

Sheth Shri Popatlal Hemchand Adhyātma Vyākhyānamālā, No. 10

# Some Jain Concepts and Conduct

by  
Dr. Sushma Singhvi



**B. J. INSTITUTE OF LEARNING & RESEARCH**

Ashram Road, Ahmedabad-9

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Published by

**DR. BHARATI SHELAT**

Director,

B. J. Institute of Learning & Research

Ashram Road, Ahmedabad-9

Gujarat (INDIA)

© B. J. Institute, Ahmedabad-380009

First Edition : 2005

Copies : 300

Price : 60-00

Printed by :

**KRISHNA GRAPHICS**

966, Naranpura Old Village,

Near Swaminarayan Temple,

Naranpura, Ahmedabad-380013

Ph. : 079 - 27494393



## Publisher's Note



शेठश्री पोपटलाल हेमचंद

जन्म

सं. १८२८, श्रावण सुद ५ ने शनिवार  
ता. २२-७-१८७१

स्वर्गवास

सं. २००१ आसो वद ५ ने गुरुवार  
ता. २५-१०-१९४५



## Publisher's Note

Under the terms of the donation made by Shri Chimanlal Popatlal Shah in 1946 in the name of his father Shah Popatlal Hemchand, it was decided to organize series of lectures on the subject of *Ātman-paramātman* with special reference to Jain Philosophy under the auspices of B.J. Institute of Learning and Research, Ahmedabad. It was decided to name the series 'Sheth Shri Popatlal Hemchand Adhyātma Vyākhyānamālā'.

Under this Lecture-series, Dr. R.D.Ranade delivered three lectures on 'Spiritual Life in Mahatma Gandhi and Hindi Saints, Pandit Sukhlalji Sanghvi on 'Adhyātmavicāraṇā', Dr. Padmanabh Jaini on 'Liberation, Incarnation and Rebirth in Jainism', Dr. Bhogilal Sandesara on 'Yoga, Anuyoga and Mantrayoga', Dr. R.N. Mehta on 'Jainism and Archaeology', Dr. N. J. Shah on, 'Concept of *Sraddhā* (*Samyak-darśana*), *Matijñāna* and *Kevala-jñāna* in Jain Philosophy,' Dr. Jitendra Shah on 'Naya in Jain Philosophy', Y.S. Shastri on 'Jainism from the view-point of Vedāntic Ācāryas and Dr. Siddheshvar Bhatt on 'The Concept of Ātman and Paramātman in Indian Thought' respectively. All these lectures have been published in the book-form by the Institute.

Dr. Sushma Singhvi is a well-known scholar of Sanskrit studies and Jain Philosophy. She has contributed a lot to the field of Sanskrit, Prakrit and Philosophy. Her scholarly works include 'Philosophical view point of Kundakundācārya's works', *Śaddarśanasamuccaya* (ed.) and several research papers on *Anekāntavāda*, Jain Naya, Philosophical Foundations of Jainism etc.

Dr. Singhvi has organized several programmes on personality development, Freedom and Education, Role of Distance Education etc. and has delivered scholarly lectures at various Institutions and universities in the foreign countries and in our homeland.

I have a great pleasure in publishing three lecture delivered by Dr. Sushma Singhvi on 'Some Jain Concepts and Conduct' in the book-form and I hope the publication will prove to be illuminative not only to the students of Indian Philosophy, but also to those who are interested in the subject.

Ahmedabad  
21 March, 2005

**Bharati Shelat**  
Director

## PREFACE

This book is a collection of my three lectures delivered under the auspices of Sheth Shri Popatlal Hemachandra Adhyātma Vyākhyānamālā, at B.J. Institute of Learning and Research, Ahmedabad in February 2005. These lectures are based on Some Jain Concepts and Conduct.

The title of the book “*Some Jain Concepts and Conduct*” has been selected to express the notion of applying the insight of Jainism to the issues of our lives to enable us to resolve them. How we can attain and sustain happiness and how we should treat other living beings are two such issues. “Knowledge is power” proverb is true in the sense that through applying and practising the knowledge of Jain philosophical concepts we can gain the power to understand and resolve the issue. It is not possible in three lectures to outline in detail the vast Jain philosophical concepts and tradition, this book should be considered as an introduction to Some Jain Concepts and Conduct. The three chapters of this books are : (i). *Anekāntavāda : Origin and Development*, (ii) *Śrāvakācāra : Code of Conduct of a Householder* and (iii) *The Concept of Ātman*.

“*Anekāntavāda : Origin and Development*” occupies a central position in Jain philosophy. In the first chapter three different phases of *Anekāntavāda* has been discussed : (1) *vibhijyavāda* : the principle of division of issues (2) *nayas* : the method of defining the frame work of reference (3) *saptabhaṅgī* : The doctrine of seven fold predications and *syādvāda* : the prefixing of the practice *syat* meaning “in a certain reference” to a preposition indicative of its conditional character. Jain āgamas refer to these stages for judging the nature of reality, interpreting the meaning of the words, describing the duties and resolving the issues.



“Śrāvākācāra : Code of Conduct of a householder” chapter deals with faith, knowledge based on the vision of truth called *samyagdarśana*. Criterion of right faith according to Jainism is the manifestation of the five characteristics : (i) *praśama* : calmness, (ii) *samvega* : aspirations after real freedom, (iii) *nirveda* : absence of hankering, (iv) *anukampā* : compassion and (v) *āstikya* : belief in the existence of soul.

In Jainism, this faith is explained as the consequence of lessening of the intensity of passions of anger, pride, deceit and greed. By observing twelve *vratas* the scope of violence is limited and circumscribed. Five *aṇuvratas*, three *guṇavratas* and four *sikṣāvratas*, are meant for limitation of the activity of the *śrāvaka*.

“The Concept of Ātman” summarises the fact that this physical world is ruled by physical law and not by any divine law. God is only the highest, noblest and fullest manifestation of the powers which lie latent in souls of living beings. There is no creator of this universe. All souls are fundamentally independent.

“Some Jain Concepts and Conduct” is based on the fundamental doctrine of nonabsolutism. This has saved Jain ethics from being one-sided and helped to lead to the balanced view between *vyavahāra* and *nīścaya*. The path of salvation is the unity of faith, knowledge and conduct. Thus Jain ethical code of conduct is not merely a system giving certain code of morality but it is religion to be lived in practice.

This book investigates that boundaries and rules in the form of *vratas* enable identities to be established and their responsibility to be fixed. Jain code of conduct assigns primary place to the life of a monk and the life of a householder is expected to be the preparation for monk hood. Householder is rightly called *śramaṇopāsaka*. It is due to this fact that Jain eth-

ics lays more emphasis on individual and ascetic virtues than on social virtues. The ultimate aim of life being liberation, observing *vratas* and practising penance is important in *śrāvakācāra*. Jain concept of *ātman* is based on equality of soul, all souls are equal and fundamentally independent. Jain ethics is based neither on oneness of life in Vedānta nor on momentary nature of self as in Buddhism.

The benefit gained from reading this book is an opportunity to become familiar with some philosophical concepts of Jainism which strengthens and increase our ability to think and reflect and practice the code of conduct which in real sense leads us to the path of development.

B.J.Institute of Learning and Research is doing a great service to the field of Indology through its research, teaching, editing and publishing and arranging learned lecture series. I am grateful to Dr. Bharatiben Shelat, Director, B.J. Institute of Learning and Research for inviting me to deliver these three lectures under the prestigious *Vyākhyānamālā*.

21<sup>st</sup> March, 2005

**Dr. Sushma Singhvi**

Director

Vardhaman Mahaveer Open University  
Regional Centre, JAIPUR

## CONTENTS

Publisher's Note	iii
Preface	v
Contents	viii
1. <i>Anekāntavāda</i> : Origin and Development	1-15
- Three stages of development :	
(a) <i>Vibhajyavāda</i>	
(b) The <i>Nayas</i>	
(c) <i>Saptabhaṅgi</i> and <i>Syādvāda</i>	
- Reflections on application of <i>Anekāntavāda</i>	
2. <i>Śrāvakācāra</i> : Code of Conduct of a Householder	16-50
- <i>Samyagdarśana</i>	
- Twelve <i>Vratas</i> :	
(a) <i>Aṇuvratas</i>	
(b) <i>Guṇavratas</i>	
(c) <i>Sikṣāvratas</i>	
- Categories of a <i>Śrāvaka</i>	
3. The Concept of <i>Ātman</i>	51-64
- Introduction	
- Attributes of <i>Jīva</i>	
- Categories of self	
- The idea of God	
- <i>Jīva</i> and <i>Ātman</i>	

# 1

## ***Anekāntavāda :*** **Origin and Development**

The three distinct stages of evolution of the doctrine of *Anekāntavāda* in the early Jaina Āgamas are the main sources to examine, Whether Jainas were analysts or propounder of the views by division of issues and not of partial view of things :-

**(a) *Vibhajyavāda-***

The method of answering a question or following an action by dividing the issues.

**(b) *Nayavāda-***

The method of defining the framework of reference.

**(c) *Syādvāda-***


The prefixing of the particle *syāt*, meaning ‘in a certain reference’ to a preposition, indicative of its conditional character.

The concept of *Anekānta* occupies a central position in Jaina philosophy. Although it is not possible, exactly, to determine the date of its origin, there is no doubt that the ontology of early Jainism was deeply influenced by this principle. Originally an ethical mode of speech, (for *artha-nirṇaya*, *artha-prarūpaṇa*<sup>1</sup>, *Samyak dharma-prarūpaṇa*<sup>2</sup>, *Samādhāna* and *Tattva-nirdhāraṇa*<sup>3</sup> etc.) being concerned with what one ought or ought not to speak, *anekāntavāda* assumed an ontological role in the *Ardhamāgadhī*

Āgamas through three stages of development, viz, *Vibhajyavāda* (the method of answering a question by dividing the issues), *nayavāda* (the method of defining the framework of reference), and *syādvāda* (the prefixing of the particle syat, meaning 'in a certain reference' to a preposition, indicative of its conditional character)<sup>4</sup>. *Syādvāda* asserts that the knowledge of reality is possible only by denying the absolutistic attitude.

### ***Vibhajyavāda :***

It is perhaps the earliest phase of the doctrine of *Anekāntavāda*, which is found mentioned in the *sūtrakṛtāṅga* where a monk is asked to explain things, through the principle of division of issues<sup>5</sup>. Non practice of this principle is considered as *anācāra*<sup>6</sup>. The method of analysis in *vibhajyavāda* for dividing the issues is called *dvipadāvatāra* method, which is the key to *anekāntavāda*<sup>7</sup>. Those, who do not know this method of *vibhajyavāda* are named as 'bāla', ignorants<sup>8</sup>. The *Bhagawati sūtra* provides many illustrations where a question is dealt with in *Vibhajyavāda*. On being asked by Gautam whether a person who says that he has taken the vow of desisting from committing injury to all sentient beings is a bonafied observer of the vow or a malafied imposter, Mahāvīra replied that if such person was incapable of distinguishing between the sentient and the insentient, or between the mobile and immobile living beings, he is the latter but otherwise he is a true observer of the vow<sup>9</sup>. Similarly on being asked by Jayanti which of the two, viz slumber and wakefulness, was preferable, he replied that for the sinful, it was the former, while for the virtuous the latter<sup>10</sup>. A resident of *vāṇijya* village asked Mahāvīra that Do you eat *Sarisava* (skt. *sadrśavaya* friend and *sarsapa* mustarad seeds) or not, Mahāvīra answered the question by dividing the issue that the *sarisavas* are eatable and also not eatable.



Thus *labdha*, *yācita*, *eṣaṇīya*, *śastrapariṇata* sarisava seed is eatable.

The process of dividing the issues continued till Lord Mahāvira could explain the method of practising Jaina śramaṇācāra. These and similar instances which are in galore in the Jaina texts are obviously case of answer by division. It should



be noted here that the alternative answers to the divided issues are sometimes introduced in the Āgama by 'vi' meaning also<sup>11</sup> and by the particle *siya* (skt, *Syād*) meaning 'in a certain reference'<sup>12</sup>. The expression *siyavāya* in the *sūtrakṛtāṅga*<sup>13</sup> also deserves mention: one should not explain anything without taking resort to *siyavāya* (skt. *syādvāda*, the principle of conditional prediction). It is obviously synonymous with the expression *vibhajyavāya* noted above and is the forerunner of the *syādvāda* of later times. It confirms that *vibhajyavāda* is the earliest phase of *anekāntavāda*.

### The Nayas

The *nayas* (stand points) constitute the second stage of the evolution of the concept of *anekānta*. The earliest and most important way of judging the nature of things was to consider them under four heads/points of view viz. *dravya* (substance), *kṣetra* (space), *kāla* (time) and *bhāva* (mode). In the *Bhagawati sūtra* the *loka* (inhabited cosmos) is considered as finite in substance and space, but infinite in time and modes<sup>14</sup>. There are also other heads such as *guṇa*<sup>15</sup>, *bhāva*<sup>16</sup> and *saṁsthāna*<sup>17</sup> which were analogous to *bhāva*. But all these heads were not called *nayas*. The expressions used in connection with the *nayas* were however *dravya* and *paryāya* (equivalent of *bhāva*). The material atoms are thus stated to be eternal qua *dravya* (*davyatthayae*) and non-eternal (qua *paryāya* *pajjavehim*<sup>18</sup> and the souls are characterized as eternal qua *dravya* (*davvatthayae*) and non-eternal qua *bhāva* (*bhāvattayae*)<sup>19</sup>. Another pair of *nayas* viz *avvocchitti naya* (skt. *avyucchitti naya*, the stand point of non-interception) and *vocchitti-naya* (skt. *vyucchitti naya*, the stand point of interception) are also mentioned in the *Bhagavati Sūtra*<sup>20</sup>. Thus the infernal beings are eternal from the stand point of non-interception (of their existence as souls) but they are non-eternal from the standpoint of interception (of their present state of being infernal after the expiry of that form of existence). *Bṛhadvṛtti on*

*Uttarādhyayana sūtra* clearly indicates that *vyavacchitti naya* is *paryāyārthika naya* and *avyavacchitti naya* is *dravyārthika naya*<sup>21</sup>. The fifth chapter (*pada*) of *prajñāpanā upāṅga* is famous by the name, '*paryāya pada*' where in *jīva* and *ajīva prajñāpanā* are explained in detail. It is difficult to comprehend this āgama without understanding *paryāyārthika naya*.

Third pair of *nayas* is also mentioned in the *Bhagavati Sūtra* viz. *vavahāriya naya* (skt. *vyavahārika naya*, the popular stand point) and *necchaiya-naya* (skt. *naiścayika-naya*, the factual or scientific standpoint). Thus from the popular standpoint the drone is black in colour but factually or scientifically speaking, it is possessed of all the five colours viz. black, blue, red, yellow and white<sup>22</sup>. Mention of seven *mūla naya* in *sthānāṅga sūtra* is also important<sup>23</sup>. Reality possesses an infinite number of attributes, this concept of non-absolutism of Jainism signifies speculations of sevenfold stand points also.

### Saptabhaṅgi

As the third stage of development of the concept of *anekānta*, we find a primitive *saptabhaṅgi* and *syādvāda* in the *Bhagavati Sūtra* '*Goyama, Siya aya, siya no aya, siya avattavva aya ti ya no aya ti ya*':<sup>24</sup>. Here the things are judged under the categories of 'self' (*aya* skt. *ātman*) and 'not self' (*no aya* skt. *no ātman*). An object is characterised as 'self' in some respect (*siya aya*), 'not self' in some respect (*siya no aya*) and 'indescribable' that is both 'self and not self' in some respect (*siya avattavam aya ti ya no aya ti ya*). Further the meaning of 'in some respect' is explained- "*Goyama! appana aditthe aya, parassa aditthe no aya, tadubhassa aditthe avattavam*....."<sup>25</sup>.

These three attributes are predicated of an object non-composite or composite, respectively from the standpoints of existent characters, non existent characters and existent cum non existent characters. In the case of the objects that are non

composite (for instance, a monad, an atom), the attributes are only three in number viz. self, not self and indescribable. Hence indescribable means the impossibility of the object being spoken of or described exclusively as self or not self, because of the same object being both (self and not self) at the same time. These three attributes however, become six in the case of a dyad (a composite body of two space points) as follows:

1. Self
2. Not self
3. Indescribable
4. Self and not self (one attribute for each space point)
5. Self and indescribable (one attribute for each space point)
6. Not self and indescribable (one attribute for each space point)

These six modes (ways) again become seven in the case of a triad (a composite body of three space points)

1 to 6 as above and

7. Self, not self and indescribable (one attribute for each of the three space points).

*Bhagavati sūtra* describes that the fourth, fifth and sixth modes have each two more subdivisions. The text referred to above gives the divisions and sub-divisions of the tetrad, pentad and hexad also. On account of various possible combinations of the space points the number of modes may be thirteen or two hundred twenty two, yet the basic modes do never exceed the number seven. The basic seven modes/ways enumerated above are the prototypes of latter seven *bhaṅgas* of what is called *saptabhaṅgi* (the doctrine of seven fold predication). What is to be carefully noticed in this connection is the fact that according to *Bhagavati Sūtra* the joint predication of the attributes 'self' and 'not self' to a monad is not possible because the monad has only one space point. Such predication is only possible of a dyad which

has two space point. Similarly the simultaneous predication of three attributes is only possible in the case of triad which has three space points. The implication of above description is that the joint predication of two contradictory attributes to the same space points is purely a case of 'indescribability' and not an illustration of a dual predication of self and not-self. The dual predication is meaningful only if the object has two parts in order that each individual attribute may find its own accommodation. The later Jain philosophers, however, did not find any difficulty in such predication, and they made the dual predication ('is' and 'is not' used by them in place of 'self' and 'not-self') irrespective of the non composite or composite character of the object. Some of them also interchanged the positions of the third and fourth attributes.

*Bhagavati Sūtra* has given us a clue to the fact that the behaviour of monad or atom and dyad etc. and molecule or particle is absolutely different. Dr. D.S.Kothari has also stated this fact in his article 'Modern Physics and *Syādvāda*'<sup>26</sup>. Explaining complimentarity principle in *syādvāda* he quotes Bohr's concept of modern physics and stresses upon the very close nature of complimentarity and *syādvāda*. Modern physics has warned us against the dangers of overestimating the value and utility of precise scientific concepts: for example, the fundamental concepts of classical physics no longer hold in quantum mechanics. It was some two thousand years after Euclid that non-Euclidean geometry was discovered in the nineteenth century.

A favourite maxim of Bohr of interest in connection with *syādvāda* is the distinction between the two kinds of truths, *profound truths* and *trivial truths*. For a profound truth its opposite or negation is also a profound truth. For a trivial truth its opposite is false, an absurdity. "The truth of a statement of the highest wisdom is not absolute, but is only relative to a suitable meaning

for the ambiguous words in it, with the consequence that the converse statement also has validity and is also wisdom.” Bohra illustrated this with his statement ‘There is a God’ a statement of great wisdom and truth and the converse. ‘There is no God’ also a statement of great wisdom and truth. (For him who believes that there is no God, his God is ‘no God’. The aspects of God are infinite, inexhaustible, inexpressible). This reminds of an oft quoted dialogue between Lord Mahāvīra and his favourite disciple Gautama.

“Are the souls, O Lord, eternal or non eternal ?”

“The souls, O Gautama, are eternal in some respect and non eternal in some respect.”

“With what end in view, O Lord is it said that the souls are eternal in some respect and non eternal in some respect?” They are eternal, O Gautama, from the view point of substance (*dravya*), and non-eternal from the view point of modes (*pariyāya*) and with this end in view it is said, O Gautama, that the souls are eternal in some respect and non-eternal in some respect.”

“Is the body, O Lord, identical with the soul or is the body different from it ?”

“The body, O Gautama, is identical with the soul as well as it is different from it.”<sup>27</sup>

Talking about the atom and complementarity, the question arises that what is the radically new situation we meet within dealing with atomic phenomena (quantum physics) as distinct from everyday experience (classical physics). When we speak of a ‘table’ or ‘chair’, any meaningful statement and its negation cannot both be correct at the same time. If the statement ‘the chair is in this room’ is correct, then the statement ‘the chair is not in this room’ is false. Both cannot be true at the same time. But this fundamental principle of logic and common sense is, in general violated at atomic phenomena. Atoms in general behave in a

manner completely foreign totally repugnant to common sense and classical logic. Suppose there is an 'atom' in a closed box. The box is divided by a partition into two equal compartments. The partition has a very small hole so that the atom can pass through it. The hole can be closed if desired. According to classical logic the atom can be either in the left compartment (L) or in the right compartment (R). There is no third alternative. But the new physics forces us to admit other possibilities to explain adequately the results of experiments. Dr. Kothari discusses that if we use the word 'box' and 'atom' then there is no escape whatsoever from admitting in some strange way which totally defies description in words- that *the same atom is at the same time in both the compartments*. What we are speaking of is not a case of the atom being sometimes in the left compartment and sometimes in the right compartment, but being in both the compartments at the same time. It is an idea crazy beyond words. And so it is, but there is no escape.

Consider the 'box' and 'atom' situation a little further. We suppose a beam of light illuminating the box (which we may take to be transparent) and we study the angular distribution of the intensity of light scattered by the atom in the box. We make three experiments. Firstly, the atom is placed in L with the hole closed; secondly, the atom is placed in R with the hole closed and thirdly, the atom is placed in the box with the hole open so that it can move freely in the whole box. The observed intensity distribution of light for the third case is truly astonishing. The intensity distribution is not a mixture, a sum, of distributions for the first and the second case, the composition of the mixture depending on the fraction of time spent by the atom in each of the two compartments. The distribution is infact altogether different. It shows an interference feature which can be only explained by assuming that the incident light is scattered from the atom present at the same time in both the compartments. The atom is, in some



strange way, in the two compartments at the same time. It shows in this case a behaviour fundamentally different from that of a 'particle'. A particle cannot be at two places at the same time. The new aspect of the atom revealed in the third experiment is called the 'wave aspect'. A wave fills all available space. Totally unlike large objects objects on the atomic scale show a dual aspect, a particle aspect and a wave aspect. The two aspects which are totally contradictory in every day experience are complimentary at the level of atoms.

Why so? Because nature is so consituated that experiments which demonstrate the particle aspect and those which demonstrate the wave aspect are *mutually incompatible*. We can have only the one set up or the other, and never the two can be combined or built together into some super apparatus to demonstrate both the aspects at the same time. What is that makes these experiments mutually incompatible? It arises from the far-reaching and totally unexpected, fact that an act of observation even an ideal observation supposed to be made with 'perfect' instruments is inevitably accompanied by a certain minimum disturbance. The disturbance cannot be eliminated, cannot be analysed or allowed for. It is inherent in the nature of things. It disturbs in an unpredictable way, the state of system under observation. We cannot even think of an experiment- a thought experiment, as it is called- that can be made free of the concomitant minimum uncertainty. According to *syādvāda* logic this fact is placed positively that the reality has inherent infinite attributes. No one is able to observe at a time or speak at a time all the attributes of really existing thing. One can only perceive or speak any one attribute at a time with particular view point not denying the remaining attributes. Observer's view point is important. Linguistic terminology always follow it.

The physical example of the atom and the box described

earlier is presented diagrammatically and compared with the seven modes of *syādvāda*.

***Seven modes of syādvāda and ‘atom’-‘box’ example***

Atom in box L= Left; R= Right			Syādvāda models of description
1.	<div>-----</div> <div>-----</div> <div>L                  R</div>	Atom in L Compartment	Existence (Atom in L)
2.	<div>-----</div> <div>-----</div> <div>L                  R</div>	Atom in R Compartment	Non-existence (Atom not in L)
3.	<div>-----</div> <div>-----</div> <div>L                  R</div> <div>Non visuali- sable</div>	Atom in both Compartment at the same time.	Avyakta (Inexpressibility)
4.	<div>-----          -----</div> <div>-----          -----</div> <div>L                  R                  L                  R</div> <div>Cases 1 and 2 at different times or two similar boxes at the same time.</div>		Existence and Non- existence
5.	3 and 1 at different times or two boxes at the same time.		Avyakta and Existence.
6.	3 and 2 at different times or two boxes at the same time.		Avyakta and Non-existence.
7.	3 and 4 at different times or three boxes at the same time.		Avyakta and Existence & Non-existence.

*Syādvāda* demands that in the very nature of things the negative of the given statement is also correct. Suppose 'A' is a meaningful statement, 'not-A' will be the negative statement of 'A'. The conditions under which the two statements, 'A' and 'not-A', are correct cannot ofcourse be the same. In general the respective conditions are mutually exclusive. Given a statement 'A', it may not be at all easy to discover the conditions or situations under which 'not-A' holds. It may even appear at the time impossible. But faith in *syādvāda* should keep us on to continue the search. The *syādvāda*, indispensable for ethical and spiritual quest and for *ahimsā* (non violence), is also of the greatest value for the advancement of natural sciences. Reflections on application of *anekāntavāda* and examples of *syādvāda* can be seen in Appendix 1.

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4. 'Anekānta', Dr. Nathmal Tatia, *Tulsi Prajñā*, Vol.IV, Nos. 7-8, pp.113 etc.
5. *Samkejjā ya' samkitabhavabhikkhu*,  
*Vibhajjavayam ca viyagarejja*.  
*Bhāsāduyam dhamma samutthitehim*,  
*viyagarejja samaya supanne*.  
*sūtrakṛtāṅga sūtra*, I/14/22.
6. *Anādiyam parinnaya, anavadaggeti va puno sasayamasasaye va iti diṭṭhim na dharaye*.  
*Eehim dohim tthanehim vavahāro na vijjai*  
*Eehim dohim tthanehim anayaram tu janae sūtrakṛtāṅga sūtra*, II/5/2,3.
7. "Jadatthi nāma loge tam savvam dupaoaram tam jahā jivacceva ajivacceva....." *sthānāṅga sūtra*, II/1/57.

8. *Evameyani jampamta bala pandiamanino niyayaniyayam santam ayananta abuddhiya sūtrakṛtāṅga*, I/1/2/4.
9. “Se nunam bhante! savvapanehim..... java siya dupacchakkhayam bhawati” *Bhagavati Sūtra*, VII/2/271.
10. *Bhagavati Sūtra*, XII/2/18/1,2.
11. “.... Goyama! Saviriyavi aviriyavi...” *Bhagavati Sūtra*, I/8/71.
12. “... Goyama! Siya saindiya vakkamai, siya anindie vakkamai, ...” *Bhagavati sūtra*, I/7/61.
13. “... na ya’siyavaya viyagarejja” *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*, I/14/19.
14. *Bhagavati Sūtra*, II/1/45.
15. *Bhagavati Sūtra*, II/10/126.
16. *Bhagavati Sūtra*, XIX/9/102.
17. *Bhagavati Sūtra*, XIV/7/80.
18. *Bhagavati Sūtra*, XIV/4/49-50.
19. *Bhagavati Sūtra*, VIII/2/58-59.
20. *Bhagavati Sūtra*, VIII/3/93-94.
21. *Samtaim pappa te’nai apajjavasiavi a tthiim paducca saia sapajjavasia vi a*
22. *Bhagavati Sūtra*, XVIII/6/108.
23. “Naigame samgahe vavahare.....” *Sthānāṅga*, VII/3/552.
24. *Bhagavati Sūtra*, XII/10/211-226.
25. *Bhagavati Sūtra*, XII/10/469.
26. *Jeet Abhinandana Grantha*, II part, pp. 187-199.
27. Tatia, Nathmal, *Studies in Jaina Philosophy*, Jain Cultural Research Society, Benaras, 1951, pp. 22-23.

## Appendix-1

Reflections on application of *Anekāntavāda*:

1. Many words have same meaning, one word may have many meaning, both is possible.
2. Knowing objects means (a) knowing what general class it belongs to (b) knowing what specific class and name it holds. (c) knowing as many possible qualities / attributes out of infinite attributes or objects. (d) knowing similarities and dissimilarities of qualities / attributes.
3. Knowing an object means by what view point what quality of object has been perceived as existing or as non-existing or as both.
4. Process of identification is the process of classification.
5. Process of perception is process of discrimination.
6. Wise knows that he does not know everything.
7. (a) Coming of day into existence is possibly because night exists.
- (b) There is an aspect of 'permanent' because temporary aspect exists.
- (c) Coming of black into existence is possible because white exists.
- (d) Some objects are called living beings because some objects are non-living beings.
- (e) Any two objects have similar as well as dissimilar aspect from each other.
- (f) Object can be identified by classification of opposite aspects.
- (g) Reality of object, view point of observer and terminology depend upon each other. *Anekāntavāda* affirms the theory of relativity as operating by *syādvāda*.

Example of *syādvāda* (approach to fundamental problem)

**Determinism and Free will-**

**Two contradictory facts :-**

- (a) One knows by direct incontrovertible experience that it is one's own self that directs the motion of one's body; and because of this freedom arises moral responsibility for one's action.
- (b) The body functions are a pure mechanism according to the Laws of Nature.



## 2

### **Śrāvakācāra : Code of Conduct of a Householder**

Who is a Śrāvaka ? The word Śrāvaka(a house holder or a lay man ) is used in a special sense in Jainism. Generally speaking a Śrāvaka is a person who has acquired a right faith (*Samyagdarśana*) in the spiritual categories like soul, karma, rebirth, enlightenment and emancipation. The *Uttarādhyayana* defines *samyaktva* as belief in nine categories.<sup>1</sup> In *Darśanapahuda*, *Kundakunda* also defines *samyagdarśana* as a firm belief in the six substances and nine categories.<sup>2</sup> In *Mokṣapahuda*, *samyagdarśana* is defined as belief in *dharma* devoid of violence, in faultless deity and in the way of life prescribed by the omniscient.<sup>3</sup> In *Niyamasāra* *samyagdarśana* is explained as a belief in liberated souls, Jaina scriptures and Jaina principles.<sup>4</sup> In *Mūlācāra*, the *samyagdarśana* is defined as belief in Nine categories.<sup>5</sup> Svāmikārtikeya added belief in non-absolutism as a condition for *samyagdarśana*.<sup>6</sup> He held that the nature of nine categories cannot be rightly ascertained without the help of *Pramāṇa* and *naya*. *Umāsvāti*, who is followed by *Amṛtacandrācārya* and *Nemicandra Siddhāntacakravartī*, defines *samyagdarśana* as belief in the seven predicaments of Jainism.<sup>7</sup> *Samyagdarśana* defines *samyagdarśana* as a belief in true deities, true scripture and true teachers as against the three follies of belief in pseudo-deva, pseudo-belief and pseudo-teacher. *Samyagdarśana* also speaks of the eight essentials of right faith and the necessary of freedom from eight types of pride for a

right believer.<sup>8</sup> Vasunandī in his Śrāvākācāra says that in addition to belief in seven predicaments, *samyagdarśana* includes belief in liberated soul and Jaina scriptures.<sup>9</sup> rightly Criterion of Right faith according to Jainism is the manifestation of the following characteristics: calmness or tranquility (*praśama*), disgust at the worldly activities and aspirations after freedom (*saṁvega*), absence of hankering (*nirveda*), compassion (*anukāṁpā*) and belief in life here after and the existence of soul, Karman etc. (*āstikya*).

The *Tattvārthasūtra* speaks of following five transgressions of *samyagdarśana*

- (i) Śaṅkā (doubt)
- (ii) Ākāṅkṣā (desire)
- (iii) Vicikitsā (repulsion)
- (iv) Anyadr̥ṣṭipraśaṁsā (Admiration of followers of other creeds)
- (v) Anyadr̥ṣṭisaṁstava (praise of followers of other creeds).<sup>10</sup>

The fourth transgression differs from the fifth in as much as the former means secretly thinking admiringly of wrong believers, whereas the latter means announcing the praise of wrong believers loudly.<sup>11</sup>

The existence of the jewel of right faith, although extremely subtle, owing to being a condition of soul, may be inferred from these qualities. Right faith is the starting point of the life of a Śrāvaka. The *Ācārāṅga Sūtra* brings out the moral significance of right faith with great emphasis when it says, "He who right faith commits no sin."<sup>12</sup> The discipline to be observed by him is based on the right view if things in the absence of which the discipline becomes only a formal practice without any meaning or content. Faith may differ from religion

to religion. But without it, a religion is meaningless. The *Rgveda* praises faith (*śraddhā*)<sup>13</sup>. The *Chāndogyopaniṣad* asks us to be faithful.<sup>14</sup> The *Gītā* says that only the faithful attains knowledge.<sup>15</sup> We find a further development of this idea of faith in the *Bhaktisūtra* of *Nārada* and *Śaṅḍilya*. In *Vedānta*, *Rāmānujācārya* held that salvation is not possible by knowledge, as held by *Śaṅkara*, but by *bhakti*.<sup>16</sup> Thus we find that the importance of faith has been impressed throughout the history of Indian culture. The essence of a religion is determined by the nature of the faith uphold in it. The moral code of a religion is necessarily based on the nature of the faith propounded there. The mental and moral discipline prescribed for a layman, *Śrāvaka* in Jainism is inspired by the criterion of faith noted above. The firmness of a *Śrāvaka*'s belief is indicated by the following eight qualities :-

1. *Niśśaṅkita* (Absence of doubt about scriptures)
2. *Niḥkāṅkṣita* (having no desire for the worldly pleasures)
3. *Nirvicikitsā* (absence of doubt about the attainments of spiritual path).
4. *Amuḍhadṛṣṭi* (no confusion about the ideal)
5. *Upabṛmhana* (Augmenting the spiritual qualities).<sup>17</sup>
6. *Sthirikaraṇa* (Re-establishing those who deviate from truth)
7. *Vātsalya* (Sense of brotherhoods towards the followers of the right path)
8. *Prabhāvanā* (Preaching the importance of truth)

It would be observed here that the first five characteristics pertain to the individual life of the aspirant whereas the last three pertain to the social aspect of religion.

**The awakening of faith** : the spiritual awakening of a person sometimes takes place after a prolonged association with saints and study of religious literature. It can also take place spontaneously without any effort<sup>18</sup>. This awakening is called *samyagdarśana* i.e. right view of things. This right view is technically called *samyagdarśana* which is taken as right faith. Faith, in essence, is a kind of knowledge, based on the vision of truth. In Jainism, this faith is explained as the consequence of lessening of the intensity of the passions of anger, pride, deceit and greed. The passions have a deluding faith. They act as impediments to spiritual awakening. These impediments are due to *karma*, which cover and mutilates the inherent qualities of the soul. A detailed process of the elimination of the effects of the karma also is given as a doctrine in *Guṇasthāna*, the stages of spiritual development, in the philosophical literature of Jainism. With the awakening of initial enlightenment, a person acquires the basic qualification of a *Śrāvaka*. He is qualified for the higher spiritual life of a layman. A brief account of the rules and regulations to be observed and practiced by a *Śrāvaka* is given below :

The *Aṇuvrata*, their makeshift character vis-à-vis *mahāvratas* : the most important vows to be undertaken by a *Śrāvaka* are called *aṇuvratas* which are five in number. These are derived from the five *Mahāvratas* practiced by the Jain monastic order. A full observance of a *vrata* requires that the act prohibited by it should not be done, or cause to be done or approved of : and also it should not be done by mind, speech and body. This is technically called a *vrata* pure in nine ways, that is three ways of doing multiplied by three organs of doing. This is the observance par excellence, which is essential for a monk or a nun. In the case of *Śrāvaka* this nine fold observance is not compulsory, as he is allowed to observe the vows as thoroughly as he can. Thus generally a *Śrāvaka* is required to

restrain his mind, speech and body in doing a work or getting it done. It is not necessary for him to abstain from giving his consent to what is being done.

Unlike the *mahāvratas* which are sometimes four only as in the times of the twenty two *Teerthaṅkaras* preceding *Mahāvīra*, the *aṇuvratas* are always five. As regards the meaning of 'aṇu' in the word *aṇuvrata*, it stands for partial as distinguished from 'mahā' Meaning full. It is said that the *aṇuvratas* are so called because they are minor (*laghu*) *vratas* as compared, with the *mahāvratas* which are major vows. An *aṇuvrata* moreover is practiced by a person in a lower *guṇasthāna*, compared to a monk established in a higher *guṇasthāna*. The *aṇuvratas* are thus only a makeshift arrangement subject to up gradation according to the ability of the observer.

As distinguished from the *mahāvratas* the *aṇuvratas* are concerned only with the abstinence from causing injury to gross living being (two sensed or higher organisms).

In the case of *vratas* other than *Ahiṃsā* the implication of the *aṇuvratas* are to be explained differently in order to distinguish them from the corresponding *mahāvratas*. The five *aṇuvratas* are regarded as the *mūlaguṇa* in the *svetāmbara* tradition.

The eight *mūlaguṇas* in Digambara tradition : the earlier Digambara Ācāryas like Samantabhadra & Jinasena included the five *aṇuvratas* in their list of *mūla guṇas*. But Amṛtacandra & others gave a different list, which mentioned abstinence from the five udumbers. The remaining three *mūlaguṇas* which are common to all the digambara list are abstinenes from meat, alcohol and honey. Jinasena and others mentioned gambling instead of honey.

In addition to the five *mūla guṇas* mentioned above

there are even *uttara guṇas*, which are divided into two groups namely *guṇavratas* and *śikṣāvratas*. The terms *mūla guṇa* and *uttara guṇa* are explained with reference to the imaginary of a big tree the former being roots and the later the body of the tree nourished by the roots.

### Twelve *vratas* :

***Ahiṃsā anuvrata***- this *vrata* occupies the most important position in the moral code of the *Jainas*. Absolute *ahiṃsā* is possible only for the monks who live an extremely austere life, denying themselves of all comforts and amenities of life. The life of lord Mahāvira described in the IX Chapter of the *Ayaro* is an example of the practice of absolute *ahiṃsā* as understood by the *Jainas*. The *ahiṃsā vrata* observed by a Śrāvaka is imperfect, because for him it is not possible to avoid all kinds of *hiṃsā* for instance he has to do agriculture and other work which necessarily involve injury to living organisms. Such *hiṃsā* is called *arambhaja*, which is not committed intentionally.

A Śrāvaka, however, is prohibited from inflicting injury to life with a motive. The motivative *hiṃsā* is called *saṅkalpaja*, which is strictly prohibited in Jainism. This implies that any profession or occupation that involves intentional *hiṃsā* is unworthy of being adopted by a Śrāvaka. Even in the event of *arambhaja hiṃsā*, a Śrāvaka should be extremely careful in order to avoid unnecessary injury to living organisms. In brief a Śrāvaka is required to avoid all sorts of *hiṃsā*, that are avoidable and as regards the unavoidable ones he should be extremely careful and vigilant in order to avoid *hiṃsā* as far as possible.

A householder is likely to destroy living organisms in five places namely oven (*cūlhā*), grinder (*cakkī*), broom (*Jhāḍu*), pestle (*mūsala*) and martar (*okhalī*) and water pot.<sup>19</sup> This involve

what is called *āraṁbha*. The householder moreover has *parigraha* consisting of animate and inanimate things. He can not avoid *araṁbha* and *parigraha*, and consequently he can not ordinarily do without minor *himsā*. In other words his observance of the *ahimsā* vrata is of necessity partial (*aṇu*). This partially has a long range starting from the abstinence from doing an act through body (*ekavidhaṁ ekavidhena*) upto the abstinence from doing, getting done and approving of an act done through the mind or the speech or the body (*trividhaṁ trividhena*). In the case of the abstinence which is *trividhaṁ trividhena* the householder reaches the perfection of abstinence which is very much like that of a monk.

A very interesting question arises in the case of *trividhaṁ trividhena*, which has exercised the intelligence of *Umāsvāti*, his commentator *Siddhasenagaṇi* and also *Haribhadra*. The *Āvaśyakaniryukti* have not mentioned *trividhaṁ trividhena* where as in the *Bhagavatisūtra* itself this is clearly admitted. This discrepancy between the original āgama and the *niryukti* has been softly removed by the three authors just mentioned. The problem is solved with reference to a *Śrāvaka* who has established himself in the eleventh stage of *Uvasaga Padima* but has not finally decided to renounce the world to become a monk in order that he may be able to look after his progeny on the completion of the padima.

Another instance of *Trividhaṁ Trividhena* is provided with reference to *Prāṇātipāta* of fish in the *Swamabhuranana* ocean which is beyond the reach of the *Śrāvaka* and his associates.<sup>20</sup>

A *Śrāvaka* is also called *Aagāri* (house holder), who has accepted the *Aṇuvrata*.

Amritcandra has refuted the arguments of the thinker who supported *Himsā* to satisfy the duties of hospitality and

propitiate gods.<sup>21</sup> It is also wrong to destroy ferocious creatures in the belief that by doing so other creatures will be saved. Creatures should not be killed with a view to save them from a state of wretchedness, thinking that death will relieve them their misery.

Haribhadra and Hemcandra are the mediaeval Svetāmbar authorities who deal great length the problem of *Ahimsā* with reference to the *ahimsā vrata* of the house holder. Haribhadra narrates a parable to illustrate a monk's attitude to the *Aṇuvrata* of *Ahimsā*, which is given below in the words of R. William : "The wives of a certain king obtained permission from their husband to leave the women's quarters and visit the city by night. To ensure that they could do so unmolested he gave order that all the men of the city should be outside the walls by dusk. However, the six sons of a merchant were detained by some business in their counting house and failed to leave. They were arrested and condemned to death. Their father besought the king for pardon but was only able to obtain the release of the youngest one by a reasoned plea to the ruler. Here the sons who were executed are the Jīva-Nikāyas<sup>22</sup> stationary animate beings (the earth organisms, the water organisms, the fire organisms, the air organisms and the plant organisms) and the released one is *transa-jīve* (from two sensed to five sensed living beings), the father is the *Sādhu*, and his plea is his exposition of the *dharma* at the time that the layman takes the *aṇuvratas*. He knows that the Śrāvaka will not be able to spare the lives of all living beings and so he attempts to save at least most of them.

An account of the *aticāras* of this *vrata* is given which are five in number namely :-

- (1) *Bandh*- keeping is captivity (2) *vaha* (vadha) beating
- (3) *Chaviccheda*-multilating (4) *Aibhara* (Atibhara) overloading



(5) *Bhattapānavuchcchheda* depriving of food and drink. As regards *bandh*, it is asserted that it is an *aticāra* only when done out of anger, bad intention, cruelty, mercilessly, without purpose.<sup>23</sup> If done with due care and a beneficial motive, for instance opening the swollen leg of a person suffering from elephantiasis (*padvalmieka*), it is not a case of *aticāra*. The ultimate cause of *aticāra* of overloading is the excessive greed for earning more than what is due.<sup>24</sup> Regarding depriving of food and drink, it is laid down that it is an *aticāra* only when this is done without any cause. It is not however *aticāra* if done for the moral good of a disciple or the physical benefit of a patient suffering from fever.<sup>25</sup> It is the intention that place an important role. If a person is very careful in his movement and has no intention to kill, he is a perfect observer of this *vrata*, thus if a monk, practicing *eryasamiti*, inadvertently kills an insect he does not bind any *karma*. It is considered as a case of *Dravyahiṃsā* as opposed to *Bhāvahiṃsā*, which is committed by an evil intention. The very intention to kill is *hiṃsā* even though no physical violence has been perpetuated.

*Somadeva*, Like *Umāsvāti*, has emphasized the positive aspect of *ahiṃsā* by incorporating the concepts of *Maitrī*, *Pramoda*, *Kāruṇya* & *Mādhyasthya* in this context. *Maitrī* according to him stands for any kind of activity that is intended to avoid any cause of suffering to anybody. *Pramod* means humble affection for a person superior in the qualities of austere and self restraint life. *Kāruṇya* stands for a disposition towards helping the poor and the needy. *Mādhyasthya* means a balanced attitude free from elation or anger. There is no act which is absolutely free from *hiṃsā*, it is only the intention that matters. It is on account of intention that a fisherman is sinner even when he is not catching fish and a cultivator is free from sin even when actually engaged in cultivation. There is indeed a gulf of difference between the psychic states of two persons-

one touching his mother and other his wife.<sup>26</sup>

The varieties of acts that are responsible for karmic bondage are given as thirteen in the *Samavāyāṅga*, the same are found in the *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* also. These activities are committed in various ways as described below :-

- |                                  |   |
|----------------------------------|---|
| 1. <i>Atthadaṇḍa</i>             | violence committed for one's interest                             |
| 2. <i>Anatthadaṇḍa</i>           | violence committed without a personal interest                    |
| 3. <i>Himsādaṇḍa</i>             | violence committed slaying.                                       |
| 4. <i>Akanhadaṇḍa</i>            | violence through accident   |
| 5. <i>Ditthivippariasiadaṇḍa</i> | violence committed by an error of sight                           |
| 6. <i>Musāvāyavattiya</i>        | violence committed through lying                                  |
| 7. <i>Adinnadānavattiya</i>      | violence committed taking what is not freely given                |
| 8. <i>Ajjhatthiya</i>            | violence committed through a mere conceit                         |
| 9. <i>Mānavattiya</i>            | violence committed through pride                                  |
| 10. <i>Mittadosavattiya</i>      | violence committed through bad treatment of one's friends         |
| 11. <i>Māyāvattiya</i>           | violence committed through deceit                                 |
| 12. <i>Lobhavattiya</i>          | violence committed through greed                                  |
| 13. <i>Iriyāvattiya</i>          | violence committed through actions referring to a religious life. |

Here the first kind of violence is prompted by a motive. The **second** is not prompted by personal interest. It is absolutely devoid of any purpose, being done simply on account the habit

of cruelty. In the **third** type of violent act, a person kills movable and immovable beings or get them killed or consents to another killing them.

This happens when a man thinks that someone has hurt or is hurting or will be hurting to one of his people or somebody else or one of that people. The **fourth** kind of prompting violence in accident is called accidental. In this case the person kills somebody not intended to be killed. Thinking that he will kill the deer, he kills partridge or a duck or a quail or a pigeon or a monkey. Here instead of one being he hurts another, therefore he is the accidental killer. The **fifth** kind of violence through an error of sight. It takes place when a man mistakes a friend for his enemy and kills him. This is usually case when during a riot an honest citizen is mistaken for rioter and killed. The **sixth** act is concerned with lying. It is not a kind of *danḍa* violent activity resulting in physical injury as in the aforesaid five act, yet it is a sinful (*savadya*) act like them. The **seventh** kind of committing sins relates to what is not freely given. This is the case takes what is not given to him. The **eighth** kind of committing sin is due to the person himself, even in the absence of any provocation from outside, being simply on account of the persons own anger, pride, deceit and greed. Such a person feels anger, grief and anxiety by nature without any sufficient external cause. The **ninth** sinful act springs from pride on account of the hostfulness in respect of caste, family, power, beauty, penance, scripture's knowledge, gain, lordship and wisdom or any other resulting in slighting, blaming, abusing revealing others and extolling oneself. The **tenth** kind of committing sin is concerned with bad treatment meted out to wants friends. This is the case when a man severely punishes even the smallest offence of his relatives. The **eleventh** kind of committing sin is related to deceit. This is the case when a person believes himself different from what he is. Asked about one thing, he

anxious about another. He speaks different from what he has spoken. A deceitful man does not confess his deceit. He is generally not trusted. He blames and revives the person whom he has deceived.

The twelfth kind of committing sin is related to greed. This is specially concerned with the heretical modes who live in woods, in huts, about villages or practice some secret rites, or not well controlled, not do they well abstain from slaying all sorts of living beings and employ speech that is true and untrue at the same time. They consider themselves superior to others and wish to be treated with reverence and honour, compared to others whom they consider inferior. This category of sin is committed by a special class of people held above the common people who are householders.

The above mentioned twelve kinds of sins should be well-understood by a pious śramaṇa or brāhmaṇa as Sāṃparāyika which leads to worldly life contrary to this is another category of *karman* which is called *iriyāvahiya*. It is the subject matter of the **thirteenth** kind of *karman* which is explained in some detail with reference to *samiti* and *guptis* and perfectly careful conduct of the *monastic* community. Such activity is called *iriyavahiya* because it is a pure activity which does not effect the spirituality of the soul. It causes bondage in the first moment, it is realized in the second and falls in the third moment. This is an account of the activity of a soul that has achieved spiritual perfection, though still living in a world and leading a mundane life.

**Satya aṇuvrata** - the second *aṇuvrata* namely the *Satyavrata* is defined as abstinence from untruth spoken out of lust or hatred and also from truth if it leads to the destruction of living beings.<sup>27</sup> Even the truthful utterance that is harsh and likely to lead to holocaust or harm the feelings of respectful

persons is also considered as untruth.<sup>28</sup>

The most primitive aspect of this vow is preserved in the earlier *Āvaśyaka* literature. *Siddhasenagaṇi* also mentions these aspects. The *sthūlasatyavratā* consists in abstinence from the untruth like speaking of an unchaste as chaste or vice versa (*kannaliya*); a cow giving meager quantity of milk as one giving a larger quantity and vice-versa (*govaliya*); a unfertile land as fertile and vice-versa (*bhomaliya*); appropriation of a dispositive (*nansavahara thapanamoso*) and witnessing to the truth of an untrue event (*kudasakhijje - kudisakha*).<sup>29</sup>

In connection with the *mahāvratā* *Umāsvāti* defines *asat* (in the sūtra - *asadabhidhānamantram*) in three ways namely (i) denial of existence (*sadbhāvapratiṣedha*) (ii) reverse statement (*arthāntara*) (iii) despicable utterance (*garhā*). The first way is of two kinds (a) denial of what is (*bhūtanihanva*) e.g. there is no *ātman*, there is no other world (b) assertion of what is not (*abhūtodbhāvana*) e.g. the soul is of the size of a grain, of millet, of rise, it is of the size of the joint of a thumb, or it is as shining as the sun, or it is devoid of any activity. In the second way the cow is spoken as horse and vice-versa. The third way consists in a speech, even though true, is characterized by violence, harshness, back hitting and so on. In this connection *Siddhasenagaṇi* quotes from the *Daśavaikālika*, VII/2, that one should not speak what is unworthy of speaking (though true), and also what is mixed with untruth and also what is purely untruth. A wise man should not also speak what has not been approved of by the enlighten ones.<sup>30</sup> The five *aticāra* of this *vratā*, given in the *Uvāsagadasāo* are thoughtless slandering (*sahasabbhakkhana*); divulgence of secret talks (*rahasabbhakkhana*); divulgence of ones own wives secret utterance (*sadaramantabheda*); false information (*mosovaese*); producing false document (*kuḍalehakaraṇ*).<sup>31</sup>

In this connection *Abhayadevasūri* remarks that if such acts are committed out of carelessness (*Pramāda*) or on the spur of the moment (*sahasakara*) or thoughtlessly (*Anābhoga*), they are infraction (*Aticāra*) and breaking of the *vrata* if committed under the influence of passion (*akuttya*).

Somadeva gives some positive features of truthfulness. The speech should be free from exaggeration, fault finding and indecency; it should be noble, beneficial and concise.<sup>32</sup>

*Kārttikeya* characterizes this *aṇuvrata* as abstinence from violent speech, harsh and cruel utterance or secret speech; it proves of beneficial and balanced language that gives satisfactions to all living creatures and reveals the true nature of spiritual life.<sup>33</sup>

*Asatya* and *hiṃsā* are intimately related. *Asatya* necessarily leads to *hiṃsā*. *Amritchandra* asserts that all *asatya* implies passionate activity (*pramattayoga*) which lies at the root of *Hiṃsā*.<sup>34</sup>

As soon as a false statement results in violence, it crosses from the stage of *aticāra* to the stage of *anācāra* which is infringement of the vow.

**Adattādāna aṇuvrata**-for the *asteya aṇuvrata* (minor vow of non stealing), the objects which can not be stolen are threefold (i) animate (*sacitta*) (ii) inanimate (*acitta*) and (iii) mixture of animate and inanimate. The *Śrāvaka* abstains from the gorss object, which is punishable crime. He does not abstain from small things like grass, fuel, dung etc.<sup>35</sup> kintu sthūlāt Couryaropaṇahetutvena Prasidhat]. The infractions of this vow are following five (i) Tenahada - receiving stolen goods (ii) Takkarppaoga - instigating the thieves (iii) *Virudharajatikkama*-crossing the boundaries of hostile kings (iv) Kuḍatulā-Kudamāna- using false weights and measures (v) *Tathādiruvagavavahāra* = adulteration.<sup>36</sup> All these acts are

genuine case of infraction (*aticāra*), if done frivolously or of the spur of the moment. But they become cases of infringement (*bhaṅga*), if done with serious intention. For instance, simply receiving the stolen goods is a case of *aticāra* but to instigate a thief to steal is a case of *anācāra* or *bhaṅga*.<sup>37</sup>

The interconnection between theft and *himsā* is explained by *Amitagati* in following words. The stealing of the possessions of a person virtually stealing his life because his property is a source of sustenance for him.<sup>38</sup>

Similarly *Aṃrtacandra* says that the appropriation of others property, out of passion like greed is an act of theft which should be considered as violence because it leads to injury to others.<sup>39</sup>

***Svadārāsantoṣa aṇuvrata*** : the fourth *aṇuvrata* is abstinence from sexual relationship with women other ones than own wife.<sup>40</sup>

The infractions of this *aṇuvrata* are five namely (i) *ittariyapariggahiyagamana* – intercourse with woman accepted as wife (ii) *apariggahiyagamana* - intercourse with an unmarried woman (iii) *anaṅgakra* - amorous play (iv) *paravivāhakarāṇa* - match making (v) *kāmabhogativvabhilāsa* – intense feeling for sexual pleasures.<sup>41</sup>

*Haribhadra* quotes from the *Cūrṇi* to say that the *brahmavrata* saves humanity from the danger of promiscuous sexual life that will demolish the social order and turn human being into the brutes.<sup>42</sup>

***Paragrahaparimāṇa aṇuvrata*** - the fifth *sthūla aṇuvrata* is concerned with voluntary limitation of one's desires and ambitions (*icchāparimāṇa*) for worldly possessions.

The *Śrāvaka* takes a vow of not possessing or acquiring animate and inanimate objects beyond the self imposed limits.

He also imposes on himself restriction in respect of the period of possessions and enjoyment of food, clothes, servants, wives etc. In brief this *aṇuvrata* sets a limit to the acquisition of properties which are counted as follows :-

Land and houses, silver and gold, commodities and grain, servant, birds (*dvipāda*)

and live stock (*catuṣpāda*) furniture, crockery and utensils (*kupya*). Ācārya Haribhadra explains the social value of this *aṇuvrata* by asserting that the voluntary limitation (*icchāparimāṇa*) of possessions saves a person from such activities as are harmful to the society. Different persons have different interests and inclinations which they control and restrict in accordance with their capacity by undertaking this vow of voluntary limitation. The outcome of it is a balanced development of social life in its various aspects.<sup>43</sup>

*Digvrata* - *guṇavratas* are meant for further limitation of the activity of the Śrāvaka. The *aṇuvratas* are more or less general principles which are further divided in the *guṇavratas* for instance in the *digvrata*, which is the first *guṇavrata*, a special limitation is imposed. A Śrāvaka can now move in a fixed area by taking the vow of not moving beyond that area. By this *guṇavrata* the scope of violence is circumscribed. This special limitation is applicable to the vertical as well as the horizontal directions.

The infractions of this *guṇavrata* are incurred when the Śrāvaka increases the prescribed limit in one direction, vertical or horizontal by decreasing some distance of the opposite side, thinking that such change is permissible because it does not violate the total distance – *uddadisipamānātikkama*, *ahodisipamānātikkama*, *tiriyadisipamānātikkama*; similar infraction is possible in respect of land also - *khattavuddhi*, on the lapse of memory when the Śrāvaka forgets the limits to be observed by



him – *sai antaraddha*.<sup>44</sup>

**Upabhoga-paribhoga-vrata** - limitation is imposed on *upabhoga*- consumption of food, drinks, sweet, flower, garlands and *paribhoga* – use of clothes, ornaments, beds, seats, house, vehicle etc. In the voluntary imposition of limit, the articles and activities which involve injury to life on a large scale is completely discarded and those which entail insignificant injury are delimited. It should be noted here that this *gunavrata* envisages two classes of thing to be abundant and delimited namely articles of food (*bhojana*) and professions (*karma*). The former includes foods and drinks and delicacies like meat, wine and honey and all other live food. The professions include fifteen items which involve injury to life.<sup>45</sup>

1. *Ingalakamma* - livelihood from charcoal
2. *Vanakamma* - livelihood from destroying plants
3. *Saḍikamma* - livelihood from carts
4. *Bhaḍikamma* - livelihood from transport fees
5. *Phoḍikamma* - livelihood from hewing and digging
6. *Dantavanijja* - trade in animal by products
7. *Lakkhavanijja* - trade in lac and similar substances
8. *Rasavanijja* - trade in alcohol and forbidden food stuffs
9. *Visavanijja* - trade in destructive articles
10. *Kesavanijja* - trade in men and animals
11. *Jantapilanakamma* - work involving milling
12. *Nilāñcchanakamma* - work involving mutilation
13. *Davaggidavanya* - work involving the use of fire
14. *Saradahatalagaparisosanya* - work involving the use of water

15. *Asatijanaposanya* - work involving breeding and rearing

The Śrāvaka is required to accept only those professions which entail the least possible injury to living beings. The *aticāras* of this *guṇavrata* are the following five (i) *sacittahara* - consuming live things (ii) *sacittapadibaddhahara* - consuming what is connected with the live things (iii) *appuliyo-sahibhakkhanaya* consuming uncooked vegetable's products - consuming partly cooked vegetable products (v) *tucchosahiyabhakkhanaya* - a vegetable that is trifle.

The *aticāras* character of this kind of consumption is due to the inadvertence of Śrāvaka in consuming food or drink that falls outside the prescribed limit.<sup>46</sup>

**Anarthadaṇḍa** - the third *guṇavrata* is called *anarthadaṇḍa*. A Śrāvaka should avoid all kinds of purposeless acts of violence. Indulgence in an act, that is not conducive to any of the ends of *dharma*, *artha*, *kāma* and *mokṣa* is a case of *anarthadaṇḍa*.<sup>47</sup>

In this connection four categories of *anarthadaṇḍa* are mentioned namely (i) *avajjhanacarita* - what is done under the influence of bad type of meditation namely *ārta* and *raudra* (ii) *pamayacarita* - what is done on account of indolence (*pramāda*) (iii) *himsāppayana* - what is committed by offering the weapons of violence (iv) *pavakammovadesa* - what is done through to giving instruction in sinful activity.<sup>48</sup>

The infraction of this *guṇavrata* is five (i) *kandappa* - amorous speech (ii) *kukkuiya* - ugly gestures (iii) *mohariya* - garrulity (iv) *sanjuttahikaraṇa* - assembles of harmful weapons implements (v) *uvabhogaparibhogatiritta* - excessive articles of luxury.<sup>49</sup>

**Sāmayika** - the first *śikṣāvrata* (out of four) is *sāmayika*

which means abstinence from all sinful activities for a fixed intended period of time. The nature of *sāmayika* has been explained in the section of *ṣaḍāvaśyaka*. The *sāmayika* has a negative as well as a positive aspect. The negative aspect stands or abstinence from all sinful activities and in its positive aspect it means practice of such activities as are absolutely free from any kind of violence.<sup>50</sup>

The *aticāras* of this *śikṣāvrata* are :

(i) *duppanihana* (ii) *vayaduppanihana* (iii) *kāyaduppanihana* - bad activities of the mind, speech and body, (iv) *samāyassa sati akaranaya* - forgetfulness of the *sāmayika* itself (v) *samāyassa anavattihaya karanaya* - unsteadiness in the *sāmayika*, it also includes interruption of the *sāmayika* before the intended period.<sup>51</sup>

Of these five *aticāras* the first three are done out of lack of attention and the last two on account of passions.<sup>52</sup>

***Desavākāsika*** - the second *śikṣāvrata desavākāsika* which stands for the further curtailment of distance and time limits undertaken by the first *guṇavrata*. This is done daily as distinguished for the first *guṇavrata* which is undertaken for a longer period of time.

Five *aticāras* are (i) *anavanappaoga* - order of something from outside the set distance (ii) *pesavanappaoga* - sending a servant for something from outside the set distance (iii) *saddanuvaya* - communicating by making sounds that go beyond the set limit (iv) *ruvanuvaya* - communicating by making gestures beyond the set limit (v) *bahiyapoggalapakkheva* - communicating by throwing objects beyond the set limit.<sup>53</sup>

The above mentioned five activities are *aticāras* because they involve action at a point beyond the limit set by the *śikṣāvrata*. They are not infringement because there is no actual crossing of the limit, though the purpose is served through

devices considered as proper and admissible.

**Posahovavāsa** - the third śikṣāvrata is *posahovavāsa*, that is fasting on the *pauṣadha* day which stands for the 8<sup>th</sup>, 14<sup>th</sup> and 15<sup>th</sup> day of a fortnight or any other day. On the sacred day Śrāvaka gives up food, starting his fasting from the previous evening and ending till the occur of the next days forenoon milk (thus abandoning four meals in all). The fasting may be longer, avoiding six meals or eight meals and so on. During this period he does not take bath and do not use any kind of cosmetics and garlands or ornaments and desists from all sinful activities and spends the time in yogic posture or lying down on seats and beds made of *kuśagrass* or wooden flake. He remains vigilant and self-aware during the whole length of fasting.<sup>54</sup> The Śrāvaka observes strict celibacy during the period. This *pauṣadhopavāsa* may be observed in full or in part in respect of food, bodily care sexual intercourse, worldly occupation. In respect of *āhāra* the śrāvaka may take once or twice tasteless food *nirvikṛti* or only rice and water (only once) *āyambila* or taking only water. This is partial *pauṣadhopavāsa*. In complete *pauṣadhopavāsa* he abandons from food and drink, similarly the observance can be partial or complete in respect of bodily care, sexual intercourse of worldly occupation.<sup>55</sup>

The five *aticāras* of this śikṣāvrata are :- (i) *appadilehiya duppadilehiya sijjasanthara* - using sleeping place or bed, not examined or examined improperly (ii) *appamajjhiya duppamajjhiya sijjasanthara* - Using a sleeping place or bed not swept or swept improperly (iii) *appadilehiya duppadilehiya uccarpasavanabhumi* - using a place of excretion not examined or examined improperly. (iv) *appamajjhiya duppamajjhiya uccarpasavanabhumi* - using place of excretion not swept or swept improperly. (v) *posahovavāsa(saha)ssa sammam ananupalanaya* - improper performance of the fast.<sup>56</sup>

**Ahasaṁvibhāga** - the fourth *śikṣāvratā ahasaṁvibhāga* (*athisaṁvibhāga*) prescribes that a *śrāvaka* should offer food, drink etc. to monk and *nuns* strictly in accordance with the rules. The items offered must be acceptable to the recipients as per the monastic rules. The things should be properly earned and offered in gratitude towards the monastic order. (1) *sacittanikkhevana* - the first *aticāra* of this *śikṣāvratā* relates to depositing the acceptable food on live articles such as grains and rice etc. with the intention of avoiding the *dāna*. (2) *sacittapihana* - the second *aticāra* is concerned with coveting the alms with living articles, such as fruits, leaves, flowers etc. (3) *kālātikamma* - The 3<sup>rd</sup> *aticāra* is called *kālātikamma*, takes place when the *dāna* is offered either when the time for the monks to eat is over or when the time has not come. (4) *parovaesa* - is incurred when a householder, at the time of breaking his fast after the *paṇṣadhopavāsa*, refuses to offer the alms on the plea that the same belongs to somebody else. (5) *maccharī* - in the fifth *aticāra* the alms is given out of the anger or envy at the monk .

All the above mentioned act of *dāna* the are *aticāras* and not *bhaṅgas* because the donor has the will and eagerness to give but his intention to give is polluted leading to inventing excuses. A genuine *bhaṅga* takes place when the donor is influenced by the *kaṁma* that obstructs the desire to give and as a consequence he does not give and prevents others from giving and also repents after giving an account of the niggardliness.

**Samlekhanā** - at the top of the *samyaktva*, *aṇuvratā* and *śīla* there is the practice of penance of *saṁlekhanā* for attenuation of the body and the passions which a layman as well as a monk or nun undertakes at the end of his life. This penance extends over twelve year in the maximum. It is undertaken by a layman and also a monk or a nun. In the *Uttarādhyayana* the period of twelve years is distributed for

different kinds of penances in the following manner. The first four years the *vikṛtis* are avoided, in the next four years various austerities are observed and the next two years are spent in fasting alternately with *acamla*. (only rice and other grain and water). Of the eleventh year in the first six months he does not practice fasting for more than two days and the next six months he observes longer fasting and during this period he is to break fasting with *acamla*, in the twelfth year a monk (or a laymen) has to engage in *acamla* everyday uninterruptedly. Occasionally during this period he undertakes fortnightly and monthly fasting.<sup>57</sup>

*Siddhasenagaṇi* quotes a verse in which the first four years are assigned to various austerities and the next four years *vikṛtis* are avoided. This is also the order followed in the *digambara* tradition. The *saṁlekhanā vrata* is adopted when the aspirant feels the approach to bad time or physical weakness or any calamity or the approach of death which renders the performance of the necessary duty impossible. In such circumstances he starts fasting. Gradually increasing its length he observes the moral and spiritual discipline as strictly as possible and finally gives up four kinds of elements for the whole life. He now spends his time in the practice of the *anuprekṣā* and the cultivation of self awareness and meditation till death and emancipation from worldly bondage. This type of spiritual life is called *ārāadhanā* which has found elaborate treatment in books like the *Mulārāadhanā*.

The last stage of *saṁlekhanā* is *sanstara dikṣā* or death bed consecration expressed special form of confession (*vikatana*) and reinforcement (*uccharana*) of the vows. The last moment on earth will then be spent in concentration on the *pañca namaskāra* and on the *catuḥsaraṇa* and in meditation on the *anuprekṣā* and all that is covered by the term *ārāadhanā*.<sup>58</sup>

The fasting unto death is undertaken in three different ways namely (1) *padovagamanam* (2) *inginimaranam* (3) *bhattapaccakkhanam*. In the first, the practitioner does not indulge in any kind of movement and remains first as straight as a tree. In this penance the practitioner is prohibited any kind of help or assistance to do any service to himself or get any service done by others. This is the highest kind of fasting for death, which is possible only for a person enjoying best health in respect of *saṁhanana*.

In the **second**, he can move about a fixed area delimited by him voluntary. In this kind of fasting the practitioner can serve himself but can not take service from anybody else. This type of fasting also is possible for a person of good *saṁhanana*. In the **third**, he is free to move about and can take service from others and can serve himself. He can engage a retinue of forty eight waiters for himself who should be monk.<sup>59</sup>

The five *aticāras* of *saṁlekhanā* are :-

- (i) *ihalogasamsappaoga* - desire for a fortunate birth in the human world.
- (ii) *paralogasamsappaoga* - desire for a fortunate birth in reign of gods.
- (iii) *jīvayasamsappaoga* - desire for a long life as an observer of fasting unto death.
- (iv) *maṇasamsappaoga* - desire for quick death.
- (v) *Kāma bhogasamsappaoga* - desire for sexual pleasure accruing from the fasting.<sup>60</sup>

**The three ambitions of a *śrāvaka***

- (1) The first ambition is to prepare for monastic life by giving up all possessions small and big .
- (2) His second ambition is to renounce worldly life and become a monk.

- (3) The third ambition is – practice of and fasting unto death (without any desire of death).<sup>61</sup>

While concluding it will not be out of place to give the **four resting places** or transitional modes of a Śrāvaka-

(i) At the first stage the (Śrāvaka) layman accepts the *aṇuvratas* and *silavrats* and observes them to the best of his capacity . At the next stage he observes the *sāmayika* and the *desavāsāsika* more intensively, which is followed in the third stage, by a meticulous observance of the *pauṣadha* fasting. At the fourth stage, which is the last, he undertakes fasting unto death to attain the highest goal, namely emancipation. These four stages are resting places, or accurate transitional modes.<sup>62</sup>

Ācārya Hemacandra gives a comprehensive list of the qualities of a Śrāvaka who should be :-

- (1) *Nyāyasampannavibhava* - the possessor of honesty wealth.
- (2) *Śiṣṭācārapraśaṁsaka* - appreciative of the conduct of the virtuous.
- (3) *Kulaśīlasamāih sārddham anyagotrajañiḥ kṛtodvāha* - wedded to a spouse of even family traditions and social life, but not of the same *gotra*.
- (+) *Pāpabhīru* - shy of committing any kind of sin.
- (5) *Prasiddham deśācāram samācāram* - observer of the established customs of the country.
- (6) *Avaṁvādi na kvāpi rājādiṣu viśeṣataḥ* - not culminating *ādarśa*, particularly the potentials.
- (7) *Anativyakte gupte sthāne suprativesmika* - dwelling in a place, neither too open nor too secluded with good neighbours and a limited number of exit
- (8) *Sad –ācāraiḥ kṛtasasaṅga* - following moral principles of moral virtues.



- (9) *Mātāpitroh pūjakaḥ* - devoted to parents.
- (10) *Upaplutam sthānam tyajan* - avoiding a place where confession prevails
- (11) *Garhite pravṛtta* - not engage the despicable profession
- (12) *Vyayam ayocitam kurvan* - spending in proportion in one's income
- (13) *Veśam vittānusārataḥ kurvan* - using garments in accordance with one's affluence
- (14) *Aṣṭabhirdhigunairyukta* - Endowed with eight intellectual quality
  - (i) *śuśrūṣā* - desire to listen
  - (ii) *śravaṇa* – listening
  - (iii) *grahaṇa* – understanding
  - (iv) *dhāraṇa* – retention
  - (v) *uha* - logical thinking
  - (vi) *apoha* - discriminative thoughts
  - (vii) *arthavijñāna* - knowledge of the meaning
  - (viii) *tattvavijñāna* - knowledge of the essence
- (15) *Dharmam anvaham śravaṇa* -listening daily to the sacred doctrine.
- (16) *Ajirṇe bhojanatyāgin* - avoiding food in the case of indigestion
- (17) *Kāle bhoktā sātmyataḥ*- Eating at the right time according to a dietary regime.
- (18) *Anyonya pratibandhena trivargaṃ sādhyān* - perusing the three ends of the life namely *dharma*, *artha*, *kāma* striking balance between them.
- (19) *Yathāvād atithou sādhou dine ca pratipattikṛt* - properly distributing charity among the guest, the ascetics and the

needy people after due consideration.

- (20) *Sadānabhiniṣṭa* - always devoid of evil motives.
- (21) *Guṇeṣu pakṣapatin* – favourably disposed to virtues such as benevolence, generosity, readiness to help, patience, and the habit of using courteous and friendly language as well as acts of kindness, as the seed of religious merit etc.
- (22) *Adeśakālayoścaryām tyajan* -avoiding conduct which is inappropriate to time and place.
- (23) *Balābalaṁ jānan* - aware in full of one's strength and weakness.
- (24) *Vṛttasthajñānavṛddhānām pūjaka* - venerating persons of high morality and superior in knowledge.
- (25) *Puṣyapoṣaka* - supporting one's dependants.
- (26) *Dirghadarśin* - far sighted.
- (27) *Viśeṣajña* - adept and discriminating.
- (28) *Kṛtajña* – grateful.
- (29) *Lokavallabha* – likable
- (30) *Salajja* – ashamed of any kind of lapse.
- (31) *Sadaya* – compassionate.
- (32) *Saumya* - gentle in disposition.
- (33) *Paropakṛtikarmattha*- ready to render service to others.
- (34) *Antaraṅgarīṣadvargapariharapārāyaṇa*- intent on avoiding the six internal enemies namely *kāma*- lust, *krodha* - anger, *lobha*-greed, *māna*-pride, *mada*-vainglory, *harṣa*-malicious pleasure.
- (35) *Vaśikṛtendriyagrāma* - master of the sense-organs.<sup>63</sup>

The seven Vices (vyasana) - a śrāvaka should avoid (sapta vyasana) seven vices for living a good social life. They are (i) *dyūta*- gambling (ii) *madya* - drinking alcohol (iii) *māṁsa*

- meat eating (iv) *veśyā* - whoring (v) *mṛgayā* - hunting (vi) *caurya* - thieving (vii) *paradārā* / *parapuruṣa* - adultery.<sup>64</sup>

In the Jain literature there are tales best known in Literature in connection with the seven vices. For gambling the example is *Yudhiṣṭhira*; for *madya* the *yādavas*; for *māṃsa* *Bakarākṣasa*; for *veśyā* *Cārudatta*; for *mṛgayā* *Brahmadatta*; for *caurya* *Shrībhuti*; and for *paradārā* *Rāvaṇa*; while addiction to all seven vices at the same time is personified by *Rudradatta*.<sup>65</sup>

These seven vices are of a later origin. In the *Bṛhatkalpabhāṣya* we find another set of seven *Vyasanās* namely (1) addiction to woman, (2) gambling (3) wine (4) hunting (5) harsh speech (6) harsh punishment and (7) mismanagement of the sources of wealth which primarily apply to the ruling authority of country.<sup>66</sup>

In this connection the *vyasanās* mentioned in the *Manusmṛhitā* deserve attention. There are ten *vyasanās* that are due to lust and there are eight due to anger. A keen addicted to *vyasanās* due to lust is deprived of his wealth and virtues and is deprived of his life if addicted to those arising out of anger.<sup>67</sup> The ten *vyasanās* due to lust are (1) hunting (2) dicing (*Juā*) (3) day dreaming (4) slundering (*parivāda*) (5) addition to woman (6) drinking (7) addiction to dance and (8) music vocal (9) addiction to music instrumental (*Tauryatrikam*) (10) and purposeless loitering (*vṛthātya*).

The eight *vyasanās* due to anger are (1) backbiting (2) rashness (*sahasya*) (3) perfidy (*droha*) (4) jealousy (*irṣyā*) (5) envy (*asūyā*) (6) misappropriation (*arthad- uṣaṇa*) (7) Harsh words and (8) harsh punishments.

**The place of six *Āvaśyakas* in householders life:-**

There appears to have been a controversy about the performance of the six *avasyakas* by a householder. *Ācārya Abhayadevasūri* quotes the following passage from the

*Anuyogadvārasūtra* to support the view that the six *āvaśyakas* are a necessary part of the spiritual life of a layman. Then what the *āvassaya* as essence- *bhāvāvassayam*, which is extra worldly - *lokottaram* ? The *āvassaya* as essence- *bhāvāvassayam*, which is extra worldly, refer to those who are monks- *samana* or nuns - *samanī*, or laymen – *savae* or lay women *saviya* whose mind is fixed on that *āvassaya*, whose colour index is according to that *āvassaya*, whose determination is fixed on that *āvassaya*, whose intense exertion is directed to that *āvassaya* who are attentive to the meaning of that *āvassaya*, whose paraphernalia (body, duster, mouth, cloth etc.) are employed for (the scale of) that *āvassaya*, who are practiced in concentration (of mind) on that *āvassaya*, without diverting their mind to anything else performing the *āvassaya* both times at sunrise and sunset. This is the *āvassaya* as essence, which is extra worldly. This is the *āvassaya* as essence without scriptural knowledge. This the *āvassaya* as essence.<sup>68</sup>

Varieties of *pratikramaṇa* : Five kinds of *pratikramaṇa* :-

- (1) *Āsravadvāra* - these are concerned with the inhibition of the doors of influx of *karma*.
- (2) *Mithyātva* - perversity
- (3) *Kasāya* - passions .
- (4) *Yoga* - activities of body, speech and mind.
- (5) *Bhāva* - tendencies and inclination to perversity etc. indulging by oneself or instigating others or approving of them through body, speech and mind.<sup>69</sup>

**Categories of Śrāvaka** :- There are three categories of *śrāvaka* namely (1) *Pākṣika* (2) *Naiṣṭhika* (3) *Sādhaka* A beginner in the practice of the layman's discipline of partial abstinence from injury to life is a *pākṣika śrāvaka*. The *naiṣṭhika śrāvaka* is one who observes the vows undertake by him in a perfect way without the least violation of the discipline. The *padhaka*

*śrāvaka* is the who has attained perfection in the discipline undertaken by him and spends his life in meditation on the self and becomes a perfect yogin as it were though still a householder.<sup>70</sup>

*Āsādhara* has mentioned the affiliation of the *śrāvaka* to anyone of three *varṇas* namely-*brāhmaṇa*, *kṣatriya*, and *vaiśya*.<sup>71</sup> He further quotes words of the *Jaina ṛsis* which prescribe a full course of a layman disciple beginning from the conception of the womb and ending in the attainment of *nirvāṇa*, accomplished with the necessary mantras and ceremonies.<sup>72</sup>

This reminds us of the injunction of the *Manusmṛti* that only a person who about whom a full course of ceremonies beginning from entry into the womb has been prescribed by means of mantras is entitled to the study of the *śāstra* and no one else.<sup>73</sup> This is a clear evidence of the influence of the Brahmanical social and religious institutions on those of the *Jainas* as who could not remain isolated from the common run of the cultural echoes.

For the person born in Jain family, it is easier to live a life strictly according to the rule and the regulations prescribed in Jainism, But for those who are born in a non Jain family it is necessary to go to a Jain *Ācārya* for entrance into Jainism (*Avatāra*) and then learn the *vratas* for the proper conduct. This is followed by learning the *namaskāra* mantra. This is called *sthānalābha*. There after the false God are expelled by him from his pantheon. This is called *guṇagrāha*. This is followed by listening to the twelve limbed scripture who is called “worship of the respectable” (*pūjārādhyā*). Then he is made to study the meaning of the fourteen *purvas*, which increases his religious merit (*puṇyayajña*). This is followed by the seventh stage strong faith in his own style of the life (*dṛḍhācārya*). Now he comes to the eighth stage by practicing a pratima yoga in the night of an auspicious day, which is called *upayogita*. Finally

at the end of these eight stage, the person becomes qualified for the *upanayana* ceremony.<sup>74</sup> These ceremonies are not available in earlier Jain literature.

Even the *śūdra* were accepted to the Jainas provided he was pure in respect of his conduct (such as abstinence from wine etc.) and his belongings (house, utensils and body).

In the *Mahāpurāṇa* it is said that a person becomes *brāhmaṇa* on account of his observance of the *vratas*. He becomes a *kṣatriya* on account of his yielding weapons (for the protection of the people), a *vaiśya* on account of his earning wealth honestly and a *śūdra* on account of his occupation. A *śūdra* can however reach higher class in society by means of higher profession.<sup>75</sup>

Among the religious duties of a *śrāvaka*, *dāna* and *yajña* find an important place. *Yajña* stands for the worship of the deity. A layman should daily perceive arhat deity in a temple by the ceremony *nityamahā* which stands for worship of the *jina* image with articles like water, sandal paste, husk rice corns (*Akṣata*) etc. or the construction of places of worship or an offer of a village or a house or a land for the temple or paying homage to the *arhat* at three juncture of a day an offering of food to the monks every day with reverence respect. All such religious activities are prescribed in great detail in text composed by *digambara ācāryas*<sup>76</sup>. A householder should take bath before doing the *pūjā*. The *Śrāvaka* should build alms house an hospital for the hungry and the poor and similarly a garden of flowers for offering to the deity. There is no harm in building such places.<sup>77</sup>

All these positive instructions to a house holder are evidently due to influence of the social and religious creeds prevalent in those times among the people with whom the followers of Jainism had intimate cultural bonds.

There is no doubt that Jainism was, in the early phase a religion that discarded all ceremonies and rites that involve any sort of injury to any kind of living being. But in later times, a new outlook grew up according to this the offering of water, rice grains, flower garlands etc. were considered as leading to a prosperous life. This was the firm conviction of the believer in image worship, which has found a clear description in the following statement of *Āśadhara* :- the **water** washing the feet of the *arhat* washes out the sins of the worshipers; the **sandal powder** offered adds to the fragrant of the worshiper's body, the **rice grains** offered are conducive to the preservation of the wealth of the worshipers; the **flower** garland offered qualities the worshiper for the garland of heavenly flowers; the articles like curd, ghee, milk etc. **naivedya** confirm ownership of fortune; the **lamp** adds to the luster of the worshiper; the leads to the prosperity of the offerer; the **fruits** offered leads to the accession of the desired object.<sup>78</sup>

In the daily routine of a house holder the following six items are called

*Satkarma*:-

- (1) *Devapūjā* - worship of the deity represented by the image.
- (2) *Gurupasti* - service rendered to the preceptor.
- (3) *Svādhyāya* - scriptural study.
- (4) *Samyama* - self restraint.
- (5) *Tapa* - susterities and penance and
- (6) *Dāna* - charity.

A *śrāvaka* should offer his daughter in marriage only a person who is a co-religionist in order to preserve the custom of using the *namaskāra mantra* at the time of conception of the child and other rituals.<sup>79</sup> He should take into full consideration the seven qualifications namely; family, conduct, the superiors,

knowledge, wealth, body and fame of the boy of the person.<sup>80</sup>

*Somadeva* has given a universal dictum in order to defend all these social activities of the *Jainas* which apparently are conflict with the traditional negative spirit of early Jainism. The dictum is o the *Jainas* all worldly activities are acceptable provided there is no harm caused to religious faith (*samyaktva*) and the vows undertaken for strict observance.<sup>81</sup>

The *Nitivākyāmṛta* gives the several following benefits of a good married life namely :- pious progeny, unblemished sects, domestic economy, discipline, nobility and pure life, faultless service o deity-twice born-guest and relatives.<sup>82</sup>

The best person is the monk (*anāgāra*) and the observer of the *aṇuvratas* is the second. Next comes the person with right faith but observing no vow And the fourth place is occupied by the person with no faith but observing the *vratas*. The last is the person devoid of right faith as well as the observance of *vratas* and is called the unfit (*apatra*). The results of charity offered to these categories of people differ enormously. The charity given to the first leads to the highest *bhogabhūmi* and so on, while the charity given to the last categories of the people is futile and no avail.<sup>83</sup>

The *Sthānāṅga sūtra* classifies people, so far as their religious discipline is concerned, into four groups.<sup>84</sup> :-

- (1) There are people who have love for the discipline but are not firm in their persuasion.
- (2) There are again those who are firm but have no love for the discipline.
- (3) There are again persons who have love for and firmness in the discipline.
- (4) In the fourth category there are people who have neither love nor firmness in respect of the discipline.



## Foot-note

1. *Uttarādhyayana*, 28/14, 15
2. *Darśanapahūḍa*, 19
3. *Mokṣapahūḍa*, 90
4. *Niyamasāra*, 5
5. *Mulācāra*, 5-6
6. *Kārttikeyānuprekṣā*, 311-12
7. *Tattvārthasūtra*, I/2
8. *Ratkarāṇḍaśrāvākācāra*, 4
9. *Vasunandīśrāvākācāra*, 6
10. *Upāsakadasāṅga*, I/40; *Tattvārthasūtra*, VII/18
11. *Caritrasāra*, p., 7
12. “*Samattadansī na kareī pāvam*”, *Ācārāṅga*, I/3/2.1
13. *Rgveda*, X/151/1.5
14. *Chāndogyopaniṣad*, VI/12.3
15. “*Śraddhāvān labhate jñanam*”, *Gītā*, IV/39
16. Radhakrishnan, S., *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. II, p., 70
17. *Puruṣārthasiddhyupāya*, 26
18. “*Tannisargādadhigamād vā*”, *Tattvārthasūtra*, I/3
19. *Manusmṛti*, III/68
20. *Bhagavatisūtra*, VIII/5/239; *Śrāvakaprajñapti*, p., 207; *Tattvārthādhi-  
gamasūtrabhāṣāṭīkā*, II, p., 85; *Haribhadravṛtti on Āvaśyakaniryukti*,  
pp. 805-806
21. “The God Svāyambhu has created the animals for offering them in  
the sacrifices. Therefore, killing them for the rituals is considered  
non killing”, *Manusmṛti*, 39, 44; *Mahābhārata*, *vana parva*, III/  
199.5; “plants, trees, cattles and other animals, birds etc. attain  
higher existence, when they are killed for the sacrificial purposes”,  
*Manusmṛti*, 40
22. *Śrāvakaprajñapti*, p.152; *Pañcāsaka*, p., 16
23. *Yogaśāstra*, III/90
24. *Charitrasāra* in *Śrāvākācārasaṅgraha*, Vol. I, p. 239
25. *Tattvārthādhi-  
gamasūtra Bhāṣya Tīkā*, Part II P. 104; *Pañcāsaka* p.  
17; *Āvaśyaka-chūrṇi*, p. 285.
26. *Upāsakādhyayana*, gāthā, 334-342.
27. *Vasunandī Śrāvākācāra*, gāthā 210
28. *Daśavaikālika*, VII/11
29. *Śrāvakaprajñapti*, p., 154
30. *Tattvārthādhi-  
gama Sūtra Bhāṣya*, p., 73

31. *Uvāsagadasāo*, I/33
32. *Yaśastilakacampū*, VIII/107
33. *Kārttikeyānuprekṣā*, gāthā, 32-33
34. “*Sarvasmīnnapyaśmīn Pramattayogaikahetukathanāni yat. Anṛtavacane pi tasminniyatam himsā samavatarati*”, *Puruṣārthasiddhyupāya*, 99
35. “*Adattādānānna sarvasmāt kintu sthūlāt cauryarop-aṇahetutvena prasiddhāt*” *Tattvārthādhigama- Bhāṣya Ṭika*, II, p. 87
36. *Uvāsagadasāo*, I/34
37. “*Aticārāt cāsyā sāksāccauryapravṛtteḥ*”, *Upāsaka-daśāṭikā*, p.31
38. “*Yo yasya haraṭi vittam sa tasya jīvasya jivitaṃ harati. Āśvāsakaram bāhyam jivanam jivitaṃ vittam.*”, *Amitagatiśrāvakācāra*, VI/61.
39. “*Avitṛṇasya grahaṇam parigrahasya pramattayogād yat. Tatpratyeeyam steyam saiva ca himsā vadhasya hetutvāt*”, *Puruṣārthasiddhyupāya*, 102
40. “*Tathā maithunād na sarvasmāt, kintu sthūlāt, sthūlam ca paradārāgamanam, tadviṣayamasya, pratyākhyānam, anyapakṣeṇa*” *Tattvārthādhigama- Bhāṣya Ṭikā*, II, p.87
41. *Uvāsagadasāo*, I/35.
42. “*Cauthe anuvrate ...*” *Āvaśyakacūṛṇi*, p. 823
43. “*Ichhāparimāṇam khalu asyārambhavinivṛtisaṃjanagam khettaivatthuvīsayam cittadavirohao cittam*”, *Pañcāśaka*, I/17
44. *Uvāsagadasāo*, I/38
45. *Uvāsagadasāo*, I/38
46. *Upāsakadaśāṭikā*, p.41
47. *Tattvārthādhigama- Bhāṣya Ṭikā*, II, p. 91
48. *Uvāsagadasāo*, I/30
49. *Uvāsagadasāo*, I/39
50. “*Sikkhavayam tu etthaṃ samaiyamo tayam tu vinneyam. Savajjeyara jogana vajjana sevannaruvam*”, *Pañcāśaka*, 25
51. *Uvāsagadasāo*, I/40
52. *Upāsakadaśāṭikā*, p.48
53. *Uvāsagadasāo*, I/41
54. *Uvāsagadasāo*, I/41
55. *Āvaśyakaṭikā*, p. 836
56. *Uvāsagadasāo*, I/42
57. *Uttarādhyayana*, XXXVI/251-55; *Ts Bh T II/p.94; Bhagavati ārādhana*, 255-56.
58. *Yogashāstra*, III/150-51

59. *Bhagavati ārāḍhanā*, 647
60. *Uvāsagadasāo*, I/44
61. *Thānāṅg (Sthānāṅga)*, III/497
62. *Thānāṅg (Sthānāṅga)*, IV/362
63. *Yogasāstra*, 47-56
64. *Vasunandīśrāvākācāra*, 59
65. *Vasunandīśrāvākācāra*, 125-33
66. *Bṛhatkalpabhāṣya*, 134
67. *Manusmṛti*, VII/45-53
68. *Nandisuttam and anuyogadārasūttam*, I/28
69. *Sthānāṅgavṛtti*, p.,/332
70. *Sāgaradharmāmṛta*, I/20
71. “Dvijāḥ dvirjāto mātṛgarbho jīnasamayajñānagarbhe cotpādād dvijo brāhmaṇa-kṣatriya-vaiśyamanyatamaḥ”, *Sāgaradharmāmṛta*, p., 65
72. “Jīno devatā yeṣāṃ te jainasteṣāṃ kulāṃ, pūrvapurūṣaparamparāprabhavo vaṃśastatra. Jinoktagarbhādhānādinirvāṇaparyanta kriyā, Mantra saṃskārayogyo mahānvaya ityarthah.” *Sāgaradharmāmṛta*, p., 66
73. “Niṣekadiḥśmaśānānto mantrairasyodito vidhiḥ | tasya śāstredhikāro-simjñheyo nānyasya kasyacit”, *Manusmṛti*, II/16
74. *Sāgaradharmāmṛta*, p., 67-69
75. *Mahāpurāṇa*, XXXXVIII/46
76. *Sāgaradharmāmṛta*, II/25
77. *Sāgaradharmāmṛta*, II/40
78. *Sāgaradharmāmṛta*, II/30
79. *Sāgaradharmāmṛta*, II/57
80. *Sāgaradharmāmṛta*, p., 93
81. “Sarva eva hi jainānāṃ pramāṇaṃ laukiko vidhiḥ. yatra samyaktvaḥnirna yatra na vratadūṣaṇaṃ”. *Upāsakādhyayana*, XXXIV/480
82. “Dharmasantatiranupahataratiḥ gṛhavrata, suvihitattvamabhijātyācāraviśuddhiḥ.” devadvijātītibandhavasatkārānavadyatvaṃ ca dāra karmaṇaḥ phalaṃ” *Nītivākyāmṛtaṃ*, XXXI/30
83. *Sāgaradharmāmṛta*, II/67
84. *Sthānāṅgasūtra*, IV/421

### 3

## The Concept of Ātman

According to the *Daśavaikālika sūtra* one who does not know the *Ātman* and *Anātman*, *Jīva* and *Ajīva*, self and non-self can not know the path of *saṁyama*.<sup>1</sup> Self is the subject, as well as an object, of all meditation. The nature of the self is, therefore, the most fundamental of all discussions. *Chāndogyo-paniṣad* says that self-realization is the key to removal of all the miseries.<sup>2</sup>

The *brhadāranyakopaniṣad* mentions that it is the self which we should perceive, hear, of which we should meditate.<sup>3</sup>

According to *Cārvāka* self is body, characterized by consciousness. On the dissolution of body, the self is annihilated.<sup>4</sup> *cāravākas* do not accept the existence of soul as a different entity from the body. This is duty refuted by the Jain statement that the *Jīva* lives by *prāṇas*. If body and soul are accepted as one then it can not be assumed that they can be separated from each other and action would be anticipated wheresoever body is existing whether lifeless or with life.

The *Nyāya* system believes that the knowledge is attributed to the soul as an associated quality. In the initial stage of inception, *dravya* is supposed to be without any attribute. According to this system the existence of a permanent *jīvātman* can be proved through inference and authority.<sup>5</sup> The *Nyāya Vaiśeṣika* systems hold that *Ātman* is basically non-conscious and consciousness becomes manifest in it only by its association with mind, sense-organs and objects of contact.<sup>6</sup> Therefore, the state of liberation is a stage of complete non-consciousness.

Vātsyāyana clearly states that there can be no bliss in the state of liberation.<sup>7</sup> However, Jain authors reject this view and holds that it is not possible to assume separation of a quality from the *dravya*. Kundakundācārya, a Jain Ācārya, propounds identification of *guṇa* and *guṇī* with only exception that one is not the synonym of the other. It is impossible for the former to exist without the later and vice-versa. This leads to the conclusion that knowledge is an innate attribute of the soul.

*Naiyāyikas*, accept the omnipresence of Jīva. According to Jain view the atoms of soul have a unique quality of expansion and contraction, thus they pervade in the body irrespective of the size of the body-possessed by the Jīva. However, Jain view accepts the omniscient and omnipresence of the Liberated Souls.

The *Sāṅkhya* system believes in a permanent soul but all visible conscious activities are attributed to *prakṛti*, different to *Puruṣa*.<sup>8</sup> According to *sāṅkhya*, it is the *liṅgaśarīra* which is bound, the soul remains detached.<sup>9</sup>

The *puruṣa* of *sāṅkhya* system resembles Jīva of Jainism but Jīva is unique in the sense that it is actor also, where as the *puruṣa* is not. All the activities of material world are conducted by the *triguṇātmaka prakṛti*. The *prakṛti* as enunciated in *sāṅkhya* system approaches very close to the *pudgala* accepted in Jain Philosophy. According to Jain view only a sentient being can be a doer of any act and one who does any deed should be responsible and should enjoy the good or bad fruits of the deed. Thus the *sāṅkhya* concept of distinction between doer and enjoyer is rendered untenable by Jain logic. Doer being different from enjoyer will be held responsible for the deeds not committed by it. They will lead to a situation where the deeds will go unrewarded (*phalahāni of kṛta*) and the fruits will be enjoyed without any effort (*akṛta-phala-lābha*).

The existence of ātman as distinguished from body is

implied in the *pūrvamīmāṃsā* system, which attributes the qualities of knowledge, activity and experience to the soul.<sup>10</sup>

Bhaṭṭa and Cārvāka propound *Jīva* to be consisting of *pañcha-Bhūtas*; as such, according to them, *Jīva* must be *mūrta*. Jain view contradicts this on the basis of distinction between *pañcha-bhautika pudgala* and *Jīva*, *Pudgala* being *mūrta* and *Jīva* being *amūrta*.

All systems given above, except the *cārvāka* system, are dualistic and realistic in nature but *Vedānta* is monistic in nature. It holds *Brahman* to be the only reality. They hold that empirical self is a creation of illusion and transcendental self is free from all bondage. All moral responsibilities lie with the empirical self.<sup>11</sup>

According to Jain point of view there is no distinction between the mundane and liberated souls as far as *dravya* is concerned. Nevertheless mundane soul possesses impure mode in comparison to the liberated soul. This two fold classification of the souls appears to be self contradictory but it is not so, because a soul which is not yet liberated has got to be mundane till liberation. It can not be assumed that the mundane soul was ever in liberated state as accepted in the *Sadāśiva* point of view because there is not rationale in believing that a liberated soul should accept a state of bondage on purpose.

Above discussion is helpful in understanding the concept of *ātman*, attributes of *Jīva* and nature of soul.

Attributes of *Jīva* : *Nemicandra Siddhānta Cakravarti* gives the following nine attributes of *Jīva*. The commentator *Brahmadeva* contradicts the above mentioned one or the other school of thought by the given attributes :

- (i) *Jīva* : It is a conscious entity. Here self is conceived as distinct from matter. This, according to *Bramadeva*, refutes the *Cārvāka* view of self.
- (ii) *Uvāogamao* : It is endowed with apprehension and

knowledge. This refutes the *Naiyāyika* view of self.

- (iii) *Amutti* : It is an intangible entity. By this attribute the *Mimāṃsā* school of thought is refuted.
- (iv) *Kattā* : The self is the agent of actions. This Jain view refutes the view of *Sāṅkhya* system.
- (v) *Svādehāparimāṇo* : *Jīva* is co-extensive with the body which is attained by it. This Jain view refutes the view of *Nyāya*, *Mimāṃsā* and *Sāṅkhya* systems.
- (vi) *Bhottā* : It is the enjoyer of the fruit of its actions. This goes to refute the momentary theory of Buddhists.
- (vii) *Sansarattho* : It passes through births and deaths. This view goes against the followers of *Sadāśiva* cult, which hold the view that soul is ever liberated even in transmigration.
- (viii) *Siddho* : It gets liberation. This goes against the view of *Mimāṃsakas* and *Cārvākas*.
- (ix) *Vissasoddhagai* : It has a natural potentiality of upward motion. This quality has been stated by way of refutation of *Maṇḍalika* philosophy.<sup>12</sup>

Though there are different views regarding nature of self yet they do not differ on the basic moral principles which are the means of self realization. Whether the self is considered atomic in size or all-prevalent or it expands and contracts according to the size of body, these views do not affect the urge for salvation, hence need not bother us.

Whether *Jīva* is the agent of activities or not ? *ātman* is conscious or not ? are the two questions which are dealt with care using empirical and transcendental stand points in Jainism to take into consideration both the views. From empirical point of view, the self is the agent of actions and it undergoes such experiences as those of pain and pleasure. The *Pūrvamīmāṃsā* school seems to emphasize the empirical nature of self. From transcendental point of view, the self is pure, unalloyed and

free from matter. The *sāṅkhya* system seems to emphasize this aspect of self. Jainism, true to its philosophy and tradition of non-absolutism takes into consideration both the aspects. Self with *karmaṇa śarīra* is empirical. Adraṣṭa in *Nyāya Vaiśeṣika* and *karāṇa śarīra* in *sāṅkhya* yoga correspond to *karmaṇa śarīra* of Jainism. In *Vedānta* also empirical illusionary self is accepted for practical purposes. Jainism, *Sāṅkhya* and *Vedānta* views resemble where self is represented in its pure intrinsic form.

**Categories of self :** On the basis of potentiality of achieving salvation kundakundācārya designates two categories of the Ātman (i) *bhavya* and (2) *abhavya*.<sup>13</sup> *Bhavya* souls are those who have capability of shedding off all the binding *karmas* and becoming *siddhas*, where as *abhavya* souls can never attain salvation.<sup>14</sup> An *abhavya* soul remains ignorant and *mithyādrṣṭi* in spite of practicing *vrata*, *samitis*, *guptis*, *śīla* and *tapa* as propounded by Arhantas in āgama. An *abhavya* soul having no faith in *mokṣa tattva* can gain nothing from *svādhyāya* as the knowledge so acquired would not be based on right faith. An *abhavya Jīva* remains entangled in the worldly pleasures and comforts.<sup>15</sup> Moreover, it does not have faith in *śuddhopayoga* of falsehood in spite of listening to the sermons from āgamas. This behaviour is more or less similar to that of a serpent which does not become free of venom in spite of taking sweetened milk.<sup>16</sup> *Bhavya* soul quite unlike *abhavya* soul practices *nijabhāvanā* which helps in destroying the *karmas*. Once four *ghatiya karmas*, *Jñānāvaraṇiya*, *Darśanāvaraṇiya*, *Mohaniya*, *Antarāya*, are annihilated the intrinsic qualities of the soul like *Anantajñāna*, *Anantadarśana*, *Anantabala* and *Anantasukha* become manifest and such a soul enlightens *lokāloka*. The soul, free of *karmas*, becomes **Paramātmā** and is known as *Jñānī*, *Śiva*, *Parameṣṭhī sarvajña*, *Viṣṇu*, *Chaturmukha* and *Buddha* etc. The soul is designated as *Jñānī* by virtues of *kevalajñāna*; such a soul is symbolic of well being, hence *Śiva*; it attains highest



stage of purity, hence *Paramēṣṭhi*; it knows everything, hence *Sarvajña*; it pervades the entire *lokākāśa* - *alokākāśa* by virtue of its *anantajñāna*, hence *Viṣṇu*; it sees everything around, hence *Chaturmukha* : it is knower of everything belonging to past, present and future and situated in *lokāloka*, hence *Buddha*.<sup>17</sup>

Out of the two categories of *ātman* only *bhavya* soul will attain salvation and rest of the souls will undergo the life cycle till eternity, as such the world will never be devoid of souls. Zimmer Henrich remarks, "we ascent and descent through various states of being, now human, now divine, now animal; the bodies seem to die and to be born, but the chain is continuous, the transformation endless, and we do pass from one state to the next. The manner in which the indestructible life monads circulate is disclosed to the inward eye of the enlightened Jain Saint and Seer."<sup>18</sup>

**The idea of God :** Many popular religions, together with some systems of philosophy, assert that there is an eternal Lord of the universe who creates, sustains and destroys it. It is He who sends us miseries and happiness. Of course, according to some religions, he does so in accordance with the actions that we perform. Thus the idea of God is not always disconnected with the doctrine of *karma* in India. But Jainism does not hold it logical to believe that there is an eternal God ruling over the universe and sitting on us in judgement, so it will not be out of the context of examining the views of Christianity. Islam and Hinduism about God.

According to Hinduism, God is all-in-all. All living beings are just puppets in his hands. We should surrender ourselves unconditionally to the will of Almighty.<sup>19</sup> Nothing can be done without His will. He is present in every heart, moving every body according to His will.<sup>20</sup> Yet the Hindu scriptures remind that the consequences of an action performed by a person

must be borne by him. So there is no denying of the responsibility.

Christianity does not consider it necessary to give any argument to prove God. The old Testament presupposes the existence of God. It teaches us to worship the one God and not to pay any attention to deities. God is one.<sup>21</sup> He is spirit, holy and righteous, merciful and forgiving.<sup>22</sup> he cares for the lowliest. Jesus, who is the son of God. Knows his father as no other can. God father, His Christ son and the spirit makes the Holy Trinity of Christianity complete. Hastings remarks: the father is the primal source, the son of the mediating power, the spirit the executive energy; and every divine act is to be understood as a working of the Father, through the Son in and by the Holy Spirit.<sup>23</sup> The mediating power Christ can be compared to the incarnation of Hinduism. Sikhism and Ārya Samāj also deny deity other than God.

Islam lays even greater emphasis on oneness of God and condemns the trinity of Christianity.<sup>24</sup> Muslim theologians have given the following seven attributes of God :

(i) *hayat* - Life (ii) *ilm* - knowledge (iii) *qudra*-power (iv) *irada* - will (v) *sam* - hearing (vi) *basar*-seeing (vii) *kalam*-speech.

To sum up we can say that these theistic religions believe in one omnipresent, omnipotent and omniscient God who is considered as creator of this universe. The theory of God is based on the idea that every action must have an agent so there should be some power which created this universe, and the power is God. Here the question arises whether the assumed God has created this universe out of nothing or any existing material ? The first alternative is not possible because, “there is no existence out of non-existence nor is there destruction of what exists, “says Gītā.<sup>25</sup> The other alternative, that God created this universe out of a pre-existent matter, could not answer how

suddenly God became creator at a particular time ? It also questions kindness of God, when creation is full of misery and suffering.

Kumārīl Bhaṭṭa opined that there could be no creator of this universe.<sup>26</sup> Even Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika, according to new researches, were originally atheistic.<sup>27</sup> Jaina view about God is different from the above systems. Jain philosophy is of the view that there is no supreme entity like God, who is creator of this universe. All souls are fundamentally independent and all the substances in this universe are independent of any external agency in their functioning and do not obey any superior power. Of what use is the inherent quality of a substance if it works only under God's supervision ? "If fire burns and water cools, it is not due to the will of God, it is due to their inherent qualities which were bestowed on these substance by God" is also an impossibility. Can we imagine these substances bereft of their qualities at any time ? No, therefore, this physical world is ruled by physical law and not by any divine law. This, however, does not mean that there is no God in Jainism. God is only the highest, noblest, fullest manifestation of the powers which otherwise lie latent in souls of living beings. There is no eternal God sitting upon judgement on human beings. Human souls themselves attain siddhahood or omniscience - omnipresence by shedding off all impurities. These free souls neither create nor destroy anything. They have conquered passions, anger, pride, deceit and greed, and do not take birth for any reason. They do not get pleased or angry and can not return or reward our prayers. This does not mean that prayers have no place in Jain Scheme of life. By meditating upon the attributes of Siddhas we try to awaken our latent potentialities of Godhood.

A detailed study of *Jiva* will help us to understand the concept of *Ātman*.

*Jiva* and *Ātman* : *Jiva* is characterized by its various

activities and the *Prāṇas* (bodily powers) causing them. *Jīva* is supposed to perform all sorts of actions due to *indriya prāṇa* (related to five sense), *bala prāṇa* (three powers of body, speech and mind), *āyu prāṇa* (possession of the allotted span of life during which the *Jīva* has to sustain a particular bodily form) and *Śvāsocchvāsaprāṇa* (powers of respiration) from *vyavahāra naya*. These four *prāṇas* are constituted of *pudgala dravya*.<sup>28</sup>

But from *nīścaya naya Jīva dravya* is characterized by *Cetana* and *Upayoga*. The above-mentioned four types of *prāṇas* are said to be the characteristics of *Jīva* from *vyavahāra naya*, as from *nīścaya naya*. *Jīva* is not alive due to these *Prāṇas* in its purest form, however; it is not devoid of *Jīva dravya*. *Kundakundācārya* considers *Jīva* as one who is alive at present, shall be alive in future and had been alive in the past by virtues of the above mentioned four *prāṇas*. These characteristics show that *Jīva* or *Ātmadravya* is eternal. Liberated soul does not have *āyu prāṇa* etc. hence *Kundakundācārya* has emphasized that one who had lived in past by virtue of the four *prāṇas* is also a *Jīva*.

The terms *Jīva* and *Ātman* appear very frequently in the Jain-works. Characteristics and categories of *Jīva* and *Ātman* have been described at several places and it can be inferred that the terms *Jīva* and *Ātman* are synonyms representing the same *dravya*. However, it appears that each of them is associated with a particular connotation e.g. the five categories of *Jīva* depending upon the sense are no-where referred to as *ekendriya Ātman* etc. Similarly in *Jaina-āgama* it has been mentioned that one should concentrate three-fold activities into the soul i.e. *Ātman* but it has been no where mentioned that these activities should be concentrated into *Jīva*. The expression *Jīva-sādhana* is no where used as an equivalent to *Ātmasādhana*.

Jain-ācāryas have presented soul in its purest form as the cherished aim of the *Jīva* desiring salvation and has suggested

that all śuddha activities are the means of achieving this end. *Jīva* has been advised time and again to concentrate all the activities in the soul to abandon *parasamaya* and to mediate on *svasamaya*. There is no difference in *Ātman* and *Jīva* from *Niścayanaya*; but it appears from *vyavahāranaya* that soul reflects a particular stage which is attained by *Jīva*. Jainas have adopted axiomatic approach to prove the existence of soul. Every *Jīva* is always aware of its existence.

*Pūjyapāda* (478-513 AD) has enunciated, in his work *sarvārthasiddhi*, his theory to prove existence of the soul. According to him *prāṇa* and other activities found in a *Jīva* are enough evidence of the existence of motivator and actor, i.e. the soul. He further explains this by the illustration of a robot whose activities clearly point towards the existence of a sentient operator.<sup>29</sup>

*Jīva* perceives, knows and experiences pains and pleasures. *Jīva* is actor of all good and bad activities and bears the consequences of these activities. Thus the existence of *Jīva* is axiomatic.

According to Jain logic the existence of souls is to be accepted by existence consciousness. Whatever is the sentient being in me is experienced by myself as 'I am' and this experience is worth receiving by *prājñā*. Everything other than this *ātmabodha* is not mine and is different from me.<sup>30</sup>

*Jīva* is characterized by *Cetana* and *Upayoga*. *Cetana*, or sentiency or consciousness is regarded as the essence of the *Ātman*. The sentiency which is responsible for all these activities of the soul is threefold:

- (1) *Jñānacetana*
- (2) *Karmacetana*
- (3) *Karmaphala Cetana*

The act of knowing all *padārthas* by *bhedavijñāna* (sva-

*para-viveka*) is cognition. This activity to know any *padārtha* by soul is due to its *Jñānacetana*. The *vibhāva pariṇāma* of soul gives rise to the bondage and fruition of *karmas*. All the activities whether good or bad of the soul in which *Pudgala karma* is an instrument and which are taking place uninterrupted are due to the *karmacetana* of *Jiva*. Pleasure and pain are the fruits of the *karmas*. *Jiva* experiences these pleasures and pains according to the bondage of *karmas* and this experience is due to its *Karmaphala Cetana*.<sup>31</sup> *Karmaphala cetana* can be well understood by a gross example: the moment out hand comes in contact with a hot thing, it automatically is taken off the hot object. The movement of the hand is symbolic of the outcome of the act of touching the hot object. This is sufficient in itself to distinguish between animate and inanimate because inanimate, being insentient, does not show any reaction which is shown by sentient animates. Thus *karmaphala cetana* may be accepted as an external evidence of the existence of the soul possessed of consciousness. As the organs in the form of *bahirātmā* are indicator of the existence of the soul, in the same way *karmaphala cetana* also points out towards the entity of *Ātman*.

*Karma* may be classified into two categories—*Dravya-karma* and *Bhāva-karma*. *Dravya-karma* is the outcome of *pudgala* and is attracted towards the soul because of *Bhāva-karma*. *Bhāva-karmas* are the outcome of the thought activities of the soul. These thought-activities are extremely subtle and cannot be perceived by sensory organs. They are subject to the realization by the self, One, who has realization, is the soul. The soul in its purest form is devoid of *dravya-karma* and *bhāva-karma* and discloses *kevalajñāna*. All the attributes of the soul and fully manifest in this state, hence it is known as *paramātmā*. The soul whose activities are entirely governed by *jñānacetana* is known as *paramātmā*.

The process of purification of self can be illustrated by

an example from our daily life. A white cloth having prolonged association with dirt appears to be black but when it is washed again and again, it regains its whiteness. This analogy is well applicable to the soul also. This mundane soul is bound by *karmas* since time infinite. It can liberate itself from the bondage by persistent efforts spread over the span of several *bhavas*, life cycles. The ultimate form of the soul, devoid of passions, is the purest form of *Ātman*, free from all karmic impurities. It should be noted here that as in the case of the cloth, the whiteness was not regained by outward imposition, rather it, became manifest when the cover or dirt was removed from the cloth, similarly the absolute purity of the soul is its intrinsic quality which becomes manifest due to the *nirjarā* of all types of *karmas* attached to soul.

Soul is sentient and *upayogamaya*. *Upayoga* is defined by Puṣṭyapāda in the *Sarvārthasiddhi* as follows :

*Ubhayanimittavaśādutpadyamānaścaitanyānuvidhāyi pariṇāmo upayogaḥ.*"<sup>32</sup>

The activity of *ātman* due to the relationship with consciousness is *upayog*. *Upayoga* is two fold-*darśanopayoga* and *Jñānopayoga*. *Darśanopayoga* is attributed to the ordinary aspect of *cetana* which perceives whereas *Jñānopayoga* is an extra-ordinary aspect of *cetana* which knows. When the soul is in its purest form, its *upayoga* is without any impurity. However, the *upayoga* of a mundane soul is impure due to *rāga* and *dveṣa*, attachment and aversion and is known as *āsuddhopayoga*. There are two categories of *āsuddhopayoga* (1) *Śubha* and (2) *Aśubha*. *Aśuddhopayoga* is the sole cause of the bondage of the soul with the *karmas*. This bondage results into various modes of the mundane soul. As soon as the soul attains *Śuddhopayoga* it becomes free from the bondage of *karmas*, and gets freedom from the life cycles to become *siddha*. This division of souls into the categories of mundane and liberated occupies the central

place in the Jain doctrine. Mundane souls are further classified into four categories according to the model point of view :

- (1) *Devagati*
- (2) *Manuṣyagati*
- (3) *Tiryāṅcagati*
- (4) *Narākagati*

Every mundane soul belonging to any of the above categories is supposed to possess a body, gross or subtle, made of pudgala. The future mode to be attached to the soul is determined by the *karmas* of the soul. This attachment of the souls is for a particular duration. As soon as this duration is over, the old mode is shed off by the soul to have a new one. The mundane soul transfers itself from one mode of the other along with its *taijasa* and *karmaṇa* bodies infinite times. In this process the new mode is created and the old is destroyed. However, there is not a least change in the *Jīva dravya* which justifies its *dhrauvya*. *Anādi* and *ananta* are the two fundamental qualities of the soul. The former is a safeguard against *anavasthā doṣa* whereas the latter explains the *dhrauvya* of the *Jīva*.<sup>33</sup>

To conclude, the following points may be noted regarding the discussion held in the chapter : (1) Though, the different systems of Indian Philosophy disagree about the nature of self or the position of liberated soul, yet as far as the particle side of moral conduct is concerned, they seldom differ, (2) Secondly, in Jainism we find a combination of both types of systems of morality, those which emphasise on knowledge and those which emphasise on conduct and faith.

### Foot Notes

1. *Daśavaikālika sūtra*, IV / 12
2. “*tarati Śokamātmavit*” *Chāndogyopaniṣad*, VII /1/3.
3. “*Ātma vā re draṣṭavyaḥ śrotavyo mantavyo nididhyāsitavyaḥ*” *Bṛhadāranyakopaniṣad*, II 4/5
4. (a) “*taccaitanyaviśiṣṭadeha evātmā*” *śaḍdarśanasamgraha*, p.3



- (b) “no pretya samjñāsti” *Bṛhaspatīsūtra*, II4/12 quoted in *Ibid.*, p.3
5. (a) Keshava Mishra : *Tārkabhāṣā*, Benaras, 1967, p.33  
(b) *Nyāyasūtra*, I 1/9
6. (a) Jayantabhaṭṭa on *Nyāyasūtra*, Benaras, 1934, pt. II, I 1/9 pp. 4-7  
(b) Praśastapāda on *Vaiśeṣika sūtra*, Benaras, 1966, III 2/1,4. p. 18-19
7. Vātsyayāna on *Nyāyasūtra*, Benaras, 1970, I 1/22, PP. 59-67
8. *Sāṅkhya tattvakaumudī*, Benaras, 1971, *Sāṅkhya Kārikā*, 17, p. 155
9. *Ibid.*, *Sāṅkhya Kāritā*, 62
10. Radhakrishna, S., *Indian Philosophy*, London, 1956, Vol. II, pp. 407-409
11. Dasgupta, s., *A History of Indian Philosophy*, Cambridge, 1982, Vol. I, p. 476
12. *Dravyasaṅgraha*, 2
13. *Pañcāstikāya* (Ed.) Manukarlal, PSPM, Bombay, 1904, verse 120, p. 183
14. *Ibid.*, verse, 106, p. 168
15. *Samayasāra*, verse, 273-75
16. *Bhāvapahūḍa*, verse, 138
17. *Ibid.*, verse, 151
16. Herrich, Zimmer : *Philosophies of India*, London, 1969, p. 228
19. *Gītā*, Madras, 1980, verse XVIII/66
20. *Ibid.*, XVIII/61
21. *The Holy Bible*. Mark XII/29
22. *The Holy Bible*, John, IV/24, XVII/11,25
23. Hastings, James : *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*, Vol. VI, p. 261
24. *Ibid*, Vol. VI. p. 300
25. “Nāsato vidyate bhāvo nābhāvo vidyate sataḥ” *Gītā*, II/16
26. ‘*Śloka-vārttika*, Calcutta, 1909, *Sambhandhākṣepaparihāra*, 47-59[ 74-88
27. Hastings, James : *ERE*, Vol. II, p. 186
28. *Pravacana Sāra*, verse, II/15, p. 189
29. *Sarvārthasiddhi*, verse, V/19, p. 166
30. *Samayasāra*, verse, 297, p. 393
31. *Pravacanasāra*, verse, II/32, p. 157
32. *Sarvārthasiddhi*, II/18, p. 89
33. Henrich, Zimmer : *Philosophies of India*, London, 1969, p. 228

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