

SPIRITUAL AWAKENING (SAMYAGDARŚANA) AND OTHER ESSAYS



Dr. Kamal Chand Sogani

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***Dedicated to
My late wife
Smt. Kamala Sogani***



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Publisher's Note

An established name in the fields of Jaina philosophy and related studies, Dr. Sogani has enriched Jainology with his radical approach backed by immaculate research. His style of presentation of complex topics successfully creates a bridge between the rarified realm of the spiritual and the pragmatism of the mundane.

The first anthology of Dr. K. C. Sogani's essays was well received by scholars as well as researchers. Prakrit Bharti is pleased to bring out the second volume of his erudite articles. This second anthology contains the following, fifteen articles selected by the author himself:

1. The Concept of Samyagdarśana (Spiritual Awakening) in Jainism, 2. The Concepts of Pariṣaha and Tapa in Jainism, 3. Indian Culture and Jainism, 4. The Concept of Aṇuvratas in Jainism, 5. Expressions of the Highest Good in Jainism : A Comparative Study, 6. Rightness of Action and Jaina Ethics, 7. Ahimsā and the Good, 8. Jaina Ethics and the Meta-Ethical Trends, 9. The Avadhi and Manaḥparyaya Types of Supersensuous Cognition, 10. The Concept of 'Arahanta' in Jainism, 11. Science and Jaina View of Values, 12. Gandhi's Contribution to Philosophy and Religion, 13. Comparative Study of the Expressions of the Ethical Ideal According to the Upaniṣads, the Gītā and Jainism, 14. Concepts Common to the Upaniṣads, the Bhagavadgītā and Jainism, 15. Story of My Contact with Dr. A. N. Upadhye, 16. Discussion, 17. Apabhraṁśa: Language, Manuscripts and Paumacariu of Svayāmbhū.

Like the first collection, this one also covers a wide range of topics. The author presents the ancient doctrines and their application in life in the much needed modern way to make them relevant and significant in the present day world.

We are sure, this work will also get similar reception by general readers, researchers as well as scholars.

We are thankful to Dr. Sogani for entrusting us with the publication of his articles in English . Our thanks are also due to Shri Surendra Bothara for copy-editing and editorial advice.

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THE CONCEPT OF SAMYAGDARŚANA (SPIRITUAL AWAKENING) IN JAINISM

The ultimate goal of the spiritual aspirant is the achievement of the perfect state of existence. The ideal is not something situated in a distant land but it consists in the realization of the transcendental nature of one's own self. It is the self in its veritable, dignified, and ontological nature. We may pose a simple question: how can an innate nature of a thing be remote from it? or how can the original qualities and modifications of a substance exist apart from the substance even for a moment? The answer is that the self has been in a defiled state of existence since beginningless past. Notwithstanding the ideal as the realization of one's own true self the effort for its revival and actualization is not so attractive as may be expected. Rather the life of flesh is becoming easier than the life of the spirit. It is overwhelmingly astonishing, but it is a fact and undeniably stares us in the face. This convincingly gives one to understand that there is an intermediary something which compels one to cling to the creature comforts and earthly pleasures, and offer a great resistance to the realization of the sublime end. Confronted with this recognition, we cannot deny that there exists a principle known as Mithyātva (spiritual perversion), which offers a great resistance to the realization of the sublime end.

Mithyātva acts as a barricade to the soul's true life. It is at the root of all evils, the seed of the tree of Saṁsāra. It

poisons all our activities so as to check the realization of the Summum Bonum of life. Moreover, it is responsible for the perversity of knowledge and conduct alike. The whole outlook, knowledge and conduct are vitiated by its operations. So long as Mithyādarśana (spiritual perversion) is operative, all our efforts to witness the sun of self's glory are bound to fail. It is to be rooted out in the interest of rendering its unwholesome functions null and void. In other words, Samyagdarśana (spiritual awakening) is to be attained, which in turn will make knowledge and conduct conducive to the attainment of liberation.

It is only after the acquisition of Samyaktva (spiritual awakening) that the soul attains the primary qualification even for marching towards emancipation from the wheel of misery. If Mithyātva (spiritual perversion) is at the root of Saṁsāra (transmigration), Samyaktva (spiritual awakening) is at the root of Mokṣa (liberation). It is the beginning of the spiritual pilgrimage, and the foundation of the magnificent edifice of liberation. The Yaśastilaka tells us that it is the prime cause of salvation, just as the foundation is the mainstay of a palace, good luck that of beauty, life that of bodily enjoyment, royal power that of victory, culture that of nobility and policy that of Government.¹ Right knowledge (value knowledge) and ethico-spiritual conduct are acquired through Samyagdarśana (spiritual awakening). Thus it forms the root and backbone of what may be called religion. The Uttarādhyayana envisages that right knowledge (value knowledge) remains unattainable in the absence of right belief (spiritual awakening), and right conduct (ethico-spiritual conduct) is out of question without right knowledge (value knowledge).²

Right Knowledge (value knowledge) and Right Conduct (Ethico-Spiritual Conduct) are Possible After Attaining Right Belief (Spiritual awakening):

A question is apt to be asked: how is right knowledge (value knowledge) acquired through right belief (spiritual awakening)? This may be replied by saying that knowledge becomes the cause of spiritual unfoldment only after right belief (spiritual awakening) is kindled and stirred up. Here the prefix right does not possess epistemological significance, but is indicative of spiritual value. Even though the possessor of right belief (spiritual awakening) cognizes rope as a snake which is no doubt epistemologically invalid, yet his knowledge is announced to be right. On the contrary, the man destitute of right belief (spiritual awakening) even though knows a things as it is after dispelling doubt, perversity and indefiniteness, he does not deserve to be called spiritually a right knower. Hence epistemological ascertainment has little to do with right knowledge which originates from spiritual awakening (right belief). In other words, in the context of supermundane experience, right knowledge (value knowledge) presupposes right belief (spiritual awakening). Though they are related as cause and effect, yet they are born simultaneously, just as light comes with the lamps.³ Simultaneous emergence cannot annul their distinctness. Again, right conduct (ethico-spiritual conduct) is preceded by right belief (spiritual awakening) and right knowledge (value knowledge). In their absence conduct even of the highest type will ever remain incapable of transcending morality, hence spiritualism will remain shrouded in mystery. The Darśana Pāhuḍa tells us that the right belief (spiritual awakening) engenders right knowledge (value knowledge) by virtue of which the virtuous and vicious paths are

cogitated, the possessor of right belief (spiritual awakening) in turn blows away vices and adopts Śīla and thereby he enjoys prosperity and emancipation.⁴ The man possessing Samyagdarśana (spiritual awakening) must recognize his self as his own as well as the causes of his misery, and the means of their elimination. He must recognize passions as his only foes; though he may not know their names, yet he must have the feeling that real happiness requires their extirpation.

Eight Components of Samyagdarśana: (spiritual awakening)

Let us now dwell upon the eight components of Samyagdarśana. They may also be called the organs of Samyagdarśana. Just as the different organs constitute the body, similarly these eight organs are the integral constituents of Samyagdarśana. The omission of even one of them will inevitably clip the wings of a man who soars high in the realm of spiritualism with the object of quenching his thirst for undying, unabating and soul-enrapturing happiness. Samantabhadra announces that the pain arising from venom cannot be eliminated by using an incomplete Mantra. Similarly he says that Samyagdarśana with mutilated organs is incapable of undermining the disquietude permeating the empirical existence.⁵ The eight organs⁶ of Samyagdarśana are: (1) Niḥsaṅkita, (2) Niḥkāṅkṣita, (3) Nirvicikitsā, (4) Amūḍhadṛṣṭi, (5) Upagūhana, (6) Sthitikaraṇa. (7) Vātsalya and (8) Prabhāvanā.

First, he who possesses the Niḥsaṅkita Aṅga does not doubt the principle that kindness to all creatures is Dharma and injury to beings is Adharma.⁷ The nature of this Aṅga must not point to the throttling of the inquisitive nature possessed by man. Doubt is not reprehensible if it aims at the decision of the nature of things. But if pushed

contrariwise, it is suicidal. The initial skepticism may lead to final certitude. Where logic can stretch its wings one should pin one's faith on a thing after following the course of rational thinking, so that dogmatism may not creep in. Because of spiritual awakening the possessor of this Aṅga, eschews the seven kinds of fear* which are ordinarily present in the perverted souls.⁸ (1) He is not frightened when the things imparting him physical and mental pleasures part company and when the sorrows and the agonies shake hand. (2) Nor is he perturbed by the fearful thought concerning the life hereafter. Besides, (3 to 7) he has ousted the fear of death, of discomfiture arising from disease, of his safety and lastly of losing his affluence or self-restraint.

Secondly, the Nihkāṅkṣita Aṅga implies that the true believer (spiritually awakened) never hankers after the worldly opulence and empyreal pleasures, inasmuch as he is convinced of the fact that these earthly enjoyments are impermanent, fraught with miseries, procreative of sin and evil and are caused by the filth of Karman.⁹

Thirdly, the Aṅga known as Nirvicikitsā signifies that there should not be a feeling of disgust at the various bodily conditions caused by disease, hunger, thirst, cold, heat etc., or at the sight of foul excretion. The body is impure by nature but is rendered venerable by the triple jewels or right belief, right knowledge and right conduct. The Nirvicikitsā Aṅga, consists in declining the scornful attitude towards the body even if it is diseased, unclean¹⁰ etc.

Fourthly, the Amūḍhadṛṣṭi Aṅga (non-stupidity) consists in steering clear of the causes of perversity and in dissociating oneself from the person pursuing wrong path.¹¹ According to Svāmikārtikeya he who does not recognize Hirṣā as Dharma, being overwhelmed by fear, inferiority and greed for profit, is free from stupidity.¹²

The fifth Aṅga is Upavṛhaṇa. He who develops in himself spiritual qualities by virtue of contemplating upon pure thoughts is said to practise the Upavṛhaṇa Aṅga.¹³

Sixthly, oppressed by the overwhelming intensity of passions like anger, pride, greed, deceit etc. or by other seductive causes, one may be constrained to deviate from the path of righteousness. At such a juncture, to re-establish the aspirant in the path by reminding him of his innate glory and magnificence is called the Sthitikaraṇa Aṅga.¹⁴ In other words, to strengthen the conviction of those who are faltering in their adherence to the spiritual path and also to save oneself from lapses—both these constitute the Sthitikaraṇa Aṅga.

The seventh Aṅga is Vātsalya which implies deep affection for spiritual matters, for the integral principle of non-injury, and for those who are spiritual brethren.¹⁵ Or he who is devoted to the meritorious persons, follows them with great respect, and speaks nobly, is said to have possessed the Vātsalya Aṅga.¹⁶

Lastly, the Prabhāvanā signifies the imperativeness of glorifying one's own self with spiritual qualities. It also implies the dissemination of the spiritual practices through the medium of exceptional charity, austerity, devotion, profound learning and by employing other means best suited to time and place.¹⁷

Characteristics accompanying the subsistence of Right Belief: (spiritual awakening)

In addition to these eight Aṅgas constitutive of Samyagdarśana, there are certain characteristics which accompany the subsistence of right belief (*spiritual awakening*) in the being of self.

First, there are four characteristics, namely, (1) manifestation of auspicious qualities, (2) turning away from the causes which enhance worldly career, (3) expression of the non-skeptical attitude towards the self and lastly (4) manifestation of universal compassion. These are respectively called (1) Praśama, (2) Saṁvega, (3) Āstikya and (4) Anukampā.¹⁸ Somadeva observes that just as the virility of a man, which cannot be perceived with senses, can be ascertained from his fortitude in danger, or the execution of his designs, similarly, the existence of the jewel of right faith (*spiritual awakening*), although extremely subtle owing to its being the condition of the soul, may be inferred from the qualities of Praśama, Saṁvega, Anukampā and Āstikya.¹⁹

Secondly, there are three other characteristics which are also possessed by the spiritually awakened, namely, (1) censuring of one's own sins in one's own mind, (2) divulging one's own weakness of conduct before the Guru, (3) devotion to Arhantas. These are respectively called (1) Nindā, (2) Garhā, and (3) Bhakti.

Thirdly, the spiritually awakened is exceedingly scrupulous in not allowing the filth of pride to maculate the self, thus striking out the eight kinds of pride namely, pride of (1) learning, (2) honour, (3) family, (4) caste, (5) power, (6) opulence, (7) penance and (8) of body, from his mind and demeanour.²⁰

Samyagdarśana (spiritual awakening) as Forming the Spiritual Background of Jaina Ethics:

We have endeavored to explain the nature of Samyagdarśana (spiritual awakening). This naturally creates an impression of its momentousness for the path to

emancipation. Without Samyagdarśana (spiritual awakening) conduct is incapable of surpassing the province of morality. An ascetic who bases his asceticism on the mere moral concepts cannot be said to be superior to a householder whose interior has been illumined with the light of Samyagdarśana, inasmuch as the former is paving the way to the achievement of empyreal pleasures far away from the blissful state of existence, while the latter's face is turned in the right direction, which will in due course yield whatever is worthy of his inherent nature. The auspicious Bhāvas (mental states) are contemplated by the spiritually converted persons as the temporary places of stay, when they find themselves incapable of staying at the pinnacle of spiritual realization. These Bhāvas (mental states) serve as a halting place for them and not as a permanent dwelling. Thus such aspirants absolve themselves even from subconscious egoism in performing auspicious activities. On the contrary, those who are only morally converted regard the acquisition of auspicious mental states and performance of auspicious activities as ends in themselves, hence they are bound to endless mundance existence, which shall deprive them of the spiritual bliss,²¹ Besides, their profound learning and the austere penances performed by them even for thousands of years or more are spiritually unfruitful in the absence of Samyagdarśana (spiritual awakening).²²

Thus we may say that the whole Jaina Ācāra whether of the householders or of the Munis is out and out sterile without having Samyagdarśana as forming its background. In other words, without the assimilation of Samyagdarśana which is nothing but the belief in the superempirical conscious principle or spiritual awakening the entire Jaina Ācāra is a labour wholly lost. Thus the Jaina Ācāra is

grounded in spiritualism. We can scarce forbear mentioning that Jainism is not merely ethics and metaphysics but spiritualism too which is evidently manifest from the persistent emphasis laid by all the Jaina philosophers on the veritable achievement of samyagdarśana (spiritual awakening) before any Ācāra subscribing to the attainment of emancipation is practised and pursued. Thus spiritualism pervades the entire Jaina Ācāra, hence the charge that the Jaina ethics is incapable of transcending morality and does not land us deep into the ordinarily unfathomable ocean of spiritualism gives way.

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THE CONCEPTS OF PARIṢAHA AND TAPA IN JAINISM

The householder and the saint are the two wheels on which the cart of Jaina ethical discipline moves on quite smoothly. It is to the credit of Jaina Ācāryas that they have always kept in mind these two orders while prescribing any discipline to be observed. They never confounded the obligations of the one with the other. In consequence, Jainism could develop the Ācāra of the householder with as much clarity and precision as it developed the Ācāra of the Muni. We shall, first, dwell upon the basic distinctions of these two disciplines before dealing with the concepts of Pariṣaha and Tapa in Jainism, inasmuch as the exposition of the distinctions will make us clear why the conquest of Pariṣaha and practice of Tapa have direct reference to the life of the saint or the Muni.

First, the upshot of the householder's discipline is to alleviate Himśā to a partial extent; but the aim of the ascetic discipline is to adhere and conform to the standard of negating Himśā to the last degree. In other words, the partial character of the householder's vows is disrupted by the potent life of the Muni, hence the Muni observes complete vows (Mahāvratas) in contrast to the householder's observance of partial vows (Aṇuvratas).

Secondly, the life of complete renunciation adopted by the saint makes possible the extirpation of inauspicious Bhāvas, which remains unrealized in the householder's life

of partial renunciation. The consequence of this is that vice totally vanishes from the life of the Muni.

Thirdly, the life of asceticism aptly illustrates the existence and operation of Śubha Dhyāna, and which, in the life of the householder is never found unmixed with its contrary. We may mention in passing that the life of asceticism is not to recoil from the world of action, but from the world of Himsā. As a matter of fact, action as such is not abandoned, but the supramundane character of action displaces its mundane form which inevitably entails Himsā. Even the high discipline of asceticism associated with auspicious Bhāvas along with samyagdarśana prevents the complete realization of Ahimsā on account of the presence of subtle spiritual enemies. The ascetic life, no doubt, affords full ground for its realization, but its perfect realization is possible only in the plenitude of mystical experience.

Thus the saint's life is an example of dedication of his integral energies to the realization of the sublime. In consequence, he regards the subjugation of Pariṣahas (afflictions) and practice of Tapas (austerities) as falling within the compass of his obligations. The saint allows no compromise with anything entangling him in the mire of Saṁsāra. His career is indicative of his complete detachment from mundane life and living. Anything incompatible with, and discordant to, his second birth in a holy world, anything which drags him down to breathe in the suffocating air of the profane world must needs be subdued, strangled and overthrown. If the Pariṣahas are not met with the adequate attitude and disposition of mind, they would tend to mar the saintly life; on the contrary, if they are encountered with the inner conviction of truth, and invaded with the non-violent army of fortitude, meditation, and devotion, they would

confer jubilation, and yield the joy of victory. And if the austerities are spiritedly practiced they would bring about the inner rejection of desire, which would let the aspirant experience unalloyed happiness far beyond the joys of this world or of any heaven.

Pariṣahas :

Those (afflictions) that are to be endured for the purpose of not swerving from the path of spiritualism are termed as *Pariṣahas*.¹ The *Uttarādhyayana* tells us that “a monk must learn and know, bear and conquer, in order not to be vanquished by them (*Pariṣahas*) when he lives the life of a wandering mendicant”.² Some of the *Pariṣahas*³ are: (1) hunger (*Kṣudhā*), (2) thirst (*Tṛṣṇā*), (3) cold (*Śīta*), (4) heat (*Uṣṇa*), (5) ennui (*Arati*), (6) walking (*Caryā*), (7) abuse (*Ākrośa*), (8) disease (*Roga*), (9) respect (*Satkāra-Purasakāra*), (10) conceit of knowledge (*Prajñā*) etc.

We now discuss the attitude of the saint towards these *Pariṣahas*.⁴ This will also make clear the meaning implied in them. The saint accepts faultless food and water. It is just possible that he may not get faultless food and water. Then he, (a) who does not get perturbed by the distress caused by hunger and thirst, (b) who is not inclined to receive food and water in improper country and in improper times, (c) who remains occupied with self-study and meditation, (d) who prefers non-obtainment of improper food and water to their obtainment, is deemed to have swam over the affliction originating from hunger and thirst. Not to dwell upon the pangs of hunger and pains of thirst amounts to the surmounting of hunger and thirst *Pariṣahas*.

It is evident that the saint has renounced resorting to external protections against cold and heat, and he remains

undecided regarding his habitation like a bird; and if, by his sojourn in the forests or at the peak of mountains, he is troubled by cold breeze, or by frozen ice, or by blasting hot wind, even then if he remains steadfast in his spiritual pursuit, he is called the conqueror of cold and heat *Pariṣahas*.

The saint who subjugates the feeling of ennui, which may be caused by the control of senses, by certain ills and maladies, by the behaviour of vicious persons, and by other formidable difficulties of ascetic life, is understood to subdue ennui *Pariṣaha*.

In leaving one place for another according to the prescribed rules of ascetic discipline, if the saint bears hardships owing to sharp pointed pebbles and thorns lying on the path, he is said to have got over walking *Pariṣaha*.

The saint who keeps an attitude of indifference towards reviles and remonstrations, and remains mentally undisturbed by them, overcomes abuse *Pariṣaha*.

In spite of being invaded by a number of diseases, the saint who conquers disease *Pariṣaha* endures them with fortitude without the neglect of his daily duties.

If the saint is not disturbed or attracted by the disrespectful or respectful attitude of the persons around him, he has overcome respect *Pariṣaha*. By not allowing himself to be puffed up with pride of knowledge, the saint attains the designation of the conqueror of the conceit of knowledge *Pariṣaha*.

Distinction between Parisahas and Austerities:

The distinction between *Pariṣahas* and austerities consists in the fact that the former occur against the will of the saint, who endures them or rather turns them to good

account by contemplating them to be the means for spiritual conquest, while the latter are in concordance with the will of the saint to have the spiritual triumph.

Secondly, most of the *Parīṣahas* may be the creations of vicious man, cruel nature and jealous gods, viewed from the common man's point of view, but austerities are the enunciations and resolutions of the aspirant's soul. Again, if *Parīṣahas* have enduring value, austerities have pursuing value.

Thirdly, *Parīṣahas* which are obstacles to spiritual life, represent themselves as the passing phase in the career of the aspirant, where as the austerities form the indispensable part and parcel of the discipline which is enjoined in order to escape from this distressed and sorrowful worldly life.

Lastly, we may say that the performance of austerities subscribes to the endurance of *Parīṣahas* with equanimity and unruffled state of mind.

Nature and Kinds of Tapa (Austerity):

Austerity (*Tapa*) implies the renunciation and rejection of desire, as the real enemy of the soul. The *Śaṭakhaṇḍāgama* pronounces that the extirpation of desire in order to actualize the triple jewels of right belief, (spiritual awakening) right knowledge (value knowledge) and right conduct (ethico-spiritual conduct) is affirmed to be *Tapa*.⁵ Thus, in the Jain view of *Tapa*, the idea of expelling all desires, the whole root of evil and suffering in favour of attaining to the freedom of the soul, tranquility and equality of mind, is not only prominent but paramount. It is at the basis as well as at the summit of Jain preachings. Despite the supremacy of this inward reference, Jains do not ignore the outer physical austerities.

In keeping with this trend of exposition, Tapas are announced to be of two kinds,⁶ namely, the external and the internal. The former is so called because of the preponderance of the physical and perceptible abandonment, while the latter is so called on account of the inner curbing of mind.⁷ We shall first dwell upon the austerities in their external forms.

External austerities:

The external austerities are enumerated as six in kind, namely, (1) Anaśana, (2) Avamāudarya, (3) Vṛttipatisaṅkhyāna, (4) Rasaparityāga, (5) Viviktasavyāśāna and (6) Kāyakleśa.⁸

(1) Anaśana⁹ implies fasting or abstinence from food either for a limited period of time, or till the separation of the soul from the body. It is performed for the purpose of practicing self-control, exterminating attachment, annihilating Karmas, performing meditation and acquiring scriptural knowledge, and not for the purpose of any mundane achievement whatsoever.¹⁰ It may be noted that Anaśana has been recognized as the simultaneous renunciation of food and the attachment to it. Mere maceration of the body is not fasting.¹¹

(2) Avamaudarya means not to take full meals; i.e. out of the normal quantity of thirty-two morsel¹² for man, and twenty-eight for woman, the reduction of even one morsel will come within the range of this Tapa.¹³ The observance of this austerity has been calculated to offer control over the senses and sleep, to assist in the practicing of self study and meditation.¹⁴

(3) Vṛttiparisāṅkhyāna¹⁵ means the predetermination of the saint regarding the number of houses to be visited, the particular manner of taken food, the specific type of food,

the giver of specific qualification, when he sets out to beg for food.¹⁶ In other words, the saint adheres to his predecided things; if the things conform literally to his predecision he would accept the food; otherwise he would go without it for that day. This is to uproot the desire for food.¹⁷

(4) Rasaparityāga indicates the abstinence from the one or more of the following six articles of food, namely, milk, curd, ghee, oil, sugar, salt; and from one or more of the following kinds of tastes, namely pacrid, bitter, astringent, sour and sweet.¹⁸ This is performed for the emasculation of the senses, subduing sleep, and the unobstructed pursuance of self-study.¹⁹

(5) Viviktasayyāśana²⁰ implies the choice of secluded place which may serve the real purpose of meditation, self-study and chastity and is not the cause of attachment and aversion.²¹

(6) Kāyakleśa means the putting of the body to certain discomforts by employing certain uneasy and stern postures and by practicing certain other bodily austerities.²² The object of Kāyakleśa is to endure bodily discomfort, to alleviate attachment to pleasures.²³

We have so far explained the nature of external austerities, and have seen that the performance of these austerities does not merely aim at the physical renunciation, but also at the overthrow of the thralldom of the body and senses. In other words, the external asceticism is capable of being justified only when it contributes towards the inner advancement of man; otherwise in the absence of which it amounts to labour which is wholly lost. The Mūlācāra²⁴ says that the external austerity should not engender mental disquietude, abate the zeal for the performance of disciplinary

practices of ethical and spiritual nature, but it should enhance spiritual convictions. This exposition brings to light the inward tendency of outward asceticism, or physical renunciation, and decries the mere flagellation of the body. The enunciation of Samantabhadra²⁵ that the external austerity serves for the pursuance of spiritual austerity also clearly shows the emphasis laid by Jainism on the internal aspect of Tapa. After vindicating the claims of the outward ascetic discipline in the ethical set up of Jaina preaching, we set out to discuss the nature of internal austerities.

Internal austerities

The internal austerities²⁶ are also enumerated as six in kind, namely, Prāyaścitta, (2) Vinaya, (3) Vaiyāvṛtta, (4) Svādhyāya, (5) Vyutsarga and (6) Dhyāna.

(1) The process by virtue of which a saint may seek freedom from the committed transgressions may be termed as Prāyaścitta.²⁷ According to Kārtikeya, that is the real Prāyaścitta wherein the commission of some fault is not repeated even if the body may be cut to hundred pieces.²⁸

(2) Vinaya implies either the control of senses and the eradication of passions, or the holding of humbleness for the triple-jewelled personalities.²⁹ All scriptural study in the absence of Vinaya goes to the wall. The outcome of the former should be the latter which in turn entails progress and prosperity.³⁰ The outward and mundane consequences of Vinaya are wide recognition, friendship, respect, grace of Guru, destruction of ill-will, while the inward and supramundane fruits of Vinaya are easiness in Self-restraint and penances, the acquisition of knowledge, purification of self, the emergence of the feeling of gratitude, simplicity and commendation of other man's

qualities, the destruction of conceitedness, and lastly the attainment of emancipation.³¹

(3) The rendering of service to saints by means of medicine, preaching etc. when they are overwhelmed by disease, Pariṣahas and perversities is called Vaiyāvṛtya.³² This austerity is performed for uprooting the feeling of abhorrence of dirt, disease etc., for spiritual realization, and for revealing affection for the spiritual path.³³

(4) Scriptural study or Svadhyaya, in the first place, comprises the fact of faultlessly making intelligible either the words or meaning or both to the person curious to learn.³⁴ secondly, the asking of questions with a view to clear away doubts or to confirm one's conviction regarding words and meanings, or both;³⁵ thirdly, the constant dwelling upon the assimilated meaning³⁶ fourthly, the fact of memorizing the scriptures and their repeated revision with unerring pronunciation,³⁷ fifthly, the moral preachings illustrated with the life of great men.³⁸

Scriptural study can enlighten the essence of life, foster self-control, direct the mind from the “abyss of sensuality to the plane of the spirit”³⁹, instill the spirit of detachment, inspire the pursuance of noble path, and develop fraternal feelings with all beings⁴⁰. Besides, it confers upon the aspirant the benediction that senses are restrained, mental concentration is obtained, and humbleness pours in.⁴¹ The man with the knowledge of Sūtras saves himself from being led astray, just as the needle with thread is not lost.⁴² Pūjyapāda points out that the purpose of Svādhyāya is to enrich intellect, to refine moral and spiritual efforts, to infuse detachment and fear from the mundane miseries, to effect an advancement in the practice of austerities, and to purify defects that may occur when one pursues the divine path.⁴³

For those who are fickle-minded, intellectually unsteady, nothing is so potent to terminate such a state of mind as the pursuance of Svādhyāya or the scriptural study, just as darkness can only be nullified by the light of the sun. ⁴⁴ It brings about mental integration and concentration, inasmuch as the aspirant overcomes the hindrances by ascertaining the nature of things through the study of the scriptures. ⁴⁵ Without the acquisition of scriptural knowledge, there always abides a danger of being led astray from the virtuous path, just as the tree full of flowers and leaves cannot escape its deadening fate for want of the root. ⁴⁶

(5) Vyutasarga signifies the relinquishment of external and internal Parigraha. ⁴⁷ The former comprises living and non-living Parigraha, and the latter, the different kinds of passions. ⁴⁸

General nature and types of Dhyāna

Having discussed the nature of five kinds of internal Tapas, we now proceed to dwell upon the nature of Dhyānas. It will not be amiss to point out that all the disciplinary practices form an essential background for the performance of Dhāyana. all the disciplinary observances find their culmination in Dhyāna. Thus Dhyāna is the indispensable, integral constituent of right conduct (ethico-spiritual conduct) and consequently, it is directly related to the actualization of the divine potentialities. It is the clear, and single road by which the aspirant can move straight to the supreme good.

To define Dhyāna, it represents the concentration of mind on a particular object. ⁴⁹ The stability of thoughts on one object is recognized as Dhyāna and the passing of mind from one object to another is deemed as either Bhāvanā, or Anuprekṣā, or Cintā. ⁵⁰

Now, the object of concentration may be profane and holy in character.⁵¹ The mind may concentrate either on the debasing and degrading object, or on the object which is uplifting and elevating. The former category is divided into two types, namely, Dharma-Dhyāna and Śukla-Dhyāna (Prasasta), and the latter, also into two types, namely, Ārta-Dhyāna and Raudra-Dhyāna (Aprasasta).⁵² The Praśasta category of Dhyāna has been deemed to be potent enough to make the aspirant realize the emancipated status.⁵³ On the contrary, the Apraśasta one forces the mundane being to experience worldly sufferings.⁵⁴ Thus those who yearn for liberation should abjure Ārta and Raudra Dhyānas and embrace Dharma and Śukla ones.⁵⁵ In dealing with Dhyāna as Tapa, we are completely concerned with the Praśasta types of Dhyāna, since they are singularly relevant to the auspicious and transcendental living. But we propose, in the first instance, to discuss the nature of Apraśasta types of Dhyāna, since its exposition would help us to understand clearly the sharp distinction between the two categories of Dhyāna.

Apraśasta Dhyāna

(a) Ārta-Dhyāna The word 'Ārta' implies anguish and afflictions; and the dwelling of the mind on the thoughts resulting from such a distressed state of mind is to be regarded as Ārta-Dhyāna.⁵⁶ In this world of storm and stress, though there are illimitable things which may occasion pain and suffering to the empirical soul, yet all of them cannot be expressed by the limited human understanding. The four kinds of Ārta-Dhyāna⁵⁷ have been recognized.

1) The first concerns itself with the fact of one's being constantly occupied with the anxiety of overthrowing the associated undesirable objects (Aniṣṭa Saṁyogaja) of varied nature.⁵⁸

2) The parting with of agreeable objects may also occasion discomposure of mind. To be overwhelmed by anxiety for restoring the loss is called the second type of Ārta-dhyāna, namely, Iṣṭa-viyogaji.⁵⁹

3) The constant occupation of mind to remove the distressing state of mind resulting from the diseased condition of the body is called the third of Ārta-dhyāna, namely, Vedanā-Janita.⁶⁰

4) To yearn for agreeable pleasures and to contrive to defeat and slander the enemy constitute what is called as the fourth type of Ārta-dhyāna, namely, Nidāna-Janita.⁶¹ In other words, to make up one's mind for and to constantly dwell upon the acquisition of the objects of sensual pleasures is termed as the fourth type of Ārta-dhyāna, namely, Nidāna-Janita.⁶²

(b) Raudra-Dhyāna

Raudra-dhyāna has also been enumerated as of four kinds.

1) To take delight in killing living beings, to be felicitous in hearing, seeing and reviving the oppression caused to sentient beings, to seek ill of others, to be envious of other man's prosperity and merits, to collect the implements of Himsā, to show kindness to cruel persons, to be revengeful, all these come within the purview of the first kind of Raudra-dhyāna, namely, Himsānandi Raudra-dhyāna.⁶³

2) The individual whose mind is permeated by falsehood, who designs to entangle the world in troubles by dint of propagating vicious doctrines, and writing unhealthy literature for the sake of his own pleasure, who amasses wealth by taking recourse to deceit and trickery, who contrives to show faults fraudulently in faultless persons in

order that the king may punish them, who takes pride and pleasure in cheating the simple and ignorant persons through the fraudulent language, may be considered to be indulging in the second type of Raudra-dhyāna, namely, Mr̥ṣānandi Raudra-dhyāna.⁶⁴

3) Dexterity in theft, zeal in the act of thieving, and the education for theft should be regarded as the third type of Raudra-dhyāna, namely, Cauryānandi Raudradhyāna.⁶⁵

4) The endeavour a man does to guard paraphernalia and pleasures of the senses is called the fourth type of Raudra-dhyāna, namely. Viṣāyanadi Raudra-dhyāna.⁶⁶

Praśasta Dhyān and it's Pre-requisites

Next in order comes the Praśasta type of Dhyāna which may be called Dhyāna proper. This type of Dhyāna is contributive to Mokṣa or final release. Before we directly embark upon the study of the types of Praśasta Dhyāna, it is of primary and radical importance to delineate their pre-requisites which will enforce banishment of all the inimical elements robbing the soul of the legitimate disposition and proper conduct for spiritual advancement. In consequence the self will gain strength to dive deep into the ordinarily unfathomable depths of the mysterious self. Indubiously, in the initial stages the purity of empirical and psychical background is the indispensable condition of Dhyāna. The necessary pre-requisites, of Dhyāna, in general, may be enumerated by saying that the subject must have the ardent desire for final liberation, be non-attached to worldly objects, possess unruffled and tranquil mind, be self-controlled, stable, sense-controlled, patient and enduring.⁶⁷ Besides, one should steer clear of mental distractions, and look towards the suitability of time, place, posture, towards the attainment

of mental equilibrium, before one aspires for Dhyāna conducive to liberation.

The control of mind which in turn leads to the control of passions and senses is also the essential condition of Dhyāna. Mental distraction hinders meditational progress, and to achieve liberation without mental purity is to drink water from there where it is not, i.e. from the river of mirage.⁶⁸ That is Dhyāna, that is the object of Dhyāna by virtue of which the mind after transcending ignorance submerges in the self's own nature.⁶⁹ A man who talks of Dhyāna without the conquest of mind is ignorant of the nature of Dhyāna.⁷⁰ On the reflective plane, the recognition of the potential divinity of the empirical self and the consciousness of the difference between the empirical self and the transcendental self will unequivocally function as the mental pre-requisite condition of Dhyāna.⁷¹

The practice of the fourfold virtues of Maitrī (friendship with all creatures), Pramoda (appreciation of merits of others), Karuṇā (compassion and sympathy) and Mādhyastha (indifference to the unruly) has also been prescribed as the mental pre-requisite conditions of Dhyāna. These quadruple virtues, practised in an earnest spirit, cause to disappear the slumber of perversion, and to set in eternal tranquility.⁷²

The selection of proper place, posture and time is no less importance for the performance of Dhyāna. The aspirant should choose those places which are associated with the names of holy Tīrthaṅkaras and saints.⁷³ A bank of a river, a summit of a mountain, an Island, and a cave and other places of seclusion and inspiration, should be chosen for practicing spiritual concentration.⁷⁴

As regards the posture for Dhyāna, for the people of this age who are generally deficient in energy, Padma and Kayotsarga postures are especially recommended.⁷⁵ For him, every posture, every place and every time is fit for meditation, whose mind is immaculate, stable, enduring, controlled and detached.⁷⁶

A place may be secluded or crowded, the saint may be properly or improperly seated, the stability of saint's mind is the proper time for meditation.⁷⁷

(i) *Praśasta Dhyāna : Dharma-Dhyāna*

The four types of Dharma-dhyāna have been recognized, namely, (1) Ajñā-vicaya, (2) Apāya-vicaya, (3) Vipāka-Vicaya, and lastly (4) Saṁsthāna-vicaya.⁷⁸

(1) When the aspirant finds no one to preach, lacks subtle wit is encountered with the subtleness of objects and experiences the deficiency of evidence and illustration in upholding and vindicating any doctrine, he adheres to the exposition of the Arahanta after believing that the Arhanta does not misrepresent things. The aspirant may thus be said to have performed Ajñā-vicaya Dharma-dhyāna.⁷⁹ Or he who has understood the nature of objects and who therefore makes use of Naya and Pramāṇa for justifying certain doctrines may be believed to have performed Ajñā-vicaya Dharma-dhyāna.⁸⁰ We may here say that the purpose of this Dhyāna is to maintain intellectual clarity regarding the metaphysical nature of objects propounded by the Arahanta.

(2) To ponder over the adequate ways and means of emancipating the souls from the wordly suffering⁸¹ and to meditate on the means of ascending the ladder of spiritual welfare, are to meditate on the means of ascending the ladder of spiritual welfare,⁸² signify Apāya-vicaya Dharma-dhyāna.

Besides, the aspirant should give himself to serious contemplation: ‘who am I?’ Why there are inflow and bondage of Karmas? How Karmas can be overthrown? What is liberation? and what is manifested nature of soul on being liberated?⁸³ If Ajñā-vicaya establishes oneself in truth, Apāya-vicaya lays stress on the means of realizing the essential nature of truth.

(3) Vipāka-vicaya Dharma-dhyāna implies the reflection on the effects which Karmas produce on the diverse empirical souls.⁸⁴

(4) The reflection on the nature and form of this universe constitutes what is called as Saṁsthāna-vicaya Dharma-dhyāna.⁸⁵ This kind of Dhyāna impresses upon the mind the vastness of the universe and the diversity of its constituents. By this Dhyāna the aspirant realizes his own position in the universe.

These four types of Dhyāna serve twofold purposes namely, auspicious reflection and self-meditation; i.e. they supply the material for the intellect and offer inspiration to the self for meditation. Though they do not seem to suggest any process of meditation, their subject-matter is such as to evoke active interest for nothing but self-realization through self-meditation. Thus Dharma-dhyāna is meditation as well as reflection, the latter may pass into the former and the former may lapse into the latter. In other words, the four kinds of Dhyāna are reflective when intellectual thinking is witnessed, and they are meditative when the mind attains stability in respect of them. The best kind of Dharma-dhyāna is to meditate upon the self by fixing one’s mind in it after renouncing all other thoughts.⁸⁶

(ii) *Praśasta Dhyāna : Śukla-Dhyāna*

Dharma-dhyāna which has so far been expounded prepares a suitable ground and atmosphere for ascending the loftiest spiritual heights. It claims to have swept away every iota of inauspicious dispositions from the mind of the aspirant. The Yogī has achieved self-mastery to the full, and has developed a unique taste for the accomplishment of that something which is unique. The Yogī, having brushed aside the unsteadiness of his mind now resorts to Śukla Dhyāna (Pure Dhyāna). Not all Yogīs are capable of performing this type of Dhyāna. Only those who are possessing bodies of the best order can have all the four types of Śukla-dhyāna.⁸⁷ The four types⁸⁸ of Śukla-dhyāna are 1) Pṛthaktva-vitarka-vicāra, 2) Ekatva-vitarka-avicāra, 3) Sūkṣmakriyāpratipāti, and 4) Vyuparatakriyānivartī.

The first type (Pṛthaktva-vitarka-vicāra) is associated with Pṛthaktva, Vitarka and Vicāra, i.e. with manyness, scriptural knowledge, and transition from one aspect of entity to another, for example, substance to modifications and vice versa, from one verbal symbol to another, and from one kind of Yoga (activity) to another.⁸⁹

In the second type (Ekatva-vitarka-avicāra) Vicāra is absent, consequently oneness displaces manyness. The mind shortens its field of concentration to the effect that the Yogī meditates upon one substance, an atom, or a modification of substance with the assistance of one kind of Yoga.⁹⁰ Hence the second type of Dhyāna is associated with Vitarka and Ekatva, i.e. with scriptural knowledge and oneness. In consequence, the Yogī experiences infinite intuition, knowledge, bliss, and energy.⁹¹ Thus the state of Jīvanamukti is attained.

The omniscient occupies himself with the third type of Śukla-dhyāna (Sūkṣmakriyāpratipātin) when an Antarmuhūrta (48 minutes) remains in final emancipation.⁹² After establishing himself in gross bodily activity, he makes the activities of mind and speech subtle.⁹³ Then after renouncing the bodily activity, he fixes himself in the activities of mind and speech, and makes the gross bodily activity subtle.⁹⁴ Afterwards mental and vocal activities are stopped⁹⁵ and only subtle activity of body is left.

In the last type of Śukla-dhyāna (Vyuparata-kriyānivartin) even the subtle activity of body is stopped. The soul now becomes devoid of mental, vocal and physical vibrations, and immediately after the time taken to pronounce five syllables it attains disembodied liberation.⁹⁶

LIST OF ABBREVIATION AND WORKS

Amita. Śrāva Amitagati-Śrāvakācāra (Anantakīrti Digambara Jaina Granthamālā, Bombay).

Anagā Dharmā Anagāradharmāmṛta of Āśādhara (Khusālacanda Gāndhi, Solapur)

Bhaga. Ārā..... Bhagavati-Ārāadhanā (Sakhārāma Nemaacanda Digambara Jaina Grantha-mālā, Solapur)

Iṣṭopa Iṣṭopadeśa of Pūjyapāda (Rāyacandra Jaina Sastramālā, Bombay)

Jnānā Jnānārṇava of Śubhācandra (Rāyacandra Jaina Śāstramālā, Bombay)

Kārti Kārtikeyānuprekṣā (Rāyacandrā Jaina Śāstramālā, Bombay)

Mūlā Mūlācāra of Vaṭṭakera (Anantakīrti Digambara Jaina Granthamālā, Bombay)

Prava Parvacanasāra of Kuṇḍakuṇḍa (Rāyacandra
Jaina Śāstramālā, Bombay)

Rājavā Rājavārtika of Akalanka (Bhāratīya Jnāna
Pītha, Kāśī)

Śat Vol VIII & XIII Śatkhāṇḍāgama of Puṣpadanta
and Bhūtabali (Jaina Sahitya Uddharaka Fund Karyālaya,
Amraot)

Sarvārtha Sarvārthasiddhi of Pūjayapāda
(Bhāratīya Jnāna Pītha, Kāśī)

Svayāmbhū Svayāmbhūstotra of Samantabhadra
(Vīraseva Mandira, Sarasāvā)

T. Sū Tattvārthasūtra of Umāsvati under the title
Sarvārthasiddhi (Bharatīya Jnāna Pītha, Kāśī)

Uttarā Uttarādhyayana (Sacred Books of the East
Vol. XLV).

..... Yoga of the Saints by Dr. V.H. Date (Popular Book
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..... History of Jaina Monachism by S.B. Deo. (Deeran
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1. T. Sū. IX. 8.
2. Uttarā. 2.
3. T. Sū. IX. 9; Uttarā. 2.
4. Sarvārtha. IX. 9, Uttarā. 2.
5. Śat. Vol. XIII-P. 55; Anagā. Dharmā VII-2.
6. Sarvārtha. P. 439; Śat. Vol. XIII. P. 54; Anagā. Dharma. VII-6,
Uttarā. 30/7
7. Sarvārtha. P.439
8. T. Sū. IX. 19; Bhaga. Ārā. 208; Mūlā. 346.
9. Mūlā. 347; Uttarā. 30/9; Bhaga. Ārā.209.

10. Sarvārtha. P. 438.
11. Śaṭ. Vol. VIII-p. 55.
12. Morsel consists of 1000 rice grains. (Anagā Dharma. VII-22) Śaṭ. Vol. XIII-p.56.
13. Mūlā. 350; Bhaga. Ārā. 211, 212; Anagā. Dharma. VII-22; Uttarā. 30/15; Śaṭ. Vol. XIII-P. 56.
14. Mūlā. 351; Anagā. Dharma. VII-22.
15. The Uttarādhyayana calls it Bhikṣācarī. "It consisted of imposing certain restrictions upon one-self regarding the mode of begging or the nature of the donor, or the quality of food or the way in which food was offered. (History of Jaina Monachism P. 188).
16. Mūlā. 355; Kārti. 443; Anagā. Dharma, VII-26; Bhaga. Ārā. 218 to 221; Śaṭ. Vol. XIII-P. 57.
17. Sarvārtha. P. 438.
18. Mūlā. 352; Uttarā 30/26; Bhaga. Ārā. 215; Śaṭ. Vol. XIII-P. 57.
19. Sarvārtha. P. 438.
20. The Uttarādhyayana calls it Saṅlīnatā. "It implies the choice of lonely place of stay devoid of women, eunuchs and animals. (Uttarā. 30/28).
21. Sarvārtha. P. 438, Kārti. 445, 447; Mūlā, 357; Bhaga. Ārā. 228; Śaṭ. Vol. XIII – P. 58.
22. Mūlā. 356; Sarvārtha. IX-19; Uttarā. 30/27; Kārti. 448; Śaṭ. Vol. XIII-P. 58; Bhaga Ārā. 222 to 227.
23. Sarvārtha. IX-19.
24. Mūlā. 358; Bhaga. Ārā. 236.
25. Svayambhū. 83.
26. T. Sū. IX-20; Mūlā. 360; Uttarā 30/30.
27. Sarvārtha. IX.20; Mūlā. 361; Śaṭ. Vol. XIII-P. 69.
28. Kārti; 452.
29. Śaṭ. Vol. XIII-P. 63; Anagā. Dharmā. VII. 60. Uttarā 30/32.
30. Mūlā. 385; Bhaga. Ārā. 128; Anagā. Dharmā. VIII.62.
31. Mūlā. 386 to 388; Bhaga. Ārā. 129 to 131.
32. Mūlā. 391, 392; Sarvārtha. IX. 24.
33. Sarvārtha. IX. 24.
34. Sarvārtha. IX. 25; Rājavā. IX. 25.
35. Ibid.

36. Ibid.
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid.
39. Yoga of the Saints. P. 66
40. Mūlā. 267, 268.
41. Mūlā. 410, 969.
42. Ibid. 971.
43. Sarvārtha. IX. 25.
44. Amita. Śrāva. XIII-83.
45. Prava-III.32.
46. Amita. Śrāva. XIII.88.
47. Mūlā. 406; Sarvārtha. IX. 26.
48. Mūlā. 407.
49. Rājavā. IX-27/10 to 15.
50. Śaṭ. Vol. XIII-P. 64.
51. Kārti. 468.
52. Kārti. 469; T. Sū. IX-28.
53. T. Sū. IX-29
54. Sarvārtha. IX-29.
55. Tattvānuśāsana. 34, 220.
56. Sarvārtha. IX. 28.
57. Jnānā. XXV. 37. T. Sū, IX. 30 to 33.
58. T. Sū. IX. 30; Kārti. 471; Jnānā. XXV –28.
59. T. Sū IX. 31; Jnānā. XXV. 31; Kārti. 472.
60. T. Sū. IX. 32; Jnānā. XXV. 32.
61. Jnānā. XXV-36.
62. Sarvārtha. IX-33.
63. Jnānā. XXV-4, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15; Kārti. 473.
64. Jnānā. XXVI-16, 17, 18, 20, 22; Kārti. 473.
65. Jnānā. XXVI-24; kārti. 474.
66. Jnānā. XXVI-29; kārti. 474.
67. Jnānā. IV-6. XXVII-3.
68. Jnānā. XXII-19.
69. Jnānā. XXII-20.
70. Jnānā. XXII-24.

71. Jnānā. XXVII-4.
72. Jnānā. XXVII-18.
73. Jnānā. XXVII-1.
74. Jnānā. XXVIII-2 to 7.
75. Jnānā. XXVIII-12.
76. Jnānā. XXVIII-21.
77. Jnānā. XXVIII-22.
78. T. Sū. IX-36.
79. Sarvārtha. IX-36.
80. Sarvārtha. IX-36.
81. Sarvārtha. IX-36.
82. Mūlā. 400.
83. Mūlā 11.
84. Sarvārtha. IX-36; Mūlā.401.
85. Sarvārtha. IX-36.
86. Kārti. 480.
87. Jnānā. XLII-5.
88. T.Sū. IX-39.
89. Jnānā. XLII-13, 15 to 17.
90. Jnānā. XLII-27.
91. Jnānā. XLII-29.
92. Jnānā. XLII-41.
83. Ibid. 48.
94. Ibid. 49.
95. Ibid. 50.
96. Ibid. 58, 59.



INDIAN CULTURE AND JAINISM

It is an acknowledged fact that Indian culture is the result of an interaction between two streams, Vedic and non-Vedic, Brāhmaṇa and Śramaṇa. The relationship of the Harappan to the Vedic civilization has remained a puzzle, nevertheless, recent records tend to favour their close relationship, though there exists a difference of opinion on the exact nature of this relationship. "How exactly Vedic and non-Vedic cultures were related is not clearly known, but there is no doubt that the two gradually fused in the post-Vedic age to form the classical culture of India."¹ It requires to be accepted that the dominant note of India culture is the dissemination of the everlasting ethico-spiritual values without any diversion. This has been practised by the great personalities of India from the Vedic seers and the Śramaṇic sages to the medieval saints and modern savants."² Thus it is the ethico-spiritual truth which has been tenaciously held in Indian culture through all its vicissitudes as the essential and consistent tradition.

Ṛṣabhanātha as non-Vedic and the founder of Jainism : In consonance with the ethico-spiritual adherence of the Indian saints and sages, non-Vedic, Śramaṇic and Kṣatriya Jaina tradition of twenty-four Tīrthaṅkaras headed by Ṛṣabhanātha or Ādināth, the first Jaina Tīrthaṅkara has been responsible for the rise and development of Jainism in the history of Indian culture. The symbol of Ṛṣabhanātha is 'bull'. This reminds us of the Mohenjodaro seals wherein the bull has played a prominent part in the cult of the Indus people. "A large number of seals have been found bearing

the figure of a bull and it is an undeniable fact that such seals are far greater in number than those bearing the figures of other animals."³ Along with the bull, the figure of the deity has been represented as naked and he has adopted Kāyotsarga (standing) meditative posture. The presence of bull in the large number of seals, the adoption of nudity and the Kāyotsarga meditative posture-all these seem to be sufficient to identify the figure on the seals as R̥ṣabhanātha, the first Tirthāṅkara of the Jainas. "Since in the seals from the Indus Valley we have the earliest evidence of a yogic posture and since Yoga as a system of self-realisation is foreign to the earlier Vedic texts, are we to conclude that the Vedic people learnt about meditation and its technique from the Indus Valley people."⁴

On the basis of the R̥ṣabhanātha cult it may be said that Jainism represents the continuation of Śramaṇic culture which is as old as the Vedas so far as the literary evidence goes, though the archaeological evidence takes Śramaṇism far back to Harappan civilization, which is predominantly a yoga-based non-Vedic culture. According to Dr. G.C. Pande⁵ "the anti-ritualistic tendency, within the Vedic fold, is itself due to the impact of an asceticism which antedates the Vedas. It is recognised that "some of the relics, recovered from the excavations at Mohen-jo-daro and Harappā, are related to Śramaṇa or Jaina tradition. "The nude images in Kāyotsarga, i.e., the standing posture lost in meditation, closely resemble the Jaina images of the Kuṣāṇa period. Kāyotsarga is generally supposed to belong to the Jaina tradition. There are some idols even in Padmāsana pose." "Even after the destruction of the Indus civilization, the straggling culture of the Śramaṇas, most probably going back to pre-Vedic times, continued even during the Vedic period as is indicated

by some such terms as Vātarasanā, Muni, Yati, Śramaṇa, Kesi, Vrātya, Arhan and Śiśnadeva". "There can hardly be any doubt that the Muni was to the Ṛgvedic culture an alien figure." "In the Ṛgveda⁶, Arhan has been used for a Śramaṇa leader." "The mention of Śiśnadevas (naked gods) in the Ṛgveda is also noteworthy⁷." All this speaks of Jainism as a pre-Vedic religion and Ṛṣabhanātha as its founder.

According to tradition, Ṛṣabhanātha founded the social order and family system, taught to mankind the cultivation of land, different arts and crafts, writing etc., improving the lot of his people. That is why the Indian tradition preserves the memory of Ṛṣabha and has been called in the Brāhmanical texts as an incarnation of god Viṣṇu and Bharata, a Mahāyogi. Owing to the importance of Ṛṣabha in the history of Indian culture, he is called Prajāpati, Mahādeva, Paśupatinātha, Brahmā etc. It will not be out of place to point out that ancient Indian Script Brāhmī has been styled 'Brāhmī Script' after the name of his daughter, Brāhmī.

Bhārata after Ṛṣabhanātha's son Bharata: "All the main Purāṇas like the Viṣṇu, Agni, Markaṇḍeya, Brahmāṇḍa, Skanda, Liṅga Purāṇa, etc. unanimously record that India came to be styled as Bhārata after Bharata Cakravartī, a supreme ruler and a great victor, the son and successor of the mighty and enlightened paramount monarch and the first Jaina Tirthaṅkara, Ādinātha or Ṛṣabhanātha of the solar dynasty"⁸, although certain scholars erroneously accosicate India's name as Bhārata after Bharata, the son of Śakuntalā and Duṣyanta.

It may be noted here that attempts are being made to change tradition into history in the modern sense of the word. The historicity of Pārśva (887 B.C.) the 23rd Tirthaṅkara has been established.⁹ The predecessor of Pārśva is Ariṣṭanemi (Neminātha) the first cousin of Lord Kṛṣṇa¹⁰. The twenty first

Tirthaṅkara Nami of Mithilā in Videha seems to have given rise to the spiritualistic thought of the Upaniṣad."

Discourses of Mahāvīra in Prākṛta and his first sermon at the advent of a Vedic Brahmin Scholar: Mahāvīra (598 B.C. - 527 B.C.) is the twenty-fourth Tirthaṅkara, who attained omniscience (Kevalajñāna). Mahāvīra remained silent and did not deliver, according to Digambara tradition, any sermon for sixty-six days. At the advent of a renowned Vedic, Brahmin scholar, named Indrabhūti Gautama in the Samavaśaraṇa (religious assembly) Mahāvīra delivered his first sermon at the Vipulācala mountain outside the city of Rājagṛha, the capital of Magadha, on Saturday the 1st July 557 B.C.¹² This day is celebrated as the Viraśāsana day and Indrabhūti Gautama was designated as the first Gaṇadhara (chief disciple) by Mahāvīra. Along with Indrabhūti Gautama his five hundred pupils joined the order of Mahāvīra. Gradually Mahāvīra initiated more Brahmin Vedic scholars into the ascetic order. It is of capital importance to note that Mahāvīra made use of Prākṛta for his discourses¹³, as a result of which the whole canonical literature in Prākṛta was prepared by the Gaṇadharas.

Now the question is why did Mahāvīra deliver his first sermon only at the advent of a Vedic Brahmin scholar? My interpretation of the event is : Vedic scholar is a Prākṛta scholar, since the Vedas have been composed in Loka Bhāṣā (language of the masses) of that period. Pt. Kiśoridāsa Vājayaye tells us that the language of the Vedas is the first form of Prākṛta, though this underwent change in form in course of time and became the second stage of Prākṛta. This second stage was prevalent in a very large area and Mahāvīra's discourses were meant for all without any

distinction of cast and creed, classes and masses, so he chose Prākṛta for his deliverances. I have no hesitation to say that the mother tongue of even Pāṇini was Prākṛta. Since the eleven Gaṇadharas including Indrabhūti Gautama were Vedic Brāhmaṇa scholars they were well-versed in Prākṛta language. Mahāvīra gave them the most important task of Āgamic preparation. My contention is that just as the seeds of Laukika Saṁskṛta are inherent in the Vedic language, similarly the seeds of Prākṛta constructions may be easily discerned in the Vedic language. Thus the Vedic language is the precursor of Laukika Saṁskṛta as well as Prākṛta constructions. Thus to say that Prākṛta is derived from Laukika Saṁskṛta is an improper approach to the history of language development in India. I may, therefore, conclude by saying that the study of Vedic language will constitute an all-embracing foundation of Indian culture. Unfortunately India is missing this aspect of culture and it must be remembered that the study of language is basic to the study of any culture. This will open the way to Prākṛta and Apabhraṁśa studies and the study of regional languages. By virtue of this, the origin of national language, Hindi will be understood in a right perspective.

Religion of Mahāvīra as Sarvodaya-Tīrtha : It will not be idle to point out that after attaining supreme knowledge known as Kevalajñāna, Mahāvīra for full thirty years visited different parts of country especially the important centres in Eastern and Northern India and promulgated socio-spiritual values throughout. Owing to the magnetic personality of Mahāvīra and his metaphysical, ethical and spiritual teachings, number of kings, queens, princes, princesses, ministers and merchants accepted him as their teacher. Thus males and females of all casts and

classes became the ardent followers of Mahāvīra, and a fourfold order of Sādhus (male ascetics), Sādhvīs (female ascetics), Śrāvakas (male householders) and Śrāvikās (female householders) came into existence. In view of the all-embracing character of Mahāvīra's principles the Jaina Ācārya Samantabhadra, as early as second century A.D. called the religion of Mahāvīra a 'Sarvodaya' Tirtha,¹⁴ which term is so commonly used now-a-days after Gandhiji. Thus Mahāvīra is one of those few towering personalities who fought for individual liberty in the context of social life. He revolted against the socio-religious exploitation and oppression of man and introduced vigorous innovations in the then existing social law and order. He did not confine himself to individual upliftment, but he dedicated himself to the development of a new creative social order for the healthiest orientation of the individual. Though he was a man of contemplative values, yet social values got his fullest attention. Those who regard Mahāvīra only as an apostle of spiritual message do great injustice to him. In fact, he serves as an illustration both of spiritual realisation and social reconstruction.

Mahāvīra attained Nirvāṇa at Pāvā in Bihāra at the age of 72 on Tuesday the 15th October 527 B.C. This day is being celebrated as the Dīpāvalī festival (festival of lamps) throughout India. Besides, Mahāvīra's Nirvāṇa day marks the beginning of Vīra Nirvāṇa Samvat. This Samvat is the oldest Samvat followed in India.

Unprecedented contributions of Jainism to Indian Culture : I take this opportunity to enumerate and discuss in brief the unprecedented contributions which have been made by Jainism to Indian culture, by virtue of which this culture has been enriched and adorned.

1. Classification of empirical selves as the basis of socio-spiritual principle of Ahimsā and the dissemination of the doctrine of Aparigraha.
2. Inclusion of the notion of Paryāya (modification or change) in the definition of Substance and its spiritual implication.
3. Theory of Metaphysico-axiological Anekānta along with the doctrine of Naya (view-point).
4. Device of Syādvāda as the key to the pointed communicability of knowledge.
5. Doctrine of Karma as an explanation of the cognitive, conative and affective differences existing in the world at large.
6. Mystical journey of the self from darkness to light, from slumberiness to perfect spiritual awakening.
7. Composite Sādhana of Tri-ratna (Samyagdarśana, Samyagjñāna and Samyakcāritra) leading to emancipation (Mokṣa).
8. According religious freedom to women and down-trodden people.
9. Propounding the philosophy of vegetarianism and the philosophy of fighting defensive wars.
10. Accepting Sallekhanā as the spiritual welcome to death without any fear and perturbation.

1. Classification of Jīvas (empirical selves) as the basis of socio-spiritual principle of Ahimsā and the dissemination of the doctrine of Aparigraha.

The doctrine of Ahimsā is the be-all and end-all of the Jinist way of life and living. The oldest Jaina Āgama Āyāro

remarkably pronounces that none of the living beings ought to be killed, ought to be ruled, ought to be enslaved or possessed, ought to be distressed and ought to be put to disquiet. (सब्वे पापा ण हंतव्वा, ण अज्जावेतव्वा, ण परिधेत्तव्वा, ण परितावेयव्वा, ण उह्वेयव्वा)¹⁵. The socio-political organisations and the capitalistic set up can easily derive inspiration from this ethico-social statement. Thus the Āyāro (Ācārāṅga) conclusively pronounces that after understanding the importance of kindness to beings, the enlightened person should preach, disseminate and applaud it at all places in East-West and North-South directions. (दयं लोगस्स जाणित्ता पाईणं, पडीणं, दाहिणं उदीणं आइक्खे विमए किट्ठे वेदवी)¹⁶. The Praśnavyākaraṇa Sūtra designates social Ahimsā as kindness, (दया) security (रक्षा) salutariness (कल्याण) fearlessness (अभय) and so on.¹⁷

The Ācārāṅga gives us certain arguments to renounce Himsā.

(i) Socio-political argument against Himsā : The Ācārāṅga condemns Himsā by saying that its operation is without any stop, cessation and discontinuance and it goes on increasing to the extent possible with the political consequence that the race of armaments becomes unarrestable and continues to grow without any check. In contradistinction to this it eulogizes Ahimsā by saying that its observance is total and not piece-meal, with the result that the armament race discontinues and comes to a stop. (अत्थि सत्थं परेण परं, णत्थि असत्थं परेण परं)¹⁸.

(ii) Psychological Argument against Himsā : After comprehending and beholding the significance of peacefulness of beings, one should renounce Himsā, inasmuch as Himsā causes suffering to beings and human suffering caused by theft, hoarding, falsehood, slavery,

economic exploitation, social oppression, curtailment of legitimate freedoms and the like is a great mental disturbance, is dreadful and is associated with unbearable pain and affliction. Since life is dear to all beings, pleasures are desirable, pain is undesirable for them, beings ought not to be killed, ruled, possessed, distressed and so on (‘णिज्झाइत्ता पडिलेहिता पत्तेयं परिणिव्वाणं सव्वेसिं पाणाणं अस्सातं अपरिणिव्वाणं महम्मयं दुक्खे’ ‘सव्वे पाणा सुहसाता दुक्खपडिकूला । सव्वेसिं जीवितं पियं’)¹⁹.

It will not be idle to point out that the talk of Ahimsā is not possible without a world of living beings. Social Ahimsā begins with the awareness of the ‘other’. Like one’s own existence, it recognises the existence of other beings. In fact, to negate the existence of other beings is tantamount to negating one’s own existence. Since one’s own existence can not be negated, the existence of other beings also can not be negated. Thus there exists the universe of beings in general and that of human beings in particular. (‘एव सयं लोगं अब्भाइक्खेज्जा, एव अत्ताणं अब्भाइक्खेज्जा । जे लोगं अब्भाइक्खति’)²⁰.

The Jaina Āgama classifies living beings (Jīvas) into five kinds, namely, one-sensed to five-sensed beings.²¹ The minimum number of Prāṇas possessed by the empirical self is four (one sense, one Bala, life-limit and breathing), and the maximum number is ten (five senses, three Balas, life-limit, and breathing). The lowest in the grade of existence are the one-sensed Jīvas which possess only the sense of touch and they have only the Bala of body, and besides they hold life-limit and breathing. These one-sensed Jīvas admit of five-fold classification;²² namely, the earth-bodied (Pṛthivīkāyika) water-bodied (Jala Kāyika) fire-bodied (Agnikāyika) air-bodied (Vāyukāyika) and lastly, vegetable-bodied (Vanaspatikāyika) souls.

The two-sensed Jīvas possess six Prāṇas, i.e., in addition to the four Prāṇas of one-sensed souls, they have two Prāṇas

more; namely, the sense of taste, and the Bala of speech; the three-sensed souls have the sense of smell additionally; the four-sensed souls have the sense of colour besides the above; and lastly, the five-sensed souls which are mindless are endowed with the sense of hearing in addition; and those with mind possess all the ten Prāṇas. Thus the number of Prāṇas possessed by one-sensed to five-sensed souls is four, six, seven, eight, nine and ten respectively. This classification of Jīvas into five kinds is used for the measurement of the degree of Ahimsā. The more the senses the more the evolved consciousness. As for example, two-sensed Jīvas are more evolved than the one-sensed beings, five sensed beings are more evolved than the one, two, three and four-sensed beings. Thus Ahimsā will be directly proportionate to the Ahimsā of the beings (Jīvas) classified.

Spiritual Perspective of Ahimsā : We have dwelt upon Ahimsā as a social value. This view regards Ahimsā as 'other' oriented and is concerned with the progress and development of the 'other'. The Puruṣārthasiddhyupāya moves in a different direction when it unambiguously expresses that non-emergence of attachment, aversion etc. on the surface of self is Ahimsā (अप्रादुर्भावः खलु रागादिनां भवत्यहिंसेति).²³ This pronouncement has a deep inward reference and regards Ahimsā as a spiritual value. This method of dealing with Ahimsā obliges us to peep into one's own inner life, so that attachment and aversion along with their ramifications like anger, pride, deceit and greed are completely got rid of. The Praśnavyākaraṇa Sūtra designates Ahimsā as Nirvāṇa (निर्वाण), Samādhi (समाही) Supreme tranquillity (संती), happiness (पमोअ), super satisfaction (तित्ती) and purity (पविता) and so on.²⁴ In other words, we may say that even the slightest fall from complete self-realisation is to be regarded as Himsā. Thus Himsā

commences with the appearance of passions on the ground of self.

The Ācārāṅga gives us spiritual argument to renounce Himsā.

Spiritual Argument against Himsā : Since all the selves are transcendently alike, killing the other is killing one's own self, ruling the other is ruling one's own self, enslaving the other is enslaving one's own self, distressing the other is distressing one's own self, and disquieting the other is disquieting one's own self. By reason of this Himsā of all the living beings has been abandoned by those desirous of self-realisation (तुमं सि णाम तं चेव जं हंतव्वं ति मण्णसि, तुमं सि णाम तं चेव जं अज्जावेतव्वं ति मण्णसि, तुमं सि णाम तं चेव जं परितावेतव्वं ति मण्णसि, तुमं सि णाम तं चंव जं परिघेतव्वं ति मण्णसि, एवं तं चेव जं उद्देतव्वं ति मण्णसि।)²⁵.

Dissemination of the doctrine of Aparigraha²⁶ : Mahāvīra was well aware of the fact that economic inequality and the hoarding of essential commodities very much disturb social life and living. These acts lead to the exploitation and enslavement of man. Owing to this, life in society is endangered. Consequently, Mahāvīra pronounced that the remedy for the ill of economic inequality is Aparigraha. The method of Aparigraha tells us that one should keep with one self that which is necessary for one's living and the rest should be returned to society for its well-being. Limit of wealth and essential commodities are indispensable for the development of healthy social life. In a way wealth is the basis of our social structure and if its flow is obstructed because of its accumulation in few hands, large segments of society will remain undeveloped. The hoarding of essential commodities creates a situation of social scarcity which perils social life. In order to resist such inhuman tendency, Mahāvīra

incessantly endeavoured to establish the social value of Aparigraha.

2. Inclusion of the notion of Paryāya (modification or change) in the definition of Substance and its spiritual implication

Definition of Substance (Dravya) : In consonance with the perspective adopted by the Jainas in their metaphysical speculation, substance is that which exists or that which is characterised by simultaneous origination, destruction and persistence, or that which is the substratum of attributes (Guṇa) and modes (Paryāya)²⁷. Permanence signifies persistence of substance along with attributes, and change refers to fluctuating modes along with the emergence of the new modes and the disappearance of the old ones at one and the same time. To illustrate, gold as a substance exists with its modifications and qualities. Now after making an ornament, gold as a substance is existent along with its attributes and what changes is the mode. Thus existence which is inseparably bound up with substance (gold) accompanied by its attributes and modes necessitates the production of a new form, the cessation of the old one, and continuation of gold as such simultaneously.²⁸ In other words, the denial of the different aspects of the Jaina view of substance will lead us either to the Buddhist philosophy of universal change which disregards the underlying permanent being, or to the Vedantic monism which declares the accompanying change as appearance or illusory.

Substance (Dravya) and modification (Paryāya): The notion of Paryāya is peculiarly Jaina.²⁹ In conformity with the nature of substance as permanence in change, Paryāya alludes to the changing aspect of a thing. Every quality changes its state every moment; and this mode of being is called

Paryāya which is incessantly transforming itself into the next, though the quality as such is never abrogated. It is on this account alleged that substance is in a state of perpetual flux. However incessant and infinite the transformations may be, the underlying substantiality and permanency can never part with existence. Substance and Paryāya are not to be distinguished like two different things, for it is substance through qualities which because of its flowing nature attains the qualification of Paryāyā. Substance and modes are neither exclusively identical nor exclusively different, but the relation is one of identity-in-difference. Thus origination and destruction are applicable to Paryāyas, and persistence to qualities along with substance. Thus there is no substance (Dravya) without modification, and modification is inconceivable without substance.³⁰ Hence permanence is not the denial of change, but includes it as its necessary aspect.

Spiritual implication of Paryāya : Svabhāva Paryāya and Vibhāva Paryāya

Kundakunda, the great philosopher of the 1st Century A.D. discusses the spiritual implication of Paryāyas (modifications) of self. According to him, the self, as an ontologically underived fact, is one of the six substance subsisting independently of anything else. Consciousness is the essential quality of the self. It manifests itself at the mundane stage of existence in auspicious and inauspicious psychical modifications. Whenever the auspicious mode of kindness originates, inauspicious mode of cruelty ceases and the quality of consciousness continues simultaneously. Thus self as a substance exists with its modifications and qualities.

Kundakunda speaks of essential modifications (Svabhāva Paryāyas) and non-essential modifications

(Vibhāva Paryāyas) and accepts that the empirical self has been associated with the non-essential modifications (Vibhāva Parvāyas) since an indeterminable past, thereby it has identified itself with attachment and aversion.³¹ We may point out in passing that the transcendental self occupies itself with essential modifications (Svabhāva Paryāyas) and goes beyond the quality of attachment and aversion and is the doer of detached actions and the enjoyer of pure knowledge and bliss. The empirical self is potentially transcendental, though this transcendental state of existence is not actualised at present; hence the distinction is incontrovertible. The worldly human beings have identified themselves with the non-essential modifications (Vibhāva Paryāyas) from beginningless past. Kundakunda, therefore, draws our attention to the essential modifications (Svabhāva Paryāyas) of self. He advises us to relinquish the working of Vibhāva Paryāyas after turning to Svabhāva Paryāyas of self. No doubt we are in the empirical form of existence from beginning past, but his theory of Svabhāva Paryāya reminds us of our spiritual magnificence and glory. The doctrine of Svabhāva Paryāya does not assert that the self is at present perfect but simply affirms that the self ought to attain the height illumined by it. It has the force of 'ought' and not of 'is'. But the force is valid for empirical selves having Vibhāva-Paryāyas. Kundakunda regards the attainment of Svabhāva Paryāya as the attainment of knowledge-consciousness (Jñāna Cetanā) which is the full-fledged and legitimate manifestation of consciousness.³² The Arhat or Siddha state is the state of knowledge-consciousness, the state of omniscience and bliss.³³

3. Theory of Metaphysico-axiological Anekānta along with the Doctrine of Naya (view-point)

Metaphysical Anekānta : It is incontrovertible that metaphysics deals with the problem of reality or substance. For Jaina thinkers, reality is constituted of apparent contradictions. So its one dimensional exposition is not possible. It is an inalienable complex of permanence and change, existence and non-existence, oneness and manyness, universality and particularity etc.

Because of this complexity, reality or substance is styled 'Anekāntic'. It is thus multi-dimensional possessing antagonistic dimensions of permanence and change, one and many etc. These antagonistic dimensions are infinite in number, of which we know only a few of them. Thus the Jaina philosopher differs from all absolutists in their approach to the unfoldment of the inner nature of reality. The Jaina advocates change to be as much ontologically real as permanence. Being implies becoming and vice versa. It may be said "if the Upaniṣadic thinkers found the immutable reality behind the world of phenomena and plurality, and the Buddha denounced everything as fleeting, Mahavīra found no contradiction between permanence and change, and was free from all absolutism." While discussing the nature of substance we have already said that permanence signifies persistence of substance along with attributes, and refers to fluctuating modes along with the emergence of the new modes and the disappearance of the old ones at one and the same time.

(i) Metaphysical Anekānta and the Classification of Substance: (Plurality, Duality and Unity)

Jainism resolves the whole of the universe of being into

two everlasting, un-created, co-existing, but independent categories of Jīva and Ajīva. The Ajīva is further classified into Pudgala (matter), Dharma (principle of motion), Adharma (principle of rest), Ākāśa (space) and Kāla (time). Hence reality is dualistic as well as pluralistic. But, according to the Jaina, plurality, considered from the point of view of one existence, entails unity also. According to Kundakunda, in spite of the unique characteristics possessed by the different substances, existence has been regarded as an all-comprising characteristic of reality which ends all distinctions.³⁴ Samantabhadra also endorses this view by affirming that in view of the conception of one universal existence all are one, but from the point of view of substances distinctions arise.³⁵ In his Saptabhaṅgītarāṅgiṇī Vimaladāsa concludes that both the postulation of existential identity and the articulation of differences from the stand-point of different substances are logically necessary and justifiable.³⁶ Thus Jainism gives credence to the recognition of existential oneness but not exclusively, since it is always bound up with plurality. This is quite consistent with the Anekāntātmaka view of reality propounded by the Jaina philosopher. Hence unity, duality, and plurality-all are inseparably and inevitably involved in the structure of reality. This is the Anekāntic view of reality.

(ii) Knowledge of Anekāntic reality (Pramāṇa and Naya)

According to Jainism reality or substance is cognised by Pramāṇa and Naya. 37 Pramāṇa refers to the grasping of reality in its wholeness, while Naya points to an aspect of infinitely-phased reality illumined by Pramāṇa, thus the latter takes into consideration only a fragment of the totality.³⁸ A substance embellishes itself with apparent antagonisms. The emphasis on the one and the cancellation of the other would

irresistibly lead us to the biased estimation and Ekantic view of reality. *Pramāṇa assimilates all the characteristics at once* without any contradiction and animosity between one characteristic and the other, for instance, between one and many, existent and non-existent, etc. Of the unfathomable characteristics, *Naya* chooses one at one moment, but keeps in view the other characteristics also. "Though the Jaina thinker has made critical estimation of the philosophical assumptions of other schools of thought, they paid proper respect to them and accept their truth-value on the basis of different *Nayas*.³⁹ "We can thus say that both *Pramāṇa* and *Naya* are essential for the proper understanding of the nature of reality. Reality being the repository of infinitely attributes, the apprehension of it from a particular angle of vision, i.e., *Naya*, which is objectively given and not subjectively contemplated, does not exhaust the whole of the multiphased reality.

We may point out here that corresponding to the infinite antagonistic characteristics, there are infinite *Nayas*. But summarily speaking, all the *Nayas* from the metaphysical point of view can be summed up into two kinds, namely, *Dravyārthika Naya* and *Paryāyārthika Naya*. These two *Nayas* can very well expound the nature of reality, or substance. *Dravyārthika Naya* refers to the permanent aspect of a substance and *Paryāyārthika Naya* refers to the changing aspect of a substance.

(iii) Axiological Anekānta

For the proper intelligibility of the Anekāntic reality, Jaina Ācāryas have given us two *Nayas*, namely *Dravyārthika Naya* and *Paryāyārthika Naya* corresponding to the permanent and changing aspects of reality. This type of comprehension yields intellectual satisfaction yet it does not

show us the way to spiritual growth, satisfaction and self-realisation. Axiological consciousness is very much different from descriptive consciousness produced by metaphysical curiosity of the human mind. So the Jaina Ācāryas have propounded two axiological Nayas, namely Nīścaya and Vyavahāra for properly evaluating the manifested and unmanifested Paryāyas of self. Thus we have axiological Anekānta and the metaphysical Anekānta.

(iv) Meaning of two axiological Nayas : ⁴⁰

The Nīścaya Naya grasps the soul in its undefiled state of existence in contradistinction to the Vyavahāra Naya which describes the self as bound, impure and the like. No doubt, we are in the defiled form of existence from beginningless past, but the Nīścaya Naya reminds us of our spiritual magnificence and glory. It prompts the sullied self to behold its spiritual heritage. It endeavours to infuse and instill into our minds the imperativeness of Śuddha Bhāvas after abundantly showing us the empirical and evanescent character of Śubha and Aśubha Bhāvas that bind the soul to mundane existence. It does not assert that the soul is at present perfect but simply affirms that the self ought to attain the height illuminated by it. It has the force of 'ought' and not of 'is', but this force is valid for empirical selves. Nīścaya Naya points to the potentiality of the empirical self to become pure and enjoy its unalloyed status.

Briefly, we may say that to make Anekāntic reality intelligible from the metaphysical perspective, Dravyārthika and Paryāyārthika Nayas are necessary and to make an axiological assessment of Anekāntic reality from the spiritual perspective, Nīścaya and Vyavahāra Nayas cannot be dispensed with.

4. Device of Syādvāda as the key to the pointed communicability of knowledge

The significant fact about knowledge is its communicability. When the knowledge is for one's own self, the question of communicability can be dispensed with; but when it is for the other, the question needs serious consideration. Communicability is accomplished through properly worded propositions and formulation of propositions is dependent on the content of knowledge. If there is discordance between the content of knowledge and formulation of propositions, serious misunderstandings are bound to arise. Syādvāda is the linguistic device to represent without any omission and distortion the content of knowledge. Thus in a way Syādvāda and knowledge become the obverse and the converse of the same coin.

The Jaina thinkers propound that the object has infinite antagonistic characteristics - some known, some in the process of being discovered and many as yet unknown. This is known as the doctrine of Anekāntavāda. Syādvāda is the method of communicating the manifold characteristics of a thing to the other. Thus Syādvāda is the expression of Anekāntavāda in language. If Anekāntavāda is the mode of cognition, Syādvāda is the mode of expression.

The significant point to be comprehended in regard to Anekāntavāda is that every characteristic of a multiphased things is maintaining its identity through the existence of its opposite as its aspect.⁴¹ In fact, a thing cannot be the same thing without the negation of other things in it. For example, a colour can not remain a colour without the negation of other characteristics like taste, smell etc. in it. Thus non-existence is as much an essential aspect of the real as existence is. Negative propositions cannot be asserted

without accepting non-existence as an element in the constitution of the real. Similarly, the characteristics of one and many, permanence and change, generality and particularity are reconciled in a thing without any incongruity. Thus when the Jinist is faced with the problem of expressing the complex content of knowledge in language in a way which can communicate to the other the knowledge as such, he had to devise the method of Syādvāda.

The word 'Syāt' when added to a proposition is indicative of the presence of multiple characteristics in a thing in addition to the characteristic referred to in the proposition under consideration. In the proposition 'Syāt Ghaṭa is colourful', the word 'Syāt' implies that the subject Ghaṭa is a manifold of attributes, of which the attribute of being colourful referred to in the proposition is there in the Ghaṭa as a matter of fact. This should not be understood, as it is generally done, to mean that the existence of colour in the Ghaṭa is doubtful. In other words, certainty of colour along with the manifoldness of characteristics is indicated by the word 'Syāt'. Thus Syādvāda is the custodian of clarity, certainty and unambiguity in the field of philosophy. It is by no means the doctrine of doubt and uncertainty.

Saptabhaṅgīvāda (Doctrine of seven-fold propositions) ⁴²

Although an existent is possessed of infinite attributes, yet the knowing of it is not a simple affair. The question is : what is it to know a thing? And how many propositions are requisite to express the content of knowledge? The conviction of the Jaina is that the seven distinct propositions, neither more nor less are needed to express the content of knowledge in regard to an existent. Let us now illustrate the doctrine of seven-fold proposition by taking an example of the attribute 'existence' in respect of pen.

1. The first proposition is : Syāt pen exists. This means that the existence of pen is contextual, the context being its own Dravya (substance), Kṣetra (space), Kāla (time) and Bhāva (state).
2. The second proposition is : Syāt pen does not exist. It states the non-existence of pen in respect of other Dravya, Kṣetra, Kāla and Bhāva. Thus it strengthens the first proposition rather than cancel it. The pen is pen only because it is non not-pen. Thus both existence and non-existence are co-present in the pen without any contradiction. According to the Jaina, non-existence is as much constitutive of the nature of thing as existence.
3. The third proposition is : Syāt pen exists and does not exist.
4. The fourth proposition is : Syāt pen is inexpressible. In this proposition the two attributes of existence and non-existence instead of being asserted successively as in the third proposition, are asserted simultaneously. Since words are incapable of expressing this apprehension of pen, the pen is inexpressible.
5. Syāt pen exists and is inexpressible.
6. Syāt pen does not exist and is inexpressible.
7. Syāt pen exists, and does not exist and is inexpressible.

All these propositions, according to the Jaina, represent a new aspect of the real.

5. Doctrine of Karma as an explanation of the cognitive, conative and affective differences existing in the world at large.

The empirical selves differ from one another in respect

of cognition, conation and affection etc. What is the cause of this difference? How to account for these perceptible distinctions among empirical selves? The answer of the Jaina is that it is the beginningless material subtle principle known as Karma that is responsible for the cause of differences in the empirical selves. This karma has been exercising its limiting and crippling influence on the empirical conscious principles from the beginningless past. This material subtle principle is known as Dravyakarma, and its psychical counterpart in terms of Rāga and Dveṣa is called Bhāva-Karma.

Karmas are of varied nature, but the fundamental kinds of Karma are eight in number⁴³-namely.

1. Knowledge-obscuring, (Jñānāvaraṇīya-Karma)
2. Intuition-obscuring, (Darśanāvaraṇīya-Karma)
3. Feeling-producing (Vedanīya-Karma)
4. Delusion-producing, (Mohaniya-Karma)
5. Longevity-determining, (Āyu-Karma)
6. Body-making (Nāma-Karma)
7. Status-determining (Gotra-Karma)
8. Obstruction-generating (Antarāya-Karma)

1. Just as the curtain obstructs the knowledge of things inside the room, so also the knowledge-obscuring Karma obstructs the expression of knowledge. 2. Just as a door keeper does not allow persons to meet the king etc. so also the intuition-obscuring Karma does not allow apprehension of things. 3. Just as on licking honey from the sharp edge of a sword, the person enjoys honey as well as suffers pain, so also the feeling-producing Karma produces pleasure and pain in man. 4. Just as wine stupefies a person, so also the delusion-producing Karma perverts the person. 5. Just as wooden fetters

stop the movement of a person, so also the longevity-determining Karma obliges the soul to stay in a particular body, 6. Just as the painter produces different pictures, so also the body-making Karma makes different bodies. 7. Just as a potter makes earthen pots of different sizes, so also the status-determining Karma determines status in society. 8. Just as a treasurer generates obstructions in giving money etc. to other, so also the obstruction-generating Karma causes handicaps in charity, in gains and in self-power.

It is no doubt true that Karmas bind the self to mundane existence. Now the question that arises is this : How the self is bound by Karmas? What are the causes that create Karmic bondage in the self? The answer of the Jaina is that it is actions (mental, bodily and vocal) polluted by passions that cause empirical bondage to the self. The passion-free actions do not bring about any mundane bondage whatsoever. When there are no passions, there is no bondage (Bandha). It is passions that mar the spiritual career of an aspirant.

6. Mystical journey of the self from darkness to light, from slumberiness to perfect spiritual awakening

The equivalent expressions in Jainism for the word 'mysticism' are: Śuddhopayoga⁴⁵, Arhat and Siddha⁴⁶ state, Paṇḍita-Paṇḍita Maraṇa⁴⁷, Paramātmānhood⁴⁸, Ātmasamāhita state⁴⁹, Samatva⁵¹, Parādr̥ṣṭi⁵², Ahimsā⁵³ etc. All these expressions convey identical meaning of realising the transcendental self. The traditional definition of Jaina mysticism may be stated thus : Mysticism consists in the attainment of Arhathood or Siddha-hood through the medium of Samyagdarśana (spiritual awakening) Samyagjñāna (value knowledge), and Samyakcāritra (ethico-spiritual conduct) after dispelling Mithyādarśana (spiritual perversion), Mithyājñāna (perverted Value Knowledge), and

Mithyācāritra (perverted conduct)⁵⁴. Kundaḥkunda (1st cent A.D.) records departure from this terminology when he says: Mysticism consists in realising the Paramātmān (transcendental self), through the Antarātmān (internal self) after renouncing the Bahirātmān (external self)⁵⁵. Thus we may say that the Paramātmān is the true goal of the mystic quest. The whole mystic journey may be put as follows : 1. Awakening of the self, 2. Purgation, 3. Illumination, 4. Dark-period of the soul, and 5. Transcendental life. The Jaina tradition deals with the mystic journey under the fourteen stages of spiritual evolution, technically known as Guṇasthānas. However, these stages may be subsumed under the above heads in the following way.⁵⁶

1. Dark-period of the self prior to its awakening:

Mithyātva Guṇasthāna (First)

In this Guṇasthāna the empirical souls remain in a perpetual state of spiritual ignorance. The soul staying in this Guṇasthāna identifies itself with bodily colour, physical frame, sex, cast, creed, family, friends and wealth. The consequence is that it is constantly obsessed with the fear of self-annihilation on the annihilation of the body and the like and is tormented even by the thought of death.

2. Awakening of the self-Aviratasamyagdarśi Guṇasthāna (Fourth)

Fall from awakening :

(a) Sāsādāna Guṇasthāna (Second)

(b) Mīśra Guṇasthāna (Third)

The soul in this Guṇasthāna considers his own self as his genuine abode regarding the outward physical dwelling places as artificial. He renounces all identification with the

animate and inanimate objects of the world and properly weights them in the balance of his discriminative knowledge. He is the only person who has acquired the right of Mokṣa.

Fall from awakening : It the spiritual awakening is due to the total annihilation of spiritual ignorance the self has thrown over all the chances of its fall to the lower stages. But if the spiritual awakening is consequent upon the suppression of spiritual ignorance, the self either falls to the lower stages or remains in the same stage with the emergence of certain defects ordinarily incognisable.

3. Purgation :

(a) Viratāvirata Guṇasthāna (Fifth)

(b) Pramattavirata Guṇasthāna (Sixth)

After dispelling the dense and intense darkness caused by spiritual ignorance, the passionate and ardent longing of the awakened self is to purge the defects of conduct which now stands between it and the transcendental self. In the fifth Guṇasthāna, the aspirant who is a householder is incapable of making himself free from all Himsā root and branch. In consequence, he adopts the five partial vows (Aṇuvratas) along with the seven Śīlavratas in order to sustain the central virtue of Ahimsā as far as possible. This shows that the householder's life is a mixture of virtue and vice, which obstructs the purgative way pursued by the mystic. Hence the aspirant, being motivated by certain incentives to spiritual life (Anuprekṣās), gradually renounces the householder's type of living, becomes a saint in order to negate Himsā to the last degree. In consequence, the saint observes five Mahāvratas, and practises internal and external austerities with special attention to meditation, devotion, and Svādhyāya. This stage may be regarded as the terminus of purgative way.

4. Illumination :

- (a) Apramattavirata Guṇasthānā (Seventh)
- (b) Apūrvakaraṇa Guṇasthānā (Eighth)
- (c) Anivṛttikaraṇa Guṇasthānā (Ninth)
- (d) Sukṣmasāmparāya Guṇasthānā (Tenth)
- (e) Upaśāntakaṣāya Guṇasthānā (Eleventh)
- (f) Kṣīṇakaṣāya Guṇasthānā (Twelfth)

These Guṇasthānā from the seventh to the twelfth are the meditational stags or the stages of illumination and ecstasy. By the time the aspirant reaches the seventh Guṇasthānā, he has developed a power of spiritual attention, of self-merging and of gazing into the ground of the soul. It is through the aid to deep meditation that the mystic now pursues the higher path. In consequence, he arrives at the eighth and the ninth stage. In the tenth Guṇasthānā there is only subtle greed that can disturb the soul. The soul suppresses even this subtle greed in the eleventh Guṇasthānā. If the self follows the process of annihilation instead of suppression it rises directly from the tenth to the twelfth Guṇasthānā.

5. Dark-period of the soul post-illumination : Fall to the first or the fourth Guṇasthānā

Owing to the suppressed passions gaining strength, the illuminated consciousness of the eleventh Guṇasthānā falls to the lowest stage or to the fourth stage. The consequence is that the ecstatic awareness of the transcendental self gets negated and an overwhelming sense of darkness envelops the mystic.

6. Transcendental life :

(a) Sayogakevalī Guṇasthāna (Thirteenth)

(b) Ayogakevalī Guṇasthāna (Fourteenth)

The slumbering and the unawakened soul, after passing through the stages of spiritual awakening, moral and intellectual preparation, now arrives at the sublime destination by dint of ascending the rungs of meditational ladder. In the thirteenth stage the soul possesses dispassionate activities and develops omniscience. It is a state of Jivana-Mukta, a supermental state of existence and an example of divine life upon earth. In the fourteenth stage the soul annuls all activities, but preserves omniscience and other characteristics. After this, disembodied liberation results (Videha Mukti). The 'self' in these two Guṇasthāna bears the title of 'Arhat' and after this, the title of 'Siddha'. This state of Siddha is beyond all Guṇasthānas.

It may be noted here that the self in these two Guṇasthāna is called Paramātmān. This perfected mystic is established in truth in all directions. He experiences bliss, which is supersensuous, unique, infinite, and interminable. He has transcended the dualities of friends and foes, pleasure and pain, praise and censure, life and death, sand and gold, attachment and aversion. The supreme mystical experience is ineffable and transcends all the similes of the world. It is a movement from darkness to light and slumberiness to perfect spiritual awakening.

7. Composite Sādhana of Tri-ratna (Samyagdarśana, Samyagjñāna and Samyakcāritra) leading to emancipation (Mokṣa)⁵⁷

Jainism regards Mokṣa (emancipation) as the highest objective of human life and for the attainment of which it

has prescribed the composite Sāḍhanā of Tri-ratna known as Samyagdarśana (spiritual awakening), Samyagjñāna (value-knowledge) and Samyakcāritra (ethico-spiritual conduct). Jainism regards spiritual awakening (Samyagdarśana) as the beginning of the spiritual pilgrimage, and it is the foundation of the magnificent edifice of liberation.⁵⁸ Spiritual perversion acts as a barricade to soul's true life. So spiritual awakening is to be attained, which in turn will make knowledge and conduct conducive to the attainment of Mokṣa.⁵⁹ Even performing very severe austerities, persons devoid of spiritual awakening do not attain spiritual wisdom even in thousands and crores of years.

Value knowledge is acquired through spiritual awakening. The spiritually awakened self considers his own self as his genuine abode and regards the outward dwelling places as artificial. He renounces all identification with the animate and inanimate objects of the world, and properly weighs them in the balance of his awakened spirit. Thus he develops a unique attitude towards himself and the world around him. The person having value knowledge becomes free from wordly attachment. Knowledge becomes the cause of spiritual unfoldment only after spiritual awakening is kindled and stirred up.

As regards ethico-spiritual conduct (Samyakcāritra), Jainism recognizes that the person who is devoid of all attachments and who is engrossed in the self apprehends and experiences the self in its basic nature. He should devote his energies to meditation on the self, perform devotion to Arthat and Siddha and engage himself in Svādhyāya of ethico-spiritual literature along with the performance of other spiritual exercises. Before taking up these spiritual practices, he resorts to moral discipline in the form of Aṇuvratas and

Mahāvratas. It may be noted here that Mahāvīra gave utmost importance to the practice of Dhyāna, since it is directly related to the actualisation of the divine potentialities.

8. According religious freedom to women and down-trodden people:

Mahāvīra gave complete religious freedom to women. They were allowed to accept the life of asceticism like men. Mahāvīra himself initiated Candanā into the ascetic order. In the Saṅgha of Mahāvīra 36000 Sādhvīs were following religious observances. We hear of large number of women in the history of Jainas who distinguished themselves as teachers and preachers. "The followers of Jaina religion have been divided into four categories, viz., Sādhus, Sādhvīs, Śrāvakas and Śrāvikās. Sādhvīs are female ascetics who follow the five great vows in a very strict manner. This shows that complete freedom was given to women to enter the ascetic order. Female sex was no bar to the practice of asceticism. The Jaina Ācāryas were extremely sympathetic is their attitude to women and admitted them freely into their order, no matter whether the candidates for admission were royal consorts, members of the aristocracy, and women belonging to the common run of society." ⁶⁰

Religious freedom given to women enhanced their prestige in society. They were imparted education like men." The first Tīrthaṅkara, Ṛṣabhadeva realised the utmost importance of imparting education to females and advised his two young daughters, Brāhmī and Sundarī that "only when you would adorn yourself with education, your life would be fruitful, because just as a learned man is held in high esteem by educated persons, a learned lady also occupies the highest position in the female world. Both the girls were first initiated to writing by their father and later on with the help of teachers

they studied all branches of knowledge to such an extent that they could be regarded as incarnations of Sarasvatī, the Goddess of Learning."⁶¹ The greatest name among Jaina Women in Kannaḍa Literature was Kāntī who, along with Abhinava Pampa, was one of the gems that adorned the Court of Hoyasala king Ballāla (A.D. 1100-1106). She was redoubtable orator and a poet who completed the unfinished poems of Abhinava Pampa in the open court of that ruler. Similarly, a Jaina lady Avvaiyāra, the Venerable Matron, was one of the most admired amongst the Tamil poets."⁶²

In times of need women did rise to the occasion and held important positions in the political sphere from the very beginning." In the first quarter of the 10th century A.D. figures a remarkable Jaina woman administrator, Jakkiyabbe, and it is stated that she was skilled in ability for good government, and protected the Nagarakhaṇḍa ⁷⁰ (a name of a place). It is recorded that a Jaina lady Saviyabbe accompanied her husband on horse-back to the battle-field and fell fighting in the battle of Bagiur.⁶³ "It appears from Epigraphia Carnatica that the office of Nāḍagaṇḍa, an important rural official, was held by a Jaina woman. An inscription dated A.D. 918 shows that a Jaina widow was a Nāḍagaṇḍa and was distinguished for the skill and ability of her management. It states that though a woman, she well protected her charge with pride in her own heroic bravery. In the 16th century A.D. when the Jaina queen Bhairavadevī, while ruling over the kingdom of Gerosoppe, was attacked by the neighbouring Śaiva Saradāra, she faced the enemy bravely and defeated him in the battle."⁶⁴

As the full religious freedom was allowed to females, widows could devote their time for their spiritual upliftment and thus carve a respectable position for them in their family and in the minds of people in general.

Mahāvīra based the fourfold division of society on activities and not on birth. He accorded full freedom to one and all including women and down-trodden people to perform religious practices and admitted them into the order of ascetics.⁶⁵ Thus "the doors of Jainism were thrown open to all and equal opportunity was given to everybody to practise religion according to his capacity. Those who followed religion as house-holders were known as Śrāvakas and Śrāvīkās and those who observed it fully by leaving their houses were called as Sādhus and Sādhvīs."⁶⁶ The Uttarādhayayana says that Harikeśa who was born in a family of untouchables attained saintly character owing to the performance of austerities. Good conduct and not caste is the object of reverence. Merit is the basis of caste and the pride of caste destroys right living.⁶⁷

It is significant to point out that Mahāvīra's social mind exhorted that Ahimsā consists in recognising the dignity of man irrespective of caste, colour and creed. Man is man and should be recognised as such without any hesitation. The dignity of man is sacred and it is our duty to honour this dignity. Every individual, whether man or woman, should enjoy religious freedom without any distinction. A non-violent society cannot subscribe to class exploitation and social oppression of man. Mahāvīra bestowed social prestige upon the down-trodden individuals. This led to the development of self-respect in them. Thus he showed that no man or woman should be deprived of availing himself of the opportunities of socio-spiritual advancement.

9. Propounding the philosophy of vegetarianism, and the philosophy of fighting defensive wars

The term Himsā maybe defined as the committing of injury to the Dravya-Prāṇas and the Bhāva-Prāṇas through

the operation of intense-passion-infected Yoga (activity of mind, body, and speech). Suicide, homicide and killing of any other life whatsoever aptly sum up the nature of Hirṃsā, inasmuch as these villainous actions are rendered conceivable only when the Dravya-Prāṇas and the Bhāva-Prāṇas pertaining to oneself and to others are injured. The minimum number of Dravya-Prāṇas has been considered to be four and the maximum has been known to be ten; and the Bhāva-Prāṇas are the very attributes of Jīva. The amount of injury will thus be commensurate with the number of Prāṇas injured at a particular time and occasion.⁶⁸

Hirṃsā is of two kinds, namely, intentional and non-intentional. The intentional perpetrator of Hirṃsā engages himself in the commitment of the acts of Hirṃsā by his own mind, speech and action; provokes others to commit them; and endorses such acts of others. Besides, Hirṃsā which is unavoidably committed by defending oneself from one's foes is denominated as non-intentional defensive Hirṃsā. This leads us to the philosophy of fighting defensive wars.⁶⁹

Now the householder is incapable of turning away completely from Hirṃsā; hence he should keep himself away from the deliberate commission of Hirṃsā of the two-sensed to five-sensed beings. The commitment of Hirṃsā in adopting defensive contrivances, cannot be counteracted by him. Thus he has to commit intentional injury to one-sensed Jīvas, namely, the vegetable-bodied, the air-bodied, the fire-bodied etc; and non-intentional injury in fighting defensive wars. Even in the realm of one-sensed Jīvas and in the realm of fighting defensive wars he is required to confine his operations in such a way as may affect the life and existence of a very limited number of Jīvas. In these two province the point to be noted is that of alleviating the amount of injury

that is apt to be caused and not that of total relinquishment which is not possible without jeopardizing the survival of man. The hard fact to be noted is that man is subject to Himsā by the very condition of his existence. Yet instead of aggravating the natural weight of Himsā by falling foul upon one another and by our cruel treatment of the animal and vegetable kingdoms, we should endeavour to alleviate this general curse, to the extent to which we are capable of doing, by conforming ourselves to the sacred injunctions enjoined by Jaina spiritual teachers.⁷⁰ Vegetarianism is therefore prescribed. It limits us to the unavoidable injury caused to only one-sensed-Jivas. This is the philosophy of vegetarianism propounded by Jainism.

10. Accepting Sallekhanā as the spiritual welcome to death without any fear and perturbation.⁷¹

Sallekhanā implies the enervation of external body and internal passions in a legitimate way by the gradual removal of the causes of their nourishment, so that one may renounce the present body with a view to having a new bodily modification. Sallekhanā is performed on the occasion when the time of natural death has been known in all probability. No doubt the body which is the medium of upliftment of the soul is to be properly nourished and cared for and the diseases are to be seriously met with without any retreat. But if the body refuses to respond to our earnest endeavours, we should not falter to forsake it in the interest of saving the peace of mind. Thus if one is encountered with the termination of duration of the present life one should resort to the performance of the process of Sallekhanā, which is not other than the spiritual welcome to death. This is not yielding to death, but a way of meeting the challenge of death undauntedly and adequately. "Self-restraint, study,

austerities, worship, and charity - all become useless if the mind is not pure at the last hour of life, just as the training of a king who has learnt the use of weapons for twelve years, becomes useless if he faints on the battlefield." The person performing Sallekhanā should observe self-control, and then fix his mind in the Ātman, when the vital forces depart from the body. The process of Sallekhanā must needs be distinguished from suicide. Sallekhanā is undertaken only when the inevitability of death is a matter of undisputed certainty, while suicide may be committed at any time in the life under the spell of emotional disturbance or passionate attitude of mind.

The person performing Sallekhanā should make his earnest request to the members of his family and others around him to pardon him for the vicious deeds committed by him to affect them wittingly and unwittingly. He should also forgive them from the bottom of his heart for being troubled by them on certain occasions. Nourishment is to be renounced gradually, so that mental disturbance may be avoided. The persistence of equanimous mental state is the prime necessity. For this the person should devote himself to meditation (Dhyāna) and bid farewell to his body. It will not be out of place to mention that Ācārya Vinobā Bhāve adopted the method of Sallekhanā in order to renounce the body with equanimity of mind.

It is important to note that there are other factors contributed by Jainism for the enrichment of Indian culture.

1. Jaina Art

2. Jaina Literature

1. Jaina Art : At the outset, it may be noted that Jainism does not subscribe to the philosophy of 'Art for Art's sake'.

Jaina Ācāryas have always exhibited their concern for the ethico-spiritual development of man. In conformity with this view, art must give ethico-spiritual message to mankind. This means that for Jainism art is purposive and the purpose is to inspire people to translate into action the ideals of life and living. Thus Jaina Art has been essentially religious with ethical predominance, but this did not obstruct the manifestation of aesthetic consciousness of an artist dedicated to the Jaina values of life. Jaina Art expresses itself in diverse forms, important of which are caves, temples, pillars, towers and paintings.

Jainas built cave dwellings for monks, so that they may get secluded places for their Sādhanā. A large number of rock-cut caves has been identified in the Udayagiri and Khandagiri Hills in Orissa (2nd Cent. B.C.) the picturesqueness of their forms, the character of their sculptures and architectural details combined with their great antiquity, render them one of the most important groups of caves in India.⁷² The other caves are found at Jūnāgaḍha in Gujarāta (2nd Cent. B.C.), Rājagiri in Bihāra (1st Cent. A.D.) Udayagiri in Madhyapradeśa, (4th Cent. A.D.), Candragiri at Śravaṇabelagolā in Mysore, (4th Cent. B.C.), at Ellora and at Usmānābāda in Mahāraṣṭra (5th Cent. A.D.) and Sittanavāsala in Tamilnāḍu (3rd Cent. B.C.)⁷³. "By far the most interesting cave-temples of the Jainas, from the artistic point of view, are, however, the Indrasabhā and Jagannātha-sabhā groups at Ellora. According to Percy Brown, "No other temple at Ellora is so complete in its arrangements or so finished in its workmanship as the upper storey of the Indrasabhā."⁷⁴

It is of capital importance to note that since Jaina religion regards the construction of temples as an auspicious act, Jainas

have constructed a large number of temples throughout India. The two temple complexes, known as the Delavādā temples at Mt. Ābū and built in the 11th and 12th centuries A.D., by the minister of the kings of Gujarāta are regarded as the minor wonders of the world."⁷⁵ Henry Cousens wrote, "The amount of beautiful ornamental detail spread over these temples in the minutely carved decoration of ceilings, pillars, doorways, panels and niches, is simply marvellous."⁷⁶

Again the Jaina temple at Rāṇakapura in Mevāḍa (1440 A.D.) is the most complicated and extensive Jaina temple in India.⁷⁷ Fergusson remarks that "no two pillars in the whole building are exactly alike - the grace with which they are arranged, the tasteful admixture of domes of different heights with flat ceilings, and the mode in which the light is introduced, combine to produce an excellent effect."⁷⁸ The other temples of such superb character are the temples of : Pārśvanātha at Khajurāho in Bundelakhanda (11 cent. A.D.), the temple at Lakkundī in Karnātika (12th cent. A.D.), The Jinanāthapura temple near Śravaṇabelagola in Mysore (12th cent. A.D.) and Hosa Bastī at Mūdabidri in South Kanara (14th cent. A.D.).⁷⁹

Besides, the grouping together of temples into what may be called "Cities of temples" is a peculiarity which the Jainas have practised to a greater extent than the followers of any other religion in India."⁸⁰ "Such notable temple-cities are found, among other places, at Śatruñjaya or Pālitāṇā and Giranāra in Gujarāta, at Sammeda Śikhara in Bihāra, at Sonāgiri in Bundelakhanda, at Muktagiri in Mahārāṣṭra, at Kunthalgiri in the Deccan, at Śravaṇabelagola in Mysore and at Mūdabidri in South Kanara."⁸¹

Another remarkable contribution of the Jainas to the whole of Indian art, is the free standing pillars found in front of almost every Jaina temple in South India.⁸² There are |

more than twenty such pillars in the district of south Kanara alone. Nothing can surpass the stately grace of these beautiful pillars. During the past one hundred years numerous such pillars have been erected in different parts of the country.⁸³" The Jainas generally call these pillars Mānastambhas.⁸⁴ Apart from pillars, a tower known as Kīrtistambha in Cittoda, Rājasthāna was constructed in 12th cent. A.D. and it was dedicated to Ādinātha.⁸⁵

It may be noted that "the most distinctive contribution of Jainism to art was in the realm of icon-making. Innumerable Jaina images made of stone, metal including gold, silver and bronze, wood, terracotta, and even precious stones, are available."⁸⁶ On the basis of the Hāthīgumphā inscription (2nd cent. B.C.) of Khāravela, the history of Jaina iconography takes us back at least to the 4th cent. B.C.

The Mathurā School of Art speaks of the development of Jaina icons from the 1st cent. B.C., to 12th cent. A.D. Statues of Tirthāṅkara were made by Jainas in good number. In the Mathurā School "Ādinātha or Rṣabhanātha was shown with hair falling on his shoulders and Parśvanātha had a snake conopy over his head and 22nd Tirthāṅkara Neminātha was presented flanked by Balarāma and Kṛṣṇa.⁸⁷" The Image of Sarasvatī is found at Mathurā (132 A.D.). This is the earliest statue of Sarasvatī known to us. Gradually it assumed many forms.⁸⁸ This shows that Sarasvatī was worshipped in Jaina tradition. Undoubtedly the most remarkable of the Jaina statues is the statue of Bāhubali situated at Śraavṇabelagola in Mysore (constructed in 983 A.D. by Cāmuṇḍarāya and it is 561/2 Ft. in height) it is the largest free standing statue in Asia.⁸⁹

Painting on walls, palm-leaves and paper : The earliest example of wall paintings is found in Sittanavāsala cave in Tamilnāḍu in the 7th cent. A.D. in the 10th and 11th cent.

A.D. the temple of Tirumalāi presents beautiful wall paintings.⁹² After 11th cent. A.D. paintings on palm-leaves began. The palm-leaves paintings are found at Muḍabidri in the South and at Pāṭaṇa (Gujarāṭa) in the North.⁹¹ In London is preserved the Kalpasūtra which is the earliest example of paper painting (1427 A.D.)⁹² Painting on cloth and wood are preserved in Jaina Śāstra Bhaṇḍāras of various places.

It is of capital importance to note that Jainas have carefully maintained manuscript libraries throughout India. These libraries possess not only Jaina literature but preserve also the non-Jaina literary works. In Rājasthāna, Madhyapradeśa, Gujarāṭa, Karnāṭaka and Mahārāṣṭra, a large number of manuscript libraries preserving vast and varied literature, both religious and secular have been maintained.

Jaina Literature : According to Jainism a Tīrthaṅkara, along with self-realisation, propagates socio-spiritual values for the benefit of mankind. His deliverances form the canonical (Āgamic) literature of the Jainas. Mahāvīra, the twenty-fourth Tīrthaṅkara preached in the language of the masses which was known as Prākṛta. Thus the Jaina Āgamas (canons) are in Prākṛta. These Āgamas form the 'Holy Scriptures of the Jainas'. These cover a wide variety of subjects. It is of capital importance to note that the Jaina Ācāryas continued to compose works in Prākṛta up to 13th cent. A.D. namely, the Āgamic commentaries, the metaphysico-spiritual works of Kundakunda, logical works of Siddhasena and Devasena, Tiloyapaṇṇati of Yativṛṣabha, Trilokasāra of Nemicaṇḍra, Bṛhaṭṣaṅgraha of Candrasuri, Vicārasāra Prakaraṇa of Pradyumnasūri, Bhagavati Ārādhana of Śivārya, Mūlācāra of Vaṭṭakera, Pravacanasāroddhāra of Nemicaṇḍra, Sāvayapaṇṇatti, Yogaśataka and Dhurtākhyāna of Haribhadra, Kattigeyāṇuvekkhā of Svamikumāra,

Paumacariya of Vimalasuri, Caupannamahāpurisa-Cariya of Śilāṅkacārya etc.⁹³

There are numerous Cāritras in Prākṛta which describe the life of individual Tīrthaṅkaras such as Rṣabha, Śāntinātha, Neminātha, Pārśva and Mahāvīra. Jains own abundant narrative literature in Prākṛta. Vasudeva-Hindī of Saṃghadāsagaṇi, Samarāicca-kahā of Haribhadra, Kuvalayamāla of Uddyotanasūri and many Kathā-Kośas have been composed by the Jains.⁹⁴ All this shows that Jains have to their credit voluminous Prākṛta literature, but unfortunately the study of Prākṛta language has practically disappeared from India. What will be its consequence is a matter of great concern for the custodians of Indian culture.

Apart from the vast Prākṛta literature Jaina authors adopted various languages such as Apabhraṃśa, Kannaḍa and Tamil for their compositions. "The credit of inaugurating an Augustan age in the Apabhraṃśa, Tamil and Kannaḍa literature unquestionably goes to the Jains."⁹⁵

Apabhraṃśa which enjoyed the credit of being the national language of Northern India for a very long time has been nourished by Jaina authors. From the 6th Cent. A.D. to 15th Cent. A.D. the cultivators of Apabhraṃśa language were Jains.⁹⁶ Svayambhū (8th Cent. A.D.) Puṣpadanta (10th Cent. A.D.), Dhanapāla (10th Cent. A.D.) Vīra (11th Cent. A.D.) Nayanandi (11th Cent. A.D.), Kanakāmara (11th Cent. A.D.), Hemacandra (12th Cent. A.D.) Harideva (15th Cent. A.D.), Raidhu (15th cent A.D.) etc. ⁹⁷ are the immortal literary figures of India. Joindu, Muni Rāmasiṃgha, Devasena etc. are the prominent ethico-spiritual writers who have been recognised as the precursors of Kabīr, Tulasī and other mystic poet-saints of India.⁹⁸ It will not be amiss to point out that the national language, Hindi owes a great deal to

Apabhraṁśa. Hindi has inherited all its literary forms from Apabhraṁśa. The regional languages such as Sindhī, Punjabī, Marāṭhī, Gujarātī, Rājasthānī, Bihārī, Uḍiyā, Baṅgalī, Asamī and the like have grown from the soil of Apabhraṁśa language and literature.⁹⁹

As regards Jaina literature in Tamil, it is not a mere accident that the best literature, known as the Saṅgama literature, of the ancient Tamil country was the creation of the Jaina scholars. The two great works, Kural and Nālaḍiyār are the compositions of Jaina authors.¹⁰⁰ Of the five major Kāvya, the three, namely, Jīvaka Cintāmaṇi, Śilappadikāram and Valaiyāpati are by Jaina writers.¹⁰¹ Jīvaka Cintāmaṇi is the greatest existing Tamil literary monument.¹⁰² Besides, all the five minor Kāvya were also composed by Jaina authors.¹⁰³ Tolkāppiyam, the earliest Tamil grammar, Nannūl, the most popular grammar in Tamil language and the works on Tamil lexicography-all these were written by Jaina authors.¹⁰⁴ We may conclude by saying that Jainism prevailed in the South from before the Saṅgama period (350 BC to 20 A.D.) of Tamil literary history.

Regarding the Kannaḍa language, we may say, "The Jainas have undoubtedly been the foremost cultivators of the Kannaḍa language from the inception of its literary history which is traced back to the 4th - 5th century A.D. by the end of the 10th century, they had made it a well established literary language."¹⁰⁵ Professro R. Narsimhachari observes, "The earliest cultivators of the language were Jainas. The oldest works of any extent and value that have come down to us are all from the pen of the Jainas."¹⁰⁶

Jaina authors in Kannaḍa are far more numerous than in Tamil. To name only a few, we have, Pampa, Ponna,

Ranna, Guṇavarma Nāgacandra, Nayasena, Nāgavarma, Aggala, Nemicandra, Janna and Madhura, authors whose works are admired as excellent specimens of poetic composition. "Besides Kāvya written by Jaina authors we have numerous works by them dealing with subjects such as grammar, medicine, veterinary science, cookery and so forth. Altogether the number of Jaina authors in Kannaḍa is nearly two hundred."¹⁰⁷

In addition to the Prākṛta, Apabhraṁśa, Kannaḍa and Tamil literature Jains started writing in Saṁskṛta also as early as 1st cent. A.D. The Tattvārthasūtra of Umāsvāti is the compendium of Jainism in Saṁskṛta. Pūjyapāda (5th cent A.D.) and Akalaṅka (8th cent. A.D.) wrote commentaries on it. Works on Jaina logic have been written from 2nd cent to 15th Cent. A.D. Some of the great logicians are Siddhasena, Samantabhadra, Akalaṅka, Vidyānandi, Haribhadra, Māṇikyanandi, Hemacandra, Prabhācandra, Vādidevasūri, Malliṣeṇa, Vimaladāsa and Yaśovijaya. Saṁskṛta literature has also been enriched by Jaina Purāṇas, Mahākāvya, devotional literature, grammar, Campukāvya and large number of ethico-spiritual works. Besides, Jaina scholars wrote treatises on politics, mathematics, lexicon, poetics, medicine, astronomy, geography and astrology. Jains recognized the genius of Kālidāsa, so much so that the Jaina writer Mallinātha wrote commentaries on the works of Kālidāsa and thus paid homage to this great luminary of Saṁskṛta literature.¹⁰⁹

In conclusion we may say that in the field of socio-spiritual values, logico-metaphysical pronouncements, diverse Indian languages and meaningful artistic, scientific and secular consciousness, Jainism has enormously contributed to Indian Culture.

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THE CONCEPT OF ANUV RATAS IN JAINISM

Jainism recognizes Mokṣa as the consummation of human pursuits. Mokṣa presupposes a way of life, just as the end presupposes the means. The celebrated book Tattvārthasūtra of Umāsvāti, generally recognized as the compendium of Jaina thought, in the first Sūtra of the opening chapter pronounces that right belief (spiritual awakening), right knowledge (value knowledge) and right conduct (ethico-spiritual conduct) constitute the path to liberation. This Sūtra summarises the end as well as the means of its achievement. Right belief is spiritual awakening, right knowledge is value awakening and right conduct is ethico-spiritual endeavour to achieve the goal. Thus right conduct which is preceded by right knowledge and right belief signifies that moral life without spiritual awakening, cannot lead us to liberation. In other words, spiritualization of moral life must take place if Mokṣa is to be attained. This statement, of course, does not deny that moral life is not possible without spiritual awakening, it simply entails that for the accomplishment of Mokṣa moral life must have a stamp of spiritual awakening. It is of capital importance to note that at no stage of the process of the Mokṣa these three integral principles styled as Ratnatraya can be dispensed with. We are not concerned here with the right belief (spiritual awakening) and right knowledge (value knowledge) but only with the one aspect of right conduct (ethico-spiritual conduct).

It is to be borne in mind that inauspicious activities emanating from the inauspicious psychical states can in no

way be the part of right conduct, hence they are to be completely relinquished.^{1&2} Thus, in order to stamp out the inauspicious psychical states from the texture of self, the aspirant must abstain himself root and branch from the vices of Himsā (violence), Asatya (falsehood), Steya (theft), Abrahma (unchastity), and Parigraha (acquisition) by following the virtues of Ahimsā (non-violence), Satya (truthfulness), Asteya (non-stealing), Brahmācarya (chastity), and Aparigraha (non-acquisition). But it is astonishing that in spite of not being the part of right conduct in any way, these vices refuse to be completely relinquished at the start on account of their being ingrained in the mind of man. Hence there arises the concept of limited morality in contrast to that of perfect morality wherein these vices are completely renounced. In Jainism the concept of limited morality is expressed by the term Aṇuvratas, while that of perfect morality is expressed by the term Mahāvratas. He who observes the Aṇuvratas being not able to renounce the vices to the full is called a Gṛhastha (house-holder), while he who observes the Mahāvratas being able to renounce the vices to the full claims the title of a Muni (ascetic). We are chiefly concerned here with the concept of Aṇuvratas. The Vratas which can be observed by the householder are then called Ahimsāṇuvrata (partial non-violence), Satyāṇuvrata (partial truthfulness), Acauryāṇuvrata (partial non-thieving) Brahma-charyāṇuvrata (partial chastity), Parigraha-parimāṇāṇuvrata, (partial non-acquisition). For the proper understanding of the five Aṇuvratas (partial vows), we shall first discuss the nature of the five vices— Himsā, Asatya, Steya, Abrahma, and Parigraha one by one and shall derive from them the scope of Aṇuvratas.

The Nature of Hiṃsā : — Hiṃsā, in its popular meaning, may be defined as the committing of injury to the Dravya-prāṇas³ and the Bhāva-prāṇas through the operation of intense-passion-infected Yoga (activity of mind, body and speech)⁴. Suicide, homicide, and killing of any other life whatsoever aptly sum up the nature of Hiṃsā, inasmuch as these villainous actions are rendered conceivable only when the Dravya prāṇas and the Bhāva-prāṇas pertaining to oneself and to others are injured. The minimum number of Dravya-prāṇas has been enumerated to be four, and the maximum has been known to be ten; and the Bhāva-prāṇas are the very attributes of Jīva. The amount of injury will thus be commensurate with the number of Prāṇas injured at a particular time and occasion. If the bodily movements etc. are performed with circumspection, nevertheless if any living being is oppressed, it cannot be called Hiṃsā, for the infecting element of intense-passion is missing.⁵ On the contrary even if, by careless bodily movements, no animate body is oppressed, the actions are not free from Hiṃsā. Here though the soul has not injured others, yet it has injured itself by defiling its own natural constitution.⁶ He who employs his mind, body, and speech in injuring others commits Hiṃsā on account of actually indulging in it. Thus, wherever there is inadvertence of mind, body or speech, Hiṃsā is inevitable.⁷

Kinds of Hiṃsā : — Hiṃsā is of two kinds; namely, intentional and non-intentional.⁸ The latter has been again subdivided into Udyamī, Ārambhi, and Virodhī.⁹ The intentional perpetrator of Hiṃsā engages himself in the commitment of the acts of Hiṃsā by his own mind, speech and action; provokes others to commit them; and endorses such acts of others. Besides, Hiṃsā which is unavoidably committed (1) by reason of one's own profession, (2) by the

performance of domestic activities, and (3) by defending oneself, one's neighbour, one's country, one's belongings and the like from one's foes is denominated as (1) Udyamī, (2) Ārambhi, and (3) Virodhī respectively.

Ahiṃsāṇuvrata:— Now the householder, being snared in the meshes of infirmities, is incapable of turning away completely from Himsā; hence he should keep himself away from the deliberate commission of Himsā of the two-sensed to five-sensed beings.¹⁰ The commitment of Himsā in being engaged in a certain profession, in performing domestic activities, and in adopting defensive contrivances, cannot be counteracted, by him. Thus he commits intentional injury to one-sensed Jīvas, namely, the vegetable-bodied, the air-bodied, the fire-bodied etc. and non-intentional injury in performing Ārambha (domestic activities), Uddyoga (profession) and Virodha (defence). He can, therefore, observe the gross form of Ahiṃsā which is known as Ahiṃsāṇuvrata. Even in the realm of one-sensed Jīvas and in the realm of non-intentional injury he should so manage to confine his operations as may affect the life and existence of a very limited number of Jīvas.¹¹ In these two provinces the point to note is that of alleviating the amount of injury that is apt to be caused and not that of total relinquishment which is not possible without jeopardizing the survival of man. Nevertheless, Himsā, even in the realm of one-sensed Jīvas and in the realm of non-intentional injury, is unjustifiable. If we reflect a little we shall find that man is subject to Himsā by the very condition of his existence. Yet instead of aggravating the natural weight of Himsā by falling foul upon one another and by our cruel treatment with the animal and vegetable kingdoms, we should endeavour to alleviate this general curse to the extent to which we are

capable of, by conforming ourselves to the sacred injunctions enjoined by the Jaina spiritual teachers.

For the observance of Ahimsāṇuvrata, (1) One should avoid the use of (i) wine and (ii) meat.¹² (2) One should not sacrifice animals for the adoration of gods, being dominated by the perverted notion of receiving benediction in return.¹³ It is inconceivable how the gods seek satisfaction and serenity from such inhuman deeds which cause unbearable pain to the animals. (3) It must not be obligatory to kill animals for the entertainment of guests, a pious design by impious means.¹⁴ (4) To harbour notion that the vegetable food necessitates the killing of innumerable lives abiding in it as compared with the slaughter of one living being may be fascinating at the inception, but it is imprudent in view of the fact that the body of an animal possesses countless microscopic lives which will inevitably be injured in its killing; and that the five-sensed Jīva would entail more, vice owing to the occupation and consequential loss of more Dravya and Bhāva Prāṇas than those of one-sensed Jīva belonging to the vegetable Kingdom.¹⁵ (5) Snakes, scorpions, lions and the like should not be killed on the ground that by so doing large number of lives will be saved, and that they (snakes, scorpions etc.) will get the opportunity of avoiding the accumulation of more sin by their continued violence.¹⁶ (6) Under the weight of misconception that those who are in distress and calamity on being killed will soon obtain relief from anguish and agony, the living beings should never be killed.¹⁷ (7) Moved by the pangs of other being's hunger, one should not provide one with the flesh of one's own body to appease one's appetite.¹⁸

Nature of Asatya: - Asatya is concerned with the expression of intense passion through the outlet of speech which expresses itself in language and gestures.

Dispassionate speech is synonymous with the mystical realization which is the height of truth man is capable of achieving. The perfect soul of Tirthankaras who preach for the upliftment of human and other beings should not be regarded as being moved by any passion inasmuch as they speak for the good of all without any selfish desire and without any constraint of passion. It follows from what has been described that Asatya, is a double fall from the loftiest heights of truth. It defiles both the internal soul and the external demeanour, the social living and the spiritual upliftment, hence it should be forsaken in the interest of advancement.

We now define Asatya. Under the constraint of anger, greed, conceit, deceit, lust and the like, the use of language which affects others and ourselves should be understood as Asatya.¹⁹ It does not merely mean the pronouncement of the existent as non-existent, nor can it be said to embrace merely the proclamation of the non-existent as existent, but also involves the misrepresentation of the true nature of the existents and the use of speech which arouses intense-passion and causes pain to others. Accordingly, Satya must not merely mean the announcement of the existent, but must also mean the use of words which are soothing, gentle, and ennobling. It should be borne in mind that, even if by our most vigilant and gentle speaking, others are somehow perversely and painfully affected, we shall not be considered as transgressing and setting at naught the vow of truth. Ontologically speaking, no word is pleasant or unpleasant in isolation and in itself. It is the spirit that counts. A word, being the modification of Pudgala, has infinite characteristics. Therefore it possesses the potency of affecting others in infinite ways, all of which are incapable of being known by

imperfect human beings. In pronouncing a word as pleasant or unpleasant, the circumstances, the place and the time, the character of the man, the mental and the physical effects on himself and others that surround him should all be counted.

According to Amṛtacandra (1) the first kind of Asatya refers to the affirmation of the existent as non-existent,²⁰ (2) the second refers to the declaration of the non-existent as existent,²¹ (3) the third refers to the representation of the existing nature of things as different from what they really are,²² and (4) the fourth is indicative of the speech which is (1) condemnable (Garhita), (2) sinful (Sāvadya), and (3) disagreeable (Apriya).²³ To explain the fourth form of Asatya, (1) back-biting, ridiculous speech, harsh language and violent words are comprised under condemnable speech.²⁴ Besides, useless gossiping, language inciting unfounded beliefs, and superstitions should also be grouped under it.²⁵ (2) Sinful speech comprises the use of language for defence, for running the household and for professional purposes.²⁶ (3) Disagreeable words are those which arouse uneasiness, engender fear, excite repugnance, inflame dolour, and intoxicate brawl.²⁷

Satyāṇuvrata: - Out of these forms of Asatya, it is beyond the power of the householder to shun totally the use of words concerning his household affairs, the affairs relating to his profession and safety, and these necessarily entail Himsā. The avoidance of sinful (Sāvadya) speech is not possible without imperiling his life and that of his dependents; just as it is not possible for him to abandon the Himsā of one-sensed Jīvas. Thus the householder should abandon all other forms of Asatya, except sinful speech as mentioned above.²⁸ This is the gross form of the vow of truth or Satyāṇuvrata. It should be noted that Samantabhadra

allows not telling the truth, if it endangers the life of anyone, in Satyāṇuvrata.²⁹ The truthful man should denounce exaggeration, fault-finding and indecent speech, and speak words that are noble, beneficial and balanced.³⁰ He should be grave and equanimous, noble-charactered personality, philanthropist, kind and sweet-tongued. He should not extol himself, and calumniate others.³¹ Nor should he hide the merits of others that are existent, and describe those of himself that are non-existent.³²

Nature of Steya : - Under the influence of intense passions, the acquisition of things without their being given by the owner is called Steya.³³ In this world, the transient things constitute the external Prāṇas of a man, and he who thieves or plunders them is said to commit Steya, inasmuch as such misdeeds necessarily ruffle the evenness of mind of others and that of himself.³⁴ This, then, is not other than Himsā.³⁵

Asteyaṇuvrata or Acauryāṇuvrata :- Not to take anything without the permission of others is a discipline par-excellence; but it lies beyond the power of the householder; so he is required to use such things freely as are of common use without their being given, such as well-water, sand,³⁶ etc. This is Acauryāṇuvrata or gross form of the vow of Asteya. According to Samantabhadra the keeper of the householder's vow of Asteya does neither appropriate to himself things, which are unoffered, placed, dropped, and forgotten by others nor gives them to anyone else.³⁷ Swāmi Kārtikeya includes even the purchasing of costly things at reduced prices under Steya, which is probably due to the possibility of selling a thing after mis-appropriating.³⁸ Somadeva holds that the underground property belongs to the king or the State; so also the property of unknown

ownership.³⁹ To take the possession of property at the death of one's own kinsman is justified, but, when he is alive, his sanction is required to sustain the householder's vow of Asteya.⁴⁰

Nature of Abrahma : - The copulation arising from sexual passion is Abrahma. This is Himsā in two ways.⁴¹ In the first place, many living beings are deprived of their vitalities in the vagina in the sexual act, just as a hot rod of iron, when it is introduced in a tube filled with sesamum seed, burns them up.⁴² Secondly, psychical life is affected because of the emergence of sexual passion, and so also the material prāṇas are affected owing to the lethargic condition consequent upon coition.⁴³

Brahmacaryāṇuvrata : - The householder cannot relinquish copulation as such. Hence he should abstain himself from the sexual and lustful contacts with all other women except his nuptial partner.⁴⁴ This is Brahmacaryāṇuvrata or gross form of the vow of Brahmacarya. In view of Vasunandi, the householder following this vow should not succumb to the unnatural ways of sexual satisfaction like masturbation, sodomy and the like and should not copulate even with one's own wife on the two pious days (Aṣṭami and Caturdāsī) of each fortnight.⁴⁵ Samantabhadra pronounces Brahmacaryāṇuvrata as renouncing lustful contacts with another man's wife, and as seeking contentment in one's own wife.⁴⁶ Such an observer of vow neither enjoys another man's wife, nor instigates another person to do so.⁴⁷ Somadeva enunciates Brahmacaryāṇuvrata as conceiving all women or concubines as one's mother, sister or daughter with the exception of one's own wife.⁴⁸ "Wine, meat, gambling, music with song and dance, personal decoration, intoxication, libertines and

aimless wandering – these ten are the concomitants of sexual passion”.⁴⁹ Besides, “one should be careful not to excite oneself by erotic acts, aphrodisiac potions and erotic literature.”⁵⁰

Nature of Parigraha: - The characteristic of parigraha is attachment.⁵¹ The definition of Parigraha shows, in the first place, that those who have a feeling of attachment, notwithstanding the renunciation of all worldly acquisitions, are far from Aparigraha.⁵² Secondly, it expresses that the possession of mundane things is not possible without internal attachment. Thus both the internal attachment and the possession of mundane things come within the sweep of Parigraha.⁵³ We may now say that, if one is disposed to remove the internal attachment, one should correspondingly throw aside mundane possessions also. In the presence of mundane possessions, if non-attachment is claimed, it will be self-deception and fraudulence, since without psychical proneness mundane possession cannot be perforce with us. It may happen that, despite insignificant mundane possessions, one may have conspicuous internal inclination for possession, just as a poor man may have. But this must not brush aside the difference in internal attachment corresponding to the kind of external possession. In other words, there occurs internal variation in attachment by virtue of the longing one possesses for the kind of external objects. For example, attachment is feeble in a young deer which continues to live on green blades of grass in comparison to a cat which kills a host of mice for procuring its food.⁵⁴ Thus, the external and the internal influence each other.

Parigraha as such can never preclude Himsā and those who wish to practise Ahimsā should avoid the internal and the external attachment. So Ahimsā will be commensurate

with the degree of avoidance. Perfect non-attachment and consequently perfect Ahimsā is rendered possible only in the life of Arhantas and below this only degrees of Aparigraha are possible.

Parigraha Parimāṇānuvrata : - The householder is incapable of renouncing all Parigraha. He should limit the Parigraha of wealth, cattle, corn servants, buildings etc. inasmuch as the spirit of renunciation is the right principle.⁵⁵ This is Parigraha-parimāṇānuvrata or the gross form of the vow of Aparigraha.

We may say in passing that the householder's vow of Aparigraha would tend to annual the economic inequality rampant in society and thereby everybody will be able to get things of daily necessities at least. Today, men, and nations are striving for the enhancement of their wealth and territory at the cost of others with the consequence that the individual and national tensions are increasing. Parigraha is detrimental when it engenders inordinate clinging. An attitude of a philanthropist is essential for the observance of the vow of Parigraha-parimāṇānuvrata.

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breathing. The two-sensed Jīvas possess six prāṇas i.e. in addition to the four prāṇas of one-sensed Jīvas, they have two prāṇas more, namely, sense of taste and Bala of speech; the three-sensed Jīvas have the sense of colour besides the above; and lastly the five-sensed Jīvas which are mindless are endowed with the sense of hearing in addition and those with mind possess all the ten prāṇas—five senses (senses of touch, taste, smell, colour and hearing), three Balas (Balas of body, speech and mind), life limit and breathing. Thus the number of prāṇas possessed by one-sensed to five-sensed Jīvas are four, six, seven, eight, nine, and ten respectively.

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EXPRESSIONS OF THE HIGHEST GOOD IN JAINISM : A COMPARATIVE STUDY

Jainism is a system of philosophy embracing logico-metaphysical reflection and indicating a path to ethico-mystical realisation. If the fountain-head of Jaina ethics is logico-metaphysical thinking, mysticism is its culmination. Thus Jainism is not merely ethics, logic and metaphysics but mysticism too. It will not be amiss to point out that ethics is the connecting link between logico-metaphysical speculation *and mystical realisation* which is the highest good. It paves the way from metaphysics to mysticism. In other words, the journey from intellect to intuition can only be traversed through moral observances resulting in meditation and devotion. Prof. Ranade says “Metaphysics, Morality and Mysticism are as inseparable from each other in the interest of the highest spiritual development of man as intellect, will and emotion are inseparable for his highest psychological development.”¹ Again, he says — The mystics of all ages and countries form an eternal divine society.² There are no racial, no communal, no national prejudices among them. Time and space have nothing to do with the eternal and infinite character of their mystical experience.³ They may weave out their mysticism with the threads of any metaphysical structure, but they always try to go behind the words and realize a unity of significance.⁴ The mystic, according to Jainism, gets sublime satisfaction from immediate contact with the transcendental self and along with it with the whole of existence through the

medium of infinite, intuitive knowledge in contradistinction to the metaphysician who gets merely intellectual satisfaction by mediately comprehending the whole of existence. In other words, the mystic has Pratyakṣa Anubhava, while the metaphysician has only Parokṣa Anubhava.⁵

In the ethico-religio-philosophical works of the Jainas the highest good is diversely formulated. Fed up with the kaleidoscopic transformations of the world, the Jaina Ācāryas have dived deep into the inner hidden regions of the spirit, and have expressed the highest good in different ways. But it may be noted here that all the formulations of the highest good convey identical meaning.

LIBERATION (MOKṢA) AS THE HIGHEST GOOD :
First, the liberation of self is deemed to be the highest good. Every human being ought to render strenuous efforts to seek his own salvation from the miseries of the world. All the systems of Indian philosophy with the solitary exception of Cārvāka acquiesce in recognising liberation as the ethical ideal, though they differ in the nature of realisation. Though the system like Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Sāṃkhya-Yoga, later Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā of Kumarila, Prabhākara, Vedānta of Śaṅkara and early Buddhism regard liberation as the Summum Bonum of human life, yet they differ widely in expounding its nature. Some schools of thought describe it negatively as freedom from sorrows and sufferings, as an escape from the trammels of Saṃsāra, while the others describe it as a positive attainment of happiness or bliss. The champions of the former view are the Vaiśeṣikas, the early Naiyāyikas, the Sāṃkhya-Yoga and some among the later Mīmāṃsakas, and the early Buddhists. Of the latter view are the Jainas, the later

Naiyāyikas like Bhāsarvajña, some of the Mīmāṃsakas and the Advaita-Vedāntins. Not only these systems differ in the nature of deliverance, but also they show divergence in the possibility of its attainment here or elsewhere, in this world or hereafter. The former is styled Jīvanmukti, while the latter is Videhamukti. Jainism, Advaita Vedānta, Sāṃkhya-Yoga and Buddhism subscribe to both the above-mentioned views, while the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the Mīmāṃsā recognise the latter view to the exclusion of the former.

According to the Advaita Vedānta of Śaṅkara, Mokṣa consists in the identification of individual self with the Brahman, the universal reality, the essence of the universe. It is not merely the absence of misery, but a positive state of bliss. This state is capable of being achieved even in this world while one is having the body. Jainism views the attainment of infinite knowledge, infinite bliss etc., as necessary correlates of emancipation. The concept of Tīrthaṅkara illustrates the possibility of attaining divine status even when the physical frame continues. The state of Videhamukti is to attain Siddhahood. Thus it is not the identification of self with the Brahman, as contemplated by the Vedāntin, but it is the attainment of Siddhahood, wherein self-individuation is sustained. The Sūtrakṛtāṅga tells us that liberation is the best thing, just as the moon is the best among the stars.⁶ The Ācārāṅga pronounces that liberation is achieved by a man who does not feel disinterested in Self-denial.⁷ Just as fire immediately burns the dry sticks, so the self established in itself forthwith annuls the filth of Karmas.⁸ In the state of final liberation the empirical self is metamorphosed into transcendental, permanent existence.⁹ Again, having totally

annihilated the eight types of Karman, and having experienced the supersensuous bliss that passes understanding, the empirical self becomes completely bereft of any collyrium that may again cause bondage.

PARAMĀTMAN AS THE SUMMUM BONUM :
Secondly, the ideal is also described as the attainment of Paramātmā after one's passing through the state of Antarātmā and renouncing the state of Bahirātmā.¹⁰ These three states of the same self may very well be compared with the three types of attitudes as recognised by Dr. Caird: "Man looks outward before he looks inward, and he looks inward before he looks upward."¹¹ The Bahirātmā sees outward; when it becomes Antarātmā, it sees inward; and when it becomes Paramātmā, it is said to see upward. Thus the realisation of the Paramātmā amounts to the realisation of the highest good. In other words, 'non-conceptual and perpetual meditation on the supreme self ought to be effected after abandoning the Bahirātmā through the intermediation of the Antarātmā; i.e., Bahirātmā is to be of necessity renounced to attain Antarātmā, which will in turn lead us to an unimaginable transformation into Paramātmā through the medium of meditation and other practices of moral nature. Following Kundakunda, Yogīndu,¹² Pūjyapāda,¹³ Śubhacandra,¹⁴ Kārttikeya¹⁵ etc., have endorsed this very statement. It will not be idle to point out here that in realising the transcendental self, the whole of existence is intuited on account of the spontaneous efflux of omniscience. The realisation of self and intuition of other substances are synchronal. It is the transition from the life of sense to the life of spirit, which is tantamount to achieving the immortal

heritage of man. This amounts to the realisation of the transcendental self. The limited character of the individual self is disrupted and invaded by the Parama Ātman which the individual feels as his own.

According to the Kathopaniṣad, the Brahman or the Parama Puruṣa is the highest goal of the aspirant's journey, which, after being known by the mortal man, releases immortality, transcends the senses, the objects of senses, the mind, the intellect, the great self, and the unmanifest.¹⁶ The same may be expressed by saying that the senses need be merged into mind, mind into the Jñāna-Ātman, Jñāna-Ātman into Mahat-Ātman and lastly, Mahat-Ātman into Śānta-Ātman. Thus Śānta-Ātman which is equivalent to Parama-Puruṣa or Brahman or Ātman is the terminus of all endeavours.¹⁷ According to Jainism also, Param-ātman or Brahman is the highest object to be pursued. The aspirant should enquire into, long for, and strive after the eternal light of knowledge which is subversive of ignorance.¹⁸ The nature of Paramātman according to the Jainas and Upaniṣadic thinkers is similar to a great extent. Paramātman is eternal, without any flaw, is devoid of colour, smell, sound, taste, touch, is without birth, death etc.¹⁹ The Bhāvapāhuḍa tells us that the supreme self is devoid of taste, colour, smell, touch and sound; it is characterised by consciousness, not assignable by any mark and lastly indefinable as regards form.²⁰

Here a word of caution is necessary. The words Paramātman and Brahman are synonymously used in the Jaina philosophical texts, but they should not be confused with the Upaniṣadic Brahman which is the cosmic principle. The Jaina gives credence to the existence of infinite Brahman, i.e.,

Paramātmans which are the consummatory stages of spiritual evolution of the individuals existent in their own right. Soul and God, according to Jainism, are identical, inasmuch as they are the two stages of the same entity. Thus every soul is potentially divine, and the manifestation of divinity is called Paramātmanhood. If this connotation implicit in the Jaina view of Paramātman is not conceded, that would constitute a virtual abandonment of the ontological pluralism of selves which it champions. Though Brahman of the Upaniṣads and Brahman of the Jainas exhibit many resemblances, yet they differ enormously.

NIŚCAYA NAYA AS THE HIGHEST GOOD : Thirdly, we encounter a different mode of expressing the highest good. The Jainas in order to expound this speak in the language of Nayas. Kundakunda, the outstanding ethico-religious philosopher of the first century A.D., is conspicuous for using Niścaya Naya (Transcendental view) and Vyavahāra Naya (Empirical view) as the language of spiritualism to make out the highest good. The Niścaya Naya which grasps the soul in its undefiled state of existence may very well serve as the highest good to be achieved in contradistinction to the Vyavahāra Naya which describes the self as bound, impure, and the like. No doubt, we are in the corrupt form of existence from beginningless past, but the Niścaya Naya reminds us of our spiritual magnificence and glory. It prompts the sullied self to behold its spiritual heritage. It does not assert that the soul is at present perfect but simply affirms that the self ought to attain the height illumined by it. It has the force of 'ought' and not of 'is', but this force is valid for empirical selves.

The Muṇḍakopaniṣad²¹ distinguishes between the Parā and Aparā Vidyās and seems to decide in favour of the former as constituting the ethical Summum Bonum, by the realisation of which all else becomes known. The Parā-Vidyā which is the same as the higher knowledge consists in knowing the Brahman which is invisible, unseizable, without connections, without hue, without eye or ear, without hands, or feet, eternal, pervading, impalpable, imperishable, and the womb of creatures.²² This does not amount to the intellectual, but to the intuitional apprehension of Brahman. The Aparā Vidyā which may be equated with the lower knowledge comprises within its fold the Ṛg-Veda, the Yajur-Veda, the Sāma-Veda and the Atharva-Veda, also chanting, ritual, grammar, etymological interpretation, prosody and astronomy.²³ The above recognition of Parā-Vidyā as the highest good may be corroborated by the conversation between Nārada and Saṅat Kumāra as given in the Chāndogya Upaniṣad.²⁴ Nārada in spite of his vast study comprehending the Vedas, history, mythology, mathematics, logic, ethics, fine arts etc., complains to his spiritual teacher Sanat Kumāra that he is invaded by grief on account of not having the knowledge of the self. Thus we learn that the intuitive knowledge of the self alone is capable of making us able to cross the ocean of sorrow and no amount of mere intellectual equipment. Hence the Parā-Vidyā is the crowning experience, the sublime good. Thus the Aparā-Vidyā or the Vyavahāra-naya is true to the extent to which it leads a man intellectually on the path, but it is not all.

There is witnessed another meaning ascribed to Niścaya and Vyavahāra. The former indicates that the self as unbound

and untouched by Karmas, while the latter indicates that it is bound and touched by Karmas.²⁵ The spiritual experience however transcends these in-tellectual points of view.²⁶ In a similar vein, Amṛtacandra argues that the proper results of instruction to a disciple can only issue if he, after assimilating the nature of Niścaya-naya and Vyavahāra-naya, adopts the attitude of indifference towards both of these, i.e., if he transcends these intellectual points of view.²⁷ Thus according to this interpretation the Aparā Vidyā corresponds to these points of view, and the Parā Vidyā, to spiritual experience. In other words, Niścaya-naya may be understood to mean mystical experience as well as the knowledge of the pure self, or both the intuitional and intellectual ideals, and Vyavahāra-naya may be understood to mean a lapse from the superb heights as well as the knowledge of the impure self. Considered from the view-point of spiritual experience or the knowledge of the pure self, Vyavahār-naya includes a lapse from superb heights and the knowledge of the impure self. In the present context of Parā Vidyā and Aparā Vidyā, Śuddhanaya or Paramārtha-naya in the sense of intuitional experience represents the former, and Vyavahāra-naya in point of intellectual knowledge of any sort expresses the latter. Hence the Parā-Vidyā or Śuddhanaya or Paramārtha-naya may be legitimately said to denote the highest good in contrast to the Aparā Vidyā or Vyavahāra-naya.²⁸

It may be noted here that like the Paramārtha and Vyavahāra Nayas enunciated by Kundakūṇḍa, Śāṅkarācārya, the great exponent of the Advaita doctrine, makes use of the Pāramārthika and Vyāvahārika view-points as the corner stones of his philosophy. But the two differ widely. The

Pāramārthika view as advocated by Śāṅkara negates the Pāramārthika existence of other material and non-material objects of the world which, in the view of the Jainas, have their own independent existence. The Vyavahāra Naya of the Jainas simply points to our slumbering state in the domain of spiritualism, and does not in the least touch the existential aspects of things. The Śuddhanaya or Paramārtha Naya simply serves to awaken the slumbering soul to attain its spiritual heritage. It does not pretend to annul the external things by mere spiritual outlook. We may say that Śāṅkaracārya seems to be indebted to Kundakunda for using the terminology of Pāramārtha and Vyavahāra.

ŚUDDHA UPAYOGA AS THE HIGHEST GOOD :

Fourthly, the attainment of Śuddha Upayoga is the highest goal of human pursuance. Therein the self synchronically realises omniscience and happiness which are its cognitive and affecting potencies respectively. According to Jainism, consciousness is the discriminative characteristic of the soul. It manifests itself in Upayoga, which follows from consciousness as the conclusion from premises. The Upayoga is of three kinds, namely, Śubha (auspicious), Aśubha (inauspicious) and Śuddha (pure). The self is said to possess auspicious Upayoga when it is absorbed in the performance of meritorious deeds of moral and spiritual nature. Hence the self acquires celestial births which, it may be noted, are also a part and parcel of worldly career. Besides, when the self entangles itself in demeritorious actions of violence, sensual pleasure, and the like, it is said to possess inauspicious Upayoga. Hence the self is led to the sub-human and hellish births. Both these auspicious and inauspicious Upayogas

results on account of the Karmic Upādhis, and these Upayogas will again continue to captivate the self in the never-ending wheel of misery. Consequently, the attainment of these two Upayogas can never function as the Summum Bonum of human life. The Jaina, therefore, makes an explicit pronouncement that so long as the self is mated with these two types of Upayoga, it will be unfruitfully dissipating its energies in pursuit of vain mirages; and so the highest good will ever remain shrouded in mystery. But as soon as the self parts company with these auspicious and inauspicious Upayogas, it joins hands with Śuddha Upayoga. In other words, the experience of Śuddha Upayoga automatically obliges the Aśuddha Upayoga (Śubha and Aśubha) to disappear, with the consequence that the transmittratory character of the self evaporates in totality. Spiritually considering, we may say that both the impure Upayogas in the form of virtue and vice prevent the soul from attaining to the loftiest mystical heights, hence they should be equally condemned as unwholesome for the healthiest development of the spirit. But if the empirical self finds that it is difficult to rise to mystical heights, it should perform auspicious activities so as to achieve atleast heavenly happiness but with the clear knowledge that these performances however intensely and ceaselessly conducted will in no way enable it to relish the pure Upayoga. The inauspicious activities should by all means be disapproved, inasmuch as they will bring about thousands of heart-rending miseries. The pure consciousness which relinquishes the impure Upayogas associated with the empirical consciousness realises omniscience and such happiness as is transcendental, born of the self, supersensuous,

incomparable, infinite and indestructible.²⁹ This transcendental self as the transcendental ideal may also be designated as 'Svayambhū'.³⁰ To make it clear, it is a state of self-sufficiency which requires no other foreign assistance to sustain itself. It is itself the subject, the object, the means for its achievement, it achieves for itself, destroys the extraneous elements, and is the support of its infinite potencies. Hence the self manifests its original nature by transforming itself into six cases; it is at once the nominative, the accusative, the instrumental, the dative, the ablative, and the locative case respectively.³¹

The Muṇḍakopaniṣad represents that he who has realised the Brahman, the lord and governor of all, has shaken off merit and demerit, and has attained perfect equanimity.³² The consideration of the Upaniṣad and the Jaina conform to each other regarding the transcendental plane of life. The highest state of existence transcends both good and evil. Such persons as have realised it within themselves go beyond righteousness and unrighteousness. According to Kundakunda, the worldly persons generally recognise inauspicious conduct as bad and auspicious one is taken by them as good. But how can the latter be understood as good, since it makes the entrance of the self into the cycle of birth and death.³³ Just as a shackle, whether of gold or of iron, indiscriminately ties a man, so also the auspicious and inauspicious conduct bind the self to mundane miseries.³⁴ The wise shun both Śubha and Aśubha.³⁵ Rare are such persons as are disposed to discard even Puṇya as Pāpa.³⁶ Pūjyapāda tells us that vowlessness causes vice and the observance of vows engenders virtues; but deliverance is the destruction of both.³⁷ The aspirant should adhere to vows after renouncing vowlessness and after attaining to the

supreme status the former should also be abjured like the latter.³⁸ The highest state of the Paramātmān transcends both good and evil; and such persons as have realised Him within themselves go beyond the vicious circle of Saṁsāra or the reach of good and bad.

ATTAINMENT OF BLISS AS THE HIGHEST GOOD :
Fifthly, Kundakunda pronounces that the realiser of the highest good experiences unprecedented bliss which originates from the inner most being of self and which is supersensuous, unique, infinite and interminable.³⁹ Pūjyapāda and all others speak of the Ātman as full of excellent bliss.⁴⁰ In the Iṣṭopadeśa he tells us that a supreme kind of happiness is experienced by the Yogī who is established in his own self.⁴¹ The Yogasāra of Yogīndu recognises that those engrossed in great meditation after renouncing all conceptual thinking enjoy ineffable bliss which is equivalent to the happiness of liberation.⁴²

The Taittirīyopaniṣad says, “Brahman is the delight of life and mind, the fullness of peace and eternity.”⁴³ It compares Brahmanic bliss with other type of physical blisses and after enumerating a number of blisses enjoyed by men, gods etc., concludes that hundred blisses of Prajāpati constitute the bliss of Brahman. Such an Ānanda is experienced by the sage who is free from all desires.⁴⁴ The Chāndogya Upaniṣad also lays stress on the pursuance of immortal happiness which consists in seeing, hearing and meditating upon the Ātman to the utter exclusion of the radically different kinds of perishable happiness experienced in seeking things beside the Ātman.⁴⁵ It may be pointed out here that the spiritual bliss which is experienced in realising Paramātmān in course of meditation is impossible to be had in the mundane life. Even Indra in the

company of crores of nymphs is incapable of having such an infinite bliss of the sage in contemplation.⁴⁶

SIDDHA GATI OR THE SIDDHA STATE AS THE HIGHEST GOOD : Sixthly, Jainism speaks of Siddha Gati and the four Gatis (celestial, human, sub-human and hellish). The former is permanent and immutable, and it implies the complete cessation of transmigratory existence. The latter indicate the rounds of birth and death in the empirical world. The Siddha state transcends the realm of cause and effect, inasmuch as the Dravya and Bhāva Karmas and the consequential four types of transmigratory existence have ceased to exist. The category of causality is applicable only to mundane souls and not to the Siddha who is an unconditioned being. Kundakunda announces that the Siddha is neither the product of anything nor produces anything, hence neither effect nor cause.⁴⁷ According to the Śaṭkhaṇḍāgama he who has destroyed all the Karmas, who is independent of external objects, who has attained infinite, unique, intrinsic and unalloyed bliss, who is not attached to anything, who has achieved steady nature, who is devoid of all sorts of mal-characteristics, who is the receptacle of all virtues is Siddha.⁴⁸ The acquisition of Siddhahood is indistinguishable from the accomplishment of Nirvāṇa, where, negatively speaking, there is neither pain, nor pleasure, nor any Karmas nor auspicious and inauspicious Dhyānas, nor anything such as annoyance, obstruction, death, birth, positively speaking, there is perfect intuition, knowledge, bliss, potency, immateriality and existence.⁴⁹ The Ācārāṅga pronounces: “All sounds recoil thence where speculation has no room, nor does the mind penetrate there.” “The liberated is without body, without

resurrection, without contact of matter; he is not feminine, nor masculine, nor neuter; he perceives, he knows, but there is no analogy; its essence is without form; there is no condition of the unconditioned.”⁵⁰

The Kathopaniṣad tells us that the realisation of Paragati delivers one from the mouth of death.⁵¹ Again, of the two paths which are open to man, the wise one after distinguishing them properly chooses the path of good in preference to the path of pleasure, by virtue of which the true aim of life is realised. On the contrary, the fool hankering after the path of pleasure is defeated in attaining to real beneficence.⁵² The mundane path which many men follow must be distinguished from the supermundane one which relieves man from the transitoriness of worldly objects, and from sorrows and sufferings. According to the Chāndogya Upaniṣad the forest ascetics adorned with knowledge and faith tread the path of the gods (Devayāna) which consequentially leads to the attainment of the Brahman or deliverance in contrast to the householders who are busy performing sacrifices and who therefore go by the path of fathers (Pitryāna) to be born again in this world.⁵³

ACTIVISM AS THE HIGHEST GOOD : Seventhly, According to Jainism the Tīrthaṅkara exemplifies the ideal life of Activism. There is a difference between a Tīrthaṅkara and a non-Tīrthaṅkara. The former is capable of preaching and propagating religious doctrines in order to guide the mundane souls immersed in the life of illusion, and his sermons are properly worded by the Gaṇadharas; while the latter is not the pro-pounder of religious faith or principles, but silently enjoys simply the sublimity of mystical experience. These do

not differ in their nature of spiritual experience. These two tendencies of the perfected mystics or Arahantas may be compared with the 'activistic' and 'quietistic' tendencies of the mystics.⁵⁴ Therefore, the attainment of Siddhahood without passing through the stage of Tīrthaṅkaraship has been conceived to be a possibility. Thus the life of Activism in the sense of Tīrthaṅkara, according to Jainism, can not be the universal rule of life.

The Īsopaniṣad tells us that "a man should try to spend his life-span of a hundred years only in the constant performance of actions. It is thus only that he can hope not to be contaminated by actions."⁵⁵ Prof. Ranade remarks, "The actions that are here implied have no further range than possibly the small circumference of 'Sacrifice', and further, the way in which, even in the midst of a life of action, freedom contagion with the fruit of action may be secured is not here brought out with sufficient clearness."⁵⁶ According to the Bhagavad-Gītā, Karma-Yoga or the life of activism constitutes the supreme end to be aimed at. It is no doubt true that we can find passages in the Gītā where Jñāna is superior to Karma, where Karma is superior to Jñāna, and where they are at par. But "the law of the body, the law of society and the law of the Universe indicate and even vindicate activism." "The Niṣkāma Karma is the natural accompaniment or result of a spiritually illumined life; it simply cannot exit, if egoism is not completely annihilated."⁵⁷

AGENCY OF TRANSCENDENTAL BHĀVAS AS THE HIGHEST GOOD : Eighthly, Kundakunda, the prominent exponent of Jaina spiritualism, has bequeathed to us the philosophy of the doer and the deed. He proclaims that in

whatever deeds the self may get itself engaged in the world, they are not the representatives of the self in its pure, undefiled and transcendental nature. The impure empirical dispositions do not pertain to the self in its original nature and are the results of Karmic association, the transcendental self is denied the agency even of these impure dispositions. There is no denying the fact that the empirical self has been the doer of impure dispositions since an indeterminable past. When the Jaina says that the empirical self is not the agent of impure dispositions, he simply persuades the empirical self to look behind the Karmic veil. Hence here the chief point of reference is the self in its pure nature. The Jaina reads no contradiction in affirming that the enlightened self which has become familiar with its true nature manifests the pure Bhāvas and thereby becomes the substantial agent of those Bhāvas, and in affirming that the ignorant self because of its erroneous identification with the alien nature develops impure dispositions, and thereby it is called their agent.⁵⁸ Just as from gold only golden things can be produced, and from iron only iron things, so the enlightened self produces pure Bhāvas and the ignorant self produces impure ones.⁵⁹ When the ignorant self becomes enlightened, it starts generating pure Bhāvas without any incongruity. Thus the self is simply the doer of its own states and not the doer of anything else whatsoever. Thus the transcendental self is the agent of transcendental Bhāvas.

PANDITA-PANDITA MARANA AS THE HIGHEST GOOD : Ninthly, the Jainas also proclaim the ideal in terms of death in order to reveal the nature of the Summum Bonum. According to them the goal of the aspirantâs one-pointed endeavour ought to be the attainment of the Paṇḍita-Paṇḍita

Marāṇa (Sublime death) to the utter exclusion of the Paṇḍita Marāṇa, the Bāla-Paṇḍita Marāṇa, the Bāla Marāṇa and the Bāla-Bāla Marāṇa.⁶⁰ The lowest and the most detestable kind of death (Bāla-Bāla Marāṇa) occurs to that man who leads the life of utter perversion.⁶¹ The highest sort of demise (Paṇḍita-Paṇḍita Marāṇa) is exemplified in the consummate lives of embodied omniscient beings when they part with their body.⁶² Those souls which have crowned themselves with spiritual awakening, but have remained incapable of observing partial vows in their life-time succumb to Bāla-Marāṇa.⁶³ This is to be distinguished from the Bāla-Paṇḍita Marāṇa⁶⁴ which is the destiny of those who give themselves to partial vows after being spiritually awakened. The saints observing complete vows enjoy Paṇḍita Marāṇa.⁶⁵ All these types of death except the Paṇḍita-Paṇḍita Marāṇa are pregnant with the future possibility of birth; hence they may be designated as empirical deaths. And these are required to be distinguished from the death of the transcendent type of the Paṇḍita-Paṇḍita Marāṇa wherein the mundane life is cast aside. Thus this latter type of departure is of the happiest kind, and consequently it requires our paramount devotedness. This sort of soulās release from bodily confinement appears before us as an illustration of challenge to death. Here the inevitability of death has been properly met with.

AHIMSĀ AS THE HIGHEST GOOD : Tenthly, the highest good finds its expression in the realisation of perfect Ahimsā. The Samaṇasuttam tells us, “just as in the world there is nothing higher than the Meru mountain and nothing more extended than the sky, so also in the world, there is no value excellent and universal corresponding to Ahimsā.”⁶⁶ Ahimsā

is so central in Jainism that it may be incontrovertibly called the beginning and the end of Jaina religion. The statement of Samantabhadra that Ahimsā of all living beings is equivalent to the realisation of Parama Brahma sheds light on the paramount character of Ahimsā.⁶⁷ The Sūtrakṛtāṅga exhorts us to regard Ahimsā as the quintessence of wisdom.⁶⁸ Since Nirvāṇa is not other than Ahimsā, one should cease to injure all living beings.⁶⁹ The Ācārāṅga pronounces that one should neither deprive any living being of life, nor rule over him, nor torment him, nor excite him.⁷⁰ This is tantamount to saying that Ahimsā is the pure and eternal Dharma.⁷¹ Since all the selves from the one-sensed to the five-sensed selves are transcendently alike,⁷² killing the 'other' is killing one's own self, ruling the other is ruling one's own self, enslaving the other is enslaving one's own self, distressing the other is distressing one's own self, and disquieting the other is disquieting one's own self. By reason of this, Himsā of all the living beings has been abandoned by those desirous of self-realisation.⁷³ The Atman which is Apramatta is Ahimsā and the Atman which is Pramatta is Himsā.⁷⁴ Amṛtacandra in the Puruṣārthasiddhyupāya holds that the appearance of any sort of passion on the surface of self is Himsā, and the self in its pure form is Ahimsā.⁷⁵ This pronouncement has a deep inward reference and regards Ahimsā as a spiritual value. This method of dealing with Ahimsā obliges us to peep into one's own inner life, so that attachment and aversion along with their ramifications like anger, pride, deceit and greed are completely got rid of. The Praśnavyākaraṇa Sūtra designates Ahimsā as Nirvana (nivvāṇa), Samādhi (samāhī), Supreme tranquility (santi), happiness (pamoā), supersatisfaction (tittī)

and purity (pavittā) and so on.⁷⁶ In other words, we may say that even the slightest fall from complete self-realisation is to be regarded as Himsā. Thus Himsā commences with the appearance of passions on the ground of self. It will not be out of place to point out that the realisation of perfect Ahimsa results in the unruffled frame of mind in the midst of life and death, loss and gain, friend and foe; pleasant and unpleasant events, pleasure and pain.⁷⁷ This is Samatā (equanimity). The Acārāṅga and the Pravacanasāra regards Samatā as the highest good.⁷⁸

KNOWLEDGE CONSCIOUSNESS AS THE HIGHEST GOOD : Lastly, the attainment of knowledge consciousness (Jñāna Cetanā) ought to be the end of aspirant's endeavours in contrast to action-consciousness (Karma Cetanā) and result-consciousness (Karmaphala Cetanā).⁷⁹ The attribution of consciousness to the auspicious and inauspicious psychical states occasioned by Karmas is called action-consciousness; and the confusion of consciousness with enjoyment of the duality of pleasure and pain is termed result-consciousness.⁸⁰ These two types of consciousness are the results of the misunderstanding regarding the inherent nature of things. Hence they need be abjured in the interest of ascending the supra-ethical plane of life. The five types of one-sensed souls are the illustrations of holding result-consciousness; the two-sensed to five-sensed souls exemplify those having predominantly action-consciousness; and the souls devoid of ten Prāṇas experience knowledge-consciousness.⁸¹ Thus knowledge-consciousness is the full-fledged and legitimate manifestation of consciousness. The Arhat or Siddha state is the state of knowledge-consciousness, the state of omniscience and bliss.

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RIGHTNESS OF ACTION AND JAINA ETHICS

He who lives in society inevitably asks himself and others on many occasions in life, "What shall I do in a particular situation? Or whether I ought to do or ought not to do certain action?" Many a time we have been told, "What you have done is wrong. Or you ought not to have done this." Sometimes in answer to such questions and such statements, judgments or evaluations, it may be said that an action is wrong if it does not conform to the moral code in question. Particular actions are to be performed in a particular moral code of the community. An impartial reflective mind cannot be satisfied with such kinds of decisions, regarding the rightness or wrongness of doing certain actions. Besides, moral codes may conflict and what is considered right according to one moral code may be regarded as wrong according to the other moral code. For instance, in accordance with one moral code untouchability is right, whereas in accordance with the other moral code untouchability is wrong. In one moral code meat-eating is forbidden, while in the other it is enjoined. The situation is worsened when two parts of the moral code of community prescribe contradictory performances to be right or wrong. All this means that moral codes cannot be relied upon as a sure guide to the rightness of an action. Of course, I do not wish to deny that there may be moral codes which prescribe universal rules of conduct but even then it cannot be said that 'right' and 'wrong' could be defined in terms of conformity or otherwise to the moral code of a particular society.

The reflective mind is not convinced of the reason for an action's being right or wrong in terms of moral code. In

fact, he is concerned with the criterion of the rightness of actions. He wishes to enquire the ground on which the rightness of actions depends. In Jaina terminology it may be asked, "How do we regard an action as Samyak? Or by what standard is an action judged to be Samyak?" It will not be out of place to point out here that the terms Samyak action in Jaina Ethics is not equivalent to the term right action in modern ethics,¹ but it implies that the action has a good motive in addition. It is, therefore, called good action. The other term in Jaina Ethics for good action is Śubha action. But for our purpose we shall treat Samyak-action or Śubha action right action without any inconsistency. In the present paper I propose to discuss the theories of the criterion or standard by which we can determine whether an action is right or wrong. Further, I shall endeavour to point out the stand of the Jaina Ethic regarding the issue under consideration.

In order to judge the rightness or wrongness of an action or rule, if the goodness or badness of its consequences is taken into consideration, we have the theory known as the teleological theory of right or wrong. For instance, gambling is wrong because it leads to many bad consequences and helping other in distress is right, because it leads to good consequences. In other words, the teleologist contends that an action or rule is right, if it is conducive to the greatest balance of good over evil, **for the agent or for the society**. The former position is taken by an ethical egoist, whereas the latter one, by the utilitarian. Since ethical egoism cannot be consistently maintained as a moral theory, we set it aside without going into the argument for its rejection. What concerns us now is to discuss utilitarianism as a teleological theory of the rightness or wrongness of an action or rule.

The other theory regarding the rightness or wrongness of an action or rule is styled deontological theory of right or wrong according to which rightness or wrongness of an action or rule is not the function of consequences, but is decided by the nature of certain characteristics of the action or rule itself. In other words, the deontologist holds that an action or rule is right even if it does not bring about any good to self or society. For instance, promise or conformity in mind, body and speech ought to be kept even if bad consequences are brought into being.

Thus the difference between the teleologist and the deontologist consists in the fact that the former regards the rightness or wrongness of an action or a rule as a function of good or bad consequences alone, while the latter regards rightness or wrongness as depending on factors other than the goodness or badness of consequences. For the teleologist there is no way of determining the right apart from the good, while for the deontologists right owes nothing to the good. Both of them may regard certain actions as right or wrong, but the reason or justification given by each is different. If I say that I ought to do actions of gratitude to my benefactor and then suppose I am asked the reason for holding it. In reply, I may say, if I hold teleological point of view, that I ought to do actions of gratitude to my benefactor if they contribute to the productiveness of good, and if they do not, the 'ought' loses its significance; but if I hold deontological point of view, I may say that I ought to do actions of gratitude to my benefactor, even if they lead to bad consequence, i.e. 'ought' on this theory is to be followed under all circumstances regardless of the consideration of any effect. To be more clear, suppose I have borrowed a sword from my friend for self-defence, shall I return it to him at a time

when my friend is planning to kill his parents owing to some discord? The teleological reply is 'no', the deontological reply seems to me to be 'yes'. Thus the teleologist believes in hypothetical imperatives and the deontologist, in categorical ones.

Having explained the two general types of tests or criteria of rightness of actions or rules, I propose first, to examine the forms of deontological positions upheld by moral philosophers and secondly, shall go on to the utilitarian positions regarding the issue under consideration. While examining these theories, I shall endeavour to bring out the contribution of the Jaina ethics to the problem of the rightness of actions.

(i) The deontologist may take two positions, (a) act-deontology and (b) rule-deontology.

(a) For the act-deontologist, *particular* actions are in themselves intrinsically right or wrong without regard to the goodness or badness of their consequences. The moral judgement that in this situation, I ought to do so and so is a function of the immediate intuitive knowledge of the rightness or wrongness of an action in a particular situation. In other words, the rightness or wrongness of actions is ascertained by simply looking at the actions themselves without considering their consequences, i.e. it is cognizable apart from the goodness or badness produced by them, either for oneself or for the society. It may be noted here that the act-deontologist may hold without contradicting himself that the general rule can be formed indirectly by making use of the general rule can be formed indirectly by making use of perceptions regarding the rightness or wrongness of particular acts. But this general rule cannot outweigh the particular judgement considering the rightness or wrongness of particular action.

(b) As distinguished from act-deontology, the rule-deontologist, holds that what is right or wrong is to be ascertained by appeal to general rules intuitively apprehended. The validity of these rules does not depend on the productivity of the goodness or badness of consequences, and they are not inductively arrived at, but rather given to us directly by intuitive apprehension. For example, the particular action of killing or stealing is wrong, because it violates the rule, 'Do not kill' or 'Do not steal' which is intrinsically right, and the particular action of fulfilling a promise is right, because it observes the intrinsically right rule 'keep your promise'. Thus the rule-deontologist asserts that there are certain rules which are *absolutely always wrong* regardless of the goodness or badness of consequences. In other words, there are certain actions, like telling the truth, keeping the promises, repaying the debt ought to be performed even when they do not promote any good whatsoever, that certain actions are our duties is sufficient ground for our doing them and considering them as right.

According to Jaina Ācāryas, both (a) act-deontology and (b) rule-deontology are untenable theories of the criterion of rightness or wrongness.

a) The weakness of act-deontology is that it regards human situations as extremely different from one another, and does not recognize the universal element inherent in them. No doubt each human situation has something of its own, but it is contrary to moral experience to say that it is not like other situations in morally relevant respects. In many human situations, because of their likeness in important respects, the general rule 'do not kill' can be applied without any incongruity. In practical life, according to Jaina ethics, moral rules cannot be dispensed with and each man's moral

judgements cannot be relied upon. The fact is that when one makes a moral judgement in particular situations, one implicitly commits oneself to making the same judgement in any similar situations.² The merit of act-deontology is that it takes into consideration the particularity of the situation. It advises us to look into the act as such.

The weakness of rule-deontology is that it occupies itself with the extreme rightness or wrongness of the rule without allowing any exception to it. In this case, fulfillment of duty may sometime become fanaticism. Truth ought to be spoken even if the society has to face bad consequences. The defect of this position in particular and deontology in general is that they do not take account of the specific situations and goodness or badness of the consequences following from such circumstances. Actions cannot be right or wrong in vacuum. They always produce effects either good or bad, and to be indifferent to effects is to ignore the verdict of moral experience which is deeply rooted in the goodness or badness of human situation.

Jaina ethics does not condemn the action of telling a lie to enemies, robbers, and even to persons who ask questions when they have no right to ask. Under some circumstances it is right to break a promise, or to take something that belongs to another without his permission. Thus no rule can be *absolutely always* right or wrong as the rule-deontologist prescribed. Mill rightly remarks, "It is not the fault of any creed but of the complicated nature of human affairs that rules of conduct cannot be so framed as to require no exception, and that hardly any kind of action can safely be laid down as either always obligatory or always condemnable."³ The merit of rule-deontology is that it gives excessive importance to rules in moral life.

After critically examining the deontological position from the point of Jaina ethics, we now proceed to examine the position taken by the teleologist. Since teleologists have often been called utilitarians, we shall be regarding teleological position as utilitarian position

(a) Act-utilitarians say that the rightness or wrongness of each action is to be determined by appealing to goodness or badness of its consequences and I ought to do an action in a situation which is likely to produce the maximum balance of good over evil in the universe. One ought not to tell the truth in a situation which is such as to cause maximum balance of evil over good by telling the truth.

(b) Rule-utilitarians hold that moral rules like truth-telling etc., are significant in life and duty in a particular situations is to be decided by appeal to a rule. In this respect they are like rule-deontologists; but, unlike deontologists, they affirm that rules are to be framed on the basis of their effects on the society as a whole. Thus rules have utilitarian basis and they must be selected, maintained, revised and replaced on this basis. Once rules are so framed, they are to be followed even if it is known they do not have the best possible consequences in **certain particular cases**.

It may be noted here that Jaina ethics subscribes to the utilitarian basis of the judgements of right or wrong. Do Not kill, Do not tell a lie, Do not hoard, Do not steal and Do not commit adultery—all these rules have as their basis the productivity of good consequences to the society. However, Jaina Ācāryas maintain that sometimes it is not the following of the rule that produces maximum balance of good over evil, but its breaking. Though Jaina Ācāryas allow breaking of the moral rules in exceptional circumstances on utilitarian basis, yet they have warned us time and again that breaking

of the rule should not be made common, since it may lead to the weakening of faith in rules which are in a way the basis of social order. The Niśītha Sūtra is a compendium of exceptions to moral rules. This work has very carefully laid down the principles of breaking the rules. This implies that Jaina ethics does not allow superstitious rule-worship, but at the same time holds that scrupulous conscientious caution is to be exercised in breaking the rules. Thus rule-utilitarianism like rule-deontology does not find favour with Jaina ethics.

Rules are merely guiding principles in common circumstances, but when the circumstances are exceptional we have not to look to rules for making any moral decision, but to situations and particular actions from the point of view of producing greater balance of good over evil. This goes to show that every time, as the act-utilitarian suggests, we have to calculate anew the effects of each and every action on the general welfare. The whole discussion brings us to the view that both acts and rules, specific situations and general principles, are to be taken into account for deciding the rightness or wrongness of actions. This may be called modified act-utilitarianism which cannot allow a rule to be followed in a particular situation, when, following it is regarded as not to have the best possible consequences. This means that Jaina ethics accepts the possibility that sometimes general moral principles may be inadequate to the complexities of the situation, and in this case a direct consideration of the particular action without reference to general principles is necessary. Thus according to Jaina ethics **acts are logically prior to rules and the rightness of the action is situational**. The corollary of this view is that duty is not self-justifying, it is not an end in itself. It is good as a

means. Its rightness is dependent on the fact of producing a greater balance of good over evil in the universe than any other alternative.

Here it may be said that rightness or wrongness of an action does not depend upon the goodness or badness of consequences, but upon the motive or motives from which it is done. We can find references in Jaina ethical texts wherein good motives are given prime importance for the performance of action producing good consequences. So long as good motives issue in right action productive of good consequences, there is nothing wrong in accepting the dependence of rightness of action on good motive. Jaina ethics seems to tie the good motives with the rightness of actions producing good consequences. Its conviction is that if there is good motive, like kindness or charitable disposition, right actions are bound to occur. At one stage in man's moral evolution it may be possible; at ordinary man's level this may not happen. Since Jaina ethics, it seems to me, could not evenly face the problem arising from the fact that sometimes good dispositions are not able to produce right actions issuing in good consequences, it made rightness of action productive of good identical with good motive. But the point is that such actions are not so blameworthy as they would have been if they had been done from bad motives. No doubt the agent deserves praise for acting as he did, but the action is wrong. Jaina ethics seems to confuse 'that to call an action morally praiseworthy is the same thing as to say that it is right, and to call it morally blameworthy the same thing as to say that it is wrong.'⁴ In point of fact these two judgements are not identical. It so often happens that a man may act wrongly from a good motive, i.e. conscientiousness may lead to fanatical cruelty, mistaken

asceticism etc., and he may act rightly from a bad motive, for instance, feeling of revenge may be able to check certain action. However, in the former case we regard the actions as wrong. Whereas in the latter we regard them as right. This means that the consideration of motives does not make any difference to the rightness or wrongness of actions. In other words, goodness or badness of disposition is to be distinguished from the rightness or wrongness of action. Thus if a right action is done from a good motive and the same action is done from a bad motive, though the goodness of the consequences will be the same, yet 'the presence of the good motive will mean the presence of an additional good in the one case which is absent in the other.'⁵

In conclusion, we may say that according to Jaina ethic the criterion of right or wrong is the goodness or badness or consequences. It rejects the view that certain rules ought absolutely always to be followed, whatever the consequences may be. No action is to be unconditionally done or avoided. No action can be our duty irrespective of the goodness of the consequences. The question whether an action is right or wrong does not depend on motive, and the presence of motive whether good or bad constitutes an additional factor in the rightness or wrongness of action.

REFERENCES

1. In some of our moral judgements, we say that a certain action or kind of action is morally right, wrong, obligatory, a duty or ought or ought not to be done. In others we talk, not about actions or kinds or action but about persons, motives, intentions, traits of character, and the like and we say of them that they are morally good, bad, virtuous, vicious, responsible, blameworthy, saintly, despicable, and so on. In these two kinds of judgement, the things

talked about are different and what is said about them is different.
(Frankena, Ethics) pp. 8-9 (Prentice-Hall, India).

2. Frankena, Ethics, p. 22 (Prentice-Hall).
3. Mill, Utilitarianism, Chapter II, P. 23 (Everyman's Library ed., New York)
4. Moore : Ethics, P. 116 (Oxford University Press, London).
5. Moore : Ethics, P. 115 (Oxford University Press, London).



AHIMŚĀ AND THE GOOD

It goes without saying that the doctrine of *ahimśā* is the be-all and end-all of the Jinist way of life and living. May be, keeping in view this inclusive nature of *ahimśā*, the Āyāro remarkably pronounces that none of the living beings ought to be killed, ought to be ordered, ought to be enslaved, ought to be distressed and ought to be put to unrest (*savve pānā na hantavvā, na ajjāveyavvā, na parighetavvā, na paritāveyavvā, na uddaveyavvā*¹). It is a unique and unparalleled statement in the entire Jinist literature. I need not say that it basically embraces all the aspects of social experience in its normative perspective. The political organisation, the economic orientation and the institutional set up can easily derive inspiration from this ethically significant statement. Thus this above statement of the Āyāro is representative of the extent which *ahimśā* is supposed to include, although most of the Jaina texts seem to include in *ahimśā* only non-killing. As for example, we find *pramattayogāt prānavyaparopanam himśā*² (The severance of vitalities out of passion is *himśā*). *Pānāvaham nigganthā vajjayanti*³ (Munis discredit killing). And *Jāvanti loe pānā na haṇe no ghāyae*⁴ (One should neither kill nor cause to kill living beings). The essence of being a wise-man is this that he does not kill any being.⁵ It should be borne in mind that if *ahimśā* is understood only in the sense of non-killing, it is narrow and socially not of wide significance. In fact killing is the last limit of *himśā* and not the only expression of *himśā*. There are hundreds of expressions of *himśā* and *ahimśā* below that last limit. It seems to me that owing to the fact of avoiding

this sort of expression of *himsā and ahimsā*, the Puruṣārthasiddhyupāya seeks to explain falsehood and truth, stealing and non-stealing, unchastely and chastity, possession and non-possession etc. as forms of *himsā and ahimsā*. This way of expression regards *ahimsā* as the essence of all virtues, thus giving supreme status to *ahimsā* it deserves. In the pages to follow, I shall be using the word *ahimsā* in this comprehensive sense.

It is of capital importance to note that *ahimsā* presupposes, first, a world of living beings, both human and non-human, along with the fact each of them is constantly affecting the other and is being affected by the other either evenly or unevenly. Secondly, *ahimsā* presumes that life is dear to all (*Savvesim jiviyam piyam*⁶) and for all living beings pain is disturbance, fearful and unpleasant (*Savvesim Pāṇānam. assāyam aparivānam mahabhayaṁ dukkhaṁ*⁷). This is also expressed by saying that just as pain is unpleasant for oneself, so also it is unpleasant for all living beings (*Jaha te na piyam dukkhaṁ emeva savvajivānam*⁸). Again, it is stated that to kill the other is to kill oneself (*Jīva vaho appavaho*⁹) and a being to be killed is not other than your self (*Tumaṁ si nāma sa ceva jaṁ hantavvaṁ ti mannasi*¹⁰). Thus without these two presuppositions the talk of *ahimsā* is inconceivable.

It may be noted that these two presuppositions are psychological in nature and the statement of *ahimsā* evaluative in nature. The former are factual or descriptive assertions, while the later is a normative or a value-assertion. Does this mean that value-assertions can be derived from factual assertions, ethical conclusions can be drawn from non-ethical premises, 'ought' can be derived from, 'is'? This problem of the derivation of 'ought' from 'is' is an important discussion in contemporary ethics, but here I do not propose to argue from

the point of view of the Jinist that value can not be derived from fact. I simply wish to say that for the Jinist *ahimsā* is not a logical deduction from the above mentioned presuppositions. Had it been a deduction like the angles of a triangle as equal to two right angles, the whole of mankind would have understood *ahimsā* immediately. Thus though the Jinist maintains the autonomy of normative ethical discourse by maintaining the distinction between facts and values, yet it holds that there is some connection between fact and value. Though the two, fact and value, are no doubt distinct, yet they are not unrelated to each other. The relation is not of entailment but it is empirical. Life is dear to all (*Savvesim jiviyam piyam*) does not entail 'we ought not to kill life' but at the same time it can not be said that there is no connection between the two. The connection is empirical, not logical. What I wish to say is this : it is not necessary that anybody who comprehends the factual assertion, life is dear to all (*Savvesim jiviyam piyam*), will logically adopt the value assertion 'we ought not to kill', or 'we ought to follow *ahimsā*'. He may as well say that we must exploit all to the extent possible. Yet the two are not unrelated to each other.

After ascertaining the relation between *ahimsā* and its two presuppositions, let us now proceed to analyse the implications of the first presupposition, namely, '*ahimsā*' presupposes a world of living beings, both human and non-human along with the fact that each of them is constantly affecting the other and is being affected by the other evenly or unevenly. This means that living beings are constantly engaged in action, which is by its very nature directed to some end, conscious or unconscious. In other words, every action is impregnated with some conscious or unconscious

end. It follows from this that actions with unconscious end are absolutely determined having no choice, whereas the actions with conscious end involve freedom of choice. The former are excluded from the scope of ethics, since they are non-moral actions, but the later are the subject of ethical enquiry, since they are either moral or immoral. It has been very well recognised that non-human actions are unconscious, and therefore, instinctive, and the human actions which are conscious, are deliberative. It is with human actions that we are concerned here. Human beings are behaving with other human beings and with other non-human beings either morally or immorally. Now the question is what end does make human actions moral? and what end does make human actions immoral? The Jinist may answer : If the end is good the action that is directed towards it will be called moral action or right action, and if the end is bad, the action that is directed towards it will be called immoral action or wrong action. We all ordinarily know what an end is. We should, therefore, enquire, what is good? and what is bad? The question, what is good? is different from the question, as Moore says, What is the good? i.e. What things are good? The former is a basic question, whereas the later has a derivative significance. But to understand 'the good' or 'the *śubha*' the first and the fundamental step is to understand, what is good? or what is *śubha*?

What, then, is good or *śubha*? How is *śubha* or good to be defined? According to the Jinist, *śubha* is an experience in tune with *ahimsā*. The experience in tune with *ahimsā*, is a complex phenomenon constituting a unified whole. The ingredients of this experience are analysable into knowing, affective and active elements. *Śubha anubhava* is constituted by these elements. It is called *śubha cāritra* in Jaina ethics. *Śubha cāritra*

without *ahimsā* is inconceivable. Thus good or *śubha*, according to the Jinist, is definable, since the experience which it entails is complex, therefore, analysable into its constituents. The experience of good is not a simple non-analysable experience. Had it been so, it would have been indefinable.

We can better understand the nature and importance of the question, ‘What is good or *śubha* in the realm of ethics, when we find that it is like the question, ‘What is *dravya* (substance) in the realm of metaphysics? The definition of *dravya* given by the Jaina *ācāryas* is : *Dravya* is that which is *sat* (being). Here ‘being’ is used in a comprehensive sense and not in any particular sense. But no particular thing can be apart from ‘being’. Logically speaking, we may say that ‘being’ is the highest genus, whereas particulars are its species and the relation between the two is of identity in difference. Similarly, when I say that ‘*śubha* is an experience in tune with *ahimsā*’, I am using the term ‘*ahimsā*’ in the comprehensive sense and not in a particular sense. But no particular *śubha* can be separated from *ahimsā* and *ahimsā* manifests itself in all particular *śubhas*. In a logical sense it can be said that *ahimsā* is the highest genus and particular *ahimsās* are its species, and the relation between generic *ahimsā* and particular *ahimsās* is a relation of identity-in-difference. As for example, in non-killing and non-exploitation, though the identical element of *ahimsā* is present, yet the two are different. So the above is the most general definition of *śubha* just like the definition of *dravya*. It may be noted that we can understand ‘being’ only through the particulars, similarly, the understanding of general *ahimsā* is possible only through the particular examples of *ahimsā*, e.g. non-killing, non-exploitation, non-enmity, non-cruelty etc.

I may point out in passing that particular kinds of *ahimsā* are a matter of exploration. Every age develops many kinds of subtle *himsā*, which are a matter of exploration. Gross *ahimsā*, like non-killing, is easily recognisable; but subtle *ahimsā*, like non-exploitation is a matter of discovery. Thus different forms of *ahimsā*, will ever be appearing before us by our exploring outlook and tendencies. Thus the, definition of *śubha* as the experience in tune with *ahimsā* is the most general definition like the definition of *dravya* as that what is *sat*.

It is all right that good is definable as the experience in tune with *ahimsā*, but it may be asked : what is *ahimsā*? Now the question, what is *ahimsā* in the value-world is like the question, what is *sat* in the factual world? Just as *sat* is understandable through the particular examples of things like pen, table, book etc., so also *ahimsā* is understandable through the particular examples of *ahimsā*, like non-killing, non-exploitation, non-enmity, non-cruelty etc. When it is so easily understandable through examples, the craving for the definition of *ahimsā* is pedantry serving no purpose. *Ahimsā* can be taught by examples, just as in arithmetic $2 + 2 = 4$ can be taught to a child with the help of an example like two balls + two balls and gradually the child learns to do big sums without examples. In the same way *ahimsā* can be understood gradually. The argument of understandability can not be adduced in the case of *śubha* without definition. For understanding *śubha*, definition is a necessity, but a similar necessity does not exist for *ahimsā* in view of the above mentioned facts.

It may be noted that the Puruṣārthasiddhyupāya defines *ahimsā* by saying that non-emergence of attachment etc. is *ahimsā* (*Aprādurbhāvah khalu rāgādinām bhavaty-*

*ahimseti*¹¹). This definition of *ahimsā* has its own significance but this is not the type of definition required by the socio-ethical consciousness of mankind. This definition makes social values like devotion to the teacher, devoted service of the country etc. as exclusive of *ahimsā*. It is a deeply inner oriented definition, which though spiritually valuable yet ethically not of much significance. The same thing can be said of the definition, '*Apramatta is ahimsaka*' ('*Appamatto ahimsago*'¹²) because *apramatta* again is said to be the non-emergence of attachment etc. To adopt the above definition of *ahimsā* is tantamount to living in the realm of mysticism, which does not concern us here. Our enquiry in ethics is concerned with the pursuit of *śubha* (good) and avoidance of *aśubha* (bad).

After dealing with the question, what is *śubha* or good? we now propose to discuss, what is **the good** or the *śubha* according to the Jinist? In other words, the question now confronts us is : What kinds of things are intrinsically good according to the Jinist. This means that there are ends which are to be desired for their own sake. The Jinist does not subscribe to the view recognised by Dewey that there are no ends intrinsically good or worthwhile in themselves. The Jinist view is that not all things are instrumentally good : there are goods which are final and intrinsic and should be pursued for the goods themselves.

This brings us to the distinction between good as a means and good in itself. What I wish to say is this : the question what is the good i.e. what things are good comprises two things namely (1) good as a means, and (2) good in itself.¹³ But the definition that 'Good is an experience in tune with *ahimsā* is applicable to both. "Whenever we judge that a thing is good as a means, we judge both that it will have a

particular kind of effect, and that effect will be good in itself". It may be noted that ethical judgements regarding good as a means may not be *universally* true; and many, though *generally* true at one period, will be *generally* false at others"¹⁴ where as ethical judgements regarding good in itself are universally true. And besides, we have to assume ourselves that "probable future evils will not be greater than the immediate good". And there are judgements which state that certain kinds of things are themselves good, they are all of them *universally true*. In both these kinds of good, the criterion of good as *ahimsā* is to be adhered to. I may say in passing that the principle that 'the end justifies the means' need not be rejected as immoral if the above definition of good is accepted. For our present purpose, *the good* means good in itself or the things which are intrinsically good.

Now the answer to the question, what is **the good**, i.e. what kinds of things are intrinsically good according to the Jinist, is as follows :

(1) The first thing which is good for the Jinist is the *ahimsā* of all living beings (*Ahimsā bhutānām jagati viditam brahma paramam.*¹⁵ *Savve pāṇā na hantavvā.*¹⁶). The Jinist classifies living beings (*jīvas*) into five kinds, one-sensed to five-sensed Jīvas. The Jinist uses this classification as the measurement of the degree of *ahimsā*. The classification of *jīvas* is in the ascending order of the importance of *jīvas* owing to the fact of having evolved consciousness known from the number of senses manifested. As for example two-sensed *jīvas* are more evolved than the one-sensed *jīvas*, five-sensed *jīvas* are more evolved than the one, two, three, and four-sensed *jīvas*. Thus *ahimsā* will be directly proportionate to the *ahimsā* of the *jīvas* classified. The Good 'Ahimsā of all living beings' means the *ahimsā* of these living beings. Though this measurement of

ahimsā emphasises the number of senses for calculating *ahimsā*, yet in certain situations *ahimsā* can not always be commensurate with the number of senses affected. This presents before us situations wherein mere mathematical calculation on the basis of senses can not guide us in calculating *ahimsā*. In simple situations number of senses may be useful in the calculation of *ahimsā*, but in complex situations this method may misguide us.

The Puruṣārthasiddhyupāya seems to be aware of this fact. Therefore, it says, though *himsā* may be committed by one yet there may be many who will have to suffer the consequences; it may be committed by many, the consequences may be suffered by one. Besides, in spite of the two persons following the same course of *himsā*, divergence at the time of fruition may be exhibited on account of the differences in their states of mind. Moreover, he does not explicitly commit *himsā*, may also reap the fruits of *himsā* because of his continual inclination towards indulging in *himsā*; and he who apparently employs himself in the acts of *himsā* may not be liable to fruits of *himsā*. Thus we may conclude that in judging the acts of *himsā* and *ahimsā*, it is the internal state of mind that counts. This does not mean that the outward commission of *himsā* has no relevance. The importance of the internal state of mind should not be over-emphasised. The Puruṣārthasiddhyupāya tells us that he who exclusively emphasises the internal aspect at the expense of the external, forgets the significance of outward behaviour.¹⁷

(2) The second thing which is the good or good in itself according to the Jinist is virtuous disposition and action and the appreciation for the virtuous. The virtuous are those who have disposition not to act unjustly¹⁸, who have disposition to bestow fearlessness on the fearful¹⁹, to treat the distressed, the thirsty and hungry with kindness²⁰, to act charitably

towards the needy²¹. Besides, the virtuous practise forgiveness²², straight forwardness²², humbleness²², egolessness²², non-acquisitiveness²³, self control etc. Such persons should be treated respectfully, so much so that they may not feel hurt in society.²⁴

(3) The third thing which the Jinist may call the good is knowledge. In other words, the experience of knowledge in tune with *ahimsā* is the good. It is significant to acquire and give to others knowledge of facts and values. The *Puruṣārthasiddhyupāya* tells us that efforts should be made to have knowledge of objects in the multiple aspects. (*Kartavyo'dhyavasayah sadanekantatmakesu tattvasu*²⁵) Again, it says that let there be endeavour to acquire knowledge of words and their meaning at proper time and with proper zeal.²⁶ It may be noted that since knowledge is liable to be misused the *Puruṣārthasiddhyupaya* advises us to acquire knowledge only after having cultivated right attitude (*Jñānāradhānamistham samyakuvanantaram*²⁷) and right attitude is the *ahimsā* attitude. In a similar vein the *Samaṇasuttam* tells us that vast knowledge without right attitude is of no use.

(4) The fourth thing that can be called the good or intrinsically good according to the Jinist is pleasure. But all pleasures are not of equal value, only that pleasure which is in tune with *ahimsā* is the good. Ross rightly remarks²⁸, 'a state of pleasure has the property, not necessarily of being good, but of being something that is good.' Thus there is no doubt that there are bad pleasures. The Jinist recognises four types of bad pleasures which are to be avoided. They are known as *Rudra Dhyānas*, namely, to feel pleasure in killing (*himsānandi*), to feel pleasure in cheating (*Mṛṣānandi*), to feel pleasure in stealing (*Couryānandi*) and to feel pleasure in sexual indulgence (*viṣayānandi*).

According to the Jinist, four things are the good i.e. intrinsically *good-ahimsā* of all living beings, virtuous disposition and action, knowledge and pleasure. There may be other things which are the good, but they can, on analysis, be shown to be the combination of two or more of the above goods. For example, Vātsalya (mutual love), which is the good, is a combination of virtuous disposition with knowledge and pleasure. Aesthetic enjoyment which is again the good is a combination of pleasure with the knowledge of the art object. Thus Jaina ethics upholds the doctrine of value pluralism; and this theory of the good or intrinsic goodness may be styled *ahimsā-utilitarianism*.

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JAINA ETHICS AND THE META-ETHICAL TRENDS

The main questions which meta-ethics is concerned with are usually three : (1) What is the meaning or definition of the terms like 'good', 'bad', 'right', and 'wrong' used in normative ethics? (2) What is the nature of normative judgements of ethics (Moral Judgements) in which the terms good, right, etc. are used? (3) How can moral judgements be justified? Modern ethics is occupied with these questions and is predominantly devoted to the philosophical analysis of ethical terms or judgements. It may not have any relevance to our practical problems, but a sort of conceptual understanding is essential prior to any use of ethical concepts. In Jaina terminology the questions reduce themselves to the following : (i) What is the meaning or definition of the terms like Śubha and Aśubha? (ii) What is the nature of judgements in which these terms are used? (iii) How can such judgements be justified and supported? I shall take these questions one by one and discuss the answer of Jaina thinkers regarding these contemporary questions of meta-ethical concern.

The first question that confronts us is : What is 'good' or 'Śubha'? This question, as Moore says, should not be confused with the question, what is 'the good' or 'Śubha' or what thing or things are good or Śubha? The former question is more basic than the latter one. It may be asked whether the question of 'good' or 'Śubha' can be decided in a universe where there is no element of consciousness. In such a universe, according to the Jaina, there will be material things, but in

the absence of consciousness good and bad are inconceivable. Thus, a universe without consciousness would be a universe without value. “Whatever is good, then, must stand in relation to consciousness.” In the history of ethical thought good has been defined in various ways, namely as pleasant, as liked by me or most members of the group, as an object of favourable interest and so on.

Any serious student of ethics would outright reject these definitions of ‘good’ or ‘Śubha’. According to the Jaina ethics, Śubha is an experience in tune with Ahimsā. Since there are degrees of Ahimsā, so there are degrees of Śubha or good. The ingredients of this experience which is complex but unified are emotions, and knowledge issuing in end-seeking action. Satisfaction on the fulfilment of ends is the accompaniment of the experience. The implication of the definition of Śubha or good is that goodness does not belong to things in complete isolation from feeling; a thing is good, because it gives rise to an experience in tune with Ahimsā. Besides, that a thing does this is an objective fact and not an imaginary construction. The question, What is ‘right’ can be answered, according to the Jaina, by saying that right cannot be separated from the good. Thus, right is that which tends to produce experience in tune with Ahimsā.

The question, what is Śubha in the realm of ethics is like the question, what is Dravya in the realm of metaphysics. The definition of Dravya given by the Jaina Ācāryas is : Dravya is that which is sat (Being). Here ‘being’ is used in a comprehensive sense and not in a particular sense. But it is to be borne in mind that no particular thing can be apart from being. In a logical way we can say that being is the highest genus whereas the particulars are its species and the relation between the two is identity-in-difference. Similarly,

when I say that Śubha is an experience in tune with Ahimsā, I am using the term Ahimsā in the comprehensive sense and not in a particular sense. No particular Śubha can be separated from Ahimsā and Ahimsā manifests itself all particular Śubhas. It can be said that Ahimsā is the highest genus and particular Ahimsās are its species, and the relation between Ahimsā and Ahimsās is a relation of identity-in-difference. As for example, in non killing and non-exploitation though the identical element of Ahimsā is present, yet the two are different. So the above is the most general definition of Śubha just like the definition of Dravya. It may be noted that we can understand 'being' only through the particulars since general being is unintelligible owing to its being abstract, though we can think of it factually, i. e. value-neutrally. Similarly, the understanding of general Ahimsā shall come only through the particular examples of Ahimsā, e. g. non-killing, non-exploitation, non-enmity, non-cruelty, etc., though we can think of it evaluatively. I may point out in passing that particular kinds of Ahimsā are a matter of exploration. Every age develops many kinds of subtle Himsā which are a matter of exploration. Gross Ahimsā like non-killing is easily recognisable but subtle Ahimsā like non-exploitation is a matter of discovery. Thus, different forms of Ahimsā will ever be appearing before us by our exploring outlook and tendencies. In fact, Ahimsā presupposes a realm of living beings, both human and non-human. So Śubha will be operative only in such a realm of living beings. No living beings, no Śubha. Thus the definition of Śubha as the experience in tune with Ahimsā is the most general definition like the definition of Dravya as that which is Sat. The former can be thought of evaluatively, just as the latter can be thought of factually, i. e. value-neutrally.

It is alright that good is definable as the experience in tune with Ahimsā, but it may be asked, what is Ahimsā? Now the question, what is Ahimsā, in the value-world is like the question, what is 'being' in the factual world? Just as 'being' is understandable through the particular examples of things like pen, table, book, etc. so also Ahimsā is understandable through the particular examples of Ahimsā, like non-killing, non-exploitation, non-enmity, non-cruelty, etc. When it is so easily understandable through examples, the craving for the definition of Ahimsā is pedantry serving no-purpose. Ahimsā can be taught by examples, just as in arithmetic $2 + 2 = 4$ can be taught to a child with the help of an example, two balls + two balls = four balls, and gradually the child learns to do big sums without examples. In the same way Ahimsā can be understood gradually. The argument of understandability cannot be adduced in the case of Śubha without definition. For understanding Śubha a definition is a necessity, but the similar necessity does not exist for Ahimsā in view of the above mentioned facts.

The above definition of good or Śubha presented by the Jaina thinkers avoids the two extremes of naturalism and non-naturalism, subjectivism and objectivism which are the present-day meta-ethical trends. According to naturalism moral terms like 'good' or 'right' can be reduced to empirical terms of psychology, biology, sociology, etc. For instance, good means actually desired by oneself or by people generally, or what tends to further human survival or what makes for social stability. The defects of these definitions are : (a) they reduce ethics to a branch of natural science, thus robbing it of its autonomy; (b) they do not leave any place for 'ought' experience since they refer only to what is. Frankena¹ is right when he says 'when we are making

merely factual assertions we are not thereby taking any pro or con attitude towards what we are talking about. But when we make an ethical or value judgement we are not neutral in this way : it would seem paradoxical if one were to say 'X is good', 'Y is right', but he is absolutely indifferent to its being sought or done by himself or anyone else. ' The merit of naturalism is that it regards value in the world as relative to consciousness.

According to non-naturalism, moral terms cannot be reduced to non-moral terms of science. No doubt 'good' or 'right' have objective properties for their being recognised as such, but they are indefinable in non-ethical terms. They are of a very different kind being non-natural or non-empirical and so to speak 'normative rather than factual'. For instance, if we say that 'knowledge is good', it means that it is good by virtue of the non-natural character of goodness in knowledge known to us directly and not by any empirical observations. The defect of non-naturalism is that it regards good as simple, unanalysable, and indefinable, but the merit of this position is that it regards goodness as objective and not merely subjective.

Now when the Jaina says that Śubha is an experience in tune with Ahimsā, he is accepting the merit of both naturalism and non-naturalism. The statement that Śubha is an experience in tune with Ahimsā accepts value in the world as related to consciousness and leaves room for 'ought' experience. For example, to say that kindness is an experience in tune with Ahimsā implies that we ought to be kind. Besides, that experience is not of the type 'liked by me' or 'approved by me' and so is not subjective or reducible to feeling but possesses an objective character, and at the same time this experience is not simple, unanalysable but complex

and analysable, and therefore definable as has been explained above.

The second and third meta-ethical questions that draw our attention are : (2) What is the nature of normative judgements of ethics? Or what is the nature of ethical judgements (obligatory and value) according to the Jaina? (3) What is their justification?

Let me now state the second question more clearly. There have been recognised three kinds of knowledge : (1) Knowledge of facts; as this flower is yellow; (2) Knowledge of necessity, as $7 + 5 = 12$ and (3) Knowledge of value, as A was a good man or murder is wrong. The question under discussion reduces itself to this. Are ethical judgements expressive of any cognitive content in the sense that they may be asserted true or false? Or do they simply express emotions, feelings, etc. ? The upholders of the former view are known as non-cognitivists (emotivists). When we say that Himsa is evil, are we making a true or false assertion or are we experiencing simply a feeling? Or are we doing both? According to the cognitivists, the ethical judgement, 'Himsā is evil' is capable of being objectively true and thus moral knowledge is objective, whereas the non-cognitivists deny both the objectivity of assertion and knowledge inasmuch-as, according to them, ethical judgements are identified with feeling, emotions etc. Here the position taken by the Jaina seems to me to be this that though the statement, 'Himsā is evil' is objectively true, yet it cannot be divested of the feeling element involved in experiencing the truth of the statement. In moral life knowledge and feeling cannot be separated. By implication we can derive from the Tattvārthasūtra that the path of goodness can be traversed through knowledge (Jnana) and feeling and activity. Amṛtcandra says that first of all

knowledge of right and wrong, good and evil is to be acquired afterwards, moral life is to be practised. Thus the conviction of the *Jaina* is that the knowledge of value and obligations is tied up with our feelings and that in their absence we are ethically blind. In fact, our feelings and knowledge are so interwoven into a complex harmony that we have never a state of mind in which both are not present in some degree. So the claims of cognitivists and non-cognitivists are one sided and are very antagonistic to the verdict of experience. Blanshard³ rightly remarks 'Nature may spread before us the richest possible benquet of good things, but if we can look at them only with the eye of reason, we shall care for none of these things; they will be alike insipid. There would be no knowledge of good and evil in a world of mere knowers, for where there is no feeling, good and evil would be unrecognisable. Again 'a life that directs itself by feeling even of the most exalted kind will be like a ship without a rudder'. Thus the nature of ethical judgement according to the *Jaina* is cognitive-affective. "The achievement of good is a joint product of our power to know and our power to feel".⁴

The next question in meta-ethics is to ask how our ethical judgements (value and obligation) can be justified. That the ethical judgements are objectively true need not imply that their justification can be sought in the same manner as the justification of factual judgements of ordinary and scientific nature. The reason for this is that value cannot be derived from fact, ought from is. In factual judgements our expressions are value-neutral, but in ethical judgements we cannot be indifferent to their being sought by ourselves or by others. That is why derivation of ought from is, value from fact is unjustifiable. The value judgements, according

to Jaina, are self-evident and can only be experienced directly. Thus they are self justifying. The conviction of the Jaina is that no argument can prove that 'Himsā is evil' and 'Ahimsā is good'. What is intrinsically good or bad can be experienced directly or immediately. The justification of right can be sought from the fact of its producing what is intrinsically good, i. e. from the fact of its producing experience in tune with Ahimsā.

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THE AVADHI AND MANAḤPARYAYA TYPES OF SUPERSENSUOUS COGNITION

The *Avadhi* and *Manahparyaya* types of cognition form part of Jainist epistemology. They are not our ordinary ways of perception through sense-organs but are completely and radically different from them. Ordinary persons and even some thinkers and scientists look at these ways of perception with scepticism. To them, the postulation of such ways of knowing is just dogmatic assertions without any scientific basis. The Jainist saint-philosophers seem to be so sure of the phenomena of supersensuous cognition that they have unhesitatingly called it *Pratyakṣa*¹ (immediate and direct). This is in contrast with the *Parokṣa* (mediate and indirect) types of knowledge which are given to us through the sense organs and the normal instrumentality of the mind.² The contention of the Jainists is that knowledge is the essential function of the soul; so it should be able to know without the intervention of sense-organs and the brain. But somehow this inherent capacity of the soul has been obstructed; hence, we need the spectacles of sense-organs for the occurrence of knowledge. Tatia remarks, "Knowledge is as independent as existence. As existence does not depend upon some other existence for its existence so knowledge does not depend upon something else for its knowledge. Knowledge is there in its own right as its objects are there in their own right."³ If we reflect a little, we shall find that knowing independently of sense-organs is our birth right and our dependence on

them is due to the fact that our real freedom has been robbed. Not only this, but we have lost faith in our right of freedom to know supersensuously. Parapsychology, a developing science, has taken the responsibility of re-establishing our sense of freedom by taking recourse to the scientific method of discovering and explaining the existence of the supersensuous knowledge. To return to our point, the Jainist view of *Avadhi* and *Manahparyaya* is comprised under supersensuous cognition. Our present purpose is to make an endeavour to represent these concepts of *Avadhi* and *Manahparyaya* as they have been described by the Jainist philosophers.

The *Avadhi* type of supersensuous cognition refers only to the knowledge of material objects along with that of the embodied souls.⁴ In other words, the scope of *Avadhi Jñāna* is simply the material objects in space and time together with the bodies of the souls. The nonmaterial objects like souls, space, time etc. are excluded from its extent and range.⁵ Thus it has a limited scope.⁶ Not all human beings are possessed of this type of knowledge, but only those who have striven to attain right faith etc. possess this.⁷ This simply shows that both the house-holder and the saints are capable of attaining this type of super-sensuous cognition.⁸ Broadly speaking, the *Avadhi Jnana* admits of a twofold classification, namely, *Deśāvadhi* and *Śarvāvadhi*.⁹ The former extends to only limited space and time as distinguished from the latter which extends to unlimited space and time.¹⁰ Again, the *Sarvāvadhi* is the privilege of severely disciplined persons, whereas the *Deśāvadhi* type of supersensuous knowledge can be present in both ordinary and disciplined persons alike.¹¹ The latter may be classified into six kinds.¹² (1) *Anugāmī*—*The Avadhi*

Jñāna which accompanies the individual in the next birth, just as light accompanies the sun. (2) *Ananugāmi* — that which does not accompany the individual in the next birth. (3) *Vardhamāna* — that which increases in extensity owing to the increase in the purity of right faith etc. (4) *Hiyamāna* — that which decreases in extensity owing to decrease in the purity of right faith etc. (5) *Avasthita* — that which is steadfast, i.e., without any increase or decrease till death or the attainment of omniscience. (6) *Anavasthita* — that which is unsteady i.e. increases or decreases during the life time. All this classification shows that the different individuals differ in regard to their extensity and durability of *Avadhi Jñāna*. It is of capital importance to note that the *Deśāvadhi* type of cognition may disappear at any time, and consequently this means that the individual who is showing the presence of *Avadhi* at one time may show its absence at some other time. However the *Sarvāvadhi* type of cognition is incapable of parting with the individual. Recent parapsychological researches do support the different types of the *Deśāvadhi Jñāna*.

The *Manahparyaya* type of supersensuous cognition is concerned with the knowledge of the material objects thought of by the minds of other people.¹³ In other words it cognises the material objects thought of by the minds of others; the very nature of this type of knowledge signifies that it is to be without the help of the sense organs. Another interpretation of *Manahparyaya* is that it knows only the mental states like thoughts and ideas of others directly.¹⁴ Thus according to the former interpretation the man possessing the *Manahparyaya Jñāna* can cognise mental states as well as the nature of material objects thought of by the minds of

others. It is possessed only by those persons who are spiritually advanced.¹⁵ It is to be remembered here that the *Avadhi Jñāna* can be possessed by the undisciplined, partially disciplined and completely disciplined persons, but the *Manahparyaya Jñāna* can be acquired only by the completely disciplined ascetics of a very high order. This means that the instances of *Manahparyaya Jñāna* are rarely found. The *Manahparyaya Jñāna* is of two kinds.¹⁶ *Rjumati* and *Vipulamati*. The minimum which the former is capable of knowing is two or three past or future births of oneself and others, while the maximum that can be known is seven or eight past or future births.¹⁷ Besides, it can cover the space having a range of two miles to eight miles.¹⁸ The minimum that the latter can know is seven or eight past or future births, whereas the maximum that can be known is innumerable births in the past and in the future.¹⁹ Again, it can cover the space within the range of eight miles to the entire abode of human beings.²⁰ Apart from these distinctions the *Vipulamati* is everlasting and purer in contrast with the *Rjumati* which is less pure and liable to disappear.²¹

From what has been delineated regarding *Avadhi* and *Manahparyaya*, it follows that the Jainists simply by experiencing them in their own selves by severe disciplines arrived at the aforementioned conclusions. It is perhaps right to say that by virtue of the experience of saints, these thoughts have been made accessible to us. It is to be noted here that the modern counterparts of *Avadhi* and *Manahparyaya* are clairvoyance and telepathy respectively. Experimental procedure launched by the science of parapsychology has led us to believe that there exist the phenomena of clairvoyance and telepathy.

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THE CONCEPT OF 'ARAHANTA' IN JAINISM

According to Jainism, Arahanta¹ and the Siddha² are the supreme objects of devotion. They are subsumed under the category of Deva (divine being). Considered from the perspective of mystical realisation, Arahanta and Siddha stand at par. But as the former enjoys embodied liberation and the latter, disembodied one, it is averred that Siddha occupies a higher status. Notwithstanding this, Arahantas are everywhere bowed first and Siddhas, next. But for this the argument adduced by the Jaina is this that it is through Arahantas that we have been able to recognise Siddhas and it is through his preachings that supreme values have been made intelligible to us. Hence Arahanta is our supreme Guru (spiritual Teacher) and the Guru is entitled to receive our preferential obeisance. Thus owing to the delivering of sermons for general beneficence, Arahanta is the perfect Guru and he is also the perfect Deva on account of the complete actualisation of the divinity potential in himself. It is through his medium that mystical life has been possible on earth. In consequence, he must have our highest gratitude and reverence.

Thus the concept of Arahanta in Jainism plays a dual role : the role of the perfect Deva (divine being) and the role of the perfect Guru (spiritual teacher). And this is quite consistent with the viewpoint of spiritual experience, and the consequent upliftment of mankind at large through preaching. Guruhood refers to the outward manifestation of intuitive experience, while Devahood signifies simply the

inward spiritual realisation. Thus the concept of Arahanta stands for the consistent identification of Devatva and Gurutva, of the inward experience and the outward expression. In the state of the Siddha, there is no outward representation of mystical experience, which on the other hand, is integrally connected with the life of Arahanta. Because of this dual role, Arahanta is bowed first in preference to the Siddha who is simply the Deva on account of his being incapable of preaching Dharma. Prof. A.N. Upādhyāya rightly remarks: “The magnanimous saint, the Jaina Tīrthāṅkara, who is at the pinnacle of the highest spiritual experience is the greatest and ideal teacher and his words are of the highest authority.” This does not imply the belittlement of the Siddha, but simply the glorification of the Arahanta as the supreme Guru, Gurutva being his additional characteristic.

There are two kinds of Arahanta, namely, Tīrthāṅkara and non-Tīrthāṅkara. The distinction between the two is this that the former is capable of preaching and propagating religious doctrines in order to guide the mundane souls immersed in the life of illusion and his sermons are properly worded by the Ganadharas, while the latter is not the propounder of religious faith or principles, but silently enjoys simply the sublimity of mystical experience. It is to be borne in mind that the word ‘Arahanta’ in the Namokara Mantra should be regarded as referring to the Tīrthāṅkara.

In Jaina texts, though Arahanta and Siddha are styled ‘God’, yet, as Dr. Upadhye says; “neither Arhat not Siddha has on him the responsibility of creating, supporting and destroying the world. The aspirant receives no boons, no favours, and no curses from him by way of gifts from the divinity. The aspiring souls pray to him, worship him and

meditate on him as an example, as a model, as an ideal that they too might reach the same condition". But it should not be forgotten that unified, single-minded devotion to Arahantas or Siddhas accumulates in the self the Punya (auspicious Karma) of the highest kind, which as a natural consequence, brings forth material and spiritual benefits. Samantabhadra observes that the adoration of Arahanta occasions great heap of Punya (auspicious Karma). He who is devoted to him, realises prosperity and he who casts aspersions, sinks to perdition; in both these the Arahanta is astonishingly indifferent. The aspirant, therefore, should not breathe in despondency for the aloofness of God (Arahanta and Siddha). Those who are devoted to him are automatically elevated. The ultimate responsibility of emancipating oneself from the turmoils of the world falls upon one's own undivided efforts upon the integral consecration of energies to the attainment of divine life. Thus every soul has the right to become Paramatman (Supreme Self) who has been conceived to be the consummate realisation of the divine potentialities.

Arahantas are consummate mystics. They lead a life of supermoralism, but not of a-moralism. It is inconceivable that the Arahanta who had attained supremacy on account of the realisation of perfect Ahimsā may in the least pursue an ignoble life of Himsā, a life of vice. He is no doubt beyond the category of virtue and vice, good and evil. Punya and Pāpa, auspicious and inauspicious psychical states, yet he may be pronounced to be the most virtuous soul, though the pursuit of virtuous life is incapable of binding him to the cycle of life and death. Samantabhadra ascribes inconceivability to the mental, vocal and physical actions of Arahanta, since they are neither impelled by desire nor born

of ignorance. Whatever issues from him is potent enough to abrogate the miseries of the tormented humanity. Hundreds of souls get spiritually converted. His presence is supremely enlightening. Even his body causes amazement to Indra in spite of his beholding it with 2 thousand eyes. Since he has transcended the limited human nature and is revered and worshipped even by celestial beings, he is the supreme Atman. Thus he is the embodiment of mystical virtues, and is the spiritual leader of society. He is beyond attachment aversion and infatuation, and consequently, he is absolutely dispassionate. By virtue of his intuitively apprehending the nature of reality, all his doubts have been resolved. By reason of his self-realization, he has transcended the dualities of friends and enemies, pleasure and pain, praise and censure, life and death, sand and gold.

The Arahanta is the omniscient being. He, therefore, neither accepts nor abandons, nor transforms the external objectivity, but only witnesses and apprehends the world of objects without entering into them. Just as the eyes see the objects of sight. The knowledge, which is independent, perfect, immaculate, intuitive and extended to infinite things of the universe may be identified with bliss on account of the absence of discomposure arising from the knowledge which is dependent, imperfect, maculate, mediate and extended to limited things. In other words, the consciousness of the Arahanta is not only omnipotent and intuitive but also blissful. Bliss is naturally consequent upon the destruction of the undesirable and accomplishment of the desirable. Thus the Arahanta experiences unprecedented bliss which originates from the innermost beings of self and which is supersensuous, unique, infinite and interminable. We may conclude by saying that the cognitive, conative and affective

tendencies of the Arahanta reveal their original manifestation in his supreme mystical experience, which is ineffable and transcends all the similies of the world.

REFERENCE

1. Embodied spiritually perfect souls.
2. Disembodied spiritually perfect souls.



SCIENCE AND JAINA VIEW OF VALUES

We are living in an age of science. The scientific progress has affected practically all walks of life. The methodology of science has revolutionized our approach to the empirical world. Natural and social sciences along with psychological studies have added new dimensions to understanding of nature and man. The tangles of nature and the depths of human personality are getting unraveled with the passage of time. The techniques developed by applied sciences are amazingly changing the face of the world. The sources of communication, the means of transportation, the researches in the medical and agricultural science, the use of the electrical and mechanical appliances and so on have, no doubt, enriched our living facilities. Thus the natural and human sciences have influenced mankind in their own ways.

There is no denying the fact that science and human life are intertwined. Men all over the world are enjoying the gifts of science. But however important the achievements of science may be, man does not seem to be peaceful. Human relationship is disturbed. Destructive tendencies in man are prominent. Individual dissensions and political strifes are becoming common. Political boundaries have divided mankind into antagonistic groups. Man's love of power is abnormally increasing. Destructive weapons are piling up. The atmosphere rampant at the national and the international level has endangered the life of man.

All this shows that, inspite of scientific achievements, man has lost sight of the ultimate values of life. The question : Can science not teach us the values of life? The answer is: It can not teach us this aspect of life. The value aspect of life is left beyond the reach of scientific method, since it concentrates on the observation of facts and arrives at some general laws on their basis. Thus science is a value free pursuit. By the very nature of scientific enquiry the realm of values is excluded from its scope. Value judgments differ in nature from factual judgments. In point of fact, scientific method is incapable of proclaiming what is good or bad, right or wrong, just or unjust and so on. For making these values of life intelligible moral philosophy is to be pursued. Beyond good and bad lie spiritual values of religion which is inclusive of both the moral and spiritual values of life. This shows that religion is not to be confounded with morality. For the proper development of man, the use of scientific achievements should be made in consonance with the moral and spiritual values. It shows us the direction in which man has to move for making sustained progress with the help of science.

It is significant to note that the rise of Jainism as a religion is a marked phenomenon in the spiritual history of mankind. It is one of the oldest living religions of the world. It represents the continuation of indigenous Śramanic culture which is as old as the Vedas themselves. According to Jaina tradition, Jainism owes its rise to Rṣabha, the first of the twenty-four Tīrthaṅkaras. The last two Tīrthaṅkaras, namely Pārśva (9th Century B.C.) and Mahāvīra (6th Century B.C.) are historical figures. In this way Jainism has its source in the spiritual Utterances of the great personalities. These extraordinary individuals proclaim a religion which has a

universal appeal. "In individualizing it here meant construing religion as something inward and personally realized; and as men have the same spiritual nature, they can partake of the same religious experience."

It is not idle to point out that Jainism as a religion embraces both the moral and spiritual values of life. An unbiased eye can look into its spiritual fervor and moral earnestness. These two elements are so greatly twined together in it that one is apt to confuse religion with morality and vice-versa. The fact is that one can not be reduced to the other. In practice though the two are closely associated, yet, they are quite distinguishable. Jainism subscribes to the view that 'religion if taken seriously and rationally will be deeply moral; but it is not morality'. The two are not identical. Thus it will not be contradictory to aver that a religious man will be necessarily moral but a moral man may not be necessarily religious. In other words, religion is co-extensive with morality. A man may be moral without being religious. All this shows that the realms of religion and morality are theoretically distinguishable. The Jain saints and sages have always exhorted us to look beyond the mere moral nature of man to transcendental horizons of life. This is not to decry social morality, but to save religion from being identified with it, and to keep the domain of religion as quite distinct from that of morality.

Ahimsā is a moral and spiritual value from the Jaina point of view. In fact, Ahimsā is primarily social value. Socio-individual behaviour if it is to be moral ought to be based on Ahimsā. But spiritual-moral traditions speak of Ahimsā in two ways (i) Moral way and (ii) Spiritual way. For speaking of Ahimsā in a moral way, social-individual behaviour is the focus of attention. But for speaking of

Ahimsā in a spiritual way individual self is the focus of attention. In the latter case Ahimsā becomes synonymous with spiritual unfoldment. The appearance of attachment and aversion on the surface of self is Himsā (Violence), but the disappearance of these passions with the growth of self-awareness is Ahimsā. In Jaina methodology, these two approaches to Ahimsā go together without any inconsistency. In both the Socio-moral and spiritual fields, Ahimsā is the supreme value, the highest thing to be achieved in life, socio-morally and spiritually. It is not one of the values, but the essence of all the values conceivable. All the values are lifeless and insignificant without the element of Ahimsā in them. Thus the Praśnavyākaraṇa Sūtra uses moral and spiritual denominations for Ahimsā in order to show its comprehensive and all inclusive character. The denominations like Nirvana (liberation), Samādhi (meditational submergence), Vimukti (freedom from bondage), Śakti (energy), Viśuddhi (self-purity), Sthiti (State of permanence), Pavitratā (purified state of existence), Apramāda (spiritual awakening) etc, exhibit the spiritual nature of Ahimsā and those like Dayā (Kindness), Rati (Love and friendship), Samiti (carefulness in activities), Saṁyama (self control), Vrata (elimination of vices), Śīla (observance of virtues), Rakṣā (security of all living beings), Āśvāsa (consolation), Viśvāsa (trustworthiness), Bodhi (value awareness) etc. express the socio-moral disposition of Ahimsā. The pronouncement of the Svayambhustotra that Ahimsā of all beings is equivalent to the realization of Paramabrahma (supreme consciousness) sheds light on the spiritual moral character of Ahimsā. Thus Ahimsā is the fountain-head of all the values. Negate Ahimsā, all the value are negated. Posit Ahimsā, All the values are posited.



GANDHI'S CONTRIBUTION TO PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION

Gandhi's contribution to philosophy cannot be given simply by enumerating certain contributions which Gandhi might have made to philosophy. It should be borne in mind that the word philosophy is ambiguous and vague. What does it connote can hardly be easily determined? The history of philosophy both eastern and western illustrates the divergence of meaning attributed to the word 'philosophy'. So what contributions Gandhi has made to philosophy can be determined only when we are clear in our mind as regards the meaning which we attach to the word 'philosophy'. This means that there may be some who regard him as a great philosopher, while there may be others who are hesitant to call him so. This difference of conclusion is due to the difference of meaning ascribed to the word 'philosophy'. So before I venture to say anything regarding Gandhi's contribution to philosophy, I propose to analyze the meaning of this word, which may be regarded as digression, but after we reach the end, this digression will look important and relevant. So let me now analyze, though in a summary way, the meaning of the word 'philosophy'.

At the outset it should be said that there is no general agreement among philosophers as to what philosophy is. What philosophy is, is itself an important philosophical question. "Philosophy" it has been said, "is its own first problem."

(1) Traditionally speaking, we may say that philosophy is concerned with the origin of universe, sources of knowledge, the place of man in it and the realization of the highest of which man is capable. Upaniśads, Jainism and Buddhism and other systems of Indian Philosophy aptly exemplify this meaning of philosophy. That is why they proclaim that philosophy is Darśana - In the west, the Platonic-Aristotelian tradition summarizes the goal of philosophy thus includes the achievements of scientists, moralists and mystics. It covers a very large scope, so much so that the questions of mathematics, astronomy, physics, chemistry, biology and of the social sciences are comprised under it. This attitude governed philosophy for about two thousand years. But with the development of pure mathematics on the one hand and the progress of natural and social sciences (by the discovery of scientific method) on the other, philosophy got separated from these disciplines. Now what is left to philosophy is the problem pertaining to ethics, religion and knowledge. But the question is : by what method these problems are to be solved.

(2) The deductive method followed by sciences, is unfruitful for philosophy. Philosophers for a very long time followed or, I must say, imitated the deductive method of mathematics in solving problem of God, self etc., without looking to its relevance.

(3) Because of the failure of these methods for solving the philosophical problems, gradually philosophy came to be interpreted as an activity of clarifying ideas by an analysis of meaning. The result is that the problems of ethics, religion and metaphysics have been declared non-sensical without any cognitive meaning. This led philosophy to occupy itself with the analysis of language and propositions, since

“ordinary language is inadequate for philosophical purposes by reason of its vagueness, inexplicitness, ambiguity, contextdependence and misleadingness.”

(4) Conceptual analysis as the job of philosophy goes with the analysis of language. What this method of conceptual analysis is “fitted to produce clarity, and explicitness with respect to the basic concepts in terms of which we think about the world and human life”.

(5) Alongside this meaning and function of philosophy, there is another meaning which is ascribed to philosophy. According to this, philosophy is concerned with fundamental human situations: love, birth, suffering, struggle, death, subjectivity, authentic and inauthentic human existence, and so on.

Now the question is : In what sense of the term Gandhi is a philosopher? Gandhi is certainly not a philosopher in the second and third connotation of the term. What I mean to say is that neither Gandhi set before himself the task of constructing great systems of philosophy by using the deductive method just as Descartes, Spinoza, Hegel etc. did, nor did he declare that the ethical statements, metaphysical expressions and religious propositions are meaningless and do not have any cognitive content. That Gandhi is not an academic philosopher is surely true in these senses of the term. He may be called a philosopher partially in the first and fourth senses and completely in the fifth sense of the term. The fourth sense of the term appears in Gandhi when he asks such questions – What is Ahimsā? What is truth? What is God? The questions are just like the questions asked by Socrates. What is justice?, What is virtue?, etc. If Socrates can be given the title of a philosopher, Gandhi deserves it all the more.

The first sense of the term, also brings to Gandhi the honour of a philosopher. I need not discuss how. But here he mostly followed the schools of Indian philosophy like the Upaniṣad, Jainism, Buddhism, Yoga, etc.

In the fifth sense of the term Gandhi is a fullfledged philosopher. His doctrine of end and means, non-violence, love; subjectivity, Satyāgraha, self-analysis etc illustrate his concern with fundamental human situations. In addition to other things he was moved by the suffering of the masses and wanted to remove the suffering of humanity in general and India in particular.

If Gandhi is a philosopher in some senses of the term, the question is what is his contribution to philosophy? The most significant contribution of Gandhi to philosophy is his transition from “God is Truth” to “Truth is God.” He writes, “Denial of God we have known, denial of truth, we have not known.” When Gandhi says that God is Truth, he is simply emphasizing the Upaniṣadic expression that Brahman is Truth, knowledge and Infiniteness. God is in us, thus we are partakers of the highest reality. This is just like saying that the kingdom of God is within us. This is not something original in Gandhi. The originality lies in saying that “Truth is God.”

Though the conversion of the proposition God is Truth to Truth is God may seem trivial from the logical point of view, yet it is very important for Gandhi who says, “And I came to the conclusion after a continuous and relentless search after truth which began fifty years ago.” Reason can reject everything but not truth. Truth has the greatest appeal to all human beings. The hope of humanity lies in organization based on appeal to reason, rather than to blind religious notions about God which have wrought havoc in

the world. So he changed his emphasis from God to Truth “which seemed to suggest I do not care for God, if he is anything but truth, anything but the undeniable reality revealed in man and outside.” This truth must be existent. “It is the regulative principle of our thinking.” Gandhi is saying nothing new when he tells us that he has “no argument to convince through reason about the existence of God. Faith transcends reason. That which is beyond reason is surely not unreasonable. Unreasonable belief is blind faith and is open to superstition.” He again says, “There is an indefinable mysterious power that pervades everything. I feel it though I do not see it. It is thus unseen power which makes itself felt and yet defies all proofs, because it is so unlike all that I perceive through my senses. It transcends the senses”.

Lively and vigorous emphasis on the spiritual truths of ancient Indian tradition seems to me to be the next significant contribution of Gandhi to philosophy. In a way he infused new life into the old ideas of universal importance. By this he reconciled the tradition of nonviolence upheld by Jainism and Vaishnavism with the tradition of Truth propounded by the Upanisads and the Vedas.

Thus what Gandhi contributed to philosophy may seem to us to be very meager. This is so because we are in the habit of looking to philosophy in the sense of system building. But as I have said, Gandhi is a partial philosopher in the traditional sense of the term and a full fledged philosopher in one of the contemporary senses of the word. In brief, **he is the philosopher of fundamental human situations.**

What are the contributions of Gandhi to Religion? In fact, the word religion, like the word ‘philosophy’ does not connote something clear. But I shall not dwell upon its

various meanings inasmuch as it has at least one meaning which is generally accepted by all i.e. religion is something spiritual. It is to accept a spiritual way of life. Gandhi's religion follows from his philosophy, God is Truth or Truth is God. For him God is a living reality. His whole way of life is nothing but a sincere, whole-hearted, devoted practice of religion. Gandhi says, 'the essence of religion is morality. 'True religion and true morality are inseparately bound up with each other'. So the question of Gandhi's contribution to religion will bring along with it the question of his attitude towards religions, religious scriptures and prayer.

Let us begin with the last, like morality "Prayer is the very soul and essence of religion", Heiler writes, "Prayer is the center of religion, without prayer faith remains a theoretical conviction, worship is only an external and formal art; moral action is without spiritual depth; man remains at a distance from God, an abyss yawns between the finite and infinite." Gandhi's view is in consonance with Heiler's view. According to him the language of the heart is to be spoken in prayer. "The prayers of those whose tongues are nectared but whose hearts are full of poison are never heard." Thus Gandhian prayer is integrating in the sense that it operates in the direction of firmer moral life. But the question is how to speak the language of the heart? It is only the true Bhakta who can do so and such Bhakta is rarely found. So Gandhi has remarkably suggested that one should adopt the religion of service as the means in the direction. "God himself seeks for his seat the heart of him who serves his fellow man. A prayerful heart is the vehicle and service makes the heart prayerful". He further says, "Those Hindus who in this age serve the untouchables from a full heart truly pray." This means that Gandhian prayer is socially effective. This

association of prayer with social upliftment is in a sense Gandhian. I may point out here that according to Gandhi prayer is not only a call to self-purification but also a 'call to social service'. I must reduce myself to Zero. He always dedicated the results of his efforts to God. He thus tried to escape the maddening vanity of success and the depressing effect of failure. All this leads us to think that Gandhian attitude to prayer is predominantly subjective as distinguished from the objective. His main focus is on the individual who prays rather than on the object of his prayer. His prayer is not the glorification of God without any dynamic effect on the individual but it is prominently a cleansing and purification of the soul for exalted individual and social living. In the words of Gandhi, "The man of prayer will be at peace with himself and with the whole world, the man who goes about the affairs of the world without a prayerful heart will be miserable and will also make the world miserable".

The question of religion brings with it the question of Gandhi's attitude towards different religions and religious scriptures of the world. Though he has always said that religion does not mean formal religion or customary religion, but religion which underlies all religions, yet he could not avoid the question of different religions. Is Gandhi's religion antagonistic to religions? Gandhi replies, 'this religion transcends Hinduism, Islam, Christianity, etc. It does not supersede them. It harmonizes them and gives them reality'. Religions are different roads conversing to the same point. Gandhi has always preached mutual tolerance among religions. "Tolerance gives us spiritual insight which is as far from fanaticism as the north pole from the south". According to Gandhi tolerance should not be understood to

mean the inferiority of other faiths to one's own. Tolerance means reverence for other faiths. But the reverence should not blind us to their faults. Gandhi says, "we must be keenly alive to the defects of our own faith also, yet not leave it on that account, but try to overcome those defects. Let us look to all religions with an equal eye". Thus according to Gandhi all religions are true and all religions have some defects in them. The same thing applies to all religious scriptures. Now the question is: by what test good and bad elements in religions are to be found. Gandhi lays down the test of truth and Ahimsā for finding the elements to be rejected and accepted in every religion and religious scriptures. It should not be forgotten that Gandhi has always decried the practice of conversion. In his view conversion brings no good. It is merely a change of name whereas we need a change of heart.

When we turn to morality we come to the heart of religion. Morality is the back-bone of individual as well as social progress. If religion in the sense of spiritual realization along with social advancement and freedom is the end, morality is to be regarded as its means. In other words, Sarvodaya requires adherence to moral principles and moral ways of life. This exposition brings us to the problem of end and means. Gandhi makes the goodness of end dependent on the goodness of means. Impure means cannot result in good end. "As the means so the end", "The means may be likened to a seed; the end to a tree, and there is just the same inviolable connection between the means and the end as there is between the seed and the tree". The theory that the end justifies the means is dangerous in the view of Gandhi, since it warrants the use of violence, fraud, opportunism and the like, which lead us to moral degeneration. History and contemporary experience bear testimony to the fact that

“violence engenders violence, revenge leads to counter-revenge and a war sows the seeds of further wars.” The Indian Law of Karma and the Gita’s view of Niskāma Karma strengthen Gandhi’s position that he has taken regarding means. In other words, immoral actions will entail ignoble consequences and too much attachment to ends, will detract the attention of the doer from the means, which may lead us to the use of defiled means. So Gandhi believes, “if one takes care of the means, the end will take care of itself.”

Now the question is : by what criterion the moral nature of means is to be decided. Gandhi unequivocally pronounces that non-violence is the test of shifting the moral from the immoral and it is to be regarded as the guiding factor in all affairs of life. Thus Ahimsā is the supreme virtue. In a way Ahimsā is truth itself. In fact, truth and Ahimsā are so intertwined that it is difficult to separate one from the other. Like truth it is not a matter so much of argument as of faith and experience.

The practice of Ahimsā develops in man other virtues of Aparigraha, Asteya, compassion, friendship, etc. But what is Ahimsā? Gandhi says, “Ahimsā means avoiding injury to anything on earth in thought, word or deed”. But such absolute Ahimsā is possible only in the plenitude of mystical experience. In fact, “man is subject to Himsā by the very condition of his existence, yet instead of aggravating the natural weight of Himsā by falling foul upon one another, we should endeavour to alleviate this general curse to the extent to which we are capable of doing”. The major defect of Himsā is that it invades both the sin and the sinner, whereas Ahimsā distinguishes between man and his deeds. Ahimsā hates the sin but not the sinner. Besides, it lays stress on self-reform before taking any step to reform others. In short,

Gandhi has dwelt upon Ahimsā at such a length that it requires a separate paper to present it in its various aspects. What Gandhi contributed to the doctrine of means is not the doctrine of Ahimsā as such, but its universal application to every aspect of life, social, political and economic, and so on.

Thus Gandhi is a philosopher of fundamental human situations and a mystic of activist type.

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COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE EXPRESSIONS OF THE ETHICAL IDEAL ACCORDING TO THE UPANIṢADS, THE GĪTĀ AND JAINISM

IN INDIAN soil we find the growth of different solutions for ontological, ethical and religious problems. The Vedic, the Jaina and the Buddhist speculations illustrate the enormous divergence of thought current in the domain of India Philosophy. Notwithstanding the differences in metaphysical conclusions arrived at by the various trends of thought, their exponents, confronted with the same sort of transitoriness of the things of the world, have resorted to similar methods and contrivances in order to go beyond the manifest superficialities of objects. It is astonishing that they concur remarkably with one another on the psychological, ethical and religious planes of existence. It is proposed to deal in this paper with the various expressions of the ethical ideal made use of in the Upaniṣads and the *Gītā* with a view to comparing them with those used in Jainism. It is of capital importance to note that the diverse formulations of the ethical ideals signify simply the diversity of expression and not the difference in the essential meaning conveyed by them.

First, of the two diverse paths that are open to man, the wise one distinguishes them properly and chooses the path of good in preference to the path of pleasure, by virtue of which the true aim of life is realized. On the contrary, the fool hankering after the path of pleasure is defeated in attaining to real beneficence.¹ The mundane path which many

men follow must be distinguished from the supermundane one which relieves man from the transitoriness of worldly objects and from sorrows and sufferings. In Jaina terminology the path of right belief, right knowledge and right conduct is traversed by the prudent souls, while that of wrong belief, wrong knowledge and wrong conduct is traversed by the ignorant. The former emancipates man from terrestrial curses in contradistinction to the latter which entangles him in the mire of distressing and insatiable sensual desires. According to the Chāndogya Upaniṣad² the ascetics in the forest adorned with knowledge and faith treat the path of the gods (devayāna) which consequently leads to the attainment of the Brahman or deliverance in contrast to the householders who are busy performing sacrifices and go by the path of the fathers (pitṛyāna) to be born again in this world. In a similar way the Gītā³ also recognizes two paths, namely the bright and the dark; the former is conducive to emancipation and the latter, leads to rebirth. The bright gati amounts to the termination of transmigration, while the dark gati, to the wanderings into the wheel of birth and death.

Jainism⁴ speaks of Siddha-gati and the four gaṭi-s, celestial-human, sub-human and hellish. The former is permanent and immutable, and it implies the complete cessation of transmigratory existence. The latter indicate the rounds of birth and death in the empirical world.

Secondly, the realization of Para Gati,⁵ the deliverance of one from the mouth of death,⁶ is tantamount to experiencing the Brahman or Ātman which is the dearest of all,⁷ the target to be aimed at,⁸ the only desirable,⁹ singularly discernible, preferentially knowable,¹⁰ and the resting abode of all that is conceivable and perceivable.¹¹ As viewed by the Gītā, the attainment of anāmāyam padam¹² (status beyond

misery), Brāhmi sthiti¹³ (divine state), Brahmanirvāna¹⁴ (beatitude of God), Parā Gati¹⁵ (highest goal), Parā Śānti¹⁶ (supreme tranquility), Parā Siddhi¹⁷ (highest perfection) and the like have been conceived to be the transcendental aim. According to the Kāthopaniṣad, the Brahman or the Parama-Puruṣa is the highest goal of the aspirant's journey, which, after being known by the mortal man, releases immortality, transcends the senses, the objects of the senses, the mind, the intellect, the great self and the unmanifest.¹⁸ The same may be expressed by saying that the senses need be merged into mind, mind into the Jñāna-Ātman, Jñāna-Ātman into Mahat-Ātman and lastly, Mahat-Ātman into Śanta-Ātman.¹⁹ Thus Śanta-Ātman which is equivalent to Parama-Puruṣa or Brahman or Ātman is the object of all our endeavours. The Śanta-Ātman or Brahman is bereft of sound, touch, colour, taste and smell, is eternal, indestructible, infinite, stable and higher than Mahat.²⁰

According to Jainism also, Paramātman or Brahman is the highest object to be pursued. The aspirant should enquire into, long for and strive after the eternal light of knowledge which is subversive of ignorance.²¹ The nature of *Paramātman* according to the Jainas and the Upaniṣadic thinkers is similar to a great extent. Paramātman is eternal, without any flaw is devoid of colour, smell, sound, taste and touch, and is without birth, death etc.²² The Bhāvapāhuḍa tells us that the supreme self is devoid of taste, colour, smell, touch and sound, it is characterized by consciousness, not assignable by any mark and lastly indefinable as regards form.²³ Notwithstanding a very close similarity in the characteristic nature of Paramātman, the difference is also striking and cannot be ignored. The difference is that on account of the metaphysical perspective adopted by the

Jainas, Brahman cannot be the cosmic principle. In view of the metaphysical pluralism of souls advocated by Jainism each soul is potentially Brahman or Paramātmān.

Thirdly, the attainment of bliss is the objective to be aimed at, Brahman is the delight of life and mind, the fullness of peace and eternity.²⁴ The Taittirīyopaniṣad compares Brahmanic bliss with other types of physical blisses and after enumerating a number of blisses enjoyed by men, gods etc. concludes that hundred blisses of Prajāpati constitute the bliss of Brahman. Such an Ānanda is experienced by the sage who is free from all desires.²⁵ It may be pointed out here that the spiritual bliss is a type of its own and no physical bliss can stand in comparison with it.

Kundakunda recognizes that the highest happiness is beyond any comparison.²⁶ Yogīndu affirms that the attainment of the highest bliss which is experienced in realizing Paramātmān is course of meditation is impossible to be had in mundane life. Even Indra in company of crores of nymphs is incapable of having such an infinite bliss of the sage in contemplation.²⁷

In order to emphasize the blissful aspect of life, the Taittirīyopaniṣad²⁸ proclaims it in terms of the five sheaths of the soul, the last being the Ānandamaya-Ātman which includes the other four and transcends them. The first sheath or Ātman is constituted of food essence, the second of vital air, the third of mind, the fourth of intelligence and the fifth of bliss. Each subsequent sheath includes the preceding ones and the last embraces all the four. In the third chapter of the Taittirīyopaniṣad Varuṇa is said to have been not satisfied with the different answers as food, vital air, mind and intellect, given in succession by Bhṛgu on the questions of the nature of ultimate reality. He is convinced only when

eventually the result of his enquiry is presented in terms of ‘beatific consciousness’²⁹ constituting the source of all things whatsoever. “We have different kinds of pleasures answering to the different levels of our existence, the vital pleasure, the sensuous, the mental and the intellectual, but the highest is Ānanda”³⁰

With certain reservations we may regard Bahirātman of Jainism as comprising Ānnaśarīraka, Prāṇaśarīraka, Manomaya Ātman-s; Antarātman may be regarded as Vijñānaśarīraka Ātman, and Paramātman as Ānandaśarīraka Ātman or the beatific consciousness, though not cosmic consciousness.

According to the Gītā³¹ also the attainment of bliss is the supreme end, the absolute value. The Yogin whose mind is thoroughly quiet, who is passionless, stainless, constantly putting himself into the Ātman, experiences easily and happily the highest bliss of contact with the Brahman.

Pūjyapāda³² and all others speak of the Ātman as full of excellent bliss. In the Iṣṭopadeśa he tells us that a supreme kind of happiness is experienced by the Yogi who is established in his own self. ³³ The Yogasāra of Yogīndu recognizes that those engrossed in great meditation after renouncing all conceptual thinking enjoy ineffable bliss which is equivalent to the happiness of liberation.³⁴

The author of the Chāndogya-upaniṣad also lays stress on the pursuance of immortal happiness which consists in seeing, hearing and meditating upon the Ātman to the utter exclusion of the radically different kinds of perishable happiness experienced in seeking things other than the Ātman. ³⁵ The experience of great happiness is consequent upon the realization of the Ātman as above and below before

and behind, to the right and to the left.³⁶ The author of the Tattvānuśāsana proclaims that on account of looking into the self by the self and on account of supreme concentration, nothing else is seen by the Yogī inspite of the existence of external objects.³⁷ According to Pūjyapāda, the Yogī engrossed in meditation transcends all bodily consciousness.³⁸

Thus the Gītā and the Upaniṣadic and the Jaina saints exhibit remarkable concurrence regarding infinite happiness as the only object of pursuit, only the Jaina does not acquiesce in making all other objects of the world dependent on or indetical with the Ātman.

Fourthly, the Muṇḍakopaniṣad³⁹ distinguished between the Parā and Āparā Vidyās and seems to decide in favour of the former as constituting the ethical summum bonum, on the realization of which all else become known. The Parā Vidyā, which is the same as the higher knowledge, consists in knowing the Brahman which is invisible, unseizable, without connections, without hue, without eye or ear, without hands or feet, enternal, pervading, impalpable, imperishable and the womb of creatures.⁴⁰ This amounts not to the intellectual, but to the intuitional apprehension of Brahman. The Aparā Vidya which may be equated with the lower knowledge comprises within its fold the R̥gveda, the Yajurveda, the Sāmaveda and the Atharvaveda, also chanting ritual, grammar, etymological interpretation, prosody and astronomy.⁴¹ The above recognition of Parā Vidyā as the highest good may be corroborated by the conversation between Nārada and Sanatkumāra as given in the Chāndogyopaniṣad.⁴² Inspite of his vast study comprehending the Vedas, history, mythology, mathematics, logic, ethics, fine arts etc., Nārada complains to his spiritual

teacher Sanatkumāra that he is invaded by grief on account of not having the knowledge of the self. Thus we learn that the intuitive knowledge of the self alone is capable of enabling us to cross the ocean of sorrow and no amount of mere intellectual equipment. Hence the Parā Vidyā is the crowning experience, the sublime good. It may be pointed out here that intellectual knowledge should not be utterly depreciated on this account nor should it be overemphasized at the expense of intuition. When the highest is reached the intellectual is displaced by the intuitional.

We find striking concordance when Kundakunda announces that the Śuddha-naya is true and Vyavahāra-naya is false.⁴³ Paramārtha-naya and Nīścaya-naya are indistinguishable from Śuddha-naya. Śuddha-naya is identical with the intuitional experience of the Ātman. Vyavahāra-naya creates differentiations in the unitary nature of the Ātman by explaining it through its distinguishing characteristics. Those who have ascended the loftiest height of mystical experience deserve the knowledge of Śuddha-naya, but those of the aspirants who fall short of this sublime ascension should take shelter under Vyavahāra-naya without losing sight of the ideal.⁴⁴ Thus the Āparā Vidyā or the Vyavahāra-naya is true to the extent to which it leads a man intellectually on the path, but it is not all. “just as every householder submits himself to Sannyāsa or renunciation and realizes his spiritual aim, so ultimately Vyavahāra is discarded in favour of Nīścaya.”⁴⁵

There is yet another meaning ascribed to Nīścaya and Vyavahāra. The former indicates that the self is unbound and untouched by karmas while the latter indicates that it is bound and touched by karmas.⁴⁶ The spiritual experience however transcends the intellectual points of view.^{46a}

In a similar vein, Amrtacandra argues that the proper results of instruction to a disciple can issue only if he, after assimilating the nature of Nīścaya-naya and Vyavahāra-naya, adopts the attitude of indifference towards both of these, i.e., only if he transcends these intellectual points of view.⁴⁷ Thus according to this interpretation the Aparā Vidyā corresponds to these points of view, and the Parā Vidyā, to spiritual experience. In other words, Nīścaya-naya may be understood to mean mystical experience as well as the knowledge of the pure self, or both the intuitional and intellectual ideals, and Vyavahāra-naya may be understood to mean a lapse from the superb heights as well as the knowledge of the impure self. Considered from the viewpoint of spiritual experience or the knowledge of the pure self, Vyavahāra-naya includes any lapse from superb heights and the knowledge of the impure self. In the present context of Parā-Vidyā and Āparā Vidyā, Śuddha-naya in the sense of intuitional experience represents the former, and Vyavahāra-naya in point of intellectual knowledge of any sort expresses the latter. Hence the Parā Vidyā or Śuddha-naya may legitimately be said to denote the moral ideal in contrast to the Āparā Vidyā or Vyavahāra-naya.

Fifthly, the consummation of human pursuits has been conceived to be the attainment of a state of life beyond good and bad, virtue and vice. The Muṇḍakopaniṣad represents that he who has realized the Brahman, the lord and governor of all, has shaken off merit and demerit and has attained perfect equanimity.⁴⁸ In a similar vein, the Kāthopaniṣad points out that Paramātmā is beyond duty and non-duty, action and non-action, past and future.⁴⁹ According to the Gītā, the attainment of supreme status exceeds the fruits of meritorious deeds resulting from the study of Vedas, the

performance of sacrifices, pursuance of austerities and charitable gifts.⁵⁰ Again, the realization of Brahman will liberate one from results, both good and evil, which constitute the bonds of action.⁵¹

This spirit of transcendence is expressed also in the Gītā in another form. When the embodied soul rises above the three guṇa-s, Sattva, Rajas and Tamas, which cause the bodily existence, he is freed from the subjection to birth and death, old age and suffering, and thus attains the life eternal.⁵² Thus, to go beyond the spell of the three guṇa-s is the ideal. In other words, one is required to be possessed of the self to be free from the dualities, to be fixed in the true being, to be away from the triple modes, and gettings, and havings,⁵³ inasmuch as the bondage to these guṇas leads one to the rounds of birth. To be more clear, when Sattva predominates, the embodied is born in the spotless worlds of the knowers of the highest principles, when Rajas prevails he appears amidst those who are attached to action, and lastly, when Tamas invades him, he takes births in the wombs of beings involved in nescience.⁵⁴ The same may be expressed by saying that those in Sattva rise upwards, in Rajas stay in the middle and in Tamas sink downwards.⁵⁵ Thus the culmination of human achievement consists in transcending the ethical level and rising to the spiritual. The considerations of the Gītā, the Upaniṣads and the Jaina conform with one another regarding the transcendental plane of life besides and beyond righteousness and unrighteousness.

According to Kundakunda the worldly persons generally recognize inauspicious conduct as bad and the auspicious one is taken by them as good. But how can the latter be understood as good, since it too makes the entrance of the self into the cycle of birth and death?⁵⁶ Just as a shackle,

whether of gold or of iron, binds a man, indiscriminately so both auspicious and inauspicious conduct bind the Self to mundane miseries.⁵⁷ The wise shun both śubha and aśubha.⁵⁸ Rare are such persons who are disposed to discard even Puṇya and Pāpa.⁵⁹ Pūjyapāda tells us that vowlessness causes vice and the observance of vows engenders virtues; but deliverance is destruction of both.⁶⁰ The aspirant should adhere to vows after renouncing vowlessness and after attaining to the supreme status the former should also be abjured like the latter.⁶¹ The highest state of the Paramātmā transcends both good and evil; and such persons who have realized Him within themselves go beyond the vicious circle of saṁsāra or the reach of good and bad.

Sixthly, the ethical ideal may be expressed in terms of action. The Īsopaniṣad tells us that “a man should try to spend his life-span of a hundred years only in the constant performance of actions. It is only thus that he can hope not to be contaminated by actions.”⁶² Prof. Ranade remarks: “The actions that are here implied have no further range than possibly the small circumference of ‘Sacrifice’, and further, the way is which, even in the midst of a life of action, freedom from contagion with the fruit of action may be seured is not here brought out with sufficient clearness.”⁶³

According to the Bhagavad-Gītā, Karma-yoga or the life of activism constitutes the supreme end to be aimed at. It is no doubt true that we can find passage in the Gītā where Jñāna is superior to Karma,⁶⁴ where Karma is superior to Jñāna,⁶⁵ and where they are at par.⁶⁶ But “the law of the body,⁶⁷ the law of society⁶⁸ and the law of the Universe⁶⁹ indicate and even vindicate activism.”⁷⁰ The Gītā tells us that the actions should be performed after brushing aside all attachment to and the desire for the fruit.⁷¹ Besides, their

performance is to be effected by dint of wisdom⁷² and equanimity.⁷³ We may affirm here that the performance of action in the afore-mentioned spirit is rendered possible only when the ideal of Karma-yoga which is the same as Ātmainc steadfastness is accomplished. “The Niṣkāma-karma is the natural accompaniment or result of a spiritually illumined life; it simply cannot exist if egoism is not completely annihilated.”⁷⁴

In the view of Jainism the Tīrthaṅkara exemplifies the ideal life of activism. He performs all actions dispassionately, and, therefore, spontaneously. But according to Jainism all the Bhavya-souls are not capable of this life of activism; only those souls which have earned Tīrthaṅkara-body-making karma can lead a life of benevolent activities, while others remain engrossed in the life of contemplation which indirectly elevates human beings. Thus the life of activism, according to Jainism, cannot be the universal rule of life, though in the case of some souls it accompanies spiritual experience without being incompatible. But this does not negate puṇya-engendering activities of saints for the benefit of human beings.

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CONCEPTS COMMON TO THE UPANIṢADS, THE BHAGAVAD-GĪTĀ AND JAINISM

INCENTIVES TO SPIRITUAL LIFE:

In the Upaniṣads and the Bhagavad-Gītā we may discern certain incentives which prompt man to strive for immortality. First, the incentive of being struck by the impermanence of worldly opulences may be seen when Naciketas rejects the offer of mundane things and pleasures—cattle and elephants, gold and horses, sons and grandsons with long life, wealth, kingdom and all sorts of pleasures—on being asked by the god of death. He declares that these transitory things wear away the glory of the senses and even a long life is insufficient to make something out of them with the consequence that dissatisfaction prevails.¹ Again he disapproves the desire for a lengthy duration of life of sensual pleasures when he has come into the presence of ageless immortals.² In the Brhadāranyakopaniṣad Maitreyi prefers immortality to the possession of the whole earth full of wealth, since riches are incapable of bestowing eternal life upon her.³ The Maitrī Upaniṣad portrays the mutable nature of the world. According to it, the gnats and mosquitoes, the grass and the trees grow and decay. There is the drying up of great oceans, the falling away of mountain peaks, the deviation of the fixed pole-star, the submergence of the earth, the departure of the gods from their station. In such a world as this, what is the good of enjoyment of desires?⁴

In a similar spirit the Gitā tells us that the sensual pleasures are the sources of sorrow; they have a beginning and an end and do not last for ever; hence the wise man does not take delight in them.⁵

This incentive may be compared with the incentive of transitoriness of things as presented by Jainism. The Uttarādhyayana⁶ instructs us not to be careless even for a moment, since man's life is not permanent. It comes to a close with the passage of time like a dew drop or a leaf of a tree falling to the ground. Besides, the sense pleasures, being impermanent, desert a man just as a bird flies away from a tree void of fruit.⁷ The Bhagavatī Ārādhana tells us that all the objects of Bhoga and Upabhoga vanish like a lump of ice and worldly fame and recognition take no time in disappearing.⁸ Just as water of the flowing river cannot return so also youth cannot reappear after once it has passed away.⁹ the Kārttikeyānuprekṣā points out that the body in spite of its due nourishment is sure to decay like an unbaked earthen pot which crumbles when filled with water.¹⁰ Friends, beauty, wife, children, wealth, and domestic animals are unstable is character like a newly shaped mass of clouds or like a rainbow or a flash of lightning.¹¹ The Ātmānuśāsana says, "What purpose is capable of being served with wealth which, like fuel, inflames the fire of desire"?¹² The fortunes of the rulers of the earth vanish in no time like the extinction of a flame of a lamp.¹³ What gust is there in sense-gratifications which are well-known as bitter like poison, terrible like serpents, incapable of quenching the thirst like salt water, and fraught with impermanence?¹⁴

Secondly, the incentive of suffering and transmigration may be exhibited when we are required to realize the self while the body endures, failing which we will have to wander

for a very long duration in different kinds of existence.¹⁵ The Kenopaniṣad declares that great is the perdition which comes to the lot of a man who falls short of self-knowledge while this body lasts.¹⁶

The Gītā accordingly tells us that the cycle of birth and death entangles a man who is not devoted to sovereign knowledge, king-secret, and supreme-sanctity.¹⁷ Those great souls who have realized the Ātman do not come to this transient and painful birth.¹⁸ Hence, having entered this impermanent, unhappy world, one should endeavour to capture spiritual truth.¹⁹

This incentive may be compared with the incentive of transmigration delineated by Jainism. The Ācārāṅga tells us that “those who acquiesce and indulge in worldly pleasures are born again and again,”²⁰ and again “those who, not freeing themselves from ignorance, talk about final liberation, turn round and round in the whirlpool of birth”²¹ In the Uttarādhyayana, when the parents of Mṛgāputra try to discourage his entrance into ascetic life, by pointing to the difficulties of Śramaṇic life.²² Mṛgāputra says, “In the Saṃsāra which is a mine of dangers and a wilderness of old age and death, I have undergone dreadful births and deaths.”²³ The Paramātmaprakāśa points out that he who has not amassed religious merit and practised austerities will have to descend into hell after being gnawed by the rats of senility.²⁴ Again it is self-deception if the human birth has not been utilized for performing penances after having purified the mind. The self is snared in the millions of birth bearing affliction and is deluded by sons and wives till the supreme knowledge does not dawn upon it.²⁵

Thirdly, the Maitrī Upaniṣad presents an incentive of bodily nature and impurity. It tells us that in this foul

smelling, unsubstantial body, a conglomerate of bone, skin, muscle, marrow, flesh, semen, blood, mucus, tears, rheum faeces, urine, wind, bile and phlegm, what is the good of the enjoyment of desires?²⁶ The Gītā does not speak in terms of bodily impurity.

This incentive may be compared with the incentive of bodily impurity as discussed by Jainism. The Uttarādhyaṇa tells us that the body is impure in nature and it is born of impurity.²⁷ The Tattvārthabhāṣya pronounces that the impure nature of the body may be testified to by several considerations.²⁸ In the first place, the antecedent conditions of its origination, for example, semen and blood, are themselves abominable, so also the consequent conditions, for instance, flesh, fat, blood etc. which are stored from the transformation of food particles. Secondly, it is the storehouse of all sorts of nasty things like bile, phlegm, perspiration, filth of ear, nose and throat. Thirdly, it is constantly discharging excreta through its several openings. Fourthly, its impurity cannot be removed by bath, perfumes, incense and other means. The Svayambhūstotra points out that the body is dependent on self for its actions; it is detestable, foul-smelling, perishable and cause of sorrows, hence to set one's affections for it is of no purpose.²⁹ The Paramātmaprakāśa tells us that this body is replete with foul things, its washing, oiling, decoration and its nourishment with palatable food—all these are of no avail like favour shown to a vile person.³⁰

IMPORTANCE OF FAITH, KNOWLEDGE AND CONDUCT

After dwelling upon certain incentives which actuate a human being to tread on the path of self realization, and to ascent the heights ordinarily inaccessible, we shall now pass

on to the consideration of the way by the pursuance of which the challenge implicit in the incentives may be adequately encountered. In other words, the question we have is: in what sort of life an aspirant should engage himself, so that the obstacles to the moral and the spiritual betterment may be surmounted. To start with, faith is the first necessity for any progress in spiritual life. The Kāṭha Upaniṣad tells us that Brahman or Puruṣa is incapable of being attained by mind, speech and eyes. He cannot be achieved unless one says, "he is".³¹ Again, When he has been grasped with the certainty of His existence, only then the essential nature of God dawns up a man.³² The Praśna Upaniṣad says that the Ātman is to be discovered through faith, knowledge, austerity, and chastity.³³ Hence, not only faith, but knowledge and conduct along with it constitute the pathway to emancipation.

The Gītā recognizes that men who have no faith in the sovereign truth wander in the wheel of birth and death.³⁴ Those who have full faith and are free from cavil are released from the bondage of work, while the ignorant, the faithless and the sceptic go to perdition.³⁵ The offerings of gift, the penance, and any other rite or work when performed without faith is 'Asat' and, is nought here or hereafter.³⁶ Only he who has faith, who is absorbed in wisdom, and who has subdued his senses gains wisdom, and having gained it, attains quickly the supreme peace.³⁷

In Jainism, the attainment of liberation is dependent on the acquisition of right faith, right knowledge, and right conduct.³⁸ We may point out here that in the Upaniṣads and the Gītā the faith in the supreme Ātman, the cosmic principle as identical with the self within, has been advocated; but with Jainism, transcendently speaking, belief in the super-empirical conscious principle imprisoned in the body

constitutes right faith. Yogīndu says that solitarily Ātman is Samyagdarśan.³⁹ Notwithstanding this distinction they believe in something divine to be mystically realized. Transcendental awakening is acceptable to all the three.

After the faith has been imbibed, knowledge and conduct are to be made the objects of one's own pursuit. According to the Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad, the Ātman which is inside the body which is radiant and pure, is capable of being invariably accomplished by right knowledge, truth, austerity, and chastity.⁴⁰ Besides, It may be seen by those who have destroyed all blemishes, and all desires.⁴¹ Mere intellectual knowledge leads nowhere. The Katha Upaniṣad recognizes that the self can be reached neither by eloquent discourse nor by subtle intellect, nor by much learning.⁴² He who has not ceased from doing evil, whose mind is not calm and equipoised cannot hope to attain the self inspite of his being equipped with the intellect of deep penetration.⁴³ The Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad points out that the self cannot be realized by a man without potency, or with inertia or errors in the seeking, or by improper austerity.⁴⁴

In accordance with the Gītā those who have the eye of wisdom see the indwelling soul.⁴⁵ Three types of knowledge have been recognized. The Sāttvika knowledge witnesses one immutable being in all existence. To distinguish it from the Rājas, one which sees multiplicity of beings and from the Tāmas one which clings to one single effect as if it were the whole.⁴⁶ The foremost one is right knowledge according to the Gītā. Sublime height cannot be attained by the undisciplined.⁴⁷ The evil doers, robbed by illusion, partaking of the nature of demons, low in the human scale cannot reach the supreme; while tranquility is realized by those who have renounced all desires, and who are free from attachment,

pried and selfishness.⁴⁸ Desire breeds wrath and envelops wisdom; consequently it is the eternal enemy of the soul.⁴⁹

In contrast to the Gītā and the Upaniṣads, the Mokṣapāhuḍa pronounces that the cognition of the distinction between sentiency and non-sentiency constitutes right knowledge.⁵⁰ This divergence is in tune with the metaphysical assertion of the Jaina. Exclusively neither knowledge nor austerity is fruitful, but the fusion of the two brings about emancipation.⁵¹ To explain it differently, Śīla and knowledge are not opposed to each other; rather, right belief, knowledge, austerity, self-control, truth, non-stealing, chastity, contenment, and compassion towards living being form the family of the former.⁵² The Ātman can only be realized by the Yogī who is detached from the animal pleasures,⁵³ and has abandoned all conceivable flaws.⁵⁴ He with the sword of conduct dismembers the pillars of sins.⁵⁵ It may be pointed out here that Śīla has been preferred to the knowledge of grammar, meter, and Nyāya.⁵⁶ Again without relinquishing the foreign psychical states, the knowledge of the scriptures is of no avail.⁵⁷ The Mūlācāra observes that the scriptural knowledge without detachment is unfruitful and acts like a lamp in the hand of a blind man.⁵⁸ Neither intellectual study, nor the keeping of books and peacock feather, nor dwelling in a religious habitation, nor pulling out the hair can be equated with Dharma.⁵⁹ He who, abandoning attachment and aversion, resides in the Ātman moves towards the eternal Gati.⁶⁰ Again, he who is free from pride, deceit, anger, greed, possession, infatuation, wordly sinful engagements, who has conquered passions, and endured hardships, is established in the path of liberation and attains supreme happiness.⁶¹ Hence the importance of conduct is evident.

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PERFECTED SAGE:

We now propose to represent the similarities and dissimilarities in the conception of perfected mystic or the ideal sage as propounded by Jainism, the Gītā and the Upaniṣads. We are concerned with the characteristics which a mystic has evolved in his person by virtue of his strenuous striving after the spiritual goal.

First, he has banished and brushed aside all the desires from the texture of his self because of his exclusive occupation with the accomplishment of the supreme desire, namely, the realization of the Ātman, thus seeking consummate satisfaction in the self by self.⁶² His undertakings exhibit destitution from desire.⁶³ On account of his self-control renunciation of all Parigraha and desires, and conquest of all the senses, he escapes and eludes the bondage despite his performance of action⁶⁴ for the benefit and guidance of mankind.⁶⁵ In other words, he remains uncontaminated by the fruits of actions like the leaf of lotus which does not get polluted by water.⁶⁶ In short, the perfect Yogī sees action in inaction and inaction in action.⁶⁷

We find concordance on this point when Jainism announces that the consummate mystic has extirpated the inimical passions depriving the self of highest attainments along with the conceptual transformations of the mind and rests satisfied with the Ātmanic experience.⁶⁸ His mental, vocal and physical actions are neither impelled by desire nor born of ignorance.⁶⁹ The activities of standing, sitting, walking and preaching, knowing and seeing are not the results of desire, and consequently they are incapable of entangling the self in bondage. Just as a mother educate her child for his benefit and a kind physician cures diseased orphans so also the perfected mystic instructs humanity for

its upliftment and dispenses spiritual pills to suffering humanity.⁷¹ He is the leader of man-kind.⁷²

(2) Secondly, the crowning experience of the mystic has made possible the termination of all sorrows, since the mystic experiences the self everywhere.⁷³ According to Jainism, he has put an end to all sorrows because he has destroyed all attachment to the objects of the world.

(3) Thirdly, Jainism, the Gītā, and the Upaniṣads concur with one another regarding the fact that by virtue of self-realization or establishment in Brahmanic experience, the perfect mystic has transcended the dualities of friends and foes, pleasure and pain, and censure, life and death, sand and gold, attachment and aversion.⁷⁴

(4) Fourthly, in view of the Kaṭhōpaniṣad and the Muṇḍakōpaniṣad the tangles of the heart of the perfected mystic are unraveled.⁷⁵ In other words, on account of his arriving at the acme of realization, the mystic is freed from all doubts whatsoever. According to Jainism, the mystic has intuitively known all the objects of the world, owing to the outright removal of all the filth of karman,⁷⁶ consequently the invasion by any doubt is out of question.⁷⁷

(5) Fifthly, he who has ascended the mystical heights has necessarily identified himself with evenness and equanimity and kept himself away from the accumulation of the detrimental elements of Puṇya and Pāpa.⁷⁸ The Bodhapāhuḍa opines that the Arhat has transcended Puṇya and Pāpa etc., and equanimity follows from this by implication.⁷⁹

(6) Sixthly, the Kaṭhōpaniṣad and the Gītā recognize that the excellent mystic experiences illimitable bliss.⁸⁰ The Mokṣapāhūḍa pronounces that the Yogī after extinguishing

conceit, deceit, anger and pride, and after attaining pure nature realizes happiness par excellence.⁸¹

(7) Seventhly, the state of the saint who has reached culmination in Yoga, is totally opposed to the persons pursuing ordinary life. What is night for all beings is the time of waking for perfected soul; and what is waking time for all beings is the night for the sage who has attained perfection.⁸² According to Kundakunda, the true Yogī sleeps in Vyavahāra, while he is awake in his own work of self-realization.⁸³ The Ācārāṅga tells us that the unwise sleeps, the sages are always awake.⁸⁴ Samantabhadra speaks that the commonplace persons work hard is the day, being impelled by the desire to live and enjoy and after getting tired, they resort to sleep at night, but the mystic keeps awake day and night in the process of self-purification and self-realization without being overwhelmed by indolence, inertia and looseness.⁸⁵ In spite of all this happy concurrence, the fundamental difference that remains is that the mystic according to Jainism, though has full experience of the Ātman does not experience it everywhere like the mystic of the Upaniṣad and the Gītā.

(8) Eighthly, the saint who has ascended the sublime heights is like an impenetrable rock. Anything dashing itself against it shatters itself. In a similar vein, he who persecutes such a holy personage causes ruin to himself.⁸⁶ Samantabhadra says that desolation and perdition stare one in the face who calumniate such lofty spirits.⁸⁷

(9) Ninthly, the Muṇḍakopaniṣad tells us that a man who wishes to be prosperous should adore the mystic who has realized the self.⁸⁸ Jainism affirms that the pious name of the mystic serves as an aid for the accomplishment of auspicious and desired purposes.⁸⁹

(10) Tenthly, there exists nothing which is required to be achieved by that mystic who takes delight in the self and who is content and satisfied with the self. He does not need any of the things of the world for any interest of his.⁹⁰ In view of Jainism the saint has done what ought to have been done by resorting to pure meditation.⁹¹

ABBREVIATION AND REFERENCES

1. **Ācārā.**—Ācārāṅga-Sūtra (Sacred Books of the East., Vol. XXII. Oxford)
2. **Ātmānu.**—Ātmānuśāsana of Guṇabhadra (Sacred Books of the Jains, Vol. VII. Lucknow).
3. **B. G.**—Bhagavad-Gītā. (Gītā Press, Gorakhpur)
4. **Bhaga. Ā.**—Bhagavatī Ārādhana (Sakharama Nemachandra Digambara Jaina Granthamālā, Solapur)
5. **Bhāva Pā.**—Bhāva Pāhuḍa of Kundakunda (Pāṭanī Digambara Jaina Granthamālā, Maroth, under the title 'Aṣṭa Pāhuḍa.)
6. **Bo. Pā.**—Bodha Pāhuḍa of Kundakunda (Pāṭanī Digambara Jaina Granthamālā, Maroth, under the title 'Aṣṭa Pāhuḍa.)
7. **Br. Up.**—Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, (Gītā Press Gorakhpur)
8. **Chā Up.**—Chāndogya Upaniṣad (Gītā Press Gorakhpur)
9. **Kārtti.**—Kārttikeyānuprekṣā (Rāyacandra Jaina Śāstramālā. Bombay)
10. **Ka. Up.**—Kaṭha Upaniṣad (Gītā Press Gorakhpur)
11. **Mai. Up.**—Maitrī Upaniṣad (under the title 'Principal Upaniṣads'. George Allen Unwin, London)
12. **Mo. Pā.**—Mokṣa Pāhuḍa (Pāṭanī Digambara Jaina Granthamālā, Maroth, Under the title 'Aṣṭa Pāhuḍa.)

13. **Mula.** — Muḷācāra of Vaṭṭakera (Anantakīrti Digambara Jaina Granthamālā, Bombay)
14. **Mu. Up.** — Muṇḍaka Upaniṣada (Gītā Press, Gorakhpur)
15. **Pp.** — Paramātmaprakāśa of Yogīndu (Rāyacandra Jaina Śāstramālā, Bombay)
16. **Pra. Up.** — Praśna Upaniṣada (Gītā Press, Gorakhpur)
17. **Prava.** — Pravacanasāra of Kundakunda (Rāyacandra Jaina Śāstramālā, Bombay)
18. **Si. Up.**—Śīla Pahuḍa of Kundakunda (Pāṭanī Digambara Jaina Granthamālā, Maroth, under the title 'Aṣṭa Pāhuḍa.)
19. **Svayambhū.**—Svayambhūstotra of Samantabhadra (Vīra Sevā Mandira, Delhi)
20. **Śve. Up.**—Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad (Gītā Press Gorakhpur)
21. **Tsū. Bhāṣya**—Tattvārthasūtra Bhāṣya of Umāsvāiti (Rāyacandra Jaina Śāstramālā. Bombay)
22. **T. Sū.**—Tattvārthasūtra (Bhāratiya Jñāna Pīṭha, Kāśī. Under the title 'Sarvārthasiddhī')
23. **Uttarā.**—Uttarādhyayana (Sacred Books of the East, Vol. XLV)
24. **Yogasāra**—Yogasāra of Yogīndu (Rāyacandra Jaina Śāstramālā, Bombay)

REFERENCE

1. Ka. Up. 1.1. 23 to 27.
2. Ibid. I. 1. 28
3. Br. Up. II. 4. 2.
4. Mai. Up. I. 4. (translation vide Radhakrishnan, 'The Principal Upaniṣads'.)

5. B.G. II-14; V-22.
6. Uttarā. X-1, 2.
7. Ibid. XIII-31
8. Bhaga. Ā. 1727.
9. Ibid. 1789.
10. Kārtti. 9.
11. Kārtti. 6, 7.
12. Ātmānu. 61.
13. Ibid. 62.
14. Ātmānu. 38, 51, 87
15. Ka. Up. II. 3, 4.
16. Ke. Up. II. 5 cf. Br. Up. IV-4-14.
17. B. G. IX. 2, 3.
18. Ibid. VIII. 15.
19. Ibid. IX. 33.
20. Ācārā. I. 4. 1. p. 36.
21. Ibid. I. 5. 1. p. 43.
22. Uttarā. XIX. 24-42.
23. Ibid. 46.
24. Pp. Ii. 133. 135.
25. Ibid. II. 123.
26. Mai. Up. 1. 3. (Translation vide Radhakrishnan, 'The Principle Upaniṣads').
27. Uttarā, XIX. 13.
28. Tsū. Bhāṣya. IX-7.
29. Svayambhū. 32.
30. Pp. II. 148. 149.
31. Ka. Up. II. 3. 12.
32. Ibid. II. 3. 13.
33. Pra. Up. I. 10.
34. B. G. IX. 3.

35. Ibid. III. 31; IV. 40.
36. B. G. XVII. 28.
37. Ibid. IV. 39.
38. Tsu. I. 1.
39. Pp. I. 96.
40. Mu. Up. III. 1. 5.
41. Mu. Up. III. 1. 5, Ka. Up. II. 3. 14.
42. Ka. Up. I. 2. 23. cf. Mu. Up. III 2, 3.
43. Ka. Up. 1. 2. 24.
44. Mu. Up. III. 2. 4.
45. B. G. XV. 10.
46. B. G. XVIII. 20 to 22.
47. Ibid. XV. II
48. Ibid. VII 15.; II. 71.
49. Ibid. III. 37, 38, 39.
50. Mo. Pa. 41.
51. Ibid. 59.
52. Śi. Pā. 66.
54. Bhāva. Pā. 85.
55. Ibid. 159.
56. Śi. Pā. 16.
57. Yogasāra. 96.
58. Mūlā, 894.
59. Yogasāra. 47.
60. Ibid. 48.
61. Mo. Pa. 45, 80
62. Kau. II 3.14, Mu. Up III 9, B.G. 55
63. B.G. IV 19
64. Ibid. IV 21, V 7
65. Ibid. III 25

66. Chā. Up. IV 11
67. B.G. IV. 11
68. Svayambhū. 67.
69. Svayambhū. 74.
70. Svayambhū. 73.
71. Svayambhū. 11. 35.
72. Ibid. 35. B.G. II 65; V. 26. I. Up. 7; Mu. Up. III. 1. 2.
74. Prava. III. 41; Svayambhū. 10; Ka. Up. 1. 2. 12; B. G. VI. 7, 8, 9; II 56, 57.
75. Ka. Up. II. 3. 15; Mu. Up. II. 2. 8.
76. Prava. I. 15.
77. Prava. II. 105.
78. B. G. II 50; V. 19; Mu. Up. II. 1. 3.
79. Bo. Pā. 30.
80. Ka. Up. 1. 2. 13; B. G. VI. 28.
81. Mo. Pa. 45.
82. B. G. II. 69.
83. Mo. Pā. 31.
84. Ācārā 1. 3. 1. (P. 28)
85. Svayambhū. 16.
86. Chā. Up. I 2
87. Svayambhū. 69.
88. Mu. Up. II 10
89. Svayambhū. 89. 7
90. B.G. III 17-18, Sve. Up. II 9, 11
91. Svayambhū. 110



STORY OF MY CONTACT WITH DR. A. N. UPADHYE

Till my M. A. in philosophy in 1955, I could not hear about the works of Dr. A. N. Upadhye. The reason might be that I offered the papers of Sankara's *Vedānta* and Ramanuja's *Vedānta* at my M. A. level. Though I offered *Vedānta* at my M. A. level, yet Dr. P. T. Raju, the then head of the Deptt. of Philosophy, University of Rajasthan asked me to work on the topic '*Ethical Doctrines in Jainism*' for my Ph. D. thesis under the supervision of Dr. V. H. Date. I readily agreed to work on this topic. May be, this was due to my reverence for **Pt. Chainsukh Das Nyayatirtha**, Principal, Jaina Sanskrit College, Jaipur and **Master Motilalji Sanghi** founder of Sri Sanmati Pustakalaya, Jaipur. After my registration in 1957 I started my work seriously and then I studied the introductions of *Pravācanasāra*, *Paramātmaprakāśa* and *Kārttikeyānuprekṣā* along with other works relevant to my topic of research. Out of these, the two are Prākṛta works of great Jaina Acaryas, namely, Kundakunda and Svāmī Kumara and the third is an Apabhraṁśa work of Yogīndu. Dr. Upadhye has written an erudite introduction to these works. His introductions are critical, analytical, comparative and historical. His technique of editing works is unprecedented and presents an imitable model for the present-day scholars. His command over Sanskrit, Prākṛta, Apabhraṁśa, Marāṭhi, Kannaḍa, Tamil, English and Hindī languages is unusual, therefore, highly commendable. He deals with a topic from many points of

view, thus making an indelible impression on the reader by his depth of learning and wide reading. We may mention here that in his introduction to *Pravacanasāra* (*Pavayanasāra*) he discusses about the names and the date of Kundakunda in admirable details. He dwells upon the philosophical aspects of *Pravacanasāra* in varied manner and presents philosophical analysis of concepts like Omniscience and *Syādvāda*. His treatment of the commentators of *Pravacanasāra* and its Prākṛta dialect has been handled in a masterly style.

In his introduction to *Paramātmaprakāśa* (*Paramappapayāsu*), Dr. Upadhye has discussed ‘Philosophy and Mysticism of *Paramātmaprakāśa*’ and the ‘Apabhraṁśa of *Paramātmaprakāśa*’ in a very lucid and impressive style. He has also dwelt upon the commentaries on *Paramātmaprakāśa* and the author of *Paramātmaprakāśa* along with other points concerning *Paramātmaprakāśa* and *Yogasāra*. Thus the introduction to *Paramātmaprakāśa* exhibits Dr. Upadhye’s acumen and keen insight in dealing with the subject of *Paramātmaprakāśa* and *Yogasāra*.

Kārttikeyānuprekṣā (*Kattigeyanuppekkha*), an important Prākṛta work of Svāmī Kumar is an exhaustive treatise dealing with Jaina doctrines, especially the twelve *Anuprekṣās*. Dr. Upadhye writes “The *Anuprekṣās*, as topics of reflection, are of great religious significance; and in Jainism, they have played a fruitful role. Their significance, scope and purpose and their evolution through and exposition in different strata of Jaina literature are discussed in detail in the Introduction. Different aspects of the text are critically studied, and fresh light is thrown on the personality and age of Svāmī Kumar. Subhacandra’s commentary is presented as satisfactorily as possible from the available Mss. Personal

details about him and his literary activities are collected; and the contents, sources and language of his commentary are critically scrutinised. ”

The study of these works for the subject of my Ph. D. helped me a great deal in structuring the presentation of my thesis. I may now mention that Dr. A. N. Upadhye and Dr. Hiralal Jain were appointed examiners for my thesis and on the basis of their reports, degree of Ph. D. was awarded to me in 1961. Since Dr. Upadhye and Dr. Jain were the general editors of the Jivaraja Jaina Granthamala, I humbly approached Dr. Upadhye for the publication of my thesis in this Granthamala. His acceptance to publish my thesis under his editorship was a great source of inspiration for me. His remarks in the general editorial always encourages me to work hard on the lines appreciated by him. He writes,

“Dr. Sogani has given us an exhaustive study of the ethical doctrines in Jainism, presenting his details in an authentic manner. ” “It is earnestly hoped that an exhaustive exposition of the Jaina ethical doctrines like this will enable earnest students of Indian religious thought to understand Jainism in its proper perspective. ” The thesis was published in 1967. After this I was in regular correspondence with him and I may mention that every letter was responded without any delay. On several occasions I was fortunate to meet him in seminars and conferences. His love for the Prākṛta studies seems to me to be extraordinary and notably unusual. He was never in favour of teaching Prākṛta through Sanskrit. Sanskrit *Chāyā* eclipses the beauty of Prākṛta language. Perhaps I imbibed his love for Prakṛt, so I planned to have a Department of Jainology and Prākṛta at the University of Udaipur, while working as a Reader/ Prof. of Philosophy in the Department of Philosophy, University of Udaipur.

Fortunately in Feb. 1978, the 'Department of Jainology and Prākṛta' was established in the University as a result of the effort which commenced in 1971. I wrote a letter to Dr. A. N. Upadhye, Prof. and Head, Deptt. of Post Graduate Studies & Research in Jainology and Prakrit, University of Mysore, Mysore on 29. 7. 71 for guiding us in the matter of opening a Department of Jainology and Prākṛta at the University of Udaipur. Dr. Upadhye sent a letter on August 4, 1971 in response to my letter of 29. 7. 71.

Dear Dr. Sogani,

I thank you for your kind letter of 29.07.71. I am glad that a Jain Chair is proposed to be established in the university of Udaipur.

The Sahu Jain Charitable Society, Calcutta, donated a sum of Rs. 2 Lakhs to the University of Mysore for founding a Jain chair. The University authorities met the additional financial responsibilities and have started a Department of Jainology and Prākṛta. At present, one professor and 2 lecturers are appointed. The office staff is already given. In due course, a reader may be added to the Department as and when the work increases. I am enclosing herewith a note. It will give you an idea as to how the department of Jainology and Prākṛta was planned. You know, there is plenty of Jaina literature in Kannada and other language based. In your University, you can lay stress on Philosophy and Apbhraṁśa how the things developed there.

With thanks and kind regards, I am

***Your sincerely,
A.N. Upadhye***

In this way under the guidance and inspiration of Dr. A. N. Upadhye the process started. Sri Akhila Bharatavarsiya Sadhumargi Jaina Sangha, Bikaner donated a sum of Rs.

2,00,000/- to the University of Udaipur for the said purpose through its convenor Shri Himmat Singh Saruparia, Udaipur.

Since I developed a love for Prākṛta and Jaina studies, I was asked to select *Gāthās* of Prākṛta from the original sources for the preparation of the central book of Jainism, known as *Samaṇasuttam*. Because I showed interest in this venture, I was invited to attend the conference in Delhi. I was accommodated in Ahimsa Mandir, Daryaganj. Fortunately Dr. Upadhye, Pt. Kailashchandji, Sri Jinendra Varniji etc. were also staying there. I had an occasion to meet these celebrated scholars in person and could hear their views about the central book of Jainism. My humble contribution has been recorded in the *Samaṇasuttam* on Page 4.

After my retirement from the University of Udaipur as a Prof. of Philosophy in the Deptt. of Philosophy, I came to Jaipur, my home-town and persuaded the trustees of Digambara Jaina Atisaya Ksetra Sri Mahaviraji to establish 'Apabhramsa Sahitya Academy' and fortunately they acceded to my request and the academy was started in 1988. I was supported in this regard by Acarya Vidyanandji Muniraja. In this Academy correspondence courses for learning Apabhramśa and Prākṛta have been started. These correspondence courses have been started for the first time in this country and abroad. I was selected for 'Acarya Kundakunda Award' which was offered to me on 3 Nov. , 1996. The money of this award was donated to the Digambara Jaina Atisaya Ksetra Sri Mahaviraji of which I am at present one of the trustees. Along with the initiation of many academic awards for the students of correspondence courses, '**Dr. A. N. Upadhye award**' was introduced in Dec. 1996 for the best article in the 'Apabhramsa Bharati' published by the 'Apabhramsa Sahitya Academy', Jaipur. This is due

to my deep regard for and indebtedness to Dr. Upadhye. I have no doubt that owing to my long association with Dr. Upadhye I have developed a sort of love for Prakṛt and Apabhraṃsa studies.

Here I should not forget to mention that because of my increasing interest in Prakṛt and Jainological studies, Dr. Upadhye, it seems to me, developed some sort of affection for me. It happened that in one of the conference in Delhi, he went to my room for conveying something to me, but unfortunately my room was locked. So he returned and did not tell me anything. Even today, I remember this misfortune.

In the end, I express my deep sense of gratitude to Upadhyaya Gyan Sagarji Maharaj who invited me to attend this national seminar on the life and works of Dr. A. N. Upadhye through Dr. Ashok Kumar Jain, Ladnun and Prof. Shubha Chandra, Mysore.



DISCUSSION

SOME COMMENTS ON “THE ACTIVE AND THE CONTEMPLATIVE VALUES”

Professor Daya Krishna has given a valuable analysis of the distinction between the Active and the Contemplative values. (Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, March, 1969). According to him, the difference between the two is a difference of primacy and direction, the latter being much more important. One may agree with him at the theoretical level at which one only thinks and does not see. But the history of civilization, particularly Indian, does not testify his theoretical conclusion regarding the trenchant distinction between the two realms of values. If they are theoretically apart, they have never been so practically and empirically. The great contemplatives like Mahāvīra, Buddha, Christ, Gāndhī etc., were neither nonactivist nor did they regard activity as a necessary evil. Professor Daya Krishna does not seem to distinguish between a pure action and an action done by affective prejudices. In my view, he who has opted for contemplative values will perform the actions more devotedly and efficiently than the man who is dedicated only to active values, inasmuch as, in the former, the duty-consciousness hence his involvement in commitments will always have egoistic leanings. In my opinion, the crisis of character is the result of separation of the active and contemplative values. The contemplative values do not obstruct but encourage actions in a right spirit. The emphasis on contemplative values in Indian tradition is simply for the

sake of the right orientation of action and not for the sake of negating action. When Professor Daya Krishan says that “At best, it is a necessary evil, something that has to be done if a society or personality, or culture is to survive at all. But then one’s heart is never in it; one does it only to the minimum extent required and that too in a perfunctory manner,” he might not have real contemplatives like Christ, Mahāvira, Buddha, Gāndhī, etc., in his mind, but pseudo contemplatives at the ordinary man’s level. Professor Daya Krishna’s article seems to me, in a way, the falsification of historical experience, which he himself, I hope, probably would not like.

Apart from these general comments, I wish now to raise some points concerning his paper in this Journal.

- 1) The statement that “the contrast between the values that pertain essentially to the realm of action and those that do not has seldom been drawn in axiological thought” and the statement that “in India the controversy between the path of knowledge and the path of action has been perennial” – these are contradictory. He tries to evade this contradiction by saying that this distinction between knowledge and action is not quite the same as he is trying to point out. This is not convincing. This very problem of the relation and distinction between active and contemplative values is just the same as the problem of Karma-yoga and Karmasamnyāsa in the Gītā. The sthitaprajña of the Gītā, the Arhat of Jainism and the Bodhisattva of Buddhism direct our attention towards the problem of contemplative and active values. What I wish to point out is that this problem has always concerned the Indian mind and is not new to it. And I

may say that it has drawn the highest attention in India and the Gītā alone is its superb example.

- 2) The meaning of active values as ‘the continuous engagement in an activity which may probably help others or achieve a certain state of affairs in the natural or the social world’ seems to me to be narrow. Where will Prof. Daya Krishna place a man of pure mathematics or a philosopher like Kant? Do they not withdraw temporarily, so also I may say that the man devoted to contemplative values retires into his own self temporarily and returns to the world of action with greater vigor and energy. Being lost in one’s own self cannot be a permanent feature of consciousness. In fact, I cannot think of a man of contemplative values without active values. The nature of action may differ from one man to the other.
- 3) According to Professor Daya Krishna, there “is an intrinsic opposition between the two in the sense that the seeking for one jeopardizes and obstructs the seeking for the other.” What does he mean by saying this? Does he mean that the two are antagonistic like love and hatred? If so, I feel his view is untenable. For this no other argument can be given except that the great personalities have lived in these two realms of values without any difficulty, as has already been pointed out. It does not, therefore, seem to me justified to say that “the nurturing and development of one type of value concern militates against the development of the other type.” The two can go together. The same man is capable of participating in both the realms of values.

- 4) In fact, the mystic and the drug addict do not differ in degrees but in kind. Prof. Daya Krishna seems to adopt the difference between the two as the difference of degrees and not of kind. That the mystic keep a minimal relationship to the world of objects does not, as a matter of fact, support the withdrawal activity of the mystic. As a criterion of withdrawal, is he thinking in terms of the number of objects or in terms of their significance? The mystic may occupy himself with the activity of writing for which he withdraws from all those things which obstruct his work. Will it be called a withdrawal from the world of the other? Or will it be the pursuit of active values in sincere earnestness?



APABHRAṂŚA : LANGUAGE, MANUSCRIPTS AND PAUMACARIU OF SVAYAMBHŪ

Apabhraṁśa language is one of the richest Indo-Aryan languages and it developed from Prakrit, one of the most ancient and sacred languages of India. Early Vedic literature is not averse to Prakrit expressions, which indicated its ancient character. Prakrit, the flowing language, gave rise to Apabhraṁśa in the course of time.

Like Prakṛt, Apabhraṁśa was the language of the masses. Apabhraṁśa literature, in all its varied forms, has made a considerable contribution to the cultural heritage of Indian tradition. Svayambhū, Puṣpadanta, Dhanapāla, Vīra, Nayanandi, Kanakāmara, Joindu, Rāmasiṁha, Hemacandra and Raidhu are some of the celebrated authors in this language.

In the sixth century A.D. Apabhraṁśa was the lingua franca of Northern India. From east to west and Kashmir (north) to Maharastra (south), it served the needs of common men as well as those of the literary world. Apabhraṁśa also contributed to the emergence of some other modern Indian languages like Sindhī, Puñjābī, Marāṭhī, Baṅgalā, Gujarātī, Maithilī, Rājasthānī and Oriyā. Even Hindī owes its origin to Apabhraṁśa as most of the literary tendencies in Hindī literature flow from the Apabhraṁśa tradition and the relation between Hindī and Apabhraṁśa is very intimate. As a result,

a proper understanding of Apabhramśa language and literature is indispensable for comprehending the development of Hindī literature correctly and adequately.

In Search of Manuscripts

It is interesting to note that the existence of Apabhramśa manuscripts in India went undetected till 1913-1914 A.D. When Pischel completed the book 'Grammar of the Prakrit Languages' in 1900, he was not aware of any information regarding Apabhramśa literature except a few Apabhramśa dohas mentioned by Hemacandra in his Apabhramśa grammar. H. Jacobi who was engaged in studying Indian literature inferred the existence of Apabhramśa manuscripts. In 1913 in Ahmedabad he saw a manuscript in the custody of a Jaina saint. The saint believed it to be a Prakrit manuscript. When H. Jacobi took a closer look at it he found that it was *Bhavisyattakahā* composed by Mahākavī Dhanapāla in tenth century A.D. in Apabhramśa. This manuscript was subsequently published by the Munich Royal Academy (Germany). In 1923 it was published again, this time as a part of the Gaekwad Oriental Series, Baroda. After this, a large number of Apabhramśa manuscripts were traced and Indian scholars gradually occupied themselves with the task of editing Apabhramśa manuscripts. Many Apabhramśa manuscripts are currently stored in the collection of Śrī Mahāvīrajī at Jaipur in the Jaina Vidyā Saṁsthāna. The most important of these is the *Paumacariu* composed in eighth century A.D. by Mahākavī Svayāmbhū.

Retrieval of Paumacariu

It is incontrovertibly recognized by scholars of Apabhramśa language and literature that *Paumacariu* of Svayāmbhū occupies the foremost place among the literary

treasure of Apabhraṃśa language. The great Apabhraṃśa poets like Puṣpadanta, Vīra, Hariṣeṇa, Nayanandi, Raidhu and Gaṇī Devasena remember him with gratitude. The celebrated scholar of Buddhism and Hindi literature Pandit Rahul Sankrityayan says, “Among all the five periods of Hindī poetry, Svayambhū is the greatest. He is one of the dozen immortal poets of India.”

Muni Sri Jinavijaya got the opportunity of seeing the manuscript of *Paumacariu* at Poona in 1919-1920 while examining the rich Bombay Government collection of old manuscripts. In fact, this collection was finally shifted to Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona. After going through the manuscript of *Paumacariu*, Muniji was impressed by the poetic genius of Svayambhū and he inspired Dr. P.D. Gune and Pandit Nathuram Premi to write upon the importance of this great work. Much later, in 1942 he encouraged Prof. Bhayani to take up the study of Svayambhū's *Paumacariu*, the earliest Puranic epic in Apabhraṃśa available until then in manuscript form.

It will not be out of place to mention that the *Paumacariu* has ninety sandhis and is divided into five kāṇḍas known as— *Vidyādharakāṇḍa*, *Ayodhyākāṇḍa*, *Sundarakāṇḍa*, *Yuddhakāṇḍa*, and *Uttarakāṇḍa*. For the purpose of his doctoral thesis, under the supervision of Muni Jinavijayaji, Prof. Bhayani decided to edit the first of the five kāṇḍas (*Vidyādharakāṇḍa*) comprising twenty sandhis.

For the preparation of the critical edition of the *Vidyādharakāṇḍa* of *Paumacariu*, Prof. Bhayani was able to secure only two manuscripts, one from Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona and the other from the Godika Temple at Sāṃgānera, Jaipur. The Poona manuscript is dated Vikrama Samvat 1521 or 1464 A.D. and Sāṃgānera

manuscript is earlier than Vikrama Samvat 1775 or 1718 A.D. At the outset, and only on the basis of these two manuscripts, Prof. Bhayani constituted the text of *Paumacariu*.

However, some time later, a third manuscript was secured from the Paṇḍulipi collection of Jaina Vidyā Saṁsthāna Digambara Jaina Atiśaya Kṣetra Śrī Mahāvīraji, Jaipur by Pandit Chainsukhadasaji Nyāyatīrtha and it was sent to Prof. Bhayani. Though the copying date of the manuscript (1541 Vikarma Samvat or 1484 A.D.) is twenty years later than the Poona manuscript, yet the original text was preserved more faithfully in it than in any of the other two manuscripts and thus it was concluded that Mahāvīraji's manuscript was based on an original which was older than the original of either Poona or Saṁgānera manuscript. So Prof. Bhayani was constrained to reconstitute the text of the first twenty *sandhis* of *Vidyādhara-kāṇḍa* on the basis of Mahāvīraji's manuscript.

Prof. Bhayani says "A very significant fact may be noted in this connection. As stated above in the beginning, I had constituted the text with the help of the manuscripts in Poona and Saṁgānera only, as the manuscript of Mahaviraji was not available at that time. The text so constituted has numerous lines which were metrically defective. I had noted down all such cases and after due consideration suggested probable emendations for most of these cases. Later on, when I could secure the Mahāvīraji's manuscript, I found that in almost all cases in which Poona and Saṁgānera had a reading which spoiled the metre, Mahaviraji's manuscript had a corresponding reading that preserved the metre, and some ninety per cent of the emendations suggested by me were

actually supported by Mahāvīrajī's manuscript. In several of these cases Mahaviraji's manuscript reading is found superior to that of Poona and of Saṁgānera."

One the basis of the above presentation we can conclude that the *Paumacariu* of Svayāmbhū in Mahāvīrajī's Paṇḍulipi collection is of great importance for future generations.*



** It may be noted here that Prof. Bhayani's critical edition of the Vidyādharakāṇḍa was published in 1953 by Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Mumbai. On the advice of Muni Jinavijayaji, Prof. Bhayani edited the rest of the kāṇḍas of Paumacariu, which were published by Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Mumbai also in two volumes in 1960.*



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