. By the third adjective "Nectar of nectars" the author means that Jainism has a latent power to bring immortality to one who wants to thoroughly utilize it, through destroying distresses by the words of the Jinās which are understood only by those who are unprejudiced and the central argument of which is based on complete "impartiality" (Mādhyasthya). On account of these three things it deserves worship and adoration. 69

END

—:O:—

ERRATUM

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