Some Amphibious Expressions in Umasvati

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I

Umasvati's Tattvārthādhipamāttra [TAS], written in short, pithy sentences is devoted to the statement and elaboration of the threefold Mokṣamārga. He himself wrote a commentary on it for the purposes of explanation and clarification. But in both these works Umasvati seems to have used certain expressions amphibiously and equivocally. In some places he has attempted to explain the significance of one expression by another expression. This seems to give the impression that he reckons these expressions as synonymous. In some other places he appears to have used certain expressions interchangeably. These instances tend to generate certain ambiguities and confusions. It is the object of this paper to focus on some of them and point out that, neither in the TAS nor in the commentary, Umasvati has made any attempt to avert them. It will also be pointed out that he does not clearly demarcate the boundaries of the significances of those expressions. The expressions in question are: Artha, Tattva, Padārtha, Dravya and Sat. Of these, the discussion of the first three expressions seems to give rise to one set of amphibious expressions, while that of the last two to another. After dealing with them, we shall hint at one methodologically weak point in Umasvati that seems to emerge. We shall concentrate on the first and the fifth chapters of the TAS. For, it is in these chapters and commentary on them that the discussion of the significances of these expressions figures mainly, if not exclusively.

Coming to the first set of amphibious expressions, let us first deal with 'Tattva'. After the prefatory remarks, in which Umasvati tells us that Samyakdarśana, Samyakjñāna and Samyak-Cārlitra are the three pillars of the Mokṣamārga, he begins the discussion of Tattvas. For, Samyakdarśana, according to him, is nothing else than either acceptance of Tattvas or Arthas, or acceptance of Arthas as they are! We are not told what the word Artha signifies. Since difference of opinion about the commonly accepted convention is not registered, it seems that by Artha is meant an object, no matter of what kind. Similarly, regarding the significance of the word 'Tattva' too any deviation from the convention is not noticed. This means that Tattva seems to signify that which is the case or that which is accepted to be the case. On the contrary, the word Artha means an object, no matter given or not. It (Artha) can be an object pre-supposed, talked about, mentioned or of any other sort. Umasvati seems to hold that the expressions 'tattva' and 'arthā' are loosely interchangeable, if not totally synonymous. Our contention is not that they cannot at all be so, but that they need not necessarily be so. That the expressions 'arthā' and 'tattva' cannot necessarily be taken to be synonymous does not seem to have stuck Umasvati. That is why he appears to have taken that which is accepted to be the case and that which is considered to be an object as the same. Something may be pre-supposed to be a case or a fact; but every fact is not an object. For example, 'it is raining' is a fact, not an object. Again something may be an object, but need not necessarily be a fact. Nor should it necessarily be taken to be so. For instance, according to some, a proposition is an object; but this need not make it a fact too. Or, according to some, there are negative facts; but that does not signify that there are negative
objects also. Thus, given objects, that there will be facts is a permanent possibility. Conversely, given facts, that they will comprise of objects is quite understandable. Yet, what facts comprise of are not objects alone. Moreover, facts and objects need not be the same. Umāsvāti does not merely seem to hold that Tattvas and Arthas are the same. He seems also to favour the view that each one of them should in principle be capable of being given empirically. This view would hold provided we are talking about empirical objects and not about any object whatever. Interchangeability of the expressions Tattva and Artha would be a weak link in Umāsvāti's explanation. For, that seems to generate the view that the sets of Tattvas and Arthas are co-extensive. And it seems difficult to accept such a view.

Again in his commentary on I.2 he mentions that Jīva etc. are Tattvas and in I. 4 he proceeds to enumerate them. He enumerates seven Tattvas, and in the commentary on I. 4 he writes that these are seven kinds of objects. Here there seems to be a slip. Kinds or sorts can be enumerated, but what is enumerated need not necessarily be sorts or kinds. Such enumeration can even be by naming. Naming is an enumerative device but not necessarily a sortal one. For instance, when I enumerate the persons present at the meeting naming them as Ram, Kiran, Ajit etc., I am not enumerating kinds of persons. Here, then, Umāsvāti seems to overlook the distinction between enumerated individuals or objects and kinds of objects which can be enumerated. Thus, in the first instance, it is incorrect to equate Tattvas with Arthas; and further maintain that the same basis and pattern of classification would apply to both of them.

Further, in his commentary on I. 4 Umāsvāti states that these Tattvas (which were earlier taken to be objects or their kinds) are Padārthas. That means, he appears to take the terms Tattva and Padārtha as synonymous. But this seems to be an error as would be clear in our further discussion. As in the case of the word Artha or Tattva, Umāsvāti does not register any deviation from the commonly accepted convention regarding the word Padārtha. There are three different generally accepted senses of the word Padārtha. It may nevertheless be granted that these three senses might not be so understood at the time of Umāsvāti or perhaps even later. For, Pūjayapāda, who wrote a commentary on the work of Umāsvāti also does not shed any light on the issue. Be that as it may. But the general context of the word Padārtha leads one to believe that Umāsvāti perhaps uses it in one sense. viz., 'Padasya padena sucitāḥ va arthāh'. This is because as stated earlier, he presumes that the expressions Padārtha and Tattva are interchangeable, however loosely they may be.

What seems to have guided Umāsvāti's view is that both Tattvas and Padārthas can be enumerated. Prima facie, this contention is sound as far as it goes. Enumerative, rather than classificatory statement of Padārthas appears to be common to the discussion of Padārthas by the Prāctna Nyāya and that by Umāsvāti. Similarly, the Sāmkhyas as also Umāsvāti adopt the enumerative pattern while enlisting their Tattvas. But this seems to be too weak a ground for Padārthas being equated with Tattvas. Equation of Tattvas with Padārthas seems to be Umāsvāti's innovation. But let it not be forgotten that innovations, philosophical or otherwise, should be meaningful and tenable. The only point which Umāsvāti seems to bring to the focus successfully is that both Tattvas and Padārthas can be mentioned by enumeration. But this does not warrant the equation of the two.

As one proceeds in one's study of Umāsvāti's works one begins to notice yet weaker links in his explanatory observations. Whereas consideration of Tattvas presupposes no use of communicative language and the scheme of concepts it brings in, that of Padārthas does presuppose them. For, by Tattvas one may minimally mean the topics around which a philosophical discussion is designed to centre. It is irrelevant and redundant whether any statements are made about them or whether anything is attempted to be communicated about them. Regarding Padārthas, on the contrary, the case seems to be different. They presuppose language and communication, no matter whether successful or not. This being the case, it seems misleading to suppose that Tattvas and Padārthas are the same. Further, there can be no language, which is bereft of concepts. Any consideration of and in terms of Padārthas, therefore, presupposes some
concepts. Perhaps, it presupposes an inter-relation between or among such concepts also. But it is doubtful whether a consideration of Tattvas also presupposes any concepts and the interrelation between or among them.

Supposing again, even if one grants, for the sake of argument, that there is some relation, proximate or remote, between Tattvas and Padārthas, it does not follow that one should accept as many Tattvas as Padārthas. Further it is irrelevant for any philosophical inquiry to talk in terms of both of them. The number of items which the employment of significant expressions in a language designates and the number of topics or items that figure in a philosophical discussion need not necessarily bear any relation to one another. Nor should there be one to one correspondence among them. This is not of course to say that they cannot at all be related. The only point is that there is no necessary relation between them and the acknowledgement of a contingent relation between them does not seem to suffice for the establishment of the synonymity or interchangeability of the expressions. This being the case, it seems equally doubtful whether sets of Tattvas and Padārthas could be taken to be co-extensive. As pointed out earlier, Umāsvāti seems to take the sets of Tattvas and Arthas as co-extensive. Now, since he holds Tattvas and Arthas on the one hand and Tattvas and Padārthas on the other as co-extensive, he seems to favour the view that the sets of Padārthas and Arthas are also co-extensive. Indeed this seems difficult to accept for there is not any additional explanation and clarification in Umāsvāti’s works.

Further, Umāsvāti states that he intends to explain Padārthas in detail, definitionally or symptomatically (laksanatoḥ) and (ca) stipulatively (vidhānatoḥ). There may not be any objection to this procedure provided one does not intend to derive any ontological implication from one’s discussion of Padārthas. But it is not correct to hold that the procedure of explaining Padārthas and Tattvas can be the same. Even if the procedure of explaining both of them may contingently meet and tally, it is doubtful whether it would hold universally and necessarily. This seems, therefore, to be another weak link in the procedure of Umāsvāti’s discussion. It seems that Umāsvāti would adopt the same procedure, with regard to Arthas. One might ignore this as a similar kind of weak point in Umāsvāti’s explanation just mentioned. But it all depends upon how the logical connective and (ca) is to be understood and interpreted. If it is interpreted conjunctively it would lead to one consequence. If, on the contrary, it is interpreted disjunctively, that would lead to another consequence. But more about this, at the end of the paper.

II

Up to the close of the fourth chapter of the TAS and Umāsvāti’s Bhāṣya thereon, the discussion centres around the explanation of the nature of Jīva and other related topics. At the very beginning of the fifth chapter he declares his intention of proceeding to consider the nature of Ajīvas, they being the second Tattva. This, as far as it goes, is in line with his declaration of considering various Tattvas or Padārthas in the same sequential order in which they have been mentioned in I. 4. At this juncture, Umāsvāti seems to introduce another set of amphibious expressions. It is to this set that we now turn.

At the beginning of the fifth chapter, Umāsvāti enumerates four Ajīvakāyas or Ajīvas. He states that he intends to explain them symptomatically or definitionally. In the next Sātra he tells that Jīva etc are Dravyas. In his commentary on V. 2, he states that the four Ajīvakāyas and living beings (prānīnāsa) are Dravyas.

One may not dispute Umāsvāti’s statement that there are five Dravyas. But his stipulation here seems to disagree with his statement in the first chapter. After the enumeration

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* Really here Umāsvāti put the word ‘Kāya’, Kāya narrates Astikāya. But the author mis-takes it to Dravya. While really Kāya and Dravya have different significance in Jaina technology.

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of Tattvas, which are nothing else then Padārthas, an anticipatory question seems to be answered saying one would be in a position to bring out each one of the Tattvas beginning with Jiva etc. by naming (nāma), idolization (sthāpana), substantiation (dravya) and consideration of state/modality (bhāva). This seems to indicate that each one of the Tattvas can also be considered as a Dravya. Now, if this contention is juxtaposed with the view that there are five Dravyas, there seems to arise some inconsistency. Perhaps Umāsvāti did not realise that it so happened. It is likely that Umāsvāti intends to concentrate only on Ajivadravyas in the chapter under consideration. He also seems to mention in passing that the four Ajiva Dravyas along with the Jivadravya make five Dravyas. This may not perhaps give an impression that Dravyas are just five, no more and no less. Be that as it may.

There is another point which Umāsvāti makes with regard to Dravyas in his commentary on I. 5. He argues that (any) Dravya * is Bhavya. While explaining what he meant by this, he states that ‘bhavya’ is to be understood in the sense of acquirable. Hence, Dravya is that which acquires or can be acquired. It is doubtful whether Umāsvāti would allow this to be applied to Tattvas. If he has no objection in doing so, Tattvas too become either those which acquire or are acquirable. This would perhaps be acceptable to him, if Tattvas and Dravyas are the same.

It may, however, be contended that Umāsvāti did not mean to take seven Tattvas to be Dravyas and to hold that Tattvas either acquire (something) or are acquirable. For, one does not normally raise points of this kind with reference to Tattvas. Perhaps there is a substance in this contention. But Umāsvāti takes at least some Tattvas to be Dravyas. This should be taken to be just contingent feature. This means that, although Dravya and Tattva need not necessarily be the same, what is called Tattva may be a Dravya. In principle one may not dispute this. Yet one may object that this kind of contingency does not yield any necessary relation between them. It does not give rise to any reciprocity between Tattvas and Dravyas either. It is this which needs to be grasped. Perhaps it is likely that in the initial stages of philosophical inquiry and investigation boundaries of the significances of various expressions were not clearly demarcated. But this should not lead us to continue to do so even now.

Ambiguity of expressions in Umāsvāti does not seem to come to an end here. In the fifth chapter of the Tattvārthādhiṣṭhigasmastūtra there are in all two statements about a Dravya. They are: (i) Dravya is that which has Guṇas (and) Paryāyas; (ii) Dravya is Sat definitionally or symptomatically. Of these the former is important in one way, the latter in another. In the commentary on the former, Umāsvāti states that anything is Dravya which has both Guṇas and Paryāyas. It is needless for our present purpose to enter into the other nuances mentioned in the commentary. It seems that this statement is either about any Tattva that is considered to be a Dravya or about five Dravyas only. Whatever may be the case. We shall concentrate on the latter view, it being the least troublesome one as also being explicitly approved by Umāsvāti.

Even if we delimit our consideration to five Dravyas, there seems to be a certain ambiguity. Out of the five Dravyas, each one is said to have Guṇas as well as Paryāyas. This may be the case. But the question is: does each one of the Dravyas have a Guṇa as well as a Paryāya in exactly the same way and sense or in different way or sense? It does not seem to be sufficient to say symptomatically or definitionally that each one of the Dravyas has both Guṇas as well as Paryāyas. For, each one of the five Dravyas is not physical. Where physical as well as extra-physical Dravyas are considered together, it seems doubtful whether each one of them has a Guṇa or a Paryāya or both in exactly the same way. It seems equally doubtful whether mere symptomatic or definitional statement about all of them would establish the point.

* Here word Dravya, by Umāsvāti, is dealt with according to the root, Dravya fluid matter By this explanation he means continuity. —Editor
† There are five Astikāyas and not Dravyas, as the writer assumes. —Editor
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But this is a minor point. Let us consider the other way of explaining Dravyas. Here we are told that to be existent is the symptom or definition of a Dravya.\(^6\) Understood in this way, anything that is existent is Dravya and anything that is Dravya is existent. This seems to be slippery and ambiguous. It seems difficult to accept that anything that is existent is Dravya, for although there are Guṇas, Paryāyas etc., just on that count we do not call them Dravyas. Further, when we use ‘exists’ or its near synonyms with reference to different items, we do not use it in the same sense. For example, we do say, there is a table, there is a ghost, there is an idea in my mind, there is a human society etc. Statement of existence or obtainability does not necessarily seem to have an ontological implication. For, at least sometimes, existential claims are ontologically sterile and impotent. Hence, even if it is said that Dravyas exist, does not entail that each one of them is a part of the furniture of the world. Secondly, it also seems difficult to accept that anything, that is, Dravya is existent. This contention seems to stem from the normal convention that anything that is considered to be a Dravya is mentioned in the nominative case. But unfortunately the converse of this does not hold. For, although Guṇas, Paryāyas etc. could be mentioned in the nominative, none of them has a substantial implication. Thus, substantive usage of an expression and its substantial import do not necessarily go hand in hand. Substantive usage, however, has substantial implication but not necessarily a substantial one. The distinction could be brought out in a technical language saying that whereas substantial is object-linguistic, substantial is metalinguistic. Substantive usage and its substantial implication may seem to meet in some cases; but this is more an accident than a rule. It is for this reason that acceptance of the co-extensivity of the sets of Dravyas and Sats seems very difficult both to entertain and justify. Unfortunately, Pujyapāda goes a step further, saying that the expression Sat and Dravya are synonymous.\(^30\) And that appears more difficult to sustain.

Another anticipatory question is raised by Umāsvāti. What is Sat? The question is answered saying anything is Sat, provided it is generated or has a beginning in time, undergoes change and yet retains its unity or continuity.\(^31\) These features any Sat is supposed to exhibit conjunctively and not disjunctively. Now, if Sat and Dravya are the same, then Dharma, Adharma, Ākāśa and Pudgala too must exhibit these features of Sat. Now, we are told by Umāsvāti himself that, of the five Dravyas, every Dravya except Jīva is a Nityadravya.\(^22\) It seems, therefore, difficult to accept Dharma, Adharma, Ākāśa and Pudgala are Nityā and exhibit the features of Utpāda, Vyaya and Dhruvya.

It may be argued that when Utpāda is spoken of with regard to Nitya Dravyas it does not mean that they themselves are produced. Rather it means that they have the potentiality of producing others.\(^33\) But this would be the case provided the expression Utpāda is used equivocally. And there does not seem to be any indication to that effect. Hence, this argument, designed to give Umāsvāti a benefit of doubt, also seems to turn out to be an equally weak link.

To turn to the other definition of a Dravya. According to it a Dravya is that which has Guṇas as well as Paryāyas.\(^34\) Taking this definition of Dravya together with that of Sat would raise two questions: (a) how is one to reconcile them? (b) why are these two definitions, if Dravya and Sat are the same? First, coming to the problem of reconciliation. It has been maintained\(^35\) that what are called generation and corruption (to use Aristotelian phraseology) with regard to any Sat are nothing else than what are called Paryāyas with regard to a Dravya. What, on the contrary, is called Dhruvya (continuity or unity) with regard to Sat is nothing else than what is called Guṇa with reference to a Dravya. Thus, understood, it does not raise any dust of inconsistency. But ambiguity it does not seem to free itself of completely. For, if Dravya is Sat and Sat is Dravya and if definitions of Dravya and Sat are to be understood with regard to each one of them, there does seem to remain a weak point at least with regard to Dharma, Adharma, Ākāśa and Pudgala, if not with regard to the Tattvas like Āsraya, Bandha, Saṃvara Nirjara and Mokṣa, as well. Because, if Tattvas are Dravyas and Dravyas are Sats,
there seems to be no reason to preclude ascription of Upāda, Vyaya and Dhravyatva to each one of the Tattvas. This problem would of course arise provided Tattvas are Dravyas. If, on the contrary, Jiva and Ajīvakkhyas alone are Dravyas such a problem would not arise regarding every Tattva, Dravya and Sat, but rather with regard to some Tattvas, every Dravya and each Sat. That is, it seems that the problem would still remain with regard to Ākāśa, Dharma, Adharma and Pudgala. Instead of pressing this point further, let us, however, turn to the next problem. The reason why the separate definitions of Sat and Dravya are given is perhaps that, it may be argued, although Umāsvāti takes every Dravya to be Sat, he does not seem to take every Sat to be a Dravya. But this prima facie plausible line of the explanation of the weak link in Umāsvāti seems to turn out to be unacceptable one. For, first, Umāsvāti himself does not seem to favour this defence as he seems to take the sets of things which are Sat and Dravya to be co-extensive. Secondly, both of these could plausibly be taken to be definitions of Dravya or Sat itself. Actually, Pujyapāda maintains that, these are not two different things at all. Similarly, he states that these are not two different definitions of different things either. They are the two ways of stating the definition of Dravya itself. But both Umāsvāti and Pujyapāda seem to be silent on the necessity of giving these two definitions of Dravya. Thus Dravya and Sat seems to be another set of amphibious expressions in Umāsvāti.

III

So far we endeavoured to point out two possible sets of amphibious expressions in Umāsvāti. Our inquiry shows that, even after making sufficient allowance to Umāsvāti, there appear certain weak points in his explanation. Before we close, we wish to draw attention to one more weak point that seems to emerge by way of a corollary. In the commentary on I. 4, Umāsvāti states his intention to explain each one of the Tattvas, Arthas or Padartha definitively and stipulatively. But in the fifth chapter, while talking about Dharma etc., he states that he would explain their nature definitionally. Further, in the same chapter a question is raised: How is one to say that there are Dharma etc.? This question is answered saying definitively. Now, the two ways mentioned in I. 4 are to be understood conjunctively or disjunctively. On each count, these seems to remain some weakness. If conjunctively understood, Dharma etc., which one is to comprehend definitionally alone, are not to be counted as Tattvas even derivatively. Since Tattva, Artha, Padartha, Dravya and Sat seem to be the same, Dharma etc., cannot be called any of them. Moreover, if stipulation or description is taken as having existential import, then those Tattvas, Arthas, Dravyas etc., which lack this aspect are considered to be so either improperly or metaphorically. Now, if disjunctively understood, the ground for taking each one of them as Tattva, Artha, Dravya etc., seems to be shaky. For, criteria of lakṣaṇatah and vidhānatah respectively may bring to the fore two different sorts of Tattvas, Dravyas etc. Even the contention of Pujyapāda that whereas ‘upādavyayadhramvayuktam sat’ is a sāmānya lakṣaṇa (generic property) while ‘rupaṇaḥ pūdgalaḥ’ etc., are viśeṣalakṣaṇas (differentia) of Pudgala etc. too seems to leave a weak link. For, while accepting the distinction between two sorts of definitions bringing definienda of both the kinds of definitions under one banner does not seem to be the ground for Tattvas or Dravyas being treated on par. If we are going to count anything as Tattva, Dravya, Sat etc. irrespective of the distinction between those fulfilling and not-fulfilling existential or ontological condition, then we seem to be mixing between them. For, unless Tattvas, Dravyas etc., are of the same kind, it seems futile to call them to be so. Such way understood there remains a difficulty in the comprehension of Tattvas, Dravyas etc.; for, any mixing up between what is ontological and what is other than ontological seems unreasonable. And therein one is constrained to say that there are certain weak links in Umāsvāti’s explanation of Tattvas, Dravyas etc.
Notes and References

1. Tattvānām arthānām śradhānām tattvenā vārthānām śradhānām tattvārthāśradhānām tat samvakdarśanām.
   —Tattva bhasya I. 2
2. Tattvānī jivādīni vakṣyante/ta eva ca arthaḥ teṣam śradhānāṃ teṣu pratayāvadharanam.
   —Tattva bhasya I. 4
   —Tattva I.4.
Before Umāsvāti the Jaina canon had accepted nine Dravyas. Umāsvāti, omitting Papa and Puṇya, enumerates seven. Puṣyapāda on the contrary, accepts nine.
4. ......iti eṣa saptaviḍaḥ arthāśatattvaṃ.
   —Tattva Bhasya I. 4.
5. Pramitīvisayah padārthaḥ/ (b) abhidheyaḥ padarthaḥ/ (a) padāsya padena sucitauḥ va arthaḥ padārthaḥ.
6. tam laksanatāḥ vidhānāḥ ca purastāt vistāreṇa upadekṣyāmah.
7. uktā jīvāḥ/jīvan vākṣyāmah.
   —Tattva Bhāsya V. 1
8. ajīvākāyā dharmādharmākāsapudgalaḥ.
   —Tattva V. 1
9. tān laksanataḥ paraṣṭat vākṣyāmah.
   —Tattva Bhāsya V. 1
10. Dravyāṇi jīvāḥ ca.
   —Tattva V. 2
11. ete dharmādayāḥ catvāraḥ prāṇāḥ ca pancha dravyāṇi.
   —Tattva Bhāsya, V. 2
   —Tattva I. 5
Bhāsya on it too is instructive.
13. Dravya ca bhavye.
   —Tattva Bhāsya, I. 5
14. Bhāvyam iti prapyaḥ aha/bhu prāptaḥ atmanepadi/tadeva prāpyante prāprunvantī vā dravyāṇi.
   —Tattva Bhāsya, I. 5
15. gunaparyayavat dravyam.
   —Tattva V. 37
16. Sat dravyalakṣaṇam.
   —Tattva V. 29
This aphorism is not available in the Tattvārthādhipamāsūtram, (ed.) Keshavalal Premachand; Bengal Asiatic Society, Samvat, 1959.
17. guṇan laksanataḥ vākṣyaḥ/bhāvāntaram samjñāntaram ca paryāyaḥ/tadabhāyam yatra vidyastet dravyam/gunaparyayah asya asmin vā santi hi guṇaparyayavat.
   —Tattva Bhāsya, V. 37
18. Umāsvāti considers Jīva, Dharmā, Ākāśa, Adharma and Pudgala to be Dravyas. But he also mentions a view that Kāla too is a Dravya, without any further comment by way of approval or disapproval. Yet the Vartikakāra Pujyapāda holds that Kāla is a Dravya. He also holds that two definitions of Dravya are applicable to Kāla. cf. Sarvārtha-siddhi, V. 39
19. Sat dravyalakṣaṇam.
   —Tattva V. 29
21. Upādhyāyapradhānyuktaṃ sat
   —Tattva. V. 29
22. etāni dravyāṇi nityāni bhavanti/tadbhāvāvyayam nityam iti vakṣyate...Tattva Bhāsya, V. 3
23. gunaparyayavat dravyam.
   —Tattva V. 38
   —Tattva Bhāsya, V. 31
26. Upādhyāyapradhānyuktaṃ sat iti dravyalakṣaṇam/punah aparēna prakāreṇa dravyalakṣaṇam pratiṇāpdayanāḥ gunaparyayavatdravyam.
   —Sarva., V. 37
27. tān laksanatāḥ vidhānāḥ ca puratāt vākṣyāmaḥ.
   —Tattva Bhāsya, I. 4
28. tān laksanatāḥ prastāt vākṣyāmaḥ.
   —Tattva Bhāsya V. 1
29. uktā—dharmādīni santi iti katham ghyate iti/atrocye dravyaḥ laksanatāḥ...—Tattva Bhāsya, V. 28
30. aha—dharmānim dravyānām viśeṣalakṣaṇāni uktāni, sámanya laksanam na uktāni, tadavakṣyavat/ucyate sat dravyalakṣaṇam.
   —Sarva. V. 28—29.