ŚRAMAŅA BHAGAVÄN MAHÁVĪRA

HIS LIFE AND TEACHING

The Universities Commission Ministry of Education Snowdon Government of India:

Snowdon, Simla I 27th July 1949.

My dear Sir,

I thank you very much for your letter of the 21st July, and the set of books you sent to me.

I am sorry to say that I have not been able to read them with the care and attention that they deserve. But I have seen enough to know that they must be of great value to students of religious thought.

With regards, Your Sincerely Sd (Radhakrishanan)

ŚRAMAŅA BHAGAVÄN MAHÄVĪRA

HIS LIFE AND TEACHING

BY MUNI RATNA-PRABHA VIJAYA

VOLUME IV NIHNAVA--VADA

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PREFACE

The Text of Nihnavavada.

Sources.

It is now a welknown fact that Risabhadeva Swāmī, the first Tirthankara of the present series, was the founder of the Jaina Canon. It was during his regime that the Sacred Works of the Jainas came into existence. After him, the Sacred Works increased in number and quality when the religion was exalted to high rank, but they were reduced considerably in times of disorder and anarchy. Generally speaking, preachings of all the Tirthankaras happened to be of the same kind, and their lives were almost similar to each other in principal characteristics.

Śramana Bhagavān Mahāvīra, the elder contemporary of Gautama Buddha, was the last, but Supreme Tīrthankara in their whole dynasty. Like His predecessors, He too had got his preachings composed in books. His Ganadharas or principal disciples arranged those preachings in twelve Angas, the last one being divided into fourteen Parvas. The Absolute Knowledge of these Paryas began to fade gradually till at last it was totally extinct. Ārya Jamba Swāmī was the last Kevalin. After him there were half a dozen Paţţadharas designated as Śruta-Kevalins. Then there were ten Dasaparvins, possessing the knowledge of ten Parvas only. Ārya Vajra Swāmī was the last Dasaparvīn, after whom the knowledge of Parvas began to fade quickly. Devarddhigani Ksamāśramana was the last of the type which possessed the knowledge of one Parva only.

Thus, when the knowledge of the original preaching of Śramaņa Bhagavān Mahāvīra was fast disappearing, it was rightly felt by some of his successors to commit those preachings to writings. As a result of such efforts, forty-five Sacred Works came into existence: 11 Angas, 12 Upāngas, 10 Prakirņas, 6 Chèda-Sotras, 2 Sotras, and 4 Mola-Sotras.× Of these, the four Mola-Sotras are considered as the Original Sotras or Commandnents, because they are primarily needed to guide the Jaina Monks in their religious practices. Āvašyaka, Dašavaikālika, Uttarādhyayana and Piņḍa Niryukti (or Ogha Niryukti) are the four Mala Sotras. According to Weber, the order or composition of these Sotras is this -(1) Uttarādhyayana (2) Āvašyaka (3) Dašavaikālika and (4) Piņḍa Niryukti.

Though Āvaśyaka Satra is not the oldest of the four Mala Satras, it is the most important of all, as its name suggests. Sāmāyika (Sāmāiya), Caturviņšati Stava (Cauvisattho), Vandanaka (Vandaņayam), Pratikramaņa (Paḍikkamaṇa), Kāyotsarga (Kāussagga) and Pratyākhyāna (Paccakkhāṇa) are the six divisions of the Āvaśyaka Satra. It should be noted that though all these Satras were dedacted into books by Gaṇadharas they were originally preached by Śramaṇa Bhagavān Mahāvīra.*

Bhadrabāhu Swāmī had already written a Niryukti on the Āvaśyaka Sotras and a number of Corņis were also composed by several authors as detailed commentaries on the Āvaśyaka Sotra. Still, however, Jinabhadra-gaņi Kṣamāśramaņa felt the need of ellucidating the Original Niryukti; hence he wrote a Bhaṣya or Commentary in gəthās or verse on the Niryukti. Since this was an additional Bhāsya to the Niryukti, which itself was a Commentary on the Āvaśyaka Sotra, it was known as Viśesāvaśyaka Bhāsya. The whole work runs into 3603 gāthās. or verses. It could further be divided into several sub-sections such as Piţhikā,

× In addition to these, some enumerate 20 more *Prakirnas*, 12 *Niryuktis*, and several more arriving at the total number of 84. Again in order to supplement the information supplied by those 84 $\bar{a}gamas$, there are several other works known as *Niga*mas or *Upanisads* which, in turn, are 36 in all and bring the total number to 120.

^{*} Vide केण कया ति य ववहारओ जिणिंदेण गणहरे हिं च। तस्सामिणा उ निच्छयनयस्स तत्तो जओ ऽणण्णं ॥३३८२॥

(भी विशेषावइयक भाष्य)

Varavarikā, Upasargas, Sāmācārī (of ten varieties), Gaņa dhara-vāda, Gaņadharas, Nihnavas, Nihnava-vāda, Šesa Upod ghāta, Niryukti and a-svādhyāya Niryukti. Of these. Ganadharavāda and Nihnavavāda are the most important of all, because they discuss, both positively and negatively, several philosophical topics that are vitally connected with the Jaina āgamas.

Gaņadharavāda and Nihnavavāda.

Although both the $V\bar{a}das$ ultimately point to the common goal of the realisation of truth there is a great contrast between $Ganadhara-v\bar{a}da$ and $Nihnavav\bar{a}da$ in so far as their subject, method of discussion, debators, and the consequences of debate are concerned. These points of contrast could be explained briefly as follows:—

Ganadharavāda deals with positive type of discussion while Nihnavavāda deals with negative type of discussion. Because Ganadharavāda strengthens the hands of Jaina Agamas by asserting certain cardinal virtues of the Jaina Religion, while Nihnavavāda tries to repudiate the principle of Jainism in one way or the other weakening thereby its influence amongst the people. Discussions in G. V. are based on the interpretations of certain Vedavacanas, while those in N. V. are based on the interpretations of the Jaina Agamas. Ganadharas enjoy the proud privilege of entering into debate with Śramana Bhagavan Mahavira Himself, while Nihnavas enter into controversy with the Precept or of one Gaccha or the other. Ganadharas entertain honest doubts in their minds from the beginning and hence accept the principles of Tirthankara as soon as they are convinced; while Nihnavas, in most cases, do not leave their rigid beliefs in spite of any number of solid arguments advanced by their opponents. Debates of Ganadharas, therefore, seem to have generated for the realisation of truth, while those of Nihnavas are caused out of jealousy, anger, vanity or infatuation in many cases. Thus, love of truth is at the root of G. V., while insinuation of truth seems to be the root of N. V. It will, therefore, be seen that all the Ganadharas argue with their Celebrated Preceptor frankly

with true desire for knowledge, and hence they do not hesitate in accepting the Dikṣā ultimately when all their doubts are dispelled; while Nihnavas deliberately try to hide the truth in order to refute the theory of the Tirthankara, as they want to establish their own theory amongst the monks and create disruption in the Gaccha.

Faith in Agamas is the guiding spirit of Ganadharas, while scepticism is the main characteristic of Nihnavas. In G. V., the debators are non-Jaina persons who are initiated into Jainism at the end, while in N. V. the debators are not only Jainas but the learned Jaina monks themselves who abandon the Jaina church and try to establish their own School. Logic, pure and simple, brings the debators to the right path in G. V., while physical punishment brings the debators to the right path in many cases in N. V.

In G. V., the discussions are held on a very high level as they treat philosophical subjects from beginning to end; while in N. V., the discussions sometimes fall to the level of mere logical tricks employed for refuting a small argument related to a certain statement of agama. Ganadharas never went against the Jaina canon; on the contrary they sponsored the movement of establishing its influence over the masses by dedacting the principles of preachings of Śramana Bhagavān Mahavīra into books. It was not so with Nihnavas. Since they were prominent monks holding strong influence over the public, the Nihnavas actually propagated their wrongly-based theories amongst the dull-witted monks and defiled certain portions of the Gaccha by dragging some of its members on their sides. Rohagupta and Śivabhati are the glaring instances of this type. In short, the tendency of being at perfect agreement with the preachings of Śramana Bhagavān Mahāvīra signifies the character of Ganadharas; while that of being at disagreement with the same, either in part or in toto, reflects the character of Nihnavas.

Utility of Nihnavavada—

It will appear from the points of contrast stated above that

Nihnavavada has proved detrimental to the cause of Jainism. Although there is very little sympathy for Nihnavas amongst Jainas, it should be remembered that these intellectual outlaws have indirectly helped to strengthen the ground of Jainism by their apparent harsh activities. Nihnayavāda is not a mere quarrel. But it is an intellectual debate in which the real essence of the religious precepts are to test. After having passed through the hard test of the fire of Nihnavavāda, lustre of the precepts of the Jaina Canon has become brighter instead of becoming faint. Secondly, Nihnavas and their thoughts have done good turn to the followers of Jainism by holding a torch-light in the form of their plight as Nihnavas and warning them thereby of the disastrous consequences of running the risk that they had undertaken. Thirdly, Nuhnavaväda draws our attention to one intrinsic weakness that is more or less inherent in every human being that of not putting into practice that we actually believe. Eventually such instances remind us of our own hypocrisy which is but another form of Nihnavavāda and make us introvert for a while to think if we could ever overcome the inconsistency of behaviour. Fourthly, the study of Nihnavavāda helps to cultivate intellectual robustness. Like Nihnavas one should learn to accept nothing without being convinced of it. Leaving aside their prejudicial temperament, Nihnavas possessed a remarkable quality of not accepting truth as it comes but only after intellectual test and direct experience. Their defeats teach us that there is one universal standard of testing truth and that is anekantavada, O**r** all-embracive point of view. Fifthly, the story of each one of the Nihnavas is very interesting and provides literary flavour in between philosophical discussions. Being more realistic, it appeals to the common reader much more than mere enumeration or ellucidation of religious precepts. Thus the study of Nihnavavāda bears importance from various sides.

Summary of the text—

A brief summary of the life-events and thoughts of different Nihnavas could be drawn as follows :---

Jamali was the first Nihnava. He was the son-in-law of Śramana Bhagavān Mahāvīra on the one hand and his nephew on the other. He was conversant with eleven Angas. He was the head of a retinue of 500 monks while his wife was the chief of 1000 nuns. Once, after having separated from Sramana Bhagavan Mahavira without his consent, as he was laid down with high fever, he ordered his followers to prepare a bed for hun. While the monks were spreading the bed for him, he questioned them as to whether the bed was ready. The monks said 'yes'. But, in the heat of fever, Jamali asserted that what was being spread could not be said to have been actually spread. Eventually he refused to accept the welknown doctrine of 'Kriyamanan Kritam', 'caliyamāņam calitam etc. found in the Bhagavatī Sutra. According to him, actual production of an object is achieved after dirghakala or long time. The sthaviras tried to refute his theory of 'bahurata' which advanced the faults of nityakritatva, mithyākriyā etc. by putting forth various sound counter-arguments. But Jamālī did not listen to them. Consequently, some of the sthaviras left his side and returned to Sramana Bhagavan Mahāvīra, while a few stuck to him and followed the theory of 'Bahuratas'. Jamāli boasted about his Kèvalitva even before the Tirthankara. Śramana Bhagavān Mahāvīra explained to him the transitoriness of Jiva like loka and asked him to renounce his theory. But Jamali did not even put faith in him. Thereafter he led the life of a stanuch śramana and met death without repenting for his misbelief. His wife, however, renounced the Bahurata theory after having graspel the truth on experiencing the burn of a charcoal thrown on her by a potter named Dhanka.

Tişyagupta was the second Nıhnava. He happened to be the student of Ācārya Vasu who was a Śruta-Kèvalin. In course of his study of Parvas, Tişyagupta came aeross a conversation between the Tirthańkara and his pupil discussing the definition of Jīva, where-in the Tirthańkara asserts that not a portion or two but all the portions combined together, form Jīva. Tisyagupta misinterpretes this ālāpaka and propounds a new theory that the last portion of a living being by which it becomes complete in form can alone be called Jiva. The preceptor tries to remove his misbelief by repeated assertions that it is not the last portion that brings about the completion of a living being, but each and every constituent of it, helps to do so, as each part of an object can never be taken as different from the object according to Evambhata Naya. Tisyagupta does not feel convinced and hence is expelled from the Gaccha. Thereafter he begins to wander here and there propagating his theory of 'Antya-pradesatva' and finally arrives at the city of Amalakalpa, where he is invited for dinner by a śrāvaka called Mitraśrī, who, by offer ing him the last portions of various articles of food, drink etc. opens his eyes and compels him to come to the right path.

Ārya Āsādhācārya was the pioneer of a third type of Nihnavas known as Avyaktas. He happened to be a preceptor in the Paulāsādha church of the eity of Śvetavikā. While teaching the practice of āgādha yoga to his pupils, Āsādhācārya died on account of acute pain in heart and attained dirvvine form in the Nalinigulma region of Saudharma deva-loka. But when he knew by means of Avadhi jnāna that his pupils were engrossed in the study of yoga, he condescended to return to his original human form and proceeded with his work. So, the god in disguise of a preceptor taught the aims, explanations, and commandments of the Holy Writ. Ultimately, at the time of departure he informed the sādhūs of his asamyata-dèvatva and begged their apology.

The young sädhus became sceptical at this instance. They began to doubt their own fellow brothers on the plea that one could never ascertain whether one was samyata or asamyata. They decided, therefore, not to respect anyone. The sthaviras tried to persuade these young sceptics in several ways but it was all in vain. Consequently the Ayaktavādins had to be expelled from the gaccha. Thereafter, on their arrival at Rājagriha, King Balabhadra sent for these Nihnavas and ordered them to be killed under the feet of elephants. For, the king argued, it could not be ascertained as to whether they were sādhus or thieves. The Nihnavas then pleaded that they were real sädhus. The king replied that if they were real sädhus they ought to have respected their own sthaviras as real sädhus. This made the Avyaktas leave their false belief and join the gaccha after tendering due apology.

Ārya Aśvamitra was the fourth Nihnava. He was the pupil of Acarya Mahagiri of the yaksa temple in the city of Mithils. While studying the Naipunika chapter of the Anupravada Porva, Asyamitra came across a statement dealing with the discussion of Chinna and chedanaka, which asserted that "all the Narakas of the present convention will perish and so will all the deities." On reading this, Asvamitra conjectured that if all the Nārakas were to perish, all other living beings would as well meet destruction as soon as they were born. Consequently, he thought, they would not be able to attain the rewards of good and evil deeds. In this way, he began to draw several conclusions on false conjectures. The preceptor proved the absurdity of his theory by pointing out various in-consistencies in accepting the entire destrution of an abject at the end of a particular condition of time, asserted by the Kşanikakşaya vada of Asvamitra from the point of view of Rijustūtra Naya. Asvamitra, however, did not give up his false notion, and was subsequently expelled from the Gaccha. Thereafter, in the city of Rājagriha, the watchmen caught hold of Asvamitra and hit him and his retinue alleging them to be burglars. Asyamitra pleaded that they were none but sravakas belonging to a particular gaccha. But the watchmen refused to believe on the strength of their own theory and retorted that those śramanas and the gaccha had already perished there and then only. This brought Asyamitra to senses and he joined the original church by tendering due apology.

Arya Gangācārya was the fifth Nihnava. He propounded the theory of Dvaikriyās viz. that of two processes taking place simultaneously. In a village on the bank of river Ullūka, there lived a monk named Dhanagiri who had a pupil called Gangacārya. Once, while crossing the river, Gangācārya, bald-headed as he was, felt the heat of sunshine on his head, and the cold of

river-water on his feet. At this time, he formed a wrong notion that both the experiences took place simultaneously, and contradicted thereby the precept of Agamas which had laid down that two processes of feeling could never take place simultaneously. He reported the theory to his preceptor and quoted his personal experience in support of it. The preceptor replied that the processes of undergoing two different feelings seem to work simulta neously on account of one's own inability to mark the subtle gap of time between the two as well as the quickness of mind. He established the validity of Agamas and refuted the n.is-belief of Dvaikriyā by proving an important principle of perception that there can never be more than one upayoga or application of mind, at one time, explaining the difference between general and definite types, of knowledge. Eventually, he was compelled by Manināga to give up his false notion, and Gangācārya had to do so out of fear. Ultimately, he resorted to his original school after tendering the apology.

Rohagupta, the pioneer of Vaiśesika System, was known as the Sixth Nihnava. He entered into controversy with a mendicant ascetic in the court of king Balasri of the city of Antaranjikā and defeated him by establishing the theory of three categories successfully. The defeated mendicant was expelled from the city, while victorious Rohagupta went to his preceptor and narrated the whole incident before him. Acarya Śrigupta inquired about the theory of Trairāśikas. So, Rohagupta explained that he had established the existence of three categories of Jīva viz. Jīva, Ajīva and Nojīva, by means of various tricks and examples. The Acarya congratulated him on the success, but at the same time he advised Rohagupta to declare before the people that although he had proved the validity of the Trairāsika theory, they should not follow the same, as it went against the Jaina Agamas. Rohagupta declined to do so. Consequently, Acarya had to enter into controversy with him in the Royal court. They discussed the principle of Trairāśikas at length for six months. Ultimately, it was agreed by both the parties to approach the kutrikāpaņa (Universal Shop) where all the objects existing in three lokas were available. Accordingly, the Ācārya asked for nojīva at the Kutrikāpaņa but it was not available. Consequently, Rohagupta was declared as Nihnava and was expelled from the gaccha in a humiliating condition. He attracted a number of followers by propagating the Trairāśika theory and started a separate school of Vaiśeşikas which, unlike Jaina Āgamas, established the principle of six entities viz. Dravya, Guņa, Karma, Sāmānya, Viśeşa and Samavāya.

Gostha-Māhila was the Seventh Nihnava. He belonged to the Iksugriha Gaccha of Dasapura Nagara. He was angry with the preceptor Raksitaseri for having appointed Durbalika Puspamitra as the head of the Gaccha after him. So, when Puspamitra gave sermons on the eighth and ninth Porvas, Gostha-Mähila did not even care to listen to him. He heard the same from Vindhya who had carefully attended and understood the sermons. In course of discussion of the Karmapravada parva, when he heard from Vindhya that Karman is tied, attached and infused with all the regions of Jiva, he contradicted that principle of āgama and tried to assert that Karman was attached to Jīva only on the surface like the skin of a snake. He did not accept the relation of Jiva and Karman as that of milk and water or that of fire and iron. Further, he objected to the predicament which laid down that the practice of pratyākhyāna is to be followed by all the monks in mind, speech, and action till the end of their life, and asserted that the sanctity of the vow could be preserved only if it were to be practised without a time-limit. Vindhya tried to explain the purport of the agama, but Gostha-Māhila did not listen to him. The matter was then reported to Acārya Durbalıkā Puspamitra. The Ācārya repudiated the viewpoint of Gostha Mahila by means of various pramanas and propounded the commandment of Scriptures that pratyākhyāna could never continue after death on the ground that Muktātmā is free from duty of observing vow after leaving the mundane world. But Gosthā Māhila arrogantly rejected the Ācārya's view-point and quoted the authority of Sramana Bhagavan Mahavira in support of his own. Eventnally it was decided in the assembly

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of sthaviras to refer the matter to Tirthańkara Sīmandara Swāmi And it was done so through a goddess, who brought the verdict of the Tirthańkara in favour of the Ācārya. Goșthā Māhila, who refused to accept even the authority of Tirthańkara Bhagavān, was then declared as Seventh Nihnava, and was immediately expelled from the Gaccha. He remained as a Nihnava till the end of his life.

Boţika is a peculiar type of Nihnavas which gave rise to the sect of Digambaras. Śivabhūti was the pioneer of that sect. Originally, he happened to be a Royal attendant in the city of Rathavīrapura. He was very irregular in his habits. He used to come home after midnight. So, his wife was very much unhappy. Once when he came home late at night his mother rebuked him and did not allow him to enter the house. Śivabhūti left the home in pride and anger. He came near an Upāśraya where he found the Jaina Sādhus engrossed in their study at that late hour. Ācārya Kriśņāsūri was the head of the gaceha. Sivabhūti approached the ascetics and requested them to initiale him into asceticism. The asoetics refused to give him dīkṣā at the first instance, but subsequently Śivabhūti got himself initiated into gaccha.

Once, when all the Sadhus were on Vihāra, Sivabhūti received a blanket as present from a king. Śivabhūti was so much fascinated towards the new blanket that he kept it with him in spite of the preceptor forbidding him to do so. Once, when Śiva bhūti was away, the preceptor took out his blanket, cut it into pieces and distributed the same amongst the sādhus. Śivabhuti's mind was greatly perturbed at this. He then heared the discourse of preceptor on Jinakalpika, and the apparel of a sādhu. Śivabhūti boasted to become Jinakalpika by complete renunciation. Accordingly, he gave up all his clothes and stayed in the garden without clothes. The Ācārya and several other sthaviras tried to disuade him from giving up clothes by explaining the true spirit of nisparigraha in various ways. But out of vanity and passion, Śivabhūti did not listen to him. His sister also followed

the brother in this respect but she was subsequently asked to put on garments. Thus Śivablūti sponsored the sect of Digambaras. He had initiate I two pupils viz. Kauņdinya and Koţţavīra, who prolonged the sect by tradition.

Commentaries—

Three commentaries are said to have been written on the text of $\hat{S}r\bar{i}$ Viśesjāvaśyaka Bhāsya. The author himself is said to have written a commentary on his own work, but unfortunately, his commentary is not available at present. The second commentary has been written by Koţyācārya (or Śilsńkācārya) the manuscript of which dated 1136 V. S. is preserved in the Bhāndārkar Research Institute, Poona, in a tattered condition. This commentary has not been published as yet. The only commentary that has been published and popularly accepted at present is that of Maladhāri Hèmacandrācarya.

Maladhāri Hèmacandrācārya is different form Kali-kālasarvajña Hèmacandrācārya, the welknown author of Dvyāśraya. Originally, he was known as Śvetāmbarācārya Bhattāraka. His worldly name was Pradyumna and in the prime of his youth, it is said, he was a minister. By the advice of Śrī Ambayadèva sori he renounced the worldly life and having left his four wives, he entered the ascetic life. Siddharāja Jayasimha, the great monarch of Gujarat, of the twelfth century V. S., was highly impressed by his great personality and wide-spread wellversedness.

The Author-His Life, Works, and Date.

Life—

Jinabhadragani Ksamāśramana is the author of this splendid work. Very little is known about his life. Yet, there is no doubt that the author was a highly-esteemed scholar of his age †

† Here are the tributes paid to him by several commentators:-

- (i) जिनभद्रगणि स्तौमि श्रमाश्रमणमुत्तमम्।
 - यः श्रुताज्जीतमुद्दे शौरिः सिन्धोः सुधामिव ॥ १ ॥

— Tilakācārya in his Avasayaka Vritti.

He was the first Jaina writer and preacher who had consistently attempted to interprete and explain the principles of the Jaina Canon in such a manner as to appeal to the intellect of the people. That is to say, he did not instruct his pupils or followers only in a traditional way without caring for the inner motive or spirit of the preachings. Though he preached the same old traditional principles of the Jaina Canon, he interpreted and explained them in a logical way so as to appeal to their intellect. He was, therefore, accepted by the people as an unparalleled preacher and scholar of the age, and hence was awarded the title of "yugapradhāna".§

His knowledge was not confined to the religious lore, but he was well-versed in the sciences of mathematics. etymology, prosody, and phonology also.[‡]

Still, however, Acarya Jinabhadragani was the staunch and orthodox upholder of the traditional Jaina Canon. Though he knew many sciences, his extensive knowledge and intelligence were taken advantage of only for establishing the authenticity

- (ii) वाक्यैविशेषातिशयैथिश्वसन्देहहारिभिः। जिनमुदं जिनभद्रं कि क्षमाश्रमणं स्तुवे ॥ ---Muni-Candra Suri in Amara Caritra.
- (iii) जिनवचननतं विषमं भावार्थं यो विविच्य शिष्येभ्यः। इत्थमुपादिशदमलं परोपकारैककृतचेताः ॥ तं नमत बोधजलधि गुणमंदिरमखिलवाग्मिनां श्रेष्ठम् । चरणश्रियोपगुढं जिनभद्रगणिक्षमाश्रमणम् ॥

-Malayagiri Sūri in his Commentary on Brihat Ksetra Samāsa.

§ Vide नमह य अणुओग-धरं जुगप्पहाणं पहाणनाणायमयं। सञ्च-सुद्द-सत्थ-कुसलं दंसण-नाणोवओगमग्गम्मिठियं॥ ---Siddhasona Sori in his Corni on Jitakalpasotra.

‡ Vide स-समय पर-समयागम-छिवि-गणिय-छन्द-सइनिम्माओ । दससु वि दिसासु जस्स य अणुओगो (अणुवमो) भणइ जसपडहो ॥ (Ibid) and validity of the Jaina Agamas. He is therefore, taken as one of the pioneer agama-pradhana or orthodox Acaryas"

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He used to take the support of logical illustrations and inferences only partially in the sense that such illustrations $\mathbf{O}\mathbf{r}$ inferences were quoted only if they strengthened the view-point of the traditional Jaina Agamas, and were rejected if they went against the traditional preachings. The example of his predecessor Siddhasdna Diväkara is welknown. Siddhasdna was a freeminded but logical interpreter. His works are full of original thoughts and independent ideas irrespective of their being different from or similar to the traditional Jaina Agamas. The theory that Absolute Knowledge and Absolute Perception do not take place simultaneouly but one after the other, has been proved by him by the help of logical inferences and concrete illustra tions. Siddhasèna thus went against the traditional view of the Jaina Agamas according to which the Kèvala-Jhana and the Kèvali-Darśana took place simultaneously. Junabhadragani Ksamäśramaņa repudiates the theory of Siddhasdoa Divākara in his Viśesāvaśyaka Bhāśya and re-establishes the original theory of the Jaina Agamas that Kèvala Darsana and Kèvala Jhana take place simultaneously. Jinabhadragani is, thus, well-renowned as the up-holder of the Jaina traditions.

That Jinabhadragaņi Kšamāśramaņa was an orator of established reputation is known from several sources. The commentator Hemcandrācārya Maladhāri refers to Jinabhadragaņi as "Upa Jinabhadra Kšamāśramaņāh Vyākhyātārah". Another commentator named Koţyācārya, who has written a commentary on the Viśešavaśyaka Bhāšya, pays him a tribute to the same effect in the last verse of his commentary. He says.[‡]

* Vide परसमयागम-निउणं सुसमिय-सुसमण-समाहिमग्गणमयं। जिणभद्दखमासमणं खमासमणाणं निहाणमिव एकं॥

(Ibid)

Also vide Jitakalpasetra Editor's Preface, p 7.

- § Vide दंसण-नाणोवओग (मग्गम्मि) ठियं।
- [†] Vide "Short History of Jaina Literature" Ed. by M. D. Desai, p. 152, foot-note.

भाष्यं सामायिकस्य स्फुटविकटपदार्थोपगृढ बृह्ध-छीमत्पूज्यैरकारि क्षतकलुषधियां भूरिसंस्कारधारि। तस्य ब्याख्यानमात्रं किमपि विदधता यन्मया पुण्यमाप्तं-प्रेत्याहं द्वाग् लभेयं परमपरिमितां प्रोतिमत्रेव तेन॥

No more information is available about the life of this great Acārya.

Works----

Jinabhadragaņi Kṣamāśramaņa is said to have composed the following works:----

(i) Viśesāvaśyaka Bhāşya This welknown work has been ranked as one of the most important and highly esteemed works of Jainism. The auther himself wrote a commentary on this Bhāsya in Sanskrit. Jinabhadragaņi has earned the reputation as a commentator mainly from this work. For, wherever he has been referred to as Bhāsyakāra, the references have been quoted from Viśesāvaśyaka Bhāsya. But as has been suggested in the Preface to the Jîta Kalpa Sotra* it is not improbable if Jinabhadragaņi Kṣamāśramaņa had composed other bhāṣyas as well. Take, for example, the following verse from the Viśesāvaśayaka Bhāsya—

पोग्गल-मोदय-दन्ते फरुसगवडसालभंजने चेव। थीणाद्वियस्स प प दिद्वंता होति नायव्वा ॥ २३५ ॥

In this verse, the examples of poggala (flesh) modaya (sweet-balls) danta (teeth) pharusaga (a potter) and vadasala (the branch of a tree) have not been explained in details by the commentators. Acarya Hemacandra Maladhāri suggestively remarks that " unregenerunfa and and fathari from Niseetha).

Koțyācārya⁺ also leaves the remark unexplained merely by saying "निशीथे वक्ष्यामः" (We shall explain this in Niseetha).

- * Vide Jīta Kalpa Sūtra, Preface, Page 9.
- [‡] Whose commentary has not been published, but is preserved in the Bhāndārkar Research Institute, Poona.

The question arises as to who is the author of Niseeth. The tradition does not give the credit of authorship either to Hèmacandracărya Maladhāri or to Koţyācārya. So, it is probable that the commentary must have been written by Jmabhadragaņi and the sentence "faxflù aşum:" found in the commentary of Koţ yācārya, might have orginally belonged to the commentary written by Srî Jmabhadragaņi Kṣamāśramaņa himself.

(ii) Brihat Samgrahani-This work runs in almost 500 verses. Acarya Malayagiri Sori has written a commentary on this work in Sanskrit The work along with the Commentary has already been published.

(iii) Bribat Ksètra-Samāsa—This is also a similar work. Ācārya Śri Malayagiri Sori and others have written commentaries and the work along with the commentaries is published.

(iv) Jita Kalpa Sutra—This work lays down various religious practices to be followed by the Jaina monks. The work is also dealing with the ten types of remonstration. The subject of remonstration has already been treated in the Chèda-sutra and other works. Jinabhadragani seems to have composed this work with a view to treat the subject in a precise and comprehensive manner.

The oldest commentary available on this work at present is the corni of Siddhasèna in Präkrit. In his Corni, Siddhasèna remarks at one place that there existed some other corni§ also, before he composed his one, but that is not available at present. On this Corni of Siddhasena, Śri Candra Sori has written explanatory notes in Sanskrit.

Besides the corni of Siddhasena, there is one more curni available in Präkrit verses. It is difficult to say whether it is the same curni that he refers to or it is different from his own. Nothing is known about the author and the date of composition

﴿ अहवा बितियचुन्निकरा-भिष्पापण चत्त्वारि वि सुत्तेण व गहिया।

either from the portion in the beginning or one at the end.*

(v) Viśeşaņavah :—This book is a miscellaneous work comprised into nearly 400 Prakrit verses and is not published as yet.

In addition to the above-mentioned five works, some people consider Dhyāna-śataka which has been incorporated by Ācarya Mahārāja Haribhadra Sari in his commentary on the Āvaśyaka Sūtras, also to be the composition of Jinabhadragaņi Ksamā-sra maņa. But there are not sufficient evidences to convince us of his authorship of Dhayāna-Śataka.

Date-

There are no definite means that help us to fix the exact date of Jmabhadragani kšamā-śramana. Still, however, the tradition of various Patțāvalis throws considerable light on the problem. The tradition of the Pațțāvalis written after the sixteenth century (V. S.) tells us that Jinabhabragani kṣamāśramana flourished 1115 years after the Nirvāna of Śramana Bhagavān Mahāvîra. This fixes the date somewhere about 645 V. S.

There is another theory which assigns to Jinabhadragani 500 years earlier than his commentator Maladhāri Hèmacandrācārya who is said to have flourished in 1175 V. S. according to this theory also, Jinabhadragani Ksamā-śramana must have flourished somewhere about 650-675 V. S.

The author of Tapāgaccha Paṭṭāvali places Jinabhadragaņi ksamā-śramaņa as the contemporary of Ācārya Śrimān Haribhadra Sori who is said to have written a commentary on Dhyāna Śataka. According to this view, Jinabhadra Gaņi had lived a long life of 104 years and though Ācārya Haribhadra Sūri was senior to him by 60 or 65 years, both of them

* At the end of this bhāsya the only reference is this:-

सं. १७२० वर्षे मार्गशीर्ष शुदि १ शुक्रवासरे अद्यहे श्रीपत्तजे लि. श्री मोढ बातिना काशीदासात्मेजन अंबादत्तेन। शुभं भवतु। दिाषमस्तु। (Jita Kalpa Setra, Preface P. 17) happened to be contemporaries on account of the long life of Jinabhadragani. This view is not sound because Haribhadra Sari did not, in fact, flourish in 530 V. S. or 580 V. S. but he flourished between 757 and 875 V. S. as has been suggested. Secondly, Śrîmān Haribhadra Sari has frequently quoted Jinabhadragani's satras in his Āvaśyaka Vritti. It is, therefore, clear that Jinabhadragani did not in any case flourish after Haribhadra Sūri.

According to other Paţţāvalis, all of Jinabhadragaņi, Haribhadra Sūri, Dèvarddhigaņi Ksamāśramaņa, Śilāńkācārya and Kālakācārya happened to be contemporaries. But the history of the development of Jamism shows that the theory is wrongly based. The date of Śrîmān Haribhadra Sūri has been fixed as the latter halt of the eighth and the first half of the 9th century V. S. Jinabhadragaņi has been placed in the latter half of the 7th and the first half of the 8th century V. S. Dèvarddhigaņi ksamā śramaņa and Kālakācārya are said to have flourished in the beginning of the 6th century V. S.

Leaving others aside, let us consider if Jinabhadragani and Silańkācārva happened to flourish at the same time. The tradition says that Śilańkācārya was the priest of Vanarāja, the king of Anahillapura Pāțana. If this is true, the date of Śilańkācārya falls somewhere near 800 V. S. This places Śilāńkācārya undoubtedly as the contemporary of Acārya Śree Haribhadra Sūriji. Now some of the Patțāvalis refer to Śilańkācārya as the pupil of Jinabhadragani Ksamāśramana. If this Śilańkācārya is the same as the commentator Koţyācārya, several references about Jinabhadragari found in his commentary on the Viśesāvaśyaka Bhāsya, do not in anv way lead us to believe that Śilańkācārya was the pupil of Jinabhadragani. Unfortunately, the first and last portions of this commentary are torn out, f but in course of his commentary the commentator refers to Jinabhadragani Kṣamāśramana at several places. e. g.

Vide Śrī Tapāgachchha Pattāvali, Vol I. page 98.

i Vide Jitakalpa Sūtra, Preface, pp. 14-15.

- (i) जिनभद्रगणिक्षमाभमणपूज्यपादैस्तु नोकम्।
- (ii) अत एव पूज्यपादैः स्वधीकायां प्रायोपप्रहणं इतम्।
- (iii) क्षमाश्रमणटीका त्वीयम् ।
- (iv) श्रमाश्रमणटीकापीयम्।
- (v) श्रीमत्क्षमाश्रमणपूज्यपादानामभिप्रायो लक्षणीय:

Although these references show how much respect the commentator had for Jinabhadragani Kṣamāśramana, they do not in any way lead us to believe that Jinabhadragani was his preceptor. On the contrary, we find a reference which shows a considerable gulf of time between the dates of Jinabhadragani and Śilańkācārya. The reference is this:—

19

भाष्याननुयायि पाठान्तरमिदं अद्रतः, एवमनेनैव वृद्धिक्रमेणेत्यादेरर्वाक्, न चेदं भूयसीषु प्रतिषु दृइपते ॥ ‡

This reference shows that there were various readings of Viśeṣāvaśyaka Bhāṣya in the time of Śilańkācārya, which means that a considerable period of time must have elapsed after the composition of the Viśeṣāvaśyaka Bhāṣya. This, therefore, prevents us from accepting the view that Jinabhadragaņi Kṣamāśramaņa was the preceptor and hence the contemporary of Śilańkācārya.

Thus there are many difficulties in accepting Jinabhadragani as the contemporary of Śilāńkācārya or even that of Haribhadra sūriji and others.

It is, therefore, proper to believe that unless and until there is no evidence against the belief of the tradition, there is no objection in accepting the date of Jinabhadragani Kṣamāśramana as roughly about the second half of the seventh century V. S.

It is hoped that translitteration, translation, and the digest of Sanskrit commentary attached to each verse will prove useful to the students of Jaina Philosophy.

Gujarat College, AHMEDABAD. 27th October 1947.

† Ibid p. 15.

D. P. Thaker

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क्षमाश्रमण श्रीजिन भद्रगणिसन्हम्धः



श्रीमलधारिहेमचन्द्रसूरिकृतटीकासमलङ्कृतः।

SWICE SOM


Ksamāśramaņa Jinabhadra Gaņi's



Along with Maludhārin Hemchandra Sari's Commentary

Chapter I.

Introductory



Before proceeding with the actual **fagura** Nihnava-väda (i. e. the discussions of the Nihnavas) it is encumbent to note in short, the life-history of each of the different types of Nihnavas and also to lay down the contest to which those discussions have been related.

एवं विहियपुहत्तेहिं रकिखयज्जेहिं पूसमित्तेहिं । ठविए गणिम्मि किर गोट्टमाहिलो पडिनिवेसेण ॥१॥२२९६॥ सो मिच्छत्तोदयओ सत्तमओ निण्हवो समुप्पण्णो । के अन्ने छ ब्भणिए पसंगओ निण्हउप्पत्ती ॥२॥२२९७॥

1. Evam vihiya puhattehim Rakkhiyajjehim Pusamittehim | Tihvie gaņimmi kira Goțțhamāhito padiniveseņam 2296,

.

2. So micchattodayao sattamao Ninhavo samuppanno I

Ke anne cha bbhanie pasanigato ninha-uppatti. 2297.

[एवं विहितप्रथक्त्वै रक्षितायेंः पुष्पमित्रे । स्थापितेगणिनि किल गोष्ठामा हिलः प्रातिनिवेद्येन ॥१॥२२९६॥ स मिथ्यात्वोदयतः सप्तमको निह्यवः समुत्पन्नः । केऽन्ये षड् भणिताः प्रसङ्गतो निह्यवोत्पत्तिः ॥२॥२२९७॥

- 1. Evam vihitaprithaktve Raksittaryaih Puspamitre i Sthäpite gaņini kila Gosthāmahilah pratinivesena, 2296.
- 2. Sa mithyā-tvodayatah saptamako nihnavah samutppannah. Ke'anye şad bhanittāh prasaņgto ninhnavotpattih 2, 2297]

Trans 1-2. Thus, indeed, when (Durbalikā) Puṣpamitra was appointed to the post of a preceptor by Arya-Rakṣita sūri who had instructed his pupils in the use of the different Anuyogas. Goṣṭhāmāhila through a wrong impression became the seventh Nihnava on account of the predominence of Mithyātva (Wrong Belief). (The pupil asks):---" Who are the other six?" Incidentally the origins of the Nihnavas are described. 2296-2297.

टीका १ २ एवम्रुक्तप्रकारेण विहितानुयोयोगप्टयकत्वरार्यरक्षित मिर्दिवं यियासुभिप्तृत-तेल्ल-वस्त्रघटादिप्ररूपणां सकल्जगच्छसमक्षं विधाय दुर्ब-लिकापुष्पमित्रे गणिन्याचायें स्थापिते यो मथुरानगयामून्यतीर्थिकेन सह "वचस्त्री" इति कृत्वा वाददानार्थं सुरिभिनिंजमातुरूको गोष्ठामाहिलः प्रेषित आसीत्, स यशः शेषेषु सुरिषु प्रति वादिनं जित्वा समागतः सन् "मामेवंभूतं वचस्विनं परितज्यान्याऽयम्रषिमूक्तकल्पः स्वरिभिराचार्य उप-वेशितः, तत्पश्य कीदशं तैः कृतम्" इत्यभिप्रायतः, तथा ततंरच घृतघटा-दिमरूपणां श्रुत्वा प्रतिनिवेशेन गाढानुश्वयेन यो मिध्यात्वादयो जातस्तस्मात स गोष्ठामाहिलः सप्तमो निह्यवः सम्रुत्पन्नः । ननु यद्ययं सप्तमः, तर्हि केऽन्ये षडु? इत्याशङ्कय प्रसङ्गतो निह्ववोत्पत्तिर्भण्यते । इत्येका भस्तावना ॥ २२९६ – २२९७.

Digest of Commentary-

The Context in short, runs as follows:----

Having explained to his pupil Durbalikā Puşpamitra (galeangana) the various are Nayas (or philosophical systems through which the objects are perceived) and Anuyogas angala-the different methods of exposition of various subjects in details, Ācārya Ārya-Rakşitasūri anana anatalanata anatalanata him as his successor to the post of preceptorship at Mathurā (Muttrā) मथुरा.

At this time, Gosthāmāhila Ingranges, the seventh Nihnavawho, in his wordly life happened to be the maternal uncle of Ācārya Maharaja Arya Raksitasūriji and who was one of the most learned pupils of the Ācarya,-comes to him after having defeated a non-Jain adversary in a controversial discussion to which he was sent by the Ācārya, and remarks with vanity "Why should the preceptor appoint a shy and weak person like Durbalikā Puspamitra, as an Acārya, leaving aside a smart and eloquent person like me ?" Being incidentally impelled by personal hatred and vanity, he further tries to hide and refute the Truth propagated by all the Tirthańkaras and the Preceptor, and as a result of that, he turns out to be a Nihnava. For, one who tries to deny and disbelieve the truthful theories merely by hiding the truth out of sheer vanity is called a **Frene** Nihnava.

Gosthāmāhila was the seventh Nihnava. In connection with the story of this Nihnava, the author describes in details, the life-history as well as the discussions of each of the other six types of Nihnavas, in regular order. 1-2 (2296-2297.)

अहवा चोएइ नयाणुओगनिण्हवणओ कहं गुरवो । न हि निण्हवति, भण्णइ जओ न जंपंति नत्थित्ति ॥३॥२२९८॥ न य मिच्छभावणाए वयंति जो पुण पयंपि निण्हवइ । मिच्छाभिनिवेसाओ स निण्हवो बहुरयाइ व्व ॥४॥२२९९॥

 Ahavā cöei Nayāņuoganinhavaņao kaham guravo (Na hi niņhavati, bhaņņai jao na jampanti natthi tti 2298
 Na ya miechabhāvaņāe vayanti jo puņa payam pi niņhavai (Miechābhinivesāo sa nihhavo Bahurayāi vva (2299)

[अथवा चोदयति नयानुयोगनिह्मवतः कथं गुरवः । न हि निह्मवा इति,भण्यते यतो न जल्पन्ति न सन्तीति ॥३॥२२९८॥

न च मिथ्याभावनया चदन्ति य पुनः पदमपि निइ्नुते । भिथ्याभिनिवेद्यात् स निह्यवो बहुरतादिरिव ॥४॥२२९९॥

 Athavā oodayati nayanuyoganihnavatah, katham guravah l Na hi nihnavā: iti, bhaņyate yato na jalpantı na santîti 3 (2298)
 Na ca mithyābhāvanayā vadanti ya punah padampi nihnute l Mithyābhiniveśāt sa nihnavo Bahuratādiriva 4 (2299)].

Trans. 3-4. Or, (if one asks) "Why are not the gurus nihnavas, on account of their hiding the nayas and anuyogas? (The reply is)-"They do not say that the nayas and anuyogas are not (existing). They do not also say so, on account of feelings of Mithyātva. He, who hides even a syllable by obstinately insisting on through Mithyātva, is a Nihnava like Bahuratas etc.

टीका ३-४ अथवेति प्रस्तावनान्तरसूचकः । पर : प्रेरयति-ननु नयानुयोगनिष्ठवात् कथमार्यरक्षितगुरवो न निह्ववा भण्यन्ते ? ।अत्रोत्तरम्-यते। "न सन्ति नयानुयोगाः" इति ते न जलपन्ति, नापि मिध्यात्वभावनया मिध्याभिनिवेदेन ते किञ्चिद् वदन्ति । किन्तु प्रवचनहितार्थमेव नयानुयोग-गोपनं तैर्विहितम् । यः पुनर्मिध्याभिनिवेशादेकमपि जिनोक्तं पदं निहनुते स बहुरनादिवज्जमालयादिवद् निह्वव प्वेति ॥ २२९८ ॥ २२९९ ॥

The author, then, ennumerates the various types of nihnavas as follows:—

बहुरय पएस अब्बत्त सामुच्छा दुग तिग अबद्धिआ चेव। एएसिं निग्गमणं बोच्छामि अहाणुपुट्वीए ॥५॥ ॥२३००॥

Bahuraya paesa avvata sämucchā duga tiga abaddhiā ceva i Eesim niggamaņam vocchāmi ahāņupuvvīe 5. (2300).

बहुरता प्रदेशा अव्यक्ता सामुच्छेदा द्वैकियास्त्रेराशिका अबद्विकाश्चेव। एतेषां निर्गमनं बक्ष्येऽथानुपुर्व्या ॥ ५ ॥ २३०० ॥

Vāda]

Nihnavavāda

Bahuratā pradešā avyaktā sāmucchedā dvaikriyā strairāšika abaddhikašcaiva I

Eteşām nirgamanam vaksye' athānupurvyā 5 (2300)].

Trans. 5 Bahuratas (or those who uphold the theory of the Long Range of time); Pradeāśs (or those who attribute consiousness to the last pradeśa only); Avyaktās (or those having dubious and unfirm opinions); Samucchedās (or those who believe in the utter im-permanence of everything); Dvaikriyās (or those who attribute two actions to one object at the same time); Trairāśikās or those who uphold the theory of three categories. viz-Jīva is free from the bondage of Karma). Now, I shall describe the production (of each one) of them in serial order (2300).

टीका ५ 'बहुरय त्ति' एकस्मिन् क्रियासमये वस्तु नोत्पद्यते, किन्तु बहुभिः क्रियासमयैः, इत्यभ्युपगमाद् बहुषु समयेंपु रताः स ता बहुरता दीर्घ-कालवस्तुप्रभवप्ररूपका इत्यर्थः । "पएस ति" पूर्वपदलोपाजीवप्रदेशा इति द्रष्टव्यम्, यथा बीरो महाबीर इति । एक एव चरमप्रदेशो जीव इत्यम्युपग-माज्जीवः प्रदेशो येषां ते जीवश्देशा निह्यवाश्वरमप्रदेशजीवप्ररूपिण इति हद्यम् । '' अव्यत्त त्ति '' उत्तरपदलोपादव्यक्तमता यथा भीमो मीमसेन इति। न ज्ञायतेऽत्र कोऽपि संयतः, कोऽप्यसंयत इत्यव्यक्तस्यैव सर्वस्या युपगमाद् न व्यक्तमव्यक्तमस्फुटम्, अव्यक्तं मतं येषां तेऽव्यक्तमताः संयतासंयताद्यवगमे संदिग्धबुद्धय इत्यथेः । "सम्रुच्छ त्ति " एकदेशेन समुदायस्य गम्यमानत्वादु-त्पच्यनन्तरमेव सामस्त्येन पकर्षतइछेदः सम्रुच्छदो वस्तुविनाधः, सम्रुच्छेद्म-धीयते, तद्वेदिनो वा, इत्यण्प्रत्यये साम्रुच्छेदाः क्षणक्षयिभावप्ररूपका इत्यर्थः। 'दुग त्ति' उत्तरपदलोपादेकस्मित्रपि समये कियाद्रयानुभवाभ्युपगमाद् दिकियाः, एकसमये दे किये समुदिते दिकियम्, तदधीयते तद्देदिनो वा दौक्रियाः कालमेदेन क्रियाद्रयानुभवश्रूपिण इति भावः। "तिग चि" त्रैराशिकाः, जीवाऽजीवनोजीवभेदात् त्रयोराश्चयः समाहृतास्त्रिराशि तत्प्रयोजन मेषां ते त्रैराशिका जीवाऽजीवनोजीवराशित्रयख्यापका इति तात्पर्यम्। ''अब-दिअ त्ति" स्पृष्टं जीवेन कर्म न स्कन्धवद् बद्धमबद्धमेव येषामस्ति वदन्ति वेत्यबद्धिकाः स्पृष्टकर्मविपाकप्ररूपका इत्यर्थ इति । एते सप्त निह्नवाः । एतेषां निर्गमनग्रत्पत्तिमानुपूर्व्या यथाक्रमं वक्ष्ये ॥ ५ ॥ २३०० ॥

The author now gives the names of

The author now gives the names of persons with whom theories originated.

बहुरय जमालिपभवा जीवपएसा य तीसगुत्ताओं । अब्बत्ताऽऽसाढाओ सामुच्छेआ असमित्ताओ ॥ ६ ॥ २३०१ ॥ गंगाओ दोकिरिया छल्ठुगा तेरासिआण उप्पत्ती । थेरा य गोट्ठमाहिल पुट्टमबद्धं परुविंति ॥ ७ ॥ २३०२ ॥

- 6. Bahuraya Jamāli pabhavā, Jivapaesā ya Tisaguttāo | Avvattā" sādhāo samuecheā Asamittāo 2801.
- 7. Gaņgāo dokiriyā Ghhalugā Terāsiāņa uppatti I Therā ya Goțțhamāhila puțțha-mabaddham parūvinti 2302.

बहुरता जमालिप्रभवा जीवप्रदेशाश्च तिष्यगुप्तात्। अव्यक्ता आषाढात् सामुच्छेदा अश्वमित्रात्॥ ६ ॥ २३०१ ॥ गङ्गद् द्वैकियाः बहुऌ्कात् त्रैराशिकानामुत्पत्ति : । स्थविराश्च गोष्ठामाहिलाः स्पृष्ठमबद्धं च प्ररूपयन्ति ॥७॥ ॥ २३०२॥

6. Bahuratā Jamāliprabhavā Jīvapradesāsca Tisyaguptāt. Āvyaktā asādhat Sāmucchedā Asvamitrāt (2301).

Gangād dvaikriyāh Sadulūkāt trairāsikānāmutpattiņ. 7. Sthavirāsca Gosthāmāhila sprsthamabaddham ca prarūpayanti 7 (2302)]

Trans 6-7. Bahuratās had been led by Jamāli and Jīvapradešās by Tiṣyagupta. Avyaktās (originated) from Āṣāḍha. Sāmucchedās from Aśvamitra, Dvaikriyās from Ganga and Trairāsikās from Saḍulūka. While the *Sthaviras* who describe the Jīva to be free from (the boundages of) Karma happen to be the followers of Gosțāhila. (2301-2302.)

टीका. ६-७ बहुरता जमालिप्रभवाः, जमालेराचार्यतः प्रभव उत्पत्तिर्येषां ते जमालिमभवाः । जीवप्रदेशाः पुनस्तिष्यगुप्तादुत्पकाः । अव्यक्ता आषाढात् । साम्रुच्छेदा अश्वमित्रादिति । गङ्गाद् द्वैक्रियाः । षडुऌकात् त्रैराश्विकानाम्रुत्पत्तिः । स्थविराश्व गोष्ठामाहिलाः स्पृष्टमबद्धं प्ररूपयन्ति ' कर्म ' इति गम्यते । पर्श्वमु ना इति पाठान्तरं वा । ततो गोष्ठामाहिलादाबद्धका जाता इति सामध्यार्द् गम्यत इति ।। २३०१--२३०२ ।।

Place and time as regards their coming into existence are now described.

सावत्थी उसभपुरं सेअम्बिआ मिहिल उल्लुगातीरं। पुरमंतरंजि दसउर रहवीरपुरं च नयराइं ॥ ८ ॥ २३०३ ॥ चोदस सोलस वासा चोदा-वीसुत्तरा य दुण्णि सया । अद्ठावीसा य दुवे पंचेव सयाय चोआला ॥ ९ ॥ २३०४ ॥ पंषसया चुलसीओ छंचेव सया नवुत्तरा हुंति । नाणुप्पत्तीए दुवे उप्पन्ना निव्वुए सेसा ॥ १० ॥ २३०५ ॥

- 9. Coddasa solalsa vāsā coddā-vīsuttara ya duņņi sayā 1 Atthāvīsā ya duve panceva sayāa ya coā 2304.
- 10. Pancasayā culasio cohacceva sayā navuttarā hunti | Nāņuppattie duve uppannā nivvue sesā 2305.

आवस्ती ऋषमपुर श्वेमविका मिथिलोल्लुकातीरम् । पुरमन्तरञ्जिका दद्यापुरं रथवीरपुरं च नगराणि । ॥८॥ ॥ २३०३ ॥ चतुर्दद्या षोडदा वर्षाणि चतुर्दद्या-विंद्यात्युत्तरे च द्वे द्याते । अष्टाविंद्यात्या चद्वे पत्रैव द्यातानिच च तुश्चत्वाारदातीं॥९॥२३०४॥ पत्रद्यातानि चतुरद्यीत्या षडेव द्यातानि नवोत्तराणि अवन्ति ' ज्ञानोत्पत्तौ द्वाबुत्पन्नौ निंवृते द्येषाः ॥ १० ॥ २३०५ ॥

8. Śrāvastī Riṣabhapuram Svetavikā Mithilollu'Rātîram.

Puramantaranjikā Daśapuram Rathavīrapuram ca nagarāņi 8. (2303)

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9. Caturdasa sodasa varsāņi caturdasa-vinsatyuttare ca dve sate Astāvinsatyā ca dve pancaiva satani ca catuscatvārinsapā 9 (2804).

^{8.} Sāvatthī Usabhapuram Seambiā Mihila Ullugātīram i Puramantaranji Dasaura Rahāvīrapuram ca nayarāim 2303.

10. Panca satāni enturasītyā saleva satāni navottrāni bhavanti i

Jnanotpattau dvāvutpannau nirvrite sesah. 10 (2305)]

Trans-8-9-10. Śrāvasti, Rişabhapura, Śvetavika, Mithilā, Ullukātīra Antaranjika, Dašapura, and Ruthavīrapura (are) the (respective) places (where they came into existence as Nihnavas Fourteen, sixteen, two hundred and fourteen, two hundred and twenty, two hundred and twenty eight, five hundred and forty four, five hundred and-eighty four, and six hundred and Nine (are respectively) the numbers of years (after Śramaņa Bhagavān Mahāvira obtained Kevala Jnāna. So, two of the Nihnavas came into existence during (the period of) Kevala Jnana of Śramaņa Bhagavān Mahāvīra and the rest appeared after his Nirvāna (2303-2305).

टीका-८ आवस्ती, ऋषभपुरम्, खेतविका, मिथिला, उल्लुकातीरम्, पुर-मन्तराख़िका, दशपुरम्, रथवीरपुरं चेति । एतान्यष्टौ नगराणि निह्ववानां यथा-योगमुत्त्पत्तिस्थानानि बोद्धव्यानि । अष्टमं नगरं द्रव्यालेक्रमात्रेणापि भिक्रानां सर्वापलापिनां महामिथ्याद्शां वक्ष्यमाणानां बोटिकनिह्वत्रानां लाघवार्थमुत्पत्ति-स्थानमुक्तामिति ॥ ॥ ८ ॥ २३०३ ॥

टीका ९-१० चतुर्दश वर्षाणे । तथा षोडश वर्षाणे । तथा " चोदा वीसु तरा य दुण्णि सय ति " चतुर्दशामिके दे शते, किंशत्युत्तरे च दे शते वर्षाणाम् इति गम्पते । तथा, अष्टार्विशत्यधिके च दे शते, तथा पञ्चव शतानि चतुमत्त्वा-रिंशदधिकानि, पञ्च शतानि चतुरशीत्यधिकानि, षर् चैव शतानि नवोत्तराणि-भवान्ति । एतावता व्यवधान-कालेन ज्ञानोत्पत्तेरारम्याद्यो द्वौ निह्ववौ सम्रत्पनौ । शेषास्तु षड् भवन्ति श्रीमन्महावीर निर्धते निर्वाणकालादारम्य उक्तशेषेण यथो-कोन व्यवधानकालेनोत्पत्रा । इदम्रक्तं भवति-श्री मन्महावीरस्य केवलोत्यत्तेवतु-र्दशभिवेषेंरतिकान्तैर्वद्ररता : सम्रत्पन्नाः, पोडशभिवंषव्यतिकान्तर्जीवप्रदेशाः सम्रत्पनाः, भगवत एव निर्वाणकालात् शेषेण चतुर्दशाधिक वर्षश्वतद्वयादिना काले-नातिकान्तेन शेषा अव्यक्तादयो निह्ववाः सम्रत्पना इति ॥ २३०४-२३०५ ॥

Foot-note 1. It should be noted that while ennumerating the types and the names of the leaders, the author has considered seven types only. These seven types of Nihnāvas are called

देशविसंवादी Deśavisamvādī, because they have disagreement in certain minor portions of the Siddhāntas. But here he has given the place and time as regards Botikas, also. The Botikas are called सर्वविसंवादी Sarvavisamvādī as they have entire total disagreement with the Siddhāntas.

D. C. The following Table shows the above-mentioned details about Nihnavas in a precise way:-

	Name of the Nihnava- type	Pioneer's name	Place	Time		
Deśavisamvādī (देश विसंवादी)						
1	Bahurata	Jamāli	Śrāvastī	14 years after the attainment of Kevala Jhāna by Śramaņa Bhagavān Mahāvīra		
2	Jīvapradesa	Tişyagupta	Riṣabha pura	16 years Do		
3	Avyakta	Āṣāḍhācā- rya	Svetavikā	24 years after the Nirvăņa of Śramaņa Bhagavān Mahāvīra		
4	Sāmucche- dikā	Aśvamitrā- cāryā	Mithilā	220 years Do		
5	Dvaikriyā	Gangācārya	Ullukātîra	228 ,, Do		
6	Trairāśika	Şadulūkā- cārya	Antaranjikā	544 " Do		
7	Abaddhika	Goșțhā māhila	Daśapura	584 ,, Do		
Sarvavisamvādī (सर्वचिसंवादी)						
	Botika		Rathavīra- pura	609 years Do		

TABLE

The life-history of each of the above-mentioned Nihnavas will be described in the following chapters just before the commencement of their respective discussions.

Chapter II

प्रथम निह्नव वक्तव्यता

Discussion with the First Nihnava

चोद्दस वासाणि तया जिणेण उप्पाडियस्स नाणस्स । तो बहुरयाण दिट्ठी सावत्थीए समुप्पन्ना ॥११॥२३०६॥

11. Coddasa vāsāņi tayā Jiņeņa uppādiyassa nāņassa I To Bāhurayāņa ditthī Sāvatthie samuppannā II (2306)

[चतुर्दश वर्षाणि तदा जिनेनोत्पादितस्य ज्ञानस्य । ततो बहुरतानां दृष्टिः आवस्त्यामुत्पन्ना ॥११॥२३०६॥

11. Caturdaśa varṣāņi tadā Jine-not-pāditasya jnānasya. Tato Bahuratānām dristī Śrāvastyāmutpannā 11 (2306).]

Trans. 11. Then, after fourteen years (had passed) since the Tirthankara (Śramana Bhagavān Mahāvīra) had attained Absolute Knowledge, the theory of Bahuratas came into existence in Śrāvastī 2306.

टीका ११ चतुर्दश वर्षाणि तदा जिनेन श्रीमन्महावीरेणोत्पादितस्य केवल-ज्ञानस्य ततोऽत्रान्तरे बहुरतनिह्ववानां दर्शनं दृष्टिः श्रावस्त्यां नगर्यां सम्रुत्पन्नेति ॥२३०६॥

The origin of the theory :--

जिहा सुदंसण जमालिणोज सावत्थीतिंदुगुज्जाणे । पंच सया य सहस्सं ढंकेण जमालि मोत्तूणं ॥१२॥२३०७॥

12 Jițțhā Sudamsana Jamāliņojja Sāvatthītindugujjāņe i Pancasayā ya sahassam Dhankeņa Jamāli mottūņam 2307

[ज्येष्ठा सुदर्शना जमालिरनवचा श्रावस्तीतैन्दुकोचाने । पत्रशतानि च सहस्रं ढङ्केन जमालिं मुक्त्वा ॥१२॥२३०७॥

12. Jyeṣṭhā Sudarśanā Jamaliranavadyā Śrāvastī-Taindukodyāne (Pancaśatāni ca sahasram Dhankena Jamālim muktvā (2307)]

TRANS. 12. Jyeṣṭhā (alias) Sudarśanā (alias) Anavadyā and Jamāli (developed the theory of Bahuratas) in the Tainduka garden of Śrāvastī. Five hundred (monks) and one thousand (nuns) excepting Jamāli (were advised) by Dhanika (2307)

, टीका १२ व्याख्या---अत्र भावार्थस्तावत् कथानकेनोच्यते-इहैव भरतक्षेत्रे कुण्डपुरं नाम नगरम् । तत्र भगवतः श्रीमन्महावीरस्य भागिनेयो जमालिर्नाम राजपुत्र आसीत् । तस्य च भार्या श्रीमन्महावीरस्य दुहिता । तस्याश्र ज्येष्ठेति वा, सुदर्शनेति वा, अनवद्याङ्गीति वा नामेति । तत्र पश्चश्वतपुरुषपरिवारो जमा-लिर्भगवतो महावीरस्यान्तिके प्रवर्ज्यां जग्राह । सुदर्शनापि सहस्रस्तीपरिवारा तदनु प्रव्रजिता । ततश्वैकादग्नस्वङ्गेष्वधीतेषु जमालिना भगवान् विहारार्थमुत्क-लापितः । ततो भगवता तूष्णीमास्थाय न किश्चित् प्रत्युत्तरमदायि । तत एवम-ग्रुत्कलितोऽपि पश्चशतसाधुपरिवृतो निर्गतः श्रीमन्महावीरान्तिकात् । ग्रामानुग्रामं च पर्यटन् गतः आवस्तीनगर्याम् । तत्र च तैन्दुकाभिधानोद्याने कोष्टकनाम्नि चैत्ये स्थितः । ततश्च तत्र तस्यान्त-प्रान्ताहारेस्तीत्रो रोगातङ्कः समुत्पन्नः । तेन च न शकोत्युपविष्टः स्थातुम् । ततो बभाण श्रमणान्-"मन्निमित्तं शीघ्रमेव संस्तारकमास्तृणीत येन तत्र तिष्ठामि "। ततस्तैः कर्तुमारब्धोऽसौ। बाढं च दाइज्वराभिभूतेना जमालिन। पृष्टम् "संस्तृतः संस्तारको न वा ?" इति। साधु-भिश्व संस्तृतप्रायत्वादर्धसंस्तृतेऽपि प्रोक्तम् ''संस्तृतः '' इति । ततोऽसौ वेदना-विह्वलितचेता उत्थाय तत्र तिष्ठासुरर्धसंस्तृतं तद् दृष्ट्वा क्रुद्धः ''क्रियमाणं कृतम्" इत्यादि सिद्धान्तवचनं स्मृत्वा मिथ्यात्वमोहनीयो द्यतो वक्ष्यमाण-युक्तिविवितथमिति चिन्तयामास । ततः स्थविरैर्वक्ष्यमाणाभिरेव युक्तिभिः प्रतिबोधितो यदा कथमपि न प्रतिबुध्यते तदा गतास्तं परित्यज्य भगवत्समीपे। अन्ये तु तत्समीप एव स्थिताः । सुदर्शनापि तदा तत्रेव श्रावक ढङ्कक्रम्भकारगृह आसीत् । जमाल्यनुरागेण च तन्मतमेव प्रपन्ना ढङ्कमपि तद् ग्राहयितु प्रवृत्ता । ततो ढङ्केन 'मिथ्यात्वमुपगतेयम्' इति ज्ञात्वा प्रोक्तम्-''नेदृशं किमपि वयं

जानीमः '। अन्यदा चापाकाग्निमध्ये मृद्धाजनोद्वर्तन-परावर्तने कुर्वताऽझार-कमेकं प्रक्षिप्य तत्रैव प्रदेशे स्वाध्यायं कुर्वत्याः सुदर्शनायाः संघाट्य अलो दग्धः । ततस्तया प्रोक्तम्-" आवक ! किं त्वया मदीयसंघाटी दग्धा ?'। तेनो म्मू-नजु दह्यमानमंदग्धम् 'इति भवतां सिद्धान्तः, ततः क्व केन त्वदीया संघाटी दग्धा ?' इत्यादि तदुक्तं परिभाव्य संबुद्धाऽसौ '' सम्यक् प्रेरिताऽस्मि " इत्यभिधाय मिध्यादुष्कृतं ददाति । जमालिं च गत्वा प्रज्ञापयति । यदा चासौ कथमपि न प्रज्ञाप्यते तदासौ सपरिवारा, शेषसाधवश्चेकाकिनं जमालिं मुक्तवा भगवत्समीपं जग्गुः । जमालिस्तु बहुजनं व्युद्ग्राह्यानालोचितप्रतिक्रान्तः कालं कृत्वा किंल्बषिकदेवेषूत्पन्नः । व्याख्याप्रज्ञप्त्यागमा चैतचरितं विस्तरतोऽवसेय-मिति । एष संग्रहगाथाभावार्थः । अक्षरार्थस्त्वयम्-'' जेट्ठा सुदंसण जमालिणो-ज्जति " ज्येष्ठा, सुदर्शना, अनवद्योङ्गीति जमालिगृहिणीनामानि । अन्ये तु व्याचक्षते- ' ज्येष्ठा महती सुदर्शना नाम भगवतः श्रीमन्महावीरस्य भगिनी तस्याः पुत्रो जमालिः, अनवद्याङ्गी नाम भगवतो दुहिता जमालिगृहिणी ' इति । श्रावस्त्यां नगर्यां तैन्दुकोद्याने 'जमालिनिह्ववद्धिरुत्पना ' इति वाक्यशेषः । तत्र पश्चशतानि साधूनां, सहस्रं चार्यिकाणाम्, एतेषां मध्ये यः स्वयं न प्रतिबु-दुस्तं जमार्लि मुत्तत्वा ढङ्केन प्रतिबोधितः। इति निर्युक्तिगाथासप्तकार्थः ॥२३०७॥

1 Or, it may be interpreted thus:-The elder (sister) Sudarśanā. Jamāli and (his wife) Anavadyā (developed) the theory of Bahuratas (vide Ācāranga Sūtra 1005)

Digest of Commentary. The following story illustrates the full details of this verse -

In this Bharata-kṣetra there was a city named Kuṇḍapura. Jamāli, the nephew (i. e. sister's son) of Śramaṇa Bhagavān Māhāvīra was a prince of that city. His wife happened to be the daughter of Sramaṇa Bhagavān Mahāvīra. She had three different names viz- Jyeṣṭhā, Sudarśanā and Anavadyāngī.

Jamāli accompanied by five hundred males and Sudarsanā along with one thousand females accepted Dīksā at the hands of Śramana Bhagavān Māhāvīra. After finishing the study of eleven Angas, Jamāli requested the Tîrthankara to grant him permission to go on vihāra (alone), Bhagavān remained silent and did not respond to it. In spite of that, Jamāli left the (company of) Śramaņa Bhagavān Mahāvīra and went out for Vihāra alone with his five hundred *sthaviras*. Wandering from place to place Jamāli Muni at last, came to the city of Śrāvastī, where in the garden of Tainduka, he stayed in a Caitya named Kosthaka.

There, on account of dry and stale food that he was taking, Jamāli Ācārya, was laid down with high fever. He, being unable to sit, asked his followers to prepare a bed for him immediately.

The bed was being prepared by the monks. In the meanwhile, due to excessive heat of fever, Jamāli Ācārya, repeatedly questioned the monks "Is the bed prepared or not?" The monks, who had already prepared half the bed, and were busy preparing the whole of it, replied "Yes, it is prepared."

But Jamāli, whose mind was not steady, on account of excessive pain, was enraged at the sight of the half-spread bed that was being spread fully. At that very moment, he denied the truth of the theory of "Kriyamāņam kritam² which was already preached by great Tīrthaňkaras and asserted that Kriyamāņa or that which is being produced is not krita or actually produced.

Some of the old *sthaviras* tried to persuade him not to do so, but it was of no avail. Consequently, some of them, went back to Śramaņa Bhagavān Mahāvīra, while others stuck to Jamāli's theory and stayed with him. Sudarśanā, too, stayed with him, in the house of the potter Dhanka who also happened to be a Śrāvaka. She being attached to Jamāli, followed Jamali's theory, and further attempted to persuade Dhanka to follow Jamāli. But Dhanka was shrewd enough to know that Sudarśanā was under the influence of *mithyatva* of vanity like Jamāli. So, he cleverly escaped by saying, "We cannot compre hend such things."

२ प्रश्नः—से पूणं भंते ! चलमाणे चलिप ? उदीरिज्ञमाणे उदीरिप ? वेइज्जमाणे वेइप ? पहीज्जमाणे पहीणे ? छिज्जमाणे छिन्ने ? भिज्जमाणे भिन्ने ? डज्झमाणे द ढ्रे ? मिज्जमाणे मडे ? निज्जरिज्जमाणे निज्जिण्णे ? उत्तरः—हंता, गोयमा ! चलमाणे चलिप, जाव निज्जरिज्जमाणे निज्जिण्णे । (भगवतीसूत्र (पञ्चम अङ्ग] प्रथम खण्डं प्रथम द्यातके, प्रथमोद्देद्याक.)

:13:

One day while arranging the earthen pots in the kiln (āpāka) Dhanka threw a piece of burning coal on Sudarśanā, who was sitting nearly engrossed in her studies. As a result of that, a border of Sudarsanā's garment was burnt. Immediately she remarked "O, Śrāvaka! why did you burn my garment?" Dhanka replied "That which is burning, is not actually burnt according to you. So, who burnt your garment and when?" When told like this, by Dhanka, Sudarsanā realised the truth and said apologetically "Really Śrāvaka! you have ied me to the Right Path. I was under a disillusion." Repenting, thus, she went to Jamāli and expressed her realisation to him and tried her best to bring him to the right path. But Jamāli did not listen to her. Consequently, Sudarsanā had to leave Jamāli alone and join Śramana Bhagavan Mahāvīra along with her retinue of nuns. Gradually, all the monks returned to Sramana Bhagavān Mahāvīra, and Jamāli was left out alone at the end. Finally, without repenting for the sins that he had committed by leading a number of persons astray, Jamāli passed away from this world (died) and assumed the form of Tejamāli Kilbişika, a low type of god thereafter³.

3. The Kilbişika gods are of three types: (1) Those enjoying duration of three palyopamas (2) Those of the category of three Sāgaropams; and (3) Those of the category of thirteen Sāgaropamas.

Those of the First type would stay above the luminary gods and below the regions of Saudharma and Isāna deva-lokas.

Those of the Second type reside above the regions of Saudharma and Isāna deva-lokas and below the regions of Sanat Kumāra and Māhendra deva-lokas.

Those of the Third Type reside above the regions of Brahma and below the region of Lāntaka deva-loka. Jīvas, who oppose or defame a preceptor, teacher, family or a group of persons and those who preach a lot of falsehood out of sheer vanity, deceiving themselves as well as others by leading the life of a saint, but do not repent of their misdeeds till death,

Nihnavavāda

Vāda]

This story has been described in details in the Vyākhyāprajnapti. The reader may refer to it for more details⁴.

The reference of the story of Jamāli is also found in other works such as $\overline{A}vasyaka$ Sūtra with the commentaries of Kotyācārya, Haribhadra Sūrji, and Malayagiri Sūrīji also. But there is no vital difference between the various descriptions given in those works except a few details here and there. The standard story related by the Vyākhyāprajnapti almost covers up all the accounts of Jamālis life and theory. It is therefore, essential .o give a brief summary of the story related therein. It runs as follows:--

Jamāli was a Ksatriya by caste. He was born in Ksatriya Kuņdagrāma. He was rich, and had an impressive personality. He had eight wives, all of whom were of equal charm. When he came to know one day that Śramaņa Bhagavān Mahāvīra had come to the Brāhmaņa Kuņdagrāma and was preaching the truthful principles of Jainism and that many people had been there to listen to him and to pay their respects. Jamāli also went to listen to the preachings of the great Tīrthaṅkara, and was immediately induced to accept the Dīkṣā. His parents though distressed by his decision, could not prevent him. Then the ceremony of the acceptance of Dīkṣā was performed with proper care and dignity. After taking Dīkṣā, Jamali Muni studied eleven Aṅgas under Bhagvān Mahāvīra Swāmiji.

assume the form of one of the three type of Kilbişika (or low) category of gods.

Kilbişika gods have to take four or five more turns in the categories of Nārakas, Tiryancas Manusyas and Devas before attaining Siddhatva or Buddhatva. But, at the same time, several of them have to wander in this beginningless and endless mundane world also. Vide Bhagavatī Sutra, Fifth Anga, Third Khanda, Ninth Śataka, Uddeśaka 33 Sutras 38-43.]

4. Vide Bhagavatī Sotra Anga 5. Khanda III Šataka IX. Uddeśaka XXXIII. So. 8-46. Then, on one day, Jamāli requested Śramaņa Bhagavāu Mahāvīra to grant him permission to go on vihāra also. But Śramaņa Bhagavan Mahāvīra remained silent and did not speak a single word of assent or refusal. As a result of that, Jamāli goes out for vihāra with a number of sthaviras, and comes to the eity of Śrāvastī, where living in a caitya named Kosthaka in the Taintuka garden, he falls ill on account of taking dry and stale food. Being unable to sit, he orders for a bed, to be prepared for him. When he asked the sthaviras as to whether the bed was ready or not; the sthaviras who had already spread half the bed and were actually spreading the whole of it, replied that the bed was prepared. Jamāli seeing that the whole bed was not prepared, gets angry, and refuses the theory of "Kriyamāņam kritam" which was already preached by Śramaņa Bhagavān Mahāvīra.

He starts his own theory of Bahuratas and argues that since a thing which is being done (Kriyamāņa) has to pass through the process of production until it is completely done (Krita). So, he says, it is not proper to assert that Kriyamāņa is krita.

Some of the old sthaviras tried to dissuade him from this wrong path but Jamāli did not yield. Consequently some of them left him, while others including his wife Sudarśanā stuck to him for some time and ultimately, they too, went back to Śramaņa Bhagavān Mahāvīra, leaving Jamāli alone.

Then, after recovery, Jamāli goes to the city of Campā where Śramaņa Bhagavān Mahāvīra was staying in a caitya called Pūraņabhadra. Coming to Śramana Bhagavān Mahāvīra, Jamāli says, "I do not move in cognito like many of your Śramņas. But I move like a Kevalin, with my own knowledge and perception. The Tīrthańkara replies. If you are a real Kevalin, answer, these questions :---

Ques. I. Is the Loka eternal or not?

Ques. II. Is Jīva eternal or not?

Vāda]

Nihnavavāda

Jamāli was confused at these questions and he could not utter a single word.

Śramaņa Bhagavān Mahāvīra, then, remarked :- 'I have a number of pupils, who are incognito, and who can easily answer these questions. But none of them boasts like you, that he is a Sarvajna, or a Jina or a Kevalin." Explaining the questions Bhagavān says :- "Loka is eternal because it is not possible to say that there was no loka in the past, there is no loka at present and will be no loka in future. On the other hand, since loka suffers destruction and creation in turn, it is **Mathematical** a-śāśvata or im-permanent also.

The same is the case with Jīva." Jamāli does not put faith in the explanation offered by the Tirthankara and goes away from him. Leading the life, however, of a strict śramana for a long time and preaching his own doctrine, wherever he went Jamāli at last met with death, without repenting for his misdeeds and attained the life of the third type of Kilbişika-deva in the Lāntaka region. He will be able to attain Siddhatva after passing through four or five bhavas of tiryancas, manusyas and devas.

Jyeṣṭhā, Sudarṣanā and Anavadyāṅgī are the three names of Jamāli's wife. Others interpret that Sudarśanā was the Jeṣṭha or elder sister of Śramaṇa Bhagavān Mahāvīra and she happened to be the mother of Jamāli. Anavadyāṅgī, the daughter of Śramaṇa Bhagavān Mahāvīra was Jamāli's wife⁵.

५. समणस्स णं भगवओ महावीरस्स पित्तियए सुपासे कासवगोत्तेण । समणस्स णं भगवओ महावीरजेट्ठे भाया णंदिवद्धणे कासवगोत्तेणं । समणस्स णं भग-वओ महावीरस्सजेट्ठा भइणी सुदंसणा कासवगोत्तेणं !.....समणस्स णं भगवओ महावीरस्स धूया कासवगोत्तेणं, तीसे णं दो णामधेज्जा एवमाहिज्जंति तां जहा-अणोज्जा ति वा पियदंसणा ति वा । समण-स्स णं भगवओ णर्जुई-कोसिय गोत्तेणं, तीसे णं दो णामधेज्जा एवमाहिज्जंति. तं जहा सेसवइ ति वा, जसवती ति वा ॥१००५॥

श्री आचाराङ्गसूत्र

Now Jamāli explains his Bahurata theory :---

सक्खं चिय संथारो न कज़माणो कउ त्ति मे जम्हा। बेइ ज़मालि सब्वं न कज़माणं कयं तम्हा ॥१३॥२३०८॥

13. Sakkham ciya santhāro na kajjamāņs kan tti me jamhā i Bei Jjamāli sarvam na kajjamāņam kayam tamhā 2308

[साक्ष देव संस्तरो न कियमाणः कृत इति मम यस्मात् । ब्रवीति जमालिः सर्वे न कियमाणं कृतं तस्मात् ॥१३॥२३०८॥

13. Sākṣādeva samstaro na kriyamāņah krita iti mama yasmāt i Bravīti Jamālih sarvam na kriyamāņam kritam tasmāt 13 # 2308]

Trans 13. Jamāli says that 'Since the bed which is being prepared, does not (actually) happen to have been prepared in my presence, everything that is being prepared cannot be said to have been (actually) prepared" (2303)

[Thus, according to Acarānga Sūtra, Sudarśana was the name of Bhagavān's elder sister and Bhagavān's daughter (who was married to Jamāli) had two names viz Anavadyā and Priyadarśanā. In other words, Sudarśanā was the name of Jamāli's mother and Anavadyā and Priyadarśanā were the two names of his wife according to the second story.

The first theory asserts, as mentioned before, that Jyestha, Sudarsanā and Anavadyā are the three names of Jamāli's wife, who also happened to be Bhagavān's daughter.

The commentators of the Avasyaka Sutra viz Śrimān Haribhadra Soriji, Malayagiriji, and Maladharin Hemacandra Suri interpret the verse in the light of this theory and merely quote the second interpretation as the theory of others. But they do not discuss the validity of them. Bhagavatī Sūtra is completely silent on this point. Hence it is very difficult to arrive at a definite conclusion about the names of Jamāli's wife and mother.

However, we think it better to take 'Jyeṣṭhā' as an adjective than take it as a proper noun and thus follow the view of Acārāṅga Sūtra. It is not improbable, if the author of Avaśyaka Sūtra had confounded Sudarśanā with Priyadarśanā -Tr.] टीकाः-१३ 'मे जम्ह ति' यस्माद् मम साक्षात् प्रत्यक्षमेवेदं वृत्तं यदुत-कम्बलास्तरणरूषः संस्तारकः क्रियमाणं कृतं न भवति, किन्तु कृतमेव कृतग्रुच्यते। ततो भगवत्यादिषु यदुक्तम्-चलमाणे चलिए, उईरिजमाणे उईरिए, वेइज्जमाणे वेइए (चलयमाने चलितम्, उदीर्यमाणे उदीरितम्, वेद्यमाने वेदितम्) भगवत्थां प्रथमश्चतके प्रथमोद्वेशे । इत्यादि, तत् सर्वे मिध्येत्यभिप्राय इति ॥२३०८॥ D. C.

Jamāli:—It is clearly evident that the bed (of blankets etc.) which is being spread at present, has not actually been spread. We can, therefore, easily remark that all objects that are being prepared or that are under the process of preparation, cannot be said to have been actually prepared, but those that have been already prepared *could alone* be said to have been prepared.

The doctrine of Caliyamāņe calitam, Udīryamāņe udīritam etc. "explained in the Bhagavatī Sūtra⁶ will therefore prove invalid. 13 (2308)

There are other faults, also, in accepting "Kriyamäņam kritam"—

जस्सेह कज़माणं कयं ति तेणेह विज़माणस्स । करणकिरिया पवन्ना तहा य बहुदोसपडिवत्ती ॥१४॥२३०९॥

14 Jasseha kajjamāņam kayam ti teņeha vijjamāņassa i Karaņa kiriyā pavannā tahā ya bahudosapadivattī 2309.

[यस्येह कियमाणं कृतमिति तेनेह विद्यमानस्य । करणकिया प्रपन्ना तथा च बहुदोषप्रतिपत्तिः ॥१४॥२३०९॥

14. Yasyeh kriyamāņam kritamiti teneha vidyamānasya.

Karaņakriyā prapannā tathā ca bahudosa pratipattiņ 14 (2309)]

Trans. 14 (He who accepts) that which is being done (kriyamāņa) has already been done (krita) (shall accept) the process of accomplishment (in case) of an object (which) already exists, and thus (will give rise to) numerous faults. 2309.

^{6.} Vide Bhagavati Sūtra Anga V Khanda I Sataka I Satra I.

टीका-१४ इह यस्य वादिनः "क्रियमाणं वस्तु कृतम्" इत्यभ्युपगमः, तेनेह विद्यमानस्य सतः करणरूपाः । क्रियाः करणक्रियाः प्रतिपत्रा अङ्गीकृता । तथा च सति वक्ष्यमाणानां बहूनां दोषाणां प्रतिपत्तिरम्युपगमरूपा कृता भवतीति ॥२३०९॥

D. C. One who accepts the principle of 'kriyamāņam kritam' will accept Karaņa kriyā or the process of preparation in case of a vidyamāna object as well. And this will involve a number ef difficulties 14 (2309)

Because,

कयमिह न कज्जमाणं सब्भावाओ चिरंतनघडोव्व । अहवा कयं पि कीरइ कीरउ निर्च न य समत्ती ॥१५॥२३१०॥

15. Kayamiha na kajjamāņam sabbhāvāo cirantana ghado vva i Ahavā kayam pi kīrai kīrau niecam ya samattī 2310.

[कृतमिह न कियमाणं सद्भावाचिरन्तन घट इव। अथवा कृतमपि कियते कियतां नित्यं न च समाप्तिः ॥१५॥२३१०॥

Kritamiha na kriyamāņam sadbhāvāccirantana ghata iva Athavā kritamapi kriyate kriyatām nityam na ca samāptiņ 15. (2310)]

Trans. 15. That which has (already) been prepared (krita) could not be said as being prepared (kriyamāņa) on account of its being existent like a ghata (which is) prepared since long. Or (if it is said that) What has already been prepared (krita) is also prepared, let it be prepared (for ever) and there would be no end (of it) 2310.

टीका-१५ इह क्रियमाणं कृतं न भवतीति प्रतिज्ञा । सद्भावात्-कृतस्य विद्यमानत्वादिति हेतुः । चिरन्तनघटवदिति दृष्टान्तः । विपर्यये वाधकमाह-अथ कृतमपि क्रियत इत्यभ्युपगम्यते, तदि नित्यमनवरतमेव क्रियतां, कृतत्वा-विशेषात् । एवं च सति न कदाचिदपि कार्यक्रियापरिसमाप्तिरिति ॥२३१०॥

D. C. What is krita cannot be said as kriyamāna. For, an object which is krita is always vidyamāna like ā ghața prepar-

ed since long. In spite of that, an object which is already *krita* is also accomplished; it ought to be accomplished for ever and the process of accomplishment will never cease to operate 15 (2310).

And,

किरियावेफछं ति य पुव्वमभूयं च दीसए होतं । दीसइ दीहो य जओ किरियाकालो घडाईणं ॥१६॥२३११॥

16. Kiriyāvèphallam ti ya puvvamabhūyam ca dīsac hontam | Dīsai dîho ya jaö kiriyā kālo ghaḍaīņam 2311 ||

[कियावैफल्यमिति च पूर्वमभूतं च दृइयते भवत् । इइयते दीर्घश्च यतः कियाकालो घटादीनाम् ॥१६॥२३११॥

16. Kriyāvaiphalyamiti ca pūrvamabhūtam driśyate bhavatį Driśyate dīrghasca yataņ kriyākālo ghadāīņam 16 (2311)]

Trans. 16. If kriyamana is taken as krita, the process (of accomplishment) will be useless. And that which did not exist before, will appear as comming into existence. Besides, on the other hand, the time of production of (the objects like) ghata etc. will appear long. 2311.

टीका-१६-यदि च क्रियमाणं कृतमिष्यते, तर्दि घटादि कार्यार्थं या मृन्मर्दन-चक्रश्रमणादिका क्रिया तस्या वैफल्यं प्राप्तोति, तत्काले कार्यस्य कृतत्वाम्युपगमात् । प्रयोगः-इह यत् कृतम्, तत्किया विफलेव, यथा चिरनि-ष्पन्नघटे, कृतं चाम्युपगम्यते क्रियाकाले कार्यम्, ततो विफला तत्र क्रियेति । किञ्च, क्रियमाण-कृतवादिना कृतस्य विद्यमानस्य क्रियेति प्रतिपादितं मवति । एवं च प्रत्यक्ष-विरोधः, यस्मादुत्पत्तिकालात् पूर्वमभूतमविद्यमानमेव कार्यं भवज्जायमानं दृश्यत उत्पत्तिकाले, तस्मात् क्रियमाणमकृतमेवेति । किञ्च, आर-म्भक्रियासमय एव कार्यम्रत्पत्तिकाले, तस्मात् क्रियमाणमकृतमेवेति । किञ्च, आर-म्भक्रियासमय एव कार्यम्रत्पद्यत इति तवाभ्युपगम । एतच्चायुक्तम् । कुतः ? । यस्माद् घटादिकार्याणाम्रुत्पद्यमानानां दीर्घ एव निर्वर्तनक्रियाकाले दृश्वर्य इति ॥२३११॥

D. C. If $Kriyam\bar{a}na$ is taken as krita, there would be no utility of processes like grinding of clay, the rotating of wheel etc. for the production of ghata etc. Because, even at the time when the process of production is going on, it is already taken for granted that gha has been produced.

Secondly, the followers of the theory of "Kriyamāṇam kritam accept the Kārya (which is a-ridyamāna) as existing as it thus gives rise to self contradiction. For, in such a case, a kārya which was a-vidyamāna before the time of production, appears as being produced. And hence, the theory of Kriyamāna kritam is not correct.

Thirdly, those who believe in 'Kriyamāņam kriţam' believe that the Kārya is produced at the very beginning of the process of production. But it is not correct to believe like that. Because, the period of production of the objects like ghaţa etc. appears very long, 16. (2311)

And,

नारंभे चिय दीसइ न सिवादद्वाए दीसइ तदंते। तो नहि किरियाकाले जुत्तं कज्जं तदंतम्मि ॥१७॥२३१२॥

17. Nāraņbhe ceiya dīsai na sivādaddhāe dīsai tadantē To nahi kiriyākālē juttam kajjam tadantammi. 2312.

[नारम्भ एव दृइयते न शिवाद्यद्धायां दृइयते तदन्ते। ततो नहि कियाकाले युक्तं कार्य तदन्ते ॥१७॥२३१२॥

17. Nārambha eva drišyate na šivādyaddhāyām drišyate tadante (Tato nahi kriyākāle yuktam kāryam tadante. 17 (2312)]

Trans. 17. An object like ghata is not seen just in the beginning, nor is it seen at the time of (production of forms such as) 'sivaka' etc; (but) is seen only at the end of that. It is, therefore, not proper to accept the (existence of) Kārya during the period of its production, but only at the end (2312)

टीका—१७ नारम्भक्रियासमय एव घटादि कार्यं भवद् दृश्यते, नापि ञ्चिवाद्यद्वायां-ञिवक-स्थास-कोश-कुश्र्लादि समयेष्वपि न दृश्यत इत्यर्थः । क तर्हि दृश्यते १ इत्याह-''तदंते '' दीर्घकालस्यान्ते घटादिकार्यं भवद् दृश्यते ।

तस्माद् न कियाकाले कार्य युक्तम्, तस्य तदानीमदर्शनात् । तदन्ते तु दीर्धक्रि-याकालस्यान्ते युक्तम् कार्यम्, तदानीमेत्र तस्य दर्शनादिति सकछजनस्य प्रत्य-क्षमिद्धमेवेदम् । इति जमालिपूर्वपन्नाः ॥२३१२॥

D. C. An object like ghata is not seen as existing just in the beginning of the process of its production nor does it appear at the time of production of its intermediate forms such as sivaka-sthāra kośa and kuśula-prior to the final form of ghata. It is seen only at the end of that long period of time which it takes during its process of production.

It is therefore, not proper to accept the existence of an object either in the beginning of the process of its production or in the intermediate stages of production. A Kārya is existent only at the end of the dīrghakāla or the long period of production.

This is the end of the arguments of Jamāli. 17 (2312). The old monks refute these arguments as follows :---

थेराण मयं नाकयमभावओं कीरए खपुष्कं व। अह व अकयं पि कीरइ कीरउ तो खरविसाणं पि ॥१८॥२३१३॥

18. Therāņa mayam nākayamabhāvao kīrae khapuppham vat Aha va akayam pi kīrai kīrau to kharavisāņam pi (2313)

[स्थविराणां मतं नाकृतमभावतः जियते खपुष्पमिव। अथवाऽकृतमपि जियते जियतां ततः खरविषाणमपि ॥१८॥२३१३॥

18. Sthavirāņām matam nākruţamabhavatah kriyate khapuşpamiva i Athavā: 'kritamapi kriyate kriyatām tatah kharaviṣāņamapi 18 (2313)]

Trans. 18. It is the belief of sthaviras that what is not be produced on account of its being non-existent like a **k**hapuṣpā. Or, (if) an a-Krita (unaccmplished) object is even made, let the horn of an ass, also, be made 2313.

टीकाः--१८ स्थविराः श्रुतवृद्धा गीतार्थाः साधवस्तेषां मतंकुत्ररूपणां

कुर्वन्तं जमालिं त एवं प्रज्ञापयन्तीत्यर्थः-नाक्रतमविद्यमानं घशदिकार्यं क्रियते, असतत्त्वात् , आकाशकुसुमवत् । अथाक्रतमविद्यमानमपि क्रियते, क्रियतां तहिं खरविषाणमपि, अक्रतत्वाविशेषादिति ॥२३१३॥

D. C. Sthaviras — An $a-krita k\bar{a}rya$ like that of a ghata is never done because it is $a-ridyam\bar{a}na$ like khapuspa. Still, however if an $a-ridyam\bar{a}na$ object is also produced, a non-existent object like kharavisana should also be male on account of its having the common element of a-kritatra. 18 (2323)

Refuting the possibility of the fault of "nitya kritatva" advanced by Jamāli, the sthaviras continue :-

निचकिरियाइदोसा नणु तुल्ठा असइ कट्टनरगा वा। पुव्वमभूयं च न ते दीसइ किं खरविसाणं पि १॥१९॥२३१४॥

19. Niccakiriyāi dosā naņu tullā asai katthataragā vāl Puvvamabhūyam ca na te dīsai kim kharavisānam pi ? 2314

[नित्यक्रियादिदोषा ननु तुल्या असति कष्टतरका वा । पूर्वमभूतं च न तव दृइयते किं खरविषाणमपि ? ॥१९॥२३१४॥

19. Nitya kriyādi doṣā nanu tulyā asati kaṣtatarakā va Porvamabhūtam ca na tava drusyate kim kharaviṣāṇamapi ? 19 (2314)]

Trans. 19. The faults of nitya-kriyā, etc. are in fact, equally possible in (case of) a non-existent object also. Or say, they are more obstructive. And, (when) an object which is not produced at all, is seen by you, why should not the horn of an ass also be seen by you? (2314)

टीकाः— १९ नन्बसत्यऽविद्यमाने वस्तुनि कारणकियाभ्युपगमे नित्यकि-यादिदोषाः, आदिश्रब्दात् कियाऽपरिसमाप्ति-क्रियावैफल्यपरिग्रहः, आवयोस्तु-लयाः समाः, यथा क्रतपक्षे त्वया दत्तास्तथाऽकृतपक्षोऽप्यापतन्तीत्यर्थः । किं तुल्या एव १। नेत्याह-कष्टतरका वा । विद्यमाने हि वस्तुनि पर्यांय विशेषाधान-द्वारेण कथश्चित् करणक्रियाद्युप पंद्यत एव, यथा '' आकाशं कुरु, पादौ कुरु,

7, Vide verse 2310.

प्रष्ठं कुरु" इत्यादि । अविद्यमाने तु सर्वथा नायं न्यायः संभवति, सर्वथाऽसच्चात्, खरविषाणवदिति । यदि च पूर्वे कारणावस्थायामभूतमसत् कार्यं जायते, तर्हि मृत्पिण्डाद् घटवत् खरविषाणमपि जायमानं किं न दृइयते, असच्वाविशेषात् १ । अथ खराविषाणं भवद् न दृइयते, तर्हि घटोऽपि तथैवास्तु, विपर्ययो वेति ॥२३१४॥

D. C. Sthaviras — Possibility of the faults such as nitya kriyatva (Continuous process of doing) Kriyā-aparisamāptii (Imperfection of the process of production) and kriyā-vaiphalyam (Futility of the process of production), shown by you⁸ are not only equally possible, but all the more possible if you believe in the production of a non-existent object. In case of an existent object, it is possible that the Kriyā or process of production may decrease comparatively owing to its taking another form. For example— when we say "Do the sky (i. e. keep the space), "Do the legs" "Do the back" etc. the Kriyā seems to slow down owing to its taking another form. This does not happen in case of an a-vidyamāna object owing to its being non-existent like a khara-viṣāṇa.

Moreover, if an a-vidyamāna Kārya is produced during the condition of Kāraņa etc. in the beginning, then, instead of ghața why should kharaviṣāņa be not seen as being produced from the lump of earth? For, the quality of being non-existent is common with the khara-viṣāņa also. But this does not happen in reality. Your theory is not valid. (2314).

In reply to the argument that the period of production of the objects like ghata etc. is long⁹, the sthaviras explain that.-

पइसमयउप्पन्नाणं परोप्परविलक्खाण सुबह्रणं । दीहो किरियाकालो जइ दीसइ किंत्थ कुंभस्स १॥२०॥२३१५॥

20. Paisamayauppannāņam paropparavilakkhāņa subahūņam i Dīho kiriyākālo jai dīsai kim ttha kumbhassa? 2315.

[प्रतिसमयोत्पन्नानां परस्परविरुक्षणानां सुबहूनाम् । दीर्घः क्रियाकालो यदि दृइयते किमत्र कुम्भस्य १ ॥२०॥२३१५॥

8. Vide verse 2310. 9. Vide verse 2311.

20. Pratisamayotpannānām parasparavilaksaņānām subahūnām i Dîrghaņ kriyākālo yadi driśyate kimatra kumbhasya? (2315)].

Trans. 20. If the period of the process of production of the numerous ($k\bar{a}ryas$) that possess mutually distinct characteristics (and) that are (being) produced at every moment, appears to be long, how is *ghata* affected (by that)? 2315.

टीकाः—-२० यदि नाम पतिसमयोत्पन्नानां परस्परविरुक्षणस्वरूपाणां सुबद्द्वानां शिवक-स्थास-कोश-कुशूलादिकार्यकोटीनां क्रियाकाल-निष्ठा-काल-योरेकत्वेन प्रतिप्रारम्भसमयनिष्ठाप्राप्तानां दीर्घक्रियाकालो दृश्यते, तदिं कुम्भस्य घटस्य किमत्रायातम् ?। इदग्रुक्तं भवति-मृदानयन-मर्दन-पिण्डविधानादिकालः सबौँऽपि घटनिर्वर्तनक्रियाकाल इति तवाभिप्रायः । अयं चायुक्त एव । यतस्तत्र प्रतिसमयमन्यान्येव कार्याण्यारम्यन्ते, निष्पाद्यन्ते च, कार्यस्य कारणकाल-निष्ठाकालयोरेकत्वात् । घटस्तु पर्यन्तसमय एवारम्यते, तत्रैव च निष्पद्यते, इति कोऽस्य दीर्घो निर्वर्तनक्रियाकालः इति ॥२०॥२३१५॥

D. C. Sthaviras:—If the period of production of the numerous Kāryas such as śivaka, sthāsa, kośa and kuśula¹⁰ etc. that are being prepared from time to time, is to be long, how is the period of production of ghața taken as long? According to you, the period of processes such as that of collecting earth, pounding it, and forming a lump etc. is the same. But it is not so. For, the production of ghața starts only at the last moment. It is, therefore, not proper to believe that the kriyā-kāla of ghața is dīrgha or long.

Jamāli:—Why is ghata not seen at the production of other Kāryas, which are produced just prior to that? (2315)

The answer is :-

अन्नारंमे अनं किह दीसउ जह घडो पडारंमे। सिझादओ न कुंभो किह दीसए सो तदद्वाए १॥२१॥२३१६॥

10. Various forms of earth before the actual form of ghata is produced.

21. Annārambhe annam kiha dīsau jaha ghado padārambhe i Sivakādaö na kumbho kiha dīsae so tadaddhāe ? (2316)

[अन्यारम्भेऽन्यत् कथं इइयतां यथा घटःपटारम्भे । शिवकादयो न कुम्भः कथं इइयते स तदद्धायाम् १ ॥२१॥२३१६॥

21. Anyārambhe'nyat katham driśyatām yathā ghaṭaḥ paṭārambhe ı

Śivakādayo na kumbhaņ katham driśyate sa tadaddhāyām? 21 (2316)]

Trans. 21. Just as ghata (is not seen) in the beginning of (the production of) pata how could a different Kārya be found at the time of the production of a (totally) different Kārya? Śivaka etc. are not ghata. Hence how could ghata be found at (the time of) their production? 2316.

टीकाः-२१ अन्यस्य शिवकादेरारम्भेऽन्यद् घटलक्षणं कार्यं कथं दृइयते ?। न हि पटारम्भे घटः कदाचिद्पि दृइयते । अतः किग्रुच्यते-'नारंमे चिय दीसइ त्ति'। शिवकादयोऽपि कुम्भरूपा न भवन्ति, किन्तु ततोऽन्य एवेति कथं तदद्धा-यामप्यसौ कुम्भो दृइयते ?। अत एव तद्प्यज्ञतया प्रोच्यते ''न सिवादद्धाए'' इति ॥२३१६॥

D. C. Just as a Kārya like ghața is not seen at the time of the production of a Kārya like pața, so also, a Kārya like ghața etc. is not seen at the time of production of the Kāryas like śivaka, etc. which are totally different from them 21 (2316).

With regard to Jamāli's contention that a Kārya is seen only at the end of the long range of "Kriyā-Kāla¹¹", the sthaviras' explanation is this---

अंते चिय आरद्धो जइ दीसइ तम्मि चेव को दोसो ?। अकयं व संपइ गए कह कीरउ कह व एस्समि ? ॥२२॥२३१७॥

22. Ante ceiya āraddho jai dīsai tammi ceva ko doso? Akayam va sampai gae kaha kīrau kaha va essammi 2317.

[अन्त एवारब्धो यदि दृइयते तस्मिन्नेव को दोषः ?। अकृतं वा संप्रति गते कथं कियतां कथं वैष्यति ?॥२२॥२३१७॥

11. Vide v 2312.

:28:

22. Anta evārab¹ho yadi drišyate tasminneva ko doṣaḥ? Akritam vā samprati gate katham kriyatām katham vaiṣyati? 22 (2317)]

Trans. 22. If a $k\bar{a}rya$ started at the end, appears at that time only what objection (is there)? (For) otherwise ($v\bar{a}$) how could (that which) is not produced at the present time, possibly have been produced in the past or in future? 2317

टीका-२२. अन्त एव कियाक्षणे पारब्धो घटो यदि तत्रेव दृश्यते तर्हि को दोषः १--न कश्चिदित्यर्थः । यदुक्तम्-तो न हि किरियाकाले "इत्यादि । तत्राह- 'अकयं वेत्यादि '। यदि च संपति वर्तमानकियाक्षणे न कृतं कार्यमिती-ष्यने तदा गतेऽतिक्रान्ते एष्यति-अनागते च क्रियाक्षणे कथं नाम तत् कार्यं क्रियताम् ?।--न कथञ्चिदित्यर्थः । तथाहि--नातीत-भविष्यत्कियाक्षणौ कार्य-कारकौ, विनष्टानुत्पन्नत्वेनासत्त्वात् , खरविषाणवत् । अतः कथं कियान्ते कार्यं स्यात् १। तस्मात् क्रियमाणेव कृतमिति । यदि च क्रियमाणमपि न कृतम्, क तहिं छतमिति वक्तव्यम् १। क्रियाविगम इति चेत्। तदयुक्तम्, तदानीं क्रियाया असन्वात् । तदसन्वेऽपि च कार्योत्पत्ताविष्यमाणायां क्रियारम्भात् प्रागपि कार्योत्पत्तिः स्यात्, क्रियासच्वाविशेषात् । अथ संप्रतिसमयः क्रियमाण-कालः, तदनन्तरस्तु कृतकालः, न च क्रियमाणकाले कार्यमस्ति, इत्यतः खलव-कृतं क्रियते न तु कृतमित्यभिधत्से। नन्वेतदिइ प्रष्टच्योऽसि किं भवतः कार्यं कियया कियते उत तामन्तरेणापि भवति १। यदि कियया, तर्हि कथं सोऽन्यत्र समये अन्यत्र तु कार्यम् ?। न हि खदिरे च्छेदनकियायां पलाशे च्छेदःसम्रुप-जायते । किश्व, '' क्रियोपरमे कार्यं भवति, न तु क्रियासन्द्रावे '' इति वदता प्रत्युतकार्योत्पत्तेविंग्नहेतुः क्रियेति भतिपादितं भवति । ततश्व कारणमप्यकारण-मिति प्रत्यक्षादिविरोधः । अथ क्रियामन्तरेण कार्यम्रुपजायत इत्यभ्युपगम्यते, तहि घटादिकार्याथिना निरर्थकः सर्वोऽपि मूंन्मईन-पिण्डविधान-चक्रारोपण-भ्रमणादिकियारम्भः। अतो न कर्तव्यं मुमुक्षुभिरपि तपः-संयमादिकियानुष्ठानम्, तदन्तरेणापि मुक्तिसुखसिद्धेः । न चैवम् । तस्मात् क्रियाकाल एव कार्यम्, न प्रनस्तदुपरम इति ॥२३१७॥

D. C. There is no harm if a ghata which is being produced at the final moment, is believed to have appeared only at

that time. Here if it is believed that a Karya is not produced during the process of its production at the present time, it could neither have been produced at any time in the past nor at any time in future. For, the kriyā-kāla of the past or future is either perished or unproduced as the case may be. It is therefore, a-ridyamana like the horn of an ass. This shows that what is being done (Kriyamāņa) has alone been done (krita). For if Kriyamāņa is not krita, where is it dene?

Again, it is not proper to assert that Karya is produced after the Kriyā is over. In spite of the absence of Kriyā, if the production of a Kārya is accepted, the Kārya should have as well been produced before the beginning of Kriyā, since there is Kriyābhāva at that time also.

The present tense is known as Kriyamāna-Kāla and the period following it, is Krita-Kāla or say Kārya-Kāla. If you say here that a Kārya which was undone (till now) has been done but that which has already been done is not done, we ask you this question :- Is the Kārya produced with or without the help of kriyā? If it is produced with the help of kriyā, how could Kriyā and Kārya take place at different times ? Bv putting a cut into the Khdira tree, a palāsa tree is never cut off.

It is also not true to say that Kārya takes place after the Kriyā is over, and is not actually produced in presence of Kriyā. For, by saying so, Kriyā will prove to be an obstruction rather than an instrument in the accomplishment of Karya and this will give rise to a number of self-contradictions.

Lastly, if it is held that Kārya is produced without the help of Kriyā, the trouble undergone by a potter desirous of ghata, by way of bringing earth, pounding it, moulding it into a lump, placing the lump on the wheel and moving the wheel in a circle, would entirely turn futile. Following your ideology, one can say that those desirous of Final Emancipation, should not perform penances or observe self-control etc¹².

12. The sentences of Veda such as windin ggung eanist;

:29

Because, according to you, the attainment of Moksa should follow without any Kriyā. But it does not happen so. So, Kārya comes into being during the process of production, and not after the process is over.

Jamāli:—Right from the time of collecting earth to the time of its transformation into the form of ghața, the whole period is the time of production of ghața. The kriyā-kāla of ghața is therefore dīrgha, according to me. It is not correct to say that a Kārya is produced just from the time when the process of production has been started.

The sthaviras reply as follows :----

पइसमयकज्जकोडीनिरवेक्खो घडगयाहिलासो सि । पइसमयकज्जकालं थूलमई घडम्मि लाएसि ॥२३॥२३१८॥

23. Paisamaya kajja kodī niravekkho ghadagayāhilāso si i Pai samaya kajja kālam thūlamaī! ghadammi lāesi 2318.

[प्रतिसमयकार्यकोटीनिरपेक्षो घटगताभिलाषोऽसि । प्रतिसमयकार्यकालं स्थूलमते ! घटे लगयसि ॥२३॥२३१८॥

23. Prati samaya kārya kotī nirapekso ghata gatābhilāso' si l Prati samaya kārya kālam sthulamate! ghate lagayasi 23 (2318)].

Trans. 23. Ignoring the numerous Kāryas (which are being) produced from time to time, you have been desirous of ghața. (And hence) O dull-witted (Jamāli)! You are confusing the period (of production) of the Kāryas (produced) from time to time with (that of) ghata 2318.

टीका-२३ हन्त ! यद्यपि प्रतिसमयमन्यान्यरूपाः कार्यकोट्यस्तत्रोत्पद्यन्ते, तथापि तकिरपेक्षस्त्वं-निष्प्रयोजनत्वेनाविवक्षितत्वादुत्पद्यमाना अपि तास्त्वं न गणयसीत्यर्थः । कुतः । यस्माद् घटगताभिलाषोऽसि, सप्रयोजनत्वेन तस्यैव प्रधानतया विवक्षितत्वात् । ''घट इहोत्पत्स्यते'' इत्येवं तत्रैव तवाभिलाषः, अतः

पकया पूर्णयाइत्या सर्वान् कामानवाप्नोति and पुण्य: पुण्येन कर्मणा, पापः पापेन कर्मणा etc.

Nihnavavāda

प्रतिसमयकार्यकोटीनामदर्शकत्वेन स्थुलमते ! प्रतिसमयकार्यसंबन्धिनमपि कालं सर्वमपि घटे लगयसि-"सर्वोऽप्ययं घटोत्पत्तिकालः '' इत्येवमध्यवस्यसि त्वमि-त्यर्थः, अतो मिथ्यानुभवोऽयं तवेत्यभिप्रायः, एकसामयिक एव घटोत्पत्तिकाल्छे बहुसामयिकत्वग्रहणेन मव्दत्तेः । अत्राह-ननु प्रतिसमयं कार्यकोट्य उत्पद्यमाना-स्तत्र न काश्वन संवेद्यन्ते, किन्त्दपान्तराल्ठे शिवक-स्थास-कोश्चादीनि कानिचि-देव कार्याणि संवेद्यन्ते । सत्यम् , किन्तु स्थूलान्येव शिवकादिकार्याणि, यानि तु प्रतिसमयभाकीनि सक्ष्मकार्याणि तानि च्छबस्यो च्यक्त्या नावधारयितुं श्रकोति, परं प्रतिसमयकार्याणां ग्राहकाण्यनन्तसिद्धकेवलिनां ज्ञानान्युत्पद्यन्ते तान्यपि तत्रापान्तराल्ठे कार्याण्येव, इति घटन्त एव प्रतिसमयं कार्यकोट्य इति ॥२३१८॥ D. C.

Sthaviras :---A series of different Kāryas are produced from time to time during the process of production. But, you being desirous of ghața alone, do not look to these Kāryas and give importance to ghața only. All the while during the process of production, you think that "ghața will be produced here."

Since, O dull-witted Jamāli, you do not apprehend the time during which the intermediate forms of ghața are prepared, you are confusing the full lengh of time (during which different $K\bar{a}ryas$ are produced) with the period of production of ghața and therefore, you assert that "This whole period of time is the period of production of ghața alone." But your assertion is totally false, as the period of production of ghața is only a part of the whole period of the process of production. Jamāli:—The whole series of Kāryas produced from time to time is not seen but the Kāryas like sivaka and sthāsa alone are seen.

Sthaviras: $--K\bar{a}ryas$ like śivaka etc. are sthula but those that are produced from time to time are suksma which could not be apprehended by a sthulamati (dull-witted) like you. The cognizance of ananta Siddha Kevalī (who has attained Absolute Perception) alone can recognize these suksma Kāryas.

It should also be noted that the various Jnanas that apprehend these Kāryas are themselves produced at various times :32:

and therefore they are also $K\bar{a}ryas$. Hence, the theory that a series of $K\bar{a}ryas$ is produced from time to tima, is valid and proper. 23 (2318).

Jamāli says :----

को चरमसमयनियमो पढमे चिय तो न कीरए कर्ज़ ?। नाकारणं ति कर्ज़ तं चेवं तम्मि से समए ॥२४॥२३१९॥

24. Ko caramasamayaniyamo padhame ceiya to na kīrae kajjam ? |

Nākāraņam ti kajjam tam cevam tammi se samaye 2319.

[कश्चरमसमयनियमः प्रथम एवं ततो न कियते कार्यम् ?। नाकारणमिति कार्यं तदेव तस्मिंस्तस्य समये ॥२४॥२३१९॥

24. Kaścaramasamayaniyamah prathama eva tato na kriyate Kāryam ?

Nākāraņamiti kāryam tadeva tasminstasya samaye 24 (2319)]

Trans. 24. If "the Kriyā Kāla is not taken as long" what is the utility of the rule of the final instant? (In that case) why is Kārya not done in the first instant (only)? (The answer is) :-"Since Kārya (cannot exist) without Kāraņa, that (i. e. the final moment) itself is its (ghaṭasya) Kāraṇa at that time." 2319.

टीका--२४ं ननु यदि कार्यस्य दीर्घः क्रियाकालो नेष्यते, किन्त्वेक-सामयिक एव, तर्हि कोऽयं चरमसमयानियमो येन तत्रैवोत्पद्यते घटादिकार्यम्-न घटत एवायं नियम इत्यर्थः । तत एतन्नियमाभावात् किं प्रथमसमय एव कार्यं न क्रियते ?--अपि तु क्रियत एवेति का का नीयते । अत्रोत्तरमाह--अकारणं कार्यं न भवति, तच्चान्त्य समय एव 'से' तस्य घटस्य कारणमस्ति न तत्प्रथम-समये, अतः कथं तत्रोत्पद्यते ? । अन्वय--च्यतिरेकसमधिगम्यो हि कार्य--कारण भावः, अन्वय--च्यतिरेकाम्यां चान्त्यसमय एव धटादेःकारणं लक्ष्यत इति तत्रैव तदुत्पद्यत इति युक्त एव चरमसमयनियम इति ॥२३१९॥

D. C.

Jamāli:-If you do not believe that the Kriyā-Kāla of ghata

is dirgha, why, should you make the rule that ghata is produced only at the last moment and not at the first?

Sthaviras:—Kārya cannot exist without Kāraņa. Wherever there is no kāraņa there is no kārya also. The kāraņa in case of kāryas like ghața etc. is always found in the final instant and not in the first one. The kārya, therefore, does not come into being in the first moment. The proposition that the production of kārya takes place at the end is justified in this way. 24 (2319)

Summarising the arguments,

तेणेह कज़माणं नियमेण कयं कयं तु भयणिज्ञं। किंचिदिह कज़माणं उवरयकिरियं च हुज्जा हि ॥२५॥२३२०॥

25. Teņeha kajjamāņam niyameņa kayam kayam tu bhayaņijjam. 1

Kimcidiha kajjamāņam uvarayakiriyam ca hujjā hi (2320)

[तेनेह कियमाणं नियमेन कृतं कृतं तु भजनीयम् । किश्चिदिह कियमाणमुपरतकियं च भवेत् ॥२५॥२३२०॥

25. Teneha kriyamāņam niyamena kritam kritam tu bhajanīyam ı Kimcidiha kriyamāņamuparatakriyam ca bhavet 25 (2320)]

Trans. 25. That is why Kriyamana is (said to be) krita as a rule; while krita is alternately (so). Here some of it may be (described) as being done, while some would have the process stopped. 2320.

टीका—२५ तेनोक्तप्रकारेण क्रियमाणं वर्तमानक्रियाक्षणभावि कार्यं नियमेन कृतमेवोच्यते, यत्तु कृतं तद् भजनीयं विकल्पनीयम् । कथम् ? इत्याह --किश्चिदिह कृतं क्रियाप्रवृतकालभावि क्रियमाणग्रुच्यते, अन्यत् तूपरतक्रियं चक्रापाकाद्युत्तीर्णं कृतं घटादिकार्यं न क्रियमाणग्रुच्यते, उपरतक्रियत्वादिति ॥२३२०॥

D. C. On account of the reasons stated above, the $K\bar{a}rya$ which is being done at present, should certainly be called as *krita*. But that which has already been done, should be taken so only alternately. For, in that case, some of the work which

is done, could be said to have been done at the time of its process of being done, while the rest of the work as in the case of ghata which is taken down from the cakra etc. could not be taken as Kriyamāņa on account of its process of production being already ceased. 25 (2320).

Now, applying all the views of Sthaviras to the case of bed, Jamāli argues:---

जं जत्थ न भोदेसे अत्थुब्बइ जत्थ जत्थ समयम्मि । तं तत्थ तथ्थमत्थुयमत्थुब्वंतं पि तं चेव ॥२६॥२३२१॥

26. Jam jattha nabhodese atthuvvai jattha jattha samayammi I Tam tattha tatthamtthuyamatthuvvantam pi tam ceva (2321)

[यद् यत्र नभोदेश आस्तीर्यते यत्र यत्र समये। तत् तत्र तत्रास्तीर्णमास्तीर्यमाणमपि तदेव ॥२६॥२३२१॥

26. Yad yatra nabhodeśa āstîryate yatra yatra samaye Tat tatra tatrāstīrņamāstīryamāņamapi tadeva 26 (2321)]

Trans. 26. That which is spread in whatever space at whatever time, is (said to have been) spread and is also (said to be under the process of) being spread at that time and in that space. 2321.

टीका-२६ आस्तीर्यमाणसंस्तारकस्य यद् यावन्मात्रं नभोदेशे यत्र यत्र समये "अत्थुव्वइ" आस्तीर्यते तत् तावन्मात्रं तस्मिन् नभोदेशे तत्र तत्र समय आस्तीर्णमेव भवति, आस्तीर्यमाणमपि च तदेवोच्यते । इदग्रुक्तं भगति-सर्वोऽपि संस्तारक आस्तीर्यमाणो नास्तीर्ण इति "क्रियमाणं कृतम्" इत्यादि मद्दावीर-बचनं व्यलीकमेव जमालिर्मन्यते । एतचायुक्तम् , भगवद्वचनाभिप्रायापरिज्ञानात् । सर्वनयात्मकं दि भगवद्वचनम् । ततश्च "क्रियमाणमकृतम्" इत्यपि भगवान् कश्रश्चिद् व्यवद्दारनयमतेन मन्यत एव, परं "चलमाणे चलिए, उईरिज्जमाणे उईरिए" इत्यादिस्वत्राणि निश्चयनयमतेनैव प्रवृत्तानि । तन्मतेन च क्रियमाणं संस्तृतम् , इत्यादि सर्वग्रुपपद्यत एव । निश्वयो हि मन्यते-प्रथमसमयादेव घटः कर्तुं नारच्धः, किन्तु सदानयनमर्दनादीनि मतिसमयं परापरकार्याण्यारम्यन्ते, तेषां च मध्ये यद् यत्र समये प्रारम्यते तत् तत्रैव निष्पद्यते, कार्यकाल्ज-निष्ठा

कालयोरेकत्वात्, अन्यथा पूर्वोक्तदोषप्रसङ्गत् । ततःक्रियमाणं कृतमंव भवति । एवं प्रस्तुतः संस्तारकोऽपि नाद्यसमयात् सर्वोऽपि संस्तरीतुमारम्यते, किन्त्वपरापरे तदवयवाः प्रतिसमयमास्तीर्यन्ते, तेषां च मध्ये यो यत्र समयेऽवयवः संस्तरीतु-मारम्यते, तत्रैव च निष्पद्यत इति संस्तीर्यमाणं संस्तीर्णमेव भवतीति ॥२३२१॥

D. C. When a particular bed is spread on a particular place at a particular time, it is said to have been spread at that time and place to a particular extent, and is also said to be under the process of being spread. That is to say, while some part of the bed has already been spread, another part is being spread. So, it is pointless to say that the whole bed has been spread. And, the theory of "Kriyamāŋam kritam" preached by Śramaṇa Bhagavān Mahāvīra seems wrong to me.

Sthaviras:—O Jamāli! You have not been able to grasp the real purport, of the Bhagavan's doctrines and that is why it seems wrong to you. The words of Bhagavan are **Example** sarvanayātmaka¹³ and hence it is possible to believe from the point of view of vyavahāra¹⁴ that kriyamāņa is not krita. But according to niścaya naya,¹⁵ satras like "calamāņe calite" are preached and from this point of view, axioms like kriyamāņam kritam" and "saṃstīryamāņam saṃstīrņam" are justified.

It should be carefully noted that the production of ghata does not start from the very first moment, but since Kriyā-kāla (period of production) and nistha-kala (period of completion) are the same, different kāryas are produced at different times and each one of them is completed at the time same started being produced. Otherwise, the faults when it has mentioned before, would certainly arise. Taking the case of bed, we can say that the bed itself is not being spread in the beginning, but its different parts are spread one after the other. Each one of those parts is being spread at one moment as has also been spread at the same moment according to our theory "Kriyamāņam kritam." The bed, as a whole, is said to

13. Containing all the points of view. 14. Practical point of view. 15. Definite view-point.

have been spread only at the final moment, for, then and then only, the work of spreading is completely finished. So, it is perfectly true to assert that "What is being spread is already spread." 26 (2321)

Moreover,

बहुवत्थत्तरणविभिण्णदेसकिरियाइकज्जकोडीणं। मण्णसि दीहं कालं जइ, संथारस्स किं तस्स ?॥२७॥२३२२॥

27. Bahuvatthattaraņa vibhiņņadesakiriyāikajjakodīņam 1 Maņņasi dīham kālam jai, samthārassa kim tassa? (2322)

[बहुवस्त्रास्तरणविभिन्नदेशक्रियादिकार्यकोटीनाम् । मन्यसे दीर्घं कालं यदि, संस्तारस्य किं तस्य १ ॥२७॥२३२२॥

27. Bahuvastrāstaraņa vibhinna deša kriyādi kāryakoţīnām ļ Manyase dīrgham kālam yadi, saṃstārasya kim tasya? 27. (2322)]

Trans. 27. If you think that the period (of production) of the series of Kāryas such as that of spreading many clothcoverings at various places etc. is long, how is the bed (as a whole) concerned by that? 2223.

टीका—२७ यदि नाम बहुदस्नांस्तरणविभिन्नदेशक्रियादिकार्यकोटीनां संबन्धिनं दीर्घकालं मन्यसे जानासि त्वम्, ततः संस्तारकस्य तस्य किमायातम् ? इत्यक्षरघटना । विभिन्नो देशो यासां ता विभिन्नदेशास्ताश्च ताः क्रियाश्च विभि-न्नदेशक्रियाः, वस्तस्योपलक्षणत्वात् कम्बलानां चास्तरणं वस्त-कम्बलास्तरणं तस्य विभिन्नदेशक्रिया वस्तकम्बलास्तरणविभिन्नदेशक्रियाः, तदादयश्च ताः कार्य-कोट्यश्च बहुवस्तकम्बलास्तरणविभिन्नदेशक्रियादिकार्यकोट्य इति समासस्तासा-मिति । आदिश्वब्दःस्वगतानेकमेदख्यापकः । कार्याणां च कोटिसंख्यत्वभिद्वापि पूर्ववद् भावनीयमिति ॥२३२२॥

D. C.

Sthaviras:—If you take the period of production of the Kāryas such as that of spreading a number of blankets, cloth-coverings etc. to be long, it does not follow at all that the period of production of the bed, as a whole, should also be long.

Vāda]

Jamāli:—According to you, various $\lambda \bar{a}ryas$ take place in the beginning, while the actual bed is begun being spread only at the last moment and it is finished also at that moment according it you. Now, if the $\lambda \bar{a}rya - \lambda \bar{a}la$ and $ni \pm \hbar \bar{a} - k \bar{a}la$ are the same, what makes me apprehend the $\lambda riy\bar{a} - k \bar{a}la$ of the bed as dīrgha? 27 (2322).

Sthaviras reply-

पइसमयकज्जकोडीविमुहो संथारयाहिकयकज्जो । पइसमयकज्जकालं कथं संथारम्मि लाएसि ? ॥२८॥२३२३॥

28. Pai samaya kajja kodī vimuho saṃthārayāhihikayakajjo (Pai samaya kajja kālam katham saṃthārammi lāesi? (2313)

[प्रतिसमयकार्यकोटिविमुखः संस्तारकाधिकृतकार्यः । प्रतिसमयकार्यकालं कथं संस्तारके लगयसि १॥२८॥२३२३ः

28. Prati samaya kārya koți vinukhan saṃstārakādhıkrita kāryan I Pratisamaya kāryakālam katham saṃstārake lagayasi ? (2323)]

Trans. 28. Being mainly careful of (the preparation of) bed and indifferent to (the production of) numerous Kāryas (that are produced) from time to time, why do you confuse the period (of production) of the Kāryas produced from time to time, with that of the bed? 2323.

टीका-२८ गतार्था, नवरं संस्तारकेणाधिकृतं प्रस्तुतं कार्यं यस्यासौ संस्तार काधिकृतकार्यं इनि समासः ॥२३२३॥

What happened when Jamālī was thus addressed with arguments ?

सो उज्जुसुयनयमयं अमुणंतो न पडिवज्जए जाहे । ताहे समणा केइ उवसंपण्णा जिणं चेव ॥२९॥२३२४॥ पियदंसणा वि पइणोऽणुरागओ तम्मयं चिय पवण्णा। ढंकोवंहियागणिदड्ढवत्थदेसा तयं अणइ ॥३०॥२३२५॥ सावय ! संघाडी मे तुमए दड्ढ त्ति सो वि य तमाह । नणु तुज्झ डज्झमाणं दड्ढं ति मओ न सिद्धंतो ॥३१॥२३२६॥

दङ्हं न डज्झमाणं जइ विगएऽणागए व का संका । काले तयभावाओ संघाडी कम्मि ते दड्ढा १ ॥३२॥२३२७॥

- 29. So Ujjusuyanayamayam amunanto na padivajjae jāhe Tāhe samaņā kei uvasampanņā Jiņam ceva (2324)
- 30. Piyadamsanā vi paiņo'ņurāgaö tammayam ciya pavaņņā Dhankovahiyāgaņidaddhavatthadesā tayam bharai (2325)
- 31. Sāvaya samghādī me tumae daģēha ti so vi ya tamāha Naņu tujjha dajjhamāņam daģēham ti mao na siddhanto (2326)
- 32. Daddham na dajjhamāņam jui vigae' ņāgae va kā sankāt Kāle tayabhāvāo samghādī kammi te daddhā? (2327)

[स ऋजुसूत्रनयमतमजानन् न प्रतिपद्यते यावत् । तावत् अमणाः केञ्प्युपसंपन्ना जिनमेव ॥२९॥२३२४॥ प्रियदर्शनापि पत्युरनुरागतस्तन्मतेव प्रपन्ना । इङ्गोपहिताग्निदग्धवस्त्रदेशा तं भणति ॥३०॥२३२५॥ आवक ! संघाटी मे त्वया दग्धेति सोऽपि च तामाह । ननु तव दद्यमानं दग्धमिति मतो न सिद्धान्तः ॥३१॥२३२६॥ दग्धं न दद्यमानं यदि विंगतेऽनागते वा का शङ्का । काछे तदभावात् संघाटी कर्सिम्स्ते दग्धा ? ॥३२॥२३२७॥

- 29. Sa Rijusūtranayamatamajānan na pratipadyate yāvat i Tāvat śramaņāķ ke'pyupasampannā Jinameva (2324)
- 30. Priyadarśanāpi patyuranurāgatastanmateva prapannā i Dhankopahitāgni dagdha vastra deśā tam bhanati (2325)
- 31. Śrāvaka ! samghātī me tvayā dagdheti so'pi ca tāmāha ! Nanu tava dahyamānam dagdhamiti mato na siddhāntah (2326)
- 32. Dagdham na dahyamānam yadi vigate' nāgate vā kā śańkā i Kāle tadabhāvāt samghātī kasminste dagdhā ? (2327)]

Trans. 29-30-31-32. Being ignorant of the Rijusatra¹⁶ point of view, when he does not accept (the principle of

16. According to the Naya theories of the Jainas, there are seven points of view for the comprehension of an object. Rijusū-

Vāda]

kriyamāņam kritam) several of the monks returned to the Tirthankara.

Priyadaršanā¹⁷ along with others follows his doctrine on account of her love for him.

When she gets a border of her garment burnt by (a spark of) fire thrown by Dhanka, she says "O śrāvaka! you have burnt my garment." He replies "You do not believe in (the principle of) dahyamāna dagdha.

Thus, when a burning (object) is not (said to have) burnt, how could you suspect that your garment is burnt in past or future on account of its being absent (then)? (2324-2327).

टीका—२९-३०-३१-३२ चतस्रोञपि गाथा गतार्थाः नवरमृजुसत्रो निश्वयनयविशेषः । '' पियदंसणा वि त्ति '' आह-ननु पूर्वे '' सुदर्श्वना '' इति

tra Naya is one of them. The seven nayas could be briefly explained as follows:---

- (1) Naigama Naya-enables the combined comprehension of sāmānya and višesa.
- (2) Sangraha Naya offers only a sāmānya or general outlook.
- (3) Vyavahāra Naya gives only a viśesa or practical point of view.
- (4) Rijusūtra Naya means a direct or straight-forward outlook of an object in its present condition. From this view-point, an object is directly perceived in its present condition.
- (5) Šabda Naya recognizes an object only on etymological strength.
- (6) Samabhiradha Naya explains numerous interpretations of the same word by virtue of different paryayas.
- (7) Evambhūta Naya explains the meaning of a word by means of vyutpatti or derivation.

It should be noted that the first four nayas are padārthagrāhi, while the remaining are Śabdārthagrāhi.

17. According to Bhasyakara, Priyadarsanā, Jyesthā, Sudarsanā and Anavadyāngi are the different names of Jamāli's wife.

(For more details Vide Foot Note 4.)

तस्या नाम प्रोक्तम्, कथमिदानीं "प्रियदर्शना" इत्युच्यते ? । सत्यम्, किन्त्वि दमपि तस्या नाम द्रष्टव्यम् । तथा चोक्तम्—"तेयसिरिं च सुरूवं जणइ य पियदंसणं ध्र्यं" इति । "ढंकोवहियेत्यादि "—स्वाध्यायपौरुषीं कुर्वत्यास्तस्या आपाकाद् गृहीत्वा ढंङ्केनोपहितः क्षिप्तो योऽग्रिस्तेन दग्धो वस्त्रदेशो यस्याःसा ढङ्कोपहिताग्निदग्धवस्त्रदेशा सती तं ढङ्कं भणति । सोऽपि तां प्रियदर्शनामाद्द-दड्ढ-मित्यादिचतुर्थगाथाया अयं भावार्थः-ननु यदि दद्यमानं दाहकियाक्षणे वर्त्तमाने वस्तं न दग्धामति भवद्भिरूच्यते, ततो विगत उपरते, अनागते वा भविष्यति दाहकियाकाल्टे का शङ्का वस्त्रदाहविषया, तदभावान दाहकियाया विनष्टानुत्पन्न-त्वेन सर्वथाऽभावादित्यर्थः । अतो वर्त्तमानाऽतीताऽनागतलक्षणे कालत्रयेऽप्युक्ति-तोऽदग्धत्वात् कस्मिन् काल्ठे आर्थे ! ते तव संघाटी मया दग्धेत्युच्यताम् ? इति ॥२३२४॥२३२५॥

D. C. Rijusūtra Naya is characterised by niścaya naya and it helps us to comprehend an object clearly as it happens to be at present.

Priyadarśanā is also the name of Jamāli's wife in addition to Sudarśanā which has already been referred to above.

In reply to her querry, as to why Dhanka burnt her garment, Dhanka asserts that " $dahyam\bar{a}na$ is not dagdha" according to the Bahurata school of thought.

So, according to your theory, your garment which is $dahya-m\bar{a}na$ or burning at present, could not be said to have been burnt. Nor should you take it to have been burnt in past or future. For, in the past as well as in future, the process of burning would be absent. Then, at what time did I burn your garment, O respectable lady? (2324-2327).

अहवा न डज्झमाणं दड्ढं दाहकिरियासमत्तीए । किरियाऽभावे दडढं जइ दड्ढं किं न तेऌ्रकं ? ॥३३॥२३२८॥

33. Ahavā na dajjhamānam daddham dāhakiriyāsamattie i Kiriyā'bhāve daddham jai daddham kim na telukkam? (2328)

[अथवा न दह्यमानं दग्धं दाहकियासमाप्तौ ॥ कियाऽभावे दग्धं यदि दग्धं किं न त्रैलोक्यम् ॥३३॥२३२८॥

33. Athavā na dahyamānam dagdham dāhakriyāsamāptau l Kriyā'bhāve dagdham yadi dagdham kim na trailokyam. (2328)]

Trans. 33. Or, (if you say that) a burning object is is burnt at the end of the process of burning. If it is burnt in absence of the process (of burning), why is the Universe not burnt? 2328.

टीका-३३ अथवैवं ब्रूपे-दह्यमानं न दग्धम्, किन्तु दाहकियासमाप्तौ दग्धम्। नन्वेवं सति दाहकियाऽभावे दग्धमित्युक्तं भवति। एतच्चायुक्तम्, यतो यदि दाहकियाऽभावे दग्धम्, तर्हि त्रैलोक्यमपि किं न ''दग्धम् '' इत्यत्रापि संबध्यते, यथा वस्त्रे तथा त्रैलाक्येऽपि दाहकियाऽभावस्य तुलयत्वादिति॥२३२८॥

D. C. If you argue that "an object which is being burnt, is not burnt now, but it is burnt only when the process of burning has ceased, that is not proper. For, if it burns in absence of $d\bar{a}ha$ - $Kriy\bar{a}$, why should not the whole Universe be taken as burnt on account of the absence of $d\bar{a}ha$ -kriy \bar{a} common therein ? 33 (2328)

उज्जुसुयनयमयाओं वीरजिणिंदवयणावलंबीणं। जुज्जेज डज्झमाणं दड्ढं वोत्तुं न तुज्झ ति ॥३४॥२३२९॥

34. Ujjusuyanayamayāb Vīra-jiņindavayaņāvalambīņam 1 Jujjejja dajjhamāņam daddham vottum na tujjha tti. (2329)

[ऋजुस्त्रनयमनाद् वीरजिनेन्द्रवचनावलम्बिनाम्। युज्यते दह्यमानं दग्धं वक्तुं न तवेति ॥३४॥२३२९॥

34. Rijusutranayamatād Vīra-jinendravacanāvalambinām (Yujyate dahyamānam dagdham vaktum na taveti. (2329)]

Trans. 34. The followers of the great Tirthankara Sramana Bhagavān Mahāvīra, are fit to say, that dahyamāna is dagdha from the point of view of Rijusūtra system. But you cannot say so. 2329.

टीका—उत्तानार्था ॥२३२९॥

Because,

समए समए जो जो देसोऽगणिभावमेइ डज्झमाणस्स । तं तम्मि डज्झमाणं दहुं पि तमेव तत्थेव ग३५॥२३३०॥

35. Samae samae jojo jojo deso'gaņibhāvamei dajjhamāņassa l Tam tammi dajjhamāņam daddham pi tameva tattheva (2330)

[समये समये यो यो देशोऽग्निभावमेति दद्यमानस्य । तत् तस्मिन् दत्त्यमानं दग्धमपि तदेव तन्नैव ॥३५॥२३३०॥

35. Samaye samaye yo yo deśo'gnibhāvameti dahyamānasya ! Tat tasmin dahyamānam dagdhamapi tadeva tatraiva (2330)]

Trans. 35. According to Rijusūtra naya, whatever part of the burning (object) is being burnt at whatever time, is said to have been burnt. Hence that which is burnt in it, is said to have been burnt there and at that moment only. 2330.

टीका-३५ यो यो दाह्यस्य पटादेर्देशस्तन्त्वादिः समये समयेऽग्निभावमेति-दह्यत इत्यर्थः, तत्तदेशरूपं वस्तु तस्मिन् समये दह्यमानं भण्यते तथा दग्धमपि तदेव वस्तु तस्मिन्नेव समये भण्यते। अतो दह्यमानमेव दग्धम् । यत्तु देशमात्रेऽपि दग्धे संघाटी मे ''दग्धा '' इति त्वं वदसि, तत् संघाट्येकदेशेऽपि संघाटी शब्दो-पचारादिति मन्तव्यमिति ॥२३३०॥

D. C. From the point of view of the Rijusūtra system, an object is comprehended only in its present condition. So, when a particular part, say, thread of the garment is burning at a particular time, it is said to have burnt actually. Dahymāna is said as dagdha in this sense. When only a part of your garment is burnt, you say that your garment is burnt, and thus you take the part of the garment as the (whole) garment itself.

We can therefore, say that---

नियमेण डज्झमाणं दड्ढं दड्ढं तु होइ भयणिज्ञं। किंचिदिह डज्झमाणं उवरयदाहं च हुज्जा हि ॥३६॥२३३१॥

36. Niyamena dajjhamānam daddham daddham tu hoi bhayanijjam i

Kimeidiha dajjhamāņamuvarayadāham ca hujjā hi (2331)

[नियमेन दह्यमानं दग्धं दग्धं तु भवति भजनीयम्। किञ्चिदिह दह्यमानमुपरतदाहं च भवेत् ॥३६॥२३३१॥

36. Niyamena dahyamānam dagdham dagdham tu bhavati bhajanīyam i

Kimcidiha dahyamānamuparatadāham ca bhavet (2331)]

Trans. 36. As a rule, dahyamāna is dagdha. But a dagdha is said to have been burnt (only) alternately. (Because) here, some (part) is (actually) burning while some is (actually) void of (the process of) burning. 2331.

टीका---व्याख्या प्रागुक्तानुसारेण कार्येति ॥२३३१॥

This has already been explained before¹⁸.

Thus explained by Dhanka-

इच्छामो संबोहणमज्जो ! पियदंसणादओ ढंकं । वोत्तुं जमालिमेक्नं मोत्तूण गया जिणसगासं ॥३७। २३३२॥

37. Icehāmo sambohaņamajjo! Piyadamsanādao Dhankamı Vottum Jamālimekkam mottuņa gayā Jinasagāsam 2332.

[इच्छामःसंगोधनमार्य ! प्रियदर्शनादयो ढङ्कम् । उत्तवा जमालिमेकं मुत्तवा गता जिनसकादाम् ॥३७॥२३३२॥

3⁷. Icchāmah sambodhanamārya! Priyadarśanādayo Dhankam Uktvā Jamālimekam muktvā gatā Jina-sakāśam (2332)]

Trans 37. Priyadarśanā and others said (apologetically) • O Revered Sir, we follow your advice " and leaving Jamāli alone, (they) went to the Tīrthaňkara. 2332.

End of the Discussion with the First Nihnava.

18. Vide verse 2320.

Chapter III

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द्वितीय निह्नव वक्तव्यता

Discussion with the Second Nihnava.

सोलसवासाणि तया जिणेण उप्पाडियस्स नाणस्स । जीवपएसियदिट्टी तो उसभपुरे समुप्पण्णा ॥३८॥२३३३॥ रायगिहे गुणसिलए वसु चउदसपुव्वि तीसभुत्ते य । आमलकप्पा नयरी मित्तसिरी कूर-पिउडाई ॥३९॥२३३४॥

- 38. Solasavāsāņi tayā Jiņena uppādiyassa nāņassa I Jīvapaesiyaditthī to Usabhapure samuppaņņā (2333)
- 39. Rāyagihe Guņasilae Vasu caudasapuvvi Tīsagutte ya I Āmalakappā nayarī Mittasirī kūra-piudāi (2334)

[षोडदावर्षाणि तद जिनेनोत्पादितस्य ज्ञानस्य । जीवप्रदेशिकदृष्टिस्तत ऋषभपुरे समुत्पन्ना ॥३८॥२३३३॥ राजगृहे गुणदािलके वसुश्चतुर्दद्यापूर्वी तिष्यगुप्तश्च । आमलकल्पा नगरी मित्रश्रीः कूर-सिक्धादिना ॥३९॥२३३४॥

- 38. Sodasavarşani tadā Jinenotpāditasya jnānasya i Jīvapradesikadrististata Risabhapure samutpannā (2333)
- 39. Rājagrihe Guņašilake Vasušcaturdašaporvī Tisyaguptašca (Āmalakalpā nagarī Mitrašrīņ kora-sikthādinā (2334)]

Trans. 38-39. When sixteen years (had passed) since the Tirthankara had attained the Absolute Perception, the theory of Jivapradesikas came into existence in Risabhapura. Tişyagupta (the pupil of) caturdaśaparvī Vasu of the Gunaśilaka caitya in (the city of) Rājagriha (was convinced) by Mitraśri in the city of Amalakalpā by (offering him) lumps of boiled rice etc. (2333-2334).

टीका-३८-३९ व्याख्या-श्रीमन्महावीरजिनेन तदा षोडञवर्षाणि केवल-ज्ञानस्योत्पादितस्याभूवन् । ततथ राजगृहापरनाम्नि ऋषभपुरे नगरे जीवभदेशिक-दृष्टिःसम्रुत्पन्नेति । कथमुत्एन्ना १। इत्याह-राजगृहे नगरे गुणझिलके चैत्ये चतुर्दशपूर्विणो वसुनामान आचार्याः समागताः, तेषां च तिष्यगुप्तो नाम ज्ञिष्यः । स च तत्र पूर्वगतमालापकं वक्ष्यमाणस्वरूपमधीयानो वक्ष्यमाणयु िभिर्विप्रति-पन्नोऽसंबुद्धःपरिहृतो गुरूभिविंहरन्नामलकल्पायां नगर्यां गतः । तत्र मित्रश्रीनाम्ना श्रावकेण कूर-पिउडादिना कूर-सिक्थादिदानेन प्रतिबोधित इत्यर्थः ॥२३३३ --२३३४॥

D. C. Sixteen years had passed since the Tirthankara (Śramana Bhagavān Mahāvīra) had attained Kevala Jñāna.

1. Like his predecessors, Śramaņa Bhagavān Mahāvīra also had got his preachings composed in books. His Gaņadharas or principal pupils arranged his preachings in twelve Angas. Of these twelve Angas, the twelfth Anga was divided into fourteen Parvas. Both the sects of the Jainas-the Śvetambaras as well as Digambaras-accept these Porvas as the oldest Sacred Works of the Jaina Canon.

The tradition of the Śvetambaras about these Pūrvas is this:—The fourteen Pūrvas had been incorpotated in the Twelfth Anga (the Drisțivāda) which was lost before 1000 A. V. But a detailed Table of its contents and consequently of the Purvas has survived in the Fourth Anga-the Samavāyānga and in the Nandi Sūtra. (Vide Weber. Indisch Studien XVI p. 341).

We are further told by the tradition that Sthavira \overline{Arya} Jamba Swāmī was the last Kevali and Sthavira Sthūlabhadraji was the last śruta-kerali who knew all the twelve Angas along with the fourteen Parvas with their meanings and explanations of intricate subjects in his memory.

There was a preceptor named Vasusūri in the Guņaśilaka caitya of Rājagriha. He was well-versed in all the fourteen Purvas. He had a pupil named Tişyagupta. During the course of his study of the Pūrvas, Tişyagupta was once overcome by vanity, as a result of which, he left the caitya and came to the city of Amalakalpā. There, he was convinced (of the validity of the Acārya's view) by a Śrāvaka named Mitraśrī who offered him lumps of boiled rice etc. 38-39 (2333-2334).

The whole story is told in details as follows:-

आयप्पवायपुब्वं अहिज्जमाणस्स तीसगुत्तस्स । नयमयमयाणमाणस्स दिहिमोहो समुप्पण्णो ॥४०॥२३३५॥

40. Ayappaväyapuvvam ahijjamänassa Tisaguttassa (Nayamayamayänamänassa ditthimoho samuppanno (2335)

[आत्ममवादपूर्वमधीयानस्य तिष्यगुप्तस्य । न्यमतमजानतो दृष्टिमोहः समुत्पन्नः ॥४०॥२३३५॥

40. Atmapravādapurvamadhīyānasya Tişyaguptasya I Nayamatamajānato dristimohan samutpannan (2335)]

Trans. 40. While studying a Purva named Atma-pravada (Ayappavaya)² Tisyagupta not knowing the (real purport of) a particular school of thought, was disillusioned. 2335.

2. Ātma-pravāda (Āyappavāya) is one of fourteen Parvas incorporated in the Pūrvagata section of Dristivāda.

Parikrama, Sutra, Anuyoga, Purvagata and Culikā are the five sections of Drisțivāda.

Porvagata forms the most important part of Dristivāda, on account of its containing the following fourteen Porvas viz :---

- 1. Utpāda parva (Uppāya-parva).
- 2. Agrāyaņīya-parva (Aggeanatha-puvva)
- 3. Viryapravāda-parva (Viriyappavāya puvva)
- 4. Atthinastippaväyapuvva (Astinästipravāda pūrva)

टीका-४० आत्मप्रवादनामकं पूर्वमधीयानस्य बिष्यगुप्तस्यायं सत्रालापकः सामायातस्तद्यथा-" एगे भंते ! जीवपएसे जीवे सि वच्च्वं सिया १। नो इणद्वे समद्वे। एवं दो, तिन्त्रि जाव दस, संखेज्ञा असंखेजा भंते ! जीवपएसा जीव त्ति वत्त्तव्वं सिया १। नो इणद्वे समद्वे, एगपएछणे वि णं जीवे नो जीवे त्ति वत्तव्वं सिया, से केणं अद्वेगं १। जम्हा णं कसिणे पडिपुन्ने लोगागासपए-सतुछे जीवे जीवे त्ति वत्तव्वं सिया, से तेणं अट्वेणं" इति । (एको भगवन् १ जीव गदेशो जीव इति वत्तव्वं सिया, से तेणं अट्वेणं" इति । (एको भगवन् १ जीव गदेशो जीव इति वत्तव्वं सिया, से तेणं अट्वेणं" इति । (एको भगवन् १ जीव गदेशो जीव इति वक्तव्यं स्थात् १। नो अयमर्थः समर्थः। एवं द्वौ, त्रयो यावद् दस्च, संख्येयाः, असंख्येया भगवन् १ जीवप्रदेशा जीव इति वक्तव्यं स्यात् ?। नो अयमर्थः समर्थः, एकपदेशोनोऽपि जीवो नो जीव इति वक्तव्यं स्यात् ! अग केनार्थेन ?। यस्मात् कृत्यः परिपूर्णो लोकाकाशप्रदेशतुल्यो जीवो जीव इति वक्तव्यं स्यात् तेनार्थेन)। अग्रं चालापकमधीयानस्य ''कस्यापि नयस्येदमपि मतम्, न तु सर्वनयानाम् " इत्येवमजानतस्तिष्यगुप्तस्य मिध्या-त्तोदयाद् दर्धर्दर्शनस्य मो हो विपर्याक्षः संजात इति ॥२३३५॥

D. C. During his study of a Parva, named Äyappaväya, Tisyagupta came across the following conversation :-

"O Lord, could one portion of a living being be called-Jīva?

"No, that is not the correct view"

"Then, O Lord! could the two, three, ten or many portions of a living being be called Jiva?

5. Jnānapravāda purva (Nāņappavāya puvva)

6. Satya pravāda pūrva (Saccappavāya puvva)

- 7. Ātmapravāda porva (Āyappavāya puvva)
- 8. Karmapravāda purva (Kammappavāya puvva)
- 9. Pratyākhyāna pradāda purva (Paccakkhānappavāya puvva)
- 10. Vidyāpravādapurva (Vijjāppavaya puvva)
- 11. Avandhya purve (Avanjjha puvva)
- 12. Prāņavāda porva (Pāņavāya puvva)
- 13. Kriyā višāla parva (Kiriyā visāla puvva)
- 14. Lokabindu sāra (Logabindu sāra)

"No, that is not the correct view. A living being even one portion less, cannot be said to be Jiva. It could be called Jivaonly if it is complete (in form) like Loka and $Ak\bar{a}sa$."

Tişyagupta did not know that this statement was true only from one point of view, and not from all points of view. He, therefore, misinterpreted the above-mentioned $\bar{a}l\bar{a}paka$ and formed a wrongly-based theory as a result of that. 40 (2335)

His theory is explained thus :---

एगादओ पएसा नो जीवो नो पएसहीणो वि। जं तो स जेण पुण्णो स एव जीवो पएसो त्ति ॥४१॥२३३६॥

41. Egādao paesā no Jīvo no paesahīno vi l Jam to sa jeņa puņņo sa eva Jīvo paeso tti (2336)

[एकादयः प्रदेशा नो जीवो नो प्रदेशहीनोऽपि । यत्ः ततः स येन पूर्णः ख एव जीवः प्रदेश इति ॥४१॥२३३६॥

41. Ekādayah pradešā no Jīvo no pradešahīno'pi i Yat tatah sa yena pūrņah sa eva Jīvah pradeša iti (2336)]

Trans. 41. One or more parts (of a living being) cannot be said as Jīva. That which lacks (some) part, is also not (Jīva). So, that (part) by which it becomes complete (in form), is alone called Jīva 2336

टीका-४१ यद् यस्मादेकादयः प्रदेशास्तावज्जीवो न भवति, एगे भंते ! जीवपएसे इत्याद्यालापके निषिद्धत्वात्; एवं यावदेकेनापि प्रदेशेन हीनो जीवो न भवति, अत्रैवालापके निवारितत्वात् । ततस्तस्माद् येन केनापि चरमप्रदेशेन स जीवः परिपूर्णःकियते स एव प्रदेशो जीवो न शेष प्रदेशाः एतत्स्त्रालापक प्रामाण्यादिति । एवं विप्रतिपन्नोऽसाविति ॥२३३६॥

D. C, Since the above-mentioned $\bar{a}/\bar{a}paka$ does not admit of one or more *pradesas* of a living being to be fiva and since it does not allow a living being lacking in some part or the other, to be called as fiva, we are led to believe that the last pradesa should alone be called Jiva, because it makes the whole being complete in form.

Tisyagupta misinterprets the ālāpaka in this way and gets himself confused. 41 (2336).

Then,

गुरुणाऽभिहिओ जह ते पढमपएसो न संमओ जीवो। तो तप्परिणामो चिय जीवो कहमंतिमपएसो ? ॥४२॥२३३७॥

42. Guruņā'bhihio jai te padhamapaeso na sammaö Jīvol To tappariņāmo ceiya Jīvo kahamantimapaeso ? 2337

[गुरुणाऽभिहितो यदि तव प्रथमप्रदेशो न संमतो जीवः। ततस्तत्परिणाम एव जीवः कथमन्तिमप्रदेशः ?॥४२॥२३३७॥

42. Guruņā'bhihito yadi tava prathamapradešo na sammto Jīvah (Tatastatpariņāma eva Jīvah kathamantimapradešah? (2337)]

Trans. 42. He was told by the preceptor that "If you do not take the first part (of a living being) to be $J\bar{1}va$, how could the last portion which happens to be of the same consequence as that of the first one, be called $J\bar{1}va$? 2337.

टीका-४२ "एकोन्त्यप्रदेशो जीवः तद्भावभावित्वाज्जीवत्वस्य " इत्यादि बुवाणस्तिष्यगुप्तो गुरुणा वसुस्ररिणाऽभिहितः-हन्त ! यदि ते तव प्रथमो जीव-प्रदेशो जीवो न संमतः, ततस्तर्धन्तिमो जीवमदेशः कथं केन प्रकारेण जीवः ?-न घटत एव सोऽपि जीव इत्यर्थः । कुतः ? तत्परिणामं इति क्वत्वा । इदग्रुक्तं भवति-भवदभिमतोऽन्त्यप्रदेशोऽपि न जीवः, अन्यभदेशैस्तुल्यपरिणामत्वात् , प्रथमाद्यन्यप्रदेशवदिति ॥२३३७॥

D. C. In reply to the belief of Tişyagupta that the last portion-and not the other portions-alone should be taken as $J\bar{J}va$, $\bar{A}c\bar{a}rya$ Vasusari explains :-

"O Tişyagupta, if you do not take the first part (of a living being) as Jīva, it is not worthy of you to take the last part also as Jīva. Because, the last portion is of the same pari-

 $n\bar{a}ma$ as that of the first one, and hence, is in no way different from the first one. 12 (2337)

अहव स जीवो कह नाइमो त्ति को वा विसेसहेऊ ते ? । अह पूरणो त्ति बुद्धी एक्नेक्नो पूरणो तस्स ॥४३॥२३३८॥

43. Ahava sa jivo kaha näimo tti ko vä visesaheu te? Aha puraņo tti buddhī ekkekko puraņo tassa (2338)

[अथवा स जीवःकथं नादिम इति वा विरोषहेतुस्तव १। अथ पूरण इति बुद्धिरेकैकः पूरणस्तस्य ॥४३॥२३३८॥

43. Athavā sa jīvah katham nādima iti vā viśeṣahetustava? | Atha pūraņa iti buddhirekaikah pūraņastasya (2338)]

Trans. 43. "Or, if that (portion) is Jīva, why not the first (one) also? Or, what is the distinctive purpose for holding such a view? Here, if the contention (is) that it is complete (in form) due to the last portion, (The reply is that) "It is complete (in form) by each and every portion" 2338.

टीका-४३ अथवा, सोऽन्तिमप्रदेशःकथं जीवस्त्वयाऽभ्युपगम्यते, कथं च न-नैकादिमः प्रथमस्तद्रूपतयेष्यते १ । नन्वाद्योऽपि प्रदेशो जीव एवेष्यताम्, शेष-प्रदेशतुल्यपरिणामत्वात्, अन्त्यप्रदेशवदिति । को वाऽत्र विशेषहेतुस्तव येन प्रदेशत्वे तुल्येऽप्यन्तिमो जीवो न प्रथमः १ इति । अथ विवक्षितासंख्येयप्रदेश-राशेरन्त्यः प्रदेशः पूरण इति विशेषसद्भावतः स जीवो न प्रथम इति तव बुद्धिः । तदयुक्तम्, यतो यथाऽन्त्यः प्रदेशः पूरणस्तर्थेकैकप्रथमादिप्रदेशस्तस्य विवक्षित-जीवप्रदेशराशेः पूरण एव, एकमपि अदेशमन्तरेण तस्यापरिपूर्तिरिति ॥२३३८॥ D C.

The Acārya:-According to you, the last portion is jīva m spite of its being similar, on what particular ground do you hold this belief?

Tişyagupta:-Since the last portion completes the range of innumerable portions of which a living being is composed, and the first portion does not do that, I hold the last *pradesa* to have $j\bar{\imath}vatva$.

The $\bar{A}c\bar{a}rya:$ -You are labouring under a great disillusion by doing so. For, it is not the last *pradeśa* alone, but each and every *pradeśa* of which a living being is composed, that helps to compose and complete the perfect form of a living being. So, either each and every portion of the living being, shall have to be taken as Jīva, if we accept your views; or there would be nothing like *jīvatva* in the last portion like other portions resulting in the absolute negation of *jīvatva* 43 (2338)

If we accept Jīvatva in every single portion of a living being, there are other difficulties also -

एवं जीवबहुत्तं पइजीवं सब्वहा व तदभावो। इच्छाविवज्जओ वा विसमत्तं सब्वसिद्धी वा ॥४४॥

44. Evam jīvabahuttam paijīvam savvahā va tadabhāvo (Iechāvivajjaö vā visamattam savvasiddhī vā. (2339)

[एवं जीवबहुत्वं पतिजीवं सर्वथा वा तदभावः । इच्छाविपर्ययो वा बिषमत्वं सर्वसिद्धिर्वा ॥४४॥२३३९॥

44. Evam jīvabahutvam pratijīvam sarvathā vā tadabhāvah (Icchāviparyayo vā visamattvam sarvasiddhirvā (2339)]

Trans. 44. In that case, every jiva will have to be taken as composed of numerous jivas. Or, there would be absolute negation of it If it is left to your free will, there would be reverse or ambiguous (statements) as well. Or, all the alternatives (will be proved) 2339.

टीका-४४ एवं सर्वजीवप्रदेशानां विवक्षितप्रदेशमानपूरणत्वेऽन्त्यप्रदेशवत् प्रत्येकं जीवत्वात् प्रतिजीवं जीवबहुत्वमसंख्येयजीवात्मकं प्राप्नोति । अथवा प्रथमादिप्रदेशवदन्त्यप्रदेशस्याप्यजीवत्वे सर्वथा तदभावो जीवाभावः प्रसजति । अथ पूरणत्वे समानेऽप्यन्त्यप्रदेश एव जीवः, शेषास्तु प्रदेशा अजीवा इत्याग्रहो न ग्रुच्यते, तर्हि राजादेरिवेच्छा भवतः, यत् पतिभासते तदेव हि जऌप्यत इति । तथा च सति विपर्ययोऽपि कस्माद् न भवति, आद्यो जीवः अन्त्यस्तु प्रदेशोऽजीव

इति १। विषमत्वं वा कुतो न भवति-केचनापि प्रदेशा जीवाः, केचित्तु अजीवा इति १ अनियमेन सर्वविकल्पसिद्धिर्वा कस्माद् न भवति, स्वेच्छया सर्वपक्षा-णामपि वक्तुं शक्यत्वात् इति ॥२३३९॥

D. C. If you take all the *pradesas* as having *jivatva* along with the last *prrdesa*, every jīva will have to be taken as composed of a number of other *jivas*. If you do not take them as jīvas, there would be absolute negation of jīvatva. Still, however, ignoring the fact that the last pradesa is, in no way, different from other pradesas, so far as parnatva is concerned, if you insist with your own sweet will that the last portion is jīva, and the rest are *a-jīvas*, then, like the free will of kings etc. you could, as well, insist upon the reverse statement viz-that the first etc. are jīvas and the last is *a-jīva*. Or, why not say vaguely that some of them are *jīvas* and some are *a jīvas*? Or, you could prove the validity of all the possible alternatives. For, being dependent upon your free will, you can opine on all sides, 44 (2339)

जं सव्वहा न वीसुं सब्वेसु वि तं न रेणुतेछं व। सेसेसु असब्भूओ जीवो कहमंतिमपउसे १ ॥४५॥२३४०॥

45. Jam savvahā na vīsum savvesu vi tam na reņutellam va Sesesu asabbhuo jīvo kahamantimapaese ? (2340)

[यत् सर्वथा न विष्वक् सर्वेष्वपि तद् न रेणुतैलमिव । रोषेष्वसद्भूतो जीवः कथसन्तिमप्रदेरो ? ॥४५॥२३४०॥

45. Yat sarvathā na visvak sarveşvapi tad na reņutailamiva Śeseşvasadbhuto jīvan kathamantimapradese? (2340)]

Trans 45. That which does not entirely exist separately, does not even exist in all parts (combined together) like the (drop of) oil in sands. Similarly, when $j\bar{\imath}va$ is not present in other parts, how could it exist in the last portion? 2340.

टीका-४५ यद् विष्वगेकैकस्मिन्नवयवे नास्ति तत् सर्वेष्वप्यवयवेषु सम्रुदि-

तेषु न भवति, यथा रेणुकणेषु प्रत्येकमसत् बत्समुदाये बैरुम्, नास्ति च अथमादिक एकैकस्मिन् प्रदेशे जोवत्वम्, ततःशेषेषु प्रथमादिप्रदेशेष्वसज्जीवत्वं गरिणामादिबा तुल्ये कथमकस्मादेवास्मिन्नेवान्त्यप्रदेशे समायातम् १ इति॥२३४०॥

D. C Like the drop of oil in the particles of sand, that which is not present in each of the portions separately, does not even exist in all the portions combined together.

Since you do not admit the existence of $j\bar{v}atva$ in portions such as the first one etc., how could $j\bar{v}atva$ be present in the last portion accidentally in spite of its being similar to other portions in respect of *parivama* etc. ? 45 (2349).

अह देसओऽवसेसेसु तो वि किह सब्वहंतिमे जुत्तो । अह तम्मि व जो हेऊ स एव सेसेसु वि समाणो ॥४६॥२३४१॥

46. Aha desao'vasesesu to vi kiha savvahantime jutto Aha tammi va jo hea sa eva sesesu vi samāņo 2341.

[अथ देशतोऽवरोषेषु ततोऽपि कथं सर्वथान्तिमे युक्तः । अथ तस्मिन् वा यो हेतुः स एव रोषेष्वपि समानः ॥४६॥२३४१॥

46. Atha deśato'vaścesesu tato'pi katham sarvathāntime yuktah i Atha tasmin vā yo hetuh sa eva ścesesvapi samānah (2341)]

Trans. 46. If it is said that in the remaining portions jīvatva exists partially, then also, how could it be wholly present in the last portion? The same reason for *jīvatva* as it is present in it (the last portion), is present in other particles as well. 2341.

टीका-४६ अथान्त्यादवशेषेषु प्रथमादिमदेशेषु देशतो जीवः समस्त्येव, अन्त्यप्रदेशे तु सर्वात्मनाऽसौ समस्तीति विशेषः । ततो ''जं सब्बहा न वीसुं '' इत्येतदसिद्धमिति भावः । अत्रोत्तरमाह-तथापि कथमन्त्यप्रदेशे सर्वात्मना जीवो युक्तः ? । नजु तत्रापि देशत एवासौ युज्यते, तस्यापि प्रदेशत्वात्, प्रथमादि-प्रदेशवत् । अथान्त्यप्रदेशे संपूर्णो जीव इष्यते, तर्हि तत्र तद्भावे यो हेतुः स

रोषेष्वपि प्रथमादिप्रदेशेषु समान एव, तुल्यधर्मकत्वात् । अतस्तेष्वापि प्रतिप्रदेशं संपूर्णजीवत्वमन्त्यप्रदेशवत् किं नेष्यते ? इति ॥२३४१॥

D. C.

Tişyagupta :-In all the portions except the last one of the living being, jīvatva exists partially, while in the last portion it exists wholly.

The $\bar{A}c\bar{a}rya:-That$ is not possible on grounds mentioned above³. How could jīva exist in the last portion wholly, and in the rest of them partially? There also, it is proper to admit its existence partially as in the case of other portions. Hence, if the whole of jīva is taken as existing in the last portion, it should also be taken as existing wholly in other portions as well. 46. (2341).

नेह पएसत्तणओ अन्तो जीवों जहाइमपएसो । आह सुयम्मि निसिद्धा सेंसा न उ अन्तिमपएसो ॥४७॥२३४२॥

47. Neha paesattaņad anto jīvo jahāimapaeso r Āha suyammi nisiddhā sesā na u antimapaeso. (2342)

[नैह प्रदेशत्वतोऽन्त्यो जीवो यथादिमप्रदेशः । आह श्रुते निषिद्धाः शेषा न त्वन्तिमप्रदेशः ॥४७॥२३४२॥

47. Neha pradeśatvato'ntyo jīvo yathādimapradeśah | Āha śrute nişiddhāh śeṣā na tvantimapradeśah 47 (2342) }

नणु एगो त्ति निसिद्धो सो वि सुए जइ सुयं पमाणं ते। सुत्ते सब्वपएसा भणिया जीवो न चरिमो त्ति ॥४८॥२३४३॥

48. Națu ego tti nisiddho so vi sue jai suyam pamāņam te Sutte savvapaesā bhaņiyā jīvo na carimo tti. (2343)

[नन्वेक इति निषिद्धः सोऽपि श्रुते यदि श्रुतं प्रमाणं तव ॥ सूत्रे सर्वप्रदेशा भणिता जीवो न चरम इति ॥४८॥२३४३॥

3. Vide verse 2340.

[Vāda]

Nihnavavāda

48. Nanveka iti nişiddhah so'pi śrute yadi śrutam pramāņam tavaļ Satre sarvapradešā bhaņitā jīvo na carama iti (2343)]

Trans. 47-48. Just as the first portion is not $j\bar{v}a$ on account of its (quality of) being *pradesa*, the last portion is also not $j\bar{v}a$ (for the same reason). If it is said that the remaining portions are excluded from the (said) commandment, but the last portion is not excluded, (The answer is this)- If the commandment is accepted as an authority (by you), that (the last portion) is, also, in fact, excluded from the commandment by virtue of its being one. In the (said) commandment all the pradesas (combined together) have been stated as having jīva. Jīva does not, therefore, exist in the last portion alone (2342-2343).

टीका-४७ इहान्त्यप्रदेशोऽपि न जीवः, प्रदेशत्वात् , यथा प्रथमादिप्रदेश्न इति । आह-नन्वागमबाधितेयं प्रतिज्ञा, यतःपूर्वोक्तालापकरूपे श्रूते शेषाः प्रथमादिप्रदेशा जीवत्वेन निषिद्धाः, न पुनरन्त्यप्रदेशः, तस्य तत्र जीवत्वानु-ज्ञानात् । अतःकथं प्रथमादिप्रदेशवदन्त्यस्य जीवत्वनिषेधं मन्यामहे १ इति ॥ २ ३४२

टीका-४८ ननु सोऽप्यन्त्यप्रदेशःश्रुते जीवत्वेन निषिद्धः । कुतः ? । इत्याह-एक इति कृत्वा । तथाहि-तत्रेवेत्थमुक्तम्-"एगे भन्ते ! जीवपएसे जीवे त्ति वत्तव्यं सिया ? । नो इणट्ठे समट्ठे " इति । ततो यदि श्रुतं तव प्रमाणम् , ततोऽन्त्यप्रदेशस्यापि जीवत्वं नेष्टव्यम् , एकत्वात् , प्रथमाद्यन्यतर प्रदेशवत् । किश्च, यदि श्रुतं हन्त ! प्रमाणीकरोषि, तदा सर्वेऽपि जीवमदेशाः परिपूर्णा जीवत्वेन श्रुते भणिताः, न त्वेक एव चरमप्रदेशः । तथा च तत्रैवाभि-हितम्-"जम्हाणं कसिणे पडिपुत्रे लोगागासपएसतुल्ले जीव त्त्वेनैष्टव्य इति ॥२३४३

D. C. Ācārya -Like the first portion, the last portion also has no jīvatva on account of its quality of being a *pradeśa*.

Tisyagupta:-But that does not go against the main śruta or commandment. Because, the śruta excludes pradeśas such as the first one etc. from having jīvatva, where as the last pradeśa

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is not excluded like that. So, why should we not take the last pradesa as having jīvatva?

The $\overline{A}c\overline{a}rya:$ -The last portion is also excluded from the śruta on account of its being a single pradeśa. I would also like to draw your attention to the statement therin, that all the pradeśas combined together would form $j\overline{w}a$, while one single last pradeśa cannot do so. It has been stated, therefore, that "Jamhā nam kasine padipanne logāgāsapaesa-tulle jīve tti vattavyanu siyā."

Since you take this ś*ruta* as an authority, you cannot take the last portion alone as jīva. 47-48 (2342-2343).

The same idea is then illustrated as follows :-

तंतू पडोवयारी न समत्तपडो य समुदिया ते उ । सध्वे समत्तपडओ सब्वपएसा तहा जीवो ॥४९॥२३४४॥

49. Tanto padovayārī na samattapado ya samudiyā te uļ Savve samattapadaö savvapaesā tahā jīvo (2344).

[तन्तुः पटोपकारी न समस्तपटश्च समुदितास्ते तु । सर्वे समस्तपटकः सर्वप्रदेशास्तथा जीवः॥४९॥२३४४॥

49. Tantun patopakārī na samastapatašca samuditāste tu Sarve samastapatakah sarvapradešāstathā jīvah (2344)]

Trans, 49. Thread is a (helping) constituent of pata, but it is not the whole pata itself. They are said to be pata (only) when they (i. e all the threads) are combined together The same is the case with $j\bar{s}va$ and (its) constituents, 2344.

टीका-४९ एकस्तन्तुर्भवति समस्तपटोपकारी, तमप्यन्तरेण समस्तपटस्या-माबात्। परं स सकस्तन्तुः समस्तपटो न भवति किन्तु ते तन्तवः सर्वेऽपि सम्रुद्विताः समस्तपटव्यपदेशं लभन्त इति पतीतमेव।तथा जीवप्रदेशोऽप्येको

: 56 :

Vāda]

Nihnavavāda

: 57:

जीवो न भवति, किन्तु सर्वेऽपि जीवप्रदेशाः सम्रुदिता जीव हति ॥२३४४॥

D. C A thread of a pata is only a constituent of the *pata* as a whole. It cannot be said to be the whole pata. All the threads combined together form the *pata* Similarly, one single prades a cannot be taken as jīva, but all the prodes combined together form jīva. 49 (2344)

एवंभूयनयमयं देस-पएसा न वत्थुणो भिन्ना । तेणावत्थु त्ति मया कसिणं चिय वत्थुमिहं से ॥५०॥२३४५॥

जइ तं पमाणमेवं कसिणो जीवो अहोवयाराओ। देसे वि सब्वबुद्धी पवज़ सेसे वि तो जीवं ॥५१॥२३४६॥

- 50. Evambhūyanayamayam desa-paesā na vatthuņo bhinnā i Teņāvatthu tti mayā kasiņam ciya vatthumiţţham se (2345)
- 51. Jai tam pamāņamevam kasiņo jīvo ahovayārāö Dese vi savvabuddī pavajja sese vi to jīvam (2346)

[एवंभूतनयमतं देश-प्रदेशौ न वस्तुनो भिन्नौ । तेनावस्त्वित मतौ कृत्स्नमेव वस्त्विष्टं तस्य ॥५०॥२३४५॥

यदि तत् प्रमाणमेवं कृत्स्नो जीवोऽथोपचारात् । देशेऽपि सर्वबुद्धिः प्रपद्यस्व शेषानपि ततो जीवम् ॥५१॥२३१६॥

- 50. Evambhūtanayamatam deśa-pradeśau na vastuno bhinnau Tenāvastviti matau kritsnameva vastvistam tasya (2345)
- 51. Yadi tat pramāņamevam kritsno jīvo'thopacārāt (Deśe'pi sarvabuddhih prapadyasva śeṣānapi tato jīvam (2346)]

Trans. 50-51. According to the *Evambhūta naya*, various portions (of an object) are not different from the object. Hence, they are known as *a-vastu* (or non-objects). The whole (of an object) is alone accepted as *vastu* according to that (point of view). If that is accepted by you, jīva too,

is a whole (being). Still however, if the part is metaphorically understood as a whole, then, the remaining parts should also be taken as jīva 2345-2346.

टीका-५०-५१ एवंभूतनयस्येदं मतं यदुत-देश -प्रदेशा न वस्तुनो भिन्नाः, तेन ताववस्तुरूपौ मतौ । अतो देश-प्रदेशकल्पनारहितं क्रत्स्नं परिपूर्णमेव वस्तु "से " तस्यैवंभूतनयस्येष्टम् । ततो यदि तदेवंभूतनयमतं प्रमाणं जानासि त्वम् एवं तर्हि क्रत्स्नः परिपूर्णो जीवो, न त्वन्त्यभदेशमात्रमिति प्रतिपद्यस्व । अथ "ग्रामो दग्धः," "पटो दग्धः," इत्यादिन्यायादेकदेशेऽपि समस्तत्रस्तूपचाराद-न्त्यप्रदेशलक्षणे देशेऽपि समस्तजीवबुद्धिस्तत्र प्रवर्तते, तर्हि शेषे प्रथमादिष्रदेश उपचारतो जीवं प्रतिपद्यस्व, न्यायस्य समानत्वादिति ॥२३४५-२३४६॥

D. C. According to the Evambhata point of view, various parts of an object are not taken as different from the object. But a part is not taken as a whole by it. Deśa-pradeśas are, therefore, a-vastus according to this naya. The whole of an object without the consideration of deśapradeśas is alone taken as vastu. From this point of view, therefore, you should take jiva, existing in a whole and not in a part like the last pradeśa. If, at this point, you take the point as a whole metaphorically, as in the case of an expressiou such as "A village is burnt" "A cloth is burnt" etc, you shall have to take jiva as existing in other pradeśas also in the metaphorical sense. 50-51 (2345-2346).

जत्तो व तदुवयारो देसूणे न उ पएसमेत्तम्मि । जह तंतूणम्मि पडे पडोवयारो न तंतुम्मि ॥५२॥२३४७॥

52. Jatto va taduvayāro desūņe na u paesamettammi Jaha tantūņammi pade padovayāro na tantunmi (2347)

4. Evambhūta naya is a sabdārtha-grāhī naya and explains the meaning of a word from the point of view of vyutpatti or derivation. In other words, this naya interprets an object in the light of its strict etymological derivation. Vāda]

[यतो वा तदुपचारो देशोने न तु प्रदेशमात्रे । यथा तन्तू न पटे पटोपचारो न तन्तौ ॥५२॥२३४७॥

52. Yato vā tadupacāro deśone na tu pradeśamātre i Yathā tantu na pațe pațopacāro na tantau (2347)]

Trans. 52. Or, that (sort of) metaphorical interpretation is applicable (to an object) having less parts and not to a single part, just as a metaphorical interpretation is applicable to a pata having less threads but not to the thread itself 2347.

टीका-५२ अथवा, उपचारादप्येक एवान्त्यप्रदेशो जीवो न भवति, किन्तु देशोन एव जीवे जीवोपचारो युज्यते, यथा तन्तुभिः कतिपयैरुने पटे पटोपचारो दृश्यते, न त्वेकर्सिमस्तन्तुमात्र इति ॥२३४७॥

D. C. Even by means of a metaphorical interpretation, the last portion does not become jīva, because the metaphorical interpretation is applicable to a jīva lacking in some parts, and not to one single portion. Take the example of *tantu* and *pața*. The metaphorical sense of *pața* could only be transposed to a *pața* having less parts, but it could not in any case be applied to a *tantu*. 52 (2347).

The Acārya explained Tişyagupta in this way, but,

इय पण्णविओ जाहे न पवज्ञइ सो कओ तओ बज्झो । ततो आमलकप्पाए मित्तसिरिणा सुहोवायं ॥५३॥२३४८॥

भकखण-पाण-चंजण-वत्थंतावयवलाभिओ भणइ । सावय ! विधम्मिया म्हे कीस त्ति तओ भणइ सड्ढो ॥५४।२३४९॥

नणु तुज्झं सिद्धंतो पज्ञंतावयवभित्तओऽवयवी। जइ सचमिणं तो का विहम्मणा मिच्छमिहरा भे ॥५५॥२३५०॥

53. Iya paņņaviö jāhe na pavajjai so kao tao bajjho Tato Āmalakappāe Mittasiriņā suhovāyam (2348)

- 54. Bhakkhana-pāna-vanjana-vatthantāvayavalābhio bhanai i Sāvaya ! vidhammiyā mhe kīsa tti tao bhanai saddho (2349)
- 55. Naņu tujjham siddhanto pajjantāvayavamittao'vayavī i Jai saccamiņam to kā vihammaņā micchamiharā bhe (2350).

[इति प्रज्ञापितो यावद् न प्रपचते स कृतस्ततो बाद्यः। तत आमलकल्पायां मित्रश्रिया सुखोपायम् ॥५३॥२३४८॥

भक्षण-पान-व्यञ्जन-वस्त्रान्तावयवलाभितो भणति । श्रावक ! विधर्मिता वयं कस्मादिति ततो भणति श्राद्वः॥५४॥२३४९

ननु तव सिद्धान्तःपर्यन्तावयवमात्रतोऽवयवी । यदि सत्यमिदं ततःका विघर्मता मिथ्यात्वमितरथा भवताम् ॥५५॥२३५०॥

- 53. Iti prajnāpito yāvad na prapadyate sa kritastato bāhyah (Tata Āmala-kalpāyām Mitraśriyā sukhopāyam (2348)
- 54. Bhakṣaṇa-pāna-vyanjana-vastrāntāvayavalābhito bhaṇati 1 Śrāvaka! vidharmitā vayam kasmāditi tato bhaṇati śrāddhah 54 (2349)
- 55. Nanu tava siddhäntah paryantāvayavamātrato'vayavī | Yadi satyamidam tatah kā vidharmatā mithyātvamitarathā bhavatām 55 (2350)]

Trans. 53-54-55. In spite of his being, thus, instructed by (his) preceptor, when he was not convinced, he was excluded (from the Order of Monks). Then, in (the city of) Āmalakalpā, (he was invited) by Miśraśrī for dinner etc. When offered the last portions of food, drinks, condiments and clothes, he said "O Śrāvaka! why did you insult us by doing so? The host replied "According to your theory, the last portion is the whole object. If it is true, how is the insult (made)? Otherwise, your theory is false." टीका ५३-५४-५५ गतार्था एव । नवरमिति पूर्वोक्त प्रकारेण गुरुभिः प्रज्ञापितस्तिष्यगुप्तो यावद् न किश्चित् प्रतिपद्यते तत उद्घाटय बाह्यः कृतो विहरन्नामलकल्पां नगरीं मत्वाऽऽम्रसालवने स्थितः । तत्र मित्रश्रीश्रावकेण "निह्ववोऽयम्" इति ज्ञात्त्वा तत्प्रतिबोधनार्थं गत्वा निमन्त्रितः-"यद् मदीयगृहे प्रकरणमद्य तत्र भवद्भिःस्वयमागन्तव्यम् ।" ततो गतास्ते तद्गृहे । तेन च तत्र तिष्यगुप्तमुपवेक्त्य महान्तं संश्रममुपदर्श्वयता तत्पुरतो भक्ष्य-भोज्याऽन्न-पान-व्यञ्चन-क्लादिवस्तुनिचया विस्तारिताः । ततस्तेषां मध्ये सर्वत्रान्त्यावयवान् गृहीत्वा प्रतिलाभितोऽसौ कूर-सिक्थादिना प्रतिलाभित इत्यर्थः । ततो भणत्य-भिधत्ते-" हे श्रावक ! विश्वमिताः किमति त्वया वयमित्थम् ?" । ततःश्राद्धो भणति-" नणु तुज्झमित्यादि " । "मिच्छमिहरा मे त्ति " अन्यथा यदि नेदं सत्त्यम्, तदा सर्वमपि मिध्या भवतां भाषितमिति ॥२३४८॥२३४९॥२३५०॥

D. C. When Tişyagupta did not accept the explanation offered by the Ācārya, as mentioned alove, he was turned out of the gaccha. Then, while wandering here and there, Tisyagupta came to the city of Āmala-Kalpā where he lodged himself in the forest named Āmrasāla. There Mitraśrī, a śrāvaka, apprehending that he was a *nihnava*, invited him to his place for dinner etc. in order to make him conscious of his error.

After Tişyagupta entered his house, he placed a pile of objects for food, drinks, condiments and clothes, in front of him. Then, from the midst of all those objects, the host took out the last portions of all the items and offered them to Tişyagupta. Being enraged at this act of the host, Tisyagupta said "O śrāvaka! what do you mean by insulting me like this? The host replied "It is, in fact, your theory that the last portion of an object means the object as a whole, how are you offended in that case ? For, otherwise, your theory would be false" 53-54-55. (2348-2349-2350)

And, अंतोऽवयवो न कुणइ समत्तकज्ञं ति जइन सोऽभिमओ । संववहाराईए तो तम्मि कओऽवयविगाहो १ ॥५६॥२३५१॥

56. Anto'vayavo na kuņai samattakajjam ti jai na so'bhimaö (Samvavahārāie to tammi kao'vayavigāho? (2351)

[अन्त्योऽवयवो न करोति समस्तकार्यमिति यदि न सोऽभिमतः । संब्यवहारातीते ततस्तस्मिन् कुतोऽवयविग्रहः ?॥५६॥२३५१॥

56. Antyo'vayavo na karoti samastakāryamīti yadi na so'bhimatah | Samvyavahārātīte tatastasmin kuto'vayavigrahah ? (2351)]

Trans. 56. The last portion does not do the work of the whole. And, therefore, if it is not acceptible to you, how did you apprehend the object as a whole in that part in absence of dealing together ? (2351).

टीका-५६ यदि नामान्त्याक्यवः समस्तस्याप्यवयविनो यत् साध्यं कार्यं तद् न करोति, इत्यतोऽसौ नाभिमतो भवताम्-क्रूर-पक्वात्र-वस्तादीनां सिक्थ-सुकुमारिकादिस्रक्ष्मखण्डतन्त्वादिरूपोऽन्त्यावयवो यदि न परितोषको भवता-मित्यर्थः, तद्दि संव्यवहारातीते तस्मिन्नन्त्यावयवे कुतः किल समस्तावयविग्रहो भवताम् ? इति ॥२३५१॥

D. C. On the ground that the last portion does not do the work of the whole, if the last portions of food, drink, clothes etc. do not satisfy you, (then), how is it that you apprehend the whole body of all the *avayavas* combined together into one *avayava* only? 56 (2351).

अंतिमतंतू न पडो तकजाकरणओ जहा कुंभो । अह तयभावे वि पडो सो किं न घडो खपुष्फं व ॥५७॥२३५२॥

57. Antimatantū na pado takkajjākaraņao jahā kumbho Aha tayabhāve vi pado so kim na ghado khapuppham va (2352).

[अन्तिमतन्तुर्न पटस्तत्कार्याकरणतो यथा कुम्भः । अथ तदभावेऽपि पटःस किं न घटःखपुष्पं वा १॥५७॥२३५२॥

7 Vāda

-57. Antimatanturna paţastatkāryākaraņato yathā kumbhah | Atha tadabhāve'pi paţah sa kim na ghaţah khapuşpam vā ? (2352)]

Trans. 57. Like ghata, the last thread also could not be called pata in absence of its doing the work of pata. An t in spite of that, if it is (taken as) pata, why should that not be taken as ghata or khapuspa? 2352

टीका-५७ अन्त्यतन्तुमात्रं न पटः, तस्य पटस्य कार्यं शीतत्राणादिकं न्तत्कार्यं तस्याकरणं तत्कार्याकरणं तस्मादिति । यथा कुम्भो घटः । अथ चदमावेऽपि पटकार्याभावेऽपि तन्तुः पट इष्यते, तर्हि किमित्यसौ पटो घटः , खपुष्पं वा न भवति, पटकार्याकतृत्वस्याविशेषादिति ॥२३५२॥

D. C. Just as a *gha*ta could not be called a pata, the last thread of a pata also could never be called pata on account of its inability to do the work of pata. Now, even in spite of its inability to do the kārya of pata, if the last thread is taken as pata, why should Khapuspa not be taken as pata on the same ground? 57 (2352).

And,

उवलंभव्ववहाराभावाओ नत्थि ते खपुष्फं व । अंतावयवेऽवयवी दिद्वंताभावओ वावि ॥५८॥२३५३॥

58. Uvalambhavvavahärabhäväo natthi te khapuppham va i Antävayave'vayavi dițțhantābhāvaö vâvi (2353)

[उपलम्भव्यवहाराभावाद् नास्ति तव खपुष्पमिव । अन्त्यावयवेऽवयवी दृष्टान्ताभावतो वापि ॥५८॥२३५३॥

58. Upalambhavyavahārābhāvād nāsti tava khapuspamiva (Antyāvayave'vayavî dristantābhāvato vāpi (2353)]

Trans. 58. Like khapuspa, the whole is not (present) in the last portion, in absence of perception, practical utility, and (apt) illustration. 2353. टीका-५८ तवाभिमतोऽवयवी अन्त्यावयवे नास्ति, उपलब्धिलक्षणपाप्तस्या-नुपलब्धेः, व्यवहाराभावाच, खपुष्पवदिति । अथवा, '' अन्त्यावयवमात्र अवयवी, अवयविसंपूर्णहेतुत्वात् " इत्यत्र तावद् दृष्टान्तामावाद् न साध्यसिद्धिरिति ॥२३५३

D, C. Since the whole of an object is neither perceived, nor utilized in the last *avayava*, it cannot be taken as existing in the last portion. And, there is no illustration to prove your theory. 58 (2353)

For,

पचकखओऽणुमाणादागमओ वा पसिद्धी अत्थाणं। सञ्वण्पमाणविसधाईयं मिच्छत्तमेवं भे॥५९॥२३५४॥

59. Paccakkhao'numänädägamaö vä pasiddhi atthänam Savvappamänavisayäiyam micchattamevam bhe (2354)

[प्रत्यक्षतोऽनुमानादागमतो वा प्रसिद्धिरर्थानाम् । सर्वप्रमाणविषयातीतं मिथ्यात्वमेवं भवताम् ॥५९॥२३५४॥

59. Pratykṣato'numānādāgamato vā prasiddhirarthānām | Sarvapramāņaviṣayātitam mithyātvamevam bhavatām (2354)]

Trans. 59. Establishment of (various) interpretations is (possible) either by means of direct proof or inference or by means of āgamas. Your theory is thus worthless in absence of all (such.) authenticities 2354.

टीका-५९ प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणैरर्थानां सिद्धिः, तानि च त्वत्पक्षसाधकेन न प्रवर्तन्ते । अतः सर्वप्रमाणविषयातीतं " मे " भवतामभिमतं मिथ्यात्वमेवेति ॥२३५४॥

D. C. Various interpretations are established on the strength of *pratyakia* pramāņas or āgamas. Your theory being devoid of all such pramāņas becomes utterly baseless.

इय चोइय संबुद्धो खामियपडिलाभिओ पुणो विहिणा। गंतुं गुरुपायमूलं ससीसपरिसो पडिकंतो ॥५९॥२३५५॥

[Vada

Nihnavavāda

60. Iya coiya sambuddho khāmiya padilābhiö puņo vihiņā (Gantum gurupāyamulam sa-sīsapariso padikkanto (2355)

[इति चोदितः संबुद्ध क्षामितप्रतिलाभितः पुनर्विधिना । गत्वा गुरुपादमूलं सशिष्यपरिषत् प्रतिकान्तः ॥६०॥२३५५॥

60. Iti coditah sambuddhah kṣāmitapratilābhitah punarvidhinā (Gatvā gurupādamolam sa-śiṣyapariṣat pratikrāntah (2355)]

Trans. 60. Being thus inspired and instructed, he was pardoned (for his errors), and awarded presents by Mitraśrī according to regular custom; (then), having gone near the soles of the preceptor's feet (and having) saluted, he returned along with his retinue of pupils. 2355.

टीका-६० इति प्रेरितः संबुद्धोऽसौ विहितश्वमितश्वामितेन मित्रश्रीश्रावकेष संपूर्णान्नप्रदानादिविधिना पुनरपि प्रतिलाभितो गुरुपादमूलं गत्वा शिष्यपरिष-रसमेतो विधिना प्रतिक्रान्तः सम्यग् मार्ग प्रपन्नो गुर्वन्तिके विजहार ॥२३५५॥

D. C. When Tişyagupta was thus inspired and instructed by the Śrāvaka Mitraśrī he was forgiven and awarded the full lumps of *bhojana* etc. by Mitraśrī. Tişyagupta, then, saluted the preceptor, and returned with his pupils.

End of the Discussion with the Second Nihnava.



Chapter IV

॥ तृतीयनिद्ववक्तब्यता ॥

Discussion with the Third Nihnava.

भय तृतीयनिक्रववक्तव्यतामाह— चउदस दो बाससया तइआ सिद्धिंगयस्स वीरस्स । तो अव्वत्तयदिट्टी सेयविआए समुप्पण्णा ॥६१॥२३५६॥

61. Caudasa do vāsasayā taiā siddhim gayassa Vīrassa | To Avvattayadiţthī Seyaviāe samuppaņņā. (2356).

[चतुर्दश द्वे वर्षशते तदा सिद्धिं गतस्य वीरस्य । ततोऽव्यक्तकदृष्टिः श्वेतविकायां समुत्पन्ना ॥६१॥२३५६॥

61. Caturdaśa dve varsaśate tadā siddhim gatasya Vīrasya | Tato'vyaktakadristih Śvetavikāyām samutpannā (2356)]

Trans. 61. When two hundred and fourteen years (had passed) since the Nirvāna of Śramana Bhagavān Mahavīra, the theory of Avyaktas came into existence in (the city of) Śvetavikā. 2356.

टीका-६१ चतुर्दञाधिकवर्षञतद्वयं तदा श्रीमन्महावीरस्य सिद्धिगतस्यासीत्। ततोऽघ्यक्ताभिधाननिह्ववानां दृष्टिर्द्ञनरूपा श्वेतविकायां नगर्यो सम्रुत्पन्नेति ॥२३५६॥

Here is the story of the production of this theory .--सेयविपोलासाढे जोगे तदिवसहिययसूल्रे य । सोहम्मनलिणिगुम्मे रायगिहे मूरियबलभद्दे ॥६२॥२३५७॥ [Vāda

62. Seyavipolāsādhe joge taddivasahiyayasūle ya I Sohamma Naliņigumme Rāyagihe Mariyabalabhadde (2357)

[श्वेतविकापौलाषाढे योंगे तद्दिवसहृदयग्रूले च । सौधर्मनलिनीगुल्मे राजगृहे मौर्यबलभद्रः ॥६२॥२३५७॥

62. Śvetavikāpaulāṣāḍhe yoge taddivasahridayaśule ca I Saudharma Nalinīgulme Rājagrihe MauryaBalabhadrah (2357)]

Trans. 62. While teaching (the practice of) yogas in the Paulāṣāḍha (church) of (the city of) Śvetavikā, when the preceptor passed away to the Nalinīgulma (region) of the Saudharmās¹ (as a result of) acute pains in his heart on the same day, Maurya Balabhadra brought them to the right path) in (the city of) Rājagriha. 2357.

टीका-६२ श्वेतविकाया नगर्याः पौरुाषाढचैत्य आर्याषाढनामान आचार्याः स्थिताः । तेषां च बद्दः शिष्या आगाढयोगान् प्रपन्नाः । अपरवाचनाचार्यासच्चे च त एवार्याषाढस्ररयस्तेषां वाचनाचार्यत्वं प्रतिपन्नाः । तथाविधकर्मविपाकतश्च ते तत्रैव दिवसे रजन्यां हृदयशुष्ठेन कालं कृत्वा सौधर्भदेवलोके नलिनीगुल्मविमाने देवत्वेनोत्पन्नाः । न च विज्ञाताः केनापि गच्छमध्ये । ततोऽवधिना प्राक्तन्व्य-तिकरं विज्ञाय साध्वनुकम्पया समागत्य तदेव शरीरमधिष्ठाप्योत्थाप्य च शेकास्तेन साधवः-यथा-वैरात्रिककालं गृहणीत । ततः कृतं साधुभिस्तथैव । श्रुतस्योदेश-सम्रुदेशा-ऽनुज्ञाश्च तदग्रतः कृताः । एवं दिव्यप्रभावतस्तेन देवेन तेषां साधूनां कालभङ्गादिविग्नं रक्षता शीघ्रमेव निस्तारिता योगाः । ततोऽनेन तच्छरीरं मुक्त्वा दिवं गच्छता प्रोक्ता साधवो; यथा-क्षमणीयं अदन्तैयदसंयतेन सता मयाऽऽत्मनो वन्दनादिकारिताश्चारित्रिणो यूयम् । अद्दं इग्रुकदिने कालं कृत्वा दिवं गतो युष्मदनुकम्पयाऽत्रागतः, निस्तारिताश्च भवतामागाढयोगाः । इत्याद्युक्त्वा क्षमयित्वा च स्वस्थानं गतः । ततस्ते साधवक्तच्छरीरकं परिष्ठाप्य चिन्तयन्ति अहो ! असंयतो बहुकालं वन्दितः । तदित्थमन्यत्रापि श्वद्वा, को

1. Region of the highest types of deities known as Saudharmas (For more details vide foot-note 3. verse 2307 Chapter II). बानाति-" कोऽपि संयतः, कोऽप्यसंयतो देवः ? इति "। सर्वस्याप्यवन्दनमेव श्रेयः, अन्यथा धसंयतवन्दनं मृषावादश्वस्थात् । इत्थं तथाविधगुल्कर्मोदयात् तेऽपरिणतमतयः साधवोऽव्यक्तमतं प्रतिपनाः परस्परं न वन्दन्ते । ततःस्थविरै-स्तेऽभिहिताः, यदि परस्मिन् सर्वत्र भवतां संदेहः, तर्हि येनोक्तम्-"देवोऽहम् " इति तत्रापि भवतां कथं न संदेहः ? 1- किं स देवोऽदेवो वा ? इति । यदि तेन खयमेव कथितं-" अहं देवः " तथा, देवरूपं च प्रत्यक्षत एव दृष्टम्, इतिं न तत्र संदेहः । इन्त ? यद्येवम्, तहिं य एवं कथयन्ति ''वयं साधवः" तथा, साधरूपं मत्यक्षत एव दृश्यते, तेषु कः साधुत्वसंदेहः, येन परस्परं यूयं न वन्दध्वे ? । न च साधुवचनातः देववचनं सत्यमिति छक्यते वक्तुम् । देववचनं हि क्रीडाद्यर्थ-मन्यश्रापि संमाव्यते, न तु साधुवचनम् , तद्विरतत्वात् तेषामिति । एवं च युक्ति-भिर्यावद् न प्रज्ञाप्यन्ते तावदुद्वाटय बाह्याः कृताः । पर्यटन्तश्च राजगृहनगरं गताः । तत्र च मौर्यवंश्वसंभूतो बलमद्रो नाम राजा । स च श्राद्धः । ततस्तेन ते विज्ञाता यथाऽव्यक्तवादिनो निह्ववा इह समायाता गुलशिलकचैत्ये तिष्ठन्ति । ततःखपुरुषान् प्रेष्य राजकूल आनायिताम्तेन ते कटकमर्देन मारणार्थ चानुवाताः । ततो हस्तिनि कटकेषु च तन्मर्दनार्थमानीतेषु तैः प्रोक्तम्-"राजन् ? वयं जानीमः श्रावकस्त्वम् " तत् कथमस्मान् श्रमणानित्थं मारयसि १। ततो राज्ञा मोकम्-"युष्मत्सिद्धान्तेनैव को जानाति किं श्रावकोऽहं न वा।" भवन्तो su कि चौराः, चारिकाः, अभिमरा ना ? इत्यपि को वेत्ति ? । " तैः प्रोक्तम्-'साधवी वयम्।' यद्येवम्, अव्यक्तवादितया किमिति परस्परमपि यथाज्येष्ठं बन्दनादिकं न इत्थ ? । इत्यादिनिष्ठुरैर्म्यदुभिश्च वचनैः प्रोक्तास्ते नरपतिना । ततः संयुद्धा लजिताथ निःश्वक्तिताः सन्मार्गं प्रतिपन्नाः । ततो राज्ञा प्रोक्तम्-" मंबतां संबोधनार्थमिदं मया सर्वमपि विहितम् " इति क्षमणीयमिति ॥२३५७॥

D. C. Ārya Āṣāḍhācārya was the preceptor of the Paulāṣādha church in the city of Śvetavikā. Many of his pupils learnt the practice of Āgāḍha yogas² under him. Āṣāḍhācārya was

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^{2.} In order to attain a highly-esteemed position of a perfect ascetic, the Jaina sādhus practise a peculiar type of penances known as "Yogodvahana." Āgādha yoga is one of the various processes of "Yogodvahana".

Nihnavavāda

thus their preceptor. On account of excessive strain taken by him in reading and teaching the practice of $\overline{A}g\overline{a}dha$ yoga, $\overline{A}rya$ $\overline{A}sadhac\overline{a}rya$ suffered from acute pain in his heart and he died on the same night. Consequently, he attained divine form in the Nalinīgulma vimān (region) of Saudharma deva-loka.

This was not known to any one in the temple. Then having known the past incident by Avadhi Jnāna³, Ārya Āṣāḍhācārya took compassion on the sādhus who were practising yogas and entered the same body. Immediately after that, he got up and asked the sādhus to proceed with their lessons of the second half of the night. Thus, the god in disguise of a preceptor taught the *Uddeśa* (aims) Samuddeśa (explanations) and Anujnā. (Commandment) of the Holy writ. Practices of all the stages

According to Patanjali, yoga is defined to be "the preventing of the modifications of *Citta* or the thinking principle (which modifications arise through the three Pramanas-Perception, Inference, and Verbal testimony-as well as through incorrect ascertainment, fancy, sleep, and recollection) by abhyāsa or the constant practice of keeping the mind in its unmodified state (clear as crystal when uncoloured by contact with other substances) and by vairagya or dispassion." This dispassion being obtained by pranidhana or devotedness to the Supreme Being, who is defined as a particular *purusa* or spirit unaffected by afflictions, works etc. The eight means or stages of Yoga or Mental Concentration are: 1. Yama (forbearance) 2. Niyama (religious observances) 3. Āsana (postures) 4. Prāņāyama (regulation of the breath) 5. Pratyāhāra (restraint of the senses) 6. Dhāranā (steadying of the mind) 7. Dhyāna (contemplation) 8. Samādhi (profound meditation, which according to the Bhagwad Gitā VI B. is to be practised by fixing the eyes on the tip of the nose. True Liberation is the cessation of matter and spirit or Kaivalya (isolation) the self-mortification and asceticism connects it closely with Buddhism and Jainism (Vide pp. 821-822 Sanskrit-English Dictionary by Sir Monier Williams).

3. Perception attained by means of concentraction of attention.

of yogas were completely taught in that way, saving thereby all the sādhus from the interruptions of time etc. by virtue of divine power. Finally, while going to heaven, after leaving the human body, he said to the sādhus "*A-samyata* (unrestrained) as I happen to be, I made you, who happen to be of high moral character, bow to me. Please pardon me for that act of mine. On the other day, I happened to meet with death and pass away to the heavenly regions, from where I condescended to come here out of sympathy for you and taught you all the practices of yoga." Having said so, he returned to his heavenly abode after being pardoned.

After his departure, sitting around his body, the sādhus began to think like this:- "Oh! an *a-samyata* (unrestrained) deity has been respected for a long time. The same could be doubted in the case of others as well. For, who knows whether one is samyata or *a-samyata*? It is better, therefore, not to respect any body. By respecting an unrestrained deity, we would become liars." Consequently, short-witted as they were, all the sādhus resorted to indiscretion and did not even bow to each other as sādhus.

Then, some of the old and wise sthaviras tried to explain them the right thing. The following conversation took place between them and the Nihnavas.

STHAVIRAS:-If you entertain such a doubt with regard to each and every one in this world, then, why not doubt the asceticism of the deity himself, when he introduced himself as a deity to you?

Nihnavas:-There is no doubt about his being a deva, firstly because, he himself said that "I am a deity" and secondly because he was directly perceived as a *deva*.

Sthaviras:-The same will be the case with sādhus also. Those who say that, "We are sādhus" and those who are recognized as sādhus directly from their appearance, should also And, you cannot assert that the word of a *deva* is more trust-worthy than that of a $s\bar{a}$ *dhu*. A deva might tell a lie even for the sake of fun etc., but a $s\bar{a}$ *dhu* being completely averted from falsehood, would never tell a falsehood.

Sthaviras tried to persuade them in many other ways, but they were not convinced. Those Avyakta-vā'lins were, therefore, expelled from the Gaccha. Then, wandering here and there, they came to Rājagriha Nagara in course of time and stayed there in the Gunasila caitya (temple of an yaksa). King Balabhadra of the Maurya Dynasty was a devotee of Jaina Dharma. Sc, as soon as he came to know of the arrival of the Nihnavas of the Sceptical Type, he called them with a view to bring them to the right path. When they were brought to his palace, the king ordered them to be killed by crushing them under the feet of elephants. When the retinue of elephants was brought there, in order to crush them, the king was thus told by the nihnavas "O king ! you are a devotee of Jaina Dharma. We are also Jaina Śramanas. Then, why do you kill us?" The king replied: "According to your principle, who knows whether I am a srāvaka or not? And who knows if you are not thieves, spies or burglars?" The Nihnavas said "We are certainly Sadhus and none else." The king replied :- If you are real Sādhus why do'n't you respect the elderly sādhus in your group?"

On hearing such harsh and tender words of the king, the Nihnavas were roused and brought to the right path with all their doubts removed.

Finally, the king said apologetically that he had to do all that for the benevolent purpose of rousing them from ignorance and hence he craved their pardon, which was duly awarded. 62. (2357).

The same story is now described by the author in details :-

गुरुणा देवीमूएण समलरूवेण वाइया सीसा । सब्भावे परिकहिए अव्वत्तयदिट्टिणो जाया ॥६३॥२३५८॥

63. Guruņā devībhueņa samaņaruveņa vāiyā sīsā. Sabbhāve parikahie Avvattayaditthiņo jāyā. 2358.

[गुरुणा देवीभूतेन अमणरूपेण वादिताः शिष्याः । सद्भावे परिकथितेऽव्यक्तकदृष्टयो जाताः ॥६३॥२३५८॥

63. Guruņā devībhutena śramaņarupeņa vāditāh śisyāh (Sadbhāve parikathite'vyaktaka drstayo jātāņ 63 (2358)]

Trans. 63. The pupils were taught by the preceptor in disguise of a monk after he had attained divinity. When the fact was told (by him), they became sceptical. 2358.

They began to raise doubts in this way:-

को जाणइ किं साहू देवो वा तो न वंदणिजो़ ति। होजाऽसंजयनमणं होज मुसावायममुगो ति ॥६४॥२३५९॥

64. Ko jāņai kim sāhū devo vā to na vandaņijjo tti 1 Hojjā'saņjayanamaņam hojja musāvāyamamugo tti (2359).

[को जानाति किं साधुर्देवो वा ततो न वन्दनीय इति । भवेदसंयतनमनं भवेद् मुषावादोऽमुक इति ॥६४॥२३५९॥

64. Ko janāti kim ṣādhurdevo vā tato na vandanīya iti I Bhavedasaṃyatanamanam bhaved mriṣāvādo'muka iti (2359)]

Trans. 64. Who knows whether a (particular) person is a sadhu or a deity? He is, therefore, not worthy of bowings. (Because otherwise) either there would be bowing to an unrestrained (person) or there would be false presumption. (2359).

टीका-६४ को जानाति-किमयं साधुवेषधारी साधुदेवो वा ? नास्त्येवात्र निश्चय इत्यर्थः । न च वक्तव्यम्-साधुरेवायम् , तद्वेष-समाचारदर्शनात् , भवा-निव । आर्याषाढदेवेऽपि साधुवेष-समाचारदर्शनेनानैकान्तिकत्वात् । तस्माद् न कोऽपि वन्दनीयः, संशयविषयत्वात् । यदि पुनर्वन्द्यते, तदाऽऽर्याषाढदेववन्दनं स्यात् । तदम्रुको ववीति-भाषणे च मृषावादः स्यादिति ।।२३५९॥

D. C. On seeing a person bearing the attire of a sādhu, one cannot decide whether he is a real monk or a deity in disguise of sādhu. It is, therefore, not proper to bow to any one on account of his being the object of doubt. For, if he is respected, it would turn out to be a bowing to an a-saymata (unrestrained) person like Aṣāḍha-deva; otherwise, while saying that "he is an ascetic, we would resort to falsehood 64 (2359).

The sthaviras reply to the arguments of the Avyakta Nihnavas as follows:---

थेरवयणं जइ परे संदेहो किं सुरो त्ति साहु त्ति ?। देवे कहं न संका किं सो देवो न देवो त्ति ? ॥६५॥२३६०॥ तेण कहियं ति व मई देवोऽहं रूवदरिसणाओ य । साहु त्ति अहं कहिए समाणरूवम्मि का संका ? ॥६६॥२३६१॥ देवस्स व किं वयणं सचं ति न साहुरूवधारिस्स । न परोप्परं पि वन्दह जं जाणन्ता वि जयउ त्ति ॥६७॥२३६२॥

- 65. Thèravayanam jai pare sandeho kim suro tti sāhu tti ? Deve kaham na sankā kim so devo na devo tti (2360)
- 66. Teņa kahiyam ti va maī devo'ham rūvadarisaņāo ya Sāhu tti aham kahie samāņarūvammi kā sankā ? (2361)
- 67. Devassa va kim vayanam saccam ti na sähuravadhärissa i Na paropparam pi vandaha jam jänantä vi jayau tti (2362)

[स्थविरवचनं यदि परे सन्देहः किं सुर इति साधुरिति १। देवे कथं न दाङ्का किं स देवो न देव इति १॥६५॥२३६०॥

तेन कथितमिति वा मतिर्देवोऽहं रूपदर्शनाच । साधुरिति कथं कथिते समानरूपे का शङ्का ? ॥६६॥२३६१॥ देवस्य वा किं वचनं सत्यमिति न साधुरूपधारिणः । न परस्परमपीह वन्दध्वे यज्जानन्तोऽपि यतय इति ॥६७॥२३६२॥

- 65. Sthavira vacanam yadi pare sandehah kim sura iti sādhuriti? Deve katham na śańkā kim sa devo na deva iti ? (2360)
- 66. Tena kathitamiti vā matirdevo'ham ropadarsanācea) Sādhuriti katham kathite samānarūpe kā sankā ? (2361)
- 57. Devasya vā kim vacanam satyamiti na sādhuropadhārirah Na parasparamapīha vandadhve yajjānanto'pi yataya iti. (2362)]

Trans. 65-66-67. Sthaviras say that (if you entertain doubt about another (person) as to whether he is a deity or a sādhu, why not question the genuinity of a deity (also) as to whether he is a genuine deity or not? If it is your belief that since he himself says that "I am a deity" and since we saw the form of a deity, we did not doubt its validity; why should you raise the doubt when it is said that "I am a sādhu" and when the same body is (directly) perceived? Or, is it, because, the word of a deity is true and that of an ascetic not so, that you do not salute each other in spite of your knowing that "this is an ascetic." 2360-2361-2362.

If you entertain doubts even about ascetics, who are *pratya-kşa*, then, there is all the more reason for your doubt about *jiva* etc. that are *parokşa*:—

जीवाइपयत्थेसु य सुहुम-व्ववहिय-विगिटहरूवेसु। अखंलपरोक्खेसु य किह न जिणाइसु भे संका १॥६८॥२३६३॥

68. Jīvāipayatthesu ya suhuma-vvavahiya-vigiţţharūvesu i Accantaparokkhesu ya kiha na Jiņāisu bhe saṅkā ? (2363)

[जीवादिपदार्थेषु च सूक्ष्य-व्यवहित-बिकृष्टरूपेषु। अत्यन्तपरोक्षेषु च कथं न जिनादिषु भवतां राङ्का ? ॥६८॥२३६३॥

68. Jīvādipadārthesu ca suksma-vyavahita-vikristarupesu | Atyantaparoksesu ca katham na Jinādisu bhavatām śańka ? (2363)] Vāda]

Trans. 68. And, why should there be no doubt about objects such as jiva etc. whose bodies are subtle, obscure and drawn asunder, as well as, about Tirthankaras etc. that are extremely remote (from the physical sight)? 68 (2363)

Here if it is argued that there cannot be any doubt about Jiva etc. on the authority of the words of Jinas, the same will be the case with ascetics also—

तव्वयणाओ व मई नणु तव्वयणे सुसाहुविसो सि । आलय-विहार-समिओ समणोऽये वंदणिजी सि ॥६९॥२३६४॥

69. Tavvayaņāo va maī naņu tavvayaņe susāhuvitto tti Ālaya-vihāra-samio samaņo'yam vandaņijjo tti (2364)

[तद्वचनाद् वा मतिर्ननु तद्वचने सुसाधुश्वत्त इति । आलय-विहारसमेतः अमणोऽयं वन्दनीय इति ॥६९॥२३६४॥

69. Tadvacanād vā matirnanu tadvacane susādhuvritta iti i Ālaya-vihārasametaņ śramaņo'yam vahdanīya iti (2364)]

Trans. 69. Or, if this belief is held (on the authority of) His words^{*}, then according to his words, a devôted having (proper) dwelling and monastic establishment, and possessing right conduct of a (real) saint, is definitely worthy of bowings. 2364.

टीका-६९ अथ तद्वचनाज्जिनवचनाद् न जीवाद्यर्थेषु श्रद्धा । नतु यद्येवम्, तद्वचन इदमप्यस्ति यदुत-शोभनं साधुद्वत्तं अपणशीर्लं यस्यासौ सुसाधुद्वत्त इति हेतोः ''अपणोध्यम्'' इति निश्वयाद् वन्दनीयः । सुसाधुद्वत्तीर्धपे सं कथं ज्ञायते १ इत्याह-'' आलय-विहार-समिओ '' इति कृत्वा । उक्तंच-

आलयेणं विहारेणं ठाणा चैकमणेण य । सका सुविहियं नाउं भासावेणइएण य ॥१॥

इति ॥ २३६४॥

^{4.} i. e. Tîrthankara's.

D. C. If you say that you do not entertain doubt about the validity of jīva etc. on the authority of the words of Jinas, then, according to the Tīrthaňkaras, one who possesses right conduct of an ascetic, is a real sādhu worthy of respect. Here, if it is asked "How is a person of right conduct of a saint, recognized? The answer is-"By means of proper dwelling and monastic establishments, a real śramaņa is at once recognized.

It is said—

"Ālayeņam vihāreņam thāņā cankamaņeņa ya | Sakkā suvihiyam nāum bhāsāveņaieņa ya⁵ || 1 ||

A real śramaņa (saint) is known from his ālaya (dwelling) vihāra (monastic establishments) movements from one place to another and courteous language]. 69 (2364)

जह वा जिणिंदपडिमं जिणगुणरहियं ति जाणमाणा वि। परिणामविसुद्धत्थं वंदह तह किं न साधुं पि ? ॥७०॥२३६५॥ हुज्ज न वा साहुत्तं जइरूवे नत्थि चेव पडिमाए। सा कीस वंदणिज्जा जहरूवे कीस पडिसेहो ? ॥७१॥२३६६॥

- 70. Jaha vä Jiņindapadimam Jiņaguņarahiyam ti jāņamāņā vi l Pariņāmavisuddhattham vandaha taha kim na sādhum pi ? (2365)
- 71. Hujja na vā sāhuttam jairūve natthi ceva padimāc i Sā kīsa vandaņijjī jairāve kīsa padiseho? (2366)

[यथा वा जिनेन्द्रप्रतिमां जिनगुणरहितामिति जानन्तोऽपि । परिणामविद्युद्धयर्थं वन्दध्वे तथा किं न साधुमपि १ ॥७०॥२३६५॥

भवेद् न वा साधुत्वं यतिरूपे नास्त्येव प्रतिमायाम् । सा कस्माद् वन्दनीया यतिरूपे कस्मात् प्रतिषेधः ॥७१॥२३६६॥

5. This verse is taken from the Avaśyaka-niryukti Vide Verse 80. Vandanaka Niryukti in the Avaśyaka-Niryukti. Also vide p. 529 v. 1148. Avaśyaka sūtra with the commentary of Haribhadra Sūri Part II. Agamodaya Samiti Edition)

Vāda]

- 70. Yathā vā Jinendrapratimām Jinaguņarahitāmiti jānanto'pi i Pariņāmaviśuddhyartham vandadhve tathā kim na sādhumapi ? (2365)
- 71. Bhaved na vä sädhutvam yatirope nästyeva pratimäyäm i Sä kasmäd vandaniyä, yatirope kasmat pratisedhah (2366)]

Trans. 70-71. Or, just as you worship the image of a Tirthankara for the sake of blissful result in spite of your knowing that the image of Tirthankara has no qualities of the Tirthankara, in the same way, why (should you) not respect a sādhu also? In the form of an ascetic, (real) qualities of a sādhu may or may not be (found). But that⁶ is altogether absent in the image. Why is the image, then, taken as worthy of worship, and what makes the form of an ascetic unworthy of respects? 2365-2366.

टीका-७०-७१ सुगमे, नवरं पथमगाथायां प्रतिमायाः साधुरूपेण सद्द वन्दनीयत्वे साम्यग्रुक्तम् । द्वितीयगाथायां तु साधुरूपे विशेषं दर्शयति-यतिरूपे प्राणिनि साधुत्वं भवेद् न वा १ इति संदिग्धमेव । प्रतिमायां तु जिनत्वं नास्त्ये-वेति निश्चयः । ततः किमिति सा वन्दनीया ?, यतिरूपे च किमिति वन्दन प्रतिषेध्रः १ ॥२३६५-२३६६॥

The opponent's answer is-

असंजयजइरूवे पावाणुमई मई न पडिमाए। नणु देवाणुगयाए पडिमाए वि हुज्ज सो दोसो ॥७२॥२३६७॥

72. Asanjayajairave pāvāņumaī maī na padimāe | Naņu devāņugayāe padimāe vi hujja so doso (2367)

[असंयतयतिरूपे पापानुमतिर्मतिर्न प्रतिमायाम् । ननु देवानुगतायां प्रतिमायामपि अवेत् स दोषः ॥७२॥२३६७॥

72. Asamyatayatirūpe pāpānumatirmatirna pratimāyām | Nanu devāņugatāyām pratimāyāmapi bhavet sa dosah (2367)]

6. Quality of a Tirthankara.

टीका-७२-अधैवंभूता मतिः परस्य भवेत्-असंयतदेवाँधिष्ठितै यतिँरूँपे वन्धमाने तद्रतासंयमरूपपापानुमतिर्भवति, न त्वसौ प्रतिमायाम् । अत्रीच्यते-ननु देवताधिष्ठितप्रतिमायामप्ययमनुमतिलक्षणो दोषो भवेदेवेति ॥२३६७॥ D. C.

Nihnavas.—While bowing to an a-samyata (unrestrained) deity in disguise of an ascetic, the fault of assenting to the sin of unrestraint would be committed. But that does not happen in case of worshipping an image of a Tirthankara.

Sthaviras:-Even in case of an image inspired by a god or a Tirthankara, the same fault of assenting to the sin would certainly be committed. 72 (2367)

अह पडिमाए न दोसो जिणबुद्धीए नमओ विसुद्धस्स । तो जइरूवं नमओ जइबुद्धीए कहं दोसो १ ॥७३॥२३६८॥

73. Aha padimāe na doso Jiņabuddīe namao visuddhassa (To jairavam namao jaibuddhīe kaham doso? (2368)

[अथ प्रतिमायां न दोषो जिनबुद्ध्या नमतो विद्युद्धस्य । ततो यतिरूपं नमतो यतिबुद्ध्या कथं दोषः ॥७३॥२३६८॥

73. Atha pratimāyām na doso Jinabuddhyā namato visuddhasya! Tato yatirūpam namato yatibuddhyā katham dosah (2368)]

Trans. 73. If there is no fault in case of one who bows to an image taking it sincerely as a Tirtrankara, then, how would a fault arise in case of one who bows to an ascetic taking him sincerely as an asectic? 2368.

टीका-७३ अथ प्रतिमायां नायमनुमतिलक्षणो दोषः। किं कुर्वनः १। नमस्यतः । कया १ । जिनबुद्धचा । कथंभूतस्य १ । विश्वद्भस्य-विश्वद्धाध्यवसा-यस्य । यद्येवम् , ततो यतिबुद्धचा यतिरूपं विश्वद्भस्य नमस्यतः को दोपः, येन भवन्तः परस्परं न वन्दन्ते १ । अत्रापरःकश्चिदाह--यद्येवम् , लिङ्गमात्रधारिणं पार्श्वस्थादिकमपि यतिबुद्धचा विश्वद्भस्य नमस्यतो न दोषः । तदयुक्तम्-पार्श्व स्थादीनां सम्यग्यतिरूपस्याप्यभावात् । तद्भावश्व '' आलष्णं विद्यारेण '' इत्यादियतिलिङ्गस्यानुपलम्भात् । ततः प्रत्यक्षदोषवतःपार्श्वस्थादीन् वन्दमानस्य तत् सावद्यानुज्ञालक्षणो दोष एव । उक्तं च-

जइचेलं बगर्लिगं जाणंतस्स नमत्रो हवइ दोसो । निद्धंधसं य नाऊण वंदमाणे धुवो दोसो ॥ १ ॥

इत्यादि । प्रतिमायास्तु दोषाचरणाभावात् तद्वन्दने सावद्यानुज्ञाऽभावतो न दोष इति ॥२३६८॥

D. C.

Nihnavas:-The fault of assenting to the evil quality will not arise in case of bowing to an image of a Tirthankara with sincere apprehension of a Tirthankara in the image.

Sthaviras: —If it is so, what harm is there in case of one bowing to a ascetic with the sincere apprehension of a sādhu in him, that you do not even respect each other as ascetics ?

Nihnavas:—If it is so, there would be no harm even in bowing to his own companion etc. with the sincere apprehension of an ascetic in him.

Sthaviras:—That is not proper, companions etc. do not actually bear even a proper appearance of an ascetic. Nor are the actual symbols such as $\bar{a}laya$, vihāra etc. apprepended in him. Hence, one who bows to companions etc. that are clearly unworthy, commits the fault of assenting to the $s\bar{a}vadya^{\dagger}$ (censurable) resolution of an ascetic in them. It is said-

Jaicelam bagalingam jāņantassa namao havai doso Niddhamdhasam ya nāsņa vandamāņe dhuvo doso 1:1118

7. Sāvadya (censurable) Niravadya (blameless)

8. This verse is also quoted from Avaśyaka Niryukti vide verse 65, Vandanka-niryukti in the Avaśyaka Niryukti. Also vide page 526 verse 1137, Avaśyaka Satra with the commentary of Śrimad Haribhadra Sari Part II.

There seems to be a slight alteration in the text of this

And.

अह पडिमं पि न वंदह देवासंकाइ तो न घेत्तव्वा। आहारो-वहि-सज्जा मा देवकया भवेज्ज ण्हु ॥७४॥२३६९॥

74. Aha padimam pi na vandaha deväsankäi to na ghettavväi Ähäro-vahi-sajjä mä devakayä bhavejja nhu (2369)

[अथ प्रतिमामपि न वन्दध्वे देवाशङ्कया ततो न ग्रहीतव्याः। आहारो-पधि-शय्या मा देवकृता भवेयुर्नु ॥७४॥२३६९॥

74. Atha pratimāmapi na vandadhve devāśankayā tato na grahitavyāh I Āhāro-padhi-śayyā mā devakritā bhaveyurnu (2369).

Trans. 74. If you do not respect an image (also) thinking it to be (that of) a deva, then, thinking that food, accessory articles, bed etc. might have been created by gods, they should not be taken (at all). 2369.

टीका-७४ अथ प्रतिमामपि न वन्दध्वे यूयम्, हन्त ! यद्येवं शङ्काचारी भवान्, तर्हि मा देवकृता भवेयुरित्याहारो-पधि-शय्यादयोऽपि न प्राह्या इति॥२३६९॥

D. C. If you become sceptical to the extent of not bowing even to an image, you should not take food, accessory articles, bed etc. as they, too, might have been created by gods. 74 (2369)

verse. Original reading of the verse found in the niryukti is this-

Jaha velambagalingam jānantassa namao havai doso

Niddhamdhasam iya nauna vandamāne dhuvo doso—

a, Instead of "Jaicelam bagalingam b, Instead of "ya."

[One who bows to a wicked and hypocrite ascetic, in spite of his knowing him to be such, would commit a fault. Having once known the breach of trust, if one bows to him, he is definitely at fault.]

But in case of worshipping an image, no such fault would arise in absence of sāvadyānujnā. 73 (2368)

And too much of sceptical attitude will result in the negation of the whole $vyavah\bar{a}ra$ in this way—

को जाणइ किं भत्तं किमओ किं पाणयं जलं मद्यम् । किमलाबु माणिक्नं किं सप्पो चीवरं हारो ? ॥७५॥२३७०॥

को जाणइ किं सुद्धं किमसुद्धं किं सजीवं निज्जीवं । किं भक्खं किमभक्खं पत्तमभक्खं तओ सब्वं ॥७६॥२३७१॥

- 75. Ko jāņai kim bhattam kimao kim pāņayam jalam madyam | Kimalābu māņikkam kim sappo cīvaram hāro? (2370)
- 76. Ko jāņai kim suddham kimasuddham kim sajīvam nijjīvam t Kim bhakkham kimabhakkham pattamabhakkham tao savvam (2371)

[को जानाति किं भक्तं क्रुमयः किं पानकं जलं मचम् । किमलाबु माणिक्यं किं सर्पश्चीवरं हारः १ ॥७५॥२३७०॥

को जानाति किं ग्रुद्धं किमग्नुद्धं किं सजीवं निर्जीवम् । किं भक्ष्यं किमभक्ष्यं प्राप्तमभक्ष्यं ततःसर्वम् ॥७६॥२३७१॥

- 75. Ko janati kim bhaktam krimayah kim pānakam jalam madyam i Kimalābu māņikyam kim sarpaścīvaram hārah? (2370)
- 76. Ko jānāti kim śuddham kimaśuddham kim sajīvam nirjīvam Kim bhaksyam kimabhaksyam prāptamabhaksyam tatah sarvam (2371)

Trans 75-76. Who knows whether a particular thing is food or a worm? Whether a drinking substance is water or wine? Whether one thing is a bottlegourd or a jewel? Whether (one thing is a serpent, a (piece of) garment or a necklace?

Who knows what is pure (and) what is impure, what is animate and what is inanimate, what is eatable and what is uneatable? Everything turns out to be uneatable in that respect. 2370-2371.

टीका-७५-७६ को जानाति किमिदं भक्तं कुमयो वा र्र इत्याद्याञ्चझायां भक्तादावपि कृम्यादिभ्रान्त्यनिवृत्तेः सर्वमभक्ष्यमेव प्राप्तं भवतः । तथा, अलाबु-चीवरादौ मणि-माणिक्य-सर्पादिभ्रान्त्य-निवृत्तेः सर्वमभोग्यं च प्राप्तमिति ॥२३७०-२३७१॥

D. C. Since you are not able to remove illusions of worms jewels, serpents etc in an article of food, bottle-gourd, garments etc. everything would become forbidden to you 75-76 (2370-71)

And,

जइणा वि न संवासो सेओ पमया-कुसीलसंकाए। होज गिही वि जइ त्ति य तस्सासीसा न दायव्वा 1,७७॥२३७२॥ न य सो दिक्खेयव्वो भव्वोऽभव्वो त्ति जेण को मुणइ ?। चोरु त्ति चारिउ त्ति य होइ जओ परदारगामि त्ति ? ॥७८॥२३७३॥ को जाणइ को सीसो को व गुरू तो न तब्विसेसो वि । गज्झो न चोवएसो को जाणइ सच्चमल्टियं ति ? ॥७९॥२३७४॥ किं बहुणा सब्वं चिय संदिद्धं जिणमयं जिर्णिदा य । परलोय-सग्ग-मोक्खा दिक्खाए किमत्थमारंभो ? ॥८०॥२३७४॥ अह संति जिण्वारिंदा तब्वयणाओ य सब्वपडिवत्ती । तो तब्वयणाउ चिय जहवंदणयं कहं न मयं ? ॥८१॥२३७६॥

- 77. Jaiņā vi na saņvāso seo pamayā-kusīlasankāe i Hojja gihī vi jai tti ya tassāsīsā na dāyavvā. (2372)
- 78. Na ya so dikkheyavvo bhavvo'bhavvo tti jeņa ko muņai?! Coru tti cāriu tti ya hoi jao paradāragāmi tti? (2373)
- 79. Ko janaī ko sīso ko va gurū to na tavviseso vi Gajjho na covaeso ko jānai saccamaliyam ti? (2374)
- 80. Kim bahuņā savvam ciya sandiddham Jiņamayam Jiņindā yaı Paraloya-sagga-mokkhā dikkhāe kimatthamārambho? (2375)
- 81. Aha sarti Jinavarindā tavvayanāo ya savvapadivattī 1 To tavvayanāu ceiya jaivandanayam kaham na mayam ? (2376)

[Vāda

[यतिनापि न संवासःश्रेयः प्रमदा-कुद्दीऌदाङ्कया । भवेद् गृद्यपि यतिरिति च तस्माआद्दीर्न दातव्या ॥७७॥२३७२॥ न च स दीक्षितव्यो भव्योऽभव्य इति येन को जानाति ? । चौर इति चारिक इति च भवति यको परदारगामीति ?॥७८॥२३७३॥

को जानाति कःशिष्यःको वा गुरुस्ततो न तद्विरोषोऽपि । ग्राद्यो न चोपदेशःको जानाति सत्यमलीकमिति ? ॥७९॥२३७४॥ किं बहुना सर्वमेव संदिग्धं जिनमंतं जिनेन्द्राश्च । परलोक-स्वर्ग-मोक्षा दीक्षायाः किमर्थमारम्भः ? ॥८०॥२३७५॥ अथ सन्ति जिनवरेन्द्रास्तद्वचनाच सर्वप्रतिपत्तिः । ततस्तद्वचनादेव यतिवन्दनकं कथं न मतम् ? ॥८१॥२३७६॥

- 77. Yatināpi na samvāsah śreyah pramadākuśīlasankayā i Bhaved grihyapi yatiriti ca tasmā āśirna dātavyā (2372)
- 78. Na ca sa dīkšatavyo bhavyo'bhavya iti yena ko jānāti?! Caura iti cārika iti ca bhavati yako paradāragāmīti? (2373)
- 79. Ko jānāti kah śiṣyaḥ ko vā gurustato na tadviśeṣo'pi Grāhyo na copadeśah ko jānāti satyamalīkamiti? (2374)
- 80. Kim bahunā sarvameva sandigdham jinamatam jinendrāsca i Paraloka-Svarga-Mokṣā dīkṣāyāḥ kim arthamārambhaḥ? (2375)
- 81. Atha santi jinavarendrāstadvacanācea sarvapratipattiķ Tatastad vacanādeva yati vandanakam katham na matam ? (2376)

Trans. 77-78-79-80-81. Doubting the misconduct of woman, it is not advisable even for an ascetic to associate (with them). Presuming that a householder may even happen to be an ascetic, blessing should not be conferred (upon him). Nobody should be (allowed to be) initiated as a pupil. For, who knows whether one is meritorious or wicked, a thief, a spy or a burgler? (And) who knows as to who is a pupil and who is the preceptor? So, there is no distinction between them also, His sermon is also not acceptable, because, who knows whether it is true or false? What more (should be said)? Tirthankaras, their principles, the other (future) world, heaven, Final Emancipation-all this is uncertain according to you. Then, what is the use of accepting diksā (at all)? If you believe in the Tirthankara and if you take everything as existing on the authority of His words, why should bowing to an ascetic oe not accepted on the same authority? (2372-2376)

टीका-७७-७८-७९-८०-८१ सर्वा अपिप्रकटार्थाः । नवरं "जइणा वि न संवासो " इत्यादिनाऽभ्युपगमविरोधो दशितः । अथ सन्ति जिनवरेन्द्राः, तद्ववचनसिद्धत्वात् तेषां, तद्वचनादेव च सर्वस्यापि परलोक-स्वर्ग-मोक्षार्देः भतिपत्तिर्भवति; एवं तर्हि तद्वचनादेव यतिवन्दनमपि कस्माद् न संमतम् ? इति ॥२३७२॥२३७३॥२३७४॥२३७५॥२३७६॥

D. C. If according to you, Tirthankara exists, and if you' believe that the existence of all objects including, paraloka (future world) Svarga (heaven) Moksa (Final Emancipation) etc. is approved by him, there is no reason why the act of bowing to ascetics be not approved by him. 77-81 (2372-2376).

Moreover,

जइ जिणमयं पमाणं मुणि त्ति तो धज्झकरणपरिसुद्धं। देवं पि वन्दमाणो विसुद्धभावो विसुद्धो त्ति ॥८२॥२३७७॥

82. Jai Jinamayam pamānam muņi to bajjhakarana-parisuddham Devam pi vandamāno visuddhabhāvo visuddho tti (2377)

[यदि जिनमतं प्रमाणं मुनिरिति ततो बाद्यकरणपरिद्युद्धम् । देवमपि वन्दमानो बिद्युद्धभावो विद्युद्ध इति ॥८२॥२३७७॥

82. Yadi jinamatam pramāņam muniriti tato bāhyakaraņa pariśuddham (

Devamapi vandamano visuddhabhavo visuddha iti (2377)]

Trans. 82 If you take the principles of the Tīrthaňkaras as authentic, then even, he who bows to a god (appearing as) purified by external means apprehending him sincerely as a sage, will be guiltless (2377).

टीका-८२ यदि जिनमतं भवतां प्रमाणम् , तर्हि " ग्रुनिः" इत्यनया बुद्धया आरूय-विद्यारादि बाह्यकरणपरिश्चद्धं देवमपि-अमरमपि वन्दमानो, विश्चद्ध-भावो भवेद् दोषरहितो विश्चद्ध एव । उक्तं चागमे-परमरहस्समिसीणं समत्तगणिपिडगभवियसाराणं । परिणामियं पमाणं निच्छयमवलंबमाणाणं ॥ १॥ इत्यादि ॥२३७७॥

D. C. If you really follow the principles of the Tirthankaras, you shall have to accept even those who bow to a god who appears purified only externally on account of $\bar{a}laya$, vih $\bar{a}ra$ etc. taking him to be a sage with a sincere heart, as guiltless.

For, it is said in the Agamas-

"Parama rahassamisīņam samatta gaņipidaga bhaviya sārāņam Pariņāmiyam pamāņam nicchayamavalambamāņāņam "

[It is a great secret of sages who (look upon) the (gemlike) treasure-box of the preceptor (the entire (collection) of the twelve Angas as auspicious wealth, and a trust worthy authority for ascetics who depend on Niścaya] 82 (2377)

Or,

जह वा सो जइरू वो दिट्टो तह कित्तिया सुरा अन्ने ? । तुब्भेहिं दिट्ठपुव्वा सव्वत्थापचओ जं मे ॥८३॥२३७८॥

83. Jaha vā so jairūvo dițțho taha kittiyā surā anne ?! Tubbhehim dițțhapuvvā savvatthāpacçao jam bhe (2378)

[यदि वा स यतिरूपो दृष्ठस्तथा कियन्तः सुरा अन्ये ?। युष्माभिईष्टपूर्वाः सर्वत्राप्रत्ययो यद् भवताम् ॥८३॥२३७८॥

83. Yadi vä sa yatirüpo dristastatha kiyantah surā anye? Yusmabhirdristaporvāh sarvatrapratyayo yad bhavatām (2374)

Trans. 83. Like that (god) in the form of an ascetic seen by you, how many more gods were seen by you in the past, that you did not put trust in anything? (2378)

टीका-८३ 'वा' इत्यथवा, यथाऽऽर्याषाढदेवो यतिरूपधरोऽत्र दृष्टस्तथा किय-न्तःसुरास्ततोऽन्ये भवद्भिर्दृष्टपूर्वाः, यदेतावन्मात्रेणापि सर्वत्राप्रत्ययो "मे" भवताम् १। न हि कदाचित् कथश्चित् कचिदाश्वर्यकल्पे कर्सिमश्चित् तथाविघे दृष्टे सर्वत्र तथा भावाञङ्का युज्यत इति भावः । तस्माद् व्यवहारनयमाश्चित्य युक्तं भवतामन्योन्यवन्दनादिकम् । उक्तं च-

निच्छयओ दुन्नेयं को भावे कम्मि वद्वए समणो । संववहारो य जुज्जइ जो पुव्वडिओ चरितम्मि ॥ १ ॥ इत्यादि ॥२३७८॥

D. C. In addition to the preceptor Aṣāḍha-deva seen by you, in disguise of an ascetic, how many more gods did you see in the past that you entertain doubt about everything?

It is not really worthy of you to entertain doubt like that when some one is seen like that at some time, in some way. Even from practical point of view, it is worthy of you to respect each other.

For, it is said-

Nicchayao dunneyam ko bhāve kammi vaţţae samaņo Samvavahāro ya jujjai jo puvvaţţhio carittammi II

[It is difficult to know definitely as to which ascetic lives in which **ma** Bhāva (inclination of mind). But, one who is preeminent in character, is fit from practical point of view.] 83 (2378)

In support of the same argument, the author continues-

छउमत्थसमयचज्जा ववहारनयाणुसारिणी सब्वा । तं तह समायरंतो सुज्झइ सब्वो बिसुद्धमणो ॥८४॥२३७९॥

Vāda]

संववहारो वि वली जमसुद्धं पि गहियं सुयविहीए। कोवेइ न सब्वणू वंदइ य कयाइ छउमत्थं ॥८५॥२३८०॥

निच्छयववहारनओवणीयमिहं सासणं जिर्णिदाणं । एगयपरिचाओ मिच्छं संकादओ जे य ॥८६॥२३८१॥

जह जिणमयं पवज्जहं तो मा ववहारनयमयं मुयह । ववहारपरिचाए तित्थुच्छेओ जओऽवस्सं ॥८७॥२३८२॥

- 84. Chaumattha samaya cajjā vavahāranayāņusāriņī savvā | Tam taha samāyaranto sujjhai savvo visuddhamaņo (2379)
- 85. Samvavahāro vi balī jamasuddham pi gahiyam suyavihīe Kovei na savvaņņā vandai ya kayāi chaumattham (2380)
- 86. Nicehaya vavahāra naovaņīyamiha sāsaņam Jiņindāņam I Egayapariceāo miceham sankādao je ya (2381)
- 87. Jaha Jinamayam pavajjaha to mā vavahāra naya mayam muyaha i Vavahārapariccāe titthuccheo jao' vassam. (2382)

[छग्नस्थसमयचर्या व्यवहारनयानुसारिणी सर्वा । तां तथा समाचरन् शुध्यति सर्वो विशुद्धमनाः ॥८४॥॥२३७९॥

संव्यवहारोऽपि बली यदशुद्धमपि ग्रहीतं श्रुतविधिना । कोपयति न सर्वज्ञो वन्दते च कदाचिच्छग्रस्थम् ॥८५॥२३८०॥

निश्चयव्यवहारनयोपनीतमिह सासनं जिनेद्राणाम् । एकतरपरित्यागो मिथ्यात्वं राङ्कादयो ये च ॥८६॥२३८१॥

यदि जिनमतं प्रपद्यध्वं ततो मा व्यवहारनयमतं मुञ्चत । व्यवहारपरित्यागे तीर्थोच्छेदो यतोऽवइयम् ॥८७॥२३८२॥

84. Chadmasthasamaya caryā vyavahāranayānusāriņī sarvā I Tām tathā samācaran śudhyati sarvo viśuddhamanāķ (2379)

- 85. Samvyavahāro'pi balī yadaśuddhamapi grihītam śrutavidhinā i Kepayati na sarvagno vandate ca kadāciechadmastham (2380)
- 86. Niścayavyavahāra nayopanītamiha sāsanam Jinendrāņām I Ekatara parityāgo mithyātvam śańkādayo ye ca (2381)
- 87. Yadi Jinamatam prapadyadhvam tato mā vyavahāramaya matam muncata | Vyavahāra parityāge Tīrthocehedo yato'vaśyam (2382)]

Trans 84-85-86-87. The whole routine of the engagements of an ascetic incognito is based upon practical point of view One who follows it sincerely becomes entirely pureminded. Mutual intercourse (of respecting each other) is also practicable. For, in case an impure (object) is apprehended by the commandment of holy writ, or in case if one bows to an ascetic incognito, the Omniscient does not disallow it. The commandment of Tirthankaras is based upon both the positive and practical view-points. It is useless to leave either of them and entertain doubts etc. (So), if you accept the commandment of Tirthankaras, then do not abandon the theory based upon practical point of view. Because, in abandoning the practical point of view, the authority of the Tirtha (Śrī Sangha) itself will be exterminated (2379-2382)

टीका-८४-८५-८६-८७-चतस्रोऽपि सुगमाः । नवरं ''कोवेईत्यादि'' न कोपयति नाममाणीकरोति न परिहरति ग्रुङ्क्त इत्यर्थः । ''संकादउ इत्यादि'' येऽपि शङ्का-काङ्कादयस्ते हि मिथ्यात्वमिति संबन्धः ॥२३७९॥२३८०॥ २३८१॥२३८२॥

Then,

इय ते नासग्गाहं मुयंति जाहे बहुं पि भण्णंता । ता संघपरिचत्ता रायगिहे निवतिणा नाउं ॥८८॥२३८३॥

बलभद्देणग्घाया भणंति सावय त्रं तवस्सि त्ति । मा कुरु संकमसंकारुहेसु भणिए भणइ राया ॥८९॥२३८४॥

Vāda]

Nihnavavāda

को जाणइ के तुब्भे किं चोरा चारिआ अभिमर सि । संजयरूवच्छण्णा अज्जमहं भे विवाएमि ॥९०॥२३८५॥ नाण-चरियाहिं नजज्ज् समणोऽसमणो व कीस जाणंतो । तं सावय ! संदेहं करेसि भणिए निवो भणइ ॥९१॥२३८६॥ तुब्भं चिय न परुप्परं वीसंभो साहवो सि कह मज्झं । नाण-चरियाहिं जायइ चोराण वि किं न ता संति ? ॥९२॥२३८९॥ उवउत्तिओ भयाब य पब्वण्णा सब्वमयमसग्गाहे । निवखामियाभिगंतुं गुरुमूलं ते पडिकंता ॥९३॥२३८८॥

- 88. Iya te nāsaggāham muyanti jāhe bahum pi bhaņņantā | Tā sanghapariccattā Rāyagihe nīvatiņā nāum (2383)
- 89. Balabhaddeņagghāyā bhaņanti sāvaya vam tavassi tti (Mā kuru sankamasankāruhesu bhaņie bhaņai rāyā (2384)
- 90. Ko jāņai ke tubbhe kim corā cāriā abhimara tti Sanjayaravacchaņņā ajjamaham bhe vivāemi (2385)
- 91. Nāņa-cariyāhim najjai samaņo'samaņo va kīsa jāņanto (Tam sāvaya ! sandeham karesi bhaņie nivo bhaņai (2386)
- 92. Tubbham ciya na parupparam vīsambho sāhavo tti kaha majjham i Nāņa-cariyāhim jāyai corāņa vi kim na tā santi (2387)
- 93. Uvauttio bhayācca ya pavvaņņā savvamayamasaggāhe i Nivakhāmiyābhigantum gurumūlam te padikkantā (2388)

[इति ते नासद्ग्रहं मुर्श्वन्ति यावद् बह्वपि भण्यमानाः । तावत् संघपरित्यक्ता राजगृहे न्टपतिना ज्ञात्वा ॥८८॥२३८३॥ बलभद्रेणाघाता भणन्ति श्रावक ! वयं तपस्विन इति । मा कुरु राङ्कामराङ्कारुहेषु भणिते भणति राजा ॥८९॥२३८४॥ को जानाति के यूयं किं चौराश्चारिका अभिमरा इति । मंयमरूपच्छन्ना अद्याहं भवतो व्यापादयामि ॥९०॥२३८५॥

ज्ञान-चर्याभ्यां ज्ञायते अमणोऽभ्रमणो वा कस्माज्जानन् । त्वं अ.वक ! संदेहं करोषि भणिते चपो भणति ॥९१॥२३८६॥ युष्माकमेव न परस्परं विस्तम्भः साधव इति कथं मम । ज्ञान-चर्याभ्यां जायते चौराणामपि किं न ते स्तः १ ॥९२॥२३८७॥ उपपत्तितो भयाच प्रपन्नाः सर्वमतमसद्ग्राहे । चपक्षामिता अभिगत्य गुरुमूलं ते प्रतिक्रान्ताः ॥९३॥२३८८॥

- 88. Iti te nāsadgraham muncanti yāvad bahvapi bhaņyamānāķ I Tāvat sanghaparityaktā Rājagrihe nripatinā jnātvā (2383)
- 89. Balabhadreņāghrātā bhaņanti śravaka ! vayam tapasvina iti | Mā kuru śankāmaśankāruheṣu bhaṇite bhaṇati rājā (2384)
- 90. Ko jānāti ke yuyam kim caurāścārikā abhimarā iti I Samyamarupacchannā adyāham bhavato vyapādayāmi (2385)
- 91. Jnäna-caryābhyām jnāyate śramaņo'śramaņo va kasmajjānan i Tvam Śrāvaka ! sandeham karosi bhaņite nripo bhaņati (2386)
- 92. Yuṣmākameva na parasparam visrambhah sādhava iti katham mama I Jnāna-caryābhyām jāyate caurāņāmapi kim na te stah? (2387)
- 93. Upapattito bhayācca prapannāh sarvamatamasadgrāhe i Nripakṣāmitā abhigatya gurumūlam te pratikrāntāh (2388)]

Trans. 88-89-90-91-92-93. When they did not give up their mischievous belief in spite of their being persuaded in many ways, as stated above, they were expelled from the Sangha (Congregation). When called by king Balabhadra, who had come to know (of their arrival) at Rājagriha, they said "O Śravaka! We are ascetics. Please do not suspect things that are beyond suspicion." The king replied-" Who knows as to who you are? Who knows whether you are thieves, spies or burglars, in disguise of ascetics? I shall kill you to-day." "In spite of your knowing that an ascetic or otherwise, is known by (his) knowledge and character, O śrāvaka! why do you suspect us ?" When thus told, the king replied :-"When you yourselves do not rely upon each other that you are (ascetics), how can I trust you merely from knowledge and character? Could they not be (found) in thieves also? (Thus persuaded) by means of trick and fear, (at last) they resorted to the right belief. Having abandoned their wrong belief, and having forgiven the king (for his apparently harsh act), all of them returned to the original (school) of their preceptor (2383-2388).

टीका-८८-८९-९०-९१-९२-९३ सर्वा अप्युक्तार्थाः, सुगमाश्र । नवरं नृपतिना बलमद्रेण "ते आगताः" इति ज्ञात्वाऽऽघाता आहूताः "के यूयम् ?" इति प्रष्टाश्र भणन्ति-हे आवक ! इत्यादि । "नाण-चरियाहिं ति" ज्ञान-क्रियाभ्यां यो भवतामपि "साधवः" इति विस्तम्भः परस्परं नास्ति स ताभ्यां कथं मम जायते १ । अपि च, किं ते कृत्रिमे ज्ञान-क्रिये चौराणामपि न स्तो-न भवतः १ । इति ॥२३८३॥२३८४॥२३८५॥२३८६॥२३८७॥२३८८॥

D. C. When king Balabhadra came to know that the Nihnavas had come to Rājagriha, he called them, and asked them-"Who are you?" "O Śrāvaka! We are ascetics etc." was the reply. With the threatening of killing them by crushing under the feet of elephants, the king said "Since you do not trust each other as ascetics on the standards of jnāna and kriyā, how can I take you to be ascetics on those standards? Outward jnāna and kriyā could be found in thieves as well."

On hearing such words, they came to know their mistake and resorted to their original school of thought, abandoning their wrong theories for ever.

End of the Discussion with the Third (type of) Nihnava.



Chapter V

चतुर्थ निह्नव वक्तव्यता



Discussion with the Fourth Nihnava.

बीसा दो वाससया तइया सिद्धिं गयस्स वीरस्स । सामुच्छेइयदिही मिहिलपुरीए समुप्पन्ना ॥९४॥२३८९॥

94. Vīsā do vāsasayā taiyā Siddhim gayassa Vīrassa i Sāmuccheiyaditthī Mihilapurie samuppannā (2389)

[विंशत्या द्वे वर्षशते तदा सिद्धिं गतस्य वीरस्य । सामुच्छेदिकदृष्टिर्मिथिलापुर्यां समुत्पन्ना ॥९४॥२३८९॥

94. Viņšatyā dve varšašate tadā Siddhim gatasya Vīrasya | SāmucchedikadristirMithilāpuryām samutpannā (2389)]

Trans. 94. Theory of Samucchedikas came into existence in (the city of) Mithilä, two hundred and twenty years after Śramana Bhagavān Mahāvīra had attained Nirvāna 2389.

टीका-९४ विंग्नत्युत्तरं वर्षशतद्वयं तदा सिद्धिं गतस वीरसासीत् । ततोऽ-त्रान्तरे साम्रुच्छेदिकदृष्टिर्मिथिलापुर्यां सम्रुत्पन्नेति ॥२३८९॥

Here is the story of the production of this theory-

मिहिलाए लच्छिघरे महगिरि कोडिन्न आसमित्ते य। नेउणियाणुप्पवाए रायगिहे खंडरक्खा य ॥९५॥२३९०॥

95. Mihilāe Lacchighare Mahagiri Kodinna Asamitte ya l Neuņiyāņuppavāe Rāyagihe khaņdarakkhā ya (2390)

[मिथिलायां लक्ष्मीयहे महागिरिः कौण्डिन्य अश्वमित्रञ्च । नैपुणिकमनुप्रवादे राजयहे खण्डरक्षाञ्च ॥९५॥२३९०॥

95. Mithilāyām Laksmīgrihe Mahāgirih Kauņdinya Asvamitrasca | Naipuņikamanupravāde Rājagrihe khaņdaraksāsca (2890)]

Trans. 95. There was (an $\overline{A}c\overline{a}rya named$) Mahāgiri in (the caitya-temple of an Yakṣa-named) Laxmīgriha in (the city of) Mithîlā. There were Kauṇḍinya, and Aśvamitra also. (While studying) the Naipuṇika (portion) of Anupravada¹ they resorted to the principle of Samucchedas. And, Khaṇḍarakṣās brought them to the right path in (the city of) Rājagriha. 2390.

टीका-९५ मिथिलानगर्यां लक्ष्मीगृहे चैत्ये महागिरिखरीणां कौण्डिन्यो नाम शिष्यः स्थितः । तस्याप्यश्वमित्रो नाम शिष्योऽनुप्रवादाभिधानपूर्वे नैपुणिकं नाम वस्तु पठति स्म । तत्र च्छित्रच्छेदनकनयवक्तव्यतायामालापकाः समायाताः, तद्यथा-" पडुप्पन्नसमयनेरहया सच्वे वोच्छिजिस्संति, एवं जाव वेमाणिय चि, एवं बीयाइसमएसु दि वत्तव्वं " । अत्र तस्य चिकित्सा जाता, तद्यथा-प्रत्युत्पन्न-समयनारकाः सर्वेऽपि तावद् व्यवच्छेदं प्राप्स्यन्ति, ततश्व इतः सुकृत-दुष्कृत कर्मफलवेदनाम्, उत्पादानन्तरं सर्वजीवानां नाशात् ? इति । एवमादिस्समति-कल्पितं प्ररूपयन् वक्ष्यमाणभाष्ययुक्तिभिर्गुरुणा प्रज्ञाप्यमानोऽपि यावत् कथमपि न प्रज्ञाप्यते तत्त उद्धाय्य संघवाद्यः कृतः सम्रुच्छेदवादं प्ररूपयन् काम्पिल्यपुर-नगरं राजगृहापरनामकं गतः । तत्र च खण्डरक्षाभिधानाः आवकाः आसन्, ते श्रुलकपालाः । तैश्व ते निह्ववाः समागता विज्ञाता मारयितुं चारन्धाः । ततो मीतैरश्वमित्रादिभिस्ते प्रोक्ताः-" वयं न जानीमः-आवका यूयम् तत्किमस्मान् अमणान् सतो मारयथ ?" । ततस्तैरुक्तम्-" ये अमणास्ते युष्मत्सिदान्तेन

1. Like parvas, such as Virya-pravāda, Asti-Nāsti pravāda, Jnāna-pravāda, Satya-pravāda, Ātma-pravāda etc., Anu-pravāda seems to belong to one of them. It is an independent parva, treating of Kriyā, Jnāna etc.

2. Neuņiya or Naipuņika is the name of a chapter in the said Anu-pravāda pūrva.

सम्रुच्छिन्नाः, यूयं तु चोराद्यन्यतराः केचिदिति मारयामः "। ततस्तैर्भीतैर्म्रुक्तो निजाग्रहः, संबुद्धाश्व दत्तमिथ्यादुष्ठुता गता गुरुपादमूल इति ॥२३९०॥

D. C. Mahāgiri-suri the preceptor of the Lakṣmīgriha caitya in Mithilā, had a pupil named Kauṇḍinya, who, in turn had a pupil named Aśvamitra. While studying the Naipuṇika chapter of the Anu-pravāda purva, Aśvamitra came across the following statement in course of a discussion of the principles of *chinna* and chedanaka (Destroyed and destroyer):—

"Paduppanna samayaneraiyā savve vocchijjissanti i Evam jāva Vemāņiya tti, evam bīyāisamayesu vi vattavvam."

[All the Nārakas (inhabitants of hell) of the present convention will perish, and so will all the deities. The same should be understood of those of other conventions as well.]

On reading this, Aśvamitra conjectured that if all the Nārakas of the present convention were to perish, all other living beings would also meet destruction, as soon as they were born. Consequently, they would not be able to attain the rewards of good and evil deeds. In this way, Asvamitra began to draw conclusions on false conjectures. His preceptor (Kaundinya) tried to persuade him by means of various tricks (which will be told hereafter), but Asvamitra was not convinced at all. He was, then, expelled from the Sangha (Congregation). He, then, came to the city of Rājagriha (or Kāmpilyapuri). There the śrāvakas khandaraksas, who were posted as customs watchmen, began to beat Asvamitra and his fellow-Nihnavas all of a sudden. "Do you not know us? Why do you beat us even though you are śrāvakas" said the Nihnavas. "Those that are śramaņas have already perished according to your theory. You may be some other people like thieves etc. and hence, we are beating you," was the reply. Being afraid of this, they gave up their false notion, came to the right path and returned to the original school of their preceptor, after having excused the khandaraksas for the apparently harsh act. 95 (2390).

Now, the author explains the above-mentioned account of Niryukti in details —

नेउणमणुप्पवाए अहिज्जओ वत्थुमासमित्तस्स । एगसमयाइवोच्छेयसुत्तओ नासपडिवत्ती ॥९६॥२३९१॥ उप्पायाणंतरओ सब्वं चिय सब्वहा विणासि ति । गुरुवयणमेगनयमयमेयं मिच्छं न सब्वमयं ॥९७॥२३९२॥

- 96. Neuņamaņuppavāe ahijjao vatthumāsamittassa | Egasamayāi-voccheyasuttao nāsapadivattī (2391)
- 97. Uppāyāņantarao savvam ciya savvahā viņāsi tti i Guruvayaņameganayamayameyam miccham na savvamayam (2392)

[नैपुणमनुप्रवादेऽधीयानस्य वस्त्वश्वमित्रस्य । एकसमयादिव्यवच्छेदसूत्रतो नाद्यप्रतिपत्तिः ॥९६॥२३९१॥ उत्पादानन्तरतः सर्वमेव सर्वथा विनाद्यीति ॥ गुरुवचनमेकनयमतमेतद् मिथ्या न सर्वमतम् ॥९७॥२३९२॥

- 96. Naipuņamanupravāde'dhīyānasya vastvaśvamitrasya I Ekasamayādi-vyavacchedasatrato nāśapratipattiķ (2391)
- 97. Utpādānantaratah sarvameva sarvathā vināśīti (Guruvacanamekanayamatametad mithyā na sarvamatam (2392)

Trans. 96-97. While studying the Naipunika chapter in the Anupravāda (parva). Aśvamitra derived the theory of (entire) destruction viz-that everything is entirely perishable after its production from the rule (laying down) the destruction (of an object) at one time etc. It is the opinion of the preceptor that it is false, because it is approved only by one point of view but not by all. (2391-2392).

टीका-९६-९७ अनुप्रवादपूर्वमध्यगतं नैपुणं वस्त्वधीयानसाश्वमित्रस पूर्वोक्तादेकसमयादिव्यवच्छेदसूत्राद्ंनाशप्रतिपत्तिरुत्पन्ना । कोऽर्थः १ । इत्याइ-''उत्पादानन्तरमेव सर्वं वस्तु सर्वथा विनश्वररूपम्'' इत्येवंभूतो बोघः सम्रुत्पन्नः ।

अत्र प्रति-विधानार्थं गुरुवचनम्- ननु प्रतिसमयाविनाश्चित्वं वस्तूनाम् इत्येतदेक-स्यैव क्षणक्षयवादिन् ऋजुद्धत्रनयस्य मतम्, न तु सर्वनयमतम्, ततो मिथ्यात्व-मेवेति ॥२३९१॥२३९२॥

D. C. While studying the Naipunika portion of the Anupravāda parva, Aśvamitra derived a theory from the rule laying down the theory of destruction of objects of one convention that all objects of one convention vanish entirely-in all respects-as soon as they are produced. The preceptor persuaded him not to form such a wrong notion, and said "The theory of destructibility of objects at every moment, is laid down by the kṣaṇakṣaya-vādins only from one point of view viz-Rijusūtra naya³, but it is not true from all points of view. So, it is false.

Why is it Mithatva?

न हि सब्बहा बिणासोऽद्धापज्जायमेत्तनासम्मि । स-पर-पज्जायाणंतधम्मणो वत्थुणो जुत्तो ॥९८॥२३९३॥

98. Na hi savvaha viņāso'ddhāpajjāyamettanāsammi (Sa-para-pajjāyāṇantadhammaṇo' vatthuṇo jutto (2393)

[न हि सर्वथा विनाशोऽद्धापर्यायमात्रनाशे । स्व-पर-पर्यायानन्तधर्मणो वस्तुनो युक्तः ॥९८॥२३९३॥

98. Na hi sarvathā vināśo'ddhāparyāyamātranāše i Sva-para-paryāyānantadharmaņo vastuno yuktah (2393)]

Trans. 98. Merely at the end of a (particular) condition of time, it is not proper to admit entire destruction of an object that has innumerable qualities on account of its own, as well as, of other's $pary\bar{a}ya$ (form) 2393.

टीका-९८ न हि सर्वथैव वस्तुनो विनान्नो युक्तः । क सति ? । इत्याह-अद्वापर्यायमात्रनान्ने । तत्रेहाद्वा नारकादीनामुत्पत्ति-प्रथमादिसमयः, स एव

3. According to this system of philosophy an object is perceived in its present condition only.

पर्यायमात्रं तस्य नाशोऽपगमस्तस्मिन् सति । कथंभूतस्य वस्तुनः ? इत्याह-स्व-पर-पर्यायानन्तधर्मकस्य । इदम्रुक्तं भत्रति-यस्मित्रेत्र समये तद्नारकवस्तु प्रथमसमयनारकत्वेन सम्रुच्छिद्यते तस्मित्रेव समये द्वितीयसमयनारकत्वेनोत्पद्यते, जीवद्रव्यतया त्ववतिष्ठते । अतो यदि नामाद्वापर्यायमात्रम्रुच्छित्रम् , ततःसर्व-स्यापि वस्तुनः सम्रुच्छेदे किमायातम् , अनन्तपर्यायात्मकस्य वस्तुन एकपर्याय-मात्रोच्छेदे सर्वोच्छेदस्य दूरविरुद्धत्वात् ? इति ॥२३९३॥

D. C. It is not at all proper to accept the entire destruction of an object merely because a particular condition (say, bhata paryāya or past condition) of time⁴ is over. Every object is possessed of innumerable qualities, say for example, whenever the Nārakas perish as Nārakas of the first condition (paryāya) of time, they do not perish entirely but they are produced immediately as Nārkas of the second condition of time, and thus continue to stay on as living matter.

It is not proper, therefore, to believe that an object which has innumerable pary $\bar{a}yas$ or forms at differment conditions of time, vanishes entirely as soon as a particular pary $\bar{a}ya$ or condition of time is over. 98 (2393)

अह सुत्ताउ त्ति मई सुत्ते नणु सासयं पि निदिहं । बत्थुं दव्वद्वाए असासयं पज्जयद्वाए ॥९९॥२३९४॥

99. Aha suttāu tti maī sutte naņu sāsayam pi nidiķķham I Vatthum davvaķķhāe a-sāsayam pajjayaķthāe (2394)

[अथ सूत्रादिति मतिः सूत्रे ननु ज्ञाश्वतमपि निर्दिष्टम् । वस्तु द्रव्यार्थतयाऽज्ञाश्वतं पर्यायार्थतया ॥९९॥२३९४॥

99. Atha sutrāditi matih sutre nanu śaśvatamapi nirdistam (Vastu dravyārthatayā'śāśvatam paryāyārthatayā (2394)].

4. According to Jaina Terminology, the word 'Addhā' signifies Time. Addhāparyāya signifies the paryāya or condition of time. e. g. Variamāna paryāya (Present condition) Bhūta paryāya (Past condition) and Bhavisya paryāya (Future condition). Trans. 99 If your belief is based upon (the afore-said) rule, it is also laid down in the rule that an object is imperishable by (virtue of its) form 2394.

टीका---९९ अर्थ पूर्वोक्तालापकरूपात् सत्रात् सत्रप्रामाण्यात् प्रतिसमयं सर्वथा वस्तूच्छेदः प्रतिपाद्यत इति तव मतिः । ननु यदि सत्रं तव प्रमाणम्, तहिं सत्रे द्रव्यार्थतया झाश्वतमपि वस्त्वन्यत्रोक्तमेव, पर्यायार्थतयैव चाझाश्वतम्, तथा च सत्रम्-" नेरइयाणं भंते ! किं सासया, असासया ? । गोयमा ! सिय सासया, सिय असासया । से केणट्टेणं ? । गोयमा ! दव्बद्धयाए सासया, भाव-द्द्याए असासया " इति ॥२३९४॥

D. C. According to you, an, object should be taken as entirely perished at every moment on the authority of the rule referred to before⁵.

Now, if you take the sūtra as an authority on this point there is another sūtra also which describes an object as śāśvata or imperishable by virtue of its being matter, and vinaśvara or perishable by virtue of its form—

The sotra runs as follows :-

- Q. "Neraiyānam bhante! kim sāsaya a-sāsayā?
- A. Goyamā ! siya sāsayā, siya a-sāsayā⁶.

- 6. The following ālāpaka is from Bhagvatī Sūtra:-
- Q. "Neraiyā nam bhante! kim sāsayā a-sāsayā ?
- A. Goyamā ! siya sāsayā siya a-sāsayā.
- Q. Se keņațtheņam bhante ! jāvaevam vuccai "Neraiyā siya sāsayā, siya a-sāsayā ?
- A. Goyamā ! Avvocchitti nayaţţhāyāe sāsayā, vocchittinayaţţhayāe asāsayā. Se teņa-aţţheņam jāva siya sāsayā siya a-sāsayā.

^{5.} Vide verse 2390.

Vāda]

- Q. Se keņațțheņam ?
- A. Goyamā ! Davvaţţhāe sāsayā, Bhāvaţţhāe a-sāsayā.
- [Q. O Lord ! are the Nārakas perishable or imperishable ?
 - A. O Gautama ! they might be perishable, as well as, imperishable also.
 - Q. How could that be?
 - A. O Gautama ! they are imperishable on account of their matter, and perishable so far as their form is concerned.]

And,

इत्थ वि न सब्वनासो समयाइविसेसणं जओऽभिहियं। इहरा न सब्बनासे समयाइविसेसणं जुत्तं ॥१००॥२३९५॥ को पढमसमयनारगनासे बितिसमयनारगो नाम । न सुरो घडो अभावो व होइ जइ सब्बहा नासो ?॥१०१॥२३९६॥

- 100. Ittha vi na savvanāso samayāivisesaņam jao'bhihiyam (Iharā na savvanāse samayāivisesaņam juttam (2395)
- 101. Ko padhamasamayanāraganāse bitisamayanārago nāma i Na suro ghado abhāvo va hoi jai savvahā nāso? (2396)

[अत्रापि न सर्वनाद्याः समयादिविद्रोषणं यतोऽमिहितम् । इतरथा न सर्वनाद्ये समयादिविद्रोषणं युक्तम् ॥१००॥२३९५॥

कःप्रथमसमयनारकनाद्ये द्वितीयसमयनारको नाम । न सुरो घटोऽभावो वा भवति यदि सर्वथा नाद्याः ?॥१०१॥२३९६॥

[Bhagavati Sutra Śataka 7 Udeśaka 3, last portion] Gujarāti Translation page 15 Part III.]

It will be noted on comparision that though both the ālāpakas differ slightly in readings, there is not the slightest difference between the two, so far ar the meanings of both the ālāpakas are concerned.]

- 100. Atrāpi na sarvanāšah samayādivišeṣaṇam yato'bhihitam ı Itarathā na sarvanāše samayādivišeṣaṇam yuktam (2395)
- 101. Kah prathamasamayanārakanāśe dvitīyasamayanārako nāma (Na suro ghato'bhāvo vā bhavati yadi sarvathā nāśah ? (2396)]

Trans. 100-101. Here also, since adjectives like samaya etc. are told, entire destruction could not (fit in). (For) otherwise, the adjectives like samaya etc. would be useless in (case of) entire destruction. How could a *naraka* of the second moment come into existence when the *naraka* of the first moment has (entirely) perished? If there were entire destruction, there would be nothing like god, *ghata* or *a-bhāva* (non-existence) 2395-2396.

टीका-१००-१०१ अत्रापि ''प्रथमसमयनारका च्यवच्छेदं यास्यन्ति '' इति सत्रे न सर्वनाश्वः सर्वात्मना नाशो गम्पते । कुतः ? इत्याह यतो यस्मात् समयादिविशेषणमिहितम्, ततो न सर्वथा नाशोऽत्र गम्पते, किन्तु प्रथमसमय-नारका व्यवच्छेत्स्यन्ति । कोऽर्थः । प्रथमसमयनारकत्वेन विनङ्क्ष्यन्ति । एवं द्वितीयादिसमयनारका अपि द्वितीयादिसमयनारकत्वेनैव विनङ्क्ष्यन्ति न तु सर्वथा, द्रव्यार्थतया शाश्वतत्वात् । इतरथा सर्वनाशेऽभिनेते प्रथमसमयादिविशेषणं न युक्तं स्यादिति । कथमयुक्तम् ? इत्याह-''को पढमेत्यादि '' प्रथमसमयोत्प-मानां हि नारकाणां सर्वथा विनाशे को नाम द्वितीय-टतीयादिसमयनारकः ?! अवस्थितस्यैव हि कस्यचित् प्रथम-द्वितीय-टतीयादिसमयोत्पन्तविशेषणं युज्यते । यदि तु सर्वथा नाश्वः तर्हि प्रथमसमयोत्पन्ततीयादिसमयोत्पन्तविशेषणं युज्यते । यदि तु सर्वथा नाश्वः तर्हि प्रथमसमयोत्पन्तारकस्य निरन्वयनाशेन नष्टत्वाद् द्वितीयसमयोत्पन्नो नारक इति व्यपदेष्टं कथं युज्यते, यन्नारकात् सर्वथा विरुश्व-त्वादसौ सुरो घटोऽभावो वा नोच्यते ?। सुरादिव्यपदेशे च न द्वितीयादिसमय-नारकाः । तस्मात् प्रथम-द्वितीय-टतीयादिसमयोत्पन्ना इति विशेषणं कथञ्चिदव-स्थितस्यैव नारकादेर्युज्यत इत्यस्मिन्नपि स्रते न नारकादेः सर्वोच्छेदः प्रतिपादते । इति निर्मूल एव निजाग्रुभकर्मविपाकजनितस्तवैप च्यामोह इति ॥२३९॥२३९६॥

D. C. In the satra laying down that the $n\bar{a}rakas$ of the first moment will meet destruction, entire destruction is not, at

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all, implied. Adjectives viz first moment, second moment' etc. mentioned therein are significant." By the expression that "Nārakas of the first moment will meet destruction," entire destruction of the $n\bar{a}rakas$ is not meant but it only means that the nārakas of the first moment lose the property of being $n\bar{a}rakas$ at that time. Similarly those of the second moment lose the property of being $n\bar{a}rakas$ at the second moment and so on.

But $n\bar{a}rakas$ would never perish entirely on account of their matter being indestructible, Thus, if the theory of entire destruction is admitted, adjectives such as *prathama samaya*, dvitiyasamaya etc. would not be justified. If the nārakas that were produced at previous moments had perished entirely along with those moments, how could $n\bar{a}rakas$ of the second moment, and those of the third moment etc. come into existence? So, the adjectives viz prathama samayotpanna (produced in the first moment) dvitīya samayotpanna (produced in the second moment) etc. would be justified only if the $n\bar{a}rakas$ were taken as the existent beings.

In spite of all this, if you hold the theory of entire destruction, a nāraka produced at the first moment, would perish entirely, and it would not leave any scope for the production of a nāraka of the second moment. And if a nāraka perishes entirely with the first moment, that which is produced at the second moment would be definitely different from the nāraka (itself), and hence it would never be possible to recognize, a sura, a ghața or a-bhāva from it. This proves that adjectives such as prathama samayotpanna, dvitīya samayotpanna etc. could be attributed only to an existing being and to none else.

Thus, the satra mentioned before, does not, in any way, imply entire destruction of nārakas, at the end of a particular period of time. It is only due to futile embarassment produced in you, on account of your (past) misdeeds, that you are led to hold such wrong notions. 100-101 (2395-2396).

जहव समाणुप्पत्ती समाणसंताणओ मई होजा। को सब्बहा विणासे संताणो किं व सामण्णं ? ॥१०२॥२३९७॥

[अथवा समानोत्पत्तिः समानसंतानतो मतिर्भवेत् । कः सर्वथा विनारो संतानः किं वा सामान्यम् ? ॥१०२॥२३९७॥

102. Athavā samānotpattiķ samānasantānato matirbhavet | Kaķ sarvathā vināše santānah kim vā sāmānyam? (2397)]

Trans. 102. Or, the belief may be that (there is) production of similar ($n\bar{a}rakas$) on account of similar offsprings. (But) in (case of) absolute destruction, what is the utility of (even) an offspring or similarity? (2397).

टीका--१०२ अथवैवंभूता मतिः परस्य भवेद्, यदुत--नारकादीनां प्रति-समयमपरापरसमानश्चणोत्पत्तिर्भवति । ततस्तया समानश्चणोत्पच्या यः समान-श्वणसंततिरूपः संतानस्तसात् संतानात् संतानमाश्रित्य नारकादेः कथश्चिद् ध्रौव्यमन्तरेणापि प्रथमदितीयादिसमयोत्पत्तविशेषणग्रुपपद्यत एव । अत्रोत्तरमाद "को सब्बद्देस्यादि" । नचु सर्वथा विनाश्चे सक्रुच्छेदेऽङ्गीक्रियमामे कः कस्य संतननः, कि वा कस्य समानम् १ इति निर्निवन्धनमेवेदग्रुच्यते । न हि निरन्वय-विनाशेऽवस्थिताः केचनापि नारकादिश्चणाः सन्ति, यानाश्रित्येदग्रुच्यते-" अय-मेर्गा सन्तानः, इदं चास्य समानम् " इति । २३९७॥

D. C.

Asymmitra:—Since $n\bar{a}rakas$ etc. are created at similar moments one after the other, their santanas are also created in the form of productions of similar moments, and by virtue of those santānas, adjectives such as *prathama samayotpanna* etc. would be justified even without any object being taken as existent.

Acārya :---When you accept the theory of entire destruction, who would be taken as whose offspring ? And what would be

^{102.} Ahava samāņuppattī samāņasantāņao mai hojjā (Ko savvahā viņāse santāņo kim va sāmarņam ? (2397).

:103:

similar to what? For, in case of entire destruction, there would not exist any moment of production of nārakas etc. by virtue of which, we can say that "This is their offspring or that is similar to this." 102 (2397)

Because,

संताणिणो न भिण्णो जइ संताणो न नाम संताणो । अह भिण्णो न कखणिओ खणिओ वा जइ न संताणो ॥ १०३॥२३९८॥

Santāņiņo na bhiņņo jai santāņo na nama santāņo l 103. Aha bhinno na kkhanio khanio vā jai na santāņo. (2398)

[संतानिनो न भिन्नो यदि संतानो न नाम संतानः । अथ भिन्नो न क्षणिकः क्षणिको वा यदि न संतानः ॥१०३॥२३९८॥

Santānino na bhinno yadi santāno na nāma santānah l 103. Atha bhinno na ksanikah ksaniko vä yadi na santänah (2398)]

Trans. 103. If an offspring is not different from (its) generator, it is not an offsping. And, if (it is) different, it would not be momentary; (for) if it is momentary, it would not be an offspring. 2398,

टीका-१०३ यदि संतानिभ्यो न भिन्नः किन्त्वभिन्नः संतानः, तर्हि न नामासौ संतानः, संतानिभ्योऽनर्थान्तरभूतत्वात्, तत्स्वरूपवत् । अय संतानिम्यो भिन्नः संतानः, तहिं क्षणिकोऽसौ नेष्टव्यः, अवस्थितत्वाम्युपगमात् । अय क्षणिको-Sसाबिष्यते तर्हि नासौ संतानः, संतानिवत् । ततस्त एव संतानाभावपश्चोक्ता दोषा इति । तदेव सर्वथोच्छेदेऽभ्युपगम्यमाने संतान उत्पचत इति भावितम् ॥२३९८॥

D. C. If a santana is not different from a santanin (generator) it would not be called a santāna, as it would not possess a form independent of santānin. And if it is different from santa104:

nin, it would not be taken as kṣaṇika or transitory, because by accepting it as kṣaṇika, its state of retention would be accepted.

On the other hand, if a santāna is taken as $k \leq a n i k a$, it will no longer be existent like *santānin* and difficulties arising from the state of non-existence of *santāna* would crop up. So, there is no scope for the santāna to exist \cdot in the midst of absolute destruction. 103 (2398)

Continuing the same argument, the author states :---

पुव्वाणुगमे समया हुज्ज न सा सव्वहा विणासम्मि । अह सा न सव्वनासो तेण समं वा नणु खपुप्फं ॥१०४॥२३९९॥

104. Puvvāņugame samayā hujja na sā savvahā viņāsammi l Aha sā na savvanāso teņa samam vā naņu khapuppham (2399)

[पूर्वानुगमे समता भवेद् न सा सर्वथा विनारो । अथ सा न सर्वनाशस्तेन समं वा ननु खपुष्पम् ॥१०४॥२३९९॥

104. Porvānugame samatābhaved na sā sarvathā vināśe i Atha sā na sarvanāśastena samam vā nanu khapuṣpam (2399)]

Trans. 104. Similarity is (possible) only in (case of) its connection with the former (moment), but not in (the midst of) all-pervading destruction. And if it exists, there would be nothing like all-pervading destruction. Or else, even khapuspa would become similar to it. 2399.

टीका-१०४ यदिं पूर्वश्रणस्योत्तरक्षणे केनापि रूपेणानुगमोऽन्वयो भवेत् तदा तत्रानुगमे पूर्वोत्तरक्षणयोः समता समानरूपता भवेत् । सर्वथा तु सर्वात्मना पूर्वश्रणस्य निरन्वयविनाशे न सा समतोत्तरक्षणस्य युज्यते । सा समता तयोर-भ्युपगम्यते, तहिं तद्रूपस्य कथञ्चिदवस्थितत्वाद् न पूर्वक्षणस्य सर्वथा विनाशः । अथ सर्वथा विनाशेऽपि तस्या समताऽभ्युपगम्यते, हन्त ! तर्हि तेन सर्वथाऽभावी-भूतेन पूर्वक्षणेन समं तुल्ट्यं युज्यते यदि, परं खपुष्पम्, सर्वथाभावरूपतया इयोरपि तुल्ज्यत्वादिति ॥२३९९॥ D. C. If the former moment is connected in any way with the later moment, there would be some sort of similarity between the former and later moments. But when there is absolute negation of the former moment, its similarity with the later moment has no place And, if there is any similarity between the two, the former moment will have to be taken as existing, and hence, there would be no possibility of absolute negation.

Still however, if this sort of similarity is accepted by you, in spite of there being absolute destruction, why should a nonexistent object like *khapuspa*, also, be not taken as similar to it as the property of being non-existent is common to both? 104 (2399).

For,

अण्णविणासे अण्णं जइ सरिसं होइ होउ तेऌक्तं। तदसंबद्धं व मई सो वि कओ सब्वनासम्मि ? ॥१०५॥२४००॥

105. Annavināse annam jai sarisam hoi hou telukkam I Tadasambaddham va maī so vi kao savvanāsammi? (2400)

[अन्यविनाइोऽन्यद् यदि सदृशं भवति भवतु त्रैलोक्यम्। तदसंबद्धं वा मतिः सोऽपि कुतः सर्वनाहो ? ॥१०५॥२४००॥

105. Anyavināśe'nyad yadi sadriśam bhavati bhavatu trailokyam (Tadasambaddham vä matih s'opi kutah sarvanāśe ? 105 (2400)]

Trans. 105. If at the destruction of one thing, something else becomes similar (to it), even (the group of) three worlds would become similar to it. Or, if it is (accepted) on account of its being unconnected-how is that even possible in the midst of all-pervading negation. 2400.

टीका-१०५ सर्वथा निरन्वयविनाशे घटात् पट इवोत्तरक्षणात् । सर्वथाऽन्य एव पूर्वक्षणस्तरमाच्चान्य एवोत्तरक्षणः । ततः सर्वथाऽन्यस्य पूर्वक्षणस्य विनाशे तस्मात् मर्वथान्यदुत्तरक्षणरूपं यदि सट्दां भवतीन्यभ्युपेयने, तर्हि भवतु त्रैलोक्य- मपि ततस्तत्सदृशम्, अनन्वयित्वेऽ यत्वस्य सर्वत्र तुल्यत्वात् । अथ तत् त्रैलोक्यं भस्तुतपूर्वक्षणेन सह देशादिव्यवहितत्वादसंबद्धमिति न तत्सदृशम्, उत्तरक्षणस्तु तेन सह संबद्ध इति तत्सदृश् इति परस्य मतिः स्यात् । ननु सोऽपि पूर्वोत्तरक्षणयोः संबन्धः पूर्वस्य सर्वथा विनाशे कुतः ?-न कुतश्चिदित्यर्थः, तत्सं-बन्धाभ्युपगमेऽन्यसंबन्धायोगेनानन्वयाभ्युपगमप्रसङ्गादिति भावः ॥२४००॥

D. C.

Ācārya:-Just as a pața is totally different from a ghața, the former moment is different from later moment and vice versa. Now, even when the former moment is taken to have perished entirely, if it is held that the later moment which is absolutely different from it, is similar to the former moment, the group of the Three Worlds should also be taken as similar to it, because the property of being absolutely different (from the later moment) is common there also.

Aśvamitra:—The group of the Three Worlds, could not be taken as similar to the former moment in question, because that is not connected with it by means of time, place etc., while later moment is taken as similar to the former moment, because it is connected with the former moment by means of time.

 $\overline{A}c\overline{a}rya:$ —But how can the relation between former and later moments exist in spite of the former moment having entirely perished? Such a relation can never exist without accepting the context, and hence, the state of retention or existence of the former moment in question, 105 (2400)

Besides,

किह वा सब्वं खणियं विण्णायं जइ मई सुयाउ ति । तदसंखसमयसुत्तत्थगहणपरिणामओ जुत्तं ॥१०६॥२४०१॥ न उ पइसमयविणासे जेणिकिकक्खरं चिय पयस्स । संखाईयसामहयं संखिज्जाइं पयं ताइं ॥१०७॥२४०२॥ संखिज्जपयं वर्क्त तदत्थग्गहणपरिणामओ हुज्जा । मब्वकम्बणभंगनाणं तदजुत्तं समयनट्टस्स ॥१०८॥२४०३॥

- 106. Kiha vā savvam khaņiyam viņņāyam jai maī suyāu ti (Tadasankhasamayasuttatthagahaņapariņāmao juttam (2401)
- 107. Na u paisamayaviņāse jeņikkikkakkharam ciya payassa i Sankhāīyasāmaiyam sankhijjāim payam tāim (2402)
- 108. Sankhijjapayam vakkam tadatthaggahanaparināmao hujjā. Savvakkhanabhanganānam tadajuttam samayanatthassa. (2403)

[कथं वा सर्वे क्षणिकं विज्ञातं यदि मतिः श्रुतादिति । तदसंख्यसमयसूत्रार्थग्रहणपरिणामतो युक्तम् ॥१०६॥२४०१॥ न तु प्रतिसमयविनाद्यो येनैकैकाक्षरमेव पदस्य । संख्यातीतसामयिकं संख्यातानि पदं तानि ॥१०॥२४०२॥ संख्यातपदं वाक्यं तदर्थग्रहणपरिणामतो भवेत् । सर्वक्षणभङ्गज्ञानं तदयुक्तं समयनष्टस्य ॥१०८॥२४०३॥

106. Katham vā sarvam kṣaṇikam vijnātam yadi matiņ śrutā diti I

> Tadasankyasamayasatrārthagrahaņapariņāmato yuktam 106 (2401)

- 107. Na tu pratisamayavināśe yenaikaikāksarameva padasya | Sańkhyātītasāmayikam sańkhyātāni padam tāni 107 (2402)
- 108. Sankhyātapadam vākyam tadarthagrahaņapariņāmato bhavet | Sarvakṣaṇabhaṅgajnānam tadayuktam samayanaṣṭasya 108 (2403)].

Trans. 106-107-108. Or, if it is asked "How is everything recognized as momentary?" (The answer is) "From the Holy writ." It is proper (to take it) as a result of the comprehension of the meanings of innumerable sūtras, but not (as a result of) the destruction (taking place) at every moment. Each syllable of a word (is produced) at an incalculable portion of time. A word consists of a definite number of those (syllables), and a sentence is composed of certain

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Jinabhadra Gani's [The fourth

number of words. At the comprehension of its meaning, knowledge of all-pervading transitoriness (is attained). (But) that is misfitted to one (whose mind) perishes (soon after) the time of production 2401-2402-2403.

टीका-१०६-१०७-१०८ '' वा '' इत्यथवा, पर्यनुयुज्यते भवान् । नन् '' सर्वे वस्तु क्षणिकम् " इत्येतत् कथं भवता विज्ञातमिति वक्तव्यम् ? । श्रुतादिति चेत् । ननु तत् अतादर्थविज्ञानमसंख्येयसमयैनिष्पन्नो यः सत्रार्थग्रहणपरिणाम-स्तस्मादेव युक्तम्, न तु प्रतिसमयविनाशे। इदमुक्तं भव त-असंख्येयानेव समयान् यावचित्तस्यावस्थाने "सर्व क्षणिकम्" इति विज्ञानोपयोगो युज्यते, न तु प्रतिसमयोच्छेदे । अत्र कारणमाह-येन यस्मात् कारणात् पद्स्य सावयवत्वात् तत्संबध्येकैकमप्यक्षरं संख्यातीतसामयिकमसंख्यातैः समयैनिष्पद्यत इत्यर्थः, तानि चाक्षराणि संख्यातानि सम्रुदितानि पदं भवति । संख्यातैश्व पदैर्वाक्यं निष्पद्यते, तदर्थग्रहणपरिणामाच वाक्यार्थग्रहणपरिणामादित्यर्थः, सर्वक्षणभङ्गज्ञानं भवेत् । तचोत्पत्तिसमयानन्तरमेव नष्टस्य सम्रुच्छिन्नस्य मनसोऽयुक्तमेवेति ॥ २४०१॥२४०२॥२४०३॥

D. C.

Aśvamitra:-How could you apprehend that everything is ksanika?

Acārya:-From the Holy writ. Apprehension of ksanikatā from the Holy writings, is justifiable only as a result of the apprehension of the meanings of sutras, but not as a result of destruction taking place at every moment. Every syllable of a word is produced at an incalculable moment. A word consists of a number of such syllables and a sentence is made up of a number of words. When the meaning of such sentences is comprehended, knowledge of all-pervading transitoriness is attained. But it should be noted that such a knowledge is not attainable to one whose mind perishes soon after the time of its production. 106 - 108. (2401 - 2403)

And,

तित्ती समो किलामो सारिक्ख-विवक्ख-पचयाईणि । अज्झयणं झाण भावणा य का सब्वनासम्त्रि ? ॥१०९॥२४०४॥

109. Tittī samo kilāmo sārikkha-vivakkha-paccayāiņi 1 Ajjhayaņam jhāņa bhāvaņā ya kā savvanāsammi? (2404)

[तृप्तिः अमः कलमः सादृरूय-विपक्ष-प्रत्ययादीनि । अध्ययनं-ध्यानं भावना च का सर्वनाहो १॥१०९॥२४०४॥

109. Triptih śramah klamah sādriśya-vipakṣa-pratyayādīni i Adhyayanam dhyānam bhāvanā ca kā sarvanāśe ? 109 (2404)].

Trans. 109. And, in (the midst of) absolute destruction, how could satiety, exertion, languor, similarity, distinction, etc; as well as, study, meditation, and imagination exist? (2404).

टीका-१०९ तृप्तिर्धाणिः, मार्गगमनादिप्रवृत्तस्य खेदः अमः, क्लमो ग्लानिः, साद्द्रयं साधर्म्यम्, विपक्षो वैधर्म्यम्, प्रत्ययः प्रत्यभिज्ञानादि; आदि-भ्रब्दात् स्वनिहितप्रत्यनुमार्गण-स्मरणादिपरिप्रहः। अध्ययनं पुनःपुनर्प्रन्थाभ्यासः, ध्यानमेकावलम्बने मनःस्थैर्यम्, भावना पौनः पुन्येनानित्यत्वादिप्रकारतो भवँन-र्गुण्यपरिभावनरूपा । एतानि सर्वाण्यप्युत्पत्त्यनन्तरमेव वस्तुनः सर्वनारोऽक्की क्रियमाणे कथम्रुपपद्यन्ते १ इति ॥२४०४॥

D. C. If the theory of entire destruction of an object (at every moment) is accepted, everything will be destroyed immediately after its production. Consequently, there will be no place for feelings like those of satiety, exertion or fatigue. There will be nothing like similarity, dissimilarity, belief or remembrance, and there will be no scope for study, meditation or imagination 109 (2404).

अण्णण्णो पइगासं मुत्ता अंते न सो वि का तित्ती ?। आः गंलावओ वि एवं इय संववहारबुचिछत्ती ॥११०॥२४०५॥

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110. Annanno paigāsam bhuttā ante na so vi kā tittī? Gantādao vi evam iya saņvavahāravucchittī (2405)

[अन्योऽन्यः प्रतिग्रासं भोक्ताऽन्ते न सोऽपि का तृतिः ?। गन्त्रादयोऽप्येवमिति संव्यवहारव्युच्छित्तिः ॥११०॥२४०५॥

110. Anyo'nyah pratigrāsam bhoktā'nte na so'pi kā triptih ? (Gantrādayo'pyevamiti samvyavahāravyucchittih (2405)]

Trans. 110. (In case of entire destruction) an eater would be different at every mouthful, (and) at the end (he would exist) no more. (Hence) how could there be (the feeling of) satisfaction at all? The same will be the condition of those who move, ect. In this way, there would be violation of the (whole of) vyavahāra. 2405.

टीका-११० "प्रसु ग्लसु अदने" प्रसनं प्रासः कवलक्षेपः, प्रस्यत इति श प्रासः कवलः । ततश्र प्रतिप्रासं भतिकवलं भोक्ता देवदत्तः क्षणिकत्वादन्य-श्वान्यश्व भवति, भोजनक्रियायाश्चान्ते पर्यन्ते सोऽपि भोक्ता सर्वश्रा न भवति, श्वजिक्रियाविशेषणस्यामावे तद्विशिष्टस्य देवदत्तस्यापि सर्वशोच्छेदात् । ततश्रैक-स्थित्रकन्त्यकवलप्रक्षेपे का तृप्तिः, भोक्तुश्चाभावात् कस्यासौ तृप्तिः ! एवग्रुक्तानु-स्थारेण मन्त्रादीनामपि श्रमाद्यभावः स्वबुद्ध्या भावनीय इति । एवं समस्तलोक-व्यवहारोच्छेदप्रसक्तिरिति ॥२४०५॥

D. C. In case of there being entire destruction (at every moment), one who eats would be different at every mouthful of food on account of his being k an i k a. In absence of the process of eating, the eater will also perish at the end. Hence, how could there be a feeling of satisfaction at the last mouthful, and in absence of eater, who will experience the feeling of satisfaction?

In the same way, those who move would not feel exertion, and so on. Ultimately this would lead the entire $vyavah\bar{a}ra$ to nothing.

Here the opponent would say-जेणं चिय पइगासं भिन्ना तित्ती अओ चिय विणासो। तित्तीए तित्तस्स य एवं चिय सब्वसंसिद्धी ॥१११॥२४०६॥

Vāda]

111. Jeņam ciya paigāsam bhinnā tittī ad ciya viņāso i Tittīe tittassa ya evam ciya savvasaņsiddhī (2406)

येनैव प्रतिग्रासं भिन्ना तृप्तिरत एव विनाजाः। तृप्तेस्तृप्तस्य-चैवमेव सर्वसंसिद्धिः ॥१११॥२४०६॥

111. Yenaiva pratigrāsam bhinnā triptirata eva vināśah (Triptestriptasya caivameva sarvasaņsiddhih (2406)]

Trans. 111 On the ground on which (feeling of) satisfaction is different from each mouthful, (the feeling of) satisfaction and the one who is satisfied attain destruction. The same will be the condition of everything. 2406.

टीका-१११ येनैव यत एव प्रतिग्रासमन्योऽन्यश्व भोक्ता भवति, अपरापरा च तृप्तिमात्रा भवति, अत एव तृप्तेः, तृप्तस्य च प्रतिक्षणं विनाश्चोऽभ्युपगम्यतेऽ स्माभिः, विशेषणभेदे विशेष्यस्याप्यवञ्यं भेदात् , अन्यथा विशेषणभेदस्याप्य-योगात् । प्रतिक्षणविनाशित्वे तृप्त्याद्ययोगोऽभिहित एवति चेत् । तदयुक्तम् । कुतः १ इत्याह-" एवं चिय सब्वसंसिद्धि ति " एवमेव प्रतिक्षणत्रिनाश्चित्व एव सर्वस्यापि तृप्ति-श्रम-क्लमादेर्लोकव्यवहारस्यसंसिद्धिः । इदग्रुक्तं भवति-तृप्त्यादि-वासनावासितः पूर्वपूर्वश्वणादुत्तरोत्तरक्षणः सग्रुत्पद्यते तावत् यावत् पर्यन्त उत्कर्षे वन्तस्तृप्त्यादयो भवन्ति । एतच क्षणिकत्व एवोपपद्यते, न नित्यत्त्वे । नित्यस्या-प्रच्युता-ऽनुत्पन्न-स्थिरैकस्वभावत्वेन सर्वदैव तृप्त्यादिसद्भावात्, सर्वदैव तदभा-वादवेति ॥२४०६॥

D. C.

Aśvamitra :--Just as an eater of each mouthful differs from another, so also, every portion of the feeling of satisfaction differs from another. This makes both the satisfaction and the satisficr, ksanika (destructible) at every moment. If the viśeṣaṇa (adjective) is different, the viśeṣya (the bject which is qualified by it) should also be different; otherwise there would be no justification of viśeṣaṇa.

Here it is not proper to advance the argument that feelings of satisfaction etc. could not exist in case of momentariness taking place at every moment. Because, it is only in that condition (i. e. only in case of there being destructibility at every moment) that the worldly feelings of satisfaction, exertion, gloominess etc., would be established. The later moments that are filled with feelings of satisfaction etc. are produced from the corresponding former moments, one after the other, until feelings of satisfaction etc. become extremely powerful. All this is possible only, if the object is perishable, instead of its being imperishable or *nitya*. That which is *nitya* is never produced or destroyed but is always retained steadily, in one condition. In such a case, feelings of satisfaction etc. would either be wholly accepted or wholly rejected. 111 (2406)

The answer is—

पुव्विस्ठसब्वनासे बुडढी तित्ती य किंनिमित्ता तो ?। अह सा वि तेऽणुवत्तइ सब्वविणासो कहं जुत्तो ? ॥११२॥२४०७॥

112. Puvvillasavvanāse vuddhī tittī ya kimnimittā to? (Aha sā vi te'ņuvattai savvaviņāso kaham jutto? (2407)

[पूर्वसर्वनारो वृद्धिस्तृप्तिश्च किंनिमित्ता ततः ?। अथ सापि तेऽनुवर्तते सर्वविनाराः कथं युक्तः ?॥११२॥२४०७॥

112. Pürvasarvanāše vriddhistriptišca kim-nimittā tatah? Atha sāpi te'nuvartate sarvavināsah katham yuktah? 112 (2407)].

Trans 112 If there is entire destruction of the previous moments, how are the (gradual) rise, as well as, the (feeling of) satisfaction accounted for? And, if they, too, follow (the later moments) how will (the theory of) entire destruction be justified? 2407.

टीका-११२ "तो त्ति" यद्येवम्, ततः पूर्वक्षणस्य सर्वथा विनाश उत्तरो-त्तरक्षणेषु तृप्त्यादीनां या क्रमेण दृद्धिरुत्कर्षवती पर्यन्ते तृप्तिः श्रमादिसंभूतिश्व सा किनिमित्ता किंकारणा ? इति वक्तव्यम् ? । पूर्वपूर्वक्षणेनोत्तरोत्तरक्षणस्य या Vāda]

तृप्त्यादिवासना जन्यते तन्निमित्तेति चेत् । न, तस्यास्तदनर्थान्तरत्वे पूर्वपूर्वश्रण-नाशे नाशात् । अथोत्तरोत्तरक्षणेषु सानुवर्तत एवेति ते तवाभिप्रायः, तद्दि पूर्वपूर्व-क्षणस्य सर्वविनाशः कथं युक्तो वक्तुम्, तदनर्थान्तरभूततृप्त्यादिवासनाया समनुवर्तनात् ? इति ॥२४०७॥

D. C.

Acārya:—If it is so, how would the gradual development of the feelings of satisfaction etc. that are found during the respective later moments, and the production of the feelings of satisfaction etc. be accounted for ?

Asymmitra :--Feelings of satisfaction etc. are produced by the instincts of satiety etc. produced in the later moments by means of former ones.

Acārya:—That is not so. Since those instincts are similar to the corresponding former moments, they would perish along with those moments.

Aśvamitra:—Feelings of satisfaction etc., are produced in later moments, in as much as they are continued in the later moments after their production during the respective former moments.

Acārya:—In believing so, as you assume the continuation of the feelings of satisfaction etc., that are similar to the former moments, you will not be able to justify the theory of entire destruction of an object along with the former moments during which it is produced. 112 (2407)

Also,

दिक्खा व सव्वनासे किमत्थमहवा मई विमोक्खत्थं। सो जइ नासो सब्वस्स तो तओ किं व दिक्खाए?॥११३॥२४०८॥

113. Dikkhā va savvanāse kmatthamahavā maī vimokkhattham So jai nāso savvassa to taö kim va dikkhāe? (2408)

[दीक्षा वा सर्वनाइो किमर्थमथवा मतिर्विमोक्षार्थम् । स यदि नाइाः सर्वस्य ततः सकः किं वा दीक्षया ? ॥११३॥२४०८॥

Trans. 113. Or, in (case of) entire destruction, what is the utility of $d\bar{i}ks\bar{a}$? Or, (it may be) your belief that it is for the sake of Final Emancipation. If that (moksa) itself is (susceptible to) destruction, then, it would be (attainable) to all. And hence, what (would be) the purpose of $d\bar{i}ks\bar{a}$? 2408

टीका-११३ दीक्षा वा क्षणानां सर्वनाशे किमर्थमिति वाच्यम् ? निरथिंके-यमिति भावः । अथ मोक्षार्थं दीक्षेति परस्य मतिः, तर्द्धत्रापि वक्तव्यम्-स मोक्षो नाश्चरूपो वाऽम्युपगम्यते, अनाश्चरूपो वा ?। तत्र "सो जइ नासो त्ति" स मोक्षो यदि नाशरूप इति पक्षः, "सव्वस्स तो त उ त्ति" ततस्तर्द्धि तकोऽसौ मोक्षे सर्वस्यापि वस्तुनः खरसतः प्रयत्नमन्तरेणापि त्वदभिप्रायेण सिद्ध एव, कि दीक्षाप्रयत्नेन इति ॥२४०८॥

D. C. According to your theory of entire destruction, diksā has no utility. If you argue that diksā is useful for the attainment of moksa, then, is that moksa perishable or imperishable? If it is perishable, it would become accessible to all living beings without any effort on their part, and then, it would lose its importance. 113 (2408).

And,

अह निचो, न क्खणियं तो सब्वं अह मई ससंताणो । अहउ त्ति तओ दिक्खा निस्संताणस्स मुक्खो त्ति ॥११४॥२४०९॥

114. Aha nicco, na kkhaniyam to savvam aha mai sa-santāno Ahau tti taö dikkhā nissantānassa mukkho tti. (2409)

[अथ नित्यो, न क्षणिकं ततः सर्वमथ मतिः स्वसंतानः । अहत इति ततो दीक्षा निःसंतानस्य मोक्ष इति ॥११४॥२४०९॥

^{113.} Dīkṣā vā sarvanāše kimarthamathavā matirvimokṣārtham Sa yadi nāšaḥ sarvasya tataḥ sakah kim vā dīkṣayā? J13 (2408)]

Vāda]

Nihnavavāda

114. Atha nityo, na kṣaṇikam tataḥ sarvamatha matiḥ svasantānaḥ l Ahata iti tato dīkṣā nihsantānasya mokṣa iti 114 (2409)]

Trans. 114. If it is imperishable, you cannot hold that everything is transitory. Here, it might be said that since one's own continuous range (santati) does not break off, diksā becomes necessary (for the purpose of breaking it off.) (For) Final Emancipation (moksa) is attainable (only) to a nihsantāna being (i e. one who does not possess the conti nuous range of birth, death etc. any more.) 2409

टीका-११४ अथ नित्यो मोक्षः ''तो त्ति'' ततस्तहिं ''सर्ववस्तु क्षणिकम्'' इत्येतद् न भवति, मोक्षेणैव व्यभिचारात् । अथ स्व आत्मीयो विज्ञान-वेदना-संज्ञा-संस्कार-रूपात्मकस्कन्धस्य संतानो नाद्यापि हतः, निःसंतानस्यैव च मोक्षः, अतो निःसंतानार्थं दीक्षा विधीयत इति ॥२४०९॥

D. C.

Acarya : If moksa is *nitya*, you cannot assert that everything is ksanika.

Aśvamitra:--Since mokṣa is attainable only to one who is nihsantāna, dīkṣā is useful for one to become nihsantāna (One is said to be nihsantāna when the continuous range of the moments of cognition, sentiments, consciousness, and perfection etc. with regard to an object, is cut off)

The Acārya answers this argument as follows :---

छिण्णेणाछिण्णेण व किं संताणेण सब्वनहस्स । किंचाभावीभूयस्स स-पर-संताणचिंताए ? ॥११५॥२४१०॥

115. Chiņņeņāchiņņeņa va kim santāņeņa savvanaţthassa Kincābhāvībhuyassa sa-para-santāņacintāe ? (2410)

[छिन्नेनाच्छिन्नेन वा किं संतानेन सर्वनष्टस्य । किश्वाऽभाषीभूतस्य स्व-पर-संतानचिन्तया ? ॥११५॥२४१०॥

115. Cchinnenācchinnena vā kim santānena sarvanastasya (Kincā'bhāvībhātasya sva-para-santānacintayā ? 115 (2410)]

Trans. 115. What is the use of santāna being broken or unbroken to one who has perished entirely? And, what is the good of worrying as to whether it is one's own santāna or some one else's, when one is entirely reduced to nothing? 2410.

टीका-११५ सर्वनष्टस्य सर्वप्रकारैविंनाश्चमापत्रस्य च्छिन्नेन, अच्छिनेन वा, संतानेन किं प्रयोजनम्, येन संतानहननार्थं दीक्षां गृहणीयात् १। किञ्च, सर्वथाऽभावीभूतस्य क्षणभङ्गुरतया सर्वथा विनष्टस्य किमनया चिन्तया-अयं खसंतानः, अयं तु परसंतानः, अयं तु न हतः, येनोच्यते-''ससंताणो अहउ ति तओ दिक्खा " इति १ ॥२४१०॥

D. C.

 $\overline{A}c\overline{a}rya:$ --It is no use discussing as to whether santāna is broken or unbroken, when one has entirely perished. And hence, what is the good of $d\overline{k}$ sā also? There is no sense in worrying that, "This is my santāna" "That is another's santāna" "This is broken" "That is not broken" etc. when there is entire negation of everything. So, the expression that "Dīksā is useful to one who is niḥsantāna," also proves futile. 115 (2410)

सन्बं पयं व खणियं प्रजंते नासदरिसणाउ त्ति । नणु इत्तो चिय न खणियमंते नासोबलद्धीओ ॥११६॥२४११॥

116. Savvam payam va khaņiyam pajjante nāsadarisaņāu tti Naņu itto ceiya na khaņiyamante nāsovaladdhiö. (2411)

[सर्वे पय इव क्षणिकं पर्यन्ते नादादद्यीनादिति । नन्वित एव न क्षणिकमन्ते नाद्योपऌब्धेः ॥११६॥२४११॥

116. Sarvam paya iva kṣaṇikam paryante nāśadarśanāditi | Nanvita eva na kṣaṇikamante nāśopalabdheḥ 116 (2411)]

Trans. 116. Everything is momentary like milk on account of the apprehension of destruction at the end. On the same Vada]

ground, it is not momentary, because of the apprehension of destruction at the end." 2411.

टीका-११६ सर्वं वस्तु क्षणिकम्, पर्यन्ते नाश्चदर्शनात्, पर्योवदिति । आह - ननु यदि वस्तूनां पर्यन्ते नाशो दृश्यते, तहिं प्रतिक्षणविनाश्चित्वे किमायातम्, येन सर्वं क्षणिकग्रुच्यते १ । सत्यम्, किन्त्वयभिद्द तदभिप्रायः - पर्यन्तेऽपि घटादीनां विनाश्वस्तावद् निर्देतुक एव भवति, ग्रुद्ररादेविंनाशहेतोरयोगात्, तथाहि--ग्रुद्ररा-दिना किं घट एव क्रियते, कपालानि वा, तुच्छरूपोऽभावो वा १ इत्यादियुक्तितो विनाश्वस्य निर्देतुकत्वं मागत्रैव दर्शितम् । ततो निर्देतुकोऽसौ भवन्नादित एव भवतु, अन्यथा पर्यन्तेऽपि तदभवनप्रसङ्गादिति पर्यन्ते नाशदर्शनाद् हेतोः क्षणिकत्वसिद्धिः ।

अत्र स्ररिः प्राह-नन्वेतस्मादेव पर्यन्ते नाशदर्शनलक्षणाद्वेतोरस्माभिरेतच्छ-क्यते वक्तुम् । किम् ? इत्याह-न क्षणिकं न प्रतिक्षणं वस्तु विनश्यतीत्यर्थः, पर्यन्त एव तन्नाश्चोपलब्धेः, घटादिवत् । न च युक्तिबाधितत्वाद् आन्तेयसुपल-बिधरिति श्रक्यते वक्तुम्, सर्वेषां सर्वत्रेत्थमेव प्रवर्तनात्, युक्तीनामेत्रावया बाधनात्, श्रून्यवादियुक्तिवदिति ॥२४११॥

D. C.

Aśvamitra:—Everything is transitory, like milk, because of the apprehension of destruction at the end.

 \overline{Acarya} :--If the destruction of an object is apprehended *at* the end, how could that, and hence everything, be said to be momentary?

Aśvamitra :---The main purport of my argument is this. Destruction of objects like ghața etc. apprehended at the end, is causeless in absence of destructive instruments like hammer etc. If the instruments like hammer etc. work as the causes, causelessness of destruction could easily be established by arguments like this :-- When an object is destroyed by means of hammer etc. What is produced ? Ghața, its fragments or the non-existence (itself)? This being causeless, destruction takes place in the beginning and is apprehended at the end. Thus, momentariness of an object is established, because of the apprehension of destruction at the end.

 \overline{Acarya} :--We establish indestructibility of an object on the same ground on which you try to prove its transitariness. Since destruction of an object is apprehended at the end, it does not perish entirely at every moment like ghata etc. It is, also, not possible for you to say that such an apprehension is nothing but an illusion, because it is bound by logical limits. Because, the condition of all objects is the same everywhere. 116 (2411)

And,

इहराइउ चिय तओ दीसेज़ंते व्व कीस व समाणो। सव्वविणासे नासो दीसइ अंते न सोऽन्नत्थ ? ॥११७॥२४१२॥

117. Iharāiu ceiya taö dīsejjante vva kīsa va samāņo Savvaviņāse nāso dīsai ante na so'nnattha? (2412)

[इतरथादित एव सको इइयेतान्ते इव कस्माद् वा समानः। सर्वविनाशे नाशो इइयतेऽन्ते न सोऽन्यन्न ?॥११७॥२४१२॥

117. Itarathādita eva sako driṣyetānte iva kasmād vā samānaķ | Sarvavināśe nāśo driśyate'nte na so'nyatra ? (2412)]

Trans. 117. Otherwise, it would be seen right from the beginning, just as (it would be seen) at the end. Or, why would destruction be not seen anywhere else, but at the end, when the entire destruction (of an object) applies equally everywhere? 2412.

टीका-११७ इतरथा यदि प्रतिक्षणं नाशो भवेत तदा यथा पर्यन्ते सर्वेणापि भवन्नसौ दृश्यते, तथा आदित एवादि-मध्येषु सर्वत्र तकोऽसौ नाशो दृश्येत । अथ पर्यन्तेऽसौ दृश्यते नादि-मध्येषु, किं कुर्मः ?। तहिं प्रष्टव्योऽसि । किम् ? इत्याह-"कीस वेत्यादि" किमिति चासौ नाशो वस्त्वभावरूपतया सर्वत्र समानो निरवन्नेषस्वरूपोऽपि सन् सर्वविनाशे मुद्ररादिना विदिते दृश्यत उपलु स्यतेऽन्ते पर्यन्ते, न पुनरन्यत्रादि-मध्येषु सर्वत्र भवताऽभ्युपगतोऽप्यसौ भवन्नु-पलुक्ष्यत इत्यत्र कारणं वाच्यम् ?, न पुनः पादप्रसारिका श्रेयस्करीति भावः ॥२४१२॥

:118:

D. C.

Acārya :---If the object is perishable at every moment, destruction ought to have been apprehended in the beginning, and in the middle, just as it is apprehended at the end.

Asymitra :---It is apprehended neither in the beginning, nor in the middle, but any how at the end.

Acārya :---Though we believe that destruction (i. c. negation of an object) is equal in the beginning, as well as in the middle, how is it that it is apprehended only at the end, when beaten by hammer etc., and neither in the beginning nor at the middle? 117 (2412)

Also,

अंते व संव्यनासो पडिवण्गो केण जदुवऌद्धीओ । कप्पेसि क्खणविणासं नणु पज्जायंतरं तं पि ॥११८॥२४१३॥

118. Ante va savvanāso padivaņņo keņa jaduvaladdhīci Kappesi kkhaņaviņāsam naņu pajjāyantaram tam pi (2413)

[अन्ते वा सर्वनाज्ञः प्रतिपन्नः केन यदुपलब्धेः । कल्पयसि क्षणविनाज्ञं ननु पर्यायान्तरं तदपि ॥११८॥२४१३॥

118. Ante vā sarvanāšah pratipannah kena yadupalabdheh (Kalpayasi kṣaṇavināšam nanu paryāyāntaram tadapi 118 (2413)]

Trans. 118. Or, who has established (the theory of) entire destruction that you believe in transitariness (of an object) by the apprehension (of destruction) at the end? In fact, that is nothing but another form (of the object) 2413.

टीका-११८ यदि वा, भोः क्षणभङ्गवादिन् ! अन्ते पर्यन्तेऽपि मुद्ररादिसंनि-धाने घटादिवस्तुनः सर्वनाशः सर्वथा विनाशः केन प्रतिवादिना जैनेनाभ्युपगतः ? यदुपलब्धेर्यदर्शनावष्टम्भेन त्वं क्षणभङ्गरूपं प्रतिक्षणविनाशं कल्पयसि घटादेः ? । यदि मुद्ररादिसंनिधाने सर्वविनाशस्तस्य जैनेनाभ्युपगम्यते, तहिं तदवस्थायां घटो न दृश्यते, कपालान्येव च दृश्यन्त इत्येतत् किमिष्यते ? इत्याह-"नण्वित्यादि" नन्वहो ! मृद्रूपतयाऽवस्थितस्यैव घटद्रव्यस्य भूत-भविष्यदनन्तपर्यायापेक्षया तदपि पर्यायान्तरं पर्यायविशेष एव कपालानि, न पुनस्तदानीं घटस्य सर्वथा विनान्नः, मृद्रूपतया अप्यभावप्रसङ्गात्, तथा च कपा-लानाममृद्रूपतापत्तेरित्यसिद्धिः पर्यन्ते सर्वनाग्नस्येति ॥२४१३॥

D. C.

Acārya:--Who has admitted the theory of entire destruction of an object that you establish transitariness (of an object) like ghața by apprehending its destruction at the end when beaten by (an instrument like) hammer ?

Aśvamitra:---If you do not believe in entire destruction fo an object like ghața when beaten by an instrument like hammer, how is it that instead of ghața, its fragments are seen ?

Acārya:—Fragments of ghața are nothing but one of the various paryāyas (forms) of ghața itself, existing primarily as earth. Ghața, therefore, does not vanish entirely at that time. If it vanished entirely at the first moment, when struck by hammer, it ought to vanish as earth also. Fragments of the vessel will also cease to exist as a paryāya of earth as a result of that.

Thus, the theory that entire destruction is apprehended at the end, is proved to be logically false. 118 (2413)

Besides, जेसिं व न पज्जंते विणासदरिसणमिहंबराईणं । तन्निबब्सुवगमओ सब्बक्खणविणासिमयहाणी ॥११९॥२४१४॥

119. Jesim va na pajjante viņāsadarisaņamihambarāiņam i Tanniccabbhuvagamaö savvakkhaņaviņāsimayahāņī. (2414)

[येषां वा न पर्यन्ते विनाद्यादर्द्यानमिहाम्बरादीनाम् । तजित्याभ्युपगमतः सर्वक्षणविनाद्यिमतहानिः ॥११९॥२४१४॥

119. Yeşām va na paryante vināśadarśanamihāmbarādīnām (Tannityābhyupagamataņ sarvaksaņavināśimatahāniņ 119

(2414)]

Trans. 119. Or, by apprehending sky etc., whose destruction is not apprehended at the end, as it is imperishable, (your) theory of entire destruction of everything would be refuted. 2414.

टीका--११९ घटादीनां तावत् पर्यन्ते सर्वनाश्चदर्श्वनात् प्रसङ्ग्रेनादित एव प्रतिक्षणनश्वरतां साधयति भवान्, ततो येषामम्बरादीनां च्योम-काल-दिगा-दिनां पर्यन्ते विनाशदर्श्वनं कदाचिदपि नास्ति, तेष्वस्मात् प्रसङ्गसाधनात् प्रतिस-मयनश्वरत्वं न सिघ्यति । ततस्तेषां नित्यत्वमेवाभ्युपगन्तव्यम् । तन्नित्यत्वाभ्यु-पगमे च ''सर्वं क्षणिकम् '' इति व्याप्तिपरं यद् मतं भवतस्तस्य हानिरघटमानतैव प्रामोतीति ॥२४१४॥

D. C. By the example of ghata etc. you try to establish the theory that everything is $k \pm anika$. But elements like sky, time, space etc., are never apprehended as perishing at the end. You cannot apply your theory of entire destruction to them. On the contrary, you shall have to accept them as *nitya* or imperishable, refuting your own theory of sarva- $k \pm anikata$ (all-pervading transitoriness). 119 (2414)

Also,

पज्जायनयमयमिणं जं सब्वं विगम–संभव–सहावं । दव्वट्टियस्स निचं एगयरमयं च मिच्छत्तं ॥१२०॥२४१५॥

120. Pajjāyanayamayamiņam jam savvam vigama-sambhava sahāvam

Davvatthiyassa niccam egayaramayam ca micchattam (2415)

[पर्यायनयमतमिदं यत् सर्वं विगम-संभव-स्वभावम्। द्रव्यार्थिकस्य नित्यमेकतरमतं च मिथ्यात्वम् ॥१२०॥२४१५॥

120. Paryāyanayamatamidam yat sarvam vigama-sambhava svabhāvam I Dravyārthikasva nitvamekataramatam ca Mithvātvam

Dravyārthikasya nityamekataramatam ca Mithyātvam (2415)]

Trans. 120. That everything is susceptible to destruction and production, is the opinion of the (followers) of the Paryāya naya (school)⁷. (But) according to a Dravyarthika⁸ it is imperishable. Either of the two view-points is wrong. 2415.

टीका-१२० पर्यायवादिन एव नयस्येदं मतं यत् त्वं ब्रूपेः-सर्वमेव त्रिभ्रव-तान्तर्श्वतं वस्तु विमम-संभव-स्वभावं प्रतिक्षणग्रुत्पद्यते विनक्यति चेत्यर्थः । द्रव्यमेवार्थो यस्य न पर्याया स द्रव्यार्थिकस्तस्य तु द्रव्यार्थिकनयस्य तदेव सर्वे वस्तु नित्यं मतम् । एवं च स्थिते यद् भवानेकतरस्यैव पर्यायनयस्य प्रतिक्षणविन-श्रयत्वलक्षणं मतमभ्युपगच्छति तद् मिथ्यात्वमेवेति मुश्चेदमिति भावः ॥२४१५॥

D. C. Your view-point is like that of a follower of the Paryāya-naya school, which takes every object in this Universe as susceptible to production and destruction at every moment by its very nature.

But according to the school of Dravyarthikas, dravya or the elementary substance, of which an object is made, (and not the paryāyas or forms which an object exhibits at different times), is given importance. So, according to them, everything is *nitya* or eternal.

7. According to the followers of the Paryāya naya school or the school of Rotation, various forms that an object holds at various times, are taken as the object itself, rendering the object thereby as susceptible to production and destruction.

8. Dravyārthika is one who takes *dravya* (matter) as the *artha* (object) itself, that is to say, *dravya* or the elementary substance, of which an object is actually composed (and not the paryāya or form), is the object itself according to this school rendering it imperishable.

In the Nyāya Philosophy, there are nine kinds of *dravya* viz Prithvī, Ap, Tejas, Vāyu, Ākāśa, Kāla, Diś, Ātman, and Manah. But according to the Jainas, there are only six types of *dravya* viz- Dharmāsti Kāya, 2. A-dharmāsti Kāya, 3. Ākāśāsti Kāya, 4. Pudgalāsti Kāya, 5. Jīvāsti Kāya, and 6. Kāla.

: 123 :

According to you, everything is ksanika or destructible at every moment, as the paryāya vanishes soon after its production.

Now, both these view-points are extreme and exclusive so far as entire Truth is concerned. As you cling to one of them exclusively, your argument is not true wholly, but partially only. And hence, it cannot be accepted as a general principle. 120 (2415).

जमणंतपज्जयमयं वत्थुं सुवणं व चित्तपरिणामं। ठिइ-विभव-भंगरूवं निचानिचाइतोऽभिमयं ॥१२१॥२४१६॥

121. Jamaṇantapajjayamayam vatthum bhuvaṇam va cittaparināmam 1 Thii-vibhava-bhaṅgaravam niceāniceāito'bhimayam (2416)

[यदनन्तपर्यवमयं वस्तु सुबनमिव चित्रपरिणामम् । स्थिति-विभव-भङ्गरूपं नित्यानित्यादिततोऽभिमतम्॥१२१॥२४१६

121. Yadanantaparyavamayam vastu bhuvanamiva citraparināmam (Sthiti-vibhava-bhaigaropam nityānityāditato'bhimatam. 121 (2416)]

Trans. 121. Since (every) object is possessed of innumerable forms like the Universe, it should be taken as possessed of variegated forms, perishable and imperishable, susceptible to retention, production, and destruction. 2416.

टीका-१२१ यद् यस्माद् नैकान्ततः पर्यायमयं, नाप्थेकान्तेन द्रव्यरूपम्, किन्त्वनन्तपर्यायं स्थित्यु-त्पाद-विनाश्वरूपत्वादभू-भवन-विमान-द्वीप-सम्रुद्रा-दिरूपतया त्रिभ्रुवनमिव समस्तमथि वस्तु नित्याऽनित्यादिरूपतया विचित्रपरि-णाममनेकस्वरूपं भगवतामभिमतम् । अतोऽस्यैकान्तविनश्वरलक्षणैकरूपाम्युपगमो मिथ्यात्वमेवेति ॥२४१६॥

D. C. Since an object is not exclusively paryāya-maya (or formed of external forms alone) nor is it exclusively dravya-maya (or formed of mere matter), but it possesses innumerable

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forms that are *nitya*, as well as a-nitya, and that are susceptible to retention, production, and destruction like thsoe such as earth, sea, and planets etc, of the Universe. Hence, your assumption of an object as being exclusevely perishable is wrongly based. 121 (2416)

Moreover,

सुह-दुक्ख-बंध-मुक्खा उभयनयमयाणुवदिणो जुत्ता। एगयरपरिचाए सब्बब्बबहारवोच्छित्ती ॥१२२॥२४१७॥

122. Suha-dukkha-bandha-mukkhā ubhayanayamayāņuvaţţiņo juttā I Egayarapariccāe savvavvavahāravocchittī. (2417)

[सुख-दुःख-बन्ध-मोक्षा उभयनयमतानुवर्तिनो युक्ताः । एकतरपरित्यागे सर्वव्यवहारव्युच्छित्तिः ॥१२२॥२४१७॥

122. Sukha-duhkha-bandha-mokṣā ubhayanayamatānuvartino yuktāḥ I Ekataraparityāge sarva-vyāvahāravyucchittiḥ 122 (2417)]

Trans. 122. (Existence of) pleasure, pain, bondage, and Final Emancipation, is justifiable (only) to those who follow both the theories. By rejecting either of the two, there could be (absolute) destruction of all worldly affairs (vyavahāra) 2417

टीका--१२२ भावितार्थैवेति ॥२४१७॥

Now, explaining the above proposition in details, the author states :---

न सुहाइ पज्जयमए नासाओ सञ्वहा मयस्सेव । न य दब्वट्टियपक्खे निचत्तणओ नभस्सेव ॥१२३॥२४१८॥

123. Na suhāi pajjayamae nāsāö savvahā mayasseva i Na ya davvațțhiyapakkhe niccattaņaö nabhasseva (2418)

[न सुखादि पर्यवमते नाद्यात् सर्वथा मृतस्येव । न च द्रव्यार्थिकपक्षे नित्यत्वतो नभस इव ॥१२३॥२४१८॥

123. Na sukhādi paryavamate nāśāt sarvathā mritasyeva | Na ca dravyārthikapakše nityatvato nabhasa iva 123 (2418)]

Trans. 123. According to the theory of paryāyas, pleasure etc. do not (actually) exist on account of (their) entire destruction, like that of a dead being. And, that is not (acceptible) according to the theory of Dravyārthikas also, on account of their (their) being imperishable like sky. 2418.

टीका-१२३ एकस्मिन्नेव पर्यायनयमतेऽङ्गीक्रियमाणे न सुखादि जगतो घटत इति प्रतिज्ञा, सुख-दुःख-बन्ध-मोक्षादयो न घटन्त इत्यर्थः । उत्पत्त्यन-न्तरं सर्वथा नाशादिति हेतुः । मृतस्येवेति दृष्टान्तः । न च द्रव्यार्थिकनयपक्षे केवछे समाश्रीयमाणे सुखादि घटते, एकान्तनित्यत्वेनाविचलितरूपत्वात् नभस इवेति । तस्माद् द्रव्य-पर्यायोमयपक्ष एव सर्वमिदम्रुपपद्यत इत्ययमेव ग्राझः, केवलैकनयपक्षस्तु दोषलक्षकक्षीक्रतत्वात् त्याज्य एवेति ॥२४१८॥

D.C. The proposition is that, worldly pleasure, pain, bondage, Final Emancipation etc., could never exist if the theory of paryāya naya is exclusively accepted. For, according to that theory, everything perishes completely like a dead being, immediately after its production.

And pleasure etc., could not exist if the theory of Dravyārthikas is exclusively accepted. Because, according to that theory, everything would be imperishable like sky. All this is possible only if both the theories are accepted as supplementing each other. Resorting exclusively to either of the two, will result in a number of difficulties. 123 (2418)

Then, again, the Sthaviras tried to persuade him from another point of view :---

जइ जिणमयं पमाणं तो मा दब्बहियं परिचयसु । सक्सस व होइ जओ तन्नासे सब्बनासो त्ति ॥१२४॥२४१९॥

124. Jai Jiņamayam pamāņam to mā davvaţţhiyam pariccayasu Sakkassa va hoi jaö tannāse savvanāso tti. (2419)

[यदि जिनमतं प्रमाणं ततो मा द्रव्यार्थिकं परित्याक्षीः । चाक्यस्येव भवति यतस्तन्नाचे सर्वनाचा इति ॥१२४॥२४१९॥

Śākyasyeva bhavati yatastannāśe sarvanāśa iti. (2419)]

Trans. 124. If the principle of the Tīrthaṅkaras is (taken as) authentic by you, then, do not reject the theory of Dravyārthikas. For, in case of your believing in its destruction, like a Bauddha, all-pervading destruction will be attained 2419.

टीका-१२४ पूर्वदर्शितस्त्रतालापकभात्रार्थमजानञ्चपि विश्रमितचित्ततया तत्प्रामाण्यं पूत्कुर्वाणः किल जिनवचनप्रामाण्यावलम्बिनमात्मानं मन्यते भवान् । तद् यदि इन्त ! सत्यमेव जिनमतं भवतः प्रमाणम्, ततः केवलपर्यायवादितया जिनमताभिमतमपि द्रव्यास्तिकनयं मा परित्याक्षीः । द्रव्यास्तित्वं मा प्रतिषेधये-त्यर्थः, यतो यस्मात् ज्ञाक्यस्य बौद्धस्येव तव तञ्चाद्ये द्रव्यस्य सर्वथा विनान्ने स्वीक्रियमाणे " सव्यनासो ति " सर्वस्यापि तृप्ति-अमादेर्वन्ध-मोक्षादेश्व व्यव-हारस्य नान्नो भवति विलोपः प्रामोतीत्यर्थः ॥२४१९॥

D. C. In spite of your ignorance of the meaning of the statements of the aforesaid sutra, if you really consider yourself as a follower of the Tīrthaṅkaras, and hence take the words of the Tīrthaṅkaras as authentic, then, by inclining yourself exclusively to the Paryāya-vāda, do not reject the theory of Dravyārthikas, which is approved by the Tīrthaṅkaras, and do not try to refute the existence of *dravya* in vain.

Because, like a Bauddha monk, if you take *dravya* as absolutely perishable, everything such as feelings of satisfaction, exertion etc., as well as, bondage, and Final Emancipation, will have no scope of existence.

What happened, when Aśvamitra was not convinced although he was persuaded with arguments--

इय पण्णविओ वि जओ न पवज्जइ कओ तओ थज्झो। बिहरंतो रायगिहे नाउं तो खंडरक्खेहिं ॥१२५॥२४२०॥

^{124.} Yadi Jinamatam pramāņam tato mā dravyārthikam parityāksīņ 1

Vada]

गहिओ सीसेहिं समं एएऽहिमर त्ति जंपमाणेहि । संजयवेसच्छण्णा सज्झं सब्वे समाणेह ॥१२६॥२४२१॥ अम्हे सावय ! जयओ कत्थुप्पण्णा कहिं च पव्वइया । अमुगत्थ बेंति सड्ढा ते वोच्छण्णा तया चेव ॥१२७॥२४२२॥ तुब्भे तब्वेसघरा भणिए भयओ सकारणं च त्ति । पडिवण्णा गुरूमूलं गंतूण तओ पडिक्वन्ता ॥१२८॥२४२३॥

- 125. Iya pannavio vi jao na pavajjai kao tao bajjho l Viharanto Rāyagihe nāum to khandarakkhehim. (2420)
- 126. Gahiö sīschim samam ee'himara tti jampamāņehim ļ Sanjayavesacchaņņā sajjham savve samāņeha. (2421)
- 127. Amhe! sāvaya! jayao katthuppaņņā kahim ca pavvaiyā! Amugattha benti saḍḍhā te vocchaņņā tayā ceva. (2422)
- 128. Tubbhe tavvesadharā bhaņie bhayao sakāraņam ca tti i Padivaņņā gurumūlam gantūņa tao padikkantā (2423)

[इति प्रज्ञापितोऽपि यतो न प्रपद्यते स कृतस्ततो बाह्यः । विहरन् राजग्रहे ज्ञात्वा ततःखण्डरक्षैः ॥१२५॥२४२०॥ ग्रहीतःशिष्यैःसममेतेऽभिमरा इति जलपद्भिः । संयतवेषच्छन्नाः, सद्यःसर्वान् समानयेह ॥१२६॥२४२१॥ वयं आवक ! यतयः कुत्रोत्पन्नाः कदा च प्रव्रजिताः । अमुन्नक ब्रुवन्ति आद्धास्ते व्युच्छिन्नास्तदैव ॥१२७॥२४२२॥ यूयं तद्वेषधरा भणिते भयतः सकारणं चेति । प्रतिपन्ना गुरुमूलं गत्वा ततः प्रतिक्रान्ताः ॥१२८॥२४२३॥

- 125. Iti prajnāpito'pi yato na prapadyate sa kritastato bāhyah i Viharan Rājagrihe jnātvā tatah khaņdarakṣaih. (2420)
- 126. Grihîtah śişyaih samamete'bhimarā iti jalpadbhih I Samyataveşacchannāh, sadyah sarvān samānayeha (2421)
- 127. Vayam śrāvaka ! yatayah kutrotpannāh kadā ca pravrajitāh | Amutraka bruvanti śrāddhāste vyucchinnāstadaiva. (2422)

128. Yūyam tadvesadharā bhaņite bhayatah sakāraņam ceti (Pratipannā gurumālam gatvā tatah pratikrāntāh. (2423)]

Trans. 125-126-127-128. Although persuaded in this way by the preceptor as well as by Sthaviras, when he was not convinced, Aśvamitra was expelled from the Sangha.× Then having apprehended his arrival at the city of Rājagriha, the khanda-rakšakas (watchmen) caught him along with his pupils, saying that "These are burglers, in disguise of ascetics." "They should be brought here immediately." "O śrāvaka! we are ascetics" said Aśvamitra. 'Whom do you belong to?' and when were you initiated? We belong to such and such a place and we were initiated at such and such a time." was the reply. They, being dead, have perished there and then only. You seem to be imposters (and hence should be punished.)

When thus told, they resorted to their original (school of) preceptor and got themselves re-initiated. 2420-2423.

टीकाः-१२५-१२६-१२७-१२८ उक्तार्था एव, नवरं "मणिए भयओ सकारणं च त्ति"तै खण्डरक्षश्रावकैरेवं पूर्वोक्ते भणिते सति भयतो भयात् सकारणं च सयुक्तिकं च समाकर्ण्यानुशास्तिरूपं तद्वचः प्रतिपन्नास्तेऽश्वमित्रप्रमुखा निद्ववसाधवः ॥२४२३॥

End of the Discussion with the Fourth Nihnava.



× Congregation.

Chapter VI

॥ पश्चमनिह्नववक्तव्यता ॥



Discussion with the Fifth Nihnava.

अट्टावीसा दो वाससया तइआ सिद्धिं गयस्स वीरस्स । दो किरियाणं दिट्टी उल्ऌुगतीरे समुप्पण्णा ॥१२९॥२४२४

129. Atthävisä do väsasayä taiä Siddhim gayasya Virassa i Do-kiriyänam ditthi Ullugatire samuppannä. (2424)

[अष्टाविंदात्या द्वे वर्षदाते तदा सिद्धिं गतस्य वीरस्य। द्वैकियाणां दृष्टिहल्खुकातीरे समुत्पन्ना ॥१२९॥२४२४॥

129. Aştāvimśatyā dve varşaśate tadā Siddhim gatasya Vīrasya | Dvaikriyāņām drstirUllukātīre samutpannā. (2424)]

Trans. 129. Then, was originated the theory of Dvaikriyās¹, on the bank of the river Ullukā², two hundred and twentyeight years after (the Tīrthankara) Śramana Bhagavān Mahāvīra had attained Nirvāna. 2424.

टीका-१२९ अष्टाविंशत्यधिके द्वे वर्षशते तदा सिर्द्धि गतस्य श्रीमन्महा-वीरस्यात्रान्तरे द्वैक्रियानिह्ववानां दृष्टिरुल्छकातीरे सम्रुत्पन्नेति ॥२४२४॥

नइखेडजणवउल्लुग महागिरि धणगुत्त अज्जगंगे य। किरिया दो रायगिहे महानवोतीर मणिनाए॥१३०७२४२५॥

1. Who hold that two processes of feeling, work simultaneously.

2. Or in the city of Ullukātīra according to another interpretation. 130. Nai kheda janava Ulluga Mahāgiri Dhanagutta Ajjagange ya I Kiriyā do Rāyagihe Mahātavotira Maņināc. (2425)

[नदीखेटजनपदोल्ऌके महागिरिर्धनगुप्त आर्यगङ्गश्च । किये दो राजगृहे महातपस्तीर मणिनागः ॥१३०॥२४२५॥

130. Nadikhețajanapadollukc MahāgirirDhanagupta Āryagaingaśca (Kriye do Rājagrihe Mahātapastīra Maņināgaņ. (2425)]

Trans. 130. In the village named after (river) Ullukā, (there lived) Mahāgiri, Dhanagupta, and Arya-ganga (who upheld the theory of) two processes (taking place at one time). Maņi-nāga (brought him to the right path) in Rājagriha near the stream (of) Mahātapastīra. 2425.

टीका-१३० उल्लुका नाम नदी तदुपलक्षितो जनपदोऽप्युल्लुका । उल्लुका-नद्याश्वेकस्मिस्तीरे धूलिमाकारावृतनगरनिशेषरूपं खेटस्थानमासीत्, द्वितीये तूल्छकातीरं नाम नगरम् । अन्ये त्वाहुः एतदेवोल्छकातीरं धूलिप्राकारष्टतत्वात् खेटग्रुच्यते । तत्र च महागिरिशिष्यो धनगुप्तो नाम । अस्यापि शिष्य आर्यगङ्गो नामाचार्यः । अयं च नद्याः पूर्वतटे, तदाचार्यस्त्वपरतटे । ततोऽन्यदा सरत्समये स्ररिवन्दनार्थं गच्छन् गङ्गो नदीमुत्तरति । स च खल्वाटः । तत्स्तस्योपरिष्टादुष्णेन दश्वते खछी । अधस्तात्तु नदाः शीतलजलेन शैत्यमुत्पद्यते । ततोऽत्रान्तरे कथ-मपि मिथ्यात्वमोहनीयोदयादसौ चिन्तितवान्-अहो ! सिद्धान्ते युगपत्कियाद्वा-नुभवः किल निषिद्धः, अहंत्वेकस्मित्रेव समये शैत्यमौष्णं च वेदयामि, अतोऽनु-भवविरुद्धत्वाद् नेदमागमोक्तं शोभनमाभाति । इति विचिन्त्य गुरुभ्यो निवेदया-मास । ततस्तैर्वेक्ष्यमाणयुक्तिभिः प्रज्ञापितोऽसौ । यदा च स्वाग्रहग्रस्तबुद्धित्वादु न किश्चित् प्रतिपद्यते । तदोद्धाय्य बाह्य कृतो विहरन् राजगृहनगरमागतः तत्र च महातपस्तीरप्रभवनाम्नि प्रश्रवणे मणिनागनाम्नो नागस्य चैत्यमस्ति । तत्समीपे च स्थितो गङ्गः पर्षत्पुरस्सरं युगपत्कियाद्वयवेदनं प्ररूपयति स्म । तच श्रुत्वा प्रकुपितो मणिनागस्तमवादीत्-अरे दुष्ट शिक्षक ! किमेवं प्रज्ञापयसि, यतोऽत्रेव प्रदेशे समवसृतेन श्रीमदर्धमानस्वामिनैकस्मिन् समये एकस्या एव क्रियाया वेदनं

प्ररूपितम् । तचेह स्थितेन मयापि श्रुतम् । तत् किं ततोऽपि लष्टतरः प्ररूपको भवान्, येनैवं युगपत्कियाद्वयवेदनं प्ररूपयसि ? । तत्परित्यजैतां कूटमरूपणाम्, अन्यथा नाशयिष्यामि त्वाम् । इत्यादि--तदुदित भयवाक्यैर्युक्तिवचनैश्व प्रबुद्धोऽसौ मिथ्यादुष्कृतं दत्वा गुरुमूलं गत्वा प्रतिकान्त इति ॥२४२५॥

Digest of Commentary :---

D. C. 130. Ullukātīra is interpreted in three ways :---

- (1) On one of the banks of the river Ullukā, there was a place surrounded by a fort of dust.
- (2) There was a city named Ullukātīra.
- (3) Since Ullukātīra was surrounded by heaps of dust, it was known as a Kheța³ also⁴.

There lived a sädhu named Dhanagiri in the above-mentioned city. He was the pupil of Acārya Mahāgiri and he had a pupil named Gangācārya.

Once upon a time, Ārya Gangācārya was crossing the river Ullukā while going to pay his homage to his preceptor, who was staying on the opposite side of the river. Ārya Gangācārya was bald-headed. It was autumn and the water of the river was cold. So, while crossing the river his bald head felt heat from sunshine, and his feet felt cold due to the river-water being cold.

At this time, under the influence of Mithyātva Mohanīya (wrong belief caused by delusion), Gangācārya disbelieved the principle of Āgamas that two processes of sensation could never take place simultaneously and thought that he felt the sensations of heat and cold at the same time. He reported the view-point to his preceptor (and declared) that the principle of the Āgamas was false on the ground that it was contrary to the actual experience which he had undergone.

3. Kheta=Village.

4. Of the three interpretations mentioned here, the commentator seems to have chosen the first one. The preceptor tried to convince him of the validity of the religious principle of the Agamas, but he did not change his belief. Consequently, he was expelled from the Sangha.

Then, during the course of his wanderings from place to place, he went to the city of Rājagriha. There, in the midst of an assembly gathered near the temple of a serpent-god named Maņināga situated on the bank of a spring named Mahātapastīra, he preached his theory of dvikriyā. Maņināga was highly enraged at the arguments of Gaṅgācarya, and he said, "O wicked monk! Why do you try to preach such an ignoble principle here? Do you claim yourself to be even a greater preacher the Great Tīrthaṅkara Śrīmān Vardhamāna Swāmi who laid down, in this city of Rājagriha, the principle that one and only one process of experience could take place at one time? What do you mean by preaching a false theory of two processes of experience working at one time? Give up holding such false notions or else you will ruin yourself."

Being afraid of Maņināga, and becoming enlightened by sound reasoning, Ārya Gangācārya gave up his false belief and at last resorted to the school of his old preceptor after having excused Maņināga for his apparently harsh deed. 2425.

Now, the whole story is narrated in detail.

नइमुल्लुगमुत्तरतो सरए सीयजलमज्जगंगस्स । सूराभितत्तसिरसो सीउंसिणवेयणोभयओ ॥१३१॥२४२६॥

लग्गोऽयमसग्गाहो जुगवं उभयकिरियोवओगो ति। जं दो वि समयमेव य सीउसिणवेयणाओ मे ॥१३२॥२४२७॥

- 131. Naimullugamuttarato sarae siyajalamajjagangassa (Sūrābhitattasiraso sī-usiņaveyaņobhayaö. (2426)
- 132. Laggo'yamasaggāho jugavam ubhayakiriyogavaögo tti Jam do vi samayameva ya sī-usiņaveyaņāö me. (2427)

[नदीमुल्खुकामुत्तरतः शरदि झीतजलमार्यगङ्गस्य । सूराभितप्तशिरसः शीतोब्णवेदनोभयतः ॥१३१॥२४२६॥ लम्रोऽयमसद्ग्रहो युगपदुमयक्रियोपयोग इति । यद् द्वे अपि समकमेव च झीतोष्णवेदने मे ॥१३२॥२४२७॥

- 131. Nadimullukāmuttaratah śaradi śītajalamāryagangasya i Sūrābhitaptaśirasah śītosnavedanobhayatah. (2426)
- 132. Lagno'yamasadgraho yugapadubhayakriyopayoga iti | Yad dve api samakameva ca śītoṣṇavedane me. (2427)]

Trans. 131-132. While crossing the cold waters of river Ullukā in Autumn, as he felt the sensations of cold as well as of heat, due to his head being heated by sushine, \overline{A} rya Ganga drew a false conclusion that "Since I have felt both the sensations-that of cold as well as of heat-at one time, the two processes of experience work simultaneously." (2426-2427)

टीका-१३१-१३२ गतार्थे, नवरमार्यगङ्गस्य लग्नोऽयमसद्व्रद्दो यदुत-युगपत्कियाद्रयसंवेदनोपयोगोऽस्ति, यद् यस्माद् मे मम द्वे अपि श्रीतोष्णवेदने समकालमेव स्तः । प्रयोगश्चात्रयुगपदुभयक्रियासंवेदनमस्ति, अनुभवसिद्धत्वात्, मम पादश्चिरोगतश्रीतोष्णक्रियासंवेदनवदिति ॥२४२६॥२४२०॥

D. C. In support of his theory, (which is really speaking nothing but misapprehension) Gangācārya argues as follows:----"Since my head felt hot due to sunshine, and my feet felt cold at the same time due to cold waters running beneath, I felt both the sensations simultaneously. It is clear, therefore, that the processes of undergoing both the feelings are working simultaneously. This is supported by my practical experience."

Then, तरतमजोगेणायं गुरुणाऽभिहिओ तुमं न लक्खेसि । समयाइसुहुमयाओ मणोऽलिचलसुहुमयाओ य ॥१३३॥२४२८॥

133. Taratamajogeņāyam guruņā'bhihio tumam na lakkhesi (Samayāisuhumayāö maņo'ticalasuhumayāö ya. (2428)

[तरतमयोगेनायं गुरुणाऽभिहितस्त्वं न लक्षयसि । समयादिसूक्ष्मतातो मनोऽतिचलसूक्ष्मतातश्च ॥१३३॥२४२८॥

133. Taratamayogenāyam guruņā'bhihitastvam na laksayasi i Samayādisūksmatāto mano'ticalasuksmatātasca. (2428)]

Trans. 133. The $\overline{A}c\overline{a}rya$ replied: "That takes place in (regular) turn. You are (not able) to mark (it) due to exquisite unstability and subtlety of mind, as well as, subtlety of time etc. 2428.

टीका-१३३ गुरुणाऽभिहितोऽसौ-हन्त ! योऽयं युगपत्कियाद्वयानुभवस्त्वया गीयते स तरतमयोगेन क्रमेणैव भवतः संपद्यते, न युगपत्, परं सदपि क्रमभवन-मस्य त्वं न लक्षयसि, समया-ऽऽवलिकादेः कालस्य सूक्ष्मत्वात्, तथा मनस-श्वातिचलत्वेनातिसूक्ष्मत्वेन चाशुसंचारित्वादिति । तस्मात् "अनुभवसिद्धत्वात्" इत्यसिद्धोऽयं हेतुरिति ॥२४२८॥

D. C.

Acārya Dhanagupta — Feeling of two sensations does not actually take place simultaneously as you represent, but both the sensations are felt one after the other. You are not able to mark such a process, because the period of interval between the two different experiences is extremely short, and the mind, which feels the two sensations one after the other, is fickle and subtle by its very nature. Your apprehension of the practical experience undergone by your own self, is therefore wrong and hence your theory is baseless. 133 (2428)

सुहुमासुचरं चित्तं इंदियदेसेण जेण जं कालं । संबज्झइ तं तम्मूत्तनाणहेउ त्ति नो तेण ॥१३४॥२४२९॥ उवलभए किरियाओ जुगवं दो दूरभिण्णदेसाओ । पाय-सिरोंगय-सीउण्हवेयणाणुभवरूवाओ ॥१३५॥२४३०॥

:134:

134. Suhumāsucaram cittam indiyadeseņa jeņa jam kālam i Sambajjhai tam tammattanāņaheu tti no teņa (2429)

[सूक्ष्माद्युचरं चित्तमिन्द्रियदेदोन येन यस्मिन् काले। संबध्यते तत् तन्मात्रज्ञानहेतुरिति नो तेन ॥१३४॥२४२९॥ उपलभते किये युगपद् द्वे दूर-भिन्नदेद्यात्। पाद-दिारोगतद्यीतो-ष्णवेदनानुभवरूपे ॥१३५॥२४३०॥

- 134. Soksmäsucaram cittamindriyadeśena yena yasmin kāle l Sambadhyate tat tanmātrajnānaheturiti no tena. (2429)
- 135. Upalabhate kriye yugapad dve dura-bhinnadeśat (Pāda-śirogataśīto-sņavedanānubhavarupe. (2430)]

Trans. 134–135. Mind, subtle and quick (as it is), becomes the cause of perception, only with regard to those senseorgans with which it is connected and that (period of) time (only) during which (the perception takes plase). So, two processes in the form of feeling heat and cold at head and feet (respectively), could not take place simultaneously, owing to the two places being extremely remote 2429–2430.

टीका-१३४-१३५ सक्ष्ममाशुचरं च चित्तं मनः, तत्र सक्ष्मं सक्ष्मातीन्द्रि-यपुद्र त्र स्कन्धनिर्वत्तत्वात् , आशुचरं च शीघ्र संचरणशीलत्वात् । ततश्च तदेवंभूतं चित्तं येन येन कायाद्याकारस्पर्श्वनादिद्र व्येन्द्रिय संबन्धिना देशेन सह यस्मिन् काल्ठे संबध्यते संयुज्यते तस्मिन् काल्ठे तन्मात्रज्ञानहेतुर्भवति-येन स्पर्शनादिद्र व्ये-न्द्रियदेशेन संबध्यते तज्जन्यस्यैव शीतादिविपयस्योष्णादिविषयस्य वैकतरविज्ञान-स्य हेतुर्जायते, न तु येनेन्द्रियदेशेन सह सत्काल्ठे स्वयं तद न संबद्धं तज्जन्य-ज्ञानस्यापि हेतुरित्यर्थः । इति शब्दो वाक्यसमाप्त्यर्थः । येनैवम् , तेन कारणेन नो नैव दूरभिन्नदेशे द्वे क्रिये कोऽपि युगपदुपल्भते संवेदयत इति संबन्धः । कयंभूते द्वे क्रिये ? इत्याह-पाद-शिरोगतशीतोष्णवेदनयोरनुभवनमनुभवस्तद्र्पे नदान्मिके । अत्र प्रयोगः-इह पाद-शिरोगतशीतोष्णवेदने युगपद्द न कोऽपिसंवे-

^{135.} Uvalabhae kiriyāö jugavam do dorabhiņņadesāö (Pāya-sirogaya-siuņhaveyaņāņubhavarūvāö. (2430)

दयते, भिन्नदेशत्वात्, विन्ध्य-हिमवच्छिखरस्पर्शनकियाद्वयवदिति "अनुभव सिद्धत्वात्" इत्यसिद्धोऽयं हेतुरिति ॥२४२९॥२४३०॥

D. C. Mind is subtle, because it is beyond the perception of senses, and quick, because it moves swiftly. Such a mind becomes the cause of feeling heat, cold etc., as a result : of its contact with sense-organs, like that of touch etc; for a particular period of time during which the contact is maintained. When it is not connected with the proper sense-organ, it does not work as the cause of perception by means of that seuse-organ. It is, therefore, utterly impossible for anyone to undergo sensations of heat and cold simultaneously, at two extremely remote sense-organs like head and feet. Your argument of personal experience is baseless from this view point also. 134-135 (2429-2430)

Morecver,

उवओगमओ जीवो उवउज्जइ जेण जम्मि जं कालं। सो तम्मओवओगो होइ जहिंदोवओगम्मि ॥१३६॥२४३१॥

136. Uvaögamaö jīvo uvaujjai jeņa jammi jam kālamt So tammaovaogo hoi jahindovaögammi. (2431)

[उपयोगमयो जीव उपयुज्यते येन यस्मिन् यस्मिन् काले। स तन्मयोपयोगो भवति यथेन्द्रोपयोगेन ॥१३६॥२४३१॥

136. Upayogamayo jīva upayujyate yena yasmin yasmin kāle | Sa tanmayopayogo bhavati yathendropayogena (2431)]

Trans. 136. Whenever the soul which is *upayoga-maya*⁵, is engaged (with a particular sense-organ), it becomes applicable to that (sense-organ) only, as in the case of (one under the) employment of Indra. 2431.

टीका-?३६ उपयोगेनैव केवलेन निर्वृत्त उपयोगमयो जीवः । ततः स येन केनापि स्पर्श्वनादीन्द्रियदेश्नेन करणभूतेन यस्मिन् शीतोष्णाद्यन्यतरविषये '' जं

5. i. c. Complete by application to or engagement with a sense-organ.

कालं ति" यस्मिन् काल उपयुज्यते सावधानो भवति तन्मयोपयोगी मवति-यत्र शीताद्यन्तरार्थउपयुक्तस्तन्मयोपयोग एव भवति नान्यथोपयुक्त इत्यर्थः । उदाहरणमाह-" जहिं दोवओगम्मि त्ति" यथेन्द्रोपयोगे वर्तमानो माणवकस्त-न्मयोपयोग एव भवति, न पुनरर्थान्तरमयोपयोगः । इदमत्र तात्पर्यम्-प्कस्मिन् काल एकत्रैवार्थउपयुक्तो जीवः संभवति, न त्वर्थान्तरे, पूर्वोक्तसांकर्यादिदोष-प्रसङ्गात् । ततश्च युगपत्कियाद्वयोपयोगानुभवोऽसिद्ध एवेति ॥२४३१॥

D. C. Jīva is *upayoga-maya* by nature. So, when it applies itself to a particular sense-organ, say, that of touch, and feels the sensation of, say, heat and cold, it is completely devoted to that sense-organ, and to those subjects of sensations at that time and is not utilized elsewhere.

As for example, when a person, say, Māṇavaka is employed in the service of Indra, he is entirely at the disposal of Indra, and does not work for anyone else. Similarly, when the Soul is employed for the perception of a particular object, it remains entirely at the disposal of that *indriya* and the object concerned, so long as it is connected with them.

In short, Jīva is applicable to one sense-organ at one time, and never to two at the same time. For, otherwise, faults like that of Sāńkarya etc. would arise.

Thus, the theory of two kriyās taking place at one time, is invalid.

सो तदुवओगमेत्तोवउत्तसत्ति त्ति तस्समं चैव । अत्थंतरोवओगं जाउ कहं केण वंसेण १॥१३७॥२४३२॥

137. So taduvaögamettovauttasatti tti tassamam ceva i Atthantarovaögam jäu kaham kena vamsena? (2432)

[स तदुपयोगमात्रोपयुक्तदाक्तिरिति तत्सममेव। अर्थान्तरोपयोगं यातु कथं केन बांद्रोन १॥१३७॥२४३२॥

137. Sa tadupayogamātropayuktaśaktiriti tatsamameva | Arthāntaropayogam yātu katham kena vāmśena? (2432)] Trans. 137. How could that (Soul) with all its energy utilized at the disposal of one object, be utilized for another (either) wholly or (even) partially exactly along with it ? 2432.

टीका-१३७ स जीवः "तदुवओगमेत्तोवउवसत्ति ति" तस्य विवक्षितै-कार्थस्रोपयोगस्तदुपयोगः स एव तन्मात्रं तत्रोपयुक्ता व्याप्टता निष्ठां गता शक्ति-र्यस्य स तदुपयोगमात्रोपयुक्तशक्तिरिति कृत्वा कथं तत्समकालमेवार्थान्तरं उपयोगं यातु १-न कथञ्चिदित्यर्थः, सांकर्यादिमसङ्गात् । किञ्च, सर्वैरपि स्वप्रदे-शैकस्मिन्नर्थउपयुक्तो जीवः केनोद्वरितेनांशेनार्थन्तरोपयोगं व्रजतु १ । नास्त्येव हि स कश्चिदुद्वरितांशो येन तत्समकमेवार्थान्तरोपयोगमसौँ गच्छेदिति भावः ॥२४३२॥

D. C.

Acārya:—When the Soul employs all its energy in the perception of one (object), it is not possible for it to work for the perception of another at the same time. And, since all the parts of Jīva are applied together at one place, it is not even possible to apply itself even partially at another place simultaneously.

Ganga :---If two processes of perception do not work simultaneously, as you say, what makes me feel like that? 137 (2432)

The answer is—

समयाइसुहुमयाओ मन्नसि जुगवं च भिन्नकालं पि। उप्पलदलसयवेहं व जह व तदलायचकं ति ॥१३८॥२४३३॥

138. Samayāisuhumayāö mannasi jugavam ca bhinnakālam pi i Uppaladalasayaveham va jaha va tadalāyacakkam ti (2433)

[समयादिसूक्ष्मतातो मन्यसे युगपच भिन्नकालमपि । उत्पलदल्ह्यातवेघमिव यथा वा तदलातचक्रमिति ॥१३८॥२४३३॥

138. Samayādisūksmatāto manyase yugapacca bhinnakālamapi (Utpaladalasatavedhamiva yathā vā tadalātacakramiti (2433)] Trans. 138. On account of acute subtlety of time etc. you take an action taking place at different times as simultaneous as in the case of boring a hole into hundred petals of lotus or (rotating of) a circular series of (burning) coal. 2433.

टीका-१३८ समयावलिकादिकालकृतविभागस्य सक्ष्मत्वाद् भिन्नकालमपि कालविभागेन प्रवृत्तमपि क्रियाद्वयसंवेदनमुत्पलपत्रशतवेधवद् युगपत् प्रवृत्तमिव मन्यसे त्वम् । न हि उत्पलपत्रशतमौत्तराधर्येण व्यवस्थापितं सुतीक्ष्णयापि सच्या छेकेन समर्थेनापि च वेधकर्ता समकालमेव विध्यते, किन्तु कालमेदेन, उपर्युप-रितनेऽविद्धेऽघोऽघोवर्तिनः पत्रस्य वेधायोगात्, अथ च वेधकर्ता युगपद् विहित-मेव वेधं मन्यते, तद्धेधनकालमेदस्य सक्ष्मत्वेन दुर्लक्षत्त्वात् । यथा वा तत् प्रसिद्धमलातचकं कालमेदेन दिक्षु अमदपि अमणकालमेदस्य सक्ष्मत्वेन दुरवगम-त्वाद् निरन्तरभ्रमणमेव लक्ष्यते । एवमिहापि शीतो-ष्णक्रियानुभवकालमेदस्य सक्ष्मत्वेन दुरवसेयत्वाद् युगपदिव तदनुमवं मन्यते भवानिति ॥२४३३॥

D. C.

Acārya:—When a strong person bores a hole into a hundred petals of lotus with a small needle after arranging the one over the other, he thinks that all the petals are pierced through simultaneously. But really speaking, that is not so. A petal beneath is not pierced unless and until the one above it is actually pierced through. Thus, really, every petal is pierced through one after the other, and hence, at different times. This difference in time is so minute that the person boring the hole, is not able to mark it.

So, also, when a circular series of burning coal is rotated, it does rotate in different directions at different times. But the timegap between every two directions is so small due to its quick speed, that one apprehends it only as moving constantly in one direction. The same is the case here also.

Sensations of heat and cold are definitely felt at different times, but they are not so apprehended because of subtlety of time etc. Thus, you are wrong in believing that the two processes of perception take place simultaneously. 138 (2433)

And,

चित्तं पि नेंदियाइं समेइ सममह य खिप्पचारि ति । समयं व सुक्कसक्कुलिदसणे सब्वोवलद्धि ति ॥१३९॥२४३४॥ सब्वेंदिओवलंभे जइ संचारो मणस्स दुछक्खो । एगेंदिओवओगंतरम्मि किह होउ सुलकखो ? ॥१४०॥२४३५॥

- 139. Cittam pi nendiyāim samei samamaha ya khippacāri ttiļ Samayam va sukkasakkulidasaņe savvovaladhi tti. (2434)
- 140. Savvendiövalambhe jai sancāro maņassa dullakkho Egendiövaögantarammi kiha hou sulakkho? (2435)

[चित्तमपि नेन्द्रियाणि समेति सममथ च क्षिप्रचारीति । समकमिव शुष्कद्राष्कुलीददाने सर्वोपलब्धिरिति ॥१३९॥२४३४॥ सर्वेन्द्रियोपलम्मे यदि संचारो मनसो दुर्लक्षः । एकेन्द्रियोपयोगान्तरे कथं भवतु सुलक्षः ॥१४०॥२४३५॥

- 139. Cittamapi nendriyāņi sameti samamatha ca ksipracārīti i Samakamiva suskasaskulīdasane sarvopalabdhiriti (2434)
- 140. Sarvendriyopalambhe yadi sancāro manaso durlakṣaḥ ı Ekendriyopayogāntare katham bhavatu sulakṣaḥ. (2435)]

Trans. 139-140. Mind also does not combine itself with (all the) sense-organs at the same time; (but) since it is quick in movement, its connection with the sense-organs is apprehended as simultaneous, just as there is apprehension of (all) tastes at (the time of) eating dry sesamum cake. (And), if the movement of mind is difficult to be traced at the (time of) perception of all sense-organs, how could it be easily apprehended in (case of) engagement with one sense-organ? (2434-2435)

टीका-१३९-१४० चित्तमपि च नैवेन्द्रियाणि सममेव समेति मनोऽपि नैवेन्द्रियैः सह युगपत् संबध्यत इत्यर्थः । उपलक्षणत्वाद् नापि शिरः-पादादिभिः स्पर्श्वनेन्द्रियदेशैर्युगपत संबध्यते, अथ च क्षिप्रचारि शीघसंचरणशीलं तदिति कृत्वा समकमिव युगपदिव '' सर्वत्र संबद्धं लक्ष्यते '' इति शेषः । दृष्टान्तमाइ--"समयं वेत्यादि"। "समयं वा" इत्येतदन्तरं योजितमप्यावृत्त्या पुनरपीह योज्यते । तत्र वाञ्चब्दो यथार्थे । यथाश्चब्दश्च दृष्टान्तोपन्यासार्थे । यथा शुष्क **शष्कुलिकादशने सर्वेषामपि शष्कुलिकागतरूप-रस-गन्ध-स्पर्श-शब्दानाग्रुप**ल-बिधः सर्वोपलब्धिरसमकं प्रवृत्तापि समकं लक्ष्यते, तथाव्त्रापि मनः--शिरः--पादा-दिभिः स्पर्श्वनेन्द्रियदेशैरिन्द्रियान्तरेश्च क्रमेण संबध्यमानमपि युगपत् संबध्यमानं लक्ष्यत इत्यर्थः । इदमत्र हृदयम्-इह दीर्घा शुष्कां च राष्कुलिकां कस्यचिद भक्षयतस्तद्रूपं चक्षुषा वीक्षमाणस्य रूपज्ञानमुत्पद्यते, तद्गन्धं च घ्राणेनाऽऽजिघ्रतो गन्धज्ञानम्, तद्रसं च रसनयाऽऽखादयतो रसज्ञानम्, तत्स्पर्शं च स्पर्श्वनेन वेदयतः स्पर्शज्ञानम्, चर्चणोत्थं तच्छब्दं च श्रृणवतः शब्दज्ञानमुपत्रायते। एतानि च पश्चापि ज्ञानगनि क्रमेणैव जायन्ते, अन्यथा सांकर्यादिदोषशसङ्गात्, मत्यादि-ज्ञानोपयोगकाले चावध्याद्युपयोगस्यापि प्राप्तेः, एकं च घटादिकमर्थं विकल्प-यतोऽनन्तानामपि घटाद्यर्थविकल्पानां प्रवृत्तिप्रसङ्घाच । न चैतदस्ति । ततःक्रमेण जायमानान्यप्येतानि ज्ञानानि प्रतिपत्ता "युगपदुत्पद्यन्ते " इति मन्यते, समया--ऽज्बलिकादिकालविभागस्य सक्ष्मत्वात् । एवमिहापि त्रिरः-पादादिभिः स्पर्श्वने-न्द्रियदेशैरिन्द्रियान्तरैश्च ऋमेण संबध्यमानमपि मनः प्रतिपत्ता युगपत् संबध्य-मानमध्यवस्यति । न तु तत्त्वतोऽसौ मनसः स्वभावः, तथा चोक्तम्''-युगपज्ज्ञा-नानुत्पत्तिर्मनसो लिङ्गम्" इति । यदि चोक्तन्यायेन सर्वेन्द्रियद्वारेणोत्पद्यमान उपलम्भे कमेण संचरतों मनसः संचारो दुर्रुक्षः, तर्हि कथमेकस्यैव स्पर्शनेन्द्रिय-मात्रस्य शीतवेदनोपयोगादुष्णवेदनोपयोगरूपउपयोगान्तरे जन्ये तत्संचारःसुल-क्षःस्यात्, अलक्ष्यमाणे च तत्क्रमसंचारे शीतो-ष्णक्रियाद्वयोपयोगविषयौ युगपद-ष्यवसायौ भवतः ? इति ॥२४३४॥ व्याख्यातार्थेव ॥२४३५॥

D. C. Mind does not come in contact with all sense-organs at the same time. So, it is not possible for it to come in contact with the senses of touch at feet and head simultaneously. Since the movement of mind is extremely quick, mind appears as if it is connected with all the *indrivas* simultaneously. As for example, a person eating a sesamum cake, perceives form by means of the sense of sight (eye), smell by the sense of smell (nose), taste by the sense of taste (tongue), touch by the sense of touch (skin), and sound by the sense of hearing (ear) while seeing, smelling, eating, touching, and, hearing the sound of chewing.

All the five kinds of perception are attained, when the mind comes in contact with the respective five *indrivas* one after the other and not simultaneously. It is only due to the fact that mind is extremely quick in movement that it appears as if it is connected with all the indrivas simultaneously, but really speaking, that is not true. For, in that case, faults like sānkarya would arise, while in course of perception of *mati jnāna* etc; avadhi jnāna would work with it simultaneously and while considering an object like ghața, innumerable ghațas would come up alternately without fail. But this does not actually happen in real life.

Although the afore-mentioned perceptions are attained one after the other, the observer being unable to mark the subtle differences in time etc, apprehends all of them as produced simultaneously. Here also, mind is employed in the senses of touch at head and feet respectively at different times. Still, however, one who feels the sensations of heat and cold, thinks that, mind is employed at both the places simultaneously. Really speaking, "Non-production of many cognitions at one time is the (essential) quality of mind⁶." Still, however, since the movement of mind passing from one object to another is difficult to be traced, the movement of mind from the cognition of heat to that of cold, becomes more difficult to be traced. In this way, it is only due to your inability to apprehend the movement of mind, that you seem to feel two sensations to-gether at one time that you labour under such misapprehensions. For, when it is not detected in case of perception of all the indrivas, it is much more difficult to detect in case of its applications to one indriya. 140 (2435)

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^{6.} For, it has already been said "Yugapajjńānanutpattir-manas lingam."

Again the author states a mumber of difficulties in case of accepting the mind as applicable to more than one object at a time :---

अन्नविणिउत्तमण्णविणिओगं लहइ जइ मणो तेणं। हर्त्थि पि द्वियं पुरओ किमण्णचित्तो न लक्खेइ ? ॥१४१॥२४२६॥

141. Annaviņiuttamaņņaviņiögam lahai jai maņo teņam t Hatthim pi tthiyam puraö kimaņņacitto na lakhei? (2436)

[अन्यविनियुक्तमन्यविनियोगं लभते यदि मनस्तेन । हस्तिनमपि स्थितं पुरतःकिमन्यचित्तो न लक्षयति ? ॥१४१॥२४३६॥

141. Anyaviniyuktamanyaviniyogam labhate yadi manastena | Hastinamapi sthitam puratah kimanyacitto na laksayati ? (2436)]

Trans. 141. If the mind engaged (already) in (a particular) object, could be engaged in some other object at the same time, why could a person with his mind concentrated elsewhere, not observe an elephant standing in front of him? 2436

टीका-१४१ अन्यस्मिन् शीतवेदनादिकेऽर्थे विनियुक्तम्रुपयुक्तमन्यविनियुक्तं मनो यदि "अण्णं ति" अन्यउष्णवेदनादिकोऽर्थस्तद्विषयोपयोगोऽन्यस्तमन्यं विनियोगम्रुपयोगं लभते, "तेणं ति" तद्दि किमित्यन्यचित्तोऽन्यार्थोपयुक्तचित्तो देवदत्तादिईस्तिनमपि पुरतो व्यवस्थितं न लक्षयति १। तस्मादेकस्मित्र्थउपयुक्तं मनो न कदाचिदन्यार्थोपयोगं लभत इति ॥२४३६॥

D. C. If the mind engaged in the process of feeling the sensation of cold is taken to have, been engaged in the process of feeling the sensation of heat at the same time, there is no reason why a person with his mind concentrated in a particular object, be not able to observe even an elephant standing in his very front. The main reason for this, is that the mind of the person being totally concentrated in some other object, it will not be able to recognize even objects like an elephant etc; standing even in his very front. 141 (2436).

विणिओगन्तरलाभे व किंत्थ नियमेण तो समं चेव। पइवत्थुमसंखेज्जाऽणंता वा जंन विणिओगा ? ॥१४२॥२४३७॥

142. Viņiögantaralābhe va kim tiha niyameņa to samam ceva Paivatthumasankhejjā'ņantā vā jam na viņiogā ? (2437)

[विनियोगान्तरलाभे वा किमन्त्र नियमेन ततः सममेव । प्रतिवस्त्वसंख्येया अनन्ता वा यद् न विनियोगाः?॥१४२॥२४३७॥

142. Viniyogäntaraläbhe vä kimatra niyamena tatah samameva Prativastvasamkheyä anantä vä yad na viniyogäh? (2437)]

Trans. 142. Or, if the (simultaneous) application (of mind) in another object (is accepted), what is the use of the rule (of the application of two processes)? (And) then, why should innumerable or endless applications taking place simultaneously in (case of) each object be not accepted? 2437.

टीका-१४२ एकोपयोगकाले विनियोगान्तरस्योपयोगान्तरस्य लाभे वेष्य-माणे "तो त्ति" ततःकिमत्र क्रियाद्वयोपयोगलक्षणेन नियमेन, "जं ति" यत् प्रतिवस्त्वसंख्येया अनन्ता वा सममेव युगपदेव विनियोगा नेष्यन्ते ?। इदम्रुक्तं भवति--यदि शीतवेदनोपयोगकाले उष्णवेदनोपयोगोऽपीष्यते, तर्हि किमत्रानेन क्रियाद्वयोपयोगनैयत्येन, यदसंख्येया अनन्ता वा प्रतिवस्तु युगपदुपयोगा न भवन्ति, यथैककाले द्वितीयोपयोगस्तथा बहवोऽपि भवन्त्विति भावः । इह च "दव्वाओ असंखेजे संखेज्जे यावि पज्जवे लहइ" इति वचनादेकस्मिन्नर्थे सम-कालमवधिज्ञानिनः किलोत्कुप्त्तोऽसंख्येया उपयोगाः भाष्नुवन्ति, रोषज्ञानिनां-त्वनन्ता इत्यभिप्रायवता प्रोक्तम्-" पइवत्थुमसंखेज्ज "-इत्यादि ॥२४३७॥

D. C. If it is accepted that the mind is engaged in another object at the same time when it is engaged in one, the rule regarding the employment of two different processes becomes useless. For, in that case, why not to accept innumerable applications of mind in case of (perception of) each object?

It has already been said before⁷ that every object attains

7. Vide v. 760

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countable or even uncountable paryāyas. One possessing avadhi jnāna⁸ is able to observe a-samkhyeya or innumerable forms at a time, while those possessing the remaining two kinds of knowledge⁹, are able to apprehend ananta or endless paryāyas at one time. 142 (2437)

Now the author states the opponent's argument and refutes it :---

बहु-बहुविहाइगहणे नणुवओगबहुया सुएऽभिहिआ। तमणेगग्गहणं चिय उवओगाणेगया नत्थि॥१४३॥२४३८॥

143. Bahu-bahuvihāigahaņe naņuvaögabahuyā sue'bhihiā | Tamaņegaggahaņam ciya uvaögāņegayā natthi. (2438)

[बहु-बहुविधादिग्रहणे ननूपयोगबहुता श्रुतेऽभिहिता । तदनेकग्रहणमेवोपयोगानेकता नास्ति ॥१४३॥२४३८॥

143. Bahu-bahuvidhādigrahaņe nanepayogabahutā śrute'bhihitā i Tadanekagrahaŗamevopayogānekatā nāsti. (2438)]

Trans. 143. "Plurality of applications has already been sanctioned by the Holy Writ, in (case of) apprehension of numerous varieties etc." It is only the comprehension of numerous forms in general (that is meant), (and) not the plurality of apprehensions." 2438.

टीका-१४३ ननु बहु-बहुविध-क्षिप्रा-ऽनिश्रिता-ऽसंदिग्ध-ध्रुव सेतर वस्तुग्रहणे पूर्वमिंहैवावग्रहादीनामनुज्ञाने एकस्मिन्नुपयोगबहुता श्रुतेऽभिहितैव, इति '' पइवत्थुमसंखेज्ज '' इत्यादि सिद्धसाधनमेव, इति परेणोक्ते सत्याह-''तम-णेगेत्यादि '' । तद् बहुविधादिरूपं वस्तुनोऽनेकपर्यायाणां सामान्यरूपतया ग्रहण

8. Visual knowledge; direct knowledge of matter limited as to subject, place, time, and nature, i. e. without the help of the senses.

9. Viz. Manah-paryaya (Mental Knowledge),-the state of mental perception which preceds the attainment of Kevala Jñāna (Perfect Knowledge) and Kevala Darśana (Absolute Perception).

मात्रमेव ज्ञाने उपयोगयोग्यतामात्रव्यवस्थापनमेव, एकर्सिमस्तु वस्तुन्येककालग्नु-पयोगानेकता कापि नास्ति, ऋमेणैवीपयोगानां भावादिति ॥१४३॥२४३८॥ D. C.

Ārya Ganga — While describing the process of avagraha (general apprehension) etc, apprehension of plenty of paryāyas, has already been laid down by the Holy Writ. Then, what harm is there if we accept innumerable or endless applications (of mind) at the same time ?

 $\overline{A}c\overline{a}rya:$ —That is not proper. For, in that rule, general apprehension of innumerable *pary* $\overline{a}yas$ of an object (with regard to the perception of an object) is meant; but plurality of the application of mind in one object at one time is not at all meant. Applications of mind are always made one after the other. 143 (2438)

समयमणेगग्गहणं जइ सीओसिणदुगम्मि को दोसो ?। केण व भणियं दोसो उवओगदुगे वियारोऽयं ॥१४४॥२४३९॥

144. Samayamanegaggahanam jai siösinadugammi ko doso?! Kena va bhaniyam doso uvaögaduge viyaro'yam. (2439)

[समकमनेकग्रहणं यदि ज्ञीतोष्णद्विके को दोषः ?। केन वा अणितं दोष उपयोगद्विके विचारोऽयम् ॥१४४॥२४३९॥

144. Samakamanekagrahanam yadi śītoṣṇadvike ko doṣaḥ ? | Kena vā bhanitam doṣa upayogadvike vicāro'yam (2439)]

Trans. 144. "If the simultaneous apprehension of many paryayas (is acceptible), what harm is there (in accepting) sensations of heat and cold (being felt) simultaneously." Who says that there is any harm (in accepting so)? Here the question is of two upayogas or applications (being simultaneous" 2439.

टींका-१४४ यद्याचार्य ! समकं युगपदनेकेषामर्थानां ग्रहणं त्वयाप्यनुझायते तदा शीतोष्णद्वये गृह्यमाणे को दोषः येन गङ्गाभ्युपगमो ष्द्यते ? । स्ररिराह- "केण वेत्यादि" केन पुनर्भणितम्-हन्त ! यत् समकमनेकार्थप्रहणे दोषः ? गृह्यन्ते युगपदपि सामान्यरूपतया सेना-वन-ग्राम-नगरादिवदनेकेऽर्था इति, पतद् न निवारयामो वयमित्यर्थः, केवलमिहोपयोगद्वये विचारोऽयं प्रस्तुतः । स च उपयोग एकदा एक एव भवति, न त्वनेक इति ॥२४३९॥

D. C.

Arya Ganga:—If you have no objection in admitting apprehension of numerous objects together at a time, what harm is there in accepting apprehension of the sensations of heat and cold together ?

 $\overline{Acarya} := If$ you say like that, you have not understood the relevent point under consideration. There is no harm in admitting the apprehension of a number of objects at a time. Generally, objects like army, forests, villages etc. could be apprehended together. We do not doubt that view-point. What we object to, is the theory of accepting numerous *upayogas* or applications being made simultaneously. There can never be more than one *upayoga* or application at one time 144 (2439)

Arya Ganga, then puts another question and Acarya replies :-

समयमणेगग्गहणे एगाणेगोवओगभेओ को १। सामण्णमेगजोगो खंधावारोवओगो व्व ॥१४५॥२४४०॥

खंघावारोऽयं सामण्णमेत्तमेगोवओगया समयं । पइवत्थुविभागो पुण जो सोऽणेगोवओग त्ति ॥१४६॥२४४१॥

- 145. Samayamanegaggahane egänegovaögabheö ko?ı Sāmannamegajogo khandhāvārovaögo vva. (2440)
- 146. Khandhāvāro'yam sāmaņņamettamegovaögayā samayam | Paivatthuvibhāgo puņa jo so'ņegovaöga tti (2441)

[समकमनेकग्रहण एकानेकोपयोगभेदः कः ?॥ सामान्यमेकयोगः स्कन्धावारोपयोग इव ॥१४५॥२४४०॥

स्कन्धावारोऽयं सामान्यमात्रमेऽकोपयोगता समकम् । प्रतिवस्तुविभागः पुनर्यः सोऽनेकोपयोग इति ॥१४६॥२४४१॥

Trans. 145-146. "While admitting the apprehension of many objects at a time, what is the sense in believing in distinction of one and many applications at a time." General apprehension (constitutes) one application as in the case of the apprehension of a retinue of army. (While apprehending that) "This is a retinue of army" there is general apprehension only (constituting) one application at a time. But that which is (contained in) every portion of an object (gives rise to) plurality of application. (2440-2441)

टीका-१४५-१४६ नतु समकं युगपदनेकार्थग्रहणेऽभ्युपगम्यमाने कोऽयमे-कानेकोपयोगमेदो नाम, येनोच्यते-''उवओगाणेगया नत्थि'' इति ? । अत्रोत्तर-माह-''सामण्णमेगजोगो त्ति'' यःसामान्योपयोगः स एकोपयोगोऽभिधीयते, स्कन्धावारोपयोगवदिति दृष्टान्तः । अग्रुमेवार्थं स्पष्टयति-''खंधावारोऽयमित्यादि'' समकं युगपदेव 'स्कन्धावारोऽयम् ' इत्येवं यत् सामान्यं सामान्यमात्रग्राहको य उपयोग इत्यर्थः, स एकोपयोगता भण्यते । यः पुनः प्रतिवस्तु '' एते हस्तिनः, अमी अश्वाः, इमे रथाः, एते पदातयः, एते खड्ग-कुम्भादयः, शिरस्ताणकवचादयः, पट-कुटिकाः, घ्वजाः, पताकाः, दका-सङ्क-काहलादयः, करभ-रासभादयश्व इत्यादिको विभागो मेदाघ्यवसायः सोऽनेकोपयोग इति ॥२४४०॥२४४१॥

D. C.

Arya Ganga:—Apprehension of numerous objects is acceptible to you, as you say. Then, what is the sense in distinguishing between one and many *upayogas* working at one time?

Acārya:—General apprehension of many objects at a time, constitutes only one application (of mind). After apprehending

^{145.} Samakamanekagrahana ekānekopayogabhedah kah? Sāmānyamekayogah skandhāvāropayoga iva. (2440)

^{146.} Skandhāvāro'yam sāmānyamātrame'kopayogatā samakam | Prati-vastuvibhāgan punaryah so'nekopayoga iti (2441)]

Vāda]

a retinue of army, when we say that "This is a retinue of army," there is only one application of mind at a time.

But when we apprehend each individual portion of it, by saying that "Those are the elephants," "Those are the horses", "These are chariots", "Here is infantry", "These are swords, pots etc." "Those are helmets, armours, tents, flags, banners, drums, conches, camels etc. the apprehension of each individual portion requires a separate application of mind, giving rise to plurality of application. 145-146 (2440-2441)

ते चियं न संति समयं सामण्णाणेगगहणमबिरुद्धं। एगमणेगं पि तयं तम्हा सामण्णभावेणं ॥१४७॥२४४२॥

147. Te cciya na santi samayam sāmaņņāņegagahaņamaviruddham I

Egamaņegam pi tayam tamhā sāmaņņabhāveņam. (2442)

[त एव न सन्ति समकं सामान्यानेकग्रहणमविरुद्धम् । एकमनेकमपि तत् तस्मात् सामान्यभावेन ॥१४७॥२४४२॥

147. Ta eva na santi samakam sämänyänekagrahanamaviru ddham (Ekamanekamapi tat tasmät sämänyabhävena. (2442)]

Trans. 147. They do not come into existence simultaneously. General apprehension of many objects is not objectionable. For, in that way, even numerous objects become one in general. 2442.

टीका-१४७ त एवानेकोपयोगाः समकं युगपद् न सन्ति न भवन्तीति निषिध्यन्तेऽस्माभिः । यचु सामान्येनानेकेषामर्थानां युगपद् ग्रहणं तदविरुद्धमेव 'तम्ह त्ति ' तस्माद् युगपदनेकोपयोगनिषेधेन किग्रुक्तं भवति १ इत्याह-'एगमणेगं पीत्यादि' यदिदं स्कन्धावाराद्युपयोगे युगपदनेकार्थग्रहणमस्माभिरनुज्ञायते 'तयं ति ' तदनेकमप्यनेकार्थग्रहणमपि सदित्यर्थः । '' एगंति '' एकमेव तत्त्वत एकार्थ-ग्रहणमेवेत्यर्थः । केन ? इत्याह-'' सामण्णभावेणं ति '' सामान्यरूपतयेत्यर्थः । अयमत्र तात्पर्यार्थः-यदनेकार्थग्रहणमनुज्ञायते तत् सामान्यमेव रूपमाश्रित्य, : 150:

विशेषरूपतया त्वनेकार्थग्रहणं नास्त्येत्र एकस्मिन् काल एकस्यैव विशेषोपयोगस्य सद्भावादिति ॥२४४२॥

D. C.

Acārya:—Our objection is against taking many *upayogas* to work simultaneously. But we do not contradict the acceptance of the general apprehension of numerous objects at a time. In case of examples such as "This is the retinue of army" etc. although we propose to apprehend numerous objects at a time, really speaking, it becomes the *general apprehension of one aggregate object only*. Thus, since there is only one application of mind in case of general apprehension, many objects are perceived simultaneously.

But simultaneous apprehension of many objects *in particular* is not possible, because there cannot be more than one *upayoga in particular* at one time. 147 (2442)

Applying the same principle to the sensations of heat and cold, the author states,

उसिणेयं सीयेयं न विभागो नोवओगतुगमित्थं। होज समं दुगगहणं सामण्णं वेयणा मे त्ति ॥१४८॥२४४३॥

148. Usiņeyam sīyeyam na vibhāgo novaögadugamittham | Hojja samam dugagahaņam sāmaņņam veyaņā me tti. (2443)

[उष्णेयं ज्ञीतेणं न विभागो नोपयोगद्विकमित्थम् । भवेत् समं द्विकग्रहणं सामान्यं वेदना ममेति ॥१४८॥२४४३॥

148. Uşņeyam śīteņam na vibhāgo nopayogadvikamittham I Bhavet samam dvikagrahaņam sāmānyam vedanā mameti. (2443)]

Trans. 148. (It is not possible) to divide it separately as "This is (the sensation of) heat, and "This is (the sensation of) cold", and causing thereby two separate applications (of mind) to work simultaneously. Simultaneous apprehension टीका-१४८ " उष्णेयं शीतेयं वेदना ' इत्येवं योऽसौ विभागो मेदोऽसौ नेष्टः-शीतोष्णविभागे शीतोष्णविशेषरूपतया युगपद् प्रहणं नेष्टमित्यर्थः । अत एव तद्विषयम्रुपयोगद्वयं युगपद् नेष्टम् । किं युगपद् वस्तुद्वयग्रहणं सर्वथा नेष्टम् ?। नैवम् । कुतः ? इत्याह-भवेत् समं युगपद् वस्तुद्वयग्रहणम् । किं विशेषरूपतया ? । न, इत्याह-सामान्यं सामान्यरूपतयेत्यर्थः । कथम् ? । " वेदना मे मम वर्तते " इत्येवं युगपद् द्वयग्रहणं भवेत् , न तु शीतोष्णवेदनाविशेषरूपतयेत्यर्थः, युगपदु-पयोगद्वयभसङ्गात् , तत्र च दोषाणामुक्तत्वादिति ॥२४४३॥

D. C. It is not desirable to make two separate divisions and remark that "This is the sensation of heat" and "This is the sensation of cold" and thereby give rise to the simultaneous apprehension of both the sensations which is absolutely impossible. For, two separate *upayogas* of mind, which relate to both the sensations, could not take place simultaneously. Two sensations could be experienced only by saying in a general tone that "I feel two sensations." But the two sensations of heat and cold. could never be experienced simultaneously. 148 (2443)

Now, explaining the difference between $s\bar{a}m\bar{a}nya$ or general cognition and $vi\dot{s}e\bar{s}a$ or particular cognition, the author states :----

जं सामण्णविसेसा विलक्खणा तन्निबंधणं जं च । नाणं जं च विभिन्ना सुदूरओवग्गहा-ऽवाया ॥१४९॥२४४४॥

जं च विसेसझाणं सामन्ननाणपुव्वयमवस्सं । तो सामण्णविसेसन्नाणाइं नेगसमयम्मि ॥१५०॥२४४५॥

- 149. Jam sämannavisesä vilakkhana tannibandhanam jam ca l Nänam jam ca vibhinna sudūraövaggahā'vāyā. (2444)
- 150. Jam ca visesannāņam sāmannanāņapuvvayamavassam ; To sāmaņņavisesannāņāim negasamayammi. (2445)

[यत् सामान्यविद्योषौ विलक्षणौ तन्निबन्धनं यच । ज्ञानं यच विभिन्नौ सुदूरतोऽवग्रहाऽवायौ ॥१४९॥२४४४॥ यच विद्येषज्ञानं सामान्यज्ञानपूर्वकमवइयम् । ततः सामान्य-विद्येषज्ञाने नैकसमये ॥१५०॥२४४५॥

- 149. Yat sāmānya-višešau vilaksaņau tannibandhanam yacca | Jnānam yacca vibhinau sudūrato'vagrahā'vāyau (2444)
- 150. Yacca viśesa-jnānam sāmānya-jnānapūrvakamavašyam I Tatah sāmānya-višesa-jnāne naikasamaye. (2445)]

Trans. 149–150. Since general (apprehension) and particular (apprehension) are mutually distinct, the respective cognitions, viz avagraha (or general cognition) and $av\bar{a}ya$ (or definite cognition) are also widely different (from each other), and since, definite cognition certainly follows the general cognition, the two cognitions (could not take place) simultaneously (2444–2445)

टीका-१४९-१५० "तो ति" तस्मात् सामान्यग्राहकं विशेषग्राहकं च ज्ञानं द्वे अपि नैकसमये नैककालं भवन इति द्वितीयगाथायां संबन्धः । कुतः? इत्याह -" जं सामण्णेत्यादि" यद् यस्मात् सामान्य-विशेषौ परस्परमतीवविभिन्न-लक्षणौ भिन्नजातीयौ, अतः कथं तावेककाल्यमेकज्ञाने प्रतिभासेते, एकत्वप्रसङ्गात्, सामान्यतत्स्वरूपवत् विशेषतत्स्वरूपवद् वा १ । माऽभूत् तत्प्रतिभासः, तथापि तज्ज्ञाने युगपद् भविष्यत इत्याह-यस्माच तन्निवन्धनं सामान्यविशेषहेतुकं सर्वमपि ज्ञानं, तत् कथं तत्प्रतिभासमन्तरेणोत्पद्येत ? सामान्यविशेषहोतुकं सर्वमपि ज्ञानं, तत् कथं तत्प्रतिभासमन्तरेणोत्पद्येत ? सामान्यविशेषहानयोरेक-त्वादेककालं ते भविष्यत इति चेत् । तदयुक्तम् । कुतः ? इत्याह-यस्माच सुदूरं विभिन्नौ सामान्य-विशेषज्ञानरूपाववग्रहा-ऽवायौ, इति कथं समकालं भवतः ? । यद् यस्माचावश्यकं सामान्यग्राहकज्ञानपूर्वकमेव विशेषग्राहकं ज्ञानम्, "नानव-गृहीतमीह्यते, नानीहितं निश्चीयते" इत्यादिवचनात् । अतः कथं तयोर्थुगपत् सम्भवः ? इति ॥२४४४॥२४४५॥

D. C.

Acārya :--Sāmānya and viśesa types of knowledge could

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never be attained simultaneously, because they are extremely distinct from each other.

Arya Ganga :---Since both happen to be jnānas, what harm in there if both are accepted to have been attained simultaneously ?

Acārya:--That is not possible. Sāmāmya and viśca types of knowledge represent avagraha and apāya types of knowledge respectively. Both these types are extremely different from each other as avagraha results in general cognition while apāya results in definite or particular cognition.

The general cognition always precedes the particular or definite cognition. For, it has already been said that "Without general apprehension, there is no definite apprehension, without which there is no definite ascertainment."

For all these reasons, it is not possible to take both the processes of jñānas to operate simultaneously. 149-150 (2444-2445)

Again, the opponent would ask--

होज न विलक्खणाई समयं सामण्ण-भेयनाणाई । बहुयाण को विरोहो समयम्मि विसेसनाणाणं १॥१५१॥२४४६॥

151. Hojja na vilakkhaņāim samayam sāmaņņa-bheyanāņāim i Bahuyāņa ko viroho samayammi visesanāņāņam ? (2446)

[भवेतां न विलक्षणे समकं सामान्य-भेदज्ञाने । बहुकानां को विरोधः समये विद्येषज्ञानानाम् ? ॥१५१॥२४४६॥

151. Bhavetām na vilakṣaṇe samakam sāmānya-bhedajňāne i Bahukānām ko virodhaḥ samaye viśesajňānānām ? (2446)]

Trans. 151. There may not be simultaneous (applications) when there is wide difference between the general and definite types of knowledge. (But) what is the objection in (accepting) numerous knowledges of definite type, (being attained) simultaneously? 2446.

Vāda]

टीका-१५१ नन्वाचार्य ! एवं तर्हि अस्ति यदुत-सामान्य वेदनामात्रग्राहकं सामान्यज्ञानं, शीतोष्णवेदनाविशेषग्राहकं विशेषज्ञानरूपं भेदज्ञानं च, इत्येते द्वे अपि सुदूरविलक्षणत्वात् समकं युगपद् न भवतः, बहूनां तु शीतोष्णादिविशेषज्ञा-नानां समय एकस्मिन् काल्टे जायमानानां विशेषज्ञानरूपतया तेषां बहूनामपि तुल्यत्वेन वैलक्षण्याभावात् को विरोधः, येन शीतोष्णवेदनाविशेषज्ञाने युगपद् गङ्गस्य निषिध्यते ? इति ॥२४४६॥

D. C.

Ārya Ganga:-Since there is a wide difference between sāmānya-jñāna or general knowledge which apprehends simple sensations only, and vises a-j nāna or definite knowledge which apprehends a definite sensation like that of heat or cold, they may not be taken to have been attained simultaneously. But since there is no difference in various vises a-jñānas, what harm is there in accepting a number of vises a-jñānas to have been attained simultaneously? 151 (2446)

The Acārya replies :---

लक्खणभेयाउ चिय मामण्णं च जमणेगविसयं ति । तमघेत्तुं न विसेसन्नाणाइं तेण समयम्मि ॥१५२॥२४४७॥

तो सामन्नग्गहणाणंतरमीहियमवेइ तब्भेयं। इय सामन्नविसेसावेक्खो जावंतिमो मेओ ॥१५३॥२४४८॥

- 152. Lakkhaņabheyāu ceiya sāmaņņam ca jamaņegavisayam ti Tamaghettum na visesannāņāim teņa samayammi. (2447)
- 153. To sāmannaggahaņāņantaramīhiyamavei tabbheyam (Iya sāmannavisesāvekkho jāvantimo bheö. (2448)

[रुक्षणभेदादेव सामान्यं यदनेकविषयमिति । तदग्रहीत्वा न विद्येषज्ञानानि तेन समये ॥१५२॥२४४७॥

ततःसामान्यग्रहणानन्तरमीहितमवैति तद्भेदम् । इति सामान्यविद्योषापेक्षा यावदन्तिमो भेदः ॥१५३॥२४४८॥

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153. Tatah sāmānyagrahaņānantaramīhitamavaiti tadbhedam | Iti sāmānyavišesāpeksā yāvadantimo bhedah. (2448)]

Trans. 152-153. Since sāmānya or general apprehension (constitutes) a number of subjects on account of various distinctive characteristics, (there is) no (possibility of) visesa jñānas or definite cognitions (being attained) at the same time without attaining it. Then, definite apprehension attained after general apprehension, recognizes their distinction. Such an inter-dependence of sāmānya and visesa continues till final distinction. (2447-2448)

टीका-१५२-१५३ तेन कारणेन समय एकस्मिन् काले बहूनि विशेषझा-नानि न भवन्ति । कुतः ? इत्याह-लक्षणं शीतोष्णादिविशेषणस्वरूपं तस्य परस्परं मेदाद् भिन्नत्वाद् न तद्प्राहकाणि ज्ञानानि समकं भवन्ति, यस्माच्चानेकविषयम्-नेकाधारं सामान्यं, इत्यतस्तदग्रहीत्वा न विशेषज्ञानसंभूतिरस्तीति, अतोऽपि न युगपद् विशेषज्ञानानि । इदग्रुक्तं भवति-पूर्वं वेदनासामान्यं ग्रहीत्वा तत ईहां प्रविश्य "शीतेयं पादयोर्वेदना" इति वेदनाविशेषं निश्चिनोति । शिरस्यपि प्रथमं वेदनासामान्यं ग्रहीत्वा तत ईहां प्रविश्य "उष्णेयमिह वेदना" इत्यध्यवस्यति । न हि घटविशेषज्ञानादनन्तरमेव पटाश्रयसामान्यरूपेऽग्रहीते पटविशेषज्ञानग्रुपजा-यते "उग्गहो ईह अवाओ य" इत्यग्रनेव कमेण घटादिविशेषज्ञानोत्पत्त्यभिधा-नात् । एवं च सति विशेषज्ञानादनन्तरमपि विशेषज्ञानं नोत्पद्यते, आस्तां पुनः समकालम्, सामान्यस्यानेकविशेपाश्रयत्वात् । तच्च पूर्वमग्रहीत्वा विशेषज्ञानस्या प्रसवादिति ।

यतश्वैवं सामान्येऽगृहीते नास्ति विशेषज्ञानम् . 'तो त्ति 'ततः सामान्यग्रह-णान्तरमीहितं तद्भेदं सामान्यमेदं घटत्वादिसामान्याश्रयं घटादिविशेषमित्यर्थः, अवैति-"घटादिरेवाऽयम्" इत्येव निश्चिनोतीत्यर्थः । तत उत्तरमेदापेक्षया घट एव सामान्यम् । तस्मिश्च गृहीते ईहित्वा "धातुजोऽयम् , न मार्तः" इत्येवं विश्विनोति । ततो घातुजोऽप्युत्तरमेदापेक्षया सामान्यम् । तस्मिश्च गृहीते ईहित्वा 'ताम्रोऽयं न राजतादिः" इतीत्थं निश्चिनोतीति । एवं सामान्य-विशेषापेक्षा ताषत् कर्त्तव्या यावदन्तिमो मेदः स कश्चित् यदनन्तरमीहा न प्रवर्तते । तत्वभेवं न कचिद् विशेषज्ञानानां युगपत्प्रवृत्तिसंभवः, सामान्यरूपतया तु समकालमपि विशेषाणां ग्रहणं भवेत्, यथा सेना, वनपित्यादि न तु युगपदुपयोग इत्युक्तमेव। तथा च भिक्काले एव शीतोष्णविशेषज्ञाने । ततो आन्तमेव समकालं शीतोष्ण-कियाद्रयवेदनं भवत इति ॥२४४७॥२४४८॥

D. C. A number of vises jñanas could never be attained simultaneously. There are various reasons for this.

Firstly, because there is a clear distinction between various characteristics such as those of heat, cold etc, their respective jñanas could not be attained simultaneously.

After apprehending a general sensation, one ascertains it as particular by saying that "There is a sensation of cold on my feet." Even in (case of) head, after apprehending a general sensation, one ascertains it in particular by saying that "Here I feel the sensation of heat."

One cannot attain vises i j n a na of pata even after the apprehension of the vises i n a na of ghat without apprehending the general form of pata. Thus, when vises i n a not produced even after a vises i n a, how could that be attained at the same time ? Sam a nya is full of many vises, and without apprehending s a n a t first, the vise a is not apprehended in any case.

Since the attainment of vises i $n\bar{a}na$ is not possible without that of $s\bar{a}m\bar{a}nya$, the definite apprehension attained after general apprehension, recognizes the various characteristics like *ghata* etc. contained in the general form of *ghatatva* etc. and then ascertains it as *ghata*. One more distinction of *ghata* is recognized after this. With regard to a further characteristic, *ghata* becomes $s\bar{a}m\bar{a}nya$, after the apprehension of which, one ascertains it as "made of metal and not of earth" This form of metal apprehended as a vises a or distinct form of ghat a again becomes a sāmanya form with regard to further distinction. After the apprehension of this, one ascertains it as "made of copper and not of silver." Such an inter-relation of sāmānya and vises acontinues up to the last distinction, further than which, the definite apprehension becomes impossible.

So, there is no possibility of many *visesa* jñānas to be attained simultaneously, as stated above, but a simultaneous apprehension of a number of particular objects, such as an army, forest etc. is possible. Their *upayogas* cannot be simultaneous.

Similarly, the vises j nas of the sensations of heat and cold are attained only at different times, and not simultaneously.

Thus, your theory of accepting the processes of undergoing both the sensations at the same time, proves to be absolutely unfounded. 152-153 (2447-2448)

Then,

इय पण्णविओ वि जओ न पवज्रह तो तओ कओ वज्झो। तो रायगिहे समयं किरियाओ दो परूवंतो ॥१५४॥२४४९॥ मणिनागेणारद्धो अओववत्तिओ पडिबोहिओ वोत्तुं। इच्छामो गुरुमूलं गंतूण तओ पडिकंतो ॥१५५॥२४५०॥

- 154. Iya paṇṇaviö vi jaö na pavajjai to taö kaö bajjho To Rāyagihe samayam kiriyāö do paravanto. (2449)
- 155. Maņināgeņāraddho bhaövavattiö padibohiö vottum I Icchāmo gurumelam gantūņa taö padikkanto. (2450)

[इति प्रज्ञापितोऽपि यतो न प्रपचते ततःसको कृतो बाद्यः । ततो राजग्रहे समकं क्रिये द्वे प्ररूपयन् ॥१५४॥२४४९॥ मणिनागेनारब्धो भयोपपतितः प्रतिबोधित उक्त्त्व ॥ इच्छामो गुरुमूलं गत्वा ततः प्रतिकान्तः ॥१५५॥२४५०॥

154. Iti prajñāpito'pi yato na prapadyate tatah sako krito bāhyah i Tato Rājagrihe samakam kriye dve praropayan. (2449) 155. Maņināgenārbdho bhayopapatitah pratibodhita uktvā Icchāmo gurumulam gatvā tatah pratikrāntah. (2450)]

Trans. 154-155. Although persuaded in this way, when (Arya Qanga) was not convinced, he was expelled from the Qaccha (Order of Monks). Then, while asserting (his) theory of two processes (of feeling) being simultaneous, in Rājagriha he was threatened by Manināga, and brought to the right path by means of threat Finally, he declared that "We wish to return to (the school of) our original preceptor and having eturned (to him), at last he was re-initiated.

End of the Discussion with the Fifth Nihnava.



Chapter VII

॥ षष्ठनिद्ववक्तव्यता ॥

Discussion with the Sixth Nihnava.

पंचसया चोयाला तइआ सिद्धिं गयरस वीरस्स । पुरिमंतरंजियाए तेरासियदिही उप्पन्ना ॥१५६॥२४५१॥

156. Pañcasayā coyālā taiā Siddhim gayassa Vīrassa I Purimantaranjiyāe terāsiya ditthī uppannā (2451)

[पञ्चद्रातानि चतुश्चत्वारिंदाता तदा सिद्धिं गतस्य वीरस्य । पुर्यामन्तरञ्जिकायां त्रैराद्तिकदृष्टिरुत्पन्ना ॥१५६॥२४५१॥

156. Pañcaśatāni catuścatvārimśatā tadā Siddhim gatasya Vīrasya | Puryāmantarañjikāyām trairāśikadrstirutpannā. (2451)]

Trans. 156. The theory of Trairāśikas (upholders of the principle of three categories) was founded in the city of Antarañjikā, five hundred and forty-four years after the Tīr-thankara Śramana Bhagavān Mahāvīra Swāmi had attained Niravāna. 2451.

टीका-१५६ पञ्चवर्षश्रतानि चतुश्रत्वारिंशदधिकानि तदा सिद्धि गतस्य श्रीमन्मद्दावीरस्य, अत्रान्तरेऽन्तरझिकायां पुर्यो त्रैराशिकदृष्टिरुत्पक्षेति ॥२४५१॥

D. C. Easy. 156 (2451)

The story of the production of the theory of Trairāśikas is narrated in detail as follows :---

पुरिमंतरंजि भूयगिह वलसिरी सिरिगुत्त रोहगुत्त य । परिवायपोद्दसाले घोसणपडिसेहणा वाए ॥१५७.।२४५२॥

157. Purimantaranji Bhayagiha, Balasiri, Sirigutta Rohagutte ya i Parivāyapottasāle ghosaņa padisehaņā vāe. (2452)

[पुर्यन्तरञ्जिका भूतग्रहं वरुश्रीः श्रीगुप्तो रोहगुप्तश्च । परिव्राजकपोट्टवाालो घोषणप्रतिषेधना वादः ॥१५७॥२४५२॥

157. Puryantaranjikā Bhūtagriham Balaśrih Srīgupto Rohaguptaśca I

ParivrājakaPottasalo ghosaņapratisedhanā vādah. (2452)]

Trans. 157. (There was) a city (named) Antarañjikā. Bhotagriha (was a temple). Balaśrī (was the king), Srīgupta (was the Ācārya), and Rohagupta (his pupil). Discussion (took place) with a parivrājaka (a mendicant ascetic) named Paţţśāla (as a result of) taking up (his) challenge. 2452.

टीका-१५७ संग्रहगाथेयम् । अस्याश्र कथानकादथोंऽवसेयः । तचेदम्-अन्तरक्षिका नाम नगरी । तस्याश्र बहिर्भूतगृहं नाम चैत्यम् । तत्र च श्रीगुप्त-नामाचार्यः स्थितः । तस्यां च नगर्यां बलश्रीर्नाम राजा । श्रीगुप्ताचार्याणां च रोष्टगुप्तो नाम शिष्योऽन्यत्र ग्रामे स्थित आसीत् । अतोऽसौ गुरुव-दनार्थमन्तर-क्षिकायामागतः । तत्र चैकः परित्राजको लोहपटकेनोदरं बद्धवा जम्बूद्धश्वशाखया च इस्ते गृहीतया नगर्यां आम्यति । किमेतत् ? इति च लोकेन पृष्टो वदति-"मदीयोदरमतीवज्ञानेन पूरितत्वात् स्फुटतीति लोहपट्टेन बद्धम् , जम्बूद्वीपमध्ये च मम प्रतिवादी नास्ति" इत्यस्पार्थस्य सचनार्थं जम्बूद्धश्वशाखा हस्ते गृहीता । ततस्तेन परिवाजकेन सर्वस्यामपि नगर्यां "शून्याःसर्वेऽपि परप्रवादाः, नास्ति कश्चिद् मम प्रतिवादी" इत्युद्धोषणापूर्वकः पटद्दको दापितः । लोहपट्टबद्वपोट्ट-जम्बूद्धश्वाखायोगाच तस्यलोके "पोट्टशाल" इति नामजातम् । ततत्ततत्पटद्दको नगरीं प्रविज्ञता रोहगुप्तेन दृष्टः, उद्घोषणा च श्रुता । ततो "अहं तेन सार्थं बादं दास्यामि" इत्यभिधाय गुरूनपृष्ट्वापि निषिद्धत्तेनासौ पटहकः । गुरुसमीपं चागत्यालोचयता कथितोऽयं व्यतिकरस्तेषाम् । आचार्यैःप्रोक्तम् न युक्तं त्वयाऽ-दुष्टितम्, स हि परिवाजको वादे निर्जितोऽपि विद्यास्वतिक्ठग्नल्तात् ताभिरुपति-ष्ठति । तस्य चैताः मप्तविद्या वाढं स्फुरन्ति ॥२४५२॥ £

D. C. Outside the city of Antarañjikā there was a temple known as Bhūtagriha. There lived a preceptor named Śrī Gupta. Śrī Gupta had a pupil named Rohagupta, who stayed in some other village from where he usually came to pay his homage to the preceptor every now and then.

Once upon a time when Rohagupta was coming to the city of Antaranjikā in order to pay his usual homage to the preceptor, he saw a parivrājaka (a wandering ascetic) with an iron belt tied around his belly, and with a branch of the Jamba tree in his hand signifying thereby that his stomach was filled to the brim with knowledge, and that there was no body in the whole of Jambadvīpa who could defeat him. This mendicant was known as Poțțasala in the city as his stomach was tide with an iron-belt. This Pottasala wandered throughout the city announcing his challenge with the beating of drum that "All my opponents have failed. There is no body who can return my challenge. On hearing this, Rohagupta took up the challenge even without consulting his preceptor. When he narrated the whole incident to his preceptor afterwards, the preceptor said, "You have incurred a risk by doing so." For, though defeated, Pottaśāla will harass you with various magical spells. 157 (2452)

Because,

विच्छ य सप्पे मूसग मिगी वराही य काग पोयाई । एयाहिं विज्ञाहिं सो य परिवायगो कुसलो ॥१५८॥२४५३॥

158. Viccha ya sappe masaga migi varāhi ya kāga poyāi i Eyāhim vijjāhim so ya parivāyago kusalo. (2453)

[वृश्चिकी सपीं मूषकी मृगी वराही काकी पोताकी। एताभिर्विद्याभिः स च परिव्राजकः कुइालः ॥१५८॥२४५३॥

158. Vriściki sarpi mūṣaki mrigi varāhi kāki potāki | Etābhirvidyābhiņ sa ca parivrājakaņ kuśalaņ. (2453)]

Trans. 158. That *parivrājaka* (mendicant) has achieved the magical spell of scorpion, serpent, mouse, deer, boar, crow and parrot. 2453.

टीका-१५८ ''विच्छ् य त्ति " द्वश्विकप्रधाना विद्या गृह्यते । '' सप्पे त्ति " सर्पप्रधाना विद्या । '' मूसगे त्ति '' मूषकप्रधाना । तथा मृगी नाम विद्या मृगी-रूपेणोपघातकारिणी । एवं वराही च । '' काग पोयाइ त्ति ' काकविद्या, पोताकी-विद्या च । पोताक्यःश्चकुनिकाः एताम्रु विद्यासु, एताभिर्वा विद्याभिः स परिवाजकः कुश्चलु इति । ततो रोहगुप्तेनोक्तम् –'' यद्येवम्, तत किमिदानीं नष्टुं कापि श्वक्यते ?, निषिद्धस्तत्पटहकः, यद् भवति तद् भवतु '' । ततःस्वरिभिः प्रोक्तम्– यद्येवम्, तहिं पठितसिद्धा एवताः सप्त तत्प्रतिपक्षविद्या गृहाण ॥२४५३॥

D. C.

Acārya:—That parivrājaka (mendicant) is proficient in magical spells of scorpions, serpents, mice, boars, crows and parrots.

Rohagupta:-If it is so, is there, now, any way to defeat him, any how? Since I have accepted the challenge, let things happen as they do."

Acārya:—If you desire so, you shall have to achieve the various counteracting spells that would overpower the abovenamed tricks successfully. 158 (2453)

The counter-acting spells are-

मोरी नउली बिराली वग्घी सिही य उऌगि उवाई । एआओ विज्ञाओ गिण्ह परिव्यायमहणीओ ॥१५९॥२४५४॥

159. Morī naulī birālī vagghi sihī ya ulugi uvāi | Eāö vijjāö giņha parivyāyamahaņīö (2454)

[मोरी नकुली विडाली व्याघी सिंही चोऌकी उलावकी। एता विद्या ग्रहाण परिव्राजकमथनीः ॥१५९॥२४५४॥

159. Morī nakulī bidāli vyāghrī simhī colukī ulāvakī | Etā vidyā grihāņa parivrājakamathanīh. (2454)]

Trans 159. Achieve the under-mentioned (counter-acting) spells that (would) vanquish the parivrājaka (mendicant) viz that of peacock, mangoose, cat, tiger, lion, owl and hawk. 2454.

टीका-१५९ वृश्विकाणां प्रतिपक्षभूता मोरीविद्या । सर्पाणां तु प्रतिपक्षभूता नकुली । मुषकाणां बिडाली । एवं व्याघ्री, सिंही, उऌकी । " उवाइ चिं" पोताकीप्रतिपक्षभूता उलावकप्रधाना विद्येत्यर्थः । एताः यरिव्राजकमथनीविद्या गृहाण त्वम् । इति सूरिणा त्रोक्ते गृह्णति रोहगुप्तः । तथा रजोहरणं चाभिमन्त्र्य सरिभिस्तस्य समर्पितम् । अभिहितश्च यथा यद्यन्यदपि किश्चित् तत्प्रणीतक्षुद्र-विद्याकृतमुपसर्गजातमुपतिष्ठते तदा तनिवारणार्थमेतद् मस्तकस्योपरि अमणीयम् । ततश्चेन्द्राणामप्यजेयो भविष्यसि, किम्रुत मनुष्यमात्रस्य तस्येति । ततश्च गतो राजसभां रोहगुप्तः । प्रोक्तं च तत्र तेन-"किमेष द्रुमकःपरिवाजको जानाति १ । करोत्वयमेव यद्क्षया पूर्वपक्षम्, येनाहं निराकरोमि।" ततः परिवाजकेन चिन्तितम्-निपुणाःखल्वमी भवन्ति, तदमीषामेव संमतं पक्षं परिगृह्णामि, येन निराकर्तुं न शकोति । विचिन्त्य चेदमभ्यधायि-" इह जीवाश्वाजीवाश्वेति द्वावेव राशी, तथैवोपलभ्यमानत्वात् , शुभा-ऽशुभादिराशिद्वयवत् '' इत्यादि । ततो रोहगुप्तेन तद्बुद्धिपरिभवनार्थं स्वसंमतोऽप्पयं पक्षो निराकृतः। कथम् १ इति चेत् । उच्यते-असिद्धोऽयं हेतुः, अन्यथोपलम्भात् , जीवा अजीवा नोजीवाश्रेति राश्वि-त्रयदर्शनात् । तत्र जीवा नरकतिर्यगादयः, अजीवास्तु परमाणु-घटादयः, नोजी-वास्तु गृहकोलिकापुच्छादयः । ततो जीवा-ऽजीव-नोजीवरूपास्त्रयो राश्वयः, तथैवोपलभ्यमानत्वात् , अधम-मध्यमो-त्तमादिराशित्रयवत् , इत्यादियुक्तिंभि-निष्प्रश्नव्याकरणः कृत्वा जितः परिव्राजको रोहगुप्तेन । ततोऽसौ ऋद्धो वश्विक-विद्यया रोइगुप्तविनाशार्थं वश्चिकान् मुश्चति, ततो रोइगुप्तस्तत्प्रतिपक्षभूतमयूरी-विद्यया मयूरान् मुञ्चति । तैश्व वश्चिकेषु हतेषु परिव्राजकःसर्पान् मुञ्चति । इतरस्त-त्प्रतिधातार्थं नकुलान विसृजति । एवं मुषकाणां बिडालान्, मृगीणां व्याघान्, ग्रूकराणां सिंहान्, काकानामुऌकान्, पोतकीनामुलावकान् मुआति । ततो गर्दभी मुक्ता । तां चागच्छन्तीं दृष्ट्वा रोहगुप्तेन रजोहरणं मस्तकस्वोपरि अमयित्वा तेनैव रजोहरणेन ताडिता सती परिवाजकस्योपरि मूत्र-पुरीषोत्सर्गं कृत्वा गतासौ । ततः सभापतिना, सभ्यैः, समस्तलोकेन च निन्धमानो, नगराद् निर्वासितः परिव्राजकः ॥२४५४॥

D. C The spells of scorpions, serpents, mice deer, boars, crows, and parrots are respectively nullified by those of pea-cocks, mangeese, cats, tigers, lions, owls, and hawks. You should pick up all those spells properly if you want to defeat the parivrājaka. Thus advised by the preceptor, Rohagupta studied all the methods. In addition to that, he was also supplied with a consecrated Rajoharaṇa* consecrated with a spell by his preceptor with instructions that he should wave it over his own head for the prevention of any other trouble created by *parivrājaka*.

Rohagupta, then, went to the Royal Assembly, and said "What does this poor mendicant know? Let him open any topic he likes, I will refute it. The shrewd *parivrājaka* knew that Rohagupta was very clever, and so, he thought of opening the tropic with the acceptance of Rohagupta's own principles, so that, Rohagupta would not be able to refute the same.

He, then, opened the topic with this remark :- Like the two categories of good and evil, there are only two categories of (1) Jīvas or animate beings and (2)A-jīvas or in-animate ones in this world. This theory is acceptable to the Jainas, but for the sake of defeating the mendicant, Rohagupta refuted it by saying that all the objects in the Universe, could be divided into three categories :-Jīva, A-jīva and No -jīva. Hellish denizens, tiryancas manuşyas etc come under the category of Jīva. Atoms, and ghaţa, paţa etc are Ajīvas and the dissected limbs such as a tail etc. of animals like house- lizard etc would come under the category of No- jīva. He argued that, like the three categories of best, medium, and the lowest, found in this world, there were three categories, of Jīvas. A-Jīvas, and No-jīvas in the Universe.

The *parivrjaka* was defeated by such an unexpected argument. So, being naturally enraged at Rohigupta, the parivrājaka, let loose his scorpions upon him. Rohagupta removed them with the help of his pea-cocks. In this way, the mendicant tried to defy Rohagupta by means of serpent, mice, deer, boars, crows and parrots, while Rohagupta over-powered all of them by means of mangeese, cats, tigers, lions, owls, and hawks respectively.

* Rajoharana a sacred broom of wool-threads always carried by Jaina Monks and Nuns for the purpose of cleaning beds, seats, etc. without inflicting any injury to vermin and insects which may happen to be there.

Nihnavavāda

Finally the *parivrājaka* released a she-ass to kill Rohagupta. But, on seeing the she-ass coming towards him, Rohagupta waved the *Rajoharaņa* (which his preceptor had given him) over his own head, and beat the she-ass with it, as a result of which, the she-ass ran away from him after passing urine and foeces etc. upon the *parivrājaka*.

The parivrājaka, who was thus vanquished in all ways, was then, driven away from the city with great humiliation. 159 (2454)

Now, the author proceeds to narrate the next incident in this connection---

जेऊण पोदृशालं छत्तुओ भणइ गुरुमूलमागंतुं। वायम्मि मए विजिओ सुणह जहासौ सहामज्झे ॥१६०॥२४५५॥ रासिदुगगहियपक्स्वो तइयं नोजीवरासिमादाय। गिहकोलिकाइपुच्छच्छेओदाहरणओऽभिहिए ॥१६१॥२४५६॥ भणइ गुरू सुद् टु कय किं पुण जेऊण कीस नाभिहियं। अपमवसिद्धंतो णे तहओ नोजीवरासि त्ति ॥१६२॥२४५६॥ एवं गए वि गंतुं परिसामज्झम्मि भणसु नायं णे। सिद्धंतो किंतु मए बुद्धिं परिभूय सो समिओ ॥१६३॥२४५८॥ बहुसो स भण्णमाणो गुरुणा पडिभणइ किमवसिद्धतो। जह नाम जीवदेसो नोजीवो हुज्ज को दोसो ? ॥१६४॥२४५९॥

- 160. Jeana Poțțasālam chaluö bhanai gurumūlamāgantum (Vāyammi mad vijiö suņaha jahāsau sahāmajjhe. (2455)
- 161. Rāsidugagahiyapakkho taiyam no-jīvarāsimādāya (Gihakolikāipucchaccheödāharaņaö'bhihie. (2456)
- 162. Bhanai gurū sutthu kayam kim puņa jeana kīsa nābhihiyan Ayamavasiddhanto ņe taiö nojīvarāsi tti. (2457)
- 163. Evam gae vi gantum parisāmajjhammi bhaņasu nāyam ņeļ Siddhanto kintu mae buddhim paribhaya so samiö. (2458)

164. Bahuso sa bhannamāno gurunā padibhanai kimavasiddhanto Jai nāma jîva-deso no-jīva hujja ko doso ? (2459)

[जित्वा पोट्टशालं षडुऌको भणति गुरुमूलमागतः। वादे मया विजितः श्रृणुत यथा स सभामध्ये ॥१६०॥२४५५॥ राशिद्विकगृहीतपक्षस्तृतीयं नोजीवराशिमादाय। गृहकोलिकादिपुच्छच्छेदोदाहरणतोऽभिहिते ॥१६१॥२४५६॥

भणति गुरूः सुष्डु कृतं किं पुनर्जित्वा कस्माद् नाभिहितम्। अयमपसिद्धान्तो नस्तृतीयो नोजीवराशिरिति ॥१६२॥२४५७॥ एवं गतेऽपि गत्वा परिषन्मध्ये भण नाऽयं नः।

सिद्धान्तः किन्तु मया बुद्धिं परिभूय स रामितः ॥१६३॥२४५८॥

बहुराः स भण्यमानो गुरुणा प्रतिभणति किमपसिद्धान्तः। यदि नाम जीवदे्रो नोजीवो भवेत् को दोषः १॥१६४॥२४५९॥

- 160. Jitvā Poţţaśalam Sadulūko bhanati gurumulamāgatan i Vāde mayā vijitan śruņuta yathā sa sabhāmadhye. (2455)
- 161. Rāśidvikagrihītapakṣastritīyam nojīvarāśimādāya Grihakolikādipuccacchedodāharaṇato'bhihite. (2456)
- 162. Bhanati guruh suṣṭhu kritam kim punarjitvā kasmād nābhihitam |
 Ayamapasiddhānto nastritīyo nojīvarāśiriti. (2457)
- 163. Evam gate'pi gatvā pariṣanmadhye bhaṇa nā'yam nah l Siddhāntah kintu mayā buddhim paribhūya sa śamitah. (2458)]
- 164. Bahuśah sa bhanyamāno gurunā pratibhanati kimapasindhānth Yadi nāma jīvadeše no-jîvo bhavet kim doṣah. (2459)]

Trans. 160-161-162-163.164 Having defeated Pattaśāla, Ṣadu loka approached the preceptor, and said "(Please) hear how he is defeated by me in discussion in the Royal Assembly. (His) theory of two categories was refuted by me, resorting to a third category of $no-j\bar{v}a$ with an illustration of the dissected tail of a house-lizard." "You have done a good deed by defeating him" said the preceptor, (but), then, why did you not declare that this principle of the third category (of) *no-jīva* was not acceptible to us? Even now, you may go to the Royal Assembly, and declare that, "That is not our principle, but (that was resorted to by me only temporarily) in order to defy his talents, and bring down (his pride)." When persuaded by the preceptor in many such ways, Rohagupta said "How (can you call it) a bad principle? What harm is there if we take a particular part of a living being to be No-jīva or slightly animate? (2455-2459).

टीका-१६०-१६१-१६२-१६३-१६४ व्याख्या-पोट्टशालपरित्राजकं जित्वा गुरुचरणमूलमागत्य रोहगुप्तोऽपरनाम्ना तु षडुऌ्को अणति-स परित्राजकाधमः समस्तनृपसभामध्ये यथा वादे मया विजितस्तथा शृणुत यूयं कथयामीति । तदे-वाह-राशिद्रयगृहीतपक्षः स परित्राजको मया वादे विजित इति प्राक्तनेन संबन्धः । किं कृत्वा ? इत्याह-तृतीयं जीवराशिमादाय पक्षीकृत्य । कुतो दृष्टान्ता-दसौ पक्षीकृत्य १ इत्याह-गृहकोलिकादीनां पुच्छमेव छिन्नत्वाच्छेदस्तदुदाहरणत-स्तद्दष्टान्तादित्यर्थः । एवं रोहगुप्तेनाभिहिते गुरुर्भणति-सुष्ठु कृतं त्वया यदसौ जितः, किन्तु तत्रोत्तिष्ठता त्वया किमेतद् नाभिहितम् १। किम् १ इत्याह-तृतीयो नोजीवराश्विरत्ययं ''णे त्ति '' नोऽस्माकमपसिद्धान्तः जीवाऽजीवलक्षणराशिद्वय-स्वैवाऽस्मत्सिद्धान्तेऽभिहितत्वादिति । तस्मादेवं गतेऽप्येतावत्यपि गत इत्यर्थः, तत्र परिषन्मध्ये गत्वा भण प्रतिपादय ''नायं णे त्ति'' नोऽस्माकं नायं सिद्धान्तः, किन्तु स परिव्राजकस्तद्बुद्धिं परिभूय तिरस्कृत्य श्रमित उपशमं नीतो दर्पे त्याजित इत्यर्थः । एवं बहुशोऽनेकधां गुरुणा भण्यमानः स रोहगुप्तः प्रतिभणति प्रत्युत्तरयति–आचार्य ? किमयमपसिद्धान्तः ?। यदि हि नोजीवलक्षण तृतीय-राक्यभ्युपगमे कोऽपि दोषः स्यात् तदा स्यादयमपसिद्धान्तः, न चैतदस्ति। कुतः १ इत्याह-यदि नाम गृहकोल्जिकापुच्छादिजीवदेशो नोजीव भवेत-नोजीव-त्वेनाभ्युपगम्येत, तर्हि को दोषःस्यात् १ न कमपि दोषमत्र पत्र्याम इत्यर्थः) ततःकिमित्यपसिद्धान्तत्वे दोषपहिरार्थं पुनर्मां तत्र प्रेषयसि ? इति भावः॥ **૨૪૬५**મા૨૪૫૬**ા**૨૪૫૭ા૨૪૫૮ા**૨**૪૫૬ા

D. C. Having defeated the parivrājaka known as Pottasāla,

in discussion in the Royal Assembly, Rohagupta, who was also known as *Saduūlka, came to the preceptor and requested him to hear the whole incident of his success. "His theory of two categories' he said" was refuted by me by advancing a third category of no-jiva supported by the example of a house lizard with its tail dissected."

Ācārya :-You have done a good deed by defeating him But while leaving the assumbly at the end, why did you not declare that the theory of the third cacegory of No-jīva is not acceptable to us? Even, now, you may go to the assembly and declare that this is not our theory but it was advanced hy us only for the sake of bringing down the pride of Poțțaśāla.

Rohagupta[.]--Revered sir, how can we take as an unacceptable theory? What difficulty does it give rise to? For, if a dissected part like the tail of an animal like house-lizard were apprehended as $no-j\bar{n}va$ or slightly animate. I do not see any harm in holding the theory of three categories. 160-164 (2455-2459)

Rohagupta, now tries to justify his theory in this way:-

जं देसनिसेहपरो नोसदो जीवदव्वदेसो य। गिहकोइलाइपुच्छं विलक्खणं तेण नोजीवो॥१६५॥२४६०॥

165. Jam desanisehaparo nosaddo jīvadavvadeso ya i Gihaköilāipuecham vilakkhaņam teņa no-jīvo. (2460)

[यद् देशनिषेधपरो नोशब्दो जीवद्रव्यदेशश्च । ग्रहकोलिकादिपुच्छं घिरुक्षणं तेन नोजीवः ॥१६५॥२४६०॥

165. Yad deśanisedhaparo nośabdo jīvadravyadeśaśca i Grihakolikādipuccham vilakṣaṇam tena no-jīvah. (2460)]

Trans. 165. As the term 'no' suggests the removal of a portion and that (too) a portion of the animate body, the tail of a house-lizard etc. being separated (from the animate

* Saduluka- A believer in six substances with Ulūka as his gotra, ie Rohagupta, who belonged to Ulūka gotra.

body of house-lizard etc.) should be taken as no-jīva (slightly animate) 2460.

टीका-१६५ यद् यस्माद् "नोजीवः" इत्यत्र नोञ्चब्दो देशनिषेधपरो न तु सर्वनिषेधपरः, नोजीवो जीवैकदेशो, न तु सर्वस्यापि जीवस्याभाव इत्यर्थः । भवत्वेवं देशनिषेधको नोश्चब्दः, परं गृहकोलिकादिपुच्छं जीवदेशो न भविष्यती-त्याश्चङ्घ्याह-जीवद्रव्यैकदेशश्व गृहकोलिकादिपुच्छप्, आदिश्चब्दाच्छित्रपुरुषादि-हस्तादयः परिगृह्यन्ते । कथंभूतं तद् गृहकोलिकादिपुच्छप् ? इत्याह-विलक्षणं "जीवा-Sजीवेभ्यः" इति गम्यते; तथाहि न तावद् गृहकोलिकादिपुच्छं जीव-त्वेन व्यपदेष्टुं श्वक्यते, तत्कार्यैकदेशत्वेन तद्विलक्षणत्वात् । नाप्यजीव इत्यमि-धातुं पार्यते, स्फुरणादिभिस्तेभ्योऽपि विलक्षणत्वात् । येनैवम्, तेन कारणेन पारिशेष्याद् नोजीव एतदुच्यत इति ॥२४६०॥

D. C. Since 'no'¹ signifies dissection of a particular portion and not of the whole body, negation of the whole jīva is not implied thereby. Such dissected portions being different from *jīva* (animate body) as well as from a-jīva (inanimate body), should be taken as *no-jīva*. Since a tail dissected from the body of a house-lizard and a hand dissected from the body of a man, are only the portions of the respective *jīvas*, they cannot be taken as *jīvas*. They cannot be taken even under the category of a-jīvas, because they move even after they are cut off from the animate bodies.

Thus, being different from $j\bar{v}a$ and $a-j\bar{v}a$, they are known as $no-j\bar{v}a$ or slightly animate bodies by the method of elimination. 165 (2460)

It has also been sanctioned by the Holy Writ viz:-

धम्माइदसविहादेसओ य देसो वि जं पिहुं बत्थुं। अपिहुब्भुओ किं पुण च्छिन्नं गिइकोलियापुच्छं ? ॥१६६॥२४६१॥

166. Dhammāidasavihādesaö ya deso vi jam pihum vatthum Apihubbhūö kim puņa echinnam gihakoliyāpuecham ? (2461)

इच्छइ जीवपएसं नोजीवं जं च समभिरूढो वि। तेण त्थि तओ समए घडदेसो नोघडो जह वा ॥१६७॥२४६२॥

:170:

¹167. Icchai jīvapaesam no-jīvam jam ca samabhirūḍho vi I Teņa tthi taö samae ghaḍa-deso no-ghaḍo jaha vā. (2462)

[धर्मादिदराविधादेशतश्च देशोऽपि यत् पृथग् वस्तु। अपृथग्मृतः किं पुनइिछन्नं गृहकोलिकापुच्छम् ? ॥१६६॥२४६१॥ इच्छति जीवप्रदेशं नोजीवं यच समभिरूढोऽपि। तेनास्ति सकः समये घटदेशो नोघटो यथा वा ॥१६७॥२४६२॥

- 166. Dharmādidaśavidhādeśatasca deśo'pi yat prithag vastu i A-prithagbhritaḥ kim punaśchinnam grihakolikāpuccham ? (2461)
- 167. Icchati jīvapradešam no-jīvam yacca samabhirūdho'pi l Tenāsti sakaņ samaye ghata-dešo no-ghato yathā vā. (2462)]

Trans. 166-167. By the commandment of the ten varieties of the category of Dharmastikāya and others, when even a portion (actually) combined (with the body), is (taken as) a separate entity, what to talk of the tail of a house-lizard that has already been cut off (from the body)? The samabhiradha view-point also admits *jīvapradeša* or a part of jīva as *no-jīva*. So, just as a portion of *ghata* is *no-ghata*, a part of jīva should be taken as no-jīva, as a (matter of) principle. (2461-2462)

टीका-१६६-१६७ व्याख्या-चकारस्य भिन्नक्रमत्वाद् यद् यस्मात् कारणाद् देशोऽपीत्यपिशब्दस्यापि भिन्नक्रमत्वाद् धर्मास्तिकायादिदेशिनः ''अपि-हुब्भूओ त्ति '' अप्टथग्भूतोऽप्येकत्वमापन्नोऽपि देशः '' पिहं वत्थुं ति '' सिद्धान्ते पृथग् वस्तु '' भणितः '' इति शेषः, पृथग्वस्तुत्वेन निर्दिष्ठ इत्यर्थः । किंपुनर्य-च्छिन्नमात्मनः पृथग्भूतं कृतं तद् गृहकोलिकादिपुच्छं पृथग्वस्तु न भविष्यति ? भविष्यत्येवेति । तच्च जीवच्छिन्नत्वेन पृथग्भूतन्वात् , स्फुरणादिना चाजीवविल-क्षणत्वात् सामर्थ्याद् नोजीव एवेति भावः । क्रुतः पुनर्वचनादेष सिद्धान्ते पृथग्

1. For, 'no' means slight or little, and hence it does not signify the negation of the whole body, but only a portion of the whole. वस्तु भणितः ? इत्याह-" धम्माइदसविहादेसउ त्ति " धर्मास्तिकायादिनाममूर्ता-जीवानां दशविधादेशतो दशत्रिधत्वभणनात् । एतदुक्तं भवति-अजीवप्ररूपणां कुर्वद्भिरुक्तं परममुनिभिः-" अजीवा दुविहा पण्णत्ता, तं जहा-रूवि अजीवा य, अरूवि अजीवा य । रूवि अजीवा चंडविवहा पण्णत्ता, तं जहा-खंधा, देसा, पएसा, परमाणुपोग्गला। अरूवि अजीवा दसविहा पण्णत्ता, तं जहा-धम्मरिथकाए, धम्मत्थिकायस्स देसे, धम्मत्थिकायस्स पएसे, एवमधम्मत्थिकाए वि, आगास-रिथकाए वि, अद्धासमए "। तदेवं धर्मास्तिकायादीनां दशविधत्वभणनेन तदेश्वस्य पृथग्वस्तुत्वम्रक्तमेव, अन्यथा दशविधत्वानुपपत्तेः । यदा च धर्मास्तिकायादीनां देशस्तेभ्योऽपृथग्भूतोऽपि पृथग्वस्तूच्यते, तहा गृहकोलिकापुच्छादिकं छिन्नत्वेन जीवात् पृथग्भूतं सुतरां वस्तु भवति । तच जीवा-ऽजीवविलक्षणत्वाद् नोजीव इत्युक्तमेवेति । अपि च, यद् यस्मात् कारणाज्जीवनदेशं नोजीवं समभिरूढनयोऽ-पीच्छति, तेन तस्मात् तकोऽसौ नोजीत्रः समये सिद्धान्तेऽप्यस्ति, न पुनर्मयैव केवलेनोच्यते, तथा चानुयोगद्वारेषु प्रमाणद्वारान्तर्गतं नयप्रमाणं विचारयता प्रोक्तम्-" समभिरूढो सद्दनयं भण्ड-जइ कम्मधारएण भणसि तो एवं भणाहि-जीवे य से पएसे य से सपएसे नोजीवे " इति । तदनेन प्रदेशलक्षणो जीवैकदेशो नोनीव उक्तः, यथा घटैकदेशो नोघट इति । तस्मादस्ति नोजीवलक्षणस्तृतीय-राज्ञिः, युत्तया--ऽऽगमसिद्धत्वात् जीवा--ऽजीवादितत्त्ववदिति ॥२४६१--२४६२॥

D. C. It has been laid down in Siddhantas that-

"A-jīvā duvihā paņņattā, taṃ jahā-Rūvi a-jīvā ya, a-rovi a-jīvā ya. Rovi a-jīvā cauvvihā paņņattā, taṃ jahā-Khandā, desā, paesā, paramāņu poggalā. A-rovi a-jīvā dasavihā paņņattā, tam jahā 1. Dhammatthikāe, 2. dhammatthikāyassa dese, 3. dhammatthikāyassa paese, 4. a-dhammatthi-kāye, 5. a-dhammatthikāyassa deśe, 6. a-dhammatthikāyassa paese, 7. āgāsatthikāe, 8. āgāsatthikāyassa dese, 9. āgāsatthikāyassa paese and 10. addhāsamae."

[The a-jīvas or inanimate objects are divided into two types: Corporeal (rupī) and in-corporeal (a-rupī). The corporeal a-jīvas are of four types:--1. Elements (Skandha) 2. their parts-desas 3. their pradeśas (bodies) and 4. their atoms (Paramāņu pudgalas).

The in-corporeal a-jīvas (a-rapī a-jīvas) are of ten types

viz 1. *Dharmāstikāya, 2. Dharmāstikāya deśa (part of Dharmā stikāya), 3. Dharmāstikāya pradeśa (Body of Dharmāstikāya) 4. A-dharmāsti kāya, 5. A-dharmāstikāya deśa (part of A-dharmāsti kāya), 6. A-dharmāsti kāya pradeśa (body of a-dharmāsti kāya), 7. Ākāśāstikāya (predicament of space), 8. Ākāśāsti kāya deśa (part of Ākāśāsti kāya), 9. Ākāśāsti kāya pradeśa (body of Ākāśāsti kāya, 10. Addhā samaya (kāla) the predicament of time.]

While describing the ten varieties of Dharmāstikāya etc. mentioned above, although the desas or various portions of each one of them, are one with them, they are necessarily taken as completely different entities. So, there is all the more reason for taking parts like tail etc. of house-lizard etc, that have already been cut off from the main bodies of jīvas as separate entities, which being naturally different from jīvas, as well as a-jīvas, may again be taken under the category of no-jīvas.

According to Samabhirūdha naya² a part of the whole jīva is taken as *no-jīva*. Thus, the category of *no-jīva* is not only my conception, but it is laid down by the religious principles, as well. It has also been said in Anuyogadvāra Sūtra "Samabhiradho saddanayam bhaṇai jai kammadhāraeṇa bhaṇasi to evam bhaṇāhi.-Jīve ya se paese, ya se sa-paese no-jīve."

* Dharmāstikāya. There is no English equivalent for the Jaina terms -Dharmāstikāya and A-dharmāstikāya. Dharmāstikāya may be rendered as the cosmic principle which upholds (or simply conditions), the order of simultaneous (or consentaneous) movements in the world answering somewhat to Leibneitz's Preestablished harmony. Dharmāstikāya is not simply the accompanying cause of movements-it is something more-it is the cause (or condition) of the system of movements-the fact of an order in movements of Jīva and Pudgala. (-Dr. Seal.) A-dharmāstikāya is the reverse of Dharmāstikāya.

2. For detailed explanation of Samabhirūdha naya. See Chapter I.

Nihnavavāda

[The samabhiradha naya explains the etymological interpretation. So, if you interprete it according to the Karmadhāraya compound, dissolve it as follows:-Jīvaśca sa pradeśaśca tasya svapradeśo no-jīvah-a part of the animate body is no-jīva or slightly animate.]

Thus one portion of $j\bar{i}va$ is called $no-j\bar{i}va$, just as one part of ghata is no-ghata. So, there is a third category of $no-j\bar{i}va$ like $j\bar{i}va$ and $a-j\bar{i}va$ supported by the commandments of $\bar{a}gamas$.

The Acārya replies to all these arguments in this way :-

जइ ते सुयं पमाणं तो रासी तेसु तेसु सुत्तेसु। दो जीवाऽजीवाणं न सुए नोजी बरासि त्ति ॥१६८॥२४६३॥

168. Jai te suyam pamāņam to rāsī tesu tesu suttesu | Do jīvā'jīvāņam na sue nojīvarāsi tti. (2463)

[यदि ते श्रुतं प्रमाणं ततो राज्ञी तेषु तेषु सूत्रेषु। दो जीवाज्जीवानां न श्रुते नोजीवराचिारिति ॥१६८॥२४६३॥

168. Yadi te śrutam pramāņam tato rāšī teṣu teṣu satreṣu | Do jīvā'jīvānām na śrute no-jīvarāśiriti. (2463)]

Trans. 168. If the Holy Writ is authentic (according) to you, then (only) two categories-of jīvas and a-jīvas-are laid down by the various commandments in the Siddhāntas, (but) not the category of no-jīvas. 2463.

टीका-१६८ " धम्माइदसविहादेसओ य ' इत्याद्युपन्यासात् सत्र प्रामाण्यवादी किल लक्ष्ये भवान् । तद् यदि सत्यमेव तव सत्रं प्रमाणम् , ततस्तहिं तेषु तेषु सत्रेषु जीवा--ऽजीवरूपौ द्वावेव राशी प्रोक्तौ, तथा च स्थानांङ्गसूत्रम्-" दुवे रासी पण्णत्ता तं जहा-जीवा चेव अजीवा चेव '' । तथा, अनुयोगद्वारसत्रेऽप्युक्तम्-"कइविहा णं भन्ते ! दच्वा पण्णत्ता । गोयमा ! दुविहा पण्णता, तं जहा-"जीवदव्वा य अजीवदव्वा य '' । तथा, उत्तराध्ययनसत्रे चाभिहितम्-"जीवा चेव अजीवा य एस लोए वियाहिए '' इत्याद्यन्येष्वपि सत्रेषु द्रष्टव्यम् । नोजीव-राश्विस्तु तृती^यः श्रुते न कचिदप्यभिहितः, तत् कथं तत्सच्चः प्ररूपणा न श्रुता-

द्यातना १ इति । न च धर्मास्तिकायादीनां देश्वस्तेभ्यो भिन्नः कोऽप्यस्ति, विव-क्षामात्रेणैव तस्य भिन्नवस्तुत्वकऌ्पनात् ॥२४६३॥

D. C.

 $\overline{A}c\overline{a}rya:$ -Since you quot expressions like "dhammāī dasa vihāi etc., you seem to be a follower of the Holy Writ. If you really believe in the authenticity of its sūtras, you should note that they are in favour of the two categories of jīvas and a-jīvas only.

It is said in Sthānānga Sūtra³ that "Duve rāsī paņņatta tam jahā-Jīvā ceva, A-jīvā ceva."

[Only two categories are taught; the category of Jīvas and that of A-jīvas.]

It has also been mentioned in the Anuyogadvāra Sūtra "Kaivihā ņam bhante ! davvā paņņattā ? | Goyamā ! duvihā paņņattā, tam jahā-Jiva-davvā ya, A-jīva davvā ya."

[Of how many types are the elements, O Lord ! known? O Gautama! They are of two types-Jīvas and A-jīvas.]

It is also said in the Uttarādhyayana Sūtra⁴ that "Jīvā ceva A-jīvā ya esa loe viyāhie."

[They (i. e. objects of the Universe) are known as Jīvas and A-jīvas in this world.]

We can quote similar instances from other Sutras, but there is no reference of the third category of no-jivas in any part of the Holy Writ. So, if you try to establish its existence, you defy the authority of the Siddhāntas.

The desas of dharmāstikāya etc. mentioned before, are not different from the bodies of those elements actually. They are merely imagined as different entities for the sake of argument.

3. Vide Sthānanga Satra, Adhyayana 2. Uddeśa 4. Sūtra 95. page 81. (Āgamodaya Samiti edition.)

4. Vide Uttarādhyayana Sūtra, Adhyayana 36 (Jīvā-jīva vibhatti) Gāthā 2.

Nihnavavāda

Similarly, tail etc. are also one with the bodies of animals like house-lizard etc. on account of their intimate connection with each other. 168 (2463)

And hence, they are taken under the category of jīva and not of no-jīva (as you say), in the following way,

गिहकोलियाइपुच्छे छिन्नम्ति तदंतरालसंबंधो । सुत्तेऽभिहिओ सुहुमामुत्तत्तणओ तदग्गहणं ॥१६९॥२४६४॥

169. Gihakoliyāipucche chinnammi tadantarālasambandho I Sutte'bhihiö suhumāmuttattaņaö tadaggahaņam. (2464)

[ग्रहकोलिकादिपुच्छे छिन्ने तदन्तरालसम्बन्धः । सुन्रेऽभिहितः सूक्ष्माऽमूर्तत्वतस्तदग्रहणम् ॥१६९॥२४६४॥

169. Grihakolikādipucche chinne tadantarālasambandhaķ | Sotre'bhihitaķ sukšmā'mortatvatastadagrahaņam. (2464)]

Trans. 169. With regard to the tail of house-lizard etc. being cut off, the rule lays down their internal connection; (But) that is not apprehended on account of its being subtle and formless. 2464.

टीका-१६९ गृहकोलिकादीनां पुच्छादिकेऽवयवे छुरिकादिना छिक्रेऽपि तयोर्ग्रहकोलिक पुच्छादिवस्तुनोर्यदन्तरालं विचालं तत्र जीवप्रदेशानां संबन्धः संयोगस्तदन्तरालसम्बन्धः सत्रेऽभिहित एव । तथा च भगवतीसत्रम्-अह मंते ! कुम्मा कुम्मावलिया, गोहा गोहावलिया, गोणे गोण।वलिया, मणुसे मणुसाव-लिया, महिसे महिसावलिया, एएसिं णं दुहा वा, तिहा वा, संस्वेजहा असंखेजहा वा छिन्नाणं जे अंतरा ते वि णं तेहिं जीवपएसेहिं फुडा ? । हन्ता फुडा । पुरिसे णं भंते ! अंतरे हत्थेण वा, पाएण वा, अंगुलियाए वा, कट्ठेण वा, किलिंचेण वा, आम्रुसमाणे वा, संमुसमाणे वा, आलिहमाणे वा, 'विलिहमाणे वा, अण्णयरेण वा तिक्सेणं सत्थजाएणं आछिंदमाणे वा, विध्विंदमाणे वा अगणिकाएणं समोदुहमाणे तेसिं जीवपएसाणं किंचि आबाहं विवाहं वा उप्पाएइ, विच्छेयं वा करेइ ? । नो इणट्ठे समट्ठे । नो खल्ज तत्थ सत्थं संकमइ " इति। यदि नामैवं सत्रे जीवप्रदेशानां तदन्तरालसंबन्धेऽभिहितः, तहिं तदन्तराले ते जीवभदेशाः किमिति नोपरु-

भ्यन्ते ? इत्याह-''सुहुमेत्यादि '' कार्मणशरीरस्य सक्षमत्वात् , जीवप्रदेशानां चामूर्तत्वादन्तराल्ठे तेषां जीवप्रदेशानां सतामप्यप्रहणं तदग्रहणमिति ॥२४६४॥

D. C. Even when parts like tail etc. of animals like houselizard etc. have been dissected by means of instruments like knife etc., the Satra, undoubtedly provides for the internal connection of atoms of jīvas in the intermediary region between body and its parts.

The Bhagavatī Sūtra speaks of the same principle: -

Aha bhante! kummā kummāvaliyā, gohā gohāvaliyā, goņe goņāvaliyā, maņuse maņusāvaliyā, mahise mahisāvaliyā, edsim ram duhā vā, tihā vā, asamkhejjahā vā, chinnāņam je antarā te vi ņam tehim jīvapaesehim phudā (Hantā phudā) Purise ņam bhante! antare hattheņa vā, pāeņa vā, anguliyā vā, kattheņa vā, kilinceņa vā, āmusamāņe vā, sammusamāņe vā, ālihamāņe vā, vilihamāņe vā, aņņayareņa vā tikkheņam satthajāeņam āchindamāņe vā, vichindamāņe vā, aganikāeņum samoduhamāņe tesim jīvapaesāņam kimci ābāham vi-bāham vā uppādi viccheyam vā karèi? (No iņatthe samatthe) No khalu tattha sattham

[And, O Lord! are the tortoise, lizard, bullock, man, and buffalo respectively (taken as) their parts also? Are they divided into two, three or innumerable particles of $j\bar{l}va$, so that, they are exhibited as the particles of $j\bar{l}va$, even in their intermediary regions? Or, can a person commit any harm or obstruction or complete destruction by means of rubbing, erasing, licking, sucking, or even destroying it with a sharp weapon, or by means of his hand, foot, wrist etc?

"No, that is not the right implication. A weapon does not go beyond that."]⁵

नैनं छिन्दन्ति शस्त्राणि नैनं दहति पावकं।
 न चैनं क्रेदयन्त्यापो न शोषयति मारुतः॥
 ---(श्रीमद् भगवदगीता)

Thus, the Satra lays down the principle of the internal relation between the $j\bar{v}a$ and its *pradesas* in the intermediary

regions between soul and body. But since Kārmaņa body is incorporeal, the atoms of Jīva are not apprehended in spite of their being present in the intermediary regions

These are not apprehended even from movements etc. as in the case of body, tail etc. 169 (2464)

Because,

गज्झा मुत्तिगयाओ नागासे जहा पईवरस्सीओ । तह जीवलक्खणाइं देहे न तदंतरालम्मि ॥१७०॥२४६५॥

170. Gajjhā muttigayāö nāgāse jahā paivarassīö | Taha jīvalakkhaņāim dehe na tadantarālammi. (2465)

[ग्राह्या मूर्तिगता नाकारो यथा प्रदीपरइमयः । तथा जीवलक्षणानि देहे न तदन्तराले ॥१७०॥२४६५॥

170. Grāhyā mertigatā nākāse yathā pradīparasmayah [Tathā jīvalaksaņāni dehe na tadantarāle. (2465)]

Trans. 170. Just as rays of a lamp (become) apprehensible (only when) accompanied by a concrete object, and not (when spread) in sky, so also, the characteristics of a living being, (become apprehensible) (only) in body, and not in (its) intermediary space. 2465.

टीका-१७० इह भू-कुडच-वरण्डका-ऽन्धकारादीनि वस्तुन्येव मूर्तियोगाद मूर्तिरूच्यन्ते। ततश्च यथा मूर्तिगता यथोक्तवस्तुगता एवेत्यर्थः, प्रदीपरक्षयो प्राद्या भवन्ति, न तु केवल आकाशे प्रसृताः, तथा तेनैव प्रकारेण जीवो लक्ष्यते यैस्तानि जीवलक्षणानि भाषणो-च्छवास-निःश्वास-धावन-वर्ल्गन-स्फुरणादीनि देह एव गृह्यन्ते न तु तदन्तराल इति ॥२४६५॥

D. C. The rays of light proceeding from a lamp are perceived only when they come in contact with a concrete object like ground, a wall, verandah, or darkness, but not when spread in sky.

Similarly, various characteristics of a living being such as its speech, breathing in, breathing out, running, galloping, vibrating movements etc. are recognized only on body and not in its intermediary space. 170 (2465)

देहरहियं न गिण्हइ निरतिसओ नातिसुहुमदेहं व। न य से होइ विवाहा जीवस्स भवन्तराछे व्व ॥१७१॥२४६६॥

171. Deharahiyam na giņhai niratisaö nātisuhumadeham vat Na ya se höi vibāhā jīvassa bhavantarāle vva. (2466)

[देहरहितं न ग्रहाति निरतिशयो नातिसूक्ष्मदेहमिव। न च तस्य अवति विवाधा जीवस्य अवान्तराल इव ॥१७१॥२४६६॥-

171. Deharahitam na grihņāti niratišayo nātisaksmadehamiva Na ca tasya bhavati vibādhā jīvasya bhavāntarāla iva. (2466)]

Trans. 171. Just as the soul is not able to apprehend a body having an extremely minute form, so also, a person who does not possess superhuman powers, is not able to perceive (a soul) without body. That soul is not damaged (in any way) as in (the case of its state) intermediary between (two) lives. 2466.

टीका-१७१ देहाभावे जीवलक्षणानाममावाद् देहरहितं मुक्तात्मानं छित्रपु-च्छाद्यन्तरालवर्तिनं वा जीवं निरतिश्वयः केवलज्ञानाद्य तिश्वयरहितो जन्दुर्न गृहाति । तथा, अतिसक्ष्मो देहो यस्य तमतिसक्ष्मदेहं निगोदादिजीवं कार्मणकाय-यौगिनं वा जन्तुं नासौ गृहाति । न च "से" तस्य जीवस्यान्तराख्वतिषु प्रदेशैष्यनन्तरदर्शितसिद्धान्तसत्रीक्तयुक्त्या कुन्ता-असि-सेष्ठादिश्वसैरग्नि-जलादि-यिर्वो विषाधा पीडा काचिद् भवति, मवान्तराले कार्मणश्वरीरवर्तिजीवप्रदेश्च-वदिति ॥२४६६॥

D. C A jīva is not perceptible, if it is not accompanied by body. So, a person who has not attained an excellence like Absolute Knowledge, is not able to perceive the soul unaccompanied by body.

On the other hand, the soul is, also, not able to apprehend an object which is suksma or extremely minute in form.

Like the atoms of $j\bar{v}a$ in the Kārmaņa state, Jīva itself is not affected by spear, sword etc. or by fire, water etc. on the strength of the Satras mentioned before.⁶

Rohagupta:—Just as a separate piece of ghata fallen in the street, is known as *no-ghata* (or a part of ghata), why should tails etc of jīvas like house-lizard etc. be not taken as no-jīvas (parts of Jīva) when they have already been cut off from the respective main body?

Acārya:-No. It is not proper to do so. 171 (2466)

For,

दव्वामुत्तत्ताकयभावादविकारदरिसणाओ य । अविणासकारणाहि य नभसो व्व न खंडसो नासो ॥१७२॥२४६७.।

172. Davvāmuttattākayabhāvādavikāradarisaņāö ya i Aviņāsakāranāhi ya nabhaso vva na khaņdaso nāso. (2467)

[द्रव्यामूर्तत्वादकृतभावादविकारदर्शनाच । अविनाशकारणाच नभस इव न खण्डशो नाशः ॥१७२॥२४६७॥

172. Dravyāmurtatvādakritabhāvādavikāradarsanācca | Avināsakāraņācca nabhasa iva na khaņdaso nāsah. (2467)]

Trans. 172. Since the matter (of which jīva is formed) is abstract, and since it is immutable, indestructible, and spontaneous, like sky, it could not be destroyed by part. (2467)

टीका-१७२ खण्डशो जीवस्य नाशो न भवतीति प्रतिज्ञा, अमूर्तद्रव्यस्वात् , अक्ठतकमावात्-अक्ठतकत्वादित्यर्थः, तथा घटादेः कपालादिवद् विकारदर्श्वना-भावात् , अविनाशकारणत्वाच्च; विनाशकारणानामग्नि - ज्ञस्तादीनाम भावाचेत्यर्थ इत्येते हेतवः । सर्वेषु "नभस इव" इति दृष्टान्त इति ॥२४६७॥

॥ अच्छेद्योऽयमदाह्योऽयमक्तेद्योऽशोष्य पव च ॥ (श्रीमद् भगवद् गीता)

^{6.} Vide verse 2464. Again,

:180:

D. C. Like sky, it is not possible to destroy soul, by means of dividing it, into various parts. Because, jīva is made of ab stract matter, and it is immutable, indestructible, and spontaneous, like sky. 172 (2467)

And if the theory of destruction by parts were accepted-

नासे य सव्वनासो जीवस्स नासो य जिनमयचाओ । तत्तो य अणिमुकखो दिकखावेकछदोसा य ॥१७३॥२४६८॥

173. Nāse ya savvanāso jīvassa nāso ya Jinamayaccāö i Tatto ya aņimukkho dikkhāvephalladosā ya. (2468)

[नारो च सर्वनारोो जीवस्य नाराश्च जिनमतत्यागः। ततश्चानिर्मोक्षो दीक्षावैफल्यदोषाश्च ॥१७३॥२४६८॥

173. Nāśe ca sarvanāśo jīvasya nāśaśca Jinamatatyāgaņ | Tataścānirmokso dīksāvaiphalyadosāśca. (2468)]

Trans. 173. And in case of accepting this sort of destruction, there would also be entire destruction of jīva, (resulting in) the rejection of Jina mata (the Siddhāntas of the Tīrthankaras). Then, there would be nothing like Final Emancipation and faults such as the futility of the observance of Dīkṣā (asceticism) etc. (would arise) 2468.

टीका-१७३ शस्त्रच्छेदादिना जीवप्रदेशस नाशे चेष्यमाणे क्रमशः सर्वना-शोऽपि कदाचित तस्य भवेत् । तथाहि-यत् खण्डशो नश्यति तस्य सर्वनाशो दृष्टः, यथा घटादेः, तथा च त्वयेष्यते जीवः, ततः सर्वनाशस्तस्य प्राप्तोति । भवत्वेतदपि, किं न क्षूयते ? इति चेत् । तदयुक्तम् । क्रुतः ? इत्याह-"नासो पेत्यादि" स च जीवस्य सर्वनाशो न युक्तः, यस्माजिनमतत्यागहेतुत्वाजिनमत-त्यागोऽसौ । जिनमते हि जीवस्य सतः सर्वथा विनाशोऽसतश्व सर्वथोत्पादःसर्वत्र निषिद्ध एव । यदाह-"जीवा णं-भंते ! किं वइ्टंति हायंति, अवद्विया ? । गोयमा ? नो वड्टंति, नो हायति, अत्रद्विया" इत्यादि । अतो जीवस्य सर्वथा नाशेऽम्यु-पगम्यमाने जिनमतत्याग एव स्यात् । तथा ततस्तत्सर्वनाशादनिर्मोक्षो मोक्षामावः पाम्यमाने जिनमतत्याग एव स्यात् । मोक्षाभावे च दीक्षादिकष्टानुष्टानवैफल्यम्, । क्रमेण च सर्वेषामपि जीवानां सर्वनाशे संसारस्य शून्यतामाप्तिः, कृतस्य च शुमाशुभकर्मणो जीवस्य सर्वनाश एवमेव नाशात् कृतनाशप्रसङ्ग इत्यादि वाच्य-मिति, न जीवस्य खण्डशो नाशः । गृहकोलिकादीनां पुच्छादिखण्डस्य पृथग्भूत-त्वेन प्रत्यक्षत एव नाशो दृश्यत इति चेत् । तदयुक्तम् । औदारिकशरीरस्यैव हि तत् खण्डमध्यक्षतो वीक्ष्यते, न तु जीवस्य, तस्यामूर्तत्वेन केनापि खण्डयि-तुमशक्यत्वादिति ॥२४६८॥

D. C.

Ācārya:—If a jīva were taken to have been damaged by the blows of weapons etc. it would gradually meet with complete destruction. For, that which is partially destroyed, is naturally susceptible to complete destruction, as in the case of ghața. So, if you take jīva to be susceptible to partial destruction, it would naturally become susceptible to complete destruction also.

But looking to the Jaina Scriptures, this is entirely improper. According to them, neither complete destruction nor complete production of an existent being, is achieved.

It is said, "Jīvā ņam bhante! kim vaḍḍhanti hāyanti avațțhiyā? etc.

[O Lord! are the *jivas* susceptibe to increase or destruction? Or, do they, remain what they are? "O Gautama! they neither increase, nor perish, but they remain what they are."]

Thus, by accepting the view of complete destruction of $j\bar{i}va$, you will chiefly violate the principle of the Jinas (Tirthańkaras).

Secondly, in that case, there would be nothing like Mokşa. For, in absence of Jīva, who would attain Mokşa? And, when Mokşa does not exist, nobody would see any sense in observing dīkṣā and such other religious rites.

Thirdly, with the destruction of all jīvas one by one, the whole world will be deserted.

Fourthly, in case of all pervading negation, since all the actions, good or evil, will perish without yielding fruit, the fault of $krita-n\bar{a}\pm a^{\dagger}$ will arise.

: 182:

Jinabhadra Gani's

Thus, it is utterly improper to believe in entire destruction of Jīva.

Rohagupta:—Parts such as tail etc. of animals like houselizard etc., that have already been separated from their bodies, are apprehended as perished directly. Then, why do you refuse to take such parts as no-jvas?

Acārya — Such parts do not actually belong to Jīva, but they belong to the gross body which invests the soul.

Since Jīva is *a-marta*, it is not possible to divide it into parts. 173 (2468)

Again, Rohagupta raises a question and the Acarya replies-

अह खंघो इव संघाय-भेयघम्मा स तो वि सव्वेसिं । अवरोप्परसंकरओ सुहाइगुणसंकरो पत्तो ॥१७४॥२४६९॥

174. Aha khandho iva sanghāya-bheyadhammā sa to vi savvesim l Avaropparasankaraö suhāiguņasankaro patto. (2469)

[अथ स्कन्भ इव सङ्घात-सेदधर्मा स ततोऽपि सर्वेषाम् । परस्परसंकरतः सुखादिगुणसंकरः प्राप्तः ॥१७४॥२४६९॥

174. Atha skandha iva sanghāta-bhedadharmā sa tato'pi sarveṣām ı

Parasparasańkaratah sukhādiguņasańkarah prāptah. (2469)]

Trans. 174. And, if that is (taken as) susceptible to association and dissociation, like a concrete object, then also, on account of their inter-combination (with each other), all objects will attain inter-combination of the properties like happiness etc. 2469.

टीका-१७४ अथ पुद्गलस्कन्ध इव सावयवत्वात् स जीवः संघात-भेदधर्मा-ऽभ्युपगम्यते, तथा कचिद् विवक्षितपुद्गलस्कन्धेऽन्यस्कन्धगतं खण्डं समागत्य

7. Apprehension of an object as destroyed, in spite of its being existent.

Nihnavavāda

संइन्यते संबध्यते, तद्गतं च खण्डं भित्वाऽन्यत्र गच्छति, एवं जीवस्याप्यन्यजीव-खंडं संहन्यते, तद्गतं तु भिद्यत इत्येवं संघातभेदधर्मा जीव इष्यत इति । अतः खण्डग्नो नाशेऽपि संघातस्यापि सद्भावाद् न तस्य सर्वनाश्च इति परस्याभिप्रायः । अत्र दूषणमाह—''तो वि सव्वेसिं इत्यादि" एवमपि च सति सर्वेषामपि सर्वलोक-वर्तिनां जीवानां परस्परसंकरतः सुखादिगुणसंकरः प्राप्तः । इदमुक्तं भवति—यदैकं जीवसम्बन्धिशुभाशुभकर्मान्वितं खण्डमन्यजीवस्य संबध्यते, अन्यसम्बन्धि तु खण्डं तस्य संबध्यते, तदा तत्सुखादयोऽन्यस्य प्रसजन्ति, अन्यसुखादयस्तु तस्य, इत्येवं सर्वजीवानां परस्परं सुखादिगुणसांकर्यं स्यात् । तथैकस्य कृतनाग्नः अन्य-स्याकृताभ्यागम इत्यादि वाच्यमिति ॥२४६९॥

D. C.

Rohagupta:--Since Jīva appears as a body of parts like a concrete object, there would be no harm if we take it as susceptible to association and dissociation. Just as a part of one *pudgala-skandha* is united with another, and sometimes dissociates itself from it, so also, some portion of a jīva combines itself with another jīva, while some other portion may dissociate itself from the jīva. Thus, since jīva is susceptible to association and dissociation, it will always be in contact with some portion or the other, even when some of its portions have already been dissociated from it. Thus, jīva will never perish entirely.

 $\overline{A}c\overline{a}rya :$ --In that case, jīvas of the whole Universe, will attain inter-combination of properties like sukha etc., on account of their own inter-combination with each other. For, when a certain portion of one jīva, accompanied by good or evil action, is combined with some other jīva, its own properties of happiness or misery, etc., would be attached to another jīva, whose properties, in turn, would be attached to the first jīva.

In this way, all jīvas will undergo inter-combination of properties like sukha etc. resulting in the destruction of an action that has already been performed and attainment of another that was never performed. In order to stop such confusions, we should not take $j\bar{i}va$ to be susceptible to association and dissociation also. 174. (2469) Here there is another difficulty also :---

अह अविमुक्नो वि तओ नोजीवो तो पइप्पएसं ते । जीवम्मि असंखेज्ञा नोजीवा नत्थि जीवो ते ॥१७५॥२४७०॥

175. Aha avimukko vi taö no-jīvo to paippaesam te i Jīvammi asamkhejjā no-jīvā natthi jīvo te. (2470)

[अथाविमुक्तोऽपि सको नोजीवस्ततः प्रतिप्रदेशं ते। जीवेऽसंख्येया नोजीवा नास्ति जीवस्ते॥१७५॥२४७०॥

175. Athāvimukto'pi sako no-jīvastataņ pratipradešam te i Jīve'saņkhyeyā no-jīvā nāsti jīvaste. (2470)]

Trans. 175. And if Jīva is taken as no-jīva, in spite of its being unseparated (from its parts), then they, (no-jīvas) would pervade every small atom, there would be innumerable no-jīvas in a jīva, and (ultimately) there would be nothing like jīva. 2470.

टीका-१७५ अथैतदोषभयाद् न जीवस्य च्छेदोऽभ्युपगम्यते, किन्त्वविम्रुक्तो-ऽप्यविच्छित्रोऽपि जीवसंबद्धोऽपि तकोऽसौ जीवदेशो नोजीवस्त्वयेष्यते, यथा धर्मास्तिकायाद्येकदेशो नोधर्मास्तिकायादिः । ततस्तर्हि प्रतिप्रदेशं ते तव नोजीव-सद्भावादेकैकस्मित्रात्मन्यसंख्येया नोजीवाः माप्ताः, ततस्ते तव नास्ति क्वापि जीवसंभवः, सर्वेषामपि जीवानां प्रत्येकमसंख्येयनोजीवत्वमाप्तरिति ॥२४७०॥

D. C.

Rohagupta:--In order to prevent the difficulties mentioned before, you may not take jiva as different from its small regions. But, just as a small part of *Dharmāstikāya*, which is not actually different from *dharmāstikāya*, is said to be *no-dharmāstikāya* (a slight predicament of dharmāstikāya), what harm is there in taking a small region of jīva associated with jīva itself, as nojīva (or slightly animate)?

Acārya:—In that case, every small particle of the $j\bar{\imath}va$ being occupied by a number of $no-j\bar{\imath}vas$, there would be plenty of $no-i\bar{\imath}vas$ in one single j $\bar{\imath}va$. And as the entire soul will be pervaded

completely by no-jīvas, there would be nothing like jīva at the end. 175 (2470)

Pointing out the possibility of one more difficulty, the auth--or states--

एवमजीवा वि पइप्पएसभेएण नोअजीव त्ति। नत्थि अजीवा केइ कयरे ते तिन्नि रासि त्ति ? ॥१७६॥२४७१॥

176. Evamajīvā vi paippaesabhèèṇa no-ajīva tti) Natthi a-jīvā kèi kayare te tinni rāsi tti? (2471)

[एवमजीवा अपि प्रतिप्रदेशभेदेन नोअजीवा इति । न सन्त्यजीवाः केचित् कतरे ते त्रयो राशय इति ? ॥१७६॥२४७**१**॥

176. Evamajīvā api pratipradešabhedena no-ajīvā iti (Na santyajīvāh kecit katare te trayo rāšaya iti? (2471)]

Trans. 176. Similarly, a-jīvas (or in-animate beings) will also become no-ajīvas or slightly inanimate) by virtue of (there being) distinction of every single particle. There would be nothing like $a-j\bar{v}a$ (or inanimate beings) left (in that case). (And hence), how would three categories be possible according to you? 2471.

टीका-१७६ एवमजीवा अपि धर्मास्तिकायादयो द्वयणुकस्कन्धादयो घटादयश्च प्रतिप्रदेशभेदतोऽजीवैकदेशत्वाद् नोअजीवाः, घटैकदेशनोघटवदिति, अतोऽजीवाः केचनापि न सन्ति, परमाणूनामपि पुद्गलास्तिकायलक्षणाजीवैक-देशत्वेन नोअजीवत्वात् सर्वत्र नोअजीवानामेवोपपद्यमानत्वात् । ततश्च कतरे ते त्रयो राशयः-त्वया ये राजसभायां प्रतिष्ठिताः, उक्तन्यायेन नोजीव नोअजीवल-क्षणराशिद्वयस्यैत्त सद्भावात् ? इति । तस्माद् बहुदोषप्रसङ्गाद् न जीवरिछ्यत इति स्थितम् ॥२४७१॥

D. C. The same will be the case with a-jivas or the inanimate objects. A-jivas such as dharmāstikāya etc., objects with aggregation of two atoms and ghata etc., would be known as no-jivas (or slightly inanimate objects) by virtue of their being one or the other portions of a-jivas. Further, even atoms that are actual portions of an a-jiva object, would be known as noajivas. Thus, in the whole of an a-jiva or inanimate object, noajivatva will be found in every atom, and there would be nothing like a-jivatva left at the end.

Consequently, the theory of three categories (viz Jīva, Ajīva and No-jīva) advanced by you in the Royal Assembly, will be refuted. For, according to this view of yours, there would be two categories only:-viz No-jīvas and No-a-jīvas which proves to be self-contradictory.

So, all these difficulties drive us to the conclusion that $j\bar{1}va$ never perishes entirely, and that there can never exist a category of *no-jiva* in addition to those of $J\bar{1}va$ and $A-j\bar{1}va$. 176 (2471)

However, no-jīva cannot be said to exist. Because, छिन्नो व होउ जीवो कह सो तछकखणो वि नोजीवो ? । अह एवमजीवस्स वि देसो तो नोअजीवो त्ति ॥१७७॥२४७२॥ एवं पि रासओ ते न तिन्नि चत्तारि संपसज्जंति । जीवा तहा अजीवा, नोजीवा नो-अजीवा य ॥१७८॥२४७३॥

- 177. Chinno va höu jīvo kaha so tallakkhaņo vi no-jīvo? Aha evamajīvassa vi deso to no-a-jīvo-tti. (2472)
- 178. Evam pi rāsaö te na tinni cattāri sampasajjanti (Jīvā tahā a-jīvā, no-jīvā no-a-jīvā ya. (2473)

[छिन्नो वा भवतु जीवः कथं स तल्लक्षणोऽपि नोजीवः । अथैवमजीवस्यापि देशस्ततो नोअजीव इति ॥१७७॥२४७२॥ एवमपि राशयस्ते न त्रयश्चत्वारः संप्रसजन्ति । जीवास्तथाऽजीवा नोजीवा नोअजीवाश्च ॥१७८॥२४७३॥

- 177. Chinno vā bhavatu jīvan katham sa tallaksaņo'pi no-jīvaņi Athaivamajīvasyāpi deśastato no-a-jīva iti. (2472)
- 178. Evamapi rāšayaste na trayašcatvāraķ samprasajanti, Jīvāstathā'jīvā no-jīvā no-a-jīvāšca. (2473)]

Trans. 177-178. Or, let jīva be (taken as) dissected. How could that be (called) no-jīva in spite of its being characterized by it? And if (it is) so, then, a portion of a-jīva will also become no-a-jīva. (But) even in that case, there would not be three categories (as proposed) by you. (There would be) four categories viz: 1. Jīvas (animate beings) 2. A-jīvas (in-animate beings) 3. No-jīvas (slightly animate) and 4. Noa-jīvas (slightly inanimate). 2472-2473.

टीका-१७७-१७८ पुच्छाद्यवयवच्छेदेन च्छिन्नोऽपि भवतु गृहकोलिकादि-जीवः, केवलं तस्य जीवस्य लक्षणानि स्फुरणादीनि यस्यासौ तल्लक्षणोऽपि सन्नसौ पुच्छादिदेशःकथं केन हेतुना नोजीवो भण्यते ? । इदम्रक्तं भवति-संपूर्णोऽपि गृहकोलिकाजीवः स्फुरणादिलक्षणैरेव जीवो भण्यते, स्फुरणादीनि च लक्षणानि च्छिन्ने तदवयवेऽपि पुच्छादिके दृश्यन्ते, अतस्तल्लक्षणयुक्तोऽप्यसौ किमिति जीवो न भण्यते येन नोजीवकल्पनाऽत्र विधीयते ? इति । "अह एवमिति " अथैवं जीवलक्षणैः सद्भिरपि पुच्छादिकस्तदवयवो नोजीव एवैष्यते, न पुनः स्वाग्रह-स्त्यज्यत इत्यर्थः । अत्र सरिराह-" तो त्ति " ततस्तहिं अजीवस्यापि घटादेर्देशे नोअजीवः प्रामोति, जीवैकदेशनोजीववदिति । अस्त्वेच न किश्चिद् मम विनन्नय-तीति चेत् । नैवम् । कुतः इत्याह-एवं "पीत्यादि " एवमग्यभ्युपगम्यमाने ये भवता त्रय एव राशय इष्यन्ते ते न घटन्ते, किन्तु चत्तारो राशयःसप्रसजन्ति तद्यथा-जीवाः, तथाऽजीवाः, नोजीवाः, नोअजीवाश्वेति ॥२४७२-२४७३॥

D. C.

Acārya :--House-lizards etc. come under the category of jīvas by virtue of their movements etc. in spite of their movements etc. in spite of their tail etc., being dissected. The parts like tail etc., that are cut off from the body, should also be known as jīvas by virtue of their movement etc. It is absurd to know them as no-jīvas.

Rohagupta: --Parts like tail etc., should definitely be called *no-jīvas* in spite of their having characteristics of jīvas.

 $\overline{A}c\overline{a}rya :$ -In that case, a portion of an a-jiva object like ghata would be known as a-jiva.

:188:

Thus, according to this theory of yours, there would be four categories-viz Jīva, A-jīva, No-jīva and No-ajīva-in stead of three mentioned by you in the Royal Assembly. 177-178 (2472-2473).

Also,

अह ते अजीवदेसो अजीवसामण्णजाइ-लिङ्गो ति । भिन्नो वि अजीवो चिय न जीवदेसो वि किं जीवो ? ॥१७९॥२४७४॥

179. Aha te ajīvadeso ajīvasāmaņņajāi-lingo tti j Bhinno vi a-jīvo ceiya na jīvadeso vi kim jīvo? (2474)

[अथ तेऽजीवदेसोऽजीवसामान्यजाति-लिङ्ग इति । भिन्नोऽप्यजीव एव न जीवदेशोऽपि किं जीवः ? ॥१७९॥२४७४॥

179. Atha te'jīvadešo'jīvasāmānyajāti-linga iti i Bhinno'pyajīva eva na jīvadešo'pi kim jīvah? (2474)]

Trans. 179. And, if a portion of a-jiva, though separated (from it), is a-jiva according to you by virtue of its species and gender being common to a-jiva, why not a portion of jiva also, be taken as jiva? 2474.

टीका-१७९ अथ ते तवाजीतस्य जीवस्कन्धादेर्देश्व एकदेशो भिन्नोऽपि स्कन्धात् पृथग्भूतोऽप्यजीव एव न तु नोअजीवः । कुतः ? इत्याह-अजीवेन सामान्ये जाति-लिङ्गे यस्यासावजीवसामान्यजातिलिङ्ग इति कृत्वा । तत्राजीवत्वं जातिः, पुंलिङ्गलक्षणं च लिङ्गम् । एतच द्रयमप्यजीव-तद्देश्वयोः सामान्यमेव, ततस्तदेशोऽप्यजीव एव । हन्त ! यद्येवम्, तदिं जीवदेशोऽपि किमिति जीवो नेष्यते, तस्यापि जीवेन समानजाति-लिङ्गत्वादिति ॥२४७४॥

D. C.

Acârya:—When you take a part of a living being, though separated from its main body as $a-j\bar{v}a$, and not as $no-aj\bar{v}a$ because its $j\bar{a}ti$ (species) and linga (gender) are common to $a-j\bar{v}a$ you have all the more reason to take a portion of $j\bar{v}a$ as $j\bar{v}a$ on account of their $j\bar{a}ti$ and linga being common. 179 (2474) In support of the same argument, the author continues-

छिन्नगिहकोलिया वि हु जीवो तल्लकखणेहिं सयलो व्व । अह देसो त्ति न जीवो अजीवदेसो त्ति नोऽजीवो ॥१८०॥२४७५॥

[छिन्नग्रहकोलिकापि खल्ठ जीवस्तछक्षणैः सकल इव । अथ देश इति न जीवोऽजीवदेश इति नो-अजीवः ॥१८०॥२४७५॥

180. Chinnagrihakolikāpi khalu jīvastallakṣaṇaih sakala iva j Atha deśa iti na jīvo jīvadeśa iti no-a-jivah. (2475)]

Trans 180. Even a dissected house-lizard is, in fact, jiva (or an animate being) like the whole (house-lizard) by virtue of its characteristics (as a living being). And if it is not jiva because it happens to be a part (of jiva), a part of a-jiva will (probably) become *no-a-jiva*. 2475.

टीका-१८० छित्रगृहकोलिकापिछिन्नःपुच्छादिको गृहकोलिकादिजीवा-वयवोऽपीत्यर्थः । किम् ? इत्याह-जीवः, इति प्रतिज्ञा । हेतुमाह-"तछक्खणेहिं ति तछक्षणेहेंतुभूतैः-स्फुरणादितछक्षणयुक्तत्वादित्यर्थः । ? "सयले व्व त्ति " यथा सकलः परिपूर्णोऽच्छिन्नो गृहकोलिकादिजीव इत्यर्थः, एष दृष्टान्तः । अथ गृहकोलिकादेर्जीवस्य पृच्छादिकस्तदबयबो देश चबेति कृत्वा न वीव ह्य्भते, संपूर्णस्यैव जीवत्वात् । यद्येवम्, अजीवस्यापि घटादेर्देग्रो नो न वाधीवः प्राफ्नोति, संपूर्णस्यैव जीवत्वात् । यद्येवम्, अजीवस्यापि घटादेर्देग्रो नो न वाधीवः प्राफ्नोति, संपूर्णस्यैवाजीवत्वात् । ततोऽयमजीवदेश्वोऽपि नो अर्जीव एव स्यात्, न त्वबीवः । तथा च सति स एव राश्विचतुष्टयभसङ्ग इति ॥२४७५॥

D. C.

Acārya:—Like the whole of house-lizard, its part (say a tail) cut off from the body, is also jīva, on account of its movements etc.

Rohagupta:—Since tail happens to be only a part of houselizard, it cannot be called jīva. Jīvatva exists only in the whole of jīva.

^{180.} Chinnagihakoliyā vi hu jīvo tallakkhaņehim sayalo vva i Aha deso tti na jīvo a-jivadeso tti no-a-jīvo. (2475)

 $\overline{A}c\overline{a}rya:$ —Then, a part of an $a \cdot j\overline{v}a$ (or inanimate) object like ghata will also cease to be $a-j\overline{v}a$ and thus be probably called no-a-j\overline{v}a, in which case again, there would be four categories: J\overline{v}a, A-j\overline{v}a, No-j\overline{v}a and No-a-j\overline{v}a. 180 (2475)

In reply to the argument that the system of samabhiradha naya accepts the jīva pradeśa as no-jīva,

नोजीवं ति न जीवादण्णं देसमिह समभिरूढो वि । इच्छइ बेइ समासं जेण समाणाहिगरणं सो ॥१८१॥२४७६॥ जीवे य से पएसे, जीवपएसे एव नोजीवो । इच्छइ न य जीवदलं तुमं व गिहकोलियापुच्छं ॥१८२॥२४७७॥ न य रासिभेयमिच्छइ तुमं व नोजीवमिच्छमाणो वि । अन्नो वि नओ नेच्छइ जीवाजीवाहियं किं पि ॥१८३॥२४७८॥

- 181. No-jîvam ti na jîvādaņņam dešamiha samabhirodho vi l Icchai bèi samāsam jeņa samāņāhigaraņam so. (2476)
- 182. Jîve ya se paèse jîvapaèse eva no-jîvol Icchai na ya jîvadalam tumam va gihakoliyāpuccham. (2477)
- 183. Na ya rāsibheyamicchai tumam va no-jįvamicchamāņo vi l Anno vi naö necchai jīvājįvāhiyam kim pi. (2478)

[नोजीवमिति न जीवादन्यं देशमिह समभिरूढोऽपि । इच्छति ब्रवीति समासं येन समानाधिकरणं सः ॥१८१॥२४७६॥ जीवश्च स प्रदेशो जीवप्रदेश एव नोजीवः । इच्छति न च जीवदऌं त्वमिव ग्रहकोलिकापुच्छम् ॥१८२॥२४७७॥ न च राशिभेदमिच्छति त्वमिव नोजीवमिच्छन्नपि । अन्योऽपि नयो नेच्छति जीवाजीवाधिकं किमपि ॥१८३॥२४७८॥

- 181. No-jîvamiti na jîvādanyam deśamiha samabhiroḍho'pi l Icchati bravîti samāsam yèna samānādhikaraņam sah. (2476)
- 182. Jîvaśca sa pradeśo jîvapradeśa eva no-jîvah i Icchati na ca jîvadalam tvamiva grihakolîkāpuccham. (2477)

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Vāda]

Nihnavavāda

183. No ca răśibhedamicehati tvamiva no-jîvamicehannapi I Anyo'pi nayo necchati jîvājîvādhikam kimapi. (2478)]

Trans. 181-182-183. Even the system of Samabhirūdha naya (does) not (take) a part (that is) different from *jiva* as *no-jiva*, but mentions it merely as a compound (laying down both of them) in the same case. According to that (system), the portion of that which is animate (*jiva-pradeśa*) is *no-jiva*. (But) this does not accept a part of jiva like the tail of a house-lizard (which is separate from the body) as *no-jiva* as you (assert). Although admitting (the category of) *no-jiva*, this does not allow for difference in categories as you (allow). Other systems also do not admit anything beyond *jiva* and *a-jiva* (2476-2478)

टीका-१८१-१८२-१८३ व्याख्या-इह ' जीवे य से पएसे य से सपएसे नोजीवे'' इत्यत्राजुयोगद्वारोक्तसूत्रालापके समभिरूढ नयोऽपि नोजीवमिति नेच्छतीति सम्बन्ध -- नोजीवत्वेन नेच्छतीत्यर्थः । कं कर्मतापत्रम् ? । देशम् । कथंभूतम् ?। जीवादन्यं जीवाद् व्यतिरिक्तं देशं नोजीव समभिरूढनयोऽपि नेच्छति-किन्त्वव्यतिरिक्तमेव तं तस्मादिच्छतीत्यर्थः । कुत ए तद् विज्ञायते ? इत्याह-येन कारणेन देश-देशिनोः कर्मधारणलक्षणं समानाधि करणमेव समास-मसौ समभिरूढनयो त्रवीत्यम्युपगच्छति, न पुनर्नैगमादिरिव तत्पुरूषमित्यर्थः । समानाधिकरणसमासश्च नीलोत्पलादीनामिव विशेषण- विशेष्याणाममेद एव भवति । अतो ज्ञायते जीवादनन्यरूपमेव देशं नोजीवमिच्छति सममिरूढ इति, एवं कथं तृतीयराशिःस्यात् १ इति । तदेव समभिरूढाभिमतं समानाधिकरण-समासं दर्शयति-" जीवें य से इत्यादि " । जीवश्वासौ प्रदेशश्व जीवप्रदेशः स एव "नोजीवो त्ति" स एव जीवादव्यतिरिक्तो जीवप्रदेशो नोजीव इत्येवमि-च्छति समभिरूढनयः, न पुनर्जीवदलं जीवात् पृथग्भूतं तत्खण्डं नोजीवमिच्छ-त्यसौ, यथा गृहकोलिकादीनां पुच्छादिखण्डं नोजीवं त्वमिच्छसीति । अपि च, नोजीवमिच्छनपि समभिरूढनयो यथा त्वं तथा नोजीवाजीवराशिद्रयाद् मेदं नेच्छति, किन्तु जीवाजीवलक्षणं राशिद्वयमेवेच्छति, नोजीवस्यात्रैवान्तर्भावात् । तथाऽन्योपि नैगमादिर्नयो जीवा-ऽजीवेम्योऽधिकं किमपि नोजीववस्तु नेच्छत्येव । ततस्त्वदीय एवायं नूतनःकश्चिद् मार्ग इति ॥२४७६॥२४७७॥२४७८॥

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D. C. Even in the statement-viz Jive ya ye prese, ya se sapaese no-jive" of Anuyogadvāra Sūtra, the samabhiradha naya does not admit a part separated from jiva as no-jiva but only that which is intimately connected with jiva. This naya interpretes the statement thus:-A part of the animate region is no-jiva. Jiva-pradeśa is here explained as a karmadhāraya compound and not as a Tat-puruşa one. Jiva therefore becomes the adjective of pradeśa, meaning thereby "Animate region." Thus, according to the samabhiradha naya, a part of the animate region is no-jiva, and it does not take anything different from the animate region as no-jiva as you take.

How would the third category be found in such a case ? For, although, considering the existence of no-jîva, there is no difference between jîva and no-jîva according to the Samabhirūdha naya. No-jîva is nothing but a part of jîva and hence there are only two categories viz jîva and a-jîva. (which naturally includes no-jîva.) Other nayas, also, do not admit anything like no-jîva as different from jîva and a-jîva. The category of no-jîva therefore, seems to be an original conception of none but yourself. 181-183 (2476-2478)

Even further than that, the Acarya argues :---

इच्छउ व समभिरूढो देसं नोजीवमेगनइयं तु। मिच्छत्तं सम्मत्तं सब्वनयमयोवरोहेणं ॥१८४॥२४७९॥ तं जइ सब्वनयमयं जिणमयमिच्छसि पवज्ज दो रासी। पयविष्पडिवत्तीए वि मिच्छत्तं किं नु रासीसु ?॥१८५॥२४८०॥

- 184. Icchau va samabhirudho desam no-jivameganaiyam tu Micchattam sammattam savvanayamayovarohenam. (2479)
- 185. Tam jai savvanayamayam Jinamayamicchasi pavajja do rāsi i

Payavippadivattie vi micchattam kim nu rāsisu? (2480)

[इच्छतु वा समभिरूढो देइां नोजीवमैकनयिकं तु । मिथ्यात्वं सम्यक्त्वं सर्वनयमतोपरोघेन ॥१८४॥२४७९॥

Vāda]

तद् यदि सर्वनयमतं जिनमतमिच्छसि प्रपद्यस्व द्वौ राज्ञी। पदविप्रतिपत्त्याऽपि मिथ्यात्वं किं नु राज्ञिषु ॥१८५॥२४८०॥

- 184. Iechatu vä Samabhirūdho deśam no-jîvamaikanayikam tu i Mithyātvam samyaktvam sarvanayamatoparodhena. (2479)
- 185. Tad yadi sarvanayamatam Jînamatamiechasi prapadyasva dvau rāsí i Padavipratipattuā'ni Mithuātuam kim nu rādisu (2480)]

Padavipratipattyā'pi Mithyātvam kim nu rāśisu. (2480)]

Trans. 184–185. Or, let the system of Samabhirūdha (philosophy) admit (the existence of) no-jîva. (But) that being supported by one system (of philosophy) (alone), turns out to be false. That which is supported by all the (philosophical) systems, is accepted as true. So if you (really) wish (to follow) the principle of Tîrthankaras, then accept (the theory of) two categories. For, even by twisting a syllable, (you are led to accept) falsehood; what (to say) about the theorý of) categories. (2479–2480).

टीका-१८४-१८५ इच्छतु वा समभिरूढनयस्त्वमिव जीवाद् भित्रमपि तदेशं नोजीवम् । तथाप्येकनयस्येदं मतमैकनयिकम्, मिथ्यात्वं चैतच्छाक्यमत-वत्, इत्यतो न तत् प्रमाणीकर्तच्यम् । सम्यक्त्वं तु सर्वनयमतावरोधेन समस्तन-यमतसंग्रहेणैव भवति । ततो यदि सर्वनयमयं जिनमतं प्रमाणमिच्छसि तदा प्रतिपद्यस्व जीवाऽ-जीवलक्षणौ द्वावेव राज्ञी, अन्यथा--

> पयमक्खरं पि एकं पि जो न रोएइ सुत्तनिदिहं। सेसं रोयन्तोऽवि हु मिच्छदिट्ठी मुणेयव्वो ॥१॥

इति वचनात् पदविषतिपत्यापि मिथ्यात्वमापद्यते, किम्रुत सकलेषु राशिषु विप्रतिपत्त्या तद् न भविष्यति ? इति ॥२४७९॥२४८०॥

D. C.

Acārya:—Or, let the Samabhirūdha naya itself accept a part of jīva as no-jīva, like you. But that theory being supported by only one *naya*, will become utterly unacceptible like the theory of Śākyas. For, a principle which is jointly supported by all the philosophical systems, is alone taken as acceptible. So, if you really want to follow the doctrine of the Tîrthankaras which is supported by all the philosophical systems, you shall have to admit only two categories: 1. The category of jîvas or animate beings and 2. The category of a-jîvas or inanimate objects.

Otherwise,

Payamakkharam pi ekkam pi jo na röèi suttaniddittham I Sèsam royanto'vi hu micchadditthi muneyavvo II

[If one dislikes only one syllable of a word in a sutra, and likes the rest of the sutra, then also, his view-point should be recognized as false belief.]

According to this rule, if misinterpretation of even one sy llable results in acceptance of falsehood, what to talk of misinterpreting the whole theory of categories? 184-185 (2479-2480)

एवं पि भण्णमाणो न पव्वज्जइ सो जओ तओ गुरुणा। चिंतियमयं पणट्ठो नासिइई मा बहुं लोगं ॥१८६॥२४८१॥ तो णं रायसभाए निग्णिहामि बहुलोगपचव्खं। बहुजणनाओऽवसिओ होही अगेज्झपक्खो त्ति ॥१८७॥२४८२॥ तो बल्लसिरिनिवपुरओ वायं नाओवणीयमग्गाणं। कुणमाणाणमईया सीसा-ऽऽयरियाण छम्मासा ॥१८८॥२४८३॥ एको वि नावसिज्जइ जाहे तो भणइ नरवई नाहं। सत्तो सोउ सीयंति रज्जकज्जाणि मे भगवं! ॥१८९॥२४८॥ गुरुणाऽभिहिओ भवओ सुणावणत्थमियमेत्तियं भणियं। जह सि न सत्तो सोउं तो निग्गिण्हामि णं कल्लं ॥१९०॥२४८५॥

- 186. Evam pi bhannamāno na pavvajjai so jaö taö gurunā l Cintiyamayam panațtho năsîhai mā bahum logam. (2481)
- 187. To nam rāyasabhāe nigginhāmi bahulogapaccakkham | Bahujananāö'vasiö hohī agejjhapakkho tti. (2482)
- 188. To Balasirinivapuraö väyam näövaniyamaggänam | Kunamänänamaiyä sisä"yariyäna chammasä. (2483)

- 189 Ekko vi nāvasijjai jāhe to bhaņai naravat nāham 1 Satto söum siyanti rajjakajjāņi me bhagavam. (2484)
- 190. Guruņā'bhihiö bhavaö suņāvaņatthamiyamettiyam bhaņiyam. Jai si na satto söum to niggiņhāmiņam kallam. (2485)

[एवमपि भण्यमानो न प्रपद्यते स यतस्ततो ग्रुरुणा। चिन्तितमयं प्रनष्टो नाशयतु मा बहुं लोकम् ॥१८६॥२४८१॥ ततो राजसभायां निग्रह्णामि बहुलोकप्रत्यक्षम् । बहुजनज्ञातोऽवसितो भवेदग्राद्यपक्ष इति ॥१८७॥२४८२॥ ततो बल्श्रीदृपपुरतो वादं न्यायोपनीतमार्गाणाम् । कुर्वतामतीताः शिष्याचार्याणां षड् मासाः ॥१८८॥२४८३॥ एकोऽपि नावसचते यदा ततो भणति नरपतिर्नाहम् । शक्तेऽपि नावसचते यदा ततो भणति नरपतिर्नाहम् । शक्ताऽभि सिदन्ति राज्यकार्याणि मे भगवन् ! ॥१८९॥२४८॥ ग्रुष्णाऽभिहितो भवतः आवणार्थमिदमियद् भणितम् । यचसि न शक्तः ओतं ततो निग्रह्णामि कल्ये ॥१९०॥२४८५॥

- 186. Evamapi bhaņyamāņo na prapadyate sa yatastato guraņā (Cintitamayam pranasto nāśayatu mā bahum lokam. (2481)
- 187. Tato rājasabhāyām nigrihņāmi bahulokapratyakṣam (Bahujanajñāto'vasito bhavedagrāhyapakṣa iti. (1482)
- 188. Tato Balaśrinripapurato vādam nyāyopanitamārgāņām (Kurvatāmatitāh śisyācāryāņām sadmāsāh. (2483)
- 189. Eko'pi nāvasadyate yadā tato bhaņati narapatirnāham ı Śaktah śrotum sīdanti rājyakāryāni me Bhagavan ! (2484)
- 190. Guruņā'bhihito bhavataņ śrāvañārthamidamiyad bhaņitam (Yadyasi na śaktaņ śrotum tato nigrihņāmi kalye. (2485)

Trans. 186-187-188-189-190. Though persuaded in this way, when he was not convinced, the preceptor thought "This (man) has been corrupted, but let him not corrupt the world. I shall, therefore defeat him in the midst of many people in the Royal Assembly. He will be known to many people as

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defeated, (and hence) his theory will be unacceptible." Consequently, the preceptor and the pupil passed six months in discussion of (the various) systems of philosophy before the King Balaśrī. When neither of the two was defeated, the king said "Revered Sir, I cann't witness this any more. (My) stateaffairs are getting delayed." The preceptor replied "All this was told for your guidance. If you are not able to hear (any more), I shall defeat him to-morrow. (2481-2485)

टीका-१८६-१८७-१८८-१८९-१९० प्रकटार्था एवैताः, नवरं " बहु-जणनाओऽवसिउ त्ति " बहुजनस्य ज्ञातो विदितोऽवसितो मया जितः सम्रग्नाह्य-वचनः सर्वस्यापि भविष्यति । " तो बरूसिरिनिवपुरउ त्ति " ततो बरूश्रीनाम्नो राज्ञः पुरत इत्यर्थः । " नाओवणीयमग्गाणं ति " नीयते संवित्ति प्राप्यते वस्त्वनेन इति न्यायः प्रस्तुतार्थसाधकं प्रमाणं, येनोपन्यस्तेन संतोपनीतो ढौकितःप्रसङ्ग-नागतः सकलस्यापि तर्कस्य मार्गो येषां ते तथा तेषां न्यायोपनीतमार्गाणां रोह-गुप्त-श्रीगुप्तद्वरीणामिति ॥२४८१॥२४८२॥२४८३॥२४८४॥२४८५॥

D. C. The meaning is clear. Thinking that Rohapupta will not be listened to by any one if he is defeated in the public assembly, the preceptor discussed with him openly in the Royal Assembly of king Balaśrî, the principles of various philosophical systems⁸ constantly for six months. But when King Balaśrī showed his inability to witness the controversy anymore as this state-affairs were being delayed, the Ācārya promised to defeat Rohagupta on the next day. 186-190 (2481-2485)

Then,

बीयदिणे बेइ गुरू नरिंद ? जं मेइणीए सब्भूयं। तं कुत्तियावणे सव्वमत्थि सव्वप्पतीयमियं ॥१९१॥२४८६॥ तं कुत्तियावणसूरो नोजीवं देहि जइ न सो नत्थि। अह भणइ नत्थि तो नत्थि किंव हेउप्पबधेणं ॥१९२॥२४८७॥

^{8.} The tracks of discussion of both were based upon Nyāya and hence their syllogism consisted of Pratijñā, hetu, udāharaņa, upanaya and nigamana.

तं मग्निज्ञउ मुल्लेण सञ्ववत्थूणि किंत्थ कालेण। इय होउ त्ति पवण्णे नरिंद-पइवाइ-परिसाईि ॥१९३॥२४८८॥ सिरिगुत्तेणं छल्ठुगो छम्मासा विकडि्रिण वाए जिओ। अहरण कुत्तिआवण चोयालसएण पुच्छाणं ॥१९४॥२४८९॥

- 191. Biyadine bei gurū narinda? jam meinie sabbhuyam (Tam kuttiyāvane savvamatthi savvappatiyamiyam. (2486)
- 192. Tamkuttiyāvaņasūro no-jîvam dehi jai na so natthi (Aha bhāņai natthi to natthi kimva hèu ppabanddeņam. (2487)
- 193. Tam maggijjau mulleņa savvavatthūņi kintha kāleņa i Iya höu tti pavaņņe narinda-paivā?-parisāhim. (2488)
- 194. Sirigutteņam Chalugo chammāsā vikaţţiūņa vāe jiöl Aharaņa kuttiāvaņa coyālasadņa pucchāņam. (2489)]

[द्वितीयदिने ब्रबीति गुरुर्नरेन्द ! यद् मेदिन्यां सद्भूतम् । तत् कुत्रिकापणे सर्वमस्ति सर्वप्रतीतमिदम् ॥१९१॥२४८६॥

तत् कुत्रिकापणसुरो नोजीवं देहि यदि न स नास्ति। अथ भणति नास्ति ततो नास्ति किं वा हेतु-प्रबन्धेन ?॥१९२॥२४८७ तद् मार्ग्यन्तां मूल्येन सर्ववस्तूनि किमन्न काल्ठेन ?। एवं भवत्विति प्रपन्ने नरेन्द्र-प्रतिवादि-परिषद्भिः ॥१९३॥२४८८॥ श्रीग्रुप्तेन षद्धऌकः षड्मासान् विकृष्य वादे जितः ।

उदाइरणानां कुत्रिकापणे चतुश्वत्वारिंशताशतेन इच्छानाम् ॥ ॥१९४॥२४८९॥

- 191. Dvitîyadine bravîti gurur-narendra i yad medinyām sadbhatam i Tat kutrikāpaņe sarvamasti sarvapratîtamidam. (2486)
- 192. Tat kutrikāpaņasaro no-jīvam dehi yadi na sa nāstiļ Atha bhaņati nāsti tato nāsti kim vā hetu-prabandhena?

(2487)

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Jinabhadra Gani's

- 193. Tad märgyantām mūlyena sarvavastoni kimatra kālena? Evam bhavatviti prapanne narendra-prativādi-pariṣadbhiņ. (2488)
- 194. Srîguptena Şadulūkah şadmāsān vikrişya vāde jitah ı Udaharānānām kutrikāpaņe catuścatvārimsatāsatena pricchānām. (2489)]

Trans. 191-192-193-194. On the next day, the preceptor said "It is known to all that everything that exists on the earth is included in the Universal Shop (Kutrikāpaņa)⁹. Hence, if the deity (in charge) of the Universal shop supplies *no-jîva* (then), it is not (correct to assert that) *no-jîva* does not exist. And if he says that it is not (available), then (it should accepted that) no-jîva does not exist. What is the use of logical arguments? So, demand all things at (various) prices. Why waste time? When it was agreed upon by the Royal Assembly as well as the opposite party (with the words) "Let it be so." Sadulūka was defeated by Śrigupta with the questions of one hundred and fortyfour illustrations (set) at the Universal Shop after having passed six months in discussion. (2486 - 2489)

टीका-१९१-१९२-१९३-१९४ व्याख्या-द्वितीयदिने व्रवीति गुरुः श्रीगुप्तद्वरिः- नरेन्द्र ! पृथिवीपते !-इह मेदिन्यां पृथिव्यां यत् किमपि सद्भूतं विद्यमानं वस्तु तत् सर्वमपि कुत्रिकापणेऽस्तीति सर्वजनस्य भवतां च प्रतीतमेवे-दम् । तत्र कूनां स्वर्ग-पाताल-मर्त्यभूमीनां त्रिकं कुत्रिकं तात्स्थ्यात् तद्वयपदेश इति कृत्वा तत्स्थलोका अपि कुत्रिकग्रुच्यते, कुत्रिकमापणयति व्यवहरति यत्र हट्टेअ्सौ कुत्रिकापणः । अथवा, धातु-जीव-मूल-लक्षणेभ्यस्त्रिभ्यो जातं त्रिजं सर्वमपि वस्त्वित्यर्थः, कौ पृथिच्यां त्रिजमापणयति व्यवहरति यत्र हट्टे स कुत्रि-

^{9.} Kutrikāpaņa could be interpreted in this way:--Ku= Prithivi=Earth, world. Trika=Three, Trio-Kutrika=The three worlds (viz. Svarga, Mritya and Pātāla) Āpaņa=Shop. Kutrikapaņa could thus conveniently be called Universal Shop wherefrom all objects of the three words could be had.

जापणः । अस्मिश्र कुत्रिकापणे वणिजः कस्वापि मन्त्राद्याराधितः सिद्धो व्यन्तर-सुरः कायकजनसमीहितं सर्वमपि वस्तु कुतोऽप्यानीय संपादयति । तन्मूच्यद्रव्यं तु वणिगेव गृह्णति । अन्ये तु वदन्ति-" वणिग्रहिताः सुराधिष्ठिता एव त आपणा भवन्ति । ततो मूल्यद्रव्यमपि स एवं व्यन्तरसुरः स्वीकरोति " । एवं च कुत्रि-कापणाः प्रतिनियंतेष्वेवोज्जयिनी-भृगुकच्छनगरादिस्थानेषु कापि कियन्तोऽप्या-सन्, इत्यागमेऽभिहितम् । ततस्तस्मात् कुत्रिकापणसुरो यदि मूल्येन याचितः सन् नोजीवं जीवाजीवव्यतिरिक्तवस्तुरूपं कमधि ददाति तदाऽसौ न नास्त्यपि त निविवादमस्त्येव । अथायमेव वदति-नास्ति तद्वचतिरिक्तःकोऽपि नोजीवस्तदा नास्त्येवासौ, किं तन्नास्तित्वसाधनाय युष्मद्राज्यप्रयोजनक्षतिकारिणा क्लेश्वफल्लेन हेतुप्रबन्धोपन्यासेन १ इति । तत् तस्माद् याच्यन्तां मूल्येन सर्ववस्तुनि कुत्रिका-परणसुरः, किमत्र काल्रेन कालविलम्बेन ? इत्यर्थः। एवं गुरुभिरुक्ते बलश्रीनरेन्द्रेण प्रतिवादिना रोहगुप्तेन सभ्यपर्षदा च युक्तियुक्तत्वात्, "एवं भवतु" इति प्रति-पने श्रीगुप्ताचार्येण षडुऌको रोहगुप्तं पूर्वं षड् मासान् विकृष्यातिबाद्य वादे जितो निगृहीतः । केन १ इत्याह-कुत्रिकापणे यानि वक्ष्यमाण भू-जल-ज्वलनाद्याहरणा-न्युदाहरणांनि तदिषयपृच्छानां चतुश्रत्वारिंग्रेन शतेन, प्राकृतश्रैल्या छन्दोबन्धानु लोम्पादार्षत्वादत्र व्यत्ययेन निर्देश इति ॥२४८६॥२४८७॥२४८८॥२४८९॥

D. C. Next day, the preceptor Sri Guptācārya said "O king! it is welknown that *Kutrikāpaņa* supplies everything that exists in the three worlds. So, it will supply all that exists on the earth also. For *ku* means "world" and the three worlds are heaven-earth and-the nether-world. Apaņa means a shop. A shop where objects existing in the three worlds are sold is known as Kutrikāpaņa. Or, it may be called *Kutrijāpaņa* also. Since everything is produced from *dhātu* or primary substance, jîva or consciousness and *mala* or root, they could also be said to be *trija* (product of the three). A place on earth where all such objects are sold, is known as *Kutrikāpaņa*. Such Kutrikāpaņas or Universal Shops, were usually managed by merchants who used to propitiate a *Vyantara* or semi-god¹⁰ who would bring for them

10. There are eight classes of Vyantaras :---Piśāca. Bhuta, Yakṣa, Rākṣasa, Kinnara, Kimpuruṣa, Mahoraga and Gandharva. any object required from anywhere in the three worlds. The money procured by sale, was appropriated by the merchants concerned.

According to another theory, these shops were managed by Vyantaras themselves and not by merchants. And hence, the money procured happened to be their property. It has been mentioned in the Agamas that such Universal Shops were situated at Ujjain and Broach.

It was proposed:—"Let us approach such a shop and demand *no-jiva* as distinguished from *jiva* and *a-jiva*. If the god in charge supplies us the same, the existence of *no-jiva* will be accepted. But if he refuses to believe in such an entity as "*no-jiva*" we shall have to believe unanimously that *no-jiva* does not exist. Why waste time? Let us approach the Universal Shop and settle the dispute."

King Balaśri, Rohagupta and all the members of the Royal Assembly, consented to this proposal and proceeded to the Kutrikāpaņa. They demanded one hundred and forty-four objects by means of a number of questions but they could not get, no-jiva as distinguished from "jîva" and "a-jîva." Consequently, Rohagupta was defeated. 191-194 (2486-2489)

The one hundred and forty-four questions referred to above are counted as follows :---

मू-जल-जलणानिल-नह-काल-दिसा-ऽऽया मणो य दब्बई । भण्णंति नवेयाइं सत्तरस गुणा हमे अण्णे ॥१९५॥२४९०॥ रूब-रस-गंध-फासा संखा परिमाणमहमह-पुहुत्तं च । संजोग-विभाग-परा-ऽपरत्तबुद्धी सुहं दुक्खं ॥१९६॥२४९१॥ इच्छा-दोस-पयत्ता एत्तो कम्मं तयं च पंचविहं । उक्सेवण-वक्सेवण-पसारणाऽऽकुंचणं-गमणं ॥१९७॥२४९२॥ सत्ता-सामण्णं-पिय-सामण्णविसेंसया-विसेसो य ।

सत्ता-सामण्ण-ापय-सामण्णावसंसया-ावसंसा य । समयाओ य पयत्था छ इत्तीसप्पमेया य ॥१९८॥२४९३॥

पमईए अगारेण य नोमारोभयनिसेहओ सब्वे । गुणिआ ओयालसयं पुच्छाणं पुच्छिओ देवो ॥१९९॥२४९४॥

- 195. Bhū-jala-jalaņā-nila-naha-kala-disā-āyā-maņo ya davvāim i Bhaņņanti naveyāim sattarasa guņā ime aņņe. (2490)
- 196. Rūva-rasa-gaudha-phāsā-saņkhā parimāņamamaha-puhuttam ca i Sañjoga-vibhāga-parā-'paratta-buddhî-suham-dukkham. (2491)
- 197. Icchā-doṣa-payattā etto kammam tayam ca pancaviham Ukkhevaņa-vakkhevaņa-pasāraņā"kuncanam gamaņam. (2492)
- 198. Sattā-sāmaņņam piya-sāmaņņavisesayā-viseso ya Samavāö ya payatthā cha chattisappabheyā ya. (2493)
- 199. Pagaid agāreņa ya nogārobhayanisehaö savvel Guņiyā öyālasayam pucchāņam pucchiö devo. (2494)

[मू-जल-ज्वलना-ऽनिल-नभः-काल-दिगा-ऽऽत्मानो-मनश्च द्रव्याणि। भण्यन्ते नवैतानि सप्तददागुणा इमेऽन्ये ॥१९५॥२४९०॥

रूप--रस-गंध--फासा-संखा--परिणाम-महत्--ष्थक्त्वं च । संयोग-विभाग-परा-ऽपरत्व--बुद्धयः-सुखं-दुःखम् ॥१९६॥२४९१॥

इच्छा-द्वेष-प्रयत्नावितः कर्म तच पश्चविधम् । उत्क्षेपणाऽ-वक्षेपण-प्रसारणा--ऽऽकुञ्चनानि-गमनम्॥१९७॥२४९२॥

सत्ता सामान्यमपि च सामान्य-विद्रोषका-विद्रोषश्च । समवायश्च पदार्थाः षट् षट्त्रिंदात्प्रभेदाश्च ॥१९८॥२४९३॥

प्रकृत्याऽकारेण च नोकारोभगनिषेधतः सर्वे । गुणितास्त्वेकचत्वारिंशताशतं पृच्छानां प्रष्टो देवः ॥१९९॥२४९४॥

195. Bho-jala-jvalanā'-nila-nabhah-kāla-digā-"tmāno manaśca dravyāņi I Bhaņyante navaitāni śaptadaśaguņā ime'nye. (2490)

Vāda]

196. Rūpa-rasa-gandha-phāsā-samkhā-parināmatha-mahat-prithaktvam ca | Saṃyoga-vibhāga-parā-'paratva-buddhayaḥ - sukham - duḥkham. (2491)

197. Icchā-dveṣa-prayatnāvitaņ karma tacca pañcavidham I Utkṣepaṇā'vakṣepaṇa-prasāraṇā-"kuñcanāni-gamanam. (2492)

198. Sattā sāmānyamapi ca sāmānyavisèṣakā-viśeṣaśca | Samavāyaśca-padārthāḥ ṣaṭ ṣaṭ trimśat prabhedāśca. (2493)

199. Prakritya'kāreņa ca nokārobhayanisedhatah sarve i Guņitastvekacatvārimsatāsatam pricchānām pristo devaņ. (2494)

Trans. 195-196-197-198-199. The deity (in charge) was asked one hundred and forty-four questions as follows :- Earth, Water, Fire, Wind, Sky, Time, Direction, Soul, and Mind are called the nine main substances. Form, Taste, Odour, Touch, Number, Shape, Length, Distinction, Combination, Separation, Remoteness, Vicinity, Intellect, Happiness, Misery, Desire, Aversion, and Effort-these are seventeen Qunas or properties. And there is Karman or Action which is of five varieties viz Those of 1. Throwing up, 2. Throwing down, 3. Expanding, 4. Contracting and 5. Moving. The sāmānya or Genus (divided into) generality of existence, general property, and (generality of) particular (elements). There are visesa (particularity), and samānya (co-inherence). (Thus there are) six (categories of) elements¹¹, of which there are thirty-six varieties. On multiplying these (thirty-six) by prakriti or the root-form, a-kara (i. e. prefixing or to the word), no-kara (i. e prefixing an to the word), and both together (i. e. prefixing and and both to-gether), there will be one hundred and forty-four questions. (2490 - 2494)

^{11.} According to Vaiśesikas there are seven elements: Dravya (substance) Guņa (quality) Karman (action) Sāmānya (Genus) Viśesa (particularity) Samavāya (co-inherence) and Abhāva (Nonexistence). Jaipas do not admit *abhāva*.

टीका-१९५-१९६-१९७-१९८-१९९ इह द्रव्य-गुण-कर्म-सामान्य-विशेष-समवायलक्षणाः षड् मूलपदार्थास्तेन षडुॡकेन कल्टि्पताः । तत्र द्रव्यं नवधा। कथम् १ इत्याह-''भू-जलेत्यादि '' भूमिः, जलम्, ज्वलनः, अनिलः, नभः, कालः, दिक्, आत्मा, मनश्वेतानि नवद्रव्याणि भण्यन्ते । गुणाः सप्तदन्न भवन्ति, तद्यथा-रूपं, रस, गन्धः, स्पर्शः, संख्या, परिमाणम्, महत्त्वम्, पृथक-च्चम्, संयोगः, विभागः, परा-ऽपरत्वे, बुद्धिः, सुखम्, दुःखम्, इच्छा, द्वेषः, प्रयत्नश्रेति । इतः कर्म तत् पुनः पञ्चविधम्, तद्यथा-उत्क्षेपणम्, अवक्षेपणम्, आकुअनम्, प्रसारणम्, गमनभिति । सामान्यं त्रिविधम्, तद्यथां सत्ता, सामा-न्यम्, सामान्यविशेषश्वेति । तत्र द्रव्य-गुण-कर्मलक्षणेषु त्रिषु पदार्थेषु सद्षुद्वि-हेतुः सत्ता, सामान्यं द्रव्यत्व-गुणत्वादि, सामान्यविशेषस्तु पृथिवीत्व,-ंजलत्व_ -कृष्णत्व-नीलत्वाद्यवान्तरसामान्यरूप इति । अन्ये त्वित्थं सामान्यस्य त्रैविध्य-मुपवर्णयन्ति-अविकल्पं महासामान्यम् , त्रिपदार्थसद्बुद्धिहेतुभूता सत्ता, सामान्य-विशेषो द्रव्यंत्वादि । महासामान्य-सत्तयोर्विशेषणव्यत्यय इत्यन्ये । द्रव्य-गुण-कर्मपदार्थत्रयसद्बुद्धिहेतुः सामान्यम् , अविकऌ्पा सत्तेत्यर्थः । सामान्यविशेषस्तु द्रव्यत्वादिरूप एव । इत्यलं प्रसङ्गेनेति । विशेषश्चान्त्यः । समवायपदार्थश्चेति ।

तदेवमेते द्रव्यादयः षट् पदार्थाः षट्त्रिंशत्प्रमेदाः-नवानां द्रव्याणां, सप्तदशानां गुणानां, पञ्चानां कर्मणां, त्रयाणां सामान्यानाम्, विशेष-समवाय-योश्व मीलने षट् त्रिंशद् विकल्पा भंवन्तीत्यर्थः । एते च सर्वे प्रकृत्या, अकारेण, नोकारेण, उभयनिषेधतश्वत्येतश्रेतुभिः प्रकारेर्गुणिताः सन्तो यचतुश्वत्वारिंशं श्वतं पृच्छानां भवति तत् पृष्टः कुत्रिकापणदेवः । इदमत्र हृदयम्-नञ्रहितं शुद्धं पदमिह प्रकृतिरुच्यते, तया शुद्धपदरूपया प्रकृत्या पृथिव्यादयः पदार्थाः पृच्छचन्ते, तद्यथा-" पृथिवीं देहि " इत्यादि । तथा, छप्तस्य नजः स्थाने योश्कारस्तेन चाकारेण संयुक्तया प्रकृत्या पृच्छा विधीयते, यथा '' अपृथिवीं देहि " इत्यादि । तथा नोकारेण संयुक्तया प्रकृत्या प्रच्छा यथा–'' नोप्टथिवीं देहि'' इत्यादि । <mark>तथा,</mark> नोकाराऽकारलक्षणं तदुभयं तेन योऽसौ मकृत्या निषेधस्तस्माच पृष्टः सुरो यथा -" नोअपृथिवीं देहि" इत्यादि । एवं जलादिष्वपि प्रत्येकमेते प्रकृत्य-- आ जलादेष्वपि प्रत्येकमेते प्रकृत्य-- आ जला नोकारोभयनिषेधलक्षणाश्वत्वारः पृच्छाप्रकारा वक्तव्या इति । एतदभिप्रायवता प्रोक्तम्-" सब्वे गुणिओ '' इति । आइ-ननु '' पृथिवीं देहि '' इत्यादिका याचनां एव कथं पृच्छाः प्रोच्यन्ते ? । सत्यम् , किन्तु '' पृथिवीं देहि " इत्यादि- पाचनाद्वारेण प्रथिष्णाचसितत्वमेवासौ देवः प्रच्छयते, ''नोजीव याचितो यद्यसौ जीवा-अजीवव्यतिरिक्तं तं दास्यति तदाऽयमस्ति, नान्यथा इत्येवमेव प्रतिज्ञात-त्वात् । ततो याचना अप्येतास्तत्त्वतः प्रच्छा एवेत्यदोषः ॥२४९०॥२४९१॥ २४९२॥२४९३॥२४९४॥

D. C. 1. Dravya (substance), 2. Guņa (quality), 3. Karman (action), 4. Sāmānya (genus), 5. Viśeṣa (particularity) and 6. Sāmavāya (co-inherhnce) are the six main categories under which all the objects are classed. There are nine kinds of *dravya*: 1. Earth, 2. Water, 3. Fire, 4. Wind, 5. Sky, 6. Time, 7. Space, 8. Soul and 9. Mind.

There are seventeen types of Guna: -1. Form, 2. Taste, 3. Odour, 4. Touch, 5. Number, 6. Shape, 7. Length, 8. Distinction, 9. Combination, 10. Separation, 11. Remoteness, 12. Vicinity, 13. Intellect, 14. Pleasure or Pain, 15. Desire, 16. Hatred and 17. Effort.

Karman is divided into five types:—the acts of 1. Throwing up, 2. Throwing down, 3. Expanding, 4. Contracting and 5. Moving.

Sāmānya is three-fold :— 1. Existence, 2. General Property and 3. Generality in particular. Three types of $s\bar{a}m\bar{a}nya$ are explained in two ways viz (1) Sattā or existence means acceptance of dravya, guņa and karman as existing. Sāmānya means quality of being *dravya* and *guņa* etc. while sāmānya-viśeṣa constitutes qualities of being prithvî, jala etc. (2) The general case of generality (mahāsāmānya) covers everything and hence has no alternative. Sattā or existence admits the various substances as *dravya* while dravyatva, guņatva etc. constitute sāmānya-viśeṣa.

According to others, makāsāmānya and sattā are exactly opposite to each other.

Vises, a is final distinction and samavaya is co-inherence or intimate connection.

Nihnavavāda

Thus, there are six main categories of substances of which there are thirty-six varieties in all. Each one of these, was demanded at the Kutrikāpaņa (a) in its original form (b) with the prefix **a**. (c) with the prefix **a**? (d) and with both the prefixes (**a** and **a**?) together, one after the other. In this way, one hundred and forty-four questions in all, were put before the said *Kutrikāpaņa*. Take for example the case of *prithiv*?. While demanding prithiv?, firstly, the element of prithiv? is demanded, in its original form. Then the demands of *A-prithiv*? (**a**-**y**?**a**?) Noprithiv? (**a**?-**y**?**a**?) and *No-a-prithiv*? (**a**?-**y**?**a**?) are respectively made.

On demand of *prithiv*, its existence is inquired. Similarlyty, on demanding "*no-jiva*" if the deity in charge satisfies the demand, it is taken for granted that "*no-jiva*" exists. But if the demand is not fulfilled, the existence of *no-jiva* will be denied. It is, therefore, better to settle this dispute by putting such demands and save time. 195-199. (2490-2494)

Now, explaining how the various demands were made and fulfilled, the author states-

पुढवि त्ति देइ छेट्टुं देसो वि समाणजाइ-लिंगो त्ति । पुढवि त्ति सोऽपुढवीं देहि त्ति देइ तोयाई ॥२००॥२४९५॥

200. Pudhavi tti ddi letthum deso vi samāņajāi-lingo tti l Pudhavi tti so'pudhavim dehi tti ddi toyaim. (2495)

[प्रथिवीति ददाति छेष्टुं देशोऽपि समानजाति-लिङ्ग इति । प्रथिवीति सोऽप्रथिवीं देहीति ददाति तोयादि ॥२००॥२४९५॥

200. Prithivîti dadāti lestum deso'pi samānajāti-linga iti Prithivîti so'prithivîm dehîti dadāti toyādi. (2495)]

Trans. 200. (On demanding) "earth" he gives a lump of earth. (For), even a part is of the same genus and gender, (and hence) is nothing (but) prithivî. But when asked that "Give us a-prithivî" he supplies water etc. (2495)

टीका-२०० प्रथिवीं याचितः कुत्रिकापणसुरो छेष्टुं ददाति । आह-अप्रस्तुत-मिदम्, अन्यस्मिन् याचितेऽन्यस प्रदानात् । नैवम् । कुतः इत्याह-" देसो वीत्यादि " देशोऽपि छेष्टुरुक्षणः " पुढवि त्ति " प्रथिव्येव मन्तव्या, प्रथिवीत्व-लक्षणाया जातेःस्त्रीलिङ्गलक्षणस लिङ्गस्य च समानत्वात् । इह यत्र प्रथिवीत्व-जातिःस्त्रीलिङ्गं च वर्तते तत् 'प्रथिवी' इति व्यवहवर्तव्यम्, यथा रत्नप्रभादि, तथा च लेष्टुः, तस्मात् प्रथिवीति । "अप्रथिवीं देहि" इत्येवं याचितोऽसौ देवस्तोयादि प्रयच्छति ॥२४९५॥

D. C. On demand of "*prithiv*î", the deity in charge of the Kutrikāpaņā supplies a lump of earth. Here, if it is objected that on demand of one thing, something else is given, it is not so. The clod which is but a portion of *prithiv*î is nothing but prithivî as the genus and gender of both are common.

On the demand that "Give (us) a-prithivî" the deity supplies water etc. 200 (2495)

And in case of no-prithivî-

देसपडिसेहपक्खे नोपुढर्वी देइ लेटूडुदेसं सो । <mark>लेट्डुइव्वावेकखो कीरइ देसोवयारो से</mark> ॥२०१॥२४९६॥

इहरा पुढवि चिय सो छेट्रु व्व समाणजाइलक्खणओ । छेट्रडुदलं ति व देसो जइ तो छेट्र्टू वि भूदेसो ॥२०२॥२४९७॥

- 201. Dèsapadisehapakkhè no-pudhavîm dèi lețthudesam so Lețthuddavvävekkho kîrai desovayaro se. (2496)
- 202. Iharā pudhavi ceiya so leţţhu vva samāņajāilākkhaņaö Leţţhudalam ti va deso jai to leţţhū vi bhūdeso. (2497)

[देशप्रतिषेधपक्षे नोप्रथिवीं ददाति छेष्टुदेशं सः । छेष्टुद्रव्यापेक्षः क्रियते देशोपचारतस्तस्य ॥२०१॥२४९६॥

इतरथा प्रथिव्येव स लेष्टुरिव समानजातिलक्षणतः । लेष्टुदलमिति वा देशो यदि ततो लेष्टुरपि भूदेशः ॥२०२॥२४९७॥

Vāda]

Nihnavavāda

- 201. Deśapratisedhapakse no-prithivim dadāti lestudeśam sah Lestudravyāpeksah kriyate deśopacāratastasya (2496)
- 202. Itarathā prithivyeva sa lasturiva samānajātilakṣaṇataḥ Leṣṭudalamiti vā deśo yadi tato leṣṭurapi bhūdeśaḥ. (2497)]

Trans 201-202. (On demanding) "no prithivî" in case of (interpreting it as) the nagation of a part, he supplies a piece of clod on account of its usage as a portion with regard to clod as *dravya*. Otherwise, that (also) will be nothing but *prithiv*î on account of its (being characterised by the) same genus and gender. Or, if the piece of clod is (taken) merely (as) a portion then clod is also nothing but a portion of earth. (2496-2497)

टीका-२०१-२०२ नोशब्दस्य देशप्रतिषेधपक्षे नोष्टथिवीं याचितोऽनन्तर मेव समस्तप्रथिवीत्वेनोपचरितस्य लेष्टोरेव देशं तत्स्वण्डरूपं ददात्यसौ देवः । आइ-ननु देशनिषेधपक्षे नोष्टथिवी तदेश एव गृद्यते, यस्तु छेष्टुदेशः स पृथ्वी-देशस्यापि देश एव, न तु पृथ्वदिशः, तत् कथं नोष्टथ्वीं याचितस्तं ददाति ? इत्याह-" लेट् टुदव्वेत्यादि " लेष्टुद्रव्यापेक्षः " से " तस्य छेष्टुदेशस्य देशोप-चारः क्रियते । इदग्रुक्तं भवति-लेष्टौ तावदनन्तरोक्तयुक्तेः संपूर्णपृथ्वीद्रव्यत्वमारी-पितम्, ततो लेष्टुलक्षणपृथ्वीद्रव्यापेक्षया तदेशस्यापि पृथ्वीदेशत्वग्रुपचर्यते, इतरधाऽन्यथा पुनः परमार्थतो लेष्टुवत् समानजात्यादिलक्षणत्वादिति पूर्वोक्तदेतोः सोऽपि लेष्टुदेशः पृथ्व्ये मन्तव्या । अथ पराभिप्रायमाविष्ठत्य परिद्वारार्थमाह-" लेट् टुदलं ति व देसो जइ त्ति " यदि तु भोः पर ! त्वं मन्यसे-योऽयं लेष्टो देशःसदलं लेष्टोरेव खण्डमात्रम्, ततः समानजातिलक्षणत्वेऽपि नासौ पृथ्वीति । अत्र परिहारमाह-" तो लेट्इ वि भूदेसो त्ति " ततस्तद्विंपुढवीत्ति देइ लेट्ठं देसो वि "इत्यादौ यः पूर्वं लेष्टुः पृथ्वीदलरूपत्वाक्त सोऽपि श्ववः प्रथिव्या देश एव । तततस्त्वदभिप्रायेण सोऽपि पृथ्वीदलरूपत्वाद् न पृथ्वी, लेष्टुदेशवदिति ॥२४९६॥२४९७॥।

D. C. When "no-prithivî is demanded, the deity-in-charge interpretes it as a negation of part and accordingly he supplies a portion of clod which was firstly taken as earth in general. Here, if it is objected that by the word "no-prithivî" a part of prithivî would be understood, but since a piece of clod is the portion of a portion of earth, how could that be called "noprithvî? The reply is this:--Just as the substance of *prithv*î has been transposed upon clod as stated before, the sense of portion has been transposed upon a piece of clod. In other words, clod represents 'prithvî' and a piece of clod represents a portion of "prithvî" in this case; otherwise, really speaking, the portion of clod is nothing but "prithvî" as jāti etc. of 'prithvî' are found in it also. The objection that a portion of clod could not be called 'prithvî' in spite of their jati etc. being common, is not proper. For, in that case, even clod which has already been taken as 'prithvî' before, will not be called 'prithvî' as it happens to be only a portion of 'prithvî'. 201-202 (2496-2497)

This argument is explained with illustrations-

देहि सुवं तो भणिए सब्वाणेया न यावि सा सब्वा । सक्का सक्रेण वि याणेउ किमुय.वसेसेणं १ ॥२०३॥२४९८॥

203. Dehi bhuvam to bhanie savvānèyā na yāvi sā savvā i Sakkā Sakkèna vi yāneum kimuyāvasesenam? (2498)

[देहि सुवं ततो भणिते सर्वानेया न चापि सा सर्वा । शक्या राकेणापि चानेतुं किसुतावरोषेण ? ॥२०३॥२४९८॥

203. Dehi bhuvam tato bhaņite sarvānèyā na cāpi sā sarvāl Śakyā Śakrèņāpi cānètum kimutāvaśeṣeṇa? (2498)]

Trans. 203. On the demand that "Give (us) prithvî" the whole of earth should be brought. But (ca) since the whole of it could not brought even by Indra, what, then, to talk of the rest (of gods) 2498.

टीका-२०३ यदि छेष्टुर्न पृथ्वी, ततस्तर्हि "अवं देहि" इत्युक्ते सर्वापि संपूर्णा सा-ऽऽनेया प्रसज्यते, न च सा सर्वा श्रकेणाप्यानेतुं शक्या, किम्रुतावशे-षेण इत्रिकाषणदेवादिमात्रेण १ इति । तर्हि किमत्र तत्त्वम् १ इति अवन्त एव कथयन्तु इति ॥२४९८॥ Nihnavavāda

D. C. If clod is not taken as earth, then, on saying that "Give (us) earth" the whole of earth should be supplied by him. But that is impossible. Even Indra will not be able to bring the whole of earth; what, then, to talk of the capacity of ordinary deities such as the one at the Kutrikāpana etc. ? 203 (2498)

Hence,

जह घडमाणय भणिए न हि सब्वाणयसंभवो र्कितु । देसाइविसिद्वं चिय तमत्थवसओ समप्पेइ ॥२०४॥२४९९॥

पुरुवि त्ति तहा भणिए तद्गदेसे वि पगरणवसाओ । छेट्टुम्मि जायइ मई जहा तहा छेट्टुदेसे वि ॥२०५॥२५००॥

- 204. Jaha ghadamānaya bhanic na hi savvānayasambhavo kintu Desāivisittham ciya tamatthavasaö samappeli. (2499)
- 205. Pudhavi tti tahā bhaņiè tadegadèsè vi pagaraņavasāö l Lețthummi jāyai mai jahā tahā lețthudèsè vi. (2500)

[यथा घटमानय भणिते न हि सर्वानयनसंभवः किन्तु। देशादिविशिष्टमेव तमर्थवशतः समर्पयति ॥२०४॥२४९९॥

श्विवीति तथा भणिते तदेकदेरोऽपि प्रकरणवज्ञात् । छेष्टी जायते मतिर्यथा तथा लेष्टुदेरोऽपि ॥२०५॥२५००॥

- 204. Yathā ghaṭamānaya bhaṇite na hi sarvānayanasaṃbhavaḥ kintu I Dèśādiviśiṣṭameva tamarthavaśatah samarpayati. (2499)
- 205. Prithivîti tathā bhaņite tadekadòśè'pi prakaraņavaśāt i Lestau jāyate mati-r-yathā tathā lestudèśè'pi. (2500)]

Trans. 204-205. Just as, on saying "Bring ghata", there is no possibility of bringing all (ghats) but he gives (only) that one (which is) characterised by place etc. by means of usage, so also, on demand of 'prithvî', the purpose being attached to one of its parts, (the deity) is inclined (to give) the clod and consequently a piece of clod. (2499-2500) :210:

टीका-२०४-२०५ यथा सामान्येन "घटमानय" "पटमानय" इत्यु-केऽपि न खलु सर्वस्यापि घटस्य सामान्यतयैवानयनसंभवोऽस्ति, किन्तु सर्वस्या-नेतुमञ्चक्यत्वात् प्रायः सर्वेण प्रयोजनाभावाच, अर्थवद्यात् सामर्थ्यत एव नियत-देश्वकालाद्यवच्छिकं विश्विष्टमेव कश्चिद् घटमानीय समर्पयति, तथाऽत्रापि "प्रथित्रीं देहि" इति भणिते सर्वस्यानेतुमञ्चक्यत्वात्, प्रायस्तया भयोजना-भावाच यथा तदेकदेशेऽपि प्रथिच्येकांशेऽपि लेष्टौ देवस्य समर्पणमतिर्जायते । कुतः १ इत्याह-प्रकरणवञ्चात्, "अनेनापि तदेकदेशेन लेंष्टुना प्रस्तुतार्थः सेत्स्यति" इत्येवं प्रस्ताववञ्चादित्यर्थः । प्रकृतमाह-"तहा लेट्ठुदेसे वि त्ति" यथा "प्रथिवीं देहि" इत्युक्ते सति प्रतिपाद्तिन्यायेन तदेकदेशेऽपि लेष्टौ समर्पण मतिर्जायते तथा तेनैव प्रकारेण "नोप्टर्थ्वी देहि" इत्युक्ते तत्खण्डरूपे तदेकदेन शेऽपि समर्पणबुद्धिरूत्पद्यत इति ॥२४९९॥२५००॥

D. C. Ordinarily when a ghata or pata is demanded, by saying "Bring ghata" or "bring pata", all the ghatas or patas are not supplied. Nor is it meant so. Only a particular ghata belonging to a definite desa, kala etc. is supplied.

Similarly, when it is said that "Give (us) *prithv*?", the whole of *prithv*? is not asked for, and that is not physically possible also. Hence the deity is naturally inclined to give a lump of earth anticipating that the object of demand will be satisfied by it.

The same is the case with the demand of "no-prithvī". Just as, on demand of "prithvī", its portion-a lump of earthis given, on demand of "no-prithvī" a portion of the lump of earth is supplied with a view that the object of demand will be satisfied by it. 204-205 (2499-2500).

Explaining how a portion of clod could be taken to serve the purpose of " $no-prithv\bar{i}$ ", the author states—

छेट्टुदव्वावेक्खाए तह वि तद्देसभावओ तम्मि । उवयारो नोपुढवि पुढवि चिय जाइलख्णओ ॥२०६॥२५०१॥

206. Lețțhudavvāvekkhād taha vi tadddsabhavaö tammi i Uvayāro no-pudhavi pudhavi ceiya jāilakkhaņaö. (2501) **Vāda**]

[लेष्टुद्रव्यापेक्षया तथापि तद्देशभावतस्तस्मिन् । उपचारो नोष्टथिवी ष्टथिव्येव जातिलक्षणतः ॥२०६॥२५०१॥

206. Lestudravyāpèksayā tathāpi taddèśabhāvatastasmin (Upacāro no-prithivī prithivyeva jātilaksaņatah. (2501)]

Trans. 206. "No-prithvī" is nothing but "prithvī" from (the point of view of) general characteristics. Still, however, with regard to clod (as a) substance, the application (of no-prithvītva), is made on that, because of its being a portion (of clod). 2501.

टीका-२०६ यद्यपि लेष्ट्रेकदेशः पृथिव्येव, तथापि "उवयारो ति" तस्मिन लेष्ट्रेकदेशे नोपृथिवीत्वस्योपचारः क्रियतेः इत्यर्थः । कया ? इत्याद-लेष्टुद्रव्या पेक्षया लेष्टोः प्रागुक्तन्यायेन यत् पृथिवीद्रव्यत्वमारोपितं तदपेक्षयेत्यर्थः । क्रुतः ? इत्याद-तदेशभावतो लेष्टुद्रव्यैकदेशत्वादित्यर्थः । प्रागुक्तन्यायेन तावस्ट्रेष्टुरेवेद पृथ्वीद्रव्यं तदपेक्षया च तदेकदेशे नोपृथ्वीत्युपचर्यत इति भावः । परमार्थतःस्वियं लेष्ट्रेकदेशलक्षणं नोपृथ्व्येव मन्तव्यम्, समानजातिलक्षणत्वादिति को वै न मन्यते, अस्माभिरेव प्रागुक्तत्वात्, इदानीमपि च स्मर्यमाणत्वात् ? इति ॥२५०१॥

D. C. Although a portion of clod is nothing but "*prithv*ī", an *upacāra* of the property of 'no-prithivī' could be made to it. Since clod was a portion of *prithv*ī, the property of *prithv*ī was attributed to it. Now, taking clod as *prithv*ī, the property of '*no-prithv*ī' will further be attributed to the portion of clod on the same ground. (2501)

With regard to the implications of negation by prefixes $\overrightarrow{a1}$ and $\overrightarrow{a4}$, the author explains—

पडिसेहदुगं पगइं गमेइ जं तेण नोअपुढवि त्ति । भणिए पुढवि त्ति गईदेसनिसेहे वि तद्देसो ॥२०७॥२५०२॥

207. Padisehadugam pagaim gamèi jam tena no-a-pudhavi tti i Bhanie pudhavi tti gaīdesaniséhé vi taddèso. (2502)

[प्रतिषेघद्विकं प्रकृतिं गमयति यत् तेन नोअप्रथिषीति । जणिते प्रथिवीति गतिर्देद्यानिषेधेऽपि तदेदाः ॥२०७॥२५०२॥

Trans. 207. Since two negatives bring about the original sense, when '*no-a-prithv*i' is uttered, *prithv*i is asserted. (So) even in (case of) negation of a portion, (the existence of) that portion (is implied). 2502.

टीका-२०७ "द्वो नजौ प्रकुतमर्थं गमयतः" इति वचनाद् नोकाराकार-लक्षणं प्रतिषेधद्वयं यस्मात् भकुर्ति गमयति-प्रकृतमेवार्थं प्रतिपादयतीत्यर्थः । तेन कारणेन "नोअपृथ्वी" इति भणिते नोशब्दस्य सर्वनिषेधपरत्वात् पृथिवी-गतिर्भवति-पृथिव्याः प्रतिपत्तिर्भवतीत्यर्थः । "देसनिसेहे वि तद्देसो त्ति" देश-निषेधवाचके तु नोशब्दे तस्या जलादिरूपाया अपृथिव्या एवोत्तरपदे श्रूयमाणाया देशस्तदेशो गम्यते, देशनिषेधके नोशब्दे नोअपृथिवीति याचिते जलादिरूपा-पृथिव्येकदेशं देवो ददातीत्यर्थः ॥२५०२॥

D. C. Two negatives viz and a would make one affirmative. 'No-a-prithvi' would, therefore, mean prithvi.

Taking \overrightarrow{n} no to signify negation, of only a portion, *no-aprithv* would mean a portion of *a prithv*, i. e. a portion of water etc., as a consequence of which, the deity would give a portion of water etc. 207 (2502)

Thus, उवयाराओ तिविहं सुवमसुवं नोसुवं च सो देइ। निच्छयओ सुवमसुवं तह सावयवाई सब्वाई ॥२०८॥२५०३॥

208. Uvayārāö tiviham bhuvamabhuvam no-bhuvam ca so dei l Nicohayaö bhuvamabhuvam taha sāvayavāim savvāim. (2503)

[उपचारात् त्रिविधं सुबमसुवं नोसुवं च स ददाति। निखयतो सुबमसुवं तथा साबयबानि सर्वाणि ॥२०८॥२५०३॥

^{207.} Pratisedhadvikam prakritim gamayati yat tena no-a-prithivīti i Bhaņite prithivīti gatirdēšanišēdhē'pi taddešah. (2502)]

Vada]

208. Upacārāt trividham bhuvamabhuvam no-bhuvam ca sa dadāti I Niścayato bhuvamabhuvam tathā sāvayavāni sarvāņi. (2503)]

Trans. 208. By (way of) formality, he supplies three types: *prithv*î, *a-prithv*î and *no-prithv*ī, but practically *prithv*î and *a-prithv*î In that manner, all objects having portions (are arranged). 2503.

टीका-२०८ स कुत्रिकापणदेवो याचितः सन् वस्तु ददाति । कतिविधमु १, किं वा तत् ! इत्याह-त्रिविधं त्रिमकारम्, चतुर्थस्य नोअभूपक्षस्य प्रथमपक्ष एवा-न्तर्भावात् । तत्र धुवं लेष्टुम्, अधुवं जलादि, नोधुवं भूम्येकदेशं ददाति। कुतः ? इत्याह-उपचारात् व्यवहारनयमताश्रायणादित्यर्थः, स एव हि देशदे-शिव्यवहारं मन्यते, न तु निश्चय इति भावः । अत एवाह-''निच्छयउ इत्यादि'' निश्वयतस्तु अवमभुवं चेत्येवं द्विविधमेव वस्तु ददाति, तृतीयस्य नोभूवक्षस्य देश-देशिव्यवहारएवोपपद्यमानत्वात् , तस्य च निश्चयनयेनानभ्युपगमादिति । तदेवं ''भू-जल-जलण '' इत्यादौ पृथिव्याः प्रथमं निर्दिष्टत्वात् तामधिकृत्यो-क्तम् । अथ श्रेषाणि जलादिवस्तून्यधिकृत्याह "तह सावयवाई वि" न केवल-मित्थं सुवं ददाति, तथा शेषाण्यपि जलादिवस्तूनि-"पगईए अगारेणं" इत्यादि प्रकारेण विशेष्ययाचितः सन् व्यवहारनयमतेन यथोक्तविधिना त्रिमकाराणि ददाति । कुतः ? इति चेत् । उच्यते-यतः सावयवानि सदेशान्येतानि सर्वाण्यपि जलादिवस्तूनि । अतस्तृतीयोऽपि देशविषयो दानप्रकार एतेषु संभवतीति भावः । निश्वयनयमतेन तु देशदेशिव्यवहाराभावादेतान्यपि जलादीनि द्विप्रकाराण्येव ददातीति । तदेवं सावयवे वस्तूनि प्रकारत्रयेण प्रकारद्वयेन च यथोक्तरीत्या दानं संभवति ॥२५०३॥

D. C. The deity in charge of Kutrikapana satisfies demands of all objects in this way. On demand of 'prithvi', he supplies a lump of earth. On demand of a-prithvi, water etc., and on demand of 'no-prithvi' a portion of earth. Since "no-a-prithvi" either signifies 'prithvi' or water, as seen before, it would not be classed separately. Thus according to Vyavahāra-naya which apprehends an object with the detailed apprehension of all its : 214 :

parts, all objects coming under the categories of 'prithvi', 'aprithvi' and 'no-prithvi' are apprehended and hence supplied.

While, from the point of view of the Niścaya-naya, the objects are supplied either in the form of $prithv_{\bar{1}}$ or in the form of ' $a-prithv_{\bar{1}}$ '.

This leads us, therefore, to an important conclusion that the objects that have parts could be supplied either in two ways or in three ways, but those that have no parts could be given only in two ways. 208 (2503)

Objects that have no parts could be given only in two ways. Because,

जीवमजीवं दाउं नोजीवं जाइओ पुणरजीवं। देइ चरिमम्मि जीवं न उ नोजीवं स जीवदलं ॥२०९॥२५०४॥

209. Jīvaņajīvam dāum no-jīvam jāiö puņarajīvam 1 Dei carimammi jīvam na u no-jīvam sa jīvadalam. (2504)

[जीवमजीवं दत्त्वा नोजीवं याचितः पुनरजीवम् । ददाति चरमे जीवं न तु नोजीवं स जीवदलम् ॥२०९॥२५०४॥

209. Jîvamajīvam dattvā "no-jivam" yācitaķ punarajīvam (Dadāti caramē jīvam na tu no-jivam sa jīvadalam. (2504)]

Trans. 209. After having given ' $j\bar{i}va'$ and ' $a-j\bar{i}va$ ', he was requested (to give) $no-j\bar{i}va$. He gives $a-j\bar{i}va$ again. In (case of) the last one, he supplies $j\bar{i}va$ but he does not give a part of $j\bar{i}va$ as $no-j\bar{i}va$. 2504.

टीका-२०९ 'जीवं देदि ' इति याचितः सुरो जीवं शुक-सारिकादिकं दच्चा 'अजीवं देदि ' इति याचितस्त्वजीवम्रुपलखण्डादिकं दच्चा कृतार्थो जायते । नोजीवं याचितः पुनरजीवम्रुपलखण्डादिकमेव ददाति, नोशब्दस्य सर्वनिषेधपर-त्वात् । 'चरमे उ' नोअजीवलक्षणे विकल्पे जीवमेव शुकादिकं ददाति, द्वयोर्नजोः प्रकृतार्थगमकत्वात् , नोशब्दस्य च सर्वनिषेधकत्वादिति, न तु स कुत्रिकापणदेवो जीवं जीवदलं जीवखण्डरूपं कापि विकल्पे ददाति । इति जीवा-ज्जीवलक्षणौ द्रावेव राज्ञी, न तु तृतीयः, असच्वात् , खरविषाणवदिति ॥२५०४॥ D. C. When 'jiva' is demanded, the deity-in-charge supplies birds like parrots etc. On demand of a-jiva, he gives a piece of earth or stone. On demand of no-jiva he again gives a piece of stone, interpreting $\exists i$ (no), to signify absolute negation. In case of no-a-jiva being asked for, the deity supplies jiva like parrot, taking 'no' and 'a' to-gether, signifying affirmation. But the deity does not supply a portion of jiva in any case. He does not interpret 'no-jiva' as a portion of jiva and supply the same accordingly.

It will be noted here that on demand of four entities (jiva, a-jiva, no-jiva and no-a-jiva), only two were supplied in fact. The third was considered as non-existing like the horn of an ass, and hence was not supplied. 209. (2504)

Then,

तो निग्गहिओ छऌुओ, गुरू वि सक्कारमुत्तमं पत्तो। धिद्धिक्कारोवहओ छऌुओ वि सभाहिं निच्छूढो ॥२१०॥२५०५॥

210. To niggahiö Chaluö guru vi sakkāramuttamam patto Dhiddhikkārovahaö Chaluö vi sabhā him nicchudho. (2505)

[ततो निग्रहीतः षडुऌूको गुरुरपि सत्कारमुत्तमं प्राप्तः । धिग्धिक्वारोपहतः षडुऌूकोऽपि सभातो िष्क्वासितः॥२१०॥२५०५

210. Tato nigrihītah Ṣaḍulāko gururapi satkāramuttamam prāptah I Dhig dhikkāropahatah Ṣaḍulāko'pi sabhāto niṣkāsitah. (2505)]

Trans. 210. Hence Sadulaka was defeated, and the preceptor was accorded the best of reception. And Sadulaka overcome with many humiliations, was (consequently) driven away from the Assembly. 2505.

टीका−२१० ततो यदा कुत्रिकापणसुरेण जीवव्यतिरिक्तो नोजीवो न दत्तः, असत्त्वात् , तदा निगृहीतो निजिंतः षडुऌकः । गुरुरपि श्रीगुप्ताचार्यो नरनाथाछो-काच सत्कारमुत्तमं प्राप्तः । षडुऌकोऽपि गुरुप्रत्यनीकत्वाज्जनभयुक्तधिकारोपहतो राजसभातो निष्कासित इति ॥२५०५॥ D. C. When the deity-in-charge of the Kutrikāpaņa did not supply '*no-jūna*' on grounds of non-existence, Rohagupta was declared as defeated. The preceptor Śrī Guptācārya was greatly honoured by the King and the people. Rohagupta was eventually driven away from the Royal Assembly, with great humiliation. 210 (2505)

Then,

वाए पराजिओ सो निव्चिसओ कारिओ नरिंदेण। घोसावियं च नयरे जयइ जिणो वद्धमाणो त्ति ॥२११॥२५०६॥

तेणभिनिवेसाओ समइविगप्पियपयत्थमादाय । बइसेसियं पणीयं फाईकयमण्णमण्णेहिं ॥२१२॥२५०७॥

- 211. Vāè parājiö so nivvisaö kāriö narindeņa 1 Ghosāviyam ca nayare jayai Jiņo Vaddhamāņo tti. (2506)
- 212. Teņābhinivesāö samaivigappiyapayatthamādāya I Vaisesiyam paņīyam phāikayamaņņamaņņehim. (2507)

[वादे पराजितः स निर्विषयः कारितो नरेन्द्रेण । घोषितं च नगरे जयति जिनो वर्धमान इति ॥२११॥२५०६॥

तेवाभिनिवेदाात् स्वमतिविकल्पितपदार्थमादाय । वैद्योषिकं प्रणीतं स्फातीकृतमन्यान्यैः ॥२१२॥२५०७॥

- 211. Vāde parājitah sa nirviṣayah kārito narendreņa I Ghoṣitam ca nagare jayati Jino Vardhamāna iti. (2506)
- 212. Tenābhinivešāt svamativikalpitapadārthmādāya I Vaišešikam praņītam sphātīkritamanyānyaiņ. (2507)]

Trans. 211-212. Defeated in discussion, as he was, the King discarded him And, it was announced in the city that the Tîrthankara Vardhamāna (Swāmi) succeeds. Then taking (the six) entities which were recognized by his own intellect and propagated by various followers of his, an alto-gether different theory was established by him, out of his (strong) adherence (to his own conviction). (2506-2507)

टीका-२११-२१२ स रोहगुप्तो गुरुणा वादे पराजितः सन् नरपतिना निर्विषयः समाज्ञातः, पटहकेन च वाद्यमानेन घोषापितं समस्तनगरे ''जयति जिनः श्रीमान् वर्धमानः '' इति । रोहगुप्तस्य च वादे निर्जितस्यापि प्रत्यनीकतो-द्वेजितेन गुरुणा खेलमछकः शिरसि स्फोटितः । ततो भस्मखरण्डितवपुषा तेना-मिनिवेशात् स्वमतिकल्पितान् द्रव्यादिपदार्थानाश्रित्य वैशेषिकमतं प्रणीतम् । तचान्यान्यैस्तच्छिष्यादिमिरियन्तं कालं यावत् ख्यातिमानीतमिति ॥२५०६॥ २५०७॥

D. C. When Rohagupta was defeated by the preceptor, the king discarded his authority; and it was announced in the city with a beating of drum, that the great Tirthankara Vardhamāna (Swāmi) succeeds.

Although Rohagupta was defeated in discussion, the preceptor Śrī Guptācārya was so much enraged at him that he dashed an earthen pot (full of ashes) against Rohagupta's head. Rohagupta went away with his body besmeared with ashes etc., and out of sheer adherence to his own convictions, he set out to propound an absolutely different theory (known as the Vaiśesika system of philosophy) which was spread by his followers after him. 211-212 (2506-2507)

Finally explaining how Rohagupta came to be known as Saduluka, the author says-

नामेण रोहगुत्तो गुत्तेण लप्पए स चोऌओ । दव्वाइछप्पयत्थोवएसणाओ छऌुउ त्ति ॥२१३॥२५०८

213. Nāmeņa Rohagutto gutteņa lappad sa Coluö Davvāichappayatthovadsaņāo Chalūu tti. (2508)

[नाम्ना रोहगुप्तो गोत्रेण लप्यते स चोऌकः । द्रव्यादिषट्पदार्थोपदेद्रानात् षडुऌक इति ॥२१३॥२५०८॥

:218:

Jinabhadra Gani's

213. Nāmnā Rohagupto gotreņa lapyate sa Colūkah I Dravyādisatpadārthopadesanāt Sadulaka iti. (1508)]

Trans. 213. He was known as Rohagupta by name, and Ulaka by lineage. He was called Sadulūka because he preached (the theory of) six entities, such as Dravya etc. 2508.

टीका-२१३ नाम्नाऽसौ रोहगुप्तो गोत्रेण पुनरुऌकगोत्रसंभूतत्वाः साबुएक्क त्यारुप्यत्ते-द्रव्य-गुण-कर्म-सामान्य-विशेष-समवाय -लक्षणषट्पदार्थप्ररूपणेन ह्यदार्थप्रधान उऌकः बहुऌक इत्ययं व्यपदिश्यते ॥२५०८॥

D. C. His name was Rohagupta and his gotra was Uluka. Since he preached the theory of six entities viz Dravya, Guņa, Karman, Sāmānya, Viśeṣa, and Samavāya, he was known as Saduluka.

End of the Discussion with the Sixth Nihnava.



Chapter VIII

॥ अथ सप्तमनिह्नववक्तव्यता॥



Discussion with the Seventh Nihnava.

पंचसयाचुलसीया तइया सिद्धिं गयस्स वीरस्स । तो अबद्धियदिही दसउरनयरे समुप्पन्ना ॥२१४॥२५०९॥

214. Pañcasayāculasīyā taiyā Siddhim gayassa Vīrassa I To Abaddhiyadițțhī Dasaura nayare samuppannā. (2509)

[पश्चशतानि चतुरद्यीत्यधिकानि तदा सिद्धिं गतस्य वीरस्यः। ततोऽबद्धिकदृष्टिर्दशपुरनगरे समुत्पन्ना ॥२१४॥२५०९॥

214. Pañcaśatāni caturaśītyadhikāni tadā Siddhim gatasya Vīrasya I Tato'baddhikadristir-Daśapura nagarè samutpannā (2509)]

Trans. 214. Then, the theory of the Abaddhika Nihnava came into existence in the city of Dasapura, five hundred, and eighty-four years, after Vīra (Śramaņa Bhagavān Mahāvīra) had attained Final Emancipation. 2509.

टीका-२१४ पञ्चवर्षश्चतानि चतुरशीत्यधिकानि तदा सिर्द्धि गतस्य महा-वीरस्य ततोऽबद्धिकनिह्ववद्दष्टिर्दशपुरनगरे सम्रुत्पन्नेति ॥२५०९॥

D. C. Clear.

दसउरनगरुच्छुघरे अज्ञरक्खिय पूसमित्ततिगयं च। गोट्टामाहिल नवम-ट्टमेसु पुच्छा य विंझस्स ॥२१५॥२५१०॥

215. Dasauranagarucchughard Ajjarakkhiya Pūsamittatigayam ca i Goțțhāmāhila navama-țțhamesu pucchā ya Vinjhassa. (2510)

[दद्वापुरनगर इक्षुग्रहे आर्यरक्षितः पुष्पमित्रत्रिकं च । गोष्ठामाहिलोऽष्टम~नवमयोः प्रच्छा च विन्ध्यस्य ॥२१५॥२५१०॥

215. Daśapuranagara Ikṣugrihè Ārya-Rakṣitaḥ Puṣpamitratrikam ca I Goṣṭhāmāhilo'ṣṭama-Navamayoḥ pricchā ca Vindhyasya. (2510)]

Trans. 215. Ārya Raksita-sūri was (a preceptor) in (a (a monastery named) Iksugriha in (the) city (of) Daśapura. He had three (pupils named) Puspamitra (Ghrita-Puspamitra, Vastra Puspamitra, and Durbalikā Puspamitra). Gosthā-Māhila had a discussion with (an ascetic named) Vindhya about the Eighth and Ninth (Pūrvas). 2510.

टीका-२१५ दशपुरनगर इक्षुग्रहे आर्यरक्षितः ''दीक्षां जग्राह " इति रोषः । तस्य च घृतपुष्पमित्र--वस्तपुष्पमित्र--दुर्बलिकापुष्पमित्रलक्षणं शिष्यत्रयं बभूव । गोष्ठामाहिलश्व तच्छिष्योऽष्टमे कर्मप्रवादपूर्वे नवमे च प्रत्याख्यानपूर्वे व्याख्यायमाने कर्मबन्धविचारे प्रत्याख्यानविचारे च विप्रतिपन्नो विधिपेरितवानिति ॥२५१०॥

D. C. Arya Raksitasūri was conducting a monastery named Iksugriha in the city of Dasapura. He had three pupils named Ghrita-Puspamitra, Vastra-Puspamitra and Durbalikā Puspamitra, respectively.

Another prominent pupil-Goṣṭhā-Māhila (who also happened to be the maternal uncle of AryaRakṣitasuri) had a discussion with an ascetic named Vindhya on the Eighth and Ninth Pūrvas (viz Karmapravāda-pūrva and Pratyākhyānapravāda-pūrva respectively).¹

The whole story is narrated as follows :---

सोऊण कारूभम्मं गुरुणो गच्छम्मि पूसमित्तं च। ठावियं गुरुणा किल गोट्टमाहिलो मच्छरियभावो ॥२१६॥२५११॥

216. Sooņa kāladhammam guruņo gacchammi Posamittam ca Ţhāviyam guruņā kila Goțțha-māhilo macchariyabhāvo.

(2511)

1. For details about Parvas, Vide Introduction and also Chapter II Foot note 2. **Vāda**]

[श्रुत्वा कालधर्म गुरोर्गच्छे पुष्पमित्रं च । स्थापितं गुरुणा किल गोष्ठामाहिलो मत्सरितभावः ॥२१६॥२५११॥

216. Śrutvā kāladharmam guro-r-gacche Puṣpamitram ca I Sthāpitam guruņā kila Goṣṭhā-Māhilo matsaritabhāvaḥ. (2511)]

Trans. 216. Having heard, that the preceptor (\overline{Arya} Raksitasūri) had attained *nirv*āņa and that (Durbalikā) Puspamitra had (already) been appointed by the preceptor (as an \overline{Aca} rya) in the Qaccha (Congregation-Sangha), Gosțha-Māhila was really excited with jealousy. 2511.

टीका--२१६ इह च सर्वासामपि गाथानां भावार्थ आर्यरक्षितकथानकादव-सेयः । तच विस्तरतो मूलावश्यकादवगन्तव्यम् । संक्षेपतस्त्विहापि किश्चिदु-च्यते । तद्यथा---

द्भपुरं नाम नगरम् । तत्र च सोमदेवो नाम बाह्यणः । तस्य च रुद्रसोमा नाम भार्यो । सा च जिनवचनप्रतिबुद्धाश्राविका । तयोश्व रक्षितो नाम चतु-र्दन्नविद्यास्थानपारगः षुत्रो बभूव । तेन च मातृप्रेरितेन तोसलिपुत्राचार्याणां समीपे दीक्षा प्रतिपना । एकादशाङ्गानि दृष्टिवादोऽपि यावान् गुरूसमीप आसीत् तावान् सर्वोऽपि गृहीतः । शेषस्त्वार्यवैरस्वामिनः समीपेऽधीतो यावद् नव पूर्वाणि, तथा चतुर्विंशतियविकानि । ततः फल्गुरक्षितो नाम तद्वन्धुकारणार्थं मात्राप्रेषितः प्रवाजितश्व । ततो द्वावपि मातापित्तसमीपे समायातौ । ततश्वार्य-रक्षितेन मातापितरौ तथा मातुलगोष्ठामाहिलप्रमुखः सर्वोऽपि स्वजनवर्गः प्रवा-जितः । एवमपरापरांश्व प्रवाजयत आर्यरक्षितस्ररेर्महान् गच्छो जातः । तत्र च गच्छे दुर्बलिकापुष्पमित्र-घृतपुष्पमित्र-वस्तपुष्पमित्रसंज्ञास्त्रयः पुष्पमित्रा आसन् । तत्र दुईलिकापुष्पमित्रेण नवपूर्वाण्यधीतानि । इह च गच्छे चत्वारः पुरुषाः प्रधानतराः, तद्यथा-दुर्भलिकापुष्पमित्रः, विन्ध्यः, फल्गुरक्षितः, गोष्ठामाहिलश्रेति। तत्र सरिभिर्दुर्बलिकापुष्पमित्रो विन्ध्यस्य वाचनां दापितः। तस्य च तां प्रयच्छतो गुणनाभावादात्मनो नवमपूर्वं गलति। ततः स्ररिभिरेवंभृतस्यापि प्राज्ञस्य यदित्थंसत्रार्थविस्मृतिः संपद्यते तदाऽशेषाणां सत्राणां दुरुद्ररः सत्रार्थः संपत्स्यते, इति विचिन्त्य पूर्वोक्तकंमेणानुयोगः पार्थक्येन व्यवस्थापितः । नयाश्च प्रायो : 222 :

निगूहितविभागाः कृता इति । अन्यदा च ते आर्यरक्षितस्ररयो विहारक्रमेण मथुरानगरीं गताः । तत्र च भूतगुहायां व्यन्तरगृहे स्थिताः ।

इतश्व शको महाविदेहे सीमन्धरस्वामितीर्थकरसमीपे निगोदवक्तव्यतां श्रुत्वा विस्मितः । पृष्ठवान्-" किं भगवन् ? भरतक्षेत्रेऽपि सांप्रतममुमतीवसूक्ष्मं निगोद-विचारं कोंऽपि बुध्यते प्ररूपयति च ?। ततो भगवता प्रोक्तम्-प्ररूपयन्त्यार्थर-क्षितसूरयः "। एतच श्रुत्वा विस्मय-कौतुक-भक्तिभरपूर्यमाणमानसो देवेन्द्रः स्थविरत्राह्मणरूपं कृत्वा साधुषु भिक्षाचर्यां गतेष्वार्यरक्षितसमीपमुपययौ । ततस्ते-नार्यरक्षितसरयो वन्दित्वा पृष्टाः-'भगवन् १ महान् व्याधिर्वर्तते, तेनाहमनशनं कर्तुमिच्छामि, तत् कथयत मम कियदायुष्कम् ? इति '। ततो यविकेष्वायुःश्रेणा-बुपयोगं दत्त्वा स्ररिभिर्ज्ञातम्-नायं मनुष्यो व्यन्तरादिर्वा किन्तु द्विसागरोपम-स्थितिकोऽसौ सौधर्माधिपतिः । ततश्व वार्धक्येनाधः पतिते करेण अवायुत्क्षिप्य निरीक्ष्य च प्रोक्तम् क्षको भवान् । एवं चाभिहिते तुष्टेन देवाधिपतिनां निवेदितः जीवाः । प्ररूपिताश्च विस्तरतः । तत्तस्तुष्टमानसेन सुरपतिना प्रणम्य ''व्रजामि " इति प्रोक्तेऽभिहितं गुरुभिः-' तिष्ठत क्षणमेकं, यावत् साधवः समागच्छन्ति येन युष्माभिईष्टैरिदानीमपि देवेन्द्रागमनमस्तीति विज्ञाय स्थैर्यग्रुत्पद्यते तेषामिति ?। ततस्तिदशपतिना त्रोक्तम्-" भदन्त ! करोम्येवम् , केवलं स्वाभाविकं मत्स्वरूपं दृष्ट्राऽल्पसच्वा निदानं करिष्यन्ति "। ततो गुरुणा प्रोक्तम्-'तर्हि निजागमनसूचकं किम ि चिह्नं कृत्वा व्रजत' । ततस्तस्रोपाश्रयस्यान्यतोऽभिमुखं द्वारं कृत्वा गत-स्निदशपतिः । आगतैश्व साधुभिर्द्वारान्यत्वदर्शनविस्मितैः पृष्टैः कथितं सर्वे सुरिभि-रिति । अन्यदा च ते विहरन्तो दशपुरनगरमागताः ।

इतश्र मथुरानगर्यां मातापित्रादिकमपि नास्ति इत्यादिनास्तिकवादं प्ररूपयन् बादी सम्रुत्थितः । तत्र च प्रतिवादिनः कस्यचिदभावात् संधेनार्यरक्षितस्ररयः एव सांमतं युगप्रधाना इति कृत्वा तत्समीपे प्रस्तुतव्यतिकरकथनाय साधुसङ्घाटकं प्रेषितम् । स्वयमतीवद्वद्वत्वाद् गन्तुमश्वक्तैः ''वादलब्धिसंपन्नः" इति कृत्वा गोष्ठामाहिलो निरूपितः । तत्र च तेन गत्वा निगृहीतोऽसौ वादी । श्रावकैश्वायं तत्रैव वर्षाकालं कारितः ।

इतश्रार्थरक्षितस्ररिभिर्निजपट्टे दुर्चलिकापुष्पमित्रः स्थापयितुमध्यवसितः। झेक्स्तु स्वजमभूतः साधुदर्गो गोष्ठामाहिलं, फल्गुरक्षितं वा, तमीहते। तत्त्व सर्वमपि गच्छग्रुपवेश्य सरयः संबोधयन्ति, तद्यथा-" इह किल त्रयो घटा भृताः। तत्रैको वछानाम्, द्वितीयो तिलस्य. तृतीयस्तु घृतस्य । एतेषु चावाङ्ग्रुखेपु कृतेषु वछाः सर्वेऽपि निर्गच्छन्ति । तैलं तु किश्चिद् घटेऽपि लगति । घृतं तु बहुतरं तत्र लगति । तदहं दुर्बलिकापुष्पमित्रं प्रति सत्राथों समाश्रित्य वछघटकल्पः संजातः सद्गतयोः समस्तयोरपि त्रयोस्तेन प्रहणात् । फल्गुरक्षितं तु प्रति तिलघटकच्पोऽहं संपन्नः, सर्वयोरपि सत्राऽर्थयोस्नेनाग्रहणात् । गोष्ठामाहिलं तु पति घृतघटकल्पोऽहं संपन्नः, सर्वयोरपि सत्राऽर्थयोस्नेनाग्रहणात् । गोष्ठामाहिलं तु पति घृतघटकल्पोऽहं संपन्नः, सर्वयोरपि सत्राऽर्थयोस्नेनाग्रहणात् । गोष्ठामाहिलं तु पति घृतघटकल्पोऽहं संपन्नः, सर्वयोरपि सत्राऽर्थयोस्नेनाग्रहणात् । गोष्ठामाहिलं तु पति घृतघटकल्पोऽह्तमभूत्रम्, बहुतरयोः स्वत्रार्थयोर्ममापि पार्श्वेऽवस्थानात् । तस्माद् मद्रताशेषसत्रार्थसंपन्नत्वाद् दुर्बलिकापुष्पमित्र एव भवतां स्रर्रिभवतु " । ततः "इच्छामः " इति भणित्वा तैः सर्वेरपि प्रतिपन्नमिदम् । स्ररिभिरप्यभिदितो दुर्बलिकापुष्पमित्रा ''यथाऽहं वर्तितः फल्युरक्षिते गोष्ठामाहिले च तथा भवता-मपि वर्तितव्यम् ' । गच्छोऽप्यभिहितः-''यथा मया सार्धं भवद्भिर्वतितं तथाऽने-नापि सार्धं वर्तितव्यम् । अपि च, अहं कृतेऽकृते वा नारूष्यम्, अयं तु न सहिष्यति, ततः सुतरामस्य विनयेन वर्तितव्यम्' । इत्याद्यनुर्यासिंत दत्त्वा भक्तं प्रत्याख्याय देवलोकग्रयपाताः सरयः।

गोष्ठामाहिल्टेन च श्रुतमिदं यथा-"गुरवः परलोकं गताः । ततो मथुरातः समागतेन पृष्टमनेन यथा - "को गणधरः स्वपदे स्ररिभिनिंवेझितः ? ।" ततः सर्वोऽपि वछादिघटप्ररूपणादिको व्यतिकरः समाकणितो 'लोकात् । तच्छ्वणाचा-तीवद्नोऽसौ स्थित्वा पृथक् प्रतिश्रये, दुर्वलिकापुष्पमित्रोपाश्रये तच्चर्योपलम्भार्थ-गतः । तैश्व सर्वैरप्यभ्युत्थितोऽसौ, भणितश्व यथा- 'तिष्ठत यूयमत्रेवोपाश्रये, किमिति पृथग् व्यवस्थिताः ? ' । तच्च नेच्छत्यसौ । पृथगुपाश्रयव्यवस्थितश्व दुर्वलिकापुष्पमित्रापचादग्रहणादिना व्युद्ग्राहयति साधून्, न च व्युद्ग्राहयितुं श्रकोति । दुर्वलिकापुप्पमित्रसमीपे चाभिमानतो न किश्चित् श्रणोति किन्तु व्या-ख्यानमण्डलिकास्थितस्य चिन्तनिकां क्रुर्वतो विन्ध्यस्यान्तिके समाकर्णयति । अन्यदा अष्टम- नवमपूर्वयोः कर्म-प्रत्याख्यानविचारेऽभिनिवेज्ञाद् विश्रतिपन्नो वक्ष्यमाणनीत्या निह्ववो जातः इति ॥

अथ प्रकृतगाथाक्षरार्थोऽनुश्रीयते-कालो मरणं तछक्षणो धर्मः पर्यायः काल-धर्मस्तं गुरोरार्यरक्षितस्य श्रुत्वा, तथा पुष्पमित्रं च गच्छेऽधिपतिं स्थापितमाकर्ण्य गोष्टामाहिलो मत्सरितभावः संजातः ॥२५११॥ D. C. Before proceeding to the story of the Seventh Nihnava, and his theory, it is necessary to narrate briefly the story of Ārya Raksitācārya as told by the Original Āvaśyaka Satras:----

There was a Brahmin named Somadèva in Daśapura nagara. His wife Rudrasomā, of whom Somadèva had a son named Raksita, was a devoted follower of the Tīrthankaras. Raksita was proficient in all the fourteen lores.² On the advice of his mother, he accepted $d\bar{i}k\bar{s}\bar{a}$ at the hands of Acarya Tosaliputra, under whose guidance he studied all the eleven Angas and whatever he could of the Twelfth Anga. In addition to that, he learnt nine pūrvas and twenty-four yavikās from Ārya Vajraswāni, His brother Falguraksita was also initiated as an ascetic when he came to Raksitasari. Then gradually both of them made all their relatives including their father, mother, and maternal uncle Gosţhā-Māhila accept $d\bar{i}k\bar{s}\bar{a}$. Since a number of persons were initiated in this way, Arya Raksitasari got his gaccha established.

In the gaccha, there were three disciples named Puşpamitra: Ghrita Puşpamitra, Vastra Puşpamitra, and Durbalikā Puşpamitra, of whom Durbalikā Puşpamitra was conversant with the nine Pūrvas. Durbalikā Puşpamitra, Vindhya, Falgurakşita and Gosţhāmāhila were the four chief ascetics in the gaccha. Durbalikā Puşpamitra was entrusted with the work of teaching purvas to Vindhya. In course of his teaching the ninth purva he found that he forgot his own study. Knowing this, the preceptor thought that if such an able disciple forgets the part of sufras,

2. According to some, these fourteen vidyās are the Four Vèdas, the six Vèdāngas, the Puraņas, the Mīmānsā, Nyāya, and Dharma. Others add four Upavèdas to these and take the vidyās to be eighteen in all.

According to Manu Smriti they are five: (1) Trayi, the Triple Vèdas. (2) Anviksiki, Logic and Metaphysics. (3) Dandanīti, the science of Government. (4) Vārttā, practical arts such as Agriculture, Commerce, Medicine etc. and (5) Atma-vidyā-Knowledge of Soul or Sublime Theological Truth.

Vide Manu VII, 43

there is no wonder if all the $s\bar{u}tras$ could not be committed to memory by anyone. Consequently, he divided all the $s\bar{u}tras$ into four anuyogas³ as mentioned before. Then, $\bar{A}rya$ Raksitasari proceeded on *vihāra* and stayed in a *Vyantara griha* in Bhūtaguphā at Mathurā.

In the mean time, once upon a time, while returning after paying his homages to Śrī Sīmandhara Swāmi, in the regions of Mahāvideha, Indra (Saudharmendra) astonished at his wonderful discourse on "nigoda"⁴ asked the Tirthankara "O worthy Lord ! does anyone in the whole of Bharata-ksetra understand and explain the subtle form of 'nigoda' at present ?" "Arya Raksitasuri teaches it" was the reply. Saudharmondra impelled by surprise, curiosity, and devotion approached Arya Raksitasuri in the attire of an old Brähmin, at the time when all the sädhus had retired for their meals. Having paid his respects, the Indra said "Revered Sir, I am suffering from a fatal disease. So, I wish to observe fasts from to-morrow. Will you kindly teld me how long is the rest of my life ?" Then, concentrating his mind on the category of age in yavikās, the Acārya recognized at once that he was neither a human being nor a Vyantara etc. but he was Saudharmendra-the lord of the Saudharma deva-loka-with an age-limit as long as two Sāgaropams. He up-raised his lifted eye-brows, which were bent down due to old age, looked at the Brahmin and said :-- "You are none but Saudharmendra. Being pleased at this, Indra narrated the whole incident of Tirthankara Śri Simandhara Swami, from whom he had studied the forms of "nigoda beings." Indra asked the Acarya about the nature of 'nigoda' living beings also. The Acarya

3. These are (1) Dravyānuyoga, (2) Caraņa-karaņānuyoga, (3) Gaņitānuyoga and (4) Kathānuyoga.

4. The division of the Sutras into four anuyogas was done by Ārya Raksitasuri. But with reference to the knowledge of 'nigoda' some attribute superior knowledge of 'nigoda' to Ārya Raksitasuri, while others attribute it to Kālikācārya. For a detailed explantion of 'Nigoda', Vide Śramaņa Bhagavān Mahāvīra Vol. I Part I page 12.

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explained the same in full details exactly in the same way as the Tirthankara had done. Indra said "Worthy sir ! you have told the same thing as the Tirthankara Sri Simandhara Swāmi did. Now I shall take your leave." The Acarya replied "But, O Lord of Deities! Kindly wait till the inmates of the gaccha return. They will stick to the gaccha more firmly at your sight" The Indra replied 'I will do like that, but what if the lower type of jīvas humiliated me on sceing me in such an ordinary attire? Then the Acarya said 'You are right. In that case, you may leave something as a token of your visit. Accordingly, Saudharmendra shifted the main-door of the upāśraya from one direction to another, and went away.

When the ascetics returned and found the main-door of the upāśraya in the opposite direction, they were surprised. The Acarya, explained the whole incident, and satisfied their curiosity. Then, moving about from one place to another, the Acarya at last came back to Dasapura nagara.

In the mean-time, a great atheist rose up in Mathūrā, denying even the existence of father and mother. When a competent combatant was not available, taking Acarya Raksitasari as 'Yuga pradhana' a deputation of ascetics was sent to him, to inform him of this incident. Due to his old age, he could not go there himself. So, he appointed Gosthā-Māhila for the task. The atheist was defeated by Gosthā-Māhila who passed his monsoon season at Mathūrā

• On the other side, in Dasapura nagara Arya Raksitsuri decided to appoint Durbalikā Puspamitra as an Acārya after him. Many of his disciples were in favour of Gostha-Mahila and Phalguraksita. So, in order to convince them of his right choice, he called a meeting all the monks of the gaccha, and showing three pots full of different things, he said, "These are three pots. One is full of Valla (beans of winnowing corn), another is full of oil, and a third one is full of ghee (clarified butter). When all of them are up-turned, all the beans from one will come out, oil contained in another pot will stick to the pot only to some

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extent, while in the third pot a large quantity of ghee will be stuck. My tendency towards Durbalikā Puspamitra is like that of the pot containing beans. That is to say, I have poured out all my knowledge into him and he has grasped the same very well. Since Phalguraksita has not been able to grasp the meaning of all the sutras my tendency towards him is like that of the pot full of oil, and as most of the knowledge has stuck to me instead of being grasped by Gosthā-Māhila, my behaviour towards him will be corresponding to that of the ghee-pot. Thus, since Durbalikā Puşpamitra has grasped all the knowledge that I possess, you shall have to honour him as an Acarya (preceptor) after me. The monks agreed upon this proposal saying "We all accept him as our Acarya." The Acarya, then, asked Durbalika Puspamitra to behave with Gosthā-Māhila and Phalgumitra with the same respect as he did. On the other side, instructing the inmates of the gaccha to respect Durbalikā Puspamitra in the same way, as they used to respect himself, he warned them that they should behave with him more humbly than they did with himself, as Durbalikā Puspamitra would not tolerate a slight immodesty on their part as he himself used to tolerate at times.

Having advised both the parties, in this way, Arya Raksitsari departed to heaven.

On hearing that \overline{Arya} Raksitasuri had departed to the other world, Gosthā-Māhila returned to Daśapura nagara immediately. He inquired and came to know about the appointment of Durbalikā Puspamitra as the \overline{Acarya} of the gaccha. He was vitally afflicted by the news. So, he did not stay in the gaccha but he stayed outside and then he went to the gaccha-upāśraya in order to see his fellow-ascetics. The ascetics at once received him with great warmth, and earnestly requested him to stop with them in the gaccha-upāśraya. But Gosthā-Māhila did not accede to their request.

Durbalikā Puspamitra was giving sermons on the Eighth Parva (Pratyā-khyāna pūrva). Gosthā-Māhila did not even care to listen to his sermons out of jealousy and impudence. He heard • 228 :

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the same from Vindhya who carefully attended and understood the sermons.

Once in course of discussion of the eighth and ninth parvas, Gosthā-Māhila contradicted the Truth, laid down by the Original sūtras, and hence he became a *nihnava*. 216 (2511)

षीसुवसहिए ठिओ छिद्दन्नेसणपरो य स कयाए। विंग्नस्स सुणइ पासेऽणुभासमाणस्स वक्खाणं ॥२१७॥२५१२॥

217. Vīsuvasahie thiö chiddannesaņaparo ya sa kayāe Vinjhassa suņai pāse'ņubhāsamāņassa vakkhāņam. (2512)

[विष्वग्वसतौ स्थितदिछद्रान्वेषणपरश्च स कदाचित्। विन्धस्य श्रणोति पार्श्वेऽनुभाषमाणस्य व्याख्यानम्॥२१७॥२५१२॥

217. Vişvagvasatau sthitaschidrānveşaņaparaśca sa kadācit | Vindhasya Śriņoti pārśve'nubhāsamāņasya vyākhyānam. (2512)]

Trans. 217. He, stopping at a separate place, and (always) bent on finding faults, sometimes heard the sermon from Vindhya who used to repeat (what Durbalikā Puspamitra had said) 2512.

टीका-२१७ विष्वग्वसतौ स्थितविच्छ्रान्वेषणपरः स गोष्ठामाहिलः कदाचिद् विन्ष्यस्यानुभाषमाणस्य चिन्तनिकां कुर्वतः पार्श्वे व्याख्यानं शृणोतीति॥२५१२॥

D. C. Clear.

Then,

कम्मप्पवायपुब्वे बद्धं पुट्टं निकाइयं कम्मं । जीवपएसेहिं समं सुईकलावोवमाणाओ ॥२१८॥२५१३॥ उब्बद्दणमुक्तेरो संथोमो खवणमणुभवो बावि । अणिकाइयम्मि कम्मे निकाइए पायमणुभवणं ॥२१९॥२५१४॥ सोउं भणइ सदोसं वकखाणमिणं ति पावइ जओ मे ।

मोक्खाभाषो जीवप्पएसकम्माविमागाओ ॥२२०॥२५१५॥

Vsde]

- 218. Kammappavāya puvve baddham puttham nikāiyam kammam i Jīvapaesehim samam suīkalāvovamāņāö. (2413)
- 219. Uvvațțanamukkero santhomo khavanamanubhavo vāvi | Anikāiyammi kamme nikāie pāyamanubhavanam. (2514)
- 220. Soum bhaņai sadosam vakkhāņamiņam ti pāvai jaö bhe i Mokkhābhāvo Jīvappaesakammāvibhāgāö. (2515)

[कर्मप्रवादपूर्वे बद्धं स्प्रष्टं निकाचितं कर्मः । जीवप्रदेशैः समं सूचीकलापोपमानात् ॥२१८॥२५१६॥

अपवर्तनमुत्करः संस्तोमः क्षपणमजुभवो वापि । अनिकाचिते कर्मणि निकाचिते प्रायोऽनुभवनम् ॥२१९॥२५१४॥ श्रुत्वा भणति सदोषं व्याख्यानमिदमिति प्रायोति यसो भवनास् । सोक्षाभावो जीवप्रदेशकर्माविभागात् ॥२२०॥२५१५॥

- 218. Karmapravädapürve baddham spristam nikācitam karma i Jīvapradešaih samam socīkalāpopamānāt. (2513)
- 219. Apavartanamutkarah samstomah ksapanamanubhavo väpil Anikācite karmani nikācite prāyo'nubhavanam. (2514)
- 220. Śrutvā bhaņati sa-doṣam vyākhyānamidamiti prāpnoti yato bhavatām i Mokṣābhavo jīvapradēśakarmāvibhāgāt. (2515)

Trans 218-219-220. In (course of discussion of the) Karmapravāda parva when he heard that Karman is tied (baddha) touched (sprista) and infused (nikācita) with (att) the regions of jīva, like a bond of needles and that reduction, exaltation, transformation, destruction, or even perception (of the final consequence) (could be worked) upon an independent Karman, while that which has already been infused (with jīva) is probably susceptible to the perception of final consequence only, he said "This sermon is faulty. For in case of Karman and the (various) regions of jīva being intimately connected (with each other), there would be notbing like moksa." (2513-2515)

टीका-२१८--२१९--२२० इह कर्मप्रवादनाम्न्यष्टमे पूर्वे कर्मविचारे प्रस्तुते दुर्बलिकापुष्पमित्र एवं व्याख्यानयति, तद्यथा-जीवप्रदेशै समं बद्धं बद्धमात्रमेव कर्म भवति, यथाऽकषायस्येर्यापथप्रत्ययं कर्म। तच कालान्तरस्थितिमवाप्यैव जीवप्रदेशेम्यो विघटते, शुष्ककुडचापतितचूर्णमुष्टिवदिति । अन्यतु 'पुट्ठं ति' "बद्धम्" इत्यत्रापि संबध्यते । ततश्च बद्धं स्पृष्टं चेत्यर्थः । तत्र बद्धं जीवेन सह संयोगमात्रमावत्रम्, स्पृष्टं तु जीवप्रदेशैरात्मीकृतम् । एतचेत्थं बद्धं सत् कालान्तरेण विघटते, आद्र लेपकुड्ये सस्नेहचूर्णवदिति । ''निकाइयं ति" ''बद्धं" " स्पृष्टं " " च " इत्यत्रापि संबध्यते । ततश्रापरं किमपि कर्म बद्धं स्पृष्टं निका-चितं भवतीत्यर्थः । तत्र तदेव बद्धरृष्टं गाढतराध्यवसायेन बद्धत्वाद्यवर्त्तनादि-करणायोग्यतां नीतं निकाचितमुच्यते । इदं च कालान्तरेऽपि विपाकतोंऽनुभवम-न्तरेण प्रायो नापगच्छति, गाढतरबद्धत्यात , आद्रकुड्याश्ठेषितनिबिडचेटिकाहस्त-कवदिति । अयं च त्रिविधोऽपि बन्धः सत्त्वीकलापोपमानाद् भावनीयः, तद्यथा-गुणाऽऽवेषितस्चीकलापोपमं बद्धमुच्यते, लोहपट्टबद्धस्वीसंघातसदर्शं तु बद्धस्पृ-मित्यभिषीयते, बद्धस्पृष्टनिकाचितं त्वप्रितप्तघनाहतकोडीकृतस्चीनिचयसंनिभं भावनीयमिति । नन्वनिकाचितस्य कर्मणः को विशेषः १ इत्याह-'उव्बट्टणेत्यादि' इह कर्मविषयाण्यष्टौ कारणानि भवन्ति । उक्तं च-

बंधण-संकमणु-व्वद्वणा य उवद्वणा उईरणया ।

उवसावणा निवत्ती निकायणा च त्ति करणाई ॥ १॥

तत्र निकाचिते कर्मणि स्थित्यादिखण्डनरूपा "उव्यद्यगं ति" अपवर्तना प्रवर्तते । तथा "उकेरो त्ति" स्थित्यादिवर्धनरूप उत्कोच उद्वर्तना । तथा "संथोमो त्ति" असातादेः सातादौ क्षेपगरूपः संक्रमः । तथा "खवणं ति" प्रकुत्यन्तरसंक्रमितस्य कर्मगः प्रदेशोदयेन निर्जरणं क्षपणम् । तथा "अणुमबो ति" स्वेन स्वेन रूपेग प्रकृतीनां विपाकतो चेदनानुमगः । इदं चोगउक्षणनुदी-रणादीनाम् । तदेतान्यपवर्तनादीनि सर्वाण्यनिकाचिते कर्मगि प्रगर्जन्ते, निकाचिते तु प्रायो विपाकेनानुभव एग प्रवर्तते, न पुनरपवर्तनादीनि, इत्यनयोविंशेषः । समाकीर्गविकृष्टतपसाग्रुत्कटाध्यवसायबलेन "तवसा उ निकाइयाणं पि" इति वचनाद् निकाचितेऽपि कर्मण्यपवर्तनादिकरणप्रवर्त्तिर्मवतीति प्रायोग्रहणम् । तदत्र व्याख्याने क्षीरनीरन्यायेन वह्तितप्रायोगोज्कन्यायेन वा जीवप्रदेशैः

तदत्र व्याख्यान श्वारनारन्यायन वाह्वतक्षायागालकन्यायन वा जावप्रदशः सह कर्म संबद्धमिति पर्यवसितं विन्ध्यसमीपे श्रुत्वा तथा विधकर्मोद्यादभिनिवेश्रेन विश्रतिपन्नो गोष्ठामाहिलः प्रतिपादयति-''ननु सदोषमिदं व्याख्यानम् , यस्मादेवं व्याख्यायमाने भवतां मोक्षाभावः प्रामोति, जीवप्रदेश्वैःसह कर्मणामधिभागेन तादात्म्येनावस्थानादिति ॥२५१३॥२५१४॥२५१५

D. C. In course of his lecture on Karma-pravāda parva, Durbalikā Puṣpamitra explains the relation between jīva and Karman as follows :---

Karman is attached to the *jīvapradeśas* only externally e.g. Karman constituting the observances of religious mendicant is tied to the holy regions of the *jīva*, only externally. It is separated from *jīva* soon after it comes in contact, like a handful of powder separating itself from a dry wall. Such a type of Karman is known as "*baddhu karman*."

There are some karmans which are connected with $j\bar{i}va$ pradeśas more closely. They could be separated from the $j\bar{i}va$ pradeśas after a long time, like a moist powder from a wet wall. These are known as "baddhasprista Karmans".

Again, there are some which are completely infused into the *jīvapradeśas*. They have almost become one with the *jīvapradeśas*, and so, they could not be separated from the j*īva* pradeśas without undergoing a change in their original condition. Such a type of Karman is known as "baddha-spriṣṭa-nikācita Karman."

All the three types are better explained with the help of an illustration of a band of needles. Karman is 'baddha' like a band of needles with a piece of string tied round it. It is 'baddha sprista' like the same with a strap of iron fastened round it, and the condition of "baddha-sprista and nikācita, is like that of a band of needles heated red-hot and hammered in such a way, that all the needles are completely infused with one another. None of them could be separated from each other without undergoing a change in its original condition.

The distinctive characteristics of an independent or anikācita karman, are described as follows :---

Bandhana-saņkamanu-vvațțana ya uvațțană uiranayā (Uvasāvanā nivatti nikayanā ca tti karanāim ()

[It is susceptible to the processes of combination, transformation, division, exaltation, liberation, reduction, determination and even infusion.]

Thus, it is seen that an $a_{-nik\bar{a}cita}$ Karman which is separated from the Soul, is susceptible to processes of division, transformation, exaltation, and even the experience of undergoing a change in the original condition. But that which is *mikacita* is not susceptible to any such process except perhaps that of undergoing change of state. Still however, processes of division etc. could also be made to work upon *nikācita* Karman by the capacity of high penances.

In the discourse as regard Karman, it is pointed out that the relation between jiva and karman resembles that of milk and water or fire and iron. When Gosthā-Māhila heard this from Vindhya he contradicted this view in the light of the above theory of Karman. He said "This discourse is faulty. For, if jīva and karman were inseparable as said above, there would the nothing like Moksa.

In support of his belief, Gosthā-Māhila proceeds :---

न हि कम्मं जीवाओ अवेइ अविभागओ पएसो व्व । तदणवगमादमुक्खो जुत्तमिंणं तेण वक्खाणं ॥२२१॥२५१६॥

221. Na hi kammam jīvāö avdi avibhāgaö padso vva i Tadaņavagamādamukkho juttamiņam teņa vakkhāņam. (2516)

[न हि कर्म जीवावपैखविभागतः प्रदेश इव । तदनपगमाद्रमोक्षो युक्तमिदं तेव व्याख्यानम् ॥२२१॥२५१६॥

221. Na hi karma jīvādapaityavibhāgataķ pradėsa iva (Tadanapagamādamokšo yuktamidam tena vyākhyāmm. (2516)]

Trans. 221. Karman is not inseparable from Soul like its portion. In case of (its) being inseparable, there would be no Moksa. This discourse of mine is (thus) justified. 2516.

टीका-२२१ "न हि-नैव कर्म जीवादपैति " इति प्रतिज्ञा । अविभागात्-वह्वचयोगोलकन्यायेन जीवेन सह तादात्म्यादित्यर्थः, एष हेतुः । "पएसो व्व त्ति " जीवप्रदेशराशिवदित्यर्थः, एष दृष्टान्तः । इह यद् येन सहाविभागेन व्यवस्थितं न तत् ततो वियुज्यते, यथा जीवात् तत्प्रदेशानिकुरम्वम्, इष्यते चाविभागो जीव-कर्मणोर्भवद्भिः, इति न तत् तस्माद् वियुज्यते । ततस्तदनपग-मात् तस्य कर्मणो जीवादनपगमाद्वियोगात् सर्वदैव जीवानां सकर्मकत्वाद् मोश्चा-भावः । तेन तस्मादिदमिह मदीयं व्याख्यानं कर्त्तं युक्तमिति ॥२५१६॥

D. C. According to you, Karman is intimately connected with jīva. Karman, in that case, will invariably be accompanying jīva and there will be no scope for jīva to attain *Moksa*. I shall therefore be justified in giving a discourse about it. (2516)

The discourse is-

पुट्टो जहा अबद्धो कंचुइणं कंचुओ समन्नेइ । एवं पुट्टमबद्धं जीवं कम्मं समन्नेइ ॥२२२॥२५१७॥

222. Puțțho jahā abaddho kañcuiņam kuñcuö samannei i Evam puțțhamabaddham jīvam kammam samannei. (2517)

[स्पृष्टो यथाऽबद्धः कञ्चुकिनं कञ्चुकः समन्वेति । एवं स्पृष्टमबद्धं जीवं कर्म समन्वेति ॥२२२॥२५१७॥

222. Spristo yathā'baddhah kañcukinam kañcukah samanveti i Evam spristamabaddham jīvam karma samanveti. (2517)]

Trans. 222. Just as, the cast-off skin of a snake goes along with the snake even with a slight touch, so also, Karman though separate, goes with jīva (even) with a (slight) touch 2517.

टीका-२२२ यथास्पृष्टः स्पर्शनमात्रेण संयुक्तोऽबद्धः क्षीरनीरन्यायादलोली-भूत एव कञ्चुको विषधरनिर्मोकः कञ्चुकिनं विषधरं समन्वेति समनुगच्छति, एवं कर्मापि स्पृष्टं सर्पकञ्चुकवत् स्पर्शनमात्रेणैव संयुक्तमबद्धं वद्वचयः पिण्डादि-न्यायादलोलीभूतमेव जीवं समन्वेति, एवमेव मोक्षापपत्तेरिति ॥२५१७॥ : 234 :

D. C. The cast-off skin of a snake though separate but touched by the snake, is always accompanying the serpent. The same is the case with Karman. Although considered as external, Karman accompanies jīva everywhere even by slight touch giving rise thereby to the complete denial of Moksa. 222 (2517)

Controversy about the Ninth Pūrva (Pratyākhyāna pūrva) is this :---

सोऊण भन्नमाणं पचकखाणं पुणो नवमपुब्वे । सो जावजीवविहियं तिविहं तिविहेण साहूणं ॥२२३॥२५१८॥ जंपइ पचकखाणं अपरिमाणाए होइ सेयं तु । जेसिं तु परिमाणं तं दुट्ठं आससा होइ ॥२२४॥२५१९॥

- 223. Souņa bhannamāņam paccakkhāņam puņo navamapuvve So jāvajjīvavihiyam tiviham tiviheņa sāhūņam. (2518)
- 224. Jampai paccakkhāņam a-parimāņād hoi seyam tu Jesîm tu parimāņam tam duļţham āsasā höi. (2519)

[श्रुत्वा भण्यमानं प्रत्याख्यानं पुनर्नवमपूर्वे । स यावज्जीवविहितं त्रिविधं त्रिविधेन साधूनाम् ॥२२३॥२५१८॥ जल्पति प्रत्याख्यानमपरिमाणतया भवति श्रेयस्तु । येषां तु परिमाणं तद् दुष्टमःशंसा भवति ॥२२४॥२५१९॥

- 223. Śrutvą bhanyamanam pratyakhyanam puna-r-navamapurve i Sa yąvajjivavihitam trividham trividhena sadhanam. (2518)
- 224. Jalpati pratyākhyānamaparimāņatayā bhavati śrèyastu I Yèṣām tu parimāņam tad dustamāśaņsā bhavati. (2519)]

Trans. 223-224. Having heard the discourse of the reliigious vow laid down in the Ninth Parva, to be observed, trividham (acting, commanding, consenting, either in the past, or the present, or the future) trividhena (in mind, speech and body) by the ascetics till the end of their life, he objects that the vow becomes excellent by (virtue of) its (being) Nihnavavāda

limitless. Those that are limited are spoiled by (the rise of) temptation. (2518-2519)

टीका-२२३ स गोष्ठामाहिलः कर्मविचारे विप्रतिपन्नः पुनरन्यदा नवमपूर्वे ''करेमि भन्ते ! सामाइयं सब्वं सावजं जोगं पच्चक्खामि '' इत्यादि यावज्जीवा-वधिकं साधूनां संबन्धिप्रत्याख्यानं भण्यमानं विन्ध्यसमीपे विचार्यमाणं शृणोति ॥२५१८॥

टीका-२२४ गोष्ठामाहिलो जल्पति-ननु प्रत्याख्यानं सर्वमप्यपरिमाणत-याऽवधिरहितमेव क्रियमाणं श्रेयोहेतुत्वात् श्रेयः शोभनं भवति । येषां तु व्याख्याने यावज्जीवादिपरिमाणमवधिर्विधीयते, तेषां मतेन तत् प्रत्याख्यानमा-श्रंसादोषदुष्टत्वाद् दुष्टं सदोषं प्रामोति ॥२५१८॥२५१९॥

D. C. In course of his listening to the Ninth parva from Vindhya, Gosthā Māhila comes across the expression "Karèmi bhantè i sāmāiyam savvam sāvajjam jogam paccakkhāmi etc., which lays down that the practice of *pratyākhyāna* is to be followed trividham (by means of acting, commanding, or consenting) trividhena (in mind, speech and body) by all the monks till the end of their life. He objects to this predicament and says that the religious vow appears excellent only if it is practised without a time-limit Those who preach the pratice of vow to be followed only till the end of life, spoil the sanctity of the same by giving rise to temptation. 223-224 (2518-2519)

It is explained in details as follows-आसंसा जा पुण्णे सेविस्सामि त्ति दूसियं तीए । जेण सुयम्मि वि भणियं परिणामाओ असुद्धं तु ॥२२५॥२५२०॥

225. Asamsā jā puņņe sevissāmi tti dusiyam tīc į Jeņa suyammi vi bhaņiyam pariņāmāö asuddham tu. (2520)

[आश्वांसा या पूर्णे सेविष्य इति दूषितं तया। येन श्रुतेऽपि भणितं परिणामादद्युद्धं तु॥२२५॥२५२०॥

225. Āśaṃsā yā parņe sevisya iti dusitam tayā i Yena śrute'pi bhaņitam pariņamādasuddham tu. (2520)] Trans. 225. It is defiled by the expectation that "I shall (be able to) enjoy at the end (of life)" That is why it is laid down in the Scriptures also, that (a vow) is (said to be) unholy on account of consequence. 2520.

टीका-२२५ ''आशंसातः प्रत्याख्यानं दुष्टम् '' इत्युक्तम् । तत्राशंसा का १ इत्याह-'ज त्ति ' यैवंविधपरिणामरूपा । कथंभूतः परिणामः ? इत्याह-पूर्णे प्रत्याख्याने देवलोकादौ सुराङ्गनासंभोगादिभोगानहं सेविष्ये '' इत्येवंभूतपरिणा-मरूपा च याऽऽशंसा तया प्रत्याख्यानं दूषितं भवति । कुतः ? इत्याह-येन श्रुतेऽप्यागमेऽपि भणितम्-दुष्टपरिणामाशुद्धेः प्रत्याख्यानमशुद्ध भवति । तथागमः-

सोही सददहणा जाणणा य विणएऽणुभासणा चेव ।

अणुपालणा विसोही भावविसोही भवे छद्वो ॥ १ ॥

तत्र ''पचक्खाणं सव्वन्नुदेसियं'' इत्यादिना अद्धानादिषु व्याख्यातेषु भावविश्वद्धे यद् च्याख्यानं तत् प्रकृतोपयोगीति दर्शते—

रागेण व दोसेण व परिणामेन व न दूसियं जं तु।

तं खलु पचक्खाणं भावविसुद्धं मुणेयव्वं ॥ १ ॥ इति ।

तदेवं विप्रतिपन्नेवं गोष्ठामाहिलेन यत् पूर्वपक्षीकृतं तद् विन्ध्येन गत्वा गुरोर्दुर्बलिकापुष्पभित्रस्य निवेदितम् । गुरुणा चोत्तरपक्षभूतं सर्वमपि प्रतिविधानं तस्योपदिष्टम्, तेनापि गत्ना गुरूपदेशेन सर्वं गोष्ठामाहिलस्य प्रतिपादितम् । स च मिथ्याभिमानाद् गाढमाविष्टो यावद् न किञ्चित् प्रतिपन्नवान्, तावद् गुरुणा स्वयमाभिद्यस्थेनोक्त इति ॥२५२०॥

D. C. The practice of *pratyākhyāna* is defiled by means of expectation or desire in this way:—A person practising a religious vow during this life, would be cherishing a desire throughout that "When the *pratyākhyāna* will be over at the end of this life, I shall be able to enjoy pleasures with damsels etc., in the divine world." The practice of *pratyākhyāna* is blotted by means of such motives. It is forbidden in the Āgamas also.

The Agama says-

Sohi saddahanā jānanā ya viņae'ņu bhāsanā ceva j Aņupālana visohi bhāvavisohi bhave chattho i

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[There are six types of purity:-1. Freedom from defilement, 2. (observance of) purificatory rites, 3. right knowledge, 4-5. modest speech and action and 6. purity of motive.]

Then explaining the purity of motive by means of expressions like "pacchakkhāņam savvannudesiyam."

(Religious vow is directed by Omniscient) etc., it has been laid down that--

"Rāgeņa va doseņa va pariņāmena va na dūsiyam jam tu Tam khalu paccakkhāņam bhāvavisuddhau muņeyavvam II

[That which is not blotted by passion, prejudice or (evil) consequence is, in fact known to have been (goaded by) pure motive.]

When Gosthä Mahila opposed the establishment of predicament of pratyäkhyäna, the matter was reported to the preceptor, Durbalikā Puspamitra, who sent a reply though Vindhya. But when Gosthā Māhīla was not convinced even by that, the preceptor himself had to come to the spot to defeat him. 225. (2520)

विंझपरिपुच्छियगुरूवएसकहियं पि न पडिवन्नो सो। जाहे ताहे गुरुणा सयमुत्तो पूसमित्तेणं ॥२२६॥२५२१॥

226. Vinjjhaparipucchiyaguruvaesakahiyam pi na padivanno so Jähe tähe gurunā sayamutto Posamittenam. (2521)

[विन्ष्यपरिष्टष्टगुरूपदेशकथिंतमपि न मतिपन्नः सः। यदा तदा गुरुणा स्वयमुक्तः पुष्पमित्रेण ॥२२६॥२५२१॥

226. Vindhyaparipristagurūpadešakathitamapi na pratipannah sah Yadā tadā guruņā svayamuktah Puspamitreņa. (2521)]

Trans. 226. When he was not convinced even by the argument advanced by Vindhya advised by the preceptor, the preceptor (Durbalikā) Puspamitra himself had to argue (with him). 2521.

[The seventh

He asks--

किं कंचुओ व्व कम्मं पइप्पएसमह जीवपज्जंते। पइदेसं सव्वगयं तदंतरालाणवत्थाओ ॥२२७॥२५२२॥ अह जीवबहिं तो नाणुवत्तए तं भवंतरालम्मि । तदणुगमाभावाओ बज्झंगमलो व्व सुव्वत्तं ॥२२८॥२५२३॥ एवं सव्वविमुक्खो निक्कारणउ व्व सव्वसंसारो। भवसुक्काणं च पुणो संसरणमओ अणासासो ॥२२९॥२५२४॥

- 228. Aha jīvabahim to nāņuvattāc tam bhavantarālammi I Tadanugamābhavāo bajjhangamalo vva suvvattam. (2528)
- 229. Evam savvavimukkho nikkāraņau vva savva samsāro l Bhavamukkāņam ca puņo samsaranamaö aņāsāso. (2524)

[किं कञ्चक इव कर्म प्रतिप्रदे्शमथ जीवपर्यन्ते । प्रतिदेशं सर्वगतं तदन्तरालानवस्थातः ॥२२७॥२५२२॥ अथ जीव बहिस्ततो नानुवर्तते तदु भवान्तराछे। तदनुगमाभाषाद् बाह्याङ्गमल इव सुव्यक्तम् ॥२२८॥२५२३॥ एवं सर्वविमोक्षो निष्कारणको वा सर्वसंसारः। भवमुक्तानां च पुनः संसरणमतोऽनाइवासः ॥२२९॥२५२४॥

- 227. Kim kañeuka iva karma pratideśamatha jīvaparyante I Pratideśam sarvagatam tadantarālānavasthātah. (2522)
- 228. Atha 1īvabahistato nānuvartate tad bhavantarale 1 Tadanugamābhavād bāhyāngamala iva suvyaktam. (2523)

Evam sarvavimokso niskāraņako vā sarvasamsārah i Bhavamuktānām ca punah samsaranamato'nāśvāsah. (2524)].

Trans. 227-228-229. Is Karman (attached to) every portion of jiva like the cast-off skin of a snake or) only) to the (out-ward) extreme of a jīva? If it is (attached to)

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^{227.} Kim kañcuö vva kammam paippaèsamaha jivapajjantè l Paidèsam savvagayam tadantarālānavatthāö. (2522)

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every portion it would be pervading the whole (of jiva) on account of (its) intermediary portions not being raised. And if it is (attached to) the external surface of jiva, it is clear that it does not follow (jiva) to the next world on account of its inability to accompany (soul) like the filth on the exterior limb. In that case, there would be attainment of mundane world by all without any reason. And those who have already been finally emancipated from this mundane world, will have to come down to the mundane world again (proving) thereby futility (of righteous deeds) (2522-2524)

टीका-२२७-२२८-२२९ व्याख्या-'' पुद्रो जहा अबद्धो कंचुइणं '' इत्या-दिगाथायां कश्चुकवत् स्पृष्टमेव जीवे कर्म न तुं बद्धमिति यदुच्यते भवता, तद् विचार्यते-किं कश्चुकवत् स्पृष्टं कर्म जीवस्य प्रतिप्रदेशं वृत्तं संदुच्यते, आहोस्वि-जीवपर्यन्ते त्वक्पर्यन्त एव वृत्तं स्पृष्टमिष्यते ? इति द्वयीगतिः । तत्र यदि भतिदेशं वृत्त्वत्वात् स्पृष्टमिष्टम्, तहिं जीवे सर्वगतं कर्म मामोति, नभोवत् । कुतः सर्वगतम् ? इत्याह-"तदन्तरालेत्यादि" तस्य जीवस्यान्तरालं मध्यं तदन्तरालं तस्यानवस्थातः तस्य कर्मव्याप्तस्यानवस्थानादनुद्धारणादित्यर्थः । न हि मतिप्रदेशं वृत्ते कर्मणि जीवस्य कोऽपि मध्यप्रदेश उद्धरति । येन कर्मणस्त-त्रासर्वगतत्वं स्यात् । तस्मादाकाशेनेव कर्मणा जीवस्य प्रतिदेशं व्याप्तत्वात् तस्य जीवे सर्वगतत्वं सिद्धमेव । एवं च सति साध्यविकलत्वात् कश्चुक दृष्टान्तोऽसंबद्ध एव प्रामोति, साध्यस्य यथोक्तस्पर्शनस्य कञ्चुकेऽभावादिति । द्वितीयविकल्पम-धिकृत्याह-'अहेत्यादि' अथ जीवस्य बहिस्त्वक्पर्यन्ते वृत्तत्वात् कञ्चुकवत् स्पृष्टं कर्मेष्यते, तहिं भवाद् भवान्तरं संक्रामतोऽन्तराले तद् नानुवर्तते तदनुवत्तिर्न प्राप्नोति त्वक्पर्यन्ते वृत्तत्वेन तदनुगमाभावात्, बाह्याङ्गमलवदिति सुव्यक्तमेव, बालानामपि प्रतीतत्वादिति । भवत्वननुवृत्तिः कमर्णो भवान्तराले को दोष ? इत्याह-'' एवमित्यादि '' एवं कर्मर्णोऽननुवृत्तौ सत्यां सर्वेषामपि जीवानां विमोधः संसाराभावः प्रामोति, संसारकारणस्य कर्मणोऽभावात् । अथ निष्कारणोऽपि संसार इष्यते, तर्हि ये व्रततपों-ब्रह्मचर्यादिकष्टानुष्ठानानि कुर्वन्ते तेषामपि सर्वेषां संसार एव स्यात्, निष्कारणत्वाविशेषात् । निष्कारणं च जायमानं भवग्रुक्ताना-मपि सिद्धानामपि पुनरपि संसरणं संसारः स्यादिति ग्रुक्तावप्यनाश्वास इति ॥ રપરરાારપરગારપરછા

:240:

D. C.

Acarya: If you believe that the relation between jīva and Karman is like that of cast-off skin and a snake, and not like that of water and milk, I put this question: Is Karman attached to jīva at all portions of jīva or is it attached only to the skin at the outward extreme of jīva?

If Karman were attached to jīva at all portions, none of the regions would be spared from the influence of Karman. This proves that the relation between Karman and jīva does not exist like that of a cast-off skin and snake. For, if Karman were to be connected like the cast-off skin to a snake on the surface of jīva, it would not be able to follow the soul to the other life.

Now, when Karman does not go with jīva, all jīvas will attain Mokṣa rendering saṃsāra to nothing thereby. Thus, if the Saṃsāra is accepted as existing without reason, persons observing celebacy, penances, and other religious rites etc., will have to come down to the mundane world. And, if the attainment of saṃsāra takes place without any reason, even Muktātmās or free souls will have to come down to saṃsāra indicating the futility of Mokṣa. 227-229 (2522-2524).

There is another difficulty also, in taking Karman as existing on the surface of jīva :---

देहंतो जा वेयणा कम्माभावम्मि किंनिमित्ता सा ? निक्कारणा वा जइ तो सिद्धो वि न वेयणारहिओ ॥२३०॥२५२५॥ जइ बज्झनिमित्ता सा तदभावे सा न हुज्ज तो अंतो । दिट्ठा य सा सुबहुसो बाहिं निव्वेयणस्सावि ॥२३१॥२५४६॥ जइ वा विभिण्णदेसं पि वेयणं कुणइ कम्ममेवं तो ।

कहमण्णसरीरगयं न वेयणं कुणइ अण्णस्स ? ॥२३२॥२५२७॥

230. Dehanto jā veyaņā kammabhāvammi kimnimittā sā? I Nikkāraņā va jai to Siddho vi na veyaņārahio. (2525)

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- 231. Jai bajjhanimittā sā tadabhāve sā na hujja to anto: Ditthā ya sā subahuso bāhimnivveyarassāvi. (2526)
- 232. Jai vā vibhiņņaddsampi vdyaņām kuņai kammamevam toļ Kahamaņņasarīragayam na vdyaņām kuņai aņņassa? (2527)

[देहान्तर्या वेदना कर्माभावे किंनिमित्ता सा १। निष्कारणा वा यदि ततः सिद्धोऽपि न वेदनारहितः ॥२३०॥२५२५॥ यदि याद्यनिमित्ता सा तदभावे सा न भवेत् ततोऽन्तः । दृष्ट्वा च सा सुबहुशो बहिर्निवेदनस्यापि ॥२३१॥२५२६॥ यदि वा विभिन्नदेशामपि वेदनां करोति कर्मेंवं ततः । कथमन्यशरीरगतां न वेदनां करोत्यन्यस्य १ ॥२३२॥२५२७॥

- 230. Dehāntaryā vedanā karmābhāve kimnimittā sā ? | Niskāraņā vā yadi tataņ Siddho'pi na vedanārahitaņ. (2525)
- 231. Yadi bahyanimitta sā tadabhāve sā na bhavet tato'ntah i Dristvā ca sa subahuśo bahirnivedanasyāpi. (2526)
- 232. Yadi va vibhinnadeśāmapi vedanām karoti karmaivam tataķ) Kathamanyaśarīragatām na vedanām karotyanyasya ?(2527)]

Trans. 230-231-232. Or, in absence of Karman, what is the cause of ailments (produced) in the body? If it is causeless, then, even the Accomplished (Soul) will not be free from ailment. If it is (due to) (some) external cause, then, internal ailment would not have been produced in its absence. But that wretched (ailment) (is) frequently (experienced) even by one who is free from external ailment. Or, if Karman gives rise to ailment even at a different place, why should Karman of one body not produce ailment to an (absolutely) different body? (2525-2557)

Váda]

पगम्यते, ततस्तद्वि सिद्धोऽपि न वेदनारहितः स्यात् निष्कारणत्वाविशेषादिति । अथ बाह्यवेदनानिमित्ता साऽन्तवेंदनाऽभ्युपगम्यते, बहिर्वेदना हि लगुडघातादि-जन्या प्राद्र्भवन्ती मध्येऽपि वेदनां जनयत्येवेति यदि तत्राभिप्रायः, तर्हि तदमावे लगुडघातादिजन्यवेदनाविरहे साऽन्तवेंदना न भवेद् न जायेत । अस्त्वेवमिति चेत् । तदयुक्तम्, यतो दृष्टाऽसौ बहुश्वः श्रूलादिप्रभवान्तवेंदना । कस्य १ इत्याद्द "बाहिमित्यादि" बहिनिवेदनस्यापि बहिर्लगुडवातादिवेदनासद्भाव एवान्त -वेंदना प्रादुरस्तीति, तदा स्यादपि त्वदभिप्रेतम् । न चैत्रम्, यतोऽनुभूयते दृश्यते च बहिर्वेदनाऽभावेऽपि यथोक्तान्तवेंदना, तनस्तत्कारणभूतेन मध्ये कर्मणापि भाष्यमिति सिद्धोऽस्मत्पक्ष इति । अधैवं मन्यसे-बहिस्त्वक्पर्यन्तवर्त्यपि कर्म मध्येऽपि श्रूलादिवेदनां जनयति न पुनर्भध्ये कर्मास्ति । तदयुक्तम्, यतो वहिर्वतिविभिभ्रदेशस्थितमपि कर्मान्यसिम् मध्यलक्षणे देशन्तर्त्त बेदनां करो-तीत्यम्युपगम्यते. एवं तहिं कथं केन हेतुनाऽन्यशरीरगतं कर्मान्यस्य यज्ञदत्ता-देवेंदनां न करोति ?-ननु करोतु नाम, एत्रमपि देशान्तरत्वाविशेषादिति भावः ॥२५२५॥२५२६॥२५२६॥

D. C.

Acārya:—If Karman is taken as existing only on the surface and not inside jīva, what is the cause of ailments such as gripe, tympanitis etc. experienced inside the human body ! If the body is taken as susceptible to such ailments without any cause, like Karman etc., even Siddhātmās or Accomplished Souls, will not be taken as free from such ailments.

Gosthā Māhila:—Inner ailments are caused by outer ones such as those produced by blows of stick etc.

Acārya:—In that case, there would be no possibility of inner ailment in absence of external ailment. But that is not so. Even if there is no external ailment, the inner ailment of gripe etc. is positively experienced. This shows that there is no such rule to the effect that inner ailment is caused only by the external ailment. It follows, therefore, that there does exist something like Karman which decidedly works as the cause of inner ail-

Vāda]

ment as well. So, it is not proper to believe that Karman does not exist in the body.

Gosthā Māhila:—Karman which is attached to the exterior surface (viz skin etc.) of body, causes the ailment inside the body and hence that is taken as the cause of interior ailment.

Acārya:—This view of yours is also not correct. Karman existing outside the body (i. e. residing in a totally different body) should not be taken as causing ailment inside the body. For, according to that rule, Karman residing in one's body would be the cause of ailment in another's body, as the distinction of place is common in both. 230-232 (2525-2527)

अह तं संचरइ मई न बहिं तो कंचुगो व्व निचत्यं। जं च जुगवं पि वियणा सव्वनि वि दीसई देहे ॥२३३॥२५२८॥

233. Aha tam sañcarai maī na bahim to kañcugo vva niceattham i Jam ca jugavam pi viyaņā savvammi vi dīsaī dehe. (2528)

[अथ तत् संचरति मतिर्न बहिस्ततः कञ्चुक इव नित्यस्थम् । यब युगपदपि वेदना सर्वस्मिन्नपि इञ्चते देहे ॥२३३॥२५२८॥

233. Atha tat sañcarati matirna bahistatah kañcuka iva nityastham (Yacca yugapadapi védanā sarvasminnapi driśyate dèhé. (2528)]

Trans. 233. If it is said that it (i. e. Karman) moves (in and out), then, it would not be permanently existing outside (the body) like a cast-off skin of a serpent. For, the ailment is experienced all over the body at one and the same time. (2528)

टीका-२३३ अथ भवतो मतिः-एकस्य देवदत्तशरीरस्य बहिरन्तथ संचरति तत्कर्भ, ततस्तत्र बहिरन्तथ वेदनां जनयति, न शरीरान्तरे स्वाधारश्वरीरे बहिर-न्तथ संचरणात्, अन्यशरीरे त्वसंचरणादिति । अत्रोच्यते-"न बहिमित्त्यादि" ततस्तहिं सर्पस्य कश्चुकवज्जीवस्य बहिरेव कर्म नित्यं तिष्ठतीति नित्यस्थितमिति यद् भवतो मतं तद् न प्रामोति, किन्तु कदाचिद् बहिः कदाचि त्वन्तः कर्मणः

संचरणाम्युपगमात् , कश्चुकवद् बहिरेव तिष्ठति इति नियमस्याघटनात् प्लवल्य एव तदिति भावः । किश्च, कर्मणः संचरणग्रुपपद्यत इति ॥२५२८॥

D. C.

Gostha Māhila:—Karman of one person, say Dèvadatta, moves inside and outside the body producing ailment both inside and outside the body (by his movements). Karman of one person does not enter or affect the body of another in any way.

Acārya:--In that case, the principle that Karman exists on the surface of body like the cast-off skin of a serpent, will be null and void. The principle of accepting Karman as moving inside at one time and outside at another, is not consistent with that of accepting it as existing only on the surface like the castoff skin of a snake.

Secondly, if Karman moves in and out, the ailment should be felt one after the other. But that is not so. For, the ailments caused outside, as well as, inside the body as a result of striking a stick are felt simultaneously. So, it is not proper to take Karman as moving inside and outside the body. 233 (2528)

There is another difficulty in taking Karman as moving-

न भवंतरमण्णेइ य सरीरसंचारओ तदनिलो व्व । चलियं निज्जरियं चिय भणियमकम्मं च जं समए ॥२३४॥२५२९॥

234. Na bhavantaramaņņei ya sarīrasañcāraö tadanilo vva l Caliyam nijjariyam ciya bhaniyamakammam ca jam samað. (2529)

[न भवान्तरमन्वेति च दारीरसंचारतस्तदनिल इव। चलितं निर्जीणेमेव भणितमकर्म च यत् समये ॥२३४॥२५२९॥

234. Na bhavāntaramanvēti ca śarīrasañcāratastadanila iva I Calitam nirjīrņameva bhaņitamakarma ca yat samayē. (2529)]

Trans. 234. Like the wind, moving in the body, it does not depart to the other world. For, it is said in the Scriptures that the moving (Karma) is a nullified (Karman) or Non-Karman. 2529.

टीका - २३४ किञ्च, यदि संचरिष्णुकर्माम्युपगम्यते, तर्हि मृतस्य तद् भवान्तरं नान्वेति-भवान्तरे तस्याजुगमनं न प्राप्तोतीत्यर्थः । अरीरे संचरणादिति हेतुः । अनिलवदिति दृष्टान्तः । इह यत् शरीरे बहिरन्तश्व संचरति न तद् भवा-न्तरमन्वेति, यथोच्छ्वास-निःश्वासानिलः, तथा च कर्म, तस्माद् न भवान्तर-मन्वेतीति । आह-नन्वागमेऽपि ''चलमाणे चलिए '' इति वचनात् कर्मणश्वलन-मुक्तम्, चलनं च संचरणमेवोच्यते, तत् किमिति तदिह निषिष्यते १ । तदयु-कम्, अभिप्रायापरिज्ञानादित्याह-''चलियमित्यादि '' ''नेरईए जाव वेमाणिए जीवाउ चलियं कम्मं निजरह '' इत्यादिवचनात्, तथा 'निर्जीर्यमाणं निर्जीण्म् इति वचनाच्च यद् यस्मात् समये आगमे चलितं कर्म निर्जीर्णम्रक्तं तदकर्मैंव मणितम्, तच्च मध्ये गतमपि न वेदनां जनयितुमलम्, अकर्मणो नभः परमा-ण्वादेरिव तत्सामर्थ्याभावात् । तस्मादित्थमनेकदोषदुष्टत्वादयुक्तं कर्मणः संचरण-मिति । अतो मध्ये व्यवस्थितं कर्मास्तीति स्थितम् ॥२५२९॥

D. C.

Acarya :---If Karman is taken as dyamic, it would not accompany the Soul to the other world. Because, like inhalations and exalations, that which is moving in and out, cannot depart to the other world.

Gosthā-Māhila:--The assertion "Calamāņè caliè"⁵ in the Agamas speaks for the dynamic character of Karman. Why do you attempt to deny it?

Ācārya:--You have not grasped the real sense of that assertion. "Calamāņè caliè" etc. and Nèraïe jāva Vèmāņie jīvāo caliyam kammam nijjarai" etc. indicate that all jīvās right from the category of Nārakās or hellish denizens to the Vaimānika divine beings, tend to nullify or destroy the (bondage of) dynamic karman. "Nirjīryamāņam nirjīrņam" implies that, that which is being destroyed, has already been destroyed. The āgamas thus imply the dynamic character of Karman as a nullified

5. Vide Bhagawatī Satra, Śataka I Uddeśaka I.

Karman or Non-karman. You are not justified in holding the view of dynamic karman. (2529)

Establishing the position of Karman, he says--

अंतो वि अस्थि कम्मं वियणासब्भावओ तयाए व्व । मिच्छत्ताईपचयसब्भावओ य सब्वत्थ ॥२३५॥२५३०॥

235. Anto vi atthi kammam viyaņāsabbhāvaö tayāe vva Micchattāīpaccayasabbhāvaö ya savvattha. (2530)

[अन्तरप्यस्ति कर्म वेदनासद्भावतस्त्वचीय । मिथ्यात्वादिप्रत्ययसद्भावाच सर्वत्र ॥२३५॥२५३०॥

235. Antarpyasti karma vedanāsadbhāvatastvaeīva. Mithyātvādipratyayasadbhāvācca sarvatra. (2530)].

Trans. 235. Karman exists in the interior, as well as, on the surface, because of the (feeling of) ailment. And, it exists all over the body on account of the motives like vanity etc. (2530)

टीका-२३५ अन्तर्मध्येऽप्यस्ति कर्मेति प्रतिज्ञा । वेदनासद्भावादिति हेतुः । त्वचीवेति दृष्टान्तः । इह यत्र वेदनासद्भावस्तत्रास्ति कर्म, यथा त्वक्पर्यन्ते, अस्ति चान्तर्वेदना, ततः कर्मणापि तत्र भवितव्यमेवेति । किञ्च, मिथ्यात्वा दिभिः प्रत्ययैः कर्म बध्यते, ते च जीवस्य यथा बहिस्तनप्रदेशेषु तथा मध्यभदे-शेष्वपि, यथा मध्यप्रदेशेषु तथा बहिष्प्रदेशेष्वपि सवेत्र सन्ति, तेषामध्यवसाय-विशेषरूपत्वात्, अध्यवसायस्य च समस्तजीवगतत्वादिति । तस्माद् मिथ्या त्वादीनां कर्मबन्धकारणानां जीवे सर्वत्र सद्भावात् तत्कार्यभूतं कर्मापि सर्वत्रैव तत्रास्ति, न पुनर्बहिरेव । तस्माद् बहन्ययः पिण्ड-क्षीरनीरादिन्यायाज्जीवेन सद्दाविभागेनैव स्थितं कर्मेति प्रतिपद्यतां सत्पक्षः, त्यज्यतां मिथ्याभिमान इति ॥२५३०॥

D. C. The proposition is that Karman exists in the interior, as well as, exterior regions of the body on account of the sensation of ailment felt inside, as well as, outside the body. Wherever there is ailment, there is Karman. So, Karman should exist all over the body, because ailment is felt by the body inside out.

Vāda]

Karman is bound by motives such as Mithyātva etc. also. These motives exist on the inner, as well as, outer side of the body. Their kārya viz Karman should, therefore, exist on the surface, as well as, inside the body. Hence, O Gosthā Māhila, leave aside your vanity, and accept the true principle that Karman is united with jīva like fire and iron-bar or water and milk. 235. (2530)

Now, in reply to the argument that there would be negation of Moksa, if Karman were inseparably united with jīva, the Acārya says---

अविभागत्थस्स वि से विमोयणं कंचणो-वलाणं व । नाण-किरियाहिं कीरइ मिच्छत्ताईहिं चायाणं ॥२३६॥२५३१॥

236. Avibhāgatthassa vi se vimoyaņam kancaņo-valāņam va l Nāņa-kiriyāhim kīrai micchattāīhim cāyāņam. (2531)

[अविभागस्थस्यापि तस्य विमोचनं काञ्चनो-पलयोरिव । ज्ञान-क्रियाभ्यां क्रियते मिध्यात्वादिभिश्वादानम् ॥२३६॥२५३१॥

236. Avibhāgasthasyāpi tasya vimocanam kāncano-palayoriva I Jnāna-kriyābhyām kriyate mithyātvādibhiścādānam. (2531)].

Trans. 236. Like (that of) gold and stone (united together), its separation (from $j\bar{i}va$) is brought about by means of cognition and action in spite of its close contact (with $j\bar{i}va$), while its re-union (with $j\bar{i}va$) is (brought about) by (means of) vanity cic. 2531.

टीका-२३६ 'से' तस्य कर्मणो जीवेन सहाविभागेन स्थितस्यापि काआनो -पलयोरिव विमोचनं वियोगो ज्ञान-क्रियाभ्यां क्रियते । तथा, तस्यैव कर्मणो मिथ्यात्वादिभिरादानं ग्रहणं जीवेन सह संयोगो विधीयत इत्यर्थः । इदमत्र हृद-यम्-इह जीवस्याविभागेनावस्थानं द्विधा विद्यते-आकाशेन सह, कर्मणा च । तत्राकाशेन सह यदविभागावस्थानं तद् न वियुज्यत एव, सर्वाद्धमवस्थानात् । यचु कर्मणा सहाविभागावस्थानं तदप्यभव्यानां न वियुज्यते । भव्यानां तु कर्मसंयोगस्तथाविधज्ञान-दर्शन-चारित्र-तपः-सामग्रीसद्भावे वियुज्यते, वइन्यौ- : 248 :

षध्यादिसामग्रीसच्चे का अनो-पलसंयोगवदिति । तथाविधज्ञानादिसामग्रयभावे तु भव्यानामपि कर्मसंयोगः कदापि न निवर्तते, "नो चेव णं भवसिद्धियविर-द्दिए लोए भविस्स" इतिवचनात् । तर्हिं भव्याः कथं ते व्ययदिश्यन्ते ? इति चेत् । उच्यते-योग्यतामात्रेण । न च योग्यः सर्वोऽपि विवक्षितपर्यायेण युज्यते, प्रतिमादिपर्याययोग्यानामपि तथाविधदारु-पाषाणादीनां तद्विधसामग्र्यभावे केषाश्चित् तदयोगादित्यलं विस्तरेण प्रागेव गणधरवादेऽस्यार्थस्य विस्तरेणोक्त-त्वात् । तस्मात् "कर्म जीवाद् न वियुज्यते, अन्योन्याविभ्वागेनावस्थितत्त्वात् , इत्यनैकान्तिकम्, उपायतो दृश्यमानवियोगैः क्षीरनीरकाश्वनोपलादिभिव्यभि-मिहितमेव "ज्ञान-कियोपायतः" इति । मिथ्यात्वादिभिहिं जीव-कर्मसंयोगः कियते, मिथ्यात्वादिविपक्षभूतीर्लज्ञनादिभिस्तज्ञनिताजीर्णसंयोगवदिति ॥ र ३६॥र५३१॥

D. C.

Acārya:--Jīva and Karman are united together like gold and stone. They could be separated from each other by means of jñāna and kriyā.

Jīva is inseparably united with two things:- (1) $\bar{A}k\bar{a}\dot{s}a$ or space and (2) Karman or action. The contact of jīva with $\bar{a}k\bar{a}\dot{s}a$ is so intimate that it is never separated. In case of contact with Karma, that with the lower types of jīvas is always inseparable, while that with the excellent ones, is broken off by means of excellent qualities such as knowledge, philosophy, character, penances etc. In case of these excellent qualities being absent, the bhavya or excellent jīvas will not be separated from the bondage of Karman.

Gosthā Māhila :-- Then, how could they be recognized as " bhavya ? ".

Acārya:--They are known as bhavya by virtue of their fitness for the attainment of Moksa. But this does not mean that all attain a certain spiritual form only by virtue of their fitness.

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Just as, an idol could not be constructed without the necessary materials such as wood, stone etc., the excellent souls also could never be created in absence of certain necessary qualities. This leads us to the conclusion that Jīva and Karman are inseparably united with each other. Just as, water and milk and gold and stone, united together, are separated from each other with the help of proper means, Jīva and Karman are also separated from each other with the help of jñāna, darśana and cāritra.

Gosthā Māhila:-Karman is attached to Jīva only on account of actions like those of bowing to false gods, as real ones, committing violence etc. But they are not separated from each other by virtue of qualities such as sympathy, generosity selfrestraint etc. 236. (2531)

The .Acārya replies :---

कह वादाणे किरियासाफर्छ नेह तब्विधायम्मि । किं पुरिसगारसज्झं तस्सेवासज्झमेगं तो ॥२३७॥२५३२॥ असुभो तिव्वाईओ जह परिणामो तदज्जणेऽभिमओ । तह तब्विहो चिय सुभो किं नेट्ठो तब्विओगे वि ? ॥२३८॥२५३३॥

- 237. Kaha vādāņe kiriyāsāphallam neha tavvidhāyammi i Kim purisagārasajjham tassevāsajjamegam to. (2532)
- 238. Asubho tivvāīö jaha pariņāmo tadajjaņe'bhimaö i Taha tivviho ceiya subho kim neţţho tavviögè vi? (2533)

[कथं वाऽऽदाने कियासाफल्यं नेह तद्विघाते । किं पुरुषकारसाध्यं तस्यैवासाध्यमेकं ततः ॥२३७॥२५३२॥ अज्ञुभस्तीव्रादिको तथा परिणामस्तदर्जनेऽभिमतः । यथा तद्विध एव ज्ञुभः किं नेष्ठस्तद्वियोगेऽपि ? ॥२३८॥२५३३॥

- 237. Katham vä"däne kriyäsäphalyam neha tadvighäte Kim purusakärasädhyam tasaiväsädhyamekam tatah. (2532)
- 238. Aśubhastīvrādiko tathā pariņāmastadarjane'bhimatah i Yathā tadvidha eva śubhah kim neśtastadviyoge'pi ? (2533)]

Trans. 237-238. Or how is (it that the) success of action (is accepted) in (case of) admitting Karman and not in (case of) its destruction? (How is it that) one action is inaccessible to an effort which achieves another? So, why don't you expect beneficial result in separating (Karman from jīva), just as you apprehend an extremely inauspicious result in (case of) accepting (the existence of) Karman? (2532-2533).

D. C. What is the definite purpose in accepting the validity of actions like committing violence etc., when the bondages of Karman are accepted, and why don't you accept the validity of actions such as expressing charity, sympathy etc. when the bondages of Karman are being destroyed? According to you, a sinful effort brings about the accomplishment of the bondages of Karman, while a meritorious deed such as that of charity or sympathy, does not bring about the destruction of bondages of Karman. This belief of yours is absurd. The whole view-point of yours about Karman is based upon such absurdity. Really speaking, the auspicious consequence of meritorious deeds des-

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troys the bondages of Karman, in the same way, as an inauspicious consequence (of sinful deeds) brings about the accomplishment of the bondages of Karman. This shows that Jiva and Karman though united intimately with each other, could be separated from each other by the help of proper means. 237-238. (2532-2533).

Now refuting the arguments advanced by Gosthā Māhila, as regards the Pratyākhyāna Porva, the Ācārya states---

किमपरिमाणं सत्ती अणागयद्धा अहापरिच्छेओ ?। जह जावदत्थि सत्ती तो नणु सचेव परिमाणं ॥२३९॥२५३४॥ सत्ति-किरियाणुमेओ कालो सूरकिरियाणुमेओ व्व । नणु अपरिमाणहाणी आसंसा चेव तदघत्था ॥२४०॥२५३५॥

- 239. Kimaparimāņam sattī aņāgayaddhā ahāpariccheö | Jai jāvadatthi sattī to naņu saccèva parimāņam. (2534)
- 240. Satti-kiriyāņumeö kālo surakiriyāņumeö vva I Naņu a-parimāņahāņī āsamsā ceva tadavatthā. (2535)

[किमपरिमाणं शक्तिरनागताद्धाऽधापरिच्छेवः ?। यदि यावदस्ति शक्तिस्ततो ननु सैव परिमाणम् ॥२३९॥२५३४॥ शक्ति-क्रियानुमेयः कालः सुरक्रियानुमेय इव। नन्वपरिणामहानिराशंसा चैव तदवस्था ॥२४०॥२४३५॥

- 239. Kimaparimāņam saktiranāgatāddhā' thāparicchedaņ? Yadi yāvadasti saktistato nanu saiva parimāņam. (2534)
- 240. Śakti-kriyānumeyaņ kālaņ sūrakriyānumeya ival Nanvapariņāmahānirāśaņsā caiva tadavasthā. (2535)]

Trans. 239-240. What is (meant by) a-parimana (imme asurable)? Is it (immeasurable) capacity, (or) the (immeasu rable) time that is not (yet) come, (or) the (unlimited) continuance? If (it means to exert) the capacity till it is finally exhausted, then, that itself becomes a limit. (The observance) ce of vow) is measured by the limits of energy and actions, just as, Time is measured by the movements of the Sun. (The principle of) *a-parim*ana is (therefore) violated, and in (case of) its acceptance, the (fault of) desire will be produced. (2534-2535)

टीका-२३९-२४० यदुक्तम्-'' प्रत्याख्यानपरिमाणमेव विधीयमानं श्रेयो भवति '' इति । तत्र प्रतिविधीयते-किमिदं नामापरिमाणं ?-किं शक्तिर्यावच्छ-कोमीत्यपरिमाणम् ? उत सर्वाप्यनागताद्धा, आहोस्विदपरिच्छेदः ? इति त्रयी गतिः । तत्र यदि '' यावदस्ति शक्तिस्तावदहमिदं न सेविष्ये '' इत्यपरिमाण मिष्यते, ततस्तहिं ननु सैव शक्तिः परिमाणमापन्नम्, अतो यदेव निषिष्यते तदेवाभ्युपगतमिति । कुतः ? इत्याह-'' सत्तीत्यादि '' '' यावच्छक्रोमि तावदिदं न सेविष्ये '' इत्येवंभूतमा हि शक्तिक्रियया प्रत्याख्यानस्यावधिभूतः काल एवा-नुमीयते-यावन्तं कालं शक्तिस्तावन्तं कालमिदं न सेविष्य इत्यर्थः । दृष्टान्त-माह-यथा स्र्यादिगतिक्रियया समया-ऽऽवलिकादिः कालोऽनुमीयते, तथाऽत्रापि शक्तिक्रियया प्रत्याख्यानावधिकाल इत्यर्थः । अस्त्वेवर्मिति चेत् । तदयुक्तम्, यतो नन्वेवं सति त्वया प्रतिज्ञातस्यापरिमाणपक्षस्य हानिः माम्रोति, शक्तिक्रि-यानुमितकालपरिमाणस्येदानीं स्वयमेवाभ्युपगमादिति । यदुक्तम्---

"तं दुट्ठं आसंसा होइ" इति, तत्राह-"आसंसेत्यादि" ननुशक्तिरूपेऽप-रिमाणेऽपि त्वयेष्यमाणे आशंसादोषस्तदवस्थ एव, "शक्तेरूत्तरकालमिदं सेवि-ष्ये" इत्याशंसायास्तदवस्थत्वादिति ॥२५३४॥२५३५॥

D. C.

Gosthā Mahila :- The *pratyākhyāna* accomplished without any time-limit or the limit of energy is the most beneficial of all.

Acārya:—What is a-parimāņa according to you? Does it imply exerting till the last drop of energy? Or, is the whole of future time included in a-parimāņa? Or, is it that a-paricchèda or continuance without break, is a-parimāņa according to you?

When you say that "I shall refrain from enjoying a particular pleasure till I have the capacity to do so," the praty $\bar{a}kh$ y $\bar{a}na$ does not become *a*-parim $\bar{a}na$ or limitless, but parim $\bar{a}na$ or limited by the bounds of capacity expressed by means of actions. Just as, the measurement of time is ascertained by the help of movements of the Sun etc., that of the limit of *pratyākhyāna* is ascertained by the help of actions exerted by capacity. Thus, your theory of *a-parimāņa* or immeasurable *pratyākhyāna* is refuted, and the fault of āśaņsā or expectation is all the while retained therein. For, the person observing *pratyākhyāna* would all the while be cherishing a desire in his heart that "after the whole of my energy is over in observing this vow, I shall be able to enjoy the objects of pleasure in the other world." 239-240 (2534-2535)

Not only that your theory is self-contradictory in this way, but there are other difficulties also-

जह न वयभंगदोसो मयस्स तह जीवओ वि सेवाए। वयभंगनिब्भयाओ यच्चक्खाणाणवत्था य ॥२४१॥२५३६॥

241. Jaha na vayabhangadoso mayassa taha jivaö vi sèvädt Vayabhanganibbhayäö paccakkhänänavatthä ya. (2536)

[यथा न व्रतभङ्गदोषो मृतस्य तथा जीवतोऽपि सेवायाम्। व्रतभङ्गनिर्भयात् प्रत्याख्यानानवस्था च ॥२४१॥२५३६॥

241. Yathä na vratabhangadoşo mritasya tathā jīvato'pi sevāyām (Vratabhanganirbhayāt pratyākhyānānavasthā ca. (2536)]

इत्तियमित्ती सत्ति ति नाइयारो न यावि पच्छित्तं। न य सब्वब्वयनियमो एगेण वि संजयत्त ति ॥२४२॥२५३७॥

242. Ittiyamittī satti tti nāiyāro na yāvi pacchittam 1 Na ya savvavvayaniyamo dgdņa vi sanjayatta tti. (2537)

[एतावन्मात्रा शक्तिरिति नातिचारो न चापि प्रायश्वित्तम्। न च सर्वव्रतनियम एकेनापि संयतत्वादिति ॥२४२॥२५३७॥

242. Etāvanmātrā śaktiriti nāticāro na cāpi prāyaścittam (Na ya sarvavrataniyama ekenāpi samyatatvāditi. (2537)]

Trans. 241-242. In cherishing (a desire) just as there is no fault of violation of a vow to a dead (being), the living (being) will also be free from fear of violating the vow, in (case of) enjoyment. And (thus), there would be confusion as regards observance of the vow. (On saying that) "This much is my capacity", there would be neither excessive practice nor remonstration. And there would be no (necessity of) observing the rule of practising all vows, as (according to you) asceticism could be attained even - by (observing) one vow. (2536-2537).

टीका-२४१-२४२ यथा मृतस्य पश्चत्वग्रुपगतस्य सुरलोकादौ सुरकामिनी-संभोगादिभोगान् भुझतोऽस्मत्पक्षे दोषो न भवति तथा शक्तिरूपमपरिमाणम-भ्युपगच्छतस्तव मते जीवतोऽपि भोगोपसेवायां न दोषः भामोति, "एतावत्येव मम शक्तिः, अतो मत्प्रत्याख्यानस्य पूर्णत्वाज्जीवन्नपि अनजिम भोगान् " इत्य-भिमायवतस्तदभ्युपगमेन जीवतोऽपि भोगानासेवमानस्य दोषानुषङ्गो न स्यादि-त्यर्थः । न चैतद् दृष्टमिष्टं वा जिनशासने । किञ्च, इत्थमभ्युपगमे " एतावती ममं शक्तिः " इत्यवष्टम्मवतो वतभङ्गनिर्भयत्वात् प्रत्याख्यानानवस्थैव स्यात्, " एतावती मम शक्तिः " इति भोगासेवनात् पुनः प्रत्याख्यानात् , पुनरप्यासेव-नात पुनः प्रत्याख्यानादिति । किञ्च, व्रतानामतिचारः, तदाचरणे च प्रायश्चि त्तम्, एकव्रतभङ्गे सर्वव्रतभङ्गनियमेन सर्वाण्यपि व्रतानि पालनीयानि, इति यदांगमरूढं तत् सर्वमपि भवदभिप्रायेण न प्रामोतीति सयुक्तिकं दर्शयत्राहं-"इत्तियमित्तीत्यादि" " एतावत्येव मम शक्तिर्नाधिका " इत्यध्यवसायेन प्रति-सेवां कुर्वतोऽपि साधोः शवत्यपरिमाणवादिनो भवतोऽभिप्रायेण नातिचारः, न चापि व्रतमङ्गः, न चापि प्रायश्चित्तम् , तथा सर्वव्रतपरिपालननियमश्च न स्यात् , श्वक्त्यवष्टम्भात्, एकव्रतपरिपालनेनापि त्वदभिप्रायेण संयतत्वादिति ॥२५३६ 11ર4રાગા

D. C. According to us, there is no objection if a person enjoys pleasures with damsels in the heavenly regions after death. Similarly, there is no objection in accepting that a living being also could enjoy pleasure etc., according to you, who apprehend the limit of energy to be immeasurable. For, by plainly saying that "This much is my capacity and at the end of that much energy, my pratyākhyāna will be over. So, there is no

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harm if I enjoy pleasures", one would think that his duty was over, and you, too, would find no objection in accepting that view. But according to the Jaina Scriptures, that is not permissible.

Moreover, on the plain assertion that "only this much-and nothing more-is my capacity" there would be no fear of violating the vow. But this would create confusion in the observance of vow. For, at first, one would enjoy pleasure by saying that, "my capacity is this much" and after some time, he would again accept the observance of pratyākhyāna, and again, he would start enjoying on the same excuse, and so on, leading ultimately the observance of vow to confusion.

Thus, according to you, those who act contrary to the religious vow on the ground of a parimāņa pratyākhyāna, will not be bound by excessive enjoyment, transgression of vow, or even remonstration.

Nor, will they be required to abide by the law of observance of all vows on the same ground. For according to you, the observance of one vow is enough for the attainment of asceticism. 241-242 (2536-2537).

Taking the alternative interpretation of *a-parimāņa* as the Future Time or continuance, the Acārya states--

अहवा सञ्वाणागयकालग्गहणं मयं अपरिमाणं । तेणापुण्णपइण्णो मओ वि भग्गवओ नाम ॥२४३॥२५३८॥ सिद्धो वि संजओ चिय सञ्वाणागयद्धसंवरधरो ति । उत्तरगुण-संवरणाभावो चिय सञ्वहा चेव ॥२४४॥२५३९॥

- 243. Ahavā savvāņāgayakālaggahaņam mayam a-parimāņam Teņāpuņņapaiņņo mao vi bhaggavaö nāma. (2538)
- 244. Siddho vi sañjaö ceiya savvānāgayaddhasamvaradharo tti Uttaraguņa-samvaranābhāvo ceiya savvahā cèva. (2539)

[अथवा सर्वानागतकालग्रहणं मतमपरिमाणम् । तेनापूर्णप्रतिज्ञो मृतोऽपि अग्नव्रतो नाम ॥२४३॥२५३८॥

सिद्धोऽपि संयत एव सर्वानागताद्धासंवरधर इति । उत्तरगुणसंवरणाभाव एव सर्वथा चैवम् ॥२४४॥२५३९॥

- 243. Athava sarvānāgatakālagrahaņam matamaparimāņam | Tenāparņapratijno mrito'pi bhagnavrato nāma. (2538)
- 244. Siddho'pi samyata èva sarvānāgatāddhäsamvaradhara iti | Uttaraguņasamvaraņābhāva èva sarvathā caivam. (2539)]

Trans. 243-244 Or, (let) the *a-parimana* be taken to imply) all the (Future) Time, that has not yet come. By (doing) so, even a dead being with his pledge unfulfilled, will be definitely violating (his) vow. Moreover, a Siddhabeing will be called a (mere) ascetic on account of (his) holding the religious vow for all the time that has not come. And (thus), there would be entire negation of the subsidiary qualities. (2538-2539)

टीका-२४३-२४४ व्याख्या-अथ सर्वस्याप्यनागतकाल्रस ग्रहणमपरिमाणं भवतः, तेन तर्हि मृतोऽपि देवलोकादौ भोगानासेवमानाः, 'नाम ' इत्यामन्त्रणे, अहो ? भग्नवत एव साधुः, अपूर्णप्रतिज्ञत्वात्, सर्वमप्यनागतकालं तदपरिपाल-नादिति सुव्यक्तमेवेति । अपि च, एवं सिद्धोऽपि संयत एव प्राप्तोति, सर्वाना-गताद्धासंवरधरत्वात् । अस्यापि सर्वाद्धागृहीतप्रत्याख्यानकालाभ्यन्तरवर्तित्वादि-त्यर्थः । यावज्जीवगृहीतविरतिकालाभ्यन्तरवर्तिसाधुवदिति दृष्टान्तः स्वयमेव द्रष्टव्यः । भवतु सिद्धः संततः, को दोषः ? इति चेत् । तदयुक्तम्, '' सिद्धे नो संजए नो असंजए, नो संजयासंजए'' इति वचनादिति । अपि च, अन्योऽपि दोषः । कः ? इत्याह-''उत्तरगुणेत्यादि " उत्तर गुणः पौष्त्पी-पुरिमाधैं-कास-नाको-पवासादितपोरूपः, संवरणं बहुभिराकारैर्गृहीतस्वैकासनादिप्रत्याख्यानस्य भोजनानन्तरमाकारसंक्षेपेण स्वरूपम्, उत्तरगुणश्च संवरणं चोत्तरगुण-संवरणे तयोरेवं सर्वानागताद्धाप्रत्याख्यानपक्षेऽभ्युपगम्यमाने सर्वथैवाभावः प्राप्तोति, पौरुष्यादिषु सर्वानागताद्धाप्रत्याख्यानत्वानुपपत्तेः, एकासनादिष्ठ पुनस्तदभिन्नायेण सर्वाद्धाप्रमाणेषु संवरणं कदाचिदपि न घटत इति व्यक्तमेवेति ॥२५३८॥२५३९॥

D. C. If, according to the second interpretation, you take a-parimāna to mean all the future time that is to come, the

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pratyākhyāna will naturally be said to have been observed in Future Time. In such a case, a person enjoying pleasures etc. in places like heavenly regions after death, will be said to have violated the vow. Because, he being engrossed in pleasures after his life is finished, will not be said to have observed the pratyākhyāna for all the future time. According to this interpretation of a-parimāņa pratyākhyāna, even Muktātmā will be said to be holding the vow and hence will be called an ascetic. But that is against the practice of the āgamas.

For, it is said-

"Sildhe no sañjad, no a-sanjad, no sañjayāsañjayd"

[A Siddha being is not restrained, nor unrestrained, nor between the two.]

There will be another difficulty also. The subsidiary quality formed of penances such as pauruși ($\hat{\mathbf{q}}$) purimārdha (\mathbf{g}), ekāsanaka, upavāsa etc., as well as, the samvaraņa would not be found at all during the whole of Future Period. For, according to you, the apprehension of *pratyākhyāna* does not fit in pauruși etc. and samvarana does not fit in ekāsanā etc. 243-244 (2538-2539).

Taking the third interpretation, the Acārya replies as follows-

अपरिच्छेए वि समाण एस दोसो जओ सुए तेण। वयभंगभयाउ चिय जावज्जीवं ति निदिट्ठं ॥२४५॥२५४०॥

245. Apariechėd vi samāņa desa doso jaö sud teņam I Vayabhangabhayāu ceiya jāvajjīvam ti niddiţţham. (2540)

[अपरिच्छेदेऽपि समान एष दोषो यतः श्रुते तेन । व्रतभङ्गभयादेव यावज्जीवमिति निर्दिष्टम् ॥२४५॥२५४०॥

245. Aparicchèdè'pi samāna èṣa doṣo yataḥ śrutè tena I Vratabhangabhayādèva yāvajjīvamiti nirdiṣṭam. (2540)]

Trans. 245. In (case of taking) continuance without break also, the same fault (arises) That is why for fear

of violation of vow, (the words) "yāvajjīvam (till the end of life)" are mentioned in the Scriptures. 2540.

टीका-२४५ यतोऽपरिच्छेदरूपेऽप्यपरिमाणेऽभ्युपगम्यमाने एष सर्वानाग-ताद्धाप्रत्याख्यानोक्तदोषः समान एव तथाहि-कालापरिच्छेदेनापि पत्याख्याने कृते किं घटिकादिमात्रं किश्चित् कालं प्रतीक्ष्य प्रतिसेवां करोतु, आहोस्वित् सर्व-मप्यनागताद्धाप्रत्याख्यानं पालयतु ?। यद्याद्यः पक्षः, तर्धनवस्था, यावद् दि घटिकां प्रतीक्षते तावद् द्वे घटिके किं न प्रतीक्षने, यावच्च द्वे प्रतीक्षते तावत् तिस्रोऽपि किं न प्रतीक्षते १ इत्यादि । अथ द्वितीयपक्षः, तर्हि मृतस्यापि भोगा-नासेवमानस्य व्रतभङ्ग एव, सिद्धस्यापि संयतत्वम्, उत्तरगुणसंवरणाभावश्चोति त एव दोषाः । उपसंहारन्नाह-"सुए तेणेत्यादि" तेनैतानपरिमाणप्रत्याख्यान-दोषानभिवीक्ष्य व्रतभङ्गभयादेव त्रिपक्षपरिहारेण श्रुत आगमे "सव्वं सावज्ञं जोगं पच्चक्खामि जावज्जीवाए" इत्यत्र साधुवत्याख्यानस्य "यावज्जीवम्" इति परिमाणमादिष्टम् । अतो मुच्यतामपरिमाणताग्रह इति ॥२५४०॥

D. C. Even if a-parimāņa is interpreted as a-paricchèd or continuance, the same difficulty (as in the case of the first two interpretations), will arise.

When there is no time-limit, should a person observing pratyākhyāna enjoy pleasure after a definite period of time, say ghațikā or should he observe the same for the whole of *anāgata*kāla (future time)? If it is said that one should enjoy pleasure after a definite time, say a ghațikā, there would be a lot of confusion, on account of questions contending as to why not after two ghațikās, three ghahkās or even more ghațikas, and so on.

Secondly, if it is said that one should observe $praty\bar{a}khy\bar{a}na$ for the whole of "anagata kāla" or the period of time that is yet to come, then those in the pra-loka will be said to have broken the vow on account of their enjoying pleasure etc. after death. The Muktätmans will be called ascetics and there would be absolute negation of uttara-guna and samvarana.

Thus, a number of difficulties arises, if the theory of a-parimāņa pratyākhyāna is accepted. It is, therefore, said in the agamas that--

"Savvam sāvajjam jogam paceakkhāmi jāvajjīvād"

[I abandon all the disgraceful contact till the end of my life.]

The commandment of the Holy Writ clearly indicates that the limit of observing vow for an ascetic is the end of his life. So, give up your false persistence for a-parimāna pratyākhyāna and abide by the commandment of the āgamas. 245. (2540)

The Acārya now proceeds to show that the fault of āśaṃsā or expectation does not arise in case of sa-parimāņa pratyākhyāna etc.

नासंसा सेविस्सामि किंतु मा मे मयस्स वयभंगो। होही, सुरेषु को वा वयावगासो विमुकस्स १ ॥२४६॥२५४१॥

246. Nāsamsa sevissāmi kintu mā me mayassa vayabhangan | Hohi, suresu ko vā vayāvagāso vimukkassa ? (2541)

[नार्श्नासां सेविष्ये किन्तु मा मे म्टतस्य व्रतभङ्गः । भूत् सुरेषु को वा व्रतावकाशो विमुक्तस्य ? ॥२४६॥२५४१॥

246. Nāśamsāni sevišye kintu mā me mritasya vratabhangan | Bhut surešu ko vā vratāvakāšo vimuktasya? (2541)]

Trans. 246. I do not cherish any desire, but (while observing the vow, I only expect that) let there be no violation
of vow after death in (the regions of) gods. And, where is the scope of (observing) a vow to a Siddha or Accomplished Soul? 2541.

टीका-२४६ यावजीवावधिना प्रत्याख्यानं कुर्वतः "मरणानन्तरमहं भोगान् सेविष्ये" इत्येवंभूता हन्त ! न कचिदाशंसा वर्तते-नैवंभूतेन परिणामेन सावधिकं प्रत्याख्यानं करोतीत्यर्थः, किन्तु "मा मे मृतस्य"-सुरेषूत्पनस्य सतो भोगानासेवमानस्य व्रतभङ्गो भविष्याते "इत्यध्यवसायेन मा मे व्रतभङ्ग-स्तत्र भूयात्" इत्येवंभूतेनैव ग्रुभपरिणामेनेत्थंभूतं प्रत्याख्यानं करोतीत्यर्थः । अतस्तत्र काऽऽग्रंसा ? । स हि विरत्यावारककर्मणः क्षयोपश्रमावस्थत्वादत्र स्वायत्तः, सुरलोके त्ववश्यं तदुद्यात् परायत्त इत्यतः श्रक्यत्वाद् यावज्जीवाव-धिना प्रत्याख्याति, परतस्त्वशक्यत्वाद् न प्रत्याख्याति, इति कथमाशंसादोष-वानयम् १ इति । अथैवं बूयास्त्वम्-किमितीत्थं व्रतभङ्गाद् बिभेत्यसौ १ । अयं हि मृतो म्रक्तिं यास्यति, तत्र च कामभोगामावाद् व्रतभङ्गासंभव एव, इति कस्तस्य व्रतभङ्ग संक्षोभः १ । तदयुक्तम्, सांप्रतमिह म्रक्तिगमनासंभवात्, महा-विदेहेष्वपि सर्वस्यापि तद्रमननिश्चयायोगादिति । अथ कोऽपि तावद् म्रक्तिं गच्छति, तस्य च विम्रक्तस्य मदभिमतेऽपरिभाणे प्रत्याख्याने गृह्यमाणे म्रक्तावपि महावतानुगमादपरिमाणप्रत्याख्यानस्य सफलता भविष्यतीति चेदित्यत्राह-"को वा वयेत्यादि" योऽपि म्रक्तिं गच्छति तस्यापि विम्रक्तस्य निष्ठितार्थस्य को वतानामवकाश्च १ किं व्रतानां साफल्यम् १ तत्कार्यस्य सिद्धत्वाद् न किश्चिदिति मावः । तस्माद् म्रक्तिगामिनमपि प्रत्यसंगतमेवापरिमाणप्रत्याख्यानमिति । तदेवं म्रुग्धमभिन्नं वा व्यक्त्त्याऽनपेक्ष्य सामान्येनैवापरिमाणप्रत्याख्याने दूषणा-न्युक्तानि ॥२५४१॥

D. C.

Acārya:--One who observes *pratyākhyāna* till death, never cherishes a desire to enjoy pleasures after death. That is to say, his pratyākhyāna is not defiled by means of any desire. On the contrary, he attaches good intention to his *pratyākhyāna*, when he desires that his vow may not be violated after death while enjoying pleasures in the divine regions. On account of good intention, the fault of āśaṃsā does not arise.

It should be noted that the observance of vow is limited to this life, only with a definite purpose. The condition of the observer of pratyākhyāna in the heavenly regions is different from his condition in this life. During his life, he being a vratadhārin will be free from the bondages of Karman by virtue of his dispassion etc., but while enjoying in the heavenly regions, bondages of Karman will definitely arise and that will obstruct the observance of vow. This shows that the pratyākhyāna is limited only to this life, and it is not possible to follow its practice in the next world. The theory of *a-parimāna* or unlimited pratyākhyāna is impracticable in this way.

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Gostha Mahila:—Why should one be afraid of the violation of vow in the other world, while following the practice of *pra* $ty\bar{a}khy\bar{a}na$. It is likely that an observer of praty $\bar{a}khy\bar{a}na$ may attain Moksa after death, and thus he may not violate his vow in absence of enjoying.

Ācārya:—Your a gument is not valid. There is no possibility for any one to attain Mokṣa at this time. There is no rule even in a heavenly abode like Mahāvidèha-kśetra that all its inhabitant creatures will attain Mokṣa.

Gosthā Māhila :--Since great vows are already included in moksa, the theory of a-parimāņa pratyākhyāna will succeed without doubt.

Acārya:—Even that is not correct. How could one who has already attained $mok \leq a$, have any scope for the observance of vows? As he has fulfilled all the metaphysical aims, he does not need the practice of $praty \equiv khy \equiv na$ in any way.

Thus, your theory of *a-parimāna pratyākhyāna* is not beneficial even to those who have been attaining Moksa. 246 (2541)

Moreover,

जो पुणरव्चयभावं मुणमाणोऽवस्सभाविनं भणइ । वयमपरिमाणमेवं पच्चक्खं सो मुसावाई ॥२४७॥२५४२॥

247. Jo puņaravyayabhāvam muņamāņo'vassabhāvinam bhaņai i Vayamaparimāņamevam paccakkham so musāvāi. (2542)

[यः पुनरव्रतभावं जानन्नवइयंभाविनं भणति । व्रतमपरिमाणमेवं प्रत्यक्षं स मुषावादी ॥२४७॥२५४२॥

247. Yah punaravratabhāvam jānannavasyambhāvinam bhaņati | Vratamaparimāņamevam pratyakṣam sah mriṣāvādī. (2542)]

Trans. 247. One who accepts a vow, as a-parimāņa (to be observed permanently) in spite of his knowing the possibility of breaking the vow as certain (in future), is an evident liar. 2542.

:261:

टीका--२४७ यः पुनरग्रेऽपि किश्चित् शास्त्रपरिकमितमतिर्विज्ञो वतं गृह्णति, विज्ञत्वादेव च ''चीर्णवतः सुरलोकमेव गच्छति '' इत्यवबुध्यमानः सुरेषु चाव्र-तभावमविरतिमावमवक्ष्यं माविनं मुणन् जाननोऽपि वतं प्रत्याख्यानमपरिमाणं यावज्जीवपरिमाणरहितं भणत्युचरति, स एवं ब्रुवाणः प्रत्यक्षं साक्षादेवं मृषावादी, अन्यथाभणित्वाऽन्यथाकरणादिति ॥२५४२॥

D. C. When a person well-versed in Scriptures, says that the practice of *pratyākhyāna* should be continued even after death for ever, in spite of his knowing that it will be certainly obstructed while enjoying pleasures in the heavenly regions, he should be called a perfect har. For, he says something else than what he actually bears in his mind. 247 (2542)

Also,

भावो पचक्खाणं सो जइ मरणपरओ वि तो भग्गं। अह नत्थि न निद्दिस्सइ जावज्जीवं ति तो कीस ? ॥२४८॥२५४३॥

248. Bhāvo paecakkhāņam so jai maraņaparaö vi to bhaggam i Aha natthi na niddissai jāvajjīvam ti to kīsa? (2543)

[भावः प्रत्याख्यानं स यदि मरणपरतोऽपि ततोभग्नम् । अथ नास्ति न निर्दिइयते यावज्जीवमिति ततः कस्मात् १ ॥२४८॥ ॥२५४३॥

248. Bhāvaḥ pratyākhyānam sa yadi maraṇaparato'pi tato bhagnam i Atha nāsti na nirdiśyate yāvajjīvamiti tatah kasmāt? (2543)

Trans. 248. Pratyākhyāna is (nothing but) a dispassionate inclination (of mind). If that (persists) even after death, the violation (of vows) certainly takes place. And if it is not so, why is it not mentioned as limited to this life? 2543.

टीका-२४८ भावश्वेतसिको विरातिपरिणामः प्रत्याख्यानम्रुच्यतें, स च प्रत्याख्यातुर्यावज्जीवावधिमेवास्ति, उत मरणपरतोऽपीति वक्तव्यम् १। यद्यन-न्तरपक्षः, तर्दि भग्नं तस्य प्रत्याख्यानम्, सुरलोकादौ भोमसेवनादव्ययंमाबी तद्भन्न इत्यर्थः । अथाद्यः पक्षः, तर्हि वचनेनापि ''यावज्जीवम् " इति परिमार्वं प्रगुणेन न्यायेन किं न निदिंग्यते-किं न क्रियते, येनान्यचेतस्यन्य तु वचनेनो-च्यते १ इति ॥२५४३॥

D. C. Inclination of mind tending to dispassion constitutes pratyākhyāna. Does such a dispassionate tendency continue ever after death? Or, is it limited only upto the end of this life? If it is taken to persist even after death it is certain that the practice of pratyākhyāna will be defiled by the enjoyment of pleasures in the divine regions. But if such a dispussionate inclination is taken to exist only in this life, there will be no fear of self-contradiction (as in the first case), why not accept, then, that pratyākhyāna is limited upto the end of life? 248 (2543)

जइ अन्नहेव भावो चेयओ वयणमन्नहा माया। किं वाऽभिहिए दोसो भावाओ किं वओ गुइ्यं १॥२४९॥२५४४॥

249. Jai annahèva bhavo cèyaö vayanannahā māyā i Kim vā'bhihiè doso bhāvāö kim vaö guruyam. (2544)

[यद्यन्यथैव भावश्चेतयतो वचनमन्यथा माया । किं वाऽभिहिते दोषो भावात् किं वचो गुरुकम् ? ॥२४९॥२५४४॥

249. Yadyanyathaiva bhavaścetayato vacanamanyathā māyā i Kim vā'bhihite doso bhāvāt kim vaco gurukam ? (2544)]

Trans. 249. When the inclination of mind is different and the (actual) statement is different (that is nothing but) fraud. Or, what harm is there in making a statement? Is word (even taken as) greater than feeling? 2544.

टीका--२४९ हन्त ! यद्यन्यथेत्र यावज्जीवात्रधिकं एव चेतसि भावः प्रत्या-ख्यानपरिणामः, अन्यथेव च यावज्जीवावधिपरिणामरहितमेत्रवचनम्, तह्येतचे-तयतो जानतः केवलैव माया निश्चीयते नान्यत् फलं दृइयते, अन्यथा विचिन्त्या-न्यथा भाषणादिति । अथवा, प्रष्टच्योऽसि त्वम्-किं भावे तथास्थितेऽपि "याव-ज्जीवाए " इत्यभिहिते दोषः कश्चिद् वीक्ष्यते भवता, येन वचनेनापि नेदमभि-

भीयते १ । यदि वा, किं भावात् सकाञाद् "वउ त्ति "वचनं गुरुकं प्रधानं पश्यसि त्वं, येन भावेऽन्यथास्थितेऽपि वचनमन्यथाऽभिदधासि ? । एतचायु-क्तम्, आगमे मावस्यैव प्रामाण्येन, वचनस्य त्वप्रामाण्येनाभिधानादिति॥२५४४॥

D. C. Although you feel that the practice of pratyākhyāna is limited to this life, you do not actually say so. On the contrary, you try to assert something different when you say that pratyākhyāna is a-parimita or limitless. Why don't you say, without hesitation, that pratyākhyāna is sa-parimāņa or limited Is it because you believe that words are greater than Truth? The āgamas do not take vacana as authentic but bhāva or actual feeling. 249 (2544).

The agamas state-

अन्नत्थ निवडिए वंजणम्पि जो खलु मणोगओ भावो । तं खलु पचक्खाणं, न पमाणं वंजणं छलगा ॥२५०॥२५४५॥

250. Annattha nivadie vanjaņmmi jo khalu maņogaö bhāvo i Tam khalu paccakkhāņam, na pamāņam vañjaņam chalaņā. (2545)

[अन्यत्र निपतिते व्यञ्जनं यः खलु मनोगतो भावः । तत् खलु प्रत्याख्यानं, न प्रमाणं व्यञ्जनं छलना ॥२५०॥२५४५॥

250. Anyatra nipatite vyañjanam yah khalu manogato bhāvah | Tat khalu pratyākhyānam, na pramāram vyaňjanam chalanā. (2545)]

Trans. 250. When a statement is (made) with regard to something else (than the real feeling), that which is the real feeling of mind (should be taken as) real vow. Word is no standard on account of its being susceptible to deception. 2545

टीका-२५०-इह केनापि त्रिविधाहारादिप्रत्याख्यानं कर्त्तुमध्यवसितम् , अधिकतरसंयमकरणाक्षिप्तचेतसा पुनः '' चतुर्विधमाहारं प्रत्याख्यामि '' इत्यादि व्यञ्जनं ग्रन्दे उच्चरितः । एवं च मानसभावाननुवृत्त्या व्यजजने शब्देऽन्यत्र Vāda]

Nihnavavāda

निपतितेऽन्यनिषये सम्रचारिते यः खछ प्रत्याख्यानविषयानेकस्कृष्मविषक्षाति-क्रान्तः स्पष्टः प्रत्याख्यातुर्मनोगतो भावस्तदेव प्रत्याख्यानं प्रमाणं--स एव प्रत्याख्यातृविवक्षितप्रत्याख्यानविषयो मनोगतो भावः प्रमाणम्, न तु व्यझनं शब्द इत्यर्थः । कुतो न व्यझनं प्रमाणम् ? । यतश्छल्रना छ्लमात्रं तद् व्यझन-मतोऽपमाणम्, मावाननुरोधेन प्रवृत्तत्वात् । तदेवमागमेऽपि वचनस्याप्रामाण्येनो-क्तत्वाद् यदि यावज्जीवावधिको मनसो भावस्त्वयेष्यते तदा वचनेनापि ''याव-जीवम् '' इत्युचार्यताम्, किं मिथ्याग्रहेण ? इति ॥२५४५॥

D. C. Suppose somebody has decided in his mind to observe the vow of relinquishing three kinds of food and declares through mistake that "I relinquish 'four kinds of food.' In such a case, where the statement made is not consistent with the real object of mind, a wrong utterance of words should not be considered, but the real purpose formed in his mind should be given importance. Since such utterances are made without any fixed consideration of the real object of mind, they become (at times) deceitful. Therefore, the agamas do not take vacana or verbal statement as (really) authentic but the true feeling in mind. Leaving aside your false persistence of verbal statement, you should, therefore, accept the true principle of sa-parimāņa pratyakhyāna. 250 (2545).

Then,

इष पण्णविओ वि न सो जाहे सदहई पूसमित्तेण । अन्नगणत्थेरेहि य काउं तो संघसमवायं ॥२५१॥२५४६॥ आहूय देवयं बेइ जाणमाणो वि पच्चयनिमित्तं । वच जिणिंदं पुच्छसु गयाऽऽगया सा परिकहेइ ॥२५२॥२५४७॥ संघो सम्मावाई गुरूपुरोगो त्ति जिणवरो भणइ । इयरो सिच्छावाई सत्तमओ निह्नवोऽयं ति ॥२५३॥२५४८॥ एईसं सामत्थं कत्तो गंतुं जिणिंदमूलुम्मि । बेई कडपूयणाए संघेण तओ कओ बज्झो ॥२५४॥२५४९॥

251. Iya paṇṇaviö vi na so jāhè saddahaī Pusamitteṇa I Annagaṇatthèrèhi ya kāum to saṅghasamavāyam. (2546)

- 252. Ahuya dèvayam bèi jānamāņo vi paccayanimittam ı Vacca Jiņindam pucchasu gayā"gayā sā parikahei. (2547)
- 253. Sangho sammāvāi guropurogo tti Jiņavaro bhanai I Iyaro miechāvāi sattamaö nihnavo'yam ti. (2548).
- 254. Eīsam sāmattham katto gantum Jiņidamalammi I Beī Kadapūyaņāe, sangheņa tao kao bajjho. (2549).

[इति प्रज्ञापितोऽपि न स यावत् अद्धत्ते पुष्पमित्रेण । अन्यगणस्थविरैश्च कृत्वा ततः संघसमवायम् ॥२५१॥२५४६॥ आहूय देवतां बवीति जानन्नपि प्रत्ययनिमित्तम् । व्रज जिनेन्द्रं ष्टच्छ गताऽऽगता सा परिकथयति ॥२५२॥२५४७॥ संघः सम्यग्वादी गुरुपुरोग इति जिनवरो भणति । इतरो म्हषावादी सप्तमको निह्नवोऽयमिति ॥२५३॥२५४८॥ ईदृद्दां सामर्थ्यं कुतो गन्तुं जिनेन्द्रमू छे । व्रवीति कडपूतनायाः संघेन ततः कृतो बाह्यः ॥२५४॥२५४९॥

- 251. Iti prajňapito'pi na sa yāvat śraddhatte Puspamitreņa I Anyagaņasthaviraiśca kritvā tatah sanghasamavāyam. (2546)
- 252. Ahūya devatām bravīti jānannapi pratyayanimittam I Vraja Jinendram priceha gatā "gatā sā parikathayati. (2547)
- 253. Sanghan samyagvādī gurupuroga iti Jinavaro bhanati (Itaro mrisāvādī saptamako nihnavo'yamiti. (2548)
- 254. Idriśam sāmarthyam kuto gantum Jinèndramūlė (Bravīti Kadaputanāyāņ, sanghena tatah krito bāhyah. (2549)]

Trans. 251-252-253-254. Although persuaded in many such ways by Puspamitra and also by the old monks of other gacchas, when he did not put faith (in truth), then, having gathered, to-gether, the whole Sangha (of Jaina monks), they called a goddess, and in spite of their knowing the real cause of faith they told her to go to Mahāvidèha and inquire of the Tīrthankara as to who was right. She went (to the Tīr-

Nihnavavāda

thankara), came back, and declared that the gaccha led by the preceptor was right, the opponent was a liar, and she further said that, he was the Seventh Nihnava. "Whence could this wretched demon⁶ have this much capacity to go to the Tirthankara? Gostha Mahila replied. As a result of this, he was expelled from the gaccha. 2546-2547-2548-2549.

टीका-२५१-२५२-२५३-२५४ चतसृणामप्यासामश्वरार्थः सुगम एव भावार्थस्तु कथानकशेषादवसेयः तचेदम्-एवं युक्तिभिः प्रज्ञाप्यमानो यावदसौ न किमपि श्रद्त्ते, तावत् पुष्पमित्राचार्यैरन्यगच्छगतबहुश्रुतस्थविराणामन्तिके नीतः । ततस्तैरायुक्तोऽसौ यादृशं सरयः प्ररूपयन्ति, आर्यरक्षितस्ररिभिरपि तादशमेव प्ररूपितम्, न हीनाधिकम् । ततो गोष्ठामाहिलेनोक्तम् " किं यूवम्पयो जानीथ ? तीर्थकरैस्तादृशमेव प्ररूपितम् यादृशमहं अरूपयामि । ततः स्थविरैरुक्तम्-मिथ्या-भिनिविष्टो मा कार्षीस्तीर्थकराशातनाम्, न किमपि त्वं जानासि । ततः सर्ववि-प्रतिपन्ने तस्मिन् सर्वेरपि तैः संघसमवायः कृतः । सर्वेणापि च संघेन देवताहा-नार्थं कायोत्सर्गो विहितः । ततो अद्रिका काचित् देवता समागता । सा वदति संदिशत, किं करोमि ? । ततः संघः प्रस्तुतमर्थं जानन्नपि सर्वजनमत्ययनिमित्तं व्रवीति-महाविदेहे गत्वा तीर्थकरमापृच्छस्व,-किं दुर्बलिकापुष्पमित्रप्रमुखः यदु भणति तत् सत्यम्, उत यद् गोष्ठामाहिलो वद्ति ?। ततस्तया प्रोक्तम्-मम महाविदेहे गमनागमनं कुर्वत्याः मत्यूहमतिघातार्थमनुग्रहं कृत्वा कार्योत्सर्गं कुरुत, येनाहं गच्छामि। ततस्तथैव कृतं संघेन। गता च सा। पृष्ट्रा च भगवन्तं प्रत्या-गता कथयति यदुत-तीर्थकरः समादिशति-"दुर्बलिकापुष्पमित्रपुरस्सरः संधः सम्यग्वादी, गोष्ठामाहिलस्तु मिथ्यावादी, सप्तमश्चायं निह्नवः " इति । तदेतत श्रुत्वा गोष्ठामाहिलो ब्रवीति−नन्वऌपद्धिंकेयं वराकी, का नामैतस्याः कडपूतनाया-स्तीर्थकरान्तिके गमनशक्तिः ? इति । एवमपि यावदसौ न किञ्चिद् मन्यते तावत् संघेनोद्धाह्य बाह्यः कृतः । अनालोचितप्रतिकान्तश्च कालं गतः ॥२५४६॥

6. Kațaputanā is a kind of demon. It is believed that a Kṣatriya not performing his duties well, is born after his death as such a goblin. It is a kind of *preta* or inhabitant of lower regions.

Jinabhadra Gani's

D. C. When Gosthā Māhila did not put faith in the words of Ācārya Durbalikā Puspamitra, sthaviras of the gaccha tried to convince him of the Truth exposed by the preceptor. But Gosthā Māhila replied arrogantly "You ascetics, what do you know?" The Tirthankaras have preached the same principle that I hold." The sthaviras said "Do not degrade the Tirthankaras by such words. You do not know the Truth."

Ultimately, the sthaviras called an assembly of all the monks, who propitiated a goddess with the help of Kāyotsarga. The goddess came to them and asked them as to what she could do for them. The monks though knowing the truth requested her for convincing other people, to go to Mahāvidèha and ask the Tirthańkara there, as to who was right. The goddess returned with a message within a short time, and declared that the gaecha led by the preceptor Durbalikā Puspamitra was, right and Gošțhā Mahila who had turned out as the Seventh Nihnava was a liar.

On hearing the message, Gosthā-Māhila said" How could this wretch of a demon go to the Tīrthankara?

Then, when he refused to believe even in this, he was expelled from the gaccha. Finally, without returning to his original school, Gostha-Mahila wandered here and there, and died as a Nihnava without explating himself for his sinful acts.

End of the Discussion with the Seventh Nihnava.



Chapter IX

॥ अथ बोटिकनिह्नववक्तव्यता॥

Discussion with the Botika Nihnava.

After dealing with the stories of the Seven *nihnavas* who contradicted the current religious ideals of Jainism as mentioned in the foregoing pages, the author now proceeds to give the story of another type of nihnavas (viz Boțika) implied by the word (ca) in "Bahuraya pacsa avvatta, samuechā duga tiga abaddhiyā cèva"¹ etc.

छव्याससयाई नवुत्तराई तइआ सिद्धिं गयस्स वीरस्स। तो योडियाण दिही रहवीरपुरे समुप्पण्णा ॥१॥२५५०॥

1. Chhavvāsasayāim navuttarāim taiā Siddhim gayassa Vīrassa | To Bodiyāņa ditthī Rahavīrapure samuppaņņā. (2550)

[षड्वर्षदातानि नवोत्तराणि तदा सिद्धि गतस्य वीरस्य। ततो बोटिकानां दृष्टी रथवीरपुरे समुत्पन्ना ॥१॥२५५०॥

1. Sadvarşasatāni navottarāņi tadā Siddhim gatasya Vīrasya (Tato Boţikānām drisţī Rathavīrapure samutpannā. (2550)]

Trans. 1. Then was produced a doctrine of Boţikas^a in Rathavīrapura, six hundred and nine years after the Tīrthańkara (Śramaņa Bhagavān Mahāvira Swāmi) had attained *nirv*āņa. 2550.

- 1. Vide Chapter I. p. 9 (v. 2300).
- 2. Popularly known as Digambaras.

The story of the rise of Botika is given as follows :----

रहवीरपुरं नगरं दीवगमुज्जाणमज्जकण्हे य। सिवभूइस्सुवहिम्मि पुच्छा थेराण कहणा य ॥२॥२५५१॥ बोडियसिवभूईओ बोडियलिंगस्स होइ उप्पत्ती। कोडिन्न--कोटवीरा--परंपराफासमुप्पन्ना ॥३॥२५५२॥

- 2. Rahavīrapuram nagaram Dīvagamujjāņamajjakaņhe ya i Sivabheissuvahimmi pucchā therāņa kahaņā ya. (2551)
- 3. Bodiya Sivabhuīö Bodiyalingassa höi uppattī 1 Kodinna-Kottavīrā paramparāphāsamuppannā. (2552)

[रथवीरपुरं नगरं दीपकमुद्यानमार्यकृष्णश्च । द्रिावभूतेरुपधौ प्रच्छा स्थविराणां कथना च ॥२॥२५५१ं॥ बोटिकद्रिावभूतेर्बोटिकऌिङ्गस्य अवत्युत्पत्तिः । कौणिडन्य-कोटवीरात् परम्परास्पर्द्रामुत्पन्ना ॥३॥२५५३॥

- 2. Rathavīrapuram Nagaram Dīpakamudyānamārya Krisņaśca (Śivabhoterupadhau priechā sthavirāņām kathanā ca. (2551)
- 3. Boțikaśivabhūte-r-Botikalingasya bhavatyutpattin | Kauņdinya-Koțța-Vîrat paramparāsparśamutpannā. (2552)]

टीका- २-३ एतद्भावार्थः कथानकगम्यः, तचेदम्-रथवीरपुरं नाम नगरम्। तद्भद्दिश्व दीपकाभिधानमुद्यानम् । तत्र चार्यक्रष्णनामानः स्वरयः समागताः । तस्मिश्व नगरे सहस्तमछः शिवभूतिर्नामराजसेवकः समस्ति । स च राजप्रसादाद् विलासान् कुर्वन् नगरमध्ये पर्यटति । रात्रेश्व प्रहरद्वयेऽतिक्रान्ते गृहमागच्छति । तत एतदीयभार्या तन्मातरं भणति-निर्वेदिताऽहं त्वत्पुत्रेण, न खल्वेष रात्रौ वेलायां कदाचिदप्यागच्छति । तत उज्जागरकेण बुशुक्षया च बाध्यमाना प्रत्यहं तिष्ठामि । ततस्तया प्रोक्तम्-"वत्से ! यद्येवं, तद्दि त्वमद्य स्वपिहि, स्वयमेवाहं जागरिष्यामि '' । ततः इतं वध्वा तथैव, इतरयास्तु जाग्रत्या रात्रिप्रहरद्वयेऽति-क्रान्ते समागत्य शिवभूतिना प्रोक्तम्-"द्वारम्रद्व्घाटयत''। ततः मकुपितया मात्रा प्रोक्तम्-"दुर्नयविधे ! यत्रैतस्यां वेलायां द्वाराण्युद्धाटितानि भवन्ति तत्र गच्छ, न पुनरेवं तव प्रष्टलग्नः कोऽप्यत्र मरिष्यति "। ततः कोपाऽहङ्काराभ्यां प्रेर्यमाणो ऽसौ निर्गतः । पर्यटता चोद्घाटितद्वारः साध्र्पाश्रयो दृष्टः । तत्र च साधवः काल-ग्रहणं कुर्वन्ति । तेषां च पार्श्वे तेन वन्दित्वा व्रतं याचितम् । तैश्व " राजवछभः, मात्रादिभिरग्रुत्कलितश्व " इति न दत्तम् । ततः खेलमछकाद् दीक्षां गृद्दीत्वा स्वयमेव लोचः कृतः । साधुभिलिङ्गं समर्पितम् । विहृताश्व सर्वेऽप्यन्यत्र । काला-न्तरेण पुनरपि च तत्रागताः । ततो राज्ञा शिवभूतेर्बहुग्रुल्यं कम्बलरत्नं दत्तम् । तत आचार्यैः शिवभूतिब्कतः--किमनेन तव साधूनां मार्गादिष्वनेकानर्थहेतुना गृद्दीतेन ? ततस्तेन गुर्वप्रतिभासेनापि संगोप्य मूर्च्छया तद् विष्टतम् । गोचर-चर्याभिश्वागतः प्रत्यहं तदसौ संभालयति, न तु क्वचिदपि व्यापारयति । ततंः " गुरुभिर्मूच्छितोऽयमत्र " इति ज्ञात्वाऽन्यत्रदिने तमनाप्रच्छयैव बहिर्गतस्य परोक्षे तत् कम्बलरत्नं पाटयित्वा साधूनां पादप्रोञ्छनकानि कृतानि । ततो ज्ञात-व्यतिकरः कषायितोऽसौ तिष्टति । अन्यदा च स्ररयो जिनकल्पिकान् वर्णयन्ति, तद्यथा---

> जिणकप्पिया य दुविहा पाणिपाया पडिग्गहधरा य। पाउरणमपाउरणा इकिका ते भवे दुविहा ॥१॥ दुग तिग चउकं पणगं नव दस एकारसेत्र बारसगं । एए अट्ठ विगप्पा जिणकप्पे हेांति उवहिस्स ॥२॥

इह केषाश्चिज्जिनकल्पानां रजोहरणं, मुखवस्त्रिका चेति द्विविध उपधिः, अन्येषां तु कऌ्पेन सह त्रिविधः, कल्पद्वयेन तु सह चतुर्विधः, कऌ्पत्रयेण सह पश्चविधः । केषाश्चित्तु मुखवस्त्रिका, रजोहरणं च, तथा,

> पत्तं पत्ताबंधो पायट्ठवणं च पायकेसरिया। पटलाइं रयत्ताणं च गोच्छओ पायनि जोगो ॥१॥

इति सप्तविधः पात्रनियोंग इति, एवं च नवविधः । कल्पेन तु सह दशविधः कल्पद्रयेन सहैकादशविध, कल्पत्रयेण तु समं द्वादशविधउपधिः केषाश्चिज्जिन-कल्पिनामिति । तदेतत् श्रुत्वा शिवभूतिना प्रोक्तम्-"यद्येवम् , तहिं किमिदा-नीमौधिकऔपप्रहिकश्वैतावानुपधिः परिगृह्यते १ । स एव जिनकल्पः किं न क्रियते १ । ततो गुरुभिरुक्तम्-जम्बूस्वामिनि व्यवच्छिन्नोऽसौ, संहननाद्यभावात् , सांप्रतं न शक्यत एव कर्त्तुम् " । ततः शिवभूतिना प्रोक्तम्-" मयि जीवति स किं व्यवच्छिचते ?, नन्वहमेव तं करोमि, परलोकाथिना स एव निष्परित्रहों जिनकल्पः कर्तव्यः, किं पुनरनेन कषाय-भय-मूच्छोदिदोषविधिना परिप्रहा-नर्थेन ?। अत एव श्रुते निष्परिग्रहत्वमुक्तम् , अचेलकाश्च जिनेन्द्राः, अतोऽचेल-तैव सुन्दरेति "। ततो गुरुणा प्रोक्तम्-हन्त ? यद्येवम् , तर्हि देहेऽपि कषाय-भय-मूर्च्छादयो दोषाः कस्यापि संभवन्ति, इति सोऽपि व्रतग्रहणानन्तरमेव त्यक्तव्यः प्राम्नोति । यच श्रुते निष्परिग्रहत्वमुक्तं तदपि धर्मोपकरणेष्वपि मूर्च्छा न कर्तच्या, मूर्च्छाभाव एव निष्परिग्रहत्वमवसेयम् , न पुनः सर्वश्रा धर्मोपकरण-स्यापि त्यागः । जिनेन्द्रा अपि न सर्वथैवाचेलकाः " सब्बे वि एगद्सेण निग्गया जिण्वरा चउव्यीसं " इत्यादि वचनात् । तदेवं गुरुणा स्थविरैश्च यथोक्ताभिर्व-क्ष्यमाणाभिश्व युक्तिभिः प्रज्ञाप्यमानोऽपि तथाविधकषायमोहादिकर्मोदयाद् न स्वाप्रहाद् निवृतोऽसौ, किन्तु चीवराणि परित्यज्य निर्गतः । ततश्र बहिरुद्याने व्यवस्थितस्यास्योत्तरा नाम भगिनी वन्दनार्थं गता। सा च त्यक्तचीवरं तं आतरमालोक्य स्वयमपि चीवराणि त्यक्तवती । ततो भिक्षार्थं नगरमध्ये प्रविष्टां गणिकगा दृष्टा। तत इत्थं विवस्तां बीभत्सामिमां दृष्टा ''मा लोकोऽस्मासु विराङ्गीत् " इत्यनिच्छन्त्यपि तया वस्त्रं परिधापिताऽसौ । तत एष व्यतिकरोः ऽनया शिवभूतेनिवेदितः । ततोऽनेन " विवस्ता योषिद् नितरां बीभत्साऽति-लज्जनीया च भवति " इति विचिन्त्य प्रोक्ताऽसौ-" तिष्ठत्वित्थमपि, न त्यक्तव्यं त्वयैतद् वस्तम् । देवतया हि तवेदं प्रदत्तमिति । ततः शिवभूतिना कौण्डिन्य-कोट्टवीरनामानो द्वौ शिष्यौ दीक्षितौ।

गाथाक्षरार्थोऽपि किञ्चिदुच्यते-" कौण्डिन्येत्यादि कौण्डिन्य अ कोड्वीर-श्रेति " सर्वो द्वन्द्वो विभाषयैकवद् भवति " इति वचनात् कौण्डिन्य-कांड्वीरम् , तस्मात् कौण्डिन्य-कोड्वीरात् परम्परास्पर्शमाचार्य-शिष्यसंबन्धलक्षणमधि-कृत्योत्पन्ना संजाता। " बोटकदृष्टिः " इत्यघ्याहारः । इत्येव बोटिकाः सम्रुत्पन्नाः ॥२५५१॥२५५२॥

D. C. A detailed account of the rise of the Boțika type of Nihnavas is given below:---

Once upon a time an Acārya named Ārya Krisņasuri had come to the city of Rathavīrapura, and put up in the Dīpaka garden outside the city. In the city, there lived a Royal attendant named Sahasramalla Śivabhūti, who being the king's favourite, wandered in the city till late at night. His wife was very much annoyed by his irregular conduct. She once complained of his irregularities to her mother-in-law saying that she had to wait for her husband till late after midnight, without taking food and sleep. The mother-in-law asked her to go to sleep, and she herself waited till her son returned. After midnight, Sivabhoti returned and asked her to open the door. The mother being enraged at his behaviour, replied "O impudent boy! go wherever the doors are open for you at this hour. Nobody is going to die after you." Overwhelmed with anger and pride, he went away. In course of his wanderings, he found the doors of a Jaina Upāśraya open at such a late hour. The Jaina sādhus were studying their lessons at that time. He approached them and requested them to initiate him into asceticism. The ascetics refused to give him dīkṣā as he was a Royal attendant and the permission to do so was not sanctioned by his mother etc. Consequently, Śivabhūti accepted dīkšā by himself from an earthen spittoon lying there. The ascetics supplied him with the necessary apparel of an ascetic, and subsequently he entered the Jaina gaccha, as a Jaina Sādhu. Next day, all the sādhus proceeded on vihāra (going about from place to place).

In course of time, it so happened that they returned to the same place. The king received them with great respect, and gave Śivabhūti a kambalaratna (a costly woollen shawl). The preceptor asked Śivabhūti to renounce it, as it would create trouble in several ways. Still, however, Śivabhūti kept the shawl secretly with him without the consent of the preceptor. Being very much attached to the shawl, Sivabhati used to see it carefully every day after returning from his begging tour etc. But he never used the same for fear of being detected. The preceptor knew that Sivabhati was deeply attached to the woollen shawl, so, once he took the shawl in Sivabhati's absence, tore it into several small pieces and gave each piece of the shawl to every sädhu for the purpose of cleaning his feet. When Sivabhati came to know of this, his mind was greatly perturbed.

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Then, once in course of his lecture on Jinakalpikas⁸, the Acārya said:---

Jiņakappiyā ya duvihā pāņipāyā padiggahadharā ya I Pāuraņamapāuraņā ikkikā te bhave duvihā (1)

Duga tiga caukka paņagam nava dasa ekāraseva bārasangam l Ed attha vigappā jiņakappe honti uvahissa. (2)

[There are two types of Jinakalpikas (1) One of these having their hands (to be used) as a vessel, and (2) the other of those who actually possess vessels of alms. Each one of these is again of two types:-(1) Those (covering their bodies) with garments, and (2) Those (going) without garments. A *jinakalpika* has an upadhi (a combination of articles) of two, three, four, five, nine, ten, and twelve varieties, (serviceable in the performance of his religious duties)]

"There are some ascetics who have only two upadhis: viz. a *Rajoharana* (a wollen chowry and a *mukhavastrikā* (a piece of cloth folded to be kept before the mouth). With an addition

3. Jinakalpikas are a variety of Jaina Sādhus who were strictly undergoing the principles of religious practices followed by the Tirthankaras irrespective of bodily discomforts and hardships. Before adopting these rigid religious practices, a Jinakalpi sādhu is required to undergo the following five tests-viz. (1) With regard to knowledge, he must have a thorough knowledge of at least nine-pervas from the beginning to the end, and also to repeat them from the end to the beginning. (2) With regard to austerities, he must have the strength to observe fasting lasting from one to several days at a time, and upto six months duration at a time, without any resulting weakness. (3) With regard to mental courage, he must remain in Kāyotsarga in deserted depilitated buildings, public squares, burning places (for dead bodies) etc. and be undaunted by several difficult sufferings and hardships. (4) He should think that he is alone, none else is his companion, and (5) With regard to bodily strength, he must balance his entire body on his toe.

Nihnavavāda

of one, two, and three kalpas (articles) to the above-stated two upadhis or paraphernalias respectively.

Again, there are some who in addition to rajoharana and muhapatti possess seven kinds of pātras in this way:-

Pattam, pattābandho, payatthavaņam ca pāyakesariyā (Patalāim rayattāņam ca gocchaö pāya-nijjogo. (1)

[$P\bar{a}tram$ (alms bowls, utensils etc.); $p\bar{a}trabandham$ (a square piece of cloth for fastening the pātras together when not in use and which can also be utilized for carrying them as in a sling, on a begging tour) Vern: $\bar{m}\bar{c}\bar{c}\bar{s}$; $p\bar{a}trasthapanam$ (a square piece of woolen cloth abou 11×11 inches with pieces of cord attached at four corners for tying up the patras); *patrakesaritā* (a small woollen chowrie, Vern: $g\bar{g}\bar{s}\bar{v}\bar{s}\bar{t}$; *patrakesaritā* (a small woollen chowrie, Vern: $g\bar{g}\bar{s}\bar{v}\bar{s}\bar{t}$; *patrakesaritā* (a small woollen chowrie, Vern: $g\bar{g}\bar{s}\bar{v}\bar{s}\bar{t}$; *patrakesaritā* (blong pieces of fine cloth 52" × 24". Three such pieces are to be used for the summer, four for winter, and five for the rainy season Vern $q\bar{g}\bar{s}\bar{t}$; *rajastrānam* (a piece of cloth to be placed between each pātra); *guechakam* (a square piece of woollen cloth similar to pātrasthāpana, with a hole in the centre, but without cord useful for tying the pātras together) are useful for Pātras.]

This shows that there are nine kinds of *upadhi*. When one, two, and three types of *Kalpa* are respectively added to these nine varieties, there are ten, eleven and twelve *upadhis* in all, in case of several ascetics."

On hearing this, Śivabhati said "If that is so, how is it that aughika (for daily use) upadhi, and aupagrahika (for occasinal use) upadhi alone are apprehended? Why is not Jinakalpa itself attained."? The preceptor replied :—Jinakalpa has disappeared with Jamba Swāmī⁴. And it is not possible to attain the same in absence of sufficient strength "etc.

4. Who died in Vīra Samvat 64. The following ten precepts are said to have disappeared with Arya Jamba Swāmi-(1) Manaņparyava Jñāna, (2) Paramāvadhi Jñāna, (3) Pulāka Labdhi, (4) Āhāraka Śarīra labdhi, (5) Kṣapakaśreņi, (6) Upaśamaśreni, (7) Sivabhūti:—" How could that be when I am alive? I shall accomplish that. One who really desires to attain *Moksa* should observe the vow of Jinakalpa without any parigraha (possession) what-so-ever. What is the use of accepting objects that cause passions, fear, attachment etc? This is the reason why the Soriptures have preached ideal *nisparigraha* (complete renouncement). The Tirthańkaras have moved about without any garment or covering. It is, therefore, advisable to go without any covering what-so-ever.

Acārya :— In that case, one should also abandon his body immediately after he undertakes to observe the vow. Because, vices of passion, fear, and attachment etc. lie in the body as well. The principle of *nisparigraha* (complete renouncement) preached by the Scriptures, means to assert that one should not cherish attachment even in religious observances. Complete negation of attachment is itself nothing but a state of *nisparigahatā* or complete abandonment of property. It should also be borne in mind that entire abandonment of religious observances, does not necessarily mean *nisparigraha*. The Tirthankaras do not really happen to be completely naked. This is seen from the statements like "Savve vi egadasena niggayā Jiņavarā cauvisam" etc., which prove that all the twenty-four Tīrthankaras had come out with one divine garment.

Śivabhati was persuaded by the preceptor and several other old Sādhus in many such ways, but out of vanity and passion, he did not give up his false notion of giving up garments etc. He stayed in the garden without a single garment to cover his body. His sister, Uttarā, who came to pay her respects to her brother found him in the naked condition. She, too, therefore, gave up her clothes. Then, while going about in the city for

Jinakalpa, (8) The three kinds of samyama-(viz 1. Parihāra vişuddhi, 2. Sokşmasamparāya and 3. Yathākhyata cāritram) 9. Kèvala Jfāna and 10. Siddhi pada. Vide Śrī Tapägacoha Pattāvali p. 9.22. also Vide verse 2598. alms in that condition, a whore saw her. Thinking that she would affect her profession, the whore gave her a cloth to cover her body, in spite of her reluctance. Eventually she narrated the whole incident before her brother. Sivabhati thought at last, that a woman would look obscene and disgustful if she did not wear a cloth, and asked her not to give up clothing.

Then, after some days, Sivabhati initiated two of his pupils viz. Kaundinya and Kottavīra who prolonged the sect by tradition.

The whole account is discussed in details as follows:--

उवहिविमागं सोउं सिवभूई अज्ञकण्हगुरुमुले । जिणकप्पियाइयाणं भणइ गुरुं कीस नेयाणि ? ॥ शा २५५३॥ जिणकप्पोञ्जुचरिज्रइ नोच्छिको ति भणिए गुणो भणइ । तवसत्तस्तोच्छिज्जड ग्रुच्छिज्जइ कि समत्थस्स ? ॥ ५॥ २५५४॥ पुच्छस्स पुञ्चमणागुच्छछिण्णकंबलकसायकछुसिओ चेव । को चेइ परिग्गइओ कसाय-मुच्छा-भयाईया ॥ ६॥ २५५५॥ दोला जओ खुबहुया खुए य भणियमपरिग्गइत्तं ति । जमचेला य जिणिंदा तदभिहिओ जं च जिणकप्पो ॥ ७॥ २५५६॥ जं च जियाचेल्परिसहो मुणी जं च तीहिं ठाणेहिं । जस्बं घरिक्र नेगंनओ तओज्वेल्या सेया ॥ ८॥ २५५७॥

- 4. Uvahivibhāgam söum Sivabhūī AjjaKaņhagurumale i Jiņakappiyāiyāņam bhaņai gurum kīsa neyāņim? (2553)
- 5. Jiņakappo'ņucarijjai nocehinno tti bhaņie puņo bhaņai (Tadasattassocehijjau vucchijjai kim samatthassa? (2554)
- 6. Pucchassa puvvamaņāpucchachiņņakambalakasāyakalusiö
 cèva]
 So bèi pariggahaö kasāya-mucchā-bhayāīyā. (2555)
- 7. Dosa jaö subahuyā sud ya bhaņiyamapariggahattam tti i Jamacelā ya Jiņindā tadabhihiö jam ca Jiņakappo. (2556

Vide]

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Jinabhadra Gani's

8. Jam ca jiyācelaparisaho muņī jam ca tīhim thāņehim (Vattham dharijja negantaö taö'celaýā seyā. (2557)

[उपधिविभागं श्रुत्वा शिवभूतिरार्यकृष्णगुरुमूले। जिनकल्पिकादिकानां भणति गुरुं कस्माद् नेदानीम् ? ॥४॥२५५३॥ जिनकल्पोऽनुचर्यते नोछिन्न इति भणिते पुनर्भणति । तदशक्तस्पोच्छिचता व्युच्छिचते कथं समर्थस्य ? ॥५॥२५५४॥ प्रष्टस्य पूर्वमनाष्टप्रच्छिन्नकम्बलकषायकऌुषित एव । स व्रवीति परिग्रहतः कषाय-मूर्च्छा-भयादिकाः ॥६॥२५५५॥ दोषा यतः सुबहुकाः श्रुते च भणितमपरिग्रहत्वमिति । यदचेल्लाश्च जिनेन्द्रास्तदभिहितो यच जिनकल्पः ॥आ२५५६॥ यच्च जिताचेल्परिषहो मुनिर्यंच त्रिभिः स्थानेः । बस्तं धारयेद् नैकान्ततस्ततोऽचेल्ता श्रेयसी ॥८॥२५५६॥

- 4. Upadhivibhāgam śrutvā ŚivabhātirāryaKrisņagurumāle i Jinakalpikādikānām bhaņati gurum kasmād nedānīm ? (2543)
- 5. Jinakalpo'nucaryate nocchinna iti bhanite puna-r-bhanati i Tadaśaktasyocchidyatām vyucchidyate katham samarthasya? (2554)
- 6. Pristasya purvamanāpristacchina kambala kasāya kalusita eva Sa bravīti parigrahatah kasāya-mūrcchā-bhayādikāh. (2555)
- 7. Doşā yatah subahukāh śrute ca bhanitamaparigrahatvamiti (Yadacelaśca Jinendrastadabhihito yacca Jinakalpah. (2556)
- 8. Yacca jitācelapariṣaho muni-r-yacca tribhih sthānaih I Vastram dhārayed naikāntatastato'celatā śrèyasī. (2557)

Trans. 4-5-6-7-8. Having heard from the preceptor the section on upadhis (possession of necessary articles) of Jina kalpika etc. he (i. e. Śivabhati) puts the question before the preceptor "Why is Jinakalpa (rites of a Tīrthaṅkara) not accomplished now? "It has died away" (was the reply). He said again :- Let it be dead to weak persons; why is it

dead to a capable person?" He (i. e. Śivabhūti), who was previously asked by the preceptor (to renounce the woollen shawl) and whose mind was perturbed with passion as his (costly) shawl was cut (into pieces) without his consent, says that "many faults such as passion, fear, attachment etc. (arise) from parigraha (possession of property). That is why even in Scriptures, the doctrine of a-parigrahatva (renunciation of all worldly objects) has been preached, the Tirthankaras (have moved about) without clothes, and they themselves have preached the Jinakalpa. Thus, one who has overcome the distress of naked condition, is (called), an ascetic, and since he would put on a garment at three places (i. e. on account of three reasons viz. out of shame, out of censure, and out of distress) but not in solitude, it is, therefore, better to remain in the state of being without garments. (2553 - 2557)

टीका-४-५-६-७-८ सर्वा अप्युक्तार्था एव, नवरं "जं च जिणाचेले-त्यादि" यस्माच "जिताचेल्परिषहो ग्रुनिः" इत्यागमेऽभिहितम् । जिताचेल-परिषहत्वं च किल त्यक्तवस्नस्यैव भवतीत्यभिप्रायः । यस्माच त्रिभिरेव स्थानैर्व-स्नधरणमनुज्ञातमागमे नैकान्ततः, तथा चागमवचनम्-" तिहिं ठाणेहिं वत्थं धरिज्जा हीरिवत्तियं, दुगंच्छावत्तियं, परीसहवत्तियं" । तत्र हीर्लजा संयमो वा प्रत्ययो निमित्तं यस्य धारणस्य तत् तथा, जुगुप्सा लोकविहिता निन्दा सा प्रत्ययो वस्य तत्तथा, एव परीषहाः शीतो ष्णदंशमञ्चकादयः प्रत्ययो यत्र तत्त्रथा । उपसंहरन्नाह-तस्मादुक्तयुक्तिभ्योऽचेलतैव श्रेयस्करीति पूर्वपक्षः ॥२५५३॥ २५५४॥२५५५॥२५५६॥२५५७॥

D. C. An ascetic could be called "jitācela pariṣaņ" only if he has abandoned clothes. As regards wearing clothes on account of three reasons, the āgamas say that—

"Tihim ţhaņehim vattham dharijjā hīrivattiyam, dugamchāvattiyam, parīṣahavattiyam.

[One should put on garment at three places: where shame, censure and torture (are counted).

The \bar{a} gamas, thus, allow the wearing of clothes on three grounds:—(1) If an ascetic requires (it) for maintaining restraint, or out of shame. (2) if he needs it for saving himself from public censure, and (3) If he wants to protect himself from physical pain arising from exposure to heat, cold, or mosquitoes etc. Sivabhati says that he does not require clothes for any of the three purposes mentioned here. Hence, he preferred absolute nakedness, to wearing even one garment. (2553-2557)

Then,

गुरुणाऽभिहिओ जह जं कसायहेऊ परिग्गहो सो ते। तो सो देहो चिय ते कसायउप्पत्तिहेउ त्ति ॥९॥२५५८॥

9. Guruņā'bhihiö jai jam kasāyahèū pariggaho so tè i To so dèho cciya tè kasāyauppattiheu tti. (2558)

[गुरुणाऽभिहितो यदि यत् कषायहेतुः परिग्रहः स ते। ततः स देह एव ते कषायोत्पत्तिहेतुरिति ॥९॥२५५८॥

9. Guruņā'bhihito yadi yat kaṣāyahètuh parigrahah sa te i Tatah sa dèha èva tè kaṣāyotpattihèturiti. (2558)]

Trans. 9. He was told by the preceptor that "If the cause of passion were (said to be) parigraha according to you, then your body itself would become the same, as that too happened to give rise to passions." 2558.

टीका-९ गुरुणाऽऽर्यक्रुष्णेनाभिहितः शिवभूतिः--यदि हन्त ! यद् यत् कषायहेतुः, तत् तत् ते तव परिग्रहः, स च ग्रुमुक्षुणा परिहर्तव्य एवोत्येकान्तः । "तो सो इत्यादि" ततस्तर्हि स्वकीयो देह एव ते तव खसात्मनोऽपि कषायो-त्पत्तिहेतुरिति परिग्रहः परिहरणीयश्व प्रामोति । अतोऽपरिग्रहत्वस्य परिग्रहाणां चोत्सका कथेति ॥२५५८॥

D. C.

Acārya:--If O Śivabhati! everything that happens to be the cause of passion is *parigraha* according to you, then, one who desires *Moksa* should renounce the body also, as the body gives rise to passions, and thus becomes *parigraha*. (2558) Vada]

Or, why say about body alone-

अस्थि व कि किंचि जए जस्स व तस्स व कसायबीयं जं। बत्युं ज होज एवं घम्मो वि तुमे न घेतव्वो ॥१०॥२५५९॥ जेण कसायनिमित्तं जिणो वि गोसाल-संगमाईणं। धम्मो घम्मपरा वि य पडिणीयाणं जिणमयं च ॥११॥२५६०॥

10. Atthi va kim kiñci jad jassa va tassa va kasayabiyam jam | Vatthum na hojja evam dhammo vi tume na ghétavvo. (2559)

11. Jeņa kasāyanimittam Jiņo vi Gosāla-Sangamāīņam ! Dhammo dhammaparā vi ya padiņīyāņam Jiņamayam ca. (2560)

[अस्ति वा किं कित्रिज्ञगति यस्य वा तस्य या कवाववीजं यत्। वस्तु न भवेदेवं अर्भोऽपि त्वया न ग्रहीतव्यः ॥१०॥२५५९॥

येन कषायनिमित्तं जिनोऽपि गोशाल-संगमादीनाम् । धर्मो धर्मपरा अपि च प्रत्यनीकानां जिनमतं च ॥११॥२५६०॥

- 10. Asti vā kim kiñcijjagati yasya vā tasya va kaṣāyabījam yat i Vastu na bhavedevam dharmo'pi tvayā na grahītavyah. (2559)
- Yena kaṣāyanimittam Jino'pi Gośāla-Sangamādīnām | Dharmo dharmaparā api ca pratyanīkānām Jinamatam ca. (2560)]

Trans. 10-11. Is there any object in (this) world that would not become the object of passion to one person or the other? In that way, even religion should not be acceptable to you. Even a Jina becomes the cause of kasāya to Qosala and Sangama etc. Thus, religion, devotees of religion, and even doctrines (preached) by Tīrthankaras (would become) the cause of evil motives to their opponents. (2559-2560)

टीका-१०-११ किं हि नामैतावति जगति तद् वस्तु, वद् यस्य वा तस्य वा कषायाणां चीजं कारणं न भवेत् ?। एतं च सति अन्त-वारित्र मेवभिको धर्मोऽपि त्वया न प्रदीतव्यः, तस्यापि कस्यचित् कषायहेतुत्वात् । कुतः ? इत्याद-'जेणेत्यादि ' येन यस्मादास्तां तत्भणीतो धर्मः, किन्तु स त्रिभ्रवनबन्धु-निष्कारणवत्सरुः सर्वसच्वानां जिनोऽपि भगवांस्तीर्थकरोऽपि क्लिष्टकर्मणां गोश्वालक-संगमकादीनां कषायनिमित्तं संजातः । एवं धर्मस्तत्प्रणीतः, तदुक्त-धर्मपरा अपि तदेकनिष्ठाः साधवः, जिनमतं च द्वादशाङ्गीरूपम्, सर्वमप्येतद् गुरुकर्मणां दुःखैकरूपदीर्घभवश्रमणभाजां प्रत्यनीकानां जिनशासनप्रतिकुल-वर्तिनां कषायनिमित्तमेव, इत्येतदप्यग्राह्यं प्राप्नोति, न चैतदस्ति । तस्मात् "यत् कषायहेतुस्तत् परिहर्तव्यम्" इत्यनेकान्त एवेति ॥२५५९॥२५६०॥

D. C.

Acārya:—Is there any object in this world that would not happen to be a root of sin or stupidity to one person or the other? From that view-point, even religion will not be acceptable to you. Because, that would act as the cause of evil motive to somebody or the other. Even the Tīrthaṅkara bimself happens to be the cause of kaṣāya to Gośālaka and Saṅgamaka etc. Thus, religion, its followers, and the doctrine of the Jinas along with twelve Aṅgas, would become the cause of kaṣāya to those who oppose the Tīrthaṅkara and His doctrine.

According to you, all this would be *parigraha* and hence should be renounced. But that does not actually happen. And, the principle that everything that gives rise to kasāya should be renounced, is not valid. 10-11 (2559-2560)

Now, the Acarya tries to remove the doubt in the opponent's mind, and assert his own principles as follows:—

अह ते न मोक्खसाहणमईए गंथो कसायहेऊ वि । वत्थाइ मोक्खसाहणमईए सुद्धं कहं गंथो ? ॥१२॥२५६१॥

12. Aha tè na Mokkhasāhaņamaīè gantho kasāyaheu vi | Vatthāi Mokkhasāhaņamaīè suddham kaham gantho? (2561)

[अथ ते न मोक्षसाघनमत्या ग्रन्थः कषायहेतवोऽपि । बस्नादिमोक्षसाघनमत्या द्युद्धं कथं ग्रन्थः ? ॥१२॥२५६१॥

Nihnavavada

Vāda j

12. Atha tè na Mokṣasādhanamatyā granthaḥ kaṣāyahètavo'pi (VastrādiMokṣasādhanamatyā śuddham katham grantha ?

(2561)

Trans. 12. If they are not proved to be *parigraha* in spite of their being the cause of passion by virtue of their being the accessory means of (attaining) Moksa, how could pure clothes etc also be taken as *parigraha* from the point of view of their being recognized as the implements for (the attainment of) Moksa? 2561.

टीका-१२ अथ मन्येथाः-ते देहादयो जिनमतान्ताः पदार्थाः कषायहेत-वोऽपि सन्तो न ग्रन्थो न परिग्रहः, मोक्षसाधनमत्या गृद्यमाणत्वादिति । इन्त ! यद्येवम् , तहिं वस्त्र-पात्रादिकमप्युपकरणं शुद्धमेषणीयं मोक्षसाधनबुद्ध्या गृद्य-माणं कथं ग्रन्थः १-न कथश्चिदित्यर्थः, न्यायस्य समानत्वादिति ॥२५६१॥

D. C. When we have not accepted deha etc. as parigraha in spite of their being the cause of kaṣāya on the ground that they happen to be the necessary implements for attaining Mokṣa, we should also accept clean clothes etc., as the implements required for the attainment of Mokṣa, and hence they should not be renounced by taking them as parigraha. 12. (2561)

In reply to the argument that clothes etc. should be abandoned on account of their being the object of murcchā or attachment, the Acārya says—

मुच्छाहेऊ गंधो जइ तो देहाइओ कहमगंथो । मुच्छावओ, कहं वा गंथो वत्थादसंगस्स ? ॥१३॥२५६२॥ अह देहा-ऽऽहारादद्यु न मोक्खसाहणमईए ते मुच्छा । का मोक्खसाहणेसुं मुच्छा वत्थाइएसुं तो ? ॥१४॥२५६३॥ अह कुणसि शुळ्ठवत्थाइएसु मुच्छं धुवं सरीरे वि । अक्षेज्जदुळ्लभयरे काहिसि मुच्छं विसेसेणं ॥१५॥२५६४॥ वत्थाइगंथरहिया देहा-ऽऽहाराइमित्तसुच्छाए । तिरिय-सबरादओ नणु हवंति निरओवगा बहुसो ॥१६॥२५६५॥

अपरिग्यहा वि परसंतिएसु मुच्छा-कसाग-दोसेहिं। अविणिग्गहियप्पाणो कम्ममलमणंतमज्जंति ॥१७॥२५६६॥

देहत्थवत्थ-मल्ला-ऽणुलेवणा-ऽऽभरणघारिणो केइ । उवसग्गाइसु मुणओ निस्संगा केवलमुर्विति ॥१८॥२५६७॥

- 13. Mucchāheu gantho jai to dehāiö kahamagantho Mucchāvaö, kaham vā gantho vatthādasangassa? (2562)
- 14. Aha-dehā"hārāisu na Mokkhasāhaņamaie te mucchā i Kā Mokkhasāhaņesum mucchā vatthāiesum to? (2563)
- 15. Abs kunasi thullavatthäidsu muccham dhuvam sarīre vil Akkejjadullabhayare kāhisi muccham visdsdņam. (2564)
- 16. Vatthäigantharahiyä dèhā-"hārāimittamucchāè I Tiriya-sabarādaö nanu havanti niraovagā bahuso. (2565)
- 17. A-pariggahā vi parasantiesu mucchā-kasāya-dosehim (Aviņiggahiyappāņo kammamalamaņatamajjanti. (2566)
- 18. Dehatthavattha-Mallā-'ņulevaņā-"bharaņadhāriņo kei (Uvasaggaisu muņaö nissangā Kevalamuvinti. (2567)

[मूच्छाइेलुर्ग्रन्थो यदि ततो देहादिकः कथमग्रन्थः । मूच्छांबतः, कथं वा ग्रन्थो वस्त्राचसङ्गस्य ? ॥१३॥२५६२॥ अथ देहा--ऽहारादिषु न मोक्षसाधनमत्या ते मूच्छा । का मोक्षसाधनेषु मूच्छा वखासिकेषु ततः ? ॥१४॥२५६३॥ अथ करोषि स्थूलवस्त्रादिकेषु मूर्च्छा भ्रुवं दारीरेऽपि । अत्रेयदुर्रूभतरे करिष्यसि मूर्च्छा विद्योषेण ॥१५॥२५६४॥ वस्त्रादिग्रन्थरहिता देहा--ऽहारादिमान्रमूर्च्छया । तिर्यक्--दावरादयो ननु भवन्ति निरयोपगा बहुदाः ॥१६॥२५६५॥ अपरिग्रहा अपि परसत्केषु मूर्च्छा-कषाय-दोषः ।

अपरिग्रहा अपि परसत्कषु मूच्छा-कषाय-वाषः। अविविग्रहीतात्मनः कर्ममलमनन्तमर्जयन्ति ॥१७॥२५६६॥

देहस्थवस्त-माल्या-नुल्लेपना-ऽऽभरणधारिणः केचित् । उफ्सर्गादिषु मुनयो निःसङ्गाः केवलमुपयन्ति ॥१८॥२५६७॥

- 13. Mūrcchā hetu-r-grantho yadi tato dèhādikaḥ kathamagranthah Mūrccāvataḥ, katham vā grantho vastrādyasaṅgasya ? (2562)
- 14. Atha dèhā"hārādişu na Mokṣasādhanamatyā tè morechā i Kā Mokṣasādhanèsu morechā vastridikèsu tatah? (2563)
- 15. Atha karoşi sthulavastrādikēşu murcehām dhruvam sarīrē pi Akrēya durlabhatarē karişyasi murcehām visesēna. (2564)
- 16. Vastrādigrantharahitā dehā"hārādimātra murchayā i Tiryak-sabarādayo nanu bhavanti nirayopagā bahusah. (2565)
- 17. A-parigrahā api parasatkeşu murcchākasāya dosaiņ (Avinigrihītātmāņaņ karmamalamanantamarjayanti. (2566)
- 18. Dèhasthavastra-mālyā-'nulepanā-"bharaņadhariņah kècit i Upasargādišu munayo niķsangāh Kèvalampayanti. (2567)]

Trans. 13-14-15-16-17-18. If the cause of attachment is parigraha, then, how could body etc. not become parigraha to one who has already got attachment, and how could clothes etc. become parigraha to a lonely ascetic? If you do not bear attachment towards body, food etc., on the ground that they are necessery (instruments) for the attainment of Moksa, then, what attachment is there on garments etc., that are equally necessary for the attainment of Moksa? And, if you attach desire to external objects like garments etc, you will be doing so all the more to body, which is more precious (than clothes etc.). The tiryancas (i. e. beasts, birds etc.) and savage people though without parigraha of clothes etc, very often go to hell only out of their attachment for body and food etc.. (There are some, who though a-parigralii (or not possessing anything whatso-ever) by then selves, earn a lot of (bondages of) Karman, because of their vices such as desire, passion, etc., while other ascetics with their bodies decorated with garments, garlands, besmearings, and ornaJinabhadra Gani's

ments etc. on the occasion of *upasarga* etc, attain the Absolute State of Existence unaccompanied (by anyone). (2562-2567).

टीका-१३-१४-१५-१६-१७-१८ एताः सुगमा एव, नवरं यदि यो मूच्छोहेतुः स ग्रन्थः परिग्रहः, परिग्रहत्वादेव च त्याज्यः, ततस्तर्हि ''म्रुच्छावउ त्ति " मूच्छोवतो वक्ष्यमाणयुत्तया मूच्छोयुक्तस्य देहा--ऽऽहारादिकस्तव हन्त ? कथमग्रन्थः १ अपि तु ग्रन्थ एव, ततः सोऽपि परित्याज्यः प्रामोति । कथं वा मभत्त्वमूच्छोरहितत्वेनासङ्गस्य सङ्गविप्रमुक्तस्य साधोर्वस्त्रादिकं ग्रन्थो गीयते भवता १-न भवत्येव तथाभूतस्य तद् प्रन्थ इति । अथ देहा-ऽऽहारादिषु ते तव मुच्छी नास्ति, मोक्षसाधनमत्या तेषां प्रहणात्, तर्हि मोक्षसाधनत्वेन तुल्ये-ष्वपि वस्त्रादिषु तव हन्त ! का मूच्छों ? इति । अंथ स्थूलेषु बाह्यत्वात् , क्षणमा-त्रेणैवाम्नि-तस्कराद्यपद्रवगम्यन्वात् , कुलभत्वात् , कांतेभयदिनान्ते खयमेव विनाशधर्मकत्वात् शरीराद् नितरां निःसारेषु वस्तादिषु मूच्छों करोषि त्वम्, तहिं धुवं निश्चितं शरीरेऽपि विशेषतो मूच्छों करिष्यसि । कुतो विशेषेण तत्र तत्करणमित्याह-''अकेज्ज दुछभयरे त्ति"ंविभक्तिव्यत्ययात् शरीरस्याक्रय्यत्वात् क्रयेणालम्यत्वात् । न हि वस्तादिवत् शरीरक्रयेण क्वापि लम्यते । अत एव वस्ताद्यपेक्षया दुर्लभतरत्वात् , तथा, तदपेक्षयैवान्तरङ्गत्वात् , बहुतरदिनावस्यायि-त्वात् , विशिष्टतरकार्यसाधकत्वाच विशेषेण शरीरे मूच्छौं करिष्यसीति । अथ देहादिमात्रे या मूच्छा सा खल्पैव, वस्तादिग्रन्थमूच्छा तु बह्वी, ततो देहादिमात्र-मूच्छीसंभवेऽपि नग्नश्रमणकाः सेत्स्यन्ति, न भवन्तः, बहुपरिग्रहत्वादित्याह-" वत्थाइ " इत्यादि गाथात्रयम् । अयमिह संक्षेपार्थः-तिर्येक्-श्वदरादयोऽल्प-परिग्रहा अपि, तथा शेषमनुष्या अपि महादारिष्योपहताः क्तिष्टमनसोऽविद्यमान-तथाविधपरिग्रहा अप्यनिविगृहीतात्मानो लोभादिकषायवर्गवश्चीकृताः परसत्केष्वपि विभवेषु मुच्छांकषायादिदोषैः कर्ममलमनन्तमर्जयन्ति, तद् बहूशो निरयोपगा भवन्ति, न मोक्षप्रापकाः । अन्ये तु महाम्रुनयः केनचिदुपसर्मादिबुद्धया श्वरीरा-सञ्जितमहामुल्यवस्त्रा-ऽऽमरण-माल्य-विलेपनादिसंयुक्ता अपि सर्वसङ्गविनि-र्मका निगृहीतात्मानो जितलोभादिकषायरिपवः समासादितविमलकेवलालोकाः सिद्धिग्रुपगच्छन्ति । तस्मादवद्रयात्मनां क्रिष्टमनसां नाग्न्यमात्रमिदमकिश्चित्कर-मेनेति ॥२५६२॥२५६३॥२५६४॥२५६५॥२५६६॥२५६७॥

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D. C. When you believe that whatever happens to be the cause of marcchā is parigraha, and hence should be renounced, how is it that body and food etc. of one attacked by delusion is considered as *a-parigraha* according to you? For, if they happen to be parigraha they should be abandoned. But garments etc. of an ascetic, absolutely alone by himself, are not as causes of parigraha to him. If you say that there is no attachment for body etc. as they happen to be the necessary instruments for attaining Moksa, then clothes etc. should also be taken as instruments for attaining Moksa. There is no reason to take them as objects of marcchā. When you attach delusion into clothes etc. that are far less important and that are easily susceptible to the attacks of fire, thief etc, and that are destructible in a short time, there is certainly all the more reason to attach delusion into body etc., that are more precious and more lasting than clothes etc.

• Secondly, if you say that delusion with regard to body etc. is very slight, and that with regards to clothes etc., is great, and therefore naked ascetics will attain Moksa in spite of their attachment into body etc., while those like us having clothes etc. will not attain Moksa, then, you should note that the tiryancas (beasts and birds) and the savage tribes of Bhils etc., who do not put on clothes etc. but who are attached only to body, and food etc., frequently attain hell. Persons suffering from poverty have to undergo ceaseless chain of Karman, on account of their souls being unrestrained due to their vices in the past life.

On the other hand, great ascetics etc, attain Moksa of Absolute Perception in spite of their being adorned by costly ornaments on the occasion of *upasarga* (a natural phenomenon supposed to forbode future evil). It should, therefore, be borne in mind, that mere renunciation of clothes does not help if the soul is impure. 13-18. (2562-2567)

Then, in reply to the assertion that the wearing of clothes etc., should be given up as that, sometimes, causes fear etc., the Acarya states---

जइ भयहेऊ गंथो तो नाणाईण ततुवघाईहिं। भयमिह ताइं गंथो, देहस्स य सावयाईहिं ॥१९॥२५६८॥ अह मोक्खसाहणमईए न भयहेऊ वि ताणि ते गथो। बत्थाइ मोक्खसाहणमईए सुद्धं कहं गंथो ? ॥२०॥२५६९॥

- 19. Jai bhayahee gantho to nāņāīņa taduvaghāihim i Bhayamiha tāim gantho, dehassa ya sāvayāīhim. (2568)
- 20. Aha Mokkhasāhaņamaīèna bhaya hèo`vi tāņi tè gantho i VatthāiMokkhasāhaņa maīè suddham kaham gantho ? (2569)

[यदि भयहेतुर्ग्रन्थस्ततो ज्ञानादीनां तदुपघातिभ्यः । भयमिति तानि ग्रन्थो देहस्य च श्वापदादिभ्यः ॥१९॥२५६८॥ अथ मोक्षसाधनमत्या न भयहेतवोऽपि तानि ते ग्रन्थः । बस्त्रादिमोक्षसाधनमत्या ज्ञुद्धं कथं ग्रन्थः ? ॥२०॥२५६९॥

- 19. Yadi bhayahetu-r-granthastato jñānādīnām tadupaghātibhyah (Bhayamiti tāni grantho dehasya ca śvapadādibhyah. (2568)
- 20. Atha Mokṣasādhanamatyā na bhayahètavo'pi tāni tè granthaḥ VastrādiMokṣasādhanamatyā śuddham katham granthah.

(2569)]

Trans 19-20. If that which causes fear is (known as) parigraha, then, knowledge etc., being susceptible to fear from the opponents, and the body (being susceptible to fear) from wild beasts etc., should be known as parigraha. And, if they are not object of parigraha in spite of their being causes of fear, because they act as the instruments for attaining Moksa, how could clothes etc., also be (recognized as) objects of parigraha inspite of their being instruments for attaining Moksa? (2568-2569)

टीका-१९-२० यदि यद् भयहेतुस्तद् ग्रन्थः, तर्हि ज्ञान-दर्शन-चारित्रा नामपि चदुपभातकेभ्यः, देहस्य च श्वापदादिभ्यो भयमस्ति, इति तान्यपि ग्रन्थ प्राप्तुवन्ति । रोषं व्याख्यातप्रायम् ॥२५६८॥२५६९॥

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D. C. If you believe that whatever becomes the cause of fear is *parigraha*, then, those having Knowledge, Perception and Character etc., would be susceptible to fear from their respective opponents, and body is susceptible to fear from beasts of prey. So, they should, also, be taken as objects of *parigraha*. (The remaining portion is clear) 19-20. (2568-2569)

In reply to the assertion that clothes etc., are the causes of inauspicious or fierce meditation, and hence, they should be abandoned, the Acārya says—

सारक्षणाणुबंधो रोइज्झाणं ति ते मई हुजा। तुछमियं देहाइसु पसत्थमिह तं तहेहावि ॥२१॥२५७०॥ जे जत्तिया पगारा लोए भयहेअवों अविरयाणं। ते चेव य विरयाणं पसत्थभावाण मोक्खाय ॥२२॥२५७१॥

- 21. Sārakkhaņāņubandho roddajjhāņam ti tè maī hujjā i Tullamiyam dèhāisu pasatthamiha tam tahèhāvi. (2570)
- 22. Je jattiyā pagārā löe bhayaheavo a-virayāņam | Te ceva ya virayāņam pasatthabhāvāņa Mokkhāya. (2571)

[संरक्षणानुबन्धो रौद्रध्यानमिति ते मतिर्भवेत् । तुल्यमिदं देहादिषु प्रदास्तमिह तत् तथेहापि ॥२१॥२५७०॥

ये यावन्तः प्रकारा लोके भयहेतवोऽविरतानाम् । त एव च विरतानां प्रशास्तभावानां मोक्षाय ॥२२॥२५७१॥

- 21. Samrakşanānubandho raudradhyānamiti tē mati-r-bhavēt (Tulyamidam dēhādisu prasastamiha tat tathēhāpi. (2570)
- 22. Yè yāvantāh prakārā lokè bhayahètavo'viratānām | Ta èva ca viratānām praśastabhāvānām Mokṣāya. (2571)]

Trans. 21–22. (Utility of clothes etc.) in connection with preservation (of body etc.) may be considered as (inspired by) evil motive according to you. But this is common in body etc. also, (and hence) it is desirable there, in the same

way, as it is here. (For), the various types of deeds that are causes of fear to unrestrained persons, are (helpful) for the (attainment of) Moksa to real ascetics having lofty ideals. (2570-2571).

टीका-२१-२२ व्याख्या-इहागमे रौद्रध्यानं चतुर्विधमुक्तम-तद्यथा-"से किं तं रोइज्झाणं ? । रोइज्झाणे चउच्चिहे पत्रत्ते; तं जहा-हिंसाणुबंधी, मोसाणु-बंधी, तेयाणुबंधी, सारक्खाणुबंधी '' तत्र हिंसायाः सत्त्ववधादिरूपाया अनुबन्धः सातत्येन चिन्तनं यत्र तद् हिंसानुबन्धि । मृषाऽसत्यं तस्यानुबन्धो यत्र तत् तथा । स्तेयं चौर्यं तस्यानुबन्धो यत्र तत् तथा । संरक्षणं सर्वेर्मारणाद्यपायस्तस्क-रादिभ्यो निजवित्तस्य संगोपनं तस्यानुबन्धः सातत्येन चिन्तनं यत्र रौद्रध्याने तत् तथा। एवं च सति संरक्षणानुबन्धो रौद्रध्यानस्य चतुर्थो मैदः। स च वसादौ गृहीते किलावक्यंभावी, रौद्रध्यानभेदत्वाच रौद्रध्यानमिति । एवं रौद्र-भ्यानहेतुत्वार् वस्तादिकं दुर्गतिहेतुः, शस्तादिवत् , ततो न प्राह्यमिति तव बुद्धि-भेवेतः तदि यदुक्तयुक्त्या रौद्रध्यानं तदिदं देवानां प्रिय ! देहादिष्वपि तुल्यम्, तेष्वपि जल-ज्वलन-मलिम्लुच-श्वापदा-अहि-विष-कण्टकादिभ्यः संरक्षणानु-बन्धस्य तुल्यत्वात् । अतस्तेऽपि परित्याज्याः प्राप्नुवन्ति । अथेह देहादेर्मोक्ष साधनाङ्गत्वाद् यतनया तत्संरक्षणानुबन्धविधानं प्रसत्तं, न दोषाय । यद्येवम्, तहिं तथा तेनागमप्रसिद्धेन यतनाप्रकारेणेहापि वस्तादौ संरक्षणानुबन्धविधानं कथं न मश्चस्तम् ? । ततः कथं वस्त्रादयोऽपि परित्याज्याः ? इति । अथैवं ब्रूपे--वस्तादिपरिग्रह एव मूच्छीदिदोषहेतुत्वाछोकस्य "भवअमणकारणम्" इत्येतदति-प्रतीतं बस्नादिपरिग्रहवतः साधोरपि कथं न स्यात् ? इत्याह-" जे जत्तिये-त्यादि "। इह ये यावन्तः ज्ञयन-पान-भोजन-गमना-Saस्थान-मनो-वाक्-कायचेष्टादयः प्रकारा अविरतानामसंयतानाममञास्ताध्यवसायवतां लोके भयहेतवो जायन्ते, त एव तावन्तः प्रकारां विरतानां संयतानां प्रसत्ताध्यवसायानां मोक्षा-यैव संपद्यन्दे । तस्माद् वस्नादिस्वीकारेऽपि नेतरजनवत् साधूनां मूलोच्छेदित-लोमादिकनाय−भय−मोहनीयादिदोषःणां तदुद्धावितदोषः कोऽप्यनुषज्यत इति રપ૭૦||રપ૭१||

D. C.

Śivabhūti:—There are four types of Raudradhyāna (evil meditation) mentioned in the āgamas. They are deeds concerning

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(1) Violence (2) Falsehood (3) Theft, and (4) (Self) Preservation. Meditation in which violence by way of killing beasts and birds etc., is always thought of, is known as himsā-nubandhi raudradhyāna. That in which falsehood is resorted to, is known as mriṣānubandhi raudradhyāna, while meditation wherein presevation of one's property from thieves etc. is invariably aimed at, is known as samrakṣaṇānubandhi raudradhyāna. Acceptance of clothes etc., will also become the cause of raudradhyāna. Like weapons etc., clothes etc., will, also, become the cause of satisfying evil motives, and that is why they should be renounced without hesitation.

Acārya :---That sort of *raudra-dhyāna* is common in body also, as the preservation of body from water, fire, robber, serpent, wild animals, poison, and thorns etc., is always sought. In that case, body too, shall have to be abandoned.

Śivabhuti:—Since body etc. happen to be the necessary instruments for attaining Mokṣa, it is commendable to preserve them carefully.

Acārya:--Why not apply the same principle to clothes etc., as well? As in the case of body etc., preservation of clothes etc; should, also, be commendable.

Śivabhati:--Since clothes etc. become the cause of attachment, they are objects of *parigraha* without doubt. They, thus, become causes of many *bhavas* to ordinary people, and consequently affect asectics having *parigraha* of clothes etc. It is, therefore, advisable to give them up.

Acārya:—This belief of yours is exclusively one-sided, and hence should not be accepted. Various acts of sitting, sleeping, eating, drinking, going, stopping, and various movements of mind, speech, and body, become causes of fear to an unrestrained person who has low motives. But the same acts become helpful for the attainment of Moksa to real ascetics who have high ideals One who has subdued evil instincts from the beginning, is not liable Jinabhadra Gani's

to any faults what-so-ever, if he accepts clothes. 21-22 (2570-2571).

Moreover, if you try to prove, with the help of the example of gold, that clothes etc. are *parigraha*, as they happen to be the causes of $marcch\bar{a}$, we prove gold etc. as *a-parigraha* on the same ground :—

आहारो व्व न गंथो देहत्थं विसघायणडाए । कणगं पि तहा जुवईधम्मंतेवासिणी मे त्ति ॥२३॥२५७२॥

23. Ahāro vva na gantho dehattham visaghāyaṇaṭṭhāe (Kaṇagampi tahā juvaīdhammantèvāsiņī mè tti. (2572)

[आहार इव न ग्रन्थो देहार्थं विषघातनार्थतया। कनकमपि तथा युवतिर्धर्मान्तेवासिनी ममेति ॥२३॥२५७२॥

23. Ahāra iva na grantho dehārtham visaghātanārthatayā i Kanakamapi tathā yuvati-r-dharmāntevāsinī mameti. (2572)]

Trans. 23. Like food, gold is not (the object of) parigraha as it is helpful to body, in as much as it is the antidote of poison. Similarly, young woman (is) also not an object of parigraha (to me), when (1 take her to be) my pupil in the observance of religious duties. 2572.

टीका २३-कनकं तथा युवतिश्व धर्मान्तेवासिनी मे ममेति बुद्धचा परिग्रह-णतो न ग्रन्थ इति संबन्धः, एषा किल मतिज्ञा । कुतः १ इत्याह-देहार्थमिति कृत्वा, अयं च हेतुः, देहार्थत्वात्-देहप्रयोजनत्वात्-देहोपकारित्वादित्यर्थः । नजु युवतेर्देहोपकारित्वं किल प्रतीतम्, कनकस्य तु तत कथम् १ इत्याह-'' विसघा-यणद्वाए त्ति '' विषघातकत्वादित्यर्थः, उक्तं च-

विसघाय--रसायण--मंगल--च्छवि--णया--पयाहिणावत्ते । गुरुए अ ढज्झकुट्ठे अट्ठ सुवण्णे गुणा होति ॥१॥

आहारवदिति दृष्टान्तः । कनक-युवत्यादयोऽपि न ग्रन्थः, देहार्थत्वात् आहारवदिति तात्पर्यम् ॥२५७२॥

Nihnavavāda

D, C. Like food, gold and young woman, do not become *parigraha*, when they prove themselves helpful to the body. Gold is beneficial to body in as much as it acts as an antidote of poison. It has been said that —

Visaghāya-rasāyaņa-mangala-cchavi-nayā payāhiņāvatte (Gurud a dhajjhakutthe attha suvanne guņā honti. (1)

[Capacity as an antidote of poison, alchemic character, auspiciousness, brilliance, polity, property of turning clock-wise (from left to right), weight, and capacity of undergoing heat-these are the eight qualities of gold.]

When a young woman is looked upon with a lofty ideal that she is a companion in performing religious rites, she does not, in any way, become the object of *parigraha* but she becomes helpful in the attainment of Moksa. 23 (2572).

Finally, the $\overline{A}c\overline{a}rya$ explains the distinction between *parigraha* and *a-parigraha* and tries to remove the confusion from the opponent's mind:---

तम्हा किमत्थि वत्थुं गंथोऽगंथो व सब्वहा लौए ?। गंथोऽगंथो व मओ मुच्छममुच्छाहिं निच्छयओ ॥२४॥२५७३॥ वत्थाइं तेण जं जं संजमसाहणसराग-दोसस्स । तं तमपरिग्गहो चिय परिग्गहो जं तदुवघाइं ॥२५॥२५७४॥

24. Tamhā kimatthi vatthum gantho'gantho va savvhā löd? I Gantho'gantho va maö mucchamamucchāhim nicchayaö. (2573)

25. Vatthāim teņa jam jam sañjamasāhaņasarāga-dosassa | Tam tampariggaho ceiya pariggaho jam taduvaghāim. (2574)

[तस्मात् किमस्ति वस्तु ग्रन्थोऽग्रन्थो वा सर्वथा लोके ? । ग्रन्थोऽग्रन्थो वा मतो मूर्च्छा-ऽमूर्च्छाभ्यां निश्चयतः॥२४॥२५७३॥

वस्त्रादि तेन यद् यत् संयमसाधनसराग-द्वेषस्य । तत् तदपरिग्रह एव परिग्रहो यत् तदुपघाति ॥२५॥२५७४॥

[The Botika

Jinabhadra Gani's

- 24. Tasmāt kimasti vastu grantho'grantho vā sarvathā lokè? Grantho'grantho vā mato murcchā'murcchābhyām niścayataņ. (2573)
- 25. Vastrādi tèna yad yat samyamasādhanasarāga-dvèśasya I Tat tadaparigraha èva parigraho yat tadupaghāti. (2574)

Trans. 24-25. "Then, what objeci is there in this world that should be known as *parigraha* or *a-parigraha* in all respects?" Really speaking, *parigraha* or otherwise, is ascertained according to attachment or aversion. Hence, whatever like clothes etc. that happens to be useful in the observance of austerities to one who is devoid of passion and prejudice, should be recognized as *a-parigraha*. That which acts against it, is *parigraha* (2573-2574).

टीका-२४-२५ व्याख्या-तस्मात् किं नाम तद् वस्त्वस्ति लोके यदात्म-स्वरूपेण सर्वथा ग्रन्थोऽग्रन्थो वा ? नास्त्येवैतदित्यर्थः । ततश्च "ग्रुच्र्छा परि-म्बद्दो वुत्तो इइ वुत्तं महेसिणा" इत्यादिवचनाद् यत्र वसु-देहा-ऽऽहार-कन-कादौ मूर्च्छा संपद्यते तद् निश्चयतः परमार्थतो ग्रन्थः । यत्र तु सा नोपजायते तदग्रन्थ इति । एतदेव व्यक्तीकरोति-" वत्थाइं नेणेत्यादि " तेन तस्मात् । शेषं सुगममिति ॥२५७३॥२५७४॥

D. C. There is not a single object in this world which can be recognized as *parigraha* or *a-parigraha* entirely by its own virtue. But by means of statements such as—" Mucchā pariggaho vuitto ii vuttam mabèsiņā" etc. parigraha is ascertained on the standard of attachment to wealth,-body,-food-gold etc. Wherever such an attachment does not exist, there is *a-parigraha*. We can, therefore, conclude that whenever clothes etc. help to attain Mok§a, they should be known as *a-parigraha*, and whenever they act contratry, there is *parigraha*. 24-25. (2573-2574).

र्कि संजमोवयारं करेइ वत्थाइं जइ मई सुणसु । सीयत्ताणं ताणं जलण-तणगयाणं सत्ताणं ॥२६॥२५७५॥ तह निसि चाउकालं सज्झाय-झाण-साहणमिसीणं । महि-महिया-वासो-सा-रयाइ रक्खानिमित्तं च ॥२७॥२५७६॥

: 295 :

मयसंवरुज्झणत्थं गिलाणपाणोवगारि वाभिमयं । मुहपुत्तियाइ चेवं परूवणिज्ञं जहाजोगं ॥२८॥२५७७॥ संसत्तसत्तु-गोरस-पाणय-पाणीयपाणरक्खत्थं । परिगलण-पाणघायण-पच्छाइकम्माइयाणं च ॥२९॥२५७८॥

परिहारत्थं पत्तं गिलाण-वालादुवग्गहत्थं च। दाणमयधम्मसाहणं समया चेवं परुप्परओ ॥३०॥२५७९॥

- 26. Kim samyamovayāram karei vatthāim jai maī suņasu i Sīyattāņam tānam jalaņa-taņagayāņam sattāņam. (2575)
- 27. Taha nisi cāukkālam sajjhāya-jhāņa-sāhaņamisīnam 1 Mahi-mahiyā-vāso-sā-rayāi rakkhā-nimittam ca. (2576)
- 28. Mayasamvarujjhanattham gilānapanovagāri vābhimayam (Muhaputtiyāi cēvam parūvaņijjam jahājogam. (2577)
- 29. Samsattasattu-gorasa-pänaya-pänäyapänarakkhattham 1 Parigalana-pänaghäyana-pacchäikammäiyänam ca. (2578)
- 30. Parihārattham pattam gilāņa-bālāduvaggahattham ca I Dāņamayadhammasāhaņam samayā cevam parupparaö. (2579,

[किं संयमोपकारं करोति वस्त्रादि यदि मतिः श्र्णु । इतित्राणं त्राणं ज्वलन-तृणगतानां सत्त्वानाम् ॥२६॥२५७५॥ तथा निशि चतुष्कालं स्वाध्याय-ध्यान-साधनम्रुषीणाम् । मही-महिका-वर्षो-स्त्र-रजआदिरक्षानिमित्तं च ॥२७॥२५७६॥ महतसंवरोज्झानार्थं ग्लानपाणोपकारि चाभिमतम् । मुखवस्त्रिकादि चैवं प्ररूपणीयं यथायोगम् ॥२८॥२५७७॥ संसक्तसक्तु-गोरस-पानक-पानीय-प्राणिरक्षार्थम् । परिगलन-प्राणघातन-पश्चात्कर्मादिकानां च ॥२९॥२५७८॥ परिहारार्थं पात्रं ग्लान-षालाखुपग्रहार्थं च । दानमयधर्मसाधनं समता चैवं परस्परतः ॥३०॥२५७९॥

- 26. Kim samyamopakāram karoti vastrādi yadi matiķ śruņu i Śītatrāņam trāņam jvalana-triņagatānām sattvānām. (2575)
- 27. Tathā niśi catuşkālam svādhyāya-dhyāna-sādhanamrişiņām I Mahī-mahikā-varşo-sra-rajaādiraksānimittam ca. (2576)
- 28. Mritasa^mvarojjhānārtham glānaprāņopakāri cābhimatam 1 Mukhavastrikādi caivam prarūpaņīyam yathāyogam. (2577)
- 29. Samsaktasaktu-gorasa-pānaka-pānīya-prāņi raksārtham 1 Parigalana-prāņaghātana-paścātkarmādikānām ca. (2578)
- 30. Parihārārtham pātram glāna-bālādyupagrahārtham cai Dānamayadharmasādhanam samatā caiva parasparatah. (2579) j

Trans. 26-27-28-29-30. If you ask as to how clothes etc. are useful in (the practice of) austerity, (then) listen (to me). (They render) protection from cold (to ascetics), and protect creatures found in fire, and grass. (A garment) is also a (necessary) means of (conducting) study and meditation to the ascetics during all hours of night. It renders (them) protection from clods of earth, rain, fog, and dust particles. (It is used) in covering and carrying the corpse. (It is) considered as useful to sick persons In that way, muhapatti. (a piece of cloth held between the nose and mouth to prevent dust, insects etc.) should, also, be (given) proper importance. Hence, a devoted ascetic ought to hold a vessel for the purpose of protecting insects found in milk, water, and such other drinks, in order to prevent it being spilt down, prevent killing of insects, and (avoid) faults like pascat Karman, and for the benefit of the sick and young. Mutual tolerance is cultivated only in this way. (2575-2579).

टीका-२६-२७-२८-२९-३० व्याख्या-कं नाम संयमोपकारं करोति वस्तादिकम् ? इति यदि तव मतिः, तर्हि कथ्यते शृणु-सौत्रिकौणिंककल्पैस्तावत् श्रीतार्तानां त्राणं साधूनामार्तध्यानापहरणं क्रियते । तथा ज्वलन-तृणादीन्धन गतानां सच्वानां त्राणं रक्षणं ''क्रियते '' इतीहापि दृइयते । इद्युक्तं भवति, यदि कल्पा न भवेयुः, तदा शीतार्ताः साधवोऽग्रि-तृणादीन्धन-ज्वलन्तं कुर्युः । तत्करण चावश्यभावा तद्वसचोपघातः । कल्पैस्तु प्रावृतैरेष न भवत्येव, अग्नि-तृणादिज्वलनमन्तरेणापि शीतार्तिनिवृत्तेरिति । तथा "कालचउकं उकोसए जहन्ने तियं तु बोधव्वं " इत्यादिवचनात् समस्तरात्रिजागरणं कुर्वद्भिः साधुभि-श्रत्वारः काला ग्रहीतव्याः । तच्च हिमकणभवर्षिणि शीते पतति चतुष्कालं यृह्वतां तेषाम्र्यीणां । कल्पाः प्रावृताः सन्तो निर्विन्नं स्वाध्यायध्यानसाधनं कुर्वन्ति, श्रीतार्त्यपहरणादिति । तथा "महि त्ति " महारात्रात्क्षिप्ता सचिता पृथिवी तस्याः पतन्त्या रक्षानिमित्तं प्रावृताः कल्पाः संजायन्ते, महिका धूमिका, "वास त्ति " वर्षा वृष्टिः, 'उस त्ति ' आवश्यायः प्रतीतः रजोऽपि सचित्तमीषदाताम्रन-भसः पततीति प्रतीतमेव, आदिशब्दात् प्रदीप-तेजः प्रभृतीनां परिग्रद्दः । एतेषां च महिकादिगतानां सच्तानां रक्षानिमित्तं कल्पाः संजायन्त इति । तथा, मृतस संवरणं संवरं आच्छादनम् , उज्झनं बहिर्नयन तदर्थं वा श्वेतोज्ज्वलप्रच्छादनपटि-कादिवत्तमभिहितम् । ग्लानप्राणोपकारि च तदभिमतं परमगुरूणाम् । एवं ग्रुख-वस्तिका-रजोहरणादि चोपकरणं समयानुसारतः संयमोपकारित्वेन योज्यं भण-नीयम् । तथा चोक्तं कल्प भाष्यादिषु --

> कप्पा आयप्पमाणा अङ्राइज्झाइवित्थडा हत्था । दो चेव सोत्तिया उन्निओ य तइओ मुणेयव्वो ॥१॥ तणगहणाणलसेवानिवारणा धम्मसुक्कज्झाणट्ठा । दिट्ठं कप्पग्गहणं गिलाण-मरणट्टया चेव ॥२॥ संपाइमरय रेणुपमज्जणट्ठा वयंति मुहपत्ति । नासं च मुहं च बंधइ तीए वसहिं पमजंतो ॥३॥ आयाणे निक्खेवे ठाणनिसीए सुयपट्टसंकोए । पुव्वं पमज्जणट्ठा लिंगट्ठा चेव रयहरणं ॥४॥ वेउव्वोऽवायेऽवाइए हीखदे पजपणे चेव । तेसिं अणुग्गहट्ठा लिंगुदयट्ठा य पट्टो य ॥५॥

तत्र प्रज्जनने मेहने ''वेउच्चि त्ति '' वैक्रिये विक्रते, तथा, अप्राष्टतेऽनावते वातिके चोत्सनत्वभाजने, हिया लजया सत्या खड्डे बृहत्प्रमाणे '' लिंगुदयह त्ति'' स्त्री दर्शने लिङ्गोदयरक्षणार्थं च पटश्रोलपट्टो मत इति । · 298 :

अथ पात्रस्य मात्रकस्य च संयमोपकारित्वं दर्शन्नाह-"संसत्तेत्यादि "। संसक्तसक्तु-गोरस-द्राक्षादिपानक-पानीयगतसत्त्वमाणरक्षणार्थं पात्रमिति संबन्धः । पात्राभावे हि संसक्तगोरसाद्यो हस्तएवानाभौगादिकारणाद् गृहीताः क किये-रन् ? तद्गतसच्चानां प्राणविपत्तिरेव स्यात् । पात्रे तु सति समयोक्तविधिना ते परिस्थाप्यन्ते । तथा च सति तद्भतसत्त्वप्रांणरक्षा पात्रेण सिध्यतीति । तथा पात्राभावे पाणिपुट एव गृहीतानां घृत-गोरसादिरसानां परिगलने सति यत् कुन्धु-कीटकादिप्राणघातनम्, ये च भाजन-धावनादिभिः पश्चात्कर्मादयो दोषास्तेषां परिहारार्थं च पात्रमिष्यते जगद्गुरुभिः । तथा, ग्लान-बाल-दुर्बल-वृद्धाद्यपग्रहार्थं च तदिष्यते । पात्रे हि सति गृहस्थेभ्यः पथ्यादिकं समानीय ग्लान-बालादीनामुपग्रह उपष्टम्भः क्रियते, तदभावे पुनरसौ न स्यादेवेति। अपरश्व, पात्रे सति भक्तपानादिकं समानीयान्यस्य प्रयच्छतां साधुनां दानमय-धर्मस्य साधनं सिद्धिर्भवति, पात्राभावे चैतद् न स्यात् । तदसत्त्वे कस्यापि केनचिद् भक्त-पानादिदानासंभवात् । "समया चेवं परुष्पर उ त्ति" एवं च पात्रे परिग्रहे सति लब्धिमतामलब्धिमतां च शक्तानामशक्तानां च वास्तव्यानां प्राघूर्णकानां च सर्वेषामधि साधूनां परस्परं समता खास्थ्यं तुल्यता भवति । पात्रे हि सति लब्धिमान् भक्त-पानादिकं समानीयालब्धिमते ददाति। एवं शकोऽशकाय, वास्तव्यः प्राघूर्णकायं तत् प्रयच्छति । इति सर्वेणां सौस्थ्यम्, पात्राभावे तु नैतत् , स्यादिति ।

इह च पात्रग्रहणस्य गुणकथनेन मात्रकस्यापि तत्कथनं कृतमेव द्रष्टव्यम्, प्रायंः समानगुणत्वात्, उक्तं च----

> छकायरक्खणट्ठा पायग्गहणं जिणेहि पस्तत्तं । जे य गुणा संभोए हवंति ते पायगहणे वि ॥१॥ अतरंत-बाल-बुड्ढा-सेहाएसा गुरू अ सहुवग्गा । साहारणुग्गहा अलद्विकारणा पायगहणं तु ॥२॥ आयरिए य गिलाणे पाहुणए दुछहे सहसदाणे । संसत्तमत्तपाणे मत्तगपरिमोगणुण्णा उ ॥३॥

Vada]

D. C.

Śivabhūti:—In what ways, are the garments and vessels useful to the practice of austerities?

Acārya:--A cotton or woollen piece of cloth protects the mendicant from cold. It protects the life of small creatures abounding in fire, grass and food. If a mendicant does not wear a garment, he lits up fire for the purpose of protecting himself from cold, and by doing so, he kills small insects abounding there-in.

On the other hand, if he has a piece of cloth to cover his body, he would prevent cold with it, without killing a single life.-

Secondly, if an ascetic wears a garment, he is liable to pass the whole night in study and meditation without any hindrance by cold, dust, rain, and fog etc. He will also be able to save insects flocking round the lamp with his garment.

Thirdly, it has been laid down by the great preceptors that in covering or taking out a corpse, a white piece of cloth should be used. Such a piece of cloth is beneficial to sick persons also.

In this way, *muhapatti* and *rajohara*na are useful in the practice of austerity and the same should be preached by you wherever you go.

It has been said in the Kalpa-Bhāşya that---

Kappā ayappamāņā addhāi jjhāivitthada hattha Do ceva sottiyā unniö ya taiö muņeyavvo. (1)

Taņagahaņāņalasevānivaraņā dhammamsukkajjhaņaţţhā | Diţţham kappaggahaņam gilāņa-maraņaţţhayā ceva. (2)

Sampāyamarayareņupamajjaņatthā vayanti muhapattim I Nāsam ca muham ca bandhai tīe vasahim pamajjanto. (3)

Ayāņe nikkheve thāņa nisīe suyapatta sankoe | Puvvam pamajjaratthā lingatthā ceva rayaharaņam. (4) Veuvve'vayade vāie hīkhadde pajaņaņe ceva (Tesim aņuggahatthā lingudayatthā ya patto o. (5)

[For the purpose of refraining from the use of fire produced by collecting straw, and for the observance of dharma-dhyāna and śukla-dhyāna, and also for the benefit of the sick, as well as (as a covering) for the dead, one should use a garment. The garments should be-two of cotton, and one woollen-as one's own self, and 2½ hands broad. A sadhu carries a muhapatti with the object of removing collected particles of dust and he ties it over his mouth and nostrils, while cleaning the upāśraya. While taking an object, while removing it, while replacing it, while rearranging a bed-sheet disturbed from a bedding prepared for the night, and as an emblem of asceticism one should use a rajoharana. For the purpose of covering the exposed sexual organ of the male as well as of the female out of decency, and for covering the male organ excited by the sight of the female, a cola-patta a loin-cloth is necessary. All these garments are very useful for the preservation of samyama-dharma-duties of an ascetic.]

Uses of pātra and mātraka are now explained. If an ascetic possesses pātra he can save the life of so many creatures found in milk, grapes etc. For if milk etc. is received in hands, the small insects abounding there-in will perish without doubt. But if milk etc. is received in some vessel insects etc. would be placed inside the vessel in stead of falling down.

Secondly, when milk is received in hands the same would flow down on the ground, and give rise to small germs resulting in the loss of more lives.

Thirdly, in absence of vessels, faults like that of bondage | of Karman etc, would arise.

Fourthly, good turns like that of distributing food etc. to the sick and poor, could only be done with the help of a pātra; in the absence of a pātra it is not possible to do so. Thus, a pātra becomes a necessary means of discharging charitable duty to ascetics who receive food from rich persons and distribute the same among the poor. Moreover, if there is a $p\bar{a}tra$, it would be beneficial to mendicants of all categoriesthose who possess and who do not possess, the able as well as disabled ones, those staying in upāśraya and those coming as guests. If a mendicant possessesa $p\bar{a}tra$ he can receive food into it, and impart the same to one who has not received food. Similarly, able-bodied monks would serve the disabled ones and church-inmate would treat a guest. In absence of pātra, no such convenience is enjoyed.

The same should be understood of mātraka also. It has been said---

Chakkāyarakkhaņaṭthā pāyaggbhananam Jiņehim pannatam | Je ya guņa sambhöc havanti te pāyagahaņe vi. (1) Ataranta-bāla-viḍḍhā-sehāesā gura a sāhuvaggā | Sāhāraņuggahā aladdhikāraņā pāya-gahaņam tu. (2)

[The Tirthańkara has deemed fit the acceptance of pātra, fit for the purpose of protecting the bodies of the six varieties of living beings. Merits abounding in enjoyment are found in acceptance of pātra also. But the pātra should be accepted for (the benefit of) weak, young, old, new desciple, guests, and sick persons being advised by the preceptor on the grounds of security (of food etc.) in absence of a-labdhi. And, the acceptance of mātra is allowed in case of preceptor being sick, an outsider being rare, and food and drink of real mendicant being given away in charity.] 26-30. (2575-2578).

In reply to the assertion that "sud bhaniyamapariggahattham" etc. the Acārya states—

अपरिग्गहया सुत्ते त्ति जा य मुच्छा परिग्गहोऽभिमओ। सब्बदब्वेसु न सा कायब्वा सुत्तसब्भावो ॥३१॥२५८०॥

31. A-pariggahayā sutte tti jāya mucchā pariggaho' bhimaö Savvadavvēsu na sā kāyavvā suttasabbhāvo. (2580)

[अपरिग्रहता सूत्रे इति या च मूच्छी परिग्रहोऽभिमतः । सर्वद्रव्येषु न सा कर्तव्या सूत्रसद्भावः ॥३१॥२५८०॥

31. A-parigrahatā setre iti yā ca mercehā parigraho'bhimatah | Sarvadravyesu na sā kartavyā setra-sadbhāvaḥ. (2580)]

Trans. 31. Non-acceptance implied in the sutra has taken $m\bar{u}rcch\bar{a}$ (attachment) as *parigraha*. That it should not be practised in (case of) all objects, is the main purport of the sutra. 2580.

टीका-३१ या च "सव्वाओ परिग्गहाओ वेरमणं " इत्यादिनाऽपरिग्रहता सत्रे प्रोक्तेति त्वया गीयते, तत्रापि मूच्छैंव परिग्रहतीर्थकृतामभिमतो नान्यः, सा च मूच्छी यथा वस्त्रे तथा सर्वेष्वपि श्वरीरा-ऽऽहारादिषु द्रव्येषु न कर्तव्येति सत्रसद्भावः सत्रपरमार्थः, न पुनस्त्वदभिमतः सर्वथा वस्त्रपरित्यागोऽपरिग्रहतेति सत्रामिप्रायः । तस्मादपरिज्ञातसत्रभावार्थी मिध्यैव खिद्यसे त्वमिति हृदयम् ॥२५८०॥

D. C. The theory of *a-parigrahat*ā advocated by you with regard to assertions like "Savvāo pariggahāo vèramaņam" etc. laid down in the Šutra is obtained only when $m\bar{u}rcch\bar{a}$ or attachment has been completely removed. In other words, there is no *parigraha* without attachment. Attachment with regard to clothes etc. works in case of all objects including body, food, driņk etc. The main purport of the Sutra is that one should abandon attachment. But it should be noted that the above-mentioned sutra in no way, leads to establish that complete renunciation of clothes is a-parigraha. 31. (2580)

In reply to "Jamacèlā ya Jiņindā"⁵ etc. the Acārya says-

निरुपमधिइसंघयणा चउनाणाइसयसत्तसंपण्णा। अच्छिद्रपाणिपत्ता जिणा जियपरिसहा सब्वे ॥३२॥२५८१॥

तम्हा जहुत्तदोसे पावंति न वत्थ-पत्तरहिया वि । तदसाहणं ति तेसिं तो तग्गहणं न कुव्वंति ॥३३॥२५८२॥

5. Vide v 2556.

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तह वि गहिएगवत्था सवत्थतित्थोवएसणत्थं ति । अभिनिक्खमंति सब्वे तम्मि चुएऽचेलया हुंति ॥३४॥२५८३॥

- 32. Nirupamadhiisanghayanā caunāņāisayasattasampannā i A-cehiddapāņipattā Jinā jiyaparisahā savve. (2581)
- 33. Tamhā jahuttadosè pāvanti na vattha-pattarahiyā vi 1 Tadasāhaņam ti tèsim to taggahaņam na kuvvanti. (2582)
- 34. Taha vi gahiègavatthä savatthatitthovaesanattham tii Abhinikkhamanti savve tammi cue'eelaya hunti. (2583)

[निरुपमधृतिसंहननाश्चतुर्ज्ञाना अतिशयसत्त्वसंपन्नाः । अच्छिद्रपाणिपात्रा जिना जितपरिषहाः सर्वे ॥३२॥२५८१॥ तस्माद् यथोक्तदोषान् प्राप्नुवन्ति न वस्त्र-पात्ररहिता अपि । तदसाधनमिति तेपां ततस्तद्ग्रहणं न कुवन्ति ॥३३॥२५८२॥ तथापि गृहीतैकवस्त्रा सवस्त्रतीर्थोपदेशनार्थमिति । अभिनिष्कामन्ति सर्वे तार्सिश्च्युतेऽचेलका भवन्ति ॥३४॥२५८३॥

- 32. Nirupama dhriti samhananāścatu-r-jñānā atiśaya sattvasampannāh i Acchidrapāņipātrā Jinā jitapariṣahāh sarve. (2581)
- 33. Tasmād yathoktadosān prāpnuvanti na vastra-pātrarahitā api i Tadasādhanamiti teṣām tatastad grahaṇam na kurvanti, (2582)
- 34. Tathāpi grihītaikavastrā sa-vastratīrthopadešanārthamiti (Abhiniškrāmanti sarve tasmimšcyute'celakā bhavanti. (2583)

Trans. 32–33-34. All the Tirthańkaras possess exceptional fortitude, strength, and knowledge, with their compact hands as vessels, and since they are victorious over all sorts of strain, they are not susceptible to the afore-mentioned faults even though they (go) without a garment or vessel. These being useless to them are not accepted by them. Still however, in order to show that the inmates of the Church shall have to bear the garment for a long time, the Tirthańkaras renounce (the world) with one garment. When that is dropped automatically they go naked. (2581–2583).

टीका-च्याख्या-यस्माझिनास्तीर्थंकराः सर्वेऽपि निरूपमष्टतिसंहननाव्च्चम स्थावस्थायां चतुर्झानाः अतिश्वयसच्तसंपद्याः, तथाऽच्छिद्रः पाणिरेव पात्रं येषां तेऽच्छिद्रपाणिपात्रा जितसमस्त-परिषहाश्च "तम्ह त्ति" तस्माद् वस्त्राभावे ये संयमविराधनादयो दोषाः प्रोक्तास्तान् यथोक्तान् दोषांस्ते वस्त-पात्ररहिता अपि न प्राप्नुवन्ति, इत्यतस्तद्रस्तादिकं न साधनं न साधकं संयमस्य तेषां तीर्थकरा-णाम् । "तो त्ति" तस्मादकिश्चित्करत्वात् तस्यात्मगतसंयमस्यानुपकारिणो वस्तादिग्रहणं न कुर्वन्ति तीर्थकरा इति । ननु यदि ते वस्तादिग्रहणं न कुवन्तीत्यु-च्यते, तर्हि "सच्वे वि एगद्सेण निग्गया" इत्यादि विरुघ्यत इत्याशंङ्रचाह-"तह चीत्यादि" यद्यपि तत्संयमस्यानुपकारिवस्तम् , तथापि सवस्तमेव तीर्थ "सवस्ता एव साधवस्तीर्थे चिरं भविष्यन्ति " इत्यस्यार्थस्योपदेश्वनं ज्ञापनं तदर्थ गृहीतैकवस्ताः सर्वेऽपि तीर्थकृतोऽभिनिष्क्रामन्तीत्ति । तर्सिमश्च वस्त्रोच्युते कापि पतितेऽचेलका वस्त्ररहितास्ते भवन्ति, न पुनः सर्वदा । ततः "अचेलकाश्च जिनेन्द्राः " इत्यैकान्तिकं यदुक्तं तद् भवतोऽनभिज्ञत्वस्वकमेवेति भावः ॥२५८१॥२५८२॥२५८३॥

D. C. Your idea about Tīrthaṅkaras as absolutely acèlaka is not quite correct. Even during their life incognito Tīrthaṅkaras are unusually bold, strong, and full of knowledge. Since they have subdued all the evil instincts they do not keep pātra or vastra, and go with their compact hands as pātra, and still they are not defiled by faults that would come in the way of the practice of austerities.

Śivabhuti:--Then, how do you say that all the Tirthankaras had renounced the world with one garment?

Acārya:--Although garment was not helpful to them in the practice of austerities etc, they, foreseeing that all the ascetics of the Church shall have to bear garments and vessels for a long time, accepted dīkṣā with one garment. In course of time, if the garment drops down by itself, they become uncovered. But that does not mean that they were uncovered for all the time. This, your belief that Tīrthaňkaras were absolutely uncovered for all the time exhibits nothing but ignorance on your part. 32-34. (2581-2583).

जिणकप्पियादओ पुण सोवहओ सब्बकालमेगंतो। उवगरणमाणमेसिं पुरिसाविक्खाए बहुभेयं ॥३५॥२५८४॥

35. Jiņakappiyādaö puņa sovahaö savva-kālameganto I Uvagaraņamāņamesim purisāvikkbāe bahubheyam. (2584)

[जिनकल्पिकादयः पुनः सोपधयः सर्वकारूमेकान्तः । उपकरणमानमेषां पुरुषापेक्षया बहुमेदम् ॥३५॥२५८४॥

35. Jinakalpikādayah punah sopadhayah sarvakālamekāntah i Upakaraņamānamesām purusāpeksayā bahubhedam. (2584)]

Trans. 35. And Jinakalpikas etc. are always exclusively full of (some) instrument (or the other). The standard of (their possessing) the instruments, depends upon the persons concerned, in various ways. 2584.

टीका-३५ अयमत्राभिष्रायः-तीर्थकर दृष्टान्तावष्टम्मेन, जिनकल्पिकोदा हरणावष्टम्मेन च त्वम्चेलकत्वं प्रतिपद्यसे । एतच सर्वं भवतो दुर्बोधविलसितमेव यतस्तीर्थकरा अपि पूर्वोक्तन्यायेन न तावदेकान्ततोऽचेलकाः । जिनकल्पिकस्व-यंबुद्धादयः पुनः सर्वकालमेकान्तेन सोपधय पवेति । अत एव " दुग तिग चउक्र पणगं " इत्यादिना पूर्वमेतेषाम्रुपकरणमानं पुरुषाषेक्षया बहुमेदम्रुक्तम् , न पुनः सर्वथा निरूपकरणता । तदयं यस्त्वया सर्वथोपकरत्यागः कृतः स दृष्टान्तीकृतानां तीर्थकर-जिनकल्पिकादीनामपि न दृक्यते, केवलं नूतनः कोऽपि त्वदीय एवायं मार्ग इति ॥२५८४॥

D. C. It has already been shown above that you cannot preach the doctrine of going without clothes by advancing the example of Tirthankaras.

Jinakalpikas and svayambuddhas etc. have always been possessing some material or the other as an upakarana to the observance of samyama. The standard of accepting such upakaranas varies with different persons. But it is important to note that entire negation of upakarana has never been referred to. Thus, the Tirthankaras, by whose examples you have formed your belief, have also never been without upakarana. 35 (2584). Also,

अरहंता जॅमचेला तेणाचेलत्तर्ण जह मर्य ते । तो तब्वयणाउ चिय निरतिसओ होहि माठचेलो ॥३६॥१५८५॥

36. Arahantā jamacelā teņācelattaņam jai mayam tel To tavvayaņāu ceiya niratisaö hohi mā'celo, (2585)

[अईन्तो यदचेलास्तैनाचेलत्वं यदि मतं ते । ततस्तद्वचनादेव निरतिशयो भूर्माऽचेलः ॥३६॥२५८५ां।

36. Arhanto yadacəlāstənacəlatvam yadī matam tə i Tatastadvacanādəva niratisayo bhu-r-mā'cəlah. (2585)

Trans. 36. If naked condition is acceptable to you because Tirthankaras were naked, then, on their own words, do not become absolutely uncovered as you are devoid of that excellence. (2585).

टीका-३६ यद् धरमादईन्तोऽचेलाबेलरहिता नानन्यघालिणस्तेन तस्मात् काल्णाइचेल्लं नग्रत्वं यदि तद मत्तं संगतम्,

आस्सियं गुरुलिर्ण सीसेंभ वि तारिसेंग होयव्वं ।

न हि होइ बुद्रतीली सेयवडी नग्गखवणी वा नाशा

इति वचनादिति । ततस्तदि तदचनादेव तीर्थकरोपदेशादेव निरुषमधूति-संहननाद्यतिशयरहितोऽचेलों नगों मां भूस्त्वम् । इदग्रुक्तं भवति-यदि तीर्थकर-श्रिष्यत्वात् तद्वेषस्तव प्रमाणम् , तहिं तत एव हेतोस्तदुपदेशोऽपि भवतः प्रमाण-मेथ । न हि मुरूषदेशमर्तिक्रम्य अर्क्तमानः शिष्योऽभीष्टार्थस्तपत्रो भवति । परमगुरूपदेश्वंवैर्व वर्ततै-निरुषमधूति संहननाद्यतिशयरहितेनाचेलकेन नैव भवित-व्यम् । तत् किं त्वमित्यं गुरूपदेशवाद्येन नाग्नेनात्मानं विगोपसीति ॥२५८५॥

D. C.

Acārya :--- O Śivabhuti ! you have accepted naked condition, because Tīrthańkaras were such. For, it has already been said that---

Jārisayam gurulingam sīsena vi tariseņa hoyavvam (Na hi höi Buddhasīso seyavado naggakhavaņo vā. (1) [A pupil should bear the same dress as (his) preceptor bears. A follower of Buddha would never be found with a white garment or naked.]

It is, therefore, in the fitness of things to follow the footsteps of Tirthankaras. But if you don't possess the qualities such as full restraint and spiritual strength as they possess, do not accept nakedness on their own words. Being the follower of the Tirthankara, if you initiate His dress and manners, you should behave according to his advice as well. One who behaves contrary to the advice of his preceptor, does not attain the fulfilment of his cherished desire. The great preceptors say that one should never accept acelakatva, unless and until he has developed the necessary qualities of unequalled fortitude and strength. By accepting a-celakatva, why do you transgress the advice of the preceptors?

Śivabhati:-Just as it is necessary to behave according to the advice of the preceptor, one should certainly follow him in dress and manners also. 36 (2585).

The Acārya says:---

रोगी जहोवएसं करेइ वेज्रस्स हो अरोगी य । न उ वेसं ऋरियं वा करेइ न य पउणइ करंको ॥३७॥२५८६॥

तह जिणवेजाएसं कुणमाणोऽबेइ कम्मरोगाओ । न उ तन्नेवत्थधरो तेसिमाएसमकरंतो ॥३८॥२५८७॥

- 37. Rogī jahovadsam kardi vdjjassa hö arogo yaı Na u vdsam cariyam vā kardi na ya pauņai karanto. (2586)
- 88. Taha Jinavejjādsam kuņamāņo'vdi kammarogāö i Na u tanndvatthadharo tdsimaesamakaranto. (2587)

[रोगी यश्रोपदेशं करोति वैद्यस्य भवस्यरोगअ । न तु वेषं चरितं वा करोति न च प्रकरोति कुर्वन् ॥३७॥२५८६॥ तथा जिनवैद्यादेशं कुर्वाणोऽपैति कर्मरोगात् । न तु तन्नेपथ्यधरस्तेषामादेशमकुर्वन् ॥३८॥२५८७॥

- 37. Rogī yathopadèśam karoti vaidyasya bhatyarogaśca i Na tu veșam caritam vā karoti na ca prakaroti kurvan. (2586)
- 38. Tathā Jinavaidyādèśam kurvāņo'paiti karmarogāt | Na tu tannèpathyadharasteṣamādeśamakurvan. (2587)]

Trans. 37-38. A sick person behaves according to the advice of a physician and cures himself, but (he) does not imitate him in dress and manners. For, doing so does not cure him.

Similarly, one who follows the advice of the Tirthankaraphysician, is cured from the disease of Karman, while one who imitates him in dress but does not behave according to his commandments, is not (cured) (of the malady of Karman). 2586-2587.

टीका-२७-२८ व्याख्या-इह यथा रोगी वैद्यस्योपदेशं करोति, तत्करण-माभेणैव च रोगाद् विग्रुच्यते, न पुनरसौ तद्वेषं करोति, नापि तच्चरितमाचरति, न च तत् दुर्वाणोऽप्यसौ प्रगुणीभवति, प्रत्युतक्षपणकादौ वैधे नाग्न्यादिकं तद्वेषं कुर्वन् सर्वरसांश्व स्वेच्छ्या तद्वद् धुझानस्तचरितानुष्ठायी संनिपातस्यैव म्रियते । तस्माद् वैद्योपदेशानुष्ठानमेव रोगिणो रोगापगमहेतुः । प्रस्तुतयोजनामाद्द "तहे-त्यादि" तथा तेनैव प्रकारेण जिनवैद्यस्यादेशं द्वर्वाणस्तद्वेषचरिते अनाचरकपि कर्मरोगादपति वियुज्यते, न पुनस्तेषामादेशमद्ध्वार्णस्तद्वेषचरिते अनाचरकपि कर्मरोगादपति वियुज्यते, न पुनस्तेषामादेशमद्ध्वार्णस्तद्वेषचरिते विभ्रा-णोऽपि तस्माद् वियुज्यते, केवर्ल तद्योग्यतारहितत्वात्तकेपथ्य-चरिताम्यां प्रवर्तन मान उन्मादादिभाजनमेव भवतीति ॥२५८६॥२५८७॥

D. C.

Acārya:—A sick person is cured of his illness only if he behaves according to the instructions of the physician. Imitating the physician in dress and manners (without following his instructions), does not help him in any way. By doing so, he would, on the contrary, become the victim of delirium.

Similarly, one who follows the instructions of the Tīrthankara, without imitating his dress or external manners, is relieved of his bondages of Karman, while one who imitates the dress

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and external manners without putting into practice the instructions given by the Tirthankaras, is not able to sescape from the clutches of Karman. On the contrary, such a person gives an impression of a mad man. 37-38 (2586-2587).

And, if you claim to be the follower of Tirthankara's dress and manners, is your imitation similar to the behaviour of the Tirthankara wholly or partly? If it is so wholly, then you should note that---

न परोवएसवसया न य छउमत्था परोवएसं पि । दिंति, न य सीसवग्गं दिक्खंति जिणा जहा सब्वे ॥३९॥२५८८॥ तह सेसेहि वि सब्वं कर्ज्ञं जह ते हिं सब्वसाहम्मं । एवं च कओ तित्थं न चेदचेलो त्ति को गाहो ? ॥४०॥२५८९॥

- 39. Na parovaèsavasayā na ya chaumatthā parovaèsam pi | Dinti, na ya sīsavaggam dikkhanti Jiņā jahā savvè. (2588)
- 40. Taha sèsèhi vi savvam kajjam jai tèhim savvasāhammam (Evam ca kao tittham na cèdacèlo tti ko gāho? (2589)

[न परोपदेशवशगा न च च्छद्मस्थाः परोपदेशंपि। ददति, न च शिष्यवर्गं दीक्षन्ते जिना यथां सर्वे ॥३९॥२५८८॥ तथा रोषैरपि सर्वं कार्यं यदि तैः सर्वसाधर्म्यम् । एवं च कुतरतीर्थं न चेदचेल इति को ग्रहः ? ॥४०॥२५८९॥

- 39. Na paropadèśavaśagā na ca cchadmasthāh paropadèśam i Dadati, na ca śisyavargam diksantè Jinā yathā sarvè. (2588)
- 40. Tathā śeşairapi sarvam kāryam yadi taih sarvasādharmyam Evam ca kutastīrtham na cèdacèla iti ko grahah ? (2589)]

Trans. 39-40. Tirthankaras do not follow the instructions of others; nor do they give instructions during their chadmstha life (i. e. before the acquisition of Kèvala Jñāna); nor do they initiate pupils. All this should be practised by their followers if they claim equality (with the Tirthankaras) in all respects. And, in that case, where is the scope for the existence of Tirth (the Jaina Church)? And, if there is no (church), where is the scope for insisting upon acelakatva (or nakedness)? (2588-2589).

टीका- ३९-४० व्याख्या-यदि तैर्जिनैस्तीर्थकरेः सह लिङ्ग-चरिताभ्यां सर्वसाधम्यम्, तहिं यथा ते खयंबुद्धत्वाद् न परोपदेशवशगाः-न परोपदेशेन वर्तन्ते, न च च्छबस्थावस्थायां प्रतिबोधार्थं परस्याप्युपदेशं ददति, न च शिष्य-वर्गं दीक्षन्ते, तथा शेषेरपि तच्छिष्य-प्रशिष्यः सर्वमेतत् त्वदभिप्रायेण कार्यं कर-णीयं प्रामोति । भवत्वेवं तहिं, को दोष १ इति चेत् । इत्याह-एवं च सति कुतस्तीर्थम्, कस्यापि प्रतिबोधाभावाद् दीक्षाद्यभावाच्च ? । ''न चेदिति '' अथ न तैः सह सर्वसाधम्यमित्युच्यते, तहिं ''अचेलो भवाम्यहम् '' इति कस्तव प्रहः ? अचिन्त्यत्वात् तच्चरितस्येति ॥२५८८॥२५८९॥

D. C. If you claim equality with Tīrthaňkaras in all respects by following them in dress, manners etc., you must be able to practise everything that Tīrthaňkaras were doing. In other words, like Tīrthaňkaras, you should not accept instructions from others, should not give instructions to others as Tīrthaňkaras do during their *chadmastha* life, and should not initiate pupils as Tīrthaňkaras do, except when they have acquired Kèvala Jūāna. And, if such a thing happens there would be nothing like dikšā etc. and ultimately the entire Jaina Church would cease to exist in absence of imparting or receiving instructions etc.

On the other hand, if you accept that you are not in equality with the Tirthankaras in all respects, you shall have to give up insisting upon accepting *acelakatva* in vain. 39-40 (2588-2589).

Besides,

जह न जिणिंदेहि समं सेसाइसएहिं सव्वसाहम्मं । तह लिंगेणाभिमयं चरिएण वि किं चि साहम्मं ॥४१॥२५९०॥

41. Jaha na Jiņindèhim samam sèsāisaèhim savvasāhammam ı Taha lingeņābhimayam carièņa vi kimci sāhammam. (2590) Vāda]

[यथा न जिनेन्द्रैः समं रोषातिशयैः सर्वसाधर्म्यम् । तथा लिङ्गेनाभिमतं चरितेनापि किश्चित् साधर्म्यम् ॥४१॥२५९०॥

41. Yathā na Jindndrain samam sosātisayaih sarvasādharmyam (Tathā lingdnābhimatam caritdnāpi kincit sādharmyam. (2590)]

Trans. 41. (You have not acquired) equality with Tirthankaras in all respects, including the rest of their excellent qualities. But, you have accepted equality (only) to some extent so far as (their external) dress and manners are concerned. 2590.

टीका-४१ यथा जिनेन्द्रैः सह "निरुत्रमधिइसंघयणा चउनाणाइ सयसत्त-संपण्णा " इत्यादिना ग्रन्थेन प्रतिपादितैलिङ्गाचरिताच रोषैरतिश्रयैः सर्वसाधम्यं नाभिमतं भवतः, किं तहि ? किश्चित् साधम्र्यमेव, तथा तेनैव प्रकारेण लिङ्गेन चरितेन च किश्चित् साधर्म्यमेव तैः सहाभिमतमस्माकम्, न तु सर्वसाधर्म्यम्, तच किश्चित् साधर्म्य लिङ्गतो लोचकरणमात्रेण न पुनरचेलत्वेन्, चरित्रेण त्वेष-णीयाहारपरिभोगा-ऽनियतवासादिना, न तु पाणिभोजित्वेन, निरतिश्चयत्त्वेन तदयोग्यत्वादस्मदादीनाम् । तस्मात् किश्चित् साधर्म्यस्योक्तन्यायेनान्यथापि सिद्धेः कोऽचेलताद्याग्रहो भवतः ? इति ॥२५९०॥

D. C. If you do not claim equality with Tirthankaras in all respects but admit the same to some extent, it is admissible to us. If you accept *loca* (plucking out of hair) etc., you attain similarity to some extent, but you do not attain the same with the principle of *acelakatva*. You follow the Tirthankaras in dress and external behaviour when you renounce the dress and take food in hands or stay at undecided places, but since you do not possess the excellent qualities of a Tirthankara, you cannot be said to have attained complete equality with them. While non-similarity with the Tirthankaras could be proved in many other ways. So, why do you insist upon *a-celakatva* unnecessarily ? 41. (2590).

Then, in reply to "Tadabhihiö jam ca Jinakappo" etc, the Acārya admits that Jinakalpa has been laid by the Tīrthańkaras

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: 312:

but explains as to how that Jinakalpa has been said and with regard to which persons-

उत्तमधिइसंघयणा पुव्वविदोऽतिसइणो सयाकालं। जिणकप्पिया वि कप्पं कयपरिकम्मा पवज्जंति ॥४२॥२५९१॥ तं जइ जिणवयणाओ पवज्जसि, पवज्ज तो स छिन्नो त्ति । अत्थि त्ति कहं पमाणं कह वुच्छिन्नो त्ति न पमाणं ? ॥४३॥२५९२॥

- 42. Uttamadhiisanghayanā puvvavido'tisaiņo sayākālam I Jiņakappiyā vi kappam kayaparikammā pavajjanti. (2591)
- 43. Tam jai Jiņavayaņāö pavajjasi, pavajja to sa chinno tti Atthi tti kaham pamāņam kaha vucchinno tti na pamāņam ? (2592)

[उत्तमघृतिसंहननाः पूर्वविदोऽतिशयिनः सदाकालम् । जिनकल्पिका अपि कल्पं कृतपरिकर्माणं प्रपद्यन्ते ॥४२॥२५९१॥

तद् यदि जिनवचनात् प्रपद्यसे, प्रपद्यस्व ततः स च्छिन्न इति । अस्तीति कथं प्रमाणं कथं व्युच्छिन्न इति न प्रमाणम् ॥४३॥२५९२॥

- 42. Uttamadhritisamhananāh purvavido'tiśayinah sadākālam i Jinakalpikā api kalpam kritaparikramāņah prapadyante. (2591)
- 43. Tad yadi Jinavacanāt prapadyase, prapadyasva tataķ sa cchinna iti i
 Astīti katham pramāņam katham vyucchinna iti na pramāņam. (2592).

Trans. 42-43. Even Jinkalpikas who prossess excellent fortitude, and (bodily) constitution, and who are conversent with (Nine) parvas, and who possess excellent qualities in Kalpa, and who have also undergone the (five) tests, always accept Jinakalpa. Following the words of the Tirthaňkaras, if you accept it, then, (you should) admit it to have been (already) perished. (For), what is the proof for establishing that it exists, and where is the proof (to show that) it has not perished? (2591-2592).

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टीका-४२-४३ । व्याख्याः-उत्तमष्टतिसंहननाः पूर्ववेदिनो जयन्यतोऽपि किञ्चिभ्यूननवपूर्वपाठका इत्यर्थः सर्वदेव निरुपमञ्चक्त्याद्यतिश्वयसंपका जिनक-ल्पिका अपि "तवेण सुत्तेण सत्तेण" इत्यादि पूर्वोक्तविधिना इतपरिकर्माण एव जिनकल्पं प्रतिपद्यन्ते, नान्यथेति न रथ्यापुरुषकल्पानां मवाद्यां जिनकल्प-स्तीर्थकरैरनुज्ञात इति । तत् तस्माद् यदि जिनवच्चनादईदुपदेशाज्जिनकल्पं प्रति-पद्यसे त्वम्, ततस्तद्दि "स जिनकल्पो व्यवच्छिन्नः" इतीदमपि प्रतिपद्यस्व । अथैतद् न प्रतिपद्यसे, तद्दि "जिनकल्पोऽस्ति" इति कथं तीर्थकरवच्चनं तव प्रमाणम् ?। कथं च "व्यवच्छिनोऽसौ" इति न प्रमाणम् ?। नन्वाग्रहपिश्चा-चिकाग्रस्तचेष्टितमिदम् ? स्वेच्छामात्रप्रवृत्तत्वादिति ॥२५९१॥२५९२॥

D. C. Jinakalpikas, who possess the virtuous qualities like excellent fortitude and bodily constitution, who are conversent with Nine Pūrvas, and who possess excellent qualities, and who have also undergone the usual five tests, always admit the validity of Jinakalpa. The Tīrthaňkaras have allowed the practice of Jinakalpa for such worthy persons, and not for unworthy persons like you. If you, therefore, believe in Jinakalpa, you should also admit the same to have already perished. For, otherwise, how could the words of the Tīrthaňkaras laying down that Jinakalpa existed, be authentic to you? And, how could the view that it has not perished, be authentic on the other hand?

Śivabhati:—Existence of Jinakalpa has already been admitted in the āgamas, but by which *pramāņa* (authoritative statement) is the destruction of Jinakalpa laid down by the Tīrthańkara? 42-43 (2591-2592).

The Acarya replies :---

मण-परमोहि-पुलाए-आहारग-खवग-उवसमे-कप्पे। संयमतिय-केवल-सिज्झणा य जंबुम्मि बुच्छिण्णा ॥४४॥२५९३॥

44. Maņa-Paramohi-Pulād-Abāraga-Khavaga-Uvasamd-Kappdı Saņyamatiya-Kdvala-Sijjhaņā ya Jambummi vucchiņņā. (2593)

[मनः-परमावधि-पुलाका-आहारक-क्षपको-पद्यामाः-कल्पः । संयमत्रिक-केवल-सिद्धयश्च जम्बौ व्युच्छिन्नाः ॥४४॥२५९३॥

44. Manah-Paramāvadhi-Pulākā-Ahāraka Kṣapako-paśamāh-Kalpah I

Samyamatrika-Kèvala-Siddhayaśca Jambau vyucchinnāh. (2593)

Trans. 44. (1) Manah paryāya Jňāna (the intermediary stage of mental perception-the highest stage of concentration, (2) Paramāvadhi Jāana (attainment of high visual knowledge, (3) Pulāka Labdhi (supernatural power possessed by a Pulāk variety of ascetics of crushing the army of a cakravartin, (4) Ahāraka śarīra (one of the five kinds of body, formed of very fine aharaka molecules assumed only by highly advanced ascetics, which enables them to approach a Master, for the purpose of solving their doubts, (5) Ksapaka-sreni (spiritual advancement in which destruction of right conduct-deluding Karmas takes place, (6) Upasama-Śrèni, (spiritual advancement in which subsidence of such Karmas takes place), (7) Jinakalpa (the religious rites of a Tirthankara), (8) Samyama trika (trio of restraint consisting of parihara visuddhi (removal of evil instincts), saksma samparaya (experience of subtle conflicts), and yathakhyata caritra (attainment of the prescribed conduct), (9) Kèvala (the state of having attained Perfect Knowledge) and (10) Siddhipada-Moksa (Final Emancipation-these ten precepts disappeared after Jambū Swāmi⁶.

टीका-४४ मनः पर्यायज्ञानम्, परमावधिः, पुलाकलब्धि, आहारकश्वरीरम्, श्वपकश्रेणिः, उपश्रमश्रेणिः, जिनकल्प, परिहारविशुद्धिक-सक्ष्मसंपराय-यथा-ख्यातलक्षणं संयमत्रिकम्, केवली, मोक्षगमनलक्षणा सिद्धिश्वेति सर्वेऽप्येते पदार्था जम्बूस्वामिनि व्यवच्छित्रा जम्बूस्वामिनं यावत् प्रद्यत्ताः, न तूत्तरत्रेति ॥२५९३॥

D. C. The ten precepts that have been mentioned above existed only upto the days of Arya Jamba Swāmi, (who died in Vira Samvat 64). After him, all these precepts are said to have vanished. 44 (2593).

In reply to "a-cèlaka parisaha" the Acārya proceeds to say-

6. Vide vs 2551-2552 (foot note 4)

Vāda]

जइ चेलभोगमेत्तादजिआचेलयपरिसहो तेण । अजियदिंगिंछाइपरीसहो वि भताइभोगाओ ॥४५॥२५९४॥ एवं तुह न जियपरीसहा जिणिंदा व सव्वहावन्नं । अहवा जो भत्ताइसु स विही चेले वि किं नेट्ठा ? ॥४६॥२५९५॥ जह भत्ताईविसुद्धं राग-दोसरहिओ निसेवंते । विजियदिगिंछाइपरीसहो मुणी सपडियारो वि ॥४७॥२५९६॥ तह चेलं परिसुद्धिं राग-दोसरहिओ सुयबिहीए । होइ जियाचेलपरिसहो मुणी सेवमाणो वि ॥४८॥२५९७॥

- 45. Jai cèlabhogamèttādajiācèlayaparisaho teņa I Ajiyadiginchāiparīsaho vi bhattāibhogāö. (2594)
- 46. Evam tuha na jiyaparisahā Jiņindā vi savvahāvannam (Ahavā jo bhattaisu sa vihī cele vi kim netthā ? (2595)
- 47. Jaha bhattāivisuddham rāga-dosarahiö nisèvanto Vijiyadiginchāiparisaho muņī sa-padiyāro vi. (2596).
- 48. Taha cèlam parisuddhim rāga-dosarahiö suyavihīd | Höi jiyācèlaparisaho muņī sevamāņo vi. (2597).

[यदि चेलभोगमात्रादजिताचेलकपरिषहस्तेन । अजितक्षुदादिपरीषहोऽपि भक्तादिभोगात् ॥४५॥२५९४॥ एवं तव न जितपरीषहा जिनेन्द्रा अपि सर्वथापन्नम् । अथवा यो भक्तादिषु स विधिश्चेलेऽपि किं नेष्टः १ ॥४६॥२५९५॥ यथा भक्तादिविद्युद्धं राग-द्वेषरहितो निषेवमाणः । विजितक्षुदादिपरीषहो मुनिः सप्रतिकारोऽपि ॥४७॥२५९६॥ तथा चेलं परिद्युद्धं राग-द्वेषरहितः श्रुतविधिना । भवति जिताचेलपरीषहो मुनिः सेवमानोऽपि ॥४८॥२५९७॥

45. Yadi cèlabhogamātrādajitācèlakapariṣaha stena Ajitakṣudādipariṣaho'pi bhaktādi-bhogāt. (2594)

- 46. Evam tava na jitaparīsahā Jindndrā api sarvathāpannam (Athavā yo bhaktādisu sa vidhiscele'pi kim nestah ? (2595)
- 47. Yathā bhaktādivisuddham rāga-dvesarahito nisevamāņaņ I Vijitaksudādiparīsaho muniņ sa-pratīkāro'pi. (2596).
- 48. Tathā cèlam parisuddham rāga-dvèṣarahitaņ srutavidhinā Bhavati jitācèlaparīṣaho muniņ sèvamāno'pi. (2597)

Trans. 45-46-47-48. By putting on a garment, if one is said to have been unable to overcome the strain of uncovered state, then, in taking food etc. he would as well be said to have been unable to overcome the distress of hunger etc. It would, therefore, follow according to you, that even Tirthankaras are not able to overcome the distress of hunger etc. Or, has the rule applied to the case of (accepting) food etc. disappeared in case of (accepting) the garment? Just as, a true ascetic is said to have conquered the strain of hunger etc. in spite of his taking the prescribed food on account of the lack of passion or aversion (towards the same), in the same way, an ascetic who accepts the garment according to his religious commandment, is said to have conquered the distress of naked condition (as he does so without any passion or aversion. (2594-2297).

टीका-४५-४६-४७-४८ व्याख्या-जिताचेलपरीषद्दो ग्रुनिर्भवतीति वय-मपि मन्यामद्दे । केवलमिदं प्रष्टव्योऽसि-किं चेलमोगमात्रेणाप्यजिताचेलपरीषहत्वं मवति येन मवता सर्वथा वस्तपरित्यागः क्रियते, आद्दोस्विदनेषणीयादिदोषदुष्ट-वस्तपरिभोगेण ? । तत्राद्यपक्षे दूषणमाद-" जईत्यादि " यदि चेलमोगमात्रादपि तेन साधुनाऽऽचेलक्यपरीषद्दो न जित इति त्वया प्रोच्यते, तर्दि भक्तादिपरिभो-गमात्रादजितदिगिंछादिपरीषद्दोऽपि त्वदभिप्रायेणैव साधुः स्यात् । एतदुक्तं भवति -इह देशीवचनत्वाद् दिगिञ्छाश्वब्देन क्षुत् प्रोच्यते, आदिश्वब्दात् पिपासादिपरि-ग्रहः, । ततथ यद्येषणीयादिगुणोपेतवस्त्र-पात्र-परिमोगाजिताचेलपरीषद्दो नेष्यते, तद्येषणादिगुणसंपत्रभक्तपानादिपरिभोगाजितक्षुत्-पिपासादिपरिषद्दोऽपि न कथि-क्रगति स्यात् । अवस्वेवम्, न किश्विद् नः क्षूयत इति चेत् । अत्राद-"एवमि- त्यादि '' एवं सति त्यदभिप्रायेण जिनेन्द्रा अपि भगवन्तो निरूपमष्टतिसंहननाः सम्वैकानिधयो न जितपरीषद्दा इति सर्वप्रकारैरापक्रम् । अर्धोद्गमादिदोषविष्ठयुक्तं विश्चद्वमेषणायं राग-देषरदितो भक्त-पानादिकं सेवमानोऽपि जितक्षुत्-पिपासा-दिपरीषद्दो ग्रुनिर्भवति, तर्दि योऽयं भक्तादिष्ठ विधिरुच्यते स चेलेऽपि वज्नेऽपि मण्यमानः किं नेष्टः कापि ?--नतु तद्प्येषणीयं रागादिदोषरदितः परिश्वज्ञानो जिताचेलपरीषद्दो ग्रुनिः स्यादेवेति भावः । एतदेव व्यक्तीक्रुर्वजाह-" जह " इत्यादि गाथाद्वयं स्पृष्टम् । नवरं "सपडिवारो वि त्ति " बुग्रुक्षा-पिपासा-जीतो-र्षादिनां भक्त-पान-वद्यादिभिः खत्रोक्तयतनया कृतः प्रतीकारः प्रतिविधानं येन स तथा । इदं च डमरुकमणिन्यायेन गाथाद्वयं संबच्यते । तस्मादनेषणीया-दिदोषदुष्टवद्यपरिभोगेणेवाजिताचेलपरीषहत्वं भवति, न तु स्वत्विधिना तदुपश्चज्ञत इति ॥२५९४॥२५९५॥२५९६॥२५९७॥

D. C.

Acarya:—We fully agree with you, in believing that a person who overcomes the distress arising from naked condition, should be known as a true ascetic. But in connection with the same, I ask you this question: Are you in favour of completely renouncing the garment, because according to you, one cannot be said to have overcome acelaka parisaha if he puts on a garment? Or, do you hold the above-mentioned view in order to prevent the wearing of undesirable garments by the ascetics?

Taking the first alternative, if you are of the opinion of abandoning the garments on the ground that "acelaka parisaha" could be said to have been overcome only if the clothes are completely renounced, you are mistaken. According to this standard, even Tirthankaras will be said to have failed in overcoming the parisaha of hunger etc. in spite of their having the best qualities of courage and strength.

Sivabhati :- An ascetic who takes the pure prescribed food and drink, etc., without any desire or aversion on his part, would be said to have subdued the pangs of hunger etc.

Acarya :--- The same standard should be applied to those who accept the prescribed garments without desire or aversion on their parts. Why should they not be recognized to have overcome the pangs of being in an uncovered state? In short, we can plainly say that one who resists hunger, thirst, cold, and heat etc. with the help of food, water, garments etc., as directed by the religious rules, should be known to have overcome the respective parisaha. This shows that an ascetie is defeated by $a-c \partial laka parisaha$ only if he wears undesirable garments, but not if he accepts the same as directed by the religious rules.

Śivabhūti:-If an ascetic accepts a garment, how could he be said to have undergone the strain of *acelakatva*? For, he is said to have endured the same only in absence of the garment.

Acārya :--- Your theory is wrong. 45-48 (2594-2597).

Because,

सदसंतचेलगोऽचेलगो य जं लोग-समयसंसिद्धो । तेणाचेला मुणओ संतेहिं, जिणा असंतेहि ॥४९॥२५९८॥

49. Sadasantacèlago'cèlago ya jam loga-samayasamsiddho Tènācèlā muņaö santèhim, Jinā asantèhim. (2598)

[सदसचेल्कोऽचेल्कश्च यल्लोक-समयसंसिद्धः । तेनाचेला मुनयः सद्भिः, जि़ना असद्भिः ॥४९॥२५९८॥

49. Sadasaccèlako'cèlakśca yalloka-samayasamsiddhahı Tenācèlā munayah sadbhih Jinā asadbhih. (2598)]

Trans. 49. Naked condition with, as well as, without clothes is welknown in the world, as well as, in Scriptures. The ascetics are (accepted as) naked with garments, (while) Tirthankaras (are naked) without garments. 2598.

टीका-४९ सचासच सदसती चेले यस्यासौ सदसचेलो यद् यस्माछोके समये चाचेलकः संसिद्धः प्रसिद्धः । च श्रब्दः प्रस्तावनायाम् । सा च कृतैव । तेन तस्मादिह ग्रुनयः सामान्यसाधवः सद्भिरेव चेलैब्पचारतोऽचेला मण्यन्ते, जिनास्तु तीर्थकरा असद्भिश्वेलैर्ग्रुख्यवृत्त्याऽचेला व्यपदिश्यन्ते । इदग्रुक्तं भवति-इद्दाचेलत्वं द्विविधम्, -ग्रुख्यम्, उपचरितं च । तत्रेदानीं ग्रुख्यमचेलत्वं संयमो

Nihnavavāda

पकारि न भवति, अत औपचारिकं गृधने, मुख्यं तु जिनानामेगासी-दिति ॥२५९८॥

D. C. Acèlakatva or uncovered state is recognized in two ways: (1) By actual abandonment of clothes, and (2) By custom. Tirthankaras are called a-celaka, on account of their complete abandonment of clothes. Ascetics who accept garments dispassionately on the ground that complete nakedness would not be beneficial to asceticism, are called acelaka by custom, in spite of their putting on garments. 49 (2598).

 Λ lso,

परिसुद्ध-जुण्ण-कुच्छिप-थोवाऽनिययन्नभोगभोगेहिं । मुणओ मुच्छारहिया संतेहिं अचेलया होति ॥५०॥२५९९॥

50. Parisuddha-juṇṇa-kuechiya-thovā'niyayannabhogabhogèhim t Muṇao mucchārahiyā santèhim acèlayā honti. (2599).

[परिशुद्धैर्जीणेः कुत्सितैः स्तोकैरनियतान्नभोगभोगैः । मुनयो मूर्च्छारहिताः सद्भिरचेलका भवन्ति ॥५०॥२५९९॥

50. Pariśuddhai-r-jīrņuih kutsitaih stokaira-niyatānnabhogabhogaih (Munayo mūrechārahitāh sadbhiracelakā bhavanti. (2599)]

Trans. 50. The dispassionate ascetics become $ac \ge laka$ in spite of their putting on, a few clean, but old, and cheap clothes in a disorderly manner 2599.

टीका-५० ग्रुनयः साधवो मूच्छारिहताः सद्भिरपि चेलैरुपचारतोऽचेलका भवन्ति । कथंभूतैश्वेलंः १ इत्याह-'' परिसुद्ध त्ति '' लुप्तविभक्तिदर्शनात् परिशुद्धै-रेषणीयैः, तथा जीणैर्बहुदिवसैः, कुत्सितैरसारैः स्तोकैर्गणनाप्रभावतो हीनैस्तुच्छेर्वा ''अनिययन्नभोगभोगेहिं ति '' अनियतभोगेन कादाचित्कासेवनेन भोगः परि-भोगो येषां तानि तथा तैः । एवंभूतैश्वेलैः सद्भिरप्युपचारतोऽचेलका ग्रुनयो भण्यन्ते । तथा, '' अन्नभोगभोगेहिं ति '' एवमपि योज्यते । ततश्व लोकरूढ-प्रकारान्यमकारेण भोग आसेवनम्, प्रकारलक्षणस्य मध्यपदस लोपात्, अन्य-भोगस्तेनान्यभोगेन भोगः परिभोगो येषां तानि तथा तैरप्येवंभूतैश्वेलैरचेलकर्त्व लोक प्रसिद्धमेक, यथा कटीबल्लेण वेश्वितसिरसो जलावगाढपुरुषस । साधोरपि कच्छावन्धामावात्, कूर्पराम्यामग्रभाग एव चोलपटकस्य धरणात्, मस्तकस्योपरिः प्रावरणाद्यमावाच लोकरूढप्रकारादन्यप्रकारेण चेलभागो द्रष्टव्यः । तदेवं "परि-सुद्ध-जुण्ण-कुच्छिय" इत्यादिविशेषणविशिष्टैः सद्भिरपि चेलैस्तथाविधवस्नाकार्या-करणात् तेषु मूर्च्छाऽभावाच ग्रुनयोऽचेलका व्यर्पादेश्यन्त इतीह तात्पर्यम् ॥२५९९॥

D. C. Ascetics who put on a few clean but old, and worthless clothes, dispassionalely and in a disorderly manner, are recognized as *acelaka* out of custom. 50. (2599).

Besides,

जहजलमवगाहंतो बहुन्वेलो वि सिरवेट्टियकडिलो। भण्णह नरो अचेलो तह मुणओ संतचेला वि ॥५१॥२६६०॥

51. Jaha jalamavagahanto bahucèlo vi sirvețthiyakadillo Bhannai naro acèlo taha munaö santacèlā vi. (2600).

[यथा जलमबगाहमानो बहुचेलोऽपि शिरोवेष्टितंकटिकः । भण्यते नरोऽचेलस्तथा मुनयः सचेला अपि ॥५१॥२६००॥

51. Yathā jalamavagāhamāno bahucelo'pi sirovestitakatikan | Bhaņyate naro'celastathā munayan sacelā api. (2600)].

Trans. 51. Just as a person plunging into water with his lower garment turned round (his) head, is called naked in spite of his possessing many clothes, so also, the ascetics (are recognized) as acelaka in spite of their possessing several garments. 2600.

टीका∸गतार्था–

Also,

तह थोव-जुन्न-कुच्छियचेछेहि वि भन्नए अचेछो ति । जहत्तर सालिय ! लहुं दो पोर्त्ति नग्गिया मा त्ति ॥५२॥२६०१॥

52. Aha thova-junna-kucchiyacèlèhi vi bhannaè acèlo tti j Jahattara sāliya lahum do pottim naggiyā mā tti. (2601) Nihnavaväda

Trans. 52. Similarly, one is said to be $ac\partial la$ even with small, tattered, and worthless clothes, as in the case of a woman saying "O weaver! make haste, give me a $s\bar{a}ree$; I (look) almost naked "2601.

टीका-५२ इयमपि सुगमा, नवरं "जहत्तरेत्यादि" दृष्टान्तः, यथेद्व कापि योषित् कटीवेष्टितजीर्णवहुच्छिद्रैकसाटिका कश्चित् कोलिकं वदति-"त्वरस्व भोःश्वालिक ! शीधो भूत्वा मदीयपोत्तीं श्वाटिकां निर्वाप्य ददस्व समर्पय, नग्निका वर्तेऽहम्" तदिह सवस्त्रायामपि योषिति नाग्न्यवात्तक श्रब्दप्रवृत्तेः "जस्सट्ठा कीरइ नग्गभावो मुंडभावो अद्वायं, अदत्तवणयं" इत्याद्यपि न विरुघ्यत इति ॥२६०१॥

D. C. The "acèlakatva" attributed to the ascetics through tradition, could be understood from another example also. A woman putting on a very old and tattered sāree with many holes inside, would go to the weaver and say—"O weaver! make haste in preparing my garment, because I look (almost) naked without it." Here the word 'naked' is used in spite of the woman putting on a garment; in the same way, ascetics are called acèlaka even though they put on a garment. 52 (2601).

Lastly, in reply to "Jam ca tihim țhāņèhim vattham dharèjja" etc., the Acārya says—

विहियं सुए चिय जओ घरेज तिहिं कारणेहिं वत्थं ति । तेणं चिय तदवस्सं निरतिसएणं घरेयव्वं ॥५३॥२६०२॥ जिणकप्पाजोग्गाणं ही--कुच्छ-परीसहा जओऽवस्सं । ही लज्ज त्ति व सो संजमो तदत्थं विसेसेणं ॥५४॥२६०३॥

- 53. Vihiyam suè ceiya jao dharejja tihim kāraņèhim vattham tiļ Tèņam eiya tadavassam niratisaèņam dharèyavvam. (2602)
- 54. Jiṇakappājoggāṇam hī-kuccha-parīsahā jaö'vassam t Hī lajja tti va so saṃjamo tadattham visèsèṇam. (2603).

[विह्तिं श्रुत एव यतो घरेत् त्रिभिः कारणैर्वस्त्रमिति । तेनैव तदवइयं निरतिशयेन घर्तव्यम् ॥५३॥२६०२॥

जिनकल्पायोग्यानांही-क्रत्सा-परीषहा यतोऽवइयम्। हीर्लजेति वा स संयमस्तदर्थं विरोषेण ॥५४॥२६०३॥

- 53. Vihitam śruta eva yato dharet tribhih kāraņai-r-vastramiti l Tènaiva tadavasyam niratisayèna dhartavyam. (2602).
- 54. Jinakalpāyogyanām hrī-kutsā-parīsahā yato'vasyam I Hrīrlajieti vā sa samyamastadartham visesena (2603)].

Trans. 53-54. Since it is laid down in the Scriptures, that (an ascetic) should wear a garment on account of three reasons, he must certainly put it on in his own way. For, those who are unfit for (the practice of) Jinakalpa, should put on garments undoubtedly, for (the sake of) shame, (public) censure, and physical pain. For the sake of shame or restraint (one should do so) all the more. (2602-2603).

टीका-५३-५४ व्याख्या-ननु "त्रिभिः कारणैर्वस्तं धरणीयम्" इत्याग-मोक्तं दर्श्वयता भगवताऽस्मत्पक्ष एव समर्थितो भवति, परं शून्यहृदयत्वाद् भवान् न लक्षयति । तथाहि–इदानीं वयमपि वक्तुं शक्नुमः–''त्रिभिः कारणैर्वस्तं धरेत् " इति सत्रेऽपि विहितं प्रतिपादितं यतो यस्मात् तेनैव अकारेण तद् वस्तं निरतिन्नयेन तथाविधधतिसंहननादिरहितेन साधुनाऽवर्व्यं धरणीयमिति । कुतः इत्याह-यतो यस्माद् निरतिशयत्वेन जिनकल्पायोग्यानां साधूनां ही-कुत्सा-परीषह-लक्षणं वस्त्रधरणकारणं पूर्वाभिहितंस्वरूपमवश्यमेव संभवति । ततो धरणी-यमेव वस्तम् । यदि वा, कुत्सा-परीषहार्थं तद् न घियते तथापि हीर्लज्जा, स च संयमस्तदर्थं तावदु विशेषेणैव वस्तं धरणीयम्, अन्यथाऽग्निज्वलनादिना बृहद-संयमापत्तेरिति ॥२६०२॥२६०३॥

D. C.

Acarya:-By saying that an ascetic should put on clothes for three reasons, you strengthen our case. You are not able to see that on account of the confusion in your mind. The satra implies that an ordinary ascetic who does not possess the necessary fortitude and strength of a Tirthankara, and hence is unfit

(for the practice of) Jinakalpa, should put on garments for the sake of shame, (public) censure, and distress. He may not probably care for reproach and physical distress, but he should be very careful for shame or decency in order to practise perfect restraint. And, that is all the more reason why he should put on garments. Otherwise, there would be violence of austerity by means of litting up fire etc. 53-54 (2602-2603).

Concluding his arguments, the Acarya explains--

जइ जिणमयं पमाणं तुह तो मा मुयसु बत्थ-पत्ताईं । पुत्र्वत्तदोसजालं लब्भिसि मा समिइघायं च ॥५५॥२६०४॥ अणुवालेउमसत्तोऽपत्तो न समत्तमेसणासमिइं । वत्थरहिओ न समिओ निक्खेवादाणवोसग्गा ॥५६॥२६०५॥

- 55. Jai Jiņamayam pamāņam tuha to mā muyasu vattha-pattāim i Puvvuttadosajālam labbhisi mā samiighāyam ca. (2604)
- 56. Aņuvāleumasatto'patto na samatta-mèsanāsamiim Vattharahiö na samiö nikkhèvā-dāņavosaggā. (2605)

[यदि जिनमतं प्रमाणं तब ततो मा मुश्र वस्त्र-पात्रादि । पूर्वोक्तदोषजालं लब्धा मा समितिघातं च ॥५५॥२६०४॥

अनुपालयितुमशक्तोऽपात्रो न समस्तामेषणासमितिम् । बस्त्ररहितो न समितो निक्षेपादानब्युत्सर्गैः ॥५६॥२६०५॥

- 55. Yadi Jinamatam pramāņam tava tato mā muñca vastra-pātrādiļ Pūrvoktadosajālam labdhā mā samiti-ghātam ca. (2604)
- 56. Anupālayitumaśakto'pātro na samastāmèṣaņāsamitim | Vastrarahito na samito nikṣepādāñavyutsargaiḥ. (2605)]

Trans. 55--56. If the theory of the Tirthankaras is acceptable to you, then, do not (certainly) leave off clothes and vessels etc. Do not become susceptible to the faults mentioned before, and do not undergo violation of samiti[†] thereby.

7. The rules of irreproachable conduct as an ascetic.

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Jinabhadra Gani's

Without vessel etc., (you) will not be able to practise the whole of Eṣaṇā samiti⁸, and without garment, (you will) not (be able) to practise nikṣèpa (careful placing), ādāna (accepting with care), and vyutsarga (throwing away with due care). (2604-2605).

टीका-५५-५६ यदि जिनमतं तव प्रमाणम्, ततो वस्तपात्रादि मा ग्रुश्च मा त्याक्षीः । क्रुतः १ इत्याह-" तेणगहणानलसेवा " इत्यादिना पूर्वग्रुक्तं दोष-जालं मा लब्धाः । तथा, समितिघातं च तत्परित्यागे माऽऽप्तुहि त्वमिति । कस्याः पुनः समितेः पात्राद्यभावे विघातः १ इत्याह-" अणुवालेउमित्यादि " अञ्चक्तोऽसमर्थो भवेत् । किं कर्तुम् १ । समस्तां परिपूर्णामेषणासमितिमजुपालयि-तुम् । कथंभूतः ? अपात्रः पात्ररहितः । पुननिक्षेपादानसमित्या व्युत्सर्गसमित्या च समितो न भवेत् , उपलक्षणत्वाद् भाषासमित्यापि समितो न भवेत् , वस्ता-द्यमावे रजोहरणग्रुखवस्त्रिकाद्यभावात् । तदभावे च यथोक्तसमितित्रयासिद्धेरिति ॥२६०४॥२६०५॥

D. C. If the theory of Tirthankaras is acceptable to you, then, do not really abandon clothes, vessels etc; otherwise, you will be susceptible to faults that have already been mentioned⁹. You will also be violating the Samiti (Main Rule of an Ascetic's conduct) thereby. In absence of $p\bar{a}tra$, you will not be able to follow the whole of $\partial sana samiti$ and being unable to practise niks ∂pa , $\bar{a}d\bar{a}na$ and vyutsarga, you will not be able to perform $bh\bar{a}s\bar{a}$ samiti as well. In absence of vastra etc. like mukhavastrikā, rajoharaņa etc. you will be leaving a part of an ascetic's duties unperformed.

Thus, without pātra and vastra, you will be violating the principles of an ascetic's life. 55-56 (2604-2605).

Then,

8. The rule of moderation in desires.

9. Vide verses 2575-2579 particularly the extracts taken from Kalpa Bhāşya etc. beginning with "Kappa āyappamāņā."

इय पण्णविओ वि बहुं सो मिच्छत्तोदयाकुलियभावो। जिणमयमसद्दहंतो छड्डियवत्थो सनुज्जाओ ॥५७॥२६०६॥

तस्स भगिणी समुज्झियवत्था तह चेव तदणुरागेणं। संपत्थिया नियत्था तो गणियाए पुणो मुयई ॥५८॥२६०७॥

तीए पुणो वि बद्धोरसेगवत्था पुणो तिछंड्विंती। अच्छउ ते तेणं चिय समुणुण्णाया घरेसी य ॥५९॥२६०८॥ कोडिन्न-कोद्टवीरे पज्जावेसी य दोण्णि सो सीसे। तत्तो परंपराफासओऽवसेसा समुप्पन्ना ॥६०॥२६०९॥

- 57. Iya paņņaviö vi bahum so micchattodayākuliyabhāvo i Jiņamayamasaddahanto chaddiyavattho samujjāö. (2606).
- 58. Tassa bhagiņī samujjbiyavatthā taha cèva tadaņurāgeņam Sampatthiyā niyatthā to gaņiyāè puņo muyai. (2607)
- 59. Tiè puņo vi baddhorasegavatthā puņo vi vichanddintī i Acchau tè tēņam ciya samaņuņņāyā dharēsī ya. (2608)
- 60. Kodinna-Koţţavīrè pajjāvesī ya doņņi so sīse i Tatto paramparāphāsaö'vasesā samuppannā. (2609).

[इति प्रज्ञापितो ऽपि बहु स मिथ्यात्वोदयाकुलितभावः। जिनमतमश्रद्दधानइछर्दितवस्त्रः समुचातः॥५७॥२६०६॥

तस्य भगिनी समुञ्ज्ञितवस्त्रा तथैव तदनुरागेण। संप्रस्थिता निवसिता ततो गणिकया पुनर्मुञ्चति ॥५८॥२६०७॥

तया पुनरपि बद्धोरसेकवस्त्रा पुनइछर्दयन्ती। तिष्ठतु ते तेनैव समनुज्ञाताऽधार्षींच ॥५९॥२६०८॥

कौण्डिन्य-कोद्दवीरौ प्राव्राजयच द्वौ स शिष्यौ। ततः परम्परास्पर्चादवद्योषाः समुत्पन्नाः ॥६०॥२६०९॥

57. Iti prajfiāpito'pi bahu sa mithyātvo-dayākulitabhāvah | Jinamatamaśraddhānascharditavastrah samudyātah. (2606)

- 58. Tasya bhaginī samujjhitavastrā tathaiva tadanurāgēņa i Samprasthitā nivasitā tato gaņikayā puna-r-muñcati. (2607)
- 59. Tayā punarapi baddhorasèkavastrā punaschardayantī i Tisthtu tē tēnaiva samanujnātā'dhārsīcca. (2608)
- 60. Kauņdinya-Kottavīrau prāvrājayacea dvau sa sisyau (Tatah paramparāsparsādavasesāh samutpannāh. (2609)

Trans. 57-58-59-60. Although persuaded in many such ways, he, with his mind obsessed with vanity, did not put faith in the words of Tirthankaras, and went away, abandoning clothes. Following him, his sister also put off her clothes and went out. She was given a garment by a whore, but she put off the same again. She was again covered with a garment on the breasts by that (whore), and again, she was (on the point of) leaving the same. (But) at the advice of Sivabhūti "Let it be worn by you," she accepted it. He, then, initiated two pupils, named Kaundinya and Kottavīra, by whose tradition, the sect of the Digambaras was produced. (2606-2609).

टीका-५७-५८-५९-६०-एताश्चतसोऽपि गतार्थाः, नवरं 'सम्रुज्जाउ त्ति ' त्यक्तवस्त्र उपाश्रयात सम्रुद्यातो मिर्गतः । " नियत्था त्ति " ततो गणिकया निव-सिता वस्त्रं परिधापितेत्यर्थः । "तीए त्ति" तया गणिकया "बद्धोरसेगवत्य त्ति" बद्धमुरस्येकं वस्त्रं यस्याः सा तथेति । " ततो परंपरेत्यादि " ततः परम्परया योऽसौ स्पर्भो गुरुशिष्यसंबन्धस्तस्माद् बोटिकसंतानवर्तिनोऽवशेषा बोटिकाः सम्रुत्पन्ना इति । एतासां च बोटिकव्यतिकरसंबद्धानां सर्वासामपि गाथानामर्थं संक्षिप्य "इह यो यदर्थीं न स तन्निमित्तोपादानं प्रत्यनाहतः, यथा घटार्थी मत्पिण्डोपादानं प्रति, चारित्रार्थिनश्च यतयः, तन्निमित्तं च चीवरमिति, न चास्यासिद्धत्वम् " इत्यादिना सत्र-वस्त-पात्रपारिग्रहाविषयं वादस्थानकं इद्धैविंर-चितमास्ते, तचोत्तराध्ययनेषु द्वितीये परीषद्दाध्ययने आचेलक्यपरीषहे वृह्ददी-कायां तदर्थिनान्वेषणीयम् । तथा, इह खल्ज यस्य यत्रासंभवो न तस्य तत्र कारणवैकल्यम् , यथा श्रुद्धािलायां भ्राल्यक्करस्य, अस्ति च तथाविधस्तीषु मुक्तेः Vada]

कारणावैकल्यम्, न चायमसिद्धो हेतुः '' इत्यादिना विरचितं स्त्रीनिर्भाणविषय -मपि वादस्थानकं तत्रेव षर्ट्विंशत्तमाध्ययने द्रष्टव्यमिति ॥२६०६॥२६०७॥ ॥२६०८॥२६०९॥

D. C. Śivabhati went out of the *upāśraya* in the naked condition. He was followed by his sister in the same condition. A whore gave her a garment to cover her body but she did not bear the same. The whore again covered her breasts with a garment, which, too, was being rejected by her. But 'at last Śivabhati asked her to put on a garment and she did so.

Śivabhūti had initiated two pupils named Kauņdinya and Koţţavīra, who in their turn initiated others, and thus a chain of Boţikas was continued till the whole of the sect (of Digambaras) was produced.

Concluding the explanation of all the verses in connection with the discussion with Boțika, the author says "Iha yo yadarthī na sa tannimittopādānam pratyanādritaņ yathā ghațārthī mritpiņdopādānam prati, cāritrārthinasca yatayaņ tannimittam ca cīvaramiti, na cāsyāsiddhatvam" etc.

[He who is desirous of any particular object, is not indifferent towards the employment of cause of production, just as any one desirous of a ghata is not (indifferent) to the employment of a lump of clay, and also just as ascetics desirous of right conduct are not indifferent to clothes which are instruments (in the careful observance of vows.) It is not that this has not been proved (beyond doubt)].

A discussion on the subject of sutra-vastra-pātra-parigraha composed etc. by, old eminent, experienced Acāryas can be found in the Parīşaha Adhyayana of Uttaradhyayana Satra.

Besides "Iha khalu yasya yatrā-sambhavo na tasya tatra kāranāvaikalyam, yathā śuddhaśilāyām śalyańkurasya, asti ca tathāvidhastrīsu mukteņ kāranāvaikalyam, na cāyamasiddho hetuņ" etc. Jinabhadra Gani's

[Whatever is really impossible here, has not lack of absence of cause of production, just as there is absence of cause of budding of rice-grains on a clean slab of stone. But there is an existence of cause of production in case of *mukti* to females. This *hetu* is also not unproved.

A discussion on the subject of Nirvāņa for females can be seen in the thirty-sixth Adhyayana of Uttarādhyayana Satra.

Chapter X



Summary of Claims and interallegations of Nihnavas.

एवं एए भणिया उसप्पिणीए उ निण्हगा सत्त । बीरवरस्स पवयणे सेसाणं पवयणे न स्थि ॥१॥२६१०॥

1. Evam de bhaniyā Usappinid u ninhagā satta | Vīravarassa pavayand sesānam pavayand na tthi. (2610)

[एवमेते भणिता अवसर्पिण्यां तु निह्नवाः सप्त । वीरवरस्य प्रवचने रोषाणां प्रवचने न सन्ति ॥१॥२६१०॥

1. Evamètè bhaņitā Avasarpiņyām tu nihnavāh sapta (Vīravarasya pravacanè śeṣāņām pravacanè na santi. (2610)]

Trans. 1 In this way, Seven Nihnavas are said to have existed in the Avasarpini age, during the regime of Vira Tirthankara (Śramana Bhagavān Mahāvira). No more (Nihnavas) are said to have existed during the regime of other Tirthankaras. 2610.

टीका-१ एवमुक्तेन प्रकारेणैतेऽनन्तरोक्ताः कथिताः प्रतिपादिता अवसपि-ण्यामेव निह्नवाः सप्त, अष्टमस्तु बोटिकश्वश्वब्दसमुचितादिकारणाद् न विवधितः। वीरवरस्य प्रवचने तीर्थे । रोषाणामईतां प्रवचने ''न त्थि त्ति '' न सन्ति, यद्वा नास्ति, ''निह्ववसत्ता '' इति शेषः ॥२६१०॥

D. C. As mentioned in the foregoing pages, there have existed Seven Nihnavas in the Avasarpini age, during the regime : 330 : Jinabhadra Gani's

of Śramaņa Bhagavān Mahāvīra. Still however, the word ca¹ expressed in the verse which ennumerated their names is interpreted by the author, as well as, commentator to include another type of Nihnavas, known as Botikas or Digambaras. Excepting these types, there has never been a single type more. 1. (2610)

मोत्तुणेत्तो एकं सेसाणं जावजीविया दिही। एकेकरस व एत्तो दो दो दोसा मुणेयव्वा ॥२॥२६११॥

2. Mottanetto ekkam sesänam jävajivivä ditthi Ekkèkkassa ya ètto do do dosā muņeyavvā. (2611)

[मुक्त्वेत एकं रोषाणां यावज्जीविका दृष्टिः। एकैकस्य चैतरमाद द्वौ द्वौ दोषौ ज्ञातव्यौ ॥२॥२६११॥

Muktveta ekam sesanām yāvajjivikā dristih j 2_ Ekaikasya caitasmād dvau dvau dosau jnātavyau. (2611).

Trains. 2. Of them, barring one, all the rest believed in (observing austerities) till the end of (their) life, each one of whom has been recognized as susceptible to two faults. 2611.

टीका--२ ग्रक्त्वैषामेकं गोष्ठामाहिलं निह्नवाधमं शेषाणां जमालिपभृतीनां प्रत्याख्यानमङ्गीकृत्य यावजीविका दृष्टिः, नापरिमाणं प्रत्याख्यानं ते मन्यन्त इति भावना ।

उच्यते-प्रत्यहमवत्र्यंकरणीयत्वेन प्रत्याग्ब्यानस्योपयोगित्वाद् मा कश्चित् तथैव प्रतिपद्येत, ततो ज्ञाप्यते-निह्ववानामपि प्रत्याख्याने यावज्जीविकैव दृष्टिः, अतो नापरिमाणं प्रत्याख्यानं विधेयमिति । " एत्तो त्ति " अतोऽमीषां मध्य एकैकस्य निह्नबस्य द्वौ द्रौ दौषौ मुणितव्यौ ज्ञातव्यौ, सदोषस्यापि स्वमतस्याभ्युपगमः, परमतस्य पुनरनभ्युपगम इति । इह च भावार्थं भाष्यकार एव वक्ष्यति । इति निर्युक्तिगाथाद्वयार्थः ॥२६११॥

1. Vide verse 2300.

Nihnavavāda

D. C. Excepting Gosthā Māhila (who believed in unlimited practice of pratyākhyāna) all the Nihnavas have accepted the principle of observing *pratyākhyāna* or vow till the end of his life. This is clearly understood from the original Niryukti, but in order to prevent people from following the wrong theory of Gosthā Māhila, we beg to draw their attention to the fact that *pratyākhyāna* should be always limited to this life, and it never extends to the next life.

There is mutual allegation of faults to each one of them in this way. One blames the other firstly because he sticks to his own misbelief, and secondly, because he does not accept the right belief of the other. 2. (2611)

This is explained in details as follows :----

मोत्तूण गोट्टमाहिलमन्नेसिं जावजीवसंवरणं। कम्मं च बद्धपुट्टं खीरोदवदत्तणा समयं ॥३॥२६१२॥ मोत्तुं जमालिमन्ने बेंति कडं कज्जमाणमेवं तु। एक्नेक्को एक्केकं नेच्छइ अबद्धिओ दोन्नि ॥४॥२६१३॥ अवरोप्परं समेया दो दोसे देतिं एक्कमेक्कस्स । परमयसंपडिवर्त्तिं विपडिवार्त्तिं च समयम्मि ॥५॥२६१४॥

- 3. Mottuņa Goțțha Māhilamannesim jāvajīvasamvarņam | Kammam ca baddhaputtham khīrodavadattaņā samayam. (2612)
- 4. Mottum Jamalimanne benti kadam kajjamānamevam tu Ekkekko ekkekkam necchai abaddhiö donni. (2613)
- 5. Avaropparam samèyā do dosè dètim ekkamèkkassa i Paramayasampadivattim vipadivattim ca samayammi. (2614)

[मुक्त्वा गोष्ठामाहिल्मन्येषां यावज्जीवसंवरणम् । कर्म च बद्धस्प्रष्टं क्षीरोदकवदात्मना समकम् ॥३॥२६१२॥ मुक्त्वा जमालिमन्ये ब्रुवन्ति कृतं कियमाणमेवं तु । जुक्षैकं ज्केकं नेच्छत्यबद्धिको द्वौ ॥४॥२६१३॥

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परस्परं समेता द्वौ दोषौ ददति एकैकस्य । परमतसंप्रतिपत्तिं विप्रतिपतिं च स्वमते ॥५॥२६१४॥

- 3. Muktvā Gosthā Māhilamanyesām yāvajjīvasamvaranam i Karma ca baddhaspristam ksirodakavadātmanā samakam. (2612)
- 4. Muktvā Jamālimanye bruvanti kritam kriyamāņamevam tu Ekaika ekaikam necchatyabaddhiko dvau. (2613)
- 5. Parasparam sametā dvau doṣau dadati ekaikasya i Paramatasampratipattim vipratipattim ca svamate. (2614)]

Trans. 3-4-5. All the Nihnavas excepting Gosthā Māhila hold the observance of vow (to be) limited till the end of this life, and (believe that) Karman is intimately united with Soul, like milk and water. Excepting Jamāli, all believed that what is being done, has already been done (and so on). Each one of them disbelieves the other's principle, while the *abaddhika* misbelieves two (principles). So, when they meet, each one attributes two faults to the other by way of his disbelief of the other, and by way of his misbelief in his own principle. (2612-2614).

टीका-३-४-५ व्याख्या-एतेषां मध्ये गोष्ठामाहिलं मुक्त्वा शेषाणां याव-ज्जीवं संवरणं यावज्जीवं प्रत्याख्यानं विधेयमित्यभ्युपगम इत्यर्थः । तथा, गोष्ठामाहिलादन्येषां कर्म च संमतम् । कथंभूतम् ? आत्मना समकं जीवेन सह-बद्धस्प्रष्टम् । किंवत् ? क्षीरोदकवदिति । गोष्ठामाहिलस्त्वेतद् द्वितयमपि न मन्यत इति । जमालिप्रभृतयस्तहिं किं मन्यन्ते ? किं वा न मन्यन्ते ? इत्याह-"मोर्चुं जमालिमित्यादि " जमालिं मुक्त्वाऽन्ये तिष्यगुप्तादयः क्रियमाणं कृतं मन्यन्ते, जमालिस्त्वेतद् न मन्यते, किन्तु कृतमेव कृतमभ्युपगच्छति । एवं तिष्यगुप्तां म्रुक्त्वा शेषाः परिपूर्णं जीवमिच्छन्ति, तिष्यगुप्तस्तु चरमेव प्रदेशं जीवं मन्यन्त इत्याद्यग्रेतनेष्वपि सुधियाऽभ्यूद्य वाच्यम् । एवं "तु त्ति " तुश्वब्दस्य चश्चब्दार्थ-त्वादेवं च सति किं सिद्धम् ? इत्याह-"एकेको इत्यादि" एकैको निह्वः श्रीमज्जिनोक्तपदार्थानां मध्ये दश्वितन्यायेनैकैकं पदार्थं नेच्छति । अवद्विकस्तु गोष्ठामाहिलः पूर्वदर्शितौ द्वौ पदार्थौं नेच्छति, उक्तशेपांस्तु पदार्थान् सर्वानपीच्छ-तीति । ततः किम् ? इत्याह-" अवरोप्परमित्यादि" एवं च सत्येकत्रसमेता मिलिताः सर्वेऽपि निह्ववा विवदन्तः परस्परमेकैकस्य द्वौ द्वौ दोषौ ददति प्रयच्छन्ति । तत्र बहुरतादेः प्रादेशिकादिः परस्तस्य परस्य यद् मतं निजोऽभि-प्रायस्तदभ्युपगमरूपा या संप्रत्तिपत्तिः सा परमतसंप्रतिपत्तिस्तां परस्परं दूषयन्ति । तथा, बहुरतादेः खस्यात्मनो यद् मतं तत्र या तदनभ्युपगमरूपा परस्य प्रादेशि-कादेविंप्रतिपत्तिस्तां दूषयन्ति । एवं च सन्येकैकस्य द्वौ द्वौ दोषौ संवर्ध्यते ।

अयमत्र भावार्थः-बहुरतः प्रादेशिकं वक्ति, तत्र द्वौ दोषौ-एकं तावत् "कृतमेव कृतम् " इति मदीयमतं निर्दोषमपि न मन्यसे, "चरम एव प्रदेशो जीवः " इत्यात्मीयमतं तु सदोषमपि मन्यस इति । एवं प्रादेशिकोऽपि बहुरतस्य व्यत्ययेन द्वौ दोषौ ददाति । तथा, अयमेव प्रादेशिकोऽव्यक्तवादिनं वदति, तत्र द्वौ दोषौ-सदोषस्वमताभ्युपगमः, निर्दोषमदीयमतानभ्युपगमश्चेति । एवमव्य-कोऽपि प्रादेशिकस्य व्यत्ययेन द्वौ लेषौ ददाति । एवं तावद् नेयं यावत् त्रैराश्चि-कोऽबद्धिकं वक्ति द्वौ दोषौ-सदोषस्वमताभ्युपगमः, निर्दोषमदीयमतानम्युपगाम-श्वेति एवमबद्धिकोऽपि त्रैराशिकं व्यत्त्ययेन द्वौ दोषौ ददातीति । एवं एवं बहुरता-द्योऽव्यक्तादिभिरपि सह दिक्योगेन क्रमशश्वारणीयाः, सर्वत्र च दिक्योगे यथो-क्तदोषद्वयप्रदानं परस्परतो वक्तव्यम् ।

आह-नन्वबद्धिकः स्प्रष्टाबद्धं कर्म, परिमाणरहितं च प्रत्याख्यानमिति द्वौ पदार्थौं नेच्छतीति प्रागुक्तम् । ततश्चासौ प्रतियोगिनो निह्ववस्य त्रीन् दोषान् ददाति, प्रतियोग्यप्यस्य त्रीनेव दोषान् प्रयच्छतीति प्राप्तोति । तथाहि-अबद्धिको बहुरतं वक्ति-तव त्रयो दोषाः एकं तावद् निर्दोषमपि मदम्युपगतपदार्थद्वयं नेच्छसि, अपरं च स्वयं सदोषमपि स्वाभिमतं पदार्थं कल्पयसीति । एवं बहुरतोऽ-प्यबद्धिकस्य व्यत्ययेन दोषत्रयं ददातीति । एवमबद्धिकेन सह प्रतियोगिनां विचारे सर्वत्र दोषत्रयं प्राप्तोति, तत् कथं एकैकस्य द्वौ द्वौ दोषौ इति व्याप्त्या प्रोच्यते १--। सत्यम्, यद्यबद्धिकस्य व्यक्तिविवक्षया पदार्थद्वयभेदेन भित्रं मतं विवक्ष्यते, तदा यत् त्वं वदसि तत् तथैव मन्यामहे । यदा तु पदार्थद्वयमेदेन भित्रमपि तस्य सामान्येनैकं मतमात्रं विवक्ष्यते तदा दर्श्वितन्यायेनैकैकस्य द्वौ द्वौ दोषाविति सर्वत्र न विरुघ्यत इत्यलं विस्तरेणेति ॥२६१२॥२६१३॥२६१४॥

D. C. All the Nihnavas excepting Gostha Mahila have acce-

pted the doctrine of *sa-parim*āņ*a* pratyākhyāna. They also admit the relation of Karma and Soul as intimate as that of water and milk, Goṣṭhā Māhila tries to refute both these theories.

All the Nihnavas except Jamāli hold the view that "kriyamaņa is krita while Jamāli believes that krita alone could be recognized as krita.

Those excepting Tişyagupta rightly believe that the whole region of Jīva is Jīva, while according to Tişyagupta, the last portion alone is Jīva.

In this manner, when Gosthā Māhila disbelieves two doctrines of the Tirthańkara, each one of the rest disbelieves one. Since, each one of them holds a belief different from another, he attributes two faults to the other. For example, Jamāli the Bahurata Nihnava, accuses Tiṣyagupta first of disbelieving his own doctrine of "krita is krita" and secondly of holding a wrong theory of "no-jīva". The pradešika nihnava (Tiṣyagupta) on the other hand, makes counterallegations on Jamāli on the same grounds. Tiṣyagupta further attributes two faults of accepting a wrong belief and rejecting the right one to Avyaktavādin, who in his turn, accuses pradešika of similar faults. The same is the case with Trairāšikas and others.

It should be noted here that since the *abaddhika Nihnava* believes in *sprista-baddha* karman and *a-parimāna pratyākhyāna* he has to preach two doctrines. If these two doctrines are taken separately, he attributes three faults to the opponent who also in turn makes three allegations on him.

On the other hand, if the two doctrines are taken together as one, the allegation and counter-allegation will be based on two faults only. This is explained by the author clearly on the consideration that the *abaddhika* blames the opponent in as much as he (i. e. the opponent) disbelieves the two doctrines laid down by *abaddhika* and wrongly asserts his own theory which is not acceptable to anyone else. The opponent, too, blames the *abaddhika* on the same grounds. 3-5 (2612-2614).

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Also,

अबद्धियस्स दोसे दिंति तओ सो वि तिन्नि अन्नस्स। तिप्पभिइ तु समेया दोसे तिप्पभिइए दिंति ॥६॥२६१५॥

6. Abaddhiyassa dosè dinti taö so vi tinni annassa I Tippabhii tu samèyā dosè tippabhiè dinti. (2615)

[अबद्धिकस्य दोषान् ददति ततः सोऽपि त्रीनन्यस्य । त्रिप्रभृतयस्तु समेता दोषांस्त्रिप्रभृतीन् ददति ॥६॥२६१५॥

6. Abaddhikasya doşān dadati tatah so'pi trīnanyasya ! Triprabhritayastu samètā doşānstriprabhratīn dadati. (2615)]

Trans. 6. (The opponents) blame abaddhika. Therefore, he, too, attributes three faults to each one (of them). When three or more *Nihnavas* meet (together), each one of them tries to attribute three or more faults to the other. (2615)

टीका-६ 'तउ त्ति ' व्यक्तिविवक्षारूपेण पूर्वदर्शितविधिना त्रीन् दोषानब-द्धिकस्य बहुरतादयः प्रत्येकं ददाति, सोऽप्यबद्धिकस्वीन् दोषानन्यस्य बहुरतादेः प्रत्येकं ददाति । तदेवं द्वयोः सम्रुद्तियोरेप विधिर्दर्शितः । यदा तु त्रिप्रभृतयः सम्रुद्तिता भवन्ति तदा को विधिः १ इत्याह-''तिप्पभिईत्यादि " त्रिप्रभृतयस्तु सम्रुद्तिता स्विप्रभृतीन् दोषान् ददाति । इदमत्र हृदयम्-बहुरतादिषु त्रिषु सम्रुद्तिरेषु बहुरतः शेषान् वक्ति-ननु भवतस्त्रयो दोषाः-कुत्सितनिजनिजमतप्ररूपणाकृतौ द्रौ, निर्दोषमदीयमतविपतििकृतस्त्वेक इति । एवं सर्वत्र त्रिक्योगे उपयुज्य वक्तव्यम् । केवलमबद्धिकेन सह यस्त्रिक्योगस्तत्र व्यक्तिविवक्षायामेकदोषष्टद्वेश्व-त्वारो दोषा वक्तव्याः । तथा प्रभृतिग्रहणाचतुष्क-पश्चक-पष्ठक-सप्तकयोगेष्वपि यथासंख्यं चतु-ष्पश्च-पट्-सप्तदोषा उक्तानुसारतो भणनीयाः । केवलमबद्धिकेन सह चतुष्कादियोगे व्यक्तिविवक्षायामेकदोषट्वद्वया पञ्चादयो दोषा वाच्याः । इति गाथा चतुष्ठयार्थः ॥२६१५॥

D. C. When the first three Nihnavas meet to-gether, each one of them alleges the other of three faults. Say, when Bahurata and the other two (excepting the *abaddhikas*) meet, each one of them attributes three faults to the other, because each one preaches wrong ideals (according to the other) and rejects the right belief (held by him). Thus, all these *Nihnavas*, barring *abaddhikas*, become susceptible to three faults,

Now, when *abaddhika* joins the other two *Nihnavas*, he attributes four faults to either of the two, and becomes susceptible to four faults. In a group of four, five, six, and seven *Nihnavas*, each Nihnava attributes four, five, six, and seven faults respectively on the other. But whenever there is *abaddhika* in the above-mentioned group, one more fault is added. So, in case of four, five, six, and seven *Nihnavas* (including the *abaddhika*) each one alleges the other of five, six, seven, and eight faults respectively. 6. (2615).

Explaining the purpose of Nihnavas' theories, the author proceeds-

सत्तेया दिहीओ जाइ-जरा-मरण-गब्भवसहीणं। मूलं संसारस्स उ हवंति निग्गंथरूवेण ॥७॥२६१६॥

7. Satteyā diţţhīö jāi-jarā-maraņa gabbhavasahīņam (Molam saṃsārasca u havanti niggantharoveņa. (2616)

[सप्तैता दृष्टयो जाति-जरा-मरण-गर्भवसतीनाम् । मूलं संसारस्य तु भवन्तिं निर्ग्रन्थरूपेण ॥७॥२६१६॥

7. Saptaitā dristayo jāti-jarā-maraņa-garbhavasatīnām (Mūlam samsārasya tu bhavanti nirgrantharopeņa. (2616)].

Trans. 7. (Theories of) all the seven *Nihnavas* happen to be the root-cause of birth, old age, death, and rebirth, and also of mundane world, even with an attire of an ascetic. 2616.

टीका-७. सप्तेता दृष्टयः सप्तनिह्नवदर्शनानि, बोटिकास्तु पूर्वोक्तकारणाद् न विवक्षिताः, मूलं कारणं भवतीति संबन्धः। कासाम् १ इत्याह-जाति-जरा-मरण-गर्भवसतीनाम्। जाति नारकादिषु यत् प्रसुतिमात्रं तद्रूपा गृह्यते, गर्भव-सतिस्तु पश्चेन्द्रिय-तिर्यग्-मनुष्येषु गर्भावास इति न पौनरुक्त्यम्। तथा, संसरणं

नारकादिषु पुनः पुनर्श्रमणं संसारस्तस्य च मूलमेताः सप्तनिह्ववदृष्टयो निर्ग्रन्थरूप मात्रेण । इतिनिर्युक्तिगाथार्थः ॥२६१६॥

D. C. Theories of all the Seven Nihnavas do not, in any way, lead to the attainment of Moksa, but they become the rootcause of the samsāra and its cycle of birth, old age, death, and re-birth. They happen to be mendicants only outwardly.

Then the question arises as to whether *Nihnavas* should be considered as mendicants, or as followers of some other religion, or as householders. The author explains that they are real mendicants. Really speaking, food meant for a mendicant is not acceptable to another mendicant. Nihnavas do not follow this rule,

And,

पवयणनिह्रयाणं जं तेसिं कारियं जहिं जत्थ। भज्जं परिहरणाए मूले तह उत्तरगुणे य ॥८॥२६१७॥

8. Pavayaṇanihuyāṇam jam tèsim kāriyam jahim jattha (Bhajjam pariharaṇād muld taha uttaraguṇd ya. (2617)

[प्रवचनाकिञ्चित्करणां यत् तेषां कारितं यदा यत्र । भाज्यं परिहरणेन मूळे तथोत्तरगुणे च ॥८॥२६१७॥

8. Pravacanākineitkarāņām yat teṣām kāritam yadā yatra i Bhājyam pariharaņdna muld tathottaraguņd ca. (2617)].

Trans. 8. Whenever and wherever whatever is prepared for the (Nihnavas) who transgress the prescribed rules, should be alternatively given up, (as they affect) the original, as well as, the subsidiary predicaments. 2617.

टीका-८ 'निहूय त्ति' देशीवचनमकिश्चित्करार्थे, प्रवचने यथा भणितं कियाकलापं प्रत्यकिश्चित्कराणां यदशनादि तेपां निह्ववानां कारितं यस्मिन् काले पस्मिन् क्षेत्रे, तद् भाज्यं विकल्पनीयम् । कया ? । परिहरणया वर्जनया । कदा-चित् परिहियते वर्ज्यते, कदाचिद् नेति । यदि लोको न जानाति यथैते निह्ववा साधुभ्यो भिन्नास्तदा परिहियते । अथ तु जानाति तदा न परिहियत इति । अथवा, परिहरणा परिभोगोऽभिधीयते । यत उक्तम्-"धारणया उवभोगो परिहरणा तस्स होइ परिभोगो " इति । ततश्व कदाचिव् परिहियते परिभ्रज्यते, कदाचिव् न, इत्येवं परिहरणा । किं पुनरित्थं भाज्यम् ? इत्याह-मूले मूलगुणविषयमाधाक-र्मादि, तथा उत्तरगुणे चोत्तरविषयं क्रीत-कृतादि । ततो नेते निह्ववाः साधवः, वदर्थायकृतस्यैकान्तेनाकल्प्यत्वात् । नापि गृहस्थाः न वा तीर्थान्तरीयाः, तद-र्थायकृतस्यासाधूनामेकान्तेन कल्प्यत्वात् । तस्मादव्यक्ता एवैति ॥ इति निर्युतिगाथार्थः ॥२६१७॥

D. C. It has already been said above that Nihnavas are not real mendicants, because they do not satisfy the rule as regards food etc. prescribed for the mendicants. Food etc. meant for mendicants should never, as a rule, be accepted by others. While in case of Nihnavas, the same may or may not be accepted by others. When people do not know that these Nihnavas are different from real mendicants, food etc. prepared for them, must not be accepted by other mendicants, but when thay happen to realize the fact that Nihnavas are not real mendicants, foodetc. meant for them should be abandoned. Right from the original predicament like that of taking pledge etc. to the minor predicament like that of kritākrita etc. alternative acceptance (of food etc. meant for Nihnavas) is prescribed.

In such a case, the *Nihnavas* are neither called sādhus norgrihasthas (house-holders), nor the followers of some other religion, because their food etc. happen to be neither wholly acceptable nor wholly unacceptable, but somewhat acceptable to some other mendicants. So, they are known as *avyaktas* or indistinct. 8. (2617).

The reason of placing them under this new category is repeated, when the author again states that---

जत्थ विसेसं जाणइ लोगो तेसिं च कुणइ भत्ताई। लं कप्पइ साहूणं सामन्नकयं पुनरकप्पं ॥९॥२६१८॥

9. Jattha visðsam jāņai logo tðsim ca kuņai bhattaim i Tam kappai sāhūņam sāmannayam punarakappam. (2618)

[यत्र विद्रोषं जानाति लोकस्तेषां च करोति भक्तादि। सत् कल्पते साधूनां सामान्यकृतं पुनरकऌ्प्यम् ॥९॥२६१८॥

9. Yatra visesam jänäti lokastesam ca karoti bhaktadi i Tat kalpate sädhenäm sämänyakritam punarakalpyam. (2618)]

Trans. 9. Wherever people know in particular (that they are not real mendicants), their food etc. become acceptable to other mendicants. But ordinarily that is not acceptable. 2618.

टीका-९. गतार्था, नवरं "सामत्रकयं ति " निह्ववरूपतां विशेषेण तेषाम-ज्ञात्वा सामान्येन यत् कृतं तदकऌ्प्यमित्यर्थः ॥२६१८॥

Lastly, with regard to food etc., prepared for Botikas the author says--

मिच्छाद्दिहीयाणं जं तेसिं कारियं जहिं जत्थ। सब्वं पि तयं सुद्धं मुछे तह उत्तरगुणे य ॥१०॥२६१९॥

भिन्नमय-लिंग-चरिया मिच्छदिहि त्ति बोडियाऽभिमया। जं ते कयमुद्दिसिउं तं कप्पइ जं च जइजोग्गं ॥११॥२६२०॥

- 10. Micchāddițțhīyāņam jam tesim kāriyam jahim jattha I Savvam pi tayam suddham mole taha uttaraguņe ya. (2619)
- 11. Bhinnamaya-linga-cariyā-micchaddiţţhi tti bodiyā'bhimayā ı Jam te kayamuddisium tam kappai jam ca jai joggam. (2620)

[मिथ्यादृष्टिकानां यत् तेषां कारितं यदा यत्र । सर्वमपि तत् द्युद्धं मूलं तथोत्तरगुणे च ॥१०॥२६१९॥ भिन्नमत्त-लिंग-चर्या-मिथ्यादृष्टय इति बोटिका अभिमताः। यत् तान् कृतमुद्दिइय तत् कल्पते यच्च यतियोग्यम् ॥११॥२६२०॥

- 10. Mithyādristikānām yat teşam kāritam yadā yatra (Sarvamapi tat suddham mulam tathottara guņe ca. (2619)
- 11. Bhinnamata-linga-caryā-mithyādristaya iti Botikā abhi matāņ

Yat tan kritamuddisya tat kalpaté yacca yatiyogyam. (2620)]

Trans. 10-11. Whenever and where, whatever is prepared for mendicants preaching false doctrines, (snould) entirely (be taken) as pure according to original, as well as, accessory predicaments. Botikās are known as mithyadristikas^{*} on account of their doctrine, dress, and character being different. (Hence), whatever is meant for them becomes acceptable to other mendicants. (2619-2620)

टीका-१० मिथ्यादृष्टीनां बोटिकानां यदग्रनादि तेषां कारितं यस्मिन्कासे यत्रक्षेत्रे तद् मूलगुणविषयम्, उत्तरगुणविषयं च सर्वमपि शुद्धं साघूनां कल्पनी-यम् ॥ इतिनिर्धुक्ति गाथार्थः

टीका-११ मतं च लिङ्गं च भिक्षाग्रहणादिविषया चर्या च मत-लिङ्ग-चर्याः, भिन्ना मत-लिंग-चर्या येषां ते तथाभूताः सन्तो बोटिका मिध्यादृष्ट-योऽभिमताः, भिन्नमतत्वादिकारणात् ते निर्धुक्तिकृता मिध्यादृष्टित्वेन निर्दिष्टा इत्यर्थः । यचाद्यनादि तानुदिश्य कृतं तत् साधूनां कल्पते । आह-ननु बोटिका-नुदिश्य सचितं कर्कटिका-दाडिमाद्यपि क्रियते, अचितं चानन्तकाय-वृन्ताका-द्यपि संस्कृत्य विधीयते, तत् किं सर्वमपि साधूनां कल्पते ? । न, इत्याह-"जं च जइजोग्गं ति" तानुदिश्य कृतमपि यदेव यतीनां साधूनां योग्यमुक्तं प्राग्ठकमेष-णीयं, समये चानुज्ञातं, तदेव कल्पते नान्यत् ॥ इति गाथार्थः ॥२६१९॥॥२६२०॥

-D. C. Everything prepared for *mithyā-dristikas* is śuddha. Boţikas with their doctrine, dress, and behaviour in asking for alms etc., different from the real mendicants are, known as mithyā dristikas or false preachers. Hence whatever (food etc.) is prepared for them, becomes acceptable to other mendicants. Still however, it should be noted carefully that if the food happened to be raw vegetable like karkatika or cooked cucumber-pomegranate etc. or ananta kāya like vrintāka (brinjal) the same would not be acceptable to other mendicants. Only that which is acceptable to ascetics according to the prescribed rules, should be accepted by other mendicants and not anything else. 10-11. (2619-2620).

4)34K0 0/4K(4----

2. False preachers.

CORRECTIONS

Page	Line	Incorrect	Correct
3	23	describces	describes
6	29	अव्य	अव्यक्ताः
11	23	मिथ्यात्वमोहनीयो दयतोः	मिथ्यात्वमोद्दनीयोदयतो
12	15	मथ्ये	मध्ये
15	9	. 0	to
20	8	ef	of
29	21	khdira	k hadira
52	5	prrdèśa	pradèśa

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