SOME REMARKS ON THE PRAMANYA-VADA OF JAINISM

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The pramāṇya-vada deals with a problem how the truth value of a cognition is determined objectively and subjectively. This has for a long time been of interest to all the Indian philosophical systems, as was the problem of the knowledge and the means thereof. As regards the determination of the truth value of a cognition, viz. truth (pramāṇya) and falsity (aprāmāṇya), most of the philosophical systems accept either of the two alternatives: whether the truth value of cognition, in origination (utpatti) and apprehension (jñāpti), is produced by its intrinsic conditions (svatah), or by some additional conditions (paratah). To confine the discussion to the ‘truth’ of a cognition, the determinant of svatastva in its origination, comprises all the possible conditions which produce the mere cognition (jñāna-mātrotpādakāraṇa-sāmagrī), whereas that in its apprehension is included factors which bring about the apprehension of the mere cognition (jñānagrāhaka-kāraṇa-sāmagrī). A cognition is said to be originated or apprehended as true externally (paratah), only after some additional necessary conditions are added to either of the afore-said determinants.

This topic was first developed by the Mīmāṁsakas concerning the validity of Vedic scriptures as source of all cognitions, and as such was basically confined to the scope of verbal testimony (sabda, āgama) only, later to have been dealt with in relation to other sources of cognition, or better, to all kinds of cognition. Though the Sanskrit term pramāṇya may have originally been understood to be equivalent to pramāṇatva signifying a property in a means of cognition, both of the terms are generally taken, in an epistemological sense, to mean an abstract property ascribed to a true cognition, thus being identical with pramāṇa.

In his Sarvasaṅgahāraṇa (Jaimini-darśana), Mādhava quotes two verses which summarize the views of four principal systems viz. the Sāmkyaas, Naiyāyikas, Baudhahas and Mīmāṁsakas as follows:¹

pramāṇatvāpramāṇatve svatah sāmkhyāḥ samāsritāḥ,  
naiyāyikas te parathī saugataś caramāṁ svatah.  
prathāmāṁ paratah prāhuḥ pramāṇyaṁ veda-vādinaḥ,  
pramāṇatvarīṁ svatah prāhuḥ parataḥ cāpramāṇatvam.

Among these four views, the first one seems not to be found in any extant Sāmkhya text. It might have possibly been dealt with in some of the extinct texts

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belonging to this system. The view attributed to the Buddhists in the above verse is neither traceable to any available Buddhist texts nor consistent with any tenet found in them. It is very likely that the view in question was either thus posulated in conformity with the Buddhist doctrine anityatva (क्षणिकत्वा), or maintained by a particular Buddhist school whose source materials have been buried in oblivion long since.

In short, the combinations of the two truth values and two-fold determinant mode (svatatva and paratatva) may be tabulated as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Truth</th>
<th>(1) svataḥ (origination, apprehension)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mīmasaka, Śāṅkara-vedāntin, Śāṅkhya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) parataḥ (origination, apprehension)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Falsity</th>
<th>(1) svataḥ (origination, apprehension)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Śāṅkhya</td>
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<tr>
<td>(2) parataḥ (origination, apprehension)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mimāṃsaka, Śāṅkara-vedāntin, Nyāa-Naiṣeṣika</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Unlike the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas and others, the Jainas regard the pramāṇa as a true knowledge which has subjective cognitive function or faculty, and it denotes its resultant cognition as well as its process.² Devasūri (1080-1169) explains in his Pramāṇanayatattvāloka (PNT) that the truth of cognition is the consistency of cognition with the object, and the falsity is the inconsistency of cognition with the object, (I. 18, 19). He further exemplifies the above contention in his own commentary Śyādvādaratnakara (SVR) as follows: ‘This consistency of knowledge with the object must be with regard to the object different from the self (=knowledge, cognition), since for anything to be inconsistent with itself is absurd. Thus any cognition is true in relation to itself, and there is no false cognition. On the other hand, in relation to objects other than the self some cognitions are right and the others are false (I. 19).³ And what is established by pramāṇa is its result (ānantaryayena phalam) and the other is the mediated one (pāramparyayena phalam) (VI. 1, 2). Out of the two, the mediate result, being that of all kinds of knowledge except for kevalajñāna, consists of the judgement of acquiring (upādāna), that of abandoning (hāna) and that of indifference (upekṣa), whereas the former is the annihilation of ignorance (ajñāna-nivṛtti) which is nothing but the determination of the self and the others (sva-paravyavasīti) (VI. 3, 4, 5). Furthermore, the result is neither exclusively different from nor totally the same as the knowledge (pramāṇa) accordig to the Jaina theory of non-absolutism (syād-vāda); hence the result is, in a way, its pramāṇa (VI. 6, 7, 8). Such being the case, truth is understood to be a property attributed to a true cognition, and is dependent on the consistency with the objects other than the self.

Devasūri holds in his PNT that truth and falsity are in their origination and determined externally only, while they are ascertained in their apprehension exter-
nally or internally (I.20). Thus like other Indian realists, the Jainas try to seek truth or falsity in terms of consistency of cognition with objects other than itself, and the truth value is not to be attributed to pramāṇa as a means of cognition. Devasūri further elucidates in SVR that, these values are internally ascertained when the object is well-acquainted by repeated experience (abhyāsa-daśāyām). A similar idea is found in the Parikṣamukhasūtra (PM) of Māṇikyanandin and its commentary Prameyakamalamārtanda (PKM) by Prabhācandra, to which Devasūri undoubtedly owed his work. Take for instance one’s own palm, one need not resort to any means other than jñānagrāhaka, it being internally known to be true. But, in the case of an unacquainted object, the first cognition arises, is followed by volitional action to acquire the object (pravṛtti), and therefrom the second cognition is obtained. The truth of the first cognition which has produced action towards the object (pravartaka-jñāna) is ascertained through the second cognition, in accordance as the latter is a subsequent confirmatory cognition (saṁvādaka-jñāna, saṁvādin, avisamvādin) or a cognition of pragmatic consequences (arthakriya-jñāna) etc. in relation to the former. In this case, the saṁvādaka-jñāna or arthakriya-jñāna etc. is accepted to be true by the Jainas, without resorting to further verification, and thus the infinite regress is evaded.

So far as the external determination is concerned, truth and falsity in origin
ation and apprehension depend on excellence (guṇa) and deficiency (doṣa) respectively; thus the Jainas postulate two distinct positive factors. But suppose a cognition is first originated and apprehended as true, as the Mīmāṃsakas hold, independent of any other means, and it is changed into a false one only by subsequent deficiencies. Then only one determinant viz. doṣa is to be accepted. Does it necessarily follow that the absence of doṣa which determines the truth might signify nothing but excellence (guṇa) ? On the other hand, if, like the view attributed to the Buddhists by Mādhavacārya, falsity is originated and apprehended internally and is developed into truth by subsequent positive factor viz. guṇa, then is the absence of guṇa not identical with doṣa ? All the polemic works dealing with this topic are invariably devoted to the inquiry into the characteristics of guṇa and doṣa with a detailed and subtle discussion. Here such controversy is passed over.

The peculiarities of the Jaina theory might be summed up as follows :

1. The determination of the truth value of a cognition has been examined hitherto from two-fold aspect viz. utpatti and jñāpti, according to general treatises like SVR etc. However, Prabhācandra (980-1065) in his PKM and Nyāyakumudacandra (NKC) establishes three-fold of division viz. utpatti, jñāpti and svakārya. The term svakārya (the result of pramāṇa) is intended to conform with the aforesaid phala, as is contrasted with pramāṇa, which consists of pravṛtti, niṣṭhī and upkeśā.

Though apprehension (jñāpti) invariably presupposes, with the exception of the case of a well-acquainted object (abhyasīta-viśaya), pravṛtti by which to verify
the truth value, yet pravṛtti and the like, as the results of pramāṇa, are here postulated for the scrutiny whether such actions are necessarily preceded by the awareness of the truth value viz: truth or falsity. Prabhācanda applies the same rule to the case of svā-kāraṇa. The idea of pravṛtti is here introduced from two distinctive standpoints. In the case of jñāpti, pravṛtti is employed as a volitional action which determines the truth value, whereas the bone of contention, in the case of svā-kāraṇa, centres about whether such responsive behaviour viz. pravṛtti (inclusive of nirvṛtti and upakṣa) is determined by the apprehension of the truth value of cognition. Thus pravṛtti has a double character; one is to determine the truth value, and the other is to be determined by the truth value.

Anantavīrya (12th cent.) in his prameyaratnānālā, another commentary on PM modelled after PKM, establishes two-fold of division viz. upatti and svā-kāraṇa. In this case, the term svā-kāraṇa refers to the two aspects: one is ‘determination of object’ (viṣaya-paricchiti) which involves upatti, and the other is subsequent response towards the object like pravṛtti etc. This two-fold division seems to be a more faithful interpretation to the original aphorism of PM than Prabhācandra’s., in conformity with the afore-said division of pramāṇa and pramāṇa-phala, whether mediate or immediate.

2. The later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas like Vācaspatimiśra and Udayana try to avoid infinite regress by postulating some kinds of self-valid knowledge which require no further confirmation. The Jainas also stand on the same footing with them, in saying ‘On some occasions truth is apprehended at once, like in the case of primal perceptual cognition unconfirmed by repeated experiences. Since such cognition is never ascertained to stand in unfailing correspondence with the object, its truth is apprehended by a subsequent confirmatory cognition of the same object, by a cognition of its pragmatic consequences, or by a cognition of object concomitant with it. And the truth of cognition of this kind in self-evident and there is no loophole for the charge of infinite regress. such a presumption is quite an unescapable fate to those who maintain the external determination of the truth value of cognition.

3. The apprehension (jñāpti) is not always fixed either internally or externally. The truth value of any cognition is apprehended from the outset of its origination when the object is well-acquainted by repeated experiences. This is the idea generally held among the Jainas. With all my limited research, it is very likely that Vidyānandin or Māṇikyanandin was the first Jaina to take up this view. However, such theory was not a monopoly of the Jainas alone, but seems to have been borrowed from such Buddhist works as Tattvasaṃgrahah and its commentary Paṇḍita. In the latter work, four alternatives are first set forth and are finally rejected on the strength of the view that such manifold congruous combination of two values and two-fold determinant mode (viz. svatāstva and paratāstva) are of an
unrestricted or unfixed \((anāyama)\) nature.\(^1\) This bone of contention quite agrees with the Jainas. The Navya-naiyāyikas also came later to hold a similar view,\(^2\) in saying that the truth value of a cognition need not be proved if there is not the slightest doubt about it, and any motiveless doubt of a possible contradiction is of no account.

**References**


2. The term ‘buddhi’ synonymous with ‘jñāna’ is generally understood to have three meanings. Athalye explains to this effect in the following way. ‘First the act of knowing, which may be called ‘understanding’; secondly the instrument of knowledge which is ‘intellect’, and thirdly the product of the act of knowing, which is ‘cognition.’ It is the last sense that the word is invariably used in Nyāya and Viśeṣika philosophies.’ (Tarkasamgraha. Bombay Sanskrit Series, No. LV, second ed., p. 173)

There is a divergence of opinions, among scholars, about English equivalents to ‘jñāna’ etc. (Cf. Ingalls, Materials for the Study of Navya-Nyāya, p. 29 ff.; Matilal, The Navya-nyāya Doctrine of Negation, p. 6 ff.) In this thesis I have tried to use ‘cognition’ for the Sanskrit term ‘jñāna’, in the third meaning, so long as the truth value is taken into consideration in terms of its locus. In Jainism, however, ‘jñāna’ is primarily understood to refer to the first and the second meanings and secondarily even to the third meaning, thus being applicable to the widest denotations, as contrasted with other similar Sanskrit terms. Every school lays an emphasis on a particular aspect denoted by ‘jñāna’, so it seems almost impossible to give a precise English translation to the ‘jñāna’ shared in common by every school. In Jainism, ‘pramāṇa’ is considered a true knowledge (samyag-jñāna). Such being the case, for the terms ‘jñāna’ and ‘pramāṇa’ I can hardly give a precise English equivalent, and thus some ambiguity and confusion cannot be avoided.


4. PNT, I. 20, tad ubhayam utpattau parata eva jñaptau tu svatah parataś ceti. SVR, p. 249ff. anabhyāsa-daśāyāṁ parataḥ pratipadyata iti. kutah pratiyata iti cēt. anabhyāsa-daśāyāṁ prāmāṇyaṁ parato jñānte samśa-
yāpadatvād ity ata iti brūmaḥ yadi hi jñānena sva-prāmāṇyaṁ svayam eva jāyeta yathārtho-paricchedakam aham astiti, tadā pramāṇāpramāṇaṁ vedam jñāam iti prāmāṇya-saṁśayaḥ kadācid api notpadyate jñānata-saṁśayavat.

5. PM, I. 6, tat-prāmāṇyaṁ svataḥ parataś ceti.; PKM, ed. by Mahenda Kumar, loc. cit., p. 149ff.


9. Pramāṇamīmāsā, Singhi Jain Series No. 9, p. 6 (I. 1. viii.), kvacit parataḥ prāmāṇya-nīscayaḥ, yathā abhivyāsa-paśāpanne pratyakṣe, na hi tat arthena ghiḥātavyabhiḥcāram iti tad eka-viṣayāt saṁvādakāta jñānatarād vā, arthakhriyā nirbhāsād vā. nāntariyārtha-darśanād vā tasya prāmāṇya nīsciyate. teśām ca svataḥ prāmāṇya-nīscayan naṇavastraḥi-dausṭhyāva-kāśeḥ.


Tattvārthaslokavārtika, ed. by Manoharlal, p. 177, tatrābhāsāt pramāṇatvaṁ niścitaḥ svata eva naḥ, abhivyāse tu parata ity āhuḥ pecid amījasā (115). tac ca syādvādānā eva svārtha-nīscayanāt sthitam, na tu sva-nīscayanukṣoṣoṣa-jānāvācān (127). kvacit atyantābhāyāsāt svataḥ pramāṇatvasya nīscayan naṇavastraḥi-dosāḥ, kvadid abhavyāsāt paratas tasya vyavasthiter nāvāyāptir ity etad api syādvādānā eva pramāṇāt hā saddhyet svārtha-nīscayopaganāt. na punaḥ svarūpa-nīscaya-rahita-sakalasaṁveda-vādānā nāvasthādaṇauparaṅgasya tad-avasthātvāt....


Tattvasamagraha, 3100, abhyāsakam yathā jānānam yramāṇam gamyate svataḥ, mithyā-jānānam cathā kimcid apramāṇaṁ svataḥ sthitam.; Pañjika, on 3123, na hi buddhaṁ eṣāṁ caturṇāṁ ekatamo ‘pi pakṣo’ bhūṣo ‘niyama-paśasyeṣṭṭvaṭ. tathā hi—ubhayām api eit kimcit szata kimcit parataḥ iti pūrvaṁ upavarṣitam. ata eva pakṣa-cauṣṭhayopanyāsṛ ‘py ayuktaḥ, pañcama-paśasya sanbhavāt.

लेखार

जैन प्रामाण्यवाद पर एक टिप्पणी

इस आत्मिक युनो, हिरोशिमा विश्वविद्यालय, हिरोशिमा, जापान

प्रामाण्यवाद जन की सत्यता को वस्तुतिःया या आत्मनिष्ठ रूप से विचार करता है। इस पर प्रायः सभी भारतीय दर्शाओं ने विचार किया है। जन का प्रामाण्य दो प्रकार से संबंध है: स्वतः और परतः। जन-मायेनकल्याण कारण सामग्री इसमें स्वतः प्रामाण्य उल्लस करती है जबकि जन-मायेनकल्याण सामग्री से जन में परतः प्रामाण्य आता है।

प्रामाण्यवाद पर सर्वप्रथम मीमांसकों ने विचार किया था। उन्होंने आध्यात्मिक से आधार पर जन का प्रामाण्य स्थीरकर किया था। सर्वदाई मंथ में चार प्रमुख भारतीय दर्शाओं का एतिहासक मत प्रकट किया गया है जिसका संक्षेपण निम्न है:

प्रामाण्यवाद में जैन जन को ज्ञातानिष्ठता के आधार पर प्रमाण मानते हैं। देवसूरी ने प्रामाणनत्त्वालक तथा स्मार्तदर्शाली ने इस विषय में यहीं तथ्य स्पष्ट किया है। इसके अनुसार, ज्ञान के समय प्रामाण्य परतः हो जाता है जब कि ज्ञान के समय यह स्वतः भी हो सकता है और परतः भी हो सकता है। इस विषय में परिशुष्टता तथा प्रभुष्टिकल्याणांतर भी दश्य हैं।

जन का प्रामाण्य, उत्पत्ति और ज्ञान दशा में गुण-दोषों पर निर्माण करता है। दोषों के कारण जन में प्रामाण्य आता है। मीमांसकों और बौद्धों ने इन गुणों और दोषों पर विचार किया है। लेकिन जैन दर्शाओं ने इस पर विशेष चर्चा नहीं की है।

प्रामाण्यवाद के लेख में जैन मत को निम्न प्रकार संक्षेपित किया जा सकता है :

(1) जन के प्रामाण्य का विचार उत्पत्ति तथा ज्ञान दशा के आधार पर किया जाता है। जनकर्ता ने इसमें स्वकार्य को तीर्थिक दशा भी बोल दी है। ज्ञान के लिए प्रूति आवश्यक है जो एविष्ट किया पर निर्माण करती है। यह प्रूति न केवल जन को प्रमाणण देती है अपितु इसका निर्माण भी प्रमाणण के आधार पर ही होता है। अन्तर्भाव ने प्रमेयतत्वमात्र में प्रामाण्य को उत्पत्ति एवं स्वकार्य दशा में विषय परिचित करते है और प्रूति के रूप में निर्माण किया है।

(II) ज्ञान-गौरविक दर्शाओं के समान जैनों ने भी अनवस्य को हूँद करने के लिए कुछ स्वयं सिद्ध जन माना है जिनका प्रामाण्य सिद्ध करने की आवश्यकता नहीं है।

(III) ज्ञान के विषय में यह नियत नहीं है कि यह स्वतः ही होता है या परतः। यह जानलेखन की दशा एवं बस्तु-परिच्छेद पर परिमाण करती है। विचारादिक और मानवसंवर्धन का यह मत तत्तत्वाध्याय और उसकी पंजिका के समान प्रत्येक के आधार पर विविध होता है। तथ्य न्यायिकों ने भी बाद में इसी के अनुरूप मत स्थीरकर किया है।

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