

# Some Aspects Of The Rasa Theory

Edited by

**V. M. Kulkarni** M.A., Ph.D.



**BHOGILAL LEHERCHAND INSTITUTE OF INDOLOGY**

(a Project of Shree Vallabh Smarak)

**DELHI (Extension Centre, Patan)**



## About the Volume

Of the Sanskrit theories of art the *rasa* theory is the most important. This theory has been much discussed and written about. Some of its aspects, however, needed to be re-examined. These aspects include: the nature of *rasa*: *laukika*, *alaukika*, the *rasa* theory and the *darśanas* (systems of philosophy), the *rasa* theory in relation to other fine arts, the *rasa* theory and its relevance to modern literature, catharsis and *rasa*, and the like.

The present volume discusses some of these aspects critically and exhaustively and should provide rich food for thought and stimulate further study and research in depth in the field of ancient critical thought in India and its relation with modern literary thought in the West.

## About the Editor

Dr. V. M. Kulkarni, formerly Director, B. L. Institute of Indology, Patan, Professor of Sanskrit and Prakrit (Maharashtra Educational Service, Class I) and Director of Languages, Maharashtra State, Bombay has taught Sanskrit and Prakrit Literature, Sanskrit Poetics and Aesthetics for several years. Besides contributing critical articles and notes to Encyclopaedias in English and Marathi he has published over ninety papers and critical reviews in various research Journals of repute.

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*Prakrit Verses In Sanskrit Works On Poetics* — A Critical Edition : Volume I (dealing with over 2800 Prakrit verses and their Sanskrit Cchāyā and Alphabetical Indexes), being published by the B.L. Institute of Indology, Delhi, (in the press), and several editions such as :

B. L. Series No. 4

*General Editor : V. M. Kulkarni*

# Some Aspects of the Rasa Theory

(A Collection of Papers read at the "Rasa" Seminar)

*Edited by*

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## PUBLISHER'S NOTE

We have great pleasure in presenting to the world of scholars *Some Aspects of the Rasa Theory* as the fourth volume of the Bhogilal Leherchand Series. There has been considerable delay in publishing this book for reasons over which we could not possibly have any control and therefore we crave the indulgence of the scholars who have contributed the papers to this publication.

We sincerely thank Professor V. M. Kulkarni and his Research Assistant, Miss Nirmalaben Chheda, M.A., for successfully organising the Seminar on the Rasa Theory at Patan in 1982 and preparing the Press-copy of this volume. Our thanks are due to the authorities of the Mouj Printing Bureau, Khatau Wadi, Bombay who have spared no pains to make the volume attractive.

This volume, it is earnestly hoped, will be warmly welcomed by scholars interested in the theories of art, more especially in the Indian theories of art and comparative aesthetics.

Bombay  
8 September 1986

**Pratap Bhogilal**  
Chairman, Governing Council  
B. L. Institute of Indology, Delhi

ज्ञान-क्रियाभ्यां मोक्षः ।

तज्ज्ञानमेव न भवति

यस्मिन्नुदिते विभाति राग-गणः ।

तमसः कुतोऽस्ति शक्ति-

र्दिनकर-किरणाग्रतः स्थातुम् ॥

रुचीनां वैचित्र्याद्भुजुकुटिलनानापथजुषां

नृणामेको गम्यस्त्वमसि पयसामर्णव इव ॥



SETH BHOGILAL LEHERCHAND

Born: 9th April, 1883

Died: 7th December, 1979

MOTTO IN LIFE

*'Simple living — High thinking'*





## PREFACE

The Institute has decided to bring out a series of books and monographs on different aspects of Indology. Our primary aim is to cover fields which have not attracted the attention of scholars so far and to publish books on subjects in which a re-examination has become necessary.

Of the Sanskrit theories of art, the most important is the well-known *rasa* theory. It has been much discussed and quite a lot has been written about it. It was, however, felt necessary to re-examine some of the aspects of the *rasa* theory, for example, the nature of *rasa* : *laukika*, *alaukika*, *rasa* theory and the *darśanas* (systems of philosophy), the *rasa* theory and its application to all other fine arts, the relevance of *rasa* theory to modern literature, catharsis and *rasa*, etc. Eminent scholars of Sanskrit, English, Marathi and Gujarati literatures were, therefore, invited to read papers on the above topics at the Rasa Seminar, organised by the Institute in February 1982 at Patan (North Gujarat). These papers have been included in the present volume. We have added by way of Appendices two more related papers, 'The Relevance of Sanskrit poetics to Contemporary Practical Criticism' by Śrī Umāshankar Joshi and, 'Does the Rasa theory have any modern relevance?' by Dr. R. B. Patankar, first published in *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bombay* and in *Philosophy East and West* 30, no. 3, July 1980 : The University Press of Hawaii respectively. We are grateful to the authorities of *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bombay* and *Philosophy East and West* who readily gave permission to include them in the present volume. We tender our heartiest thanks to Dr. E. A. Solomon, Professor and Head, Department of Sanskrit, School of Languages, Gujarat University, Ahmedabad for inaugurating the Seminar and Dr. K. P. Joag, Professor of Sanskrit, Deccan College, Pune, and Professor Nagindas Parekh, Ahmedabad for actively participating in the Seminar, and all the scholars who contributed their papers on the topics assigned to them, and made the Seminar a success.

We hope scholars interested in the Sanskrit Aesthetics and Comparative Aesthetics will find the papers thought-provoking and that these papers will stimulate further study and research in depth in the field of ancient critical thought in India and modern literary thought in the West.

V. M. Kulkarni

Director

31st December 1982  
Patan (North Gujarat)

B. L. Institute of Indology, Patan

Resepctfully Dedicated

To

Pūjya Mahattarā Sādhvīśrī Mṛgāvatiji

Who with her learning and devotion tried to realize  
the ennobling ideals of her Guru

Ācāryaśrī Vijayavallabhasūri, the Yugadraṣṭā

Pratap Bhogilal  
Chairman, Governing Council  
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# The Basic Modes of Poetic Expression<sup>1</sup>

H. C. BHAYANI

According to the early tradition of Indian poetics *Alaṅkāra*, embellishment, was the principal source of poetic beauty, and it distinguished poetic expression from non-poetic expression. In this tradition *Svabhāvokti*, natural description, seems to have caused considerable difficulty. It involved an unresolved paradox. If *Alaṅkāra* was the *sine qua non* of poetry, *Svabhāvokti* cannot claim to be poetry, because the relationship of embellishment and that which is embellished was inherent in the former, but the latter was by definition unembellished expression (*Kuntaka*).<sup>2</sup> On the other hand, it could not be denied that poems having just *Svabhāvokti* and no other figure were felt to be beautiful (*Mahima-bhaṭṭa*).<sup>3</sup> Even prior to *Bhāmaha* the opinion in this matter was sharply divided: Some rejecting and others somehow accepting *Svabhāvokti*. It was not merely a technical issue or theoretical matter of marginal value. Works of best poets had numerous passages graphically describing objects and situations without using figurative expressions, and there were hundreds of short lyrics, *Muktakas*, wherein the main source of poetic charm was *Svabhāvokti*.

It was therefore inevitable to recognize two distinct basic sources of poetic beauty. Accordingly, the whole domain of literature was classified into *Svabhāvokti*, using the natural mode of expression, and *Vakrokti*, using the figurative mode (*Daṇḍin*).<sup>4</sup>

In the *Dhvani* tradition, however, the basis of poetic beauty was thought to be quite different. The special manner in which the poetic meaning was conveyed, *Vyañjanā*, suggestion, was accepted as the principal ground of poetic beauty. The suggested sense may be an emotion, *Rasa*, a figure, *Alaṅkāra* or an idea, *Vastu*. Of these the suggestion of emotion, *Rasadhvani*, was considered poetically the most excellent (*Ānandavardhana*, *Abhinavagupta*). Even though *Alaṅkāra* was said to be another ground of poetic beauty, this was said just for the sake of form, for it was categorically stated that the poetry bereft of *Rasa* and having only *Alaṅkāra* was imitation poetry, hardly

- 
1. The present paper partly aims at making explicit and drawing pointed attention to what has been implicit in V. Raghavan's detailed treatment of the various points touched here briefly. See 'Some Concepts of the *Alaṅkāra Śāstra*,' 1942, pp. 92-130; Bhoja's *Śṛṅgāra Prakāśa*, 1963, pp. 105-137, 401. That treatment requires however, to be supplemented by an account of *Kuntaka*'s views, which is a serious omission.
  2. *Vakroktijīvitā*, I 11-15.
  3. *Vyaktiviveka*, pp. 108-109.
  4. सिन्नं द्विधा स्वभावोक्तिर्वकोक्तिश्चेति वाङ्मयम् । (*Kāvyādarśa*, II-363)



worthy of the name.<sup>5</sup> Quite obviously, Svabhāvokti can have quite an insignificant place in this scheme of things.

A serious consequence of accepting such a position is that a large mass of Sanskrit and Prakrit poems would be consigned to a very inferior status. Svabhāvoktis would be put down either as specimens of weak poetic exercises, or alternatively, they would be accepted as secondary poems, by associating with them a shade of emotion on the basis of some supposed context (Jagannātha).<sup>6</sup> Possibly there were historical reasons for this down-right devaluation of the poetic beauty deriving exclusively from Alāṅkāra and Svabhāva-varṇana.

Bhoja has recognized three types of poetic beauty, based on three distinct modes of expression : Svabhāvokti, Vakrokti and Rasokti, i. e. natural description, figurative description and delineation of emotion respectively.<sup>7</sup> When the poetic beauty primarily derives from Guṇa we have Svabhāvokti; when it derives from Alāṅkāra, we have Vakrokti; when it derives from the delineation of Rasa, we have Rasokti.

The credit, however, goes to Kuntaka for working out basic principles of categorizing the poetic expression. His treatment of the problem is marked by perception, lucidity and logical rigour. The introduction to his treatment of Alāṅkāras in the *Vakroktijīvita* (III-1-16) establishes that the poetic beauty deriving primarily from non-figurative description of objects (as in Svabhāvokti) and delineation of emotions (as in Rasavat) inheres in the poetic subject-matter or content, Vastu, while that deriving primarily from the embellishment, Alāṅkāra, of the poetic content inheres in the verbal expression. In Kuntaka's words, in the former case the Saundarya is Svābhāvika, while in the latter case it is Racanā-vaicitrya-yukta.

Dhvanivāda and Rasavāda cannot account for the whole range of the experience of beauty in poetry. Some types of experiences have quite a different basis. The aesthetic experience produced by natural description of objects remains unaccounted for by the Dhvani theory, and that produced by rhetorical description remains unaccounted for by the Rasa theory.

Ruyyaka and Jayaratha have pointed out the psychological basis of Svabhāvokti and Rasavat Alāṅkāra (which closely corresponds to Rasokti). In poetry the Sahrdaya experiences Hrdaya-samvāda, the correspondence or

5. *Dhvanyāloka*, Vṛtti on III 41-42; *Locana* on the same.

6. यत्तु रसवदेव काव्यमिति साहित्यदर्पणे निर्णीतम्, तन्न । वस्त्वलंकारप्रधानानां काव्यानामकाव्यत्वापत्तेः । न चेष्टापत्तिर्महाकविसंप्रदायस्याकुलीभावप्रसंगात् ।...न च तत्रापि यथाकथंचित् परंपरया रसस्पर्शोऽस्त्येवेति वाच्यम् ।  
(*Rasagaṅgādhara. Nirṇaya-Sagar*, edn, 1939, pp 8-9)

See also K. Krishnamoorthy, 'Essays in Sanskrit Criticism' 1964' pp. 234-240.

7. वक्रोक्तिश्च रसोक्तिश्च स्वभावोक्तिश्च वाङ्मयम् । (*Sarasvatīkaṇṭhābharaṇa*, V. 8.)

त्रिविधः श्लङ्कारवर्गः । 'वक्रोक्तिः,' 'स्वभावोक्तिः,' 'रसोक्ति' रिति । तत्रोपमाश्लङ्कारप्राधान्ये वक्रोक्तिः, श्लेषादिगुण-प्राधान्ये स्वभावोक्तिः, विभावानुभावव्यभिचारिसंयोगात् रसनिष्पत्तौ रसोक्तिरिति ॥ (*Śṛṅgāraprakāśa*, p. 438)

identification of the reader's consciousness with that of the poet as expressed in the poetic work. In the case of Svabhāvokti, it is Vastu-saṁvāda, objective matching or correspondence (i. e. the feeling that the expressed idea is exactly as we thought it to be), while in the case of Rasokti it is Citta-vṛtti-saṁvāda, emotional matching or correspondence (i. e. identification of the reader's emotion with that expressed in the poem).<sup>8</sup> The following remarks by Raghavan in this context, even though made with respect to Bhoja, apply much more aptly to Kuntaka.

'In the realm of ideas or Artha, there are only two classes, namely, the mere nature of things—Vastu-svabhāva and Emotions. In the description of these two, we have Vastu-saṁvāda and Citta-saṁvāda respectively, and the corresponding cases of expressions are called Svabhāvokti and Rasa-delineation, or Rasa-Ukti, according to Bhoja. These two are bare descriptions, Vastu-svabhāva or Rasa-svabhāva being the object of description. When both of these are figuratively described, we have the third kind of Ukti, Vakrokti'.<sup>9</sup> In other words, the different types of beauty experienced from poetry depend upon the depiction of ideas or emotions, and the manner of depiction in both cases can be either natural and vivid or heightened and embellished. Such a categorization of literary beauty can be matched with the types of aesthetic experience from life. Things and expression of emotions are felt beautiful, just by themselves or when tinged with psychological associations.

Though content and form are interfused or integrated in a literary work, resorting to the Apoddhāra method (as Kuntaka says), we can consider each of the two by itself. We find that in some works, the poetic content functions as the main source of beauty, while in some others, such a function is fulfilled by the poetic form of expression. We can say that Svabhāvokti and Rasokti are content-oriented and Vakrokti (in Bhoja's terminology) is form-oriented.<sup>10</sup>

While concluding, I would like to hint at the wider significance of the above-noted views of Kuntaka and Bhoja. In a recent important work of literary criticism dealing with some fundamental problems like the nature and typology of literature, David Lodge examines<sup>11</sup> the relationship between form and content in the literary text. Adopting a vital linguistic distinction from Roman Jakobson, Lodge establishes a fundamental polarity between the metaphoric (analogous, symbolic) and metonymic (contiguous, realistic) techni-

8. न च हृदयसंवादमात्रेण स्वभावोक्तिरसवदलंकारयोरभेदः । वस्तुसंवादरूपत्वात् स्वभावोक्तेः, चित्तवृत्तिसमाधिरूपत्वाच्च रसवदलंकारस्य । (Alaṅkārasarvasva, p. 227.)

9. Bhoja's Śiṅgārāprakāśa, p. 136.

10. It is assumed here that for certain purposes and in certain contexts we can take these controversial terms as contrastive.

11. 'The Modes of Modern Writing' published by Arnold Heinemann, London, 1977 (reprinted in 1979), issued as Indian Edition in 1980. Lodge adopted for his purpose Jakobson's theory that dichotomy of metaphor and metonymy characterizes all verbal behaviour and human behaviour in general. See 'The Modes of Modern Writing', pp. 73-103.

ques of expression. Quite obviously Lodge is dealing with the vast and highly complex perspective of modern literature, while Kuntaka's perspective is comparatively quite limited. Even then the matter both of them are talking about is, it seems to me, essentially analogous. But of course this requires to be discussed in depth as a separate issue.

Some parallels to the basic categories of the aesthetic experience of literature can be drawn from another domain of art, viz, painting. In the area of objective painting, (1) naturalistic works like landscapes and still life, (2) works with symbolic meanings and (3) scenes from life have in some styles, obviously different aesthetic bases.



## Germes of the later Rasa doctrine in Bharata's Nāṭyaśāstra.

M. V. PATWARDHAN

The Nāṭyaśāstra of Bharata deals among several matters pertaining to dramaturgy, with the four-fold *abhinaya*:— (1) *āṅgika*, (2) *vācika*, (3) *sāttvika* and (4) *āhārya*. Drama differs from poetry because of its four-fold *abhinaya*. In poetry there is no scope for any *abhinaya*, if it is recited silently by a reader to himself. If, however, it is recited publicly before an audience there is a good deal of scope for *vācika* and *āṅgika abhinaya*. *Vācika abhinaya* in a dramatic representation on the stage is concerned with the proper recitation and intonation of the speeches assigned to different characters, these speeches being marked by literary qualities, such as excellences (*guṇa*), tropes (*alāṅkāra*) and other miscellaneous traits (*lakṣaṇa*). According to Bharata all the four kinds of *abhinaya* are intended to convey to the audience the thoughts and feelings of the characters. Bharata explains this basic concept of *abhinaya* in Nāṭyaśāstra 8. 7-10 and in the prose passage preceding these stanzas. (Baroda edn., Vol. II, pp. 1—2)<sup>1</sup>. Out of these four kinds of *abhinaya*, *āṅgika*, *vācika* and *sāttvika* are located exclusively in the actors (*naṭa*) representing the different characters, while *āhārya abhinaya*, in its aspect of make-up, costume and personal adornment, is located in the actors, and in its aspect of scenic arrangements on the stage and the employment of various items of stage-apparatus it is located outside the actors and constitutes the scenic background. Bharata's treatment of *abhinaya* is intimately connected with conveyance of the thoughts and emotions of the characters in a drama to the audience, and the treatment of the *rasa* doctrine in the Nāṭyaśāstra is intended to explain the purpose served by *abhinaya* in a dramatic representation. Bharata deals with the *rasa* doctrine in the context of drama in chapter 6 (*rasādhyāya*) and chapter 7 (*bhāvādhyāya*) of the Nāṭyaśāstra. It is proposed to show in this paper how Bharata's treatment of the *rasa*—doctrine contains a good many hints of the *rasa* theory propounded by later writers on Sanskrit poetics beginning with Ānandavardhana (author of *Dhvanyāloka*).

In the prose passage immediately following st. 31 of chapter 6 (p. 272), Bharata stresses the paramount importance of *rasa* (emotion) in a dramatic work.<sup>2</sup> He says that there cannot be any theme worthy of being handled in

1. अभिपूर्वस्तु णीञ्धातुराभिमुख्यार्थनिर्णये । यस्मात् प्रयोगं नयति तस्मादभिनयः स्मृतः ॥ विभावयति यस्माच्च नानार्थान् हि प्रयोगतः । शास्त्राज्ञोपाज्ञसंयुक्तस्मादभिनयः स्मृतः ॥ चतुर्विधश्चैव भवेन्नाट्यस्याभिनयो द्विजाः । अनेकभेदबहुलं नाट्यमस्मिन् प्रतिष्ठितम् ॥ आज्ञिको वाचिकश्चैव आहार्यः सात्त्विकस्तथा । ज्ञेयस्त्वभिनयो विप्राः चतुर्धा परिकीर्तितः ॥ अभिनय इति कस्मात् । उच्यते । असीत्युपसर्गः, णीञ् इत्ययं धातुः प्रापणार्थः । अस्य अभिनी इत्येवं व्यवस्थितस्य 'एः अच्' (पाणिनि ३, ३, ५६) इति अच्प्रत्ययान्तस्य अभिनय इति रूपं सिद्धम् । एतच्च धात्वर्थवचनेन अवधार्यम् ।

Compare also Nāṭyaśāstra, 7, 2-3, which enumerates the four kinds of *abhinaya*.

2. न हि रसादृते कश्चिदर्थः प्रवर्तते ।

a drama apart from human emotion. This means that according to Bharata, portrayal of the emotions of various characters is the main business of a play. A drama necessarily deals with the emotional ups and downs and emotional conflict in the minds of various characters. For many of the thoughts and most of the actions of human beings are prompted directly and indirectly by some emotion or the other in their minds. This holds good as much in the case of poetry as in that of drama. In fact the *rasa*-doctrine and the supreme importance of the portrayal of *rasa* in drama as propounded by Bharata has been accepted in toto by all writers on poetics and the portrayal of human emotions has been regarded by them as the essence of poetry and drama.<sup>3</sup>

In *Nāṭyaśāstra* 14.2 (Vol. II, p. 220), while dealing with *vāgabhīnaya* (i.e. *vācika abhīnaya*), Bharata says that the utmost care must be taken by an actor in the matter of the recitation of speeches assigned to the character represented by him (and by implication, also by a playwright in regard to the composition of those speeches), because these speeches are the corpus (*tanu*) of a drama.<sup>4</sup> since a drama is predominantly a vocal performance. This statement of Bharata, coupled with his earlier statement about the paramount importance of *rasa* in a drama, clearly shows that he foreshadows the idea set forth by later writers on poetics, that *rasa* is the soul of poetry (including drama) and that words (and their literal senses) are the body of poetry.<sup>5</sup>

Later writers on poetics, such as Ānandavardhana, while stressing the importance of *rasa* as the soul of poetry, say that *rasa* (emotion) is always to be suggested in poetry through the description of its causes (*vibhāvas*) and its effects (*anubhāvas*) and is never to be mentioned by its name. In this connection they have propounded the doctrine of *vīṇāñjanā* or *dhvani*

3. अग्निपुराण, ३३६, ३३ : वाग्वैदग्ध्यप्रधानेऽपि रस एवात्र (काव्ये) जीवितम्। ध्वन्यालोक, १, ५ (पृ. ८६) : काव्यस्यात्मा स एवार्थः (= रसरूपः एव अर्थः); ३, पृ. ३३६ : कविना रसपरतन्त्रेण भवितव्यम्।... न हि कवेरिति वृत्तमात्रेण किञ्चित् प्रयोजनम्, इतिहासादेव तत्सिद्धेः।; ४, ५, पृ. ५२९ : व्यङ्ग्यव्यञ्जकभावेऽस्मिन् विविधे (= त्रिविधे) संभवत्यपि। रसादिमय एकस्मिन् कविः स्यादवधानवान्॥; anonymous stanza quoted by प्रतीहारैन्दुराज in his commentary on उद्भट्ट's काव्यालंकारसारसंग्रह, ६, ७ (पृ. ८३, BORI edn) : रसाद्यधिष्ठितं काव्यं जीवद्रूपतया यतः। कथ्यते, तद्रसादीनां काव्यात्मत्वं व्यवस्थितम्॥; राजशेखर, काव्यमीमांसा, ३ (पृ. २६, Chowkhamba Series edn, 1934) : रसः आत्मा।; अभिनवगुप्त, लोचन, पृ. १७५ : रसेन एव जीवति काव्यम्।; मम्मट, काव्यप्रकाश, ७, ४९ (पृ. २६३, BORI edn.) : मुख्यार्थहतिदोषः, रसश्च मुख्यः (= मुख्यः अर्थः)।; विश्वनाथ, साहित्यदर्पण, १, ३ : वाक्यं रसात्मकं काव्यम्। It will be seen from these quotations that Bharata's statement cited in note 2 has inspired subsequent writers on Sanskrit poetics to emphasise *rasa* as the soul or quintessence of poetry.
4. वाचि यत्नस्तु कर्तव्यः नाटयस्यैषा तनूः स्मृता। On this Abhinavagupta says (Vol. II, p. 220) : वाचि यत्नस्तु कर्तव्यः कविना निर्माणकाले, नटेन प्रयोगकाले। कुत इत्याह—एषा हि तनुनीटयस्य सकलप्रयोग-भित्तिभूतत्वेन आतोद्यगीताभिनयानुग्राहकत्वात्, स्वयम् अभिनयरूपत्वाच्च।
5. दण्डिन्, काव्यादर्श, १, १० : तैः शरीरं च काव्यानाम् अलंकाराश्च दर्शिताः। शरीरं तावदिष्टार्थव्यवच्छिन्ना पदावली॥; राजशेखर काव्यमीमांसा, ३, पृ. २५ : शब्दार्थौ ते (= काव्यपुरुषस्य) शरीरम्।; विश्वनाथ साहित्यदर्पण, १, २ पृ. ३ (Kane's edn.) : काव्यस्य शब्दार्थौ शरीरम्।

(suggestion). The very first *kārikā* of *Dhvanyāloka* says that suggestion is the soul of poetry.<sup>6</sup> The *Dhvanyāloka* is the first work on Sanskrit poetics dealing with the theory and practice of poetic suggestion in all its aspects. A superficial reader of the *Nāṭyaśāstra* may carry the impression that, though Bharata recognised and propounded the supreme importance of *rasa* in drama, he did not say that *rasa* is to be suggested and not to be identified by its name. But it is a fact that Bharata was acquainted with the concept of suggestion in the context of *rasa*.<sup>7</sup>

In *Nāṭyaśāstra* 7, Vol. I, pp. 348-349 (Baroda edn, 1956), Bharata uses the phrase *sāmānyaguṇayogena* in connection with the experience of *rasa* arising from the portrayal of the 49 *bhāvas* through their appropriate *vibhāvas* and *anubhāvas*.<sup>8</sup> This phrase used by Bharata in the context of the experience of *rasa* anticipates the doctrine of *sādhāraṇīkaraṇa* which together with *abhidhā* (denotation) and *bhogīkaraṇa* (or *bhogakṛttva* or *bhojakatva*) (gustation) forms the basic trilogy of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka's hypothesis about *rasa*-experience.<sup>9</sup> The idea of *sādhāraṇīkaraṇa* (generalisation or universalisation) of the *vibhāvas*, *anubhāvas*, *vyabhicāribhāvas*, and *sthāyibhāvas*, which is already found in Bharata's work was adopted by Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, Abhinavagupta and later writers on poetics. Abhinavagupta, however, enlarged the scope of

6. ध्वन्यालोक १, १ : काव्यस्यात्मा ध्वनिः ।

7. नाट्यशास्त्र, ६, पृ. २८८-२८९ (Vol. I, Baroda edn., 1956) : नानाभावाभिनयव्यञ्जितान् वागङ्गसत्त्वोपेतान् स्थायिभावान् आस्वादयन्ति सुमनसः प्रेक्षकाः । ७, पृ. ३४८, prose passage after stanza 6 : एवम् एते काव्यरसाभिव्यक्तिहेतवः एकोनपञ्चाशद् भावाः प्रत्यक्षगन्तव्याः । एभ्यश्च सामान्यगुणयोगेन रसाः निष्पद्यन्ते ।; पृ. ३४९ : अत्राह—यदि काव्यार्थसंश्रितैः, विभावानुभावव्यञ्जितैः एकोनपञ्चाशद्भावैः सामान्यगुणयोगेन अभिनिष्पद्यन्ते रसाः... ।; १४, २ : अङ्गनैपथ्यसत्त्वानि वाक्यार्थे (= रसभावादिरूपं काव्यार्थं) व्यञ्जयन्ति हि । In all these four passages the words व्यञ्जित, अभिव्यक्ति and व्यञ्जयन्ति are used in the context of *rasa*-experience, and they have undoubtedly a reference to the linguistic and non-linguistic function of suggestion, which forms the most essential part of the doctrine of *dhvani* as propounded in the *Dhvanyāloka*.

8. See Note 7 above.

9. For a summary of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka's hypothesis, see *Locana* II, pp. 182-183 (Kashi Sanskrit Series edition with Bālapriyā commentary, 1940). किंतु अन्यशब्दवैलक्षण्यं काव्यात्मनः शब्दस्य त्र्यंशतः प्रसादात् । तत्र अभिधायकत्वं वाच्यविषयं, भावकत्वं रसादिविषयं, भोजकत्वं सहृदयविषयम्, इति त्रयो अंशभूताः व्यापाराः । तत्र एतद् भावकत्वं नाम रसान् प्रति, यत् काव्यस्य तद्विभावादीनां साधारणत्वापादनं नाम । भाविते च रसे तस्य भोगः परब्रह्मास्वादसविधः । स एव च प्रधानभूतः अंशः सिद्धरूपः । Compare the following stanza quoted by Uttuṅodaya in his commentary on the *Locana*, p. 79 (Kuppu-svāmi Shastri's edition, Madras, 1944) : व्यापारत्रिविधो बुधैरभिमतः काव्येऽभिधाभावनाभोगोत्पादक-तात्मनः (? त्मकः), तदधिको नास्ति ध्वनिर्नाम नः । सिद्धाया व्यवहारभूमिषु, विभावावयर्थसाधारणीकारात्मा त्वपरा, निरर्गलरसास्वादात्मिकैवान्तिमा ॥ Compare also the following two stanzas (of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka ?) cited by Hemacandra in his *Kāvyañuśāsana* (Bombay edition, 1964), pp. 96-97 : अभिधा भावना चान्या तद्भोगीकृतमेव च । अभिधाधामतां याते शब्दार्थालंकृती, ततः ॥ भावनाभाव्य एषोऽपि शृङ्गारादि-गणो हि यत् । तद्भोगीकृतरूपेण व्याप्यते सिद्धिमान् नरः ॥

*sādhāraṇīkaraṇa* in two directions: (1) mental identification (*tanmayībhavana* or *hrdayasaṁvāda* of the sensitive, cultured readers and spectators (*sahrdaya*) with the characters and their emotions as depicted in poetry and drama, through the employment of appropriate style marked by suitable literary excellences (*guṇa*) and figures of speech (*alāṅkāra*);<sup>10</sup> (2) Sharing of an aesthetic experience by a reader or spectator along with several other fellow readers or spectators. The consciousness that several other people are having the same aesthetic experience heightens the intensity of that experience.<sup>11</sup>

In chapter 6, pp. 288-289, Bharata says that *rasa* is called *rasa* because it is capable of being relished (*āsvādyā*), and then he gives an illustration to show how *rasa* is relished. He says that *rasa* is relished by cultured and sensitive spectators in the same way as dainty dishes are relished by connoisseurs of food and that this relishment of *rasa* gives them joy and satisfaction.<sup>12</sup> Here Bharata uses the word *bhuñjānāḥ* in the case of connoisseurs alone, but it is clear that he intends it to be understood in the case of sensitive and cultured spectators also.<sup>13</sup> The implicit use of the word *bhuñjānāḥ* by Bharata in the context of *rasa*-experience must have inspired Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka to regard *bhojakatva* (or *bhogīkaraṇa*) as a function of poetic expression, along with *abhidhā* and *sādhāraṇīkaraṇa* (*bhāvanā*). On pp. 188-189 of the *Locana* (edition of *Dhvanyāloka* with *Locana* published in the Kāshī Sanskrit Series, Vārāṇasī, 1940), Abhinavagupta also accepts the idea underlying *bhogīkaraṇa*, not as a function of poetic expression, but as the result of the revelation (or suggestion) of aesthetic experience due to the suggestive power of poetic expression.<sup>14</sup> His contention is that *bhoga* (relishment of *rasa*) is not the direct outcome of poetic expression and that consequently it cannot be regarded as a function belonging to poetic expression.<sup>15</sup> According to him *bhoga* is a synonym of *āsvāda* (delectation), and consists in the revelation of the essentially

10. *Locana*, p. 188 : भावकत्वमपि समुचितगुणालंकारपरिग्रहात्मकम् अस्माभिरेव वितत्य वक्ष्यते । किम् एतदपूर्वम् ।  
The employment of appropriate style enables the sensitive reader or spectator to identify himself with the characters and situations depicted in a poem or drama and enables him to share their emotions. The words तन्मयीभवन and हृदयसंवाद are frequently used by Abhinavagupta in the *Locana* and *Abhinavabhāratī* in the context of *rasa*-experience.
11. *Abhinavabhāratī* on *Nāṭyaśāstra* VI, Vol. I, p. 279 : अत एव सर्वसामाजिकानाम् एकघनता एव प्रतिपत्तेः सुतरां रसपरिपोषाय, अनादिवासनाचित्रीकृतचेतसां वासनासंवादात् ।
12. अत्राह—रस इति कः पदार्थः । उच्यते, आस्वाद्यत्वात् । कथमास्वाद्यते रसः । यथा हि नानाव्यञ्जनसंयुक्तम् अन्नं भुज्जाना रसानास्वादयन्ति सुमनसः पुरुषाः हर्षादींश्चाधिगच्छन्ति, तथा नानाभावाभिनयव्यञ्जितान् वाङ्मयसत्त्वोपेतान् स्थायिभावान् आस्वादयन्ति सुमनसः प्रेक्षकाः, हर्षादींश्च अधिगच्छन्ति । The two stanzas 32 and 33 on p. 290 merely repeat in metrical form the idea expressed in the prose passage cited just now.
13. Thus he means to say : स्थायिभावान् भुज्जानाः सुमनसः प्रेक्षकाः तान् आस्वादयन्ति ।
14. *Locana*, p. 188 : भोगीकरणव्यापारश्च काव्यस्य रसविषयः ध्वननात्मैव ।
15. *Locana*, p. 189 : भोगोऽपि न काव्यशब्देन क्रियते, अपि तु घनमोहान्ध्यसंकटतानिवृत्तिद्वारेण आस्वादाप्ररनाम्नि अलौकिके द्रुतिविस्तरविकासात्मनि भोगे कर्तव्ये लोकोत्तरे, ध्वननव्यापार एव मूर्धाभिषिक्तः । तच्चेदं भोगकृत्वं, रसस्य ध्वनीयत्वे दैवसिद्धम् ।

delightful nature of the soul immediately after the removal of the shroud of the-dense infatuation (enveloping the soul), by the artistic portrayal of an emotional situation by a poet.

In the passage from the *Nāṭyaśāstra* cited in note 12 and explaining how *rasa* is relished, Bharata says that cultured, sensitive readers obtain delight, etc. (*harṣādīn*). According to Abhinavagupta, who holds the view that all *rasas*, without exception, are delightful, the word *ādi* in *harṣādīn* does not stand for *śoka* (sorrow), *bhaya* (fear), *jugupsā* (disgust) etc., but for moral and intellectual enlightenment, cleverness in worldly matters, etc.<sup>16</sup> In addition to this view of Abhinavagupta regarding the uniformly and invariably delightful nature of all *rasas* (*kevalānandavāda*), there is another view (called *vibhajyavāda*, propounded by Rāmendra and Guṇacandra in the *Nāṭyadarpaṇa*, according to which some *rasas* (*śṛṅgāra*, *hāsyā*, *vīra*, *adbhuta*, and *śānta*) are of a delightful nature, while other *rasas* (*karuṇa*, *bhayānaka*, *raudra* and *bībhatsa*) are of a painful nature.<sup>17</sup> It is quite possible that Bharata believed in *vibhajyavāda*. This is shown by what he says in *Nāṭyaśāstra* 27.55, about the different mental reactions of a cultured spectator to the various emotions depicted in a drama.<sup>18</sup> Thus the seeds of both *kevalānandavāda* and *vibhajyavāda* can be found in Bharata's phrase *harṣādīn*, depending on how the word *ādi* is interpreted.

In *Nāṭyaśāstra* VI, pp. 288–289 Bharata uses the word *sumanasah* to qualify connoisseurs (*puruṣāḥ*) and spectators (*prekṣakāḥ*) while comparing the gustatory enjoyment of culinary preparations with aesthetic enjoyment of emotional situations. The phrase *sumanasah prekṣakāḥ* is used here in the sense of cultured, responsive and sensitive spectators, and it is clearly a forerunner of the *sahṛdaya* frequently used in the *Dhvanyāloka* by Ānandavardhana and in the *Locana* by Abhinavagupta. The word *sahṛdaya* is found used in Vāmana's *Kāvyaśālikārasūtravṛtti*<sup>19</sup>, I. 2.21, stanza 2, in the sense in which it is used by Ānandavardhana, Abhinavagupta and later writers. Abhinavagupta explains the word in *Locana*, I, p. 38, as follows : “sensitive readers are people who have the capacity of identifying with matter under description in poetry because the mirror of their heart has become clean (or polished) due to their repeated reading and contemplation of poetry”.<sup>20</sup> In the introductory stanza at the commencement of the *Locana*, Abhinavagupta says

16. *Abhinavabhāratī* Vol I. p. 289 : हर्षप्रधानानां धर्मादिव्युत्पत्तिवैदग्ध्यादीनाम् आस्वादफलत्वम् ।... अन्ये तु ‘आदिशब्देन शोकादीनामत्र संग्रहः’ । स च न युक्तः । सामाजिकानां हि हर्षैकफलं नाद्यं न शोकादिफलम् ।; p. 282 : इति आनन्दरूपता एव सर्वरसानाम् ।; p. 292 : अस्मन्मते तु संवेदनमेव आनन्दधनम् आस्वाद्यते । तत्र का दुःखाशङ्का ।

17. *Nāṭyadarpaṇa* III (pp. 141–142, : Baroda edition, 1959).

18. यस्तुष्टौ तुष्टिमायाति शोके शोकमुपैति च । दैन्ये दीनत्वमभ्येति स नाट्ये प्रेक्षकः स्मृतः ॥

19. उदयति स हि तादृक् क्वापि वैदर्भीरितौ सहृदयहृदयानां रञ्जकः कोऽपि पाकः ।

20. येषां काव्यानुशीलनवशाद् विशदीभूते मनोमुकुरे वर्णनीयतन्मयीभवनयोग्यता ते स्वहृदयसंवादभाजः सहृदयाः ।

Cf. *Dhvanyāloka*, p. 359, line 6 : तस्माद् रसज्ञता एव सहृदयत्वम् ।

that the essence of poetry is the presence of creative imagination in the poet and of sensitive responsiveness in the cultured reader.<sup>21</sup> Sensitive readers and critics are indispensable for the proper evaluation of poetry. Even good poetry is wasted on incompetent readers and critics, and even ordinary poetry becomes exalted when it is evaluated by competent and sensitive critics.<sup>22</sup>

While speaking of *vācika abhinaya* which is concerned with the recitation of speeches assigned to various characters in a drama with appropriate intonation and modulation of the voice, in chapter 16, Bharata deals with three important topics in poetics having a vital bearing on *rasa*. These topics are : (1) the ten literary qualities or excellences (*guṇas*), (2) the ten blemishes (*doṣas*) and (3) the four stylistic figures (*alaṅkāras*) namely *upamā* (simile), *dīpaka* (zeugma), *rūpaka* (metaphor) and *yamaka* (rhyme). The *guṇas*, *doṣas* and *alaṅkāras* belong in the first instance to the words used in a drama and to the senses conveyed by them. But in the last instance they have the effect of augmenting or spoiling the beauty of the portrayal of emotions in a drama. Though the number and nature of the *guṇas*, *doṣas* and *alaṅkāras* have undergone considerable modifications in their treatment by later writers on poetics, still their vital bearing on the portrayal of emotional situations in poetry and drama is unanimously recognised by all. The connection between poetry and drama on the one hand and the presence of *guṇas* and absence of *doṣas* on the other is invariable and vital. The connection between poetry and *alaṅkāras* is, however, not vital and invariable.<sup>23</sup> But, as

21. सरस्वत्यास्तत्त्वं कविसहृदयाख्यं विजयते ।

22. *Locana*, II. p. 260 : सज्जनैः (=सहृदयैः) विना काव्यम् इत्येष शब्दोऽपि ध्वंसते । तेषु तु सत्सु शब्दसंदर्भमात्रमपि काव्यशब्दव्यपदेशभाक् सुभगम् आस्ते ।

23. *Vāmana, Kāvyaālaṅkārasūtra*, III 1. 1-3 : काव्यशोभायाः कर्तारो धर्माः गुणाः । तदतिशयहेतवस्त्वलंकाराः । पूर्वे (=गुणाः) नित्याः । *Vāmana* implies by *sūtra* No. 3, that *alaṅkāras* are *anitya*, i.e., dispensable and variable attributes of poetry. Compare *Dhvanyāloka* II, 6 : तमर्थमवलम्बन्ते येऽङ्गिनं ते गुणाः स्मृताः । अङ्गाश्रितास्त्वलंकाराः मन्तव्याः कटकादिवत् ॥; *Sāhityadarpaṇa*, X. 1 : शब्दार्थयोरस्थिराः ये धर्माः शोभातिशयिनः । रसादीनुपकुर्वन्तोऽलंकारास्तेऽङ्गादादिवत् ॥; *Kāvya-prakāśa*, VIII. 66 : ये रसस्याङ्गिनो धर्माः शौर्यादय इवात्मनः । उत्कर्षहेतवस्ते स्थिरचलस्थितयो गुणाः ॥; *Sāhityadarpaṇa*, VIII. 1 : रसस्याङ्गित्वापत्तस्य धर्माः शौर्यादयो यथा । गुणाः माधुर्यमोजोऽथ प्रसाद इति ते त्रिधा ॥; *Kāvya-prakāśa* VIII. 67 : उपकुर्वन्ति तं सन्तं येऽङ्गद्वारेण जातुचित् । हारादिवदलंकारास्तेऽनुप्रासोपमादयः ॥ The employment of *alaṅkāras*, though not indispensable, is quite common in poetry. Compare *Dhvanyāloka*, III. p. 507 : वाच्यालंकारसंकीर्णत्वम् अलक्ष्यक्रमव्यङ्ग्यापेक्षया रसवति सालंकारे काव्ये सर्वत्र सुव्यवस्थितम्; on which *Abhinavagupta* says : ईदृशमेव काव्यं भवति । *Dhvanyāloka* I. p. 87 : विविधवाच्यवाचकरचनाप्रपञ्चचारुणः काव्यस्य स एव अर्थः सारभूतः, which is explained by *Abhinavagupta* (pp. 87-88) as : विविधं तत्तदभिव्यञ्जनीयरसानुगुणेन विचित्रं कृत्वा वाच्ये वाचके रचनायां च प्रपञ्चेन यत् चारु शब्दार्थालंकारगुणयुक्तम् इत्यर्थः ।; *Dhvanyāloka*, I. p. 45 : ललितोचितसंनिवेशचारुणः काव्यस्य, on which *Abhinavagupta* says : ललितशब्देन गुणालंकारानुग्रहम् आह । *Vāmana, Kāvyaālaṅkārasūtravṛtti* I. 1-1 says : काव्यशब्दोऽयं गुणालंकारसंस्कृतयोः शब्दार्थयोः वर्तते ।; *Bhoja, Sarasvatikanthābharaṇa*



Mammaṭa says, poetry is by and large adorned with figures of style and only occasionally marked by their absence. Even Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta—the chief exponents of the *rasa-dhvani* doctrine—recognise the importance of figures of style in poetry, as is clear from their express statements in this behalf and from the pains they take for laying down rules for the judicious employment of figures of style in a way congenial to the portrayal of emotional situations.<sup>24</sup> It is clear that Bharata anticipated later writers in the matter of literary excellences, literary blemishes and literary tropes. He does not however anywhere precisely state the relation between *rasa* on the one hand and the *guṇas*, *doṣas* and *alaṅkāras* on the other hand. Vāmana was the first writer on poetics who tried to define the nature and role of the *guṇas* and *alaṅkāras* in poetry and said that *rīti* (style) consisting in the presence of literary excellences is the soul of poetry, that the *guṇas* are intrinsic, invariable and indispensable attributes (*nitya-dharma*) of poetry and that the *alaṅkāras* are extrinsic, and dispensable properties (*anitya dharma*) of poetry.<sup>25</sup> Daṇḍin also said that the ten *guṇas* are the life-breath (*prāṇa*) of the *vaidarbha mārga* (i. e. *vaidarbhi rīti*).<sup>26</sup> It was Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta who first ever defined the relation of the *guṇas* and *alaṅkāras* to the suggested emotional content (*rasa*) in poetry and formulated a philosophy of literary excellences, blemishes and adornments.<sup>27</sup> Bharata's *Nāṭyaśāstra* does not contain any hints of this subsequently developed philosophy.

I. 2 says : निर्दोषं गुणवत् काव्यम् अलंकारैरलंकृतम् । Mammaṭa follows Bhoja in describing poetry as : तददोषौ शब्दार्थौ सगुणावनलंकृती पुनः कापि, *Kāvyaaprakāśa* I-4 ab), and then says कापि इत्यनेन एतद् आह यत् सर्वत्र सालंकारौ, कचित् तु स्फुटालंकारविरहेऽपि न काव्यत्वहानिः । We find Jayadeva (*Candrāloka*, I. 8) insisting on the invariable presence of *alaṅkāras* in poetry, with a hit very probably against Mammaṭa : अङ्गीकरोति यः काव्यं शब्दार्थवनलंकृती । असौ न मन्यते कस्माद् अनुष्णम् अनलं कृती ॥ According to Jayadeva *alaṅkāras*, are an intrinsic and indispensable attribute of poetry, as heat is of fire.

24. *Dhvanyāloka*, II. 13-20, pp. 223-234.

25. See the first quotation under Note 23. *Kāvyaṭalaṅkārasūtra*, I. 1. 6-8 : रीतिरात्मा काव्यस्य । विशिष्टपदरचना रीतिः । विशेषो गुणात्मा ।

26. *Kāvyaadarśa*, I. 42 . इति वैदर्भमार्गस्य (=वैदर्भ्याः रीतेः) प्राणा दश गुणाः स्मृताः ।

27. *Dhvanyāloka*, II. 6 : तमर्थमवलम्बन्ते येऽङ्गिनं ते गुणाः स्मृताः । अङ्गाश्रितास्त्वलंकारा मन्तव्याः कटकादिवत् ॥; *Locana*, II. p. 204 : अलंकार्यव्यतिरिक्तश्च अलंकारो अभ्युपगन्तव्यः, लोके तथा सिद्धत्वात्, यथा गुणिव्यतिरिक्तः गुणः । गुणालंकारव्यवहारः च गुणिनि अलंकार्ये च सति युक्तः । स च अस्मत्पक्षे एव (=ध्वन्यात्मवादपक्षे एव) उपपन्नः । See also *Locana* II. pp. 197-198 : एतदुक्तं भवति-उपमया यद्यपि वाच्यो अर्थो अलंक्रियते, तथापि तस्य (=वाच्यस्य अर्थस्य) तदेव अलंकरणं यद् व्यङ्ग्यार्थाभिव्यञ्जनसामर्थ्याधानम्, इति वस्तुतः ध्वन्यात्मा एव अलंकार्यः (न तु वाच्यः अर्थः) । कटककेयूरादिभिरपि हि शरीरसमवायिभिः चेतनः आत्मा एव तत्तच्चित्तवृत्त्यौचित्य-सूचनात्मतया अलंक्रियते । तथाहि अचेतनं शवशरीरं कुण्डलाद्युपेतमपि न भाति, अलंकार्यस्य अभावात् । यतिशरीरं कटकादियुक्तं हास्यावहं भवति, अलंकार्यस्य अनौचित्यात् । न हि देहस्य किञ्चिद् अनौचित्यम्, इति वस्तुतः आत्मा एव अलंकार्यः, अहम् अलंकृतः इति अभिमानात् ।

One of the common topics discussed in later works on poetics is the benefits accruing to poets and readers from the composition of poetry and its contemplation respectively (*kāvya-prajayojana*). One of the benefits accruing to the readers is mental delight or satisfaction (*prīti*) and another is intellectual and moral enlightenment (*vyutpādana* or *upadeśa*). In *Nāṭyaśāstra* I. 106-117, Bharata deals with the role of drama as a means of people's entertainment and education. There he uses the phrases *hitopadeśajanana*, *sarvopadeśajanana*, *lokopadeśajanana*, *viśrāntījanana* and *buddhivivardhana*, to convey the recreative and educative functions of dramatic poetry. These phrases anticipate the ideas of later writers on poetics, (such as Bhāmaha, Rudraṭa, Anandavardhana, Abhinavagupta, Maṃmaṭa and Viśvanātha) on this twofold role of poetry in general. According to Anandavardhana (*Dhvanyāloka* III, p. 398), drama is intended by Bharata to be a potent means of imparting moral instruction to people.<sup>28</sup> The phrase *Viśrāntījanana* used by Bharata in the sense of relief from mental worries and tensions, must have undoubtedly inspired Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka and Abhinavagupta in giving a new dimension to the recreative role of poetry and in putting forward the idea of *svasamvid-viśrānti*-repose in the essentially blissful nature of the soul.<sup>29</sup> The phrase *buddhivivardhana* in Bharata is perhaps at the root of the idea of enlightenment in *dharma*, *artha*, *kāma*, *mokṣa* and secular arts of which Bhāmaha speaks in his *Kāvyaśālikā*,<sup>30</sup> and the idea of the training and sharpening of the critical faculty of readers of which Abhinavagupta speaks in the *Locana*.<sup>31</sup>

It will be seen from the points discussed above that Bharata's *Nāṭyaśāstra* anticipates in quite a few respects the concepts germane to the doctrine of *rasa* experience as elaborately developed and cogently presented in later works on poetics. Bharata was undoubtedly acquainted with various important matters connected with the doctrine of *rasa* experience, but he made only a casual or passing reference to them and did not undertake a detailed discussion on them, as he thought that such a discussion would involve him in digression from the main purpose of his work, namely the theory and practice of dramaturgy (*nāṭya*).

28. सदाचारोपदेशरूपा हि नाटकादिगोष्ठी विनेयजनहितार्थम् एव मुनिभिर्व्यवहृता ।

29. See *Locana*, II. p. 183 : भाविते च रसे तस्य भोगः... रजस्तमोवैचित्र्यानुविद्धसत्त्वमयनिजचित्त्वभावनिवृत्ति-विश्रान्तिलक्षणः परब्रह्मास्वादसविधः । This forms part of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka's view regarding the nature of *rasāsvāda*, which does not differ from that of Abhinavagupta. See *Locana*, p. 190, lines 2-3.

30. *Kāvyaśālikā*, I. 2 : धर्मार्थकाममोक्षेषु वैचक्षण्यं कलासु च ।

31. *Locana*, II. p. 190 : यथा रामस्तथा अहम् इति उपमानातिरिक्तां रसास्वादोपायस्वप्रतिभाविजृम्भारूपां व्युत्पत्तिम् अन्ते करोति (काव्यम्) ।

# Śaṅkuka—A Defence

R. B. PATANKAR

As all know, a statement of Śrī Śaṅkuka's theory has not come down to us in his own words. We have to depend entirely on the brief versions which appear in Abhinava or Mammaṭa or Hemacandra. One point should be clear from this; these three critics must have taken Śaṅkuka's theory seriously; otherwise they would not have given it the space they have in their writings; nor would have Bhaṭṭa Tauta thought it worth his while to attempt its detailed refutation.

Our first task is to re-construct Śaṅkuka's theory with the help of the points we get in these different versions. We must also keep in mind that these critics must have had before them not only the views of Śaṅkuka alone, but also those of his followers; it is not unlikely that in the course of their discussion with their critics the Śaṅkukaite changed Śaṅkuka's original position, some of them even misrepresenting it in places. We must further remember that following the Sanskritist convention Bhaṭṭa Tauta must have considered all the possible interpretations of Śaṅkuka's position including those which to us look improbable. Threading our way through all this is indeed a difficult task. We shall be guided in our inquiry by the following assumption : Śaṅkuka was a sophisticated theoretician capable of building up a self-consistent theory which can stand critical scrutiny if considered sympathetically. The last clause is necessary because Śaṅkuka's theory is likely to prove to be a viable alternative to the theories of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka and Abhinavagupta; the latter are so powerful that it requires special efforts on the part of a researcher to break their spell and consider the earlier theories afresh. The use of some modern speculative instruments will help us do this.

Śaṅkuka's theory will have to be scrutinised first as expressed in a statement which follows his attempted refutation of Lollaṭa, and later in the context of Tauta's attack on Śaṅkuka. Let us consider it in that order.

(A) The *sthāyī* which originally belongs to chief characters like Rāma, when imitated, is known by the transformed name as *rasa*, its character of being an imitation warranting the transformation of the name. The *sthāyī* is perceived as belonging to the actor through the process of inference by artificial tokens, which do not look artificial.<sup>1</sup>

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1. तस्माद्धेतुभिर्विभावाख्यैः...प्रयत्नाजिततया कृत्रिमैरपि तथानभिमान्यमानैरनुकर्तृस्थेन लिङ्गबलतः प्रतीयमानः स्थायी भावो मुख्यरामादिगतस्थाय्यनुकरणरूपोऽनुकरणरूपत्वादेव च नामान्तरेण व्यपदिष्टो रसः। (All quotations, unless otherwise mentioned, are from Professor R. P. Kangle's Edition of the VI and VII chapters of *Nāṭyaśāstra*, with *Abhinavabhāratī*; the Edition was published by Maharashtra Sahithya Sanskriti Mandal, Bombay 32, in 1973. The present quotation is on pp. 129-30.)

One observation may be made here. The two processes of 'imitation' and 'inference' are to be taken as synchronous and inter-related processes. If only one of the two were present *rasa* would not be produced. For example, if the James-Lange theory of emotion is correct, having a particular emotion-behaviour-pattern will induce in a person the relevant emotion. Śaṅkuka will not call this induced emotion *rasa*, because the emotion-behaviour-pattern is real and not artificial. Originally an emotion and the accompanying behaviour-pattern are two parts of one whole. But later on they can be separated, in thought and also in fact. For example, one may be very angry and yet may show no external signs of it. Again, one may produce all the external signs of anger and have no emotion of anger at all. As one grows in years one develops a control over the two aspects so well that either of the two aspects can be activated or suppressed at will. This opens the road to deception, hypocrisy, etc. on the one hand, and to play-acting on the other. There is obviously a difference between an imposter and an actor. The difference does not consist only in the presence and absence of the motive to deceive. It consists mainly in the difference between the responses expected of the spectators. People are, at least sometimes, deceived by an imposter; but they are not deceived by what the actor says or does. Just as the actor is not an imposter, he is also not a man who by producing emotion-behaviour produces in himself a real emotion. The emotion-behaviour that Śaṅkuka appears to have in mind is the one that is acquired through learning; according to him it is artificial, not real, although its artificiality is not noticed by the spectator. The details mentioned about the artificial *vibhāvas* etc. indicate that Śaṅkuka is writing for an audience that is well acquainted with the concept of 'play-acting'.

The next relevant question is how to give a logical account of 'play-acting', particularly of the experience of seeing a play, in terms of the nature of this kind of seeing and also in terms of the object of this seeing. The first tentative position that Śaṅkuka takes is that seeing a play is seeing of the non-real, in other words, a false perception. The real *sthāyī* belonging to the original character is replaced by an imitated, de-realized *sthāyī*, located in the actor; but this false perception does not destroy its causal efficacy (*artha-kriyāpi mithyā-jñānād dṛṣṭā*).

But he shifts his position soon afterwards, most probably because he has undertaken a closer scrutiny of the ontological and epistemological aspects of the concept of 'play-acting', which involves a special relationship between the actor and the character. If it were seeing the actor as the actor, or Rāma as Rāma the situation would have presented no problems, for there would not have been anything more than veridical perception. But the situation is very complicated.

We do not perceive that the actor here is happy [Rāma] (*na cātra nartaka eva sukhīti pratipattiḥ*); we do not perceive that the actor himself is Rāma (*nāpyayameva Rāma iti*), nor again that the actor is not happy [Rāmā] (*na*

*cāpyayam na sukhīti*), nor is there a doubt whether the actor is Rāma (*nāpi Rāma syād vā na vāyamiti*), nor is the actor seen to resemble Rāma (*na cāpi tatsadṛśa iti*); we perceive that this actor is the happy Rāma (*kintu yaḥ sukhī Rāmaḥ asāvayamiti pratitirasti*).

The perception relevant in drama is different from the four known varieties of perception enumerated by the Sanskritists: veridical perception, false perception, perception of resemblance, doubtful perception. It is here that the concept of *citraturaga-pratīti* is introduced by Śāṅkukaiteś.<sup>2</sup>

The most important question here is how to interpret *citra-turaga-pratīti*. What sort of 'seeing' is it? We shall make use of some modern conceptual tools and compare this 'seeing' with some other sorts of 'seeing'. (a) Somebody points to a tree and says 'That tree is green' or 'That is a mango tree.' In this context various questions become relevant, e. g. 'Where is it? How old is it? What price do the mangoes fetch nowadays? Where do you propose to sell the fruit this season? Could you let me have one mango?' (b) I say 'I saw a mango tree in my dream yesterday. It was near the compound wall. It looked very old. The man who was with me told me that I would get a good price for the fruit'. These statements regarding the location of the tree do not puzzle us because we have learnt to take them to refer to the dream-space and dream-time. If we have acquired the concept of dreaming we also know that the following questions have no application: 'If we go to the compound wall after breakfast, will you please show me the tree? I didn't see any tree last evening; did it suddenly come into existence during the night? What price will these mangoes fetch today? Can I have one mango?' They have no application because there is no continuity between the dream world and the commonly shared real world. (c) I look into a mirror and see my face in it against the background of some pieces of furniture. Where are my face and the furniture that I see there, located? If we have formed the concepts relevant to the situation of looking into a mirror, we shall answer 'In the mirror-space, of course'. In the course of forming these concepts we shall also have learnt not to confuse mirror-space with the surface of the mirror. The former is not continuous with our space, but the latter is. (d) Now suppose we are looking at a painting. We could say that we see a framed piece of canvas with pigments spread over it; but instead we say, 'we see a horse standing some distance away from a mango tree, a long way from the village; it is latish afternoon, the shadows of things are lengthening'. That all

2. As Mammaṭa puts it : सम्यङ्मिथ्यासंशयसादृश्यप्रतीतिभ्यो विलक्षणया चित्रतुरगन्यायेन रामोऽयमिति प्रतिपत्त्या प्राह्ये नटे। Vāmanācārya Jhalakikar in his commentary explains this with the help of a quotation from *Kāvyaprakāśadarpaṇa* : यथा बालानां चित्रतुरगे वस्तुपरिच्छेदशून्या तुरगोऽयमिति बुद्धिर्भवति तथा रामोऽयमिति प्रतिपत्त्या ज्ञानेन प्राह्ये नटे अभिनेतरि। Jhalakikar himself calls this भ्रम :- यद्यप्ययं भ्रम एव तथापि बाधक्षिरस्कस्यैवात्र भ्रमत्वेन विवक्षणाच्च दोषः। अत्र च बाधानवतारः स्पष्ट एव। अन्यथा तद्रूपेण पक्षत्वमेव न स्यात्। (*Kāvyaprakāśa* of Mammaṭa repr. from the Fifth Edition, Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona, 1955, pp. 88-89.)



these things are spatially and temporally inter-related in certain ways is clear; but they are so inter-related in the picture-space and picture-time which are not continuous with 'our' space and time. Answers to the questions 'What are you looking at?', 'What do you see there?' will vary from one conceptual context to another. 'I see a painted piece of canvas', 'I see a horse', 'I see a pictorial representation of a horse', 'I see an Impressionist painting',—all these are correct answers in their appropriate conceptual contexts. The point to remember is that one must not mix up contexts and end up with a feeling of philosophical puzzlement.

Our relation with the objects in the picture-world appears to be peculiar. It appears that there is a limited, one-way causal relation between these objects and us. Suppose we are looking at the picture of a holy man. Whatever we may do, it is logically impossible for us to affect the holy man. We can at best bring about changes in the canvas and the pigments. But, on the other hand, it seems, the holy man in the picture *can* affect us, although in a limited way; e. g. he can create in us the attitude of respect. But, of course, he cannot come out of the picture-world and hit us on the head.

One more point to remember is that within a certain conceptual framework there is nothing odd about looking at a painting, say, that of a man, and attributing human qualities, values, emotions to what we see. We refer to 'the sad face of the man...' A face in a picture may be called sad if it saddens the spectator. But sometimes we locate the sadness in the painting itself. Suppose it is the picture of a sad refugee who has lost everything in the world. We then refer to the 'sad face of the refugee'. The sadness of the refugee is now seen 'expressed' in the picture, is taken as an attribute of the face in the picture, which, under another description, i. e. in another conceptual framework, is only a configuration of pigments and nothing more.

(e) Now finally, let us analyse 'seeing a play'. Here the situation becomes complicated because the actor and the character appear to be on the same ontological plane, which they share in common with the spectators as well. Actor Caitra plays the role of the character Rāma, and the spectator sees this take place. All the three are human beings, and one is likely to take them as interacting substances. The confusion which would not arise if Caitra, a human being, were replaced by a configuration of pigments, now is likely to arise, if we lose grip over the concept of play-acting and the corresponding concept of seeing a play. While looking at a painting we can legitimately say (i) 'we see a piece of canvas with pigments spread over it'; (ii) 'we see a horse'. We know that the horse in the painting does not have the same ontological status as the painted canvas, an actual physical object, has. To see the horse in the painting as animated by life impulses, etc. is a special variety of 'seeing'. But we do not equally readily realise that an identical situation exists when we see a play being enacted on the stage. Actor Caitra has an ontological status, which is similar to that of the spectator; they belong to one Space-Time context; they can be related as two actually existing interacting substances. But a fictional character like Cārudatta of *Mṛcchakatika*

cannot interact in a similar way with Caitra or the spectator; Cārudatta does not belong to the Space-Time context to which Caitra and the spectator belong. However, when we see a play, we do not say that we see Caitra; we say that we see Cārudatta. But we cannot see Cārudatta in the same sense in which we can see Caitra, because of the ontological difficulty mentioned above. We can circumvent this difficulty only by changing the conceptual context. In this new context, we can see Caitra as Cārudatta, Caitra *representing* Cārudatta, *playing the role of* Cārudatta or *imitating* Cārudatta. Caitra can play this role only on the condition that he temporarily suppresses his independent ontological status to lend it to Cārudatta. Cārudatta and Caitra cannot co-exist as beings with equal ontological status. If the spectator forgets this, he is likely to develop a logical squint and see double, see Cārudatta and Caitra as co-existing, having real, individual emotions and other experiences. Actually the spectator sees Caitra speaking, gesticulating, laughing, shedding tears; but as Caitra has lent his ontological status temporarily to Cārudatta, the spectator 'sees' Cārudatta, (not in the straightforward sense of 'seeing' a physical object, but in the special sense in which we 'see' the horse in the painting.) Gesticulation, shedding of the tears is actually done by Caitra; this can be verified. But in accordance with the rules of projection in force in the context of 'play-acting', Cārudatta is taken to do all this and through it express emotions, etc. Conceptual confusion arises if we forget that Caitra has temporarily lent his ontological status to Cārudatta, and take the actions, etc. to be those of Cārudatta expressing Cārudatta's emotions. In that case there will be two sets of actions and emotions, those of Caitra and those of Cārudatta. This confusion arises because Cārudatta and Caitra are conceived as human beings capable of having their own separate emotional experiences. This possibility does not exist in *citraturagapratīti*, because a configuration of colours is not capable of having emotional experiences. Here the ontological self-sacrifice on the part of the colour-configuration is so complete, that the question of there being two emotions does not arise. The *citraturagapratīti* is expected to help us interpret correctly 'seeing a play being enacted'. Let us look at the diagrams below.

*Diagram 1*

Configuration of <i>pigments</i>	A terrified Horse
Possesses ontological status as configuration of <i>pigments</i> only	Possesses ontological status as a Horse
As such is incapable of experiencing emotions like fear.	As such is capable of experiencing emotions like fear.

A terrified  
Horse in a  
Painting

Configuration of pigments which has temporarily suppressed its ontological status and lent it to a horse which here does not possess ontological status of its own. The spectator now can ignore the pigments' incapacity to experience emotions and 'see' the emotions as belonging to the 'horse' in the painting.

*Diagram 2*

Actor Caitra	Character Rāma or Cārudatta.
<i>Actual human being</i>	<i>Actual/Fictional human being</i>
Possesses ontological status as a human being	If actual, possesses <i>ontological status as a human being</i>
	If fictional, does not possess ontological status as a human being.
Capable of experiencing emotions such as fear; capable of perceiving, etc.	If actual, capable of experiencing real emotions such as fear.
	If fictional, incapable of feeling real emotions such as fear.
At the time of play-acting Caitra's ontological status as Caitra is suppressed and <i>temporarily lent to Rāma or Cārudatta</i> . Caitra's capacity to experience emotions, to perceive, etc. is <i>temporarily transferred to Rāma or Cārudatta</i> . Although Caitra	A special feature of the play-acting situation is that a character like Rāma, with his own ontological status, his own position in Space and Time is not and cannot actually remain present on the stage.

retains these capacities in some ways they are, according to the rules of the concept 'seeing a play', to be ignored; e. g. Caitra as Caitra knows that the crown he wears is not made of gold; the Rāvaṇa he 'kills' is not really there and is not really killed. But Caitra is not supposed to act on what he knows as Caitra; he is expected to act on what he knows as Rāma or Cārudatta.

If he feels any emotions as Caitra, they are to be ignored.

His ontological status being temporarily suppressed, his actions, emotions, etc. are ascribed to Rāma or Cārudatta.

This is inevitable because play-acting is logically based on the temporary suppression of the actor's existence/actuality and its temporary projection on to the character.

With the help of the above two diagrams we can pose the problems again. What does the spectator see? What variety of seeing is this? What does he make of the relation between Caitra and Rāma? If 'seeing an actual physical object' is called 'seeing<sub>1</sub>', the spectator cannot be said to be concerned with 'seeing<sub>1</sub>' Caitra, for he is not interested in Caitra as an actual individual, nor to be 'seeing<sub>1</sub>' Rāma, for the latter does not have the necessary Space—Time location in order that 'seeing<sub>1</sub>' may become possible for the spectator in the theatre. The possibility of 'seeing<sub>1</sub>' Cārudatta just cannot arise because he is fictional. That the spectator sees someone cannot however be denied. The only alternative that remains to be considered is that of 'seeing Caitra as Rāma'. This may be called 'seeing<sub>2</sub>' to distinguish it from 'seeing<sub>1</sub>' Caitra as Caitra, or Rāma as Rāma. The spectator does not say that he 'sees<sub>1</sub> Caitra as happy/happy Rāma'; nor does he 'see<sub>1</sub> that Caitra himself is Rāma', nor again does he 'see<sub>1</sub> that Caitra is not happy Rāma'; he does not also say that 'he sees<sub>1</sub> Caitra and Rāma as resembling each other'; he is not in doubt whether he sees<sub>1</sub> Rāma. Seeing<sub>1</sub> is not involved at all. The spectator just takes Caitra as the happy Rāma. The perception relevant here is not of the variety of 'seeing<sub>1</sub>' but that of 'seeing<sub>2</sub>', the only variety of seeing that is in accordance with the rules of the concepts of 'play-acting'/'seeing a play'.

The *sthāyī* of the character is made the object of the experience of the

spectator through acting, and not through words.<sup>3</sup> *Rasa* thus is *sthāyī* represented by means of acting (and not denoted by words).<sup>4</sup> As the *sthāyī* of the character is made the object of experience by logical tokens which, as presented not by the character himself, but by the actor by means of artificial tokens, it is the case of 'seeing<sub>2</sub>' the *sthāyī* as located in the actor when he is in the process of acting. But, as we have seen earlier, the actor as a particular actual man, following the particular profession of acting, is not the object of perception. The actor, as playing the role of Rāma, and only during the time he is playing that role, and in that capacity, functioning, as it were, like the carrier of Rāma's emotion, is the object of our perception.

(B) We shall now turn to the second stage in Śaṅkuka's statement of his position, which appears while he is under attack from his critics, particularly from Abhinava's teacher (*upādhyāyaḥ*), Bhaṭṭa Tauta. If *rasa* is said to be the imitation of *sthāyī*, the objector asks, to whom does it appear in that form : (a) to the spectator, or (b) to the actor, or (c) to the wise interpreter who distinguishes between reality and appearance, or (d) to Bharata ? Let us follow the polemic step by step. Some of the answers are recorded in the text as actually given by the Śaṅkukites; and the others may be taken as answers supplied by modern Śaṅkukaitees.

Objection 1. Things perceivable by one sense can alone be regarded as imitating each other. The actually perceived drinking of one liquid can be taken to be an imitation of the perceived drinking of another liquid. But how can something accessible to one sense imitate something not available to that sense ? How can *rati* which belongs to the realm of the mind and is accessible to the mind alone, be imitated by bodily gestures, etc. which are accessible to physical senses alone ?

Reply : One fails to see how this objection applies to Śaṅkuka's theory at all, because he has not maintained that the actor's *gestures*; etc. *imitate* any *mental states*.

Objection 2. Only if one has experienced the original, can one recognise its imitation. But nobody has had a prior experience of Rāma's *rati*. How can therefore anyone claim that something is the imitation of Rāma's *rati*, or that the actor is imitating Rāma ?

Reply : If *Rāmāyana* is regarded as *history*, and not as an epic poem which deals only with a fictional world, one does not see how this objection can be raised. No living person today can claim that he has seen Śivājī or

3. उदयनगतः सुखात्मा रतिः स्थायी भावोऽभिनीयते न तूच्यते । अवगमनशक्तिर्ह्यभिनयनं वाचकत्वादन्या । R. P. Kan-  
gle, op. cit. p. 130.

4. स्थाय्यनुकरणरूपोऽनुकरणरूपत्वादेव च नामान्तरेण व्यपदिष्टो रसः । Ibid.



Akbar. But cannot people say that these two kings existed and had particular characteristics, basing their claim to this knowledge on the evidence obtained from contemporary documents? If *Rāmāyaṇa* is taken as history, we can get enough evidence in it regarding Rāma's appearance, his actions, etc. And if we possess enough factual knowledge about Rāma, why are we not competent to judge whether the actor is imitating Rāma? The objection can be regarded as valid only with regard to fictional characters. This can be met by pointing out that here the original to be imitated consists of what the poet has given us in his text. The poet gives us information about how the fictional character he has created looks, speaks, behaves. The actor can be said to imitate him if he follows the poet's description closely.

(What is to be done if the Actors or Directors interpret in different ways the characters created by the poet is a further problem, but it does not fall within the scope of this paper.) If the objection is about the previous perception of Rāma's *rati*, something mental, and therefore accessible only to Rāma, this objection will rule out all mutual understanding among men—and that is an untenable position.

Objection 3. This can be validly raised only if objection 2 is sustained. Let us assume for discussion's sake that it is sustained. If it is granted that the *rati* aroused in the Actor cannot be regarded as the imitation of the original character's *rati*, someone may suggest that the *rati* aroused in the Actor be itself regarded as imitated *rati*. The objector will point out that much depends on the form in which it appears. It may be said by Śaṅkukaite that *rati* appears in the Actor in the same form in which it appears in common people through the relevant causes, etc.<sup>5</sup> If Śaṅkukaite take this position it will indicate that they have replaced the theory of 'imitation of the emotion of a particular character like Rāma' by 'imitation of the emotion of people in general'. This shift from the particular to the general is significant. It partly anticipates the later emphasis on generality (*sādhāranya*) in Sanskrit poetics. Secondly, this shift is very natural because a move towards generality becomes unavoidable at some stage or the other in the argument. For even if we know plenty of details regarding even a historical character, we do not, and cannot, know all; whatever we know has to be supplemented by what we know about people in general. Recourse to the latter is necessary to a greater extent in the case of fictional characters. It will be objected that, in that case, (i. e. if the Śaṅkukaite have really given the above answer), real *rati* and not its imitation will be produced. The Śaṅkukaite might point out that a difference will still be there. For in the case of the men whose emotions are imitated the *vibhāvas*, etc. are real, whereas they are artificial-unreal—in the case of the imitator. This explanation is necessary to complete and reinforce the earlier Śaṅkukaite


5. ननु प्रमदादिभिः कारणैः...लिंगभूतैर्या लौकिकी कार्यरूपा कारणरूपा सहचारिरूपा च चित्तवृत्तिः प्रतीतियोग्या तदात्मकत्वेन सा नटचित्तवृत्तिः प्रतिभाति। Ibid, pp 136-37.

argument. For at that stage it was not made clear why the *rati* in the actor, aroused as *rati* is commonly aroused, should be called 'imitated' *rati*. It will now be objected that if the spectator knows that the *vibhāvas*, etc. in the case of the imitator, are unreal, how can, with the help of unreal logical tokens, real *rati* be experienced/inferred? Smoke and mist resemble each other; so do fire and red flowers. Although one can legitimately infer the existence of fire from the existence of smoke, it is not legitimate to infer the existence of red flowers (which resemble fire) from the existence of mist (which resembles smoke). In the same way, one cannot legitimately infer from artificial *vibhāvas*, etc., which resemble real *vibhāvas*, etc., the existence of imitated *rati*, which resembles real *rati*.

Reply : The whole attack on Śaṅkuka's position seems to be based on the non-recognition of the variety of seeing which we have called 'seeing<sub>2</sub>'. The view attributed to Śaṅkuka appears to be as follows :


**Diagram 3**

**Relation of Imitation.**



But if the concept of 'seeing<sub>2</sub>' is accepted Śaṅkuka's view can be represented as follows :

**Diagram 4**



What is presented is the Actor and his imitated *vibhāvas*, *anubhāvas*. Rāma is not presented, because, as we saw earlier, he cannot be presented on the stage, for his reality, as a historical being, has a spatial and temporal location quite distinct from those of the different theatres and also of the different troupes of actors performing plays with Rāma as a character in them. The actor has suppressed his ontological status and lent it for the time being to Rāma, who has his own independent ontological status as a historical human being located elsewhere in Time and Space. Just as the changes in the mercury column in the thermometer are *read* as changes in the temperature of the patient's body, whatever the actor does or says is *seen* as done by Rāma. Whatever inferences we draw from them regarding mental states are taken as inferences regarding the mental states of Rāma and not those of the actor. To say that there are two *ratis*—one real *rati* belonging to Rāma and the other *rati* belonging to the actor, the latter being the imitation of the former, is to put an extremely clumsy and artificial construction on what Śāṅkuka could have meant. It goes against the very concept of play-acting. In the framework of that concept, arousal of any emotion in the actor as an actual person is totally irrelevant. What is being denied here is not the possibility of emotion-arousal in the actor, but only its relevance to the concept of play-acting. Play-acting can take place whether there is emotion-arousal in the actor or no. The actor, who has lent his being to the character, acts and speaks... and we draw inferences about the character's *rati*. It is, however, not unlikely that some Śāṅkukaite inadvertently slipped into the false position of assuming the existence of two *ratis*.

Objection 4. An attempt is now made to show that there are self-contradictions in the position of Śāṅkuka. Here again one has to admit that perhaps some Śāṅkukaite actually took some of the positions which are here criticised. Or perhaps these are the *possible* interpretations of the Śāṅkuka position that his critics could think of.

(a) The Śāṅkukaite might say in defence of the imitation theory : Even when the actor is not angry, i. e. does not himself experience the emotion of anger, he looks as if he is angry. The objector might say that this obviously contradicts the view ascribed earlier to Śāṅkuka that in the actor there is an arousal of an emotion, which is supposed to imitate the emotion of the character.

(b) It might be further pointed out by the objector that the resemblance is confined only to externals like movements of the eye-brows. But, according to Śāṅkuka's critics, this does not constitute imitation. (Most probably what is expected by the objector is imitation of emotion, and not imitation of the externals.)

Reply :— It is not true that all Śāṅkukaite have admitted the real existence or the relevance of *rati* in the actor.

Objection 5. When the spectator perceives the actor and says 'he is Rāma', it should be taken as veridical perception if it is not disproved at a later stage; if it is so confuted it should be regarded as false perception. And even in the absence of such a confutation what the spectator gets is false perception.

Reply :- The objector appears to be using only the concepts of veridical and false perception. For reasons which he has not stated, he has, towards the end, placed the perception involved in seeing a play in the category of false perception (*vāstavena ca vṛttena bādhakānūdayepi mithyājñānameva syāt*). The arguments really fail to sustain the objection. It is wrong to operate with only two concepts, those of veridical and false perception, if one wants to do justice to the concept of 'seeing a play'.

Objection 6. Even when one actor is replaced by another actor, the experience is that 'he is Rāma'. In that case it will have to be admitted that 'Rāma' stands not for an individual but for a class.

Reply :- This will happen only if we take the dramatic perception to be veridical (*Rāma evayam ayameva Rāma iti*).

All this time the objector has been considering the problem from the spectator's angle. Now he will discuss it from the Actor's angle. The objections raised here are reminiscent of or complementary to those raised earlier.

Objection 7. The actor's experience also is not that he is imitating Rāma or Rāma's mental state. Let us assume that 'to imitate' is taken to mean to do something which is like something else (viz. the original). If the original is not available to the actor he is incapable of performing the act of imitation—for what can he 'imitate?' If 'to imitate' is interpreted as following after, doing something after something else, this is a common enough phenomenon in the world. Not being an exclusive feature of drama, it cannot be regarded as the distinguishing characteristic of drama.

If it is said that the actor imitates not the emotion of grief of an individual but that of the people of a type (*uttama-prakṛteḥ śokam*), then it is necessary to ask by what means he does it. Not by his own parallel grief, because he is not himself experiencing any grief. Not also by shedding tears, because, as shown earlier, what is accessible to the mind alone cannot be imitated by that which is available only for sense-perception. The only objects that the actor can possibly imitate are the effects the *sthāyī* produces in the people of a type. But in order that this should happen it is necessary to give particularity to the object of imitation. If the actor tries to achieve particularization by saying 'I imitate the weeping of *anybcdy* who weeps in this way', it will not do,

because the term 'anybody' can also cover the actor himself. And if it is taken to cover the actor also the concept of imitation will have no application.

Reply :— No separate refutation is called for, as all these objections have been met earlier.

Objection 8. Bharata has nowhere said that the imitation of *sthāyī* is *rasa*. It is true that he has called Drama the imitation of things in the world (*saptadvīpānukarānamityādi*). But this does not lend support to Śaṅkuka; for it only means that Drama shows the kind of things one sees in the real world. According to Abhinavagupta, by '*anukarāṇa*' Bharata means aesthetic re-perception and not imitation or a replica of the world.<sup>6</sup>

Reply :— Bharata's statements appear to lend greater support to Śaṅkuka's theory of de-ontologized imitation than to the theory of de-ontologized and de-particularised representation. For a change in the ontological status is necessarily involved in the process of imitation, but that of de-particularization is not.

Objection 9. The argument that a configuration of colours reveals a real bull is not acceptable. It is the light of a lamp which can reveal it. (The objector has obviously 'taken the word 'reveal' in its literal sense.) The colours arranged as the limbs of a bull are arranged in reality, are seen to resemble a bull; the experience is that of *resemblance* (which Śaṅkuka has denied). Further, arrangement of *vibhāvas* does not resemble an emotion like *rati*.

Reply :— That there is a partial resemblance between a bull and its picture is true. This is restricted only to colours and shapes unless the latter are 'seen<sub>2</sub>' as limbs of a bull. This resemblance between the bull and its

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6. The following is an abridgement of R. Gnoli's note on the concept of Imitation :— Bharata (N. S. I, v, 106 or 107) says that "Drama is the re-telling (*anukīrtanam*) of all the forms of existence in the three worlds (*trailokyasyāsya sarvasya nāṭyaṁ bhāṭyānukīrtanam*)" According to A. G., the words 're-telling' and 'imitation' (*anukarāṇa*, *anukāra*), used by Bharata, must be interpreted in the sense of a "re-perception *sui generis*" (*anuvyavasāya*, *anuvyavasāyaviśeṣa*) and not in the proper sense of *anukarāṇa*, imitation. This *anuvyavasāya* is "like a direct perception" (*pratyakṣakalpa*, *sākṣātkārakalpa*)....

The term *anuvyavasāya* is one proper to logic; it defines the activity of the mind which works on the data furnished by the senses. It is, therefore, the mental re-perception (*anu=paścāt*, afterwards) of the sensible perception.... In aesthetics, *anuvyavasāya* has come to mean aesthetic re-perception (without, that is, any association with the concepts of reality and irreality.... and therefore with the limited "I", but generalized) of things perceived in practical life. The expressions *anukarāṇa*, *anukīrtana*, etc. used by Bharata...., observed A. G., should not be interpreted literally, in the sense, that is, of imitation, i. e., of a replica of reality, but in the sense of *anuvyavasāya*, of aesthetic re-perception of the facts of practical life. (R. Gnoli : *The Aesthetic Experience according to Abhinavagupta*, Roma, 1956, p. 108).

pictorial representation is of a different kind from the resemblance between two bulls, say, one big and another small. If *sādrśya* is restricted to a relation between two things which share both *form and matter* in common, the relation between a bull and its painting cannot be called *sādrśya*. But if we have already formed the concept of 'representation', we can relate different things between which there are different degrees of resemblance, including the zero degree, (as when we say 'Phonetic symbols represent sounds'.)

The objection regarding the arrangement of *vibhāvas* resembling or imitating *sthāyī* can only be met by showing that Śaṅkuka has not held that the physical resembles or imitates the mental. If the objection is about *infering* the mental states of characters from the physical actions of the actors, it can be pointed out that it is part of the concept of 'seeing<sub>2</sub>', where we see one thing as another, the actor as the character. Emotion-behaviour does not imitate an emotion. In ordinary life such a token seen in a particular person is taken as evidence for inferring the existence of an emotion in the same person. But if the context is that of 'see<sub>2</sub>' a physical token in the actor is taken as evidence for the existence of the relevant emotion in the character. 'See<sub>2</sub>' involves such ontological and epistemological conditions that no other conclusion can follow. 'See<sub>2</sub>' is a variety of experience which is governed by rules which are peculiar to it, and which it does not share with such other forms of experience as *samyak*, *mithyā*, *sādrśya*, *saṁśaya*. In that sense, and only in that sense, it can be called *a-laukika*.

Objection 10. Śaṅkuka's view that the *sthāyī*, made the object of experience by means of *vibhāvas*, is itself called *rasa* is wrong. If Śaṅkuka's view is right, it should be possible to have *rasa* experience in ordinary life also; for if *rasa* can come into being in unreal things, it will certainly come into existence in real things.<sup>7</sup>

Reply :- This objection needs no separate refutation if one has firmly grasped the concepts of play-acting and 'seeing<sub>2</sub> a play.'

Objection 11. It is significant that there is no mention of *sthāyī* in *rasa-sūtra*. Such a reference would indeed have created difficulties.<sup>8</sup>

Reply :- It is true that Bharata has not mentioned *sthāyī* in this *sūtra*. But that, by itself, does not mean that he deleted the mention of *sthāyī* for any theoretical reasons. Elsewhere he does not mind bringing the two terms '*sthāyibhāva*' and '*rasa*' close together. For example, he says, '*sthāyibhāvāṁśca rasatvamupaneṣyāmaḥ*'.<sup>9</sup>

7. एवं हि लौकिकेऽपि किं न रसः । असतोऽपि हि यत्र रसनीयता स्यात् तत्र वस्तुसतः कथं न भविष्यति । तेन स्थायिप्रतीतिरनुमितिरूपा प्राप्ता न रसः । R. P. Kangle, op. Cit. p. 174.

8. अत एव सूत्रे स्थायिग्रहणं न कृतम् । तत्प्रत्युत शक्यभूतं स्यात् । Ibid, p. 174.

9. Ibid, p. 226.



Objection 12. *Rasa* is not in the actor. The actor is merely a vehicle.<sup>10</sup>

Reply :— This objection is based on a distortion of Śāṅkuka's position, for Śāṅkuka refers to *rasa* being in the actor only in the context of play-acting, and not outside it.

We have gone through the moves and counter-moves made by Śāṅkukaiteś and their opponents. As we saw at the outset it is likely that Śāṅkukaiteś did not maintain one position throughout; perhaps they were required to make changes under the pressure of the opponents' attacks. There are places where they appear to be almost on the point of accepting two *sthāyīs*, one that of the character and the other that of the actor. But these lapses are very few and they do not detract from the value of the original insight Śāṅkukaiteś have obtained into the nature of drama. Again, some of the views attributed to them were perhaps never *actually* held by them. Śāṅkukaiteś thus emerge as the first aestheticians to bring out the ontological and epistemological peculiarities of the concepts of 'play-acting' and 'seeing a play'. Their theory offers a viable alternative to the theories of Lollaṭa on the one hand and those of Nāyaka and Abhinava on the other.

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10. Ibid. p. 198.

# Abhinavagupta on the Alaukika<sup>1</sup> Nature of Rasa

V. M. Kulkarni

Some of the Sanskrit Alamkārikas, notably Rāmacandra and Guṇacandra, the authors of *Nāṭyadarpaṇa* and Siddhicandra gaṇi, the author of *Kāvya-prakāśa-Khaṇḍana*, unequivocally take the position that the *rasa-pratīti* or *rasānubhava*, the aesthetic or imaginative experience, is entirely *laukika*, that is, worldly or continuous with and like other experiences in everyday life. Abhinavagupta, who is the greatest authority in Sanskrit Aesthetics and his very able followers like Mammaṭa, the author of *Kāvya-prakāśa*, a standard work on Sanskrit poetics and aesthetics, Viśvanātha, the author of the well-known *Sāhitya-Darpaṇa* and Pandit Jagannātha, the author of the celebrated *Rasagaṅgādhara*, take the very opposite position that the aesthetic experience is something that is *alaukika*, non-worldly, extra-worldly, transcendental and beyond our framework of time and space and that it only takes place in the realm of literature and never in real life.

The present paper confines itself to giving a clear exposition of this concept of *alaukikatva* according to Abhinavagupta in the light of his observations in his two well-known commentaries—*Abhinavabhārati* on Bharata's *Nāṭyaśāstra* and *Locana* on Ānandavardhana's *Dhvanyāloka*, and examining if it corresponds with the Western or, to be more specific, the Kantian concept of the autonomy of the art (aesthetic) experience.

Abhinavagupta never tires of stating over and over again that *rasa* is *alaukika*. Some of the relevant passages from the two commentaries are almost identical, word for word; some others closely correspond with each other and only a few make a new point. The major passages in which Abhinavagupta dwells on *alaukikatva* are presented here :

(i) *Locana*, p. 79 : When a man hears the words : "A son is born to you" joy is produced (through the power of denotation—*abhidhā*). But the suggested sense (*rasa* and the like) is not produced the way joy is produced in the above case. Nor does it come about through the secondary usage (*lakṣaṇā*, *guṇavṛtti*, *bhakti*). But it arises in a sensitive man (*sahṛdaya*—a man who is sensitive to literature) through his knowledge of *vibhāvas* and *anubhāvas*, because of his *hṛdaya-saṁvāda* (sympathetic response) and his *tanmayibhāva* (identification). It is *vilakṣaṇa* (different) from ordinary awareness of happiness etc. and it is not an objective thing (like a jar etc.).<sup>2</sup>

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1. The total range of meanings conveyed by the word 'alaukika' cannot be expressed through any one English expression. Different expressions such as *sui generis*, autonomous, extra-worldly, non-worldly, other-worldly, supra-normal, transcendental, etc., have been used by critics in different contexts for the term *alaukika*.

2. न चायं रसादिरर्थः 'पुत्रस्ते जातः' इत्यतो यथा हर्षो जायते तथा । नापि लक्षणया । अपि तु सहृदयस्य हृदय-

(ii) *Locana*, pp. 50-52 : The *Pratīyamānārtha* (suggested sense) is of two kinds (i) *laukika* (ordinary) : Thoughts (or ideas-*vastu*) and images (or *alamkāras*) may be suggested, but they are at the same time *vācya* (expressible) also; and (ii) *Kāvya-vyāpāraika-gocara* (= *vyañjanā-gocara* or *alaaukika*) what can only be suggested; no emotion is, in its essence, directly describable. It is not communicable like a thought (or idea) and image (or *alamkāra*). (The use of words like 'love' and 'sorrow' may convey to a person, an idea of the corresponding emotion but it will be only an idea and not a *felt* emotion). *Rasa*, according to Abhinavagupta, is never even in a dream *sva-śabda-vācya*—conveyed by the mere naming of the emotion (to be suggested).<sup>3</sup>

In these passages Abhinavagupta draws our attention to the fact that *rasa* does not arise either through *abhidhā* or *lakṣaṇā* (*bhakti, guṇavṛtti*). It comes about through *vyañjanā* the power of suggestion, peculiar to poetry (i. e., creative literature).

(iii) *Locana*, p. 160 : "In literature, however, the *vibhāvas* etc. conveyed (by convention and context) immediately tend towards the production of aesthetic relish (and are not ends in themselves) and so convention etc. do not play any role in the actual aesthetic relish itself. Nor is this (knowledge of the suggested sense) like the apprehension of religious (injunctions) such as : 'I have been enjoined to do such and such. I am now engaged in doing such and such. I have accomplished such and such.' Because in these cases some action is involved, and so these are of worldly nature." "In literature (however) the aesthetic relish (of the suggested sense) through the *vibhāvas* etc. is like the appearance of a magic flower; it is essentially a thing of the present moment which does not depend on the past or the future time."<sup>4</sup>

संवादबलाद् विभावानुभावप्रतीतौ तन्मयीभावेनास्वाद्यमान एव रस्यमानतैकप्राणः सिद्धस्वभावसुखादिविलक्षणः परिस्फुरति ।

The last compound we dissolve in a way quite different from the way both the commentators (The authors of *Bālapriyā* and *Kaumudī*, p. 147) and Professors Masson and Patwardhan (*Aesthetic Rapture*, Vol. I, p. 27 and Vol. II, p. 37, f. n. 233) do it. We dissolve the compound as 'siddha-svabhāva-vilakṣaṇaḥ', and 'sukhādivilakṣaṇaḥ'. This way the compound expression agrees with Abhinavagupta's description of *rasa* in A. Bh. I., p. 284 : 'na tu siddha-svabhāvaḥ tātkālika eva', and, *smṛtyanumāna-laukika-saṁvedana-vilakṣaṇa eva* .

3. तत्र प्रतीयमानस्य तावद् द्वौ भेदौ—लौकिकः काव्यव्यापारैकगोचरश्चेति । लौकिको यः स्वशब्दवाच्यतां कदाचिदधिरोते स...वस्तुशब्देनोच्यते ।...यस्तु स्वप्नेऽपि न स्वशब्दवाच्यो न लौकिकव्यवहारपतितः किं तु शब्द-समर्थमाणहृदयसंवादसुन्दरविभावानुभावसमुचितप्राग्विनिविष्टरत्यादिवासनानुरागसुकुमारस्वसंविदानन्दचर्वणाव्यापार-रसनीयरूपो रसः, स काव्यव्यापारैकगोचरो रसश्चनिरिति...।

—*Locana*, pp. 50-52

4. इह तु विभावाद्येव प्रतिपाद्यमानं चर्वणाविषयतोन्मुखमिति समयायुपयोगाभावः । न च नियुक्तोऽहमत्र करवाणि कृतार्थोऽहमिति शास्त्रीयप्रतीतिसदृशमदः । तत्रोत्तरकर्तव्यौन्मुख्येन लौकिकत्वात् । इह तु विभावादिचर्वणाद्भुतपुष्पवत् तत्कालसारैवोदिता न तु पूर्वापरकालानुबन्धिनीति लौकिकास्वादाद् योगिविषयाच्चान्य एवायं रसास्वादः ।

In this passage Abhinavagupta points out that this aesthetic rapture is *unique*. It is different from the ordinary worldly joy (and also from the bliss of *brahmāsvāda* experienced by a *yogin*, as explained in the passage (ix) below.)

(iv) *A. Bh. I., p. 36* : In this marvellous passage Abhinavagupta identifies some of the distinctive features of *rasa* and the *rasika* : As it is a very long passage we shall refer only to the most striking features mentioned in it : For the sensitive spectator practical interests or affairs are of no consequence when he goes to the theatre. He feels : he would listen to and see something marvellous which is beyond his everyday experience (*lokottara*), something worthy of his attention, something whose essence is from the beginning to the end, sheer delight. He would share this experience with the rest of the spectators. Engrossed in the aesthetic enjoyment of appropriate music, both vocal and instrumental, a man completely forgets himself (and also his worldly preoccupations, the narrow interests of his routine life and his worries) and he is aware then of nothing beyond the object or the situation portrayed by the poet. His heart becomes like a spotless mirror. It facilitates *hrdaya-saṁvāda* (sympathetic response) and *tanmayībhāva* (identification). What he sees is divorced from space and time. His apprehension (of *rasa*) does not fall within the ordinarily recognised categories of knowledge : right knowledge, false knowledge, doubt, probability or fancied identification, and the like. He is so engrossed in what he sees and is so carried away by an overpowering sense of wonder that he identifies himself with the principal character and sees the whole world as the latter saw it.<sup>5</sup>

(v) *Locana, p. 442* : In everyday life we hear such sentences as : "Take the cow to the field for grazing" or "Bring the cow home as it is evening." On hearing these sentences the concerned boy actually carries out what he has been told to do. In literature, however, there is no such activity demanded of the spectator. There is absolutely no suggestion of anything that he is expected to do. His attitude (towards the actor playing the part of, say, a villain like Rāvaṇa or the actress playing the role of the heroine Sītā) is one of appreciation alone and his sole aim is to find restful joy.<sup>6</sup>

In these passages Abhinavagupta pointedly refers to some of the important steps in the aesthetic experience, the attitude of a true spectator, the generalized nature of what he sees on the stage, the extra-ordinary or non-worldly

5. नाट्ये तु पारमार्थिकं किञ्चिदय मे कृत्यं भविष्यतीत्येवंभूताभिसंधिसंस्काराभावात् सर्व-परिषत्साधारणप्रमोदसारापर्यन्त-समादरणीयलोकोत्तरदर्शनश्रवणयोगी भविष्यामीत्यभिसंधिसंस्कारादुचितगीतातोयचर्चणाविस्मृतसांसारिकभावतया विमलमुक्तुरकल्पीभूतनिजहृदयः सूर्याद्यभिनयावलोकनोद्भिजप्रमोदशोकादितन्मयीभावः पाठ्याकर्णनपात्रान्तरप्रवेशवशात् समुत्पन्ने देशकालविशेषावेशानालिङ्गिते सम्यङ्-मिथ्या-संशय-संभावनादिज्ञानविज्ञेयत्वपरामर्शानास्पदे स्वात्मद्वारेण विश्वं तथा पश्यन्...।

6. काव्यवाक्येभ्यो हि न नयनानयनाद्युपयोगिनी प्रतीतिरभ्यर्थ्यते, अपि तु प्रतीतिविभ्रान्तिकारिणी, सा चाभिप्राय-निष्ठैव नाभिप्रेतवस्तुपर्यवसाना।

nature of the cognition of *rasa*, absence of any (physical) activity on the part of the spectator, and presence in him of a contemplative attitude.

(vi) *Locana*, p. 158 : *Rasa* is nothing but aesthetic enjoyment and this enjoyment consists (almost) exclusively in a kind of knowledge or consciousness. If it were possible to convey *rasa* through words (and their conventional meanings) alone we would have been possibly forced to admit that *rasa* is, like the denoted sense, *laukika*. But we do find that *rasa* is capable of being suggested by alliteration, gentle or harsh, which is devoid of any denoted sense. But in everyday life we never come across a thing which could possibly be suggested by *anuprāsa*. This is therefore, an additional proof for the doctrine of the *alaukikatva* of *rasa*.<sup>7</sup>

(vii) *A. Bh. I.*, p. 284 : In another passage Abhinavagupta says : *Rasa* is completely different from the permanent emotions like love, sorrow, etc; and it cannot be maintained, as Śaṅkuka did, that *rasa* is the apprehension of the permanent emotion of somebody else and that it is so called because it is an object of relish. For if it were so why should the permanent emotion of real life be not called *rasa* ? For if a non-existing (unreal) permanent emotion (in the actor) be capable of being the object of aesthetic relish, a real permanent emotion has all the more reason for being so capable. Therefore the apprehension of the permanent emotion of another person should be called only inference and not *rasa*. For what aesthetic relish is involved in this kind of inference<sup>8</sup> ? *Rasa* is not an objective thing in the real world as it is coterminous with the process of aesthetic relish and ceases to exist the moment the process of its relish is over;<sup>9</sup>... unless one is actually experiencing it, *rasa* does not exist. Its essence consists exclusively in aesthetic enjoyment. It is the permanent emotion (*artha*) brought to the state of aesthetic relish which is a form of knowledge free from worldly obstacles-worries, narrow personal interests, etc., by the *vibhāvas*, *anubhāvas* and *vyabhicāribhāvas* which attain a unity in the mind of the spectator (or reader).<sup>10</sup>

7. ज्ञानविशेषस्यैव चर्वणात्मत्वात् । इत्यलं बहुना । अतश्च रसोऽयमलौकिकः । येन ललितपरुषानुप्रासस्यार्थाभिधानानु-  
पयोगिनोऽपि रसं प्रति व्यञ्जकत्वम् । —*Locana*, p. 158

वाचकशब्दैकगम्यत्वे हि रसस्य वाच्यार्थवन्नौकिकत्वं कथञ्चिच्छब्दशब्दव्यमनुप्रासादिनापि वाचकत्वशून्येन व्यङ्ग्यत्व-  
मस्त्येव । न चानुप्रासव्यङ्ग्यं वस्तु लोके दृष्टचरमतोऽपि रसस्यालौकिकत्वं सिद्धमित्यर्थः । —*Bālapriyā*, p. 158

8. स्थायिविलक्षण एव रसः । न तु यथा शङ्कुकादिरभ्यधीयत—स्थाय्येव विभावादिप्रत्याय्यो रस्यमानत्वाद् रस उच्यत  
इति । एवं हि लौकिकोऽपि किं न रसः । असतोऽपि हि यत्र रसनीयता स्यात् तत्र वस्तुतः कथं न भविष्यति । तेन  
स्थायिप्रतीतिरनुमितिरूपा प्राप्या (? वाच्या) न रसः ।...तथा हि लौकिकचित्तवृत्त्यनुमाने का रसता ।

—*A. Bh. I.*, p. 284

9. न तु सिद्धस्वभावः तात्कालिक एव न तु चर्वणातिरिक्तकालावलम्बी...रसः ।

—*A. Bh. I.*, p. 284

10. अत एवालौकिकविभावादिनामधेयव्यपदेशैः...सामाजिकधियि सम्यग् योगं संबन्धमैकाग्र्यं वाऽऽसादितवद्भिरलौकिक-  
निर्विण्णसंवेदनात्मकचर्वणागोचरतां नीतोऽर्थश्चर्व्यमाणतैकसारः...रसः ।

—*A. Bh. I.*, p. 284

(viii) A. Bh. I., pp. 284-285 : The *vibhāvas* etc. are *alaukika* and are so called on account of their peculiar functions of *vibhāvanā* (awakening to life the latent permanent emotion) etc.<sup>11</sup> They are not the causes of the production of *rasa* (*niṣpatti-hetus* = *kāraka-hetus*) for if it were so, there would arise the contingency of its (*rasa*'s) existence even in the absence of the knowledge of the *vibhāvas* etc. Nor are they the causes of cognition (*Jñapti-hetus*) of *rasa* as *rasa* is not an objective thing (like a *ghaṭa*, *paṭa*-a jar, cloth, etc.) in our everyday life. Then what are the *vibhāvas* etc.? The *vibhāvas*, etc. are *alaukika*; they make it possible for the *rasika* to relish *rasa*. If the opponent asks; "Is there anything in the whole world like this?" Abhinavagupta replies : The fact that there is nothing in the whole world like this only serves to strengthen our position that *rasa* is *alaukika*.<sup>12</sup>

In these passages Abhinavagupta draws our pointed attention to two distinctive features of *rasa* : One, *rasa* which consists exclusively in aesthetic relish or pleasure is *alaukika* as it is radically different in kind from the permanent emotions (four of which are primarily pleasurable and four, primarily painful).<sup>13</sup> And, two, : The *vibhāvas* etc. are *alaukika*. They correspond to the *kāraṇas* etc. in everyday life but as they make the relish of *rasa* possible they exist only in the context of *rasa*. In everyday life we do not have, such terms as *vibhāva*, etc. They belong only to art, not to the real life. The ancients whom Bharata also follows invented an entirely new terminology to impress on our minds the basic distinction between the real life and the realm of literature, the real world and the world of drama.

(ix) A. Bh. I. pp. 284-285. : The aesthetic enjoyment of *rasa* consists in a completely extra-ordinary sense of wonder or mystic delight (*camatkāra*) and is totally different (*vilakṣaṇa eva*) from memory or recollection (*smṛti*),

11. तैरेवोद्यानकटाक्षवृत्त्यादिभिलौकिर्कीं कारणत्वादिभुवमतिक्रान्तैर्विभावना...मात्रप्राणैः अत एवालौकिकविभावादि-  
व्यपदेशभाभिः...

—A. Bh. I. p. 284

12. अत एव विभावादयो न निष्पत्तिहेतवो रसस्य । तद्बोधोपागमेऽपि रससंभवप्रसङ्गात् । नापि श्रुतिहेतवः येन प्रमाणमध्ये पतेयुः । सिद्धस्य कस्यचित् प्रमेयभूतस्य रसस्याभावात् । किंतुहेतुर्द्वि विभावादय इति । अलौकिक एवायं चर्वणोपयोगी विभावादिव्यवहारः । क्वान्यत्रेत्यं दृष्टमिति चेद् भूषणमेतदस्माकमलौकिकत्वसिद्धौ ।

—A. Bh. I. p. 285

Cf also :

न हि लोके विभावानुभावादयः केचन भवन्ति । हेतुकार्यावस्थामात्रत्वालोके तेषाम् । अथ त एव रसनोप-  
योगित्वे विभावादिरूपतां प्रतिपद्यन्ते ।

—A. Bh. I. p. 292

लोके हि न कश्चिद् विभावादिव्यवहार इति भावः ।

—A. Bh. I. p. 293

लोके विभावानुभावभिनयादिव्यवहाराभावात् ।

—A. Bh. I. p. 327

13. तथा हि—रतिहासोत्साहविस्मयानां सुखस्वभावत्वम् ।...क्रोध-भय-शोक-जुगुप्सानां तु दुःखरूपता ।

—A. Bh. I. p. 43

inference and worldly feelings of happiness, etc.<sup>14</sup> The empirical means of valid knowledge such as direct perception, etc. do not operate in the case of this non-worldly or extra-worldly (*alaukika*) *rasa-carvaṇā*. This aesthetic enjoyment or relish of *rasa* is brought about solely by the combination of the *vibhāvas*, etc., which are extra-worldly (*alaukika*)<sup>15</sup>. It is different from the perception of the permanent emotions of *rati* (love) etc., aroused by the empirical means of valid knowledge such as direct perception, inference, *āgama*, *upamāna*, etc.<sup>16</sup> It is also different from the perception without active participation of the thoughts of others on the part of imperfect *yogins*;<sup>17</sup> further, it is also different from the ecstatic experience of the perfect *yogin* in which he experiences the undifferentiated bliss of his Self and in which all desire for worldly objects is absent.<sup>18</sup> For these three forms of perception are vitiated by one kind of defect or another. To explain, : (i) The perception of the worldly permanent emotions like love etc. gives rise to practical desires such as possessing the object of love etc; (ii) The perception of an imperfect *yogin* lacks vividness and (iii) The perception of a perfect *yogin* is simply overpowered by the *Ātman* (self, or Brahman, the Ultimate Reality); and therefore all these three perceptions are devoid of beauty.<sup>19</sup> In aesthetic experience, on the contrary, there is no possibility of there arising any obstacle or defect : because of the absence of sensations of pleasure etc. as inhering exclusively in one's person, one is not overpowered by *Ātman*, or Brahman, (the object of *samādhi*); because of one's active participation and the absence of sensations of pleasure etc. as inhering exclusively in other persons, there is no lack of vividness; and because of one's being overpowered by one's own *vāsanā*, say, love etc., awakened by the corresponding *vibhāvas*, etc. which are generalized, there is no possibility of any obstacle confronting you.<sup>20</sup>

14. तथा हि लौकिकचित्तवृत्त्यनुमाने का रसता । तेनालौकिकचमत्कारात्मा रसास्वादः स्मृत्यनुमानलौकिक[स्व]संवेदन-विलक्षण एव ।

—A. Bh. I. p. 284

15. ...न चात्र लौकिकप्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणव्यापारः । किन्त्वलौकिकविभावादिसंयोगबलोपनतैवेयं चर्वणा ।

—Ibid, p. 285

16. सा च प्रत्यक्षानुमानागमोपमानादिलौकिक-प्रमाण-जनित-रस्याद्यवबोधतः...विशिष्यते ।

—Ibid, p. 285

17. तथा योगिप्रत्यक्षजनिततटस्थपरसंवित्तिज्ञानात्...विशिष्यते ।

—Ibid, I. p. 285

18. सकलवैषयिकोपरागशून्यशुद्धपरयोगितस्वात्मानन्दैकवनानुभवाच्च विशिष्यते ।

—Ibid, p. 285

19. एतेषां यथायोगमर्जनादिविघ्नान्तरोदयात् ताटस्थहेतुकारस्फुटत्वेन विषयावेशवैष्येन च सौन्दर्यविरहात् ।

—Ibid, p. 285

20. अत्र तु स्वात्मैकगतत्वनियमासंभवाच्च विषयावेशवैष्यम्, स्वात्मानुप्रवेशात् परगतत्वनियमाभावाच्च ताटस्थस्फुटत्वम्, तद्विभावादिसाधारण्यवशसंप्रबुद्धोचितनिजस्वादिवासनावेशाच्च न विघ्नान्तरानां संभवः ।

—Hemacandra's *Kāvyaṇuśāna*, MJV edn, pp. 102-103

In this passage Abhinavagupta asserts that empirical means of valid knowledge do not at all operate in the case of *rasanā* (and consequently that of *rasa*) and contrasts the aesthetic pleasure or relish or experience with a number of other experiences. These other experiences are : (i) ordinary perception or cognition or apprehension of love, etc. produced by empirical means of valid knowledge; (ii) telepathy (the knowledge of other people's minds) of an imperfect *yogin* and (iii) the ecstatic experience of the perfect *yogin* in which he experiences the undifferentiated (compact) bliss of his Self. He is all the while driving at the *alaukika* nature of *rasa*.

(x) A. Bh. I. p. 285 : *Rasa* consists exclusively in aesthetic relish and it is not of the nature of the object of cognition. The very life or existence of *rasa* entirely depends on this aesthetic relish. (*Rasa* ceases to exist after its enjoyment.) The aesthetic relish is not the result of any means of valid cognition nor of any means of production. But *rasa* itself is not unprovable for it is verified by one's own heart—from one's own experience of it. Aesthetic relish or experience consists exclusively in knowledge. However this knowledge is *totally different from all other empirical or mundane kinds of knowledge*.<sup>21</sup>

In this passage Abhinavagupta makes it clear that aesthetic experience, which consists exclusively in knowledge, is *in a class by itself*, not comparable to any other kind of knowledge, unique, *sui generis*. Further, he asserts that the proof of *rasa* is "*sva-samvedana-siddhatvam*"—because *rasa* is felt, therefore it exists."

(xi) *Locana* : pp 86, 92-93, 155 : In the "*Krauñca*-episode", narrated at the beginning of Vālmīki's *Rāmāyana*, the sage's poetic utterance is not to be viewed as the expression of his own sorrow. It is hardly natural for one that is tormented by grief to play the poet, .. (It is not the emotional situation as it actually was (*laukika*) that is represented in it.) It is the situation as it is in the poet's vision or as it has been transfigured by his sensitive nature and imaginative power (*alaukika*)<sup>22</sup>

The word "*pratibhā*" means "creative imagination" capable of creating ever newer and newer things. A form of this *pratibhā* is capable of creating beautiful poetry. It is when the poet is filled with *rasa*—(is fully under

21. रस्यतैकप्राणो ह्यसौ न प्रमेयादिस्वभावः ।...सा च रसना न प्रमाणव्यापारो न कारकव्यापारः । स्वयं तु नाप्रामाणिकः । स्वसंवेदनसिद्धत्वात् । रसना च बोधरूपैव । किन्तु बोधान्तरेभ्यो लौकिकेभ्यो विलक्षणैव ।

22. मा निषाद प्रतिष्ठां त्वमगमः शाश्वतीः समाः ।  
यत् क्रौञ्चमिथुनादेकमवधीः काममोहितम् ॥ इति ॥  
न तु मुनेः शोक इति मन्तव्यम् ।...न च दुःखसंतप्तस्यैषा दशेति ।

—*Locana*, p. 86

Cf :

एवं हि लोकगतचित्तवृत्त्यनुमानमात्रमिति का रसता । यस्त्वलौकिकचमत्कारात्मा रसास्वादः काव्यगत-विभावादि चर्वणाप्राणो नासौ स्मरणानुमानादिसाम्येन खिलीकारपात्रीकर्तव्यः ।

—*Ibid*, p. 155



the spell of *rasa*) that he spontaneously expresses himself in the form of poetry—like a liquid, say water, which overflows a vase if it be already full.<sup>23</sup>

The purport of this passage is : A poet does not depict “the emotional situation as it actually exists and as he witnesses it. That would by no means constitute art. *He idealises the situation.* Absorption in such an idealised situation helps transcending worries, tensions of ordinary life and attaining a unique form of experience. *That is why rasa is called alaukika.*”

(xii) *A. Bh. I. p. 282* : All these *rasas* consist essentially in delight, for the essence of undifferentiated or compact *prakāśa* (light) consisting in the aesthetic rapture of one's own consciousness is (transcendental) delight. In everyday life also women when they are totally absorbed in the relish or rumination of their consciousness plunged in profound sorrow find rest or repose in their own heart. For happiness consists in complete rest or repose without any kind of obstacle. Pain, on the contrary, is nothing but lack or absence of complete rest or repose. It is precisely for this reason that the Sāṃkhyas who explain sorrow as property of *rajas* declare that restlessness is the very essence of sorrow. All the *rasas* thus consist essentially in (mystic) delight.<sup>24</sup>

(xiii) *A. Bh. I. pp 291-292* : In this passage, which is apparently aimed at criticising Saṅkuka, Abhinavagupta says : People (like Saṅkuka) argue that *rasa* consists in the imitation of (permanent emotions such as) love etc. They themselves raise the objection : “How can sorrow be the cause of pleasure ?” And they answer their own objection by saying that it is the very nature of the emotions that when portrayed in a drama they give rise to pleasure. In refuting this position Abhinavagupta writes :

“But in the first place, the objection they raise is itself false. For it is not a rule that when one perceives sorrow in somebody else, one will necessar-

23. ‘प्रतिभा’ अपूर्ववस्तुनिर्माणक्षमा प्रज्ञा । तस्या विशेषो रसावेशवैशयसौन्दर्यं काव्यनिर्माणक्षमत्वम् ।

—Ibid, pp. 92-93

यावत् पूर्णो न चैतेन तावन्नैव कमत्यमुम् ।

—Ibid, p. 87

Note :— For this paragraph I am indebted to M. Hiriyanna : *Art Experience*, pp. 34-35.

24. तत्र सर्वेऽमी सुखप्रधानाः । स्वसंविचर्वणरूपस्यैकघनस्य प्रकाशस्यानन्दसारत्वात् । तथा हि—एकघनशोकसंविचर्वणे-  
ऽपि लोके स्त्रीलोकस्य हृदयविश्रान्तिरन्तरायशून्यविश्रान्तिशरीरत्वात् । अविश्रान्तिरूपतैव दुःखम् । तत एव  
कापिलैर्दुःखस्य चाञ्चल्यमेव प्राणत्वेनोक्तं रजोवृत्तितां वदद्भिरित्यानन्दरूपता सर्वरसानाम् ।

Read in this connection the following passage from *Aesthetic Rapture*, Vol. I. pp. 31-32 :  
.... “The compassion of a poem is different from the compassion found in the ordinary world. The explanation is that sensitive readers (*rasika*) become more and more deeply attracted towards this aesthetic experience of grief whereas they tend to shun the real experience. For if (*karuṇa*) were to consist exclusively in sorrow the way worldly *karuṇa* does, then nobody would feel like going (to plays in which *Karuṇa-rasa* was present) and thus large (and important) works as the *Rāmāyaṇa* etc. which consist exclusively in *karuṇarasa*, would fall into oblivion.... Therefore, *karuṇa*, like the other *rasas* consists in joy.” Also, cf : *Dhanika's Avaloka* on *Daśarūpaka* (Adyar edn. 1963, p. 221) and *Sāhitya-Darpana* III. 4-8.

ily feel sorrow in oneself. For instance, when one finds one's enemy in sorrow one is *delighted*. In other cases (i. e. those of persons who are neither one's friends nor foes) one remains indifferent. Now as regards the answer they gave to their own objection (that it is the very nature of the emotions that when they are portrayed in a drama they give rise to pleasure) it is no answer at all. In our opinion, in aesthetic experience it is one's own consciousness which consists of uniform bliss that is enjoyed. How can there be any suspicion of sorrow? The various permanent emotions like love, sorrow, etc. only serve to lend variety to the enjoyment of this bliss. Acting (*abhinaya*) etc. serve to awaken to life these permanent emotions."<sup>25</sup>

In these passages Abhinavagupta dwells upon his favourite theme that all *rasas* are essentially pleasurable. Even the painful emotions of anger, fear, sorrow and disgust (*krodha*, *bhaya*, *śoka* and *jugupsā*) of our real life, when poetised or represented on the stage, are contemplated in their idealised form, completely divorced from reference to personal interests, one's own or those of others, (and from all reference to time and space); and when they are thus contemplated they yield pure joy.

(xiv) *Locana* : p. 40, p. 399, p. 455 : Abhinavagupta states that *vyutpatti* (instruction in regard to the four well-known *puruṣārthas*—ends of human life, or as the term has been sometimes interpreted, moral instruction, intellectual refinement) and *prīti* (pleasure, joy, delight) constitute the goal of literature. If *vyutpatti* is half of the goal of literature, *prīti* is the other half. But he does not fail to state that moral instruction and delight are not really different from one another but are two aspects of the same thing; for they both have the same cause—both are aroused by poetry—both are the result of one and the same aesthetic experience.<sup>26</sup>

25. ये तु रत्याद्यनुकरणरूपं रसमाहुः, अथ चोदयन्ति शोकः कथं सुखहेतुरिति । परिहरन्ति च अस्ति कोऽपि नाट्यगतानां विशेष इति । तत्र चोद्यं तावदसत् । शोको हि प्रतीयमानः किं स्वात्मनि प्रत्येतुर्दुःखं व्रितनोतीति नियमः । शत्रुदुःखे प्रहर्षात् । अन्यत्र च मध्यस्थत्वात् । उत्तरं तु भावानां वस्तुस्वभावमात्रेण (मात्रता) इति न किञ्चिदत्र तत्त्वम् । अस्मन्मते संवेदनमेवानन्दघनमास्वाद्यते । तत्र का दुःखाशङ्का । केवलं तस्यैव चित्रताकरणे रतिशोकादिवासनाव्यापारः । तदुद्धोधने चाभिनयादिव्यापारः ।

—A. Bh. I. pp. 291-292

26. (i) तत्र कवेस्तावत्कीर्त्यापि प्रीतिरेव संपाद्या । यदाह—'कीर्तिं स्वर्गफलमाहुः' (काव्यालङ्कारसूत्रवृत्ति १.१.५) इत्यादि । श्रोतॄणां च व्युत्पत्ति-प्रीति यद्यपि स्तः, यथोक्तम्—  
धर्मार्थकाममोक्षेषु वैचक्षण्यं कलासु च ।  
करोति कीर्तिं प्रीतिं च साधुकाव्यनिषेवणम् ॥ इति ॥  
तथापि तत्र प्रीतिरेव प्रधानम् । अन्यथा प्रभुसंमितेभ्यो वेदादिभ्यो मित्रसंमितेभ्यश्चेतिहासादिभ्यो व्युत्पत्तिहेतुभ्यः कोऽस्य काव्यरूपस्य व्युत्पत्तिहेतोर्जायांसमितत्वलक्षणो विशेष इति प्राधान्येनानन्द एवोक्तः । चतुर्वर्गव्युत्पत्तेरपि ज्ञानन्द एव पार्यान्तिकं मुख्यं फलम् ।

—*Locana*, pp. 44-41

(ii) ...रसास्वादवैवश्यमेव स्वरसभाविन्यां व्युत्पत्तौ प्रयोजकमिति प्रीतिरेव व्युत्पत्तेः प्रयोजिका । प्रीत्यात्मा च रसस्तदेव नाट्यं नाट्यमेव वेद इत्यस्मदुपाध्यायः । न चैते प्रीतिव्युत्पत्ती भिन्नरूपे एव । द्वयोरप्येकविषयत्वात् ।

—*Locana*, p. 336

(xv) *A. Bh. I.*, p. 3 : Drama is indeed different from every wordly thing (*laukika-padārtha-vyatiriktam*); it is altogether different from (*vilakṣaṇam*), imitation (*anukāra*), reflection (*pratibimba*), picture (*ālekhyā*), similitude (*sādṛśya*), superimposition (*āropa*), identity, poetical fancy, dream, tricks, magic, and the like. It is fit to be cognised by one's own perception which is of the nature of aesthetic relish; and this cognition is altogether different (*bhinna-vrttānta*) from the well-known kinds of knowledge; right perception, error, doubt, lack of determinate knowledge, and lack of identity. It is truly of the nature of *rasa* (aesthetic experience).<sup>27</sup>

(xvi) *A. Bh. I.*, p. 35 : Abhinavagupta explains the above passage with examples while commenting on Bharata's *Nāṭya-Śāstra*, I.107, p. 35 : To explain : Here, that is in drama, (literally, in the *Nāṭyaveda*) those who are seen (on the stage—playing the roles of the gods and the demons) are not the real gods and the demons. With regard to them there arises neither the cognition of identity nor of similitude, as in the case of twins; nor of error (mistaken knowledge), as in the case of a mother-of-pearl for silver, nor of superimposition, as when one says : "This man from the country called Bālḥika (part of modern Punjab) is a bull"; nor of a poetical fancy, as when one says "Her face is like the moon"; nor of a copy, as in the case of a picture or a clay-model etc.; nor of an imitation, as in the case of a disciple who cleverly imitates his teacher when reproducing his explanation; nor of a sudden creation, as in magic (*indrajāla*); nor of an appearance by employing *māyā* (tricks); as in the case of a sleight of hand, etc. In all these cases, as there is no *sādhāraṇī-karaṇa* and the spectator is quite indifferent he cannot have the aesthetic pleasure or experience.<sup>28</sup>

(iii) न हि तेषां (काव्य) वाक्यानामभिप्रेत्यादिवाक्यवत् सत्यार्थप्रतिपादनद्वारेण प्रवर्तकत्वाय प्रामाण्यमन्विष्यते, प्रीतिमात्रपर्यवसायित्वात् । प्रीतेरेव चालौकिकचमत्काररूपाया व्युत्पत्त्यङ्गत्वात् ।

—Locana, p. 455

Note :—Abhinavagupta quotes the view of an earlier writer :

सामाजिकानां हि हर्षैकफलं नाट्यं न शोकादिफलम् ।

—A. Bh. I. p. 289

"The sole purpose of drama is joy and that it never creates sorrow."

From the passages cited above it would seem that Abhinavagupta would agree with this view.

27. तत्र नाट्यं नाम लौकिकपदार्थव्यतिरिक्तं तदनुकार-प्रतिबिम्बालेख्यसादृश्यारोपाध्यवसायोत्प्रेक्षास्वप्नमायेन्द्रजालादिविलक्षणं तद्ग्राहकस्य सम्यग्ज्ञान-भ्रान्तिसंशयानवधारणानध्यवसायविज्ञानभिन्नवृत्तान्तास्वादनरूपसंवेदनसंवेद्यं वस्तु रस-स्वभावमिति वक्ष्यामः ।

—A. Bh. I. p. 35

28. तथाहि—तेषु न तत्त्वेन धीः । न सादृश्येन यमलकवत् । न भ्रान्तत्वेन रूप्यस्मृतिपूर्वकशुक्तिरूप्यवत् । नारोपेण सम्यग्ज्ञानबाधानन्तरमिथ्याज्ञानरूपम् । न तदध्यवसायेन गौर्वाहीकवत् । नोत्प्रेक्ष्यमाणत्वेन चन्द्रमुखवत् । न तत्प्रतिकृतित्वेन चित्रपुस्तकवत् । न तदनुकारेण गुरु-शिष्य-व्याख्याहेवाकवत् । न तात्कालिकनिर्माणेन्द्रजालवत् । न युक्तिविरचिततदाभासतया हस्तलाषवादिमायावत् । सर्वेष्वेतेषु पक्षेष्वसाधारणतया द्रष्टुरौदासीन्ये रसास्वादायोगात् ।

—A. Bh. I. p. 35

In these passages Abhinavagupta demonstrates how drama (or, for the matter of that, creative literature) is unique, different from the various ordinary worldly things and how it lies beyond the ken of the various recognised modes or means of cognition, and is therefore *alaukika*, completely outside both time and space. He means to say Drama or "Literature occupies a time and a space that exist to the side of the world we know, it is a dimension apart, a different order of reality."<sup>29</sup> "The aesthetic perception which is not dependent on the concepts of reality and unreality, cannot be spoken of as a real experience (that is, the direct experience, perception of something real). Abhinavagupta says it is *like* a real experience. In other terms, the aesthetic experience is *like* a direct perception *sui generis*, free of every relation with practical reality, etc."<sup>30</sup>

Abhinavagupta's *alaukikatva* of *rasa* doctrine may briefly be stated as follows :—

Objects in the world of poetry or drama have no place in the everyday world of our space and time. Owing to this lack of ontological status the question of reality or unreality does not apply to them. This, however, does not mean that they are unreal. They are drawn from life but are *idealised*. They, however, do not become false or illusory through idealisation. A reader or spectator who mistakes them for real objects or views them as unreal or false is no true spectator—*sahrdaya*. The objects, depicted in poetry or drama, assume a *unique character which the spectator can describe as neither real nor unreal*. To take a logical view of the things portrayed in poetry or drama or to adopt a strictly philosophic approach to literature would only invite ridicule (as Anandavardhana and Abhinavagupta say).<sup>31</sup>

The things of our real life the poet transforms by the magic touch of his divine *pratibhā*—creative imagination. That the aesthetic sense is not universal is a well-known fact. The poet therefore, needs a *sahrdaya* (one endowed with a similar sensitivity—a sensitive spectator or fully responsive reader) to, appreciate the things of beauty and joy he has created by his *pratibhā*.

29. *Aesthetic Rapture*, Vol. I. p. 32 and Vol. II. f. n. 271

30. R. Gholi : *The Aesthetic Experience According To Abhinavagupta*, pp. 57-58, f. n. 1

31. काव्यविषये च व्यङ्ग्यप्रतीतिनां सत्यासत्यनिरूपणस्याप्रयोजकत्वमेवेति तत्र प्रमाणान्तरव्यापारपरीक्षोपहासायैव संपद्यते ।

—*Dhvanyāloka*, p. 455

न हि तेषां वाक्यानामग्निष्टोमादिवाक्यवत् सत्यार्थप्रतिपादनद्वारेण प्रवर्तकत्वाय प्रामाण्यमन्विष्यते, प्रीतिमात्रपर्यवसायित्वात् । प्रीतेरेव चालौकिकचमत्काररूपाया व्युत्पत्त्यङ्गत्वात् । ... नायं सहृदयः केवलं शुष्कतर्कोपक्रमकैः सहृदयः प्रतीतिं परामर्शुं नालमित्येष उपहासः ।

—*Locana*, p. 455

and, जैमिनीयसूत्रे ह्येवं योज्यते न काव्येऽपीत्यलम् ।

—*Locana*, p. 173

Incidentally, it may be noted that Abhinavagupta's respected *guru*, Bhaṭṭa Tauta, argues against the maxim of a painting of a horse (*citra-turaga-nyāya*) of Śaṅkuka. His arguments apply conditions of truth and falsity. (Anandavardhana and Abhinavagupta are very well aware that such notions of truth and falsity do not apply to the realm of literature (or art in general) as would be crystal clear from the above quotations.

In our real life everything is consciously or unconsciously related to the individual perceiver (*pramātr*) or to his friend, or to his enemy (*para*) or to some one in no way connected with him (*tatastha*). But the poet's creations are not so related; they are wholly impersonal. They have no reference to anybody in particular. Being altogether divorced from reference to personal interests, one's own or those of others, aesthetic experience is free from all the limitations of ordinary pleasure, arising out of narrow attachment, such as envy, desire or aversion; and the *sahrdaya* becomes almost unconscious of his private self. He rises above the duality of pain and pleasure, love and hatred and enjoys through disinterested contemplation absolutely pure joy or delight. With the outer vesture of all practical interests and infatuation removed he experiences pure delight, *ānanda*, bliss of his Self with this qualification that it is coloured by a particular *vāsanā* say of love, sorrow, etc., awakened to life for the time being by the particular *vibhāvas*, etc.,<sup>32</sup> He experiences or enjoys a unique kind of delight that has no parallel in our everyday life. It is therefore called *alaukika*. The aesthetic perception is an inward-oriented apprehension. The *sahrdaya* is completely absorbed in the aesthetic object to the exclusion of everything else—in other words, his mind is completely free from all obstacles, worries, tensions, preoccupations, prejudices etc., and he tastes his own consciousness which is but pure bliss and bliss alone. It is only coloured by some *vāsanā* or the other, aroused by the particular *vibhāvas* and that is why it is said to be akin to the enjoyment of *Brahman*—the Ultimate Reality (*Brahmāsvādasavidha*).

These important passages from Abhinavagupta's two works on literary and aesthetic criticism throw sufficient light on *alaukikatva*, a key term for him. It would be evident to a careful student of these passages that Abhinavagupta uses the term *alaukika* with different shades of meaning. In one or two places he uses the term *alaukika* to distinguish the process whereby *rasa* is achieved from other worldly or mundane (*laukika*) processes. It is achieved by the power of suggestion which is peculiar to poetry (or creative literature) and not by the commonly known processes of *abhidhā* (power of denotation) and *lakṣaṇā*, *guṇavrtti*, or *bhakti* (secondary usage). Occasionally he uses this term '*alaukika*' to point out that the mundane or worldly or earthly things of our everyday life are completely transformed by the magic touch of the activity of a poet's *pratibhā* (creative imagination, genius). He, however, frequently uses this term to mean "what is different or distinct from worldly things", "non-ordinary", "non-worldly", "what is not found in every-

32. (i) अस्मन्मते संवेदनमेवानन्दधनमास्वाद्यते । तत्र का दुःखाशङ्का । केवलं तस्यैव चित्रताकरणे रतिशोकादिवासनाव्यापारः । तदुद्बोधने चाभिनयादिव्यापारः ।

—A. Bh. I. p. 292

(ii) तत्र सर्वरसानां शान्तप्राय एवास्वादो विषयेभ्यो विपरिवृत्त्यान्तर्मुखात्तालाभात् । केवलं वासानान्तरोपहित इत्यस्य सर्वप्रकृतित्वाभिधानाय पूर्वमभिधानम् ।

—A. Bh. I. p. 339 (as restored by me)

day life", "what exists only in the realm of literature (or any other fine art)". He also uses the term to convey the sense of "what is unique", "in a class by itself", *sui generis*, transcendental or autonomous. He lays great emphasis on this aspect of *rasa* when he, over and over again, remarks that experience of *rasa* is something that is *alaukika*, not really of this world, and beyond our concepts of time and space or divorced from time and space and that it approximates the experience of the perfect *yogin* in which he experiences the undifferentiated bliss of his Self or that it is akin to the enjoyment or relish of *Brahman*—the Ultimate Reality.

Before comparing Abhinavagupta's position that *rasa* is *alaukika* with Kant's position that art experience is autonomous, let me briefly state in the words of Prof. R. B. Patankar, the author of *Sauṃdarya-Mīmāṃsā*, a unique work on Aesthetics in Marathi, the autonomist position of Kant :—

"Two positions have been taken regarding the relation between (i) art experience and (ii) other experiences in life. *The first position* is that (a) there is a continuity between the two types, (i) and (ii), of experiences (b) and that art experience is valuable because it promotes goals of these other experiences. (E. g., art experience is valuable because it gives us an insight into reality, it makes us morally better.) *The second position* is that art experience is radically different from other varieties of experiences, the difference is one of kind, not one of degree. Art experience is *sui generis*; autonomous, self-contained; art experience is valuable because it is art experience, and for no other reason.

If one wants to maintain the autonomist position, as Kant wants to, one has to show that art experience is different from (i) cognitive experience (ii) practical experience, including moral experience; (iii) experience of sensory pleasure, entertainment, etc. If the autonomy of art experience is to be proved, it will have to be shown (a) that the art object does not have the ontological status that objects in the real world have, and (b) that art experience is not mediated by any concepts. Sanskrit aestheticians like Śaṅkuka, Abhinavagupta have pointed out that the art object does not have the ontological status that things in the real world have. But no Sanskrit aesthetician has thought it necessary to say that art experience is not mediated by concepts... Śaṅkuka has deontologised the art object. But no Sanskritist deconceptualised art experience."

If we examine the concept of Abhinavagupta, that *rasa* is *alaukika*, by applying the above-mentioned criteria we will have to admit that Abhinavagupta is not autonomist. It is true that according to Abhinavagupta the empirical means of valid cognition such as direct perception, inference, etc. simply do not operate in regard to *rasa*. He explicitly states that no kind of intellectual thinking bears any parallel to the experience of *rasa*. Further, it is also true that according to him sheer delight is ultimately the sole aim or goal of poetry (or creative literature). Śaṅkuka, and following his lead, Abhinavagupta have deontologised the art-object. But they have not taken

the second step—they have not deconceptualised art or aesthetic experience. So they cannot be called autonomist in the Kantian sense.

But leaving aside this restricted Kantian meaning of the term 'autonomist' and accepting the words 'autonomy' and 'autonomist' in their wider sense we can certainly say that Abhinavagupta and Ānandavardhana, whom Abhinavagupta follows, are both full-fledged autonomists :

In his *Dhvanyāloka* Ānandavardhana observes : "In the province of poetry (creative literature) obviously standards of truth and falsity have no relevance. Any attempt to find out or discover whether a poem (or any literary composition) is true or false by employing means of valid cognition leads to ridicule alone." Abhinavagupta comments on it : "Such a person will be ridiculed as follows : He is not sensitive to literature. He is not able or competent to appreciate aesthetic experience for his mind has become (truly) hard by his indulging in dry logic."<sup>33</sup>

In the same work at another place Ānandavardhana dwells upon the autonomy of a poet : "In the boundless world of poetry, the poet is the sole creator. As it pleases him to create a new world of his own, this real world is transformed. If the poet is pervaded by *rasa* then the whole world in his poem will be infused with *rasa*. But if he be devoid of emotion then the world too will become dry as dust."

A great or good poet, by virtue of his autonomy, at his sweet will causes even insentient objects to behave as if they were animate and animate objects to behave as if they were inanimate."<sup>34</sup>

Mammatā, a staunch follower of Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta endorses this view of poet's autonomy, and consequently, that of the aesthetic experience in the opening verse of his *Kāvya-prakāśa* :

"Supreme is the poet's speech which unfolds an altogether new creation, which is free from the laws of *niyati* (Destiny or nature), which consists of delight and delight alone, which is completely independent of anything else and which is charming on account of nine *rasas*."

So keeping in view the ancient tradition about the *alaukika* nature of poetic creation and Abhinavagupta's constant emphasis on the *alaukika* nature of *rasa* throughout his writings we are perfectly justified in

33. Vide footnote (29) *supra*.

34. अपारे काव्यसंसारे कविरेकः प्रजापतिः ।

यथास्मै रोचते विश्वं तथेदं परिवर्तते ॥

शृङ्गारी चेत् कविः काव्ये जातं रसमयं जगत् ।

स एव वीतरागश्चेत्तीरसं सर्वमेव तत् ॥

भावानचेतनानपि चेतनवचेतनानचेतनवत् ।

व्यवहारयति यथेष्टं सुकविः काव्ये स्वतन्त्रतया ॥

describing Abhinavagupta as a champion of *alaukikatāvāda*, an autonomist in the popular and wider sense of that word. To call Abhinavagupta an autonomist in the restricted sense in which Kant uses the term, would be a highly misleading and inexcusable error.

Finally, it would be better to coin a new appropriate term (other than autonomy) in English to express Abhinavagupta's concept of *alaukikatva* and a new suitable term (other than *alaukikatva*) in modern Indian languages like Marathi, Gujarati, Hindi etc. to express Kant's concept of autonomy. If this suggestion is followed a lot of confusion in the minds of scholars reading books on Abhinavagupta and his *alaukikatva* in English and modern Indian languages would be avoided.

Although Bhaṭṭa Tauta criticises Śaṅkuka's analogy of '*citra-turaga-pratīti*' and although it is traditionally believed that the view of the *guru* is also the view of his *śiṣya*, Abhinavagupta's own statements indisputably prove that he is one with Śaṅkuka in accepting *alaukika* or the unique mode of perception involved in aesthetic experience—*citra-turaga-pratīti*.



## Worldly Nature of Rasa

T. S. NANDI

Aesthetes over centuries have discussed the nature of *rasa* and they seem to have agreed to differ. Abhinavagupta, with his master Ānandavardhana, and his followers, the great *ālaṃkārikas* such as Maṃmaṭa, Hemacandra, Viśvanātha and Jagannātha and a host of others belonging to the formidable Kashmiri tradition, have all unequivocally declared the '*a-laukikatva*' of *rasa* : *asmanmate tu saṃvedanameva ānandaghanam āsvādyate; tatra kā duḥkḥāśāṅkā*. But there were others who held the opposite view. Abhinava could see the strength of their case and in order to reduce it he was almost forced to amend the text of Bhārata and read—'*harṣāmcādhigacchanti*' in place of '*harṣādīmścādhigacchanti*,' but even while doing so he had to recognise a weighty opinion on the nature of *rasa* that went dead against him. We will try to examine this problem in its historical perspective.

To say that the nature of *rasa* is worldly is to say that the emotional response to a work of art does not basically differ from its counterpart in the work-a-day world. This means that feelings and emotions and events presented through the medium of art do not differ in nature from their counterparts in the real world and that they cause identical response by way of generating a feeling of happiness or unhappiness in the minds of discerning spectators in the case of a dramatic performance or readers in the case of poetry. The crux of the problem is whether life presented through the medium of poetry or art retains its original character, that is whether it continues to be a mixture of good and evil resulting into happiness and unhappiness. Abhinava and his school are of the opinion that life presented through artistic media undergoes a sea-change, and is transformed into an experience totally unworldly, *a-laukika*, consisting of only bliss unbounded. The joys and sorrows of life, the favourable and the unfavourable, the acceptable and the unacceptable are all transformed creating a unique aesthetic experience not to be found in normal life. He says :

*Rasa* or aesthetic pleasure is never met with in ordinary life, but is peculiar to art.<sup>1</sup> The *bhāvas* or emotions and feelings, when suggested—*abhivyakta*—cease to have their original character.

But this was not acceptable to a number of aesthetes, perhaps beginning with Bharata himself. Life for them, continues to be the same mixture of pleasure and pain even when presented through the art-media. For Abhinava and his followers, therefore, *rasa* is *sthāyivilakṣaṇa*, i. e. different in nature from the *laukika sthāyī* while for the others the *laukika sthāyī*, is itself *rasa* :

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1. तेन नाट्य एव रसा न लोक इत्यर्थः ।

*Nāṭya-śāstra* VOL. I, p 291 (GOS edn, Baroda, 1956)

*sthāyī eva rasaḥ*. We will try to see how a majority of the aesthetes held this view but were perhaps outnumbered by Abhinava and his friends.

We will begin with Bharata, whose *Nāṭyaśāstra* (NS) (second edn. G. O. S. 56) is perhaps the oldest available document on Indian aesthetics. Bharata wants the dramatic performance to represent life in its varied colours, reflecting the activity of the whole mankind in its various moods. He says :

*Nāṭya* is supposed to be rooted in *dharma*, i. e. it imparts instruction concerning one's duty, is covetable, is accompanied by the means for attaining the four goals of human life in a direct way, throws light on all the activities of people for future generations. It is rich with the essence of all the *śāstras*, promotes all arts. I will define the nature and scope of the fifth *Veda* called *nāṭya*. (NS. I, 14, 15).<sup>2</sup>

The first performance presented an imitation, in which the demons were shown to be defeated by the gods.<sup>3</sup> This presentation was full of the din and bustle, of life<sup>4</sup> causing jubilation for the gods and a sense of insult and injury in the camp of the *asuras*<sup>5</sup>. It was thought advisable to appease the demons, who felt sore over the presentation and took it as an insult.<sup>6</sup> The creator of *nāṭya-veda* or dramatic art tried to pacify them in soft words explaining how his art-creation tried to reflect the auspicious and the inauspicious alike in the case of both the gods as well as the demons, and that it followed the pattern of activity and intention on their part : I have created *Nāṭyaveda* which depicts the good or bad fortunes of (both) the gods as well as you (*Asuras*) and it follows the patterns of one's activity, intention or feeling and lineage. It does not exhibit exclusively either your or the gods' (behaviour). It represents the behaviour and states of all the three worlds. (NS. I, 106, 107).<sup>7</sup>

2. धर्म्यमर्थं यशस्यं च सोपदेश्यं ससङ्ग्रहम् । भविष्यतश्च लोकस्य सर्वकर्मानुदर्शकम् ।

ना. शा. (१-१४, पृ. १३).

सर्वशाल्लार्थसम्पन्नं सर्वशिल्पप्रवर्तकम् । नाट्याख्यं पञ्चमं वेदं सेतिहासं करोम्यहम् ॥

(१-१५, पृ. १३)

3. तदन्तेऽनुकृतिर्विद्धा यथा दैत्याः सुरैर्जिताः ॥

ना. शा. (१. ५७ ब, पृ. २६).

4. सम्फोटविद्रवकृता च्छेद्यमेयाहवात्मिका ।

ना. शा. (१. ५८ अ, पृ. २६)

5. अभवन्शुभिताः सर्वे दैत्या ये तत्र सङ्गताः ॥

ना. शा. (१. ६४ ब, पृ. २८)

6. प्रत्यादेशोऽयमस्माकं सूरार्थं भवता कृतः ॥

ना. शा. (१. १०३ ब, पृ. ३३)

7. भवतां देवतानां च शुभाशुभविकल्पकः । कर्मभावान्वयापेक्षी नाटयवेदो मया कृतः ॥

ना. शा. (१. १०६, पृ. ३५)

नैकान्ततोऽत्र भवतां देवानां चानुभावनम् । त्रिलोक्यस्यास्य सर्वस्य नाटयं भावानुकीर्तनम् ॥

ना. शा. (१. १०७, पृ. ३५) .

Bharata seems to advocate that normal likes and dislikes, hate and love are reflected as they are in their true colours, of course, bereft of any personal element. It should exactly reflect different shades of life causing a feeling of joy or sadness as the case may be : *Nāṭya* which is created by me, reflects various feelings and situations, (and) represents the general pattern of life in the world. It deals with the activity of the high, the middle and the low classes of people, imparts instruction for their welfare, and leads to satisfaction, entertainment and happiness, etc. (NS. I, 112, 113).<sup>8</sup>

The 'ādi' in '*sukhādikṛt*' is important and Bharata thereby admits '*duḥkha*' also in the fold of art-experience. Though of course Abhinava does not accept this and explains 'ādi' as—by 'ādi' is meant the enlightenment of the pious people.<sup>9</sup>

That the dramatic art is embracing is suggested by Bharata when he says that it touches every art and every aspect of life—There is no knowledge, no art, no branch of learning or fine art, no application (of art and knowledge), no activity which is not reflected in *nāṭya*.<sup>10</sup>

In fact, this art is meant to reflect life in its entirety—This *nāṭya* will imitate the (activity of the) seven *dvīpas* (i. e. the entire world).<sup>11</sup>

The nature of our existence which is a curious mixture of happiness and unhappiness is sought to be exactly represented by art-media : The nature of worldly existence which is a mixture of pleasure and pain as expressed by physical and other types of representation is called *nāṭya*.<sup>12</sup>

Even Abhinava, while commenting on verses 118 and 119 on p. 43, admits of the fact that the various *sthāyibhāvas* and *vyabhicārins* are a blending of both happiness and unhappiness : *Nāṭya* is (the complete representation) of the entire world with both its pain and pleasure that one relishes in its depersonalized form.<sup>13</sup> He further elaborates how various

8. नानाभावोपसम्पन्नं नानावस्थान्तरात्मकम् । लोकश्रुतानुकरणं नाटयमेतन्मया कृतम् ॥

ना. शा. (१.११२, पृ. ४०)

उत्तमाधममध्यानां नराणां कर्मसंश्रयम् । हितोपदेशजननं धृतिक्रीडासुखादिकृत् ॥

ना. शा. (१. ११३, पृ. ४०)

9. आदिग्रहणेन तपस्विनो मतिबोधादय इति मन्तव्यम् ।

(अ. भा. पृ. ३९)

10. न तज्ज्ञानं न तच्छिल्पं न सा विद्या न सा कला । नासौ योगो न तत्कर्म नाटयेऽस्मिन् यन्न दृश्यते ॥

ना. शा. (१.११६, पृ. ४१)

11. सप्तद्वीपानुकरणं नाटयमेतद्भविष्यति ॥

ना. शा. (१.११७ ब. पृ. ४१)

12. योऽयं स्वभावो लोकस्य सुखदुःखसमन्वितः । सोऽङ्गाद्यभिनयोपेतो नाटयमित्यभिधीयते ॥

ना. शा. (१.११९, पृ. ४२)

13. लोकस्य सर्वस्य साधारणतया स्वत्वेन भाव्यमानश्चर्यमाणोऽर्थो नाटयम् । स च सुखदुःखरूपेण विचित्रेण समनुगतः ।

न तु तदेकात्मम् ।

(अ. भा. पृ. ४३)

feelings cause pleasure or pain, and concludes (p. 44, A. bh.) : *Nāṭya* is that complex of feelings which resembles the entire gamut of pleasurable and painful worldly emotions and which contains the traces of the latter.<sup>14</sup>

It is only a necessary logical step further, to say that the nature of art-experience, the *rasa* is identical everywhere, i. e. of the nature of both happiness and unhappiness, resulting into the '*laukikatva*' of this experience. This perhaps is undeniable so far as Bharata is concerned. The *samavakāra* type as illustrated by *Amṛta-manthana* (iv. 2, 3, 4 p. 85), or the *ḍima* called *Tripuradāha* (iv. 10, p. 86), also represents the same admixture, the same reflection of activity and feelings of a similar (*karma-bhāvānukīrtana*) nature (iv. 11, p. 87).

In chapter VI. vv. 15, 16, 17 etc. Bharata enumerates the *rasas* and *bhāvas*, and gives his famous *rasa-sūtra* viz., *Vibhāvānubhāva-vyabhicāri-saṁyoga-drasaniṣpattiḥ*, at VI. 31, p. 272. Lollaṭa, whose views are quoted in the A. bh. (p. 272) seems to hold that the *rasa* is located both in the '*anukārya*' i. e. original character, historical or otherwise as the case may be, and the *anukartā*, i. e. the actor—(p. 272, A. bh.) : *Rasa* is present in both—primarily in Rāma, the object of imitation, and (secondarily also) in the actor, through the continuous awareness (present in both, the actor and the spectator of the fact of representation).<sup>15</sup>

This perhaps implies that for Lollaṭa emotion in art-experience is on the same footing as that in normal life. To put it more clearly, *rasa* is *sukha-duḥkḥātma* i. e. of the nature of pleasure and pain as in the case of *laukika Rāmādi* i. e. worldly Rāma etc. and is therefore of a worldly nature. Perhaps Lollaṭa is close to Bharata, who, we will go to see, further explains in ch. VII, the nature of various *sthāyibhāvas* and *vyabhicāri-bhāvas* in a similar vein. For Lollaṭa then, '*sthāyī eva rasaḥ*' i. e. *rasa* is *sthāyibhāva* itself seems to be the guiding principle.

For Śaṅkuka also, *rasa* is an imitation of feelings and moods realised through inference with the help of unfailing marks in the actor.

The *sthāyī* (which originally belongs to chief characters like Rāma and) which is perceived, on the strength of the tokens, as being present in the actor is of the nature of imitation; and because it is of the nature of imitation it is called by a different name *rasa*.<sup>16</sup>

It should be specially noted that in the A. bh. there is no mention of '*vastu-saundaryabalāt rasanīyatvena*...etc. thereby giving not even the

14. लौकिका ये सुखदुःखात्मानो भावाः तत्सदृशस्तत्संस्कारानुविद्धो नाट्यलक्षणोऽर्थः समुदायरूपस्तस्यैव भागानुसमयः ।

(अ. भा. पृ. ४४)

15. स चोभयोरपि । [मुख्यया वृत्त्या रामादौ] अनुकार्येऽनुकर्तार्यपि चानुसन्धानबलात् ।

(अ. भा. पृ. २७२)

16. अनुकर्तृस्थत्वेन लिङ्गबलतः प्रतीयमानः स्थायी अनुकरणरूपः । अनुकरणरूपत्वादेव च नामान्तरेण व्यपदिष्टो रसः ।

(अ. भा. पृ. २७२)

slightest chance of believing that perhaps for Śaṅkuka the nature of art-experience was totally divorced from the nature of worldly experience and that for him *rasa* was *laukika-sthāyi-vilakṣaṇa*. It is only Mammaṭa who seems to introduce this twist, though of course Śaṅkuka does differentiate between 'avagamanaśakti' which is itself 'abhinayana' and *vācakatva* : *avagamanaśaktirhi abhinayanam vācakatvādanyā* (p. 273). 'Anumiti' and 'vācakatva' stand poles apart, but this does not change the *laukika* nature of *rasa* in the opinion of Śaṅkuka, which is the main target of attack for Abhinava who later on says : Where is the relish in the mere inference of a worldly feeling ?<sup>17</sup> It seems very clear that at least for Abhinava, Śaṅkuka's imaginative guess of a particular basic mental state is equivalent to the normal process of reasoning of a worldly mental state. In that case, it will be safe to presume that perhaps for Śaṅkuka also *rasa* is identical with the feelings and emotions met with in ordinary life and is therefore '*laukika*.' In these circumstances it is difficult to presume that Śaṅkuka ever imagined a *sthāyī* in the poetic context to be dissimilar to the ordinary *sthāyin*. Tauta, when he criticises Śaṅkuka means exactly this and observes : If someone were to say that the actor's feeling of *Rati* which is apprehended (by the spectator) is the same as the Erotic sentiment (*Śṛṅgāra*) it remains to be seen in what form (it is so apprehended.) (Let us suppose that exponent of the Imitation theory says that) we apprehend the actor's feelings of *Rati* in the same way as we apprehend in ordinary life the *Rati* in a person through the complex of causes like young women, effects like their sidelong glances, concomitants like feeling of satisfaction. If this is so then it can be objected that *Rati* in its original form, and not in its imitated form, is apprehended. Then the whole talk of imitation is meaningless.<sup>18</sup>

Tauta comes to the inevitable conclusion that whatever Śaṅkuka has said is less than sense—*atha ca tadanukārapratibhāsa iti riktā vācoyuktiḥ* (p. 275, A. bh). Abhinava also seems to toe the line of his *guru* and declares that if *rasa* is just a feeling arrived at by reasoning with the help of (artificial) determinants etc., then what harm is there in recognising *rasa* in ordinary life where the determinants etc., are real?—And it is not as Śaṅkuka and others have said viz. that a permanent emotion, brought to consciousness by determinants, etc., being relishable, is itself *rasa*.<sup>19</sup>

17. लौकिकचित्तवृत्त्यनुमाने तु का रसता ।

(अ. भा. पृ. २८४)

18. अथ नटयता चित्तवृत्तिरेव प्रतिपन्ना सती रत्यनुकारः शङ्कार इत्युच्यते, तत्रापि किमात्मकत्वेन सा प्रतीयत इति चिन्त्यम् । ननु प्रमदादिभिः कारणैः कटाक्षादिभिः कार्यैः धृत्यादिभिश्च सहचारिभिर्लिङ्गभूतैर्या लौकिकी कार्यरूपा कारणरूपा सहचारिरूपा च चित्तवृत्तिः प्रतीतियोग्या तदात्मकत्वेन सा नटचित्तवृत्तिः प्रविभाति हन्त तर्हि रस्याकारणैव सा प्रतिपन्नेति दूरे रत्यनुकरणतावाचोयुक्तिः ।

(अ. भा. पृ. २७४)

19. न तु यथा शङ्कुकादिभिरभ्यधीयत, "स्थावरेव विभावादिप्रत्याग्यो रस्यमानत्वादस उच्यते ।" एवं हि लौकिकोऽपि किं न रसः ।

(अ. भा. पृ. २८४)

From this it should be clear that for Saṅkuka, the imitated *styāyī* is of *laukika* nature. And keeping in view this result Abhinava says : To explain : Where is the relish in the mere inference of worldly feeling ? The relish of *rasa* is in its essence a state of unique & wonderful enjoyment (*camatkāra*). It is radically different from memory, inference and worldly (sensation of) pleasure.<sup>20</sup>

This much for the *rasa-sūtra* of Bharata. True, Bharata himself has not provided any direct clue to the nature of *rasa* in the *rasa-sūtra*, but his stray expressions at different places in NS, could be taken as dependable indicators in this respect. We will continue to examine them further, after once again taking note of two expressions of Bharata viz., *dhrti-krīdā-sukhādi-krt* at I. 113, and, *sukha-duḥkha-samanvitaḥ* at I. 119.

While explaining what *rasa* exactly means, Bharata has the following observation : (p. 288, NS) -

Now one enquires, 'What is the meaning of the word *rasa* ? It is said, in reply (that *Rasa* is so called) because it is capable of being tasted (*āsvādyatvāt*).

How do people relish *rasa* ? Just as good-natured connoisseurs relish food enriched with various condiments, good-natured spectators relish permanent emotions, suggested by the representation of various transient emotional states; the representation consists of speech, bodily gestures, and involuntary physical reflexes. The connoisseurs thus experience pleasure and other feelings.<sup>21</sup>

This expression viz., '*harṣādīmśca*' is a clear pointer as to Bharata's attitude towards the nature of *rasa*. It is a direct thrust causing damage to the theory of the *alaukikatva* of *rasa*. And the result is that even Abhinava seems to have been embarrassed and has to be purely on the defensive when he observes that, while others include '*śoka*' etc., because of the word '*ādi*' in '*harṣādīmśca*' he & his followers do not. For, a dramatic performance could not result in an experience other than that of unmixed joy : Some are of the view that the word '*ādi*' ('other feelings' in the quotation cited above) includes sorrow, etc. But this view is not correct. For the end of Drama is to produce (unalloyed) joy, and never sorrow.<sup>22</sup> If the result were anything but unmixed joy, then people would avoid any such performance, and further there is no valid reason also in accepting this. Abhinava would therefore make bold to suggest a text amendment, viz; *harṣāmścādhigacchanti*. He says (p. 289,

20. तथाहि लौकिकचित्तवृत्त्यनुमाने का रसता । तेनालौकिकचमत्कारात्मा रसास्वादः स्मृत्यनुमानलौकिकसंवेदनविलक्षण एव  
(अ. भा. पृ. २८४)

21. अत्राह—रस इति कः पदार्थः । उच्यते—आस्वाद्यत्वात् । कथमास्वाद्यते रसः । यथा हि नानाव्यञ्जनसंस्कृतमन्नं भुज्जाना रसानास्वादयन्ति सुमनसः पुरुषा हर्षादींश्चाधिगच्छन्ति तथा नानाभावाभिनयव्यञ्जितान् वागङ्गसत्वोपेतान् स्थायिभावानास्वादयन्ति सुमनसः प्रेक्षकाः हर्षादींश्चाधिगच्छन्ति । तस्मान्नाटयरसा इत्यभिध्याख्याताः ।

(ना. शा. पृ. २८८-८९)

22. अन्ये त्वादिशब्देन शोकादीनामत्र संग्रहः । स च न युक्तः । सामाजिकानां हि हर्षैकफलं नाटयं न शोकादिफलम् ।  
(अ. भा. पृ. २८९)

A. bh.) : There is no reason to believe that Drama leads to sorrow; otherwise there would have arisen the need to disprove this view. Therefore some people accept the variant reading pleasures (*harṣāmśca*).<sup>23</sup> Yogī as Abhinava was, he had no good reason to explain away the text in the manner he does. His, and of course Ānanda's eloquent advocacy of *śānta* as the only *rasa* and a *mahārasa* could also be viewed from this angle. But irrespective of what Abhinava says, we can clearly see that Bharata supports the view that *Rasa* is *laukika* in character.

Bharata then explains individual *rasas* and says—We shall take the Permanent Emotions to the level of *Rasa*.<sup>24</sup> Here also stray hints dropped by Bharata go to prove our thesis that for Bharata *rasa* was of a *laukika* nature. His treatment of *vipralambha* (p. 306), and *karuṇa* (p. 309) points in the same direction. *Karuṇa* is *śokasthāyibhāvaprabhava* (p. 317). But Bharata is silent about its aesthetic enjoyment. *Raudra* (p. 319), *bhayānaka* (p. 326) and *bībhatsa* (p. 328) are also delineated in keeping with their *laukika* nature.

But all the description of various *rasas* and *sthāyibhāvas*, even in keeping with the *laukika* design, could not be taken as a pointer to Bharata's actual concept of the nature of tasting. No doubt Bharata holds that the *vibhāvas* and the *anubhāvas* need not be described by him because they are fairly known to us; *tatra vibhāvānubhāvau lokaprasiddhau* (p. 348). Bharata perhaps cites somebody else's verse when he says : (p. 348, v. 6)—The stanza which is relevant in the context is as follows :—

The wise may note that the determinants and the consequents in dramatic representation correspond to their counterparts in everyday life in respect of their nature and their behaviour.<sup>25</sup>

He says that there are eight *sthāyins*, or the basic mental states, thirty-three *vyabhicārins* or accessories and eight *sāttvika-bhāvas* or involuntary physical reflexes. These forty-nine taken together make for 'Kāvya-rasābhivyakti.' *Rasas* are born of these, when they are presented in a universalized state. He says—It may be noted that these forty-nine emotions in their generalized form are the source of *Rasa*.<sup>26</sup>

It may be noted that Bharata here and also elsewhere mentions '*kāvya-rasa*,' and if '*sāmānya-guṇa-yoga*' is the same as interpreted by us above,

23. तथात्वे निमित्ताभावात्तत्परिहारप्रसङ्गाच्चेति मन्यमाना हर्षाश्चाधिगच्छन्तीति पठन्ति ।

(अ. भा. पृ. २८९)

24. स्थायिभावांश्च रसत्वमुपनेष्यामः ।

(ना. शा. पृ. २९९)

25. भवति चात्र श्लोकः—

लोकस्वभावसंसिद्धा लोकायात्रानुगामिनः । अनुभावा विभावाश्च ज्ञेयास्त्वभिनये बुधैः ॥

(ना. शा. पृ. ३४८, श्लो. ६)

26. एवमेते काव्यरसाभिव्यक्तिहेतव एकोनपञ्चाशद्भावाः प्रत्यवगन्तव्याः । एभ्यश्च सामान्यगुणयोगेन रसा निष्पद्यन्ते ।

(ना. शा. पृ. ३४८)

then we need not wait for Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka for the concept of *sādhāraṇīkaraṇa*. Similarly Ānanda's '*abhiivyakti*' also could be said to be present in Bharata, though this point needs to be carefully examined, in deciding this. That the *sthāyins*, *vibhāvas*, *anubhāvas* and *vyabhicārins* follow the pattern of their normal form, should not necessarily lead us to believe that their relish also follows the *laukika* pattern. Yet there are indications, as seen above in Bharata's use of language which perhaps speak out his mind. For example, at the end of the description of *sāttvikabhāvas* he has this observation viz. Drama is the representation of mundane life and therefore it is desirable that *sattva* (concentration) should be present in it. What analogy is there (in support of this) ? Here the pleasure and pain produced on the stage according to the dramatic conventions should be accompanied by *Sattva* (concentration) so that they would correspond with their originals in everyday life.<sup>27</sup> These *bhāvas* are said to be "*sukha-duḥkha-kṛtaḥ*" i. e., resulting into an experience of both pain and pleasure. They have to be therefore '*yathāvat*' i. e., absolutely identical in nature and scope with the *bhāvas* at *laukika* level. Bharata says : (p. 377, v. 108) ..I have described here the forty-nine emotions which belong to three categories.<sup>28</sup>

This much about Bharata. And perhaps it strengthens our observation that Bharata's concept of the nature of *rasa* was *laukika*.

The earlier *ālaṃkārikas* such as Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin Vāmana, Udbhaṭa, and Rudraṭa are not very specific as to the nature of *rasa*. But when Abhinava quotes from Daṇḍin while discussing the views of Lollaṭa, it would be safe to guess that these *ācāryas* had a '*laukika*' view of *rasa*. If '*upaciti*' of a *bhāva* is held as *rasa* by Daṇḍin, it very much proves the point that for him *sthāyins* etc., as presented through the art-media are identical in both nature and scope with their counter-parts at the normal work-a-day level. This much should suffice for the present here.

Bhoja, with his *ahamkāra-abhimāna-śṛṅgāra* theory recognises many *rasas* in the *madhyamā koṭi* wherein all the forty-nine *bhāvas*, and some others also, become *rasa* through '*prakarṣa*' or enhancement. To quote Dr. V. Raghavan (p. 433, *Śṛṅgāra Prakāśa*, edn. '63) —

"To Bhoja, *rasa*, as ordinarily understood, means what it meant to Daṇḍin and Lollaṭa, the *Prakarṣa* of the *sthāyi-bhāva*." Bhoja accepted many *rasas* in keeping with Lollaṭa who also accepted *rasas* not to be just eight but perhaps as many as are the *bhāvas*. What concerns us here is that at least in this '*madhyamāvasthā* or on '*vyavahāra*' plane, perhaps Bhoja also, took *rasas* as generating '*sukha*' and '*duḥkha*' and thereby taking the '*laukika*'

27. लोकस्वभावानुकरणत्वाच्च नाटयस्य सत्त्वमीप्सितम् । को दृष्टान्तः—इह हि नाट्यधर्मप्रवृत्ताः सुखदुःखकृता भावास्तथा सत्त्वविशुद्धाः कार्याः यथा सरूपा भवन्ति ।

(ना. शा. पृ. ३७५)

28. एकोनपञ्चाशदिमे यथावद्भावास्त्यवस्था गदिता मयेह ।

(ना. शा. ७-१०८ अच, पृ. ३७७)



character as suggested in Lollaṭa also. Some quotations from *Śr-Pra.* will support our observation. Bhoja says : (1) Rasas are pleasurable and painful. They are seen in sentient beings and not in literature which consists of word and meaning and thus lacks sentience. (2) There are three classes of Figures (1) *Vakrokti* (Striking, Deviating Expression) (2) *Svabhāvokti* (Natural Description) and (3) *Rasokti* (Portrayal of *Rasa*). *Vakrokti* is present when Figures like simile predominate; *Svabhāvokti* is present when Qualities like *śleṣa* predominate; and *Rasokti* is present when *Rasa* arises out of the combination of the determinants, consequents, and concomitants. The determinants are of two kinds : fundamental (*ālambana*) and excitant (*uddīpana*). Of these two the fundamental determinants are meant to be seen as favourable or unfavourable...<sup>29</sup>

While explaining *raudrarasa-niṣpatti* from *krodha*, Bhoja observes : (Anger) when accompanied by the concomitants of Jealousy, Trembling, Labour etc; which are painful in nature, rises to the level of the Furious when intensified.<sup>30</sup>

Dr. Raghavan (p. 449) further observes : "It was the *sthāyin* itself that got the name *rasa*. Says Bharata : ' Thus these permanent emotions should be known as *rasas*. '

So it is, says Saṅkuka, that in the *Rasa-niṣpatti-sūtra* the word '*sthāyin*' is not found. It is merely the *sthāyin* of the world that is called *rasa* when imitated. Daṇḍin and Lollaṭa applied the name *rasa* to the *sthāyin* itself when it (is) *saṃyukta*, *puṣṭa* or *prakṛṣṭa* or *udrikta* by means of *vibhāvas* etc. Says Bahurūpa-Miśra in his commentary on the *Daśarūpaka* : ' Thus then (*rasa*) is a particular state of permanent emotion itself. ' Bhoja followed these writers. He has not got two different departments as *laukika* and *alaukika*.<sup>31</sup>

We cannot accept Dr. Raghavan's last statement in the above quotation for when Bhoja follows this group of writers, the *laukikatva* of *rasa* in the *madhyamāvasthā* follows as a logical corollary.

29. (१) रसा हि सुखदुःखावस्थारूपाः । ते च शरीरिणां चैतन्यवतां, न काव्यस्य । तस्य शब्दार्थरूपतया अचेतनत्वेन ।

Dr. V. Raghavan : Bhoja's *Śṛṅgāra Prakāśa*, Third Revised Enlarged Edition, Madras, 1978, P. 423

२. त्रिविधः खल्वलङ्कारवर्गः—वक्रोक्तिः, स्वभावोक्तिः, रसोक्तिरिति । तत्रोपमायलङ्कारप्राधान्ये वक्रोक्तिः, श्लेषादिगुणप्राधान्ये स्वभावोक्तिः, विभावानुभावव्यभिचारिसंयोगानु रसनिष्पत्तौ रसोक्तिरिति । तत्र द्विविधो विभावः, आलम्बनविभाव उद्दीपनविभावश्च । तयोरालम्बनविभाव इष्टानिष्टसंदर्शनादिः । यमालम्ब्य सुखं दुःखं चोत्पद्यते तेन सुखदुःखविषयेणानुभावेन स्मरणहेतुः संस्कारो जन्यते । .....स एव त्वीप्सितानवाप्तौ जिहासितस्य चाहानात् दुःखात्मकैर्व्यभिचारिभिश्चिन्तौत्सुक्यवेगनिर्वेदादिभिः संसृज्यमानो दुःखात्मकविप्रलम्भ-शृङ्गारादि रसरूपतामध्यास्ते ।

G. R. Josyer : *Maharaja Bhojaraja's Srīngara Prakasha*, Second Volume, Mysore, 1963, PP. 438-39

30. अस्यावेगवेषयुश्रमादिषु दुःखात्मकेषु व्यभिचारिषु परं प्रकर्षमधिरूढे रौद्ररसतामापन्ने स्थायिनि.....

(Ibid, P. 440)

31. ---Dr. Raghavan : Bhoja's *Śṛṅgāra Prakāśa*, Third Revised Enlarged Edition, P. 449

Siddhicandra, (the author of *Kāvya-prakāśa-Khaṇḍana* edn. 53, by Prof. Parikh.) explains a view held by some 'Navīnas' who seem to take a *laukika* view of *rasa*. Siddhicandra (p. 16) observes: "*Tadapekṣayā kāmīni-kuca-kalaśa-sparśa-candanānulepanādineva nāṭya-darśana-kāvya-śravanābhyām sukhaviśeṣo jāyate. Sa eva tu rasa iti navīnāḥ.*"—“This view puts the aesthetic pleasure on a par with ordinary sensual pleasures. In the discussion of *Rasānanda* or aesthetic pleasure - observes Prof Parikh in his introduction (p. 10) to Siddhicandra's *Kāvya-Prakāśa-Khaṇḍana*—“this is really a moot point-viz., whether the aesthetic pleasure is like any other pleasure of ordinary life or whether its character is different: If the experience of the artistic representation of pleasure and pain is the same as the experience of these in life, what is painful in life would not give pleasure in poetry and therefore such sentiments as those of sorrow, anger, aversion, etc., cannot become *rasas* in poetry. Consistently with this view the Navīnas, therefore hold that, there are only four *rasas*, viz; *Śṛṅgāra*, *Vīra*, *Hāsyā* and *Adbhuta*. Siddhicandra says: *navīnāstu śṛṅgāra-vīra-hāsyā-dbhuta-samjñāścātvarā eva rasāḥ.* (p. 16). He further refutes the claim of *Karūṇa*, *Raudra* etc; to the title of *rasas* in the words *atha karuṇādīnām katham na rasatvam iti cet*,...etc.”

It is not clear who these Navīnas were. But they certainly held *rasa* to be of *laukika* character.

In Rāmacandra and Guṇacandra, the joint authors of the *Nāṭya-darpaṇa*, Edn. G.O.S., 1959), we find an eloquent advocacy of the *sukha-duḥkhātmak* nature of *rasa*, thus placing its nature, on *laukika* plane. They hold *rasa* to be 'a-laukika' only in the sense that the assemblage of determinants etc., as portrayed in a dramatic or poetic composition are not real—(*rasa* is perceived in a real man and a real woman, an actor and a spectator) but with this difference: in the case of a real man and a real woman the *rasa* is perceived vividly because its determinants are actually present; and it is because of this fact that the accessories and the consequents produced by *rasa* (sentiment) are clearly perceptible. In other cases like that of a spectator, however, the sentiment is perceived not vividly but indistinctly for the determinants, etc., presented through *kāvya* (a poem or a drama) have no real existence. As a consequence, the accessories and consequents too which follow *rasa* are not distinctly perceptible. That is why the *rasa*, perceived in a spectator, is said to be *alaukika*—extra-ordinary.<sup>32</sup>

That the *Nāṭyadarpaṇa* (ND) takes intensified *sthāyī* which is of the nature of *sukha* and *duḥkha* to be *rasa* is clear from its definition of *rasa*, (p. 141, IV-7). It is held that *śṛṅgāra*, *hāsyā*, *vīra*, *adbhuta* and *śānta* having *iṣṭa* i.e., favourable determinants etc., are *sukhātmaka*, and *karuṇa raudra*

32. केवलं मुख्यस्त्री-पुंसयोः स्पष्टेनैव रूपेण रसो विभावानां परमार्थसत्त्वादत एव व्यभिचारिणोऽनुभावाश्च रसजन्याः तत्र स्पष्टरूपाः । अन्यत्र तु प्रेक्षकादौ ध्यामलेनैव रूपेण विभावानामपरमार्थसत्तामेव काव्यादिना दर्शनात् । अत एव व्यभिचारिणोऽनुभावाश्च रसानुसारेणास्पष्टा एव । अत एव प्रेक्षकादिगतो रसो लोकोत्तर इत्युच्यते ।

*Nāṭyadarpaṇa*, Revised Second Edition, GOS, Baroda, 1959, P. 143

*bibhatsa* and *bhayānaka* their determinants etc., being '*aniṣṭa*' or unfavourable are *duḥkḥātmaka*. The ND holds that people see performances with *karuṇa* etc., as principal *rasa*, only out of their love for the expert presentation on the part of the poet and the actor. It is for this '*camatkāra*' or sense of wonder caused by the expert presentation on the part of both the poet and the actor that the spectators take *rasa* to be pleasurable. But poets develop their themes keeping in mind the pleasurable and painful nature of the original story of Rāma and the like. Incidents such as the abduction of Sītā, the discourtesy shown to Draupadī, the slavery of Hariścandra, the death of Rohitāśva, Lakṣmaṇa's being hit by an arrow, the attempt to kill Mālatī, can never cause joy in the hearts of the connoisseurs. If imitation of tragic situation evokes a joyous response in the heart of the spectators, the imitation would cease to be imitation proper — *yadi cānukarane sukhātmānaḥ syur na samyag anukaraṇam syāt* (p 182).

All this makes it sufficiently clear that for the ND, *rasa* is primarily *laukika* because of the *laukika* nature of the *sthāyin* concerned, and is only *alaukika* in the sense that the whole complex of determinants etc., is unreal.

For Viśvanātha who follows the lead of Ānanda and Abhinavagupta, and also for Hemacandra, the author of *Kāvyaṇuśāsana* and the *guru* of Rāmācandra and Guṇacandra, *rasa* is *alaukika*. But Viśvanātha finds it quite difficult to defend the case of *karuṇa*. Dhanañjaya also, though he takes *sthāyin* to be *rasa* (DR IV. i.), falls in line with the Kashmir School in taking *rasa* to be of *alaukika* nature. Later eminent writers such as Jagannātha, also accept the view of Abhinavagupta and uphold the *a-laukikatva* of *rasa*.

The above presentation of the views of *ālaṃkārikas* beginning with Bharata onwards shows that their house is divided so far as the problem of *laukikatva* or *alaukikatva* of *rasa* is concerned. But it seems probable that the earlier, writers from Bharata down to Rudraṭa emphasized the worldly nature of *rasa* and it required great courage to hold the fort against the formidable onslaught of the *rasālaukikatvavādins* like Ānanda and Abhinavagupta, Mammāṭa and Jagannātha. The *Nāṭyadarpaṇa*'s was perhaps a lone voice with its heart lying with the *laukikatva-vādin* and its head bringing around a compromise in holding *rasa* as *a-laukika* on the almost flimsy ground that the *vibhāvādins* or the whole complex of determinants, consequences and accessories presented by the poet in either poetry or drama is unreal i. e., artificial.

# Rasa Theory and the Darśanas

KRISHNA S. ARJUNWADKAR

## SOURCES OF BHARATA :

Bharata's *rasa* theory is original in most of its constituent concepts, their classification and the metalanguage he uses to expound the theory. No work in Sanskrit literature, contemporary or written prior to the *Nāṭyaśāstra* of Bharata, attempts the treatment of similar topics in a way comparable to that of Bharata. The credit does not, of course, go to Bharata alone but is shared by him with his predecessors whom he has frequently quoted. As a probable source, a reference may be made to works on *Āyurveda* which, while treating of their materia medica, speak of the *rasa*, *viryā*, *vipāka* and *prabhāva* of the material described. One would expect an analysis of the faculties of mind in the *Yoga* System which Bharata might have made use of; but little is found in that system which has even a remote resemblance with what Bharata has presented. The *Sāṃkhya* system, akin to the *Yoga*, says little in this respect that is different from its sister-system. Even *Kāmasūtra*, which has *rati* as its special field, disappointed me in my attempt to find anything resembling Bharata's analysis of mental faculties. Surprisingly enough,—and it may be a pure coincidence,—there is a striking resemblance between Bharata's theory of *rasa* and *Cārvāka*'s theory of *caitanya*—consciousness, a quality of the body not present individually in the four elements—earth, water, heat and air—that combine to make the body but which emerges from their combination.<sup>1</sup> The same may be said of *rasa* and its correlatives.

## LOLLAṬA :

Lollaṭa, the earliest critic on record, preferred to seek aid from his common sense rather than from any established system. For him, *rasa*, which is substantially the *sthāyin* created by the *vibhāvas*, revealed by *anubhāvas* and nourished by the *vyabhicārins*, abided primarily in the character in the play like Rāma, and secondarily in the actor who enacted the character.

## ŚAṆKUKA :

For Śaṅkuka who finds fault with Lollaṭa's view, the actor himself, who is a contemporary of the spectators and who is not far removed from them as are characters like Rāma whom he imitates, is the receptacle of *rasa*, which

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1. Cp. अत्र चत्वारि भूतानि भूमिवार्यनलानिलाः ।

चतुर्भ्यः खलु भूतेभ्यश्चैतन्यमुपजायते ।

किष्वादिभ्यः समेतेभ्यो द्रव्येभ्यो मदशक्तिवत् । *Sarva-darśana-saṅgraha*,

*Cārvāka-darśana*.

is an imitation of the *sthāyin* in the original character like Rāma. This *sthāyin* in the actor is inferred from his acting. Both the *sthāyin* and its correlatives are thus unreal and hence are named by Bharata by specially newly coined terms like *vibhāva*. How can such an unreal apparatus lead to the real enjoyment of *rasa*?—‘As does the picture of a horse lead to the cognition of a real horse’, (*citra-turaga-nyāya*) says Śaṅkuka; he deems it ‘*saṁvādi-bhrama*’ and quotes Dharmakīrti, the Buddhist philosopher, for a support. Imagine a person who sees rays of a lamp at a distance, thinks that it is a jewel, rushes to secure it, reaches the spot and, to his disappointment, finds a lamp there. Imagine also another person who sees rays of a jewel (and not the jewel itself, it being too small and too far from him), thinks that it is a jewel, reaches the spot and actually finds a jewel. In fact, both are mistaken in as much as they take as a jewel something other than a jewel. But this false knowledge (*bhrama*) produces a real action in them, with the only difference that one of the two is rewarded with what he sought (a case of *saṁvādi-bhrama*) while the other is not (a case of *visaṁvādi-bhrama*).<sup>2</sup>

This is how Śaṅkuka argues, conceding that the inferred *sthāyin* in the actor and its apparatus are unreal. Personally he thinks that the cognition of the *sthāyin* in the actor defies definition, that it cannot be included in any of the known varieties of cognition, but, at the same time, its existence cannot be denied as it is a matter of direct experience for every *rasika*.<sup>3</sup>

It is customary to deem Śaṅkuka a *Naiyāyika* because of his view that *rasa*, that is the imitated *sthāyin*, is inferred. I do not subscribe to this view; for nothing typical of the *Nyāya* system is involved in this view. A farmer does not need to study *Nyāya* to infer that it would rain before long when he sees dark and heavy clouds in the sky. If Śaṅkuka’s theory of inference is an adequate ground to deem him a *Naiyāyika*, his reference to Dharmakīrti can be regarded as sufficient ground to deem him a Buddhist: I would consider the second claim to be more plausible, as the verse quoted from Dharmakīrti is closely related to the theory of knowledge of the Buddhists who deny the existence of the objective world. This sort of naive tagging of names based on a flimsy ground is of little consequence in a serious study.

## NĀYAKA

Nāyaka would like to explain *rasa* as a joint outcome of two operations—‘*bhāvakatva*’ and ‘*bhojakatva*.’ By the first he means the process of ‘*sādhāraṇīkaraṇa*’ or generalization, i. e. shearing *rasa* and its correlatives of

### 2. मणिप्रदीपप्रभयोर्मणिबुद्ध्याभिधावतोः ।

मिथ्याज्ञानविशेषेऽपि विशेषोऽर्थक्रियां प्रति ॥ *Pramāṇa-vārttika*, 2.57

This is alluded to in Śaṅkuka’s view by the words ‘*अर्थक्रियापि मिथ्याज्ञानाद् दृष्टा*’ । Kangle’s edn. p. 130

### 3. प्रतिभाति न संदेहो न तत्त्वं न विपर्ययः ।

धीरसावयमित्यस्ति नासावेवायमित्यपि ॥

विरुद्धबुद्धयसंभेदादविवेचितविप्लवः ।

युक्त्या पर्यनुयुज्येत स्फुरजनुभवः कथा ॥ Kangle’s edn. p. 130

their particular space-time-person context and making them a 'common wealth'—a state produced by fourfold acting in a play and *guṇālaṅkāras* in poetry. Thus generalized, *rasa* is relished by the spectator by *bhojakatva*, a unique process of the mind distinct from the commonly recognised modes of cognition such as perception, memory, etc. Though made up of the three primeval qualities, the *sattva*, the *rajas* and the *tamas*, it is dominated by the *sattva*, as a result of which this experience rests in the consciousness (*caitanya*) full of light and happiness—much the same way as the experience in the realization of the Supreme *Brahman* (*Para-Brahmāsvāda-savidha*). Nāyaka conceives *bhāvakatva* and *bhojakatva* as processes exclusively operating in the field of poetry (and drama) and distinct from the *ābhidhā* process which is common to poetry and other literature—mandatory (*Veda*, etc) and advisory (*Itihāsa*, *Purāṇa*, etc). The chief purpose of poetry is, therefore, to give pure joy, and only secondarily, to give moral instruction.

Even a hurried survey of Nāyaka's theory would reveal that in formulating it he has drawn substantially on *Mīmāṃsā* (as Abhinava presents him), Sāṃkhya and, most of all, *Vedānta*; this shows what an imaginative, discriminating man of wide knowledge can contribute to the exposition of a theory. For his *bhāvakatva* concept, he is indebted to *Mīmāṃsā*; for his conception of the *rasa* experience, to Sāṃkhya (a part of which is also absorbed in *Vedānta*); and for the idea of over-whelming, total absorption in the experience, he is indebted to *Vedānta*. Nāyaka is the first critic to compare poetic experience to the experience of *Brahman* which the Indian tradition regards as the highest goal of life. All subsequent writers on poetics are indebted to him for this brilliant conception. Even Abhinava who has rejected his contention that *rasa* is not a cognition and that *bhāvakatva* is a specific process peculiar to poetic experience, concedes that his description of the poetic experience is on a par with the spiritual experience, and that his *bhojakatva* process is identical with Ānanda's *Vyañjanā*. As monistic *Śaivāgama*, of which Abhinava is the chief exponent, is basically not different from the monistic *Vedānta*, indebtedness of his exposition to *Śaivāgama* needs no special mention.

#### ABHINAVA AND NĀYAKA :

The two salient points in Nāyaka's interpretation which Abhinava has criticised are : (i) *rasa* is not a cognition, and (ii) *bhāvakatva* is a special poetic process which brings about *sādhārāṇīkaraṇa*. About the first, Abhinava remarks that it is self-contradictory to call *rasa* a *bhoga*—pleasure, and at the same time to deny that it is a cognition—*pratīti*. What is pleasure if not a form of awareness or cognition ? Abhinava has no objection to singling it out from the common forms of cognition or awareness; but calling it 'no cognition' is equivalent to making it unfit for any dealing with it.<sup>4</sup> As for *bhāvakatva*,

4. अप्रतीतिं हि पिशाचवत् अव्यवहार्यं स्यात् । किं तु यथा प्रतीतिमात्रत्वेन अत्रिच्छिष्टत्वेऽपि प्रात्यक्षिकी, आनुमानिकी, आगमोत्था, प्रतिभानकृता, योगिप्रत्यक्षजा च प्रतीतिः उपायवैलक्षण्यात् अन्यैव, तद्वत् इयमपि प्रतीतिः चर्वणास्वादन-भोगापरत्नामा भवतु । *Locana on Dhvanyāloka with Bālaprītyā* (Com.), Banaras (1940); p. 187

Abhinava takes it as another self-contradiction Nāyaka has committed; for it militates against his (Nāyaka's) view that *rasa* is not produced. *Bhāvakatva* is the same as *bhāvanā* of the *Mīmāṃsakas*; and *bhāvanā* is conceived as a mental process of a person that causes a thing to come into being. It operates through two media : the word and the meaning; and is accordingly named *śābdī* and *ārthī*, as illustrated by the statements : (i) 'someone desires me to do this', and (ii) 'I must do this.' *Mīmāṃsakas* believe that through this process a performer is inducted by the *Veda* to perform a ritual, then a will is created in his mind to do it and this, eventually, is translated into the actual performance of the ritual. In matters secular, it is some person in command who plays the role of the *Veda* in the above cited example.

With due respect to Abhinava, I beg to differ from him in his interpretation of Nāyaka on the point of *bhāvakatva*. It is in the context of *sādhāraṇīkarana* that Nāyaka ushers in the *bhāvakatva*, which, when understood in the proper light, means elimination of the element of particularity from the apparatus of *rasa* by the spectator on the strength of his will-power, something on a par with 'willing suspension of disbelief.' It is a unique power of the human mind to infuse a lifeless matter with life, to associate with or dissociate from something, to equate something with an agreeable or disagreeable complex of qualities. A lifeless picture or image, a book, a souvenir, a word, a flower, a smell, a colour, a piece of furniture, an apparel,—in short, anything, howsoever insignificant it might be from others' point of view, can mean a lot for a person who infuses it with feelings by his will-power. It is a symbol for him of something which exists in the world of his mind. This power of symbolism, which man discovered first in the formation of language and extended subsequently to other countless areas, is perhaps the one phenomenon that pervades the entire human life. All arts, plays, games, other forms of entertainment; religious, social or political conventions; meta-language and notations in all studies are nothing but manifestations of the power of symbolism backed by individual or social will-power. Bereft of this power, man would be a poor creature. This is man's *bhāvanā śakti*, which, I think, Nāyaka implies when he speaks of *bhāvakatva*. Abhinava's criticism of him on this point is, therefore, unfair or is an outcome of a misunderstanding. Even if Abhinava is supposed to be right in taking *bhāvakatva* as equivalent to *bhāvanā*, it deserves to be noted that what Nāyaka relates to it is not *rasa* but only *sādhāraṇīkarana*, which, by common consent, can be granted as produced.

On a close examination of the *rasa* theory as understood by Nāyaka and by Abhinava, one cannot help feeling that the latter has essentially incorporated the former's view and developed it to a form one would inevitably arrive at by ordinary logical processes—except on the points of *bhāvakatva* where Abhinava has misunderstood Nāyaka, and *bhojakatva* which, for Abhinava, is a cognition not different from *vyañjanā*. The last point is merely a matter of difference in terminology.

## ABHINAVAGUPTA :

As interpreted by Abhinava, *rasa* is different from *sthāyin* inasmuch as the former can abide only temporarily and only in a connoisseur (*sahrdaya*), while the latter exists dormant and permanently in every being from the moment he is born. In other words, *rasa* exists only in drama (or other arts), and *sthāyins* exist only in actual life. *Rasa* exists only as long as the act of *carvanā*—relishing—continues : and *carvanā* continues only as long as the *rasa* apparatus—*vibhāva* etc.—is present before the spectator. That is the reason why the correlatives of *rasa* cannot be regarded as having a causal relation with *rasa*; for an effect like a pot can exist independently of the potter who has made it, once it has come into being. This leads us to the inevitable conclusion that the experience of *rasa* has no parallel in actual life and must hence be regarded as *alaukika*, uncommon. The relation between *rasa* and its correlatives is explained on the analogy of a pot and a lamp,—*ghaṭapradīpa-nyāya*, and is called *vyañjanā*. The pot is revealed, not produced, by the nearby lamp; and that also only as long as the lamp emits light. *Rasa*, too, which already exists in the form of *sthāyin* in the mind of the spectator, is likewise revealed to him by its correlatives when it assumes the form of a *rasa*. Before this stage is reached, the *sthāyin* undergoes a metamorphosis—shorn of its space-time-person context, it is generalized : this is *sādhāranīkaraṇa*. As a result, it is experienced by the spectator not as his own, nor as his opponent's, nor as that of a neutral person, leaving thus no scope for such reactions as embarrassment, anger or indifference. This experience does not have the character of memory (for it is not recalling of something experienced before), or perception (for it is not produced through the medium of sense organs), or inference (for it is directly relished),—though, of course, the faculty of inference in the spectator as he utilizes it in worldly affairs lays the foundation for the experience of *rasa*. Hence it is a unique, pure experience, uninterrupted by any other cognition and unpolluted by any worldly motive, very much like the experience of the Supreme *Brahman*, and, likewise, constituted of pure happiness. The most logical conclusion of this view is that theoretically *rasa* is only one (for *Brahmāsvāda* does not have varieties),—a suggestion not taken notice of by his immediate successors, but taken up later on by Bhoja and elaborated to its fullest extent.

## VYAÑJANĀ : IN GRAMMAR AND IN POETICS :

For the concept of *vyañjanā*, also called *dhvani*, presented in an elaborate form for the first time in the work '*Dhvanyāloka*', Ānanda has acknowledged his debt to grammarians who first enunciated this principle in the context of *sphoṭa*,<sup>5</sup> a characteristic semantic theory of the Pāṇinian school. *Vyañjanā*

5. वर्णातिरिक्तः वर्णाभिव्यङ्ग्यः अर्थप्रत्यायकः नित्यः शब्दः स्फोटः । *Sarva-darśana-saṅgraha*, Pāṇini-darśana.

नादैराहितबीजायामन्त्येन ध्वनिना सह ।

आवृत्तिपरिपाकायां बुद्धौ शब्दोऽवर्धयते ॥ *Vākyapadīya*, 1.85



does not have a very significant role to play in the corpus of formal grammar. It was Ānanda who realized that this concept could contribute substantially to the criticism of poetry and therefore elaborated it in a systematic manner. It changed the whole outlook of Sanskrit criticism in the years that followed.

#### JAYANTA AND MAHIMAN :

The concept which Nāyaka calls *bhojakatva* (only in the context of *rasa*) and the Ānanda-Abhinava school calls *vyañjanā* (in a context wider than that of *rasa*), is challenged by Jayanta Bhaṭṭa briefly and Mahima-Bhaṭṭa in detail. The latter claimed that *vyañjanā* or *dhvani* could always be reduced to inference (*anumāna*) and that it was not necessary to invent a new power of a word like *vyañjanā*. For them the apparatus of *rasa* (*vibhāva* etc.) is as much a cognitive tool (*jñāpaka hetu*) of the *sthāyin/rasa* as is smoke, of fire. They see no reason why there should be a discrimination between the two. Of course, of the two critics of *vyañjanā*, Jayanta is candid enough to concede that, after all is said and done, this is the field of the critics of poetry and too profound for the logicians to pass a judgment on. But Mahiman argues the case of inference against *vyañjanā* in his *Vyaktiviveka*. We cannot accept Mahiman's stand that all *vyañjanā* is but *kāvya-numāna* without dismissing, as the Vaiśeṣikas do, the claim of *śabda* (alongwith its other *vyāpāras*, i. e. *abhidhā* and *lakṣaṇā*) as a separate *pramāṇa*.

#### BHOJA :

As stated earlier, a suggestion in Abhinava's exposition of *rasa* that *rasa* is one, was later taken up and elaborated by Bhoja. Bhoja does not subscribe to the traditional view that there are eight or nine *rasas* in drama or poetry. It is a myth, handed down from generation to generation and followed blindly like a belief that a certain tree is inhabited by a ghost! What are popularly called *rasas* are no more than *bhāvas* generated from the *rasa*, and they need not be limited to the sacred number eight or nine; they are as many as fortynine ! Why should only a few of them be promoted to the status of *rasa* ? We find one logical end of the *rasa* spectrum in Rudraṭa's answer to this question : that there can be as many *rasas* as there are *bhāvas*, i. e. 49. The other end is found in Bhoja's position that none of the 49 *bhāvas*, which play alternately the principal and the subordinate roles in relation to one another, deserves to be called *rasa*, which is above them all. Bhoja names this one *rasa* variously as *abhimāna*, *ahamkāra* and *śrṅgāra* (which must not be confused with its namesake in Bharata's exposition). *Rasa* is what is relished, is the object of *āsvāda*. And what is it that we really relish ? 'Our own ego', says he; and explains it as self-love.<sup>6</sup> Whatever is liked, disliked, loved, hated, welcomed, avoided, is the object of anger, sorrow or

6. वयं तु शृङ्गारमेव रसनाद् रसमामनामः । *Śrṅgāraprakāśa*, intro.

रसोऽभिमानोऽहंकारः शृङ्गार इति गीयते । *Sarasvatī-kaṇṭhābharaṇa*, 5.1

surprise,—all that has an invariable reference to one's own self. This principle of ego is so overwhelming that it can convert even pain into pleasure and vice versa. A young girl feels pleasure at the scratches made by her lover's nails on her breasts : why ? Her ego is the answer.<sup>7</sup> It is plain that every man is happy or sorry for the profit he makes or the loss he incurs. Even when he appears to be happy or sorry for another man's profit or loss, it is really for himself, in an indirect way. The sacrifice a man makes for another is also for himself—for the satisfaction he obtains therefrom. If he weeps for another, it also is really for himself. It is the self-love that is the source of all a man does or does not do. Even Yājñavalkya and Manu do not think otherwise;<sup>8</sup> and, above all, no one can deny one's own experience.

This ego is a quality of the soul; and, hence, whosoever has a soul has also an ego. Its refinement which goes to make a *rasika* is the achievement of its cultivation during a series of past lives.<sup>9</sup> The ego, according to the Sāṃkhya theory, is constituted of *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*. It develops into *rasa* when the element of *sattva* reigns. Bhoja conceives it in three stages : the first, pure ego; the second, where the 49 *bhāvas* get a scope to be enriched by their respective *vibhāvas*, etc.; the third, the fully developed stage where the *bhāvas*, enriched in the second stage, merge into one single awareness—self-love. Bhoja has openly acknowledged his debt to the Sāṃkhya system. But there are in his exposition of *rasa* concepts like *karman*, *vāsanā*, *punarjanman* which are commonly shared by almost all Indian philosophical systems and are drawn upon tacitly or explicitly as much by Bhoja as by other expounders of the *rasa* theory like Abhinava.

### JAGANNĀTHA :

Jagannātha is the last doyen of the Sanskrit tradition of criticism. He has enlisted as many as eleven views on *rasa* including those discussed by Abhinava. Only the first four of these views are given by him in detail, while the rest are covered in a few lines, the last five receiving hardly a line each. The obvious distinction of Jagannātha's treatment of *rasa* is that he presents his material mostly in a style cultivated by the *Navya Nyāya* and adopted by the post-Gaṅgeśa works on *Vedānta*. Following the ancients, he

7. दुःखं देतो वि सुहं जणेइ जो जस्स वल्लहो होइ ।

दइअणहूदूमिआण वि वडुइ थणआण रोमंचो ॥ Bhoja's *Śṛṅgāra Prakāśa* p. 516; see also pp. 465-66, 484, 527

8. न वा अरे सर्वस्य कामाय सर्वं प्रियं भवति, आत्मनस्तु कामाय सर्वं प्रियं भवति । *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, 4.5.6  
अकामस्य क्रिया काचिद् दृश्यते नेह कर्हिचित् ।

यद्यदि कुरुते कर्म तत् तत् कामस्य चेष्टितम् ॥ *Manusmṛti*, 2. 4

9. तत्र अयम् आत्मनः अनुपहतेभ्यः सुकृतविशेषेभ्यः उत्पद्यते । उत्पन्नस्य सर्वस्य आत्मा । ...शृङ्गारो हि नाम...  
आत्मनः अहंकारविशेषः सचेतसा रस्यमानः रस इत्युच्यते । यदस्तित्वे रसिकः, अन्यथात्वे नीरस इति ।

Bhoja's *Śṛṅgāra Prakāśa*, pp. 464-465

first pronounces the character of *rasa* as the *sthāyin* qualified by uncovered consciousness; and later rectifies the statement by saying that 'in fact, *rasa* is uncovered consciousness engulfed by the *sthāyin*.'<sup>10</sup> The difference between these statements is like that between 'the coloured glass illuminated by the sunlight' and 'the sunlight filtered through the coloured glass.' As a true philosopher, he makes it categorically clear that the experience of *rasa*, engulfed by objects such as *vibhāva*, is quite distinct from the experience of the Brahman in meditation.<sup>11</sup> As a true *Vedāntin*, he has traced *rasa* to a *śruti* passage, the oldest possible authority respected by all devout traditionalists. In the third interpretation which he has ascribed to the 'moderns', he presents *rasa* as on a par with the appearance of silver on a shell shining in the sun,—both caused by imperfections in cognitive conditions, and equally *anirvacanīya*, indeterminate.<sup>12</sup> Others would like to call them both illusions. These are practically extensions to *rasa* of various *khyātis* in philosophical systems which attempt to explain what happens when X is cognized as Y.

### CONCLUSION :

From what has been stated above it would seem that the distinctive doctrines of more than one system of philosophy are found mentioned in Sanskrit works on poetics. The Sāṃkhya and the Vedānta systems however appear to have exercised a profound influence in moulding the *rasa* theory. The very concept that *rasa* is not produced but already exists, it is only revealed, it is one with the *Sthāyin*, has a close resemblance with the Sāṃkhya doctrine of *Satkāryavāda*. The concepts of '*bhoga*' and '*sattvodreka*' are also primarily derived from the Sāṃkhya system. The idea of *sādhāraṇīkaraṇa*, first propounded by Nāyaka, has its roots partly in the Sāṃkhya concept that the *puruṣa* (really not related to the *guṇas* which cause *bhoga*) is subjected to the worldly experiences of pleasure and pain because of his identification—and *sādhāraṇīkaraṇa* is practically a form of identification—in error with the *Prakṛti* (which is constituted of the three *guṇas*) and partly in the Vedānta idea that all is *Brahman*. (Yet another probable source for *sādhāraṇīkaraṇa* is the concept of *sāmānya* of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika systems which is the common heritage of most of the philosophical systems.) It is particularly significant in the context of identification and *bhoga* to find that the Sāṃkhyas compare the role of *Prakṛti* to that of an actress who presents the dance of pleasure and pain on the stage of the world, that is, the *samsāra*, in which

10. इत्थं चाभिनवगुप्तमम्मटभट्टादिग्रन्थस्वारस्येन भग्नावरणचिद्विशिष्टो रत्यादिः स्थायी भावो रस इति स्थितम्। वस्तुतस्तु वक्ष्यमाणश्रुतिस्वारस्येन रत्याद्यवच्छिन्ना भग्नावरणा चिदेव रसः। ...अस्त्यत्रापि 'रसो वै सः, रसं ह्यवायं लब्ध्वानन्दी भवति' इति श्रुतिः ...। *Rasagaṅgādhara* I, p. 55 in R. B. Athayle's edition (Poona 1953). vol. I

11. इयं च परब्रह्मस्वादात् समाधेर्विलक्षणा, विभावादिविषयसंवलितचिदानन्दात्मनत्वात्। *loc. cit.*

12. नव्यास्तु...सहृदयतोलासितस्य भावनाविशेषरूपस्य दोषस्य महिम्ना...स्वात्मन्यज्ञानावच्छिन्ने शुक्तिकाशकल इव रजतखण्डः समुत्पद्यमानोऽनिर्वचनीयः...रसः। *Op. cit.*, pp. 56-57

the *puruṣa* gets involved so long as he does not realise that he is in no way part of it<sup>13</sup>. The idea that all *rasas* are pleasurable has its roots in the Upaniṣadic concept of Brahman as constituted of *sat*, *cit*, and *ānanda*. Among the various terms used in the Upaniṣads to denote Brahman, one is '*ānanda*.' It is so termed because of the restful bliss that results from realising the inner harmony of the universe in one's own experience. In artistic (or aesthetic) perception, too, there is a realisation of unity in diversity and it is followed immediately by pure delight. But this pleasurable experience is fugitive or short-lived as it lasts for the duration of the dramatic performance. The novel *rasa* theory expounded by Bhoja is unquestionably founded on the Sāṃkhya-Vedānta grid, with a marked Sāṃkhya bias both in conception and terminology<sup>14</sup>.

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13. रङ्गस्य दर्शयित्वा निवर्तते नर्तकी यथा नृत्यात् ।

पुरुषस्य तथात्मानं प्रकाश्य विनिवर्तते प्रकृतिः ॥

तेन निवृत्तप्रसवामर्थवशात् सप्तरूपविनिवृत्ताम् ।

प्रकृतिं पश्यति पुरुषः प्रेक्षकवदवस्थितः स्वस्थः ॥ *Sāṃkhya-kārikā* 59, 65. The point to be noted here is that the spectator is viewed here as not involved in the drama going on before him, while the theory of *rasāsvāda* presumes involvement of the spectator in the drama to a certain extent.

14. For a more detailed exposition, vide the author's paper : *The Rasa Theory and the Darśanas* in the *Annals* (pp. 81-100) of the B. O. R. Institute, LXV (1934), POONA

## Rasa Theory and the Darśanas-2

P. R. VORA

Scholars, both ancient and modern, associate the interpretation of the *Rasa-Sūtra* given by the early writers on Dramaturgy with the one or the other of the *darśanas* (Systems of Philosophy). Thus Lollaṭa is thought to be a Mīmāṃsaka, Śaṅkuka is considered to have based his interpretation on the Nyāya *darśana*, Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka is understood to have followed the Sāṃkhya *darśana*, while Abhinavagupta is mostly accepted to have interpreted the *rasa-sūtra* according to the Kashmir Śaiva Philosophy. We shall discuss how far these claims are justifiable and proper.

Lollaṭa's theory : It is unfortunate that we do not have sufficient information about Lollaṭa's view regarding *rasa* and its enjoyment. Scholars have even seen discrepancies in the presentation of his theory as available in the *Abhinava-Bhārati* and *Locana* on the one hand and the *Kāvya-prakāśa* (K. P.) on the other. Dr. K. C. Pandey, for example, thinks that the word '*pratīyamānaḥ*' in the 'K. P. is 'a slight emendation (by Mammaṭa) of the text of Abhinava', it is, therefore, very difficult and even rash to judge Lollaṭa's attitude towards *rasa* from the meagre evidence that can be gathered from these aforesaid sources. However the following points may be noted :

(i) *rasa* is a product of the combination of the determinants (*vibhāvas*), consequents (*anubhāvas*) and the auxiliaries (*vyabhicāribhāvas*) (ii) *rasa* abides primarily in the original character (*anukārya*) and only secondarily in the actor (*anukartā/nartaka*) (iii) *rasa* is perceived by the *sāmājika*, who derives pleasure therefrom.

According to Lollaṭa the spectator enjoys *rasa* in this way : As he witnesses a dramatic performance, he allows himself to forget for the time being that he is witnessing a dramatic performance—this happens because of the clever acting of the *naṭa*. He identifies (*anusandhāna*) the actor with the original character (*anukārya*, e. g. Rāma). This identification is due to the former's peculiar movements, etc. (*anubhāvas*). He is not able to account for the various mimetic movements of the actor otherwise than by construing them as the indications of love (*rati*) etc. He does so by resorting to *lakṣaṇā*-secondary function of word (*abhidheyāvinābhūta-pratītiḥ*). This *avinābhava* is not necessarily an invariable connection like that between smoke and fire.

Is this identification of the actor with the original character an *āropa* (superimposition) or a *bhrama* (illusion) ? Yes, of course it is an *āropa*, and not a *bhrama*. It is a voluntary (*āhārya*) superimposition. The *sāmājika* suspends his consciousness of the difference between the *naṭa* (*anukartā*) and the (original character) (*anukārya*). It is due to this sort of superim-

position that *nāṭya* is called a *rūpaka* (*rūpakam tat-samāropāt*). This *āhārya āropa* is like the *āropa* of the moon (*candra*) on the face (*mukha*) in the illustration of metaphor: *mukha-candraḥ udeti*. Though we know that the face is not the moon, we enjoy this *rūpaka*. We cannot, however, enjoy it if we are, all the while, conscious of the rugged and crater-covered surface of the moon. According to Lollaṭa the *sāmājika* enjoys *rasa* in the same manner. His theory is confuted by Śrī Saṅkuka.

From the foregoing discussion it is amply clear that Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa was not influenced by the Vedānta *darśana* as some scholars have tried to establish, by explaining 'anusandhāna' as superimposition (*āropa*) because, as has been pointed before, this *āropa* is not an illusion like that of a serpent on a rope.

Lollaṭa probably drew on the Bhāṭṭa school of Pūrvamīmāṃsā, for he resorts to the secondary power of word (*lakṣaṇā*) accepted by Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, to account for the mimetic movements of the actor. It is suggested that Lollaṭa explained this not by *lakṣaṇā* but by *Arthāpatti*. Even then one has to admit that he was influenced by the Pūrvamīmāṃsā *darśana*.

MM. Kane too has suggested and rightly so, that Lollaṭa was influenced by Pūrvamīmāṃsā.

While we discuss the *rasa* theory as influenced by Pūrvamīmāṃsā it would not be out of place to refer to the views of Dhanañjaya and his commentator Dhanika set forth in the *Daśa-rūpaka* and the *Avaloka* thereon respectively.

They contend that one is able to apprehend *rasa*, by virtue of *vākyārtha* i. e. *tātparyārtha* which though it is not a *padārtha* is none-the-less a *vākyārtha*. (*a-padārtho'pi vākyārthaḥ*). According to Dhanika *vibhāvas* etc., are like *padārthas* (*vibhāvāḥ padārtha-sthāninah*) and *ratyādi* connected therewith is *vākyārtha*. *Vibhāvas* etc., in short, conduce to the apprehension of the *sthāyī*, which is the total meaning or purport (*tātparyārtha*) of the sentence in the form of dramatic performance. It is, for this reason, that while distinguishing *nrtya* from *nāṭya* he points out that *nrtya* is *padārthābhinaya* while *nāṭya* is *vākyārthābhinaya*.

Śaṅkuka's theory of *rasa* : Śaṅkuka argues that the spectator apprehends the *sthāyī* abiding in the actor by inference and derives pleasure therefrom, since due to the clever acting of the trained and well practised actor he identifies the *anukartā* as the *anukārya* shorn of his individuality (i. e. not as *Rāmaḥ ayam* but only *Rāmaḥ*).

The following points may be noted in this connection : (i) *Vibhāvas* etc., the *liṅgas* for the *anumāna* are artificial; yet the *sāmājika* is led into believing them to be real due to the ingenious actions of the *naṭa*. (ii) The *sthāyī* is cognised as abiding in the *anukārya* by inference of an extraordinary nature since other subjects of inference (*anumāyamāna*) are not relishable whereās the *sthāyī* is. (iii) The *anukartā* is taken for the *anukārya* on the analogy of the *citra-turaga*. (iv) Though this *sthāyī* cognised by the *sāmājika* does not

abide in him he none-the-less enjoys it and derives pleasure therefrom; and the *sthāyī* so enjoyed is *rasa*.

From the above it is clear that Śaṅkuka's explanation of the *rasa* theory is influenced by the Nyāya *darśana*. But he makes it amply clear that in this *anumāna* the object inferred is not prosaic like the object in the inference of the fire from the smoke.

Commentators like Vidyācakravartin have tried to explain the extraordinary nature of the *anumīyamāna* in this inference.

Śaṅkuka claims that the *anukartā* (*naṭa*) is identified with the *anukārya* on the analogy of the *citra-turaga* (The horse in a picture, which is taken for a real horse). He explains this cognition as peculiar since it is distinct from *pramā* as well as *apramā*.

When one looks at the picture of a horse the cognition is not (i) *mithyā* (false) since it is the same-unchanged-at all times and is not contradicted, (ii) it is not doubtful (*saṁśaya*) because it is certain, (iii) it is not even similarity (*sādrśya*) because there is no similarity of limbs etc. between the picture and the horse. Hence just as this cognition of the *citra-turaga* is quite distinct from all other cognitions, the cognition of Rāma with respect to *naṭa* is quite peculiar.

'This *citra-turaga* is like the *vikalpa*' says Nāgeśa, which is defined by Patañjali thus : *Śabda-jñānānupātivastu-sūnyo vikalpaḥ*/' Predicate-relation (*vikalpa*) is without any corresponding perceptible object and follows as a result of perceptions or of words'. Here too there is no corresponding real horse and yet the *ābhāsa* of a horse is there.

Śaṅkuka claims that the unreal *vibhāvas* are taken for real by the *sāmājika* and on the strength thereof he infers the *sthāyī* of the actor. This has no parallel in the Nyāya-*śāstra*. Abhinava remarks that there cannot be any valid inference from an unreal mark (*liṅga*). Hemacandra quotes a verse from Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇa-vārttika* to justify Śaṅkuka's stand; for causal efficiency (*artha-kriyā-kāritā*) is after all the true test of reality, (i. e. for the right form of cognition). 'Even a mistake, observes Dharmakīrti, if it does not delude the perceiving subject, is a source of right knowledge.' So Śaṅkuka is vindicated to that extent if we accept causal efficiency to be the basic criterion for truth.

It should be noted in this connection that though they do not subscribe to the view of Śaṅkuka, Dhanañjaya and Dhanika resort to a similar analogy.

It would not be out of place to see what our greatest poet has to say in this connection. In the sixth Act of the *Śakuntala*, the hero looks at the picture of his beloved, drawn by himself on the canvas. He gets so much lost in the act that for the time being he forgot that he is looking at the picture till he is awakened, by the Vidūṣaka with the words, "*Bhoḥ citraṁ khalv etat.*" The disappointed king's reply suggests Kālidāsa's view in the matter.

He probably thought that it was not impossible to act on *citra-turaganyāya*, for Duṣyanta says, “*Punarapi citrī-krtā kāntā.*”

Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka's theory of *rasa* : His main contribution to the theory of *rasa* is the idea of universalisation (*sādhāraṇīkaraṇa*), whereby the determinants (*vibhāvas* etc. are stripped off all relations, temporal, spatial or personal, and presented in a universalised form by a distinct function of words recognised by him and called *bhāvakatva*. The *sthāyī* which too is universalised by *bhāvakatva* is enjoyed by virtue of the third function of words viz. *bhojakatva*/*bhoga*/*bhogikṛti*, which is of the nature of *samādhī*.

Now Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka has no śāstric (philosophical) authority to support him so far as the recognition of the last two functions, leaving *abhidhā*, is concerned. One may call it his invention, but that does not in any way lessen the importance of his contribution to the explanation of the *rasa* theory.

From the word ‘*sattvodreka*’ used by Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, Govindā Thakkur and Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa infer that he was influenced by the Sāṃkhya *darśana*. According to them *bhoga* is like the consciousness of *ānanda*. ‘According to the Sāṃkhya system,’ says Nāgeśa, *jñāna* is nothing but the reflection of the *citta-vṛtti* in the *Puruṣa* and the form of the *jñāna* is, therefore, the same as that of the reflected *citta-vṛtti*. Now when the *sāmājika* witnesses a drama, the *sattva* quality becomes predominant while the other two qualities, *rajas* and *tamas*, are subdued. This ‘*sattva-maya-citta-vṛtti*’ is reflected in the *Puruṣa*; and since *sattva* gives rise to *ānanda*, the *sattva* so reflected in the *Puruṣa*, creates the consciousness of *ānanda*. Thus the *sāmājika* enjoys *rasa*.

This is the explanation given in *Pradīpa* and *Uddṛyōta*.

Vidyācakravartin explains this theory with the help of the Yoga-*darśana*. He points out that by acts of purification (*pari-karma*) like cultivation of friendliness (*maitrī*) towards happiness (*sukha*), compassion (*karuṇā*) towards pain (*duḥkha*), joy (*muditā*) towards merit (*puṇya*) and indifference (*upekṣā*) towards demerit (*a-puṇya*), the *sattva* quality becomes free from the other two qualities, *rajas* and *tamas*, which struggle to overpower it and the mind-stuff assumes a state of complete calm like that in a *samādhī* which is of the nature of consciousness (*prakāśa*) and bliss (*ānanda*). According to Vidyācakravartin's interpretation of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, the *sāmājika*'s pleasure partakes of the ecstatic bliss which a *yogin* enjoys in the state of *samādhī*.

It is suggested that the words ‘*prakāśa*’ and ‘*ānanda*’ employed by Mammaṭa in the explanation of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka's theory of *rasa* are used in their Śaiva significance; so *prakāśa* stands for *vimarśa* (self-consciousness) and the word *sattva* too should be interpreted in that light. This conjecture does not seem to be very helpful since Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka's concept of aesthetic experience appears to be more akin to the Vedāntic concept of *ānanda*, which consists in the predominance of pure *sattva* due to the inoperation of the other two qualities, *rajas* and *tamas*, which is the result of the absence of the



phenominal world in this experience. The *saṁvid-viśrānti* conceived by Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka stands for '*vigalita-vedyāntara ānanda*'. We have the authority of one of the greatest philosophers of all times, Ācārya Abhinava, to say with confidence, that Nāyaka's approach to *rasa* theory was grounded in Vedānta Philosophy, for twice in the *Locana* and once in the *Abhinava-Bhāratī*, he says that the *ānanda* of the aesthete, as conceived by Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, is equivalent to the *para-brahmāsvāda*.

It is possible that though Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka was a Mimāṃsaka he explained the *rasa* theory on the basis of his own invention of the powers of words and explained the aesthetic pleasure with the help of an analogy making it akin to the state of bliss enjoyed by the person who realises *Brahman*. He wanted to confute the novel notion of *dhvani*. But his own invention of the two novel functions of *bhāvakatva* and *bhojakatva* brings him close to the concept of *dhvani* or *vyāñjanā* (suggestion); and Abhinavagupta actually accepts his interpretation by identifying his two powers or functions of *bhāvakatva* and *bhojakatva* with the concepts of *sādhāraṇīkaraṇa* and *vyāñjanā* respectively.

It may be pointed out that Dhanañjaya and Dhanika who explain *rasa* theory on the basis of the Bhaṭṭa School of Pūrvamīmāṃsā also seem to accept one of these two functions invented by Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, viz *bhāvakatva*. They too believe in the process of universalisation though they do not elucidate this point. They also accept like Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka and Abhinava that *ratyādi sthāyī* belongs to the *sāmājika* or, as they put it, to the *rasika*. They also follow Lollāṭa, as has already been pointed out, in respect of the cognition of *sthāyī* by *lakṣanā*.

Abhinavagupta's theory of *rasa* :

This is the most convincing of all the interpretations of the *rasa* theory. The following are some of the important features of Abhinava's theory :—  
(i) The *vibhāvas* etc; presented in a universalised form, suggest (*vyaktaḥ*) the permanent state (*sthāyī*) (ii) This *sthāyī* is already present as a *vāsanā* (latent impression) in the spectator (*sāmājika*). (iii) The *sthāyī* which belongs to the spectator and is so suggested by the *vibhāvas* etc., is apprehended by him in a universalised form because at the time of witnessing the *nāṭya* he becomes a de-individualised cogniser. (iv) This *sthāyī* is enjoyed by the *sāmājika* like the *pānaka-rasa* (v) When relished the *sthāyī* becomes *rasa*. (vi) The word *niṣpatti* in the Bharata-sūtra refers not to the *rasa* but to the relish (*rasanā*) of the *rasa*, which former is *bodha-rūpā* (of the nature of consciousness) yet *alaukika*. (vii) This *rasa* is not itself distinct from one's being; and hence it is very much similar to the *Brahmāsvāda*.

From the above points the indescribable and unworldly nature of *rasa* becomes fairly clear. Certain phrases used by Abhinava and his follower Mammaṭa in their exposition of the *rasa-sūtra* e.g. (i) *Svākara ivābhinno'pi gocarikṛtaḥ* (ii) *Brahmāsvādam ivānubhāvayan* (iii) *Svasaṁvedana-gocaraḥ* (iv) *alaukikānandamayasya* (v) *Sva-saṁvedana-siddhatvāt etc.*,

lend support to the view that *paraīd* is *alaukika*. These epithets used in respect of *rasa* have induced, of course, not unjustifiably, several scholars, to consider that Abhinava's interpretation of the *rasa* theory is based on the Vedānta *darśana*.

Let us examine some of these epithets :

(i) *Svākāra ivābhinno'pi gocarikṛtaḥ* : Like the self (*ātman*) *rasa* is *jāñanarūpa*, yet it can be seen by *ātman* itself as Kālidāsa describes '*Ātmānam ātmany avalokayantam*'. In the same way *rasa* which is of the nature of knowledge (*bodha-svarūpa*) can also become the object (*gocara*) of knowledge. (ii) *Sva-samvedana-gocaraḥ* and (v) *Sva-samvedana-siddha*. Like the self (*ātman*), *rasa* is known to exist from its experience. One can only realise the *rasa* by oneself and in one's own self, but it cannot be described since it defies all descriptions like the *Ātman*. It cannot even be proved either by *savikalpa* or *nirvikalpa pratyakṣa*. (iii) *Brahmāsvādam iva anubhāvayan* and (iv) *alaukikānandamaya* : These two expressions (*Brahmāsvāda*) and *alaukikānanda* are invariably associated with the Vedānta System. It is well known that *Brahma* is *ānandamaya* : This *ānanda* is not the worldly transient *ānanda* but the Eternal Bliss. There is a great resemblance between *Brahmānanda* and *rasāsvāda* or *rasānanda*; but they differ in the following respects : (a) *Brahmānanda* is eternal, *rasānanda* lasts only while the *vibhāvas* etc last. (b) *Brahmānanda* is a state of *nirvikalpatā*, but *rasānanda* or *rasa* is beyond *savikalpatā* and *nirvikalpatā*. "In this lies the secret of its *alaukikatva*," says Abhinava.

From these several common features of *rasāsvāda* and *brahmāsvāda* it may be proposed that Abhinava's interpretation of the *rasa* theory is influenced, perhaps very heavily so, by the Vedānta philosophy.

But this does not seem to be correct. Dr. K. C. Pandey has very ably and in a highly convincing and scholarly way established Abhinava's association with the Kashmir Śaivism. He has also pointed out in great details the unquestionable influence of the Kashmir Śaiva philosophy on Abhinava's aesthetic theory.

Abhinava and, following in his footsteps, Mammaṭa, have used several technical terms and phrases which are borrowed from the Kashmir Śaivism. e. g. (1) *parimita pramātā*; (2) *na parimitam sādharāṇyam api tu vitatam*; (3) *bhuñjānasyādbhutabhoga-spandāviṣṭasya camanaḥ* (? *camataḥ*) *karaṇam camatkāraḥ*; (4) *sphurann astu, santāna-vṛtteḥ* etc.

As I have already said these and many other traces of Kashmir Śaiva philosophy have been pointed out by Dr. K. C. Pandey.

It is worth noting that this Śaiva influence on the great Ācārya's interpretation was well known to Bhaṭṭa Gopāla, the learned author of the *Sāhitya-cūḍāmaṇi*, a commentary on the *Kāvya-Prakāśa*. At least five hundred years back Bhaṭṭa Gopāla interpreted Abhinava's doctrine, as given in the *Kāvya-Prakāśa*, in the light of Kashmir Śaivism. He even quotes three verses from

the *Spanda-Kārikās* to support his explanation of the terms *parimita* and *āparimita pramātā*.

Who is an *aparimita-pramātā*? The individual is a mere manifestation of the Absolute and as such he is related to temporal and spatial limitations; he is therefore called a *parimita pramātā*, as a cogniser with utilitarian out-look. But when he is witnessing a drama (*nāṭya*) the practical, utilitarian approach is absent, therefore he is freed from the temporal and spatial limitations. He can, therefore, witness the drama and cognise the *vibhāvas* etc. and the *sthāyī* in a universalised way, as Abhinava remarks; *na parimitam sādharmaṇyam api tu vitatam*/(i. e. *aparimitam* or universalised). This is what they call '*sādhārāṇīkaraṇa*.'

The absence of *savikalpa* and *nirvikalpa pratyakṣa pramāṇa* also can be more satisfactorily explained on the basis of Kashmir Śaivism. *Vikalpa* is determinancy which has reference to the object related to temporal and spatial limitations as distinct from the subject. But since the Absolute of Śaivism, unlike the *Brahman* of Vedānta is unity in multiplicity we can account for this *alaukika* condition of *rasa* in so far as it is neither perceived by *savikalpa* nor by *nirvikalpa pratyakṣa pramāṇa*, for Sadāśiva too is self-conscious yet *nirvikalpa*.

The word *sphuran* suggests *sphurattā* or *sattā*, a power of the Absolute also called *kriyā*, which appears in the individual in a limited way as *sattva*.

The word *bhuñjāna* is explained as suggesting a person who 'attains to the state of rest on self, when he sees a good drama presented on the stage'. Dr. Pandey points out that 'the impediment in the form of object is totally absent' in the case of the aesthetic experience, whereas in the case of the experience of flavour this impediment is present.

We have seen how the various interpretations of the theory of *rasa* differ. But it should not be forgotten that the chief aim of all the great scholars and *Ācāryas* was to find out the process of the apprehension of *rasa*. They should therefore not be thought to be contradictory theories. Each one of these writers had a constructive approach. These theories are the several rungs of the same ladder (*vikāsa-sopāna-paramparā*) as Abhinava has pointed out.

## Rasa Theory and the Darśanas-3

Bhagavatiprasad Pandya

This happens to be a very, very brief summary of my paper on the above subject.

At the outset it has to be made absolutely clear that it is one thing to trace the influence of various *darśanas* on the theory of *rasa* as interpreted by some *ācāryas*, and it is quite another to hold that such and such an *ācārya* was an avowed follower of such and such a *darśana* and that his interpretation is completely influenced by it. Modern scholars of eminence have made serious efforts to decide the issue which to my mind remains as open as it ever was. The obvious reason for this is that these *ācāryas* had a very catholic outlook, and when they got themselves busy with the solution of the problem of aesthetic relish, they never allowed themselves to be unduly influenced by their philosophical commitments. Actually their philosophical leanings never clashed with their views on aesthetics, or else how can we explain the great Hemacandra, an advocate of Jain *Darśana* following Abhinavagupta, the great Śaiva. We have therefore to be very careful in arriving at judgements.

We may begin with Bharata himself. Where shall we place him? What were his philosophical leanings? We normally discuss this problem only with reference to the *ācāryas* who tried to interpret his *rasa-sūtra*. But we lose sight of Bharata himself who is very much in the centre. He talks of '*niṣpatti*'. So do we associate him with *Parīṇāmavāda* for that? Is it proper? He also talks of '*abhivyakti*' at various places. Shall we call him *Vyañjanāvādī* for that? I am afraid we cannot. And if we cannot place Bharata correctly would it be useful to try to place any other *ācārya* so far as aesthetics is concerned?

This does not aim at side-tracking the issue. Nor do we deny influence of philosophical thought on aesthetics. For example, we come across any number of philosophical terms in the explanations of various *ācāryas*.

We may begin with the term '*anusandhāna*' appearing in Lollaṭa's explanation of the *rasa-sūtra*. The Sanskrit commentators explain it either as '*āropa*' or '*abhimāna*', while on the other hand Dr. K. C. Pandey takes it to mean '*Yojana*' in the technical sense of the Śaiva *darśana*. Lollaṭa has left no clue. What do we do? He explains '*niṣpatti*' as '*upaciti*'. He accepts the fact of emotions and feelings remaining eternally in the form of impressions or '*vāsanā*'. But does this lead us anywhere? No. Actually there were certain notions shared equally by various philosophical systems. The Sāṃkhya concept of *prakṛti* which is '*triguṇātmikā*' or having the three qualities of *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*, is practically acceptable to all *darśanas*. We cannot therefore brand Lollaṭa either as a Mīmāṃsaka or a follower of Śaiva *darśana*. We shall have to collect and scrutinise all the references to

Lollaṭa scattered in different places to decide the issue. The same needs to be done in the case of the other *ācāryas* except Abhinavagupta whose philosophical works are fortunately available. Further, while engaged in this task we shall have to keep our minds open.

Let us turn to Śaṅkuka. The fact that he takes '*niṣpatti*' to be '*anumiti*', should not lead us to draw hasty conclusions. It is a matter of common experience that we always infer other people's feelings. If our observation is subtle and if we can correlate the external expressions with the inner feelings in an accurate way we may correctly infer other people's feelings or inclinations. As in life, so also in literature perhaps the same process is at work. We can only infer Rāma's feelings. We cannot feel them for ourselves. As the setting is artistic and unreal the process of reasoning also becomes relishable according to Śaṅkuka and then Mahima. Well, there is nothing wrong about it. But we need not characterise them as *naiyāyikas*. Actually so many *nyāyas* or maxims found in the *mīmāṃsā* and *nyāya darśanas* are also shared by other *darśanas* without any reservations. When I infer or imagine your mood to be good or bad on a particular morning, I do not thereby become a *naiyāyika*. As with Lollaṭa, so with Śaṅkuka also we have to search in for enough material to characterise him positively as belonging to this or that discipline. This in itself does not rule out the influence of *nyāya-darśana* on the *anumitivāda* as advanced by Śaṅkuka. But the simple conclusion is that the data are not sufficient to relate him definitely with any particular *darśana*. It may not sound unreasonable to share the views of Dr. Pandey who has put in great labour in tracing the philosophical movements in Kashmir in the centuries when these *ācāryas* lived. It is possible that by faith and by virtue of their philosophical leanings these *ācāryas* were all *Saivites*. A Hemacandra or a Rāmacandra does not cease to be a Jain when he accepts or rejects the views of Abhinavagupta.

The *bhuktivāda* of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka and the Sāṃkhya view (*sāṃkhyadrśā*) cited prior to it, carry an unmistakable stamp of the Sāṃkhya *darśana*. The terminology used is absolutely transparent. But for that matter do we make Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka an upholder of Sāṃkhya philosophy? Was he not, by faith, a follower of Kashmir *Saivism*? We have no conclusive proof.

We are on absolutely firm grounds when we talk of Abhinavagupta and Jagannātha. The reason is simple. We know more of these two. We also have their other works providing us necessary research tools to decide the issue with certainty. Prof. Athavale has done excellent work on Jagannātha and we are clear about what particular branch of Advaita-vedānta he adhered to.

To sum up, we may say that the efforts made in this direction are not sufficient enough to lead us to definite conclusions. We have to seek inspiration from the efforts made by Dr. Pandey and Prof. Athavale and continue our research in this direction with an open mind. It is possible that we may never reach a conclusion and be in a position to make any categorical statement.

All this has been taken care of in my long paper, which was originally written in Gujarati, and which for want of time, I am not in a position to present in English right now.

# The Rasa Theory in Relation to All The Fine Arts

P. N. VIRKAR

Before proceeding to consider the relation of the *rasa*-theory to the various fine arts, we have to see which portion of that theory is relevant to our present purposes and which arts fall under the head 'Fine Arts'.

The *rasa-sūtra* of Bharata has been accepted by all to be the basis of the *rasa*-theory. It is not necessary here to explain the different terms used in the *rasa-sūtra*. It will be enough to remember that *rasa* is something experienced by the *rasika* and that the experience is a highly delightful one. The *rasika* gets such an experience on reading an excellent poem or on witnessing a first-rate dramatic performance. That poem or that performance is to be regarded as excellent or first-rate which has the power to give such a delightful experience to the *rasika*.

Now when is it that a poem comes to possess this power to give a *rasa*-experience? It is, in the first place, only when the poet or the dramatist strains every nerve to delineate in his own way some feeling (*bhāva*) through his work. This *bhāva* may be a *sthāyī bhāva* or any other *bhāva*. It is only when one feeling or the other is delineated in a poem that it looks as if it were full of life. Then alone would it be capable of touching the heart of the spectator or reader.

But will it be enough for a poet merely to delineate a feeling or merely to rouse it in the heart of the reader? Of course not. That way so many happenings in life are capable of giving rise to some feeling or the other in a person's mind. Getting some money would make him happy. Winning a prize, a mishap in the family, the sight of a serpent or that of filth by the side of a road may generate some sort of a feeling, whether mild or intense, pleasant or unpleasant. Similar may be the condition of the spectator if he were to see a street accident, a smile on the face of a child, etc.

The rise of every feeling is not, of course, pleasant and even if it happens to be pleasant, the pleasure derived will be '*laukika*' or worldly and never '*alaukika*' or higher than merely worldly, and cannot, consequently, be called a *rasa*.

But an extra-ordinary or super-worldly joy will of necessity arise on witnessing a play of a high order or reading a poem of a similar level, provided, of course, that the spectator or reader is a *rasika*. Now, why should it be so? What is there in an excellent poem or a first rate dramatic performance that we do not come across in any incident in actual life? It is, of course, the exquisite beauty which a poem or a play happens to possess. Such beauty in a poem or play serves to give an '*alaukika*' delight, to a *rasika*.

It is in order to lend beauty to the feeling depicted in a poem or play that the poet has to make a highly clever use of *vibhāvas*, *anubhāvas* and *vyabhicāri-bhāvas*, which are but the means to be employed to give *rasa*-experience to the reader. The word '*samyoga*' in the *raso-sutra* means '*samyag yaga*' or an exquisite combination. The whole charm of a poem is a result of the poet's choice of the appropriate *vibhāvas* etc. and their proper synthesis into one whole. That is why it has been rightly said that the poet uses the same words as are known to all people and that he uses them in the same senses in which others do, but a piece of poetry assumes a new form, only on account of the skill of the poet in properly weaving them into one whole.<sup>1</sup>

*Rasa* may, therefore, be described as the beautiful delineation of an emotion with the help of suitable *vibhāvas* etc. as to give an extremely delightful experience of that emotion to the reader or spectator.

But the *rasa*-theory had initially been propounded as an essential element of *nāṭya* (i.e., the dramatic art) and it came to be applied later on to *kāvya* or poetry. Can this theory be of a considerable use to all the other fine arts as well? That is the main question we have mainly to consider in the following pages of this article.

Fine arts other than *nāṭya* and *kāvya* are generally supposed to be *ālekhyā* (i. e., drawing and painting), *saṅgīta* (music), *mūrtiśilpa* (sculpture) and *vastuśilpa* (architecture). *Saṅgīta* is made up of *nṛtya* (dancing), *gīta* (i. e., singing or vocal music) and *vādyā* (i. e., instrumental music)<sup>2</sup>. By 'fine' arts we shall, for our present purposes, understand those arts the main aim of which is to give delight to the artist himself and the *rasikas* by bringing into being something endowed with uncommon beauty.

We shall begin, then, with *ālekhyā*. This art is pretty old so far as our country is concerned. I need not here proceed to describe the semi-circular, circular, square and other shapes that used to be given to sacrificial altars and the figure of a heron that used to be 'arranged' in Vedic times, as is mentioned in the '*Śulva-sūtra*' written soon after the Vedic literature proper. In the *Rāmāyaṇa* of Vālmīki, an explicit mention has been made of a number of pictures, in the bedrooms of Rāvaṇa.

The *sāstra* of the art of drawing and painting has been dealt with, fairly elaborately, in nine *adhyāyas* (*adhyāyas* 35 to 43) of the third *Khaṇḍa* of the *Viṣṇudharmottara Purāṇa*, supposed to have been written about 600 A. D. These nine *adhyāyas* are known by the name '*Citra-sūtra*'.

But much before the elaboration in the *Citra-sūtra* proper, i. e., in the early *ślokas* of the second *adhyāya* of the same third *Khaṇḍa* of the *Viṣṇu-*

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1. त एव पदविन्यासाः, ता एवार्थविभूतयः ।  
तथापि नव्यं भवति काव्यं ग्रन्थनकौशलात् ॥
  2. नृत्यं गीतं च वाद्यं च त्रयं संगीतमुच्यते ।

*dharmottara Purāṇa*, the *śāstras* of *gīta* (vocal music), *ātodya* (instrumental music), *nṛtta* (dancing), *citra* and *mūrtiśilpa* (*pratimā-lakṣaṇa*) have actually been mentioned and are dwelt upon in that and the following *adhyāyas*. *Pratimā-lakṣaṇa* is discussed in a number of *adhyāyas* after the *Citra-sūtra*, under the heading, *Devatārūpa-nirmāṇam*'.

Let us first see whether the *rasa*-theory is considered by the *Viṣṇu-dharmottara Purāṇa* to be of use, in the discussion of the fine arts mentioned therein. We have, constantly, to bear in mind that so far as the application of the *rasa*-theory to fine arts other than *kāvya* or *nāṭya* is concerned, we are not at all concerned with the different views regarding the process of *rasa*-realisation put forth by the so many commentators of the *rasa-sūtra* of Bharata. We have to take into account only the *core* of the *rasa theory* pointed out above and see what importance it has in relation to the fine arts other than poetry and drama.

In *Adhyāya* II of the third *Khaṇḍa*, the *Viṣṇudharmottara* says that *Citra-sūtra* cannot be understood without the *Nṛtta-śāstra*<sup>3</sup> and out of the fifteen *Adhyāyas* from XX to XXXIV which deal with *Nṛtta śāstra*, *Adhyāya* 30th is called *Rasādhyāya* and the next one (i. e., 31st) is named *Bhāvādhyāya*. Nine *rasas* (including *śānta*) are mentioned and described in the *Rasādhyāya*, the last (i. e., the 29th) verse<sup>4</sup> of which says that *nṛtta* without *rasa* is of no significance and hence a dancer should always have recourse only to that *nṛtta* which is based on *rasa*. It will be interesting to note that in the 4th, 5th and 6th verses of the same *Adhyāya*, 'Colours'<sup>5</sup> of the various *rasas* are mentioned. Are we to take the hint and use these very colours to depict the different *rasas* in Drawing and Painting?

As many as forty-nine *bhāvas* are listed in the *Bhāvādhyāya* and in the last (i. e., the 58th) verse of that *Adhyāya* we are told which *bhāvas* are to be made use of in depicting each of the nine *rasas*.

Thus because *Citra-śāstra* cannot be understood without *Nṛtta-śāstra* and because *Nṛtta* is of no importance without a *rasa*, it follows that no *Citra* is worth anything if it does not delineate a *rasa*.

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3. विना तु नृत्तशास्त्रेण चित्रसूत्रं सुदुर्विदम् ।
  4. नाट्यस्य मूलं तु रसः प्रदिष्टो रसेन हीनं न हि नृत्तमस्ति ।  
तस्मात् प्रयत्नेन रसाश्रयस्य नृत्तस्य यत्नः पुरुषेण कार्यः ॥
  5. शान्तः स्वभाववर्णस्तु रसः प्रोक्तो नराधिप ।  
शृङ्गारस्तु भवेच्छायामो रक्तो रौद्रः प्रकीर्तितः ॥  
सितो हासश्च विज्ञेयः कृष्णश्चैव भयानकः ।  
गौरो वीरस्तु विज्ञेयः पीतश्चैवाद्भुतः स्मृतः ॥  
कापोतः कर्णश्चैव नीलो बीभत्स एव च ।

.....

These very colours are mentioned in Bharata's *Nāṭyaśāstra* also (VI, 42-43).



In the *Abhilasitārthacintāmaṇi* of Someśvara *citra* is said to be of four kinds. One of these is called *bhāvacitra*.<sup>6</sup> It is one at the very sight of which the *rasika* gets *rasa*-experience. This kind of *citra* is said to be causing curiosity. The words *Darśanādeva* are bound to remind us of *Mammata's* words '*Samanantarameva rasāsvādanasamudbhūtam*'<sup>7</sup> (absolutely instantaneous delight, which springs from the relishing of *rasa*), and also of the *asamlakṣya-kramavyaṅgya* variety of *dhvani*. Ānandavardhana says that the *rasa* variety of the suggested sense is understood very soon, almost along with the expressed sense.

And if we look at the question independently without worrying ourselves about what the *śāstras* say, the importance of the *rasa*-principle to the art of drawing and painting should be very obvious.

A picture that skilfully delineates some emotion, is far too superior to another that depicts merely inanimate objects. The quality of pictures presenting landscapes etc. will be much greater when they are drawn with the object of impressing some *bhāva* on the mind of the *rasika*. A picture which depicts a heap of fruits, howsoever neatly arranged, cannot, I think, hold a candle to another which depicts, artistically, say, the love of a mother for her child.<sup>++</sup>

I must here cite a verse quoted by Yaśodhara in his commentary named *Jayamaṅgalā* on the *Kāma-Sūtra* of Vātsyāyana. The author of the verse is not mentioned. :

रूपभेदाः, प्रमाणानि, भाव-लावण्य-योजनम् ।  
सादृश्यं, वर्णिकाभङ्ग इति चित्रं षडङ्गकम् ॥

Of the six *aṅgas* of a picture mentioned in this verse, I wish to draw the attention of the readers to two, viz. *bhāva-yojana* and *lāvanya-yojana*, which are extremely important. *bhāva-yojana* of course means depicting an emotion and *lāvanya-yojana* means depicting it beautifully. Such a picture is superior to one that very skilfully presents inanimate objects. It is so, obviously because the latter is incapable of giving *rasa*-experience to the spectator.

The name of the eighty-second *Adhyāya* of the *Samarāṅgaṇa-sūtradhāra* is *Rasa-dṛṣṭilakṣaṇa*. The very first verse of that *Adhyāya* says that *bhāvābhivyakti* in a *citra* is dependent on *rasadrṣṭi*.<sup>8</sup> The whole of the second

++ Could the picture of the *yakṣa* that his wife might have drawn with a view to console herself, be not suggestive of his ardent love in separation ? [Please vide *Kālidāsa's Meghadūta*, line II of verse 25 (*Uttaramegha*). If it is so suggestive, such a picture can be said to give an experience of (*Vipralambha Śṛṅgāra*) *rasa* to the *rasika*.

6. शृङ्गारादिरसो यत्र दर्शनादेव गम्यते ।  
भावचित्रं तदाख्यातं चित्रकौतुककारकम् ॥ (I, (3), 942-43).
7. *Kāvyaprakāśa*, *Ullāsa* 1, *Vṛtti* on verse No. 2
8. रसानामथ वक्ष्यामो दृष्टीनां वेह लक्षणम् ।  
तदायत्ता यतश्चित्रे भावव्यक्तिः प्रजायते ॥

stanza and the first part of the third stanza give a list of eleven *rasas* and the latter part of that stanza states that experts in the art of painting hold that *rasas* are eleven. The thirty-third and the thirty-fourth stanzas of the same *Adhyāya* tell us that *citra* is dependent on the import that is suggested by the hands and the eyes. These (i. e., the hands and the eyes) serve to make the picture appear as if it were living.<sup>9</sup>

The same theory applies to *mūrtiśilpa* also. As that art is concerned mainly with *mūrtis*, that is, with representing living figures, it could be said without hesitation that the *mūrti* which exquisitely shows feelings should be considered to be superb and far superior to one which does not exhibit a feeling, but which is just a symbol of a particular deity.

A word about *sādhāraṇīkaraṇa* which is an essential part of the *rasa*-theory, would be quite appropriate here. I am not going to examine the different interpretations of that term offered by critics. I am trying to take quite an independent, practical view and to find out what the main idea underlying this concept can be. Both Bhaṭṭanāyaka and Abhinavagupta have held that *sādhāraṇīkaraṇa* takes place only after the *rasika* has understood the expressed (*vācya*) sense. Now, what can be the nature of the expressed sense of a *kāvya*? It is obviously the knowledge of the *vibhāvas*, *anubhāvas* etc., as described by the poet. In the case of a picture (or a *mūrti*), we may say that the expressed sense therein is equivalent to the *vibhāvas*, *anubhāvas*, etc. as shown or displayed by the artist. Now the *vibhāvas* and *anubhāvas* could be shown by the artist only in a 'particular' form. He has to choose 'particular' characters and show *their* gestures and movements and those, too, in a *particular* setting only. He has to choose Duṣyanta or Rāma or some particular hero and a particular heroine etc. and manifest the intended *bhāva* through *their* gestures and movements. So the reader or the spectator first understands the *anubhāvas* etc. of those particular individuals at particular times and in particular places. But everything is presented by the artist with great workmanship hence if the beholder is a *rasika*, he is so much influenced by that workmanship that he repeatedly contemplates on whatever is expressed or shown. This is what Abhinavagupta means by '*anusandhāna*'. We must not forget that the main aim of a great artist is to depict a *bhāva* and that the *vibhāvas* etc. are but the instruments employed by him to achieve that aim. As a result of his repeated contemplation the *rasika* gradually forgets or loses sight of the instruments or less important details and concentrates all his attention only on the main *bhāva* and on the beauty with which it is delineated. This and nothing else is, to me, the main idea underlying the concept of *sādhāraṇīkaraṇa*. To be aware, only of whatever

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9. हस्तेन सूचयन्नर्थं दृष्ट्वा च प्रतिपादयन् ।  
 सजीव इति दृश्येत सर्वाभिनयदर्शनात् ॥  
 आङ्गिके चैव चित्रे...साधनमुच्यते ।  
 (भवेद्भादत (?)-) स्तस्मादनयोश्चित्रमाश्रितम् ॥

is *pradhāna* (or main) and to disregard everything that is *gaṇa* (or subordinate) should be taken to be the sum and substance of *sādhāraṇīkaraṇa* (particular details are lost sight of and the spectator is 'generally'—(i. e., without being related to particular individuals or things)—\* aware of whatever is mainly intended to be conveyed). The same interpretation should hold good in the case of all works of art—whether it is a poem or a play or a picture or a *mūrti* or a statue.

*Vāstuśilpa* or Architecture may be considered after *mūrtiśilpa*. We have to remember in this connection that architecture can be looked upon as a fine art only when the architect intends to erect something mainly with a view to producing a piece of beauty. Not residential buildings or offices etc., but constructions like temples etc. in erecting which workmanship is predominantly made use of, can be said to be works of *vāstuśilpa*. Of these, only those temples etc. which are embodiments of *bhakti* will impress the spectator most. Much of the charm of the Taj is likely to be lost if one ignores that it is an embodiment of the love of Shahājahān for his dear Mumtāj.

To turn, finally, to *saṅgīta*. We have already seen earlier that *saṅgīta* is composed of *nr̥tta*, *gīta* and *vādyā* (please see note 2). The relation that *rasa* bears to *nr̥tta* has already been considered. Let us now take account of *gīta* and *vādyā*. In his *Saṅgīta-ratnākara*, Śārṅgadeva says thus in verse 1351 of the seventh *adhyāya* :

'Experts wish that in this *Tauryatrika*<sup>10</sup>, *rasa* should be the main aim'. In the three hundred and twenty verses that follow, we have been supplied with exhaustive pieces of information about all the details regarding *rasas*, *bhāvas* etc. and about their so many *aṅgas*.

Now although these details have been picked up mostly from Bharata,<sup>11</sup> the *Saṅgīta-ratnākara* has expressly said that in *saṅgīta* (as in *nāṭya*), *rasa* is the chief thing. For *saṅgīta* the term *tauryatrika* has been used. This *triaka* obviously means *nr̥tta*, *gīta* and *vādyā*. So in addition to *Viṣṇu-dharmottara—purāṇa*, the *Saṅgīta-ratnākara* also tells us that *nr̥tta* is *rasapradhāna*. Moreover, it says that *gīta*, too (with *vādyā*), is *rasa-pradhāna*.

Let us take an independent view of this art, as we did in the case of *citra*. Is *nr̥tta* in no way different from a demonstration of physical exercises? And if it is different, it is so not only because it is an art, but because it artistically manifests one *bhāva* or another. But what should we say about *gīta* and *vādyā*? The answer will be found in the answer to the question whether *gīta* is meant to give joy to the *rasika* or not. The

\* Please vide संबन्धविशेषस्वीकारपरिहारनियमान्वयसायात् साधारण्येन प्रतीतिः and तत्कालविगलितपरिमित-प्रमातृभाववशोन्मिषितवेद्यान्तर-संपर्क शून्यापरिमितभावेन प्रमात्रा Kāvyaaprakāśa, Zalkikar edition, p. 92.

10. रसप्रधानमिच्छन्ति तौर्यत्रिकमिदं विदः ।

11. सूरिश्रीशार्ङ्गदेवेन नाट्यवेदाङ्गबुधेरिदम् ।

समस्तादुद्धृतं सारं धीरैरातृप्ति सेव्यताम् ॥ (VII-1672)

*Saṅgīta-ratnākara* in I-26-30 expressly says that *gīta* has the power to give the highest delight to all, from God Śiva down to an angry snake.<sup>12</sup>

A Marathi poem, '*Satārīce Bola*'<sup>12</sup> by the poet Keśavasuta is so well-known to Marathi speaking people. The poet had once been buried so deep in misery and disappointment that he for a moment felt like going to the length of committing suicide. As he was walking along in the darkness of the night in this mood, totally unmindful of everything that happened around him, he just chanced to listen to the sweet notes of a lute being played in some house. He at first got annoyed, thinking that the player was so self-centred as to be completely indifferent to the miseries of others. Gradually, however, he went on being so deeply influenced by the notes that continued to be emitted, that his mind ultimately achieved the state of perfect peace and happiness.

If music (*gīta* or *vādyā*) is able to give such a joy even in the worst of moods, it must be such as would move the feelings of a listener.

A Sanskrit *subhāṣita*<sup>13</sup> tells us that one whose heart does not melt on listening to a song is either one who has renounced all worldly bonds or is a beast. And can a song that is not *rasa-pradhāna* be capable of melting the listener's heart? The same is suggested by J. Dryden, an English poet, when he says :

"What passion cannot Music raise and quell?"<sup>14</sup>.

And what else do Shakespeare's following lines<sup>15</sup> hint at? :

'The man that hath no music in himself,  
Nor is *not moved* with concord of sweet sounds,  
Is fit for treasons, strategems and spoils :  
The motions of his spirit are as dull as night,

.....

Let no such man be trusted.'

- 
12. गीतेन प्रीयते देवः सर्वज्ञः पार्वतीपतिः ।  
गोपीपतिरनन्तोऽपि वंशध्वनिवशं गतः ॥  
सामगीतिरतो ब्रह्मा, वीणासक्ता सरस्वती ।  
किमन्ये देवगन्धर्वयक्षमानवदानवाः ॥  
अज्ञातविषयास्वादो बालः पर्यङ्किकागतः ।  
रुदन् गीतामृतं श्रुत्वा हर्षोत्कर्षं प्रपद्यते ॥  
वनेचरस्तृणाहारश्चित्रं मृगशिशुः पशुः ।  
लुब्धो लुब्धकसङ्गीते गीते त्यजति जीवितम् ॥  
क्रुद्धो विषं वमन् सर्पः फणामान्दोलयन् मुहुः ।  
गानं जाङ्गलिकाच्छ्रुत्वा हर्षोत्कर्षं प्रपद्यते ॥
  13. सुभाषितेन गीतेन युवतीनां च लीलया ।  
यस्य न द्रवते चित्तं स वै मुक्तोऽथवा पशुः ॥
  14. 'A Song for St. Cecilia's day, 1687.'
  15. Merchant of Venice, Act V. (Lorenzo's speech in the moonlight)

I remember an experience I had some forty years ago. A friend of mine gave me the pleasure of listening to a song that was recorded. It was sung in the *Bhāiravī Rāgiṇī* by Abdul Karim Khan. I really felt as if my vitals were being touched. Hence I can safely venture to say that even music rouses feelings and when, thus, it is *rasa-pradhāna*, it rises to the height of one of the finest of arts.

The doctrine of '*aucitya*' (first clearly put forth by Ānandavardhana) is one very closely allied to *rasa*. It is one that holds good with any fine art. To consider it at the present moment in the context of music : Music is regarded these days as an essential part of motion pictures. It will not, however, do if the music therein happens to be introduced for the sake of music alone. The tunes, the rhythm, must be perfectly suitable to the main theme of the picture and to the various incidents in it. The *druta* (i. e. fast) rhythm will damage the beauty of a song that may be sung with a view to giving vent to the sad thoughts of the singer. The sounds in the words must be soft, the tunes suitable to the *rasa* and the rhythm as slow as the mood requires. Then alone, and not when the song is a demonstration of mere erudition, that the *rasika* will be inspired to say to the singer :<sup>16</sup>

'I am drawn, forcibly, by the charming melody of your song.'

## ADDENDA

Several questions may occur when one thinks of the *rasa*-theory in the context of drawing and painting and of music. An attempt is made to consider some of them, in the following lines.

Patterns and designs are employed on a number of occasions in everyday life, for example, while decorating door curtains, windows (with lattice work), floors, walls, dining tables and so on. The question is whether such designs are capable of giving *rasa*-experience to the spectator.

The answer is that when designs etc. are used only for decoration, they cannot be likened to a composition forming one whole. Even when an attempt is made to arrange some of them into a whole, they may be said to resemble what Mammaṭa calls '*citra-kāvya*'. Sometimes the designs may happen to be symbolic, i. e., suggestive (for example, a *svastika*, a lotus, a conch-shell, etc.). When such symbolic figures are made use of in temples and similar other places, they may serve to add to the main effect produced on the mind of a devotee visiting the temple. They are somewhat similar to the *varṇas*, *padas*, parts of *padas* etc. used by a poet and are deemed as *guṇibhūtavyaṅgya* by Ānandavardhana (vide page 485 of the Kāśī edition of the *Dhvanyāloka*.)

It is possible that a series of symbolic figures may, in special circumstances, give rise to a *bhāva* in the mind of a *rasika*, as a *Marāṭhi* poet,

16. *Abhijñāna-śākuntalam*, last verse of the prelude (i. e., *prastāvanā*).

Keśavasuta tells us in his poem on seeing a young woman drawing auspicious figures (*rangāvali*) in the court-yard. Under such special circumstances, the symbolic figures may inspire a *rasika* onlooker with some *bhāva* (emotional mood) such as piety, auspiciousness, etc.

Another question that may present itself is, which, in the case of painting and of music in particular, can be said to be the *vibhāvas*, *anubhāvas* etc., if that piece of art is capable of giving *rasa* (or *bhāva*) experience to a *rasika*.

It was already said in this article that a picture is capable of evoking *rasa* (or *bhāva*) only when it delineates some emotion. Take, for example, a picture representing the love of a mother for her child. The *ālambana vibhāva* of her motherly love is, obviously, the child. If the child is shown to be smiling, the smile on the child's face will be an *uddīpana-vibhāva*. The expressions on the mother's face and her actions meant to fondle the child will be the *anubhāvas* and so on. To quote (as an additional instance) the following verse from the *Meghadūta* of Kālidāsa :

त्वामालिख्य प्रणयकुपितां धातुरायैः शिलायामात्मानं ते चरणपतितं यावद्विच्छामि कर्तुम् ।  
असौस्वान्मुहुर्मुहुरपचितैर्दृष्टिरालुप्यते मे क्रूरस्तस्मिन्नपि न सहते संगमं नौ कृतान्तः ॥<sup>००</sup>

If, in this case, we were to think *only* of the picture drawn by the *yakṣa* (and *not* of the effect of seeing the picture on him), the *Vipralambha-rati* (love in separation) of the *Yakṣa's* wife will have to be considered to be the *sthāyī bhāva* (suggested by the picture). The offence given by the *yakṣa* provoking her anger will be the *vibhāva*, the anger depicted on her face will be an *anubhāva*, and so on.

To turn, now to 'pure music'. Instrumental music can be said to be an ideal instance of 'pure' music. A reference was made, towards the close of this article, to the poem 'Tunes of a Lute (*Satārīce Bola*)' by the Marathi poet, Keśavasuta. He, in that poem, says that in course of time the lute began to emit 'hope-in-spring' (*āsāpreraka*) tunes. So even pure music is capable of evoking some emotional mood, and thus of giving a *bhāva* experience (if not a *rasa*-experience) to a *rasika*.

If, then, the tunes of a musical instrument manifest some feeling, whose can it be said to manifest? Of course that of the person playing on the instrument. His mood at that particular moment is manifested.\* If so, the tunes must be looked upon as *anubhāvas* of the artist's mood. It will be useful to recollect the words "मधुरांश्च निशम्य शब्दान्" (and on hearing sweet sounds) from *Śākuntala* (Act V, verse 2nd). They are enough to show that pure music does touch the heart of a (*rasika*) listener.

०० *Uttaramegha*, 38.

\* Or rather, we may say that a mood 'recollected (by the artist) in Contemplation' is manifested.

# The Relevance of RASA Theory to Modern Literature

K. KRISHNAMOORTHY

## I

1. "Criticism can never be a science : it is, in the first place, much too personal, and in the second, it is concerned with values that science ignores. The touchstone is emotion, not reason. We judge a work of art by its effect on our sincere and vital emotion, and nothing else. All the critical twiddle-twaddle about style and form, all this pseudo-scientific classifying and analysing of books in an imitation-botanical fashion, is mere impertinence and mostly dull jargon.... A critic must be able to *feel* the impact of a work of art in all its complexity and force. To do so, he must be a man of force and complexity himself, which few critics are. The more scholastically educated a man is, generally, the more he is an emotional bore".

—D. H. Lawrence

While reading this passage, one will be reminded of Ānandavardhana's dictum—

It (i. e. the suggested meaning intended by the poet) is not understood by those who are learned merely in grammar and lexicography. It is understood only by those who have an insight into the true nature of poetic meaning.<sup>1</sup> and Abhinavagupta's definition of a *sahṛdaya* :

Responsive critics are those whose mirror-like minds have become perfectly clear by dint of a constant and close perusal of poetic works and as a result of which they acquire the ability to share imaginatively what is described and to attain a heartfelt response within themselves.<sup>2</sup>

If great poets are rare, rarer are perceptive critics. In the history of the world's literature on poetry these two figures,—Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta—stand out as two peaks of Indian thought as they combined in themselves the all too rare endowments of creative poetry and meticulous

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1. śabdārtha-śāsana-jñāna-mātreṇaiva na vedyate/  
vedyate sa tu kāvyārtha-tattvajñāireva kevalam// —*Dhvanyāloka*, I. 7.

2. Yeṣāṃ kāvyānuśīlanābhyāsa-vaśād-viśadībhūte manomukure varṇanīyatanmayībhavana-yogyatā te sva-hṛdaya-saṁvādabhājah saṁhṛdayāḥ. —*Locana on Dhvanyāloka*, I. 1.

learning, sensitive taste and penetrating philosophy. Not all the library of critical works today on poetry and drama including the specialized advances made in the psychology of literature and aesthetics, structural stylistics and semantics, etc. can render their vital findings out-dated or anachronistic; for they touch the vital mainspring of all art-creation and art-appreciation. That mainspring or pivotal point is *rasa*. That it is one of the most misunderstood and misinterpreted concepts, both by medieval schoolman in India as well as modern Sanskritists, would be an understatement, judging by the number of works which have appeared on the subject up-to-date. Not a little of the bewildering confusion is due to some mis-translations in English of key-words in Sanskrit. A study of the theory in an exclusively historico-critical perspective, in isolation from the total thought-complex of the great theorists, cannot but lead to inconclusive and misleading results. It is proposed in this short paper to re-examine just one or two most crucial constituents of the *rasa* theory, and indicate its implications in a way which will substantiate its relevance to the study of all literature, modern literature not excepted.

## II

We often come across English words like instincts, drives, propensities, emotions, moods, feelings, sentiments etc. borrowed from modern psychology; to designate the Sanskrit technical terms, *bhāva* and *rasa* in their multiplicity. We also find words like 'art-experience,' 'aesthetic experience,' 'aesthetic contemplation' etc. as descriptions of the trained reader's enjoyment of literature. The former are common to life-experiences also; while the latter are prominent in the appreciation of the fine arts. But none is sure how they differentiate life-emotion from art-emotion.

Allied to this confusion is the lack of clarity in our understanding of *vibhāvas* and *anubhāvas*, *sthāyibhāvas* and *vyabhicāribhāvas* as also of *bhāva* vis-a-vis *rasa*.

As a result, the very seminal explanation of the aesthetic process as involving *sādhārāṇīkaraṇa* becomes distorted and difficult to accept. I might refer in this connection to the brilliant and closely-argued paper by Prof. R.B. Patankar entitled : "Does the *rasa* theory have any modern relevance?" published in the prestigious journal, *Philosophy, East and West*.<sup>3</sup> *Rasa* is a superstructure resting on one or two foundational pillars. Remove the pillars, and the whole structure goes to pieces.

Before I embark upon setting down the basic passages relevant to a proper understanding of the *rasa*-theory from the master Abhinavagupta himself—passages not only from his well-known *Alaṅkāra* texts (*Locana* and *Abhinavabhāratī*); but also the ignored and almost unknown philosophical texts—I shall quote one or two passages as representative of modern critical thought and practical criticism. These two approaches appear to me to come closest to the ancient thought of Abhinavagupta.



1. The first is from Jacques Maritain's *Creative Intuition in art*<sup>4</sup> where he discusses T. S. Eliot's views regarding the nature of emotions in poetic creation and criticism. While he agrees with Eliot that "one who reads poets should not mistake for the poetry an emotional state aroused in himself by the poetry, a state which may be merely an indulgence of his own emotions"; and that "the end of the enjoyment of poetry is a pure contemplation from which all the accidents of personal emotion are removed"—Maritain calls these "brute emotions or merely subjective feelings"—he adds his proviso that "this pure contemplation itself is steeped in the *creative emotion* or poetic intuition conveyed by the poem. T. S. Eliot goes on to say: "It is not in his personal emotions, the emotions provoked by particular events in his life, that the poet is in any way remarkable or interesting... The business of the poet is not to find new emotions, but to use the ordinary ones, and in working them up into poetry, to express feelings which are not in actual fact emotions at all, ... poetry is not a turning loose of emotion, but an escape from emotion." And Maritain observes: "The escape of which he speaks cannot come about except through poetic knowledge and creative emotion, and in the very act of creating." At last he is in full agreement with Eliot when he ends up with the following observation: "Very few know when there is expression of *significant* emotion, emotion which has its life in the poem and not in the history of the poet."

Before I cite the next passage, let me set beside this the aphorism of Anandavardhana—"If the poet be suffused with emotion, the entire world of his creation will be pulsating with *rasa*; If he should be devoid of it, the entire world of his creation too will be dry and inspid".<sup>5</sup>

Here is Abhinavagupta's exegesis of *śṛṅgārī*: "The poet should be taken to be suffused with the delectation of the various ingredients of a love-situation as found in literature; one should not wrongly understand that he must be a voluptuary running after women in life. Further, the word *śṛṅgāra* here is really indicative of *rasa* in general."<sup>6</sup>

Anandavardhana and Abhinavagupta thus are well aware of the distinction between what Maritain would call 'creative' emotion and T. S. Eliot would call 'significant emotion' on the one hand and brute emotion or raw emotion of everyday life. The former is a singular feature underlying all creative writing; while the latter belongs to the private lives of people as particular individuals with their worldly love-hate complexities. I quote this passage to underscore the point that this has not been particularly noticed by Sanskritists, when Abhinavagupta regards *kavi* and *sahṛdaya* as two poles of the same creative power :

4. New York, 1955, p. 310.

5. *śṛṅgārī cet kaviḥ kāvyē jātaṁ rasamayam jagat/  
sa eva vītarāgaścet nīrasaṁ sarvameva tat//*  
—*Dhvanyāloka*, Ed. K. Krishnamoorthy, Dharwad, 1974, p. 250.

6. *Locana*, N. S. P. Edn., Bombay, 1935, p. 278.

Glorious indeed is the truth singular (or attitude identical) of Poetry, designated by two alternate names viz., the poet and the responsive critic.<sup>7</sup> He is identifying them on account of this vital affinity between them in the partaking of *rasa*. The world of nature which is hard as stone is made instinct with life by means of this creative *rasa* within each of them; creative fully in the poet and re-creative in the critic :<sup>8</sup>

What else but this creative-recreative emotion is involved in Vālmiki's *śoka* becoming instantly a *śloka*? Lest we should confuse the sorrow as a life-emotion of the pained sage. Abhinavagupta comments that it is quite different from it and also of the nature of repose, within his creative spirit or soul, which melts his heart as it were and floods it with an afflatus of self-delight :<sup>9</sup>

The adjuncts *nija* and *sva* governing *rasa* in both these excerpts from Abhinavagupta deserve further notice. But we shall take it up later. The creative afflatus called *rasa*, *karuṇa*, here, overflows spontaneously and takes the art-form of a *śloka*. The creative *rasa* then is existentially co-terminus with the created art-form itself. As a citation in Pratihārendurāja states :—

The poet's creative soul which delights in *rasa* shines bright when it finds a ready reflection in the clear mirror of word and meaning, a mirror embellished elegantly by literary qualities like perspicuity and power.

The poet's *rasa* is a lamp and his creation a mirror which adequately reflects the lamp-light. It has nothing to do with the creator's private emotion which his diary might record. Abhinavagupta emphatically asserts :

'One should not take it as the personal sorrow of the sage'.

Why?—one might ask. Abhinava's answer is : 'If it were personal sorrow on his part, Ānandavardhana would have no reason to regard *rasa* as the *ātman* or soul of literature. For, no sorrow-stricken person turns suddenly creative like this.'<sup>12</sup>

I need not labour this point any more. Whatever be the worldly emotion in question—love or sorrow—, the creative state of *rasa* is identical in each case; that is why the poet and the critic can both share in that 'tragic pleasure' which is not at all a paradox. Only this common *rasa* state, which is creative through and through, and underlying all worldly emotions, pleasurable or otherwise deserves the status of *ātman* or life-essence of literature. In the

7. Sarasvatyāstattvaṃ kavi-saḥṛdayākhyāṃ vijayate—*Ibid.*, Invocatory verse.

8. cf. jagad grāvaprakhyāṃ *nija-rasa-bharāt* sārayati ca—*op. cit.*

9. karuṇa-rasa-rūpatāṃ laukika-śoka-vyatiriktāṃ *sva-citta-dṛṣṭi-samāsvādyasārāṃ* pratipannā *rasa*... —*op. cit.*, p. 31.

10. rasollāsi kaverātmā svacche śabdārthadarpaṇe/  
mādhuryaujoyuta-prauḍhe prativindya prakāśate// —*Laghuvṛtti* on Udbhaṭa's *Kāvya-lāṅkārasaṅgraha*, N. S. P. edn., pp. 79-80.

11. na tu munēḥ śoka iti mantavyam —*Loc. cit.*

12. evam hi sati...so'pi duḥkhita iti rasasya ātmeti niravakāśaṃ bhavet; na ca duḥkha-saṃtap-tasya eṣā daśeti.

—*Loc. cit.*

words of T. S. Eliot, it is 'significant emotion' and in the words of Jacques Maritain, it is 'creative emotion.' *Rasa* is absolutely impersonal and free from worldly associations, and is consummated only with the creation of the art-object. *Rasas* should not be mistaken for life-emotions which are raw emotions or brute emotions, which have no place in literature.

To show *rasa's* further relevance to modern literature, I shall now cite a passage from W. H. Auden. He describes Wagner's music almost in the same language that Abhinava uses to describe Vālmiki's expression of *karuṇa-rasa* :

In the expression of physical suffering, the  
suffering of unrequited love, the suffering  
of self-love, the suffering of betrayed love,  
the sufferings, in short, of failure Wagner  
is one of the greatest geniuses who ever lived.  
But only in the expression, 'the imitation' of  
suffering. Happiness, social life, mystical joy,  
and success were beyond him.<sup>13</sup>

But whether one should call it good or bad art is another question and it involves questions of response linked with personal belief or unbelief of the critic. Auden has explained this very penetratingly :

We have two kinds of experiences : the first,  
objective experience of the world outside  
consciousness, entering as sensory images  
or as memories from our unconscious; this  
kind of experience is governed by causal  
necessity, that is, it is presented to us  
independently of our will, and it is either  
pleasant or unpleasant. The second, subjective,  
or consciousness of our own conscious faults;  
this kind of experience is accessible to the will;  
and is governed by whatever is our conception of  
logical and moral necessity; it is here that  
ethical judgements are made, and conduct  
decided—experience here is either good or evil.  
Similarly there are two classes of events : those  
which we cannot alter or prevent by our own  
actions, and those which we can. If we call  
unpleasant events which are unalterable tribula-  
tions, and evil events which are preventable  
temptations, then science and art are both concer-  
ned primarily with tribulations, but in different  
ways. The aim of science is to convert tribula-  
tions into temptations, an insoluble problem of

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13. Ed., W. K. Wimsatt, *Literary Criticism, Idea and Act*, California, 1974, p. 38.

passive endurance into a soluble problem of conduct, the unpleasant into the evil....

But there are always tribulations which science has not yet been able to change into temptations and which it will never be able to change because they have already happened. It is with these that art is concerned; the Muses are the daughters of memory. For if past events cannot be altered, our attitude towards them can. They can be accepted. Their relation to each other and the present can be understood. The moralist's attack on art comes from his confusion of art with science.<sup>14</sup>

The romantic movement in the West advocates the autonomy of the poetic-art; and raises its banner of revolt against conformity to any external norms. It makes the poet the 'unacknowledged legislator of the world'. Ānandavardhana too asserts in the same strain :

In poesy's unlimited estate,  
the poet is the Creator sole !  
As he pleases, so things mutate  
in this universe whole !<sup>15</sup>

His poet obeys no law which is not intrinsic to his inspired vision. This law itself is the integral norm of *propriety (aucitya)* to *rasa*. It is at once a-logical and a-moral. Any theme is grist to the poet's mill. What makes it aesthetically viable and valuable is only *rasa-aucitya*. That is the reason why *rasābhāsa* has an honoured place alongside of *rasa* in literature, according to Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta. The latter insists on the condition that the *sahrdaya* should be free from inhibitions imposed by his personal beliefs and unbeliefs, to make his response genuinely aesthetic. Against the background of Auden's penetrating analysis of experience, it will be easy to see how the Indian conception of thematic "*rasādis*" alongside of the over-all creative *rasa* is both meaningful and significant. The former are governed by the law of unity, symmetry, harmony, and propriety while the over-all *rasāveśa* or creative afflatus is a law unto itself.<sup>16</sup> The question of the poet's belief is not brought into literary criticism or value judgement. What is ever insisted upon is the commonality of interest between the poet and his reader, since art, by definition, is a shared thing. This is a point admitted by Auden also. If it cannot be shared, "poetry would be no more than a personal allegory of the

14. *Ibid.*, p. 39.

15. *apare kāvyasaṁsāre kavireva prajāpatiḥ/  
yathāśmai rocate viśvaṁ tathedaṁ parivartate*// —Loc. cit., p. 250.

16. The following citation found in *Pratīharendurāja* shows how *rasa* and *rasādi* were not always kept distinct even in early times :  
*rasādyadhīṣṭhitam kāvyam jīvad rūpatayā yataḥ/  
ucyate tadarasādīnām kāvyātmatvaṁ vyavasthitam*//

artist's individual dementia, of interest primarily to the psychologist and the historian".<sup>17</sup> Some ultra-modernist literary trends in Western literature seem to be experimenting with this extreme idea. But the other extreme would mean a photographic copy of the accidental details of life. The *rasa*-theory holds a golden mean between the two, because its recognition of *navarasas* is wide enough to do justice to all the major emotional experiences in man's life, with an underground connection involving one of the four *puruṣārthas* or life-values, in an unobtrusive manner though.

2. Next I take up a view expressed by a famous French poet-critic, Yves Bonnefoy in the *Encounter* :<sup>18</sup>

Poetic creation, in short, is hieratic, it makes  
an inviolable place, and while the rite of read-  
ing continues, it draws its mind into this illusory  
communion.

Are we not reminded here of Kālidāsa's description of drama as a "ritual feast for the eye of gods"<sup>19</sup> and that it is a singular source of satisfaction to all the spectators with varied tastes?<sup>20</sup>

Among the theorists, both Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka and Abhinavagupta bring in their Kashmir Śaiva metaphysics to explain the experience of *rasa* which is nothing but a sudden flash of bliss, innate in the *Ātman*, and which is realised by the powerful impact of music and dance on the stage etc., while witnessing a drama or by responding to poetry. This *rasa* is described as *svarūpānanda* which is infinite subjectivity of the soul, void of all objectivity; and which is of the same nature as the bliss of *yogins*. Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, as quoted by Mahimabhaṭṭa states :—

When *rasa* is thus made to immerse (the playhouse) with recitations from the drama-text and melodious singing of *dhruvā* songs (i. e. rhythmic musical sets) by the actors, the spectator concentrates himself solely in its irresistible appeal and turns inward for a moment. When the objective things outside thus disappear from his field of attention, he attains the state of his inmost spiritual being. Then the true bliss of his inner spirit is manifested, a bliss which only *yogins* know !<sup>21</sup> That Abhinava is only confirming this Vedāntic view of *rasa* which is esoteric is evident in his

17. See note 13 above; *Ibid.*, p. 43.

18. *Encounter*, London, June 1962, p. 39.

19. Cf. "devānāmidamāmananti munayaḥ kāntaṁ kratuṁ cākṣuṣam." The word *kratu* in Sanskrit means not only an act of holy sacrifice but also something most cherished or longed for : rucratīṣayaḥ kāmye viṣaye kratuṣyate —Rādhākānta Dev, *Śabdakalpadruma*. Vol. II, p. 212.

20. "nāṭyam bhinnarūcerjanasya bahudhāpyekam samārādhanaṁ" *Mālavikāgnimitra*, I. 4.

21. pāthyādatha dhruvāgāntataḥ sampūrite rase/  
tadāsvāda-bharaikāgro hṛṣṭyāntarmukhaḥ kṣaṇam//  
tato nirviṣayasyāṣya svarūpāvasthitaṁ nijah/  
vyajyate hlādanīṣyando yena tṛpyanti yoginaḥ//  
*Vyaktiviveka*, Chowkhamba Edn., p. 94.

expressions already noted, viz. *nijarasabharāt*, etc. This unique Indian context of Yoga-cum-Vedānta cannot be forgotten while estimating the concept of *rasa* in its final phase in Indian poetics. Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka also states unequivocally that *rasa* essentially, is an in-depth response to poetry :

*Rasa* or the experience which is one of perfect delectation and which arises only in the wake of an overwhelming experience evoked by the (represented) multi-feeling complex, comes to be termed the essence of poetry.<sup>22</sup>

Even direct perception of beauty in nature cannot yield the kind of supreme *rasa* or aesthetic delight which only the representation of it by a consummate poet can give by virtue of his creative or artistic power :—

Because of this process of *einfuhlung* or aesthetic empathy, things presented by the poet's creative power acquire a vividness which is indeed far greater than that of things directly perceived.<sup>23</sup>

Now we have landed in the tangled web of *tanmayī-bhāva*, whose consideration we have been postponing all along; because it is the master-key utilized by both Bhaṭṭa-Nāyaka and Abhinavagupta in explaining the apparently mysterious nature of *rasāsvāda*. As we shall see presently, it is a synonym of *hrdaya-saṁvāda* as well as *sādhāraṇikaraṇa*. To take the last in isolation from its Kashmir Śaiva context and to attach it modern meanings like 'universalization' is not warranted by the texts.

Even in modern Western aesthetics, the traditional conception of the "aesthetic object" as anything towards which a certain disinterested attitude is adopted, is in trouble as Richard W. Lind demonstrates in a recent article entitled "Attention and the Aesthetic Object" in the *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*. He has referred to several studies in the last two decades as converging to this conclusion.<sup>24</sup> He comes to the conclusion that the term "aesthetic" is vacuous and that "aesthetic objects are not merely illuminated by attitude; their very structure and texture are both *constituted* and *made intelligible* by discriminating attention." Spontaneous elicitation of attention is its distinguishing feature. The crude psychology of I. A. Richards has been

22. *bhāva-saṁyojanā-vyaṅgya-parisaṁvitti-gocaraḥ/ āsvādanātmānubhavo rasaḥ kāvyārtha ucyate//* —*Ibid.*, p. 67. Quoted also by Abhinava in his commentary on *Nāṭyaśāstra*, GOS, Vol. I, p. 277. The slightly variant readings therein do not affect the main argument here.

23. *kavi-śaktyarpitā bhāvāstanmayībhāva-yūktitoh/ tathā sphurantyaṁ kāvyānna tathādhyakṣataḥ kila//* —*Ibid.*, p. 73.

24. Vol. XXXIX, No. 2, 1980, p. 131 f. Some of the studies referred to are

1. George Dickie, 'The Myth of the Aesthetic Attitude', *Introductory Reading in Aesthetics* (ed. John Hesper, New York, 1969), pp. 28-45;
2. Marshal Cohen, 'Appearance and the aesthetic attitude', *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. 56 (1959), pp. 915-25.
3. Robert Mac-Gregor, 'Art and the Aesthetic', *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, Vol. XXXII (1973-74), pp. 549-559.

discarded long ago by philosophers like Maritain. To Richards there is no aesthetic emotion peculiar to art: "When we look at a picture or read a poem or listen to music, we are not doing something quite unlike what we were doing on our way to the gallery or when we dressed in the morning."<sup>25</sup> Even art-critics like Roger Fry have shown how transmutations of sensations of experience take place in art. Our reaction to works of art is a reaction to a relation and not to sensations as such or even to objects or persons. I have been struggling all the time to highlight the fact that *rasa* as explained by Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka and Abhinava does not exist outside the percipient. It is to be discovered or intuited within by an inward directed process, which is non-empirical and hence called *alaukika* or *lokottara*; these terms should not be interpreted as super-normal because intuitive apperception is quite a normal feature in all aesthetic contemplation.

One more digression from texts bearing on *sādhārāṇīkaraṇa* in Sanskrit. I might be permitted, to build up the right atmosphere for the understanding of the intended purport of the texts. That is the modern idea of symbol. Susanne Langer is the reputed exponent of the theory that all art is essentially symbolic.<sup>26</sup> She has drawn inspiration from the Indian *rasa* theory also. According to her all artistic creation consists of only "forms of human feeling." Art does not represent actual things and events but ideas of them. It has import without conventional reference. The symbol has a special sense of "significant form" where "significance" is a quality felt by the percipient while "form" is that art-object outside which expresses feeling. This feeling is not communicated but revealed. The aesthetic emotion is not expressed in the work, but belongs to the percipient.<sup>27</sup> The correspondence of all this with the postulates of the *dhvani* theory is obvious. When widely interpreted in the context of modern thought, *dhvani* or *abhi-vyakti* is nothing but a sudden revelation; the *sahṛdaya*'s response is a fresh discovery of *rasa*. The poem is only a stimulus.

But then there would arise the philosophical problem as to how *rasa* would be a valid experience in the absence of the subject-object relationship. This is dismissed by Śaṅkuka with a mere assertion:

'Who can challenge an experience which is validated by the testimony of being clearly felt?'<sup>28</sup> But Anantadāsa, son of Viśvanātha, commenting on his father's *Sāhityadarpaṇa*<sup>29</sup> quotes two verses which offer this *svataḥ-*

25. See, *Principles of Literary Criticism*, New York, p. 16 ff.

26. Vide—1. *Feeling and Form*, New York, 1953.

2. *Philosophy in a New Key*, Cambridge (Mass.), 1942.

3. *Problem of Art*, New York, 1957.

27. For further details, see Richard Courtney, *On Langer's Dramatic Illusion*, *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, Vol. XXIX, No. 1 (1970).

28. Cf. yuktyā paryanuyujyeta sphurannanubhavaḥ kayā? —*Abhinavabhāratī* (GOS), Vol. I, 1956, p. 273.

29. *Locana on Sāhityadarpaṇa*, Ed. Devadatta Kaushik, Bharatiya Vidya Prakashan, 1978 Delhi, p. 7.

*prāmāṇya-vāda* (thesis of self-validity) the support of *tādātmya* or *tanmayībhavana*—

All poetry, in our view, is exquisitely valid; since it comes forth only due to the valid experiencing of *rasa* which is self-illuminated. That *rasa* is of the nature of a unique consciousness will be established in the sequel. *Rasa*-consciousness or experience is not invalid like the illusion of silver in a shell, because it is never subsequently sublated as in the case of the silver-shell illusion.<sup>30</sup>

It remains now to be stated that the word *sādhāraṇīkaraṇa* is conspicuous by its absence in all Indian poetical works till Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka coined it. And he coined it as a synonym of *bhāvakatva-vyāpāra* of *kāvya* in relation to *rasa* as distinguished from *bhojakatva-vyāpāra* in relation to the *sahṛdaya*, and *abhīdhā-vyāpāra* in relation to rhetorical or aesthetic use of language in poetry (with *guṇas* and *alāṅkāras*). These two unique *vyāpāras* or functions of poetic language are postulated by him to serve as better explanations than the one of *dhvani* proposed by Ānandavardhana. According to him, the *dhvani* function or *vyāñjanā-vyāpāra* cannot adequately highlight the imaginative and contemplative state which is exclusive to the realisation of *rasa*. This new poetic function envisaged by him is called by names like *bhāvanā*, *bhāvakatva* and *sādhāraṇī-karaṇa*. All the three refer to the same phenomenon. The word *sādhāraṇa* in this context means just “common” *vibhāvas* etc. delineated in a play or poem, *vibhāvas* etc. which are common to two or more constituents in the aesthetic situation. We have already seen the commonness of feeling between the poet and the *sahṛdaya*. The characters described in literature are common to several readers or spectators. *Rasa* is thus a common or shared experience. The etymology of the word *sādhāraṇīkaraṇa* (*abhūta-tadbhāve cviḥ*) is self-explanatory. What is not common is made to become common. The imaginative experience of the poet, as well as the experience of characters as fashioned by him and that of the actors who represent these and of the spectators or readers are all strictly speaking non-common or different; but they are made common as it were, by the magic power of art. This power inherent in art is, strictly speaking, one aspect (*aṁśa*) only like the other two aspects mentioned, viz., rhetorical (*abhīdhā*) and delighting (*bhojakatva*) of a unitary *kāvya*—*vyāpāra*.

“In poetry which involves a threefold functional aspect of language. viz., denotation, evocation and delectation. . .”<sup>31</sup>

is Abhinava's citation. As in Mīmāṃsā injunctions or prohibitions i. e. do's and don't's, are the results of the power called *bhāvanā* inherent in scriptural

30. suvidagdha-pramā kāvyam pramāṇam sarvameva naḥ/  
sva-prakāśa-rasāsvāda-pramiti-prabhavaṁ yataḥ//  
rasasya jñānarūpatvaṁ tādātmyāditi vakṣyate/  
na cāpramā rasa-jñānaṁ śuktau rajata-dhīriva//  
tasmin na jāyate bādho yasmādauttarakālikāḥ// —Loc. cit.

31. “abhīdhā-bhāvanā-rasacarvaṇātmake'pi tryaṁśe kāvye” —*Locana*, Madras, p. 273. Cf. also *Abhinavabhāratī*, I (GOS), p. 277 for full citation of the verse.



statements, so too the *rasas* like *śṛṅgāra* are the results of the *bhāvanā*—*vyāpāra* indigenous to *kāvya*. Since *kāvya* is a conscious creation of a poet, the *kāvya-vyāpāra* of *bhāvanā* ultimately means *kavi-vyāpāra* only. The *sahṛdaya*-oriented *vyāpāra* has been separately called *bhojakatva*; and hence *bhāvakatva* cannot be *sahṛdaya*'s. By the same token, it cannot be ascribed to the character (*anukārya*) created by the poet or the actor (*anukartr*) who represents him. We are left only with the creative agent, the poet and his *pratibhāvyāpāra* oriented to *rasa*; this alone comes to be designated *bhāvakatva*.

It is this *bhāvakatva*, and none other, which is held to be synonymous with *sādhāraṇīkaraṇa*. The noncommon is made commonly shareable. By whom? Obviously, by the poet's imaginative and creative activity. The love and suffering of Rāma and Sītā, when treated thematically, are regarded as *vibhāvas* etc. of *sthāyībhāvas*, viz., *rati*, *śoka* etc. No one, not even the poet, has seen the actual life-emotions of these legendary persons. He only imagines them and gives them a coherent form in his work. In the former state (*laukika*), we have only causes, associates, etc. of mental states. But in their imagined state (*alaukika*), they are re-designated as *vibhāva*, *anubhāva*, etc., of *sthāyībhāva*. That means once again that they come to have an existential status only when they are imaginatively conceived and artistically objectified by a poet. These can be shared now by any number of readers or spectators. *Vibhāvas* etc. are thus *sādhāraṇīkṛta* or rendered shareable by one and all *sahṛdayas*, transcending the boundaries of even time and space :

“By the function called *bhāvakatva* whose essence lies in making *vibhāvas* etc. commonly shared”<sup>32</sup>

is Abhinava's summary of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka's position. In a way, they might become archetypal or typical human conditions with arrested movement as in Keats's Grecian Urn in the Ode. But is this exactly “universalization” in the logical sense? I don't think so. When the poet has not seen even the particular, what can he universalize? Dhanañjaya's explanation of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka is imprecise, leading to this confusion among scholars :

“Words like Sītā denote only a woman in general, divested of particular attributes like being daughter of Janaka, etc.”<sup>33</sup>

The right interpretation is indicated by Simha-bhūpāla in his *Rasārṇava-sudhākara* :<sup>34</sup>

Particular attributes so divested are only the ones that might obstruct the reader's self-identification with the character (viz., Sītā here), such as “being the daughter of Janaka”, “being the wife of Rāma” etc. (and not the other ones which are unobstructive). Individual attributes such as “being

32. “vibhāvādi-sādhāraṇīkaraṇātmanā bhāvakatva-vyāpāreṇa” —Loc. cit.

33. Sītādi-śabdāḥ parityakta-Janaka-tanayādi-viśeṣāḥ strī-mātra-vācināḥ —*Daśarūpaka*, IV. 40.

34. Janaka-tanayātva-Rāma-parigrahaṭvādi-viruddha-dharma-parihāreṇa lalitojjvala-śucī-darśanīyatvādi-viśiṣṭa eva...Sītādi-vibhāvo yoṣitsāmānyaṁ tādṛśameva jñāpayati, na punaḥ strī-jati-mātram. —*Rasārṇavasudhākara*, Ed. T. Venkatacharya, Adyar, 1979, p. 299.

endowed with grace, liveliness, chastity, winsomeness, etc.”, are indeed very much present in the denotation of the word in question. A character-stimulant such as *Sitā* calls forth to our mind only a particular woman endowed with such unobstructive epithets, and *not* the genus of all women.

### III

Now let us turn to Abhinavagupta. He could take over Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka's findings, lock, stock and barrel, because both were Kashmir Śaivas.<sup>35</sup> But he does not accept the *kāvya-vyāpāra* of *bhāvakatva* or *sādhāraṇīkarana*, since in his poetics *vyañjanā-vyāpāra* is a better substitute for both *bhāvakatva* and *bhojakatva*. Abhinavagupta's *sādhāraṇīkarana* is only an implication contained in poetic suggestion or manifestation, and not its whole nature. All his accounts of *sākṣātkāra* (intuitive actualization), *camatkāra* (esoteric flash), *bhogāveśa*, (afflatus of enjoyment), *eka-ghana-samvit*, (consciousness absolute), etc. are couched in terms common to Kashmir Śaivism and aesthetics, used repeatedly for the first time by Abhinava. The corrupt reading of the available *Abhinavabhāratī* on *sādhāraṇīkarana* cannot permit any ready translation unless the whole background is grasped. The passage in question is—Hence it is that commonness is not limited at all, but quite unlimited. This is even like the relation of invariable concomitance between the syllogistic probans, viz., smoke and the probandum, viz, fire. Or it may be compared with the invariable relation between a stimulus like fear and its response like a shiver. Towards this apparently “intuitive actualization”, the whole paraphernalia of actors etc. on the stage is contributory. When, in a dramatic performance, all limiting factors like place, time and cogniser, both real and poetically conceived, become completely annihilated because of their mutual opposition, the aforesaid state of “commonness” alone will stand out. Hence it is that the common experience of all connoisseurs adds up to a perfect state of *rasa*.<sup>36</sup>

The context is of fear becoming a *rasa* in the connoisseur while witnessing the scene of the hunted deer in *Śakuntala* etc., as described by Kālidāsa.

It should be very clearly noted that the word used here is *sādhāraṇyam* and *sādhāraṇī-bhāva* but *not* *sādhāraṇīkarana*. It is a state of unlimited extension even like the relation of invariable concomitance between the probans and the probandum. The actors on the stage etc. only contribute to the spectacle taking the form of a self-actualization. It is not any outside

35. Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka's faith in Śakti theology is clear in a citation from him in Abhinava's commentary on the *Parā-trimśikā*, p. 47:—

napuṃsakamidaṃ nāma parabrahma phalet kiyat/  
tat-pauruṣa-niyoktā cenna syāt tacchakti-sundarī//

36. Cf. *tata eva na parimītam eva sādhāraṇyam; api tu vitatam. Vyāptigraha iva dhūmāgnyoḥ, bhaya-kampayorvā; tadatra sākṣātkārāyamāṇatve paripoṣikā naṭādi-sāmagri. Yasyām vastu-satām kāvyārptitūnām ca deśakāla-pramātrādinām niyamahetūnām anyonya-pratibandha-balād atyantam apasaraṇe sa eva sādhāraṇībhāvaḥ sutarām puṣyati. Ata eva sarvasāmājikānām ekaghanatayaiva pratipattiḥ sutarām rasa-paripoṣāya.*

*Abhinavabhāratī*, Vol. I (GOS), p. 279.

object like a deer they perceive. They realize within themselves the very mental state of fear in all its depth. The conditioning elements of an object-consciousness like time, space and subject are totally annihilated by reason of their mutual cancellation (*anyonya-pratibandha*); and the resultant, which is divested of all elements of individuality, shines out in its general form only. That is why all the spectators beget a singularly unified identical awareness and this adds exceedingly to the nourishment of *rasa*.

This is my translation of the passage in question. I have not found it necessary to bring in "universalization" of any kind. As the further exposition of Abhinava reveals, he is at pains to adduce a number of reasons to establish the fact that (self-repose *samvid-viśrānti*), the very core of *rasa* cannot be attained by stopping short of anything secondary, (*apradhāna*), the only primal entity in his idealistic philosophy being the undifferentiated Self or Absolute; and all *sthāyins* are in essence aspects of this inmost self. Again, they are practically conceded to assume prominence for the time being by their serving as means to the recognised *puruṣārthas* only. Nothing unimportant to the Inner Self can usher in *rasa* is the argument.

Finally, I shall now set forth the relevant passages from Abhinava's philosophical works which throw light on what he means by *sādhārāṇabhāva* :

A taster of a sweet recipe, etc., is rightly so designated only because he enjoys chiefly the aspect of his own inmost self-delight while judging the given recipe in the form : "this tastes exactly this way", a form totally other than that of a tasteless glutton.

Even in the case of plays and poems, etc., the separate identity (of the perceiver and the perceived) is totally superceded and only pleasure is tasted, because the joy of *rasas* like the erotic is very much unlike that of sensual joy—all impediments incidental to the attainment of the latter in mundane life being overcome in the former—and is nothing but self-repose inherent in the very attitude of the percipient himself when he is freed from the tentacles of all intruding impediments and is designated by different names such as tasting, chewing, and supreme gratification.

Therefore, it is also called *sahridayatā* (lit, common-heartedness) since it is predominantly a function of the heart or repose in the experiential aspect (*parāmarśa*) of the perceiver *qua* perceiver. The objective aspect of it, though present in the object perceived, is ignored for the nonce. Thus such mental states as are entirely free from impediments and yield always a very delectable taste, and that too, only during the state of aesthetic contemplation, are but nine. As this idea has been explained at length by us in our *Abhinavabhāratī*, a commentary on the *Nāṭya-Śāstra*, inquisitive readers might refer to it for further details.

..While one is tasting a sweet recipe, etc., there is the marginal intrusion of the sense of touch (by the tongue) ; but while one tastes a poem or a play, even that gross sense-intrusion disappears. Yet a subtle trace of it in the form

of mental impression is discernible even there. But there are percipients who are capable of transcending the impeding aspect of even that mental impression; and they indeed experience supreme delight by acute alertness in overcoming the subtlest impediments (in the way of *rasa*)<sup>37</sup>

In this self documented summary of his idea of *rasa*, Abhinava explains how a glutton's eating of food differs from that of a gourmet – taster. The glutton is attentive to the food object outside; but the taster is inattentive to it, though it is present (this is technically called *vyavadhānā*); but the latter is most attentive to its taste within himself. In poetry and drama too the feeling of separate identity (*anyathābhāva*) is overshadowed and only the taste of joy remains. In empirical life there is the inevitable pull of activities for securing desired ends. This obstacle is transcended by becoming a spectator, and hence the joy in seeing a drama is different from sensual joy. Here again, the joy is nothing but self-repose. The word *sa-hṛdaya* means etymologically one who can find joy within himself. The seen objective entity is ignored by him; he is concentrated in attending only to spiritual joy.

In relishing the flavour of sweetness, the sense of touch is a marginal intruder (*vyavadhāna*), which is superceded to reach the relishing self within. This gross intrusion of sense-object is absent in poetry and drama: yet the mental impressions of these may remain as marginal intruders there also. Only those who can ignore them and turn their full attention to the relishing self within, do indeed attain supreme delight:

While in Advaita Vedānta the self within is just passive though *sva-prakāśa* in Śivādvaita of Kashmir, *vimarśa* or *parāmarśa* is real as Śiva's inseparable *śakti*. So in Śaṅkara's thought *bhoga-virāga* is a pre-condition for self-realisation. But in Abhinava *bhoga* itself in its intensity can be enjoyed in the spirit of a released soul, i. e., transmuted into *mokṣa*.

The words *Anyathābhāva*, *Vyavadhāna*, their transcendence or neglect (*anādara*) and inward directed attention (*avadhāna*) are, all technical terms and nowhere is the implication of "universality" in the modern sense present in all this, as it can be easily seen.

True, *sādhāranya* is mentioned in connection with the *vyavadhāna*-

37. Cf. madhurāḍau rase audarikābhyavahāra-vailakṣaṇyena pravṛtta idaṁ itthamiti pramātari viśrāmayan pramātṛ-bhāgameva prādhānyatayā vimṛśan bhuñjāna iti ucyate. Yatrāpi atyantam anyathābhāvaṁ atikramya sukhaṁ āsvādyate, arjanādi-sambhāvya-māna-vighnāntara-nirāsat vaiṣayikānanda-vilakṣaṇe śṛṅgārāḍau nāṭya-kāvya-ādi-viśaye, tatra vīta-vighnatvādeva asau rasanā-carvaṇā-nirvṛtiḥ pratītiḥ pramātrtā-viśrāntireva. Tata eva hṛdayena parāmarśa-lakṣaṇena prādhānyāt vyapadeśya-vyavasthithiḥ syāpi prakāśa-bhāgasya vedya-viśrāntatayā anādarānāt saḥṛdayatā ucyate iti nirvighnāḥ svāda-rūpāśca rasanā-tadgocarikāryāścitta-vṛttayo rasā nava ityayaṁ-artho 'bhinava-bhāratyāṁ nāṭya-veda-vivṛtau vitatya vyutpādito' smābhiriti tat-kutūhalī tām eva avalokayet.

madhurādi-rasāsvāde tu viśaya-sparśa-vyavadhānam; tato'pi kāvyanāṭyāḍau taḍ-vyavadhāna-sūnyatā. Tad-vyavadhāna-saṁskārānuvedhastu tatrāpi; te tathodita-vyavadhānāṁśa-tiraskriyā-sāvadhāna-hṛdayāḥ labhanta eva paramānandam.

*Īśvara-pratyabhijñā-vivṛti-vimarśinī*, Vol. II, pp. 180-181.

*tirodhāna* or *vighna-nirāsa*. This is a corollary of the rule that private and personal attitudes in empirical life must be consciously or unconsciously shed. Those who cannot shed them are not *sahṛdayas*; and they cannot attain *rasa* which is a spiritual experience. Abhinava's classification of ego-centric associations in empirical life, positive and negative, under just three heads—mine or my friend's, my enemy's and an unconcerned one's—may be imperfect, but that cannot vitiate the main argument that the aesthetic attitude ignores the empirical attitude, even if it be marginally present. Nor does it substantiate "universalization" of any kind.

Even the ancient commentator on *Kāvya-prakāśa*<sup>38</sup> who is aware of Abhinava's tradition, viz., Bhaṭṭa Gopāla, explains Abhinava's theory by alluding to passages from *Spanda-kārikā* of Kallaṭa (14-16) and *Īśvara-pratyabhijñā* (I. V. 15).<sup>39</sup> A much later author, Vidyābhūṣaṇa (c. 1550 A. D.) states in his *Sāhitya-kaumudī* that the function in question belongs to *vibhāvādis* and that its nature is to effect oneness of the connoisseur with them.<sup>40</sup>

I shall conclude this paper by referring to two more passages, from the *Abhinavabhāratī*. One is his comment on *Nāṭyaśāstra*<sup>41</sup>

Since a play is to be seen by one in the company of (the members of his family like) father, son, daughter-in-law, mother-in-law, etc., all the obscenities mentioned should be avoided with effort.<sup>41</sup>

If obscene things were allowed, says Abhinava :-

*rasa* would be destroyed,<sup>42</sup>

Why ? The answer is—

The vital essence of *rasa* depends on common shareability of experience as pointed out repeatedly by me;<sup>43</sup>

Can this common shareability by any chance refer to "universalization" ? This idea is repeated in the *Tantrāloka* also<sup>44</sup> It is more like 'aesthetic distance' which provides for both "involvement" and "detachment". One is psychologically involved, though practically detached and impersonal.

For want of space, I could not enter into details regarding the precise implication of *bhāva* etc. I just draw your attention to one pithy comment. This is on Bhāṭa's text (XXV. 41)<sup>45</sup>

38. *Kāvya-prakāśa*, IV. 4-5.

39. Ed. R. P. Dvivedi, Varanasi, 1981, p. 121

40. Cf. śaktirasti vibhāvādeḥ kāpi sādharmaṇīkṛtiḥ |  
pramātā tadabhedena svarṇa yayā pratipadyate ||

—Meerut Vishvavidyalaya-Saṁskṛta-śodha-patrikā, Jan-Dec. 1980, p. 75.

41. pitā-putra-snuṣā-śvaśrū-dr̥śyaṁ yasmāttu nāṭakam |  
tasmādetāni sarvāṇi varjanīyāni yatnataḥ ||—Loc. cit.

42. tataśca raso bhajyeta—Loc. cit.

43. Sa hi sādharmaṇyo'nyonyānupraveśa-prāṇa iti pratipadam vadāmaḥ—Loc. cit.

44. X. V. 85 ff.

One's own experience is *bhāva* while experience arising on seeing another is *vibhāva*.<sup>45</sup>

Abhinava comments :

To those who are forgetful by nature, the author is indicating by way of a telling analogy the exact nature of emotion (*bhāva*), stimulant (*vibhāva*) and ensuant (*anubhāva*). That experience which is personally lived through, e. g., pleasure and pain, is *bhāva*. The word *ātma* or "personal" here rules out categorically the experiencing of things like a pot from the province of *bhāva*.<sup>46</sup>

And that is his last word on the subject.

The main thrust of this paper is to expose how Abhinava has been more often than not misunderstood by modern scholars. *Sādhāraṇīkaraṇa* is not a differentia of *rasa*; it is only a half-way house leading to the destination of *rasa* proper. Even if it be subjected to a critique and found inadequate, it cannot affect the validity of the theory of *rasa* which rests on the unshakable foundation of the ever-blissful self, allowing us glimpses of its ecstasy in the state of deep poetic response. Rightly understood, his philosophy grounded on the bed-rock of "spiritual pre-conscious," transmuting a finite conscious being (*parimita-pramāṭr*) into an infinite subject of all-consciousness (*aparimitapramāṭr*), if I can borrow a phrase from Maritain, remains relevant to modern literature also.

45. *ātmānubhavanam bhāvo vibhāvaḥ paradarśanam*—Loc. cit.

46. *atha vismarāṇaśīlān prati śṛṅga-grāhikayā bhāva-vibhāvānubhāva-svarūpaṁ darśayati 'ātmānubhavanam bhāva ityādi, Ātma-viśrāntam yadanubhavanam sukha-duḥkha-saṁvid-rūpaṁ sa bhāvaḥ ityarthah. Ātma-grahaṇāt ghaṭādyanubhavanam na bhāvaḥ ityuktaṁ bhavati.*—Loc. cit.

## **“Catharsis and Rasa”**

C. N. PATEL

Catharsis and *rasa* are related concepts, in that they seek to explain the central feature of all aesthetic experience, namely, that it is so basically different from ordinary experience that, whatever the subject or object which stimulates it, it is always pleasurable. This feature of aesthetic experience arrests attention with striking vividness in our response to tragedy in which emotions which would be painful in real life are so transformed as to excite a pleasurable thrill ending in a feeling akin to “The still sad music of humanity” to which the beauty of nature opened Wordsworth’s ears. Aristotle, the first systematic literary critic in the West, called this process catharsis. He did not define the term and there has been a long discussion among critics and students of poetry about what he may have meant. Similarly, in the Indian tradition, too, Bharata, the first systematic writer on poetics, merely mentions how *rasa* is generated without explaining what he means by *rasa* and how it differs from the pleasurable emotions of ordinary experience. Later writers took up the concept and made it the subject of an absorbing speculation about the nature of aesthetic experience.

Though Western and Indian writers on poetic experience thus deal with the same problem, their treatment of the subject differs completely from each other’s. The difference springs from a more fundamental difference between the two philosophical attitudes, the transcendental and the empirical. The former looks upon the waking state as an aspect of a larger reality not accessible in full to that state, whereas the latter confines itself to man’s experience in the waking state, and even when it concerns itself, as it does in some areas of modern psychology, with unconscious or subconscious levels of the human psyche which reveal themselves in dream experiences, it seeks to understand those experiences in terms of standards and principles derived from the waking state. The Western philosophical tradition oscillates between these two poles, Plato being the typical representative of the transcendental pole and Aristotle of the empirical. Indian tradition remained anchored to the transcendental framework and produced no thinker corresponding to the figure of Aristotle in the West.

This difference in approach reflected itself in the field of aesthetics. The transcendental view regards the experience of beauty as a reflection on the human plane of a spiritual state, whereas the empirical view of it regards it as one expression of man’s emotional nature to be understood in terms of its other expressions. Plato, however, did not extend this aesthetic principle to the experience of poetry or the arts. On the contrary, he regarded them as obstacles to the realization of pure truth and spiritual freedom. Western poetics, beginning with Aristotle, has developed in reply to this view of Plato.

The theory of catharsis is part of that reply. The Indian theory of *rasa* also is a reply to the Platonic view, though not intended as such, for no argument corresponding to Plato's was advanced by any writer in India. The two replies differ from each other, in that the Aristotelian reply shifts the argument from the transcendental to the empirical, normal human plane whereas the Indian reply is on the purest transcendental plane.

Plato had indicted art on two grounds. First, art is an imitation of the phenomenal world of appearances which, in turn, is an imperfect copy of reality. Art therefore is twice removed from truth. Secondly, art strengthens man's emotional nature and thereby weakens the rational principle in the human soul which alone can give true knowledge. In other words, art, in the language of Indian philosophy, strengthens man's bondage to the world of *māyā* both intellectually and emotionally. Aristotle's reply seems to be that poetry represents individual facts not in themselves but in their general, universal significance and is therefore more philosophical than history, and further that it purifies man's emotional nature. Catharsis refers to this process of emotional purification. There has been a long argument among critics whether Aristotle meant catharsis as a medical metaphor in the sense of purgation of excessive emotional impulses, or whether he simply meant by it the psychological process of purification of the emotions of pity and fear of their selfish elements. But the point is not really important. Probably Aristotle himself had no clear idea of what he meant by the term catharsis. He uses it in an earlier treatise, *Politics*, to describe the effect of certain kinds of music on persons overcome by religious frenzy, saying that he will explain the term in another work. But Aristotle gives no such explanation in *Poetics*. Whatever meaning Aristotle attached to catharsis, it is clear that he had in mind not any benefit of poetry in man's spiritual quest, but its effect on his conduct in ordinary human affairs. In the language of the Indian tradition, Aristotle was interested in the effect of poetry on man's behaviour in the world of *vyavahāra* and not on his pursuit of *paramārtha*. Even his stress on the philosophical content of poetry refers to the general significance of concrete individual facts grasped by the intellect and not to the intuitive perception of the eternal forms or ideas of Plato's vision of divine truth.

The Indian theory of *rasa* is a more satisfying reply to the Platonic position. It unequivocally asserts that art is a means of spiritual experience and gives one a taste of the bliss of divine realization. In the moments of artistic enjoyment the consciousness of the individual transcends its sense of separate identity, becomes *sādhāraṇa* or pure human consciousness in a state of being watching the world of becoming without being involved in it. In other words, *jīva* ceases to feel itself as a *kartā* and has a momentary glimpse of its true state as the *ātman*, the *anumantā*, *upadrṣṭā* and *bhoktā* of the *Bhagavad-Gītā*. The Upaniṣadic view of reality asserts that all pain and sorrow are the consequence of self-forgetfulness, of the individual consciousness feeling itself alienated from the universal consciousness which is its source. In the enjoyment of art, this alienation is overcome and the individual's



consciousness feels the bliss of its union with its source. This bliss is the most ecstatic in our response to an artistic representation of tragedy, whether in drama or any other literary genre, because fear is the most basic emotion of the alienated consciousness and tragedy helps us to face that existential fact and rise above it.

Aristotle saw this truth, but only partially. According to him, tragedy effects the catharsis of the emotions of fear and pity, but by fear he means only the fear aroused by events in the lives of certain types of individuals. In giving this explanation of the cause of fear, Aristotle ignores the religious background of Greek drama. The latter was a collective experience in the form of an annual ritual representing certain mythic events or legends embodying the fear of the whole race, namely, the fear of invisible forces inflicting inexplicable calamities on man. All Greek tragedies are pervaded by a sense of doom or inescapable fate. The Greek mind seems to have been profoundly troubled by a sense of the hostility or indifference of the gods to man, and the Greek drama was a ritual representation of this collective fear so as to overcome it. Indian aestheticians also stress the special significance of *karuṇa rasa* and its transformation into *śānta rasa*. The Indian mind, though not troubled by the destructive aspect of the gods and goddesses, was profoundly convinced that all life was sorrow and suffering. In dramatic art, sorrow and suffering lost their painfulness and subsided into a sense of pleasurable calm.

How did art perform this miracle? Neither Western nor Indian writers answer this question directly, though they do indicate the lines along which the solution may be sought. Aristotle stresses the importance of unified structure in tragedy and of rhythm and harmony in its language, and Bharata says categorically that *rasa* is produced by the *saṃyoga* or harmonious representation of the three types of *bhāvas*, *vibhāvas* *vyabhicāribhāvas* and *anubhāvas*. Both, it seems, refer to the same feature of creative act, namely, apprehension and representation of pattern and order in the flow of experience. Aristotle stresses the unity and order of the whole material of the dramatic representation, while Bharata refers to the unified perception of every component unit in the total series of events constituting the drama. What is important in both is the fact of apprehension of unity in the diverse elements in the matter of representation. This apprehension is an act of the imagination, through which both the artist and the spectators participate in the divine power of creation. The basic fact of the universe is the creation of order at all levels of reality, from the microscopic world of discrete atoms formed by patterns of electromagnetic waves, to the telescopic world of stars and galaxies, from the unicellular world of germ-plasm to the infinitely complex structure of the human body and the still greater miracle of the human mind. In artistic creation man, created, according to the Bible, in the image of his Maker, exercises for his pleasure through self-expression the same power that has created the universe. The *pratibhā* which creates

ever new artistic forms, *navanavollekhaśālīnī prajñā*, is a manifestation in the individual consciousness of the power of universal self which said “*ekoham bahu syām.*” According to the English the poet-critic Coleridge, the imagination which creates art and poetry is a repetition in the finite mind of the Infinite “I am.” The Infinite “I am,” according to the Upaniṣad, is *rasa*, “*raso vai saḥ,*” and the *kavi* and the *bhāvaka*, by imitating the creative act of that “I am” share in his *rasa*.

Confronted with this explanation of the pleasure of poetry and art, Plato would probably have asked, how can we be sure that this *rasa* of poetic enjoyment is the *rasa* of momentary participation in spiritual being and not merely an *ābhāsa* of it? Judged by the conduct in life of men in love with the pleasure of poetry and the arts, do the effects of poetic enjoyment seem spiritually beneficial? It is a challenging question to lovers of art, particularly to the advocates of “art for art’s sake” doctrine.

## Appendix-I

# The Relevance of Sanskrit Poetics to Contemporary Practical Criticism \*

UMASHANKAR JOSHI

I am aware of the honour the authorities of the Asiatic Society of Bombay have done me by inviting me to preside over the function, for the award of medals to three outstanding scholars for their service in Oriental Research. If I did not hesitate to accept the invitation, even though not qualified as an Oriental Researcher, it was just with a view to paying my humble homage to the Bombay Asiatic Society, which has become during the past 175 years of its existence almost a legend in the academic life of our country.

While conveying that I could choose any date in April or May, the invitation letter carried a post-script that in case May 7 was convenient to me, my address would be termed Kane Memorial Lecture as that date coincided with the birthdate of the great scholar.

The moment I agreed to speak on the seventh of May, in order to be able to honour the memory of MM. P. V. Kane, the subject of my lecture had almost suggested itself. It could be one related to either of his loves, Sanskrit Poetics or Dharma Śāstra. It seems, you have only to be well-meaning to find yourself in deeper and deeper waters. I like to play with the idea that I should rather have spoken on Dharma Śāstra, if only because it is always far easier to speak on a subject, the complexities of which one is not sufficiently aware of. Knowing full well as I do, how the field of Sanskrit Poetics bristles with problems and even conundrums which would require in-depth philosophical, metaphysical, psychological, linguistic and literary, study that should have been the last thing for me to get involved in. But I hazarded it, my purpose being a limited and specific one, that of investigating how far those of us, who are interested today in the critical activity in the various languages of India, can benefit from the ideas and tools made available by ancient Indian writers on Poetics.

Perhaps it is more than a hazard inasmuch as I can hardly claim to be a regular student of Sanskrit Poetics or of Philosophy, of which Poetics forms a legitimate part. Even though I might have to stray far, sometime perilously far, into these fields, my main concern will be with the possible enrichment of the contemporary critical activity. And in that context, I feel, lies the hope for Sanskrit Poetics to survive. If it is not to be studied by a few specialists of a past cultural phase only and is to form a part of mankind's living knowledge, it is only by proving itself to be a rich resource to practising critics in the various languages. that Sanskrit Poetics can flourish as a

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\* Lecture delivered at the Asiatic Society of Bombay on 7th May 1980.

body of dynamic ideas. Even if those ideas are not frequently invoked, it would be enough if they are at the back of the mind; for that too is a use. If I put stress on the need for the awareness of the seminal ideas of Sanskrit Poetics, it is more with an eye on the sharpening of aesthetic sensibility and equipping the mind with the capacity for discerning beauty in whatsoever manner it manifests itself in a literary work. It seems the study of Sanskrit Poetics has reached a stage where we can take stock of things, define fresh needs in terms of the pursuit of knowledge and try to visualize how possibly the ideas of the Ācāryas—great writers of treatises on Poetics can be best availed of.

Our current critical endeavour has to keep pace with that in the Western world, as our creative writing during the past hundred and fifty years or so has been, by and large, under the influence of the West. We have freely borrowed genres, models and techniques from Western literature. While our critical writings mainly follow Western norms, the critical terminology employed by us is, as it would be in the nature of things, more or less borrowed from the works of the ancient Ācāryas. Terms like 'aucitya', 'vakrokti', 'rīti', 'upamā', 'rūpaka', 'sahrdaya', 'dhvani' and the most enigmatic of them all 'rasa', along with 'rasānubhava', 'rasāsvāda' are freely used, most of them not always strictly in the sense in which the Ācāryas used them.

In fact, we are in a fortunate position. We have at our disposal the whole critical usage of the West, which has relevance to our modern creative writing, and we also have a rich critical tradition of our own from which, at least, we pick up terms in howsoever a casual manner. It is open to us to make a comparative study of the two traditions and forge a critical apparatus and a critical idiom which would meet the present need for enjoying and evaluating literary works of any age or language.

Let me hasten to add at the very outset that such a comparative study is beset with great difficulties. The ideas and the technical terms used are rooted in different cultural milieus. One such term is 'Tragedy'. In order to make *Sākuntalam* a tragedy, the ringing down of the curtain at the end of the fifth act will not do. Tragedy is a concept, interwoven with the fabric of Greek life and is totally unknown to Indian culture. One should take care not to be taken in with apparent or superficial similarities. Take the term 'metaphor' in Aristotle. Prof. D. R. Mankad argues how the metaphor is usually referred to in India as 'rūpaka', but it might be sometimes a 'samāsokti' as in 'unbridled rage'.<sup>1</sup> It is said : metaphor is implied simile. Aristotle considers it by far the best gift of the poet—his ability to find similitude in dissimilar things. The Ācāryas look upon *upamā*—simile as the greatest gift of a poet and Kālidāsa the greatest poet is accredited with the best use of the simile, which is normally described as *sādharmyam*—similitude, sharing of the same

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1. D. R. Mankad, *Kāvyaivivecana* (Gujarati), Vallabha Vidyanagar, Charutar Prakashana. 1949, p. 116.

properties. Instead of getting bogged down into details of nomenclature or semantic quibblings, it would be worthwhile to look rather for the informing aesthetic principle. The sagacious Hemacandrācārya calls the simile '*hrdyam sādharmyam*'—pleasurable (heart-pleasing) similitude, and this should lead us to the modern exploring of the link of analogy in feeling.

Even if the concept of tragedy is foreign to India, and the 'tragic' is not exactly '*karuṇa-rasa*,' there is an aesthetic principle which is common to both. Plato talked of 'tragic pleasure' (Philebus, 47-8). Aristotle says that tragedy does not depress one, it raises the spirits of men.<sup>2</sup> The Sanskrit writers (except Rāmacandra-and-Guṇacandra) have constantly maintained that Pathos (the *karuṇa-rasa*) also pleases, that all *rasas* are dominated by pleasure, that all art-experience ends in beatitude.

Every critic who deals with a poem has to keep in his view the trinity of (1) the poet, (2) the poem, and (3) the reader. Where does he actually start from? Perhaps he thinks he starts from the second—the poem itself. But, what is a poem? Is it just a piece of paper with marks of ink on it or a video-tape? Valery said, "It is the reading of the Poem that is the Poem".<sup>3</sup> In other words, it is in somebody's experience of poem that 'the poem' becomes itself. So, the critic, while dealing with a poem, has always to start with the third—the reader, himself, i.e. his own experience of the poem. The Sanskrit writers on Poetics, especially those who testify to *rasa*, could not be more right. One can speak about the poem and even the poet only after one's experience of the poem.

It is surprising that no less an expert on Sanskrit poetics than the late S. K. De should chide the Ācāryas for their preoccupation with the understanding of the nature of art-experience. He says,<sup>4</sup> "...they consider the problem indirectly and imperfectly from the standpoint of the readers and not directly and completely from that of the poet", and adds, "they are concerned mainly with the question of the reader's reproduction but not of the poet's production". But, there is no way of dealing with the poet's production but through the reader's reproduction. Even if the poet himself chooses to say something about his production, outside of the production itself, he cannot be treated as a final authority. His account would be one of many such accounts available from discerning readers and the final authority has to be the critic himself engaged in the task of judging it aesthetically.

However, it is not correct to say that the Ācāryas have neglected the problem of poetic creation. In fact, their concern with it is interconnected with their concern with the problem of poetic experience. For, when the *rasa-sūtra* '*vibhāvānubhāva-vyabhicāri-samyogād rasa-niṣpattiḥ*' lays down

2. Aristotle, The Works of Aristotle Vol. II, William Benton, Publisher, Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., 1952, p. 688.

3. Paul Valery, "A Course in Poetics: First Lesson," Southern Review, 5 (Winter 1940), p. 409.

4. S. K. De, Sanskrit Poetics as a Study of Aesthetics, Oxford University Press, 1963, p. 74.

that art experience is the result of the co-mingling rather compounding of the *vibhāvas* (the characters and the environment), *anubhāvas* (the bodily manifestations of emotions) and *vyabhicāri-bhāvas* (temporary states or emotions feeding the dominant emotion), it has already hinted at the process of the poetic creation as well. For example, the *vibhāvas*, the hero, the heroine and other characters and the environment, the situation and events that follow—all should be adequate if the work is to satisfy as a work of beauty.

If one looks at how a competent modern critic of the stature of T. S. Eliot gropes for neatly articulating what involves the creative process, one would feel grateful to the Ācāryas for having given a clear and authentic description of it. Eliot has a difficulty with 'Hamlet.' He lays the blame at the door of Shakespeare's creative faculty and suggests that we are let down by it. Somewhere it falters, he feels, and locates it in the poet's inability to discover, to use Indian terminology, an appropriate or adequate *vibhāva*. Let us hear him as he struggles to articulate it with the help of the, by now, popular phrase 'Objective Correlative,' which, incidentally, was, not his coinage but was first used in 1850 by Washington Elston in his 'Lectures on Art'—a fact later acknowledged by Eliot also. Eliot says: "The only way of expressing emotion in the form of art is by finding an, 'objective correlative', in other words, a set of objects, a situation, a chain of events which shall be the formula of that *particular* emotion such that when the external facts, which must terminate in sensory experience, are given, the emotion is immediately evoked."<sup>5</sup>

Eliot succeeds in formulating the need for finding *vibhāvas*, commensurate with the original emotion, which is to be expressed in the form of art. Thus far his account of the process of poetic creation is correct and finds support in the words of the Ācāryas. But he is on no sure ground if he means that the *Vibhāvas* when presented will evoke the same emotion in the mind of the reader or the spectator, for the emotion while being presented through the medium of the 'Objective Correlative,' the *vibhāvas*, has suffered a sea-change. It is now no more the original emotion. (This is one example of how the fullest understanding of the reader's art-experience is necessary for a proper understanding of the creative process). Valery knew better. He alerts us, "We must contrast as clearly as possible poetic emotion with ordinary emotion."<sup>6</sup>

Valery's statement of the creative and reproductive processes (for it aims possibly at covering both) comes very near to the truth of the matter. He says that a sort of a 'sense of a universe' is characteristic of poetry and adds: "I said: sense of a universe. I meant that the poetic state or emotion seems to me to consist in a dawning perception, a tendency toward perceiving a *world*, or complete system of relations, in which beings, things, events and acts, although

5. T. S. Eliot, *Selected Essays*, Faber and Faber Ltd., London, 1953, p. 145.

6. Paul Valery, *The Art of Poetry*, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1958, p. 179.

they may resemble each to each, those which fill and form the tangible world—the immediate world from which they are borrowed—stand, however, in an indefinable, but wonderfully accurate, relationship to the modes and laws of our general sensibility. So, the value of those well-known objects and beings is in some way altered. They respond to each other and combine quite otherwise than in ordinary conditions.”<sup>7</sup>

Kuntaka, who flourished in the tenth century, refers to the veiling of the real nature of objects (*samācchādita-svabhāvāḥ*), when they are presented, by a sudden inspiration, in the poet's imaginative world. He adds that when this special predicament (*tathāvidha-viśeṣa*) finds a masterly utterance in words, it becomes a thing of wondrous beauty to the mind.

It was Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka who had, a century before Kuntaka, enunciated the idea of generalised emotion (*sādhāranīkaraṇa*), which proved to be the greatest aid in unlocking the meaning of the *rasa*-theory. It showed how the aesthetic consciousness resulted when objects or beings were visualised not as related to the immediate tangible world, but in a generalised, i.e. universal manner.

Valery almost suggests this when he says that the poetic state or emotion occurs when the values of the objects and beings of the world are altered because of their relationship to the laws of our general sensibility, i.e. when they cease to have personal or individual interest and appear in a generalised, universal way. Eliot also hints at the same thing when he talks of an escape from personality.

Abhinavagupta and his *guru* Bhaṭṭa Tauta say that this poetic emotion or aesthetic consciousness or *rasa* is primarily of the poet. The actor on the stage as well as the spectator or the reader of the work consequently attain it. The generalised consciousness pertaining to the poet (*kavi-gata-sādhāranībhūta-samvit*) alone is in reality *rasa* (*paramārthataḥ rasaḥ*).

So, those who appreciate the work of a poet need an equal measure of genius. Rājaśekhara calls the creative genius '*kārayitṛi pratibhā*' and the appreciative genius '*bhāvayitṛi pratibhā*.' One, who experiences the work of art, has to re-live the poetic emotion of the creator. He has to re-evoke the aesthetic consciousness of the poet, re-construct the aesthetic object.

The best connoisseur of aesthetic beauty is called '*sahrdaya*' one who is of the same heart. Abhinavagupta describes him as one, the mirror of whose mind has become clear due to constant contact with poetic works and who has the capacity to identify himself with what is presented i.e. with the heart of the poet.

The art-experience of such a *sahrdaya* is, indeed, subjective. Abhinavagupta describes it as ending in '*prakāśa*'—illumination and '*ānanda*'—beatitude.

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7. Paul Valery, *Ibid*, p. 138.

The poem, the word-construct has also received a fair amount of attention. Some of the writings on Poetics were of the nature of manuals for prospective writers. The discussions on *alaṃkāras*, *guṇas*, *rīti*, *vakrokti* and *aucitya* were meant to be a valuable help, though it was maintained that when the creative spirit worked, all the embellishments and graces and properties entered the composition in an onrush vying with one another (*ahampūrvikayā parāpatanti*) and they did not remain exterior (*na teṣāṃ bahiraṅgatvam*) to the poem, which was an organic whole. For the organic unity there is a happy expression—‘*ekavākyatā*’ which literally means one-sentence-ness. The ancients consider even a long work, if it is a creative work, to be just one sentence. Even the *Mahābhārata* with its more than one hundred thousand verses is just a one-sentence piece. The very term ‘*sāhitya*’—togetherness is most fortunate and it at once emphasises the crucial fact about a poetic composition that the verbal correlative is commensurate with the poetic emotion and it is this *sāhitya*—togetherness which the aesthetic object is.

The seminal ideas in Sanskrit poetics are three:

1. First and most significant is the *rasa-sūtra*, which has come to enjoy the status of a kind of an Einsteinian formula in the realm of poetic theorization. It seems to be the distillation of the aesthetic thinking of generations. Though it occurs in the encyclopaedic *Nāṭyaśāstra* of Bharata, it may as well have been picked up from an earlier work, for Bharata refers to Druhiṇa as an authority regarding even the names of the eight *rasas*.

2. The second important idea is that of ‘*dhvani*’—suggestion. *Rasa* came to be associated with plays or other entire works and a need was felt for accounting for the beauty of smaller compositions or even single stanzas. The *alaṃkāra* school came into existence cutting *rasa* to size, by naming a ‘*rasa-vat*’ *alaṃkāra* also. The *guṇas* (qualities) and *rīti* (composite poetic diction) came to be emphasised later. It was Ānandavardhana, who laying his hand on *dhvani*, succeeded in explaining the presence of beauty in all kinds of compositions, *muktakas*—single stanzas as well as *prabandhas*—entire works, by referring it to either *vastu-dhvani*, *alaṃkāradhvani* or *rasa-dhvani*. It was also he who reconciled the claims of *rasa* with other approaches, by yielding in no ambiguous terms that even though varieties of *dhvani* were mentioned they were all to be comprehended through the medium of *rasa* and *bhāva* which were preponderant.

Since the *alaṃkāra*-school started, the emphasis came to be laid on stanzas rather than entire works. The wood was lost for the trees. Ānandavardhana was the first to discuss an entire work, as a practical critic. He raised the important question of what the *rasa* of *Mahābhārata* was and answered by saying that it was *śāntarasa*. Kuntaka, who followed him, was perhaps the greatest practical critic amongst the Sanskrit writers on poetics and the fourth chapter of his *Vakroktijīvita* has a freshness about it and throws up a number of hints for the artistic structuring of entire works.



3. The third great idea is that of '*sādhāranīkaraṇa*'—the generalized or universal apprehension of the poetic feeling and the poet's world.

These ideas have survived and contributed effectively to a clearer understanding of the aesthetic object due to the astute and vigorous presentation by a master-synthesizer of the stature of Ācārya Abhinavagupta, who is the greatest single name in Sanskrit Poetics. He eagerly seized upon the reconciliatory approach of Anandavardhana bringing *rasa* again into the focus. Instead of attempting a new work of his own, he chose to write commentaries *Abhinava-Bhāratī* on Bharata's *Nāṭyaśāstra* and *Locana* on Anandavardhana's *Dhvanyāloka* and used both texts for highlighting his own special predilection for *rasa*, whose secret he unravelled with the help of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka's ideal of *sādhāranīkaraṇa*. Abhinavagupta is one of the tallest thinkers not only of India but of the world. His apt utterances on Poetics have gone on ringing in the ears of generations after generations. It is a pity that even though during his life-time, during the eleventh century, a philosophical dialogue was possible between him and the great Muslim thinker Avicenna (Ibn Sina) of West Asia,<sup>8</sup> a worth-while dialogue is yet to start with Western thinkers of today. (Incidentally, I took an opportunity to draw Dr. I. A. Richards' attention to Abhinavagupta's work in early 1956, at Harvard, and later wrote to him about Dr. R. Gnoli's translation of a portion of *Abhinava-Bhāratī* which was just published.)

Once the texts are critically edited and annotated, they should leave the hands of the Sanskritists and reach the experts in the various disciplines. I hate the idea of the '*Arthaśāstra*' being studied only by the Sanskrit graduate students, and never forming a legitimate part of the curriculum for advanced studies in Political Science. So also, the more important work in Sanskrit Poetics could be better studied by advanced students of Philosophy, for, problems of Poetic Theory form a legitimate part of Philosophy and not of one language or another, nor even of literature as such.

I hope, it would be interesting to refer here to what a modern philosopher, Roman Ingarden (picking up one by random sampling), has to say about 'Aesthetic Experience and Aesthetic Object'<sup>9</sup> from (as it happens) a phenomenological approach. It would remind one again and again of the observations of the Sanskrit writers on Poetics. Prof. Ingarden carefully distinguishes between the ordinary perceptful experience and aesthetic experience. He shows how a composite structure of aesthetic experience has three kinds of elements: "(a) emotional (aesthetic excitement), (b) creative (active) constitution of an aesthetic object, (c) passive—perception of the qualities already revealed and harmonized."

8. Nilla Cram Cook, *The Way of the Swan*, Asia Publishing House, Bombay, 1958, p. 18.

9. Roman Ingarden, "Aesthetic Experience and Aesthetic Object" in 'Readings in Existential Phenomenology'—edited by Nathaniel Lawrence, Daniel Connor, Prentice Hall, Inc. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1967, pp. 318-319.

Prof. Ingarden says that "in the final phase of an aesthetic experience there ensues an *appeasement* in the sense that, on the one hand, there is a rather quiet *gazing upon* (contemplating) the qualitative harmony of the aesthetic object already constituted and a 'taking in' of these qualities. On the other hand, along with this, there proceeds what I have named the second form of emotional response to a harmony of qualities. And namely there arise some feelings in which an *acknowledgement of the value* of the constituted aesthetic object is taking place." He says that in experiencing feelings of admiration and rapture, while directly confronting an aesthetic object, one pays, so to say, homage to it. It is the sequence of '*prakāśa*' and '*ānanda*' for which he seems to vouchsafe.

I may be permitted to repeat what I have said earlier—that one can get at the poem only by experiencing it. And it inevitably follows from this that practical criticism presupposes such an experience of the aesthetic object.

Prof. Ingarden states that "it is only in such direct intercourse with an aesthetic object that a primary and vivid emotional response is possible" and adds, "To evaluate" without being moved, i.e. to form a *judgment* of the aesthetic value of something is possible, when using proper technical criteria even without the accomplishment of an aesthetic process, and thus also without waiting for a harmony of qualities to be constituted in an evident way." Some persons, who have much to do with works of art, 'are not easily enraptured by anything' and develop a peculiar routine of dealing with subsidiary details.

Practical criticism, that does not flow from *bhāvanā*—a state of *bhāva* (*bhāvayanti rasān*), is, to use a rather strong term, suspect. Prof. Ingarden calls it an intellectual exercise, 'an inferred judgment.' He maintains that only those value-judgments which result from a state of feeling and are based on the aesthetic process of experiencing the art-object are valid and justified: "the *experience* which alone, and in an essential way, makes this judgment valid lies in the final phase of the aesthetic process, and, in particular, in the acknowledgement of an aesthetic object, an acknowledgement which has the character of feeling and is grounded in the 'seeing of a harmony of qualities.' Therefore, strictly speaking, it is only those judgments concerning value, which are given *on the basis* of an aesthetic process, and when such a process has been accomplished, that are *justified*."

The discerning reader, the *sahṛdaya*, the critic, reproduces—re-creates the art-object created by the poet, the *kavi*, by passing through the aesthetic process and while acknowledging the presence of the aesthetic object pays joyful 'homage' to it.

At this point the poet and critic the *kavi* and the *sahṛdaya* meet and the *kārayitṛi*-creative faculty in one and a matching reciprocating or receiving

(*bhāvayitrī*) faculty in the other partake of the nature of *pratibhā*—intuitive apprehension.

As a matter of fact, the two had symbolically met when the poem originally came to be written—when the composer laid down his pen after writing the last word and making final touches, if any. Only at the final moment of the composition the poet can realize what poem he was trying to write, what the *kavigatasādhāraṇībhūtasamvit*-generalized consciousness of the poet-actually was. It must have been the enjoyer, the critic, the *sahṛdaya* in him who must have borne out the creator in him and reassured him of the finality of the outcome. Abhinavagupta seems to suggest as much when he says in the opening stanza of *Lōcana*, '*sarasvatyāstattvaṃ kavisahrdayākhyam vijayate*'—victorious is the essence of Speech called *kavisahrdaya*, for he has so worded his say that the compound *kavisahrdaya* also means 'the creator-enjoyer, the poet, who himself is the discerning reader,' over and above referring to the inevitable pair involved in all aesthetic activity—'the poet, the artist and the discerning enjoyer, the critic.'

## Appendix-II

### Does the Rasa theory have any modern relevance ?

R. B. PATANKAR

In modern times the *rasa* theory appears to have suffered at the hands of two groups of critics. (a) Those who are totally ignorant of the literary thought in pre-British India do not feel the need to develop any acquaintance with it. They find the Western critical framework adequate for their purposes. In his *The Languages of Criticism and the Structure of Poetry*, R. S. Crane could argue convincingly for the readoption of the Aristotelian approach to the problem of poetic structure on the ground that the modern contrastive and assimilative methods do not lead to the discovery of the particular structuring principles underlying individual literary works as does the Aristotelian method. Readoption of the *rasa* theory cannot be recommended on similar grounds, although the moderns might find something thought-provoking in it. It does not appear to satisfy an urgent need of Westernized people as perhaps does *yoga*. (b) Most of the Sanskritists have started looking upon the theory as a sacred relic of the past which has to be studied, labelled, and preserved in a museum but which is not supposed to be put to mundane uses like analysis and evaluation of modern literary works, even of works produced in Indian languages.

However, a comparative study of the Western and the ancient Indian critical traditions is worth attempting. It will show that there are significant points of contact between the two, and this might lend support to the view that there is a universal human mind which responds to similar situations in similar ways, irrespective of age and country. The comparison might also make an interaction between the two traditions possible. Modern Indian thinkers would profit a great deal if this were to take place. A bridge would thereby be built, not only between India and the West but also, between ancient India and modern India.

When we study a conceptual structure like the *rasa* theory across many centuries, we find that it contains parts which are completely unintelligible to us, and others which possess only historical interest. Consider, for example, the lists Bharata has given of *sthāyibhāvas* and *vyabhi-cāribhāvas*. The first list includes mental occurrents like fear and mental dispositions like love. And the second includes mental states like joy and bodily states like languor and sleep. If we take into account the all-round intellectual achievement of the ancient Indians we shall see why it would be wrong to dismiss the preceding classification as patently absurd. All that we shall be justified in saying is that *we* are unable to understand the principles of classification that Bharata used. The problem regarding the number of *rasas* is one of historical significance only. On one view, Bharata studied the dramatic compositions which were available to him and saw that most of them expressed eight (or nine)

emotions/sentiments. On another view, the number is based on psychological findings about what constitutes the relatively permanent part of the structure of the human mind. Much has happened in the fields of literature and psychology since Bharata wrote; and perhaps he would have changed his views if he had known all that later critics and psychologists know about dramatic works and the human mind.

But the *rasa* theory also contains a part which is not restricted in like manner to a particular age. It consists of certain clusters of concepts which are very basic to the theory. I propose to discuss two such clusters, one at some length, and the other rather briefly at the end. I shall also try to show that these clusters have their counterparts in the Western critical tradition, and indicate the points where a fruitful interaction between the two traditions can take place today.

The first cluster centers round the concept of *sādhāraṇīkaraṇa* (universalization). On this concept is based Abhinavagupta's triple claim that (a) the *rasa* experience is *alaukika* (*sui generis*), that (b) it is essentially pleasurable and that (c) the spectator does not contemplate it as something outside himself but undergoes it. Universalization can be interpreted as (i) a one-way process, from a particular to the universal which subsumes it, or as (ii) a two-way process, from a particular to the universal, and back again to a particular—the second particular not being the same as the first particular. That Abhinavagupta most probably had the second interpretation in mind is indicated by the example of Sāmba cited by Hemacandra, who follows Abhinavagupta very closely. The three stages in the process are as follows : (a) Sāmba worshipped the sun and was restored to good health; (b) everyone who worships the sun is restored to good health; (c) if I worship the sun, I too will be restored to good health. Subsumption of particular human beings under a common universal explains the possibility of communication between them. They have a common meeting ground in their humanity. All that is human is, at least potentially, followable/shareable by all men. This explanation can be extended to the act of watching a play. Although the characters on the stage differ from the spectator in one important respect, they have in common their human qualities. The spectator can understand and/or undergo the experiences presented on the stage because they are universally shareable/followable.

*Sādhāraṇīkaraṇa*, as we saw, can also be regarded as a one-way process from a particular to the universal (interpretation 1). The best example of this is available in the empirical sciences. Scientists are primarily concerned with the discovery of universal laws, in the formulation of which particulars as particulars have no place. If *sādhāraṇīkaraṇa* is interpreted as a one-way process, the characters in literary works will become abstractions on account of the *sādhāraṇīkaraṇa* which they undergo. It is a fact that characters answering to this description do exist in literary works; it is also a fact that some of these works are good. On the other hand, it will be wrong or say

that literary works cannot be good unless the characters are abstractions. For, in a very large number of literary works the characters are individualized. This is particularly true of literary works produced during and after the Romantic age. As a matter of fact the presence of individualized characters is often regarded as a source of literary value.

It is true that example of Sāmba suggests that Abhinavagupta most probably had in mind the second interpretation of *sādhāranīkaraṇa*. It is also likely that there is something in the distinction such Sanskritists as R. Gnoli have made between *sādhāraṇya* and *sāmānya*, that is, between the universal in literature and the universal in logic.<sup>1</sup> But these two facts do not constitute a sufficient reason for completely rejecting the first interpretation of *sādhāranīkaraṇa*. For, as we shall see later in this article, some claims made about the nature of the *rasa* experience cannot be sustained if the first interpretation is totally rejected.

Let us now see how the concept of universalization has fared in the Western critical tradition. In the ninth chapter of his *Poetics*, Aristotle has said: "Poetry, therefore, is a more philosophical and a higher thing than history: for poetry tends to express the universal, history the particular. By the universal I mean how a person of a certain type will on occasion speak or act, according to the law of probability or necessity."<sup>2</sup> That Aristotle is taking a universalist stand is clear. The question is whether he wants particularity of characters to be completely transcended, and abstractions to be presented on the stage. If it is found that particularity cannot be completely transcended, at what degree of universalization does he expect the poet to aim? Aristotle has not made any explicit statement about these issues.

The problem of reconciling the claims of universality and particularity has been exercising the minds of critics during and after the Romantic age. For example, S. H. Butcher, a post-Hegelian interpreter of Aristotle, writes,

But though it [poetry] has a philosophic character it is not philosophy: It tends to express the universal....Philosophy seeks to discover the universal in the particular; its end is to know and to possess the truth, and in that possession it reposes. The aim of poetry is to represent the universal through the particular, to give a concrete and living embodiment of a universal truth. The universal of poetry is not an abstract idea; it is particularized to sense, it comes before the mind clothed in the form of the concrete, presented under the appearance of a living organism....The meaning is not that a general idea is embodied in a particular example—that is the method of allegory rather than of poetry—but that the particular case is generalized by artistic treatment.<sup>3</sup>

1. R. Gnoli, *The Aesthetic Experience According to Abhinavagupta*, (Rome: 1956), p. 44.

2. S. H. Butcher, ed. and trans., *Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Art*, 4th ed. (New York: Dover publications, 1951), p. 35.

3. *Ibid* pp. 191-194.

The problem continues to exercise the minds of modern critics also. Dr. Avner Zis, a Marxist critic, writing in 1977, has taken a position similar to that of Butcher, when he says,

....the artistic image presents us with an indivisible unity of features of cognition intrinsic both to immediate contemplation and abstract thought.... Yet concepts do not enjoy an independent life of their own in art. They cannot replace images... The artist as it were 'divests' the phenomenon which interests him from random and particular features that might obscure the essence of what he is seeking to portray. He does not reproduce phenomena of life in their actual entirety, but only those characteristic features which constitute their 'living soul.'<sup>4</sup>

The balance between the universal and the particular is not easy to maintain; there is always the danger of slipping into either the universalist position, or the Crocean particularist position that the function of art is to reveal the individual physiognomy of things.<sup>5</sup> Every individual combines both, the universal and the particular. The dispute between universalists like Aristotle and particularists like Croce may therefore be regarded as a dispute about the relative importance of the two, the Aristotelians subordinating the particular to the universal, the Croceans doing exactly the opposite. This shows that universalization, like particularization might be obtainable in different degrees. What degree of universalization do the defenders of *sādhārāṇīkaraṇa* expect? This is an important issue because not only the characters (*vibhāvas*), emotions, and so on, but also the spectators (*rasikas*) are supposed to undergo *sādhārāṇīkaraṇa*. That excessive preoccupation with his own personal problems would come in the way of the spectator's aesthetic experience may be readily granted. It would also come in the way of various other activities like watching a cricket match, solving a mathematical problem or taking part in a discussion. Excessive preoccupation with oneself is an obstacle because it makes concentration on anything other than the self, practically impossible. But this does not mean that complete transcendence of the empirical self is a precondition of literary experience. Careful observation will reveal that our empirical self is actively involved in the literary experience in varying degrees. In his well-known paper on "The Relation of the Poet to Day-dreaming"<sup>6</sup> Freud has shown that readers of one variety of literary works derive vicarious satisfaction through the fantasy world the writer has created. Such literature is a universalized and beautified version of the writer's daydream. Owing to the reduction of what is too personal in it, a daydream becomes universally shareable. Of course, this shareability is also dependent on the reader's capacity for partial self-transcendence. If he is excessively preoccupied with his own self he may find it impossible to slip

4. Avner Zis, *Foundations of Marxist Aesthetics* (Moscow, 1977), pp. 77, 79, 82.

5. Benedetto Croce, *Aesthetic*, trans. Douglas Ainslie (London: Vision Press, Peter Owen, 1953), p. 5.

6. Sigmund Freud, *Collected Papers* (London: Hogarth Press, 1925), Vol. IV, pp. 173-183.

into the role designed for him by the writer to facilitate vicarious wish-fulfilment. This cannot, of course, mean complete self-transcendence; for wish-fulfilment presupposes the presence of mundane wishes in the reader. It might be objected that the Freudian theory covers only escapist, and therefore valuationally inferior, literature; what is true of it might not be true of great literature. In reply, it may be pointed out that escapist literature does not cease to be literature because it is escapist. Again, self-involvement may be present even in the experience of great literature. At the conscious level we remain detached spectators, hence we do not easily become aware of this fact. We know that we are in the auditorium watching an emotional drama in the life of characters being enacted on the stage. But this does not rule out the possibility of our being involved at a deeper level in that emotional drama. Different parts of our personality might react in strikingly different ways to a complex object of experience like a literary work. If we analyze our reaction to Satan's character in *Paradise Lost* we realize the truth of this. On the conscious plane we do not belong to Satan's party; and, as a religious man, Milton could not have espoused Satan's cause. Nevertheless, Satan's character fascinates the reader. We realize that a strong emotional force must have gone into the making of the character. Perhaps in the depth of our psyche there is a primitive, unsocialized element, which resents restraint of any sort; and it is this element which derives satisfaction from Satan's rebellion. This shows that we might be detached on one level and deeply involved on another.

Abhinavagupta also could not have expected complete self-transcendence on the part of the *rasika*. First of all, he does not want him to lose the consciousness that he is watching a play. Further he wants the *rasika* to bring with him the traces of past experiences (*vāsanārūpa-saṃskāras*). It is reasonable to suppose that these include traces of past emotional experiences, enduring dispositions, moral evaluations, knowledge of the world and men, ideological commitments, and world views. If the spectator brings all this structure to the theatre with him, how can he be said to transcend his empirical ego completely, or even to an appreciable extent?

The defenders of Abhinavagupta point out that although activation of past experiences is expected to take place, the experiences undergo a qualitative change because of *sādhāranīkaraṇa*. Our everyday experience, we are told by followers of Abhinavagupta, depends upon egocentric relations between individuals; these individuals are related to our ego in three ways, and these relations determine our attitudes to them: (a) they belong to us or to our friends, (b) they belong to our enemies, (c) they are such as do not concern us. Our attitude to people and things in category (a) is friendly; to those in category (b), it is hostile; and those in (c) it is completely indifferent. The *rasa* experience is said to be *sui generis* because it is not based on these egocentric relations. The first objection to this argument is that the threefold division of human relations is too cynical to be acceptable. Although many human attitudes are egocentric, there are many others which are not so. Only a cynic will interpret altruism as egocentric. Again, if we analyze the



presuppositions of our moral life we shall realize the importance of universalization in our everyday life. Universalizability of principles of human action is often regarded as the very condition of the possibility of moral experience.

The preceding discussion shows that (a) universalization in literature in the sense in which we have taken the term admits of degrees, (b) it is not always the highest degree of universalization that is expected either of characters or of the spectator, nor is it desirable to achieve it; (c) universalization is not peculiar to literary experience; (d) if universalization explains how the *rasa* experience becomes shareable, it also explains how *any* experience is rendered shareable.

Two further claims are made on behalf of the *rasa* experience. It is said to be (a) necessarily pleasurable, and (b) in a class by itself (*alaukika*). Both these claims are, in Abhinavagupta's system, ultimately based on *sādhāraṇīkaraṇa*. We have examined the second claim and seen that it cannot be maintained because *sādhāraṇīkaraṇa* is not peculiar to the *rasa* experience alone. We shall now briefly examine the first claim. If *sādhāraṇīkaraṇa* of experience means rendering it universally shareable it is obvious that *sādhāraṇīkaraṇa* by itself cannot make an experience pleasurable; this is particularly true of experiences which are indifferent in their affective tone and those which are decidedly unpleasant. The following example of the repulsive (the *bībhatsa*) will make this amply clear. Bhartṛhari says in his *vairāgya-śataka* "A woman's breasts really are only protruberances of flesh, but the poets have likened them to golden pitchers; her face is a place filled with saliva and mucus, but the poets have compared it to the moon; her hips and loins are made wet by urine, but the poets have compared them with the frontal globe on the forehead of an elephant. That which is repulsive in reality has been shown to be great by the poets." The description is universalized and made applicable to all women. The feeling of disgust, thus universalized and transformed into the *bībhatsa rasa* cannot be said to have become in any way pleasurable. It is indeed doubtful whether the *bībhatsa rasa* can ever be pleasurable if experienced by itself. It might become bearable, and perhaps even pleasurable only if it gives rise to the feeling of indifference to worldly objects (*nirveda*) and leads to the creation of *śānta rasa*. It therefore appears that at least some *rasa* are not pleasurable by themselves; they can, however, become pleasurable by being subordinated to other *rasas* or to ends which are not peculiar to literature, for example, moral or religious values.

Another way of making the *rasa* experience pleasurable is to raise it to a qualitatively higher level, where it acquires a universal significance. Here universalization does take place, but not in the limited sense of making something universally shareable. Some problems are universally shareable but they are not called universal problems. Losing a job is an example of a universally shareable problem. But "What is the place of human goodness in the ultimate scheme of the world?" is a universal problem, a problem with a

universal significance. A universal problem is not necessarily a problem which is actually raised by all men; it is such as *can* be raised by all men, but is actually raised only by a few mature men with a philosophical bent of mind when confronted with the central mysteries of human life. The fear of the young deer described in act one of *Śākuntala* is often cited as an example of the *bhayānaka rasa*. The experience is universal in the sense that it is universally communicable; but it does not have the universal significance of the anguish of Oedipus. This discussion shows that in the context of literature "universalization" can be taken to mean (i) "making something universally followable, shareable/ applicable" or (ii) "endowing something with universal significance." Butcher most probably wants to emphasize the second meaning when he writes about the tragic hero. "So much human nature must there be in him that we are able in some sense to identify ourselves with him, to make his misfortunes our own. At the same time he is raised above us in external degree and station .... there is a gain in the hero being placed at an ideal distance from the spectator. We are not confronted with outward conditions of life too like our own....[The tragic emotions] are disengaged from the petty interests of self, and are on the way to being universalized .... In the spectacle of another's errors or misfortunes, in the shocks and blows of circumstance, we read the 'doubtful doom of human kind'.... The spectator who is brought face to face with grander sufferings than his own experiences a sympathetic ecstasy, or lifting out himself.... The tragic *katharsis* requires that suffering shall be exhibited in one of its comprehensive aspects; that the deeds and fortunes of the actors shall attach themselves to larger issues, and the spectator himself be lifted above the special case and brought face to face with universal law and the divine plan of the world." Universalization in the sense of investing an experience with universal significance can plausibly be regarded as a way of making it pleasurable; that which elevates us mentally is often a source of pleasure. The satisfaction which attends a moral experience can be cited as an example. (Incidentally, this shows that "universalization" in Butcher's sense also does not make the literary experience *sui generis*.)

The Sanskritists do not appear to use *sādhāraṇīkarāṇa* in Butcher's sense. But then if we take *sādhāraṇīkarāṇa* as a process which depersonalizes an experience or renders it universally shareable/followable we shall not be able to prove either that the *rasa* experience is necessarily pleasurable or that it is *sui generis*, or that it is valuationally superior to everyday experiences.

We shall now consider two other arguments put forward to prove that the *rasa* experience is *sui generis*. The substance of the first argument is that the means-end category has no application in the context of *rasa* experience. Where this category has an application, the means can be discarded after the end is achieved. But *vibhāvas* and so on are not the means to achieve the end, namely, the *rasa* experience. For the *rasa* experience is coterminous with the

presence of the *vibhāvas* and so on before us. It is *vibhāvādijīvitāvadhi*. It comes into existence with the *vibhāvas*, and ends when the *vibhāvas* are removed from the stage. The argument perhaps aims at distinguishing between the *sthāyibhāvas*, which are permanently there in the human mind in a dormant state, and the *rasa* experience, which occurs only when the *vibhāvas* are present before us. But then this distinction holds good even outside the literary context, for it is the distinction between dispositions and occurrents which is familiar to all psychologists. An irascible man is not angry all the time; he has a disposition to get angry at the least provocation; and the anger, which is an occurrent and not a disposition, lasts only so long as the cause for provocation lasts. When we say that "X enjoys music" we are talking about X's disposition, we can use this expression even if, at the moment, no musical concert is in progress. But it would be logically odd to say "X is enjoying a musical concert which is not now in progress." The same is true about enjoying a particular performance of a play or a cricket match that is just not there. According to the logic of the verb "to enjoy" when used in the context of an episode, enjoyment and the thing which is enjoyed are coterminus.

At one stage in this article it was shown that *sādhāraṇīkaraṇa* is not peculiar to the *rasa* experience, for universalization is a precondition of the ethical experience also. But the supporters of Abhinavagupta might say that despite this similarity the two experiences are different because the ethical experience issues into action but the *rasa* experience is an end in itself. It might be readily conceded that the *rasa* experience does not give rise to immediate overt action. But that is because the peculiar ontological status of *vibhāvas* rules out the very possibility of any such action with regard to them. Even if we wish to, it is logically impossible for us to interfere in the lives of the 'characters' on the stage. The world in which the characters move is structured like the world in which real men move; but there is no continuity between the worlds. That we should be able to see the former and that it should be able to induce emotional states in us creates peculiar epistemological and ontological problems. Śrī Śaṅkuka's theory of *citraturagapratīti* shows that the Sanskritists were aware of these problems. We see a configuration of pigments to be a horse, although we know that a real horse is not made of pigments. In the same way we see an actor as a character like Rāma. Seeing one thing as another thing is not a variety of ordinary seeing. As Śrī Śaṅkuka has shown, it does not belong to the four known categories of perception : (a) veridical perception (b) illusory perception (c) perceiving something as resembling something else (d) perception which leaves us in doubt about the identity of what we perceive. What we see has a peculiar ontological status; the status would not have been peculiar if we had before us an actor merely as a man following a particular profession. Again, there would have been no problem if Rāma, whose role the actor is supposed to play, were actually present before us. What we see on the stage is *sui generis*; and our seeing it is also *sui generis*.

It should be evident that Śrī Śaṅkuka's theory bears a striking resemb-

lance to the Kantian theory of "disinterestedness" and Aldrich's theory of "categorical aspection." It is true that neither of these theories has anything to do with watching a play on the stage; but they are both concerned with the peculiar ontological status of the object of aesthetic contemplation. And one cannot avoid facing this problem when one tries to give a logical account of "watching a play." Since Plato, Western aestheticians have been discussing the ontological status of the aesthetic object. Plato concluded that the aesthetic object is ontologically inferior to things in the phenomenal world and is thus twice removed from the ultimate reality. Kant removed the aesthetic object from the Platonic ontological order by declaring that the aesthetic delight is "disinterested" in the sense that it does not depend upon the actual existence of the aesthetic object.<sup>8</sup> We neither affirm nor deny that it exists. In the aesthetic context we contemplate not a physical object but an "aesthetic semblance." That which is an "aesthetic semblance" in the aesthetic context may turn out to be an actually existing physical object in the cognitive or the practical context. While determining the ontological status of the aesthetic object, we must see that the contexts are not confused. The world of imagination is not an imaginary, false world to be contrasted with the "real" world. It is one aspect of the same world whose other aspect is the so-called "real" world. The knower, the practical agent, and the aesthetic contemplator deal with the same world under different aspects. About the phenomenon of changing the aspects Aldrich writes, "What I am approaching is the phenomenon of categorical aspection, . . . Categorical aspection involves a change of categorical aspects; the same material thing is perceived now as a physical object, now as an aesthetic object, neither of which involves seeing it as another *thing*. The difference between categorical aspects has to do with modes of perception and the kinds of space in which their objects are realized."<sup>9</sup> To see a configuration of pigments only as a configuration of pigments is to see under one aspect; to see it as a horse is to see it under a different aspect. This theory can be extended to cover the act of "watching a play on the stage." To see an actor as an actual human being and to see him as a "character" are two different varieties of seeing, although the same sense organs are involved in the two seeings; the difference between the two is based on categorical aspection. Śrī Śaṅkuka was laying a foundation for an autonomist theory of art when he propounded the theory of *citraturaga-pratīti*. Of course, this by itself cannot prove the validity of the autonomist stand. For that we also need the deconceptualization of the aesthetic experience, as Kant has maintained.<sup>10</sup>

The first step which Śrī Śaṅkuka took in the direction of autonomism was retracted by Abhinavagupta. For once the actor, the character, the spectator, and the emotional experiences are universalized, the concepts of "playing a

8. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Aesthetic Judgement*, First Moment.

9. Virgil C. Aldrich, *Philosophy of Art* (Englewood Cliff, N. J. : Prentice-Hall, 1963), pp. 21-22.

10. Immanuel Kant, *op. cit.*, Second Moment.

role," "seeing" a real human being "as a character" lose all meaning. For if all share the same universalized emotion, who can be said to imitate, to play the role of, whom? Abhinavagupta really has no use for the notion of imitation, which is so central to the world of drama, and to the world of representational art as a whole. Not only does Abhinavagupta retract the step taken by Śrī Śaṅkuka, he actually takes a step in the opposite direction. For through *sādhāraṇīkaraṇa* we can go from the world of art back to the world of "real" men and women. For although the "characters" in a play do not inhabit the "real" world, "real" men who resemble the "characters" in many respects do live in the same "real" world in which we live. "Characters" thus direct our attention to "real" men. That is why we often exclaim "How true!" while watching a play. Further, if the *rasa* experience is claimed to be an end in itself, why does the Abhinavagupta school attach importance to the ultimate goals of human life (the *puruṣārthas*) while deciding upon the number of *rasas*? If the *rasas* are expected to be conducive to the basic goals of life, the longterm conative-affective effects of the *rasa* experience will have to be taken into account while discussing the intrinsic nature of that experience. This position is different from A. C. Bradley's stand in his well-known article "Poetry for Poetry's Sake."<sup>11</sup> Bradley admits that poetry may have ulterior ends like softening of passions in addition to its sole legitimate end of being "a satisfying imaginative experience." However, for Bradley these ulterior ends of poetry are totally irrelevant in a discussion of poetry as poetry. The case of Abhinavagupta is entirely different. For him the *rasas* depend on *sthāyibhāvas*; and *sthāyibhāvas* are *sthāyī*, that is, permanent and dominant sentiments/emotions because they promote the basic goals of life. Some *bhāvas* are not given the status of *sthāyī*, and are not regarded as sources of *rasas* only because they are not conducive to these goals. This connection between *rasas* and the basic goals of life goes counter to the autonomist stand. To accept the theory of *sādhāraṇīkaraṇa* and to insist on the close connection between *rasas* and the basic goals of life is to weaken the claim that the *rasa* experience is in a class by itself (*alaukika*).

That there are points of close similarity between the Western and the ancient Sanskrit traditions should be evident from the preceding discussion. Topics such as watching a theatrical performance, emotionality of literature, autonomy of the world of literature, degree of universalization involved in literary experience, aesthetic pleasure, and the nature of aesthetic perception are of living interest today. About all of them the ancient Sanskritists have said something that the moderns will find relevant and thought-provoking, if not acceptable. Of course, to be relevant, it is not necessary for a theory to be acceptable. The modern Sanskritists can, and should, take part in the dialogue between India and the West. They can contribute something to the modern theory of literature, if they stop being mere exponents of the ancient critical thought. Let them continue to owe allegiance to Śrī Śaṅkuka and

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11. A. C Bradley, *Oxford Lectures on Poetry* (London : Macmillan, reprinted., 1962), pp. 4-5.

Abhinavagupta. But let them also take on the task of restating and defending the ancient theories in the context of contemporary literary thought. They will then be required to meet new objections and give an adequate account of modern aesthetic data. They might also realize that it is necessary to modify the ancient theories. For example, a mere juxtaposition of the ways Abhinavagupta and Butcher have treated the problem of universalization in literature will force them to do radical rethinking about the whole issue. If the modern Sanskritists want to be part of the world critical tradition, they will have to assume a new role; they will have to become moulders and not merely discoverers of critical concepts. An active dialogue with Western aestheticians will bring them close, as living minds, to their own past. The past in its turn will become living if they approach it in this way.

#### POST-SCRIPT :

In the discussion during the Patan Seminar and elsewhere I have made the following additional points about Sanskrit Poetics.

(1) In modern times, particularly after the emergence of the Novel as a distinct and important form of literature, we often evaluate literary works in terms of the insight they give into reality. We cannot do this from within the Sanskrit Poetics. There is provision for this in Aristotle's Poetics; for example, see chapter IX of *Poetics*.

(2) A play like Sophocles's *Antigone* is rated very high for the moral problem it presents with great force. Again, one cannot do this with the critical tools ancient Sanskrit Poetics has given us. It is not as if there were no moral problems in ancient Sanskrit literature; nor is the case that moral problems were not dealt with in ancient literary works. *Mahābhārata* is full of moral problems. And yet Sanskrit poetics does not tell us how to discuss them or how to bring out their bearing on the literary excellence of poetic works which deal with them. Aristotle must have given thought to the moral aspect of literature, as can be seen from his theory of Catharsis.

(3) When the *rasa* theory is sought to be applied outside Drama and Poetry, care should be taken to see whether this application involves any metaphorical extension of the meanings of terms like *vibhāva*, *sthāyibhāva*.

(4) While discussing the nature of literary experience we should regard our own experience as of supreme importance. *A priori* reasoning such as the following will not convince/deceive any modern reader : '*rasa* is by definition pleasurable; *karuṇa* is a *rasa*; *karuṇa* is therefore pleasurable.'



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#### He has also contributed :

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