

SOME REMARKS ON THE PRAMANYA-VADA OF JAINISM

Dr. Atsushi Uno, Hiroshima University, Hiroshima, Japan

The *prāmāṇya-vada* deals with a problem how the truth value of a cognition is determined objectively and subjectively. This has for a long time been of interest to all the Indian philosophical systems, as was the problem of the knowledge and the means thereof. As regards the determination of the truth value of a cognition, viz. truth (*prāmāṇya*) and falsity (*apramāṇya*), most of the philosophical systems accept either of the two alternatives : whether the truth value of cognition, in origination (*utpatti*) and apprehension (*jñāpti*), is produced by its intrinsic conditions (*svataḥ*), or by some additional conditions (*parataḥ*). To confine the discussion to the 'truth' of a cognition, the determinant of *svataḥ* in its origination, comprises all the possible conditions which produce the mere cognition (*jñāna-mātrotpādaka-kāraṇa-sāmagrī*), whereas that in its apprehension is included factors which bring about the apprehension of the mere cognition (*jñānagrāhaka-kāraṇa-sāmagrī*). A cognition is said to be originated or apprehended as true externally (*parataḥ*), only after some additional necessary conditions are added to either of the afore-said determinants.

This topic was first developed by the Mīmāṃsakas concerning the validity of Vedic scriptures as source of all cognitions, and as such was basically confined to the scope of verbal testimony (*śabda, āgama*) only, later to have been dealt with in relation to other sources of cognition, or better, to all kinds of cognition. Though the Sanskrit term *prāmāṇya* may have originally been understood to be equivalent to *prāmāṇatva* signifying a property in a means of cognition, both of the terms are generally taken, in an epistemological sense, to mean an abstract property ascribed to a true cognition, thus being identical with *pramāṇatva*.

In his *Sarvadarśanasamgraha* (Jaimini-darśana), Mādhava quotes two verses which summarize the views of four principal systems viz. the Sāṃkhyaas, Naiyāyikas, Bauddhas and Mīmāṃsakas as follows :¹

pramāṇatvāpramāṇatve svataḥ sāmṁkhyāḥ samāśritāḥ,
naiyāyikāḥ te parataḥ saugatāḥ cāramāṇam svataḥ.
prathamam parataḥ prāhuḥ prāmāṇyam veda-vādināḥ,
pramāṇatvam svataḥ prāhuḥ parataḥ cāpramāṇatvam.

Among these four views, the first one seems not to be found in any extant Sāṃkhya text. It might have possibly been dealt with in some of the extinct texts

belonging to this system. The view attributed to the Buddhists in the above verse is neither traceable to any available Buddhist texts nor consistent with any tenet found in them. It is very likely that the view in question was either thus posulated in conformity with the Buddhist doctrine *anīyatva* (*kṣaṇīkatva*), or maintained by a particular Buddhist school whose source materials have been buried in oblivion long since.

In short, the combinations of the two truth values and two-fold determinant mode (*svatastva* and *paratastva*) may be tabulated as follows :

truth	(1) svataḥ (origination, apprehension) Mīmāsaka, Śāṅkara-vedāntin, Sāṃkhya
	(2) parataḥ (origination, apprehension) Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika
falsity	(1) svataḥ (origination, apprehension) Sāṃkhya
	(2) parataḥ (origination, apprehension) Mīmāṃsaka, Śāṅkara-vedāntin, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika

Unlike the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas and others, the Jainas regard the *pramāṇa* as a true knowledge which has subjective cognitive function or faculty, and it denotes its resultant cognition as well as its process.² Devasūri (1080-1169) explains in his *Pramāṇanayatatvāloka* (PNT) that the truth of cognition is the consistency of cognition with the object, and the falsity is the inconsistency of cognition with the object, (I. 18, 19). He further exemplifies the above contention in his own commentary *Syādvādaratnākara* (SVR) as follows : 'This consistency of knowledge with the object must be with regard to the object different from the self (= knowledge, cognition), since for anything to be inconsistent with itself is absurd. Thus any cognition is true in relation to itself, and there is no false cognition. On the other hand, in relation to objects other than the self some cognitions are right and the others are false (I. 19).³ And what is established by *pramāṇa* is its result (*ānantaryeṇa phalam*) and the other is the mediated one (*pāramparyeṇa phalam*) (VI. 1, 2). Out of the two, the mediate result, being that of all kinds of knowledge except for *kevalajñāna*, consists of the judgement of acquiring (*upādāna*), that of abandoning (*hāna*) and that of indifference (*upekṣā*), whereas the former is the annihilation of ignorance (*ajñāna-nivṛtti*) which is nothing but the determination of the self and the others (*sva-para-vyavasiti*) (VI. 3, 4, 5). Furthermore, the result is neither exclusively different from nor totally the same as the knowledge (*pramāṇa*) according to the Jaina theory of non-absolutism (*syād-vāda*); hence the result is, in a way, its *pramāṇa* (VI. 6, 7, 8). Such being the case, truth is understood to be a property attributed to a true cognition, and is dependent on the consistency with the objects other than the self.

Devasūri holds in his PNT that truth and falsity are in their origination and determined externally only, while they are ascertained in their apprehension exter-

nally or internally (I.20). Thus like other Indian realists, the Jainas try to seek truth or falsity in terms of consistency of cognition with objects other than itself, and the truth value is not to be attributed to *pramāṇa* as a means of cognition. Devasūri further elucidates in SVR that, these values are internally ascertained when the object is well-acquainted by repeated experience (*abhyāsa-daśāyām*).⁴ A similar idea is found in the *Parīkṣamukhasūtra* (PM) of Māṇikyanandin and its commentary *Prameyakamalamārtanḍa* (PKM) by Prabhācandra⁵, to which Devasūri undoubtedly owed his work. 'Take for instance one's own palm, one need not resort to any means other than *jñānagrāhaka*, it being internally known to be true. But, in the case of an unacquainted object, the first cognition arises, is followed by volitional action to acquire the object (*pravṛtti*), and therefrom the second cognition is obtained. The truth of the first cognition which has produced action towards the object (*pravartaka-jñāna*) is ascertained through the second cognition, in accordance as the latter is a subsequent confirmatory cognition (*saṃvādaka-jñāna*, *saṃvādin*, *avisamvādin*) or a cognition of pragmatic consequences (*arthakriyā-jñāna*) etc. in relation to the former. In this case, the *saṃvādakā-jñāna* or *arthakriyā-jñāna* etc. is accepted to be true by the Jainas, without resorting to further verification, and thus the infinite regress is evaded.

So far as the external determination is concerned, truth and falsity in origination and apprehension depend on excellence (*guṇa*) and deficiency (*doṣa*) respectively; thus the Jainas postulate two distinct positive factors. But suppose a cognition is first originated and apprehended as true, as the Mīmāṃsakas hold, independent of any other means, and it is changed into a false one only by subsequent deficiencies. Then only one determinant viz. *doṣa* is to be accepted. Does it necessarily follow that the absence of *doṣa* which determines the truth might signify nothing but excellence (*guṇa*)? On the other hand, if, like the view attributed to the Buddhists by Mādhavācārya, falsity is originated and apprehended internally and is developed into truth by subsequent positive factor viz. *guṇa*, then is the absence of *guṇa* not identical with *doṣa*? All the polemic works dealing with this topic are invariably devoted to the inquiry into the characteristics of *guṇa* and *doṣa* with a detailed and subtle discussion. Here such controversy is passed over.

The peculiarities of the Jaina theory might be summed up as follows :

1. The determination of the truth value of a cognition has been examined hitherto from two-fold aspect viz. *utpatti* and *jñāpti*, according to general treatises like SVR etc. However, Prabhācandra (980-1065) in his PKM and *Nyāyakumudacandra* (NKC) establishes three-fold of division viz. *utpatti*, *jñāpti* and *svakārya*.⁶ The term *svakārya* (the result of *pramāṇa*) is intended to conform with the afore-said *phala*, as is contrasted with *pramāṇa*, which consists of *pravṛtti*, *nivṛtti* and *upkeśā*.

Though apprehension (*jñāpti*) invariably presupposes, with the exception of the case of a well-acquainted object (*abhyāsita-viśaya*), *pravṛtti* by which to verify

the truth value, yet *pravṛtti* and the like, as the results of *pramāṇa*, are here postulated for the scrutiny whether such actions are necessarily preceded by the awareness of the truth value viz: truth or falsity. Prabhācandra applies the same rule to the case of *sva-kārya*. The idea of *pravṛtti* is here introduced from two distinctive standpoints. In the case of *jñāpti*, *pravṛtti* is employed as a volitional action which determines the truth value, whereas the bone of contention, in the case of *svakārya*, centres about whether such responsive behaviour viz. *pravṛtti* (inclusive of *nivṛtti* and *upekṣā*) is determined by the apprehension of the truth value of cognition. Thus *pravṛtti* has a double character; one is to determine the truth value, and the other is to be determined by the truth value.

Anantavīrya (12th cent.) in his *prameyaratnamālā*, another commentary on PM modelled after PKM, establishes two-fold division viz. *utpatti* and *sva-kārya*.⁷ In this case, the term *sva-kārya* refers to the two aspects : one is 'determination of object' (*viśaya-paricchiti*) which involves *utpatti*, and the other is subsequent response towards the object like *pravṛtti* etc. This two-fold division seems to be a more faithful interpretation to the original aphorism of PM than Prabhācandra's., in conformity with the afore-said division of *pramāṇa* and *pramāṇa-phala*, whether mediate or immediate.

2. The later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas like Vācaspatimiśra and Udayana try to avoid infinite regress by postulating some kinds of self-valid knowledge which require no further confirmation.⁸ The Jainas also stand on the same footing with them, in saying 'On some occasions truth is apprehended at once, like in the case of primal perceptual cognition unconfirmed by repeated experiences. Since such cognition is never ascertained to stand in unfailing correspondence with the object, its truth is apprehended by a subsequent confirmatory cognition of the same object, by a cognition of its pragmatic consequences, or by a cognition of object concomitant with it. And the truth of cognition of this kind is self-evident and there is no loophole for the charge of infinite regress.⁹ such a presumption is quite an unescapable fate to those who maintain the external determination of the truth value of cognition.

3. The apprehension (*jñāpti*) is not always fixed either internally or externally. The truth value of any cognition is apprehended from the outset of its origination when the object is well-acquainted by repeated experiences. This is the idea generally held among the Jainas. With all my limited research, it is very likely that Vidyānandin or Māṇikyanandin was the first Jaina to take up this view.¹⁰ However, such theory was not a monopoly of the Jainas alone, but seems to have been borrowed from such Buddhist works as *Tattvasaṃgraha* and its commentary *Pañjikā*. In the latter work, four alternatives are first set forth and are finally rejected on the strength of the view that such manifold congruous combination of two values and two-fold determinant mode (viz. *svatastva* and *paratstva*) are of an

unrestricted or unfixed (*aniyama*) nature.¹¹ This bone of contention quite agrees with the Jains. The Navya-naiyāyikas also came later to hold a similar view,¹² in saying that the truth value of a cognition need not be proved if there is not the slightest doubt about it, and any motiveless doubt of a possible contradiction is of no account.

References

1. Sarvadarśanasamgraha, Government Oriental Series, Class A, No. 4, p. 279.
2. The term 'buddhi' synonymous with 'jñāna' is generally understood to have three meanings. Athalye explains to this effect in the following way. "First the act of knowing, which may be called 'understanding'; secondly the instrument of knowledge which is 'intellect', and thirdly the product of the act of knowing, which is 'cognition.' It is the last sense that the word is invariably used in Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika philosophies." (Tarkasamgraha, Bombay Sanskrit Series, No. LV, second ed., p. 173)

There is a divergence of opinions, among scholars, about English equivalents to 'jñāna' etc. (Cf. Ingalls, Materials for the Study of Navya-Nyāya, p. 29 ft.; Matilal, The Navya-nyāya Doctrine of Negation, p. 6 ft.) In this thesis I have tried to use 'cognition' for the Sanskrit term 'jñāna', in the third meaning, so long as the truth value is taken into consideration in terms of its locus. In Jainism, however, 'jñāna' is primarily understood to refer to the first and the second meanings and secondarily even to the third meaning, thus being applicable to the widest denotations, as contrasted with other similar Sanskrit terms. Every school lays an emphasis on a particular aspect denoted by 'jñāna', so it seems almost impossible to give a precise English translation to the 'jñāna' shared in common by every school. In Jainism, 'pramāṇa' is considered a true knowledge (*samyag-jñāna*). Such being the case, for the terms 'jñāna' and 'pramāṇa' I can hardly give a precise English equivalent, and thus some ambiguity and confusion cannot be avoided.

3. PNT, I. 19, 20. jñānasya prameyavyabhicāritvaṁ prāmāṇyam iti. tad-itarat tvapramāṇyam; SVR, Poona edition, p. 240. prameya-vyabhicāritvaṁ ca jñānasya sva-vyatirikta-grāhyāpekṣaiva lakṣaṇīyam. svasmin vpabhicāritvāsambhavatvāt. tena sarvaṁ jñānaṁ svāpekṣayā pramāṇam eva na pramāṇābhāsaḥ. bahir-arthāpekṣayā tu kiṁ cit pramāṇam kiṁ cit punas tad-ābhāsam.
4. PNT, I. 20, tad ubhayam utpattau parata eva jñaptau tu svataḥ parataś ceti. SVR, p. 249ff. anabhyāsa-daśāyāṁ parataḥ pratipadyata iti. kutah pratiyata iti cet, anabhyāsa-daśāyāṁ prāmāṇyam parato jñānate saṁśa-

yāpadatvād ity ata iti brūmaḥ yadi hi jñānena sva-prāmāṇyaṁ svayam eva jñāyeta yathārtho-paricchedakam aham astīti, tadā pramāṇāpramāṇaṁ vedaṁ jñāam iti prāmāṇya-saṁśayaḥ kadācid api notpadyate jñānatva-saṁśayavat.

5. PM, I. 6, tat-prāmāṇyaṁ svataḥ parataś ceti.; PKM, ed. by Mahendra Kumar, loc. cit., p. 149ff.
6. PKM, p. 149ff.; NKC, ed. by Mahendra Kumar, vol. 1. p. 199ff.
7. Prameyaratnamālā, ed. by Phoolcanra & Vālacandra, p. 19ff.
8. Nyāyāuārttikatātparyatikā, Kashi Skt. Series 24, p. 13; Nyāyavārttika-tātparyapariśuddhi, Bib, Ind., pp. 119-120.
9. Pramāṇamīmāsā, Singhi Jain Series No. 9, p. 6 (I. 1. viii), kvacit parataḥ prāmāṇy-niścayaḥ, yathā anabhyāsa-paśāpanne pratyakṣe. na hi tat arthena grhītavyabhicāram iti tad eka-viśayāt saṁvādakāta jñānātarād vā, arthakriyā nirbhāsād vā. nāntariyārtha-darśanād vā tasya prāmāṇya niścīyate. teṣāṁ ca svataḥ prāmāṇya-niścayān nānavasthādi-dausthyavakāśeḥ.
10. There are no fixed opinions available among scholars about the dates of the said two logicians. Dr. Mahendra Kumar agrees with Pt. Kothiya that Vidyānandin flourished in 775-840, while he fixed the date of Māṇikyānandin in 993-1053. Cf. Aptaparīkṣā, ed. by Kothiyā, Intr. pp. 26-54; Siddhivinīścaya, vol. 1., ed. by Mahendra Kumar, Intr. pp. 49-50.
Tattvārthaśloka-vārtika, ed. by Manoharlal, p. 177, tatrābhāsāt pramāṇatvaṁ niścitaḥ svata eva naḥ, anabhyāse tu parata ity āhuḥ pēcid amjaśā (115). tac ca syādvādinām eva svārtha-niścayanāt sthitam, na tu sva-niśeayonmuktaniḥśeṣa-jñānavācinām (127). kvacid atyantābhyāsāt svataḥ pramāṇatvasya niścayān nānavasthādi-doṣaḥ, kvadid ahabhyāsāt paratas tasya vyavasthiter nāvāptir ity etad api syādvādinām eva parmāthataḥ siddhyet svārtha-niścayopagamāt. na punaḥ svarūpa-niścaya-rahita-sakala-saṁveda-vādinām anavasthādyanuṣaṁgasya tad-avasthatvāt....
11. Cf. Pramāṇamīmāṁsā, op. cit., Bhāṣātippaṇāni, pp. 16-19.
Tattvasaṁgraha, 3100, abhyāsikaṁ yathā jñānaṁ yramāṇaṁ gamyate svataḥ, mithyā-jñānaṁ cathā kimcid apramāṇaṁ svataḥ sthitam.; Pañjika, on 3123, na hi bauddhair eṣāṁ caturṇām ekatamo 'pi pakṣo' bhīṣṭo 'niyama-pakṣasyeṣṭatvāt. tathā hi—ubhayam apy eīat kimcit szataḥ kimcit parataḥ iti pūrvam upavarṇitam. ata eva pakṣa-catustayopanyāsr 'py ayuktaḥ. pañcama-pakṣasya sambhavāt.
12. Tattvacintāmaṇi, Bib. Ind., pp. 277-79, 282-84; S. C. Chatterjee, The Nyāya Theory of Knowledge, p. 99.

जैन प्रामाण्यवाद पर एक टिप्पणी

डा० आत्सुशी यूनो, हिरोशिमा विश्वविद्यालय, हिरोशिमा, जापान

प्रामाण्यवाद ज्ञान की सत्यता को वस्तुनिष्ठ या ज्ञातानिष्ठ रूप से विचार करता है। इस पर प्रायः सभी भारतीय दर्शनों ने विचार किया है। ज्ञान का प्रामाण्य दो प्रकार से संभव है : स्वतः और परतः। ज्ञान-मात्रोत्पादक कारण सामग्री इसमें स्वतः प्रामाण्य उत्पन्न करती है जबकि ज्ञान-ग्राहक-कारण सामग्री से ज्ञान में परतः प्रामाण्य आता है।

प्रामाण्यवाद पर सर्वप्रथम मीमांसकों ने विचार किया था। उन्होंने आगम के आधार पर ज्ञान का प्रामाण्य स्वीकार किया था। सर्वदर्शन संग्रह में चार प्रमुख भारतीय दर्शनों का एतद्विषयक मत प्रकट किया गया है जिसका संक्षेपण निम्न है :

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| ज्ञान का प्रामाण्य | (i) स्वतः (उत्पत्ति, ज्ञप्ति) मीमांसक, सांख्य, शंकर वेदान्त |
| | (ii) परतः (उत्पत्ति, ज्ञप्ति) न्याय-वैशेषिक |
| ज्ञान का अप्रामाण्य | (i) स्वतः (उत्पत्ति, ज्ञप्ति) : सांख्य |
| | (ii) परतः : मीमांसक, न्याय, वेदान्त |

न्याय के विपर्यास में जैन ज्ञान को ज्ञातानिष्ठता के आधार पर प्रमाण मानते हैं। देवसूरि ने प्रमाणनयतत्वालोक तथा स्याद्वादरत्नाकर में इस विषय में यही तथ्य स्पष्ट किया है। इसके अनुसार, उत्पत्ति के समय प्रामाण्य परतः ही होता है जब कि ज्ञप्ति के समय यह स्वतः भी हो सकता है और परतः भी हो सकता है। इस विषय में परीक्षामुख तथा प्रमेयकमलमार्तंड भी द्रष्टव्य हैं।

ज्ञान का प्रामाण्य, उत्पत्ति या ज्ञप्ति दशा में गुण-दोषों पर निर्भर करता है। दोषों के कारण ज्ञान में अप्रामाण्य आता है। मीमांसकों और बौद्धों ने इन गुणों और दोषों पर विचार किया है। लेकिन जैन दार्शनिकों ने इस पर विशेष चर्चा नहीं की है।

प्रामाण्यवाद के संबंध में जैन मत को निम्न प्रकार संक्षेपित किया जा सकता है :

(I) ज्ञान के प्रामाण्य का विचार उत्पत्ति तथा ज्ञप्ति दशा के आधार पर किया जाता है। प्रभाचंद्र ने इसमें स्वकार्य की तीसरी दशा भी जोड़ दी है। ज्ञप्ति के लिए प्रवृत्ति आवश्यक है जो ऐच्छिक क्रिया पर निर्भर करती है। यह प्रवृत्ति न केवल ज्ञान को प्रमाणता देती है अपितु इसका निर्धारण भी प्रमाणता के आधार पर ही होता है। अनन्तवीर्य ने प्रमेयरत्नमाला में प्रामाण्य को उत्पत्ति एवं स्वकार्य दशा में विषय परिच्छित्ति और प्रवृत्ति के रूप में निरूपित किया है।

(II) न्याय-वैशेषिकों के समान जैनो ने भी अनवस्था को दूर करने के लिए कुछ स्वयं सिद्ध ज्ञान माने हैं जिनका प्रामाण्य सिद्ध करने की आवश्यकता नहीं है।

(III) ज्ञप्ति के विषय में यह निश्चित नहीं रहता कि यह स्वतः ही होती है या परतः। यह ज्ञानोत्पत्ति की दशा एवं वस्तु-परिचय पर निर्भर करती है। विद्यानंदि और माणिक्यनंदि का यह मत तत्त्वसंग्रह और उसकी पंजिका के समान ग्रन्थों के आधार पर बना प्रतीत होता है। नव्य नैयायिकों ने भी बाद में इसी के अनुरूप मत स्वीकार किया है।