



## Some Amphibious Expressions in Umāsvati

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I



Umāsvati's Tattvārthādhigamasūtra [TAS], written in short, pithy sentences is devoted to the statement and elaboration of the threefold Mokṣamārga. He himself wrote a commentary on it for the purposes of explanation and clarification. But in both these works Umāsvāti seems to have used certain expressions amphibiously and equivocally. In some places he has attempted to explain the significance of one expression by another expression. This seems to give the impression that he reckons these expressions as synonymous. In some other places he appears to have used certain expressions interchangeably. These instances tend to generate certain ambiguities and confusions. It is the object of this paper to focus on some of them and point out that, neither in the TAS nor in the commentary, Umāsvāti has made any attempt to avert them. It will also be pointed out that he does not clearly demarcate the boundaries of the significances of those expressions. The expressions in question are : *Artha*, *Tattva*, *Padārtha*, *Dravya* and *Sat*. Of these, the discussion of the first three expressions seems to give rise to one set of amphibious expressions, while that of the last two to another. After dealing with them, we shall hint at one methodologically weak point in Umāsvāti that seems to emerge. We shall concentrate on the first and the fifth chapters of the TAS. For, it is in these chapters and commentary on them that the discussion of the significances of these expressions figures mainly, if not exclusively.

Coming to the first set of amphibious expressions, let us first deal with '*Tattva*'. After the prefatory remarks, in which Umāsvāti tells us that *Samyakdarśana*, *Samyakjñāna* and *Samyak-Cāritra* are the three pillars of the *Mokṣamārga*, he begins the discussion of *Tattvas*. For, *Samyakdarśana*, according to him, is nothing else than either acceptance of *Tattvas* or *Arthas*, or acceptance of *Arthas* as they are ! We are not told what the word *Artha* signifies. Since difference of opinion about the commonly accepted convention is not registered, it seems that by *Artha* is meant an object, no matter of what kind. Similarly, regarding the significance of the word '*Tattva*' too any deviation from the convention is not noticed. This means that *Tattva* seems to signify that which is the case or that which is accepted to be the case. On the contrary, the word *Artha* means an object, no matter given or not. It (*Artha*) can be an object pre-supposed, talked about, mentioned or of any other sort. Umāsvāti seems to hold that the expressions '*tattva*' and '*artha*' are loosely interchangeable, if not totally synonymous. Our contention is not that they cannot at all be so, but that they need not necessarily be so. That the expressions '*artha*' and '*tattva*' cannot necessarily be taken to be synonymous does not seem to have stuck Umāsvāti. That is why he appears to have taken that which is accepted to be the case and that which is considered to be an object as the same. Something may be pre-supposed to be a case or a fact ; but every fact is not an object. For example, 'it is raining' is a fact, not an object. Again something may be an object, but need not necessarily be a fact. Nor should it necessarily be taken to be so. For instance, according to some, a proposition is an object ; but this need not make it a fact too. Or, according to some, there are negative facts ; but that does not signify that there are negative



objects also. Thus, given objects, that there will be facts is a permanent possibility. Conversely, given facts, that they will comprise of objects is quite understandable. Yet, what facts comprise of are not objects alone. Moreover, facts and objects need not be the same. Umāsvāti does not merely seem to hold that *Tattvas* and *Arthas* are the same. He seems also to favour the view that each one of them should in principle be capable of being given empirically.<sup>2</sup> This view would hold provided we are talking about empirical objects and not about any object whatever. Interchangeability of the expressions *Tattva* and *Artha* would be a weak link in Umāsvāti's explanation. For, that seems to generate the view that the sets of *Tattvas* and *Arthas* are co-extensive. And it seems difficult to accept such a view.

Again in his commentary on I.2 he mentions that *Jīva* etc. are *Tattvas* and in I. 4 he proceeds to enumerate them. He enumerates seven *Tattvas*,<sup>3</sup> and in the commentary on I. 4 he writes that these are seven kinds of objects.<sup>4</sup> Here there seems to be a slip. Kinds or sorts can be enumerated, but what is enumerated need not necessarily be sorts or kinds. Such enumeration can even be by naming. Naming is an enumerative device but not necessarily a sortal one. For instance, when I enumerate the persons present at the meeting naming them as Ram, Kiran, Ajit etc., I am not enumerating kinds of persons. Here, then, Umāsvāti seems to overlook the distinction between enumerated individuals or objects and kinds of objects which can be enumerated. Thus, in the first instance, it is incorrect to equate *Tattvas* with *Arthas*; and further maintain that the same basis and pattern of classification would apply to both of them.

Further, in his commentary on I. 4 Umāsvāti states that these *Tattvas* (which were earlier taken to be objects or their kinds) are *Padārthas*. That means, he appears to take the terms *Tattva* and *Padārtha* as synonymous. But this seems to be an error as would be clear in our further discussion. As in the case of the word *Artha* or *Tattva*, Umāsvāti does not register any deviation from the commonly accepted convention regarding the word *Padārtha*. There are three different generally accepted senses of the word *Padārtha*.<sup>5</sup> It may nevertheless be granted that these three senses might not be so understood at the time of Umāsvāti or perhaps even later. For, Pūjyapāda, who wrote a commentary on the work of Umāsvāti also does not shed any light on the issue. Be that as it may. But the general context of the word *Padārtha* leads one to believe that Umāsvāti perhaps uses it in one sense. viz., '*Padasya padena sucitāḥ vā arthaḥ*'. this is because as stated earlier, he presumes that the expressions *Padārtha* and *Tattva* are interchangeable, however loosely they may be.

What seems to have guided Umāsvāti's view is that both *Tattvas* and *Padārthas* can be enumerated. Prima facie, this contention is sound as far as it goes. Enumerative, rather than classificatory statement of *Padārthas* appears to be common to the discussion of *Padārthas* by the *Prācīna Nyāya* and that by Umāsvāti. Similarly, the *Sāṃkhya*s as also Umāsvāti adopt the enumerative pattern while enlisting their *Tattvas*. But this seems to be too weak a ground for *Padārthas* being equated with *Tattvas*. Equation of *Tattvas* with *Padārthas* seems to be Umāsvāti's innovation. But let it not be forgotten that innovations, philosophical or otherwise, should be meaningful and tenable. The only point which Umāsvāti seems to bring to the focus successfully is that both *Tattvas* and *Padārthas* can be mentioned by enumeration. But this does not warrant the equation of the two.

As one proceeds in one's study of Umāsvāti's works one begins to notice yet weaker links in his explanatory observations. Whereas consideration of *Tattvas* presupposes no use of communicative language and the scheme of concepts it brings in, that of *Padārthas* does presuppose them. For, by *Tattvas* one may minimally mean the topics around which a philosophical discussion is designed to centre. It is irrelevant and redundant whether any statements are made about them or whether anything is attempted to be communicated about them. Regarding *Padārthas*, on the contrary, the case seems to be different. They presuppose language and communication, no matter whether successful or not. This being the case, it seems misleading to suppose that *Tattvas* and *Padārthas* are the same. Further, there can be no language, which is bereft of concepts. Any consideration of and in terms of *Padārthas*, therefore, presupposes some

concepts. Perhaps, it presupposes an inter-relation between or among such concepts also. But it is doubtful whether a consideration of *Tattvas* also presupposes any concepts and the interrelation between or among them.

Supposing again, even if one grants, for the sake of argument, that there is some relation, proximate or remote, between *Tattvas* and *Padārthas*, it does not follow that one should accept as many *Tattvas* as *Padārthas*. Further it is irrelevant for any philosophical inquiry to talk in terms of both of them. The number of items which the employment of significant expressions in a language designates and the number of topics or items that figure in a philosophical discussion need not necessarily bear any relation to one another. Nor should there be one to one correspondence among them. This is not of course to say that they cannot at all be related. The only point is that there is no necessary relation between them and the acknowledgement of a contingent relation between them does not seem to suffice for the establishment of the synonymity or interchangeability of the expressions. This being the case, it seems equally doubtful whether sets of *Tattvas* and *Padārthas* could be taken to be co-extensive. As pointed out earlier, Umāsvāti seems to take the sets of *Tattvas* and *Arthas* as co-extensive. Now, since he holds *Tattvas* and *Arthas* on the one hand and *Tattvas* and *Padārthas* on the other as co-extensive, he seems to favour the view that the sets of *Padārthas* and *Arthas* are also co-extensive. Indeed this seems difficult to accept for there is not any additional explanation and clarification in Umāsvāti's works.

Further, Umāsvāti states that he intends to explain *Padārthas* in detail, definitionally or symptomatically (*lakṣanataḥ*) and (ca) stipulatively (*vidhānataḥ*).<sup>6</sup> There may not be any objection to this procedure provided one does not intend to derive any ontological implication from one's discussion of *Padārthas*. But it is not correct to hold that the procedure of explaining *Padārthas* and *Tattvas* can be the same. Even if the procedure of explaining both of them may contingently meet and tally, it is doubtful whether it would hold universally and necessarily. This seems, therefore, to be another weak link in the procedure of Umāsvāti's discussion. It seems that Umāsvāti would adopt the same procedure, with regard to *Arthas*. One might ignore this as a similar kind of weak point in Umāsvāti's explanation just mentioned. But it all depends upon how the logical connective and (ca) is to be understood and interpreted. If it is interpreted conjunctively it would lead to one consequence. If, on the contrary, it is interpreted disjunctively, that would lead to another consequence. But more about this, at the end of the paper.

## II

Up to the close of the fourth chapter of the TAS and Umāsvāti's *Bhāṣya* thereon, the discussion centres around the explanation of the nature of *Jīva* and other related topics. At the very beginning of the fifth chapter he declares his intention of proceeding to consider the nature of *Ajīvas*,<sup>7</sup> they being the second *Tattva*. This, as far as it goes, is in line with his declaration of considering various *Tattvas* or *Padārthas* in the same sequential order in which they have been mentioned in I. 4. At this juncture, Umāsvāti seems to introduce another set of amphibious expressions. It is to this set that we now turn.

At the beginning of the fifth chapter, Umāsvāti enumerates four *Ajīvakāyas*<sup>8</sup> or *Ajīvas*. He states that he intends to explain them symptomatically or definitionally.<sup>9</sup> In the next *Sūtra* he tells that *Jīva* etc are *Dravyas*.<sup>10</sup> In his commentary on V. 2, he states that the four *Ajīvakāyas* and living beings (*prāṇināśca*) are *Dravyas*.<sup>11</sup>

One may not dispute Umāsvāti's statement that there are five *Dravyas*.<sup>\*</sup> But his stipulation here seems to disagree with his statement in the first chapter. After the enumeration

\* Really here Umāsvāti put the word 'Kāya', *Kāya* narrates *Astikāya*. But the author mis-takes it to *Dravya*. While really *Kāya* and *Dravya* have different significance in Jain technology.



of *Tattvas*, which are nothing else then *Padārthas*, an anticipatory question seems to be answered saying one would be in a position to bring out each one of the *Tattvas* beginning with *Jiva* etc. by naming (*nāma*), idolization (*sthāpana*), substantiation (*dravya*) and consideration of state/modality (*bhāva*).<sup>12</sup> This seems to indicate that each one of the *Tattvas* can also be considered as a *Dravya*. Now, if this contention is juxtaposed with the view that there are five *Dravyas*, there seems to arise some inconsistency. Perhaps Umāsvāti did not realise that it so happened. It is likely that Umāsvāti intends to concentrate only on *Ajivadravyas* in the chapter under consideration. He also seems to mention in passing that the four *Ajiva Dravyas* along with the *Jiva-dravya* make five *Dravyas*. This may not perhaps give an impression that *Dravyas* are just five, no more and no less. Be that as it may.

There is another point which Umāsvāti makes with regard to *Dravyas* in his commentary on I. 5. He argues that (any) *Dravya* \* is *Bhavya*.<sup>13</sup> While explaining what he meant by this, he states that 'bhavya' is to be understood in the sense of acquirable. Hence, *Dravya* is that which acquires or can be acquired<sup>14</sup>. It is doubtful whether Umāsvāti would allow this to be applied to *Tattvas*. If he has no objection in doing so, *Tattvas* too become either those which acquire or are acquirable. This would perhaps be acceptable to him, if *Tattvas* and *Dravyas* are the same.

It may, however, be contended that Umāsvāti did not mean to take seven *Tattvas* to be *Dravyas* and to hold that *Tattvas* either acquire (something) or are acquirable. For, one does not normally raise points of this kind with reference to *Tattvas*. Perhaps there is a substance in this contention. But Umāsvāti takes at least some *Tattvas* to be *Dravyas*. This should be taken to be just contingent feature. This means that, although *Dravya* and *Tattva* need not necessarily be the same, what is called *Tattva* may be a *Dravya*. In principle one may not dispute this. Yet one may object that this kind of contingency does not yield any necessary relation between them. It does not give rise to any reciprocity between *Tattvas* and *Dravyas* either. It is this which needs to be grasped. Perhaps it is likely that in the initial stages of philosophical inquiry and investigation boundaries of the significances of various expressions were not clearly demarcated. But this should not lead us to continue to do so even now.

Ambiguity of expressions in Umāsvāti does not seem to come to an end here. In the fifth chapter of the *Tattvārthādhigamasūtra* there are in all two statements about a *Dravya*. They are : (i) *Dravya* is that which has *Guṇas* (and) *Paryāyas*;<sup>15</sup> (ii) *Dravya* is *Sat* definitionally or symptomatically.<sup>16</sup> Of these the former is important in one way, the latter in another. In the commentary on the former, Umāsvāti states that anything is *Dravya* which has both *Guṇas* and *Paryāyas*.<sup>17</sup> It is needless for our present purpose to enter into the other nuances mentioned in the commentary. It seems that this statement is either about any *Tattva* that is considered to be a *Dravya* or about five *Dravyas*<sup>18†</sup> only. Whatever may be the case. We shall concentrate on the latter view, it being the least troublesome one as also being explicitly approved by Umāsvāti.

Even if we delimit our consideration to five *Dravyas*, there seems to be a certain ambiguity. Out of the five *Dravyas*, each one is said to have *Guṇas* as well as *Paryāyas*. This may be the case. But the question is : does each one of the *Dravyas* have a *Guṇa* as well as a *Paryāya* in exactly the same way and sense or in different way or sense ? It does not seem to be sufficient to say symptomatically or definitionally that each one of the *Dravyas* has both *Guṇas* as well as *Paryāyas*. For, each one of the five *Dravyas* is not physical. Where physical as well as extra-physical *Dravyas* are considered together, it seems doubtful whether each one of them has a *Guṇa* or a *Paryāya* or both in exactly the same way. It seems equally doubtful whether mere symptomatic or definitional statement about all of them would establish the point.

\* Here word *Dravya*, by Umāsvāti, is dealt with according to the root, *Dravya* fluid matter By this explanation he means continuity. —Editor

† There are five *Astikāyas* and not *Dravyas*, as the writer assumes. —Editor

But this is a minor point. Let us consider the other way of explaining *Dravyas*. Here we are told that to be existent is the symptom or definition of a *Dravya*.<sup>19</sup> Understood in this way, anything that is existent is *Dravya* and anything that is *Dravya* is existent. This seems to be slippery and ambiguous. It seems difficult to accept that anything that is existent is *Dravya*, for although there are *Guṇas*, *Paryāyas* etc., just on that count we do not call them *Dravyas*. Further, when we use 'exists' or its near synonyms with reference to different items, we do not use it in the same sense. For example, we do say, there is a table, there is a ghost, there is an idea in my mind, there is a human society etc. Statement of existence or obtainability does not necessarily seem to have an ontological implication. For, at least sometimes, existential claims are ontologically sterile and impotent. Hence, even if it is said that *Dravyas* exist, does not entail that each one of them is a part of the furniture of the world. Secondly, it also seems difficult to accept that anything, that is, *Dravya* is existent. This contention seems to stem from the normal convention that anything that is considered to be a *Dravya* is mentioned in the nominative case. But unfortunately the converse of this does not hold. For, although *Guṇas*, *Paryāyas* etc. could be mentioned in the nominative, none of them has a substantial implication. Thus, substantive usage of an expression and its substantial import do not necessarily go hand in hand. Substantive usage, however, has substantival implication but not necessarily a substantial one. The distinction could be brought out in a technical language saying that whereas substantival is object-linguistic, substantial is metalinguistic. Substantive usage and its substantial implication may seem to meet in some cases; but this is more an accident than a rule. It is for this reason that acceptance of the co-extensivity of the sets of *Dravyas* and *Sats* seems very difficult both to entertain and justify. Unfortunately, Pūjyapāda goes a step further, saying that the expression *Sat* and *Dravya* are synonymous.<sup>20</sup> And that appears more difficult to sustain.

Another anticipatory question is raised by Umāsvāti. What is *Sat*? The question is answered saying anything is *Sat*, provided it is generated or has a beginning in time, undergoes change and yet retains its unity or continuity.<sup>21</sup> These features any *Sat* is supposed to exhibit conjunctively and not disjunctively. Now, if *Sat* and *Dravya* are the same, then *Dharma*, *Adharma*, *Ākāśa* and *Pudgala* too must exhibit these features of *Sat*. Now, we are told by Umāsvāti himself that, of the five *Dravyas*, every *Dravya* except *Jiva* is a *Nityadravya*.<sup>22</sup> It seems, therefore, difficult to accept *Dharma*, *Adharma*, *Ākāśa* and *Pudgala* are *Nityā* and exhibit the features of *Utpāda*, *Vyaya* and *Dhrauvya*.

It may be argued that when *Utpāda* is spoken of with regard to *Nitya Dravyas* it does not mean that they themselves are produced. Rather it means that they have the potentiality of producing others.<sup>23</sup> But this would be the case provided the expression *Utpāda* is used equivocally. And there does not seem to be any indication to that effect. Hence, this argument, designed to give Umāsvāti a benefit of doubt, also seems to turn out to be an equally weak link.

To turn to the other definition of a *Dravya*. According to it a *Dravya* is that which has *Guṇas* as well as *Paryāyas*.<sup>24</sup> Taking this definition of *Dravya* together with that of *Sat* would raise two questions: (a) how is one to reconcile them? (b) why are these two definitions, if *Dravya* and *Sat* are the same? First, coming to the problem of reconciliation. It has been maintained<sup>25</sup> that what are called generation and corruption (to use Aristotelian phraseology) with regard to any *Sat* are nothing else than what are called *Paryāyas* with regard to a *Dravya*. What, on the contrary, is called *Dhrauvya* (continuity or unity) with regard to *Sat* is nothing else than what is called *Guṇa* with reference to a *Dravya*. Thus, understood, it does not raise any dust of inconsistency. But ambiguity it does not seem to free itself of completely. For, if *Dravya* is *Sat* and *Sat* is *Dravya* and if definitions of *Dravya* and *Sat* are to be understood with regard to each one of them, there does seem to remain a weak point at least with regard to *Dharma*, *Adharma*, *Ākāśa* and *Pudgala*, if not with regard to the *Tattvas* like *Āsrava*, *Bandha*, *Samvara*, *Nirjara* and *Mokṣa*, as well. Because, if *Tattvas* are *Dravyas* and *Dravyas* are *Sats*,



there seems to be no reason to preclude ascription of *Utpāda*, *Vyaya* and *Dhauvyatva* to each one of the *Tattvas*. This problem would of course arise provided *Tattvas* are *Dravyas*. If, on the contrary, *Jīva* and *Ajīvakāyas* alone are *Dravyas* such a problem would not arise regarding every *Tattva*, *Dravya* and *Sat*, but rather with regard to some *Tattvas*, every *Dravya* and each *Sat*. That is, it seems that the problem would still remain with regard to *Ākāśa*, *Dharma*, *Adharma* and *Pudgala*. Instead of pressing this point further, let us, however, turn to the next problem. The reason why the separate definitions of *Sat* and *Dravya* are given is perhaps that, it may be argued, although Umāsvāti takes every *Dravya* to be *Sat*, he does not seem to take every *Sat* to be a *Dravya*. But this *prima facie* plausible line of the explanation of the weak link in Umāsvāti seems to turn out to be unacceptable one. For, first, Umāsvāti himself does not seem to favour this defence as he seems to take the sets of things which are *Sat* and *Dravya* to be co-extensive. Secondly, both of these could plausibly be taken to be definitions of *Dravya* or *Sat* itself. Actually, Pūjyapāda maintains<sup>26</sup> that, these are not two different things at all. Similarly, he states that these are not two different definitions of different things either. They are the two ways of stating the definition of *Dravya* itself. But both Umāsvāti and Pūjyapāda seem to be silent on the necessity of giving these two definitions of *Dravya*. Thus *Dravya* and *Sat* seems to be another set of amphibious expressions in Umāsvāti.

### III

So far we endeavoured to point out two possible sets of amphibious expressions in Umāsvāti. Our inquiry shows that, even after making sufficient allowance to Umāsvāti, there appear certain weak points in his explanation. Before we close, we wish to draw attention to one more weak point that seems to emerge by way of a corollary. In the commentary on I. 4, Umāsvāti states his intention to explain each one of the *Tattvas*, *Arthas* or *Padārthas* definitionally and stipulatively.<sup>27</sup> But in the fifth chapter, while talking about *Dharma* etc., he states that he would explain their nature definitionally.<sup>28</sup> Further, in the same chapter a question is raised : How is one to say that there are *Dharma* etc. ? This question is answered saying definitionally. Now, the two ways mentioned in I. 4 are to be understood conjunctively or disjunctively. On each count, these seems to remain some weakness. If conjunctively understood, *Dharma* etc., which one is to comprehend definitionally alone, are not to be counted as *Tattvas* even derivatively. Since *Tattva*, *Artha*, *Padārtha*, *Dravya* and *Sat* seem to be the same, *Dharma* etc., cannot be called any of them. Moreover, if stipulation or description is taken as having existential import, then those *Tattvas*, *Arthas*, *Dravyas* etc., which lack this aspect are considered to be so either improperly or metaphorically. Now, if disjunctively understood, the ground for taking each one of them as *Tattva*, *Artha*, *Dravya* etc., seems to be shaky. For, criteria of *lakṣaṇataḥ* and *vidhānataḥ* respectively may bring to the fore two different sorts of *Tattvas*, *Dravyas* etc. Even the contention of Pūjyapāda that whereas '*utpādayayadhrauvayayuktaṃ sat*' is a *sāmānya lakṣaṇa* (generic property) while '*rupiṇaḥ pudgalaḥ*' etc., are *viśeṣalakṣaṇas* (differentia) of *Pudgala* etc. too seems to leave a weak link.<sup>30</sup> For, while accepting the distinction between two sorts of definitions bringing definienda of both the kinds of definitions under one banner does not seem to be the ground for *Tattvas* or *Dravyas* being treated on par. If we are going to count anything as *Tattva*, *Dravya*, *Sat* etc. irrespective of the distinction between those fulfilling and not-fulfilling existential or ontological condition, then we seem to be mixing between them. For, unless *Tattvas*, *Dravyas*, etc., are of the same kind, it seems futile to call them to be so. Such way understood there remains a difficulty in the comprehension of *Tattvas*, *Dravyas* etc. ; for, any mixing up between what is ontological and what is other than ontological seems unreasonable. And therein one is constrained to say that there are certain weak links in Umāsvāti's explanation of *Tattvas*, *Dravyas* etc.

## Notes and References

1. Tattvānām arthānām śradhānam tattvena vārthānam śradhānam tattvārthaśradhānām tat samyakdarśanam. —Tattva bhasya I. 2
2. Tattvāni jivādini vakṣyante/ta eva ca arthāḥ teṣam śraddhānam teṣu pratyayāvadharanam. —Tattva bhasya I. 2.
3. Jivājivāsra-bandhasamvaranirjarāmokṣaḥ tattvaṃ. —Tattva I.4.  
Before Umāsvāti the Jaina cannon had accepted nine Dravyas. Umāsvāti, omitting Papa and Puṇya, enumerates seven. Pūjyapāda on the contrary, accepts nine.
4. ....iti eṣa saptavidhaḥ arthāstattvaṃ. —Tattva Bhasya I. 4.
5. Pramitivisayaḥ padārthaḥ/ (b) abhidheyaḥ padārthaḥ/ (a) padāśya padena sucitaḥ va arthaḥ padrāthaḥ.
6. tam lakṣaṇataḥ vidhānataḥ ca purastāt vistāreṇa upadekṣyāmaḥ. —Tattva Bhasya, I. 4.
7. uktā jivāḥ/ajīvan vakṣyāmaḥ. —Tattva Bhasya V. 1
8. ajīvakāyā dharmādharma-kāśapudgalaḥ. —Tattva V. 1
9. tān lakṣaṇataḥ parastāt vakṣyāmaḥ. —Tattva Bhasya V. 1
10. Dravyāṇi jivāḥ ca. —Tattva V. 2
11. ete dharmādayāḥ catvāraḥ praṇināḥ ca pañca dravyāṇi. —Tattva Bhasya, V. 2
12. Nāmasthāpanādravyabhāvataḥ tanniyāsaḥ. —Tattva I. 5  
Bhasya on it too is instructive.
13. Dravya ca bhavye. —Tattva Bhasya, I. 5
14. Bhāvyam iti prapyam aha/bhu prāptau atmanepadi/tadeva prāpyante prāpnuvanti vā dravyāṇi. —Tattva Bhasya, I. 5
15. guṇaparyayavat dravyam. —Tattva V. 37
16. Sat dravyalakṣaṇam. —Tattva V. 29  
This aphorism is not available in the Tattvārthādhigamasūtram, (ed) Keshavalal Premachand ; Bengal Asiatic Society, Samvat, 1959.
17. guṇān lakṣaṇataḥ vakṣyāmaḥ/bhāvāntaram samjñāntaram ca paryāyāḥ/tadubhayam yatra vidyatetat dravyam/guṇaparyayaḥ asya asmin vā santi iti guṇaparyayavat. —Tattva Bhasya, V. 37
18. Umāsvāti considers Jiva, Dharma, Ākāśa, Adharma and Pudgala to be Dravyas. But he also mentions a view that Kāla too is a Dravya, without any further comment by way of approval or disapproval. Yet the Vartikakāra Pūjyapāda holds that Kāla is a Dravya. He also holds that two definitions of Dravya are applicable to Kāla. cf. Sarvārthasiddhi, V. 39
19. Sat dravyalakṣaṇam. —Tattva V. 29
20. Yat sat tat dravyamityarthāḥ —Sarva. V. 29 (Kolhapur Edition, Samvat, 1825)
21. Utpādayayadhrauvayayuktam sat —Tattva. V. 29
22. etāni dravyāṇi nityāni bhavanti/tadbhāvavyayam nityam iti vakṣyate...Tattva Bhasya, V. 3
23. guṇaparyayavat dravyam. —Tattva, V. 38
24. Utpannam vā utpanne vā utpannāni va sat. —Tattva Bhasya, V. 31
25. Devendramuni Shastri : Jaina Darśana : Svarūpa aur viśeṣaṇa, p. 59.
26. Utpādayayadhrauvayayuktam sat iti dravyalakṣaṇam/punah aparena prakāreṇa dravyalakṣaṇam pratipādayannāḥ guṇaparyayavatdravyam. —Sarva., V. 37
27. tān lakṣaṇataḥ vidhānataḥ ca purstāt vakṣyāmaḥ. —Tattva Bhasya, I. 4
28. tān lakṣaṇataḥ prastāt vakṣyāmaḥ. —Tattva Bhasya V. 1
29. atraḥa—dharmādini santi iti katham grhyate iti/atrocyaṭe lakṣaṇataḥ..—Tattva Bhasya, V. 28
30. aha—dharmādinaṃ dravyānām viśeṣalakṣaṇāni uktāni, sāmānya lakṣaṇam na uktāni, tadvaktavyam/ucyate sat dravyalakṣaṇam. —Sarva. V. 28—29.

