Studies in Haribhadrasūri

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Edited by N M Kansara 🍨 G C Tripathi



B. L. Institute of Indology, Delhi

Courtesy:

Manuscript Jambudweep-Sangrahani-Stabaka of Haribhadrasūri (Prakrit Original with exposition in Rajasthani-Gujarati)

Studies in Haribhadrasūri

Papers presented at a Seminar in the B. L. Institute of Indology, Delhi

Edited by

N. M. KANSARA Ex-Visiting Professor L. D. Institute of Indology Ahmedabad

and

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BHOGILAL LEHERCHAND INSTITUTE OF INDOLOGY DELHI 110036

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Published by

Bhogilal Leherchand Institute of Indology Vijay Vallabh Smarak Jain Mandir G.T. Karnal Road, P.O. Alipur, Delhi 110036 Email : director@blinstitute.org Tel: 011-27202065, 27206630

First Edition: Delhi 2014

© B. L. Institute of Indology, Delhi

Price: ₹400

Typesetting by Laxmi Kant at the Computer Section of the B. L. Institute of Indology

Printed at Shree Maitrey Printech Pvt. Ltd., Noida

Editorial Note

With great pleasure, but also with a considerable amount of trepidation we wish to present to the scholars of Jain Philosophy and Literature this edited collection of papers presented at an International Conference organized by this Institute in the year 1987. Unfortunately it took a long time to collect the papers and to do a sort of preliminary editing on them. In 1999 the Institute contacted Prof. N. M. Kansara, the renowned Jainologist who was working at the Jain Viswa Bharati, Ladnun at that time. He did the job of editing wonderfully well within less than a year and submitted the quasi-final version in the year 2000. They were typeset at the Institute and were awaiting final revision so that they may be sent to press. It could not be done due to various unfavourable circumstances prevailing in the past years and the manuscript was awaiting its fate lying incognito in a file cabinet.

After I took over as the Director of the BLII the collection was salvaged from oblivion, re-set in computer and I went through the whole script picking up and removing the printing mistakes. Also the linguistic expressions in some papers had to be rectified and streamlined. The main problem that I faced during the editing was the non-availability of the original scripts. The final editing, therefore, had to be carried out without having recourse to the originals.

Strangely enough, only the papers presented in the English language were taken up for inclusion in this volume whereas the Hindi papers were excluded. Whether they were meant to be published in a separate volume, or were simply to be discarded, I do not know. They are no more traceable.

I am thankful to all my previous Directors especially to Prof. N. R. Banerjee, Prof. V. Venkatachalam and Prof. V. P. Jain, for arranging the Conference, for going though the papers and for getting them edited, respectively. I am also thankful to respectable Vice Chairman of the BLII Dr. J. B. Shah of Ahmedabad who has not only appreciated and encouraged this endeavour but have also helped in every way to get it materialized.

Thanks are due also to my colleague Professor Phool Chand Jain for his help and cooperation in every way and Shri Laxmi Kant, the DEO of the BLII who typed out the whole text of this collection.

> G.C. TRIPATHI Director B. L. Institute of Indology, Delhi

May 2014

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Introduction

This volume presents the papers of the two Seminars on 'Haribhadrasūri and His Works' organized by the Bhogilal Leherchand Institute of Indology, Delhi, in 1986 (on 27–28 September) and 1987 (on 25–27 September), respectively. Although Mahā-mahopādhyaya Vinaya Sāgaraji and Dr. V. Venkatachalam working with the institute, as the then Director had gone through them, they were not finalized unto the year 1999, and the material was still lying unpublished. I was, therefore requested by the current Director, Dr. Vimal Prakash Jain to go through them, make my recommendations and finalize the papers to be published.

All the scholars seem to have taken for granted that the Haribhadrasūri around whom this Seminars revolved is the one well known as the disciple of Jinadattasūri of the Vidyādhara Gaccha, and who mentions himself as 'Yākinī-sūnu' and whose works are said to be 'Virahāṅka' due the occurrence of the word "viraha' in the last verse of his composition. It is this famous Jain Acharya whose contribution is intended to be discussed by the organizers of these two Seminars. He flourished during the eighth century, according to the opinion of modern scholars, though the Jain tradition would place him a couple of centuries earlier, i.e. during the sixth century AD. Prof. H. R. Kapadia has noted about six other Jain Acharyas, with the nomenclature 'Haribhadra' who lived during the two hundred and fifty years, between the twelfth and the fourteenth century AD. Our Haribhadra preceded them all. The tradition preserves more or less mythical details

in various accounts that at times cover and confound the identity of our Haribhadra with his later namesakes who originally had nothing in common but their name and fame. As has been showed by Muni Jinavijayaji in a brilliant exposition, some of the writings ascribed to our Haribhadra must, judging from their contents, be later than the date fixed for his death (about 800 AD).

Prof. R. Williams seems to think that Haribhadra, the 'Yākinīsūnu' who was the disciple of Jinabhadra is possibly different from Haribhadra known as 'Virahānka'. He has inferred that one can discern in the works of our Haribhadra certain characteristics that are inferred to be typical of him. Thus, in the first place his Sanskrit style is correct and classical, with Paninian purity of the language. His erudition goes far beyond the purely Jaina field. He knows brahmanical lore and pauranic legends with the absurdities of which he makes free play. He is acquainted with the doctrines of the Buddhists and can quote their scriptures. And, for an early Śvetāmbara context it is necessary to note that, he is ready to acknowledge the authority of the Tattvārtha-sūtra. Moreover, though attaching importance to the technique of mantras and vidyas, he takes pleasure in clothing dry dogma and ritual with a new moral significance. R. Williams has also alluded to what we might call the 'signature element' of his writings. First, there are in the printed editions of certain works concluding verses of very similar content. Thus, all such verses in his Astaka, Yoga-bindu, Lalita-vistarā, Daśa-vaikālika-tīkā, Āvaśyaka-tīkā, Nandī-tīkā, Pañca-vastu-tīkā, and Anuyoga-dvāra-tīkā, are characterized by an almost identical wording, yad arjitam (or avāptam or prāptam) punyam (or kuśalam), and certain other phrases recur in several of them.

At the same time, R. Williams, certain works, viz., the *Anekānta-jaya-patākā* has noted that *Śāstra-vārtā-samuccaya*, the *Yoga-dṛṣṭi-samuccaya*, and the commentaries on the *Anuyoga-dvāra*, *Āvaśyaka*, *Caitya-vandana* (*Lalita-vistarā*), *Daśa-vaikālika*,

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Nandī, Pañca-sūtra, Pañca-vastu, and Śrāvaka-prajñapti, show a colophone containing one or more of the following elements: krtir iyam/Sitāmbarācāryasya (or Śvetāmbara-bhiksor)/Jina-padasevakasya/Jinadatta-śisyasya/dharmato Yākinī-mahattarā-sūnor/ Haribhadrasya. Even this second element of this is distinctive, for very few early Śvetāmbara writers are accustomed thus to stress that they belong to a particular sect. Moreover, the special mention of the nun Yākinī, in association with the two other people, viz., Jinabhata and his guru Jinadatta, who had influenced the writer's life, justifies us in applying to the author of the works that bear this colophone the designation of Yākinī-putra.

Now, as to the 'virahānka', each of the 19 Pañcāśakas is signed with it in the last line. But this reappears again in Astaka, Dharmabindu, Sambodha-prakarana, Śāstra-vārtā-samuccaya, Śodasaka, Yoga-bindu, Yoga-drsti-samuccaya, and in the comentaries on the Daśa-vaikālika, Caitya-vandana, and Pañca-vastu. R. Williams has pinpointed a flagrant case of a false use of the anka occurring in the Sambodha-prakarana (or Tattva-prakāśaka) which is clearly much later than the time of Yākinī-putra. Yet not only does the word bhava-viraha appear in the last line but the colophone even records that the treatise was composed by Haribhadrasūri for the enlightenment of Menorahīyā, a female pupil of Yākinī Mahattarā, which smacks of deliberate forgery designed to lend the authority of a famous name to a later work. It is a diffuse verse tract in Prakrit (except for seven Sanskrit verses, viz., XI.5-11), and gives summary information on miscellaneous themes in a way that suggests an imitation of the Pravacana-sāroddhara. Unlike that encyclopaedia it is, however, strung together without logical sequence, and is often repetitive, and at times even selfcontradicting. This fact alone would call for caution in accepting an ascription to Yākinī-putra whose method of exposition is uniformly clear, taut and orderly.

The scholars who contributed the papers are all veterans in the field of Jainology, and their papers, fourteen in all, touch various aspects of the writings of Haribhadrasūri, like Yoga, Nyāya, religious worship, religio-philosophical outlook, and try to introduce some of his works. Accordingly, I have classified the papers in five broad heads, viz., (i) Haribhadra and Yoga; (ii) Haribhadra and Nyāya; (iii) Haribhadra and Religious Worship; (iv) Haribhadra and Religio-philosophical Outlook; and (v) Some Religious Works of Haribhadrasūri.

Dr. Dayanand Bhargava has, in his paper on the *Yoga-śataka* of Haribhadrasūri, draw our special attention to the order in which the three constituents, viz., right knowledge, right faith and right conduct, of the path to liberation have been set forth by Haribhadrasūri and he has placed right knowledge prior to right faith, thus suggesting that faith cannot logically precede knowledge, and that one must first know before he can believe. Haribhadra here tries to fall in line with the majority of the then prevalent systems, which held knowledge as supreme.

Dr. Gokul Chandra Jain attempts a comparison of Yoga Systems as propounded by Patañjali and Haribhadrasūri and notices that Patañjali and Haribhadrasūri have used different terminology in the exposition of their Yoga Systems. Yet there is much similarity in practice, that the metaphysical foundation and ethical code of conduct are the essential part of the two systems, and this spirit is visible at every step in the exposition. Some fundamental concepts, viz., Purusa and Prakrti in Patañjali, and *Jīva* and *A-jīva* in Haribhadra, play important role. In the formation of the code of conduct and spiritual stages the theories of bondage and liberation are the deciding factors.

Dr. Ramjee Singh highlights the contribution of Haribhadrasūri in the field of the Yoga-vidyā. He notes that it was Haribhadra who for the first time defined the term Yoga as that which leads one to emancipation, and thus gave an altogether new dimension to the interpretation of Yoga. His comparative

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studies in Yoga is the special feature in that he co-relates the different stages of Guṇasthānas to the different stages of concentration, shows that there is a fundamental unity among all the apparently conflicting systems of thought regarding the means of freedom from the worldly existence, lays down five steps of *adhyātma*, *bhāvanā*, *dhyāna*, *samatā* and *vrtti-saṁkṣaya* as a complete course of Yoga. Further he points out that in spite of the resemblance, there are fundamental differences also with the mystical way adopted him. And, although Haribhadra knew them, he endeavoured to establish the unity among the different systems of Indian thought, which face makes Haribhadra's studies in the Yoga-vidyā a landmark in Indian spiritual Sādhanā.

Dr. N. M. Tantia has sought to trace the eight Dṛṣṭis in Haribhadra's *Yoga-dṛṣṭi-samuccaya* to their Buddhist sources, particularly in view of their striking parallelism with Vasubandhu's eight Dṛṣṭis described in the latter's *Abhidharma-kośa-bhāṣya*, of course understood very cautiously. He explains that of the eight Dṛṣṭis of the Buddhists, Haribhadra lumps together the five classical ones together in the Ogha-dṛṣṭi. Further he has found out a close affinity between the fourteen guṇa-sthānas in Jainism and the eight stages of Mārga and Phala in Buddhism.

Prof. L. C. Jain discusses the Jaina concept of causality in Haribhadra's *Śaddarśana-samuccaya* and its commentaries. He has selected the verses 48 and 49, which according to him are relevant to the topic of his paper. Among the six fluents (*karmapudgala*) the time fluent (*kāla-dravya*) is said to be causal. According to the commentary of Gunaratna, time-fluent exists in the human universe, is extremely fine, and the indivisible instant (*samaya*) is regarded as a pure time-fluent. It is single-pointed (*eka-pradesī*) and cannot be called existent corporeal (*asti-kāya*), but somehow flows through its own events (*paryāya*) and controls (*guna*). Prof. Jain relates it not only to epistemology but also with phenomenology, and regards them as connected with change as well as its information communication, both these aspects

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involving calculation with time. Then he dives into the realm of the five mathematicians and follows the equation dual to those of Einstein's derivations based on the minimal velocity postulate. The maximal velocity postulate, according to him, brings us near the causality about particles which could move faster than the velocity of light, while the minimal velocity brings us nearer the causality about particles which could not move less than that. Then he emphasizes the need for interdisciplinary studies in the centres of Jaina learning.

Dr. K. K. Mittal tries to assess the place of Haribhadra's commentary on the Nyāya-praveśa among the works of Buddhist logic. He begins his paper with a list of thirteen entries about the Nyāya-praveśa from the Encyclopaedia of Indian Philosophies edited by Karl Potter, and refers to just three articles, two of Guiseppe Tucci and one of Vidhusekhar Bhattacharya that are relevant to his objective. After a discussion of these three items, the author is constrained to confess that after all the beating about the bush he has not even once been able to hit the focal point of the title of the paper. He further adds that if there had not been a reference to Haribhadra's commentary in the tradition of China the simple explanation is that the commentary never came to be known to have existed in the world of scholarship in India or elsewhere till its publication in the third decade of the past century. He believes that after the commentary came into being, foreign invaders destroyed the Buddhist monasteries along with their libraries forcing the stoppage of Buddhist studies for a few centuries altogether and arousing in others the instinct of preservation so strongly, that the Jaina Bhandaras remained closed to all except very few till about the beginning of the twentieth century. He further states that the scholars of Japan have carried forward the tradition of logical studies rooted in the Nyāya-praveśa are alrerady making use of the commentary of Haribhadra.

Dr. U.P. Shah explores the significance of the two interesting references, viz., (1) to the Ambā-kusmāndī-vidyā, and (2) to Kottakiriyā or Kottavyā. The references to the first are found in the Lalita-vistara, the commentary on the Caitya-vandana-sūtra of Haribhadra, with the help of some other references to it in the Anuvoga-dvāra-sūtra, in its Cūrni by Jinadāsa Mahattara, in the Tīkā by Ksamāśramana on the Viśesāvaśyaka-mahābhāsya, the Abhidhāna-cintāmani of Hemacandra, the Visnpurāna, and the Taittirīya Āranyaka. Dr. Shah opines that originally Ambā-Kusmāndī was a tantric Vidyā and later she was also worshipped as a Yaksi in Jainism, that the earliest image of the Jain Ambikā Yaksī so far obtained belongs to the latter half of the sixth century AD, installed by Jinabhadra Vācanācārya, convincingly identified with Jinabhadra-gani Ksamāśramana, the author of the Viśesāvaśyaka-mahābhāsya with its auto-commentary. Further he discovers that in the origin and development the Jaina Ambikā Yaksī, the elements of perhaps three different ancient deities have been fused. They are a Mother-Goddess Ambā riding a lion, some ancient Yaksī associated with mangoes or the mango tree, and some goddess associated with an ancient tribe called Kusmandas.

The identification of Kuṣmāṇḍa with watermelon by Dr. Shah has been considered as a misconception by Dr. V. Venkatachalam, who points out that the word denotes 38 mantras contained in the three consecutive anuvākas (3–5) of the second prapāṭhaka of the Taittirīya Āraṇyaka of the Kṛṣṇa-Yajurveda, and that they are used during the expiatory homa in a living tradition in south India. Then, Dr. Shah further observes that Yakṣas in ancient Indian literature are known as sylvan deities, and that Mothergoddesses in brahmanical rites are invoked with tender leaves of mango-tree. As regards the references to Koṭṭakiriyā or Koṭṭavyā, Haribhadra, the *Viśeṣāvaśyaka-mahābhāṣya-tīkā* and Jinadāsa Mahattara describe the goddess is Durgā in her terrific form, engaged in killing the demon Mahisa. Dr. Shah feels certain that this Koṭṭavyā is the goddess Korravaī of the Tamil Sangam works, and that there are references to this goddess as Kottāryā in the *Niśītha Cūrņī* and in the *Kuvalayamālā* where she is regarded as Durgā.

Prof. N. R. Banerjee presents a study of the three chapters pertaining to the construction of Jain temple, installation of images, and offering of worship, from Haribhadra's Sodaśaka. This paper concerns itself with the chapter on the Jina-mandira-sodaśaka, which is the sixth among the sixteen chapters of the whole work. The precepts in it are contained in the verses composed in $\bar{A}rv\bar{a}$ meter and they are elucidated by two commentaries, viz., Sugamārtha-kalpanā by Yaśobhadra and Yoga-dīpikā by Yaśovijay Upādhyāya. Of these two, the former is brief while the latter is more detailed. The viewpoints are delightfully modern and humanistic as well as scientific. It states among other things that only those who have earned their wealth righteously and have set aside sizeable fund, are intelligent favourably inclined, and are known for their rectitude are entitled to undertake the construction of a temple. The land on which a temple is to be built should be pure, and along with the land, the bricks and the stones to be used should be acquired by paying proper price to the owner, so that he does not suffer nor is he harassed. The wood to be used in the construction should be of good quality and drawn from the trees grown in sacred places. The workmen of all categories employed were to be paid adequately. Thus, there is no doubt that Haribhadra's approach to life was so much objective and scientific as to command acceptance in modern times.

Dr. S. P. Narang highlights the role of Haribhadra as an advocate of eve-salvation, and he has based it on the *Lalita-vistarā*, the commentary on the Caitya-vandana-sūtra. At the end of his paper the author has drawn the following conclusions: (i) Digambaras negated the salvation of woman, whereas by the sixth century AD they had been divided over the issue, particularly the sages belonging to the Yāpanīya Samgha believed in the

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salvation of woman. (ii) Haribhadra brought in rationality into play in the discussion of the issue with multidimensional arguments, prevalent in Indian society in general and Jaina society in particular. (iii) The argument relegating inferior status to woman was refuted. (iv) Barriers of caste and place were rejected, thus establishing the parity of all the castes. (v) He utilized all the religio-emotional arguments to uphold his opinion that woman too has a bona fide right to attain salvation.

Hon. Justice M. L. Jain has visualized Haribhadra as a legend in catholicity, on the basis of what he said in his Yoga-drstisamuccaya. Therein he has discovered that the reason why different great teachers preach different prescriptions is their knowledge about different spiritual capabilities of the disciples and followers. They were a sort of spiritual healers. Their aim being literature, they preached in view of the prevailing situation. It is not proper for us at present to criticize them for the apparent contradictions to be found in their teachings. Spirituality cannot be perceived through logic. To insist for a single system is but improper for seekers of Truth. Those who are concerned with liberation have to set aside the doubts, differences and one-sided views, since arguments and counter-arguments leads one to nowhere. One should necessarily give up partiality, should become impartial, and accept whatever stands to reason. Haribhadra thus teaches us a lesson of unique importance in these days of fundamentalism and sectarianism.

In his new approach to the *Vimśati-vimśatikā* of Haribhadra, Professor V. M. Kulkarni seeks to discuss all the aspects of the work, such as its title, its form, its contents, the nature of a Prakarana-grantha, its language, its structure and style and a long felt need of a truly critical edition of the work. Further, he points out to the unfortunate fact that there is neither autocommentary, nor any commentary of a later commentator on this work as a whole, except Yaśovijaya's commentary on one of the twenty *vimśatikās*, viz., the *Yoga-vimśatikā*.

In his paper Dr. R. S. Betai discusses the concept of God and man in Haribhadra's Loka-tattva-nirnaya consisting of 147 verses. After giving introductory information about the topics discussed in the work, the author has analysed the relevant verses to clarify the concept he has selected for discussion. Haribhadra holds that nobody has created this universe. There is no God who can be said to have created it. The real position is that the birth of the souls in various physical forms takes place today as it ever did in the past. The liberated souls are devoid of passions and are not fettered by the bonds of karma. It is only the unliberated souls that are full of passions and are fettered by karma. Existence has been there for all times by its very nature. The souls pass from one form of birth to another in this transitory world helplessly due to their own deeds. Thus, the concept of one supreme (Paramātman or Parabrahma) as the creator of the universe is not acceptable to Haribhadra, but he designates the Tirthankara as the supreme soul who has attained perfection and liberation. Jīvas can attain the status of Siddha by utmost efforts in the form of penance calculated to shade the fetters of karma, and thus attain liberation.

In his critical study of Haribhadra's *Loka-tattva-nirnaya*, Dr. J. B. Shah has pointed out that the author himself has not referred this work by this name. He further draws our attention to the fact that the author himself has stated in the very introductory verse that he elucidates the 'Nr-tattva-nigama' for the enlightening the devout Jaina worshippers. Thus, the presuppositions of most of the previous scholars like Kapadiya, Betai, and others are rather off the mark. Then, he has briefly discussed the contents of this work which, in his opinion came to be known as the 'Loka-tattva-nirnaya' on the basis of two verses quoted by the author of the '*Tarka-rahasya-dīpikā*' with the introductory remark '*Tad-uktam* haribhadrasuribhir eva loka-tattva-nirnaye', as late as the fifteenth century of the Vikrama Era.

Pandit Śīlacandravijaya Gani (now Vijaya-Shilachandra Suri) moots the problem of the authorship of the Prakrit work named Pañca-sūtra, since scholars are at variance as to its real author. Some take it to be the work of some ancient Jain preceptor or Cirantanācārya, while others regard it as the work of Haribhadra, though there is no controversy regarding the authorship of the Sanskrit commentary on it, which is unanimously accepted as the work of Haribhadra. The author of this very long paper is convinced that Haribhadra himself is the author of both the original work and the commentary on it. In his endeavour to demolish the entire structure of arguments against his thesis, put forth from time to time by veteran indologists like M. Winternitz, Prof. Kashinath V. Abhyankar, Dr. A. N. Upadhye, and Dr. V. M. Kulkarni, he has sought to marshal his argumentative guns with the powder of internal and external evidence. His main plank rests upon the three sentences at the end of Haribhadra's commentary on the Pañca-sūtra, viz., 'Pravrajyā-sūtram samāptam/ Evam pañcama-sūtra-vyākhyā samāptā // Samaptam pañcsūtrakam vyākhyānato 'pi // ' The author of the paper draws our attention to the word 'api' in the third sentence, since it implies that the original work along with the commentary is completed, in both these forms. The author of the original Prakrit has employed the phrase 'Samattam pañca-suttam', and the Sanskrit commentator writes 'Samāptam pañca-sūtrkam . . .'. The massive onslaught of arguments based on other internal and external evidences, as interpreted by the author of this paper are quite interesting and also entertaining academically, particularly so when he summons in his support the letter from Professor Madhusudan Dhaky to the effect that comprehensively it seems that the commentator and the author of the original text are one.

In the original form some of the articles were not very systematic as expected from the point of view of a compact format consistently consigning the supporting details to the footnotes. Many details in some of them were repeated. The editor has, therefore, been constrained to edit them suitably and introduce necessary amendments while keeping the substance of the authors statement intact; and, the footnotes added by Dr. V. Venkatachalam on some of the papers have been incorporated as such in their respective places in the endnotes, with his name mentioned in brief as V.V.

I have great pleasure in acknowledging the help in the form of the facilities like an air-conditioned room with a computer made available in the campus of the L. D. Institute of Indology, Ahmedabad, by Dr. J. B. Shah, the Director of the L. D. Institute of Indology, Ahmedabad, to carry out this task of editing these research papers of the above-mentioned Seminars. I am thankful to Dr. V. P. Jain, the Director of the B. L. Institute of Indology, Delhi, for the confidence put in me by entrusting this work to me. I am also thankful to my young friend Shri Jagdish Patel, a member of the computer staff of Dr. J. B. Shah, for the technical help provided from time to time whenever I needed it in the course of entering the data of this book myself.

Ahmedabad 25 June 2000 N. M. KANSARA

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SECTION I

Haribhadra and Yoga

CHAPTER 1

The Yoga-śataka of Haribhadrasūri

DAYANAND BHARGAVA

In the course of his comparative studies in Haribhadra's Yoga, Dr. Nathmal Tatia has worked between 1951^1 and 1986^2 on the Yoga-bindu (YB), the Yoga-drsti-samuccaya (YDS), the Yogavimśikā (YV), and the Śoḍaṣaka (S), but he has somehow not touched upon the Yoga-śataka (YŚ). The present author attempts to fill this gap.

According to the *Yoga-śataka*, Yoga is that which unites one with liberation.³ Yoga is thus the threefold path of right knowledge, right faith and right conduct.⁴

According to Patañjali, Yoga is the stoppage of the psychical activities,⁵ whereas in Jainism it is the stoppage of all psychical as well as physical and vocal activities, included in $\bar{a}srava$, which is the cause of bondage, and freedom from it (*samvara*) is the ultimate means of final emancipation.⁶ Yoga, consisting of disciplined activities, leads to the stoppage of all the activities (*a-yoga*); just as the *Samprajñāta-samādhi* leads to the *Asamprajñāta-samādhi* in Patañjali's *Yoga*.

What is worthy of our special attention is the order in which Haribhadra has set forth these three constituents of the path of liberation. In contradiction to the traditional order, he places right knowledge prior to right faith. Thus, besides indicating his love for knowledge, Haribhadra has suggested that faith cannot logically precede knowledge. One must first know; only then can one believe. Haribhadra has here tried to fall in line with the majority of the systems where knowledge is supreme. The view that the journey begins from right faith smacks of bigotry, whereas the rational view appears to be that it begins with right knowledge. When right faith is eulogized out of proportion, it seem to suggest as if liberation is some sort of a birth-right of a particular sect, whereas knowledge is invariably the result of right illumination and not of any blind adherence to a system. The author is not aware of any other Jaina writer who has followed a more rational order, which Haribhadra has laid down, perhaps not without a purpose. This assumption is further strengthened when it is found that Haribhadra defines delusion (moha) as ignorance $(a-j\tilde{n}ana)$.⁷ In Jainism, moha holds the key position amongst all the binding Karmas. By describing moha as ignorance, Haribhadra has implicitly assigned 'knowledge' the supermost place among the various means of liberation.

The act of faith, without knowledge is, however, not totally futile. The journey may well begin with obedience to the preceptor and with a keen desire to know the truth from him.⁸ In the initial stage, one may just follow the secular code of conduct ($lok\bar{a}c\bar{a}ra$) by not inflicting misery on others, by respecting the preceptor, gods and guests and by helping the downtrodden.⁹ The real spiritual discipline (lokottara*dharma*)¹⁰ starts from the practice of the lesser vows (*anuvratas*), whereas the supra-moral stage ($s\bar{a}m\bar{a}yika-visya$)¹¹ comes last Haribhadra's contribution consists in giving recognition even to commonsense morality, which he rightly calls *loka-dharma*.

If the above scheme were analysed minutely, the journey would thus start from secular morality, and progress through knowledge, to be followed by right faith. This concept of secular morality has been elaborated by Haribhadra in the *Yoga-bindu* under the heading of '*pūrva-sevā*', indicating that it is a sort of preliminary preparation for Yoga. Here Haribhadra includes all the elders—mother, father and teacher—among those who are to be respected,¹² thus embracing the teaching of the *śikṣā-valli* of the *Taittirīyopaniṣad*.¹³ As regards the controversial issue whether gifts can be given to a non-monk or not, Haribhadra clearly decides in favour of offering gifts to the needy.¹⁴ He gives a long list of such other duties, which includes following the prevalent popular customs (*lokācārānuvṛtti*).¹⁵ This shows the practical approach of Haribhadra to Yoga.

Equanimity in pain and pleasure, loss and gain, etc., is well known as the essence of Yoga. Haribhadra has added an entirely new dimension to it by saying that one should have equanimity in what is prescribed and prohibited by the scriptures. One should have no attachment to what is prescribed and no aversion for what is prohibited.¹⁶ This comes nearer to the concept of *suddhopayoga* of Kundakundācārya. Śaṅkarācārya also says that prescription and prohibition belong to the domain of the *Pūrvamīmārinsā*, which conducts an inquiry into *Dharma*. Of course this latter term is to be understood in the technical sense of ritualistic religion, and not does belong to the domain of *Vedānta*, which enquires into spiritualism (*brahma-jijñāsā*). Haribhadra has shown a deep understanding of spiritualism in this context. He has made a very bold proposition in putting the meritorious and demeritorious actions on par.

This is, however, only one aspect of the problem. The perennial problem is how *Yoga* could lead to *A-yoga*, the *Samprajñāta* to *A-samprajñāta*, and *Śubha* to *A-subha*, and *Karma* to *A-karma*. If the ultimate aim is to stop all activities, why prescribe any activity at all? The answer is that vigilant activities purify the body; utterances free from blemishes purify the speech; and auspicious thinking purifies the mind.¹⁷ The body, speech and mind are first to be purified before their activities are totally stopped. Hence the importance of *Yoga* for *A-yoga*. The evil propensities which have a stronger sway over us, are to be counteracted by good activities, which are easier to be regulated and controlled.

There are, thus, antidotes for all evil tendencies. Fear is to be checked through seeking the shelter of a preceptor, *karma* by penance and infatuation by the study of the scriptures.¹⁸ These three remedies remind one of the three constituents of the *Kriyāyoga* of the essence of Yoga of Patañjali.¹⁹ For obvious reasons, only the refuge in God has been replaced by refuge in the preceptor. Patañjali has influenced Haribhadra in other ways also, as for instance, when he suggests that the counter-ideas of sin should be entertained to overcome evil thoughts of attachment to women or wealth and thoughts of enmity.²⁰

And, last but not the least, Haribhadra's emphasis is on performing activities with mindfulness. Activities, when performed mechanically, yield but temporary results, whereas those performed with mindfulness lead to permanent results. This has been brought out with the help of a simile.²¹ The frog lying dead comes to life again when there is rain, but not if its body is reduced to ashes. Similarly, our passions may subside temporarily through some mechanical process, but their permanent annihilation is possible only through mindful or conscious *Yoga*. This suggests the difference between the temporary pacification (*aupaśamika*) and permanent annihilation (*kṣāyika*) paths of progress (*śreni*).

Thus, in fine, a study of even a small treatise like the *Yogaśataka* of Haribhadra shows, beyond doubt, his rationality, catholicity, robust commonsense, deep insight into spiritual tradition, his power to reconcile the opposites and his originality.

Notes

- 1. Studies in Jaina Philosophy, Banaras, 1951, pp. 293-304.
- 2. Jaina Meditation, Ladnun, 1986, pp. xxiii-xliv.
- Yoga-śataka (YS), Beawar, 1982, 2; Yoga-vimśikā, 1; Yoga-bindu (YB),
 31.
- 4. Ibid., 2.
- 5. Yoga-sūtra, 1.2: Yogaś citta-vrtti-nirodhh /
- 6. Tattvārtha-sūtra, 9.1: Āsrava-nirodhah samvarah /
- 7. YS, 59: Annānam puņa moho /
- 8. Ibid., 4 and 13.
- YS, 25: Padhamassa loka-dhamme para-pīdā-vajjaņāI oheņa / Gurudevātihi-pūyāI dīņadāņāI ahigicca //
- 10. Ibid., 27.
- 11. Ibid., 29.
- 12. YB, 110: Mātā pitā kalācārya etesām jñātayas tathā / Vrddhā dharmopadestāro guru-vargah satām matah //
- 13. TU., Mātr-devo bhava / Pitr-devo bhava / Ācārya-devo bhava /
- 14. YB, 121: Pātre dīnādi-varge ca dānam vidhivad īsyate /
- 15. Ibid., 130.
- YS, 17: Padisiddhesu ya dese vihiyasu ya īsi-rāga-bhāge vi / Sāmāiya asuddham suddham samayāe dosum pi //
- Ibid., 40: Gamanāiehim kāyam niravajjehim vayam ca bhaniehim / Suha-cintanehim y manam ohejjā joga-siddhi tti //
- 18. Ibid., 48.
- 19. YSū, 2.1: Tapah-svādhyā-praņidhānāni kriyāyogah /
- 20. Ibid., 2. 67-70; also 2. 33: Vitarka-bādhane pratipakṣa-bādhanam /
- Ibid., 86: Kāya-kiriyāe dosā khaviyā mumdukka-cunna-tulla tti / Te ceva bhāvanāe neyā tac-chāra-sarisa tti //

CHAPTER 2

A Comparison of the Yoga Systems as Propounded by Patañjali and Haribhadrasūri

Gokul Chandra Jain

A comparative study of the Yoga Systems as propounded by Patañjali and Haribhadrasūri is by itself an important topic of discussion. In this case first of all one is expected to possess a sound knowledge of the traditional background of the two exponents. Patañjali belongs to the ancient Sāmkhya-Yoga School whereas Haribhadra to the Jaina school of Indian Philosophy. Second, when Patañjali propounded his doctrine, he might have been well aware of the other Schools including the Jaina School as known and practiced during his age, but certainly not with the exposition of Haribhadra, as he was later than Patañjali. Third, when Haribhadra composed his works on Yoga, many traditions and interpretations including that of Patañjali were current. Fourth, Haribhadra was a Brahmin turned into a Śramana, and as a versatile scholar he had shouldered great responsibility of exploring the oneness of purpose of all the main streams of Indian wisdom, as soon as he adopted Śramanism. And finally, in the Śramanism, which Haribhadra inherited, the term Yoga had an absolutely different meaning than that with Patañjali; it is significant in the doctrine of Karma.

According to Umāsvāti, actions of the body, the organ of speech and the mind is called *Yoga*.¹ Actually the vibration of the soul caused by the action of these three is *Yoga*. Here *Yoga* is activity, *karma*. It is differentiated into tree kinds, viz., *Kāya-yoga*, *Vacana-yoga* and *Mano-yoga*, according to the nature of the cause being the body, the speech and the mind, respectively. Bodily activity (*kāya-yoga*) is the vibration set in the soul by the molecules of the body. The speech-activity (*vacana-yoga*) is the vibration set in the soul by the molecules of the organ of speech. Thought activity (*mano-yoga*) is the vibration in the soul caused by the molecules composing the mind.

This three-fold activity, i.e. the *Yoga*, attracts the karmic matter. It is, therefore, the influx, technically called $\bar{A}srava.^2$ Just as water flows into a lake through the streams, so also the karmic matter flows into a soul through the channels or medium of activity. Hence, activity is the cause of influx ($\bar{a}srava$) of *karma*. This type of Yoga is being performed by all beings since ever without a beginning, up till now, and while reaping its fruits they have been attracting new karmic matter, which in its turn will bear its fruit in future.

It should be kept in mind that one is oneself alone responsible for one's own *Yoga* and will have to face the result of it. None else can share in this *Yoga* and its result. We are, therefore, reminded by Umāsvāti that this *Yoga* is of two kinds, viz., virtuous activity (*śubha-yoga*) and wicked activity (*a-śubha-yoga*), which results in merit (*puŋya*) and demerit (*pāpa*).³

As to what is good and evil, Umāsvāti enumerates killing, stealing, etc., as wicked activity, and the opposite of it as good one. From the real point of view, there is no doubt that all activities are undesirable, since every activity is the cause of influx and bondage. From this view point, no activity, would really ever be desirable as conducive to liberation at all. In this context, Umāsvāti says that the activity, which purifies the soul, is merit, and that which keeps the soul away from good is demerit. Again, this influx is of two kinds, viz., that of persons having passions, which continues the transmigration, and that of the persons who are free from passions; the latter prevents or decreases it.⁴ The individual soul attracts particles of matter that are likely to turn into *karma*, as the soul is actuated by passion. This is called bondage.⁵

Now, the means to stop the influx, which is the cause of generating karmic matter, is the obstruction (*samvara*) of the inflow of karmic matter. This is the real Yoga. It almost approaches the definition of Yoga as given by Patañjali. The term *Samvara* in Jainism is defined as the control or restraint of the influx.⁶ It comes to mean the restrain (*nirodha*) of the activity of the body, speech and mind.

Thus, both these terms *Samvara* and *Yoga* signify restraint, but while in the former the restraint is of the threefold influx, in the latter it is only of the mental activity. It can be seen here that there is no essential difference between the two, because the activity of the body and that of speech necessarily presuppose the corresponding mental activity.

Yoga as the Āsrava in Jainism twofold, viz., Sakasāya-yoga and A-kasāya-yoga. Patañjali's Yoga-sūtra mentions two types of mental activities, viz., impure (klista) and pure (a-klista). These two terms kasāya and kleśa have the same connotation. According to Jainism the Sakasāya-yoga has to be first ended and then A-kasāya-yoga. So, too, in the Patañjali's Yoga-sūtra the impure activities have to be restrained first and then only the pure.

In his *Tattvārtha-sūtra*, Umāsvāti enumerates as the aides to restraint the following: self-control (*gupti*), self-regulation (*samiti*), moral virtues (*dharma*), contemplation (*anupreksā*), conquest of patience (*pariṣaha-jaya*), conduct (*cāritra*), austerity (*tapas*).⁷ The Jainism admits of austerity as both physical and external (*bāhya*) and mental or internal (*ābhyantara*) which effects the stoppage of influx (*samvara*). The external austerity is of six types, viz., fasting (*anaśana*), decreased diet (*avanaudarya*), fixing the type of diet by excluding all other types (*vrtti-parisamkhyāna*), giving up delicious diet (*rasaparityāga*), selecting a lonely habitat (*vivikta-śayanāsana*), and mortification of the body (*kāya-kleśa*). The internal austerity is of six types, viz., expiation (*prāyaścitta*), humility (*vinaya*), service of worthy people (*vaiyāvrtya*), study (*svādhyāya*), giving up attachment to the body, etc. (*vyutsarga*), and meditation (*dhyāna*).

Of the aids to the stoppage of influx mentioned above, conduct (*cāritra*) conforms to Patañjali's Yama and Buddhist Śīla. Similarly, the internal austerities like meditation, etc., resemble Patañjali's *Pratyāhāra* and Buddhist *Samādhi*. Likewise, the external austerities like fasting, etc., corresponds to *Tapas* given as the third among the *Niyamas* by Patañjali, while the external austerity called 'study' may be compared to the Svādhyāya enumerated as the fourth among the five *Niyamas* by Patañjali.

Haribhadra composed about half a dozen works on the science of Yoga. In his times many traditions and interpretations of Yoga were current. He sorted cream from all of them and utilized it in enriching the Jain Yoga literature. The Yoga-drsti-samuccaya and the Yoga-bindu are two major works of Haribhadra on Yoga in Sanskrit, while his Yoga-śataka and the Yoga-vińśikā are in Prakrit. In the first two texts Haribhadra mainly discusses the problem of an ideal personality.

In the Yoga-drṣṭi-samuccaya, Haribhadra attempts a novel scheme of spiritual tradition. He has divided Yoga into three types, viz., *icchā-yoga, śāstra-yoga* and *sāmarthya-yoga*, and the spiritual evolution into eight stages or *drṣṭis*, viz., *Mitrā, Tārā, Balā, Dīprā, Sthirā, Kāntā, Prabhā,* and Parā. These names and the basic concepts underlying them seem to have been borrowed from some non-Jaina tradition because there is almost nothing typically Jaina about this eight-fold division. Still one can compare the fourteen Guṇa-sthānas with these eight stages as well with the list given by Patañjali in his Yoga-sūtra.

In his Yoga-bindu, Haribhadra has enumerated three types

of Yogins, viz., A-punar-bandhaka, Samyag-drsti or Bhinnagranthin, and Cāritrin. The last type is further divided into two subtypes, viz., Deva-vratin and Sarva-vratin. Of these last two, the Deva-vratin is subject to the rise of all types of passions (kasāya), particularly the darśanīya and the mohanīya types. The Samyag-drsti and the Caritrin of the Desa-vratin subtype are endowed with the wearing away (ksaya) and cessation (upaśama) of the darśaniya and the mohaniya types of karmas, as well as the wearing away and cessation of the *a-pratyākhyāna*. and of the possibility of the rise of the rest of the kasāyas. In the case of the Caritrin of the Sarva-vratin type, i.e. the would-be Vītarāgin and the would-be Kevalin who have ascended to the stage of cessation of all karmas, there prevails the cessation of the darśaniya and the mohaniya, as also both the wearing out and the cessation of the anantānubandhin and apratyākhyānāvarana karmas, too. The Cāritrin who have ascended to the stage of cessation is endowed with the wearing out of all types of karmas. Both the Vītarāga and the Kevalin are endowed with the wearing out of all the karmas.

In the description of *Cāritrin*, Haribhadra presents an exposition of the five stages of *Yoga*, viz., contemplation of truth accompanied by moral conduct (*adhyātma*), repeated practice of contemplation accompanied by the steadfastness of the mind (*bhāvanā*), concentration of mind (*dhyāna*), equanimity (*samatā*), and the annihilation of all traces of mental activities (*vrtti-samkṣaya*). The first four, and the last one of these, are comparable to the *samprajñāta* and the *a-samprajñāta* types of *samādhi* of Patañjali. This description of the stages of spiritual development differs from the one found in the *Yoga-dṛṣți-samuccaya*, in regard to the terminology, classification and style. The subject matter of the *Yoga-śataka* closely resembles with that of the *Yoga-bindu* and most of the topics found in it are summarized in the *Yoga-śataka*.

The Yoga-vimśikā gives a very brief sketch of Yoga. It does

not refer to the initial stages, but discusses only the advanced stages of spiritual development. Although Haribhadra herein as Yoga considers all spiritual and religious activities, because they lead to liberation, he gives special importance to five kinds of activities, viz., the practice of proper posture (*sthāna*), correct utterance of sound ($\bar{u}rn\bar{a}$), proper understanding of the meaning (*artha*), concentration ($\bar{a}lambana$) on the image of Tīrthankara in his full glory, and concentration on his abstract attributes (*anālambaba*). Of these, the first two constitute external spiritual activity (*jñāna-yoga*) and the last three the internal spiritual activity (*jñāna-yoga*). These five activities are to be mastered one after another, and they all constitute a full course of yogic practice.

Haribhadra further adds that only those individuals, who have attained the fifth or still higher stage of spiritual development (guna-sthāna), viz., the Deśa-cāritrin and the Sarvacāritrin, can properly practice these activities. One reaches the consummation of the above activities in the following order: At the outset one develops an interest in these activities and comes to have a will (icchā) for practicing them; then he takes an active part in them and begins actual practice (pravrtti); gradually he becomes steadfast in them and achieves stability (sthairya); and finally, he gains mastery (siddhi) over the activities.

These various types and subtypes of Yoga become possible as a result of the wearing away and destruction (*kṣayopaśama*) of this or that sort which the souls, which ever destined to attain liberation, earn through their evincing an attitude of faith, attachment, etc., towards *Yoga*. According to Haribhadra the feeling of compassion for those in misery, that of disgust for the worldly existence, that of eagerness for liberation, and that of calmness in general are the respective results of the *icchā-yoga*, and others.

One may practice these spiritual activities either out of love (*prīti*), or reverence (*bhakti*), or as an obligatory duty prescribed

by the scriptures (*āgama* or *vacana*), or without any consideration (*asanga*). When they are not performed out of love and reverence, they lead to worldly and other-worldly prosperity (*abhyudaya*), and when they are performed as duty without any consideration whatsoever, it leads to final emancipation (nihśreyas).

And, out of the five special kinds of activities, enumerated by Haribhadra, it is the practice of the last one comprising the meditation on the abstract attributes (*anālambana-yoga*) through which one crosses over the ocean of delusion, the crossing that marks the completion of the process of ascending to the top of the successive stages (*śreny-ārohana*). After that one first attains omniscience, then one goes down into the trance in which all bodily, mental and vocal activities come to cease, and one finally attains liberation (*moksa*).

Thus, to conclude:

- 1. Although Patañjali and Haribhadra have used different terminology in the exposition of their respective Yoga Systems, there is much similarity in practice.
- 2. The metaphysical foundations and ethical code of conduct are the essential part of both these Systems, and this spirit is witnessed at every step in their respective exposition.
- 3. While some fundamental concepts like Purusa and Prakrti of Patañjali and Jīva and A-jīvan of Haribhadra, play very important role in their respective Systems, the theories of bondage and liberation are the deciding factors in the formulation of their codes of conduct and the gradual spiritual stages.

Notes

- 1. TS, 6.1: Kāya-vān-manaḥ-karma yogaḥ /
- 2. TS, 6.2.
- 3. TS, 6.3: Śubhah puŋyasyāśubhah pāpasya /
- 4. TS, 6.4: Sa-kaşāyākaşāyayoķ /
- 5. TS, 8.2: Sakaṣāyatvāj jivaḥ karmaṇo yogyān pudgalān ādatte sa bandhaḥ⁄
- 6. TS, 9.1: Āsrava-nirodhaḥ saṁvaraḥ /
- TS, 9.2: Sa gupti-samiti-dharma-anuprekşā-parişahajaya-cāritraih tapasā nirjarā ca /

CHAPTER 3

The Contribution of Haribhadra to the Yoga-Vidyā

RAMJEE SINGH

The Indian systems of thought and culture are not mere speculations on the external nature of things but also of the mysteries of our mind and soul. Even frankly realistic disciplines like Jainism, Nyāya-Vaiśesika and Mīmāmsaka, show most serious concern to fathom the depths of the mind and unravel the mysteries of spirit. The common channels and sources of knowledge like perception, inference, etc., are found to be inadequate and it has been the abiding spiritual ambition of man to extend the frontiers of his knowledge. Even to a scientist, any attempt to put a limit to our knowledge is a result of some wrong notions. Nothing is regarded as static or absolute. Even to the Marxists, 'there is nothing in the nature which cannot be explained'. Thus the growth of human knowledge has been due to a sort of progression of septical and agnostic attitudes. It seems that it can extend without assignable limits with regard to the knowledge of mankind.1

A spiritual conviction and a constant urge for the ultimate truth are the basis of our common $S\bar{a}dhan\bar{a}$. It is not only the perfection of the cognitive faculty of the self but also its ultimate end.² Hence, 'know thyself' ($\bar{a}tm\bar{a}nam$ viddhi), has been regarded as the climax of our spiritual $S\bar{a}dhan\bar{a}$. There are obvious limitations to our sensory knowledge, and there are antinomies of reasons. Hence, we have to transcend these usual sources of knowledge in order to realize the truth. This process has a common term in Indian thought—we have to transcend these usual sources of knowledge in order to realize the truth. This process has a common term in Indian thought—*Yoga*. It is not *against* but *beyond* reason.

The term *Yoga* symbolizes the core of Indian spiritual $S\bar{a}dhan\bar{a}$. The fourfold social divisions of occupation (*varna-vibhājana*), its trade and business, language and physical culture, etc., are only the external signs of the Aryans;³ even the concept of other world, heaven and hell, is not its essential ingredient.⁴ Its real and inner spirit lies in the absolute concentration of thought, or one-pointedness, on the ultimate reality which is beyond the present space and time.⁵ Perhaps, on account of this distinctive feature, the Aryans have been judged as superior to all other races and climes.

In life, theory and practice, knowledge and action, empirical and transcendental require to be synthesized. As a matter of fact, the real practice of one's knowledge is called *Yoga*. Knowledge precedes, *Yoga* succeeds. But knowledge without its practice or implementation is not only incomplete but also ambiguous. Thus Yoga is superior to *Tapas, Jñāna* and *Karma*.⁶ It is the best of all the three and includes devotion also. *Yoga* or union with God, which is attained through Bhakti, is the highest spiritual goal. *Jñāna* is scriptural learning (*śāstra-pānditya*)⁷ and not spiritual realization. Truly wise man is the *Yogī*. Without *Yoga* or concentration of mind, the human energies are frittered away in many directions and go waste. Hence, the spirit of man is the key for the success of all practical activities. A man versed only in scriptural learning, but lacking in Yogic realization is called as 'the friend of the learned',⁸ but not a *Yogi*.

Then there are two dimensions of *Yoga*, the external and the internal. Even he process of concentration is regarded as its

outer frame, whereas renunciation of all attachment and reducing oneself to zero is its inner spirit. The real *Yoga*, therefore, consists in inner poise, self-mastery, and conquest of anger, of sensitiveness, of pride and of ambition.⁹ So there are two types of *Yoga*, that of knowledge, and that of action. The former consists in the knowledge about the Self, its bondage, its liberation and the path to liberation. But mere knowledge or theoretical knowing is no good. What is more important is the performance of work without any selfish attachment to results, with a view to securing the welfare of the world, with the realization that the agentship belongs to the modes of Prakrti or to God Himself.¹⁰ In fact, Yoga consists in practical realization of the Self.

There are threefold traditions of Yoga literature in Indian writings, the Vedic, the Jinistic, and the Buddhist. Though the term *yoga*' has occurred many times in the *Rgveda*, it has always been used in the sense of 'union' only, and never in the sense of meditation or concentration of mind. Even such keywords, like meditation, non-attachment, breath control, withdrawal from the external world, etc., of Yoga literature, are absent in the *Rgveda*.¹¹

However, the Upanisads¹² do abound in mentioning these concepts. There might be differences of opinion regarding the nature or number of the ultimate reality, but there is a remarkable unanimity regarding the acceptance of Yogic Sādhanā for its realization. All the Vedic systems including Nyāya,¹³ Vaiśeṣika,¹⁴ Sāmkhya,¹⁵ Yoga,¹⁶ and Vedānta,¹⁷ accept the utility and relevance of *Yoga* in their respective systems. Pūrva-mīmāsā is the only exception, which does not even refer to *Yoga*. It is interested in ritualistic action. The *Bhagavadgītā*,¹⁸ the *Mahābhārata*,¹⁹ the *Bhāgavata*,²⁰ the *Yoga-vāsiṣtha*,²¹ and important works on Tantra,²² as also many works of Hathayoga, accept the place and importance of *Yoga*. Many medieval saints and scholars like Jñānadeva,²³ Ambeya,²⁴ Kabir,²⁵ and others have discussed the subject of Yoga with great seriousness.²⁶

In Jainism, the term Carita (conduct) is the exact equivalent

of the general term Yoga.²⁷ The Jaina tradition, being predominantly ascetic and world-negating, lays stress upon wilful silence (mauna), austerities (tapas), and other vogic activities. The Jaina Agamas describing the conduct of the mendicants (sādhu-carvā) refer to many vogic activities like the abstentions (yama) and observances (niyama), study (svādhyāya), austerities (tapas), withdrawal of the senses (pratyāhāra), etc.²⁸ Even the acts of volition (pravrtti) has to be surcharged by the spirit of volition in the negative sense (*nivrtti*), technically called as Asta-pravacana-mata.²⁹ Jaina mendicants are directed to concentrate on study and meditation for the three-fourths of their daily routine.³⁰ In the Jaina Agamas³¹ and the Niryuktis,³² the term Yoga has been mostly used in the sense of concentration of mind with numerous classifications and sub-classifications. Even the Tattvārtha-sūtra³³ refers to dhyāna, and the Dhyānaśataka of Jinabhadra-gani Ksamasāśramana is only the explication of the notion of dhyāna.

But it was Haribhadra who for the first time gave an altogether new dimension to the interpretation of Yoga. It is only he who defined the term Yoga in the sense of 'what leads one to emancipation'.³⁴ Thus he has ushered a new era in the Yoga-literature of the Jainas. He wrote important Yoga treatises like the Yoga-bindu (YB), the Yoga-drsti-samuccaya (YDS), the Yoga-vimśikā (YV), the Yoga-śataka (YS), and the Sodaśaka (S). The term Yoga was used in the general sense of subduing the senses and the mind and the process of concentration and ecstasy even in the earlier stages of the Jainism as well as in the early Buddhist thought. But the terms Jhāna (dhyāna) and Samādhi were more in vogue than the term Yoga. It is only in the Yogasūtra of Patañjali that we find the proper location of dhyāna in the eight-fold process of *Yoga*, for the first time.³⁵ Haribhadra in his characteristic catholic outlook did not discuss and interpret Yoga according to the Jaina tradition only, but he made a comparative and critical study of Patañjali's Yoga,³⁶ etc. The

description of the eightfold standpoints³⁷ in the Yoga-drstisamuccaya is altogether a new dimension in the Yoga literature.

Haribhadra considers all spiritual and religious activities that lead towards emancipation as Yoga. His ingenuity lies in the yogic interpretation of the Jaina doctrine of spiritual development (guna-sthāna). The soul has inherent capacity for emancipation but this capacity remains dormant and inactive due to karmic influences. But the soul can be roused to active spiritual exertion, which is nothing other than yogic activities. The Jainas do not believe in the eternal revelation of the Truth like the Mīmāmsakas and the Vedāntins, nor in its revelation by a Supreme Divinity like the Nyāya-Vaiśesikas and the Patañjali's Yoga. Only rare souls known as Tirthankaras, who have acquired the potency of revealing the Truth and preaching it to the world by their moral and virtuous activities can help in arousing us from moral slumber. The centrifugal tendency of the soul to run away from the fetters of world existence is thwarted by a centripetal force of attachment $(r\bar{a}ga)$, repulsion $(dvesa)^{38}$ and perverted attitude (mithyātva). However, the soul, when it achieves purification, feels uneasiness with the worldly existence and shows manifestation of energy known as yathā-pravrtta-karana for the spiritual advancement. But the struggle between the twofold processes, the centrifugal and the centripetal,³⁹ continues unless the soul develops such spiritual strength as is destined to lead it to final emancipation by reducing the duration and intensity as also the mass of karmic matter through the triple processes of the yathāpravrtta-karana, the apūrva-karana, and the anivrtti-karana.⁴⁰ The soul then starts climbing up the spiritual ladder of subsidence (upaśama-śreni) and that of annihilation (ksapaka-śreni) up to the final fourteenth stage of absolute motionlessness.

Haribhadra's style of describing the fourteen stages of spiritual development through the process of *Yoga* is original and illuminating. In the course of his discussions, he has mentioned the names of many *Yogis*⁴¹ and treatises on *Yoga*.⁴²

Here, Haribhadra poses a crucial problem as regards knowing the real point of the beginning of the spiritual development of the soul desiring salvation in the timeless world of attachment. According to Haribhadra, it is when the influence of the deluding *Karma* starts decreasing that the process of spiritual development starts. The state prior to this beginning of the spiritual develop- ment is called *A-carama-pudgala-parāvarta* while the state posterior to it is called *carama-pudgala-parāvarta*. Between these two poles of *a-carama* and *carama*, we have the different stages of spiritual development.⁴³ Herein the process of Yoga begins, which causes simplicity, humility, catholicity, benevolence and other virtues in the soul.⁴⁴ The emergence of these ethical virtues is the outer signs of the spiritual development of the soul.

The special feature of Haribhadra is his comparative studies in Yoga. For instance, in the YV, wherein five kinds of activities. viz., sthāna, ūrna, artha, ālambana and an-ālambana, divided into external activity (karma-yoga) and the internal spiritual activity (jñāna-yoga),45 are discussed. Haribhadra has here tried to correlate them with the stages of spiritual development (guna-thana). Only those who have attained the fifth one or a still higher stage of the Guna-thanas can properly practice these activities. In this way, Haribhadra correlates different stages of the Guna-thanas to the different stages of concentration (dhyana).46 He compares the An-ālambana-yoga with the Samprajñāta Samādhi, in Patañjali's system⁴⁷ and the final consummation of this an-ālambana concentration is the A-samprajñāta Samādhi. Similarly, the fourteenth stage of the spiritual development corresponds to the Dharma-megha Samādhi of Patañjali, and of the Amrtātman of yet another system, to the Bhava-śatru of a third system, to Śivodaya of yet another system, to the Sattvānanda of yet others and to the Parā of still another school.48 Similarly, Haribhadra tries to show the unanimity of the concept of final self-realization of all the systems of thought. He enumerates eight primary defects,49 from which the mind of a Yogī must always be free. By practicing the concentration of mind, the soul realizes itself. This is known as Supreme Bliss (*paramānanda*) in the Vedānta, the extinguished lamp (*vidhmāta-dīpa*) of the Buddhists, the extinction of animality (*paśutva-vigama*) of the Śaivites, the end of suffering (*duḥkhānta*), freedom from the specific qualities according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, and detachment from the elements (*bhūta-vigama*).⁵⁰ Like an impartial truth-seeker, Haribhadra asks the seekers to keep their minds open and investigate the Truth with perfect detachment and freedom from prejudices.

Similarly, Haribhadra shows that there is a fundamental unity among all apparently conflicting systems of thought regarding the means to attain freedom from worldly existence. He asks us to see unity in diversities. He lays down five steps as a complete course of Yoga, viz., contemplation on truth (adhyātma); repeated practice of meditation (bhāvanā), concentration of mind (dhyāna), equanimity (samatā), and annihilation of all the traces of Karma (vrtti-samksaya).⁵¹ The same principle, according to Haribhadra, is expressed by different terms. It is the Purusa in the Vedanta, as well as in the Jaina system, Jñāna in the Buddhist school and Ksetra-vid in the Sāmkhya system. Similarly, the fundamental ground of worldly existence is called Avidyā in Vedānta and Buddhism, Prakrti in Sāmkhya, and Karma in Jainism. Likewise, the relation between matter and spirit is known as Bhranti in Vedanta and Buddhism, Pravrtti in Sāmkhya, and Bandha in the Jaina system.52 Referring to Gopendra of the Sāmkhya system, Haribhadra holds that the Purusa does not even enquire about the path of realization unless the Prakrti has turned her face away from him. In other words, it is the nature of the Spirit to get disentangled from Matter. For this, the requisite purification of the soul is very necessary. Then the soul becomes a Bodhisattva or Tirthankara.53 Then there is no more spiritual degeneration to him.⁵⁴ He does not commit evil or sin; on the contrary, he is keen exclusively on the well-being of others,

acquires wisdom,⁵⁵ treads upon the right path and appreciates merit. Haribhadra compares the Jaina conception of *Tirthankara* with the Buddhist one of *Bodhisattva*.⁵⁶ He distinguishes three categories of the souls destined to be emancipated, the *Tirthankara*,⁵⁷ *Ganadharas*,⁵⁸ and *Mundā-kevalins*.⁵⁹ Haribhadra's contribution also lies in suggesting fivefold stages of preliminary preparation for *Yoga* as we find in Patañjali's scheme of *Yama* and *Niyama*. As has been mentioned earlier, the stages of the soul are *Adhyātma*,⁶⁰ *Bhāvanā*,⁶¹ *Dhyāna*,⁶² *Samatā*,⁶³ and *Vrtti-samkṣaya*. Here the accumulated and obscuring *Karmas* are destroyed forever and the soul attains omniscience⁶⁴ and final emancipation.

In the YDS, Haribhadra presents a novel plan of classification of yogic stages.⁶⁵ The core of this scheme is the concept of Drsti, which means attitude towards truth. The most important feature of spiritual development is acquisition of love of truth (samyag-drsti). The gradual purification of its love of truth takes place in correspondence to the purification of the soul. So long as the soul has not cut off the knot and attained purification, its attitude is bound to be wrong and perverse, termed as avidvā, mithvātva or darśana-moha. Without purification, the soul can have only commonplace attitude (mogha-drsti) as opposed to the right attitude (sad-drsti) or the attitude of a spiritually advanced soul (yoga-drsti). Haribhadra has listed eight kinds⁶⁶ of spiritual development of the love of truth (drsti) corresponding to the eightfold stages of Patañjali's Yoga, and he refers to the consensus of opinion of a number of authors regarding the stages of Yoga in his auto-commentary on the YDS.⁶⁷ His love of truth is so great that he can never be sectarian. He asks us to realize the truth by means of all the three organs, viz., scripture, logic and practice, of Yoga in keeping with the best-tried and trusted tradition of India. The truth is one. It cannot be multiple. There is only the difference of views or terminology. Yoga is not the monopoly of a particular sect or system. It is based on direct experience of the seers and

lovers of truth. Haribhadra illustrates difference in terminology of the different systems about the same concept. For instance, the state of final realization is known as Sadāśiva in one system, Parabrahman in another, Siddhāntātman in the third and Tathāgata in still another one.⁶⁸ Hence, there can be no conflict when the truth is realized. Controversies take place only when the truth has not been realized,⁶⁹ in the same way as an empty pot makes much noise. The various revelations have to be understood from various contexts and viewpoints. The love of truth gives one the power to cultivate faith in spiritual revelations. In the same way, while referring to the seventh *Dṛṣṭi*, called *Prabhā*, Haribhadra compares it with the *Viṣabhāgaparikṣaya* in the Buddhist School, with the *Praśānta-vāhitā* in the Sāmkhya system, *Śiva-vartman* in the Śaiva system and the *Dhruvādhvan_* of the Mahāvratikas.⁷⁰

Besides these eightfold Drstis corresponding to the eight steps of Yogic Sādhanā in Patañjali, Haribhadra refers to the threefold Yoga, the first stage being the Icchā-yoga, in which in spite of his knowledge and will, the Yogī falters in his practice on account of inertia (*pramāda*),⁷¹ the second stage being the Śāstra-yoga⁷² wherein the practitioner never falters in his yogic practices, strictly follows the scriptural injunctions and develop penetrating insight, and the third and the last stage being the Sāmarthya-yoga,⁷³ when the Sādhaka has fully mastered the scriptural injunctions and has developed the power to transcend them. These are the three broad divisions of all the possible stages of Yoga, and the eight-fold Drstis are only the elaboration of these three.⁷⁴ Similarly, Haribhadra enumerates a fourfold classification of Yogīs, viz., Gotra, Kula, Pravrtta-cakra, and Nispanna. The first three are not incapable of emancipation, while the last one has already achieved his final state. Hence, it is the Yogis of the first three classes who need Yogic instruction.75

In spite of this resemblance, there are fundamental differences also with the mystical way adopted by the Jaina

monk. The Yoga system of Patañjali has not recognized the imperative- ness of mystical conversion. Probably it confuses moral conversion with the mystical one, the importance of initiation by a *Guru*, the necessity of seeking his guidance at every step, the possibility of fall from certain heights, i.e. the dark nights of the soul, the significance of the *Prati-kramana* and the *Pratyākhyāna*. Haribhadra knew these differences but he wanted to establish a unity among the different systems of Indian thought. The process of spiritual development as traced in the *YDS* is different from that found in his *YB*. The *YV* does not describe the preliminary stages of spiritual development but it discusses adequately the later stages. Altogether, Haribhadra's studies in the Yoga Vidyā are a landmark in Indian spiritual *Sādhanā*.

Notes

- Ramjee Singh, The Concept of Omniscience in Ancient Hindu Thought, Oriental Publisher, Delhi, 1979, p. 336.
- 2. Ibid.; *The Jain Concept of Omniscience*, L.D. Institute of Indology, Ahmedabad, 1974, p. 221.
- 3. Max Müller, Biographies of Words and the Home of the Aryans, p.50.
- Radhakrishnan, S., Bhagavadgītā, IX. 21: 'They return to the world of mortals when their merit is exhausted'.
- 5. Max Müller, Sacred Books of the East, vol. I, p. 23 (Intro.).
- 6. Bhagavadgītā (BG), VI. 46
- 7. Ibid. Śāṅkara-bhāṣya on BG. VI.46.
- 8. Yoga-vāsistha, Nir. Prak., Ch.21.
- 9. BG., II.48.
- 10. Ibid., III.43 (view of Yāmunācārya in the Gītā-samgraha).
- The term Yoga has occurred many times in the Rgveda, e.g., I. 5.3;
 I.18.7I; I.34.9; II.8.1; IX.58.3; X.266.5; etc.
- 12. Tait. Up., II.4; Katha., II.6.11; Śvetā.II.11; VI.3; I.14; Chāndo. VII.6.1; VII.6.2; VII.7.1; VII.26.1.
 - 13. Nyāya-Sūtra of Gautama, I.1.1; IV.2.38; IV.2.42; IV 2.46.
- 14. Vaiśe. Sū. Of Kanāda, I.1.4; VI.2.2; VI.2.8.
 - 15. Sāmkhya Sū. Of Kapila, I.1; III.30; III.31-34.
 - 16. Yoga Sū. of Patañjali, IV.33.
 - 17. Brahma Sū. of Bādarāyana, III. Chap. Known as the Sādhjana Pāda.
 - The first six chapters deal with Karma-yoga, the middle six with Bhaktiyoga, and the last six with Jñāna-yoga.
 - Mahābhārata, Śānti Parva, Chs., 193, 217, 254; Anuśāna Parva, Chs., 36, 246, etc.
 - Śrīmad Bhāgavata Mahāpurāņa, Skan., III, Chs. 28; Skan., XI. Chs. 15, 19, 20, etc.
 - Yoga-vāsistha, Chs. on Vairāgya, Mumuksu-vyavahāra, Utpatti, Sthiti, Upāsanā and Nirvāņa.
 - 22. Mahānirvāņa Tantra, Ch. 3.

- 23. Jñāneśvarī B.G., Ch. 6.
- 24. Siddhānta Samhitā of the Suhiroba Ambiya.
- 25. Kabir's Bījaka is an important treatise on Yoga and mysticism.
- 26. S.N. Das Gupta, *Philosophical Essays*, Calcutta University, Calcutta, 1941, p. 179.
- 27. Das Gupta, History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 226.
- S. Sanghvi, Darśana Aura Cintana (Hin.), Gujarat Vidya Sabha, Ahmedabad, 1957, p. 245.
- 29. Uttarādhyayana Sūtra, Ch. 24.
- 30. Ibid., Ch. 26.
- 31. (a) Sthānānga, IV. Uttarādhyayana, XXX. 35.
 - (b) Āvaśyaka Niryukti 1; Samavāyānga, IV; Bhagavatī, XXV.7; Uttarādhyayana, XXX. 35.
- 32. Āvaśyaka Niryukti, (Kāyotsarga), Gāthā 1-2-1486.
- 33. Umāsvāti, Tattvārtha Sū., IX.7.
- 34. YV, Kārikā 1: Mokhena joyaņā jogo savvo vi dhamma-vāvāro /
- 35. N. M. Tatia, *Studies in Jaina Philosophy*, Jaina Cultural Research Society, Varanasi, 1951, p. 261.
- 36. Haribhadra, YB, 418, 420.
- 37. Haribhadra, YDS, Karikā 13.
- Visesāvasyaka Bhāsya, Yasovijaya Jaina Granthamālā, No.35, Gāthā 1194.
- 39. Ibid., Gāthās 1204-1217.
- Bhatta Akalanka, Kashi, 1935, p. 327; Labdhisāra ofNemicandra, R.J. S., No. 8, Nirnaya Sagar Press, 1916, p. 35.
- 41. Gopendra (YB, vs. 200), Kālātīta (YB, vs. 300), Patañjali, Bhadanta Bhāskarabandhu (YSS, vs.16, Ţīkā).
- 42. Yoga-nirnaya (YSS, vs.1, Tīkā).
- 43. Mukta-dveşa-dvātrimśikā, vs. 28.
- 44. S. Sanghavi, op. cit., p. 264.
- 45. Haribhadra, Yoga-Vimśikā (YV), 1.2, Sodasaka-Prakarana (SP), with Yaśobhadra's commentary, Jamnagar, 1992, XIII.4; XIV.1.
- 46. YV, I.18.
- 47. Ibid., 20.

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- YV, with Yaśovijaya's Tīkā, 20; Yoga-Bindu (YB) of Haribhadra, Jaina Granthamala Prakashaka Sabha Series No. 25, Ahmedabad, 1940, p. 422.
- 49. SP with Yaśobhadra's Tīkā, XIV.2-3; XVI.14.
- 50. Ibid., XVI. 1-4.
- 51. YB, 17-18 (with commentary).
- 52. Ibid., 17-18.
- 53. Ibid., 270.
- 54. Ibid., 271.
- 55. Ibid., 272.
- 56. Ibid., 274.
- 57. Ibid., 284-288.
- 58. Ibid., 289.
- 59. Ibid., 290.
- 60. Ibid., 358-359.
- 61. Ibid., 360-362.
- 62. Ibid., 364-365.
 - 63. Ibid., 31.
 - 64. Ibid., 366-367.
 - 65. Yoga-drsti-samuccaya (YDS) of Hatibhadra, ed. Prof. L. Suali, Ahmedabad, 1912, p. 12.
 - 66. The eight forms of love of truth (*drstis*) are Mitrā (YDS, 22, 22–40), Tārā (YDS, 41–48), Balā (YDS, 40–50), Dīprā (YDS, 57–58); Sthirā (YDS, 152–154), Kāntā (YDS, 160–162); Prabhā (YDS, 168–169); Parā (YDS, 179–184).
- 67. Ibid., 16.
 - 68. Ibid., 157, 128.
 - 69. Ibid., 130.
- 70. Ibid., 173-174.
 - 71. Ibid., 3.
 - 72. Ibid., 4.
 - 73. Ibid., 5.
 - 74. Ibid., 12.
- , 75. Ibid., 206-210.

CHAPTER 4

The Buddhist Source of the Eight Drstis in the Yoga-drsti-samuccaya of Haribhadrasūri

N. M. TANTIA

In his Yoga-drsti-samuccaya (YDS), Ācārya Haribhadrasūri enumerates eight stages of Yogic development. The most important feature of the spiritual development is the acquisition of Samyag-drsti. The soul undergoes gradual purification and along with the purification its vision (drsti) becomes progressively steady and reaches perfection in the realization of the Truth. This gradual development of the vision has been classified into eight stages, viz., Mitrā, Tārā, Balā, Dīprā, Sthirā, Kāntā, Prabhā and Parā.

Drsti means attitude towards Truth. This attitude, according to Jainism, is wrong and perverse so long as the soul has not cut asunder the knots (granthi-bheda). This perverse attitude is known as Darśana-moha or Mithyātva or Moha. The attitude of the soul, which has not cut the knot, is known as commonplace attitude (ogha-drsti). The opposite of this is the attitude of the spiritually advanced soul (yoga-drsti). It is also known as the sad-drsti. The former is responsible for the origination of the mutually conflicting systems of thought.

The above-mentioned eight *drstis* are the *yoga-drstis* and not purely the common-place attitudes, although the first four

of them belong to those who have not cut the knots, while the last one belong to those who have cut the knots. But even then they are not counted as commonplace in view of the fact that they are destined to lead to the *yoga-drṣṭi*. These eight *drṣṭis* correspond respectively to the eight famous limbs of Yoga, viz., *Yama, Niyama, Āsana, Prāṇāyāma, Pratyāhāra, Dhāraṇā, Dhyāna*, and *Samādhi* of the system of Patañjali. While they are said to be free respectively from *Kheda, Udvega, Kṣepa, Utthāna, Brānti, Anyamud, Ruk,* and *Āsanga*, they are accompanied respectively by *Adveṣa, Jijñāsā, Suśruṣā, Śravaṇa, Bodha, Mimāmsā, Pari-śuddhā pratipatti* and *Pravṛtti*.

Haribhadra introduces the topic of *drsti* by explaining the nature of the *ogha-drsti* in the following verse:

Sameghāmegha-rātrādau sagrahādyarbhakādi-vat / Ogha-drstir iha jñeyā mithyā-drstītarāśrayā //

In the above-mentioned verse the examples of Samegharātri, Amegha-rātri, Samegha-dina, Amegha-dina, etc., are given in order to explain the gradual clarity of the attitudes.

The eight *drstis* have been compared respectively to the sparks of straw fire, cowdung fire, wood fire, the light of the lamp, the lustre of gem, the light of a star, the light of the sun, and the light of the moon. In the first *drsti*, called *Mitrā*, the soul achieves a very faint and indistinct enlightenment. Here the soul accumulates the seeds $(b\bar{i}ja)$ of Yoga which eventually fructify into emancipation. In the second *drsti*, called $T\bar{a}r\bar{a}$, the soul is capable of some sort of self-restraint and becomes inquisitive about Truth. In the third *drsti*, called *Balā*, the enlightenment becomes more distinct and the soul develops a strong desire for knowing the Truth. In the fourth *drsti*, called $D\bar{i}pr\bar{a}$, the power of understanding Truth develops further, and the soul regards his religion dearer than his very life.

Real spiritual progress, however, has not yet set in. The soul is only trying to capture the image of the Truth instead of the Truth itself. It is only the next four drstis that enable the aspirant to know the Truth. One makes various conjectures about Truth so long as one does not see it face to face. This leads to a number of speculative systems based on fallacious logic. In conformity with ancient Indian tradition, Haribhadra asks us to realize the Truth with the help of all the three means, viz., the scriptures, the logical argument and the practice of Yoga. The Truth is one; it cannot be many. The state of the final realization is known as Sadāśiva in one system, as Parabrahman in another, as Siddhātman in still another, and as Thatāgata, in yet another. It is necessary to understand revelation in its proper context. One should cultivate faith in spiritual revelations. This faith is wanting in all the four commonplace attitudes described above. It is only when the soul has properly cultivated the faith that it cuts asunder the knot (bhranti) and comes to possess the fifth drsti, called Sthirā. In the sixth drsti, called Kāntā, the aspirant is engrossed in spiritual contemplation. The world now loses all attraction for him. In the seventh drsti, called Prabha, the aspirant practices spiritual discipline without any ulterior motive (asangānusthāna). In the seventh gunasthāna the aspirant prepares to rise up to the eighth stage on the Ksapakaśreni. The soul is now marching on the great path (mahā-pathaprayāna), which leads to the state from which one never returns (an-āgami-pada). Haribhadra remarks here that this drsti is known as Praśānta-vāhitā in the Sāmkhya system, as Visa-bhāgapariksaya in the Buddhist school, as Śiva-vartman in the Śaiva system, and as Dhruvādhvan according to the Mahāvratikas. In the eighth drsti, called Parā, the soul is completely free from the attachment to the world. This is the ninth Guna-sthana, in which the soul gradually attains omniscience and emancipation by means of the last Yoga known as A-yoga.

There is a striking parallelism between Haribhadra's concept of the eight *drstis* and Vasubandhu's description of the eight *drstis* described in his *Abhidharma-Kośa-Bhāsya* (*AKBh*.). This parallelism is, however, to be understood very cautiously. The eight *drṣṭis* mentioned by Vasubandhu are the five classical *drṣṭis*, viz., Sathāya-drṣṭi, Anta-grāha-drṣṭi, Mithyā-drṣṭi, drṣṭiparāmarśa, Saikṣī-drṣṭi, and A-saikṣī-drṣṭi.

Of the above-mentioned eight drstis of the Buddhists, the five classical ones are lumped together in the Ogha-drsti by Haribhadra. The Laukikī Samyag-drsti of Vasubandhu is analysed by him as the first four drstis, viz., Mitrā, Tarā, Balā, and Diprā. Similarly, the Śaiksī-drsti of Vasubandhu is analysed in the YDS as Sthirā, Kāntā and Prabhā that obviously correspond to Srotāpatti, Sakrdāgamin and An-āgamin comprised by the Saiksidrsti. It is interesting to note in this connection that the drsti called Prabhā has been identified as An-āgami-pada, which finally confirms our conjecture about Haribhadra's indebtedness to Vasubandhu. The last drsti called Parā is identical with Asaiksī-drsti that leads to Arhattva. It should be further noted that Vasubandhu has explained the gradual clarity of the eight drstis by means of the similes of Samegha-rātri, A-megh-rātri, Samegha-divā and A-megha-divā, almost exactly as Haribhadra has done. In the description given by Vasubandhu, the Klistalaukikī-dṛṣṭi is like the vision in a cloudy night, the A-klistalaukikī-drsti (also called Laukikī-samyag-drsti) is like the vision in a cloudless night, the Saiksī-drsti is like the vision in a cloudy day, and the A-saiksī-drsti is like the vision in a cloudless day. This is expressed by Vasubandhu as follows:

Sa-meghāmegha-rātrindiva-rūpa-darśana-vat/ kliṣṭākliṣṭa-laukikī-śaikṣikyaśaikṣībhir dṛṣṭibhir dharmadarśanam. (AKBh., I. 41)

In this connection it will not be out of place to mention that there is a very close affinity between the fourteen stages of spiritual development (guṇa-sthāna) of Jainism and the eight stages of Mārga and Phala in Buddhism. There is a gradual elimination of wrong notions and passions in both the systems. At the stage of Srota-āpatti, Mārga and Phala, all the wrong notions including Vicikitsā are eliminated. This is called Darśanamārga. The Bhāvanā-heya passions, viz., Avidyā, Rāga, Pratighā (dvesa), and Māna, however, remain intact. At the Sakrdāgamī stages the passions of Rāga, Pratighā and Avidyā are attenuated, and at the An-āgamī stage, the Kāma-cchamda and Pratighā are totally eliminated. At the stage of Arhattva all the remaining passions, viz., Arūpa-rāga, Auddhatya, Māna and Avidyā are totally eradicated (AKBh., p. 356, Prahlad's edition). It is not necessary to explain the Jaina conception of the spiritual stages as that is well known to all.

SECTION II Haribhadra and Nyāya

CHAPTER 5

On the Jaina Concept of Casuality in Haribhadrasūri's Sad-darśana-samuccaya and its Commentaries

L. C. JAIN

The *Sad-darśana-samuccaya* (*SDS*) of Haribhadrasūri (eighth century _{AD}) is said to be a leading Indian work providing a compendium of the six systems of Indian philosophy,¹ and Gunaratnasūri has composed an exhaustive commentary on it.

According to some preceptors, the time-fluent ($k\bar{a}la$ -dravya), among the six fluents, is said to be casual. Some other preceptors regard the lapsing of an instant as eventual in the remaining five fluents. Here we propose to take up section 172, in which details regarding Time have been given.²

According to Gunaratna's commentary, time-fluent exists in the human universe. It is extremely fine, and the indivisible instant (*samaya*) is required as a pure time-fluent ($k\bar{a}la$ -dravya). As it is single-pointed (*eka-pradeśī*), it cannot be called existentcorporeal (*astikāya*), because an aggregate of points (*pradeśas*) is called existent-corporeal (*astikāya*). But according to some preceptors, it is a fluent (*dravya*), hence it flows through its events (*paryāyas*) and controls Gunas. So far as its functions are concerned, they are enumerated as parināma, kriyā, paratva and aparatva.³ Now, in the *Sad-darśana-samuccaya* Haribhadra has declared that $J\bar{i}va$ is different and somehow not different from the attributes such as knowledge, etc. has transformations, and is the doer of auspicious and inauspicious action, the enjoyer of the fruits of actions and is characterized by consciousness. That which has a nature opposed to this has been called *A-jīva*. Virtue is the *pudgals* of good *karma*.⁴

Regarding communication of information, the Dhavalā commentary says that an ultimate particle (paramanu) can travel; at an instant (samaya) with minimal velocity of transgression of a point (pradeśa) and with a maximal velocity of transgression of points (pradeśa) contained in an interval of fourteen rajus. Maxima and minima are described in the Jaina canonical texts as thousands of places whenever comparability (alpa-bahutva) relevant to pud and gala is sought like the Yin and the Yang of the relevant topics in the Chinese philosophy. The Ajaghanyānutkrsta is the middle path traversed by the Buddhas and the Chinese, whereas such terms have mathematical significance in the Jaina philosophy.

Vīrasena explains that an instant is the time of non-passing away of one atom from another one. It is further elaborated as passing away of the ether to the extent of fourteen rope lengths.⁵

This is the behavioural time (*vyavahāra-kāla*) of the Jaina $\bar{A}gama$. The deterministic time (*niścaya-kāla*) is the *Kāla-dravya*. Einstein worked with the maximal possible velocity, which he postulated as remaining constant in all inertial frames of reference, and this created the special theory of relativity, which solved a dilemma of physicists of the beginning of the twentieth century. Still, then remained the problems of the elementary particle theory and the question was whether the minimal velocity postulate of the Jaina School could contribute to it at the nuclear dimensions. These became important at (10)-33 cms., and the time intervals become important from (10)-23 secs., backwards. Perhaps the gravitational force becomes

important at these dimensions which the Jaina literature calls gravity-levity (*gurutva-laghutva*).

For the mathematicians, the following equations deal to those of Einstein's derivations, based on the minimal velocity postulate, are given as follows. These are expected to give new results for particle physics:

$$T = \emptyset(v)\beta_0 (t - Co^r/v^2)$$

$$\xi = \emptyset(v)\beta_0 (x - Cot)$$

$$M = \emptyset(v)y$$

$$U = \emptyset(v)$$

Here, relative to an observer, a Frame of reference is moving with velocity V along axis of X, when the action at the event propagates with minimal velocity cocorresponding to minimal time interval. Here (v) may be found to be +1. (4) Further:

$$\beta_{o} = \frac{1}{\sqrt{1 - \frac{Co^{2}}{v^{2}}}}$$

There is one more beauty of this minimal velocity postulate. The maximal velocity postulate of Einstein led Minkowsky to give a mathematical space-time where casuality could be determined on the basis of reality relations. However, Einstein was said to have found that mathematics in which he was supposed to be weak was brought into relativity. However, his general theory of relativity my also be said to be based on Riemannian geometry alone. Today the gauge theories of fields work only on the fibre-bundle geometry and if we introduce the minimal and maximal velocity postulates with respect to a minimal time interval (*samaya*) of the Jains, we get a fibre bundle geometry of discrete space-time where functionals play part of fields and particles.

The maximal velocity postulate brings us near the casuality about particles, which could not move faster than the velocity of light. The minimal velocity brings us nearer the casuality about particles, which could not move less than it does. What could be such particles? Could they help us in getting a remote control over the chain reaction, which causes explosion of an atom or hydrogen bomb? How could such particles be transmitted as mediating particles? These are the pathways, which may be followed by an academician or technologist who has read Jaina literature thoroughly in its mathematical aspect of the *Karma* theory. Could this casuality search not save the world from the nuclear hazards?

As soon as the maximal velocity postulate worked out the casuality of mass energy relation, the possibility of making an atom bomb through chain reaction was sought out and became the top-secret topic for the developed nations. But the minimal velocity postulate stands in opposition to it to counteract the abuses of the atom bombs and worked out a possibility of some more mysterious controls at the nuclear dimensions. Professor Emeritus Kazuo Kondo has envisaged that gravitons might be such particles that may be moving with the velocity of half of the Planck's constant. It is natural to imagine that if fast moving neutrons could cause fission and produce a critical state of chain reaction, then we could also think of charming the particles and cause them to get neutralized from the effects of the neutrons permanently, through the results of the minimal-maximal field theory.

At this moment it may be emphasized that the centres of Jaina learning should be prepared for interdisciplinary studies for which they should come up to accommodate such scholars who are mathematicians and physicists as well as interested in the Jaina studies. There are several secrets other than the casuality concepts detailed above, in the *Karma* system theoretic approach of the Digambara Jaina canonical texts, full of mathematical symbolic manoeuvre, on which the author has been recently working with financial support of the Indian National Science Academy.⁶ Time has come when traditional scholars cannot keep their eyes and ears closed for scientific knowledge.

Notes

- Sad-darśana-samuccaya of Haribhadrasūri (SDS), ed. Dr. Mahendra Kumar Jain, Bhāratīya Jñānapītha, New Delhi, 1970.
- 2. Ibid., pp. 251-252.
- Tattvārtha-sūtra (TS), 5.22: vartanā-pariņāmah kriyā paratvāparatve cakālasya.
- 4. SDS, 48–49: Tatra jñānādi-dharmebhyo bhinnābhinno vivrttimān Śubhāśubh-karma-karttā bhoktā karma-phalasya ca // Caitanyalakṣaņo jīvo yaś caitad-viparītavān 'A-jīvaḥ sa samākhyātaḥ puŋyam sat-karma-pudgalaḥ //
- Aņor aņvantarāvyatikrama-kālah samayah / Coddasa rajju-āgāsapadesa-kamaņa-metta-kāleņa jo coddasa-rajju-kamaņa-kkhamo paramāņu tassa ega-paramāņu-kkamaņ-kālo samaoņāma.
- 6. The author is grateful to Dr. A. K. Bag for providing help in the above study. He is also grateful to the Indian National Science Academy for financial support, a part of which helped in this work. Thanks are due to Prof. Dr. S.C. Datt for providing research facilities in his department.

CHAPTER 6

Haribhadra's Commentary on the Nyāya-praveśa and its Place in the Works of Buddhist Logic

K. K. MITTAL

The Encyclopaedia of Indian Philosophies, vol. 1, edited by Karl H. Potter, revised edition, 1983, has listed under Śańkarasvāmin (about 555 AD), the Nyāya-praveśa, under Entry Nos. 2038 to 2050. But it has neither been possible nor was it thought necessary to handle all this material for the limited purpose of this short paper. It has, therefore, been decided to refer to just three articles only, viz., two of Giuseppe,¹ and one of Vidhusekhar Bhattacharya,² from among them. However, these were supplemented by the references to the Nyāya-praveśa, with or without Haribhadra's commentary from the three books such as Satischandra Vidyabhusan's History of Indian Logic (VHIL), F. Th. Stchetbatski's Buddhist Logic, vol. 1 (SBL), and Hajime Nakamura's Indian Buddhism: A Survey with Bibliographical Notes (NIBS).

Satischandra Vidyabhusan mentions Haribhadra in connection with his inclusion of the Nyāya system among the six systems of his *Sad-darśana-samuccaya*,³ and tells us that in this work Haribhadrasūri (1168 AD) as well as in that of Maladhārī Rājaśekharasūri (1348 AD), the followers of the *Nyāya* Philosophy have been called the *Śaivas*, while those of the *Vaiśesika* system have been called the *Pāśupatas*,⁴ and he mentions him as supporting a reason for the use of Prakrit and Ardhamāgadhī languages for the Jaina scriptures.⁵ Again, he mentions Haribhadra as a commentator of the *Nyāyāvatāra*⁶ of Siddhasena Divākara, the first Jaina writer on systematic logic.⁷ While talking about the affinity between the Jaina and the Buddhist Logic, Satischandra Vidyabhusan informs us⁸ that the Jainas, in so far as they wrote regular treatises on logic, did not differ much from the Buddhists in respect of their subject and style.

The Nyāyāvatāra, by the Śvetāmbara Jaina logician Siddhasena Divākara (500 AD), traverses almost the same ground as the Nyāya-praveśa of the Buddhist logician Dinnāga (450– 530 AD). Rabhāsa Nandi, a Digambara Jaina logician, wrote a commentary called Sambandhodyota on the Sambandha-parikṣā, and likewise, the Jaina Kalyāṇacandra wrote a commentary named Pramāṇa-vārtika-tīkā on the Pramāṇa-vārtika, both of them of the Buddhist logician Dharmakīrti (635 AD). Similarly, Mallavādin (about 926 AD) wrote a commentary named Dharmottara-tippaṇikā on the Buddhist work Nyāya-bindu-tīkā of Dharmottara (847 AD).

In a reverse process we also find the Buddhist authors writing on the Jain themes. Thus, the Buddhist Śāntarakṣita (749 AD) instituted in his *Tattva-samgraha* an inquiry into the Jaina doctrine of the soul, while the Jaina author Haribhadrasūri (750 AD) gave a complete summary of the Buddhist philosophy in his *Sad-darśanasamuccaya*.⁹ Giving a special note on him, Satischandra Vidyabhusan tells us¹⁰ that we find mention of at least two Śvetāmbara Jaina authors bearing the name Haribhadrasūri; one of them died in Vik. Sam. 535, i.e. 478 AD, that while the other was a pupil of Ānandasūri and Amaracandrasūri of the Nāgendra Gaccha and they lived about 1093–1135 AD, that the latter one was called 'Kalikāla Gautama', and that he must have been an eminent logician and author of the *Sad-darśana-samuccaya*, the Daśa-vaikālika-niryukti-tīkā, the Nyāya-pravešaka-sūtra and the Nyāyāvatāra-vrtti. He further adds that the Śad-darśanasamuccaya refers in the chapter on the Bauddha-darśana to the views of such authors as Dinnāga, Dharmakīrti. Again, Satischandra Vidyabhusan informs us¹¹ that in the Anekāntajaya-patākā-tīkā attributed to Haribhadrasūri, there are passages quoted from the works of Dinna, i.e. Dinnāga, Dharmapāla, Dharmakīrti, Bhartrhari, Siddhasena Divākara, Samantabhadra, Mallavādin and Śubhagupta, and is often described as having protected the words of the Arhats, like mother, by his 1,400 works.

One thing that emerges from all these mentions of Haribhadrasūri is that there is no clear statement of his being a commentator of the Nyāya-praveśa of Dinnāga or Sankarasvāmin. Any way the VHIL is not forthcoming in this context as in the observation¹² that the Nyāya-praveśa or the Nyāya-pravešo nāma pramāna-prakarana is another excellent work on logic by Dinnaga. The Sanskrit original is lost. There exists a Tibetan translation of it, which extends over folios 1883-1888 of the Bstan-hgyur, in the section called Tshad-ma-rigspar hjug-pahi-sgo signifying the 'Door of Entrance to Logic', an then he further informs us¹³ that he consulted the Nyāya-praveśa in the volume Ce of the Tibetan Bstan-hgyur which was placed at his disposal by the India Office, London, and that he had also brought a copy of the Nyāya-praveśa from the monastery of Dabrang in Sikkim which he visited in May 1907. This probably is the same as the 'Nyāyadvāra-tarka-śāstra'.14

Satischandra Vidyabhusan informs¹⁵ that at the kind suggestion of Prof. H. Ui¹⁶ he has re-examined the *Pramānanyāya-praveša* (fully entitled as *Nyāya-pravešo nāma pramānaprakaraņa*), and *Pramāṇa-śāstra-nyāya-praveša* (fully called *Pramāṇa-śāstra-nyāya-pravešo nāma*), and find that they are identical in their contents. One was translated into Tibetan direct from Sanskrit and the other through the Chinese version. The original Sanskrit work, of which these are translations, was perhaps called *Nyāya-praveśa*. The *Bstan-hgyur* ascribes this work to Dinnāga who dealt in it with fourteen fallacies besides other subjects. The *Hetu-cakra*, which treats of nine reasons, is a part of it. The *Nyāya-praveśa* and the *Hetu-cakra* combined together constitute Dinnāga's 'Logic of the Nine Reasons and Fourteen Fallacies'. Further, the *Nyāya-praveśa* corresponds to Nos. 1223 and 1224 of Bunyiu Nanjio's *Catalogue of the Chinese Tipitaka*, of which the former represents I-tsings' translation of the *Nyāya-praveśa* brought out in 711 AD, while the latter is Xuan Zhang's translation finished on 648 AD.¹⁷

According to the Chinese *Tipitaka*, Śańkarasvāmin was the author of a work called *Hetuvidyā-nyāya-praveśa-sāstra*, or *Nyāya-praveśa-tarka-sāstra*, ¹⁸ which was translated into Chinese by Xuan Zhang in 647 AD. This work seems to be different.¹⁹ The Tibetans do not know of Śańkarasvāmin an all. The Chinese pilgrim I-tsing, who visited India during 671–695 AD, speaks of Dinnāga and Dharmakīrti, but does not mention Śańkarasvāmin. Even Xuan Zhang (Yuan Chwang) in his *Travels* does not mention him. Śańkarasvāmin's *Nyāya-praveśa-tarka-śāstra* seems to correspond to No. 1216 of Bunyiu Nanjio's *Catalogue*. Is the original Sanskrit text of No. 1216 different from that of No. 1224, i.e. the *Nyāya-praveśa* or more fully the *Nyāya-praveśo nāma pramāņa-prakarana* which, as we have seen, is ascribed by the Tibetans to Dinnāga?

Now, quite in line with the position maintained by the VHIL, Vidhusekhar Bhattacharya argues, in the article no. 5, that both the Tibetan as well as the Indian traditions stand firm in holding the view that Dinnāga, and not Śankarasvāmin, is indeed the author of the Nyāya-praveśa. He refers not only to the knowledge and belief of Haribhadrasūri, the author of the commentary Nyāya-pravešaka-vyākhyā (vrtti), Pārśvadeva the author of the Nyāya-praveśa-tippaṇa to that effect, but also points to the references of the Nyāya-praveśa as a work of Dinnāga in some other works on Philosophy as well, say or instance, to the Ślokavārttika of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, to Pārthasārathī's commentary on the same and to the Vilāsa-kamalāvatī, a commentary on the pramāṇa-samuccaya of Dinnāga himself, now extant only in Tibetan.

In his article entitled Is the Nyāya-praveśa by Dignāga?²⁰ Tucci starts with the observation that the Nyāya-praveśa with the commentary of Haribhadra has been published in the Gaekwad Oriental Series, together with a careful comparative study of the two Tibetan translations by his friend Vidhusekhar Shastri, and then he builds up his case that the Nyāya-praveśa is not the work of Dinnāga but that of his pupil Śankarasvāmin, based on and somewhat differing in contents from the work of the former entitled Nyāya-mukha, and refutes the arguments of Vidhusekhar to conclude that neither the attribution of the Nyāyapravesa to Dignaga to be found in the rather later Tibetan translations of this work, nor the statement of the later author such as Haribhadra, can authorize us to deny the validity to the ancient Chinese sources, which through Xuan Zhang, were directly connected with the traditions current in India at the time of the travels of the great Chinese pilgrim. Nor should we forget that in the colophone of the discovered manuscript of the Nyāya-praveśa no statement is to be found concerning the author of the work.

Stcherbatski has rightly observed²¹ that apart from his two works, viz., the Abhidharma-kośa-marma-pradīpa (a condensed summary on the capital work of his teacher Vasubandhu) and the Astasahasrika-prajñā-pāramitā-sūtra, the remaining works of Dinnāga are all devoted to logic.²² These are the Ālambanapariksā, the Irikula-pariksā, the Hetu-cakra-samarthana (Hetucakra-namaru?), the Nyāya-mukha (=Nyāya-dvāra), the pramāṇa-samuccaya with Vrtti, and the Hetu-mukha.²³ He at first exposed his ideas in a series of short tracts some of which are preserved in Tibetan and Chinese translations,²⁴ and then condensed them in a great oeuvre d' ensemble, the pramāṇa-

samuccaya, in six chapters of mnemonic verse with the author's own commentary. SBL has something to say further interesting: 'The second introduction of logic into China and from that country into Japan due to Xuan Zhang.'25 On his return from India he brought with him and translated two logical works, the one is the Nyāya-mukha (=Nyāya-dvāra) by Dinnāga, the other the Nyāya-praveśa by Śańkarasvāmin.²⁶ Both these works are very short tracts containing summaries of the formal part of the logic of Dinnaga with unimportant changes and additions by his pupil Śańkarasvāmin. The philosophical and epistemological part, as well as all controversies, with non-Buddhist systems, is ignored in them. Pramana-samuccaya, the fundamental work of Dinnaga, as well as the seven treatises of Dharmakīrti, and the enormous literature of commentaries with their division in schools is quite unknown in China and Japan.²⁷ What may have been the reasons which induced Xuan Zhang, who is believed to have studied the logical system of Dinnāga in India under the guidance of the most celebrated teachers of his time, to choose for translation only two nearly identical short manuals, it is difficult for us at present to decide.

One answer that can be offered for the poser in the quotation from the *SBL*, may be the remarks that Tucci makes about the *Nyāya-praveśa*, in the article no. 8 above as follows: '... text of great interest for the study of Indian Logic; in fact, in spite of its conciseness it contains an extremely clear exposition of Buddhist logic as was taught in India, at least among some particular schools as those of the *Yogācāra* and the *Sautrantika* in that lapse of time which separates Dinnāga from Dharmakīrti.' It was perhaps because of this that there grew up a tradition of logical studies based on these texts themselves in China that has its own distinct grandeur. It is an acknowledgement of the same that can be found in the following from Stcherbatski:²⁸ 'A considerable growth of commentaries and sub-commentaries on the manual of Śańkarasvāmin has been produced. Among the disciples of Hsuen Tsang there was one named K'wei-chi, who took up logic as his special branch of study. With Dinnāga's manual on the one hand and the notes from Hsuen Tsang's (Xuan Zhang's) lectures on the other, he wrote six volumes of commentary on Śankarasvāmin's *Nyāya-praveśa*. This is the standard Chinese work on logic. It has since come to be known as the 'Great Commentary.'²⁹

I am constrained to confess after all this beating about the bush that I have not even once been able to hit the focal point of the title of the paper. If there had not been a reference to Haribhadra's commentary in the tradition of China just referred to, the simple explanation is that the commentary never came to be known to have existed in the world of scholarship in India or elsewhere till its publication in the third decade of the last century. This has been so, I believe, due to the peculiar circumstance of History in India that shortly after the coming into being of the commentary of Haribhadra, foreign invaders destroyed the Buddhist monasteries along with their libraries forcing the stoppage of Buddhist studies for a few centuries altogether and arousing in others the instinct of preservation so strongly, that the Jaina Bhandāras remained closed to all except very few till about the beginning of the twentieth century. This is something, which cannot be said to be the fault of anybody at all. I must conclude with a note of hope now that the wind for Indological studies is favourable, we must sail to the proper shores. That the scholars of Japan who have carried forward the tradition of logical studies rooted in the Nyāyapravesa are already making use of the commentary of Haribhadra can be known by turning the pages of Nakamura's above-mentioned work.

Notes

- Giuseppe Tucci: (1) Is Nyāya-praveśa by Dignāga? Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland (JRAS, Gr. Brt. & Ir.), London, 1928, pp. 7–14; Reprinted in Giuseppe Tucci, Opera Minore, Parte 1, (GTOM), Rome, 1971, pp. 169–174; (2) Notes on the Śamkarasvāmin, (JRAS, Gr. Brt. & Ir.), London, 1931, pp. 381–413; Reprint GTOM, 277–304.
- Vidhusekhar Bhattacharya, Nyāya-praveśa of Dignāga, Indian Historical Quarterly, vol. 3, 1927, pp. 152–160.
- 3. VHIL, p. 152.
- 4. Ibid., p. 154.
- 5. Ibid., p. 160.
- 6. Ibid., p. 206.
- 7. Ibid., p. 173.
- 8. Ibid., p. 222.
- 9. SDS, pp. 221-222.
- 10. VHIL, pp. 208–210.
- 11. Ibid.
- 12. Ibid., p. 221.
- 13. Ibid., p. fn.
- 14. Vide, Takasuku's *I-tsing*, p. 186; and Bunyiu Nanjio's Catalogue of the Chinese Tripitaka, Nos. 1223 and 1224; Cf. Also Dr. Sugiura's Hindu Logic As Preserved in China And Japan, pp. 36, 60, where Śamkarasvāmin's Nyāya-praveśa-tīkā-śāstra is noticed.
- 15. VHIL, p. 300.
- 16. Vide, his Vaiśesika Philosophy, p. 68.
- 17. VHIL, p. 300 fn. 2.
- Ibid., p. 300 fn. 3; also vide Bunyiu Nanjio's Cat. Chi. Tri., No. 1216, and Appendix 1, No. 13.
- 19. VHIL, p. 300 fn. 4.

- 20. Giuseppe Tucci, op. cit., No. 7.
- 21. Buddhist Logic (SBL), vol. I, p. 33.
- 22. Ibid., fn. 4.
- 23. TSP, 339. 15.
- 24. SBL, vol. I, p. 33 fn. 5: It is remarkable that his chief work, the Pramāṇa-samuccaya, has remained unknown in China and Japan. It has been replaced by the Nyāya-praveśa, a work of Śańkarasvāmin, . . . Mr. Borris Assiliev in his paper mentioned above establishes that the Chinese logicians knew about the Pramāṇa-samuccaya only from hear-say.
- 25. Ibid., pp. 53–54.
- 26. See, articles by Tubianski, No. 3; and Tucci, No. 8.
- 27. Cp. G. Tucci, JRAS, Gr Bit. & Ir., 1928, p. 10 B.
- 28. SBL, vol. I, p. 54.
- 29. Cp. Sugiura, Hindu Logic, p. 39; On Xuan Zhang's school of logic, cf. also the information collected by B. Vassiliev.

SECTION III

Haribhadra and Religious Worship

CHAPTER 7

Two Interesting References by Haribhadrasūri to *Ambā-kuṣmāṇdī-vidyā*

U. P. Shah

In his Lalita-vistarā-tīkā (LVT), which is the same as the Caityavandana-sūtra-vṛtti, Haribhadrasūri (c. 550-625) writes:

aiyāvrtta-karāņām pravacanārtham vyāprtā-bhāvānām, yathā ambā-kusmāņdī-ādīnām; śānti-karānām...¹

The Ambā-kuṣmāṇḍī-vidyā is also referred to by the same author in his gloss on the \bar{A} vaśyaka-niryukti-vrtti (ANV).² The Anuyoga-dvāra-sūtra (AYDS), a Jaina canonical text has the following passage:

Teyasā lalamte imdassa vā khamdassa vā ruddassa vā sivassa vā vesamaņassa vā devassa vā nāgassa vā jakkhassa vā bhūyassa vā mugundassa vā ajjāe vā duggāe vā koṭṭa-kiriyāe vā uvalekhaṇa-samamjaṇāsaṇavarisaṇa-dhūva-puppha-gamdha-mallāiyāīm uvvāvassayāim karemti /³

Commenting on this, Haribhadrasūri writes:

Āryā praśānta-rūpā durgā, kotta-kiriyā saiva mahisārūdhā.

The *Cūrnī* on the above passage, possibly by Jinadāsa Mahattara (seventh century AD) reads: *Durgāyāh pūrva-rūpam āmra-kusmāndi-vat (āmra-kusmāndi-vat or āmra-kusmāndi-vat?)* tadhā thitā ajjā bhaṇṇati, saiva mahiṣa-vyāpādana-kālāt prabhṛti tad-rūpa-sthitā koṭṭavyā (kotta-kiriyā) bhaṇati/

Thus the AYDS refers to the worship of Indra, Skanda, Rudra, Śiva, Vaiśravaṇa, Deva, Nāga, Yakṣa, Bhūta, Mukunda (= Baladeva, according to Maladhāri Hemaprabha), Āryā and Koṭṭakiriyā. Āryā is explained as a pacific form of Dūrgā, while Koṭṭakiriyā (koṭṭavi of the Cūrṇī) is the terrific form of Dūrgā destroying the demon Mahiṣa, as Mahiṣāsura-mardinī. The author further adds that Āryā, the original form of Dūrgā, is like Āmra-kuṣmāṇḍī.

In Jaina literature we have a still earlier reference to Ambakuṣmāṇḍī from the Tīkā of Kṣamāśramaṇa Mahattara on the Viśeṣāvaśyaka-mahābhāṣya.⁴ In the commentary on the gāthā beginning with the words: 'Itthī vijjā'bhihiyā', etc., we find the following passage:

... Yasmin mantra-devatā strī sā vidyā, ambakusmāndyādih / Yatra devatā purusah sa mantrah, yathā vidyārāja-hariņegamesi-sarveņeyaksaya (sarvāhņyaksa) ityādi / Athavā yāvān mantrah sakalpa-sādhanah sā vidyā, yas tu paṭhita-siddhah sādhana-rahitah sa mantra iti / Vijjā ya cakkavaṭṭi. ityādi / Vidyānām sarvāsām adhipatiś cakravartī ekā vā mahatī vidyā siddhā, yathā'mbakusmāndī mahārohinī mahāpurusdattā, mahāprajñaptir vā sa vidyāsiddhah sātiśayatvāt khapuṭaksamāśramaṇādivat /

It would seem that *amba-kuṣmāṇḍī* was originally a tantric Vidyā and later she was worshipped as a Yakṣī in Jainism. The earliest image of the Jaina Ambikā (yakṣī) so far obtained belongs to the latter half of the sixth century AD, installed by Jinabhadra Vācanācārya whom I have convincingly identified with Jinabhadra-gaṇi Kṣamāśramaṇa, the author of the Viśeṣāvaśyaka Mahābhāṣya with his svopjña-tīkā cited above. Two questions arise here: Why was Ambikā called Kuṣmāṇḍinī or why was she identified with a goddess known as Kuṣmāṇḍinī, and why was she called Āmrā? About Ambikā's association with Āmra or mango tree and the mango-bunch held in her hand we have an explanation given in a latter account known as Ambikā-devī-kalpa by Jinaprabhasūri published in his Vividha-tīrtha-kalpa. In this account of the origin of the goddess Ambikā, Jinaprabha-sūri further says that after death, Ambikā, the Brāhmaṇalady, was born in one of the heavens called Kohaṇḍā Vimāna and that Ambikā is otherwise known as Kohaṇḍī (Kūṣmāṇḍī). In Jaina Tantric works and in hymns and in the Purāṇas, etc., Ambikā is variously addressed as Ambā, Āmrā, Kūṣmāṇḍinī, Simhavāhinī and Ambikā. She is also addressed as $\overline{Amrā}$ -Kūṣmāṇḍinī.

Thus it would appear that in the origin and development of the Jaina *Ambikā* Yaksī, elements of perhaps three different ancient deities have contributed. First, a Mother-Goddess (*ambā* = mother), probably a form or *Durgā* riding the lion, or a prototype of *Durgā* which may be Nanā on the lion found on the Kuṣāṇa coins. This *Nanā* is *Nanaiyā* and is a Babylonian (Sumerian goddess) identified also with *Anāhitā* or *Anihate*, etc. Even now *Nānī* in north India means grandmother. This Hindi word (*Nanī*) has its origin in the vedic word *nanā* (= mother), cf. '. . . upalapraksiņī *nanā*' (RV IX: 112.2), G.C.T. Second, some ancient goddess or *yaksī* was associated with mangoes and/or the mango tree. *Ambikā*'s association with a tree suggests some origin from the *Yaksa* cult. Third, some goddess that was associated with the *Kūsmāndas* (an ancient tribe).

In his Abhidhāna-cintāmani (AbhC)⁵ Hemacandrācārya gives various synonyms of the Brahmanical Durgā, including names like Gaurī, Kālī, Pārvatī, Mātr, Rudrānī, Ambikā, Umā, Durgā, Simhayānā, Āryā, etc. Commenting on the above, Hemacandra quotes Śesa giving a list of 108 names of the goddess. These include names like Prakusmāndī, Revatī, Haimavatī, Skandamātā, Bahuputrī, Jayā, Vijayā, Jayantī, Nandā, Ṣaṣṭhī, etc. Thus, even in the brahmanical traditions, Āryā-Durgā was known both as Ambikā and Kuṣmāṇḍī. According to the Jaina accounts, Kuṣmaṇḍas are a class of Vyantaras. The Digambara text Tiloyapaṇṇatti speaks of eight classes of Vyantaras, namely, Kinnara, Kimpuruṣa, Gandharva, Yakṣa, Rākṣasa, Bhūta, Mahoraga and Piśāca. In the Śvetāmbara tradition, the Brhatsamgrahaṇī speaks of the same eight classes. The Digambara Tiloyapaṇṇatti further divides the Piśācas into fourteen classes, viz., Kuṣmāṇḍa, Yakṣa, Rākṣasa, Tāraka, Satālaka, Kāla, Mahākāla, and so on. The Śvetāmbara tradition gives sixteen classes of Piśācas,viz., Kuṣmāṇḍa, Pālaka, Kāla, Mahākāla, Sujoṣa, Āhnika, and so on.⁶

Of these Vyantaras, there are eight more classes mentioned by the Prajñāpanā and other Śvetāmbara texts. They are Anapanni, Panpanni, Isivāī, Bhūyavāī, Kandi, Mahākandi, Kohanda and Piyanga. Thus, Kusmānda (=Kohanda) belong to the class of semi-divine or supernatural beings called Vyantaras. In the Brahmanical traditions, Kusmāndas are a class of Śiva's Ganas, according to the Visnupurāna (VP).7 The Visnupurāna also refers to the Piśāca-ganas harassing children. They created obstacles in the meditation of Dhruva. In the Tadāgotsava-vidhi, a Kusmānda-sūkta is recited from the Yajurveda.8. In the Taittirīva Āraņyaka (TA)9, Kusmānda-homa is prescribed before beginning any rite or karma. Kusmanda here seems to refer to a kind of watermelon whose sweet preparation is well known as pethā in north India.¹⁰ In the Kusmānda-vrata, a creeper of Kusmānda is worshipped as Laksmī on the full moon day of the Indian month of Kārttika, according to the Vrata-rāja. Both the Vrata-rāja and a text called 'Rgvedīya Brahma-karma Samuccaya' speak of a Kusmānda-vrata wherein the creeper of Kusmānda is worshipped daily for six months.¹¹ Compare:

Kūṣmāṇḍyai kāmadāyinyai brahmaṇyai sukha-hetave / Namo'stu śiva-rūpāyai saphalaṁ kuru me vratam // Kuṣmāṇḍas are said to be the servants of Rudra Vidūdhaka, a ruler of the Kumbhāṇḍas, is the guardian of the southern quarter in the Buddhist literature. Thus, Ambā or Ambikā, riding on the lion like the Hindu goddess Durgā-Āryā, could easily be identified with Kuṣmāṇḍī, who was probably a deity worshipped by the Kumbhāṇḍas or Kuṣmāṇḍas. However, the problem of the identification of Ambikā with Kuṣmāṇḍī or Kuṣmāṇḍinī further deserves investigation, especially about the origin as well as the form of the ancient goddess.

In Chapter IX (Ācāra-adhyāya) on Vināyaka-pūjā, of the Yājñavalkya-smrti, we find: 'Vināyakasya jananīm upatisthet tato mbikām'. Ambikā was famous as the mother of Vināyaka. In the Mathura Museum image (No. D7) of the Jaina Ambikā, small figures of Ganesa and Kubera are shown on two sides of the goddess. The above-mentioned section of the Yājñavalkya-smrti seems to be an abridgement and versification of the XIV Khanda of the second Purusa of the Manava-grhya-sutra referring to the worship of the Vināyakas. They are Śāla-kantaka, kusmāndarājaputra, Usmita and Devayajana. The signs manifested by persons possessed by these Vināyakas are described and the mantras for the Vināyakas are given. Then in V. 30 of this section of the Smrti we are asked to invoke Ambika the mother of the Vināyakas. The whole passage not only explains Ambikā's name as Kusmāndinī (being the mother of Kusmānda-rājaputra) but also explains her association with Ganesa and Kubera, the lord of the Yaksas.

Since the Yaksas in ancient Indian literature are known as sylvan deities, *Ambikā's* resting under a tree is understandable; but not all the Jaina Yaksas and Yaksinīs are associated with trees. We have noted the close correspondence of the conceptions of the Jaina *Ambikā* with those of the ancient Mother-Goddess and of the Brahmanical *Durgā-Āryā-Ambikā*. Mother-Goddess in the brahmanical rites is to be invoked with tender leaves of the mango-tree (*āmra-pallava*), according to the *Kātyāyana Smrti*. Again, in a group of sculptures of *Ganeśa* obtained from Bengal, etc., *Ganeśa* is shown standing or sitting under a canopy or *torana* of mangoes (suggesting also perhaps a mango-tree).

A beautiful kaolin figure of a Yaksī (with head lost) showed as riding some animal, the figure of the animal being lost, is obtained from the site of ancient *Pratisthānapura* (modern Paithan). The goddess carries an *āmra-lumbī* in her hand. A similar male counterpart is also obtained from her. Both the figures date from the age of the Sātavāhanas and are not later than *c*. third century AD. It is just possible that this ancient goddess or Yaksī influenced the conception of the Jaina $\bar{A}mr\bar{a}$ or $\bar{A}mra-kuṣmāndinī$.

According to Haribhadrasūri, Jinadāsa Mahattara and the Viśeṣāvaśyaka-mahābhāṣya-tīkā, the terrific form of Durgā-Āryā was known as Koṭṭakiriyā. Jinadāsa Mahattara said that this form is engaged in destroying Mahiṣa, and in it the goddess was known as Koṭṭavyā.

The names *Kottakiriyā* and *Kottavyā* need some explanation. *Kottavyā* or *Kottavī* form is derived from the Dravidian name. *Kottavī* is referred to in the *Harṣacarita* as a naked female regarded as an ill omen. V. S. Aggrawala informs us that according to Keśava, *Kotavī* was a form of Ambikā. In fact, *Kotavī* was originally a south Indian goddess *Kottavai* whose form was of a demoness. Later on she came to be worshipped in the form of *Durgā* or *Umā*. Possibly she was introduced in the north India during the Gupta period. During the times of Bāṇa she was believed to be indicative of misfortune. In the toys of Ahicchatrā there is carved a nude women showing her index finger, from the gesture of which it seems to be the figure of *Kotavī*.¹²

In a footnote he further adds that *Kottavī* was well known in north India, that he found a shrine dedicated to Kotāmāl Yaksī near the campus of the Banaras Hindu University, and that at Kotalgaḍha, 12 miles from Lohagaḍh in the Almora district, there is a shrine of *Kotavī*. It seems that this nude goddess was known as *Koṭarī* and that perhaps *Koṭavī* was another goddess. The Jain explanation *Koṭṭavī* does not fit in with Agrawala's identification of her as a nude goddess moving her finger. *Koṭa* in Dravidian means *Mahiṣa*. The *Viṣṇupurāṇa*¹³ says that when Kṛṣṇa was about to send his *Sudarśana-cakra* to kill Bāṇāsura, the latter sent *Koṭarī Vidyā*, nude in appearance, before Kṛṣṇa. *Harivaṁśa*,¹⁴ too, refers to *Kauṭavī* coming in front of Kṛṣṇa.

It seems almost certain that this Kottavyā referred to by Jinadāsa Mahattara is the goddess *Korravaī* of Tamil Sangam works. As shown by R. Nagaswami¹⁵ in *Tirumurugarruppadai* three aspects of *Śakti* are alluded to: 'As *Korravaī* she is the giver of victory.... The learned commentator gives the meaning of *Korravaī* as *Vana Durgā* and *Palaiyol* as *Kadukal* (*Kālī*)....' In the *Siruppānarruppadai*, 'the spear of a chieftain is praised as a lofty one adorned by *Korravaī* (*Durgā*)'.

'Tolkāppiyam, the earliest extant Tamil grammar, refers to a certain poetic composition called *Korravaī nilāi*. The word *Korravaī* means *Durgā*. The reference in this work relates to the worship of goddess *Durgā* by soldiers when they embark on a cattle lifting expedition or cattle-rescuing operation.'

Nagaswami has shown that the cave temple at the northern end of Mamallapuram, now called 'Kotikkal-mandana', is undoubtedly a monument dedicated to $Durg\bar{a}$.¹⁶

It may be noted that a goddess $Kott\bar{a}ry\bar{a}$ is also referred to in the *Nisitha Cūrnī* (*NC*).¹⁷ The *Kuvalayamālā* refers to a *Kottaja-grha*, and in it also *Kottavaī* is regarded as *Durgā*.

Notes

- 1. LVT, p. 60.
- 2. ANV, gāthā 931, p. 411.
- 3. AYDS, 20.
- 4. Patan Ms. Folio 226.
- 5. AbhC, II. 117-119.
- 6. In his commentary on the Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra, Siddhasena Divākara says that Pišācas are of fifteen kinds only. He reads Pataka, Joşa and Ahnaka in place Pālaka, Sujoşa and Āhnika, respectively. The fifteen classes enumerated by him are: Kuşmānda, Pataka, Joşa, Ahnaka, Kāla, Mahākāla, Cokşa, Mukharāpišācas, Adhastāraka, Deha, Mahāvideha, Tūṣnīka and Vana-pišāca. Others add Videha after Deha to make it sixteen (additional remarks by V. Venktachalam).
- 7. VP, 1. 12. 13.
- 8. Bhāratīya Samskrti Kośa, II, p. 456.
- 9. TA, 2.7.
- 10. Bhāratīya Samskrti Kośa, II, p. 370.

This description of Kusmanda here as 'watermelon' by the learned author of this otherwise studied and fine paper is a misconception, arising from lack of initiation or experience in the tradition of Vedic rituals. There is living tradition of this expiatory homa in the south. It continues to be performed by orthodox Brahmins on different occasions to this day. The word Kūsmānda (spelt variously with palatal sa or cerebral sa), in Vedic parlance, denotes certain mantras of the Yajurveda and has nothing to do with watermelons at all! It is especially noteworthy that this nomenclature of the mantras has a hoary history commencing from the Vedic texts themselves. These mantras, numbering 38, are contained in the three consecutive anuvākas (3-5) of the second prapāthaka of the Taittirīya Āranyaka and are spoken of as Kusmānda in the following anuvāka of the Āraņyaka which lays down the homa with the words: kuśmāndair juhuyād yo 'pūta iva manyeta / One of the intervening anuvākas narrates the odd story of the sages called Vātaraśanas entering into these mantras through their astral bodies. Sāyana writes: Yoga-sāmarthyāt sūksmasarīrā bhūtvā kusmāņdākhyāni mantra-vākyāny

anupravistāh / The Śukla Yajurvrda tradition also has this nomenclature but there the name is applied to a group of three mantras (20. 14-16) only and these mantras are used in the Avabhrtha ritual of the sacrifice. Mahīdhara writes as follows in his Bhāsya: Agni-vāyu-sūrya-devatyās tisro 'nustubhah küsmändī-samjñāh / The name küsmända for these continues in Dharma-śāstra texts also, both in the masculine form as above, as well as in the feminine form as kūsmāndī. Manu (8.106) lays down the homa with these three mantras called kūsmānda. (masc.), whereas Yājñavalkya (3. 299) speaks of them as kūsmāndī (fem.). Whereas Kullukabhatta, the commentator of Manu, refers to these mantras in general terms as 'kūsmāṇḍa-mantrā yajurvedikā 'yad devā deva-heḍanam' ity evamādayaḥ' and it can mean either the three mantras of the Sukla School or the 38 mantras of the KY School. Viśvarūpa in his commentary Bālakrīdā on Yājñavalkya is more specific and says that the homa should be performed with the Taittirīya mantras: 'Yad-deva-hedanam ityādibhih taittirīyāmnātābhih / It is probably because the Taittirīya version of the expiatory mantras is truly exhaustive that Visvarupa specifically prescribes the kūsmānda-mantrās of the Taittirīya school. Why these Mantras were called kūsmānda is somewhat enigmatic. It is probable that the seer who first envisioned these mantras was named Kūsmānda, and the mantras came to be known after his name (Editor, NMK).

- 12. Harşacarita-Eka Sāmskrtika Adhyayana: 'keśava ke anusāra kotavī ambikā kā eka rūpa thā (Kalpadru-kośa, p. 398, v. 127) / Vastutah kotvī daksiņa bhārata ki mūla devī kottavai thī jisakā rūpa rāksasī thā/ Pīche vaha durgā yā umā ke rūpa mem pujī jāne lagī / Sambhava hai uttara bhārata mem usakā paricaya guptakāla mem āyā hogā ' Bāņa ke samaya mem vaha durbhāgya kī sūcaka mānī jāne lagī thī.../Ahicchatrā ke kaī khilauno mem tarjanī dikhātī huī eka namgī strī amkita kī gaī hai jisakī mudrā se vaha kotavī kī ākrti jñāta hotī hai' /
- Gorakhpur ed., V. 33. 34-37: Muñcato bāṇa-nāśāya tataś cakram mahgudviṣaḥ / Nagnā daiteya-vidyā'bhūt koṭarī purato hareḥ //36// Tām agrato harir drtvā mīlitākṣas sudarśanam / Mumoca bāṇam uddiśya cchettum bāhu-vanam ripoḥ //37//
- HV (Cr. Ed.) 112. 49: Punaś cakram sa jagrāha bhūtānta-karaņam tadā / Vyāvidhyamāne cakre tu krsņenā'mitatejasā // Tam drstvā pramukhe tasya vyatisthata ca kautavī / Apagacchāpagaccha tvam dhig-dhig ityeva so'bravīt //

- 15. Tantric Cult of South India, pp. 4, 6-7.
- 16. Ibid., p. 147.
- 17. NC, 13. 4000.

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CHAPTER 8

Construction of Temple, Installation of Images and Offering of Worship as Depicted in Haribhadra's *Sodaśaka*

N. R. BANERJEE

There are sixteen prakaranas or sections, each of them of sixteen Āryā-verses in this text. They are the miscellaneous topics, such as: (1) Dharma-parīksā; (2) Deśanā; (3) Dharma-lakṣaṇa; (4) Dharmecchu-liṅga; (5) Lokottaratva; (6) Jina-mandira; (7) Jinabimba; (8) Pratiṣṭhā-vidhi; (9) Pūjā-svarūpa; (10) Pūjā-phala; (11) Anujñā-liṅga; (12) Dīkṣādhikāra; (13) Guru-vinaya; (14) Yoga-bheda; (15) Dhyeya-svarūpa; and (16) Sama-rasa. This paper concerns itself with the chapter on the Jina-mandirasodaśaka only.

Haribhadra's *Sodaśaka* is distinguished by two commentaries, known as the *Sugamārtha-kalpanā* by Ācārya Yaśobhadrasūri (twelfth century AD) and the Yoga-dīpikā by Nyāyācārya Yaśovijaya Upādhyāya (eighteenth century AD), respectively, which help to elucidate the precepts contained in the Āryā-verses. While the former is brief, the latter is more detailed, and sometimes employs similes to explain many an obscure point. Out of the sixteen prakaraņas, the three called the Jina-mandira, the Jina-bimba and the Pratisthā-vidhi, are interrelated. These three Sanskrit sections of the Sodaśaka contain, among others, interesting chapters on the construction of temples, making and installation of images and offering of worship. The viewpoints are delightfully modern and humanistic as well as scientific. They also throw light on the eternal human follies to deny adequate prices for both the goods and the services to fellow human beings.

It states, among other things, that only those who have earned their wealth righteously (ruling out black money, to use modern terminology), and have set aside sizeable funds, who are intelligent and so inclined, who are known for their rectitude (so that presumably they may not commit any act of injustice or impropriety), are entitled to undertake the construction of a temple. It is apparent that a temple could be commissioned only by the righteous and only if adequate well-earned funds are available. Funds could arise from economical living and savings.

The land on which a temple is to be built has to be pure (not being a burial ground, cremation area or otherwise polluted in any way), and acquired by payment of a proper price to the owner, without causing suffering or harassment (through forcible eviction or displacement, etc.), and with money that has been righteously earned.

The bricks and stones to be used in the construction should also be paid for adequately to their makers or quarrymen and carvers. The wood to be used in the construction should be of good quality, drawn from trees grown in sacred places. It should not be worn out or suffering from rot, nor should it be sapwood. It should be hard (as hard as Khadira or Catechu tree as explained by the commentator) and straight (i.e. free from curvature which could make it weal) and also free from knots. These are the yardsticks to assess the quality of wood and could be commended to the modern wood-anatomist or connoisseur of wood among architects and engineers. The workmen of all categories employed on the works should also be paid adequately. The words used purport to convey that they must not be cheated. $\bar{A}c\bar{a}rya$ Haribhadra, broad as his humanism was, would have been hailed by labour leaders and trade unionists of today for his solicitude for the underdogs and poor workers and craftsmen who have perhaps been victims of underpayment at all times in history.

Thus, we have a glimpse of the great personality that Haribhadra was, as a scholar, a saint, an objective thinker, a social reformer, a philosopher, a synthesizer, an exponent of abstruse principles of Yoga, and a religious leader with humanistic outlook towards all fellow human beings. In fact, he was an intellectual giant of his times. As an earlier, but a near contemporary of the great Śańkarācārya, he has not, for some reason, achieved as much renown as the latter. This is perhaps because he did not travel as much as the latter as a parivrājaka and, moreover, his preaching and teaching were confined to a rather small community in a limited area. Besides, he abhorred the path of confrontation and controversy and was more inclined to iron out the differences. Who knows what might have happened if the two had met!

There is no doubt that his approach to life was objective and scientific and would commend acceptance even in modern times. His approach to tradition and legend was also objective and his writings on the theme seem to contain the basics of scientific and objective historical criticism. His solicitude for fellowmen, whether a wage earner or a poor relation, was marked by sympathy, compassion, and grasp of psychological issues.

Some of his works are yet to be studied and published. Nevertheless, all the works must be re-examined in a comprehensive and integrated manner, and the relative chronology of his works needs to be established with the help of both internal and external evidences as well as considerations of literary style. May be, as a result of such an effort, a much clearer and historically authentic picture of the eighth century, society, especially of Gujarat and Rajasthan emerges before our eyes. There seems to be much in his writings that is beyond the mere religio-philosophical interests of most students and exponents of Prakrit or Jaina works. There is apparently much scope for the social historian of literature, if not also the political historian, to delve deeper into his writings and unearth fresh facts for consideration. Much more needs to be known, not merely about the personal life of Haribhadra and the various influences that had shaped his character and career, but also about the political history of the times around Chittor and geographical area of Haribhadra's activities as well as the social and economic conditions of his times. SECTION IV

Haribhadra and Religio-Philosophical Outlook

CHAPTER 9

Haribhadrasūri: An Advocate of Eve-Salvation

S. P. NARANG

Haribhadrasūri, the doyen of Jainism, is not only known for his original writings but also for the excellent commentaries on various texts. His commentaries prepare an extraordinary digest of the views of his opponents, which is a valuable storehouse of the lost or unknown Jaina or non-Jaina sects and their thoughts. The present paper is related to the topic of the salvation of women on the basis of the *Lalita-vistarā* (*LV*), a commentary on the *Caityavandana-sūtra*, the object whereof is to attain the prayer and the good seeds for rebirth.

The great saint Haribhadra-sūri is not an adamant follower of the traditional thoughts. His writings have a fresh approach based on a balanced reason and logic ($san-ny\bar{a}ya$), that investigates the merits and demerits with the object of propagation of knowledge and removal of doubts.¹ His liberal attitude was a distinct help in reaching a rational conclusion.

The issue of liberation of women raised a controversy amongst the Jainas. The Digambara tradition, particularly the $Y\bar{a}pan\bar{i}ya$ $S\bar{a}stra$, the arguments whereof have been put forth as authority by Haribhadrasūri, propounds that woman cannot attain salvation. But Haribhadrasūri has quoted a $g\bar{a}th\bar{a}^2$ that clearly mentions that woman can attain salvation, although visà-vis man, she was not given the first priority in the maledominated Indian society. But Haribhadra has interpreted *Purusa* as *Purusottama* and thus propounded the view that both good men and women can attain salvation.³

Haribhadrasūri has refuted the ten arguments of his Pūrvapaksins that may be those of Digambara Jainism and has supported it by the Yāpanīya Tantra that been referred to in the earliest inscription of Avinīta (560 AD) discovered from Hoskote, Bangalore District, Karnataka.⁴ The main object of this paper is to reproduce the arguments for and against, together with the corroborative background wheresoever it is traced.

Argument 1: Woman is a-jīva

The woman is not *Jīva*, she is *an a-jīva*. This is the first reason for disqualifying her to attain salvation. The term *Jīva* may have two meanings here. First, she is not a 'being' vis-à-vis the existence of 'man'. This state of non-being has not been recognized anywhere. Second, *a-jīva* may be understood in a philosophical sense. *Jīva* is identified with the soul, which though fundamentally similar to the concept in other philosophical schools, is still different from them in certain respects. Soul is eternal, uncreated and beginningless.⁵ Vis-à-vis *Jīva*, *A-jīva* is *pudgala* or matter. The concept of woman as 'matter' is found in a number of speculations in India, e.g. in the Dharma-śāstras. The *Sāmkhya* philosophy also, in a personified *Prakrti*, propounds her to be but matter and not fit for salvation. Here we can take the word *A-jīva* in the sense of 'matter' which is not eligible for salvation.

But Haribhadrasūri appears to be taking the word *A-jīva* in a general sense. Now the question is whether woman is thought to be an *A-jīva*. Haribhadra has established the relationship of *Jīva* with the performance and acquisition of the best '*Dharma*' which is interpreted by the *Prakāsá* Hindi Commentary as salvation (*dharma mokṣa-kāraṇa cāritra-dharma*). It may be interpreted as attainment of the Highest Goal of becoming a *Tīrthaṅkara*. Since a woman has no contradiction with this goal in any of the *Agama* texts, it proves, in the opinion of Haribhadra, that she may attain salvation.

Argument 2: Woman has no qualifying symptoms for salvation

Another argument was that she is not qualified for salvation because the qualifying symptoms do not appear in her, i.e. she is *A-bhavya*.

The main attack on this argument by Haribhadrasūri is as to why should the epithet A-bhavya is applied exclusively to women only? The symptoms 'would be' (bhavva)⁶ do not appear in all the men and all man do not attain salvation. Then he poses the question whether there is any reasonable ground that woman genus should be put in a particular category. There may be a few a-bhavya women, but likewise there may be a few a-bhavya men as well. There are men who have absolutely no disinterest in the worldly activities (samsāra-nirveda), nor are they interested in salvation (nirvāna), much less even in any religious activities (dharma). If still the non-attainment of salvation does not apply to the man-genus, why should it be applied to woman-genus? It is the individual and not the genus that is qualified or disqualified for the attainment of salvation. It can be concluded from the above argument that, according to Haribhadra, the attainment of salvation depends upon the sensitivity of the mind of the individual and the intensity of the desire to attain salvation (mumuksutva). In Vedānta, it has been prescribed as a pre- requisite for salvation of an individual.

Again, opposing the concept that woman exists as a genus, Haribhadrasūri says that the existence is that of an individual human being, may be male or female, and we cannot categorize woman as a genus. Hence she is not disqualified to attain salvation.

Argument 3: She is unfit for philosophical speculation

It appears that the Jaina tradition prescribed that women should not be given instructions in the systems of philosophy. Hence she was thought to be unfit for philosophical speculations.

J. C. Jain has cited the Brhat-kalpa-bhāsya-pīthikā (146) and the Vyavahāra-bhāsya (5.139) to prove that women is disgualified for the study of philosophical speculations (drsti $v\bar{a}da$) in Jaina canonical literature. The argument is based on her being weaker physically, and mentally egoistic and having fickle temperament although the author disagrees with this viewpoint and thinks that it is the frustrated expression of weak sages.⁷ But other religious sects propound her equality,⁸ for example, Brahmanism. But Vātsvāvana in his Kāma-sūtra has not maintained parity between man and woman. A man may learn sixty-four arts openly, whereas a woman should practice them alone in secret place.9 The list of subjects like music, dance, painting, cooking, decoration, cosmetics, ethics, amusements, sewing, architecture, metallurgy, physical labour and academic topics are not included in the subject of 'study of philosophical speculation'.¹⁰ In the Bhhadāranyaka Upanisad, Gārgī is of lower calibre than that of Yājñavalkya. It indicates that in ancient India, woman was advised not to engage herself in philosophical topics. That is why Jainism also accepts that she was antagonistic to philosophy (darśana-virodhinī).

But as a reformer, Haribhadrasūri thinks that her nature is not contradictory to philosophical speculations. Relying on a different ground, he widens the dimensions of the word *darśana* and interprets it as a total expression of reality (*tattvārtha*) and faith (*śraddhā*), i.e. *Samyag-darśana*. In his opinion, the word *darśana* should not be bound within the traditional dimensions of superficial philosophical sense. Philosophy, according to him, should be utilitarian and practical faith and it should not consist of crude logical arguments of mind-boggling nature. If so, how can we say that a woman is inimical to philosophy? Argument 4: She is not different from man (*no a-mānuṣa*) Man has been a privileged being in ancient India. Woman was denied a number of privileges that man enjoyed. Salvation might have been one of them. The apparent reason is the difference in their biological set up.

The *Dharma-śāstras* have made a distinction based on biological features as a criterion for possessing or non-possessing property. Originally, it was for the impotent,¹¹ but in parallel law, woman was excluded from the property of agnates as is seen in the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*,¹² although the Smrti authors modified it to some extent in tune with changing social conditions and customs of different origins.¹³

As a reformer Haribhadra has accepted not only the equality of man and woman, but has also considered them as belonging to the same genus. He has refuted the argument of the biologists on the basis of biology itself. Thus, he asks: How can man and woman be different entities when they possess similar hands and feet, etc.? There had been some systems of philosophy, e.g. Sāmkhya, which believe in Prakrti and Purusa (symbolized) as separate entities. But Haribhadra does not agree with their disparity at the social level. It might be due to the historical fact that a woman cannot attain salvation when she is placed at the level of Prakrti, which cannot attain salvation. There had been a Sāmkhya view prior to Īsvarakrsna summed up by Kundakundācārya in the Samayasāra, which concluded, 'the results of all actions, whether done by Purusa or Prakrti, belong to the Purusa'.14 Man and woman as contradictory entities to the extent of being mutually inimical is propounded by Jaina canonical literature.¹⁵ Thus by removing the social contradiction of man and woman, Haribhadrasūri tried to establish social harmony.

Argument 5: She is not an *An-ārya* (not of Non-Aryan birth) Two qualifications, viz., (i) birth in an *Ārya* family, and (ii) having a longer lifespan, are related to salvation and are summed up in Arguments 5 and 6. Being an *An-ārya* involved a number of social barriers in ancient India, such as (i) the treatment as a slave in the Vedic Age,¹⁶ (ii) defeat in the battle as recorded by Patañjali in the *Mahābhāsya*,¹⁷ (iii) extradition from society, like the *Vrātyas*, and (iv) living outside the city,¹⁸ etc. It is recorded as a novelty that an *An-ārya* cannot attain salvation.

Haribhadra, as a reformer, removed the barriers between $\bar{A}rya$ and $An-\bar{a}rya$. In his opinion, if a woman is born in an $An-\bar{a}rya$ family cannot attain salvation, a bad woman born in a $\bar{A}rya$ family should also not be qualified for salvation. Salvation is an attainment based on the qualification of an individual and it should not be based on caste criterion.

Argument 6: Age and Salvation (in continuation of the Argument 5)

It was argued that since woman and $An-\bar{a}rya$ have lesser (*samkyāta*) longevity ($\bar{a}yus$), both are unqualified to attain salvation. Haribhadrasūri refutes this on the same footing as in the preceding argument that life is an attainment of an individual and does not depend upon the $\bar{A}rya$ or $An-\bar{a}rya$ class. Moreover, the $\bar{A}rya$ - $An-\bar{a}rya$ criterion must not be applied to woman in respect of salvation. It is generally seen that a woman belonging to a $\bar{A}rya$ family may live for limited lifespan, where as a woman belonging to an $An-\bar{a}rya$ family may have a longer life. Moreover, it should not have any nexus with salvation. As a matter of fact, good health has been recognized by all as instrumental for the attainment of *Dharma*.¹⁹

Cruelty has been put forth as another disqualification for salvation and applied to woman not only in Jaina canonical literature,²⁰ but also in Vedic literature,²¹ legal literature like the work of Cāṇakya,²² the Epics like the Mahābhārata,²³ the Purāṇas,²⁴ and the classical authors writing on renunciation.²⁵ Since cruelty results in aggressive thoughts (*raudra-dhyāna*) which lead to hell, it is a bar to the attainment of salvation. In answer to this Haribhadra argues that since woman can go only to the 'sixth hell' it shows that the degree of her cruelty is not so high as to consign her to the seventh hell which is the penalty for 'serious cruelty'. Hence she can still hope to attain salvation.²⁶

It is argued further that if she has no fierce thoughts (*raudra-dhyāna*), it implies that she does not possess the 'high voltage negative demerits'. If she has not got that resistance capacity, how can she have the power of possessing the positive merit, which may lead her to salvation? To this Haribhadra replies that it does not logically follow that if aggressive thoughts exist, the good thought should also not exist. *Pañjikā* takes the Nyāya rule of logical concommitance (*vyāpti*), e.g. wherever there is smoke, there must be fire.²⁷ It further elaborates it thus: If one argues that wherever there is Dhyāna par excellence, there should necessarily be *Raudra-dhyāna*.²⁸ As the resultant, the answer is that it cannot be proved that every object in discharging its own function is necessarily bound by its opposite reactionary forces. On the other hand, if there are no aggressive thoughts, there are high possibilities of salvation.

The prima facie objection raised here is that since *Raudra-dhyāna* is psychologically related to lust and mars pious beauty, and taking into consideration the fact that woman is not horrible or cruel in thought, one has to accept that she is pervaded by lust.²⁹ Wherever lust exists it mars the pious beauty which is an essential ingredient of a good lady and salvation as well. Hence woman and salvation become antonymous.

To this objection, Haribhadra replies that there is no dearth of women who have extinguished their attachment, as is often seen in the world. Here the objector argues that if her attachment is extinguished she can have no good behaviour and conduct in day-to-day life (a-śuddhācāra), and hence she must be condemned. Haribhadra replies to it by asking as to why should one think that women do not have good conduct, since on the contrary we do see that they generally possess the basic virtue of doing no harm to others (parāpakaranā-varjanam) or doing good to others (parāpakaranā-varjanam). But, the persisting objector further argues that even if her conduct is good, she is impure physically.³⁰ He gives more importance to physical purity than that of the conduct (*suddhācārā 'py a-suddha-bandhir a-sādhvī*). Haribhadra's reply to this is that there are some women who are physically pure. Such parallel thoughts are found in the Jaina canonical literature.³¹ Due to good actions in previous births, they can have a pure body without the oozing of the impurities like illsmelling sweat.

Again the objector argues that even if she is physically pure, she has no concern with the posterior birth. To this Haribhadra replies that women too are seen concerned with the other world and it is also seen that they have an attachment to the scriptures as well. Haribhadra, thus, proves that woman can attain salvation.

Argument 7: She is not antagonist to apūrva-karaņa

The objector argues that, taking for granted that woman has the instinct for the action leading to salvation (*sa-vyavasāya*), if she has no motivation for actions leading to salvation (*apūrvakarana-virodhinī*), she cannot attain salvation. It stands to reason that if there is no motivation, she will not perform actions that may lead to salvation. Here the objector thinks that woman has no such instinct because she is constitutionally contrary to this type of instinct. Haribhadra replies to this that there is no contradiction between woman and *apūrva-karana*. It does exist in the woman genus too. None of the scriptures has negated its existence in woman (*apūrva-karana-sambhavasya strī-jātiṣv api pratipāditatvāt*).

Argument 8: No nava-guņa-sthāna-rahitā

The objector claims that accepting for the time being that woman may possess the faculty of *apūrva-karaṇa*, she is still devoid of the nine stages of virtues (*nava-guṇa-sthānma*), and hence she cannot attain salvation. Haribhadra refutes this argument on the ground that she is not devoid of the nine stages of virtue. They may exist in a woman. So, the argument does not hold water.

Argument 9: Nā 'yogyā labdheh

The objector again argues that even if we accept that woman possesses nine stages of virtue, she is not a deserving bona fide entity who can attain salvation $(a-yogy\bar{a})$.

To this Haribhadra poses a question as to why should one assume in a vacuum that she if not a bona fide aspirant for salvation? Even today it is seen that a number of women are capable of removing disease by their mere touch (*āmarṣauṣadhyādi-rūpāyāh kālaucityenedānīm api darśanāt*).

Argument 10: No akallāņ-bhāyaņam

The objector shifts his stand and argues that even is woman can be a bona fide aspirant, she cannot bestow welfare on the human generation.

Here Haribhadra relies on the emotional plane that since women have been the mothers of the greatest personalities like the Tirthankaras, who have been the greatest 'welfare-bestowing entity', how can it be asserted that they do not possess all these qualities in themselves? Hence, she can attain salvation.

A number of good women are referred to in the Jaina canonical literature³² who have absolutely renounced their personal interests and devoted themselves to public welfare. A woman is counted amongst the fourteen gems of the Cakravartin.³³

Moreover, the evidence of Mallīnātha in the Śvetāmbara tradition corroborates that according to this tradition woman can attain salvation. But, in the Digambara tradition Mallīnātha is Mallikumāra and thus salvation in the case of woman is negated. In the Śvetāmbara tradition, however, the attainment of salvation by Mallī is one of the 'ten wonders'.³⁴

Conclusion

On the basis of the above analysis of the text of the *Lalita-vistarā* and some other corroborative facts, the following conclusions may be drawn:

- 1. Digambaras negated the possibility of woman attaining salvation, whereas by the sixth century AD they had been divided over the issue. Particularly the mendicants belonging to the Yāpanīya Samgha believed in the salvation of woman. The relevant passage from the *Yāpanīya Tantra* is fully quoted by Haribhadrasūri.
- 2. As a progressive reformer, Haribhadrasūri brought in rationality in the discussion of the issue with multidimensional arguments, prevalent in the Indian society in general and the Jaina one in particular.
- 3. The argument, that woman should be considered inferior on physical and intellectual grounds, was refuted, and she was treated at par socially and philosophically.
- 4. The barriers of caste and place are rejected and parity of all the castes belonging to various places was established.
- 5. Haribhadrasūri utilized all the religio-emotional arguments to establish that woman has a bona fide right to attain salvation.

Notes

- Ibid., p. 401: Eko vi namokkāro jiņavara-sahassa vaddhamāņassa / Samsāra-sāgarāo tārei naram vā nārīm vā //; Variant in Prakāśa Hindi Comm.: Ikko vi namukkāo.
- Ibid., Puruşa-grahanam puruşottama-dharma-pratipādanārtham /Strīgrahanam tāsām api tadbhava evam samsāra-kşayo bhavatīti jñāpanārtham /
- Mysore Archaelogical Report, 1938, pp. 80ff; Jaina-śilālekha- samgraha, vol. IV, no. 20; A.N. Upadhye (about Ravikīrti, the author of the Aihole Inscription), Journal of the Bombay University (Arts & Law), May 1933, p. 230; Chatterjee, Asim Kumar, A Comprehensive History of Jainism Upto 1000 CE., Calcutta., 1978, pp. 132–133.
- 5. Jain, Bhagchandra, Jainism in Buddhist Literature, Nagpur, 1972, pp. 61–63.
- 6. The word Bhavya appears to have been used here in its other familiar sense of 'worthy' or 'auspicious'. Haribhadra has defined 'bhavya' earlier in this same treatise as 'deserving the attainment of Siddhi' (Bhavyatvam nāma siddhi-gamana-yogyatvam'. Vide Sutra 10, Loguttamānam). V.V.
- J.C. Jain, Jaināgama Sāhitya mem Bhāratīya Samāja (Hindi), Varanasi, 1965, p. 249.
- 8. Varāhamihira, Brhat-samhitā, 76. 6, 12; 14. 16; A. S. Altekar, Position of Women in Hindu Civilization, pp. 167–168.
- 9. Vātsyāyana, Kāmasūtra, 1. 2, 13.
- 10. Ibid., 1.2.15.

- Yājñavalkya-smṛti, Dāya, 140: An-amśau klība-patitau jātyandhabadhirau tathā / Unmatta-jaḍa-mūkāś ca ye ca kecin nirindriyāh //
- 12. Śatapatha Bāhmaņa, 10. 5. 2. 10; for details, Ray. W. Staat und Gesellschaft im alten Indian, Wiesbaden, 1957, p. 29.
- 13. Günther-Dietz Sontheimer, *The Joint Hindu Family: Its Evolution as a Legal Institution*, Delhi, 1977, p. 10.
- 14. Shiv Kumar, *Deśabhūṣaṇa Felicitation Volume*, 1987, Philosophy Section, pp.161ff.
- 15. J.C. Jain, op. cit., p. 246: Nārī samā na narāņam arīo /
- 16. RV, 2.12.4, Yo dāsam varņa adharam guhā'kah /
- Patañjali, Vyākarana Mahābhāsya, Paspašā Āhnika |: Te 'surāh hailayo helaya iti [bruvantah] parābabhūvuh /
- 18. Kāśikā on Pāņ. 1.1.36: Nagara-bāhyāś cāṇḍālādi gṛhā ucyante /
- cf. Kumāra-sambhavam, V.33: Api sva-śaktyā tapasi pravartase śarīramādyam khalu dhrma-sādhanam /
- J.C. Jain, op. cit., pp. 246–247; Uttarādhyayana-tīkā, 4, p. 93; Bhagavatīārādhanā, pp. 938–1002; Anguttara-nikāya, 2.2, p. 498.
- 21. *RV*, 10.95.15. In the dialogue hymn of Pururavas-Urvaśī, she is branded as being wild-hearted (*sālāvṛkāṇām hṛdayāni etāḥ*).
- Cānakya-nīti, 2.1: Anrtam sāhasam māyā mūrkhatvam ati-lobhitā/ Asaucam nirdayatvam ca strīnām dosāh svabhāvajāh//
- 23. M.Bh., 13.2.24: A-nṛtaṁ satyam ity āhuh satyaṁ cāpi tathānṛtam/ Yad antas tan na jihvāyāṁ yaj jihvāyaṁ na tad-bahih //
- 24. Bhāg. Pur. 9.14.37: Striyo hy a-karuņāh krūrāh dur-bhāṣāh priyasāhasāh/ Ghnanty alpārthe 'pi viśrabdham patim bhrātaram apyuta//
- 25. Authors like Śaṅkara, Bhartṛhari, Dhanada, Amitagati, Ksemendra, etc. The author of this article confesses that he could not trace the source of this concept.
- 26. The Commentary Pañjikā: Saptametyādi saptama-narake ati-kliṣṭasattva-sthāne āyuṣo nibandhanasya raudra-dhyānasya tīvra-sankleśarūpasyābhāvāt strīņnām, 'şaṣṭhīm ca striyaḥ' iti vacanāt /
- Lalita-vistarā: Na, tena tasya pratibandhābhāvāt /; Pañjikā: Pratibandhasiddhau hi śimśapātve iva vrkṣatvam dhūma iva ca dhūma-dhvajaḥ /
- Pañjikā: Prakrsta-subha-dhyāna-bhāve sva-phalakāriņy avasyam-bhāvī prakrta-raudra-dhyāna-bhāvah sva-kāryakārī, sva-kārya-kāritvād

vastunaḥ, sva-kāryam akṣipat katham iva parama-puruṣārtham nāpahānād iti /

- Vrddha-Cāņakya, 1.17: Strīņām dviguņa āhāro lajjā cāpi catur-guņā/ Sāhasam sad-guņam caiva kāmas cāsts-guņah smrtah//; J.C. Jain, op. cit., pp. 245–246; See also Bhartrhari, Śrngāra-sataka; Amitagati, Subhāşita-ratna-sandoha.
- 30. J.C. Jain, loc. cit., Pañcatantra, 1.202.
- 31. J.C. Jain, op. cit., p. 250; aupapātika-sūtra, 3.8, pp. 167–168. Here the author of this paper confesses that he could not trace the source of this concept and he has expressed a wish that he may be obliged if enlightened by somebody on the technical significance of the term apūrva-karaṇa. In response to it, Dr. V. Venkatachalam has added the following note: This term along with its two concomitant concepts Yathā-pravrtta-karaṇa and A-nivrtta-karaṇa are briefly adverted by Dr. Ramjee Singh in Section IV of his paper, which is included in this volume. He describes these on general lines as the triple processes of spiritual advancement. For greater details, the two texts referred to by him in his footnote 40 may be perused. In fact, the term Apūrva-karaṇa is clearly explained by Haribhadrasūri himself in his Lalita-vistarā, the very text studied by the learned author of this paper for his present theme of eve-salvation. Vide śloka 8 and its explanation under Sāmarthya-yoga, where the two stages of Apūrva-karaṇa are explained.
- 32. Ibid., p. 250.
- 33. Ibid., p. 250, fn. 3; Jambū-dvīpa-prajñapti, 3.67; Uttarādhyayana-tīkā,
 18. p. 247: Cakka, hatthi, assa, maņi, itthi, etc.
- 34. Ibid.; cf. Jñātā-dhamma-kahāo, 8; Kalpa-sūtra-tīkā, 2, pp. 32-42.

CHAPTER 10

Haribhadrasūri: A Legend in Catholicity

M. L. JAIN

Haribhadrasūri lived sometime between 700–770 AD. Some scholars consider an earlier period, while others still a later one. However frugal, the details available about him show that his father was Śańkara Bhaṭṭa and his mother was Gaṅgā, that he was born at Chittor (Rajasthan) and that he rose to be the Rāja-guru of Jitāri, the ruler of Chittor. Being a highly wellversed Vedic Brahmin scholar, he was so assured of his learning and considered himself so incomparable that he used to carry a *Jambu* twig to proclaim his supremacy as a unique peer in the entire *Jambu-dvīpa*. Later on he was converted to Jainism by Jinadatta-sūri at the instance of a nun, named Yākinī Mahattarā. When he realized the moment of his departure from this world, he undertook fast unto death in the traditional way the Jaina monks do.

He had a great command over both the Prakrit and the Sanskrit languages, as is evidenced from the trend that he led in the field of the Sanskrit commentaries on the authentic philosophical works in Prakrit comprising the *Niryuktis* and the $C\bar{u}rnis$. He wrote both in prose as well as in the verse, and enriched the Jaina scriptural literature to the extent of the supposedly 1,444 works. However, about 93 works are found to be authored by some of the many Haribhadra-sūris, out of

which about 23 have been proved to be of his undoubted authorship. He studied thoroughly the works of his predecessors and systematically consolidated their thought. In the process of expounding the Jaina principles, he wrote extensively on the Vedic and Buddhist traditions, and as he differed from them, he refuted them in a vigorous style, although in doing so he exhibited commendable respect for them. In this respect he was unrivalled among his contemporaries. With his versatility and catholicity, not only did he preach the Anekanta-vada, but also practiced it with remarkable conviction. Being a rue Vitarāgin, he debated without rancor, argued without contempt, and in the process established himself not only as a great and impartial exponent of, but also as a firm adherent to, the principles and the philosophy of Mahāvīra and of those who preceded him. Wishing to remove communal and sectarian poison and the fundamentalism, he tried to establish the brotherhood and displayed great foresight.

His most important works like the *Śāstra-vārtā-samuccaya* and the *Anekānta-jaya-patākā* confirm his eminençe. In his *Yoga-drsti-samuccaya* he has declared as follows:

Citrā tu deśanaiteṣāṁ viney (asy)ānuguṇyataḥ / Yasmād ete mahātmāno bhava-vyādhi-bhiṣagvarāḥ //

Yad vā tat-tan-nayāpeksā tat(-tat)kālādi-yogatah / Rsibhyo deśanā citrā tan-mūlaisā 'pi tattvatah //

Tad-abhiprāyam ajñātvā na tato 'rvāg-dṛśāṁ satām / Yujyate tat-pratikṣepo mahā'narthakaraḥ paraḥ //

Niśānātha-pratiksepo yathā 'ndhānām asangataḥ / Tad-bheda-parikalpaś ca tathaivārvāg-drśām ayam //

Na yujyate pratikṣepaḥ sāmānyasyāpi tat-satām / Āryāpavādas tu punar jihvācchedādhiko matah //

Jñāyeran hetu-vādena padārthā yady atīndriyāḥ / Kālenaitāvatā prajñaiḥ kṛtaḥ syāt teṣu niścayaḥ // Grahaḥ sarvatra tattvena mumukṣūṇām asaṅgataḥ / Muktau dharmā api prāyas tyaktavyāḥ kim anena tat //

'The reason for different prescriptions by different great teachers is the spiritual capabilities of the people and disciples, because they were able physicians for mundane afflictions. They preached keeping in view the prevailing conditions but their basic aim was liberation. It will be truly disastrous for people like us with little knowledge to criticize them. Just as it is foolish for blind men to describe the moon variously, it is foolish for us to see the differences in their preaching. When it is improper to contradict an ordinary person, it is better to slit one's tongue before it wags in controverting them. It is for consideration that if things spiritual could be perceived through logic, why do logicians continue to entertain doubts? It is, therefore, improper for searchers of Truth to insist upon any single system. If you want liberation, then give up these doubts, differences, and one-sided views. Arguments and counter-arguments will not be of any help.' He, however, maintained that what Kapila said and what Buddha preached, is all true. Non-dualism is at the very root of leveling the differences. In the Loka-tattva-nirnaya he said:

Pakṣapāto na me vīre na dveṣaḥ kapilādiṣu / Yuktimad vacanam yasya tasya kāryaḥ parigrahaḥ //

I am not partial to Lord Mahāvīra nor do I bear any grudge against Kapila and others. I accept what is logical in their proposition.

In the Puratana-prabandha-samgraga, he said:

Pakṣpātam parityajya madhyasthībhūyam eva ca/ Vicārya yuktiyuktam yad grāhyam tyājyam ayuktimat // Give up partiality and be neutral; whatever stands to reason,

accept; and whatever does not, give up.

This is the lesson of unique importance in these days of fundamentalism and sectarianism.

SECTION V

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Some Religious Works of Haribhadrasūri

CHAPTER 11

Haribhadrasūri's Vimsati-Vimsatikā

V. M. KULKARNI

Haribhadrasūri (700–770 AD) was a versatile and voluminous author, whom tradition credits with the authorship of 1,400 *prakaranas*. Although this number is an exaggeration, the latest list and classification of his works, the total number of his available works is thirty-nine, with eight more mentioned as authored by him in other works; while the number of works attributed to him but are not definitely known to be his comes to twenty-six.¹

This list and classification show how Haribhadrasūri had explored various branches of literature. In the galaxy of writers especially Prakrit ones, he is a star of the first magnitude. An eminent logician and philosopher, a master satirist, a witty critic, a consummate artist, a profound 'psychologist', a learned commentator, a resourceful story-teller, a gifted poet—these are the diverse facets of this versatile genius. He wielded a facile pen and displayed command of language, both Sanskrit and Prakrit. His fame as *Yuga-pradhāna* chiefly rests on his literary activity for the cause of the Jains and Jainism.

The Title: With this introduction, we now turn to his brief but comprehensive work *Vimśati-vimśatikā* (*VV*).² Its title may be rendered in English as *Score of Twenties*. This title is thus explained:

Vimsatih slokāh parimāņam yasyāh sā vimsatih, vimsatīnām vimsatih yasyām sā vimsati-vimsatikā//

It is not unlikely that Haribhadrasūri was influenced by the titles of the Buddhist texts in choosing titles for a few of his works. His titles *Śad-darśana-samuccaya* and *Śāstra-vārtā-samuccaya*, remind us of the Buddhist works like Dinnāga's *Pramāna-samuccaya* and Asangas *Abhidharma-samuccaya*. His works *Dharma-bindu* reminds us of Dinnāga's *Nyāya-bindu*. The title of the present work *Vimśati-vimśatikā* reminds us of Vasubandhu's *Vimśikā* and *Trimśikā*.

Regarding the two forms of the title, both are grammatically correct. We come cross similar titles in the Brahmanical literature also. *Simhāsana-dvātrimśatikā* (Twenty-two Stories about the Throne), and *Vetāla-pañcavimśatikā* (Twenty-five Stories of Vetāla) are well known throughout India.

The Contents: Haribhadrasūri chooses to present his readers the following twenty topics in Twenty Sets of Twenties. He lists the following topics in the first *Vimśikā* (called *Adhikāra-Vimśikā*):

- 1. Adhikāra—List of the topics dealt with in the VV.
- 2. Lokānāditva-Beginninglessness of the World.
- 3. *Kula-nīti-loka-dharma*—Family traditions and popular customs of the country.
- 4. Carama Parivarta—The last existence, preceding Liberation.
- 5. Tad-bījādi-karma—The seed, etc., of the Tree of Dharma.
- 6. *Samyaktva*—Description of *Samyaktva* from the practical point of view.
- 7. Dāna-vidhi-The Mode of Charity (its three kinds).
- 8. *Pūjā-vidhi*—The Mode of Worship.

- 9. Śrāvaka-dharma-The Duties of a Householder.
- 10. Śrāvaka-pratimā—The eleven observances of a Householder.
- 11. Yati-dharma—The Duties of a Monk.
- 12. Dvividhā-śikṣā-Two-fold Religious Instruction.
- 13. Bhiksā-vidhi-The Mode of collecting alms.
- 14. Tad-antarāya—Unforeseen obstacles in the way of partaking the alms.
- 15. *Alocana-vidhi*—The Mode of Confession of Faults.
- 16. *Prāyaścitta-vidhi*—The Mode of Atonement of Sinful Acts.
- 17. Yoga-vidhāna—The Mode of Yoga.
- 18. Kevala-jñāna-Perfect Knowledge.
- 19. Siddha-vibhakti-Categories of Liberated Souls.
- 20. Siddha-sukha-Perfect Bliss of Liberated Souls.

This list of topics dealt with in the VV, is comprehensive and covers some of the most important aspects of Jainism. The work, therefore, though short, is comprehensive and may rightly be described as a *Prakarana(-grantha)*.

• The Nature of a Prakarana(-grantha)

The dictionary gives the meaning of *Prakarana* as (i) a subject, topic; (ii) a species of drama with invented plot. These meanings are not relevant in the context of the work on hand. Another definition of a *Prakarana* runs as follows:

Śāstraikadeśa-sambaddhaṁ śāstra-kāryāntare sthitam/ Āhuḥ Prakaraṇaṁ nāma grantha-bhedaṁ vipaścitaḥ//

According to this definition, a work which aims at expounding some important tenets relating to a system of thought is called a *Prakarana-grantha*. The two phrases in the first half of the above stanza amount to the same thing: 'Related to or dealing with a portion or section or part (*ekadeśa*) of a *Śāstra*, mean one and

the same thing. In other words, this definition is not comprehensive, as it applies to a work dealing with a portion or section or part of a Sāstra. Prof. K. V. Abhyankar explains the term as 'A work in which the treatment (of a *sastra*) is given in the form of topics, by arranging the original sūtras or rules differently so that all the rules relating to a particular topic are found together,' and cites the Prakriyā-kaumudī and the Siddhāta-kaumudī as examples. This definition too is not applicable to the text in hand, strictly speaking. For there is no question of arranging the sūtras or rules 'differently'. Unless we enlarge the scope of the sūtras to cover teachings set forth in source books and authoritative texts and commentaries on them. The name prakarana-grantha, most probably, was used to distinguish a work from the seminal work or source book (ākaragrantha). A prakarana-grantha is systematically and topic-wise arranged compendium (samgraha) of scattered and discursive teachings of its corresponding seminal or source work or works. In this sense, the Artha-samgraha, the Tarka-samgraha, the Siddhānta-bindu, based on the Pūrva-mimāmsā, the Nyāya and Vaiśesika-sūtras, and the Śānkara-Vedānta, respectively are prakarana-granthas. In this sense the Vimsati-vimsatika too is a prakarana-grantha based on sacred and authoritative Jaina Sūtras and Niryukti, Bhāsya, and such other commentaries on them.

Its Language: The language of the text is Prakrit, to be more specific Jaina Māhārāstrī, which is employed by all Śvetambara authors in their Prakrit poems and differs not much from the classical.

Its Structure and Style: The *Vimisati-vimisatikā* obviously intend to supply a compendium of the principal teachings of Jainism in 'Twenty Sets of Twenties'. In a sense, these sets are quite independent of one another as each deals with one topic only, and is a complete unit by itself. But from another point of view, these sets may be looked upon as closely connected with each other as each preceding set anticipates the succeeding one. His self-imposed condition of completing one topic in twenty $g\bar{a}th\bar{a}s$ only proves a handicap to the author. Some of the $g\bar{a}th\bar{a}s$ are too elliptical. They combine brevity with accuracy all right, but not with lucidity. Brevity is the soul of wit, no doubt. But brevity leading to the unintelligibility is not commendable, since occasionally, the author errs too much on the side of brevity, rendering the text of the $g\bar{a}th\bar{a}$ obscure. Of course, it must be admitted that obscurity of sense is sometimes due to corrupt readings also.

Long felt Need of a Truly Critical Edition: Unfortunately there is no auto-commentary on the Vimsati-vimsatika nor any commentary of a later commentator on it, with the only exception of that of Upādhyāya Yaśovijaya on the one of the twenty Vimśikās, namely the Yoga-vimśikā. Prof. K. V. Abhyankar's edition is based on six different MSS, one printed edition from Indore and Pt. Sukhalalji's edition of the Yoga-vińśikā with the commentary of Upādhyāya Yaśovijaya on it. It contains Sanskrit Introduction, Sanskrit rendering of the gathas of the text, notes in English and an appendix. The Editor observes at one place in the Sanskrit Introduction that all the MSS bristle with many scribal errors and that he has not been able to explain the text at some places , satisfactorily. The edition is good as far as it goes. But the need for another critical edition based on Prof. Abhyankar's edition and the concerned passages from the Seminal works and other works of Haribhadrasūri himself where parallel thoughts are discussed by him and giving full explanatory notes, is a desideratum.

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Notes

- 1 Vimśati-vimśatikā by Haribhadrasūri, ed. K. V. Abhyankar, Pune, 1932.
- 2 Samadarśī Ācārya Haribhadra, by Pt. Sukhalalji Sanghavi, Rajasthan Oriental Research Institute, Jodhpur, 1963.

CHAPTER 12

On the Loka-tattva-nirnaya of Haribhadra

R. S. BETAI

The *Loka-tattva-nirnaya* is a small work comprising 147 stanzas. This paper deals with the concept of the Supreme Soul and man in this work.

As is laid down in one of the editions, the work discusses the following topics:

- 1. Discussion about the fitness or otherwise of the listener, i.e. the Jaina follower;
- 2. The divine element (*devatā-tattva*);
- 3. Exposition of the divine element that is known as reality (yathārtha-tattva);
- 4. Exposition of the various views proposed by different traditions on the nature of reality in the world;
- 5. The view of the false philosophers regarding the reality of the world;
- 6. The true nature of the reality of the world;
- 7. The views of various opponents pertaining to the nature of the soul and various traditions based on them;
- 8. The nature of the soul and karma;
- 9. The precise nature of reality; and
- 10. Refutation of the theory of the Supreme Soul as the creator of the world.

In an edition of this work with Gujarati translation, the verse-wise topics are classified and the changing meters are enumerated. It shows that the following topics are discussed in this work: 'There are in all 145 verses in different meters. At two places there is some prose passages. The number of stanzas differs as 75, 29, 4, and 37. This is because the context differs at each place. Of the first 75 verses, twenty describe the various ways by which the listeners may acquire and determine their fitness. In the next twenty, the element of divineness is examined in an impartial manner, and consequently, it is proved to exist only in the Art. In the next 35, 29, and 4 verses, the views of different schools pertaining to the creation and the creator ofthe world and the rise of the soul and karma are discussed. In the last 37 verses, the views of all these schools are refuted and rejected, and the author firmly lays down his own view. The work is so unique that we are not in a position to reveal its real greatness of thought in the absence of a commentary'.

The author's concept of god and man would become clear as we analyse the work verse-wise: Scriptures emphasize that to keep oneself alert is the very essence of the human life. For true knowledge, sādhus should be consulted, since knowledge is to be imparted only to the noble (1-4). Only the calm and the tranquil deserve to study the scriptures; preaching to persons blind with ignorance is but futile (7–10). Persons having sinful inclinations do not attain enlightenment even after they comprehend the essence of all the things (*padārthas*), and those who depend on others' opinion roam about purposelessly in the world. If, under the influence of others' opinions, the intellect wavers, one should take to some beneficial activity till right thinking starts (11-15). Thinking develops only in the case of deserving ones. Only humble persons can be trained in this discipline. It should be noted that the views afforded by the scriptures or arrived at through inference should be accepted only after thorough pondering and analysis. Persons who do

not think in this manner have to lament because speech and intellect are created for pondering and meditation (16–20).

The next twenty verses deal with the greatness, glory and uniqueness of Lord Mahāvīra, to whom the first benedictory verse is dedicated. It emphasizes the author's utmost devotion to 'the best of the Jinas, who is of the nature of 'Kaivalya'. Mahāvīra, as compared to Brahmā, Visnu and Maheśa is calm, composed and confers benefits on all in the universe (21-24). He has supreme righteousness; his conscience is only for the bliss, happiness and benefit of all (25). Only the words of Viramuni can lead to quell man's faults (26). His intellect and vision are ever-ready and anxious to act for the good of others. He is the recourse for all (27–29). Right path, non-violence, service to others, etc., are taught to us only by the Jineśvara, who is himself free from all faults. He is perfect, and so we take recourse to him. He is uniquely blissful to the whole universe and so we are devoted to him. Lord Mahāvīra is totally free from morality and all the illusions. One who desires to take shelter in the Best should take recourse to Mahāvīra (30-38).

Haribhadrasūri next refers to various views and traditions of the Ātma-tattva, and the nature of creation, such as those of the Naturalists (*prakrti-vādins*), Kaņāda, Kāśyapa, Sāmkhya, and the views like birth through providence, birth from the five Mahābhūts (41–50). He also refers to the views, which hold Viṣṇu or Īśvara or Aśvattha tree as all pervading (*sarva-vyāpī*) and eternal (51–53), and so on. Reference is also made to the view that Īśvara inspires men to act in such a way that they attain heaven or hell (62), and to the view that He is incomprehensible (64).

The author next takes up for exposition different views about the creation of the Universe. The views mentioned are that the Universe is the creation of Brahmā (66–67); the views of the Sāmkhya, of Buddhism, $\bar{A}tma-v\bar{a}da$, etc. (66–74). The *Purusavāda* states that the perishable and the imperishable are only

two *Purusas* in this world; all beings are what we call perishable. while the Kūtastha Ātman is imperishable (76–77). This is followed by the view of another Atma-vadins who state that scriptures and persons who accept that *Atmans* are really in existence, that the Atman has created the bodied beings and their association (yoga) with Karma (79), and that Atman is this entire Universe. This is followed by the view of the Gītā. The Jīvātman is designated as Svayambhū on account of its natural self-knowledge; it has the ability to create its own at will, is desired (82). It is imperishable, the very life force of the Supreme Brahman. It is both Jīvātman and Virāt (85). There is none higher than this. He is neither the performer of actions nor the enjoyer (86). Atman can be saved only by Atman (88). None can do a thing that has not been done earlier (89). Only the embodied souls are responsible for their own actions. (90-92). Destiny is that which results from actions undertaken earlier (94), and though forgotten, it is one's Daiva (95). It is only one's inherent nature that acts; man has no freewill to acts as he likes (96). The four elements, viz., Vavu, Tejas, Jala, and Prthivi, spring from the Aksara; all beings spring up that way (97). Everything is dependent upon Niyati (104). This is followed by the views that the creation of the world and its beings has sprung up without any cause, i.e. Ahetu-vāda (103), from destiny niyati-vāda (104), Pariņāma-vāda (105), Bhūtavāda (105-106), and the Anekānta-vāda (110), etc.

Haribhadra's own views: In the last 37 verses (111–147), Haribhadrasūri states his own views on $\bar{A}tman$, creation, etc. The author, first of all, very ably dismisses the different views that have been enumerated as Pūrva-pakṣa (111). The world cannot possibly spring from *sat* or *a*-*sat*. This is because *a*-*sat* cannot create the world, and *a*-*sat* has no creator (112). Actually, *a*-*sat* is non-existent at all times (113). *A*-mūrta cannot become *a*-*sat* and vice versa. The Jainas state that Mūrtāmūrta dravya is paryāya-vināśī (114). Similarly, the view of Kāśyapas has been rejected (115). Actually the great sages state that all *Padārthas*, both *mūrta* or *a-mūrta*, are endowed with their own traits (116) *Rūpi* and *A-rūpi* dravyas are known as *sva-lakṣaṇa* (117). Actually, therefore, the five *Bhūtas* cannot possibly spring from *Abhūta-cetana* (119). This helps us to reject the other views of the *Pūrva-pakṣa*, like *Īśvara* being the creator, etc.

Actually Haribhadrasūri wants to emphasize that nobody has created this Universe. No great soul will ever create this dirty world (125). If Isvara created this Universe and the Jivas, why do we find happiness and sorrow, poverty and riches in the world (127)? Why does He destroy the world after creating it? The author refuses to accept that Isvara, who creates the world with all its diversities and contradictions, is not affected by it (132). The actual position is that the birth of beings in various species (yoni) takes place today as ever in the past; so say the Siddhas (134). The views on creation of the Universe as enunciated earlier are mutually contradictory (136-137). The real position is that the liberated souls (muktas) do not create the Universe, for those who are devoid of passion are not bound by Karman. Only the Jīvas, full of passions, are bound by Karman (137). Nobody is the creator or master of the Siddhas, who have attained to a state of Eternity, and who torment none (138). Actually only one Creator does not exist in the world; he is different in each embodied being (139), Atmans that are liberated and eternal are as such for all time (140). The variegated world with its Jñāna, Vrddhi and Hāni has no Creator. Existence is there by its own very nature (142). Atman is also its own proof and eternal (143). The earths, oceans, mountains, heaven (svarga), mid-regions of the sky (antariksa) with Siddhālaya, are eternal and svābhāvika; this is a-laukika (144). The Jīva roams in this transitory world helplessly through its own deeds. The author ends the whole discussion with the description of the Samsāra-cakra in the following words:

Tasmād a-nādy a-nidhanam vyasanorubhīmam Janmāra-doṣa-dṛḍha-nemy-ati-rāga-tuṅgam / Ghoram sva-karma-pavanerita-loka-cakram Bhrāmyaty anāratam idam kim iheśvarena //

This clarifies the following points with regard to the conception of God or Supreme Soul in the present work:

(i) As is natural with the author, who is a Jaina $\bar{A}c\bar{a}rya$, the concept of one supreme power of the nature of *Paramātman* or *Parabrahman* is not acceptable to Haribhadrasūri.

(ii) Still, in the first verse, he designates Mahāvīra as '*Ekam* anekam kevala-rūpam jinottamam', which means that Mahāvīra is the best, highest, supreme *Ātman*, the one amongst the many.

(iii) *Ātman* and *Jīva* are, for the purpose of the Jaina philosophy carefully differentiated. *Ātman* is here an incarnation of all virtues, knowledge, enlightenment and perfection, while the *Jīva* is a living being moving to and fro and being tossed in the world due to attachments, vices and what not. *Ātman* at the highest state is *Videha-mukta*, i.e. purified or realized or perfect soul endowed with *Ananta-darśana*, *Ananta-jñāna*, *Ananta-vīrya* and *Ananta-sukha*.

(iv) However, through struggle for years, countless births, rise and fall, and unstinted effort, enlightenment may and can come to the *Jīva*, and it can attain the higher state, and struggle for the attainment of the state of a *Siddha*.

(v) Knowledge, unstinted devotion, struggle to attain a state of non-action, perfect non-violence, non-attachment and perfect self-control are the qualities that a *Jīva* should attain.

(vi) The Tīrthaṅkaras are Siddhas, i.e. liberated souls, no doubt, but their status is higher in Jainism because of their spirit of service to humanity and to all living beings, in an effort to help others rise to higher and higher planes, and to guide men of the world preserve and protect ethical and moral values, to encourage all to get over their passions and lack of control, etc. There are many pursuits, in which the $\bar{A}tmans$ indulge, but without being attached or in any way affected by all this. This also comes to them in a natural course, and surely their enlightenment and liberation are not in any way disturbed. The spirit of mercy, compassion and equanimity remains as it is there.

(vii) The Tīrthankaras are thus the highest $\bar{A}tmans$, and are often worshipped as gods; and here also, Lord Mahāvīra is worshipped with utmost devotion and complete self-surrender by the Jīvas of the world.

It is expected naturally that everybody should put in all possible efforts to sublimate his soul and come out of this shell of the mortal and transitory world and existence so that he constantly struggles to free himself from all passions, attractions, joys and sorrows that the world offers. In a way, that the Kathopanisad stated, viz., '*Śreyaś ca preyaś ca manusyam etas tau samparītya vivinakti dhīrah* /, i.e. 'both the ultimate good as well as what is agreeable come to man; a man of fortitude analyses them both', rightly applies to all men of the world, and to all souls. This ultimate good may come to man through the sufferings and struggles of countless births, but the struggle is really worth taking recourse to.

CHAPTER 13

The Loka-tattva-nirnaya: A Critical Study

J. B. Shah

Ācārya Haribhadrasūri has discussed the theories of the creation of the universe and the basic beliefs and principles of different philosophical systems in his Sanskrit work named the Lokatattva-nirnaya, composed in various meters. Although very small, it is an important work. The Jaina philosophers entered rather late in the philosophical field than was expected. But once they entered they depicted almost all the philosophical traditions by way of the prima facie views, and ably discussed them too. Subsequent to the Agamic period, Acarya Siddhasena · Divakara was the first to present profound philosophical thoughts in his works like the Dvātimsad-dvātrimsikā and the San-mati-tarka. After him, the Jaina philosophers like Jinabhadra-gani, Svāmī Samantabhadra, Mallavādī, Simha-sūri, contributed in the field with their important works. Haribhadrasūri's is a highly famous name in this tradition of the Jaina philosophy. According to the traditional view he is supposed to have authored 1,444 works in all, and in them he is said to have discussed numerous tenets of many philosophical systems. Consequently, he was conferred upon the epithet 'Śruta-kevalī'. Of the several treatises authored by Haribhadrasūri, the Śāstra-vārtā-samuccaya, the Anekāntajaya-patākā and the Sad-darśana-samuccaya are highly well known among the scholars, while the Dharma-sangrahani, the

Loka-tattva-nirnaya, Sarvārtha-siddhi and others are rarely known. Over and above these, he has composed vast commentaries on many of the $\bar{A}gama$ texts. He has given us four very important works concerning the Jain scriptural topics ($\bar{a}gamika$ -prakaraṇa), the conduct ($\bar{a}c\bar{a}ra$) of the Jaina mendicants as well as laymen and religious instruction (upadeśa). He has also composed works pertaining to the literary fields of narratives, astronomy/ astrology and panegyrics. All these works are marked with his all round scholarship. When he takes up some topic, not only does he present all its aspects and discusses it thoroughly, but he also effects a beautiful harmony in the process, and this is his unique style.

As regards the early years and monastic life, as also his works, Pt. Sukhalal Sanghavi and Prof. Hiralal Kapadia have discussed in great detail in their works, entitled *Sama-darśī Ācārya Haribhadrasūri* and *Śrī Haribhadrasūri*, respectively. We have not touched the problem of his time, since Pt. Jinavijayaji has already fixed his date after putting forth sufficient evidences.

The specialty of the works of $\bar{A}c\bar{a}rya$ Haribhádras $\bar{u}ri$ is that even when he discusses the Jaina philosophy, he quotes from the works of other systems of philosophy, and while propounding his own view he harmonizes them with it. It is in view of this that he has been distinguished with the epithet 'impartial' (sama-darsī).

The Title: This work has been known by the name 'Lokatattva-nirṇaya', but the author himself has never mentioned it as such. It is, therefore, not out of place to discuss it. In the very Maṅgalācaraṇa verse, the author declares as follows:

Pranipayaikam anekam kevala-rūpam jinottamam bhaktyā /

Bhavya-jana-bodhanārtham nṛ-tattva-nigamam pravakṣyāmi//

'Having bowed down to the One, who is [at the same time] several, the one in the form of absolute knowledge, the best among the Jinas, I am going to expound for the sake of the

noble [readers] the fundamental substance of human beings'. Here the author has mentioned the name of his work as the 'nrtattva-nigama', while the popular title is Loka-tattva-nirnaya. In this work as published by the Jaina-dharma Prasāraka Sabhā. Bhāvanagara, 1902, while translating this verse, the word 'Nr-tattva-nigama' was explained as loka-tattva-nirnaya. It is a problem worth considering as to why the editor/translator explained it as such. In another translation the word 'nr-tattvanigama' is explained as 'loka-svarūpa-nirnaya'. The word 'Nr' means 'human being'. But explaining it as 'loka', Prof. Hiralal Kapadia says that the reason for mentioning the title as 'Lokatattva-nirnaya' is that it has been so mentioned in the colophon. If we come across some author subsequent to Haribhadra who has mentioned this work, one ought to check how has he done it and to how much old period does he belong. One may thus come to some plausible conclusion. If the colophon has come into existence author's pen, one may surmise that both the names were intended for the work. It may be that since the compound word 'nr-tattava-nigama' could not fit in the verse, the name 'loka-tattva-nirnaya' was utilized.1 Pt. Sukhalal Sanghavi and M.D. Desai accept the latter name as the title of this work, while Prof. Hiralal Kapadia mentions both the names.

Dr. R. S. Betai, discusses the significance of this *mangala*verse² and says that Haribhadrasūri salutes to Mahāvīra, the best of the Jinas, and declares that he is presenting this treatise in order to determine the real significance of the human life, so that all human beings may constantly keep themselves conscious in future about its reality. He introduces Mahāvīra as the best of the Jinas, one and yet many, and of the nature of *Kaivalya*. He expects here that people of the world may awaken and get to the true significance of the essential basic principle of human life. He has composed this treatise for this very purpose. It is only by devotion to this best of the Jinas, and through the grace obtained from Him that men can acquire the secret of this life of this creation. Haribhadrasūri announces the title by presenting the subject matter of the work in this manner.

The above discussion about the mangala-verse by the learned scholar is but based on his own imagination. He has explained the quarters '*Bhavya-jana-bodhanārtham* nr-tattvanigamam pravaksyāmi' to mean that he is composing this work so that men can acquire the secret of this human life and this creation. The word '*bhavya-jana*' is a technical term in the Jaina philosophy, and it means the souls that are qualified for attaining liberation. Thus Haribhadrasūri intends to compose this work in order to enlighten the souls that are prone to liberation. By twisting this simple sense, the whole significance gets lost. Not only that, it does not become clear as to what the author intends to convey. When the author himself calls this work as Nr-tattva-nigama, he means the clarification (nigama) or determination (nirnaya) regarding the essence of this human world (nr-tattva), and thus it ultimately means the significance of human world.

In the commentary, named *Tarka-rahasya-dīpikā*, on the first verse of the *Sad-darśana-samuccaya*, the commentator has quoted two verses from this work, introducing them with the words: '*Tad uktam haribhadrasūribhir eva loka-tattva-nirnaye*'. This shows that the work was known by this name at least by the fifteenth century of the Vikrama Era.

Form: This work, composed in 147 verses in different meters, was first published in 1902 AD, in three parts of 75, 35 and 37 verses, respectively. In the first part deals with cosmology, and discusses various theories about the creation of the world. In the second part in the vss. 76–86 he discusses the nature of the $\bar{A}tman$, and in the vss. 87–110, he deals with the treatment of the theory of *Karman* from the non-Jaina viewpoint. Here the thoughts presented are of those who give unwarranted importance to *Svabhāva*, *Niyati*, or *Pariņāma*. In the third part comprising vss. 111–147 the non-Jaina beliefs are refuted.

As regards the philosophical discussion, the three main topics treated are Jīva, Jagat, and Īśvara, about which different systems hold different views. These views are criticized in this work. Prior to the discussion of all these topics, Haribhadrasūri advises the speaker/instructor to test the assembly. He says:

Bhavyābhavya-vicāro na hi yukto 'nugraha-pravṛttānām/ Kāmaṁ tathā 'pi pūrvaṁ parīkṣitavyā budhaiḥ pariṣad // i.e. although it is not proper for great men who are out to oblige the persons prone to liberation, even then wise men should test the assembly before launching on the task.

LTN., Part No.	Vs. No.	Contd. Vs. No.	BG., Chap. No.	Vs. No.
1	52	52	13	1
1	53	53	15	1
2	2	77	15	16
2	6	81	5	14
2	8	83	2	23
2	9	84	2	24
2	13	88	6	5

Some of the verses of this small work have been drawn from the *Bhagavad-gītā*, as shown below:

The Vss. Nos. 70 and 71 are quotations from the $S\bar{a}mkhya-k\bar{a}rik\bar{a}$ Vss. Nos. 22 and 3, respectively. The introductory portion of Part II, resembles with the Śvetāśvtara Upanisad Vs. 3.15 and 3.9. The LTN Vs., viz., Yad ejati yan nejati yad dūre yad u antike / Yad antar asya sarvasya yad u sarvasyāsya bāhyatah //, is drawn from the Īśa Upanisad, 5. The LTN Vs. of the Part II, is but the Vs. No. 33, commencing with the words "Etāvān eva loko 'yam. . . .' of the Sad-darśana-samuccaya.

Now, after this discussion about the external form of the work, let us look into its internal form. After the *Mangalācarana*

in the beginning, the author has immediately taken up the topic of the qualification of a listener, which pertains to the person fit to receive the knowledge (adhikārī) propounded the work. He says that when one is out to oblige it is not proper for great saints to take into consideration whether a particular listener is prone to liberation (bhavya) or not (a-bhavya). But at the same time, he should taste the assembly as a whole, because to impart instruction to an unfit person is tantamount to churning water, to speaking to a deaf person, and to enact a drama in front of a blind man. That is why it is useless and improper to instruct those whose hearts are hard like a diamond stone, those who are like a sieve that empties itself immediately, those who are used to make the instruction turbid as does a male buffalo the water of a pond, those who catch hold of the faults only like a filter.3 He should instruct only a proper person. To impart instruction to an improper one would but prove the ignorance on the part of a preceptor. Thus, it is a duty of the intelligent preceptor to first test the listeners and then only should he impart proper instruction. Nandī-sūtra has expressed similar thoughts with reference to the types of listeners.⁴

Duty of the Speaker to Give Impartial Instruct: After testing the listeners the speaker should impart instruction without any insistence or prejudice. Giving up partiality, the instruction should be imparted regarding the welfare of the soul through logically consistent words. In this context he has quoted two beautiful verses, viz.,

Āgamena ca yuktyā ca, yoʻrthah sam-abhi-gamyate / Parīksya hema-vad grāhyah, pakṣapātāgraheṇa kim //ˤ

'That topic which can be understood through the scriptures and logic, should be accepted only after one has fully tested it, as one does in the case gold. Why should be partial in it?' Then again he says:

Pratyakṣato na bhagavān ṛṣabho na viṣṇur Ālokyate na ca haro na hiraṇya-garbhaḥ / Teṣām svarūpa-guṇam āgama-samprabhāvāj-. Jñātvā vicārayata ko 'tra parāpavādah //6

'Lord Rṣabha is not directly visible (at present), nor is Viṣṇu, nor even Śiva, nor Hiraṇyagarbha, i.e. Brahmā. Think about them after knowing their nature and qualities by the power of the scriptures. What is the use of finding fault with others?'

Haribhadrasūri here asks us to think impartially and to accept whatever is the conclusion after such thinking. Thus, in the field of philosophy, he has inspired us to become even-minded and to try to think the viewpoints of others. He asks us not to cling to our presuppositions as the only true ones, and to examine them to, before final decision to arrive at the conclusions.

Various Traditions about the Concept of God: In the philosophical arena the chief topics of dispute are the soul, the world and God, and whether they are one or many, and eternal or transitory. Various philosophical systems have arisen on the basis of different answers to these controversial points. Haribhadrasūri has mentioned almost all the traditions prevalent in his times. Exhorting us to think properly (samvak) he has mentioned in brief about the concepts of God or divinities. The nature of divinity or God, according to him is full of divine qualities, such as mercy, grace, providing protection, and others. How can the evil qualities of terrifying, destructiveness, mercilessness, cruelty, and others be justified in a divine being. If they be such, how can they be regarded as divine? The nature of Visnu, Mahādeva, the gods like Śakra and others, Balabhadra, Kārtiksvāmī, Ambikā-devī, Ganapati, Sūrya, Agni, Candra, etc., seems to be full of attachment or hatred. How can they be called divine?

On the other side, while elucidating the real nature of a divinity, Haribhadrasūri lays down that they always wish welfare of others, constantly prone to oblige others, desire to make happy this whole world tormented by diseases and pains, who are capable of realizing the Truth directly, who speak about the Truth as it is. Having defined the divine nature thus, he declares that who ever is endowed with such qualities is acceptable to him as a divine being. This idea he has expressed in the following verse:

Pakṣapāto na me vīre, na dveṣaḥ kapilādiṣu /

Yuktimad vacanam yasya tasya kāryah parigrahah //

'I am not partial towards Mahāvīra, nor do I hate Kapila and others. He who have speaks rationally, his words must be accepted.

Yasya nikhilāś ca doṣā na santi sarve guṇāś ca vidyante/ Brahmā vā visnur vā haro jino vā namas tasmai //

'The god who is devoid of all the faults, and is endowed with all the good qualities, may he is Brahmā, or Viṣṇu, or Śiva, or Jina. I bow down to him.' Haribhadrasūri has concluded this topic after showing the necessity of good qualities in the divinity.

Various beliefs about the World: The other topic of great important in the philosophical field is about the nature of the world. Acārya Haribhadrasūri discusses all the above theories and states that first of all one must think as to the source of this world, was it from *Sat* or *A*-sat? If it were taken to be from *Sat*, *it will be logically faulty, because Sat survives as the same in all* the three times. How can *A*-sat be created from *Sat*? It cannot be vice versa, too. Therefore, the world with all its things persists in all the three times. There is no need to posit a Creator for them. Creation or destruction is but relative. Total creation or destruction is impossible. Therefore, a substance should be accepted as subject to creation, subsistence and destruction.

Criticizing the concept of God of the theistic philosophers, he states that if the creation of the world depends on some Creator, and is that creator is created by God, who created the God? If one argues that God can be uncreated, then why can the world, too, not be without a God? Moreover, why did the merciful God create such a world? Why did he make the world so unhappy? All these arguments refute the idea of the creation of the world by God. Others theories are also refuted in brief.

Then, he takes up the discussion about the $\bar{A}tma$ -tattva and Karma. Just as different theories are prevalent about God and the world, similarly there are different theories about the nature of the Self. After discussing them, the author has propounded that the Self is eternal, that the cycle of transmigration goes on ceaselessly, and the soul becomes happy or unhappy due to his own Karma. On exhausting all the Karma, the soul finally attains to liberation. With this statement Haribhadrasūri closes the work.

The main topics of discussion, such as the soul, the world, God, and *Karma* are treated fully, and various philosophical systems are presented as prima facie views, and them they are refuted, and the Jaina view is justified. Though many of the philosophical theories presented as prima facie views are today known only by their mere names, they are important from the historical point of view for the students of the history of philosophical ideas. Another specialty of this work is that in it Haribhadrasūri has given us many beautiful verses.

Notes

- 1. LTN., Vs.3, 4.
- 2. Nandī-sūtra.
- 3. LTN.,vs. 18.
- 4. Ibid., vs. 23, 31.
- 5. Ibid., vs. 38.

CHAPTER 14

Who is the Author of the *Pañca-sūtra*: Cirantanācārya or Ācārya Haribhadra?

Śīlacandravijaya Gani¹

The *Pañca-sūtra* is a treatise that enjoys great respect among the Jaina ascetics since its composition many centuries ago. It contains a record of essentially spiritual experience, presented in a systematic way with a view to help the aspirants achieve sublimation of their souls and purity of their hearts. It is a pleasant work offering the subject in short, beautiful sentences in the Prakrit language. In spite of its being a short treatise, it is vastly popular.

The venerable Haribhadrasūri has composed a brief and beautifully easy commentary on it, which is published in various editions. Its critical edition has been done by the Revered Muni Śrī Jambūvijayaji, and is recently published by the B. L. Institute of Indology, Delhi.²

Although this sacred work has been of lasting interest for the aspirants to self-realization and inner purity of heart, there has been thorough ignorance as to its real author. Those who have edited the text so far have tacitly accepted the traditional view that some Cirantanācārya composed it. The name of this supposed author of this work has been explained in two ways: (1) *Cirantana* means ancient, thus implying that it is the work of some very ancient preceptor; (2) *Cirantana* is the proper name of the preceptor who composed this work. Out of these two, the former view has been generally accepted.

Since the problem of the real authorship of this work has been rarely discussed critically the general consensus has been that the real author of the work is unknown. The various opinions to be considered here are as follows:

- In the Introduction to the *Pañca-sūtra*, Prof. V. M. Shah has referred to two views: (i) It is composed by Cirantanācārya, meaning ancient preceptors or a preceptor named Cirantana, the first alternative being more líkely. It is difficult to assign individual authorship to a work like this.³
 (ii) The usage *Cirantanācāryaih* does not help us much in deciding the authorship. The plural form may have been used to show respect for the author. At the same time, it is very likely that ancient authors might have composed the *Sūtras* and Haribhadrasūri might have put them together.⁴
- Prof. K. V. Abhyankar holds that the *Pañca-sūtra* is a small, elegant treatise written by some ancient writer whose name has still remained unknown.⁵
- Dr. A. N. Upadhye observes that it is not possible to talk of individual authorship with regard to works like the *Pañca-sūtra*. The basic contents of this work are as old as Jainism. They are literary heirlooms preserved in the memory of the Jain monks.⁶
- 4. Prof. V. M. Kulkarni explicitly states: The language of the post-canonical Jaina works is partly Prakrit—the so-called Jaina Māhārāṣṭrī, and partly Sanskrit. The language of the known Prakrit works of Haribhadra is the Jaina Māhārāṣṭrī, whereas the present work is written in the Ardhamāgadhī prose; and this prose shares quite a few peculiarities of the diction and style of the canonical works. This fact suggests that Ācārya Haribhadra was possibly not its author. It is

not unlikely that the author of the *Pañca-sūtra* regarded the contents of the text as the property of the entire Jaina Samgha and preferred to remain anonymous. It is also suggestive of its early date of composition. How early, it is difficult to say. Since Haribhadra does not know who its author was, we may not be far wrong in saying that it was composed about a century or so before Ācārya Haribhadra flourished.⁷

The gist of the four opinions mentioned above is that these four learned scholars are unanimously quite clear in their opinion that $\bar{A}c\bar{a}rya$ Haribhadras $\bar{u}ri$ is not the author of the *Pañca-s\bar{u}tra*. Besides this, the eminent scholar Muni Jambuvijayji who has prepared a critical edition of the work is inclined to hold that Haribhadras $\bar{u}ri$ may probably be the author of the *Pañca-s\bar{u}tra*. In spite of this, in the absence of definite proofs, he does not offer any positive view, and accepts the tradition 'cirantan $\bar{a}c\bar{a}rya$ -viracitam'.⁸

Against this established tradition and opinion of the above scholars, my own view is that Haribhadrasūri himself is the author of the *Pañca-sūtra*. To corroborate my view, I would put forth the following internal and external evidences:

(1) At the end of the commentary on the *Pañca-sūtra*, there are three sentences,⁹ viz., '*Pravrajyā-phala-sūtram samāptam / Evam pañcama-sūtra-vyākhyā samāptā // Samāptam pañca-sūtrakam vyākhyānato 'pi //*' Among these three sentences, the last one deserves special consideration. It comes from the pen of the commentator and is, therefore, written in the style '*Samāptam pañca-sūtrakam vyākhyānatah //*' Now, if the commentator and the author of the *Pañca-sūtra* were different, the sentence in question ought to have been like '*Samāptā pañca-sūtrakam vyākhyānatah //*', with the last word '*Api*' in it, which is significant. The term '*Api*' implies that *Pañca-sūtra* has been completed in the form of commentary also. That means it has been completed in that of its commentary. If the term 'Api' is omitted from this sentence, it would mean that the Pañca-sūtra is completed in the form of a commentary. The addition of only one word 'Api' changes the whole contextual meaning. This suggests that had the commentator and the author of the sūtra-treatise been two different persons, such a sentence would never have been as it actually is. It must be only when the author of the sūtra-treatise and the commentary had been one and the same person, that such a sentence could have been employed. Now, we know definitely who the commentator is. And, therefore, it is but unavoidable inference that the author of the sūtra-treatise must also be the same one, i.e. Haribhadrasūri.

Some may argue: 'At the end of the original text, the author of the text has put the sentence "Samattam pamcasuttam"¹⁰ to indicate the completion of the original text. In the same way in the continuation of that sentence the commentator has employed this sentence to indicate the completion of the commentary, and therefore it is not proper to connect it with the original text and its author.'

In reply, it can be stated that if the matter referred to in the preceding paragraph happens to be a fact, the commentator would have written either the sentence as 'Samāptam pañca- sūtrakam vyākhyānataḥ', or as 'Samāptā pañcasūtratīkā'; and this would have been regarded as proper. Moreover, after this, there is a positively independent sentence¹¹ 'Pañcasūtratīkā samāptā', which has been written by the commentator. Consequently, the whole contextual reference of the sentence 'Samāptam pañca-sūtrakam vyākhyānato 'pi //' is altogether changed, and this sentence written by the commentator as also the author of the original text.

Second, the original author has employed the phrase 'Samattam' pamcasuttam',¹² which implies the completion of the *Pañca-sūtra* and not the *Pañca-sūtraka*. On the other hand, the commentator writes 'Samāptam' pañcasūtrakam'.¹³

Elsewhere also, everywhere in the commentary, the commentator speaks of this composition definitely as '*Pañcasūtraka*'.¹⁴ Is it possible for a master commentator like Haribhadrasūri to take liberty with the original name of the work as employed by the original author, and that too at the end of the original text? On the contrary, an ancient commentator like him would proceed with his commentary and remain thoroughly faithful to each and every word of the original author. On this very basis, it will be reasonable to infer that he would make any desired addition in respect of the original text only if the commentator has been the original text, too. From this point of view, only if he himself had given the name '*Pañcasūtrakam*' to the original text, then and then only he could employ the name '*Pañcasūtrakam*' in the commentary and at the end of it.

(2) After the sentence 'Samāptam pañca-sūtrakam vyākhyānato 'pi', the commentator had added some devotional sentences, too, as follows: 'Namaḥ śruta-devatāyai bhavatyai / Sarva-namaskārârhebhyo namaḥ / Sarva-vandanārhān vande / Sarvopakārinām icchāmi vaiyāvṛtyam / Sārvānubhāvādaucityena me dharme pravṛttir bhavatu / Sarve sattvāḥ sukhinnaḥ santu //sarve sattvāḥ sukhinnaḥ santu //15

It has been the established tradition of the commentators that the task expected of them is to elucidate word by word the text composed by the original author. And, when their work is over, they indicate the completion of their work by writing either a verse or more, or some prose sentences. Thereafter, they do not make any addition of their own to the commentary. Even Ācārya Haribhadrasūri has not taken such a liberty in the commentaries on the texts authored by himself, such as the *Yoga-drṣṭi-samuccaya* and the *Pañca-vastuka*. In the commentary on the *Sodaśaka-prakarana* also, its master commentators have not taken such a liberty. From this we can realize the tradition prevalent in this regard.

Quite contrary to this established tradition, Haribhadrasūri,

has added nearly six Sanskrit sentences after the completion of the commentary on the *Pañca-sūtra*, and they have been inserted in such a style that they can be taken to be in continuation of the original *sūtras*. If these sentences are compared with the sentences '*Namo namiya-namiyānam*',¹⁶ etc., in the fifteenth prose section of the first *Pāpa-pratighāta-sūtra* of the *Pañcasūtra*, there is no difference both in the style and the presentation, except the difference of the language. Moreover, the four sentences, beginning with '*Sarva-mamaskārârhebhyo namah*' and the sentence '*Sarve sttvāh sukhinah santu*' repeated thrice and incorporated in the prose part of the commentary, positively appear to be the retrospective reflections of the sentences '*Namo sesa*' (which seem to be intended as *Namo* '*sesa*'), *Namokkārārihānam*¹⁷ and *Suhino bhavamtu jīvā*¹⁸ found in the prose portion of the original text.

Thus, the circumstances mentioned above clearly and positively lead us to infer that Haribhadrasūri himself is the author of the original text, and for that very reason, he might have incorporated this small prose section in the commentary, during the process of repeatedly experiencing the spiritually surcharged moments. It is thus not redundant to say that he would not have taken such a liberty, had he been only the commentator and the author too of the original text.

(3) The mighty logician Mahopādhyāya Yaśovijaya Gaṇi, who had the title 'Laghu-haribhadra' and who flourished in the seventeenth-eighteenth century, has made the following observation,¹⁹ in his Dharma-parikṣā, with reference to the Pañca-sūtra: 'Pāpa-pratighāta-bījādhāna-sūtre haribhadrasūribhyir apy etad-bhava-sambandhi bhavāntara-sambandhi vā pāpam yat-tat-padābhyām paramṛśya mithyā-duṣkṛtaprāyaścittena viśodhanīyam ity uktam / Tathā hi saraṇam uvagao a esim.... itham icchāmi dukkaḍam /

Here Yaśovijayajī has clearly written 'Pāpa-pratighātabījādhāna-sūtre haribhadra-sūribhyir apy etad uktam, and not

'Pāpa-pratighāta-bījādhāna-sūtra-vrttau. This is quite noteworthy, since it indicates that Yaśovijayaji had in view some credible tradition of attributing the authorship of the Pañca-sūtra to Haribhadra-sūri. Otherwise he would not have framed this sentence in this way. With reference to such, though apparently insignificant matter, we may take one more example of such rational vigilance. We know that the Sodaśaka is a treatise of undoubted authorship of Haribhadrasūri, and Yaśovijayajī has written a commentary on it, too. Therein in the last Sodaśaka, i.e. the group of sixteen verses, there are seventeen instead of sixteen verses. In the seventeenth one, viz., 'Vacanam nanu hāribhadram idam,20 there is a clear mention of the name. This would warrant a reasonable conclusion that Haribhadrasūri himself, and none else, is the author of the work, according to the belief of the commentator. But Yaśovijayaji must have some other view too about this seventeenth verse, since he has inserted the sentence 'Śisyakartrkeyam āryêtyanye'21 at the end of the commentary on this verse. Even on the basis of this much evidence, one can easily understand that it must not have been possible for him to put some such statement as '. . . Śrī-haribhadrasūribhir apy uktam'. Thus, in the case of the Pañca-sūtra, he must have had a firm conviction that the author of the work was none other than Haribhadrasūri himself, and it is for this very reason that he has made such a statement. Thus it stands to reason Haribhadrasūri himself is the author of the Pañca-sūtra.

(4) The titles, such *Pañca-vastuka*, *Pañca-sūtraka*, *Astaka*, *Sodaśaka*, *Vimśikā*, *Pañcāśaka*, found in the Jaina literature are a characteristic of only Haribhadrasūri. The name *Pañca-sūtraka* could be conceived by a genius like Haribhadrasūri only. Muni Jambuvijayajī writes: 'The name of the treatise written by Ācārya Haribhadrasūri is *Pañca-vastu* in the practical convention; still he has given the name *Pañca-vastuka* to it and he has shown its etymological interpretation in the same way.²² This gives a positive support to our inference that such names are the

characteristic specialty of Ācārya Haribhadrasūri.

(5) It is most important here to scrutinize the significant verbal phraseological and expressional similarity met with in other treatises of Haribhadrasūri and in the *Pañca-sūtra*. The internal evidence of such stylistic features helps in arriving at a reasonably definite conclusion, regarding the authorship of this treatise.

Let us, then, compare some portions of the *Pañca-sūtra* with those of his other works like the *Vimśati-vimśatikā*, the *Dharmabindu*, the *Yoga-drsti-samuccaya*, the *Sodaśaka*, etc.:

(i) In the Pañca-sūtraka, there appears a phrase, viz., vyādhita-sukriyā-jñāta, in the following Prakrit passage: 'Vāhiyasukiriyā-nāeṇam, se jahā kei mahā-vāhi-gahie, aṇubhūyatavveyaṇe viṇṇāyā sarūveṇa, nivviṇṇe tattao, suvejjavayaṇeṇa sammam tam avagacchiya jahā-vihāṇao pavanne sukiriyam, niruddha jahicchācāre tuccha-pattha-bhoī muccamāṇe vāhiṇā nyattamāṇa-veyaṇe samuvalabbhāroggam pavadḍamāṇatabbhave tallābha-nivvuīe pappadibamdhāo sirakhārāijoge vi vāhisamārogga-viṇṇāṇeṇa iṭṭhanipphattīo aṇākula bhāvayāe kiriyovaogeṇa, a-pīdie, a-vvahie, suha-lessāe vaddhai, vejjai, vejjam ca bahu mannai', etc.²³

The idea of this same expression $vy\bar{a}dhita$ -sukriy \bar{a} -j $\tilde{n}\bar{a}ta$ is also found in a verse of the 12th $Vim\dot{s}ik\bar{a}$ of the $Vim\dot{s}ati$ - $vim\dot{s}atik\bar{a}$ (VV) with a slightly altered wording and in a different context:²⁴

No Āurassa rogo nāsai taha osaha suīo //12// Naya vivarīeņaeso kiriyā-jogeņa avi ya vaḍḍhei/ Iya pariņāmāo khalu savvaṁ khu jahuttamāyarai //13// Thevo 'vitthama jogo niyameņa vivāga-dāruņo hoi / Pāga-kiriyā-gao nāyam iņaṁ suppasiddhaṁ tu //14// Jaha Āyurassa roga-kkhaya-tthiņo dukkarā vi suha-heu / Ittha cigicchā kiriyā taha ceva jaissa sikkhatti //15// It is clearer in the 16th verse of the 12th Sodaśaka of the Sodaśaka-prakarana (SP):

Vyādhy-abhibhūto yadvan nirviņņas tena tat-kriyām yatnāt/ Samyak karoti tadvad dīksita iha sādhu-sac-cesṭām //²⁵

(ii) In the fourth *Sūtra* of the *Pañca-sūtra*, there is a group of sentences as follows:

Se sama-lethu-kamcane sama-sattu-mitte niyatta-ggahadukkhe pasama-suha-samee sammam sikkhām āiyai, guru-kulavāsī, guru-padibaddhe, viņīe, bhūyattha-darisī, na iyo hiyattaram ti mannai, sussūsāi-guņa-jutte tattābhi-nivesā vihipare paramamamte tti ahijjai suttam /²⁶

The verses of the 12th *Vimśikā* of the *Vimśati-vimśatikā*, partly bearing verbal similarity and upholding the central though of these sentences, are as follows:

Ittham vi hoi gada-suham tatto evopasama-suham //4// Sikkhā duggammi pīī jaha jāyai hamdi samaņa-sīhassa / Taha cakka-vaṭṭiṇo vi hu niyameṇa na jāu niya-kicce //5// Ginhai vihiṇā sattam bhāveṇa parama-mamta-rūvatti /²⁷

(iii) In the fourth Sūtra, there are sentences, such as:

Āyao guru-bahumāņo avamjha-kāraņatteņa /

Ao parama-guru-saṁjogo / Tao siddhī a-saṁsayaṁ //28

The verse of the second *Sodaśaka* bears complete similarity with the above sentences, thus:

Guru-pāratantryam eva ca tad-bahumānāt adāśayānugatam⁄ Parama-guru-prāptee iha bījam tasmāc ca mokṣa iti 10/29

The noteworthy feature here is that the phrase 'Avamjhakāratteņa' appearing in the text of the Pañca-sūtra has been explained as 'Moksam praty apratibaddha-sāmarthyaetutvena,'³⁰ in the commentary, and the phrase 'sad-āśayānugatam' appearing in the verse of the Sodaśaka has also been explained as 'Sadāśayah samsāra-kṣaya-hetur gurur ayam mametyevā-nubhūtah kuśalaparināmas/tenānugatam guru-pāratantryam,'³¹ by its commentator. From this it is evident that the thought content of these two passages is similar.

(iv) Now, let us compare the two passages given below:

(a) Nidamsanam etam tu navaramsavva-sattu-kkhae savvavāhi-vigame savvattha-samjogenam savvicchā-sampattīe jārisameyam etto 'namta-gunam khu ttam, bhāva-sattu-kkhayādito / Rāgādayo bhāava-sattū. Kammodayā vāhiņo, parama-laddhīo u atthā, anicchecchā icchā/ Evam suhumam eyam, na tattao iyarena gammai, jai-suham-ivājainā, Ārugga-suham na rogina tti vibhāsā //³²

(b) Jam savva-satttu taha savvāhi savvattha savvam cchāṇam/ Khaya-vigama-joga-pattīhim hoi tatto aṇamtam iṇam /3// Rāgāīyā sattū kammudayā vāhiņo ihamneyā / Laddhīo paramatthā icchā'nicchecchamo ya tahā //4// Aņuhava-siddham eyam nārugga-suham varogin navaram / Gammai iyarena tahā sammaminam cimtiyavvam tu//5//³³

The similarity between the two references mentioned above is very much obvious, the first one of them is the fifth *Sūtra* of the *Pañca-sūtra* and the second one the verses of the 20th *Siddhasukha-vimśikā*.

(v) In the same way, the sentence of the fifth $S\bar{u}tra$ 'Jatthā ego tatthā niyamā anamtā'³⁴ can be compared favourably with the sentence 'Jatthā ya ego siddho tatthā anamtā'³⁵ of the 18th verse of the 20th Vimsikā.

(vi) There is yet another sentence in the fifth Sūtra of the *Pañca-sūtra*, viz., '*Na sattā sad-amtaram uvei*.'³⁶ This is in the form of a general argument, and as it can easily fit in with different contexts, it can be freely employed elsewhere. And for this very reason, Haribhadrasūri has employed this very sentence in the 19th verse of the 20th *Virńskā*, thus: '*em eva bhavo iharā* na jāu

sattā tayamtaram uvei /³⁷ Here the reading, which has been traditionally accepted everywhere and which has been incorporated by Prof. K. V. Abhyankar in the Vimśati-vimśatikā edited by him. is as follows: 'Emeva lavo iharā jāu sannā tayantaram uvei'.³⁸ That the reading adopted here is faulty becomes clear when we compare it with the similar sentence 'Na sattā sad-amtaram uvei' in the Pañca-sūtra. The word 'Sattā' might have been miswritten as 'Sannā' through scribal oversight, or the reader/scribe might have read it wrongly. The reading 'emeva bhavo' positively appears in some manuscripts. Therefore the very sentence 'satta na tayamtaram uvei' seems to be the proper one and consistent in meaning. From all the above circumstances, it can be guessed that the author of the Vimśatikā and the Pañca-sūtra is one and the same.

(vii) Thé discussion, which is carried on in the fifth $S\bar{u}tra$ of the $Pa\bar{n}ca$ - $s\bar{u}tra$, as in the passage 'na didikkhā a-karaņassa / na yādiṭṭhammi esā / na sahajāe nivittī / na nivittīe āyāṭṭhāṇam / na yaṇṇahā tassesā / na bhavvattatullā nāeṇam / na kevala-jīva-rūvam eyam //',³⁹ etc., is the same, though expressed in a slightly different way, as that in the following verses of the second Vimśatikā, named Lokā'nāditya-vimśikā:

'Jaha bhavvattama-kayagam na ya niccam eva kim na bamdho vi/ Kiriyā-phala-jogo jam eso tā na khalu evamti //14//

Bhavvattam punam-akayagam-aniccamo ceva taha-sahāvāo/ Jaha kayago 'vi hu mukkho nicco 'viya bhāvavaicittam //15// Evam ceva ya (di-)dikkhā bhava-bījam vāsanā a-vijjā ya / Sahajamalasasaddavaccam vannijjai mukkha-vāhim'//16//⁴⁰

(viii) In the same way, we find a very rational annotation of the sentences 'anāi jīve, anāi jivassa bhave, anādi-kammasamjoga-nivattie',⁴¹ in the Sūtra, and 'Anāimam bamdho pavāhenam'⁴² in the initial twelve⁴³ verses of the second Vimśikā.

(ix) The first verse, viz., 'Nicchayao puņa eso jāyai niyameņa

carama-pariyatte / Taha bhavvatama-lakkhaya-bhāvā accamtasuddhutti //1//¹⁴⁴

Of the fourth Vimśikā, and first half of the 8th verse, viz., 'Eyammi sahaja-mala-bhāva-vigamao suddha-dhammasampattī /¹⁴⁵ is in effect a free metrical rendering of the sentence:

'Sudhamma-sampattī pāva-kamma-vigamāo, pāva-kammavigamo tahā-bhavvattādi-bhāvāo.⁴⁶

(x) The sentences in the third Sūtra are as follows: 'Tao anunnāe padivajjejja dhammam / Annahā anuvahe cevovahājutte siyā / Dhammārāhanam khu hiyam savva-sattānam/Tahā taheyam sampādejjā / Savvahā a-padivajjmāne ca ejja te aṭṭhānagilānosahatthacāganāeṇam'//⁴⁷

Some of the following aphorisms of Haribhadrasūri's *Dharma-bindu* can be compared favourably with the above sentences:

Tathā-Gurujanājñeti //23// Tathā tathôpadhāyoga iti //24// Duhsvapnādi-katham iti //25// Tathā-viparyaya-linga-seceti //26// Devajñais tathā nivedanam iti //27// Na dharme māyeti //28// Ubhaya-hitam etaditi //29// Yathā-śakti sauhity-āpādanam iti //30// Glānausadhādi-jñāt tat tyāga iti //31//⁴⁸

The astonishing feature here is that a more or less exact paraphrase of the aphorisms 23, 24, and 31 from amongst the ones quoted above, is directly met with in the original textual matter, while the sense of the remaining aphorisms is found in the commentary of the fourth $Vimśikā.^{49}$ This strongly corroborates the view that Haribhadrasūri himself is the author of both the *Pañca-sūtra* and its commentary. Who is the Author of the Pañca-sūtra?

(xi) The context of the two sentences 'na didikkhā akaraņassa' and 'na sahajāe nivitti'⁵⁰ incorporated in the fifth Sūtra exactly corresponds to the following two verses of the Yoga-dṛṣti-samuccaya:

Didṛkṣādy-ātma-bhūtaṁ tan mukhyam asyā nivartate / Pradhānādi-nater hetus tad-abhāvān na tan-natiḥ //200// Anyathā syād iyaṁ nityam eṣā ca bhava ucyate / Evaṁ ca bhava-nityatve kathaṁ muktasya sambhavah//201//⁵¹

(xii) It is hereby my belief that the first employment of the term 'didrksa' in the Jaina literature are to be seen in the works of Haribhadrasūri. Thus, the term is employed: (a) in the verse 200 of the YDS quoted above; (b) in 'didrksādi-nivrtyādi-pūrvasūry uditam tathā' in vs. 489 of the Yoga-bindu;⁵² (c) in the phrase 'evam ceva didikkha' in the 16th verse of the second Vimśikā of the Vimśati-vimśikā. The traditional reading 'evam ceva va 'didikkhā' which has been accepted by Prof. K.V. Abhyankar is incorrect and inconsistent. It is only if we adopt the reading 'didikkhā' here that it becomes correct and consistent everywhere;53 (d) in the 8th verse, viz., 'Sāmarthya-yogato yā tatra didrksety asanga-śaktyādhyā / Sā' lambhana-yogah'//54 of the 15th Sodaśaka of the Sodaśaka-prakarana (SP). Here the term does not mean what it is supposed to in other treatises. It is used here in the sense of Alambana-yoga, consistently with its etymological interpretation 'drastum icchā'. Now, we find that Ācārya Haribhadrasūri has employed the term 'didrksā' in the sentence 'na didikkhāa-karanassa'55 of the Pañca-sūtra in the same sense as he has used it in the above-mentioned three works, except the Sodaśaka-prakarana. Thus, we see here how intelligently has Haribhadrasūri employs the term which has a technical sense according to the Sānkhya school of Indian philosophy.

(xiii) The term 'samantabhadd \bar{a} ',⁵⁶ employed in the fourth Sūtra of the Pañca-sūtra, appears to be a favourite one of

Haribhadrasūri because it appears in the *Vimśati-vimśikā*⁵⁷ (8/3), though in a different context, in the sense of 'adoration conferring all-sided auspiciousness' (*sarva-mangala-kāriņī pūjā*). Again in the 10th verse of the 9th *Sodasaka*, this adoration has been styled '*vighnopaśamanī*' but the commentator Yaśovijayajī has suggested another interpretation.⁵⁸

(xiv) Lastly, let us mark the following sentences in the last aphorism of the *Pañca-sūtra*:

'Na esā annesim deyā / Limga-vivajjayāo tappariņņā / Tayaņuggahaṭṭhāe āma-kumbhodaga-nāsanāeṇam / Esā karuṇatti vuccai//⁵⁹ Similar significane is embodied in the following concluding verses of the Yoga-dṛṣṭi-samuccaya:

Haribhadra idam prāha naitebhyo deyam ādarāt //226// Avajñeha kṛtā lpā 'pi yad anarthāya jāyate /

Atas tat-parihārārtham na punar bhāvadosatah //227//60

i.e. the contents of this treatise should not be passed on to unworthy persons for fear of harmful results.

The above discussion shows that Haribhadrasūri himself is the author of the text of the *Pañca-sūtra*. For, if the current view of some ancient preceptor named Cirantana, who flourished prior to Haribhadrasūri, be still upheld as its author, the similarities pointed out above will have to be explained away as being borrowed by the latter, to the detriment of his originality, and that will be a great injustice to him.

(6) Pandit Bechardas Doshi has observed: 'From a linguistic point of view, the grammarians have given three types of Prakrit — (1) the one based on Sanskrit; (2) Sanskrit-like Prakrta, and (3) Native Prakrit. . . . This grammar (i.e. of Hemacandra) belongs to the first type.'⁶¹ In view of the above view, on examination of the language of the text of the *Pañcasūtra* appears to be first type, observing all the rules that are formulated by Hemacandra in his grammar, and this is quite natural for versatile Sanskrit author like Haribhadrasūri.

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As regards the language of the Pañca-sūtra, it is possible that scholars might be inclined to identify it as the Ardhamāgadhī, on seeing the use of 'e' in the forms of the nominative singular, such as 'Anāi jīve bhave kamma-samjoganivattie dukkha-rūve'.62 But if they had taken into consideration the use of 'o' also employed in the forms of nominative singular forms in many places in this very treatise, as in 'Raga-dosa-visaparama-mamto kevali-pannatto dhammo saranam uvagao vivario va samsāro anavatthiva-sahāvo . . .',63 and such other constructions, they would not rush to such a conclusion. Quoting the view of M. Winternitz, Dr. Kulkarni concludes: 'The Language of the post-canonical Jaina works is partly Prakritthe so-called Jaina Māhārāstrī Prakrit-and partly Sanskrit. The language of the other Prakrit works of Haribhadrasūri is Jaina Māhārāstrī, whereas the Pañca-sūtra is written in the Ardhamāgadhī prose. So, Ācārya Haribhadrasūri was possibly not its author, but it is a treatise written by some ancient Ācārya prior to Haribhadrasūri.⁶⁴But the apparent striking similarity of the language in other treatises and the Pañca-sūtra and also the similarity of linguistic usage involving the 'samskrta-sama' and the 'samskrta-bhava' words, positively proves that the language of the work is not the Ardhamāgadhī, but the Prakrit. The argument of Dr. Kulkarni, based on his opinion of the language of the work, is not convincing, since the same genius like Haribhadrasūri, with his linguistic versatility can possibly employ different languages and different diction.

(7) Now, as regards Cirantanācārya, he is no doubt considered to be ancient (*cirantana*) for us today. But how can it be that he was not known even to Haribhadrasūri, if he had flourished prior to him by a century or two?⁶⁵ The treatises of Haribhadrasuri are in different strains of Prakrta and in various dictions. As such there is no problem in accepting him as the author of *Pañca-sūtra* as well, especially as we know that he wielded a facile pen both in prose and verse. If there was a

different author who preceded Haribhadrasūri by a century or two, could not have been unknown to Haribhadra and the ancient preceptor would have also recorded his own name. Since he has not done so, possibly such an ancient preceptor did not exist at all, and Haribhadrasūri himself was the author of the work.

The gist of the above discussion is that just as Haribhadrasūri is the author of the commentary of the *Pamca-sutta*, he himself is likewise the author of the original text. The traditionally prevailing view as recorded by scholars quoted above thus becomes untenable, and all the alternative speculations too turn out to be but futile.

Now, the question arises that how did the confusion regarding the authorship of the *Pañca-sūtra* arose? It appears that this happened in the fifteenth century of the Vikrama Era. The three palm-leaf manuscripts then available, were possibly copied from the original ones in the twelfth and the fourteenth century of that era, and that there was no record anywhere about its author, as recorded by Muni Jambuvijayajī. These Mss end with the sentence 'samattam pamcasuttam'.⁶⁶

The first record of such a type is: $p\bar{a}\bar{n}cas\bar{u}tram pr\bar{a}krtam\bar{u}lam$ s $\bar{u}tran$ 210 vrttiś ca hāribhadrī 880 /⁶⁷ in the Brhattipanikā, a list of the Jaina works, suppose to have been prepared by some learned Jaina monk in the fifteenth century of the Vikrama Era. Here it is mentioned that there are 210 aphorisms of the Pānca-sutra in Prakrit and the commentary (by implication in Sanskrit) by Haribhadra comprises the extent of 880 (i.e. Anustubh verses). But the name of the author is conspicuous by its absence. On the strength of the use of the particle 'ca' here we may construe it with the first word ' $p\bar{a}\bar{n}casutram$ ' and interpret it to imply the sense of its adjective like 'Hāribhadram', meaning composed by Haribhadra. Of course, this might be far-fetched in view of the separate mention of the author of the Sutra work. But it is noteworthy that there is no reference here to any ancient sage as its author. Naturally, the author of the list took it to be anonymous (*ajñāta-kartṛka*). Two further Mss. of the work copied the text from this one in the seventeenth century of the Vikrama Era. And, thence forward the colophone 'Sammattam' pamcasūtrakam' //cha// Kṛtam cirantanācāryair vivrtam ca jākinī-mahattarā-sūnu-śrī-haribhadrācāryaiħ/'.68 There might have been such a colophone in other Mss., too, copied during this period, and this added to the confusion, for future.

Another point that needs clarification is that the term 'bhavaviraha' almost invariably appears in almost all works authored by our Haribhadrasūri,⁶⁹ particularly those composed after the murder of his two favoured disciples. No such usage is found anywhere in the concluding portion of the *Pañcasūtra*, and this might have inspired to attribute to it some ancient author, of course a respectable one in that it merited the commentary by a veteran like Haribhadrasūri.

Regarding the authorship of the *Pañca-sūtra*, Prof. Madhusudan Dhaky writes: 'Examining this composition from the viewpoint of graceful elegance, matter and diction of the original text, it seems to me also that it is a post-canonical work, but it bears the construction of sentences, which can be called proportionally modern, taking into consideration new emotions and modern technical language compared with antiquity. Haribhadrasūri has neither referred to the name of the Sūtrakāra, none of the commentator. Thus, comprehensively it seems that the commentator and the author of the original text are one.' Thus from the evidences put forth above it appears that Haribhadrasūri himself is the author of both the Sūtra work as also its auto-commentary.

This work seems to have been composed by Haribhadrasūri in the evening of his life, as it appears to incorporate the essence of his lifelong study of the scriptures, manifests the spiritual intoxication natural to a practitioner of the mystic science. A condensation of the *Yoga-drsti-samuccaya* is presented here.⁷⁰ The *Pañca-sūtra* appears to be his latest one, or one of the latest compositions.

With reference to the chronological order of Haribhadrasūri's works, Prof. K. V. Abhvankar records his opinion and remarks that most probably he composed his commentaries first, then followed the Dharma-kathās, and then the works like the Anekānta-jaya-patākā, the Loka-tattva-nirnaya and others propounding the Jainism. Thereafter he composed the philosophical works like the Sad-darśana-samuccaya, the Śāstravārtā-samuccaya, the Pañcāśaka, then the works teaching Yoga, such as the Yoga-bindu, the Yoga-drsti-samuccaya, etc. And at the end when his wisdom had matured he composed the works like the Vimsati-Vimsatika, and others propounding his own interpretation and the essence of the scriptures and a collection of thoughts pertaining to various topics.⁷¹ Among them, he might have composed the *Pañca-sūtra* with his auto-commentary, thus trying his hand at abstracting in his treatise the essential topics elucidated in the preceding ones. For a clearer perception of the sequence of his works it can be guessed that he may have composed his works in the following chronological order: the Pañcāśaka, the Vimśikā, the Sodaśaka, the Astaka, and the Pañcasūtraka.

Finally, it may be added that Haribhadrasūri enjoys a unique position in the field of Jainology as the author of supposedly 1,444 works, though only a few of his excellent philosophical works, a few commentaries, and a few of his smaller treatises with numerals like *pañca*, *aṣta*, *soḍaśa*, *vimśati*, etc. in the titles have survied today.

Notes

- 1. Now, Vijaya-śīlacandra-sūri.
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- 4. Ibid., p. 20.
- 5. Ibid., Foreword, p. 69.
- 6. Muni Jambuvijaya, Pañcasutrakam (Edt.), Intro., p. 33.
- 7. Ibid.
- 8. Ibid., Prastāvanā, pp. 4-5.
- 9. Ibid., p. 80.
- 10. Ibid., p. 79.
- 11. Ibid., p. 81.
- 12. Ibid., p. 80.
- 13. Ibid., Prastāvanā, p. 3.
- 14. Ibid., pp. 80-81.
- 15. Ibid., p. 24.
- 16. Ibid., pp. 80-81.
- 17. Ibid., p. 24.
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- 19. Dharma-parīksā, Jaina Grantha Prakashak Sabha, Ahmedabad, V.S. 1998, 2324.
 - 20. Sodasaka-prakarana, Sri Mahavira Swami Jaina Swe. Mu. Tapa Sangha, (Vadala) Bombay, 1984, p. 96.
 - 21. Ibid.
 - 22. Muni Jambuvijaya, op. cit., Intro., p.4.
 - 23. Ibid., pp. 50, 53–54.
 - 24. Abhyankar, K. V., VV., 1932, pp. 38-39.
 - 25. SP., Bombay, 1984, p. 70.
 - 26. Muni Jambuvijaya, op. cit., pp. 45–46.
 - 27. Abhyankar, K. V., op. cit., p. 37.
 - 28. Muni Jambuvijaya, op. cit., pp. 57–58.
 - 29. Ibid.
 - 30. Ibid.

- 31. Sp., Bombay, 1984, p. 10.
- 32. Muni Jambuvijaya, op. cit., 1936, pp. 70, 75.
- 33. K.V. Abhyankar, op. cit., pp. 61, 63.
- 34. Ibid.
- 35. Ibid.
- 36. Muni Jambuvijaya, op. cit., 1986, p. 68.
- 37. K.V. Abhyankar, op. cit., p. 63.
- 38. Ibid.
- 39. Muni Jambuvijaya, op. cit., 1986, p. 3.
- 40. K.V. Abhyankar, op. cit., pp. 4-6.
- 41. Muni Jambuvijaya, op. cit., p. 3.
- 42. Ibid., p. 6.
- 43. Ibid., p. 71.
- 44. K.V. Abhyankar, op. cit., p. 11.
- 45. Ibid., p. 12.
- 46. Ibid.
- 47. Muni Jambuvijaya, op. cit., pp. 37-40.
- 48. Ibid., pp. 37-40.
- 49. Ibid., p. 73.
- 50. K.V. Abhyankar, op. cit., p. 24.
- Hāribhadra-yoga-bhāratī, Divyadarshan Trust, Bombay, V.S. 2035, p. 123.
- 52. Ibid., p. 286.
- 53. K.V. Abhyankar, op. cit., p. 6.
- 54. SP, Bombay, 1984, p. 85.
- 55. Muni Jambuvijaya, op. cit., p. 73.
- 56. Ibid., p. 76.
- 57. K. V. Abhyankar, op. cit., p. 24.
- 58. SP, Bombay, 1984, p. 85.
- 59. Muni Jambuvijaya, op. cit., pp. 78-79.
- 60. Hāribhadra-yoga-bhāratī, Divyadarshan Trust, Bombay, V.S. 2036, p.129.
- 61. Prākŗta Vyākaraņa, Gujarat Purattava Mandir, Ahmedabad, Praveśa, p. 12.
- 62. Muni Jambuvijaya, op. cit., p. 3.
- 63. Ibid., pp. 13-16.
- 64. Ibid., Introduction, p. 33.
- 65. Ibid.

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- 66. Ibid., Pratāvanā, p. 4.
- 67. Ibid., Pratāvanā, p. 3.
- 68. Ibid., Pratāvanā, p. 4.
- 69. R. Williams in his research paper published in the *Bulletin of Oriental and African Studies*, London, 1935, had mooted the controversy about the 'Yākinī-putra' and 'Bhava-viraha' being two different namesakes of Haribhadra. N.M.K.
- 70. Ibid., p. 80.
- 71. K.V. Abhyankar, op. cit., 1932, Prāstāvikam, p. 7.

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